Opinion ID: 2370675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Qualification as an Expert Witness

Text: Dr. Kleeman first argues that the trial court erred by allowing Dr. Golding to offer expert testimony. He argues that Dr. Golding was not qualified because he had not operated since 1986 and had relinquished all surgical privileges by 1988. Additionally, Dr. Kleeman points out that Dr. Golding was never trained in and had never performed any lapar[a]scopic surgery, observed an ALIF, or cared for a post-operative ALIF patient. Goudreault counters that, although Dr. Golding retired from surgery for health reasons, he remained active in medicine. Goudreault points out that his was not strictly a lapar[a]scopic procedure because the complications required conversion to an open approach, which was within Dr. Golding's experience. Goudreault asserts that Dr. Golding was very familiar with the ... lumbar anatomy and while [he] had never performed a lapar[a]scopic spinal surgery, he was well familiar with the techniques and [related] equipment. Goudreault maintains that vascular injuries are not unique to the ALIF procedure and that compartment syndrome can arise from various types of surgery. Expert witness testimony is required to establish a prima facie medical negligence case. See RSA 507-E:2, I (1997). A witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. N.H. R. Ev. 702. In deciding whether to qualify a witness as an expert, the trial judge must conduct an adequate investigation of the expert's qualifications. Milliken v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 154 N.H. 662, 667, 914 A.2d 1226 (2006) (quotation omitted); cf. RSA 516:29-a, I (2007). Because the trial judge has the opportunity to hear and observe the witness, the decision whether a witness qualifies as an expert is within the trial judge's discretion. Milliken, 154 N.H. at 667, 914 A.2d 1226 (quotation omitted). We will not reverse that decision absent a clearly unsustainable exercise of discretion. Hodgdon v. Frisbie Mem. Hosp., 147 N.H. 286, 289, 786 A.2d 859 (2001); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296, 787 A.2d 175 (2001). Our inquiry is whether the record establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made. Lambert, 147 N.H. at 296, 787 A.2d 175. To prevail on appeal, the defendant must demonstrate that the court's ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. (quotation omitted). After a hearing, the trial court ruled that [b]ased on his training and experience,... Dr. Golding is qualified to render his opinions about the surgery performed on the plaintiff and his follow-up care together with opinions about the role and responsibility of Dr. Kleeman as the lead surgeon ... on plaintiff's procedure. We cannot say that the trial court's ruling was an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Dr. Golding had training in vascular surgery and was board-certified in thoracic, cardiovascular and general surgery. Although he no longer operates, he has been licensed to practice medicine since 1959 and is currently licensed to practice in three states. During his career, he taught medicine, performed research and practiced as a cardiac surgeon. He is an attending surgeon and consultant at three different hospitals. In addition to teaching surgeons about compartment syndrome, Dr. Golding authored a chapter about vascular trauma in a medical textbook including a discussion of compartment syndrome. Dr. Golding's lack of laparascopic ALIF experience and training does not negate his ability to advance the jury's understanding and determination of facts at issue. Although a medical degree does not automatically qualify a witness to give an opinion on every conceivable medical question, Mankoski v. Briley, 137 N.H. 308, 313, 627 A.2d 578 (1993) (quotation omitted), we have held that [t]he lack of specialization in a particular medical field does not automatically disqualify a doctor from testifying as an expert in that field. Milliken, 154 N.H. at 667, 914 A.2d 1226 (quotation omitted); see also Mankoski, 137 N.H. at 312, 627 A.2d 578 (An orthopedic surgeon is not per se unqualified to render expert testimony on the psychological health of a patient.). Although Dr. Golding had not operated on patients since 1986 and had never personally performed an ALIF, he had performed surgery in the posterior lumbar area hundreds of times and had assisted to resolve major vascular problems that occurred during spinal fusions. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's ruling qualifying Dr. Golding as an expert. See N.H. R. Ev. 702.