Opinion ID: 2165153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: steven and outten

Text: Both Outten and Steven argue that their defenses, as developed at trial, were antagonistic and mandated severance. The Superior Court ruled, however, that the defenses were not. Severance is a matter within the sound discretion of the Trial Court, with the defendant [having] the burden of demonstrating `substantial injustice' and unfair prejudice, to prove necessity of severance. Lampkins v. State, Del.Supr., 465 A.2d 785, 794 (1983). Both Outten and Steven rely on this Court's decision in Bradley v. State, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1234 (1989), to prove necessity. In Bradley the Court held that the antagonistic defenses presented there mandated separate trials. This Court based its decision on the incompatible nature of each codefendant's case: In this case each defendant presented an alibi defense. Their two defenses as they unfolded in this case were so antagonistic that the jury could not accept one defendant's defense without rejecting a central part of the other defendant's defense. Moreover, throughout the trial, the jury was witness to repeated attempts by each defendant to incriminate the other. A fair trial is not possible under these circumstances, and a severance should have been granted. Id. at 1241. The Court, however, limited the application of Bradley: Antagonistic defenses between codefendants is a fact to be considered when determining whether a severance should be granted. However, it is clear that the presence of hostility between a defendant and his codefendant or mere inconsistencies in defenses or trial strategies do not require a severance. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Annotation, Antagonistic Defenses as Ground for Separate Trials of Codefendants in Criminal Case, 82 A.L.R.3d § 2, at 250 (1978)). In Bradley the defendants took the stand, presented contradicting and mutually exclusive alibis, and introduced evidence that strongly implicated one another. Id. There was no such antagonism in the instant case. Neither Outten nor Steven took the stand, nor presented evidence that implicated the other, except for Steven's offer of the Borsello testimony late in the trial. [6] The defendants' defenses were not mutually exclusive, and the jury easily could have found one defendant, both or neither defendant guilty. Neither defendant has met his burden of demonstrating substantial injustice and unfair prejudice requisite for showing the necessity of separate trials. Thus the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to sever.
During jury selection, Rodney Merriweather (Merriweather), an African-American venire member, responded to the State's questions concerning his views on the death penalty by stating that: [F]rom everything that I've read over the years, the death penalty is not applied fairly in a lot of circumstances and, that is, applies to race. It seems that either the judicial system or the jurors seem to unfairly apply the death penalty for some of the crimes. Merriweather also informed the State that three of his family members had been murdered over the past ten years, and, in his opinion, justice had not been served in these cases. Based on Merriweather's responses, the State moved to strike Merriweather for cause; neither Outten nor Steven expressed any view. The trial judge denied the motion, noting that such a challenge would violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) ([A] defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury panel solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges ...). The State then attempted to use a peremptory challenge to dismiss Merriweather. The Superior Court resisted the State's challenge, again citing Batson. At this point Outten's counsel stated, We oppose any action by the Court not allowing the State to use their strike. Despite the trial judge's opinion that the peremptory challenge constituted a Batson violation, he nonetheless excused Merriweather and later stated that, by agreeing to the peremptory strike of Merriweather, all parties waived any Batson claims. Defendants argue that the existence of a Batson violation mandates the declaration of a mistrial, and, in the alternative, that the State's peremptory challenge violated Del. Const. art. I § 7. The race of a potential juror cannot be the basis for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The Equal Protection Clause prohibits race-based exclusion of jurors and guarantees the right of both the defendant, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), and the prosecutor, Georgia v. McCollum, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), to object to purposeful racial discrimination in the use of a peremptory challenge. Regardless of the objector's race, the constitution requires that the exercise of peremptory challenges be race-neutral. For a defendant to prove a Batson violation, he or she must establish a prima facie case by showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to disqualify persons from the petit jury solely on the basis of race. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-09, 111 S.Ct. at 1368-70. One such way a defendant may do this is by showing that he and the prospective juror are of the same racial group. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Neither Outten nor Steven has met this burden. Both are Caucasian while Merriweather is African-American. Even Outten's counsel notes the ineffectiveness of this argument: In the case at bar, Outten was Caucasian and the jurors removed by prosecution were black. Therefore, it is probable that any argument grounded in the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution violation would not be successful. Another possible way for the defendant to establish a prima facie case is by showing that the prosecution exhibited a systematic pattern of excluding prospective jurors of a certain racial group. Neither defendant has shown that the State exhibited such conduct. Although seven peremptory strikes had been used prior to the strike of Merriweather, Merriweather was the first African-American venire member struck by the State. Indeed, though in one instance the State found one minority juror acceptable, the defendants used one of their peremptory strikes to remove the prospective juror. Additionally, despite its Batson concerns, the trial court found that there has been no pattern of use by the State of its peremptory charges  or challenges in connection with exclusion of black jurors. There is nothing here in this case to indicate that. The defendants have not established a prima facie case of a Batson violation. Although the Superior Court incorrectly stated that the State's exclusion of Merriweather from the jury violated Batson, this error was harmless. The trial court ultimately upheld the State's peremptory challenge and permitted the State to strike Merriweather from the jury. The defendants' Delaware State Constitution argument is equally without merit. Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (1985), held that the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely on the basis of race violates a criminal defendant's right under Del. Const Art. I, § 7 to a trial by an impartial jury. In a later case, however, the Court noted that the procedures outlined in Riley are consistent with those outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Batson. Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1089 (1993). Since neither Outten nor Shelton can support a claim under Batson, they likewise cannot support a claim under Robertson.