Opinion ID: 1276632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nagle's First Amendment retaliation claim fails.

Text: Nagle contends that the defendants retaliated against him for comments that he made at a May 12, 2004, Labor Management Meeting that he attended in his capacity as the union safety and grievance officer. This meeting consisted of a small group of union and management representatives including Chief Davis and other Calumet Park police officers. The focus of this meeting was the reduction of the number of officers during certain shifts, and concerns were raised by attendees that manpower reductions would impact police safety. Nagle claims that, the day after the meeting, Chief Davis warned Nagle that if he ever spoke to Chief Davis in the manner in which Nagle did at the Labor Management Meeting, he would be disciplined. Following this warning, Chief Davis suspended Nagle for two days for violating the sick-day policy. Nagle alleges that the suspension was in retaliation for statements he made at the Labor Management Meeting. Nagle also maintains that his May 24, 2004, reprimand for allowing a prisoner to escape with handcuffs on and his August 2004 suspension for failing to assist another officer were in retaliation for his earlier statements at the Labor Management meeting. To make out a prima facie case of first amendment retaliation, a public employee must present evidence that: (1) his speech was constitutionally protected, (2) he has suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech, and (3) his speech was at least a motivating factor in the employer's action. Massey v. Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir.2006) (citations omitted). Under the first prong, speech is constitutionally protected if (1) the employee spoke as a citizen on matters of public concern, and (2) the interest of the employee as a citizen in commenting upon matters of public concern outweighs the interest of the State as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir.2007). In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), the Supreme Court held that speech made pursuant to a person's official responsibilities does not receive First Amendment protection. See also Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 965 ( Garcetti made clear that public employees speaking `pursuant to their official duties' are speaking as employees, not citizens, and thus are not protected by the First Amendment regardless of the content of their speech.); Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 570 (7th Cir.2007). Nagle argues that because he was speaking in his capacity as a union official, his comments were made as a citizen rather than as a public employee. In Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir.2006), we held that Garcetti did not control where a deputy sheriff made constitutionally protected statements in his capacity as a union representative. Similarly, Nagle was speaking in his capacity as a union representative and Garcetti does not deprive his comments of First Amendment protection. Nonetheless, Nagle's claim fails because he has not shown that he engaged in constitutionally protected speech. Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983). In analyzing the content, form, and context of a given statement to determine if the statements are constitutionally protected, we have stressed that content is the most important. Kokkinis v. Ivkovich, 185 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir.1999). According to Nagle, his statements addressed the manpower and the police safety on the street as far as the community and as far as the officers and the reduction of cops on the street, as far as safety for the residents and businesses. Nagle does not identify any specific statements that were made at the meeting. While his statements regarding police manpower could, as a general matter, be of public concern, the subject matter alone does not convey constitutional protection to his statements. See Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 410 (7th Cir.1994) (the fact that an employee speaks up on a topic that may be deemed one of public import does not automatically render [his] remarks on that subject protected) (quotation omitted); Hartman v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 4 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir.1993) (finding that whether speech is of public concern does not turn on the general subject matter of the employee's speech); Colburn v. Trs. of Indiana Univ., 973 F.2d 581, 586 (7th Cir.1992) (the fact that the issue could be `interesting' to the community does not make it an issue of public concern). We must instead delve deeper into the precise content, form, and context of speech that admittedly may be of some interest to the public. Cliff, 42 F.3d at 410 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684). Here, the content or form of the statements made by Nagle at the Labor Management meeting is unclear from the record, nor is it apparent how these statements, whatever they may be, relate either to his job as a police officer, his status as a citizen, or his capacity as a union representative. At his deposition, when asked by his attorney what was said by whom at the Labor Management meeting, Nagle testified that: It was a discussion amongst everybody in regards to different things and how manpower was reduced and was going to be reduced at different times of the year. Nagle did not provide any details about the statements he made at the meeting, stating only that It's just that I remember that's what the meeting was about. See Brooks, 406 F.3d 476, 479-80. Not only is it unclear which of Nagle's statements could constitute protected speech, the context in which the comments were made is also unclear. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate on Nagle's First Amendment Retaliation claim. [6]