Opinion ID: 204153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does VARA Apply to Unfinished Works of Art?

Text: Büchel argues that the district court erred by failing to recognize that VARA applies with equal force to incomplete artistic endeavors that would otherwise be subject to VARA protection. He asserts that the Act's plain language compels such a conclusion, which he claims is confirmed by the legislative history and sparse case law interpreting the statute. The Museum, for its part, does not argue that unfinished works are excluded from VARA's scope. Instead, it interprets the district court's opinion as expressly assum[ing] that VARA applied to Training Ground for Democracy in its incomplete state, and then concluding that Büchel had failed to put forth sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue regarding the violation of his rights under the statute. We do not read the district court's ruling to conclude categorically that VARA does not apply to unfinished works. Rather, the court held that, if the statute applied, display of th[e] unfinished installation would have violated neither Büchel's right of attribution nor his right of integrity. 565 F.Supp.2d at 259. Nonetheless, the court repeatedly expressed skepticism about Büchel's claim that the incomplete Training Ground fell within VARA's scope, observing at one point in its opinion that unfinished art may not be covered by VARA at all. Id. at 258; see also id. at 259 ([I]t is doubtful that VARA even covered the assembled materials that constituted this unfinished installation.). Moreover, the court qualified the statute's application to unfinished works: To the extent that an artist seeks protection for an uncompleted work, a violation of one of VARA's two explicitly recognized rights must be demonstrated with special clarity. Id. at 258. Our review of the district court's interpretation of VARA is de novo. Phillips, 459 F.3d at 139. `As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute,' id. (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002)), and [i]f the meaning of the text is unambiguous our task ends there as well, United States v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2008). If the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courtsat least where the disposition required by the text is not absurdis to enforce it according to its terms. In re Rudler, 576 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir.2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The definition of a work of visual art for VARA purposes is stated in terms both positive (what it is) and negative (what it is not). Carter, 71 F.3d at 84. An unfinished sculptural installation such as Training Ground for Democracy is not one of the items specifically excluded from VARA protection, [9] and MASS MoCA wisely does not attempt to argue otherwise. Instead, we must determine whether the positive aspect of the definition of work of visual art includes an unfinished version of a sculpture[] existing in a single copy. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The text of VARA itself does not state when an artistic project becomes a work of visual art subject to its protections. However, VARA is part of the Copyright Act, and that Act's definition section, which defines work of visual art, specifies that its definitions, unless otherwise provided, control throughout Title 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. That general definitional section of the Copyright Act states that a work is created when it is fixed in a copy ... for the first time. Further, where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). A work is fixed when it has been formed, by or under the authority of the author, in a way that is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. Id. Not surprisingly, based on section 101's general definitions, courts have held that the Copyright Act's protections extend to unfinished works. See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir.1989), rejected on other grounds by Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739, 742 n. 8, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989); Zyware, Inc. v. Middlegate, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2348(SHS), 1997 WL 685336, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov.4, 1997) (noting that there is no requirement that a work be complete before it is protected by the Copyright Act); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F.Supp. 295, 314 (S.D.N.Y.1993) ([T]he [Copyright] Act protects works in progress.), modified on other grounds by 840 F.Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y.1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part by 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.1995). Reading VARA in accordance with the definitions in section 101, it too must be read to protect unfinished, but fixed, works of art that, if completed, would qualify for protection under the statute. [10] To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the rule that provisions of a single act should be construed in as harmonious a fashion as possible. United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 231 (1st Cir.1990) (citation omitted). At least one circuit has previously assumed VARA's applicability to unfinished works. See Carter, 71 F.3d at 83-88 (discussing VARA claims stemming from an unfinished, walk-through sculpture being installed in the lobby of a building). [11] Our conclusion that the statute's plain language extends its coverage to unfinished works makes it unnecessary to delve into VARA's legislative history. We nonetheless note that we have looked closely at that history, and it fully supports our reading of the plain language. Common sense points in the same direction. Moral rights protect the personality and creative energy that an artist contributes to his or her work. That convergence between artist and artwork does not await the final brush stroke or the placement of the last element in a complex installation. See, e.g., Monica Pa & Christopher J. Robinson, Making Lemons out of Lemons: Recent Developments in the Visual Artists Rights Act, 3 Landslide 22, 24 (Jan./Feb. 2009) ([T]he history of art is full of sublime `unfinished' works of art, such as Leonardo da Vinci's Statue of a Horse (begun 1488), Michelangelo's Tomb of Pope Julius II (begun 1505), or El Greco's The Vision of St. John (1608-14).); Laura Flahive Wu, Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art v. Büchel: Construing Artists' Rights in the Context of Institutional Commissions, 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts 151, 163 (2008) (noting that many works are considered `art' even though they capture creative expression short of an artist's ultimate realization of that expression). We thus hold that VARA protects the moral rights of artists who have created works of art within the meaning of the Copyright Act even if those works are not yet complete. [12]