Opinion ID: 1945193
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Resolving the Conflict Question

Text: Again, the narrow question we must resolve is whether the 1998 version of NICA gives the ALJ jurisdiction to determine if the notice mandated by section 766.316 was provided. As previously stated, we disagree with the Second District's holding that [t]here is nothing in section 766.309 or elsewhere in NICA that gives the ALJ any responsibility or authority to determine . . . that notice under section 766.316 was or was not properly given. All Children's Hosp., Inc., 863 So.2d at 456. Instead, we agree with Judge Kahn's analysis of this question in Tabb, 880 So.2d 1253, where he wrote: The ALJ's authority derives from section 766.304, Florida Statutes (2001): [17] The administrative law judge shall hear and determine all claims filed pursuant to ss. 766.301-766.316 and shall exercise the full power and authority granted to her or him in chapter 120, as necessary to carry out the purposes of such sections. The administrative law judge has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim filed under this act is compensable. No civil action may be brought until the determinations under s. 766.309 have been made by the administrative law judge. If the administrative law judge determines that the claimant is entitled to compensation from the association, no civil action may be brought or continued in violation of the exclusiveness of remedy provisions of s. 766.303. If it is determined that a claim filed under this act is not compensable, neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel nor res judicata shall prohibit the claimant from pursuing any and all civil remedies available under common law and statutory law. . . . (emphasis added). In order to hear and determine a claim, an ALJ must, almost of necessity, decide whether notice was given, because if no notice was given, the exclusivity provision of the statute does not apply. See § 766.316, Fla. Stat. (2001); Galen, 696 So.2d at 310-11. Further, an ALJ has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim is compensable under the NICA Plan. In the absence of notice, the Plan does not apply. Given these provisions, we are led to conclude that an ALJ has jurisdiction to determine whether notice was given. As established law provides, an ALJ must have jurisdiction to determine whether the ALJ has jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sun Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 105 So.2d 574, 575 (Fla.1958) (explaining that a tribunal always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction). Notably, in 2003, the Legislature amended the NICA statute to add section 766.309(4), Florida Statutes: If it is in the interest of judicial economy or if requested to by the claimant, the administrative law judge may bifurcate the proceeding addressing compensability and notice pursuant to s. 766.316 first, and addressing an award pursuant to s. 766.31, if any, in a separate proceeding. The administrative law judge may issue a final order on compensability and notice which is subject to appeal under s. 766.311, prior to issuance of an award pursuant to s. 766.31. Ch. 03-416, § 77, at 4117, Laws of Fla. In passing the amendment, the Legislature implicitly acknowledged the existing case law indicating that an ALJ has jurisdiction to determine whether notice was provided pursuant to section 766.316. See generally, e.g., City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196, 1202 (Fla.2000) (explaining that the Legislature is presumed to know the judicial construction of a law when passing a new version of the law and to have adopted the prior judicial construction unless a contrary intent is expressed). Other district courts of appeal had, before 2003, indicated that an ALJ has jurisdiction to determine whether the notice requirement was satisfied in a particular case. See O'Leary v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 757 So.2d 624, 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (The language used by the legislature in its amendment to the Act indicates that the administrative judge is to determine all matters relative to a claim. Notably, the determination of the adequacy of notice is not excluded from the duties of the administrative law judge. . . . [A]ny issue raising the immunity of a health provider, including the issue of whether the health provider satisfied the notice requirements of the Plan is an issue to be decided by the administrative law judge as one which relates to the question of whether the claim is compensable under the Plan.); Univ. of Miami v. M.A., 793 So.2d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (adopting decision in O'Leary ). See also Gugelmin v. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 815 So.2d 764 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Behan v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 664 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Tabb, 880 So.2d at 1256-57. Given our agreement with this analysis of NICA in Tabb, we hold that when notice is raised as part of a claim filed under NICA, an ALJ has jurisdiction to make findings regarding whether a health care provider has satisfied the notice requirements of section 766.316, Florida Statutes. [18]