Opinion ID: 76397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of Plain Error

Text: 11 Our first inquiry is whether there was error that was plain. Monroe claims that the district court committed plain error because it did not explicitly inform him of his right against compelled self-incrimination. 12 At the time of Monroe's guilty plea, Rule 11(c)(1)-(4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provided that, before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must address the defendant personally in open court and must inform him of the following matters and rights: 13 (1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law, including the effect of any special parole or supervised release term, the fact that the court is required to consider any applicable sentencing guidelines but may depart from those guidelines under some circumstances, and, when applicable, that the court may also order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense; and 14 (2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent the defendant; and 15 (3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right against compelled self-incrimination ; and 16 (4) that if a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere the defendant waives the right to a trial.... 17 Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)-(4) (2001) (emphasis added). 4 These rules are neither precatory nor aspirational; they are mandatory and the district court is obliged to tell the defendants in words or in substance the matters contained in Rule 11(c)(1)-(4). 18 The record shows that the district court expressly referenced each item in Rule 11(c)(1)-(4) except for the right against compelled self-incrimination in Rule 11(c)(3). Monroe argues that the court's failure to state expressly that he had the right against compelled self-incrimination constitutes a clear Rule 11 violation and thus plain error. 19 In reply, the government emphasizes that the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 explain that [t]he rule takes the position that the defendant's right not to incriminate himself is best explained in terms of his right to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea if it has already been made. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee's note. In other words, the Advisory Committee Notes counsel that telling the defendant that he can continue to plead not guilty is, in effect, also telling him that he is not required to admit guilt or to incriminate himself by admitting guilt. Further, the United States Supreme Court has admonished, In the absence of a clear legislative mandate, the Advisory Committee Notes provide a reliable source of insight into the meaning of a rule, especially when, as here, the rule [Rule 11] was enacted precisely as the Advisory Committee proposed. Vonn, 535 U.S. at 64 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. at 1049 n. 6 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 165-66 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 439, 448 n. 9, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988)). In addition, this Court has stated that Rule 11 does not say that a court's only means of compliance is to read the specified items in haec verba.  United States v. Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945, 950 (11th Cir.2000). Instead, in Rule 11 proceedings, matters of substance, not form, are controlling. See United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1513-14 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Bell, 776 F.2d 965, 971 (11th Cir.1985). 5 20 Turning to the Rule 11 colloquy with Monroe, the district court informed Monroe, I want you to know you don't have to plead guilty. You may continue in your plea of not guilty and go to trial. Thus, the government argues that the district court's colloquy conforms to the Advisory Committee Notes' suggestion regarding the manner in which to inform the defendant of his right not to incriminate himself. In light of the Advisory Committee Notes, the government asserts that the district court's colloquy suffices to advise Monroe of his right against compelled self-incrimination. As a result, the government contends that the district court's failure to use the precise words of right against compelled self-incrimination did not constitute error, much less plain error. 21 We agree with the government that the record does show that the district court advised Monroe in great detail about his rights and that he would waive them by entering a guilty plea to the drug charge. Further, the Advisory Committee Notes do provide, as the government argues, that the defendant's right not to incriminate himself is best explained in terms of his right to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee's note. In a similar vein, the district court did advise Monroe that he did not have to plead guilty and that he may maintain his not guilty plea and proceed to trial. Thus, in light of the thorough nature of the overall colloquy, the Advisory Committee Notes, and our own precedent that does not require in haec verba recitation, it is arguable that there was no Rule 11 error in this case and that in any event, any error was not plain. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1777 (describing plain as synonymous with clear or obvious); United States v. Bejarano, 249 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir.2001) (stating that [p]lain error is clear or obvious) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, we need not and do not decide either of these two questions because it is absolutely clear in this record that Monroe failed to carry his burden of establishing that any alleged error affected or prejudiced his substantial rights or that any alleged error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.