Opinion ID: 77991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Westry and Carter's Requested Jury Instructions

Text: Westry assigns error to the trial court's refusal to give a requested instruction on withdrawal from the conspiracy. Testimony was presented that after Westry pled guilty to a state court indictment, and returned to the Clay Street home on probation, he was no longer involved in the federal offenses charged in Counts Thirty-One and Thirty-Two. Carter submits the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury that it must determine the amount of controlled substances that was foreseeable to Carter within the scope of his participation in the conspiracy, and if the death of Johns was caused by controlled substances foreseeable to Carter within the scope of his participation in the conspiracy. A trial court's refusal to give a jury instruction requested by the defense is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Dulcio, 441 F.3d at 1275 (citation omitted). To constitute reversible error, a defendant must show that the requested jury instruction `(1) was a correct statement of the law; (2) was not adequately covered in the instructions given to the jury; (3) concerned an issue so substantive that its omission impaired the accused's ability to present a defense; and (4) dealt with an issue properly before the jury.' Id. (quoting United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1139 (11th Cir.1997)). Westry claims the following testimony of Shannon Jones supports his claimed withdrawal from the conspiracy, and consequently, supports his requested charge on withdrawal: [6] Q. Do you remember about when it was that he [Westry] moved back to Clay Street? A. It was a little while after the State had indicted us the first time. Q. Okay. And would that have been sometime around the end of 2003, later? A. Perhaps, yes. Q. After Calvin moved back to Clay Street, did you ever see whether or not he was involved with the distribution of drugs? A. He really didn't  no, he wasn't involved there, you know. He was on probation. Basically, he just said, enough. Under governing law, the foregoing exchange, without more, is insufficient to support Westry's requested instruction. We begin with the very language of the instruction: [I]n order for you to decide that a Defendant withdrew from a conspiracy you must find that the Defendant took affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose of the conspiracy. . . . Offense Instruction 13.4. As the comments to the Instruction make clear, withdrawal is an affirmative defense that the defendant has the burden to prove. We have held that a defendant must prove he undertook affirmative steps, inconsistent with the objects of the conspiracy, to disavow or to defeat the conspiratorial objectives, and either communicated those acts in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his co-conspirators or disclosed the illegal scheme to law enforcement authorities. United States v. Finestone, 816 F.2d 583, 589 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1571 (11th Cir.1994). The defendant's burden to establish the defense is substantial; hence, mere cessation of activity in the conspiracy is not sufficient to establish withdrawal. Finestone, 816 F.2d at 589 (citations omitted). Jones' testimony is insufficient to satisfy Westry's burden of showing withdrawal. At best, her testimony could support a mere cessation of activity. [7] Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Westry's requested instruction, as the issue was not properly before the jury on the record developed. Carter proposed two instructions concerning foreseeability of the drug amounts involved in the conspiracy and the death enhancement. [8] The trial court declined to give the requested instructions, finding that the combination of the special verdict form and the charges, including a Pinkerton [9] charge, sufficiently covered the issues sought to be addressed in Carter's requested instructions. The trial court instead instructed as follows on the issues of foreseeability: If you find any defendant guilty as to Count One, you will then be asked to specify on the verdict form your unanimous finding concerning the weight of the mixture or substance containing cocaine base that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You will not be required to determine the exact amount; rather, the verdict form requests that you determine the drug amount by ranges. For instance, you may indicate by range, that is, less than five grams, five grams or more but less than 50 grams, or 50 grams or more. Such amounts must be proven by the Government beyond a reasonable doubt. The Pinkerton instruction stated, in part, that if a defendant was found guilty of the conspiracy offense, the jury could find the defendant guilty of the substantive offense(s): even though such Defendant did not personally participate in such offense if you find beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that the offense charged in such count was committed by a conspirator during the existence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of its objects; second, that the Defendant under consideration was a knowing and willful member of the conspiracy at the time of the commission of such offenses; and third, that the commission of such offense by a co-conspirator was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy. We agree with the trial court that the foregoing combination of instructions properly and sufficiently instructed the jury in its consideration of the foreseeability of the drug amount and Johns' death, two of the applicable enhancements. See United States v. Dohan, 508 F.3d 989, 993 (11th Cir.2007) ([T]his court will reverse the district court only if we are left with a substantial, ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided in its deliberations in this regard.) (citation omitted). We similarly find no abuse of discretion in the denial of the requested instructions, which duplicated the information already provided in the Pinkerton instruction given.