Opinion ID: 3066157
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of NEPA to the FWS

Text: We first consider whether the FWS’s issuance of the BiOp was a “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” such that the FWS was obligated to complete an EIS. A “[m]ajor federal action includes actions with effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. The regulations offer several categories of major federal actions, including “[a]doption of formal plans, such as official documents prepared or approved by federal agencies which guide or prescribe alternative uses of Federal resources, upon which future agency actions will be based” and “[a]pproval of specific projects, such as 47 Reclamation provided notice of its intent to prepare an EIS on March 28, 2012. See Remanded Biological Opinions on the Coordinated LongTerm Operation of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project: Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and Notice of Scoping Meetings, 77 Fed. Reg. 18858-02 (March 28, 2012). The district court continues to actively manage Reclamation’s deadline for completing the EIS process. See Memorandum Decision and Order Regarding Motion to Extend Remand Schedule, Consolidated Delta Smelt Cases, No. 1:09-cv-00407(E.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013), ECF No. 1106. 128 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL construction or management activities located in a defined geographic area.” Id. at § 1508.18(b)(2), (4). The federal defendants argue that the FWS, in its capacity as a consulting agency under Section 7 of the ESA, is merely offering its opinions and suggestions to Reclamation, which, as the action agency, ultimately decides whether to adopt or approve the plan. This view is well supported by the statute, regulations, and our case law. Section 7(b) explains that the FWS “shall provide to the Federal agency [e.g., Reclamation] . . . a written statement setting forth the Secretary’s opinion, and a summary of the information on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency action affects the species or its critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (emphasis added). “If jeopardy or adverse modification is found, the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not violated subsection (a)(2) of this section and can be taken by the Federal agency [e.g., Reclamation] . . . in implementing the agency action.” Id. (emphasis added). We would not ordinarily consider an “opinion” or “suggest[ion]” a “major Federal action[].” The regulations further provide that “[f]ollowing the issuance of a biological opinion, the Federal agency [e.g., Reclamation] shall determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the action in light of its section 7 obligations and the Service’s biological opinion.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a). Our cases confirm that an action agency like Reclamation has some discretion to deviate from the BiOp and its RPAs. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1418 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We have recognized that the Secretary is to be afforded some discretion in ascertaining how best to fulfill the mandate to conserve under section 7(a)(1) [of the ESA] . . . . For example, [an action] agency is given discretion to decide whether to implement SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 129 conservation recommendations put forth by the FWS.”); Tribal Vill. of Akutan v. Hodel, 869 F.2d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 1988) (“The agency is not required to adopt the alternatives suggested in the biological opinion . . . . [The Secretary] satisfied section 7(a)(2) if he took alternative, reasonably adequate steps to insure the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species.”). We are mindful of the fact that “while the Service’s Biological Opinion theoretically serves an ‘advisory function,’ in reality it has a powerful coercive effect on the action agency.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (citation omitted). “The action agency is technically free to disregard the Biological Opinion and proceed with its proposed action, but it does so at its own peril (and that of its employees), for ‘any person’ who knowingly ‘takes’ an endangered or threatened species is subject to substantial civil and criminal penalties, including imprisonment.” Id. at 170.48 But the “powerful coercive effect” of a BiOp on an action agency like Reclamation does not render it akin to the “[a]doption of formal plans” or “[a]pproval of specific projects,” which tend to trigger NEPA’s requirements. 40 C.F.R. 1508.18(b)(2), (4). Unlike Reclamation, the FWS is not responsible for, and will not implement, the RPAs. And even if Reclamation felt compelled to implement the FWS’s proposal, we must bear in mind that Reclamation will 48 In Bennett, “The question for decision [was] whether the petitioners . . . [had] standing to seek judicial review of the biological opinion under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA . . . and the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 157. The case did not raise or resolve any questions concerning the application of NEPA to agency action under Section 7 of the ESA, which is at issue in this case. 130 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL complete an EIS evaluating the effects of implementing the BiOp. See infra section IV.B.2. The fact that Reclamation, and not the FWS, bears responsibility for implementing the BiOp—or an alternative that complies with Section 7’s mandate—distinguishes this case from Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 343 (9th Cir. 1996), where we held that the agency issuing a BiOp and ITS was required to comply with NEPA. In Ramsey, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) produced a BiOp and ITS in connection with the Columbia River Fish Management Plan, which is a “unique, judicially created, federal-statetribal compact” that “apportions the fishing rights to the state and tribal members.” Id. at 438. Notably, “The states then enact regulations governing fishing in the Columbia River, although they must do so in compliance with the terms of the Columbia River Fish Management Plan.” Id. After the NMFS completed its BiOp and ITS, the states of Washington and Oregon issued regulations, which “would be illegal, if not for that [incidental take] statement,” permitting a specified amount of salmon fishing in the Columbia River. Id. at 444. The Ramsey court “conclude[d] that the incidental take statement in this case is functionally equivalent to a permit.” Id. Our cases had already established that “if a federal permit is a prerequisite for a project with adverse impact on the environment, issuance of that permit does constitute major federal action and the federal agency involved must conduct an EA and possibly an EIS before granting it.” Id. (citing Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 827–29 (9th Cir. 1986); Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 478–79 (9th Cir. 1979)). For this reason, the court held “that the issuance of [the incidental take] statement constitutes major federal action for purposes of NEPA.” Ramsey, 96 F.3d at 444. SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 131 In Ramsey, the states of Washington and Oregon occupied the position typically inhabited by a federal action agency like Reclamation because the BiOp and ITS were issued as part of a federal-state-tribal compact. Because NEPA applies only to “federal actions,” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), in that case there was no downstream federal agency to complete an EIS. If the consulting agency, the NMFS, did not comply with the EIS requirement in Ramsey, then the action would have evaded NEPA review altogether even though the action was, in substance, identical to the process for issuing a permit, which would require the issuing agency to prepare an EIS. Here, there is no comparable need to require the FWS to prepare an EIS because Reclamation stands ready to do so. We have held that an agency need not complete an EIS where another agency will authorize or implement the action that triggers NEPA. In Sierra Club v. FERC, 754 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1985), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a preliminary permit to construct a hydroelectric power plant. Id. at 1508. The plaintiffs argued that the Commission should have conducted an EIS before issuing the permit. Id. at 1509. We disagreed, explaining that the applicants “can only enter federal land and conduct groundbreaking activities after obtaining Forest Service and BLM special use permits. Thus, these agencies, not the Commission, will be responsible for evaluating the environmental impact of activities authorized by their special use permits.” Id.; see also Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the sale of particular oil and gas leases did not require the Forest Service to complete an EIS because “absent further governmental approval, the [ ] leases absolutely prohibit surface-disturbing activity.” (emphasis added)). 132 SAN LUIS V. JEWELL We see no reason to require a consulting agency like the FWS to complete an EIS when an action agency like Reclamation will either (1) prepare an EIS when it implements FWS’s proposal or (2) reject FWS’s proposal and prepare an EIS on whatever alternative it implements. We have condemned efforts to use NEPA as an “obstructionist tactic.” See Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 729 F.3d 967, 984 (9th Cir. 2013); Douglas Cnty., 48 F.3d at 1508. Of course the fact that completing an EIS might be time consuming or costly does not excuse an agency from complying with NEPA; that is a balance struck by Congress, not the courts. But the statute requires completion of an EIS in connection with all “major Federal actions.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (emphasis added). It does not require completion of an EIS by all agencies that make recommendations with respect to an action or participate in formulating a proposal for action. As the district court observed, “it makes little sense to have two agencies prepare separate NEPA documents for the same agency action.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota, 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1042. We hold that, under these circumstances, the FWS was not required to comply with NEPA in issuing the BiOp. There are situations where a consulting agency like the FWS is required to complete an EIS in conjunction with the preparation of a BiOp under Section 7 of the ESA. We have already identified one such scenario in Ramsey. But neither the statute nor our case law supports the proposition that the FWS’s production of a BiOp constitutes a “major Federal action[]” when its implementation is contingent on Reclamation’s adoption of the BiOp, which is an action that will trigger Reclamation’s obligation to complete an EIS. SAN LUIS V. JEWELL 133