Opinion ID: 885241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exceptions to the Open Range Doctrine

Text: ถ 46 By the turn of the century the west's open range doctrine was narrowed, excluding all but accidental trespasses from the statutory fence-out rule. In Montana, the modification followed a U.S. Supreme Court decision, Lazarus v. Phelps , which arose in Texas. The Lazarus decision essentially waived the fence-out condition precedent in cases where the trespass was intentional, reasoning that the open range doctrine applied narrowly only to those trespasses that were accidental โ where livestock merely followed the inherent instinct to seek food and water. See Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 85, 14 S.Ct. at 478. See also Fant, 9 Mont. at 61-62, 22 P. at 120-21 (indicating that willful or malicious herding of sheep onto plaintiff's land by owner would exempt plaintiff from lawful fence requirement). ถ 47 This narrowing of the doctrine was followed by this Court in 1900, in Monroe v. Cannon (1900), 24 Mont. 316, 61 P. 863. In that case, it was undisputed that the plaintiff's land was not fenced. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the plaintiff's right to recovery for damages where the defendant had willfully or maliciously herded his sheep onto the plaintiff's land. See Monroe, 24 Mont. at 324-26, 61 P. at 865-66 (following Lazarus v.. Phelps , and distinguishing Smith v. Williams and Fant v. Lyman ). ถ 48 Thus, at the start of the 20th century in Montana, livestock trespasses resulting from willful, malicious, or even negligent conduct by the livestock owner followed the English common law rule and waived the lawful fence requirement, leaving only purely accidental livestock trespasses under the open range doctrine, which required a lawful fence in order to recover damages. See, e.g., Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305 (providing that willful or intentional herding or driving of livestock onto another's unfenced land or placing them so near that trespass is bound to occur is an exception to the open range doctrine) (quoting Montgomery v. Gehring (1965), 145 Mont. 278, 283, 400 P.2d 403, 406); Andes, 56 Mont.L.Rev. at 488-93 (discussing narrow application of open range doctrine under Lazarus to include only accidental trespass of livestock); ง 1-2-103, MCA (providing that statutes in derogation of the common law establish the law of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate and should be liberally construed to effect their objects) (emphasis added).
ถ 49 Montana's Legislature has, over time, amended the open range Containment of Livestock statutes to prohibit owners from allowing certain kinds of animals to run at large. See ง 81-4-201, MCA (prohibiting swine, sheep, llamas, alpacas, bison, ostriches, rheas, emus, and goats from running at large); ง 81-4-204, MCA (prohibiting male equine from running at large on the open range); ง 81-4-210, MCA (prohibiting any kind of bull that is not purebred, and any bull between December 1 and June 1 of each and every year from running at large upon any such public highways, open range, or national forest reserve); ง 81-4-211, MCA (prohibiting female breeding cattle unaccompanied by a purebred bull from running at large upon the public ranges or national forest reserves). See also Jorgenson v. Story (1927), 78 Mont. 477, 493, 254 P. 427, 432 (stating that when cattle are in the public highway, in charge of a person directing or controlling their movements, they are not `running at large'). ถ 50 The foregoing statutes are accompanied by penalties, including monetary fines, liability for damages to any party injured by the violation, castration of the offending animal, and even killing of the offending animal. See งง 81-4-202, 207, 208, 209 and 212, MCA. Thus, any trespass resulting from the intentional act of permitting such animals to run at large waives the fence-out condition precedent of the open range doctrine. See ง 81-4-217, MCA (allowing retention of wrongfully trespassing animal as well as those breaking through legal fences); ง 81-4-215, MCA (providing that [t]his section may not be construed to require a legal fence in order to maintain an action for injury done by animals running at large contrary to law). ถ 51 Further, the monetary penalty under ง 81-4-202, MCA, as well as the damages to any party injured language expanded the scope of the open range doctrine to provide a benefit for the general public, not just a landowner who suffers damages as a result of a trespass. Nevertheless, the conduct proscribed under งง 81-4-201, 204, 210 and 211, MCA, is explicitly intentional. Thus, an accidental escape of one of the animals identified under these statutes from an owner's premises is not a per se violation. As made clear by this Court in Monroe, and the U.S. Supreme Court in Lazarus, the open range doctrine, as a modification of the common law, never included intentional conduct. See Monroe, 24 Mont. at 324-26, 61 P. at 865-66. ถ 52 Finally, liberally construing Part 2 of our Containment of Livestock statutes as a whole, it is clear that open range includes all highways or public highways that pass through open range areas. See ง 81-4-203, MCA (providing that the term open range includes all lands in the state of Montana not enclosed by a fence of not less than two wires in good repair as well as all highways outside of private enclosures and used by the public); [3] ง 81-4-210, MCA (providing that non-purebred bulls, and all bulls between December 1 and June 1 shall not be turned upon or allowed to run at large on public highways, open range, or national forest reserve within the state). ถ 53 Even so, we conclude that these statutes offer no clear enunciation of any explicit legal duty owed by livestock owners to motorists beyond the inferential duty to not intentionally permit certain animals to occupy highways, which does not include negligent conduct. Therefore, the running at large statutes, under a negligence theory, at the most establish a different standard of care for owners of certain livestock from that required in open range areas: in open range, certain animals may be lawfully permitted to occupy highways, and other animals may not. Again, the only clear legal duty addressed by the foregoing is that between livestock owners and landowners.
ถ 54 Under Part 3 of Montana's Containment of Livestock statutes, the Montana Legislature has permitted landowners to exempt a particular area of land from the open range. See ง 81-4-301, MCA (stating requirements for herd district creation); ง 81-4-322, MCA (stating requirements for horse herd districts). This exemption is not absolute; such a district may be in effect for only certain months of the year. See ง 81-4-305, MCA. ถ 55 Critical to our discussion is the fact that the term fence (legal or otherwise) does not appear once under this Part in any form, nor did the Legislature include any reference to highways and motorists. See งง 81-4-301 through 328, MCA. Further, aside from the horse herd district statutes, the more general herd district laws prohibit only willful acts. See ง 81-4-306, MCA (providing penalty to owner who willfully permits the animals to run at large). [4] See also Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc. (1968), 151 Mont. 463, 466-67, 443 P.2d 753, 755 (equating willfully with purposely or knowingly and concluding that escaped cattle did not result from willful act). Thus, similar to ง 81-4-201 through 220, MCA, the herd district statutes do not explicitly contemplate that a livestock owner whose animal accidentally escapes from the owner's premises commits a per se violation of the statute, or that livestock may lawfully occupy roads within herd districts under the care of herders. ถ 56 In light of these omissions, and of particular relevance to the action here, this Court's decision in Williams v. Selstad (1988), 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247, addressed whether herd districts under งง 81-4-301 through 328, MCA, provided an exception to Montana's open range doctrine. Specifically, the Court addressed whether the statutes imposed a duty on livestock owners to keep livestock from wandering onto the roadway within the herd district . Williams, 235 Mont. at 139, 766 P.2d at 248. Ultimately, we held that the Legislature did not intend to change the open range no-duty rules through enactment of the herd district statutes. Williams, 235 Mont. at 141, 766 P.2d at 249. ถ 57 This holding, however, was premised on the assumption that the open range doctrine relieves owners or possessors of livestock of a duty to keep their livestock from wandering onto the roadway, which in turn inferentially applied the no duty standard to livestock owners whose animals are involved with accidents with motorists. Williams, 235 Mont. at 138, 766 P.2d at 247-48. ถ 58 With the enactment of herd district statutes, pursuant to งง 81-4-301 through 328, MCA, the open range doctrine rule that livestock may follow their instincts, and freely wander in search of food and water, came to an end once such a district was created. If owners of livestock are statutorily proscribed from permitting their animals to run at large, then the notion that the owner of livestock has no duty to prevent the livestock from wandering no longer exists. Compare ง 81-4-306, MCA (prohibiting any livestock owner from willfully permitting animals to run at large within herd district) with Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305 (stating that an owner of livestock has no duty to prevent livestock from wandering in open range country). In turn, if the open range includes all highways outside private enclosures used by the public, as we have already concluded, then highways passing through herd districts are no longer part of the open range, as a matter of law, during those periods when the herd district is in effect. ถ 59 Again, there is no express broadening of the underlying legal relationship that the open range doctrine addresses: livestock owners and landowners. Rather, as a matter of law, herd districts are no longer open range, and therefore the open range fence-out rule is no longer required to maintain an action for trespass, which ostensibly returns such districts to the common law trespass rule during those periods when they are in effect. See ง 81-4-307, MCA (entitled Trespassing animals in herd districts and permitting the owner of premises wrongfully entered by animals referred to in ง 81-4-306, MCA, to recover damages and costs, with no mention of legal fence requirement). ถ 60 Thus, the Court in Williams correctly stated that the herd district statutes were intended only to protect landowners and owners of livestock. Williams, 235 Mont. at 140, 766 P.2d at 248. In turn, the Court also was correct in its conclusion that it was not clear whether Montana's Legislature intended to create a duty owed to motorists through enactment of the herd district statutes, Williams, 235 Mont. at 140, 766 P.2d at 248, and thus such a duty may not be judicially inserted by this Court. See ง 1-2-101, MCA. The Court incorrectly assumed, however, that the open range doctrine's no duty rule that applied exclusively to livestock owners and landowners inferentially applied to the legal relationship between livestock owners and motorists โ an assumption that the statutes simply fail to address. ถ 61 Therefore, we overrule Williams v. Selstad to the extent that it holds that the open range doctrine no duty rule may be applied to the legal relationship between livestock owners within a herd district and motorists traveling on herd district highways. We further hold, however, that the herd district statutes, similar to the running at large statutes discussed above, do not establish an explicit legal duty owed by livestock owners to motorists beyond the inferential duty to not intentionally permit certain animals to run at large within the districts โ which, again, does not include negligent conduct. Rather, we conclude that the herd district statutes โ like the running at large statutes โ establish a different standard of care for owners of livestock from that found in open range areas: in open range, certain animals may be lawfully permitted to occupy highways, in herd districts none may be lawfully permitted to run at large on highways.
ถ 62 Similar to the running at large and herd district statutes, our Legislature in 1951 removed certain state highways from the open range โ again, without invoking any explicit statutory duties arising from the legal relationship of livestock owners and motorists. The Legislature merely made it unlawful for livestock owners to use certain U.S. and state highways as a place for the pasturage or running of livestock. See Ch. 95, L.1951. Codified under งง 32-1018-1020, RCM, the statutes were originally inserted under the obstructions and encroachments chapter of the Highways, Bridges and Ferries statutes. ถ 63 Unlike the running at large and herd district statutes, however, traffic safety on such highways can reasonably be presumed as one of the purposes of what would eventually become งง 60-7-201 through 205, MCA. [5] Nevertheless, there was never an explicit legal duty, or a standard of liability, ascribed to livestock owners that was owed to motorists. See and compare, e.g., ง 49-4-216, MCA (describing duty and civil liability of pedestrian or driver approaching blind person); ง 61-5-108, MCA (describing liability of minors imputed to parents under motor vehicles statute); ง 61-6-201, MCA (describing liability of owner for negligence of employee driver); ง 61-7-106, MCA (describing duty of a driver of any vehicle which collides with any vehicle which is unattended); ง 61-7-107, MCA (describing duty of driver of any vehicle involved in an accident upon striking fixtures or other property upon a highway); ง 61-8-384, MCA (describing liability of operator of a vehicle in a funeral procession). ถ 64 Moreover, as originally codified, a violation occurred only if the livestock owner acted wilfully, which first required that 24-hours' written notice be given to the owner by a peace officer informing the owner of the presence of his animals on the highway, or a finding that the owner habitually permits such use of such highway by livestock. See Ch. 95, L.1951. Otherwise, as originally conceived, there was no immediate legal duty owed by livestock owners to other highway users; rather, livestock could occupy a fenced highway traveled by motorist up until written notice was provided, or the livestock's presence on a highway was deemed habitual. ถ 65 Today, ง 60-7-201, MCA, is far less lenient. An owner of livestock now may not lawfully permit his livestock to graze, remain upon, or occupy a part of the right-of-way of: (1) a state highway running through cultivated areas or a part of the fenced right-of-way of a state highway if in either case the highway has been designated by agreement between the transportation commission and the secretary of transportation as a part of the national system of interstate and defense highways; or (2) a state highway designated by agreement between the transportation commission and the secretary of transportation as a part of the federal-aid primary system, except as provided in 60-7-202. Under this statute, this Court has held that livestock owners in Montana may now be found liable for negligent rather than wilful conduct which results in the presence of their cattle on the right-of-ways, but cannot be held strictly liable. Ambrogini v. Todd (1982), 197 Mont. 111, 120, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018 (construing the term permit subsequent to a legislative amendment that excised the term wilful). Nevertheless, the Legislature expressly provided that even if a livestock owner violates ง 60-7-201, MCA, there is no presumption or inference that the collision was due to negligence on the part of the owner or the person in possession of the livestock or the driver or owner of the vehicle. See ง 60-7-203, MCA. ถ 66 Further, under ง 60-7-202, MCA, the prohibitions of ง 60-7-201, MCA, do not apply to the following: (1) livestock on state highways under the charge of one or more herders; (2) the parts of fenced highways adjacent to open range where a highway device has not been installed to exclude range livestock; and (3) the parts of a state highway or a part of the federal-aid primary system which the department of transportation designates as being impracticable to exclude livestock. ถ 67 In Ambrogini, this Court determined that because none of the foregoing exceptions applied to the facts, the livestock owner, Todd, had a legal duty to exercise due care in preventing his livestock from wandering on Highway 10. Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 121, 642 P.2d at 1019. After reviewing the facts of the livestock's escape from the defendant's premises, we further concluded that [t]he reasonableness of Todd's conduct is for a jury to decide and therefore reversed the district court's summary judgment in his favor. Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 121, 642 P.2d at 1019. ถ 68 Thus, under the explicit terms of the foregoing statutes, an owner of livestock may not permit his livestock to freely wander on certain clearly defined state highways that, prior to enactment, may once have been part of the open range. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, livestock may lawfully occupy such highways without violating the grazing of livestock on highways statutes. Accordingly, establishing a standard of reasonable care for livestock owners in their legal relationship with motorists on such highways is a fact-driven, circumstance-specific inquiry that is merely assisted by a proven violation of ง 60-7-201, MCA.
ถ 69 Therefore, even with the various judicial and statutory modifications providing exceptions and exclusions, Montana's open range doctrine remains true to its original purpose from the 1874 Smith decision forward until 1967: to determine the rights and remedies arising from the relationship of livestock owners and landowners in actions involving the accidental trespass on private property of livestock lawfully occupying the open range. Although our Legislature statutorily altered the common law rule regarding trespass to fit the conditions of this state, and has subsequently from time to time modified these laws, it has not similarly addressed the common law rule regarding the duty, or lack of duty, owed by livestock owners to the users of public highways in Montana other than within the narrow scope of งง 60-7-201 through 203, MCA, as addressed in Ambrogini. ถ 70 We conclude, therefore, that any assertion of legal duties arising from the legal relationship between the owners of livestock and motorists is clearly beyond the scope of Montana's statutory open range doctrine.