Opinion ID: 1597598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: property appraiser's standing

Text: The initial question presented is whether, in an action filed by a property appraiser seeking review of an adverse decision of the VAB which has overturned the appraiser's ad valorem tax assessment on a subject property, the appraiser may, within an appeal pursuant to section 194.036, Florida Statutes (1997), challenge the validity of a statute on the basis that such statute is contrary to limitations imposed by the United States Constitution or the Florida Constitution. We conclude that an appraiser may not, in that context, challenge the constitutionality of an applicable valuation statute. Historically, it has been recognized that an appraiser acting in his or her official capacity cannot ordinarily initiate an independent action challenging the validity of a taxing statute which allegedly provides for an ad valorem tax exemption (express or de facto ) which is contrary to limitations imposed by the Florida Constitution. See Markham v. Yankee Clipper Hotel, Inc., 427 So.2d 383 (Fla. 4th DCA) (holding that a property appraiser who is dissatisfied with the wisdom of a taxation statute cannot challenge the validity of the statute in an action for declaratory relief), review denied, 434 So.2d 888 (Fla.1983). The appraiser can make such a challenge, however, if the taxing statute at issue involves the disbursement of public funds. See Kaulakis v. Boyd, 138 So.2d 505, 507 (Fla.1962) (recognizing that the general rule that a ministerial officer cannot in a judicial proceeding attack the validity of a law imposing duties on him is subject to the exception that such a law may be challenged where it involves the disbursement of public funds); Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 351 (Fla.1953) (observing, without finding it applicable, that an exception to the Atlantic Coast Line [3] rule that the right to declare an act unconstitutional... cannot be exercised by the officers of the executive department under the guise of the observance of their oath of office to support the Constitution becomes applicable when the public may be affected in a very important particular, its pocketbook, and, in such case, the necessity of protecting the public funds is of paramount importance, and the rule denying to ministerial officers the right to question the validity of the Act must give way to a matter of more urgent and vital public interest). The appraiser may also raise such a constitutional defense in an action initiated by the taxpayer challenging a property assessment. See Department of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla. 1982) (observing that, while state officers must presume legislation affecting their duties to be valid, and do not have standing to initiate litigation for the purpose of determining otherwise, because, in such case, they do not have a sufficiently substantial interest or special injury to allow the court to hear the challenge, if the operation of a statute is brought into issue in litigation brought by another against a [state officer, the officer] may defensively raise the question of the law's constitutionality). However, as we recognized in Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455, 458 (Fla.1982), [s]tate officers and agencies must presume legislation affecting their duties to be valid, and do not have standing to initiate litigation for the purpose of determining otherwise. Section 194.036(1)(a) provides no exception to this rule. Indeed, it specifically provides, in pertinent part, that nothing herein shall authorize the property appraiser to institute any suit to challenge the validity of any portion of the constitution or of any duly enacted legislative act of this state. As aptly observed by the Second District in Turner, [t]his statutory prohibition of constitutional challenges by property appraisers is in accord with the general common law principle denying ministerial officers the power to challenge the constitutionality of statutes. 739 So.2d at 179-80 (citing State ex rel. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922), and Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d 347, 351 (Fla. 1953)). Accordingly, we approve the decision in Turner, and reverse the decision in Fuchs. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.