Opinion ID: 1823280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Violations of Jury Sequestration/ Defendant's Assignments of Error numbers 12, 13, 21 and 22

Text: In these assignments of error, the defendant alleges the trial judge committed reversible error when it allowed various violations of the sequestration order. The first alleged violation occurred when the judge allowed the jurors to have supervised family visits on the weekend. These visits were pursuant to an unpublished court rule of the 27th Judicial District, and the trial judge issued a per curiam to address this assignment of error: The Court received the defendant's assignments of error on June 9, 1998. The Court considers it necessary to specially address assignments of error numbered 12, 21, and 22 which address supervised weekend family visitation with the jurors. Beginning with the case of State v. Smith , a capital case, this Court instituted procedure which permitted sequestered jurors to visit with family members under a well defined procedure. This procedure is in place in the 27th Judicial District as an unpublished court rule. A copy of the rule is attached. A copy should already be in the record. This procedure was approved by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal in State v. Smith, 96-261 (La.App. 3 Cir.12/30/96), 687 So.2d 529 (La.App. 3 Cir.1996), writ denied 97-0314 (La.6/30/97), 696 So.2d 1004. The record in this case will confirm that the procedure of the rule was followed, and the spirit of the rule of sequestration was followed. The rule provides: REGULATIONS FOR FAMILY VISITS IN CAPITAL CASES We, the undersigned judges of the 27th Judicial District Court, establish the following regulations regarding family visits in capital cases: A. Availability, Communication 1. The Court shall announce to the selected jurors that week-end family visits with family members will be available to them. Family members as used in this context means: Father, mother, husband, wife, or child. 2. The deputy in charge of a sequestered juror or his or her immediate supervisor shall make contact with the juror's family member and inform the family member that week-end visitations will be made available. B. When Permitted Family visits shall be made on Sundays. However, Saturdays may be used when available. But only one visit per week-end will be permitted. C. Procedure During Visits 1. There can be no exchange between the juror and family members of any a. written communication, b. videos, c. pictures, or d. taped messages. However, jurors can receive clothes and money from family members. These items must be inspected by the deputy in charge. The clothes have to be inspected by the deputy for messages, writings, or other communications. 2. Group visits are prohibited. 3. During visits the jurors and family members have to be monitored by a deputy from the beginning to the end of the visit. 4. All visits are limited to thirty (30) minutes or less. The time allotted should be reasonable under the circumstances. 5. The deputy shall instruct the jurors and their family members that the case cannot be discussed or even mentioned in their conversation. D. Insurance of Compliance The first working day following family visits, the presiding judge shall interrogate each juror, separately, on the record and ascertain: 1. What matters were discussed during the family visits; 2. Whether there was any discussion of the case; 3. Whether the family member furnished the juror with any writing that may have contained any information about the case. The record shows that the judge did individually interrogate the jurors following the weekend visits in compliance with this rule. The second alleged violation occurred when a juror was allowed to fraternize with individuals in the courthouse during recess: Ms. Thomas: Mr. Tromblay. While we were all outside during a break, I noticed that Mr. Sylvester was babying a baby and I don't who [sic] that unscheduled happy visitorwhat the deal was. The Court: I'm going to find out about that right now. Where is the deputy in charge? The Bailiff: The what? The Court: The deputy in charge of the jury. The Bailiff: We got about half a dozen of them. The Court: I'll take however many they've got. (Deputies brought to the bench.) The Court: During the last break Ms. Thomas says Mr. Sylvester was holding a baby. Was he doing that? Deputy: I didn't see. I let them out. The Bailiff: He was talking to me outside. The Court: Let meMr. Sylvester, would you come up a second, sir. Mr. Sylvester: [sic] During the last break, did you at any time hold a baby outside? Mr. Sylvester: Yes, sir. The Court: Who was that? Mr. Sylvester: I don't know. The Court: You don't know who it was? Just a little baby? Mr. Sylvester: That was just a little baby. I had no idea The Court: Go sit down. Come on back up here. (Summoning the attorneys.) That was just a baby and he didn't have any idea whose baby it was. Mr. Frederick: We can assume he didn't discuss it with him? The Court: With the baby, if he did Ms. Thomas: That's a cute baby. Mr. Tromblay: We're satisfied that there's no problem. Mr. Frederick: Thank you, Judge. The next witness was then called. The third alleged violation occurred when Roma Eslick was present in the courtroom during the arguments that occurred immediately prior to the penalty phase; although Ms. Eslick heard the attorneys argue, she did not hear any witnesses testify. [5] The court declined to exclude her from testifying, noting [t]he rule of sequestration deals with testimony of witnesses, not discussions by the Court and counsel. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 791(B) provides [i]n capital cases, after each juror is sworn in he shall be sequestered, unless the state and the defense have jointly moved that the jury not be sequestered. The 1995 revisions to this article changed the former mandatory sequestration requirement; sequestration is now permissive. [6] Even under the former mandatory sequestration requirement, we have declined to reverse convictions when the alleged sequestration violation is de minimis and there is no prejudice to the defendant. We refused to reverse the defendant's conviction in State v. Liner, 397 So.2d 506 (La.1981) because six sworn jurors were allowed to fraternize with five potential jurors during a fifteen minute recess, as the defendant was not prejudiced by this technical violation of sequestration. Logically, the same result has been reached with the permissive sequestration provisions of revised La.C.Cr.P. art. 791(B). In State v. Robertson, 97-0177 (La.3/4/98), 712 So.2d 8, we declined to reverse the defendant's conviction based on an alleged sequestration violation that occurred when one juror's husband called her to complain about the kids not being used to him. Robertson, 712 So.2d at 23. There was no indication that the juror had discussed the case with her spouse, nor did the record reveal any prejudice resulting from the phone call. In the present case, we find that the alleged violations of sequestration involving Mr. Sylvester and the family visits do not warrant reversal. The incident involving Mr. Sylvester was minimal, and the defendant does not allege, nor can we discern, how this incident could have prejudiced him. Indeed, as is evidenced by the record excerpt above, trial counsel for defendant seemed satisfied that the incident was non-prejudicial. Similarly, no prejudice resulted from the family visits. The record reveals that deputies were always present during the visits, and, when individually questioned by the trial court, the jurors affirmatively stated that they did not engage in forbidden communications with their visitors. Thus, no prejudice resulted to the defendant from these visits, and these assignments of error lack merit. Louisiana Code of Evidence 615(A), which governs witness sequestration, provides: On its own motion the court may, and on request of a party the court shall, order that the witnesses be excluded from the courtroom or from a place where they can see or hear the proceedings, and refrain from discussing the facts of the case with anyone other than counsel in the case. In the interests of justice, the court may exempt any witness from its order of exclusion. The rule of witness sequestration is intended to prevent witnesses from being influenced by the testimony of earlier witnesses and to strengthen the role of cross-examination in developing the facts. State v. Chester, 97-2790 (La.12/1/98), 724 So.2d 1276; State v. Mullins, 353 So.2d 243 (La.1977). As noted by the trial judge, the rule does not pertain to discussions between the judge and attorneys. Ms. Eslick heard only these discussions; she did not hear any witness testimony. Further, defendant does not allege, and our examination of the record does not reveal, any prejudice as a result of Ms. Eslick's presence during the arguments. Thus, both because Ms. Eslick did not hear the testimony of any other witnesses and because there was no prejudice to defendant as a result of this incident, this assignment of error lacks merit.