Opinion ID: 453326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Instruct Jury on Theories of the Defense

Text: 70 Reservitz requested the court to instruct the jury on two theories of defense. The procuring agent theory and the outrageous government conduct theory. The court's refusal to do so was correct. 71 The refusal to instruct the jury on the procuring agent theory was already dealt with, so we will only consider the refusal to instruct on the outrageous government conduct theory. 72 Reservitz argues that the outrageous government conduct theory should have been submitted to the jury. United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075, 98 S.Ct. 1264, 55 L.Ed.2d 780 (1978), held that it was the court's province to decide whether defendant's theory of defense was such that, if believed, it would fall into the exceptional category where fundamental fairness requires the dismissal of an indictment because of outrageous police conduct. We ruled that [w]hatever its possible role in resolving contested factual issues raised by an entrapment defense, the jury is not equipped and should not be permitted to speculate on whether particular facts do or do not amount to fundamental fairness. We hold that the court properly rejected the proposed instruction. Id., at 181-182. The court below properly denied appellant's request that the jury be instructed as to the outrageous government conduct theory. 5. Hearn's Assignment of Errors A. Severance 73 We now consider Hearn's assignment of errors. First, Hearn alleges that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance. One of the reasons given by Hearn for requesting the severance was because his defense was antagonistic to Baker's entrapment defense. This contention is without merit since Hearn does not even state which defense is antagonistic to Baker's entrapment defense. 74 Hearn further contends that he was prejudiced by the admissibility of evidence of Baker's prior drug dealings. Appellant Hearn makes reference to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence 8 which governs the admissibility of evidence pertaining to other crimes committed by a defendant. Other crimes evidence is relevant to the issue of intent. United States v. Rivera Sola, 713 F.2d 866 (1st Cir.1983). The district court admitted the evidence of Baker's prior drug dealings so that the government could disprove Baker's defense of entrapment. The evidence was not presented to show knowledge or intent to commit the offenses in question for Baker's knowledge or intent was not a contested issue in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Franceso, supra; United States v. Rivera Sola, supra. 75 There was no error in the trial court's allowing Baker's prior drug dealings to be admitted into evidence against Baker alone, nor was there any error in not severing Hearn's trial because of the spill over prejudicial effect of that evidence in his case. See, United States v. Hernandez, 715 F.2d 548, 551 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1006, 79 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); United States v. Hines, 717 F.2d 1481, 1489 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2656, 81 L.Ed.2d 363 (1984); United States v. Payden, 536 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923, 97 S.Ct. 323, 50 L.Ed.2d 291 (1976). The jurors were properly instructed to consider said evidence only against Baker and for the specific purpose for which it was presented. 76 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Sustain the Conviction of Hearn 77 Hearn next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Appellant Hearn alleges that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite intent to agree and to commit the substantive offense charged. 78 In reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must consider the evidence as a whole taken in the light most favorable to the government, together with all legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. George, 752 F.2d 749, 752 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 738, 74 L.Ed.2d 960 (1983); United States v. Pappas, 611 F.2d 399 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Leach, 427 F.2d 1107, 1111 (1st Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829, 91 S.Ct. 95, 27 L.Ed.2d 59 (1970). 79 The essential element in a conspiracy count is the existence of an agreement. United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110, 103 S.Ct. 738, 74 L.Ed.2d 960 (1983), which can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902 (1st Cir.1983). Hearn argues that there is no evidence that he in any way participated in the conspiracy and that the government's evidence does not show any further involvement in the conspiracy than his mere association with persons involved in criminal activities; his mere presence at the scene of the crime; and a mere single sale of drugs which, if true, fails to establish his participation in the conspiracy. 80 Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a different story emerges. On February 23, 1983, Agent Pavlick met with co-defendant Baker in Boston and arranged for a sample exchange of marijuana. After the exchange with the DEA agents co-defendants Porter and Baker met with co-defendant Reservitz. Reservitz entered a restaurant carrying a brown plastic bag bearing the name Louis. Reservitz left the restaurant without the bag, and a short time later Hearn left carrying the Louis bag. Agent Pavlick testified that that same evening Baker told him that samples were given out. 9 It is appropriate to infer that Hearn, as a representative of a group which was to purchase the marijuana, met with Reservitz to obtain one of the samples given out or being given out. On February 24, 1983, Baker told Pavlick that everything was all set. Next day Pavlick met with Baker and Reservitz and arranged for the transfer of the down payment to the DEA agents and of the marijuana to the defendants. To view the money, upon instructions of Reservitz, Pavlick got into a car with Willis and Hearn. He sat behind Hearn and Hearn proceeded to search him. They drove to a parking lot, where he was shown the money which was inside the trunk of a Cadillac. In light of those actions, Hearn's innocent story of being a bodyguard or babysitter to the money is inherently unbelievable. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, supra. We conclude that the evidence of Hearn's activity was basis enough from which a reasonable person could find that Hearn had the requisite intent to agree to the conspiracy as charged. The court properly denied Hearn's motion for acquittal. C. Bruton 81 Hearn also assigns as error the court's denial of the motion for severance on grounds that the admission into evidence by the trial court of a statement made by co-defendant Porter 10 to Agent Fencer violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). 82 It is well established that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Bruton against the use of a non-testifying defendant's extrajudicial statements inculpating a co-defendant in a joint trial is not applicable to a situation in which the extrajudicial statement makes no reference to the co-defendant. United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 287, 62 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); United States v. Cleveland, 590 F.2d 24, 28-30 (1st Cir.1978); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1218 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206, 103 S.Ct. 1194, 75 L.Ed.2d 439 (1983); United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1048, 1054, n. 6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Hoskins v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 565, 83 L.Ed.2d 506 (1984); United States v. Guilette, 547 F.2d 743 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 839, 98 S.Ct. 132, 54 L.Ed.2d 102 (1977); United States v. Stewart, 579 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 332, 58 L.Ed.2d 332 (1978). 83 An examination of the record reveals that Porter's extrajudicial statement did not inculpate Hearn. The statement made no mention of Hearn nor even suggested Hearn's participation in the marijuana deal. The motion for severance grounded on Bruton was properly denied. 84 D. Prejudicial Variance and Improper Spillover 85 Appellant Hearn argues that prejudicial variance occurred when the government allegedly offered evidence as to conspiracies that were not contained in the indictment. 86 Appellant claims that the evidence of co-defendant Walter Baker's previous drug dealings and of the pattern of Baker's dealings with the undercover agents and the informant Gonzalez constituted evidence of multiple conspiracies. However, the evidence about Baker's previous drug dealings was not introduced to show other conspiracies as such. Rather, it was presented to disprove Baker's defense of entrapment. The government was permitted to introduce evidence of Baker's drug dealings and of the two-month history of his negotiations with undercover agents and the DEA informant leading to the actual transaction to show that Baker was predisposed to commit the crime and that the government agents did not induce him to do so. Thus, this did not constitute a prejudicial variance. Cf., United States v. Scanlon, 640 F.2d 144 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941, 101 S.Ct. 2025, 68 L.Ed.2d 330 (1981). 87 Furthermore, there was no impermissible spillover of evidence in this case. The government did not and could not link Hearn to other conspiracies beyond that charged in the indictment because, as we stated before, Baker's previous drug dealings were not introduced to show other conspiracies. Cf., United States v. George, supra. In fact, one conspiracy was charged and one was proven. Moreover, the trial court adequately instructed the jury at the time the evidence was admitted that they were to consider it as to Baker only. United States v. Moosey, 735 F.2d 633, 635 (1st Cir.1984).