Opinion ID: 888972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Morrisey's Miranda-Mosley Claim[4]

Text: ¶ 32 Morrisey does not contend that the detectives failed to give him the Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Rather, he contends that they failed to honor his assertion of his right to remain silent, thus requiring the suppression of his statements. This claim derives from the following passage in Miranda: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28 (footnote omitted). ¶ 33 The Supreme Court interpreted this passage in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). The Court first rejected the notion that the passage requires only the immediate cessation of questioning and permits a resumption of interrogation after a momentary respite. The Court reasoned that [t]o permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine the will of the person being questioned. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 326. Likewise, the Court rejected the opposite extreme under which a person who has invoked his right to silence can never again be subjected to custodial interrogation by any police officer at any time or place on any subject. The Court reasoned that a blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102, 96 S.Ct. at 326. ¶ 34 The Court instead settled on a middle ground. The critical safeguard identified in the passage at issue, the Court noted, is a person's right to cut off questioning. Through the exercise of that right, the person can control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. at 326. In turn, the requirement that law enforcement respect a person's exercise of the right to cut off questioning counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. Thus, the Court adopted the following standard: the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his `right to cut off questioning' was `scrupulously honored.' [5] Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. ¶ 35 Before we consider whether the officers satisfied this standard in the present case, we must address two preliminary matters: whether Morrisey was subjected to custodial interrogation and whether Morrisey invoked his right to remain silent.
¶ 36 Because the rules articulated in Miranda and its progeny protect persons who are subjected to interrogation while in custody, Morrisey cannot invoke Miranda's exclusionary rule unless his statements stemmed from a custodial interrogation. See Slwooko v. State, 139 P.3d 593, 602-04 (Alaska App.2006), and cases cited therein. The State disposes of this question as follows: For the sake of complying with the word limit of the Appellate Rules, the State will not address the issue whether Morrisey was subject to `custodial interrogation,' although it agrees with the district court's analysis that Morrisey was not `in custody.' [6] Based on our independent review of the record, however, we agree with Morrisey that the statements at issue here were the product of custodial interrogation. As the District Court noted, there is no dispute that Morrisey was interrogated about Dolana's homicide. Thus, we focus on the question of custody. ¶ 37 A person is in custody for Miranda purposes if he has been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or his freedom of action has been curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. Munson, 2007 MT 222, ¶ 21, 339 Mont. 68, 169 P.3d 364. This determination focuses on whether, given the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 465, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995); see also Munson, ¶ 23 (listing circumstances pertinent to this inquiry). Here, Morrisey was stopped by armed police officers pursuant to a traffic stop in a remote area. The officers took control of his pickup and placed him in the caged back seat of their squad car for transport back to his house. They then took control of his house and his other two vehicles. He was given the Miranda warnings which, although not dispositive ( see Munson, ¶ 23 n. 1), certainly contributes to a reasonable person's understanding that he or she is being held as a criminal suspect. See People v. Aguilera, 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 587, 593 n. 6 (1996); People v. Brown, 136 Ill.2d 116, 143 Ill.Dec. 281, 554 N.E.2d 216, 221-22 (1990); see also e.g. State v. Lacey, 2009 MT 62, ¶ 63, 349 Mont. 371, 204 P.3d 1192. Eight to ten law enforcement officers were present at his residence. He was accompanied by at least two officers at all times (while in the front yard, on the trip to the café, and during the interview). They told him that they came a long ways to talk to you about [Dolana's homicide] and wanted to get a formal statement then and there because they were not coming back here. The detectives put Morrisey in another police car and transported him elsewhere for an interview. They became increasingly forceful in their questioning, directing him several times to stay on point and repeatedly challenging the veracity of his answers. It is true that when he objected to doing the interview at the local sheriff's office, they allowed him to choose another location. It is also true that they did not physically restrain him with handcuffs or by use of force. Nevertheless, they controlled his actions while at his house, they took him from his house in a police car for purposes of an interrogation, and they told him that they needed to get a formal statement that day. Morrisey was never advised that he was free to leave; to the contrary, through their statements and conduct, the detectives communicated that he was under their control and would not be let out of their presence until he gave a statement. [7] In sum, a reasonable person in Morrisey's shoes would not have felt free to terminate the interrogation, get out of the police car, and leave. The totality of the circumstances establishes that he was in custody, having been deprived of his freedom of action in [a] significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
¶ 38 The State asserted in the District Court that Morrisey did not invoke his right to counsel; therefore the police were free to continue questioning him. The issue, however, is whether he invoked his right to remain silent, and the fact that he did not request an attorney is certainly irrelevant to the question of whether he invoked his right to remain silent. United States v. Rambo, 365 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir.2004). Moreover, it does not follow that the police were free to continue questioning Morrisey simply because he did not invoke his right to counsel. If he invoked his right to remain silent, the police were required to cease any interrogation and to scrupulously honor his right to cut off questioning. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 100, 104, 96 S.Ct. at 325, 326. ¶ 39 Alternatively, the State argues that Morrisey's invocation of his right to remain silent was invalid because it was ambiguous or equivocal. This standard, which derives from Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), applies to a post-waiver invocation of the Miranda right to counsel (i.e., an invocation after having initially waived that right), and the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether it applies to the right to remain silent, let alone a pre-waiver invocation of that right. See DeWeaver v. Runnels, 556 F.3d 995, 1000-01 & n. 1 (9th Cir.2009) (noting that an ambiguous pre-waiver assertion might require a different analysis); State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1997) (refusing to extend Davis to pre-waiver scenarios). But even assuming, arguendo, that a person in custody must articulate his pre-waiver desire not to answer questions sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an assertion of the right to remain silent, Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355, we conclude that Morrisey did so. ¶ 40 [A] suspect need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.' Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Nor need he rely on talismanic phrases or any special combination of words to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir.1996); accord McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir.2001). Laypeople are not learned in constitutional principle or legal nicety, and to require that precise words be uttered would elevate form over substance. State v. Spang, 2002 MT 120, ¶ 23, 310 Mont. 52, 48 P.3d 727, overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Buck, 2006 MT 81, ¶ 48, 331 Mont. 517, 134 P.3d 53. Whether the suspect invoked his Miranda rights is an objective inquiry. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. Here, when Cameron told Morrisey, You have the right to remain silent, Morrisey responded, Yeah, I will. And when Cameron stated, Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law, Morrisey asserted, I ain't saying nothing. Taken together, we find nothing ambiguous or equivocal about these responses. Cf. State v. Szpyrka, 220 Ariz. 59, 202 P.3d 524, ¶ 5 (App. 2008) (finding no meaningful difference between the defendant's statement I got nothin' to say and the locution I wish to remain silent); People v. Carey, 183 Cal.App.3d 99, 227 Cal.Rptr. 813, 814-15 (1986) (I ain't got nothin' to say was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent); Cuervo v. State, 967 So.2d 155, 163 (Fla.2007) (No quiero declarar nada, or I don't want to declare anything, constituted a clear invocation of the right to remain silent); State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Tenn.1992) (I don't have anything to say was sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent). ¶ 41 The State notes Morrisey's subsequent statements to the detectives and contends that his remarks could not have been interpreted to mean that he was unwilling to talk. But a suspect's post-request responses to further questioning may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100, 105 S.Ct. 490, 495, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam). We conclude that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would have understood Morrisey's initial statements to be an assertion of his right to remain silent. [8]
¶ 42 Having concluded that Morrisey was subjected to custodial interrogation and invoked his right to remain silent, we now address whether that right was infringed thus requiring the suppression of his statements. The central question is whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 326. The Mosley Court did not announce a bright-line rule for determining whether the police satisfied this standard, but the Court did indicate that refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or persisting in repeated efforts to wear down [the person's] resistance and make him change his mind would violate the scrupulously honor requirement. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06, 96 S.Ct. at 327. Short of such conduct, the determination depends on surrounding circumstances, such as the amount of time that elapsed between the assertion of the right to remain silent and the resumption of questioning, whether the person was given a fresh set of Miranda warnings and a full and fair opportunity to exercise his rights, whether the second interrogation concerned the same crime that the person previously declined to discuss, and the intensity with which the police pursued questioning after the suspect asserted the right to silence. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06, 96 S.Ct. at 326-27; United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1383-84 (1st Cir. 1992). Unlike the traditional voluntariness test, where the suspect's state of mind is central ( see ¶ 26, supra ), the Mosley test focuses on what the police did, and when, after the suspect exercised the right to remain silent. Barone, 968 F.2d at 1384. ¶ 43 The present case does not involve a refusal by the police to discontinue an interrogation upon request. First, when Morrisey first asserted his right to remain silent, there was no interrogation in progress. Then, at the outset of the formal interview, he told the detectives that he was willing to talk to them about Dolana's homicide; and at no point thereafter did he ask that questioning be terminated. Morrisey points out that in the interim between his assertion of the right to remain silent and the start of the formal interview, the detectives conversed with him about a variety of topics ( see ¶¶ 18-20, supra ), which in Morrisey's view violated Mosley. However, none of the detectives' questions and comments constituted interrogation. Interrogation, as conceptualized in Miranda, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). A definition that included any question posed by a police officer would be broader than that required to implement the policy of Miranda itself. United States v. Foster, 227 F.3d 1096, 1102-03 (9th Cir.2000). Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that interrogation under Miranda extends only to words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90 (footnote omitted). Here, Cameron asked Morrisey a few questions related to the search and then left Morrisey with Schaffer and Bellusci, who in turn informed Morrisey why they were there and told him that they wanted to sit down with him and discuss Dolana's homicide. Morrisey responded, That is fair. I got no complaints. He also stated several times, I have nothing to hide. From that point forward until the formal interview began, the three of them conversed about numerous topics which had nothing to do with the investigation. Although the conversation did touch on the investigation a few times, we cannot agree that the detectives should have known that their questions and comments were reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses. Indeed, no incriminating response was elicited during this period. ¶ 44 This also is not a case in which the police persisted in repeated efforts to wear down the suspect's resistance and make him change his mind about remaining silent. To the contrary, the transcript of the conversation preceding the formal interview shows that Morrisey changed his mind of his own volition. With little or no prompting at all, he freely conversed with the detectives about the weather, the surrounding landscape, his pet cat, his guns, the price of gas, his relationship with his mother, his experiences with bears in the area, where he does his banking, where he buys his gas and groceries, why he decided to settle in that part of Colorado, why he was unmarried, and why he did not have a computer or Internet access. Morrisey was hardly opposed to speaking; if anything, he was loquacious. Furthermore, at the outset of the formal interview, the detectives reminded him that he had been advised of his rights, they asked him whether he was willing to talk to them about the homicide, and Morrisey stated, I will talk. ¶ 45 Morrisey points out that not long after he asserted his right to remain silent, the detectives told him that we want to get it cleared up  we want to get this case done and hopefully sit down, visit with you and see where we can  see if we can get this resolved. In isolation, these statements could be viewed as an attempt to undermine Morrisey's resolve to remain silent. But by that point, he had already stated several times that he had nothing to hide; and when read in context, the detectives' remarks were not part of an effort to induce Morrisey to talk when he otherwise would not do so. ¶ 46 In sum, the critical safeguard at issue is Morrisey's right to cut off questioning and thus control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation, thereby counteracting the coercive pressures of the custodial setting. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04, 96 S.Ct. at 326. The record before us does not support the conclusion that this right was infringed. We hold, therefore, that Morrisey was not entitled to suppression of his statements under his Miranda-Mosley theory.