Opinion ID: 484637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction Over Constitutional Challenges

Text: 11 In deciding whether the district court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' constitutional claim, we are guided by the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). In that case the Court held that a statute prohibiting judicial review of the decisions of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs did not prohibit review of constitutional questions. See 38 U.S.C. Sec. 211(a). 2 The Court noted that to hold otherwise would, of course, raise serious questions concerning the constitutionality of Sec. 211(a).... Johnson, 415 U.S. at 366, 94 S.Ct. at 1165. Applying the cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question[s] may be avoided, Johnson, 415 U.S. at 367, 94 S.Ct. at 1165 (quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 1404, 28 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971)), the Court construed the phrase in Sec. 211(a), the decisions ... under any law administered by the Veterans' Administration, to exclude constitutional issues. The Constitution is not a statute administered by the Veterans' Administration. See Robison, 415 U.S. at 367, 94 S.Ct. at 1165 (emphasis supplied). 12 In interpreting Sec. 8128(b) in like fashion, we call attention to the similarity between that provision and Sec. 211(a) of the Veterans' Act. See footnote 2 below. The phrase [t]he action ... under this subchapter in Section 8128(b) refers to statutory, and not constitutional, action. (Emphasis supplied). See Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1347-48 (9th Cir.1985). Accordingly, the district court has jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Secretary's actions administering the FECA. 13 Whether the district court has jurisdiction over the particular constitutional challenge in this case depends on whether it is, as the Secretary contends, so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit. Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579, 24 S.Ct. 553, 557, 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904); see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1378-79, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). Plaintiffs claim that the Secretary irrationally discriminated between the group composed of class members who were injured and filed FECA claims prior to the date of FECA Memorandum 242, but whose claims had not been finally adjudicated, and the group composed of persons who were injured, had filed claims, and had begun receiving benefits by July, 1978. The only difference between the first group and some of the members of the second group is how quickly the Department of Labor processed their claims. 14 To withstand plaintiffs' equal protection challenge the Secretary would have to show that the policy had a legitimate purpose and that the classifications imposed were rationally related to that purpose and not arbitrary or irrational. See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-77, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459-60, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980). In his brief, the Secretary claims that the prospective application of FECA Memorandum 242 only to class members whose claims were adjudicated after July 14, 1978, serves the legitimate purpose of carrying out the Congressional intent in the FECA and the National Guard Technicians Act, while at the same time protecting the legitimate expectations of those class members already receiving dual benefits. The Secretary further argues that this classification is rational because an employee has no entitlement to FECA benefits until a final decision is made on a claim. 15 We will not comment on the merits of this defense other than to say that it is not strong enough to render the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge wholly insubstantial. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33, 82 S.Ct. 549, 550, 7 L.Ed.2d 512 (1962). Accordingly, the district court has jurisdiction. In the light of United States Retirement Board v. Fritz, supra, plaintiffs will have a difficult time invalidating the policy. Nevertheless, they are entitled to an opportunity to try. On remand the district court shall consider the merits of this constitutional challenge.