Opinion ID: 1637491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the original sentence.

Text: The State argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to revoke appellant's probation in 1997 and his suspended sentence in 2002, but the State's argument is unavailing. We have said that a sentence must be in accordance with the statutes in effect on the date of the crime. State v. Ross, 344 Ark. 364, 39 S.W.3d 789 (2001). By the provisions of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-309(f) (Repl.1993), [i]f the court revokes a suspension or probation, it may enter a judgment of conviction and may impose any sentence on the defendant that might have been imposed originally for the offense of which he was found guilty.... Here, the trial court revoked appellant's probation on October 30, 1997. The 1997 order reflects that the trial court found appellant in violation of his probation and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. The trial court also imposed a fifteen-year suspended imposition of sentence to run consecutively to the six-year sentence. Appellant was also fined $4,078.00, the unpaid balance of the fines and the costs previously assessed. Under Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-309(f), the trial court could have imposed a term of imprisonment of ten to forty years or life for a class Y felony. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-401(1) (Repl.1993). Here, the trial court imposed a term of imprisonment, but exceeded its authority by modifying the terms of the original executed sentence when it entered an additional fifteen years' suspended sentence. These terms imposed an additional condition to the original executed sentence, and the trial court lacked authority to modify the original sentence. Harmon v. State, 317 Ark. 47, 876 S.W.2d 240 (1994) (citing Jones v. State, 297 Ark. 485, 763 S.W.2d 81 (1989)). In sum, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-309(f), the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the original sentence by adding the fifteen years' suspended imposition of sentence. Additionally, after the invalid 1997 order, the trial court did not regain jurisdiction to enter the February 19, 2002 order that revoked appellant's second probation and sentenced him to eleven years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Our case law is clear that before the Act, once an original sentence is put into execution, an attempted modification of the original order is erroneous. See Harmon, supra . Based upon these well-established principles, as well as the plain meaning of § 5-4-301(d), we hold that the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the sentence by imposing an additional term of fifteen years' suspended sentence. Accordingly, under Harmon, supra , and Bagwell, supra , we reverse the 1997 order adding a fifteen-year suspended sentence and the 2000 order revoking the suspension of that sentence and imposing additional penalties. We remand for further action consistent with this decision. Reversed and remanded.