Opinion ID: 186846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Case of the Mistaken Maximum

Text: 13 In the course of resentencing Watson, the district court stated, incorrectly, that Watson was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 240 months. In fact, the maximum under the felon-in-possession statute was 120 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Watson contends this mistake led the district court to conclude his sentence of 108 months was, as the district court put it, considerably less than the statutorily-available sentencing maximum. The Government responds that Watson's failure to disabuse the district court — indeed, counsel expressed agreement with the court's misstatement of the maximum — makes the error subject to review for plain error, if at all. Further, the Government contends, the error did not substantially affect the court's choice of sentence within the recommended sentencing range, and therefore was not prejudicial. 14 We agree with the Government in part: Because counsel for Watson did not object, we will review the record only for plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). Under this standard, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (error harmless if it does not affect substantial rights). If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 15 In this case there was an error, it was plain, and we have no trouble seeing its effect upon Watson's substantial rights: The district court's misimpression that a sentence of 108 months was considerably less than the statutorily-available sentencing maximum was apparently the basis upon which the court suggested it had taken the relevant mitigating factors into account and was imposing a significantly lesser sentence. Thus, it appears there might have been a materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C.Cir.2005), had the district court had the proper sentencing range — either the 115-month Guidelines maximum or the 120-month statutory maximum — rather than the supposed 240-month statutory maximum as its frame of reference. In short, it appears the district court thought it was imposing a sentence considerably less than, but instead imposed a sentence quite close to, the maximum. 16 We conclude the district court's erroneous premise gave it the mistaken impression it was being lenient and the error thus infected Watson's sentence. Cf. United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2d Cir.2005) ([L]eaving in place an error-infected sentence that would have been materially different absent error and that could be readily corrected would `seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Indeed, it would seriously affect all three. (footnote and citation omitted)). We therefore reverse Watson's sentence.