Opinion ID: 3021079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Samantha’s Negligence

Text: Preliminarily, the District Court found that Samantha was contributorily negligent as a matter of law because she failed to stop, look and listen before crossing the railroad tracks. A traveler’s failure to stop, look and listen before crossing a railroad track ordinarily “constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law” in Pennsylvania. Tomasek v. Monongahela Ry. Co., 235 A.2d 359, 362 (Pa. 1967) (citations omitted). The traveler’s obligation to stop, look and listen continues as he crosses the tracks. Id. Because contributory or comparative negligence is a defense, CSX bears the burden of proving that Samantha did not stop, look or listen. See Marks v. Swayne, 701 A.2d 224, 226 (Pa. 1997). The parties agree that Samantha stopped, for between five and ten minutes, at the crossing. The only evidence in the record as to what she did before crossing thereafter, in the form of Dodds’s testimony, indicates that she looked from her left to her right. That Dodds used the word “glance” to describe the way that she looked does not undermine this basic fact. In addition, although we can’t be sure whether Samantha listened for the train, Dodds testified that he did not hear the westbound train’s horn or bell until after 6 impact, which at least raises an inference that Samantha might not have heard the train, even if she listened for it. Given CSX’s burden to establish that Samantha did not stop, look and listen, and Rule 56(c)’s directive to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we conclude that CSX is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to Samantha’s negligence for failing to stop, look and listen before she crossed the tracks. Cf. Baker v. Pa. R.R. Co., 85 A.2d 416, 419 (Pa. 1952) (“[W]here a traveller [sic] stops, looks and listens before entering a grade crossing and, neither seeing nor hearing anything approaching on the tracks, proceeds and is thereafter struck by a train on a track beyond the first, the question of his contributory negligence is for the jury.”). However, our scrutiny of Samantha’s actions does not end there. In addition to the duty to stop, look and listen, Pennsylvania law also imposes on travelers the duties to remain stopped at a railroad crossing until the signal lights stop flashing, see Burkman v. Anderson, 188 A. 287, 288-89 (Pa. 1936), and to wait until a temporary obstruction, such as a passing train, clears before crossing the tracks, see McCartney v. Pa. R.R. Co., 161 A. 63, 64 (Pa. 1932) (plaintiff’s failure to wait for the smoke from westbound freight trains to clear before proceeding across a railroad crossing barred his recovery under contributory negligence principles); Nolder v. Pa. R.R. Co., 123 A. 507, 508 (Pa. 1924) (plaintiff who proceeded across railroad tracks before receding train had sufficiently cleared crossing to enable him to see other tracks was contributorily negligent). The record demonstrates conclusively that Samantha failed to satisfy these 7 obligations. First, Samantha negligently proceeded into the crossing as the red lights were still flashing. Taylor testified that the lights on the north side of the crossing, which were facing Bouchard, were active and flashing when the accident occurred. Dodds’s testimony, that he did not notice whether the lights were flashing when Samantha entered the crossing, does not contradict this point. Second, the facts as found by the District Court establish that the eastbound train had only cleared the crossing by about fifty feet when Samantha began to pedal across; Bouchard does not challenge this finding on appeal. And Dodds testified that the passing eastbound train obscured his and Samantha’s view of the tracks beyond the first. Thus, we conclude that Samantha was also negligent in failing to wait until she could see the other tracks well enough to make an informed decision as to whether it was safe to cross. Cf. Nolder, 123 A. at 508 (holding that plaintiff who waited until receding train was 100 feet away should have waited for it to clear an additional 100 feet before crossing). However, our finding that Samantha was negligent as a matter of law does not resolve the question of whether Bouchard’s claims should be barred based on principles of comparative negligence. Under Pennsylvania’s comparative negligence statute, a plaintiff’s negligence bars recovery only when it is greater than that of the defendant. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102. Comparative negligence is ordinarily an issue for the jury; it is a “rare situation where it can be said that the plaintiff is more than 50% negligent as a matter of law.” Gilbert v. Consol. Rail Corp., 623 A.2d 873, 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 8 1993). The District Court relied on Gilbert v. Conrail, 14 Pa. D. & C. 4th 147 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1992), to hold that Samantha’s negligence precluded recovery. See Bouchard, 2005 WL 2266593, at . However, that case is no longer good law; the Commonwealth Court overturned Gilbert’s comparative negligence ruling on appeal in 1993. Gilbert, 623 A.2d at 876. And the case that CSX urges us to follow to uphold the District Court’s ruling, Hillerman v. PennDOT, 595 A.2d 204 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991), is not on point. In that case, which involved a pedestrian who was struck by a car while crossing the street against the light, the court determined that the plaintiff was more than 50% negligent as a matter of law as against the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the City of Philadelphia, which were responsible for maintaining the signals at the crosswalk. Its ruling was based in part on the fact that plaintiff testified that she did not look before walking into traffic and in part on the fact that the plaintiff had not named the driver of the car that struck her as a defendant in the suit. See id. at 205-06. In this case, by contrast, there is evidence that Samantha did look before crossing the tracks. See supra. Moreover, unlike the Hillerman defendants, CSX is liable for its actions in operating the train as well as for its actions in maintaining the signals at the Juniper Street crossing. Thus, the possibility remains, after Hillerman, that CSX’s negligence in operating the train, or the combination of its negligence in failing to properly maintain warning signals at the crossing and in operating the train, exceeded Samantha’s. CSX has not cited, and we have not found, any other authority that supports the 9 District Court’s conclusion that Samantha was more than 50% negligent as a matter of law. Following Pennsylvania law, we will vacate the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to CSX on this basis and leave the issue of comparative negligence for the jury to decide on remand.