Opinion ID: 2010891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-Examination (Jencks Issue)

Text: Wheeler argues that the trial court improperly limited his attempts to test Babb's memory, credibility, and bias. Defense counsel requested Jencks [37] material for use in cross-examining Babb about his assistance to law enforcement officers under a plea agreement admitting his participation in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, for which he had not yet been sentenced. Pursuant to that agreement, Babb agreed to provide the police with information about ongoing crime in the hope that the government would recommend a lenient sentence. Counsel for Wheeler therefore asked for Jencks statements [38] by Babb pertaining to cases other than Wheeler's; he reasoned that if the information Babb provided before Wheeler's trial had not been useful to the police, then his testimony at Wheeler's trial, favorable to the government, would have been especially important in achieving a lighter sentence for his part in the cocaine conspiracy. In short, counsel wanted the Jencks statements for help in exploring whether Babb had an incentive to exaggerate the information he provided against Wheeler. Before the government must produce Jencks material to the defense, four prerequisites must be satisfied: The material must be in the possession of the government; the defense must request the material; the material must constitute a `statement' as defined [in the Jencks Act]; and the statement must relate to the subject matter of the witness' direct testimony. Lyles v. United States, 879 A.2d 979, 983 n. 12 (D.C.2005) (quoting Butler v. United States, 481 A.2d 431, 446 (D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029, 105 S.Ct. 1398, 84 L.Ed.2d 786 (1985)). In assessing Wheeler's argument, it is important to repeat that trial counsel was seeking information from the government about Babb's statements concerning crimes other than those charged against Wheeler. It is highly questionable, therefore, whether any statement pertaining to those other crimes can be said to relate to the subject matter of the witness' direct testimony, id., in Wheeler's trial, because Babb's testimony, aside from preliminaries, focused entirely on his interactions with Wheeler during the thirty-one hours immediately preceding Taylor's murder. Defense counsel told the trial court, however, that this subject matter criterion was satisfied because the government had introduced Babb's plea agreement in evidence and Babb, on direct examination, had provided details of his cooperation with the police in other cases. The trial court deflected that argument by calling the requested material irrelevant. We need not resolve this subject matter issue, or even resolve whether Babb had made statements [39] that would qualify for disclosure as Jencks material if they pertained to the subject matter of Babb's direct examination. The trial court was correct: the requested material could not have been relevant to trial counsel's only stated reason for seeking the material, because whether the information Babb had supplied to the police about other crimes had, or had not, been useful to law enforcement was entirely beyond the ability of Babb, or Wheeler's trial counsel, to evaluate. Only the police and the prosecutors could evaluate the usefulness of information provided by Babb in other matters. The trial court ruled that defense counsel was free to examine [Babb] about any bias or motivation he ha[d], and counsel did so effectively. As to credibility, counsel established that Babb had been a drug dealer, was facing a substantial federal sentence for conspiracy to sell drugs, and had agreed to cooperate with the government in the hope of receiving a lenient sentence. As to bias, counsel elicited that Babb had worn a wire to record conversations with various drug dealers, but not with his friend, Taylor, who also was a drug dealer. Nor did he report Taylor's theft at Brittainy Johnson's house to the police. Moreover, once Babb learned that Wheeler believed Taylor had been the robber, Babb and Taylor discussed getting guns to deal with the tense situation that was developing. Counsel, it is clear, elicited considerable evidence bearing on Babb's memory, credibility, and bias. In contrast with this evidence, the information that counsel might have obtained from his request for Jencks material related to other cases was so speculative that no potential benefit to the defense is discernible. Furthermore, we agree with the government: satisfying appellant's cross-examination request would have required a wholesale fishing expedition through potentially countless confidential investigative files. This would have offered minimal probative value to the defense when compared with the substantial prejudice to the government. As we have said, the Jencks Act is not a tool for discovery; rather, [o]ne purpose of the Jencks Act was to restrict defendant's right to any general exploration of the government's files. Hilliard v. United States, 638 A.2d 698, 704 (D.C.1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). All things considered, therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion [40] in denying trial counsel's request for Jencks material. [41]