Opinion ID: 864487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the lower court, in ruling on

Text: EVIDENTIARY MATTERS, COMMITTED ERROR, AND THE EASTERN ANNEXATION AREA OBJECTORS DID NOT RECEIVE A FULL HEARING ON ALL ISSUES. ¶51. The Eastern Objectors assert that the court erred in not allowing the attorney who represented the Eastern Objectors to cross-examine western annexation witnesses and that the denial deprived the Eastern Objectors of due process. The Eastern Objectors contend that the right to cross-examine a witness in a civil trial cannot be denied. The Eastern Objectors further contend that the eastern and western areas were represented by two separate counsel, that the areas were not contiguous, that the interest of each side was different and that they put on different proof. In addition, the Eastern Objectors complain that a witness is open for any and all questions relevant to the issue being tried. 18 ¶52. Petal argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the Eastern Objectors to cross-examine the Western Objectors’ witnesses about issues concerning the western annexation area. Petal argues that the trial court has inherent power to limit cross-examination to relevant matters and advances that the examinations were simply limited to question concerning the area the witness spoke on behalf of, either east or west. Petal maintains that the Eastern Objectors were given an opportunity to fully crossexamine Petal's witnesses. Petal argues that the Eastern Objectors failed to preserve this argument on appeal by making an offer of proof. Petal advances that the Eastern Objectors put on no proof that they were prejudiced. ¶53. Whether evidence is relevant and/or admissible is left to the discretion of the chancellor, and reversal occurs only where that discretion has been abused. Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So.2d 359, 369 (Miss. 1992). Moreover, M.R.E. 611 gives the court discretion to direct the mode and order of interrogation of a witness. It states in pertinent part: (a) Control by Court. The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. (b) Scope of Cross-Examination. Cross-examination shall not be limited to the subject matter of direct examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness. 19 M.R.E. 611. The scope of cross-examination though ordinarily broad, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court possesses inherent power to limit crossexamination to relevant matters. Heflin v. State, 643 So.2d 512, 518 (Miss.1994). ¶54. During the direct examination of Steven Lavell Floyd by Jolly W. Matthews, attorney for the Eastern Objectors, the following exchange transpired: Q. Now you, as a developer, and as a professional real estate man, is that how you want to present your city to the world; that unsightly mess? BY MR. TYNER: And to which we object, if the Court please. We’re talking about developing, we’re not talking about Richton Tie and Timber. BY MR. MATTHEWS: Judge, he’s on cross. I didn’t bring him here. BY MR. TYNER: He’s not on your cross. He’s on my cross. BY THE COURT: All right, you’ve got two (2) annexation areas. You’ve got the east and the west. You represent the east. And you represent the west. Mr. Tyner represents the petition of the city. We can’t get around the Court’s ruling on what witnesses are, can testify to by using cross examination between the two objectors. Do you understand what I mean? In other words, Mr. Rogers cannot use this witness to talk about things, because he did not provide the city with that information on Discovery. You, Mr. Matthews can’t get around that limitation by saying, “Now I’m on cross, and I can ask him about anything.” So, I’m going to sustain the objection. Do you understand the Court’s ruling? BY MR. MATTHEWS: Then my cross examination is limited to what Mr. Rogers talked about? BY THE COURT: I’m considering you and Mr. Rogers as co-counsel, so to speak. BY MR. MATTHEWS: Judge, we do not have - - 20 BY MR. MATTHEWS: Well, my response is, Judge, I didn’t align the parties. The City of Petal brought this matter and aligned - - the parties were aligned by the way they brought it. But Mr. Rogers and I do have diverse interests in this matter, and in some instances totally different proof. BY THE COURT: Well, I understand you’re representing different areas in this annexation endeavor. BY MR. MATTHEWS: Yes sir. BY THE COURT: But you are both in opposition to the city’s annexation lawsuit. So, I don’t see that - I’m going to consider your testimony more in line of a direct testimony than cross examination, direct questioning rather than cross. And therefore, I’m not going to allow you the freedom that a pure cross examination is entitled to, which is unlimited. Your examination will be limited. ¶55. We find that the chancellor properly exercised his discretion in limiting the Eastern Objector’s cross-examination of the Western Objectors’ witnesses because they were not in opposition. The Eastern Objectors directs this Court’s attention to Jones v. Babst, 323 So.2d 757 (Miss. 1975), (overruled on other grounds by Toliver v. Gen. Motors Corp., 482 So.2d 513 (Miss. 1985), in support of their argument. However, we agree with Petal that this case is not relevant here. It holds that when the interests of defendants are different, the defendants can have separate peremptory challenges and each has the right to cross-examine each of the plaintiff’s witnesses. See Jones, 323 So.2d at 760. The Eastern Objectors were not limited in their cross-examination of the witnesses, only the co-defendant, the Western Objectors. Therefore, we find that while it may be true that the two areas have diverse interests, essentially they both contended that their areas should not be annexed to Petal. For the reasons stated above, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion. 21