Opinion ID: 2588468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application to the Petitioners' Cases

Text: Having determined that Crane did not create a new element in SVP commitment proceedings, that the legislature may restrict consideration of LRAs to an SVPs first annual review, and that actuarial models may be used to predict future dangerousness, we now address the sufficiency of the evidence and the consideration of LRAs under the facts of each petitioner's case. In order to uphold the commitment of the individuals below, we must find that the juries at their respective commitment trials had sufficient evidence to find the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That the respondent has been convicted of or charged with a crime of sexual violence; and (2) That the respondent suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and (3) That such mental abnormality or personality disorder makes the respondent likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. As we explain above, as part of this review, we must determine that the mental abnormality or personality disorder, coupled with the person's sexual offense history, supports the finding that the person has serious difficulty controlling his behavior beyond a reasonable doubt.
We conclude, after reviewing the record of the commitment proceedings, that sufficient evidence existed at trial for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Thorell was unable to control his urge to molest children at the time of his commitment. Thorell has a lengthy history of child molestation, conceding at his commitment hearing that he suffers from pedophilia. The State presented extensive evidence demonstrating that Thorell had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. For example, during his confinement, and continuing up to the time of his SVP hearing, Thorell continued to promote his sexual fantasies involving children by modifying children's pictures to make pornography, writing pornographic stories featuring children, and concealing store advertisements featuring children (prohibited to him under the SVP treatment program). The State also presented evidence that during the same period, Thorell attempted to underreport his deviant fantasies to his treatment group so that if I went to trial, why there would be a positive recommendation. 4 Clerk's Papers (CP) (Thorell) at 801. The State's evidence allowed the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Thorell's previous violent offenses, his mental disorder, and the resulting serious lack of control, led to the likelihood Thorell would engage in future sexually predatory acts if not confined to a secure facility. We therefore affirm Thorell's commitment.
We conclude the evidence in Ross's case, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is sufficient for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ross had serious difficulty controlling his behavior and was thus likely to commit acts of predatory sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility. Ross has a history of committing acts of sexual violence. In addition, the jury heard the testimony of one of the State's experts, Dr. Eusanio, who diagnosed Ross with borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder, narcissistic personality disorder, and alcohol dependence. CP at 232-33. Dr. Eusanio testified that these affected Ross's ability to control his behavior. During direct examination, Dr. Eusanio explained the behavioral results of having this cluster of personality disorders: Q. Now, were these various diagnoses affecting Mr. Ross's emotional or volitional capacity? A. Yes. Q. And would you just tell the jury now what I just asked you in terms of emotional and volitional capacity? A. Well, when you have this stance to the world, this set of attitudes, you have difficulty looking at the law as applying to you. You don't see how it protects other people. If you want something, you want it for yourself, and nothing will stand in your way. If you are told that something is illegal and you still have a strong compulsion to do it, for example, drugs or sexual offenses, you will continue to do it and use whatever resources you have to hide your behavior and to con, manipulate, get around a lot. Q. These diagnoses and your impression therefrom, you believe they predispose him to the commission of criminal acts? A. Yes, I do. 2 Report of Proceedings (RP) (Ross) at 234-35. Dr. Eusanio's testimony provided the link between Ross's history and personality disorder, which supports the conclusion that Ross had a serious lack of control. Dr. Packard, another expert witness for the State, diagnosed Ross with antisocial personality disorder and paraphilia with an orientation toward rape. CP at 809. Dr. Packard explained that a personality disorder is an enduring pattern of thinking, feeling, and behaving that is relatively stable over time. CP at 810. Ross's cluster of personality disorders gives rise to general callousness to the rights of others, ... disregard to the rights of others, ... engaging in criminal activities, [and] ... self-centeredness. CP at 817. Based on Ross's history of violent sexual acts, his treatment file while incarcerated, and his personality disorder diagnosis, Dr. Packard testified that Ross is likely to commit violent and predatory sexual acts in the future if not confined to a secure facility. CP at 824. Ross's own expert, Dr. Brown, raised the possibility Ross would not commit sexually violent acts in the future if he avoided drugs and alcohol and engaged in outpatient therapy. CP at 1221. However, Dr. Brown also testified that his preference would be for state supervision of Ross upon release. CP at 1221. Court ordered supervision is not available at the initial commitment trial. This means the jury had to decide whether to commit Ross or release him without any supervision. As we explain above, a person may defend against SVP commitment by bringing evidence that unsupervised release is appropriate because that goes to the definition of whether someone is an SVP. Someone subject to SVP commitment may not defend against commitment, however, by bringing evidence that LRAs are appropriate. Dr. Brown's testimony thus provides no support for Ross's argument that he does not meet the statutory definition of an SVP. Finally, a diagnosis of a mental abnormality or personality disorder is not, in itself, sufficient evidence for a jury to find a serious lack of control. Such a diagnosis, however, when coupled with evidence of prior sexually violent behavior and testimony from mental health experts, which links these to a serious lack of control, is sufficient for a jury to find that the person presents a serious risk of future sexual violence and therefore meets the requirements of an SVP. We conclude the testimony of the State's experts gave the jury sufficient evidence to commit Ross as an SVP, and affirm his commitment.
Gordon's primary objection to his commitment under the SVPA is that his schizophrenia could also qualify him for commitment under chapter 71.05. [17] However, there is no talismanic significance to a particular diagnosis of mental illness. No technical diagnosis of a particular mental abnormality definitively renders an individual either an SVP or not. As explained above, it is a diagnosis of a mental abnormality, coupled with a history of sexual violence, which gives rise to a serious lack of control and creates the risk a person will likely commit acts of predatory sexual violence in the future. The evidence before the jury at Gordon's commitment trial allowed the jury to find that he meets the statutory criteria of an SVP. Gordon was convicted of rape in the second degree. At trial, defense and State experts generally agreed that Gordon's diagnoses are schizophrenia, antisocial personality disorder, and polysubstance abuse disorder. We hold that merely because an individual suffers from a mental illness that may be treatable under chapter 71.05, the State is not barred from seeking to commit the individual under the SVPA in appropriate circumstances. In Gordon's case there was sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gordon currently had serious difficulty controlling his dangerous sexual behavior. The State's expert testified that Gordon heard voices and, at times, experienced irrational beliefs that were related to sexual issues. The State's expert also testified mania was present because of Gordon's schizophrenia and that this impaired Gordon's ability to control impulsive behavior. In the expert's opinion, Gordon's mania was unresponsive to medication. The State presented evidence that Gordon [a]bsolutely had poor behavioral control at the time of his commitment hearing. 17 RP (Gordon) at 34. Finally, during the course of his confinement, Gordon told a Department of Corrections counselor, I'm Mr. Rapo, I have raped 15 people, women, in the past ... I'm going to rape again. 9 RP (Gordon) at 138. We hold the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Gordon had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. We affirm Gordon's commitment.
The evidence of lack of control over behavior in Bishop's case was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bishop had serious difficulty controlling his urge to molest children at the time of his commitment. Bishop is a diagnosed pedophile with a lengthy history of child molestation. Several days before the State sought to have him committed as an SVP, Bishop estimated he was likely to reoffend within nine months. The State also introduced evidence that during his confinement Bishop had continuously attempted to solicit sex from other inmates who fit his preferred molestation profile. One year before his scheduled release date, Bishop was caught soliciting a young, slim, mentally retarded inmate with child-like features. When questioned about the incident, Bishop admitted he had targeted the inmate because he was unable to acquire children while incarcerated. Finally, the State's expert believed that Bishop demonstrated signs that his deviancy was escalating even while he was in therapy. We hold there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Bishop had serious difficulty controlling his urge to molest children at the time of commitment. LRAs have already been considered for Bishop during his annual review under RCW 71.09.070. [18] In any event, Bishop's argument is that Brooks requires the complete reversal of his commitment. Because we hold that LRAs may be considered for the first time at the first annual review and overrule Brooks on that issue, we reject this argument and affirm Bishop's commitment.
The evidence of lack of control over behavior in Strauss' case was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Strauss had serious difficulty controlling his urge to rape at the time of commitment. Strauss was diagnosed with paraphila not otherwise specified, sexual sadism, and antisocial personality disorder. The State's expert testified that the combination of these disorders was a very, very lethal cocktail that will enable somebody to go out and carry on raping. 11 RP (Strauss) at 196. The evidence proved that Strauss committed his last rape 39 days after his release, while still on parole from an earlier rape conviction. In Strauss' deposition, taken a month before the commitment hearing, he testified that he did not remember the details of the rapes he had committed, was not certain why he had committed them, or what had drawn him to particular victims. Strauss testified the women he victimized were just, happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, which he further elaborated meant ... [a]n unpopulated area, nobody around, they're there by themselves. 2 CP (Strauss) at 255. Although Strauss conceded he had a behavioral problem, he testified that he had not sought counseling to help him gain behavioral control. Finally, when asked if he had ever been able to effectively control his impulse to rape, Strauss answered that he was unable to respond [b]asically because I don't recall ever being in a position of [sic] on the verge of attacking someone and not attacking somebody. 2 CP (Strauss) at 255-56. We hold the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Strauss had serious difficulty controlling his urge to rape at the time of commitment.
The only issue is whether sufficient evidence existed for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson had serious difficulty controlling behavior at the time of his commitment. [19] Johnson has an extensive history of sexual crimes, including two separate convictions for indecent liberties and a conviction for communication with a minor for immoral purposes. Based on a review of Johnson's record, the State's expert diagnosed Johnson as suffering from pedophilia, opposite sex, nonexclusive type, and antisocial personality disorder. The State's expert testified the combination of pedophilia and antisocial personality disorder increased the likelihood that Johnson would be unable to control his behavior because he would act impulsively and would be less likely to learn from negative experience. Johnson testified at trial and by deposition. As a part of his deposition testimony, Johnson stated he believed the seven-year-old girl he had molested in 1984 had cried after the molestation, not because of his actions, but because she had not obeyed her mother. Johnson testified his practice when not incarcerated had been to wait near parks and playgrounds so that he would have the opportunity to prey on young girls and that if the opportunity arose, he would prey on whoever was there. 4 RP (Johnson) at 90-92. Johnson also admitted during his redirect testimony that he had violated the conditions of his release for the 1984 molestation by engaging in contact with a two-year-old girl in 1992. The State's expert concluded Johnson's deposition was remarkable for the evidence of a lack of insight, a lack of empathy and a lack of remorse for his conduct. 5 RP (Johnson) at 260. The State's expert considered Johnson's lack of empathy particularly important because it reduced Johnson's interest in controlling his impulses. We hold there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Johnson had serious difficulty controlling his behavior, when committed. Because we hold lack of control is not a separate element of the SVP commitment, we do not reach Johnson's arguments under the Washington Constitution. We deny the State's motions, passed to the merits, to strike Johnson's harmless error argument and to be granted leave to file a supplemental brief addressing this argument. We affirm Johnson's commitment.