Opinion ID: 2534147
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reaction by victim's family to jury verdicts

Text: Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred by denying [his] motion to discharge the jury based on the emotional outburst of the victims' families in favorable response to the rendition of the guilty verdict. This contention lacks merit. At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, when the jury's verdicts and findings were read in open court, Lavelle Garratt, the daughter of victim Marie Caton, said in a loud voice, Yes, yes. The court admonished her to [k]eep it down, ma'am; and the prosecutor also loudly instructed her to remain silent. Other members of Mrs. Caton's family embraced one another, cried, and whispered among themselves. The following week defense counsel moved to discharge the jury on the ground it had been exposed to constitutionally impermissible victim impact evidence under Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440. In denying the motion, the court expressed doubt as to whether any prejudice occurred, but offered to admonish the jury to disregard the outburst and not let it influence their penalty deliberations, unless the defense preferred that an admonition not be given, as it might serve to highlight the incident in the minds of the jurors. Defense counsel said he would have to decide whether to ask for such an admonition. As it turned out, no admonition was given. While the record does not reflect whether defense counsel expressly declined the court's offer, it strongly suggests he did. The next day the court stated that some matters had been discussed in chambers and we've gone over the penalty phase instructions. After the court listed the instructions it intended to give, it asked whether either counsel wanted other instructions. Defense counsel stated, I have no other requests. Earlier, defense counsel had stated he felt no admonition could be effectivethat the proverbial bell could not be unrung. Assuming arguendo an admonition would have cured any prejudice, defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request an admonition. Again, we disagree. The brief, spontaneous reaction of the members of Marie Caton's family to the jury verdicts did not constitute victim impact evidence of the sort proscribed in Booth v. Maryland, supra, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440. Moreover, while this case has been on appeal, the United States Supreme Court, partially overruling Booth and South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876, held that [i]n a capital trial, evidence showing the direct impact of the defendant's acts on the victims' friends and family is not barred by the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825-827 [111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720] [( Payne )].) ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1180, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) Payne applies retroactively. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 672, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705 ( Clair ).) Under California law, victim impact evidence is admissible at the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (a), as a circumstance of the crime, provided the evidence is not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the case. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 444 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 835-836 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1180, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) It would come as no surprise to a jury that a victim's family was anguished by her murder, relieved that part of the trial was over, and satisfied with the guilty verdicts. The relatively muted reaction of Marie Caton's family to the jury verdicts was certainly not so inflammatory as to elicit from the jury an irrational or emotional response untethered to the facts of the case. ( Ibid. ) Finally, defense counsel may have made a reasonable tactical decision that an admonition was not, on balance, desirable, because it would remind the jury of the incident.