Opinion ID: 1981820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims Waived

Text: Counsel for the remonstrators now wish to raise various constitutional objections to the annexation. First, they claim that the annexation statute deprives them of their right to a jury trial under the Indiana Constitution. Ind. Const. art I, § 20. Second, they submit that because the statutory procedure does not permit the annexed territory to vote on the annexation, they have been deprived of due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Finally, they allege that the annexation constitutes a taking without just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution because Hobart merely wants to increase its tax revenues. Counsel for the remonstrators, however, have waived each of these claims. Counsel may not raise these issues for the first time on appeal, Wynn, 239 Ind. 567, 157 N.E.2d 828, much less for the first time on a subsequent appeal after a limited remand. Counsel did not demand a jury trial, for example, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 38. Thus, they may not now complain that the statute provides for a bench trial. Hayworth v. Bromwell (1959), 239 Ind. 430, 158 N.E.2d 285. Counsel also waived the due process, equal protection, and uncompensated taking claims. Counsel made general references in their original complaint to alleged violations of constitutional guarantees but did not specify which rights were at issue. Counsel did not raise these issues in their supplemental complaints, trial brief, opening statement, or first Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Neither did counsel include these issues in their briefs on appeal, City of Hobart v. Chidester (1991), Ind. App., 582 N.E.2d 457, or on transfer. Even up to the last hour, counsel did not raise these constitutional issues in their second Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Supp.R. at 14-40. In short, the subject was rather mentioned than debated. Stilz v. City of Indianapolis (1877), 55 Ind. 515, 524. We note that this Court has previously decided these constitutional issues against the remonstrators. It is well established that a municipality may annex territory without the consent of the inhabitants of that territory. See, e.g., Forks v. City of Warsaw (1971), 257 Ind. 237, 273 N.E.2d 856 (failure to provide referendum did not violate Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 841, 93 S.Ct. 39, 34 L.Ed.2d 80 (1972); Woerner v. City of Indianapolis (1961), 242 Ind. 253, 177 N.E.2d 34 (annexation statute did not violate Fourteenth Amendment or right of self-government under Indiana Constitution), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 989, 82 S.Ct. 605, 7 L.Ed.2d 526 (1972); Taggart v. Claypool (1896), 145 Ind. 590, 44 N.E. 18 (limiting right of appeal to freeholders did not violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment or Privileges or Immunities Clause of Indiana Constitution). Counsel's takings argument has also been resolved adverse to their claim. See Taggart, 145 Ind. 590, 44 N.E. 18; see also Stilz, 55 Ind. 515. There is no constitutional guarantee for the continued existence of a governmental subdivision of the state, Woerner, 242 Ind. 253, 267, 177 N.E.2d 34, 40, and annexation of territory to a city is not a taking of the property, nor does it deprive any person of his property, Taggart, 145 Ind. at 596, 44 N.E. at 20. As we said more than a century ago, no property is taken from the owner, by annexation, no private right of the owner is affected; the act simply changes the property and its owner, in their civil relation to certain public authority. This power the State has the right to exercise, directly or indirectly, within constitutional limits, at any time. Stilz, 55 Ind. at 523. [6] Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the trial court. DeBRULER, GIVAN, DICKSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.