Opinion ID: 2582281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Decisions of the California Courts of Appeal

Text: In the period since the high court handed down its decision in Apprendi, a number of decisions rendered by our intermediate appellate courts have addressed, in a variety of contexts, the claim that a defendant who faces a potential increase in sentence on the basis of a prior conviction is entitled, in light of Apprendi, to have a jury rather than the court decide one or more issues related to the prior conviction. As we shall explain, these earlier Court of Appeal decisions followed an approach to Apprendi somewhat different from that taken by the Court of Appeal in the present case. In Thomas, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 212, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 571, the defendant faced an increased sentence under section 667.5 based on allegations that he had served two prior prison terms. At trial, defense counsel purported to waive the defendant's right to a jury trial on the prior-prison-term allegations, but the defendant did not personally waive a jury trial on those allegations. The trial court found that the defendant had served two prior prison terms and imposed an increased sentence on the basis of those enhancements. After the defendant was sentenced, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Apprendi, and on appeal the defendant in Thomas argued that he was denied a jury trial on the prior-prison-term allegations in violation of Apprendi, because the trial court failed to obtain his express personal waiver of that right. The defendant in Thomas relied upon the following language in Apprendi: `Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( Thomas, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 216, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 571.) The Court of Appeal in Thomas rejected the defendant's claim. Citing a number of authorities from other jurisdictions, that court observed: [O]ther courts have construed Apprendi as requiring a jury trial except as to matters relating to `recidivism.' Courts have not described Apprendi as requiring jury trials on matters other than the precise `fact' of a prior conviction. Rather, courts have held that no jury trial right exists on matters involving the more broadly framed issue of `recidivism.' [Citations.] ( Thomas, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th 212, 221, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 571.) Concurring in these decisions, the court in Thomas concluded that [i]n terms of recidivism findings that enhance a sentence and are unrelated to the elements of a crime, Almendarez-Torres is the controlling due process authority.... Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. The language ... in Apprendi, `[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,' refers broadly to recidivism enhancements which include section 667.5 prior prison term allegations. ( Id. at pp. 222-223, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 571.) Finally, the court in Thomas observed that the evidence in that case consisted of documents that demonstrated, without dispute, that the defendant on two separate occasions had been sentenced to and had completed prison terms. ( Id. at p. 223, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 571.) In People v. Belmares (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 19, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 400 ( Belmares ), the defendant's sentence similarly was increased under section 667.5 on the basis of two prior prison terms, and on appeal the defendant contended he had a constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue whether he was the person whose name appeared on the section 969b packet admitted into evidence to establish the allegations that he had served prior prison terms. [8] Relying upon our decision in Epps, supra, 25 Cal.4th 19, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 572, 18 P.3d 2, the Court of Appeal rejected the defendant's position, observing: `The right, if any, to a jury trial of prior conviction allegations derives from sections 1025 and 1158, not from the state or federal Constitution. [Citations.]' ( Belmares, supra, at p. 27, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, fns. omitted.) The Court of Appeal further observed that [c]ase law sets out the procedure for the court to find and instruct on [the issue] of identity. . . . ( Id. at p. 28, 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, italics added.) In light of these state law mandates, the Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant had no constitutional right to a jury trial on the question of his identity as the person identified in the section 969b packet. ( Ibid.; see also People v. Garcia (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1159, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 694 ( Garcia ) [same].) Although acknowledging the foregoing appellate court decisions, the Court of Appeal in the present case disagreed with their broad interpretation of the Almendarez-Torres exception as encompassing all questions relating to recidivism, and instead suggested that the exception should be interpreted narrowly: [W]e conclude that the Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi is confined to determinations about the past legal consequences of a defendant's conduct, such as whether his conduct has given rise to a conviction or prison term, and does not extend to determinations about the conduct itself, such as the intent with which a defendant acted. Reasoning that the question whether defendant was subject to an increased sentence on the basis of the prior Nevada robbery convictions required a factual finding as to whether his conduct at the time he committed the prior offense satisfied the elements of the California robbery statute, the Court of Appeal concluded that this was the type of factual issue on which defendant had a right to a jury trial under Apprendi. In so holding, the Court of Appeal distinguished Thomas, Belmares, and Garcia as involving only factual issues related to the legal consequences [a recidivist] had suffered as a result of past criminal conduct, not whether that conduct was criminal in the first place. As we shall explain in the discussion that follows, we believe the Court of Appeal erred in framing the issue as one calling for a finding of fact regarding defendant's conduct at the time he committed the prior offense. Instead, we believe it is more accurate to characterize the inquiry that is required under California law as a legal determination of the nature of defendant's prior convictions as established by the record of the prior criminal proceedings.