Opinion ID: 864414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the state met its burden of

Text: PROOF IN A CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASE. ¶7. The State's case was based purely upon circumstantial evidence, meaning that there was no direct evidence of Jones's involvement in Pam's death. The State established motive by testimony that Jones had visited internet sex chat rooms and met Cattano with whom he had a serious relationship. After Pam's death, Jones actually moved to Pennsylvania to live with Cattano. Also, Pam's life insurance policy paid off a large debt. The State established opportunity by showing that Jones was the only person in the house during the period of time in which Pam was shot twice. Fragments of two bullets were found in the brain, and there were two bullet trajectories. A neighbor testified that she heard a gunshot between 1:00 and 1:30
¶8. To sustain a conviction on circumstantial evidence, every other reasonable hypothesis of innocence must be excluded. [D]irect evidence is unnecessary to support a conviction so long as sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Neal v. State, 805 So. 2d 520, 526 (Miss. 2002) (quoting Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d 18, 35 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Conner 1 A neighbor testified that she heard two gunshots, one around 1:30 a.m., and the other around 3:30 a.m. 3 v. State, 632 So. 2d 1239, 1252 (Miss. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1999))). Circumstantial evidence need not exclude every 'possible doubt,' but only every other 'reasonable' hypothesis of innocence. Neal, 805 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Tolbert v. State, 407 So. 2d 815, 820 (Miss. 1981)). Each case must be determined from the circumstances shown in the testimony and the facts must consistently point to but one conclusion--guilt. Neal, 805 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Hilliard v. State, 749 So. 2d 1015 (Miss. 1999)). ¶9. The State established motive and opportunity. Jones's claim that Pam committed suicide is not a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Expert testimony established that (1) Pam was shot twice; (2) there was only one entrance wound; and (3) Pam would not have had the motor function needed to shoot herself in the head the second time. Even if she could have moved her arm to put the gun to her head and pull the trigger, it would have been virtually impossible for her to have lined up the muzzle of the gun with the first gunshot wound. ¶10. Jones insists that Pam was suicidal because she was depressed about the death of her father and their inability to adopt a baby. However, several other witnesses testified that she was happy and was planning to host a party. Crediting the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorable to the State, we find that the jury could reasonably exclude the hypothesis that Pam committed suicide. See, e.g., McDonald v. State, 454 So. 2d 488, 493 (Miss. 1984). ¶11. We find that a jury could conclude that Jones's defense of suicide did not constitute a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, see id. at 492, and that the circumstantial evidence used to convict Jones was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.