Opinion ID: 2604718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: plaintiff's summary judgment

Text: The present case parallels Rodriguez closely so we look there for guidance. The paramount lesson of Rodriguez is the normal summary judgment procedure should be followed in `actual malice' defamation actions. 65 Haw. at 439, 653 P.2d at 1151. Summary judgment for the plaintiff is proper only where the record reveals that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the defendants. Id. at 438, 653 P.2d at 1150. Moreover, the trial court must find the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) 56(c). This is indeed a difficult hurdle to clear. As we stated in State v. Zimring, 52 Haw. 472, 475, 479 P.2d 202, 204 (1970) (quoting Phoenix Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 381 F.2d 245 (4th Cir.1967)), `It is well settled that summary judgment should not be granted unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and establishes affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances.' To prevail here on summary judgment, plaintiff must establish as a matter of law each element of defamation by a preponderance of the evidence except the element of actual malice, which must be proven with a higher standard of clear and convincing proof. Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 438-39, 653 P.2d at 1150-51. The presence of an issue of fact from which a reasonable trier of fact could find plaintiff had not met her burden of proof on even one element of her defamation claim would be sufficient to defeat her motion for summary judgment. Id. at 440, 653 P.2d at 1151. To prove defamation, the plaintiff must establish four elements: (a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher [actual malice where the plaintiff is a public figure]; and (d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the publication. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). In the present case, there are questions of fact concerning elements (a) and (c). [5]
The truth of defendants' statement is questionable but plaintiff did not establish its falsity as a matter of law. The ad stated that Ariyoshi and Beamer were controlled by Trask and Mehau. While Beamer refutes its truth, both Reed and Nishiki maintain in their answer, affidavit, and deposition that the statement is true. The defendants' answer claims the statement was true. R. at 16. Nishiki's affidavit states I continue to believe that its [the ad's] contents were true in substance and in fact... . R. at 79-80. Reed's affidavit also claims no doubts as to the truth of the statement. R. at 82. Finally, in his deposition Nishiki stated he considered the statement true. [6] Viewing the record from defendants' point of view there is at least some question whether Beamer was in fact controlled by Trask and Mehau and it is a question of fact for the jury. Whether defendants' statement was defamatory also raises a question of fact. This court recently stated the proper test for ascertaining when a statement is defamatory: A communication is defamatory when it tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 (1976); Kahanamoku v. Advertiser, 25 Haw. 701 (1920). Whether a communication is defamatory `depends, among other factors, upon the temper of the times, the current of contemporary public opinion, with the result that words, harmless in one age, in one community, may be highly damaging to reputation at another time or in a different place.' Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 73 A.D.2d 276, 284, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 282 (1980). Kahanamoku, supra. Fernandes v. Tenbruggencate, 65 Haw. at 228, 649 P.2d at 1147. Here the ad stated that Beamer was controlled by Trask and Mehau, without express mention of the organized crime connection. Thus the question is whether use of the word control in connection with the names Trask and Mehau is defamatory per se; that is, whether MEHAU AND TRASK NEVER HELP ANYONE THEY DON'T CONTROL is capable of either an innocent or defamatory interpretation, or could only as a matter of law be interpreted as defamatory. Both sides bombard us with different definitions of control. [7] Viewing the ad itself, the words known puppet and Mehau and Trask running our State government might lead the reader to interpret control as dominate or dictate. In his deposition, however, Nishiki gave a more innocuous definition: Q. [Schutter] What do you mean by control? A. [Nishiki] Influence. Q. [Schutter] Influence? Well, you follow up by saying, If you don't want Mehau and Trask running our state government, be careful not to vote for Ariyoshi and Beamer. Now, by that, do you mean running the government, or that they might influence the government? A. [Nishiki] They might influence. Q. [Schutter] They have great influence? A. [Nishiki] Yes. Q. [Schutter] But you say running our government. Did you mean running our government or did you mean influencing our government? A. [Nishiki] Well, I said that they have great influence, and that is what I'm saying. Deposition of Wayne Nishiki at p. 192. [8] Viewing the issue in defendants' light, we cannot say the assertion that Beamer was strongly influenced by two men was defamatory per se. The possible defamatory character of the statement lies in the implication that Beamer was a puppet of a union leader and a rumored underworld figure. In the context of the times, that implication was very feasible, but on its face the statement falls short of being defamatory as a matter of law. It is for the jury to consider the context of the statement and determine whether it lowered Beamer's reputation in the estimation of the community. Fong v. Merena, 66 Haw. 73, 74 n. 1, 655 P.2d 875, 876 n. 1 (1982); Fernandes v. Tenbruggencate, 65 Haw. at 228, 649 P.2d at 1147; Chedester v. Stecker, 64 Haw. 464, 469, 643 P.2d 532, 535 (1982). In Rodriguez, this court ruled in part that the defamatory character of another of Nishiki's statements (CRIMINALS CONTROL ENTERTAINERS Did you know that organized crime has a stranglehold on our entertainment industry?) was a matter for the jury: There is an issue of fact as to whether Nishiki's statement was susceptible to an innocent meaning by reasonable persons and whether Nishiki acted with the requisite actual malice. We have held in the past that if a statement can be interpreted as having both an innocent and a defamatory meaning, it is within the province of the jury, rather than the trial court in summary judgment, to determine the sense in which it was understood. Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 445, 653 P.2d at 1154-55. The statement at issue in this case (MEHAU AND TRASK NEVER HELP ANYONE THEY DON'T CONTROL) is similar enough that the question of whether it was defamatory should go to the jury.
Beamer concedes she is a public figure. A public figure defamation plaintiff must prove with clear and convincing proof that the defendant acted with actual malice. Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 439, 653 P.2d at 1151. This court has defined actual malice as `deliberate falsification' of facts or `reckless disregard' of the truth, i.e., reckless publication despite a high degree of awareness, harbored by the publisher, of the probable falsity of the published statements. Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., (Tagawa II), 50 Haw. 648, 652, 448 P.2d 337, 340, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 822, 90 S.Ct. 63, 24 L.Ed.2d 73 (1968). Moreover, this court has agreed with the U.S. Supreme Court that reckless disregard is a subjective question of the defendant's state of mind: [R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. Mehau v. Gannett Pacific Corp., 66 Haw. at 148, 658 P.2d at 322 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968)). As this court stated in Rodriguez: If there is a factual dispute about defendant's state of mind with regard to actual malice, summary judgment should not be granted. As the Supreme Court recently noted in Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2680 n. 9, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), the proof of actual malice calls a defendant's state of mind into question, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 [84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686] (1964), and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 439, 653 P.2d at 1151; quoted in Mehau, 66 Haw. at 146, 658 P.2d at 321. Proving defendants acted with a high degree of awareness of the ad's probable falsity is extremely difficult as a matter of law. The existence or absence of malice is generally a question for the jury. Runnells v. Okamoto, 56 Haw. 1, 5, 525 P.2d 1125, 1129 (1974). As we noted in Rodriguez, an ad's defamatory character, the defendants' failure to investigate, and the incredibility of evidence concerning defendants' state of mind together do not constitute actual malice as a matter of law: Actual malice cannot be presumed from the mere fact of the defamatory character of the publication... . Mere investigatory failure on the part of Reed to determine whether the specific entertainers named in his article were actually connected with organized crime is also insufficient to establish that Reed acted with knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth... . Appellees [also] cannot satisfy the obligation of showing actual malice simply by asserting that the only evidence concerning Reed's state of mind is too incredible for a reasonable person to consider. Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 441-42, 653 P.2d at 1152; See also, Fong v. Merena, 66 Haw. at 75, 655 P.2d at 876-77. Of course, we have also noted that professions of innocence alone are not a conclusive defense to a defamation suit: The defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot, however, automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was indeed made in good faith. Professions of good faith will be unlikely to prove persuasive, for example, where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be likely to prevail when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. Mehau, 66 Haw. at 148, 658 P.2d at 732 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326) (emphasis added). Yet, as the underlined portion indicates, the question of the defendant's state of mind is generally a question for the trier of fact, not for summary judgment. [9] Applying the law to the present case, we note that plaintiff must prove each defendant acted with actual malice. Rodriguez, 65 Haw. at 441, 653 P.2d at 1152. Nishiki's affidavit states that he thought the ad was true and had no doubts about the basis of his knowledge. R. at 79-80. [10] At his depositions Nishiki was extremely evasive but did state that he agreed with the ad. Nishiki Deposition at 166-68, fn. 6, supra. Finally, Nishiki's answer claims he honestly believed the statements were true. R. at 16. Viewing the record as we must in Nishiki's favor, we conclude his statements do raise at least a question of fact from which a reasonable jury could find he had less than a high degree of awareness that the ad was probably false. Reed's affidavit states he also had no doubts about the truth of the ad. [11] Plaintiff never deposed Reed to test his basis for the statement, so we are unable to say as a matter of law that he had none. [12] Consequently, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment for plaintiff.