Opinion ID: 1161819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contributory negligence distinguished from assumption of risk

Text: Contributory negligence, which was introduced to the common law a few years after assumption of risk first made its appearance, [17] is that conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard of one to which he is required to conform for his own protection. [18] The test for contributory negligence relies on an objective standard [19] of conduct that falls below the degree of care which would be exercised by a reasonable person. The inquiry is into whether the plaintiff's conduct conforms to that of a reasonably prudent man in the protection of himself and, if not, whether it is a contributing cause to the injury. Contributory negligence implies the omission of a duty on the part of the injured person and excludes the idea of willfulness. [20] What is in actuality lack of due care or heedlessness on the part of a plaintiff is often mislabeled assumption of risk. [21] For risk assumption to avail as a defense to a tort claim for negligence there must either be an express agreement, a pre-existing status between the defendant and plaintiff, or an element of consent to the harm that is known and appreciated by the plaintiff. Anything falling outside these areas is simply contributory negligence. In the present case, it cannot be said that the plaintiff consented to being thrown from the car when he jumped onto it. The plaintiff may have been reckless and exhibited a lack of due care, but that would require a jury charge on contributory negligence and not on assumption of risk. The evidence clearly warranted the instruction on contributory negligence, which the trial court gave, but not one on risk assumption. Because the flawed charge gave the defendant the benefit of a complete defense [22] to which he was not entitled, the trial court's order granting plaintiff's motion for new trial rests clearly on legally tenable grounds. [23] The trial court's order granting a new trial is affirmed. DOOLIN, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, ALMA WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. KAUGER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. SIMMS, J., dissents.