Opinion ID: 886124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: On the loading side of loading docks.

Text: UBC, § 1712(a) (1991). The District Court held that the pit did not fit the loading dock exception and therefore, the City's failure to install guardrails was negligence per se. ¶ 26 The City argues that this is a question of fact because conflicting evidence from two experts was presented at trial. The expert who testified on behalf of Chambers gave the opinion that the pit facility did not fit the loading dock exception to the UBC ordinance. The City's expert, the chief building officer charged with interpreting and applying the UBC and the one who actually reviewed the design of the transfer station, testified he determined that the pit facility met the loading dock exception to the UBC. Thus, the City contends that interpretation of the UBC ordinance was a finding of fact that the trial court improperly removed from the province of the jury because the court made credibility determinations and weighed the evidence. Consequently, the City argues that it was denied its right to a jury trial. ¶ 27 In addition, the City supports its argument that violation of a UBC ordinance is a question of fact by pointing to Montana Pattern Jury Instruction (MPI) No. 2.14. This instruction reads: If you find that [any party to this suit] [the defendant] violated any of the following laws, then [that party] [the defendant] is negligent. You should then determine whether that negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's injury. [Quote or paraphrase the statute] MPI No. 2.14. The City argues that this instruction would not be included as a pattern instruction if violation of a statute were a matter of law. ¶ 28 In contrast, Chambers asserts that interpretation of a UBC provision, like interpretation of a statute is a question of law. ¶ 29 We agree with Chambers. We have held that the interpretation of an ordinance is practically the same as interpretation of a statute. Schanz v. City of Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 328, 332, 597 P.2d 67, 69. Interpretation and construction of a statute is a matter of law. Clover Leaf Dairy v. State (1997), 285 Mont. 380, 389, 948 P.2d 1164, 1169; § 26-1-201, MCA. Further, we have previously stated that whether negligence per se exists is an issue of law. Schwabe ex rel. Estate of Schwabe v. Custer's Inn Assocs., 2000 MT 325, ¶ 25, 303 Mont. 15, ¶ 25, 15 P.3d 903, ¶ 25. ¶ 30 We have also specifically addressed application of the UBC as a matter of law in previous cases. For example, in Herbst v. Miller (1992), 252 Mont. 503, 507, 830 P.2d 1268, 1271, we held the plaintiff was entitled to a negligence per se holding because the city UBC ordinance requiring handrails applied to the defendant landlord's building as a matter of law and it was undisputed the landlord failed to install handrails. In Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S. (1995), 270 Mont. 97, 106, 890 P.2d 1254, 1259, we held an architect negligent per se because it was undisputed that he failed to prevent access to an unsafe area as required by our interpretation of the terms of the UBC. Finally, in Knutson v. Barbour (1994), 266 Mont. 170, 173-76, 879 P.2d 696, 698-700, we held the UBC did not apply to the accident area because the area did not fit the UBC criteria as a matter of law. See also Massman v. City of Helena (1989), 237 Mont. 234, 238-40, 773 P.2d 1206, 1209-10 (city not negligent per se because it was not required to ensure fire extinguishing system existed for temporary permit under UBC as a matter of law). ¶ 31 Together, these cases require a conclusion that interpretation of a UBC ordinance is a matter of law, the violation of which may constitute negligence per se if all the elements of negligence per se are met. See VanLuchene v. State (1990), 244 Mont. 397, 401, 797 P.2d 932, 935 (setting out elements of plaintiff's burden to prove negligence per se: defendant violated a particular statute that was intended to regulate members of defendant's class; plaintiff is a member of the class statute was enacted to protect with an injury of the sort statute was enacted to prevent). ¶ 32 In this case, it is undisputed that the City was subject to the UBC ordinance at issue and undisputed that there were no guardrails installed along the transfer station pit. Further, the District Court's statement that the obvious purpose of the UBC ordinance was to prevent falls indicates that it was undisputed that Chambers was a member of the class of persons with an injury of the sort the ordinance was enacted to prevent. Given these undisputed facts, Chambers met the elements of negligence per se. See VanLuchene, 244 Mont. at 401, 797 P.2d at 935. The only determination to be made was whether the loading dock exception properly applied to the transfer station pit under UBC § 1712(a). Therefore, any factual decision to be made other than causation or damages was already removed from the jury because it was undisputed by the parties. ¶ 33 Further, MPI 2.14 indicates that it is up to a jury to decide whether a statute has been violated. The determination of whether a party actually committed a proscribed act is distinct from the determination of what activity a statute actually proscribes in the first place. For example, a plaintiff might assert a defendant is negligent per se for running a red light, thereby violating a statute and causing an accident injuring the plaintiff. However, the defendant may argue as an issue of fact that he did not actually run the light. This determination would be properly left to the jury with MPI 2.14 given as instruction. Cf. Davis v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (1990), 244 Mont. 61, 67, 796 P.2d 181, 184 (conflicting testimony submitted on whether church's ramp was actually in violation of the UBC) overruled on other grounds by Richardson v. Corvallis Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 (1997), 286 Mont. 309, 950 P.2d 748. In this case, MPI 2.14 should not have been given to the jury as instruction once the court made the negligence per se determination, because the there were no undisputed issues regarding violation of the statute. ¶ 34 As stated, the only determination remaining to be made was whether or not the loading dock exception properly applied to the pit. This was a question of statutory interpretation for the court to decide. We disagree with the City's position that conflicting evidence or differing expert opinions inevitably creates an issue of fact that must go to the jury. If that were the case, statutory interpretation would always become an issue of fact. Therefore, we hold that the District Court was correct in deciding the negligence per se issue as a matter of law, despite the fact that the court did not make this determination until the close of evidence and despite the fact that the District Court considered conflicting evidence from experts who disagreed regarding the appropriate application of the exception to the UBC ordinance. See Pierce, 270 Mont. at 104-05, 890 P.2d at 1258 (expert testimony submitted on application of the UBC during trial); cf. Knutson, 266 Mont. at 173, 879 P.2d at 698 (no expert testimony submitted). While issues of law are normally decided on summary judgment preceding the trial presentation of evidence, a court can properly dispose of issues of law at anytime during the proceedings. Again, our review of the District Court's determination of law is de novo. Carbon County, 271 Mont. at 469, 898 P.2d at 686. ¶ 35 While the City presents no argument on appeal regarding the interpretation of UBC § 1712(a), other than noting the testimony of the City building official as discussed above, we conclude that the District Court correctly interpreted the ordinance and held the City negligent per se in this case. ¶ 36 The court stated that because the loading side of loading docks was not defined, it had to look to dictionary definitions and common usage. The Court further stated that the dictionary definitions it reviewed all indicated that while loading docks were not specifically defined, docks were defined as platforms used to load and unload from motor carrier-type vehicles and that none of these definitions indicated use of a pit. Further, the court noted that common usage of loading docks as testified to by the parties fit the dictionary definitions. Finally, the court noted that the plans for the facility showed a pit, that there was no indication on the plans that the pit was considered to be a loading dock and that the City's building official did not indicate on the plans that the loading dock exception applied to the pit. Consequently, the court concluded that the City was negligent per se. ¶ 37 We agree that the plain language of UBC § 1712(a) and its loading dock exception do not include a pit design such as that used at the transfer station for the reasons cited by the District Court. When a UBC term is not defined, ordinary dictionary definitions are to be used. Knutson, 266 Mont. at 174, 879 P.2d at 698. While loading dock is not listed in the dictionary, both the noun and verb forms of the word dock indicate that loading on and off of a carrier-type vehicle by joining two surfaces together is intended. See WEBSTER'S NEW AMERICAN DICTIONARY 153 (1995) (dock n: 2 .... platform for loading or unloading materials; dock vb: 1. to bring or come into dock). Further, all our cases using the term loading dock refer to platforms that vehicles can pull up to for loading. See e.g. Salvail v. Great N. Ry. (1970), 156 Mont. 12, 16, 473 P.2d 549, 552; Carlson v. Cain (1983), 204 Mont. 311, 324, 664 P.2d 913, 919. ¶ 38 Under the common usage of loading dock, the activity of people using the dock actually ends up being on the somewhat level surface that is created when a motor-carrier type vehicle is pulled up to and abutting the dock. To equate this activity to one in which people must move material over the edge of a drop-off would render the loading dock exception nearly meaningless. Therefore, the District Court correctly determined that the loading dock exception did not apply, that the City violated UBC § 1712(a), and that Chambers was a member of the class with the type of injury the ordinance was designed to prevent. Therefore, the court properly determined the City was negligent per se. ¶ 39 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in granting Chambers a new trial on the issue of causation? ¶ 40 Regarding the final issue on appeal, the parties agree that the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Wilhelm v. City of Great Falls (1984), 211 Mont. 430, 433, 685 P.2d 350, 351; Brockie v. Omo Constr. (1994), 268 Mont. 519, 525, 887 P.2d 167, 170 overruled on other grounds by Porter v. Galarneau (1996), 275 Mont. 174, 911 P.2d 1143. ¶ 41 In this instance, the City asserts that the District Court abused its discretion by granting Chambers a new trial on the issue of causation because it asserts there was substantial evidence upon which the jury based its verdict. The City argues that the jury found no causation because Chambers supposedly did not present direct testimony or expert testimony on whether the lack of a guardrail was a substantial factor in his accident. The City argues the jury properly interpreted the facts of the accident and concluded that Chambers pulled on the screen door with such force and fell backward with such force, that a guardrail would not have stopped his fall. Further, the City argues it was within the province of the jury to judge Chambers' credibility and decide that the accident was due to his own contributory negligence. Finally, the City asserts that the District Court failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the City as the prevailing party and consequently, the District Court's decision to grant a new trial denied the City its right to a jury trial. ¶ 42 Chambers argues the court properly exercised its discretion. Chambers asserts that the evidence he presented on the issue of causation, simply his own and Therriault's uncontradicted testimony regarding how the accident happened, was direct evidence of causation. Further, Chambers argues that the City did not present direct evidence or testimony on the issue of causation to refute the witness testimony. Chambers also asserts that expert testimony was not necessary on the issue of causation. Finally, Chambers notes that the negligence per se ruling established the City's negligence. ¶ 43 Regarding the grant of a new trial, the District Court stated: Here, the Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict. The evidence is clear that the accident happened when Chambers tripped on the concrete curb and fell into the pit. The City was required by the UBC to provide a 42 inch high guard rail [sic] to serve as a fall protection device, but the City failed to do so. In Instruction No. 13, the jury was told that [t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the plaintiff's injury if it is a substantial factor in bringing it about. Clearly, the lack of a fall-protection device was a substantial factor in the accident. Further, the District Court noted there was no requirement for expert testimony on the issue of causation in a case such as this. Therefore, the District Court based its decision to grant a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict because it stated that Chambers met his burden to show that the City's negligence was a substantial factor in the accident. ¶ 44 While we agree with the City that jury verdicts are to be treated with deference, our standard of review of motions to grant a new trial indicates that we also give deference to a trial court's decision on whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. In Wilhelm, 211 Mont. at 433, 685 P.2d at 351, we upheld the trial court's grant of a new trial to the plaintiffs based on insufficiency of the evidence where the jury found that the defendant's failure to properly manage its garbage dump was the cause of the plaintiffs' damages, but at the same time found that the plaintiffs were ninety percent negligent for living a mile and a half from the dump. We agreed with the trial court that the jury findings were based on insufficient evidence. Cf. Brockie, 268 Mont. at 525, 887 P.2d at 170 (trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a new trial where the jury found no damages even though statute entitled the plaintiff to certain undisputed damages). See also § 25-11-102(6), MCA. ¶ 45 Here, the court held that the jury's verdict was based on insufficient evidence because the City was negligent per se and Chambers fell over an edge that was required to have a fall protection device. We agree with the District Court that the jury's verdict was based on insufficient evidence and we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. ¶ 46 Finally, the dissent demands an explanation for the majority's decision to remand this cause to the District Court. The reason is obvious. In this cause the trial court erred by failing to consider various factors in deciding whether the City's operation of the transfer site was abnormally dangerous. We are remanding to allow the District Court to consider and apply those criteria. While the decision itself is one of law, the trial court is in the best position to weigh the various factors in the light of the existing record and whatever new evidence it wishes to consider and to decide what the law is. We are not pre-determining how the judge should rule. The dissent would simply impose his own weighing of the factors on the trial court. We believe that it is more appropriate to let the District Judge do his job, and if his decision is in error, then we will do ours.