Opinion ID: 2611126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the statute permits introduction of all constitutionally relevant mitigation evidence

Text: This court in Wagner held: We construe the statute [ORS 163.150] to mean that a defendant shall be permitted to introduce any competent evidence relevant to mitigation on any of the three issues. 305 Or. at 156-57, 752 P.2d 1136. The focus of that holding is plainly on the range of mitigation evidence to be permitted; it is not on whether a fourth issue can or should be submitted to the jury. This is evident not only from the statement of the holding, but from the fact that the court focused on interpreting the statutory provision that  evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence. 305 Or. at 156, 752 P.2d 1136. (Emphasis added.) The court thereby held that mitigation evidence shall be admissible on all three statutory issues, not just the second, and that it would be preferred practice to instruct on mitigation on all three statutory issues, not just the second. 305 Or. at 156-67, 752 P.2d 1136. The statute provides that the court shall conduct a separate proceeding to determine life imprisonment or death. ORS 163.150(1)(a). The statute allows at that proceeding evidence of any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and further provides that each side shall be permitted to present arguments for or against a sentence of death. Id. Thus far, the terms of the statute support a contention that the trial court has the authority to admit the broadest range of mitigating evidence and that a defendant may argue to the jury, based on that evidence, for a life sentence. These provisions do not, however, on their face, translate into a defendant's right to have a fourth, general mitigation question submitted to the jury. The textual interpretation of ORS 163.150(1)(a) proffered above is fully supported by the holding of the court in Wagner. There the court held that [u]nder ORS 163.150(1), the jury may consider all mitigating factors or circumstances that are shown by the evidence. 305 Or. at 160, 752 P.2d 1136. This holding interpreting the statute was both immediately preceded and followed by the court's recognition that the United States Supreme Court would presumably deem the Oregon statute unconstitutional if it `prevent[ed] the sentencer from considering any aspect of the defendant's character and record or any circumstances of his offense as an independently mitigating factor.' 305 Or. at 160, 752 P.2d 1136 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 607, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2966, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). (Emphasis added.) Justice Linde in dissent in Wagner relied on United States Supreme Court precedent to show the decisive point that the sentencer must not merely admit evidence but consider `nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.' 305 Or. at 204, 752 P.2d 1136. The court responded expressly to this point by holding, We have no quarrel with that rule, and we conclude the Oregon scheme is not to the contrary. 305 Or. at 161, 752 P.2d 1136. In interpreting and applying the statutory requirement that evidence may be presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentence, the court in Wagner relied on its interpretation of the then current federal precedents to conclude that jury consideration of mitigating evidence relevant to the three statutory issues was sufficient to satisfy federal constitutional mandates. Evidence relevant to sentence was thus defined in constitutional terms, and was then deemed to be limited to evidence relevant to the three statutory issues. The statute on its face, as we have seen, does not require more, and the court in Wagner did not feel compelled to construe it to permit more, i.e., submission of a fourth question. One year after Wagner, it can be seen that the dissents in Wagner read the federal precedents more insightfully than did the court and that Justice Gillette's dissent accurately concluded that the federal constitution could indeed require something more, some avenue for the sentencing jury to give meaningful effect to mitigating evidence relevant outside or beyond the statutory issues. See 305 Or. at 219-32, 752 P.2d 1136. [2] In June 1989, the United States Supreme Court so held in Penry, a case involving the Texas statute in which the Oregon statute has its roots. In Penry, the Supreme Court appears to have put its imprimatur on a fourth question as one mechanism for the sentencing jury to give meaningful effect to its consideration of the entire range of possible mitigating evidence and to provide a reasoned moral response to the ultimate question of whether the defendant should live or die. Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. at ___, ___, 109 S.Ct. at 2947, 2951, 106 L.Ed.2d at 279, 284.