Opinion ID: 48706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: management of standby counsel

Text: 200 Fields complains that the district court's management of his standby counsel violated his due process rights. He argues that the court failed to safeguard the orderly process of trial. See United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1122 (1st Cir. 1989). According to Fields, the court's inconsistent directions about the role of standby counsel were fundamentally unfair and compromised the integrity of the verdict. Significantly, Fields does not claim that standby counsel's participation at trial intruded upon his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation.
201 In the circumstances of this case, our review of this claim is limited. Trial courts must make difficult judgment calls when trying to reconcile the role of standby counsel with a defendant's desire to represent himself. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Since trial courts clearly are in the best position to make those calls, the Supreme Court has instructed us to accord deference to their decisions. Id. We will review for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 1998). Here, Fields failed to object below to the court's standby-counsel orders. Thus, our deferential review is restricted even further by the plain-error doctrine. See United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 685 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1997).
202 Fields's claim fails the first prong of plain error review: the district court did not abuse its discretion. The court's actions appear to us as nothing more than a reasonable attempt to deal with a trial that turned chaotic due to Fields's insistence on self-representation. See United States v. Einfeldt, 138 F.3d 373, 378 (8th Cir. 1998). 203 After Fields decided to represent himself, the court explained the role of standby counsel. They would serve as Fields's legal reference material. However, Fields was responsible for making statements to the Court and framing questions to witnesses. Accordingly, Fields's standby counsel were instructed that they could not represent him through him. The crux of Fields's complaint now appears to be that the court, while initially requiring that standby counsel play this very limited role, thereafter allowed them to participate more and more, rendering the rules for standby counsel incomprehensible and compromising the orderly process of trial. 204 It is necessary to put this complaint in perspective. Fields's attempt at self-representation was, as he acknowledges, predictably catastrophic. Not surprisingly, Fields lacked the legal ability to abide by the elementary rules of courtroom procedure. Fields's questions frequently were argumentative, e.g.: Mr. Davis, being a government witness, it's your job to make excuses for the lack of evidence; am I correct? Often they were improper, e.g.: Ms. Hilliard, do you know why [the victim's] baby was born premature? . . . Isn't it true that [she] drunk liquor and vinegar in an attempt to abort— and Are you aware that the witness that was just up here said—. Many times Fields's questions were not questions at all. While cross-examining a fellow inmate who testified that Fields confessed to him, Fields said, Man, I don't know you from the man in the moon. He told another witness, You been watching too many Westerns. 205 The court sustained Government objection after Government objection. For example, during Fields's cross-examination of a witness named Shaylakea Scroggins, the court sustained hearsay objections to four consecutive questions, along with many others. Eventually, the progress of trial became so frustrated by improper questioning that the court dismissed the jurors to determine which of Fields's questions would be acceptable. 206 This context shows that Fields's complaint about the court's allegedly inconsistent management of standby counsel has no merit. The record indicates that the court had to permit an expanded role for standby counsel later in the trial precisely to ensure that the trial continued in an orderly fashion. Cf. Dunn, 162 F.3d at 307 (stating that an accused has a right to appear pro se only if he is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol). Fields was allowed to confer frequently with standby counsel to develop his questions because he proved unable to formulate appropriate questions on his own. Standby counsel was allowed to make arguments for Fields outside the jury's hearing because Fields demonstrated that he could not protect his own interests. The disorderly situation caused by Fields's self-representation provided the court adequate justification for any inconsistency (if there was inconsistency) in its directives concerning standby counsel. There was no abuse of discretion and no violation of due process.