Opinion ID: 1399255
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Label the Factors as Either Mitigating or Aggravating

Text: Defendant contends the trial court was required to label the sentencing factors as either mitigating or aggravating. We have repeatedly rejected this contention. ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 148 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559]; People v. Gallego (1990) 52 Cal.3d 115, 198 [276 Cal. Rptr. 679, 802 P.2d 169].) (16) Defendant also claims the court was required to instruct the jury that the absence of a mitigating factor is not itself aggravating. Although that would be a correct statement of the law ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]), a specific instruction to that effect is not required, at least not unless the court or parties make an improper contrary suggestion. A jury properly advised about the broad scope of its sentencing discretion is unlikely to conclude that the absence of such unusual factors as `extreme' emotional disturbance, victim consent, or reasonable belief in moral justification [citations] is entitled to significant aggravating weight. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 769 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741], italics in original.) No one suggested here that the mere absence of a mitigating factor was aggravating.