Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Restriction on Defense Guilt Phase Argument

Text: Addressing the jury on the subject of Zelma Cureton's testimony, defense counsel argued that its significance was on the question of reasonable doubt. The following exchange then occurred: MS. LANGE [defense counsel]: . . . You're going to hear a long description of reasonable doubt, but basically it's defined as that  THE COURT: I will give the instruction on reasonable doubt. MS. LANGE: Okay. I was going to read the last sentence. THE COURT: You read the whole thing or not read it at all. MS. LANGE: Okay. The Judge will instruct you on what reasonable doubt, what reasonable doubt is, excuse me. Counsel then argued Cureton's testimony raised a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt. Defendant contends the court abused its discretion and deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, by restricting counsel's argument in this manner. We disagree. Counsel was precluded neither from previewing the reasonable doubt instruction nor from arguing the evidence did not prove guilt by that standard. The court barred counsel only from giving an incomplete version of the instruction, including only that part favorable to the defense and omitting that part favorable to the People. [11] Such a limitation was well within the court's discretionary control over argument (§ 1044; Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593) and did not preclude counsel from fairly arguing the case against conviction.