Opinion ID: 2453230
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Ongom Decision

Text: ¶ 20 Ongom presented a more difficult case. The license at issue in Ongom lacked many of the characteristics traditionally associated with the historical professions and the licensee had a personal interest in her certification lesser than that held by a physician in his or her medical license. See Ongom, 159 Wash.2d at 157-58, 148 P.3d 1029 (Owens, J., dissenting). Despite Ongom's more limited property interest, we held that her disciplinary proceedings required application of the clear and convincing standard. Id. at 142, 148 P.3d 1029. We based this holding on the premise that Ongom's case was indistinguishable from Nguyen. Id. (In sum, this case is on all fours with Nguyen.... ). ¶ 21 To arrive at this holding, we applied the generalized considerations set forth in Mathews. Id. at 138, 148 P.3d 1029. Applying the first Mathews factor, we rejected the argument that we could distinguish Nguyen on the basis of the personal interest at stake. Id. We said: Although undoubtedly a medical license is much more difficult to obtain than a registration to practice as a nursing assistant... [w]e cannot say Ms. Ongom's interest in earning a living as a nursing assistant is any less valuable to her than Dr. Nguyen's interest in pursuing his career as a medical doctor. Id. ¶ 22 Looking to the second Mathews factor, we rejected the argument that we could distinguish Nguyen on the basis of the additional procedural protections afforded to Ongom under the APA. Id. at 140, 148 P.3d 1029. We said that [w]hile there are certainly some differences in the facts and procedures at issue ... these differences do not justify a distinction in the eyes of the law and... the potential risk of error is not appreciably different. Id. ¶ 23 Lastly, in light of the third Mathews factor, we rejected the argument that we could distinguish Nguyen on the basis of the nature of the governmental interest. Id. at 141-42, 148 P.3d 1029. Determining that the inquiry is not about the ultimate governmental interest which justifies the licensing scheme in the first place we said, `[T]his requirement relates to practical and financial burdens to be imposed upon the government were it to adopt a possible substitute procedure for the one currently employed.' Id. at 141, 148 P.3d 1029 (quoting Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 532, 29 P.3d 689). Moreover, we concluded that the clear and convincing standard promoted the government's primary interest in accurate proceedings. Id. at 142, 148 P.3d 1029. ¶ 24 Upon careful reconsideration of its reasoning and effects, we now overrule Ongom. [O]verruling prior precedent should not be taken lightly. Lunsford v. Saberhagen Holdings, Inc., 166 Wash.2d 264, 278, 208 P.3d 1092 (2009). We will not overrule a precedent unless there is `a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful.' Id. at 280, 208 P.3d 1092 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wash.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004)). Ongom is both incorrect and harmful precedent; therefore, it is overruled. ¶ 25 Ongom is incorrect because of its flawed application of the Mathews factors. First, Ongom confused the interest at stake in a disciplinary proceeding with Ongom's subjective desire to engage in her occupation. For purposes of the Mathews analysis, the personal interest at stake in a proceeding is the property interest (i.e., the license) and not one's subjective desire to perform work in the job of one's choosing. To determine the value of this property interest, a court must look to objective measures of investment (e.g., time, money, education, etc.) rather engaging in the hopeless task of weighing the subjective value each individual places on his or her chosen occupation. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-43, 96 S.Ct. 893 (applying objective measures to distinguish the value of the welfare benefits at stake in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), from the value of the disability benefits at stake in Mathews and holding that only the former requires an evidentiary hearing before adverse administrative action). ¶ 26 A license is an endorsement that lends credibility and esteem to an individual. It is a benefit granted by the State and it encourages third parties to believe that the State sanctions and positively evaluates the work of the license holder. In the present case, the Department's revocation of Hardee's license is not an absolute prohibition that terminates her right to provide child care of any sort. Rather, the revocation is a withdrawal of the State's endorsement and certificate of approval. ¶ 27 Ongom incorrectly applied the first Mathews factor when it mistakenly focused on Ongom's desire to work as a nurse compared to Nguyen's desire to practice medicine. See Ongom, 159 Wash.2d at 138, 148 P.3d 1029. This is not the proper inquiry. The proper inquiry should focus on objective measures to determine the value of the property interest that the State seeks to take awayi.e., the license. It is therefore relevant to consider the time, expense, and education invested to obtain the license. This is not some sort of elitist value judgment. [10] It is simply one realistic measure of the property interest at stake in an administrative proceeding. ¶ 28 Second, Ongom failed to apply the second Mathews factor. Ongom failed to apply the second Mathews factor because it determined, without explanation, that Ongom 's procedural protections under the APA were sufficiently similar to Nguyen 's. Id. at 140, 148 P.3d 1029. This too is incorrect. The adequacy of procedural protections is context dependent. Compare Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. 893 (not requiring an evidentiary hearing for revocation of disability benefits), with Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 260-61, 90 S.Ct. 1011 (requiring evidentiary hearing for revocation of welfare benefits). Ongom, however, failed to address the adequacy of the procedural protections afforded to Ongom in her particular context. This inquiry is essential to the second Mathews factor that requires us to evaluate, not only the risk of erroneous deprivation, but also the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.... Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (emphasis added). ¶ 29 Third, Ongom misapplied the third Mathews factor. Describing the government interest factor, Ongom incorrectly stated that `this requirement relates to practical and financial burdens to be imposed upon the government were it to adopt a possible substitute procedure for the one currently employed.' Ongom, 159 Wash.2d at 141, 148 P.3d 1029 (quoting Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 532, 29 P.3d 689). Ongom 's reliance on Nguyen 's dicta is misplaced. Mathews did not limit the government's interest to its interest in maintaining current procedural protections vis-à-vis providing additional procedural protections. While the governmental interest includes the financial and administrative burdens of providing additional procedural protections, its interest is not limited to such considerations. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 (describing the third factor as the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail (emphasis added)). ¶ 30 Because of its misapplication of the Mathews factors, Ongom was incorrect. The decision is also harmful. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Mathews: [T]he Government's interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administrative resources is a factor that must be weighed. At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Id. at 348, 96 S.Ct. 893. Due to the scarcity of resources, a decision that requires the State to direct more time and money towards administrative hearings can ultimately harm the very individuals the administrative proceeding was designed to protect. See id. ([T]he cost of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited.). ¶ 31 The present case illustrates the harmful consequences of Ongom 's reasoning. Like other sexual assaults, the sexual abuse of children almost always occurs in private. The perpetrator typically selects the victim on the basis of the child's vulnerability, vulnerability that often includes the child's inability to report the abuse and a lack of physical evidence. This is most aggravated when the victim is a young child or an infant. The circumstances surrounding the crime make it, in most instances, extremely difficult to prove. This is true even for criminal prosecutors supported by experienced detectives and a professional police force. ¶ 32 Despite these inherent evidentiary hurdles, Ongom would compel the Department to use its limited resources to satisfy a quasicriminal standard of proof before revoking its endorsement of a child care facility even when a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the children in the facility were exposed to potential sexual abuse. This requirement is potentially very harmful and is not constitutionally mandated. ¶ 33 Because it is both incorrect and harmful, Ongom is overruled. We hold that, at an administrative hearing to revoke a home child care license, the statutory requirement that the Department justify its revocation by a preponderance of the evidence satisfies constitutional due process. Our decision in Nguyen does not control because, unlike the present case, it involved an individual's unique property interest in a professional license. Our decision in Ongom is overruled.