Opinion ID: 777468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability Under the IDEA of the Relief Sought by Polera

Text: 15 In her complaint, Polera seeks, inter alia, compensatory and punitive damages. While this Court has found damages to be an available remedy in actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the IDEA, 5 this appeal presents a different question: are damages available under the IDEA itself? 6 16 The statute is silent as to the availability of damages. While nothing in the language of the IDEA limits the types of relief recoverable for violations of the statute, nor does the statute anywhere mention damages. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii) (the court shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate). The IDEA's central mechanism for the remedying of perceived harms is for parents to seek changes to a student's program; as described above, many provisions of the statute focus on this administrative process. However, because the statutory language and structure offer no unequivocal answer to our question regarding damages, we turn to case law. 17 In Burlington School Committee v. Massachusetts Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, in granting relief under the EHA, courts can order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education for a child if the court ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. Id. at 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996. Some have read the Burlington opinion as casting doubt on the availability of damages (as distinguished from equitable remedies such as reimbursement or other restitution) under the IDEA. See, e.g., Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386 (6th Cir.1992) (In Burlington ..., the Court appears to interpret § 1415(e)(2) as not allowing `damages' in general but as allowing `reimbursement [of] ... expenses ....'). The Burlington Court did state that while courts have broad discretion to grant relief, that relief must be `appropriate' in light of the purpose of the Act which is to provide handicapped children with `a free public education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.' Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996. The Court also noted that the reimbursement contemplated by the Act is not a form of damages: Reimbursement merely requires [the defendant] to belatedly pay expenses that it should have paid all along.... Id. at 370-71, 105 S.Ct. 1996. But the Court did not explicitly address the availability of damages under the EHA. 18 We have not yet squarely confronted the issue of whether damages are available under the IDEA itself. In Hope v. Cortines, 872 F.Supp. 14, 15 (E.D.N.Y.1995), the plaintiffs brought suit under the ADA and other statutes, not including the IDEA, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Without addressing the availability of damages under the IDEA, the District Court held that the injunctive relief that the plaintiffs sought is precisely the type of remedy best fashioned by the educational experts skilled in developing such programs and provides a textbook example of the types of cases justifying administrative exhaustion. Id. at 21. Therefore, the District Court held, the plaintiffs sought relief that was available under the IDEA, and should be required to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 21, 23, 872 F.Supp. 14. Considering the case on appeal, we noted that the District Court had determined that the relief plaintiffs seek is available under the IDEA, and we affirmed on the opinion of the District Court. Hope v. Cortines, 69 F.3d 687, 688 (2d Cir.1995). More recently, the District Court in Wenger v. Canastota Central School District, 979 F.Supp. 147, 152 (N.D.N.Y.1997), flatly stated that [t]he IDEA does not provide for compensatory money damages, and we affirmed in an unpublished summary order, 208 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.2000) (table). 19 District courts in our Circuit generally have held that damages are not available under the IDEA. See Butler v. South Glens Falls Cent. Sch. Dist., 106 F.Supp.2d 414, 419 (N.D.N.Y.2000) (holding that relief available under the IDEA does not include compensatory or punitive damages); Schuler v. Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 96 Cv. 4702, 2000 WL 134346, at  n. 15 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.1, 2000) (holding that monetary damages are unavailable under the IDEA); BD v. DeBuono, 130 F.Supp.2d 401, 427-28 (S.D.N.Y.2000) (assuming without discussion that damages are unavailable under the IDEA); Stellato v. Bd. of Educ. of the Ellenville Cent. Sch. Dist., 842 F.Supp. 1512, 1516-17 (N.D.N.Y.1994) (holding that damages are unavailable under the IDEA except in two exceptional circumstances: where there is a danger to the physical health of the child or where the school district acts in bad faith). 20 At least five other courts of appeals — the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits — have found damages unavailable under the IDEA. For example, in Charlie F. v. Board of Education of Skokie School District, 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit found that the structure of the statute — with its elaborate provision for educational services and payments to those who deliver them — is inconsistent with monetary awards to children and parents.... [W]e conclude that damages are not `relief that is available under' the IDEA. This is the norm for social-welfare programs that specify benefits in kind at public expense, whether medical care or housing or, under the IDEA, education. Id. at 991 (citation omitted). 21 Similarly, in Sellers v. School Board of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871, 119 S.Ct. 168, 142 L.Ed.2d 137 (1998), the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiff's damages claim, holding that [t]ort-like damages are simply inconsistent with IDEA's statutory scheme. 22 The touchstone of a traditional tort-like remedy is redress for a broad range of harms `associated with personal injury, such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other consequential damages.' By contrast, the touchstone of IDEA is the actual provision of a free appropriate public education.... Compensatory or punitive damages would transform IDEA into a remedy for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and other consequential damages caused by the lack of a free appropriate public education. Such a result would be inconsistent with the structure of the statute, which so strongly favors the provision of and, where appropriate, the restoration of educational rights. 23 Id. (citation omitted); see also Witte v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 1271, 1275 (9th Cir.1999) (finding damages unavailable under the IDEA and noting that the phrase appropriate relief ... is usually construed as a mere grant of jurisdiction to enforce and supplement the administrative procedures for identification, evaluation, and placement of the child, and not of authority to award retrospective damages (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Heidemann v. Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1033 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that general and punitive damages for the types of injuries alleged by plaintiffs are not available under the IDEA); Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 980 F.2d 382, 386-87 (6th Cir.1992) (stating that we do not find case authority interpreting the [EHA] to allow an award of general damages for emotional injury or injury to a dignitary interest and holding that the plaintiff cannot recover general damages under the EHA or under Section 1983 for violations of the EHA). 24 Two courts of appeals — the Third and Fifth Circuits — have addressed the issue without endorsing the view that damages are never available under the IDEA. In W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484 (3d Cir.1995), after finding that damages may be sought under Section 1983 for violations of the IDEA, id. at 494-95, the Third Circuit noted that the IDEA itself makes no mention of such relief, id. at 496. However, the court ultimately held: In the matter before us, it would be futile, perhaps even impossible, for plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies because the relief sought by plaintiffs in this action — which included damages— was unavailable in IDEA administrative proceedings. Id. The Fifth Circuit, in Salley v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, 57 F.3d 458 (5th Cir.1995), affirmed a damages award for a violation of the IDEA, but the damages were merely nominal and the court did not discuss the availability of damages under the IDEA as a general matter. Id. at 466. Because Matula reached no definitive conclusion on the general availability of damages under the IDEA and Salley was silent on the issue, neither case undercuts the position staked out by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits: that damages are unavailable under the IDEA itself. 25 We agree with the prevailing opinion of the other Circuits and the district courts in our Circuit. The purpose of the IDEA is to provide educational services, not compensation for personal injury, and a damages remedy — as contrasted with reimbursement of expenses — is fundamentally inconsistent with this goal. The availability of damages also would undercut the IDEA's carefully structured procedure for administrative remedies, a mechanism that encourages parents to seek relief at the time that a deficiency occurs and that allows the educational system to bring its expertise to bear in correcting its own mistakes. We therefore hold that monetary damages are not available under the IDEA. However, as discussed below, we do not believe that this holding leads inexorably to the conclusion that because Polera seeks relief that is not available under the IDEA, she was not required to exhaust her administrative remedies.
26 In addition to damages, Polera's complaint seeks several forms of equitable relief: a declaration that her rights were violated, injunctive relief bestowing various academic honors, reimbursement of educational expenses from 1986 to 1996, and attorneys' fees. Of these forms of relief, all that are not moot 7 appear to be available under the IDEA. 27 The relevant state and local administrative agencies have the capacity to find that an IEP is deficient, has not been complied with, or that similar wrongs have been committed. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(4) (parties to an administrative proceeding under the IDEA have the right to written... findings of fact and decisions on any complaint about the provision of a free appropriate public education). Similarly, the administrative system, which is designed to ensure that disabled students receive the free appropriate public education to which they are entitled, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) & (h), seems uniquely well positioned to guarantee that Polera receives proper academic recognition. For example, the administrators could have determined that Polera's school failed to comply with its policies and procedures governing academic honors. Reimbursement of educational expenses also is a form of relief available under the IDEA. See, e.g., Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Mass. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.1998). Lastly, the IDEA authorizes the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the parents of a disabled child who is the prevailing party. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). 28