Opinion ID: 801002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Continuing Applicability of Price Waterhouse View

Text: Since shortly after the Price Waterhouse decision was rendered and Congress responded by amending Title VII, the lower courts have confronted whether the mixed-motive frameworks apply in the context of other civil rights statutes. From 1992 through 1996, a number of circuit courts determined (or assumed) that Price Waterhouse applied to Title VII retaliation claims, even though the statutory provisions governing such claims relied on an independent, unembellished because of standard and lacked any mixed-motive, burden-shifting language. See, e.g., Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 681 (1st Cir.1996) (holding that while Title VII's mixed motive provisions do not apply to Title VII retaliation claims, the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting rule does); see also Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir.1996); Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 596 n. 8 (3d Cir.1995); Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 863 (5th Cir.1993); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039-41 (2d Cir.1993); Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 468 (3d Cir. 1993); Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462, 1470-71 (10th Cir.1992). In subsequent years, other courts have explicitly extended Price Waterhouse's reach well-beyond the Title VII context, often with little or no analysis. See Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir.2009) (finding that in a § 1981 claim involving mixed motives, [w]e focus on the mixed motives analysis under Price Waterhouse ); Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1135-36 (8th Cir.1999) (To trigger Price Waterhouse analysis [under the ADA], a plaintiff must show that `an impermissible motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision.'). More often than not though, courts have applied a mixed motive analysis without indicating whether the analysis came from, or was justified by, Price Waterhouse or the 1991 Title VII amendments. See Garrison v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 287 F.3d 955, 965 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting a Title VII case in support of applying mixed motive analysis in an ADA context: A mixed motive instruction is . . . appropriate in any case where the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to find both forbidden and permissible motives.); Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 150 F.3d 31, 42 (1st Cir.1998) (assuming that either Price Waterhouse or Title VII mixed motive analysis applies to the ADA, but declining to decide which). Based upon this long history of applying Price Waterhouse's mixed motive analysis beyond the confines of Title VII discrimination suits, there was, until recently, every reason to think this analysis had continuing applicability to the ADA. This was a sensible conclusion, as there is nothing in the Price Waterhouse analysis of the because of standard and the associated evidentiary burden that pertains uniquely to Title VII; the opinion's principles are sweeping and broadly applicable. Further, as previously discussed, Congress' enactment of the ADA immediately after Price Waterhouse was decided gives rise to a reasonable inference that Congress intended for the Court's interpretation of the because of standard to apply to the ADA. In 2009, however, the Supreme Court cast considerable doubt upon the applicability of mixed-motive analysis to statutes other than Title VII. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services , the Court raised sua sponte the question of whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) authorized a mixed-motive age discrimination claim. 557 U.S. 167, 169, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). The Court concluded that it does not. Id. After a cursory examination of the relevant case law and statutory history, the Court examined the ADEA's causation standard and determined that because of means that a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the `but-for' cause of the challenged employer decision. Id. at 178, 129 S.Ct. 2343. Furthermore, the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision. Id. at 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343. To those who would consider the Price Waterhouse controlling, the Court indicated that Price Waterhouse was so fraught with problems in application that there was no perceivable benefit to extending its framework to ADEA claims. Id. at 179, 129 S.Ct. 2343. The Court also expressed grave doubt as to whether it would have the same approach were it to consider the question [raised in Price Waterhouse ] today in the first instance. Id. at 178-79, 129 S.Ct. 2343. The Court does not go so far as to abrogate Price Waterhouse, but it certainly signals that the Court might do so if the opportunity presented itself. And, although the holding addresses only the ADEA, its stark language leaves little doubt that the present Court shares little of Justice O'Connor's concern that placing the burden of proof entirely on the plaintiff's shoulders demands the impossible and disserves the deterrent purpose of Title VII. Because Gross addressed only the ADEA, there is a strong argument that the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting doctrine remains controlling law outside of the ADEA context. [1] Still, the shadow of Gross is long and troubling. See Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010). This Court can hardly be faulted for being reluctant to hang its judicial hat on such a wobbly peg.