Opinion ID: 77938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Section 5 Privileges Claim

Text: Section 552(b)(5) exempts from FOIA disclosure any inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). The statutory provision, known as Exemption 5, incorporates into FOIA the statutory and common law privileges normally available to a party in civil discovery. Here, the EPA withheld documents pursuant to the Section 5 Exemption in three categories of privilegedeliberative process, attorney-client, and attorney work product. Although privileged portions of documents may be withheld, [a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt under this subsection. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (sentence following the exemptions). [22] Based upon FOIA's statutory language and Congressional intent, courts have expounded upon the level of information required from an agency to support its claimed privileges under Exemption 5. The D.C. Circuit [23] observed in Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C.Cir.1973), that because the nature of FOIA seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our legal system's form of dispute resolution, 484 F.2d at 824, the agency must give the requester of information adequate specificity . . . to assure] proper justification by the governmental agency, id. at 827. The Vaughn decision marked the beginning of a tool (and in some Circuits, a requirement) that is widely referred to as the  Vaughn Index i.e., a list containing the information claimed as exempt and the corresponding exemption under which it is claimed. The D.C. Circuit later clarified that a Vaughn Index required a relatively detailed justification, specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of a withheld document to which they apply. Mead Data Central, Inc., 566 F.2d at 251; see also Dellums v. Powell, 642 F.2d 1351, 1361 (D.C.Cir.1980). This Circuit has held that in FOIA litigation, an agency has the burden of proving that it properly invoked any FOIA exemptions when it decided to withhold information. Ely v. F.B.I., 781 F.2d 1487, 1489-90 (11th Cir.1986). In reviewing a district court's finding of privilege for exemptions, we have two duties: we must determine (1) whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for the decision rendered; and (2) whether, upon this basis, the decision reached was clearly erroneous. A trial court may utilize alternate methods by which to make the adequate factual basis determination: in camera review and the so-called Vaughn Index. Under the terms of the statute, the decision to conduct an in camera review of the documents and/or resort to the Vaughn Index is discretionary. See N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.E d.2d 159 (1978) ( in camera review); 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) ( in camera review); Ely, 781 F.2d at 1491 ( Vaughn Index). In addition, the agency may rely on affidavits (in lieu of a Vaughn Index) to meet its burden so long as they provide an adequate factual basis for the district court to render a decision. Miscavige v. I.R.S., 2 F.3d 366, 368 (11th Cir.1993). Accordingly, in this Circuit, an adequate factual basis may be established, depending on the circumstances of the case, through affidavits, a Vaughn Index, in camera review, or through a combination of these methods. Id. In accordance with Ely, our analysis of the district court's Section 5 rulings in this case begins first with the question of whether the court had before it sufficient evidence supporting the EPA's claimed exemptions to render a decision on the validity of those exemptions. 1. Whether the Evidence Provided by the EPA Contained Sufficient Detail for the District Court to Make a Ruling on Summary Judgment The Tribe, relying principally on cases from the D.C. Circuit establishing exacting standards for the level of detail required in a Vaughn Index, asserts that the EPA failed to submit evidence supplying relatively detailed justification[s for exempting documents], specifically identifying the reasons why a particular exemption is relevant and correlating those claims with the particular part of the withheld document to which they apply. Mead Data Central, 566 F.2d at 251. Crucial to our analysis of the Tribe's arguments is the appropriate standard for reviewing the factual support provided for the exemption under Section 5. a. Appropriate Standard for Determining the Level of Detail Required to Establish a Factual Basis for the Exemption The Tribe asserts that the requester and the trial judge must be able to derive from the index a clear explanation of why each document or portion of a document withheld is putatively exempt from disclosure. Campaign For Responsible Transplantation v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 180 F.Supp.2d 29, 32 (D.D.C.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Tribe urges this court to reject what it characterizes as the EPA's only conclusory language that parrots the exemption and instead adopt the D.C. Circuit's requirement of two factors that can assist the court in determining whether this [deliberative-process] privilege is available: the nature of the decision making authority vested in the officer or person issuing the disputed document, and the relative positions in the agency's chain of command occupied by the document's author and recipient. Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Dep't of the Air Force, 44 F.Supp.2d 295, 300 (quoting Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586 (D.C.Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Moreover, specifically with respect to e-mails, the Tribe points to a decision of the Southern District of Florida which says that the agency must describe each e-mail, its author and recipient, and the e-mail contents withheld. St. Andrews Park, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army Corps of Eng'rs, 299 F.Supp.2d 1264, 1271 (S.D.Fla.2003). In response to the Tribe's arguments, the EPA notes that, despite the wealth of caselaw from other courts on this issue, the appropriate standard of review in this case is supplied by the law of this Circuit (and not the D.C. Circuit). In the Eleventh Circuit, we have distilled the review of a district court's finding of privilege for exemptions into two levels: (1) determine whether the district court had an adequate factual basis for the decision rendered; and (2) whether, upon this basis, the decision reached was clearly erroneous. Ely, 781 F.2d at 1490. Despite the Tribe's reliance on the exacting standards of the D.C. Circuit, an adequate factual basis can be established in this Circuit by affidavits alone, in lieu of a Vaughn Index or an in camera review. See Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 368 (holding that in certain cases, affidavits can be sufficient for summary judgment purposes in a FOIA case if they provide an accurate basis for a decision). Indeed, depending on the circumstances, an adequate factual basis may be provided through a singular methodSuch as affidavits, a Vaughn Index, or an in camera review, or a combination of these methods. Miscavige, 2 F.3d at 368. As the EPA notes, it is a rare case, however, where the government provides all threeaffidavits, a Vaughn Index, and in camera review as was done by the agency here. The EPA criticizes the Tribe's attempt to require information regarding the role of each specific document in the decision-making process and the role of each sender and receiver in the decision-making process for the withheld documents, which were factors described as helpful to the district court in making its decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 44 F.Supp.2d at 300. An analysis of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. reveals that nothing in that case indicates that all three factors should be required in every case where a deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work product privilege is claimed by an agency. In fact, in Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., the Air Force had not provided one single description of any of the documents withheld. 44 F.Supp.2d at 299. Likewise, in St. Andrews Park, Inc., the Southern District of Florida had no descriptive affidavit or Vaughn Index upon which to base its factual determination. 299 F.Supp.2d at 1272. Thus, both of these cases, upon which the Tribe relies, lacked the elaborate statement of facts outlined in supporting affidavits, the detailed index entries, and the underlying documents themselves presented to the district court for in camera inspectionall of which were present in this case. Based upon the applicable case law, it is readily apparent that the Tribe seeks to impose upon the EPA a burden of factual specificity that is not only not part of this Circuit's precedent, but that is not even mandatory according to the other courts that have opined that additional tools may be helpful to the court's analysis. Moreover, the Tribe has not pointed to a single case in which a district court looked to three independent factual sources supporting the claimed exemption (as was done here) but nonetheless rejected the agency's reliance on that privilege. Against this backdrop, the court turns to the Tribe's specific criticisms of the three' methods utilized in this case. b. Adequacy of Vaughn Index and Affidavits Standing Alone [24] The Tribe contends that the EPA's Vaughn Index and supporting affidavits are inadequate, to establish a factual basis for the claimed exemptions because they fail to: (1) specifically note why each withheld or partially withheld document's release would have a chilling effect on the EPA's decision-making process; and (2) describe the role of each specific document in the decision-making process. Contrary to the Tribe's assertions, this Circuit has not established a set formula or pattern for what will suffice as a Vaughn Index. The index usually consists of a listing of each withheld document, or portion thereof, indicating the specific FOIA exemption applicable and the specific agency justification for the non-disclosure. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 827. The Tribe complains that the EPA's Vaughn Index and the accompanying affidavits also incorporate the same conclusory language as part of the explanation given for many of the documents withheld: Release would have a chilling effect on the Agency's decision-making processes and cause public confusion about the reason for an Agency decision. The Tribe notes this general language provides no true explanation why withholding those documents would have a chilling effect or cause public confusion. Moreover, the Tribe argues that the documents are not sufficiently described in either the Vaughn Index or in the accompanying affidavits and that the EPA never identifies the title or position of most of the authors and recipients of the withheld documents. For instance, many of the withholdings in the Vaughn Index refer only to EPA Staff. The EPA maintains their burden as to the index was satisfied, especially when the index is read in conjunction with the two affidavits offered in support thereof. Assistant Regional Administrator Wright's Affidavit states that documents 1 and 2 on the Vaughn Index, for example, are draft bills of the EFA, which reflect the back-and-forth discussions and mental impressions lions of the EPA staff. Those drafts include analysis of the EFA amendments and any policy implications for agency actions ongoing at the time of the documents' creation. Wright goes on to explain that the information contained in those documents was predecisional and deliberative as comments on possible approaches for the agency to consider regarding the EFA amendments. He notes that release of the documents would have a chilling effect on the agency's decision-making processes and would cause public confusion about the reason for the EPA's decision. Wright also asserts that no segregable information could be released without also revealing exempt information i.e., any factual information in the documents is inextricably intertwined with the exempt information. From the Vaughn Index and supporting affidavits, it is fair to say that both the Tribe and the district court were able to understand why each document or portion of a document was withheld as exempt from disclosure, even without the in camera review. As noted by the district court in its January 17, 2006 order on the in camera viewing, the EPA did an admirable and thorough job of disclosing as much information in the withheld documents as possible without waiving the privilege. However, in an effort to grant the Tribe the relief it sought regarding withheld documents, and in light of the Tribe's concerns that the Vaughn Index was not specific enough, the district court went even beyond the paperwork submitted and conducted a complete in camera review of the withheld documents to determine the applicability of the privileges.