Opinion ID: 67136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gray’s Title VII Disparate Treatment Claims

Text: i. Whether most of Gray’s claims are time-barred under Title VII Before a plaintiff may pursue a Title VII discrimination claim, she first must 2 “Although McDonnell Douglas was a Title VII case, Title VII and section 1983 claims have the same elements where the claims are based on the same set of facts.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Georgia, 520 F.3d 1269, 1275 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008). 8 exhaust her administrative remedies. Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). To exhaust her remedies, the plaintiff must file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). To be timely within a non-deferral state, such as Alabama, it must be filed within 180 days of the last discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 2070, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) (stating that “[i]n a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who initially files a grievance with that agency must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice; in all other States, the charge must be filed within 180 days”); see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., Inc., 421 F.3d 1169, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 127 S.Ct. 2162 (2007) (noting that Alabama is a non-deferral state). Gray filed her EEOC complaint on April 13, 2005. Thus, to be timely, the acts of which Gray complains must have occurred on or after October 15, 2004. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109, 122 S.Ct. at 2070. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it adopted the magistrate’s finding that the claims involving acts before then were time-barred. However, because the record reflects that Gray’s shift changed when she returned to work in September 9 2005, and she claimed that she was denied a shift change request in August 2005, the magistrate erred when it found that Gray’s last shift change fell outside the 180-day period. As a result, Gray’s Title VII claims relating to the following acts are timely: (1) the Board’s January 2005 selection for the high school positions; (2) the retaliation of Gray’s alleged protest of discriminatory treatment after her November 2004 conversation with the AEA representative; (3) the acts relating to Gray’s April 2005 letter concerning her wages; and (4) the denial of Gray’s shift change request. ii. Failure to Promote To establish a prima facie case of discrimination on failure-to-promote grounds, Gray must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for and applied for the promotion; (3) she was rejected despite these qualifications; and (4) other equally or less qualified employees who were not members of the protected class were promoted. Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1988); but see Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1185-93 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the qualifications of others is not relevant to the prima facie case). To satisfy her burden, Gray cannot be required to show that she applied for the job in question when the employer does not advertise the job opening or uses informal means for hiring. Jones v. Firestone Tire and Rubber 10 Co., Inc., 977 F.2d 527, 533 (11th Cir. 1992). In that case, the plaintiff still must show that she was qualified for the job in question. Id. The record indicates that the Board posted open positions in accordance with state law.3 Gray does not assert, nor is there any evidence that the Board failed to post the head custodian position to which Ezell was selected. Moreover, unlike Gray’s assertions otherwise, the Board’s application process involved more than merely including a letter of general interest in the custodial application file. Gray was aware of the posting process and had used it to apply for positions in the past. Thus, even though she had a conversation with Dr. DeLano about her interest in other positions, Gray has not shown that she actually applied for the head custodial position at the high school. As such, the district court did not err by granting the Board’s motion for summary judgment on this claim because Gray failed to establish a prima facie case of failure to promote.4 See Wu, 847 F.2d at 1483. 3 Although in her complaint, Gray alleges that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender and race with respect to three high school positions, she acknowledged in her deposition that she was not discriminated against on the basis of race because the three selected individuals were also African American. Moreover, Gray claimed gender discrimination only with respect to the head custodian position to which Ezell was selected. Thus, the other two positions she mentions in her complaint are not discussed. 4 Even if she had established a prima facie claim of failure to promote, we would still affirm because Gray has failed to rebut the Board’s proffered reason for selecting Ezell for the position. Specifically, the record reflects that Ezell was selected because, inter alia, he had the requisite experience buffing floors. Even though the magistrate found that Gray was “at least minimally qualified” for the position, the head custodian position required that the selected employee have floor-buffing experience, and Gray admitted that she had none. As such, Gray has not met her burden of showing that the proffered reason for the Board’s decision to select 11 iii: Disparate Pay To establish a prima facie case of disparate pay, Gray must show that she occupies a job similar to that of higher paid persons who are not members of her protected class. Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir. 1994). Gray has failed to make a prima facie case because the record reflects that “there were no other custodial employees on any step higher than [Gray’s step] at that same time.” See id. Moreover, Dr. DeLano stated that “all custodians regardless of race or gender were treated in an equivalent manner as to salary.” Gray acknowledged that the other similarly-situated white employees with less seniority were not paid more than she. Further, although she later complained that another white male named Renfroe was paid more than she, the only evidence Gray presented to support her claim was Jones’s affidavit in which Jones stated that she had taught fourth grade at Vestavia Hills until 2001, several years before Gray filed her April 2005 EEOC complaint. Thus, Gray has not shown that the magistrate erred by finding that Gray had failed to establish a prima facie claim of disparate pay.5 Ezell was pretextual. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1347. 5 Gray also has failed to rebut the Board’s proffered reason for the pay structure or its application. Specifically, Dr. DeLano discussed how, prior to the 2002-2003 school year, Gray and others had “capped out” at the highest step, Step 14. When the pay structure changed, more steps were added, but none of the “capped out” employees were “adjusted” to account for additional years of service, and each of the employees who had capped out were then eligible to 12 iv. Shift Change We have held that: to prove adverse employment action in a case under Title VII’s anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, “[a]lthough the statute does not require proof of direct economic consequences in all cases, the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff's employment.” Id. at 1239. Gray filed her EEOC complaint in April 2005, and she claims that she was denied the shift change request in August 2005. Thus, as an initial matter, even though the parties do not raise it, it is questionable whether Gray properly exhausted this issue. See Wilkerson, 270 F.3d at 1317. Nonetheless, even if this issue were properly exhausted, the denial of Gray’s request for a shift change from 6:30 a.m. - 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. - 2:30 p.m. does not amount to a “serious and progress up to Step 20. Gray ended up at Step 17 at the time she filed her EEOC complaint, and there were no other custodians who were paid at a higher step. As such, Gray has not met her burden of showing that the proffered reason for the Board’s pay structure or application thereof was pretextual. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1347. 13 material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239-40. Although Gray asserts that she suffered “direct economic harm” because the denial of her request affected her other job, which she had to keep in order to make ends meet, the record reflects that, in September 2005, when she returned to school, Gray was not working at the second job at that time. Thus, she has not shown that the change was materially adverse to her as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances. See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239-40.