Opinion ID: 6325613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equal Terms Provision

Text: The other provision of RLUIPA that New Harvest claims the City has violated is the equal terms provision. It provides that “[n]o government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). We have previously identified four elements of an equal terms claim: “(1) there must be an imposition or implementation of a land-use regulation, (2) by a government, (3) on a religious assembly or institution,” and (4) the imposition or implementation must be “on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.” Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1170–71. It is undisputed here that the City has imposed or implemented a land use regulation, that the City is a government, and that New Harvest is a religious assembly or institution. Thus, only the fourth element is at issue in this case: whether the Assembly Uses Provision 16 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS impermissibly treats religious organizations on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution. The equal terms provision contemplates both facial and as-applied challenges. It prohibits the government from “‘imposing,’ i.e., enacting, a facially discriminatory ordinance or ‘implementing,’ i.e., enforcing[,] a facially neutral ordinance in a discriminatory manner.” Elijah Group, Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward County, 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (describing “three distinct kinds” of equal term violations, including regulations that “facially differentiate[] between religious and nonreligious assemblies or institutions” and regulations that are “truly neutral” but are “selectively enforced against religious, as opposed to nonreligious assemblies or institutions”). Here, New Harvest alleges that the Assembly Uses Provision facially violates the equal terms provision because it permits certain nonreligious assemblies to operate on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area while forbidding religious assemblies from doing the same. 8 8 New Harvest also purports to bring an as-applied challenge to the implementation of the Assembly Uses Provision. “The line between facial and as-applied challenges can sometimes prove ‘amorphous.’” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1128 (2019) (quoting Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 15 (2012)). Such is the case here. Although the contours of New Harvest’s as-applied challenge are murky, the argument appears to be that particular nonreligious assemblies, such as the Ariel Theatre, currently operating on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area should have been precluded from doing so under the Assembly Uses Provision because they are “similar” to “clubs, lodges, [and] places of religious assembly.” Because this provision’s applicability, on its face, thus turns on the issue of whether other uses are “similar” to churches, New Harvest’s facial and as-applied challenges NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 17 “As this is a facial challenge, we consider only the text of the zoning ordinance, not its application.” Calvary Chapel Bible Fellowship v. County of Riverside, 948 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2020). New Harvest bears the initial burden of “produc[ing] prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation” of the equal terms provision. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b). If New Harvest succeeds in doing so, the statute shifts the burden of persuasion to the government on “any element of the claim.” Id. To make out a prima facie case of facially unequal treatment, New Harvest must show that the Assembly Uses Provision draws an “express distinction” between religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1171 (“[T]he express distinction drawn by the ordinance establishes a prima facie case for unequal treatment.”). The Assembly Uses Provision does just that: it draws an express distinction between “[c]lubs, lodges, and places of religious assembly, and similar assembly uses,” on the one hand, and all other nonreligious assemblies, on the other hand, with regard to permitted firstfloor uses in the Main Street Restricted Area. Salinas City Code § 37-40.310(a)(2). Because the Assembly Uses Provision expressly excludes religious assemblies while permitting some nonreligious assemblies, New Harvest has established a prima facie case. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1171 (“It is hard to see how an express exclusion of ‘religious organizations’ from uses permitted as of right by other [nonreligious] ‘membership organizations’ could be other than ‘less than equal terms’ for religious organizations.”). Accordingly, the City has the burden of are not meaningfully distinct. We therefore analyze it as a facial challenge. 18 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS persuasion on each element of the equal terms provision claim. 9 To meet that burden with respect to the contested fourth element, the City must show that any nonreligious assembly permitted to operate on the first floor of the Main Street Restricted Area is not similarly situated to a religious assembly “with respect to an accepted zoning criteri[on].” Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173. The City, taking a 9 Of course, a religious organization will face a more difficult challenge establishing a prima facie case where, unlike here, the challenged regulation does not expressly prohibit religious assemblies. Instructive is our recent decision in Calvary Chapel. In that case, a church purchased a plot of land in the Citrus-Vineyard (C/V) Zone of the Temecula Wine Country of Riverside County. 948 F.3d at 1174. The zoning ordinance neither expressly permitted nor excluded religious assemblies. Rather, in the C/V Zone, “vineyards, groves, crops, orchards, gardens, and pastures for raising livestock are all permitted as of right,” while “[e]ighteen-hole golf courses, child day care centers, bed and breakfasts, country inns, hotels, restaurants, spas, cooking schools, wine sampling rooms, retail wine sale stores, and special occasion facilities are all permissible . . . upon approval of a plot plan.” Id. at 1174. After the county declined to amend the zoning ordinance “to specifically permit churches in the C/V Zone,” the church brought a facial challenge under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision. Id. at 1175. The church argued that the zoning ordinance facially violated the equal terms provision by prohibiting religious assemblies, while permitting the above-mentioned nonreligious assembly uses. See id. We rejected that challenge, holding that the church failed to make out a prima facie case because, “[a]t least on the face of the ordinance, secular and religious places of assembly are treated the same.” We explained that “[b]oth are permitted in the C/V Zone only if they meet the requirements of a ‘special occasion facility,’” and “nothing in the text of the ordinance prevents churches from holding regular worship services or other religious assemblies in their special occasion facilities.” Id. at 1176. Here, unlike Calvary Chapel, the challenged land-use regulation expressly prohibits religious assemblies from operating on equal terms with at least some nonreligious assemblies—a prima facie violation of the equal terms provision. NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 19 different view of the proper order of operations, argues that the burden should shift only after New Harvest identifies a similarly situated nonreligious assembly that is permitted to operate on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area. Such an approach, however, is inconsistent with Centro Familiar, where we found that the ordinance’s express exclusion of religious assemblies gave rise to the plaintiff’s prima facie case, without requiring the plaintiff to point to similarly situated nonreligious comparators. Id. (“The burden is not on the church to show a similarly situated secular assembly, but on the city to show that the treatment received by the church should not be deemed unequal, where it appears to be unequal on the face of the ordinance.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the similarly situated comparators come into play, in a facial challenge, only after the plaintiff has put forward sufficient evidence that the regulation makes an express distinction between religious and nonreligious assemblies. 10 10 A decade ago, we observed that the approaches of our sister circuits to facial challenges under RLUIPA’s equal terms provision fell “roughly into two camps.” Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1169 n. 25. Since then, the split has only widened, and we now discern not two but three distinct approaches to facial challenges under the equal terms provision. One camp—which includes the Third and Sixth Circuits— requires that plaintiffs “put forward” similarly situated nonreligious assemblies in order to make a prima facie case. See Tree of Life Christian Sch.’s v. City of Upper Arlington, 905 F.3d 357, 373 (6th Cir. 2018); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 270 (3d Cir. 2007). The second camp, which includes this Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, makes it easier for the plaintiff to make out a prima facie case, requiring only that the plaintiff bring forward sufficient evidence that the challenged regulation makes an express distinction between religious and nonreligious assemblies, regardless of whether those assemblies are similarly situated. See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 291–93 (5th Cir. 2012). Only after the 20 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS Since, as mentioned, New Harvest has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the City to show that any nonreligious assembly permitted to operate on the first floor of the Main Street Restricted Area is not similarly situated to a religious assembly with respect to an accepted zoning criterion. As the Fifth Circuit has observed, this is functionally a two-part test, requiring the government to establish: (1) that the zoning criterion behind the regulation at issue is an acceptable one; and (2) that the religious assembly or institution is treated as well as every other nonreligious assembly or institution that is “similarly situated” with respect to that criterion. See Opulent Life, 697 F.3d at 292–93. Turning to the first element, one stated purpose of the Assembly Uses Provision is to encourage pedestrianoriented neighborhoods. See Salinas Zoning Code § 3740.290. New Harvest contends that the Assembly Uses Provision is not an acceptable zoning criterion because it does not further a “compelling interest.” But, as the Sixth Circuit observed in rejecting a similar argument, there is no requirement that the criterion further a compelling interest; only an acceptable one. See Tree of Life Christian Sch.’s, 905 F.3d at 372. It is a closer question whether the City’s choice to ban certain first floor uses is an acceptable means plaintiff establishes a prima facie case does the burden shift to the government to show, among other potential rebuttals, that the religious and nonreligious assemblies are not, in fact, similarly situated. See id. In the final camp is the Eleventh Circuit, which, like this Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, does not require the plaintiff to put forward similarly situated nonreligious assemblies in order to make a prima facie case; however, under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the government may carry its burden only by showing that the challenged provision survives strict scrutiny. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231–32 (11th Cir. 2004). NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 21 of realizing its stated purpose to foster a pedestrian-friendly Downtown Core Area. We need not resolve this issue because, even if the zoning criterion is lawful, the City fails the second element of the two-part test. We conclude that the City has failed to show that the Assembly Uses Provision treats religious assemblies on equal terms with nonreligious assemblies that are similarly situated with respect to an accepted zoning criterion. The City assumes throughout its briefing that the Assembly Uses Provision distinguishes between “private” and “public” assembly uses, prohibiting only the former from operating on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area. The City suggests that private assembly uses, but not public assembly uses, “typically are open only to organization members and their guests, operate during limited hours and for most of the week are closed, and have ‘blank facades’ with no windows or windows with drawn shades or blinds.” The Assembly Uses Provision itself, however, does not speak in terms of “public” and “private” assemblies. Instead, the provision prohibits three particular types of assembly uses—clubs, lodges, and places of religious assembly— along with “similar” assembly uses. Under the zoning code, clubs and lodges are fairly characterized as private assemblies. They are defined as “[m]eeting, recreational, or social facilities” that are “primarily for use by members or guests.” Salinas Zoning Code § 37-10.270. Churches, however, are not fairly characterized as private assemblies because they are commonly open to the public and can attract substantial foot traffic. Indeed, some of the country’s largest houses of worship, like New York’s St. Patrick’s Cathedral and Washington’s National Cathedral, host hundreds of thousands of visitors annually, only a small 22 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS fraction of whom are members or guests of the church. 11 And, although not directly relevant in this facial challenge, New Harvest itself explains that its own services “are held open to the public and no one has ever been denied entry.” For that reason, we hold that other nonreligious assemblies, such as theatres, which are permitted to operate on the first floor of the Main Street Restricted Area, are similarly situated to religious assemblies with respect to the City’s stated purpose and criterion. 12 Like many religious assemblies, including New Harvest, theatres are open only on certain days of the week and for certain portions of the day; they attract sporadic foot traffic around their opening hours; and while they have some regular patrons, they are also open to newcomers. Some patrons come from nearby; others drive miles to attend. When it comes to the “eyes on the street” effect, theatres generally do not have large windows facing the street with people visible inside. Because the City prohibits New Harvest from hosting worship services on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area but permits theatres to operate on the ground floor in that area, the City does not treat New Harvest as well as nonreligious assemblies similarly situated with respect to an acceptable zoning criterion. We therefore conclude that 11 See, e.g., Liam Stack, With Tourists Gone, St. Patrick’s Cathedral Pleads for Help, N.Y. Times, July 19, 2020. 12 Theatres are classified in the zoning code as “commercial recreation,” see Salinas City Code § 37-10.270. They are permitted on the Main Street Restricted Area, with only a nondiscretionary site plan review required, so long as they are less than two thousand square feet in floor area; otherwise, a conditional use permit is required. See id. § 3720.240, Table 37.30.110 & n. 6; see also id. § 37-60.270 (setting forth the nondiscretionary site plan review process). NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 23 the Assembly Uses Provision facially violates the equal terms provision of RLUIPA. Even if the City had met its burden of showing that the Assembly Uses Provision treats New Harvest on equal terms with similarly situated nonreligious assemblies, Centro Familiar suggests that the City would need to make yet another showing: that the provision is “reasonably well adapted” to the accepted zoning criterion. See 651 F.3d at 1175. For this standard, which is less rigorous than strict scrutiny, id. at 1175, considerations of both over- and underbreadth are relevant. Id. at 1174–75. To be sure, we have not discussed, let alone applied, the “reasonably well adapted” test since we first articulated it in Centro Familiar, and we know of no other court that has done so. And because we find that the City’s regulation does not treat religious assemblies on equal terms with similarly situated nonreligious assemblies, we need not pass on this test’s continuing vitality today. We briefly note, however, that applying the “reasonably well adapted” test to the Assembly Uses Provision provides further support for our holding. First, the Assembly Uses Provision, like the ordinance at issue in Centro Familiar, is overbroad because it “excludes not only churches, but also religious [assemblies] that are not churches.” Id. at 1174. The zoning code defines “religious assemblies,” as relevant here, to include “[f]acilities for religious worship and assembly, incidental religious education, meeting halls, gymnasiums, and similar uses.” Salinas City Code § 3710.270. Even if churches were properly characterized as private assemblies—and they are not—the Assembly Uses Provision would also operate to exclude other “religious assemblies” that would appear to foster the sort of vibrancy that the zoning code is purportedly designed to promote. For 24 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS example, the Assembly Uses Provision, as written, would bar a YMCA gymnasium from operating on the first floor in the Main Street Restricted Area, even as it permits an Equinox gymnasium from operating in the same place. 13 Second, Centro Familiar teaches that courts should also look to non-assembly uses whose presence is inconsistent with a city’s stated zoning criterion. 651 F.3d at 1174–75. The City’s zoning scheme permits on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area numerous uses, including government offices, funeral services, and laboratories, that do not appear to advance the City’s vision for a vibrant downtown. 14 To be sure, these are non-assembly uses, so they are not directly relevant as nonreligious comparators for New Harvest. But their potential operation on the first floor of the Main Street Restricted Area “would have the same 13 Both a YMCA and an Equinox would be classified as a “fitness center” under the zoning code. See Salinas Zoning Code § 37-10.300. They would be permitted in the Main Street Restricted Area with only a nondiscretionary site plan review so long as they are less than five thousand square feet in floor area; otherwise, a conditional use permit would be required. See id. § 37-30.240, Table 37-30.110 & n. 6. However, the Assembly Uses Provision would operate to bar the YMCA, but not an Equinox, from operating on the ground floor in the Main Street Restricted Area. 14 See Salinas Zoning Code § 37-40.310 (defining the use classifications for the Downtown Core Area as those of the “underlying base district,” with a small number of exceptions not relevant here); id. § 37-30.240, Table 37-30.110 (listing all use classifications in mixed use districts and providing that government offices, funeral services, and laboratories can operate in such districts, with only the nondiscretionary site plan review required). NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 25 practical effect” as a private assembly, undermining the City’s vibrancy plan. Id. at 1174. 15 RLUIPA, of course, does not prevent the City from crafting a zoning scheme that employs an accepted criterion in order to prohibit certain uses from operating on the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area. But the Assembly Uses Provision, as written, impermissibly treats religious assemblies on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies. In writing its zoning code, the City should have done and can do much better.