Opinion ID: 1276694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Basis for Allowing Discovery of Appraisal Reports for Other Properties Is Legally Unsound

Text: The majority opinion takes the position that appraisal reports on properties surrounding Fort Pleasant's property, which were prepared by experts expected to testify in the case, may be discoverable in appropriate circumstances and if necessary upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. [15] The majority opinion reached this erroneous conclusion without any analysis of our rules pertaining to discovery of information from a testifying expert. As I will demonstrate, until the decision in this case, the so called appropriate circumstances and the doctrine of exceptional circumstances had no application to materials sought from a testifying expert. 1. Appropriate circumstances. To begin, Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure sets out the guidelines for discovering information from trial experts. Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) a party may use interrogatories to learn information regarding trial expert witnesses, and under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) a party may depose a trial expert witness. For the purposes of my dissent, only Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) is relevant. With respect to discovering information from a trial expert through interrogatories, Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) provides the following: A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) is plain and clear. Nowhere in the rule does it require a party to turn over documents his/her trial expert prepared in another proceeding. In fact, under the rule a party is not obligated to turn over the actual report that his/her expert prepared in the case in which he/she is going to testify. The majority opinion has attempted to get around the clear requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) by omitting any discussion of the rule in the context in which it applies. To add insult to injury, the majority opinion adopts the federal position on this issue in footnote 6, [16] even though the majority opinion states that it is declining to do so. [17] The majority opinion provides that discovery of reports and evaluations prepared by designated witnesses relative to other properties may be discoverable information in appropriate circumstances. The opinion fails to expressly state what those appropriate circumstances are. Instead, the opinion drops a footnote and references to a federal rule that addresses disclosure of information from an expert. Under federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B) a party calling an expert must turn over the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions[.] [18] It is this provision of the federal rule that the majority opinion has relied upon to establish its heretofore unheard of appropriate circumstances. However, under a plain application of our Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), the reports are simply not discoverable. To be clear, the majority opinion resorted to evasive language to expand Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) to incorporate the provisions contained in federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B). The manner in which the majority opinion chose to modify Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) is insulting to the integrity of this Court. There was simply no need for the majority opinion to deny that it was changing our rule. The fact that the rule was modified is plainly demonstrated by the outcome reached by the opinion. 2. Exceptional circumstances. Under the majority opinion, once appropriate circumstances have been shown to permit disclosure, there must be a further determination of exceptional circumstances before the reports are actually turned over. In other words, under the majority opinion if the appraisal reports were prepared by the trial experts as non-trial experts in the other proceedings, then exceptional circumstances must be shown to obtain the reports. This is absurd. [19] The doctrine of exceptional circumstances is utilized in Rule 26(b)(4)(B) with respect to information sought from non-trial experts. Under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) experts consulted in anticipation of litigation, but who are not expected to be called as a witness at trial, are subject to a more restrictive discovery standard. For experts not expected to testify, the rule is that discovery can only take place (1) as provided in Rule 35(b), or (2) upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means. Franklin D. Cleckley, Robin J. Davis, Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Litigation Handbook, § 26(b)(4)(B), p. 740-741. (2d ed.2006). The majority opinion has unfortunately merged the exceptional circumstances doctrine of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) with Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i). To make matters worse, the majority opinion has performed this unwise union between Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and the exceptional circumstance doctrine by creating an unacceptable basis for establishing exceptional circumstances. This is to say that, assuming there was a rational justification for the union of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) and the exceptional circumstances doctrine, the basis for establishing exceptional circumstances set out in the majority opinion is inconsistent with the doctrine of exceptional circumstances. In a commentary explaining the operation of the exceptional circumstances in its proper context, the following has been said: The party seeking discovery from non-testifying retained experts faces a heavy burden. It has been said that since a litigant will not know what facts the opposing party's non-testifying experts have discovered and what opinions they have formed, it will rarely be possible to make the required showing of exceptional circumstances. Cleckley, et al., Litigation Handbook, § 26(b)(4)(B), p. 741. Further, it has been said that: The heavy burden of establishing exceptional circumstances contemplates a showing that a party has found opinions by others on the subject to be unavailable before he/she may obtain discovery from his/her opponent's retained expert who is not expected to be called to testify on the same subject. Cleckley, et al., Litigation Handbook, § 26(b)(4)(B), p. 741 n. 223. Establishing exceptional circumstances under the majority opinion will not be a heavy burden, nor will it be rare. This is because under the majority opinion the exceptional circumstances doctrine may be established merely by showing that the document sought was relied upon by the witness in formulating the witness's opinion[.] This basis for disclosure was taken by the majority opinion from the federal rule that governs disclosure of trial expert information. As I have already pointed out, under federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B) a party calling an expert must turn over the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opinions[.] Under the federal rules this is not an exceptional circumstance-only under the majority opinion has this turned into an exceptional circumstance. Moreover, under the majority opinion this is also the basis for establishing the so called appropriate circumstances. [20] In the final analysis, the majority opinion has done a grave disservice to the bench and bar by reaching a legally unsupportable result through the distortion of our carefully crafted rules that govern disclosure of information from trial and non-trial experts.