Opinion ID: 774130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Included in the EEOC Charge

Text: 22 1. Local Rule 56.1. Before reaching the merits of Holtz's sexual harassment claim, we pause to consider a procedural issue raised by RCI. Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (Local Rule 56.1) requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a separate, short and concise statement setting forth material facts as to which there is no genuine issue to be tried. See Local Rule 56.1(a). A party opposing summary judgment must respond with a statement of facts as to which a triable issue remains. See Local Rule 56.1(b). The facts set forth in a moving party's statement will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the opposing party's statement. Local Rule 56.1(c). 23 RCI, as the moving party, submitted a statement of allegedly undisputed facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(a), but Holtz did not respond with a statement of disputed facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b). RCI's statement alleges, among other things, that Mumbach, whom Holtz accuses of having sexually harassed her, never physically touched Holtz except on the hand and never physically touched Holtz... in a sexual or offensive manner. RCI asserts that the district court was required to accept these allegations as admitted facts and therefore to grant summary judgment on the sexual harassment claim. 24 RCI's assertions, if accepted as true, might justify the dismissal of the sexual harassment claim. In the absence of sexually suggestive or offensive physical contact, the pattern of conduct alleged by Holtz would consist only of verbal remarks that might not rise to a Title VII violation. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). And we have affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the basis of uncontested assertions in the moving party's Local Rule 56.1 statement. See, e.g., Millus v. D'Angelo, 224 F.3d 137, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Gubitosi v. Kapica, 154 F.3d 30, 31 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998) (accepting as true defendant's uncontested assertions in reversing denial of summary judgment). 25 We nonetheless reject RCI's argument. A district court has broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party's failure to comply with local court rules. See Wight v. Bankamerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2000); Somlyo v. J. Lu Rob Enters., 932 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1991). Thus, we have previously indicated, and now hold, that while a court is not required to consider what the parties fail to point out in their Local Rule 56.1 statements, it may opt to conduct an assiduous review of the record. Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Corrections, 214 F.3d 275, 292 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Prunella v. Carlshire Tenants, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 2d 512, 513 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to deem admitted facts contained in defendant's Rule 56.1 statement where plaintiff failed to file responsive statement); Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same); Local Union No. 38 v. Hollywood Heating & Cooling, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 246, 247 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (same). 26 The district court did not mention Holtz's failure to file a Local Rule 56.1 statement, and conducted at least some scrutiny of the record independent of RCI's Local Rule 56.1 statement. See Holtz, 1999 WL 1043866, at , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at . The court concluded from that review of the record that Holtz had failed to raise a triable issue on the sexual harassment claim. In reviewing that ruling, we take our cue from the district court, in whose discretion lay the initial determination not to apply Local Rule 56.1 to Holtz's failure to file a counter-statement, and review the record de novo. 27 We have a second reason to look past Holtz's failure to file a Local Rule 56.1 statement. RCI's allegations of uncontested fact cannot be deemed true simply by virtue of their assertion in a Local Rule 56.1 statement. Local Rule 56.1(d) provides that [e]ach statement of material fact by a movant or opponent must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Interpreting the predecessor to the current Local Rule 56.1, we held that [a] Rule 9(g) statement by counsel on a motion for summary judgment cannot be a substitute for an affidavit as to the facts. Zanghi v. Incorporated Village of Old Brookville, 752 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1985). Likewise, district courts in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York have interpreted current Local Rule 56.1 to provide that where there are no[] citations or where the cited materials do not support the factual assertions in the Statements, the Court is free to disregard the assertion. Watt v. New York Botanical Garden, No. 98 Civ. 1095(BSJ), 2000 WL 193626, at  n.1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1611, at  n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000); see also IBS Ketel, Ltd. v. Korea Telecom Am., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 4856(DC), 2000 WL 821013, at  n.1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8678, at  n.1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2000); Am. Auto. Assn. v. AAA Auto. Club of Queens, Inc., No. 97 CV 1180, 1999 WL 97918 SJ, at , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8892, at  (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1999); Rivera v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 152 F.R.D. 479, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Allowing a Rule 56.1 statement to substitute for the admissibility requirement set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) would be tantamount to the tail wagging the dog. Rivera, 152 F.R.D. at 484. 28 The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is to streamline the consideration of summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the parties. See Monahan, 214 F.3d at 292; Watt, 2000 WL 193626, at  n.1, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1611, at  n.1. The local rule does not absolve the party seeking summary judgment of the burden of showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and a Local Rule 56.1 statement is not itself a vehicle for making factual assertions that are otherwise unsupported in the record. Where, as here, the record does not support the assertions in a Rule 56.1 statement, those assertions should be disregarded and the record reviewed independently. 1 See Zanghi, 752 F.2d at 47. 29 Neither of the key factual contentions in RCI's Local Rule 56.1 statement -- that Mumbach only touched Holtz's hand, and that none of the physical conduct was sexual or offensive - is supported by the portions of the record cited within the statement or by the record as a whole. Holtz testified that Mumbach touched her hair as well as her hand, and the portion of the record cited by RCI in its Rule 56.1 statement does not suggest otherwise. The statement that Mumbach's touching was never sexual or offensive is similarly unsupported by the cited deposition testimony. That testimony indicates only that Holtz believed one particular form of Mumbach's conduct -- his tendency to come much, much too close to [her] -- was caused by something other than an intent to harass her. Holtz's testimony did not relate to Mumbach's alleged touching of her hand, which she considered an intentional and unwanted sexual advance. 30 We thus decline to deem as admitted the assertions made by RCI in its Local Rule 56.1 statement that Mumbach's physical contact with Holtz was limited to touching her hand and not sexual or offensive, and we review the record on this claim de novo. 31 2. Sexual Harassment under Title VII. An employer violates Title VII's prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex when it allows the working environment to become permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [I]n order to be actionable under the statute, a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim did in fact perceive to be so. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 32 In determining whether a work environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive to violate Title VII, we 'look[] at all the circumstances,' including the 'frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.' Id. at 787-88 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Title VII is not a general civility code. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998). [S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The incidents of allegedly offensive conduct must also be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order to be deemed pervasive. Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 33 3. Merits. The district court granted summary judgment on Holtz's sexual harassment claim, stating that Mumbach's alleged conduct, although perhaps boorish and inappropriate, do[es] not rise to the level of harassment. Holtz, 1999 WL 1043866, at , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at -. The court relied principally on what it saw as Holtz's failure to establish that Mumbach had touched her intentionally or requested sexual favors. We disagree. 34 The question of whether a work environment is sufficiently hostile to violate Title VII is one of fact. See, e.g., Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate only if it can be concluded as a matter of law that no rational juror could view [the defendant's conduct] as... an intolerable alteration of [the plaintiff's] working conditions. Howley v. Town of Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 154 (2d Cir. 2000); accord, e.g., Brennan v. Met. Opera Ass'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 319 (2d Cir. 1999). 35 Were a rational jury to credit Holtz's version of the events, it could find that Mumbach's conduct crossed the line between boorish and inappropriate behavior and actionable sexual harassment. Although that line is admittedly indistinct, its haziness counsels against summary judgment in this case. An Article III judge is not a hierophant of social graces. Evaluation of ambiguous acts such as those revealed by the potential evidence in this case presents an issue for the jury. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 347 (2d Cir. 1998). 36 Holtz testified that Mumbach grabb[ed] and placed his hand on [her] hand on a daily basis, constantly, whenever he had the opportunity, every time [she] would try to hand him a paper, and that he used to touch [her] hair a lot. This conduct was ongoing over months and months. While the alleged physical contact resulted in no physical injury, if it in fact occurred in the manner in which Holtz described it, a jury could find that it was objectively reasonable for her to view it as offensive, hostile or abusive in light of (1) its frequency and duration, (2) the fact that Mumbach touched no other person in this way, and (3) the background context of Mumbach's other sexually suggestive conduct, including obscene leers, repeated efforts to peek underneath Holtz's clothing, and a pattern of teasing comments about her sex life. 37 As to the requirement that the alleged harassment be subjectively offensive, Holtz asserts, and RCI is hard put at this stage of the proceedings to disprove, that she found this conduct offensive. She testified that she interpreted Mumbach's comments as accusing her of being a loose woman; that she asked Mumbach to stop and complained of his conduct to her superiors; that she burst into tears when describing his conduct to Massimo; and that two years after she left RCI, she still became physically and emotionally distressed talking about the alleged harassment. These sworn assertions, if credited by a trier of fact, would suffice to show that Holtz was subjected to a hostile work environment. The alleged conduct arguably was both objectively and subjectively offensive such that a jury could conclude that a reasonable person would find [it] hostile or abusive, and... the victim did in fact perceive [it] to be so. Farragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 38 There is also a triable issue as to whether Mumbach's alleged conduct 'unreasonably interfere[d] with [Holtz's] work performance.' Id. at 788 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). Holtz testified that it [was] almost impossible for [her] to do [her] work without getting upset when the harassment occurred. 39 We thus conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to RCI on Holtz's hostile work environment claim. 40
41 Holtz alleges that when Cowan hired her, he promised to provide her with training as an accountant but that he later refused to do so because of her age. The district court granted summary judgment on this claim on the ground that Holtz failed to show that she was treated differently than were similarly situated co-employees. We conclude that the district court incorrectly applied the burden-shifting analysis applicable to discrimination claims. Properly applied, this analysis requires reversal. 42 1. Applicable Law. The ultimate issue in an ADEA case is whether the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her age played a motivating role in, or contributed to, the employer's decision. Renz v. Grey Advert., Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1997). Because direct evidence of discrimination -- a 'smoking gun'... attesting to a discriminatory intent, Rosen v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 528, 533 (2d Cir. 1991) -- is typically unavailable, plaintiffs and courts ordinarily proceed by way of the three-part burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). [T]he allocation of burdens [under the McDonnell-Douglas framework] and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981). 43 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). An ADEA plaintiff meets that burden by showing that (1) she was within the protected age group, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) that action took place in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000). By making out this 'minimal' prima facie case,... the plaintiff 'creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated,' and thus places the burden of production on the employer to proffer a nondiscriminatory reason for its action. James v. New York Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 44 If the defendant meets its burden, the McDonnell Douglas framework...disappear[s] and the sole remaining issue... [is] discrimination vel non. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2 The plaintiff must then meet her ultimate burden of proving that she was the victim of intentional discrimination without the benefit of McDonnell Douglas's intermediate burdens and presumptions. Id. at 143. 45 2. Analysis. As noted, the district court dismissed Holtz's failure-to-train claim because she failed to show that she was treated differently than were other similarly situated employees. It is true that evidence of disparate treatment may establish the inference of discrimination necessary to satisfy a plaintiff's prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. See Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 467-68. But such evidence is not always necessary. See id. [A] plaintiff may rely on direct evidence of what the defendant did and said in satisfying her initial burden under McDonnell Douglas. Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 468. We have held, for instance, that evidence that the employer had told the employee that he was being fired because of his age[,]... coupled with a firing (or refusal to hire) of a person in the protected age group, would support a finding that the firing was based on an impermissible criterion such as age. Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 921 (2d Cir. 1981). 46 Holtz has provided similar direct evidence in this case. She testified at her deposition that when Cowan discussed his plans to give Colleen Ryan new duties and give her more responsibilities,... he went on at some length about how he was grooming Colleen and training her and she was a good employee to invest in because she was a young girl, a young woman. Holtz testified further that on a different occasion Cowan called [her] in and told [her] how much he enjoyed training young women and he mentioned Colleen Ryan and Paula Aviles. Even more pointedly, Holtz testified that when she would raise the particular subject of her training and ask, 'When are we going to have these sessions in which you teach me the basics of accounting,' he would say, 'Oh, Laura, it's young women I like to train.' Holtz testified, moreover, that these incidents were not isolated. Throughout her employment, there were always kind of these [sic] references to how he liked training young women, she said. 47 Holtz's testimony is the only evidence in the record directly ascribing discriminatory intent to Cowan or RCI, and consists largely of her uncorroborated accounts of what Cowan said. We nonetheless conclude that her statements raise a genuine issue of fact as to the defendant's intent. See Owens v. New York City Hous. Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir.) (stating that employer's contention that discrimination plaintiff's proffered evidence of discriminatory comments is uncorroborated and not credible is a jury argument inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 964 (1991); Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep't, 888 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1989) (The plaintiff may preclude summary judgment by producing evidence from which the trier of fact reasonably could draw an inference of discrimination.). 48 Having concluded that Holtz failed to make out a prima facie case because there was no evidence of disparate treatment, the district court proceeded no further in its McDonnell Douglas analysis, that is, it did not consider whether RCI had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for failing to train Holtz and, if so, whether Holtz nonetheless met her burden of raising a triable issue of fact as to whether RCI engaged in intentional discrimination. Without addressing these issues explicitly, RCI suggests that there was a legitimate explanation for Cowan's refusal to train Holtz in accounting, namely, that she was not qualified for a staff accounting position. Even if true, however, this assertion does not necessarily defeat Holtz's claim that because of her age, she was not given the training promised her when she was hired. Holtz's evidence that the promise was made and that age was at least a substantial part of the motivation for the denial of training is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 49 The dissent asserts that Holtz's testimony regarding Cowan's comments is insufficient to carry her burden at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. We understand the dissent to argue that as part of this burden, Holtz was required to show that RCI's proffered justification for not giving her accounting training was false by showing, for example, that others similarly situated but for age were given the training to which Holtz insists she was entitled. We disagree. 50 We first note that just as evidence of disparate treatment is not an essential element of a prima facie case of discrimination, see Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 467-68, such evidence is also not always necessary at the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See, e.g., Owens, 934 F.2d at 410 (holding that evidence of remarks by employer reflecting discriminatory motive was sufficient to raise[] a triable issue as to whether the articulated reasons for [the employer]s conduct] were pretextual.). To defeat summary judgment within the McDonnell Douglas framework, moreover, the plaintiff is not required to show that the employer's proffered reasons were false or played no role in the employment decision, but only that they were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the 'motivating' factors. Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; Bickerstaff v. Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435, 447 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000); Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1994). The plaintiff's burden in this regard may often be carried by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more. Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203. 51 Of course, RCI may still raise the defense articulated by the dissent -- that it would have refused to train Holtz regardless of her age. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568-69 (2d Cir. 1989). But the validity of this defense is ordinarily for the jury to decide at trial rather than for the court to determine on a motion for summary judgment. See Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203. For the reasons set forth in the dissent, Holtz may have a distinctly uphill battle on these issues at trial. But we conclude that as to this claim, she is entitled to such a trial and that summary judgment was improperly granted to the defendant.
52 Holtz also contests the district court's grant of summary judgment on the claim that she was fired in retaliation for complaining to Massimo and others about Mumbach's alleged sexual harassment. 53 1. Prima Facie Case. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show (1) that she was engaged in protected activity by opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) that the employer was aware of that activity; (3) that she suffered adverse employment action; and (4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Galdieri-Ambrosini v. Nat'l Realty & Dev. Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir. 1998); see McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282-83 (2d Cir. 2001). 54 Holtz's termination 3 occurred shortly after she complained to Massimo, the Director of Human Resources, about her confrontation with Cowan. That confrontation, in turn, arose from Holtz's desire to avoid interaction with Mumbach, whom she alleges was sexually harassing her. Massimo investigated the incident, and her ensuing conversations with Holtz about the investigation and more broadly about Holtz's stated desire to leave RCI eventually led to Holtz's termination by Massimo and John Leyden, RCI's Chief Financial Officer. 55 The district court apparently concluded that Holtz's complaint to Massimo consisted only of the accusation that Cowan had humiliated her in front of her coworkers. See Holtz, 1999 WL 1043866, at , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17682, at -. The court seemed to be of the view that the complained of conduct, thus limited, could not objectively be viewed as discriminatory, and that Holtz's complaint therefore did not constitute protected activity upon which a retaliation claim could be based. See McMenemy, 241 F.3d at 285 (The plaintiff is... required to have had a good faith, reasonable belief that [s]he was opposing an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII.). 56 But Holtz's alleged protected activity included more than her complaints to Massimo about being humiliated by Cowan. We conclude that Holtz raised a triable issue as to whether she engaged in additional protected activity by complaining of activity that she believed in good faith was illegal, and that the persons responsible for her termination were aware of her complaints. For instance, the record could support a finding that Holtz complained of sexual harassment by Mumbach during the June 29, 1995 meeting with Massimo regarding her confrontation with Cowan. Holtz testified that she went to Human Resources about [Mumbach's] sexual harassment, and that she burst into tears when trying to describe Mumbach's conduct to Massimo. Because, as discussed, Holtz's allegations regarding Mumbach's conduct were sufficient to support a harassment claim, her complaints about such conduct to RCI officials were also sufficient to support a retaliation claim with respect to subsequent employment actions taken against her. 57 There also is no dispute that at the July 17, 1995 meeting with Massimo and Leyden in which her termination was effectively announced, she complained that she had been the subject of illegal treatment. 58 Equally important, the record included several indications that Holtz had complained of Mumbach's alleged harassment before June 1995, and that Massimo and Leyden knew of those complaints. It is undisputed that Massimo was aware that Holtz had complained to Cowan about very serious problems, and had claimed that she was being abused by people who were making accusations about her and older men. Cowan claimed that Holtz said the alleged abusers were not... in [Cowan's] department, but Holtz claims otherwise. Leyden also knew generally of Holtz's complaints about Mumbach. Holtz further claims that she had complained to Canterbury that Mumbach had made unwanted sexual advances. Canterbury admits discussing Mumbach's behavior with Holtz, but she denies that Holtz alleged that she was being sexually harassed. 59 Read in the light most favorable to Holtz, see Tenenbaum, 193 F.3d at 593, this record could support the following version of events. Holtz's refusal to interact with Mumbach, the alleged perpetrator of sexual harassment against her, led to a confrontation with Cowan, to whom she had complained about the harassment. Cowan's angry insistence that Holtz deal directly with Mumbach notwithstanding her discomfort led to conversations with Massimo and Leyden, both of whom knew or soon learned of Holtz's complaints regarding Mumbach. After Massimo investigated the confrontation and had a conversation in which Holtz made allegations of illegal treatment, she and Leyden essentially forced Holtz to resign. 60 Under these circumstances, a jury could find that Holtz was engaged in protected activity, that her employer was aware of that activity, and that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action. Galdieri-Ambrosini, 136 F.3d at 292. Holtz thus met her prima facie burden. 61 2. Estoppel. RCI asserts that Holtz is estopped from alleging that she complained to Massimo of sexual harassment because she testified under oath before the state Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (UIAB) that the only subject of her complaint was Cowan's alleged public humiliation of her. RCI relies on Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6-8 (2d Cir. 1999). In Mitchell, we held that a party may be estopped from asserting a position if (1) the party... took an inconsistent position in a prior proceeding and (2) that position was adopted by the first tribunal in some manner, such as by rendering a favorable judgment. Id. at 6 (citations omitted). We also held that statements to administrative agencies... may... give rise to judicial estoppel. Id. 62 We reject RCI's estoppel argument. The issue before the UIAB was whether Holtz was terminated, and thus eligible for unemployment benefits, or whether she resigned. The UIAB found she had been fired. That tribunal did not, on the basis of Holtz's testimony or otherwise, adopt a position inconsistent with the argument Holtz advances in this litigation, that she had complained to Massimo and others that she had been sexually harassed. 63 3. RCI's Proffered Reason for the Discharge. Once Holtz made out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifted to RCI to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the allegedly retaliatory act. See Richardson v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 443 (2d Cir. 1999). RCI met this burden by linking Holtz's termination to her long-held and oft-repeated intention to leave RCI's employ in the near future. Indeed, Holtz told Massimo that she was actively looking for another job. Massimo stated that in light of Holtz's plans, the company was concerned that she would quit on short notice and leave them short of trained staff during a particularly busy season. Holtz has offered no reason to conclude that such concerns were unfounded. 64 After each party has satisfied her or its initial burdens under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion is the burden she bore from the outset -- to persuade the trier of fact that she was the subject of illegal discrimination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The plaintiff then has the opportunity to demonstrate that the employer's proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. But proof that the employer's proffered justification is false, however persuasive, is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 517 (1993)). As noted, the plaintiff may instead rely on evidence -- circumstantial or otherwise -- showing that an impermissible reason was 'a motivating factor,' without proving that the employer's proffered explanation played no role in its conduct. Fields, 115 F.3d at 120; see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203. In some cases, then, the plaintiff's evidence establishing a prima facie case and defendant's production of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action raise a question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder after a trial. Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203. 65 Accordingly, Holtz's failure to show that RCI's stated reason for her discharge was false was not fatal on this record. A rational jury could conclude from the circumstances of her termination -- the fact that it grew directly out of a dispute that may have been related to her complaints of sexual harassment, and the evidence that the persons who made the decision to terminate Holtz may have known of those complaints -- that retaliation for protected activity was a substantial motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Fields, 115 F.3d at 121 (emphasis in original). Of course, a jury could also discredit the evidence of improper motive, or could conclude, if so charged at RCI's request, that RCI would have terminated Holtz irrespective of its employees' desire to retaliate for her protected activity. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45. But those are questions to be resolved by the factfinder after trial. Cronin, 46 F.3d at 203.
66 To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under the classic McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must show that [she] was (1) within the protected age group; (2) qualified for the position; (3) discharged; and (4) that such discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Carlton, 202 F.3d at 134. 67 As the district court correctly observed, the plaintiff failed to raise an inference that she was discharged because of her age. Neither Massimo nor Leyden, the RCI employees responsible for Holtz's termination, made any discriminatory remarks or otherwise exhibited signs that they were motivated by Holtz's age. Nor has Holtz shown that similarly situated employees were treated differently or that she was replaced by a younger person, or adduced any other circumstantial evidence indicative of discriminatory intent. Summary judgment on this claim was thus properly granted.