Opinion ID: 2529268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Postsale Duty to Warn

Text: ¶ 109 We next consider Ford's various contentions regarding plaintiffs' fourth theory of negligence. Specifically, Ford maintains that plaintiffs' fourth theory of negligence, which was never pleaded before trial, is premised upon a postsale duty to warn which is contrary to Illinois law. Under plaintiffs' fourth theory, the jury was instructed that it could find Ford negligent for its failure to inform of the existence of the Trunk Pack and/or Trunk Pack recommendations. Ford developed these measures a decade after the sale of the 1993 Lincoln Town Car. ¶ 110 We initially reject plaintiffs' argument that Ford has forfeited any claim of error on the postsale duty to warn issue. The pretrial and trial record is replete with instances where Ford raised the lack of a postsale duty and challenged the relevance of the postsale testimony in relation to its duty to the consumer at the time of manufacture. ¶ 111 With respect to the merits, under established Illinois precedent, when a design defect is present at the time of sale, the manufacturer has a duty to take reasonable steps to warn at least the purchaser of the risk as soon as the manufacturer learns or should have learned of the risk created by its fault. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.2d 26, 33-36, 37 Ill.Dec. 304, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980) (duty to warn if manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger at the time of sale); Carrizales v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., 226 Ill.App.3d 20, 34, 168 Ill.Dec. 169, 589 N.E.2d 569 (1991) (Illinois law has been reluctant to impose a duty to warn beyond the time when the product leaves the manufacturer's control unless the manufacturer knew or should have known at that time that the product was defective.); Kempes v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 192 Ill. App.3d 209, 218, 139 Ill.Dec. 259, 548 N.E.2d 644 (1989). ¶ 112 Nevertheless, a manufacturer is under no duty to issue postsale warnings or to retrofit its products to remedy defects first discovered after a product has left its control. Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 302 Ill.App.3d 879, 890, 236 Ill.Dec. 394, 707 N.E.2d 239 (1999); Carrizales, 226 Ill. App.3d at 34, 168 Ill.Dec. 169, 589 N.E.2d 569; Collins v. Hyster Co., 174 Ill.App.3d 972, 977, 124 Ill.Dec. 483, 529 N.E.2d 303 (1988) ([T]he law does not contemplate placing the onerous duty on manufacturers to subsequently warn all foreseeable users of products based on increased design or manufacture expertise that was not present at the time the product left its control.). [1] ¶ 113 Plaintiffs argue that their fourth theory has always been premised upon a continuing duty to warn at the time the car was manufactured, and thereafter. Specifically, they argue that if a manufacturer knew or should have known of the hazard at the time of manufacture, establishing a duty to warn when the product left its control, that duty to warn is then a continuous one. ¶ 114 The appellate court agreed and found that plaintiffs' theory was based upon a continuous duty to warn. We do not quarrel with the statement of the law recognizing a continuing duty to warn. We reiterate, as the appellate court noted in Modelski, a continuing duty may be imposed if at the time of manufacture of the product the manufacturer knew or should have known of the hazard. ¶ 115 Nevertheless, that theory was not presented to the jury at trial. During the hearing on Ford's motion for a directed verdict, plaintiffs specifically noted that the evidence pertaining to subsequent remedial measures was admissible to support a post-sale duty to warn. Moreover, the jury instruction proffered by plaintiffs does not comport with a continuing duty to warn theory. Rather, over Ford's objections, the trial court submitted the following non-IPI instruction to the jury: One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the seller's failure to provide a warning after the time of sale or distribution of a product if a reasonably careful person in the seller's position would provide such a warning under the circumstances. A reasonably careful person in the seller's position would provide a warning after the time of sale if: The seller knows or reasonably should know that the product poses a substantial risk of harm to persons; and Those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and A warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to whom a warning might be provided; and The risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing a warning. Whether or not Ford Motor Company acted as a reasonably careful person under the circumstances of this case is for you to decide. ¶ 116 This instruction is virtually a verbatim recitation of section 10 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998), [2] which has not been previously adopted in Illinois. As explained under comment a, section 10 specifically recognizes a duty to warn of a product-related risk after the time of sale, whether or not the product is defective at the time of original sale,  if a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning under the enumerated circumstances. (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 10, cmt. a, at 192 (1998). The reporters' note to comment a specifically highlights that Illinois has reject[ed] the imposition of any post-sale duty to warn if the product was not defective at the time of sale. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 10, Reporters' Note, cmt. a, at 198 (1998). ¶ 117 Accordingly, the jury instruction as proffered allowed the jury to find Ford negligent even if Ford had not breached a duty of care existing at the time the car was manufactured. The instruction allowed the jury to recognize a duty that could arise based upon knowledge of risks discovered after the sale of the car even if it found Ford had not acted unreasonably at the time the car was manufactured. Indeed, there was evidence admitted that Ford subsequently learned of tank punctures from trunk contents causing fuel-fed fires in Panther platform Crown Victoria Police Interceptor vehicles involved in high-speed rear-end collisions. Based upon this subsequently acquired knowledge alone, the jury could have found a postsale duty to inform of the safety improvements made nearly a decade later without ever concluding that Ford knew or should have known the product was unreasonably dangerous at the time of sale. Consequently, where plaintiffs' theory, as presented to the jury, was premised upon a duty not recognized in Illinois at the time of trial, it was legally defective and improperly submitted to the jury for its consideration. See Lazenby v. Mark's Construction, Inc., 236 Ill.2d 83, 98, 337 Ill. Dec. 884, 923 N.E.2d 735 (2010). ¶ 118 Alternatively, plaintiffs and amicus ITLA ask this court to adopt section 10 and to recognize the postsale duty to warn theory articulated by the American Law Institute. Although we do not foreclose the possibility that a postsale duty to warn could be recognized in the future in Illinois, we decline the invitation to expand the duty in this case under the particular facts and circumstances presented here. ¶ 119 Even if we were to adopt the formulation as reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury with regard to the enumerated circumstances under which a reasonable person would provide a warning under section 10. As stated previously, the theory was never pleaded by plaintiffs prior to trial. Furthermore, required elements of such a claim included whether [t]hose to whom a warning might be provided can be identified, and whether a warning could effectively be communicated to those persons and acted on by the consumer. ITLA suggests that Ford could have easily identified the customers and effectively communicated the warning. ITLA notes that vehicle identification numbers (VIN) are used to register vehicles and would allow for the location of the current owner. ITLA indicates that Ford could feasibly identify the VINs of vehicles for which a postsale warning should be given and that Ford could have publicized to consumers through the general media. Nevertheless, none of this evidence was specifically presented to the jury at trial on this theory, nor was Ford provided with an opportunity to dispute these circumstances as articulated under this new theory. With respect to the failure to inform of the Trunk Pack, Arndt acknowledged that it was not even suitable for the 1993 Lincoln Town Car. Accordingly, we decline to consider in this case whether Illinois should adopt a postsale duty to warn.