Opinion ID: 784879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adoption of the Presentence Report

Text: 28 A district court satisfies its obligation to make the requisite specific factual findings when it explicitly adopts the factual findings set forth in the presentence report. United States v. Eyman, 313 F.3d 741, 745 (2d Cir.2002) (per curiam), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1021, 123 S.Ct. 1949, 155 L.Ed.2d 864 (2003); see United States v. Zichettello, 208 F.3d 72, 107 (2d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1143, 121 S.Ct. 1077, 148 L.Ed.2d 954 (2001). It may do so either at the sentencing hearing or in the written judgment it files later. United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 456 (2d Cir.1996). 29 In the present case the sentencing court's entire explanation of the sentence enhancement was as follows: 30 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Southwick. Anything further? 31 MR. WELLS: No, Judge, except that I thought you did not rule on the two-point enhancement on the day of the hearing, I thought you reserved it until time of sentencing. 32 THE COURT: Well, how much difference does that make? 33 MR. WELLS: Just that I wanted to make sure I also put on the record that I did not concede the issue that had been ruled on. 34 THE COURT: Well, I'll rule on it now. 35 MR. WELLS: Yes, sir. 36 THE COURT: I'll grant the two-point enhancement at this time. Mr. Molina, the Court finds that the Total Offense Level in this case is 26, and the Criminal History Category is III, and the Guideline Imprisonment Range is 78 to 97 months ... 37 This is light treatment indeed, and it does not meet the requirement imposed on the district court of making specific factual findings. The quoted discussion does not indicate whether the trial court actually considered the requisite factors under § 3B1.1. Some of those factors are, for example, the defendant's exercise of decision making authority, his recruitment of accomplices, and the degree of his participation in organizing the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n. 4. Such a lack of specificity devoid of any statement of reasons does not permit meaningful appellate review of the enhancement the district court imposed. 38 Moreover, a sentencing court that relies on a PSR must not only agree with that report, but must also adopt it expressly. Despite the insufficiency of the explanation offered for the sentence enhancement, the district court arguably satisfied its fact-finding obligations under Thompson by expressly adopting the presentence report in the statement of reasons set out in its written judgment. 39 However, even if the district court was sufficiently explicit in satisfying its fact-finding obligations under Thompson, we still must consider whether the trial court satisfied its obligations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) to state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. The trial court did not satisfy this unambiguous mandate. 40 Several of our cases contain language that might appear to be at odds with the terms of § 3553(c), which requires that [t]he court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence (emphasis added). See, e.g., Eyman, 313 F.3d at 745 (A district court satisfies its obligation to make the requisite factual findings when it indicates in its written judgment that it is adopting the findings set forth in the PSR. (emphasis added)); accord United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Prince, 110 F.3d 921, 924 (2d Cir.1997); Thompson, 76 F.3d at 456. The issue before the court in those cases, however, was the district court's obligation to make sufficient factual findings — not its obligation to state those findings in open court — so it is not surprising that the cited cases did not address the open court requirement. Consequently, we do not read them as dispensing with the requirements of § 3553(c). Congress had goals in mind when it enacted § 3553(c), including: (1) to inform the defendant of the reasons for his sentence, (2) to permit meaningful appellate review, (3) to enable the public to learn why defendant received a particular sentence, and (4) to guide probation officers and prison officials in developing a program to meet defendant's needs. See S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 79-80 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3262-63; United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 325 (7th Cir.1990). We are concerned that these goals may not be fully met when the fact-finding to support a sentence enhancement is set out only in the written judgment. 41 We recognize nonetheless that the open court requirement may be satisfied by the district court adopting the PSR in open court. Adopting the PSR in open court puts the defendant on notice of the grounds for the sentence imposed since the defendant usually has either seen his own PSR or is entitled to ask for it. However, in the present case the district court did not state either its reasons or adopt the PSR in open court.