Opinion ID: 1536009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Motion for a Stay to Further Investigate and Challenge the Randomness of the Hunterdon County Jury Pool Selection Process

Text: On April 18, 1997, defendant challenged the Hunterdon County's jury pool selection process on the ground that it was not random, as required by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-1. He asked for a stay in the proceedings pending further investigation and hearings on the matter. In support of his motion, defendant relied solely on materials prepared by social psychologist John Lamberth, Ph.D. for a similar motion filed in the pending capital case of State v. Robert Simon. [10] Dr. Lamberth's statistical analysis of the jury pool in Simon revealed that, given the population of Hunterdon County, an extraordinary number of jurors were drawn from the same families. Lamberth offered no independent analysis of the jury pool in defendant's case. Defendant requested a stay so the defense expert could further investigate the County's compliance with statutory guidelines for jury pool selection under N.J.S.A. 2B:20-2, 20-3 and 20-4. The trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court observed that, pursuant to Rule 1:8-5, jury lists were made available to both parties on January 13, 1997, twenty days before voir dire commenced. One hundred and sixteen days had passed since that date. Moreover, defendant's motion offered no indication that defendant had attempted to view the information on Hunterdon County's jury selection procedures, as allowed by N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4(e)(2). Defendant's motion was based on a speculative certification challenging a jury in another case. Because defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case for a violation, the court concluded that relaxing the rules would indulge a fishing expedition: There's nothing before me to suggest that random selection of the jury pool based upon electronic means was insufficient, was prejudicial, was not satisfactory. The court denied the motion, ruling that defendant had failed to show good cause to excuse the delay in filing.
Capital appeals require special attention to procedural fairness. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A. 2d 641. [J]ury selection is an integral part of the fair process to which every criminal defendant is entitled. It is vital that juries be selected in a manner free from taint and suspicion. To that end the pertinent practice safeguards in the statute must be carefully observed. In capital cases, this responsibility is of the deepest concern. [ Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 230, 524 A. 2d 188 (citations omitted).] N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4d guarantees an impartial jury panel by requiring that [b]oth the drawing of names and the assignment of selected names to [jury] panels shall be public and random. Section 4e provides that [t]he Assignment Judge may provide for the random selection of jurors, and their assignment to panels, by the use of electronic devices, if ... (2) the specification of the method and any programs and procedures used to implement the method, including any computer programs which are utilized, are available for public inspection upon request. Any party can challenge the jury array on the ground that the jurors were not selected, drawn or summoned according to law. R. 1:8-3(b). In State v. Long, 204 N.J.Super. 469, 482, 499 A. 2d 264 (Law Div.1985), the court held that a defendant must challenge the petit jury within thirty days of entering an initial plea. (reading R. 1:8-3 and R. 3:10-2 in pari materia ). The court may enlarge the time period if good cause is shown. Id. at 483, 499 A. 2d 264. If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of actual prejudice to his right to a fair and impartial jury, the court can relax the time period. State v. Butler, 155 N.J.Super. 270, 271, 382 A. 2d 696 (App.Div.1978). Challenges asserting constitutional rights, however, must be shown to rest on fact. Mere conclusions are inadequate. State v. Robinson, 128 N.J.Super. 525, 530, 320 A. 2d 533 (Law Div.1974) (holding that defendant had not made out prima facie case for non-randomness in grand and petit jury selection process given that no figures or information regarding source of selection process were presented). Where a defendant has ample opportunity to investigate improper jury pooling, courts likely will reject challenges to the jury array made in an untimely manner. State v. McClain, 263 N.J.Super. 488, 496-97, 623 A. 2d 280 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477, 634 A. 2d 524 (1993); Robinson, supra, 128 N.J.Super. at 529, 320 A. 2d 533 (holding that because defense had many months to investigate jury pool selection procedures, challenge to array was properly denied). Time limitations on these challenges are strictly enforced to foster judicial efficiency. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 128, 549 A. 2d 792. Although a trial court does not abuse its discretion by granting untimely challenges to jury randomness, acceptance of such eleventh hour claims is by no means constitutionally compelled. Long, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 37, 486 A. 2d 351. Given the strict rules regarding jury pool sampling challenges, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a stay. Defendant failed to show good cause entitling him to an extension of time and he did not make a prima facie showing of prejudice. Defendant was given the panel list within the applicable twenty day period. Despite ample opportunity to challenge the array, the defense took few steps to investigate. Defendant never attempted to get information regarding the process Hunterdon County used in selecting its jury, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2B:20-4e. Although he did present the analysis that Lamberth had conducted for the Simon case, showing that many members of the jury pool had the same last name, Lamberth did not analyze the data over time. Nor did Lamberth analyze the process used in defendant's case. In short, defendant's argument was based on speculation. He simply did not make out a prima facie case for non-randomness. Cf. Long, supra, 198 N.J.Super. at 37, 486 A. 2d 351 (allowing stay while noting that it had no obligation to accept untimely challenges). Therefore, the court was within its discretion in denying defendant's application for a stay.