Opinion ID: 470011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lanza's Claims.

Text: 16 Appellant Lanza raises three issues on appeal. He contends that there was insufficient evidence for his conviction, that the testimony by Zubok which referred to his being shown Lanza's picture at an FBI office vitiated Lanza's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that, since his voice was not on the tape recordings which were introduced into evidence, his trial should have been severed from the trial of his co-defendants. We reject each of Lanza's arguments. 17 As to the sufficiency of the evidence, in light of Zubok's testimony regarding the above-described events which he stated occurred on three separate occasions in Lanza's presence and his testimony that Lanza told Zubok that $150,000 had been given to the burglars, coupled with the references by the alleged co-conspirator, Nuzio, to Tony and my boss on the tape recordings, the jury was free to draw reasonable inferences from this evidence and make determinations as to the credibility of the various witnesses. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Losada, 674 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2945, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). It is clear that there was sufficient evidence upon which reasonable jurors could infer Lanza's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and Lanza has failed to meet the heavy burden which a convicted defendant must meet when challenging a verdict for insufficiency of evidence. United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir.1983). 18 Similarly, we are unpersuaded by Lanza's argument that Zubok's testimony about being shown a picture of Lanza at the FBI's offices unfairly prejudiced him and infringed upon his right to a presumption of innocence. Appellant relies upon United States v. Reed, 376 F.2d 226 (7th Cir.1967), to support the proposition that such references vitiate a defendant's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and, therefore, constitute prejudicial error. However, Reed presented a factual predicate which was substantially different from this case. It involved several references to mug shots; the defendant was referred to as a former [inmate] of the state prison; and there were references to defendant being met after he was released from prison. Id. at 228-29. The challenged testimony by Zubok did not suggest that the picture was selected from a collection of photographs of criminals; it merely revealed that Zubok saw the picture at FBI offices. We find no undue prejudice to Lanza where the statement contained no suggestion that he had ever committed a crime. The fact that it may have allowed an inference that Lanza had been under investigation at some point is insufficient to support appellant's contention, see, e.g., United States v. Dichiarinte, 385 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1967) (distinguishing Reed on the basis that references to prison photos are unfairly prejudicial while references to non-prison photos are not), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 1029, 19 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1968). While a cautionary instruction might have been appropriate, we note that no such instruction was requested. In sum, we find this argument to be meritless. 19 As for Lanza's motion to sever, severance of criminal co-defendants, under Rule 14 of the Fed.R.Crim.P., is within the broad discretion of the district court. 20 The defendant seeking a severance must shoulder the difficult burden of showing that the prejudice to him from joinder is sufficiently severe to outweigh the judicial economy that would be realized by avoiding lengthy multiple trials. 21 United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1149 (2d Cir.1984) (citing Losada, 674 F.2d at 171). Though Lanza's voice was not heard on the tape recordings, the testimony which placed Lanza in attendance during meetings with Zubok and with co-conspirators as well as other common evidence was before the district judge for his consideration in weighing prejudice against judicial economy. Lanza has not met his burden and the district court did not err in denying the motion for a severance.