Opinion ID: 586721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Sanchez' Cross-examination

Text: 27 Next, Vigoa claims the district court's refusal to allow Juan Sanchez to testify solely about Sanchez' access to the storage sheds violated Vigoa's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. A district court's decision regarding the scope of cross-examination is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544, 554 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1067 (1987). 28 Fed.R.Evid. 611(b) provides that [c]ross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination but that [t]he court may, in the exercise of discretion, permit inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination. In this case, the district court refused to limit Sanchez' testimony to the issue of his access to the storage sheds. Instead, it ruled that the Government could cross-examine him regarding his knowledge about the narcotics in the sheds, because such inquiries would be within the scope of the direct examination. As a result, Sanchez refused to testify on Vigoa's behalf. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in ruling that the Government's potential questions were within the scope of direct examination. See United States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir.1988) (upholding the cross-examination of a defendant regarding narcotics in his apartment, on the basis that [w]hat was in that apartment was a subject 'reasonably related' to [his] direct testimony), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 and 489 U.S. 1029 (1989). 29 The cases cited by Vigoa are not on point. They generally involve situations where the trial court allowed a witness to assert a blanket assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, even as to non-privileged matters, without careful inquiry regarding the scope of the privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 700-01 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1049-50, modified, 543 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir.1976). Here, the district court acted within its discretion because the non-privileged matters which Vigoa sought to examine would have led to reasonably related privileged matters on cross. It is well-established that a defendant who testifies waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and may be cross-examined on matters made relevant by his direct testimony. United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1341 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985). This rule applies with equal force to a nondefendant witness. See United States v. Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d 564, 567-68 (7th Cir.1988) (a witness cannot assert the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to specific questions if they are within the scope of his testimony; he cannot deprive the opposing party of the right of cross-examination). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Sanchez could not testify without being cross-examined on related topics. 3