Opinion ID: 1160457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objection to Cross-examination of Neetelfer Hawkins

Text: In his case, defendant called Neetelfer Hawkins to the witness stand. On direct examination, he elicited testimony that she welcomed him to stay at her home in March, April, and May of 1987  apparently, other evidence suggested, as a lover. He also elicited testimony in an attempt to support his alibi defense: at 7 a.m. on May 17, 1987  the date of the charged robbery and murder of Allen Birkman and the charged robbery of Greta Slatten  he placed a telephone call to her and made an (evidently) unsuccessful request of her to pick him up. On cross-examination, the People sought to inquire, for purposes of impeachment, into an interview that officers of the Sacramento Police Department conducted with Hawkins about 10 p.m. on May 17. Defendant objected on the grounds that any responsive testimony would be irrelevant and also inadmissible hearsay. Outside the presence of the jury, the People made an offer of proof: in the course of the interview, the officers posed specific questions to Hawkins about defendant and her contacts with him, and she gave detailed answers in response, but failed to mention any telephone call that day; if she did not admit the omission on cross-examination, they would call one of the officers in their case in rebuttal to establish it as a fact. Defendant then effectively objected to the People's inquiry into specific questions by the officers and detailed answers by Hawkins as lacking in foundation, in advance of their introduction of evidence that she indeed failed to mention any call that day. The superior court overruled all defendant's objections. On cross-examination, the People inquired into the May 17 interview. Hawkins testified to specific questions by the officers and detailed answers by her in response. But she denied that she failed to mention any telephone call from defendant that day. Subsequently, taking the witness stand on his own behalf, defendant testified, inter alia, that sometime early in the morning of May 17, he placed a telephone call to Hawkins and made an (evidently) unsuccessful request of her to pick him up. He further testified that, about 11:30 or 11:40 a.m. that same day, he placed another call and made another unsuccessful request. In their case-in-rebuttal, the People called Hawkins. She restated that, on May 17, defendant placed a telephone call to her at 7 a.m. She added that, on that day, to her knowledge he did not place any other call to her at any other time. The People also called Sergeant Ralph Coyle. He was one of the police officers who interviewed Hawkins on May 17. He testified that she failed to mention any telephone call from defendant that day. (18) Defendant now contends that the superior court erred by overruling his lack-of-foundation objection to the People's inquiry into specific questions by the officers and detailed answers by Hawkins in the course of the May 17 interview, in advance of their introduction of evidence that she failed to mention any telephone call from him that day. As a general matter, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling as to the order of proof for abuse of discretion. That is because, as a general matter, the trial court has authority to regulate the order of proof in the exercise of its discretion. (Evid. Code, § 320.) We examine the superior court's passing on defendant's lack-of-foundation objection for abuse of discretion. We do so inasmuch as it amounts to the kind of ruling as to the order of proof that is generally entrusted to its discretion. After such examination, we discern no abuse of discretion. The superior court was not unreasonable in allowing the People's inquiry into specific questions by the officers and detailed answers by Hawkins in the course of the May 17 interview, in advance of their introduction of evidence that she failed to mention any telephone call from defendant that morning. They had made an offer of proof of her omission. Defendant did not contest the issue. Through the testimony of Sergeant Coyle, they subsequently furnished the proof. We do not see any basis for a conclusion that the superior court's regulation of these matters was wanting in any particular.