Opinion ID: 2972945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Petitioner’s INA claim

Text: Unlike a grant of asylum, a grant of withholding of removal under the INA, Section 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), is not discretionary. An applicant who meets the statutory and regulatory requirements must be granted withholding of removal. Klawitter v. INS, 970 F.2d 149, 151 (6th Cir. 1992). An applicant for withholding of removal must prove that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b) (2005). Furthermore, an applicant for withholding of removal must show a “clear probability” of persecution. Persecution on account of a protected ground must be more likely than not to occur in order for withholding of removal to be granted. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). If an applicant is determined to have suffered past persecution, a rebuttable presumption is created that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the future. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1). The government can rebut this presumption by presenting evidence of a fundamental change in circumstances in the proposed country of removal, such that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened or the applicant could avoid the threat to his or her life or freedom by relocating to another part of that country, and it would be reasonable under the circumstances to expect the applicant to do so. Id. -12- No. 04-3369 The denial of Dushi’s claim for withholding of removal must be upheld if “supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Id. (quoting Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 388). “The petition for review may be granted only if the evidence presented ‘not only supports a contrary conclusion, but indeed compels it.’” Id. (quoting Klawitter, 970 F.2d at 151-52)).
The IJ’s credibility determination is dispositive of Dushi’s INA claim; however, even assuming Dushi is credible, his claim still fails. Because the INA provides no definition of “persecution,” this Court,“[i]n Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384 (6th Cir.1998) . . . reviewed numerous cases from other circuits in an attempt to discern the meaning of the term within the context of the INA.” Gilaj v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 275, 284 (6th Cir. 2005). Mikhailevitch concluded that a claim of persecution will not lie where a petitioner establishes only “a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty.” 146 F.3d at 390. Gilaj explains that “Mikhailevitch has not been interpreted as ‘suggesting that physical punishment is in all cases sufficient for finding persecution.’” Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 284 (quoting Gjokic v. Ashcroft, Nos. 02-3915, 02-3917, 2004 WL 1491638, at  4 (6th Cir. June 29, 2004) (unpublished)) (citing Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 390). This Court has thus explained, albeit in an unpublished opinion, that “while even a single beating offends one's sense of civilized governmental conduct, a single beating does not compel a finding of persecution.” Gjokic, 2004 WL 1491638, at  (citing Dandan v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 567, -13- No. 04-3369 574 (7th Cir. 2003)) (“being detained, beaten and deprived of food for three days did not compel a finding of persecution”); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th Cir.1995) (“‘[a]lthough a reasonable fact-finder could have found’ a brief detention and beating requiring no medical care ‘sufficient to establish past persecution . . . a fact-finder would [not] be compelled to do so’” ); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 704, 707 (10th Cir.1991) (“being ‘detained for a two-day period [and] interrogated and beaten’ did not compel a finding of past persecution”); Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir.1991) (“The function [of the past persecution inquiry] is to identify persecution so severe that perhaps a person should not be forced to return to the country in which she underwent it even if the danger of recurrence is negligible.”). The Court in Gjokic upheld a finding that petitioner had not been persecuted where he had been detained for several days following his attendance at a demonstration and who had been beaten by the police with rubber sticks, which caused bruising but no permanent injuries. Gjokic, 2004 WL 1491638, at . The court found that the IJ had properly considered the length of the detention, the severity of the physical harm, and “the context of the demonstration” that the alien had attended, i.e., the fact that the petitioner did not lead any demonstrations, did not speak at any demonstrations, and had not distinguished himself from the thousands of other demonstrators. Id. at . This Court’s decision in Gjokic, while unpublished, lends persuasive support to the IJ’s determination that, even if Dushi were credible, he failed to establish past persecution. Like the petitioner in that case, Dushi established only one incident of violence at the hands of the authorities, which resulted in bruising but no permanent injuries. While these allegations are serious, they do not compel a finding of past persecution, particularly in light of the fact that Dushi, like the -14- No. 04-3369 petitioner in Gjokic, similarly failed to establish anything particularly notable about the context of his arrest and detention at the demonstration: he was not a leader of the demonstrations, did not speak at the demonstration, and indeed did not belong to any political organization except one which is a part of the Albanian government. Dushi has not established past persecution. As a result, no presumption exists that he would be persecuted if returned to Albania. The question then becomes whether Dushi, without the presumption, has established he is more likely than not to be persecuted if returned to Albania. He has not met this standard. As the IJ pointed out, “[T]here is no evidence that the Socialist Party of 1998 would seek to harm [Dushi] . . . .” This is the result of . . . a change of circumstances since the election of the Democratic Party in March of 1992, a significant change in circumstances in that Albania has undergone several elections, the most recent of which were deemed to be in accord with general international standards, whereby the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party exchanged power on several occasions. The IJ based her reasoning on the Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions as published by the Department of State. Dushi’s response was the bald assertion that “[n]othing had changed.” Such an assertion is insufficient to show that Dushi would more likely than not be subjected to persecution. Dushi has not shown past persecution, nor has he shown a probability of future persecution. The IJ’s decision to deny Dushi’s INA claim was based on substantial evidence. As a result, his INA claim must fail. C. Petitioner’s Convention Against Torture claim -15- No. 04-3369 1. Legal Framework and Standard of Review An applicant for withholding of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture must establish that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured in the proposed country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2) (2005). The applicant’s testimony “if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration.” Id. In assessing the risk of torture, the adjudicator shall consider evidence of past torture inflicted on the applicant; evidence that the applicant could relocate to a part of the country where he is not likely to be tortured; evidence of “gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights;” and any other relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal. Id. § 208.16(c)(3). The regulations related to the Convention Against Torture define torture as: any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). This Court must uphold the IJ’s denial of withholding under the Convention Against Torture unless it is “manifestly contrary to the law.” Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591,596 (6th Cir. 2001). 2. Analysis The IJ rejected Dushi’s claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture simply by noting that he had “failed to establish that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured on one of the grounds cognizable under the regulations.” The IJ’s determination was, of course, in part -16- No. 04-3369 predicated on her determination that his testimony was incredible; however, even if Dushi were credible, he still failed to make the requisite showing. As an initial matter, a petitioner who is unable to make out a claim for withholding of removal under the INA based on past persecution is unlikely to be entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture. If the detention and beating occurred as Dushi describes, undoubtedly the experience was frightening and painful, but it did not constitute torture because he has presented no evidence meeting the statutory definition of “severe pain or suffering.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). The abuse alleged in this case, while certainly serious, does not appear to be as severe as that alleged in the rare case where this Circuit has found a petitioner to be entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture. See, e.g., Namo v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding petitioner was tortured when Iraqi authorities “detained him for two weeks, during which time he was beaten, forced to witness the rape of a woman, and threatened with the rape of his own wife”). Moreover, in addition to evidence of past torture, this court must weigh evidence of “gross, flagrant, or mass violations of human rights” – and Dushi has presented none. The IJ may consider any other information relevant to the question of whether Petitioner is likely to face torture if returned to Albania, and the IJ specifically noted evidence of changed conditions in Albania “indicat[ing] that the Socialist Party has not in fact maintained a post-communist tradition of retribution against political leaders.” Finally, as noted supra, the IJ relied on evidence of changed circumstances in Albania, in that democratic processes were taking hold in the country. Dushi presented no evidence that he was more likely than not to be tortured in such a changed country. -17- No. 04-3369 The IJ’s determination that Dushi was not entitled to relief under the Convention Against Torture was not manifestly contrary to the law, and therefore, this Court denies relief on that ground.