Opinion ID: 1201575
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Defendant entitled to severance?

Text: Defendant points out that if Rule 13.3(a)(1) was the basis for joinder, he was entitled to severance as a matter of right under Rule 13.4(b). We agree. We do not believe, however, that the error of failing to sever under Rule 13.4(b) will always require reversal. If the evidence of one crime would have been admissible in a separate trial for the others, it is unlikely that Defendant suffered prejudice by the court's denial of severance. Cf. Day, 148 Ariz. at 494, 715 P.2d at 747 (noting that prejudice in failing to sever is mitigated because the same evidence would have been admissible in the separate trials); State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 115, 704 P.2d 238, 245 (1985) (same), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048, 106 S.Ct. 1268, 89 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986). A treatise on Arizona evidence law notes that when Rule 13.3(a)(1) (same or similar character) is the basis for joinder, severance is mandated under Rule 13.4(b) even in those cases in which the similarities are so great as to permit the introduction of one to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the other. Morris K. Udall, et al., Arizona Practice  Law of Evidence § 84, at 184 n. 14 (3d ed. 1991) (hereinafter  Arizona Evidence ). According to the authors, however, there is little risk of prejudice from joinder if the joined offense would be permitted to be introduced for an evidentiary purpose anyway. Here again, we agree. The authors note that Arizona courts have avoided this problem by interpreting the identity exception of Ariz. R.Evid. 404(b) in the same manner as the common scheme or plan exception  where there is no severance as a matter of right. Id. We choose not to stretch the rule to reach the result. Aside from the series of crimes themselves, there is little evidence of any scheme or plan and considerable evidence to the contrary. Instead, we simply look for any prejudice occasioned by the court's failure to sever. Other states have followed a similar course. People v. Miller, 50 Cal.3d 954, 269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 509, 790 P.2d 1289, 1306 (1990) (cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels inference of prejudice that accompanies joinder of counts), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1041, 111 S.Ct. 713, 112 L.Ed.2d 702 (1991); State v. Hall, 103 Wis.2d 125, 307 N.W.2d 289, 296-97 (1981) (risk of prejudice caused by joinder of counts is not significant if counts would be admissible in the separate trials). In light of this, we look to see if the evidence of the attempted murder would have been admissible in a separate trial for the three murders.