Opinion ID: 1659705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the submission of the robbery aggravating circumstance violated state law and the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.

Text: Instruction C-1 allowed the jury to consider as an aggravating circumstance that [t]he capital murder of David James Norwood, Jr. was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice, in the commission of armed robbery. Apparently ignoring the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246, 108 S.Ct. 546, 555, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), as well as this Court's application of that decision, Holly suggests on appeal that submission of this aggravating circumstance does not narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in a rational manner, thus it violates the Eighth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has held that as long as the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty is narrowed during the guilt or sentencing phase of the trial, the fact that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make this sentence constitutionally infirm. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. 231 at 246, 108 S.Ct. at 555. In Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991), this Court, again rejecting the contention that aggravating factors could not be stacked, reiterated Lowenfield, stating: The United States Supreme Court held that when constitutionally required narrowing of the class of persons eligible for the death penalty is accomplished by the legislative definition of capital offenses in the guilt phase (as is done in Louisiana and Mississippi), the jury's further narrowing of the sentencing phase is not constitutionally required. [ Lowenfield, 484 U.S.] at 241-46, 108 S.Ct. at 552-55, 98 L.Ed.2d at 579-83. Ladner, 584 So.2d at 763. Since this issue has been resolved by this Court, we find no merit to Holly's argument.