Opinion ID: 75949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impact of the Litigation on Florida's Ability to Protect Its Interest

Text: 38 Georgia argues that, even if Florida has a legal interest sufficient for intervention, it is still not entitled to intervention because the disposition of this action will not impair or impede Florida's ability to protect that interest by means both of the ACF Compact negotiations and by filing an original action in the United States Supreme Court. See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104, 58 S.Ct. 803 (describing the two means provided by the Constitution for adjusting interstate controversies). Georgia argues that its lawsuit does not seek to enjoin or interfere with the ACF Compact process in any way. 39 Initially, we note that the Compact addresses the possibility that one or more of the parties will seek to increase its water consumption while negotiations are pending. Article VII of the ACF Compact specifically provides that 40 any person who is withdrawing, diverting, or consuming water resources of the ACF Basin as of the effective date of this Compact ... may increase the amount of water resources withdrawn, diverted or consumed to satisfy reasonable increases in the demand of such person for water between the effective date of this Compact and the date on which an allocation formula is approved by the ACF Basin Commission as permitted by applicable law. Each of the state parties to this compact further agree to provide written notice to each of the other parties to this compact in the event any person increases the withdrawal, diversion or consumption of such water resources by more than 10 million gallons per day on an average annual daily basis, or in the event any person who was not withdrawing, diverting or consuming any water resources from the ACF Basin as of the effective date of this Compact, seeks to withdraw, divert or consume more resources from the ACF Basin as of the effective date of this compact, seeks to withdraw, divert or consume more than one million gallon per day on an annual daily basis from such resources. This Article shall not be construed as granting any permanent, vested or perpetual rights to the amounts of water used between January 3, 1992 and the date on which the Commission adopts an allocation formula. 41 ACF Compact, Art. VII. It is not clear, however, what impact an order compelling the Corps to enter the long-term contracts Georgia seeks in this lawsuit would have on the Compact negotiations. 42 More importantly, however, even if no vested right under the Compact is achieved pursuant to this lawsuit, there exists the possibility that the historical pattern of extending the Compact deadline will continue and that the three states will remain at an impasse regarding the allocation of water. In that event, should Georgia prevail in its lawsuit, any negative impact upon the Apalachicola resulting from increased withdrawals from Lake Lanier would continue unabated for the duration of the impasse. Since the Compact requires the agreement of all three states — which cannot be compelled — it does not provide Florida a meaningful ability to protect its interests in this regard. Thus, the disposition of this action could impair or impede Florida's interests until such time, if any, that the parties reach agreement under the Compact. 9 43 Georgia alternatively argues that Florida can adequately protect its rights through an original action in the Supreme Court of the United States. Florida acknowledges that it could seek an equitable apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin in a proceeding under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but it argues that the Court would almost certainly decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter that is presently being negotiated pursuant to a Compact created to achieve that same purpose. Florida further argues that in an equitable apportionment action, the Court would not re-adjudicate any issues already litigated in the district court, since an equitable apportionment action weighs the competing equities existing at the time the case is brought. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815 (1945). Florida thus suggests that if Georgia were successful in its suit against the Corps, the Supreme Court would honor the district court's decision that the Corps was obligated to grant Georgia's water supply request. Presumably — although Florida does not plainly say so — that could result in the Supreme Court deciding that Florida is entitled to less water than it would be entitled to absent a district court decision ordering the Corps to grant Georgia's water supply request. 44 Georgia replies that, if Florida could prove the requisite harm, the Supreme Court would exercise its jurisdiction and that, in so doing, proceedings in the Court would address a different issue than the issue in the present case — the Supreme Court would adjudicate Florida's rights to a certain quantity of water at the state line, which is not an issue before the district court. This response, however, does not address whether the Supreme Court might, as a practical matter, reach a different conclusion about Florida's equitable share if the district court in this case were to rule that the Corps is required to grant Georgia's water supply request. 45 There is a significant question regarding whether the Supreme Court would exercise its jurisdiction over an equitable apportionment action brought by Florida while the Compact is in effect and there is no proven shortage of water. Indeed, the Supreme Court has substantial discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of an original forum in [the Supreme] Court for particular disputes within [its] constitutional original jurisdiction, Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983), and none of the equitable apportionment cases decided by the Supreme Court has ever been brought while an interstate compact was being negotiated. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that its original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76, 113 S.Ct. 549, 121 L.Ed.2d 466 (1992). In deciding whether to accept an action within its original jurisdiction, the Court considers the nature of the interest of the complaining State and the availability of an alternative forum in which the issue tendered can be resolved. Id. at 77, 113 S.Ct. 549. 10 Thus, Florida has no clear-cut and compulsory right to be heard by the Supreme Court. As long as the members of the Compact continue to negotiate, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would choose to hear an equitable apportionment claim involving the ACF Basin. And, although Florida can cause the Compact to expire by refusing to sign further extensions, termination of the Compact requires consent of all three signatory states. ACF Compact, Art. VIII. Given the string of contingencies involved in determining whether Florida would even be able to bring an original action in the Supreme Court, we cannot say with certainty that Florida would be able to protect its interests through an equitable apportionment claim. 46 Moreover, assuming the Court did take jurisdiction of a future case filed by Florida, the resolution of Georgia's lawsuit might adversely affect Florida's future lawsuit. While the Supreme Court will take into account existing uses, it would not necessarily honor water rights obtained by a state or private entity prior to an equitable apportionment action. The doctrine of equitable apportionment is neither dependent on nor bound by existing legal rights to the resource being apportioned ... although existing legal entitlements are important factors in formulating an equitable decree, such legal rights must give way in some circumstances to broader equitable considerations. Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025, 103 S.Ct. 2817, 77 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983). At the same time, the Supreme Court has also said that it recognize[s] that the equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually be compelling. The harm that may result from disrupting established uses is typically certain and immediate. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187, 103 S.Ct. 539, 74 L.Ed.2d 348 (1982). If Georgia wins, its use of any additional amount of water from Lake Lanier might be considered established, and Florida then would have to overcome this existing economy. 47 Thus, Florida has proven that the disposition of this action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect its interest in the waters of the ACF Basin as required by Rule 24(a)(2).