Opinion ID: 1851190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Width of the granted easement

Text: The extent of an easement is determined by the terms of the grant or by the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired. SDCL 43-13-5. `... The terms of the grant, as they can be learned either by words clearly expressed, or by just and sound construction, will regulate and measure the rights of the grantee.' Salmon v. Bradshaw, 84 S.D. 500, 505-06, 173 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1969) (quoting Witman v. Stichter, 299 Pa. 484, 149 A. 725, 727 (1930)). The terms of this grant seem somewhat inconsistent. The grant initially states that the easement is over the North Fifty-eight Feet (N 58') of Lot 19. However, any inconsistency is cured by the language restricting the easement for ingress and egress to the above described property, over and upon the roadway presently existing and situated on the North 58 feet of said Lot 19. (Emphasis added.) We find that the language specifically stating that the use of the easement shall be over and upon the roadway presently existing indicates that the easement is limited to the use of the roadway and not the entire fifty-eight feet of land. The North Fifty-eight Feet of Lot 19 merely describes the parcel of land on which the easement is located and not the easement itself. Ordinarily a grant or reservation of a right of way by instrument referring to an existing way at the place contemplated, and not otherwise indicating the width of the passage, operates to limit the width to that of the existing way.... W.W. Allen, Annotation, Width of Way Created by Express Grant, Reservation, or Exception Not Specifying Width, 28 A.L.R.2d 253, 267 (1953). See Wilson v. De Genaro, 36 Conn.Sup. 200, 415 A.2d 1334 (1979), aff'd, 181 Conn. 480, 435 A.2d 1021 (1980) (reference to existing roadway without reference to width of passage limited easement to width of existing way); Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 78 Nev. 254, 371 P.2d 647 (1962) (right-of-way granted over grantor's roads as now located could not widen easement beyond width at time of grant). This court agrees that the reference to the existing roadway in the grant serves to limit the easement to that part of the north fifty-eight feet of Lot 19 that was the existing roadway at the time of the grant. The language of the grant referring to the north fifty-eight feet is merely the legal description of the part of Lot 19 on which the easement (roadway) is located. Because the grantors of the easement owned only the north fifty-eight feet of Lot 19, it was necessary to describe that portion of Lot 19 which they owned and on which they could grant the easement. We therefore conclude that the grant to Travis conveyed an easement only over the existing roadway and not over the entire northern fifty-eight feet of Lot 19. However, while we reverse the trial court's finding as to the width of the easement, we nonetheless agree with the trial court that Madden may not interfere with Travis' use of the easement. Terry Madden may not obstruct or interfere with the use of the easement in the manner described above. The roadway must remain unobstructed for the passage of vehicles and equipment.