Opinion ID: 2639367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 27] In her final claim of error, Appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support her forgery conviction. Appellant was convicted of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-3-602(a)(ii) and (b) (LexisNexis 2001): (a) A person is guilty of forgery if, with intent to defraud he: .... (ii) Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed; or .... (b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, forgery is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years, a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00), or both. Appellant's challenge invokes the definition of writing, which means printing or any other method of recording information, money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, and other symbols of value, right, privilege or identification. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-601 (LexisNexis 2001). [¶ 28] The evidence at trial indicated that Appellant manually entered the credit card numbers into the machine since Harlow did not possess the actual card. After the receipt was printed, Appellant would give it to Harlow so he could sign Eric Huff's name. Appellant claims her actions did not constitute uttering a forged writing largely because her actionsmanually entering the credit card numbersdid not purport to be the act of another. She also argues that the credit card receipt did not become forged under the statute until Harlow had signed it. Thus, the simple act of keying in the credit card numbers cannot support a forgery conviction because the action was taken before any forgery existed. [¶ 29] Our standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims is well established: When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we assume that the evidence favoring the prevailing party is true, disregard the evidence favoring the unsuccessful party, and give the prevailing party the benefit of every favorable inference that we may reasonably draw from the evidence. Lucero v. State, 14 P.3d 920, 924 (Wyo.2000) (citing Wentworth v. State, 975 P.2d 22, 25 (Wyo.1999)) (quoting Willis v. Willis, 48 Wyo. 403, 49 P.2d 670, 678 (1935)). Resolution of Appellant's claim requires us to invoke our rules of statutory interpretation: When we analyze statutes, we endeavor to interpret them in accordance with the legislature's intent. Fall v. State, 963 P.2d 981, 983 (Wyo.1998). We begin by making an `inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.' Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo.1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts of the statute in pari materia so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. Fall, 963 P.2d at 983. Capshaw v. State, 10 P.3d 560, 564 (Wyo. 2000). [¶ 30] We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of forgery. The elements of forgery are: (1) the making, completing, executing, authenticating, issuing or transferring of a writing purporting to be the act of another who did not authorize the act; and (2) with the intent to defraud. As noted above, the statutes define writing as the printing or any other method of recording certain specified items or other symbols of value, right, privilege or identification. Under the plain language of the statute, Appellant's actions clearly constitute a forgery. Appellant entered the credit card numbers into a machine that printed out a receipt of a financial transaction. This receipt purported to be a recording of a sale of goods to Eric Huff. The record conclusively demonstrated that Eric Huff had not given his permission for this transaction and that Appellant was aware of that fact. The word make is defined, in its ordinary sense as to cause to exist ... to form, fashion, or produce. Black's Law Dictionary 955 (6th ed.1990). By entering the credit card numbers into the machine and printing a receipt, Appellant caused a document to exist that purported to be the act of another person who did not authorize its creation. The fact that Harlow is the one who signed the receipt does not alter the fact that it was Appellant who created the false document and thereby committed forgery. [¶ 31] Appellant also claims that there is insufficient evidence to sustain her forgery conviction because the Amended Information did not identify the specific transaction constituting the basis of the charge. Originally, Appellant was charged with two counts of forgery. Harlow had made fifteen transactions on Eric Huff's credit card: four at one convenience store at which Appellant worked, and eleven at the other. After the presentation of evidence, the district court granted Appellant's motion for a judgment of acquittal on one of the forgery counts but allowed the other counts to go to the jury. The district court instructed the jury that it should determine whether Appellant committed a forgery between the dates of April 15 and May 2, 1998. This time frame encapsulated all of the transactions between Harlow and Appellant. After the jury returned a guilty verdict, Appellant renewed her motion for a judgment of acquittal raising the same argument she presents before us. In its decision letter, the district court responded: As noted during the trial proceedings, it appears that the method of charging the multiple counts in the Amended Information in this case was problematic. The difficulties and concerns noted by this judge contributed to the granting of a judgment of acquittal on Counts II, IV, and V of the Amended Information. In granting the judgment of acquittal on those three counts, the Court closely reviewed the requirements of Rule 3 of the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the requirements that (a) the information state the essential elements of the alleged crime, and (b) be sufficiently definite so that the defendant can prepare his or her defense and grant protection from further prosecution for the same offense (double jeopardy). Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 617 (Wyo.1986). Based upon the situation presented with respect to the charge of forgery contained in Count I in this case, it would not appear that the above analysis provides a basis for the granting of a judgment of acquittal as to that charge. While it surely may have been preferable for Count I to set forth a precise date and identity of the alleged forged writing or writings, it cannot be said that the remaining forgery charge fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 3 of the Wyoming Rules [of] Criminal Procedure. Further, it cannot be said that Count I of the Amended Information, after the dismissal of Count II, fails to sufficiently appraise the defendant of the charge for the purposes of preparing her defense, or fails to protect the defendant against another prosecution for the same offense, as such criteria has been developed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962), and its prodigy [sic]. Therefore, the Court must deny the defense's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Count I of the Amended Information in this case. Appellant makes no suggestion that the forgery charge does not comply with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 3. [3] Furthermore, all of the transactions involved Appellant entering the credit card numbers manually into the machine and printing out a receipt for the transactions. Every one of those actions would support a forgery conviction, and Appellant makes no argument to the contrary. Theoretically, the State could have charged Appellant with fifteen counts of forgery. However, Appellant was convicted on one count that embraced all fifteen acts. Appellant cites no authority to the effect that this was improper. Furthermore, Appellant does not contend that she was not aware of the basis of the charge against her or that Appellant's ability to defend herself was in any way compromised. As noted, there is sufficient evidence to support a forgery conviction on each act, and since each of those acts was contained within the charge that went to the jury, double jeopardy has attached to each one. Accordingly, we concur with the district court and affirm Appellant's conviction.