Opinion ID: 2595521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: right to expert assistance

Text: ¶ 21 Burns contends that the trial court erred in requiring her to choose to either (1) keep her attorney, retained by her father, and forgo access to state-funded expert assistance; or (2) give up the attorney her father had retained and accept LDA counsel who would then provide her with access to such assistance. She provides arguments under the federal and state constitutions as well as the Utah Indigent Defense Act and public policy. ¶ 22 The Sixth Amendment provides, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. In Foster v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court held that this provision of the Sixth Amendment means that counsel must be furnished to an indigent defendant prosecuted in a federal court in every case, whatever the circumstances. 332 U.S. 134, 136-37, 67 S.Ct. 1716, 91 L.Ed. 1955 (1947). Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the right to assistance of counsel for criminal defendants was a fundamental right of due process and thereby applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). ¶ 23 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held in several cases that the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process means that this right to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-97, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985) (effective assistance also applies at appellate level); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (guarantee of effective assistance means indigents must be afforded adequate legal assistance); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90, 76 S.Ct. 167, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955) (assignment of counsel after indictment was not effective assistance of counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-73, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) (trial judge's general appointment of all members of the bar for arraignment and then failure to appoint counsel for trial was not effective assistance of counsel). In furtherance of this premise, the Court in Britt v. North Carolina held that as a matter of equal protection, a state must provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners. 404 U.S. 226, 227, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (holding that to provide effective defense, indigent defendants must have access to basic tools of defense). ¶ 24 It is this line of decisions by the United States Supreme Court that prompted states to implement acts such as the Utah Indigent Defense Act (the Act) to ensure that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes access for indigents to the basic tools of defense. We now turn to the Act to determine whether Burns was denied her right to a fair trial when she was required to use the attorney services of the LDA or forfeit her right to all other indigent benefits. ¶ 25 First, our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. See Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity. See id. In analyzing a statute's plain language, we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent meaning so as to give effect to all of its terms. V-1 Oil Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 942 P.2d 906, 917 (Utah 1997). However, if we find a provision that causes doubt or uncertainty in its application, we must analyze the act in its entirety and `harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.' Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cas., 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)). Nevertheless, a statute's unambiguous language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning. Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997). ¶ 26 Burns's motion to appoint an expert witness was heard on April 10, 1992. At that time, the Act provided: The following are minimum standards to be provided by each county, city and town for the defense of indigent persons in criminal cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state: (1) Provide counsel for every indigent person who faces the substantial probability of the deprivation of his liberty; (2) Afford timely representation by competent legal counsel; (3) Provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense; (4) Assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client; and (5) Include the taking of a first appeal of right and the prosecuting of other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by the defending counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1990) (enacted by Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 15, § 2, 1980 Utah Laws 110, 209 (amended 1983)) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (Supp.1999)). [2] In addition, the Act provided that the [g]overning bodies of counties, cities and towns shall either: (1) Authorize the court to provide the services prescribed by this chapter by appointing a qualified attorney in each case and awarding him reasonable compensation and expenses to be paid by the appropriate governing body; or (2) Arrange to provide those services through non-profit legal aid or other associations. Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-6 (1990) (enacted by Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, ch. 15, § 2, 1980 Utah Laws 110, 209) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-306 (Supp. 1999)). [3] ¶ 27 Thus, section 77-32-1 separately listed five requirements that were the minimum standards a county had to provide to an indigent defendant. Additionally, section 77-32-6 allowed a county two options for providing those minimum standards. See also Washington County v. Day, 22 Utah 2d 6, 10, 447 P.2d 189, 192 (1968) (holding that section one obligates county to furnish minimum standards and section six provides two options for providing standards). ¶ 28 Burns argues that nothing in section 77-32-1 conditions expert assistance on the appointment of state-funded counsel. The minimum standards available to an indigent defendant are listed in section 77-32-1 as five discrete subsections. This is an indication that the right to counsel stands separate and distinct from the right to the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense. [4] Furthermore, it is clear from the plain language of that section that a county must [p]rovide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense to every indigent person, not just to those represented by the LDA. There is nothing in the section that conditions availability of these basic tools of defense on acceptance of LDA counsel. Instead, under the plain language of section 77-32-1, the only deciding factors of eligibility for this type of assistance are that the defendant in a criminal case be indigent and that the investigatory and other facilities be necessary to a complete defense. ¶ 29 The State argues, however, that section 77-32-6 should be read to provide that the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a complete defense need be furnished to an indigent defendant only if the LDA is representing that defendant. To resolve the State's contention, we must analyze the Act in its entirety and harmonize sections 77-32-6 and 77-32-1 in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose of providing indigents with access to the basic tools of defense. In doing so, the unambiguous language of section 77-32-1 may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning. ¶ 30 Section 77-32-6 provides that a county may set up a nonprofit legal aid association to provide the minimum required services or authorize the court to appoint such services. However, this section cannot be read to mandate the packaging of indigent assistance with LDA representation. To suggest, as the State does, that only those indigents represented by LDA are eligible for the minimum services would be a direct contradiction of the plain meaning of section 77-32-1 as well as the legislative purpose of providing indigents with the basic tools of defense. In fact, contrary to its argument, the State indicated at oral argument that an indigent defendant proceeding pro se who has declined standby counsel from the LDA would be able to acquire funding for expert assistance. See generally State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶¶ 9, 35, 979 P.2d 799 (indigent defendant refused LDA counsel and proceeded pro se but had independent expert witness to testify at hearing). ¶ 31 Furthermore, rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [u]pon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution. Utah R.Crim. P. 15(a). [5] There is no indication in this rule that a defendant must be represented by LDA to qualify for this assistance. Instead, the only prerequisites for eligibility are financial inability to pay and necessity for an adequate defense. ¶ 32 It follows, therefore, that the only requirements for receiving public assistance for expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence. [6] It is up to the court, not the LDA, to determine indigency and therefore eligibility. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-4 (1990). While who is paying for a defendant's attorney may be a factor in the determination of indigency, it is not the determinative factor, [7] and in this case, the court did not allow Burns to have her hearing on indigence without condition of LDA representation. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to determine whether Burns was indigent and in holding instead that LDA representation was a prerequisite to providing the statutorily required minimum standards for an indigent defense. As a result, even though Burns's father was paying for her defense attorney, Burns was entitled to a hearing for a determination of whether she was indigent without the condition that she accept LDA counsel.