Opinion ID: 1702128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excited Utterance or Spontaneous Statement

Text: Hutchinson argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Renee's friend, Pruitt, because it was inadmissible hearsay. Pruitt recounted a telephone conversation between the two women on the night of the murders. In the course of the conversation, Renee told Pruitt that she had a big fight with Hutchinson and that he had taken some of his things and left. Over Hutchinson's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the testimony as an excited utterance. The State now contends the testimony was admissible as either an excited utterance or a spontaneous statement. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement testified to by a person other than the declarant which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003); Hitchcock v. State, 636 So.2d 572, 573 (Fla.1994). Such hearsay statements are generally inadmissible because the declarant is not testifying under oath, the trier of fact cannot observe the declarant's demeanor, and the declarant is not subject to cross-examination. See Banks v. State, 790 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla.2001). However, hearsay statements may be admitted into evidence if the trial court finds that one of the exceptions provided for by statute is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. See §§ 90.802, 90.803, 90.804, Fla. Stat. (2003); cf. Rigdon v. State, 621 So.2d 475, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (In the absence of an applicable exception, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.). The State asserts that Pruitt's hearsay statement was admissible either as an excited utterance or as a spontaneous statement. We disagree. Section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2003), defines an excited utterance as follows: Excited utterance.  A statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Section 90.803(1), Florida Statutes (2003), defines a spontaneous statement as follows: Spontaneous statement.  A spontaneous statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter, except when such statement is made under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness. Both the excited utterance and the spontaneous statement exceptions require the declarant to be laboring under the influence of a startling event at the time that the statement is made. See State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla.1988) (explaining that the excited utterance exception and the spontaneous statement exception are primarily distinguishable by the time lapse between the event and the statement describing the event). Although the spontaneous statement and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule overlap to some degree, there are two main differences. See id. at 661. First, the exceptions differ in the amount of time that may lapse between the event and the statement. See id. at 661-62. The excited utterance must be made before there is time for reflection, and the spontaneous statement must be made while perceiving the event or immediately thereafter. See id. Second, the exceptions differ in the statement describing the event. See id. An excited utterance relates to the event and includes acts, statements, occurrences and circumstances, see State v. Snowden, 345 So.2d 856, 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), while the spontaneous statement describes the event. See Jano, at 662. While an excited utterance need not be contemporaneous to the event, it must be made while the declarant is under the stress of the startling event and without time for reflection. See Rogers v. State, 660 So.2d 237, 240 (Fla.1995). In this case, the time between the startling event (the fight between Renee and Hutchinson) and the telephone conversation is not clearly ascertainable from this record. The most that can be said is that the fight probably occurred between 7 p.m. (the approximate time of Renee's conversation with another friend) and 7:30 p.m. (the approximate time of Renee's conversation with Pruitt). Without more information, we can only speculate as to whether Renee engaged in reflective thought. However, this was a long enough time interval to permit reflective thought. [W]here the time interval between the event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded in the absence of some proof that the declarant did not in fact engage in a reflective thought process. State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence, § 297, at 856 (3d ed.1984)). There is no evidence in the record to show what occurred between the fight with Hutchinson and the phone call to Pruitt. Absent some evidence that Renee did not engage in reflective thought, the statement to Pruitt cannot be admitted as an excited utterance. See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 660 So.2d 237 (Fla.1995) (finding that the victim had eight to ten minutes for reflective thought, but based on witness testimony regarding the victim's behavior during that time period, the victim did not engage in reflective thought, and the victim's statements were admissible as an excited utterance). The fact that Renee was crying when she called Pruitt is not, by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that Renee did not engage in reflective thought. A statement as to what occurred does not become admissible merely because the victim is still in an excited state. Charlot v. State, 679 So.2d 844, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Because the record does not describe the fight between Renee and Hutchinson, or provide the time the fight was over, we have no evidence upon which to base a conclusion that Renee did not engage in reflective thought. Renee's statements to Pruitt are not, therefore, admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Renee's statements to Pruitt are not admissible under the spontaneous statement exception either. A spontaneous statement must be made at the time of, or immediately following, the declarant's observation of the event or condition described. J.M. v. State, 665 So.2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Like the excited utterance exception, the spontaneous statement exception also requires that the statement must be made without the declarant first engaging in reflective thought. Id. For the reasons explained above, we cannot say that Renee did not first engage in reflective thought before she made the phone call to Pruitt because there is no evidence in the record to show what occurred between 7 and 7:30 p.m. The evidence shows that Hutchinson had already left the home when Renee made the phone call to Pruitt. This suggests that the argument had already occurred by the time the phone call was made. Thus, Renee's call to Pruitt was not made at the time of the fight, and we cannot ascertain from the record whether it was made immediately following the fight or while Renee was still perceiving the fight. Pruitt's testimony, therefore, is not admissible as a spontaneous statement. However, any error in the admission of this testimony was harmless. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1139 (Fla.1986). Under DiGuilio, [t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict. Id. If the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the verdict, then the error is, by definition, harmless. Id. In this case, the admission of Pruitt's testimony did not affect the verdict. The State relied on Pruitt's testimony to show that Hutchinson's motive for the murders was his argument with Renee. However, as the State points out, Pruitt's testimony was not the only evidence that the argument occurred. Hutchinson told the bartender, Renee is pissed off at me. Also, when police found Hutchinson after responding to the 911 call, his clothes and other items were in his truck. From this, the jury could have reasonably concluded there was some type of disagreement between Renee and Hutchinson. Furthermore, the fact that Hutchinson and Renee had an argument does not provide any motive or explanation for the murder of the three children. Pruitt's testimony adds little, if anything, to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, which includes Hutchinson's call to 911 in which he told the operator he had just killed his family, the gunpowder residue on his hands, the fact that he was the owner of the murder weapon, and the fact of the victims' blood and tissue found on his clothes. There is no reasonable possibility this error affected the verdict. We therefore deny relief on this claim.