Opinion ID: 166828
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violent History

Text: 19 The testimony of Parole Officer Walters related in large part to the second weapon, the .44 magnum, and the search for parolee Gary Adamson after the parole officers had received information that it was in his possession. During redirect examination the prosecutor questioned her about the urgency of this search: 20 Q: Ms. Walters, was there a particular factor in this case that gave an immediacy to parole's role in the investigation? 21 A: Yes, there was. There was a public safety factor of a parolee with a violent history possibly in possession of weapons. 22 Q: And when you believed that Mr. Adamson may have been in possession of a weapon, it is then that you took the steps that you recounted? 23 A: Do you mean Mr. Herron? 24 Q: No, the focus on what Mr. Adamson and why didn't you focus on Mr— 25 R. Vol. V at 297. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that Parole Officer Walters had just told the jury that Mr. Herron had a violent history, which was highly prejudicial. The district court denied the motion but instructed the jury, Ladies and gentlemen, I have stricken from the record and taken entirely out of the case any reference to Mr. Herron's history, any reference at all in that respect as testified by this witness, and you will disregard it entirely. R. Vol. V at 298. 26 We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for mistrial. See United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir.2003). A mistrial may only be granted when a defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial has been impaired. Id. at 1155. As we read the record, the parolee with a violent history was Mr. Adamson, not Mr. Herron. The previous eight pages of testimony focused on Mr. Adamson, not Mr. Herron. Moreover, the district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard any reference to Mr. Herron's history. R. Doc. V. at 298. We presume that jurors will follow clear instructions to disregard evidence unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant. United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no reason to reject the presumption in the circumstances presented here. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. See United States v. Maynard, 236 F.3d 601, 606-07 (10th Cir.2000) (no abuse of discretion in denying mistrial when judge gave strong curative instruction).