Opinion ID: 2627219
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the proper interpretation and application of section 32a-12-216 requires circumstantial evidence of endangerment, recognizes private clubs as private places, and includes a mens rea requirement

Text: ¶ 23 The parties disagree over the interpretation of Utah Code section 32A-12-216 (2001). At the time of the incidents in question, section 32A-12-216 provided as follows: (1) The offense of intoxication shall be defined and punished in accordance with Section 76-9-701 of the Utah Criminal Code. (2) A person may not permit any other person to become intoxicated, as defined in Section 76-9-701, or any intoxicated person to consume any alcoholic beverage in any premises of which the person is the owner, tenant or occupant.... (3) A violation of Subsection (2) is an infraction. ¶ 24 The referenced statute, Utah Code section 76-9-701 (1999) (the public intoxication statute) defined intoxication as follows: A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol ... to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons. [19] ¶ 25 Due South raises three questions regarding the interpretation and application of section 32A-12-216. First, whether the may endanger element of intoxication can be met by showing a speculative possibility of harm or whether it requires a reasonable likelihood of harm. Second, whether a private club is a private place within the meaning of the statute. Third, whether section 32A-12-216 is unconstitutionally vague because it requires a server to predict when an individual will become intoxicated.
¶ 26 The district court concluded that the may endanger element of the public intoxication standard could be satisfied by showing a speculative possibility of harm without requiring any circumstantial evidence of endangerment. We hold that the may endanger element of the intoxication standard requires proof of a reasonable likelihood of harm based on the circumstances; a speculative possibility of harm is not sufficient. Our interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent, as indicated by the plain language of the statute. It is also consistent with our own case law as well as case law from other states. ¶ 27 The argument that evidence of endangerment may be satisfied by a speculative possibility of harm conflicts with our principle of statutory interpretation that requires us to avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. [20] Requiring only a speculative possibility of harm would effectively eviscerate the endangerment requirement in the public intoxication statute for two reasons. First, an officer could always conceive of some speculative source of endangerment. This is apparent in the district court's findings of fact regarding the SIP operation. The court's endangerment finding for each patron contained some variant of the stock conclusion that the patron posed a risk of endangerment from his unsteadiness, from falling, or from exercising diminished judgment due to the alcohol or that the patron could endanger himself or another if he were to drive a motor vehicle. This stock conclusion was applied to every patron regardless of his particular circumstances. Moreover, it could be applied to all persons exhibiting signs of intoxication regardless of whether they actually posed a risk of endangerment. Thus, accepting a speculative possibility of harm would effectively eliminate the endangerment requirement from the public intoxication standard. ¶ 28 Second, an endangerment test based upon the speculative possibility of harm, rather than on the individual circumstances actually presented, necessarily conflates public intoxication with any blood alcohol content over the legal limit for driving. [21] This is so because any individual with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit would necessarily endanger others should he decide to get behind the wheel. This conflation is evidenced by the hearing officer's report in this case, in which he concluded that a person may endanger himself or another if there are indications that the person obviously is, or appears to be impaired to the degree that he or she cannot operate a motor vehicle without regard to whether the person intends to do so. (Emphasis added.) Under this interpretation, every person with a .08 blood alcohol level poses a speculative possibility of harm and satisfies the public intoxication standard. But this is not what the legislature intended. Had the legislature intended for the public intoxication standard and the DUI standard to be equivalent, it would have defined intoxication in section 32A-12-216 by referring to the DUI statute, not to the public intoxication statute. By referring to the public intoxication statute rather than the DUI statute, the legislature evinced an intent to require both intoxication and endangerment for a violation of section 32A-12-216. Thus, in order for the endangerment requirement to have any meaning, there must be a reasonable likelihood of endangerment based on the particular circumstances, rather than a speculative possibility of endangerment. ¶ 29 Requiring a circumstantial analysis of endangerment is consistent with the approach taken by states with similar statutes. For example, the Texas public intoxication statute employs the same may endanger requirement as Utah's public intoxication statute. [22] In applying the endangerment requirement, the Texas Court of Appeals stated that physical manifestations of alcoholic consumption, such as slurred speech, blood shot eyes, and a smell of alcohol on the breath are not sufficient to constitute public intoxication. [23] Rather, the State must demonstrate proof of potential danger either to the appellant himself or to others. [24] The proof of potential danger requirement has been met in cases where the individual was walking down the middle of a street, [25] buying tire chains and indicating an intent to drive, [26] arguing in the middle of the street and resisting arrest, [27] and sleeping in a car in front of a lounge, presenting the likelihood that the individual would wake up and drive home. [28] But it was not met where the individual was in a private driveway leaning on the back of a vehicle. [29] ¶ 30 Requiring circumstantial evidence of danger is also consistent with our past case law. In State v. Trane, we evaluated whether officers had probable cause to arrest Trane for public intoxication without a warrant. [30] In that case, two officers responded to a disturbance complaint and found Trane outside a convenience store in the middle of the night. They immediately noticed that he had slurred speech, that he appeared unsteady, and that he smelled of alcohol. [31] We rejected Trane's argument that there was no evidence of endangerment under the public intoxication statute because when the officers approached Trane, he puffed his chest out [and] took a defensive posture similar to a boxer. [32] This aggressive behavior made the officers fear[ ] for their safety. [33] Thus, in determining whether there was probable cause to believe that Trane was violating the public intoxication statute, we looked for actual evidence of endangerment based on the circumstances. ¶ 31 In summary, we hold that in order to satisfy the may endanger element of the public intoxication statute, an officer must be able to articulate objective facts indicating a reasonable likelihood of endangerment based on the particular circumstances. Because this was not the standard applied by the district court, we remand this case for application of the proper standard.
¶ 32 Due South and the DABC disagree over whether section 32A-12-216 [34] incorporated the entire public intoxication definition from section 76-9-701, including the public place/private place distinction and, if it did, whether Due South is a private place within the meaning of the statute. We hold that section 32A-12-216 did incorporate the public place/private place distinction and that Due South is a private place. ¶ 33 The DABC argues that section 32A-12-216 only incorporates the level of intoxication in the public intoxication statute, not the public intoxication statute [itself]. This argument fails on closer analysis because the public intoxication statute establishes two different levels of intoxication, depending on whether the individual is in a private or public place. [35] Under the public intoxication statute, an individual is guilty of intoxication in a public place if he is under the influence of alcohol ... to a degree that [he] may endanger himself or another. [36] And he is guilty of intoxication in a private place if he is under the influence of alcohol... to a degree that [he] ... unreasonably disturbs other persons. [37] Our principles of statutory construction direct us to assume that the legislature used each term in the statute advisedly [38] and to interpret[ ] statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoid[ ] rendering portions of the statute superfluous. [39] The DABC's interpretation runs contrary to these principles because it would require that we ignore half of the public intoxication statute. The public intoxication statute does not articulate a universal level of intoxication that is independent of the public place/private place distinction. Accordingly, we reject the DABC's argument and interpret section 32A-12-216 to incorporate the public place/private place distinction. ¶ 34 Whether Due South, as a private club, is a private place within the meaning of the statute presents a more difficult issue that is not resolved by the plain language of the statute. When there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose. [40] ¶ 35 One policy objective of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act is to regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in a manner that will reasonably satisfy the public demand and protect the public interest, including the rights of citizens who do not wish to be involved with alcoholic products. [41] This objective requires a balancing of two opposing intereststhe public demand for alcohol and the public interest in avoiding alcohol or its adverse consequences. ¶ 36 Interpreting a private club as a private place within the meaning of the public intoxication statute best satisfies both of these objectives. First, in the alcohol regulatory scheme, there are Public Liquor Licenses [42] and Private Club Liquor Licenses. [43] Public Liquor Licenses apply to places that the general public is likely to visit, such as restaurants, [44] airport lounges, [45] and banquets held at hotels, resorts, sports centers, or convention centers. [46] The Private Club Liquor Licenses apply to places that are not open to the general public. In order to enter a private club, an individual must be a member, have purchased a visitor card, or be a guest of either a member of the club or a holder of a visitor card. [47] Furthermore, minors are not allowed into private clubs when alcohol is being served, [48] and any public advertising for a private club must clearly specify that the club is a private club for members. [49] These restrictions on private clubs ensure that the general public will not be inadvertently exposed to the higher level of alcohol consumption that is allowed to occur in a private place under the public intoxication statute. Moreover, providing public venues where individuals can meet and share alcoholic drinks satisfies the public demand for alcohol, while still protecting the public interest. Since private clubs do not allow entrance without a membership, unwary citizens will not accidentally find themselves exposed to alcohol consumption. ¶ 37 In arguing that Due South is not a private place under the public intoxication statute, the DABC relies heavily on Elks Lodges #719 & # 2021 v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, in which we held that private liquor clubs were within the public sphere. [50] Elks Lodges is inapposite because the interests at stake and the analysis employed were demonstrably different than they are here. In Elks Lodges, the plaintiff argued that, as private clubs, the Elks Lodges could discriminate against women based on their constitutional right to freedom of association. [51] In contrast, no constitutional rights are involved in this case. The only issue regarding the private club status of Due South is whether Due South qualifies as a private place under the public intoxication statute. Unlike Elks Lodges, this issue does not require us to balance the rights of private individuals against the right of the State to regulate activities that take place in the public sphere. Instead, the analysis in this case is an issue of statutory interpretation to determine Due South's obligation within the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. Thus, the Elks Lodges analysis is not applicable and does not undermine our conclusion that Due South is a private place within the meaning of the public intoxication statute. ¶ 38 We note, however, that on remand the public place/private place distinction may have little practical effect because the instant that a patron leaves the premises of a private club, he is no longer in a private place. At that point, the public place standard for intoxication applies.
¶ 39 Due South also argues that Utah Code section 32A-12-216 is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if the terms of the law are so ambiguous that persons of ordinary intelligence are unable to determine whether their acts conform to the law, [52] or if the ambiguity in the law encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. [53] We will construe a statute as constitutional wherever possible, resolving any reasonable doubt in favor of constitutionality. [54] ¶ 40 Due South argues that section 32A-12-216 encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions because the standard applied by the DABC for determining intoxication (based on a speculative possibility of harm to demonstrate endangerment) contains too much interpretive discretion. This argument is resolved by our earlier discussion, which rejects a speculative possibility of harm as the endangerment standard. The standard we announce, requiring circumstantial evidence of a reasonable likelihood that the individual may endanger himself or another, cabins the DABC's interpretive discretion and does not encourage arbitrary and erratic arrests. ¶ 41 Second, Due South argues that the statute is ambiguous because it requires a server to predict when a person will become intoxicated and to avoid that result by refusing service before intoxication occurs. Due South reasons that persons of ordinary intelligence cannot determine whether their acts conform to the law under this standard because no one, not even the scientists, can predict at what point a specific person will `become intoxicated' since everyone's body processes alcohol differently. The DABC, on the other hand, argues that because the general public can recognize the signs of intoxication, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Rather, it simply imposes liability on anyone that permits another to become intoxicated. ¶ 42 We hold that this statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is not a strict liability statute, which means that servers are liable only if they intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly permit another to become intoxicated to a degree that they may endanger themselves or another. We interpret section 32A-12-216 to include a mens rea requirement because it carries criminal penalties. [55] Accordingly, the principles of construction, ... burdens of proof, definitions, principles of criminal responsibility, punishments, and inchoate offenses [from title 76 of the Criminal Code] apply. [56] Central to the concept of criminal liability is the principle that [a] person is not guilty of an offense unless the person's conduct is prohibited by law and the person acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, unless the offense is a strict liability offense. [57] Furthermore, [e]very offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state. [58] An offense is only interpreted as a strict liability offense if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. [59] ¶ 43 Section 32A-12-216 does not clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose criminal responsibility without proof of a culpable mental state. In the absence of an articulated mental state, it is appropriate to defer to the default mens rea requirements supplied by section 76-2-102. [W]hen the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state ... intent, knowledge or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. [60] ¶ 44 The court of appeals has taken this same approach in two cases construing analogous violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. First, in State v. Souza, the court of appeals interpreted the statute that prohibited furnishing or supplying alcohol to minors. [61] The statutory language at the time provided, A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any alcoholic beverage or product to any person under the age of 21 years. [62] The court of appeals interpreted furnish or supply to mean that the defendant (1) has some measure of control over the alcohol in question; (2) knows that whatever act he or she undertakes contributes to making alcohol available to minors; and (3) intends or is reckless to the fact that minors will accept or consume that alcohol. [63] The court reasoned that requiring that accused persons must know that they were making alcohol ... available to a minor with the intent or reasonably inferred expectation that the minor will accept it, struck a balance between the protective purpose of the statute while preventing inadvertent culpability. [64] ¶ 45 More explicitly, in State v. Valdez, the court of appeals interpreted subsection (2) of the same statute, which elevates the penalty for individuals who knowingly furnish or supply alcohol to a minor. [65] Part of the court's analysis compared subsection (2) to subsection (1), explaining that because subsection (1) does not specifically state the requisite mens rea for the offense, the mens rea is supplied by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1995). [66] ¶ 46 In summary, section 32A-12-216 does not impose liability on servers who fail to accurately predict whether the next drink will cause a patron to become intoxicated. Instead, it imposes liability on a server who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly permits a patron to become intoxicated to the point that the patron may endanger himself or another. Applying a mens rea requirement and requiring evidence that endangerment is reasonably likely to occur ensures that persons of ordinary intelligence can conform their actions to the requirements of the law by exercising reasonable judgment. As interpreted, section 32A-12-216 is not unconstitutionally vague.