Opinion ID: 783116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Law Claims Against Brosseau

Text: 107 Haugen also sued Brosseau based on state law tort claims. Under Washington law, 108 [i]t is a complete defense to any action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death that the person injured or killed was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or death and the felony was a proximate cause of the injury or death. 109 Wash. Rev.Code § 4.24.420 (2003). The district court dismissed Haugen's state law claims because, in its view, Haugen was engaged in the commission of a felony when Brosseau shot him. Washington law provides that 110 [a]ny driver of a motor vehicle who wilfully fails or refuses to immediately bring his vehicle to a stop and who drives his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and his vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle. 111 Id. § 46.61.024. 112 After being shot, Haugen drove away and, for a time, refused to stop for police. He ultimately pled guilty to a felony under § 46.61.024. But, as discussed in section A.1.c., supra, there is a disputed factual question about when Brosseau shot Haugen. Construing the facts in Haugen's favor, it appears that Brosseau may have shot Haugen before be had begun to drive his vehicle in a manner indicating a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives or property of others. Id. It therefore is not clear that he was engaged in the commission of a felony at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or that his felony was a proximate cause of his injury. Id. § 4.24.420 (emphasis added). At this stage in the proceedings, it is not clear that Brosseau will have the benefit of the complete defense provided in § 4.24.420. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment on Haugen's state law tort claims.