Opinion ID: 859236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timeliness of Trial Court Order

Text: ¶7 Cabrera asserts that the superior court erred in issuing its order twenty-nine days after Escamilla filed the complaint because A.R.S. § 16-351(A) directs trial courts to “hear and render a decision” on an election matter within ten days after the action is filed. Cabrera concedes that in Brousseau v. Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456, 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984), we interpreted this statutory time limit as directive and not jurisdictional. But she argues that the filing and prosecution of this case unfairly left her little time to appeal and that Escamilla failed to diligently prosecute this case. When a non-jurisdictional deadline is not met, the relevant inquiry is whether a party suffered prejudice because of the delay. See Bee v. Day, 218 Ariz. 505, 507 ¶ 7, 189 P.3d 1078, 1080 (2008). ¶8 Here, the trial court’s processing of the case left sufficient time for expedited appellate review before the ballot printing deadline. And Escamilla is not at fault for any delay; 4 he diligently prosecuted his case, which is evidenced by his serving Cabrera immediately and promptly moving to have an expert appointed and Cabrera tested. Moreover, some delay is due to Cabrera’s own tardiness in filing her answer below. Because the § 16-351(A) deadline for decision is not jurisdictional and Cabrera has not shown prejudice, we find no error. Given the expedited nature of challenges to candidate qualifications, however, we emphasize that trial courts should render decisions within § 16-351’s ten-day deadline.