Opinion ID: 2585384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: review of wellsville's decision

Text: ¶ 41 DPSI next claims the district court abused its discretion by issuing permanent injunctions based on review of Wellsville's decision rather than granting DPSI a trial on the merits. Wellsville counters that because it brought its claim for injunctive relief only as a means of enforcement for nuisance abatement, two separate but related issues were before the court: (1) whether the Wellsville City Council's decision was within lawful authority and not arbitrary or capricious, and (2) whether an injunction was an appropriate remedy. ¶ 42 It is well established that when courts review the actions of an administrative body, that body's actions are `endowed with a presumption of correctness and validity which the courts should not interfere with unless it is shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken.' Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Utah 1984) (quoting Cottonwood Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979)); see also Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 24, 979 P.2d 332 (ruling that review of municipality's action is based on whether, in light of evidence before municipality, reasonable minds could reach same conclusion); 2 Antieau, supra ¶ 32, § 29.07[2], at 29-59 (majority of courts presume that local government legislation is valid and constitutional). Judicial review of license revocations by municipalities is limited to a determination whether the municipality acted within its lawful authority and in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious. Whiting v. Clayton, 617 P.2d 362, 364 (Utah 1980); see also Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Utah 1980) (holding that courts will not interfere with action of city council unless action is outside authority or deemed capricious or arbitrary); Peatross v. Board of Comm'rs, 555 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 1976) (holding that reviewing court will not interfere unless lower tribunal's action was outside scope of authority or deemed capricious and arbitrary and thus licensee was not entitled to trial de novo). In its review, the district court must not weigh the evidence anew but, instead, must determine whether the record discloses a reasonable basis for the municipality's decision. See Springville Citizens, 1999 UT 25 at ¶ 24, 979 P.2d 332; Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035. ¶ 43 Therefore, we agree with Wellsville's characterization of the proceedings. As a result, we will review the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis of its conclusions that Wellsville acted within its lawful authority and Wellsville's decision was not arbitrary or capricious. We will separately review the district court's grant of injunction as an appropriate remedy. See infra part V. ¶ 44 First, we have already established that Wellsville was within its specifically granted authority to refuse to renew DPSI's business license in view of Wellsville's ruling that DPSI violated the Wellsville nuisance ordinances. See supra part II. Therefore, we look to whether DPSI raised any genuine issue as to whether Wellsville's action was arbitrary or capricious. ¶ 45 The record shows that the city council began to receive complaints of terrible smells as early as the spring of 1991. Wellsville and DPSI negotiated and stipulated to measures that would hopefully abate these odors. However, the smells continued. In January of 1996, the city council reviewed whether to renew DPSI's business license. The council considered denying renewal at that time but agreed to work further with DPSI on the issue. A joint committee was formed to investigate and eliminate the odor problem. Nevertheless, the odors continued, and after nine months of continuing complaints, the city council once again held a hearing to consider whether to renew DPSI's business license. After a hearing in October 1996, the Wellsville City Council determined that the strong odors from DPSI's operations violated the Wellsville nuisance ordinances and therefore the council denied DPSI's business license renewal application. ¶ 46 The facts, even when taken in a light favorable to DPSI, indicate that Wellsville had worked with DPSI in good faith over an extensive period of time to resolve the odor problem. Since DPSI has shown no genuine issue as to any material fact that disputes the reasonableness of Wellsville's action, we hold that the district judge did not err in finding Wellsville's action to be neither arbitrary nor capricious. Therefore, summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law.