Opinion ID: 1823282
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in ordering a new trial and sanctions for Ford's allegedly untimely production of documents.

Text: Discovery orders and rulings by the trial court ¶ 43. The crux of this appeal is whether Ford disregarded rulings and orders of the trial court concerning the production of documents. The plaintiffs contend that throughout the discovery process, and through the trial itself, Ford intentionally withheld relevant documents in violation of numerous court orders. The plaintiffs highlight several comments made by the trial court about Ford's poor discovery conduct. However, in our review of the record on appeal, we find only a few orders of the court concerning discovery matters, and only one order violated by Ford. ¶ 44. In its original response to the plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production, Ford asserted general objections applicable to every request and specific objections to various individual requests. In her April 26, 2002, correspondence to Ford, plaintiffs' counsel asked the company to withdraw its general objections. Additionally, according to the transcript, the trial judge, referring to a previous order, stated that [t]he Court indicated that defendants were required to resubmit the responses without [general] objections. [6] However, at no point did the trial court order Ford to withdraw its specific objections to all of the plaintiffs' discovery requests. In fact, the trial court could not have taken such an action. [W]hen objections to discovery of specific documents are made, the trial court should deal with each on an item-by-item basis, carefully considering each objection, deciding whether to allow discovery, and stating the rule or exception which provides the basis for the decision. Hewes v. Langston, 853 So.2d 1237, 1250 (Miss. 2003); see also Miss. United Methodist Conference v. Brown, 911 So.2d 478, 481-82 (Miss.2005). ¶ 45. For example, a ruling by the trial court on the production of non-frontal crash tests for various Explorer models  the plaintiffs' Request for Production No. 6  was not made until May 30, 2003, the fourth day of trial. Until then, Ford had every right to rely on its specific objection to the production based on the dissimilarity of circumstances and relevance. A party has every right to make a good faith objection that certain interrogatories [and discovery requests] are improper. Grant v. Kmart Corp., 870 So.2d 1210, 1214 (Miss.Ct.App.2001); see also West v. West, 891 So.2d 203, 219 (Miss.2004) (parties are bound by the rules of relevance in regard to discovery); Pittman v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 368 So.2d 238, 240 (Miss.1979) (a motion picture reconstruction of an accident was not relevant because it contained material dissimilarities to the actual accident). ¶ 46. We now take this opportunity to address the validity of general objections to discovery requests, like those proffered by Ford in its initial response to the plaintiffs' interrogatories and requests for production. M.R.C.P. 34(b) specifies the duties of a party objecting to a request for production: The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is objected to in which event the reasons for objection shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an item or category, the part shall be specified. General objections applicable to each and every interrogatory or request for production are clearly outside the bounds of this rule. If a party wishes to lodge an objection to a question or request submitted by the opposition, that party must make such objection to that specific question or request. ¶ 47. Although the plaintiffs rightfully ignored Ford's general objections, which the trial court later ordered withdrawn, they could not similarly disregard Ford's specific objections. As previously indicated, where the plaintiffs disagreed with a specific objection proffered by Ford, the proper course of action was to timely file a motion to compel and subsequently seek to obtain an order to compel. When a party is aware of an incomplete or evasive discovery response, that party should take affirmative action by seeking an order compelling discovery pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). Warren v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 783 So.2d 735, 743 (Miss.Ct.App.2000). In Caracci v. Int'l Paper Co., 699 So.2d 546, 557 (Miss. 1997), we outlined the appropriate procedure under the rules for dealing with a party's failure to fully respond to discovery: Under our rules of civil procedure, failure to make or cooperate in discovery should first be resolved by making a motion in the proper court requesting an order compelling such discovery. See M.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The remedy for failing to comply with the discovery requests when the trial court grants an order to compel falls under M.R.C.P. 37(a)(4) in the form of awarding the moving party the expenses for such a motion. See M.R.C.P. 37; January v. Barnes, 621 So.2d 915, 922 (Miss.1992). After such an order to compel has been granted under M.R.C.P. 37(a)(2), and the party ordered to answer fails to respond, then the remedy may be sanctions in accordance with M.R.C.P. 37(b). (Emphasis added). See also State Hwy. Comm'n v. Havard, 508 So.2d 1099, 1104 (Miss.1987) (the discovering party must seek and obtain an order compelling a more detailed response as a precondition of obtaining Rule 37(b) sanctions). ¶ 48. As the passage above indicates, simply filing the motion is insufficient. It is the movant's burden to ensure that the motion is heard, ruled upon, and an appropriate order is entered by the trial court. Cossitt v. Alfa Ins. Corp., 726 So.2d 132, 135 (Miss.1998) ([a] motion that is not ruled upon is presumed abandoned). ¶ 49. At the April 14, 2003, hearing, the plaintiffs for the first time sought trial court rulings on specific responses by Ford to their interrogatories and discovery requests. The court ordered Ford to provide all of the documents requested by the plaintiffs in Interrogatories 5 and 6 and Requests for Production 12 and 13, and Ford complied. ¶ 50. April 22, 2003, was the first time that the plaintiffs requested the court examine in camera the documents Ford claimed to be privileged. An order granting the plaintiffs' motion was not entered until May 23, 2003, four days before trial. The order required the documents to be submitted to the court by May 27, 2003. This is the only order not fully complied with by Ford. Instead of producing all of the documents by May 27, the submission was completed by Ford on May 29. ¶ 51. Ford has contended from the beginning of this litigation that non-frontal crash tests on Ford Explorers other than the model at issue (1995-1997) are irrelevant to the claims at issue, since the accident here was a frontal collision involving a 1997 Ford Explorer (although Ford did abide by the court's order expanding the scope of discovery to include frontal crash tests for 1991-1994 Ford Explorers). On May 30, 2003, the plaintiffs finally asked for a ruling on their Request for Production No. 6 asking for all crash tests for all Explorer models. The court ordered Ford to produce the requested documents in three days, and Ford complied. ¶ 52. When the plaintiffs followed the procedure contemplated by Rule 37 just days before and during trial, Ford produced the ordered documents. [7] A party should not be punished because the other party opted to continue complaining to the trial court about perceived discovery abuses rather than request and pursue specific action earlier in the litigation. See Caracci, 699 So.2d at 557 (sanctions reversed where there was no order compelling plaintiff to fix discovery deficiencies); Robert v. Colson, 729 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Miss.1999) (sanctions for failing to timely answer interrogatories reversed where no order to compel had been entered); January v. Barnes, 621 So.2d 915, 922 (Miss. 1993) (sanctions reversed where the only order to compel was substantially complied with); Harvey v. Stone County Sch. Dist., 862 So.2d 545, 550 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (sanction of dismissal unwarranted where plaintiff complied with trial court's only order to compel one day late); Warren v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 783 So.2d 735, 741 (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (sanctions improper where there were no prior orders in place to compel discovery). Cf. Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796 So.2d 942, 949 (Miss.2001) (new trial warranted where defendant failed to comply with orders regarding discovery); Herrington v. Herrington, 660 So.2d 215, 219 (Miss.1995) (monetary sanctions upheld where defendant refused to comply with the trial court's oral ruling on plaintiff's motion to compel). ¶ 53. In the end, Ford violated a single order of the court concerning the time frame for the submission of documents, and the documents were submitted two days late. Thus, Ford is not absolved of all fault for the discovery disputes in this case. Indeed, Ford often walked a fine line with respect to other discovery issues, such as not disclosing a potential witness's phone number and waiting to disclose a fire report it had found in its investigation. That said, while the trial court's frustration with the discovery process is understandable, we find that the ordering of a new trial after a unanimous jury verdict for the defendant, based on a perceived violation of court orders which were never placed of record, was an abuse of discretion. Plaintiffs never requested a continuance ¶ 54. Inexplicably, the plaintiffs chose not to move for a continuance after receiving thirty-plus boxes of discoverable documents during trial. This Court has often enforced waivers when there has been no request for a continuance. Kindred v. Columbus Country Club, Inc., 918 So.2d 1281, 1286 (Miss.2005) (plaintiff waived right to complain about the exclusion of witnesses unknown until trial by failing to ask for a continuance or mistrial). ¶ 55. At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel stated that she did not want to incur the expense of a continuance or mistrial, and she further believed that the trial court would not have granted one. From reading the trial transcript and court papers, we think the decisional risk rested more on a belief that the plaintiffs were going to prevail in the case regardless, although hindsight reveals the imprudence of this choice. Nevertheless, the option was available to the plaintiffs, and if they were genuinely concerned about needing the information produced during trial, then the proper procedure was to request a continuance or mistrial and a claim for expenses and costs. The plaintiffs should not get a second bite at the apple based on their questionable trial strategy. ¶ 56. The trial court granted the new trial based on perceived violations of non-existent court orders. We can find no evidence in the record showing the discovery abuses claimed by the trial court, and as such, the unanimous jury verdict in favor of Ford should not have been disregarded. Additionally, since the plaintiffs failed to request a continuance or mistrial after the crash test and durability reports were produced during trial, they cannot now benefit from that flawed strategic decision. Therefore, we find the trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the jury's verdict and ordering a new trial.