Opinion ID: 1710486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Ground

Text: Section 6-3-2(b)(1) provides: In proceedings of an equitable nature against individuals: (1) [a]ll actions where real estate is the subject matter of the action, whether it is the exclusive subject matter of the action or not, must be commenced in the county where the same or a material portion thereof is situated. Martin and Auburn University insist that real estate, namely, the conference center and hotel, is the subject matter of [this] action. Referring to the contractual history of the development of the hotel and citing the counts of the complaint seeking rescission or, in the alternative, specific performance of the lease, they contend that this action is much more than simply transitory. Brief and Answer in Response to the Plaintiffs' Petition for Writ of Mandamus, at 16. Consequently, they argue, § 6-3-2(b)(1) requires the prosecution of this action in Lee Countythe situs of the conference center and hotel. We disagree with this premise and its conclusion. A `transitory' action is one [that] could have arisen anywhere. Ex parte City of Birmingham, 507 So.2d 471, 473 (Ala. 1987). By contrast, an action having real estate as its subject matter is an example of a local action, that is, one that could only have arisen in the particular locality where it did arise. Id. [L]ocal actions `are in the nature of suits in rem ... which are to be prosecuted where the thing on which they are founded is situated.' Reed v. City National Bank of Selma, 406 So.2d 906, 909 (Ala.1981). This Court stated in Reed: `The test as to whether an action is transitory or local is not, as a general proposition, the subject causing the injury, but the object suffering the injury, or, as the distinction is otherwise stated, it exists in the nature of the subject of the injury and not in the means used or the place at which the cause of action arises.' Id. at 906 (emphasis added). [F]or venue purposes an action on a lease is one in personam, not in rem, and is transitory and therefore may be brought in any county where other transitory actions could be brought. Ex parte Canady, 563 So.2d 1024, 1026 (Ala.1990). Moreover, [c]ontract actions are generally considered transitory even where damage to real property is involved.  Ex parte Teledyne Exploration, 436 So.2d 880, 882 (Ala.1983) (emphasis added). A number of these principles are illustrated in Ex parte Diamond, 596 So.2d 423 (Ala.1992). In that case, a general partnership composed of Sam Diamond (a Jefferson County resident) and Jake and Owen Aronov acquired a leasehold interest in a parcel of land located in Montgomery County. Id. at 424. In order to finance improvements on the property, the partnership borrowed money from Central Bank of the South (`Central Bank'), executing a note, a leasehold mortgage, and a security agreement to Central Bank.... Id. Subsequently, the partners executed to Central Bank a continuing guaranty jointly and severally guaranteeing all indebtedness of [the partnership] up to the sum of $563,285.04. Id. Eventually, the Aronovs purchased the note from Central Bank and sued Diamond in Montgomery County, alleging that he owed them his proportionate share of the remaining principal and interest ... on the note. Id. Diamond moved to transfer the action to Jefferson County, where he resided. The Aronovs objected to the transfer, contending that the real estate located in Montgomery County was the subject matter of the action. Id. The trial court denied Diamond's motion; he petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the court to transfer the action to Jefferson County. Id. In granting the petition, we explained: An allegation that `one of the parties owns real estate, or has substantial rights in real estate which are dependent upon the settlement of the controversy, is not enough to make real estate the subject matter of the suit.' Alabama Youth Services Board v. Ellis, 350 So.2d 405, 408 (Ala.1977). See also Wesson v. Wesson, 514 So.2d 947 (Ala. 1987) (`subject matter' was real estate where the nature of the complaint and relief sought involved the determination of the validity of a conveyance of land, which in turn determined title to the property); Clark v. Smith, 191 Ala. 166, 67 So. 1000 (1915) (complaint for partition must be filed in county where part of the land is located). In the present case, the complaint did not involve land; the relief sought was monetary compensation arising from a note executed by the partnership in which each partner was a one-third owner. The fact that the note was secured by a mortgage of real property does not turn the cause of action into one of which the `subject matter' is real estate. The complaint did not involve the determination of the validity of the leasehold interest or the validity of the mortgage of the Montgomery property, nor did it involve any determination of the validity of a conveyance of property or a question involving who owned legal or equitable title to property. There was also no count in the complaint seeking to foreclose the mortgage against Diamond. Therefore, the `subject matter' of the action is not real estate.... 596 So.2d at 425 (emphasis added). Similarly, this case involves none of the concerns identified in Ex parte Diamond as involving real estate sufficiently to invoke § 6-3-2(b)(1). The complaint cannot be construed as alleging any injury to the real estate. Cf. Reed v. City National Bank of Selma, 406 So.2d 906 (Ala.1981). Indeed, the principles discussed above compel the conclusion that this action is in personam and not in rem. The real estate located in Lee County is not the subject matter of this action as contemplated by § 6-3-2(b)(1).