Opinion ID: 2344662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Childers Oil Company Was a Proper Defendant

Text: Childers based its motion to dismiss on an assertion that Adkins had never been employed by Childers. The original complaint had been filed by Adkins on May 17, 2004, and despite extensive discovery, Childers did not claim it was an improper defendant until April 20, 2005  only one week before the trial was set to begin. By that point in time, however, Childers had effectively admitted to being the employer of Adkins, and at the very least, there was a material issue of fact for the jury  an issue that was eventually decided against Childers. As early as August 23, 2004, Childers filed answers to Adkins's first set of interrogatories that indicated Childers had no contention with being named as Adkins's employer. The following answers were submitted among others: Interrogatory No. 4(B): Please state the nature of the Plaintiffs work for the defendant. Answer: Employed at the Shelby [sic] doublekwik as a cashier and, later as a deli cook/attendant. Interrogatory No. 4(C): Please list the Plaintiffs job duties for all her positions while employed by the Defendant. Answer: Worked as cashier, prepared food, took customer food orders, cleaned in the kitchen, ordered stock and counted inventory. (Emphasis added.) Childers also responded to the interrogatory, Please state the name of all the Plaintiffs immediate supervisors during her employment with the Defendant . . ., as well as, Please state any comments that the Plaintiff made to the Defendant-employer or its agents about her termination.  (Emphasis added.) Through the entirety of this initial set of interrogatories, Childers was referred to specifically as the employer of Adkins no less than twelve separate times  all without objection. In the same set of questions Childers rejected, at least five times, the use of the words fired or terminated in reference to Adkins and responded that Adkins was instead laid off. Childers did object once  to an interrogatory it found to be unduly burdensome. Reading the response to this interrogatory it is clear that Childers read the questions with great attention and with an eye for objectionable material. Since Childers quibbled in its responses over whether Adkins was fired or laid off, it surely would have raised objection at being referred to as her employer if it believed otherwise. On September 27, 2004, Childers submitted its first set of interrogatories, which contained the following request: Interrogatory No. 11: State in complete and exact detail your entire basis in law and in fact for your allegations contained in Paragraph 1 of your complaint, where you state that on or about January 30, 2004, you were wrongfully terminated from your employment with the Defendant and that termination was an act of age discrimination and sex discrimination. (Emphasis added.) Childers's counsel clearly had no issue with referring to the corporation as Adkins's employer. In the same set, Interrogatory No. 14 also refers to Adkins's employment with the Defendant. And lastly, the fatal blow to Childers's claim is the motion for summary judgment it submitted on March 4, 2005, roughly five weeks prior to the motion based on the claim it was an improper party. In the memorandum, Childers began its argument with the following: The only issue in this case is whether or not Childers'[s] decision to terminate Adkins was improperly and unlawfully motivated by reason of age discrimination. Indeed, the very first sentence of the memorandum, which begins the statement of facts, is the following: The Plaintiff is forty-eight (48) years of age and was originally hired by the Defendant as a cashier at Defendant's Shelby [sic] store. It is not reasonable to believe that Childers or its counsel suddenly realized after' months of interrogatories and discovery that it should not be the defendant in this action. By the time Childers had made this motion it had already made an effective judicial admission that it was the employer of Adkins and the proper defendant in this action. Even if Childers had not effectively admitted to being the employer, Childers can argue, at best, that a genuine issue of fact had been raised. Evidence was presented at trial by both parties on the issue, and the jury found that Childers was the proper employer and defendant. The evidence supporting this finding included that the employee handbook given to Adkins was clearly labeled as the Childers Oil Company Employee Handbook of Personnel Policies and that the person who hired and terminated Adkins was a regional supervisor for the Childers Oil Company. To be sure, Childers entered its own affidavits and items into evidence, which on the surface are no less weighty than those entered by Adkins. However, it is the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and make a finding when a fact is at issue. The jury specifically found that Bertha Adkins was employed with the Defendant prior to January 30, 2004. There was evidence to support the jury's finding, and it should not be disturbed. Either by admission or jury finding, Childers Oil Company, Inc. has been found to be the proper defendant to this action, and its argument on this issue has no merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals was correct on this issue.