Opinion ID: 1003283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Tax Evasion Conviction

Text: Frank and Linda next argue that admission of Frank’s prior tax conviction had a prejudicial spill-over effect against Linda that allowed the jury to improperly infer her guilt simply by her relationship with Appellant Frank. (Appellant’s Br. at 27.) We conclude that admission of Frank’s prior conviction for tax evasion is not a basis for reversal. First, defense counsel originally introduced this evidence, initially in an attempt to demonstrate that the IRS fraudulently obtained Frank’s signature on the tax settlement, and then during the cross-examination of Timothy Ayers, a business partner of Frank and Linda’s: And you remember having a conversation with Frank . . . where he told you, many years ago even though he was innocent, that he was found guilty of a tax offense? (J.A. at 816.) Second, the district court gave a specific limiting instruction to the jury on this evidence, instructing that Frank’s prior conviction could be considered only in determining whether [Frank] owed a tax debt as alleged in the indictment and not for any purpose, whatsoever, in deciding the government’s case against [Linda]. (J.A. at 864-65.) Jurors, of course, are presumed to follow such cautionary instructions. See United States v. Love, 134 F.3d 595, 603 (4th Cir. 1998). The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Frank’s prior conviction.9 9 Frank and Linda’s argument could be construed as an argument in favor of severance. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 provides that the court may . . . grant a severance of defendants if it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of . . . defendants . . . for trial together. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. However, [b]arring special circumstances, individuals indicted together should be tried together. United States v. Brugman, 655 F.2d 540, 542 (4th Cir. 1981). UNITED STATES v. MASIARCZYK 15