Opinion ID: 2103389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Majority's Departure From Edwards

Text: In discarding Edwards ' precedent of eighteen years, the majority asserts that it cannot reasonably conclude that the statements identifying the perpetrator, such as those at issue in this case, were made by young children `for the purpose of medical treatment or diagnosis.' Op. at 246. The majority further asserts the reliability of a child's identification of the perpetrator of the abuse to a medical professional contains the same tangible risk of unreliability generally inherent in all hearsay testimony. Id. at 246-47. Outside the medical field, one could assert this conclusion to be valid as long as it rested on the obvious assumption that the declarant is responding under the impression that [he or she] is being asked to make an accusation that is not relevant to the physician's diagnosis or treatment. Renville, 779 F.2d at 438. However, [t]his assumption does not hold where the physician makes clear to the victim that the inquiry into the identity of the abuser is important to diagnosis and treatment, and the victim manifests such an understanding. In such circumstances, the victim's motivation to speak truthfully is the same as that which insures reliability when he recounts the chronology of events or details symptoms of somatic distress. Id. Here, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the child's motive in making these statements to medical personnel was other than as a patient responding to a physician questioning for prospective treatment. Id. at 439 ( citing United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir.1980)); see also U.S. v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir.2005) (The record supports the district court's finding that `there is sufficient indicia that these statements were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment . . . to be admissible under 803(4).'). The reasoning for retaining the Edwards / Renville exception was also aptly noted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384, 72 S.W.3d 493, 498 (2002): R.T.'s identification of appellant as her abuser allowed Dr. Hawawini to take steps to prevent further abuse by her stepfather, who was a member of her household. Additionally, R.T.'s identification of appellant as her abuser allowed Dr. Hawawini to take steps to treat the emotional and psychological injuries which accompanied the rape. Moreover, we note that based on R.T.'s statements, Dr. Hawawini referred her to a physician at Children's Hospital who specialized in treating children who are sexually abused. Finally, R.T.'s identification of appellant as her abuser permitted Dr. Hawawini to fulfill her legislatively imposed duty of calling the child-abuse hotline and reporting the crime. And, the Court in Morgan v. Foretich , also noted that [w]e agree with the judgment of the Eighth Circuit [in Renville ] that `[s]exual abuse of children at home presents a wholly different situation' from that normally encountered in Rule 803(4) cases and that situation requires great caution in excluding highly pertinent evidence. 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir.1988) ( citing Renville, 779 F.2d at 437). In State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675 (Iowa 1992), the Iowa Supreme Court agreed, noting that [b]ecause of the nature of child sexual abuse, the only direct witnesses to the crime will often be the perpetrator and the victim. Consequently, much of the State's proof will necessarily have to be admissible hearsay statements made by the victim to relatives and medical personnel. Id. at 682. Thus, `[i]nformation that the abuser is a member of the household is therefore `reasonably pertinent' to a course of treatment which includes removing the child from the home.' Id. at 681-82 ( quoting Renville 779 F.2d at 438); see also State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 735 P.2d 801, 810 (1987) ([I]n child sexual abuse cases, we therefore join the growing number of jurisdictions which recognize that statements regarding the abuser's identity fall within Rule 803(4) whenever, as here, identity is relevant to proper diagnosis and treatment.); State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C. 590, 350 S.E.2d 76, 80 (1986) ([I]n the context of a child sexual abuse or child rape, a victim's statements to a physician as to an assailant's identity are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment.); Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 725 (Wyo.1983) ([T]he function of the court must be to pursue the transcendent goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment which afflicts our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child abuse.); U.S. v. George, 291 Fed. Appx. 803, 805 (9th Cir.2008) (The district court also did not abuse its discretion by admitting D.B.'s statement to a nurse practitioner that George touched her inappropriately because the statement was made for the purposes of a medical diagnosis.); People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir.1993) (Thus, a child victim's statements about the identity of the perpetrator are admissible under the medical treatment exception when they are made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. ) (emphasis added).