Opinion ID: 597909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the hearing in florida

Text: 16 Contrary to Femia's allegation, the transcript makes clear that the magistrate held a detention hearing in Florida. 1 He had the government proffer its reasons for detention. He provided Femia's counsel an opportunity to respond, and Femia's counsel advised that there was nothing further. From this we infer that Femia's counsel made it clear to the magistrate judge that he did not wish to make a proffer in opposition to the government's proffer. Based on the government's proffer and the presumption arising under 18 U.S.C. § 3142 that Femia presented a risk of flight and a danger to the community, the magistrate properly ordered Femia to be detained until trial.... His written detention order explicitly stated the reasons for ordering Femia's detention. 17 The detention hearing and order met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3142. The magistrate had a copy of the Massachusetts indictment before him, charging Femia with controlled substance offenses carrying maximum penalties exceeding ten years. Thus, the indictment presumptively established probable cause to believe that Femia had committed controlled substance offenses triggering the Section 3142(e) presumption that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure [his] appearance ... and the safety of the community.... See United States v. Dillon, 938 F.2d 1412, 1416 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Vargas, 804 F.2d 157, 162-63 (1st Cir. 1986). Neither presumption was rebutted by Femia. Femia's objection that a judicial officer may not order detention on the basis of a mere proffer of evidence by the government is simply not correct. See United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206-08 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that the Bail Reform Act had not changed the principle that magistrates and judges traditionally have been permitted to base their decision ... as to possible detention, on hearsay evidence, such as statements from the prosecution or the defendants about what they can prove and how; and stating further that [o]ften the opposing parties simply describe to the judicial officer the nature of their evidence; they do not actually produce it); see also United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1987) (We hold that the government as well as the defense may proceed by proffering evidence subject to the discretion of the judicial officer presiding at the detention hearing.). 18 The magistrate's statements that he would order detention subject to [Femia's,] again, having a detention hearing when he arrives in the District of Massachusetts, without prejudice to the Defendant's requesting an additional detention/bond hearing in Massachusetts ..., and without prejudice so that the defendant may file a written motion for bond in the District of Massachusetts, clearly were meant to safeguard Femia's right to request a detention hearing in Massachusetts. Femia has not yet done so. The motion he presented to the district court sought district court review of the magistrate's decision denying bail and a hearing in connection with that review. We turn now to the district court's decision.