Opinion ID: 1846260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the state improperly presented evidence of alleged sexual abuse.

Text: ¶ 46. Kolberg's next assignment of error revolves around testimony elicited from Dr. Paul Rice, one of the State's expert witnesses. When Madison was first examined in the emergency room, emergency doctors noticed abrasions on Madison's vagina, and a hymenal tear. The doctors requested that Dr. Rice, an OB/GYN, examine her. Dr. Rice observed multiple old abrasions at the introitus, the opening of the vagina, as well as an old scar along the introitus at approximately the seven o'clock position indicating a hymenal tear. It was opined that the vaginal abrasions were about one or two weeks old. ¶ 47. Kolberg filed a motion to prevent the State from making any allegations of sexual abuse. At the conclusion of the hearing on this motion, the trial judge ruled that the State would be prohibited from making any allegations of sexual abuse, but that evidence of the abrasions, but not the scar, would be admissible at trial if the State could lay a proper foundation establishing its relevance. A prerequisite of this ruling, however, was that if the State sought to have the abrasion testimony admitted, such request would have to be made to the trial court outside the presence of the jury. Although counsel for Kolberg attempted to have the trial judge rule conclusively whether he would allow the abrasion testimony at trial, the trial judge declined to do so pre-trial, stating that he would issue a definitive ruling at trial, in the context of the foundation which had been laid in order for him to determine if the abrasion testimony was in fact relevant.
¶ 48. Kolberg asserts that the State committed a discovery violation by virtue of Dr. Rice's testimony. Specifically, Kolberg complains that Dr. Rice testified that the abrasions were inflicted intentionally, and that the State failed to disclose that he would offer such testimony. Kolberg objected at trial to a massive discovery violation and now argues that reversible error was committed when the trial judge overruled his objection without even following the first Box step. See Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 23-26 (Miss.1983). The Box criteria are now reflected in Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 9.04 I. The pertinent portion of that section reads as follows: If during the course of trial, the prosecution attempts to introduce evidence which has not been timely disclosed to the defense as required by these rules, and the defense objects to the introduction for that reason, the court shall act as follows: 1. Grant the defense a reasonable opportunity to interview the newly discovered witness, to examine the newly produced documents, photographs or other evidence; and 2. If, after such opportunity, the defense claims unfair surprise or undue prejudice and seeks a continuance or mistrial, the court shall, in the interest of justice and absent unusual circumstances, exclude the evidence or grant a continuance for a period of time reasonably necessary for the defense to meet the non-disclosed evidence or grant a mistrial. 3. The court shall not be required to grant either a continuance or mistrial for such a discovery violation if the prosecution withdraws its efforts to introduce such evidence. ¶ 49. Thus, Kolberg asserts that the trial judge should have granted a continuance in accordance with this rule. However, the State maintains this rule was simply not applicable because no discovery violation occurred. Kolberg's ground for claiming this alleged discovery violation is that Dr. Rice never stated that the abrasions were evidence of intentional acts on anybody's part. ¶ 50. While Kolberg claims that he received no notice prior to trial that Dr. Rice would say the abrasions were non-accidental, we disagree. In a footnote in his brief before us, Kolberg tells us [a]s a precaution, when it seemed the State might change horses on this issue, the defense filed a Motion to Bar any Discussion of Alleged Sexual Abuse of the Child.  This motion was partially the reason for a pre-trial hearing, and at the onset of the hearing, the State informed the trial judge that it had one witness present in response to this motion. Kolberg focuses on the State's assertion that it was not intending to get into any evidence of alleged sexual abuse. However, the State went on to say: This is onlythe only thingI told Mr. Stafford Smith that the only intention I had was to bring in the injuries that Madison had at the time she was admitted to the hospital, and that includes the bruises and abrasions in her vaginal area that were present on the day that she was admitted to the hospital. And case law is clear in Mississippi that as long as we are using it in rebuttal style purposes to negate the fact that this was an accident, which that is the theory that Mr. Kohlberg [sic] has espoused from the very beginning, it was an accident, that as long as we are using these injuries to negate the fact that it was an accident that we are entitled to use that. (emphasis added). Kolberg consistently argued that Dr. Rice's testimony was irrelevant due to the inability to date the injuries. Kolberg insisted that Dr. Rice be called to the stand to be questioned at this pre-trial hearing, whereupon the State, at the insistence of Kolberg's counsel, called Dr. Rice to the stand at the pre-trial motion hearing. During this pre-trial hearing, the following exchange occurred between Dr. Rice and the State: Q. Dr. Rice, you can't say if this child was sexually abused or not; can you? A. No, I can't. Q. But there wasI believe in your impressions in your report you did put as one of your impressions possible sexual abuse; correct? A. Well, possible vaginal trauma. On redirect examination, the following exchange occurred between the State's attorney and Dr. Rice: Q. Dr. Rice, with a 22-month-old baby girl what you observed in her vaginal area, is that what you would consider a normal finding of a 22-month-old child with vaginal tears and torn hymen and abrasions in that area? A. The abrasions may have been could have been there, but the torn hymen that's unusual. Q. Especially, coupled with the fact that she was in a coma from being beaten to death? A. Yes, ma'am. Q. So that would be unusual finding (sic)? A. Yes. Finally, the State emphasized after the conclusion of Dr. Rice's testimony that: We would just reiterate in the case law of Houston and Aldridge case that the evidence of prior abuse may be received to negate the idea that the injuries were the result of a fall or isolated incident. And, of course, that is why all the other bruises came in. And I am not trying to get in the hymenal tear or the scar. I understand that thatwe cannot date it but the abrasions are within that time period that Bryan Kolberg was there at the home. ¶ 51. Accordingly, based on the above-quoted testimony, it is clear that Kolberg cannot claim he was surprised by Dr. Rice's testimony at trial that he believed Madison's injuries were non-accidental. Thus, we agree that the Box factors did not apply here. This assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 52. Kolberg next asserts the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed evidence of the abrasions to be admitted at trial. Essentially, this asks us to pass on the admissibility of the evidence. The admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1089 (Miss.1998). This Court will only reverse if the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. ¶ 53. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Miss. R. Evid. 401. Kolberg asserts that any evidence of the abrasions was not relevant of anything. The State tells us the evidence of prior abuse may be received to negate the idea that the injuries were the result of a fall or isolated incident. And, of course, that is why all the other bruises came in. Additionally, the State asserts that since the abrasions were one or two weeks old, they would have occurred at a time when Kolberg was in the home with Madison and Laurel. Further, the State says if the injuries were self-inflicted or accidental, they would not have been relevant. Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) states: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (emphasis added). Miss. R. Evid. 403 provides that relevant evidence may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. .... The State argued at the pretrial hearing that it would attempt to introduce the testimony to rebut Kolberg's claim that Madison's injuries were accidental. The trial court determined that it would consider allowing evidence of the vaginal abrasions but not of the hymenal tear. ¶ 54. The following dialogue at trial between the State and Dr. Rice on redirect examination serves as the basis for Kolberg's assertion that the error of admitting the alleged irrelevant abrasion testimony was further compounded throughout the trial: Q. Dr. Rice, let me ask you a question. Do you know who caused the vaginal trauma to Madison Watson? A. No, I don't. Q. But you have stated that this was nonaccidental trauma to her vagina; is that correct? A. In my opinion, yes. Q. Okay. Let me ask you: Would this be consistent with a vulvar intercourse? A. In my experience in examining children that have participated in vulvar intercourse, you would see superficial abrasions. Q. Okay. And can you MR. SMITH: Your Honor, I object to that. THE COURT: Sustain objection. Q. Mr. Smith had asked you what this could have been caused by. Could it have been caused by someone using their finger to rub against the child's vagina? Counsel for Kolberg again objected, and his objections were again sustained. The State asserts counsel for Kolberg opened the door by asking how the abrasions might have been caused. ¶ 55. During Kolberg's cross-examination of Dr. Rice, he sought to establish that it would be pure speculation for anyone to say how the abrasions came to be on Madison's body. Kolberg's counsel quoted Dr. Rice's testimony from the pre-trial hearing where Dr. Rice had said: I don't know if changing a diaper could cause a superficial abrasion, or I don't know if the child had been manipulated prior to coming to the hospital, or if she had been examined in the emergency room prior to my being called down. Apparently, counsel for Kolberg was offended by the State's earlier question that was predicated on the statements of Kolberg's counsel in opening statements that the abrasions could have been caused by a diaper rash. For, after quoting Dr. Rice's testimony from the pretrial hearing, counsel for Kolberg then stated: So it was you [Dr. Rice] who suggested that, in fact, rubbing from the diaper could cause a tiny abrasion like this. Is that fair to say? Dr. Rice answered yes but was cut off by defense counsel from completing his answer and disputed defense counsel's allegation that he [Dr. Rice], had said that such an abrasion was a normal finding in a 22-month old baby. ¶ 56. We conclude without doubt that this line of questioning by defense counsel opened the door for the State's vulvar intercourse questioning on redirect examination. We have previously said that [i]f a defendant opens the door to line of testimony, ordinarily he may not complain about the prosecutor's decision to accept the benevolent invitation to cross the threshold. Randall v. State, 806 So.2d 185, 198 (Miss.2001) (citing Doby v. State, 557 So.2d 533, 539 (Miss.1990)). See also Reddix v. State, 381 So.2d 999, 1009 (Miss. 1980) (If the defendant goes fishing in the state's waters, he must take such fish as he catches.). ¶ 57. Notwithstanding our finding here that Kolberg opened the door to this line of questioning on redirect examination, we note here that while allowing evidence as to the vaginal abrasions discovered by the medical personnel at the hospital as they struggled to save Madison's life, the trial court consistently ruled that no evidence concerning sexual abuse would be allowed, and when the prosecutor attempted to question a witness about vulvar intercourse on redirect examination, the trial court promptly sustained the objection. Additionally, the trial court cautioned the jury as to this evidence. The trial court had a conference with the attorneys outside the presence of the jury, and then once the jury was put back in the box, the trial court instructed the jury, inter alia: [T]here has been some evidence placed before the jury that might indicate there is an effort to establish a sexual abuse, and the Court would instruct you that that is not an issue for you to consider; that sexual abuse is not an allegation charged against the defendant, and you are not to consider that in your deliberations. ¶ 58. In Davis v. State, 377 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Miss.1979), this Court wrote (giving a cautionary instruction) regarding the prohibition against using prior convictions as substantive evidence of guilt of the cardinal charge, the proof falls outside of the `forbidden inferential sequence' and does not constitute reversible error. ¶ 59. In Pugh v. State, 584 So.2d 781 (Miss.1991), the defendant argued successfully that it was reversible error for the trial judge not to have entered a cautionary instruction regarding admission of prior convictions. In (a) situation where no cautionary instruction is given to the jury, prejudicial error has intervened. Id., 584 So.2d at 786 (quoting United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978)). ¶ 60. In Baldwin v. State, 784 So.2d 148 (Miss.2001), the trial judge did not allow the state to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior convictions. Instead, the trial court sustained the defendant's objections and heard his motion for a mistrial, which he overruled. The trial judge admonished the jury to disregard the impermissible testimony and this Court ruled that the judge's curative efforts prevented prejudicial error. ¶ 61. In Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss.1984), which was a capital murder case, this Court held that a jury is presumed to have followed the judge's curative admonitions to a jury. Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 744 (Miss.1982), also a capital murder case, held that [t]he jury is presumed to have followed the directions of the judge. ¶ 62. In the end, we find on the record before us that the abrasion evidence was properly admitted under Miss. R. Evid. 403 and 404(b); and that any error which may have occurred regarding alleged sexual abuse was cured by the trial judge's cautionary instruction. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.