Opinion ID: 2607582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Invasion of Privacy and Defamation

Text: A second argument advanced by publishers is that little distinction exists between a tort action for false light invasion of privacy and one for defamation. Thus, because defamation actions are available, they argue, Arizona need not recognize false light invasion of privacy. Again, we disagree. Although both defamation and false light invasion of privacy involve publication, the nature of the interests protected by each action differs substantially. See PROSSER & KEETON § 117, at 864. A defamation action compensates damage to reputation or good name caused by the publication of false information. Hill, 385 U.S. at 384 n. 9, 87 S.Ct. at 540 n. 9; Reed. To be defamatory, a publication must be false and must bring the defamed person into disrepute, contempt, or ridicule, or must impeach plaintiff's honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation. See Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P.2d 150 (1957). Privacy, on the other hand, does not protect reputation but protects mental and emotional interests. Indeed, [t]he gravamen of [a privacy] action ... is the injury to the feelings of the plaintiff, the mental anguish and distress caused by the publication. Reed, 63 Ariz. at 305, 162 P.2d at 139. The remedy is available to protect a person's interest in being let alone and is available when there has been publicity of a kind that is highly offensive. PROSSER & KEETON § 117, at 864. Under this theory, a plaintiff may recover even in the absence of reputational damage, as long as the publicity is unreasonably offensive and attributes false characteristics. However, to qualify as a false light invasion of privacy, the publication must involve a major misrepresentation of [the plaintiff's] character, history, activities or beliefs, not merely minor or unimportant inaccuracies. Restatement § 652E comment c. Another distinction between defamation and false light invasion of privacy is the role played by truth. To be defamatory, a publication must be false, and truth is a defense. PROSSER & KEETON § 116, at 839. A false light cause of action may arise when something untrue has been published about an individual, see PROSSER & KEETON § 117, at 863-66, or when the publication of true information creates a false implication about the individual. In the latter type of case, the false innuendo created by the highly offensive presentation of a true fact constitutes the injury. [2] See Restatement § 652E. Thus, although defamation and false light often overlap, they serve very different objectives. The two tort actions deter different conduct and redress different wrongs. A plaintiff may bring a false light invasion of privacy action even though the publication is not defamatory, and even though the actual facts stated are true. Several examples in comment b to Restatement § 652E also illustrate the practical differences between a false light action and defamation and demonstrate how, in a certain class of cases, the false light action is the only redress available. [3] It is these considerations, we believe, that lead the vast majority of other jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme Court, to recognize the distinction between defamation and false light. [4]