Opinion ID: 428321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Court Reporter Immunity

Text: 18 We also hold that the district court did not err in dismissing Green's complaint as to the court reporter, Maraio, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Maraio acted pursuant to Judge Ingrassia's explicit instructions and thus is immunized from liability under section 1983 by the defense of qualified immunity for actions carried out within the scope of those instructions. Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1265-66 (5th Cir.), petition for reh'g en banc denied, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir.1978), aff'd after remand to the district court, 690 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.1982); Mourat v. Common Pleas Court of Lehigh County, 515 F.Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D.Pa.1981). 19 Green contends that the existence of any immunity defense for Maraio depends on her position and her motivation for the alleged actions. Green, therefore, concludes that the district court erred by extending qualified immunity to Maraio without first holding a hearing for the purpose of determining whether Maraio's motivations entitled her to defense of good faith. Green is wrong. 20 Usually, the defense of qualified immunity cannot support the grant of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 832 (5th Cir.1976). The Supreme Court has emphasized: 21 The procedural difference between the absolute and qualified immunities is important. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at trial. 22 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 419 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. at 989 n. 13. This distinction was drawn because [i]t is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity ... for acts performed in the course of official conduct. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct. at 1692, see also Gomez, 446 U.S. at 641, 100 S.Ct. at 1924; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318, 95 S.Ct. 992, 999, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). 23 However, in this case, there are several reasons why Maraio's defense of qualified immunity can support the grant of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, Green's own complaint alleges that Maraio, in her capacity as a court reporter, acted pursuant to the judge's instructions. Thus, the complaint itself establishes the circumstances required as a predicate to a finding of qualified immunity and, consequently, there is no reason to require an answer, a hearing or a trial. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-08, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732-33, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Once it was established that the basis for Maraio's action was the judge's instructions, inquiry into other questions of motivation or good faith became unnecessary. 24 Further, allowing a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal whenever the basis for finding qualified immunity applicable is established by the complaint itself permit[s] '[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated.'  Id. at 814, 102 S.Ct. at 2736 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978)); see also Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 765, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 1993, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (noting that Butz cautioned the judiciary to exercise their authority under the rules of procedure in order to protect official defendants from groundless claims) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. Briscoe v. Lahue, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1120, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (even the processing of a complaint that is dismissed before trial consumes a considerable amount of time and resources). 25 Last, we note that dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) was proper as to Maraio [s]ince judges are immune from suit for their decisions, [and therefore] it would be manifestly unfair to hold liable the ministerial officers who carry out the judicial will. McCray v. State of Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 5 n. 11 (4th Cir.1972). Maraio is alleged by Green to have altered Green's transcript pursuant to Judge Ingrassia's explicit instructions. Clearly, it was the judge's decision to make the change, not the court reporter's. Under these circumstances, it would be manifestly unfair to allow Maraio to be subjected to liability when she was acting within the scope of the judge's instructions and was simply acting as an arm of the court in compliance with the exercise of his judicial authority. 26 We have considered Green's other contentions and find that they merit no discussion.