Opinion ID: 2594069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Time Limit on Closing Arguments

Text: [¶30] Mr. Sanchez claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 6 and 10 of the Wyoming Constitution because the trial court imposed a time restriction on closing arguments. Mr. Sanchez argues that the forty-five minutes allotted for his closing was an insufficient amount of time to summarize the evidence because of the number of witnesses and the variance in the criminal charges. This insufficient time, he claims, deprived him of effective assistance of counsel. [¶31] A trial court's decision to place time restrictions on closing arguments is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2554, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Cole v. Tansy, 926 F.2d 955, 958 (10th Cir. 1991). Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily and capriciously. Penner v. State, 2003 WY 143, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 1045, 1047 (Wyo. 2003). [¶32] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. [¶33] Notwithstanding those rights, however, trial courts are afforded discretion in controlling their courtrooms and the proceedings therein, including closing arguments: . . . In a criminal trial, which is in the end basically a fact[-]finding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence for each side before submission of the case to judgment. This is not to say that closing arguments in a criminal case must be uncontrolled or even unrestrained. The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. He may limit counsel to a reasonable time and may terminate argument when continuation would be repetitive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he must have broad discretion. Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. at 2554 (emphasis added). [¶34] Many courts have failed to find an abuse of discretion or a Sixth Amendment violation despite a time restriction on closing arguments. For example, in United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1513 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1035, 113 S.Ct. 817, 121 L.Ed.2d 689 (1992), the court upheld a time restriction of forty-five to fifty minutes where the defendant was tried on twenty-six counts of violating various federal laws. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld a restriction of ten minutes for each defendant in a case which covered a six-year period and involved multiple conspiracies, 40 witnesses, 133 exhibits, a 12 count indictment, and 22 pages of jury instructions. United States v. Sotelo, 97 F.3d 782, 793 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1135, 117 S.Ct. 1002, 136 L.Ed.2d 881 (1997); 520 U.S. 1149, 117 S.Ct. 1324, 137 L.Ed.2d 486 (1997). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court to limit closing arguments to thirty minutes where the government's case involved twelve witnesses and twenty-seven exhibits. United States v. Davila, 693 F.2d 1006, 1008 (10th Cir. 1982). [¶35] In light of these decisions and under the circumstances of this case, forty-five minutes for summation is not unreasonable. Mr. Sanchez's trial lasted approximately eight days  two of which were expended on jury selection and the unavailability of a witness. Sixteen witnesses were called. Defense counsel did not use all of the allotted time and did not lodge an objection as to what, if anything, he was unable to cover in his summation. Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion.