Opinion ID: 1250996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Opening Brief

Text: Preliminarily, it appears both necessary and appropriate that we address the form and content of appellant's opening brief. Oki was granted five extensions of time in which to file the opening brief on behalf of appellant, the last of which was embodied in an order for Oki to show cause why he failed to file the opening brief in a timely manner. Notwithstanding the five extensions, appellant's brief in almost no respect conforms to the requirements of Hawai`i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 28(b), which we have held is, alone, sufficient basis to affirm the judgment of the circuit court. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Diocese of Honolulu, 77 Hawai`i 383, 385, 885 P.2d 361, 363, reconsideration denied, 77 Hawai`i 489, 889 P.2d 66 (1994). First, HRAP 28(a) provides in pertinent part that, [e]xcept after leave granted, the clerk will not receive an opening or answering brief of more than 35 typewritten pages[.] Appellant's brief actually totals thirty-seven pages. Although the last numbered page of the brief reflects the number 35, the brief contains two pages, with different text, that are designated as page 20 and an unnumbered page after the last page numbered 35. Were it not for the creative page numbering technique, the opening brief would not have been accepted for filing. Second, HRAP Rule 28(b)(3) requires that an opening brief contain [a] concise statement of the case, containing the facts material to consideration of the questions and points presented, with record references supporting each statement of fact or mention of trial proceedings. In presenting those material facts[,] all supporting and contradictory evidence shall be presented in summary fashion and with appropriate record references. There shall be appended to the brief a copy of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, or opinion or decision, if any, unless otherwise ordered by the court. (Emphases added.) The opening brief filed by Oki on appellant's behalf does not contain a single citation to the record, nor does it include copies of the decisions from which the appeal is taken. Third, appellant's statement of points on appeal similarly fails to comport with the requirements of HRAP Rule 28(b)(4), which provides in relevant part that [e]ach point shall refer to the alleged error committed by the court or agency upon which appellant intends to rely. The point shall show where in the record the alleged error occurred and where it was objected to[.] Finally, as vexatious as the aforementioned departures from HRAP Rule 28(b) are, it is the failure to heed HRAP Rule 28(b)(7) that most warrants comment in this case. Rather than exhibiting clearly the points of fact and of law being presented, citing the authorities relied upon, HRAP Rule 28(b)(7), the argument section of appellant's brief excoriates individual family court judges personally in a scathingly contemptuous diatribe that has no place in appellate argument. Despite the existence of arguably applicable precedent, [1] the only point of law cited and argued by appellant was that the family court, by imposing sanctions, failed to give proper consideration to the Aloha Spirit, and thereby violated HRS § 5-7.5(b) (1993), which provides in pertinent part: In exercising their power on behalf of the people and in fulfillment of their responsibilities, obligations and service to the people,... judges of the appellate, circuit, and district courts may contemplate and reside with the life force and give consideration to the Aloha Spirit. The remainder of the argument section consists of lengthy quotations from the hearing transcript [2] and Oki's running sarcastic commentary, carried on in footnotes throughout the opening brief. For example, where the court commented that calling non-party witnesses without a witness list was an unfair surprise, the comment was footnoted with the remark that If this is not an example of an out-an-out [sic] abuse of power, then the author [Oki] does not what [sic] is. At this point, the only surprise that played in appellant's counsel's thought was how'd she ever become a judge! Followed by why am I putting up with this b____? ODC, baby! (Bold in original.) The judge apparently afforded Oki one last chance to provide a complete answer to her repeated questions about how many witnesses he planned to call and how long he expected to take. Again commenting in a footnote, Oki states: Discretion at this point prevents the author [Oki] to [sic] describe Appellant counsel's thoughts were [sic] at this point. But, the appellate courts being the overseer of the lower courts, if counsel saw fit at that time to provide the trial judge with the sort of complete answer demanded, could anything said in direct response to this specific question be deemed contemptuous as it seems to the author that this particular trial judge undoubtedly will again ill-advisedly format her question in similar  if not identical  fashion. And it seems ironically unfair to deprive her of an answer, a complete answer. Additional footnotes (1) refer to the proceedings as being similar to trying to take a leak at the Pali on a windy day, (2) ask [i]s this a script right out of Saturday Night Live or what, and (3) refer to a family court judge as a Rell Sunn Look-alike. This kind of incivility is demeaning to the legal profession and should not be tolerated. As we have stated, lawyers who know how to think but have not learned how to behave are a menace and a liability ... to the administration of justice.... [T]he necessity for civility is relevant to lawyers because they are ... living exemplars  and thus teachers  every day in every case and in every court; and their worst conduct will be emulated... more readily than their best. In re Matter of Hawaiian Flour Mills, Inc., 76 Hawai`i 1, 18, 868 P.2d 419, 436 (1994) (Levinson, J., concurring) (quoting former Chief Justice Burger in his address to the American Law Institute, Washington, D.C., reported in the National Observer, May 24, 1971, and reprinted in D. Schrager and E. Frost, The Quotable Lawyer 193 (1986)). [L]awyers represent their clients' interests best when they discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the preamble to the Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC)[.] Id. at 17, 868 P.2d at 435 (Levinson, J., concurring). Among the lawyer's responsibilities enumerated in the preamble is the following: A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal affairs. A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to uphold legal process. Although the preamble is worded in precatory terms, the preeminent rule of the HRPC is mandatory and states that [a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. HRPC Rule 1.1 (1995). The commentary to the rule notes that [c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. The opening brief, which was filed in this case, is an egregious example of the substitution of rancorous rhetoric for legal and factual analysis in appellate briefs. Not only does this burden the court, but, more importantly, it is adverse to the client's interests, and we view such matters with dismay. It is sound legal and factual argument, rather than vituperative sniping, that is compelling to the court. When an attorney, in briefing the court, foregoes the former to engage in the latter, the client is deprived of an opportunity to persuade the court of the merits of his or her position. The lack of professionalism and civility demonstrated in appellant's opening brief does not comport with the precepts embodied in the preamble to the HRPC, and we are compelled to refer the supreme court record in this case, as we must pursuant to the Revised Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D)(2) (1992), [3] to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for its review and appropriate action. The fact that appellant's brief flouts the requirements of HRAP Rule 28 is also grounds for dismissal. See HRAP 30 (When the brief of an appellant is otherwise not in conformity with these rules, the appeal may be dismissed[.]). However, this court has consistently adhered to the policy of affording litigants the opportunity to have their cases heard on the merits, where possible. O'Connor, 77 Hawai`i at 386, 885 P.2d at 364 (citations omitted). Notwithstanding such policy, we are, as discussed below, unable to consider the merits of appellant's contention that sanctions were erroneously imposed in this case because appellant failed to include the transcript of the applicable hearing in the record on appeal.