Opinion ID: 796559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Humphries's Retaliation Claim Is Cognizable Under Section 1981

Text: 35
36 This is the first opportunity we have had since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to re-visit the issue of whether section 1981 forbids all retaliatory discharge claims. 5 Cracker Barrel contends that our decision in Hart has already foreclosed retaliation claims under section 1981. See Hart, 426 F.3d at 866. This is incorrect. Unfortunately, Hart has already been cited for this inaccurate proposition. See Williamson v. Denk & Roche Builders, Inc., No. 04 C 4051, 2006 WL 1987808, at  (N.D.Ill. July 11, 2006) (citing Hart for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit has made clear that a retaliation claim is not viable under Section 1981); Franklin v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:04 CV 246, 2006 WL 905914, at  (N.D.Ind. Apr.7, 2006) (same); Welzel v. Bernstein, 436 F.Supp.2d 110, 117 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing Hart for the proposition that this circuit, unlike other circuits, precludes retaliation claims under section 1981). Our analysis in Hart was limited to the narrow issue of whether an individual who was not the subject of discrimination could assert claims of retaliation for complaining about the discrimination of others. 6 We held that section 1981 did not protect against retaliation in such circumstances. Hart, 426 F.3d at 866. But Hart has no application to the facts here, where the plaintiff is plainly asserting retaliation stemming from discriminatory acts targeting him. (And, as we shall see below, even Hart's limited holding is no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court's Jackson decision.) 37 Thus, the issue before us is whether section 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, applies to claims of retaliation. We hold that it does. The plain text of the statute, as amended in 1991, makes clear that section 1981 encompasses the termination of contracts, and there can be no doubt that a retaliatory discharge is indeed a termination of the employment contract. 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court subsequently interpreted the amended provisions of section 1981 as protecting against discriminatory contract terminations. Rivers, 511 U.S. at 302, 114 S.Ct. 1510 (stating that Section 101 of that Act provides that § 1981's prohibition against racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts applies to all phases and incidents of the contractual relationship, including discriminatory contract terminations). Now, it may be that, strictly speaking, a discriminatory termination of contract is not the same thing as a retaliatory discharge—for instance, analytically, retaliation need not have a discriminatory intent behind it. See Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185-87, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But the Civil Rights Act of 1991 dispensed with this heightened degree of formalism, and the legislative history confirms that Congress intended retaliation to be included within section 1981. See Andrews, 140 F.3d at 1411 n. 12. As a result, whatever concerns Patterson raised about the postformation nature of retaliatory discharges evaporated with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See id.; Rivers, 511 U.S. at 306 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 1510. But see Rivers, 511 U.S. at 309 n. 8, 114 S.Ct. 1510 (noting that the legislative history of the 1991 Act reveals conflicting views about whether § 101 would `restore' or instead `enlarge' the original scope of § 1981) and id. at 305, 114 S.Ct. 1510 (A legislative response does not necessarily indicate that Congress viewed the judicial decision as `wrongly decided' as an interpretive matter. Congress may view the judicial decision as an entirely correct reading of prior law—or it may be altogether indifferent to the decision's technical merits—but may nevertheless decide that the old law should be amended, but only for the future.). 38 2. Our Holding Is Consistent with Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, which Affirmed Sullivan's Continuing Validity 39 Even if the statute were unclear on this issue—after all, the specific word retaliation still does not appear in section 1981 8 —and without turning to the pertinent legislative history, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) compels the same result. In Jackson, the male coach of a girls' high school basketball team sued the Birmingham Board of Education under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, claiming that the Board retaliated against him for complaining about sex discrimination in the high school's athletic program. Id. at 171, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of federal education funding, but, like section 1981, it contains no express mention of retaliation. Id. at 173, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Instead, Title IX simply prohibits discrimination. The Supreme Court, however, determined that Title IX's proscription on discrimination necessarily subsumed (and implied) acts of retaliation, which it viewed as simply different forms of discrimination: 40 Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX's private cause of action. Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of discrimination because the complainant is being subjected to differential treatment. Moreover, retaliation is discrimination on the basis of sex because it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination. We conclude that when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of Title IX. 41 Id. at 173-74, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 42 The Jackson court relied heavily on its prior decision in Sullivan, 396 U.S. 229, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386, where it held that section 1981's companion statute, section 1982, which prohibits discrimination with respect to property rights, contained an implied prohibition against retaliation. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Specifically, the Jackson court interpreted Sullivan as holding that section 1982's general prohibition on racial discrimination, which, like section 1981, makes no mention of retaliation, nonetheless covered retaliation against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition. Id. The Jackson court also observed that the statutory objective of preventing discrimination would be severely hampered if retaliatory practices were not also banned: If recipients were permitted to retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination would be loathe to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations might go unremedied as a result. Id. at 180, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (citing Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237, 90 S.Ct. 400). Indeed, if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX's enforcement scheme would unravel. Id. 43 Thus, the Jackson court appears to have jettisoned our prior observation that retaliation and discrimination are separate wrongs. Cf. Malhotra, 885 F.2d at 1312; see Jackson, 544 U.S. at 185-87, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that [a] claim of retaliation is not a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex and that [r]etaliation therefore cannot be said to be discrimination on the basis of anyone's sex, because a retaliation claim may succeed where no sex discrimination ever took place). Instead, at least for the purpose of interpreting broad statutory discrimination prohibitions that omit specific retaliation provisions, the Supreme Court has determined that retaliation is simply a different form of discrimination, and one that is included within broad-based prohibitions of discrimination. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175, 125 S.Ct. 1497 (distinguishing between the structure of Title VII, which includes express retaliation provisions, and Title IX's implied cause of action). Moreover, the Jackson court noted that a statute targeting discrimination would necessarily be undercut if retaliatory acts evaded its purview. Id. at 180, 125 S.Ct. 1497. And although Jackson directly targeted Title IX, there is no meaningful analytic distinction that renders the conclusion in Jackson inapplicable to section 1981. 9 That is, like Title IX, section 1981 broadly prohibits discrimination (although only Title IX, enacted roughly a century after section 1981, contains the more contemporary term of discrimination), fails to list specific discriminatory practices, and omits specific references to retaliation. See id. at 175-76, 125 S.Ct. 1497. 44 Indeed, the fact that Title IX omitted any mention of retaliation, even though it was enacted in 1972, eight years after Title VII and its specific inclusion of retaliation provisions, did not trouble the Jackson court nor lead it to conclude that Congress must have intended to exclude retaliation from Title IX's coverage. See id. To the contrary, the Court looked to its Sullivan decision (which was issued three years before the passage of Title IX) and concluded that it provided a valuable context for understanding Title IX. Id. at 176, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Specifically, the Court stated it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [ Sullivan ] and that it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with [it]. Id. (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 45 Thus, the foundation of the Jackson decision is built squarely upon the Court's prior determination in Sullivan that section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended as a broad prohibition on discrimination that contained an implied cause of action for retaliation. Id.; see Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237, 90 S.Ct. 400 (A narrow construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, from which § 1982 was derived.). And there can be no doubt that Sullivan's examination of section 1982 with respect to implied prohibitions on retaliation readily applies to its companion statute, section 1981, given that sections 1981 and 1982 are simply carve-outs of the same section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, sharing identical historical origins and concerns. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 384, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982) (noting the shared legislative history between section 1981 and its companion section 1982); Runyon, 427 U.S. at 170-71, 96 S.Ct. 2586 (noting that the holding in Jones, 392 U.S. at 437, 88 S.Ct. 2186 pertaining to section 1982 necessarily implicated section 1981, given their shared legislative history); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 440, 93 S.Ct. 1090, 35 L.Ed.2d 403 (1973) (holding that [i]n light of the historical interrelationship between sections 1981 and 1982, there was no reason to construe the sections differently solely on the basis that the defendant was a private party); see also Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266, 1270 (6th Cir.1977) (holding that in view of both Sections 1981 and 1982 being derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and in view of the similarity in language and intent, no reason is seen not to apply the rationale of Sullivan in interpreting Section 1981); DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 n. 9 (2d Cir.1975) (same). 46 3. Our Holding Is Sensible and Aligned with the Weight of Authority 47 Accordingly, we join the other circuits that have addressed this issue in the post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 era—all of whom uniformly conclude that retaliation claims are cognizable under section 1981. See Foley, 355 F.3d at 339; Hawkins, 163 F.3d at 693; Andrews, 140 F.3d at 1410-11; Barge, 87 F.3d at 259. Not only is this result compelled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and corresponding Supreme Court authority, but it is also the sensible result. To hold that section 1981 allows unfettered retaliation is to invite wholesale circumvention (and eventual undermining) of the statute, and it would create perverse incentives for the employer to fire complainants as quickly as possible to thereby limit (or entirely avoid) damages under section 1981. See, e.g., Goff, 678 F.2d at 598 (noting that Section 1981 would become meaningless if an employer could fire an employee for attempting to enforce his rights under that statute). This is not an insignificant issue, as section 1981 damages often have more teeth than those available under Title VII. 48 There is no traction in observing that Title VII provides a back-up or competing statutory regime to the plaintiff. See generally Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 732 (7th Cir.2004) (noting the significant overlap and differences in the two statutory schemes). Although the substantive overlap and procedural inconsistencies between section 1981 and Title VII animated the Court's concerns in Patterson, Congress is not bothered by this parallel statutory scheme. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459, 95 S.Ct. 1716 (`[T]he legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.' In particular, Congress noted `that the remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.') (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 48, 94 S.Ct. 1011 and H.R.Rep. No. 92-238, at 19 (1971)); see also Patterson, 491 U.S. at 201-12, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing and discussing legislative history indicating that Congress intended to maintain section 1981 and Title VII as separate, distinct, and independent); Randolph, 368 F.3d at 732. Nor is it our role to attempt to harmonize these statutes or seek to channel particular causes of action toward one or the other statute. Congress has unmistakably provided for two separate regimes to redress, in many instances, identical discriminatory practices in the employment context. The resolution of any inefficiencies resulting from the existence of two parallel (but quite different) statutory regimes that cover similar harms, but contain differing procedural requirements, limitations periods, and remedies, resides with Congress, not us. 49 4. We Overturn Hart to the Extent that it Conflicts with Sullivan and Jackson 50 We must now briefly return to Hart, where we held that a white employee who alleged that he suffered retaliation for supporting his co-worker's charge of discrimination could not maintain such a claim because section 1981 encompasses only racial discrimination on account of the plaintiff's race and does not include a prohibition against retaliation for opposing racial discrimination. Hart, 426 F.3d at 866. In so holding, we relied solely on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Little v. United Technologies, Carrier Transicold Division, 103 F.3d 956 (11th Cir.1997), which held that a white employee who opposed a co-worker's racially derogatory remark could not bring a section 1981 retaliation claim because he did not contend that the employer discriminated against him because he was white (i.e., did not claim direct discrimination). Id. at 961. The Little decision, however, cited no authority for this proposition, nor did it provide reasoning for this declaration. 10 Id. We likely placed too much reliance on Little, given that its holding runs squarely against the Supreme Court's Sullivan decision, as well as the Court's subsequent decision in Jackson, which further solidified Sullivan's holding. See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237, 90 S.Ct. 400; Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173-74, 125 S.Ct. 1497; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 n. 22, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (citing Sullivan for the proposition that sections 1981 and 1982 are examples of exceptions that allow parties to raise putative rights of third parties, including such situations where a party is punished for entering into a contractual relationship with an individual protected under the statute). Jackson, which was issued after Little, but while the Hart appeal was pending, made clear that Sullivan prohibits retaliation against those who advocate the rights of groups protected by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Thus, Sullivan stands for the proposition that a white owner could maintain his own private cause of action under § 1982 if he could show that he was `punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities.' Id. at 176 n. 1, 125 S.Ct. 1497. Aside from conflicting with Sullivan and Jackson, the Little decision is plainly the minority view among the circuits: the great weight of authority is that individuals who suffer retaliation for opposing the racial discrimination suffered by others have standing to assert retaliation claims under section 1981. 11 51 As a result, it is clear that our decision in Hart cannot survive scrutiny under Sullivan, as expanded by the Court in Jackson. Moreover, our decision is out-of-step with the outcomes reached in the vast majority of cases outside of our circuit. Accordingly, we overrule our holding in Hart on this limited issue. 12 We now hold that a plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under section 1981, where the plaintiff has suffered retaliation for advocating the rights of those protected under section 1981. See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179-80, 125 S.Ct. 1497. 52