Opinion ID: 655552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Separation of the Trial into Phases4

Text: 8 De Anda argues that the district court erred in separating his trial into three phases. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), which authorizes the district court to conduct separate trials, provides that 9 [t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution or as given by statute to the United States. 10 A district court's decision to order separate trials may be set aside only for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 275, 116 L.Ed.2d 227 (1991). Reversal is required only if we have a definite and firm conviction that the district court made a clear error of judgment in its conclusion. Id. (citing Abatti v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 115, 117 (9th Cir.1988)). 11 It is clear that Rule 42(b) gives courts the authority to separate trials into liability and damage phases. See Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 549 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829, 98 S.Ct. 109, 54 L.Ed.2d 88 (1977). However, the district court, despite De Anda's claim that Burgess, Davenport and Binkley conspired to violate his civil rights, did not include the issue of Binkley's liability in the first phase of the trial. Instead, Binkley's liability was to be tried during the municipal liability phase. 5 Because De Anda alleged that all of the defendants were individually liable for the same constitutional injury, there was no reason to try the issue of Binkley's liability in a separate phase. Cf. Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 640 (9th Cir.1991) (stating that issue of police chief's individual liability was properly tried in a separate phase when based on a distinct theory). Further, the municipal liability phase of the trial was rendered moot, and De Anda never had an opportunity to present evidence that Binkley was liable as a member of the alleged conspiracy. For these reasons, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion. On remand, the district court must insure that the liability of each of the alleged conspirators is tried in a single phase of the trial. 12