Opinion ID: 2195278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The McDonnell Douglas Analysis

Text: ¶ 23. Plaintiff next claims that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to make out a prima facie case as required by McDonnell Douglas. Defendants argue that the court was correct in finding that plaintiff had not made out her prima facie case, and, even so, plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Bertek's justification for its actions was a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. We find that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case, but that she has not carried her burden to show that defendants' actions were pretextual, sufficient to withstand summary judgment.
¶ 24. McDonnell Douglas established an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases, St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), in order to progressively... sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089. At the outset, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Boulton v. CLD Consulting Eng'rs, Inc., 2003 VT 72, ¶ 15, 175 Vt. ___, 834 A.2d 37; Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 159, 624 A.2d at 1127. This step serves a screening function: it eliminates the most patently meritless claims  i.e., where the plaintiff was rejected for common nondiscriminatory reasons. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The evidentiary burden required of the plaintiff at this stage is a relatively light one. See id. (burden at prima facie stage is not onerous); Beckmann v. Edson Hill Manor, Inc., 171 Vt. 607, 608, 764 A.2d 1220, 1222 (2000) (mem.). ¶ 25. The specific elements of a prima facie case may vary depending on the claim and the particular facts of the case. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089 (prima facie standard is not inflexible and may differ given differing factual situations). In general to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding this adverse employment action permit an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Bennett v. Watson Wyatt & Co., 136 F.Supp.2d 236, 246 (S.D.N.Y.2001); see also State v. Whitingham Sch. Bd., 138 Vt. 15, 19, 410 A.2d 996, 998-99 (1979); Carpenter v. Cent. Vt. Med. Ctr., 170 Vt. 565, 566, 743 A.2d 592, 594-95 (1999) (mem.) (elements for age discrimination). ¶ 26. Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 159, 624 A.2d at 1127 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817). This second step serves to respond to the plaintiff's prima facie case as well as to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The employer's burden at this second stage is solely one of production, not persuasion. Id. ¶ 27. If the employer meets his burden at this stage, the presumption of discrimination disappears, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 510-11, 113 S.Ct. 2742, and the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination. Hodgdon, 160 Vt. at 159, 624 A.2d at 1127. This third step is in keeping with the fact that [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089.
¶ 28. Returning to the case at hand, the first issue concerns plaintiff's attempt to establish a prima facie case off discrimination. The trial court found that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case for two reasons: (1) plaintiff failed to satisfy the second element because she did not demonstrate that she was qualified for the Supervisor of Drug Delivery position, and (2) plaintiff failed to satisfy the fourth element because she did not demonstrate that Miller had similar or lesser qualifications for the position than she, and thus there could be no inference of gender discrimination. Plaintiff contends that in making such a finding the trial court ignored relevant evidence suggesting that plaintiff was qualified for the open position but that Govil manipulated the job opening in order to prevent her from obtaining that position because of her gender. We find that plaintiff's proffer of evidence was sufficient to meet her burden at the prima facie case stage. ¶ 29. Under McDonnell Douglas, if plaintiff is not objectively qualified for the position, then she cannot make out a prima facie case. Defendants persuaded the trial court to conclude that defendant was not qualified because the job description required a Ph.D. in Pharmaceutics, Material Science, or Chemical Engineering, and plaintiff did not have a Ph.D. at that time. We do not find the educational qualification conclusive. Plaintiff was close to obtaining her Ph.D., and her evidence suggests that Bertek had often let other employees assume positions when they did not meet all of the educational requirements but were close to completing them. Moreover, plaintiff was performing the nearest comparable job, Manager of Formulations, on an interim basis. She claimed that the responsibilities did not substantially change, but that Govil changed the title and added qualifications to give the job to his hand-picked male candidate. See Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir.1998) (prima facie case established where plaintiff presented evidence that responsibilities of new position given to male employee were the same as those that plaintiff had performed before restructuring); Gates v. BEA Assocs., No. 88 Civ. 6522(JSM), 1990 WL 180137, at -2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.13, 1990) (summary judgment at prima facie stage not warranted where there were disputed issues as to whether degree requirement was bona fide job qualification and whether it was added solely to exclude plaintiff from consideration); Larson, supra, § 8.02[3], at 8-25 (A court may be inclined not to take the employer's stated qualifications seriously when in fact the employer does not consistently adhere to those stated qualifications when making employment decisions.). Again, we stress that plaintiff's burden is relatively light at the prima facie case stage. ¶ 30. We have a similar view of the trial court's holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the fourth element of her prima facie case because she could not show that Miller had similar or lesser qualifications for the position than she. See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1185 (11th Cir. 1998) (issue of comparative qualifications more appropriate for rebuttal stage, as employer is in better position to provide information pertaining to this issue); Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir.1997) (requiring plaintiff to establish comparative qualifications at prima facie case stage effectively removed his opportunity to establish pretext); Larson, supra, § 8.02[6], at 8-31 ([C]ourts have generally repudiated th[e] view [that failure of the plaintiff to present evidence of comparative qualifications is fatal to the prima facie case], holding that there is no such requirement and that a plaintiff need only demonstrate minimum qualifications.). Plaintiff must come forward with evidence to show that the circumstances surrounding her failure to receive the Supervisor of Drug Delivery job permit an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Carpenter, 170 Vt. at 567, 743 A.2d at 595. Again, we find that the evidence that the job description and job qualifications were manipulated, combined with the fact that a man was chosen for the position over plaintiff, is sufficient to permit such an inference, see, e.g., Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir.1996) (plaintiff made out prima facie case by showing that she is a member of a protected class, a black female; that she applied for the positions; that she was qualified for the positions; and that the positions were filled by a white male and a white female), and discharge plaintiff's very light burden at this stage. See Boulton, 2003 VT 72, at ¶ 16, 834 A.2d 37; see also Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.1995) ([P]laintiff's burden of proof in a ... discrimination action is de minimis at the prima facie stage ....). We therefore hold that plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination.
¶ 31. Pursuant to the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, defendants have offered evidence in support of a legitimate business reason for their actions: the elimination of the Manager of Formulations position, and the inclusion of certain qualifications in the job description for the new Supervisor of Drug Delivery position were the result of restructuring done in response to large employee turnover and a perceived lack of scientific ability and expertise in certain specialty areas in the Research and Development department. The important element of this justification, for purposes of this case, is that Govil, and senior management who approved the restructuring, made an early, pre-recruitment decision that the necessary qualifications and skill for the senior drug development jobs did not exist among the employees who were left after the extensive turnover. Thus, in creating the restructuring plan and job descriptions, Govil made the decision that neither plaintiff or any other existing employee would be hired to fill the new jobs. At this second stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, defendants have only a burden of production, rather than one of persuasion, see Boulton, 2003 VT 72, at ¶ 15, 834 A.2d 37, and plaintiff does not dispute that the reasons defendants proffered for their hiring decision, if believed, were legitimate and nondiscriminatory. We conclude that defendants have met their burden under McDonnell Douglas. Thus the only question that remains is whether the total evidence offered by plaintiff is sufficient to carry her ultimate burden of demonstrating that Bertek's justification is a mere pretext for discrimination. We conclude that plaintiff has not carried her burden here. ¶ 32. As we indicated above, we have generally followed the burden allocation rules applicable to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the burden of demonstrating pretext in a number of cases, and its latest discussion of the nature of the burden in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), is the most pertinent. Although Reeves is an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case, it was decided on the basis that the burdens for the ADEA and for Title VII are the same. See 530 U.S at 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Supreme Court took the case to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to reject the employer's nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, is adequate to sustain a finding of liability for intentional discrimination. Id. at 140, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal citations omitted). The Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence of pretext, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Id. at 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Court also recognized, however, that this will not always be the case: Certainly there will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred. Id. Although the Court was describing the standard for determining whether the employer was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, commentators and courts after Reeves have concluded that the decision also describes the standard for determining whether the employer is entitled to summary judgment. See Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir.2000) (applying Reeves to a summary judgment motion); C. Thompson, Juries Will Decide More Discrimination Cases: An Examination of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 26 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2001); L. Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 Employee Rts. & Emp. Pol'y J. 37, 63 (2000); Note, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products: Stemming the Tide of Motions for Summary Judgment and Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law, 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1549, 1565 (2001). In part, they have reached this conclusion because the Reeves Court commented that the standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that the inquiry under each is the same. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 33. Reeves explained the application of its ruling in terms consistent with our law on summary judgment, as set out above. Whether summary judgment is appropriate under Reeves depends on a number of factors, including the strength of the plaintiff's prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer's explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer's case and that properly may be considered on a summary judgment motion. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148-49, 120 S.Ct. 2097. The Reeves Court further clarified this standard: Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses. Id. at 150-51, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal citations and quotations omitted). ¶ 34. Plaintiff has relied in part on the Reeves holding. Having adopted the burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas, we see no reason not to adopt the standard of Reeves as a reasonable approach to analyzing evidence in an employment discrimination claim brought under FEPA. Thus, we would normally allow plaintiff to avoid summary judgment at this third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis by demonstrating that there is an issue of material fact underlying the question of whether the employer's reason for its action was pretextual. We conclude that plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. ¶ 35. The difficulty with plaintiff's position is that the hiring decision was not a simple choice among applicants for a preexisting job. Defendants' assertion that they restructured and redefined the research and development management is largely unchallenged by plaintiff. This Court may not second-guess an employer's non-discriminatory business decisions, regardless of their wisdom. Williams v. New York City Dep't of Sanitation, No. 00 Civ. 7371(AJP), 2001 WL 1154627, at  (S.D.N.Y. Sept.28, 2001) (citing cases); see also Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir.2001) (courts should not act as super personnel departments that second-guess employer's business judgments); Tarshis v. Riese Org., 211 F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir.2000) (Title VII ... [does] not grant courts authority to second-guess the wisdom of corporate business decisions....). Moreover, much of the evidence plaintiff has relied upon is entirely consistent with defendants' reason for their action and does not raise an inference of pretext. ¶ 36. To the extent that plaintiff has attempted to show that defendants' rationale for the hiring decision was a pretext, she has relied upon three theories. The first is that Govil manipulated the hiring process in violation of company policies to allow him to hire Miller. As we held above, this evidence helped plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case, the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, but it is unhelpful in demonstrating pretext. Once Govil decided that the existing Bertek employees did not have the necessary skills to lead the research and development of drugs, he had to conduct a search for persons with the needed qualifications. It is obvious that he could not find highly skilled persons with advanced educational degrees in the narrow field involved by simply announcing that positions were open and hoping that the right persons saw the announcement and applied. Consistent with his goals, Govil actively recruited Dr. Miller even before the restructuring was approved. Although Govil put less emphasis on the application process for internal candidates, we cannot conclude that he violated any company policies in the process, [5] and plaintiff did apply and was interviewed. In summary, at best plaintiff may have showed that Govil violated the spirit of company hiring procedures, but the arguable violations reinforced Govil's rationale for hiring Miller, rather than showing the rationale was a pretext for discrimination. ¶ 37. Her second theory of pretext  that she was more qualified than Miller  also does not meet her burden. It is undisputed that plaintiff did not meet the posted minimum qualifications for the job of Supervisor of Drug Delivery. There is no evidence to support plaintiff's argument that Govil adopted the minimum qualifications solely to give the job to Miller. Indeed, the minimum qualifications were entirely consistent with the business rationale of upgrading skill levels. ¶ 38. We cannot agree with her arguments against these central facts. Plaintiff's personal opinion of her relative qualifications cannot be determinative. See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.2000) (plaintiff's opinion that she was more qualified than the person who was hired for the job she sought is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the reasons given for the hiring decision were pretextual). Nor can we conclude that plaintiff has met her burden by showing that some of the responsibilities of the new job of Supervisor of Drug Delivery overlapped with those of the job she was performing on an interim basis. See Lesch v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 282 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir.2002). ¶ 39. We do not believe that plaintiff's related allegation that the company had waived minimum qualifications in the past helps plaintiff's position in this context. Since the whole point of the restructuring was to upgrade skill and competency of research and development managers, any waiver of qualifications to hire an existing employee would defeat this point. Nor are we persuaded that plaintiff showed pretext by her husband's testimony that the General Manager of Bertek, Matthew Costigan, once told him that Miller should not be interviewed because he was an academician and did not have the industrial experience necessary for the job. Irrespective of the views of Costigan, who was not responsible for the hiring, it is undisputed that Miller met the minimum qualifications for the job, including five years of transdermal formulations experience, and that plaintiff did not. ¶ 40. We do not belittle plaintiff's evidence in support of her third theory  that women were subject to widespread discrimination at Bertek. Her evidence suggested that Bertek's work culture was frequently hostile to women, [6] that men held the upper research and development positions, [7] that Govil was a poor manager and supervisor especially with respect to women employees, or that cultural differences adversely affected his attitude toward women employees. This evidence may be relevant under Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151-52, 120 S.Ct. 2097, to support sufficient evidence that the stated reason for the hiring decision was pretextual, but it does not replace such evidence. It does not respond to defendants' business rationale for their hiring decision and show that it is a pretext. ¶ 41. In general, plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut defendants' rationale beyond her own conclusory allegations, see Quechee Lakes Landowners' Ass'n, 170 Vt. at 28, 742 A.2d at 736 (conclusory allegations without facts to support them are insufficient to survive summary judgment), to contradict this evidence. See Smith v. Am. Express Co., 853 F.2d 151, 154-55 (2d Cir.1988) (summary judgment for defendant appropriate when plaintiff failed to show pretext in selection of better qualified candidate for promotion). We conclude that plaintiff failed to meet her burden and that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against her on her claim that defendants illegally failed to promote her. [8]