Opinion ID: 2997111
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence put forward by Conner at the PCR

Text: hearing During his PCR hearing, which lasted five days, Conner presented evidence in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In its subsequent order denying postconviction relief, the Superior Court correctly characterized much of this evidence as “cumulative” to that presented by trial counsel during the guilt and penalty phases. We note here only the portions of the PCR hearing evidence which are both non-cumulative and relevant to his ineffective assistance claim now before this court. At the PCR hearing, both counsel testified regarding their respective roles in Conner’s defense. Regarding the coordination and preparation of Conner’s defense, Lazinsky testified that initially there was some confusion as to the 24 No. 03-1951 division of responsibility, but that he eventually assumed control of Conner’s case. And although the two attorneys never sat down to explicitly divide up tasks, each oversaw certain aspects of Conner’s defense. While Mendez oversaw the filing of what he referred to as “stock death penalty motions,” Lazinsky personally filed other motions as he saw fit. Mendez was responsible for obtaining an independent psychiatrist to evaluate Conner, and Lazinsky retained a private investigator. Lazinsky testified that he could not recall whether intoxication was considered as a defense, or whether manslaughter was considered as a lesser-included offense. Mendez testified that he always considered lesser-included offenses, such as manslaughter. Lazinsky also expressly stated that a mental health defense was rejected because there was a lack of substantive evidence to support such a claim. Similarly, Mendez testified that Dr. King was not called to testify because his report was unfavorable. With respect to counsels’ perceptions of their representation of Conner, both testified that they did not feel constrained or hampered by any political considerations in the performance of their duties as trial counsel. Mendez also testified that all funding assistance counsel requested was provided by the court. He further testified that he felt that he had utilized all resources he was aware of in preparation of Conner’s defense. Likewise, although Lazinsky noted that he was apprehensive about directing a capital defense, he testified that he believed he pursued all aspects of Conner’s defense of which he was aware. The investigator hired by counsel also testified at the PCR hearing. His investigation had focused on the efficacy and thoroughness of the investigation conducted by the police. He interviewed Detective Stamm and witness Dennis Wolf, and attempted to interview at least four other parties. Specifically, the investigator testified that he had done all No. 03-1951 25 he could think to do with respect to the Conner case. He also indicated that, in his opinion, the case was properly investigated by the police. Numerous members of Conner’s family and friends testified at the PCR hearing. As alluded to earlier, the testimony—detailing Conner’s close relationship with his adoptive father, Carl Conner, his immense grief when Carl died, his strained relationship with his step-father, his stepfather’s drinking and abusive behavior, and Conner’s positive characteristics—was duplicative of that presented at trial and during the penalty phase. The only “new” information presented at the PCR hearing with respect to Conner’s background was that Conner had learned he was adopted inadvertently, around age twelve, and he was deeply upset by this. Also, viewing the testimony of family and friends at the post-conviction hearing most generously, it shed additional light upon only two aspects of Conner’s background: (1) the extent of his step-father’s alcoholism and its impact on Conner’s home life; and (2) the extent of Conner’s own abuse of alcohol beginning at an early age. Conner also had three experts testify at the PCR hearing. First, Jeanine Jones was qualified as an expert in social work. Jones testified generally that the death of a parent will cause a young child to experience feelings of loss, sometimes accompanied by exaggerated feelings of loneliness and abandonment. Jones further testified that if the deceased parent is soon thereafter replaced by another caregiver, a child will often exhibit animosity towards the new caregiver. Also, Jones indicated that children of alcoholics will often themselves become alcoholics, and will often mirror other behaviors exhibited in their home environment, including violence. Lastly, Jones testified that children who unexpectedly discover that they are adopted often have feelings of loss, rejection, and betrayal, and harbor anger and resentment toward their adoptive parents. 26 No. 03-1951 Second, Dr. David Price was qualified as an expert forensic psychologist. He testified generally about the fundamentals of reaching an accurate mental health diagnosis and how the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM”) is revised over time. Price stated that he reviewed various documents relevant to Conner’s case, including Conner’s previous mental health evaluations from 1988 (including the reports by Drs. Fredrickson, Hull, Schuster, and King), and personally interviewed Conner on two occasions. Generally, Price criticized the amount of information Drs. Fredrickson, Hull, Schuster, and King relied upon. He offered an opinion that Dr. Fredrickson’s evaluation of Conner was incomplete and inaccurate. He also opined that the reports of Drs. Hull and Schuster considered only whether Conner was sane at the time of the murders and whether he was competent to stand trial. In particular, Dr. Price testified that he believed neither doctor considered the broader question of whether there were any other diagnosable mental conditions relevant to mitigation. Last, with respect to Dr. King, Price testified that King “did a more thorough job.” Price acknowledged that King requested an electroencephalography (“EEG”), assessed lead levels, and that King’s report discussed Conner’s background in depth and did, in fact, proffer a diagnosis potentially relevant to mitigation—that Conner had an antisocial personality and mild pathological intoxication. But Price also discounted King’s conclusion because King had used the “outmoded” DSM-3, and not the DSM-3R, which was available in 1987. However, Price testified that despite King’s usage of the DSM-3, he nonetheless could not call King’s diagnosis incorrect. Price also offered his opinion that Conner “potentially could have [met the criteria for] thirty-one diagnoses . . . found under DSM-3R.” Specifically, Price testified that Conner currently has a “delusional disorder,” a thought disorder where the subject perceives that he is being perseNo. 03-1951 27 cuted in a grandiose fashion. Price also stated that Conner may have three personality disorders, including an organic personality disorder. Furthermore, Price testified that had Conner suffered from such a disorder in 1988, his behavior would have been irrational, impulsive, and unpredictable— effects which would have been exacerbated by Conner’s consumption of alcohol. Third, a toxicology expert, Dr. Michael Evans, testified that Conner’s blood alcohol content at the time of the killings was approximately .19, most likely with a range of .15 and .23. He further testified that when intoxicated, an individual’s judgment and logical thought processes are impaired. Specifically, Evans stated that Conner was substantially impaired at the time of the murders.