Opinion ID: 199293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bivens Claim and Qualified Immunity

Text: 9 We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, and affirm if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Hegarty v. Somerset Cty., 53 F.3d 1367, 1372 (1st Cir. 1995). The analysis of a qualified immunity defense is identical for actions brought under § 1983 and Bivens. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989). The Supreme Court has set forth a preferred method of analysis, most recently reinforced in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right. Id. at 609, quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). Second, the court must proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. Only if these two questions are answered in the affirmative does the court address the particular conduct in question. The question there is whether an objectively reasonable officer, performing discretionary functions, would have understood his or her conduct violated that clearly established constitutional right. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982); seealso Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 591 (1998). 10 Here, the first two questions are easily answered in the affirmative. It has been clearly established for a very long time that the Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be based on probable cause. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 11 This case turns on the third question: whether an objectively reasonable officer would have understood that the arrest of the plaintiff violated these clearly established constitutional rights. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. This question itself is subject to certain ground rules. Evidence concerning the officer's subjective intent is simply irrelevant to a qualified immunity defense. Crawford-El, 523 U.S. at 588. It is objectively reasonable for officers to seek an arrest warrant so long as the presence of probable cause is at least arguable. Prokey v. Watkins, 942 F.2d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 1991). When officers make an arrest subject to a warrant, 2 then, even if probable cause is lacking, officers are entitled to qualified immunity 'unless the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable.' St. Hilaire v. Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1995), quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1986). Similarly, an officer who conducts an arrest pursuant to a warrant is liable only where the officer should have known that the facts recited in the affidavit did not constitute probable cause. Rodriques v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 812 (1st Cir. 1991). 12 Abreu argues that the officers should have known that there was no probable cause because the photographic identification by the informant of Junior from Abreu's old license picture was tainted. Plaintiffs claim that agents altered considerably Abreu's learner's permit photograph, adding a moustache and an afro hairdo, before presenting it to the informant, and they altered it in order to make it conform to the informant's description of Junior. As the district court observed, there is no evidence to support Abreu's allegation other than Abreu's 1999 affidavit. That affidavit is inconsistent with Abreu's earlier sworn statement that Agent Ford showed him a photocopy of a photo and asked me if I was the person, I replied that it was me and inquired where they had obtained that photo, since it was very old. We have repeatedly held that a party opposing summary judgment may not manufacture a dispute of fact by contradicting his earlier sworn testimony without a satisfactory explanation of why the testimony is changed. See, e.g., Colantuoni v. Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1994). Even if this were acceptable testimony, as it is not, it would not change the outcome. The issue is whether objectively reasonable agents would have believed they had probable cause. 3 Whether there was an addition to the photograph or not, the informant identified the photo as Junior and Abreu also identified the photo as being of himself. 13 To the extent Abreu is arguing there was nonetheless no objectively reasonable basis to think there was probable cause, the argument fails. The undisputed facts reveal that the warrant was based in part on information provided by a cooperating defendant who was involved in the alleged conspiracy. An informant's information is considered reliable if the informant speaks with personal knowledge, as here. SeeUnited States v. Cochrane, 896 F.2d 635, 641 (1st Cir. 1990). Agents also corroborated facts related by the informant, lending support to the reliability of that information. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 (1983). Agent Riley obtained information from the Puerto Rico Phone Company that the cellular telephone number provided by the informant as belonging to Junior was registered to Abreu. There was documentary evidence that co-conspirator Nunez called Abreu's cellular phone number twice during the time of the overt acts under investigation. Further, agents confirmed that there were no reports that Abreu's cellular phone number had been cloned -- unauthorized access and use of another's phone number -- and so it was unlikely Nunez was calling someone other than Abreu. 14 A different issue is raised by plaintiffs' claim that the agents should either not have arrested Abreu or immediately released him when they realized he varied from the physical description of Junior. Plaintiffs argue that there were major discrepancies in the informant's description of Junior, rendering the identification of Abreu unreliable. The description of Junior given by the informant was a black, light skinned Hispanic male, approximately 6'0 to 6'2 in height, weighing approximately 175 to 180 pounds, black hair, clean shaven [and] 33 to 35 (years of age). Abreu, 69 F. Supp.2d at 281-82. At the time of his arrest, Abreu was described as a black Puerto Rican male, 5'10 in height, weighing 202 pounds, and 25 years old. Id. at 282. Where, as here, a physical description closely resembles an individual, some discrepancies in the description do not undermine the reasonableness of officers' belief that an arrestee was the person named in a warrant. See Rodriguez v. United States, 54 F.3d 41, 46 (1st Cir. 1995) (three inch discrepancy in height and twenty pound difference in weight insufficient to render officers' reliance on physical description unreasonable). Further, the photo identification and telephone number evidence existed apart from any physical description. 15 A reasonable officer could have believed there was probable cause that Abreu was Junior. Plaintiffs failed to produce a material issue of fact demonstrating that no reasonably competent officer would have found probable cause to arrest Abreu. Prokey, 942 F.2d at 72 n.4. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on plaintiffs' Bivens claim. 4