Opinion ID: 1871043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Vague and Misleading Language

Text: Petitioners first argue that the following phrase in the second clause of the ballot title is vague and misleading: that legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas[.] They submit that the word status, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 1447 (8th ed.2004), refers to the sum total of a person's legal rights, duties, liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular group of them separately considered. They submit that the term legal status is commonly used in Arkansas law to classify an individual and identify the legal rights and duties for such a classification, like the legal status of an invitee or a stepparent. Petitioners submit further that the term marital status is vague and open-ended in that it is merely a basis of classification consisting of either married or unmarried. They cite to Black's Law Dictionary, 987 (8th ed.2004) as defining the term as [t]he condition of being single, married, divorced, or widowed. Given this definition, they contend that the ballot title's second clause prohibits an unmarried person from having a legal status that is identical or substantially similar to that of either a married or unmarried person. Thus, they argue that the phrase is vague and nonsensical. Petitioners also argue that, contrary to what Intervenors may have intended, the term marital status does not mean marriage. They argue further that Intervenors could have used that readily understood term, but they chose not to do so. To support their argument, Petitioners cite to various proposed amendments from other states which do not employ the term marital status. Both Respondent and Intervenors argue that Petitioners' interpretation of these words is unreasonable and absurd and ignores the context in which they are used. They assert that in the context of an employment application, the term marital status may be easily understood as referring to the status of being either married, single, divorced, or widowed. However, they assert that the context of this proposed measure enables the voters to understand that marital status means the status of being married. We conclude that the term marital status is not vague because it can be understood by the voters within the context of the ballot title. The fact that a term is capable of more than one possible meaning does not render the term meaningless, so long as its meaning may be fairly gleaned from the context in which it is used. The entire clause in which this term is found provides: that legal status for unmarried persons which is identical or substantially similar to marital status shall not be valid or recognized in Arkansas, except that the Legislature may recognize a common law marriage from another state between a man and a woman. [Emphasis added.] We agree with Intervenors that the meaning becomes apparent when considering that the one exception to the ban on recognition of legal status for unmarried persons that is identical or substantially similar to marital status is the recognition of common law marriages between a man and a woman from another state. We are not persuaded that the voters will view the term with the same degree of technicality as have Petitioners and their attorneys. Indeed, to accept their construction of the ballot title, that the amendment prohibits unmarried persons from having a legal status identical or substantially similar to that of unmarried persons, would lead to an absurd result. Moreover, we observe that the ballot title clearly puts the voters on notice that the passage of this amendment is just the beginning, not the end, of the matter. The proposed amendment is not self-executing. In fact, the third clause of the ballot title reflects that the amendment specifically empowers the General Assembly to pass enabling legislation to determine the capacity of persons to marry, subject to this amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, privileges, and immunities of marriage. Because the actions of the legislature will occur in the future, an interpretation of the particulars of this amendment is yet to come. The voters are sufficiently informed of this. In sum, our job is not to review the relative merit or fault of the proposed initiative, nor is it to fashion a perfect or even a better ballot title. Rather, we are to review the ballot title liberally, using common sense, with an eye toward the purpose of Amendment 7, which is to reserve to the people the right to adopt or reject constitutional amendments or legislation. See Walker v. Priest, 342 Ark. 410, 29 S.W.3d 657 (2000); Crochet v. Priest, 326 Ark. 338, 931 S.W.2d 128 (1996); Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605. This court's holding in Becker v. Riviere, 270 Ark. 219, 604 S.W.2d 555 (1980), is instructive: We must also bear in mind that strict technical construction is not required, but that substantial compliance with Amendment No. 7 is all that is required. As was pointed out in Hoban v. Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958), it is our duty to approve a ballot title if it represents an impartial summary of the measure and contains enough information to enable the voters to mark their ballots with a fair understanding of the issues presented. Our task is not to require nor draft the perfect proposed popular name and ballot title, but merely to determine if those presented are legally sufficient. Id. at 225-26, 604 S.W.2d at 558 (citation omitted). Thus, while Petitioners may be correct in asserting that the ballot title could have been written more clearly, they have not met their burden of proving that the ballot title is misleading or insufficient. See Roberts, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 376; Christian Civic Action Comm., 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605.