Opinion ID: 2521062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Disclose Pending Criminal Charge

Text: Cardenas contends that the State's failure to disclose that one of its key witnesses (Ausencio Diaz) had been charged with possession of stolen property denied him the opportunity to impeach the witness. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. The grant or denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for abuse of that discretion. State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 294, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). A trial court abuses its discretion when the reason for its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds. Davis v. Globe Mach. Mfg. Co., 102 Wash.2d 68, 77, 684 P.2d 692 (1984). Because possession of stolen property is a crime of dishonesty affecting credibility, Cardenas argues that he could have used the information for impeachment thereby possibly changing the outcome of the trial. He correctly observed, that the prosecutor has a duty to disclose any criminal record or prior criminal convictions of state's witnesses. CrR 4.7(a)(1)(vi). The Court of Appeals found that the State's disclosure duty includes informing the defense of a pending charge against a state witness but that disclosure here would not have changed the outcome of the trial. The court found that other evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to allow the jury to question Diaz's credibility, including the fact that he was on probation and that another witness testified that Diaz sold drugs and often accepted stolen property in exchange for drugs. Evidence that a witness is on probation is not probative of his credibility. State v. Johnson, 90 Wash.App. 54, 72, 950 P.2d 981 (1998). Further, this court has specifically held that allegations regarding a witness' drug dealings are also not relevant to credibility. See In re Pers. Restraint of Benn, 134 Wash.2d 868, 913, 952 P.2d 116 (1998). Nevertheless, we agree that disclosure here would not have affected the outcome of the trial because the information could not have been used for impeachment purposes as contemplated by Cardenas. Although Cardenas relies on State v. McKinsey, 116 Wash.2d 911, 913-14, 810 P.2d 907 (1991) for authority that the existence of a pending charge is proper impeachment evidence, his reliance is misplaced. McKinsey involved a conviction rather than a pending charge. Moreover, while a conviction is probative of credibility and admissible for impeachment purposes under ER 609(a), a charge is not. Similarly, an arrest without a conviction is usually inadmissible for impeachment under ER 608. The comment to ER 608(b) notes that generally acts of misconduct not the subject of a prior conviction have not been admissible for impeachment purposes. See ER 608(b) cmt. to (b) at 168. See also 5A Karl B. Tegland, Washington Practice: Evidence Law and Practice §§ 608.6, at 362; 609.3, at 394-95 & n. 1 (4th ed.1999) (noting a mere arrest without conviction is inadmissible for impeachment). Accordingly we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.