Opinion ID: 2636680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Purpose and Authority for Detention

Text: In her supplemental brief, S.M. continues to assert that Judge Johnson relied on the court's inherent contempt powers to detain her. However, respondent has never made that argument to this court, nor does the record support that contention. Accordingly, we will not discuss S.M.'s detention in the context of contempt of court, except to note that the exercise of contempt powers requires the court to strictly comply with the procedures set forth in K.S.A. 20-1204a, which it did not do in this case. The district attorney's supplemental brief candidly admits that the purpose and authority for S.M.'s detention upon which respondent now relies differs from that alleged in the answer. Apparently, respondent noted that the school absences predated the imposition of probation and, therefore, the absences could not have been a K.S.A.2008 Supp. 38-2361(f)(2) verifiable violation of the probation conditions, which had not yet been imposed. The respondent's justification is now based upon K.S.A.2008 Supp. 38-2331(b)(10), that speaks to the detention of a juvenile who has violated conditions of release, which respondent suggests includes preadjudication release. S.M. does not dispute that she could have been taken into custody, pursuant to K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 38-2330(c), for a perceived violation of the conditions of her preadjudication release, or that she could have been detained for violating a condition of release, pursuant to K.S.A.2008 Supp. 38-2331(b)(10). Her complaint is that the court failed to follow the appropriate statutory procedures to effect such a detention. Accordingly, the parties' fluid arguments have now coalesced; they agree that the purpose of S.M.'s detention was a response to her violating a condition of preadjudication release. Likewise, the parties apparently agree that the authority for such a detention must flow from K.S.A.2008 Supp. 38-2331(b)(10).