Opinion ID: 768200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Co-Conspirator Liability

Text: 109 Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer first contend that their convictions for RICO conspiracy must be reversed because of the Supreme Court's decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), and our decision in United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994). Relying upon the district court's statement that they did not operate or manage, directly or indirectly, the enterprise in dismissing the substantive RICO violation charged in the indictment, appellants contend that Reves precludes a RICO conspiracy conviction for outsiders not involved in the operation or management of the enterprise. Alternatively, they contend that a conviction for RICO conspiracy requires a showing that such outsiders knew about and agreed to all the racketeering activity of the enterprise, including racketeering acts in which they were not personally involved. Appellants thus argue that because they did not know the TPBA Officers were accepting bribes from other vendors, they cannot be guilty of RICO conspiracy. We disagree. 110 Appellants' reading of Reves is simply incorrect. Reves ruled only that for a defendant to be convicted of a substantive RICO violation under Section 1962(c), the defendant must have taken some part in directing the enterprise's affairs. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 179. No such requirement exists under Section 1962(d), however. See Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 477 (A person . . . may be liable for conspiracy even though he was incapable of committing the substantive offense.); Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 683-84 (2d Cir. 1995) ([Defendant] was convicted only on the RICO conspiracy charge, and that conviction is unaffected by the Reves error.); Viola, 35 F.3d at 43; see also Goren v. New Vision Int'l, Inc., 156 F.3d 721, 731 (7th Cir. 1998) ([W]e have held that a defendant can be charged under 1962(d) even if he cannot be characterized as an operator or manager of a RICO enterprise under Reves . . . .). 111 To argue that Reves controls the instant case confuses substantive RICO crimes with conspiracy. A defendant can be guilty of conspiring to violate a law, even if he is not among the class of persons who could commit the crime directly. Viola, 35 F.3d at 43. The straightforward language of 1962(d) provides: 'It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)). A RICO conspiracy charge is proven if the defendant 'embraced the objective of the alleged conspiracy,' and agreed to commit . . . predicate acts in furtherance thereof. Id. (quoting United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1986)). Assuming that a RICO enterprise exists, the government must prove only that the defendant[s] . . . know the general nature of the conspiracy and that the conspiracy extends beyond [their] individual role[s]. United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d 822, 828 (2d Cir. 1989). In applying this analysis, we need inquire only whether an alleged conspirator knew what the other conspirators were up to or whether the situation would logically lead an alleged conspirator to suspect he was part of a larger enterprise. Viola, 35 F.3d at 44-45; see also Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 478 (upholding conviction under Section 1962(d) where defendant knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme). 13 112 We turn then to appellants' argument that, because the district court, in dismissing the substantive RICO count, stated that appellants did not know of certain acts of the RICO enterprise, reversal of their conspiracy convictions is necessary. However, there is no rule requiring the government to prove that a conspirator knew of all criminal acts by insiders in furtherance of the conspiracy. 113 No theory requires co-conspirators to have such knowledge. To be convicted as a conspirator, one must be shown to have possessed knowledge of only the general contours of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 828 ([T]he government need not prove that a [RICO] conspiratordefendant agreed with every other conspirator, or knew all the other conspirators, or had full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy.). Accordingly, the district court properly instructed the jury that the government did not have to prove full knowledge of all the details of the conspiracy but only that each defendant was aware of the general nature of the conspiracy and that the conspiracy extended beyond the defendant's individual role. While we have held that too little knowledge may undermine a conspiracy conviction, see, e.g., Viola, 35 F.3d at 44-45, there is no requirement that a defendant must have been omniscient. 114 The evidence easily suffices to support the jury's finding that the appellants were aware of the general nature of the conspiracy. Hartman, Lysaght, and Kramer each knew that the kickback schemes extended beyond themselves individually and involved at least each other, Reale, Zichettello, Montoro, and A&G.