Opinion ID: 164304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Third Amendment

Text: We do affirm the district court’s denial of Rueb’s requests to file a third amended complaint, for the reasons stated in the relevant R&Rs. R. Doc. 185 1 The district court’s summary adoption of the numerous R&Rs created confusion with respect to its intended disposition of several claims. The magistrate judge concluded claim seven was partially time-barred and failed to state a claim, R. Doc. 132 at 18, 23, but did not include it in the summary listing of dismissed claims, see id . at 31. A subsequent order amended the R&R to recommend dismissal of claim seven for failure to state a claim, see Doc. 206 at 1, 3, but the district court did not dismiss claim seven in its final order, except to the extent it (erroneously) dismissed the entire complaint as a sanction. The initial R&R describes claim eight as dismissed in its entirety, dismissed in part, and as not dismissed. Doc. 132 at 31. The magistrate judge later described claim eight as time-barred in its entirety, see Doc. 185 at 11, but entered a subsequent order clarifying that claim eight was not dismissed as time-barred, see Doc. 206. Still later, the magistrate judge recommended denial of Rueb’s motion for partial summary judgment on claim eight because there were disputed issues of material fact. See Doc. 258 at 4. The district court adopted all of the R&Rs, without noting their inconsistencies, and ordered claim eight dismissed as time-barred in part and in whole, yet also adopted the recommendation that claim eight proceed to trial. Doc. 284 at 4, 5. The district court’s order does not list claims six and fourteen in the final listing of time-barred claims, though these claims were described in the body of the relevant R&R as time-barred and are not listed as claims that survived dismissal. See Doc. 132 at 2, 4, 18, 31. Finally, the district court listed claims fifteen and thirty-five as being dismissed as time-barred both in whole and in part. To the extent required after resolution of the exhaustion and tolling issues, the district court is directed on remand to clarify its disposition of claims six, seven, eight, fourteen, fifteen, and thirty-five. -9- and 217. The district court had already allowed two amended complaints, and it did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow a third amendment. See Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. , 940 F.2d 564, 586-87 (10th Cir. 1991). Rueb’s motion to use the original record is GRANTED; his motion to file multiple opening briefs is GRANTED; his motion to strike appellees’ brief is DENIED; his motion to Supplement Opening Brief No. 1 is GRANTED. We GRANT Rueb’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and remind him that he is obligated to make partial payments of the filing fee until the entire fee has been paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. Entered for the Court Stephanie K. Seymour