Opinion ID: 184923
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fees for Work by In-House Counsel

Text: 17 The materials submitted by the FDIC in support of its request for attorneys' fees included the sum of $10,000 for the estimated time spent on the case by the FDIC's in-house counsel. Appellants oppose the inclusion of this sum on two grounds, both of them valid. First, the time the counsel devoted to the case is insufficiently documented; and second, it is not possible to determine, from the FDIC's submissions, how much of the time in-house counsel did devote was in a capacity other than that of a mere liaison between the agency and the Justice Department attorneys who represented it in this case, a function for which the recovery of fees is not permitted. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1985) (Of course, if inhouse counsel are not actively participating (e.g., acting only as liaison), fees should not be awarded.); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1499 (11th Cir. 1983) (same). 18 The district court provided no reason for its inclusion of the $10,000 in the fee award other than that it appear[ed] that fees for FDIC's in-house counsel are appropriate in this case. FDIC v. Bender, No. 93-0864 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 1998).This explanation is inadequate. If, on remand, the court is to award any amount for the in-house counsel's work, it must determine whether she contributed anything of substantive value to the litigation; and if she did, the court must then determine the approximate amount of time she devoted to that work as well as the hourly rate to be charged for it. 19