Opinion ID: 776320
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Act is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest

Text: 28 The essence of Bookmart's equal protection claim is that the Act should be held unconstitutional because it is under-inclusive. Bookmart claims that the Act's exemption of live cabarets from these restrictions is irrational because the Tennessee legislature determined that the secondary effects of live cabarets are indistinguishable from those of adult bookstores. This being the case, the legislative goal of combating the harmful secondary effects of adult-oriented establishments cannot explain the difference in treatment between adult cabarets and adult bookstores. 29 The problem with this argument, however, is that an exemption will rarely, if ever, invalidate a statute, unless the distinction created by the exemption is the result of invidious discrimination. See Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 520 (7th Cir.1990) (The existence of an exemption will rarely if ever invalidate a statute unless the distinction created by it is invidious-say a head tax from which Christians are exempt.). 30 As the Supreme Court explained in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955): 31 The problem of legislative classification is a perennial one, admitting of no doctrinaire definition. Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. 32 Id. at 489, 75 S.Ct. 461 (internal citations omitted). 33 The Supreme Court has determined that invidiousness is present when a legislature is motivated by a discriminatory or impermissible intent when creating the challenged classification. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 276-80, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the state's hiring preference for veterans because there was no finding that the law's purpose was to intentionally discriminate against women); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (holding that the police department's written personnel test did not run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause despite its racially disproportionate impact because the requirement was not prompted by an invidious motive); cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed.2d 891 (1956) (holding that the de facto denial of appeal rights by an Illinois statute that required payment for a trial transcript denied equal protection to indigents because it invidiously discriminated among defendants based upon their wealth). 34 In Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993), the Court elaborated on the meaning of invidious discrimination by looking at the definition and the context in which it was used in Griffin. The Court cited with approval the dictionary definition of the term invidious as [t]ending to excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminating. Id. (citing Webster's Second International Dictionary 1306 (1954)) (brackets in original). In the present case, Bookmart does not even allege, much less attempt to prove, such an invidious intent on the part of the Tennessee legislature in its exemption of live cabarets from the operating-hour restrictions of the Act. 35 This leaves Bookmart with the argument that the Act's underinclusiveness constitutes content-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But as we have discussed above in determining the proper level of scrutiny, an inference of content-based discrimination is inconsistent with the uncontroverted fact that the expressive content of live cabarets is virtually identical to that of adult bookstores. DLS, 107 F.3d at 411. 36 We conclude that the history behind the Act's passage, and the virtually identical expressive content as between live adult cabarets and adult bookstores, belies the notion that the Tennessee legislature made an impermissible distinction on the basis of content or that the operating-hours exemption of the live cabarets was invidious. This court has determined that [a] state legislature may implement its program of reform by gradually adopting regulations that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 588 (6th Cir.1987). 37 The District Attorney in fact argues that the legislature decided to exclude live cabarets from the operating-hour provisions of the Act simply because of the legislative efforts the year before that were aimed at combating the secondary effects associated with public nudity. Although the Act did not go as far as it might due to its exemption of live cabarets from the operating-hour restrictions placed on the regulated businesses, this does not make the Act unconstitutional. See Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 49 S.Ct. 336, 73 L.Ed. 722 (1929) (A statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did.). Moreover, the legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976) (holding that Detroit must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems in regulating adult movie theaters, book stores, and similar establishments); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 536, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (That more or fewer activities than fall within the exceptions could with equal rationality have been excluded from the general ban does not make irrational the selection which has actually been made.) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 38 The Tennessee legislature arrived at a plausible step-by-step approach to addressing these risks. This is the kind of judgment that is committed to state and federal legislatures rather than to the courts. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (In short, the judiciary is not to sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.). Given the overwhelming precedent upholding legislative step-by-step reform efforts and the lack of any invidious discrimination in exempting live cabarets from the Act's operating-hour provisions, we hold that the Act bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose, and therefore does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 39 Bookmart's final argument is that the entire Act must be declared unconstitutional if any part is held invalid. It claims that because the Act lacks a severability clause, the provisions regarding viewing-booth configurations must also be struck down. Given our conclusion that the Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, however, we need not address Bookmart's argument concerning whether the provisions of the Act are severable.