Opinion ID: 293978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Company's Refusal to Bargain and Propriety of Order

Text: 31 The last issue concerns the unfair practice growing out of the Company's refusal to recognize or bargain with the Union and the propriety of the Board's issuing a bargaining order on the basis of a once-existing card majority. 32 The Company claims it was entitled not to recognize or bargain with the Union after the latter requested such following its majority card authorization since (1) the Union did not clarify the bargaining unit it represented; (2) the Company was justified in questioning the majority status of the Union since many of the authorization cards were signed a good deal earlier or appeared suspect; (3) apparently some employees may have thought the cards were to indicate an election only. 33 The Board found to the contrary as to each of these contentions: (1) the Union's demand for recognition was found to be clear; (2) the Company did not have a basis for denying recognition, the authorization cards having accounted for 17 of 24 employees, a clear majority; and (3) the cards were accurate and not merely election cards. 34 Relevant to point (2) is the Supreme Court decision in N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), reh. den. 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 35, 24 L.Ed.2d 123 (1969). The issue before the Court was the extent of the employer's duty to recognize a union basing its claim to representative status solely on possession of union authorization cards and what employers might do to resist such card-based recognition. The Court noted that although traditionally an employer could refuse to bargain if he had 'good faith doubt' about the union's majority status (the defense raised here by the Company), the Court in Gissel noted that under the Board's current practice, the employer's good faith doubt is 'largely irrelevant.' Id. at 594, 89 S.Ct. 1918. See also Note, 'NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.: Bargaining Orders and Employee Free Choice,' 45 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 318, 334 (1970). 35 Although some commentators have been unclear as to whether the Supreme Court was repudiating the 'good faith doubt' rule outright or merely expressing the Board's position without endorsing same, most courts have and evidently will accept the Supreme Court's statement as an indication of its own dissatisfaction with the old rule. Accordingly, an employer's good faith doubt' is not sufficient reason to refuse to bargain with a union claiming a majority, even if only card-based. See N.L.R.B. v. S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 414 F.2d 561, 565 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 916, 90 S.Ct. 919, 25 L.Ed.2d 96 (1970). 36 The last point here concerns the propriety of the remedy recommended by the Board, namely the bargaining order. The Board has, of course, broad discretion to fashion such remedies as are necessary to effectuate its orders. Accordingly, in some instances the Board has issued bargaining orders in addition to or instead of cease and desist orders (a practice recognized and approved in Gissel) lest the employer benefit from its own wrongful acts. 37 In a context such as that before us the bargaining order may be dangerous since, at least at this point, the Union apparently no longer represents a majority. See N.L.R.B. v. Patent Trader, Inc., 415 F.2d 190, 200-202 (2d Cir. 1969). The Court in Gissel also recognized the superiority of the election process over the card count and that a bargaining order issued on the basis of a card majority is not a preferred method of establishing a union's representative status. N.L.R.B. v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1970). 38 Nonetheless, the Court in Gissel did recognize that an election is not the only way for recognition and that cards may suffice. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 592, 89 S.Ct. 1918. Apparently the Board has taken the Supreme Court at its word and now commonly issues bargaining orders in unfair labor cases. See Perl, 'The NLRB and Bargaining Orders: Does a New Era Begin with Gissel?' 15 Vill.L.Rev. 106, 113 (1969). When does a card majority warrant a bargaining order? When the employer's conduct is disruptive of the election process, 'cards may be the most effective-- perhaps the only-- way of assuring employee choice.' Gissel at 602, 89 S.Ct. at 1934. In such a case a bargaining order may issue even though the union has not maintained its majority status. Id. at 610, 89 S.Ct. 1918. As the Court concluded: 39 The only effect of our holding here is to approve the Board's use of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process. The Board's authority to issue such an order on a lesser showing of employer misconduct is appropriate, we should emphasize, where there is also a showing that at one point the union had a majority;    Id. at 614, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. 40 Several cases both before and after Gissel have approved the use of the bargaining order where the employer's unfair labor practices have resulted in the dissipation of a union majority. E.g., Snyder Tank Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 428 F.2d 1348, 1350-1 (2d Cir. 1970); N.L.R.B. v. Li'l General Stores, Inc., 422 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1970); Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. N.L.R.B., 136 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 419 F.2d 1207, 1209 (1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 988, 90 S.Ct. 1120, 25 L.Ed.2d 396 (1970); N.L.R.B. v. L. B. Foster Company, 418 F.2d 1, 3-4 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1124, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970); N.L.R.B. v. Wylie Manufacturing Company, 417 F.2d 192, 195-196 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. den., 397 U.S. 913, 90 S.Ct. 915, 25 L.Ed.2d 94 (1970); Wausau Steel Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 377 F.2d 369, 373-374 (7th Cir. 1967). Some factors respecting the issuance of such an order are listed in Note, supra, 45 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 318, 339-341. 41 The Company is left only with the argument that the conduct here complained of is within an exception noted by the Gissel Court: 42 We emphasize that under the Board's remedial power there is still a third category of minor or less extensive unfair labor practices, which, because of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining order. Id. at 615, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. 43 Suffice it to say that the discussion above establishes that the Company committed unfair labor practices which were not minimal and which did in fact impede the election process here. The order of the Board is enforced.