Opinion ID: 400072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: procedures governing corrective action cases

Text: 51 We turn, then, to the merits. The provisions of the CSRA governing corrective actions lack both the detail and the historical background of other sections of the Act. See p. 155 supra. Accordingly, we must begin by briefly exploring the purposes of this new type of proceeding. In that effort, we are guided not only by our usual policy of deferring to an agency's interpretation of its enabling act, but especially by the requirement that we pay heed to the contemporaneous construction of a (new) statute by (those) charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new. 40 52
53 While petitioners seem to view the Special Counsel as both public defender for federal employees and the final judge of whistleblowing claims, the Board conceives the Special Counsel more as a prosecutor charged with vindicating the Act's goal of achieving a fair, efficient, and lawfully-conducted Civil Service. The Board thus draws a significant distinction between the purpose of a corrective action proceeding and that of a Chapter 77 appeal. While appeals concern personal employment disputes, the Board argues, the thrust (of corrective action petitions) is toward systemic, not individual problems in the federal merit sytem .... Brief for Respondents at 35, n.17. 54 The Board's analysis of the Special Counsel's role is supported by the language and legislative history of the Act. It is evident on the face of the statute that the Special Counsel may seek to remedy prohibited practices that do not aggrieve any particular employee. See p. 154 supra. Moreover, even in cases initiated by a complaining employee, the Special Counsel can apparently make compromises with the agency involved, seek corrective action short of that requested by the complainant, and, we assume, refuse to pursue the case at all. 41 Quite clearly, then, the duties of the Special Counsel are not equivalent to those of an employees' advocate. 55 Rather, the authors of the CSRA apparently expected the Special Counsel to act as an ombudsman responsible for investigating and prosecuting violations of the Act. 42 The Special Counsel was modeled after the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) who performs an independent prosecutorial role with respect to employment relations in the private sector. 43 Furthermore, the reports and debates concerning the CSRA are replete with characterizations of the Special Counsel as a prosecutor or watchdog of merit system abuses. 44 In short, if Chapter 77 appeals can be analogized to civil proceedings in which the immediate interests are personal to the litigants, corrective action petitions are comparable to criminal prosecutions designed to vindicate the public interest. 56 On this view of the Act, the principal recourse for individual employees who have suffered cognizable injury from a personnel action is to a Chapter 77 appeal-and not to the office of Special Counsel. But see note 41 supra. There will, of course, be many instances in which the interests of the Special Counsel and of a particular employee converge. An individual improperly discharged for whistleblowing, for example, could presumably seek the assistance of the Special Counsel in a Chapter 77 appeal 45 or forego that route entirely and rely on the Special Counsel to remedy the separation through a corrective action petition. Moreover, the Board may possess authority to merge corrective action and Chapter 77 appeals when they arise from the same set of facts. 46 Even in situations like those posited, however, the roles of the individual employee and the Special Counsel may differ. While the former seeks personal restoration, the latter is fundamentally concerned with the integrity of the merit system. As the Senate Report explained: 57 The Special Counsel should not passively await employee complaints, but rather, vigorously pursue merit system abuses on a systematic basis. He should seek action by the Merit Board to eliminate both individual instances of merit abuse and patterns of prohibited personnel practices. 47 58
59 Having established the nature of the new corrective action proceeding and the role of the Special Counsel, we can now consider petitioners' various challenges to the procedures employed by the Board. Petitioners' first claim is that the Board exceeded its authority in conducting an evidentiary hearing on the facts underlying the deputies' allegations. Instead, they argue, the Board was bound by the legal and factual conclusions of the Special Counsel and was limited to determining the appropriate remedy. In response, the Board contends that the authority of the Special Counsel extends only to investigation and prosecution and that all adjudicatory power is lodged in the Board itself. 60 We agree with the Board. As outlined above, the language and history of the Act consistently describe the Special Counsel in terms that suggest a prosecutor rather than a judge. The same sources clearly assign adjudicatory functions to the Board. Section 1205(a)(1) of the Act, for instance, grants the Board comprehensive power to hear and adjudicate all matters within its purview. 48 With respect to petitions brought by the Special Counsel, section 1208 gives the Board final authority to issue stays and section 1207 requires the Board to conduct a hearing when the Special Counsel's complaint is directed at an individual. See note 42 supra. 61 Moreover, the corrective action section itself is cast in terms that evoke a prosecutor-judge relationship between the Special Counsel and the Board. When the Special Counsel finds reasonable grounds to believe that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, exists, or is to be taken, he or she may request  action by the Board. Section 1206(c)(1)(A) & (B) (emphasis added). The Board correctly points out that these phrases are typically employed in defining the standard for bringing an enforcement action. 49 Together with the constant references in the legislative history to the Board's quasi-judicial role, 50 the Act's language undermines petitioners' argument that the Special Counsel's determinations are binding on the Board. 51 62 In light of its broad responsibility to adjudicate merit system disputes, the Board certainly has authority to conduct evidentiary hearings in appropriate cases. As previously noted, section 1205(a)(1) allows the Board to hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or adjudication, of all matters within (its) jurisdiction .... While the corrective action sections do not require a hearing when the respondent is an agency rather than an individual, 52 we have often emphasized that agencies may adopt procedures beyond the minima explicitly prescribed by statute. FTC v. Brigadier Industries Corp., 613 F.2d 1110, 1115 (D.C.Cir.1979). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524, 98 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978); O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C.Cir.1974). In light of the serious factual disputes and credibility issues raised by the Special Counsel's petition, we believe the Board acted reasonably in ordering a hearing in this case. 63
64 Petitioners next contend that the Board erred in requiring the Special Counsel to prove the existence of prohibited personnel practices by the preponderance of the evidence. Asserting that the Board must at least give the determinations of the Special Counsel great deference, the deputies argue that the filing of a corrective action petition makes out a prima facie case which the charged agency must rebut by clear and convincing evidence. Respondents counter that the Board's allocation of the burden of proof is supported by other provisions of the Act and by the case law in analogous areas. 65 As section 1206 is silent on the question of which party bears the burden of proof, we must sustain the Board's choice if it is consistent with the statutory scheme and reasonable. See FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290-94, 85 S.Ct. 1459, 1467-69, 14 L.Ed.2d 383 (1965). We believe the Board's analysis satisfies these criteria. In Chapter 77 appeals, an agency seeking to take a challenged personnel action bears the burden of showing that its decision is justified by concerns for the efficiency of the civil service. See section 7701(c)(1). Yet the employee, and not the agency, apparently bears the burden of proving allegations of prohibited personnel practices. See section 7701(c) (2)(B). 53 These provisions may reflect a congressional assumption that agency reprisals are relatively exceptional 54 and that official regularity in this regard should be presumed. See Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 717 n.38 (D.C.Cir.1977). The Board could reasonably conclude that, especially in light of the prosecutorial nature of the proceeding, see p. 162 supra, the same principle should apply in a corrective action case. 66 Requiring the Special Counsel to demonstrate that an agency's action was improperly based on retaliatory motives is also consistent with the rule in other employment contexts. A public employee claiming a violation of the first amendment, for instance, must prove that protected activities constituted a substantial cause of a disciplinary action. Mount Healthy City School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). 55 Similarly, both the General Counsel of the NLRB and employees asserting rights under the Civil Rights Act bear the burden of demonstrating prohibited reprisal motives in discharge cases. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (civil rights); Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981) (civil rights); Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1980); District 65, Distributive Workers of America v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 1155, 1165 (D.C.Cir.1978). See also Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1384-87 (5th Cir. 1979) (allegations of prosecution brought in retaliation for first amendment activities). 67
68 As noted above, p. 157 supra, the Board decided that, in order to demonstrate the existence of prohibited personnel practices, the Special Counsel must prove that the official accused of taking the retaliatory action against the whistleblower had knowledge that the protected disclosure had been made and by whom. Petitioners agree with the Board that official knowledge of protected activities constitutes an essential element of a reprisal finding. They read the Board's opinion, however, as requiring a showing of direct, personal knowledge by the final agency decisionmaker. Such a requirement, petitioners argue, conflicts with the purpose of the whistleblower provisions of the CSRA by permitting prohibited retaliations to be insulated by layers of bureaucratic ignorance. Moreover, petitioners claim, the Board's imposition of an actual knowledge requirement with respect to the disclosures is inconsistent with the Board's treatment of the EEO-related claims. 56 69 There can be no doubt that a rule limiting retaliation findings to situations in which the top agency official has actual knowledge of the protected activities would seriously undercut the CSRA's goal of strengthening management accountability. Section 2302(c), for instance, provides: 70 The head of each agency shall be responsible for the prevention of prohibited personnel practices, for the compliance with and enforcement of applicable civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and other aspects of personnel management. Any individual to whom the head of an agency delegates authority for personnel management, or for any aspect thereof, shall be similarly responsible within the limits of the delegation. 71 In elaborating on this provision, the Senate Report explained, to the extent that managerial or supervisory authority is delegated, this section means that responsibility for insuring compliance with the merit system, and potential disciplinary liability for failing to ensure compliance, will follow such a delegation. 57 The report continued: 72 The delegation will not, however, relieve the head of the executive agency or other top officials for ultimate responsibility for personnel actions and policies within the agency, to the extent that such officials have knowledge or should have knowledge of the actions taken or policies implemented. (Emphasis added.) 58 73 Thus, the statute imposes on agency heads an affirmative obligation to prevent prohibited practices of which they are or should be aware. We agree with petitioners, therefore, that constructive knowledge of protected activities on the part of one with ultimate responsibility for a personnel action may support an inference of retaliatory intent. Moreover, while delegation of authority does not relieve an agency head of responsibility, subordinates with power to effect a personnel action may also be called to account. Thus, section 2302(b) expressly prohibits (a)ny employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action from taking such an action for prohibited reasons. 74 While the Board's opinion could have been clearer, we believe it adequately conformed to these principles. With respect to the agency head, the Board was explicit:We are compelled by the record here to conclude that Director Hall did not have actual or constructive knowledge that these deputies had engaged in protected activities. Rather, he acted in full reliance upon the recommendation of the management review team which ... was for the most part based upon sound management considerations. 59 75 In support of these conclusions, the Board detailed the evidence showing Hall's lack of actual knowledge and noted the absence of evidence to the contrary. 60 The Board then considered the Special Counsel's argument that knowledge of the disclosures by the management review team should be attributed to Hall. 61 On review of the evidence, the Board rejected the factual predicate of the argument, crediting the uniform testimony of the team's members that they did not know that the four deputies whose transfers they recommended had made disclosures to the congressmen. 62 Finally, the Board found no basis for application of the small plant doctrine, a labor law rule attributing knowledge of protected activities to employers of relatively small labor forces. 63 Although the Board occasionally employed the phrase actual knowledge in its treatment of these points, its analysis implicitly acknowledged the possibility that a finding of retaliation could be based on constructive knowledge as well. 76 The Board also recognized that retaliatory intent on the part of Hall's subordinates, even if not attributable to the Director, could form the basis of a prohibited practice to the extent that they contributed to the decision to take the personnel actions. The only individuals whose views might have lead to the transfer orders and who knew about the whistleblowing were three officials of the Marshals Service: Angel, Lora, and Vandergrift. See p. 157 supra. The evidence did not indicate that either Vandergrift or Lora had played any role in the decision to transfer the deputies. 64 While Angel did seek the reassignment of three of the petitioners, the Board determined that his suggestion played no part in the ultimate decision: 77 (A)ssuming that Marshal Angel had the requisite knowledge and acted with retaliatory intent in recommending the transfers of Deputies Frazier, Reilly, Morris, and Jordan, that recommendation was a nullity since Hall did not act on it. Instead, Hall ordered the transfers of Chief Deputy Bowler and Deputies Love, Reilly, Morris, and Frazier, acting in reliance upon the recommendations of the management review team. 65 78 In sum, the Special Counsel alleged that officials of the Marshals Service recommended or ordered personnel actions in retaliation for protected activities. The Board properly assumed that such a claim presupposes that individuals with actual or constructive knowledge of the activities helped cause the personnel actions. Fairly read, the Board's opinion determined that, in this case, those who effected the transfers had no knowledge and those with knowledge had no effect. 79
80 Frazier, whose transfer was rescinded by the Board, challenges the Board's refusal to award him attorney's fees. The Board concluded that the authority to award fees granted by section 7701(g) of the Act does not extend to corrective action proceedings. Relying on the language, placement, and history of the section, the Board decided that its power to grant fees was limited to Chapter 77 appeal cases. 81 We begin by noting that monetary liability may not be imposed against a federal agency unless Congress has clearly waived sovereign immunity. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 267-68, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1626-27, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); N.A.A.C.P. v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied sub nom. Andrulis v. U. S., 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3012, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1980). We must decide, therefore, whether such a waiver can be found in the express language of section 7701(g) or by necessary implication from the statutory context in which (the) fee provision arises. Id. at 516-17. 82
83 (T)he Board, or an administrative law judge or other employee of the Board designated to hear a case, may require payment by the agency involved of reasonable attorney's fees incurred by an employee or applicant for employment if the employee or applicant for employment is the prevailing party and the Board, administrative law judge, or other employee, as the case may be, determines that payment by the agency is warranted in the interests of justice, including any case in which a prohibited personnel practice was engaged in by the agency or any case in which the agency's action was clearly without merit. (Emphasis added.) 84 The section is not expressly limited to appeals brought under Chapter 77. Indeed, it extends to any case and explicitly includes those, like the present one, that involve prohibited personnel practices. 85 The Board nevertheless relies on the emphasized phrases to argue that the provision's language clearly presupposes the existence of ... an appeal. Brief for MSPB at 14. We find the Board's reading strained. First, the Board notes that the beginning of the section refers to the decisionmakers assigned by the Act to Chapter 77 appeals. See section 7701(b). Yet section 1205, on whose broad grant of procedural discretion the Board depends in another context, see p. 164 supra, specifically permits the Board to delegate the hearing of all matters within (its) jurisdiction to the same decisionmakers. 86 Second, the Board contends that the phrase hear a case limits the operation of the section to those proceedings in which the Act expressly provides for a hearing. This argument stands somewhat uncomfortably beside the Board's insistence that it had the power-perhaps even the duty-to conduct a hearing in this case. See p. 164 supra. In any event, the provision is not, by its terms restricted to cases which must include a formal hearing. Rather, the language easily covers any case the Board chooses to hear. 87 Third, the Board suggests that an employee can only be a prevailing party within the language of the section when he or she appeals as of right under Chapter 77. In this very case, however, the Board permitted the deputies, through their attorneys, fully (to) participate in this proceeding as any other party. The Board thus implicitly recognized that intervenors can have the status of parties. The rights conferred by that status may include the right to request attorney's fees. Cf. United States v. Board of Education of Waterbury, Connecticut, 605 F.2d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding authority to award fees to district court intervenor). 88 Finally, the Board asserts that the last clause of the fee provision which gives examples of when an award is 'warranted in the interest of justice,' refers to specified kinds of appeal cases, as the introductory word 'including' indicates. Answering Brief for MSPB at 3. While including certainly suggests an example, the phrase any case hardly seems restricted to appeals. The instant proceeding was manifestly a case in which a prohibited personnel practice was engaged in by the agency, as the Board itself determined. 89 In short, we are unconvinced by the Board's effort to import unusual meaning into the words of the section. The phrases hear a case and prevailing party are not, as this case demonstrates, restricted in common usage to the type of action contemplated by Chapter 77. And the reference to any case involving prohibited practices plainly extends to all proceedings in which action is sought to identify and correct such practices. Read naturally, the language of the provision clearly waives sovereign immunity with respect to any case in which an employee or applicant for employment appears as a party. 90 2. Legislative intent. The Board suggests that, however broad the language of section 7701(g) may be, there are independent indications that Congress intended to limit the operation of the provision to Chapter 77 appeals. Specifically, the Board points to the fact that the fees provision is part of a section entitled Appellate procedures which in turn appears in Chapter 77. Furthermore, the Board notes, references to fees in the legislative history occasionally speak of appeals but never mention corrective action cases. For reasons just detailed, the Board's parsing of the section fails to disclose the kinds of linguistic ambiguities that require resort to interpretive aids like placement and history. We believe, nevertheless, that the Board's contentions reflect an unduly narrow understanding of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we will discuss them briefly. 91 We may assume, from the section's placement and from various references in the legislative history to appeals, that Congress expected the fees provision to operate chiefly in the context of Chapter 77 actions. That fact alone, however, does not demonstrate that Congress intended to limit its waiver of immunity to such cases. At least two views of the legislative intent are plausible. Congress may, as the Board suggests, have assumed that the presence of the Special Counsel and the nature of corrective action proceedings make fee awards in such cases unnecessary or unwise. Alternatively, Congress may have allowed awards in all cases in which employees participate as parties. In that case, references in the history to appeals may simply reflect the fact that the possibility of such participation in corrective action proceedings was not immediately apparent to Congress. 92 We believe the latter hypothesis is more consistent with the available evidence. The purpose of the fees provision was set forth in the Senate Report at length: 93 The Civil Service Commission currently does not have the authority to require agencies to pay the attorney fees of employees who prevail in their appeals. Employees whose agencies have taken unfounded actions against them may spend a considerable amount of money defending themselves against these actions (yet) they cannot be reimbursed for attorney fees upon prevailing in their appeals to the Commission. Instead, they must file civil actions against the Government in order to obtain a review of their requests for reimbursement. 94 The legislation remedies this problem by authorizing the Board members and hearing officials to require payment, by agencies which are losing parties to proceedings before the Board, of attorney fees to the employees who prevailed.... 66 95 As expressed in this passage, the policy underlying the fees provision, while stated with reference to appeals, seems applicable to any proceeding in which an aggrieved employee seeks to vindicate rights conferred by the Act. As the Board may have recognized when it allowed the deputies to appear through their own lawyers, an employee can have a strong interest in challenging agencies (that) have taken unfounded actions against them even when those actions can only be remedied through a corrective action petition. Nor is that interest necessarily protected by the Special Counsel, whose efforts to assure a properly managed civil service may conflict with the goals of individual employees. See pp. 162 to 163 supra. Indeed, given the negotiating process that precedes the filing of a petition, the Special Counsel may commonly take a position before the Board that is somewhere between that of the employer and the employee. 96 Thus, it seems doubtful that Congress concluded that separate representation, and thereby fee authority, would be unnecessary in corrective action proceedings. Instead, Congress seems to have conferred authority to award fees in all cases in which employees appear as parties and permitted the Board to decide whether such appearances and fees were appropriate in corrective action proceedings. As noted earlier, p. 155 supra, corrective action petitions, unlike appeals, did not exist prior to the enactment of the CSRA. Congress was quite familiar with the experience of the Civil Service Commission in treating appeals and, in an effort to improve that process, elaborated the procedures governing such cases in considerable detail. In contrast, the initial shaping of corrective action procedures was left to the Board; Congress authorized the proceeding in a few open-ended sentences. Those sentences gave the Board the discretion, which it exercised in this case, to employ many of the procedures associated with appeals and to conclude that the interests of the employees involved justified independent representation. See p. 157 supra. We are confident that that flexibility is also broad enough to permit the Board to create a proceeding which by its nature would be within the intent of the waiver of sovereign immunity. 97 In sum, we hold the Board erred in determining that it lacked authority to assess attorney's fees in favor of the successful deputy. The language of section 7701(g) of the Act plainly waives sovereign immunity in any case in which an employee or applicant for employment appears as a party. Moreover, while the placement and history of the provision indicate that Congress did not expect fees questions to arise in corrective action proceedings, the intent of section 7701(g) together with the statutory scheme clearly give the Board the flexibility to award fees in appropriate corrective action cases. By permitting the deputies to appear through their own lawyers, the Board raised the possibility that this was such a case. 98 Our conclusion does not, of course, require the Board to award fees to petitioner Frazier. The Board must decide, in the first instance, whether the role employees play in the kind of proceeding it has established here implicates the policy underlying the fees provision. If so, the Board should consider whether Frazier can be called a prevailing party in light of his victory on the EEO wing of the case and whether payment by the agency is warranted in the interest of justice. In examining the value of employee participation in corrective action proceedings, both in general and in the particular case, the Board may take into account the presence and role of the Special Counsel. We decide only that Congress has granted the Board power to award fees in all cases within its jurisdiction in which complaining employees appear as parties.