Opinion ID: 3190308
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Binford’s Detention

Text: The district court was correct in finding that Binford’s detention did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. First, Binford’s detention was permissible under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), and its progeny. Second, Binford’s detention did not amount to an illegal arrest. In Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court held that during the execution of a search warrant for contraband, police officers have the “limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” 452 U.S. at 705. Similarly, “[a] brief investigatory detention by an officer with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is not an unreasonable seizure.” United States v. Hopson, 134 F. App’x 781, 789 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that when officers execute a search warrant, they may question occupants during the search so long as the questioning does not prolong the search. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99-101 (2005). Therefore, Kinal had the authority under Summers to detain Binford incident to the search warrant. Further, because the two controlled purchases of marijuana gave Kinal reasonable No. 14-1635 United States v. Binford Page 8 suspicion of criminal activity,3 he also had the authority to subject Binford to a brief investigatory detention, which is what occurred when Kinal took Binford into the bathroom during the search. Moreover, because the bathroom questioning did not prolong the search, it was permissible under Muehler. 544 U.S. at 99-101. Finally, while it is true that “special circumstances, or possibly a prolonged detention” might render a detention during the execution of a search warrant unreasonable, Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.21, those circumstances do not exist in this case. While Binford does not dispute the officers’ authority to detain him while the search was conducted, Binford argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the police “took advantage of the search warrant to isolate and interrogate him, despite not having an arrest warrant or probable cause.”4 Specifically, he argues that by questioning him in the bathroom, Kinal overstepped the bounds of Summers because “he exploit[ed] Binford’s detention in order to gain more information.” Binford reasons that when Kinal took Binford into the bathroom for questioning, “Kinal had no ‘reasonable suspicion’ justifying a greater detention than what was allowed by the search warrant itself.” In support, Binford cites United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Trepel v. Roadway Express, Inc., 194 F.3d 708, 717 (6th Cir. 1999), and argues that his detention in this case was greater than this court allowed in Fountain. In that case, federal agents executed a search warrant on a residence for firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. Fountain, 2 F.3d at 659-60. During the search, a defendant, McEaddy, and three other occupants were initially handcuffed and detained in the living room. Id. After the search uncovered firearms and narcotics, McEaddy was separated from the other occupants and taken to an open and adjoining dining room area for an “investigative” detention and questioning. Id. 3 Not only did Kinal have reasonable suspicion, he also had probable cause to arrest as evidenced by the fact that the search warrant itself was based on the two controlled purchases. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701 (“Of prime importance in assessing the intrusion is the fact that the police had obtained a warrant to search respondent’s house for contraband. A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause . . . . ”). 4 The government does not dispute that Binford’s detention was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. No. 14-1635 United States v. Binford Page 9 On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress. We considered “whether the district court correctly concluded that the continued detention of McEaddy at the conclusion of the search was supported by reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 665 (internal quotations omitted). To that end, we noted that “[t]o establish that the detention, which was not supported by probable cause, was reasonable, the government must show: 1) that the seizure was based on ‘reasonable suspicion’ of criminal activity; and 2) that the investigative measures used were the least intrusive means reasonably available to dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Otherwise stated, the government must show that “under the totality of the circumstances, the agents diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly . . . . ” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Finally, we held: McEaddy . . . does not claim the agents did not have “reasonable suspicion.” McEaddy argues that the detention after the search concluded and before the agents had probable cause to arrest was an exploitation of the initial Summers detention. We disagree. Once the search of the premises was completed and resulted in the discovery of drugs and firearms, the agents had reasonable suspicion to focus on any occupant who was present in the home voluntarily or purposefully. Although McEaddy was already handcuffed at this point, the use of handcuffs does not necessarily turn an encounter into an arrest for which probable cause is required. McEaddy was not removed from the home, placed in a squad car, or taken to the police station. Rather, the agents took McEaddy into the adjoining dining room, where he was briefly questioned. Although the intrusion was significant, it was reasonable in light of the significant law enforcement interests and the physical surroundings of the encounter. Id. at 665-66. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Binford asserts that in contrast to the facts of Fountain, “when Binford was taken to the bathroom the search of the apartment was ongoing, and Kinal had no ‘reasonable suspicion’ justifying a detention greater than what was allowed by the search warrant itself.” Additionally, Binford claims that “the twenty-minute interrogation was extremely intrusive, isolating Binford and forcing him to sit naked in a small bathroom with an armed officer blocking the only exit.” Thus, according to Binford, his bathroom detention exceeded what was allowed under Summers, as discussed by this court in Fountain. No. 14-1635 United States v. Binford Page 10 Binford’s arguments misconstrue Fountain. As stated in Fountain, “a valid search warrant implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the ‘occupants’ of the premises while police conduct the search.” 2 F.3d at 661 (citing Summers). Further, Kinal had reasonable suspicion that Binford was engaged in criminal activity based upon the two controlled marijuana buys. Additionally, Kinal’s reasonable suspicion was not required to arise from evidence uncovered during the search; rather, it is permissible that his reasonable suspicion was founded upon the marijuana sales. This conclusion is based on this court’s holding in United States v. Hopson, 134 F. App’x 781, 789 (6th Cir. 2004), that a police officer with a valid search warrant to enter into and search a person’s residence, but lacking an arrest warrant, may arrest that person in his home based solely on pre-existing probable cause (i.e., probable cause supporting the search warrant itself as opposed to probable cause based on evidence later uncovered during the search). In such a situation, if an arrest may be made based on pre-existing probable cause, it must logically follow, and we now hold, that a police officer’s authority to detain an occupant during a Summers detention may be based on pre-existing reasonable suspicion. Thus, in this case, Kinal had reasonable suspicion based on the prior marijuana sales. Second, Binford remained in his apartment during the questioning and was not placed in a police cruiser or taken to police headquarters. As in Fountain, Binford was merely and permissibly moved to another room inside his home, namely, the bathroom connected to the bedroom where he was initially detained.5 Third, and also as in Fountain, based on the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Binford’s bathroom questioning was brief and reasonable as Kinal “diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel [his] suspicions quickly.” Fountain, 2 F.3d at 665. Kinal took Binford to an adjoining room for questioning, which lasted no more than twenty minutes and ended before the search was complete. 5 While Binford argues that it was the totality of the circumstances of the bathroom detention that caused it to exceed the limits of Summers, Binford’s attorney stated at oral argument that their theory relies heavily on “the location” of the questioning, specifically, “the action of moving Mr. Binford from a relatively open area [the bedroom] where he could see his family and moving him and isolating him into a confined space [the bathroom].” Binford cites no authority to support this contention, and we reject it. Simply put, there is no legal authority that requires a suspect to be detained in a specific room inside the residence where he or she is found. No. 14-1635 United States v. Binford Page 11 However, even if Kinal did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause, Binford’s argument fails because it relies on the mistaken assumption that Binford’s questioning in the bathroom was a separate Fourth Amendment seizure, distinct from his initial detention in the bedroom. The Supreme Court has made clear that the questioning of an occupant during the execution of a search warrant does not constitute a “discrete Fourth Amendment event” so long as the questioning does not prolong the search. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100-01. Where there is no prolonging of the search, and thus, no additional Fourth Amendment event (i.e., seizure), officers are not required to have “independent reasonable suspicion” before questioning an occupant. Id. Therefore, because it is not disputed that Binford’s questioning in the bathroom did not prolong the search, it was not a separate seizure, and Kinal was not required to have additional reasonable suspicion to question Binford in the bathroom. Because Binford was permissibly detained during the execution of the search warrant, the detention did not amount to an unlawful arrest without probable cause. Therefore, because Binford’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated, the district court did not err in declining to suppress on that ground either Binford’s incriminating statements and the gun obtained during the search.