Opinion ID: 6357359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Aggrievement

Text: Statutory aggrievement ... exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the  case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lewis v. Slack , 110 Conn. App. 641 , 644, 955 A.2d 620 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 953 , 961 A.2d 417 (2008). In determining whether a statute regulating certain conduct also affords a private remedy, Connecticut courts generally hold to the rule that when the legislature intends to create a new cause of action it does so explicitly in the statute itself. Antinerella v. Rioux , 229 Conn. 479 , 495, 642 A.2d 699 (1994), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan , 265 Conn. 301 , 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Although the operating presumption is that a statute does not create a private right of action unless explicitly stated, that presumption may be overcome on rare occasions. See Provencher v. Enfield , 284 Conn. 772 , 780, 936 A.2d 625 (2007) (it is a rare occasion that [the Connecticut Supreme Court] will be persuaded that the legislature intended to create something as significant as a private right of action but chose not to express such an intent in the statute). In Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut, Inc. , 238 Conn. 216 , 249, 680 A.2d 127 (1996) (overruled on other grounds by Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health , 281 Conn. 277 , 284-85, 914 A.2d 996 [2007] ), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1103 , 117 S. Ct. 1106 , 137 L.Ed. 2d 308 (1997), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a party asserting the existence of an implicit private remedy must satisfy an exacting three part test: First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose ... benefit the statute was enacted ... ? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?  (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rollins v. People's Bank Corp. , 283 Conn. 136 , 142, 925 A.2d 315 (2007). Additionally, in order to overcome the presumption that no private right of action is implied in the statutory enactment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that no factor weighs against affording an implied right of action and [that] the balance of factors weighs in [the plaintiffs'] favor. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In examining these three factors, each is not necessarily entitled to equal weight. Clearly, these factors overlap to some extent with each other, in that the ultimate question is whether there is sufficient evidence that the legislature intended to authorize [the plaintiff] to bring a private cause of action despite having failed expressly to provide for one. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.  Applying the Napoletano factors to the present case, it appears that the plaintiffs are within the class of persons intended to be protected by the grievance process established under General Statutes § 51-90g and the parallel rules of practice. That process was created to protect the public and the court from unfit practitioners. Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 234 Conn. 539 , 554, 663 A.2d 317 (1995). Plainly, the plaintiffs are members of the public who have had dealings with a legal practitioner that they consider to be unfit. Cf. Pane v. Danbury , 267 Conn. 669 , 680, 841 A.2d 684 (2004) (the class of persons for whom Freedom of Information Act was enacted consists of members of the general public who desire information about the conduct of their government), overruled on other grounds by Grady v. Somers , 294 Conn. 324 , 349, 984 A.2d 684 (2009). Accordingly, the first Napoletano factor is satisfied or, at the very least, does not weigh against recognizing a private remedy for these plaintiffs. Turning to the second Napoletano factor, the plaintiffs concede that there is no provision in either the  Practice Book rules or the General Statutes that expressly grants them permission to commence a civil action of any sort to challenge the dismissal of an attorney grievance complaint. Also, the parties have not provided anything in the nature of a legislative history that would contain an expression of intent (or lack thereof) to create such a remedy. The record before this court is silent in this respect, and therefore fails to indicate any intent to create a private right to challenge Statewide Grievance Committee decisions or procedure. In seeking to discern the intent behind a legislative enactment, the court may also look to the circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maxwell v. Freedom of Information Commission , 260 Conn. 143 , 147-48, 794 A.2d 535 (2002). General Statutes § 51-90e grants any person the right to file a written complaint alleging attorney misconduct. From that point forward, by design, further action on the complaint becomes the responsibility of the statewide bar counsel, not the complainant. Should proceedings be conducted, § 51-90g(b) and General Statutes § 51-90h expressly define the role of the complainant in those grievance proceedings. Section 51-90g(b) grants the complainant the right to be present and represented by counsel at all hearings, and the opportunity to make a statement at the conclusion of the evidence. Section 51-90h grants a complainant a right to submit a statement in support or against any proposed decision. Had the legislature intended the complainant to have some right to challenge the outcome of any proceeding, or to challenge procedural irregularities in any proceeding, it could have easily inserted appropriate  provisions. The fact that it did not militates against any finding of legislative intent to create a private remedy for the complainant. In this case, the plaintiffs seek review of the defendant grievance panels' alleged violation of Practice Book § 2-32(i)(2) in dismissing the plaintiffs' grievance complaints rather than forwarding them to the Statewide Grievance Committee for further review. It is undisputed that § 2-32(i) makes no mention whatsoever of a complainants' right to appeal that determination. However, a similar or parallel provision, § 2-32(c), expressly states that where the statewide bar counsel dismisses a complaint pursuant to § 2-32(a)(2), the complainant shall have fourteen days ... to  file an appeal of the dismissal  with the statewide bar counsel. (Emphasis added.) The fact that § 2-32(c) expressly provides for an appeal by the complainant, whereas § 2-32(i) -in which a grievance panel dismisses a complaint pursuant to § 2-32(a)(1) -makes no mention of any right of appeal, compels a conclusion that the omission in § 2-32(i) was deliberate and that no intent can be implied to grant the complainant a right to seek a review of the dismissal. See State v. Kevalis , 313 Conn. 590 , 603, 99 A.3d 196 (2014) ([w]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject ... is significant to show that a different intention existed [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The court concludes with respect to the second Napoletano factor that the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that either the legislature or the drafters of the Practice Book rules evidenced any intention, express or implicit, to grant a complainant the right to seek review of a dismissal of a grievance complaint by a grievance panel.  Finally, turning to the third Napoletano factor (consistency of a private cause of action with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme), the plaintiffs suggest that finding an implicit right to challenge a dismissal through appeal, writ, or injunction is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme in that it gives those who file complaints remedies to protect their rights. The argument appears to be that, without the remedy of an appeal from a dismissal, persons who file grievance complaints will be denied procedural rights to appear and be heard, and deprived of any chance of restitution (the grievance defendants' failure to follow the law and the rules has denied the plaintiff specific procedural rights as well as the extreme likelihood that the grievances will result in restitution and an accounting). At the outset, although an award of restitution may be a virtual certainty in cases where attorney misconduct relates to moneys properly due to a client, it is not a right guaranteed to a person making a grievance complaint. A statutory right of action cannot be implied in a statute to protect a right that is not expressly stated in that statute. As to the denial of procedural rights which are expressed in the statutes, those same statutes authorize the Statewide Grievance Committee to adopt rules of procedure as a mechanism for protecting procedural rights. See General Statutes § 51-90a. It has not been shown how creating a remedy of appeal by the complainant for procedural deviations is consistent with an evident statutory scheme to vest authority for creating and implementing the procedural framework for grievance proceedings in the Statewide Grievance Committee. The attorney disciplinary process exists within the broader framework of the relationship between attorneys and the judiciary.... This unique position as officers and commissioners of the court ... casts  attorneys in a special relationship with the judiciary and subjects them to its discipline. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Massameno v. Statewide Grievance Committee , supra, 234 Conn. at 554 , 663 A.2d 317 . Thus, an attorney grievance proceeding is not a civil action whose objective is to provide restitution to a victim or redress civil wrongs inflicted upon a victim. Its purpose is to investigate and regulate the conduct of court officers in order to safeguard the courts from persons unfit to practice before them. See In re Application of Pagano , 207 Conn. 336 , 339, 541 A.2d 104 (1988), abrogated in part on other grounds by  Scott v. State Bar Examining Committee , 220 Conn. 812 , 823-24 n.8, 601 A.2d 1021 (1992). Against this background, granting an individual complainant the right to challenge the outcome of the grievance process is not necessarily consistent with the underlying purposes of the scheme of attorney discipline. A person who files an attorney grievance has only a limited role in the resulting proceedings. It is not essential to superintending the relationship between an attorney and the court that the client/complainant have a right to challenge the outcome of those proceedings. Input from the complaining party is a logical component of the attorney discipline process. Granting the complainant the right to challenge, or appeal from, the outcome of the process, is not. For these reasons, the court concludes with respect to the third Napoletano factor that the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the implication of a remedy of appeal by a complaining party from a local panel's dismissal of a grievance complaint is consistent with the underlying purposes of the disciplinary process. [A]s the party seeking to invoke an implied right of action, the plaintiffs bear the burden of demonstrating that such an action is created implicitly in the statute. Asylum Hill Problem Solving Revitalization Assn. v. King , 277 Conn. 238 , 246, 890 A.2d 522 (2006). The  plaintiffs have not carried their burden and have not met the rigorous requirements for creation of a private cause of action by implication from the enactment of a statute. They have not shown statutory aggrievement.