Opinion ID: 6348578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [6-8] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. 6 For an appellate 1 Schlake v. Schlake, 294 Neb. 755, 885 N.W.2d 15 (2016). 2 Bohling v. Bohling, 304 Neb. 968, 937 N.W.2d 855 (2020). 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Great Northern Ins. Co. v. Transit Auth. of Omaha, 308 Neb. 916, 958 N.W.2d 378 (2021), disapproved on other grounds, Clark v. Sargent Irr. Dist., 311 Neb. 123, 971 N.W.2d 298 (2022). 6 Schlake, supra note 1. - 639 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from which the appeal is taken. 7 Although partial summary judgments are usually considered interlocutory and must ordinarily dispose of the whole merits of the case to be considered final, partition actions are unique in that the action has two distinct stages: first, the title determination and, second, the division of the real estate, i.e., the “partition.” 8 The seminal case on the issue of the appealability of orders in a partition action is Peterson v. Damoude. 9 In that case, we explained that the appealability of orders in partition actions depends on the nature of the controversy resolved and that such orders can be arranged into three classes: (1) Where there is no controversy as to the ownership of the property in common and the right of partition, but the controversy is as to something relating to the partition, as whether the property can be equitably divided or must be sold, one party contending that it can be equitably divided and asking for a distinct portion of the property, and the other party contending that it cannot be equitably divided and asking that the whole property be sold, or some similar controversy in regard to the partition itself. When that is the case, the partition alone is the subject of litigation, and of course is not final until the partition is made. (2) The second class is where there is the same issue as above indicated as to the method of partition, and at the same time a distinct issue as to the title and ownership of the property. In such cases the parties would have a right to have their title first tried and determined, and, if that was done, the order thereon would be a final 7 Pennfield Oil Co. v. Winstrom, 267 Neb. 288, 673 N.W.2d 558 (2004). 8 Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017). 9 Peterson v. Damoude, 95 Neb. 469, 145 N.W. 847 (1914). - 640 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 order, . . . but if the matter is tried to the court, and the parties do not ask that their title be first determined, and there is no indication that the court proceeded first to determine the title, the parties should be held to have waived their right to appeal before the partition is completed. (3) The third class is where everything depends upon the title and the nature of the title, and where, when that question is determined, the whole thing is determined. In such case there can be no doubt . . . that, when that question is determined, such determination is a final order, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable. 10 [9-11] Put differently, when the dispute in a partition action is over the partition itself rather than ownership or title, there is no final, appealable order until the partition is made. 11 When a partition action involves a dispute over ownership or title as well as a dispute over the method of partition, the parties have a right to have title determined first, and, if they elect to do so, an order resolving only the title dispute is a final, appealable order. 12 When the only issue in a partition action depends on ownership and the nature of the title, an order determining that issue is a final, appealable order. 13 In Peterson, the petition alleged that a decedent’s will disposed of certain real estate, prayed that the court construe the will “‘with reference to the right of the plaintiffs to have partition and division of said premises,’” and asked the court to quiet title in the plaintiffs. 14 On appeal, this court recognized that the “sole matter contested was the construction and effect of the will; there being no contest as to the partition if the 10 Id. at 471, 145 N.W. at 848, citing Sewell v. Whiton, 85 Neb. 478, 123 N.W. 1042 (1909). 11 Schlake, supra note 1. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Peterson, supra note 9, 95 Neb. at 472, 145 N.W. at 848. - 641 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 will is construed as the plaintiffs contend.” 15 Thus, because the order construing the will determined the whole controversy, we determined that the case fell within the third class and concluded that the district court’s order was final. Then, in Beck v. Trapp, 16 another partition case, the district court found, in part, that the plaintiffs were the owners of the land and quieted their title to the same. The court also determined the respective interests of the defendants and directed that the lands be partitioned. Subsequently, the appointed referee reported that partition could not be made without prejudice to the owners. Accordingly, the land was sold. On appeal, we determined that the case came within the third Peterson class, because “[t]he decree settling the question of title in the case at bar ‘determined the whole controversy.’ . . .” 17 In making this determination, we recognized that the real controversy in the action was the issue of title and that the partition prayed for was only incidental, because “[i]f the plaintiffs did not succeed in establishing their title, they would have no right to partition.” 18 We have consistently applied the three classes set out in Peterson to determine when and under what circumstances orders in partition actions are final and appealable, and we conclude it is applicable here as well. As an initial matter, we first note that this case does not fall into either the first or second Peterson class, because the parties do not contest the method of partition. Barbara’s complaint asserts that a sale of the Home is necessary because the Home is not susceptible to a partition in kind. Appellants generally deny this allegation in their answer, but fail to assert what they believe is the appropriate method of partition. Further, in his deposition, Smith appeared to concede that if the Home is subject to a 15 Id. 16 Beck v. Trapp, 103 Neb. 832, 174 N.W. 610 (1919). 17 Id. at 835, 174 N.W. at 611. 18 Id. at 834, 174 N.W. at 610. - 642 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 partition, the appropriate method would be a referee sale of the Home. The real controversy in this case is the issue of title, and the partition is incidental to the issue of title. If Barbara does not succeed in establishing her title, she has no right to partition. If Barbara does succeed in establishing her title, the parties seem to agree that a referee’s sale is appropriate. Accordingly, this brings the case within the third Peterson class, because the order settling the question of title “determined the whole controversy,” and, as such, we find that the district court’s order is final and appealable. Summary Judgment Appellants assert that there exist genuine disputes of material fact concerning the parties’ respective titles to the Home and that therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate. Upon our review of the record, we agree. [12] Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and the evidence admitted at the hearing disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material facts or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 19 The evidence that may be received on a motion for summary judgment includes depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits. 20 Before we consider whether Barbara’s motion for summary judgment should have been entered, we must first consider the possible implications of Appellants’ failure to file an evidence index and an annotated statement of disputed facts, as required by § 6-1526 in opposition to the motion. At the summary judgment hearing, Appellants offered, and the court received, several exhibits into evidence. Appellants also made certain arguments in support of their opposition to summary 19 Brown v. Morello, 308 Neb. 968, 957 N.W.2d 884 (2021). 20 Bohling, supra note 2. - 643 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 judgment. Barbara contends that Appellants’ evidence and arguments made in opposition to her summary judgment motion should be disregarded because Appellants failed to comply with § 6-1526. We disagree. [13] In a recent case, we identified three reasons for § 6-1526, namely, to benefit the parties by making their claims as to disputed and undisputed facts clear and precise, to serve the courts by exposing the precise claims of the parties, and to focus the parties and the court on the specific factual contentions. 21 We noted, however, that in the context of § 6-1526, trial courts should have some discretion to adapt procedures to the needs of a particular case, and an appellate court will not intervene except where the discretion is abused. 22 Here, the issues and facts raised and contested by Appellants were made clear by their “Evidence of Frivolous in Support of Motion and Notice for Dismissal” and “Evidence Index in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice.” As such, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s allowing Appellants to proceed with offering evidence notwithstanding their failure to comply with the summary judgment rule. But, we caution that trial courts should not condone a party’s failure to follow § 6-1526 merely because the party finds it inconvenient or unfamiliar. 23 Instead, courts should set deadlines in compliance with the rule and require parties to submit necessary materials. 24 Now turning to the appropriateness of granting summary judgment, we note that the method of partition was never in question and we discern no genuine issue of material fact regarding that issue. We therefore focus our analysis on whether the district court erred in granting summary 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. - 644 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 judgment in favor of Barbara on the contested issue of title, specifically whether Donald forgave the Loan. As noted, it is undisputed that the $25,000 Donald paid toward the purchase price of the Home was a loan and that upon repayment of the Loan, Donald would relinquish his ownership interest in the Home, leaving Smith as the sole owner. Thus, if the allegation that Donald forgave the Loan is true, it would necessarily follow that Smith is the sole owner of the Home and that Barbara does not have a right to partition. Despite Barbara’s argument that the Loan was not forgiven, the evidence adduced at the summary judgment hearing demonstrated that Donald may have made an affirmative representation to Appellants that he would forgive the remaining balance on the Loan. At the hearing, transcripts from both Smith’s and Prosolow’s depositions were received into evidence. According to Smith’s deposition, Donald forgave the loan in June or July 2018. This was corroborated by Prosolow, who testified that sometime in July 2018, she overheard Donald tell Smith that “as long as you take care of [Barbara], that’s all I want, then the loan is forgiven and you’ll have the truck so that you can take care of her.” Thus, there is a genuine dispute as to whether Donald forgave the loan. Moreover, the district court itself seemed to recognize this factual dispute when it declined to grant summary judgment on Barbara’s claim for unpaid rent, because it recognized that “there [was] conflicting evidence on this issue,” because “[a] reasonable mind could conclude that, although Smith initially agreed to repay the Loan in full, it was later forgiven and Smith is no longer obligated to repay it.” As such, summary judgment on the partition action was improper. [14] We further acknowledge that in the summary judgment context, a fact is material only if it would affect the outcome of the case. 25 Thus, we find it important to address the district court’s findings that even if the Loan was forgiven, 25 Brock v. Dunning, 288 Neb. 909, 854 N.W.2d 275 (2014). - 645 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 Donald retained his ownership interest in the Home because there is no evidence that he ever relinquished his ownership interest. [15,16] It is a well-settled principle that a court of equity will consider the purpose and not the form, and that the particular form or words of a conveyance are unimportant if the intention of the parties can be ascertained. 26 Additionally, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-251 (Reissue 2018) states in part that “[e]very deed conveying real estate, which, by any other instrument in writing, shall appear to have been intended only as a security in the nature of a mortgage, though it be an absolute conveyance in terms, shall be considered as a mortgage.” Generally, a deed of real estate, absolute in form, may be shown by parol to have been intended by the parties to it as security for a debt or loan, and as between such parties, at least, the instrument will be construed to be a mortgage. 27 Here, there is evidence that the special warranty deed was intended by the parties to be security for a loan, as evidenced by the loan agreement, record of payments, and the testimony of the parties. If the finder of fact determined such was true, the deed could be construed as a mortgage, and the finder of fact could then conclude that Donald’s purported forgiveness of the Loan operated as a relinquishment of his ownership interest in the Home. As such, the question of whether the Loan was forgiven is a material issue of fact as it affects the determination of title and the outcome of the partition claim. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Barbara on the issue of partition. Smith’s Counterclaim Appellants argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Barbara on Smith’s counterclaim, wherein he alleged that Barbara had been unjustly enriched 26 Koehn v. Koehn, 164 Neb. 169, 81 N.W.2d 900 (1957). 27 Id. - 646 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 because the value of work he performed exceeded the amount he was paid. However, Appellants neither assigned nor sufficiently argued this error in their brief. It is a well-settled principle that to be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error. 28 However, an appellate court may, at its discretion, notice a plain error not assigned. 29 Here, we choose to review for plain error, but find none. Plain error is error plainly evident from the record and of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. 30 [17] Though the record reflects that Smith agreed to work at various hourly wages, and that the Humphreys paid him what he was owed, Smith nevertheless argued that he should have been paid more based on what a contractor would charge for the same work. Unjust enrichment claims are viable only in limited circumstances, and the terms of an enforceable agreement normally displace any claim of unjust enrichment within their reach. 31 Though contract claims supersede unjust enrichment claims, a plaintiff is permitted to allege both, and when a plaintiff elects to do so, a court should address the contract claim first. 32 We agree with the district court that as a matter of law, Smith is precluded from asserting an unjust enrichment claim, because it is undisputed that Smith agreed to work at an hourly wage and that the Humphreys paid him all amounts due under that agreement. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not commit plain error in granting summary judgment in favor of Barbara on Smith’s counterclaim. 28 Diamond v. State, 302 Neb. 892, 926 N.W.2d 71 (2019). 29 In re Estate of Soule, 248 Neb. 878, 540 N.W.2d 118 (1995). 30 Great Northern Ins. Co., supra note 5. 31 DH-1, LLC v. City of Falls City, 305 Neb. 23, 938 N.W.2d 319 (2020). 32 Id. - 647 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 311 Nebraska Reports HUMPHREY v. SMITH Cite as 311 Neb. 632 Barbara’s Unjust Enrichment Claim [18] In her brief, Barbara argues the court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment with respect to her unjust enrichment claim. In particular, Barbara contends that Appellants have been unjustly enriched by residing in the Home without paying rent. However, Barbara has not filed a cross-appeal, and, generally, an appellee may not question a portion of a judgment at issue on appeal unless the appellee properly raises the issue by filing a cross-appeal. 33 Moreover, the denial of a motion for summary judgment is typically an interlocutory order rather than a final order and thus not immediately appealable. 34 Accordingly, we decline to consider this argument.