Opinion ID: 2144105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Lynn challenges this court's jurisdiction over this appeal. The Department argues that jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1), because the circuit court held that a state statute was unconstitutional. Supreme Court Rule 302(a)(1) provides for appeals to be taken directly to this court from final judgments of circuit courts in cases in which a statute of the United States or of this State has been held invalid. 134 Ill.2d R. 302(a). Lynn contends that the circuit court's order in this case did not hold a statute unconstitutional but, rather, held only that the statute was unconstitutional as applied in this case. Lynn relies on this court's decision in Rehg v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 152 Ill.2d 504, 509, 178 Ill.Dec. 731, 605 N.E.2d 525 (1992), in which we noted that a lower court order that simply declares that application of [a] statute would violate a particular defendant's constitutional rights is not directly appealable to this court pursuant to Rule 302(a). A narrow reading of the circuit court's order in this case supports Lynn's argument. The order states that the statutory provisions would lead to an unconstitutional result in the instant case. We must look, however, to the effect of the circuit court's order to determine whether the order actually declared the statutory provisions unconstitutional on their face. See Doe v. Gainer, 162 Ill.2d 15, 18, 204 Ill.Dec. 652, 642 N.E.2d 114 (1994). If the effect of the circuit court's order was to declare a statute unconstitutional on its face, this court has jurisdiction under Rule 302(a)(1). See Doe, 162 Ill.2d at 18, 204 Ill.Dec. 652, 642 N.E.2d 114 (although circuit court's order stated that statute was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff, effect of order was to declare provision unconstitutional on its face and jurisdiction under Rule 302(a)(1) was proper); First of America Bank, Rockford, N.A. v. Netsch, 166 Ill.2d 165, 169, 209 Ill.Dec. 657, 651 N.E.2d 1105 (1995) (this court assumed jurisdiction under Rule 302(a)(1) of appeal from circuit court order which held that certain statutory provisions were unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff); People v. Roos, 118 Ill.2d 203, 113 Ill.Dec. 81, 514 N.E.2d 993 (1987) (this court assumed jurisdiction under Rule 302(a)(1) of appeal from circuit court order which held that a statute was unconstitutional as applied to the practice of acupuncture); Miller v. Lockett, 98 Ill.2d 478, 479-80, 75 Ill.Dec. 224, 457 N.E.2d 14 (1983) (this court held that jurisdiction was proper under Rule 302(a)(1) even though the circuit court did not directly state that the statute was unconstitutional because it appeared from the order that the circuit court found the statute invalid); Sommer v. Village of Glenview, 79 Ill.2d 383, 385-86, 38 Ill.Dec. 170, 403 N.E.2d 258 (1980) (this court held that it had jurisdiction under Rule 302(a)(1) of appeal from circuit court order which stated only that a particular statutory provision could not be applied to home rule units because, in effect, the circuit court order necessarily held that the statutory provision was unconstitutional as applied to home rule units). The Department asserts that the effect of the circuit court's order was to declare sections 10-1 and 10-10 of the Public Aid Code, in part, unconstitutional on their face. We agree. The circuit court ruled that sections 10-1 and 10-10 of the Public Aid Code were unconstitutional as applied to Larry because, in the court's opinion, Larry earned $40,000 per year and therefore was capable of pursuing child support enforcement services without the Department's assistance. [1] As we discuss in detail later in this opinion, however, sections 10-1 and 10-10 clearly grant the Department the discretion to provide child support enforcement services to any individual who applies for them, regardless of that individual's financial capability to pursue enforcement privately. Thus, Larry is within the class of recipients contemplated by the statutory provisions. The trial court's ruling that the provisions are unconstitutional as applied to Larry is therefore, in effect, a ruling that the provisions are unconstitutional to the extent they allow application to Larry and others who are financially capable. In effect, the circuit court declared portions of sections 10-1 and 10-10 unconstitutional on their face. We therefore have jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 302(a)(1).