Opinion ID: 2320774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Inflation Adjustment

Text: [¶ 14] The hearing officer's decision was rendered prior to our decision in Bernard, 2001 ME 15, ¶ 17, 765 A.2d at 581. In Bernard, we vacated a decision of a hearing officer who had made an inflation adjustment to an employee's pre-injury wage. We held that, in cases in which a partially incapacitated employee is entitled to an inflation adjustment, the hearing officer must first compare unadjusted wages and apply the inflation factor to that result. [4] Id. Because Bernier's unadjusted pre-injury wage is lower than her post-injury work capacity, Bernier would receive no benefits after a comparison of pre- and post-injury wages if she is not entitled to an adjustment of her 1978 wage. [¶ 15] Subsequent to the Bernard decision, and while this case was pending, the Legislature enacted a new statute that alters the rule established in Bernard. The new statute provides: The annual adjustment made pursuant to former Title 39, sections 55 and 55-A must be made as follows. The preinjury average weekly wage must first be adjusted to reflect the annual inflation or deflation factors as computed by the Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission for each year from the date of injury to the date of calculation. Once this weekly benefit amount is calculated, the amount must continue to be adjusted annually so that it continues to bear the same percentage relationship to the average weekly wage in the State as computed by the Maine Unemployment Insurance Commission as it did at the time of the injury. This section clarifies the method of calculating the annual adjustment to benefits under former Title 39, sections 55 and 55-A and applies to all benefit calculations pursuant to those sections. P.L.2001, ch. 390, § 1 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 224 (effective Sept. 21, 2001)). The enacting provision to section 224 states: This Act applies retroactively to benefit calculations made under the Maine Revised Statutes, former title 39, sections 55 and 55-A at any time after January 1, 1972, and applies notwithstanding any adverse order or decree. P.L.2001, ch. 390, § 2. [¶ 16] Data General contends that section 224 cannot be applied to Bernier's case because her case was pending at the time section 224 became effective. Data General further argues that the enacting statute lacks the requisite clear and explicit language to suggest a legislative intent to apply section 224 to pending proceedings. We have held that [i]n determining whether a statute or ordinance affects proceedings pending on the date of enactment, we apply 1 M.R.S.A. § 302 (1989), and require a clear statement or implication of retroactive intent. [5] Weeks v. Allen & Coles Moving Sys., 1997 ME 205, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 320, 322; see also Loud v. Kezar Falls Woolen Co., 1999 ME 118, ¶ 11, 735 A.2d 965, 969. Legislation expressly citing section 302, or explicitly stating an intent to apply a provision to pending proceedings, is sufficient to overcome the general rule of section 302. [6] See DeMerchant v. DeMerchant, 2001 ME 66, ¶ 3 n. 2, 780 A.2d 1134, 1135 n. 2. However, we have never required an express reference to pending proceedings or a citation to section 302 to overcome the section 302 restriction against application to pending proceedings. For example, in Stickney v. City of Saco, 2001 ME 69, ¶ 30 n. 11, 770 A.2d 592, 604 n. 11, we discussed the applicability of a statute addressing conveyances of real property, enacted two years after the underlying lawsuit was commenced. The statute expressly applied to [a] conveyance or reservation of real estate, whether made before or after the effective date of this section .... Id. (quoting 33 M.R.S.A. § 772(1) (Supp.2001)) (emphasis added). Although the enacting statute did not specifically refer to pending proceedings, or cite to 1 M.R.S.A. § 302, we concluded that the statute was applicable to pending proceedings. Id. [¶ 17] The sweep of the enacting statute at issue in this case is sufficiently broad to demonstrate a legislative intent to apply section 224 to pending proceedings. [7] Our conclusion is supported by the legislative history which indicates a legislative intent to give section 224 the broadest possible application. See Comm. Amend. A to L.D. 943, No. H-616, Summary (120th Legis.2001); Legis. Rec. H-1091 to H-1094 (2001). Accordingly, on remand, section 224 is applicable to the calculation of Bernier's benefits. The entry is: Decision of the hearing officer of the Workers' Compensation Board vacated. Remanded to the Board for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.