Opinion ID: 617228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Validity of consent to search

Text: What happened next raises the issue of whether Mr. Hunter and/or Ms. Isaacson gave a valid consent to the search which led to the discovery of the drugs and weapon in the car. The government argues Ms. Isaacson gave a valid consent to Trooper Nicholas to search the car. Mr. Hunter argues that any consent was invalid because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when Trooper Nicholas turned around and immediately began asking questions; Ms. Isaacson, who was not listed on the rental car agreement as the rental car driver, lacked authority to consent to a search; and Mr. Hunter, who was the listed driver on the rental car agreement, did not give explicit consent to search. Mr. Hunter concedes that there is no legal authority which expressly states that only the named person on a rental car agreement can authorize a search of a rented car. We are aware of no such authority either. Our cases have held that a third party may have actual authority to consent to a search if that third party has either (1) mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access, or (2) control for most purposes. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716 (10th Cir.) (further quotation omitted), amended by, 499 F.3d 1162 (2007). Furthermore, even if, for some reason, Ms. Isaacson lacked actual authority, she had apparent authority to consent. A person can have apparent authority if the facts available to the officers at the time they commenced the search would lead a reasonable officer to believe the third party had authority to consent to the search. Andrus, 483 F.3d at 716. [A] third party has apparent authority if the officer has a reasonable belief that the third party has (1) mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access, or (2) control for most purposes over it. United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1128 (10th Cir.2007) (further quotation omitted). Ms. Isaacson was legally driving the rental car, with a legal driver's licence, and she was as entitled, apparently or in fact, as Mr. Hunter to consent to a search of the car. Additionally, Mr. Hunter concedes that a police officer is not required to tell someone that he/she is free to leave the scene of a police/citizen encounter, nor is an officer required to inform a suspect that he/she need not answer questions. See United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1314 (10th Cir.2006) (The Supreme Court has held that officers need not expressly inform suspects that they are free to go before requesting permission to conduct a search.). Rather, [v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The central question is whether a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave or disregard the officer's request. Id. (further quotation omitted). As Ledesma instructs us: we have identified a number of factors that suggest that an encounter was not consensual, including the threatening presence of several officers, the use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer's request is compulsory, the prolonged detention of a person's personal effects such as identification, the absence of other members of the public and the officer's failure to advise the defendant that she is free to leave. Ledesma, 447 F.3d at 1314. As we have also stated, [p]hrases like `thank you' and `have a safe one' signal the end of an encounter, and afford a defendant an opportunity to depart. Id. at 1315. In view of our precedents, and having reviewed the video of the traffic stop, we can easily conclude that the district court did not err in determining that the encounter between Mr. Hunter and Trooper Nicholas had become a consensual one by the time Trooper Nicholas searched the car driven by Ms. Isaacson.