Opinion ID: 2600127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conviction of First-Degree Murder on Combined Theories

Text: Morton breaks this first issue in two, presenting it first as a violation of his right to a unanimous verdict and second as an error in instructions. Both challenges, when reduced to their essence, require us to decide a question of law, and our review is therefore unlimited. See State v. White, 275 Kan. 580, 597-98, 67 P.3d 138 (2003). Like the defendant in the recent case of State v. Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 80 P.3d 52 (2003), Morton points to language from State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 262, 970 P.2d 42 (1998), and State v. Wakefield, 267 Kan. 116, 139, 977 P.2d 941 (1999), to support this argument. Wakefield merely repeated the language from Vontress : The Vontress court observed that as stated in the statute, premeditated murder and felony murder were separate and distinct offenses. Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 139. This language is confusing when considered in isolation. It is inconsistent with previous and succeeding Kansas case law, as well as the reasoning and outcome of the cases in which it appears. As Justice Gernon observed in Hoge, the statement was dicta, included in Vontress without any analysis of whether premeditated murder and felony murder actually constitute separate crimes. Hoge, 276 Kan. at 809. Before Vontress and Wakefield were decided, this court had stated clearly: Premeditated and felony murder are not separate, distinct offenses but are two separate theories under which the crime of first-degree murder may be committed. State v. McKinney, 265 Kan. 104, Syl. ¶ 1, 961 P.2d 1 (1998); see also Hoge, 276 Kan. at 809 (premeditated murder, felony murder merely different theories of proving the required elements of premeditation and intent for the crime of first-degree murder) (citing State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 491-92, 759 P.2d 105 [1988]; State v. Matson, 260 Kan. 366, 372, 921 P.2d 790 [1996] (harsher sentence for premeditated murder is just that, a sentence  not a separate crime); State v. Barncord, 240 Kan. 35, 37-38, 726 P.2d 1322 [1986]; State v. McCowan, 226 Kan. 752, 759-61, 602 P.2d 1363 [1979]). In essence, the felonious conduct proved in a felony murder is a stand-in for the deliberation and premeditation usually required to be proved in a first-degree murder case. Hoge, 276 Kan. at 809 (quoting State v. Branning, 271 Kan. 877, 887, 26 P.3d 673 [2001]). In Vontress, the jury was presented with a verdict form similar to the one used in this case. During deliberations it marked the form to indicate that the first-degree murder conviction was based on the jury's unanimous agreement on the defendant's guilt of premeditated murder and its unanimous agreement on the defendant's guilt of felony murder. Vontress, 266 Kan. at 261-62. The defendant received the harsher sentence available only for premeditated murder. 266 Kan. at 250-51. The defendant appealed, arguing the verdict was ambiguous. We held that there was no ambiguity. The jury had found the defendant guilty under each theory of first-degree murder, and his sentence for premeditated murder was not illegal. 266 Kan. at 264. The Wakefield jury also was presented with a verdict form similar to the one used in this case. See 267 Kan. at 137. In that case, the jury selected all three options on the form; the jurors unanimously found the defendant guilty of premeditated murder and of felony murder, but they also said they were unable to agree under which theory the defendant was guilty. Again, the defendant received the harsher sentence available only for premeditated murder. We again affirmed, holding the harsher sentence was legal because the order of the jury's options on the verdict form meant the jury first unanimously found Wakefield guilty of premeditated murder and then unanimously found Wakefield guilty of felony murder prior to finding Wakefield guilty on the combined theories. 267 Kan. at 141. In State v. Davis, 268 Kan. 661, 678-79, 998 P.2d 1127 (2000), the defendant argued on appeal that he was denied his right to jury unanimity on his first-degree murder conviction for aiding and abetting the crime because the jury had not agreed on either premeditation or felony murder as the theory of guilt. We recited the alternative means rule of State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 289, 875 P.2d 242 (1994) (quoting State v. Kitchen, 110 Wash. 2d 403, 410, 756 P.2d 105 [1988]); `In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means. [Citations omitted.] In reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.]' Davis, 268 Kan. at 679. Under this rule, we upheld the verdict because each means of committing first-degree murder  aiding and abetting a premeditated killing or participating in a felony murder  was supported by sufficient evidence. Davis, 268 Kan. at 680-81. Jury unanimity on either means was not required. The holding of Davis was not only consistent with Timley ; it also followed from pre- Timley case law in Kansas and United States Supreme Court precedent. In State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 345, 552 P.2d 931 (1976), we had upheld a first-degree murder conviction, stating, under the alternative means rule: If a verdict of first degree murder can be justified on either of two interpretations of the evidence, premeditation or felony murder, the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation of the evidence and part on another. In Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 115 L. Ed. 2d 555, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991), the Supreme Court examined a conviction for first-degree murder obtained after the prosecution had advanced both premeditation and felony murder theories. The majority, citing Wilson among many cases from various states that had upheld such a practice, rejected the defendant's contention that due process was offended by his conviction on the combined theories. 501 U.S. at 630-45. Regardless of whether we consider jury unanimity a federal constitutional guarantee or a state statutory right, see K.S.A. 22-3421, these cases confirm that Morton got all that he was entitled to in this case. Although we know from the verdict form that Morton's jury could not agree on premeditation or felony murder, it was unanimous as to his guilt of first-degree murder. That was enough as long as the evidence of each means was sufficient. Instruction and conviction on the combined theories was proper. See Hoge, 276 Kan. at 817. Moreover, because Morton was not given the harsher sentence appropriate only for a unanimous conviction under a premeditation theory, his sentence also would pass muster. See Wakefield, 267 Kan. at 136; Vontress, 266 Kan. at 264.