Opinion ID: 1262445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Section 1252(b)(1) is a Jurisdictional Limitations Period

Text: As to whether the 30-day period set forth in § 1252(b)(1) is jurisdictional in nature and what constitutional ramifications result by operation of the Suspension Clause, we hold today that the statutory limitations period set forth in § 1252(b)(1) is indeed jurisdictional in nature, as this Court has already held in Malvoisin. See 268 F.3d at 75-76; see also Iasu, 511 F.3d at 887-93. Despite the fact that Malvoisin was decided before the REAL ID Act was enacted, the REAL ID Act did not alter the language of § 1252(b)(1) or provide any equitable defenses to the strict 30-day filing period such as tolling. Therefore, we reject Petitioners' argument that the applicable limitations period of 30 days is subject to equitable tolling. Support for our holding comes from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bowles v. Russell ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007), where the Court again examined whether a Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal filed after the statutory limitations period (but within a period allowed by a district court's order). 127 S.Ct. at 2362. The Court ruled that when examining a party's time period for filing an appeal beyond the period allowed by statute, it has long and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature. Id.; see also John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 750, 753, 169 L.Ed.2d 591 (2008) (citing Bowles with approval for the proposition that judicial efficiency is promoted by limitations periods that are jurisdictional in nature). In Bowles, a convicted prisoner filed a habeas petition following his unsuccessful challenge to his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. After entry of judgment by the district court denying his petition for habeas relief, Bowles had 30 days to file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals, Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A). Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2362. Bowles failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Nonetheless, the district court granted Bowles's motion pursuant to Rule 4(a)(6) to reopen the time period during which he could file a notice of appeal. Id. For reasons apparently unknown to the Supreme Court, the district court, in granting Bowles's motion to reopen, provided him 17 days to file a notice of appeal as opposed to the 14 additional days provided for by Rule (a)(4)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c). Id. Affirming the Court of Appeals's dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court first explained that the filing rule at issue in Bowles was derived from a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), which described the district, court's authority to reopen and extend the time for filing a notice of appeal after the lapse of the usual 30 days. 127 S.Ct. at 2363. The Supreme Court observed that it has long held that the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is `mandatory and jurisdictional.' Id. (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc, Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam)). Moreover, the Court noted how the Courts of Appeals routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction. Id. And, addressing any cases that could be arguably construed as holding to the contrary, the Court held: Regardless of this Court's past careless use of terminology, it is indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century. Id. The Court grounded its approach in Congress's authority to prescribe the types of cases that courts may entertain and the manner in which they may do so: Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. Put another way, the notion of subject-matter jurisdiction obviously extends to classes of cases . . . falling within a court's adjudicatory authority, but it is no less jurisdictional when Congress forbids federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate class of cases after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment. Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2365-66 (internal citations ,omitted); accord Grullon v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 107 (2d Cir.2007) (amended opinion issued Jan. 7, 2008). The Court noted that [i]f rigorous [filing] rules . . . are thought to be inequitable, Congress may authorize courts to promulgate rules that excuse compliance with the statutory time limits. Even narrow rules to this effect would give rise to litigation testing their reach and would no doubt detract from the clarity of the rule. However, congressionally authorized rulemaking would likely lead to less litigation than court-created exceptions without authorization. 127 S.Ct. at 2367. In Grullon, this Court recently had the opportunity to apply Bowles in the context of the question of whether the REAL ID Act's provision requiring that a petition file an appeal with the. BIA before filing a petition for review with this Court was jurisdictional in nature. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Grullon held that as regards the requirement that petitioners appeal to the BIA, § 1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional. 509 F.3d at 110. We noted that  Bowles emphasized repeatedly that its reasoning was based on the statutory origin of the limitation, and thus made clear that limits expressed in statutes  as to time or `classes of cases  limit subject-matter jurisdiction.' Id. (quoting Bowles, 127 S.Ct. at 2366 (As we have long held, when an appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 2365 (observing that the Supreme Court's treatment of its certiorari jurisdiction also demonstrates the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress)).