Opinion ID: 2429561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: national childhood vaccine injury act

Text: Next, SLU incorrectly asserts that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Danny's petition pursuant to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 et seq. (1988). The pertinent section of the statute provides: No person may bring a civil action for damages ... against a vaccine administrator or manufacturer in a State or Federal court for damages arising from a vaccine related injury or death associated with the administration of a vaccine... 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A). We agree with SLU that the purpose of this statute is to ensure the continuance of vaccine production by manufacturers who fear liability. SLU, however, has no basis to raise the argument that this statute warrants the dismissal of this case. They were not the manufacturer, administrator, or in any way related to Danny Callahan's polio vaccine. SLU also contends that the trial court erred in not permitting counsel to inquire during voir dire whether any jurors had knowledge of this Act. This Court recognizes the broad discretion vested in the trial court for determining the propriety of questions during the voir dire. State v. Holland, 653 S.W.2d 670, 678 (Mo. banc 1983). Unless there is an abuse of that discretion, we will not interfere. We might even go so far as to say that this discretion will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse. See McMillin v. Union Electric Co., 820 S.W.2d 352, 354 (Mo.App.1991). SLU is displeased with the trial court's finding that the questions were irrelevant, but fails to assert why the questions are relevant. SLU also fails to show how the trial court abused its discretion or caused harm by not allowing the questions. Because the Act does not preclude liability for SLU and there was no showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court during voir dire, this argument fails.