Opinion ID: 196628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CAPECO's Experts

Text: 74 Additionally, CAPECO argues that the district court's refusal to allow its two experts, Dr. Jorge Freyre (Dr. Freyre) and Dr. Elias Gutierrez (Dr. Gutierrez), to testify was based on a fundamental error of law and was an abuse of discretion that requires that we reverse the district court and order a new trial. 75 In order to evaluate CAPECO's contentions, we must review the district court's orders leading up to the exclusion of the relevant testimony. The district court's June 22, 1993 Scheduling Order stated that [t]he parties will announce the names and qualifications of their experts by October 1, 1993. This date was modified subsequently to December 1, 1993. In compliance with this order, CAPECO named Cesar Figueroa (Figueroa) and Rafael Martinez-Margarida (Martinez-Margarida). On March 1, 1994, pursuant to a motion by new counsel for Caribbean, the district court modified the previous order and issued a revised scheduling order stating all experts are to be announced by March 30, and also specifying that expert reports to be used during each party's case-in-chief were to be exchanged on June 3, 1994, and that expert rebuttal reports were to be exchanged on July 1, 1994. Upon CAPECO's June 1 motion, the date for reports to be exchanged was extended by an Omnibus Order to ten days after service of that order, dated August 15, 1994. On August 29, 1994, Coastal delivered to CAPECO expert reports prepared by Dr. Sherwin and Dr. Zalacain, and CAPECO provided Coastal with an expert report prepared by Figueroa. These experts were deposed between September 9 and September 14, and thereafter CAPECO retained experts Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez ostensibly as rebuttal witnesses under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(C). CAPECO informed Coastal on September 20, 1994, that it had retained Dr. Freyre as a rebuttal witness, and similarly informed Coastal of Dr. Gutierrez on or about October 4, 1994. CAPECO informed the district court about Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez on October 5, 1995. 76 The district court instructed CAPECO to produce Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez and to make them available for depositions. On October 5 and October 6, Coastal filed motions in limine to exclude Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez, respectively, on the theory that neither witness could properly be characterized as a rebuttal witness within the meaning of Rule 26(a)(2)(C), and thus both should have been disclosed previously. After oral argument, the district court granted Coastal's motion and excluded the testimony of Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez. The district court, upon CAPECO's admission that it planned to use Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez in its case-in-chief, noted that you got a problem with my orders because you have not complied with my orders insofar as Freyre and Gutierrez [are] concerned, apparently referring to the previous scheduling order deadline for experts in the case-in-chief to be disclosed. 77 CAPECO argues (1) that because the Omnibus Order did not provide a deadline for the exchange of rebuttal expert reports, no scheduling order applied, and therefore the disclosure of Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez was controlled by Rule 26(a)(2)(C); 17 and (2) that the district court misconstrued Rule 26(a)(2)(C) to signify that a defendant cannot offer testimony to contradict or rebut under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). We need not consider whether the district court in fact misconstrued Rule 26(a)(2)(C), because, for three reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in its exclusion of these witnesses as rebuttal witnesses. First, at no time did CAPECO ever seek leave of the court to announce the names of experts not disclosed by December 1, 1993, as originally required, or by March 30, 1994, as permitted by the trial court. CAPECO's motion of June 1 sought extension principally due to alleged noncooperation by Coastal in discovery, making CAPECO's experts' task difficult to complete by the deadline then in effect. We cannot conclude, as CAPECO does, that the Omnibus Order's extension rendered all other orders unbinding. Because CAPECO did not ask for its extension on the grounds it now argues, the district court could not have had such an effect in mind, nor was it given an opportunity to consider such effect. A trial court may readily exclude a witness or exhibit if some previous order had set a deadline for identification and the proponent [has], without adequate excuse, failed to list the witness or exhibit. Fusco v. General Motors Corp., 11 F.3d 259, 265 (1st Cir.1993); see also Freund v. Fleetwood Enter., Inc., 956 F.2d 354 (1st Cir.1992). 78 Additionally, we cannot agree that the district court's March 1, 1994, Scheduling Order was necessarily superceded, given that that order scheduled trial for October 24, 1994, and in fact, trial began on that date. The proximity in time between CAPECO's attempts to bring in Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez and actual trial casts doubt on any argument that CAPECO was somehow misled into thinking that previous Scheduling Orders did not apply. Finally, even assuming that CAPECO is correct that the Scheduling Order's provisions regarding rebuttal witnesses had been superceded and thus Rule 26(a)(2)(B) applied, the district court might still have enforced its previous deadlines regarding experts in the case-in-chief. For better or for worse, at oral argument on October 21, 1994 (three days before trial was to start), counsel for CAPECO identified Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez as witnesses in its case-in-chief. 18 79 Given the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the exclusion of the testimony of Dr. Freyre and Dr. Gutierrez was an abuse of discretion warranting a new trial.