Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Right to Confront Witnesses at the Capital Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant's seventh point for review is that the State violated his right to confront witnesses when a Department of Corrections records keeper testified for the State about defendant's prison disciplinary record and an assistant State's Attorney read to the jury a statement and the grand jury testimony of a witness to the killing that resulted in defendant's prior murder conviction. Defendant argues that the jury learned at the eligibility stage that defendant had pleaded guilty to the murder of Alfred Evans. At that stage of the sentencing hearing, the State told the court that Mark Carrington, a witness to that murder, was dead, but the State still wanted to present Carrington's grand jury testimony about Evans' murder. The defense objected, but the court found that because Carrington was under oath before the grand jury and defendant had pleaded guilty to the murder, the evidence was relevant and reliable and was therefore admissible. The State placed into evidence Carrington's signed statement to the police and a transcript of his grand jury testimony. Barry Gross then testified that as an assistant State's Attorney in 1985, he conducted the grand jury investigation into Evans' murder. Gross read Carrington's grand jury testimony to defendant's sentencing jury. Carrington testified that he met with defendant on March 15, 1985, when defendant was a general, and Carrington was a member, of the Gangster Stones. Defendant told Carrington to accompany him to get narcotics. They walked to a building a block away and defendant told Carrington to wait outside. Defendant went inside and talked to two men in the hallway. Defendant pulled a gun and shot the shorter of the two men in the back. As Carrington fled, he heard more shots. Carrington met defendant later that night and defendant told him he had done it because Fred had been shot earlier. Carrington said he was not told more because [g]enerals don't really talk. They don't really do nothing else about what they do. Defendant requested a mistrial or, in the alternative, that the testimony be stricken, because he was unable to cross-examine Carrington. Again, the trial court stated that the evidence was relevant and reliable. The court also overruled defendant's objection that his right to confront witnesses would be violated if Glen Jackson, the DOC record keeper, should be permitted to testify concerning the details of certain violations reported in defendant's master file. The court ruled the evidence was admissible. Jackson testified that defendant accumulated 133 rules violations between 1983 and 2000 and provided more specific information as to five of those violations as set forth below. First, Jackson testified that on September 11, 1990, while defendant was at Hill Correctional Center, defendant approached an officer and berated him because the officer would not let defendant leave the yard early. Forty or fifty inmates watched, and the officer felt intimidated. Jackson said a disciplinary ticket was filed and the adjudicatory committee found defendant guilty of the charges. Next Jackson stated that on February 12, 1991, defendant was housed at Illinois River Correctional Center and was issued a ticket for insolence, unauthorized movement, and disobeying a direct order. Jackson explained that defendant was asked to leave the dietary area because he was finished eating, and he refused to comply with three orders to leave the area. Defendant left when a higher ranking officer ordered him to do so. The adjudicatory committee found him guilty of those charges. Jackson also testified that defendant was issued another ticket on May 19, 1992, at Illinois River Correctional Center for creating a dangerous disturbance, insolence, and unauthorized movement. Defendant attempted to avoid a shakedown as he was leaving lunch. As a number of other inmates watched, defendant became loud and insolent when a lieutenant asked him to empty his pockets. The adjudicatory committee found defendant guilty of insolence and unauthorized movement, but not of creating a dangerous disturbance. Jackson further testified that defendant received a ticket on January 23, 1993, at the Illinois River Correctional Center for intimidation, threats, disobeying a direct order, insolence, violation of rules, and sexual misconduct. An officer had seen defendant holding a door open, and as the officer shut it, defendant pushed past him into a different wing of the facility. Defendant then refused to return to his wing, refused to produce his identification card, swore at the officer, and shook his finger in the officer's face. When defendant finally left, he started yelling turn around, I got something for you and when the officer turned around, he saw defendant with his pants pulled down and his penis exposed through his shorts. The adjustment committee found him guilty of all charges except sexual misconduct. Finally, Jackson testified that on January 25, 1994, defendant was ticketed for insolence, intimidation, and threats based on his going to the correctional office, telling the reporting officer that he did not like being at Danville Correctional Center and that he wanted to go back to Pontiac. Defendant said, I just want to let you know, my name is Banks, I'm a Stone, and I want to see the warden about getting out of here. I'm telling you, I'm letting you know, you have been warned, if anything happens, it's on you. The adjudicatory committee found defendant guilty. Defendant contends that the admission of Carrington's statements through Gross' testimony, and the admission of the various prison guards' accounts of rule violations through Jackson's testimony, violated defendant's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to confront witnesses, citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The trial court's ruling that the evidence was relevant and reliable did not address the defendant's confrontation objection. The sixth amendment's confrontation clause, which applies to both federal and state prosecutions ( Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 S.Ct. at 1359, 158 L.Ed.2d at 187), provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right    to be confronted with the witnesses against him   . U.S. Const., amend. VI. In Crawford, the Supreme Court further interpreted the confrontation clause and held that the testimonial hearsay statements of a witness who is unavailable at trial may not be admitted against a criminal defendant unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203. The Court in Crawford declined to spell out a comprehensive definition of testimonial, but it found that: Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. at 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d at 203. The State argues that both the testimony from the records officer and the testimony recounting a deceased witness' grand jury testimony were properly admitted in aggravation during defendant's sentencing hearing. The ordinary rules of evidence are relaxed at the aggravation/mitigation stage of a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 125, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (2001). The only requirement for the admissibility of evidence at this stage of a capital sentencing hearing is that the evidence be relevant and reliable. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d at 125, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163. Furthermore, it is well settled that the introduction of hearsay evidence in a capital sentencing hearing violates neither the due process clause ( People v. Jones, 94 Ill.2d 275, 286 [68 Ill.Dec. 903, 447 N.E.2d 161] (1982)), nor the confrontation clause ( People v. Brown, 172 Ill.2d 1, 49 [216 Ill.Dec. 733, 665 N.E.2d 1290] (1996)). Therefore, the arguments based on the sixth and fourteenth amendments also fail. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 83, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998). These well-established rules in Illinois are consistent with Williams v. People of State of New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949), where the Supreme Court stated: Highly relevantif not essential to [a court's] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247, 69 S.Ct. at 1083, 93 L.Ed. at 1342. There is nothing in Crawford to indicate that the confrontation clause does or does not apply to the aggravation/mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing. There is a split of authority on the issue by the courts that have considered the issue. The parties have cited cases which hold that the confrontation clause does not apply, namely, People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 83, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998), Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392 (7th Cir.2002), United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313 (5th Cir.2007), United States v. Jordan, 357 F.Supp.2d 889 (E.D.Va.2005), United States v. Johnson, 378 F.Supp.2d 1051 (N.D.Iowa 2005), State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 140 P.3d 930 (2006), State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574 (Tenn.2006), and Summers v. State, 122 Nev. 1326, 148 P.3d 778 (2006); and cases which hold that the right to confront witnesses does apply, namely, Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227 (11th Cir.1982), United States v. Mills, 446 F.Supp.2d 1115 (C.D.Cal.2006), Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex. Crim.App.2005), State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 603 S.E.2d 93 (2004), and Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000). Defendant contends that the argument against applying the confrontation clause to the aggravation/mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing relies upon Williams. But, defendant argues, a growing number of jurists have questioned the continued vitality of Williams. Because the sixth amendment right to confrontation was not extended to the states until over 15 years after Williams was decided, Williams was decided on due process grounds and it is thus quite questionable whether Williams is controlling with respect to the determination of whether the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation extends to capital sentencing hearings. United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 405 n. 13 (5th Cir.1998). The bases of the Williams decision, written in 1949, well before the modern death penalty era of Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972),] and Gregg [v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)], have been eroded as applied to capital cases. United States v. Taveras, 424 F.Supp.2d 446, 457 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). A similar argument was presented to this court in People v. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d 407, 299 Ill.Dec. 157, 841 N.E.2d 889 (2005), which involved the question of whether a Crawford violation was subject to harmless-error review. In Patterson we stated: What defendant is arguing, in essence, is that Crawford implicitly overruled Harrington [v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969)], [ Delaware v.] Van Arsdall, [475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986),] and any other Supreme Court decision holding that confrontation clause violations are subject to harmless-error review. Crawford does not explicitly overrule these decisions, and we may not assume an implicit overruling of a previous Supreme Court decision. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 2017, 138 L.Ed.2d 391, 423 (1997) (reaffirming rule that it is the prerogative of the Supreme Court to overrule its own decisions). In view of the well-established rule, pre- Crawford, that confrontation clause violations were subject to harmless-error analysis, and the numerous post- Crawford decisions applying harmless-error review to Crawford violations, as well as the Supreme Court's admonition not to assume the implicit overruling of a Supreme Court decision, we conclude that Crawford violations are subject to harmless-error analysis. Patterson, 217 Ill.2d at 427-28, 299 Ill.Dec. 157, 841 N.E.2d 889. Applying the rationale of Patterson, we hold that the confrontation clause does not apply to the aggravation/mitigation phase of a capital sentencing hearing. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 83, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998). As we stated earlier, the only requirement for the admissibility of evidence at this stage of a capital sentencing hearing is that the evidence be relevant and reliable. People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 125, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (2001). We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complained-of hearsay evidence. First, the testimony of Glenn Jackson, the chief records officer, detailed defendant's prior behavior in the Department of Corrections, which directly impacts defendant's potential for rehabilitation and his ability to adjust to a life of incarceration. Traditionally, this type of evidence has been found relevant and admissible. People v. Casillas, 195 Ill.2d 461, 494, 255 Ill.Dec. 382, 749 N.E.2d 864 (2000); People v. Terrell, 185 Ill.2d 467, 506, 236 Ill.Dec. 723, 708 N.E.2d 309 (1998); People v. Ward, 154 Ill.2d 272, 328-29, 181 Ill.Dec. 884, 609 N.E.2d 252 (1992). The testimony from former Assistant State's Attorney Barry Gross was also properly admitted at the sentencing hearing. Gross testified that he presented a now-deceased witness named Mark Carrington to the grand jury in 1985, and then proceeded to read Carrington's sworn testimony to defendant's sentencing jury. In that testimony before the grand jury, Carrington described watching defendant shoot Alfred Evans in the back. The testimony was also reliable, as it consisted of Carrington's signed handwritten statement and his sworn grand jury testimony regarding a crime to which defendant pleaded guilty, and it was relevant because it shed light for the jurors on not only the circumstances surrounding defendant's first conviction for murder, but also his street gang affiliations.