Opinion ID: 4509115
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Points of Error

Text: Canada identifies several alleged procedural points of error in the district court below’s finding of special factors. First, he complains that the 10 Canada takes issue with the district court below’s “conclusion” that a case which presents a new Bivens context mandates dismissal. The district court below merely stated what this court wrote in Hernandez. See ROA at 453–54 (“[W]hile . . . Hernandez suggested that . . . ‘the newness of this ‘new context’ should alone require dismissal of the plaintiffs’ damage claims,’ 885 F.3d at 818, the Supreme Court’s decisions . . . appear to require a court to analyze whether any ‘special factors’” exist “in any case that presents a ‘new context’ for Bivens purposes . . . .”) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the district court below did analyze the “special factors” prong of Ziglar’s two-part test. Therefore, even if the district court below erred in “concluding” that a new context mandates dismissal, such an error was harmless. 11 Canada argues that the district court below improperly considered the special factors by applying a “sound reason” standard rather than a “convincing reason” one. Canada asserts the latter is what Ziglar requires. See Appellant’s Br. at 23–24. Not so. Canada’s brief quotes Justice Breyer’s dissent in Ziglar, not the majority opinion. Id. (citing Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1876 (Breyer, J., dissent)); see also Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (majority opinion) (“[I]f there are sound reasons to think Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages remedy as part of the system for enforcing the law and correcting a wrong, the courts must refrain from creating the remedy . . . .”) (emphasis added). 12 Case: 18-11398 Document: 00515316589 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/20/2020 No. 18-11398 district court below impermissibly shifted the burden to establish the special factors. Canada believes the burden should lie with the Individual Defendants based on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Carlson. See 446 U.S at 18 (“[A Bivens] cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Defendants disagree and argue that the existence of special factors are determined in “quasi-jurisdictional terms” (i.e., without regard to the burden of proof). Appellees’ Br. at 32. Although recent cases like Ziglar and Hernandez support Defendants’ position, it is unnecessary for this court to decide that issue because the Defendants raised the three special factors that the district court below addressed. 12 Additionally, Canada argues that the district court below erred by not performing its special factors analysis at a “high level of specificity” rather than an “abstract level.” See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 738 (9th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S __ (U.S. Sept. 7, 2018) (No. 18–309). In Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit suggested that a “high level of specificity” means looking for “special factors in terms of the specific facts alleged in the complaint,” not broad generalities or hypothetical cases. 899 F.3d at 744. The district court below’s analysis was sufficiently tied to the facts alleged in Canada’s Amended Complaint and did not overly concentrate on hypothetical penalty assessment cases. To be sure, Canada identifies no specific factor that the district court below found that was analyzed at an “abstract level.” 12 In fact, the Supreme Court as early as 1983 seemingly disposed of placing the burden on the defendants; instead, placing the onus on the courts. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (“[T]he federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal, paying particular heed, however to any special factors counselling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”). 13 Case: 18-11398 Document: 00515316589 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/20/2020 No. 18-11398 Therefore, assuming the Ninth Circuit’s high level of specificity requirement applied to the district court below, it still complied.