Opinion ID: 449763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffectiveness of Counsel at the Sentencing Hearing

Text: 65 The district court also vacated the sentence of death on the ground that trial counsel's service to Blake at the sentencing hearing fell far short of the requirement that reasonably adequate assistance in fact be rendered. 513 F.Supp. at 779. 66 Blake's defense counsel, Haupt, testified at the habeas hearing that he made no preparations whatsoever for the penalty phase of Blake's trial because he believed that Blake would be found not guilty by reason of insanity. It was his philosophy that a lawyer should try to win [a case] rather than prepare for losing it. Only after the jury had retired did Haupt sense that his client would be found guilty. At that time he sought a continuance, which was denied. 67 As a result, Haupt went into the sentencing phase without any idea whether there was or was not mitigating evidence available which might persuade the jury not to impose a death sentence, other than the psychiatric evidence introduced during the trial. 68 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court's opinion in Strickland v. Washington enunciated a two-part test which must be applied in judging whether defense counsel's errors amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. 104 S.Ct. at 2064. We do not hesitate in agreeing with the district court that Blake has satisfied the first part of the test. It should be beyond cavil that an attorney who fails altogether to make any preparations for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial deprives his client of reasonably effective assistance of counsel by any objective standard of reasonableness. 69 This is not the end of the inquiry, for Blake must also demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney's conduct. The district court determined that Haupt's error was prejudicial per se and that even if prejudice needed to be affirmatively proved, Blake had adequately shown that Haupt's ineffectiveness was prejudicial: [n]evertheless, petitioner has made a credible, if hardly overwhelming, showing of prejudice. 513 F.Supp. at 780. 70 However, because the district court was without the benefit of Strickland, we must reexamine this conclusion in light of that case's holding. There the Court held, first, that [c]onflict of interest claims aside, actual ineffectiveness claims alleging a deficiency in attorney performance are subject to a general requirement that the defendant affirmatively proved prejudice. 104 S.Ct. at 2067. The Court added that such claims cannot be classified according to likelihood of causing prejudice. Id. 71 The Court also enunciated the proper standard for proving prejudice resulting from ineffective counsel: 72 The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 73 Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2068. 74 We agree with the district court that a presumption of prejudice would be proper where counsel's representation was so deficient as to amount in every respect to no representation at all, see Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 739 n. 1 (11th Cir.1982). However, we do not believe this is the case here, although this is a very close question. As Haupt acknowledged at the habeas hearing, the psychiatric evidence presented during the guilt phase of the trial was relevant not only to the issue of insanity but also to the question of mitigation in the determination of an appropriate penalty. Furthermore, there is no contention that Haupt did not build a reasonably cogent argument around the psychiatric evidence as a basis for mitigation; although no record of that argument exists. Thus, on balance, it probably cannot be said that Blake's defense during the penalty phase was a mere sham, amounting to no representation at all. 75 We must then turn to the question whether Blake has demonstrated actual prejudice--that is, whether it is reasonably probable that the jury would have imposed a lesser sentence, but for Haupt's failure to prepare for the penalty phase of the trial. We note that, in finding actual prejudice, the district court applied a harmless error standard, which is incorrect under Strickland v. Washington. 76 Upon an exhaustive search of the record, we nevertheless believe that Blake has adequately demonstrated a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence but for Haupt's complete failure to search out mitigating character evidence. As the district court found, [p]etitioner has demonstrated that no favorable evidence was sought and that some was in fact available. 513 F.Supp. at 781. Haupt apparently did interview Blake's father on more than one occasion and there were other persons with the father during those interviews. It also appears that he met with both of Blake's parents at his office one time before the trial. This apparently was the extent of his investigation into character evidence which might be used for mitigation at a penalty proceeding. 77 At the habeas hearing, Blake proffered four persons, in addition to his mother, who could and would have testified to mitigating circumstances on his behalf but who were never contacted by Haupt. Three had known him since childhood. All could have testified to the effect that Blake was a man who was respectful toward others, who generally got along well with people and who gladly offered to help whenever anyone needed something. His mother also named four other persons who would have testified on Blake's behalf but who had since died. 11 We agree with the district court that: 78 Mr. Haupt in no way used or even considered additional evidence which might have been available to support the defendant's cause. Such a performance hardly comports with the notion that the sentencing phase be in fact a distinct procedure where the jury's attention is focused not just on the circumstances of the crime, but also on special facts about this defendant that mitigate against imposing capital punishment! 79 513 F.Supp. at 780 (citations omitted). 80 The state insists that the absence of any mitigating evidence did not prejudice Blake because each of the witnesses would also have testified, if asked, that he or she knew that Blake had once been arrested on an assault charge in connection with the stabbing of his estranged wife, Charlesetta Blake, who was pregnant at the time. We believe that while this very well could have persuaded a jury to impose the death sentence in any event, Blake was nevertheless prejudiced by the absence of the character evidence. In fact, during the guilt phase of the trial, the state was permitted to introduce testimony by Charlesetta Blake concerning the altercation which had preceded the stabbing, though any testimony about the stabbing was excluded. Mrs. Blake testified that, in an attempt to compel her to return to him, Blake had grabbed her two-year old son and held a knife to him, saying, If I run this knife through this baby's heart, you'll come with me. Thus, the jury already knew much about the incident that was damaging to the defendant. The district court was correct when it noted that the available mitigating evidence might have demonstrated to the jury that the petitioner was not the totally reprehensible person they apparently determined him to be. Certainly they would have provided some counterweight to the evidence of bad character which was in fact received. 513 F.Supp. at 780. 81 As we have already indicated, we find it a close question whether the petitioner received any defense at all in the penalty phase. Certainly he would have been unconstitutionally prejudiced if the court had not permitted him to put on mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, no matter how overwhelming the state's showing of aggravating circumstances. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 642, 98 S.Ct. 2977, 2980, 57 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1978). Here, Haupt's failure to seek out and prepare any witnesses to testify as to mitigating circumstances just as effectively deprived him of such an opportunity. This was not simply the result of a tactical decision not to utilize mitigation witnesses once counsel was aware of the overall character of their testimony. Instead, it was the result of a complete failure--albeit prompted by a good faith expectation of a favorable verdict--to prepare for perhaps the most critical stage of the proceedings. We thus believe that the probability that Blake would have received a lesser sentence but for his counsel's error is sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome. Therefore, the decision of the district court is 82 AFFIRMED.