Opinion ID: 1537146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in admitting two experts' opinion testimony.

Text: KLP argues that the trial court erred in relying upon the opinions of two experts, Robert Moore, Sr., and Gary Pokrant, because the tenants' association did not disclose that it intended to call Moore as an expert prior to trial, as required by Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(4); and, as to Pokrant, who was listed as an expert in the association's pretrial statement, because the trial court erroneously admitted his testimony concerning the proper interpretation of the TLOA, a legal issue on which he was not qualified to offer an opinion.
The purpose of requiring that a party identify experts that it intends to call at trial is to give notice, so that the opposing party has an opportunity to examine the expert's background and opinion prior to trial. Abbey v. Jackson, 483 A.2d 330, 335 (D.C.1984). Civil Rule 26(b)(4) allows a party to seek facts and opinions held by an expert that were acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(b)(4). Here, appellants complain that because Moore was not identified as an expert in the association's pretrial statement, they were denied the opportunity to prepare to cross-examine Moore at trial. But the judge remedied this problem at the end of trial by allowing appellants' counsel to re-open discovery to depose the witness and call additional experts, an opportunity that counsel did not seize. [24] Moreover, although the trial court considered Moore's testimony along with that of appellant's expert, Norman Eule, on the question of the association's readiness to purchase the property, it is not clear that the opinion Moore presented at trial was acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation. [25] But even if we assume that his testimony was erroneously admitted and considered as expert opinion, we see no abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, who, as noted, afforded counsel an opportunity to re-open discovery in order to depose Moore and call additional experts. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361 (D.C.1979) (noting that an inherent part of an appellate determination that trial court has abused discretion is finding of prejudice warranting reversal).
KLP's counsel objected to Pokrant's calculation of the purchase price owed by the association under the contract: Your Honor, this witness issued a report certifying a calculation based upon the IRS depreciation. He is not here to testifyto interpret a contract and the price of the contract. The contract speaks for itself. The trial court initially agreed with the objection, but decided to hear Pokrant's testimony subject to the objection. After hearing Pokrant testify, the trial court overruled KLP's objection. The decision whether to admit or require expert testimony on a particular state of facts is confided to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we have described that discretion as `broad.' Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 266 (D.C.2006). On this record, it is perfectly understandable why the trial court decided to admit Pokrant's expert testimony. Pokrant is a tax analyst at an accounting firm that was familiar with KLP's affairs at the time the initial investments were made and during the accelerated depreciations period. [26] Pokrant calculated the purchase price of the property, see note 15, supra, which was disclosed to KLP prior to trial. Indeed, KLP deposed Pokrant before trial and stipulated to the accuracy of his calculation based on the relevant I.R.S.Code provision, § 167(k)(2)(B)(iii). As noted, KLP's sole objection at trial, as on appeal, is based on its view that the amount thus derived constitutes only part of the purchase price set out in the TLOA, and that the amount of the outstanding deed of trust should be included in the purchase price. This is an interpretation of the TLOA that we have already rejected as a matter of law because the contract clearly provides that the purchase price is to be calculated solely in accordance with § 167(k)(2)(B)(iii). Therefore, any opinion that Pokrant may have expressed about the connection between the calculation based on the Internal Revenue Code provision and the purchase price called for under the TLOA was, at best, superfluous. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court that the tenants' association has a contractual option to purchase the property for $584,132, and that it is entitled to specific performance of the contract, is Affirmed.