Opinion ID: 2708354
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ISPs’ Motions for Fees

Text: In addition to challenging the attorneys’ fees for Smith, appellants also argue that the district court erred by granting fees to the ISPs. Duffy argues he was not given an oppor‐ tunity to respond to the ISPs’ request, and all three argue they were not given an opportunity to respond to the fee itemization.
While Steele and Hansmeier submitted timely memoran‐ da in opposition to the ISPs’ motions, Duffy did not. He as‐ serts that he was not given an opportunity to respond be‐ cause the district court ruled on the motions before the time to respond expired under the court’s local rules. This argu‐ ment is frivolous. Duffy does not cite any local rule for this point, and had he taken the time to look at the rules, he quickly would have realized that there was time to respond. The ISPs electronically filed their motions on November 8, 2013. The local rules allow 17 days for any response to elec‐ tronically filed motions. See SDIL‐LR 7.1(g); SDIL‐LR 5.1(c). The rules provide that “[f]ailure to file a timely response to a motion may, in the Court’s discretion, be considered an ad‐ mission of the merits of the motion.” SDIL‐LR 7.1(g). Duffy had until November 25, 2013, to submit his response, but he did not file anything. The district court granted the ISPs’ mo‐ tion on November 27, 2013. Duffy had an opportunity to re‐ spond; he simply chose not to exercise it. 12 Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682
All three appellants also argue they were not given an opportunity to respond to both Smith and the ISPs’ fee item‐ ization and were prejudiced by this alleged omission. Once again, they miss the mark. They had a full opportunity to respond to Smith’s itemization but chose to focus on other issues. With respect to the ISPs’ itemization, they are correct that the district court erred when it ruled too quickly, but we conclude that this error was harmless. Smith filed his itemization on November 8, 2013; he added a notice that he would raise the itemization at the November 13 hearing. On November 10, Hansmeier filed a notice of intention to file a response to Smith’s itemization on or before November 22. On November 12, the court sent a Notice of Striking, which required Smith to re‐file his itemization with a corrected signature block; Smith complied that same day. On November 13, the district court held a rehearing on the matter of Smith’s fees and an initial hearing on the ISPs’ request for fees. On November 25, the district court ordered the docket text to be modified to describe defendants’ November 12 re‐submitted itemization as a supplement to the motion for sanctions. The court did not indicate any change in the deadline for a response. The court then issued its ruling finding the fees reasonable on November 27—five days after the date by which Hansmeier had promised his response to Smith’s itemization. While appellants contend that the court reset the response deadline on November 25 when it characterized Smith’s re‐submitted itemization as a supplement, they give us no indication why this should be so. Beyond the fact that the district court never actually reset the deadline, there was no change to the Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682 13 substance of Smith’s itemization. Moreover, appellants could not have relied on that November 25 characterization, because their deadline to submit their opposition was that same day. In short, appellants had ample opportunity to be heard on any questions related to Smith’s itemization of fees. The time the court gave for responses to the ISPs’ itemi‐ zation was shorter than the 17 days called for by the local rules. AT&T did not file its itemization until November 15; Comcast’s filing was even later, November 22. The district court ruled on the submissions on November 27, just 12 and five days later. The court’s order noted that Duffy, Hansmei‐ er, and Steele had not filed responses to the specific itemiza‐ tion. It went on to explain that it found a response unneces‐ sary because, after having reviewed the itemizations, it con‐ cluded that the itemized fees were reasonable. We can as‐ sume that it was error for the court to accelerate the time for ruling without informing the parties of the revised schedule. Nevertheless, any such error was harmless. Appellants have not given us any reason to believe that the ISPs’ itemization was unreasonable. Indeed, in focusing on the errors in Smith’s fees, appellants argue that Smith’s fees are unreason‐ able when compared to the fees requested by Comcast. We see no reversible error here.
Appellants next challenge the ISPs’ motion on the ground that they delayed too long before filing it. They are correct that motions under section 1927 must not be unreasonably delayed. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Chi. Indus. Tire Co., 697 F.2d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1983). But they push the point too far when they assert that the delay divested the district court of juris‐ diction over their motion. In Overnite, the case on which they 14 Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682 rely, an appeal of the judgment was pending, and eight months elapsed between the filing of the notice of appeal and this court’s affirmance on appeal. During that period, jurisdiction had shifted from the district court to the court of appeals. After this court affirmed, the district court granted attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 1927. Id. at 792. We held that the district court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for costs and attorneys’ fees. The district court had not reserved jurisdiction over this issue after the notice of appeal was filed; the statute did not leave jurisdiction in the district court for this purpose; and no motions concerning the case were directed to either this court or the district court during the eight months the appeal on the merits was pend‐ ing. Id. The circumstances here are entirely different. Between the time the case was voluntarily dismissed to the time when the ISPs filed their motion for sanctions, the district court re‐ tained jurisdiction; no appeal was pending. Smith moved for sanctions on April 5, 2013, and the district court originally granted his motion on October 30, 2013. Appellants moved for reconsideration in late October and early November, and at that point the ISPs moved for attorneys’ fees. It was up to the district court to decide, in its discretion, whether that motion was timely. The court concluded that it was, and we see no abuse of discretion in that ruling.