Opinion ID: 1378445
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Post Mortem

Text: Now that home rule for Oregon cities is dead and buried for most, if not all, practical purposes, a post mortem may be appropriate. I am concerned not only with the result of the decision in this case, but with the grounds on which the decision by the majority is based and its devastating effect in future cases by an opinion which would confer almost, if not complete, legislative supremacy over cities by its holdings that: (1) Even a statute which provides procedures which conflict with procedures provided by city ordinances will not be considered as one addressed to    procedures of local government if such a statute is addressed primarily to substantive social, economic or other regulatory objectives of the state. Not only are all statutes presumably addressed to some such objective, but under the decision by the majority that determination is one which can now be foreclosed by legislative decision. (2) Even statutes which are addressed to structure and procedures of local government will prevail over conflicting city ordinances whenever the legislature decides, either expressly or by implication, that there is a need for such a statute. (3) City voters do not have the power by initiative or referendum to control the compensation paid by cities to their officers and employees, contrary to the representation to Oregon voters when Article IV, Section 1 was submitted to them for approval as an amendment to the Oregon Constitution. The sole response by the majority to these three post mortem conclusions is a quotation from Mark Twain that reports of his death were greatly exaggerated. This is a clever, but evasive, response. The majority does not deny that its opinion in this case has these three drastic results. In addition to the obvious effects of such needless and drastic holdings by the majority in this case, the additional consequences of these holdings, when considered with the two concurring opinions, include the following: (1) The criteria adopted by this court in LaGrande/Astoria and purportedly based upon precise provisions of Article XI, Section 2, so as to constitute a constitutional command, are illusory, meaningless, and impractical in application, as demonstrated by the fact that a majority of this court cannot agree upon the meaning and application of such criteria. (2) The distinction by the majority of this court in LaGrande/Astoria between statutes addressed to matters of procedure and those addressed to matters of substance (a distinction repudiated by the union, the Attorney General and the cities in that case) is also illusory and meaningless, as the same distinction has been found in other contexts. [32] (3) The test of predominant interest, as previously reaffirmed by unanimous decision of this court in Heinig and approved by many authorities on the subject, [33] but rejected by this court in LaGrande/Astoria in a four to three decision, is not only a more honest and straightforward test, but one far less difficult in application than the criteria adopted in LaGrande/Astoria Tests involving a balancing of interests have been adopted by courts in many other contexts. [34] (4) Under these holdings by the majority, the Oregon legislature could adopt statutes which, by preemption, not only supersede any structure or procedures provided by any city charter or ordinance, but also impose, either directly or indirectly, heavy financial burdens on cities without providing funds with which to meet such burdens. [35] (5) The only remaining recourse available to the cities, as a practical matter, is to promote the adoption of an amendment to the Oregon Constitution which spells out more specifically the home rule rights of cities and counties. For all of these reasons, I dissent from the opinion by the majority in this case.