Opinion ID: 110512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Equal Pay Act

Text: The starting point for any discussion of sex-based wage discrimination claims must be the Equal Pay Act of 1963, enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. §§ 201-219 (1976 ed., Supp. III). It was there that Congress, after 18 months of careful and exhaustive study, specifically addressed the problem of sex-based wage discrimination. The Equal Pay Act states that employers shall not discriminate on the basis of sex by paying different wages for jobs that require equal skill, effort, and responsibility. In adopting the equal pay for equal work formula, Congress carefully considered and ultimately rejected the equal pay for comparable worth standard advanced by respondents and several amici. As the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act amply demonstrates, Congress realized that the adoption of the comparable-worth doctrine would ignore the economic realities of supply and demand and would involve both governmental agencies and courts in the impossible task of ascertaining the worth of comparable work, an area in which they have little expertise. The legislative history of the Equal Pay Act begins in 1962 when Representatives Green and Zelenko introduced two identical bills, H. R. 8898 and H. R. 10226 respectively, representing the Kennedy administration's proposal for equal pay legislation. Both bills stated in pertinent part: SEC. 4. No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to any employee at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to any employee of the opposite sex for work of comparable character on jobs the performance of which requires comparable skills, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority or merit increase system which does not discriminate on the basis of sex. H. R. 8898, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H. R. 10226, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (emphasis supplied). [1] During the extensive hearings on the proposal, the administration strenuously urged that Congress adopt the comparable language, noting that the comparability of different jobs could be determined through job evaluation procedures. Hearings on H. R. 8898, H. R. 10226 before the Select Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 16, 27 (1962) (testimony of Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson). A bill containing the comparable-work formula, then denominated H. R. 11677, was reported out of the House Committee on Education and Labor and reached the full House. Once there, Representative St. George objected to the comparable work language of the bill and offered an amendment which limited equal pay claims to those for equal work on jobs, the performance of which requires equal skills. 108 Cong. Rec. 14767 (1962). As she explained, her purpose was to limit wage discrimination claims to the situation where men and women were paid differently for performing the same job. What we want to do in this bill is to make it exactly what it says. It is called equal pay for equal work in some of the committee hearings. There is a great difference between the word `comparable' and the word `equal'. ..... . . . The word `comparable' opens up great vistas. It gives tremendous latitude to whoever is to be arbitrator in these disputes. Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.) Representative Landrum echoed those remarks. He stressed that the St. George amendment would prevent the trooping around all over the country of employees of the Labor Department harassing business with their various interpretations of the term `comparable' when `equal' is capable of the same definition throughout the United States. Id., at 14768. The administration, represented by Representatives Zelenko and Green, vigorously urged the House to reject the St. George amendment. They observed that the equal work standard was narrower than the existing equal pay for comparable work language and cited correspondence from Secretary of Labor Goldberg that comparable is a key word in our proposal. Id., at 14768-14769. The House, however, rejected that advice and adopted the St. George amendment. When the Senate considered the bill, it too rejected the comparable work theory in favor of the equal work standard. Because the Conference Committee failed to report a bill out of Committee, enactment of equal pay legislation was delayed until 1963. Equal pay legislation, containing the St. George amendment, was reintroduced at the beginning of the session. The congressional debate on that legislation leaves no doubt that Congress clearly rejected the entire notion of comparable worth. For example, Representative Goodell, a cosponsor of the Act, stressed the significance of the change from comparable work to equal work. [2] I think it is important that we have clear legislative history at this point. Last year when the House changed the word `comparable' to `equal' the clear intention was to narrow the whole concept. We went from `comparable' to `equal' meaning that the jobs involved should be virtually identical, that is, that they would be very much alike or closely related to each other. We do not expect the Labor Department to go into an establishment and attempt to rate jobs that are not equal. We do not want to hear the Department say, `Well, they amount to the same thing,' and evaluate them so that they come up to the same skill or point. We expect this to apply only to jobs that are substantially identical or equal. 109 Cong. Rec. 9197 (1963) (emphasis supplied). Representative Frelinghuysen agreed with those remarks. [W]e can expect that the administration of the equal pay concept, while fair and effective, will not be excessive nor excessively wide ranging. What we seek to insure, where men and women are doing the same job under the same working conditions[,] that they will receive the same pay. It is not intended that either the Labor Department or individual employees will be equipped with hunting licenses. ..... . . . [ The EPA ] is not intended to compare unrelated jobs, or jobs that have been historically and normally considered by the industry to be different.  Id., at 9196 (emphasis supplied). [3] Thus, the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act clearly reveals that Congress was unwilling to give either the Federal Government or the courts broad authority to determine comparable wage rates. Congress recognized that the adoption of such a theory would ignore economic realities and would result in major restructuring of the American economy. Instead, Congress concluded that governmental intervention to equalize wage differentials was to be undertaken only within one circumstance: when men's and women's jobs were identical or nearly so, hence unarguably of equal worth. It defies common sense to believe that the same Congress which, after 18 months of hearings and debates, had decided in 1963 upon the extent of federal involvement it desired in the area of wage rate claimsintended sub silentio to reject all of this work and to abandon the limitations of the equal work approach just one year later, when it enacted Title VII. Title VII Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000a et seq., one year after passing the Equal Pay Act. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1). The question is whether Congress intended to completely turn its back on the equal work standard enacted in the Equal Pay Act of 1963 when it adopted Title VII only one year later. The Court answers that question in the affirmative, concluding that Title VII must be read more broadly than the Equal Pay Act. In so holding, the majority wholly ignores this Court's repeated adherence to the doctrine of in pari materia, namely, that [w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of enactment. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U. S. 148, 153 (1976), citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 550-551 (1974); United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U. S. 164, 169 (1976). In Continental Tuna, for example, the lower court held that an amendment to the Suits in Admiralty Act allowed plaintiffs to sue the United States under that Act and ignore the applicable and more stringent provisions of the previously enacted Public Vessels Act. We rejected that construction because it amounted to a repeal of the Public Vessels Act by implication. We recognized that such an evasion of the congressional purpose reflected in the restrictive provisions would not be permitted absent some clear statement by Congress that such was intended by the later statute. Similarly, in Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1 (1976), this Court rejected a construction of the Federal Water Control Act which would have substantially altered the regulation scheme established under the Atomic Energy Act, without a clear indication of legislative intent. Id., at 24. When those principles are applied to this case, there can be no doubt that the Equal Pay Act and Title VII should be construed in pari materia. The Equal Pay Act is the more specific piece of legislation, dealing solely with sex-based wage discrimination, and was the product of exhaustive congressional study. Title VII, by contrast, is a general antidiscrimination provision, passed with virtually no consideration of the specific problem of sex-based wage discrimination. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S. 125, 143 (1976) (the legislative history of the sex discrimination amendment is notable primarily for its brevity). [4] Most significantly, there is absolutely nothing in the legislative history of Title VII which reveals an intent by Congress to repeal by implication the provisions of the Equal Pay Act. Quite the contrary, what little legislative history there is on the subject such as the comments of Senators Clark and Bennett and Representative Celler, and the contemporaneous interpretation of the EEOCindicates that Congress intended to incorporate the substantive standards of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII so that sex-based wage discrimination claims would be governed by the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act and by that standard alone. See discussion infra, at 190-197. In order to the reach the result it so desperately desires, the Court neatly solves the problem of this contrary legislative history by simply giving it no weight. Ante, at 172, n. 12, 176, and n. 16. But it cannot be doubted that Chief Justice Marshall stated the correct rule that [w]here the mind labors to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived . . . . United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). In this case, when all of the pieces of legislative history are considered in toto, the Court's version of the legislative history of Title VII is barely plausible, say nothing of convincing. Title VII was first considered by the House, where the prohibition against sex discrimination was added on the House floor. When the bill reached the Senate it bypassed the Senate Committee system and was presented directly to the full Senate. It was there that concern was expressed about the relation of the Title VII sex discrimination ban to the Equal Pay Act. In response to questions by Senator Dirksen, Senator Clark, the floor manager for the bill, prepared a memorandum in which he attempted to put to rest certain objections which he believed to be unfounded. Senator Clark's answer to Senator Dirksen reveals that Senator Clark believed that all cases of wage discrimination under Title VII would be treated under the standards of the Equal Pay Act:  Objection. The sex antidiscrimination provisions of the bill duplicate the coverage of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. But more than this, they extend far beyond the scope and coverage of the Equal Pay Act. They do not include the limitations in that act with respect to equal work on jobs requiring equal skills in the same establishments, and thus, cut across different jobs.  Answer. The Equal Pay Act is a part of the wage hour law, with different coverage and with numerous exemptions unlike title VII. Furthermore, under title VII, jobs can no longer be classified as to sex, except where there is a rational basis for discrimination on the ground of bona fide occupational qualification. The standards in the Equal Pay Act for determining discrimination as to wages, of course, are applicable to the comparable situation under title VII.  110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964) (emphasis added). In this passage, Senator Clark asserted that the sex discrimination provisions of Title VII were necessary, notwithstanding the Equal Pay Act, because (a) the Equal Pay Act had numerous exemptions for various types of businesses, and (b) Title VII covered discrimination in access ( e. g., assignment and promotion) to jobs, not just compensation. In addition, Senator Clark made clear that in the compensation area the equal work standard would continue to be the applicable standard. He explained, in answer to Senator Dirksen's concern, that when different jobs were at issue, the Equal Pay Act's legal standardthe equal work standard would apply to limit the reach of Title VII. Thus Senator Clark rejected as unfounded the objections that the sex provisions of Title VII were unnecessary on the one hand or extended beyond the equal work standard on the other. Notwithstanding Senator Clark's explanation, Senator Bennett remained concerned that, absent an explicit cross-reference to the Equal Pay Act, the wholesale insertion of the word sex in Title VII could nullify the carefully conceived Equal Pay Act standard. 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964). Accordingly, he offered, and the Senate accepted, the following amendment to Title VII: It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of [§ 6 (d) of the Equal Pay Act]. Although the language of the Bennett Amendment is ambiguous, the most plausible interpretation of the Amendment is that it incorporates the substantive standard of the Equal Pay Actthe equal pay for equal work standardinto Title VII. A number of considerations support that view. In the first place, that interpretation is wholly consistent with, and in fact confirms, Senator Clark's earlier explanation of Title VII. Second, in the limited time available to Senator Bennett when he offered his amendmentthe time for debate having been limited by cloturehe explained the Amendment's purpose. [5] Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effective only yesterday. By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of this act. Now when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word `sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word `sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act. The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified. 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964) (emphasis supplied). It is obvious that the principal way in which the Equal Pay Act could be nullified would be to allow plaintiffs unable to meet the equal pay for equal work standard to proceed under Title VII asserting some other theory of wage discrimination, such as comparable worth. If plaintiffs can proceed under Title VII without showing that they satisfy the equal work criterion of the Equal Pay Act, one would expect all plaintiffs to file suit under the broader Title VII standard. Such a result would, for all practical purposes, constitute an implied repeal of the equal work standard of the Equal Pay Act and render that Act a nullity. This was precisely the result Congress sought to avert when it adopted the Bennett Amendment, and the result the Court today embraces. Senator Bennett confirmed this interpretation just one year later. The Senator expressed concern as to the proper interpretation of his Amendment and offered his written understanding of the Amendment. The Amendment therefore means that it is not an unlawful employment practice: . . .(b) to have different standards of compensation for nonexempt employees, where such differentiation is not prohibited by the equal pay amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Simply stated, the [ Bennett ] amendment means that discrimination in compensation on account of sex does not violate title VII unless it also violates the Equal Pay Act.  111 Cong. Rec. 13359 (1965) (emphasis supplied). Senator Dirksen agreed that this interpretation was precisely the one that he, Senator Humphrey, and their staffs had in mind when the Senate adopted the Bennett Amendment. Id., at 13360. He added: I trust that that will suffice to clear up in the minds of anyone, whether in the Department of Justice or elsewhere, what the Senate intended when that amendment was accepted. Ibid. [6] We can glean further insight into the proper interpretation of the Bennett Amendment from the comments of Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and sponsor of Title VII. After the Senate added the Bennett Amendment to Title VII and sent the bill to the House, Representative Celler set out in the record the understanding of the House that sex-based compensation claims would not satisfy Title VII unless they met the equal work standards of the Equal Pay Act. He explained that the Bennett Amendment [p]rovides that compliance with the [EPA] satisfies the requirement of the title barring discrimination because of sex[§ 703 (h)]. 110 Cong. Rec. 15896 (1964). The majority discounts this statement because it is somewhat imprecise. Ante, at 176. I find it difficult to believe that a comment to the full House made by the sponsor of Title VII, who obviously understood its provisions, including its amendments, is of no aid whatsoever to the inquiry before us. [7] Finally, the contemporaneous interpretations of the Bennett Amendment by the EEOC, which are entitled to great weight since they were issued while the intent of Congress was still fresh in the administrator's mind, further buttresses petitioners' interpretation of the Amendment. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U. S. 1, 16 (1965); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U. S., at 142. The EEOC interpretations clearly state that the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard is incorporated into Title VII as the standard which must be met by plaintiffs alleging sex-based compensation claims under Title VII. The Commission's 1965 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex explain: Title VII requires that its provisions be harmonized with the Equal Pay Act (section 6 (d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d)) in order to avoid conflicting interpretations or requirements with respect to situations to which both statutes are applicable. Accordingly, the Commission interprets section 703 ( h ) to mean that the standards of `equal pay for equal work' set forth in the Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in compensation are applicable to Title VII. However, it is the judgment of the Commission that the employee coverage of the prohibition against discrimination in compensation because of sex is coextensive with that of the other prohibitions in section 703, and is not limited by § 703 (h) to those employees covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 29 CFR § 1604.7 (1966). (Emphasis supplied.) Three weeks after the EEOC issued its Guidelines, the General Counsel explained the Guidelines in an official opinion letter. [8] He explained: The Commission, as indicated in § 1604.7 of the Guidelines issued November 24, 1965, 30 F. R. 14928, has decided that section 703 (h), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 incorporates the definition of discrimination in compensation found in the Equal Pay Act, including the four enumerated exceptions . . . . General Counsel's opinion of December 29, 1965, App. to Brief for Petitioners 7a. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus EEOC's contemporaneous interpretation of the Bennett Amendment leaves no room for doubt: The Bennett Amendment incorporates the equal work standard of discrimination into Title VII. [9] The Court blithely ignores all of this legislative history and chooses to interpret the Bennett Amendment as incorporating only the Equal Pay Act's four affirmative defenses, and not the equal work requirement. [10] That argument does not survive scrutiny. In the first place, the language of the Amendment draws no distinction between the Equal Pay Act's standard for liabilityequal pay for equal workand the Act's defenses. Nor does any Senator or Congressman even come close to suggesting that the Amendment incorporates the Equal Pay Act's affirmative defenses into Title VII, but not the equal work standard itself. Quite the contrary, the concern was that Title VII would render the Equal Pay Act a nullity. It is only too obvious that reading just the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII does not protect the careful draftsmanship of the Equal Pay Act. We must examine statutory words in a manner that `reconstitute[s] the gamut of values current at the time when the words were uttered.' National Woodwork Manufacturers Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U. S. 612, 620 (1967) (quoting L. Hand, J.). In this case, it stands Congress' concern on its head to suppose that Congress sought to incorporate the affirmative defenses, but not the equal work standard. It would be surprising if Congress in 1964 sought to reverse its decision in 1963 to require a showing of equal work as a predicate to an equal pay claim and at the same time carefully preserve the four affirmative defenses. Moreover, even on its own terms the Court's argument is unpersuasive. The Equal Pay Act contains four statutory defenses: different compensation is permissible if the differential is made by way of (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) is based on any other factor other than sex. 29 U. S. C. § 206 (d) (1). The flaw in interpreting the Bennett Amendment as incorporating only the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII is that Title VII, even without the Bennett Amendment, contains those very same defenses. [11] The opening sentence of § 703 (h) protects differentials and compensation based on seniority, merit, or quantity or quality of production. These are three of the four EPA defenses. The fourth EPA defense, a factor other than sex, is already implicit in Title VII because the statute's prohibition of sex discrimination applies only if there is discrimination on the basis of sex. Under the Court's interpretation, the Bennett Amendment, the second sentence of § 703 (h), is mere surplusage. United States v. Menasche, 348 U. S. 528, 538-539 (1955) (It is our duty `to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute,' Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 152, rather than emasculate an entire section). [12] The Court's answer to this argument is curious. It suggests that repetition ensures that the provisions would be consistently interpreted by the courts. Ante, at 170. But that answer only speaks to the purpose for incorporating the defenses in each statute, not for stating the defenses twice in the same statute. Courts are not quite as dense as the majority assumes. In sum, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, read together, provide a balanced approach to resolving sex-based wage discrimination claims. Title VII guarantees that qualified female employees will have access to all jobs, and the Equal Pay Act assures that men and women performing the same work will be paid equally. Congress intended to remedy wage discrimination through the Equal Pay Act standards, whether suit is brought under that statute or under Title VII. What emerges is that Title VII would have been construed in pari materia even without the Bennett Amendment, and that the Amendment serves simply to insure that the equal work standard would be the standard by which all wage compensation claims would be judged.