Opinion ID: 2302398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The unemployment compensation statute

Text: The District's unemployment compensation law is set forth in D.C.Code §§ 51-109 et seq. (2001 & Supp.2011). Briefly, the statute creates a right to unemployment compensation benefits, but an employee may be disqualified from receiving benefits if he or she was discharged for misconduct, either gross or other than gross, id. § 51-110(b), the latter category being commonly known as simple misconduct. Larry, 973 A.2d at 182. The employer has the burden of proving misconduct, and misconduct shall not be presumed. Washington Times, 724 A.2d at 1218 (citing 7 DCMR §§ 312.2, 312.8); Keep v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 461 A.2d 461, 463 (D.C.1983) (per curiam). The purpose of the unemployment compensation statute is to protect against economic dependency caused by temporary unemployment and to reduce the need for other welfare programs. Hickey v. Bomers, 28 A.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.2011) (quoting Bowman-Cook v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 16 A.3d 130, 134 (D.C.2011)). The statute is remedial humanitarian legislation of vast import, and its provisions must be liberally and broadly construed. Washington Times, 724 A.2d at 1216-17 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cruz v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs., 633 A.2d 66, 69 (D.C.1993)); see also Hickey, 28 A.3d at 1126 (unemployment compensation law is to be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose and extend its coverage, with a consequent strict construction of exemption provisions (quoting Brannum v. District of Columbia Pub. Sch., 946 A.2d 962, 966 (D.C.2008) (internal citation and brackets omitted))). Remedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy, Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1234 (D.C.1990) (quoting 3 N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60.01, at 55 (4th ed. 1986)), and we must construe our unemployment compensation law accordingly. In light of the foregoing principles, [t]he fact that an employee's discharge appears reasonable from the employer's perspective does not necessarily mean that the employee engaged in misconduct. Washington Times, 724 A.2d at 1218 (citing Cruz, 633 A.2d at 69). Hojeij might reasonably have believed, in light of Ms. Hamilton's absences, that it would be to its economic advantage to replace her, but such a belief would not automatically warrant the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. Proof by the employer that the employee was fired for misconduct, either gross or simple, was required.