Opinion ID: 2166944
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Retroactivity of Section 3105

Text: In 1987, when the parties executed their property settlement agreement, support provisions of an incorporated but unmerged agreement clearly were not subject to downward modification by a court. Brown v. Hall, 495 Pa. 635, 435 A.2d 859 (1981). However, Section 401.1(b) of the Divorce Code, 23 P.S. § 401.1(b), effective February 12, 1988, repealed by Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240, No. 206, § 6, effective in 90 days, reenacted as 23 Pa.C.S. § 3105(b), provides, A provision of an agreement regarding child support, visitation, or custody shall be subject to modification by the court upon a showing of changed circumstances. Husband argues that Section 3105 should apply retroactively, thus affording him the opportunity to seek modification of the child support provision of the parties' agreement. In Nessa v. Nessa, 399 Pa.Super. 59, 581 A.2d 674 (1990), the Superior Court held, in a footnote, that an agreement executed before February 12, 1988, was not affected by the amendments to the Divorce Code. The Superior Court expanded this in Brangs v. Brangs, 407 Pa.Super. 43, 595 A.2d 115 (1991), where it noted the existence of a well-settled presumption against retroactive application of statutes affecting substantive rights. Id. at 48, 595 A.2d at 118. The presumption is supported by Section 1926 of the Statutory Construction Act, which provides that no statute shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1926. Furthermore, this Court has held that statutes generally should not be applied retroactively to a contractual relationship where the application would alter existing obligations. Empire Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources, 546 Pa. 315, 340, 684 A.2d 1047, 1059 (1996). However, this Court has retroactively applied laws that only vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into. . . . Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 503 Pa. 373, 382-383, 469 A.2d 987, 991 (1983). We adopt the Superior Court's reasoning in Brangs that application of Section 3105 of the Divorce Code to a divorce decree entered before February 12, 1988, would be retroactive. Retroactive laws have been defined as those which take away or impair vested rights acquired under existing laws, created new obligations, impose a new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to the transaction or consideration already past. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.1990) 1184. As the Superior Court stated: The impact of section 401.1(b) [now Section 3105], if applied to the instant private agreement, would be to allow modification of a contractual obligation heretofore unmodifiable under previous law. While the line between `procedural' and `substantive' enactments may occasionally be difficult to fix, we can think of no clearer example of substantive change than empowering the court to remake the terms of an enforceable contract where no such power existed until the amendment was enacted. Brangs, 407 Pa.Super. at 53, 595 A.2d at 120. Because the retroactive application of Section 3105 would deprive Wife and children of the contractual right to the specific amount of child support for which they bargained, we reject Husband's argument that we should apply the amendments retroactively to allow modification. [3]