Opinion ID: 303604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Walters

Text: 8 Walters claims that his guilty plea was induced by an unkept promise. He alleges that through his attorney, Robert Kneece, he made a bargain with an unnamed Assistant United States Attorney to plead guilty in return for a ten-year sentence. He alleges also that the bargain was confirmed in a conversation between him and the Assistant United States Attorney within the hearing of five named persons including Kneece. Walters pleaded guilty and received two twenty-year concurrent sentences. He has been convicted also of threatening by mail the life of the district judge who sentenced him. In explaining his action, Walters stated that he had been told by an FBI agent that the judge had agreed with the District Attorney to give him ten years with an 'A' sentence. 9 If Walters was in fact promised by the Assistant United States Attorney that he would receive a ten-year sentence, he is entitled to relief. Machibroda, supra; United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972). Sentencing Walters was within the authority of no one but the trial judge. An assurance by another that Walters would receive a particular sentence, therefore, would be a promise that could not be kept. An unkept bargain which has induced a guilty plea is grounds for relief. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). 10 The transcript of the arraignment discloses that the trial judge conscientiously in compliance with Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, examined Walters to ascertain if his plea was voluntary: THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything: 11 DEFENDANT: No, sir. 12 THE COURT: Now, embraced in that is also the fact-because it very often occurs-that perhaps your lawyer, or one of your lawyers, may have said, Well, I think it's better that you go along with a plea of guilty because you'll probably get a lighter sentence if you do that. Or maybe some of your friends have advised you to that effect. Or maybe some have said, Well, I don't believe that the court would give you over so and so in the way of a sentence if you enter a plea of guilty. Now, you told me nobody has promised you anything. But even if somebody has done some of the things, or in the manner that I am suggesting to you, that perhaps may have been done, do you fully understand that that in no way is binding on this court? 13 DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 14 THE COURT: Do you fully understand that the court, and the court alone, is responsible under the law for any sentence that is imposed upon a defendant who pleads guilty or who is found guilty, do you fully understand that? 15 DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 16 THE COURT: So you tell me that no one has promised you anything, is that correct? 17 DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 18 THE COURT: I ask you, has anyone threatened you, coerced you, or intimidated you in any manner into waiving your rights and telling this court that you are in fact guilty of the charges against you in this indictment. Has anyone threatened, coerced, or intimidated you to make you do such? 19 DEFENDANT: No, sir. 20 It is doubtful that the trial judge's instruction that the length of Walters' sentence was within his sole control would have eradicated the effect of the prosecutor's alleged promise to Walters. 21 The Government's return denies that either the Assistant United States Attorney or Walter's attorney made any promise about his sentence. Attached to the return are affidavits from Assistant United States Attorney John Fowles, Jr., who, according to the affidavit, had primary responsibility for handling Walters' case, and Robert Kneece, each denying that he had made any promises about the sentence. Walters was represented at the arraignment by William O. Kneece, and the Government was represented at both the arraignment and the sentencing by Assistant United States Attorney Thomas P. Simpson. The Government submitted affidavits from neither. The situation is reminiscent of that in Santobello, supra, where it was said the prosecutor must let the left hand know what the right hand is doing. 22 We think that the pleadings raise an issue of material fact that cannot be determined conclusively from the record. At a minimum the record must be expanded to include affidavits from William Kneece and Assistant United States Attorney Simpson in response to Walters' allegation and affidavits from Walters' witnesses supporting his claim. Indeed on these allegations and the representation of so many witnesses the district court would probably be well advised to order an evidentiary hearing-although the method of inquiry- whether by affidavits, interrogatories, depositions or other means is ordinarily left initially to the discretion of the trial judge. Kent, supra, citing Machibroda, supra. Depending upon the indicated testimony of William O. Kneece and Simpson and Walter's alleged supporting witnesses it may or may not be necessary to produce the prisoner. 23 Apparently the basis below for dismissing Walters' motion was that his claim was conclusively refuted by his denial at the arraignment that any promise had induced his plea. A number of circuits have adopted this view. E. g., Pursley v. United States, 391 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968); Norman v. United States, 368 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1966); Putnam v. United States, 337 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Davis, 319 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1963). We think, however, that strict compliance with Rule 11 unfortunately cannot always accomplish its purpose of enabling expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas, McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1170, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). Examination of the defendant alone will not always bring out into the open a promise that has induced his guilty plea. It is well known that a defendant will sometimes deny the existence of a bargain that has in fact occurred, e. g., White v. Gaffney, 435 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1970); Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1970); out of fear that a truthful response would jeopardize the bargain. 24 If the judge, the prosecution, or the defense counsel makes a statement in open court that is contrary to what he has been led to believe, especially as to promises by the prosecutor or his defense counsel, . . . [the defendant] would no more challenge the statement in open court than he would challenge a clergyman's sermon from the pulpit. 25 United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940, 949 n. 13 (4th Cir. 1969), quoting from Trebach, The Rationing of Justice 159-60 (1964). The danger that a Rule 11 inquiry will not uncover a plea bargain is sufficient that the defendant's responses alone to a general Rule 11 inquiry cannot be considered conclusive evidence that no bargaining has occurred. See Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Simpson, 436 F.2d 162 (D.C.Cir. 1970); United States v. McCarthy, 433 F.2d 591 (1st Cir. 1970); Trotter v. United States, 359 F.2d 419 (2d Cir. 1966). 26 Surely in the future the United States Supreme Court's approval of plea bargaining, Santobello, supra, will dispel the doubt about the validity of plea bargaining that has caused plea bargains traditionally to be shrouded in secrecy. We reiterate what we have said before: that when plea bargaining occurs it ought to be spread on the record and publicly disclosed. Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (1970). [I]f [a plea] was induced by promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made known. Santobello, supra at 261-262, 92 S.Ct. at 498. 27 District judges in this circuit ought henceforth to expand their Rule 11 inquiry substantially as follows: 28 I now inquire of the United States Attorney and of the prisoner and his counsel whether or not there have been plea negotiations. Before permitting you to respond, I advise you that the United States Supreme Court has specifically approved plea bargaining and has said it is an essential component of the administration of justice . . . . to be encouraged. You may, therefore, advise me truthfully of any plea negotiation without the slightest fear of incurring disapproval of the court. 29 We are inclined to the viewpoint that a negative response to such an inquiry would finally conclude the subject matter and prevent subsequent litigation. 30 Finally, Walters claims that he was improperly sentenced by the district court. He pleaded guilty to two counts of an indictment charging violations of the federal bank robbery statute, 18 U.S.C.A. Secs. 2113(a) and (d). Both counts arose out of the same transaction. Walters was sentenced to twenty years on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. It was not the intent of Congress by the various sections of 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2113 to create a number of distinct crimes for a single bank robbery. See Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322, 77 S.Ct. 403, 1 L.Ed.2d 370 (1957). Rather the various sections create different maximum punishments for a single offense depending on whether aggravating circumstances exist, Eakes v. United States, 391 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir. 1968), and it is impermissible to impose sentence under more than one section of a single transaction, see Heflin, supra; Prince, supra. It is just as impermissible to impose concurrent sentences as it is to impose consecutive sentences because of the harmful consequences that could flow therefrom. United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1971). Accordingly, Walters is entitled to have his conviction under one of the counts vacated on remand. 31 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 32