Opinion ID: 621963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “attached to said pad”

Text: Appellants argue that the district court erred by holding that the specification implicitly defined “attached” to mean “affixed to an exterior surface.” They argue that the term does not require any construction and that the plain and ordinary meaning includes affixing an item to either an exterior or an interior surface. They contend that the specification explicitly states whether an attachment is to an interior or exterior surface: “a vibratory actuator can be attached to [the] outer side of the throttle handle.” Appellant’s Br. 13 (quoting ’941 patent col.39 ll.58-60). They argue this shows that when the applicant wished to distinguish an internal from an external attachment, he did so with deliberate, express language. Thus, appellants argue that the specification contemplates “attached” to have its plain and ordinary meaning—attached to either an interior or exterior surface. Finally, appellants argue that the fact that claim 10 includes the word “embedded” does not mean that “attached” can only mean connected to an exterior surface. Rather, appellants argue that “embedded” is merely a narrower term that includes only attachment to an interior surface. Sony responds that the patent clearly identified two different connections, “attached to” and “embedded within.” It argues that in every instance where the specification uses the term “attached,” it refers to an attachment to an outer surface. Conversely, in every embodiment where the actuator is placed inside a housing, the specification uses the term “embedded.” See, e.g., ’941 patent col.32 l.66 (“embedded within or attached to”). 9 THORNER v. SONY COMPUTER Our case law is clear, claim terms must be given their plain and ordinary meaning to one of skill in the art. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. The plain meaning of the term “attached” encompasses either an external or internal attachment. We must decide whether the patentee has redefined this term to mean only attachment to an external surface. As Sony argues, the specification repeatedly uses the term “attached” in reference to embodiments where the actuators are “attached to [an] outer side.” ’941 patent col.33 ll.40-41. In fact, the specification never uses the word “attached” when referring to an actuator located on the interior of a controller. We hold that this does not rise to the level of either lexicography or disavowal. Both exceptions require a clear and explicit statement by the patentee. CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366; Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325. It is not enough that the patentee used the term when referencing an attachment to an outer surface in each embodiment. See Kara Tech., 582 F.3d at 134748. In fact, the specification explains that an actuator was “attached to [an] outer surface.” See ’941 patent col.33 ll.40-41. If the applicant had redefined the term “attached” to mean only “attached to an outer surface,” then it would have been unnecessary to specify that the attachment was “to [an] outer surface” in the specification. We conclude that the term attached should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The specification does not redefine attached nor is there any disavowal. The fact that the specification uses the two terms “attached” and “embedded” as alternatives does not require a different result. See, e.g., id. col.32 l.66. There is nothing inconsistent about the applicant’s use of the narrower term, “embedded,” to describe embodiments affixed to an internal surface. The plain and ordinary meaning of embedded, “attached within,” is narrower than “attached.” Hence it makes sense that the applicant would THORNER v. SONY COMPUTER 10 want to use embedded when it meant to explicitly claim attached to the inside only. That does not mean the word attached automatically means attached to the external surface, as opposed to the broader plain meaning – attached to either the interior or exterior. It is true that in certain pre-Phillips cases, we held that use of two terms as alternatives could amount to an implicit redefinition of the terms. See Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2001). But the “implied” redefinition must be so clear that it equates to an explicit one. In other words, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have to read the specification and conclude that the applicant has clearly disavowed claim scope or has acted as its own lexicographer. Simply referring to two terms as alternatives or disclosing embodiments that all use the term the same way is not sufficient to redefine a claim term. Other parts of the claim and specification also support this construction. The claim at issue requires a “flexible pad.” The only embodiment in the specification that includes flexible material is the seat cushion 510 shown in Figure 2. The specification states that “the tactile feedback seating unit 510 is a semi-rigid flexible foam structure . . . with a plurality of actuators embedded within the foam structure.” ’941 patent col.37 ll.6-10. Thus, the only flexible embodiment in the specification has embedded actuators. If we agreed with Sony that “attached” must mean attached to an outer surface, then the claim would exclude the only flexible embodiment disclosed in the specification. This is further evidence that the term “attached” should have its plain and ordinary meaning which includes either internal or external attachments. We hold that the term “attached to said pad” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning which encom11 THORNER v. SONY COMPUTER passes either internal or external attachment. Because the parties based the stipulation of noninfringement on the district court’s erroneous construction of this claim term, we vacate and remand.