Opinion ID: 2611126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: procedural applications

Text: The Penry decision was issued by the United States Supreme Court on June 26, 1989. Immediately thereafter, the 1989 Legislative Assembly initiated and passed legislation amending ORS 163.150. The amended statute provides, in part: (5) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, the following shall apply: (a) If a reviewing court finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, the court may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court. No error in the sentencing proceeding shall result in reversal of the defendant's conviction for aggravated murder. Upon remand and at the election of the state, the trial court shall either: (A) Sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105(1)(c); or (B) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose of conducting a new sentencing proceeding. (b) The new sentencing proceeding shall be governed by the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section. A transcript of all testimony and all exhibits and other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceeding shall be admissible in the new sentencing proceeding. Either party may recall any witness who testified at the prior trial or sentencing proceeding and may present additional relevant evidence. (c) The provisions of this section are procedural and shall apply to any defendant sentenced to death after December 6, 1984. Accordingly, pursuant to ORS 163.150(5) (1989), the appropriate remedy in this case is a remand for resentencing. See also State v. Wagner, 305 Or. at 233, 752 P.2d 1136 (Gillette, J., dissenting). We do not agree with defendant's contention that the requirement of ORS 163.150(1)(a) that the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted    before the trial jury as soon as practicable has any implications in the case of a remand for resentencing. (Emphasis added.) That provision is nothing more than the procedural directive to the trial court in the ordinary course of events. There is no statutory or constitutional requirement, or persuasive jurisprudential rationale, to compel a resentencing before the original trial jury (to the contrary, the new statute requires a new jury) or to require a new guilt trial or default sentencing to something less than death simply because the original guilt phase jury has been discharged. If the state elects to pursue the death penalty, the new sentencing jury shall be selected in the same manner that the trial jury in a capital case is selected. In accordance with subsection (1)(e) of ORS 163.150 (1989), the jury must answer the fourth question unanimously in the affirmative as a prerequisite to a death sentence. The state must prove each of the first three statutory issues submitted beyond a reasonable doubt; but that requirement does not apply to the fourth question. ORS 163.150(1)(d) (1989). There is no burden of proof on the fourth question because it does not present an issue subject to proof in the traditional sense, rather it frames a discretionary determination for the jury. ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989), the new statutory statement of the fourth issue, made applicable to this resentencing proceeding pursuant to ORS 163.150(5)(b) (1989), provides: If constitutionally required, considering the extent to which the defendant's character and background, and the circumstances of the offense may reduce the defendant's moral culpability or blameworthiness for the crime, whether a sentence of death be imposed. We, frankly, have been unable to understand this provision grammatically, and we are extremely conscious of the need for clear direction from the legislature and the courts on the statutory and constitutional mandates of the death penalty sentencing procedures. The lack of grammatical clarity in the statutory statement of the issue must translate into an intelligible instruction to a jury for the sentencing process to be effective. Accordingly, consistent with ORS 163.150(1)(b)(D) (1989) and the guidelines of Penry, if constitutionally required in a particular case, the trial court must instruct each juror on the fourth issue, which instruction may (but need not) be the following: Should defendant receive a death sentence? You should answer this question `no' if you find that there is any aspect of defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense, that you believe would justify a sentence less than death. If any juror votes no on this or any of the four questions, the death penalty may not be imposed, because a sentence of death by a jury must be unanimous. Additionally, the court must also instruct on the other issues set forth in ORS 163.150(1)(b) (1989). The instructions may (but need not) be the following: 1. Was the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result? 2. Is there a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society? In determining this issue, you shall consider any mitigating circumstances offered in evidence, including, but not limited to, the defendant's age, the extent and severity of the defendant's prior criminal conduct and the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting at the time the offense was committed. (If raised by the evidence) 3. Was the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased? We reject the state's dual contentions that mitigating evidence is limited under former or current ORS 163.150 to evidence causally related to the offense and that mitigating evidence may be constitutionally so limited. We do not believe that mitigation evidence can be practicably limited to items `causally related' to the crime and we conclude that all aspects of a defendant's character and background are relevant to sentence, i.e., the jury's exercise of a reasoned moral response to the question should defendant receive a death sentence? See State v. Wagner, supra, 305 Or. at 160, 752 P.2d 1136 (the jury must be able to consider  any aspect of the defendant's character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently mitigating factor). (Emphasis added.); Penry, 492 U.S. at ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2947-52, 106 L.Ed.2d at 278-84; Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). In the fourth question proposed above, we are asking the jury, in making its finding, to consider any mitigating aspect of defendant's life, alone or in combination, not necessarily related causally to the offense. This does no more than to provide the sentencing jury with the data traditionally available to the sentencing judge under the discretionary sentencing model for criminal cases. Acceptable instructions relating to evidence and proof of mitigating circumstances are set out in State v. Farrar, supra (decided this date). The judgment is affirmed as to the guilt phase and reversed as to the penalty phase. The case is remanded to the circuit court for resentencing for the reasons stated in this opinion and in accordance with the procedures outlined herein. LINDE, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which FADELEY, J., joined.