Opinion ID: 2167568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prejudiced-Juror Claim

Text: There are two conceivable theories upon which the hearing court might have based its determination that appellant waived his right to assert his prejudiced-juror claim. [7] First, the court might have concluded that appellant waived his right to assert his claim by failing to raise it at trial or in subsequent court proceedings. See Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 4(b) (1), 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b) (1). Second, the court might have concluded, as the Commonwealth argues on this appeal, that defense counsel's failure to ask questions on voir dire which may have brought to light the alleged prejudice of the juror prevents appellant from now raising the claim. See Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 205-07, 216 A. 2d 50, 54-55 (1966). However, upon analysis, neither of these theories can support a finding that appellant waived his right to assert his prejudiced-juror claim. The PCHA petition that is presently before us represents appellant's third attempt to secure post-conviction relief in our state courts. After a hearing on February 21, 1967, appellant's first PCHA petition was dismissed, and that dismissal was affirmed by the Superior Court on January 5, 1968. Appellant's second petition was dismissed without a hearing on December 17, 1969, and no appeal was taken from that dismissal. In neither of these petitions did appellant raise the prejudiced-juror claim which he now asserts. However, at the hearing on the petition that is now before us, appellant testified that before his trial he had an altercation with a man who lived on Cedar Avenue in Philadelphia. After his trial, appellant was told by a fellow prisoner that this man whom appellant had fought had been a juror at appellant's trial. Appellant had not recognized the juror at the time of his trial since appellant had been intoxicated at the time of the fight. Appellant thereupon contacted a Mr. Pepp of the Defender Association of Philadelphia. Mr. Pepp forwarded to appellant a list purporting to include the names of all of the jurors at appellant's trial. This list was offered into evidence at the hearing below. Since the name of the individual who lived on Cedar Avenue, and with whom appellant allegedly had the altercation, did not appear on this list, appellant did not raise the prejudiced-juror claim in his first or second PCHA petition. However, appellant subsequently requested and obtained a second list of the jurors at his trial from the court clerk. This second list contained a name which had not appeared on the first list. Appellant alleged that the individual who was named in the second list but not in the first list was the man from Cedar Avenue with whom he had fought prior to his trial. If appellant's testimony is believed, it is clear that he cannot now be regarded as having waived his prejudiced-juror claim on the ground that he knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted or in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this act. . . . Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, § 4(b) (1), 19 P.S. § 1180-4(b) (1) (Supp. 1970) (emphasis added). Since appellant was not aware of the alleged presence of the prejudiced juror at his trial until after he had filed his first and second PCHA petitions, he could not have raised the issue previously. Since no reason appears on the record to disbelieve appellant's testimony, and since we have no indication that the hearing judge disbelieved appellant's testimony, we conclude that appellant cannot be regarded as having waived his claim under § 4(b) (1) of the Post Conviction Hearing Act. However, the Commonwealth, relying on Commonwealth v. Aljoe, 420 Pa. 198, 205-07, 216 A. 2d 50, 54-55 (1966), argues that appellant's counsel failed to ask questions on voir dire which may have brought to light the alleged prejudice of the juror, and that this failure bars appellant from raising his claim. In Aljoe we did announce the rule that: `It is the duty of the parties to ascertain, by proper examination at the time the jury is empaneled, the existence of any reason for objection to the jurors. . . . [T]he failure to do so and to make objection at the proper time operates as a waiver . . .' . . . . 420 Pa. at 206-07, 216 A. 2d at 55. However, we further noted in Aljoe : `. . . That waiver may be relieved against when the party affected has been intentionally misled or deceived by the juror. . .' . . . . 420 Pa. at 206, 216 A. 2d at 55. The flaw in the Commonwealth's argument is that the record of appellant's trial does not indicate whether or not appellant's counsel asked questions which, if answered truthfully, would have brought to light the alleged prejudice of the juror. The record of the voir dire, set forth in relevant part below, [8] indicates only that appellant's counsel did not challenge any jurors. The record does not indicate whether or not appellant's counsel put any questions to the jury. In fact, it appears from the record that some questions were asked by counsel for a co-defendant and were not recorded. At the hearing on appellant's petition, there was no attempt by either appellant or the Commonwealth to introduce any further evidence as to what transpired at the voir dire. Therefore, the determinative question is who has the burden of proving compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of Aljoe ? We note initially that the right to an impartial jury is not only guaranteed by the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, [9] but the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury [10] has been applied to the states through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [11] As the United States Supreme Court held in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S. Ct. 1639, 1642 (1961): In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, `indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process. . . . `A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625, 99 L. Ed. 942. Two cases from the Third Circuit illustrate that the due process guarantee of an impartial jury invalidates criminal trials where even a single juror is discovered to have been partial or prejudiced against the defendant. In United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, [12] the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial when it was discovered that a juror at the defendant's trial had concealed the fact that he had recently been robbed in the same vicinity and in a fashion similar to the robbery murder of which defendant was accused. In United States ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, [13] a case arising from the Pennsylvania state courts, a juror at the defendant's trial was discovered to have been the son-in-law of a prosecution witness. The court concluded that the presence of the juror violated the defendant's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and ordered a new trial. These cases make it clear that in asserting that a juror at his trial was personally prejudiced against him as a result of a fight in which the two had engaged, appellant is alleging a violation of his federal constitution right to an impartial jury. In determining whether appellant, through the inaction of his counsel, [14] waived his federal constitution right to an impartial jury, federal standards of waiver must be applied. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 447 Pa. 228, 230, 286 A. 2d 892, 893 (1971); Commonwealth v. Norman, 447 Pa. 217, 221, 285 A. 2d 523, 525 (1971); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712 (1969); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S. Ct. 822, 849 (1963); Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 791, 65 S. Ct. 989, 992 (1945); Harris v. Brewer, 434 F. 2d 166, 168 (8th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F. 2d 500, 502 n.7 (3d Cir. 1969). The federal standards of waiver that control this case are quite explicit. As early as 1938, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that `courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . we `do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' Id. at 464, 58 S. Ct. at 1023. [15] In 1962, the United States Supreme Court expressly held that in cases such as the one before us, where the record is silent on whether or not a waiver of a federal constitutional right occurred, it is impermissible to place the burden of proving nonwaiver on defendants. The Court stated in unequivocal terms in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 82 S. Ct. 884 (1962), that: Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. Id. at 516, 82 S. Ct. at 890. Thus we are constitutionally unable, in this case where the record is silent on whether the requirement of Aljoe was met, to place the burden of proving compliance with Aljoe on appellant. The mandate of Carnley v. Cochran is not one with which this Court is unfamiliar. Rather, we have recognized our constitutional obligation to follow it on a multitude of occasions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 447 Pa. 228, 231, 286 A. 2d 892, 893 (1971) and cases cited therein; Commonwealth v. Norman, 447 Pa. 217, 222, 285 A. 2d 523, 526 (1971); Commonwealth v. Bower, 442 Pa. 379, 383, 275 A. 2d 109, 111 (1971); Commonwealth ex rel. Mullins v. Maroney, 428 Pa. 195, 199, 236 A. 2d 781, 784 (1968); Commonwealth ex rel. Edowski v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 229, 236, 223 A. 2d 749, 753 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Cavell, 422 Pa. 253, 258, 220 A. 2d 611, 614 (1966). Since the burden of proving noncompliance with Aljoe, in cases such as this one where the record is silent, must be placed on the Commonwealth, and since the Commonwealth failed to meet that burden, we must reject the Commonwealth's argument that appellant, pursuant to Aljoe, has waived his right to assert his prejudiced-juror claim. Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is reversed and the order of the hearing court is vacated. The record is remanded to the hearing court with direction to allow counsel's amendments to appellant's pro se petition and with direction to hold a hearing on the merits of appellant's prejudiced-juror claim.