Opinion ID: 1469581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence against Teer and Eastern at the Close of the Plaintiffs' Case.

Text: When the appellants filed their third party claim, they asserted two grounds of negligence against Teer and Eastern. These grounds were later included in the plaintiffs' amended declaration. One was that as Eastern's loaded trucks made the turn into Route 13 they spilled dirt and debris over the highway and that this contributed to the accident. This claim appears to have been completely abandoned, and it found no support in the evidence. We shall therefore not discuss it further. The other ground upon which negligence was charged against Teer and Eastern was based upon the alleged negligence of the flagman in flagging down traffic on Route 13. The appellants contend that this was enough to take the case to the jury as against both Teer and Eastern. So far as we can see, there was no evidence to show that Eastern hired the flagman or that it had any control over him or over the way in which he performed his work which might render Eastern liable for his negligence. It seems to have been agreed that Eastern was an independent contractor in its relationship with Teer. The flagman was employed by Teer and we think that the evidence showed that he remained Teer's employee, that he was engaged in furthering Teer's business and that he was not borrowed by Eastern, though Eastern received some benefit from his services. See Vacek v. State, Use of Rokos, 155 Md. 400, 142 A. 491; Dippel v. Juliano, 152 Md. 694, 137 A. 514; Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, Use of Schriefer, 184 Md. 250, 40 A.2d 678, and the full review of the cases therein contained. Ordinarily such a question is one for the jury, but on the evidence actually presented in the instant case, there does not appear to be any room for an inference that the flagman was Eastern's servant. On the general principles of law involved, see also the Restatement, Agency, Sec. 227, and Comment b thereunder. We are also of the opinion that the evidence presented up to the close of the plaintiffs' case was not sufficient to take the case to the jury as against the flagman's employer, whether his employer was Teer (as we think) or Eastern. As was said in Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 506, 112 A.2d 475, 478, in which the opinion was written by Judge Delaplaine:    in any action for damages the court is not justified in inferring negligence merely from possibilities. A mere surmise that there may have been negligence on the part of the defendant will not justify the court in submitting the case to the jury. The plaintiff must produce some evidence that the defendant, either by his act or omission, violated some duty incumbent upon him that caused the injury. If there is no evidence upon which a rational conclusion may be based in support of the plaintiff's claim, the court should withdraw the case from the jury. Surmise and conjecture are not enough to warrant submitting the case to the jury. Maas v. Sevick, 179 Md. 491, 20 A.2d 159; Goldman v. Johnson Motor Lines, 192 Md. 24, 63 A.2d 622 (contributory negligence). In Baltimore Transit Co. v. Worth, 188 Md. 119, 140, 52 A.2d 249, 259, Judge Collins quoted with approval the following passage from Judge Mitchell's opinion in Armiger v. Baltimore Transit Co., 173 Md. 416, at 427, 196 A. 111, at 115: As has been intimated, the application of the principle of proximate cause to the facts in a given case is not always without its difficulties. But the general rule is that, where the injury of the plaintiff is the result of concurring causes, the question is one which should be submitted to the jury; unless, however, the evidence discloses a state of facts showing no connection between the injury and the negligence charged, except the bare possibility that the former resulted from the latter, or an uncontroverted state of facts establishing an efficient intervening cause which would preclude the defendant's act from being the proximate cause of injury. The facts, which we have stated in some detail, show that Nichols was able to stop his station wagon at the flagman's signal somewhat suddenly, but without difficulty, short of the intersection and that Carroll was driving some distance behind Nichols. How far back is not clear, but the only testimony on that point was that the truck was still 90 or 95 feet behind the station wagon when the station wagon had stopped. To ascribe the failure of Carroll to stop the Stem truck, without crossing into the wrong lane and without hitting Nichols' vehicle, to any suddenness of the flagging down of Nichols would, we think, be a matter of mere surmise or conjecture. We think that the trial court was correct in holding that the evidence before it was insufficient to warrant a verdict against Teer or Eastern.