Opinion ID: 2295861
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court, of course, does have a role in asking questions.

Text: It is beyond question that a court may interrogate a witness in the aid of truth and furtherance of justice [citations omitted], and it is not only the right but the duty of the trial judge to participate directly in the trial, including the propounding of questions when it becomes essential to the development of the facts of the case. [Citations omitted.] To what extent the court will intervene for this purpose is a matter of discretion. [Citations omitted]. [ Womack v. United States, D.C.App., 350 A.2d 381, 382-83 (1976).] [83] There was only one significant instance of the court's asking questions. [84] During the testimony of Mr. Simon, one of the hostages, after counsel for Hamid had completed cross-examination, the court inquired about Hamid's role in the incident where Adam and Latif had broken through a door at B'nai B'rith, Adam had stabbed Mr. Kirkland, and someone had said, Do that again and I'll kill you! In the process, the court incorrectly referred to Latif, not Adam, as the one who stabbed Mr. Kirkland, although a few moments later the witness testified that Latif was the one who said that [ i. e., the `kill you' statement] to the person who did the stabbing, thereby implicitly correcting the court's misstatement. (Previous testimony had also established that Adam had stabbed Kirkland.) After completing its questions, the court permitted counsel for Hamid to resume cross-examination, whereupon counsel was able to establish, for a second time, that Hamid had not made the kill you statement. Although the court, in this instance, intervened in the sensitive area of identifying the participants in specific assaults, it is clear that the court was attempting to perform a clarifying role. There was no abuse of discretion  and no prejudice. See Womack, supra . Only one other instance should be mentioned. After counsel for Khaalis and Muzikir had completed cross-examination of Mr. Rudman, a B'nai B'rith hostage, the court followed up counsel's last question (whether Rudman had had lunch yesterday with another witness, Henry Siegel) by asking Rudman: Did you discuss your testimony with anyone before you came in here today? The witness replied, No. The court then pursued defense counsel's questions about Rudman's statement to the police and probed further into the question whether Rudman had testified on the basis of his own recollections or of newspaper or other media accounts. [85] Counsel for Khaalis objected. The court's questions were entirely proper in seeking to insure that publicity  before and during trial  and collaboration of government witnesses were not influencing the testimony. Moreover, the court made its role clear to the jury at this point: Ladies and gentlemen, so that there is no misunderstanding here, the court can ask questions for your benefit. As you know, you sit there and you cannot ask questions. When the court feels that it is relevant that that information be given to you, the court is empowered to ask these questions to clarify issues, because I take no position. I don't know what the answers are, but I felt that these issues should be presented to you. There was no error. On several other occasions the court asked a few, brief follow-up questions to clarify testimony usually after all counsel  government and defense  had indicated that they had no further questions. [86] Far from undertaking a prosecutorial role, the court asked questions in the aid of truth. Womack, supra at 382. Compare Haughton v. Byers, D.C.App., 398 A.2d 18, 21 (1979) (new trial ordered in personal injury action because of trial court's extensive examination of witnesses and highly prejudicial comments before the jury). 2. Appellants allege a potpourri of approximately 20 other instances of the trial court's assuming a prosecutorial role, usually in the form of objecting itself to defense counsel's questions. In at least seven of these, the jury was either out of the courtroom or the comments were at the bench out of the jury's hearing. [87] On one occasion the court objected to a question by Khaalis' counsel because the court had already ruled on the issue. [88] On another, the court objected because the same counsel was arguing with a witness. [89] On still another, the court was clearly not assuming a prosecutorial role; it was merely issuing a legal ruling. [90] Occasionally, however, in sustaining a government objection, the court added an unnecessary prefatory remark; e. g., I suggest that you should have objected a long time ago because it is improper and irrelevant. [91] And again: Excuse me. Isn't this beyond the scope of your direct? Are you [the prosecutor] permitting this? [92] Although such remarks were unfortunate, Clifton, supra at 301, see Part VIII. E. supra, they were few in number and not, overall, prejudicial. Compare Williams v. United States, supra at 847. 3. In summary, the court, through its questions and sua sponte objections, facilitated the fact-finding process; it did not side with the prosecution. Compare Womack, supra , with Petway v. United States, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 798 (1978).