Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Assertedly misleading instruction on expert testimony

Text: The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.80 as follows: A duly qualified expert may give an opinion on questions in controversy at a trial. To assist you in deciding such questions, you may consider the opinion with the reasons given for it, if any, by the expert who gives the opinion. [¶] You may also consider the qualifications and the credibility of the expert. You are not bound to accept an expert opinion as conclusive but should give it the weight to which you find it to be entitled. (See § 1127b [requiring the trial court, when the opinion of any expert is received in evidence, to instruct in substantially the above terms, and stating no further instruction on the subject of opinion evidence need be given].) Defendant contends this instruction was deficient because it merely permitted, but did not require, the jury to consider the factual premises underlying the expert's opinion. This omission, he urges, misled the jury to believe that, to be given weight, an expert's opinion need not be founded on any reasons. Thus, defendant argues, the instruction as given caused the jury to accept uncritically Dr. Missett's opinion that defendant was malingering rather than incompetent. He observes that CALJIC No. 2.80 was revised, after his trial, to provide that the jury should consider, in addition to the witness's qualifications and believability, the facts or materials upon which each opinion is based, and the reasons for each opinion. (CALJIC No. 2.80 (6th ed.1996).) Because the asserted error affected the reliability of the jury's verdict, he contends, it denied him due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As the Attorney General points out, defendant requested this instruction, without requesting it be modified along the lines he now asserts was necessary. If defendant believed the instruction was incomplete, it was incumbent on him to ask the trial court to clarify or supplement it. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1211, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) In any event, we see no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the instruction in the manner defendant contends. ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) The instruction told the jury it should consider the reasons supporting the expert's opinion; that the jury would not have understood this term to encompass the factual assumptions underlying the opinion is implausible.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in giving the jury the standard instructions that statements made by the attorneys during the trial are not evidence (CALJIC No. 1.02), that jurors must determine the facts from the evidence and no other source (CALJIC No. 1.00), and that they must not independently investigate the facts (CALJIC No. 1.03). The problem with these instructions, defendant asserts, is that they invited the jury to disregard the testimony of Douglas Gray, defendant's counsel at the guilt and penalty phases of trial, who testified in the competency phase concerning defendant's interaction with him. The Attorney General points out that defendant requested these instructions and argues he therefore invited any error. We agree: Although counsel did not expressly articulate a tactical purpose in requesting the instructions, that he did so in order to ensure the jury did not consider statements made by the prosecutor as evidence seems likely. (See People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 49, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) We also agree with the Attorney General that defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the jury misapplied the challenged instructions. ( Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72, 112 S.Ct. 475; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) The trial court and the parties informed the jurors, during voir dire, that they would be asked to consider the testimony of two attorney witnesses, Gray and Nolan. Neither party suggested that jurors disregard Gray's testimony because of his status as defendant's counsel in the criminal trial. Indeed, the prosecutor cited portions of Gray's testimony in his closing argument. The giving of these instructions did not constitute error.