Opinion ID: 170931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Wright

Text: Mr. Wright concedes that joinder of the counts against Ms. Jones and him was proper under Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that an indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction. FED.R.CRIM.P. 8(b). Rule 8(b) further provides that defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count. Id. Nevertheless, Mr. Wright contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for severance for two reasons. First, he avers that evidence presented at trial regarding Ms. Jones's drug trafficking and firearm offense prejudiced his defense as a result of a spillover effect. Specifically, he argues that evidence of Ms. Jones's drug trafficking, as well as evidence of his drug trafficking, which defense counsel elicited, prejudiced his defense by confusing the jury and creating an unfavorable impression of him with jurors. Second, he contends that Ms. Jones and he presented mutually exclusive defenses. Mr. Wright raised only the first argument before the district court. We will consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Wright's motion to sever on the grounds that drug and firearm evidence presented against Ms. Jones, and against Mr. Wright as part of Ms. Jones's defense, would prejudice his defense by way of a spillover effect. See Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1197. Because Mr. Wright did not raise his second severance argument before trial, pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, we may review that contention only for plain error. See Barrett, 496 F.3d at 1097 (reviewing for plain error when a defendant failed to raise a severance motion before trial); United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir.1991) (observing that then-Rule 12(f), which Rule 12(e) has replaced, applies not only to the failure to make a pretrial motion, but also to the failure to include a particular argument in the motion). Thus, with respect to his second contention, Mr. Wright must demonstrate (1) error (2) that is plain and (3) that affected his substantial rights. See FED. R.CRIM.P. 52(b); Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. As noted above, we may correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, [w]hen defendants properly have been joined under Rule 8(b), a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (emphasis added). Because Mr. Wright and Ms. Jones were charged with conspiracy, Mr. Wright must overcome the presumption that in a conspiracy trial it is preferred that persons charged together be tried together. Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1197 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, we are mindful that Rules 8(b) and 14 are designed `to promote economy and efficiency and to avoid multiplicity of trials, [so long as] these objectives can be achieved without substantial prejudice to the right of the defendants to a fair trial.' Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 132 n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 1620).
Mr. Wright's memorandum in support of his motion for severance did not explicitly cite a specific trial right that would be compromised by a joint trial. Instead, he articulated a fear that he would be found guilty by association because the jury could not realistically be expected to compartmentalize and segregate that which applies only to Defendant Anthony Wright as distinguished from that which implicates only co-defendant Jones. Rec. vol. I, doc. 126, at 6, 7. Yet, his filings before the court failed to discuss any specific evidence that might prejudice his defense, and he offered no explanation of his theory that jurors could not be expected to separate evidence of Ms. Jones's drug trafficking from evidence of bank fraud and conspiracy against him. On appeal, Mr. Wright argues that he was prejudiced by a spillover effect at trial, although his spillover theory before this court differs somewhat from the one articulated in his motion for severance. In particular, he observes that counsel for Ms. Jones elicited testimony from a government witness regarding his alleged drug dealing and made comments about the same in her opening and closing statements, evidently for the purpose of suggesting that Mr. Wright  and not Ms. Jones  was responsible for the marijuana Secret Service agents found in Ms. Jones's vehicle. During her opening statement, counsel for Ms. Jones forecasted, You will hear testimony from different witnesses that Mr. Wright is the person who sells marijuana. Rec. vol. VI., at 175. The district court then allowed Ms. Jones to elicit from Mr. Freeman that he had purchased marijuana from Mr. Wright in 2005 and watched Mr. Wright sell marijuana to others on more than twenty occasions. Mr. Wright further observes that counsel for Ms. Jones asked Mr. Burton, [Y]ou have known Mr. Wright to sell drugs before? Aplt. Wright's Br. at 20 (quoting Rec. vol. VII, at 171). However, the district court did not permit Mr. Burton to answer that question. Finally, Mr. Wright notes that counsel for Ms. Jones referred to his alleged drug dealing in her closing statement. Though the district court allowed Ms. Jones to establish the possibility that she was unaware of the presence of drugs in her vehicle by permitting her to suggest that Mr. Wright had placed them there, it wisely chose to hedge against possible prejudice to Mr. Wright by giving several limiting instructions. Following Mr. Freeman's testimony the court addressed the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, one limiting instruction. When Mr. Freeman was testifying about his drug transactions with Mr. Wright, you will remember that Mr. Wright is not charged with dealing drugs and, therefore, that testimony is not relevant to the charges against Mr. Wright in this case and should not be considered by you when you are considering Mr. Wright's liability or not for the charges against him. Rec. vol. VI, at 246-247. Further, the court's final jury instructions directed the members to separately consider the evidence against each defendant on each count and return a separate verdict for each count and return a separate verdict for each defendant. Rec. vol. I, doc. 172, at 5 (instr. no. 4). The court also reminded jurors that [t]he defendants are not on trial for any act, conduct, or crime not charged in the superceding indictment. Id. at 15 (instr. no. 14). The Supreme Court has observed that, in the context of joint trials, limiting instructions [ ] often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933. As noted above, notwithstanding Mr. Wright's contentions, as a general rule, we presume that juries follow [limiting] instructions. Lane, 883 F.2d at 1498. See also United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 668 (10th Cir.1989) ([T]hat juries can and will follow the instructions they are given is fundamental to our system of justice.). In this case, we see no reason to conclude that the jury did not follow the court's limiting instructions. Further, Mr. Freeman's testimony and the comments of Ms. Jones's attorney would not have helped the government establish the elements of bank fraud and conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Wright has called our attention to no other evidence of prejudice with respect to his spillover claim, and our review of the record has uncovered none. As a general rule, neither a mere allegation that defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial nor an argument that evidence against one defendant would have a spillover effect on another defendant demonstrates prejudice. Small, 423 F.3d at 1182 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 540, 113 S.Ct. 933 ([I]t is well settled that defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials.). Having found no basis to conclude either that the district court abused its discretion or that Mr. Wright was prejudiced by the joinder, we affirm the district court's decision to deny his motion for severance.
A trial court must apply a three-step inquiry when considering an argument that a defendant will be prejudiced because he and a co-defendant will present defenses that are mutually exclusive. Pursley, 474 F.3d at 765. First, the court must determine whether the two defenses are so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, because mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se,  the court must consider whether there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right . . . or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Id. (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933). Third, if a defendant shows that his case satisfies the first two factors, the trial court must weigh the prejudice to a particular defendant caused by joinder against the obviously important considerations of economy and expedition in judicial administration. Pursley, 474 F.3d at 765 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). We have observed that [t]o warrant a finding that a district court abused its discretion by not severing a trial, the conflict between the defendants' defenses must be such that the jury, in order to believe the core of one defense, must necessarily disbelieve the core of the other. United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1165 (10th Cir.2005) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to Mr. Wright, the core of his defense was that the government's witnesses were lying and that he did not in fact commit bank fraud or enter into a conspiracy to do so. He observes that Ms. Jones's counsel made some statements that were antagonistic to this defense, contending that Mr. Wright orchestrated the bank fraud and even exercised some measure of control over Ms. Jones. For example, Ms. Jones's counsel asserted in her opening statement that Mr. Wright was the head of the bank fraud operation. Rec. vol. VI, at 174. In her closing argument, counsel for Ms. Jones again accused Mr. Wright of running that organization. Rec. vol. IX, at 37. To be sure, these statements were antagonistic to Mr. Wright's defense, but the core of Ms. Jones's defense was not so antagonistic to Mr. Wright's that the two defenses were mutually exclusive. Mr. Wright's guilt was not, in itself, a viable legal defense for Ms. Jones, and it was not an indispensable component of her theory of the case. Indeed, the core of Ms. Jones's defense  that she did not act knowingly or voluntarily with respect to any of the alleged acts  did not necessarily depend on Mr. Wright's guilt. See id. (Ms. Jones's counsel stating, [I]t will be up to you to decide when you go back to deliberate, did Shyla Jones act knowingly and voluntarily[?]). In our view, the jury could have simultaneously believed that the government's witnesses were lying about Mr. Wright's involvement in the bank fraud conspiracy and that Ms. Jones did not knowingly commit bank fraud. Cf. Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 542, 113 S.Ct. 933 (Stevens, J., concurring) (There is no logical inconsistency between a version of events in which one person is ignorant, and a version in which the other is ignorant; unlikely as it may seem, it is at least theoretically possible that both versions are true, in that both persons are ignorant.). Thus, a severance was not necessary.