Opinion ID: 1057564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of Conspiracy to Interfere With Contract

Text: Shortly before trial, the Waughs filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial court refuse to allow Mr. Sanford to put on evidence of conspiracy to commit any underlying torts or bad acts other than fraudulent conveyance and malicious prosecution, because the court had previously granted summary judgment on the rest of Mr. Sanford's claims. Mr. Sanford responded by alleging for the first time, less than two weeks before the trial was scheduled to begin, that the Waughs conspired with the Prows to commit the tort of interference with contract. Mr. Sanford did not plead interference with contract in his complaint or his amended complaint. The trial court granted the Waughs' motion in limine on the grounds that the plaintiff did not plead the tort of interference with contract and no discovery was exchanged on this cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed, and the Waughs argue on appeal that it erred in doing so. In our review of the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence, we apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tenn.2005). The trial court's ruling was based on the facts that (1) Mr. Sanford never pled interference with contract, and (2) Mr. Sanford's response to the Waughs' interrogatory requesting him to [i]dentify with specificity the tort underlying the conspiracy claim did not include any suggestion of an interference with contract claim, stating instead that Sanford has asserted claims against Defendants for breach of fiduciary duty, malicious prosecution, fraudulent conveyance and conversion.... Consequently, as the trial court noted, the Waughs did not take any further discovery relating to a potential claim of interference with contract and had no notice of such a potential claim until Mr. Sanford's response to their motion in limine on the eve of trial. Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 8.01 and 8.05 require parties to plead their claims in short, plain, simple, concise, and direct language. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted in this case, [o]ne purpose of pleadings is `to give notice of the issues to be tried so that the opposing party can adequately prepare for trial.' Sanford, 2009 WL 1910957, at  (quoting Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374, 377 (Tenn.2002)). Similarly, [p]re-trial discovery is intended to bring out the facts prior to trial, thereby eliminating surprise and enabling the parties to decide what is at issue. Wright v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 789 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tenn.Ct. App.1990); accord Se. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. Gentry, 57 Tenn.App. 162, 416 S.W.2d 773, 776 (1966) (stating that the purpose of the discovery process is to promote the ascertainment of truth by aiding a party in preparing for trial, to prevent surprise and insure as far as possible a trial on the merits, rather than upon fortuitous and unforeseen developments at the trial). Because Mr. Sanford did not plead a cause of action for interference with contract, and because he failed to include such a tort or bad act in his answer to the interrogatory directly requesting him to state with specificity the underlying torts supporting his conspiracy claim, the Waughs had a reasonable argument that they were unfairly surprised on the eve of trial at Mr. Sanford's last-minute claim of conspiracy to commit interference with contract. Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the Waughs' motion in limine. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed on this issue.