Opinion ID: 4241107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exemption From Antitrust Laws

Text: Finally, the Attorney General contends that the circuit court committed error in concluding that the West Virginia Health Care Authority Act “exempts the subject acquisition from the state antitrust laws enforced by the Attorney General.” The statute in question, W.Va. Code, 16-29B-26 [2016], effective March 12, 2016, provides: 22 Actions of the board [of the West Virginia Health Care Authority] shall be exempt from antitrust action under state and federal antitrust laws. Any actions of hospitals and health care providers under the board’s jurisdiction, when made in compliance with orders, directives, rules, approvals or regulations issued or promulgated by the board, shall likewise be exempt. It is the intention of the Legislature that this chapter shall also immunize cooperative agreements approved and subject to supervision by the authority and activities conducted pursuant thereto from challenge or scrutiny under both state and federal antitrust law: Provided, That a cooperative agreement that is not approved and subject to supervision by the authority shall not have such immunity. “Cooperative agreement” is defined in W.Va. Code, 16-29B-28(a)(2) [2016], also effective March 12, 2016, as including, inter alia, an agreement providing for the consolidation, by merger or other combination, of facilities and services traditionally offered by hospitals or other health care providers. Subsection (c) of W.Va. Code, 16-29B-28 [2016], provides that, when such an agreement might be anticompetitive within the meaning of the antitrust laws, “the Legislature believes it is in the state’s best interest to supplant such laws with regulatory approval and oversight by the Health Care Authority as set out in this article.” Subsection (f) of W.Va. Code, 16-29B-28 [2016], states that the Authority “shall consult with the Attorney General of this state regarding his or her assessment of whether or not to approve the proposed cooperative agreement.”16 16 Later amendments to W.Va. Code, 16-29B-26 [2016] and W.Va. Code, 16-29B­ 28 [2016], are not applicable herein. 23 Here, the bidding process concerning the proposed merger of St. Mary’s and Cabell Huntington; the commencement of the federal and State antitrust investigations; the filing of the two Assurances of Voluntary Compliance; Steel’s FOIA request; and the filing of Steel’s complaint in the circuit court to enjoin the Attorney General from withholding documents all occurred prior to the March 12, 2016, enactment of W.Va. Code, 16-29B-26 [2016] and W.Va. Code, 16-29B-28 [2016]. Nothing suggests that those statutes have retroactive application regarding the investigative exemption asserted by the Attorney General. This Court held in syllabus point 4 of Taylor v. State Comp. Comm’n., 140 W.Va. 572, 86 S.E.2d 114 (1955): “The presumption is that a statute is intended to operate prospectively, and not retrospectively, unless it appears, by clear, strong and imperative words or by necessary implication, that the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive force and effect.” Accord syl. pt. 3, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W.Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 942 (2003). The amended Assurance of Voluntary Compliance filed in 2015 requires St. Mary’s and Cabell Huntington to observe a number of conditions for a period of ten years following the merger’s consummation. The requirement to enter into an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance and its public filing are found in the Antitrust Act. The terms thereof in the current matter reflect the Attorney General’s investigative authority and the confidentiality of the information obtained. 24 The effect of the circuit court’s ruling would completely eliminate the Attorney General’s investigative exemption found in W.Va. Code, 47-18-7(d) [1978], in relation to the proposed merger of St. Mary’s and Cabell Huntington. However, the Attorney General’s duties of confidentiality in securing information regarding the merger predate the 2016 statutes. The ruling of the circuit court regarding the 2016 statutes is, therefore, reversed.