Opinion ID: 1952083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: R.E. 804(b)(3) Statement Against Interest

Text: The Superior Court ruled that even if the videotape itself qualified for admissibility under D.R.E. 803(5) or 803(24), Flonnory's statements to Lehman that he, not Demby, had killed Brown, did not qualify as a statement against interest under D.R.E. 804(b)(3). D.R.E. 804(b)(3) provides that a statement against penal interest is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In fact, declarations against interest are the most prevalent exception for allowing the admission of hearsay statements made under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thereby compensate for the absence of the oath and opportunity for cross-examination. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1047, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 7.27, at 339-45 (3d ed. 1996) (Declarations Against Interest: Application of the Exception). D.R.E. 804(b)(3) further provides, however, that a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. D.R.E. 804(b)(3). The Superior Court decided it had to make a preliminary determination concerning the reliability of the evidence before it could be admitted and considered by the jury. The Superior Court concluded that [a]lthough ... the jury is the ultimate finder of the facts, defendant, in my view, has not made a threshold showing under 804(b)(3) that corroborating circumstances indicate clearly the trustworthiness of the statement. Demby's second argument on appeal challenges that ruling by the Superior Court. There are three prerequisites for the admissibility of a statement against interest under D.R.E. 804(b)(3): first, the declarant must be unavailable; second, the statement must so far tend[] to subject him to ... criminal liability ... that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true; and third, a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. D.R.E. 804(b)(3). In this case, Flonnory was unavailable because he had invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See D.R.E. 804(a)(1). Flonnory's statements to Lehman, if true, were against his penal interest. Flonnory's statement that he, not Demby, killed Brown was self-inculpatory. See Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). Accordingly, the dispositive issue becomes whether Demby satisfied the requirement in D.R.E. 804(b)(3) that corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. D.R.E. 804(b)(3). The factors that a trial judge should consider in determining whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement, as set forth by this Court are: (1) whether the statement was made spontaneously and in close temporal proximity to the commission of the crime; (2) the extent to which the statement was truly self-incriminatory and against penal interest; (3) consideration of the reliability of the witness who was reporting the hearsay statement; and (4) the extent to which the statement was corroborated by other evidence in the case. Outten v. State, Del.Supr., 650 A.2d 1291, 1296-97 (1994); see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 300-301, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-1049. First, in this case, Flonnory's statements to Lehman were made within a few weeks after Brown was killed. Thus, they were made in close temporal proximity to the commission of the crime. Second, Flonnory's statements to Lehman were truly self-incriminatory. Flonnory was likely to confide in Lehman, since they were confederates in crime at the time of the self-inculpatory remarks, having escaped together from Ferris School. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 300-301, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-1049; United States v. Barrett, 1st Cir., 539 F.2d 244, 251 (1976). Third, the trustworthiness of Lehman's statement on the videotape was enhanced by the fact that it was given to the police at a time when Lehman had an interest in providing accurate information to ameliorate his own pending criminal charges. See Outten v. State, 650 A.2d at 1297; see also United States v. Nagib, 7th Cir., 56 F.3d 798 (1995). But see United States v. Mendoza, 8th Cir., 85 F.3d 1347 (1996). The fourth and final factor for assessing trustworthiness in Outten is the extent to which the statement against interest is corroborated by other evidence in the case. Outten v. State, 650 A.2d at 1296. In Outten, this Court did not address how much corroboration should be required. That inquiry has been carefully analyzed, however, in the context of Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.). People v. Barrera, Mich.Supr., 451 Mich. 261, 547 N.W.2d 280, 289 (relying on legislative history of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) in interpreting corresponding rule in Michigan Rules of Evidence), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 333, 136 L.Ed.2d 246 (1996). D.R.E. 804(b)(3) is virtually identical to its federal and Michigan counterparts. Accordingly, an analysis of those rules is instructive. Hoffman v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 1096, 1098 (1988). In Barrera, the Michigan Supreme Court looked to the legislative history of [F.R.E.] 804(b)(3) for assistance in ascertaining Congress' intent. People v. Barrera, 547 N.W.2d at 289. Although Congress indicated what it believed would not be sufficient corroboration, it left the answer to what would be sufficient to case-by-case development. Id. at 290, 547 N.W.2d 280. In Barrera, the court recognized that there was a tension between the state's interest in ensuring that evidence be credible, and a defendant's constitutional right, recognized in Chambers, that state rules of evidence should not be rigidly applied to exclude reliable exculpatory evidence. Id. It is clear that the standard for corroboration must not be too high. 11 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 804.06(3)[2], at VIII-283 (2d ed. 1994). The dispositive questions that must be answered are: what minimum level of corroboration will satisfy Rule 804(b)(3), and what minimum level of corroboration will preclude exclusion of evidence under Chambers? Id. In Barrera, the court concluded: [T]he defendant's constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence in his defense and the rationale and purpose underlying [Rule 804(b)(3) of the Michigan Rules of Evidence] of ensuring the admission of reliable evidence must reach a balance. We believe they may be viewed as having an inverse relationship: the more crucial the statement is to the defendant's theory of defense, the less corroboration a court may constitutionally require for its admission. People v. Barrera, 547 N.W.2d at 291. [7] Demby argues there was evidence in the record which tended to corroborate the truthfulness of Flonnory's statements to Lehman. According to the State's witnesses, a possible motive for the shooting was an argument between Brown and Demby that took place just a few hours before the shooting. Berry told the police that, during this argument, Flonnory had pulled out a gun, but Demby told him to put the gun away. Witnesses who saw the perpetrator  Nate Dollard, Abe Farnum and Demetrius Brown  all described the person who shot Brown as being dressed in black. Simone Berry testified that shortly after the shooting, Flonnory and Flowers came to Demby's house and that they were both dressed in all black. In Flonnory's statement to Lehman, he allegedly told Lehman that they got witnesses that said that they saw him, but they didn't see me. In fact, the Superior Court acknowledged the possibility that the shooting could have occurred the way Lehman said Flonnory had described it. The corroboration requirement of D.R.E. 804(b)(3) is a preliminary question as to the admissibility of evidence. See United States v. Garcia, 7th Cir., 986 F.2d 1135, 1141 (1993). The trial judge must find only that sufficient corroborating circumstances exist and then permit the jury to make the ultimate determination of the weight to be given to such evidence. 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.06[5][c], at 804-59 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). The corroboration requirement should not be used as a means of usurping the jury's function. Id.; see GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 7.27, at 341-42. For purposes of the threshold inquiry under D.R.E. 804(b)(3), [e]vidence that the declarant was near the scene and had some motive or background connecting him with the crime should be sufficient collaboration. 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.06[5][c], at 804-58. Instead of making a threshold determination of whether corroborating circumstances existed, the Superior Court weighed the corroborating evidence and then decided the issue. See United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d at 1141. In its ruling, that there was insufficient corroboration, the Superior Court focused on the fact that Flonnory's statements to the police contradicted what he allegedly told Lehman. [8] The Superior Court concluded that Flonnory's statements to the police were more reliable than his alleged statement to Lehman. Since the record reflects corroboration, the question of whether Flonnory was telling the truth to Lehman in January 1995, or to the police on March 15, 1995, should have been for the jury to determine. Accord United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135 (1993). Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his [or her] own defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049. If there is some corroboration to support the self-inculpatory statement that another person committed the crime for which the defendant is on trial, that evidence should be presented to the trier of fact. United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135 (1993) (corroborating circumstance clearly indicated trustworthiness of unavailable passenger's statement that marijuana was his and defendant had no knowledge of it). The videotape of Lehman's interview, with the self-inculpatory statement attributed to Flonnory, should have been admitted into evidence. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Outten v. State, Del. Supr., 650 A.2d 1291 (1994); People v. Barrera, 451 Mich. 261, 547 N.W.2d 280 (1996). Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the Superior Court's decision not to admit the Lehman videotape into evidence deprived Demby of a fair trial because he was denied his right to present witnesses in his own defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049.