Opinion ID: 2319967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Firearms and Toolmark Identification Evidence

Text: When Mobile Crime Technician Gerald Wills arrived at the 1200 block of Meigs Place, N.E., paramedics had already rushed Valentine to the hospital, where he later died of the gunshot wound to his chest. Mr. Wills recovered a .45-caliber shell casing and a copper-jacketed bullet from the murder scene. Crime scene investigators in North Carolina recovered a.45-caliber shell casing and bullet as well as a 9-millimeter casing and bullet from the Check Into Cash store. Using the traditional method of pattern matching, two firearms experts examined this evidence. [1] Neal Morin compared the bullets and shell casings recovered from the North Carolina crime scene to bullets and casings test-fired from the pistols found in Ms. Ward's spare room. Mr. Morin testified that the .45-caliber shell casing and bullet were fired from the .45-caliber pistol he test-fired. His level of certainty with respect to that conclusion was 100% or to the exclusion of all other firearms[.] Defense counsel did not object to these questions, nor did he move to strike the answers. Examiner Michael Mulderig used the same methodology and testified that the.45-caliber shell casing and bullet from the District of Columbia crime scene were fired from the same .45-caliber pistol recovered from Ward's home. Like Morin, Mulderig answered yes when the prosecutor inquired whether his conclusion regarding the match was to the exclusion of all other firearms? When the prosecutor asked Mulderig about his level of certainty with respect to his conclusion, defense counsel interjected: Objection. Foundation. Judge Dixon overruled the objection and Mulderig stated he was 100% certain about the match. Defense counsel retained a firearms expert, who independently examined the same evidence. That expert did not testify at trial.
Just prior to trial, in January of 2008, appellant's counsel orally requested leave to adopt a motion which former co-defendant Leaks had filed in September of 2006 seeking a pretrial hearing on the admissibility of firearms identification evidence. Judge Dixon allowed the defense to adopt, summarize, and argue the motion. Appellant's counsel urged the court to conduct a Frye hearing, [2] asserting that pattern matching is not generally accepted within the scientific community. Judge Dixon advised, I'm familiar with that type of testimony, because we have heard it in other cases. What is the novelty of this issue[?] Counsel argued that there is: a lack of objective criteria by which a firearms examiner makes his conclusions; no peer review of their work; no proficiency testing; and no calculation of error rates[.] By contrast, the prosecutor argued that pattern matching is the generally accepted practice and, therefore, presumptively reliable. Judge Dixon agreed that the evidence was an accepted type of analysis that has been admitted in courtroom after courtroom[,] and he did not find any need to conduct any type of pretrial hearing on [its] admissibility[.] Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying this request for a Frye hearing. [3]
In the District of Columbia, before expert testimony about a new scientific principle [may] be admitted, the testing methodology must have become `sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.' Williams v. District of Columbia, 558 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (quoting Frye, 54 App.D.C. at 47, 293 F. at 1014). The issue is consensus versus controversy over a particular technique, not its validity. United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1022 (D.C.2005) (citing United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992)). Moreover, general acceptance does not require unanimous approval. Porter, 618 A.2d at 634. Once a technique has gained such general acceptance, we will accept it as presumptively reliable and thus generally admissible into evidence. The party opposing the evidence, of course, may challenge the weight the jury ought to give it. Jones v. United States, 548 A.2d 35, 39 (D.C.1988). Although we do not doubt that a technique that has previously been recognized in court as generally accepted may lose that wide acceptance, we conclude that appellant has not shown that to be the case with respect to pattern matching as a way of identifying firearms. [4]
Here, the trial court properly admitted the expert testimony without conducting a Frye hearing. Frye only applies to a novel scientific test or a unique controversial methodology or technique. Drevenak v. Abendschein, 773 A.2d 396, 418 (D.C.2001); see Cook v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 825 A.2d 939, 950-51 (D.C. 2003) ( Frye [] is inapplicable and there is no burden `to demonstrate ... [that the cobalt test] has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community' because testimony of two investigators highlights the fact that the MPD had used the cobalt test for many years and nothing suggested it was a novel test, or new scientific technique, or unique controversial methodology[.]) (quoting Porter, 618 A.2d at 633). Pattern matching is not new, and courts in this jurisdiction have long been admitting firearms identifications based on this method. [5] Even Leaks's motion conceded that firearm and toolmark identification evidence has generally historically been accepted in various courts across the country. Indeed, Leaks (and appellant) cited no case that had excluded such evidence. Appellant attempts to avoid this problem by asserting that, had the trial court conducted a Frye hearing, the defense could have demonstrated that the challenged method was no longer generally accepted in the scientific community. This assertion is simply not true; comparison matching remains widely accepted and appellant misplaces his reliance upon a law review article [6] to suggest that pattern matching is no longer generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Even the courts that have held pretrial hearings on the admissibility of firearms identification evidence, and considered the studies and articles cited by Jones on appeal (and Leaks below), [7] have not excluded this type of proof. Instead, the most these courts have done is to impose guidelines for the presentation of such evidence. [8] In sum, nothing presented to the trial court (or to us) suggests that the pattern matching methodology is no longer generally accepted, [9] and there was no need for Judge Dixon to expend scarce judicial resources on a Frye hearing. [10] See Jones, 548 A.2d at 40, 42 (General acceptance means just that; the answer cannot vary from case to case.... [So in evaluating general acceptance,] judicial notice of court opinions and scientific literature is appropriate and, on occasion, even necessary.).
Appellant asserts that the trial court should have at least precluded the experts from stating their conclusions with absolute certainty excluding all other possible firearms. The government does not directly concede the point, but instead represents that the current policy of the United States Attorney's Office is to have firearms experts qualify their conclusions `to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty[.]' In light of the government's representation and the growing consensus that firearms examiners should testify only to a reasonable degree of certainty, see note 8, supra, we will assume, without deciding, that such experts should not be permitted to testify that they are 100% certain of a match, to the exclusion of all other firearms. Nevertheless, we agree with the government that any such error was harmless in this case. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). [11] Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined the experts about three topics: their level of certainty; the subjective nature of their conclusions; and the lack of demonstrative evidence from which the jurors could assess their conclusions. Counsel pointed out, for example, that Morin was willing to conclude that a cartridge casing is matched to a particular gun to the exclusion of all other possible guns, even though he had not examined all those other firearms. Defense counsel emphasized that Mulderig had rendered an opinion of 100% certainty that [two casings were] fired from the same weapon[,] although he acknowledged there were inconsistencies between them. Counsel also questioned Mulderig about how he could tell with certainty that various marks were imparted to the case head by the gun instead of during the manufacturing process. Mulderig agreed that his conclusions were all subjective [based] on what you see in the microscope and concurred with defense counsel's assertion that none of you [examiners] are scientists[.] In a similar manner, Morin conceded that the concept of sufficient agreement is purely a subjective one[.] Morin agreed with the defense's observation that, in the firearms identification field, there's no universal agreement as to how many features of similarity constitutes sufficient agreement[.] Defense counsel also asked, [W]hat is there about this science that the average juror could look at to determine whether or not your conclusions are accurate? When Morin suggested that the jurors go back to [his] microscope, [where he] would show them the matching patterns, defense counsel pointed out that Morin didn't bring [his] microscope to court. In his closing argument, Jones's counsel used the examiners' expressions of certainty to his advantage. Counsel asserted that, in light of the completely and totally subjective nature of examiners' conclusions and the fact that neither examiner provided the jury with a visual depiction of the points of comparison where they found similarities[,] all [the jury] got from the experts was a trust me, this is the answer. The defense suggested that, as a result, when the experts said, I'm sure[, there's a match, h]undred percent[, t]ake it or leave it[,] the jury should leave it. In the face of this record, the jury's assessment of this evidence surely did not turn on the difference between a 100% certain conclusion and a reasonably certain opinion. Defense counsel did not present an expert to explain the difference or to opine that the government examiners' confidence in their results was unjustifiably exaggerated. Nor did the defense put on an expert to point out any weaknesses in the methodology employed by the government experts. In fact, even though the trial court made it possible for the defense to conduct an independent test, it chose not to have an expert testify at all. See Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 931 (D.C.2007) ([W]hile `[n]o amount of attention to detail, auditing, and proficiency testing can completely eliminate the risk of error[,] ... the best protection an innocent suspect has from a false match is an independent test[.]') (quoting National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence (1996)). In sum, reversal is not warranted when the record is considered as a whole. An eyewitness to the murder identified appellant, who gave a detailed confession to a cellmate. Even if the government's experts had qualified their conclusions to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, the strength of the government's case would not have been appreciably diminished. In these circumstances, we can say, `with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.' Goines v. United States, 905 A.2d 795, 802 (D.C.2006) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239).
When discussing the pattern matching process on cross-examination, Morin explained that experts are looking for quality and quantity of detail that matches, [that is,] striated detail, which are lines, or [] impressed type detail, pot mark type detail, [or] circular detail. Morin then described his laboratory's policy not to take photographs of our examinations[,] due to the fact that photographs are two-dimensional representations of what we are looking at, which is generally three-dimensional. Under a microscope, experts can determine the depth and width of impressed details, which is not easily reproduced in a photograph. According to Morin, based on [] training and experience, experts are also able to filter out some of the extraneous detail that is necessarily left by [] residue in the barrel[.] For those reasons, [a] photograph may lead somebody who is not trained in the examination of firearms to the wrong conclusion. By contrast, Mulderig had taken a photograph through his comparison microscope and defense counsel used it to question him about his exam techniques and conclusions. First, the defense got him to agree that, although there's a pattern of striation marks[] on the primer, which you have determined to be consistent on both casings, ... [t]here are also marks on both the primer and the case head which do not appear to be consistent, right? After Mulderig described the picture, [12] defense counsel questioned him about several specific differences between the two images depicted there. For example, counsel asked: Now on the silver one it would appear that there's a firing pin impression on the very center of the primer? ... And there's a similar crater-looking firing pin impression on the gold sampleevidence sample, but it's to the right of the center of the primer, ... at about 3 o'clock? Defense counsel questioned Mulderig about another mark at 9 o'clock, or maybe at 9:30, on the gold sample which did not appear at the same position on the silver shell casing[.] The defense also inquired whether Mulderig agreed that at 12 o'clock, on the base head of the gold cartridge case there's a remarkable blemish ... [and] there is no similar remarkable image at the same 12 o'clock position on the silver case head? Although Mulderig readily conceded these apparent differences in the markings on the two casings as depicted in the photo, he also explained that a trained examiner doesn't come to any conclusions by looking at pictures. You have to look at the evidence. He emphasized that, just because [i]n the photo there is not a similar mark on the two casings, that doesn't mean it wasn't there under the microscope.... I'm looking at a microscope with very, very expensive equipment, called lenses, and a camera may not capture everything[.] So when conducting an examination, he testified, I don't rely on the photographs; I'm relying on my eyes, and my microscope[.] Subsequently, at a bench conference held so as not to put defense counsel on the spot in front of the jury, the trial court confirm[ed that counsel was] not at a point to move th[e] exhibit into evidence. Defense counsel agreed, but said, I do intend to move it into evidence. The prosecutor then noted that he planned to object, given the experts' testimony that a picture does not fairly and accurately capture everything an examiner sees under a microscope. The prosecutor mentioned this in advance, he explained, because Mulderig would not be available after the prosecution rested, and so that [the defense] wouldn't be trying to [admit it] in the absence of a witness in the defense case. Defense counsel responded: That's fair. And I appreciate it. I'll try and lay the foundation for it right now. Counsel then asked Mulderig: [G]iven th[e] caveat that you testified [about] previously that it may not depict certain marks that you can see with your eyes in the microscope [because] the camera hasn't picked [them] up, is the photograph a fair and accurate depiction of what you looked at through the microscope? Mulderig answered: For the most part, yes. At no point during Mulderig's testimony did defense counsel seek to admit the photograph into evidence. Later, Judge Dixon expressed the tentative view [] that based on the witness's testimony to that point, he would not admit the photograph because it would be more confusing than it is probative. Instead, the defense would need some sort of expert testimony that the photograph was actually demonstrable of either the lack of a comparison, or of the comparison. The court gave such notice just so that if you need to make arrangements with your expert you can do so. Counsel responded: We do intend to do that, Your Honor. Yet, despite having retained a firearms expert who had looked at the photograph, conducted an independent test-fire, and examined the evidence, the defense did not present testimony from him or any other expert. When the defense sought to introduce the picture into evidence at the end of its case, Judge Dixon excluded it, having viewed the photograph with respect to what the defense contends may be differences that the [] expert should have taken into con[sidera]tion, and based on the expert's testimony ... that no expert would use that type of photograph to make an analysis[,] and in the absence of any contrary evidence....
The admission of photographs is `within the sound discretion of the trial judge.' Henderson v. United States, 527 A.2d 1262, 1264 (D.C.1987) (quoting Rich v. District of Columbia, 410 A.2d 528, 531 (D.C.1979)). This is because the trial judge [] is in the best position to determine [the photograph's] relevance and accuracy. Simms v. Dixon, 291 A.2d 184, 186 (D.C.1972); see also March v. United States, 362 A.2d 691, 704 (D.C.1976) (the trial judge ... is in the best position to determine whether [the photographs] properly reflect the testimony or the circumstances sought to be depicted) (brackets in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The test of admissibility is whether the photograph[] accurately represent[s] the facts allegedly portrayed by [it]. Henderson, 527 A.2d at 1264 (quoting Simms, 291 A.2d at 186). Jones's attorney reasoned that Mulderig explained why the [differences] don't change his opinion about the identification, but it is relevant evidence, and the jury should be allowed to understand what he's talking about. However, both experts testified that such two-dimensional depictions of what examiners observe three-dimensionally under a microscope do not accurately represent the physical differences in the markings on the casings. According to both experts, photographs can be misleading. Because of its inherent deficiencies, Mulderig never unequivocally stated that the photograph was a fair and accurate depiction of what an examiner would see through a microscope. Discretion signifies choice. ( James) Johnson, v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979). We do not render [our] own decision of what judgment is most wise under the circumstances presented, but instead recognize that the decision-maker exercising discretion has the ability to choose from a range of permissible conclusions. Id. at 361-62. Although another judge might have admitted the photograph, perhaps with a cautionary instruction, Judge Dixon did not act outside the range of permissible conclusions by excluding it. Moreover, we are not convinced that seeing the photograph would have affected the jury's verdict. See id. at 367 (a trial court has not abused its discretion unless the exercise of discretion was in error and ... the impact of that error requires reversal) (emphasis added). Testimony that the photograph depicted several readily observable differences in the casings was certainly before the jury. Moreover, defense counsel extensively and effectively cross-examined Mulderig about those dissimilar markings and made the jurors well aware that Mulderig had not provided them with a visual means to evaluate his conclusion. Regardless of whether Judge Dixon erred in excluding the picture, doing so did not cause Jones any significant prejudice, Stone v. Alexander, 6 A.3d 847, 851 (D.C.2010) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted), and reversal is not warranted.