Opinion ID: 4535750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Error in the Analysis in Walls

Text: Because it remains clear that Hall establishes a new rule of law that emanates from the United States Supreme Court and is constitutional in nature, it satisfies the first two prongs of Witt. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 931. Thus, the question of Hall’s retroactivity still turns on the third prong of Witt: whether the new rule constitutes a “development of fundamental significance.” Id. In Walls, this Court determined that the Hall decision met the third prong of the Witt analysis by “plac[ing] beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties,” because it “removes from the state’s authority to impose death sentences more than just those cases in which the defendant has an IQ score of 70 or below” and is therefore of fundamental significance. Walls, 213 So. 3d at 346. We now conclude that this Court erred in making that determination. - 11 - In discussing developments of fundamental significance that fall within the category of changes of law that place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties, this Court in Witt cited as an example of a decision falling within that category Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eight Amendment categorically prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult woman as cruel and unusual punishment. Witt, 387 So. 2d at 929. But contrary to the reasoning of the majority in Walls, “Hall places no categorical limitation on the authority of the state to impose a sentence of death.” Walls, 213 So. 3d at 350 (Canady, J., dissenting). The example of Coker is totally inapposite. In Hall, the Supreme Court recounted its decisions holding that particular punishments are prohibited by the Eighth Amendment “as a categorical matter,” such as the denaturalization of natural-born citizens as a punishment, Hall, 572 U.S. at 708 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)), the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by juveniles, id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)), “[a]nd, as relevant for [Hall],” the imposition of the death penalty on persons who are intellectually disabled, id. (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321). The Court then unambiguously set out the issue it was to address: “The question this case presents is how intellectual disability must be defined in order to implement . . . the holding of Atkins.” Id. at 709 (emphasis - 12 - added). And the holding of Hall was limited to a determination that it is unconstitutional for courts to refuse to allow capital defendants whose IQ scores are above 70 but within the test’s standard error of measurement to present evidence of their asserted adaptive deficits. Hall, 572 U.S. at 723. Thus, Hall merely “created a procedural requirement that those with IQ test scores within the test’s standard of error would have the opportunity to otherwise show intellectual disability.” In re Henry, 757 F.3d 1151, 1161 (11th Cir. 2014).4 The categorical prohibition on executing the intellectually disabled was not expanded by Hall. See Walls, 213 So. 3d at 350 (Canady, J., dissenting) (“Hall . . . does not preclude death sentences for individuals whose scores fall within the SEM.”). The issue addressed in Hall was not whether the State is categorically prohibited from executing those intellectually disabled defendants with IQs above 70, but within the SEM. Intellectually disabled persons with IQ scores above 70 are not a distinct class from intellectually disabled persons with IQ scores of 70 or below; all are members of the same class protected by Atkins. In re Hill, 777 F.3d 1214, 1223 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Hall merely provides new procedures for ensuring that States do not execute members of an already protected group.”); Henry, 757 4. The new rule announced in Hall is a procedural rule because it “regulate[s] only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (“[R]ules that regulate only the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability are procedural.”). - 13 - F.3d at 1161 (“The Supreme Court made clear in Hall that the class affected by the new rule—those with an intellectual disability—is identical to the class protected by Atkins. . . . Hall did not expand this class; instead, the Supreme Court limited the states’ power to define the class . . . .”); Elmore v. Shoop, No. 1:07-CV-776, 2019 WL 5287912, at  (S.D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2019) (“[The class of people which is addressed in Hall] is the same class of people that Atkins found ineligible for the death penalty because that is the definition of mental retardation/intellectual disability the Court used in Atkins. What Hall did was to preclude the State of Florida from using an IQ score of 70 as an automatic disqualification for proving that a person is in the class of people [who], on account of their intellectual disability, may not be executed if they commit murder.”). The conclusion “that Hall warrants retroactive application as a development of fundamental significance that places beyond the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence” because it may prohibit execution of intellectually disabled persons “within a broader range of IQ scores than before,” Walls, 213 So. 3d at 346, is therefore incorrect. Hall does not place beyond the authority of the State the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties; Hall merely more precisely defined the procedure that is to be followed in certain cases to determine whether a person facing the death penalty is intellectually disabled. Hall is merely an application of Atkins. Kilgore v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., - 14 - 805 F.3d 1301, 1314 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[Hall] merely provides new procedures for ensuring that states follow the rule enunciated in Atkins.”). Hall’s limited procedural rule does nothing more than provide certain defendants—those with IQ scores within the test’s margin of error—with the opportunity to present additional evidence of intellectual disability. Thus, Hall does not constitute “a development of fundamental significance that places beyond the State of Florida the power to impose a certain sentence,” Walls, 213 So. 3d at 346.