Opinion ID: 78057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count I: Young Apartments Has Standing to Challenge the Overcrowding Ordinance as Discriminatory.

Text: Young Apartments' first cause of action claims that Jupiter violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting the Overcrowding Ordinance and then enforcing it only against properties that housed Hispanic immigrant tenants. The district court divided these allegations into an enactment claim and an enforcement claim. The court held that Young Apartments did not have standing to challenge Jupiter's actions as racially discriminatory for either of these claims, because a non-Hispanic landlord lacks standing to bring a race discrimination claim on behalf of its Hispanic residents. (D. Ct. Op. at 7.) Therefore, the court found that Young Apartments could not challenge the enactment of the ordinance on the basis of a suspect classification, and instead scrutinized the ordinance under a rational basis standard of review. The court upheld the ordinance as valid under this rational basis review, and dismissed the enactment claim. Because Young alleged that other similarly-situated landlords were not targeted for enforcement, the court allowed Young's selective enforcement claim to move forward under a class of one analysis. Young Apartments is currently only challenging the district court's denial of standing to challenge Jupiter's actions as racially discriminatory, and not the subsequent summary judgment ruling in which the district court found that Young Apartments could not prevail on its selective enforcement claim. The analytical framework for resolving standing issues requires consideration of both constitutional and prudential requirements for standing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). The constitutional requirements derive from Article III's limitation of federal jurisdiction to situations where a justiciable `case or controversy' exists between the litigants. Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121 (citing Warth, 422 U.S. at 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that to meet the requirements of Article III, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he has suffered an actual or threatened injury, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Id. (citing Saladin v. Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 690 (11th Cir.1987)). If a plaintiff cannot satisfy these constitutional standing requirements, the case lies outside the authority given to the federal courts by Article III and must be dismissed. Id. At the initial pleading stage, a plaintiff may establish standing based on general factual allegations of injury. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir.2002). Because this issue reaches us on a motion to dismiss, we must presume that a plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish the facts alleged. Id. Under this standard of review, there is no dispute that Young Apartments' allegations fulfill all three of these constitutional requirements. Young Apartments has suffered a financial injury based on lost rent and the lost sale of its property. It claims that this injury was caused by Jupiter's enactment of the Overcrowding Ordinance and the Town's subsequent enforcement measures. [4] Young Apartments' injury would be remedied by the proposed damages and injunctive relief, which would compensate Young Apartments for the loss in its property's value and prevent future unlawful enforcement actions. Accordingly, the amended complaint fulfills the constitutional requirements for standing. In addition to the constitutional requirements of Article III, the Supreme Court has also instructed courts to consider three prudential principles when weighing whether judicial restraint requires the dismissal of a party's claims. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197; Bischoff v. Osceola County, 222 F.3d 874, 883 (11th Cir.2000). The Eleventh Circuit has summarized these prudential considerations as: 1) whether the plaintiff's complaint falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional provision at issue; 2) whether the complaint raises abstract questions amounting to generalized grievances which are more appropriately resolved by the legislative branches; and 3) whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties. Harris, 20 F.3d at 1121 (quoting Saladin, 812 F.2d at 690). The district court found that Young Apartments lacked standing to complain of the alleged racial or ethnic discrimination by Jupiter, because it believed that a non-Hispanic landlord lacks standing to bring a race discrimination claim on behalf of its Hispanic residents. (D. Ct. Op. at 6-7.) This ruling, however, is erroneous for two reasons. First, this ruling ignores that Young Apartments is suing Jupiter to remedy its own mistreatment, which it claims resulted from Jupiter's discriminatory targeting of its Hispanic tenants. Accordingly, Young Apartments has standing under § 1983 to vindicate its own rights, which are distinct from the rights of its Hispanic tenants. Second, to the extent that Young Apartments is raising claims that implicate the rights of its Hispanic tenants, the district court wrongly concluded that prudential considerations should prevent Young Apartments from bringing such claims.