Opinion ID: 744916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: SFM's Motion for a New Trial

Text: 25 In the alternative to the above Rule 50 motion, SFM made a motion for a new trial because of alleged errors made in the admission of evidence. That motion was denied by the district court. A district court's decision concerning a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989). Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and should not be reversed absent some prejudice. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1996). An abuse of discretion is a plain error, discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are found. International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir.1993) (internal quotation omitted).
26 Over a hearsay objection, the district court allowed Iva Stade's testimony that her late husband Conch told her that he traded the collision pickup for parts. The district court admitted this hearsay under Fed. Rule Evid. 804(b)(5), the residual exception for an unavailable declarant. A statement having circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness may be admitted under that rule if the court determines that: (A) it is evidence of a material fact; (B) it is the most probative evidence on the point, and (C) the general purposes of the rule and justice are served. Id. The contested statement satisfies all three of these requirements. 27 Generally, the district court must make specific findings of trustworthiness when using this hearsay exception. See Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom, 957 F.2d 707, 713 (9th Cir.1992). If the district court fails to make such findings, we may review the record to determine if the prerequisites of the rule have been met. United States v. Bachsian, 4 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir.1993). 28 Upon our review of the record, we find that Conch Slade's statement possesses the threshold circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and was properly admitted. First, Conch Slade would have no reason to lie to his wife about whether he traded the pickup for parts or left it to be sold on consignment. See Id.; FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 608 (9th Cir.1993). Second, there was corroborating evidence for the statement. Iva and Conch Slade planned to trade the collision pickup for parts. Later, Conch Slade returned from the garage without the pickup, having received from Jim's Garage the parts and service for which he sought to trade it. Third, the meaning of the declarant's statement is clear, despite attempts to make it appear ambiguous. Traded means the transfer of property in exchange for other property. Leaving the pickup with the garage to sell on his behalf is not a likely interpretation of the term.
29 Over a hearsay objection, the district court allowed testimony from Shayphane's friend Randy Gilliam that the late Sherwood told him that Larry Rogers lent the collision pickup to Sherwood. Because Sherwood was unavailable, the applicable hearsay exception was once again Rule 804(b)(5). This contested statement also satisfies the three requirements of that exception, but the district court did not make specific findings of trustworthiness. Therefore, we must examine the record for evidence of trustworthiness. 30 The same trustworthiness factors that we found with respect to Iva Slade's testimony apply here. First, Sherwood had no motivation whatsoever to lie about whether or not Jim's Garage lent him the pickup. Second, corroborating evidence supports the trustworthiness of the statement. Sherwood brought one of his trucks in for repairs and drove out with a different one. He did not pay any money before he drove off with the latter truck, nor did he receive title. This behavior is consistent with the lending of a truck described in Sherwood's statement. Third, the clear meaning of the word lent is not disputed. Therefore, the hearsay is properly admitted under Rule 804(b)(5). 3
31 The court erroneously admitted records from the First Interstate Bank to prove that Sherwood was senile and suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The evidence was admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) as a record of regularly conducted business activity. This rule requires that the record be made by a person with knowledge of the information. No showing was made as to the foundation of the people entering the records. Furthermore, there was a second level of hearsay within the records that was only admitted to demonstrate the content of the bank's records rather than the substantive point that Sherwood was senile. Nonetheless, the Ahrings' counsel mentioned the records in closing as evidence that Sherwood was senile. 32 Although admission of the records likely was in error, it was harmless. The issue of Sherwood's senility was not crucial to the issue of ownership nor the delay in payment that supports the bad faith claim. In addition, there was considerable other testimonial evidence from Sherwood's relatives and acquaintances which supported the conclusion that Sherwood was senile. 4

33 The Ahrings' counsel read into the record a statement made by Donna Sherwood the day after the accident that was written down by Linda Woodall. Woodall was the secretary of Todd Bosen, SFM's insurance agent for all the relevant actors herein. The statement, made over the telephone, was: Larry told Milburn [Meb] that this way no one would get stuck with the $100,000 bill. He kept saying, 'You need to sign this title over and Todd would take care of the insurance.'  Donna Sherwood testified that she did not remember making the statement, although she said she was sure that she made it. 34 The district court allowed the reading of this hearsay statement pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(5): 35 A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly. 36 Id. The Woodall note was neither made nor adopted by Donna Sherwood when it was fresh in her memory. Therefore, it was error to admit the statement. 37 This error was harmless. There was considerable other evidence of the scheming between Larry Rogers and Todd Bosen to get Meb Sherwood to sign over the title of the pickup, including Donna Sherwood's own admissible testimony. Although none of the other testimony includes this statement by Larry Rogers about a hundred thousand dollar bill, that statement is not of such singular importance that it would require a new trial.
38 SFM objected to Donna Sherwood's testimony relaying Larry Rogers' overheard statement to Meb Sherwood. According to Donna, Rogers said, Meb, we have to get this taken care of right away. I've talked to Todd, and he said that we have to do this right away and say that you were going to buy the vehicle so this pickup would be covered by insurance. This statement is admissible within the hearsay exception for statements made by a co-consipirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
39 Donna Sherwood testified that on the day after the accident she felt like it was wrong that Meb Sherwood should have to buy that truck. SFM claims that her feelings were irrelevant as to whether Meb agreed to buy the truck before the accident. The testimony is relevant, however, to whether Donna felt that Meb was under any coercion to sign his name to the title. Therefore, there was no error. 5