Opinion ID: 47006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In camera review of parole file

Text: First, McGoy contends the district court violated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by denying him an in camera review of his parole file because the defendants were in possession of the only evidence with which he could prove his case. We review a district court’s refusal to grant a continuance of a summary judgment motion in order to conduct discovery for abuse of discretion. Burks v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 212 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000). Generally, “summary judgment should not be granted until the party opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery.” Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand 2 Optical Co., 862 F.2d 841, 843 (11th Cir. 1989). This is not, however, a blanket prohibition on the granting of summary judgment before discovery. Id. Rule 56(f) states: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). “The availability of a continuance is built into the rules to guard against the premature entry of summary judgment. Subsection (f) allows a party who has no specific material contradicting his adversary’s presentation to survive a summary judgment motion if he presents valid reasons justifying his failure of proof.” Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 931 (11th Cir. 1989) (quotations and citation omitted). “[A] Rule 56(f) motion for discovery requires the court to balance the movant’s demonstrated need for discovery against the burden such discovery will place on the opposing party[;]” therefore, “[a] Rule 56(f) motion must be supported by an affidavit which sets forth with particularity the facts the moving party expects to discover and how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.” Harbert Int’l, Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998). “The nonmovant may not simply rely on vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but 3 unspecified, facts, but must show the court how the stay will operate to permit him to rebut, through discovery, the movant’s contentions.” Barfield, 883 F.2d at 931. (quotations and citation omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McGoy’s motion for a continuance. First, McGoy, contrary to his argument, did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) in that he did not set forth with particularity the facts he expected to discover and how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact. In his brief in support of his motion for a continuance, McGoy alleged the Board’s 90 percent policy was adopted to qualify for federal funding under the Violent Offenders Incarceration and Truth-In-Sentencing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13701, et. seq. (VOITIS), and noted the affidavit of Melissa Rogers, the Board’s Assistant Director of Legal Services, did not deny the Board applied for and received grants under VOITIS or that McGoy was included in their statistical average.1 However, he did not state how an in camera review of his records would help prove these allegations. McGoy cannot rely on such vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed but unspecified facts. Barfield, 883 F.2d at 931. 1 On appeal, McGoy asserts evidence will show that no violent offenders were considered for parole in accordance with the parole guidelines and all inmates had their sentences substantially extended beyond the guidelines recommendation. However, since McGoy makes this argument for the first time on appeal, we need not consider it. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding issues not raised in the district court and raised for the first time on appeal are not considered by this court). 4 Furthermore, the district court balanced McGoy’s need for discovery against the burden such discovery would place on the Board. Here, that burden was quite great since parole records in Georgia are confidential state secrets. O.C.G.A. § 42- 9-53(b) (2005). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it found the facts before it did not rise to the level necessary to overcome the state’s interest in maintaining the confidentiality of their parole records. Lastly, the district court did not violate due process in denying his request for in camera review, as McGoy asserts, because Georgia’s parole process does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1503 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McGoy’s motion for continuance.