Opinion ID: 176714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexual Harassment Claim Involving Rodriguez[10]

Text: In awarding summary judgment to the defendant, the district court found that the comments made by Rodriguez, coupled with Vera's general sense of unease, did not amount to a hostile work environment. We disagree both with the district court's characterization of the facts of record and with the legal conclusion it reached. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Vera, as we must on summary judgment, we cannot rule, as a matter of law, that the circumstances of Vera's employment did not constitute a hostile work environment. See Billings, 515 F.3d at 50. For three months, [11] until Vera removed herself to a different office, Rodriguez shared her workspace for multiple hours every day, stared at her in a sexual way, came so close to her that she could feel his breath, pulled his chair next to her so that their legs touched, laughed at her discomfort, blocked her escape from the cramped office with a closed door, and on one occasion called her Babe. While they were sharing an office, and again after Vera returned from an extended leave, Rodriguez maintained his practice of drawing inappropriately close to her and smirking at her when she backed away. As a result of Rodriguez's conduct, Vera suffered psychological and emotional distress that her friend and co-worker characterized as constant. [12] The conduct Vera alleges involves many, if not all, of the factors we use to guide us in determining whether a claim such as hers may survive summary judgment. See Marrero, 304 F.3d at 18-19. The alleged conduct by Rodriguez was described by Vera as constant because Rodriguez was in their shared office most of the time. Although Rodriguez did not overtly threaten Vera, the allegation that he blocked her from leaving the office on at least one occasion suggests a physically threatening environment. When Rodriguez looked at her up and down in a sexual way, [13] she felt extremely uncomfortable, an understandable reaction to sharing an office with a supervisor who finds his subordinate's discomfort amusing and intentionally causes that discomfort by placing his body inappropriately close to hers in the small office. [14] Vera also states that she occasionally left her office while Rodriguez was there in order to escape him; ultimately, she removed herself from the office entirely. Although proof of such interference is not necessary to maintain a successful claim of a hostile work environment, conduct that forces an employee to abandon his or her own office during the workday could reasonably be seen as interfering with that employee's work performance. Che, 342 F.3d at 40 (finding an employer's interference with an employee's use of his radio, which might hamper his work performance, supported a hostile work environment claim). Further, although some lack of privacy and personal space was inherent in the odd circumstance of having both Rodriguez and Vera working in a small office, the facts and attendant circumstances suggest that Rodriguez went out of his way to violate Vera's privacy and the integrity of her personal space. Finally, there is testimonial and documentary evidence that Rodriguez's conduct caused Vera to suffer psychologically. [15] Our case law supports the conclusion from this summary judgment record that Vera suffered severe and pervasive harassment in the form of a hostile work environment. In Billings, for example, we found that an employee whose supervisor stared at her breasts whenever the two came in contact over the course of more than two years had asserted a cognizable claim of severe and pervasive harassment. 515 F.3d at 50. In Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 19 (1st Cir.2002), we found that it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that an employee whose supervisor made sexual comments to her and touched her inappropriately on five occasions over the course of a little over one year had experienced sexual harassment. 304 F.3d at 19. Here, a jury could find that the intensity and frequency of the contact between Vera and Rodriguez altered the conditions of her employment despite the relatively short duration of their office-sharing. That Rodriguez's behavior caused Vera psychological trauma that persisted even after she had left the hostile environment, as evidenced by Lopez's testimony and the doctor's note written in April 2005, reinforces the conclusion that she experienced harassment that was both severe and pervasive. Likewise, it would be reasonable for the jury to conclude, based on Vera's account of Rodriguez's conduct, that his conduct was so objectively offensive that a reasonable person would find it to be hostile or abusive. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399. As we have explained elsewhere, it is one thing to say that employees must learn to tolerate simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious). . . . It is quite another to require employees to suffer the constant attentions of a lascivious supervisor. Marrero, 304 F.3d at 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, we are unable to conclude, as a matter of law, that such conduct on the part of a supervisor is an ordinary tribulation[ ] of the workplace. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. Rather, the facts portray the kind of sexual harassment that Title VII was intended to address. 2. Sexual Harassment Claim Involving Morales a. Procedural Requirements for Federal Employees Under Title VII Under Title VII, an aggrieved federal employee may file a civil action in a federal district court. Brown, 425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Prior to doing so, however, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him. Brown, 425 U.S. at 832, 96 S.Ct. 1961. The specific procedures for seeking agency relief, in turn, are set by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) pursuant to its authority to issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary to carry out its responsibilities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). EEOC regulations provide a highly structured set of steps which must be taken by the agency and the aggrieved party as the complaint process proceeds. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.103-.707. At the outset of the process, [a]ggrieved persons . . . must consult a Counselor prior to filing a complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter. Id. § 1614.105(a). That consultation must be initiated within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory . . . . Id. § 1614.105(a)(1). If the matter has not been resolved, the aggrieved person shall be informed in writing by the Counselor, not later than the thirtieth day after contacting the Counselor, of the right to file a discrimination complaint with the EEOC or the on-site EEO Office. Id. § 1614.105(d). The employee has fifteen days after the receipt of that notice to file the complaint. Id. After the employee has filed a discrimination complaint, he or she may bring a civil suit in federal court only if the EEOC dismisses the [discrimination complaint], or if it does not bring civil suit or enter into a conciliation agreement within 180 days of the filing of the [discrimination complaint]. Franceschi v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 514 F.3d 81, 85 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). Although typically a failure to exhaust administrative remedies will bar suit in federal court, the exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII claim in federal court. Frederique-Alexandre v. Dep't of Nat'l & Envtl. Res., 478 F.3d 433, 440 (1st Cir.2007). Rather, the time period for filing a charge is subject to equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)). Such doctrines are to be applied sparingly, id., however, and this circuit takes a narrow view of equitable exceptions to Title VII exhaustion requirements. Frederique-Alexandre, 478 F.3d at 440 (quotation marks omitted). We have recognized two related doctrines whereby a plaintiff may modify or avoid the Title VII filing period: equitable estoppel and equitable tolling. In this case, we are concerned solely with equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel is appropriate when an employee is aware of her Title VII rights but does not make a timely filing due to [her] reasonable reliance on [her] employer's misleading or confusing representations or conduct. Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 752 (1st Cir.1988) (citing Dillman v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 784 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir.1986)). [16] An employee must also show [e]vidence of either the employer's improper purpose or his constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of his conduct. Id. That evidence must be in the form of some definite, unequivocal behavior . . . fairly calculated to mask the truth or to lull an unsuspecting person into a false sense of security. Clauson v. Smith, 823 F.2d 660, 663 (1st Cir.1987). In determining the applicability of an equitable remedy, a court must also look to any countervailing equities against the plaintiff, such as whether she diligently pursue[d] the claim. Kale, 861 F.2d at 753. For example, some courts have held that to invoke an estoppel as a shield against a statute of limitations defense, a plaintiff must show that [s]he brought [her] action within a reasonable time after the facts giving rise to the estoppel have ceased to be operational. Buttry v. Gen. Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1494 (2d Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.1989) (per curiam); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1370 (6th Cir.1975).