Opinion ID: 2063953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the remainder of subsection 709.4(2).

Text: Defendant concedes that if the portion of the subsection following the disjunctive is eliminated, the purpose of the statute can nevertheless remain standing and enforceable. The record suggests he would interpret the remaining part of subsection 709.4(2) to apply only in the case of a person so mentally deficient or incapacitated as to be unable to utter the words yes or no. We do not agree. Properly construed in light of the overall thrust of section 709.4, the obvious legislative intent, and our decision in Haner, we hold the remaining portion of subsection 709.4(2) protects not only completely incompetent persons but those who while having some degree of intellectual power and some capacity for instruction and improvement, are still so far below the normal in mental strength that they can offer no effectual resistance to the approach of those who will take advantage of their weakness. Haner, 186 Iowa at 1262, 173 N.W. at 226. In short, subsection 709.4(2) protects those who are so mentally incompetent or incapacitated as to be unable to understand the nature and consequences of the sex act. Such persons cannot give the meaningful consent required by the enactment. There is abundant authority from other jurisdictions to support our view that the capacity to consent in these situations presupposes an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences. Stephenson v. State, 35 Ala. App. 379, 383, 48 So.2d 255, 258, aff'd, 254 Ala. 313, 48 So.2d 259 (1950); People v. Boggs, 107 Cal.App. 492, 495, 290 P. 618, 619 (1930); People v. O'Neal, 50 Ill.App.3d 900, 906, 8 Ill.Dec. 871, 875-876, 365 N.E.2d 1333, 1337-38 (1977); see 65 Am.Jur.2d Rape § 9, at 766-67 (1972); Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1227, 1234-37 (1970). We are unimpressed by defendant's arguments that the statute is rendered vague by its requirement that the alleged violator determine another's mental capacity. The potential offender must simply determine if his or her partner understands the nature and consequences of engaging in the sex act. Under normal circumstances a mental incapacity to consent would be apparent in ordinary social intercourse. The potential offender who would engage in sex acts with a stranger may be required to ask questions to be safe, just as he or she would be required to do in order to ascertain the other's chronological age to avoid prosecution under subsection 709.4(3). The fact an erroneous judgment by an offender may still subject him or her to criminal sanction if the partner in fact does not possess the requisite mental capacity does not make the statute unconstitutional. This crime does not require knowledge or intent. As in the case of sexual abuse due to age status, the policies in support of protecting those who suffer mental incapacities outweigh the danger of mistake. See Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 228-29, 195 S.E.2d 392, 395-96 (1973). We hold the standard imposed by subsection 709.4(2) is clear: To avoid the proscribed conduct one must refrain from performing a sex act with a person who is mentally incapable of understanding the nature and possible consequences of sexual activity. It follows a trial information alleging a violation of subsection 709.4(2), The Code, as in this case, charges that the alleged offender has engaged in a sex act when the other participant is suffering from a mental defect or incapacity that precludes giving consent. The statute as truncated is constitutional. The charge will lie and should not have been dismissed. Defendant asserts that by agreement of counsel the charge was intended to allege only the unconstitutional portion of the statute. Of course any post-remand activity directed to this result would exceed the jurisdiction of our limited remand. State v. Johnson, 298 N.W.2d 293, 294 (Iowa 1980); State v. Hall, 249 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977). The trial information, the bill of particulars, and other papers before us do not indicate the charge was so limited. We affirm trial court's finding that the last portion of subsection 709.4(2) is unconstitutional. We reverse trial court's dismissal of the charge, and remand for further proceedings in conformance herewith. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.