Opinion ID: 396306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: umta report

Text: 16 Appellants claim that the district court erred in refusing to admit a report prepared by the staff of the Urban Mass Transit Administration (UMTA). UMTA is a federal agency to which the Secretary of Transportation has delegated his statutory duty to investigate unsafe conditions in facilities and equipment financed under the Urban Mass Transportation Act 3 and to review state or municipal programs for the correction of those unsafe conditions. National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974 § 107, 49 U.S.C. § 1604a (1976). The report, dated April 4, 1980 and prepared as a recommendation to the Administrator of UMTA, reviewed various proposals for correction of the cracking problem affecting the R-46 undercarriages, including the retrofit and the replacement programs which later were brought to the attention of the jury in the instant case. The report concluded that the retrofit was the surest way of immediately correcting the R-46 safety problem, but reached no conclusion on the question of whether the retrofit provided an effective long-term solution to the safety problem. 17 At trial, appellants sought to introduce the UMTA report or testimony regarding its conclusions. They claimed that the report rebutted appellees' contention that the retrofit was unsafe. Appellants argue here that the district court's refusal to admit the report, or testimony about its findings, deprived them of a fair trial with respect to damages. They assert that the report-which was written by employees of the only government agency other than those of The City of New York and The Transit Authority which evaluated the safety of the retrofit-was relevant non-hearsay which would have led the jury to find that The Transit Authority Board of Directors unreasonably failed to mitigate damages when it rejected the retrofit. We disagree that it was error to reject the report. 18 Contrary to appellants' claims at trial and on appeal, we hold that the hearsay report was not admissible as the record, report, or statement of a government agency pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C). That Rule provides for the admission in evidence, in civil actions, of government agency reports which otherwise would be excludable as hearsay, if those reports constitute factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. As with any exception to the rule against hearsay, Rule 803(8)(C) is to be applied in a commonsense manner, subject to the district court's sound exercise of discretion in determining whether the hearsay document offered in evidence has sufficient independent indicia of reliability to justify its admission. LeRoy v. Sabena World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 272 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 878 (1965); see Swietlowich v. County of Bucks, 610 F.2d 1157, 1165 (3 Cir. 1979); Weinstein and Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence P 803(8)(03) (1979). In applying that rule to the UMTA report, it is clear to us that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion, Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 550 F.2d 762, 769 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977), in excluding the document as hearsay. 19 By its own terms, the UMTA report was not the final report or finding of a government agency within the meaning of the Rule, but was an interim staff report in the form of a recommendation to the Administrator. As an interim report subject to revision and review, the report did not satisfy the express requirement of the Rule that the proffered evidence must constitute the findings of an agency or official. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F.Supp. 1125, 1145 (E.D.Pa.1980). In so holding, we do not rely merely on the staff's use of the term interim, but we attach substantial significance to the fact that the report expressly declined to state a conclusion on the most significant safety question-whether the retrofitted R-46 cars would provide long-term safety, although important static and fatigue tests requested by appellees never had been performed. 4 Accordingly, while the UMTA report included broad conclusory language which might have been used to advantage at trial, as appellants claim, a close reading of the report makes it evident that the broad language did not embody the findings of an agency, but the tentative results of an incomplete staff investigation. We hold that it was properly excluded. Pollard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 598 F.2d 1284, 1286-87 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979). It also is significant that the UMTA Administrator did not accept the recommendation of the staff report to the extent that the staff stated a preference for the retrofit proposal. 5 Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., 141 F.2d 568, 572 (10 Cir. 1944). 20 Moreover, the findings set forth in the report were not based on independent testing by the UMTA, or tests which had been verified by UMTA, or even test results which were the subject of formal administrative hearings. Instead, the UMTA staff relied upon hand-outs from the parties to this action which consisted largely of data derived from tests conducted by appellants themselves. This lack of formal verification or procedure itself was sufficient to justify the exclusion of the report as untrustworthy. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1051 (2 Cir. 1976); Notes of Advisory Committee, Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C), 28 U.S.C.A. at 590 (1975). 21 In our view, no other exception to the hearsay rule would have permitted the admission of the UMTA report. 6 Even if the report was admissible, however, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding, in the alternative, that the report should be excluded under Fed.R.Evid. 403 because the likelihood that it would confuse the jury and protract the proceedings outweighed its probative value. United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978). Judge Weinfeld's decision represented an eminently sound exercise of discretion. First, the report was prepared for very different purposes that those for which it was offered at trial. The UMTA staff was attempting to determine the quickest solution for an immediate safety problem, and not whether The City of New York and The Transit Authority would get what they bargained for-subway cars which would be safe and dependable for up to 35 years. Second, as a so-called government report which in fact was incomplete and based largely on hearsay, the report would have been presented to the jury in an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness which would not have been commensurate with its actual reliability. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1 Cir. 1979); see United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 674 (2 Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Weinstein and Berger, 1 Weinstein's Evidence P 403(04) (1980). Third, the admission of the report would have been likely to protract an already prolonged trial with an inquiry into collateral issues regarding the accuracy of the report and the methods used in its compilation. John McShain v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3 Cir. 1977).