Opinion ID: 2540167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: mr. taylor is entitled to habeas relief

Text: Mr. Taylor contends that he is entitled to habeas relief under the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Ring and Blakely. These decisions were handed down by the United States Supreme Court only after Mr. Taylor's death sentence was affirmed by this Court in State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209 (1996). These cases, he argues, rejected this Court's stated premise in Taylor that a defendant has no constitutional right to have a jury assess punishment, 929 S.W.2d at 219. I agree. Apprendi held that under the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, any fact, except the fact of prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the maximum allowed by the facts found by the jury also must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 476, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Ring made clear that in a capital case this means, Capital defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that factno matter how the State labels itmust be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 602, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The only exception is when the increase is conditioned on the existence of prior convictions; those findings need not be made by the jury. Id. at 597 n. 4, 600, 122 S.Ct. 2428. In reaching its holding in Ring, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), which had held that there is no Sixth Amendment violation where a judge finds an aggravating factor because aggravating factors are mere sentencing considerations, not element[s] of the offense of capital murder. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Ring in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). It clarified that the Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding as to punishment is separate from the right to a jury trial on guilt, and, although a particular defendant is free to choose not to take advantage of that right, as when that defendant makes a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of that constitutional right, otherwise the right to a jury determination of punishment applies even if a defendant has pleaded guilty, because the right to jury fact-finding is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531. A year after Ring, this Court set aside Joseph Whitfield's death sentence (which it had affirmed on appeal before Ring was decided) because the judge rather than the jury made the factual determinations on which his eligibility for the death sentence was predicated. 107 S.W.3d at 256. The judge had determined the factual issues necessary for imposition of the death penalty in Whitfield because after finding Mr. Whitfield guilty of first-degree murder, the jury was unable to reach a verdict in the punishment phase. In the punishment phase, the jury was required to impose a life sentence unless it made three specific findings beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) at least one statutory aggravating factor was present in the defendant's case; (2) the aggravating evidence warrant[ed] imposing the death sentence; and (3) any mitigating evidence was not sufficient to outweigh the evidence in aggravation of punishment found by the trier. [4] § 565.030.4, RSMo 1994. As the Whitfield jury was unable to agree on punishment, the trial judge conducted the section 565.030.4 step-by-step analysis and imposed the death penalty. In this way, the judge rather than the jury found the essential facts under section 565.030.4 to impose death. This was error for, as this Court specifically held in affirming Mr. Whitfield's initial appeal in 1992, State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514-15 (Mo. banc 1992), steps 1, 2 and 3 of the statute set out required factual findings the jury must make to impose death. In the absence of any one of these findings, the jury must impose life. As such, the statute gives no discretion to the juryit must impose a life sentence unless it makes each of these factual findings in favor of the state. Id. For this reason, in its 2003 Whitfield decision, this Court held it clearly violated the requirement of Ring that the jury rather than the judge determine the facts on which the death penalty is based. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 262; accord, People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 496 (Colo.2007) (in the death penalty context, the facts essential to punishment that fall under the Apprendi-Ring-Blakely rule consist of those facts needed to make a death penalty determination, including finding aggravating circumstances, finding mitigating circumstances, and weighing all of these circumstances). Whitfield then observed that the burden shifted to the State to show that the Ring error was harmless and that the State could not carry its burden because there was no way to know, based on the jury deadlock, whether the jury's impasse came at step 2 or 3, which Ring requires a jury to find, or if it came at the point where the jury considers whether to give mercy under section 565.030.4(4)a determination that a judge may make. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 262-64.
Whitfield also determined that the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine all the facts necessary to impose punishment recognized in Apprendi, Ring and Blakely would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review under the three-part Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity analysis long used in Missouri. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 266, 268, citing, Spidle v. State, 446 S.W.2d 793 (Mo.1969); State v. Ussery, 452 S.W.2d 146 (Mo.1970); McCulley v. State, 486 S.W.2d 419 (Mo.1972). [5] Missouri's Linkletter-Stovall retroactivity analysis requires a court to determine retroactivity by considering: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268. Whitfield held that consideration of the three Linkletter-Stovall factors required retroactive application of the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury rather than a judge determine the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty. In so doing, Whitfield noted that the purpose to be served by the rule set out in Ring is to ensure a jury of defendant's peers finds each of the factual elements necessary to his conviction and sentence of death. Id. Whitfield also noted that the extent of reliance by law enforcement on the old rule was small and the effect on the administration of justice of applying the new rule would be minimal, as the number of affected cases would be small, because in Missouri juries have always made the decision whether to impose the death penalty except in those few cases in which the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Id. Whitfield itself identified five such cases in addition to Whitfield but recognized that a small number of other similar cases might later be identified and that the retroactivity analysis necessarily also would be applied to them. Id. at 269. In the ensuing years, a number of additional cases, some pending and some no longer pending or on collateral review, have been identified in which a judge rather than a jury found the facts necessary to impose punishment. The Apprendi-Ring-Blakely analysis has been applied to each of them, as required by Whitfield. As this Court described the principle in applying Whitfield in State ex rel. Baker v. Kendrick, 136 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. banc 2004), which was pending at the time that Whitfield was decided: Because this case was tried after the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), the principles set out in Ring must be applied to it. As stated in Whitfield, this means that, where, as here, the jury was unable to agree on punishment and the record fails to show that the jury found all facts necessary to impose a sentence of death, the trial court's only authority was to enter a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of probation or parole. Id. at 491. [6] Mr. Taylor correctly notes that he presents yet another of these cases in which a judge rather than a jury determined the facts necessary to impose a death sentence and that he too is entitled under Apprendi-Ring-Blakely-Whitfield to have his death sentence set aside. He argues that, having determined in Whitfield that the right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to punishment applies retroactively, the state cannot pick and choose to which defendants or in which fact situations that right will be retroactively applied without violating equal protection principles. I agree. Indeed, the state concedes in its brief that [t]here is no dispute that Ring . . . applies retroactively to Missouri cases under State v. Whitfield . . .. The reason for this concession is evident. While in his case a jury deadlock was not the reason that a judge imposed punishment, Ring and its progeny were not based on jury deadlock. In fact, Ring itself did not involve a jury deadlock. Rather, it involved a jury verdict of guilt, but the judge then found additional facts that justified an increase in punishment over that which would have been authorized by the charge submitted to the jury. It was this additional fact-finding that Ring found improper. 536 U.S. at 592-93, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Likewise, neither Apprendi nor Blakely involved a deadlocked jurythe defendants in both of those cases first pleaded guilty and thereafter sentences were imposed based on judge-found facts. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300-01, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Therefore, it is settled that the Sixth Amendment right is to have a jury determine the facts necessary to impose punishment, whatever the context in which that right was denied. In Whitfield and the other Missouri cases that the courts have considered to date, that context was a jury deadlock resulting in judge sentencing. [7] Whitfield held that it would not deviate from Missouri's traditional Linkletter-Stovall test for retroactivity and that under that test the Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to impose punishment applied retroactively to those whose sentence had been imposed based on facts found by a judge. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 268. The majority argues that the above retroactivity analysis is irrelevant because the facts of this case are different, in that Mr. Taylor did not get sentenced to death after the jury was unable to agree on punishment but instead pleaded guilty without knowing he had a right to a jury trial on the facts necessary to impose death. While this factual distinction is present, it does not affect the retroactivity analysis, for in all legally relevant respects, Mr. Taylor is in the same position, in that he was denied a jury trial of the facts underlying punishment in violation of Apprendi-Ring-Blakely, just as in Whitfield and the other cases cited. Having chosen in Whitfield to retroactively apply the right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to punishment, this Court must do so uniformly to all similarly situated persons: It is the general doctrine that the law, relative to those who may be charged and convicted of crime, as well as the punishment to be inflicted therefore, shall operate equally upon every citizen or inhabitant of this state. State v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 641, 117 S.W.2d 319, 325 (1938). O'Malley held it unconstitutional to allow ballot records to be preserved and used against those committing fraud in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants for a longer period than against those committing fraud in smaller communities, stating: Every one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules, and a special statute which, without his consent, singles his case out as one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, but would be such an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free governments. Id. Similarly, in State v. Baker, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. banc 1975), this Court held that a statute that mandated consecutive sentences for defendants convicted of two crimes, but did so only if they had not yet been sentenced for either crime, violated equal protection because the chronological order in which they were sentenced was immaterial to the reasons why a consecutive sentence might be appropriate. For this reason, for equal protection purposes, they were similarly situated and must be similarly treated, for Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. Id. at 129. As noted in Smith v. State, 680 S.W.2d 412, 413 (Mo.App.1984), citing State v. Brown, 554 S.W.2d 574 (Mo.App.1977), [s]ubsequent cases applied Baker retroactively and required that all defendants sentenced under its guidelines must be resentenced. See also State v. Davis, 765 S.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Mo. banc 1989) (equal protection requires equal treatment of those similarly situated and discrimination based upon a ground wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the legislative objective violates equal protection principles). To allow defendants who plead guilty, such as Mr. Taylor, to be singled out and deprived of the right to jury determination of the facts on which punishment is based runs afoul of this basic principle of equal treatment. As the Ninth Circuit has stated the point in holding that the California Supreme Court would violate the equal protection clause if it gave one class of persons but not another the benefit of retroactive application of its rule providing defendants a right to an impartial jury: The equal protection clause prohibits a state from affording one person (other than the litigant whose case is the vehicle for the promulgation of a new rule) the retroactive benefit of a ruling on a state constitution's right to an impartial jury while denying it to another. Myers v. Ylst, 897 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir. 1990). Similarly in LaRue v. McCarthy, 833 F.2d 140 (9th Cir.1987), the Ninth Circuit held that California could not pick and chose those to whom it would retroactively apply a rule that prohibited basing felony murder charges on child abuse. Rather, the state must apply its rule retroactively in all cases or in none because once a state has established a rule it must be applied evenhandedly. Id. at 142, citing, Johnson v. Arizona, 462 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir.1972). Johnson had held that Arizona could not apply a decision striking down determinant sentences retroactively in some cases but not all without violating equal protection principles. Id. at 1354. Other courts are in accord. Hill v. Roberts, 793 F.Supp. 1044 (D.Ks.1992), stated that a state is free to choose whether to apply many constitutional rules retroactively. But, it said: The equal protection clause clearly prohibits a state from affording one person the retroactive benefit of a ruling and denying it to another who is similarly situated. Id. at 1046. To the contrary, once a state establishes a new rule, it must be applied evenhandedly. Id. Hill found that the state had applied its new rule only to pending cases and, therefore, had not violated the equal protection clause. Here, unlike in Hill, this Court has applied its new rule retroactively to cases that were not pending at the time of the new rule. It cannot now choose not to apply it retroactively to some but not other cases in which that Sixth Amendment right was violated. While the particular reasons that Mr. Taylor and Mr. Whitfield were denied jury sentencinga guilty plea as opposed to a hung jurymay be different, they are similarly situated insofar as the Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of the facts on which punishment is based is concerned. Apprendi, Ring, Blakely and Whitfield all involved very different fact situations, but all reached the same result because, in the only relevant respect, all were identicalin each the defendant was denied a jury determination of the facts necessary for punishment. Ring states that allowing a judge rather than a jury to find the facts necessary to impose death violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Blakely says that this principle extends to situations in which a defendant has pleaded guilty. Even in the case of a plea agreement, therefore, the state cannot violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial on all facts necessary to impose a sentence. Here, Mr. Taylor did not receive a jury trial on punishment, although he had a right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose the death penalty. As this Court noted on the prior appeal of this case in discussing the statutory right to jury trial, where a defendant previously had a right to have a jury impose sentence, section 565.035.5(3) does allow `a new jury' to be selected for purposes of imposing sentence. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 219. Mr. Taylor was denied this right here.
The State does not disagree that Ring and Whitfield would apply retroactively here if Mr. Taylor had asked for but been denied a jury trial on the facts necessary to impose punishment. It instead bases its position that Mr. Taylor's death sentence should not be set aside on the assertion that Mr. Taylor waived any statutory right to jury sentencing by pleading guilty in 1991 and that in doing so he should be held also to have waived any constitutional right to jury sentencing. For this reason, the majority quotes at length from the guilty plea hearing transcript to show Mr. Taylor knew that by pleading guilty he would not receive a jury trial on the facts necessary to impose punishment. That issue is not in doubt; however, it simply is not the relevant question. I agree with the State that a defendant may choose to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his constitutional right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose a sentence, just as a defendant may choose to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial on guilt. This legal issue is not controverted by any party, nor could it be. Further, nothing has been cited that requires a trial court to accept a guilty plea; therefore, there is nothing that appears to prohibit a court from refusing to accept such a plea from a defendant who has demanded jury sentencing. But, in Mr. Taylor's case, a jury trial on punishment was not denied based on an affirmative knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of Mr. Taylor's Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding. Neither did the trial court refuse to accept Mr. Taylor's guilty plea because Mr. Taylor wanted a jury trial on the facts on which punishment would be based. To the contrary, Mr. Taylor was denied a jury trial solely based on the fact that section 565.006.2 barred him from being allowed a jury trial on punishment because he pleaded guilty. Mr. Taylor agrees that he acknowledged his awareness that this was the effect of section 565.006.2 and, so, that by pleading guilty he knew he would try the punishment phase before a judge, not a jury. His counsel also knew this was the effect of his plea. But, Mr. Taylor says, he did not agree to legally waive any such right, for there was no statutory right under section 565.006.2 for him to waive. And, even were there such a right, he did not and could not have waived his constitutional right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to impose the sentence. This is because, contrary to the state's unsupported opposing argument, and as Taylor itself expressly recognized, no such Sixth Amendment right had been recognized at the time of his plea. 929 S.W.2d at 219. As Taylor noted in regard to the statutory right to a jury trial, Mr. Taylor could not waive a right he did not have. Id. Moreover, the transcript of the post-conviction motion hearing makes it clear that his counsel did not inform him that he could have a jury trial of punishment if he pleaded guilty, for they did not believe this legally was allowed. After this Court's ruling in Taylor, the United States Supreme Court held that defendants do have an independent, Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding as to any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the maximum a judge may impose based solely on the facts admitted by the defendant in his guilty plea. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. But, the concept set out in Taylor that one cannot waive a right that does not exist or has not been recognized is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's approach to the concept of waiver in other cases in which it has been alleged that a defendant had waived a constitutional right by pleading guilty. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (emphasis added). A waiver of a constitutional right must be made knowingly and intelligently. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Courts are to indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019. The law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent and sufficiently aware if the defendant understands the nature of the right and how it would apply in general in the circumstances . . .. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 91, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004). The State says that by acknowledging he would not receive a jury trial on punishment if he pleaded guilty, he waived the as yet unknown constitutional right to have a jury determine the facts necessary to punishment as well, even though he was not aware of its existence. But, the State cites no law saying that one can knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily relinquish a right that has not yet been established. Two United States Supreme Court cases are directly on point, however, and state that such a waiver is not permissible. Smith v. Yeager, 393 U.S. 122, 89 S.Ct. 277, 21 L.Ed.2d 246 (1968), involving a state prisoner's right to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for federal habeas corpus, rejects a very similar argument. At the time the petitioner first sought federal habeas corpus in 1961, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953), was the controlling law. Under it, the district court believed that the petitioner had no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on the federal habeas petition. Petitioner's counsel agreed, stating that they did not need one anyway. After the decision in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), expanded the right of habeas petitioners to an evidentiary hearing, the petitioner again sought habeas relief. The federal court of appeals held that his attorney had waived petitioner's right to an evidentiary hearing in the 1961 proceeding. The Supreme Court reversed, stating that the fact that counsel said he was not sure whether there was a right to such a hearing but that he relinquished it did not constitute a waiver, for: Whatever counsel's reasons for this obscure gesture of noblesse oblige, we cannot now . . . presume that he intentionally relinquished a known right or privilege, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461), when the right or privilege was of doubtful existence at the time of the supposed waiver. Yeager, 393 U.S. at 125, 89 S.Ct. 277 (emphasis added). The majority's attempt to distinguish Yeager on the basis that here it was definitely known that there was no statutory right confuses the very point at issue herethat everyone believed there was no parallel constitutional right, indeed Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), specifically had so held, and therefore that right could not have been waived even if the statutory right was waived. This is the very concept underlying the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation of the principle that one cannot waive a future right not yet recognized in Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 125 S.Ct. 2582, 162 L.Ed.2d 552 (2005). Halbert noted that the governing Michigan law provided that an accused who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere could appeal by leave of the court only and that, in most circumstances, counsel would not be provided to assist indigents in applying for leave to appeal. The petitioner pleaded nolo contendere and was denied appointment of counsel to assist him in applying for leave to appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id. at 614, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Halbert rejected Michigan's argument that it was not required to provide counsel for indigents who were seeking leave to appeal, holding that the due process and equal protection clauses require the appointment of counsel for defendants, convicted on their pleas, who seek access to first-tier discretionary appellate review. The state of Michigan alternatively contended that even if there were a constitutional right to have counsel appointed to represent defendant when he sought leave to appeal, the petitioner in Halbert necessarily waived that right because he knew that a Michigan statute provided that a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere will not receive the assistance of counsel in applying for discretionary appeal. Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 770.3a (West 2000). Therefore, by pleading nolo contendere, he had to know that the statute would deny him a right to court-appointed counsel. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The Halbert majority rejected Michigan's argument. The court held that Mr. Halbert could not have waived his constitutional right to appeal because, [a]t the time he entered his plea, Halbert, in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to appointed appellate counsel he could elect to forgo. Id. (six-person majority, including Justice Kennedy). In so holding, Halbert rejected the argument by Justice Thomas in dissent that assuming Mr. Halbert did have a statutory right to counsel on appeal, he waived it when he decided to plead guilty with knowledge that the consequence likely would be that he would not get counsel on appeal. Id. at 637-43, 125 S.Ct. 2582 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, as even Justice Thomas recognized, Whether Michigan law provides for such counsel says nothing about whether a defendant possesses (and hence can waive) a federal constitutional right to that effect. That Michigan, as a matter of state law, prohibited Halbert from receiving appointed appellate counsel if he pleaded guilty or no contest, is irrelevant to whether Halbert had (and could waive) an independent federal constitutional right to such counsel. Id. at 640, 125 S.Ct. 2582. The parallel to Mr. Taylor's case is remarkable. When Mr. Taylor entered his plea, there was no recognized Sixth Amendment right to have a jury make the factual findings on which a death sentence was based. Indeed the question was not even unsettled in 1991; in the death penalty context, the holding of Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)that the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to find the aggravating circumstances necessary to impose deathhad established that no such right existed. Just as in Yeager and Halbert, Mr. Taylor could not have waived his right to jury fact-finding for (borrowing from the language used in Halbert ) at the time he entered his plea, [Taylor], in common with other defendants convicted on their pleas, had no recognized right to [a jury determination of the facts relating to punishment] he could elect to forego. Halbert, 545 U.S. at 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. While as the majority opinion notes, Mr. Halbert also was not informed that he definitely would be denied counsel on appeal, review of Halbert leaves no doubt that this was not the paramount basis of the Supreme Court's decision, which turned on whether one can waive a right one does not have, not lack of knowledge of the consequences, as the Halbert dissent makes clear. Id. at 612-14, 623, 125 S.Ct. 2582. Colorado faced a very similar issue in People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007). There, defendant pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. In Colorado, as in Missouri, a capital defendant who pleads guilty is denied the right to a jury trial on punishment. 18-1.3-1201(1)(a) C.R.S.2006. Accordingly, the punishment phase trial was held before the judge, who imposed the death penalty. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, stating, While a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial on sentencing facts, this waiver must be knowing, voluntary and intelligent. 157 P.3d at 492. The court found that to the extent that the Colorado statute prohibited a jury trial on punishment solely based on a defendant's decision to plead guilty, it therefore violated the Sixth Amendment because the statute fails to effect a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver, as the waiver is automatic when a defendant pleads guilty. Id. In other words, the statute could not constitutionally link the waiver of a jury trial on punishment to the waiver of a jury trial on guilt because that would make such a waiver automatic. While a defendant may waive jury fact-finding during the punishment phase, Blakely requires that waiver to be knowingly, intelligently and separately waived. Id. The only relevant case cited by the state to the contrary is State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 806-809 (S.D.2006). [8] In that case, the South Dakota Supreme Court interpreted its death penalty procedure statute as providing for a sentencing hearing at which a jury determines the presence or absence of alleged aggravating factors when a defendant pleads guilty. Piper, 709 N.W.2d at 804. Piper noted that before finding the aggravating factors necessary to impose death, the [trial] court properly presented Piper with the option of exercising his right to sentencing by a jury as provided by South Dakota's capital punishment statutory scheme. Id. at 806. The majority in Piper held that although the Ring right to a jury finding of aggravating factors had not yet been established at the time of the defendant's sentencing hearing, the defendant had  specifically asked to be sentenced by the circuit court, thereby waiving his constitutional right to have a jury determine whether the alleged aggravating circumstances in his case existed beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Piper, then, is distinguishable from this case because Mr. Taylor never specifically requested that a judge be the fact-finder at his punishment trial; indeed, when his sentencing phase was held after remand in 1994, Mr. Taylor specifically asked for a jury, not a judge. Moreover, at no point did the trial court present Mr. Taylor with the option to have a jury. Instead, by operation of section 565.006.2, the fact-finders at both of Mr. Taylor's penalty phase trials were judges. Much more persuasive and relevant is the dissenting opinion in Piper, which adopted the approach taken by this Court in Taylor, stating, the waiver of a substantive right presupposes the existence of the right in the first place. The language of the statute expressly limits the fact-finding role to the judge in non-jury cases. . . the judges . . . had no authority to offer jury sentencing. 709 N.W.2d at 821. The dissenting judge concluded that in light of the Supreme Court's holding that there is a constitutional right to jury fact-finding, because the required factual findings were not admitted by the defendant or found by a jury, the death sentence imposed by the judge was in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 822. The principles set out in Yeager, Halbert and Montour are directly applicable here. Mr. Taylor could not waive a right to punishment-phase jury fact-finding that he did not have. The waiver argument made by the State and accepted by the majority is without merit.
Even were Halbert not a bar to holding that Mr. Taylor could waive an as yet unrecognized constitutional right to a jury determination of the facts necessary to punishment, the law of the case doctrine bars the state from making such an argument as to Mr. Taylor. This Court already has held that Mr. Taylor did not waive any such right, for he had no right to waive, based on either a statute or the constitution. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d at 217, 218-219. This Court also has held that where, as here, it is shown that the defendant did have a right to a jury trial prior to reversal and remand for re-sentencing, then section 565.035.5(3) does allow `a new jury' to be selected for purposes of imposing sentence. Id. at 219. The majority implicitly argues that law of the case does not apply here because the holding in Mr. Taylor's first appeal was made in the context of rejecting Mr. Taylor's argument that his rights were violated when he was not told that he could have jury sentencing if the state agreed to it. But, that is the point, of course. To reject Mr. Taylor's argument, this Court held that Mr. Taylor never had a right to jury sentencing under Missouri statutes in the first place and, therefore, he had no right he could waive. Now that Mr. Taylor embraces this holding, the majority would have this Court takes the opposite view, stating that he could and did waive his right to jury trial. But, the legal point is the samethere was no right, so there was no waiver. The courts cannot alternate between recognizing and not recognizing such a right depending on the issue before it and the consequences of such recognition. There cannot be no right to waive when addressing whether counsel failed to inform him of his rights but then a right to waive when the question changes to did he chose to waive unrecognized rights. The majority certainly cites no authority to support its conclusion that there is no inconsistency in its holding simply because it was made in response to a different factual question, when the basis of decisionwhether factually there was a waiveris the same. Under Missouri authority, the holding that Mr. Taylor did not waive a jury determination of punishment is law of the case. The law of the case doctrine is a neutral principle that can inure to the benefit of either the defendant or the State. Compare State v. Graham, 13 S.W.3d 290, 293 (Mo. banc 2000); Ex Parte Calvin, 689 S.W.2d 460, 462-63 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (both applying law of the case principles to defendant's benefit); with Smulls v. State, 71 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Mo. banc 2002); State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 545 (Mo. banc 2010) (both applying law of the case principles to state's benefit). Of course, there are exceptions to the law of the case doctrine. Appellate courts will not apply the law of the case doctrine if the first decision was based on a mistaken fact or resulted in manifest injustice or where a change in the law intervened between the appeals. Deck, 303 S.W.3d at 545, citing Walton v. City of Berkeley, 223 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Mo. banc 2007); accord, Cross v. State, 37 S.W.3d 256, 259 (Mo.App.2000) (refusing to apply law of case to preclude defendant from raising issue where law changed between first and second appeals). Similarly, a court will not apply the law of the case doctrine if it is determine[d] that a new rule with retroactive effect contradicts the law of the case. Bejarano v. State, 122 Nev. 1066, 146 P.3d 265, 271 (2006); accord, Tippins v. State, 780 So.2d 147, 148 (Fl.App.2001) (court would not apply law of the case because law had changed and sentence was in excess of that allowed by law, making exception for manifest injustice applicable). In Mr. Taylor's case, however, as noted, these exceptions work in his favor. The only change in the law has been to his benefitthe United States Supreme Court has recognized he had a Sixth Amendment right to jury fact-finding on the issue of punishment, not just on guilt, and Whitfield has recognized that this right applies retroactively in Missouri. For these reasons, the State is precluded from claiming that Taylor waived the right to jury sentencing at his guilty plea hearing. Under the doctrine of the law of the case, the issue has already been decided; there was no waiver.
For all of the above reasons, Mr. Taylor could not legally be held to have waived a constitutional right to jury trial that was not yet recognized, and even could he do so, this Court's prior holding that there was no such waiver is law of the case. Even were it correct to review Mr. Taylor's prior statements to see whether he affirmatively stated he knowingly waived a right to jury trial of the facts necessary to punishment, he did not do so. The guilty plea hearing transcript shows without question that he wanted to plead guilty and that he knew that by doing so he would not have a right to a jury trial on punishment. It uses the word waiver only once, and only in the context of acknowledging that because he wanted to plead guilty, he knew he therefore would not be getting a jury trial. Of course, at that time, as discussed, he had no constitutional right to a jury trial on punishment once he pleaded guilty, so this was just a statement of fact. He never said that he independently desired that a jury not be permitted to determine the facts necessary to punishment. The state and the majority try to fill this gap by citing to testimony made by Mr. Taylor in his first post-conviction hearing, discussed in detail above. Of course, the relevant question is not what Mr. Taylor retroactively might have said he previously thought or would have thought had he been offered a right to a jury trial on punishment, but whether he in fact was offered one and waived it at the time of his guilty plea. He was not and did not. Even more basically, assuming Mr. Taylor's statements in his post-conviction proceeding about his statutory right to jury trial were the relevant issue, the transcript does not contain the admissions claimed by the State as to waiver. In context, Mr. Taylor clearly states that he wanted to plead guilty because he already had confessed and believed that a trial on guilt made little sense in light of his confession. When the prosecutor asked, So let me ask you, why is it that you avoided a jury in your decision that you made when you decided to plead in front of Judge Randall? What was it that you were afraid of in front of a jury, the exchange proceeded as follows: A. It wasn't that I was afraid, it just didn'tI preferred not to go to a jury trial. Q. Did you have any doubt in your mind that a jury would sentence you to death? A. Did I have any doubt? I didn't know. Q. You didn't have an opinion, is what you're telling us under oath, as to what a jury would do? A. I can't answer that because I'm not the jury. I mean, I would hope that they would understand me acceptingmy willingness to admit that I committed this crime and have mercy. . . . . Q. Okay. And your testimony before this Judge is that you don't recall any discussions with your attorneys about the likelihood of receiving death in front of a jury? A. No. Q. You don't recall and you're telling us under oath in front of this Judge that you don't recall any real discussions about the death penalty likelihood at all? A. We discussed the issues concerning the First Degree Murder charge of life without parole and possibility of the death penalty. But as far as discussing what I probably would get going to a jury, we really didn't discuss that. Q. Why did you decide to plead in front of a Judge? Why did you want to plead in front of Judge Meyers? A. Because of my videotaped statement. Q. Did you think that the Judge would be more or less likely to give a death penalty than a jury? A. I really don't know. Q. . . . You had no discussions, no opinion as to the relative benefits between a Judge or jury for punishment, is that what you're telling us? A. Yes. Mr. Taylor does not say he pleaded guilty to waive a jury determination of punishment, as the state contends was the case. Rather, he said that he did not initially want to go to trial before a jury because he had confessed so there was no point to a trial of his guilt and that his counsel did not discuss with him whether a judge or jury would provide him with a better chance for avoiding the death penaltysuch a discussion would have been pointless, of course, as he had no opportunity to have a jury trial of punishment once he decided to plead guilty. He did not know which trier of fact would have given him a better chance at avoiding death sentence; that question did not come up and was not an issue his counsel discussed with him because a jury trial of punishment was not an option once he decided to plead guilty. Counsel confirmed that they did not discuss with Mr. Taylor whether it would be better to have a judge or jury decide the sentence he should receive once he pleaded guilty. Certainly they believed and advised him that he should plead guilty, but it was because, as Mr. McClain testified, he believed that the videotaped confession would be very damaging at a guilt phase proceeding and, thus, a trial of the guilt issues before a jury might look like Mr. Taylor was trying to back out of his admissions, which likely would inflame the fact-finder. Mr. McClain testified that he was concerned with how bad the confession would look to a jury of twelve and how bad it would look that [they] were contesting his guilt when he had made that confession. Mr. McClain was not aware whether a defendant could go to trial before a jury but then confess guilt, he had never heard of such a possibility and did not consider it or discuss it with Mr. Taylor. Mr. McClain testified that his memory was the choice was between the jury and pleading guilty and having the Judge sentence. Had she thought there was a choice of whether to try punishment to a judge or jury, Ms. Delk testified that she was not sure what she would have recommended, for she saw benefits and detriments to each approach. A judge might better understand Mr. Taylor's criminal history, but according to Ms. Delk factors that may have made a jury favorable were the remorse that [Mr. Taylor] felt as well as the family situation, the family support, that type of mitigation I think would also go well to a jury. Because Missouri law did not permit a jury trial of punishment where defendant pleaded guilty, however, once Mr. Taylor took counsel's advice to plead guilty, Ms. Delk testified that she did not discuss with him these factors tending toward jury sentencing after a plea. Ms. Delk admitted that in this regard she failed in her duty to inform him of all his options. Far from providing evidence of waiver, the testimony from the original PCR hearing confirms that Mr. Taylor did not waive the right to have a jury determination of the facts necessary for imposition of the death penalty.