Opinion ID: 1834364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: BARKER FACTORS First Trial

Text: 1. Length of Delay As previously noted, Handley was actually tried 603 days, or approximately 20 months, after arrest. This Court has reversed cases where the delay was less than 603 days. See Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss. 1989) (370 days); Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1986) (423 days); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059 (Miss. 1985) (298 days); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194 (Miss. 1982) (566 days). Twenty (20) months is a substantial period of time and is presumptively prejudicial to Handley. This factor, alone, is insufficient for reversal, but requires a close examination of the remaining factors. Smith, 550 So.2d at 408; Bailey, 463 So.2d at 1062. If the remaining factors evidence a lack of support in favor of the prosecution (or in the absence of the defendant's position on the other Barker factors being weak), reversal may be warranted. Beavers, 498 So.2d at 790. 2. Reason for the Delay There are several reasons for the 603 day delay. We examine them in chronological order. The first delay is the 162 days from arrest to indictment. The record does not reflect any reason for this delay, nor does the State address this delay in the record or in its brief. The failure of the State to address this lapse of time and show good cause therefore is tantamount to confession of error, and this Court will accept it as such. Turner v. State, 383 So.2d 489, 491 (Miss. 1980). Where the defendant has not caused the delay, and where the prosecution has declined to show good cause for the delay, we must weigh this factor against the prosecution. Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss. 1982). Accordingly, the 162 day delay between arrest and indictment is charged against the State. Secondly is the 57-day delay between indictment and arraignment. Again, we find no explanation for this delay from the State, either in the record or in the brief. However, we are aware of the procedure which must be followed before arraignment may occur and the fact that Handley jumped his bond shortly after arraignment. Thirdly is the 78-day delay between arraignment and the first scheduled trial. As previously noted, this delay is not unreasonable under the facts and circumstances in this case. Next is the delay caused by Handley himself. Handley was originally scheduled to go to trial February 12, 1986. Handley jumped bond and failed to appear at that time. An Order was entered forfeiting his bond and an instanter alias capias was issued. A review of the record shows that he was recaptured and taken into custody sometime during September 1986. Since no specific date in September is given, we have assigned a recapture date which benefits Handley: September 1, 1986. Two hundred (200) days elapsed from February 12, 1986, until September 1, 1986, assuming Handley was incarcerated September 1, 1986. The reason for this delay, as reflected in the trial court's February 12, 1986, Order, was caused by Handley himself. If the defendant causes the delay he will not be allowed to complain. Bailey at 1062 citing to Perry at 199. Accordingly the delay of 200 days is attributable to Handley. Finally, we are left with the delay between the time Handley was incarcerated following his flight [which we have set as September 1, 1986], and the actual trial on December 15, 1986, a period of 76 days. A delay of seventy-six (76) days under the circumstances is most reasonable. 3. Defendant's Assertion of His Right to a Speedy Trial Handley's first assertion of his right to a speedy trial came after his recapture in his first Motion to Dismiss on November 11, 1986, 35 days prior to his first actual trial. Handley's failure to assert his right to a speedy trial prior to this time weighs against him, [but] it is by no means fatal to his claim that he was denied a speedy trial. Instead, it is only one factor to be considered in the Barker balancing test. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989). 4. Prejudice to the Defendant Handley claims resulting prejudice from a lack of speedy trial in the following manner: (1) memory lapse of the Defendant and other defense witnesses; (2) record memory of witnesses for the State without the benefit of proper foundation; (3) resulting stigma to Handley and an increase in his anxiety; and (4) Handley's chief witness, Allen Murphy, died between the first and second trials. These assertions of prejudice are argued, however, in terms of how they affected the retrial, not the original trial. Having presented no argument supported by a record of prejudice suffered as a result of the delay from arrest to the first trial, Handley has failed to show prejudice as a result of the delay. Balancing the four (4) factors above in light of the totality of the circumstances, we find that Handley was not denied his Constitutional right to a speedy trial. We must now determine whether Handley was denied his Constitutional right to a speedy trial as a result of the delay between mistrial and retrial.