Opinion ID: 1060278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Royal next argues that the trial court erred in determining that he would be a future danger to society because the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of future dangerousness and, therefore, his motions to strike the Commonwealth's evidence should have been granted. In determining whether the trial court erred in denying Royal's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. It is undisputed that Royal planned the murder of Officer Cooper and furnished each of the three co-conspirators with the weapons for the crime. Moreover, when Royal realized the officer in the car was not his original intended victim, Officer Cooper, he did not abandon his plan. He proceeded to murder Officer Wallace, not because of any acrimony toward Officer Wallace, but apparently because Officer Wallace was there and Officer Cooper was not. Dr. Billups, Royal's expert witness described Royal's mental capacity as borderline, which he explained as not high enough to be considered normal, but yet not low enough to be considered retarded. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that Royal had the capacity to, and did, plan a serious criminal offense, recruit others to participate, and execute the plan. More importantly, killing a person under these circumstances shows clear disregard for human life. This evidence, combined with the escalating nature of Royal's antisocial personality disorder, is sufficient to support a finding that Royal would be a future danger to society. Royal asserts, however, that comments made by the trial court while ruling on Royal's motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence show that the trial court erroneously shifted the burden to him to disprove that he was a future danger. Those comments, however, must be considered in context. Royal based his motion to strike, in part, on Dr. Ryans' statement that he could not state with medical certainty that under certain circumstances Royal would not repeat violent behavior that would put others at risk. Royal characterized this testimony as equivocal. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the issue of future dangerousness was not for Dr. Ryans or any other qualified medical person to decide, but for the trier of fact to resolve based on the medical evidence as well as all other relevant evidence. In denying the motion to strike, the trial court commented that, [i]n fairness or in passing, if Dr. Ryans or anyone else had sat there and said as a matter of psychiatry or psychology we were able to say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Royal wouldn't do this again, I would have listened to them. Taken in context, the court's comment does not establish a requirement of affirmative expert testimony that Royal was or would not be a future danger to society as a prerequisite to such a finding by the court. Rather, this comment was directed at the evidentiary weight the trial court would give to Dr. Ryans' testimony. Nothing in the trial court's statement placed the burden of proof on Royal to affirmatively show that he would not be a future danger to society. Finally, Royal argues that the finding of future dangerousness was flawed because the Commonwealth was bound by the expert testimony of Dr. Ryans, which did not establish future dangerousness, and because Royal's prior conviction for second degree murder was on appeal and therefore should not have been considered as evidence of future dangerousness. We disagree. Dr. Ryans' testimony was not an affirmative opinion that Royal either would or would not be a future danger to society. This statement did not preclude the Commonwealth from proving future dangerousness by other evidence. Furthermore, the trial court was entitled to consider Royal's prior murder conviction even though that conviction was on appeal at the time of sentencing. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 289, 297-98, 302 S.E.2d 520, 525-26, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 202, 78 L.Ed.2d 176 (1983). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Royal's motion to strike.