Opinion ID: 1408380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Explanation of the confession

Text: The defendant insists he was not allowed to divulge fully his reasons for giving a confession, including the fact he knew that conviction of dangerous or deadly assault would result in a minimum of twenty-five more years in the penitentiary. At trial, the defendant testified: Q [by Mr. Cardenas, defendant's attorney] What did you tell Officer Morgan about how you did it? A [the defendant] Well, I told Officer Morgan that I went out onto the field that morning and went into the  I don't know the correct name of it, it is a building next to the weight area that they keep athletic supplies in, and I told him I got a piece of metal out of there and I think I told him I went to the southwest corner of the complex and made a knife out of it and then returned and stabbed Ruffing and left. Q Okay. Did you in fact stab Ruffing? A No, I did not. Q Why did you tell Officer Morgan that you did? A Well, when Officer Morgan first asked me if I had stabbed Inmate Ruffing, I denied it, and due to some recent, I guess you could call them pressures, peer pressures in prison, I decided that since I was close to the board, I only had four months to parole, that when he told me hey, I will leave it to the disciplinary court, I just told myself I can do fifteen days' isolation, that is nothing, you know, and still make my board instead of getting a twenty-five to life sentence for something I didn't do. After a bench conference, it was agreed not to refer before the jury to the specific punishment imposable under the statute, but only to a long prison sentence. Morgan was later examined concerning the inmates' knowledge of the penalty for dangerous or deadly assault: Q [Cardenas] But it is also true, isn't it, Investigator Morgan that all inmates at the Arizona State Prison are indoctrinated when they arrive there, and one of the things they are indoctrinated in is if they commit an assault with a deadly weapon they will get a long prison term for which there is no discretion, that that long prison term is mandatory? A [Morgan] I don't know that there is an indoctrination as such. I do know that the inmates are quite aware of what the possible penalties are for assault with a deadly weapon. Q It is common knowledge, isn't it? A Yes, it is. Defendant contends in his brief: Appellant's defense was that he did not stab Ruffing. Aside from the confession, the State presented no evidence of Appellant's motive for stabbing Ruffing. Appellant's credibility, therefore, was critical to his defense to explain why he initially confessed to an offense he had not committed. His credibility would have been enhanced had he been allowed to explain that he knew the punishment for deadly assault by a prisoner was a life sentence without the possibility of parole until he had served twenty-five calendar years. It was this knowledge, coupled with the promise that the stabbing incident would be disposed of at a prison disciplinary court, that induced him to confess. The State did not want evidence of the mandated penalty presented to prevent the jury from learning the penalty Appellant would receive if they convicted him. Even if we could agree with the logic of defendant's argument, we can find no prejudice to the defendant. The matter of the extent of the mandatory nature and length of the sentence was brought out to the jury by the defendant, and other witnesses were allowed to refer to a very long sentence for commission of the crime. How the defendant's counsel handled this in closing argument we do not know, since the closing argument was not designated as part of the record on appeal. Rule 31.8(b), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S. We find no prejudice to defendant. Defendant contends, however, that State v. Morales, 120 Ariz. 517, 587 P.2d 236 (1978) supports his position. The defendant's reliance on Morales is misplaced. In Morales, a juvenile was called to testify against the appellant. The accused attempted to present the fact that the juvenile agreed to testify against the appellant in order to avoid conviction and a sentence of death or twenty-five years to life under our first-degree murder statutes. We held it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to allow evidence of what was perhaps the primary reason the witness was willing to testify against the defendant. That is not the case here. The witness in question is the defendant. Defendant was allowed to present his explanation as to why he confessed to the jury. The jury merely chose to believe Morgan's testimony that there were no promises made to the defendant in exchange for cooperation. We find no error.