Opinion ID: 773511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence of Drug Use

Text: 18 Burke's second argument - that evidence of his drug use was improperly admitted - is also easily disposed of. In light of the testimony by plaintiff's expert that Burke's post-accident hospitalization was due in part to increasing use of marijuana and alcohol (testimony that was not directly elicited by defense counsel and that was contrary to plaintiff's prior stipulation that he would not include increased drug use as a component of his damages), the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing subsequent questioning about the extent of Burke's drug and alcohol use before and after the accident. Cf. Fletcher v. City of New York, 54 F. Supp.2d 328, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (admitting evidence of plaintiff's past drug use for the limited purpose of proving that plaintiff's injuries were caused by past drug use, not by defendants' conduct) (following Lewis v. District of Columbia, 793 F.2d 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 19 Although such evidence obviously poses a danger of unfair prejudice to plaintiff, the district court took reasonable steps to minimize that danger by twice instructing the jury on the limited purpose for which it could consider the evidence. See United States. v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (Juries are presumed to follow their instructions. (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993))). Under these circumstances, the trial judge was within her discretion in allowing the testimony as evidence relevant to Burke's damages. 20