Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Instructions Bearing on Special Circumstances

Text: Defendant claims that a series of instructional errors led to erroneous true findings on the special circumstances. We disagree. [7]
Defendant's first claim of error involves a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80 (1990 rev.). The court instructed the jury: If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first degree, you must then determine if one or more of the following special circumstances are true or not true: robbery and/or kidnap. The People have the burden of proving the truth of a special circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not true. Where the special circumstance is based on robbery and/or kidnap, intent to kill need not be established as long as there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the actual killer and the victim was killed in furtherance of the robbery or kidnap. You must decide separately each special circumstance alleged in this case. If you cannot agree as to all of the special circumstances, but can agree as to one, you must make your finding as to the one upon which you do agree. In order to find a special circumstance alleged in this case to be true or untrue, you must agree unanimously. (Italics added.) [8] Defendant requested the third paragraph of the instruction. He now contends that the language he proposed was confusing because it could allow the jury, if it found the intent to kill, to find the special circumstances true without finding the killing was in furtherance of the underlying crime. Such a finding would be incorrect insofar as it would omit the requirement that the killing be in furtherance of an underlying crime, would result in an incorrect finding on both special circumstances under the law at the time of the crimes (see § 190.2, former subd. (a)(17)(i), (ii) as amended by Prop. 11, added by voters, Primary Elec. (June 6, 1990); People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1201, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; cf. § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(M), added by Stats.1998, ch. 629, § 2; Prop. 18, approved by voters, Primary Elec. (Mar. 7, 2000) [as of effective date of initiative, i.e., March 8, 2000, felony-murder-kidnapping special circumstance no longer requires killing be in furtherance of kidnapping as long as the defendant intended to kill]). We first address respondent's claim of invited error. Defense counsel sought the instruction because he asserted it was an exact quote from People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 979, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475, and People v. Pock (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1274, 23 Cal. Rptr.2d 900. Counsel further asserted that the added paragraph would give the jurors some guidance. They get to know that the special circumstances is something different than just felony murder, that ... a murder was committed in order to carry out or advance a commission of the crime... The trial court agreed with defense counsel, disagreed with the prosecution's objection that the language would confuse the jury, and added the paragraph we have italicized here to the instructions. Although defense counsel exaggerated in stating the instructional language was an exact quotation of the language of Jennings and Pock, it did convey the essential holdings of those cases. Jennings stated, A felony-murder special circumstance is established even absent intent to kill, premeditation, or deliberation, if there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant personally killed the victim in the commission or attempted commission of, and in furtherance of, one of the felonies enumerated in subdivision (a)(17) of section 190.2. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d 963, 979, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475.) Pock stated, Where a special circumstance is based upon one of the requisite felony-murder provisions, intent to kill need not be established as long as there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person killed the victim in furtherance of the felony. ( People v. Pock, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1274, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 900.) `The doctrine of invited error bars a defendant from challenging an instruction given by the trial court when the defendant has made a conscious and deliberate tactical choice to request the instruction. [Citations.]' ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 970, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) Accordingly, defendant may not complain on appeal about the giving of the modified version of CALJIC No. 8.80. Were we to address the merits, we would find no error. As noted, defendant claims under California law that the instruction created ambiguity. When presented with such a claim, we review the challenged language to inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the instruction caused the jury to misconstrue or misapply the law. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Doing so, we find no such reasonable likelihood. The instruction correctly stated the law. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d 963, 979, 251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475; see People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 516, 71 Cal. Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) It informed the jury that in the felony-murder context, even if intent to kill was not established, the jury should nonetheless find the special circumstance true if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer and that he killed in furtherance of the underlying crime. Moreover, any possible confusion on the part of the jury was eliminated by the giving of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 with respect to both the kidnapping and the robbery special circumstances. That instruction informed the jury that to find the special circumstance allegations true, it must find that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of the specified felony, or during the immediate flight thereafter, and was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime, to facilitate the escape therefrom, or to avoid detection, and that the special circumstance is not established if the felony was merely incidental to the murder. The jury therefore could not have found the special circumstances true had it not been persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was committed in furtherance of the kidnapping and robbery. Defendant's claim lacks merit.
Next, defendant contends that because he conceded guilt of felony murder, disputing only the truth of the felony-murder special circumstances, it was error to instruct the jury that it could consider the evidence of his false statements and his attempts to hide evidence as showing consciousness of guilt. Defendant theorizes that the instructions improperly allowed the jury to consider evidence of acts showing consciousness of guilt as also amounting to evidence of his state of mind at the time of the murder of O'Sullivan, i.e., that he killed her in furtherance of robbery and kidnapping. Again, we disagree. Preliminarily, we cannot accept defendant's premise that because he conceded his guilt of felony murder, as to homicide the trial should have been limited to resolving the truth of the special circumstance allegations. In view of defendant's not guilty plea, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each material fact of the crimes charged. [T]he fact remained that defendant did not plead guilty to any of the charges and the jury had before it the issue of guilt on all charges. ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 304, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585; see People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 260, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897.) Thus, the trial court was required to instruct the jury on all issues. The court gave the jury three instructions regarding consciousness of guilt. First: If you find that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or deliberately misleading statement concerning the crimes for which he is now being tried, you may consider such statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your determination. (See CALJIC No. 2.03 (5th ed.1988).) Second: If you find that a defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself in any manner, such as by destroying evidence or by concealing evidence, such attempt may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration. (See CALJIC No. 2.06 (5th ed.1988).) Third: The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is accused of a crime, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. (See CALJIC No. 2.52 (5th ed.1988).) Defendant's claim is without merit. The cautionary nature of the instructions [discussing CALJIC Nos. 2.03 and 2.06] benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Moreover, whenever the prosecution properly relies on evidence of consciousness of guilt, relevant instructions must be given. (See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 694, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 [discussing CALJIC No. 2.52].) We have rejected claims that consciousness-of-guilt instructions permit the trier of fact improperly to draw inferences about a defendant's state of mind. ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 327, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Defendant further argues that because his identity was not at issue the consciousness-of-guilt instructions were improper. He is incorrect. Instructions on consciousness of guilt are proper not only when identity is at issue, but also when the accused admits some or all of the charged conduct, merely disputing its criminal implications. ( People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d 668, 694, fn. 10, 268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887 [discussing CALJIC No. 2.52 and addressing circumstances in which the prosecution theorized defendant intentionally murdered and robbed, and defendant admitted killing but claimed doing so in self-defense with no intent to kill, and denied intending to steal from the victim].) Also without merit is defendant's complaint that the trial court erred in giving his specially requested consciousness of guilt instruction only after modifying it by adding the word necessarily. The court's action resulted in the jury receiving the following instruction: As used in these instructions, consciousness of guilt means consciousness of some wrongdoing, and does not necessarily refer to consciousness of having committed the specific offenses charged. This was an accurate statement of the law. `A reasonable juror would understand consciousness of guilt to mean consciousness of some wrongdoing rather than consciousness of having committed the specific offense charged.' ( People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 327, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) But because some wrongdoing could include a specific offense, the instruction, as modified by the court, accurately stated the law. ( Ibid. ) But evidence of consciousness of guilt may be significant, even if it is not sufficient to establish guilt, and must not be understood as being tantamount to a confession to a specific crime. It may be evidence tending to prove, in light of all of the evidence the trier of fact hears, that a criminal defendant knew he or she committed a crime. Hence the court's inclusion of the word necessarily was proper. Defendant also complains of the trial court's refusal to give this special instruction, which he requested: The defendant's consciousness of guilt, if any, is relevant upon the questions of whether defendant was afraid of being apprehended or whether the defendant thought he had committed a crime. Consciousness of guilt may not be considered in determining the nature or the degree of the crime.  (Italics added.) Defendant focuses on error he perceives in the court's unwillingness to provide the jury with the nature or degree language in the italicized sentence. We recently rejected a similar claim ( People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 125, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400), and see no reason to reconsider our view.
Defendant next argues that the jury should not have been instructed, Motive is not an element of the crime charged and need not be shown. (CALJIC No. 2.51 (5th ed.1988).) He contends that the jury could have applied this rule to the special circumstance allegations. We disagree. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1027, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1; see also People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503-504, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.)
Defendant next argues that the following instruction was flawed because it failed to refer to the special circumstance allegations: In the crimes and allegations charged in Counts 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and a certain specific intent in the mind of the perpetrator, and otherwise the crime or allegation to which it relates is not committed. (See CALJIC No. 3.31 (1992 rev.).) The special circumstance allegations were, considered by the jury in connection with count 1, the murder count, which the instruction did not list. Defendant contends that the jury may have concluded that it need not consider whether a union of act and intent was required to find the special circumstances true. He is incorrect. To be sure, concurrence of act and intent is required to find true a special circumstance allegation. (See People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 904-905, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921.) The instruction given to the jury said nothing about the crimes and allegations charged in count 1, and, in light of a more specific instruction that referred to count 1, we presume that the jury did not draw any conclusion about count 1 from the modified version of CALJIC No. 3.31. The jury presumably followed the specific instruction, under which it was instructed that to find the special circumstance allegations true it must find: The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the [underlying crime] or to facilitate the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the [underlying crime] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. (See CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1991 rev.).) CALJIC No. 8.81.17 by itself made clear the required concurrence of conduct and intent at the time of the capital crime. (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1144, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1 [relying on the giving of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 and, with respect to the underlying crimes only, CALJIC No. 3.31].)