Opinion ID: 3131353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The district court's numerous plain errors in

Text: accepting Figueroa's guilty plea prejudicially affected the fairness of the proceedings The foregoing demonstrates that the district court committed plain and obvious error in entering Figueroa's plea as knowing and voluntary. Remaining are the third and fourth prongs of the plain error standard. Gandia-Maysonet, 227 F.3d 1, is instructive on those points as well. In Gandia, we found the district court's error in describing the mens rea for carjacking - 23 - as knowingly and unlawfully, rather than as with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, sufficiently prejudicial to affect the defendant's substantial rights, thus satisfying the third prong of plain error review. Gandia, 227 F.3d at 4–5. We thought that the court's repeated misstatement, if accepted by [the defendant], could well have encouraged him to plead guilty. After all, a defendant who honestly did not think that he had intended to kill or maim might well bridle if told that he had to admit to this intent . . . . Id. at 5. The district court's misstatements about the scienter requirements at Figueroa's colloquy were at least as confusing and misleading as those in Gandia. Additionally, as in Gandia, there is little evidence that the defendant understood the element from some other source. See id. And so we conclude that this confusion could well have encouraged [the defendant] to plead guilty. Id. If there were any doubt, our conclusion is easily confirmed by the manner in which a weakness in the government's proffer aligns with the district court's most glaring errors in explaining the law. The government's proffer offered at best a sketchy basis for inferring that Figueroa possessed or constructively possessed the firearms, much less that he knew that any were stolen. The proffer showed only that Figueroa was in the back seat of a car that contained three firearms, one of which was somewhere on the floor of the car. Such presence, by itself, is - 24 - not enough to establish criminal liability. See, e.g., Ridolfi, 768 F.3d at 62 (noting that mere presence with or proximity to weapons, or association with another who possesses a weapon, is not enough to sustain a conviction for firearms possession); United States v. Davis, 773 F.3d 334, 342 (1st Cir. 2014) (same); United States v. Rodríguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 40 (1st Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 79 (1st Cir. 2007) (same). Rather, the Government must show some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the contraband and indicates that he had some stake in it, some power over it. United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). There was no such fact conceded or otherwise made a part of the record that provided a rational basis for concluding Figueroa had some stake in or some power over the weapons in the car.16 16 The closest the proffer comes to suggesting Figueroa was in constructive possession of a firearm is the allegation that a firearm was found in the floor of the car after Figueroa exited the vehicle. From this, one reasonably might infer that the firearm was found on the floor near where Figueroa was sitting, from which one reasonably might infer that it was within arm's reach of Figueroa, from which one reasonably might infer Figueroa knew the weapon was within arm's reach, from which one reasonably might infer that Figueroa was in possession of the firearm. Facts, however, may not be established by stacking inference upon inference. See United States v. López-Díaz, 794 F.3d 106, 113–14 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Burgos, 703 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012)). Again, there were no facts indicating Figueroa knew there was a firearm in the floor, or that he knowingly [had] the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over [a firearm] either directly or through others. - 25 - The district court therefore had before it a defendant claiming a lack of the precise knowledge for which the prosecution was offering no evidence at all. In short, a man was apparently and unwittingly telling the court that he was very likely not guilty of the charge, with no evidence to the contrary. We have no difficulty finding in such a case that, but for the court's error in wrongfully disregarding Figueroa's unwitting claims of innocence, there is a reasonable probability that this guilty plea would not have been entered. Nor, finally, is there any doubt that the error seriously affects the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings. We noted in Gandia that the plea's force . . . in evidencing arguable guilt was substantially undercut by the misstatement of the scienter standard. Id. at 6. Given that, in combination with the fact that the other evidence of scienter was thin (although not beyond reasonable inference), we held that the fourth prong of plain error review was satisfied, because [the error] seriously affected the guilty plea colloquy's fairness and integrity. Id. The same result is dictated by the errors in this case. United States v. McLean, 409 F.3d 492, 501 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 510 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. Robinson, 473 F.3d 387, 399 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding constructive possession of firearm found hidden in vehicle's engine compartment shown by, inter alia, defendant's statement that, When they came from everywhere, I could have gone boom, boom). - 26 -