Opinion ID: 1040053
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mack’s Hearsay Claim

Text: Mack contends that the district court improperly awarded summary judgment based on hearsay, referring to a statement made by another Wortham employee, Leticia Martinez, to Flournoy that Mack had failed to follow established procedures and had incorrectly filled out a checklist. We reject this argument because the district court did not consider Martinez’s statement but rather relied on documentation submitted by Wortham, including the checklist Mack improperly completed, to determine that Mack had disregarded the company’s procedures. Martinez did alert Flournoy that Mack was marking uncompleted tasks as completed, but the record demonstrates that Mack was disciplined based not on Martinez’s statement, but on the actual document at issue. Wortham also provided a memorandum from Flournoy to Hahn dated January 6, 2009, indicating that Martinez had discovered that Mack had failed to follow the established procedures for these checklists. Any consideration made by the district court of this violation was made based on the documentation submitted by Wortham. Consequently, we agree with the district court that it was appropriate to consider evidence of Mack’s failure to follow established procedures and reject Mack’s supposed hearsay claim. C. Claims Barred by 300-Day Limitation for Filing a Charge of Discrimination Because all of the alleged unlawful acts that occurred in the Risk 10 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 Management and Commercial Accounts Departments, as well as some that occurred in the Marine Department, took place outside of Title VII’s 300-day limitation period, all of Mack’s claims arising out of those events are barred. Under Title VII and the ADEA, a discrimination claim not brought within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act is time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d); Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1989). To argue that discriminatory acts that occurred outside of the 300-day period should be considered, Mack raises two exceptions to this rule: the continuing violations doctrine and the hostile work environment theory. Although these exceptions, if applicable, allow a plaintiff to bring claims that would otherwise be time-barred, we agree with the district court that neither applies to Mack’s case. The continuing violations doctrine “relieves a plaintiff of establishing that all of the complained-of conduct occurred within the actionable period if the plaintiff can show a series of related acts, one or more of which falls within the limitations period.” Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 134–35 (5th Cir. 1997). If the plaintiff can demonstrate that the discrimination manifested itself over time rather than in a series of discrete acts, actions that would otherwise be timebarred may be considered by the court. Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 238–39 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that whereas demotion and failure to promote are discrete events that should put an employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued, racial harassment manifested through unequal treatment of employees and fostering an atmosphere of racism weas sufficient to invoke the continuing violations doctrine)). However, where the employee complains of “separate and varied acts and decisions that occurred at different times,” and the record does not confirm “an organized or continuing effort to discriminate,” this Court has declined to apply the continuing violations doctrine. Frank, 347 F.3d at 136. 11 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 Even if specific actions were discriminatory, this Court has stated that a plaintiff may not rely on the continuing violations doctrine “to resurrect claims about discrimination concluded in the past, even though its effects persist.” Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 715 F.2d 971, 979 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257 (1980)). Thus, though the effects of an allegedly discriminatory act may persist, a claim based on that act is not actionable under Title VII if the act occurred more than 300 days before the charge was filed. See Del. State Coll., 449 U.S. at 257–59 (holding that the denial of tenure was the alleged discriminatory act from which the 300-day limitation began, although the ultimate harm that resulted from the denial occurred later). To determine whether alleged discriminatory acts are related closely enough to constitute a continuing violation, this Court has used the following three non-exhaustive factors: (1) subject matter, (2) frequency, and (3) degree of permanence. Berry, 715 F.2d at 981. If the alleged acts involve the same type of discrimination, occur frequently, and indicate to the employee that the continued existence of adverse consequences is likely, it is probable that they rise to the level of continuing violations. Id. Mack’s transfers were infrequent, isolated incidents that did not indicate the possibility of permanent consequences. She remained employed by Wortham for almost three years following her third transfer, which was longer than she had worked in either of her prior departments. She has failed to demonstrate a connection between the incidents involving Hurd and Cox and her termination. Mack has alleged no facts showing that her transfers and denial of transfer were related acts, or that any of these acts was related to her termination, which is a prerequisite for the application of the continuing violations doctrine. The decisions to transfer her first from the Commercial Accounts Department and then from the Risk Management Department were made by different individuals in separate 12 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 departments. Furthermore, assuming arguendo these claims were not timebarred, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were given for both transfers: Johnston determined Mack was not a good match for the position and McCann cited Mack’s lack of necessary computer skills as the primary reason for her termination. Both Johnston and McCann assisted Mack in obtaining positions in other departments within the company. Mack has thus failed to demonstrate a factual dispute as to whether Wortham’s actions rose to the level of continuing violations.2 Because Mack’s continuing violations theory fails, we now consider whether she has established a hostile work environment claim. In order for a hostile work environment claim to survive, the unlawful employment practice must have occurred “over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002) (holding that managers’ racial jokes, racially derogatory acts, and racial epithets created a hostile work environment and were part of the same actionable hostile environment claim). We have held that, unlike demotion, “the cumulative effect of the petty annoyances of daily harassment . . . constitute[s] a part of the same pattern of behavior that amounts to a continuous violation by rendering [the employee’s] workplace a hostile environment.” Huckabay, 142 F.3d at 240. To determine whether an actionable hostile environment claim exists, we examine all of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s 2 We also note that, had Mack brought a Title VII claim within 300 days of being transferred or being denied transfer she would not have been successful for lack of an adverse employment action, which requires, at a minimum, a demotion, a transfer to a lower or less desirable position, or a denial of a promotion. Both transfers were lateral and neither involved a decrease in responsibility or salary and she was never denied a promotion. See, e.g. Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 613-14 (5th Cir. 2007). 13 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 work performance. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 116. The actions of which Mack complains were infrequent, isolated incidents for which reasonable explanations were given. She was not threatened or humiliated, and neither the transfers nor the disagreements she had with her superiors can be construed as interfering with her performance, which was already less than satisfactory from the beginning of her time in the Marine Department. Wortham’s decisions to transfer Mack do not amount to the same kind of acts described in Huckabay, where the continuous racial harassment only manifested itself over time through relatively minor but frequent incidents and thus warranted the label of hostile work environment. Mack was not exposed to a hostile work environment, and, as discussed above, the alleged discriminatory acts were neither adverse nor related. Because Mack fails to establish an exception to the 300-day limitation, we only consider alleged discriminatory acts that occurred after May 28, 2008. We therefore affirm the district court’s decision that her claim for relief based on her transfers from the Commercial Accounts and Risk Management departments, as well as Wortham’s refusal to transfer her from the Marine Department in 2007, is barred by her failure to file the EEOC charge within 300 days of these incidents. D. Claims Barred by EEOC Ninety-Day Limitation for Filing Suit The right to sue is lost if a claim is not filed within ninety days of the plaintiff’s receipt of the right-to-sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC mailed the dismissal and notice of rights to Mack on August 30, 2010. Mack filed her complaint on December 2, 2010, ninety-four days after the mailing date. She asserts that she received the EEOC letter on September 3, 2010, and that her suit was timely filed. However, Wortham contends that, since Mack testified in deposition that she had “no reason to believe” she did not receive the letter within three days of its mailing, it is presumed that she received it by September 14 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 2, 2010, and she filed her claim ninety-one days after its receipt. When there is a dispute as to the date the right-to-sue letter is received, this Court has presumed it was received between three and seven days after the letter was mailed. Stokes v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 367 F. App’x 545, 547–48 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002)). Mack’s original complaint states that she received the right-to-sue letter on September 3, 2010. However, when asked “[s]o you have no reason to believe that [the right-to-sue letter] did not arrive in your mailbox within three days of August the 30th, 2010, correct?” in her deposition, she responded that she had no reason to believe that she did not receive the letter by September 2, 2010. Despite this discrepancy, we take all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant at the summary judgment stage and presume that she received the letter some time between September 2, 2010 and September 6, 2010. Because she received the letter after September 2, 2010, her complaint was timely filed. E. Claims Barred by EEOC Charge Wortham also alleges that Mack’s claims of sex and culture discrimination are barred by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Under that statute, the scope of a Title VII complaint is limited to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Young v. City of Hous., 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990). Mack’s EEOC charge alleged age- and race-based discrimination, but her complaint alleged age, race, sex, and culture discrimination. As explained below, her age- and race-based discrimination claims are barred. An employee who wishes to bring a discrimination claim against her employer must first exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2006). “Title VII clearly contemplates that no issue will be the subject of a civil action until the EEOC has first had the opportunity to attempt to obtain 15 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 voluntary compliance.” Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 467 (5th Cir. 1970). Because the scope of an EEOC complaint is to be construed liberally, we review a Title VII claim broadly and do not limit our review to the scope of the administrative charge itself, but consider the scope of the EEOC investigation which “can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789 (quoting Sanchez, 431 F.2d at 466). Because this Court has held that a failure to allege sex discrimination in an EEOC charge properly results in dismissal of a subsequent complaint for lack of exhaustion, the omission of a culture discrimination claim from an EEOC charge is similarly a failure to exhaust. The district court was correct in its determination that investigation into Mack’s race- and age-based discrimination charges would not reasonably lead the EEOC to investigate sex or culture discrimination charges. See Kretchmer v. Eveden, Inc., 374 F. App’x 493, 495 (5th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (per curiam); see also Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000). We therefore affirm its decision that Mack’s sex and culture discrimination claims are barred because she has failed to meet the exhaustion requirement. F. Failure to Establish Prima Facie Case of Discrimination Because Mack’s claims arising out of her transfers from the Commercial Accounts Department and the Risk Management Department, as well as her claims of discriminatory acts that occurred in the Marine Department before May 28, 2008, are barred by the 300-day limitation, we will focus only on her claims arising out of her termination from the Marine Department.
Title VII makes it unlawful to discharge, refuse to hire, or discriminate against “any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 16 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the employee must produce evidence “that she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or, in the case of disparate treatment, shows that others similarly situated were treated more favorably.” Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 512–13 (5th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). However, the defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons—it is sufficient that the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981). If the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the given reason was mere pretext by showing either that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 256. Assuming arguendo Mack can show the first three prongs of the prima facie case, she has failed to show that either she was replaced by someone outside the protected class or that others similarly situated were treated more favorably. She alleges in her EEOC charge that Dreana Lemon, a Hispanic female with less seniority, was allowed to remain in her position when Mack was terminated. However, Lemon was already employed by Wortham and merely returned from leave to her prior position—she did not replace Mack. Mack also stated in her deposition that she did not know who, if anyone, had replaced her. In fact, she was not replaced at all. Flournoy’s affidavit explains the chain of events that led to Mack’s termination. In 2008, one of Wortham’s largest clients 17 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 sold the majority of its properties, reducing the amount of business in the Marine Department. The adoption of an automation system further reduced the workload of the Marine Department. Two employees were out on leave at the time, and Flournoy decided that once both returned, the department would be overstaffed. To determine which employee to lay off, he asked each member of the technical and professional staff in the Marine Department to rank the department employees. Each ranking listed Mack as the lowest-performing employee. Mack’s position was eliminated and she was not replaced. Alternatively, to establish disparate treatment a plaintiff may show that the employer gave preferential treatment to another employee under “nearly identical” circumstances, which requires a showing that an employee outside of the protected class held the same job, title, and duties, was under the same supervisor, committed the same infractions, and was not discharged. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995); Okoye, 245 F.3d at 514 (holding that because other employees’ violations differed from and did not rise to the level of those committed by plaintiff, plaintiff failed to establish disparate treatment). Mack has not alleged that any other Wortham employee was similarly situated, and therefore cannot show that a similarly-situated employee was treated more favorably. Mack admitted in her deposition that she was tardy more frequently than anyone else in the Marine Department. She has also failed to present evidence that other employees were similarly insubordinate, much less that other insubordinate employees were not discharged. She has offered only her subjective belief that she would have been treated differently had she not been African American. However, a generalized statement of less-favorable treatment is insufficient to establish a factual dispute as to disparate treatment. See Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1186 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that plaintiff’s contention that he was “watched” more closely than white 18 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 employees did not establish race-based discrimination in the absence of evidence that similarly situated white employees were also regularly tardy but not watched). Consequently, she cannot raise a genuine dispute of fact as to whether another similarly situated employee who committed the same infractions was treated more favorably. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Mack had successfully pleaded a prima facie case of discrimination, summary judgment would still have been proper based on Wortham’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Mack’s consistent tardiness is well-documented and undisputed. The incidents of insubordination, even taken in the light most favorable to Mack, demonstrate conflicts between Mack and her supervisors. The record also demonstrates her failure to follow established procedures and her supervisors’ instructions. Wortham’s Vice-Chairman decided to lay off an employee in the Marine Department due to changed circumstances. He terminated the weakest employee in the department. Mack has not rebutted any of these facts and thus has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact as to whether Wortham’s proffered explanation was pretextual. She has shown neither that her termination was more likely motivated by a discriminatory reason nor that Wortham’s proffered explanation is implausible. She does not dispute that she could have been disciplined or even terminated for her tardiness alone and makes no showing that the reasons given for her termination were invalid.
Under Title VII, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . .” 42 U.S.C. 19 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 20 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim has the burden of establishing that (1) she participated in statutorily protected activity; (2) she received an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Mayberry, 55 F.3d at 1092. Although Mack does not make this clear in her complaint, ostensibly the “statutorily protected activity” in which she participated and which she contends led to her termination consisted of her complaints against Hurd, Cox, and Carlson. Because she had already been terminated, she cannot claim that she was retaliated against for filing an EEOC discrimination charge against her supervisors. Even if we assume that the adverse employment action to which she refers was her termination from Wortham, she makes no reference in her complaint to any causal connection between her alleged informal complaints to other Wortham employees and the ultimate adverse employment action, and thus fails to make a prima facie showing of retaliation. Furthermore, as stated above, Wortham has demonstrated several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination from the Marine Department, which Mack has failed to rebut.
In order to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that she was discharged; (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she was within a protected class at the time of the discharge; and (4) that she was replaced by someone outside the protected class, replaced by someone younger, or that her discharge was otherwise because of her age. Young v. City of Hous., 906 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1990). Once the plaintiff establishes this, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of discrimination. Id. Evidence relevant to a showing of pretext may include that employees outside of the protected class were engaged in the same type and level 20 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 21 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 of infraction as the plaintiff. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. The parties do not dispute that Mack was discharged from her position in the Marine Department. There is a disagreement as to whether Mack was qualified for her position, but because Wortham does not explain the minimum qualifications for her position, we assume without deciding that Mack was qualified. It is also undisputed that Mack, who was fifty-five years of age at the time of her termination, was within a protected class. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). As explained above, Mack cannot satisfy the fourth prong of a prima facie case because she has not shown that she was replaced at all, let alone by someone under fifty-five years of age. Furthermore, she has alleged no facts showing that her discharge was because of her age. This Court has held that “a plaintiff’s subjective belief that his discharge was based on age is simply insufficient to establish an ADEA claim.” Waggoner v. City of Garland, 987 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1993). Mack has presented no support for her age discrimination claim other than her subjective belief that she would have been treated differently if she had been younger. Mack testified that she never heard any Wortham employee or supervisor make negative remarks based on age. Her allegation that she was replaced by Lemon, a younger Hispanic female, is false—Lemon was already an employee of Wortham and simply returned from maternity leave. Because Mack cannot show that she was replaced, she has failed to raise a factual dispute as to whether she was replaced by an individual outside of the protected class, and she has not met her burden of establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination. As described above, even if she had met this burden, because Wortham articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for her termination which Mack has not rebutted as pretextual, summary judgment would still have been proper. G. Breach of Contract 21 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 22 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 Mack argues that on December 2, 2005, she and Wortham entered into a written contract which stipulated that Mack’s supervisor would give her annual reviews. She complains that because she only received one review during more than three years of employment, Wortham breached this contract. The “contract” is in the form of an e-mail sent to Hahn by J.M. Jones (and copied to Mack) which states: This e-mail will confirm our telephone conversation yesterday regarding an “annual” performance review for Eula Mack. You indicated that you had already marked Eula’s personnel file to review her job performance annually. Because breach of contract is a state law claim, Texas law applies. To bring a successful breach of contract claim in Texas, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the breach. Mullins v. TestAmerica, Inc., 564 F.3d 386, 418 (5th Cir. 2009). A valid contract requires (1) an offer, (2) an acceptance, (3) a meeting of the minds, (4) each party’s consent to the terms, (5) execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and binding, and (6) consideration. Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). The essential terms must be defined “with sufficient precision to enable the court to determine the obligations of the parties.” New Process Steel, L.P. v. Sharp Freight Sys., No. 01-04-00764-CV, 2006 WL 947764, at  (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 13, 2006, no pet.). Furthermore, a meeting of the minds refers to a mutual understanding and assent to the agreement regarding the subject matter and the essential terms of the contract. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Romfor Supply Co., 316 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). This e-mail lacks at least two requirements for a valid contract and therefore does not qualify as such. Even if the e-mail were an offer to Mack to perform an annual performance 22 Case: 12-20798 Document: 00512363750 Page: 23 Date Filed: 09/05/2013 12-20798 review, there is no evidence that she accepted the offer. Additionally, even if we did find a valid offer and acceptance, there is no consideration—there is no evidence of a bargained-for exchange of promises, which is the basis of a valid contract. See Tex. Gas Util. Co. v. Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. 1970). Mack’s agreement to work for Wortham was not induced by the promise of annual performance reviews, nor was Hahn’s statement that Mack was to receive annual performance reviews induced by consideration from Mack. In the absence of a mutuality of obligation, there can be no enforceable contract. Id.