Opinion ID: 202346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The aggravated felony

Text: De Araujo's claims mirror those he previously made before this Court in De Araujo I. In that case, we held that the IJ's February 12, 2002 ruling that the 1995 Connecticut conviction constituted an aggravated felony, which rendered De Araujo subject to removal, became final on July 8, 2002 when the BIA dismissed his appeal of the IJ's order. De Araujo I, 399 F.3d at 88. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (An order of removal made by the immigration judge at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall become final . . . [u]pon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of -11- Immigration Appeals). We noted the strict jurisdictional requirement that, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1), all petitions for review addressed to this Court from BIA orders must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal and dismissed the claim as time-barred. De Araujo I, 399 F.3d at 88 (quoting Zhang v. INS, 348 F.3d 289, 292 (1st Cir. 2003)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, under the REAL ID Act, habeas petitions transferred to the court of appeals are not subject to the 30-day time limit. See REAL ID Act § 106(c) (The court of appeals shall treat the transferred case as if it had been filed pursuant to a petition for review under such section 242 [8 U.S.C. § 1252], except that subsection (b)(1) of such section shall not apply.); see also Ishak, 422 F.3d at 27. Thus the strict jurisdictional requirement does not apply here. Moreover, De Araujo properly exhausted his administrative remedies, giving us jurisdiction over his appeal. It is wellsettled law that a court of appeals may not review an order of deportation or exclusion unless the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). This exhaustion requirement generally means that the BIA must first review an IJ's determination of deportability before a petitioner may present his appeal to us. Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 195 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 1999) (Usually issues not raised before the BIA may not be raised for the first -12- time on a petition for review.) (citing Ravindran v. INS, 976 F.2d 754, 761 (1st Cir. 1992)) (citation omitted). Here, De Araujo filed a Notice of Appeal with the BIA and also stated that he would file a timely brief, but failed to do so. The BIA therefore dismissed the appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E). The BIA also denied De Araujo's subsequent motion to reconsider the dismissal of his appeal. It therefore never reviewed De Araujo's argument regarding the aggravated felony. We were presented with a similar situation in Athehortua-Vanegas v. INS, 876 F.2d 238 (1st Cir. 1989). In Athehortua, the BIA summarily dismissed an appeal where the petitioner filed a timely Notice of Appeal followed by an untimely brief. We held that the petitioner had exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 240 (Petitioner did not overlook the Board, or ignore it, or attempt to appeal directly to the courts from the IJ's order. . . . [He] went to the BIA, albeit unsuccessfully. He thereby exhausted the remedy.). Here, we similarly find that De Araujo has exhausted his administrative remedies. The foregoing considerations notwithstanding, however, we will not address the merits of De Araujo's argument. As discussed above, the BIA summarily dismissed De Araujo's appeal for failure to file a brief. In his current appeal, De Araujo does not address this decision but instead goes straight to the merits of his aggravated felony argument. De Araujo's only hint at a challenge -13- to the summary dismissal occurs in the last paragraph of his brief where he states that we have jurisdiction to review his claim because he raised the aggravated felony issue in his detailed notice of appeal. He does not argue that raising an issue in his Notice of Appeal could be enough to withstand a summary dismissal for failure to file a brief, nor does he ever actually claim that the BIA erred in dismissing his appeal for failure to file a brief. We have repeatedly held that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.); see also Stoll v. Principi, 449 F.3d 263, 267 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that where a petitioner has not proffered an argument along certain lines, any such claim has been abandoned). De Araujo's conclusory statements, without further development, do not rise to the level of a cognizable appellate argument. Inasmuch as our review is limited to the BIA's final order (here, summary dismissal under 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(2)(i)(E)), De Araujo has not adequately challenged the summary dismissal to preserve the issue, and we go no further. -14-