Opinion ID: 1143642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the dorham evidence

Text: Gordon C. Dorham (Gordon) retained petitioner in a dissolution matter. Gordon's wife Ruthelle was represented by Attorney Cole. On February 7, 1984, a contested hearing was held before Judge Kay in Department 28, early portions of which were reported but not transcribed. In the transcribed portion, Judge Kay orally granted an interlocutory decree and made other oral rulings. After setting child and spousal support, he awarded joint legal custody of the couple's small son, Gordon, Jr., with physical custody in Ruthelle. Gordon was to enjoy out-of-home visitation rights as follows: (1) two hours every odd weekend upon 24 hours notice, (2) one additional hour, between 6 and 7 p.m., each 15th of the month, (3) once Gordon, Jr., reached three years of age, every Christmas, Easter, Fourth of July, Washington's Birthday, and Labor Day in even-numbered years, and every New Year's Day, Thanksgiving, and Memorial Day, and the child's and father's birthdays, in odd-numbered years, and (4) once Gordon, Jr., reached five years of age, all first and third weekends, from 6 p.m. Friday to 6 p.m. Sunday. No mention was made on the record about garnishments or assignments of Gordon's wages or benefits to satisfy support obligations. [21] On March 9, 1984, a formal interlocutory decree, drafted by Cole, was filed. In addition to the matters expressly addressed in the transcribed portion of the February 7 hearing, it provided (1) that [t]he present wage assignment shall remain in effect, as modified to reflect these new Orders, (2) that [t]he arrearages to be withheld shall remain at $100.00 per month until the arrearages are paid in full, and (3) that $650 [o]f the money held by the Sheriff ... after garnishing [Gordon's] Vacation Trust Fund should be released to Ruthelle to be applied towards the spousal and child support due for February 1984 and towards arrearages, with the remainder to be released to Gordon. On March 15, 1984, petitioner noticed a motion entitled Conforming order to and as announced. On the face sheet, Department 28 (Judge Kay's department) was typed in as the site of the hearing. Attached was a proposed conforming order. In the notice of motion, Gordon declared under penalty of perjury that except for an additional visitation day, Father's Day, which was inadvertently omitted and not mentioned during trial, the attached proposed order is the order made by this court after hearing as the same was pronounced from the bench immediately at the close of trial.... The notice also asserted that the [p]resent order is not supported by the evidence, & without trial thereon. The proposed order differed from the judgment as filed by (1) adding Father's Day as a visitation day in all years (while omitting the father's birthday in odd-numbered years), (2) providing for full weekend visits to begin when Gordon, Jr., reached three rather than five, (3) including an annual summer visitation, commencing in 1989, and (4) omitting all references to the wage garnishment and vacation trust fund. Ruthelle filed an opposition, and on April 4, 1984, petitioner filed a response on Gordon's behalf. There petitioner declare[d] on personal knowledge, among other things, that his proposed judgment was entirely supported by the trial record and the court minutes except for addition of the Father's Day visitation, that [t]he court deliberately and emphatically refused to make any ruling on wage assignment, and that he was  not seeking a new trial nor an order for modification. (Italics added.) Petitioner's response included no typed reference to the department in which the matter was to be heard. However, the face of the filed document bore the handwritten notation Dept. 13 4-6-84. Department 13 was the domestic relations department. Apparently, both counsel appeared before Judge Grant of Department 13 on April 6. She reassigned the matter to Department 28, where it was heard by Judge Kay on April 19. Judge Kay sarcastically announced it as a unique motion, in effect an appeal to the court's clerk of the order pronounced and signed. He immediately demanded to know petitioner's statutory authority for the motion. Petitioner responded that it was a commonsense procedure necessary because the written judgment prepared by my opponent did not conform to the oral order. Without permitting further argument, Judge Kay then delivered a heated lecture. Despite other pressing matters, he said, and though petitioner's motion had no statutory basis, both he and his clerk had carefully reviewed the minutes and the verbatim transcript; they found that each and every separate order in the proposal submitted by petitioner was different than that which I have pronounced. The court suggested that petitioner's failure to type Department 28 on his response caused the matter to be naturally ... misdirected to Department 13. It deemed the proposed order contemptuous, saying petitioner should thank [his] lucky stars that I am not going to hold a contempt hearing. The motion was denied with extreme prejudice. The court advised petitioner that, though he was entirely in the wrong here, his remedy was to order a transcript and take an appeal, ... At that point, the court curtly bid counsel good afternoon, but Cole interjected a request for a ruling on his request for fees on a frivolous motion. As argument began, petitioner interrupted to complain about the court's use of the word contemptuous and asked why his client should now be subjected to the additional expense of an appeal. Judge Kay responded that he thought petitioner was contemptuous by deliberately preparing a false order; it could not otherwise be so inaccurate in every respect. The court said it had made petitioner's order, unsigned, a permanent part of the files for anybody to look at. The following interchange then occurred: THE COURT: ... If you'd like, I will cite you to the State Bar right now. [¶] MR. MALTAMAN: If you wish to do so, go ahead, Your Honor. [¶] THE COURT: I do so. [¶] MR. MALTAMAN: Because, Your Honor, I think I would like to take issue on the question that said I was contemptuous and I was wrong in every respect. [¶] THE COURT: All right. I do so. I cite you to the State Bar to such disciplinary proceedings as they may deem appropriate. [¶] MR. MALTAMAN: Which I would be very glad to face. [¶] THE COURT: All right. The court granted Cole $250 in frivolous-delay sanctions, to be paid by petitioner personally pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. Petitioner then objected that the signed judgment wrongly garnished $650 from Gordon's vacation trust fund to be applied against arrearages in spousal and child support. Petitioner noted that the court did not make any rulings in that respect at the February 7 hearing. The court responded it had specifically stated I was going to leave it alone. Petitioner agreed the court had said it was not going to touch the wage assignment but claimed again that no prior order supported the $650 garnishment. The court concluded the discussion by remarking that [i]t would remain as it was, that's the only clear meaning you can put on those words, Mr. Maltaman.... At the disciplinary hearing, both Cole and Judge Kay testified that an unreported conference took place immediately after the February 7 reported hearing. Its purpose, they said, was to clarify portions of the court's oral ruling. Both stated that petitioner attended and that counsel took detailed notes. Petitioner denied he was present at the meeting. Cole testified that the posthearing discussion included, in addition to the visitation issues, something regarding a wage assignment that needed to be clarified ..., and some money that had been garnisheed from [Gordon's] vacation fund. [¶] Those things, the wage assignment and the garnisheed money had been done prior to the trial. Cole had not reviewed his notes of the posthearing conference before his testimony. Judge Kay simply asserted, without stating specifics, that petitioner's proposed judgment was [not] consistent with the court's ruling. There were sharp disputes with respect to the mixup between Department 13 and Department 28. Julie DeChavez testified she was a superior court clerk who in April 1984 worked in Department 13. Prior to April 6, she received a call from Judge Kay asking whether the Dorham case (i.e., petitioner's motion to conform) was set in Department 13. She checked and found it was; her own initial indicating such setting was on the face of petitioner's original motion papers, which did specify Department 28. Judge Kay confirmed to DeChavez that the matter should have been set in Department 28. DeChavez called petitioner to determine why the matter was in Department 13; petitioner indicated that Judge Kay and Judge Grant [of Department 13] had already talked about it. From this, DeChavez inferred that petitioner wished the matter heard in Department 13. DeChavez called Judge Kay back and reported petitioner's response. She did not write Department 13 on petitioner's response papers and did not know who had. Cole testified that he received some notice to appear in Department 13 on the hearing date. The presiding judge in Department 13 then rerouted the matter to Department 28. Cole recalled a telephone conversation with petitioner prior to the hearing, but could not recall its contents. Petitioner testified he received a call from Judge Kay's clerk, who said the matter was being rerouted to Department 13, since Judge Kay did not usually handle domestic relations matters. Later, DeChavez phoned to say it would not be heard in Department 13. Petitioner agreed but asked what would happen to the motion. DeChavez advised it would be taken off calendar rather than rescheduled. Seeking to avoid that result, petitioner suggested to DeChavez that he and Cole appear in Department 13, advise Judge Grant of the mixup, and obtain an order reassigning the matter. In a telephone conversation, Cole agreed to this procedure. Petitioner denied any knowledge about the Department 13 notation. Thomas Catchings testified he was Judge Kay's bailiff in late April 1984. He recounted the boudoir incident more or less as set forth in the notice. He indicated that he went into chambers to report petitioner's remark to Judge Kay; when they returned to the courtroom, petitioner was gone. Petitioner's version of this incident emerges from his cross-examination of Catchings and his opening argument; he never directly testified on the matter. He sought to establish that he entered Judge Kay's courtroom only to examine records there; the bailiff approached him and told him he was not welcome because Judge Kay was still upset about what occurred last week (presumably the April 19 hearing). It was at this point, petitioner suggested, that he made the boudoir remark. In the Dorham matter, the referee made specific findings, adopted by the review department, that petitioner was present at the posthearing conference; filed a proposed order differing in many particulars from that ordered ... and clarified by the Judge; caused the matter to be misdirected to Department 13; has intentionally wholly failed, refused, and neglected to comply with the court's frivolous-sanction order; and made the boudoir remark in a voice, manner, tone and loudness to be heard by others present. Also included was a conclusion that [t]here is no statutory procedure, in law, to prepare and file a motion such as [petitioner's motion to conform].