Opinion ID: 2032776
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: cohe's allegation of an unfair labor practice

Text: At the core of COHE's claim to exemption from the administrative exhaustion requirement is its establishment of an immediate and irreparable harm to it and its membership. At the outset, we note there is a lack of such a finding contained in the circuit court's alternative writ of prohibition of June 6, 1988. COHE maintains that the Regents' actions constituted an unfair labor practice in that the Regents engaged in: (1) Individual bargaining with the faculty unit members contrary to SDCL 3-18-3.1(1) and (5); (2) Interfered in the administration of an employee organization, SDCL 3-18-3.1(2); and, (3) Discriminated in regards to a condition of employment to discourage membership in an employee organization, SDCL 3-18-3.1(3). The sole evidence as to any direct contact between the Regents and COHE members is contained in the individual faculty contract offers. The document states in part: The salary level and other benefits under this contract are the same as any noted in your current contract. Any salary increase or other changes will be determined by the final results of the negotiating process between the BOR and COHE. The position offered is subject to, and governed by ... the agreement between the South Dakota Board of Regents and the Council of Higher Education in force during the coming academic year.... The terms and conditions expressed herein can only be modified, extended or renewed upon mutual agreement of the same parties [COHE and the Regents]. The circuit court states in its brief to this court that it issued its alternative writ of prohibition because it believed that it is fundamentally unfair to require faculty members to enter into binding contracts and subject themselves to liquidated damages when they did not know their next year's level of compensation because of a lack of a new master contract. It has long been recognized, however, that the courts cannot substitute their judgment for the legislative will expressed in labor statutes. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970); Independent School District v. Oklahoma City Federation of Teachers, 612 P.2d 719, 724 (Okla.1980). [2] Cf. Boggs v. Department of Public Safety, 261 N.W.2d 412 (S.D. 1977). Should a new master agreement not be reached, the impasse provisions of SDCL ch. 60-10 could be implemented on the request of either party. However, it is clear that the Regents, as an arm of the state, while under a duty to negotiate in good faith, are not required to agree to a contract or any specific rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment. See SDCL 3-18-2 and 3. Should an impasse situation arise, the Regents have chosen to honor the terms and conditions of the current master contract. That is, the Regents have chosen to offer more than the law requires. This type of situation has led one commentator to conclude that under the current status of SDCL ch. 3-18, ultimately, it is the employer who must decide how the dispute will be resolved. Finch, The South Dakota Public Employees' Union Act: Is it Really Collective Bargaining? 24 S.D.L.Rev. 243 (1979). SDCL 3-18-3.1 prohibits employer misconduct which is determined by the legislature to be an unfair labor practice. The statute standing alone is not specific enough to be definitive on whether the Regents' actions in this matter were a violation of that provision. However, when analyzed along with the statutes set forth above, it is clear that the Regents did not proceed in a manner which is in violation of SDCL 3-18-3.1. A statute must be construed according to its manifest intent. Such intent must be derived from the statute as a whole, as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. Simpson v. Tobin, 367 N.W.2d 757, 763 (S.D.1985). Under Article XIV, § 3 of the South Dakota Constitution and SDCL 13-49-14, the power to hire and fire university faculty rests exclusively with the Regents, subject to such rules and restrictions as the Legislature shall provide. This court held in Meierhenry, supra, that the limited jurisdiction granted to the Department of Labor under SDCL ch. 3-18 did not violate the constitutional authority of the Regents in that it did not remove all power from the Regents. We found that the authority of the Department restricts, but cannot, and does not, eradicate control. 351 N.W.2d at 451. Both COHE and the Regents admit that the power granted the Department under SDCL ch. 3-18 does not include the authority to enjoin the Regents as was done by the circuit court in this matter. To now construe SDCL 3-18-3.1 and the circuit court's authority under SDCL ch. 21-30 to allow a finding of an unfair labor practice on the facts of this case and to authorize an injunction against any further action by the Regents arrives at the point forecast by Justice Wollman in his dissent in Meierhenry, that is that the expansion of encroachment upon the Regents' authority would eventually render them totally powerless. Such an expansive interpretation of the circuit court's jurisdiction over the Regents and what constitutes an unfair labor practice is not in accord with our Constitution, our statutes and our case law. If given two possible interpretations of a statute, one constitutional and one unconstitutional, it is our duty to interpret the statute in a constitutional manner. Crowley v. State, 268 N.W.2d 616 (S.D.1978). Thus, COHE has suffered no immediate and irreparable harm because the actions of the Regents in this case are not, as a matter of law, an unfair labor practice under SDCL 3-18-3.1. The circuit court therefore erred in granting its writ of prohibition as no exceptional circumstances exist for waiving the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. De Hueck, supra at 423. The circuit court's writ must be dissolved to enable the Regents to carry on with their immediate task of ensuring a fully staffed and qualified faculty when school starts on August 30. Therefore, this court properly issued its peremptory writ of July 6, 1988, against the circuit court. [3] We do not reach the question of liquidated damages. It is a matter which involves factual disputes which are more appropriately found in the first instance by a fact-finding administrative body such as the South Dakota Department of Labor. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN, SABERS, and MILLER, JJ., concur. GILBERTSON, Circuit Judge, sitting for HENDERSON, J., disqualified.