Opinion ID: 1929169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inherent Rights as a School Board Member

Text: Gabrilson also appeals the district court's decision to strike Count II of her original petition for mandamus. Mandamus is an equitable action and our review is de novo. Iowa Code § 661.3; Fitzgarrald v. City of Iowa City, 492 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Iowa 1992). In her original petition, Gabrilson claimed she has inherent rights as a school board member to review public and confidential records alike. The court, in dismissing Count II, found that individual school board members have no greater rights than ordinary citizens under chapter 22. We disagree.
School board members are charged with authority to regulate the affairs of the district. Iowa Code § 274.7. Members of the school board are granted policy making power and to adequately exercise that power, we hold that they generally should be allowed access to both public and private records that are necessary for the proper discharge of their duties. See generally Iowa Code ch. 279. We agree that members of the Board of Education occupy a fiduciary position and are under a duty to make detailed inquiry into any matter which appears to be wrong. Lane v. Blair, 162 W.Va. 281, 250 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1978). This duty necessarily implies that school board members should have access to records and documents of the district, subject to the legal constraints of chapter 22, in order to give effect to the authority granted them by statute. Gabrilson urges us to find that any member of a governing body has an inherent right to access public and confidential records. But we need not make such a broad determination. In the instant case, the duties uniquely charged to a school board put its members in a lawful position to review the assessment, subject to the confidentiality provisions of chapter 22. This does not mean, however, that her access to the records and what she may do with them is without limitation. Although Gabrilson is free to examine the assessment herself, the district court has properly enjoined her under section 22.7(19) from making its content public, and she is bound by that order irrespective of her status as a school board member.
Presumably as a result of Gabrilson's requests for disclosure of the assessment, the school board has chosen to curtail its own power to access these records. The board adopted policy 101.9, which provides: All requests for information regarding . the Eleventh Grade Assessments or other similarly developed programs will be made through the Office of the Superintendent.. . . Under these procedures requests which come from a board member will be reviewed by the Superintendent and the Board President [who] will determine if the materials requested should be made available to the board member. The policy cites the provisions of chapter 22 relating to the confidentiality of trade secrets and examinations in restricting access to the assessment. Gabrilson challenges the legality of this policy on the basis that it unfairly precludes a dissenting member of the board from obtaining information that is necessary to determine the legality of school board action. We agree with Gabrilson's challenge to the validity of this order. It is a general principle of law that the courts will give broad deference to discretionary decisions of school boards and that persons aggrieved by decisions of a board must normally appeal to the state board of education for relief. See Iowa Code § 290.1; Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 1265, 147 N.W.2d 854, 857 (1967). But the adoption of policy 101.9 is not merely a matter of the discretion of the school board. Rather, this presents a case where the plaintiff has expressly challenged the power of the school board to adopt a policy that delegates the discretionary authority granted to it by statute to its agent. In cases where the power of a school board is in question, we have held that the courts of the state are the sole arbiters. Green, 259 Iowa at 1265, 147 N.W.2d at 857; Center Township Sch. Dist. v. Oakland Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 Iowa 1113, 1117-19, 104 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1960); Altman v. Independent Sch. Dist. of Gilmore City, 239 Iowa 635, 641, 32 N.W.2d 392, 395 (1948); Courtright v. Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist. of Mapleton, 203 Iowa 26, 30, 212 N.W. 368, 370 (1927). Thus, this court has proper jurisdiction over this question even though no appeal was made to the state board. Green, 259 Iowa at 1265, 147 N.W.2d at 857. It is a fundamental tenet that a school board may not abrogate its power to regulate the affairs of the district to an agent. As this court has stated, Rule-making by school boards involves the exercise of judgment and discretion. The legislature has delegated rule-making power to those boards, and the general principle is that while a public board or body may authorize performance of ministerial or administrative functions by others, it cannot re-delegate matters of judgment or discretion. Bunger v. Iowa High Sch Athletic Ass'n, 197 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Iowa 1972) ( citing Kinney v. Howard, 133 Iowa 94, 110 N.W. 282 (1907)). We have also specifically recognized a limitation on the powers a school board may delegate to a superintendent or to board members. `In accordance to the rule applicable to public boards and officers generally,. . . a board of education, . . . cannot lawfully delegate to others, whether to one or more of its members, or to any school officer, . . . the exercise of any discretionary power conferred on it by law. Bunger, 197 N.W.2d at 560 (emphasis added) (quoting 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 122, at 910). Determination of school board access to school records, or specifically to the eleventh grade assessment, is not a ministerial or administrative matter. Rather, it is precisely the type of discretionary decision the legislature has empowered the school board to make. Furthermore, we do not believe it would be good public policy to permit the school board, or any other governmental body, for that matter, to withhold information from members who happen to be in the minority. Even though Gabrilson may hold an unpopular view concerning the district's educational philosophy, she should not be denied an opportunity to access and challenge the materials as is necessary to fulfill her duties as a school board member. This court has held that reasonableness is crucial in determining the validity of a school board rule. Id. at 564. To deprive Gabrilson of access to these records would effectively prohibit her from exercising the fiduciary duties imposed on her by law. Thus, policy 101.9 is unreasonable and cannot be enforced. We therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of Count II of the plaintiff's petition. Gabrilson is free to examine the assessment in order to fulfill her duties as a school board member. She does not have the right, however, to copy, disseminate, or publish the contents of those records, due to their confidential nature as established under section 22.7(19).