Opinion ID: 6348805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Instructions at Issue

Text: In Instruction 4, the district court provided a standard instruction, based on PIK Crim. 4th 54.110 (modified slightly to include the phrase or another for whose conduct he is criminally responsible, as discussed in the previous challenge), for the elements of count 1, Hillard's first-degree premeditated murder charge: The defendant, Jeff Hillard, is charged in count one with murder in the first degree. The defendant pleads not guilty. To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. The defendant, or another for whose conduct he is criminally responsible, intentionally killed Scottie Goodpaster. 2. The killing was done with premeditation. 3. This act occurred on or about the 6th day of November, 2016, in Sedgwick County, Kansas. (Emphasis added.) The jury instructions for count 2, felony murder, and count 8, rape, also instructed the jury that it must find [t]his act occurred on or about the 6th day of November, 2016, in Sedgwick County, Kansas. These instructions were also based on PIK. See PIK Crim. 4th 54.120 (felony murder); PIK Crim. 4th 55.030 (rape). 52 The location in which a defendant commits an offense is not technically an element of any of these crimes. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5402 (first-degree murder); K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5503 (rape). Rather, the location in which a crime is committed is a jurisdictional fact that determines the appropriate venue for prosecuting a defendant for the crimes. Kansas law requires that the jurisdictional facts supporting proper venue be proved in every case . . . . Thus, even though [venue] isn't strictly an element of the offense, it is, as a practical matter, handled as if it were. State v. Rivera, 42 Kan. App. 2d 1005, 1010, 219 P.3d 1231 (2009). The elements instructions for Hillard's first-degree murder and rape charges instructed the jury it had to find the acts occurred in Sedgwick County. In turn, Instruction 50 informed the jury how to determine whether a charged act occurred (or a crime was committed) in a particular county under Kansas law: In considering whether the State has met its burden as to each defendant in relation to Counts 1, 2, and 8, if any alleged crime is committed in any vehicle passing through this state, and it cannot readily be determined in which county the alleged crime was committed, the prosecution may be in any county in this state through which such vehicle has passed or in which such travel commenced or terminated. Further, in considering whether the State has met its burden in relation to Counts 1, 2, & 8, where two or more acts are requisite to the commission of any crime and such acts occur in different counties, the prosecution may be in any county in which any of such acts occur. Hillard objected to Instruction 50 at trial. He argued the instruction was not factually appropriate because there was no evidence to suggest the rape of S.S. occurred outside of Sedgwick County and the State had argued that Hillard killed Goodpaster by hanging him in Harvey County. The district court overruled the objection, finding the instruction was both legally and factually appropriate. 53 B. Standard of Review and Relevant Legal Framework Hillard's argument raises two distinct issues—the sufficiency of the evidence supporting venue in Sedgwick County and instructional error. Venue must be proved to establish the jurisdiction of the court; it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, albeit the existence of jurisdiction is a question of law, subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Hunt, 285 Kan. 855, 859, 176 P.3d 183 (2008). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding of venue in Sedgwick County, we view the venue evidence 'in a light most favorable to the prosecution.' 285 Kan. at 860. If Hillard's challenge to the venue evidence requires us to interpret relevant Kansas venue statutes, this statutory interpretation raises a question of law over which appellate courts exercise unlimited review. State v. Castleberry, 301 Kan. 170, 175, 339 P.3d 795 (2014). And for any claim of instructional error, we analyze the issue under the four-step process set forth in the previous issue. See Plummer, 295 Kan. at 163. C. The Challenged Instructions Were Legally Appropriate We first address Hillard's claim that the challenged instructions were not legally appropriate. To be legally appropriate, a jury instruction must fairly and accurately state the applicable law. This presents a question of law over which our review is unlimited. State v. Dominguez, 299 Kan. 567, 573-74, 328 P.3d 1094 (2014). And as we explained in the previous issue, we consider the jury instructions together as a whole rather than viewing a single instruction in isolation. Rogers, 276 Kan. at 502. We conclude the jury instructions, viewed together as a whole, fairly and accurately stated the law on venue in this case. The elements instructions for Hillard's charges of first-degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and rape informed the jury 54 that the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act occurred in Sedgwick County. This element accurately reflects the State's obligation to prove venue as a jurisdictional fact in criminal cases. See State v. Stevens, 285 Kan. 307, 325, 172 P.3d 570 (2007), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ahrens, 296 Kan. 151, 290 P.3d 629 (2012). Instruction 50 set forth the relevant Kansas law guiding the jury's decision whether the act can be considered to have occurred in Sedgwick County, even if there is some ambiguity as to the county in which that act was completed. The first paragraph of Instruction 50 is patterned after K.S.A. 22-2608: If a crime is committed in, on or against any vehicle or means of conveyance passing through or above this state, and it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed, the prosecution may be in any county in this state through or above which such vehicle or means of conveyance has passed or in which such travel commenced or terminated. The second paragraph is patterned after K.S.A. 22-2603 which provides: Where two or more acts are requisite to the commission of any crime and such acts occur in different counties the prosecution may be in any county in which any of such acts occur. Generally, jury instructions patterned after statutes are legally proper. State v. Carr, 314 Kan. 615, 658, 502 P.3d 546 (2022). We have rejected a venue instruction that included language informing jurors where 'the prosecution may be,' in part, because that language could have confused the jury. State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 284, 363 P.3d 875 (2015), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017). But we find Robinson distinguishable. 55 In Robinson, the State prosecuted the defendant for capital murder in Johnson County even though the bodies of two victims were found in a different county. The district court gave a jury instruction to aid jurors in deciding whether venue was proper. But that instruction was modeled after common-law principles for territorial jurisdiction (i.e., which state has jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings), not venue. 303 Kan. at 283 (citing State v. Grissom, 251 Kan. 851, 889, 840 P.2d 1142 [1992]). The instruction failed to include any language based on the two statutory venue rules applicable in that case, including K.S.A. 22-2611. That statute governs venue when the cause of death is inflicted in one county and the death ensues in another county and imposes a statutory presumption that death occurs in the county where a victim's body is found. Robinson, 303 Kan. at 283 (citing K.S.A. 22-2603 and K.S.A. 22-2611). Thus, the jury instruction in Robinson abjectly failed to inform the jury of any relevant venue rules. Unlike Robinson, the district court properly instructed Hillard's jury on the relevant venue statutes. The court did not erroneously inform the jury about rules for territorial jurisdiction. And K.S.A. 22-2611 was not germane to the evidence developed at trial or the jury instruction challenges Hillard raised below or on appeal. Moreover, any potential confusion related to the phrase identifying where the prosecution may be was cured by reading Instruction 50 along with the relevant elements instructions. We hold that the venue instructions were legally appropriate. D. Instruction 50 Was Factually Appropriate and Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury's Venue Finding Having determined the jury instructions were legally appropriate, we turn to whether they were also factually appropriate. To answer this question, we must determine if there was sufficient evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, to support a factual basis for the instruction. 'Such an inquiry is closely akin to the sufficiency of the evidence review frequently performed by appellate 56 courts in criminal cases.' [Citations omitted.] Dominguez, 299 Kan. at 573-74. Thus, our assessment of the factual appropriateness of Instruction 50 also determines whether the jury's venue findings are supported by sufficient evidence. Hillard's challenge to the factual appropriateness of Instruction 50 is based on the State's theory that Hillard killed Goodpaster by hanging him in Harvey County. At trial, the State presented sufficient evidence to support this theory. But the State's evidence also raised the possibility that Goodpaster died in Sedgwick County or somewhere between Sedgwick County and Harvey County as defendants transported Goodpaster (or his body) in Hillard's truck. Bussart testified that three or four minutes after leaving the Hillards' house, while the parties were in route from 1310 S. Meridian Street in Valley Center (a city within Sedgwick County) to Bright's residence, also in Valley Center, he could no longer hear Goodpaster breathing. Bussart believed Goodpaster may have been dead at that point. And Bussart added that he thought Goodpaster was already dead when they dragged him to the creek area in Harvey County. And during Bright's 911 call, he reported that Hillard had just left Bright's residence in a white Chevrolet truck. Based on his conversation with Hillard, Bright reported that Hillard may have just killed someone and was looking for a place to hide the body. Bright also observed what he believed to be a body slumped over in Hillard's truck. While Dr. Distefano concluded that Goodpaster died because of asphyxiation by hanging, he reached this conclusion largely because law enforcement had discovered Goodpaster's body hanging from a tree. Dr. Distefano admitted at trial that Goodpaster could have also died because of the perpetrators positioning of Goodpaster's head and neck in the truck, preventing him from breathing and causing his death. Together, this evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from it support a finding that Goodpaster died in the truck while the parties were still within the boundaries of Sedgwick County. In turn, such a finding establishes that venue was proper in 57 Sedgwick County under the general criminal venue statute. See K.S.A. 22-2602 (Generally, the prosecution shall be in the county where the crime was committed.). At the same time, this evidence supports a finding that Goodpaster died sometime during the drive from Sedgwick County to Harvey County. Thus, even if there is some uncertainty whether Goodpaster took his final breath before or after defendants had crossed the Sedgwick-Harvey County line, this evidence was sufficient to establish venue in either county. See K.S.A. 22-2608 (where crime committed in vehicle traveling in Kansas and it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed, the prosecution may be in any county in this state through which the vehicle has passed). Likewise, this evidence confirms that the first paragraph of Instruction 50, patterned after K.S.A. 22-2608, was factually appropriate. Alternatively, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Hillard killed Goodpaster by hanging him in Harvey County (as the State argued at trial). If the jury adopted this finding in arriving at the verdict, venue was still proper in Sedgwick County under K.S.A. 22-2603, provided that Hillard committed an act requisite to the commission of first-degree murder there, and then committed an act requisite to the commission of murder in Harvey County. When a victim is removed from one county to be murdered in another, the removal was an act 'requisite' to the commission of the murder under K.S.A. 22-2603. State v. Pyle, 216 Kan. 423, 435, 532 P.2d 1309 (1975). Here, the trial evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Hillard and his cohorts severely tortured and beat Goodpaster at Hillard's residence in Sedgwick County. Then, they transported Goodpaster to Harvey County, where Bussart helped Hillard hang Goodpaster. If Goodpaster did not die from positional asphyxiation in the truck, Hillard's decision to transport Goodpaster from Sedgwick County was an act requisite to the commission of his murder in Harvey County. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to 58 support the jury's venue finding under K.S.A. 22-2603. And this evidence also confirms that the second paragraph of Instruction 50, patterned after K.S.A. 22-2603, was factually appropriate. In sum, the State presented evidence sufficient to support a finding that Goodpaster died while being transported in Hillard's truck, rendering venue in Sedgwick County proper under either K.S.A. 22-2602 or K.S.A. 22-2608. Alternatively, the State presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Hillard's decision to transport Goodpaster from Sedgwick County was an act requisite to his murder in Harvey County. Thus, venue was also proper in Sedgwick County under K.S.A. 22-2603. We hold that the district court venue instructions were legally and factually appropriate, and the jury's venue findings are supported by legally sufficient evidence. V. The District Court Did Not Err in Limiting Cross-Examination of Two Witnesses Next, Hillard argues the district court abused its discretion when it limited crossexamination of S.S. and Bussart on the agreements they purportedly reached with the State in exchange for their testimony. A. Relevant Legal Framework and Standard of Review The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10 (providing a criminal defendant the right to meet the witness face to face). Inherent in the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation is a criminal defendant's right of cross-examination. Thomas, 307 Kan. at 738. But a defendant's right of cross-examination is not absolute, and [i]n certain circumstances it must 'bow to accommodate other legitimate interests 59 in the criminal trial process.' 307 Kan. at 738 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 [1973]). Because a district court may exercise reasonable control over the scope of crossexamination, appellate courts review the court's decision to limit cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. Thomas, 307 Kan. at 739. As the party asserting an abuse of discretion, Hillard bears the burden of proof on this issue. 307 Kan. at 739.