Opinion ID: 1559426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Motion to Pass the Case and Declare a Mistrial

Text: The defendant's first contention is that his due process rights were violated when the trial justice declined to pass the case and declare a mistrial after a particular portion of the prosecution's redirect examination of a witness elicited an implication that defendant had intimidated the witness. We are not persuaded by this contention. During the redirect examination of Mr. Calderon, the prosecuting attorney confronted Mr. Calderon regarding the inconsistency between his trial testimony and his statement to the police on June 25, 2003: Q. In this statement, you told the police, you told this detective, `He went into his pocket and pulled out a gun.' You agree with me? Isn't that what it says in there? A. That's what it says, yeah. That's what it says, yes. Q. You agree with me that you said you were at the front bumper when he pointed it at Joe [Volpe], referring to the gun? You agree that's what it says[.] Do you see it right there? `I was at the front of the car near the front bumper when he pointed it at Joe.' Do you see that? (PAUSE) A. I didn't see him point a gun. Q. Does it say that in the statement? A. Yes. Q. Okay. When did you learn, Mr. Calderone, that the defendant had a copy of this statement? A. Had a copy of this statement? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection. THE COURT: Hold on a second. I'm going to allow it. Overruled. A. Today. Q. Does that statement have your address on it? A. Yes. [PROSECUTOR]: Nothing further. THE COURT: [Defense counsel]. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have a motion, Judge, at the side bar. A motion to pass a case and declare a mistrial should be granted when the trial justice determines that a witness's remarks have so inflamed the jurors that they no longer would be able to decide the case based on a calm and dispassionate evaluation of the evidence. State v. Werner, 830 A.2d 1107, 1113 (R.I. 2003); see also State v. Disla, 874 A.2d 190, 198 (R.I. 2005). The fundamental policy consideration in this regard is that the jurors must be able to consider the evidence properly submitted without being significantly distracted by anything not in evidence. See State v. Pacheco, 763 A.2d 971, 979 (R.I. 2001); see also State v. Bolduc, 822 A.2d 184, 186 (R.I. 2003). In making that determination, the trial justice should not limit his or her focus to the challenged statement alone, but rather must examine it in view of the entire trial context. See Werner, 830 A.2d at 1113. Not all potentially prejudicial statements  require the trial justice to pass the case. Bolduc, 822 A.2d at 186. More specifically, even if the words of a particular witness, if not further addressed, could have a prejudicial effect on defendant's right to a fair trial, a motion to pass a case and declare a mistrial will properly be denied if a cautionary instruction is given in a timely manner and is effective in curing the prejudice. See State v. Shinn, 786 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 2002) (`[I]f the prejudice can be cured[,]  a mistrial will be ordered only if we are convinced that the cautionary instructions were untimely or ineffective.'); see also Disla, 874 A.2d at 198. Here, defendant argues that the above-quoted questioning of Mr. Calderon by the prosecution gave rise to an implication that defendant had somehow intimidated Mr. Calderon. The trial justice correctly concluded that this possible implication did not rise to such a level as to necessitate the granting of defendant's motion to pass the case and declare a mistrial, but rather could be resolved by the giving of a cautionary instruction. An appropriate and clear instruction was given in a timely manner: the trial justice instructed the jury immediately after the sidebar conference and the lunch break that followed the challenged portion of the redirect examination of Mr. Calderon. [3] Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the cautionary instruction was likely to be ineffective. This Court must assume that the jury has disregarded those portions of testimony that were the subject of such a cautionary instruction unless some indication exists that the jury was unable to comply with the cautionary instruction. State v. Powers, 566 A.2d 1298, 1304 (R.I. 1989); see also State v. Mendoza, 889 A.2d 153, 159 (R.I. 2005). In this case, there is no indication that the jury was incapable of obeying the cautionary instruction. In fact, it is noteworthy that all the jurors indicated to the trial justice that it was understood by them that they must disregard both the challenged question and any answer to it. [4]