Opinion ID: 769567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Repairman Position

Text: 16 The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability by failing to make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of that individual. 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(5)(A). The issue before us is whether this provision requires an employer to provide an accommodation to a disabled employee that would directly violate the promotional series seniority system maintained by an employer and a union under the terms of a CBA. We hold that it does not. 17 Boersig first argues that Union Electric should have accommodated him by promoting him instead of Gina Perry to the Repairman position in November 1996. At the time the Repairman position became available, Boersig was a Helper and Perry worked as an Installer. Boersig acknowledges that the CBA required Union Electric to give hiring preferences to Installers over Helpers when filling vacant Repairman positions. However, Boersig argues that he should have been awarded the Installer position in 1994 or 1995. If he had been promoted at that time, Boersig would have had more promotional series seniority than Perry when Union Electric filled the Repairman position. 18 Insofar as Boersig's argument relies on Union Electric's alleged failure to promote him to Installer in 1994 and 1995, his argument fails. In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the district court concluded that Boersig's reasonable accommodation claim was time-barred because Boersig filed his EEOC complaint more than 300 days after the effective date of Union Electric's unlawful actions. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1) (applicable to ADA claims under 42 U.S.C. 12117(a)). We agree with the district court. Boersig cannot now resurrect his time-barred claims by challenging Union Electric's adherence to the promotional system clearly set forth in the CBA. 19 Boersig also argues that Union Electric should accommodate his disability by simply promoting him directly from Helper to Repairman. Boersig argues that he is fully capable of performing all Repairman duties in a safe and effective manner, and, thus, Union Electric should promote him to Repairman ahead of Installers who would otherwise be entitled to the position under the CBA's promotional system. In light of unambiguous Eighth Circuit precedent, we reject Boersig's arguments. 20 In Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995), we held that the ADA does not require an employer to accommodate a disabled employee by violating a bona fide seniority system. A bona fide seniority system has been defined as one that was created for legitimate purposes, rather than for the purpose of discrimination. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 n.7 (7th Cir. 1996). Boersig offers no evidence that Union Electric and Local 1439 incorporated the promotion system at issue in this case to discriminate against the disabled. Thus, Boersig has failed to demonstrate that the promotion system is not bona fide. Moreover, although the CBA's promotional system is based on departmental seniority rather than total length of employment, we find that this CBA creates a seniority system which Union Electric was not required to violate to accommodate Boersig's disability. See Benson, 62 F.3d at 1114.
21 Boersig attempts to avoid the rule announced in Benson, a reasonable accommodation case, by invoking a disparate impact theory of ADA liability, which defines discrimination as including the use of selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless such criteria are shown to be job-related for the position in question and [are] consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(6). Boersig argues that, because employees with his disability are unable to perform the duties of an Installer, the CBA's requirement that Union Electric offer vacant Repairman positions to Installers before Helpers is a selection criterion that is unlawful as applied to him because it has the effect of discriminating against him because of his disability without any sound business justification. We reject Boersig's argument. 22 Although the term selection criteria is used in both Title VII and the ADA, Boersig has cited no cases to this Court supporting his argument that a bona fide seniority system fits within the definition of selection criteria. Boersig has not convinced us that seniority systems should be considered selection criteria for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(6). Including seniority systems within the definition of selection criteria would jeopardize many carefully negotiated CBAs because virtually all seniority systems contain prerequisites for movement between jobs. Many of these prerequisites screen out disabled employees from certain jobs within the seniority system. Unless an employer renegotiates this kind of seniority system with the union to allow certain accommodations for disabled employees, Boersig's disparate impact argument would require an employer to accommodate a disabled employee by violating the express terms of a CBA. However, we have repeatedly held that the ADA does not require an employer to take action inconsistent with the contractual rights of other workers under a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Benson, 62 F.3d at 1114. For similar reasons, the ADA does not require an employer to renegotiate a bona fide seniority system to avoid screening out a disabled employee who may not be able to reach the highest rung on a promotional series because of disability. 23 Seniority systems contained in CBAs, such as the one involved in the instant case, create rights in union members which are protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151-187. Our Benson decision recognizes the importance of protecting these rights from unnecessary interference arising from the perceived need to accommodate a disabled employee under the ADA. We believe that these rights are entitled to protection regardless of whether a plaintiff seeks a reasonable accommodation or claims the seniority system has a disparate impact on disabled employees. In either case, the plaintiff invites the court to disrupt a carefully negotiated agreement between union and employer at the expense of other union employees who hold legitimate expectations of advancement based on the governing CBA. This sort of judicial intrusion into labor relations is unwarranted unless an employee can show that a seniority system was designed to discriminate against the disabled. Because we find the promotional system in the instant case is a bona fide seniority system, we reject Boersig's disparate impact claim.