Opinion ID: 2625727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusion of the Gornick Statement

Text: Defendant claims the trial court's exclusion of Gornick's statement violated defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. Gornick had told defense counsel and an investigator during a jailhouse interview that he did not want his statement turned over to the district attorney unless it was absolutely necessary. He said he would be claiming self-defense at his own trial, and that if called as a witness in defendant's case he would assert his privilege against self-incrimination. Gornick then gave counsel and the investigator the following version of Flemming's killing. Flemming had threatened Gornick's life, and threatened his family after obtaining Gornick's phonebook. The two made a deal to fight when they came out of their cells for showers. No one else was to be involved. When the doors opened, both he and Flemming had one hand free. It was supposed to be a knockdown-type fight, but Flemming had a shank. When Flemming dropped the weapon, Gornick dove on it and used it in self-defense. There was blood everywhere, and no deputies in the area for several seconds. Defendant was never uncuffed during the episode, and the deputy was not where he said he was. Evidently, Gornick referred here to Deputy Mendoza's preliminary hearing testimony. Gornick explained that defendant got blood on himself from the towels while he was on the ground. The prosecution moved to exclude the statement as hearsay. Defendant filed points and authorities in opposition, claiming the statement was a declaration against interest because Gornick had exposed himself to the death penalty. Gornick appeared in court and affirmed his intention to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege if called to testify, as discussed in part II.C, ante, at page 862. The court excluded the statement, noting that a declaration against interest must be so contrary to the declarant's interest that a reasonable person would not have made it without believing it to be true. The court expressed doubt that Gornick's statement was actually against his interest. His presence at the scene with a weapon in his hand was indisputable, and he claimed the killing was in self-defense and the defense of others. Furthermore, the court observed that Gornick had refused to testify about the incident even as he gave the statement, and left out critical details that would ordinarily be the subject of cross-examination, such as where defendant was and what he did during the attack. The court concluded that it's very convenient and very deliberate, I think, and very intentional. And to me, it makes it untrustworthy and unreliable. This discretionary ruling will not be overturned unless it was so arbitrary as to result in a miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 585 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104].) That standard has not been met; the reasons given by the court amply justified its conclusion. The trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest is the focus of the inquiry, and we rely on the trial court to apply its understanding of human nature in the circumstances presented, including the declarant's motivations and his relationship with the defendant. [9] ( Geier, at p. 584.) Here, the court accurately noted that Gornick attempted to justify his actions, rather than to incriminate himself. Moreover, he made his statement fully intending to insulate himself from questioning, and provided only a minimal account of defendant's actions. These factors seriously undermined the trustworthiness of the statement. (7) Defendant contends he was constitutionally entitled to present Gornick's statement regardless of its admissibility under the hearsay rule, citing Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038], and Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 98 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct. 2150]. Both those cases, however, require substantial indications of reliability, and we have held that [t]he same lack of reliability that makes . . . statements excludable under state law makes them excludable under the federal Constitution. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 780 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297]; accord, People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 629 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302].) Defendant argues that Gornick's assertion of self-defense did not detract from the reliability of his statement because the defense may not have been legally sufficient. However, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Gornick was fabricating a defense, as its comments suggested. Even taken at face value, there was no indication Gornick lacked confidence in the legal merits of his claimed defense. Defendant also asserts that Gornick's reliance on his privilege against self-incrimination showed he was concerned about the inculpatory nature of his statement. Be that as it may, it also demonstrated his unwillingness to expose himself to cross-examination at the same time he provided defendant's attorney with a limited version of the events. The trial court properly considered these circumstances in evaluating the reliability of Gornick's statement.