Opinion ID: 1827884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in awarding lisa one-half of the value of the personal property which the trial court classified as marital property.

Text: ¶ 11. John argues that he and Lisa did not commingle their funds and personal property, and for that reason, the chancellor erred in determining that his personal property prior to the marriage was marital property to be distributed equitably. John cites two Court of Appeals cases in support of his argument: Wilson v. Wilson, 820 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss.Ct.App. 2002), and Brown v. Brown, 797 So.2d 253, 256 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). The Court of Appeals decisions are not binding on this Court, and there is ample authority from our prior cases to guide this Court's decision. ¶ 12. The first step in property distribution as a result of divorce is to classify the property as either marital property or non-marital property based on Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss. 1994), which defined marital property for divorce proceedings as any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor. We assume for divorce purposes that the contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value. 639 So.2d at 915. See also Waring v. Waring, 747 So.2d 252, 255 (Miss.1999). Separate property that has been commingled with the joint marital estate also becomes marital property subject to equitable distribution. Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1286 (Miss.1994). See also Maslowski v. Maslowski, 655 So.2d 18, 20 (Miss.1995). Assets which are classified as non-marital, such as inheritances, may be converted into marital assets if they are commingled with marital property or utilized for domestic purposes, absent an agreement to the contrary. Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So.2d at 1221 (Miss.2002) (citing Heigle v. Heigle, 654 So.2d 895, 897 (Miss.1995); Johnson, 650 So.2d at 1286). ¶ 13. John argues that he and Lisa did not commingle their personal property and that they maintained separate checking accounts and filed separate tax returns; therefore, his personal property prior to the marriage should remain his separate property. The chancellor considered the facts in this case along with this Court's prior rulings in Hemsley and Johnson in determining the marital or non-marital character of the personal property in question. Accordingly, the trial court found that the personal property brought into the home of the parties on Monterey Road in Rankin County, all of which was subject to familial use, lost its character as premarital property and became marital property subject to equitable distribution, just as did the residence at Monterey Road. The chancellor also found that both John and Lisa paid household bills and participated in maintaining the household. Evidence in the record supports these findings. When a chancellor makes findings that are not clearly erroneous, this Court will not disturb his findings. Bell, 563 So.2d at 596-97. ¶ 14. After the classifications have been established, the chancellor analyzes the case according to the following factors found in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 928 (Miss.1994): 1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of property a. direct or indirect economic contribution b. contribution to stability and harmony of the marital relationship measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of marriage. c. contribution to the education, training bearing on the earning capacity of spouse accumulating assets. 2. Degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of assets. 3. Market value and emotional value of assets subject to distribution. 4. Value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse. 5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution. 6. Extent to which property division may be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of friction. 7. Needs of the parties. 8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered. ¶ 15. The trial court made a detailed analysis of each of these factors in this case, and determined that though John and Lisa kept their monies separate and filed separate tax returns, they each contributed something to the marital home and intended familial use of their premarital property. Under the circumstances, the chancellor decided equity would best be served by a equal division of the personal marital property between Lisa and John. Finding that the evidence presented in the record is consistent with the trial court's judgment, we affirm the trial court's ruling as to the marital property division.