Opinion ID: 2384680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mel Downs

Text: Finally, appellants contest the summary judgment dismissing their negligence claim against Mel Downs. Downs counters that, as a public employee, he is immunized from liability by both the official immunity and public duty doctrines, two closely related concepts that serve similar functions. The public duty doctrine shields public officers, and the governmental bodies that employ them, from liability for injuries or damages resulting from the officer's breach of a duty owed to the general public as opposed to particular individuals. Stacy v. Truman Medical Ctr., 836 S.W.2d 911, 921 (Mo. banc 1992). Official immunity, on the other hand, protects public officials acting within the scope of their authority from liability for injuries arising from their discretionary acts or omissions. Kanagawa v. State By and Through Freeman, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc 1985). This protection is extended in the hope of promoting the effective administration of public affairs by removing the threat of personal liability from those officials who must exercise their best judgment in conducting the public's business. Id. at 836; Green v. Denison, 738 S.W.2d 861, 865, 866 (Mo. banc 1987). Appellants attack the applicability of the public duty doctrine to Downs on two fronts. First, they argue that the legislature's partial abrogation of sovereign immunity, § 537.600, RSMo 1986 has effected a corresponding abrogation of the public duty doctrine. For support, they cite the example of several courts that have abolished the doctrine after finding it to be closely related to or dependent upon sovereign immunity. [21] See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241-42 (Alaska 1976); Ryan v. State, 134 Ariz. 308, 310, 656 P.2d 597, 599 (1982); Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 160 (Colo.1986); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River Cty., 371 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Fla.1979); Schear v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 101 N.M. 671, 673-74, 687 P.2d 728, 730-31 (1984); Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719, 725 (1979); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (1976). This argument, however, was rejected in Beaver v. Gosney, 825 S.W.2d 870, 872-73 (Mo.App.1992). [22] Appellants also urge this Court to recognize a special duty exception to the public duty doctrine, which would withdraw the grant of immunity in situations where the public official owes a special duty toward a specific individual. This exception has never been recognized by our courts, id. at 874, and appellants do not produce any facts that would entitle them to invoke the exception were we to recognize it now. The duty of MHTC and its employees to properly design and construct highways runs to the public at large. The fact that a badly designed overpass may threaten adjacent properties with flooding does not impose on them a different or higher duty toward the persons who happen to own or occupy those properties. Similarly, appellants have not disclosed any facts that would preclude application of the official immunity doctrine in this case. Whether an act is discretionary depends on the degree of reason and judgment it requires, judged by such factors as the nature of the official's duties, the extent to which policymaking or professional expertise is involved, and the likely consequences of withholding immunity. Kanagawa, 685 S.W.2d at 836. Without question, the design of a highway bypass project qualifies as a discretionary function under these criteria. We conclude that Downs is immune from liability for negligence in the design of the bypass project under both the public duty and official immunity doctrines. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in his favor was not in error.