Opinion ID: 2154919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to communicate discussions

Text: At the hearing on post-conviction relief, evidence was adduced which showed that two different deputy prosecutors on two different occasions discussed with defense co-counsel Brinkmeyer the possibility of a plea bargain. The first discussion was held early in the criminal proceedings. Defense counsel Brinkmeyer testified that he had a conversation with deputy prosecutor Carithers who said of the case that it was an unfortunate set of circumstances and that it would perhaps be appropriate if the petitioner could plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter. Brinkmeyer characterized this exchange as merely a discussion and not an offer and said that he related the conversation to senior defense co-counsel Rice. Rice testified that he recalled Brinkmeyer's relating Carithers expression that the charge might be too great for the facts of the case. Deputy Prosecutor Bowers testified that three weeks before the trial he had a brief discussion with Brinkmeyer in which Bowers asked if Brinkmeyer could check with Rice about whether there was some possibility of a plea to voluntary manslaughter. Bowers testified that at the time he did not have authority to offer a binding plea bargain and that the remark was made entirely on his own initiative. The post-conviction relief hearing judge found as facts that neither deputy prosecutor had authority to offer a binding plea bargain, and that both conversations referred to above were casual conversations without authority from the Prosecutor or Chief Prosecutor and were not of such a binding nature which required communication with the client. In Curl v. State, (1980) Ind., 400 N.E.2d 775, this Court adopted the ruling of the Court of Appeals in Lyles v. State, (1978) Ind. App., 382 N.E.2d 991, that if a defendant's counsel failed to inform the defendant of a plea offer, we would be compelled to reverse a conviction and permit the defendant to pursue the plea negotiations or to be retried. The Lyles court adopted as persuasive authority the then-extant A.B.A. Standard § 6.2(a): In conducting discussions with the prosecutor, the lawyer should keep the accused advised of developments at all times and all proposals made by the prosecutor should be communicated promptly to the accused. We reaffirm that rule here, but we hold that the post-conviction relief judge's finding that the discussions did not rise to the level of developments or proposals which should have been communicated promptly to the accused was not shown to be erroneous by the petitioner.