Opinion ID: 107058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jaben complaint read as follows:

Text: The undersigned complaint, being duly sworn, states: That he is a Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service and, in the performance of the duties imposed on him by law, he has conducted an investigation of the Federal income tax liability of Max Jaben for the calendar year 1956, by examining the said taxpayer's tax return for the year 1956 and other years; by identifying and interviewing third parties with whom the said taxpayer did business; by consulting public and private records reflecting the said taxpayer's income; and by interviewing third persons having knowledge of the said taxpayer's financial condition. That based on the aforesaid investigation, the complainant has personal knowledge that on or about the 16th day of April, 1957, at Kansas City, Missouri, in the Western District of Missouri, Max Jaben did unlawfully and wilfully attempt to evade and defeat the income taxes due and owing by him to the United States of America for the calendar year 1956, by filing and causing to be filed with the District Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Kansas City, Missouri, at Kansas City, Missouri, a false and fraudulent income tax return, wherein he stated that his taxable income for the calendar year 1956 was $17,665.31, and that the amount of tax due and owing thereon was the sum of $6,017.32, when in fact his taxable income for the said calendar year was the sum of $40,001.76 upon which said taxable income he owed to the United States of America an income tax of $14,562.99. [Signed] David A. Thompson Special Agent Internal Revenue Service Kansas City, Missouri. Petitioner argues that the complaint is basically indistinguishable from that which the Court found wanting in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U. S. 480. The Giordenello complaint read in relevant part: The undersigned complaint being duly sworn states: That on or about January 26, 1956, at Houston. Texas in the Southern District of Texas, Veto Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, to-wit: heroin hydrochloride with knowledge of unlawful importation; in violation of Section 174, Title 21, United States Code. And the complainant further states that he believes that ___________ ____________ [4] are material witnesses in relation to this charge. The complaints there and here are materially distinguishable. Information in a complaint alleging the commission of a crime falls into two categories: (1) that information which, if true, would directly indicate commission of the crime charged, and (2) that which relates to the source of the directly incriminating information. The Giordenello complaint gave no source information whatsoever. Its directly incriminating information consisted merely of an allegation in the words of the statute, and even then incomplete, supplemented by on or about January 26, 1956, at Houston. If the Jaben complaint were as barren, it would have stated simply that on or about April 16, 1957, at Kansas City, Missouri, Jaben willfully filed a false income tax return. In fact, it gave dollars-and-cents figures for the amounts which allegedly should have been returned and the amounts actually returned. As to sources, the affiant indicated that he, in his official capacity, had personally conducted an investigation in the course of which he had examined the taxpayer's returns for 1956 and other years, interviewed third persons with whom the taxpayer did business and others having knowledge of his financial condition, and consulted public and private records reflecting the taxpayer's income; and that the conclusion that Jaben had committed the offense was based upon this investigation. Beyond the substance of the complaint there is a material distinction in the nature of the offense charged. Some offenses are subject to putative establishment by blunt and concise factual allegations, e. g.,  A saw narcotics in B 's possession, whereas  A saw B file a false tax return does not mean very much in a tax evasion case. Establishment of grounds for belief that the offense of tax evasion has been committed often requires a reconstruction of the taxpayer's income from many individually unrevealing facts which are not susceptible of a concise statement in a complaint. Furthermore, unlike narcotics informants, for example, whose credibility may often be suspect, the sources in this tax evasion case are much less likely to produce false or untrustworthy information. Thus, whereas some supporting information concerning the credibility of informants in narcotics cases or other common garden varieties of crime may be required, such information is not so necessary in the context of the case before us. Giordenello v. United States, supra , and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, established that a magistrate is intended to make a neutral judgment that resort to further criminal process is justified. A complaint must provide a foundation for that judgment. It must provide the affiant's answer to the magistrate's hypothetical question, What makes you think that the defendant committed the offense charged? This does not reflect a requirement that the Commissioner ignore the credibility of the complaining witness. There is a difference between dis-believing the affiant and requiring him to indicate some basis for his allegations. Obviously any reliance upon factual allegations necessarily entails some degree of reliance upon the credibility of the source. See, e. g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 13. Nor does it indicate that each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or that each and every fact which contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the complaint. Compare United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102. It simply requires that enough information be presented to the Commissioner to enable him to make the judgment that the charges are not capricious and are sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further steps of the criminal process. In this instance the issue of probable cause comes down to the adequacy of the basis given for the allegation that petitioner's income was $40,001.76 instead of the $17,665.31 he had reported. This is not the type of fact that can be physically observed. The amount of petitioner's income could only be determined by examining records and interviewing third persons familiar with petitioner's financial condition. Compare Holland v. United States, 348 U. S. 121. Here the affiant, a Special Agent of the Internal Revenue Service, swore that he had conducted just such an investigation and thereafter swore that he had personal knowledge as to petitioner's actual income. In such circumstances, the magistrate would be justified in accepting the agent's judgment of what he saw without requiring him to bring the records and persons to court, to list and total the items of unreported income or to otherwise explain how petitioner's actual income was calculated. We conclude that the challenged count of this indictment is not time-barred. Affirmed.