Opinion ID: 2674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Rationale for Vacating Sentence in This Case

Text: We do not decide that consideration by a sentencing court of population density or similar community-based factors is impermissible in all cases. See United States v. Anati, 457 F.3d 233, 238 (2d Cir.2006) (suggesting that the special impact of the offense in a particular geographical community could be relevant to sentencing). [3] Nonetheless, the preceding discussion suggests the circumstances under which a district court can base a sentence on such factors in a manner that is both compatible with the § 3553(a) factors and in keeping with its judicial role will arise infrequently. A heavy measure of caution is suggested also by several pre- Booker decisions of our sister circuits. See United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494, 1498-99 (5th Cir. 1990) (reversing sentence where district court considered local standards as to what constituted a significant amount of cocaine); United States v. Thomas, 906 F.2d 323, 327-28 (7th Cir.1990) (rejecting sentence based on degree of violence in city and state where offense was committed); United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347, 351-53 (1st Cir.1989) (reversing upward departure based on high incidence of crime and insufficient law enforcement in specific location and community standards); see also United States v. Hadaway, 998 F.2d 917, 920-21 (11th Cir.1993) (rejecting downward departure based on finding that many local residents committed the crime in question and would perceive sentence as too high, while allowing judges to consider community factors in sentencing within Guidelines). Each of these cases held that a sentencing court could not depart from the Guidelines on the basis of community-specific considerations. These courts expressed concern that allowing departures based on such considerations would undermine the congressional goal of reducing sentencing disparity. See, e.g., Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d at 352-53 (stating that any regime where equally blameworthy criminal received different sentences depending on where crime occurred would foster the wide variations Congress sought to eliminate). The decisions emphasized in addition that departures should be based on case-specific considerations rather than generalized disagreements with the Guidelines' treatment of whole categories of offenses. See, e.g., Hadaway, 998 F.2d at 921 (Downward departures based on community standards . . . would apply generally to every violation of a specific federal statute by any person in a particular community.); Barbontin, 907 F.2d at 1499 (noting that judicial dissatisfaction, no matter how steeped in real-world wisdom, is an untenable ground for departures). We share each of these concerns and find them pertinent today as before Booker. Of course, we have recognized that, after Booker, the Guidelines limitations on the use of factors to permit departures are no more binding on sentencing judges than the calculated Guidelines ranges themselves. United States v. Jones, 460 F.3d 191, 194 (2d Cir.2006). Accordingly, district judges are afforded wide latitude to impose non-Guidelines sentences based on case-specific applications of the § 3553(a) factors. For example, in Jones, the district court had imposed a non-Guidelines sentence that was 50 percent below the bottom of the Guidelines range based on the judge's gut feeling about the defendant and findings on his personal circumstances. Id. In affirming the sentence we observed that a district judge may consider the defendant's background together with the judge's own sense of what is a fair and just sentence under all the circumstances, thereby fulfilling his or her historic role. Id. at 195-96. Read together, our cases addressing sentences outside the Guidelines range make clear that Booker requires the district courts to tailor sentences to reflect an application of the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114 (2d Cir.2005) (emphasizing our expectation that post- Booker sentences will achieve more individualized justice). But such individualized sentencing does not authorize a district court to inject into sentencing decisions its policy preferences with respect to the category of offense in question or the kind of community in which it is perpetrated, see, e.g., Castillo, 460 F.3d at 357 ([N]othing in Booker suggests that it is the task of district court judges to pronounce broad policy choices rather than specific sentences based on the specific facts of a case.). Cavera's sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. The district court committed procedural error by relying on its own policy judgment concerning all gun trafficking offenses in New York and comparable cities in fixing Cavera's sentence. See Castillo, 460 F.3d at 354 ([T]he question . . . is whether the . . . imposition of a sentence that rejected the 100:1 ratio purely on generalized policy grounds . . . satisfies [the] standard of procedural reasonableness.). As the resulting non-Guidelines sentence has not been explained by reference to any properly considered § 3553(a) factor, we also deem Cavera's sentence substantively unreasonable. Cf. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d at 134 (A non-Guidelines sentence that a district court imposes in reliance on factors incompatible with the Commission's policy statements may be deemed substantively unreasonable in the absence of persuasive explanation as to why the sentence actually comports with the § 3553(a) factors.). Because we hold that the district court's reliance on improper factors renders Cavera's sentence unreasonable, we do not address his contention that the district court erred by failing to afford him adequate notice of its intent to impose an enhanced non-Guidelines sentence.