Opinion ID: 2632348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: What Instruction Would The Majority Permit?

Text: After balancing the relative risks and benefits of the instruction, I would not disapprove CALJIC No. 17.41.1. Its first sentence advises jurors, in terms that cannot be disputed, that the integrity of the trial depends on compliance with the court's instructions during deliberations. The second sentence directs jurors to inform the court if any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other] improper basis. (CALJIC No. 17.41.1.) The instruction's focus on deliberations is sensible, inasmuch as existing pattern instructions warn the jurors not to converse among themselves on any subject connected with the trial prior to deliberations. (CALJIC 0.50.) Consequently, the first opportunity for a juror to discover most kinds of misconduct by another juror is during deliberations. A refusal to apply the law, a refusal to deliberate, and a willingness to consider punishment in a noncapital caseall of which are conceded to be misconduct by the majority (maj. opn., ante, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d at pp. 866-67, 49 P.3d at pp. 212-13)would be manifested only during deliberations. Other improper bases for decisionsuch as deciding the case by a roll of the dice, by threats or bribes, or by resort to extrajudicial materialsalso occur in the jury room during deliberations. I do not believe we can be successful in reducing prejudicial jury misconduct without recognizing, as this instruction does, the critical role of deliberations. Fortunately, I do not understand the majority to have foreclosed trial courts completely from informing jurors of their duty to report misconduct. The majority does not deny that [t]he integrity of a trial requires that all jurors, at all times during their deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. (CALJIC No. 17.41.1.) Nor does it cast doubt on the practice of prosecutors and defense attorneys alike of informing jurors, during argument, of their duty or opportunity to report misconduct to the court. One can easily imagine a defense attorney whose client is accused of a notorious or heinous crime or who is a member of an unpopular group wanting to enlist the aid of the jury to ensure that the verdict is not the product of bigotry, conversations with victims and their friends, an unauthorized experiment, or consideration of the relative severity of punishment for certain of the charged crimes. (See People v. Williams, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 462, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209 [Jurors who do not feel bound to follow the law can act capriciously, to the detriment of the accused.].) [3] Alternatively, one can imagine a prosecutor who is saddled with advocating on behalf of an unappealing victim or with enforcing an unpopular law likewise urging the jury to report attempts at nullification among its ranks. I do not understand the majority to bar attorneys from taking these steps to safeguard the rule of law. Since it would be unprecedented to permit counselbut not the trial courtto inform the jury of its rights and responsibilities, it follows that trial courts must have retained some meaningful ability to instruct jurors as to their obligations in those circumstances. One clue as to the type of instruction the majority would permit comes from the opinion's repeated emphasis that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 is part of the concluding instructions (maj. opn., ante, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d at p. 866, 49 P.3d at p. 212) and is given immediately before deliberations begin ( id at pp. 865, 869, 49 P.3d at pp. 211, 215). This suggests that the majority's objection, at least in part, is simply a matter of timing. Furthermore, to the extent the majority criticizes the instruction as vague (see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 870-71, 49 P.3d at p. 216), it is possible to redraft the instruction to eliminate the ambiguity. In lieu of listing only a few possible violations of a juror's obligations focused exclusively on deliberations, a redrafted instruction might instead direct the jury to report to the court when a member violates any of the court's instructions. Thus, one possible instruction would expand the pretrial admonition set forth in CALJIC No. 0.50 to alert jurors that the integrity of a trial requires they at all times conduct themselves as required by the instructions given by the court and that they have an obligation to immediately advise the court if any juror has violated or has refused to comply with those instructions. The instruction should also explain the procedure by which the juror can make a report of misconduct to the court. I hope that trial courts will not misinterpret the majority and overreact by abstaining from reasonable efforts to prevent and remedy misconduct in a timely manner. Unless jurors are informed of their solemn responsibility to report misconduct, I predict that many judgments will be reversed simply because the trial judge never had the opportunity to cure the problem. Those interested in the administration of justice should therefore be mindful of the narrowness of the majority's holding and continue permissible efforts to inform jurors of their full responsibilities as a critical component of our legal system. Because the majority has unjustifiably restricted trial courts from selecting among constitutionally permissible methods to prevent or cure jury misconduct, however, I respectfully dissent. WE CONCUR: CHIN and BROWN, JJ.