Opinion ID: 784472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State-Incorporation Approach

Text: 57 We believe that the same result is reached if injury or loss of property is defined federally (i.e. for purposes of the FTCA), in reference to the law of Connecticut, the relevant state in this case, rather than in reference to the general common law. 58 When a federal statute looks to state law to give meaning to one of its provisions, it does not do so indiscriminately. Thus, in our case, given the many uses of the term property across the range of statutory and common-law fields, it would not do to throw a dart at the Connecticut case reports and use whatever definition of property is thereby encountered. Rather, we must do what the Supreme Court did in De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 76 S.Ct. 974, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956), and focus on that aspect of state law that is most relevant to the purposes of the federal statute at issue. In De Sylva, after deciding to refer to California law to determine whether illegitimate children are children under the Copyright Act and therefore empowered to renew their deceased parents' copyrights, the Court examined California's inheritance statute, since [t]his is really a question of the descent of property. Id. at 582, 76 S.Ct. 974. The Court found it sufficient that the child was eligible for inheritance under this statute, regardless of the fact that the child was not legitimate for other purposes under California law. Id. By doing this, the High Court made clear that to decide the state meaning of a federally used phrase, federal courts should be guided by those state cases that deal with the circumstances akin to those at play in the federal statute. 59 The parties' submissions, in the instant case, do not comport with the above principle. Thus, the government offers ample Connecticut case law to support the proposition that, under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-81, which deals with equitable distribution upon the dissolution of a marriage, a person's interest as a potential heir is not subject to distribution because it is a mere expectancy. See, e.g., Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 387 A.2d 548 (Conn. 1978) (interpreting a predecessor of § 46b-81 and stating: Expectancy is the bare hope of succession to the property of another, such as may be entertained by an heir apparent. Such a hope is inchoate. It has no attribute of property, and the interest to which it relates is at the time nonexistent and may never exist.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 527 A.2d 1184 (Conn. 1987) (holding that an expected inheritance is not subject to distribution under § 46b-81). 60 For her part, Plaintiff conversely (and correctly) points out that, in the life insurance context, Connecticut adheres to the view that the interest of the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is more than a mere expectancy. See COUCH § 58:15 (placing Connecticut in the qualified property right or vested right subject to divestment category); see also Allen v. Home Nat'l Bank, 120 Conn. 306, 180 A. 498, 500-01 (Conn. 1935) (holding that a widow's interest before her insured husband's death was more than a mere expectancy under Connecticut law: Where, as here, the right to change [beneficiaries] is reserved to the assured, the interest of the beneficiary is yet deemed to be vested, although qualified in that it is subject to be defeated by an exercise of the right reserved.... So long as the power of defeasance is not exercised, [beneficiaries] stand in the position of one having a title which the law will recognize, and for the protection of which they are entitled to the usual legal and equitable remedies.) (internal quotation marks omitted; second alteration in original); Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 362 F.2d 975, 978 (2d Cir.1966) (noting that, under Connecticut law, a beneficiary stands in the position of one having a title which the law will recognize so long as the power of defeasance is not exercised). 61 The parties thus confront us with cases standing for seemingly conflicting propositions. In some contexts, an interest analogous to the one before us is termed a mere expectancy, while, in others, the interest is described as more than a mere expectancy and is the sort that commentators call a qualified property right, see COUCH § 58:15. This situation, however, only underscores the fact that the appropriate place to find the meaning of injury or loss of property lies in Connecticut tort law and not either in the law of marital dissolution or in that of insurance. 20 That is, the approach we took in the last section, when we were seeking a uniform federal meaning for the phrase, is also the one we must follow with regard to the law of the relevant state. 62 The question thus becomes whether a person's interest as a named beneficiary or potential heir is a property interest that is protected by the tort law of Connecticut. 21 We conclude that it is because Connecticut follows the majority of jurisdictions both in recognizing the tort of interference with an inheritance, see Benedict v. Smith, 34 Conn.Supp. 63, 376 A.2d 774 (Conn.Super.Ct.1977), 22 and in recognizing an intended heir's cause of action against a lawyer for the negligent drawing of a will, see Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981); Krawczyk v. Stingle, 208 Conn. 239, 543 A.2d 733, 735 (Conn. 1988). 23 63 It follows that, under either the uniform federal approach or the state-incorporation one, Plaintiff's claim satisfies the requirement of injury or loss of property.