Opinion ID: 200216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Appeal

Text: 32 The MDLEA makes it a crime for any person on board  a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ... to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or distribute, or to possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(a) (emphasis added). A vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes a vessel without nationality, or a stateless vessel. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(c)(1)(A). González asserts that the vessel in this case was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States because it was not a stateless vessel. 33 The majority holds that González's unconditional guilty plea has waived this challenge. I disagree. González's unconditional guilty plea admitted only the elements of the charged offense. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). As such, he waived all appeals other than jurisdictional defects. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); United States v. Cordero, 42 F.3d 697, 698-99 (1st Cir. 1994). A jurisdictional defect calls into doubt a court's power to entertain a matter, Cordero, 42 F.3d at 699, thus depriving the federal court of jurisdiction. A jurisdictional defect may be raised by the party or sua sponte by the court at any point in the litigation. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 896-97, 111 S.Ct. 2631, 115 L.Ed.2d 764 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In this case, González argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea because the United States did not have jurisdiction over the vessel from which he was rescued. The issue is therefore whether the requirement that the vessel be subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is a factual predicate for federal jurisdiction. If so, then González has not waived this issue. However, if it is a substantive element of the crime, then the issue has been waived. 34 Although determining whether an issue is jurisdictional and thus appealable is not always easy, here, the plain language of the statute provides the answer. In 1996, Congress added the following to the MDLEA: Jurisdiction of the United States with respect to vessels subject to this chapter is not an element of any offense. All jurisdictional issues arising under this chapter are preliminary questions of law to be determined solely by the trial judge. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(f). The legislature is responsible for identifying the elements of an offense, see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985), and it clearly removed jurisdiction as an element of the MDLEA. See United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1106 (11th Cir.2002) (The statutory language of the MDLEA now unambiguously mandates that the jurisdictional requirement be treated only as a question of subject matter jurisdiction for the court to decide.). The text of the statute is unambiguous: Whether or not the vessel was stateless, and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, is not an element of the offense. It has been made jurisdictional and, as such, is appealable. 5 35 The word jurisdiction can be confusing, but there is support for the reading that jurisdiction over the vessel is a subject matter jurisdiction determination. First, while it is true that the district courts have jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 3231, Congress can attach additional jurisdictional requirements in substantive criminal statutes, and did so here. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1104 n. 18. Under the MDLEA, the district court's jurisdiction extends only so far as a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903. If a defendant is apprehended on a vessel not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the MDLEA does not apply, and the defendant clearly may not be charged under the MDLEA in district court. 36 This differs from laws where Congress attaches a jurisdictional element to enable it to act under its enumerated powers. For example, in many cases, Congress can only criminalize activities that substantially affect interstate commerce, so statutes often include a statement limiting their reach as such. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (criminalizing only conduct which obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce). In those cases, the jurisdictional element is critical to Congress's ability to legislate, and therefore is likely an element of the crime. In contrast, Congress obtains authority to regulate drug trafficking on the high seas under the protective principle of international law, which permits a nation `to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct outside the nation's territory threatens the nation's security.' United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1988)). Congress invoked the protective principle in the MDLEA, finding that trafficking in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and is universally condemned [and] ... presents a specific threat to the security ... of the United States. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902; accord Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. Because of this authority, the MDLEA does not require a jurisdictional statement to place it within Congress's regulatory power. The jurisdictional statement of the MDLEA is therefore not an essential element of the crime, as it may be in other statutes that lack outside authority. 37 Second, the elements of a crime traditionally include the actus reus, causation, and mens rea. See Black's Law Dictionary 520 (6th ed.1990). Whether or not a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States does not go to any of these traditional elements. For example, in Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927), the defendants were charged with carrying liquor during the Prohibition era on the high seas, in violation of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain. Id. at 601, 47 S.Ct. 531. The defendants contended that they were not within the zone of the treaty. Id. at 604, 47 S.Ct. 531. The Court held this was a jurisdictional issue for the judge to decide because [t]he issue whether the ship was seized within the prescribed limit did not affect the question of the defendants' guilt or innocence. It only affected the right of the court to hold their persons for trial. Id. at 606, 47 S.Ct. 531. Similarly, whether a vessel is within the jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of the MDLEA is a proper question for the judge, as it bears upon the right of the court to entertain the claim. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1109 ([T]he § 1903 jurisdictional requirement is not an essential ingredient or an essential element of the MDLEA substantive offense); see also United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758, 766 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that § 1903(f) empowers the court to determine whether the United States had jurisdiction over the place where the vessel was allegedly intercepted, while the jury determines whether the vessel was actually intercepted at that place). 38 Third, the legislative history of the 1996 MDLEA amendments does not conflict with my interpretation. The limited legislative history suggests that the 1996 amendments were made to expand the Government's prosecutorial effectiveness in drug smuggling cases. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-854, at 142 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4292, 4337; accord Statement by President William J. Clinton, October 19, 1996, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4341, 4341 (stating that the amendments strengthen[] the hand of prosecutors in drug smuggling cases, and clarify United States jurisdiction over vessels in international waters.). Removing jurisdiction as an element of the crime may ease prosecution under the MDLEA. For example, in Smith, 282 F.3d at 758, the defendant appealed his conviction under the MDLEA because the jury was not required to find that he was on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 765. The court held that the district court properly determined that the United States had jurisdiction over the area where the vessel was found, pursuant to § 1903(f). Id. at 766. 6 The issue was therefore properly removed from the jury and not available as an avenue of appeal to the defendant. So, while the amendment might allow a defendant to attack the jurisdiction of the United States following a guilty plea, at trial it eases prosecution by permitting the Government to establish, as a matter of law, that the area was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 39 Finally, I note that this is not the first time we have considered this issue, although we have never conclusively decided it. See Cardales, 168 F.3d at 554 n. 3 (noting that jurisdiction is no longer an element of the MDLEA); United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 340 n. 9 (1st Cir. 1997) (same). 7 Also, two other circuits which have considered this issue have reached the same result as I have. See Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1106; United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1947, 152 L.Ed.2d 850 (2002) (finding jurisdiction over a vessel under the MDLEA subject to appeal following a guilty plea). The only case to the contrary is United States v. Ramos, 47 Fed.Appx. 471, 472 (9th Cir.2002), an unpublished, three paragraph opinion which lacks any analysis of the issue. 40 To summarize, I believe that by the 1996 amendment, whether or not a vessel is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States is not an element of the offense under the MDLEA, but a question of subject matter jurisdiction for the court to decide. It goes to the power of the court to hear the case, and such a jurisdictional determination cannot be waived by a guilty plea.