Opinion ID: 4568253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board’s Restroom Policy

Text: To analyze Grimm’s as-applied constitutional challenge to the Board’s restroom policy, we must begin with the equal protection framework. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. It is “essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The Equal Protection Clause protects us not just from state-imposed classifications, but also from “intentional and arbitrary discrimination.” See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cty., 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)); see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9 (2003) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause contains both anticlassification and antisubordination principles). Put another way, 32 state action is unconstitutional when it creates “arbitrary or irrational” distinctions between classes of people out of “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446–47 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (sex-based classifications “may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women” (citation omitted)). When considering an equal protection claim, we first determine what level of scrutiny applies; then, we ask whether the law or policy at issue survives such scrutiny. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that heightened scrutiny applies to Grimm’s claim because the bathroom policy rests on sex-based classifications and because transgender people constitute at least a quasi-suspect class. Therefore, to withstand judicial scrutiny, the Board’s bathroom policy must be “substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.” See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. Because we hold that the Board’s policy as applied to Grimm is not substantially related to the important objective of protecting student privacy, we affirm summary judgment to Grimm.
In determining what level of scrutiny applies to a plaintiff’s equal protection claim, we look to the basis of the distinction between the classes of persons. See generally United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Representing two ends of the scrutiny spectrum, most classifications are generally benign and are upheld so long as they are “rationally related to a legitimate state interest,” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 33 whereas race-based classifications are “inherently suspect” and must be “strictly scrutinized,” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223–24 (1995) (internal quotation mark omitted). Sex is somewhere in the middle, constituting a quasi-suspect class. Sex 8 is only quasi-suspect because, although it “frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society,’” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion)), the Supreme Court has recognized “inherent differences” between the biological sexes that might provide appropriate justification for distinctions, see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 (citing, as examples of appropriate sex-based distinctions, “compensat[ing] women for particular economic disabilities” and “promot[ing] equal employment opportunity” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) (holding that less burdensome citizenship application requirements for the child of a citizen mother than that of a citizen father withstands intermediate scrutiny, in part because “[t]o fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences—such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father need not be—risks making the guarantee of equal protection superficial, and so disserving it”). 8 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has, in certain equal protection cases, used both the terms “gender” and “sex” interchangeably. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515. Therefore, Grimm has preserved an argument that transgender individuals necessarily fall under this line of cases based on gender discrimination. Because we need not reach this question in order to resolve Grimm’s appeal, we treat this line of cases on perhaps its narrower terms—that is, as referring to classifications based on biological sex. 34 Because sex-based classifications are quasi-suspect, they are subject to a form of heightened scrutiny. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41. Specifically, they are subject to intermediate scrutiny, meaning that they “fail[] unless [they are] substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.” See id. at 441. To survive intermediate scrutiny, the state must provide an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its classification. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
On its face, the Board’s policy creates sex-based classifications for restrooms. It states that the school district will “provide male and female restroom and locker room facilities in its schools, and the use of said facilities shall be limited to the corresponding biological genders.” J.A. 775. The only logical reading is that “corresponding biological genders” refers back to “male and female.” And, although the Board did not define “biological gender,” it has defended its policy by taking the position that it will rely on the sex marker on the student’s birth certificate. We agree with the Seventh and now Eleventh Circuits that when a “School District decides which bathroom a student may use based upon the sex listed on the student’s birth certificate,” the policy necessarily rests on a sex classification. See Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (applying heightened scrutiny to a transgender student’s equal protection claim regarding a bathroom policy); see also Adams ex. rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., No. 18-13592, 2020 WL 4561817, at  (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (same). As in Whitaker, such a policy “cannot be stated without 35 referencing sex.” See id.; accord M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 719. On that ground alone, heightened scrutiny should apply. Moreover, and as the district court held, “Grimm was subjected to sex discrimination because he was viewed as failing to conform to the sex stereotype propagated by the Policy.” Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 750. Many courts, including the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, have held that various forms of discrimination against transgender people constitute sex-based discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause because such policies punish transgender persons for gender nonconformity, thereby relying on sex stereotypes. See, e.g., Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (holding that the School District’s bathroom policy “treat[ed] transgender students . . . who fail to conform to the sex-based stereotypes associated with their assigned sex at birth, differently”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Ever since the Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications, its consistent purpose has been to eliminate discrimination on the basis of gender stereotypes.”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573–75; 578 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying a sex-stereotyping theory, albeit without mentioning a level of scrutiny, and holding that the transgender plaintiff stated a sex discrimination claim in violation of equal protection); M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 719 (holding that a school locker room policy was subject to heightened scrutiny because it “classifie[d] [the plaintiff] differently on the basis of his transgender status, and, as a result, subject[ed] him to sex stereotyping”); see also Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 210 (D.D.C. 2017) (military bans on transgender persons subject to heightened scrutiny because they “punish individuals for failing to adhere to 36 gender stereotypes”), vacated sub nom. Doe 2 v. Shanahan, 755 F. App’x 19 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768 (D. Md. 2017) (adopting Doe 1 rationale); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that discrimination on the basis of transgender status is subject to intermediate scrutiny in part under sex-stereotyping theory). 9 In so holding, these courts have recognized a central tenet of equal protection in sex discrimination cases: that states “must not rely on overbroad generalizations” regarding the sexes. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; see also Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724–25 (“Although the test for determining the validity of a genderbased classification is straightforward, it must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”). For each of these independent reasons, we hold that the Board’s policy constitutes sex-based discrimination as to Grimm and is subject to intermediate scrutiny. And although the Board raises two related counterarguments in an effort to convince us otherwise, we reject them both. First, the Board contends that all students are treated the same, regardless of sex, because the policy applies to everyone equally. See Reply Br. 16 (noting that any student may use a “private, single-stall restroom,” and “[n]o student is permitted to use the 9 As relied on by the Board, one 2015 district court case goes the other way, Johnston, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 671, but the same district court later chose not to follow that decision, see Evancho v. Pine–Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 287 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (“Johnston also acutely recognized that cases involving transgender status implicate a fast-changing and rapidly-evolving set of issues that must be considered in their own factual contexts. To be sure, Johnston's prognostication of that reality was profoundly accurate.” (citation omitted)). 37 restroom of the opposite sex”). But that is like saying that racially segregated bathrooms treated everyone equally, because everyone was prohibited from using the bathroom of a different race. No one would suppose that also providing a “race neutral” bathroom option would have solved the deeply stigmatizing and discriminatory nature of racial segregation; so too here. Rather, the Board said what it meant: “students with gender identity issues shall be provided an alternative appropriate private facility.” J.A. 775. The single-stall restrooms were created for “students with gender identity issues.” And by “students,” the Board apparently meant Grimm, as, per its own deposition witness, it “only ha[d] a sample size of one.” J.A. 458. The Board suggests that this purpose insulates its policy from intermediate scrutiny, because it shows that the policy “relies solely on transgender status.” See Opening Br. 46. But again, how does the Board determine transgender status, if not by looking to what it calls “biological gender”? Second, the Board contends that even if the policy necessarily involves sex-based discrimination, it cannot violate equal protection because Grimm is not similarly situated to cisgender boys. Instead, it asks us to compare Grimm’s treatment under the policy to the treatment of students it would consider to be “biological” girls, because Grimm’s “choice of gender identity did not cause biological changes in his body, and Grimm remain[ed] biologically female.” Opening Br. 46. But embedded in the Board’s framing is its own bias: it believes that Grimm’s gender identity is a choice, and it privileges sexassigned-at-birth over Grimm’s medically confirmed, persistent and consistent gender identity. The policy itself “recognizes that some students question their gender identities,” and states that such students have “gender identity issues.” J.A. 775. Grimm, however, 38 did not question his gender identity at all; he knew he was a boy. See Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cty., 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1317 (M.D. Fla. 2018) (“There is no evidence to suggest that [the transgender plaintiff’s] identity as a boy is any less consistent, persistent and insistent than any other boy.”). The overwhelming thrust of everything in the record—from Grimm’s declaration, to his treatment letter, to the amicus briefs—is that Grimm was similarly situated to other boys, but was excluded from using the boys restroom facilities based on his sex-assigned-at-birth. Adopting the Board’s framing of Grimm’s equal protection claim here would only vindicate the Board’s own misconceptions, which themselves reflect “stereotypic notions.” See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 (“Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the [state’s] objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.”). 10
Alternatively, and as held by the district court in this case, we conclude that heightened scrutiny applies because transgender people constitute at least a quasi-suspect class. Although the Seventh Circuit declined to reach the question of whether heightened scrutiny applies to transgender persons in Whitaker, many district courts, including the 10 Our dissenting colleague’s opinion reveals why this is so. To avoid a conclusion that Grimm was similarly situated to other boys, the dissent fails to “meaningfully reckon with what it means for [Grimm] to be a transgender boy.” See Adams, 2020 WL 4561817, at  n.2; see also Dissenting Op. at 93–94. We have been presented with a strong record documenting the modern medical understanding of what it means to be transgender, and considering that evidence is definitively the role of this Court. 39 district court here, have analyzed the relevant factors for determining suspect class status and held that transgender people are at least a quasi-suspect class. See Evancho v. Pine– Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that transgender people constitute a quasi-suspect class); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (same); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (same); M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 718–19 (same); Norsworthy, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (same); F.V. v. Barron, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145 (D. Idaho 2018) (same); Flack v. Wis. Dep’t of Health Servs., 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 951–53 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (explaining in a ruling on a preliminary injunction why heightened scrutiny would likely apply to transgender persons). 11 As articulated by one district court, “one would be hard-pressed to identify a class of people more discriminated against historically or otherwise more deserving of the application of heightened scrutiny when singled out for adverse treatment, than transgender people.” Flack, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 953. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit recently joined the many district courts in holding that transgender people constitute a quasi-suspect class. See Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1200 (9th Cir. 2019) (affirming the district court’s reasoning as to why transgender people are a quasi-suspect class). Only one court of appeals decision holding otherwise remains good law, but it reluctantly followed a since-overruled Ninth Circuit opinion. See Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 971 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that “[r]ecent research concluding 11 The Eleventh Circuit was not presented with this question in Adams because the parties agreed that heightened scrutiny applied to the plaintiff’s claim based on that Circuit’s precedent in Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1319. See Adams, 2020 WL 4561817, at . 40 that sexual identity may be biological suggests reevaluation of [Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977),]” but following it regardless because the plaintiff’s allegations were “too conclusory to allow proper analysis”). Engaging with the suspect class test, it is apparent that transgender persons constitute a quasi-suspect class. We consider four factors to determine whether a group of people constitutes a suspect or quasi-suspect class. First, we consider whether the class has historically been subject to discrimination. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). Second, we determine if the class has a defining characteristic that bears a relation to its ability to perform or contribute to society. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41. Third, we look to whether the class may be defined as a discrete group by obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics. Bowen, 483 U.S. at 602. And fourth, we consider whether the class is a minority lacking political power. Id. Each factor is readily satisfied here. First, take historical discrimination. Discrimination against transgender people takes many forms. Like the district court, we provide but a few examples to illustrate the broader picture. See Grimm, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 749 (“[T]here is no doubt that transgender individuals historically have been subjected to discrimination on the basis of their gender identity, including high rates of violence and discrimination in education, employment, housing, and healthcare access.” (collecting cases)). As explained in the Brief of the Medical Amici, being transgender was pathologized for many years. As recently as the DSM-3 and DSM-4, one could receive a diagnosis of “transsexualism” or “gender identity disorder,” “indicat[ing] that the clinical problem was the discordant gender identity.” See John W. Barnhill, Introduction, in DSM-5 Clinical Cases 237–38 (John W. Barnhill ed., 41 2014). Whereas “homosexuality” was removed from the DSM in 1973, “gender identity disorder” was not removed until the DSM-5 was published in 2013. See Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. Rev. 507, 509–10, 517 (2016). What is more, even though being transgender was marked as a mental illness, coverage for transgender persons was excluded from the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) after a floor debate in which two senators referred to these diagnoses as “sexual behavior disorders.” See Barry et al., supra, at 510; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1). The following year, Congress added an identical exclusion to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, “stripping transgender people of civil rights protections they had enjoyed for nearly twenty years.” Barry et al., supra, at 556; see also H.R. Rep. No. 102-973, at 158 (1992). The transgender community also suffers from high rates of employment discrimination, economic instability, and homelessness. According to the National Transgender Discrimination Survey (NTDS), 12 people who are transgender are twice as likely as the general population to have experienced unemployment. When employed, 97% of NTDS respondents reported experiencing some form of mistreatment at work, or “hiding their gender transition to avoid such treatment.” Barry et al., supra, at 552. NTDS respondents were “four times more likely than the general population to have a household 12 The NTDS is a major national survey on transgender discrimination. Along with its successor, the USTS, the NTDS has been relied upon by many amici to this case, as well as other courts. See, e.g., Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1051 (citing to the NTDS); M.A.B., 286 F. Supp. 3d at 720 (citing to both the NTDS and the USTS); Adkins, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (relying on the NTDS). 42 income of less than $10,000 per year,” and two and a half times more likely to have experienced homelessness. Id. That is not all. Transgender people frequently experience harassment in places such as schools (78%), medical settings (28%), and retail stores (37%), and they also experience physical assault in places such as schools (35%) and places of public accommodation (8%). See id. at 553. Indeed, transgender people are more likely to be the victim of violent crimes. Id. So, in 2009, Congress expanded federal protections against hate crimes to include crimes based on gender identity. Id. at 555. In so doing, the House Judiciary Committee recognized the “extreme bias against gender nonconformity” and the “particularly violent” crimes perpetrated against transgender persons. See id. Of course, current measures and policies continue to target transgender persons for differential treatment. Without opining on the legality of such measures, we note that policies precluding transgender persons from military service, even after the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” see Gary J. Gates & Jody L. Herman, Transgender Military Service in the United States 1 (2014), have recently been re-implemented as to most transgender service members. And this year, the Governor of Idaho signed into law a bill that would ban transgender individuals from changing the gender marker on their birth certificates, as Virginia law allowed Grimm to do. Further still, the Department of Health and Human Services recently issued a final rule redefining “sex discrimination” for purposes of Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act to encompass only biological sex, and not gender identity. The list surely goes on. 43 Next, we turn to the second factor—whether the class has a defining characteristic that “bears [a] relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.’” Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41 (quoting Frontiero, 441 U.S. at 677). Being transgender bears no such relation. Seventeen of our foremost medical, mental health, and public health organizations agree that being transgender “implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational capabilities.” See Br. of Medical Amici 6 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Discrimination Against Transgender and Gender Variant Individuals 1 (2012)). Although some transgender individuals experience gender dysphoria, and that could cause some level of impairment, not all transgender persons have gender dysphoria, and gender dysphoria is treatable. See id. “Importantly, ‘transgender’ and ‘impairment’ are not synonymous.” Barry et al., supra, at 558. That leaves the third and fourth factors. As to the third factor, transgender people constitute a discrete group with immutable characteristics: Recall that gender identity is formulated for most people at a very early age, and, as our medical amici explain, being transgender is not a choice. Rather, it is as natural and immutable as being cisgender. Br. of Medical Amici 7. But unlike being cisgender, being transgender marks the group for different treatment. Fourth and finally, transgender people constitute a minority lacking political power. Comprising approximately 0.6% of the adult population in the United States, transgender individuals are certainly a minority. Even considering the low percentage of the population that is transgender, transgender persons are underrepresented in every branch of government. It was not until 2010 that the first openly transgender judges took their place 44 on their states’ benches, see First Two Openly Transgender Judges in the U.S. Appointed Last Month, Women’s Law Project (Dec. 7, 2010),