Opinion ID: 454309
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Money Judgment/Debt

Text: 21 For section 2007(a) to apply in this case, the consent order must be a money judgment or debt. 7 The Secretary contends that imprisonment for failure to make court-ordered payments is not imprisonment for debt within the meaning of section 2007(a). The two cases cited in support of this argument do not resolve the status of the present consent order. See In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 21 n. 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); Usery v. Fisher, 565 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir.1977). In Cordova Gonzalez, the alleged debt was actually a fine imposed as a sanction on an attorney who withdrew shortly before trial. The fine was based on the costs incurred by opposing counsel in preparing for trial and was imposed under the inherent power of a court to assess expenses against counsel who wilfully abuse judicial processes. Id. at 20 (citation omitted). In Fisher, the Tenth Circuit found the prohibitions against imprisonment for debt inapplicable because the consent order was equitable in nature rather than being a money judgment. Id. at 139. 22 Although the consent order in Fisher bears some resemblance to that in the present case, the court's construction of the Fisher order as equitable appears to have been based on its implementation of the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 201 et seq. Specifically, the order in Fisher enjoined Fisher from further violations of the Act and restrained him from continuing to withhold the sum of $2,500 in unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation due his employees. Id. at 138. The order also provided that the amounts due be paid to the Secretary of Labor in monthly installments for distribution to the employees by the Secretary. Id. After Fisher ceased making the monthly payments, the Secretary instituted civil contempt proceedings against him. The district court denied the Secretary's petition, finding the consent order to be a money judgment, and therefore under section 2007(a) and Colo. Const. art. II, Sec. 12, not enforceable by a contempt judgment. 23 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's analysis to the extent that it found the consent order not to be a money judgment but rather to be equitable in nature. Id. The court focused on the terms of the order enjoining Fisher from continuing to withhold the money due his employees, citing a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition that the purpose of an injunction under the Fair Labor Standards Act to restrain the withholding of wages due is not to collect a debt ... but [is] to correct a continuing offense against the public interest. Id. (quoting Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.1965)) (emphasis added). Fisher also cites a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that the payment of money for past violations of the Act is not a money judgment but a judgment designed to ensure compliance with the Act. Id. (citing Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.1941)). We distinguish the Fisher decision as restricted to the enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 24 Thus, neither Cordova Gonzalez nor Fisher provides a basis for our finding that the consent order in the present case requiring the payment of money not to be a money judgment or debt within the meaning of section 2007(a). Similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act violation involved in Fisher is a recent case involving the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1001-1381, in which the court relied on Fisher and the other Fair Labor Standards Act cases cited therein to justify the imposition of a contempt judgment. See Robbins v. Labor Transportation Corp., 599 F.Supp. 705, 708 (N.D.Ill.1984). The court in Robbins noted the similarity as follows: In either case, what is at stake is the economic well-being of ... employees who are entitled to minimum wages and to the pension and health benefits that have been promised them. Id. (emphasis in original). In holding that contempt proceedings would be proper, the court further referred to the importance of the public policy embodied in the Employment Retirement Income Security Program, i.e., the continued well-being and security of employees ... [with] appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the federal courts. Id. Robbins, too, would not provide a basis for our finding that the consent order in the present case is not a money judgment for the purposes of section 2007(a). 25 Thus, we find that the consent order in the present case is a money judgment and as such is subject to the prohibition against imprisonment for debt of section 2007(a). It does not fit any of the exceptions previously carved out by the federal courts concerning judgments involving money that are not subject to section 2007(a). Further, no compelling public policy argument has been advanced by the Secretary nor do we sua sponte find the present money judgment to be exempt from the section 2007(a) prohibition.