Opinion ID: 1800402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Return to Custody

Text: The plaintiff also seeks to hold the defendants liable for negligence in failing to take steps to secure Corley's return to custody after he failed to report back from his pass. The Court of Appeals apparently would allow this claim to proceed against the physicians but not against the supervisory defendants. This part of the claim cannot be parried on the basis that the defendants were exercising discretion or judgment. It is the sense of the petition that the treating physicians had determined that Corley should be released only for a short time, to return to the facility when his pass expired, and that there was no purpose of releasing him unconditionally. We also assume that the interruption of his treatment might exacerbate his mental disorders so as to render him more dangerous. We assume further that the failure to take steps to secure his return was negligent on the part of somebody and that, until the contrary is shown by evidence, the negligence was that of Jacks or of Doe. The plaintiff at the very least would be entitled to use the discovery processes to determine who should have taken the initiative when the absence was discovered, if the claim of failure to return to custody is a legally cognizable one giving rise to civil damages. We nevertheless conclude that the persons responsible for Corley's custody and treatment do not owe a civil duty to the general public, with regard to securing his return. The recognition of a duty of this kind could place a severe burden on the public service. It would probably not be difficult in many cases to make a case for the jury as to the foreseeability of injury, but this is not sufficient to establish a duty to the public at large. Our conclusions are supported by authority from Missouri and elsewhere. In Parker v. Sherman, 456 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.1970), the plaintiff sued a sheriff because of alleged failure to enforce the gambling laws of the state. The plaintiff claimed that his property was damaged by the presence of disorderly persons and because of their lawless behavior. The court held that the general duties imposed on the sheriff by statute were owed to the public at large, not to particular individuals, and that general duties of this sort did not give rise to civil liability to individuals who sustain damage. The Parker opinion referred to and cited several illustrative cases from other jurisdictions. The venerable case of South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1856), held that a private citizen who had been kidnapped and held for ransom could not recover damages from a sheriff who allegedly failed to take proper steps to protect and free him after he had been abducted. A similar case is Annala v. McLeod, 122 Mont. 498, 206 P.2d 811 (1949), holding that a sheriff was not civilly liable to property owners whose holdings were destroyed by a mob. See also Tomlinson v. Pierce, 178 Cal.App.2d 112, 2 Cal.Rptr. 700 (1960). A particularly apposite case cited in Parker is Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 132 P.2d 773 (1943) in which a sheriff was held not to be civilly liable for negligently allowing a person to escape from a mental institution, and negligently allowing him to return armed, at which point he shot several persons. The court said that the plaintiffs could not found their civil action on the sheriff's alleged negligence in performing the duties he owed to the public at large. The superintendent of the facility was also held not to be liable. Parker also placed strong reliance on Leger v. Kelley, 142 Conn. 585, 116 A.2d 429 (1955) in which the State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, in violation of state statutes, allowed a vehicle to be registered when it was not equipped with safety glass. The court held that the Commissioner was not liable to an accident victim who had been cut by glass. In Nelson v. Freeman, 537 F.Supp. 602 (W.D.Mo.1982) affirmed, 706 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.1983), the court, interpreting Missouri law, held that officers or employees of the Missouri Division of Family Services were not civilly liable for the death of a child allegedly resulting from their failure to perform their duties under the child abuse statutes. (Sec. 210.110-210.165, RSMo Supp.1982). The opinion concluded that these statutes create only general duties, not specific ones, and do not give rise to civil liability. Other cases supporting our position are Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303 (Ind.App. 1980), declining to find liability against a police officer for negligently failing to investigate a rape and to apprehend the rapist who, a week later, raped the plaintiff's daughter; and Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969), holding that wrongful death and personal injury actions did not lie against a deputy sheriff for failure to apprehend drunken drivers he was pursuing who were proceeding side-by-side down the highway. Nelson v. Freeman, supra , cites both of these as consistent with Missouri law. We agree. See also, Anno. 41 A.L.R.3d 692 (1972). The plaintiff cites § 202.430, RSMo 1969, now repealed, which authorizes state hospital authorities to call upon the local sheriff to assist in the apprehension of escaped or strayed inmates, and argues that there was an affirmative duty to give this notice. Our Court, in recent years, has been reluctant to find an implied right to a civil action from a statute which does not refer to civil liability in express terms. Shqeir v. Equifax, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 944 (Mo. banc 1982). A minimum requirement is that the would-be plaintiff be a member of a class for whose benefit the statute has been enacted. 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes, Secs. 432-33. The statute here cited was not passed for the benefit of a discrete class. Its primary purpose is to authorize one governmental agency to call on another for help. There is no indication of any special duty in the language of the statute. The statute does not clearly require the hospital authorities to notify the sheriff. A statute of this kind will not be read as conferring a civil action by implication. Nor may the plaintiff base a civil action on the duty of the hospital authorities to keep the committed person in custody as initially directed by the juvenile court. What we say here, of course, is not intended to apply to the numerous situations in which a public officer may be held liable for breach of a duty owed to a particular individual. Thus, for many years, our courts have recognized the liability of a sheriff or constable for failure to levy an execution, Douglass v. Baker, 9 Mo. 41 (1845), or for an improper levy or sale, Duncan v. Matney, 29 Mo. 368 (1860). Numerous other examples could be cited. We deal only with tort liability arising out of duties owed to the public at large. We conclude that it is in the public interest to deny a civil action against public employees who fail to secure the return to custody of a person temporarily released from a public mental hospital by decision of the attending physicians, for injury inflicted by the patient on a member of the general public. The cases cited above also support the conclusions of Part II(a) of this opinion. The treating psychiatrists do not owe duties to the public generally which will support tort liability for negligence.