Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Discussion of Threats Against Robert James

Text: Defendant contends he was entitled to be present for the discussion between the court and counsel regarding the threats against prosecution witness Robert James (see pt. II.D.1., ante, at pp. 1287-1288). In this bench conference, for which the jury was excused and defendant was absent, the court offered to allow counsel to stipulate that defendant had nothing to do with his sister's threat against James. Defense counsel was unwilling to stipulate, repeatedly protesting that he had no first hand knowledge of the threat. Counsel was concerned that a stipulation would establish the threat as a fact. The prosecutor offered to stipulate merely that James had told Detective Stewart about the threat, but defense counsel ultimately decided he would rather question the detective about James's failure to disclose the threat earlier, in an attempt to suggest that it never happened. Defendant contends the stipulation would have protected him against the damaging evidence of the threat. He asserts that if he were present, he could have assured his counsel he had nothing to do with the threat, and insisted on accepting the stipulation. However, counsel displayed no concern over whether defendant was himself involved in the threat; his preoccupation was with the evidence establishing the fact of the threat. There is no reasonable, substantial likelihood that if defendant had been present, counsel would have made a different strategic decision on how to counter the threat evidence, which was clearly relevant to James's state of mind when he testified. The right to be present does not extend to argument over such evidentiary matters. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1191-1192 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1116, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 830, fn. 1.) Defendant fails to show how his presence would have contributed to the fairness of the procedure during the discussion of the threat evidence, or that his opportunity for effective cross-examination was interfered with. Accordingly, he fails to establish any violation of the controlling constitutional standards. In any event, after the detective testified the court unequivocally instructed the jury that the threat could not be attributed to defendant, achieving the same effect as the stipulation that counsel rejected. Defendant claims a stipulation would have prevented the prosecutor from implying that he was involved (see pt. II.D.3., ante, at pp. 1289-1290). However, any such implication was equally refutable by reference to the court's limiting instruction.