Opinion ID: 201480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Refusal to Transfer the Action Against Gaffney

Text: 20 We now address whether the district court erred in denying Ralph's motion to transfer the action against Gaffney from Maine to Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. We review a refusal to transfer for abuse of discretion. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C.Cir.1986). 21 Section 1631 directs a district court to transfer a case in which there is a want of jurisdiction, ... if [transfer] is in the interest of justice. Here, the district court determined that transfer would not be in the interest of justice because it was granting Guardian's motion for summary judgement. The district court's determination would have been reasonable if Ralph's claims against Gaffney were entirely derivative of his claims against Guardian. But, we do not understand that to be the case; rather, we understand Ralph's claims against Gaffney to rest on independent obligations that Gaffney owed to Ralph. For example, Ralph's claim that Gaffney breached numerous duties of care is premised in part on Gaffney's duty to inform Guardian of Ralph's new Maine address. Accordingly, we find that the district court erred in denying the motion to transfer on the ground given. 22 Nevertheless, it may be that there are other grounds on which to deny transfer, as urged on us by Gaffney. See Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.2003) ([I]f an action ... is fanciful or frivolous, it is in the interest of justice to dismiss it rather than to keep it on life support (with the inevitable result that the transferee court will pull the plug).). The relevant claims were based on a conversation that Jean had with Gaffney late in the summer of 2000, more than three years before Ralph filed suit in the fall of 2003. Consequently, it appears that the common law claims against Gaffney are time-barred. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2A (Except as otherwise provided, actions of tort, actions of contract to recover for personal injuries, and actions of replevin, shall be commenced only within three years next after the cause of action accrues.). 23 Although the remaining claim, based on Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, is not time-barred, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 5A (Actions arising on account of violations of any law intended for the protection of consumers, including... chapter ninety-three A[,] ... shall be commenced only within four years next after the cause of action accrues.), it nonetheless is barred if Ralph failed to provide Gaffney with the pre-suit notice required by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3). 19 See, e.g., Entrialgo v. Twin City Dodge, Inc., 368 Mass. 812, 333 N.E.2d 202, 204 (1975) (A demand letter listing the specific deceptive practices claimed is a prerequisite to suit and as a special element must be alleged and proved.). Although Ralph sent a letter that gave notice of his Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim to Guardian, it is not clear that he also sent a copy of that letter to Gaffney. 24 In light of the above, we vacate the denial of Ralph's motion to transfer 20 and remand the action against Gaffney for the district court to reconsider whether transfer is in the interest of justice. 21 25 The grant of Guardian's motion for summary judgment is affirmed; the denial of Ralph's motion to transfer is vacated and the action against Gaffney is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.