Opinion ID: 1795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court properly addressed Pape's arguments concerning his personal history and characteristics and his family responsibilities.

Text: First, Pape contends that the district court's statement, reproduced above, that it did not have authority to balance the good and bad parts of him was an admission that it did not consider the defendant's history and characteristics in sentencing him. It appears that the district court was merely stating that it was not authorized to render final judgment on the defendant's life and, in effect, emulate God at the Last Judgment. See United States v. Christiansen, 594 F.3d 571, 576-77 (7th Cir.2010) (rejecting an argument regarding a claim that the district court failed to consider the defendant's history and characteristics based on similar language used at the sentencing hearing). Moreover, the district court's oral statement is augmented by the Statement of Reasons the district court issued after the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 854 (7th Cir.2009) (evaluating both oral and written statements to determine whether the sentencing explanation was sufficient); Goldberg, 491 F.3d at 671 (same); cf. United States v. Baker, 445 F.3d 987, 991-92 (7th Cir. 2006) (declining to limit the appellate court's review to the written statement of reasons); but see United States v. Omole, 523 F.3d 691, 700 (7th Cir.2008) (finding that the sentence was unreasonable in part because the district court's statements at the sentencing hearing were contradicted by a subsequent written document that explained the court's reasons for deviating from the Guidelines). We have encouraged district courts to commit their sentencing decisions to paper in certain contexts to create[ ] a surer path of communication with the reviewing court. See United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 565 (7th Cir.2008). We must balance this suggestion with the acknowledgment that a district court must state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a)(3) ([T]he defendant must be present at sentencing.). We will not disregard the statement made in open court, but we read the district court's Statement of Reasons as an aid to the interpretation of its oral statement. The district court's Statement evaluates the mixed picture revealed in the defendant's history of an active community member and a good father with no criminal background who also exhibited bad behavior in his private life. Consequently, the district court gave explicit consideration to the defendant's history and characteristics in sentencing Pape as required by § 3553(a)(1) and committed no procedural error. See United States v. Jung, 473 F.3d 837, 844-45 (7th Cir.2007); cf. United States v. Williams, 553 F.3d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir.2009) (remanding for resentencing because the district court ignored defendant's arguments regarding his mental illness). Pape's arguments that the district court's choice of words quoted above suggested improper sentencing procedure are not well taken. Second, Pape argues that the district court erred by failing to consider pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). He highlights the policy statement U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, n. 1, which discourages a sentencing court from reducing the sentence of a defendant with care-taking obligations unless the defendant has exceptional family responsibilities. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 n. 1(B). As Pape concedes, this Guideline is inapplicable because he was convicted of an offense under chapter 110 of Title 18. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. The district court was certainly authorized to disregard the referenced part of the policy statement. There is no policy of the Sentencing Commission that militates in favor of giving weight to the caretaking responsibilities of someone who has been convicted of possession of child pornography, even if his caretaking responsibilities are extraordinary. [2] The district court did not need to discuss Pape's argument grounded in § 3553(a)(5) as potentially meritorious. See Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 678. The government acknowledges, however, that the district court retained discretion to consider Pape's caretaking responsibilities as part of its § 3553(a) analysis. See United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755-56 (7th Cir.2008) (Although the concept of departures has been rendered obsolete in post- Booker sentencing the district court may apply those departure guidelines by way of analogy in analyzing the section 3553(a) factors.) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Millet, 510 F.3d 668, 680 (7th Cir.2007) (remanding to ensure that the district court imposed its sentence with the understanding that it had the discretion to consider the defendant's family circumstances). As noted above, however, the district court heard Pape's arguments regarding his responsibility for his children and the special difficulties of raising a child with autism. In sentencing Pape, the district court mentioned his parenting responsibilities and his failure to convince his family that he had a problem with child pornography. Cf. United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d at 756 (remanding for resentencing because the district court explicitly rejected consideration of any hardship on the defendant's family). Pape's procedural arguments for the district court's consideration of his history, characteristics and parenting responsibilities are unavailing given the district court's consideration and discussion of these subjects in shaping its sentence.