Opinion ID: 2606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exclusion of the draft plea agreement

Text: Fell assails the district court's exclusion of a draft plea agreement on the ground that it was mitigation evidence that rebutted the government's position that Fell had not accepted responsibility. See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979). Fell's argument is driven by two contentions. First, he argues that the trial court misapplied the FDPA's evidentiary standards governing the admission of evidence. Second, he claims that the exclusion of the agreement denied him an opportunity to rebut the government's misrepresentations about his willingness to plead guilty and accept responsibility. We disagree. In 2001, the parties considered a plea agreement under which Fell would plead guilty to Count 2 of the original Indictment  kidnapping Teresca King with death resulting  in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment. The proposed plea agreement detailed substantial mitigating evidence related to Fell's mental health and impaired capacity at the time of the events[;] ... his mental health history; his youth; his remorse; his assistance to authorities; and his lack of any substantial prior criminal history. Id. at 782. Fell and his attorneys signed the agreement, but the prosecutors did not. Under Department of Justice guidelines, the proposed agreement was expressly conditioned on approval by the Attorney General, after which the U.S. Attorney for the District of Vermont could sign the agreement. [11] The Attorney General rejected Fell's agreement and the government filed notice that it would seek the death penalty. In a pre-trial submission, the government moved to bar admission of the draft agreement as well as information surrounding plea negotiations at the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Fell, 372 F.Supp.2d at 781. The government characterized the plea agreement, a conditional offer that was subject to acceptance by the Attorney General, as containing the unendorsed opinion of the prosecution and embodying inchoate compromise negotiations barred by Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 410. Fell agreed that the evidence was irrelevant at the guilt phase, but opposed the motion, claiming that the proposed agreement contained binding judicial admissions that substantial mitigating factors existed. He also contended that the Fifth and Eighth Amendments as well as § 3593(c) of the FDPA compelled admission of the draft. On May 26, 2005, the district court excluded the draft plea agreement  and statements made during plea negotiations  as irrelevant because a prosecutor's statements of personal belief regarding [aggravating and mitigation] factors should have no bearing on the jury's independent evaluation of the evidence. United States v. Fell, 372 F.Supp.2d 773, 783 (D.Vt.2005). The court also emphasized that the statements in the proposed plea agreement were never adopted by the government. See id. It concluded that while the draft's probative value was negligible because the opinions of the prosecutors [did not] make the existence or non-existence of any mitigating factor more probable or less probable, id., it could prejudicially distract the jury from making its own independent evaluation of the mitigating and aggravating factors. Finally, the court determined that public policy disfavored evidence that would deter plea bargaining. However, the district court permitted Fell to introduce during the penalty phase a stipulation that he had offered to plead guilty to Count 2 in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In the court's view, Fell's offer [was] relevant to the mitigating factor of acceptance of responsibility. Id. The stipulation informed the jury that on May 18th, 2001, Donald Fell, through his attorneys and in writing, offered to plead guilty to Count II of the indictment, kidnapping, death resulting, in exchange for a life sentence without the possibility of release. The government refused that offer. In summation, defense counsel contended that Fell's attempt to plead guilty demonstrated that he had accepted responsibility, assisted law enforcement, and felt remorse. In response, the government argued in closing: Ladies and gentlemen, the judge instructed you. You know the law. Life imprisonment without the possibility of release is the minimum sentence that Donald Fell faces for kidnapping with death resulting. It's the minimum sentence. When he offered to make that plea, he knew the evidence against him was overwhelming. He knew there was no doubt he was going to be convicted, so he asked for the minimum sentence. We rejected that, ladies and gentlemen. We wanted a jury to decide the appropriate sentence in this case. And, ladies and gentlemen, let's take a look at the last part of this: He's maintained that offer to this day. Ladies and gentlemen, we had to try and convict him. If he wanted to plead guilty, he could have pled guilty. We had a guilt phase in this case, ladies and gentlemen. We put on our case. We met our burden. We proved it. And now we are here to decide what is the just sentence. The minimum sentence? Or death sentence. Fell did not object or request a curative measure at the time. When he moved for a new trial, he argued that the government committed misconduct by taking inconsistent positions with respect to the facts underlying the stipulation. By minimizing Fell's cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, he contended, the government took a position inconsistent with that which it had set forth in the draft plea agreement. This alleged misconduct, Fell urged, entitled him to be re-sentenced to life imprisonment or to receive a new sentencing hearing. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Fell renews his objection to the court's exclusion of the draft agreement and mounts an expanded challenge to the government's allegedly improper rebuttal comments. As to the agreement, he argues that the court violated the FDPA because the draft agreement was relevant to the mitigation factors. He also makes a two-fold claim regarding the government's misconduct. First, Fell believes that once the prosecution commented in its closing argument on his refusal to plead guilty, he should have been permitted to introduce the draft agreement as rebuttal evidence. Second, he avers that the government's intimations about his refusal to plead guilty impermissibly burdened his right to plead not guilty. Since Fell failed to object to the prosecution's comments, we review for plain error. While we see none with respect to the court's exclusion of the draft agreement, the prosecutor's remarks present a more complicated question. In cases governed by the FDPA, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at the penalty phase. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c); Fell I, 360 F.3d at 143. The FDPA provides that information relevant to the sentence, including any mitigating or aggravating factor: is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.... The government and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing, and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any aggravating or mitigating factor, and as to the appropriateness in the case of imposing a sentence of death. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). See Fell I, 360 F.3d at 146 (upholding the constitutionality of this provision of FDPA and collecting cases so holding). Accordingly, a capital defendant has a right to introduce as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. [12] Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court recognized, however, that its holding did not limit[ ] the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. Id. at 604 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954. Likewise, the FDPA's evidentiary standards do not mean that the defense has carte blanche to introduce any and all evidence that it wishes. United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 756 (8th Cir.2005). Nor does the FDPA eliminate th[e] function of the judge as gatekeeper of constitutionally permissible evidence. Fell I, 360 F.3d at 145. The court's exclusion of the draft agreement was within its traditional authority to exclude evidence of questionable relevance. The district court appropriately concluded that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), the draft agreement's inclusion of the unadopted statements of the prosecutors lacked evidentiary value and that it would distract the jury from an independent assessment of the mitigating factors. In addition, admission of the draft would authorize a confusing and unproductive inquiry into incomplete plea negotiations. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. at 88, 55 S.Ct. 629 (stating that the opinions of prosecutors should properly carry no weight with the jury); accord United States v. Melendez, 57 F.3d 238, 240-41 (2d Cir.1995). For these reasons, we see no error  much less abuse of discretion  in the district court's decision to exclude the opinions of the prosecutors set forth in the draft plea agreement. Fell next argues that the prosecutor misrepresented his willingness to plead guilty by stating, in closing argument, that if [Fell] wanted to plead guilty he could have. Fell contends that, in order to correct this purported misrepresentation, he should have been allowed to introduce the draft agreement in rebuttal. Further, Fell maintains that the prosecution's remark implicated his right to plead not guilty and avail himself of a jury trial. Because Fell did not preserve his challenge at trial, we review for plain error and conclude that the prosecution's statement falls well short of meeting this test. First, the draft agreement did not need to be admitted in rebuttal to the prosecution's statements. To the extent Fell sought to introduce the draft agreement to bolster his mitigation defense that he accepted responsibility and to counter the prosecution's comments that he did not, the agreement was cumulative of the stipulation informing the jury that the government refused his offer to plead guilty. In any event, the record is virtually conclusive that the jury was clearly aware of Fell's willingness to plead guilty. On the verdict form, all twelve jurors found that Donald Fell offered to plead guilty to kidnapping and murdering Teresca King, knowing that the law requires a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release, and he has maintained that offer to this day. In addition, six jurors found the mitigating factors addressed in the agreement  concluding that Fell had admitted responsibility for the death of Teresca King and had assisted law enforcement. Regardless, all twelve jurors unanimously found that the government had established each of the alleged aggravating factors. In view of the jurors' responses, even if the agreement had been admitted and an additional six jurors had found that Fell had admitted responsibility, the result of the penalty phase would not have been different. Fell's constitutional objection to the government's comments that as a consequence of his plea of not guilty, the government had to try to convict him and if [Fell] wanted to plead guilty, he could have pled guilty requires a different analysis. [13] Fell contends that this argument constituted an improper attempt, in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, to defeat a mitigating factor and impermissibly penalize him for pleading not guilty. Fell first challenged these comments in his motion for a new trial only on the due process ground of the inconsistency between the prosecution's original view that the existence of mitigating evidence warranted plea negotiations and its position during the penalty phase that any mitigating factors were far outweighed by the aggravating circumstances of the case. Fell, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24707, at . Since no mention was made of the Sixth Amendment below, we review his claim for plain error. We have held that, when addressing the jury, a prosecutor must avoid commenting in a way that trenches on the defendant's constitutional rights and privileges. For example, [ ]he may not permissibly comment on the failure of the defendant to testify, or invite the jury to `presume' in the absence of countervailing evidence that the government's view of the case is correct, or suggest that the defendant has any burden of proof or any obligation to adduce any evidence whatever. United States v. Parker, 903 F.2d 91, 98 (2d Cir.1990). In order to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor's remarks were improper and ... that the remarks, taken in the context of the entire trial resulted in substantial prejudice. United States v. Bautista, 23 F.3d 726, 732 (2d Cir.1994). The challenged comments occurred in response to Fell's endeavor to use the stipulation of his offer to plead guilty to prove acceptance of responsibility as a mitigating factor. In summation, the prosecution sought to place the stipulation in context by noting that, when faced with overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Fell offered to plead guilty in exchange for the minimum penalty authorized for his conduct. When this offer was not accepted, the government proceeded to a trial that Fell could have avoided by pleading unconditionally. At that trial, the government was put to a burden which it met. We believe these arguments  which the jury was repeatedly told were not evidence  were reasonable responses to Fell's use of the stipulation. No error occurred. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 183, 106 S.Ct. 2464.