Opinion ID: 788575
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction Omitting Element Of Murder

Text: 74 Burton's fourth procedurally defaulted claim is that his conviction should be reversed on the basis that the trial judge omitted an element of the crime of murder in his instructions to the jury. Specifically, Burton challenges the omission of an instruction that, in order to prove that Burton committed murder, the prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of justification or excuse. See Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 287 n.4 (6th Cir.2000) , cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 2577, 150 L.Ed.2d 739 (2001) (noting the complexity of cases where an ingredient can arguably be both an element of a charged crime and of a defense, or the presence of a defense can arguably negate a required element). 75 Michigan case law at the time of Burton's trial did list absence of mitigation or justification as one of the elements of murder. See People v. Bailey, 451 Mich. 657, 549 N.W.2d 325, 331 (1996) (The elements of second-degree, or common-law, murder are '... (3) absent circumstances of justification, excuse, or mitigation....') (quoting People v. Dykhouse, 418 Mich. 488, 345 N.W.2d 150, 158 (1984)). However, the Michigan Supreme Court had also stated that [t]he absence of mitigating circumstances need not be established in order to convict one of first- or second-degree murder in ruling that voluntary manslaughter (which required a showing of provocation) was not automatically a lesser included offense of murder. 6 People v. Van Wyck, 402 Mich. 266, 262 N.W.2d 638, 640 (1978); see also Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 521 (6th Cir.) , cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955, 99 S.Ct. 354, 58 L.Ed.2d 347 (1978) (ruling that failure to include in jury instruction that burden of proof is upon the prosecution to disprove self-defense theory asserted by defendant violated defendant's federal due process rights, explaining that, [i]n Michigan an element of proof of murder is evidence which negates self-defense, in any case where self-defense is claimed and evidence is offered thereon ) (emphasis added). Indeed, the Michigan pattern jury instructions for first-degree and second-degree murder at the time of Burton's trial specifically noted that an instruction regarding the element of absence of justification or mitigation was not required if no such evidence had been proferred during trial. See 2 Mich.Crim. Jury Instructions 16.1 First-degree Premeditated Murder n.4 & Commentary (2d ed. 2003 & 2003/2004 Supp.) (Paragraph (6) [i.e., `that the killing was not justified, excused, or done under circumstances that reduce it to a lesser crime'] may be omitted if there is no evidence of justification or excuse, and the jury is not being instructed on manslaughter or any offense less than manslaughter.... Using traditional state of mind formulations based on `malice aforethought,' some cases had implied that justification, excuse, and mitigation were `negative elements' of murder, which the prosecutor had to disprove. However, the weight of Michigan authority is that justification, excuse, and mitigation need not be disproved by the prosecutor in every case. The absence of mitigating circumstances need not be established in order to convict one of first- or second-degree murder. With this in mind, the committee bracketed paragraphs on justification, excuse, and mitigation for use in appropriate cases. Of course, when a defense of self-defense, accident, or provocation is raised by the evidence, the prosecutor is required to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court is obliged to give the appropriate bracketed language.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); 2 Mich.Crim. Jury Instructions 16.5 Second-degree Murder n.4 (2d ed. 2003 & 2003/2004 Supp.); 2 Mich.Crim. Jury Instructions 16.6 Element Chart — First-degree Premeditated and Second-degree Murder n. (2d ed.2003, 1995/1996 Supp., & 2003/2004 Supp.). 76 Burton's principal defense at trial was that he had been mistakenly identified as the person who shot McClayton. Because Burton claimed not to have shot McClayton, the issue of justification or mitigation simply did not apply, and an instruction on these issues was not required under Michigan law. Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 39, 44-45. Furthermore, because justification or mitigation do not seem to have been at issue during the trial, any jury-instruction error on this point did not render Burton's trial so fundamentally unfair as to state a constitutional due process claim cognizable on habeas corpus review. In sum, a constitutional claim based on the absence of an instruction regarding mitigation or justification in this case lacks merit, so it cannot be said that failure to raise such an objection on appeal constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel that overcomes procedural default. 77 5. Prosecutorial Statements Regarding Jury's Duty To Convict And Defense Counsel's Failure To State That Defendant Is Not Guilty 78 Burton's fifth procedurally defaulted claim is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making statements undermining Burton's presumption of innocence. Prosecutorial misconduct, in order to rise to the level of a constitutional due process violation, must be so severe that the defendant did not have a fair trial. As we explained in Bowling v. Parker, for prosecutorial misconduct to rise to the level of a constitutional violation cognizable on habeas review: 79 the misconduct must have so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Even if the prosecutor's conduct was improper or even universally condemned, we can provide relief only if the statements were so flagrant as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Once we find that a statement is improper, four factors are considered in determining whether the impropriety is flagrant: (1) the likelihood that the remarks would mislead the jury or prejudice the accused, (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive, (3) whether the remarks were deliberately or accidentally presented to the jury, and (4) whether other evidence against the defendant was substantial. 80 344 F.3d 487, 512-13 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 81
82 Burton first challenges statements of the prosecutor during voir dire on the basis that such statements impermissibly instructed jurors that they had a duty to convict Burton; that is, that the prosecutor, in effect, directed the jury to enter a verdict against Burton. However, a review of the prosecutor's statements reveals that they were not improper because they did not amount to an instruction to the jury that it must convict Burton irrespective of its own assessment of the evidence presented during trial. Rather, the prosecutor's statements were part of a line of questioning directed at determining whether jurors understood that, if the jurors determined that the prosecution had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Burton had committed murder, then they would be under a duty to convict Burton: 83 [D]o you understand at the conclusion of the case, if the evidence shows that the defendant is guilty of the crime of murder, it'd be your duty as jurors to come back with a guilty verdict. Do you understand that? ... 84 If the proofs show you beyond a reasonable doubt that this man, Kumal Burton, committed murder, it'd be your duty to convict him. Do you understand that? If the evidence was there. It's the way our system works. 85 If the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that Kumal Burton committed murder on June 3rd, 1994, would each of you be able to stand up in this courtroom and face him and tell him that you are convicting him of murder? 86 Trial Tr. Vol. I at 28. Such questioning is not improper during the impaneling of a jury. See United States v. Hill, 738 F.2d 152, 154 (6th Cir.1984) (Although historically the incidence of the prosecutor's challenge has differed from that of the accused, the view in this country has been that the system should guarantee `not only freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution. Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held.') (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70, 7 S.Ct. 350, 30 L.Ed. 578 (1887)); United States v. Blount, 479 F.2d 650, 651 (6th Cir.1973) (The primary purpose of the voir dire of jurors is to make possible the empanelling of an impartial jury through questions that permit the intelligent exercise of challenges by counsel. It follows, then, that a requested question should be asked if an anticipated response would afford the basis for a challenge for cause.) (citations omitted). Moreover, the prosecutor specifically noted during voir dire that the jury would have a duty to find Burton not guilty if the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof. Trial Tr. Vol. I at 49-50 (And obviously, as [defense counsel] has indicated here, if the People don't prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all the elements, it would be your duty as jurors to find the defendant not guilty. Do you understand that?). Given that Burton's claim of unconstitutional prosecutorial misconduct based on the prosecutor's alleged statement that the jury had a duty to convict Burton lacks merit, Burton's counsel on direct appeal was reasonable in choosing not to raise this argument on direct appeal, and no showing of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel can be made. Thus, this claim remains procedurally defaulted. 87
88 Burton's second allegation of prosecutorial misconduct stems from the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that, I did not hear [defense counsel] say that his client was not guilty. He did not say that. Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 30 (quoted in J.A. at 68) (Br. in Support of Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 45). Burton asserts that such a comment constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because it runs counter to the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 89 While the prosecutor's statement was improper, it did not render Burton's trial so fundamentally unfair that a constitutional violation mandating reversal of conviction occurred. The prosecutor, defense counsel, and the court repeatedly noted Burton's presumption of innocence. Trial Tr. Vol. I at 49 (during voir dire, prosecutor's statement that, because the state of Michigan — I represent the state of Michigan — the People of the state of Michigan, the burden, as [defense counsel] has suggested, is on my shoulders to prove guilt in this courtroom. And I accept that burden. That's the burden that the law imposes. But that doesn't mean that I have to come into the courtroom on criminal cases and prove guilt beyond all doubt.... And obviously, as [defense counsel] has indicated here, if the People don't prove guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all the elements, it would be your duty as jurors to find the defendant not guilty.); Trial Tr. Vol. I at 81 (judge's charge to jury at opening of trial regarding presumption of innocence); Trial Tr. Vol. I at 109 (defense counsel's statement during opening remarks to the jury that, [A]s we talked earlier during the voir dire, the burden is on the prosecutor throughout this trial to prove his allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. And that burden does not shift at any point in time to the defendant. And so as we discussed during the voir dire, since that's true, the burden never shifts — the defendant has no obligation and need not present any witnesses. Need not even take the stand and testify. Because throughout this process, until such time as the Judge gives you the instructions and sends you into that room to deliberate over what you heard, the defendant is cloaked with a presumption of innocence and the burden to change that presumption of innocence, remains firmly upon the prosecutor's shoulders.... And that's very important today, because I will tell you right now, Kumal Burton is not going to take the witness stand. And, in fact, we will present no witnesses.); Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 54 (judge's instruction to jury at close of trial that, a person accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent. This means that you must start with the presumption that this defendant is innocent. This presumption continues throughout the trial and entitles the defendant to a verdict of not guilty unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty.). 90 In view of the repeated references to the presumption of Burton's innocence during the course of the trial, it cannot be said that the prosecutor's single (albeit improper) remark during closing arguments rendered Burton's trial as a whole fundamentally unfair. See Roe v. Baker, 316 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir.2002) , cert. denied, 540 U.S. 853, 124 S.Ct. 140, 157 L.Ed.2d 95 (2003) ([T]he government does not argue that such comments were appropriate, but they were limited, isolated and mitigated when the court gave the jury appropriate instructions, which would have cured any misperception that the jury might have received from the prosecutor's arguments. We agree. Moreover, such passing comments did not render the sentencing phase fundamentally unfair.); see also Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 789 (6th Cir.1996) (explaining that, with regard to prosecutorial comments regarding a defendant's post-arrest silence, a habeas petitioner must establish that the error had a `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict') (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). Because establishing a claim for unconstitutional prosecutorial misconduct on the facts of the case at bar is difficult at best, counsel on direct appeal could have reasonably decided not to raise this claim. Hence, the failure of Burton's counsel to raise this objection on direct appeal does not rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance of appellate counsel necessary to establish cause to excuse procedural default. 91 In sum, the failure of Burton's counsel on direct appeal to raise Burton's various procedurally defaulted claims does not rise to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel necessary to overcome procedural default because none of Burton's claims seem meritorious. Because Burton is unable to prove cause via ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, an analysis of the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice inquiry is not required. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Burton's petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to the procedurally defaulted claims. 7