Opinion ID: 1977097
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Record

Text: Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in the Superior Court. Each party argued that there was no dispute of material fact because the terms and conditions of the amended Agreement were clear and unambiguous. Each party requested the Superior Court to interpret the amended Agreement as a matter of law. However, when the cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, they were each accompanied by opposing affidavits. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56. Each party's interpretation of the amended Agreement and respective version of the pre-closing events was set forth in the affidavits. Thus, the parties created a paper record which went beyond the face of the amended Agreement. When the affidavits are considered, a sharp disagreement among the parties, regarding their intention and the meaning of the pertinent contractual provisions, becomes apparent. Nevertheless, the Superior Court interpreted the amended Agreement without reliance on the extrinsic evidence in the affidavits. As this Court stated in Klair v. Reese, Del.Supr., 531 A.2d 219 (1987): As long as the court is aware that doubts and uncertainty lurk in the meaning and application of agreed language, it will consider testimony pertaining to antecedent agreements, communications and other factors which bear on the issue. The primary search is for the common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed on them by law.... [T]he court is not free to exclude or disregard extrinsic evidence; for the meaning of words used in an agreement can only be known through an appreciation of the context and circumstances in which they were used. Id. at 223 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Superior Court is to be commended for attempting to decide a dispute which was submitted to it on cross-motions for summary judgment. However, cross-motions for summary judgment are not the procedural equivalent of a stipulation for a decision on a paper record. [T]he function of the judge in passing on a motion for summary judgment is not to weigh evidence and to accept that which seems to him to have the greater weight. His function is rather to determine whether or not there is any evidence supporting a favorable conclusion to the nonmoving party. When that is the state of the record, it is improper to grant summary judgment. Continental Oil Co. v. Pauley Petroleum, Inc., Del.Supr., 251 A.2d 824, 826 (1969). It is imperative that the court consider whether there is a genuine issue of material fact each time such motions are presented. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Wolcott, Del. Supr., 83 A.2d 759, 762 (1951); accord, Rains v. Cascade Indus., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir.1968) (the making of such inherently contradictory claims [i.e., cross motions for summary judgment] does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.13 (2d ed. 1988).