Opinion ID: 1613187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bell and Hill's Burden of Proof

Text: The only opposition Bell and Hill offered to Blue Ribbon's properly supported motion to compel arbitration was their claim that Blue Ribbon had waived its right to compel arbitration by substantially invoking the litigation process. We note that there is a presumption against finding that a party has waived the right to compel arbitration. See Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So.2d 1022, 1028 (Ala.2000); Eastern Dredging & Constr., Inc. v. Parliament House, L.L.C., 698 So.2d 102 (Ala.1997). A party seeking to prove a waiver of a right to arbitrate carries a heavy burden, and the courts will not lightly infer a waiver of the right to compel arbitration. Lee, supra, at 1028-29, citing Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Wilson, 716 So.2d 1160 (Ala.1998). In First Family Financial Services, Inc. v. Jackson, 786 So.2d 1121 (Ala.2000), this Court addressed the question whether the defendant in that case had waived its right to compel arbitration. This Court stated: We will find a waiver of the right to compel arbitration only when `the party seeking arbitration has so substantially invoked the litigation process that to compel arbitration will substantially prejudice the party opposing it.' Georgia Power Co. v. Partin, 727 So.2d 2, 7 (Ala.1998). In Companion Life Insurance Co. v. Whitesell Manufacturing, Inc., 670 So.2d 897 (Ala.1995), this Court said: `Whether a party's participation in an action amounts to an enforceable waiver of its right to arbitrate depends on whether the participation bespeaks an intention to abandon the right in favor of the judicial process and, if so, whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by a subsequent order requiring it to submit to arbitration. No rigid rule exists for determining what constitutes a waiver of the right to arbitrate; the determination as to whether there has been a waiver must, instead, be based on the particular facts of each case.' 670 So.2d at 899. 786 So.2d at 1128. The First Family Court continued: The record in this case shows unequivocally that First Family did not substantially invoke the litigation process before it moved to compel arbitration. The first document First Family filed was its motion to compel arbitration. Like the defendant in [ Ex parte ] Merrill Lynch [ Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 So.2d 1 (Ala.1986)], First Family did not even answer the complaint. The only other documents in the record that First Family filed are its brief in support of its motion to compel arbitration, evidentiary filings also in support of that motion, and its notice of appeal to this Court. Jackson had the heavy burden of proving both that First Family had substantially invoked the litigation process and that he was prejudiced thereby. He did not meet that burden. Id. (citations and emphasis omitted). In this case, as in First Family, the record unequivocally shows that Blue Ribbon did not bespeak[] an intention to abandon the right [of arbitration] in favor of the judicial process. Id. at 1128. In its initial filing, the notice of removal to federal court, Blue Ribbon expressly referenced its right to compel arbitration and, in fact, Blue Ribbon immediately followed the filing of its notice of removal with the filing of a motion to compel arbitration. Cf. Ex parte Hood, 712 So.2d 341 (Ala. 1998) (`By [removing the case to federal district court] without at the same time asking the district court for an order to arbitrate, [the defendant] manifested an intention to resolve the dispute through the processes of the federal court.') (quoting Companion Life Ins. Co. v. Whitesell Mfg., Inc., 670 So.2d 897, 900 (Ala.1995) (emphasis added)). Additionally, the record reflects that the only other documents Blue Ribbon filed in this action pertained to dismissal of the case, to arbitration, or to the filing of an appeal of the trial court's order. We conclude that Bell and Hill have not met their burden of proving that Blue Ribbon substantially invoked the litigation process. Therefore, we conclude that Blue Ribbon has not waived its right to compel arbitration. Because Bell and Hill have not proven that Blue Ribbon substantially invoked the litigation process, we need not address the element of prejudice. Blue Ribbon has properly supported its motion to compel arbitration. Bell and Hill have failed to meet their burden of proof in establishing that Blue Ribbon waived its right to compel arbitration by substantially invoking the litigation process. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Blue Ribbon's motion to compel arbitration. We reverse the trial court's order of December 8, 2000, and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an order granting Blue Ribbon's motion to compel arbitration. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, HARWOOD, and WOODALL, JJ., concur. MOORE, C.J., and JOHNSTONE, J., dissent.