Opinion ID: 2052142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issues of Legitimate Public Concern.

Text: Palmer urges this court to adopt a standard requiring a private-figure plaintiff to demonstrate actual malice when the plaintiff is involved in a matter of legitimate public interest. In effect, this standard would reinstate the public-interest privilege articulated in the plurality opinion of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Rosenbloom was expressly rejected as a matter of federal constitutional law in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). Gertz, by itself, does not prevent this court from establishing the Rosenbloom standard. Gertz allows the states to depart from actual malice standards in defamation actions by private plaintiffs against media defendants. The states are permitted to adopt for themselves any standard of liability, so long as they do not impose liability without fault. Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809. In the wake of Gertz, a vast majority of states have adopted a negligence standard when a private plaintiff brings an action for defamation against a media defendant. See Contemporary Studies Project, Standards Governing the News: Their Use, Their Characters, and Their Legal Implications, 72 Iowa L.Rev. 637, 667 n. 258 (1987); Annotation, State Constitutional Protection of Allegedly Defamatory Statements Regarding Private Individual, 33 A.L.R. 4th 212 (1984). Palmer offers three reasons as support for its argument that we should adopt the Rosenbloom public interest privilege in Iowa. First, Palmer asserts that recent Supreme Court decisions have weakened the viability of Gertz. Second, Palmer urges this court to follow other states which have established the Rosenbloom standard, and third, Palmer contends that Iowa case law supports this decision. Palmer argues that three recent Supreme Court cases act to revive Rosenbloom in the aftermath of Gertz. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S.Ct. 1558, 89 L.Ed.2d 783 (1986); Dunn & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985). Each of these cases act to define a particular area of defamation law. Their narrow holdings, viewed collectively, do not weaken the viability of Gertz. Palmer urges this court to follow other state courts which have adopted the Rosenbloom standard in the aftermath of Gertz. See, e.g., Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671, 321 N.E.2d 580 (3d Dist.1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1112, 47 L.Ed.2d 318 (1976); Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083 (N.J.1986); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied sub nom., Woestendiek v. Walker, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469, 46 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975), overruled in part by Diversified Management, Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103 (Colo.1982). We find these cases to be unpersuasive. Gertz provides the state courts latitude to interpret state law. If, as a matter of state jurisprudence, the state would provide greater protection of the media, the state is permitted to adopt a standard higher than negligence. Under Gertz, states are free to define the appropriate standards of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual, so long as the states do not impose liability without fault. Thus, a state may adopt a standard higher than negligence. In Aafco and Walker, the state courts of Indiana and Colorado adopted the Rosenbloom standard of actual malice where the subject of the publication was a matter of public interest. Both Aafco and Walker have been criticized for their failure to consider their respective state law and state constitutional protections. [2] In Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 279, 516 A.2d 1083, 1091-93 (1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Rosenbloom standard even though the New Jersey Constitution qualifies the right of free speech by expressly creating responsibility for the abuse of that guarantee. See New Jersey Const. art. I, ¶ 6; see also Iowa Const. art. I, § 7 (right to free speech includes similar qualification). This constitutional provision was not directly addressed in Sisler. The court found that the fair report privilege under New Jersey law provided broader protection of free speech than provided by the federal constitution. In Iowa, the fair report privilege was developed prior to federal involvement in defamation law. Under this privilege, a person could freely publish statements of opinion on public figures or matters of public interest, so long as such opinions were based on truth and were not malicious. When the statement concerned the character, qualifications, or conduct of a public official or candidate for public office, protection from liability extended to include false statements of fact made without express malice. See Note, 62 Iowa L.Rev. 1067, 1073-74 (1977). Thus, the protection provided by the doctrine of fair report is now afforded by constitutional interpretations which provide absolute protection for statements of opinion and require a showing of actual malice when the statement concerns a public official or public figure. Iowa's fair report privilege does not broaden the protection now provided to the media by the first amendment. The effect of Aafco, Sisler, and Walker is to shift the primary inquiry away from whether the plaintiff is a public figure or public official. Under this line of cases, the threshold question for actual damages is whether the statements are of public interest or public concern. The United States Supreme Court has expressed grave concern about the fairness of applying a public interest/public concern test to private plaintiffs. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d at 808 (private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery). Commentators have also criticized the public interest/public concern inquiry based on the lack of guidance as to the definitions of public concern, public interest, or public controversy. [3] Contrary to Aafco, Walker, and Sisler, we give consideration to the plain language of the Iowa Constitution. Article I, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution provides: Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it appears to the jury that the matter charged as libelous was true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted. Iowa Const. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added). We recognize that this express concern for the abuse of free speech is not found in the United States Constitution. Several other states have interpreted similar clauses in state constitutions to justify the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in a defamation action. See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill.2d 184, 195, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975) (public interest would limit responsibility for abuse of free speech imposed by state constitution); McCall v. Courier-Journal, 623 S.W.2d 882, 886 (Ky.1981) (abuse clause in state constitution requires adoption of negligence standard to adequately protect private reputational interests), cert. denied sub nom. Courier-Journal v. McCall, 456 U.S. 975, 102 S.Ct. 2239, 72 L.Ed.2d 849 (1982); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla.1976) (Expressly in its Constitution, Oklahoma has weighed the right [of free speech] with the responsibility for an abuse of that right. That same responsibility is not expressly found in the federal constitution.) We agree with this line of cases and will not ignore the express concern for injury to reputation found in the Iowa Constitution. To summarize, we decline to adopt the Rosenbloom public interest/public concern standard as an appropriate method of determining whether a plaintiff, in seeking actual damages, must demonstrate actual malice on the part of the defendant. We reject the argument that Iowa's fair report privilege requires the adoption of the Rosenbloom standard. Further, we believe that injection of the public interest/public concern test into this particular question would create more questions than it resolves.