Opinion ID: 2351686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Deficiency in Understanding English

Text: In his third claim on appeal, defendant argues that his severe deficiency in understanding the English language caused him to be denied various statutory and constitutional rights, including his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, his right to equal protection, and his right to effectively assist his counsel in his own defense, and that the trial court should have appointed an interpreter. At the inception of his testimony, defendant said, I'm not good in English. He then continued to say: You know you got to be very slow with me and if you please, if you please, if I need help for any other word in the question explained, you know, just to try to give me a clear question so I can answer honestly. I'm an honest man fighting for my life. To this self-serving disclaimer defendant's attorney replied I will do that Mr. Ibrahim, before commencing his direct examination of defendant. At no other point during the trial was defendant's language proficiency ever raised again, nor did defendant or his attorney ask for the services of an interpreter. We, therefore, reiterate our above statement, that an issue that was not raised below is waived for appellate review. The only exception to this raise or waive rule concerns basic constitutional rights. Donato, 592 A.2d at 141. In order for the exception to apply, however, the error asserted must go beyond the level of harmless error, the record must be `sufficient to permit a determination of the issue,' and counsel's failure to raise the issue must be premised upon `a novel rule of law that counsel could not reasonably have known during the trial.' Id. at 141-42 (quoting State v. Estrada, 537 A.2d 983, 987 (R.I.1988)). We are of the opinion that the present case does not constitute such an exception. Several years ago, the Legislature enacted G.L. 1956 chapter 19 of title 8, pertaining to the use of language interpreters in legal proceedings. The policy underlying this statute is as follows: [T]o guarantee the rights of persons who, because of a non-English speaking background, are unable to readily understand or communicate in the English language, and who consequently need the assistance of an interpreter be fully protected in legal proceedings in criminal matters   . Section 8-19-1. Rhode Island case law is silent on the rights of defendants to an interpreter. The United States Supreme Court has not yet recognized a constitutional right to a court-appointed interpreter. United States v. Si, 333 F.3d 1041, 1043 n. 3 (9th Cir.2003). The United States Supreme Court, instead, has recognized that the right to an interpreter is a matter largely resting in the discretion of the trial court. Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.Ed. 722 (1907). Other states that have enacted foreign language interpreter statutes similar to the one in Rhode Island still hold that the appointment of an interpreter for a defendant is within the discretion of the trial court. In Minnesota, for example, the statute provides that [i]t is hereby declared to be the policy of this state that the constitutional rights of persons handicapped in communication cannot be fully protected unless qualified interpreters are available to assist them in legal proceedings. Minn.Stat. § 611.30 (2002). Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, held that [w]hether an interpreter shall be appointed for a defendant is within the discretion of the [trial] court. State v. Cham, 680 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Minn.Ct.App.2004) (citing State v. Perez, 404 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn.Ct.App.1987)). Although in this case the question of whether defendant was entitled to an interpreter was not preserved for our review, we acknowledge that a trial justice is entrusted with the discretion to appoint an interpreter if he or she determines that a defendant is unable to understand the English language adequately, whether or not a defendant specifically requests an interpreter. Moreover, we endorse the recommendation made by the First Circuit that the trial justice should make the defendant aware that he or she has a right to a court-appointed interpreter if the court determines that one is needed, and, whenever put on notice that there may be some significant language difficulty, the court should make such a determination of need. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1973). In the case before us, however, we are unable to conclude from the record that defendant's deficiency in English was so significant that the trial justice should have realized that an interpreter was necessary in order to protect his constitutional rights. At the time of the trial, Mr. Ibrahim had been living in the United States for approximately eight years, during which time he was employed by GTECH Corporation in New York and Rhode Island as a project manager in the engineering department. Although at the beginning of his direct examination he requested that his attorney speak slowly, and on several occasions asked that a question be repeated, it is not clear from the context of the proceedings that he did not understand the question because of a language problem or simply because the interrogator was speaking too quickly. Indeed, viewing his testimony as a whole it is not readily apparent that he did not have a basic, functional understanding of English. At one point, his attorney even described him as verbose and someone who sometimes expresses too much   . At the sentencing hearing, defendant said: I really am not native English speaker. As my command of English is poor, I feel my thoughts were not communicated well. I feel I was placed at a disadvantage when I represented myself. Yet not once during or before the trial had he requested an interpreter. In the absence of such a request, defendant's contention that he was denied any statutory or constitutional right clearly lacks merit.