Opinion ID: 2143146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsections (a) and (b)

Text: As the majority notes, two other subsections of section 5 are subject to the notice requirements of subsection (d). 233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729. A consideration of the language of these two subsections illuminates the legislature's intent in subsection (c) and also shows why subsection (d) must be read in conjunction with the substantive requirements of each respective subsection. Subsection (a) deals with first offenders who are acquitted or otherwise released without being convicted. In this subsection, the legislature provided that the trial court may upon verified petition of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged. 20 ILCS 2630/5(a) (West 2006). Here, the legislature used the word may in regard to the trial court, not the petitioner. Instead of saying that the petitioner may have a court order entered, the legislature stated that the trial judge may order the record of arrest expunged. Consequently, this subsection has been interpreted to grant the trial court discretion to deny a petition even if the petitioner satisfies the statutory requirements. See Chesler v. People, 309 Ill.App.3d 145, 152, 242 Ill.Dec. 884, 722 N.E.2d 668 (1999); People v. Wells, 294 Ill.App.3d 405, 408-09, 228 Ill.Dec. 886, 690 N.E.2d 645 (1998). Although the majority concerns itself with why the legislature did not use the phrase shall enter an expungement order, as it did in subsection (c-6), it never explains why, if the legislature intended to grant discretion, it did not assign the word may to the trial court, as it did in subsection (a). As petitioner Howard points out, at the time the legislature enacted subsection (c), the courts had already construed subsection (a) as granting discretion to trial courts to deny petitions brought under that subsection, yet the legislature chose not to use the same language it used in subsection (a). In other words, the legislature very easily could have tracked the language of subsection (a) and drafted subsection (c) to provide as follows: Whenever a person who has been convicted of an offense is granted a pardon by the Governor which specifically authorizes expungement, the chief judge of the circuit where the person had been convicted, any judge of the circuit designated by the Chief Judge, or in counties of less than 3,000,000 inhabitants, the presiding judge at the defendant's trial, may upon verified petition of the defendant order the record of arrest expunged from the official records of the arresting authority and order that the records of the clerk of the circuit court and the Department be sealed until further order.... The legislature did not do this, instead providing that, if a petitioner meets the statutory requirements, he may have an expungement order entered. Under settled rules of statutory construction, we presume that the legislature intended a different meaning by using different language in subsections (a) and (c). See People v. Hudson, 228 Ill.2d 181, 193, 319 Ill.Dec. 840, 886 N.E.2d 964 (2008) (when the legislature uses certain language in one part of statute and different language in another, court may assume different meanings were intended). Let us now turn our attention to subsection (b), which covers a situation in which any assertion of trial court discretion to deny petitions that meet statutory requirements is highly dubious. Subsection (b) concerns the right of victims of identity theft to correct the official records when the identity thief commits crimes in the victim's name. As with subsections (a) and (c), subsection (b) is subject to the notice provisions of subsection (d). Here is the language that the legislature used in subsection (b): Whenever a person has been convicted of a crime or of the violation of a municipal ordinance, in the name of a person whose identity he has stolen or otherwise come into possession of, the aggrieved person from whom the identity was stolen or otherwise obtained without authorization, upon learning of the person having been arrested using his identity, may, upon verified petition to the chief judge of the circuit wherein the arrest was made, have a court order entered nunc pro tunc by the chief judge to correct the arrest record, conviction record, if any, and all official records of the arresting authority, the Department, other criminal justice agencies, the prosecutor, and the trial court concerning such arrest, if any, by removing his name from all such records in connection with the arrest and conviction, if any, and by inserting in the records the name of the offender, if known or ascertainable, in lieu of the aggrieved's name. (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2630/5(b) (West 2006). Here, as in subsection (c), the legislature used the may have a court order entered language instead of subsection (a)'s language that the trial court may    order the record of arrest expunged. Consequently, whatever this court interprets the phrase may have a court order entered to mean in subsection (c) will also apply to subsection (b). See Maggette, 195 Ill.2d at 349, 254 Ill.Dec. 299, 747 N.E.2d 339 (words used in one section of a statute have the same meaning when used in other sections of the same statute, unless a contrary legislative intent is clearly expressed). To the majority's credit, it does not deny the consequences of its holding. Indeed, the majority states explicitly that for petitions filed under subsection (b), a trial court retains discretion where the records show the conviction was made under a wrong name. 233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729. No authority is cited for this proposition, but it is the necessary consequence of the majority's reading of subsection (c). I do not think that this point can be glossed over as quickly as the majority wants it to be, and if we consider it further, I think we gain clear insight into the meaning of the phrase may have a court order entered. So there can be no mistake: a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court has today explicitly stated that trial courts have broad discretion to deny victims of identity theft the right to have the official records corrected when identity thieves commit crimes in their name. If my colleagues truly believe this, can they give some examples of when it would be appropriate for a trial court to deny a proper petition under this susbsection? I can think of no circumstances under which it would be appropriate for a trial court to place such a crippling burden on an innocent victim and to grant such an unjustified benefit to a criminal. And if there are no such examples, is that perhaps a strong indication that the legislature did not intend to grant such discretion? I believe that, as with subsection (c), the State's right to object and the trial court's right to deny a petition filed under this subsection is limited to a failure to satisfy the statutory requirements. Thus, unless the petition is not verified or unless the petition fails to establish that the crimes actually were committed by another person, the trial court must grant the petition. The Holland majority held that the factors that courts have adopted to guide trial court discretion under subsection (a) should also apply to the consideration of petitions filed under subsection (c). Holland, 374 Ill.App.3d at 128, 312 Ill.Dec. 560, 870 N.E.2d 1004. We should thus assume that courts will also apply these factors to petitions filed under subsection (b). Those factors are: the strength of the State's case against petitioner; the State's reasons for wishing to retain the records; petitioner's age, criminal record and employment history; the length of time between the arrest and expungement petition; and the adverse consequences the petitioner may suffer if expungement is not granted. Holland, 374 Ill.App.3d at 128, 312 Ill.Dec. 560, 870 N.E.2d 1004. Does it make any sense to consider these factors when we are talking about the right to have official records reflect the name of the person who actually committed a crime? If A steals B's identity and commits a crime in B's name, and B goes to court to exercise his statutory right to have the official records corrected, is the trial court really entitled to mull over B's age and employment history when deciding whether to order the records corrected to show that A committed the crime? At that point would we have reached absurdity, injustice, or inconvenience? See Palmer, 218 Ill.2d at 156, 300 Ill.Dec. 34, 843 N.E.2d 292. This is the path that the majority has set us on, and I think that it is as clear an indication as anything that this court is simply not reading the phrase may have a court order entered correctly. I do not believe that the legislature intended to grant discretion to trial courts to deny proper petitions filed under subsection (b). When considering subsection (b) together with subsection (c-6) of the Act (20 ILCS 2630/5 (West 2006)) and section 5-5-4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-4(b) (West 2006)) (both mandating expungement after judicial determinations of factual innocence), I see an unmistakable policy determination by the legislatureconsistent with the most basic notions of justice and fundamental fairnessthat in Illinois the factually innocent will not be forced to bear the stain of crimes they did not commit. By contrast, the majority apparently believes that the legislature's intent was to mandate expungement for the factually innocent who have been criminal defendants (233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707-08, 909 N.E.2d at 729-30), but to give the trial court complete discretion to decide if correction of official records is appropriate for a small category of the factually innocent who have not been criminal defendants (233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729). If that was indeed the legislature's intent, then the legislature unquestionably intended something absurd, unjust, and inconvenient. We are supposed to presume that the General Assembly intended none of these things, let alone all three. See Palmer, 218 Ill.2d at 156, 300 Ill.Dec. 34, 843 N.E.2d 292. Considering subsection (c) together with subsections (a) and (b) leaves no doubt that the legislature did not intend to grant trial courts the discretion to deny petitions that meet the statutory requirements of subsection (c). Rather than use the discretionary language of subsection (a), the legislature used the same language that it used when dealing with the right of factually innocent victims of identity theft to have official records corrected to show the name of the person who actually committed the crime. The right of a trial court to deny a petition under subsections (b) and (c) is clearly limited to those cases in which the statutory requirements are not met.