Opinion ID: 1335940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Circuit Court Properly Denied Motion to Reconsider

Text: The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration with the circuit court. In that motion, the plaintiff quoted language from an affidavit provided by George Bell, [16] a building and maintenance expert who actually investigated and observed the water damage to the condominiums in 1984, as well as the damage allegedly discovered in 1990. It was the contention of Mr. Bell that the damage in 1990 was the result of problems and defects different from and unrelated to those detected and repaired in 1984. [17] The circuit court, by order of February 7, 1995, denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff now contends the affidavit of Mr. Bell placed into dispute two related material issues of fact which presented questions for jury determination: (1) whether the cause of the leakage in 1984 was the same cause of the leakage in 1990; and (2) whether the 1990 leakage problem could have been discovered in 1984. The defendants counter this argument by relying on three affidavits the plaintiff tendered below on the issue of res judicata. [18] These affidavits show the plaintiff was aware of the leakage problem that occurred in 1984. Moreover, the defendants argue the location of the damage, in the rear walls of the condominium units, was the same in 1990 and 1984 and, therefore, the cause of the leakage was the same. The defendants contend that because the location of the problem was the same and the plaintiff was aware of the leakage problem in 1984, the plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the two-year limitation found in W. Va.Code, 55-2-12(a) (1959), which provides that a negligence claim must be filed [w]ithin two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property[.] Under the defendants' theory, the plaintiff had to bring the present cause of action prior to 1987. After carefully reviewing the record, we find the plaintiff, in bringing its motion for reconsideration, failed to satisfy the prerequisites of both Rule 60(b) [19] and Rule 56(e) [20] of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. We first must determine the scope of our appellate review in the instant case. When a party filing a motion for reconsideration does not indicate under which West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure it is filing the motion, as in the case sub judice, we have considered the motion to be either a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment or a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment order. See Savage v. Booth, 196 W.Va. 65, 67-68, 468 S.E.2d 318, 320-21 (1996); In re Burnley, 988 F.2d 1, 2 (4th Cir.1992). In note 5 of Savage, 196 W.Va. at 68, 468 S.E.2d at 321, we adopted a bright-line rule that if the motion is filed within ten days of the circuit court's entry of judgment, the motion is treated as a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e). If the motion is filed outside of the ten-day limit, it can only be addressed under Rule 60(b). See Computer Professionals v. U.S. Secret Service, 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C.Cir.1996) ([a]n untimely motion under Rule 59(e) may be considered as a motion under Rule 60(b) if it states grounds for relief under that rule.). (Citations omitted.) In the instant proceeding, the circuit court entered its summary judgment order on December 9, 1994. The plaintiff filed its motion for reconsideration on January 26, 1995. Obviously, the motion was not timely to be treated under Rule 59(e); therefore, it must be considered as a motion under Rule 60(b). [21] Although Rule 60(b) does not explicitly allow a party to file a motion for clarification and reconsideration, [22] it is well established that a proper Rule 60(b) motion may urge a court to reconsider or vacate a prior judgment. Syl. pt. 3, Lieving v. Hadley, 188 W. Va. 197, 423 S.E.2d 600 (1992); Bego v. Bego, 177 W.Va. 74, 78, 350 S.E.2d 701, 705 (1986); CNF Constructors, Inc. v. Donohoe Construction Co., 57 F.3d 395, 400-401 (4th Cir.1995) (per curiam); 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857 at 254-64 (2nd ed. 1995). The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration cites several crucial and important facts. Facts which, if properly documented and presented at the summary judgment proceeding, would have been sufficient to preclude the granting of the motion for summary judgment. [23] Indeed, the plaintiff strongly contends that its motion for reconsideration cured its earlier failure to comply with the summary judgment mandates of Rule 56(e), and the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the new information in its motion and in its refusal to reverse its earlier summary judgment. We disagree. Our review of a denial of a motion to reconsider is for an abuse of discretion. See Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560 n. 7, 54 L.Ed.2d 521, 530 n. 7 (1978); Johnson v. Nedeff, 192 W.Va. 260, 266, 452 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1994); Robinson v. McKinney, 189 W.Va. 459, 465, 432 S.E.2d 543, 549 (1993); Syl., Ross v. Ross, 187 W.Va. 68, 415 S.E.2d 614 (1992); Syl. pt. 5, Toler v. Shelton, 157 W.Va. 778, 204 S.E.2d 85 (1974); Syl., Intercity Realty Co. v. Gibson, 154 W.Va. 369, 175 S.E.2d 452 (1970). This standard of review reflects the circuit court's institutional position as the forum best equipped for determining the appropriate use of Rule 60(b) to ensure that litigants who have vigorously and diligently complied with the summary judgment mandates of Rule 56 are not penalized by the action of those who choose not to comply. In establishing the bounds of such motion, the weight of authority supports the view that Rule 60(b) motions which seek merely to relitigate legal issues heard at the underlying proceeding are without merit. [24] See Syl. pt. 4, Johnson (Rule 60(b)... does not afford relief from a final judgment of the circuit court dismissing a personal injury action with prejudice for failure to comply with the statutory limitations for instituting suit); Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3rd Cir. 1988) (legal error, without more, cannot justify granting a Rule 60(b) motion.). (Citations omitted); United States v. Williams, 674 F.2d 310, 312 (4th Cir.1982) (Rule 60(b) does not authorize a motion merely for reconsideration of a legal issue.... Where the motion is nothing more than a request that the ... court change its mind ... it is not authorized by Rule 60(b)). (Citation omitted). A Rule 60(b) motion is designed to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and not merely to erroneous applications of law. Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of General Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir.1995), citing McMillan v. MBank Fort Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362, 367 (5th Cir.1993). A circuit court is not required to grant a Rule 60(b) motion unless a moving party can satisfy one of the criteria enumerated under it. In other words, a Rule 60(b) motion to reconsider is simply not an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled. See Syl. pt. 2, N.C. v. W.R.C., 173 W.Va. 434, 317 S.E.2d 793 (1984) ([t]he definition of an independent action, as contemplated by W.Va.R.Civ.P. 60(b), is an equitable action that does not relitigate the issues of the final judgment, order or proceeding from which relief is sought and is one that is limited to special circumstances). It is established also that a Rule 60(b) motion does not present a forum for the consideration of evidence which was available but not offered at the original summary judgment motion. See Anthony v. Runyon, 76 F.3d 210, 215 (8th Cir.1996) (a motion for reconsideration should not be used `as a vehicle' to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the [previous] motion). (Citations omitted). We must now address specifically whether the new information contained in the plaintiff's motion to reconsider is newly discovered. [25] The great weight of authority is that failure to file documents in an original motion does not convert the late filed documents into newly discovered evidence. See Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 676 F.2d 132, 140 (5th Cir.1982); School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993); Richardson v. National Rifle Association, 879 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1995); Timothy A. Garverick & Associates v. Heidtman Steel, 807 F.Supp. 430, 434 (E.D.Mich.1992). In the instant matter, the evidence is clear that the contents of Mr. Bell's affidavit was known prior to the summary judgment motion. In other words, the [p]laintiff ... was at liberty to raise this [matter] in a properly filed response to the motion for summary judgment, which [it] did not do. Hood v. Hood, 59 F.3d 40, 43 (6th Cir.1995). On this record, we are unable to reach any other principled decision than that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not further indulging the plaintiff in another round of judicial proceedings. In the circuit court's mind, the plaintiff's failure to proffer Mr. Bell's affidavit at the time the motion for a summary judgment was being considered may have been a strategic decision for which the plaintiff bears the responsibility. The circuit court's refusal to reconsider its earlier ruling may be harsh, but its harshness is lessened by another omission of the plaintiff. Even if the circuit court would have reconsidered its summary judgment ruling, the motion filed by the plaintiff was not sufficient to permit a different outcome. Although the motion alleged new facts, the facts were never properly documented as required by Rule 56(e). [26] The plaintiff's proffered affidavit of Mr. Bell was never tendered to the circuit court; only some of the salient points of the affidavit were restated in the motion's memorandum. When a party opposing summary judgment fails to comply with the formalities of Rule 56(e), a circuit court may choose to be lenient in the exercise of its discretion to deal with deficiency. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2558, 91 L.Ed.2d at 274; Williams, 194 W.Va. at 59, 459 S.E.2d at 337-38 (nonmoving party need not produce affidavits in a form admissible at trial). However, discretionary leniency does not stretch so far that Rule 56(e) becomes meaningless. See Peterson v. United States, 694 F.2d 943, 945 (3rd Cir.1982) (failure to attach key documents to affidavit violated Rule 56(e)); Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc., 831 F.2d 920, 925 (9th Cir.1987) (unauthenticated documents may not be relied upon to defeat a motion for summary judgment). Here, due to the absence of other evidence, Mr. Bell's affidavit would have been necessary to create a trialworthy issue, yet this crucial document was never provided to the circuit court. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only when a reasonable jury could render a verdict for the nonmoving party, if the record at trial were identical to the record compiled in the summary judgment proceedings before the circuit court. See Griffin v. City of Milwaukee, 74 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir.1996). Lacking this documentation, counsel's motion and memorandum for reconsideration amounted to nothing more than an attorney's argument lacking evidentiary support. Williams, 194 W.Va. at 61 n. 14, 459 S.E.2d at 338 n. 14 (self-serving assertions without factual support in the record will not defeat a motion for summary judgment). Our conclusion with regard to Rule 60(b) promotes the twin concerns of judicial efficiency and respect for the burdensome trial management responsibilities of a circuit court. Questions of the adequacy of the motion to reconsider due to newly discovered evidence will usually turn upon findings of fact or other trial management factors, and a circuit court is better equipped to make these decisions than an appellate court. This is not to deny our jurisdiction to review for abuse of discretion an appeal from a Rule 60(b) ruling, but when a party chooses to utilize the attention and limited resources of a circuit court in a motion under Rule 60(b), we think it is just and proper that it be required to put before the circuit court whatever infirmities or evidence supports setting aside the final judgment. This brings to bear the circuit court's discretion and unique knowledge of the case and maintains this Court's role as a forum for resolving disputed questions of lawnot facts or matters controlled by the circuit court's discretion.