Opinion ID: 2829377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legislature’s Authority to Abate Nuisances

Text: For over a century, this Court has recognized the Legislature’s authority to determine that a condition is a nuisance, and to provide for its summary abatement. As far back as 1876, we explained that the Legislature could declare that wooden buildings are nuisances under certain circumstances, and could so authorize their abatement. See Pye v. Peterson , 45 Tex. 312, 313–14 (1876) (holding that a city could not treat wooden buildings as nuisances absent a specific grant of such authority from the Legislature). This understanding is consistently echoed in our subsequent decisions. See Crossman , 247 S.W. at 812; Stockwell , 221 S.W. at 934 (“The State, in the exercise of its public power, may denominate certain things to be public nuisances, and because of their having that character provide for their summary abatement.”). Consequently, we have long recognized that the Legislature, pursuant to its authority to declare and abate nuisances, can confer to agencies or municipalities (by statute or grant of authority, as in a municipal charter) the ability to abate a specified nuisance, as defined by the legislative grant. See Crossman , 247 S.W. at 812; Pye , 45 Tex. at 314 (noting that the Legislature has the power to authorize municipalities to prohibit wooden buildings as nuisances). There are, however, limits to the Legislature’s authority. First, the Legislature cannot declare something a nuisance that is not so in fact. City of Houston v. Lurie , 224 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. 1949) (“‘This power is limited to declaring only those things to be such nuisances which are so in fact, since even the State may not denounce that as a nuisance which is not in fact. ’” ( quoting Crossman , 247 S.W. at 814)); Crossman , 247 S.W. at 812 (“Not even the Legislature can declare that a nuisance which is not so in fact.”). A “nuisance in fact” is a condition that “endangers the public health, public safety, public welfare, or offends the public morals.” State v. Spartan’s Indus., Inc. , 447 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. 1969). It is an otherwise unoffending condition that becomes a nuisance “by reason of its circumstances or surroundings.” 54 Tex. Jur. 3d Nuisances § 5 (2010). In other words, the Legislature may not declare a condition to be a nuisance that, by reason of its circumstances, does not endanger public health, safety, welfare, or morals. Second, the Legislature cannot delegate an open-ended authority to define nuisances to agencies or municipalities; rather, in authorizing abatement, the Legislature itself must define the nuisance in question. See City of Texarkana v. Reagan , 247 S.W. 816, 817 (Tex. 1923); Stockwell , 221 S.W. at 934. That grant is further subject to a due process requirement of judicial appeal when an agency or municipality acts under such legislative authorization. See Crossman , 247 S.W. at 813; Stockwell , 221 S.W. at 935; see also Brazosport Sav . & Loan Ass’n v. Am. Sav . & Loan Ass’n , 342 S.W.2d 747, 750–51 (Tex. 1961). The Court concludes that only a court is competent to ultimately determine whether a building is a nuisance, and that any such determination by an agency is always subject to de novo review, despite a legislative determination that the substantial evidence rule should apply. Though I agree with the Court that a nuisance determination is generally “a justiciable question,” Crossman , 247 S.W. at 813, our precedents do not require de novo judicial determination in every case of this nature in order to satisfy due process. A survey of our precedents in this area instead demonstrates that de novo review is not required if the Legislature has both (1) properly defined the nuisance and authorized its abatement, and (2) provided for a different standard of review of such an abatement . In Stockwell , the commissioner of agriculture did not merely determine that the particular hedge in question was a nuisance; instead, he determined that the type of citrus disease infecting the region was a nuisance under the general, catch-all provision of the statute in question. See Stockwell , 221 S.W. at 934. In other words, the commissioner effectively set the boundaries of his own authority by defining for himself what constituted a nuisance. See id. We held that Stockwell had a right to a judicial determination of whether citrus canker was a nuisance because the Legislature had not defined it as one, not because that right exists always and in every circumstance. 5 See id. at 935. Similar issues confronted this Court in Crossman . The principal due process defect in that case was that the municipality lacked authorization from the Legislature to abate the type of nuisance in question. See Crossman , 247 S.W. at 811–12. Specifically, the Legislature, through the city’s charter, had defined and authorized the abatement of wooden buildings constituting a fire hazard, but had not authorized the abatement of buildings that were merely dilapidated. Id. Accordingly, we held that a city ordinance, purporting to authorize the abatement of dilapidated buildings, was invalid for exceeding the authority given to the city by the Legislature. Id. at 812. In Reagan , we invalidated another city ordinance, holding that “this ordinance, in so far as it makes final the orders of the city council declaring the building a nuisance . . . is void.” Reagan , 247 S.W. at 817. Once again, the municipality in question lacked proper legislative authorization defining the nuisance in question. See id. at 816 (noting that the city council was purportedly “authorized by its charter to define and abate nuisances,” and questioning the validity of the charter accordingly) (emphasis added). Finally, in Lurie , we twice recognized the Legislature’s authority to declare a condition to be a nuisance. Lurie , 224 S.W.2d at 875 (noting that judicial determination that a condition is a nuisance is required unless it is “ property . . . within the class designated and condemned by statute . . . as a nuisance”); id. at 877 (“ [U] nless property is of the class condemned by statute . . . as a nuisance, the question whether it is in fact a nuisance is for judicial determination.”) ( emphasis added). We also construed—without any doubts as to its validity—the specific statute the Legislature had enacted pursuant to that power, authorizing the abatement of defined nuisances: “dangerous or dilapidated buildings or buildings [constituting a] fire hazard.” Id. at 874. We observed: “‘The State, in the exercise of its public power, may denominate certain things to be public nuisances, and because of their having that character provide for their summary abatement.’” Id. (quoting Crossman , 247 S.W. at 814). Thus, although Lurie goes on to state there is a right to judicial determination of whether a property is a nuisance, that right only arises when the Legislature or common law has not already defined the class of things in question as a nuisance. Id. at 875, 877. Of course, where the Legislature has made such a determination, due process still guarantees a qualified judicial review, but does not require that the review be de novo. Cf. City of Houston v. Blackbird , 394 S.W.2d 159, 160–61 (Tex. 1965). Nor did Lurie announce any general right to de novo appeal. Instead, it simply declined the city’s invitation in that case to limit appeal to substantial evidence review without guidance from the Legislature, based in part on the importance of the rights in question, but equally on the lack of legislative authorization. See Lurie , 224 S.W.2d at 875–76 . Therefore, under Lurie , due process does not require that the judicial review be de novo, if the Legislature, in its grant of authority to abate a defined nuisance, has provided for a lesser standard of review. See id. at 876 (declining to apply substantial evidence review because no statute authorized doing so). Here, the Legislature has authorized cities to abate a particular nuisance, and has specifically defined it as: [A] building that is: (1) dilapidated, substandard, or unfit for human habitation and a hazard to the public health, safety, and welfare; (2) regardless of its structural condition, unoccupied by its owners, lessees, or other invitees and is unsecured from unauthorized entry to the extent that it could be entered or used by vagrants or other uninvited persons as a place of haborage or could be entered or used by children; or (3) boarded up, fenced, or otherwise secured in any manner if (a) the building constitutes a danger to the public even though secured from entry; or (b) the means used to secure the building are inadequate to prevent unauthorized entry or use of the building in the manner described in Subdivision (2). Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001(a )( 1)–(3). This definition of what constitutes a nuisance is specific, and constitutes a nuisance in fact. See Spartan’s Indus. , 447 S.W.2d at 413 (observing that a nuisance in fact is a condition that “endangers the public health, public safety, public welfare, or offends the public morals”). Thus, unlike the statute in Stockwell , 6 or the charter in Reagan , 7 the grant in question here is circumscribed to specific conditions that constitute a nuisance in fact, and the municipality or agency is not allowed to define the nuisance. Further, the authorization specifies that judicial review is limited by the substantial evidence rule, Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.0012(f), which stands in stark contrast to the situation in Lurie , where the statute was silent as to the standard of review, see Lurie , 224 S.W.2d at 874, 876. As Justice Johnson notes in his dissent, the Court effectively overturns the statutory system created by the Legislature to facilitate nuisance abatement. This is especially troubling because the Legislature appears to have made every reasonable effort to draft these statutes in accordance with the relevant standards pronounced by Texas courts, including other due process requirements not at issue here. In particular, the statutes provide for: (1) notice and hearing, compare Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001(b )( 2)–(3), with Perry v. Del Rio , 67 S.W.3d 85, 92 (Tex. 2001), (2) a chance to remedy the nuisance, compare Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001(d), with Crossman , 247 S.W. at 812, (3) notice to mortgagees and lienholders , compare Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001(h), with State Bank of Omaha v. Means , 746 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied), (4) a right to judicial appeal, compare Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.0012, with Blackbird , 394 S.W.2d at 161; Crossman , 247 S.W. at 813; Stockwell , 221 S.W. at 934–35, and (5) a clear definition of what constitutes a nuisance in this context, compare Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001(a )( 1)–(3), with Stockwell , 221 S.W. at 934–95. In addition, there is no need for the novel course the Court embarks on today. Although there are important substantive rights behind the procedural issue in this case—i.e., rights under the Takings Clause—creating a new procedural entitlement to protect such rights is unnecessary. The right to compensation for takings of private property is a vital one, as evidenced by its enshrinement in both the Federal and Texas Constitutions. Without reservation, I share the Court’s laudable concern with preventing uncompensated takings. As such, I note that even under substantial evidence review, it is still possible to prove that an agency’s or municipality’s action is illegal, see Brazosport Sav . & Loan Ass’n , 342 S.W.2d at 752, which might well be relevant if an agency or municipality acts outside of its authority, as by using the nuisance procedures to actually take title to a piece of real property, or by violating the procedures in Local Government Code chapters 54 and 214, or other statutes. Accordingly, our system already provides adequate safeguards for property owners, without thwarting the intent of the Legislature as the Court does. In summary, the Legislature has both (1) validly defined the nuisance in question and authorized its abatement, Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 214.001, and (2) specified what standard of review applies, id. § 214.0012(f). As a result, I would conclude that the urban nuisance statutes at issue comport with our nuisance precedents, and therefore afforded Stewart due process, and thus should have precluded Stewart’s takings claim. 8