Opinion ID: 5487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hill Petroleum's Appeal

Text: Hill purports to raise two different issues before this Court. First, Hill argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury finding of willful discrimination, and second, Hill argues that the district court erroneously denied Hill's motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of willfulness. In reality, these two arguments present only one issue. Reviewing a denial of a motion for directed verdict made at the end of trial and reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence are one and the same thing. Dickinson v. Auto Center Mfg. Co., 733 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir.1983); Murphy v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 628 F.2d 862, 868 n. 13 (5th Cir.1980). Under either of Hill's arguments, the only question before this Court is whether there is a lack of substantial evidence to support a jury verdict. Dickinson, 733 F.2d at 1102. What Hill has neglected to mention, either in briefs or at oral argument, is that a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of willfulness was not made at the conclusion of all the evidence in this trial. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, Hill did move for judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs had not shown that Hill intended to violate the ADEA. See supra note 4. That motion, however, was not renewed at the conclusion of all evidence. Hill's failure to renew it s motion for directed 5 Under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), liquidated damages are awarded in an amount equal to the total unpaid wages. verdict has two severe consequences. First, the earlier motion for directed verdict cannot be the basis for a challenge before this Court to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence. It is well-established law that the sufficiency of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal unless a motion for directed verdict was made in the trial court at the conclusion of all the evidence. Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715 F.2d 983, 986 (5th Cir.1983); CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 593 (1971). By introducing its own evidence and failing to renew the motion for directed verdict after all the evidence was in, Hill waived any objection to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' prima facie case. McCabe & Steen Constr. Co. v. Wilson, 209 U.S. 275, 276, 28 S.Ct. 558, 559, 52 L.Ed. 788 (1908); Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154, 155 (5th Cir.1965); 5A JEREMY C. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 50.05[1] (2d ed. 1992). Second, Hill's earlier motion cannot serve as a predicate for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whatever the merits of Hill's substantive argument, it is well established that a party waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with a JNOV unless a motion for directed verdict is made or renewed at the close of all evidence. FED.R.CIV.P. 50(b); Scheib v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 628 F.2d 509, 512 (5th Cir.1980). The district court should not have even considered Hill's motion for JNOV. Scheib, 628 F.2d at 511 n. 1. In the past, this Court has been willing to excuse certain de minimis departures from technical compliance with Rule 50(b). See, e.g., Davis v. First Nat'l Bank, 976 F.2d 944, 948-49 (5th Cir.1992); Merwine v. Board of Trustees, 754 F.2d 631, 634-35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823, 106 S.Ct. 76, 88 L.Ed.2d 62 (1985); Bohrer v. Hanes Corp., 715 F.2d 213, 216-17 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026, 104 S.Ct. 1284, 79 L.Ed.2d 687 (1984). This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the application of Rule 50(b)  should be examined in the light of the accomplishment of [its] particular purpose[s] as well as in the general context of securing a fair trial for all concerned in the quest for truth.'  Merwine, 754 F.2d at 634 (quoting Bohrer, 715 F.2d at 217) (alterations in original). In each case where we have excused noncompliance with Rule 50(b), this Court has concluded that the purposes of the rule had been satisfied. In each case, the trial court had reserved a ruling on an earlier motion for directed verdict (made at the close of the plaintiff's evidence); the defendant called no more than two witnesses before closing; only a few minutes elapsed between the motion for directed verdict and the conclusion of all the evidence; and the plaintiff introduced no rebuttal evidence. Davis, 976 F.2d at 948-49; Merwin, 754 F.2d at 634-35; Bohrer, 715 F.2d at 217. In the instant case, however, the situation was very different. The district court did not reserve a ruling on Hill's motion for directed verdict; instead the court flatly denied the motion. Also, Hill introduced numerous witnesses after the close of the plaintiff's case. In fact, Hill's evidence took up over a full day—nearly one-third of the three and a half day trial. Neither the district court nor the plaintiffs could have been aware that Hill continued to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' prima facie case. Here we are not faced with a de minimis departure but rather a complete failure to follow the requirements of Rule 50(b). While it is true that this Circuit approaches such questions of technical compliance with a liberal spirit, see Davis, 976 F.2d at 948, we are not wi lling to rewrite the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Nevertheless, even if this Court were willing to take such a drastic step and overlook Hill's failure to renew its motion for directed verdict, it still would not change our holding in this case. The ADEA establishes a two-tiered system of damages. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128, 105 S.Ct. 613, 625, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); see John E. Charland, Willfulness, Good Faith, and the Quagmire of Liquidated Damages Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 13 J.Corp.L. 573 (1988). A showing of an ADEA violation entitles the plaintiff to recover compensatory damages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Once basic liability under the ADEA has been established, a finding that the violation was willful entitles the plaintiff to an award of liquidated damages. Id. In the instant case, at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence Hill moved for judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs had presented insufficient evidence to show intentional discrimination by Hill. In other words, Hill argued that the plaintiffs had not proven a vio lation of the ADEA as required under the first tier of the ADEA's liability scheme. See supra note 4. Hill now attempts to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence of a willful violation of the ADEA, the second tier of the statutory liability scheme. Rule 50(a) requires a motion for a directed verdict to state the specific grounds6 for granting the motion. See Woods v. Sammisa Co., 873 F.2d 842, 853 (5th Cir.1989). A party may not base a motion for JNOV on a ground that was not included in a prior motion for a directed verdict. 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, ¶ 50.08. Yet at no point did Hill specifically object to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence on the issue of willfulness. The question of liability under the ADEA is completely separate from the question of willfulness. To establish liability under the ADEA, a plaintiff must show only that he is within the protected class of the ADEA and the defendant discharged, refused to hire, or otherwise discriminated against the plaintiff with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of the plaintiff's age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In contrast, a showing of willfulness requires proof that the defendant either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir.1992) (quoting Burns v. Texas City Ref., Inc., 890 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir.1989)). It would be a constitutionally impermissible re-examination of the jury's verdict for the district court [or this Court] to enter judgment n.o.v. on a ground not raised in the motion for directed verdict. Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 846 n. 17 (5th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 1148, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976). Because proof of liability under the ADEA requires completely different evidence than proof of willfulness, Hill's motion for judgment was simply not specific enough to allow Hill to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' proof of willfulness on appeal. Since Hill did not actually move for a directed verdict on the issue of willfulness at the close of all the evidence—and consequently was not entitled to move for a JNOV o n the issue—Hill's objection to the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence on willfulness is being raised for the first time on appeal. It is the unwavering rule in this Circuit that issues raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed only for plain error. Shipman v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 709 F.2d 383, 388 (5th 6 Rule 50(a)'s specific grounds requirement serves both to make the trial court aware of the movant's position and to give the opposing party an opportunity to mend its case. Hall, 715 F.2d at 986. Cir.1983). In other words, this Court will reverse o nly if the judgment complained of results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 297 (5th Cir.1978). Thus, the question before this Court is not whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict, but whether there was any evidence to support the jury verdict. Id. Even if no evidence supports the verdict, this Court lacks the power to enter judgment for the appellant. Instead, appellate relief is limited to ordering a new trial. Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 1228 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S.Ct. 80, 107 L.Ed.2d 46 (1989); Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 429 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921, 92 S.Ct. 2463, 32 L.Ed.2d 807 (1972); see 5A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra, ¶ 50.05[1]. In order to establish willfulness, Hickman had the burden of proving that Hill either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA. Ramirez, 970 F.2d at 1378. Our review of the record fails to reveal any evidence that could satisfy Hickman's burden on this issue. Although the plain error exception is only applied in the exceptional case, we must conclude that this is such a case. But because Hill's relief is sorely limited by its failure to move for a directed verdict on this issue, we cannot render judgment for Hill. Instead, we remand this case for a new trial limited to the issue of whether Hill's ADEA violation was willful.