Opinion ID: 1177782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bill of Exceptions

Text: At the sentencing hearing the State urged that the court first sentence the defendant on his conviction for sexual assault in violation of § 6-4-302(a)(i), W.S. 1977, and then proceed to sentence him to life imprisonment for having been determined to be an habitual criminal under § 6-1-110, W.S. 1977. The State emphasizes on appeal that if two separate sentences were imposed, there would be a merger of offenses and/or sentences, and that the lesser sentence merges with the greater and only the greater is to be served. The State further points out that this procedure would be in the interest of judicial economy; and concludes that if both sentences are not imposed, a resentencing will be necessary when error occurs in the habitual criminal sentencing process. We do not agree that two separate sentences should have been imposed. The habitual criminal statute does not create a new or separate crime and does not authorize or contemplate the conviction of the charge of being an habitual criminal. The distinct crime of being an habitual criminal is unknown. The habitual criminal act only prescribes a punishment and provides that in cases of a fourth felony conviction the penalty shall be enhanced. The repetition of criminal conduct aggravates the offense and provides greater penalties. The punishment is for the fourth felony, but it is enhanced because the defendant is an habitual criminal. The prior felony convictions are not integral parts of the principal offense charged in the information, but are instead matters of aggravation concerning the punishment to be imposed. Habitual criminality is a status, not an offense, and its finding calls for an enhancement of the punishment for the crime charged.    Since habitual criminality is a status, not a crime,    a judgment of conviction of an accused as an `habitual criminal' is considered null and void, there being no such offense, and on conviction under an indictment alleging prior convictions there can be but one judgment or sentence imposed. 24B C.J.S. Sentence of Judgment § 1971, p. 521 (1962).    Habitual criminality is a status rather than an offense, and allegations of previous convictions made in indictments or informations brought under an habitual criminal statute do not constitute a distinct charge of crime, but go only to the punishment of the criminal.    42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 145, p. 1065 (1944), quoted with approval in Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514, 519 (1950). The effect of two sentences would be tantamount to sentencing a defendant for being an ex-convict. Separate sentences would violate the double jeopardy prohibition. People v. Atkinson, 376 Ill. 623, 35 N.E.2d 58 (1941); State v. Collins, 266 Mo. 93, 180 S.W. 866 (1915); Von Bokelman v. Sigler, 175 Neb. 305, 121 N.W.2d 572 (1963); Jones v. State, 147 Neb. 219, 22 N.W.2d 710 (1946); Ex Parte Kuwitzky, 135 Neb. 466, 282 N.W. 396 (1938); Meade v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 484 S.W.2d 366 (1972); State v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E.2d 115 (1966). In State v. Boles, 149 W. Va. 365, 141 S.E.2d 59 (1965), the defendant had been convicted of breaking and entering in 1958. After conviction and before sentencing, a second information was filed against defendant setting forth two previous convictions of felonies in the years 1944 and 1953. [10] Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment under West Virginia's recidivist statute. Defendant contended that the life sentence was void and his sentence should have been one to ten years for breaking and entering, plus an additional five years for a previous conviction. The court held:    However our recidivist statute does permit an increased sentence for a convicted felon who has theretofore been convicted of one or more felonies and such fact is brought to the attention of the court prior to sentencing by means of an information. That is exactly what occurred in this case and the information was filed subsequent to conviction and prior to sentencing. It is the view of this Court that under those circumstances the trial court had no authority to impose a one to ten year sentence upon the prisoner, that being the statutory penalty for the principal crime of which he had been convicted and not yet sentenced, inasmuch as under the provisions of    [recidivist statute] it became the mandatory duty of the trial court to impose a life sentence in the penitentiary upon the prisoner. The language of that section is clear and this language will be repeated: `   the person shall be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for life.' State v. Boles, supra, 141 S.E.2d at 63. In a later case, the court said,    A defendant may not be sentenced for the principal offense and then be given an additional separate sentence upon the information. This, in effect, would result in sentencing one for being an ex convict.    State v. Boles, 151 W. Va. 194, 151 S.E.2d 115, 119 (1966). In Ex Parte Kuwitzky, supra, 282 N.W. at 399, the Nebraska Supreme Court held: We are of the opinion that count 2 of the information filed in Otoe county against the appellant in the case at bar did not charge a separate and distinct offense under the laws of Nebraska; that the previous convictions on several felonies alleged therein, would, if proved, show the appellant to be an habitual criminal, and permit his punishment for the act of burglary charged in count 1 to be increased, but that the trial court was without authority to render a distinct, separate judgment and sentence upon count 2 of said information, as was done. See also: People v. Fountain, 407 Mich. 96, 282 N.W.2d 168 (1979); and Cohen v. State, Nev., 625 P.2d 1170 (1981). Here the trial court properly refused to impose separate sentences under the sexual assault statute and under the habitual criminal statute. He imposed one sentence for violation of the sexual assault statute, such sentence being enhanced because the defendant was determined to have been an habitual criminal. While the court's judgment and sentence provided for a single sentence, it did not specifically say that such sentence is for violation of the sexual assault statute. [11] However, the court's analysis of the sentencing problem at the time of sentencing indicates that the court recognized that the defendant had only been convicted of sexual assault, and that the determination that he was an habitual criminal required an enhanced sentence mandated by the legislature to be life imprisonment. Affirmed.