Opinion ID: 1255464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Weighing of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

Text: The district court instructed the jury on the interaction between mitigating and aggravating circumstances as follows: The jury may impose a sentence of death only if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance has been established beyond a reasonable doubt and further finds that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found. Otherwise, punishment imposed shall be imprisonment in the state prison for life with or without the possibility of parole. Bennett insists that the jury should have been instructed more clearly that under no circumstances are they obligated to impose the death penalty, even if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. The State counters that the instruction incorporates almost verbatim NRS 175.554 and was approved of in Riley v. State, 107 Nev. 205, 808 P.2d 551 (1991). In Riley we held: While may can be interpreted to mean shall, if the context of the word requires as much, generally the word may is not to be construed to create a requirement, but rather, is construed to signify the ability to choose or the power to act. See Gyler v. Mission Insurance Company, 514 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Cal. 1973). Riley, 107 Nev. at 217, 808 P.2d at 558; see also Canape v. State, 109 Nev. 864, 884-85, 859 P.2d 1023, 1036 (1993) (Steffen, J., concurring). Consistent with our holding in Riley, we conclude that the above jury instruction accurately informed the jury of their statutorily endowed prerogative to decide whether Bennett would live, regardless of whether aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances. May is clearly permissive in the context of NRS 175.554(3) and the instruction submitted to the jury. We nevertheless recognize a potential for abuse as prosecutors may, for the purpose of obscuring the clear legislative intent underlying our capital sentencing statute, favor the slightly less unambiguous language of NRS 175.554(3) at the expense of a more explicit instruction. Because of the unique gravity of the death penalty, there is no sound reason why juries should not be fully advised of their constitutional prerogatives with respect to capital cases. As we observed in Gallego v. State, 101 Nev. 782, 790-91, 711 P.2d 856, 862-63 (1985), the death penalty is only a sentencing option if, after balancing and evaluating the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the former are found to outweigh the latter. Simply stated, district courts should plainly instruct juries in capital cases that irrespective of the predominance of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, the jury still has the discretion to return a penalty other than death. Although we conclude that the jury in the instant case was adequately instructed, we direct the district courts to henceforth provide instructions that will satisfy the concerns expressed herein, thereby more precisely reflecting the public policy of this state. Bennett's final contention challenging the constitutionality of his sentence on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, which is essentially an amalgam of all issues discussed above, is meritless.