Opinion ID: 1169413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: attempted impeachment for bias of the manufacturer's witness-employee

Text: The motorist contends that she was improperly precluded from inquiring into the salary of Ford's witness-employee. She asserts that the amount of the salary the witness was receiving for his services was proper cross-examination to affect his credibility. The motorist sought to impeach the testimony of Ford's witness for the purpose of showing bias in favor of Ford or interest in the outcome of the litigation. The Oklahoma Evidence Code [Code] [1] does not expressly address impeachment for bias or interest. [2] Only a few aspects of the witness' impeachment rules are governed by that statute. [3] Because the omission leaves the common law unaltered by the Code, we must look to the former for guidance in determining whether the trial court erred in limiting the scope of attempted cross-examination into the bias or interest of the manufacturer's witness. [4] At common law a witness' credibility may be affected by showing bias, corruption and interest. [5] The law recognizes that a relationship between a party and a witness might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. The term bias signifies a witness' interest in the outcome of the case, including friendly or hostile association with one of the parties which could induce him to distort or falsify his testimony. [6] Bias can be exposed by showing the witness' relationship to the case, his financial interest in the outcome, or his association with one of the parties. For instance, potential prejudice may be demonstrated by showing that the witness is employed by a party or has an economic stake in the outcome of the litigation. [7] The impeaching party is not confined to matters elicited on direct examination. Its inquiry to test a witness' credibility may extend to matters beyond the scope of direct examination. [8] The trial court restricted the attempted cross-examination by disallowing inquiry into the amount of the witness' salary. An offer of proof discloses that his annual compensation was $100,000. Although the exact amount of the employee's salary was kept from the jury by the trial judge's ruling, there was other evidence affecting the witness' credibility: the witness (a) was a parts and service zone manager for Ford, (b) had worked for Ford for almost twenty-one years, (c) believed that Ford was a good employer, (d) had never offered testimony that Ford made a defective product and (e) conceded on cross-examination that he would like to help Ford win the instant lawsuit. While the salary paid a witness by a party may be shown to affect the witness' credibility, we believe that the trial court did not, in this case, commit a reversible error by limiting the inquiry. This is so because the motorist had been afforded ample opportunity to establish bias by reason of the other facts and circumstances elicited without any court interference. We conclude that, on the record before us, no prejudice appears to have resulted from the trial judge's objectionable restriction of the motorist's attempted inquiry. In short, the limitation improperly placed upon cross-examination was clearly harmless. [9]