Opinion ID: 2332073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was sergeant nicoletta entitled to a hearing?

Text: We shall pass various procedural and other questions involved below, in order to examine the meritorious issue projected by the petition for certification, on the basis of which we agreed to review the case. That is to say: What due process or like right is owing to an employee such as Nicoletta, in the circumstances presented here, incident to the termination of his public employment? We have seen that such termination need not be predicated on just cause, and accordingly no property interest is implicated, such as to invoke the due process shield. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed. 2d 548 (1972). The property interest contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment may take many forms over and above the ownership of tangible property. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1997, 32 L.Ed. 2d 556, 573 (1972); see generally Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964). But in this context the key concept is entitlement, such as involved in statutory eligibility for welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed. 2d 287 (1970); tenure employment, Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 76 S.Ct. 637, 100 L.Ed. 692 (1956); contractual right to employment, Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 216 (1952); a clearly implied promise of continued employment, Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 91 S.Ct. 1772, 29 L.Ed. 2d 418 (1971), or the like. The chief ingredient of this kind of property interest such as to quicken the right to protection by procedural due process is a legitimate claim of entitlement. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 561. As we have seen, the statute here subjects the duration of employment to the will of the employer and as against the exercise of such will, Nicoletta had no entitlement to employment. His status may be analogized to that of the respondent in Roth : [T]he terms of the respondent's appointment secured absolutely no interest in re-employment for the next year. They supported absolutely no possible claim of entitlement to re-employment. Nor, significantly, was there any state statute or University rule or policy that secured his interest in re-employment or that created any legitimate claim to it. In these circumstances, the respondent surely had an abstract concern in being rehired but he did not have a property interest sufficient to require the University authorities to give him a hearing when they declined to renew his contract of employment. [408 U.S. at 578, 92 S.Ct. at 2710, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 561 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)]. Nor does the present case involve an attempt to circumvent a constitutional right such as free speech, in which event there might be, as mentioned by Justice Stewart in Roth, a different case. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed. 2d 570 (1972); Williams v. Civil Service Commission, 66 N.J. 152 (1974). But see, where there are multiple causes for dismissal, Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed. 2d 471 (1977). A property interest aside however, it is asserted that the circumstances of Nicoletta's dismissal involved a liberty interest on his part within the intendment of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, as it recalled in Roth, has required due process protection for deprivations of liberty beyond the sort of formal constraints imposed by the criminal process. Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 572, 92 S.Ct. at 2706, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 558. This liberty includes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of    conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized    as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923). The Roth Court distinguished a case which might imperil these rights: The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community. It did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been guilty of dishonesty, or immorality. Had it done so, this would be a different case. For [w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed. 2d 515, 519.    In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials. In the present case, however, there is no suggestion whatever that the respondent's interest in his good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake. Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. The State, for example, did not invoke any regulations to bar the respondent from all other public employment in state universities. Had it done so, this, again, would be a different case. For [t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury   . Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath [341 U.S. 123, 185, 71 S.Ct. 624, 655, 95 L.Ed. 817, 861] ( Jackson, J., concurring). See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131, 135. The Court has held, for example, that a State, in regulating eligibility for a type of professional employment, cannot foreclose a range of opportunities in a manner    that contravene[s]    Due Process, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed. 2d 796, 801, 64 A.L.R. 2d 288, and, specifically, in a manner that denies the right to a full prior hearing. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96, 103, 83 S.Ct. 1175, 10 L.Ed. 2d 224, 229, 2 A.L.R. 2d 1254. [408 U.S. at 573-74, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 558-59 (citations & footnote omitted)]. These concepts direct our attention again to Williams v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 66 N.J. 152, 156-57: In this State a rule of the Civil Service Commission authorizes the Chief Examiner and Secretary of the Commission, with respect to any applicant who shall at any time theretofore have been removed    from the public service    to do any of the following: 1. Reject the application of a person for admission to an examination; 2. Refuse to test an applicant; 3. Refuse to place the name of a person on the employment list; 4. Refuse to certify the name of an eligible person; or 5. Remove from the employment list the name of an eligible person. [ N.J.A.C. 4:1-8.14] Thus removal from the public service  as has occurred to this plaintiff  may indeed have imposed upon him a stigma or potential disability, seriously affecting his liberty to seek future employment in a position which falls within the domain of the civil service regulations. We do not consider here, for three reasons, the bearing on Nicoletta's reputation of the strong charges of wrongdoing included in the Commission's eventual findings of fact, supra, which were filed only in response to the remand direction of the Appellate Division. It cannot be overemphasized that Nicoletta's employment was terminated for cause, which went to the heart of the responsibilities of a law enforcement official. Thus, in this case, the disclosure of reasons occurred after the termination for cause and the accrual of constitutional injury. In addition, as perceptively noted in the dissent of our colleague Justice Schreiber, the United States Supreme Court has distinguished between public and private disclosures or nondisclosures of reasons. It stated in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed. 2d 684 (1976), that: In this case the asserted reasons for the City Manager's decision were communicated orally to the petitioner in private and also were stated in writing in answer to interrogatories after this litigation commenced. Since the former communication was not made public, it cannot properly form the basis for a claim that petitioner's interest in his good name, reputation, honesty, or integrity was thereby impaired. And since the latter communication was made in the course of a judicial proceeding which did not commence until after petitioner had suffered the injury for which he seeks redress, it surely cannot provide retroactive support for his claim. A contrary evaluation of either explanation would penalize forthright and truthful communication between employer and employee in the former instance, and between litigants in the latter. [ Id. at 348-49, 96 S.Ct. at 2079-80, 48 L.Ed. 2d at 692]. [3] Contrary to Bishop, where the original firing was allegedly for no reason or for reasons which were not disclosed or publicized but only came to light upon the insistence of the employee, in this case the revealment of reasons was elicited in the context of litigation instituted by the employee based on his legitimate assertion of constitutional injury stemming from the original firing for cause. Third, we agree with Justice Schreiber that the Supreme Court in Bishop and Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed. 2d 405 (1976), appears to have receded from the dictum of Roth concerning the stigmatic legal implications of a discharge for blameworthy cause. In Paul, the Court stated: While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the frequently drastic effect of the stigma which may result from defamation by the government in a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is either liberty or property by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause. [ Id. at 701, 96 S.Ct. at 1160-61, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 414]. It is unnecessary to probe and explore the scope of ambivalence in the treatment of this reputation-stigma factor by the United States Supreme Court in Board of Regents v. Roth, supra ; Bishop v. Wood, supra ; Paul v. Davis, supra ; and Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed. 2d 515 (1971). Nor need we determine the applicability of our State constitutional guarantee of due process, which has its source in N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 1; Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1 (1977); Cunningham v. Department of Civil Service, 69 N.J. 13 (1975); or, the firmly-established New Jersey fairness and rightness doctrine. State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 109-12 (1976); Donaldson v. Board of Educ., 65 N.J. 236, 242-43 (1974); Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 294-96 (1971); Monks v. Parole Bd., 58 N.J. 238, 249-50 (1971); State v. Kunz, 55 N.J. 128, 144 (1969). For there is a much more narrow, yet palpable, ratio decidendi upon which to rest our decision, a ground conspicuously absent in Roth, Bishop and Paul. In the present case, as in Williams, the removal of the employee from public employment per se exposed him to potential disqualification from further public employment. As indicated in Williams, supra, the source of this disablement is N.J.A.C. 4:1-8.14, which provides in pertinent part: (a) The Chief Examiner and Secretary shall take the following actions for any cause listed in subsection (b) of this Section or for any other good cause: 1. Reject the application of a person for admission to an examination; 2. Refuse to test an applicant; 3. Refuse to place the name of a person on the employment list; 4. Refuse to certify the name of an eligible person; or 5. Remove from the employment list the name of an eligible person. (b) Any of the following shall constitute good cause for such action by the Chief Examiner and Secretary against any prospective employee who:     6. Has been removed or has resigned not in good standing or has resigned in lieu of removal from the public service, or whose record of employment, public or private, has been unsatisfactory for any reason which casts substantial doubt upon the person's capacity to perform satisfactorily the duties of the position for which the application has been filed or the test held.     [ N.J.A.C. 4:1-8.14]. No case, including Bishop and Paul, holds, or even suggests, that the foreclosure from future employment opportunities by operation of state law is less than a protectible liberty interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental, preliminary point, reiterated recently by the Supreme Court in Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1560-61, 56 L.Ed. 2d 30, 39-40 (1978), is that the underlying substantive liberty or property interest is defined with reference to state law. In Williams, supra, Justice Mountain characterized the disabling consequences of termination from public service. He wrote: Thus removal from the public service  as has occurred to this plaintiff  may indeed have imposed upon him a stigma or potential disability, seriously affecting his liberty to seek future employment in a position which falls within the domain of the civil service regulations. [66 N.J. at 157]. Since Nicoletta has been removed from the public service, the Chief Examiner and Secretary of Civil Service now has good cause to invoke all the sanctions of N.J.A.C. 4:1-8.14(a), including automatic disqualification from future state service. The essential impetus of Roth, Paul and Bishop buttresses the conclusion that such a concrete injury is a protectible liberty interest. In Roth, the Supreme Court stated that `[t]o be deprived not only of present government employment but of future opportunity for it certainly is no small injury   .' 408 U.S. at 574, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 599. In Paul the Court quoted with approval  indeed, even accentuated  a passage from Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1230 (1961): Finally, it is to be noted that this is not a case where government action has operated to bestow a badge of disloyalty or infamy, with an attendant foreclosure from other employment opportunity. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-191, 73 S.Ct. 215, 97 L.Ed. 2d 216; Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140-141, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817.... Id., at 898, 81 S.Ct. 1750, 6 L.Ed. 2d 1230. (Emphasis supplied.) [ Paul v. Davis, supra, 424 U.S. at 705-06, 96 S.Ct. at 1162, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 416]. This thought  that the impairment of future employability by operation of state law is a protectible liberty interest  flows logically from other passages in Paul. For example, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, quoted approvingly from Board of Regents v. Roth, supra : Similarly, there is no suggestion that the State, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.  Id., at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed. 2d 548. [ Paul v. Davis, supra, 424 U.S. at 709-10, 96 S.Ct. at 1164, 47 L.Ed. 2d at 419 (some emphasis in original)]. In view of these precedents, it is apparent that any eviscerating influences on the Roth reputation theme in no way affect the continued vitality of the principal thrust of Williams, supra, that is, its basic concern with the mentioned disabilities applicable to a person removed    from the public service    as Nicoletta has been. In such case it is clear that a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest was implicated in the termination of his employment. It is readily deducible that had such a future disqualification factor existed in the Bishop and Paul cases by operation of state law, and certainly in Roth, those courts would have perceived and enforced due process rights on the part of the employee. In any case, the liberty interest which we have identified impels us now to an inquiry as to the nature of the due process or like right involved, and whether in connection with his ouster Nicoletta received the benefit of such right or anything reasonably equivalent to it.