Opinion ID: 43553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the debt

Text: Rogers contends that the bankruptcy court and district court erred in determining that the debt was in the nature of support because those courts did not employ the factors set out in Dennis v. Dennis (In re Dennis), 25 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1994). Rogers’s argument fails for two reasons. First, the debt in Dennis involved the payment of a portion of the ex-husband’s pension in support of the ex-wife; support of a child was not in question. Second, this circuit and the majority of other circuits have plainly held that debts like the one at issue are in the nature of support of the child. At the time of Rogers’s bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) provided: A discharge under . . . this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that . . . such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support . . . .2 There is no question that the debt arose “in connection with a . . . divorce decree” and that the chancellor’s order was a “determination made in accordance with State . . . law.” Accordingly, to determine whether the debt is exempt from discharge under § 523(a)(5), the essential question is whether the “liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.” This court’s precedent dictates that the liability is in the nature of support of Erin, and, as such, the debt is exempt 2 Rogers initiated bankruptcy proceedings in November 1999. Section 523(a)(5) has since been amended by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-8, § 215(1)(A), 119 Stat. 23, 54 (2005). -4- from discharge. This circuit has been clear on the nature of the debt involved: “A court ordered obligation to pay attorney fees charged by an attorney that represents a child’s parent in child support litigation against the debtor is non-dischargeable.” Hudson v. Raggio & Raggio, Inc. (In re Hudson), 107 F.3d 355, 357 (5th Cir. 1997). The same holds true as to debts incurred in the adjudication of custody disputes. See Dvorak v. Carlson (In re Dvorak), 986 F.2d 940, 941 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that under § 523(a)(5) attorney’s fees and court costs from a custody hearing were not dischargeable because the “court hearing . . . was for [the child]’s benefit and support”). See also Sonntag v. Prax (In re Sonntag), 115 F. App’x 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Sonntag II”) (per curiam) (“Attorney fees awarded in connection with a child custody dispute are for the benefit of the parties’ children, as the purpose of such a proceeding is to determine who can provide the best home and environment for the children at issue.”), aff’g No. 4:04-CV-145-A, 2004 WL 764728 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2004) (“Sonntag I”). Regarding the nature of the debt involved, the Hudson court reasoned that “[b]ecause the ultimate purpose of such a proceeding is to provide support for the child, the attorney fees incurred inure to her benefit and support, and therefore fall under the exception to dischargeability set out in § 523(a)(5).” 107 F.3d at 357. The majority of other circuits agree that “custody actions are directed towards determining which party can provide the best home for the child and are, therefore, held for the child’s benefit and support.” Lowther v. Lowther (In re Lowther), 266 B.R. 753, 757 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (“The majority of circuit courts addressing this issue have reached similar conclusions.”) (collecting cases), aff’d, 321 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2002). The nature of the debt in question here is no different. -5- The attorney’s fees and court costs that make up the debt arose as a direct result of the adjudication of Rogers’s allegations of sexual abuse by Morin. The abuse hearing formed a part of the overall custody determination. The resolution of the abuse allegations and determination of whether Morin should be permitted reasonable rights of visitation plainly were for Erin’s benefit and well-being: the chancellor made custody and visitation determinations based on Erin’s needs after determining that Morin had not abused her. As such, under this court’s precedent, the liability incurred from the proceedings is a debt that is in the nature of support for Erin. In light of Hudson and Dvorak, the bankruptcy court and the district court did not err in holding that the debt was in the nature of support.