Opinion ID: 2543261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting Johnson's juvenile records into evidence?

Text: Johnson contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting juvenile records during the selection phase of his penalty hearing. He primarily relies upon the Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons [10] for support, arguing that the admission of these records was highly prejudicial. We disagree. The Supreme Court in Roper held that it was cruel and unusual to execute offenders who were under 18 years old when they committed their crimes. [11] The Court reasoned that juveniles by their very age and lack of development cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders. [12] However, Roper did not prohibit the admission of juvenile records during a death penalty hearing. Because there is no question that Johnson was not a juvenile when he committed the murders, his reliance upon Roper is misplaced. Rather, `[t]he decision to admit particular evidence during the penalty phase is within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.' [13] Evidence of character is admissible during a penalty hearing so long as it is relevant and the danger of unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. [14] Here, the evidence of Johnson's juvenile history primarily consisted of records and testimony regarding his participation in and conviction for the armed bank robbery in California in 1993 as a 15-year-old gang member and his subsequent successes and failures in the CYA program for juvenile offenders. This evidence also concerned his subsequent absconding from that program's parole a few years later. Johnson's juvenile record was relevant to his character, revealing a pattern of escalating violent criminal behavior that began with his participation in an armed bank robbery and culminated in the quadruple murder he committed in this case. Although this evidence was prejudicial, it was not unfairly so. And it had significant probative value, showing not only his propensity for violence and gang involvement but also his amenability to rehabilitationall relevant considerations in the determination of his sentence. Because this evidence was admitted only during the selection phase of his hearing, there are no concerns that it may have improperly influenced the jury's weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these records, and Johnson's contention in this respect is without merit. [15]