Opinion ID: 2293324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The denial of Weber's request for a lesser included offense instruction.

Text: Weber first claims that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on Offensive Touching [4] as a lesser included offense of First Degree Robbery [5] . The trial judge concluded that Offensive Touching is not a lesser included offense of First Degree Robbery, and that in any event, there was no rational basis to convict Weber on Offensive Touching. Because the trial judge did not give the requested instruction, we review Weber's claim de novo to determine: (i) whether the instruction was available as a matter of law; and, if so, (ii) whether the evidence presented at trial supported a conviction on the lesser included offense. [6] As we noted in Herring v. State, Appendix B of the 1973 Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary sets forth the following as illustrative of included offenses of Robbery in the First Degree . . . § 601 Offensive Touching. . . . [7] Therefore, the trial judge erred by concluding that Offensive Touching is not a lesser included offense of First Degree Robbery. The trial judge, however, was not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense. [8] This standard applies even where the defendant denies any involvement in the charged offense. [9] A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if there is any evidence fairly tending to bear upon the lesser included offense, however weak that evidence may be. [10] At trial, the State argued that the record did not support a conviction on Offensive Touching because that offense would require the victim to have testified that it caused some annoyance or alarm to him. The trial judge agreed with the State's interpretation of the record and the law. We conclude, however, that a conviction for Offensive Touching does not require proof that the victim actually felt offended or alarmed. In relevant part, 11 Del. C. § 601 defines Offensive Touching as a person intentionally touch[ing] another person either with a member of his or her body or with any instrument . . . knowing that the person is thereby likely to cause offense or alarm to such other person. This definition focuses on the actor's intent and knowledge before touching another person, not on that other person's resultant mental state. After carefully reviewing the record, we find sufficient evidence to support an acquittal of the First Degree Robbery charge and a conviction of the lesser included offense of Offensive Touching. Although Weber primarily argued at trial that he was not the person identified on the surveillance video accosting Naspo, Weber also questioned the State's evidence that the person in the video actually attempted to steal Naspo's car. Weber's defense counsel attempted to impeach Naspo by demonstrating that his trial testimony did not entirely match his original statement to the police. [11] The surveillance video shows a brief struggle between Naspo and another man but does not conclusively establish that the man attempted to steal Naspo's car. If the jury did not find Naspo's testimony entirely credible, they could have concluded that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Weber attempted first degree robbery. [12] Therefore, we find that the record supports Weber's request for a lesser included offense instruction on Offensive Touching. Lesser included offense instructions `provide the jury with a less dramatic alternative than the sharp choice between conviction of the offense charged and acquittal[,]' [13] and ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable-doubt standard [14] . The trial judge here failed to accord Weber this full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard by refusing Weber's request for a lesser included offense instruction on Offensive Touching. A trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury regarding a lesser offense is not reversible error per se.  [15] For example, in cases involving offenses on a ladder, if the trial court wrongfully refuses to charge the offense at the bottom rung, that error is harmless provided the jury returns a guilty verdict for an offense higher up rather than for an intermediate offense which was also charged. [16] This exception does not apply to the case at bar because the trial judge only instructed the jury on the highest offense (First Degree Robbery). Nor can the fact that the jury convicted Weber on Attempted First Degree Carjacking render the trial judge's error harmless. It is possible to find a defendant guilty of carjacking and not guilty of theft (an element of First Degree Robbery), if the jury finds that the defendant did not intend to permanently deprive the owner of his vehicle. A reasonable jury could have convicted Weber on Attempted First Degree Carjacking and Offensive Touching. For these reasons, we must reverse Weber's conviction of First Degree Robbery.