Opinion ID: 2448997
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: It Was Error To Grant Summary Judgment On The Cowans' Adverse Possession Claim.

Text: Prior to 2003, Alaska had two adverse possession statutes. Under former AS 09.45.052(a), claimants with color of title could establish adverse possession by showing that their use of the land was continuous, open and notorious, exclusive, and hostile to the true owners of the land for seven years. [19] Under former AS 09.10.030, claimants without color of title claiming adverse possession had to fulfill the same requirements for ten years. [20] In 2003 the Alaska Legislature modified AS 09.45.052(a) to add a claim for adverse possession where there was uninterrupted adverse notorious possession of real property for 10 years or more because of a good faith but mistaken belief that the real property lies within the boundaries of adjacent real property owned by the adverse claimant. [21] The Legislature also modified AS 09.10.030 [22] with the intent of abolishing adverse possession in cases where the claimant does not have color of title. [23] The net effect of these changes was to limit Alaskans' adverse possession claims to cases where the claimant had either color of title or a good faith but mistaken belief that the claimant owned the land in question. [24] On the first day of trial, the superior court held that it would apply the 2003 test for adverse possession because the Cowans had failed to bring an action for quiet title before the Legislature had changed the law. The court concluded that the Cowans' adverse possession claim under the current statute failed as a matter of law because the Cowans did not have color of title or a good faith but mistaken belief that the property was within the boundaries of their property. In doing so, the court effectively granted summary judgment on the Cowans' adverse possession claim. We find that it was error to grant summary judgment on the Cowans' adverse possession claim because the 2003 version of AS 09.10.030 does not apply to this case, and there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Cowans had adversely possessed the disputed land under the pre-2003 version of the statute.
The Cowans argue that it was error to apply the 2003 version of AS 09.10.030 to their adverse possession claim because the Cowans were vested with title to the disputed land well before the statute was changed, the legislative history indicates that the changes were not intended to be applied to vested adverse possession rights, and the Legislature did not indicate that the law changing AS 09.10.030 was retrospective. Alaska Statute 01.10.090 states that [n]o statute is retrospective unless expressly declared therein. The 2003 amendments to AS 09.10.030 specifically stated that the amended version applie[d] to actions that have not been barred before [July 18, 2003] by AS 09.10.030 as it read before [July 18, 2003]. [25] Thus, the changes to AS.09.10.030 were not intended to be retrospective. We have held that [a] statute will be considered [retrospective] insofar as it gives to pre-enactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute. [26] The Cowans claim that they adversely possessed the disputed land for more than ten years before 1980. Because title automatically vests in an adverse possessor at the end of the statutory period, [27] the true owner's action to recover the property would thus have been barred by 1980 under former AS 09.10.030 if the Cowans in fact perfected their adverse possession claims by 1980. Applying the amended statute to the Cowans' case would therefore give the Cowans' pre-2003 conduct a different legal effect, effectively stripping them of their title. Because the 2003 revision to AS 09.10.030 was not intended to be retrospective, and applying it to this case would produce retrospective results, it was error to apply the revised statute to the Cowans' adverse possession claim.
The Cowans also argue that they met all of the requirements for adverse possession under former AS 09.10.030, [28] and that the only contested question in this case was whether their possession of the disputed land was hostile. The Cowans argue that they raised a genuine issue of material fact whether their possession of the disputed land was hostile because they presented evidence that they treated the disputed land as their own, held themselves out as owners of the land, and protected their right to exclusive use of the land. In response, Sharon Yeisley argues that the Cowans' use of the disputed land could not be hostile under the law because they had a legally protected right (an easement) to use the land, and they made no other use of the land besides that which was legally protected. We find, as the superior court did in its Omnibus Order, that there may be a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of hostility. [29] We have held that [h]ostile possession does not imply that the adverse possessor bore ill will or aggression toward the true owner; it only means that the adverse possessor held the land in such a way that his interest in the property was incompatible with the record owner's interest. [30] If the adverse possessor, without the true owner's permission, `acted toward the land as if he owned it,' then his claim is hostile. [31] The test is an objective one. [32] We have also stated that when possession has begun permissively, it cannot become hostile until the presumption of permissive use is rebutted by proof of a distinct and positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner of the property. [33] Subsequent to the trial court's Omnibus Order, we decided Hansen v. Davis , which provides additional guidance on the concept of hostility in the context of easements. [34] When the trial court issued its Omnibus Order, it found that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of hostility but failed to explain the basis of this finding. Because it was error to apply the revised adverse possession statute and the Cowans presented evidence that might support a finding of adverse possession under the former statute, we reverse and remand on the issue of adverse possession. On remand, the trial court should determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding any of the factors of adverse possession under the pre-2003 statute in light of our holding in Hansen. Additionally, the trial court should determine specifically which of the Cowans' activities on the 30-foot right of way, if any, constitute hostile activity and when each of those activities took place. The trial court may either reexamine the facts in the record as it stands, or reopen the record and take new evidence to make these determinations.