Opinion ID: 901347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intent and Conduct of the Parties

Text: [¶ 26.] Behrens argue that because the Initial Agreement states that it was drafted in `contemplation' of a future transaction between the parties, it was only intended to be a springboard or starting point for a completed transaction. They further argue that the subsequent negotiations were strong evidence that the initial agreement was not a final and complete contract. Behrens specifically assert that the buyer changed, the terms changed, the contract, note and mortgage came to fruition, and the cross default provisions were added. [¶ 27.] Although changes did occur, we observe that the Initial Agreement was very detailed and specific, and it did include a clear offer and acceptance of terms necessary to form a contract. [5] Although the Initial Agreement did contemplate a more formal purchase agreement with necessary closing documents, it explicitly stated that it was an offer for the purchase of Behrens Mortuary. Moreover, Jon's and Don's signatures indicated that the OFFER [was] ACCEPTED AND AGREED. We also note that Behrens' current claim that they did not consent or intend to be bound by the Initial Agreement is inconsistent with Don's admission at trial that by signing the Agreement he agreed to its contents. [¶ 28.] Therefore, there was evidence suggesting that the Initial Agreement was intended to be a binding contract, with only additional closing documents contemplated. Although there was also other evidence suggesting that the Initial Agreement may not have been intended to be the final binding agreement, that dispute of fact made the existence and terms of a contract a question for the jury. Morrisette, 486 NW2d at 427 (citation omitted). Ultimately, [w]hether a contract is formed is judged objectively by the conduct of the parties, not by their subjective intent. Geraets v. Halter, 1999 SD 11, ¶17, 588 NW2d 231, 234 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the requisites of a binding contract and on Behrens' factual theory that [e]nsuing negotiations between the parties may be evidence of an absence of intent that an initial agreement constitutes a final and complete contract. Although the jury did not adopt Behrens' theory, considering the conflicting evidence concerning the parties conduct and intent, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to grant summary judgment on this issue.