Opinion ID: 2326772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Opinion Regarding the Lack of Credibility of Certain Veteran Police Officers

Text: The defendant also claims that the state's attorney improperly expressed his personal opinion regarding the lack of credibility of certain veteran police officers. In particular, the defendant challenges the following rebuttal argument by the state's attorney: And I don't believe for a minute that all these officers were either true to themselves or spoke the whole truth. Perhaps they don't know what it is. Perhaps they're afraid to address it. But look at what they didn't say. There wasn't one officer [who] got on the stand and said, `You know, I saw exactly what went on. This guy was struggling. What they did was proper.' They all turned away at one point or another. `Well, yeah, I saw something going on but I don't know what it was. Yeah, he was struggling but I don't know what exactly he was doing.' The state's attorney also stated that, [a] lot of the officers that were there that night weren't involved in the search for the truth. And when they testified here they weren't involved in the search for the truth. We reject the claim of the defendant insofar as he takes issue with the state's attorney's assertion that some of the witnesses were not entirely candid in their testimony. As we have explained, the state's case was predicated upon the theory that a number of police officers had engaged in a cover-up that commenced on the evening of the incident and continued up to and throughout the defendant's trial. Because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support such a claim, the state's attorney's argument urging the jury to credit that theory was not improper. We nevertheless agree with the defendant that the state's attorney should not have expressed his own belief that those officers had testified untruthfully. Rather, he should have couched his argument in terms of the state's theory of the case. The state's attorney's comment regarding his belief that several officers had testified untruthfully, however, was isolated and not repeated. Moreover, the state's attorney's use of the first person did not carry the suggestion that he possessed information unavailable to the jury; on the contrary, the state's attorney recited the specific evidentiary predicate for the inference that he was urging the jury to make. We must give the jury the credit of being able to differentiate between argument on the evidence and attempts to persuade [it] to draw inferences in the state's favor, on [the] one hand, and improper unsworn testimony, with the suggestion of secret knowledge, on the other hand. Id., at 465, 832 A.2d 626. Although [w]e repeatedly have emphasized that counsel, and especially prosecutors, must be particularly careful to avoid the unnecessary use of the first person; State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 205, 836 A.2d 224 (2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004); we also have recognized that comments of the type at issue here represent the kind of lapse that sometimes occurs, without premeditation, in the heat of the moment and at the close of an emotional trial. Id. Thus, isolated comments of this type generally do not give rise to a due process violation or otherwise result in manifest injustice because a properly instructed jury is likely to appreciate fully its duty to decide the case on the evidence and not on the basis of such rhetoric. Id. In view of the fact that the state's attorney's use of the first person was limited, and because the jury was instructed that the arguments of counsel do not constitute evidence, we conclude that the state's attorney's isolated assertion of his belief that some of the officers had testified untruthfully did not rise to the level of misconduct. 4