Opinion ID: 780296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Principles Regarding Probable Cause

Text: 22 A basic principle of the Fourth Amendment is that there must be probable cause for a search warrant to issue. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ([N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.); see also United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 979 (6th Cir.2000) (en banc) (Clay, J., dissenting) ([T]he requirement that a warrant be supported by specific evidence of criminal activity before being issued is deeply rooted in our history.); United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir.1998) (elaborating that the affidavit presented must contain adequate supporting facts about the underlying circumstances to show that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant). This Court has explained that [p]robable cause exists when there is a `fair probability,' given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. United States v. Davidson, 936 F.2d 856, 859 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir.1985) (per curiam)). Moreover, where an affidavit is the basis for a probable cause determination, that affidavit must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). 23 In evaluating whether probable cause exists for issuing a search warrant, a judicial officer may rely on hearsay evidence. United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 477 (6th Cir.1999); Weaver, 99 F.3d at 1377; see generally Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-70, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) (In testing the sufficiency of probable cause for an officer's action even without a warrant, we have held that he may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge.), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980). When confronted with hearsay information from a confidential informant or an anonymous tipster, a court must consider the veracity, reliability, and the basis of knowledge for that information as part of the totality of the circumstances for evaluating the impact of that information: 24 The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying the hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 25 Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317; see also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Smith, 182 F.3d at 477; United States v. Greene, 250 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir.2001); Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 814 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 958 (6th Cir.1995). 26 Within that framework, precedent provides additional direction for the treatment of hearsay information provided by confidential informants and anonymous tipsters. For hearsay evidence from a confidential informant, this Court has held that if the prior track record of an informant adequately substantiates his credibility, other indicia of reliability are not necessarily required. Smith, 182 F.3d at 483. Anonymous tips, however, demand more stringent scrutiny of their veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge than reports from confidential informants. Greene, 250 F.3d at 479. For instance, in Florida v. J. L., the Supreme Court explained that in the investigatory stop context `an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity.' 529 U.S. 266, 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). Central to the Court's holding was the notion that although the anonymous tipster provided accurate information about the location and appearance of concealed criminal activity (a juvenile with a firearm), the tip had to be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinative person. Id. at 272, 120 S.Ct. 1375. Based on that principle, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of evidence obtained from an investigatory stop where the criminal activity component of the anonymous tip was not corroborated. Id. This Court reached a similar result in United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir.1993), where it concluded that the persuasive value of an anonymous tip sparse in relevant detail and wholly uncorroborated was too low to establish probable cause. Id. at 1362; see also Allen, 211 F.3d at 976 (approving of the Leake holding).