Opinion ID: 534522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As to Defendant Olivia Chatten

Text: 35 Chatten did not present any evidence in her own defense, nor did her attorney examine her codefendant, Clotida. It has been uniformly held that if a defendant rests without introducing evidence of his own he need not renew his [Rule 29] motion in order to preserve his objection to the sufficiency of the evidence. The motion need not be renewed, and defendant waives nothing, even if a codefendant has offered evidence. C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 463 (2d ed. 1982) (footnotes omitted); see also Lopez, 576 F.2d at 843 (codefendant's testimony favorable to defendant not deemed to waive defendant's prior Rule 29 motion). 36 On the facts presented, therefore, Chatten did not waive the Rule 29 motion which she made at the close of the government's case-in-chief. Accordingly, in order to sustain Chatten's conviction it must be shown that, when examined in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence presented in the government's case-in-chief, including all inferences that may be drawn therefrom, would permit a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lopez, 576 F.2d at 843. Hence, in the language of Lopez, [s]ince we can review the sufficiency of the evidence only as of the time the Rule 29 motion was made, we consider only the government's testimony in chief and exclude the ... evidence presented by codefendant Clotida. Id. See also United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 475 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Tate v. United States, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 904 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975); Cephus v. United States, 324 F.2d 893, 895-97 (D.C.Cir.1963). 37 Clotida and Chatten are charged with aiding and abetting each other in the commission of the offenses of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, importation of cocaine, and the possession of cocaine aboard an aircraft. To help determine whether a party is an aider or abettor, the Supreme Court in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949), articulated the following test: 38 In order to aide and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. 39 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938)). 40 In contrast to the evidence against Clotida, Chatten's connection with the criminal enterprise is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence has been defined as proof which does not actually assert or represent the proposition in question, but which asserts or describes something else, from which the trier of fact may either (i) reasonably infer the truth of the proposition, ... or (ii) at least reasonably infer an increase in the probability that the proposition is in fact true.... 1 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 94 (1977). It has been noted that [t]he ... general problem of circumstantial proof is to determine whether proffered evidence indirectly or inferentially supports the proposition sought to be proved. Id. at § 91. 41 It cannot be doubted, however, that circumstantial evidence is often very probative. As Professor Wigmore notes, without allowing the introduction of evidence that permits an inference upon an inference, hardly a single trial could be adequately prosecuted. 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence § 41 (1983). Indeed, the courts in general have recognized that circumstantial evidence may, in given settings, have equal if not greater weight than direct evidence. 1 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 5 (14th ed. 1985). Furthermore, it is important to note that, in the context of review of a motion for acquittal, no legal distinction exists between circumstantial and direct evidence. United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1358 (D.C.Cir.1986). 42 The evidence presented by the government, in its case-in-chief against Chatten, is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict of guilty. United States v. Glover, 814 F.2d 15 (1st Cir.1987), represents a fair example of the farthest that this court has ventured in sustaining a conviction based entirely on circumstantial evidence. In Glover, the defendant was convicted of a conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction, because there was no direct connection between her and either the drugs found in [her codefendant's] possession or the drug paraphernalia found in her home. Id. at 16. This court, however, sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the defendant knew certain facts about the presence and location of the cocaine. Id. at 16-17. In Glover, the court concluded that: 43 [T]he evidence of [the defendant's] knowledge of open drug activity in her apartment, combined with her control of the closet containing the cash, permitted the inference that she at least tacitly agreed to participate in a plan to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it in which her role included providing the premises for the drug venture and controlling the funds generated as a result of it. 44 Id. at 17. Hence, we held that the evidence, viewed as a whole in the light most favorable to the government, together with all legitimate inferences that can be drawn from it, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that [the defendant] conspired with the intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at 16-17. 45 In the present case, the evidence relied on to connect Chatten to the crime charged does not approach the evidence present in Glover. Rather, this is a case of 'mere presence' in which [Chatten] was convicted simply because she was present at the scene of a crime and shared a relationship with the perpetrator. Id. at 17. Hence, the present case is more closely analogous to United States v. Mehtala, 578 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.1978), rather than Glover. 46 In Mehtala, the defendant was convicted of knowingly aiding and abetting in the importation of marijuana by boat. On appeal, this court noted that [t]he Government's entire proof consisted of Mehtala's presence on the ship ... and inferences of a close relationship with the [ship's] captain. Id. at 10. The court stated that there was [n]o evidence ... that Mehtala embarked on the voyage for any purpose other than a pleasure cruise. There [was] no indication that she had a prior association with the captain, that she used marijuana, or that she had been engaged in previous drug operations. Id. The court reasoned that: 47 Even if through the supposed close relation between Mehtala and the ... captain, Mehtala obtained knowledge of the presence of the marijuana, this knowledge would not be sufficient to convict her of aiding and abetting. Mere association between the principal and those accused of aiding and abetting is not sufficient to establish guilt; nor is mere presence at the scene and knowledge that a crime was to be committed sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. 48 Id. (quoting United States v. Francomano, 554 F.2d 483, 486 (1st Cir.1977)). Hence, in Mehtala, this court reversed the conviction because the government had not proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. 49 In this case, the government, in its case-in-chief, presented no evidence that Chatten assisted Clotida in the smuggling of cocaine, or, even apart from assisting, had any knowledge of the presence of the cocaine. The government's case against Chatten consisted of the evidence of the clothing, impregnated with cocaine and found in the suitcases with baggage tag numbers that matched those in the possession of Clotida. 50 The evidence is clear, as the arresting officer Inspector Albino testified, that it was Clotida who had both airline tickets, all the baggage claim tickets and both their passports. From the government's case-in-chief, the only evidence that may be said to connect or tie Chatten to the crime was the fact that she was present at the airport in San Juan, and had accompanied Clotida from Quito, Ecuador. 51 The remainder of the government's case dealt with the events that followed after the evidence was seized, and after Clotida and Chatten were arrested. That part of the testimony of Customs Inspectors Albino and Otado, which related to the events inside the Customs' enclosure area, pertained only to Clotida. The testimony of Sergeant Hiram Gomez Santini related to what happened to the contraband after it was released by Customs, and the testimony of Roman, a chemist for the DEA, dealt with the tests performed on the contraband. Indeed, the only testimony which pertained directly to Chatten after her arrest, related to the reading of her Miranda Warning. 52 In sum, no evidence in the government's case-in-chief indicated that Chatten associate[d] [her]self with the venture, that [s]he participate[d] in it as in something that [s]he wishe[d] to bring about, that [s]he [sought] by h[er] action to make it succeed. See Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 619, 69 S.Ct. at 769. It has been stated that [m]ere association between the principal and those accused of aiding and abetting is not sufficient to establish guilt, nor is mere presence at the scene and knowledge that a crime was to be committed sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. United States v. Francomano, 554 F.2d 483, 486 (1st Cir.1977) (citations omitted). 1 53 Chatten reaps the full benefit of the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal trial is a fundamental principle of the common law. Blackstone, in his commentaries, discussing presumptions in the criminal law, asserted that the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 352. In McKinley's Case, 33 How.St.Tr. 275, 506 (1817), Lord Gillies of the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh asserted that the presumption in favour of innocence is not to be redargued by mere suspicion.... I conceive that this presumption is to be found in every code of law which has reason, and religion, and humanity, for a foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed in indelible characters in the heart of every judge and juryman.... The origins of the presumption of innocence may be found in ancient Rome, and, indeed, can be traced to the codes of Athens and Sparta. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-55, 15 S.Ct. 394, 402-03, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895). 54 In the United States, with commendable brevity, Wigmore states that [t]he presumption of innocence is fixed in our law. 9 Evidence § 2511 (emphasis omitted). In Coffin, in a portion of the opinion that is still valid and worthy of quotation, Justice Edward White stated that it is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 453, 15 S.Ct. at 402. The Coffin Court, in stressing the importance of the presumption of innocence, concluded that the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of the accused introduced by the law in his behalf.... Id. at 460, 15 S.Ct. at 405. Professor Wigmore, however, notes that [n]o presumption can be evidence; it is a rule about the duty of producing evidence. 9 Evidence § 2511 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). In the words of Professor Wigmore, the tempoary aberration caused by Coffin, as to the evidentiary effect of the presumption of innocence, was soon afterwards discarded in the court of its origin. Id. (citing Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51-52, 17 S.Ct. 235, 241, 41 L.Ed. 624 (1897); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253, 31 S.Ct. 2, 6, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910)). 55 The presumption is nonetheless basic and essential. An American scholar writes that it is a substantive principle of law which is so engrained in the accusatorial system of American justice that no one challenges its preferred and unquestioned position. M. Bassiouni, Criminal Law and Its Processes § 2.2 (1969). The presumption also reflects a universally accepted norm proclaimed as a human right and fundamental freedom in article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. G.A.Res. 217, 3 U.N.GAOR 71, 73, U.N.Doc. A/810, at art. 11 (1948) (Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law....). 56 In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the United States Constitution protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Beyond the rule that places the burden upon the prosecution of producing evidence to prove the accused guilty, Professor Wigmore states that the presumption of innocence ... conveys for the jury a special and additional caution ... to consider, in the material for their belief, nothing but the evidence, i.e., no surmises based on the present situation of the accused. 9 Evidence § 2511 (emphasis in original). 57 Chatten did not waive her Rule 29 motion. Considering, therefore, that the evidence presented by the government in its case-in-chief, including all inferences that could be drawn therefrom, was insufficient to have permitted the jury to find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Chatten's conviction was improper. Hence, the district court erred in denying Chatten's Rule 29 motion. 58 The essence of any truly civilized criminal justice system is fairness in the individual case. In reversing Chatten's conviction, we are reminded that [i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent [persons] are being condemned. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072. To deem the evidence presented against Chatten adequate would do violence to the presumption of innocence, and the due process requirement that a defendant be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.II. The Prosecution's Rebuttal 59 Clotida also argues that, in allowing the prosecutor to bring [in] what amounted to a confession through rebuttal, the district court abused its discretion by permitting the surprise of the defendant. Clotida asserts that the sandbagging tactics of the prosecution effectively deprived him of his fifth amendment right to testify in his own defense by impairing his ability to make an intelligent decision as to whether or not to testify. 60 It has been stated that [t]he function of rebuttal is to explain, repel, counteract or disprove evidence of the adverse party. The fact that testimony would have been more proper for the case-in-chief does not preclude the testimony.... United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 446 U.S. 939, 100 S.Ct. 2161, 64 L.Ed.2d 793 (1980). As the Supreme Court noted in Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1334, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976), the order in which the parties present their evidence is totally within the discretion of the trial court. 61 In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion in any particular case, three factors must be considered: (1) surprise to the defendant, (2) defendant's opportunity to meet the proof, and (3) detriment to the defendant because of the order in which the evidence was introduced. Luschen, 614 F.2d at 1170. 62 Notwithstanding Clotida's assertion, the facts and circumstances indicate that there was no surprise in this case. With full knowledge of the facts, Clotida assumed the risk of the consequences of testifying contrary to his own prior inculpatory statements. Surely, he can hardly claim surprise if the government would attempt to rebut his testimony, and delve into damaging statements that he had made after his arrest in the presence of DEA agents. Regardless of purpose or motive, whether to assert his innocence or exculpate Chatten, it was clearly his decision to testify and risk the consequences of rebuttal evidence. 63 Unlike cases in which there is non-disclosure by the prosecution, in violation of Rule 16, the government in this case allowed a complete open-file discovery so that Clotida was fully aware of the risks of taking the stand. See United States v. Gladney, 563 F.2d 491 (1st Cir.1977). Under the circumstances presented, there was no violation of Clotida's constitutional right to testify or remain silent.