Opinion ID: 3018165
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Domicile and residence of the parties:

Text: As mentioned above, when both the place of injury and the conduct causing the injury are the same, the general approach is to apply the law of the jurisdiction where the injury occurred. Id. at 1217-18 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e; § 146 cmts. c and d). Having identified the most relevant contacts, it is necessary to determine which state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and parties. Id. at 1218. 14 Evaluating the competing interests of the states is the most important aspect of the analysis used in determining the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship. Id. at 1217. Pennsylvania has a strong and clear interest in providing full recovery in survival actions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that, when it is the domicile of the decedent and his family, the state is “vitally concerned with the administration of [the] decedent’s estate and the well-being of the surviving dependents to the extent of granting full recovery, including expected earnings.” Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. 1964). The federal courts faced with choice of law issues in this context have all recognized Pennsylvania’s important interest in securing an adequate recovery. E.g., Amoroso, 901 F. Supp. at 905. The majority of federal courts to address the issue have held that New Jersey also has an interest in applying its Survival Act under these circumstances because it would limit New Jersey defendants’ exposure to damage awards. E.g., Capone, 963 F. Supp. at 413. (“I concur with the vast majority of cases in finding that, the New Jersey Legislature, in providing for such limited recovery under the Survival Act, ‘was expressing its interest in protecting New Jersey defendants.’”) (quoting Mathis v. Motley, 649 F. Supp. 38, 40 (D.N.J. 1986)). In discussing a choice of law issue involving New Jersey’s Wrongful Death statute, we stated that “[i]nasmuch as [the statute] sets forth the type of damages that may be recovered in a wrongful death action, it reflects the New Jersey Legislature’s determination both of what is fair for a plaintiff to recover and a defendant to pay in such a case.” Petrella, 826 F.2d at 1343. The principle, observed in Petrella, that when a statute details the nature and 15 extent of damages recoverable in a wrongful death action, it reflects the legislature’s concern for both plaintiffs and defendants, applies here as well – even though this case is addressed under the New Jersey Survival Act. To the extent that the purposes behind the New Jersey Survival Act have been discussed, it appears that the Act was part of a comprehensive scheme of recovery to work in concert with the Wrongful Death Act to ensure proper redress by next of kin and the estate of the deceased following a tort leading to death. See Smith v. Whitaker, 734 A.2d 243, 249-50 (N.J. 1999). However, the interests of defendants appear also to be a concern of the New Jersey Legislature because the Survival Act was structured to avoid allowing multiple recoveries for the same loss. Alfone, 403 A.2d at 15. When a legislature creates such a damages scheme, it is considering the interests of both those who receive and those who pay. Thus, we conclude that one of the purposes of the Survival Act was to protect defendants. See Petrella, 826 F.2d 1343; Alfone v. Sarno, 403 A.2d 9, 15 (N.J. Super. 1979) (noting “strong policy against recovery of duplicate damages” under New Jersey’s Wrongful Death and Survival Acts).6 Pennsylvania, on one hand, has expressed a strong interest in affording recovery to plaintiffs in Survival Act cases 6 New Jersey’s Wrongful Death Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 et seq., seeks to compensate survivors “for the pecuniary loss [they] suffer as a result of the death of the decedent.” Capone, 963 F. Supp. at 414 (quoting Lovely v. Rahway Hosp., 548 A.2d 242, 244 (N.J. Super. 1988). 16 involving a Pennsylvania decedent. New Jersey, on the other hand, has an interest in protecting both New Jersey plaintiffs and New Jersey defendants by applying its Survival Act in the context of the broader New Jersey remedial scheme. See Smith, 734 A.2d at 249-50. In this case, each state’s interests would be furthered by application of its law because there is a Pennsylvania decedent and New Jersey defendants. As discussed, New Jersey permits plaintiffs to recover loss of support (determined in part by expected earnings) in wrongful death claims. Id. at 248 (“The amount of recovery is based upon the contributions, reduced to monetary terms, which the decedent might reasonably have been expected to make to his or her survivors.”). Lost earnings, however, are not cognizable in New Jersey Survival Act cases. Pollock, 610 F. Supp. at 881. Pennsylvania, on the other hand, allows wrongful death claims by parties other than the estate and permits the estate to recover lost earnings for itself. Frey v. Pa. Elec. Co., 607 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 1992). We are thus presented with a situation in which both states’ policies would be furthered by the application of their law and each state’s interests frustrated by the application of the other state’s law. In weighing the interests, our holding in Broome v. Antlers’ Hunting Club, 595 F.2d 921 (3d Cir. 1979), is informative. In that case, an executor of a New York decedent who died in Pennsylvania sought the application of the Pennsylvania Survival Statute in a case against a Pennsylvania defendant. We applied Pennsylvania’s choice of law rules and held that Pennsylvania law, rather than New York law, applied. We considered the respective interests of the states and concluded that “New York’s interest in applying its law of 17 damages to its resident who chose to vacation in Pennsylvania would weigh lightly on the qualitative scale compared with Pennsylvania’s policy of compensating tort victims when that state is the place of the tortious impact.” Id. at 925. Because New Jersey and Pennsylvania have similar choice of law tests, Cannon, 664 F. Supp. at 200-01 (citing Henry v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 1975)), applying that reasoning to this case counsels in favor of applying New Jersey law here. When each state is interested in the application of its laws and the application of the foreign state’s law would frustrate the purposes of the forum state, the presumption is to apply the law of the forum. Erny, 792 A.2d at 1217-18; Colley, 422 F. Supp. at 957 (“The law of the forum should be applied even though a foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy.”) (footnote omitted). For example, in Petrella, we held that New Jersey’s wrongful death law applied rather than Florida’s law in a case involving the death of a Florida resident allegedly caused by New Jersey resident doctors practicing in New Jersey. 826 F.2d 1343. We noted that Florida was interested because the plaintiff was from that state, and “thus Florida obviously has a legitimate interest in the quantum of damages for his death being fixed under Florida law.” Id. With respect to New Jersey, the forum state, it was interested because the alleged tort took place in New Jersey and was allegedly committed by New Jersey residents. Id. After noting that both states were interested, we concluded that “New Jersey’s interest in this case is no less than Florida’s and the judge correctly held that its law of damages should be applied.” Id. 18 Other choice of law norms also counsel in favor of applying New Jersey law in this case. When a person chooses to travel across state lines, he should expect the laws of the place in which he is located to govern his transactions. “By entering the state . . . the visitor has exposed himself to the risks of the territory and should not expect to subject persons living there to a financial hazard that their law had not created.” Colley, 422 F. Supp. at 957 (citing D.F. Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process 146-47 (1965)). For this reason, the place of injury takes on special significance “where, as here, the place where the injury occurred was not fortuitous . . ..” Blakesley v. Wolford, 789 F.2d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 1986). In this case, Carson and Golonka’s trip to New Jersey was part of a planned shopping excursion and, thus, it cannot be considered a fortuity that they found themselves on New Jersey’s roadways. In light of the fact that both New Jersey and Pennsylvania are interested, and the fact that general notions of comity militate toward applying the law of the state where the accident occurred when the defendants are residents of that state, we hold that a New Jersey court would apply New Jersey law in this case. Lebegern, however, focuses on the decision in Pollock, where the District Court stated “this court believes that, when enacting the statute, the New Jersey Legislature was principally, if not solely, concerned with the plight of the decedent and his estate, not with the defendant tort-feasor.” 610 F. Supp. at 880. The court concluded, based on legislative history and common law principles, that the New Jersey Survival Act was simply the closing a loophole to prevent duplicative recovery. Id. at 881. Because the Death Act of 1848 allowed next of kin to recover for lost future wages, the court concluded that the Legislature 19 “did not believe it was fair or necessary to also allow this recovery to the estate . . ..” Id.; Contrary to the conclusion drawn in Pollock, however, we believe the desire to close a loophole in damages does express an interest in protecting defendants. Indeed, it is anomalous to speak of an intent to structure damages and conclude that defendants, who are to pay the awards, were not on the mind of the legislature. Petrella, 826 F.2d at 1343. Taking up this language from Pollock, Lebegern argues that a review of the legislative history of the New Jersey Survival Act does not show an intent to protect the interests of New Jersey defendants. Lebegern also points to the statute’s original placement in a body of legislation titled “An Act Concerning Executors and the Administration of Estates.” She further argues that there are no New Jersey cases construing the Survival Act as intending to protect defendants. With respect to the latter argument, a state’s interest in the application of its laws can be expressed in ways other than a definitive ruling by a state court concerning the policies behind the legislation. A state’s interest cannot depend on the fortuity of appropriate legal action necessary to establish the pertinent jurisprudence. Moreover, while the statute’s title or placement in a particular portion of a state code might provide some evidence of legislative intent, Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892); State v. Hodde, 858 A.2d 1126, 1130 (N.J. 2004) (noting that title of statute is often not instructive but indicating that there are exceptions), in this case neither the title nor the placement militates toward a finding that New Jersey intended to benefit either plaintiffs or 20 defendants. The Survival Act concerned executors and administration of estates and its placement in that statutory section is not inconsistent with the interpretation we give it. At any rate, neither a law’s title nor location in the code is determinative for purposes of ascertaining the policies underlying the law. Id. Lebegern is correct that there is a paucity of legislative history supporting the theory that the New Jersey Legislature was concerned with resident defendants in passing the Survival Act. She is also correct that legislative history can be a factor in making a choice of law policy analysis. See Erny, 792 A.2d at 1219. The federal cases dealing with the New Jersey Survival Act infer the Act’s purposes by making an assumption that the Legislature’s limit on the scope of damages was intentional and designed to benefit those who would naturally benefit. See e.g., Capone, 963 F. Supp. at 413. Although it certainly would be easier to support the application of New Jersey law if there was legislative history or caselaw from New Jersey clearly setting forth the purposes of the Survival Act, we believe that in the absence of such evidence of intent it is proper for a federal court sitting in diversity to find the purposes behind legislation by considering which entities or parties naturally benefit from a legislative scheme. This is true not only because it is logical to assume that a legislature is cognizant of the natural consequences of its actions, see First Merchants Acceptance Corp. v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 198 F.3d 394, 402 (3d Cir. 1999), but also because legislative history from state legislatures is often sparse. Murillo v. Bambrick, 681 F.2d 898, 908 n.20 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 n.7 (1976)). 21