Opinion ID: 184149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eluding Police in the Second Degree

Text: In Harris, this Court considered whether the second degree felony of willfully fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer under Florida law, a crime which required that the defendant drive at high speed or demonstrate[] a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, constituted a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. 586 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a)). Using the three-step inquiry listed above to analyze the crime as it is ordinarily committed, the Court determined that the Florida offense was a crime of violence because it was clear from the face of the statute that it was similar in kind and degree of risk to the enumerated crimes. Id. at 1288. The Court reasoned that [f]leeing from the police at high speed or with `a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property' does indeed `show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.' Id. (quoting Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a) and Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 146, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1587, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008)). The Court determined that the act of fleeing the police was undeniably purposeful, as willfulness is an explicit element of the statute. Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the offense was violent and aggressive because, [i]n the `ordinary case,' roadways are populated by other travelers whom the offender and the officer will have to avoid hitting in the course of a high speed chase. Id. (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586, 1597, 167 L.Ed.2d 532 (2007)). Thus, fleeing the police at high speed is like holding a weapon out, ready to fire, or [l]ike an arsonist lighting a fire without regard for harm the fire may cause. Id. at 1288-89. In reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished second degree eluding from third degree eluding, a crime which the Court found not to be a violent felony in United States v. Harrison, 558 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.2009). Id. at 1287. In Harrison. the Court concluded that the Florida crime of third degree eluding, as ordinarily committed, did not constitute a violent felony because it did not require either high speed or a wanton disregard for safety, and therefore did not entail the same high level of risk as the enumerated crimes. 558 F.3d at 1294. Harris is instructive due to the similarities between the Florida and New Jersey crimes of second degree eluding. [2] Here, the parties agree that Lee was convicted under Section 2C:29-2b of the New Jersey Statutes, which reads: Any person, while operating a motor vehicle on any street or highway in this State ... who knowingly flees or attempts to elude any police or law enforcement officer after having received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle ... to a full stop commits a crime of the third degree; except that, a person is guilty of a crime of the second degree if the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b. We begin by reading the face of the statute itself to discern the crime as it is ordinarily committed. Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288. This statute contains elements that are very similar to the Florida second degree eluding statute: (1) a law enforcement officer signals a motorist to stop; (2) the motorist knowingly flees or attempts to elude the officer; and (3) the flight or attempt to elude creates a risk of death or injury to any person. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b. We next rely on our own common-sense analysis of whether this [crime] poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir.2010). Like the Florida eluding statute, it is clear from the face of the New Jersey statute that this crime presents a serious potential risk of physical injury that is similar in degree to the risks posed by the enumerated crimes. This is because, like the Florida statute's requirement that the flight be committed with a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, this statute contains the essential element that the flight creates a risk of death or injury to any person. Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(3)(a); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b. Furthermore, the New Jersey crime of second degree eluding must be committed knowingly after the motorist receives a signal from law enforcement, and therefore, it involves a purposeful act. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b; see Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288 (noting that, because willfulness is an expressed element of the Florida statute, this suggests that the driver has seen the siren and lights of the police car, recognized that the officer wanted him to stop, and deliberately disobeyed the order in a dangerous fashion). The New Jersey offense is also necessarily violent and aggressive because it requires that the motorist flee law enforcement in such a way that the flight creates a risk of death or injury to any person. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:29-2b; see Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288 (reasoning that [t]he offender who eludes a police officer at [high] speeds ... necessarily poses a powerful risk to the arresting officer, pedestrians, and other drivers and passengers in their own cars). We reject Lee's contention that, because second degree eluding under New Jersey law criminalizes flight that creates a risk of injury to any person, including the defendant himself, it is a strict liability offense that cannot qualify as a crime of violence. Cf. United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir.2010) (acknowledging the holding of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 143, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), that strict liability crimes are not `roughly similar' to burglary, arson, extortion, or an offense involving the use of explosives and therefore do not come within the residual clause). We are required to analyze how the crime is ordinarily committed. Harris, 586 F.3d at 1288. In the `ordinary case,' roadways are populated by other travelers whom the offender and the officer will have to avoid hitting in the course of a high speed chase. Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, the motorist who knowingly flees from law enforcement in such a way that the flight creates a risk of death or injury to any person poses a risk not only to himself, but to other drivers, passengers, pedestrians, and law enforcement officers. In analyzing the New Jersey crime of second degree eluding as it is ordinarily committed, we reach the same conclusion that we reached in Harris: that knowingly fleeing law enforcement, when that flight creates a risk of death or injury to any person, is categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). As we stated in Harris, [f]leeing at high speed or with wanton disregard for safety amounts to holding a finger on the trigger of a deadly weapon, without care for whom the bullet may strike. 586 F.3d at 1289.