Opinion ID: 454326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Cause and Prejudice Standard

Text: 10 Relying on Reed v. Ross, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2901, 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984), Griffin argues that he has cause for not raising his multiplicity argument because the circuits are split on the question of whether a defendant must raise a multiplicity claim based on the indictment before trial. In Reed, the Supreme Court held that where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures. 104 S.Ct. at 2910. Initially, we note that Reed applies to novel constitutional theories rather than procedural questions. See id. at 2911. However, even if we were to agree with the defendant that Reed also applies to procedural questions and that a split in the circuits qualifies to render a question novel as that term is utilized in Reed, the defendant's argument still fails because it does not explain why he did not raise his multiplicity claim on appeal. When the cause and prejudice standard is applied, the defendant must satisfy both the cause and prejudice elements. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 168, 102 S.Ct. at 1594. Because Griffin is unable to demonstrate cause excusing his double procedural default, we need not address the question of whether he was actually prejudiced. 11