Opinion ID: 1301257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court Properly Exercised Jurisdiction

Text: The decision whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed lies within the district court's discretion. Foster, 504 F.3d at 1051. The fact that Satey may have later sought dismissal of his federal claims does not divest the district court of its power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless those claims were absolutely devoid of merit or obviously frivolous. See Gilder v. PGA Tour, Inc., 936 F.2d 417, 421 (9th Cir.1991). Satey's federal claims were neither devoid of merit nor obviously frivolous even though they were not pursued. In Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351, 108 S.Ct. 614, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988), the Supreme Court observed that pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed to enable courts to handle cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity[.] Id. at 351, 108 S.Ct. 614. [I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine  judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity  will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Id. However, dismissal of the remaining state law claims is not mandatory. Id. at 350 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 614. There is no dispute that the district court's initial exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Satey's state law claims was entirely proper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The parties dispute whether the district court abused its discretion by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim in light of Satey's stated intention to dismiss the remaining federal claims. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by retaining supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (recognizing discretionary nature of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and observing that a federal district court with power to hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, them under the conditions set out in § 1367(c)). Judicial economy and convenience to the parties were better accommodated by retaining the state law claim at that juncture, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by so doing. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 U.S. at 350-51, 108 S.Ct. 614. B. Chase is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Satey's Claim Under California's Identity Theft Law Chase challenges Satey's claim under California's Identity Theft law on two distinct bases. Chase contends that the FDCPA preempts Satey's claim under California's Identity Theft Law. Chase also argues that it is not a claimant under California's Identity Theft Law, and thus, Satey's claim against Chase fails as a matter of law. Since we conclude that Chase is not a claimant under California's Identity Theft Law, we express no opinion on whether the FDCPA preempt's Satey's claim against Chase under California's Identity Theft Law. California's Identity Theft Law allows a victim of identity theft to bring an action for damages, civil penalties, and injunctive relief against a claimant to establish that the person is a victim of identity theft in connection with the claimant's claim against that person. Cal. Civ.Code § 1798.93(a) and (c). Claimant means a person who has or purports to have a claim for money or an interest in property in connection with a transaction procured through identity theft. Cal. Civ.Code § 1798.92(a). The statute defines a victim of identity theft as a person who had his or her personal identifying information used without authorization by another to obtain credit, goods, services, money, or property, and did not use or possess the credit, goods, services, money, or property obtained by the identity theft, and filed a police report in this regard pursuant to Section 530.5 of the Penal Code. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.92(d). Civil penalties are available if the victim of identity theft proves all of the following by clear and convincing evidence: (A) That at least 30 days prior to filing an action or within the cross-complaint pursuant to this section, he or she provided written notice to the claimant at the address designated by the claimant for complaints related to credit reporting issues that a situation of identity theft might exist and explaining the basis for that belief. (B) That the claimant failed to diligently investigate the victim's notification of a. possible identity theft. (C) That the claimant continued to pursue its claim against the victim after the claimant was presented with facts that were later held to entitle the victim to a judgment pursuant to this section. Cal. Civ.Code § 1798.93(c)(6). Chase argues that summary judgment is appropriate on Satey's claim under California's Identity Theft law because it does not currently have, and has not had since 2003, a claim for money . . . in connection with a transaction procured through identity theft. Thus, Chase argues, that it has not been a claimant since 2003 and that Satey's claim against Chase under California's Identity Theft Law fails as a matter of law. For the reasons set forth below, we agree. The term claimant, as defined in California Civil Code section 1798.92(a), reflects a present tense interest in a debt or attempt to collect. In construing statutes, the use of verb tense by the Legislature is considered significant. Hughes v. Bd. of Arch. Exam'rs., 17 Cal.4th 763, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641, 649 (Cal. 1998). It is a general rule of statutory construction that a statute, expressed in general terms and words of present or future tense, will be applied, not only to situations existing and known at the time of the enactment, but also prospectively to things and conditions that come into existence thereafter. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. McConnell, 46 Cal.2d 330, 294 P.2d 440, 446 (1956); see also Cal. Civ.Code § 14. (Words used in this code in the present tense include the future as well as the present.). If the California Legislature wanted to define claimants in the past tense, it could easily have done so by modifying the statutory language. See Palmer v. United States, 945 F.2d 1134, 1136 (9th Cir.1991) (If the legislature wished to deprive urban property holders of qualified immunity, it could have easily done so. It is not our role as a court to rewrite the plain language of a state statute.); see e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 52012.5 (expressly including a past-tense construction in the statutory definition of first time homebuyer). Accordingly, granting the appropriate significance to the verb tense used by the California Legislature, we cannot construe claimant to include a person who had an interest in a disputed debt at some point in the past, but who no longer retains the interest at the time suit is filed, under California's Identity Theft Law. At the time Satey filed suit on October 31, 2005, he may have had a claim under California's Identity Theft Law against Great Seneca. Great Seneca had a claim for money or an interest in property in connection with a transaction procured through identity theft. Cal. Civ.Code § 1798.92(a). However, Satey had no claim under California's Identity Theft Law against Chase on October 31, 2005 because Chase did not have, and had hot had since 2003, a claim for money or an interest in property in connection with a transaction procured through identity theft. Id. Our holding that the term claimant is limited to the present or future tenses is consistent with the four-year statute of limitations allowed by California's Identity Theft Law: a claimant could maintain a claim against a victim of identity theft for four or more years. The statute of limitations would continue to run, and a victim of identity theft could seek relief under California's Identity Theft Law, so long as the claimant maintained a claim. If, as happened here, a claimant sells the disputed debt to another entity, and the victim of identity theft has not yet filed suit, the victim of identity theft may no longer sue the former claimant under California's Identity Theft Law. In that situation, the victim of identity theft would be able to seek relief against the new claimant and would have four years within which to do so. In summary, because the California Legislature explicitly used the present tense when crafting the definition of claimant under California's Identity Theft Law, we hold that it does not apply to a claimant who no longer has a claim at the time the lawsuit is filed. For that reason, while Chase may have previously come within the scope of California's Identity Theft Law, once Chase sold the debt it was no longer a claimant under California's Identity Theft Law. Thus Satey's claim under California's Identity Theft Law was not viable against Chase when he filed suit on October 31, 2005. Satey instead dismissed his claim against Great Seneca. Consequently, we affirm the district court and hold that summary judgment was appropriately entered in light of the fact that Chase is not a claimant under California's Identity Theft Law. Therefore, we decline to reach the propriety of the district court's conclusion that California's Identity Theft Law is preempted by the FCRA. In light of our decision affirming summary judgment, Chase's request for further proceedings on its statement of material facts not in controversy is moot. [1] Affirmed.