Opinion ID: 1218865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether NRS 62.080 Violates Constitutional Due Process Requirements in Failing to Provide Sufficient Guidelines.

Text: Appellant argues that NRS 62.080 is unconstitutional in failing to announce the criteria to be employed in certifying juvenile felony offenders as adults. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to enact standards for those who apply the laws, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Sheriff v. Martin, 99 Nev. 336, 339, 662 P.2d 634, 637 (1983). However, statutes are presumed valid, and the burden is on the person challenging the statute to prove it is unconstitutional. Wilmeth v. State, 96 Nev. 403, 610 P.2d 735 (1980). There must be a clear showing of invalidity to overcome such a burden. Sheriff v. Martin, 99 Nev. 336, 340, 662 P.2d 634, 637 (1983). Appellant relies largely on United States ex. rel . Pedrosa v. Sielaf, 434 F.Supp. 493 (N.D.Ill.1977), modified on other grounds, 598 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.1979), a case in which an Illinois court faced a vagueness challenge to a similar transfer statute. The court found that the statute was unconstitutional, stating: Neither was the vagueness in the statute removed by any Illinois decisions construing the statute to require criteria for the transfer decision. Nothing prevented the Illinois juvenile judge from using any criteria he desired no matter how arbitrary. This potential for arbitrariness was aggravated by the absence of provisions requiring a statement of reasons for the transfer (the judge in this case gave no reasons), or allowing appellate review of the transfer decision. Id. at 496. We note, however, that Pedrosa is not persuasive for the following reasons. In the case of In the Matter of Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 434-36, 664 P.2d 947, 952 (1983), we created criteria for courts to consider in certifying juveniles for transfer to adult court. After establishing public protection as the controlling principle upon which the transfer decision is to be based, we held that a court should consider the nature and seriousness of the charged offense, the persistency and seriousness of the adjudicated or admitted past criminal offenses, and the personal attributes of the offender. Id. Thus, judges are not free to use arbitrary criteria in the certification process. Moreover, in Castillo v. State, 106 Nev. 349, 792 P.2d 1133 (1990), this court held that an order certifying a juvenile for transfer to district court is an appealable order, so that review of a transfer decision is possible. Therefore, the concerns expressed by the Pedrosa court are not present in Nevada. Additionally, this court has stated: Where the intention of the Legislature is clear, it is the duty of the court to give effect to such intention and to construe the language of the statute so as to give it force and not nullify its manifest purpose. Woofter v. O'Donnell, 91 Nev. 756, 762, 542 P.2d 1396, 1400 (1975). When a former statute is amended, or a doubtful interpretation rendered certain by subsequent legislation, such amendment is persuasive evidence of legislative intent with regard to the statute. Id. The decisional matrix announced by this court in Seven Minors had been in place for the eight years leading up to the amendment of NRS 62.080 in 1991. If the Legislature had intended guidelines other than those set out by this court in Seven Minors, they could have amended the statute to provide such guidelines, just as they amended the statute to provide that juveniles under sixteen who commit crimes cannot be certified after this court's decision in State v. District Court, 105 Nev. 644, 781 P.2d 776 (1989). Thus, we conclude that Castillo has not met the burden of proving that NRS 62.080 is unconstitutional. Accordingly, we affirm Castillo's conviction. STEFFEN, YOUNG and SHEARING, JJ., concur.