Opinion ID: 2161601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Separate Trials as to Counts

Text: Grandison also asserts that the charges of conspiracy and handgun violation were improperly tried in Somerset County in conjunction with the murder charges. Appellant was charged in a four count indictment with the murders of Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy, conspiracy to murder Scott and Cheryl Piechowicz, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. He sought removal of the case for trial without reference to counts. Subsequently, he moved to separate the trial of the conspiracy count from the trial of all other counts. Appellant argued that he intended to take the witness stand in his own defense with respect to the conspiracy charge but wished to remain silent with respect to the murder charges. After the proceedings were removed to Somerset County, the motion for separate trials was denied. We perceive no error in the denial of appellant's motion. It is uncontroverted that the decision as to whether to grant a severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Stevenson v. State, 43 Md. App. 120, 130, 403 A.2d 812, 818 (1979), aff'd, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980); State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232, 238, 395 A.2d 1182, 1185 (1979). The trial court, in exercising its discretion, is required to balance the likely prejudice to the accused against the possible effects on economy and efficiency in judicial administration. McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604, 609-10, 375 A.2d 551, 555 (1977). Moreover, we note that in considering a charge of conspiracy, the overt acts of the conspirators in the commission of the crime are clearly relevant and material to the proof of the conspiracy. See Jones v. State, 8 Md. App. 370, 379-80, 259 A.2d 807, 813 (1969); Hill v. State, 231 Md. 458, 461, 190 A.2d 795, 796 (1963). It follows that in the case at bar, evidence of the homicides and surrounding circumstances is relevant and material to the conspiracy which in the first instance contemplated and directed their commission. The homicides at issue here are clearly related to the conspiracy. [4] Additionally, absent authority to the contrary, it would be foolhardy and purposeless to require as of right two trials  one for a crime committed and one for conspiracy to commit the same crime. Green v. State, 25 Md. App. 679, 686, 337 A.2d 729, 733 (1975). At trial, appellant offered no authority or compelling justification for a finding that a severance was warranted. Only the following took place at the February 27, 1984 hearing, in pertinent part: THE COURT: Three. Motion for Separate Trials under Counts 1, 2 and 4. I guess what you're saying, you're asking that Counts 1, 2 and 4 be tried and that Count 3 be tried separately. Counts 1 and 2 are murder, first degree murder, and 4 is a handgun violation, and 3 is conspiracy. What you're saying is that the charges be severed and that we have two separate trials. All right. I'm ready to hear from you on that. You want to be heard on that, sir? MR. GRANDISON: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right, sir. MR. GRANDISON: The position on this motion is that counts should be severed because I intend to take the stand as to Count 3, but not as to Counts 1 and 2, which the State is seeking the death penalty. My position is that if cases are tried jointly, if I take the stand, then I would be subject to being cross-examined as to any prior conviction that I may have. I feel that this might be very prejudicial to me as to those two counts which the State is seeking the death penalty. THE COURT: Are you saying that the reason those counts should be separate is because  did I understand you to say in Counts 1 and 2 you don't want to take the stand, but on Count 4 you do? MR. GRANDISON: Count 3 is the conspiracy offense. I intend to take the stand and testify, offer testimony. THE COURT: I see. MR. GRANDISON: But as to Count 1 and 2, I do not wish to testify. THE COURT: All right. And because of that, you think the cases should be separated, that the counts should be separated. Is that the only reason? MR. GRANDISON: That's not the only reason. I have additional reasons in my memorandum. THE COURT: What are they? MR. GRANDISON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I have no additional reason other than what I stated.       MR. GRANDISON: The conspiracy offense in this case is a distinct offense from the substantive offense which is first degree murder charges. I don't believe it to be true that evidence that would be admissible in the conspiracy count would be admissible as well in the first degree murder case. I have no authority rightly before me to support that position. I think this is  the law is clear on that as well as the rules, that evidence may be admissible in a conspiracy, but not be admissible to substantive offense. I think that I am entitled to a separate trial on these two counts, especially in light of the fact that I have presented to the Court that I wish to take the stand as to the conspiracy and not as to the first degree murder counts. This is not no ordinary run-of-the-mill case. The State is seeking the death penalty on first count of the indictment, the first two counts of the indictment. I think the situation would be different from any other case and I think that I'm entitled to a separate trial on these counts, and I submit.       MR. GRANDISON: Your Honor, offer one additional thing. To force me into a trial of Count 3 along with the first two counts in the indictment would be a  put me in the position where I would have to offer defense for my alleged co-defendant as well, where I wouldn't be in that position if I was being tried separate for both counts. But being as the conspiracy count, the State would allege different things as act or allegedly committed by three co-defendants which would force me in a position to have to defend the act allegedly committed by them which I think would be very prejudicial and no way could I receive a fair trial being tried in all these counts together. We are unable to find any authority for the proposition that a trial court is required to grant a motion for separate trials as a matter of right to a criminal defendant upon an allegation by that defendant that he wishes to testify on less than all counts charged against him. In this case, Grandison has done little more than express a generalized desire to testify as to some counts but not others. He has not indicated what he would or would not have testified to and whether such testimony would have been of any particular importance. We are thus unable to conclude that appellant has demonstrated compelling prejudice resulting from denial of the motion for separate trials when we have been given no indication that testimony to be offered or withheld by appellant had any value. See McKnight, 280 Md. at 609-10, 375 A.2d 551. Therefore, we conclude that Grandison's bare allegation proffered in support of his motion, with nothing more, under the record before us is no basis for mandating a severance of trial. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 648-49 (11th Cir.1984). It follows, then, that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying appellant's motion for separate trials. Considering the allegation that the conspiracy and handgun counts were improperly removed along with the murder counts from Baltimore County in the first instance, we conclude this argument to be without merit. As Judge Simpkins correctly noted at trial, You remove the whole case, not parts of it. More particularly, former Md. Rule 744 [5] speaks in terms of transferral of the case or case file. Further, in Stevenson v. State, 9 Md. App. 152, 263 A.2d 36 (1970), the Court of Special Appeals held that [E]ven though [an] indictment contains other counts which charge offenses which are not punishable by death, those offenses are carried along with the removal of the offense that is or may be punishable by death, and are also removed for trial. Id. at 162, 263 A.2d at 41. Finally, we note that appellant's initial motion did not express the intent to remove only the murder counts from Baltimore County. Indeed, appellant's Motion and Affidavit for Removal of Trial filed in this case demanded a removal of appellant's trial. As we have stated herein, it was proper for appellant's entire trial, encompassing all counts which were enumerated in the Baltimore County Grand Jury Indictment to be removed pursuant to former Md.Rule 744. Therefore, in light of the plain language enunciated in former Md.Rule 744 and Stevenson, 9 Md. App. 152, 263 A.2d 36, we hold that the trial court did not err in transferring the entire proceeding to Somerset County.