Opinion ID: 2067926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Queen's Deposition.

Text: Petitioner urges that the Circuit Court committed reversible error in permitting Respondents to read into the record excerpts from Ms. Queen's deposition testimony as substantive evidence in the defense's case. As noted earlier, there is a gap in the transcribed record of this case at a point pertinent to this issue. The parties, however, stipulate that Petitioner objected and that Respondents proffered that Ms. Queen was a party for purposes of Rule 2-419(a)(2), thus allowing them to use her deposition for any purpose. The parties also stipulate that Petitioner argued that Ms. Queen ceased to be a party when her individual claims were disposed of in Respondents' favor at the close of her and Petitioner's case-in-chief, but that Petitioner's objection was overruled. Before considering the directives of Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2), we reiterate that, when interpreting the Maryland Rules, we ordinarily employ the rules of statutory construction. Hurst v. State, 400 Md. 397, 417, 929 A.2d 157, 168 (2007). A cardinal principle in that regard states that if the language of a rule is clear and unambiguous, it will be applied thusly in a common-sense manner. Id. Maryland Rule 2-419 provides, in pertinent part: Deposition-Use. (a) When may be used. .... (2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, managing agent, or a person designated under Rule 2-412(d) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership, association, or governmental agency which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. Petitioner maintains that Rule 2-419(a)(2) does not provide Respondents with an evidentiary basis for using Ms. Queen's deposition as substantive evidence in their defense case because, so she asserts, Ms. Queen ceased to be a party, as required by the rule, when her individual claims were disposed of in Respondents' favor before the defense's case commenced. Respondents have two responses. Initially, they posit that determination of a deponent's status as a party for purposes of Rule 2-419(a)(2) reckons back to the time that her or his deposition was taken, not the time of the deposition's use as evidence. Thus, according to them, because Ms. Queen was a party in her own right at the time of her deposition, they were entitled to use that deposition for any purpose at trial. Alternatively, Respondents assert that, even when they offered Ms. Queen's deposition as evidence in their defense case, Ms. Queen was a party due to her continuing status as Petitioner's next friend. We shall discuss each of Respondents' contentions in turn. This Court has not had an opportunity previously to consider whether Rule 2-419(a)(2) permits a litigant to use for any purpose the deposition of a person who was a party in the same case at the time of the deposition, but ceased to be a party by the time the deposition was offered into evidence [17] ; however, the wording of the Rule, which we presume to be deliberate, directs our answer. Rule 2-419(a)(2) covers two types of depositions: (1) those of natural persons who are parties, and (2) those of representatives of institutions that are parties. With respect to both, the Rule speaks in the present tense, allowing that either may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. With respect to the depositions of representatives of institutions, however, the Rule explicitly recognizes that a deponent's capacity as a representative of the institutional party may change between the taking of the deposition and the trial, without affecting the right of the institution's opponent to use the deposition against the institution for any purpose. Rule 2-419(a)(2) makes no similar provision for allowing a litigant to use for any purpose the deposition of a former party (either as a natural person or as an institution testifying through a representative) whose status as a party changed between the deposition and the time that the litigant attempts to use the deposition at trial. Therefore, for an adverse party to use a party deponent's deposition for any purpose under Rule 2-419(a)(2), the deponent (or the institution that the deponent represented) must be a party when the deposition is offered into evidence. In this regard, we agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of Colorado, which interpreted that state's equivalent to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2) and, likewise, concluded that the time that a deposition (or a part thereof) is offered into evidence constitutes the relevant point for determining the status of the deponent (or the institution speaking through the deponent) for purposes of the rule's applicability: This conclusion is supported by the language of the rule. The rule, in essence, states that the deposition of a party who is a natural person, or a person who was at the time of the deposition testifying as an agent or representative of an entity which is a party, may be used by an adverse party for any purpose. The rule speaks in the present tense as to both circumstances, but recognizes the status of a deponent as to an entity may change between the deposition and trial. Rojhani v. Meagher, 22 P.3d 554, 560 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (italics in original). [18] Our conclusion is echoed by other states' intermediate appellate courts as well. See Skok v. City of Glendale, 3 Ariz.App. 254, 413 P.2d 585, 588 (1966) (We therefore hold that as to the deposition of a party as distinguished from an `officer, director, or managing agent of a ... corporation, partnership, or association which is a party[,]' its admissibility and use by any adverse party `for any purpose' is to be determined by the facts which appear at the time the deposition is offered in evidence and not necessarily as they existed at the time the deposition was taken. (citation omitted)) [19] ; Vivion v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 200 Cal.App.2d 597, 19 Cal.Rptr. 602, 608 (1962) (With respect to the witness ..., the action having been dismissed against her, she was no longer a party to the record Under these circumstances, she does not come within the categories mentioned in the Code of Civil Procedure, ... [which] permits the depositions of persons who come within the categories enumerated to be used by an adverse party for any purpose.); State Univ. Constr. Fund v. Kipphut & Neuman Co., 159 A.D.2d 1003, 552 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (1990) (The language of the statute refers to two points in time. With respect to the deponent's status as an officer, director, agent or employee of a party, it refers to the time of taking of the deposition. With respect, however, to the `use' of the deposition by `any adversely interested party', the language refers back to `at the trial'.). [20] Respondents rely on Iheme v. Simmons, 148 Misc.2d 223, 560 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y.Civ.Ct.1990), for the counter-proposition that a person's status as a party, for purposes of a rule detailing the use of a deposition for any purpose, is determined by looking backward in time to the deponent's status at the time the deposition was given. Respondents point out that Iheme was decided under a rule substantially similar to Rule 2-419(a)(2), before New York changed its rule on the use of depositions to permit expressly the use for any purpose of a deposition of a former party. [21] We are not persuaded by Iheme's conclusion. It is inconsistent with the plain language of Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2), which speaks in the present tense. Additionally, Iheme is a trial court decision and is against the weight of other well-reasoned, persuasive authority, including other cases decided by New York courts. See State Univ. Constr. Fund, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 473; Nedball v. Tellefsen, 102 Misc.2d 589, 424 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.1980). Respondents retort that, even at the time they offered into evidence Ms. Queen's deposition testimony, Ms. Queen was a party for purposes of Rule 2-419(a)(2), regardless of the resolution of her individual claims. This is so, Respondents urge, because Ms. Queen, at all times, was acting also as Petitioner's next friend, rendering her, for all intents and purposes, a party. Petitioner, however, contends that under Maryland law, a next friend is not a party. A next friend, or prochein ami, is one who brings suit on behalf of a minor or disabled person because the minor or disabled person lacks capacity to sue in his or her own right, or ... one who defends a suit against a minor or disabled person lacking the capacity to defend. Fox v. Wills, 390 Md. 620, 625-26, 890 A.2d 726, 729 (2006). [22] We have stated that a next friend `stands very much in the relation of an attorney to the case, and [] it is supposed that he is appointed by the court.' Berrain v. Katzen, 331 Md. 693, 703, 629 A.2d 707, 712 (1993) (quoting Deford v. State, Use of Keyser, 30 Md. 179, 199 (1869)); see also Fox, 390 Md. at 629, 890 A.2d at 731 (noting same). Furthermore, we recognize that `the trial court has a special duty to protect the rights and interests of the minor plaintiff who is represented by [a] next friend to insure that the next friend does not prejudice those rights and interests through conflict of interest, fraud, or ... neglect.' Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax, 396 Md. 405, 435, 914 A.2d 113, 131 (2007) (quoting Berrain, 331 Md. at 706, 629 A.2d at 715-16). Decisions of this Court generally recognize a distinction between infant litigants and their next friends. More than a century and a half ago, this Court, considering whether an infant that was a defendant in an action should be bound by his next friend's answer to a plaintiffs bill of complaint, iterated: Regularly an infant's answer by his guardian is not evidence against him, because he is not sworn, and it is only for the purpose of making proper parties. It is not in reality the answer of the infant, but of the guardian only who is sworn; and there is great danger to the interests of an infant, in permitting such an answer to be read against him, who from his tender years, may know nothing of the contents of the answer put in for him by his guardian, or not be able to judge of it, or of its effect. And the guardian ad litem is so appointed, as often to know nothing of the matter himself; and too much caution cannot well be observed, in guarding the rights of infants, not only against the improvident answers of honest guardians, but against the answers of such as may have sinister views; to say nothing of how far an infant may ordinarily be bound by a decree, upon an answer by his guardian, admitting the facts of the bill. The better and safer course, therefore, for all concerned, is in every case, in which an infant is a defendant, answering by his guardian, to put the plaintiff upon the proof of the material allegations in his bill, in the same manner, as if nothing had been admitted by the answer, unless otherwise expressly provided by law. It is the proper course, and that which prevails elsewhere. Kent's Adm'rs v. Taneyhill, 6 G. & J. 1, 3 (Md.1833). Almost a century later, this Court pondered, in Pindell v. Rubenstein, whether a minor plaintiff was bound by the hearsay admissions of his next friend. 139 Md. 567, 575, 115 A. 859, 862 (1921). There, the minor plaintiff, through his mother as his next friend, sued the defendants alleging that their wooden gate fell on him while he walked past it on his way to the store, breaking one of his legs. At trial, the mother testified on direct examination that she sent the minor plaintiff to the store with her sister, the minor's aunt, and that she knew nothing of the accident until her sister brought the injured child home. Id. at 572, 115 A. at 861. The defendants sought to introduce evidence that the mother visited one of the defendants shortly after the accident and told that defendant that it was the minor's fault that he was hurt, and not the defendants' fault. The defendants proffered further that the mother said she did not see the accident, but learned from the minor's aunt, who was with the minor at the time of the accident, that he was climbing on the gate before it fell on him. Id. at 575, 115 A. at 862. In holding that the admission by the minor plaintiffs mother was not admissible, we opined: [The minor plaintiffs mother] had positively disclaimed any knowledge of the accident or the instrumentality which caused it. Anything which she may have said therefore as to it was necessarily hearsay, irrelevant and collateral to any issue involved in this case. She was in no sense a party to the cause within the meaning of the rule permitting evidence to be given of admissions against interest made by a party, and her admissions were not competent to affect the interest of the infant whom she represented. Id. (italics added). While this Court has not revisited recently the issue of whether a next friend is a party, we have reaffirmed, in other contexts, the distinctions recognized between a next friend and an infant litigant. In Berrain v. Katzen, we held that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to enter a default judgment against minor plaintiffs as a sanction for the failure of the plaintiffs' next friend to comply with the reasonable discovery requests of the defendants. 331 Md. at 706, 629 A.2d at 715-16. There, the plaintiffs were three minor siblings who suffered permanent brain damage, allegedly from exposure to lead-based paint. Id. at 695, 629 A.2d at 707. Through their mother as their next friend, the children initiated an action against their landlord; however, the case was dismissed without prejudice, due to a lack of prosecution. Id. Two years later, the children, again through their mother as next friend, filed a new suit against the same landlord. Id. at 696, 629 A.2d at 707. The defendant landlord propounded interrogatories to the plaintiff children through their mother, and, after waiting more than seven months for a response, sought sanctions against the plaintiffs. Id. at 697, 629 A.2d at 707-08. Finding it to be the appropriate sanction under the circumstances, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff children's action with prejudice and denied their motion for reconsideration. Id. In reversing the trial court, [23] we observed that [h]ad the plaintiffs ... been adults, the record and our decisions would clearly support ... the trial court's dismissal with prejudice; however, where neglect ... lies with the next friend, an officer of the court, not the minor plaintiffs, the harshest of discovery sanctions was not warranted. Id. at 710-11, 629 A.2d at 715-16. We suggested instead that the trial court should have replaced the next friend with someone willing to represent diligently the plaintiffs' interests or, if no such person was available, dismiss the plaintiffs' action without prejudice so that they could pursue their claims upon reaching the age of majority. Id. at 711, 629 A.2d at 716. In Fulton v. K & M Assocs., another lead paint case, we held that it was abuse of discretion for a trial court to decline to dismiss without prejudice the suit of a minor plaintiff, where the next friend, the minor plaintiffs mother, did not cooperate with counsel's endeavors to have the minor plaintiff examined by a medical expert. 331 Md. 712, 713-14, 629 A.2d 716, 717 (1993). There, counsel for the minor plaintiff informed the trial court, on the day of trial, that he was not prepared to proceed, citing the lack of cooperation on the part of the minor plaintiffs mother in taking the child for psychometric testing to determine whether his disabilities were consistent with lead poisoning. Id. at 714, 629 A.2d at 717. Counsel for the minor plaintiff accordingly moved for a voluntary dismissal in order to preserve the cause of action. The trial court denied the motion, and the minor plaintiff proceeded with his case without expert medical testimony. After the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the court granted the defendants' motion for judgment. Id. at 714-15, 629 A.2d at 719. Based on the same reasoning which supported our decision in Berrain we reversed the trial court's decision not to grant the motion for a dismissal without prejudice. Id. at 717, 629 A.2d at 719. [24] We observed that the apparent negligence on the part of the next friend should have prompted the trial court to intervene[ ] on behalf of the minor plaintiff. Id. at 718, 629 A.2d at 719. Berrain and Fulton are reconcilable with other cases in which we have declined to enforce rigidly the status of a next friend as separate and distinct from that of the infant litigant whom the next friend represents. In Alters v. Leitch, we held that the testimony of a next friend is subject to the same limitations under the dead man's statute [25] as would be the testimony of a minor plaintiff 213 Md. 390, 392, 131 A.2d 458, 459 (1956). Accordingly, the next friend of a minor plaintiff, in a suit against the estate of a decedent, was not competent to testify concerning a transaction with the decedent. Id.; see also Snyder v. Crabbs, 263 Md. 28, 30-31, 282 A.2d 6, 8 (1971). More recently, in Aventis Pasteur, Inc. v. Skevofilax , we held that it was not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to deny a motion by a minor plaintiff, through his parents as next friends, to dismiss his claims without prejudice in order to preserve his cause of action, where there was no evidence of fraud, conflict of interest, or neglect on the part of his next friends. 396 Md. at 435-36, 914 A.2d at 131. In Skevofilax, the minor plaintiff, through his next friends, designated a medical expert for the purpose of rendering an expert opinion as to whether the minor plaintiffs autism spectrum disorder was caused by a mercury preservative in the defendants' pediatric vaccines; however, after the trial court entered several revised scheduling orders due to the expert's inability to compile the data necessary for him to provide an opinion on causation, the expert finally declined to participate in the litigation, assertedly, because of other commitments. Id. at 413-14, 914 A.2d at 118-19. When it became clear that the sole causation expert designated by the plaintiff would not be available, counsel for the defendants moved for summary judgment. Counsel for the minor plaintiff moved for a dismissal without prejudice. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice, citing the significant time and money that had been expended in preparing pleadings and preliminary motions, and the conduct of extensive discovery, and awarded summary judgment to the defendants due to the lack of expert testimony on causation. Id. at 415, 914 A.2d at 119. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, relying on this Court's decisions in Berrain and Fulton; however, we reversed the intermediate appellate court. Id. at 416, 914 A.2d at 120. We reasoned that absent conflict of interest, fraud, or neglect by a parent, guardian, next friend, or the minor's attorney, a motion for voluntary dismissal made on behalf of a minor should not be analyzed differently than a motion for dismissal without prejudice filed by any plaintiff. Id. at 436, 914 A.2d at 131. From the foregoing cases, we glean that a child who, due to her or his infancy, must rely on a next friend during litigation should not be subjected to an interpretation of the rules of evidence and discovery that effectively would penalize her or him for prosecuting or defending a cause through a next friend; conversely, in the interests of justice and fairness to the opponents of infant litigants, a child should not be permitted to evade, by prosecuting or defending a cause through a next friend, application of the rules of evidence and discovery. In the present case, we resolve that the trial judge erred by allowing Respondents to read into evidence during their defense case the deposition testimony of Ms. Queen. As stated, Rule 2-419(a)(2) mandates that the deposition be of someone who is a party at the time the deposition is offered into evidence. As Petitioner's next friend, Ms. Queen was not a party when Respondents offered her deposition into evidence. See Pindell, 139 Md. at 575, 115 A. at 862. The present case is not one, like Skevofilax, in which Petitioner evades application of the rules of evidence or discovery because of her infancy. Nevertheless, we will not reverse a judgment if the trial court's error was harmless. Crane, 382 Md. at 91-92, 854 A.2d at 1185. A successful proponent of error ordinarily has the additional burden of showing that the error complained of probably, as opposed to possibly, influenced the unfavorable verdict. Id. Here, Petitioner is not able to carry the day. She complains that she was particularly prejudiced by the trial court's ruling because [Ms. Queen's] credibility was obviously an issue. She does not articulate any harm to her cause other than that the deposition testimony undermined Ms. Queen's credibility. She directs our attention to a portion of the closing argument of Respondents' counsel in which he said to the jury, I ask you to think about when I read portions of [Ms. Queen's] deposition and she didn't remember anything about the house. She didn't remember if [her] father and mother lived there. In fact she said in her deposition they didn't. Petitioner contends that Respondents should not have been able to impeach [Ms. Queen's] credibility after their counsel already had the chance to cross-examine her. She claims that they took advantage of the trial court's error by emphasizing the `read-in' portions of the deposition in closing argument. The flaw with Petitioner's contention is that, when Respondents' counsel read into evidence the deposition testimony of Ms. Queen during the defense's case, Respondents had used the deposition previously to impeach Ms. Queen during their cross-examination of her during Petitioner's case-in-chief. In other words, the damaging features of Ms. Queen's deposition testimony (to which Petitioner directs us) already were before the jury, regardless of Respondents' potentially duplicative use of the deposition during their defense case. Petitioner, however, does not complain here about Respondents' use of Ms. Queen's deposition during their cross-examination of her; nor does it appear from the record (which is intact for this part of the trial) that Petitioner objected to its use at that time. The following exchange from the cross-examination of Ms. Queen is pertinent: [Respondents' counsel:] Now, first of all you were talking about your step-father, Mr. Brown, living with you [at the Subject Property?] [Ms. Queen]: Yes. Q Do you recall telling me in deposition... that Mr. Brown didn't live at [the Subject Property]? A He lived there but he just wasn't being there. He lived there. That was his residence. He lived there. Yes, he lived there. I don't recall. .... Q Do you recall pointing out to us in deposition that Mr. Brown ... had his own apartment somewhere? A No. Q Okay. Did Mr. Brown live at [the Subject Property]? A Yes. Q Okay. Let me refer you toand I'll give you a copy of your deposition page thirty-three. I'm going to hand it to you, if you don't mind. There it is. There is page thirty-three. .... A Well I said it. .... Q ... On page thirty-three, you were asked: You don't know if your father lived with you at [the Subject Property]? .... Answer: I wasn'tno, I am not sure. He lived there but he didn't come there. So I say no. Question: He lived there but he didn't come there? Answer: He paid everything, paid the bills. It is their house but they don't stay there. Question: We are referring to Robert Brown? Answer: Yes. A Yes. Q So do you recall testifying that Mr. Brown, in fact, didn't live at [the Subject Property]? A I saidyou said I said he lived there but he don't stay there. Yes. Q Okay. Now, when you said in this testimony that they didn't live there, that they didn't stay there A My mother stayed there. .... Q Now, when you said in your sworn deposition testimony that they didn't stay there, were you referring to the fact that your parents didn't live there at times? A No. Q For instance, you just told us that there were four bedrooms and they were all occupied with others. A And I said they stay down in the basement. I know what I said. Q So your parents stayed in the unfinished basement? A I said they decorated it theirself. That's what I said. [Trial Judge]: But the question is, did they stay in the basement? A I said yes. [Respondents' counsel]: And that basement was unfinished? A I said they decorated it theirself but it was unfinished at first. Q Did Robert Brown stay with you the entire time you were at [the Subject Property]? .... A No. No is the best way to answer you. Petitioner does not explain how the impeachment value of Respondents' use of Ms. Queen's deposition during the defense's case-in-chief, which Petitioner objected to and continues to protest, differed in substance or effect from the use of the deposition during the foregoing dialogue, which engendered no protest from Petitioner. In fact, as the foregoing dialogue reveals, counsel for Respondents read an excerpt from the deposition during his cross-examination of Ms. Queen. That excerpt concerned whether Ms. Queen's mother and step-father lived at the Subject Property, and it is the relevant portion of the deposition testimony that he referenced in his closing argument to the jury. Counsel for Respondents also iterated in his closing argument that Ms. Queen did not recall new wallpaper at the Subject Property; however, that point was developed as well during cross-examination, regardless of whether it came out again when he read the deposition during Respondents' defense case. Petitioner asserts that the excerpts read into evidence during Respondents' defense case also might have included some statements in which Ms. Queen admitted that Respondents occasionally sent people to the Subject Property to make repairs, a point Petitioner believes prejudices her by undermining the believability of Ms. Queen. If, however, counsel for Respondents in fact read into evidence this part of the deposition, the prejudice to Petitioner was not sufficient to warrant reversing the jury's verdict in this case. First, Ms. Queen acknowledged during her direct examination that Respondents sent people to the Subject Property to make repairs, testifying that Daniel Realty patched the hallway up and had some men on the roof. Second, it is not apparent how the fact that Respondent sent repairmen to the Subject Property, if believed, likely influenced the jury to conclude erroneously that the Subject Property did not contain chipping or peeling paint, lead-based or otherwise. Accordingly, the trial judge's error in allowing Respondents, under Rule 2-419(a)(2), to read into evidence excerpts from Ms. Queen's deposition testimony during their defense case was harmless on the record as presented to us. Because we conclude as such, we do not reach the issue of whether the deposition testimony alternatively was admissible under Maryland Rule 5-802.1, as so resolved by the intermediate appellate court. At least according to the parties' stipulations, Rule 5-802.1 was not relied upon by the Circuit Court in allowing use of the deposition. [26]