Opinion ID: 2558362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Substantial, or Mere Incidental, Burden?

Text: If one disagrees with my view that the judge's denial of Petitioner's motions to postpone the trial for Shavuot constitutes a neutral and generally-applicable governmental action, it does not follow necessarily that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review. As discussed supra, to the extent a governmental action is an individualized assessment or is not neutral and generally applicable, under Sherbert, strict scrutiny applies only if the governmental action in question places a substantial burden on one's Free Exercise rights. In this regard, our opinion in Trinity, supra , becomes relevant. Accordingly, a brief reiteration of the relationship between Trinity and Free Exercise jurisprudence is in order. In 1993, Congress enacted . . . the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the RFRA), in response to what it perceived to be an erosion of religious liberty reflected in Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting and applying the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. [42 U.S.C.A.] § 2000bb(a). Three decades before Congress enacted the RFRA, the Supreme Court decided Sherbert v. Verner . . . . The substantial burden test (the Sherbert test) remained the law of the land governing claims under the Free Exercise Clause until 1990. . . . [when it decided] Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith . . . . The Court [in Smith ] turned its back on the substantial burden test, noting that it was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct, namely unemployment compensation. Congress enacted the RFRA to respond to Smith. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 [117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624] (1997) (noting that Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to . . . Smith ). . . . Congress disagreed that application of the substantial burden test would invite anarchy, finding instead that it is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior government interests. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(a)(5). Congress found further that neutral, generally applicable laws nonetheless may have the effect of burdening religious exercise to the same degree as laws intended to stifle such exercise. Accordingly, the RFRA announced that [g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion[,] even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application of the burden . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest[] and is the least restrictive means of furthering that . . . interest. Id. § 2000bb-1 (a) & (b). An attack on the RFRA, however, was quick and decisive. In City of Boerne v. Flores , the Supreme Court partially invalidated the RFRA, holding that the enforcement power granted to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to impose universally the substantial burden test on state and local governments. . . . After three years of hearings, Congress found that actions by state and local governments, in these two areas [land use and institutionalized persons] particularly, threaten religious exercise. To ensure that the RLUIPA did not suffer the same fate as the RFRA, Congress circumscribed the reach of the substantial burden test. Trinity, 407 Md. at 86-89, 962 A.2d at 423-425. Because courts have defined RLUIPA's substantial burden provision by reference to the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence, Vision Church, United Methodist v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 996 (7th Cir.2006), and because it is my view that the substantial burden test is relevant to the present case, I turn for guidance to Trinity a Maryland RLUIPA caseto gauge the reach of `substantial burden.' Trinity, 407 Md. at 93, 962 A.2d at 427; see Rouse v. Caruso, 2007 WL 209922, at , 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4941, at  (E.D.Mich. 24 January 2007) (The RLUIPA does not define `substantial burden,' but the courts that have considered the Act have defined the term by reference to the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law.). In Trinity, this Court cited, with approval, the following elucidation of other courts regarding substantial burden:  Government action which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which ha[s] no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs does not qualify as a substantial burden Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1326 [99 L.Ed.2d 534] (1988).  [A] substantial burden on religious exercise occurs when a . . . government, through act or omission, `put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.' Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.2006).  A `substantial burden' on `religious exercise' must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise. Guru Nanak Soc'y of Yuba City v. County of Sutter; Casey Kroon; Dennis Nelson; Larry Munger; Dan Silva, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.2006).  A `substantial burden' must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; a `substantial burden' is akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly. Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227.  A substantial burden on religion is a restriction that prevents adherents from conducting or expressing their religious beliefs or causes them to forgo religious precepts. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 406 F.Supp.2d 507, 515 (D.N.J. 2005) Trinity, 407 Md. at 93-94, 962 A.2d at 428-29. I think that the judge's denial of Petitioner's motion to postpone the trial for Shavuot did not coerce, put substantial pressure on, or impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon Petitioner to violate his religious precepts. Had the judge's denial of his motion to postpone placed such a burden on Petitioner's Free Exercise rights (or Petitioner perceived truly such a burden), Petitioner, I suspect, would have informed the trial court at some point during the period between 24 January 2008when the final trial dates were scheduledand 6 May 2008the date on which Petitioner first and ultimately informed the trial court of the Shavuot conflict, less than a month before commencement of trial. See United States v. Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1985) (Appellant had a duty to inform the court [about a religious holiday] sufficiently before the trial in order to assert his [F]irst [A]mendment rights.) (emphasis omitted). That is not to say that the exercise of Petitioner's religion was not affected in any way by the trial court's denial of his motion; of course, neither he nor his counsel was able to attend trial on either day of Shavuot. Yet, governmental action that merely inconvenience[s] the exercise of religion do[es] not create a substantial burden. First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 610 F.3d 1274, 1290 (11th Cir.2010), vacated by, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir.2010). In distilling the authorities in Trinity, we stated that a substantial burden on religious exercise existsalbeit in the RLUIPA contextonly if it leaves the aggrieved religious institution without a reasonable means to observe a particular religious precept. Trinity, 407 Md. at 96, 962 A.2d at 429. An amicus here asks rhetorically: If Jews could not hold public office in Maryland until 1825, is it an unfair stretchor an unconscionable realityto suggest that they cannot freely observe their holidays in 2010? Brief for Interested Professors of Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at 31. Simply put, Petitioner was free to celebrate Shavuot as he deemed fit; the trial court did not compel his presence in court in violation of the Jewish faith. Accordingly, because Petitioner was with reasonable means to observe the holiday of Shavuot, I do not think a substantial burden was placed upon his Free Exercise rights. See State v. Pride, 1 S.W.3d 494, 507 (Mo.Ct. App.1999) (applying the abuse of discretion standard to a denial of a motion to continue a trial); Gordon v. Gordon, 739 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Mo.Ct.App.1987) (same).