Opinion ID: 2061056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mrs Packard, the Louries and the Tappers vs. Coca-Cola.

Text: The Plaintiffs' claims against Coca-Cola were based entirely upon negligence in permitting its truck to stand within 25 feet of the corner of curbs at an intersection, thus establishing prima facie validity of the ordinance. 30 M.R.S.A. § 2155. The jury could have concluded from the ensuing testimony that the Defendant Coca-Cola's truck had been left standing within 25 feet of the intersection and that its position there at that time obstructing the views of Mrs. Whitten and the driver of the taxi was one of the proximate causes of the collision. Coca-Cola attempted to rebut the prima facie validity of the ordinance, first by seeking to prove by the testimony of the librarian of the Lewiston Sun and Journal that it had not been published as was required by the City Charter. Her testimony failed to establish this fact as her examination of the volumes of newspapers for the related period had been conducted with another person who had examined some of the volumes of the crucial period while the librarian was inspecting others. The other person's testimony would also have been necessary to establish absence of publication. It was absent. The City Charter required that city ordinances be approved by a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court before becoming effective. This ordinance was approved by an Active Retired Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court. R.S.1944, chap. 91, § 6 which was then controlling provided that an Active Retired Justice shall    constitute a part of the court from which he has retired and shall have the same jurisdiction and be subject to the same restrictions therein as before retirement, except that he shall act only in such cases and matters and hold court only at such terms and times as he may be directed and assigned to by the chief justice of the supreme judicial court.    The Defendant Coca-Cola contends that the record does not demonstrate the Active Retired Justice's authority to act in this particular matter. We must bear in mind that the Plaintiff had established prima facie proof of the validity of the ordinance. Therefore, to establish lack of approval by a Justice the Defendant was required to show the Active Retired Justice's lack of authority to perform this particular act. Defendant has not done this. Defendant Coca-Cola also urges that as the office of Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court is a constitutional office the Legislature exceeded its constitutional powers in enacting the statute defining the duties of Active Retired Justices. There appears to us no doubt as to the Legislature's authority here. While the Court was established by the Constitution, (Constitution of Maine, Art. VI, sec. 1) it was left to the Legislature to prescribe the number of Justices constituting the Court, their powers, emoluments, conditions of retirement, etc. The Legislature here, after exercising its prerogative of fixing a retirement date, also provided conditions under which a Justice who chose to retire might also continue to perform certain limited judicial services. Our conclusion that Defendant failed to produce evidence which could overcome the prima facie validity of the ordinance makes it unnecessary for us to consider the propriety of the Presiding Justice's undertaking to rule on proof of validity as a matter of law. Finally, Defendant Coca-Cola urges that although its truck may have been positioned within 25 feet of the intersection it was parked there and that section 101.11 of the traffic ordinances of the City defines parking as meaning the standing of a vehicle otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of, and while actively engaged in loading or unloading. Thus, Coca-Cola contends that its truck was not parked at the intersection in violation of City ordinance because its driver was engaged in the act of unloading. In construing these ordinances we note that the section which the Plaintiffs claim the Defendant violated prohibits not only parking but also standing and stopping of a vehicle. We conclude that it was the intention of the enactors of the ordinance to prohibit the standing of a motor vehicle within 25 feet of an intersection whether unloading or not, doubtless because of considerations of public safety as distinguished from mere considerations of convenience of shoppers, drivers, businesses, etc. which might dictate many parking regulations. The evidence supports the jury's finding of causal negligence on the part of Defendant Coca-Cola.