Opinion ID: 692054
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Materiality of the Evidence

Text: 94 The third and final element of a Brady claim requires proof that the evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97; see also Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2397; Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 95 The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court first addressed the materiality question in Agurs, enunciating three different standards 38 of materiality dependent upon the specificity of the defendant's request and the conduct of the prosecutor. Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1441. 96 If the defendant made a specific request for disclosure of an identifiable piece of evidence, then the prosecution was on specific notice of what was sought. Thus, the standard of materiality should be, and was, more lenient than if the defendant made either a general request for all Brady evidence or no request at all, both of which fail to provide any descriptive notice of what is being sought. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-83, 105 S.Ct. at 3381-84 (discussing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103-12, 96 S.Ct. at 2397-2402). 97 Agurs specifically considered the obligation of the prosecution in cases where no request was made. Recognizing that disclosure obligations are tied to the level of notice afforded to the prosecution, the Court held: 98 If there is a duty to respond to a general request ... it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce, that duty should equally arise even if no request is made.... [W]e conclude that there is no significant difference between cases in which there has been merely a general request for exculpatory matter and cases ... in which there has been no request at all. 99 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107, 96 S.Ct. at 2399 (emphasis added). Therefore, while it is certainly more prudent for defense counsel to at least make a general request for Brady material rather than no request at all, the failure to make any request does not relieve the prosecution of its obligation to disclose evidence with an obviously exculpatory character. 100 As a practical matter, this must be true, at least in situations where defense counsel simply has no way of knowing the prosecution possesses certain exculpatory evidence. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106, 96 S.Ct. at 2399 (In many cases, however, exculpatory information in the possession of the prosecutor may be unknown to defense counsel.). Any other rule would penalize criminal defendants for their counsel's failure to be prescient. Moreover, if defense counsel knew the prosecution possessed particular exculpatory evidence, counsel could vitiate this entire problem by making a specific request for that evidence. It is precisely because defense counsel does not, and cannot, know what potentially exculpatory evidence the prosecution possesses that there cannot realistically be any meaningful distinction between the prosecution's obligation under Brady in a general request case and its obligation in a no request case. If the prosecution possesses evidence that, in the context of a particular case is obviously exculpatory, then it has an obligation to disclose it to defense counsel whether a general request is made or whether no request is made. This represents a paradigmatic example of the imbalances inherent in the criminal justice process, and it serves to illustrate the purpose behind the Brady doctrine. 101 The Agurs framework, however, was unnecessarily rigid and the semantic distinctions between the different standards of materiality were often difficult to apply in practice. In Bagley, five members of the Court, through two separate opinions, adopted a single standard of materiality sufficiently flexible to cover the 'no request,' 'general request,' and 'specific request' cases. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 685, 105 S.Ct. at 3385 (opinion of White, J.); 39 see also Bowen v. Maynard, 799 F.2d 593, 603 (10th Cir.) (discussing the three standards of materiality under Agurs and noting that after Bagley, courts are to apply a single test ... to all instances of nondisclosure, including specific request, general request and no request cases), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 962, 107 S.Ct. 458, 93 L.Ed.2d 404 (1986). Under this standard, [t]he evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383; accord Fero, 39 F.3d at 1472; Ballinger, 3 F.3d at 1376. 102 Under this more flexible, sliding scale approach to assessing the materiality vel non of the evidence in question, the specificity of the request is inversely related to the prosecution's disclosure obligation. As the specificity of the defendant's request increases, a lesser showing of materiality will suffice to establish a violation. Conversely, as the defendant's request becomes more general or even nonexistent, a greater showing of materiality is required to establish a Brady violation. 103 In making the materiality determination, we view the suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a whole, Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252 (citing United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 304, 102 L.Ed.2d 323 (1988)), keeping in mind that [w]hat might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already questionable verdict. Robinson, 39 F.3d at 1119 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113, 96 S.Ct. at 2402). We are also to consider any adverse effect that the prosecutor's failure to respond might have had on the preparation or presentation of the defendant's case ... in light of the totality of the circumstances. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384. 104 We reiterate the question of [w]hether the government was required to disclose certain evidence under Brady is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. Fleming, 19 F.3d at 1330 (citing Buchanan, 891 F.2d at 1440); Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d at 1179. Therefore, [t]he state court's ultimate conclusion under Brady ... is not entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(d) and is open to review by federal courts. Bowen, 799 F.2d at 610 (citing Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1344-46 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1090, 105 S.Ct. 601, 83 L.Ed.2d 710 (1985)); see also Case, 887 F.2d at 1393 (No presumption of correctness attaches to legal conclusions or determinations on mixed questions of law and fact. Those are reviewed de novo on federal habeas review.). 40 Findings of fact by the district court are reviewed for clear error. See Thomas v. Kerby, 44 F.3d 884, 886 (10th Cir.1995) (a district court's factual findings in a habeas corpus case are reviewed for clear error) (citing Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494, 1495 (10th Cir.1991)). We must now apply these principles to the facts of the present case.