Opinion ID: 560347
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effectiveness of traditional remedies

Text: 73 This factor is frequently dispositive. The normal cure for an unfair election is a fair election, and the Board wields an array of remedies to enhance its likelihood. The Board may order the employer, for example, to cease and desist his unfair practices, to post a notice or read one aloud, and to reinstate and reimburse unlawfully discharged employees. See St. Agnes, 871 F.2d at 147; Conair, 721 F.2d at 1385-87. A bargaining order is appropriate only where the unfair practices have so intimidated employees that an election, even with the full complement of traditional NLRB remedies, would not reflect their true sentiments. 74 Three factors preclude enforcement of the bargaining order here. First, our conclusions above have extinguished at least one of the hallmark violations supporting the order, the Hamby termination. Second, the ALJ and the Board failed to consider turnover in the bargaining unit. Third, the ALJ and the Board failed to explain why they concluded that a bargaining order is essential, an explanation that our precedents emphatically mandate. See, e.g., Amazing Stores, 887 F.2d at 330-31; Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45-46. 75
76 The ALJ spoke of Avecor's hallmark violations, which he defined as [p]articularly pervasive unfair labor practices which are deemed highly coercive and are likely to have a longer lasting and inhibitive [e]ffect on a substantial percentage of the work force. ALJ Decision at 48. He emphasized the firings of Tidwell and Hamby, which he characterized as an unlawful discharge of roughly 6 percent of the unit that was likely to have a substantial and lasting impact on employee free choice, id., and Ingram's statement to Hamby that the company might close its doors if the union won. He also noted that many of the violations were especially coercive because they were committed by high management officials. 77 We have concluded that the Hamby firing was not unlawful, and we have suggested that Ingram's isolated remark to Hamby was less heinous than the ALJ painted it. Consequently, a significant question is presented whether the remaining unfair labor practices in this case are serious enough, or pervasive enough, to have the tendency to undermine majority strength and prevent the holding of a fair rerun election. Pedro's, Inc. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1005, 1011 (D.C.Cir.1981). The Board must, therefore, consider whether the remaining violations justify a bargaining order. 78
79 A bargaining order is appropriate where the employer has so polluted the electoral process that the wishes of the employees will be better reflected by an old card majority than by a new election. Substantial changes in the workplace, however, may render that finding untenable. Where many of the intimidated employees have moved on, and where the company is under order not to resume its unlawful ways, a fair election may well be possible. A bargaining order in those circumstances may unjustly bind new employees to the preferences of departed ones. Where a remedial order has the primary effect of negating the rights of current employees rather than furthering them, it defeats, rather than effectuates, the policies of the N.L.R.A. Ship Shape Maintenance, 474 F.2d at 443 (footnote omitted); see also Creative Food Design, 852 F.2d at 1302-03. 80 According to the company, the bargaining unit had changed considerably as a result of growth and turnover. The company submitted evidence indicating that as of May 27, 1988, only about half of the workers in the bargaining unit had been in its employ at the time of the election. The ALJ refused to consider this evidence. He explained: The Board, as distinguished from the position of some of its members, has not included turnover as a factor in determining the appropriateness of [a] bargaining order remedy. ALJ Decision at 48 n. 28. The Board adopted this conclusion without comment. 81 The circuit courts have reached divergent conclusions as to whether post-election events, including turnover, should be taken into consideration in determining the need for a bargaining order. See Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45 n. 18, 47-48; Note, After All, Tomorrow Is Another Day: Should Subsequent Events Affect the Validity of Bargaining Orders?, 31 Stan.L.Rev. 505, 512-21 (1979) (citing cases). Indeed, our own cases have not been wholly consistent. Compare Creative Food Design, 852 F.2d at 1302 (Board must always consider turnover before issuing a Gissel bargaining order), Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1012 (Board must always consider conditions that exist at time it enters bargaining order), and Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45-46 n. 18 (same), with St. Francis, 729 F.2d at 856 (though precedents require Board to con sider specific significant events, court has never ... imposed a blanket requirement on the Board that it consider subsequent events before issuing a bargaining order). 82 In our most recent examination of this issue, in which we discussed Gissel orders generally, we concluded that the Board must consider turnover unless it finds that the employer's practices are particularly flagrant: 83 [D]etermination of whether a Gissel order is necessary rests on consideration of both the nature and pervasiveness of the employer's misconduct as well as the amount of turnover. Where the Board finds that a practice is particularly pervasive or enduring, it need make only minimal findings that the effects have not been dissipated by subsequent employee turnover. Conversely, where the practices at issue are not especially pervasive or permanent in nature, the Board needs to make more careful determinations respecting the effect of subsequent employee turnover. 84 Amazing Stores, 887 F.2d at 331. We then added, however, that 85 [w]here the Board finds that employer misconduct is pervasive and likely to persist despite turnover, these conditions alone are sufficient to satisfy the turnover inquiry. 86 Id. 87 In Amazing Stores, we were dealing with a category I case. We spoke of the extreme, pervasive, and entrenched character of the [employer's] misconduct, id., and, borrowing the Supreme Court's characterization of category I in Gissel, we described its anti-union activities as outrageous and pervasive. Id. at 329; cf. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. In the instant case, however, we are dealing with a category II situation, which the ALJ defined as a less extraordinary case[ ] marked by less pervasive unfair labor practices which nonetheless have a tendency to undermine majority strength. ALJ Decision at 47. Based on this distinction, and in the interest of clarifying this area of our case law, we hold that before issuing a category II bargaining order, the Board must carefully consider employee turnover. 88 Thus, if on remand the Board continues to believe, in the light of our findings, that a bargaining order may still be indicated, it must take account of the turnover. Moreover, it must examine the turnover that has occurred up to the time it would issue the new order. As we explained in Pedro's: 89 In considering whether a bargaining order may issue, ... we emphasize that the Board must ... consider the conditions in the bargaining unit at the time it renders its decision on remand. As stated by this court in Peoples Gas, [w]e think it clear that no responsible decision-making body can formulate a reasonable remedy without taking into account conditions at the time its order is entered. 90 Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1012 (quoting Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45 n. 18) (citations omitted). The question the Board will have to determine is whether the company's actions in the spring of 1987 left so lasting an imprint that a fair rerun election cannot be assured; or whether, to the contrary, changes in the Company's work force have made a bargaining order now inappropriate, even if one might have been appropriate at some earlier time. NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 681 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir.1982) (per curiam). 91
92 In Peoples Gas, we refused to enforce a bargaining order for want of a reasoned justification. We explained: 93 Before the Board is entitled to the considerable respect and deference with which we normally approach any review of its choice of remedy, its orders must reflect a responsible exercise of discretion and clearly articulate the basis for its decision. A remedial order should recognize the competing considerations which are potentially affected by the remedy chosen, be grounded in factual determinations rather than speculation, and explain how, in light of present circumstances[,] its remedy can be expected to effectuate the purposes of the Act. 94 Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 45 (footnote omitted). We went on to hold that 95 before we will enforce a bargaining order, we must be able to determine from the Board's opinion (1) that it gave due consideration to the employees' section 7 rights, which are, after all, one of the fundamental purposes of the Act, (2) why it concluded that other purposes must override the rights of the employees to choose their bargaining representatives and (3) why other remedies, less destructive to employees' rights, are not adequate. 96 Id. at 46; see also Amazing Stores, 887 F.2d at 330-31 (applying same factors). 97 Here, the ALJ briefly discussed the first two factors. He acknowledged in passing that a secret ballot election is the preferred measure of employee choice; and with respect to the other purposes that he believed should override the Avecor employees' section 7 rights, he detailed the company's violations and their potential impact on the employees' freedom of choice. He made no mention, however, of turnover; in fact, he refused to accept evidence on the subject. 98 As to the inadequacy of traditional remedies, the ALJ wrote: 99 Considering the total circumstances of this case and all those factors noted above regarding the small size of the unit, the unlawful discharge of two employees, the likely impact of all the unlawful conduct on unit employees, and the fact that much of the unlawful conduct was committed by high Respondent officials, I find that it is improbable that the use of traditional remedies here would be sufficient to ensure a fair rerun election. 100 ALJ Decision at 50. This is a promising topic sentence; unfortunately, no elaboration follows. The ALJ never explained why the cloud created by these violations was likely to linger. He pointed to no evidence, for example, that the managers would resume their anti-union practices. See Amazing Stores, 887 F.2d at 331. He never explored the possibility that other remedies might cleanse the environment enough to permit a fair election. Instead he offered only conclusory statements that a fair rerun election cannot be held. St. Agnes, 871 F.2d at 148. We require a more comprehensive accounting. 101 The need for a real demonstration of the inadequacy of alternative remedies is particularly acute, of course, in a case such as the present one, where the Board relies on a weakly supported inference for its belief that the unfair practices undermined the election that immediately followed them. If the basis for thinking that the unfair labor practices affected that election is weak, a claim that they would fatally contaminate a new election months or years later is even weaker. 102 Our insistence on a full explanation is not the caprice of one crotchety circuit. As we pointed out in St. Agnes, id. at 148-49, other courts are equally adamant that a bargaining order must be accompanied by something meatier than because I say so. See, e.g., M.P.C. Plating, Inc. v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 883, 888-89 (6th Cir.1990) (remanding with instructions not to issue bargaining order where Board failed to provide requisite analysis); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (7th Cir.1990) (remanding where Board failed to explain why traditional remedies would be inadequate); NLRB v. American Spring Bed Mfg. Co., 670 F.2d 1236, 1247-49 (1st Cir.1982) (remanding with instructions to hold election where Board failed to explain why fair election was unlikely); see also NLRB v. Pace Oldsmobile, Inc., 739 F.2d 108, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984) (vacating bargaining order without remand where Board provided only conclusory analysis); NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 841-42 (4th Cir.1982) (same); NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 766-70 (5th Cir.1974) (same); T. Kheel, Labor Law Sec. 15.05, at 15.41 n. 14 (1989) (citing additional cases). 103 The courts have imposed these requirements because of the Board's evident partiality for bargaining orders. See NLRB v. J. Coty Messenger Serv., 763 F.2d 92, 101 (2d Cir.1985). We emphasize once again that a bargaining order is not a snake-oil cure for whatever ails the workplace; it is an extreme remedy, St. Agnes, 871 F.2d at 147, that must be applied with commensurate care. By requiring specific findings, the courts try to keep the Board from overprescribing.