Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Anti-Corruption

Text: 81 The Supreme Court has recently clarified that the anti-corruption interest, in the campaign finance context, is not confined to bribery of public officials, but extend[s] to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 660. Moreover, the Shrink Court reiterated that, in addition to the actual influence of campaign contributions on politicians' behavior, the perception of corruption was an important part of this compelling state interest because it could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 897 (citing United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562, 81 S.Ct. 294, 5 L.Ed.2d 268 (1961) (democracy works only if the people have faith in those who govern)). 82 In terms of the quantum of empirical evidence needed, we note that although the interest in avoiding corruption and the appearance thereof is well-established as sufficiently important in the context of contribution limits, the rejection in Buckley of the anti-corruption interest as a constitutional justification for spending limits dictates the need for considerable evidence to demonstrate that unlimited spending is part of the corruption problem, and that spending limits are a necessary and plausible solution. 83 In this case, the District Court found that Vermont had proven that the reality and perception of corruption in its political system was a legitimate concern. Specifically, it found that [e]vidence at trial overwhelmingly demonstrated that the Vermont public is suspicious about the effect of big-money influence over politics, and it appears they have reason to feel that way, 118 F.Supp.2d at 468, concluding that [t]he record suggested that large contributors often have an undue influence over the legislative agenda. Id. In light of Shrink, this undue influence over the legislative agenda is properly considered part of the anti-corruption interest. See 528 U.S. at 389, 120 S.Ct. 897. 11 For the reasons that follow, our independent review of the evidence supports these findings by the District Court. 84 First, citizens in Vermont have consistently demonstrated a belief that the attention of their public representatives may be available for a price. As a result, public faith in the democratic system has declined. The General Assembly described the effects of a need to raise ever growing amounts of funds: Robust debate of issues, candidate interaction with the electorate, and public involvement and confidence in the electoral process have decreased as campaign expenditures have increased. 1997 Vt. Laws P.A. 64 (H. 28) (finding No. 4). Large contributions and large expenditures by persons or committees, other than the candidate and particularly from out-of-state political committees or corporations, reduce public confidence in the electoral process and increase the appearance that candidates and elected officials will not act in the best interests of Vermont citizens. Id. (finding No. 9). At trial, one expert witness, Celinda C. Lake, concluded that [v]oters are extremely concerned about the influence of special interests in the political process. In fact, according to polling data, nearly 75 percent of Vermont voters say that ordinary voters do not have enough influence over Vermont politics and government, and more than two thirds believe that large corporations and wealthy individuals have too much influence. (expert report of Celinda C. Lake). 85 Testimony by Vermont's elected officials revealed that this disenchantment and loss of public faith played a critical role in their belief that expenditure limits are necessary. One sponsor of Act 64, Representative Karen Kitzmiller, presented the Vermont House of Representatives with evidence showing that 94 percent of Vermonters believe that too much money is spent in politics, and 76 percent believe that ending private contributions would reduce the power of special interest groups. Another state legislator, Gordon Bristol, testified at trial about his concern about the regular guy on the street, and I think if they feel that candidates are spending a modest amount of money, that they are going to get candidates in there who are representing issues and not a special interest. . . . According to another legislator, citizens have reported that they do not vote because `[a]ll the big money controls everybody in Montpelier anyways.' . . . They think it's all wrapped up and that the special interests control it and, quite frankly, they aren't that wrong. (testimony of Elizabeth Ready). Another legislator said: [I]t's the monied interests that control the process, and that cynicism ... it keeps people from participating, from engaging. . . . (testimony of Donald Hooper). 86 Second, because of the limited number of campaign contributors and the constant concern of being outspent, candidates and elected officials are significantly influenced in deciding positions on issues by a belief that they are unable to oppose too many special interests, no matter how unpopular, because they will be cut off from funds. The General Assembly described the effects of a need to raise ever growing amounts of funds: Increasing campaign expenditures require candidates to seek and rely on a smaller number of larger contributors, often outside the state, rather than a large number of small contributors. 1997 Vt. Laws P.A. 64 (H.28) (finding No. 5). If legislation alienates one major special interest group, officials are reluctant to alienate others because the number of entities and people making political contributions is finite and small. One state legislator admitted that, when considering a piece of legislation, You have to initially consider it as whether or not you want to risk losing the financial support or, in the worst case, having that financial support go to a primary opponent or to a person who opposes you in a general election. (testimony of Peter Smith). One candidate recalled being told by another lawmaker: We've already lost the drug money [because of the pharmacy bill], and I don't need to lose the food manufacture money too. So I'm not going to sign the bill. (testimony of Cheryl Rivers). 87 Third, and perhaps most perniciously, the demands of fundraising also affect the behavior of elected officials in the context of agenda-setting, since officials pay attention to which contributor wants what to happen in terms of language of the bill, in terms of calendaring the bill, in terms of writing the rules. (testimony of Peter Smith). That same witness also noted that a crucial part of any deliberation on a bill involves speculation about the reaction of contributors because they control the money: politicians are forever asking what's the industry position, what's the union position, what's — you know, and what they're talking about is where [is] the money behind the issue, what does the money want, where is the conflict between and among the power brokers. Senator Rivers testified that campaign contributors, by virtue of their role as contributors, can dominate the attention of party leadership or a committee chair, and thereby influence the legislature's agenda. In her words, there is kind of an atmosphere that is created that there is [an] assumption that phone calls [of contributors] will get taken and [their] policy issues will be considered. Another senator, Elizabeth Ready, recognized that there is an agenda out there that is pretty much set by folks that are not elected. 12 Candidates, often with great reluctance, accept the bargain with contributors so that they do not lose large sources of potential fundraising for the arms race in which they feel compelled to participate. 88 The evidence at trial established that candidates for public office rely on special interests for financial support, produced directly or by way of bundling smaller contributions from a particular company or industry. 13 The Buckley Court seemed to assume that many small contributions could not raise the specter of corruption. If a senatorial candidate can raise $1 from each voter, what evil is exacerbated by allowing that candidate to use all that money for political communication? 424 U.S. at 56 n. 64, 96 S.Ct. 612 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the reality of campaign financing in Vermont is a far cry from this idyllic vision of political fundraising, in large part because not every voter has the financial ability to participate by giving campaign contributions. [T]he average Vermonter has been, to some degree, disenfranchised because the average Vermonter cannot afford the price of admission. Senate J. of the State of Vt., at 1338 (Biennial Session, 1997) (statement of William T. Doyle). 89 Vermont has a compelling interest in safeguarding its political process from such contributor dominance, because it corrupts the process for achieving accessibility and accountability of state officials and candidates. The evidence at trial demonstrated that money — and the special interests that wield it — has a great influence on candidate behavior in Vermont, at the expense of the electorate as a whole, since candidates depend on it in order to run for office. Where access and influence can be bought, citizens are less willing to believe that the political system represents the electorate, exacerbating cynicism and weakening the legitimacy of government power. See Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir.2003) (describing the phenomenon of access-peddling and explaining that it creates a danger of corruption and the appearance of corruption). The accessibility and accountability of public officials — and the public's faith that Vermont's government is accessible and accountable — are fundamental to any democratic system. 90 In our view, such influence of campaign contributors is pernicious because it is bought. Certain private citizens and organizations should not be given greater access to public office holders — and thus greater influence — on account of those citizens' ability and willingness to pay for candidates' campaigns. Even with contribution limits, the arms race mentality has made candidates beholden to financial constituencies that contribute to them, and candidates must give them special attention because the contributors will pay for their campaigns. Quid pro quo corruption is troubling not because certain citizens are victorious in the legislative process, but because they achieve the victory by paying public officials for it. 91 In short, we believe, based on the District Court's findings and our own independent review of the record, that Vermont has proven the strength of this interest, and its relationship to unlimited campaign spending. And we believe that the factual record developed by Vermont in support of the anti-corruption interest, through the legislative process and at trial, may be sufficient to distinguish Buckley. Cf. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 617-18, 116 S.Ct. 2309 (plurality opinion) (indicating that the lack of coordination between the candidate and the source of the expenditure... prevents us from assuming, absent convincing evidence to the contrary, that a limitation on political parties' independent expenditures is necessary to combat a substantial danger of corruption of the electoral system.) (emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (citing West Coast Hotel and Brown v. Board of Education as examples of applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not been seen by the Court before). Nonetheless, given Buckley 's holding rejecting the anti-corruption interest as inadequate to support the expenditure limits at issue in that case, we are reluctant to conclude that the same general interest, standing alone, is sufficiently compelling to support Act 64's expenditure limits. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46-48, 96 S.Ct. 612; see also McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 647. We turn then to the second interest asserted by defendants.