Opinion ID: 2377250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Limited Scope of Immunity

Text: Stein asserts not only that he is immune from prosecution under D.C.Code §§ 6-2311 and 6-2361, but that his immunity extends to all the offenses with which he is charged. The plain language of the immunity statute refutes this assertion. Section 6-2375(a) states that compliance with its provisions shall preclude the arrest and prosecution of [the person so complying] on a charge of violating any provision of this chapter  (emphasis added), referring to the chapter 23 of title 6 of the District of Columbia Code. This chapter is the Code's translation of a phrase in the original statute enacted by the Council of the District of Columbia. Section 6-2375 of the Code is derived from section 705 of the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, D.C. Act 1-142, 23 D.C.Reg. 1091 (1976), which became effective as D.C.Law 1-85, 23 D.C.Reg. 2464 (1976). The immunity granted by section 705 was from prosecutions for violations of this act. 23 D.C. Reg. at 1130. This act, of course, was D.C. Act 1-142, later to become D.C.Law 1-85, which is now codified as chapter 23 of title 6 of the Code. Stein maintains that we should nevertheless read the statutory language broadly, construing it as a grant of immunity from prosecution for any firearms offense when the firearms in question are surrendered in accordance with section 6-2375(a). He makes various arguments in favor of such a construction, but they all founder on the language of the statute itself. That language is clear and unambiguous, and nothing in the legislative history suggests that it means anything other than what it says. We can only conclude that the statute as written plainly states the intent of the Council to restrict its grant of immunity to violations of the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975.