Opinion ID: 2619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Claim of Entitlement to Representation By Two Attorneys

Text: Count One of the superseding indictment against Douglas charged him with attempting to enter a banking facility with intent to commit a larceny therein, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Count two charged that in connection with that offense, Douglas killed Moran in violation of subsection (e) of that section, which provides that [w]hoever, in committing any offense defined in this section, ... kills any person, ... shall be punished by death or life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) (emphasis added). The original indictment against Douglas, which also charged him with violating § 2113(e), was filed on September 27, 2004. The first attorney appointed to represent Douglas following his arrest was Paul E. Davison, Esq., of the Office of the Federal Defender. On October 5, 2004, in light of the potential death sentence if Douglas were convicted on count two, Davison requested the appointment for Douglas, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3005, of a second attorney, one learned in the law applicable to capital cases. The court granted that request by order dated October 6, 2004, appointing Clinton W. Calhoun, III, Esq., who was learned in the law applicable to capital cases, as an additional attorney to represent Douglas. By letter dated March 2, 2005, the government informed Douglas and the court that it would not seek the death penalty in the present case. ( See also Conference Transcript, March 9, 2005, at 2.) Douglas requested that the court nonetheless continue the appointment of both Calhoun and Davison as his attorneys. The court rejected the request, reasoning that where there was no longer a potential death sentence, the services of counsel learned in the law applicable to capital cases were no longer needed. The court concluded that the government only needs to pay for one lawyer from this point forward.... ( Id. at 3.) Douglas was allowed to decide which attorney would continue to represent him, and, without waiving his objection to the court's ruling, he opted for Calhoun. On this appeal, Douglas contends, raising an issue of first impression in this Court, that the district court's refusal to continue the appointment of a second attorney for him following the government's notification that it would not seek the death penalty violated his right under 18 U.S.C. § 3005 to be represented by two attorneys and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial. We disagree. Section 3005 provides that when a person is indicted for [a] capital crime, the court before which the defendant is to be tried, or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant's request, assign 2 ... counsel, of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases, and who shall have free access to the accused at all reasonable hours. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (emphases added). The section states plainly that such death-penalty-qualified counsel is to be appointed promptly in a case involving a capital crime; but it is silent as to whether the court has an obligation to continue the appointment after the government has announced that it does not seek the death penalty. However, the purpose of the two-attorney right is to reduce the chance that an innocent defendant would be put to death because of inadvertence or errors in judgment of his counsel, United States v. Waggoner, 339 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1005, 125 S.Ct. 623, 160 L.Ed.2d 466 (2004), and all but one of our Sister Circuits that have dealt with this issue have reasoned that once the government has announced that it does not seek the death penalty, the case is no longer a capital case, see, e. g., United States v. Casseus, 282 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 852, 123 S.Ct. 206, 154 L.Ed.2d 84 (2002), and the appointment of counsel learned in death penalty law may be terminated, see, e.g., United States v. Waggoner, 339 F.3d at 917-19; In re Sterling-Suarez, 306 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. Grimes, 142 F.3d 1342, 1347 (11th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1088, 119 S.Ct. 840, 142 L.Ed.2d 695 (1999). In United States v. Waggoner , for example, the district court appointed death-penalty-qualified second counsel on an interim basis, pending the government's determination of whether to seek the death penalty. After the government announced that it would not seek that penalty, the court terminated the appointment. The Ninth Circuit found no error in either the conditional nature of the appointment or the termination of the appointment once the death penalty was no longer a potential sentence: The question we address in this case is whether the defendant's right to be represented by two attorneys is extinguished once the threat of capital punishment has been irrevocably removed from the slate of available punishments. In this case, the district court properly concluded that the defendant was not entitled to be represented by two attorneys after the government filed formal notice that it did not intend to seek the death penalty. .... ... [W]hen a defendant is no longer subject to indictment for a capital crime because the threat that the death penalty will be imposed has been eliminated, the defendant no longer has a statutory right to a second court-appointed attorney to defend him at the trial of the non-capital offense. 339 F.3d at 917, 919 (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Grimes , in which the government had stated, on the record prior to trial, that it would not seek the death penalty in this case, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the defendant was properly denied benefits afforded to a capital defendant because the Government stipulated that it would not seek the death penalty and thereby transformed this case into a non-capital proceeding. 142 F.3d at 1347. See also In re Sterling-Suarez, 306 F.3d at 1175 (granting mandamus requiring the district court to appoint death-penalty-qualified second counsel promptly, rather than wait for a decision by the government as to whether to seek or eschew the death penalty, stating that there are practical reasons to treat the case as capital from indictment forward, for purposes of appointing learned counsel, until it becomes clear that the death penalty is no longer an option and the matter is no longer a capital case) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis ours); United States v. Casseus, 282 F.3d at 256 (holding that any error in the district court's refusal to appoint death-penalty-qualified second counsel was harmless in light of the facts that during plea negotiations the defendants were not pressured by the possibility of death sentences and that the government announced prior to trial that it would not seek the death penalty; after the government declared that it would not seek the death penalty, the appellants were no longer capital defendants). Other Circuits had similarly held that § 3005 did not require the appointment of a second attorney where a sentence of death was precluded by the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which invalidated the death penalty under statutory schemes then in effect. See, e.g., United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 727-29 (7th Cir.) (§ 3005 does not apply because there is no possibility that the death penalty can be imposed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 158, 58 L.Ed.2d 155 (1978); United States v. Weddell, 567 F.2d 767, 770-71 (8th Cir.1977) (in light of Furman, the case lost its capital nature as charged in the indictment. It follows that the district court did not err in rejecting Weddell's request for the appointment of a second attorney pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3005.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2267, 56 L.Ed.2d 761 (1978). So far as we are aware, only the Fourth Circuit has taken an opposite view, although the precise contours of that Circuit's views of the scope of § 3005 are not entirely clear. In United States v. Boone, 245 F.3d 352, 358-61 (4th Cir.2001) ( Boone ), in which one count charged the defendant with an offense that could be punished by death and the district court did not appoint death-penalty-qualified counsel, the Fourth Circuit ordered a new trial on that count despite the fact that the government had not sought the death penalty. The Boone court ruled that the § 3005 right to the appointment of death-penalty-qualified counsel in a case where the death penalty may be imposed attaches upon indictment and that that right is absolute and not extinguished, even when the government does not in fact seek the death penalty. See id. at 358-59. Although in Boone, the court ruled that the error in failing to appoint such counsel could not be deemed harmless, see id. at 361 n. 8, the Fourth Circuit viewed the rights created by § 3005 as less absolute in United States v. Robinson, 275 F.3d 371, 383-84 (4th Cir.) ( Robinson ), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1006, 122 S.Ct. 1581, 152 L.Ed.2d 500 (2002), declining to reverse a conviction where death-penalty-qualified counsel had been appointed but the appointment was terminated  without objection  after the government elected not to seek the death penalty. In Robinson, the court stated that [u]nder Boone, the failure to provide Robinson with two attorneys throughout trial was plain error even though the Government withdrew its notice of intent to seek the death penalty, id. at 384 (emphasis added); but the Robinson court concluded that the failure to provide a non-capital defendant with the benefit of a provision designed to provide additional protection to capital defendants[] did not affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, id. (emphases in original); see also Boone, 245 F.3d at 360 (Surely, if the government decides not to seek the death penalty, then the penalty phase is won before trial....). In any event, we agree with the majority of the federal courts of appeals that once the government has formally informed the court and the defendant of its intention not to seek the death penalty, the matter is no longer a capital case within the meaning of § 3005 and that section does not require the district court to continue the appointment of a second attorney. The district court in the present case properly appointed such counsel for Douglas upon his request shortly after the filing of the original indictment; and it was not error for the court to rule that after the government's renunciation of any intent to seek the death penalty, Douglas was not entitled to representation by more than one government-funded attorney. Finally, we emphasize that the question on this appeal is whether the district court erred in requiring Douglas to proceed with only one government-funded attorney once it became clear that he would not be subject to the death penalty. Our conclusion that § 3005 does not entitle a defendant to a second attorney under these circumstances would not preclude a district court, in its discretion, from maintaining the dual appointment in a future case out of a concern for fairness at the trial of a criminal offense, United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir.1976). [N]o right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. United States v. King, 140 F.3d 76, 81 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the district court discontinued Davison's appointment nine months before the trial was scheduled to begin, leaving more than enough time for Calhoun, Douglas's remaining attorney, to get ready for trial and undertake whatever responsibilities had been shouldered by Davison. Deciding when, if ever, the retention of both counsel is necessary in the interest of justice after the government has announced it will not seek the death penalty is an exercise best left to the broad discretion of the district court.