Opinion ID: 2292857
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of Paulley's Statement.

Text: The final issue we must discuss is raised by Gunn alone. Gunn contends the trial court erred by excluding on hearsay grounds a statement purportedly made by Paulley that Ward fired the fatal shot. We disagree with the argument that the trial court erred. Megan Sanders was an acquaintance of Paulley and, along with others, spent time with Paulley in a park shortly after Brown was killed. When called as a witness by the Commonwealth, Sanders began to relate her version of the events on the night in question. During the early portions of Sanders's testimony, the Commonwealth requested a bench conference at which the Commonwealth stated it believed that Sanders would shortly testify that Paulley had told Sanders that Ward had fired the shot that killed Brown. The Commonwealth stated that such a statement was inadmissible hearsay; Gunn's counsel stated that the statement should be admitted as a statement against interest. The trial court ruled the Commonwealth was not required to introduce any statements in its own case that it did not wish to introduce. The trial court then stated it believed the statement would be inadmissible hearsay if defense counsel sought to introduce it on cross-examination. When Gunn later sought to question Sanders about Paulley's alleged statement about Ward having been the shooter, the trial court ruled the statement inadmissible. All parties seem to agree the statement whatever its precise content would have beenwould have been hearsay. And hearsay is not admissible, unless it fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. [52] Gunn argues two main exceptions to the hearsay rule. Neither is persuasive. First, Gunn argues that the statement should have been deemed admissible under the holding of Chambers v. Mississippi. [53] We have summarized the pertinent aspects of Chambers as follows: In Chambers, another person, McDonald, who was not charged with the offense, had signed a sworn confession to having committed the murder. He had also made unsworn statements to others in which he admitted being the killer. The defendant was permitted to call McDonald as a witness and to introduce the sworn, written confession. However, McDonald denied committing the murder and recanted the confession, offering a plausible explanation for having originally signed it. Under Mississippi's voucher rule of evidence, the defendant was prohibited from thereafter impeaching McDonald, his own witness, either by cross-examination or by use of his prior unsworn statements. Mississippi's hearsay rule did not permit McDonald's prior inconsistent, but unsworn, statements to be used for substantive purposes, and did not contain an exception for hearsay statements against penal interest. Thus, the defendant could not rebut McDonald's recantation of his sworn confession and was essentially prevented from presenting his best defense to the charges against him. It was held under those circumstances that where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. [54] Plainly, Chambers is distinguishable from the case at hand. Chambers was concerned with a situation in which a defendant could not impeach his own witness and whether that inability deprived a defendant of a right to defend himselfa concern not present in the case at hand. Equally important, the statement at issue in Chambers was self-incriminating; Paulley's alleged statement at issue in the present case directly incriminated Ward and only indirectly incriminated Paulley by, at most, merely placing Paulley at the scene of the shooting. So we do not believe that Chambers applies, nor that our longstanding rules deeming hearsay inadmissible are, in this case, being applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. [55] Gunn's second argument in favor of the statement's admissibility is even less meritorious. Gunn contends that the statement was admissible as the statement of a party-opponent. [56] We have recently rejected an identical argument, explaining that [f]or a party to use another's statement against them, the express language of the rule [ i.e., KRE 801 A] and general understanding indicate that such use can only occur between party opponents. Co-defendants in a criminal prosecution are treated as the same party for purposes of the rule. [57] So the statement at issue, being the statement of a co-defendant, does not fall within the ambit of KRE 801A.