Opinion ID: 757749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guideline Range Stipulation

Text: 97 Nolan-Cooper additionally contends that the government breached the plea agreement by recommending to the court a sentence outside the stipulated Guideline range. In the plea agreement, the government expressly represented that it would make whatever sentencing recommendation it deems appropriate within the stipulated Sentencing Guideline range of 41 to 51 months imprisonment. App. at 262. The district court, however, determined at the sentencing hearing that the applicable guideline range was actually 63 to 78 months, and denied Nolan-Cooper's motion for a downward departure from this range. App. 418-51. After this finding was explained to the parties, additional witnesses were called, and the government was subsequently given the opportunity to present its arguments on Nolan-Cooper's sentencing to the court. The government made the following statement: 98 [These were] crimes committed by an individual who knew better, who was not forced either by economics or otherwise, any form of duress, to commit these crimes, she chose to commit these crimes knowingly and deliberately. 99 [I]t is difficult even now as I stand before this Court for anyone, I believe, not to be shocked by the defendant's callous and calculating attempts to subvert the law. That would be the case whether or not she was a lawyer, but the fact that she is a lawyer, someone who swore to uphold the law, makes this case--the actions of this defendant particular [sic] egregious, that she in fact flaunted the fact that she had special tools, the escrow account, which she could use as a resource to break the law. 100 App. at 477-78. At the conclusion of its comments, the government stated that the Judge should sentence the defendant to the higher end of the guidelines based on her conduct. App. at 479 (emphasis added). 101 Defendant's counsel immediately objected, claiming that the government had breached the plea agreement. The following colloquy ensued: 102 The Government: Your honor, I stand corrected on that. When I said the higher end of the guideline range, I meant within the plea agreement and I misspoke on that, so that will stand corrected. 103 The Court: Well, it can (sic) be within the plea agreement, can't it? Doesn't it have to be at least 63 months? 104 The Government: Yes, your Honor, but I think for purposes of argument today, I think I can stand before the Court and argue the higher end of the guideline as stipulated to. 105 The Court: Okay, I will disregard the Government's recommendation since, frankly, it seems to be a little schizophrenic here as to who is recommending what to whom when. So, we will give no weight to the Government's recommendation in this case and I will take into account [defense counsel] Mr. Howard's recommendation to that. 106 App. at 479-80. Nolan-Cooper contends that the government violated the plea agreement in two ways. First, she contends that the government's lengthy statement preceding its sentence recommendation--in which the government characterized her in a highly negative way and implicitly advocated a severe sentence--itself constitutes a breach. Second, Nolan-Cooper asserts that, despite the subsequent correction, the government's original recommendation of a sentence at the higher end of the guidelines was also a breach. We take up these arguments in turn. 107 As we said in Badaracco, we must examine what the defendant reasonably understood she would be receiving from the government in return for her plea of guilty. See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 939. We believe, as a basic matter, that it was entirely reasonable for Nolan-Cooper to understand that the government's promise to recommend a sentence between 41 and 51 months included a promise not to advocate the imposition of a sentence longer than 51 months. See United States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 370 (11th Cir.1996). Advocacy of a position requiring a greater sentence is flatly inconsistent with recommendation of a lesser sentence. Id. To resolve Nolan-Cooper's claim that the government's comments preceding its recommendation violated the plea agreement, we must determine whether those comments constitute impermissible advocacy. 108 The First Circuit faced an almost identical situation in United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir.1992). In that case, the government agreed to recommend a sentence 36 months in duration. At the sentencing hearing, however, the district court determined that the applicable guideline range was 46 to 57 months. After this determination was made, the government stated, inter alia: 109 [T]he plea agreement ... indicates that the government would recommend a period of incarceration of 36 months, which under the calculations, that at that time under the information that was known to the government ... was the upper end of the guideline range. That is in the plea agreement. 110 The government feels a substantial period of incarceration in this case [sic], for the reason the Court has already indicated: this is a massive fraud perpetrated on a large number of individuals over a long period of time.... 111 It is important, the government feels, that a very strong message be sent by the Court. This is one of the largest, if not the largest advance fee scheme, which the Office of the United States Attorney has been involved in in the last several years. 112 960 F.2d at 269. After making a few more comments regarding restitution, the government remarked I begged the question as to the specific amount of the period of incarceration here-- at which point the district court interjected I think you are stuck with the plea agreement. Id. The government replied, I believe I am, your Honor. Id. 113 The First Circuit noted that, while the government informed the district court of the agreed-upon 36 month sentence, it never affirmatively recommended such a sentence and that its comments seemed to undercut such a recommendation. Id. at 268. The court concluded that the government's comments, though not explicitly repudiating the plea agreement, violated Santobello. Id. at 269. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that the government's overall conduct must be reasonably consistent with making such a recommendation, rather than the reverse. Id. We agree. 114 We considered a similar situation in Hayes, supra. In that case, the government agreed to make no recommendation as to the specific sentence that the Court should impose, yet in its sentencing memorandum advocated a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines as to Count One ... and a lengthy period of incarceration on the nonguideline counts. Hayes, 946 F.2d at 232. While we recognized that a promise to make no recommendation is a lesser commitment [than a promise to take no position at all] and permits some latitude in the prosecutor to influence the sentence without actually commenting on the sentence itself, we concluded that the specific comments here clearly clashed with the plain language of the agreement, and we held for the defendant. Id. at 234-35. 115 We believe that the same principles apply here. Once the district court had determined that the lower end of the applicable sentencing guideline range was higher than the high end of Nolan-Cooper's stipulated range, the government essentially had received more than it had bargained for when it entered into the plea agreement. Since the government was prohibited by the agreement from recommending a sentence longer than 51 months, once the district court determined that the low end of the applicable range was 68 months, the government should have said nothing further. As in Canada, the government's subsequent comments can only be interpreted as an attempt to influence the court to impose a longer sentence than stipulated to in the agreement, and is therefore a breach. 116 To illustrate the limits of our holding, we identify a possible exception to this rule. If the government otherwise adheres to the terms of the plea agreement, and the court independently determines that the applicable range is higher than that stipulated to, it would not appear to be a breach if the government states only that in light of the changed circumstances, the court should impose the lowest end of the applicable range. But that was not the case here. There is no way that the government's comments could possibly be construed as advocating for the lower half of the range, let alone the lowest possible term of imprisonment. To the contrary, the government's professed shock at Nolan-Cooper's callous and calculating attempts to subvert the law can only be reasonably read as advocating a severe sentence. 117 We emphasize that our conclusion is not based on a belief that the government acted in any bad faith, but rather on an objective interpretation of the import of the government's remarks within the context of the district court's previous determination regarding the applicable guideline range. In these circumstances, the most prudent course would be for the government, if given an opportunity to comment, to inform the court that it is bound by the plea agreement and therefore will not make any further remarks. Of course, if the plea agreement permits the government to correct any misstatement of facts made by the defendant during her colloquy, the government would be within its power to do so--so long as any statement it makes does not undermine its agreed-upon position. See Canada, 960 F.2d at 270. The government should exercise its power to comment in these circumstances with extreme discretion, e.g. to correct blatant misstatements by the defendant. Of course, if sentencing issues other than the amount of incarceration to be imposed are still undetermined, the government would be permitted to make any statements relevant to those issues, so long as those statements do not otherwise undermine other provisions of the plea agreement. 118 Nolan-Cooper's second argument (i.e. that the government's initial misstatement of its sentencing recommendation also constitutes a breach) presents a number of difficult questions. While we are convinced that the government's initial misstatement was just that--a misstatement--it is similarly true that, under our case law, even inadvertent breaches can require vacatur of the sentence. See Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233. While we have stressed that the government must choose its words at a plea hearing very carefully, we also recognize that the dynamics of an extemporaneous courtroom colloquy can lead to missteps, and we are reluctant to adopt a strict rule that would characterize an immediately corrected good-faith misstatement as a breach. But see United States v. Kurkculer, 918 F.2d 295 (1st Cir.1990) (finding breach of plea agreement when government recommended sentence in violation of agreement although government withdrew its recommendation and then recommended agreed-upon sentence after continuance). It is uncertain whether our reluctance is precluded by our holding in Hayes that even inadvertent breaches having no effect on the court still require vacatur of the sentence. See Hayes, 946 F.2d at 233. However, since we find that the government's commentary preceding its misstated recommendation itself constitutes a breach, we need not reach this issue.