Opinion ID: 2601613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Power arising by clear implication from PEERA

Text: Both PERB and AAUP argue the Board has the power to award money damages under K.S.A. 75-4323(e)(3) through its general authority to effectuate PEERA's purposes and provisions. They also cite PERB's quasi-judicial role in prohibited practice claims and the authority given other state and federal labor-related agencies to review prohibited labor practices. But in the absence of express statutory language, the essence of their claim is that it is illogical for PERB to have the duty to determine whether a prohibited practice occurred, without the additional power to impose money damages when the Board deems such an award appropriate to remedy the resulting consequences. And while this may be a valid public policy concern, such considerations in the area of statutory provisions are for the legislature to resolve rather than this court. State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 737, 200 P.3d 1 (2009) (Of course, the legislature, rather than this court, is the body charged with study, consideration, and adoption of any statutory change that might make [the statute] more workable.); see also Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 544, 216 P.3d 158 (2009) (It is not the duty of this court to criticize the legislature or to substitute its view on economic or social policy.); Higgins, 288 Kan. at 364, 204 P.3d 1156 ([W]e are not free to act on emotion or even our view of wise public policy. We leave the guidance of public policy through statutes to the legislature.). If we are to agree PERB may impose money damages, we must find that power clearly arises from the Board's express statutory framework and not because we simply believe the authority should be there. Looking first at the statutory provisions, PEERA's express purposes weigh against finding the legislature conferred upon PERB a power to order a party to pay money damages. PEERA specifies two distinct purposes for the Board: (1) to encourage public employers, employees, and their representatives to discuss grievances and disputes; and (2) improve the public employer-employee relationship by recognizing the employee's right to organize. K.S.A. 75-4321(b). It is difficult to conclude the power to award money damages clearly arises to effectuate these enumerated purposes. For example, the cease and desist order, which admittedly is not in dispute here because the university did not pursue a challenge to it, arguably does a better job of preventing future prohibited practices by encouraging discussion and improving employer-employee relationships than does a monetary award to a single employee. The notices that are part of that order further PEERA's stated purposes by educating the university's public employees about their rights and acknowledging FHSU's duty to recognize them, which is the essence of encouraging discussion and improving employer-employee relationships. See State Dept. of Administration v. Public Employees Relations Bd., 257 Kan. 275, 293, 894 P.2d 777 (1995) (PERB did not exceed its statutory jurisdiction by fashioning a remedy that included cease and desist orders.). In addition, the cease and desist order is more consistent with the actual prohibited practices found in this case and the facts supporting those findings. Recall PERB found FHSU violated K.S.A. 75-4333(b)(5) (refusal to meet and confer in good faith with representatives of recognized employee organizations) and K.S.A. 75-4333(b)(6) (denying the representative's rights accompanying certification or formal recognition). The underlying facts supporting those findings were misconduct directed at AAUP, the certified organizational representative, not Gaskill. The third prohibited practices violation was found under K.S.A. 75-4333(b)(1) (interfere, restrain, or coerce public employees in the exercise of organizational rights). But this violation was premised solely on the facts supporting the subsections (5) and (6) infractions, which were found to be directed at AAUP's representational status. Accordingly, each violation directly concerns AAUP, so the attendant remedy must relate directly to the statutory rights that were denied the representative organization, not the employee. AAUP, of course, argues the monetary award benefits the entire bargaining unit, but it is difficult to discern how. The award to Gaskill is significantly less direct than the cease and desist order, especially when the prohibited practices at issue here concern only AAUP's representational status in a grievance process, as opposed to specific retaliation that might occur in another case against a single employee for union-related activities. See K.S.A. 75-4333(b)(4) (discharge or discrimination against an employee for filing grievances under PEERA, participating in proceedings provided by PEERA, or forming, joining or choosing to be represented by an employee organization). Any connection between the monetary damages ordered in this case and PERB's statutory purposes to encourage discussion of grievances and improving relationships is tenuous at best. Viewed another way, the most obvious interpretation to give PERB's action and AAUP's argument is that the monetary remedy will coerce the university's future compliance with PEERA to avoid paying large monetary awards. PERB concedes as much when it wrote in its petition for review: Without PERB having authority to redress harm that a prohibited practice cause[s,] leaves the grievantpublic employer or employee organizationwithout an effective avenue to punish and discourage prohibited practices. (Emphasis added.) But this taints the monetary remedy as a punitive action designed to foster employer apprehension in future labor dealings. We cannot reconcile this view with the statutory scheme set out in PEERA, especially when PERB concedes it is without authority to punish wrongdoers and that PEERA does not create a private right of action for individuals. It is also contrary to this court's holding that the KJRA is the exclusive remedy for university professors to pursue breach-of-contract claims. See Schall v. Wichita State University, 269 Kan. 456, 482-83, 7 P.3d 1144 (2000). Seen for what it truly is, the monetary award to Gaskill is obviously less directed toward PEERA's legislatively stated purposes and provisions than the cease and desist order, which can be enforced in district court if it is violated. K.S.A. 75-4334(c) (Any action of the board pursuant to subsection (b) [regarding a prohibited practice finding] is subject to review and enforcement in accordance with the [KJRA]. [Emphasis added.]). We agree with the Court of Appeals when it addressed AAUP's argument, by stating: The utter disconnect between the prohibited practice violation and the damage award to Gaskill is demonstrated by AAUP's brief on appeal that suggests the violation `caused damage to all members of the bargaining unit.' While this may be true, we fail to appreciate why such widespread damage should be measured and awarded to Gaskill as if he would have prevailed in his breach of contract action. In fact, even if AAUP had been allowed to represent Gaskill and if there had been a proper meet and confer proceeding, this certainly would not have established that Gaskill was entitled to monetary damages based upon his loss of employment at FHSU. The award of monetary damages under these circumstances demonstrates that PERB acted in a manner beyond its statutory authority. Ft. Hays, 40 Kan. App.2d at 729-30, 195 P.3d 259. As a final point, statutory construction rules hold that specific statutes control over general ones. See In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 82, 169 P.3d 1025 (2007), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 36, 172 L.Ed.2d 239 (2008). The argument could be made that PERB's authority under K.S.A. 75-4334(b) to make findings and file them in prohibited practice proceedings comes from a more specific statute, which controls over the general power in K.S.A. 75-4323(e)(3) to effectuate PEERA's purposes. With this construction, the general power would not apply in prohibited practices proceedings. The Court of Appeals appears to have taken this stricter view when it held PERB's powers are limited to making findings and filing them in the proceedings. Ft. Hays, 40 Kan.App.2d at 728, 195 P.3d 259. But taken to its logical end, this statutory interpretation renders PERB powerless to enter nonmonetary remedies, such as cease and desist orders, which this court has accepted in the past. See State Dept. of Administration, 257 Kan. at 293, 894 P.2d 777. It is unnecessary to further explore the merits to this argument in this appeal because there are other grounds for determining the monetary award was improper. It is sufficient to note there is support for the more restrictive approach to PERB's remedial powers taken by the Court of Appeals. In the case before us, we find this more restrictive perspective to PEERA's language at the least compels against our finding implicit authority for PERB to impose monetary damages, which is on the far end of the state agency-power continuum. See Ft. Hays, 40 Kan.App.2d at 729, 195 P.3d 259 ([T]he award of monetary damages measured by wrongful termination of an employment contract is arguably the ultimate intervention in employee-employer relations.). For these reasons, we find no support within PEERA's statutory framework to hold PERB has the power to impose monetary damages for a prohibited practices violation. We consider next whether provisions in the original version of PEERA, which were changed in 1986, alter this view.