Opinion ID: 165372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Admit Deposition Testimony

Text: 8 Garcia-Martinez's first argument is that the district court should have admitted his deposition testimony under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 and Federal Rule of Evidence 804 because he was unavailable at the time of trial. We review the district court's decision disallowing the deposition testimony for abuse of discretion, Coletti v. Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 773 (10th Cir.1999), and the district court's interpretation of the federal rules de novo. United States v. Medina-Estrada, 81 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir.1996).
9 The procedural background is important to our review of this argument. In September 2001, Garcia-Martinez gave a deposition in preparation for trial on his § 1983 claims. Later, after the completion of discovery but before trial, a magistrate judge presided over a mandatory settlement conference. According to Garcia-Martinez on appeal, while he and his counsel were alone with the magistrate judge during the conference, the judge asked Garcia-Martinez about his immigration status. When the magistrate judge discovered that Garcia-Martinez was an illegal alien, he told Garcia-Martinez that he risked being arrested and imprisoned if he showed up to trial. He recommended that Garcia-Martinez settle the case. The record also shows, however, that the magistrate judge told the defendant that the court would not do anything to precipitate Garcia-Martinez's arrest at trial. Garcia-Martinez, who was then under a standing deportation order, returned to Honduras shortly thereafter. 10 Prior to trial in January 2003, Garcia-Martinez's attorney designated and submitted portions of Garcia-Martinez's deposition testimony to the district court. Garcia-Martinez's attorney claimed this testimony should be admitted at trial under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence because Garcia-Martinez was out of the country and therefore unavailable for trial. In response, the defendants submitted a counter-designation of the deposition testimony, as well as a motion in limine opposing the admission of the deposition testimony, arguing that Garcia-Martinez was not unavailable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(3)(B) because he had procured his own absence by voluntarily leaving the country. 11 The district court heard arguments on this issue during the first day of trial. The judge concluded that the deposition was inadmissible because Garcia-Martinez procured his own unavailability. The court rejected counsel's argument that Garcia-Martinez faced the Catch 22 of choosing between staying in the United States for trial and risking imprisonment or leaving the United States and losing the opportunity to testify at trial. The court observed, I have not been presented with any authority for the proposition that there is actually no way for him to obtain a temporary visa in order to come into this country for purposes of attending this hearing. The court thus concluded that Garcia-Martinez's decision not to attend trial, even if it was for the espoused reason that he was afraid of the consequences that he might suffer for remaining in the United States illegally, [was] not near or close to justifying a determination that he [was] unavailable for the purposes of using his deposition. 12 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 and Federal Rule of Evidence 804 to these facts.
13 Deposition testimony is ordinarily inadmissible hearsay, although Rule 32(a) creates an exception to the hearsay rules. Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 962-63 (10th Cir.1993). Under Rule 32(a): 14 The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: ... (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition. ... 15 Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3) (emphasis added). The proponent of the deposition bears the burden of proving that it is admissible under Rule 32(a). Angelo, 11 F.3d at 963; see also Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 876 (6th Cir.1990) (The party seeking to admit a deposition at trial must prove that the requirements of Rule 32(a) have been met.). 16 In applying the rule, we start with its plain meaning. [T]he starting point is always the language of the [rule] itself. If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the [rule] controls. United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 669 (10th Cir.2002) (internal citation omitted). The plain meaning of procure in Rule 32(a) is to bring about or to cause to happen. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1809 (Philip Babcock Gove, ed., 2002). 17 The next question is whether a party's voluntary absence from trial fits within the plain meaning of the rule. It does not. While this circuit has yet to address a plaintiff's voluntary absence at trial in connection with a proffer of deposition testimony, other circuits and commentators have concluded that the rule requires the proponent to demonstrat[e] to the trial court that he ha[s] not procured his own absence. Fairfield 274-278 Clarendon Trust v. Dwek, 970 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir.1992) (citations omitted). See also Vevelstad v. Flynn, 230 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir.1956) (noting that since the party voluntarily left the United States, and as the trial court found, willfully absented himself, the court's refusal to consider the deposition may well have been in accordance with the provisions of the Rule.); 7 James Wm. Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 32.24[5] (3d ed.2003). Other cases hold that the mere fact a party is more than 100 miles from the courthouse does not require the district court to automatically admit a party's deposition. See Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir.1991) . Rather, the trial court may consider all the circumstances relating to the party's absence to determine whether the deposition may be used. Moore, supra; see also In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F.Supp. 1493, 1501-02 (D.Colo.1989). The preference for a witness's attendance at trial is axiomatic. When the key factual issues at trial turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witness, we prefer the finder of fact to observe live testimony of the witness. This is especially true when the witness is the plaintiff. Moore, supra. 18 All of these authorities stand for the proposition that the trial court retains significant discretion in applying Rule 32 to an absent party. In the face of these authorities, Garcia-Martinez argues that he did not procure his own absence at trial because he did not leave the country in order to benefit from his own unavailability. However, after hearing testimony from both attorneys regarding the circumstances of Garcia-Martinez's departure, the court concluded that Garcia-Martinez brought about his own absence from trial by choosing to leave the country and thus he was not eligible to invoke Rule 32(a). We agree. 19 Applying Rule 32 to the facts at hand, it is obvious that Garcia-Martinez meant to cause his own absence at trial. In response, Garcia-Martinez suggests a good faith exception to the application of the rule should apply. Even if such an exception is available, we cannot invoke it on this record. While he may have had good reasons for failing to appear at trial, it is abundantly clear from this record that Garcia-Martinez made scant effort to make other arrangements to appear temporarily for trial or to make himself available for remote testimony. In these circumstances, the proponent of the testimony — plaintiff Garcia-Martinez — procured his own absence from trial without offering evidence that he could not return to the United States or that he had no alternative means of testifying. 20 We do not establish a per se rule that any plaintiff who procures his own absence from trial is not eligible to seek refuge in Rule 32. 1 We cannot conclude here, however, that the district court abused its discretion in granting the defendants' motion in limine.
21 Federal Rule of Evidence 804 provides an independent ground for the admission of deposition testimony. Rule 804(b)(1) permits a party to admit testimony by deposition as an exception to the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. A declarant is unavailable if he or she 22 (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance ... by process or other reasonable means. 23 A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. 24 Fed.R.Evid. 804(a) (emphasis added). The party wishing to introduce a deposition under this rule bears the burden of showing unavailability. United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir.1989). 25 Garcia-Martinez claims he was unavailable for trial because his absence was not for the purpose of preventing the witness [himself] from attending or testifying, Fed.R.Evid. 804, but rather simply to avoid arrest. There are several problems with this claim. First, [t]he sponsor of a declarant's former testimony may not create the condition of unavailability and then benefit therefrom. United States v. Kimball, 15 F.3d 54, 55-56 (5th Cir.1994); see also United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 13-14 (2d Cir.1996). Secondly, although the federal rules provide a mechanism for the admission of deposition testimony, they do not alter the long-established principle that testimony by deposition is less desirable than oral testimony. Salsman v. Witt, 466 F.2d 76, 79 (10th Cir.1972); see also In re Air Crash Disaster, 720 F.Supp. at 1502. The deposition has always been, and still is, treated as a substitute, a second-best, not to be used when the original is at hand. Salsman, 466 F.2d at 79 (quoting Napier v. Bossard, 102 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.1939)). 26 In applying the rule, we look at two factors to determine unavailability. The first factor is whether the proponent was able to procure the witness's attendance by process or other reasonable means. Garcia-Martinez does not literally meet this requirement since he voluntarily failed to return to Colorado for trial. The second factor looks to whether the absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of the testimony. Garcia-Martinez also does not literally meet this requirement, since his absence at trial was calculated. 27 Confronting the rule's plain language, Garcia-Martinez again asks us to apply a good faith exception. His argument is that the absence from trial must be for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying. Fed.R.Civ.P. 804(a). Since his absence was due to exigent circumstances beyond his control, the court should find him unavailable under the rule. We disagree that he is entitled to an exception on this record. 28 As with his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 argument, Garcia-Martinez has put forth no evidence showing that alternative options for testifying had been exhausted. He made no attempt to obtain a temporary visa to reenter the country for the limited purpose of attending trial or show that an effort to do so would certainly have been denied. Nor did he demonstrate that alternatives to live testimony, such as a testimony via video-conferencing, were unavailable. The only explanation of Garcia-Martinez's absence from trial comes from statements of his attorney to the district court at the evidentiary hearing. Thus, Garcia-Martinez has not demonstrated that a good faith effort was made to obtain the declarant's presence at trial using reasonable means. United States v. Fuentes-Galindo, 929 F.2d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir.1991) (citing Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 269); see also Peterson, 100 F.3d at 13-14 (holding that a party who invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege is not unavailable under Rule 804(a)); Kimball, 15 F.3d at 55-56 (same). 29 Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit Garcia-Martinez's deposition at trial under Rule 804. 30