Opinion ID: 844248
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Constitutional Claim

Text: On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court violated equal protection guarantees by purposefully discriminating against women and Hispanics in selecting nominees for the pool from which his grand jury was drawn. We first summarize the statutory scheme which regulates this process, and which gave rise to the challenged procedures. The grand jury scheme, which codified prior law, has been in effect for decades. (See § 888 et seq., added by Stats. 1959, ch. 501, § 2, p. 2443; see also Stats. 1959, ch. 501, § 20, p. 2458; People v. Superior Court ( 1973 Grand Jury ) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 436 & fn. 5 [119 Cal.Rptr. 193, 531 P.2d 761] ( 1973 Grand Jury ).) (1) Each county must have at least one grand jury drawn and impaneled every year. (§ 905; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 23.) The grand jury consists of the required number of persons returned from the citizens of the county before a court of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to inquire into both public offenses within the county and county matters of civil concern. (§ 888; see § 888.2 [specifying required number of grand jurors based on county size]; see also §§ 904.4-904.8 [authorizing additional grand juries depending on county size].) This general authority over both criminal and civil matters involves three functions: (1) weighing criminal charges and deciding whether to present indictments (§ 917), (2) evaluating misconduct claims against public officials and deciding whether to formally seek their removal from office (§ 922), and (3) acting as the public's watchdog by investigating and reporting upon local government affairs. (§§ 919-921, 925 et seq.; see McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1170 [245 Cal.Rptr. 774, 751 P.2d 1329] ( McClatchy ).) In counties with a single grand jury, that one body performs all three functions. (See 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 181, 182 (1993) [concluding that any additional grand jury authorized by statute is restricted to criminal matters and may not perform civil oversight functions].) [14] (2) In California, unlike other jurisdictions, the grand jury most often plays the civil oversight role. ( McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1170; see 1973 Grand Jury, supra, 13 Cal.3d 430, 436, fn. 4 [distinguishing federal grand juries insofar as they do not report on public affairs].) Many statutes identify specific topics of inquiry. [15] In performing its functions, the grand jury operates in secret. (E.g., §§ 915, 924.2, 939; see § 911 [oath].) It may retain auditors, appraisers and other experts (§ 926), and has subpoena power (§ 939.2; see § 921 [access to public records]). At the end of its term, the grand jury must issue a final report to the presiding judge of the superior court (§ 933, subd. (a)), documenting all findings therein. (§ 916; see 1973 Grand Jury, supra, 13 Cal.3d 430, 434 [interim report].) (3) As shown by the testimony here, grand jurors must be citizens age 18 or older and have resided in the county for at least one year immediately before their service begins. (§ 893, subd. (a)(1).) A person who serves on this body also must have sufficient knowledge of the English language to perform the grand jury function ( id., subd. (a)(3)), and be in possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence, of sound judgment, and of fair character ( id., subd. (a)(2)). [16] The county pays grand jurors a modest daily fee, and reimburses mileage costs, upon the order of the superior court. (§§ 890, 890.1.) (4) The Legislature has vested the superior court with responsibility for selecting grand jury members. (See 1973 Grand Jury, supra, 13 Cal.3d 430, 438 & fn. 8 [noting close statutory relationship between grand jury and convening court].) Shortly before the county fiscal year begins, the court makes an order estimating the number of grand jurors required for that year. (§ 895.) Thereafter, the court shall select the grand jurors required by personal interview for the purpose of ascertaining whether they possess the qualifications prescribed by subdivision (a) of Section 893. (§ 896, subd. (a).) If, in the opinion of the court, these qualifications are met, the person selected must sign a statement declaring that he will be available for the number of hours required of grand jurors in the county. ( Ibid. ) The court makes a list of the prospective grand jurors it has selected, and gives it to the jury commissioner. (§ 896, subd. (b).) After receiving and filing the list of prospective grand jurors, the jury commissioner publishes it in a newspaper of general circulation, along with the name of the judge who selected each person on the list. (§ 900.) The jury commissioner then randomly draws the names from the `grand jury box,' using one of two methods. ( Id., subds. (a) [folded slips of paper], (b) [numbered markers].) Once drawn, the grand jury is certified and summoned (§ 906), and the grand jury is impaneled. (§ 905; see § 909 [before accepting anyone drawn as grand juror, court must be satisfied that they are duly qualified].) [17] Against this statutory backdrop, and based on the evidentiary record, defendant contends the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to present a prima facie case that the grand jury nomination process violated federal equal protection guaranties. He insists all essential elements were present under Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, to wit, substantial underrepresentation of a distinct class (women and Hispanics) in the grand jury pool over time, and a highly subjective nominating process that was susceptible of abuse. Defendant argues that whether or not any overt racism was shown, the evidence he presented below raised an inference of purposeful and intentional discrimination, which the People did not rebut. We now consider Castaneda in some detail. In Castaneda, defendant Partida was indicted and convicted of a felony in Hidalgo County, Texas, near the Mexican border. In seeking a new trial in state court, he claimed his federal equal protection rights had been denied because of the historical underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on grand juries in the county when he was indicted in 1972. Besides testifying about racial discrimination in the area, Partida introduced evidence from the 1970 census showing that 79.1 percent of the county's population was Mexican-American, and that the group was underprivileged by various socioeconomic measures. Partida also showed that the average representation of Mexican-Americans on grand jury lists over an 11-year period, from 1962 to 1972, was 39 percent. In rebuttal, the state offered no evidence to show that the alleged underrepresentation and discrimination had not occurred. Ultimately, the motion for a new trial was denied, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 485-489.) Partida renewed his equal protection claim on habeas corpus in federal district court. This time, the state outlined some of the procedures used to select grand juries in Hidalgo County, as follows: A state district court judge appointed from three to five jury commissioners. The commissioners, in turn, selected 15 to 20 persons to comprise the list from which the actual grand jury was drawn. When 12 persons on the list appeared by summons in court, the state district judge determined whether they were statutorily qualified to serve, examining them under oath on issues such as citizenship, voting age, literacy, mental soundness and moral character, and criminal record. As soon as the court found 12 qualified persons, they were impaneled as the grand jury. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 484-485.) Also, the state district judge who applied these rulescalled a key man systemtestified that in appointing the commissioners (including a greater number of Mexican-Americans than persons from other ethnic groups), he advised them on the qualifications and exemptions related to grand jury service. However, there was no evidence in any form, including from the commissioners themselves, on the manner in which they compiled the grand jury list. ( Id. at pp. 490-491.) The federal district court declined to grant habeas corpus relief on grounds the prima facie case of discrimination was weak, and sufficient rebuttal had occurred. The court surmised that the statistical evidence overstated the racial imbalance on the grand jury lists, and that it ignored the role of Mexican-Americans as a local governing majority who held prominent posts in the community. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 491-492.) The latter theory referred to the fact that, at the relevant time, a large percentage of Mexican-Americans served, among other things, as jury commissioners, prospective grand jurors, actual grand jurors, and trial jurors in Partida's case. However, the federal circuit court of appeals rejected this analysis and reversed the district court's decision. The court of appeals placed little weight on the governing majority approach, and otherwise found that Partida's prima facie showing of a constitutional violation had not been adequately rebutted by the State. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 491-492.) The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari by the State of Texas, through the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, challenging the equal protection theory on which Partida had prevailed in the federal court of appeals. In a five-to-four decision, accompanied by three dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling invalidating the state's grand jury selection process. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492, 501; see id. at p. 504 (dis. opn. of Burger, C. J.); see also id. at p. 507 (dis. opns. of Stewart, J., and Powell, J.).) (5) At the outset, Castaneda embraced the venerable notion that equal protection precludes a defendant from being tried under an indictment issued by a grand jury from which persons `of his race or color' have been excluded `because of that race or color.' ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492.) Reviewing its prior decisions, the court observed that such conduct is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. ( Id. at p. 493, italics omitted.) Rather, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment targets discrimination that is purposeful and intentional ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 493), and that selects grand jurors in a `racially non-neutral' way ( id. at p. 494). In evaluating how the key-man system was applied in Hidalgo County, Castaneda set forth the requirements that a criminal defendant must meet in order to establish a prima facie equal protection violation. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. [Citation.] Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time.... Finally, [the court noted], a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 494, citations & fn. omitted.) Once the requisite showing has been made, and a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose appears, the burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case. ( Id. at p. 495.) Under this test, Castaneda held, Partida had presented a prima facie case. First, Mexican-Americans were a clearly identifiable class. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 495.) This conclusion rested on the common use of Spanish surnames in the group, and on the socioeconomic disadvantages its members had long endured. Second, Castaneda found the statistical showing clearly sufficient for prima facie case standards. Partida had established a 40 percent disparity between the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the county's population and the average percentage of Mexican-Americans summoned as prospective grand jurors over an 11-year period before he was indicted. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 495-496.) The court further indicated that the constitutional significance of the disparity would not change to the extent the relevant population could be limited, based on the available statistical evidence, to persons who were statutorily eligible to serve as grand jurors. ( Id. at pp. 486, fn. 6 [noting that exclusion of noncitizens resulted in only a negligib[e] 3 percent decrease in the number of Mexican-Americans in the county population], 488, fn. 8 [finding a 26 percent disparity between Mexican-Americans 25 years or older who have some schooling, and are presumably literate, and Mexican-Americans in grand jury pools].) Third, the substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans in grand jury pools did not end the inquiry. Castaneda proceeded to address the final factor it had identified as bearing on the establishment of a prima facie casethe nature of the grand jury selection process itself. The court noted that, as a general proposition, the key-man system was not inherently unconstitutional, and that it had repeatedly been upheld against facial challenge. However, referring to the Texas system in particular, the court characterized it as both highly subjective and susceptible of abuse as applied. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 497.) In context, such criticisms seemed directed at evidence the court had previously described indicating that no known methods or standards regulated the manner in which the commissioners compiled the grand jury lists. ( Id. at pp. 490-491.) In any event, without further discussion, the court found that an inference of intentional discrimination arose, which the state was required to dispel. ( Id. at pp. 497-498.) In the final analysis, Castaneda determined that the state did not rebut the showing of intentional discrimination that Partida had made. The court emphasized the barren state of the record as to both the motivations and methods of the grand jury commissioners. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 499.) In light of the gross underrepresentation of Hispanics on the grand jury lists, the court indicated that proper rebuttal required some explanation as to how the commissioners determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to the statutory time for testing qualifications in state district court. ( Id. at p. 498.) Nor did the governing majority theory devised by the federal district court fill the evidentiary gap. The high court was not willing to assume that members of one definable group would never discriminate against other persons in the same group. It likewise did not matter to the court that certain local officials or prominent persons in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American. ( Id. at p. 499.) For all these reasons, Castaneda concluded that there had been a denial of equal protection in the selection of the grand jury in Partida's case. The United States Supreme Court has referred to Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, sparingly in the 35 years since it was decided, and has had no occasion to apply its equal protection analysis to a key man system under circumstances other than those at issue there. Nevertheless, the high court has reaffirmed, in closely related contexts, that Castaneda involved the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against purposeful and invidious discrimination. Thus, in Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 260-264 [88 L.Ed.2d 598, 106 S.Ct. 617], the court declined to adopt a harmless error standard where the grand jury had been selected in violation of equal protection guaranties. Consistent with a long line of cases, the court observed that such a fundamental structural flaw in the proceedings compelled reversal of the conviction. Few constitutional errors were as grave, the court said, as the state engaging in the intentional exclusion of grand jurors because of their race. ( Id. at p. 262; see Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-559 [61 L.Ed.2d 739, 99 S.Ct. 2993] [similar analysis].) [18] Against this backdrop, we are not entirely certain of the elements of a prima facie equal protection violation sufficient to shift the burden of proof from the defense, and to require rebuttal from the state. On the one hand, Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, speaks broadly of the presumption, or inference, of discriminatory intent raised by the constitutionally significant underrepresentation of a distinct group over time ( id. at p. 494), of the underlying support[] for such inference provided by a selection process that is susceptible of abuse or not racially neutral ( ibid. ), and of the highly subjective and malleable nature of the Texas key-man system in particular ( id. at p. 497). Read in its most literal and absolute manner, such language arguably implies that mere statistical disparity, coupled with some official discretion in the selection of grand jurors, is always sufficient, without more, to raise a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. (6) On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of a grand jury selection systemincluding one less unfettered and more objective than Castaneda' s in which no meaningful discretion guides the nominating process, and which would survive constitutional scrutiny under the foregoing view, assuming the requisite statistical showing was made. As reflected by the statutory requirement of personal interviews for grand jury nominees, and by the individualized screening process that the county used here, it seems inherent in the grand jury itself, and in its civic oversight role and strict schedule, that persons nominated and selected to that body not only be eligible and qualified to serve, but that they also be willing and able to do so. For this pragmatic reason, perhaps, Castaneda recognized that key-man systems are not unconstitutional per se, absent any evidence or inference of discriminatory intent as applied. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 497.) [19] We now determine whether defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was properly denied. We begin by noting the parties' agreement that women (see Duren, supra, 439 U.S. 357, 364), and Hispanics ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 495), each qualify as a distinct class for equal protection purposes. Hence, the first prong of Castaneda' s prima facie test is met. Regarding Castaneda' s second prima facie prong, as to which considerable evidence was admitted below, the significance of defendant's statistical showing is less clear. Here, as under the Sixth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on either the means by which disparity may be measured or the constitutional limit of permissible disparity. ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d 502, 527-528, fn. omitted.) The exhibits showed various absolute disparities comparing adult women in the population to women in grand jury pools in Los Angeles over several years. While the difference spiked at one point, it otherwise was either zero or ranged between 5 and 10 percent. Likewise, there was no expert consensus concerning the absolute disparity between Hispanics in the county population and Hispanics in grand jury pools, with each witness defining and measuring such groups for statistical purposes differently. (See id. at p. 526, fn. 12 [defendants must use available jury-eligible population figures in fair-cross-section cases].) Some of the more relevant absolute disparity figures for Hispanics ranged from 9.7 percent to 11.4 percent. At bottom, none of the disparities shown for either women or Hispanics in this case approaches the 40 percent mark in Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482. Nor do they show substantial underrepresentation over time outside the more modest limits that courts have assumed are constitutionally permissible. (See Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [reviewing cases that deemed absolute disparity of 4.5 to 11.49 percent insufficient, and that seemingly reached opposite result as to 14 percent disparity]; see also People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856-857 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1] [declining to decide effect of 10.7 percent disparity on fair-cross-section claim].) However, we need not resolve these statistical issues. The same is true as to whether defendant has met Castaneda' s third prima facie prong by showing that the grand jury selection procedure was not racially neutral ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 494), or was highly subjective and susceptible of abuse as applied to women and Hispanics ( id. at p. 497). The reason is that even assuming a prima facie case exists under Castaneda, the evidence admitted and considered by the trial court is more than sufficient to dispel [any] inference of intentional discrimination and to show that no equal protection violation occurred ( Id. at pp. 497-498.) (7) To recap the process, grand jurors are randomly selected from a group of persons nominated by the judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The original pool of applicants for nomination includes both volunteers from the community and individuals personally known to the judges. The superior court determines by personal interview whether prospective grand jurors meet the eligibility requirements under section 893, subdivision (a). (§ 896, subd. (a).) Section 893, subdivision (a) ensures that such persons have, among other things, the basic capacity to perform the grand juror function. Elsewhere, the scheme defines such function in terms of the responsibility to conduct criminal and civil inquiries, most of which concern investigating and reporting on the financial, administrative, and legal affairs of government agencies and officials. The relevant statutes further assume that this service, which is largely uncompensated, demands a high level of personal commitment from those sworn to perform it. Thus, in addition to determining eligibility and qualification to perform the grand jury function, the court must ensure that nominees can and will work the necessary hours. (§ 896, subd. (a).) These statutory requirements are neither uncommon nor inherently unconstitutional. (See Carter v. Jury Commission (1970) 396 U.S. 320, 331-337 [24 L.Ed.2d 549, 90 S.Ct. 518]; 1 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (14th ed. 2010) § 4:4, pp. 4-30 to 4-42.) The evidence in this case showed that the Los Angeles County Superior Court had adopted standard procedures and written guidelines to implement the foregoing rules. The jury commissioner gave the same application to all persons who wanted to serve as grand jurors, whether or not they were known to any judge. Similarly, the interview system used to nominate grand jurors was not limited to persons known to the judges, but was extended to everyone who volunteered to apply. To ensure that all applicants and interviewees were evaluated in a uniform and proper manner, the court used written guidelines focusing on statutory eligibility rules, relevant background and experience, and time and service requirements. Nominating responsibility was shared by the entire superior court bench, which consisted at the relevant time of 238 judges serving in courthouses located in different communities throughout Los Angeles County. Contrary to defendant's view, nothing in these rules or procedures authorized, encouraged, or established that the judges nominated grand jurors in a manner that discriminated against women, Hispanics, or any other distinct group. Rather, the criteria used to select nominees were gender and race neutral, and clearly sought to test qualifications without reference to any impermissible subjective factor. Far from seeking to exclude members of minority groups from the pool of nominees, the superior court operated under a prodiversity policy. It engaged in a widespread campaign to recruit grand jury volunteers from all segments of the county population. These efforts targeted Hispanics and other minority groups. (See People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th 203, 227 [rejecting 6th Amend. fair-cross-section challenge to Orange County Grand Jury pool where superior court made exhaustive efforts to invite Asian-Americans to apply].) In a related vein, the neutral selection criteria used by the Los Angeles Superior Court, consisting of statutory requirements and its own guidelines, were rationally related to the grand jury function. The pool of persons who were eligible, qualified, and willing to serve as grand jurors was not unlimited. Hence, in evaluating nominees, the court considered any traits, skills, and experience that would assist the grand jury in conducting its investigations and preparing its reports. The testimony indicated that these standards were broadly inclusive and did not seek to eliminate persons based on occupation or education. (See People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 927 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589] [rejecting equal protection challenge to selection of grand jury foreperson where presiding judge in San Francisco Superior Court used race-neutral, job related factors to make decision].) Finally, in implementing the screening process, the Los Angeles Superior Court was evidently aware of its constitutional duties in selecting grand jurors, including the requirement that no one be excluded `because of [their] race or color.' ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492.) Such awareness can be inferred from the written form given to all grand jury applicants, and distributed (at least in the case of volunteer candidates) to the entire court, announcing full compliance with the law in this regard. Further, it appears that any racial or similar background information voluntarily provided on the form was used in a manner consistent with the diversity policy and outreach efforts we have described. Indeed, the evidence showed that the application and interview process was not used to eliminate Hispanic volunteer candidates, because they were nominated at a higher rate than Whites who were screened in the same manner. (8) Thus, unlike Castaneda, on which defendant so heavily relies, the present record is filled withnot devoid ofevidence of the nondiscriminatory motivations and methods of the judicial officers who selected the grand jury pool. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 499.) Accordingly, we conclude that the Los Angeles County procedure for the nomination of prospective grand jurors neither allowed, nor produced, purposeful or intentional discrimination against women and Hispanics. We therefore reject defendant's claim that his indictment violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the motion to dismiss was erroneously denied.