Opinion ID: 2076252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: hunt's allocution

Text: Hunt contends that his allocution was denigrated by the trial judge. He complains of the judge's: instructions to the jury regarding allocution, refusal to lift the sequestration order to allow Hunt's relatives to be present during allocution, failure to allow Hunt to give his allocution from the witness stand, and failure to sustain Hunt's objections to the prosecutor's closing argument. Having already rejected the last contention, we will address only the first three.
We addressed the issue of a trial judge's instructions concerning a defendant's allocution in Harris V, wherein the trial court had instructed the jury as follows concerning the defendant's right of allocution: A Defendant has a common law right of allocution, i.e., to address the sentencing body in mitigation of punishment, however, his statement in allocution is not evidence or testimony. During allocution the Defendant is not under oath, and thus not subject to the penalties of perjury and to cross-examination. Any statement Jackie Harris makes to you should not be regarded as evidence but rather as his statement in mitigation of punishment. Harris V, 312 Md. at 254, 539 A.2d at 651. We reversed because the instructions in effect told the jury that it should disregard any facts stated during allocution, because those facts were not evidence or testimony. This is so because the sentencing jury was previously instructed that it was `to decide the case only on ... evidence.' We further noted that the instructions told the jury that they should not heed the ... precept that statements made at allocution may not be disregarded merely because they were not under oath. Id., 312 Md. at 254-55, 539 A.2d at 651. The court in the instant case initially instructed the jury on allocution as follows: Now, Mr. Hunt has presented a statement before you which is called an allocution. A defendant has a right of allocution, that is, to address the sentencing body in mitigation of punishment. His statement in allocution is not under oath and is not subject to the penalty of perjury and cross-examination. It is his opportunity to explain to you, in his own words, anything about the crime, his feelings regarding his conduct and any other matter which he wishes to bring to your attention in considering his sentence. You may consider his allocution and it may be a basis for establishing mitigating circumstances in imposing a life sentence. You must each, individually, accord whatever weight you deem appropriate in deciding the proper sentence for Mr. Hunt. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge. In response to the note, the judge reinstructed the jury and included the following on allocution: Mr. Foreman and ladies and gentlemen, I have been asked to further explain to you, in section three, you must analyze all of the evidence presented and Mr. Hunt's allocution and determine if any mitigating circumstances have been proven. Now, I just mentioned allocution. Mr. Hunt has presented the statement before you which is called an allocution. The defendant has a right of allocution, that is, to address the sentencing body in mitigation of punishment. His statement in allocution is not evidence or testimony. During the allocution, the defendant is not under oath and thus not subject to the penalty of perjury and cross-examination. It is his opportunity to explain to you, in his own words, anything about the crime, his feelings regarding his conduct and any other matter which he wishes to bring to your attention in considering his sentence. You may consider his allocution and it may be a basis for establishing mitigating circumstances in imposing a life sentence. You must each individually accord it whatever weight you deem it appropriate, in determining the proper sentence for Mr. Hunt. (Emphasis added.) Hunt does not claim that the judge's instructions were erroneous, but instead he complains that [t]he combined effect of the [instructions] and the prosecutor's arguments had the effect of denigrating [his] allocution. He contends that the instructions as a whole, and particularly the addition in the reinstructions that allocution is not evidence or testimony when taken in conjunction with the closing arguments of the prosecutor, improperly encouraged the jury to disregard his allocution. We disagree. The instructions do not misstate the law on mitigation or allocution. While the court should not have told the jury that allocution is not evidence or testimony, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It was made clear to the jury that allocution may be the basis for establishing mitigating circumstances, and contrary to Hunt's assertion, the instructions did not improperly encourage the jury to disregard [Hunt's] allocution. These instructions left the jury free to find as a mitigating circumstance such aspect of the content of [Hunt's] allocution ... simply by specifically setting it forth on the sentencing form. Booth v. State, 306 Md. at 199, 507 A.2d at 1112.
Hunt contends that his allocution was denigrated because it was given from the defendant's table instead of the witness stand. The record does not reflect that Hunt expressly requested to give his allocution from the witness stand; but even if he had, since allocution is not given under oath, the trial judge could have properly denied such a request.
Finally, Hunt contends that his allocution was denigrated because his family was not allowed to be present. They were witnesses at the sentencing hearing and were subject to a sequestration order. The trial judge denied Hunt's motion to lift the sequestration order so that his family could attend his allocution. The conduct of criminal trials falls within the sound discretion of the trial judge which will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Hunt, 312 Md. at 500, 540 A.2d at 1128. Two of the four members of Hunt's family had broken down in tears during their testimony. The trial judge was in the best position to determine if allowing the family members into the courtroom would have caused a disturbance or have impacted on security. Cf. Hunt, 312 Md. at 501, 540 A.2d at 1128. Furthermore, failure to allow the witnesses into the courtroom, if error, was harmless error. There is no reason to believe that his family's presence would somehow have lent additional weight or credibility to Hunt's allocution or that their absence would have the opposite effect.