Opinion ID: 2634864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntary Manslaughter (Jose Gutierrez, Mazatlan Bar)

Text: As noted above, the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, as to each one of the charged killings except the killing of Jose Gutierrez committed at the Mazatlan Bar. Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter regarding the Gutierrez killing constituted reversible error. He is mistaken. The Penal Code defines manslaughter as `the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.' (§ 192.) The offense is voluntary manslaughter when the killing is `upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.' ( Id., subd. (a).) As we have explained in greater detail in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] ( Breverman ), manslaughter has been considered a lesser, necessarily included, offense of intentional murder. Generally, an intent to unlawfully kill reflects malice. (§ 188; Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 153[, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094]; People v. Saille [(1991)] 54 Cal.3d [1103,] 1113[, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588].) An unlawful killing with malice is murder. (§ 187.) Nonetheless, an intentional killing is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if other evidence negates malice. Malice is presumptively absent when the defendant acts upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion on sufficient provocation (§ 192, subd. (a)), or kills in the unreasonable, but good faith, belief that deadly force is necessary in self-defense. ( In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574].) Only these circumstances negate malice when a defendant intends to kill. ( People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].) ( People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 58-59, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001 ( Lee ).) As we further explained in Lee: Although section 192, subdivision (a), refers to `sudden quarrel or heat of passion,' the factor which distinguishes the `heat of passion' form of voluntary manslaughter from murder is provocation. The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim (see In re Thomas C. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 786, 798 [228 Cal.Rptr. 430]), or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim. (See People v. Brooks (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 687, 694 [230 Cal.Rptr. 86]; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against the Person, § 512, p. 579.) The provocative conduct by the victim may be physical or verbal, but the conduct must be sufficiently provocative that it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection. ( People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515 [134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777]; People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 138-139 [169 P.2d 1].) `Heat of passion arises when at the time of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.' ( People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201[, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531].) ( Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th 47, 59, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001.) Thus, [t]he heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective component. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 326-327 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill under the heat of passion. ( Id. at p. 327 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) But the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion are also viewed objectively. As we explained long ago in interpreting the same language of section 192, `this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances,' because `no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.' ( People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49 [164 P. 1121].) ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252-1253, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225; see also People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1143-1144, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572 [same].) `To satisfy the objective or reasonable person element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the accused's heat of passion must be due to sufficient provocation.' ( People v. Wickersham [(1982)] 32 Cal.3d [307,] 326[, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) ( People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572.) A trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense if substantial evidence exists indicating that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) `Substantial evidence' in this context is `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude []' that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) As noted earlier, on appeal we employ a de novo standard of review and independently determine whether an instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter should have been given. (See Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 733, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) In the present case, the evidence adduced at trial presented two mutually exclusive descriptions of the circumstances surrounding the killing of Jose Gutierrez, as follows. Adela Lopez, who worked at the Mazatlan Bar on the night of the shooting, testified that immediately prior to the events in question, the victim was asleep at the bar, and that defendant grabbed him without exchanging any words and thereafter repeatedly shot him. Immediately after the shooting, Lopez observed defendant depart from the bar with a pistol in his hand, followed by the bar's security guards with their weapons drawn. By contrast, Beatriz Escamilla testified that the victim approached defendant and started offending him, called defendant a mother fucker, asking defendant whether he had a gun and daring him to use it. According to Escamilla, defendant repeatedly told the victim to calm down and that he did not want any problems. Escamilla testified that she did not see the victim attempt to grab or stab defendant or hold a weapon, nor did she see one fall to the ground. She testified that defendant shot him from a distance of approximately four feet. In deciding whether there is substantial evidence of a lesser offense, courts should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a task for the jury. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Thus, we need not and do not attempt to determine whether the testimony given by Adela Lopez or Beatriz Escamilla was the more credible. Such a determination is not pertinent, because even under the version of events that was ostensibly more favorable to defendant, Escamilla testified that defendant repeatedly told the victim to calm down and that defendant did not want any problems. Escamilla's testimony contained no indication that defendant's actions reflected any sign of heat of passion at the time he commenced firing his handgun at the victim. There was no showing that defendant exhibited anger, fury, or rage; thus, there was no evidence that defendant actually, subjectively, kill[ed] under the heat of passion. ( People v. Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) To the contrary, Escamilla's testimony portrayed defendant as attempting to exert a calming influence on the victim. The subjective element of the heat of passion theory clearly was not satisfied, and for that reason the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as to heat of passion with regard to the killing of Jose Gutierrez. (See People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 43-44, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673 [rejecting the defendant's contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on provocation when the evidence adduced at trial did not indicate whether the victim's statements and conduct had any effect on the defendant's state of mind].) Even if we were to assume for the sake of discussion that Escamilla's testimony satisfied the subjective requirement that defendant actually killed Gutierrez in the heat of passion, however, the evidence of provocation was insufficient to satisfy the objective requirement, that is, that defendant's heat of passion resulted from sufficient provocation caused by the victim. Although the provocative conduct may be verbal, as it may have been if Escamilla's testimony were to be credited, such provocation must be such that an average, sober person would be so inflamed that he or she would lose reason and judgment. ( Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th 47, 60, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001.) That standard was not met here. Escamilla testified that Gutierrez called defendant a mother fucker and that he also taunted defendant, repeatedly asserting that if defendant had a weapon, he should take it out and use it. Such declarations, as recounted by Escamilla, comprised the only evidence of provocative conduct attributed to the victim, and plainly were insufficient to cause an average person to become so inflamed as to lose reason and judgment. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, the evidence of provocation was insufficient to suggest that defendant's killing of Gutierrez amounted to voluntary manslaughter rather than murder. The trial court properly denied defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based upon the theory of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Finally, we observe that as to each of the four counts of murder charged against defendant, the trial court instructed the jury that evidence of provocation could be considered in determining the degree of the murder. (CALJIC No. 8.73.) [18] The court also gave other pattern instructions informing the jurors that if they harbored a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant committed first degree or second degree murder, or harbored a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing was murder or manslaughter, they must give defendant the benefit of the doubt and return a verdict of guilty of the lesser offense. (CALJIC Nos. 8.71, 8.72.) In view of these instructions, and considering the factual determinations made by the jury in reaching a verdict of first degree murder, we conclude the jury would have returned the same verdict of first degree murder as to the killing of Jose Gutierrez even if the voluntary manslaughter instruction refused by the trial court had been given. Accordingly, even if we were to assume for the sake of discussion that the trial court erred in refusing the instruction requested by defendant, any error clearly would have been harmless. (See People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144-1145, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572.)