Opinion ID: 1836030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of LeCroy's Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: Strickland mandates that the trial court conduct a two-prong test to determine whether the sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The first prong requires a showing of deficient performance and must identify the acts or omissions of counsel alleged to be unreasonable. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The court then must determine after an evidentiary hearing, and in view of all the circumstances, whether the acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. A critical threshold question under this prong is whether counsel reasonably investigated the appellant's background. Attorneys have the absolute threshold duty to conduct an investigation of the defendant's background, for possible mitigating evidence. Porter v. Singletary, 14 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir.1994). If it is demonstrated that an investigation has been conducted, [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The underlying rationale is that even highly competent attorneys will disagree on trial strategy. However, where there is little or no investigation, the court may conclude that the omission was a substantial oversight, rather than legitimate trial strategy. See Rose, 675 So.2d at 572-73 (finding counsel's penalty phase performance deficient because it was neither informed nor strategic, involved a strategy which even he believed to be ill-conceived, and entailed no investigation of options or meaningful choice). LeCroy alleges that trial counsel did not investigate and present evidence to the sentencing jury of LeCroy's personal history and particularly, his history of severe mental and emotional problems. Clearly, these allegations of substantial but omitted mental health evidence appear to be LeCroy's strongest claim. LeCroy alleges in great detail that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence on current and past mental and emotional health, diminished capacity at the time of the offense, and past child abuse. LeCroy has presented six matters upon which he claims counsel was ineffective due to failure to present evidence: (1) his immaturity, learning disability, emotional disturbance, compulsivity, indecisiveness, and insecurity, which he says could have been presented through the testimony of Drs. Romanos and Silversmith and through school records; (2) his adjustment to jail; (3) his diminished level of psychological functioning at the time of the offense; (4) his brother's guilt; (5) his poor and abusive childhood; and (6) his mental instability, as well as that of his family members, during the search for the victims. Counsel allegedly did not present evidence of LeCroy's learning disability, low mental age, and emotional problems, all of which LeCroy argues were available through medical and school records. LeCroy also contends that counsel failed to investigate and present evidence about his poor and abusive upbringing. For example, LeCroy argues that counsel did not utilize family members and neighbors who could have testified about his childhood as a neglected runt who was severely abused and exhibited self-destructive and aberrant behavior early on. Courts have consistently held that, if substantiated, this type of evidence is particularly compelling in any determination of whether the failure to investigate and present such evidence would prejudice a capital defendant. See Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (11th Cir.1988) (emphasizing that evidence of a psychological problem has the potential to totally change the evidentiary picture by altering the causal relationship that can exist between mental illness and homicidal behavior); see also Turpin v. Christenson, 269 Ga. 226, 497 S.E.2d 216, 225 (Ga.1998) (finding that defendant's anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders would have likely refuted prosecution's arguments about his culpability). Like these courts, this Court has consistently emphasized that severe mental disturbance is a mitigating factor of the most weighty order. Rose, 675 So.2d at 573; see Rivera, 717 So.2d at 485; see also Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.2d 107, 110 (Fla.1995); Santos v. State, 629 So.2d 838, 840 (Fla.1994). For example, in Cherry v. State, 659 So.2d 1069, 1074 (Fla.1995), we found that allegations of the defendant's poor and abusive background, in conjunction with his mental defects, not investigated or presented by counsel, were cumulatively sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing. The severe mental and emotional problems detailed by LeCroy are almost identical to the evidence cited as warranting relief in these cases. Regardless of the ultimate resolution of this issue on the merits after a proper hearing, LeCroy has clearly presented sufficient allegations to merit an evidentiary hearing. Rivera; Cherry.