Opinion ID: 336609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Thirteen-Month Delay.

Text: 7 This Court held, in Cleveland v. Ciccone, supra, decided June 10, 1975, that a parolee's right to a prompt revocation hearing is not suspended by the fact that he is serving an intervening sentence. If a parole violator's warrant is issued and lodged against a prisoner as a detainer, a revocation hearing must be accorded within a reasonable time. If the instant case were judged by this Cleveland standard, Creech would clearly be entitled to habeas relief; the thirteen-month delay could hardly be characterized as reasonable. 8 Creech's position is seriously impaired, however, because the entire delay occurred prior to the Cleveland decision. Cleveland represented a significant extension of previous case law. See 517 F.2d at 1089. For that reason, we held that it was not to be applied retroactively absent a clear showing of prejudice. We said: 9 Absent a showing of demonstrable prejudice severe enough to render the revocation hearing itself inadequate in terms of relief, we cannot say that the warrants should have been quashed or other habeas relief granted to preclude revocation of the paroles involved in this case.    Delays in future cases must, however, be measured in consonance with notice of our holding today. 10 517 F.2d at 1089. 11 Therefore, the appellant, like the appellants in Cleveland, could obtain outright release only by showing demonstrable prejudice severe enough to render the revocation hearing itself inadequate in terms of relief. He has shown no such prejudice. 12 Creech has not shown that the delay in holding a hearing in any way affected the fact-finding and decision-making process leading to revocation of his parole. He does not contend that evidence of the violation was lost because of the thirteen-month delay, or that the delay somehow hindered the Parole Board in making the policy decision to revoke parole. 2 13 He does assert that the failure to accord him an early hearing on the parole violation charge affected the length and conditions of his Ohio confinement and precluded the possibility of concurrent running of his federal and state sentences. However, these very effects were present in Cleveland. They plainly are not of the type which would warrant outright release. 14 Creech has not shown prejudice which would render the revocation hearing itself inadequate, and so, under Cleveland, is not entitled to outright release by reason of the thirteen-month delay. 15