Opinion ID: 2974049
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Perez’s Conviction

Text: Perez argues that the evidence was not sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a distributor relationship between himself and Fonseca. He claims that the evidence only demonstrated a buyerseller relationship. He argues that this Court held in United States v. Layne, 192 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 1999), that a buyer-seller relationship must be supplemented with additional evidence such as “repeat purchases or some other enduring arrangement that implies knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy.” Perez’s Br. at 9. Perez asserts that even though he purchased $7,000 worth of drugs from Fonseca on two separate occasions there is no evidence to show that he was involved in the further distribution of the drugs. Id. at 10. As detailed in the fact section, the record is replete with evidence that would support a rational jury’s finding that Perez’s relationship with Fonseca was more than just a buyer-seller relationship. Perez was the manager of Fonseca’s unprofitable seafood restaurant. Perez then asked Fonseca if he could sell methamphetamine with him. Further, Roach also testified that she purchased methamphetamine over a two year period from Perez. Edwards, another defendant, also testified that he obtained methamphetamine from Perez. Perez further argues that the jury should not have believed Fonseca’s testimony as a coconspirator who had an interest in cooperating with the Government. This Court has repeatedly held that a juror is free to weigh the testimony of a co-conspirator who pleads guilty and testifies pursuant Page 9 of 22 to a cooperation agreement with the United States. United States v. Burns, 298 F.3d 523, 535 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 227 F.3d 686, 694 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[s]ufficiency-of-the-evidence appeals are no place . . . for arguments regarding a government witness’s lack of credibility”)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Spearman, 186 F.3d at 746 (stating that “it is well-settled that uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may support a conviction in federal court”) (citations omitted). Overall, the facts above demonstrate that there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could determine that Perez was involved in the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Accordingly, we affirm Perez’s conviction.