Opinion ID: 1206745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: should the court have instructed on aggravation of pre-existing condition?

Text: Plaintiff's counsel requested Instructions Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions Civil (OUJI-CIV) No. 4.9 which states: 4.9 MEASURE OF DAMAGES  AGGRAVATIONS OF PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS A person who has a condition or disability at the time of an injury is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of such pre-existing condition or disability directly caused by the injury. This is true even if the person's condition or disability made him more susceptible to the possibility of injury than a normally healthy person probably would have been, and even if a normally healthy person probably would not have suffered any substantial injury. When a pre-existing condition or disability is so aggravated, the damages as to such condition or disability are limited to the additional injury caused by the aggravation. The trial court declined the request and stated for the record: I don't think we have expert testimony to that effect. The only thing I believe I've heard is that one side's witness experts say it was a result of the neonatal period and the other as a result of the respiratory arrest. I don't believe I've heard any evidence of combination. (Tr. p. 1233) A trial court must instruct on issues raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence. The court's refusal to give requested instructions on questions neither pled nor supported by evidence is not error. [3] In fact it has been held reversible error to instruct on issues not justified by the pleadings and evidence. [4] Plaintiffs failed to either plead or offer evidence of any pre-existing condition. In fact plaintiffs consistently maintained Sid's condition was normal up until his hospitalization in 1977. All of the plaintiff's testimony was directed toward proving that the incident in August 1977 was the sole proximate cause of his disability. The request for instruction on aggravation came almost as an afterthought, on the morning of the day instructions were to be given. Although neither party's brief offers from Oklahoma authority squarely on the subject at least two other jurisdictions have supported the trial court's refusal to instruct. The Colorado Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Reiser [5] said: [2] A second and equally valid reason for refusing this instruction was the fact that there was no evidence to support the theory of aggravation of a pre-existing condition. An instruction should not be given if the theory it propounds is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. Houser v. Eckhardt, Colo., 450 P.2d 664. Otherwise, the jury might infer competent evidence is present to support this principle. Greenwood v. Kier, 125 Colo. 333, 243 P.2d 417. Two medical experts testified at trial, one for the plaintiff and one for the defendant. A close scrutiny of the record fails to reveal any testimony by either doctor that the injuries suffered as a result of this accident might be related to or connected with plaintiff's back injury for which he was operated on in 1960 or 1961. Merely because the pain occurring in 1967 is in the same general area as the area operated on in 1960 or 1961 does not in itself establish the probability of aggravation. It would be mere conjecture under these circumstances to presume that the 1967 accident aggravated a condition existing by virtue of the 1960 or 1961 operation, and therefore refusal to instruct on the issue was not error. General Motors v. Walden, 10 Cir., 406 F.2d 606 [1969]. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Lapsley v. Jackson [6] said: [6, 7] At trial Mrs. Lapsley made no claim and presented no evidence alleging that her physical injuries and complications were in any way aggravated by reason of her pre-existing condition. In fact, Mrs. Lapsley attempted to show that her injuries were entirely unrelated to her prior physical infirmities... . [8] Mrs. Lapsley claims that Jackson introduced evidence that could give rise to an inference on aggravation; she refers to the introduction of her past medical records which showed that she suffered from numerous internal complaints prior to the accident. The mere possibility that the jury could have considered aggravation, in a case where no such theory was argued by either side, cannot require the trial court to instruct the jury on aggravation. ..... Mrs. Lapsley failed to argue that her injuries may have been aggravated by her pre-existing condition. Therefore, it was up to the jury to decide whether all or only part of Mrs. Lapsley's injuries were proximately caused by Jackson's negligence. We hold that the trial court correctly refused Mrs. Lapsley's tender of an instruction concerning aggravation of a pre-existing condition... . We have held that a judgment is not to be disturbed on appeal because of allegedly erroneous instructions unless it clearly appears that the instructions given or refusal either caused a miscarriage of justice or led to a different verdict than would have been rendered but for this alleged error. [7] By failure to either plead or prove aggravation of a preexisting injury we hold that under the facts of this case plaintiff was not entitled to the requested instruction, and refusal to give it was not error.