Opinion ID: 396333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: separate sentences for possession and distribution.

Text: 54 Appellant Berkowitz does not challenge his conviction, but claims that he was improperly sentenced for both possession and distribution based on the same single transaction. Berkowitz contends that such multiple sentencing for possession and distribution arising out of a single transaction violates this court's en banc holding in United States v. Hernandez, 591 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). The court in Hernandez held that Congress did not 'intend to make a single delivery of narcotics punishable as two separate offenses--one, possession with intent to distribute and the other, the actual distribution . . .. When the intent to distribute was executed by a successful sale, the possession with intent to do so merged into the completed offense.' Id. at 1021-22. 55 We must reject this contention for two reasons. First, since Berkowitz was convicted of conspiracy, his culpability extends to all substantive offenses committed in furtherance of that conspiracy. The jury, having found Berkowitz to have joined in the conspiracy, under the Pinkerton rule, could convict him of any substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of that conspiracy. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Hodges, 606 F.2d 520, 523 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1035, 100 S.Ct. 708, 62 L.Ed.2d 671 (1980); United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907, 99 S.Ct. 1213, 59 L.Ed.2d 454 (1979). Even assuming arguendo that Berkowitz did not independently possess the cocaine aside from the moment of delivery (i. e., distribution), at the very least, convicted co-conspirator D'Alessandro, in furtherance of the conspiracy, possessed the cocaine prior to the actual distribution (i. e., a separate and distinct transaction--e. g., sometime between when he left the apartment and when he returned with the cocaine). Under the Pinkerton rule, Berkowitz is liable for these acts of possession committed by D'Alessandro. 56 Second, regardless of the existence of a conspiracy, Hernandez does not shield Berkowitz on the facts of this case from the imposition of separate sentences for possession and distribution. In Hernandez, the appellant and a confederate negotiated with undercover narcotics agents the sale of one ounce of heroin. The confederate alone, however, consummated the actual distribution of the heroin at a later time when Hernandez was not present. 14 Hernandez, thus, was convicted of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin based solely on his constructive possession at the time of distribution. 15 The en banc court remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing, stating: 57 The sentence for possession with intent to distribute combined with the consecutive sentence for distribution imposes double punishment for conduct that, under the facts of this case, merges into a single offense. The evidence of the sale was relied upon to prove both Hernandez' constructive possession of the heroin and his intention to distribute it. There was no evidence of Pete's [Hernandez] possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it apart from the evidence of the actual sale. When the intent to distribute was executed by a successful sale, the possession with intent to do so merged into the completed offense. 58 591 F.2d at 1022. 59 United States v. Foundas, 610 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980), further refines the Hernandez rule. The appellant in Foundas met with undercover agents in a motel bar and arranged the sale of one or two kilograms of cocaine. The appellant disappeared briefly and then rejoined the agents in a motel room where she produced the cocaine. The court, noting the government's position that Foundas during her absence must have obtained the cocaine from a hiding place (Id. at 300), affirmed the separate sentences that Foundas received for possession with intent to distribute and distribution. Hernandez was distinguished: 60 In Hernandez, the convictions were both based on the same act: Hernandez' friend sold heroin to DEA agents. Hernandez was convicted separately for possession with intent to distribute and distribution (even though the only evidence of possession was his constructive possession at the time of distribution). In this case, Ms. Foundas admitted telling the DEA agent that she had cocaine; she disappeared at one point to get it; and she produced cocaine from her purse at the appropriate moment. The possession in this case was separate from the actual act of distribution. 61 Id. at 302 (emphasis in original). 62 In the present case, unlike Hernandez, there is independent evidence of Berkowitz' prior possession of the kilogram of cocaine 16 before the actual time of distribution. As in Foundas, the transportation of the drugs by the appellant to the place of distribution constituted 'possession . . . separate from the actual act of distribution.' Id. The evidence sufficiently established that Berkowitz had constructive possession of the cocaine during the car ride to the Hidden Harbor Condominium, if not actual possession of the cocaine in his home. 17 We find that the facts of this case are controlled by Foundas and distinguishable from Hernandez. Therefore, Berkowitz could be properly sentenced for both possession with intent to distribute and distribution. 18 63