Opinion ID: 2639312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Definition of Person

Text: The City next asserts that RCW 49.48.030 allows recovery of attorney fees only to a natural person and not a union. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 14-15. This was the primary challenge made by the City to the trial court and the Court of Appeals. First, the City argues that construing the chapter as a whole, it is clear that person could only mean a natural person because RCW 49.48.020 separates person from a firm or corporation. Br. of Resp't (Court of Appeals) at 17. Thus, the City argues, if person is interpreted to include unions, it would render the use of the terms firm and corporation meaningless. Id. (citing City of Seattle v. State, 136 Wash.2d 693, 698, 965 P.2d 619 (1998)) ([s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect). However, the City fails to recognize that the term person as used in the two statutes refers to different entities. The terms person, firm, and corporation in RCW 49.48.020 describe various types of employers [12] not employees as the term person is used in RCW 49.48.030. Thus, the terms firm and corporation are not rendered superfluous by including union under the term person in RCW 49.48.030. Furthermore, Local 46 was acting in a representative capacity when it brought the arbitration action on behalf of Rider and Key. Under the parties' CBA, Local 46 was the only party that could file a grievance for violations of the CBA. This is a common practice in labor contracts. It would be counterintuitive to limit the recovery of attorney fees to only those employees who bring an action on their own behalf when they would never be allowed to bring such an action independent of their union. Finally, we have previously held that an award of attorney fees to employees who successfully recover wages or salary owed should not be reduced by the amount contributed to the employees by their union. Hume, 124 Wash.2d at 673, 880 P.2d 988. We find no difference in awarding attorney fees to employees who then give the fees to their union, which supported the litigation and awarding the fees directly to the union. Second, the City relies on the language in the statute, which states, a `person ... successful in recovering wages or salary owed to him. ' Br. of Resp't (Court of Appeals) at 18-19. The City argues that because the wages were not owed to Local 46, it should not be entitled to attorney fees. Id. The City's position is unpersuasive in light of the liberal construction of RCW 49.48.030 and the nature of union representation of employees in grievance matters. We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that where a union is the exclusive entity under its collective bargaining agreement entitled to bring an employment grievance, the statute should be construed to allow payment of attorney fees to a union because the union is acting as an agent for the employees in collecting wages owed. See Fire Fighters, 101 Wash.App. at 747, 6 P.3d 50. See, c.f., Dep't of Labor & Indus. v. Overnite Transp. Co., 67 Wash.App. 24, 39-40, 834 P.2d 638 (1992) (holding that Department of Labor and Industries was entitled to attorney fees under RCW 49.52.070 for successfully recovering overtime compensation for injured employees under Washington's Minimum Wage Act, chapter 49.46 RCW), review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1030, 847 P.2d 481 (1993). Because the union controls access to the grievance system, the purpose of the statuteto encourage employees to vindicate their rights to wagesis furthered by reimbursing unions for attorney fees they incur in bringing these actions. Permitting a union to recover attorney fees for bringing successful arbitration proceedings also furthers the union's ability to bring future wages claims on behalf of its members. Thus, we hold that the term person in RCW 49.48.030 necessarily includes unions that bring actions on behalf of their members.