Opinion ID: 1985567
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualifications.

Text: Like all expert testimony, the admissibility of DNA evidence must satisfy our accepted standards for admission of expert testimony. Yet, we have traditionally adhered to a liberal rule when reviewing claims concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. Mensink v. Am. Grain, 564 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Iowa 1997); State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1994); Cook v. State, 476 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 1991). As a general rule, we permit expert testimony if it consists of specialized knowledge that will aid the jury in understanding the evidence or in deciding a material issue. Iowa R. Evid. 702; Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Iowa 1993); Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 32. We have previously found expert testimony explaining DNA evidence to be quite helpful to the trier of fact. See Williams, 574 N.W.2d at 297-98; Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 31-33. Additionally, the witness through whom the testimony will be offered must be sufficiently qualified as an expert in that particular field. Iowa R. Evid. 702. We afford the trial court wide latitude in its rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony, and reverse only if the court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced. Buller, 517 N.W.2d at 713; Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 32. Any special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education can qualify a witness as an expert. Iowa R. Evid. 702. However, no precise rule governs how a witness may acquire the requisite qualifications. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 525, at 329 (1996). The witness need not be considered a specialist in the particular field as long as the testimony is within the general area of expertise. Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510, 519 (Iowa 1992); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 1986). Furthermore, the witness need not possess a particular license, certification, or educational degree. See 7 Iowa Practice § 702.3, at 520; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 524, at 327, § 525, at 329-30. On the contrary, witnesses may acquire expert knowledge through practical experience and training, as well as through formal education. DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 138; see Buller, 517 N.W.2d at 714. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Harman's testimony regarding the DNA analysis she performed for this case. Although Harman did not obtain a special license or graduate degree, she received a bachelor's of science degree from the University of Missouri and took graduate courses focusing on DNA and statistical analysis from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy. Moreover, Harman received ongoing training in the field of serology, studying blood and body fluids, while employed as a forensic scientist by the St. Louis County Police Department for thirteen years. In addition, Harman attended numerous intensive seminars at a variety of institutions throughout the country involving DNA typing. Harman had been testing DNA samples for five years before she and her husband formed their own DNA testing laboratory in 1998. The evidence also reveals that Harman used a 310 genetic analyzer manufactured by Perkin-Elmer and received extensive training from the manufacturer on the use of the analyzer. Furthermore, Harman has engaged in proficiency testing five times a year by the American College of Pathologists. She has never failed any of the tests. Considering Harman's education, training, and experience, we conclude she was sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert witness in this case. See Buller, 517 N.W.2d at 714 (years of experience and training with dog qualified dog handler as expert witness regarding dog's reactions); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 497 N.W.2d at 827-28 (extensive experience sufficient). Additionally, we do not believe the State was required to show Harman's laboratory was certified in order to independently establish she was competent to apply and use the DNA technology. The standards for admission of expert testimony relate to the ability of the analytical method to produce accurate results when properly applied. See Shea, 957 F.Supp. at 340-41. They do not necessarily relate to the skill of the particular individual using the analytical method. Id. at 340. The ability of an expert to perform the accepted method typically affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Id. at 341.