Opinion ID: 1443930
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Investigation of mitigating evidence

Text: On the first day of the sentencing hearing, Kelesis informed the three-judge panel that he had visited with Kirksey a number of times in the days leading up to the penalty hearing and that Kirksey had made it quite clear that he did not want Kelesis to challenge the State's evidence, present mitigating evidence, or make an opening or closing statement during the sentencing hearing. The three-judge panel canvassed Kirksey on two different occasions during the penalty hearing to ensure that Kirksey understood the seriousness of his decision. Kirksey said that he was satisfied with his attorney's performance, understood that he could present mitigating evidence and that he did not want to do so. He also stated that he was not aware of any witnesses who should have been interviewed, but were not. Finally, Kirksey said that he felt he was competent to make this decision. Kirksey argues that he has been denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to investigate or prepare for the penalty hearing. A post-conviction investigation suggests that Kirksey had a history of psychotic and suicidal episodes, and of drug and alcohol abuse. The investigation further indicates that Kirksey's father had committed suicide when Kirksey was seventeen. Kirksey argues that this information should have been presented to the three-judge panel as mitigating evidence. Kirksey further insists that had counsel conducted an investigation into possible mitigating evidence, it is unlikely that Kirksey would have prevented counsel from presenting the evidence to the three-judge panel because Kirksey's instructions were based upon his view that he would get death or life without in California anyway so why not do it now. [7] Finally, Kirksey contends that Kelesis' ineffective assistance denied him of his right to an individualized sentence. Generally, when a defendant is charged with first-degree murder, defense counsel must prepare for the eventuality that a guilty verdict may be returned. See Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998, 106 S.Ct. 374, 88 L.Ed.2d 367 (1985). However, a defendant may waive the right to present mitigating evidence and defense counsel's acquiescence to such a waiver does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Lang, 49 Cal.3d 991, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411-14, 782 P.2d 627, 652-54 (1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 224, 112 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990). [8] As the California Supreme Court has reasoned: To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount duty of loyalty to the client and would undermine the trust, essential for effective representation, existing between attorney and client. Moreover, imposing such a duty could cause some defendants who otherwise would not have done so to exercise their Sixth Amendment right of self-representation before commencement of the guilt phase in order to retain control over the presentation of evidence at the penalty phase, resulting in a significant loss of legal protection for these defendants during the guilt phase. Lang, 782 P.2d at 653 (citations omitted). The Lang court also concluded that a defendant who refuses to allow his attorney to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase is estopped from later claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel's acquiescence to his wishes. Id. at 413, 782 P.2d at 654. The California court recognized, however, that failure to adequately investigate the availability of mitigating evidence or to advise the defendant regarding its significance might undermine the defendant's decision not to present mitigating evidence and thereby support a claim of ineffective assistance. See id. at 413, 782 P.2d at 654. We agree with the California court's reasoning. This approach is also consistent with prior Nevada cases wherein this court has upheld the death sentence where the defendant, appearing in propria persona, refused to present mitigating evidence or to allow standby counsel to present mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Bishop v. State, 95 Nev. 511, 597 P.2d 273 (1979). We therefore conclude that Kirksey cannot predicate his claim of ineffective assistance solely on Kelesis' acquiescence. Moreover, the record of Kirksey's sentencing hearing belies his contention that he decided not to present mitigating evidence based solely on Kelesis' uninvestigated representation that Kirksey would receive the death penalty in California. During one of the instances when the panel members canvassed Kirksey regarding his decision, the following exchange took place: JUDGE ADAMS: .... Why don't you [Kirksey] want to aggressively be represented here and defend yourself at a hearing when the result of that hearing could be the difference between whether you live or die? Just tell me why. THE DEFENDANT: Either way, man, look, I'll be in the penitentiary the rest of my life or I'm going to get the death penalty. You know what I'm saying? I might as well be dead, anyway, if I'm going to set [sic] in the penitentiary, anyway, the rest of my life. I can't win either way it goes, California or here. I did them. You know what I'm saying? I don't feel no remorse about it, because I don't care. Just let it happen. JUDGE GAMBLE: Now, Mr. Kirksey, do you understand one of the findings we might make is life with the possibility of parole? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. But, then, I got to go back to California. And then what? I get it there or get another life or another life without. JUDGE GAMBLE: I just don't want you to be thinking your only two choices are to be in prison forever or die, because there is another choice if you aggressively defend this. THE DEFENDANT: Man, with this, with the Las Vegas and California together, I ain't never getting out of the penitentiary. Either way it go, I end up killing somebody else in the penitentiary. Either go crazy in the penitentiary, setting in the penitentiary all my life, end up taking somebody's life. This dialogue demonstrates that Kirksey was aware of the lesser possible sentences if he were returned to California for trial. It is equally clear that Kirksey did not want to live in jail. After reviewing the record, we conclude that Kirksey was not misled by his counsel when he decided that he did not want counsel to present mitigating evidence and that because Kirksey instructed counsel not to present mitigating evidence, he cannot now claim ineffective assistance based on counsel's acquiescence or failure to investigate.