Opinion ID: 512567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Intel Sites

Text: 17 Petitioner Intel Corporation attacks the inclusion of two of its landfill sites on the NPL update. 4 Intel Santa Clara III is a four acre facility used by Intel Corporation to test micro processors. Intel Magnetics is approximately one acre used by Intel to produce and test magnetic products and bubble memories. The two sites are near each other and each of the parties essentially treats them as one for purposes of asserting or denying errors in the administrative proceedings. Therefore, we too will discuss them together. 18 EPA included the Intel sites on the NPL based on the Agency's conclusion that there was an observed release to groundwater of 1,1-dichloroethene (DCE). Relying on this conclusion and the fact that approximately 300,000 people within three miles of the sites depend upon groundwater from the relevant aquifer of concern as a source of drinking water, EPA derived an HRS score of 31.94 for each site. Intel first attacks the listing of its sites on the theory that there was no observed release to the relevant aquifer of concern. In Intel's view, the only observed release is to the shallow or upper aquifer zone, while the groundwater use is from a deeper or lower aquifer zone. As we noted in Eagle-Picher III, [t]he EPA has incorporated an 'aquifer of concern' principle into its regulations, requiring a scorer to consider the same aquifer when scoring for the observed release or route characteristics as when calculating target characteristics such as population served. 822 F.2d at 138 (citation omitted). 19 Intel, like the petitioner in Eagle-Picher III, contends that EPA has violated this aquifer of concern principle by calculating the score using a factor based on an observed release to the upper acquifer and a target factor based on the population drawing from a separate lower aquifer, resulting in a much higher score than would result from either taken alone. Computations treating the aquifers separately would not have caused inclusion of the sites on the NPL since there was no observed release to the lower, and no population drawing on the upper. 20 According to the HRS scoring process, direct evidence of a release results in a maximum (45) score on the relevant worksheet. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A Sec. 3.1 (1987). This is based on the obvious conclusion that an observed release indicates that the likelihood of a release is 100%. 47 Fed.Reg. 31188 (1982). Without an observed release, the scoring process requires the use of route characteristics for determining the likelihood of a release. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A Secs. 3.1, 3.2 (1987). This likelihood, obviously being less than 100%, would result in somewhat less than a maximum score. In this case, that score is sufficiently lower to qualify Intel's sites for exclusion from the NPL update. 21 This argument by Intel is identical to the one made in Eagle-Picher III, supra. In that case, the petitioner asserted that EPA had measured the level of contamination in [an aquifer] from which drinking water is no longer drawn, but used [another aquifer], which supplies the area with drinking water, for calculating the target population. 822 F.2d at 138. However, what EPA had in fact done in that instance was conclude that because of bore holes and other hydrologic connections, pollution from the first constituted a release to the second. In other words, EPA had concluded that there were not two aquifers, but two parts of the same aquifer, so that contamination of the one was an observed release to the other. We held this conclusion by EPA to be entirely proper, stating that we think it clear that the aquifer-of-concern principle does not preclude the combination of hydrologically connected aquifers for scoring purposes. Id. (citation omitted). 22 The record underlying the present petition directly parallels the recited facts of Eagle-Picher III. EPA noted contamination to the upper aquifer revealing an observed release. Even though the target population uses the lower aquifer, EPA noted in its initial proposal that the upper and lower zones were in fact connected and thus together constituted one aquifer of concern. HRS Score Sheet and Documentation Record at 2 (Aug. 23, 1984), NPL-U2-2-202, reprinted in J.A. 1006; HRS Score Sheet and Documentation Record at 2 (Aug. 24, 1984), NPL-U2-2-203, reprinted in J.A. 1029. EPA originally based this conclusion on the presence of wells believed to be capable of conducting contaminants from the upper to lower aquifer zones. Rationale for Establishing the Hydraulic Connection Between the Aquifer Zones in the Santa Clara Valley (Aug. 1984), NPL-U2-15-4-3, NPL-U2-15-5-3, reprinted in J.A. 1227-31 (hereinafter EPA Rationale for Zones). During the comment period Intel and a number of other commenters criticized this conclusion. Based on those comments, EPA reexamined the question with the benefit of the comments and the work of a consultant in the field. Taking into account the prior information concerning the wells, the arguments offered by the commenters, and the nature of the contaminants present, 5 EPA renewed its conclusion that the two aquifers were, in fact, not separate but hydrologically connected. Thus, the Agency renewed its conclusion that release, having occurred, was 100% likely, and reaffirmed the prior scoring. As we did in Eagle-Picher III, supra, we note that where a contaminated aquifer spreads water to an aquifer supplying a target population, contamination to the first is hazard to the second and the Agency reasonably treat[s] them as a unit for purposes of the Hazard Ranking System. 822 F.2d at 139. 23 Further, Intel argues that the Agency deprived it of a proper opportunity for comment in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 553 (1982). Intel argues that the Agency, by considering the consultant's information between the publication of the proposed rule and the adoption of the final rule, changed its theory and proceeded to operate on the single aquifer basis without giving Intel and other interested parties a chance to comment. This, Intel argues, is a prejudicial violation of proper administrative procedure since 24 it is especially important for the agency to identify and make available technical studies and data that it has employed in reaching the decisions to propose particular rules.... An agency commits serious procedural error when it fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time to allow for meaningful commentary. 25 Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 79, 74 L.Ed.2d 76 (1982). However, the facts in this case do not support the application of that principle of administrative law. EPA set out its position early on that the aquifers were connected. EPA Rationale for Zones, supra, at 1227-31. Intel not only had the opportunity to comment on the aquifer interconnection issue, in fact it and other commenters specifically addressed that very issue. EPA specifically responded to the comments. Concededly, the Agency in its responses placed additional reliance on a 1984 study conducted by the state of California and brought to the attention of EPA by its consultant during the comment period, but EPA's conclusion that the aquifers are connected has never changed. As we noted in Section I, supra, an Agency may promulgate a final rule that differs from its proposed rule without allowing further comment if the relevant changes are a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule and the notice and comments upon it. NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1988); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C.Cir.1983). The statutory requirement of notice and the opportunity for comment on a proposed rule does not automatically generate a new opportunity for comment every time the Agency reacts to the comments. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C.Cir.1973). 26 As we have long recognized, [a] contrary rule would lead to the absurdity that ... the agency can learn from the comment on its proposals only at the peril of starting a new procedural round of commentary. Id. at 632 n. 51. If it were not possible for an agency to reexamine and even modify the proposed rule, there would be little point in the comment procedures. The whole rationale of notice and comment rests on the expectation that the final rules will be somewhat different--and improved--from the rules originally proposed by the agency. Trans-Pacific Freight Conference of Japan/Korea v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 650 F.2d 1235, 1249 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 2316, 68 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981). 27 There are, of course, cases in which changes exceed the logical outgrowth and prejudicial error would occur if no second round were afforded. Cf. Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C.Cir.1982) (An agency adopting final rules that differ from its proposed rules is required to renotice when the changes are so major that the original notice did not adequately frame the subjects for discussion. (emphasis added)). This is not such a case. EPA's original notice of proposed rulemaking gave the petitioner and others an adequate foundation for comment. Petitioner exercised its right on the very point in question. EPA's solicitation of additional data did not defeat petitioner's right to comment. Rather, EPA has allowed petitioner full exercise of that right. Intel's problem is not that it could not make comments but simply that EPA did not agree with its comments. 28 Intel also argues that EPA should not have used DCE for the determination of the toxicity/persistence element of the scoring computation because to do so was a violation of EPA's own rules. This argument is derived from the EPA regulation which requires that a contaminant be present in a reportable quantity in order to be used in computing the HRS score. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. A Sec. 3.4 (1987). Intel contends that the detected DCE did not amount to this quantity. However, that regulation applies only in the rare instance [w]here the total inventory of substances in a facility is known, and is, therefore, inapplicable here. Id. EPA did not pos sess, nor did Intel supply, a total inventory of substances at the Intel facilities. All that was before the Agency, and all that is now before the Court on the subject of quantity is Intel's calculation back from the amount of contaminant detected in the water to the quantity of hazardous substance which that detected quantity of contaminant could index. This is a far cry from the total inventory contemplated by Sec. 3.4. Indeed, Intel specifically admitted in its comments that it was unable to determine when, how, and in what quantity the chemicals entered the groundwater. Comments of Intel Corporation on the Proposed Listing of Intel Magnetics, Intel Santa Clara III and Intel Mountain View on the National Priorities List (NPL) at 9 (Dec. 13, 1984), NPL-U2-3-542, reprinted in J.A. 1058. It requires but a moment's thought to reveal that this sort of back calculation has no statistical reliability. The amount of contaminant indexed by detection in a single monitoring well may reflect a concentration at the very edge of a plume, or from its center, anywhere in between, or even at a single pocket of contamination. Intel's argument on this point is without merit. 29 In sum, Intel, like Stoughton, has failed to demonstrate any error in EPA's placing of its landfill sites on the NPL.