Opinion ID: 1997708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: What showing of falsity was required?

Text: Having determined that some of the defamatory statements were a matter of public concern and others were not, we now must decide what kind of showing with respect to falsity (a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence). Ayala had to make with respect to each kind of speech to support the award of compensatory and punitive damages. In Hepps, supra, the Court addressed the question whether to recover compensatory damages, private-figure plaintiff bore the burden of proving falsity as well as fault where the defamatory speech was of public concern. See 475 U.S.A at 776-78, 106 S.Ct. 1563-65. The Court approached the problem by reasoning that the allocation of the burden of proof distributed between the parties the risk that he available evidence was unpersuasive as to truth or falsity. See id. at 776, 106 S.Ct. at 1564-64. The Court held that [t]o ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, the risk had to be assigned to the plaintiff in a defamation action. Id. at 776-77, 106 S.Ct. at 1564. The Court held, in the context of compensatory damages, that the risk was sufficiently managed if the plaintiff was required to show falsity by a preponderance of the evidence, without need to make a showing by clear an cornicing evidence. Id. Applying Hepps to the present case, we hold that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's award of compensatory damages because the jury found that Ayala, a private figure in a case involving matters of publics well as private concern, had shown all three elements of defamation by at least a preponderance of the evidence. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question whether a private-figure plaintiff must show falsity by clear and convincing evidence to recover punitive damages. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2682 n. 2, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes , 836 F.Supp. 740, 742 (E.D.Wash.1993); aff'd, 67 F.3d 816 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1567, 134 L.Ed.2d 666 (1996). The present case squarely presents us with the question of Ayala's entitlement to punitive damages. Looking to the court's analysis in Hepps for guidance, we first note that Ayala, unlike Hepps, has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted with constitutional malice. Toe decide how persuasive the evidence of falsity must be for the plaintiff to prevail, we are guided by the purpose of punitive damages. In these circumstance where a jury has determined that he defendants's conduct has been proven, by clear and convicting evidence, to constitute constitutional malice, we do not think that any greater certainty is necessary with respect to falsity than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Punitive damages are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil; juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. The reprehensible conduct that is sought to be punished and deterred is speaking with constitutional malice, that is, with actual knowledge of the falsity of the speech or reckless disregard of it. Once a defendant had done that, it is mere fortuity if what was said should happen to turn out to be true. What is punished is the creation of an unwarranted risk, not the actual harm that results from the risk. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 459-60, 113 S.Ct. 2711, 2721, 125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993) (plurality opinion) (stating that any constitutional limitation on award of punitive damage relates not only to actual damages, but to injury that could have flowed from conduct); see also id. at 466-68, 113 S.Ct. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (endorsing objective indicia of reasonableness discussed by plurality); id. at 484, 113 S.Ct. at 2734 (O'Connor and White, JJ., concurring in the judgment) (I have no quarrel with the plurality that, in the abstract, punitive damages may be predicated on the potential but unrealized harm to the victim, or even on the defendant's anticipated gain.); cited with approval in BWM of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1602, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). Although it is appropriate to require proof of falsity as a check on veracious lawsuits concerning circumstances in which no coginzable harm could accrue to the plaintiff, once that hurdle has been passed, there is no constitutional concern requiring greater certainty of proof with respect to falsity. Of course, just as [a] jury is obviously more likely to accept a plaintiff's contention that the defendant was at fault in publishing the statements at issue if convincing that the relevant statements were false, Hepps, supra, 475 U.S. at 778, 106 S.Ct. at 1565, a jury is more likely to find proof of constitutional malice by clear and convincing evidence if it is shown by similarly persuasive evidence that the statement was false. Thus, our decision [affects] only marginally ... the burdens that the plaintiff must already bear as a result of [the Court's] earlier decisions in the law of defamation. Id.