Opinion ID: 1536009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Agreement to See Jenin

Text: Defendant asserts that his request to see Jenin was tantamount to an invocation of his right to remain silent and to end all questioning. A request to end interrogation, however ambiguous, must be scrupulously honored by the authorities. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04, 96 S.Ct. 321, 326, 46 L.Ed. 2d 313, 321-22 (1975); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 64, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I ); State v. Harvey, 121 N.J. 407, 415, 581 A. 2d 483 (1990) (Harvey I) , cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931, 111 S.Ct. 1336, 113 L.Ed. 2d 268 (1991). In Harvey, supra, the defendant requested to speak with his father. Id. at 417, 581 A. 2d 483. At the conclusion of their meeting, which lasted over three hours, the defendant made a statement to police. Ibid. The police did not issue new Miranda warnings until after the statement was recorded. Immediately after his rights were read, the defendant requested an attorney. Ibid. The Court held that the defendant's request to speak with his father constituted a request to terminate the interrogation. Id. at 419-20, 581 A. 2d 483. The defendant had maintained that he did not want to talk about the murder throughout the three days of questioning. Ibid. The Court reasoned that defendant would have invoked his rights earlier, had the police read them. Ibid. This case is different. Defendant had been given an opportunity to invoke his rights several times prior to seeing Jenin. He never once invoked them. The meeting with Jenin was not in private, it occurred in the presence of officers. Defendant never requested to be alone with Jenin. The meeting was brief (only a few minutes), because it took defendant very little time to confess. Jenin was not called into the room on defendant's initiative. The meeting was arranged by the detectives. Defendant merely responded in the affirmative to the officers' suggestion that he talk to Jenin. In short, we find no evidence that defendant had any intention of invoking his constitutional right to silence or to terminate interrogation by agreeing to speak with Jenin. We also see little merit in defendant's assertion that Jenin was acting as a police agent, and therefore the failure to readminister Miranda warnings prior to Jenin's involvement violated defendant's right to counsel. There is no evidence that Jenin was acting as a government agent. The police did not direct Jenin to elicit any information from defendant. Jenin's outburst and defendant's response were unexpected. Moreover, the rule regarding the use of government agents to elicit incriminating statements applies only when a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been triggered by indictment and he is represented by counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 169-74, 106 S.Ct. All, 483-86, 88 L.Ed. 2d 481, 491-95 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-06, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1202-03, 12 L.E6L2A 246 (1964). State v. Bey, 258 N.J.Super. 451, 466, 610 A. 2d 403 (App.Div.1992), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19, 611 A2d 657 (1992); State v. Leopardi, 305 N.J.Super. 70, 76, 701 A2d 952 (App.Div.1997) certif. denied, 153 N.J. 48, 707 A2d 152 (1998). Neither of those factors was present here.