Opinion ID: 2051720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of actual confusion.

Text: [W]hen determining whether there exists a likelihood of confusion, weight is given to the number and extent of instances of actual confusion. Life Technologies, Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc., 826 F.2d 775, 777 (8th Cir.1987). The test under this factor is whether any consumers have actually been confused by the products or services bearing the allegedly confusing marks. See KAT Video v. KKCT-FM Radio, 584 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D.1998) (citations omitted). Commercial Savings points to the evidence in the record concerning the letters and telephones calls it received as proof of actual confusion. These incidents of confusion, however, must be viewed in context. See Madison Reprographics, 552 N.W.2d at 449 (citing 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.02(2)(a) (3d ed.1996)). First, the majority of mistakes concerning mail and delivery of documents were made by other entities doing business with Commercial Savings, not by actual customers. For the most part, it seems that these mistakes can be attributed to inattentiveness on the part of the caller or sender rather than actual confusion. We note that the incidents of confusion occurred during, or soon after, the time Commercial Federal assumed operation of Hawkeye Federal which diminishes the significance of the incidents. See First Nat'l Bank, Sioux Falls, 153 F.3d at 890 (Isolated evidence of some actual confusion occurring initially upon the creation of a potentially confusing mark is not itself sufficient to establish a likelihood of confusion.). We also note that plaintiff presented no additional evidence concerning incidents of actual confusion following the October 31, 1996 hearing and the December 19, 1996 ruling denying a temporary injunction to plaintiff and the entry of the agreed final decree almost four months later. Thus, plaintiff's evidence on this factor can more accurately be characterized as short-lived confusion by non-customers rather than lasting confusion by actual customers. See Safeway Stores Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, 675 F.2d 1160, 1167 (11th Cir.1982) (noting that kinds of persons confused and degree of confusion are factors that affect the weight and relevance afforded instances of confusion). Based on the minimal incidents of actual confusion by customers, we believe the district court properly determined that the similarity in the names is not such that an appreciable number of ordinary purchasers are likely to be misled as to the source of plaintiff's products and services. [8]