Opinion ID: 1980604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope and Use of the Psychiatric Examination

Text: Taylor also argues his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. He does not claim he was denied the chance to consult with counsel. Rather, he complains the defense was not notified that Dr. Crane's examination would touch on the events surrounding the crime itself and that the doctor would testify concerning Taylor's statements about the shooting. This claim fails. A defendant is entitled to the opportunity to consult with counsel before submitting to a psychiatric examination by the State. In Estelle, the Supreme Court emphasized that a defendant must be given the benefit of the assistance of his attorneys in making the significant decision of whether to submit to the examination. 451 U.S. at 471, 101 S.Ct. at 1877. The Estelle Court also recognized the importance of notifying the defense to what end the psychiatrist's findings could be employed. Id. Later, in Buchanan, the Court reiterated that in order for counsel to perform effectively, counsel must be informed about the scope and nature of the proceeding. 483 U.S. at 424, 107 S.Ct. at 2919. When the defense of insanity is raised, of course, counsel is on notice that the State may examine the defendant and that the results of that examination may be used to rebut the insanity claim. So long as the testimony of the State's physician goes to the mental capacity of the defendant, the requirements of the Sixth Amendment have been satisfied. Id. at 424-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2918-19. The State may not, however, use a defendant's statements during such an examination to demonstrate his guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719, 725 (4th Cir.1968). As we have explained, the purpose of the exam is to evaluate the defendant's mental health, not to gather further evidence of guilt. The focus of the examination must be the defendant's mental health, and the physician's trial testimony must remain similarly focused. See Stolarz v. State (1983), Ind.App., 445 N.E.2d 114 (upholding conviction where State's psychiatrists not permitted to testify about what defendant told them regarding crime itself). The justification for permitting the State's examination is the maintenance of a `fair state-individual balance,' Albright, 388 F.2d at 724. The defendant may not plead insanity and then prevent the State from gathering reliable evidence bearing on that issue. As the Court explained in Estelle, [w]hen a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465, 101 S.Ct. at 1874. On the other hand, the State may not misuse its access to the defendant by attempting to prove the defendant's guilt through the testimony of its physician. [6] If the court finds that the State is abusing the opportunity and using the defendant's statements to demonstrate guilt, it should not hesitate to exclude such statements. There will be cases, however, in which the defendant makes statements during the interview that are both probative of his sanity at the time of the crime and incriminating. See Phelan v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 542, 406 N.E.2d 237; see also Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996, 99 S.Ct. 597, 58 L.Ed.2d 669 (1978). In such cases, if the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh its probative value, the statements may be admitted. This determination we leave to the sound discretion of the trial judge. In this case, the doctor's testimony did not prejudice the defendant. To the extent that Crane's testimony bore on the issue of guilt, it was cumulative of evidence already before the jury. Renica Johnson and Nicole Durham had already testified as eyewitnesses to the shooting, and both identified Taylor as the perpetrator. The State had shown further that the bullets removed from Tawana's body could have been the same type as those found in Taylor's apartment after the shooting. Ms. Smith had also testified, consistent with the testimony of Renica and Nicole, that Taylor broke into her apartment and beat her with a revolver. Furthermore, Crane's testimony was highly probative of Taylor's mental state at the time of the shooting. The defense theory was that Taylor suffered from post-traumatic stress as a result of service in Vietnam and that he was in a dissociative state when he shot Tawana. Consistent with this strategy, defense experts testified that Taylor believed he was in Vietnam on May 5 and that he had no memory of the murder. [7] In response, Crane testified he was suspicious of Taylor's alleged psychological impairment. Crane pointed to the fact that while Taylor did not admit shooting Tawana, he did recall many of the details of the incident, including that he had a gun and that he fired it. [8] Taylor's right to assistance of counsel was not violated by Dr. Crane's testimony. When the defense put Taylor's sanity in issue, it was fully aware that the State could have its own expert examine the defendant and testify at trial. The defense was also aware that the events of May 5 would play a role in assessing Taylor's mental state at that time. [9] Crane's testimony was highly probative of Taylor's sanity at the time of the crime. There is no indication that the doctor's testimony was offered for any reason other than to explain his assessment of Taylor's mental health. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Buchanan, the defendant had ample opportunity for consultation with counsel before raising the insanity defense, and counsel should have anticipated that the State would use such an examination to rebut the defense. Buchanan, 483 U.S. at 424-25, 107 S.Ct. at 2918-19.