Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Introduction of DNA Evidence In Violation of Oklahoma's Discovery Code

Text: Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 2002 provides that, upon request from defense counsel, the state shall disclose, at least ten days prior to the start of trial, the names and addresses of witnesses which the state intends to call at trial with their statements or summaries thereof, along with results of scientific tests or experiments and tangible objects which the prosecution intends to use at trial. Mr. Wilson contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights when it admitted evidence, specifically, the PCR DNA results, in violation of the Oklahoma discovery code, because the district attorney did not inform him ten days in advance of the presence of the DNA evidence. Because federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990), we construe Mr. Wilson's claim to allege that the late notice deprived him of his ability to provide a proper defense. Though not entirely clear, he also seems to argue that the admission of the DNA evidence in contravention of the Oklahoma Discovery Code violated a specific, protected liberty interest created by state law. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). The OCCA rejected this claim, finding that the defendant had been given the notice required under the discovery code. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 461. The district court affirmed, Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at  17-18, and we agree. First, Mr. Wilson has not shown that the Oklahoma Discovery Code creates a protected liberty interest, compare with Vitek, 445 U.S. at 488, 100 S.Ct. 1254, and even if it did, we agree with the OCCA's assessment that proper notice was given. On July 16, 1996, defense counsel filed a motion for discovery requesting all physical evidence. On January 24, 1997, ten days prior to trial, the District Attorney informed counsel that the entire file was available for him at the office. Defense counsel, however, failed to pick up the file until Monday, January 27, 1997. Defense counsel was unaware of the fact that the DNA evidence existed only because of his own negligence, and we therefore find no violation of the prosecution's obligations under the Code. Second, while [a] defendant's right to notice of the charges against which he must defend is well established, there is no clearly established constitutional right to non-exculpatory discovery. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167-68, 116 S.Ct. 2074, 135 L.Ed.2d 457 (1996). So long as Mr. Wilson had a meaningful opportunity to deny or explain, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), there is no clearly established due process violation. Gray, 518 U.S. at 169-70, 116 S.Ct. 2074. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 thus prohibits us from finding error here. Mr. Wilson knew about the DNA evidence before trial and heard about it in open court during the trial, and so he was free to contest it; additionally, he has shown no evidence of prejudice for example, that defense counsel tried to hire an expert but was unable to do so because of the short notice. Because Mr. Wilson has failed to show that the admission was so prejudicial that it fatally infected the trial, we must deny this claim. Fox, 200 F.3d at 1296.