Opinion ID: 2195337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Officer's Operation of the Police Car

Text: As to the second claim, the State conceded that it waived sovereign immunity, but asserted that it waived sovereign immunity only to the extent of the available commercial insurance coverage. Thus, for the Pauley Plaintiffs to prevail on a claim for unlimited liability they must identify a statute that clearly expresses the General Assembly's intent to waive the bar of sovereign immunity with respect to claims exceeding the amount of available insurance coverage. The Pauley Plaintiffs contend that 21 Del.C. § 4106 is such a waiver and expresses the General Assembly's clear intention both to bar sovereign immunity as an absolute defense and to expose the State to unlimited liability for grossly negligent operation of State owned emergency vehicles. Authorized emergency vehicles are the subject of Title 21, Section 4106 of the Delaware Code. The subject is treated in Title 21  Rules of the Road.. The specific provision at issue here is subsection d, which states: The owner of such emergency vehicle may not assert the defense of governmental immunity in any action on account of any damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of such driver or owner. [10] (emphasis supplied) The Superior Court judge found that Reinoehl was negligent. Section 4106(e) makes it clear that State owned police vehicles are authorized emergency vehicles within the meaning of the EVS. Thus, we conclude, the State may not assert sovereign immunity as an absolute bar to the Pauley Plaintiffs' recovery. The problem, however, is that although sovereign immunity cannot be asserted as an absolute bar to recovery, the Pauley Plaintiffs have failed to show why a waiver (a bar to asserting the defense of governmental immunity) under 4106(d) necessarily compels the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to expose the State treasury to unlimited monetary claims for negligent operation of a State owned emergency vehicle. The EVS does not discuss the extent of the State's exposure to damage claims at all. The statute's location in that portion of the code denominated the Rules of the Road suggests a focus on operation of the vehicle, not the collateral consequences going beyond the defenses applicable to negligent operation. It is difficult to conceive that the General Assembly would remove a cap on the State's exposure to damages without specifically indicating an intent to do so and without referring to 18 Del.C. ch. 65. It is 18 Del. C. ch. 65 that addresses the State Insurance Program and the methodology by which the Executive and Legislative branches determine the extent that it is feasible for the State to provide coverage for liability risks. As we indicated in our Opinion of December 17, 2003: This Court has confirmed that sovereign immunity is waived to the extent any risk or loss is covered by the State Insurance Program. [11] The Pauley plaintiffs nevertheless urge us to conclude that the EVS, 21 Del. C. § 4106(d) and (e), completely waives the State's sovereign immunity without regard to the availability of insurance. [12] Any analysis must begin with the inescapable premise that: Where a party seeks to hold the state or a state agency liable under a statute, any reasonable doubt as to the proper construction of the statute should be resolved in favor of the State. [13] The Pauley Plaintiffs' correctly maintain that subsections (d) and (e), when read together, do indicate that the General Assembly, under the circumstances contemplated by that statute, intended to prevent the assertion of sovereign immunity as a total bar to recovery. We must conclude, nevertheless, that the General Assembly did intend that the State's exposure to damage claims continue to be limited to the amount of self-insurance or commercial insurance applicable to the occurrence giving rise to the claim. As we stated on December 17, 2003: We affirm recognizing that the trial judge's interpretation of governmental immunity, of course, has no bearing on any limitation on thresholds of monetary liability or any limitation on the extent to which sovereign immunity may have been waived by the State or its political subdivisions. It is, nonetheless, an interpretation entirely consistent with public policy that suggests that when the State or any of its political subdivisions make insurance available for the purpose of remedying harm caused by its emergency vehicles in an accident, then governmental immunity may not be asserted to bar a claim up to the limit of that coverage. In the context of 21 Del. C. § 4106(d), the trial judge's view is affirmed. The legislative history of the State Insurance Program and the EVS suggests that subsection (d) of the EVS does not reflect any intent of the General Assembly to waive sovereign immunity completely. In 1969, the General Assembly enacted the State Insurance Program. The purpose of that Program was to protect the public from wrongful actions of State officials and employees, by waiving the State's sovereign immunity up to the threshold of insurance coverage made available by the State. [14] This view, is not, as the Pauley Plaintiffs suggest, contrary to existing precedent. The Pauley Plaintiffs claim that: The General Assembly enacted the EVS knowing that the State Insurance Program had not been implemented and, therefore, that the presumptive limited waiver of sovereign immunity in 18 Del.C. § 6511 had expired because of lack of follow through. They cite Doe v. Cates [15] as support for that view. [16] In fact, Doe exhaustively examines the history of the State Insurance Program and its relationship to waiver of sovereign immunity, and concludes that where neither self-insurance nor commercially procured insurance provides coverage, the State has in fact met its burden under the Pajewski case and has overcome the presumptive waiver of immunity in 18 Del.C. § 6511 at 1179. Doe does not discuss the EVS at all, but it does explain that the State Tort Claims Act did not waive sovereign immunity in all cases where a ministerial act was performed with gross or wanton negligence or in bad faith. [17] Tellingly and consistently with the application of the doctrine of limited waiver in Delaware, the Doe Court went on to say: Appellants' interpretation reads much too much into this limited statute and would expose the state to liabilities which would not otherwise exist. It was clear in 1979 that the General Assembly had declined to fund its program to provide increased protection for injured persons. [18] Like the STC in 1979, when the EVS passed in 1981, [19] the General Assembly is presumed to have been aware of the existing law which included 18 Del. C. § 6511. [20] Section 6511 waived immunity only as to risks covered by the State Insurance Program  a program which at the time of the occurrence giving rise to the Pauley Plaintiffs' claims, consisted solely of an applicable commercial insurance policy. Just as the Doe Court rejected a claim that the State waived sovereign immunity for unlimited exposure where no insurance was available, the State has waived sovereign immunity on the Pauley Plaintiffs' claims but only to the extent that the State has provided applicable insurance coverage. As Doe makes clear, the mode of abolishing or limiting  the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be by an Act of the General Assembly. [21] The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not judicially created nor can it be abolished or modified by judicial opinion. When, where, under what circumstances, and to what degree the State purchases commercial insurance to cover a risk, acts to self-insure or to remove any cap on the State's exposure to damages, is entirely a matter for the General Assembly. We, as reluctantly as the Court in Doe, are constrained to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a limited bar to exposure to damages arising from an occurrence under the EVS. The State has waived sovereign immunity in this case because it purchased commercial insurance to indemnify against the risk of loss contemplated by the EVS, but only to the extent coverage is available. The Superior Court judge did not err when he concluded that the State faced exposure up to the amount of the insurance coverage but that 21 Del. C. § 4106(d) did not evidence an intent to remove the cap on exposure to damages determined by the policy limits of the insurance procured and applicable.