Opinion ID: 403925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Eligibility of the KKK

Text: 10 The KKK meets at least two other threshhold requirements of the EAJA. It is a prevailing party in civil litigation against an agency of the federal government. Second, the KKK's demand for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is clearly one kind of civil action in which fees may be awarded under section 2412. The mandatory award provision under section 2412(d) excludes tort actions, but the legislative history of the EAJA notes that constitutional torts are not considered a part of this exclusion. H.R.Rep.No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4953, 4997. See also Matthews v. United States, 526 F.Supp. 993 (M.D.Ga.1981). 11 To qualify for a mandatory fee award under section 2412(d), the KKK faces two additional hurdles. First, it must demonstrate that it meets the financial eligibility requirement set forth in section 2412(d)(2)(B), which requires that the organization's net worth did not exceed $5,000,000 at the time the civil action was filed ... (or that the organization had) not more than 500 employees at the time the civil action was filed. 11 Assuming the KKK meets the financial eligibility requirement, the burden shifts to the federal government to prove that its position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. 12 Neither the Act nor the legislative history provides a conclusive answer as to whether the position for which substantial justification must be shown is the United States' litigation position or the United States' posture in its pre-trial actions. See Alspach v. District Director of Internal Revenue, 527 F.Supp. 225, 228 (D.Md.1981). The test of whether or not a government action is substantially justified is essentially one of reasonableness. H.R.Rep.No. 96-1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4989. Where the Government can show that its position had a reasonable basis both in law and fact, no award will be made. This standard represents a middle ground between an automatic award of fees and a restrictive position which would have required the prevailing party to show that Government action was arbitrary, frivolous, and groundless. 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4993. The special circumstances exception provides a safety valve for the Government when it is advancing in good faith a credible, though novel, rule of law. Id. 13 This Court does not have before it adequate facts to determine whether the KKK meets the financial limitation requirement or whether the Government was substantially justified in its position. Furthermore, the basic role of this Court is merely to review a fee award or denial of an award under the EAJA, modifying it only if the failure to make the award, or the calculation of the amount of the award, was an abuse of discretion. 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 5012-13. 14 This cause is therefore remanded to the district court to determine if the KKK qualifies under either the mandatory or discretionary provisions of the EAJA. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff submit an application for fees and other expenses to the district court within thirty days of the issuance of this mandate. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 15 The reconsideration of this Court's judgment in light of the EAJA does not affect this Court's prior determination that this cause should also be remanded to the district court to determine what amount, if any, of attorneys' fees reasonably may be assessed against the Board. Accordingly, this Court's remand for that purpose, as set forth in East Baton Rouge Parish, 643 F.2d at 1040-41, is reinstated. 16 REMANDED.