Opinion ID: 2434010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of chancery court hearing

Text: The appellants objected to having the case heard by the chancellor because the appellees' claim for possession made their claim an ejectment action. Ejectment is an action for possession filed in circuit court by one who has title to the property, while a quiet title action is filed in chancery court by one who is in possession and wants title to the property declared to be in him. Pearman v. Pearman, 144 Ark. 528, 222 S.W. 1064 (1920). The equity jurisdiction to quiet title, independent of statute, can only be invoked by a plaintiff in possession, unless his title be merely an equitable one. The reason is that where the title is a purely legal one and someone else is in possession, the remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete, and an action of ejectment cannot be maintained under the guise of a bill in chancery. In such case the adverse party has a constitutional right to a trial by jury. [144 Ark. at 531, 222 S.W. at 1067] In Ralston v. Powers, 269 Ark. 63, 598 S.W.2d 410 (1980) we held: The jurisdictional requirement that a party be in possession to quiet title to land in equity has been approved by this court many times. Gibbs v. Bates, 150 Ark. 344, 234 S.W. 175 (1921); Rice v. Rice, 206 Ark. 937, 175 S.W.2d 201 (1943); Lowe v. Cox, 210 Ark. 169, 194 S.W.2d 892 (1946). [269 Ark. at 65, 598 S.W.2d at 412] Where the propriety of having the case in chancery court is challenged, as here, we reverse if the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. Hesser v. Johns, 288 Ark. 264, 704 S.W.2d 165 (1986). The reason the chancellor gave for overruling the motion to transfer the case to the circuit court was that a portion of the title asserted by the appellees was equitable in nature. We do not necessarily agree with that finding, but we need not discuss it further, for there was another basis for retention of the case in chancery court. Where a defendant in a quiet title action files an answer setting up title in himself by adverse possession and requests affirmative relief, he thereby waives his objection to the jurisdiction of the court. Stolz v. Franklin, 258 Ark. 999, 531 S.W.2d 1 (1975). We affirm a chancellor's ruling if it is correct even though we do so on a basis different from the one he asserted. Smith v. Smith, 272 Ark. 199, 612 S.W.2d 736 (1981).