Opinion ID: 894693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Too Many Statutes

Text: Second, there is no evidence to support an injunction against every statutory aspect of the Texas school-finance system. The Court finds only one constitutional violationthat the tax-rate ceiling in subsection 45.003(d) of the Education Code violates Article VIII. As already noted, there is no evidence showing this is the case in every school district in Texas. But even if there were, that would justify nothing beyond declaring this one subsection unconstitutional. When we declared a single provision of the Water Code an unconstitutional delegation to landowners, we did not enjoin all water quality regulations in Texas. [102] When we found a single provision of the Tax Code unconstitutional, we did not enjoin all taxes; to the contrary, we reformed the lower court's injunction to make it narrower. [103] When we found an absolute two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims unconstitutional as applied to minors, we did not enjoin the entire statute but merely tolled limitations for minors. [104] In each of these cases, we narrowly limited our orders to the legislation we found unconstitutional. By the same standard, if the Legislature imposed a property tax on the nine Texas counties whose names begin with J, surely we would declare only that statute unconstitutional; we would not stop all state funding in those counties, much less in the other 245. But today the Court does precisely that, finding one subsection unconstitutional as applied to nine focus districts, and then affirming an injunction against the entire Texas school-finance system. This injunction includes most of Chapters 41 and 42 of the Texas Education Codea collection of almost 100 different statutes. This is far too broad. The Court acknowledges that the single violation here could be corrected by limiting relief to that single statute. [105] But it imposes far more sweeping relief, on the ground that we must leave such matters to the discretion of the Legislature. [106] In other words, rather than enjoining a single statute in a handful of districts, the Court enjoins scores of statutes across the entire Statein deference to the Legislature. Reasonable people may question whether this is very much deference. It is true that we have enjoined the entire school-finance system before, but never for grounds as limited as those here. [107] In Edgewood I and II, there was a fundamental flaw in the system, not in any particular provisions but in its overall failure to restructure the system. [108] By holding that Article VII required the entire system to draw revenue from all property at a substantially similar rate, [109] our ruling could not be narrowly limited to a small part. Similarly, because the statute we held unconstitutional in Edgewood III mandated a state property tax in every Texas county, the injunction we issued had to cover every county too. [110] Nor could we limit relief to the portion of the system held unconstitutional, as there would have been little financing left over for schools without it. [111] By comparison, nothing about the Article VIII claim here inevitably extends to the whole school-finance system. Surely a single violation of Article VIII anywhere cannot justify an injunction shutting down school finances everywhere. The Court says the current system cannot survive without the tax-rate cap, because for districts that need additional revenue, the funding system would be inefficient. [112] But the Court cannot have it both waysif school districts need more funding, then current funding cannot be adequate for a general diffusion of knowledge; conversely, if the current funding is adequate (as the Court explicitly holds), then the cap only affects supplemental spending. As the Texas Constitution does not guarantee equal supplemental spending, [113] the cap is hardly central to a constitutional system. [114] Of course, it is no mystery why the plaintiff school districts never asked for narrower relief. If only section 45.003(d) were declared unconstitutional, they would once again have meaningful discretion to set tax rates as they wish, and could raise them to pay for all the programs they say their communities demand. But they also might find out at the next election that their beliefs about community demand were somewhat exaggerated. Instead, by enjoining school-finance across the state, the school districts here hope to obtain funding from sources other than those within their own borders. Raising revenues from outside sources is unlikely to make school districts more accountable or more efficient. Neither equity nor the Texas Constitution allows school districts to demand supplemental programs on condition that someone else pay for them.       The Court closes by reminding the Legislature how important education is to the future of this State and its people. This seems an odd way to conclude an opinion that rejects every claim except that the Legislature has imposed a statewide ad valorem tax. If our goal is to improve education, we should not enjoin the entire school-finance system on collateral grounds to pressure the Legislature to change it. But we should demand efficiency, as that is what the Texas Constitution requires. Recognizing the common meaning of efficient would not require us to abandon our previous school-finance cases, or the equity for Texas schools they require. But we cannot keep overlooking the one standard the Texas Constitution explicitly demands. Nor do we help Texas school children by insisting efficient means nothing beyond equal access to taxes. Someday, the Texas school system must become efficient by 21st century standards. As that is what the Texas Constitution requires, we should start that process today.