Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct

Text: Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct during his penalty phase argument, violating her rights under state and federal law. As noted above, a prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process. ( People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11; accord, Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, supra, 416 U.S. at p. 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868.) In other words, the misconduct must be of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. ( United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392.) A prosecutor's conduct `that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' violates California law `only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.'' ( People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 167, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) By failing to make contemporaneous objection in this situation, where the record supports no contention that to do so would have been futile, Coffman failed to preserve any of her claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase argument. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) She contends, however, that her trial counsel's failure to make appropriate objection constituted ineffective assistance. In any event, as will appear, Coffman's contention that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct lacks merit, and her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. Coffman first contends the prosecutor improperly asserted that the very fact she was defending against the charges in this case with a defense of domination or duress, and in a posture conflicting with Marlow's defense, was itself evidence of sociopathy. She quotes the following portion of the prosecutor's argument: And I think this theory, the alternative theory, that the defendants' classic sociopaths synergistic result affect each other results in this violent crime spree, really is the best theory to explain all the evidence you've got, for one thing. [ļ] I mean, how can you get a fact pattern where each defendant can claim at least plausibly that they were dominated and controlled by the other defendant? [ļ] Well, we have heard about sociopaths and what they are. [ļ] They are people that abuse and exploit everyone they meet their whole life, right? [ļ] So if you have two sociopaths, of course, they probably abused and exploited each other. In the same vein, Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suggesting that, to the extent her defense drew upon her fear of harm to her son as motivating her to participate with Marlow in the charged crimes (in the face of evidence that she failed to mention any such fear to investigating officers after her arrest and that she wished to take Josh from his grandparents and have him come to live with herself and Marlow), Coffman was exploiting and abusing her son. With these arguments, the prosecutor appears to have been urging the jury to adopt a particular interpretation of the evidence, not â as Coffman asserts â misstating the law by asserting that the mere proffer of a defense is itself evidence of guilt. Likewise, the prosecutor's characterizations of Coffman's personality (an uncontrollable temper, utterly arrogant, total disrespect for authority) did not purport to express a professional expertise, but constituted instead permissible comment on the evidence. There was no misconduct and no basis on which to object. Coffman complains the prosecutor misstated evidence in arguing that the jury should draw no inferences favorable to Coffman from the testimony of Marlow's former wife, Katherine Davis, regarding the abuse she suffered at Marlow's hands. The prosecutor said: I think in the â the thing I talked about in our guilt phase argument that I found repulsive that â is that battered woman syndrome we see one of Mr. Marlow's former wives. [ļ] She clearly fits into that category. [ļ] Of course, you'll remember she got out as quickly as she could. [ļ] She had injuries. Corroboration. [ļ] Miss Coffman's defense team is hoping that the genuine repulsion that we all feel towards that kind of a crime will somehow wash over Mr. Marlow and make her seem better. [ļ] And I think they are trying to exploit that in this battered woman syndrome stuff. Coffman points out that Davis testified Marlow left her after a particularly violent episode, not that she (Davis) left Marlow. Coming as it did in the context of the prosecutor's argument emphasizing the evidence of Coffman's responsibility for the offenses, however, this minor misstatement would not, to a reasonable probability, have unfairly influenced the jury. Coffman further argues the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence in attributing ownership of the shovel with which Novis was buried, and the handcuffs with which Novis (and possibly Murray) was restrained, to both Coffman and Marlow, rather than Marlow alone. But the record contains sufficient evidence of defendants' joint participation in the offenses to support the prosecutor's use of the third person plural pronoun. Coffman complains the prosecutor improperly referred to nonstatutory aggravating evidence in referring in his penalty phase closing argument to her celebratory behavior at the Denny's restaurant following the murder of Lynell Murray. ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 773, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) We see no misconduct in the prosecutor's discussion of this evidence, which arguably tended to suggest Coffman's voluntary, active role in the crimes, contrary to her defense of domination and duress, and thus bore on section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the offense. Coffman further contends the prosecutor committed Davenport error (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861) in suggesting that deficiencies in her defense of duress constituted aggravating evidence. Clearly, however, in context the prosecutor was merely commenting on the state of the evidence, as he was entitled to do. No misconduct appears.