Opinion ID: 2380792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: dissolution of the attachment and consent judgment

Text: Plaintiff's primary contention is that the presiding justice abused his discretion in dissolving the orders relating to the consent judgment and attachment. We find, however, that there was no abuse of discretion because the presiding justice clearly was not exercising his discretion when he ordered the tourmalines returned to the Sweatts and dissolved all court orders barring such return. At the May 15 adversary hearing on defendant's motions to release the gems, the justice stated It is really a question of a conflict between a civil order and the Supreme Court's mandate [ in State v. Sweatt ], and I think at this point it is appropriate that the mandate be carried out. Our review of the record of the hearing requires us to conclude that the presiding justice believed the order of this Court in State v. Sweatt was dispositive of the issues before him on May 15. Therefore, his decision was one of law rather than an exercise of discretion and must be reviewed for errors of law. We did not, in State v. Sweatt , order the tourmaline returned to the Sweatts in contravention of civil claims which had been asserted against it. Our opinion states that where the suppressed evidence is neither contraband by force of law nor stolen property nor evidence of a crime, it must be returned to the movant absent an adverse claim of ownership , and that no third-party claim has been advanced. (emphasis added) 427 A.2d at 951. Plumbago was not a party to the suppression hearing or the appeal in State v. Sweatt , and therefore we could not have ruled on its claims of title to the tourmalines. In fact, we expressly ruled that other claims were not before us. The presiding justice misread our opinion and read too much into our mandate, which stated: Remanded for entry of an order suppressing all property seized and directing its prompt return to the movants. 427 A.2d at 951. We can find no evidence in the record suggesting that the court below gave consideration to any other grounds advanced by defendant for vacating the pertinent orders, or to any of plaintiff's arguments. In the absence of such evidence, we are compelled to find that the presiding justice erred as a matter of law in ruling that he was bound by the State v. Sweatt decision to order the consent judgment and attachment dissolved. We vacate the May 15 order. We now address whether or not equity demands a reinstatement of the attachment and return of the attached property to the Cumberland County Deputy Sheriff who originally attached one black footlocker and its contents. The attachment was granted after a Superior Court justice had determined that there [was] a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will recover judgment, including interest and costs, in an amount equal to or greater than the amount of the attachment over and above the aggregate of any liability insurance.... M.R.Civ.P. 4A(c). Plaintiff was and is entitled to the benefits of the attachment which would be available to satisfy a favorable judgment should such be obtained in the conversion action. It is only fair and equitable that the parties be returned to the status which existed immediately prior to the order vacating the attachment. We therefore order the attachment reinstated. We also find that the consent judgment should not have been dissolved or vacated by the presiding justice on May 15, 1981. Consent judgments cannot be modified or vacated absent a claim of fraud or mistake by the consenting party. Cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 48 S.Ct. 311, 72 L.Ed. 587 (1928) (consent to a decree constitutes a waiver of legal defects in such decree); Thompson v. Perkins, 57 Me. 290 (1869) (party cannot appeal from final judgment to which he consented). The lower court's reliance on State v. Sweatt was, as we have stated, misplaced and could not support an order modifying the consent judgment in any way. The lower court erred as a matter of law in vacating the consent judgment. We therefore order reinstated the consent judgment of January 20, 1981 entered in the FED action. We further order defendant Dale Sweatt to return the black footlocker and its contents as of May 19, 1981, to the Deputy Sheriff of Cumberland County who had custody of the property under the attachment. Such a mandate leaves the defendant in the same legal position he was in prior to the dissolution of the attachment. The entry is: Motion to dismiss consolidated appeals denied. Appeal in State v. Sweatt , Law-81-192 denied. Judgment affirmed. Appeal sustained in Law-81-203, Plumbago Mining Corp. v. Sweatt, et al. Remanded to Superior Court with instructions to vacate the order of May 15, 1981, to reinstate the attachment order dated April 17, 1981, and consent judgment order dated January 15, 1981; and to order defendant Dale Sweatt to return to Deputy Sheriff Stanley Fulton the property attached pursuant to the April 17, 1981 Superior Court order. All concurring.