Opinion ID: 2671505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intent to Tamper

Text: -35- A defendant is guilty of tampering with a witness if he knowingly kills another person with intent to “prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding” or “prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), (C). A defendant who conspires to commit the offense of tampering is subject to the same penalties. § 1512(k). “To sustain a conviction under [§ 1512] the government does not need to prove the defendant knew of the existence of an ongoing official proceeding.” United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing § 1512(c)(2)). Rather, “a conviction is proper under the statute if interference with the official proceeding is the ‘natural and probable effect’ of the defendant’s conduct.” United States v. Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 601 (1995)). 10 10 In Aguilar, the Supreme Court addressed the intent element under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), which criminalizes “corruptly endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede” the due administration of justice. The Court announced the “natural and probable effect” test (or the “nexus” requirement) as the correct approach to determining whether a defendant acts with the requisite intent under the statute. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601. In Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 708 (2005), the Court applied this test to the intent element under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), which prohibits knowingly and corruptly persuading another person to withhold documents in an official proceeding. Based on the similar language of §§ 1503(a) and 1512(c)(2), and the Supreme Court’s application of the Aguilar test to another section of § 1512, we held the “natural and probable effect” test applies to § 1512(c)(2). Phillips, 583 F.3d at 1264. For substantially (continued...) -36- Smalls argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish the requisite specific intent. The only evidence that Gantz was still assisting federal investigators was that he was a potential witness in the government’s case against a reneging cooperator. And Gantz had last provided information to the government nearly a year before the murder; thus, an inference of intent to hinder attendance or communication cannot be reasonably derived from these circumstances. But the government introduced sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that interference was the “natural and probable effect” of Smalls’s conduct. Smalls was aware that Gantz had cooperated with federal authorities in the past and manifested a belief that Gantz was still cooperating. 11 Gantz also was, at the time of the murder, a potential witness in the upcoming trial of the reneging government cooperator. Even if Smalls was not specifically aware of this information, preventing a witness’s testimony in a federal proceeding is a natural and probable effect of killing a known government informant. See Ashley, 606 F.3d at 140 (“We are mindful that retaliation against informants and witness tampering are distinct offenses. While the difference between them should not be 10 (...continued) the same reasons we described in Phillips, the Aguilar test is the correct approach to determining whether the defendant acted with the requisite intent under § 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C). 11 Cook testified that Smalls said, “Gantz was cooperating with the federal authorities or whatever.” R., Vol. V at 1098. -37- blurred, the two offenses are often related. Providing information and serving as a witness often go hand-in-hand, and the proof used to support a conviction on one offense will frequently underlie a conviction on another, notwithstanding the differences between the two statutes.”). Viewed in a light most favorable to the government, a reasonable juror could infer from this evidence that Smalls killed Gantz to prevent him from testifying in a federal proceeding. 12 4. Communication with Federal Law Enforcement Authorities Finally, Smalls contends that there was insufficient evidence to show that Gantz would have had a future relevant communication with federal law enforcement. He points to a recent Supreme Court case, Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045 (2011), to support his claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under the federal witness tampering statute. The Court in that case held the government must show a “reasonable likelihood” that had the victim communicated with a law enforcement official, at least one relevant communication would have been made to a federal official. Id. at 2052. The Court stressed that the government “need not show that such a communication, had it occurred, would have been federal beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even that 12 Smalls offers the same intent argument to challenge his conviction of killing Gantz for aiding a federal investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1121(a)(2). But, as with the retaliation and tampering counts, the government introduced sufficient evidence that Smalls was motivated by Gantz’s assistance in a federal investigation, which was ongoing at the time of Gantz’s murder. -38- it is more likely than not.” Id. But it “must show that the likelihood of communication to a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish, or simply hypothetical.” Id. The government submitted enough evidence from which a jury could infer that it was reasonably likely that had Gantz communicated with a law enforcement officer, he would have communicated with a federal officer. Gantz was cooperating with the FBI, had debriefed twice with the FBI regarding drug trafficking in Roswell, pleaded guilty to a plea agreement with cooperation language, and was a potential witness in a future trial of a reneging cooperator in a federal investigation. Melgar also testified that Gantz was giving out information about other people in a federal case. Because there was sufficient evidence that Smalls killed Gantz to prevent his communication with a law enforcement officer, and it was reasonably likely that this communication would have been to a federal officer, there is sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction under § 1512.