Opinion ID: 1964920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Documents Numbered 1, 3, and 7-13.

Text: [¶ 12] The Department contends, and the trial court held, that documents 1, 3, and 7-13 are protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine. Springfield argues that the documents are not protected because they were not prepared in anticipation of litigation. We agree with the Department. [¶ 13] Documents which would be within the scope of a privilege against discovery are not public records subject to disclosure. See 1 M.R.S.A. § 402(3)(B) (Supp.1999). One such privilege is the work product doctrine. [A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things . . . prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial' equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation. M.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). [¶ 14] In the few cases in which this issue has been addressed, we have conducted our own in camera review of the challenged material to determine whether the trial court committed legal error in determining whether a document is protested work product. See Boccaleri v. Maine Med. Ctr., 534 A.2d 671, 672-73 (Me.1987); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 448 A.2d 272, 283 (Me.1982). [¶ 15] Rule 26(b)(3), which is identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(3), contemplates a preliminary analysis by the trial court to determine whether the party, seeking to protect the material from disclosure has met its burden of establishing that the document is work product. See M.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). If that burden is met, the burden then shifts to the party seeking disclosure to demonstrate that it has substantial need of the materials and cannot obtain the document otherwise without undue hardship. See id. Finally, even if the party seeking disclosure can establish need and hardship, documents, or parts of documents, containing Mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney shall not be disclosed. See id. [¶ 16] A document is protected as work product only if it was created because of the party's subjective anticipation of future litigation. See M.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir.1993) (holding that [o]nly by looking to the state of mind of the party preparing the document or ... the party ordering the preparation of a document can the court determine whether the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation). Yet, subjective belief alone is not enough. The preparer's anticipation of litigation must also be objectively reasonable. See Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d at 1260. [¶ 17] Moreover, the document must also be of a type that can be considered work product. A party generally must show that the documents were prepared principally or exclusively to assist in anticipated or ongoing litigation. United States v. Construction Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir.1996). `[T]he test should be whether, in light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.' [5] In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir.1979) (quoting 8 Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024, at 198 (1970)), quoted in Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d at 1260; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Perrigan, 102 F.R.D. 235, 238 (W.D.Va.1984). [¶ 18] Finally, the test should be applied in light of the purpose of the rule, which is to `promote the adversary system by protecting the confidentiality of papers prepared by or on behalf of attorneys in anticipation of litigation.' See Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d at 1265 (Nygaard, J., concurring) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir.1991)) (alterations omitted). [O]ur adversary system depends on the effective assistance of lawyers, fostered by the privacy of communications between lawyer and client and the privacy in development of legal theories, opinions, and strategies for the client. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 967 F.2d 980, 983 (4th Cir. 1992). Moreover, it is not just the work of the attorney that is protected. Also protected are documents created by the party or the party's representatives, as long as they are created in anticipation of litigation. See M.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). [¶ 19] Some courts have found that litigation need only be `identifiable' in order to trigger work product protection. See Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d at 1260 (quoting 4 James W. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 26.64[2], at 26-352 (1991)). A remote possibility of litigation is insufficient, however, and some courts even have found the likelihood of litigation to be a deficient showing, requiring a substantial probability with commencement imminent. 4 Moore supra, ¶ 26.64[2], at 26-353 (1987). Because the purpose of the rule is to protect those communications that were legitimately made in anticipation of trial, the party seeking to prevent disclosure should be able to demonstrate that its expectation of litigation is reasonable. A good formulation of this reasonableness test can be found in National Union Fire Insurance: The document must be prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual claim or a potential claim following an actual event or series of events that reasonably could result in litigation. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., Inc., 967 F.2d at 984.
[¶ 20] Documents 1, 7, and 8 are communications from Department officials to its chief counsel regarding possible eminent domain proceedings. They were drafted after Guilford orally agreed to abandon the Lower Lewiston Road, and each document was created in anticipation of future eminent domain litigation. Indeed, they were created for the purpose of determining whether eminent domain proceedings could be brought at all. [6] [¶ 21] When the Department sought advice regarding whether or not the law allowed it to bring an eminent domain proceeding against Guilford, it adequately identified the prospect that litigation would be necessary to restore rail service to the Lewiston Lower Road. That it hoped that legal action would not be necessary does nothing to alter the fact that the Department's belief in the necessity of a legal solution was strong enough to submit the idea to outside counsel. [¶ 22] Moreover, the Department's anticipation of litigation was reasonable. The key factor to consider in making that analysis is the lack of any binding written agreement for the sale of Guilford's interest in the Lewiston Lower Road. While Guilford orally agreed to abandon the line and to negotiate with the Department, it was in no way bound to do so. Consequently, it was reasonable for the Department to expect that the negotiations would be unsuccessful and that it would likely be forced to resort to any eminent domain power it might have in order to acquire the property. Because the Department prepared documents 1, 7, and 8 in reasonable anticipation of litigation, we conclude that those documents are protected from disclosure by the work product doctrine.
[¶ 23] Documents 9-13 are authored by the Department's chief counsel and outside counsel, and they are responses to the requests for legal advice contained in Document Nos. 1, 7, and 8. Not only do those documents contain advice regarding the mechanics and possible outcomes of various forms of future litigation, they also contain, almost exclusively, the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney and are, therefore, protected from disclosure by M.R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
[¶ 24] Document 3 is a letter from the Department's chief counsel to outside counsel seeking advice on yet another legal alternative to a negotiated solution with Springfield. Accordingly, as with documents 1, 7, and 8, this communication is protected work product. [7] The entry is: Judgment affirmed.