Opinion ID: 1531299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the limitation of the cross-examination of the witness doris pontery

Text: The defendant assigns error in the trial judge's limitation of the cross-examination of the State's witness, Doris Pontery. Doris was one of two eyewitnesses who testified for the State. Her testimony was pertinent and impressive, and the defendant had the right to seek to minimize its importance by attacking the witness' credibility. Her hostility toward her mother and any special interests she may have had in testifying against her were fair grounds of inquiry. The defense endeavored to show that Doris was hostile toward her mother, and additionally, she had a special interest in testifying against her. To show her antagonism, defense counsel asked her whether she had not, shortly after her mother and father separated, gone to her mother's safety deposit box and withdrawn her mother's jewelry without her mother's permission. On objection, the trial court excluded this testimony. During the discussion of the court's ruling in this respect, counsel announced he also intended to ask Doris whether she was, except for a legacy to William, her brother, the sole beneficiary under her father's will and whether she knew that if her mother was convicted, her mother would forfeit her interest in all real estate owned by her father. The prosecution did not object to this line of cross-examination but the court refused, on its own volition, to allow any such questions to be asked. In the trial court's opinion, as expressed, it would do nothing but prejudice the jury. He said he did not feel it was proper to permit this sort of examination of this particular witness on the theory that she is lying or in order to feather her own nest financially   . On the following day, the court, discussing the ruling on the question, announced any such line of inquiry might tend to degrade the witness and refused to permit counsel to proceed along this line. We think the court erred in this respect and that the ruling was prejudicial, requiring a reversal of the judgment rendered. In our jurisdiction, no witness has the privilege against giving testimony simply because it might degrade him. In In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 454 (1949), we said:    the answer appears to be clear that no such privilege exists. Additionally, as a general rule, any fact which bears against the credibility of a witness is relevant to the issue being tried, and the party against whom the witness is called has a right to have that fact laid before the jury in order to aid them in determining what credit should be given to the person testifying. State v. Black, 97 N.J.L. 361 ( Sup. Ct. 1922). And it is proper for either the defense or the prosecution to show the interest of a witness as bearing upon the witness' credibility. State v. DiDolce, 109 N.J.L. 233 ( E. & A. 1932). Were it otherwise, the value of cross-examination in the search for truth which goes on in our courts every day would be severely curtailed and in some respects perhaps extinguished altogether. This does not mean, however, that the cross-examiner has a license to roam at will under the guise of impeaching the witness. By the great weight of authority here, e.g., Fielder v. Friedman, 124 N.J.L. 514 ( E. & A. 1940); State v. Todaro, 131 N.J.L. 59 ( Sup. Ct. 1943); and elsewhere, Kelly v. Meyer, 156 Kan. 429, 134 P. 2 d 658 ( Sup. Ct. 1943); Heathcock v. Wolfe, 136 S.W. 2 d 105 ( Mo. App. 1940); McCauley v. Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co., 167 Ore. 80, 115 P. 2 d 307 ( Sup. Ct. 1941); Blue v. State, 224 Ind. 394, 67 N.E. 2 d 377, 380 ( Sup. Ct. 1946); 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3 rd ed. 1940), §§ 943 et seq., the trial judge has broad discretion to determine the proper limits of cross-examination of a witness whose credibility is put in issue. The fact that the daughter had gone to the mother's safety deposit box to remove her jewelry without the mother's permission and the mother's subsequent demand for its return was admissible as having some relevancy demonstrating the daughter's animosity to her mother. In Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55 (1952), we held that the mother would forfeit an estate by the entirety. Such being the law, Doris certainly stood to gain from her mother's conviction of the crime of murder and it was a proper field of inquiry on cross-examination to determine the daughter's knowledge of the financial benefit she might acquire if her mother were convicted of the crime for which she was being tried. Her knowledge and awareness of it would have a material bearing upon the witness' interest. Although the court had no knowledge of it at the time of its ruling, the subsequent admission by the witness that she had committed perjury at the trial and her recantation of certain testimony which she had given indicates the cross-examination was being pursued in fertile fields and was directly related to the witness' possible motives for falsification.