Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Media rights contract.

Text: 90 This court joins other courts, scholars and organizations of the bar who have uniformly denounced the execution of literary and media rights fee arrangements between attorneys and their clients during the pendency of a representation. 19 The Texas Code of Professional Responsibility stated at the time of this trial: 91 Prior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to his employment, a lawyer shall not enter into any arrangement or understanding with a client by which he acquires any interest in publication rights with respect to the subject matter of his employment or proposed employment. 92 Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR5-104(B) (1982). See also ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8(d). Succinctly, a media rights contract is offensive because it may encourage counsel to misuse the judicial process for the sake of his enrichment and publicity-seeking, and it necessarily trades on the misery of the victim and his family. 93 Perhaps because of the widely shared professional disapproval of media rights contracts, few cases challenging them have arisen. Although the cases have been judged under various legal standards, hardly any convictions have been reversed for a pernicious influence of such contracts on counsel's effectiveness. 20 94 So it must be here. Notwithstanding Andrews's apparent breach of his ethical obligations, this court sits not to discipline counsel but to determine whether Beets was thereby deprived of a fair trial. The state has the duty to punish an attorney for unethical conduct. For reasons not disclosed in the record, the state declined to discipline Andrews for this fee arrangement. While the media rights contract posed a serious potential conflict of interest, Beets failed to show how it hindered Andrews's presentation of her defense or prejudiced her by rendering the result of her criminal prosecution fundamentally unreliable. Beets has not asserted that Andrews manipulated the case to enhance publicity 21 or that the contract generally clouded his good judgment. 22 Beets has shown no actual influence of the media rights contract on the conduct of her defense. In the state habeas proceedings, Andrews filed an affidavit in which he denied that the media rights contract affected his representation of Beets. The state courts accepted this unrebutted statement. At the federal habeas hearing, Andrews's co-counsel Gilbert Hargrave was asked by the court, was there any action taken by Mr. Andrews during the trial of this case that was in any way affected by the fact that he or his son had this book deal assignment? Hargrave answered, No. If there is such an action, I'm not aware of it. I did not observe it. The federal district court concluded: 95 After further review of the record, the Court simply does not believe that the media rights contract affected Andrews' performance at any conscious level. (footnote omitted). There is, of course, no adverse effect where there was no effect at all. 96 The finding of the district court is shielded by the clearly erroneous standard, while that of the state courts is entitled to the presumption of correctness in habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). Those findings are that the media rights contract did not affect Andrews's conduct of Beets's defense. Accordingly, whether or not the media rights contract represented deficient performance under Strickland, it did not prejudicially affect Beets's defense. 97 Beets continues to assert, however, that because of the media rights contract, Andrews was motivated to continue his work as defense counsel when he should have withdrawn and testified as a material defense witness. There is no support in the record for a finding concerning Andrews's subjective motivation, and none has been made by the state or federal courts. Whether a lawyer-as-witness conflict existed, however, is a separate question to which we now turn. 98