Opinion ID: 2782723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Granting Permanent Injunction

Text: The second assignment of error raised by the petitioners is that the circuit court erred in granting a permanent injunction to the respondent that enjoins the petitioners from placing any obstructions within the respondent’s 20-foot wide right-of­ 3 The petitioners also assert as part of this assignment of error that the complaint and counterclaim were so closely joined that it was compulsory that they be tried together. In addition, they complain that Respondent Jeffrey Weatherholt is a law clerk to another judge in the same circuit as the judge who presided in the instant case. We decline to address these arguments because they constitute nothing more than unsupported assertions. “Typically, this Court will not address issues that have not been properly briefed.” State v. White, 228 W. Va. 530, 541 n. 9, 722 S.E.2d 566, 577 n. 9 (2011). Indeed, we have reiterated that “casual mention of an issue in a brief is cursory treatment insufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.” State v. Lilly, 194 W. Va. 595, 605 n. 16, 461 S.E.2d 101, 111 n. 16 (1995) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Finally, we have indicated that “a skeletal argument, really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim.” State Dep’t. v. Robert Morris N., 195 W. Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 8 way. Specifically, the petitioners challenge the circuit court’s finding that the location of children’s toys and the open doors of outbuildings into the easement were “habitual.” The petitioners further dispute the circuit court’s finding that the toys located in the unpaved portion of the right-of-way were inconvenient and unsafe. According to the petitioners, the toys and outbuilding doors did not constitute obstructions because they were not within the 12-foot paved portion of the easement in which the respondent traveled. We find no merit to this assignment of error. It is undisputed that the 20­ foot right-of-way expressly was conveyed to the respondent by deed. In addition, the parties generally agreed that the 20-foot right-of-way is located ten feet from either side of the centerline of the paved portion of the right-of-way.4 The respondent presented testimony that the petitioners erected outbuildings at the edge of the unpaved portion of the right-of-way, and that when the outbuilding doors are open they obstruct a portion of the unpaved portion of the right-of-way. The respondent also testified that specific toys were placed in the unpaved portion of the right-of-way and that these toys remained in the right-of-way for a period of months. Finally, the respondent presented several photographs in support of his testimony. In light of this evidence, we find no error in the circuit court’s finding that the outbuilding doors and toys constituted a continuing material interference with the respondent’s use of the right-of-way. Although these obstructions were not placed within the paved portion of the right-of-way, the petitioner expressly was granted a right-of-way 20 feet in width, and he has the right to the 4 See supra n. 2. 9 convenient use of the entire width of the right-of-way. Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the respondent a permanent injunction enjoining the petitioners from placing any obstructions within the respondent’s right-of-way. As part of this assignment of error, the petitioners also challenge the denial of their request that permanent speed bumps be placed on the respondent’s right-of-way. The circuit court found in regard to this issue: The primary complaint of [petitioners] and Otis and Bette Weatherholt were for the potential safety of the [Petitioners’] children, ages 15, 11, and 7, while playing in and alongside the roadway. However, no evidence was offered at trial that demonstrated that any of [petitioners’] children were ever in danger by anyone traveling on the right of way, and the concerns expressed were general in nature. . . . No accidents or injuries have resulted from this use of the right of way. The petitioners fail to cite to any evidence in the record that contradicts the circuit court’s findings on this issue. Therefore, we find no error in the circuit court’s findings.5 C. Respondent’s Water Line As A Prescriptive Easement 5 In addition, the petitioners set forth the following contentions in support of this assignment of error: the respondent should have pled his action as a nuisance action; the circuit court erred in failing to balance the rights of both parties; the circuit court erred in failing to require the respondent to post a bond prior to the court’s granting of a temporary injunction; and the respondent failed to show that the petitioners’ actions resulted in irreparable harm to the respondent. Again, these contentions amount to nothing more than unsupported assertions that this Court declines to address. See supra n. 3. 10 In their final assignment of error, the petitioners challenge the circuit court’s finding that the respondent’s placement of his waterline across the petitioners’ property constitutes a prescriptive easement. At the time of the placement of the respondent’s waterline, the petitioners’ property belonged to Ruth Barr, the grandmother of Daniel and Jeffrey Weatherholt. The respondent testified below that the water line was not placed in the 12-foot utility because rocks within the utility easement made it too difficult to dig the necessary trench there. As a result, the respondent had to locate the water line elsewhere through Ms. Barr’s property. The respondent testified further on direct examination as follows: Q. Did anyone object at that time? A. No. Q. Did your grandmother object at that time? A. No. Q. Was she aware of where [the water line] was put? A. I asked her – I didn’t ask her. I mean, I said, “Grandma, we had to run the water line down through the woods.” And – or she said – I said, “We needed to run it down through the woods.” And she said, “Well, why did you need to do that?” I said, “Well --” I said, “It was hard to dig it there,” as I recall, and she said okay. I mean, she was very easygoing. I mean, you know, Grandma didn’t – it didn’t matter to grandma. Q. So there was no objection? A. No. 11 Q. You did not go to her before you did it and asked permission? A. No, sir. I don’t recall doing that. Evidence adduced at trial indicates that the petitioners subsequently acquired the property from Ms. Barr. The petitioners learned of the waterline’s location in 2001 when they began construction of their home, and they did not challenge the placement of the waterline until 2013 when they filed their counterclaim to the respondent’s suit for an injunction. The circuit court found, in pertinent part, as follows on the issue of the prescriptive easement: From the testimony and evidence at trial, the Court finds that the [respondent’s] water line was constructed in 1998 or 1999 with the knowledge and assistance of Otis Weatherholt, through what was then property owned by Ruth M. Barr, to the home of [respondent]. Based upon the uncontroverted testimony of the [respondent], the Court finds that he did not obtain the permission of the grandmother, Ruth M. Barr, prior to constructing the water line outside his confines of his twelve feet (12′) wide utility easement, that he built the water line in its current location with the knowledge and even assistance of his father, Otis Weatherholt, and that a friend of his father’s [sic] installed the line in its current location after having trouble digging the line within the twelve feet (12′) wide utility easement. After installing the water line outside the confines of the utility easement, [respondent] informed the owner, Ruth M. Barr, of the location of the water line and she did not object or take any subsequent action so long as she owned the 12 property to have [respondent] remove or relocate the water line. Ruth M. Barr subsequently sold her real estate, through which the [respondent’s] water line was constructed, to [petitioners] by deed dated March 30, 2001. [Petitioner] Daniel Weatherholt’s testimony confirmed that he was aware of the location of the water line, as it crossed through and under his real estate, during the construction of his home in 2001. The Court finds that Otis Weatherholt and the [Petitioner] Daniel Weatherholt had knowledge of the exact location of the water line as it crossed the real estate then owned by Ruth M. Barr. .... The [petitioners] had actual knowledge of the existence and exact location of the [respondent’s] water line prior to constructing their home in 2001, a period of more than ten years, prior to objecting to it by the filing of their counterclaim in this action on August 8, 2013. . . . [Petitioner] Daniel Weatherholt . . . testified that although he was aware of the existence and location of the water line and access road easements, he was unaware of the deeded location of the twelve feet (12′) wide utility easement. . . . The Court finds that the [petitioners] took no adverse action and made no objection as to the location of the water line from the fall of 2001 until the filing of the Counter Claim in this action by Certificate dated August 5, 2013, a period of more than ten years. The Court further finds that the [petitioners] acquiesced to the location of the water line for a period exceeding ten years. The petitioners argue that the circuit court erred in finding that the location of the respondent’s water line through the petitioners’ property constitutes a prescriptive easement. The crux of the petitioners’ argument is that the respondent’s placement of the water line outside of his utility easement was not an adverse use of Ruth Barr’s property 13 because Ms. Barr granted implied permission to the location of the water line after she was informed of its location by the respondent. This issue is governed by this Court’s definitive opinion on prescriptive easements, O’Dell v. Stegall, 226 W. Va. 590, 703 S.E.2d 561 (2010). In syllabus point 1 of O’Dell, this Court held: A person claiming a prescriptive easement must prove each of the following elements: (1) the adverse use of another’s land; (2) that the adverse use was continuous and uninterrupted for at least ten years; (3) that the adverse use was actually known to the owner of the land, or so open, notorious and visible that a reasonable owner of the land would have noticed the use; and (4) the reasonably identified starting point, ending point, line, and width of the land that was adversely used, and the manner or purpose for which the land was adversely used. At issue in the instant case is the first element: the adverse use of another’s land. Regarding this element, this Court explained in O’Dell that [i]n the context of prescriptive easements, an “adverse use” of land is a wrongful use, made without the express or implied permission of the owner of the land. An “adverse use” is one that creates a cause of action by the owner against the person claiming the prescriptive easement; no prescriptive easement may be created unless the person claiming the easement proves that the owner could have prevented the wrongful use by resorting to the law. Syl. pt. 5, Id. When we apply our law in O’Dell to the instant facts, we find no error in the circuit court’s determination that the respondent’s placement of his water line outside 14 of the utility easement constituted an adverse use of the petitioners’ property. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the evidence clearly indicates that the respondent did not ask permission of Ms. Barr, the owner of the property, to place the water line outside of the utility easement. Instead, the respondent placed the water line outside of the utility easement and thereafter informed Ms. Barr of the location of the water line. As we held in syllabus point 5 of O’Dell, “[a]n ‘adverse use’ is one that creates a cause of action by the owner against the person claiming the prescriptive easement.” In the instant case, the respondent’s placement of the water line through Ms. Barr’s property outside of the utility easement without first seeking Ms. Barr’s permission created a cause of action by Ms. Barr against the respondent for trespass. Therefore, the respondent’s placement of the water line outside of the utility easement without first seeking Ms. Barr’s permission meets the definition of “adverse use” set forth by this Court in O’Dell. The petitioners’ argument that implied permission means the same as acquiescence must fail when applied to the facts of this case. It is significant that there is no evidence that Ms. Barr had knowledge of the water line until after it was installed outside of the utility easement. If Ms. Barr knowingly had acquiesced to the placement of the water line outside of the utility easement prior to its placement, her acquiescence could be construed as implied permission. Instead, she acquiesced to the placement of the water line after learning that the water line already had been placed outside of the utility easement. The fact that Ms. Barr acquiesced to the placement of the water line after it was installed is actually proof of one of the elements of a prescriptive easement. 15 Specifically, element three requires a person claiming a prescriptive easement to prove that “the adverse use was actually known to the owner of the land, or so open, notorious and visible that a reasonable owner of the land would have noticed the use.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, id (emphasis added). In other words, a person claiming a prescriptive easement must prove that the owner of the land had knowledge of the adverse use and acquiesced to the adverse use for the requisite number of years. In the present case, the evidence shows that Ms. Barr had actual knowledge of the location of the water line outside of the utility easement, and she acquiesced to the location. Therefore, we find that the circuit court did not err in ruling that the respondent proved by clear and convincing evidence that his placement of the water line outside of the utility easement constituted an adverse use of the petitioners’ land.6