Opinion ID: 844238
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prejudgment

Text: Although the record amply demonstrates that during deliberations Juror No. 11 did say words to the effect that, When the prosecution rested, she didn't have a case, the precise meaning of his statement is not entirely clear. The court interpreted it to mean that Juror No. 11 had, in effect, prejudged the case by deciding to vote not guilty before hearing defense and rebuttal evidence, closing argument, jury instructions, and the views of his fellow jurors. In Grobeson v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 778 [118 Cal.Rptr.3d 798] ( Grobeson ), the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of a motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. There was evidence that, in the middle of the trial, one juror told another, `I made up my mind already. I'm not going to listen to the rest of the stupid argument.' ( Id. at p. 784.) In a posttrial declaration the juror denied making the statement, and instead claimed she had made up her mind only during deliberations. ( Ibid. ) In evaluating the juror's credibility, the trial court concluded that during trial the juror did make the statement that she had made up her mind and would not continue to listen. [10] The Court of Appeal concluded the juror's prejudgment was serious misconduct. Her midtrial remark required neither interpretation nor the drawing of inferences. It [was] a flat, unadorned statement that this juror prejudged the case long before deliberations began and while a great deal more evidence had yet to be admitted. ( Grobeson, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 794.) Grobeson involved misconduct committed while evidence was still being presented. [11] This case is different. Juror No. 11's statement was made during deliberations, and only made reference to his previous state of mind at a single point during the trial. It did not indicate an intention to ignore the rest of the proceedings. The Attorney General has cited no case, and we have found none, in which a juror was discharged for prejudgment based solely on comments made during deliberations. (5) Unlike the juror in Grobeson, Juror No. 11's comment, however phrased, was subject to some interpretation. His remark was not an unadorned statement that he had conclusively prejudged the case. It did not establish that he had ignored further evidence, argument, instructions, or the views of other jurors. Although section 1122 requires jurors not to form an opinion about the case until it has been submitted to them, it would be entirely unrealistic to expect jurors not to think about the case during the trial. . . . ( People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 729 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657] ( Ledesma ).) A juror who holds a preliminary view that a party's case is weak does not violate the court's instructions so long as his or her mind remains open to a fair consideration of the evidence, instructions, and shared opinions expressed during deliberations. Juror No. 11's statement that the prosecutor had failed to prove her case was made at some point during deliberations, not during the presentation of evidence or even at the outset of the deliberations. [12] The record does not demonstrate that Juror No. 11 refused to listen to all of the evidence, began deliberations with a closed mind, or declined to deliberate. Indeed, other evidence indicates the contrary. Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at pages 836 to 841, is instructive. There, we vacated a penalty judgment for the improper discharge of a juror. The trial court gave several reasons for the action, including alleged prejudgment of the penalty phase. The trial court relied on two statements the juror made during the presentation of guilt phase evidence: `How can you hold someone responsible for their actions?' and `This is what you expect when you have no authority figure, this type of behavior.' ( Id. at p. 837.) In vacating the penalty judgment, we concluded this evidence did not establish a demonstrable reality that the juror prejudged the penalty question, given that he participated in the guilt phase deliberations, voted to convict, joined in an initial vote to impose the death penalty, and then changed his vote only after two other jurors did the same. ( Id. at pp. 840-841.) Here, although Juror No. 11 appeared to have held a strong opinion about the prosecutor's case, he was participating in jury discussions. He voted undecided on the fifth day of deliberations, just before the court interviewed the jurors. No juror testified Juror No. 11 expressed doubt as to the prosecutor's case during the presentation of evidence, and there was no indication that he stopped paying attention after the prosecutor rested. Juror No. 11's conduct during deliberations may have annoyed other jurors, but that is not dispositive evidence that he had prejudged the case. (6) This case is different from Lomax, where the juror refused to deliberate. Juror No. 11 was participating in the deliberative process: Other jurors confirmed that Juror No. 11 commented, sometimes assertively, on the views of other panel members and gave his opinion of what the evidence showed. Jurors are supposed to share their own evaluations of the credibility of witnesses and the strength of the evidence. That a given juror may reach a different conclusion on these questions from those espoused by other jurors, or may do so forcefully, is not necessarily evidence of prejudgment or a failure to deliberate. Juror No. 11's undecided vote and participation in deliberations were consistent with his representation to both the foreperson and the court that he had not made up his mind before deliberations began. The court here, however, implicitly rejected his denials of prejudging the case. Yet, the court made no findings that his undecided vote and participation were somehow a sham or lacking in good faith. Moreover, the court did not ask Juror No. 11 what he meant by his statement. Nor did it attempt to resolve the matter with curative instructions. The court's approach to resolving the issue was also deficient. Based on Juror No. 11's statement about the prosecutor's case, the court concluded that he had his mind made up. In doing so, the court relied on the opinions of a large number of jurors including the foreperson who, the court noted, had given the question great thought. It is true that two jurors explicitly said that Juror No. 11 made the statement that the prosecutor had not made her case. Two others reported that he had said his mind was made up before deliberations began. However, the court's finding that Juror No. 11 made it relatively clear to a majority of the jurors here that he . . . had his mind made up at the time . . . before the matter had been submitted to the jury is inconsistent with this record. (7) The reality that a juror may hold an opinion at the outset of deliberations is, as we have noted (see Ledesma, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 729-730), reflective of human nature. It is certainly not unheard of that a foreperson may actually take a vote as deliberations begin to acquire an early sense of how jurors are leaning. We cannot reasonably expect a juror to enter deliberations as a tabula rasa, only allowed to form ideas as conversations continue. What we can, and do, require is that each juror maintain an open mind, consider all the evidence, and subject any preliminary opinion to rational and collegial scrutiny before coming to a final determination. We specifically note further that a trial court should be wary of relying on the opinions of jurors, rather than on its own consideration of objective facts. Under Evidence Code section 1150, for example, a court cannot consider evidence of a juror's subjective reasoning process in deciding whether to grant a new trial based on purported juror misconduct. (See, e.g., People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1261 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225] ( Steele ).) Although this case is not governed by Evidence Code section 1150, its underlying policy provides guidance: In deciding whether to discharge a juror for misconduct, a court should focus on its own consideration of a juror's conduct. The court cannot substitute the opinions of jurors for its own findings of fact. (8) In making its findings, the court here appropriately relied on the jurors' recitation of what Juror No. 11 had said. And a reviewing court defers to the factual determinations the trial court makes when assessing the credibility of the jurors, who may offer conflicting accounts. (E.g., Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) That Juror No. 11 made the comment was not disputed, nor was there a significant dispute about his attitude during deliberations. The jurors' opinions, however, about Juror No.'s 11 comment should not have played a role in the court's ruling. Great tension may arise when a group of people are asked to make an important decision and views vary. While some jurors may be understandably impatient that another will not adopt their view and abandon his or her own, the mere failure to change a vote is not necessarily misconduct. Certainly, a court may not discharge a juror merely because he or she harbors doubts about the prosecution's case. (E.g., Cleveland, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 483.) That Juror No. 11 was unimpressed by the strength of the evidence and unpersuaded by his colleagues' assertions during deliberations does not amount to prejudgment. To conclude otherwise would threaten the ability of jurors to express minority viewpoints during deliberations and undermine the principle that both parties are entitled to the independent judgment of each individual juror. (CALJIC No. 17.40; CALCRIM No. 3550.) (9) In light of his undecided vote and participation in the deliberative process, Juror No. 11's middeliberation statement about the prosecutor's case, even when coupled with his expression of strong views during deliberations, does not establish prejudgment to a demonstrable reality. The court abused its discretion by discharging him on that basis.