Opinion ID: 2525646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The New Mexico Supreme Court Decision in Helen G. II Does Have Retroactive Effect

Text: ¶ 15 The decision announced by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Helen G. II reversed the New Mexico Court of Appeals and declared that the time for filing a paternity action in order to establish parental rights is before the initiation of adoption proceedings. 175 P.3d at 920 (emphasis added). However, the Natural Father asks us not to apply this decision retroactively. To determine whether a New Mexico Supreme Court decision that reverses the New Mexico Court of Appeals should apply retroactively, we must turn to the law of New Mexico. New Mexico has adopt[ed] a presumption of retroactivity for a new rule imposed by a judicial decision in a civil case. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 118 N.M. 391, 881 P.2d 1376, 1383 (1994). However, absent an express declaration within the individual opinion, the presumption may be overcome by a sufficiently weighty combination of one or more of the Chevron Oil factors, which [the New Mexico Supreme Court has] espoused. Id. at 1383. The parties have devoted substantial discussion to these factors. The presumption of retroactivity, and the exception to it, apply only when a judicial opinion announces a new rule. Id. Indeed, [t]he issue of retroactive effect arises only when a court's decision overturns prior case law or makes new law. Santillanes v. New Mexico, 115 N.M. 215, 849 P.2d 358, 366 (1993). On the contrary, when a court interprets for the first time an existing, legislatively-created statute, the judicial decision is not considered to be a new rule, but merely clarification of the existing rule. See, e.g., Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312-13, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994) (A judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.); Id. n. 12 ([W]hen this Court construes a statute, it is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant continuously since the date when it became law.); Kendrick v. Dist. Att'y of Phila. County, 591 Pa. 157, 916 A.2d 529, 538 (2007) (`Therefore, when we have not yet answered a specific question about the meaning of a statute, our initial interpretation does not announce a new rule of law. Our first pronouncement on the substance of a statutory provision is purely a clarification of existing law.' (quoting Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 634, 757 A.2d 842, 848 (2000))). Accordingly, a first-time interpretation of an existing statute is to be applied retroactively. ¶ 16 In the case of Helen G. II, the New Mexico Supreme Court interpreted a provision of an existing statute that it had not previously interpreted. 175 P.3d at 916. Specifically, the court interpreted the provision in the New Mexico Adoption Act requiring an unmarried biological father to file a paternity action in order to establish his right to consent to an adoption. The court said that to be timely, the petition must be filed before the initiation of adoption proceedings. Id. at 920. As such, the decision was a first-time statutory interpretation and not a new rule. Therefore, under New Mexico law, the deadline set for establishing acknowledged father status announced in Helen G. II applies retroactively. The Natural Father failed to meet that deadline and consequently failed to comply with the requirements set forth by New Mexico law. As a result, he also did not meet the Utah law requirement of compliance with another state's law [3] and failed to establish his parental rights. See Utah Code § 78B-6-122(1)(c)(i)(B). Therefore, his consent was not required by Utah law for the adoption, and it was not error for the district court to deny his motion to dismiss the adoption.