Opinion ID: 159762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to remove jurors for cause

Text: Petitioner argues the trial court’s failure to remove two jurors--C.O. Pouder and Loretta C. Mess--for cause denied her a fair trial. Petitioner and Bryson removed these jurors with peremptory challenges. Petitioner argues the trial court’s failure to remove these jurors required her to use peremptory challenges that could have been used to remove Ms. Haynie, Ms. Crownover, or Mr. Roberts. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma appellate court determined any error with respect to Mr. Pouder was waived because petitioner failed to challenge him for cause. See Plantz , 876 P.2d at 277. Concerning Ms. Mess, the court determined that the record showed she would be a fair and impartial juror. See id. at 277-78 (citing Wainwright v. Witt , 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Morgan v. Illinois , 504 U.S. 719, 733-36 (1992)). The court therefore concluded petitioner was not unfairly forced to remove these two prospective jurors with peremptory challenges. See id. at 278. The federal district court found that petitioner failed to show the views expressed by either of these two would have required the trial court to disqualify -21- them, and, even if they were partial, peremptory challenges to achieve their removal did not violate petitioner’s right to an impartial jury. It is settled that “‘a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’” Witt , 469 U.S. at 420 (quoting Adams v. Texas , 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980)) (emphasis omitted). “A trial judge’s determination of a potential juror’s bias under this standard is a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness.” Moore , 195 F.3d at 1168. The trial judge assesses the credibility of the prospective juror, something an appellate court cannot easily do based upon a record. See id. Although the state appellate court determined an objection to Mr. Pouder was waived, respondent does not argue procedural bar. Accordingly, this court may proceed to the merits. See Moore , 195 F.3d at 1178. When Bryson’s counsel questioned Mr. Pouder about punishment, he responded as follows: PROSPECTIVE JUROR POUDER: –I feel like that–well, an eye for an eye. You know, that’s the way I feel about it. MRS. BAUMANN: Okay. And to you an eye for an eye means if you kill someone then you should die for what you did? PROSPECTIVE JUROR POUDER: I feel like I should, I guess, yes. If–yes. -22- Tr. vol. II at 272. He, however, later stated that he would consider everything in making a decision, he did not have a preconceived idea about guilt, he was open-minded, and he would consider all punishments. On the whole, Mr. Pouder’s voir dire testimony indicated his views would not have prevented or substantially impaired the performance of his duties as a juror. Ms. Mess stated that if the defendants are guilty “I feel like they need to pay for it,” id. at 504, and need to die or be punished to the fullest extent. Also, she stated Well, sometimes in my mind I feel like they need to get the same thing that they give that man. Maybe I’m too harsh on people, but that’s what’s wrong with the system. They let these people get by with stuff and they put them off in the penitentiary for the rest of their life and we pay taxes and feed them and they sit there and get educated and -- Id. at 505. Although Ms. Mess indicated that at the time she first learned of the crime she believed the perpetrator(s) should receive the death penalty, she continually stated that she would need to listen to the evidence to make a decision as to which punishment would be appropriate. She believed she could be fair and consider all possible punishments and was not predisposed to one. Petitioner has failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence the trial court’s factual finding that Ms. Mess would be a fair and impartial juror. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that she would be a fair and impartial juror was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. -23- Even if Mr. Pouder and Ms. Mess should have been removed for cause, petitioner’s use of a peremptory challenge to achieve an impartial jury caused no constitutional error. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar , 120 S. Ct. 774, 777 (2000); Ross , 487 U.S. at 88.