Opinion ID: 728910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Releasability

Text: 36 The trial court ruled further that [t]he absence of evidence of breakdown of products that contain [hazardous substances] ... precludes a finding that disposal of that product constitutes a disposal of [hazardous substances]. Murtha II, 815 F.Supp. at 545. Later, it explained that statement by saying that [l]iability does not lie if the material disposed of would release a [hazardous substance] only on the intervention of another force. Murtha III, 840 F.Supp. at 188. The coalitions believe that these pronouncements were wrong. 37 As noted, to make out a prima facie CERCLA case, a plaintiff must show a release, or a threatened release ... of a hazardous substance. § 9607(a)(4). Accordingly, if a hazardous substance is only used in a non-releasable form in the manufacturing of a product, it may scientifically be impossible for the plaintiff to show a threatened release. Hence, the district court properly required plaintiffs to show a release or threatened release. But, when it required them to show an actual breakdown of products containing hazardous substances, and determined there was no liability if the hazardous substances would only be released by an intervening force, it acted in a manner contrary to precedent. 38 In Alcan, we held that proof that a defendant's waste did not release listed hazardous substances is only relevant to the issue of apportionment of damages, not to the issue of liability. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 722. Independent releasability is not required to establish liability; a defendant otherwise liable may show nonreleasability in order to mitigate its share of damages. It follows logically that a defendant who disposes of hazardous substances that are not independently releasable may still be held liable, even though that defendant may not be required to pay damages when the cost apportionment phase of the litigation is reached. 39 In addition, the trial court's reading of CERCLA is inconsistent with the Act's language, which provides only the four already recited causation-related defenses. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). The canon of construction that says expressio unius est exclusio alterius cautions against creating additional exceptions to complex statutory enactments. Cf. Greene v. United States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1355 (2d Cir.1996) (applying this principle in the context of federal tax law). 40 Moreover, if we required a plaintiff to show more than a release or threatened release, we essentially would be asking the plaintiffs to prove that a specific defendant's hazardous substances caused the release of a hazardous substance. No causation is needed, however, to establish liability under CERCLA, see Alcan, 990 F.2d at 721, because it is, as stated, a strict liability statute. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042; see also Alcan Aluminum, 964 F.2d at 266 (requiring only that plaintiff prove that hazardous substances were deposited at a site from which there was a release or threatened release that caused response costs to be incurred); Amoco, 889 F.2d at 670 n. 8 ([I]n cases involving multiple sources of contamination, a plaintiff need not prove a specific causal link between costs incurred and an individual generator's waste.). 41 None of the lower court cases upon which the district court relied as precedent for its view regarding releasability is persuasive. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 769 F.Supp. 591, 597 (D.Del.1991); United States v. Serafini, 750 F.Supp. 168, 171 (M.D.Pa.1990). Although appellants must show a release or threatened release in order to make out a prima facie case, the additional releasability requirement of product breakdown finds no support in CERCLA.