Opinion ID: 2159212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: By His Own Conduct

Text: Defendant did not object to the jury charge nor to the verdict sheet used, but now claims that because the verdict sheet did not include a finding that defendant committed the murder by his own conduct, the sentence of death must be vacated. We find little merit in defendant's assertion that the death penalty must be vacated because there was no express jury finding that defendant committed the homicidal act by his own conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c provides that only a person convicted of murder under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) or (2) and who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or ... as an accomplice shall be death-eligible. There is no question that the only proof submitted to the jury by the State was that defendant by his own conduct committed the murder of Amie Hoffman. There was no allegation that Amie's murder involved an accomplice. Defendant's defense was based on denial and alibi. The State and the defense recognized that this case involved a single murderer. As the trial court reviewed the proposed verdict sheet with counsel, the prosecutor asked if the by his own conduct language was going to be added to the verdict sheet. The trial court insisted that to include such language would be redundant. The trial court added: There's no suggestion in this case that the jury would consider anything other than that this defendant did it or didn't he do it. Not like there's a third person helping along here; any evidence presented like that. So I don't think it's necessary to add language. Defense counsel did not object to the trial court's failure to include this language nor did he request that this language be added. Given the facts and the trial court's instructions, the jury could not have returned a guilty verdict unless it found that defendant committed the homicidal act by his own conduct. In its instructions to the jury, the court preliminarily charged the jury on presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. Noting that identification was an issue in the case, the court stressed that the burden of proof on the State extends to each and every element of each offense charged. This specifically, of course, includes the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes with which he stands charged. (Emphasis added). After these preliminary instructions, the court charged the jury on the elements to be proven by the State on each count. With respect to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2), the trial court noted that defendant was charged with the purposeful or knowing murder of Amie Hoffman, and thereafter explained the terms purposely and knowingly. In addition, the court informed the jury that the circumstances surrounding the crime could be considered in determining whether defendant acted knowingly or purposely in committing the murder. In summing up the elements of the offense, the trial court emphasized that the essential determination for you to make in regard to the charge of murder in this case is whether the defendant committed the killing purposely or knowingly as I have defined these terms for you. What the State says is that the defendant kidnapped Amie Hoffman, had forced sexual intercourse with her and stabbed her to death. In order for you to find the defendant guilty of murder, the State must first establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of Amie Hoffman was committed by the defendant, James Jerold Koedatich, and that the killing was done by him purposely or knowingly as I have defined those terms for you. If, after a consideration of all the evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of Amie Hoffman either purposely or knowingly, then your verdict should be guilty. (Emphasis added). The only fair inference to be drawn from the proof adduced at trial was that defendant alone murdered Amie Hoffman. Moreover, the jury was repeatedly instructed that it could find defendant guilty only if it found that he by his own conduct murdered Amie Hoffman. It had to find that defendant was the perpetrator of the murder in order to convict him. Accordingly, the jury's verdict, by definition, reflected a finding that defendant by his own conduct committed the homicidal act of murdering Amie Hoffman. Certainly where there is any question at all on this issue (by his own conduct), it must be submitted to the jury explicitly in the guilt phase. Here, there was no question raised in this regard. Furthermore, the court's charge, in view of the evidence and contentions of the State and defense, left no alternative to the jury but to find that either defendant killed Amie by his own conduct, or he did not kill her at all. We affirm defendant's convictions for murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault, but reverse the imposition of the death penalty and remand the matter for a new sentencing proceeding. CLIFFORD, J., dissenting. I agree with Justice Handler that under any recognized standard of review, the conclusion is inescapable that the prosecutor's egregious conduct resulted in reversible error, given the weakness of the State's case and the implications of our holding in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 324 (1987). Post at 365-370. Twenty-five years ago Justice Brennan declared for this Court: The weaker the State's case against the defendant, the more, not the less, is it the prosecuting attorney's obligation to stay within bounds, that no man be convicted unjustly. A prosecuting attorney's standing rests upon his reputation for prosecuting fairly, that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer, not upon the number of convictions he obtains. In the heat of advocacy he may with propriety employ to the full his talent for forceful expression, but he must confine himself to fair comment upon the facts in evidence. [ State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 141 (1953).] Everyone seems to recognize the outrageous nature of the prosecutor's conduct in this case. The majority concludes, however, that the error was harmless, given the prompt curative instructions of the trial court. See ante at 323 and 325-326. I would hasten to acknowledge that the trial court's efforts to corral the prosecutor, to secure this loose cannon in the courtroom, bordered on the heroic. I cannot imagine how the court could have done more in its attempt to fashion some semblance of order out of the chaos left by the prosecutor's mangling of the evidence and by his taking of liberties with the record in his summation to the jury. But here, as in the view of three members of the Court in State v. DiPaglia, 64 N.J. 288 (1974), the circumstances created by the tactics of the prosecutor did not lend themselves to remedial instruction    sufficient to avoid the potential for harm. Id. at 306 (dissenting opinion). It is worth recalling that even though the evidence for conviction may be deemed legally sufficient, a defendant is nonetheless entitled to a trial    fair and free from prejudicial error. State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 156 (1964). [T]he sound administration of justice dictates that the means as well as the ends be just; where serious trial error has undermined the proceeding, there must be reversal without regard to our own views as to guilt. This is particularly true where, as here, lives are at stake and stricter appellate approaches are warranted. [ Ibid. (citations omitted).] See also State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322-23 (reversal of a criminal conviction is warranted if prosecutorial misconduct is so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial). A word of caution. This Court took note, in State v. Spano, 64 N.J. 566 (1974), of a plethora of cases in which prosecutors have been admonished, and of the phenomenon of improper comments    fast becoming too prevalent, thereby vitiating defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 568. We there announced that [h]enceforth, an expression of displeasure may not suffice. Further and more severe action may be necessary. Id. at 569. Consistent with that salutary declaration I voted, as a majority of the Court did not, to reverse convictions on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct in State v. DiPaglia, supra, 64 N.J. at 298 (dissenting opinion); State v. Perry, 65 N.J. 45, 55 (1974) (dissenting opinion); and State v. Kenny, 68 N.J. 17, 32 (1975) (concurring opinion). Here, too, I would vote to reverse based on prosecutorial excess, as so vividly recounted by Justice Handler. I see little hope of avoiding repetition of the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial if we do no more than reiterate our warning to prosecutors in capital cases that dire consequences may flow from their violations of the special ethical rules governing prosecutors. Ante at 325. HANDLER, J., dissenting. The majority upholds James J. Koedatich's capital murder conviction despite strong evidence that the jury's determination was prejudiced by the deluge of pretrial publicity and by the prosecutor's misconduct. In so doing it not only fails to honor its previous professions that death is different, thus requiring searching appellate review, but also frustrates the settled jurisprudence of this Court safeguarding a defendant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. The majority's review of the record is perfunctory and deferential rather than searching; its conclusion that the trial judge's rulings on publicity and venue should be sustained, and that the prosecutorial misconduct does not constitute reversible error, fail to meet the standards for the review of capital prosecutions exemplified by this Court in State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. 45 (1988). The Court upholds the trial court's rulings on publicity and venue despite the unprecedented local saturation of prejudicial pre-trial publicity and despite the trial court's application of an erroneous and antiquated standard in denying a change of venue. In the same vein, the majority disregards the stricter standard for adjudging prosecutorial excesses in capital cases, acquiescing in ordinary curative instructions that fail to overcome the effect of outrageous prosecutorial misconduct. The majority fails in the process to appreciate that the prejudicial effect of the publicity and prosecutorial misconduct was exacerbated because of the rather tentative circumstantial evidence of defendant's guilt. Finally, the Court also breaks with the implications of its precedent in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987), by requiring that defendant again be subjected to the death penalty despite indisputable evidence that the jury was deadlocked on the existence of mitigating factors effectively depriving defendant of the opportunity for an acquittal of the death penalty through a non-unanimous determination, see State v. Bey (II), 112 N.J. 123 (1988), and by indicating that checks on prosecutorial discretion may not be needed. I dissent from these determinations. The case undeniably is riddled with significant errors and is fraught with prejudice to the defendant. Because I believe that defendant was denied a fair trial before an impartial jury, I would reverse defendant's conviction and sentence. Furthermore, because defendant's death sentence was coerced, I believe that he cannot, consistent with State v. Ramseur, supra , be exposed again to a death sentence on remand.