Opinion ID: 6352826
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Melanie L.

Text: ¶35 S.A.M.'s reliance on Melanie L. is also unavailing. Melanie L. involved a county expert's failure to answer questions using the terms in the statute. 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶91. The expert opined that Melanie was incapable of applying an understanding of the medication 'to her advantage.' Id. By contrast, the statutory standard demanded that she be substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his or her mental illness . . . to make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment. Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)4.b. Because there was conflicting evidence on this standard, we concluded that the expert's deviation from the statutory terms cast doubt on whether the expert was applying the standard or changing the standard. Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶90-91. As such, the County failed to meet its clear-and-convincing burden. Id., ¶94. 21 No. 2019AP001033 ¶36 We face a different record here than we did in Melanie L. The record before us shows the circuit court, parties, and witnesses all in accord regarding the statutory standards they were applying. The County made clear at the outset that it intends to show today that there's a substantial likelihood that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn, as § 51.20(1)(am) requires. Though no witness recited the Third Standard with exactness, the experts' repeated references to S.A.M. both reporting and threatening self-harm make clear to this court that they were properly assessing the probability of physical impairment or injury to himself if the commitment ended. We therefore conclude the evidence on S.A.M.'s dangerousness sufficiently justified his recommitment.