Opinion ID: 4425842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Claims Generally

Text: Title VII prohibits an employer from “taking an adverse employment action” against an individual “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”22 Because it is often difficult to obtain direct evidence of discriminatory intent, we employ a “burden‐shifting framework” (commonly identified by reference to the Supreme Court case from which it derives, McDonnell 19 Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 306 (2d Cir. 2015). 20 See id. 21 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See note 1, ante, and accompanying text. 22Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). 12 Douglas Corp. v. Green)23 to “progressively sharpen[ ] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.”24 To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only establish “a prima facie case of sex discrimination by demonstrating that (1) [he] was within the protected class; (2) [he] was qualified for the position; (3) [he] was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”25 If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer at the summary judgment stage “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.”26 Finally, if the employer carries that burden, a plaintiff must submit admissible evidence from which a finder of fact could “infer that the defendant’s employment decision was more likely than not based in whole or in part 23 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Walsh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 828 F.3d 70, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Claims of sex‐based discrimination under Title VII and the NYHRL are analyzed using the familiar burden‐shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green . . . .”). 24 St. Maryʹs Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (citation and ellipses omitted). 25 Walsh, 828 F.3d at 75 (citation omitted); see also Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311 (explaining that because the submission of a complaint “by definition . . . occurs in the first stage of the litigation,” a “plaintiff cannot reasonably be required to allege more facts in the complaint than [he] would need to defeat a motion for summary judgment made prior to the defendant’s furnishing of a non‐discriminatory justification”). 26 Id. (citation omitted). 13 on discrimination.”27 The burden‐shifting framework thus “reduces the facts needed to be pleaded under Iqbal” at the 12(b)(6) stage of a Title VII suit.28 A plaintiff need only allege facts that give “plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.”29 Here, there is no dispute that Menaker’s Amended Complaint satisfies the first three elements of a prima facie case.30 Thus the only remaining question is whether the complaint alleges circumstances that provide at least minimal support for an inference of discriminatory intent. We conclude that it does. As explained below, the District Court’s conclusion to the contrary stems in part from its failure to appreciate the scope of our precedent in Doe v. Columbia. The District Court also failed to draw all reasonable inferences in Menaker’s favor, relying instead on impermissible factual findings. Finally, on remand, the District Court should also consider whether Kaplan’s discriminatory intent could be imputed to Hofstra through a “cat’s paw” theory of vicarious liability. 27 Id. (citation omitted). 28 Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 310 (2d Cir. 2015). 29 Id. at 311. 30 Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., No. 2:17 Civ. 5562 (DRH) (AYS), 2018 WL 4636818, at  (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) (“[T]here is no dispute . . . that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, that he was qualified for the position he held, and that he suffered an adverse employment action.”). 14