Opinion ID: 1855720
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the trial court violated stidham's right against double jeopardy.

Text: ¶ 15. At the conclusion of the evidence, Stidham objected to the State's proposed Instruction S-2, the elements-of-the-offense instruction, on the ground that it referred to a speed limit of 55 miles per hour at the time and place in question. ¶ 16. The trial court, initially believing that neither of the patrol officers had testified directly that the 55 mph speed limit was posted at the time and place in question, retracted its earlier ruling denying the motion for directed verdict, and sustained the motion. Immediately thereafter, the trial court requested that the court reporter read back the testimony regarding the speed limit. The court reporter recited Lucas' testimony that [the vehicle] appeared to be traveling over the posted speed limit, which was fifty-five. The trial court then denied the motion for directed verdict and overruled the objection to S-2. ¶ 17. Stidham contends that once the court had verbally sustained a motion for directed verdict, the case was dismissed, and the court's subsequent decision to overrule the motion constituted a violation of his protection against double jeopardy. Although Stidham raised the double jeopardy issue in the lower court, he did not do so in this context. It is established that this Court will not review matters on appeal that were not considered by the lower court. One (1) 1979 Ford 15V, VIN # E14HBEE7506 v. State ex rel. Miss. Bureau of Narcotics, 721 So.2d 631, 637 (Miss.1998) (citing Ditto v. Hinds County, 665 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss. 1995)). Thus, this issue is procedurally barred. [2] Notwithstanding the procedural bar, the argument is without merit. ¶ 18. The Mississippi Constitution provides, No person's life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 22. This Court has held that there must be an actual conviction or acquittal on the merits to support the plea of former jeopardy. State v. Thomas, 645 So.2d 931, 934 (Miss.1994). Therefore, the issue presented is whether the judge's preliminary expression to grant a directed verdict operated as an acquittal on the merits. Here it is obvious the issue was still open and before the court, as the judge requested the court reporter to review the testimony of the highway patrolman as to the specific proof of the posted speed limit. Once this testimony was located and substantiated, the judge correctly denied the motion for directed verdict. Here, not only was there no signed judgment granting a directed verdict, but it was obvious the issue was open and under active consideration by the court. Therefore, the protection against double jeopardy does not apply, and this portion of Stidham's double jeopardy argument is without merit. ¶ 19. Stidham also contends that his conviction for speeding subjected him to a double jeopardy violation in that he had already been punished by the State of Alabama revoking his driver's license for failure to appear in court after being issued a traffic citation. ¶ 20. A claim of double jeopardy presupposes that the defendant has been placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 22. In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the United States Supreme Court established the test for federal double jeopardy claims, stating, [t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation to two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. If each offense contains an element not contained in the other then they are not the same offense and double jeopardy is not at issue. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2856, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). ¶ 21. The same elements methodology of Blockburger has been applied by this Court to analyze claims under both federal and state double jeopardy clauses. See, e.g., Shook v. State, 552 So.2d 841, 848 (Miss.1989). The offense of speeding and the offense of failure to appear in court after being issued a traffic citation are entirely separate offenses, with each offense obviously containing some or all elements not contained in the other. Therefore, this argument is without merit.