Opinion ID: 2586624
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Deadline for Beginning Trial Is Directory

Text: In Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th 216, the defendant was tried for falsely imprisoning a child, found not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed to a state hospital. In a proceeding to extend his commitment, the statutory deadlines for filing the extension petition and commencing trial were not met. The defendant contended the trial court thereby lost jurisdiction to try the case because the deadlines were mandatory. We rejected this contention, concluding the deadlines were directory. ( Id. at pp. 224-228.) (2) One of the grounds for our conclusion was that section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(2) expressly states the time limits set out in that section are not jurisdictional. The statute setting out the time limit for commencing an MDO recommitment trial does not have a similar disclaimer. (See § 2972.) However, this difference does not necessarily indicate the Legislature intended this deadline to be mandatory. Unless the Legislature clearly expresses a contrary intent, time limits are typically deemed directory. ( Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 225; People v. Allen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 91, 101-102 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 124, 164 P.3d 557] ( Allen ).) (3) Moreover, the other factors we relied upon in Lara to conclude the Legislature intended the NGI time limits to be directory are also present here. The Legislature's failure to include a penalty or consequence for noncompliance with the NGI statute's time limit indicates that the requirement is directory rather than mandatory. ( Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 227; California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1145 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 693, 899 P.2d 79]; Edwards v. Steele (1979) 25 Cal.3d 406, 410 [158 Cal.Rptr. 662, 599 P.2d 1365].) Like the parallel provision governing NGI recommitment proceedings, section 2972 contains no indication that an MDO extension trial may not take place if the 30-day deadline is not satisfied. Indeed, the statute itself provides that its time limit is not binding if good cause is shown for not having met it, or if the defendant waives time. (See Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 227.) Finally, the purposes of the MDO recommitment procedure would be defeated by holding the time limit mandatory. As we said in Lara regarding the NGI recommitment procedure: Holding it to be mandatory would mean that a court, faced with a filing deadline missed for good cause, would be powerless to extend treatment under the statute no matter how great the defendant's need or the danger release might pose to the public. Such an interpretation would run counter to the very purposes of the NGI statutes and the provision for extension of commitment. It would elevate the secondary benefit to the defendant derived from the time limit over the fundamental purposes of the NGI provisions, to ensure that needed treatment is provided and the public protected. (Cf. [ People v. ] Williams [(1999)] 77 Cal.App.4th [436,] 451 [92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1] [construing the time limit provisions of the Mentally Disordered Prisoners Act].) [Fn. omitted.] ( Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 228.)