Opinion ID: 2446007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Viola Exception

Text: This allocation of the burden of persuasion on plain error review is the rule in the District and in the federal circuitswith one exception of uncertain authority. After Olano, but prior to Johnson, the Second Circuit held that where the source of plain error is a supervening decision, the government should bear the burden of showing a lack of prejudice to the defendant. United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 42 (2d Cir.1994), abrogation on other grounds recognized in United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 99 n. 13 (2d Cir. 2000). This modified plain error rule shifts the burden with respect only to the third prong of plain error. See United States v. Wong, 40 F.3d 1347, 1373 (2d Cir.1994). No other circuit has adopted the rule in Viola, and the Second Circuit, while not yet overruling it, has repeatedly questioned its viability after Johnson. E.g., United States v. Needham, 604 F.3d 673, 678 (2d Cir.2010) ([A]s a number of panels have noted, it is unclear whether this standard remains in force following. . . Johnson . . . . [We] need not resolve this open question. . . .). We have, for good reason, declined to apply the Viola exception. See Kidd v. United States, 940 A.2d 118, 127 n. 11 (D.C.2007) (Thus, we do not follow the `modified plain error rule.'); cf. Thomas, 914 A.2d at 22 n. 28 (Given . . . that appellant has shown prejudice, we need not decide in this case whether to follow Viola. ). To allocate to the government the prevailing partythe burden of persuasion on any of the four prongs of plain error review would contravene existing precedent, which we, as a division of the court, may not do. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971). Even if we could alter the plain error doctrine, we would not do so. Reallocating the burdens associated with plain error review would be a deviation of no small consequence. The Rule . . . reflects a careful balancing of our need to encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). The time of a judge is scarcest of all judicial resources. Every unnecessary remand is a theft of that time from cases where the dispute really matters. . . . The dilution of plain error requirements in one case then becomes. . . the means or excuse for a further dilution in other cases, inviting a further downward spiral. United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 225 (1st Cir.2005) (Boudin, C.J., concurring). We therefore require appellant to establish all four components of plain error.