Opinion ID: 739296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State-law claim of unjust enrichment

Text: 18 Lightfoot contends that during his years of employment by Carbide he participated in the development of several new products and lines and that he was promised additional compensation for these inventions. In his complaint, he sought recovery of Carbide's profits from these inventions under state-law principles of unjust enrichment. 19 Defendants answer that Lightfoot's claim is precluded by a Memorandum of Employee's Agreement (the Agreement) in which Lightfoot agreed to assign to Carbide any inventions made in the course of his employment by Carbide. Agreeing with defendants, the district court granted defendants' summary judgment motion dismissing the unjust-enrichment claim. Lightfoot argues on appeal that summary judgment was inappropriate because the terms of the Agreement are ambiguous, and thus there is a genuine issue of material fact. 20 It is true that under the quasi-contractual doctrine of unjust enrichment, courts may infer the existence of an implied contract to prevent one person who has obtained a benefit from another ... from unjustly enriching himself at the other party's expense. Chadirjian v. Kanian, 123 A.D.2d 596, 506 N.Y.S.2d 880, 882 (1986) (citations omitted). Such an agreement will not be implied, however, where there is a valid express agreement between the parties which explicitly covers the same specific subject matter for which the implied agreement is sought. Id. Lightfoot concedes that in 1959 he signed the following Agreement: 21 In consideration of my employment by Union Carbide Corporation ... in a capacity which makes available to me confidential information concerning the technology and trade secrets on which the Corporation's business depends, I agree ... [t]o assign to Union Carbide Corporation all inventions made by me, alone or jointly with others, in the course of such employment, relating to the business of the Corporation or resulting from tasks specifically assigned to me by the Corporation. 22 .... 23 This Agreement does not, of course, bind either party to any specific period of employment. 24 Lightfoot signed the identical agreement in 1986. 25 Plaintiff finds these agreements ambiguous. See Seiden Assocs. v. ANC Holdings, 959 F.2d 425, 428 (2d Cir.1992) (Where language used is susceptible to differing interpretations ... and where there is relevant extrinsic evidence of the parties' actual intent, the meaning of the words become[s] an issue of fact and summary judgment is inappropriate.). Contract terms are considered ambiguous if they are capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or business. Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1192 (2d Cir.1996). 26 Lightfoot's cavil with the Agreements is that they do not contain any provision specifying the effect of an employee's termination on any claims he might later assert. Because contract terms are construed against the drafter, see Monica Textile Corp. v. S.S. Tana, 952 F.2d 636, 643 (2d Cir.1991), he argues, silence in the Agreements should not be interpreted as a waiver of his post-employment claim of damages for unjust enrichment arising from ... wrongful termination as a result of age discrimination. Appellant's Brief at 44. 27 This argument conflates ambiguity and omission. The plain language of the Agreements is clear: Lightfoot agreed to an unconditional assignment of any and all inventions created by him while working for Carbide. The unconditional assignment is not rendered ambiguous by the parties' failure to anticipate specifically how Lightfoot's employment might end. Thus, while Carbide may indeed have been enriched by Lightfoot's efforts, we cannot say that such enrichment was unjust. There is no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of unjust enrichment, and the court's grant of summary judgment on this issue was appropriate.