Opinion ID: 360429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First and Sixth Amendment Rights.

Text: 41 The plaintiffs suggest that restrictions, inherent in segregation, on their opportunity to attend general religious services and to associate with members of the general population are such as to require the imposition of procedural due process. It is also apparent from their brief that they would make a similar Sixth Amendment claim due to the limitation segregation necessarily places on their access to the prison law library. It is beyond doubt that the Constitution's First and Sixth Amendment freedoms extend inside prison walls. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), and Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). However, it is equally clear that the Supreme Court gives substantial leeway to the discretion of prison authorities in this regard. As long as adequate alternatives are available in light of legitimate penological objectives, a limitation on a prisoner's constitutional rights will not be deemed impermissible. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). All that is required is reasonable accommodation. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079 n.2. Thus, to the extent segregation was properly imposed, all the state would need to establish here is some opportunity for the plaintiffs to exercise the protected rights. This much was shown through the Revis affidavits, at least with respect to the Pontiac and Stateville plaintiffs. A fair reading of the affidavits would net the same result as to the Menard plaintiffs who were also segregated in Stateville. The reasonable inference is that the same policy extended to the Joliet plaintiffs as to whom no affidavits were submitted on this point. The contention of plaintiffs is without merit. 42