Opinion ID: 1922564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prohibition Against Presenting Nude Entertainment for Liquor Licensees Holding Special Amusement Permits

Text: [¶ 31] We now address Diva's claim that section 61-17, which prohibits liquor licensees from presenting nude entertainment, unduly burdens protected speech in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Less than ten years ago, we concluded that local ordinances which prohibited liquor licensees from providing nude entertainment did not violate the First Amendment. Proctor v. County of Penobscot, 651 A.2d 355, 357-58 (Me.1994) (citing Gabriele v. Town of Old Orchard Beach, 420 A.2d 252, 257 (Me.1980)). We are not persuaded that our holding in Proctor must be overturned. In Proctor, we relied on a series of United States Supreme Court cases that based their analysis on the Twenty-first Amendment. [8] Although the Court has since reduced its reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment, it has never wavered from holding that states may regulate the activities allowed in establishments selling liquor. [9] [¶ 32] Most courts that have addressed this specific issue have reached the same conclusion that states retain inherent powers to regulate nude entertainment where alcohol is sold for consumption on the premises. See, e.g., BZAPS, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 268 F.3d 603, 605-08 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding concern about combination of alcohol and adult entertainment is not irrational and the city was entitled, under its police power, to prohibit the sale of alcohol in locations featuring adult entertainment), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 904, 122 S.Ct. 2356, 153 L.Ed.2d 179 (2002); Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 140 F.3d 993, 999 (11th Cir.1998) (finding prohibition on nude dancing where liquor is sold restricts only the place or manner of nude dancing without regulating any particular message); El Marocco Club, Inc. v. Richardson, 746 A.2d 1228, 1234-39 (R.I. 2000) (holding prohibition on nude dancing in places where alcohol is served was a content-neutral regulation that constitutionally restricted time, manner, and places where nudity could occur). The few state courts, including the Supreme Court of Alaska and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, that have taken a contrary approach interpret their state's constitutional free speech rights as prohibiting the exclusion of nudity based solely on the on-premises sale of alcohol. See, e.g., Mickens v. City of Kodiak, 640 P.2d 818, 821 (Alaska 1982) (explaining that the Alaska State Constitution, [10] which does not contain a clause similar to the Twenty-first Amendment, prohibits cities from restricting expression otherwise protected by the First Amendment in places where liquor is sold); Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 373 N.E.2d 1151, 1155-56 (1978) (stating that in the absence of a provision giving a preferred position to regulation of alcohol, the free speech provision of Massachusetts Constitution [11] protects nudity in places licensed to sell alcohol); see also Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 571 Pa. 375, 812 A.2d 591, 603-08 (Pa.2002) (on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, 529 U.S. 277, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000)) (interpreting its own state constitution [12] as providing more expansive protection for expression involving nudity than the protection provided by the First Amendment). We find no such right in the language of the Maine Constitution and are unpersuaded by the analysis of those courts. [13] [¶ 33] Therefore, employing the same O'Brien analysis as described above, we conclude that section 61-17 complies with the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 4, of the Maine Constitution. First, the ordinance is within the City's authority to enact pursuant to its broad police powers. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 515, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996); see also 30-A M.R.S.A. § 3001 (1996) (granting home rule authority to municipalities). Second, the ordinance furthers the important government interest of controlling the issuance of special amusement permits for music, dancing, and entertainment for liquor licensees and preventing the harmful secondary effects associated with nude entertainment. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-52, 106 S.Ct. 925; Young, 427 U.S. at 62-63, 96 S.Ct. 2440. Third, section 61-17 is a content-neutral regulation that serves important governmental interests that are unrelated to the suppression of free expression. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673; Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569-70, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Finally, section 61-17's incidental restriction on speech is no greater than is necessary to achieve the government's purpose and provides reasonable alternative avenues for expression. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673; Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065. Accordingly, we hold that section 61-17 complies with the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 4, of the Maine Constitution. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.