Opinion ID: 819831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence of Pretext and Retaliatory Animus

Text: As noted, the record shows that long before the crucial events of October 17, 2008, Kelley and Kesteloot had a number of disagreements regarding Kelley's need for accommodation. Even before Kelley returned to work after her medical leave, Kesteloot suggested that she would not be permitted to return unless she could come back full time. When Kelley did in fact return from her leave of absence, Kesteloot tried to prevent her from working until she returned with a properly formatted doctor's note describing the extent of her injuries. Kesteloot's own supervisor overruled this decision and permitted Kelley to begin work and bring a properly formatted note at a later date. Moreover, Kelley's affidavit -16- states that Kesteloot accused [her] of lying about having a fractured pelvis and no hip socket and suggested that she would essentially be immobile if her injuries were truly that extensive. There was also the evidence that Kesteloot prohibited Kelley from using a cane until she returned with a doctor's note stating that she was required to use the cane to aid her mobility, despite the fact that Kelley's disability was more than evident. Taken together, this circumstantial evidence could lead a jury to conclude that Kesteloot was repeatedly hostile to any accommodation of Kelley's disability. Importantly, Kesteloot's comments and actions were consistently linked to Kelley's disability and her need for accommodation. Hence, the presence of discriminatory animus is a reasonable inference that arises from these interactions, thereby distinguishing this case from those where the employer's proffered basis for its adverse action may have been false, but the record contains little to no evidence suggesting that the adverse action stemmed from an unlawful motive. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (observing that summary judgment may be appropriate in cases where the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer's reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred). Also, the consistent links between Kesteloot's hostility and Kelley's disability distinguishes this case from that -17- of the plaintiff in Roman, a Title VII case on which appellees rely. In that case, we rejected the plaintiff's numerous claims of retaliation partly on the basis that she had relied heavily on her subjective belief in retaliation, rather than on concrete evidence of animus. 604 F.3d at 41. The record in Roman showed that the employer had taken numerous adverse actions against the plaintiff that were well supported by legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, without any evidence connecting those adverse actions to Roman's protected activity. Id. at 40-42. By contrast, the evidence in this case describes exchanges between Kelley and Kesteloot that were closely connected to the former's requests for accommodations for her disabled status, and Kesteloot's resistance to these accommodations. This background of disability-based animus is also probative of a pretextual ground for terminating Kelley's employment. One well-established method of demonstrating pretext is to show that discriminatory comments were made by the key decisionmaker or those in a position to influence the decisionmaker. Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 55; see also Domínguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 433 n.6 (1st Cir. 2000); Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 342 F.3d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) (observing that remarks related to protected characteristic are appropriately taken into account . . . even where the comment is not in the direct context of the termination) -18- (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As described above, Kesteloot's interactions with Kelley extended beyond mere comments or remarks suggestive of animus. On repeated occasions, Kesteloot exhibited her resistance to accommodating Kelley through both her words and her conduct prior to October 17, 2008. See Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing that plaintiff may meet pretext burden by relying on comments by the employer which intimate a retaliatory mindset). The events of October 17 may reasonably be viewed as the culmination of this history of disability-based conflict. On that evening, Kelley requested yet another accommodation for her disability, precipitating a confrontation between Kesteloot and Kelley regarding what kind of accommodation was appropriate. Notably, during the crucial speakerphone call, Voorhees eventually agreed to do it all, including doing the narcotics count and taking the clinic keys. Although this concession seemingly resolved the dispute, Kesteloot nonetheless proceeded to have Kelley escorted from the premises after the call ended, and promptly recommended her termination. Such conduct suggests her eagerness to be rid of Kelley. Under these circumstances, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Kelley's refusal to obey an instruction of Kesteloot served as a convenient pretext for eliminating an employee who had engaged in ADA-protected conduct -19- one too many times. See Wright v. CompUSA, Inc., 352 F.3d 472, 478 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding, in case where employee was terminated immediately after returning from medical leave and requesting accommodation, that employee had raised triable issue as to whether alleged insubordination or request for accommodation had motivated his discharge). Put another way, a reasonable factfinder could find that Kesteloot's action against Kelley was a disingenuous overreaction to justify dismissal of an annoying employee who asserted [her] rights under the ADA, rather than the firing of an insubordinate employee. Miller v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 200 (7th Cir. 2011); cf. Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 190 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that employee had adduced sufficient evidence that employer had tired of her persistent requests for an accommodation and therefore fired [her] in retaliation for her protected activity rather than (or in addition to) her insubordinate behavior). In granting summary judgment, the district court focused almost exclusively on Kelley's insubordination. The court concluded that on October 17, Kesteloot had made an effort to accommodate Kelley by requiring Voorhees to handle the physically demanding duties, thereby rendering baseless Kelley's resistance to assuming responsibility for the main clinic. Although this view of the record is reasonable, it disregards the record evidence of -20- Kesteloot's ongoing disability-based animus and the way in which that animus might have influenced Kesteloot's adverse employment action against Kelley. Moreover, an employer's seeming willingness to accommodate an employee's disability does not conclusively preclude a finding that the employer was motivated by retaliatory intent. Cf. Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16 (stating that it would be anomalous to interpret the ADA as leav[ing] employees unprotected if an employer granted the accommodation and shortly thereafter terminated the employee in retaliation). Although CMS tries to explain Kesteloot's prior conduct as merely a supervisor's diligent adherence to protocol, it is insufficient at this stage of the case to depict Kesteloot's actions as arguably nondiscriminatory, Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 144. Where permissible inferences that could be drawn from the facts support the employee's claims, the employer is not entitled to summary judgment. Dominguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 433. There are such inferences here.