Opinion ID: 2192828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Law as Applied to This Case

Text: In applying the Maryland law discussed supra, while concurrently reading the Act liberally in order to effectuate its benevolent purpose of compensating injured workers and their families, we hold that Mrs. Martin continues to be wholly dependent under § 9-681(d) on Mr. Martin's income at the time of his fatal accident. For the reasons discussed below, we find that the Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that Mrs. Martin could only continue to receive compensation if she had an ongoing dependency on the death benefits. As we will elaborate infra, Mr. Martin, the deceased spouse, earned an average of $200,000 per year while he was alive. In stark contrast is the average salary of Mrs. Martin, the surviving spouse, of approximately $15,000 per year. After Mrs. Martin received the initial $45,000, she was still earning approximately $15,000 per year; therefore, she continues to be wholly dependent if her circumstances have not changed since the initial dependency determination was made. Respondents assert that § 9-681(d) is ambiguous as to the identity of the payment source upon which the surviving spouse must continue to be dependent, but we find no ambiguity in the statute. Indeed, the plain language of § 9-681(d) itself states at the time of death when discussing the initial determination of dependency. Therefore, if the Act makes the awarding of initial benefits dependent on the salary of the deceased spouse at the time of death ( see § 9-681(b)), then it is only logical and consistent that determinations of ongoing dependency under § 9-681(d) should also depend on the salary of the deceased spouse. In addition, even if we did find ambiguity in the language of § 9-681(d), we must resolve all such ambiguities in favor of the claimant, Mrs. Martin, as it was the intent of the legislature that the Act be liberally construed to effect its broad remedial goal. As such, we must also examine § 9-681(d) in context of the Act's overall remedial scheme, not in isolation. For example, § 9-681(a), which empowers the Commission to decide whether the claimant is wholly or partially dependent on the deceased employee after the worker's death, provides: If there are individuals who were wholly dependent on a deceased covered employee at the time of death resulting from an accidental personal injury or occupational disease, the employer or its insurer shall pay death benefits in accordance with this section. (Emphasis added). Section 9-681(c), which governs the duration of benefits, states that death benefits are to be paid (1) for the period of total dependency; or (2) until $45,000 has been paid. (Emphasis added). Thus, when subsection (d) is read within the overall context of § 9-681, there is no language to indicate that the issue of total dependency after the $45,000 has been paid should focus on a continued dependency on the benefits. To the contrary, if subsection (a) is read as a preamble to the rest of the section, including subsection (d), it plainly states that the test for determining total dependency is individuals who were wholly dependent on a deceased covered employee at the time of death. The logical inference from this reading is that for a claimant to continue to be wholly dependent, he or she must have an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker's salary at the time of death. In the instant case, pursuant to § 9-679, Mrs. Martin's dependency was determined at the time of her husband's death, which was the same time as the accident. In the recent case of Meadowood v. Keller, 353 Md. 171, 725 A.2d 563 (1999), we also construed dependency in the Act to turn on the timing of the event giving rise to the benefit. Mrs. Keller was injured in a job-related accident and later died of an unrelated cause. At the time of the accident, her son was not financially dependent on her, but he later became so after he left his job to live with and take care of her. Using § 9-679, which covers death benefits, as a guide in construing Md. Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., § 9-632, which deals with permanent partial disability benefits, we held that the dependency of Mrs. Keller's son turned on his circumstances at the time of her accident and not at the time of her death. Keller, 353 Md. at 185, 725 A.2d at 571. We noted that § 9-679 mandates application of the facts existing at the time of the accident that caused the death of the employee in dependency determinations and held that dependency for the purposes of § 9-632 must also be determined as of the date of the accident. Keller, 353 Md. at 176-78, 725 A.2d at 566-67. This Court stated: [W]e are unable to discern any evidence that the Legislature desired to have the term `dependent' mean one thing for purposes of the death benefits and another for purposes of the survived benefit, nor have we been able to determine any compelling reason why it would have wanted to have different standards apply. Keller, 353 Md. at 187, 725 A.2d at 571. Like we held in Keller, we believe that § 9-681(d) should be construed to turn on the timing of the event giving rise to the benefit. Respondents further propose that, in determining whether Mrs. Martin continues to be wholly dependent, we should look at Mrs. Martin's current income and compare it to the maximum benefits available under the statewide average weekly wage pursuant to Md.Code (1991 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.), Labor and Employment Art., § 9-602 and COMAR 14.09.01.07. Respondents maintain that if Mrs. Martin's current income constitutes a significant percentage of the statewide average weekly wage, then she is no longer dependent on the workers' compensation death benefits and is therefore not wholly dependent. We decline to adopt Respondents' proposed formula for calculating whether a claimant continues to be wholly dependent under § 9-681(d). Rather, the correct formula to apply in making ongoing dependency determinations is to compare the amount earned by the worker at the time of death with the amount the surviving spouse earns after the $45,000 has been paid. In Martin, the court based its holding in part on a detailed hypothetical regarding two surviving spouses whose deceased spouses made very differing salaries when they were alive, resulting in a more frequent finding of continues to be wholly dependent on the part of the wealthier surviving spouse. [8] The court stated: If we were to adopt [Mrs. Martin's] reading of [ ] § 9-681(d), persons whose spouses earn huge incomes would be more likely to be able to convince the Commission that they continue to be wholly dependent than those with modest income. This would produce an illogical and unjust result and one at odds with the purpose of the Act. Martin, 119 Md.App. at 673, 705 A.2d at 1181. We do not feel it necessary to refute the court's hypothetical point-by-point, but instead rely on four safeguards to demonstrate the hypothetical's fallacious reasoning. Before we discuss the safeguards, however, we want to first view the hypothetical from a different perspective. The hypothetical can easily be seen as penalizing the spouse whose husband earned more money, in that she will receive only eight percent of her deceased husband's average weekly wage in workers' compensation death benefits as compared to the spouse with the more modest income, who will be awarded sixty-two percent of her husband's salary. In examining the instant case, it was found that two-thirds of Mr. Martin's average weekly wage of $2,850 at the time of his death was $1,881. Therefore, Mrs. Martin's weekly death benefit was $475, which was the maximum permitted under the Act in 1992. See footnote 5, supra. As such, Mrs. Martin was only receiving seventeen percent of her husband's full weekly salary in workers' compensation death benefits; a figure nowhere near her husband's average weekly wage at the time of his death. At this juncture, we wish to emphasize that we are not determining a specific income percentage or amount at which a surviving spouse achieves a self-supporting status. We simply use percentages in this opinion to illustrate the major income disparity between Mrs. Martin's current financial situation and what her lifestyle was when Mr. Martin was alive. In accordance with the Act and the manner in which the Commission administers it, we maintain that Mrs. Martin's dependent status, either total or partial, will not abruptly end at a particular point in time, say after she has received death benefits for a certain number of days, weeks, months, or years. Instead, she will continue to receive benefits so long as her dependency on her deceased husband's salary remains. Under the current schema, Mrs. Martin's benefits will continue until she remarries, dies, or the Commission determines that she has become either wholly or partially self-supporting. We now turn to the safeguards that protect against the unjust awards predicted in the Court of Special Appeals' hypothetical by our adoption of an interpretation of § 9-681(d) based on the deceased worker's salary. The first safeguard is the statutory cap on compensation. The cap obviates the Court of Special Appeals' concern that a wealthy claimant will reap an unjust award. Under § 9-681(b), the weekly benefit may not exceed the State average weekly wage. We need look no further than the instant case to see the curative effect of this safeguard. Mr. Martin's average weekly wage was found to be $1,881 (two-thirds of $2,850), yet Mrs. Martin was only receiving the statewide average weekly wage of $475, which is the maximum allowed under the statute. Therefore, Mrs. Martin's average weekly income was reduced by $1,406, a seventy-five percent reduction. The second safeguard is § 9-679, which requires that initial dependency determinations be based on the particular facts of each case. Section 9-679's mandate, that the Commission must examine each case on its own unique set of facts, prevents the perceived unfairness and injustice that Respondent, and the Court of Special Appeals, maintains would result if we determine that continues to be wholly dependent refers to an ongoing dependency on the deceased worker's salary rather than the benefits. The particular facts and circumstances include the wide range of salaries that may be involved from case to case. For this reason, it would be inappropriate for us to adopt a specific percentage under which a dependent can earn income, relative to the deceased worker's salary, and still be found wholly dependent by the Commission. In this case, Mrs. Martin earns approximately eight percent of Mr. Martin's yearly income at the time of his death. On its own, Mrs. Martin's approximately $15,000 annual salary is insufficient to compensate her as contemplated by the legislature in enacting the Workers' Compensation Act. Modifying the facts of the instant case and applying them to our own hypothetical, say that Mr. Martin was earning $500,000 at the time of his death. If we take eight percent of $500,000, Mrs. Martin's annual salary would be $40,000 per year. Now when we apply § 9-679 and examine the particular facts and circumstances of this hypothetical, we observe that the Commission could well determine that Mrs. Martin is not wholly dependent, even though her $40,000 salary would also constitute a mere eight percent of Mr. Martin's annual salary at the time of his death. The third safeguard is the consequential contribution test, discussed in Part II.B.2. supra, which ensures that total dependency will not be found if the claimant makes a substantial contribution to his or her own support. In applying the consequential contribution test to this case, it is clear that Mrs. Martin's earnings with Canada Dry do not constitute a consequential contribution to the family income. First, when we apply the correct formula, detailed supra in this section, and compare Mrs. Martin's current income against Mr. Martin's salary at the time of his death, it is obvious that the percentage of Mrs. Martin's earnings when compared to Mr. Martin's does not rise to the level of those found in the Mario Anello, Mullan Construction, and Toadvine cases, discussed supra, so as to constitute a consequential, substantial contribution. As mentioned, Mr. Martin's weekly wage was $2,850. After business expenses were deducted, Mrs. Martin's approximate weekly wages from her Canada Dry job were as follows for the three years after her husband's fatal injury: 1993$216 ($11,249.50 divided by 52); 1994$186 ($9,651 divided by 52); and 1995$305 ($15,879 divided by 52). Thus, in 1993, Mrs. Martin earned eight percent of Mr. Martin's full weekly wage; in 1994, she earned seven percent; and in 1995, she earned eleven percent. Second, even if we apply the formula that the Court of Special Appeals adopted and compare Mrs. Martin's current income to the statewide average weekly wage, we see that her weekly income is significantly less than the statewide average weekly wage of $475 in 1992, a figure that increases every year and thus makes the disparity even greater today. From the above weekly wage calculations, it is apparent that Mrs. Martin is not earning more than the average worker in Maryland, nor anywhere close to this average weekly wage. Moreover, there has been little change in Mrs. Martin's financial circumstances since the time when the Commission initially found her to be wholly dependent on Mr. Martin in its initial death benefit compensation award of February 1, 1994. Her personal income remains fairly static. The final safeguard that exists to curb unfair award determinations is found in § 9-681(j). It states in pertinent part: (j) Continuing jurisdiction of commission.The Commission has continuing jurisdiction to: (1) determine whether a surviving spouse or child has become wholly or partly self-supporting; (2) suspend or terminate payments of compensation. Therefore, should Mrs. Martin's financial circumstances change down the road and she becomes either wholly or partially self-supporting, the Commission has the authority to reduce or eliminate her benefits as necessary. In many cases there may well be a discrepancy in the amount of ultimate benefits awarded to a person who is wealthy and a person who is not. In general, workers' compensation benefits are based on the worker's income, so there will naturally be a variable in how much claimants receive. However, the unfairness the court says will result if we adopt an interpretation of continued dependency based on the deceased worker's salary, rather than on the death benefits, is negated by application of the above four safeguards. The (1) built-in protection of the statutory cap; (2) the analysis of dependency determinations on a case-by-case basis pursuant to § 9-679; (3) the application of the consequential contribution test after the initial $45,000 has been paid; and (4) the exercise of Commission jurisdiction under § 9-681(j), as necessary, all will result in findings that are consistent and in accordance with the benevolent purpose of the Act. Finally, any unfairness that results which is beyond the reach of these safeguards is for the legislature to resolve. We now turn to a discussion of Linder Crane, which the Respondents misconstrue. In finding that Mrs. Martin continues to be wholly dependent on Mr. Martin's income at the time of his death, we note that the Martins, like the Hogans in Linder Crane, had a private marital agreement that she would not work outside the home. This agreement was in place for the last several years of their marriage, including at the time of Mr. Martin's death; thus, it is clear that he intended to provide indefinite financial support for his wife while she took care of the household. Like Mrs. Hogan in Linder Crane, Mrs. Martin sought employment due to the financial circumstances brought about by her husband's death. Respondents point to the temporary employment language found in Linder Crane and maintain that because Mrs. Martin's present job with Canada Dry is not temporary, as Mrs. Hogan's was found to be, she cannot continue to be wholly dependent on Mr. Martin. While it is true that Mrs. Martin's position with Canada Dry may not be temporary or occasional, it is undisputed that her income, which has never exceeded $16,000, is a mere fraction of what the Martin family income was when her husband was alive. Any contributions Mrs. Martin made to the family income, both while Mr. Martin was alive and also after his death, were minor, insubstantial contributions. Mrs. Martin's job selling business forms, which she had while Mr. Martin was alive, was purely a sideline business that yielded no substantial income ($4,246 in 1991). Moreover, her clients for this sideline business derived almost exclusively from her husband's business contacts. In addition, the salary she received from Sun Dun was purely gratuitous and did not in any way alter her dependent status on her husband. Therefore, we can analogize the temporary employment scenario in Linder Crane to the major disparity that exists between Mrs. Martin's current income and what it was before Mr. Martin died. In so doing, it is obvious that Mrs. Martin's low-paying job with Canada Dry, with its sporadic, non-established hours, was not intended to alter [her] dependency ... on [Mr. Martin]. See Linder Crane, 86 Md.App. at 444, 586 A.2d at 1293. Even total dependency is consistent with the receipt of some other income, if unsubstantial, or sporadic. 2A ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 63.13, at 11-134 (1989)(footnote omitted). On a policy level, if we were to adopt Respondent's interpretation of § 9-681(d) there would be a disincentive for a surviving spouse, or any dependent, to work and be a productive member of society; instead, he or she could earn more money by not working and staying home. At the present time, Mrs. Martin is not earning more than the benefits, so if she had simply quit her job prior to the second workers' compensation hearing, she would have unquestionably been granted continuing death benefits. Perhaps this all or nothing facet of the Act is something that the legislature should address, but until it does should we tell people in Mrs. Martin's situation to simply quit their jobs in order to retain their benefits? Rather than being punished by having her benefits discontinued, Mrs. Martin should be commended for working. Efforts toward self-sufficiency should be encouraged, not discouraged. We agree with Judge Wolff's factual finding, and the Commission's finding and interpretation of the statute, that Mrs. Martin's current income level is not sufficient to provide her with the basic necessities contemplated by the Workers' Compensation statute. While it may appear unfair to some, the reality of our capitalist system is that people earn vastly different amounts of money depending on their education, training, background, and level of industriousness, among other factors. That reality is reflected in the Act's recognition that even with the application of the safeguards discussed supra, employers/insurers must still pay higher benefits to those employees, or their dependents, for whom they have elected to compensate at a higher salary. [9] The fact is that Mrs. Martin's husband earned a high wage, and as a result she grew accustomed to a higher standard of living than many experience. While she should naturally expect a diminution in income after her husband's death, the disparity should not be so great that she is subsisting solely on the income from her job as an independent contractor, which is less than ten percent of the previous family income. The Act clearly considers a claimant's standard of living when making benefit determinations; indeed, § 9-681(b) contemplates the socioeconomic status of the dependent in making an initial award of benefits when it mandates that the average weekly wage of the deceased be considered in any benefit determination. [10] See also 2A ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 63.11(b), at 11-109 (1989)(stating that [a] showing of actual dependency does not require proof that, without decedent's contributions, claimant would have lacked the necessities of life, but only that decedent's contributions were relied on by claimant to maintain claimant's accustomed mode of living )(emphasis added)(footnote omitted). We also may be affronted by the particulars of the arrangement the Martins made; specifically, the fact that in accepting a gratuitous salary from Sun Dun, Mrs. Martin was getting something for doing nothing. No matter what our personal biases are, we must not penalize Mrs. Martin because Mr. Martin was professionally successful and financially able to make this special arrangement with his wife. We are still obligated to look at the facts of each case and make not only our initial dependency determinations based on her deceased husband's salary, but also any continuing dependency determinations on this basis. Thus, when we look at the plain language of the statute in the context of its benevolent purpose, we hold that Mrs. Martin continues to be wholly dependent on Mr. Martin's income at the time of his fatal accident. We further hold that the correct formula to apply in determining whether a claimant continues to be wholly dependent under § 9-681(d) is to compare the amount earned by the worker at the time of death with the amount the surviving spouse earns after the $45,000 has been paid. If we adopt the Court of Special Appeals' interpretation, that for compensation to be continued the claimant must have an ongoing dependency on the death benefits, untold numbers of people may be unable to continue to receive the support they need to live. Nothing in our case law, or the wording of the statute itself, points to such a strict rule of construction; in fact, legislative intent tells us that we must avoid such a narrow reading of the Act. Furthermore, pursuant to § 9-745(b)(1), the decision of the Commission is presumed to be prima facie correct. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the Commission did not fairly consider all of the facts regarding Mr. Martin's accidental death or that it exceeded its powers or misconstrued the law and facts of the case. See § 9-745(c)(1)-(3). Therefore, in accordance with § 9-745(e)(1), we shall affirm the decision of the Commission and uphold the order of reinstatement of Mrs. Martin's workers' compensation death benefits.