Opinion ID: 1854562
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The next question presented is whether Holiday can be held responsible by reason of express warranty.

Text: Plaintiffs contend they were told by a representative of this defendant, during sales negotiations and prior to signing the purchase order, the cleaning units would operate for not more than .30¢ a load but actual cost was at least $2.00. Early decisions held mere affirmations or representations by a seller as to the condition of a thing offered for sale did not attain the status of a warranty. American Fruit Product Co. v. Davenport Vinegar & Pickling Works, 172 Iowa 683, 699, 154 N.W. 1031. This doctrine has more recently been abandoned. It is now generally recognized no particular form of words need be used in order to create a warranty. In fact the matter was at least partially resolved in accord with the modern rule by section 554.13, Code 1962, here applicable, which provides: Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the value of the goods nor any statement purporting to be a statement of the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty. See also section 554.2313, Code 1966. We conclude the statement made as to operating costs of the subject machine was more than sales talk, being, under the circumstances, an inducing representation or affirmation of fact given in such terms as to attain the status of a warranty. It is also evident plaintiffs relied in part at least on this sale inducing statement. Had they been aware of the fact the machine here concerned would not operate for less than $2.00 a load, it is safe to assume the purchase would never have been made. In support hereof, see Distillers Distributing Corp. v. Sherwood Distilling Co., (4 Cir.), 180 F.2d 800, 802-803; Farmers State Bank v. Cook, 251 Iowa 942, 947, 103 N.W.2d 704; Marxen v. Meredith, 246 Iowa 1173, 1178-1179, 69 N.W.2d 399; Mitchell v. Pinckney, 127 Iowa 696, 698-699, 104 N.W. 286; Watson v. Brown, 113 Iowa 308, 311, 85 N.W. 28; Valerius & Co. v. Hockspiere, 87 Iowa 332, 334-335, 54 N.W. 136; Garbark v. Newman, 155 Neb. 188, 51 N.W.2d 315, 321-322; Wat Henry Pontiac Co. v. Bradley, 202 Okl. 82, 210 P.2d 348, 351; Acme Equip. Corp. v. Montgomery Coop. Cream. Ass'n, 29 Wis. 2d 355, 138 N.W.2d 729, 731; 77 C.J.S. Sales § 308, page 1131; and 46 Am.Jur., Sales, section 313, page 494. The trial court found a breach of express warranty by defendant Holiday. This finding stands supported by substantial evidence. V. We turn now to Exhibit A, the face page being a complete purchase order signed by Dailey on behalf of plaintiffs. It was presented to plaintiffs for execution in the form of a tablet with several pages and carbons. The reverse side of this instrument contains printed material which to the extent here relevant provides as follows: The seller warrants all new machinery for the same period as the manufacturer of same, from date of shipment, against defects in material of workmanshipthe seller's obligation being limited, however, to furnishing replacement only for any part returned f.o.b. our factory within such period and found by the seller to have been thus defective. This warranty is contingent upon use of the equipment under normal operating conditions.    These warranties are in lieu of all other warranties expressed or implied. ALL PROMISES AND VERBAL UNDERSTANDINGS OR AGREMENTS OF ANY KIND PERTAINING TO THIS CONTRACT NOT SHOWN HEREIN ARE EXPRESSLY ABROGATED AND WAIVED. As previously stated the purchase order makes no reference to any warranties, conditions or exclusions on the reverse side of the document. Furthermore neither plaintiff recalls having ever seen the printed material to which reference is here made. And a salesman for Holiday admitted there was never any conversation about the back-side of Exhibit A. A comparable situation was presented in Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 48 S.E.2d 653, 659, where a limitation on warranty was in fine print with a showing made it had never been brought to the attention of the buyers. There the court said: Both the president and vice-president and treasurer of appellant testified that they had not previously observed such stipulation and it was never called to their attention. It is so located as to easily escape attention. Certainly it could not be said as a matter of law that appellant should have been aware of the stipulation. 'The rule in this state is that for such a clause to be applicable in any case it must be shown that it was brought to the attention of the purchaser.'   . Under existing circumstances we are satisfied the exclusions or conditions here concerned are inapplicable and accord Holiday no relief by reason of what may best be described as evasive concealment on its part. In support hereof see the majority view expressed in International Milling Co. v. Gisch, 258 Iowa 263, 137 N.W.2d 625, 631-632. And see Boeing Airplane Company v. O'Malley, (8 Cir.), 329 F.2d 585, 593; Steele v. J. I. Case Company, 197 Kan. 554, 419 P.2d 902, 909; and 77 C.J.S. Sales §§ 312c, 317b, at pages 1152, 1167. Upon the basis of the factual situation disclosed we conclude the alleged disclaimer of warranties by defendant Holiday was of no legal force or effect.