Opinion ID: 76258
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Schad v. Mount Ephraim

Text: 18 This concept was not without limits, however, as the Court's next encounter with adult entertainment, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), made clear. Schad involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance brought by the operators of a store selling adult materials who added a coin-operated mechanism enabling customers to watch a live, nude dancer performing behind a glass panel. The ordinance, Mount Ephraim, N.J., Code § 99-15B (1), (2) (1979), described permitted uses in the community's small commercial zone and prohibited all other uses. The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance, which had been construed by the state courts to forbid nude dancing, because it prohibit[ed] a wide range of expression long been held to be within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the municipality's alleged justifications for its blanket prohibition were inadequate. Schad, 452 U.S. at 65, 101 S.Ct. 2176. Writing for the majority, Justice White held that when a zoning law infringes on a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest. Id. at 68, 101 S.Ct. 2176. In this case, none of Mount Ephraim's asserted justifications for its ordinance could withstand this heightened scrutiny, since it had presented no evidence to defend its claims that problems associated with live entertainment, such as parking, trash, police protection, and medical facilities were more significant than those associated with various permitted uses, that live entertainment [was] incompatible with the permitted uses, or that the kind of entertainment appellants wish to provide [was] available in reasonably nearby areas. Id. at 73-76, 101 S.Ct. 2176. 19