Opinion ID: 2541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Materiality Standard for Use of Perjury

Text: Spinelli argues that even if he cannot satisfy the Brady and Giglio materiality standard, his case satisfies the lower standard that applies in cases where a conviction is obtained by the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony. Spinelli claims that the prosecutors knew about Gioia's breach of his cooperation agreement and either instructed Gioia not to reveal the breach at trial or in any event knew he was lying when he testified. In deciding whether a new trial is required due to the prosecutor's knowing introduction of perjured testimony, the appropriate inquiry depends on the materiality of the perjury to the jury's verdict and the extent to which the prosecution was aware of the perjury. United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 456 (2d Cir.1991). This standard of materiality, as Spinelli correctly argues, is less exacting than in the case of a prosecutor's failure to perform Brady or Giglio obligations. If the prosecution knew of the perjury, then the conviction must be vacated if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Id.; see also Wong, 78 F.3d at 81-82. The district court denied Spinelli's motion based on its conclusion that the government prosecutors did not know of Gioia's perjury. This finding, however, rested on the prosecutors' sworn affidavits, which were never tested by cross examination because the district court denied Spinelli's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Because the defendant had no opportunity to challenge the prosecutors' statements, we cannot affirm on the basis of that finding. Cf. United States v. Hamilton, 538 F.3d 162, 168 (2d Cir.2008) (holding, in the context of a suppression motion, that if asserted facts are contested, the court must hold a hearing to determine the contested issues). Even if we were to assume, despite the prosecutors' contrary affidavits, that they did know Gioia was testifying perjuriously, the reduced materiality standard described in Wallach was not met. As described above, Gioia was shown to be a professional criminal, a member of a vicious organized crime family who engaged in murder, extortion, and trafficking in contraband, not to mention lying. The additional potential for impeachment of Gioia would in the circumstances have raised no reasonable likelihood of affecting the jury's verdict. See Wong 78 F.3d at 82 (where the court assumed that the government knowingly used perjured testimony, materiality standard was not met because ample other evidence supported the conviction and the evidence of perjury would have been cumulative of other significant impeachment of the witness.)