Opinion ID: 2995520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the mcnairs’ fourth amendment claim

Text: Qualified immunity is ’an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’ Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). This right is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. As noted previously, on three separate occasions prior to the jury verdict--(1) in a motion for summary judgment; (2) in a motion for directed verdict following the plaintiffs’ case; and (3) in a motion for directed verdict following the close of all evidence--Coffey raised the defense of qualified immunity, arguing that the facts taken in the light most favorable to the McNair brothers were insufficient to sustain a jury’s finding that he violated the Fourth Amendment and could not have reasonably believed that his con duct was lawful. The district court denied each of these motions only to grant Coffey’s post- verdict Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment on the basis that a reasonable police officer could have believed that the high risk procedure Defendant Officer Coffey used was lawful based on the law [in existence] when force was [displayed] in this case. (Doc. No. 103 at 6.) As explained previously, although Coffey’s motion for summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, explicitly argued that, if the court were to rule that Officer Coffey’s actions may somehow have violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, it could not be fairly said that a reasonable police officer in his position would have known that his conduct was forbidden by law, (Doc. No. 34 at 15), the trial judge denied the motion on the basis that the presence of factual disputes concerning the defendant’s conduct precluded summary judgment. (Doc. No. 55 at 8.) Yet the law was equally settled before and after trial; likewise, my review of the record convinces me that the proposed finding of facts submitted by Coffey at summary judgment, and undisputed by the McNairs, were identical to the material facts developed at trial./7 It is difficult, therefore, to reconcile the judge’s decision before trial to deny the motion for qualified immunity with his decision after trial to grant the motion for qualified immunity notwithstanding the jury verdict. Indeed, if we are to preserve the fundamental benefit that qualified immunity confers on governmental officials performing the difficult task of navigating the hazy borders between permissible and impermissible activity, i.e., avoiding the burdens of needless litigation and trial, we are compelled to observe that the trial judge erred by failing to grant Officer Coffey’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case more than two years ago. See Egebergh v. Nicholson, 272 F.3d 925, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (police officers are entitled to immunity before trial . . . if the facts are construed as favorably to the plaintiff as the record permits, [and] they still are entitled to immunity-- in which event they shouldn’t be put to the burden of a trial that might cast the facts in a light unnecessarily more favorable to them.)
After granting Officer Coffey’s writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated our prior opinion and remanded this case for further consideration in light of Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). 121 S.Ct. 2545 (2001). Saucier, in turn, states as follows: In a suit against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence. . . . Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. . . . A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry. In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was violated on the premises alleged, a court might find it necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for holding that a right is clearly established. This is the process for the law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question of whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case. 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56 (internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied). Thus, Saucier directs us to ask whether Coffey’s conduct, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation as a matter of constitutional law. Only if this initial question is answered in the affirmative are we to consider whether a law enforcement officer in Coffey’s position on December 20, 1997 would, nevertheless, have reasonably believed that his conduct was lawful./8 Id. at 2156. Yet the majority opinion fails to answer the first question that Saucier requires us to ask. The majority contends that Coffey did not take issue with the jury’s verdict and, therefore, concedes that his conduct was unconstitutional. Ante at 3. This statement is confusing. I wish to emphasize that on three separate occasions prior to the verdict--(1) in a motion for summary judgment; (2) in a motion for directed verdict following the plaintiffs’ case; and (3) in a motion for directed verdict following the close of all evidence--Coffey did argue that his display of force was protected by the Fourth Amendment, even if all of the McNairs’ evidence was accepted as true. Thus, because I am: (1) mindful of the fact that Coffey has adequately preserved his right to challenge the legal sufficiency of the jury verdict against him; (2) cognizant of our discretionary authority to review the entire record; (3) obligated by Saucier to clarify the boundaries of the law by considering in every instance whether the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, 121 S.Ct. at 2156; and (4) instructed by the Court to review this case in light of Saucier, I am prepared to answer the question head on of whether the McNair brothers were the subject of an unreasonable seizure. Conducting such an analysis complies with the Saucier Court’s ultimate goal of establishing legal principles that remove uncertainty in the case law, guiding public officials in their daily conduct, and protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly break the law from future nettlesome lawsuits. Indeed, although the district court dismissed this case on the basis of qualified immunity, I believe the more proper course in this instance is to set aside the verdict on the independent, clear, and more compelling basis of the insufficiency of the evidence. Qualified immunity is an appropriate and accepted method for disposing of cases prior to trial, rather than after trial, because the denial of a qualified immunity defense is the only procedural vehicle a defendant can use to bring to us at the pretrial stage, instead of after final judgment, any question relating to the merits. Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). Conversely, because the advantage of qualified immunity is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial, Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, qualified immunity in the context of a trial is indistinguishable from other affirmative defenses that come into play only if the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has violated his rights. Thus, it is a non-sequitur for us at the late stage of this litigation to cloak our decision in the language of immunity. When considering Coffey’s post-verdict motion, I am convinced that we should use the same legal analysis as other cases, with the initial inquiry being whether there were sufficient facts to support the verdict rendered, in light of the applicable law. I agree that if the facts substantiated the view that Coffey violated the Constitution, then the proper recourse would be through the doctrine of immunity. But because his actions were reasonable in the first instance, he is entitled to a ruling that affirmatively characterizes his conduct as lawful and prudent, without any discussion of a defense that implies the existence of a valid antecedent claim against him. See Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1273-74 (Hoeveler, J., concurring). Based on the law of the land and my review of the evidence adduced at trial, I agree with the law enforcement officer that this case should never have gone to trial and, furthermore, should never have been submitted to the jury. See Egebergh, 272 F.3d at 926-27. Our inquiry is whether the record contains a legally sufficient evidentiary basis from which a jury could have reasonably derived its verdict. In doing so, we must consider the entire record, without reweighing the evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985). Sitting as an appellate tribunal, we assume that the jury resolved all genuine factual disputes in favor of the McNairs, id., but at the same time, as I read the law, we cannot ignore the court record containing unequivocal, undisputed, andunimpeached evidence that is favorable to Officer Coffey and relevant to the legal sufficiency of the McNairs’ case. See McGee v. Bauer, 956 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing jury award; dismissing case on the basis of undisputed facts and the court’s independent determination of the scope of the Procedural Due Process Clause); see also Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 216 (1931) (jury is not at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony, when from no reasonable point of view is it open to doubt.); Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1274 n.4 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Even after drawing inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict, I am convinced, as a matter of law, that Officer Coffey’s conduct did not violate the Constitution.
in Qualified Immunity Cases Before reviewing the evidence, however, I must pause and comment upon how defense counsel’s unorthodox strategy prejudiced Officer Coffey and complicated our review of this case on appeal. In cases of this nature, defense counsel is responsible for timely preparing and presenting proper interrogatories for the trial judge to submit to the jury. Sadly, defense counsel failed to supply the trial judge with instructions and specific factual interrogatories related to the material contested facts presented at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b). Instead, both parties took the easy but fatal way out (to the detriment of the jury’s deliberative process) and presented the trial judge with only a general verdict form containing the following question: Did Defendant Sean Coffey use excessive force during the course of the December 20, 1997 traffic stop of Plaintiff Victor McNair [and Plaintiff Tre McNair], which deprived [them] of [their] Fourth Amendment right[s] to be free from unreasonable seizure? Counsel neglected to object to the verdict form’s amorphous question, which improperly invited the jury to usurp the role of the court and resolve constitutional issues in the form of a legal conclusion devoid of reference to specific facts, i.e., what constitutes the precise amount of force that may be displayed in response to the circumstances surrounding the safety risk Coffey reasonablybelieved to have been posed by the McNairs to the police and the public at large. See McGee, 956 F.2d at 735. It is a basic premise of our legal system that juries are the triers of fact only; it is for the judge, not the jury, to interpret the law and to draw the line in the sand separating conduct that is protected and unprotected under the Constitution. In other words, the plaintiff must convince the court that the facts found by the jury are sufficient to trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment as a matter of law. See id. at 735-36. This case presents an issue similar to that in McGee, which involved the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff McGee alleged a due process violation when a building inspector posted a sign declaring McGee’s house uninhabitable without having previously offered him the right to participate in a hearing. We found error with the trial court’s limited jury instruction that McGee was entitled to damages if the jury was convinced that he was deprived of his property without due process of law. See id. at 735 ([t]he jury was instructed that McGee should prevail . . . if he proved . . . [t]hat the alleged deprivation occurred without due process of law.) We held that this instruction was impermissible because it essentially asked the jury to decide what process McGee was due in regards to the alleged deprivation. Id. Jurors without the benefit of legal education, training and experience are not expected to be qualified to interpret a constitutional question dealing with the precise substantive guarantees of the Due Process Clause. We stated that [w]hat process is due under the Constitution is a legal question that the judge should resolve. The judge then should put to the jury any factual questions relating to the application of that standard. The jury’s conclusion that McGee did not receive ’due process of law’ does not inform our analysis of what process was due. Id. Certainly, the reasoning of McGee applies to the facts in the case before us. During the trial, the McNairs raised a constitutional issue, alleging an excessive display of force. At the close of the McNairs’ case, upon proper motion and with the aid of respective counsel, the trial judge was obligated to initially inquire whether the plaintiffs produced any facts sufficient to allow a jury to determine whether Patrolman Coffey violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Before sending the case to the jury, and after taking into consideration the facts and the law applicable thereto, the attorneys were obligated to submit, and the court was likewise obligated to present the jury with special interrogatories that would have then allowed the court to: (1) understand what precisely occurred on December 20, 1997; and (2) determine, in light of those particular findings and the applicable law, whether such a violation in fact occurred. See Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180, 1202 n.15 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Gros v. Port Washington Police Dist., 944 F. Supp. 1072, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ([u]nresolved factual questions bearing on qualified immunity should be decided . . . on special interrogatories.) Here, the issue is whether the McNairs proved at trial that Officer Coffey displayed excessive force. As previously discussed, after resting their cases, the parties should have provided the trial judge with special interrogatories and requests that the jurors be instructed, prior to their deliberations, that the parties agreed that Officer Coffey was the sole patrolman on duty, seated in his car in the dark of winter around 5:30 p.m., in an area stipulated to as having a high crime rate, including drug trafficking; and that Officer Coffey encountered the McNairs among a group of three other individuals standing on a street corner near an apartment known to be the site of illegal drug activity. (Appellants’ Br. at 6-7; Appellee’s Br. at 1-3.) See 9A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure sec. 2506 at 174-76 (1995) (discussing jury instructions related to undisputed facts). Then, the specific questions asked of the jury should have included, but not necessarily been limited to: According to the evidence presented, would a patrolman in Officer Coffey’s position have reasonably believed that: (1) the McNairs and this crowd dispersed shortly after seeing Officer Coffey’s police vehicle, with some members of the group retreating towards the apartment?; (2) a third suspect may have been present in the McNair vehicle outside Coffey’s field of vision?; (3) the McNairs should have seen and heard Coffey’s emergency lights and sirens, yet disregarded these observations and continued driving for one mile or more?; (4) the McNairs pulled into a gas station lot, where customers were present, which was within walking distance of a residential neighborhood?; and (5) furthermore, as a result of their seizure, did the McNairs suffer any physical injuries while they were detained for approximately one hour for questioning? The jury’s responses then should have served as the basis for the district judge’s determination of whether Officer Coffey’s actions were reasonable as a matter of constitutional law. See Rakovich, 850 F.2d at 1202 n.15; 9A Wright & Miller, supra sec.sec. 2511-13 at 217-35. Because of defense counsel’s failure to request, much less tender any proposed special interrogatories to the trial judge, the jury was improperly instructed and ill-informed. Nevertheless, I cannot agree with the wild-eyed speculation and supposition offered by plaintiffs’ counsel that the McNairs must prevail because the jury necessarily determined that a reasonable officer would never have believed the McNairs were drug dealers or posed any sort of threat. (Appellants’ Rule 54 Stmt. at 5 n.5.) Counsel’s argument is misdirected in at least two respects. First, although counsel sets up a strawman, i.e., his drug dealer argument, and proceeds to flail away at it, the dispositive issue is not whether the McNairs were drug dealers. Rather, the controlling question is whether Officer Coffey acted reasonably at the time, in light of his knowledge, information,experience, and perceptions of the seriousness of the totality of the circumstances confronting him. Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2155-56; Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 743-44 (7th Cir. 2001). In addition, as I stated earlier, the jury’s conclusion that Coffey used excessive force must be supported with specific evidence offered at trial. To the extent that undisputed and unimpeached evidence established material facts showing, as a matter of law, that Officer Coffey was justified in his belief that the McNairs posed a risk to himself and to the community, the uninformed jury’s finding that Coffey violated the Fourth Amendment, in response to the inane, sweeping question, Did Defendant Sean Coffey use excessive force during the course of the December 20, 1997 traffic stop of Plaintiff Victor McNair [and Plaintiff Tre McNair], which deprived [them] of [their] Fourth Amendment right[s] to be free from unreasonable seizure?, is useless and highly prejudicial to Officer Coffey. See McGee, 956 F.2d at 735-36; Dual Mfg. & Eng’g v. Burris Indus., 619 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
Turning to the merits, the Fourth Amendment protects citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. Police may seize a person only if there is probable cause. The power to seize necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it, Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), and [f]ollowing Graham, we analyze all excessive force claims stemming from an arrest or other seizure by the police under a Fourth Amendment ’objective reasonableness’ standard. Ellis v. Wynalda, 999 F.2d 243, 246 (7th Cir. 1993). The Graham analysis focuses on whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him], without regard to [his] underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. We must place ourselves in the shoes of the patrolman at the time he made the decision to call for backup assistance, in light of his knowledge, experience, and perception of the possibly volatile situation confronting him. Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 804-05 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc). We judge the reasonableness of his actions based upon the information he possessed at the time, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. We balance the amount of forcedisplayed against the danger posed to the arresting officer and the community if the suspect resists or flees. McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1992). Among therelevant factors to consider are the nature of the crime for which the suspect is being pursued, the threat posed to the safety of the officers and to the community, and whether the suspect is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; post at 42. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Moreover, [n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 396. Officer Coffey was the sole law enforcement officer on the scene. I believe that overwhelming material evidence, almost none of which is disputed, established at trial that Coffey--as any reasonable officer would do in like circumstances--would have called for backup assistance at a time when he had reason to believe the McNairs posed a serious risk to himself and to the general public. Furthermore, based on the record before me, it is patently obvious that Coffey’s decision to call for backup assistance, which resulted in the display of force objected to in the arrest of the McNairs, was eminently reasonable. I review this evidence to add to the majority’s brief recitation of facts and to make clear the reasonableness of Coffey’s actions. I then explain why I conclude, from my discretionary review of the record, that Officer Coffey did not violate the McNairs’ Fourth Amendment rights.
Officer Coffey and the general public On the night of December 20, 1997, Officer Sean Coffey had been a law enforcement officer for approximately 2 years. He was routinely assigned to the Allied-Dunns Marsh neighborhood in the community of Fitchburg, Wis., which is neither a village, town nor city, but, rather, is an unincorporated area of 18,000 people adjoining the city of Madison, Wis. Even the McNairs concede that Coffey correctly perceived that the area around Rosenberry Road and Thurston Lane in Fitchburg is an undesirable area, with a crime rate that is higher than normal, that has been the site of armed robberies, burglaries, damage to property, person crimes, batteries, assaults, and a lot of drug activity. (Tr. 2- 140.) Indeed, in the plaintiffs’ own words, [d]rug dealing and other criminal activity is known to have occurred in the neighborhood. (Appellants’ Br. at 6.) This troubling situation occurred between 5 and 5:30 p.m. in the dark of winter. The streetlights were activated and the black shadows of night had long past set. Coffey was parked in an empty parking lot across the street from the location where he first sighted the people later identified as the McNair brothers, Victor and Tre. As he was looking out onto Thurston Lane, observing the traffic and keeping tabs on the activity in the area, he noticed a Mitsubishi Galant vehicle parked at the curb. Coffey, while seated as the sole occupant in his squad car, observed at least five young people standing on the sidewalk, apparently looking at this automobile. Coffey decided to investigate the scene and then drove alongside the people and the automobile. As he did so, at least two or three individuals standing on the sidewalk departed the area and proceeded towards an apartment known to be a site of illegal drug activity on the corner of Thurston and Rosenberry. Coffey stated that he believed he saw the McNair brothers and a third person enter the Mitsubishi and proceed to drive off in the opposite direction of the squad car. Coffey stated that the congregation of people on a street corner in this crime-prone area of Fitchburg, accompanied by the almost immediate dispersal of several men towards the apartment after they had in all probability sighted his squad car, made him suspicious as to whether there was possible illegal drug activity afoot. (Tr. 2-50, 2-89; Appellee’s Br. at 2-3.) Coffey decided to pursue the McNair car. He radioed the Fitchburg police headquarters and asked the dispatcher for an owner and license plate I.D., to ascertain whether the legal owner resided in the immediate area, and if he had any outstanding warrants or a prior police record. As the vehicle continued to travel for several hundred feet along the frontage road towards an on-ramp for the Madison Beltline expressway, there was but one vehicle between the Mitsubishi and Coffey’s police vehicle. The dispatcher responded and advised that the vehicle belonged to a Victor McNair and that its state motor vehicle registration was suspended for unpaid traffic citations. At this point, after receiving this information, Coffey had probable cause to stop the vehicle. See Wis. Stat. sec. 346.04(1). Once the car made its way to the top of the on- ramp, and was rapidly approaching the expressway, Coffey maneuvered his squad car so that he was immediately behind the McNair vehicle. At this time, Coffey activated his emergency lights, hoping to direct the McNairs to pull over, and also activated the video camera positioned on top of his police car. The McNairs refused to comply with the officer’s signal and instead continued driving for an unspecified distance at about 55 mph, keeping up with the flow of traffic. After another five or six seconds while the suspects’ refused to obey a lawful command by a police officer, Coffey turned on his emergency siren. The traffic was normal, and Officer Coffey was close enough behind the vehicle to allow him to form the opinion, based on his knowledge, experience, and perceptions at the time, that the McNairs could readily hear his siren and see the flashing, colored overhead lights. Indeed, as the videotape of the chase reflects, at least one vehicle can be observed pulling over to the side of the road, with its blinkers on, pursuant to law. Moreover, while on the Beltline, other cars traveling in the same direction were observed moving over to the traffic lane furthest from Officer Coffey’s squad car, thus suggesting that other vehicles in the immediate area also heard and saw the police sirens and lights. Under this escalating and evolving scenario, I am convinced that Coffey must have been reasonably concerned for his safety and what lie ahead of him as he proceeded to make a valid arrest of a fleeing suspect. Coffey testified that he thought he saw three people enter the Mitsubishi when it was parked on Thurston and Rosenberry, but from his observation of the occupants of the car during this pursuit, he was able to observe the silhouettes of only two individuals. He testified that he believed the third person might have crouched down below the rear window vision line, attempting either to obtain a weapon or possibly secrete drugs or drug paraphernalia. I believe that Coffey’s fears were well-founded: the police are trained to assume that a person who conceals himself from view may well be doing so to establish an advantage in an attempt to overpower or ambush an approaching officer. (Tr. 2-153 to -154.) The situation with the fleeing suspects continued to deteriorate, as the McNairs persisted for almost another mile along the Beltline highway in their attempted flight from the officer, despite the squad car’s flashing lights and blaring sirens directing them to pull over, before they finally exited onto an off- ramp. Because the McNairs refused to stop in a timely fashion, it was reasonable for the officer to assume that they were fleeing in an attempt to avoid arrest. In addition, Coffey gave undisputed testimony that, while an individual apprehended on the highway is somewhat constrained by speeding traffic and concrete barriers, a suspect who pulls over in a residential area is able to flee on foot much more easily, should he be so inclined. (Id.) For these reasons, I believe it is, at best, improper to state, as plaintiffs’ naive counsel does, that Officer Coffey was effectuating a routine traffic stop and could not have reasonably believed the McNairs . . . were trying to evade or elude him. (Appellants’ Br. at 20.) As the Supreme Court explained in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), we know from proverbial common sense that the ordinary law-abiding citizen yields upon a policeman’s lawful order to halt. Id. at 623 n.1; see also Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1997) (if police are forbidden to pursue, then many more suspects will flee--and successful flights not only reduce the number of crimes solved but also create their own risks for passengers and bystanders.) After leaving the expressway, the McNair car proceeded along the frontage road. Since the operator of the vehicle failed to stop within a reasonable distance, Coffey radioed his Fitchburg headquarters and advised that he was switching over to the Dane County police network to request additional officer support from other nearby municipalities. Fitchburg is an unincorporated area with a very small police force, suffering from financial problems and insufficient law enforcement personnel to handle a possibly dangerous and violent situation of this nature. There is no evidence in this record to suggest that Coffey knew how many officers from nearby municipalities would hear his call for assistance, much less respond to it. If the officers were preoccupied on other assigned police duties within their respective jurisdictions, or off-call during the relevant time period, they would not be able to respond to a request for help. Coffey, who was working alone, without a partner, radioed for a 10-80 when the McNairs pulled off the Beltline and began traveling down the off-ramp. A 10-80 is a police procedure referred to as a high-risk vehicle contact. In other words, it means the requesting officer believes that he is involved in a dangerous situation that requires backup assistance. The record reflects that Coffey has called for 10-80 assistance only in dire situations. Indeed, Coffey testified that, while he has handled hundreds of traffic stops in the past, he has radioed for 10-80 assistance no more than four times in his entire career. (Tr. 2- 152.) The McNair vehicle continued along the frontage road for several tenths of a mile, approaching a Citgo gas station soon after Coffey made his request for backup assistance. Shortly thereafter, the auto decelerated and signaled the driver’s intention to turn into the station. The McNairs entered the station’s small lot, which was occupied by other vehicles and customers. The McNairs pulled up adjacent to one of the gas pumps, immediately adjacent to others pumping gas. Coffey testified that he pulled in directly behind the McNair vehicle. There was reason to be concerned about the safety of the bystanders in the congested lot and the nearby residential neighborhood, because if the suspects attempted to escape, misdirected gun shots might strike innocent civilians or possibly ignite any flammable liquids in the vicinity. I share Officer Coffey’s concerns about police and public safety. I am convinced that Coffey, on single assignment without a partner, had more than sufficient information, knowledge, and experience (2 years on the force) to be concerned and believe that the McNairs posed an immediate threat to his own safety as well as the general public. To review, from Coffey’s perspective, the McNairs behaved somewhat suspiciously on Thurston Lane when they were first observed mulling around with a crowd of people in a high-crime area after dark, with a known drug apartment a mere stone’s throw away; they exhibited behavior consistent with illegal drug activity; they were operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in violation of state law; they disobeyed lawful directions, thus requiring the officer to pursue them for over a mile in his squad car with its emergency lights on and the siren blasting away; there was possibly a third passenger hiding somewhere in the vehicle with them, outside Coffey’s line of vision; and when the fleeing suspects finally did pull over, they drove into a crowded gas station adjoining a residential area, where unsuspecting, law-abiding customers and homeowners could be harmed and definitely placed in a lethal situation if the suspects persisted in their attempt to flee and violence erupted. It is important to note that between 1990 and 1999, a total of 6,048 law enforcement officers were assaulted, and 94 were killed, at the scene of a traffic stop or during a traffic pursuit. FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement Personnel, tbls. 18, 38 (2000). We have previously stated that proper respect for these statistics underscore[s] our reluctance to second-guess an officer’s split-second judgment when faced with potentially explosive situations. Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 807 n.2 (en banc). In the same vein, we have described it as beyond dispute that drug traffickers are often armed and dangerous and that they sometimes shoot policemen. United States v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1989). Such precedent, coupled with the aforementioned facts, justifies Officer Coffey’s testimony that the McNairs and another person may have been involved in drug activity and may very well have been armed and dangerous. It is irrelevant, of course, that Coffey’s beliefs ultimately proved to be in error; the reasonableness of Coffey’s decision to call for additional backup assistance must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Moreover, even were I to accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the jury concluded that Coffey had no reason to suspect that the McNairs were trafficking narcotics, and also discredited Coffey’s testimony about his belief that a third individual was hiding in their vehicle, two crucial undisputed facts remain. First, from his position alone in the squad car, Coffey saw the McNairs in the dark of a winter night talking to a group of people in a high-crime area in the immediate vicinity of a known drug house. Within seconds after seeing Coffey in his police vehicle, the McNairs departed the scene and several of the remaining bystanders retreated towards the house. Under these circumstances, such unprovoked flight upon noticing the police produces reasonable suspicion that some type of criminal activity involving the McNairs may have been afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). Second, the McNairs’ subsequent, prolonged, and unabated flight in the face of the existence of probable cause raises alarm in and of itself. It is of no consequence that the McNairs claim to have been driving away from Coffey because they wanted to pull over in a well-lighted area; Coffey had no way to know the McNairs’ intentions./9 (Tr. 2-57 to -58.) Moreover, law-abiding, responsible motorists do not disregard signals from police vehicles unless they are trying to avoid apprehension, and, should they choose to do so, no right is guaranteed by federal law that one will be free from circumstances where he will be endangered by the misinterpretation of his acts. Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805 (en banc).
reasonable Once the McNairs stopped at the gas station, Coffey’s personal involvement in the arrest was limited to: instructing the suspects over the loudspeaker to place their hands on the roof on the inside of the car; ordering the nearby customers pumping gas to clear the immediate area; and waiting for his backup officers to arrive at the scene and allow him to place them under arrest. It is inconceivable to suppose that such a proper display of lawful authority, standing alone without even an allegation of the use of excessive physical force, violates the Fourth Amendment. See Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1400-01 (7th Cir. 1985); Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir. 2001) (en banc); see also State v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128 (Wis. 1990). Mindful of these facts and the applicable case law, and in compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate on remand, I agree and concur with the decision of my colleagues to set aside the jury verdict, although I reach this result for separate and distinct reasons. I see no merit to the plaintiffs’ legal claim, based on nothing but speculation and a foundation of quicksand, that Defendant Coffey violated the Fourth Amendment by calling for backup help with the knowledge that his fellow officers’ response would be unreasonable. Coffey gave undisputed testimony at trial that he did not request any specific number of squad cars or officers to respond to his call for backup assistance. Coffey also gave the unchallenged testimony that he neither knew how many officers would respond, nor how quickly much less whether, in fact, they would respond at all. Nor did he give any directions, signals or orders to the officers as to what actions they should take once they arrived upon the scene. (Tr. 2-98 to -99; 2-154 to -156.) Admittedly, seven officers driving separate squad cars responded to Coffey’s 10-80; four of these officers exited their vehicles and aimed their loaded weapons at the McNair brothers. Yet it is apparent that Coffey did not personally control the acts of other Fitchburg patrolmen, much less the law enforcement officers from the outlying areas. Furthermore, the officers’ collaborative display of firearms conformed with standard police procedures in all respects, and the McNairs never have argued that the procedures themselves authorize an unreasonable response to an officer’s call for assistance. Cf. Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 10 (7th Cir. 1972). Finally, even assuming that the actions of the officers on the scene could be somehow attributed to Officer Coffey, I am of the opinion that the combined response of all the officers would still pass Fourth Amendment muster. We are fighting a war on drugs at a time when the population is increasingly desensitized to violence, and assaults against police officers are frequently applauded or even encouraged by certain elements of pop culture. An officer, working alone at night without a partner, who has probable cause and encounters what he believes to be three suspects acting suspiciously and fleeing from the vicinity of a known drug house, is entitled to seize the suspects using greater force than is usually necessary during a routine traffic stop. At the time of the seizure, none other than the arresting officer and, perhaps, an officer assisting, laid a hand upon either of the McNairs except to take them into custody and eventually charge Victor McNair with failing to obey an officer’s sign or signal and driving with a suspended license. Where the undue force underlying an excessive force claim primarily consists of an abstract demonstration of force and not its actual use, a justified finding of liability under sec. 1983 would be most unusual. Gumz, 772 F.2d at 1401. The McNairs were in custody for less than an hour at the scene; they were never conveyed to the station and booked; and they experienced only momentary fright during the hour or so following their seizure, along with some later disgust they attributed to their subjective belief of having been victimized. They did not complain at the time of their arrest, nor did they file a formal complaint with the department any time thereafter. They testified that they never sought counseling or visited a doctor, never missed any work or any jam sessions with the music group to which they belonged, and never experienced any subsequent physical or emotional problems. Indeed, they failed to produce even one single independent witness to corroborate their allegations of mental anguish and emotional distress. Because of the lack of objective evidence, and for the reasons previously stated, the jury verdict must be set aside and this case dismissed. See id. (reversing jury award in display of force case); see also Richard v. City of Harahan, 6 F. Supp.2d 565, 573-74 (E.D. La. 1998) (granting summary judgment when plaintiff offered no psychological, medical, or other corroborating evidence to establish an injury.) Very recently, the Seventh Circuit sustained a summary judgment ruling that an officer used reasonable force in a case that is far more egregious and troubling than this one. The police in Smith, 242 F.3d at 744, activated their sirens and followed a suspect for twelve blocks before he finally decided to pull over and comply with the officer’s directions. We reasoned that the suspect’s actions created the appearance of flight, thereby justifying the use of a higher degree of force to protect the community and the officers than that needed for someone who committed only a minor traffic violation. Id. The police forcibly pulled the man from his vehicle, pinned his arms behind his back, slammed him against the hood of the vehicle, and handcuffed him. We held that the officers’ use of force here was not high, let alone excessive under the circumstances. Id. Moreover, it was of no consequence that the man claimed he did not commit a traffic violation, hear the siren, or know he was being followed by police (they were in plainclothes and an unmarked car) because we assessed the factual situation from the officer’s point of view at the time of the arrest, not the suspect’s, as case law mandates./10 See id. The show of force by Officer Coffey and his summoned assisting partners in this case pales in comparison to the force outlined above in Smith, even though the McNairs potentially posed a far more serious safety risk to the law enforcement officials involved--as well as to the general public. Accordingly, in light of Gumz and Smith, and for the foregoing reasons, I am convinced that no rational, properly instructed jury could have found in the McNairs’ favor on their constitutional claim. All of Officer Coffey’s actions were reasonable under the United States Constitution. Therefore, the district judge should have dismissed this suit at the outset, when Coffey first filed for summary judgment.