Opinion ID: 767657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retaliation for Public Criticism

Text: 37 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants removed them from the stand-by call list as retaliation for Sottile's public criticism of the Sheriff, in violation of Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. 4 The district court dismissed this claim on grounds that Plaintiffs were not protected under the First Amendment because Plaintiffs were not government employees or contractors, nor were Plaintiffs a regular provider of services to the County. 38 In dismissing Plaintiffs' First Amendment retaliation claim, the district court adopted Defendants' position that First Amendment protections extend only to independent contractors or other regular-service providers subject to termination of pre-existing commercial relationships with the government. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the government 'may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech' even if he has no entitlement to that benefit. Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (quoting Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). The Court explained as follows: 39 [E]ven though a person has no right to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests -- especially, his interest in freedom of speech. 40 Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. As set forth more fully in Umbehr's companion case of O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 717 (1996), placement on a municipal tow rotation list is one such benefit that may not be denied a person because of his constitutionally protected speech. 41 In this case, Defendants have admitted that Plaintiffs were placed on the stand-by tow call list for Area 4. Even though Plaintiffs did not receive any calls during their four-week stint on the stand-by list, their inclusion on the list undeniably constitutes a governmental benefit. The Sheriff himself admitted that it was important to be on the tow list because it gives [tow truck operators] community recognition. (J.A. at 292.) Moreover, the Sheriff stated that placement on the stand-by list was done so that a record with our office can be established, thus allowing a wrecker service to eventually receive tow calls off the regular rotation. (J.A. at 259.) Finally, as Plaintiffs note, their inclusion on the list could have been used in advertising or as a credential when applying for other tow lists -- which are particularly important to a new company. 42 The instant case is reminiscent of Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 929 (5th Cir. 1995), in which the plaintiff wrecking service was removed from the city's rotating on-call towing list after making various complaints to city officials. The plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against the city alleging, among other things, that the city wrongly retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Id. at 930. The district court dismissed the Plaintiff's retaliation claim on the basis that he was not a public employee, or equivalent to a public employee, and thus was not entitled to First Amendment protection against the city's retaliatory conduct. Id. at 931. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected this notion: 43 At the outset, we reject the district court's apparent assumption that only public employees enjoy the protections of the First Amendment. The district court's reasoning is inverted. Every citizen enjoys the First Amendment's protections against governmental interference with free speech, but the First Amendment rights of public employees are restricted by the nature of the employer-employee relationship. 44 Id. Likewise, in the case at hand, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' retaliation claim on grounds that they were not entitled to First Amendment protection against the retaliatory conduct of the Sheriff's Department. 45 Since the district court held that Plaintiffs were not entitled to any First Amendment protections, the court did not consider whether Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence on their retaliation claim to survive Defendants' motion for summary judgment. We believe that they have. To prevail on their retaliation claim, Plaintiffs must establish (i) that they were engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (ii) that Defendants' adverse action caused them to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (iii) that the adverse action was motivated at least in part as a response to the exercise of their constitutional rights. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc); see generally Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977); Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Village Schs. Bd. of Educ., 820 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1987); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1977). We believe that Plaintiffs have adduced substantial evidence in support of each element. 46 First, Plaintiffs have clearly established that they were engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. The First Amendment protects speech that may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern. Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection Dist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1997). In order to conclude that speech addresses a matter of public concern, 'this court must be able to fairly characterize the expression as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.' Id. at 574 (citation omitted). 47 In the instant case, Sottile repeatedly accused the Sheriff of favoritism, lack of competition and unfairness in his administration of the tow call list, alleging that the Sheriff used his authority to reward political supporters and campaign contributors at the expense of other tow companies. This Court has expressly stated that: Freedom to criticize public officials and expose their wrongdoing is at the core of First Amendment values, even if the conduct is motivated by personal pique or resentment. Barrett, 130 F.3d at 263. Moreover, the First Amendment protects Sottile's right to voice concerns and criticize the Sheriff and his policies. See Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 904 (6th Cir. 1975) (The right of an American citizen to criticize public officials and policies and to advocate peacefully ideas for change is the central meaning of the First Amendment) (quoting New York TimesCo. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)). 48 Notably, Sottile made his comments at the same time that the Board was contemplating the merger of central dispatch with emergency services. Sottile himself placed his comments in the context of this larger issue, by making comments such as, That's all I want to say to the Board so you can take it into consideration with Central Dispatch cause as far as I'm concerned there's no justice or fair play or anything in the Sheriff's Department right now. (J.A. at 318-19.) In addition, Sottile's comments at the April 25, 1995, Board meeting followed Larry Lucas' speech at the same forum two weeks earlier, where Lucas voiced similar complaints about the Sheriff's administration of the tow call list. Lucas' speech, as noted, was the subject of the lead story in the next day's local paper -- a story that also quoted Sottile as joining in Lucas' criticisms. 49 In Chappel, this Court expressly rejected the defendants' argument that the Plaintiff's speech did not address a matter of public concern because it was predominantly motivated by his own self-interest: 50 We may quite readily concede that Chappel hoped to gain from his speech. Indeed, this may be a fair assumption to make about most speech addressing matters of public concern. Our aim, however, is to determine whether Chappel's speech may be fairly characterize[d] . . . as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Even if we were to assume that Chappel's predominant motivation was securing a job for himself, we would not conclude that this motivation so dominated the substance of Chappel's speech that the point or communicative purpose of his speech was rendered merely a matter of personal concern. Chappel directly addressed matters that are rightly near [the] zenith of public concern -- matters of public safety, and the gross mismanagement and misappropriation of public monies. 51 131 F.3d at 578 (alterations in original). We find that the same holds true here. Plaintiffs need only show that their speech somehow related to a matter of community concern. As set forth above, with respect to the subject of favoritism and unfairness in the disbursement of government benefits, tow calls are a classic issue of community concern. Indeed, Sottile made his comments at various public forums, and his comments were widely reported in prominently featured newspaper articles, clearly demonstrating that the community deemed the issues raised to be of public concern. See id. (holding that the Plaintiff's speech was a matter of public concern where, among other things, it was made in public forums and covered extensively in the local press). 5 52 Second, we find that Plaintiffs have presented sufficient evidence to indicate that, after voicing their final comments at the April 25, 1995, Board meeting, they were subjected to an adverse action that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in publicly criticizing the Sheriff. Plaintiffs were removed from the stand-by tow call list, thus ending any opportunity to receive business via central dispatch or to be added to the regular tow rotation so long as the Sheriff remained in office. There is no doubt that such conduct would deter the average wrecker service operator from voicing similar criticisms of the Sheriff. 53 Third, we find that Plaintiffs have presented overwhelming evidence that their removal from the stand-by tow call list was motivated by their constitutionally protected public criticism of the Sheriff's Department. The May 4, 1995, letter informing them of their removal expressly states that the action was being taken because Sottile voiced his complaints publicly before the Board rather than in private: 54 Since a dialogue had already been opened in regard to your grievance with our office, your appearance before the County Board can only be viewed as an attempt to discredit the Office of the Sheriff. The Office of the Sheriff will therefore no longer be requiring your services as a standby Wrecker Company. 55 (J.A. at 259.) In his deposition, the Sheriff stated that Plaintiffs were removed from the stand-by list for the same reasons that Lucas was removed from the regular rotation. The Sheriff's Department, of course, informed Lucas that he was being removed because of the accusatory remarks about the Sheriff and his wrecker policy [he] made before a Board of Commissioner's meeting on April 11, 1995. (J.A. at 153.) Therefore, we find that the district court erred in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim of retaliation in violation of their rights under the First Amendment.