Opinion ID: 183803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the District Court Erred in Denying Haigh's Motion for a New Trial

Text: Under Rule 59, the decision to grant a new trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard v. Mo. Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 615 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir.2010). The key question in determining whether a new trial is warranted is whether it is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Maxfield v. Cintas Corp., No. 2, 563 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir.2009). Haigh asserts the court erred in denying his motion for new trial because his health affected his participation at trial. Due to the pain medication he was taking and his physical exhaustion, Haigh asserts he was not at full mental capacity, at least for the last day of trial, and therefore he was unable to be of assistance to his attorney. In addition, Haigh informed the court of additional documentation he continued to find that was relevant to the court's consideration of the case, and he requested an opportunity to present that information once it was all found. The district court concluded both parties had ample opportunity to present their evidence at trial and their arguments to the jury, and no miscarriage of justice occurred. The court noted it observed Haigh fully engaged in trial on multiple occasions, including taking notes and conferring in private with his attorney. Moreover, Haigh never suggested during trial that he could not continue on account of his physical or mental limitations. As for Haigh's documentation allegation, the court stressed that Haigh failed to present even one of the alleged documents to the court, and thus it could not determine whether the evidence had any value or if it would produce a different verdict. In addition, the court stated there was no reason Haigh could not have discovered the documents prior to trial because he alleged he found the documents after a fire at his house that occurred a year prior to trial. We agree with the district court on each ground raised by Haigh. First, Haigh does not dispute that he was physically present for the entirety of the three-day trial. The court stated it observed Haigh participating on multiple occasions during trial, including note-taking and conferring with counsel, thus undermining his allegation that he was not mentally present or able to participate. Given the district court's superior position to observe these matters during the course of trial, we cannot say the court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial on these grounds. Haigh's second ground also fails. Motions under Rule 60(b)(2) on the ground of newly discovered evidence are viewed with disfavor. U.S. Xpress Enters., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 320 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir.2003). In order to succeed, Haigh must show (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) he exercised due diligence in discovering it; (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. Id. Here, even assuming Haigh discovered the evidence after trial and exercised due diligence, he failed to present any of the alleged newly discovered evidence to the district court, and thus the court could not make a determination on whether the evidence was material and not merely cumulative, or whether it was probable that a new trial would produce a different result. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of Haigh's new trial motion.