Opinion ID: 1248766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Emotional harm

Text: Citing Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir.1981), the court of appeals concluded: In cases involving violation of a statutory right, emotional-distress damages are recoverable absent evidence of verifiable physical injury or severe emotional distress. Navarre, 633 N.W.2d at 54. Williams involved a racial discrimination claim under Title VII and the Eighth Circuit held that damages are to be presumed where there is an infringement of a substantive constitutional right, thereby not requiring medical testimony. Williams, 660 F.2d at 1272. Therefore, the reason for not requiring medical testimony in Williams was not because the damages being sought were for a statutory violation but because the damages were for the violation of a substantive constitutional right, codified by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. No such constitutional right is at issue in this case. Accordingly, we find Williams to be neither controlling nor helpful in this case. The court of appeals also cited to Gillson v. State Dept. of Natural Res., 492 N.W.2d 835, 842 (Minn.App.), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 1993), and concluded that emotional damages may be awarded based solely on subjective testimony and that a plaintiff need not show that the pain and suffering was severe. Gillson is also distinguishable from this case because the damages sought in Gillson were for mental anguish under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, which, like Title VII, relates to discriminatory conduct similar to that discussed in Williams. Gillson, 492 N.W.2d at 841. Nevertheless, we recognize that an entity that violates any provision of the MGDPA is liable to a person    who suffers any damage as a result of the violation. Minn.Stat. § 13.08, subd. 1 (2000) (emphasis added). We believe this broad language indicates that a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional harm under the MGDPA. However, a plaintiff must still satisfy the standard of proof necessary to recover such damages for emotional harm. Generally, [w]e have not been anxious to expand the availability of damages for emotional distress. This reluctance has arisen from the concern that claims of mental anguish may be speculative and so likely to lead to fictitious allegations that there is a potential for abuse of the judicial process.    Thus, we have been careful to limit the availability of such damages to those plaintiffs who prove that emotional injury occurred under circumstances tending to guarantee its genuineness. Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560 (Minn.1996) (quoting Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 437-38 (Minn.1983)). Here, respondent failed to produce any verifiable medical or psychological evidence to support her claim but did introduce evidence indicating that appellant's disclosure of information made her extremely upset and caused her to be afraid to go out in public. While this evidence was conclusory and not substantiated by any medical testimony, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that the evidence was sufficient to allow respondent's emotional damage claim to be submitted to the jury. However, the district court did not allow any impeachment of this testimony by cross-examination or the introduction of the respondent's prior medical and psychological history. The district court committed error in this regard. We hold that where a plaintiff seeks emotional damages under the MGDPA and puts her emotional state at issue, the defendant should be allowed to introduce probative evidence of the plaintiff's preexisting condition, treatment and prognosis, including expert testimony and/or medical records, that is relevant to the plaintiff's claim for emotional damages. We agree with the court of appeals that it may have been within the district court's discretion to deny an independent medical examination but that the denial appears to have been based in part on respondent's assertion that her existing medical records adequately documented her emotional condition. Navarre, 633 N.W.2d at 55. However, these records were not received into evidence, although offered. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and hold that the district court abused its discretion by not allowing appellant to introduce evidence related to respondent's preexisting emotional problems.