Opinion ID: 2634894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Agreement to Private Lands

Text: [¶ 11] The district court found the Agreement created common use rights to the BLM lands only, leaving the private lands unencumbered. The district court reasoned that, since the actual sale was for private lands only and the private lands were unencumbered, there could be no breach of contract or breach of warranty deed. The Ellises, of course, strongly rely upon this reasoning on appeal. As a result, we find it expedient to analyze the area of geographical coverage of the Agreement as a preliminary matter. [¶ 12] Contrary to the finding of the district court, we find the Agreement ambiguous as to its coverage in the West Pasture. This Court construes contractual language as a matter of law. Its goal is to determine the intent and understanding of the parties. It begins the inquiry by determining whether the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous. Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Co., 2001 WY 16, ¶ 10, 18 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Wyo.2001). If the language is clear and unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be secured from the four corners of the contract. Id.; Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo.1989). [¶ 13] The language of a contract is to be construed within the context in which it was written, and this Court may look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose of the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made. Carlson v. Flocchini Invs., 2005 WY 19, ¶ 15, 106 P.3d 847, 854 (Wyo.2005); Polo Ranch Company v. City of Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo. 1998). The language is also to be considered as a whole, taking into consideration the relationship between the various parts. Collins v. Finnell, 2001 WY 74, ¶ 15, 29 P.3d 93, 99 (Wyo.2001). This Court attempts to avoid a construction which renders a provision meaningless by striving to reconcile any provisions which apparently conflict before adopting a construction which would nullify any provision. Stone v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., L.P., 2008 WY 49, ¶ 18, 181 P.3d 936, 942 (Wyo.2008). [¶ 14] As applied to the Agreement, reading the Agreement as a whole, we find it does affect private lands. On the one hand, the original parties to the Agreement were neighboring ranchers who were the users of the federal range in T. 24 N., R. 79 and 80 and T. 23 N., R. 79 and 80. However, the priorities are set within what the parties termed blocks of land such as the Ellis Block and the Chace Block. These Blocks are undefined in the Agreement. [¶ 15] The language of the Agreement indicates the blocks included both federal lands and private lands. For instance, the Agreement provides the users will determine at this meeting the priority of these [sic] using the federal range in this area together with a rating of the federal range and their privately owned property and later the users set the rating on the federal range as six acres per cow per month and on the unfenced private owned land at 5 acres per cow per month. In allocating grazing priorities within each block, the Agreement divides the stock among the area being worked. The fact that the area being worked is more than just the federal lands is demonstrated by the individual allocations. For each block, the parties listed stock that would be allowed on federal range lands and stock that would be allowed elsewhere. [¶ 16] These references reflect a direct impact of the Agreement on private lands. How the Agreement impacts the lands within the West Pasture, however, is unclear. 9V's predecessor in interest was Gust Nelson. In the Agreement, Nelson was given priority for 111 stock in the Ellis Block52 on federal range and 59 elsewhere. This certainly suggests Nelson's allotment included Ellis private lands. Ambiguity exists, however, because of the lack of a more precise definition of the Ellis Block and elsewhere. This ambiguity prevents the Agreement from being used as unambiguous support for the Ellises' argument that private lands are unaffected. [3] Because we are reviewing the grant of summary judgment and Foxley therefore is entitled to receive the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we will proceed with our discussion operating under the assumption that common use rights exist on private lands as well as federal lease lands in the West Pasture.