Opinion ID: 220349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Fassler’s counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw as appellate counsel. In the Anders brief, counsel asserts that, after an “exhaustive review” of the record, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, though counsel does raise the issue of whether the court erred when it imposed an $8,000 fine, despite the PSR’s conclusion that Fassler did not appear to have an ability to pay. Counsel also states that regardless of the merit of any claims, Fassler waived his right -3- No. 08-4258 United States v. Fassler to pursue a direct appeal in his “validly executed binding plea agreement.” Fassler sought and was granted an extension of time in which to file a supplemental pro se brief, however, he ultimately did not file a pro se brief. The government also did not file a brief, but explained in a letter that it agreed with Fassler’s counsel that “Fassler was subject to a knowing and voluntary plea agreement wherein he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence to the extent that the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.” We review de novo the question of whether a defendant waived his rights in a valid plea agreement. United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 739 (6th Cir. 2010). “‘It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case may waive any right, even a constitutional right, by means of a plea agreement.’” United States v. Calderon, 388 F.3d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763–64 (6th Cir. 2001)). However, “[f]or a plea agreement to be constitutionally valid, a defendant must have entered into the agreement knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Smith, 344 F.3d 479, 483 (6th Cir. 2003). If the agreement is valid, we are “bound by that agreement and will not review the sentence except in limited circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Fassler’s plea agreement provided that he “expressly waiv[ed]” his appellate rights, “except as reserved below.” The plea agreement then reserved only Fassler’s right to appeal “any punishment in excess of the statutory maximum” and “any punishment to the extent it represents a sentence higher than 135 months.”1 At his plea hearing, the court complied with Federal Rule of 1 It also stated that the agreement was no bar to Fassler’s right to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct, neither of which are at issue here. -4- No. 08-4258 United States v. Fassler Criminal Procedure 11(b) and ensured that Fassler understood and was fully informed about the terms of the plea agreement, including the appellate waiver. Fassler’s counsel and counsel for the government both stated that Fassler was competent to enter his plea, and the court concluded that Fassler was entering his plea knowingly and voluntarily. Fassler has not submitted a pro se brief and there is no argument before the court that the waiver was not knowingly or voluntarily made, nor does our review of the record demonstrate any support for such an argument. Thus, we conclude that the appellate waiver is valid. Moreover, because the fines imposed were well below the statutory maximum, the exception does not apply and we need not consider the claim raised by Fassler’s counsel in the Anders brief. Additionally, review of the record demonstrates that there are no other non-frivolous issues for appeal that fall within the exceptions to Fassler’s appellate waiver.