Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Procedural Parity

Text: 47 Hall next contends that, even if the Constitution does not vest criminal defendants with an independent, per se right to make an unsworn statement in allocution before the jury, the district court's denial of his request to make such a statement was nonetheless unconstitutional because the district court allowed the government to introduce similarly nontestimonial victim impact statements. Hall contends that such disparate treatment constitutes an unconstitutional disruption of the balance of forces between the accused and his accuser. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474, 93 S.Ct. 2208, 37 L.Ed.2d 82 (1973). We disagree. 48 The constitutionally required balance between prosecution and defense is a balance between the total advantages enjoyed by each side rather than an insistence on symmetry at every stage in the process. Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir.1995). In this case, we conclude that no significant imbalance existed in the total advantages afforded Hall and the government at sentencing. First, contrary to Hall's contention, the district court actually allowed him to present evidence of a type similar to the victim impact statements. Specifically, the district court allowed Hall to introduce hearsay evidence of his own remorse in the form of his sister's testimony of his statements of remorse to her when she visited him in prison. The government was not allowed to cross-examine Hall as to the contents of these statements. 49 Second, Agnes Rene, Lisa Rene's mother and the author of one of the three victim impact statements introduced at sentencing, testified during the sentencing hearing regarding the impact of the loss of her daughter. Hall declined to cross-examine her. This provides a strong indication that Hall did not consider cross-examination of the makers of the victim impact statements to be vital--or, for that matter, even beneficial--to his defense. 50 Third, the district court's refusal to allow Hall to make an unsworn statement that was not subject to cross-examination constituted at best a marginal procedural disadvantage. Had Hall taken the stand and offered limited testimony in substance equivalent to his proffered statement in allocution, he would have waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only as to matters reasonably related to the contents of that statement. See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156, 78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958) (holding that a criminal defendant could not take the stand to testify in her own behalf and also claim the right to be free from cross-examination on matters raised by her own testimony on direct examination  (emphasis added)); United States v. Hernandez, 646 F.2d 970, 979 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (noting that, in cross-examining a criminal defendant who chooses to testify, [t]he government's questions must be reasonably related to the subjects covered by the defendant's direct testimony. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 51 A great deal of the type of information that the government would have likely sought to admit to impeach Hall's testimony or directly refute his claims of remorse and acceptance of responsibility was admitted as direct evidence of aggravating factors during the sentencing hearing, particularly the nonstatutory factor that Hall constitutes a future danger to the lives and safety of other persons. Specifically, the government offered evidence of Hall's prior convictions and unadjudicated offenses. Additionally, the government introduced the testimony of Larry Nichols, one of Hall's fellow inmates at the correctional facility where Hall was incarcerated prior to trial. Nichols testified that Hall joked and bragged about repeatedly raping Lisa Rene. He also testified that Hall told him that, given the opportunity, he would kill Steven Beckley because, were it not for Beckley's assistance, the government would have had no case against him. Additionally, Nichols testified that Hall informed him of his plans to attempt to escape from the correctional facility in which they were incarcerated by taking his lawyer hostage using a shank, a homemade knife. Hall has pointed to no information that would have been rendered relevant by virtue of his offering testimony similar in substance to his proffered statement in allocution which the government did not present as direct support of the aggravating factors the existence of which it sought to prove during the sentencing hearing. Thus, we conclude that the district court's decision to admit victim impact statements offered by the government but to exclude Hall's request to make an unsworn statement in allocution to the jury did not unconstitutionally skew the balance of procedural advantage in the government's favor.