Opinion ID: 1292855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding there was competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of a fee agreement?

Text: The jury awarded Middleton $906.62 for unpaid commissions pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 39-65-20 (2008), which requires that when a contract between a sales representative and principal is terminated, the principal must pay all commissions due. When an employer violates § 39-65-20, § 39-65-30 provides that the employer is liable for attorney's fees actually and reasonably incurred by the sales representative in the action and court costs. S.C.Code Ann. § 39-65-30 (2008). Williamson argues that the Court of Appeals en banc erred in finding that competent evidence supports the finding that fees were incurred. We agree. Middleton's counsel was deposed on the issue of attorney's fees. He acknowledged that he and Middleton were personal friends, that he had handled other legal matters for Middleton in the past without taking a fee, and that Middleton was never sent any statements of attorney's fees incurred. Furthermore, Middleton's counsel answered in the negative when specifically asked if Middleton incurred any attorney's fees: Q. Has Mr. Middleton incurred any attorney's fees from this representation? A. No, technically, he hasn't because we don't have a fee agreement with Mr. Middleton. We talked about this with Mr. Middleton to begin with and we decided that we would try to help him collect the monies due him and at the end of the case, we would talk about a fee. So we don't have a fee agreement with him. But some day, he might pay us a fee. Right now, he has no obligation at this point if there is no agreement. He might feel a moral obligation. And when we talk at the end of the case, he will have the final say. The Court of Appeals en banc found competent evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that attorney's fees were incurred. The majority noted that the statement cited by Williamson could be interpreted in different ways: While Parham's testimony . . . could be interpreted to mean Middleton would never be required to pay a fee, it also indicates that at the end of the case, [Middleton and his attorneys] would talk about a fee. [The trial court] adopted this latter interpretation. . . . Williamson, 374 S.C. at 429, 649 S.E.2d at 63. We find no competent evidence to support the finding that Middleton incurred attorney's fees. Though Middleton's counsel did indeed indicate that he and Middleton would talk about a fee at the conclusion of the case, he also explained that Middleton had no obligation other than a moral obligation to pay a fee and that Middleton would have the final say. In our view, the only logical interpretation of the statement by Middleton's counsel is that Middleton could choose not to pay a fee to his counsel. It therefore follows that no attorney's fees were incurred. [2] As evidence that attorney's fees were actually incurred, the Court of Appeals en banc noted that Parham testified that he was hired by Middleton in the Spring of 2001 and had kept extensive and diligent records detailing the amount of time spent on the case and by whom the work was done. The Court of Appeals en banc also found that it was unlikely that Middleton's second-chair attorney, Wyche associate Patricia Ravenhorst, who had no prior relationship with Middleton, would have volunteered her time with no expectation of being paid. We find that these facts simply cannot overcome the candid admission by Middleton's counsel that no fees were incurred. [3]