Opinion ID: 848659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Michigan Constitution

Text: This case is not about the federal constitution's Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection. It is about the double jeopardy protection provided by the Michigan Constitution to those within the jurisdiction of this state. The majority claims that it must determine whether we correctly applied the doctrine of dual sovereignty in People v. Cooper . Ante at 47. The appropriate question is whether the Cooper decision correctly interpreted our state's constitution. I assert that it did. The Cooper Court rejected the United States Supreme Court's one-sided view of dual sovereignty. The current majority suggests that the Cooper Court incorrectly applied dual sovereignty, whereas the Cooper Court specifically rejected it. Instead, it appropriately adopted a rule that balances the rights of the state with the fundamental rights afforded to the accused. As Justice Denise Johnson of the Vermont Supreme Court observed, [W]e do not need a unique state source to justify our differences with the interpretation of the federal Constitution. The concept of sovereignty gives state courts the right and the justification to disagree. Woltson, ed., Protecting Individual Rights: The Role of State Constitutionalism, Report of the 1992 State Judges Forum (1993), p. 43, quoted in Shepard, The maturing nature of state constitution jurisprudence, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 421, 439 (1996). [O]ur courts are not obligated to accept what we deem to be a major contraction of citizen protections under our constitution simply because the United States Supreme Court has chosen to do so. We are obligated to interpret our own organic instrument of government. [ Sitz v. Dep't of State Police, 443 Mich. 744, 763, 506 N.W.2d 209 (1993).] In interpreting the Michigan Constitution, `the provisions for the protection of life, liberty and property are to be largely and liberally construed in favor of the citizen.' Lockwood v. Comm'r of Revenue, 357 Mich. 517, 557, 98 N.W.2d 753 (1959), quoting United States ex rel Flannery v. Commanding Gen., Second Service Command, 69 F.Supp. 661, 665 (S.D.N.Y., 1946). The Double Jeopardy Clause in the Michigan Constitution currently reads, No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy. Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15. To determine the parameters of this guarantee, we must examine the history of our state's constitutional and common-law heritage. Before reaching statehood, Michigan accepted the common law of England as part of its legal heritage. The common law was applied when Michigan was part of the province of Upper Canada in 1792. At that time, the legislature of Upper Canada repealed Canadian Law and declared that resort should be had to the laws of England as the rule for the decision of [real property and civil rights]. 1 Michigan Territorial Laws, Introduction, p. viii (1871). Likewise, the Northwest Ordinance contained a provision indicating that the territories should apply the common law. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art II. [11] When the territory that would become Michigan shifted possession from England to the new United States of America, the common law remained. It is a principle of universal jurisprudence that the laws, whether in writing or evidenced by the usage and customs of a conquered or ceded country, continue in force till altered by the new sovereign.... All that occurred here was the mere change of the sovereign power, which left all rights and laws as they had been. 1 Michigan Territorial Laws, Introduction, pp. x-xi (1871). Furthermore, in 1795 the Governor and judges of the territory adopted an act declaring that the common law of England was the applicable law. Id. at xi-xii. The common law of England held that protection from double jeopardy extended to prosecutions by other sovereigns. The practice in Great Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was that prosecution by a different sovereign precluded England from retrying a defendant. See State v. Hogg, 118 N.H. 262, 265-266, 385 A.2d 844 (1978). Michigan adopted its first constitution in 1835. At that time, its double jeopardy provision read, No person for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment. Const. 1835, art. 1, § 12. In 1850, the state constitution was expanded and reworded to read, No person after acquittal upon the merits shall be tried for the same offense. Const. 1850, art. 6, § 29. Constitutional convention notes from 1850 suggest that the proponent of this change considered it to be simply a clarification of the provision's language. [12] After the 1850 Constitution was ratified, the Michigan Supreme Court had occasion to interpret this new language. It determined that the phrase after acquittal on the merits did not mean that jeopardy attached only after a verdict was rendered. Writing for the Court, Justice COOLEY stated: The present Constitution of this State was adopted in 1850, when all the tendencies of the day were in the direction of enlarging individual rights, giving new privileges, and imposing new restrictions upon the powers of government in all its departments. This is a fact of common notoriety in this State; and the tendencies referred to found expression in many of the provisions of the Constitution. Many common-law rights were enlarged, and given the benefit of constitutional inviolability; and if any were taken away, or restricted in giving new privileges, it was only incidentally done in making the general system more liberal, and, as the people believed, more just. Such a thing as narrowing the privileges of accused parties, as they existed at the common law, was not thought of; but, on the contrary, pains were taken to see that they were all enumerated and made secure. Some were added; and among other provisions adopted for that purpose was the one now under consideration. [ People v. Harding, 53 Mich. 481, 485-486, 19 N.W. 155 (1884).] The Harding Court, therefore, determined that the language used in the 1850 Constitution was meant to expand the rights our state's citizens had at common law. At common law, a person could be retried after an acquittal on the merits if the first court lacked jurisdiction. The language of the 1850 Constitution was intended to preclude this great hardship. Id . at 486, 19 N.W. 155. It was meant to give a privilege not existing at the common law; it had no purpose to take away any which before existed. Id . A constitutional convention was next called in 1908, but that convention left the language of the double jeopardy provision untouched. During the 1961 constitutional convention, the double jeopardy provision again received attention. The convention notes suggest that the delegates were concerned only with the issue of when jeopardy attached. The actual language of the state constitution's double jeopardy provision indicated that the protection did not attach until a verdict of acquittal had been rendered. Yet, in Harding , the Michigan Supreme Court had determined that jeopardy attached long before the rendering of a verdict. The delegates' discussion revolved solely around conforming the language regarding when jeopardy attached to the interpretation the Michigan courts had given it: Mr. Stevens: Mr. Chairman and delegates, the original wording of this was: No person, after acquittal upon the merits, shall be tried for the same offense. The Supreme Court of Michigan, however, has virtually held that this means the same thing as the provision in the federal constitution, [13] which is what we have put in: No person shall be subject for the same offense to be put twice in jeopardy. It is true that in the opinion of some of the jurists of the state this might make it a little bit easier for the state to appeal in some cases. Otherwise it makes no difference except it brings the provision of the constitution more clearly into the practice of this state. [1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 539.] And later, Delegate Stevens noted: You would think from reading this, probably  and that is a matter of clarification  a layman might think that only after a person has been acquitted on the merits has he been put in jeopardy. That is not the fact under the decisions of the Michigan supreme court. He is better protected than that. There is nothing in here that I believe can be construed to in any way delete or reduce the rights of the defendant. [1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 540.] Reference was made to the similarity between the proposed provision and the language of the United States Constitution, the delegates noting that [t]he wording which we propose is that which is found in the vast majority of state constitutions. 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 540 (Delegate Danhof). However, nothing suggests that they meant by the similarity in wording that all aspects of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be construed the same as other sovereigns' clauses, either then or afterward. The only discussion at the convention centered on conforming the language of Michigan's Double Jeopardy Clause to the interpretation Michigan courts had given to that language. Silence regarding other aspects of the protection should not be construed to mean that the delegates considered federal case law the definitive authority regarding the meaning of our state provision. Rather, this silence should be taken to mean what it more likely signifies: a lack of consideration of any of the aspects of double jeopardy protection beyond the question of when jeopardy attaches. This specific concern was carried through to the people when they voted on the new constitution. The Address to the People contains the following language: This is a revision of Sec. 14, Article II, of the present constitution. The new language of the first sentence involves the substitution of the double jeopardy provision from the U.S. Constitution in place of the present provision which merely prohibits acquittal on the merits. This is more consistent with the actual practice of the courts in Michigan. [Emphasis added.] In addition, the preface to the Address to the People states, Traditional liberties and rights of the people were carefully reviewed and changes made are in the direction of clarifying and strengthening them. (Emphasis added.) Given the full history of our constitution, and the history of the 1961 constitutional convention, several things are clear. First, the sole concern in revising the Double Jeopardy Clause in our state constitution was to clarify that jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn, as our courts had interpreted. It does not attach when a verdict is issued, as appeared from the language of the 1908 Constitution. Second, the language regarding the United States Constitution in the Address to the People simply informs us from where that language was derived. The change in the Double Jeopardy Clause in the 1963 Constitution did not signal the people's intent to adopt the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of all aspects of double jeopardy protection, past and future. Instead, the people intended to ratify what the Michigan courts had already held with regard to when jeopardy attaches. Despite the history outlined above, the majority in People v. Nutt [14] took this language to mean that the people intended to adopt the federal interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. It assumed that the people knew what the United States Supreme Court had interpreted the federal Double Jeopardy Clause to mean, and that they agreed with it. It assumed that they were willing to accept all future interpretations that the federal courts applied to it. It assumed that they willingly gave away their sovereignty as a people and as a state by allowing the federal government to interpret our constitution for us. I cannot agree with all those assumptions. I do not presume that the voters of our state intended that Michigan's Double Jeopardy Clause would be interpreted exactly as the federal provision is interpreted. I have reviewed our common-law history before we became a state, our state's constitutional history, and the language in the Address to the People. It has become obvious to me that the people intended that the language of the state Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to mean what Michigan courts had said it means. See Harding, supra. The holding in Cooper was grounded on the Michigan Constitution. This was specifically recognized in People v. Gay , [15] in which the Cooper decision was reaffirmed and given retroactive effect. As Justice Levin noted, Cooper was a reasoned and careful analysis of the state constitution. People v. Mezy, 453 Mich. 269, 299, 551 N.W.2d 389 (1996) (Levin, J., dissenting). Cooper protects the rights of Michigan's citizens. Unlike federal jurisprudence, it requires that the government balance those individual rights with the state's interest in preserving the public peace and protecting the public safety. Cooper held that Michigan's rights as a sovereign were generally vindicated when a defendant was brought to justice in another jurisdiction. But, it also recognized that there would be times when another sovereign's prosecution would not validate Michigan's interests. In those rare cases, Cooper allowed a successive prosecution: Const. 1963, art. 1, § 15 prohibits a second prosecution for an offense arising out of the same criminal act unless it appears from the record that the interests of the State of Michigan and the jurisdiction which initially prosecuted are substantially different. Analysis on a case-by-case basis cannot be avoided. [ Cooper, supra at 461, 247 N.W.2d 866.] The balancing test of Cooper protects a person's rights to avoid (1) continued embarrassment, expense and ordeal; (2) being compelled to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity; and (3) the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty through repeated prosecutions. Cooper, supra at 460, 247 N.W.2d 866 citing United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975), and Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). The facts that a court should consider in applying the Cooper balancing test include whether the maximum penalties of the statutes involved are greatly disparate, whether some reason exists why one jurisdiction cannot be entrusted to vindicate fully another jurisdiction's interests in securing a conviction, and whether the differences in the statutes are merely jurisdictional or are more substantive. [ Cooper, supra at 461, 247 N.W.2d 866.] The Cooper Court's rejection of the dual sovereignty doctrine as a basis for allowing successive prosecutions, without reference to the defendant's fundamental interest in being free from double jeopardy, was unanimous. [16] The majority uses Heath to attack the holding in Cooper . But Cooper does not rest on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal constitution. It rests on the Michigan constitution. It depends on balancing the interest of the state in curbing criminal activity with the liberty interests of those within its jurisdiction. Gay, supra at 693-694, 289 N.W.2d 651. As discussed, this is perfectly consistent with the intent of the 1961 constitutional convention delegates and with the intent of the people. Given the rejection of the Bartkus one-sided approach to dual sovereignty, later cases such as Heath that apply the same one-sided approach have no bearing on whether Cooper was correctly decided. The Cooper rule is necessary to protect the individual's interest, as well as the state's interest in rare cases where the state's interest is not vindicated by another sovereign's prosecution. The defendant here is being forced to undergo multiple ordeals when he should be able to rely on the finality of his prosecution in Kentucky. He had an expectation that his guilty plea in Kentucky would end governmental action against him involving the car theft. Instead, the Kentucky guilty plea can now be used against him in the Michigan proceeding. Defendant will again be punished for the same activity for which he has already been punished in Kentucky. Cooper specifically directs a case-by-case inquiry of whether the state's interests have been met. Cooper, supra at 461, 247 N.W.2d 866. It allows successive prosecutions when the interests of the two states are substantially different. The court considers the maximum penalties available, facts indicating that the other jurisdiction cannot be trusted to vindicate fully Michigan's interests, and whether the statutory differences are substantive or merely jurisdictional. Id . There is no evidence in the record before us that Michigan's interests have not been adequately protected by the proceedings in Kentucky. Defendant pleaded guilty in Kentucky to attempted theft of property having a value of more than $300. He was sentenced to one year's probation. Defendant is charged in Michigan with UDAA and receiving stolen property worth $1,000 or more. These crimes are felonies punishable by not more than five years' imprisonment. Similarly, the Kentucky statute makes theft of property with a value of more than $300 a felony punishable by not more than five years' imprisonment. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 514.030 and 532.020(1)(a). To conserve trial resources, Michigan prosecutors frequently offer a plea bargain to a defendant to plead guilty to a lesser offense. The Kentucky prosecutor's willingness to offer defendant a plea to a lesser offense cannot be said to undermine our state's interests. Furthermore, the Michigan prosecutor in this case does not argue that Michigan's interests were compromised. The facts of this case serve to show that Cooper is not, in fact, unworkable. The interests sought to be protected by each state's law are not substantially different. The interests of the state of Michigan are amply protected, while the interests of the individual are not ignored. The Double Jeopardy Clause was written not to protect the state or federal government, but to protect the individual. To hold that Michigan will allow prosecution in our state after a federal or sister state prosecution for the identical act is to embrace a system of constitutional duality. It enables a state to pursue a person who either has been found innocent or has paid the price for his crime to another sovereignty. To harass the innocent, the acquitted, or the guilty person who has paid the price for a crime in money or freedom is not compatible with constitutionally legitimate state action. To the contrary, it is at just such harassment that our state constitution takes aim. The policy that weakens double jeopardy protections is not validated because both state and federal sovereignties combine to embrace it. It is incongruous to allow a state's basic constitutional policy, one integral to its sovereignty, to be frustrated as a consequence of the duality that allows that state to exist. Furthermore, it is inconsistent and ironic to use that federalism, which has been justified in the name of protecting freedom, to obliterate a fundamental right. Rarely are Michigan's interests not vindicated after one fair test of guilt. Normally, the cause of justice is not served in the second pursuit of one who has been subjected to jeopardy for the same act in a different jurisdiction. To hold otherwise is to require an accused either to prove innocence twice or to pay twice for the same offense. The sole rationale for it is that the acts complained of took place where two layers of government coincide. For almost thirty years, Cooper and its progeny have protected citizens and others subject to the jurisdiction of this state from the risk of (1) continued embarrassment, expense and ordeal; (2) being compelled to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity; and (3) the possibility that even though innocent [we] may be found guilty through repeated prosecutions. [ Gay, supra at 694, 289 N.W.2d 651 citing Wilson, supra at 343, 95 S.Ct. 1013 and Green, supra at 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221.] See also People v. Herron, 464 Mich. 593, 601, 628 N.W.2d 528 (2001). Cooper correctly held that Michigan's Double Jeopardy Clause protects us from multiple prosecutions for the same crime. That protection exists as long as the state's interest is protected by a prosecution for the crime in another state or by the federal government. The Court in Cooper did not need to find a different history behind Michigan's adoption of a double jeopardy bar [17] to conclude that the Michigan Constitution protects us from multiple prosecutions for a single crime. As explained, that protection has been a bedrock principle of our common law for decades.