Opinion ID: 844216
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance Was Excusable as a Good Faith Mistake of Law

Text: While the Courts of Appeal in Sharkey and Lucas differed on whether regulation 2600.1, subdivision (d)'s definition of good cause was deficient, they both went on to conclude that the Board's reliance on the regulation was excusable as a good faith mistake of law because it had not been called into question in any earlier administrative or judicial decision. As noted, section 6601, subdivision (a)(2), provides that [a] petition shall not be dismissed on the basis of a later judicial or administrative determination that the individual's custody was unlawful, if the unlawful custody was the result of a good faith mistake of fact or law. The legislative history of section 6601, subdivision (a)(2) reveals that a good faith mistake of ... law as used there is one that does not involve `negligent or intentional wrongdoing' by correctional authorities. ( In re Smith (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1251, 1260 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 469, 178 P.3d 446] ( Smith ); see id. at pp. 1259-1261.) We reviewed the legislative history in Smith and concluded the statute was intended to codify the holding of People v. Superior Court ( Whitley ) (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1383 [81 Cal.Rptr.2d 189] ( Whitley II ). Prior to Whitley II, in Terhune v. Superior Court (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 864 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 841] ( Whitley I ), a trial court had dismissed SVP proceedings against Whitley for lack of probable cause. However, instead of releasing him, the Board revoked his parole under a regulation that purported to authorize parole revocation for psychiatric treatment. Whitley successfully challenged the regulation in Whitley I. There the court held that the regulation exceeded the Board's authority because it was basically an end run around the procedural protections of the SVPA. ( Smith, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1259.) Whitley II, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1383, involved the question whether Whitley was entitled to release because the Board mistakenly relied on the invalid regulation to revoke his parole. The Whitley II court concluded that he remained subject to SVP proceedings. `[T]he record in the present case does not indicate negligent or intentional wrongdoing by the Department of Corrections in revoking Whitley's parole for psychiatric conditions based on [California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2616, subdivision (a)(7)]. The department's error in revoking his parole on that basis resulted from its mistake of law concerning the scope of its broad statutory authority to establish and enforce regulations governing parole. Until we decided [ Whitley I ], there was no controlling judicial decision directly on point .... Given these factors and in light of the serious public safety purpose underlying the Act, we conclude that despite the department's legal error, the trial court had jurisdiction or power to consider the People's latest petition for Whitley's commitment.' ( Whitley II, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1389-1390.) ( Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 1260.) In Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1251, we noted that when section 6601, subdivision (a)(2) was added to the SVPA in 1999, legislative committee analyses made clear that it was intended to adopt a rule similar to the holding in Whitley II. The Senate Committee on Public Safety's analysis of the amendment states that it was `a response to [ Whitley I ], in which the Court of Appeal barred SVP proceedings against inmate Whitley.... [¶] In [ Whitley II ], ... the court held that because [the Board of Prison Terms] and the [Department of Corrections] did not unlawfully hold Whitley in custody through negligent or intentional wrongdoing, an SVP petition against Whitley could proceed.' (Sen. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 11 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 23, 1999, pp. 3-4.) ... [¶] ... [¶] An Assembly Republican bill analysis stated: `The bill responds to an ambiguity created by an appellate court decision and makes it clear that sexually violent predators are not to be unleashed on society simply because the constable has blundered.' (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Republican Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 11 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 1999, p. 1.) ( Smith, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1260-1261.) (11) The mistake of law in the cases at bar is essentially similar to that in Whitley II. Just as in Whitley II, the Board here relied on a regulation that was later held to be clearly invalid. However, although the regulation's invalidity is readily apparent to us now, the Board cannot be faulted for not having anticipated our decision, given that no previous judicial decision questioned its validity and that the Courts of Appeal in these very cases split on the question. [11] Moreover, the Board's interpretation of good cause is contained in a regulation formally adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.). `[A]n interpretation of a statute contained in a regulation adopted after public notice and comment is more deserving of deference than [one] contained in an advice letter prepared by a single staff member.' ( Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 785, 801 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 978 P.2d 2].) Finally, the regulation is entitled to greater deference because it embodies a statutory interpretation that the Board has consistently maintained and that has gone unchallenged for over 13 years. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, in the absence of any indication of negligent or intentional wrongdoing by correctional authorities, we conclude that the Board's reliance on the regulation here was excusable as a good faith mistake of law. Petitioners disagree. They make alternative arguments in support of their contention that the Board's reliance on the regulation was not excusable. (12) First, petitioners claim that the Board failed to follow the procedure set out in the regulation for issuing a 45-day hold. They point to subdivision (a) of regulation 2600.1, part of the same regulation that, in subdivision (d), defines good cause for a 45-day extension. Subdivision (a) permits a hold for up to three days beyond the scheduled release date. By its terms, subdivision (a) applies when exceptional circumstances preclude an earlier evaluation .... [12] Petitioners claim that in order to grant a 45-day extension order under regulation 2600.1, subdivision (d), the Board must first comply with subdivision (a)'s 3-day hold requirement. They conclude that [i]t would constitute an absurd result if the imposition of a 3-day hold required a finding of `exceptional circumstances' while the imposition of a 45-day hold did not. The premise of petitioners' argument is faulty. Petitioners urge that a three-day hold is a condition precedent to the grant of a 45-day hold. But that is not the case. A three-day hold under regulation 2600.1, subdivision (a) is an available, but not a mandatory, provision. The statutory provision contemplates that the determinations required by section 6601, subdivision (a)(1) (an inmate may be an SVP) and subdivision (b) (an inmate is likely to be an SVP) will be made substantially earlier in the process. As noted, the secretary's referral is to be made at least six months before the scheduled release date. The DCR and Board screening must generally be done in time to allow for a full evaluation by up to four psychiatrists or psychologists, the preparation of their reports, a final DMH determination, and a review by the district attorney or county counsel prior to the filing of a commitment petition. Regulation 2600.1, subdivision (a), is a safety valve that allows an extra three days when exceptional circumstances have precluded an earlier evaluation [of] the person pursuant to section 6601 .... Nowhere has the Legislature by statute, or the Board by regulation, required that a three-day hold be granted before a 45-day extension may be sought. Indeed, in neither of these cases was a three-day hold requested or granted. There was no need. Here, the initial determinations of section 6601, subdivisions (a) and (b) were made but a referral for a full evaluation had not been made. The recognition that the release date was imminent occurred with sufficient time to permit the Board to act on a 45-day extension request. (13) The three-day hold provision of regulation 2600.1 is also intended to apply when there is not enough time before the inmate's release date for the Board to make the good cause determination required for a 45-day hold. Subdivision (a) explains that if the Board's staff informs the Board that the inmate may or does need a full evaluation, the Board may impose a three-day hold pending its good cause determination. Subdivision (b) of regulation 2600.1 says that during the three-day hold, the staff must document that the inmate has been screened or is in the process of being screened, and that the Board's good cause determination must occur during this three-day period. Even if the staff has already decided that the inmate does need a full evaluation, the Board may need three days to confirm that determination and authorize a 45-day hold. However, there is nothing to suggest that the Board has to impose a three-day hold if it does not need that time to decide on a 45-day hold. (Reg. 2600.1, subds. (a), (b).) Next, petitioners argue that, contrary to the position taken by the DCR here, the legislative history of section 6601.3 reveals that the DCR has always understood that 45-day holds require a showing that exceptional circumstances prevent the timely completion of SVP evaluations. Petitioners rely on the following statement regarding the purpose of section 6601.3 by the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency in an enrolled bill report. [13] [T]here will always be inmates whose release dates are advanced through judicial or administrative action so as to collapse the 6 month lead time, either before the process of referral has begun or before a probable cause determination can be made. The new regulation, based on apparent legislative intent that referrals not be released prior to a probable cause determination... serves this purpose, and is by this amendment explicitly included in the SVP law. (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 1496 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) Jan. 25, 1996, p. 2 (Enrolled Bill Report).) Petitioners misapprehend the legislative history. A careful reading of the history of section 6601.3 and of regulation 2600.1 reveals that the Board has consistently understood section 6601.3 to authorize the issuance of a 45-day hold upon a showing that some evidence indicates a suspected SVP meets the SVPA's criteria. The basic provisions of the SVPA were enacted in 1995 and took effect on January 1, 1996. ( Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1143.) Section 6601.3 was not part of the original enactment. (See Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 3, pp. 5922-5929.) On December 26, 1995, regulation 2600.1 was filed as an emergency measure, to become effective on January 1, 1996. The regulation's stated purpose was to provide a mechanism for screening suspected SVP's where exceptional circumstances preclude an earlier evaluation and judicial determination of probable cause. [14] (Reg. 2600.1, former subd. (a), Register 96, No. 23 (June 7, 1996) p. 91.) The regulation provided for 45-day holds if the Board found probable cause to believe a suspected SVP met the act's criteria. (Reg. 2600.1, former subd. (c).) Probable cause for a 45-day hold was defined as requiring a showing of [s]ome evidence that the criteria were met. ( Ibid. ) Regulation 2600.1 took effect before section 6601.3 did. Section 6601.3 was added to the statutory scheme several weeks later as a clean up provision. It was approved by the Governor on January 25, 1996, and became effective immediately as urgency legislation. (Stats. 1996, ch. 4, §§ 2, 5, pp. 16-17.) As originally enacted, section 6601.3 did not require a showing of either probable cause or good cause for the issuance of a 45-day hold. Instead, it provided only that [t]he Board of Prison Terms may order that a person referred to the State Department of Mental Health pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 6601 remain in custody for no more than 45 days for full evaluation pursuant to subdivisions (c) to (h), [15] inclusive, of Section 6601, unless his or her scheduled date of release falls more than 45 days after referral. (§ 6601.3, former subd. (a), added by Stats. 1996, ch. 4, § 2, p. 16.) [16] The Board construed section 6601.3 as impliedly incorporating into the SVPA the 45-day hold procedure the Board had earlier adopted in regulation 2600.1. In the enrolled bill report relied upon by petitioners, the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency stated that section 6601.3 places the parole hold procedure adopted as regulation by the Board of Prison Terms into the body of the statutory scheme. (Cal. Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, Enrolled Bill Rep., supra, at p. 2.) As noted, when the enrolled bill report was written, the only required showing under the regulation was [s]ome evidence that the SVPA criteria were met. (Reg. 2600.1, former subd. (c), Register 96, No. 23 (June 7, 1996) pp. 91-92.) Nowhere does the applicable legislative history reveal that the corrections agency understood that a 45-day hold required a demonstration of exceptional circumstances. Only in 2000 was section 6601.3 amended to require that good cause be shown for the imposition of 45-day holds. [17] Regulation 2600.1 was not amended until 2007, when the term good cause was substituted for the term probable cause. The amended regulation then provided, as it does now, that good cause to place a 45-day hold existed when there was [s]ome evidence the person had committed a specified offense and was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. (Reg. 2600.1, subd. (d), Register 2007, No. 48 (Nov. 30, 2007) p. 93.) Not until 2010 did the Legislature amend section 6601.3 to make explicit the meaning of good cause that we find implicit in the statutory scheme. [18] For the foregoing reasons, the Board's reliance here on the regulation's definition of good cause was excusable as a good faith mistake of law.