Opinion ID: 215814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: At oral argument, the former captains' counsel argued that Governor Blagojevich's actions after his veto did not constitute legislative action; rather, such actions are administrative. Yet at the district court the former captains' targeted the line-item veto and the seniority decision as Governor Blagojevich's alleged retaliatory acts. At times the former captains alleged that actions before the line item veto constituted administrative actions and the parties disputed whether the shift commander position was merely a renamed captain. Yet the former captains never tied Governor Blagojevich to any alleged retaliatory action that happened before or after the veto. Early in discovery, the evidence the former captains cited tying Governor Blagojevich to the captain position's elimination consisted of a press release announcing the veto and an interview on eliminating IDOC positions. The former captains cited this evidence because the Governor tried to block his deposition by arguing that his high-ranking public official status justified requiring plaintiffs to show that deposing him would lead to admissible evidence. See Stagman, 176 F.3d at 994-95 (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that deposing Illinois's attorney general would serve no useful purpose); Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 409-10 (7th Cir.1997) (noting that busy officials should not have to spend their time giving depositions in cases arising out of the performance of their official duties unless there is some reason to believe that the deposition will produce or lead to admissible evidence). And the former captains defeated Governor Blagojevich's initial attempts to avoid his deposition because of the evidence tying him to the veto. The magistrate judge found on March 28, 2007, that: ... Governor Blagojevich is likely to possess relevant information, such that requiring him to sit for deposition would be reasonable.... Plaintiffs allege that the Governor was either the ultimate decision maker or at least personally involved in the decision to eliminate the correctional captain position. As support, Plaintiffs have provided the Court with a June 4, 2003 press release from the Office of the Governor, in which the Governor personally takes credit for the decision to eliminate the correctional captain position, as well as a newspaper article containing similar comments. Bagley v. Blagojevich, No. 05-3156, 2007 WL 951921, at  (C.D.Ill. Mar. 28, 2007). The district court expressly adopted the magistrate judge's opinion in its entirety on May 10, 2007, denying Governor Blagojevich's initial effort to block his deposition. See Bagley, 486 F.Supp.2d at 787. The former captains did not show how Governor Blagojevich participated in the decision to fill some of the former captains' responsibilities with shift commanders or any other post- or pre-veto actions that could be construed as administrative. And the former captains do not appeal the lower court's decision that Blagojevich's high-ranking public official status justifies requiring plaintiffs to show that he was likely to possess relevant information, such that requiring him to sit for deposition would be reasonable. Id. at 789. Because of this posture, we proceed to determine whether the district court erred in finding that legislative immunity covered Governor Blagojevich's veto. Deciding whether legislative immunity covers post-or pre-veto acts would be irrelevant because the former captains did not present evidence that Governor Blagojevich participated in those decisions. As for the remaining defendants, the former captains fail to acknowledge that the district court's decision granting legislative immunity to Governor Blagojevich's veto (and Curry's involvement) did not relate to the other defendants' involvement in the position's elimination. As argued by the former captains' counsel at oral argument, the post-veto actions may not be legislative; rather, decisions such as creating a new position may be administrative and unprotected by legislative immunity. But the former captains fail to explain why the district court erred in finding that they waived the issue related to the non-Blagojevich defendants by making no real argument on the claim. Indeed, the former captains' response to the non-Blagojevich defendants' motions for summary judgment acknowledges that if Governor Blagojevich's actions are entitled to legislative immunity, all of the other defendants are entitled to immunity as to the captain position's elimination. Thus, the former captains pin their case against the non-Blagojevich defendants' participation in the position's elimination on overturning the court's legislative immunity decision. See Reply Br. of Pls'-Appellants at 1 (This case presents largely a narrow question: `is a line item veto by a Governor per se entitled to legislative immunity?')
Our discussion of whether legislative immunity covered the veto starts with the Supreme Court's unanimous Bogan decision. [1] Absolute legislative immunity attaches to all actions taken `in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783). Whether an action is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. Id. Legislative acts include signing and vetoing bills because they are integral steps in the legislative process. Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966 (citing Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482, 490, 52 S.Ct. 627, 76 L.Ed. 1239 (1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372-73, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932)). In Bogan, an administrator of a city's health and human services department received a complaint that an employee temporarily under her supervision made repeated racial and ethnic slurs about her colleagues. 523 U.S. at 46, 118 S.Ct. 966. As the administrator prepared to fire the employee, the employee used her political connections to press her case with several state and local officials. Id. The city council held a hearing and accepted a settlement where the employee was suspended without pay for 60 days, but the city's mayor later substantially reduced the punishment. Id. at 47, 118 S.Ct. 966. As the charges against the employee pended, the mayor prepared a budget that froze salaries and eliminated 135 positions because of an anticipated reduction in state assistance. Id. The budget also eliminated the administrator's department, of which she was the only employee. Id. The council adopted the proposal and the mayor signed the bill, eliminating the administrator's position. Id. The administrator sued the city, its mayor, and other city officials, alleging that her position's elimination was motivated by racial animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First Amendment rights in filing the complaint. Id. A jury found the city, its mayor, and another official liable because the administrator's speech was a substantial or motivating factor in her position's elimination. Id. at 47-48, 118 S.Ct. 966. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment against the mayor and the official, holding that the positions' elimination was not legislative because the mayor and the official individually targeted the administrator and treated her differently from other managers. Id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Scott-Harris v. City of Fall River, 134 F.3d 427, 441 (1st Cir.1997)). The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that [w]hether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it. The privilege of absolute immunity `would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives.' Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783). A defendant acts in a legislative capacity even though he allegedly singled out the plaintiff for investigation in order `to intimidate and silence plaintiff and deter and prevent him from effectively exercising his constitutional rights.' Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 371, 71 S.Ct. 783). The Court stripped ... considerations of intent and motive and examined whether the actions were legislative. Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Bogan first looked at whether the acts were in form, quintessentially legislative. Id. The Court had little trouble concluding that they were. Id. Introducing, voting, and signing into law a budget were formally legislative actions even though an executive official (the mayor) introduced and signed the budget. Id. The mayor's actions were legislative because they were integral steps in the legislative process. Id. That almost ended the matter. But the Court addressed the plaintiff's request to look beyond petitioners' formal actions to consider whether the ordinance was legislative in substance.  Id. The Court noted that it did not need to determine whether the formally legislative character of petitioners' actions is alone sufficient to trigger legislative immunity because here the ordinance, in substance, bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. Id. The ordinance reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the city and the services the city provides to its constituents. Id. at 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. The action involved the termination of a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. Id. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966. The city council's elimination of the department was an action in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act. Id. (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379, 71 S.Ct. 783). The parties' briefs indicate that we should apply the two-part test even though Bogan does not explicitly require an inquiry into the action's substance. We will examine the action's substance because it helps illuminate what actions are included in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783). To determine whether an act is legislative in form, courts look at whether the defendants acted pursuant to constitutional or statutory procedures. See State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 90-91 (2d Cir.2007) (concluding that it was unclear whether the alleged actions were integral steps in the statutory budget process); Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pa., 211 F.3d 760, 774 (3d Cir. 2000) (In addition, the act must be `procedurally' legislative, that is, passed by means of established legislative procedures. (quoting Ryan v. Burlington Cnty., N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1291 (3d Cir. 1989))); Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir.1999) (examining a county code to determine whether a board of commissioners had authority to take the action that formed a basis of the claim). Bogan asks whether the actions were integral steps in the legislative process. 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Without a doubt, the act of vetoing a line item in a bill constitutes an integral step in Illinois's legislative process. Illinois's Constitution gives the state's governor authority to exercise a line-item veto over appropriation bills. Ill. Const. art. IV, § 9(d) (The Governor may reduce or veto any item of appropriations in a bill presented to him.). Bogan also recognized that a governor's vetoing of a bill is part of the legislative process. 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966 (citing Smiley, 285 U.S. at 372-73, 52 S.Ct. 397). The former captains do not expressly acknowledge that Governor Blagojevich's veto was legislative in form; rather they forfeit this point by failing to argue it in their opening brief. State appellees' opening brief raises appellants' forfeiture, Br. of State Defs'-Appellees 25, and appellants' reply brief does not challenge this. See generally Reply Br. of Pls'-Appellants 1-10. Thus, we conclude that Governor Blagojevich's action in vetoing the provision funding the captain position was legislative in form. This could be the end of the discussion. Yet like the Supreme Court in Bogan, we will look at the action's character to determine whether the action substantively bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation. 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Bogan explained that eliminating positions qualifies as legislative in substance if it reflects a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the [government] and the services the [government] provides to its constituents. Id. at 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. The decision to eliminate a position is unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee because eliminating positions may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. Id. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966. Our precedent supports the distinction between the firing of an employee and the elimination of a position. In Nisenbaum v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804, 808 (7th Cir.2003), we held that Bogan kept state and local officials [from being] mulcted ... on account of introducing, voting for, or signing legislation. Thus, legislative immunity attached to a county executive's role of transmitting a budget from the department of public works to the county board, which enacted the budget, eliminating the plaintiff's position. Id. In Strasburger v. Board of Education, Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 143 F.3d 351, 355 & n. 1 (7th Cir.1998), we noted that a school board's dismissal of an employee through a reduction in force due to low class enrollments and the need to conserve funds could justify legislative immunity for the board members under Bogan, but the board members failed to raise the defense. Legislative immunity claims are not successful when the action relates to the firing of a specific individual rather than the elimination of positions. In Baird v. Board of Education for Warren Community Unit School District No. 205, 389 F.3d 685, 696 (7th Cir.2004), legislative immunity did not attach to a school board's termination of a principal for reasons cited in an evaluation. The board argued that the individual board members were immune because the actions taken to fire the employee such as the determination of rules and procedures, participation in the pre-termination hearing and individual decisions to fire the employeewere legislative acts. Id. But we found that the activities were not taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity because they involved an employee's termination, which was an administrative act. Id. (quoting Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966). Other circuits apply the same distinction between actions that involve the elimination of positions for policy reasons (legislative actions) and actions that result in an individual's termination for reasons that relate to that individual (administrative actions). In Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1306 (11th Cir.2009), an official developed a budget that eliminated an employee's position. The employee alleged that the budget proposal was an artifice for what was in fact a retaliatory personnel decision. Id. at 1303. The court held that [u]nlike the termination of an individual employee, the elimination of a public employment position `may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office.' Id. at 1306 (quoting Bogan, 523 U.S. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966). A decision to abolish the position and prepare the budget proposal is properly construed as embodying a policy decision with prospective implications. Id. at 1306-07. Even though the facts obviously suggest an improper motive, id. at 1307, the court held that a claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege. Id. (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783). Thus, the court refused to consider the official's intent or motive in preparing the budget. Bryant, 575 F.3d at 1307. In Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir.2007), the court granted legislative immunity to a governor who signed, and a state arts council's chairperson who advocated for, legislation eliminating the plaintiff's position. The plaintiff, the state's poet laureate, created an outcry after reading a poem that the governor said implied that Israelis had known about the September 11 terrorism attacks. Id. at 194 (quoting a statement from the governor's spokesperson). The court held that the actions were substantively legislative because the law eliminated the position of poet laureate, a position that was legislatively created. Eliminating the position of poet laureate constitutes the type of `policy-making' that traditional legislation entails, and the actions here were substantively legislative. Id. at 199 (citing Gallas, 211 F.3d at 774). The officials' motive and intent were immaterial to whether certain acts [were] entitled to legislative immunity. Id. at 200 (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55, 118 S.Ct. 966). Consistent with this distinction, Fowler-Nash v. Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 469 F.3d 328, 340 (3d Cir.2006), held that because the alleged actions did not reach beyond a single employee, and did not eliminate a position thereby affecting future employees, the defendants were not acting legislatively when they terminated the plaintiff. The decision did not rely on any broad consideration of policy, neither was it directed to creating a new policy. Id. The situation was a textbook example of a legislator performing an administrative function. Id. Governor Blagojevich's elimination of the captain's position through his budget proposal and his line item veto substantively attempted to reduce management positions in order to save money. Perhaps the Governor harbored secret motives, but motives do not matter in determining whether the action is legislative. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (Whether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783 (The claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.). Governor Blagojevich's veto targeted cutting costs and eliminating management positions. Nothing in the record suggests that the Governor targeted particular employees; rather, he targeted the positions. Thus, Governor Blagojevich's line-item veto was substantively a legislative act and not administrative. The former captains argue that state officials did not perform a budgetary analysis or determine whether there was any financial benefit to eliminating the captain position. Yet state officials believed they could save $17 million a year by eliminating 200-plus captain positions and reduce the total number of IDOC positions by 162. Governor Blagojevich also explained in a press release that the decision to eliminate the captain position was an attempt to reduce the cost of middle management we just don't need. The former captains argue that the creation of a nearly identical position after the captain position's elimination shows that the decision was administrative. This contention lacks citation to the record and is a mere assertion without details supporting the conclusion. Failure to show how any evidence in the record tends to support such a claim generally results in a waiver of the argument. Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 F.3d 371, 384 (7th Cir.2008). Yet the former captains' opening brief's fact section details the issue sufficiently for us to address this contention because this case demonstrates how this was not a one-for-one replacement of disfavored employees with more favored individuals to do the same work. Some responsibilities overlapped and some former captains performed duties similar to the shift commanders, but not to a degree that the reorganization was not prospective. The reorganization reduced the command structure from twelve to ten positions, merging major/chief of security, superintendent, and captain positions into a single major/shift commander position. Assistant wardens of operations took over many of the duties performed by the majors/chiefs of security. The shift commanders also started to regularly command shifts as the high number of captains at certain facilities kept captains from regularly commanding shifts. This reorganization reflected a discretionary, policymaking decision implicating the budgetary priorities of the government. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. The veto terminated a position, which, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, had prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. Id. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966. This elimination of a position is a field where legislators traditionally have power to act, id. (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 379, 71 S.Ct. 783), and plaintiffs have not shown us why this case is otherwise. The former captains cite Canary v. Osborn, 211 F.3d 324 (6th Cir.2000), in arguing that we should look closely at Blagojevich's actions to determine whether they bore the hallmarks of traditional legislation. In Canary, an assistant principal sued school board members after they demoted him. See 211 F.3d at 327-28. The board members claimed legislative immunity protected their decision. Id. at 328. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the finding that the board members were not entitled to legislative immunity because the record did not indicate that they made the decision for budget reasons. See id. at 330. The record indicated that the action was not a position's elimination because the board assigned others to fill the plaintiff's old position and to fulfill his former job duties. See id. at 330-31. Canary is distinguishable from this case in an instructive manner: it involved the replacement of an individual with other individuals with the same title or duties. Here, the individuals in the shift commander position took up additional responsibilities and the action reorganized and streamlined IDOC's command structure. The former captains also cite Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera-Monroig, 204 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2000), in arguing that Governor Blagojevich's decision targeted individuals currently employed as Captains. In Acevedo-Garcia, a group of current and former city employees sued the city, its mayor, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they were fired or that their work conditions were made worse for political reasons. See 204 F.3d at 4. Two ordinances eliminated positions (almost all affiliated with the disfavored party) and detailed layoffs. See id. at 5. The defendants asserted legislative immunity. See id. at 4. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of immunity because the replacement of the employees with politically connected workers and the political harassment did not reflect a discretionary policymaking decision. See id. at 8. The political discrimination was not prospective and did not reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office. Id. (quoting Bogan, 523 U.S. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966). Rather, it targeted specific individuals affiliated with the disfavored party. Id. Acevedo-Garcia is distinguishable from this case because the record does not indicate that the state officials eliminated the captain position because of political allegiances. The closest the record comes to indicating that the former captains' politics were involved is Governor Blagojevich's statement that apparently AFSCME was concerned that most of these captains happen to be Republicans and that they shouldn't be hired. This quote does not indicate that a belief as to the former captains' political affiliation drove the state officials' decision because in the very next part of the quote the Governor says that the former captains should be able to reapply for other positions in state government and we don't care what political party they come from. And 55 of the former captains were promoted to shift commander. Of the other former captains, 83 took lieutenant positions, 64 took correctional officer positions, and 10 accepted layoffs. Governor Blagojevich's veto did not target individuals; rather, it targeted a broad category of employees who held the same position, not for the employees' political allegiances, but to reduce layers of management. Because we find that Governor Blagojevich's veto was legislative, we also hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in blocking the Governor's deposition and limiting Curry's deposition. In Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85, 87 S.Ct. 1425, 18 L.Ed.2d 577 (1967) (per curiam), the Court held in dismissing a civil suit that legislative immunity protected legislators engaged in legislative actions not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves. In Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502-03, 95 S.Ct. 1813, 44 L.Ed.2d 324 (1975), the Court held that civil actions force legislators to divert their time, energy, and attention from their legislative tasks to defend the litigation. Private civil actions also may be used to delay and disrupt the legislative function. The court reaffirmed that once it is determined that a legislator is acting within the `legitimate legislative sphere' the Speech or Debate Clause is an absolute bar to interference. Id. (quoting Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973)). In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980) (citations omitted), the Court held that although separation of powers justifies a broader privilege for Congressmen than for state legislators the Court generally equates the legislative immunity to which state legislators are entitled under § 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under the Constitution. We see no reason why the immunity protecting the Governor from liability for his veto (and Curry to the extent of her involvement in the veto) would not also protect them from the burden of defending themselves, Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at 85, 87 S.Ct. 1425, for their actions `in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.' Id. (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376, 71 S.Ct. 783). The former captains cite Rowland, 494 F.3d at 71, in arguing that the court should decide whether legislative immunity applied after more discovery. In Rowland, the court upheld the denial of a motion to dismiss, which the defendants based partially on legislative immunity. See id. at 76. The court held that additional discovery was necessary to determine whether defendants' acts were indeed procedurally legislative under Bogan.  Id. at 90. Yet Rowland held that the district court erred in focusing on defendants' motives when concluding that discovery was warranted. Id. Rowland also required discovery to determine whether the actions in question were substantively legislative. 494 F.3d at 92. The pleadings only alleged that the employees were fired for illegal reasons, not that their positions' budget lines were eliminated. Id. The former captains also cite Jaggers v. City of Alexandria, No. 08-5213, 2009 WL 233244, at  (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (unpublished) for its holding that legislative immunity could not be determined on a complaint's face. There, a city council rejected plaintiffs' development plan. The developers sued the city and the council members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. at . The council members moved to dismiss on legislative immunity grounds. Id. The court held that nothing in the record established that the development plan's rejection was legislative and not managerial or administrative. Id. at . Although the council members had authority to disapprove of development plans, there was no allegation or evidence ... establishing that the [legislative] procedures were the procedures used rather than their managerial or administrative powers. Id. Thus, discovery was necessary to determine whether these actions were legislative. See id. The court also held that discovery was necessary to determine whether the actions were substantively legislative, or that the decision evidenced broad-based policy decisions. Id. The former captains claim that additional discovery is necessary to determine whether Blagojevich acted legislatively. But the former captains do not explain how deposing the Governor (or Curry more extensively) would lead to such evidence. Rowland does not give the former captains an automatic right to depose Governor Blagojevich; rather Rowland requires additional discovery when the pleadings do not explain how the alleged action was performed. 494 F.3d at 92 (Plaintiffs do not allege in their amended complaint that defendants `terminat[ed] the budget lines' that would have funded their positions or that defendants eliminated the positions through other means. (citation omitted)). We know how the Governor's actions contributed to the captain position's elimination: Governor Blagojevich vetoed legislation funding the position. As noted above, the former captains failed to present evidence connecting Blagojevich to other actions and waived arguing that the other non-Blagojevich defendants participated in the captain position's elimination in non-legislative capacities. Procedurally, Governor Blagojevich vetoed the captain position's funding pursuant to his state constitutional authority. Substantively, the evidence shows that the veto of the captain position's funding was pursuant to a broad-based policy targeting certain positions believed unnecessary. Both Rowland and Jaggers also involved motions to dismiss and are thus materially different from this case where the parties had ample opportunities for discovery on whether the captain position's elimination was an administrative or legislative act. The district court did not err in finding that legislative immunity protected Governor Blagojevich's veto of the captain position's funding, nor did it err in finding that the former captains waived their claim against the other non-Blagojevich defendants by making no real argument on the claim.
The former captains raise three areas of evidence to support their argument that the district court improperly found that there was insufficient evidence of causation on whether the seniority decision was retaliatory: (1) that state officials agreed to read the CBA language in contravention to what it says in an effort to punish the former captains; (2) that AFSCME officials' contact with a Blagojevich administration official and Curry's conversations with a CMS official suggest that defendants influenced the seniority decision; and (3) that the district court ignored the battle between AFSCME and ISEA over representing the captains. When IDOC eliminated the captain position, 64 former captains took correctional officer positions. AFSCME opposed giving seniority credit to the former captains for the time the former captains spent in the officer's RC-6 bargaining unit. AFSCME argued that the RC-6 CBA determined seniority based on their continuous length of service, even though the CBA does not include the word continuous in explaining the seniority calculation. The RC-6 CBA states (emphasis supplied): Seniority for RC-6 and 9 shall, for the purposes stated in this Agreement, consist of the length of service of an employee with their department in an AFSCME bargaining unit(s), except when a previously excluded position enters a bargaining unit pursuant to labor board procedures, seniority for an employee in that position shall consist of the employee's total length of service with their department. IDOC refused to change its plans so AFSCME filed a grievance that proceeded to CMS. CMS determined that the state's position was not viable. AFSCME and IDOC entered an agreement on November 18, 2003, that stipulated that the former captains demoted into the RC-6 unit would receive seniority based on their length of the continuous service ... beginning with their most recent return to the RC-6 AFSCME bargaining unit. The former captains allege that state and AFSCME officials agreed to read continuous into the CBA to harm them. Yet the agreement to read continuous into the CBA language was not so unreasonable as to suggest an attempt to harm the former captains. The language taken as a whole suggests that length of service essentially means continuous length of service because the same provision calculates another group of employees' seniority based on the employee's total length of service with their department. Without reading the term continuous into the first category, the term total in reference to the second category becomes redundant. The former captains also do not contest that the provision has been interpreted to read continuous length of service in previous situations. The AFSCME defendants also presented evidence that AFSCME proposed the provision to prevent non-bargaining unit employees moved back into the unit from receiving prior service credit. Previously, existing members were laid off because they accrued less total seniority than former management employees. Plaintiffs' only argument against this evidence is that the agreement's clear language contradicts this reading. The provision's alleged clarity aside, plaintiffs do not contest AFSCME's reasons for proposing the provision. That the provision governing the seniority calculation in the CU-500 bargaining unit (covering lieutenants) includes the phrase continuous does not control the reasonableness of the interpretation of the RC-6 CBA language. The CU-500 CBA states (emphasis supplied): Seniority shall, for the purpose of layoff and recall, be continuous service as currently defined and administered by the Rules of the Director of Central Management Services. Seniority for all other purposes shall be the continuous length of service in the affected employee's classification, except that employees employed in the CU-500 bargaining unit as of July 1, 1989, shall have his/her length of service prior to July 1, 1989, whether continuous or not, in his/her affected classification counted toward his/her seniority. The CU-500 CBA seniority calculation turns on the phrase continuous, while the RC-6 CBA seniority calculation turns on the phrase total. The RC-6 CBA determines seniority on whether the employee's length of service is either the employee's total length of service or simply the length of service of an employee. The CU-500 CBA determines seniority by either the length of service whether continuous or not or the continuous length of service. That two contracts use different words to delineate the seniority calculationand that CMS eventually agreed with an interpretation favoring AFSCMEdoes not provide sufficient evidence that reading the CBA language in AFSCME's favor was an effort to harm the former captains. The former captains cite a meeting AFSCME official (and appellee) Henry Bayer had with Blagojevich's chief of staff Alonzo Monk to discuss the seniority issue. Bayer testified that the issue was a very, very hot issue for us because these people were going to be coming into our bargaining unit and bringing in seniority, which might potentially enable them to bump one of our members who has weekends off. Bayer's deposition suggests that he met with Monk to protect the interests of existing AFSCME members. Nowhere does Bayer indicate that he met with Monk to punish the former captains. Bayer also testified that CMS chief counsel for labor relations Nancy Pittman made the decision on how to interpret the CBA and that he could not get Curry to change the administration's position on the seniority issue. The former captains point to Curry's acknowledgment that she spoke to Pittman about the grievance as evidence that CMS did not act independently. But nothing about Curry's testimony suggests that she influenced Pittman. Curry said she talked to Pittman about the grievance to get information about the case's progress and the ultimate decision. Curry testified that Pittman resolved the grievance on her own and on the merits of the case. The former captains argue that if CMS acted independently, Curry would have had no reason to talk to CMS. The former captains overstate a meeting's significance. As deputy chief of staff, Curry oversaw a review of Illinois agencies' organizational structures. Curry worked with IDOC personnel directors in 2003 to identify IDOC positions to eliminate and consolidate. There are many reasons for Curry to meet with Pittman but there is no evidence that Curry met with Pittman to influence her decision. The former captains only briefly mention their claim against the AFSCME officials. Because the former captains sued the AFSCME officials in their individual capacities, the former captains had to prove that the AFSCME officials were willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27, 101 S.Ct. 183, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982) (holding that a person could be a state actor because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials). AFSCME and ISEA's competition to represent the captains is not sufficient evidence that the AFSCME officials' communications with state officials regarding the seniority issue were retaliatory. The former captains argue that AFSCME went as far as to file intervention petitions seeking to represent the Captains demonstrating the history of the battle over who would represent the Captains. But the former captains do not cite evidence that a desire to harm the former captains motivated the AFSCME officials. The evidence indicates that AFSCME officials acted to protect existing members. The former captains' reply brief argues that a quid pro quo existed because AFSCME's financial support of Blagojevich's campaign meant that it wanted something in return. We can reasonably infer that AFSCME expected something in return for its campaign contributions, but that alone does not reasonably lead to the inference that what AFSCME officials wanted in return was retaliation against the former captains. The former captains allege that the AFSCME officials engaged in a conspiracy with the State Officials based on Bayer's communications with state officials and the resolution of the union grievance against the former captains. Communications with state officials and a complaint's resolution against the former captains but in favor of existing AFSCME members is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate a conspiracy. The former captains fail to cite any evidence suggesting that a desire to punish the former captains motivated the AFSCME officials' actions. The AFSCME officials' communications with state officials and the resolution of the grievance in AFSCME's favor certainly suggest that the AFSCME officials attempted to influence state officials, and perhaps their efforts caused the state officials to resolve the grievance in their favor. But that is where the reasonable inference ends. The former captains failed to show that a genuine dispute exists regarding the AFSCME officials' intent in influencing state officials. [2]