Opinion ID: 3062090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicable Legal Standards at Second Step

Text: Having determined that the district court properly reached the second step of the analysis, we turn to Hasan’s argument that “the district court did not follow the applicable legal standards applicable to the second step.” Aplt. Br. at 20. In Hasan I we held: If the district court finds that at the time of the grand jury proceedings Mr. Hasan’s primary language was other than English, it must determine whether the lack of an interpreter during his testimony inhibited his comprehension of the proceedings or communication with . . . the presiding judicial officer, [or his] comprehension of questions and the presentation of . . . testimony, 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1), to such an extent as to have made the [hearing] fundamentally unfair . . . . This is itself a two-step inquiry. 526 F.3d at 666 (internal quotation and citation omitted). -14- In making this determination, “[f]irst, the district court must assess whether comprehension or communication was inhibited during his grand jury testimony, or in other words, whether the second prong of the statute is met. If it is met, then it was error for the prosecutor to fail to appoint an interpreter.” Id. But even if there was error, “the court must then ask whether the error rendered the grand jury proceedings fundamentally unfair.” Id. “To be sure, the term fundamental fairness (or unfairness) is far from self-defining, but . . . . [i]n the CIA context, courts coming before us have explained that an inquiry into fundamental fairness focuses on whether the purposes of the Act [comprehension of the proceedings and the ability to effectively communicate] were adequately met.” Id. at 666–67 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Hasan primarily takes issue with the statement that “[t]his is itself a twostep inquiry,” and he argues the district court again failed to explain its reasoning. Hasan argues the district court improperly compressed the analysis in concluding that “the lack of an interpreter during the grand jury did not inhibit Mr. Hasan’s comprehension of the grand jury proceedings and communications therein or his comprehension of the questions and presentation of the testimony to such an extent as to have made the grand jury proceedings fundamentally unfair.” R., Vol. I at 390. The government responds that the district court “examined the grand jury transcripts closely, and found indicia that Hasan was able to comprehend and -15- communicate during the grand jury proceedings.” Aple. Br. at 29. Specifically, the district court found that “Hasan appropriately answered questions, asked for clarification if he did not understand a question, and after receiving clarification responded appropriately and intelligently.” R., Vol. I at 382. Additionally, the court reporter testified that she had no trouble understanding Hasan and described his ability to speak English as “fair.” Id. at 384. Both parties also argue a related order of battle question: whether the fact that the district court moved on to conclude that the lack of an interpreter did not render the grand jury proceedings fundamentally unfair means the court “made the predicate finding . . . that comprehension or communication was inhibited.” Aplt. Br. at 22. Hasan’s argument is based on Hasan I, which required that the court “first” assess Hasan’s comprehension and “then” determine whether the proceedings were fundamentally unfair. 526 F.3d at 666–67. The government counters that Hasan I indicated “an inquiry into fundamental fairness focuses on whether the purposes of the Act [comprehension of the proceedings and the ability to effectively communicate] were adequately met.” Id. at 667. We find the district court’s combined analysis satisfies our directions in Hasan I and Hasan II. All of the required analysis is in the court’s order—though not necessarily in a neat package on appeal. In Hasan II, we effectively collapsed the analytical directive into one step, by directing the district court to “determine whether . . . Mr. Hasan was inhibited in his ability to comprehend and -16- communicate at the grand jury proceedings to such an extent as to have been fundamentally unfair.” 609 F.3d at 1131. While the Hasan II opinion does rely on Hasan I, the district court’s failure to carefully delineate each step along the way was not error. In sum, the district court understood it must find whether Hasan’s “comprehension or communication was inhibited during his grand jury testimony,” and then if it was, assess whether any linguistic limitation rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. We find that the district court’s order adequately addressed both of these required findings.