Opinion ID: 2317416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Strickland's second prongprejudice

Text: Even if we were to assume that DeRosa could satisfy the first Strickland prong, we are not persuaded that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance. In assessing prejudice, we must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the [jury] . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In making this determination, we consider the strength of the State's case, the aggravating circumstances the jury found, the mitigating evidence defense counsel did present, and the additional mitigating evidence the defense might have presented. Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1062 (10th Cir.2001). At the sentencing phase of trial, the prosecution formally adopted all of the evidence it presented during the guilt phase of trial. The first-stage evidence established in particular that DeRosa was the key instigator in the decision to rob the Plummers, and was also the person who, in response to Curtis Plummer's request to be allowed to seek help for his critically injured wife, struck him over the head with a marble-top end table and then slit his throat. The first-stage evidence further established that the crime netted DeRosa and his accomplices approximately $73, a portion of which the three spent to buy food at Taco Bell. And, even though DeRosa's stated purpose in committing the robbery was to obtain cash to allow himself and Castleberry to travel to Texas to look for work, in the end the robbery proceeds were insufficient to accomplish this purpose, and DeRosa and Castleberry had to borrow money from Justin Wingo in order to fund their trip. In addition to adopting the first-stage evidence, the prosecution presented victim-impact testimony from Janice Tolbert, the Plummers' only daughter, and Jo Milligan, the sister of Gloria Plummer. Both women read to the jury statements that they had prepared prior to trial. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase of trial, the jury found that the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution. The jury's findings in this regard were supported by overwhelming evidence. With respect to the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, the prosecution's evidence, which included testimony from the medical examiner who performed the autopsies on the Plummers, established that the Plummers' deaths were preceded by a physical and bloody struggle with DeRosa, and later Castleberry, during which both victims were stabbed multiple times. Gloria Plummer, the evidence established, suffered five stab wounds to her back (one of which entered her chest cavity and terminated at the diaphragm, a second that entered her left lung, and a third that went into the right lobe of her liver), one stab wound to her front (that also entered her left lung and cut her aorta), and four incised wounds or cuts. One of the incised wounds was a four-inch long wound to her upper neck that passed through her windpipe and transected her left carotid artery and jugular vein. This wound, the medical examiner testified, was caused by either sawing action with a knife or multiple passes in the same area with a knife. Although several of these wounds would have been independently fatal, the medical examiner testified, the evidence established that Gloria was conscious prior to, and likely during, the point in time that Castleberry inflicted the incised wound to her upper neck. As for Curtis Plummer, the evidence established that he suffered six separate stab wounds, two of which entered his lungs, as well as a seven-inch incised wound to his neck (caused either by multiple separate passes with a knife or a repositioning and a sawing type motion) that transected and passed through his trachea, windpipe, esophagus, carotid arteries, and jugular veins. The evidence also indicated that Curtis suffered a blunt force wound to the left side of his head from the marble-topped end table DeRosa threw on him. Although this blunt force wound may have rendered Curtis unconscious, and thus unaware at the time DeRosa inflicted the lengthy wound to his neck, the evidence was uncontroverted that Curtis was conscious prior to that point, and well aware not only of his own injuries, but also of the serious injuries suffered by Gloria. Indeed, the evidence established that he begged DeRosa and Castleberry to allow him to call 911 to seek assistance for Gloria, and offered them anything he had if they would allow him to get help. The evidence also overwhelmingly established that the murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest or prosecution. The prosecution's evidence established that the Plummers knew DeRosa because he had worked for them for a short time in the year prior to their murders. And DeRosa's plan to rob the Plummers capitalized on this familiarity: DeRosa, accompanied by Castleberry, approached the Plummers' home in the late evening and asked Gloria Plummer if they could enter in order to talk to Curtis Plummer about the possibility of work. But, significantly, DeRosa's plan to rob the Plummers did not include any method for avoiding arrest or prosecution, short of murdering the Plummers. Had the Plummers lived, they clearly could have identified DeRosa. Also, after DeRosa and Castleberry left the Plummers' house, they drove to a local lake and disposed of evidence, including the Plummers' truck, their clothing, and the knives, by dumping it into the lake. Lastly, following his arrest, DeRosa told cellmate Daniel Wilson at the LeFlore County Jail that everything went perfect until Scotty White . . . c[a]me forward and told the authorities what had happened. Tr., Vol. II at 277. Having outlined the facts relevant to the prejudice determination, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence that DeRosa now points to would have impacted the jury's findings regarding the aggravating circumstances of these murders. Thus, the only way that DeRosa could have been prejudiced by the omission of the additional mitigating evidence is if there is a reasonable probability that the presentation of the additional mitigating evidence would have caused the jury to conclude[ ] that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. On this point, DeRosa argues that, [m]ost prominently, a mountain of deeply disturbing evidence regarding [his] mother Cassie existed but was not presented at trial and could have altered the jury's sentencing determination. Aplt. Br. at 31. And, he argues, [t]he mitigating power of Connie Naydan Carroll's letter to the Massachusetts court [wa]s unprecedented and especially strong. Id. In short, he argues, Cassie was . . . a raging sociopath with an unimaginably destructive effect on [him], and [t]his [wa]s a horror story, both biologically and environmentally, that the jury should have heard. Id. at 14. The problem with DeRosa's arguments is that the jury was well aware, based upon the mitigating evidence actually presented by DeRosa's trial counsel, that Cassie had serious personal issues and was far from a perfect mother. In particular, the jury knew that Cassie effectively abandoned her young sons at a daycare center and then, after her mother took the boys from the daycare center, made no serious attempts to obtain custody of them for several years thereafter. Although the jury may not have been aware of all of the sordid details of Cassie's life, the important point is that, through the testimony of the mitigating witnesses actually presented, the jury was made aware that DeRosa was repeatedly abandoned, rejected, or abused by the important figures in his life, most notably Cassie. In other words, the new evidence that DeRosa now points to regarding Cassie does not differ in a substantial way . . . from the evidence actually presented at sentencing. Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 286 (6th Cir.2005). Relatedly, although DeRosa now attempts to portray his maternal grandmother as a potentially caring figure who was concerned for his well-being, the great weight of the evidence suggests otherwise. To be sure, it was Connie who retrieved DeRosa and Jason from the Oklahoma daycare center where Cassie had placed them. But Connie did not retain custody of DeRosa for long. Instead, the record indicates that she handed DeRosa over to Money. And there is no indication in the record that DeRosa continued to have any type of contact, let alone relationship, with Connie as an adolescent or young man. In fact, the evidence indicates that, as an adult, he continued to maintain a relationship with Cassie. Finally, and again relatedly, the mitigating evidence actually presented to the jury at sentencing established that, until DeRosa was a teenager and encountered DeRosa Sr., virtually every significant adult figure in DeRosa's life, including Connie, was seriously flawed and either abandoned, rejected, or physically or emotionally abused him. Nor would the additional mitigating evidence have added anything significant to the jury's understanding of DeRosa's mental deficiencies. As this court has previously stated, a jury may decide not to impose the death penalty because mental illness helps to explain why the defendant behaved the way he did and makes the defendant less culpable for his crimes, or they may decide not to impose the death penalty because mental illness makes the defendant a more humanized, sympathetic figure. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1144. But DeRosa has not shown a reasonable probability that the additional evidence he offers would have changed the jury's balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances under either [of these] approach[es]. Id. In sum, the mitigating evidence actually presented by DeRosa's trial counsel did not le[ave] the jury with a `pitifully incomplete' picture of the defendant. Id. at 1146 (quoting Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1148 (10th Cir.2007)). Instead, it gave the jury a relatively complete, albeit summarized, look at DeRosa's background and mental issues. And, most significantly, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence now identified by DeRosa, whether considered individually or as a whole, would have altered the jury's sentencing determination.