Opinion ID: 2615788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Position of the Respective Parties

Text: The city contends that a determination by a legislative body that an emergency exists is conclusive upon the courts, even though it places the law in a category to which the referendum does not apply unless a court can find the declaration of an emergency contradictory and false on the face of the ordinance. The city also urges that the facts warranting the emergency action are distinctly specified by that part of § 1 reading:    due to the police problems presented by such punchboards   . It further claims that the reasons are adequately revealed by the following words found in § 2:    In order that the police problems caused by punchboards may be relieved without delay   . As a corollary, it asserts that the ordinance discloses nothing within its four corners which renders the declaration of an emergency nugatory. It is the thesis of the plaintiff that an emergency must presently exist before the council can speed its operation. Plaintiff accentuates the present immediacy of the cause for the urgency action rather than the immediacy of its effective date. He claims that this  can only be done when necessary for the  immediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety (italics ours) and that the word distinctness should be read to some extent as synonymous with detail. Plaintiff not only argues that no emergency in fact existed but takes a position that the sufficiency of the statement of the facts and reasons is to be measured by the completeness of a statement which will enable the court to go behind the face of the ordinance and examine the truth of the matter. Plaintiff's counsel here revealed this position in the following words: Now I think certainly that the court can inquire into the reasons, if any, stated in the emergency because they are on the face of the ordinance. We contend, of course, and in this contention the circuit court held against us, that the court can and should go behind the face of the ordinance and examine the truth of the matter. This is a direct challenge to the doctrine laid down in Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or 118, 74 P 710, 75 P 222, and, therefore, necessitates a more extended statement in this opinion than would ordinarily be required if the literal sufficiency of the statement alone was involved. Most of the authorities relied upon by plaintiff, as will be later seen, exploit the broader thesis which he urges here.