Opinion ID: 844231
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner's Due Process Claims

Text: Petitioner contends the Board's denial of parole based on his lack of insight deprived him of due process because (1) even if he had denied guilt altogether, he could not be found unsuitable for parole on that basis; (2) an aging inmate's honest but deteriorating recollection of past events is at best immutable, and therefore parole would be interminably denied on that basis, converting a sentence for second degree murder to life without the possibility of parole; and (3) the Board's reasoning would require petitioner to fabricate facts he does not recall in order to obtain parole. These claims have no merit. Penal Code section 5011, subdivision (b) states: The Board of Prison Terms shall not require, when setting parole dates, an admission of guilt to any crime for which an inmate was committed. Petitioner does not deny his guilt, so this provision has no application here. It may be that when a denial of guilt is the only evidence of an inmate's lack of insight, and the denial is plausible, parole may not be denied on that basis. (See In re Jackson (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1389-1391 [123 Cal.Rptr.3d 486], discussing cases.) That question is not before us. We note, however, that an implausible denial of guilt may support a finding of current dangerousness, without in any sense requiring the inmate to admit guilt as a condition of parole. In such a case it is not the failure to admit guilt that reflects a lack of insight, but the fact that the denial is factually unsupported or otherwise lacking in credibility. Here, petitioner's lack of insight was established by a variety of factors: the 2004 and 2005 psychological reports discussed in Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pages 1250-1252; his own statements about the shooting, which failed to account for the facts at the scene or to provide any rational explanation of the killing; his inability to acknowledge or explain his daughter's charge that he had raped her; and his demonstrated failure to come to terms with his long history of domestic violence in any but the most general terms. Petitioner's contention that his inability to recall the circumstances of the crime is an immutable factor, and that he would be required to engage in fabrication to show insight, finds no support in the record. He did not claim in his written statement that he could not remember the crime. He merely said, I do not have a vivid recollection of all of my previous conduct. His retained psychologist did not detect any deficit in his memory. To the contrary, Dr. Stark reported that when she interviewed petitioner [h]is thinking was rational, logical and coherent. . . . He presented as average to above average in functioning. . . . His memory was intact. Both remote and recent memories were intact. . . . There were no signs of a thought disorder. His judgment and insight appeared to be within normal limits. In general his presentation was sincere and straightforward. (Italics added.) Thus, it does not appear that petitioner's memory presented any obstacle to his ability to demonstrate that he had gained insight into his criminal behavior. We note as well that, as in Shaputis I, the Board's decision was not based solely on petitioner's lack of insight, but also on the nature of the murder and petitioner's long history of domestic violence. ( Shaputis I, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pp. 1259-1260.) Petitioner finds himself incarcerated because of his criminal conduct. That conduct, as well as his level of insight and acceptance of responsibility, remains a crucial aspect of the determination whether he may safely be paroled.