Opinion ID: 2807494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kidnapping Charges

Text: On appeal, appellants argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support their convictions for kidnapping. Appellants urge this court to adopt what they call “the majority approach” to construing the elements of kidnapping, which would require the government to prove that the detention underlying the kidnapping was “prolonged” or for an “appreciable length of time,” and not incidental to another offense. They argue that such an interpretation is necessary to prevent injustice because some offenses, such as rape and robbery, often necessarily include some period of detention, and it was not the intent of the legislature to allow the government to bring an additional charge of kidnapping where the detention is not distinct from another offense. In support of their 9 position, appellants rely on cases from other jurisdictions that have construed kidnapping statutes narrowly, in order to address the risk of severe sanctions being imposed for kidnapping based on “a broad and ill defined range of behavior, including relatively trivial types of restraint.” State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092, 1115 (Conn. 2007); see also, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1979) (interpreting Virgin Islands kidnapping statute); People v. Levy, 204 N.E.2d 842, 844-45 (N.Y. 1965). Although appellants raise interesting issues of statutory interpretation, their argument is foreclosed by a binding precedent of this court. Moreover, the evidence in the instant case would be sufficient even under the standard that appellants propose. We therefore affirm appellants’ kidnapping convictions and decline to address their statutory-interpretation arguments because consideration of those arguments is not necessary to resolve the cases on appeal. See Koonce v. District of Columbia, No. 13-CT-494, slip op. at 32 (D.C. Mar. 19, 2015) (McLeese, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing United States v. Adams, 740 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2014) (“This prudential approach makes eminently good sense: . . . [d]iscretion is often the better part of valor, and courts should not rush to decide unsettled legal issues that can easily be avoided.”); Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 398 (Del. 2010) (“[I]t is unnecessary for this Court to decide 10 that issue, because a decision either way would not alter the result we have reached nor would a gratuitous statutory interpretation resolving this difficult issue be prudent.”)). Appellants assert that the kidnapping statute, D.C. Code § 22-2001 (2001), presents a “problem” because its broad language encompasses a wide range of conduct inherent in other crimes, such as assault, robbery, and rape. The kidnapping statute is, indeed, worded expansively. It provides: Whoever shall be guilty of, or of aiding or abetting in, seizing, confining, inveigling, enticing, decoying, kidnapping, abducting, concealing, or carrying away any individual by any means whatsoever, and holding or detaining, or with the intent to hold or detain, such individual for ransom or reward or otherwise, except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than 30 years. D.C. Code § 22-2001 (2001). The plain language of the statute contains no exception for cases in which the conduct underlying the kidnapping is momentary or incidental to another offense. Indeed, we have previously stated that “there is no requirement that the victim be moved any particular distance or held for any particular length of time to constitute a kidnapping; all that is required is a ‘seizing, 11 confining’ or the like and a ‘holding or detaining’ for ransom or reward ‘or otherwise.’” West v. United States, 599 A.2d 788, 793 n.9 (D.C. 1991). Nevertheless, this court has acknowledged the issue identified by appellants and previously addressed it by applying the doctrine of merger. In (Thomas) Robinson v. United States, 388 A.2d 1210 (D.C. 1978), a decision which has since been overruled, we considered whether the offense of kidnapping should merge with the offense of assault with intent to rape. In that case, the defendant had dragged the complaining witness across a street, into a park, and through some woods before pulling down her underpants. Id. at 1211. In holding that the offenses should merge, we noted that “some type of seizure, detention or confinement is an integral part of every rape,” and that it is “unlikely that Congress intended that every person who commits a rape be also charged and convicted of [kidnapping], with its generally more severe penal consequences.” Id. We applied a test of “whether the asportation (or seizure) in a given case was of the type incidental to every rape or whether the confinement and restraint were significant enough of themselves to warrant an independent prosecution for [kidnapping].” Id. at 1211-12 (citing Levy, 204 N.E.2d at 842). Moreover, we held that because the detention in (Thomas) Robinson was “momentary and coextensive in time and 12 place with the assault,” it was “an integral element of the assault” and did not constitute a separate crime. Id. at 1212.2 The standard we applied in (Thomas) Robinson is substantially the same as the one advocated by appellants in the present appeal, albeit in a different legal framework (that of merger instead of sufficiency of evidence). But in Byrd v. United States, 598 A.2d 386 (D.C. 1991) (en banc), we overruled (Thomas) Robinson and various other cases that also employed a “factual analysis” to determine whether offenses should merge. See Parker v. United States, 692 A.2d 913, 916 (D.C. 1997) (confirming that merger analysis applied in Robinson was superseded by Byrd). We held in Byrd that merger should be governed by the “elements test” established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), 2 In the years following (Thomas) Robinson, we applied this fact-based merger inquiry in numerous other kidnapping cases. See, e.g., Sinclair v. United States, 388 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (D.C. 1978) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where victim was inveigled into an automobile at gunpoint and driven twenty-five blocks, because such confinement was not “approximately coextensive or a necessary incident to the crime of robbery”); Beck v. United States, 402 A.2d 418, 423 (D.C. 1979) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where defendant forced victim from the street into a nearby house at knifepoint before raping and robbing her); Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1215-16 (D.C. 1988) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where victim “was forced from a busy intersection into an alley” and then “forced one hundred and sixty feet further into the alley” before robbery); West v. United States, 599 A.2d 788 (D.C. 1991) (kidnapping conviction affirmed where confinement lasted for more than fifteen minutes and extended “for a period of time following the [rape and robbery]”). 13 which provides: “Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Byrd, 598 A.2d at 389 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). The Blockburger test does not consider the facts of the case, but instead looks solely to the elements of the offenses of conviction. Under the elements test prescribed by Blockburger, kidnapping does not merge with robbery,3 rape,4 or assault.5 3 Compare D.C. Code § 22-2001 (kidnapping), with D.C. Code § 22-2801 (2001) (robbery). See also Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845, 855-56 (D.C. 1995) (“Kidnapping requires proof that the victim was seized or detained, which [robbery] does not. [Robbery] requires proof that property of value was taken, which kidnapping does not.”). 4 Compare D.C. Code § 22-2001 (kidnapping), with D.C. Code § 22-3002 (2001) (first-degree sexual abuse). See also Bryant v. United States, 849 A.2d 1093, 1108 (D.C. 2004) (“[D]etention is not an element of sexual abuse, and each offense has at least one element that the other does not have, thereby precluding merger.”). 5 Compare D.C. Code § 22-2001 (kidnapping), with D.C. Code § 22-404 (2001) (simple assault). See also (Michael) Robinson v. United States, 50 A.3d 508, 533 (D.C. 2012) (holding that assault and kidnapping charges do not merge “as they are not the ‘same act’ for purposes of Blockburger . . . and as each required proof of an element the other did not”). 14 With merger foreclosed by Byrd and Blockburger, appellants essentially seek to resurrect (Thomas) Robinson’s “factual analysis” of kidnapping convictions by asking us to construe the kidnapping statute to encompass the Robinson test; appellants urge us to find the evidence insufficient to sustain a kidnapping conviction if that test is not met. As noted supra, support for this approach may be found in cases from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 56 A.3d 1245, 1265 (N.H. 2012); Salamon, 949 A.2d at 1092; State v. Stouffer, 721 A.2d 207, 215 (Md. 1998); Berry, 604 F.2d at 227; Levy, 204 N.E.2d at 842. But before relying on precedents that do not bind us, we must first look to our own case law. We believe that a binding precedent forecloses our adoption of appellants’ approach. We previously considered a claim that the offense of kidnapping should include an element of “non-incidental” confinement in Hagins v. United States, 639 A.2d 612, 617 (D.C. 1994). The defendant in Hagins was charged with both rape and kidnapping. He argued on appeal that the jury should have been instructed that it could not convict him of kidnapping “if the alleged ‘confinement’ was factually incidental to the sexual assaults.” Id. at 617. We rejected that argument, noting that “[t]he jury’s function is to apply the statutory elements of the crime to the facts at hand, and ‘non-coextensive’ (or ‘non-incidental’) confinement 15 under Robinson is not such an element.” Id. Our holding in Hagins appears to foreclose reconsideration of this issue. Contrary to Hagins, appellants are asking us to construe the kidnapping statute to require an element of “non-incidental” confinement, and to find the evidence insufficient to support their convictions if that element is not met. We are bound by Hagins, for a panel of this court may not overrule a prior panel decision. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). We thus must reject the approach advocated by appellants. Appellants suggest that our holding in Hagins is called into question by a footnote in Parker, 692 A.2d at 917 n.5. As noted supra, we confirmed in Parker that the Blockburger test should be applied instead of the (Thomas) Robinson test in determining whether a kidnapping conviction should merge. We stated in Parker, however, that “[a]ny lingering question that the same conduct does not support two separate offenses is properly framed as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove each of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. This general statement, which is dictum, does not overrule or specifically address Hagins; nor is it inconsistent with the holding of Hagins. At most, it may reflect an erroneous assumption that the issue of evidentiary sufficiency in this context had not yet been addressed. We are unwilling to conclude that the footnote in Parker overrules a case that it does not even mention. 16 In any event, even if we were not bound by Hagins and were writing on a clean slate, this case is an inappropriate vehicle to consider adoption of the approach advocated by appellants. The evidence presented in this case supports appellants’ convictions for kidnapping even under the new standard that appellants propose. Appellants were not charged with robbery, and were acquitted of assault with intent to commit robbery. Appellants thus fight an uphill battle in arguing that the detention of Mr. O’Brien or Ms. Johnson was incidental to either of those offenses, and that it would be unjust to allow the kidnapping convictions to stand. Cf. Davis v. United States, 613 A.2d 906, 913 (D.C. 1992) (even under (Thomas) Robinson test, “there is nothing to prohibit the government from charging both offenses, with the kidnapping charge surviving when there is an acquittal on the charge [that allegedly encompasses the kidnapping].”). On this record, appellants are forced to argue that the kidnappings were incidental to simple assault, the offense of conviction. The assaults on Mr. O’Brien and Ms. Johnson did not necessarily encompass or require moving Mr. O’Brien into the bedroom, binding both victims’ wrists, and detaining the victims for 8-10 minutes. Thus, the detention of Mr. O’Brien and Ms. Johnson was not incidental to the assaults on those victims. 17 In sum, appellants’ proposal is inconsistent with one of our own precedents, and appellants’ convictions for kidnapping are supported by the evidence even under appellants’ view of the statute. Accordingly, we decline to reverse appellants’ kidnapping convictions.