Opinion ID: 1655758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: separation of jurors.

Text: After the jury had been deliberating its guilt-phase verdicts for some time, but before the jury returned to open court, the foreperson of the jury left the jury room and walked down the hall to the judge's office, apparently intending to personally deliver the jury's verdicts to the judge. The judge's secretary would not accept the verdicts and directed the foreperson to return to the jury room, which he did. Shortly thereafter, all of the jurors returned to the courtroom and the foreperson delivered the verdicts to the judge in open court. At a hearing held on the issue, the trial court was able to account for the foreperson's whereabouts during his entire absence from the jury room, and it does not appear that the foreperson spoke with anyone except the judge's secretary. Appellant claims this incident warranted a mistrial. We disagree. Criminal Rule 9.66 provides that jurors deliberating a felony charge shall be sequestered unless otherwise agreed by the parties with approval of the court. That does not mean that each juror must remain constantly in the presence of the others. If that were so, jurors would not be permitted to take restroom breaks or to sleep in separate rooms during an overnight sequestration. The general rule is that a mere temporary separation of the jury is not grounds for reversal if it appears that no definite prejudice resulted and there was no opportunity to tamper with the jurors. 75B Am.Jur.2d Trial § 1505 (1992). That has long been the rule in Kentucky. There is more or less separation in the case of every jury required to be kept together under the law, it being a well known fact that it is a matter of practical impossibility to keep all twelve members of a jury in close contact with each other at all times. . . . [T]he trend of rulings has been towards a liberal application and a construction that a substantial compliance with the statute was sufficient unless there was some fact or circumstance indicating that a juror had been approached or an opportunity afforded to influence him. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 1, 127 S.W.2d 876, 877 (1939) (citations omitted). Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Ky.2000). See also Smith v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Ky.1962); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 381, 388 (Ky.1962) (jurors properly permitted to separate by being allowed to make telephone calls to relatives concerning their personal needs during overnight sequestration), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 829, 82 S.Ct. 847, 7 L.Ed.2d 795 (1962); Hendrickson v. Commonwealth, 259 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Ky.1953) (jurors properly permitted to stay in separate hotel rooms during overnight recess); Marcum v. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Ky.1953) (absent a showing or claim of misconduct, temporary absence of two jurors following restroom break did not constitute improper separation). Accordingly, we affirm Appellant's conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree and the sentence imposed therefor, and reverse his conviction of unlawful transaction with a minor in the first degree and the sentence imposed therefor, and remand the latter count of the indictment to the Perry Circuit Court for a new trial on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in the first degree. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, ROACH, and SCOTT, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., concurs with so much of the opinion that affirms the conviction of first-degree sexual abuse, but dissents from the reversal of the conviction of unlawful transaction with a minor because the evidence supported conviction under both charges; the jury instructions were correct and there was no double jeopardy.