Opinion ID: 2646000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: [2] For the sake of completeness, we note that Fester’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly before us. His guilty pleas did not waive the claim; while normally a voluntary guilty plea waives all defenses to a criminal 7 See State v. Timmens, 282 Neb. 787, 805 N.W.2d 704 (2011). 8 See State v. Edwards, 284 Neb. 382, 821 N.W.2d 680 (2012). 9 See id. 10 Id. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. FESTER 45 Cite as 287 Neb. 40 charge, in a postconviction proceeding brought by a defendant convicted because of a guilty plea or a plea of no contest, a court will consider an allegation that the plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.11 And Fester’s claims are not procedurally barred because he was represented by the same counsel at trial and on appeal, and thus postconviction is the proper forum to raise his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.12 [3-7] Certain general principles govern our consideration of Fester’s claims. In order to establish a right to postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has the burden, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington,13 to show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense in his or her case.14 To show deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law in the area.15 To show prejudice when the alleged ineffective assistance relates to the entry of a plea, the defend­ ant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he or she would not have entered the plea and would have insisted on going to trial.16 The two prongs of this test, deficient performance and prejudice, may be addressed in either order.17 The entire ineffectiveness analysis is viewed with a strong presumption that counsel’s actions were reasonable and that even if found unreasonable, 11 State v. Dunster, 278 Neb. 268, 769 N.W.2d 401 (2009). 12 See, State v. Robinson, 285 Neb. 394, 827 N.W.2d 292 (2013); State v. McKinney, 279 Neb. 297, 777 N.W.2d 555 (2010). 13 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 14 State v. Dunkin, 283 Neb. 30, 807 N.W.2d 744 (2012); State v. Golka, 281 Neb. 360, 796 N.W.2d 198 (2011). 15 State v. Watt, 285 Neb. 647, 832 N.W.2d 459 (2013). 16 See State v. Dunkin, supra note 14. 17 See, id.; State v. Golka, supra note 14; State v. Vo, 279 Neb. 964, 783 N.W.2d 416 (2010). Nebraska Advance Sheets 46 287 NEBRASKA REPORTS the error justifies setting aside the judgment only if there was prejudice.18 In Fester’s brief to this court, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective in three respects. We examine each of them in turn. Investigation and R eview by Counsel Fester alleges that his counsel provided ineffective assist­ ance because he did not directly review any discovery materials with Fester and did not adequately investigate the case. Fester alleges that because of these alleged shortcomings, he was forced to enter his guilty pleas. The district court examined this claim in light of all the evidence presented and found that Fester failed to establish that counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court largely limited its analysis to whether counsel’s performance was deficient. In doing so, it found that Fester’s claims were substantially negated by the statements he made on the record at the time he entered his pleas—specifically, that he was satisfied with counsel’s representation and that he had had ample time to discuss the case with him. Further, the court relied upon counsel’s testimony that although he did not give discovery reports directly to Fester, he kept Fester informed on an “‘ongoing’” basis of what he was reviewing and met with Fester 10 times outside of the courtroom. The court also found that Fester’s counsel spent approximately 285 hours preparing for trial and that he continued to prepare until the plea agreement was reached. None of these factual findings are clearly erroneous, and we agree that on these facts, counsel did not perform deficiently. We affirm the district court’s finding that counsel was not ineffective in this regard. P romise of 21- to 35-Year Sentences Fester claims that his attorney told him he would be sentenced to 21 to 35 years in prison on the second degree murder 18 State v. Dunkin, supra note 14. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. FESTER 47 Cite as 287 Neb. 40 convictions and that but for this assurance, he would not have entered into the plea agreement. But the district court found the evidence refuted this claim and that counsel did not perform deficiently. Specifically, the court found that prior to accepting the plea, Fester was advised that the possible penalty for second degree murder was 20 years to life in prison. The court also credited his attorney’s testimony that he did not tell Fester he would be sentenced to 20 to 35 years in prison on the murder convictions and 1 to 5 years in prison on the weapon conviction. In addition, the record demonstrates that the plea agreement itself set forth the possible penalties for second degree murder and that Fester read and signed the plea agreement. We agree with the district court that the evidence establishes that Fester’s counsel did not perform deficiently in this respect and therefore did not provide Fester ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial P reparation Fester alleges that although trial was set for February 26, 2007, by January 19, his attorney had not taken any depositions, subpoenaed any witnesses, or discussed Fester’s right to testify in his own defense at trial. He implies that due to this lack of preparation, he was coerced into entering into the plea agreement. But Fester testified that at the time he entered his pleas, he understood his attorney was prepared to try the case. He also informed the court during the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with his attorney’s services and had had ample time to review the case and the plea agreement with him. This evidence directly negates his claim that he was forced to enter the pleas because he thought his attorney was unprepared for trial. We further note the record demonstrates that counsel engaged in substantial pretrial preparation and that in the course of doing so, he was confronted with significant evidence against Fester. Under the circumstances, it was a reasonable strategy to enter into the plea agreement which reduced the charges to second degree murder.19 We agree with the district court 19 See, generally, State v. Edwards, supra note 8. Nebraska Advance Sheets 48 287 NEBRASKA REPORTS that Fester’s counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in this regard.