Opinion ID: 523192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Svetlana's

Text: 77 Svetlana testified that she and Miller attempted to penetrate the KGB on behalf of the FBI. After the government had used the sidebar to impeach Svetlana's testimony that Miller had never shown nor given her a classified document, Miller sought to introduce seven prior statements of Svetlana to rehabilitate her. 78 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) provides that prior statements are admissible if they are (1) consistent with a witness' trial testimony and (2) offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. In this circuit, rehabilitative prior statements are admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) only if they were made before the witness had a motive to fabricate. Breneman, 799 F.2d at 473; United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Rodriguez, 452 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir.1972). The district court refused to admit Svetlana's prior statements because they were all made after her arrest, a time when she clearly had a motive to fabricate. Miller argues that this decision was incorrect because, even if the statements were inadmissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), they should have been admitted for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the witness' impeached credibility. When introduced for that limited purpose, argues Miller, the statements are not hearsay because they are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted. The government responds by arguing that the requirement of no motive to fabricate applies regardless of whether the statements are being introduced only for a limited purpose. 79 We begin by noting that at least two circuits have indeed held that the requirement that there be no motive to fabricate does not apply when the prior consistent statement has been offered solely for rehabilitation and not as substantive evidence. See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 398-400 (7th Cir.1985). 10 In order to decide whether we will follow this rule, we must first examine both the purpose of the requirement that there be no motive to fabricate and the nature of the requirement. 80 The court in Harris stated that the reason for the requirement is that, unless there was no motive to fabricate, the prior consistent statement has little probative value. Thus, the court stated: 81 [E]vidence which merely shows that the declarant said the same thing at trial as he did on a prior occasion is of no probative value to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication when the declarant's motive in making both statements was the same[,] for the simple reason that mere repetition does not imply veracity. 82 Harris, 761 F.2d at 399. Thus, contrary to the suggestion in Brennan, see 798 F.2d at 587, the requirement of no motivation to fabricate does not arise from anything in the literal terms of Rule 801(d)(1)(B); rather, the requirement emerges from relevancy concerns under Rules 402 and 403. See Harris, 761 F.2d at 399 ([A]lthough a prior consistent statement may meet the literal requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), it may nonetheless be inadmissible for failure to meet the relevancy requirement of Rule 402.). However, after concluding that the requirement is not based on the terms of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Harris inexplicably goes on to conclude that the requirement applies only in cases where the evidence is offered as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Id. at 400. 83 We reject the distinction drawn in both Harris and Brennan. We do so for two reasons. First, since the requirement of no prior motive to fabricate is rooted in Rules 402 and 403, and not in the terms of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), there is no basis for limiting the requirement to cases involving prior statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Indeed, we fail to see how a statement that has no probative value in rebutting a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), could possibly have probative value for the assertedly more limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness. If repetition does not imply veracity, see Harris, 761 F.2d at 399, then proof of repetition cannot rehabilitate. 84 Second, the distinction drawn by Harris and Brennan is inconsistent with the legislative history of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Prior to the adoption of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), prior consistent statements were traditionally only admissible for the limited purpose of rebutting a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee's notes. The Rule goes one step further than the common law and admits all such statements as substantive evidence. Id. The Rule thus does not change the type of statements that may be admitted; its only effect is to admit these statements as substantive evidence rather than solely for the purpose of rehabilitation. 11 Accordingly, it no longer makes sense to speak of a prior consistent statement as being offered solely for the more limited purpose of rehabilitating a witness; any such statement is admissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 12 In short, a prior consistent statement offered for rehabilitation is either admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or it is not admissible at all. The distinction drawn by Brennan and Harris is therefore untenable. 85 This does not imply that we disagree with the result in either Brennan or Harris. Although we do not believe that prior consistent statements may be admitted for rehabilitation apart from Rule 801(d)(1)(B), we do not agree with the very strict manner in which those cases apply the requirement of no motive to fabricate. Indeed, the Harris and Brennan courts seem to have created an end run around Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in order to blunt the apparent harshness of the requirement. For example, in Brennan, the Second Circuit first concluded that the prior consistent statements made by a government witness (Mr. Bruno) before a grand jury were inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) because Mr. Bruno's fear of prosecution gave him a reason to fabricate. 798 F.2d at 587. The court then went on to conclude, however, that the statements were admissible for the limited purpose of rehabilitation. Bruno had been impeached with other statements he made during his grand jury testimony, and the court therefore concluded that the consistent statements were admissible because they helped to amplif[y] and clarif[y] the alleged inconsistent statements, and because they helped to cast doubt ... on whether the impeaching statement[s] [were] really inconsistent with the trial testimony. 798 F.2d at 589. See also Harris, 761 F.2d at 400 (despite presence of motive to fabricate, which barred admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), government was permitted to rehabilitate witness with consistent statements made during same interview as allegedly inconsistent ones; statements were relevant to whether the impeaching statements really were inconsistent within the context of the interview); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1986) (Prior consistent statement that is inadmissible as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is admissible for limited purpose of rehabilitation where it tends to cast doubt on whether the prior inconsistent statement was made or on whether the impeaching statement is really inconsistent with the trial testimony or where it will amplify or clarify the allegedly inconsistent statement.). 86 We believe that these cases interpret the requirement of no motive to fabricate too strictly. The requirement should not be applied as a rigid per se rule barring all such prior consistent statements under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), without regard to other surrounding circumstances that may give them significant probative value. Indeed, our conclusion that the requirement emerges from the relevancy concerns of Rules 402 and 403 implies that trial judges should consider motivation to fabricate as simply one of several factors to be considered in determining relevancy--albeit a very crucial factor. Thus, the trial judge must evaluate whether, in light of the potentially powerful motive to fabricate, the prior consistent statement has significant probative force bearing on credibility apart from mere repetition. Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333. This determination rests in the trial judge's sound discretion. 13 87 We can now apply these principles to the case before us. The seven prior statements of Svetlana that Miller offered for rehabilitation were all made during the period Svetlana was under criminal investigation or indictment. Svetlana thus had a powerful motive to fabricate exculpatory testimony, and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the statements have any probative force bearing on credibility apart from mere repetition. Pierre, 781 F.2d at 333. Indeed, closer examination of the statements merely confirms the correctness of the district court's decision. All of the statements were made either to federal agents or to defense attorneys, thus heightening the suspicion that the statements are too self-serving to have any significant probative value. 88 Svetlana's prior statements in no way help to explain or amplify the inconsistent statement with which she was impeached, and since Svetlana admitted to making the inconsistent statement, the prior statements obviously do not cast any doubt on whether the inconsistent statement was made. The district court was correct in excluding these statements. 89 Miller also offered several other prior statements of Svetlana that did not directly deal with the issue of the passage of documents. The court excluded some of these statements because it concluded that they did not corroborate her testimony on direct examination. For example, Svetlana initially denied any involvement with Soviet intelligence and insisted that she and Miller were mere friends; at trial, she testified that she and Miller had worked together to ensnare the KGB. Other statements that were offered did not concern matters on which Svetlana had been impeached. The decision to exclude such statements on these grounds was clearly within the trial court's discretion. 90 b. Marta York's. 91 The government called Marta York to testify. York and Miller had been lovers, and she visited Miller in Los Angeles in September 1984. She returned to her home in Portland several days later. On October 2, 1984, during his interrogation, Miller called York to warn her that the FBI might be contacting her. 92 York testified that Miller told her during that conversation that he had given one classified document to his Soviet girlfriend and that he had received a good deal. On cross-examination, the defense showed that, in numerous FBI interviews, York had denied that Miller said he had given the Soviets any documents. The district court allowed the government to rehabilitate York by introducing testimony concerning statements York had made immediately after Miller's phone call. Gary Allan, a social worker present in York's home during the call, testified that York told him Miller said he had passed one document. 93 The court allowed the statement because it was spontaneous and made before any motive to fabricate arose. Miller contends that York had motives to fabricate before she made her statement to Allan. He maintains that York had reason to fabricate the statement because she was upset and resentful about her broken love affair with Miller. (Miller had decided to become reconciled with his wife and had told York that he had been seeing a third woman (Svetlana) in Los Angeles during September 1984.) At trial, York maintained that she was reluctant to cooperate with the FBI in earlier interviews because she still loved Miller and did not want to provide information against him. The government thus contends that York's only motive was to protect Miller. 94 In deciding whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of York's prior consistent statement, we first note that the dangers presented by York's alleged motive to fabricate are very different from those involved in the case of Svetlana. Svetlana made her prior statements during a criminal investigation when she had a strong motive to fabricate exculpatory testimony. Courts are extremely reluctant to admit such testimony for rehabilitation, not only because it is of very low probative value, but also because this meager probative value is clearly outweighed by the danger that criminal suspects will be encouraged to manufacture exculpatory testimony by simply repeating to many people that they are innocent. Accordingly, such testimony is generally not admitted. 95 The situation with York's statement is very different. Her alleged motive to fabricate is that she was angry at Miller and wanted revenge against him for breaking off their affair. While this may indeed be true and should be argued to the jury, we do not believe that the prior statement was so worthless as to warrant its total exclusion under Rule 402 or Rule 403. While York's alleged motive to lie is not negligible, it is not nearly as strong as the very powerful motive that criminal defendants may feel to give exculpatory testimony. Because her statements were found to be spontaneous, there is little fear that admitting York's statement to Allan will somehow encourage spurned lovers to avenge their broken hearts by manufacturing false inculpatory testimony against their former loves. Accordingly, even if York had a motive to fabricate, we conclude that, given the speculative nature of the motive and the spontaneous nature of York's statement, exclusion would have been inappropriate. It was sufficient in this case that Miller was able to argue to the jury that York might have lied when she made the earlier statement. The district court was therefore correct in admitting Allan's testimony concerning York's prior consistent statement. 96 8. The Exclusion of the Contents of Classified Documents. 97 We review for abuse of discretion the district court's ruling refusing to admit classified information in the form that Miller had requested. See United States v. Clegg, 846 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir.1988) (Clegg II). We review de novo the court's construction of the statute governing disclosure of classified information. See United States v. Clegg, 740 F.2d 16, 18 (9th Cir.1984) (Clegg I). 98 During the interrogation period, Miller consented to searches of his two residences and his work desk. The searches uncovered a number of classified documents. Pursuant to Sec. 5 of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. App. III (1982), Miller gave advance notice of his intention to introduce all of these documents at trial. His written notice consisted simply of a list indicating the length and title of each document found. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of CIPA, a pretrial hearing was held to determine the use, relevance, [and] admissibility of the classified documents Miller sought to introduce. At the hearing, Miller stated that he intended to argue at trial that he was not collecting classified documents in order to pass them to the Soviet Union, but rather that he was a disorganized pack-rat who simply failed to properly file all of his documents. He argued that the jury could not evaluate this defense without seeing all of the documents, and that therefore all of the classified documents were relevant. The district court agreed that Miller's pack-rat theory was a viable defense, but the court did not agree that the entire contents of each and every document were relevant to establishing this defense. Miller argued that it was up to the government to state what portions of the documents should be either deleted altogether or replaced with a substitute summary. The district court disagreed, ruling that the defense first had to establish that all of the material offered was relevant. The court couched this conclusion in terms of the notice requirements of Sec. 5, ruling that Miller's notice was inadequate because it failed to set forth (1) the particular contents of each document and (2) the reasons why each such particular item of classified information was relevant to the defense's case. 99 On appeal, Miller argues that the notice he gave was fully adequate under Sec. 5 of CIPA. We agree. The only language in Sec. 5 concerning the form and content of the required notice is the statement that [s]uch notice shall include a brief description of the classified information. Miller's notice satisfied the purpose of this requirement inasmuch as it fully alerted the government as to what classified information Miller sought to introduce. The government knew exactly to which documents Miller was referring, and it knew what information was contained in them. Indeed, we note that the Fourth Circuit has recently ruled that a notice comparable to this one was sufficient under Sec. 5 of CIPA. See United States v. Zettl, 835 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 (4th Cir.1987). 100 Although we agree that Miller's notice was sufficient under Sec. 5, that does not imply that the trial court's ruling was erroneous. The trial court ruled that Miller had not demonstrated that all of the documents would be relevant to his defense. This decision was not an abuse of discretion. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. In United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 143, 93 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986), the defendant was charged with attempting to arrange the assassination of witnesses who were to testify against him at several trials (which ultimately resulted in convictions). The defendant asserted that he simply had no motive to intimidate any of the witnesses at the earlier trials because his prior participation in various covert activities on behalf of the United States led him to believe that he would not be sentenced and imprisoned for any of the offenses at the earlier trials. Wilson therefore sought to introduce various items of evidence concerning his earlier covert activities. The district court ruled that the defendant would be permitted to testify that he worked for various intelligence agencies and was involved in covert activities, but the court refused to permit Wilson to reveal the details of the particular covert actions, concluding that the meager probative value of such evidence was outweighed by its potential to inflame, mislead, or confuse the jury and to waste the court's time. The court of appeals affirmed. Similarly, in this case the district court appropriately ruled that Miller would not be permitted to introduce all of the documents in a wholesale fashion, but rather would be required to specify with greater particularity which documents or portions of documents were relevant. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Miller had failed to show that the contents of all of these documents were relevant to his defense. Furthermore, introduction of the entire contents of all of these documents might confuse and mislead the jury and waste the court's time. 101 Miller argues that CIPA places the burden on the government to say what documents or portions of documents should be excluded as irrelevant. This is incorrect. Section 6(c) of the Act provides that [u]pon any determination by the court authorizing the disclosure of specific classified information, the government may move to substitute the classified information with summaries or may simply admit the relevant fact. The plain language of the provision indicates that it is not applicable unless and until the court has first ruled that the classified information is admissible. See H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1436, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 4294, 4307, 4310 (There would be a separate hearing on the question of alternative disclosure after rulings on use, relevance or admissibility.). The burden of showing admissibility remained with Miller. 102 The record indicates that, rather than attempting to make a more narrowly tailored offer of proof, Miller stipulated to the substitute statement offered by the government. This statement consisted of the titles, dates, classification, and length of each document. Miller also attempted to support his pack-rat defense by showing the jury the pile of documents found. Because Miller did not make an alternative offer of proof and instead stipulated to the government's statement, the only claim preserved on appeal is Miller's argument that all of the documents should have been admitted. See United States v. Allison, 490 F.2d 79 (5th Cir.) (defendant was held to have waived any objection to the manner in which the district court admitted certain testimony when the record revealed that, after losing the motion to exclude, the defendant had himself requested the terms under which the evidence was admitted), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 851, 95 S.Ct. 91, 42 L.Ed.2d 82 (1974). Since we reject that claim, we conclude that the district court's handling of this evidence was proper. 14 103 9. The Jury Instructions. 104 In reviewing allegedly erroneous jury instructions, we consider whether the instructions, considered as a whole in the context of the trial, were misleading or inadequate to guide the jury's determination. United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221, 226 (9th Cir.1987). We review the language or formulation of specific instructions only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 844, 107 S.Ct. 158, 93 L.Ed.2d 98 (1986). 105 Miller raises three objections to the jury instructions in this case. First, Miller claims that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury concerning the intent required to convict Miller on the espionage-related counts charged under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 793(b) & 794(a) and 50 U.S.C. Sec. 783(b). Miller argues that the instructions permitted the jury to convict upon a showing of general intent, rather than the required specific intent. Miller asserts that the government should have been required to show that he acted with bad faith, i.e. a purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. 106 In order to prove the offenses charged under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 793(b) & 794(a), the government must show that Miller intentionally performed the acts charged and that he did so with intent or reason to believe that the information [delivered] is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign government. Contrary to the suggestion of Miller, this showing is all that the Supreme Court required when it stated that a person may not be convicted under these statutes absent a showing of bad faith. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28, 61 S.Ct. 429, 433-34, 85 L.Ed. 488 (1941). The district court's instructions accurately described the required intent. The court instructed the jury that Miller could be convicted only if he voluntarily and intentionally committed the acts charged. The court also instructed the jury that it could not convict unless it found that Miller acted with intent or reason to believe that the documents he delivered, if any, would be used to harm the United States or benefit the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the district court properly refused to instruct the jury that it could not convict Miller unless it concluded that he knew that his actions violated the law. 15 107 Second, Miller challenges the court's denial of an instruction to the effect that the prosecution could not prove an essential element of the crime of bribery merely by the jury's disbelief of Miller's out-of-court denials of guilt. Miller correctly points out that our cases establish, as a general matter, that the government may not seek to prove an element of a charged offense simply by urging the jury to disbelieve the defendant's out-of-court statements. See, e.g., United States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.1987). However, we conclude that there was no evidentiary basis in this case for giving the jury an instruction to this effect. The likelihood that the evil which Behanna seeks to prevent could occur in this case is, on this record, just too remote to justify the potential confusion the instruction would cause in the minds of the jurors. A Behanna problem could only occur in this case if the jury (1) disbelieved all of Miller's inculpatory out-of-court statements, (2) disregarded all of the circumstantial evidence indicating that Miller had performed the charged acts, and that he had done so for monetary gain, and (3) then went on to rely exclusively on disbelief of an exculpatory out-of-court statement in order to find at least one of the essential elements of the crime. We conclude that there was very little, if any, risk that the jury would convict Miller in this way. There was thus no evidentiary basis for giving such an instruction. 108 Furthermore, the instruction might have carried a significant risk of confusing the jury in this case. The potential for mischief from such an instruction is amply illustrated by the example that Miller gives in his brief, which he claims shows why the instruction was necessary. Miller suggests that it was improper for the prosecution to urge the jury to believe his out-of-court statements that he solicited cash and gold, but to disbelieve his out-of-court statements that the solicitation was not corrupt. This is plainly incorrect. Behanna does not stand for the proposition that the prosecution can never urge the jury to disbelieve out-of-court statements; it only says that the prosecution may not do only that. Miller's mistaken argument here illustrates the potential the instruction would have for confusing the jury as to when it could and could not disbelieve an out-of-court statement. Where, as in this case, there is little risk that the jury will behave in the way that Behanna seeks to prevent, the instruction is neither required nor appropriate. 109 Finally, Miller argues that he was entitled to an instruction that unless the jury was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not act to benefit the United States, he could not be guilty of the espionage charges. The instruction that Miller requested would have stated that he could not be convicted if his actions were intended to benefit the United States. The instruction would also have explicitly stated that this statement would still be true even if a person acted with a mistaken, but reasonable, belief as to the extent of his authority. We conclude that Miller was not entitled to this instruction, because it does not accurately state the law. The statute expressly states that an offense is established if the defendant intentionally performed the acts charged and did so with intent or reason to believe that the [information delivered] is to be used to the injury of the United States. 18 U.S.C. Secs. 793(a) 16 & 794(a) (emphasis added); see also Gorin 312 U.S. at 27, 61 S.Ct. at 434. Miller's proposed instruction was defective because it ignored the fact that the statute is written in the alternative. The jury could have concluded that Miller believed that his actions would neither harm the United States nor help the Soviets and yet still have convicted him on the grounds that either (or both) beliefs were unreasonable. Indeed, even the cases cited by Miller demonstrate that the defendant's belief that his actions would help the United States must be a reasonable one. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 592 F.Supp. 424, 429 & n. 2 (E.D.Va.1984), vacated on other grounds, 780 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc). 110 Although we conclude that Miller was not entitled to the instruction that he requested, we nonetheless remain troubled by the instruction that the court actually gave concerning the existence of a good faith defense. The court's instruction to the jury on this issue read, in part, as follows: 111 [Y]ou may consider whether the defendant acted in good faith and reasonably believed that communication or delivery of the document specified in Count Two was within the scope of his authorized duties as an FBI Agent and actually intended to communicate and deliver that classified document to Svetlana Ogorodnikova as part of his official duties as an FBI agent to the extent that it may bear on whether he had reason to believe that the document was to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. 112 We are troubled by this instruction because it seems to misconceive the nature of Miller's defense. Miller did not really contend that he was acting within the scope of his duties; rather, his defense was that he deliberately went outside the scope of what he was authorized to do and that he did so in order to set up an operation that he hoped would later meet with FBI approval. Thus, it would have been more appropriate to instruct the jury to the effect that Miller's reasonable belief, if any, that his actions would have met with subsequent approval from his FBI superiors could be taken into account in deciding whether he had reason to believe that his actions would harm the United States or help the Soviets. 113 10. Corroboration of Miller's Admissions. 114 We review mixed questions of law and fact which are primarily factual for clear error. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). 115 Miller contends that the court should not have admitted, as evidence on the bribery and non-conspiracy espionage charges, Miller's out-of-court statements that he (1) passed a classified document and (2) solicited money and gold. Miller argues that his statements were not sufficiently corroborated and that they were unreliable in view of his earlier denials, the circumstances of the interrogation, and the other evidence of unreliability that he presented. For these reasons, Miller also objects to the court's denial of his motion for acquittal on these counts under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29. 116 The government must introduce sufficient independent evidence that tends to establish that a defendant's admission is trustworthy. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 164, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954); United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1116-17 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1309, 94 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that it is sufficient if the corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the confession, without independently establishing the crime charged. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 156, 75 S.Ct. 194, 199, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954). Although all the elements must be established by independent evidence or corroborated admissions, one method of corroboration is for the independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense 'through' the statements of the accused. Id. 117 The government did not merely rely on Miller's statements. Evidence of the surrounding circumstances, as reviewed above, helped the jury to determine the trustworthiness of Miller's admissions. Although the independent evidence against Miller is not as strong as the evidence in some cases, see, e.g., Kampiles, 609 F.2d at 1238 (bank account showed deposit in same amount that defendant confessed receiving), sufficient evidence exists here to support the district court's admission of the evidence and to support the denial of the motion for acquittal.