Opinion ID: 2148885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wellman's Death

Text: If Wellman's restoration and Murphy's discharge, standing alone, did not deprive Murphy of standing to appeal, then they certainly did when considered with Wellman's death. However, the appellate court reasoned that [a]s Wellman's property held in joint tenancy remains, we hold that the issue whether the denial of the petition to sever the joint tenancies was error is not moot. This reasoning was erroneous. Not only did Wellman's death render moot the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying Murphy's petition to sever the joint tenancies, but Wellman's death also deprived Murphy of standing to assign the error. The general rule is that a guardianship necessarily terminates by the death of the ward. 57 C.J.S. Mental Health § 146, at 45, § 158, at 55 (1992); 39 Am.Jur.2d Guardian & Ward § 54 (1968). Contrary to the appellate court's reasoning, although Wellman's property remained after his death, at issue is Murphy's relationship to that property. Murphy was the guardian of Wellman's estate. That relationship ended at the latest on July 3, 1991, when Murphy was formally discharged, or on August 17, 1991, when Wellman died. Section 24-12 of the Probate Act of 1975 accords with the general rule that a guardianship terminates with the death of the ward, but subject to section 24-19. 755 ILCS 5/24-12 (West 1992). Section 24-19(a) provides: Without order of appointment and until the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration or until sooner discharged by the court, a representative of the estate of a deceased ward has the powers and duties of an administrator to collect. (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/24-19(a) (West 1992). In the present case, Murphy was discharged prior to Wellman's death. Accordingly, the general rule applies. The appellate court's order lacks any reference to this court's decision in Burgeson, where the court applied this reasoning against Murphy. This court held that Murphy's duties as Burgeson's guardian terminated upon her death. Burgeson, 125 Ill.2d at 487, 126 Ill.Dec. 954, 532 N.E.2d 825. We further held that Murphy had a legally recognizable interest that existed following Burgeson's death-an unpaid creditor of the estate. However, that interest terminated once Murphy's office received its fees in the final account of the estate. Burgeson, 125 Ill.2d at 487-88, 126 Ill.Dec. 954, 532 N.E.2d 825; 755 ILCS 5/18-10 (West 1992). Murphy unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish the present case from Burgeson. Murphy first argues that in Burgeson the decedent's estate was closed, while Wellman's estate is in probate and a will contest is pending. Thus, the decedent's estate in this case has not been closed. However, Murphy's relationship to Wellman's person and estate was closed on July 3, 1991, when Murphy was formally discharged. Murphy also characterizes himself as an unpaid creditor. However, he filed his final account of the estate, which the trial court approved. Also, in his motion for leave to appeal, Murphy stated to the trial court that he would not seek any fees from Wellman's estate for work on the appeal. Burgeson controls the outcome of this issue. Murphy raises serious allegations impugning the professional conduct of Young. If Murphy suspects Young of unethical conduct, then he, like anyone else, can complain to the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. See Burgeson, 125 Ill.2d at 488, 126 Ill.Dec. 954, 532 N.E.2d 825. However, we hold that Wellman's restoration and death deprived Murphy of standing to appeal from the denial of his petition to sever the Wellman-Young joint tenancies. Consequently, the appellate court erred in severing the joint tenancies.