Opinion ID: 781943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Koerner has waived his Valerio argument.

Text: 41 Before we turn to the applicability of Valerio to the situation presented here, we address the question of whether any argument based on Valerio has been waived because it was not raised in the opening brief filed by Koerner's former appellate counsel. In general, [w]e `will not ordinarily consider matters on appeal that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellant's opening brief.' United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986)). Nonetheless, 42 [t]hree main exceptions to that rule exist. First, we will review an issue not present in an opening brief for good cause shown, Fed. R.App. P. 2, or if a failure to do so would result in manifest injustice. United States v. Loya, 807 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir.1987). Second, [w]e have discretion to review an issue not raised by appellant ... when it is raised in the appellee's brief. In re Riverside-Linden Investment Co., 945 F.2d 320, 324 (9th Cir.1991). Third, we may review an issue if the failure to raise the issue properly did not prejudice the defense of the opposing party. 43 Id. at 514 (second alteration in original). We find that, in this case, good cause is evident. The record reveals a breakdown in communication, and disagreements as to what arguments should be advanced, between Koerner and his appointed appellate counsel. Shortly after terminating representation by his counsel, Koerner alerted us to the applicability of Valerio, and focused on it in his oral argument. It is apparent that, had Koerner been representing himself, he likely would have made this argument from the outset. 44 To hold that Koerner has waived this argument would place an unrepresented habeas petitioner in an extremely difficult position, especially if, as is often the case, such petitioner has some knowledge of the pertinent legal issues in his or her case. An indigent habeas petitioner has the option of requesting the appointment of counsel to assist in his or her case. If such counsel could waive irrevocably a client's arguments — even after counsel is terminated and even when the argument is raised by the petitioner him or herself — the petitioner would be taking a great risk in requesting the appointment of counsel. We find that the imposition of that risk is inconsistent with the policy underlying the rules allowing for the appointment of counsel. Under the narrow circumstances presented here, where the petitioner has terminated his appointed counsel and subsequently made additional arguments himself, we hold that this Court may exercise its discretion to consider such arguments. 3 45