Opinion ID: 1859418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: comparison of plain error relief standard with post-conviction relief standard under strickland

Text: Mr. Deck filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15, which was denied by the motion court. The State argues that the motion court properly rejected Mr. Deck's arguments in regard to error in the mitigation instructions based on this Court's holding on direct appeal that the failure to give the jury the two mitigation paragraphs did not amount to plain error. The State argues, it is well-settled law that a finding of no `plain error' on direct appeal forecloses a movant from re-litigating the same issue in a post-conviction motion under the guise of `ineffective assistance of counsel.' It concludes that, as a result, [t]he finding of no manifest injustice under the `plain error' standard on direct appeal serves to establish a finding of no prejudice under the test of ineffectiveness of counsel enunciated under Strickland v. Washington, [466 U.S. at 686-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052]. In support, the State relies on cases such as Sidebottom v. State, 781 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. banc 1989), and various intermediate appellate court decisions. Mr. Deck disputes the State's interpretation and application of these cases and argues that, to the extent they may support the State's position, they fail to follow Strickland and should be overruled. This Court's review of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying a post-conviction motion is limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous. Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Mo. banc 2001). Here the parties have presented an issue as to the proper legal standard to be applied in determining a post-conviction motion. This is an issue of law, which this Court determines de novo, without deference to the motion court. State v. Werner, 9 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. banc 2000).
The United States Supreme Court set out the standard for granting post-conviction relief based on allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland . It held that the benchmark for judging whether counsel is ineffective is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It further explained that in order to meet this standard movant must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that trial counsel failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A movant bears a heavy burden in establishing the first prong of the standard by a preponderance of the evidence, for the movant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel provided competent assistance. Rule 29.15(i); Leisure v. State, 828 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. banc 1992). Movant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To do this, movant must identify specific acts or omissions of counsel that resulted from unreasonable professional judgment, and the court must determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In regard to the second prong of the Strickland test, the Court said that an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For this reason, a movant must claim counsel's errors resulted in prejudice by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). This standard is not met by showing that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding or that the errors `impaired the presentation of the defense,' as those standards are either unworkable or subject to being satisfied by every error. Id. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. On the other hand, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that a movant must meet an outcome-determinative test by showing that it is more likely than not that counsel's deficient conduct altered the outcome of the case, because [t]he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome. Id.
While Missouri courts since Strickland have uniformly recognized the Strickland standard for ineffectiveness and prejudice, some cases have overlooked Strickland 's careful admonition that a movant need not prove that an error was outcome-determinative in order to be entitled to post-conviction relief. The origin of this erroneous application of Strickland appears to be in the misinterpretation of Sidebottom . Sidebottom involved the effect of defense counsel's failure to object to an exhibit that made reference to an uncharged rape and burglary. After setting forth the applicable Strickland standard, Sidebottom noted that the error was raised on direct appeal, but was determined not to have resulted in plain error. 781 S.W.2d at 796-97. It then determined that, [o]n the facts of the present case and the law as applied to them, the bases for the Court's finding of no manifest injustice on direct appeal serve now to establish a finding of no prejudice under the Strickland test. Sidebottom, 781 S.W.2d at 796 (emphasis added). As is evident, Sidebottom did not state that a finding of no plain error on direct appeal necessarily equates to a finding of no prejudice under Strickland . It simply held that the facts that formed the bases of its finding of no plain error in that case also formed the bases of the finding of no Strickland prejudice on the post-conviction motion. In so doing, it properly applied the Strickland standard, not the plain error standard, stating,  movant fails to show that, but for trial counsel's failure to object and then to request a mistrial, there was a `reasonable probability that the result would have been different.'  Sidebottom, 781 S.W.2d at 797 (emphasis added). Various opinions have taken this language from Sidebottom , and from two of this Court's later cases, [3] out of context and have incorrectly concluded that [a] finding of no manifest injustice on direct plain error review establishes a finding of no prejudice for purposes of the Strickland test. State v. Williams, 945 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Mo.App. W.D.1997). [4] In so doing, they have lost sight of the difference in the standards of review Strickland teaches are applicable on plain error review as opposed to on post-conviction review. More specifically, while, under Missouri law, plain error can serve as the basis for granting a new trial on direct appeal only if the error was outcome determinative, State v. Armentrout, 8 S.W.3d 99, 110 (Mo. banc 1999), Strickland clearly and explicitly holds that an outcome-determinative test cannot be applied in a post-conviction setting. [5] 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, the two tests are not equivalents. To the extent that the cases relied on by the State and other Missouri cases apply a different standard, they are inconsistent with Strickland and should no longer be followed.
The reason why the standards of review of preserved and unpreserved error on direct appeal are different from each other, and why both are in turn different from the standard for review of a post-conviction motion, is explained by the very different focuses of the inquiries under each standard. On direct appeal, the issue is whether the trial court erred in its rulings at trial. Appellate review of preserved error is for prejudice, not mere error, and [it] will reverse only if the error is so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. banc 1996). If no objection was made or the error was otherwise not preserved, then the trial court cannot normally be accused of error in its rulings, much less prejudicial error. In order to serve the need for accuracy in the outcome of a trial, appellate courts have the discretion to nonetheless review for plain error if manifest injustice would otherwise result. Rule 30.20; State v. Johnson, 968 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Mo. banc 1998). But, both of these standards presuppose that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. By contrast, when a post-conviction motion is filed alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant is asserting the absence of one of the crucial assurances that the result of the proceeding is reliable, so finality concerns are somewhat weaker and the appropriate standard of prejudice should be somewhat lower. Id. The ultimate determination thus, is not the propriety of the trial court's actions with regard to an alleged error, but whether defendant has suffered a genuine deprivation of his right to effective assistance of counsel, such that this Court's confidence in the fairness of the proceeding is undermined. Cf. Wilson v. State, 813 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Mo. banc 1991); Walker v. State, 698 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo. App. W.D.1985). Of course, as Strickland recognized, 466 U.S. at 694, 697, 104 S.Ct 2052 this theoretical difference in the two standards of review will seldom cause a court to grant post-conviction relief after it has denied relief on direct appeal, for, in most cases, an error that is not outcome-determinative on direct appeal will also fail to meet the Strickland test. Nonetheless, Strickland cautions that the distinction in the standards of review is important because there are a small number of cases in which the application of the two tests will produce different results. Id. at 697, 104 S.Ct 2052. This is borne out in the several Missouri cases that have found a basis for post-conviction relief, or recognized that such a basis could exist, despite finding no plain error on direct appeal. For instance, in Kenner v. State, 709 S.W.2d 536 (Mo.App. E.D.1986), the court noted that on direct appeal it had held that the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting evidence of other crimes committed by defendant, where counsel did not object to admission of this evidence. Id. at 539. There, as here, the State argued that claims rejected on direct appeal are not cognizable in his post-conviction motion. Id. at 540. Kenner rejected this argument based on the distinction between the issues before a court on direct appeal and on post-conviction review, stating: In reviewing the trial court's decision on movant's Rule 27.26 motion we are not determining the propriety of the admittance into evidence of testimony and photographs ... We are determining whether defense counsel's failure to timely and properly object to this evidence constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel thereby prejudicing movant. We find that the untimeliness ... was highly prejudicial and is grounds for granting movant[`]s Rule 27.26 motion. Id. (emphasis added). Other opinions recognize that the two inquiries are different and that denial of a plain error claim is not dispositive of the question whether counsel was ineffective in failing to preserve the issue as to which plain error was not found. See, e.g., State v. Sublett, 887 S.W.2d 618, 620 (Mo.App. W.D.1994) (court found no plain error, said it could not say how it might have ruled were the issue preserved, and remanded for determination of the separate issue whether counsel would be found ineffective under Rule 29.15 for failing to object). [6]