Opinion ID: 884934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay testimony of Kenneth.

Text: ¶ 22 Officer Watson testified: He [Kenneth Berosik] told me that he didn't want us to be able to identify him because he knew that his brother had already used his name as his own, and if we found out who he really was, we'd realize that he was going to get another D.U.I., and one more would not be good for him. ¶ 23 Berosik contends that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony and that the testimony violated the District Court's grant of his motion in limine. Berosik appears to argue that the motion in limine barred the admission of any prior crime, that Kenneth's testimony was proof of another crime, and that it violated Rule 404(b). ¶ 24 The State responds that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Officer Watson's testimony. The State argues that Officer Watson's testimony rebutted Berosik's claim that he was not worried about a DUI and that the testimony was admissible to show Berosik's consciousness of guilt. ¶ 25 We conclude that Officer Watson's testimony did not violate the motion in limine. The testimony regarding another DUI did not specifically reference the alleged April, 1997 DUI. Moreover, Berosik is mistaken in his contention that the District Court's grant of his motion in limine barred the admission of prior crime evidence for any purpose. As previously discussed, Berosik's motion in limine requested that no mention be made at trial of the alleged April, 1997 DUI incident. In granting the motion in limine, the District Court concluded that whether Berosik had used his brother's name when he was arrested in April, 1997 doesn't make it more probable that that's what he was doing this time and that his alleged prior use of his brother's name had only very marginal relevance. The District Court determined that the State could not use the alleged April, 1997 DUI incident to show that Berosik had previously used his brother's name. ¶ 26 We note that Berosik's counsel then asked, I take it, then, our intent is we will not talk about priors in any fashion? The District Court responded, that's my impression. However, the record reveals that Berosik's counsel again attempted to articulate the District Court's ruling, stating just so we understand the general philosophy is `we'll try it with a misdemeanor DUI with no prior.' The State agreed but pointed out that Berosik could not try to `BS' the jury with purity. The District Court then commented that if Berosik opened the door to prior crimes evidence, the District Court expected that the State would first talk with Berosik's counsel and the District Court. Thus, Berosik's contention that the motion in limine barred mention of prior crimes for any purpose is not plausible. The record clearly establishes that the parties contemplated circumstances in which prior crimes could be admitted, that the District Court explained the specific grounds on which it had granted the motion in limine, and that Berosik's motion in limine addressed only the alleged April, 1997 DUI. ¶ 27 We hold that Officer Watson's testimony was properly admitted for the distinct purpose of showing Berosik's consciousness of guilt. Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. does not apply to evidence of consciousness of guilt. We have previously concluded: It should be first noted that the admissibility test and the procedural requirements of State v. Just [ (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957 ] do not apply to evidence establishing consciousness of guilt regarding the crime with which the defendant is charged. We have said numerous times that testimony showing or tending to show flight or concealment by the defendant may be taken into consideration by a jury in determining whether the defendant is guilty of the offense charged.... The evidence is relevant because it tends to show consciousness of guilt and therefore tends to prove the commission of the crime charged and the defendant's responsibility for it. Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid., as to other crimes, does not apply. State v. Moore (1992), 254 Mont. 241, 245, 836 P.2d 604, 607. In the present case, Officer Watson's testimony tended to show Berosik's consciousness of his guilt and thus tended to prove his commission of the crime with which he was charged. Moreover, we conclude that Berosik was not prejudiced by Officer Watson's testimony because of the previously discussed overwhelming independent evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that he was guilty. ¶ 28 Finally, we consider whether the District Court erred in denying Berosik's motion for a mistrial. We review a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial to determine whether the district court abused its discretion. See State v. Partin (1997), 287 Mont. 12, 17-18, 951 P.2d 1002, 1005. The Court in Partin determined that [t]he general rule is that, where there is a reasonable possibility that inadmissible evidence might have contributed to the conviction, a mistrial is appropriate. Partin, 287 Mont. at 18, 951 P.2d at 1005. ¶ 29 In the present case, we need only consider whether the District Court's admission of the HGN and breathalyzer evidence denied Berosik a fair and impartial trial. Partin, 287 Mont. at 16, 951 P.2d at 1004. Berosik's other grounds for a mistrial are without merit: as previously discussed, Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid. does not apply to Officer Watson's statement and Berosik failed to preserve his objection to the State's questions about the penalties for DUIs. ¶ 30 We must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence of Berosik's April, 1997 HGN and breathalyzer test results contributed to Berosik's conviction. See Partin, 287 Mont. at 18, 951 P.2d at 1005 (concluding where there is a reasonable possibility that inadmissible evidence might have contributed to the conviction, a mistrial is appropriate). As previously discussed, there was overwhelming independent evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Berosik was guilty. Compare Partin, 287 Mont. at 21, 951 P.2d at 1007(concluding evidence against Partin was weak and conflicting[:] ... the stronger the evidence against the defendant, the less likely it is that a reference to other charges or a prior arrest will have a prejudicial effect). In light of the overwhelming independent evidence of Berosik's guilt, we conclude that there is not a reasonable possibility that the admission of the HGN and breathalyzer evidence contributed to Berosik's conviction. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Berosik's motion for a mistrial. ¶ 31 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in admitting a police booking form. ¶ 32 Berosik argues that the booking form prepared by Sergeant Anderson was double hearsay. Berosik argues further that the booking form is an investigative report that falls outside the exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(8), M.R.Evid., [1] that the booking form met no exception to the hearsay rule, and that admission of the booking form was unnecessary because Sergeant Anderson was available to testify. Berosik cites this Court's decision in State v. Zackuse (1992), 253 Mont. 305, 833 P.2d 143. ¶ 33 The State responds that the booking form was not double hearsay and that it was admissible as the recorded present sense impressions of Sergeant Anderson. The State argues further that even if the District Court erred in admitting the booking form, the error was harmless because the booking form was merely cumulative of other witness' testimony. ¶ 34 The District Court admitted the booking form as a recorded present sense impression under Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid. Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid., provides: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid. ¶ 35 In City of Helena v. Hoy (1991), 248 Mont. 128, 809 P.2d 1255, a police officer took handwritten notes on a printout card, recording the calibration and results of a breathalyzer test. The Court in Hoy determined that the officer's testimony regarding her handwritten notes was admissible as a present sense impression, concluding that [t]he numbers Officer Badger recorded on the printout card were a written assertion describing a condition, namely appellant's blood alcohol content results, made at the time she was perceiving the event or condition. Hoy, 248 Mont. at 131, 809 P.2d at 1257. ¶ 36 We note in the present case that the booking form was not double hearsay; it is not a combined statement or hearsay within hearsay but rather a form with Sergeant Anderson's observations of Berosik. Further, Berosik's reliance on Zackuse is simply misplaced. In Zackuse, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a State Crime Lab Form as evidence of [the investigating officer's] receipt of the drug evidence from the State Crime Lab. Zackuse, 253 Mont. at 309, 833 P.2d at 145. ¶ 37 In the present case, the record establishes that Sergeant Anderson's notes on the booking form were based on her personal observations of Berosik. The record appears to indicate and Berosik does not dispute that Sergeant Anderson recorded her observations while she observed Berosik or immediately thereafter. Rule 803(1), M.R.Evid. Moreover, when the State moved to admit the booking form, Sergeant Anderson had already testified about Berosik's condition when she observed him: Q. Do you remember what your impression was of [Berosik's] condition? A. Yeah. My impression was he was intoxicated. Following the District Court's admission of the booking form, Berosik conducted a full cross-examination of Sergeant Anderson. We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the booking form as a recorded present sense impression. Because this holding is dispositive, we do not address Berosik's other objections to the admission of the booking form. ¶ 38 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, JAMES C. NELSON, WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR. and JIM REGNIER, JJ., concur.