Opinion ID: 3040111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor’s Comment About Incest

Text: Fahy alleges that the prosecutor suggested in her closing argument that he had an incestuous relationship with Nicky Caserta. Fahy raised this claim as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in PCRA #3 and it was rejected. The District Court was correct in concluding that the claim was “adjudicated on the merits” and entitled to § 2254(d) deference. Fahy contends that his case had nothing to do with incest and that the prosecutor’s comments were simply an attempt to inflame the passions of the jury. The PCRA court concluded that the prosecutor did not suggest that Fahy himself committed incest but was instead responding to the defense’s argument that Fahy could not have raped and murdered the victim because he loved her. According to the PCRA court, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to assert a baseless objection. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that this decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Again, the PCRA court did not cite 65 to Supreme Court precedent; however, it appropriately relied on its own state court cases, which articulate the proper standard.34 A significant part of Fahy’s defense strategy was to persuade the jury that he had a close, loving relationship with Nicky Caserta, and therefore, could not have killed her. In her closing argument, the prosecutor noted that the only witness 34 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 581 A.2d 544, 561–62 (Pa. 1990) (citing with approbation observations made by Chief Justice Burger in United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985): [Our] standards reflect a consensus of the profession that the courts must not lose sight of the reality that [a] criminal trial does not unfold like a play with actors following a script. It should come as no surprise that in the heat of argument, counsel do occasionally make remarks that are not justified by the testimony, and which are, or may be, prejudicial to the accused. Nevertheless, a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments standing alone, for the statement or conduct must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 66 who testified to a close relationship between Fahy and his victim was Fahy himself. The prosecutor argued that [n]ot one other person that took that stand, except the defendant, ever said that Nicky used to come over and kiss the defendant. Was that part of their little scenario to have you believe that they were so close and loving? And ladies and gentlemen, even if they were close, which the evidence would not indicate, it would simply indicate that she knew him because he was her aunt’s boyfriend. She saw him because he lived with [her] aunt when she went to visit [her young cousin]. But, ladies and gentlemen, you’ve heard of incest. And incest occurs even when it’s your natural child, unfortunately, in this society and other societies. In this case, it’s not a natural relationship, it was not a blood relationship. So the fact that she knew the defendant is only one more little piece of the puzzle. The prosecutor’s argument was simply this: if sexual abuse can occur in a blood relationship, then a fortiori, it can occur in a non-blood relationship, albeit a “loving” one. This argument was proper and logical when responding to the defense’s argument that Fahy could not have raped and murdered Nicky Caserta because he loved her. Therefore, such a comment did not render Fahy’s trial fundamentally unfair, and the state court’s decision that Fahy’s right to due process had not been violated was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of 67 clearly established federal law.