Opinion ID: 49915
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligent Classification

Text: Lambert first argues that the district court erred when it determined that his FTCA classification claim was barred by the discretionary function exception because the BOP had an obligation to conduct his custody classification review in August 2001 and it failed to do so. The FTCA “waives the United States government’s sovereign immunity from suit in federal courts for the negligent actions of its employees.” Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1340. There is an exception, however, for actions taken as part of the officer’s discretionary functions. The 7 discretionary function exception precludes government liability for “[a]ny claim based upon . . . the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). Whether the United States is entitled to application of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA is a question of law subject to de novo review. Cohen, 151 F.3d at 1340. If the discretionary function exception applies, the FTCA claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In Cohen, this court rejected a claim almost identical to the one Lambert makes, holding that even if the BOP has a duty of care to safeguard prisoners, it “retains sufficient discretion in the means it may use to fulfill that duty to trigger the discretionary function exception.” Id. at 1341, 1344. Additionally, this court noted that, under statute, the BOP had discretion in the manner in which it classified prisoners. Id. at 1343. Moreover, although this court recognized that the BOP’s failure to follow its own procedures renders the discretionary function exception inapplicable, id. at 1344-45, in this case Lambert offers nothing more than his own statements to show that the defendants failed to conduct a review of his custody classification or even 8 that such a review was required at that time. The district court, therefore, correctly determined that the discretionary function exception applied and that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Lambert’s classification claim.