Opinion ID: 3160879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court Lacked Jurisdiction

Text: Petitioner Johnson seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. In order to appeal from the dismissal of a § 2241 petition, a state prisoner must obtain a COA. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Based on the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a COA to appeal.”); Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1063 (11th Cir. 2003). When the district court disposes of a § 2241 petition on procedural grounds, in order to obtain a COA, the petitioner must demonstrate that jurists of reason would find debatable both (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons outlined below, we easily conclude 12 Case: 15-15173 Date Filed: 11/19/2015 Page: 13 of 18 that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and no jurists of reason would find this issue debatable. Thus no COA should issue. We explain why. It is axiomatic that § 2254 applies where a prisoner is “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Johnson is in custody pursuant to the judgment of the Georgia court and, therefore, § 2254 applies to his petition. See Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Medberry, 351 F.3d at 1059-62. Importantly, a state prisoner cannot evade the procedural requirements of § 2254 by characterizing his filing as a § 2241 petition, which is what Johnson has done here. Thomas, 371 F.3d at 787 (“If the terms of § 2254 apply to a state habeas petitioner . . . then we must apply its requirements to him.”); see also Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A] prisoner collaterally attacking his conviction or sentence may not avoid the various procedural restrictions imposed on § 2254 petitions . . . by nominally bringing suit under § 2241.”). A § 2241 petition filed by a state prisoner is subject to the bar on second and successive petitions contained in § 2244(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), a state prisoner who wishes to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition “under Section 2254” must move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider such a petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), (b)(3)(A). That requirement cannot be evaded by 13 Case: 15-15173 Date Filed: 11/19/2015 Page: 14 of 18 characterizing the petition as one filed under § 2241 instead of § 2254. Johnson’s position–that a habeas petitioner can evade any and all of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) restrictions set out in §§ 2244 and 2254 by the simple expedient of labeling the petition as one filed under § 2241–has no merit whatsoever. Among other things, it would render the AEDPA amendments to §§ 2244 and 2254 a nullity and mean that scores of Supreme Court decisions, and thousands of lower court decisions, are utterly pointless. Although Johnson relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009), that decision involved an original petition for writ of habeas corpus filed directly in the United States Supreme Court. Davis, 557 U.S. at 952, 130 S. Ct. at 1. This not the Supreme Court and Johnson has not filed an original petition there. Nothing in Davis undermines our above precedent that § 2254 and in turn the requirements of § 2244(b) apply to state prisoner Johnson’s instant habeas petition filed in the district court. B. Application to File Successive Habeas Petition Alternatively, Johnson has filed an application for permission to file a successive § 2254 petition. We deny that application for numerous reasons. First, certain of Johnson’s claims were made in his first § 2254 petition and for that reason are barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (stating that claims presented 14 Case: 15-15173 Date Filed: 11/19/2015 Page: 15 of 18 in a successive federal habeas petition that were presented in a prior application shall be dismissed). Second, to the extent Johnson asserts that he has some newly discovered evidence or new law to support his claims, he also failed to meet the requirements of § 2244(b)(2). Under that provision, this Court may grant authorization to consider a second or successive habeas petition only in two narrow exceptions where: (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Johnson does not argue that any of his claims rely on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court that was previously unavailable. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). And he has not alleged, much less shown, that (1) the factual predicate for his claims could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence or (2) that the facts underlying his claims, if proven, would establish by clear and convincing 15 Case: 15-15173 Date Filed: 11/19/2015 Page: 16 of 18 evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the underlying capital murder. Id. § 2244(b)(2)(B). C. Actual Innocence Claim It is not settled whether a freestanding actual innocence claim is viable in a capital case on federal habeas corpus review. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869 (1993); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 816 (2009); Jordan v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 1351, 1356 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[O]ur precedent forbids granting habeas relief based upon a claim of actual innocence, anyway, at least in non-capital cases.”). That question is not presented here. Instead, the question we face is whether Johnson can bring his actual innocence claim in a second or successive petition. To do so, he must still satisfy the requirements of § 2244(b)(2)(B). Even assuming that Johnson could meet the requirement of due diligence in § 2244(b)(2)(B), his claims would fail because he has not asserted, much less shown, both actual innocence and an underlying “but for” constitutional violation. In In re Davis, 565 F.3d at 823, this Court held that § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) “requires both clear and convincing evidence of actual innocence . . . as well as another constitutional violation.” We recently reiterated that “§ 2244(b)(2)(B) undeniably requires a petitioner seeking leave to file a second or successive petition to establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and another constitutional violation.” In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d 789, 796 16 Case: 15-15173 Date Filed: 11/19/2015 Page: 17 of 18 (11th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). This Court has called this the “actual innocence plus” standard. See In re Everett, 797 F.3d 1282, 1290 (11th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Johnson’s actual innocence claim is not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) because he has not shown a separate constitutional violation. See id. at 1290-93; see also In re Lambrix, 776 F.3d at 796. And in any event, Johnson’s “newly discovered evidence” is patently insufficient in light of the wealth of evidence proving guilt. Section 2244(b)(2)(B) requires successive petitioners to establish actual innocence by “clear and convincing evidence.” Johnson has come nowhere near satisfying the “clear and convincing evidence” standard. This is not a case, like Davis, in which seven of the state’s key witnesses recanted their trial testimony, several individuals implicated the state’s principal witness as the shooter, and scores of postconviction affidavits existed that, if reliable, would satisfy the threshold showing for a “truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence.” Davis, 557 U.S. at 953, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring). Johnson has not come close to showing that he is actually innocent.