Opinion ID: 1394268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discharge of the Remaining Sentence, Including CSP and Probation

Text: The State asserts the circuit court erred in discharging Picklesimer from his entire remaining sentence, including CSP and residual probation, pursuant to State v. Dawkins . The State first assigns error to the circuit court's finding that Picklesimer must be treated as having successfully completed CSP, because in the Department's good faith attempt to comply with McGrier and terminate Picklesimer's CSP due to his apparent fulfillment of the available revocation period, the Department effectively deprived him of the opportunity to successfully complete CSP. We agree. In Dawkins , this Court held that probationary terms, and mandatory CSP terms for sentences deriving from no parole offenses, run concurrently. 352 S.C. at 166-67, 573 S.E.2d at 785. Moreover, it held that under the strict construction of section 24-21-560(E), once a defendant participant of CSP successfully completes the CSP program, the remainder of the defendant's sentence, including any residual probation, would be discharged. Id.; see also § 24-21-560(E) (A prisoner who successfully completes a community supervision program pursuant to this section has satisfied his sentence and must be discharged from his sentence.). The Court, however, because it was unnecessary to the resolution of the case in Dawkins , did not define what it meant by successful completion of CSP. Dawkins, 352 S.C. at 167, 573 S.E.2d at 785 (Accordingly, Dawkins' sentence, including probation, is discharged upon successful completion of the CSP.) (emphasis in original). We now hold successful completion of CSP connotes the completion of a maximum of two continuous years of CSP, as mandated by section 24-21-560(B), without any violations or revocations, or a determination by the Department that a defendant has fulfilled his CSP responsibilities prior to two years' service in the program. If the defendant's CSP is revoked for a period due to violations, the CSP term begins anew upon the defendant's release. See § 24-21-560(D). However, we add the following caveat that incorporates our clarification of section 24-21-560(D) above: under no circumstances shall a defendant be incarcerated, or forced to participate in mandatory CSP or residual probation, stemming from the same conviction, outside of the time given by the trial judge in the original sentence, which encompasses both the suspended and unsuspended portions of the sentence. Under this adjusted interpretation, Picklesimer would not have been treated as having successfully completed his CSP because he had not served two continuous years without any violations or revocations of the CSP. Additionally then, Picklesimer's CSP would have continued to run, and he would have been eligible for incarceration due to revocation until the outside time limit of his original sentence, June 1, 2010, or until he successfully completed his CSP. Moreover, this definition of successful completion is entirely reconcilable with this Court's holding in Dawkins . If a defendant is sentenced to a term including both a suspended and unsuspended portion, once the unsuspended portion has been served, or eighty-five percent of which has been served, the defendant will be released into the Department's CSP or normal probation program. If the defendant is enrolled and thereafter successfully completes a CSP according to the definition expressed above, under Dawkins , the defendant's sentence will be discharged, including any residual probation. If the defendant is required to enroll in normal probation upon initial release, rather than CSP, the probationary term will continue to run until the end of the original sentence. The State next contends the circuit court erred in finding no distinction between successful completion of a CSP program and the inability to continue CSP due to a defendant reaching the maximum allowable incarceration time attributable to CSP revocations. Based on our clarification and definition of successful completion above, the State's contention is rendered moot, as the scenario that occurred in Picklesimer's case, under the erroneous interpretation of section 24-21-560(D), is no longer a possibility. More specifically, because the Court finds that the original sentence encompasses both the suspended and unsuspended portions of the sentence, coupled with our pronouncement in Dawkins that CSP and normal probation run concurrently, then a defendant will either successfully complete his CSP, or continue in CSP due to violation revocations until the end of the original sentence, at which time the sentence will have been fulfilled. As a result, the problem of fulfilling the maximum allowable incarceration time prior to the end of a defendant's original sentence is no longer a temporal possibility. See Mathis v. South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 260 S.C. 344, 195 S.E.2d 713 (1973) (stating when there remains no actual controversy, this Court will not pass on moot and academic questions or render judgment which will have no practical effect). Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is REVERSED. TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur. BEATTY, J., concurring in a separate opinion.