Opinion ID: 728892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NLRA Section 10(b)

Text: 13 Section 10(b) of the NLRA provides that no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). In N.L.R.B. v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 309, 79 S.Ct. 1179, 1184, 3 L.Ed.2d 1243 (1959), the Supreme Court held that Section 10(b) does not preclude the Board from making allegations of unfair labor practices which occurred outside the six month statute of limitations so long as such allegations are related to charges timely filed with the Board. This court has interpreted Fant Milling as requiring a significant factual affiliation between matters prosecuted by the Board and the activity alleged in the Union's charge. Drug Plastics & Glass Co. v. N.L.R.B., 44 F.3d 1017, 1020 (D.C.Cir.1995) (quoting G.W. Galloway Co. v. N.L.R.B., 856 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Similarly, the Board has developed a three-part test that asks whether complaint allegations and charge allegations are closely related. Nickles Bakery of Indiana, Inc., 296 N.L.R.B. 927, 928, 1989 WL 224354 (1989). 14 There is no dispute that the amendment to the General Counsel's complaint to include the anti-union speech allegation was made more than six months after the speech was given. The Hermany speech was given in February 1993, while the charge involving the speech was not added to the complaint until May 1994. The Board, therefore, argues that the amendment was permissible because the anti-union speech charge was closely related to the other charges against Parsippany. Under this court's Section 10(b) jurisprudence, Parsippany would appear to have a strong argument that the anti-union speech charge was not closely related to the charges in the General Counsel's complaint. However, we need not address this Section 10(b) issue because it was not raised by Parsippany at any time before the Board. 15 Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides that [n]o objection that has not been urged before the Board ... shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). The Board's regulation interpreting this provision requires that an exception to an ALJ's ruling inform the Board of the questions of procedure ... to which the exception is taken as well as the grounds for the exception. 29 C.F.R. § 102.46(b)(1) (1996). While we have not required that the ground for the exception be stated explicitly in the written exceptions filed with the Board, we have required, at a minimum, that the ground for the exception be evident by the context in which [the exception] is raised. Consolidated Freightways v. N.L.R.B., 669 F.2d 790, 794 (D.C.Cir.1981). 16 In this case, Parsippany's exception to the ALJ's decision to permit the amendment stated only that [t]he ALJ erred in allowing ... the General Counsel to amend his complaint. While we have found vague exceptions to preserve an issue for appeal under limited circumstances, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Blake Constr. Co., 663 F.2d 272, 283-84 (D.C.Cir.1981) (holding that petitioner's exception to the ALJ's conclusions of law as 'based on misstatements of facts, mistaken premises, suppositions, hearsay, and misapplication of law'  sufficiently preserved a due process issue), we conclude that Parsippany's vague exception was insufficient to provide notice to the Board that the ground for the exception was Section 10(b). When the General Counsel moved before the ALJ to amend his complaint to include the anti-union speech allegation, Parsippany's counsel suggested orally to the ALJ that there may be a statute of limitations problem. However, under the plain language of Section 10(e), an issue may not be preserved for appeal simply by raising it before the ALJ. Similarly, the fact that the ALJ discussed the Section 10(b) issue in his opinion which was adopted by the Board is also insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Section 10(e). See Local 900 Int'l Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. N.L.R.B., 727 F.2d 1184, 1191 (D.C.Cir.1984) (stating that even discussion of an issue by the Board does not necessarily prove compliance with section 10(e)). 17 The cases cited by Parsippany do not require a contrary conclusion. In Blake Construction, we held that petitioner's vague exception to the ALJ's misapplication of law was sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal when petitioner's brief in support of its exceptions adequately put the Board on notice that petitioner was objecting to the ALJ's ruling on due process grounds. 663 F.2d at 283; see also Consolidated Freightways, 669 F.2d at 794 (noting that petitioner had discussed the ground for its exception in its brief to the Board). In this case, it appears that Parsippany did not set forth the Section 10(b) issue in any detail before the Board. Parsippany also cites May Dep't Stores Co. v. N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376, 66 S.Ct. 203, 90 L.Ed. 145 (1945), in support of its argument that the Section 10(b) claim was not waived. May, however, is easily distinguishable from this case. In May, the petitioner asserted before the Board that the ALJ's order was not supported or justified by the record, id. at 386 n. 5, 66 S.Ct. at 209 n. 5, an exception far more informative than Parsippany's cursory allegation that the ALJ erred. 18 The facts in Davis Supermarkets, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 2 F.3d 1162 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1003, 114 S.Ct. 1368, 128 L.Ed.2d 45 (1994), cited by petitioner, also differ dramatically from the facts here. In Davis, the Board argued that while the employer had specifically objected in its exceptions to the ALJ's findings, the claim should be barred because the employer did not brief and argue the issue to the Board. Id. at 1174. We dismissed the Board's argument, relying on a long line of circuit precedent holding that briefing and argument before the Board is unnecessary to preserve an issue for appeal under Section 10(e). Id. (citing Local 900, 727 F.2d at 1192). In this case, by contrast, Parsippany failed specifically [to] object to the ALJ's decision to allow the complaint amendment, as well as failing to brief the issue. 19 Parsippany's reliance on this court's opinion in Local 900 is also of no avail. In Local 900, it was the General Counsel who excepted to the ALJ's decision, urging the Board to adopt the rationale expressed by two Board members in another case. 727 F.2d at 1193. In its cross-exceptions to the Board, the union supported the ALJ's reasoning. Id. In light of the General Counsel's own exceptions which highlighted the particular issue, we concluded that the union's somewhat imprecise cross-exception was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. In this case, there is no parallel information source to put the Board on notice. Thus the Local 900 case is inapposite. 20 Moreover, even had Parsippany raised the Section 10(b) issue before the Board, it would nonetheless be barred from consideration by this court, as it did not raise the issue in its opening brief. E.g., Corson & Gruman Co. v. N.L.R.B., 899 F.2d 47, 50 n. 4 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam). In the course of arguing in its opening brief that it was error to permit the General Counsel to amend its complaint, not once did Parsippany make mention of Section 10(b) or use words such as closely related, related, or significant factual affiliation, or otherwise alert the court and respondent to the Section 10(b) argument. Parsippany asserts that while it did not specifically mention Section 10(b) in its opening brief, it nonetheless cited and relied upon case law applying that provision. The only case to which Parsippany cited on the amendment issue in its opening brief was Redd-I, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 1115 (1988). That case, however, contains discussion of both the Section 10(b) and due process issues arising out of an ALJ's decision to allow an amendment to a complaint. The emphasis in Parsippany's opening brief on how the amended complaint caught it completely flat-footed, caused severe[ ] prejudice, and involved a charge it knew nothing about because it received no prior notice, Petitioner's Brief at 31, supports the due process argument it does make, and certainly does not clearly raise the Section 10(b) claim. See Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (collecting cases discussing the degree of specificity with which a party must raise an issue on appeal).