Opinion ID: 164068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Search of House

Text: 51 Cline next argues that the execution of a search warrant at his residence early in the morning of March 27, 2000, violated 18 U.S.C. § 3109 and requires the suppression of all the evidence gathered pursuant to that warrant. The district court denied Cline's motion to suppress. On appeal from that denial, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, its conclusions of law de novo, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. United States v. Gallegos, 314 F.3d 456, 458 (10th Cir.2002). 52 The knock and announce rule contained in § 3109 forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). Section 3109 provides that a law enforcement officer may: 53 break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of a warrant. 54 18 U.S.C. § 3109. The knock and announce requirement may be dispensed with entirely if the police have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). When officers do knock and announce, as they did here, `the amount of time that officers must wait after knocking and announcing depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case.' Gallegos, 314 F.3d at 460 (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 175 F.3d 1208, 1213 (10th Cir. 1999)). We have recently stated that our survey of cases in this circuit has not revealed a single case upholding an interval of less than ten seconds in the absence of exigent circumstances, and our review of cases from other circuits has yielded similar results. Id. 55 The district court made the following findings concerning the execution of the warrant: 56 John Aldine, a DEA Special Agent, was the team leader for this execution. Aldine testified that at approximately 7:30 a.m. on March 27, 2000, Special Agent Robert Allen rapped on Cline's door with one hand and yelled loudly once or twice, DEA, search warrant. After waiting five to ten seconds thereafter, and hearing no response from inside, Aldine ordered Allen to hit it. Allen hit the door with a battering ram, the door opened, and eight to ten agents entered Cline's residence with weapons drawn. Both Clines were found in bed, awake but unclothed. 57 Mem. and Order at 8-9, R. Vol. 8, doc. 983. The district court held the five to ten second interval between the knock and announce and the forced entry was reasonable under the circumstances, because several developments during the officers' approach to the Clines' residence gave the officers a legitimate concern for their safety and made further delay too risky: 58 The evidence was uncontradicted that the executing officers were nervous and apprehensive. Special Agent Aldine testified that their cavalcade of cars had been spotted in the small town in which they assembled and had possibly been reported to the Clines by someone on a cell phone that morning as the cars approached the Clines' residence. 59 Agents knew, because of authorized wiretaps, that Cline and Johnny Shane Wright were associated, that Wright used and that Clines may have used counter surveillance devices, such as police scanners and cameras mounted at a distance from the house. The agents felt exposed because of the Clines' neighbor's view of their cars on the road near Cline's drive, the possibility that the Clines had a camera mounted near the gate to their residence, and the open area surrounding their immediate approach to the Clines' house. 60 Agents were delayed for several minutes by their unsuccessful attempts to break the lock on the gate at Clines' drive, and had to leave their vehicles, which they had anticipated using as cover, at the gate approximately 200-300 yards from the residence. Soon thereafter, agents unsuccessfully attempted to call Timothy Cline out of his house by use of the telephone, while approaching Cline's residence on foot. 61 Agents also had information causing them to believe that Cline may be armed and dangerous.... 62 Based upon the above uncontradicted testimony, the court finds that the Clines could easily have been alerted to the presence of the agents because of the activities that occurred outside the house immediately prior to their entry. It was thus reasonable for the agents to believe that their safety had been compromised and further delay was unwarranted. 63 Id. at 10-11 (emphasis added). 64 Those findings are amply supported by the testimony at the suppression hearing and are not clearly erroneous. 65 We conclude that the officers' entry under the circumstances of this case was reasonable. Not only were the officers aware that a prior search of Cline's house had revealed firearms, but they suspected he used counter-surveillance equipment and could be aware of their approach; their approach to his house had taken longer than anticipated and was exposed for the last 200-300 yards, because of the locked gate which they were unable to open; they feared their approach had been relayed to Cline, based upon their observation of a person watching them while talking on a cell phone, as well as a neighbor watching them; their fears were not allayed when they tried to reach Cline by cell phone several times but were unable to. 10 Thus, in this case, these exigencies permitted the officers to enter the house forcibly some ten seconds after knocking and announcing their presence. 11