Opinion ID: 658201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the district court err in denying the motion for recusal?

Text: 15 Under Section 455(a) [a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 455(a) (1993). Disqualification under section 455(a) is required only when the alleged bias is personal in nature, however. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Comm., 637 F.2d 1014, 1020 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2035, 72 L.Ed.2d 483 (1982). [F]or a bias to be personal, and therefore disqualifying, it 'must stem from an extra-judicial source.'  In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958, 964 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888, 101 S.Ct. 244, 66 L.Ed.2d 114 (1980) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966)). Thus, as a general rule, a judge's rulings in the same case are not valid grounds for recusal. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31, 41 S.Ct. 230, 232, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921). 3 16 Every incident of alleged bias cited by Ray occurred during the district judge's handling of the motion for fees. As none of these grounds stem from an extra-judicial source, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Loranger's motion for recusal. 17 However, the fact that a judge's remarks or rulings occur in a judicial context does not necessarily insulate them from scrutiny. In rare cases 4 , we have required recusal when such pervasive bias and prejudice is shown by otherwise judicial conduct as would constitute bias against a party. Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1685, 48 L.Ed.2d 188 (1976). 5 Ray's complaints about the trial judge, however, are nothing more than complaints about the judge's timeliness and rulings. Neither the district judge's delay, nor his adverse rulings, constitute the sort of pervasive bias that necessitates recusal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Loranger's motion for recusal. 18