Opinion ID: 344225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel on Appeal.

Text: 39 Appellant alleges in a conclusory fashion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from his state court conviction. Appellant's Brief at 5-6. While appellant does not state the grounds on which he bases this allegation, a review of the record shows that he argued to the district court that his counsel should have appealed to the New Mexico Supreme Court the state court's temporary insanity instruction on page 17 of the trial court's instructions. Record, vol. I, at 48, 58. 6 We will therefore consider the allegedly erroneous temporary insanity instruction as the basis for appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. 40 Appellant points out that defense counsel objected to the instruction on the ground that it was vague and ambiguous in its description of temporary insanity, because it did not sufficiently clarify the time element involved, Record, vol. V, at 611, but that counsel did not present that issue to the New Mexico Supreme Court on appeal. Record, vol. I, at 48. When the instructions are considered as a whole, 7 it appears that any ambiguity as to the time element contained in the temporary insanity instruction on page 17 was sufficiently clarified by the instructions on pages 13, 14, 16 and 20. Record, vol. II, at 68-70, 72. See United States v. Coppola, 486 F.2d 882, 885 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948, 94 S.Ct. 1469, 39 L.Ed.2d 563 (1974). Thus, the court charged the jury that (c)rimes involving a guilty intent cannot be successfully prosecuted against one charged who is insane at the time of commission of the offense, because an insane person does not have the capacity to form a criminal intent. Page 13 of the Court's Instructions, Record, vol. II, at 68-69 (emphasis added). The court further instructed that (u)nder his plea of 'not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the offense,' the defendant has raised the issue of his sanity at the time of the alleged offenses. Page 14 of the Court's Instructions, Record, vol. II, at 70 (emphasis added). In still another instruction the court stated: If the jury has a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case whether the accused was sane at the time of the offense or offenses, he should be acquitted on the charges of first degree murder and all lesser offenses including second degree murder, even though it may appear that he was sane at earlier and later times. Page 16 of the Court's Instructions, Record, vol. II, at 70-71 (emphasis added). 41 Furthermore, the trial court's instructions covered the elements of insanity 8 and advised the jury as to the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of insanity. 9 See State v. Montano, 83 N.M. 523, 494 P.2d 185, 186 (Ct.App.1972); State v. James, 83 N.M. 263, 490 P.2d 1236, 1239 (Ct.App.1971). We therefore conclude that even if the challenged instruction on page 17 was erroneous, counsel's failure to raise it as an issue on appeal does not constitute a  'failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.'  United States v. Guerrero, 517 F.2d 528, 531 (10th Cir. 1975). We agree with the district court that counsel need not appeal every possible question of law at the risk of being found to be ineffective. Gillihan v. New Mexico, No. 74-414 (D.N.M., May 14, 1975), Record, vol. I, at 58-59. We accordingly conclude that appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal from his state court conviction. 42 III. Appellant's Claim that his Conviction Was Rendered Void by the Imposition of the Death Penalty. 43 Appellant argues that his conviction was rendered void by the imposition of the death penalty which constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant's reliance on Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), in support of this contention is misplaced. Furman did not hold, as appellant seems to contend, that the infliction of the death penalty per se violates the eighth amendment. Rather, Furman held that (the death penalty) could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883 (1976). The Supreme Court's holding left intact the convictions by merely reversing the judgment in each case before it insofar as it left undisturbed the death sentence imposed. 408 U.S. at 240, 92 S.Ct. at 2727, 33 L.Ed.2d at 350. Accord, Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2992, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 962 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3008, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, 983 (1976). 44 Furthermore, four years after Furman the Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death penalty does not per se constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Court stated: We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883-84 (1976). Accord, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2954, 49 L.Ed.2d 929, 936 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2964, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 920 (1976). Appellant's claim that his conviction was rendered void by the imposition of the death penalty must therefore be rejected as being without merit.IV. Appellant's Claim that the Submission to the Jury of the Death Penalty as a Possible Verdict Deprived him of Due Process of Law. 45 Appellant contends that he was denied due process of law and the equal protection of the laws since the jury which sat at his state court trial was given unrestricted power to impose the death penalty without any standards or guidelines by which to be governed. Appellant's Brief at 6. Appellant relies on Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970). However, that case does not support appellant's position. The Supreme Court of the United States there held that, by reason of the double jeopardy clause, a defendant could not be retried for murder after he had been tried for murder once before, but had been convicted only of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The voluntary manslaughter conviction had been set aside because of an erroneous jury instruction. 398 U.S. at 327-29, 90 S.Ct. 1757. 46 Moreover, as pointed out previously in connection with appellant's third claim, in the cases before the United States Supreme Court which involved death sentences imposed on the basis of unconstitutional state statutes, the Court only reversed the judgments insofar as they left undisturbed the death sentence imposed. E. g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2992, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 962 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336, 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3008, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, 983 (1976); Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845, 92 S.Ct. 2845, 33 L.Ed.2d 744 (1972) (per curiam); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2727, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 350 (1972) (per curiam). We accordingly conclude that appellant was not deprived of due process of law or the equal protection of the laws by reason of the jury's authority to return a death penalty verdict. 47 V. Appellant's Claim that the Imposition of the Consecutive Life Sentences Constitutes Impermissible Enhancement of Sentence. 48 Appellant contends that the trial court's imposition of consecutive life sentences upon resentencing after the death sentences had been vacated by the New Mexico Supreme Court enhanced his sentence in violation of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 10 In support of this contention appellant argues that the four death sentences imposed were necessarily concurrent since they could not be executed consecutively and since the trial court did not specify that they were to run consecutively. 11 Appellant then cites United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931) for the proposition that once a defendant has begun serving his sentence, the sentence may not be enhanced. Appellant's Brief at 7. 49 We note at the outset that appellant does not cite any authority in support of his contention that the consecutive life sentences constitute greater punishment than the death sentences originally imposed on each of four convictions of murder in the first degree. Even if we were to accept appellant's enhancement of punishment argument, which we decline to do, it does not follow that the imposition of a greater sentence upon resentencing constitutes a violation of the fifth amendment right against double jeopardy when, as here, the prior sentences had been set aside at the appellant's behest. We previously resolved that issue in Tipton v. Baker, 432 F.2d 245, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1970) (footnotes omitted):We conclude that where, at the defendant's behest, his sentence is set aside on appeal or by collateral attack, the imposition of a greater sentence does not violate Federal double jeopardy principles. Murphy v. Massachusetts, (177 U.S. 155, 20 S.Ct. 639, 44 L.Ed. 711 (1900)); Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (6th Cir.), aff'd., 324 U.S. 282, 65 S.Ct. 666, 89 L.Ed. 944; King v. United States, 69 App.D.C. 10, 98 F.2d 291, 295; Bryant v. United States, 214 F. 51, 53 (8th Cir.); and see United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 474, 67 S.Ct. 1330, 91 L.Ed. 1610. We have considered Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 21 L.Ed. 872, and United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354, relied on by appellant, and similar authorities. There is dicta in the Benz case that, while a court may amend a judgment during the term so as to mitigate punishment, it may not increase the penalty because of double jeopardy restrictions. Id. at 307, 51 S.Ct. 113. While it is not free from doubt, we nevertheless believe that the prohibition against a sentence being augmented does not apply where invalidation of the prior sentence occurred at the defendant's behest. We agree with the conclusion in King v. United States, supra, that the law remains as the Murphy case established it     that when a void, or merely voidable, sentence has been vacated as a result of the prisoner's own demands, he cannot complain if his second sentence increases his punishment. 98 F.2d at 295. Thus, we do not agree with appellant's double jeopardy contention. 50 Accord, United States ex rel. Ferrari v. Henderson, 474 F.2d 510, 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 102, 38 L.Ed.2d 81 (1973); cf. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973), aff'g 455 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1972) (rendition of a higher sentence by a jury upon retrial does not violate the double jeopardy clause). 12 We accordingly conclude that the imposition of the consecutive life sentences upon resentencing did not violate appellant's right against double jeopardy. 51