Opinion ID: 494652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 7 The Fund argues on appeal that summary judgment was inappropriate to dispose of the complaint and counterclaim, asserting there are material factual disputes. 8 The Fund argues first that there is a fact issue about the intended meaning of the compensation agreement, which it says was misconstrued by the trial judge. The trial judge found that Duffey was not an ERISA-defined fiduciary after his trusteeship had terminated, but was instead a party in interest for ERISA purposes and was therefore entitled to reasonable compensation. Accordingly, the judge found Duffey's services were necessary and reasonable for the operation of the plan. 5 9 The Fund claims that the intended meaning of the compensation paragraph is a material issue in dispute and a jury question, arguing that it was misconstrued in its text as well as contrary to the intent and practice of the parties. The Fund points out that the letter from the Fund to Duffey in response to his prior inquiry shows the error. Duffey had asked whether he was entitled to reimbursement of income lost as a result of his time spent preparing and giving testimony in Fund-related matters. The Fund answered the question in a letter requesting certain information relative to Duffey's billings: (1) that Duffey's hourly rate for legal services would be the same as he had charged the Fund; (2) that the hours charged to the Fund were not compensated by some other source; and (3) that Duffey had sustained an actual loss of income equal to the amount charged the Fund. The Fund now argues Duffey suffered no loss of income, because his firm had $12,000 a month in retainers received from other clients totally unrelated to the Fund. 10 We see no need to impanel a jury to interpret the compensation arrangement. When interpreting a contract a court must determine the intent of the parties, which may be found in the language of the contract. If there is a conflict in interpretation because some part is susceptible to more than one meaning, the court will look to the practical construction applied by the parties in performing under the agreement, which is highly probative of intent. William B. Tanner Co. v. Sparta-Tomah Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (7th Cir.1983) (citing Zweck v. D P Way Corp., 70 Wis.2d 426, 435, 234 N.W.2d 921, 926 (1975)). If there is no dispute about which documents constitute the contract, the contract may be construed as a matter of law. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 446 F.Supp. 1163, 1168 (E.D.Wis.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 1087, 63 L.Ed.2d 325 (1980). 11 The wording of the compensation paragraph is not offended by the parties' past performance under the agreement, which serves as the best indication of the parties' mutual interpretation. Duffey billed the Fund nine different times in detail, showing the date, service, time, and computations of his fees at his usual hourly rate, and the Fund paid him without dispute. Although the tenth bill was in similar form, the Fund refused to pay. The pattern of past dealings of the parties and the wording of the resolution providing for attorneys' fees supply all the interpretation that is needed in this instance. 12 The Fund next argues that a material fact issue remains about the reasonableness of the Duffey charges on this tenth bill. Duffey set forth in detail the basis of his charges in the affidavit underlying his motion for summary judgment. The Fund's argument is based on an affidavit of attorney James L. Coghlan, an associate of counsel who represented the Fund. Coghlan's affidavit does not dispute the dates, the services, the particular hours expended, or the $100 an hour rate, but in a general and conclusory way argues that Duffey is entitled only to certain expenses. His principal point seems to be that Duffey failed to credit the Fund for the other income from his monthly retainers. 13 We consider Duffey's unrelated income to be unrelated to the issues of this case. An attorney with substantial retainers from other sources is not obligated by that good fortune to contribute his services to his other clients. The Fund seems to take the position that the Fund in effect owes Duffey nothing unless the work related to the Fund caused Duffey to lose his retainers. Monthly retainers are paid whether actual service is rendered in any one month or not, however, and impose no restrictions, absent a conflict of interest, on earning additional fees by service to other clients. 14 Since Duffey's detailed affidavit is not specifically attacked in any particular regard by the Fund's counter-affidavit or any of the Fund's other submissions regarding Duffey's claim, those documents are insufficient to raise any genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see First Commodity Traders, Inc. v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 766 F.2d 1007, 1011 (7th Cir.1985) ([c]onclusory statements in affidavits opposing a motion for summary judgment are not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact). Duffey's last statement for services is related to the prior statements, and appears to be in line with all of his prior submissions that were fully honored. If the Duffey statement is incorrect in some respect, that error has not been identified or disputed sufficiently to raise a question of material fact. This case was ready for summary judgment and correctly decided. 15 We see no reason why Duffey should not be paid in full the balance claimed. 16 AFFIRMED.