Opinion ID: 67136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gray’s Title VII Retaliation Claim

Text: Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee in retaliation for opposing a practice made an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, “a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the two events.” Johnson v. Booker T. Washington Broad. Serv., Inc., 234 F.3d 501, 507 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Gray can establish that she engaged in statutorily protected activity under Title VII ’s opposition clause only if “[s]he shows that [s]he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful employment 14 practices.” Little v. United Tech., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). Gray must show not only that she subjectively believed she was being discriminated against, but also “that [her] belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record presented.” Id. (emphasis in original). As previously discussed, once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of retaliation by producing legitimate reasons for the adverse employment action. Springer, 509 F.3d at 1347. If the defendant offers legitimate reasons, the presumption of retaliation disappears. See id. The plaintiff must then show that the employer’s proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. See id. In this case, Gray has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to either of the activities she complains because, inter alia, she cannot show that she engaged in statutorily protected activity with respect to the activities surrounding either the November 2004 conversation or the April 2005 letter about her pay. See Johnson, 234 F.3d at 507. As such, she cannot show that the Board retaliated against her on that basis. Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment on this claim.6 6 It is worth noting that, with respect to her claim of retaliation based on her “protest” regarding her pay, (1) there is no evidence that Gray was being paid less than other similarly15