Opinion ID: 2630324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Strict liability under NRS 585.520(1)

Text: Dutchess and Legend argue that the Board improperly applied a strict liability standard when it determined that Dutchess had violated NRS 585.520(1), which prohibits [t]he manufacture, sale or delivery, holding or offering for sale of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. [27] According to Dutchess and Legend, the administrative hearing was at least a quasi-criminal proceeding because NRS 585.550 provides for certain criminal penalties. Thus, Dutchess and Legend assert, because the proceeding was criminal in nature, certain requirements for imposing criminal liability should apply. Dutchess and Legend argue specifically that (1) NRS 193.190 requires a union of act and intention, or criminal negligence to constitute a crime; (2) in the absence of clear legislative intent, there is a strong presumption that a crime requires a culpable mental state; (3) the Board did not present any evidence that the Legislature intended NRS 585.520(1) to be a strict liability statute; (4) the Board's staff presented caselaw during their closing argument that was not applicable to the current case and was therefore prejudicial; and (5) Dutchess had no knowledge that any of the drugs it bought or sold were counterfeit. We reject all of Dutchess and Legend's arguments as meritless and determine that the Board used the proper standard in adjudicating Dutchess guilty of violating NRS 585.520(1). We address first Dutchess and Legend's contention that the administrative hearing was a quasi-criminal proceeding. Although NRS 585.550 provides for criminal penalties for anyone who violates any provision of Chapter 585, NRS 585.540(1) instructs the Attorney General or district attorney to institute appropriate proceedings... in the proper court after learning from the agency of a violation of Chapter 585. NRS 585.550 thus enables the Attorney General or district attorney, not the Board, to prosecute criminal violations of Chapter 585. In holding its hearings, the Board was not adjudicating alleged criminal violations and was therefore not bound to apply criminal standards, such as that contained in NRS 193.190, when proceeding against Dutchess and Legend. We next address, as a matter of first impression, whether NRS 585.520(1) contains a knowledge requirement. NRS 585.520(1) states that [t]he manufacture, sale or delivery, holding or offering for sale of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded is prohibited in Nevada. The plain meaning of the statute is evident by its languageit prohibits the sale or delivery of any drug that has been adulterated or misbranded. The statute does not contain a knowledge requirement, and we decline to impose such a requirement when none exists. Contrary to Dutchess and Legend's contention, the Board did not bear the burden of establishing that the Legislature intended NRS 585.520(1) to be a strict liability statute because under NRS 233B.135(2) [t]he burden of proof is on the party attacking or resisting the decision. Because Dutchess and Legend were attacking or resisting the Board's decision, they have the burden of proving that the statute contained a knowledge requirement. That NRS 585.520(1) does not contain a knowledge requirement is further supported by the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of NRS 585.520( l )'s federal counterpart, section 331(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Section 331(a) prohibits [t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. [28] In United States v. Dotterweich, the Supreme Court held that section 331 contains no knowledge requirement: Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conductawareness of some wrongdoing. [29] The Court explained that the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was intended to protect consumers, and, although the imposition of liability absent consciousness of wrongdoing may be harsh, Congress determined that the burden was more properly borne by shippers rather than the general public. [30] Based on the plain language of NRS 585.520(1), and supported by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute's federal counterpart, we conclude that NRS 585.520(1) contains no knowledge requirement and that liability may be imposed under that section absent consciousness of any wrongdoing. The Board did not err by interpreting the statute this way.