Opinion ID: 195254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duration of Detention

Text: 11 We first consider whether the suppression theory clearly asserted for the first time on appeal--that the surrender of the contraband was the product of an unconstitutionally prolonged detention--was waived. Criminal Rule 12(f) provides: Failure by a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial, at the time set by the court pursuant to subdivision (c), or prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(f) (emphasis added). 7 See United States v. Gomez, 770 F.2d 251, 253 (1st Cir.1985) (Rule 12 implements an important social policy; waiver results absent compliance); see also Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044, 1047-48 (5th Cir.1969) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 840, 91 S.Ct. 81, 27 L.Ed.2d 75 (1970). The record reflects that the district court neither found cause nor granted relief from waiver under Rule 12(f). 8 12 Even though appellate courts on occasion have implied relief from waiver under Rule 12(f) where the trial court proceeds to address the suppression issue on the merits, see, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 858 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 847, 102 L.Ed.2d 978 (1989); contra United States v. Oldfield, 859 F.2d 392, 396-98 (6th Cir.1988), we have not had occasion, nor are we disposed, sua sponte, to conjure relief from waiver under Rule 12(f) in circumstances where no cause for relief appears and the district court record does not enable reliable appellate review on the merits. 13 First, it would make Rules 12(b)(3) and (f) meaningless were an unexplained change of mind on the part of the defendant deemed cause for relief from waiver, following jury empanelment, under a rule fundamental to orderly pretrial procedure. In this vein, it is instructive to contrast the circumstances surrounding the late requests to suppress the contraband and the Nunez admission. The government's failure to disclose the Nunez admission until shortly before trial provided a paradigmatic example of cause for relief from waiver under Rule 12(f). See, e.g., United States v. Lamela, 942 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a Rule 12(b)(2) motion first asserted at trial was not time-barred where the relevant information did not become available until trial). On the other hand, no extrinsic justification whatever is suggested for the belated request to suppress the contraband due to the duration of the detention even though all the relevant facts were known to the defense from the outset. Instead, the untimeliness is attributed exclusively to Nunez's original decision not to challenge the contraband. In these circumstances, we believe something more than an unexplained change of mind must be shown to warrant relief from a Rule 12(f) waiver brought on by the defendant's tactical decision. See United States v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir.1984) (upholding denial of relief from waiver under Rule 12(f) after defendant changed mind about whether to move to suppress). 14 Second, Rule 12 itself provides that the court shall not defer a pretrial motion for determination at trial, even for good cause shown, if a party's right to appeal is adversely affected. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(e). Once a jury has been sworn and jeopardy attaches, the government loses its right to appeal an adverse ruling on suppression. United States v. Taylor, 792 F.2d 1019, 1025 (11th Cir.1986) (scope of discretion to grant relief under Rule 12(f) narrows once jeopardy has attached), citing 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3731, 9 cert. denied sub nom. King v. United States, 481 U.S. 1030, 107 S.Ct. 1957, 95 L.Ed.2d 530 (1987). See United States v. Barletta, 644 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1981) (Coffin, C.J.) ([D]efendants' motions to suppress, based on the exclusionary rule, are at the heart of the legislative purpose in providing government appeal rights.). On the other hand, the defense tactic employed below would have insulated from pretrial review, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3731, any exclusionary ruling based on the duration of the detention. As our court clearly explained in Barletta, 644 F.2d at 54-55: 15 Were a defendant able to delay such a motion until trial, he could prevent the government from appealing, thus frustrating the central purpose of Sec. 3731. It is for this reason that motions to suppress--motions based on the exclusionary rule alone--must be made by a defendant prior to trial or not at all, and for this reason as well that a district court ordinarily may not defer a ruling on a defendant's motion to suppress. We agree with the district court that such rulings and the government's ability to appeal them are at the core of 12(e). 16 Under these circumstances, therefore, relief from waiver of the Nunez suppression claim based on the duration of the detention will not be implied. See id. at 54; see also, e.g., United States v. Gomez-Benabe, 985 F.2d 607, 611-12 (1st Cir.1993) (finding Rule 12(f) waiver and concluding that: [i]t is unnecessary to address the substantive aspects of appellant's arguments [that should have been raised in a pretrial motion to suppress] since appellant has totally failed to put the matter in issue.). 10 B. Pat-down Frisk 17 Lastly, Nunez argues that the pat-down frisk conducted by Customs was pretextual--a search for contraband rather than a security frisk for weapons--and that the contraband subsequently recovered by Customs therefore should have been suppressed under Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Nunez insists that the Customs agents could not have apprehended a genuine security risk warranting a pat-down frisk for weapons at the INS checkpoint because he had just passed through the security checkpoint without incident. See supra note 1. Furthermore, he argues, the Customs agents would have searched his carry-on bag as well were they genuinely concerned for their personal security as the government asserts. 11 18 The trial court is required to assess the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers, rather than dissecting the evidence and weighing the individual components. United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 111 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3191, 96 L.Ed.2d 679 (1987). We review its factual findings under the clear error standard, United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 351 (1st Cir.1981); see also United States v. Walker, 924 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1991) (pat-down frisk), and will uphold the suppression ruling if supported by any reasonable view of the evidence, United States v. Young, 877 F.2d 1099, 1100 (1st Cir.1989) (citing cases). 19 The district court based its findings principally on the agents' testimony concerning the reasons for the pat-down frisk. Trial court credibility determinations are prime candidates for appellate deference. See United States v. Brum, 948 F.2d 817, 819 (1st Cir.1991); cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). The suppression hearing transcript discloses abundant support for the district court finding that the pat-down frisk was based on a reasonable concern, on the part of the agents, for their own security and for the safety of airline passengers. 12 As the record evidence supports the district court's reasoned conclusion, there was no error. 20 Affirmed.