Opinion ID: 4530397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Residual Clause

Text: The Supreme Court recently made clear that the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause was unconstitutionally vague. 3 United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019). Because Davis invalidated the residual clause, Smith may “avail himself of [Davis’s] protection.” Reece, 938 F.3d at 635 (holding that the rule announced in Davis applies retroactively). Here, considering the merits of Smith’s petition, he is correct that, in light of Davis, the district court relied on case law that has since been overruled by the Supreme Court. However, Smith’s firearms convictions can still be sustained if the predicate offenses—bank robbery (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113) and attempted murder (in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1114)—can be defined as a COV under the elements clause contained in § 924(c)(3)(A). 3 Several years earlier, in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court stroke down the residual clause definition of a “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (the “ACCA”) as unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555–57. The ACCA and § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clauses are identical in language; hence, why both suffer from the same vagueness problems. 3 Case: 18-10476 Document: 00515400622 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/30/2020 No. 18-10476