Opinion ID: 2972425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Denial of Asylum

Text: Kalaj argues that he should have been granted asylum because he demonstrated a wellfounded fear of persecution based upon his political affiliation. This court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the BIA affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. On review, administrative findings of fact, such as whether an individual is entitled to refugee status, are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, and will not be overturned “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Singh v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 396, 400 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because the BIA adopted the Immigration Judge’s reasoning with respect to Kalaj’s claims for asylum, the court of appeals reviews those aspects of the Immigration Judge’s decision directly. Id. at 401. Immigration Judges, acting on behalf of the Attorney General, have discretion to grant asylum to any alien who qualifies as a “refugee.” Yu v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir. 2004). A “refugee” is defined as an alien who is unwilling or unable to return to his home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To -5- No. 03-4216 Kalaj v. Gonzales establish a well-founded fear of persecution, an alien must show: “(1) that he has a fear of persecution in his home country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (2) that there is a reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution if he were to return to that country; and (3) that he is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of such fear.” Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In addition, “[a]pplicants who establish that they have suffered past persecution are presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution, . . . [although] this presumption may be rebutted by the government if it shows by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions in the country have changed so fundamentally that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.” Singh, 398 F.3d at 401. The Immigration Judge’s determination that Kalaj did not establish either past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution is supported by substantial evidence. As noted by the Immigration Judge, the experiences of Kalaj’s family members did not show that the petitioner himself suffered any specific harm, nor did he present evidence that he was subject to persecution based on the familial relationships. With regard to the other incidents relied upon by Kalaj, there is evidence to support the Immigration Judge’s finding that the events were “arbitrary and random [in] nature, . . . rather than coordinated, sustained, [and] systematic acts of persecution.” Although Kalaj alleges that he was threatened on two separate occasions in 1997, Kalaj concedes that he was not harmed in these incidents. Furthermore, although Kalaj claims that he was beaten while detained by police for one night, in 1998, he admits that he was not charged with any crime, and that no -6- No. 03-4216 Kalaj v. Gonzales subsequent actions were ever taken against him by authorities. In fact, Kalaj admitted that the police released him after determining that they had no evidence tying him to the incident being investigated. Finally, the circumstances surrounding the explosion of Kalaj’s car are too vague to demonstrate persecution. Kalaj himself admitted that he did not know what caused the explosion, or who was responsible. Thus, Kalaj has not presented evidence that the act was anything more than simple violence. Moreover, there is also substantial evidence to support the Immigration Judge’s decision that, even if the past events amounted to persecution, Kalaj did not prove that such persecution was based on his political affiliation. The events complained of by Kalaj happened primarily between 1997 and 2000, a period of general civil strife in Albania. The State Department’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Albania for the year 2000 states that in 1997 there was “a 5-month period of chaos and anarchy due to the collapse of pyramid schemes.” In addition, a document produced by the United States Department of State in 2001, entitled “Albania: Asylum Claims and Country Conditions,” states that “all political parties have been active in most of the country without a pattern of mistreatment even during the dark days of 1997 and more importantly there is no postcommunist tradition of retribution against political leaders and few instances thereof.” The profile goes on to note that “[t]here is virtually no evidence that individuals are targeted for mistreatment on political grounds” and that “[f]ar more prevalent is organized and amateur crime, exacerbated by the widespread availability of fire-arms, high unemployment and poverty, continued corruption among the police, and a culture of blood feud that is wholly independent of political activity.” -7- No. 03-4216 Kalaj v. Gonzales Although Kalaj argues that these reports are not accurate, he has failed to introduce evidence that would require a finding contrary to that of the Immigration Judge. B. Ineffective Assistance of Accredited Representative Kalaj next argues that any lack of evidence supporting his position was based on the ineffective assistance of his accredited representative, and that this ineffective assistance resulted in a denial of his due process right to a fair hearing. Assuming arguendo that the representative’s assistance was ineffective, Kalaj has not stated a viable due process claim. As an initial matter, it is clear that an alien in removal proceedings has no Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel is premised on a constitutional right to counsel. See id. at 752-53. An alien appearing in removal proceedings has “the privilege of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A); id. § 1362. However, an alien “is not entitled to have counsel appointed at government expense to represent him at the hearing.” Delgado-Corea v. INS, 804 F.2d 261, 262 (4th Cir. 1986). It follows that an alien may not bring an ineffective assistance claim under the Sixth Amendment if that claim relates to the conduct of her counsel during removal proceedings. See Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 723 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Because ‘[a] deportation proceedings is a purely -8- No. 03-4216 Kalaj v. Gonzales civil action,’ an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is reviewed under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment rather than under the Sixth Amendment.”) (internal citation omitted). We have previously stated that at alien can, in at least some circumstances, state a cognizable claim for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 724 (an “alien will succeed if he meets his burden of showing more than ‘mere[] ineffective assistance of counsel, but assistance which is so ineffective as to have impinged upon the fundamental fairness of the hearing in violation of the fifth amendment due process clause.’”) (quoting Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 500 (9th Cir. 1986)). However, such claims remain subject to the requirement that an alien claiming that ineffective assistance of his counsel resulted in a denial of due process must still demonstrate that “but for [his counsel’s] legal advice, [he] would have been entitled to continue residing in the United States.” Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699-700 (6th Cir. 2001). This requirement applies a fortiori in a case where ineffectiveness is asserted on the part of a nonlawyer accredited representative. Kalaj argues that, but for the ineffective assistance of his accredited representative, he would have been granted asylum. A review of the record however demonstrates that the representative did, in fact, bring to the attention of the Immigration Judge many of the facts that Kalaj asserts would have been enough to establish persecution based on political affiliation. Although Kalaj argues that the information could have been presented more persuasively, the fact remains that the IJ was made -9- No. 03-4216 Kalaj v. Gonzales aware of the facts that Kalaj claims entitles him to asylum. Under such circumstances, it is clear that Kalaj was not denied a fundamentally fair hearing.4