Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Illness of Pedophilia

Text: Along these same lines, the district court insisted on describing Irey as suffering from the illness of pedophilia, while the two defense experts described it as a treatable disorder. [27] The district court found that because he suffered from pedophilia: Mr. Irey's acts that bring him here today, I think it's safe to say, were not purely volitional. I think they were due in substantial part to a recognized illness. And while it does not excuse his conduct and he will be held accountable for it, I think it would be inappropriate to ignore that fact. The record does not support the district court's finding that because he is a pedophile Irey could not much help raping, sodomizing, and sexually torturing little children, posing them as trophies, and smiling while he did it. The record actually contradicts that finding. Dr. Berlin reported: Although it is not his fault that he has the disorder [of pedophilia], it is his responsibility to do something about it. It could not be Irey's responsibility to do something about his pedophilia if he lacked the volitional capacity to do something about it. One is responsible for doing something only if one has the ability to do something about it. Both experts agreed that pedophilia was treatable. What Irey could have done about his pedophilia is seek treatment for it. He never once sought treatment for his pedophilia, which was part of what he described as his terrible dark side, during the four or five years he was sexually abusing little children many many times. Like most criminals, Irey stopped only when he got caught. Not only that, but as Dr. Berlin noted, [e]ven without treatment, in the past, [Irey] had been able to refrain from any sexual contact with children within the United States. The undisputed fact is that Irey was perfectly capable of not sexually abusing children where the risk of detection and punishment was high, which is why he consciously chose to commit his crimes against children halfway around the globe in a third world country where there was little or no risk from law enforcement. Irey's self-restraint when it was in his own best interest not to indulge his lust for children proves that his volition was not impaired to any extent worthy of weight in sentencing. During the sentence hearing, the district court asked Dr. Shaw: is a person who acts out as a result of this condition acting totally of rational free will or is that person acting out as a result of something that is in essence an illness that he at that point has no control over? Dr. Shaw refused to endorse the court's pedophiles-can't-much-help-it theory. Instead, he gave his expert opinion that while pedophilia is not curable, it is treatable and pedophiles can and many do avoid molesting children. Dr. Shaw stressed that Pedophilia is very treatable, and there are many pedophiles in the community who are doing just fine and managing their behavior. He later reiterated that there are thousands of pedophiles and child molesters, different, out there, ... who aren't re-offending, who are in recovery and are doing just fine. The many pedophiles in the community could not be doing just fine and the thousands of pedophiles ... out there could not be avoiding commission of offenses if, as the district court believed, the illness of pedophilia rendered the criminal acts of those who molest children not entirely volitional. See generally Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 505, 524 (1998) (People diagnosed with pedophilia do not molest children in the presence of police officers or in other situations presenting a high likelihood of apprehension. Rather, they act with stealth, deception, and premeditation in an effort to avoid detection. This is purposeful, planned, and goal-directed conduct, not spontaneous and uncontrollable action or action that is substantially beyond the individual's ability to avoid.); id. at 523-24 (There is nothing in the diagnostic criteria for pedophilia or any of the other paraphilias that suggests that individuals diagnosed with these disorders suffer from any cognitive impairment that affects their ability to understand the wrongfulness of their conduct or that renders them irrational in any respect or unable to control their actions.... Moreover, there is nothing in the clinical literature that suggests that sex offenders are unable to exercise self-control.). The district court refused to acknowledge the line that both of the defense experts drew between pedophilia and child molestationa line, as the AUSA argued, that is similar to the one between alcoholism and driving under the influence. Dr. Shaw attempted to explain to the court metaphorically the difference between having the urge and acting on the urge: Pedophiles are capable of not re-offending, even if they have an urge, in the same way that compulsive dessert eaters can choose to not eat dessert. The district court did not heed the metaphor or the experts' reports or the testimony of Dr. Shaw, but instead reasoned that because pedophiles have the urge they have diminished volition when it comes to resisting the urge. We would recognize this finding as clear error if the government had argued the point to us. Since it did not, we will accept as a fact, for this case only, the erroneous finding that when pedophiles molest children they are not acting in a purely volitional way but instead their crimes are due in substantial part to their pedophilia. [28] That finding, which we assume correct for this case, is relevant to the § 3553(a)(1) factor concerning the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. But the assumed fact cannot reasonably carry much weight. Not purely volitional does not mean not volitional, and due in substantial part does not mean due, period. The district court did not find that Irey could not help committing the crimes, that he committed many many times over a period of four or five years. Perhaps the reason the court stopped short of finding Irey could not help it at all is that Irey obviously did help it when doing so suited his purpose of not getting caught. While in this country Irey refrained from committing any crimes against children, never once touching an American child in an inappropriate way, and instead consorted with adult prostitutes. It was while in Cambodia, where he could get away with sexually violating children, that he did it so many many times. And he acted with cunning. As Judge Hill put it: I also disagree with the apparent weighty consideration that the sentencing judge gave to the notion that this defendant acted on account of some type of sickness. The defendant acted deliberately, cunningly and with obvious delight. He ruined the lives of at least forty-three children (that we know of) and then published his triumphs on the internet for all the world to see, complete with scurrilous black marker writings tattooed on the nine-year-old girls' skin. Irey, 563 F.3d at 1227 (Hill, J., concurring). Moreover, the history and characteristics of the defendant component of the § 3553(a)(1) factor is aimed at distinguishing among defendants who commit a particular offense or type of offense. The theory of the district court's finding, however, is one of non-distinction because it applies to virtually everyone who commits this type of crime. According to the district court's theory, pedophilesnot Irey in particular but pedophiles in general share the characteristic of having impaired volition when it comes to sexually abusing children. They all have what the district court insisted on calling the illness of pedophilia. If the sexual molestation of children by pedophiles is not entirely volitional, as the district court found and as we are assuming, then most sexual abuse of children is not entirely volitional, because most of it is done by pedophiles. See Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 Mayo Clinic Proc. 457, 458 (2007) (An estimated 88% of child molesters and 95% of molestations (one person, multiple acts) are committed by individuals who now or in the future will also meet criteria for pedophilia. Pedophilic child molesters on average commit 10 times more sexual acts against children than nonpedophilic child molesters. (footnotes omitted)). This point is important because it matters whether the reason for the variance is a fact that takes the present case outside the heartland of cases covered by the individual guideline. The Supreme Court instructed us in Kimbrough that decisions to vary may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case outside the heartland to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109, 128 S.Ct. at 574-75 (quotation marks omitted); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 351, 127 S.Ct. at 2465 (the guidelines themselves foresee that they are not to apply to cases outside the heartland of cases). The Court stated that, by contrast, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge's view that the Guidelines range fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations even in a mine-run case. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109, 128 S.Ct. at 575; see also Spears, 129 S.Ct. at 843 ([ Kimbrough 's] implication was that an `inside the heartland' departure (which is necessarily based on a policy disagreement with the Guidelines and necessarily disagrees on a `categorical basis') may be entitled to less respect.). The district court's reliance on the theory that pedophiles have reduced volition, applying as it does to virtually all crimes involving sexual abuse of children, does not take this case outside the heartland to which the Commission intended the guidelines relating to sexual offenses against children to apply. Instead, the pedophiles-are-ill variance is more properly seen as a variance based on the judge's view that the guidelines range for crimes involving the sexual abuse of children does not properly reflect § 3553(a) factors even in mine-run cases, i.e., in the vast majority of cases. For that reason, as Kimbrough teaches, the decision is not entitled to the greatest respect but instead should be subject to closer review. Exercising that closer review, we reject as unreasonable and a clear error in judgment the district court's view that the guidelines involving sex crimes against children are too harsh in a mine-run case because pedophiles have impaired volition. The reasons should be apparent but, if not, we refer the reader to our upcoming discussion about the devastating and permanent harm that this type of crime inflicts on its young victims. See infra at 1206-08 see also Garcia v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 463, 471-72 (5th Cir.2006) (capital case) (The second error in Garcia's argument is the suggestion that pedophilia may be considered `mitigating' of a defendant's moral culpability. No case has so held.... There is no sense in which reasonable people could view Garcia's pedophilia as morally mitigating of guilt, any more than reasonable people would find a defendant's uncontrollable compulsion to commit incest or eat human flesh `mitigating.'), vacated on other grounds, 257 Fed.Appx. 717 (5th Cir. 2007).