Opinion ID: 158148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Dawn’s Testimony

Text: Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by allowing Ms. Melissa Dawn to testify in two respects. First, Ms. Dawn testified that many people visited Defendant at the trailer which she shared with him for a period of 2 Because we conclude that the court did not violate Rule 602, we need not reach Defendant’s Sixth Amendment argument. -17- time preceding the March 11, 1996 incident in this case. She stated that a lot of people were “coming and going through the house” causing “high traffic.” Id., Vol. 5 at 192. Defendant seems to argue that this testimony was irrelevant because it was not in accordance with either the Government’s proffer concerning “high traffic” testimony or Captain Homman’s expert testimony that the residence’s “high traffic” suggested that drugs were sold there. Defendant also claims that the irrelevance of Ms. Dawn’s testimony renders Captain Homman’s “high traffic” testimony irrelevant. We agree with the district court that Ms. Dawn’s testimony was consistent with the Government’s pretrial proffer. The Government proffered that Ms. Dawn would testify that “a steady stream of visitors” came to the residence she shared with Defendant, id., Vol. 1, Doc. 60 at 3, and that they would go into Defendant’s bedroom, close the door, and stay for a short time before they left. The Government also indicated that Ms. Dawn would testify that she feared Defendant was involved in illegal drug trafficking activities and that she reported this to the Salina Police Department. Although her testimony was somewhat obscured on cross-examination, Ms. Dawn definitively stated that she went to the police station on the same day that she heard about the incident at the Midas shop from Mr. Mixon and that she reported to the police that she was nervous about the high level of traffic at her house because she was on probation, had an infant, and -18- did not want to get into trouble. This evidence is relevant to and probative of whether Defendant knowingly and intentionally sold cocaine. Additionally, Ms. Dawn’s “high traffic” testimony is made more relevant by the expert testimony of Captains Homman and Marshall, both of whom stated that an abnormal amount of traffic, i.e., several visits to a house every day and night, is indicative of drug dealing. Finally, although Ms. Dawn testified that some of Defendant’s visitors stayed for long periods of time, she also testified that the visitors would come and go, which is consistent with the officers’ testimony and the Government’s proffer. In light of the strong record on this point, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Ms. Dawn’s “high traffic” testimony, and we therefore reject Defendant’s claim that Captain Homman’s testimony was irrelevant. Second, Defendant objects to Ms. Dawn’s testimony that she kicked Defendant out of the trailer after he told her about the incident at Midas because she was concerned that “he was selling drugs again.” Id., Vol. 5 at 185. He claims that this testimony was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Initially, we examine the underlying context of this testimony to determine our standard of review. After Ms. Dawn stated that she had reason to suspect that Defendant was doing something illegal and wanted him out of her house, the prosecutor asked her, “What is it that he was doing that made you think he might -19- be doing something illegal?” Id. She replied that she thought “[t]hat he was selling drugs again.” Id. Responding to a question asking her the basis of that belief, Ms. Dawn then stated that Defendant “had been in prison for [selling drugs] before.” Id. Before Ms. Dawn could testify as to what she had heard about Defendant selling drugs, Defendant objected that Ms. Dawn was about to testify to hearsay and that her statement that Defendant had been in prison violated Rule 404(b) because it suggested that Defendant had a prior conviction. See id. at 186. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to completely disregard Ms. Dawn’s statement that Defendant had been in prison for selling drugs. See id. at 189. Because Defendant’s objection came after the “in prison” statement, it is not clear at first blush that Defendant contemporaneously objected to Ms. Dawn’s statement about Defendant “selling drugs again.” However, we think that the colloquy between the court and defense counsel pertained not only to the “in prison” statement and subsequent objection but also to Ms. Dawn’s prior statement about “selling drugs again.” See id. at 186-88. Therefore, we think the Defendant sufficiently objected to this earlier statement, and we review the admission of this statement for an abuse of discretion. First, Defendant’s Rule 404(b) argument is off the mark. Ms. Dawn’s statement that she thought Defendant was selling drugs again does not constitute prior bad act evidence. Ms. Dawn was not testifying about something Defendant -20- had done but instead she was explaining why she no longer wanted to share her residence with Defendant. Moreover, her belief was based on her observation of numerous people coming and going from her residence while visiting Defendant. In short, she was testifying about what she was thinking when she went to the police with her concerns. Second, this testimony did not prejudice Defendant under Rule 403. Not only did Defendant vigorously question Ms. Dawn’s credibility on crossexamination by asking her about her prior convictions and by getting her to concede that “someone might conclude that [she has] a hard time telling the truth,” id. at 198, but also abundant independent evidence was presented from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendant was guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. For these reasons, we hold that the admission of Ms. Dawn’s testimony that she thought Defendant was selling drugs again was not an abuse of discretion.