Opinion ID: 2587
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amendments to the IDEA

Text: Fuentes also argues that, in response to court decisions struggling with why biological parents were not specifically included in the meaning of the term parent in the IDEA, Congress amended the IDEA in 2005 in ways that have made the intention of the IDEA in relation to `parents' far more certain. Appellant's Br. at 21. The IDEA now provides that: The term parent means  (A) a natural, adoptive, or foster parent of a child ... 20 U.S.C. § 1401(23)(2005). Furthermore, Fuentes contends that new DOE regulations enacted pursuant to the IDEA create a presumption in favor of standing for biological parents and that this presumption operates to confer standing upon him. The regulations provide: (b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, the biological or adoptive parent, when attempting to act as the parent under this part and when more than one party is qualified under paragraph (a) of this section to act as a parent, must be presumed to be the parent for purposes of this section unless the biological or adoptive parent does not have legal authority to make educational decisions for the child. (2) If a judicial decree or order identifies a specific person or persons under paragraphs (a)(1) through (4) of this section to act as the parent of a child or to make educational decisions on behalf of a child, then such person or persons shall be determined to be the parent for purposes of this section. 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(2006). Fuentes posits that these changes create a presumption that a biological parent retains a right to sue under the IDEA regardless of custodial status so long as the decree at issue does not restrict the biological parent's rights with regard to educational decisions. He further argues that his position is supported by the drafters' comments in the 2006 regulations of the Department of Education which provide that [i]n situations where the parents of a child are divorced, the parental rights established by the Act apply to both parents, unless a court order or State law specifies otherwise. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,540, at ,568 (August 14, 2006). The BOE contests this interpretation and argues also that if Fuentes is correct, applying the new rule would pose retroactivity concerns. We need not address the BOE's retroactivity concerns because the 2006 changes do not affect Fuentes's case. Importantly, Fuentes ignores the language in the DOE regulations that state that the presumption will not apply if the biological or adoptive parent does not have legal authority to make educational decisions for the child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.30(b)(1) (emphasis added). [1] And Taylor makes clear that we look to state law to determine who has such legal authority. Thus, after the 2006 amendments to the statute and the regulations, state law is still determinative of Fuentes's appeal. We now turn to that question.