Opinion ID: 753501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: DiMartini's Speedy Trial Right

Text: 46 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), a defendant's trial must commence within 70 days from the date of the indictment or initial court appearance, whichever occurs later. Since the last codefendant was arraigned on January 25, 1996, DiMartini calculates that he should have been tried by April 4, 1996. 47 In postponing the trial from February 14, 1996 through May 21, 1996, the district court relied on § 3161(h)(8)(A)--the ends of justice exception. On appeal, DiMartini argues that the district court failed to satisfy this exception's requirements. See U.S. v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir.1994). 48 Regardless, we need not decide whether the district court satisfied the ends of justice exception. We find an alternative basis for excludable delay. Specifically, § 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion. See U.S. v. George, 85 F.3d 1433 (9th Cir.1996). 49 On January 24, 1996, DiMartini filed a motion to suppress evidence. This motion was not decided until 61 days later, on March 26, 1996. Under § 3161(h)(1)(F), these 61 days were properly excludable. Thus, DiMartini's right under the Speedy Trial Act was not violated. 50 In a footnote, DiMartini argues that his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was also violated. Applying the four-factor test given in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we find no constitutional violation. In particular, we note that DiMartini's failure to prove prejudice pursuant to Barker is not excused by Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992).