Opinion ID: 68146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: At issue in this case is whether Shao has a well founded fear of persecution on account of his political opinion, thereby entitling him to asylum, under the following provision: [A] person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of a political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to such persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(B). Before 2008, the BIA interpreted this provision as providing that the “past persecution of one spouse can be established by coerced abortion or sterilization of the other spouse.” In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 917, 919 (BIA 1997) (en banc). In 2008, however, the Attorney General overruled this interpretation and instructed the BIA to require the spouse of one forced to undergo involuntary sterilization to independently show his resistance to the coercive population control program and that he would be subject to persecution on account of this resistance. Matter of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 523. Our circuit recently adopted this rule, concluding that the Attorney General’s interpretation of 6 § 1101 (a)(42)(B) was “reasonable and entitled to deference.” Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., – F.3d –, 2009 WL 1457102,  (11th Cir. May 27, 2009). This court also held that the BIA’s application of Matter of J-S- to cases that were open and on direct review when Matter of J-S- was decided did not involve an improper retroactive application of the law because the BIA was simply applying the “Attorney General’s determination of what the law had always meant.” Id. at  (emphasis in original). “Once the Attorney General clarified the meaning of § 1101(a)(42)(B) in Matter of J-S-, that decision became the controlling interpretation of the law and was entitled to full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review, regardless of whether the events predated the Attorney General’s decision.” Id. In his petition for review, Shao argues that the BIA should have remanded his case to the IJ for reconsideration because, at the time the administrative record was developed, the law only required Shao to show that his wife had been forcibly sterilized in order for him to be entitled to refugee status. Shao asserts that the record shows that he “resisted” China’s coercive population control program through his unsuccessful attempts to protect his wife from being forcibly sterilized, but that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to develop this aspect of the record. Shao notes that, in a footnote in Matter of J-S-, the Attorney General contemplated that certain cases decided under the BIA’s former per se rule should 7 be remanded in light of the change in the rule. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 543 n.15. Accordingly, Shao asserts that justice demands that this matter be remanded so that he may present additional evidence and the IJ may consider in the first instance whether Shao has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of his political opinion. We disagree. In Matter of J-S-, the Attorney General noted that remand may be appropriate, but limited this remedy to cases in which the record indicated that the applicant may be entitled to relief if given a full opportunity to present evidence: Whether the Board and the courts should remand other cases for reconsideration in light of this opinion depends on the particularized facts of those cases. Where, as here, a case that was decided principally on the basis of the per se rule appears to involve credible evidence of threats or action against the applicant that might support relief under the legal framework set forth herein, but that were not adequately considered or developed before the Immigration Judge, it may be an appropriate exercise of the Board’s discretion to order a remand. Id. In this case, Shao had a full opportunity to present evidence of past or future persecution on account of his “other resistance” to China’s policies. At his removal hearing, Shao told the full story of his wife’s forced abortion and sterilization. Shao testified that he and his wife attempted to hide her unauthorized pregnancy and that he “tried to stop” the Chinese officials from taking his wife to be sterilized. Even assuming this conduct could be construed as “other resistance,” 8 Shao did not claim or present any evidence indicating that he was persecuted in the six years he remained in China after committing these alleged acts of resistance, nor did he present evidence indicating that one who has resisted China’s family planning policies has a well-founded fear of such persecution. Moreover, Shao does not indicate what kind of evidence he would present if given the opportunity. Although remand may be appropriate where an applicant has presented “credible evidence of threats or action against the applicant that might support relief” which were not “adequately considered or developed” before the IJ, we conclude that remand is not required where, as in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate what other evidence of persecution an applicant could have offered, nor does the applicant say. Accordingly, we also conclude that substantial evidence in the record supports the BIA’s determination that Shao has not shown either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his resistance to China’s family planning policy or any other protected ground.3 See Yu, 2009 WL 1457102 (noting that to the extent hiding his wife from authorities to avoid sterilization could considered “other resistance,” the record did not compel a finding of persecution where Yu was never detained or physically harmed); Lin, 3 Although Shao testified at the hearing before the IJ that he would be imprisoned and fined for leaving China illegally, he does not raise this claim in his petition. Accordingly, this claim has been abandoned. See Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1228. Even if he had raised the issue, “prosecution for leaving China illegally is not a statutorily protected ground entitling an alien to asylum.” Yu, 2009 WL 1457102 at  n.4 (citing Lin, 555 F.3d at 1316). 9 555 F.3d at 1316 (“[E]ven assuming Lin’s accidentally hitting the family planning official and tearing up the fine amounted to ‘other resistance,’ he has not made the requisite showing that he was persecuted on account of that resistance.”). Inasmuch as the record does not compel a finding that Shao has a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of a protected ground, Shao cannot satisfy the more stringent standard applicable to a claim for withholding of removal or CAT relief. Lin, 555 F.3d at 1317.