Opinion ID: 891791
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Executive Privilege in New Mexico

Text: {33} Having reviewed executive privilege in the federal courts and our sister states, we now turn to the proper scope of the privilege in New Mexico. The assertion of executive privilege in response to an IPRA request is a matter of first impression for this Court. We previously have concluded, however, that some form of executive privilege is mandated by the separation of powers clause of the New Mexico Constitution. First Judicial, 96 N.M. at 257, 629 P.2d at 333. {34} We decided First Judicial, our formative opinion on executive privilege, in response to a discovery dispute in civil cases arising from the 1980 state penitentiary riot. The Attorney General conducted an extensive investigation into the riot, and claimed that all of the information gathered during the course of that investigation was privileged from 14 discovery in any matter. Id. at 256-57, 629 P.2d at 332-33. We agreed with the Attorney General that he was entitled to withhold information pursuant to executive privilege. Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334. {35} First Judicial explained that “for a privilege to exist in New Mexico, it must be recognized or required by the Constitution, the Rules of Evidence, or other rules of this Court.” Id. at 257, 629 P.2d at 333. We reaffirm that holding here. We then held that “recognition of an executive privilege is required by the Constitution of the State of New Mexico[,]” specifically the separation of powers clause contained in Article III. Id. Citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, and Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff’d 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.1967), we stated: The purposes of the executive privilege are to safeguard the decision-making process of the government by fostering candid expression of recommendations and advice and to protect this process from disclosure. Executive personnel who fear or expect public dissemination of their remarks may temper their comments because of their concern for their own personal interests, safety, or reputation. Id. at 258, 629 P.2d at 334. The executive privilege First Judicial recognized is not absolute, as that “would conflict with the constitutional duty of the courts to do justice in matters brought before it.” Id. {36} First Judicial went on to instruct that in the context of civil discovery, the trial court must determine whether the privilege was properly invoked and then balance the competing interests in order to determine whether the privilege has been overcome. Id. First Judicial’s balancing test requires that the movant show good cause for the production of the material over which the privilege has been asserted. Id. The trial court must then conduct an in camera review of the material to determine if it “would be admissible in evidence and that it is otherwise unavailable by exercise of reasonable diligence.” Id. Finally, the trial court must assure that the balance of interests weighed in favor of disclosure. Id. First Judicial identified the competing interests as “the public’s interest in preserving confidentiality to promote intra-governmental candor,” and “the individual’s need for disclosure of the particular information sought.” Id. (citing Nixon, 418 U.S. 712, and Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (Cust. Ct. 1979) (discussing the balancing necessary before an assertion of deliberative process privilege will be honored)). The competing interests implicated by a claim of executive privilege are more accurately characterized as the public’s interest in disclosure weighed against the government’s interest in nondisclosure. See Lamy v. N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 872 A.2d 1006, 1010 (N.H. 2005) (identifying the central tension as between “the public interest in disclosure against the government interest in nondisclosure” as well as any individual privacy interests in favor of nondisclosure); Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 230 P.3d 1238, 1240 (Colo. App. 2009) (noting that Colorado’s public records law “balances the public’s interest in access to information . . . against the privacy interests of public officials and employees”). As we explain below, 15 when the Governor invokes executive privilege in response to an IPRA request, however, courts do not apply First Judicial’s balancing test. {37} In contrast to its recognition of a constitutionally-based executive communications privilege, First Judicial rejected the assertion of a common law “public interest privilege.” Id. The Attorney General had argued that the Court should recognize such a privilege to protect his communications with individuals outside of the executive department exchanged in the course of his investigation. Id. at 258-59, 629 P.2d at 334-35. In the Attorney General’s view, the “rule of reason” exception to disclosure set forth in Newsome, discussed above, supported the existence of a public interest privilege. Id. at 260, 629 P.2d at 336. First Judicial concluded, however, that neither the constitution nor the evidentiary rules mandated such a privilege or any other common law evidentiary privileges, noting that if such privileges were accepted, “there would be no limit to the communications that could