Opinion ID: 1351576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Suppress Confession to Police Psychiatrist

Text: (6) Defendant moved to suppress his confession to the police psychiatrist. He had given the statement during an interview conducted by the psychiatrist, William E. Gordon, a member of the Sexual Assault Response Team, on January 10, 1986  the day after his first confession to the police. Defendant made the motion orally in the midst of Dr. Gordon's testimony as the People's first witness. The ground was evidently that the confession was involuntary under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, sections 7 and 15. [6] The argument in support was somewhat vague  to the effect that the statement was assertedly obtained by a promise of benefit and/or the improper influence of official deception. The promise, it appears, was a statement by a jailer: late on the night of January 9, 1986, after giving his first confession to the police, defendant was placed on suicide watch, and was put naked into a small, empty cell with foam-rubber padded walls and bare concrete floor  a so-called rubber room; he was told by the jailer that he would not be released until he was cleared by Mental Health. The deception, it appears, was the alleged substitution of Dr. Gordon in place of an expected visitor from Mental Health the next morning. The court conducted a hearing outside the presence of the jury. The evidence included live testimony by defendant; the testimony he had given at the hearing on the motion to suppress his confessions to the police; and, it appears, the transcript of those statements. Concluding impliedly that the confession to Dr. Gordon was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, the court denied the motion. It determined, in substance, that defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights by Dr. Gordon, and that he effectively waived those rights; that there is no evidence ... of any kind of physical, or mental, psychological coercion upon Mr. Benson to talk with Dr. Gordon; that the authorities made no promise and practiced no deception; and that defendant freely gave his statement out of compunction. As noted, parts of the confession were subsequently introduced at the guilt phase. Defendant now contends that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress his confession to Dr. Gordon. We disagree. Reviewed de novo, the court's conclusion of voluntariness and its supporting determinations are all sound. First, defendant was properly advised of, and effectively waived, his Miranda rights  nor does he claim otherwise. Second, and of crucial importance, the necessary element of coercion on the part of the authorities is lacking. The record supports, indeed compels, the court's conclusion: there is no evidence ... of any kind of physical, or mental, psychological coercion upon Mr. Benson to talk with Dr. Gordon. Defendant claims that The police secured the ... confession [to Dr. Gordon] by manipulating [his] custody so that he believed that the only way to secure his release from the `rubber room' was to talk to the police psychiatrist. Manipulation, however, is simply absent from the record. We recognize that defendant was placed in a rubber room on suicide watch. But we cannot discern any official coercion therein. Indeed, at the hearing defendant effectively conceded that the placement was justified. In giving his first confession to the police, he made statements that he admitted someone could have interpreted ... as being suicidal. We also recognize that defendant testified that he spoke with Dr. Gordon [b]asically to get out of that cell. The court expressly found the assertion unworthy of credit. Its finding is supported by substantial evidence. But in any event, the assertion is insufficient: it does not establish official coercion. Third, there was no promise or deception by the authorities. The evidence introduced at the hearing, including defendant's own testimony, does not support the inference of any promise. Construed either objectively or subjectively, the jailer's statement, i.e., that defendant would not be released until he was cleared by Mental Health, was merely a statement. That same evidence does not support the inference of any deception. In fact, defendant himself admitted that prior to the interview, Dr. Gordon properly identified himself as a physician and a member of the Sexual Assault Response Team. His assertion that he nevertheless believed that Dr. Gordon was from Mental Health is of no consequence: his belief cannot properly be attributed to deceptive conduct on the part of the government. Finally, defendant made his confession freely out of compunction. The court stated: [I]t seems to me clearly that Mr. Benson was going through some terribly draining emotional feelings. And that in his own heart and mind he felt it was necessary to get this off of his chest and to speak to somebody about it. We share the court's view. In sum, the denial of defendant's motion to suppress his confession to Dr. Gordon was not error.