Opinion ID: 220365
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Policy Requirement Warrants Heightened Scrutiny

Text: Applying these cases to the one before us, we conclude that the Policy Requirement, as implemented by the Agencies, falls well beyond what the Supreme Court and this Court have upheld as permissible funding conditions. Unlike the funding conditions in the cases discussed above, the Policy Requirement does not merely restrict recipients from engaging in certain expression (such as lobbying ( Regan ), editorializing ( League of Women Voters ), abortion-related speech ( Rust ), or welfare reform litigation (the LSC cases)), but pushes considerably further and mandates that recipients affirmatively say something  that they are opposed to the practice[] of prostitution, 45 C.F.R. § 89.1. The Policy Requirement is viewpoint-based, and it compels recipients, as a condition of funding, to espouse the government's position. Compelling speech as a condition of receiving a government benefit cannot be squared with the First Amendment. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-17, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (finding unconstitutional requirement that drivers, as condition of using the roads, display state motto Live Free or Die on license plates); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958) (finding unconstitutional requirement that veterans, as condition of receiving property tax exemption, declare that they do not advocate the forcible overthrow of government); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (finding unconstitutional requirement that schoolchildren, as condition of going to school, salute the flag; stating that such involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence). Here, much as in Wooley, Speiser, and Barnette, silence, or neutrality, is not an option for Plaintiffs. In order to avoid losing Leadership Act funding, they must declare their opposition to prostitution. As Defendants correctly point out, these traditional compelled speech cases involved already-existing public benefits, not government funding programs, and are therefore distinguishable in that respect. But these cases teach that where, as here, the government seeks to affirmatively require government-preferred speech, its efforts raise serious First Amendment concerns. [3] The Supreme Court recently implied as much in FAIR, where it upheld the Solomon Amendment's requirement that universities permit military recruiters on campus as a condition of receiving federal funding. The Court noted that [t]here is nothing in this case approaching a Government-mandated pledge or motto that the school must endorse. 547 U.S. at 61-62, 126 S.Ct. 1297. The Policy Requirement calls for exactly that. The Policy Requirement is also viewpoint-based, because it requires recipients to take the government's side on a particular issue. It is well established that viewpoint-based intrusions on free speech offend the First Amendment. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (It is axiomatic that the government may not regulate speech based on its substantive content or the message it conveys.); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991) (stating broad[] principle [that] [r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although viewpoint-based funding conditions that target speech are not necessarily unconstitutional, see Rust, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, such conditions are constitutionally troublesome. In Regan, for example, the Court applied minimal scrutiny in reviewing a condition that was, unlike the Policy Requirement, decidedly viewpoint- neutral (it banned all lobbying by § 501(c)(3) organizations, regardless of the nature of the legislation or the organization's position on it). See 461 U.S. at 541, 548, 103 S.Ct. 1997. In League of Women Voters, which invalidated a viewpoint-neutral restriction on editorializing, all four dissenting Justices indicated that if the restriction were viewpoint-based, they too would find it constitutionally problematic. See 468 U.S. at 407-08, 104 S.Ct. 3106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that condition was strictly neutral, not directed at editorial views of one particular ideological bent); id. at 413, 104 S.Ct. 3106 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ([O]f greatest significance for me, the statutory restriction is completely neutral in its operation  it prohibits all editorials without any distinction being drawn concerning ... the point of view that might be expressed.); cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.). The LSC cases confirm this conclusion. In Velazquez I, we invalidated as viewpoint-discriminatory a restriction prohibiting LSC grantees from representing clients seeking welfare reform. 164 F.3d at 769-72. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Rust could not justify the restriction because although, as Rust had implicitly established, viewpoint-based funding decisions can be sustained in instances in which ... the government use[s] private speakers to transmit information pertaining to its own program, the LSC grantees were not speaking on behalf of the government. Velazquez II, 531 U.S. at 540-42, 121 S.Ct. 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, in BLS, while we remanded for the district court to apply the adequate alternative channels test to the LSC's viewpoint-neutral program integrity regulations, we expressly recognized, citing Velazquez I, that substantive restrictions that are directed toward speech as such might require closer attention  an issue that [went] to the... statutory restrictions challenged in [the LSC] cases. See BLS, 462 F.3d at 230. The Policy Requirement is substantive, viewpoint-based, and directed toward speech, as it affirmatively requires recipients to speak. It is this bold combination in a funding condition of a speech-targeted restriction that is both affirmative and quintessentially viewpoint-based that warrants heightened scrutiny. Furthermore, the targeted speech, concerning prostitution in the context of the international HIV/AIDS-prevention effort, is a subject of international debate. The right to communicate freely on such matters of public concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982) ([E]xpression on public issues has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Policy Requirement offends that principle, mandating that Plaintiffs affirmatively espouse the government's position on a contested public issue where the differences are both real and substantive. For example, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) have recognized advocating for the reduction of penalties for prostitution  to prevent such penalties from interfering with outreach efforts  as among the best practices for HIV/AIDS prevention. [4] Plaintiffs claim that being forced to declare their opposition to prostitution harms [their] credibility and integrity as NGOs, which generally avoid taking controversial policy positions likely to offend host nations [and] partner organizations, and risks offending all of the[] groups whose approach to HIV/AIDS may differ from that of the government, not to mention some of the very people, prostitutes, whose trust they must earn to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS. Appellees' Br. 11-12.