Opinion ID: 614206
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deviation from Company Procedure

Text: A plaintiff may also raise a triable issue of pretext through evidence that an employer's deviation from established policy or practice worked to her disadvantage. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P'ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1214 (9th Cir.2008); see also Johnson v. Lehman, 679 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C.Cir.1982) (finding employer's departure from internal procedures probative evidence of pretext). Earl was terminated after receiving a single DIP. She never received a PIP, a much more serious warning. Earl has presented evidence that in terminating her without first issuing a PIP, Nielsen deviated from its normal internal disciplinary procedure. In May 2006, Nielsen did not terminate employee 46432, a younger recruiter, even though he had extremely serious performance issues, because he had received only a DIP. In an email exchange with other company officials, Bob Burns wrote: As much as it sounds reasonable to terminate him without a PIP, it would not be consistent with our procedure. Employee 46432 was eventually terminated, but only after issuance of a PIP. Nielsen contends that the Burns email does not correctly recite company policy. It points to its written disciplinary policy which does not refer to PIPs, describes its employees as at will, and expressly states that the company may accelerate the disciplinary process up to and including termination in any case. Human Resources Manager Jim Sowatzke testified in a deposition that although Burns's interpretation of company policy would be definitive he did not understand Burns's email to be stating a matter of policy. However, Sowatzke also testified that a PIP is part of the company's formal disciplinary process. In a later email to another Nielsen official, Burns explained that he recommended a pre-termination PIP for employee 46432 so the company can demonstrate that we treated him no differently than we have anyone else. Burns said he assumed that [employee 46432] is a protected class individual, and so consistency is of utmost importance. Earl has raised a triable issue why consistency was not of similar importance when Nielsen terminated heranother protected class employeeseven months later. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Earl, we conclude that Earl has raised a genuine dispute whether issuing a PIP prior to a termination constitutes an internal company practice or procedure. Even if issuance of a pre-termination PIP was not Nielsen's formal policy, the above evidence is also relevant to show that Nielsen applied a more forgiving disciplinary process for younger recruiters who were similarly situated to Earl. We note, in particular, employee 46432 who failed to meet virtually every aspect of his job requirements during his first several weeks as a recruiter, but whom Nielsen refused to terminate without first issuing a PIP. A few months after employee 46432 was terminated, Nielsen terminated Earl even though she had been issued only one DIP in her more than a dozen years with the company and had never received a PIP. We conclude that the more lenient disciplinary process Nielsen used for younger recruiters thus raises a triable issue of pretext, regardless of the company's formal policy or practice.