Opinion ID: 159589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: unconstitutional burden of proof at competency hearing

Text: 9 Mr. James first contends the trial court denied him procedural due process by applying at his competency hearing the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof found unconstitutional in Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996). The state counters that Mr. James failed to exhaust this issue, that it is procedurally barred, and that, in any event, there was no constitutional violation. 10 Mr. James attempted to raise this claim in a pro se second post-conviction application. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to accept the pro se filing because Mr. James was represented by an attorney and the attorney was required to submit the argument, see Okla. Stat. tit. 22, ch. 18, app., Rule 3.4(E). Although the court dismissed the application without prejudice, Mr. James did not attempt to refile with proper submission by an attorney. Thus, the state contends, the claim was not exhausted. 11 Exhaustion is not required if an attempt to exhaust would be futile. See Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999). If Mr. James had presented a successive post-conviction application, the Oklahoma courts would have deemed the claim procedurally barred. Oklahoma bars Cooper claims presented for the first time in a successive post-conviction application even if, as is the case here, the direct appeal and first post-conviction application were final before Cooper was decided. In 1995 Oklahoma amended its post-conviction procedures to bar post-conviction relief where the claim was not raised on direct appeal unless the petitioner can show the issue could not have been raised in a direct appeal. Okla. Stat. 22, 1089(c)(1). Applying this standard, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that the challenge to the clear and convincing burden of proof could have been raised by a petitioner on direct appeal, even though Cooper had not been decided, because the legal basis for the challenge pre-dated the Supreme Court's decision. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 942 P.2d 755, 758 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Walker v. State, 940 P.2d 509, 510 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Walker v. State, 933 P.2d 327, 338-39 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Presentation of this claim to the Oklahoma courts would thus have been futile, and Mr. James' failure to exhaust should be excused. See Clayton, 199 F.3d at 1170. 12 Even if failure to exhaust is excused, however, procedural competency claims may otherwise be procedurally barred. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 944 (2000). Thus, a claim that has been defaulted in state court on an adequate and independent state ground will be considered on federal habeas review only if the petitioner shows cause and prejudice to excuse the default or shows a fundamental miscarriage of justice will result if the claim is not considered. See Clayton, 199 F.3d at 1170-71. To be adequate, a state's procedural rule must have been firmly established and regularly followed when the purported default occurred. Id. at 1171. 13 The 1995 Oklahoma statutory amendments greatly circumscribed the court's power to apply intervening changes in the law to post-conviction applicants. Valdez v. State, 933 P.2d 931, 933 n.7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). Prior to the amendments, Oklahoma law would not have barred Mr. James from challenging the clear and convincing standard for the first time in a post-conviction application. See Rogers, 173 F.3d at 1290. Mr. James filed his direct appeal and application for post-conviction relief in the state courts in the 1980s. Therefore, his purported default occurred well before the 1995 amendments. We have made clear that a defendant cannot be expected to comply with a procedural rule that did not exist at the time of the purported default. See Walker v. Attorney General, 167 F.3d 1339, 1343-44 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 449 (1999); see also Rogers, 173 F.3d at 1290. Consequently, the 1995 amendments are not an adequate state ground in this case for procedural default, and Mr. James' failure to challenge the clear and convincing evidence standard on direct appeal or in his first post-conviction application does not bar federal habeas review of the claim. See id. 14 In order to prevail on a procedural competency claim, a petitioner must establish a 'bona fide doubt as to his competency' at the time of trial. Wallace, 191 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1135). 3 Mr. James was not competent to stand trial if he lacked sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, and did not have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quotation omitted). Evidence of irrational behavior, demeanor at trial, and prior medical opinion regarding competence are relevant to a bona fide doubt inquiry. Wallace, 191 F.3d at 1243. 15 The record does not persuade us there was a bona fide doubt regarding Mr. James' competence to stand trial. The defense's own witness, Dr. Garcia, testified that he had observed and evaluated Mr. James over a seventeen day period during which Mr. James was a patient at Eastern State Hospital. Dr. Garcia observed no organic brain syndrome at the time and diagnosed Mr. James with a schizoid personality disorder which only slightly affected his decision making ability. In Dr. Garcia's opinion, Mr. James was competent, able to comprehend the nature of the charges and proceedings against him, and capable of assisting his legal defense. Based on Dr. Garcia's testimony, the trial court found Mr. James competent. Dr. Ruedi, who did not testify but who examined Mr. James for competency, also concluded he had an adequate factual and rational understanding of the charges and the possible outcome of a guilty verdict, could assist in the preparation of his defense, and was competent. 16 There was no evidence that Mr. James' competency changed from the time of the competency hearing to the time of trial, at which he testified during both stages. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975). Mr. James was lucid, understood the charges against him, and participated in his own defense. See Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1346 (10th Cir. 1997). The record indicates he responded coherently, logically, and responsively to the questions asked. See Foster v. Ward, 182 F.3d 1177, 1191 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 120 S. Ct. 1438 (2000). He did not engage in the sort of irrational or unusual behavior during trial which would lead the court to question his competency. See Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1566 (2000). Moreover, the trial court, having ample opportunity to assess Mr. James' ability to understand the proceedings and assist counsel, did not indicate any concerns about his competency. See Foster, 182 F.3d at 1191. Because Mr. James has failed to show a bona fide doubt regarding his competence, his procedural competency claim fails.