Opinion ID: 783986
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State and Federal Practice

Text: 38 It is clear that, in practice, the imposition of a term of confinement during the ordinary course of parole or probation does not necessarily mean that a revocation has occurred. State statutes describe a wide array of intermediate sanctions which are clearly intended as alternatives to revocation; some, like the statute in this case, are uniquely targeted at juvenile parolees or probationers. 8 The most commonly available sanctions are modifications such as increased supervision, lengthened terms of parole, or enrollment in so-called boot camp or scared straight programs. See supra note 8. Temporary detention statutes like the one utilized in the instant case are also common. See id. 39 From this vast array of options, parole or probation officials choose the punishment that they believe will best address the needs of the individual parolee or probationer. A finding of a technical or lower-level violation typically results in the imposition of an intermediary sanction and not in actual revocation. See generally U.S. Probation Office, CENT. DIST. OF CAL. REVOCATION WORKBOOK (last revised 2003). Because their primary aim is to act as a warning to the parolee or probationer, modification procedures generally lack the formality or due process protections required by actual revocation; they are not intended to rise to the level of a formal revocation. 9 40 It is clear that a violation can result in a vast range of sanctions, including revocation, none of which are necessarily directly related to either the seriousness of the violation or the culpability of the parolee or probationer. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a) (distinguishing between mandatory versus discretionary revocation on the basis of the seriousness of the violation). The inherently flexible and discretionary nature of the different state systems, which aim to consider the totality of the parolee's or probationer's history as well as the gravity of the violation, leads to discrepancies in the type of sanctions handed down for even the same minor violations. A definition of revocation that looks only to the nature of the sanction imposed would thus result in a rule that is more arbitrary than what would result if we adhered to an actual revocation requirement. Parolees or probationers who engaged in similar offenses would receive vastly different sentences based on unsubstantiated guesses as to what parole or probation boards intended to do. We do not believe that Congress contemplated such a result when it wrote § 4A1.2(k). 41 In short, both Morrissey and practice instruct that we should defer to the original parole or probation entity to determine whether or not revocation is an appropriate sanction for the violation. By engaging in ad-hoc determinations that violations are of a sufficiently serious nature to warrant revocation, or by interpreting a particular sanction as indicative of an intent to revoke, subsequent courts usurp the discretion of the parole or probation authority. Where the parole or probation authority followed the procedures required for revocation but explicitly chose not to initiate revocation, we cannot second-guess that determination any more than we could determine that a defendant who was punished as severely as they would have been for murder was constructively convicted of murder.