Opinion ID: 217821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Agency Acted within its Discretion in Permitting Intervention

Text: After rejecting Travelers's argument that the timing of its intervention was reasonable in light of the development of the law of our circuit, the panel majority notes that Travelers's behavior, though not commendable, may be legitimate, provided that the delay ... did not prejudice Mr. and Mrs. Crowe. Maj. Op. at 443. As the panel majority notes, there is no specific requirement in the statute or the regulations requiring intervention to occur within a specific time frame, but the court will suppose that the regulations contemplate that an insurer ... will seek intervention in a timely manner. Id. at 442. In determining whether intervention should be permitted in this case, the panel majority cites authorities, not specific to the agency context, describing the factors that courts should consider in determining whether to permit a delayed intervention. After noting that chief among those factors is the prejudice suffered by the opponent, the panel majority concludes that there was substantial prejudice to the Crowes in this case and reverses. Respectfully, I cannot agree. Given the substantial discretion the agency enjoys in the conduct of proceedings under the Act, it is not our role to engage in essentially de novo review of the intervention question. Nor do I believe that `all of the circumstances of the case,' Maj. Op. at 444 (citing 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1916 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp.2010)), demonstrate that the intervention should have been denied. Although the Crowes were required to continue participating in the proceedings over a period of several years, the majority identifies no specific prejudice to their case. First, the majority acknowledges that briefing continued with counsel for the surety participating, albeit in the name of the employer. See Maj. Op. at 451 n. 5. Second, the record in this case was complete by the time that Horizon was dissolved; the ALJ did not permit the introduction of additional evidence, but adjudicated the petition with the evidence originally submitted by Zeigler. See Decision and Order of ALJ at 4-5 (July 1, 2005) (declining to reopen the record for additional evidence). Finally, in the period of time after Melvin and Griskell demonstrated that intervention was appropriate, the case was essentially stagnant before the agency for a period of several months, awaiting a decision on already filed motions. Once the final remand order was issued, Travelers moved to intervene within a reasonable time frame, and, again, the Crowes suffered no direct prejudice in the interim. The Board acted within the bounds of its discretion when it permitted Travelers to intervene. Nothing in the statute or case law required a different result. It was understandable for the insurer to believe that it could proceed in the former employer's name until our decisions in Melvin and Griskell. Further, given that no specific prejudice resulted for the Crowes, it was within the discretion of the ALJ to allow the case to continue under the employer's name and was further within the discretion of the Board to permit the intervention in 2009.