Opinion ID: 848649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right-of-way as fee simple or easement

Text: Our initial task is to establish the precise contours of the property interest conferred upon Mineral Range Railroad, plaintiff's predecessor in interest. According to plaintiff, the 1873 deed conveyed the land itself to Mineral Range Railroad. Thus, plaintiff argues that, as Mineral Range's successor in interest, it owns the land described by the 1873 deed in fee simple. Defendant argues, however, that the deed transferred only an easement-the right to use the land-rather than the land itself. An inquiry into the scope of the interest conferred by a deed such as that at issue here necessarily focuses on the deed's plain language, [13] and is guided by the following principles: (1) In construing a deed of conveyance[,] the first and fundamental inquiry must be the intent of the parties as expressed in the language thereof; (2) in arriving at the intent of parties as expressed in the instrument, consideration must be given to the whole [of the deed] and to each and every part of it; (3) no language in the instrument may be needlessly rejected as meaningless, but, if possible, all the language of a deed must be harmonized and construed so as to make all of it meaningful; (4) the only purpose of rules of construction of conveyances is to enable the court to reach the probable intent of the parties when it is not otherwise ascertainable. [14] These four principles stand for a relatively simple proposition: our objective in interpreting a deed is to give effect to the parties' intent as manifested in the language of the instrument. The instrument's granting clauses are a natural starting point for discerning the parties' intent. [15] The deed purports to convey a right of way that consist[s] of a strip of land ... across [the parcels described in the deed]. As we recognized over seventy years ago in Quinn, a deed granting a right-of-way typically conveys an easement, whereas a deed granting land itself is more appropriately characterized as conveying a fee or some other estate: Where the grant is not of the land but is merely of the use or of the right of way, or, in some cases, of the land specifically for a right of way, it is held to convey an easement only. Where the land itself is conveyed, although for railroad purposes only, without specific designation of a right of way, the conveyance is in fee and not of an easement. [16] Here, the deed's granting clause conveys only a right-of-way. The plain language of the deed, as well as the rule of construction articulated in Quinn, therefore indicate that the deed conveyed an easement rather than a fee simple. Plaintiff relies on Quinn for the proposition that the term right-of-way has two meanings in railroad parlance: the strip of land upon which the track is laid, and the legal right to use such strip. [17] The former meaning, in plaintiff's view, is an estate in real property, whereas the latter-the right to use property-is an easement only. Because right-of-way may be defined in two ways, plaintiff contends that the 1873 deed is ambiguous. The initial flaw with this argument is this: although right-of-way is susceptible to two meanings, it does not follow that the phrase is equally susceptible to either meaning in this case. As already noted, application of the principles articulated in Quinn shows that this deed-which grants a right of way rather than, for example, a strip of land to be used as a right-of-way-conveys an easement only. Moreover, it would make little sense to read the phrase right of way as referring to a strip of land. Recall that the deed conveys a right-of-way, and subsequently describes that right-of-way as consist[ing] of a strip of land . . . . If right of way is to be interpreted as conveying the land itself rather than passage over a strip of land, then the instrument must be interpreted as transferring  [a strip of land] ... to consist of a strip of land .... This reading produces a redundancy and violates the principle that all the language of a deed must be harmonized and construed so as to make all of it meaningful .... [18] Accordingly, it is an interpretation we must reject. According to the granting clause, the right-of-way to which the deed refers appears to be the legal right to use the ... strip-or, in other words, an easement. [19] The deed contains no language that belies this conclusion or affirmatively indicates that the parties intended to convey a fee simple. Although the deed refers to strips of land, even a cursory reading of the deed reveals that these references are merely descriptive of the right-of-way, [20] the object of the granting clauses, and are not an attempt to convey an interest in the land itself. Indeed, one need only examine the language describing the right-of-way as consisting of a strip of land ... across  the described parcels to confirm this fact. That the parties described the interest as going across the land reveals that they understood the right-of-way as being distinct from the land itself. As in Westman v. Kiell, [21] [t]his language evidences an intent to convey a use or right of way upon and across the land, or, in other words, an easement. [22] The language of the habendum clause is also consistent with conveyance of an easement. This clause states that Mineral Range Railroad was to have and to hold the said strip of land with the appurtenances, for the purpose and uses above stated and subject to the reservations aforesaid ... forever .... The reference in the habendum clause to the purpose and uses above stated and ... the reservations aforesaid demonstrates the parties' intent to convey only the limited property interest previously described in the deed. Although the habendum clause refers to a strip of land, the context of this phrase-particularly the references to strip[s] of land in clauses that precede the habendum clause-shows that this reference describes the geographical placement of the easement rather than the nature of the property interest conveyed. Plaintiff contends that Quincy Mining's reservation of mineral rights indicates that the parties intended the deed to convey a fee simple rather than an easement. This argument is unpersuasive. Indeed, plaintiff's assertion that this reservation would have been unnecessary if Quincy Mining had conveyed only an easement overlooks the key difference between railroad easements and ordinary easements. Typically, the owner of a servient estate may continue to use land encumbered by an easement. [23] Railroad easements, however, are essentially different from any other [easement]. [24] As one commentator recently noted, a railroad right-of-way easement granted by a landowner cannot be used by the landowner for any reason, even if the use does not interfere with the use by the easement holder. [25] For this reason, grantors of railroad rights-of-way have included language in deeds to delineate their continuing use rights in the portion of their fee estate burdened by a railroad easement. In Michigan Limestone & Chemical Co. v. Detroit & M. R. Co., 238 Mich. 221, 213 N.W. 96 (1927), for example, a railway enjoyed a right of way through plaintiff's property [26] -an easement according to the standards articulated in Quinn.  [27] Yet the deed expressly reserved for the grantor the right to build a road, pipeline, or conduit across the railroad right-of-way to ensure that the grantor's quarry had continued access to Lake Huron. [28] Therefore, there is nothing incongruous about the grantor's reservation of mineral rights and our conclusion that the right-of-way conveyed in 1873 was an easement. Rather, such a reservation might be expected in a deed conveying a railroad right-of-way, particularly when the grantor is a mining company and has a strong interest in protecting its mining interests. Although our sole concern is the intent of the parties as manifested in the plain language of the deed at issue here, it is worth noting that this analysis of the deed is consistent with our prior jurisprudence in this area. In general, this Court has construed deeds that purport to convey a right-of-way as transferring an easement. In fact, we have been unable to discover a single case in which this Court construed a deed conveying a right of way as transferring a fee estate, and plaintiff has directed us to none. In Jones v. Van Bochove, [29] for example, we considered a deed with a granting clause that conveyed [a]ll that certain piece or parcel of land situate    and described as follows, to wit: The right of way for a railroad, running from the marl bed of said cement company to their works, on the west side of the Kalamazoo river, and described as follows: `A strip of land 40 feet wide    and 952 feet in length.' [30] We held that this granting clause conveyed an easement rather than a fee, noting that the deed does not purport to convey a strip of land 40 feet wide, etc., but the right of way over a strip 40 feet wide.  [31] Likewise, in Mahar, supra, we determined that the following language conveyed an easement rather than a fee estate: That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the future construction, continued maintenance and operation of a first-class, standard-gauge steam railroad (over which shall be transported passengers and freight) within the time, limits and conditions hereinafter to be defined, ... have granted, bargained, sold and conveyed and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell, convey and quitclaim unto the party of the second part, his successors or assigns, for a right of way for a railroad forever .... [32] In contrast, deeds that this Court and the Court of Appeals have read as conveying a fee rather than an easement typically contain language that unambiguously conveys an estate in land and are therefore readily distinguishable from that at issue here. In Quinn, this Court held that a deed conveying a `parcel of land' `to be used for railroad purposes only' conveyed a fee estate. [33] Not only did that deed omit any reference to a right of way, but it specifically conveyed  all the estate, right, title, claim and demand whatsoever of the [grantor], both legal and equitable, in and to the said premises .... [34] This language unambiguously showed the grantors' intent to convey their entire estate. Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that the deed in O'Dess v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 218 Mich.App. 694, 555 N.W.2d 261 (1996) [35] concerned a fee. In that case, the deed at issue conveyed  all the estate, right, title, claim, and demand of the party of the first part, both legal and equitable.  Again, this language unequivocally manifested an intent to convey all the grantor's rights to the property. This Court also held that the instrument at issue in Epworth Assembly v. Ludington & Northern Railway, 236 Mich. 565, 211 N.W. 99 (1926) [36] conveyed a fee determinable. That conveyance purported to be a quitclaim deed: Provided, however, if, for any reasons, the property ... above described shall, for one year or longer, cease to be used for railroad purposes and trains shall not be run over the railroad track built or to be built on the land described, then and in that case all of the land herein described, together with all and singular the hereditaments and appurtenances belonging or in anywise appertaining thereto shall revert to the Epworth Assembly, of Ludington, Michigan, its heirs and assigns, and this quitclaim deed become null and void and of no effect and all rights, title and interest in and to the lands above described remain the same as would have been the case if this quitclaim deed had never been executed. [37] A quitclaim deed is, by definition, [a] deed that conveys a grantor's complete interest or claim in certain real property but that neither warrants nor professes that the title is valid. [38] Again, then, the deed at issue in Epworth showed the grantor's intent to convey all its interest in the property and lacked any language indicating that the grantor intended to convey merely an easement. In short, we have consistently held that deeds conveying a right-of-way transferred an easement. And we have reached a contrary conclusion only in cases in which the deed unmistakably expressed the grantor's intent to convey a fee simple. As shown above, the deed at issue here falls squarely within the first group.