Opinion ID: 747772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lake County Case: Failure of Prosecution to Disclose

Text: Fingerprint Evidence 18 Approximately two years after his convictions for rape, robbery and intimidation in Lake County, Lieberman learned, while serving his prison term, that a police officer investigating the Lake County crime had lifted seventeen sets of fingerprints from the scene of the assault (victim's residence) and that the prosecuting attorney had failed to turn them over to him in response to a discovery order to turn over scientific tests. The state appellate court 9 found that the fingerprints were taken from areas suspected to [have been] touched by the offender, and that while three or four of the prints were identified as belonging to someone who had lived in the household, the remaining prints were determined to have come from unidentified sources. Lieberman argues that the failure to turn over this evidence constituted a violation of his right to due process as articulated in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 19 We recently had occasion to review the requirements of Brady and its progeny in United States v. Hamilton, 107 F.3d 499 (7th Cir.1997): 20 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), requires that the government provide a defendant with exculpatory evidence within the government's knowledge or control where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the prosecutor's good or bad faith.... Nondisclosure of material exculpatory evidence ... violates a defendant's due process right to a fair trial. See [United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) ]. Evidence is material to the defense if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383-84 and 473 U.S. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385; United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 818 (7th Cir.1994). A reasonable probability is that sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. The materiality standard is not met by [t]he mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial.... United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-10, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). 21 107 F.3d at 509 (emphasis added). Thus, Brady does not require a prosecutor to divulge every scintilla of evidence that might conceivably inure to a defendant's benefit. Id. (citing Smith v. Secretary of New Mexico Dept. of Corrections, 50 F.3d 801, 823 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 272, 133 L.Ed.2d 193 (1995)). 22 The petitioner claims that the state's failure to disclose the existence of the fingerprint evidence lifted from the premises and areas known or thought to have been touched by the assailant prevented him from effectively challenging the prosecution's case. Because none of the fingerprints lifted belonged to the petitioner, and only three or four belonged to members of the household with the others unidentified, the petitioner argues this would have been material evidence for the jury to consider. The district court considered and properly rejected this argument in light of Brady's materiality standard, as set forth by the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), and U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). The district judge reviewing Lieberman's habeas petition reasoned that the lack of fingerprints left by the defendant and the presence of other unidentified prints at the crime scene was not unusual, 10 and concluded that because of the other, overwhelming evidence of Lieberman's guilt, there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the fingerprint evidence been introduced. Similarly, the state appellate court concluded earlier that the fingerprint evidence would not have materially helped [Lieberman] in his defense, when considered in the context of the entire record, i.e., the overwhelming evidence of his culpability. 23 We agree with the district court and the Illinois appellate court that in light of the wealth of evidence of Lieberman's guilt, there is no reasonable probability that this evidence could possibly have made a difference in the outcome of the defendant's Lake County trial. The victim in the Lake County case testified that she observed Lieberman's face when he came to the door of the home where she was staying, and that she could clearly see the assailant before and during the assault. Furthermore, she was able to identify him on two separate occasions: in a lineup and at trial. She described the assailant as a white male, muscular build, about 6 feet tall, 25 years old, with a slight mustache, and wearing light sunglasses. The victim testified that, after raping and tying her up, the assailant asked her where her money was and began opening drawers. After his departure she discovered $180 to $200 had been stolen from her bedroom drawer. In addition to the victim's identification of Lieberman, two young male witnesses identified the petitioner as the man they saw on the date and at the time of the incident in the victim's front yard moving quickly away from the house in the direction of a parked car. Both of these witnesses gave a description of the man. One witness described this man as a white male with sandy brown hair in his late twenties. The other witness described him as a white male, approximately six feet tall, dirty blond hair, 24 years old, and of heavy build. The two witnesses also reported the type of car he entered and had the presence of mind to record the license plate number, which assisted the police in apprehending Lieberman several hours after the rape. The light sunglasses identified by the victim as being worn by her assailant were found in the vehicle, as was $135 in cash found under the floor mat. Upon questioning, the petitioner was unable to offer any explanation for the money found in the vehicle. 24 Finally, Lieberman's purported alibi testimony regarding his presence at Golf Road Firestone, a service station, at the time the sexual assault occurred was not corroborated by the employees at the gas station. In fact, these employees testified that the time reflected on the receipt was not in their handwriting, and that Lieberman's mother, Harriette, had visited the station the day after the rape to try to convince them to state that Lieberman was at the station at 3:30 p.m. on the day of the rape. Initially, Harriette urged Breckler, Sr., the owner of Golf Road Firestone, to make a written statement that petitioner was at the service station as early as 3:00 p.m. on May 5, but he refused to do so. Breckler, Sr. explained at trial that because Harriette continued to giv[e][him] a bit of a difficult time concerning the requested alteration of the worksheet and to the extent that he tr[ies] to be kind to people if [he] can, he eventually gave in to her demand and wrote on the ticket, Mr Lieberman was at station and went to Wag's Deli for coffee while car was being taken care of between 3:30 and 4:45. However, just moments earlier Breckler, Sr. had testified that he in fact [did]n't know exactly what time [the Camaro] got there [the Golf Road Firestone] on May 5, and that he first saw it [at] approximately 4:00 o'clock. 25 Although we do not approve of the state prosecutor's failure to turn over requested evidence after a proper and timely request, we agree with the district court that, in light of the overwhelming evidence of Lieberman's guilt presented during the Lake County trial, there is no reasonable probability that the trial would have turned out differently had this evidence been provided to the defense in a timely fashion. As the Supreme Court stated in Agurs, [the] mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have ... affected the outcome of the trial does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense. 427 U.S. at 109-10, 96 S.Ct. at 2400-01 (emphasis added). Because the fingerprint evidence that the prosecutor failed to relinquish was not material as that term is defined in Brady and its progeny, the withholding of this evidence (even though improper) does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id.; see also U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481. With respect to the issue of the fingerprint evidence in the Lake County case, we thus hold that the district court's denial of habeas relief was proper. 26