Opinion ID: 2339319
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the role of the division when the attorney general challenges an order of the public utilities commission

Text: At the request of the court the parties to this case have briefed and argued the issue of the role of the division in instances in which the Attorney General has challenged an order of the commission. In this state the Legislature has created a Division of Public Utilities and Carriers in order to implement the policies of the state in regulating public utilities and carriers so as to achieve ultimate policy goals of providing for adequate, efficient, and economical energy, communication, and transportation services and water supplies at just and reasonable rates. The chief officer of the division is the administrator. General Laws 1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 39-1-2. The Legislature has also created a Public Utilities Commission consisting of three persons who serve as a quasi-judicial tribunal with jurisdiction to hold investigations and hearings involving rates, tariffs, and charges made by public utilities. Sections 39-1-3 and 39-1-4. The chairman of this commission by virtue of his office also serves as the administrator and chief executive officer of the division. Section 39-1-3. See Narragansett Electric Co. v. Harsch, 117 R.I. 395, 402-06, 368 A.2d 1194, 1199-1202 (1977). Upon request by the administrator, the Attorney General will represent the division in a public-utility proceeding. Section 39-1-19. The Attorney General may also intervene in such a proceeding on behalf of the State of Rhode Island or its citizens, and the division may employ independent legal counsel to represent it in such circumstances. Id.; § 39-1-20. Thus, the somewhat incongruous situation may arise wherein the administrator despite his capacity as chairman of the commission may, pursuant to § 39-5-1, seek review of a unanimous decision of the commission in his capacity as administrator of the division. In their brief the division and the Attorney General argue that the incongruity is more apparent than real. They point out that the responsibility for the division's positions in a rate case is delegated to division personnel other than the administrator so as to avoid any conflict-of-interest problems. They also point out that in some instances the chairman (the administrator) may dissent from the decision of his fellow commissioners or may not participate in the decision, or the commission may be required to act in compliance with judicial decisions with which the commission disagrees; in these situations the chairman may not wish to assume the defense of the commission's order. The company argues that the division ought not to seek review of its administrator's own decision rendered by him as chairman of the commission but asserts that it is the obligation of the division to defend a decision made by the commission. It further argues that if the Attorney General wishes to challenge a commission decision, he should not represent the division at commission proceedings, and that in such circumstances the division should retain separate counsel. The company concedes the right of the Attorney General to intervene in commission proceedings and seek review of commission decisions, as long as he has not represented the division in those proceedings. We believe that a symmetrical interpretation of the legislative plan would best be served by the following allocation of functions among the division, the commission, and the Attorney General. [2] In any case in the discretion of the administrator, the Attorney General may be retained in order to represent the division in proceedings before the Public Utilities Commission. In the event that the administrator foresees that there will be a conflict between the division and the Attorney General, he may, of course, retain independent counsel to represent the division. In the event that following a commission decision the Attorney General, having previously represented the division, desires to seek review, he should do so in his own name rather than on behalf of the division. In our opinion it is the function of the division to serve the commission in bringing to it all relevant evidence, facts, and arguments that will lead the commission in its quasi-judicial capacity to reach a just result. Once the commission has made its decision, it is inappropriate for the division and its administrator to challenge that decision, even when the administrator (chairman) has dissented. In such a situation, the people and rate payers of the State of Rhode Island may most properly be represented by the Attorney General in seeking review of the commission's decision. The Attorney General need not be precluded from seeking such review merely because he has previously represented the division as counsel. In the event of a challenge by statutory petition for certiorari of a commission decision, brought by the Attorney General as representative of the state or the citizens of the state, the division may retain its own counsel in order to defend the commission's decision or it may rely upon the adversary party to the proceedings to defend the decision. In the event of a petition for review of a commission decision, brought by a utility that is aggrieved by such decision, the division may in the discretion of its administrator continue to seek the services of the Attorney General or may engage independent counsel in the event of a conflict of positions between the division and the Attorney General. [3] The statement of principles in respect to standing and representation set forth above shall apply to future proceedings before the commission and on certiorari before this court. These principles have not been applied to alter the standing of any party to the present controversy. For the reasons heretofore stated, the petition for certiorari filed by the company is granted insofar as the commission has purported to reduce the company's rate base by the sum of $4,305,940, and that portion of the commission's decision is quashed. The records certified to the court are ordered returned to the commission with the direction that it adjust the tariff rates sought by the company to reflect the inclusion of this sum in the rate base. The petition for certiorari filed by the division and the Attorney General is hereby denied, the writ heretofore issued is quashed, and the records certified to this court are ordered returned to the commission with our decision endorsed thereon.