Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excusing Prospective Jurors for Cause Over Defense Objections

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in excluding for cause four prospective jurors because of their views on the death penalty, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. The applicable law is settled. The trial court may excuse for cause a prospective juror whose views on the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of that juror's duties. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 727, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) On appeal, we will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous. ( Ibid. ) Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors. ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224, ___ L.Ed.3d ___.) As we explain, we have reviewed the record as to each of the four prospective jurors and find no basis on which to overturn the trial court's rulings. All gave conflicting and sometimes ambiguous statements, but all also made statements supporting the court's findings that their views would at least substantially impair their performance of their duties. The fact that these jurors also gave statements that might have warranted keeping them as jurors does not change this conclusion. The question before us as a reviewing court ... is whether the evidence supports the actual rulings, not whether it would have supported different rulings. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 602, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.)
On his written juror questionnaire, when asked to rate himself on a scale of 1 to 10, with one being strongly against the death penalty and 10 strongly in favor of it, Prospective Juror No. 4 of October 17, 1994, marked that he was a 2. He answered the questionnaire's inquiry, Briefly describe your general feelings about the death penalty, with I would really not want to be confronted with the decision to apply the death penalty. The questionnaire also asked, assuming a defendant was convicted of a premeditated murder during the course of a kidnapping and robbery and a special circumstance, would you: [ķ] (a) No matter what the evidence was, always vote for the death penalty. [ķ] (b) Always vote for life without possibility of parole. [ķ] (c) I would not automatically vote for either life without possibility of parole or the death penalty. I would consider all the evidence and vote my conscience. The prospective juror checked choice (c). At jury voir dire, this prospective juror stated that he might be an unsuitable juror from the perspective of both parties. Defendant might find him undesirable to serve on the jury because defendant had lived next door to the prospective juror briefly and the victim could have been his wife or daughter. The prosecution might find him undesirable because [i]t would be with great trepidation that I would vote for the death penalty. Both parties questioned this prospective juror extensively regarding his attitude toward the death penalty He gave conflicting and equivocal responses. He told defense counsel I would find it quite difficult to ... rule [on] the ... death penalty, but that I would not say it is impossible. This was the first of three times that the prospective juror told defense counsel that he would find it difficult to decide the question of penalty. Asked by defense counsel, You feel that there are some murder cases w[h]ere you would consider the death penalty as a possible sentence? the prospective juror replied, Right now without hearing it I would probably say no. But if I heard all of the details, I may be convinced. He told defense counsel that he thought he would consider both sentencing options. But when defense counsel asked the same question in a different way, Do you feel you would be able to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence? he replied, With difficulty.... Thereafter the prosecutor questioned the prospective juror. The prosecutor explained, If your conscience tells you that [the lesser sentence] is the appropriate penalty you could have a feeling that the aggravating circumstances ... overwhelmingly outweigh the ... `mitigating circumstances,' and yet the law does not require you to vote for the death penalty. The prospective juror responded, You are making it easier for me. [ķ] ... [ķ] ... I would not feel so guilty about, you know, religiously or any other reason about voting for the death penalty.... The prosecutor sought clarification: Could you explain that a little bit now? `It makes it easier'? The prospective juror answered, Because you just said that there is no circumstance that would make me â there is no circumstance unless â in other words, you would not back me into that situation. The prosecutor queried, using the words that you yourself used a few minutes ago, you said `When it comes right down to the wire,' you are not sure if you could vote for the death penalty. [ķ] Knowing that there is no circumstance where you have to, when it comes right down to the wire do you feel that ... if you had the option between either the death penalty or life in prison without possibility of parole[,] ... you would always vote for life in prison without possibility of parole? He answered, I feel like saying `yes,' but, you know, then again it depends on the â probably the information. [ķ] Right now I â it's like saying I can't think of any scenario that would, you know, like information that would lead me to say nothing but death penalty, but, you know, we all learn. The prosecutor asked him about his juror questionnaire response that he was a 2 on a scale of 1 to 10 of favoring the death penalty. The prospective juror affirmed his view. The prosecutor then asked, When I consider that combined with what you have told us about how you expect your conscience would bother you if you voted for the death penalty ..., I get the impression ... that as long as you were not backed into a corner where you were required to vote for the death penalty, that you always had an option, that you would always vote for life in prison. Is that impression correct? The prospective juror replied, Notr â not completely, no. The prosecutor asked, Can you tell me how it is wrong? and the prospective juror replied, I am not sure I know how to answer that. [ķ] Just like I said to the lady on the Defense there, ... it is similar to if you were being attacked or felt that strongly that you would in fact kill someone else, you know, that you could rise to that occasion. . . . [ķ] ... [ķ] That I could essentially, personally, be judge, jury and executioner if somebody was attacking me, which is actually going no further than what I would be asked to do, you know, serving on a jury where I am only asked to be the juror. The prosecutor asked, with your attitude toward the death penalty ... do you think you would be a fair juror to the Prosecution, considering your attitudes toward the death penalty, and considering [that] the Prosecution will be asking you to vote for the death penalty? The prospective juror replied, you should judge that up front, the fact that I marked '2' on the scale of 1-to-10. He soon added, when you say `fair to the Prosecution,' I would be certainly on the biased side against the Prosecution in that case, certainly. Certainly I would. [ķ] I would not be to your advantage. It would be with great trepidation that I would vote for the death penalty, that's obvious. Finally, the prosecutor asked, Well, is it true that to vote for the death penalty you would have to go against your conscience and how you feel about the death penalty? He responded, I would say I would really have to. That would be pretty much it.' I have to go against my conscience. The trial court excused him, stating, The gentleman is an enigma. He said a lot of things that were inconsistent and a lot of things I, frankly, did not understand, but I'm not convinced that he could be fair to the People. In light of this prospective juror's conflicting and equivocal statements, we must defer to the trial court's ruling.
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court's ruling that Prospective Juror No. 3 of October 6, 1994, was substantially impaired in her ability to impose capital punishment in a proper case. She gave conflicting answers throughout voir dire. At times she stated that she could follow the law. But at other times she expressed either doubt about her willingness to impose the death penalty or an inability at all to do so. For example, she stated, I can't conceive of taking somebody's life, and I couldn't take the life of a cat or [a] dog. Defendant argues that the trial court granted the challenge for cause of this prospective juror on the assertedly incorrect ground that I don't think she quite understands the area of discretion that remains in deciding sentence. He maintains that the court could have educated the prospective juror with additional comments or questions. But the court also said, I think she's prejudiced against the death penalty. The court was stating, in a shorthand form, its conclusion that she could not follow her oath or the law. Substantial evidence supports that conclusion.
Prospective Juror No. 4 of October 11,1994, stated that because of her strongly felt opposition to the death penalty she would find it difficult ... even if the aggravating circumstances were overwhelming in comparison to the mitigating to follow the sentencing instructions. To be sure, she gave conflicting answers, including an ability to keep an open mind until all of the evidence had been presented. But the prospective juror stated that her open-mindedness amounted only to a shred. She acknowledged stating on her questionnaire and reaffirmed her belief that, as the prosecutor quoted from her questionnaire, I do not think I believe in the death penalty. I feel it's ultimately wrong for a human to decide that another must die. [I]t's too arbitrary, she explained. The prospective juror also expressed doubt that she could convict defendant of crimes that could lead to a death sentence. She alerted the trial court and parties to her fear that her attitudes could lead to a mistrial at the penalty phase. The court implicitly concluded that the prospective juror was substantially impaired, and granted the challenge. Substantial evidence supports its decision.
Prospective Juror No. 5 of October 18, 1994, made a number of conflicting oral and written statements. She wrote on her questionnaire, As a Catholic I was brought up not to judge anyone. God was the only one with that right. She checked that she would always vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In response to questions by defense counsel, this prospective juror stated that she could set aside her religious beliefs and vote to impose the death penalty on defendant if persuaded it was warranted. In stating that she could vote for the death penalty, she expressly retracted the choice she had made on her juror questionnaire that she would always vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. On further voir dire by defense counsel, this prospective juror said that, contrary to her responses to some of the prosecutor's questions, she could vote for the death penalty in a proper case even if it meant, in counsel's words, that she would go against your own personally held beliefs. Presented with a follow-up question by the trial court, she responded, after a pause of unknown length, that it would not be a sin to vote to impose a death sentence on defendant. Defense counsel conceded that this prospective juror had gone back and forth just like many jurors have.... But he argued that made her no different from other prospective jurors whom the trial court had passed for cause. The court pronounced her another enigma.... I really don't know what she is going to do. But he concluded that she would have to choose between her religious beliefs and the law, and I just don't have enough confidence that she is going to follow the law. We must also defer to this ruling.
The record here is similar to that in People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344, where we also rejected the defendant's claim that four prospective jurors who had been excused on the ground of substantial impairment in their ability to impose capital punishment were improperly excused. Here as there, the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and to assess the degree of uncertainty and reluctance of each prospective juror and resolved any equivocal and conflicting responses in a manner that caused the court to conclude that each of these jurors' views ... would substantially impair the juror's ability to make a penalty determination in accordance with the court's instructions. On this record, we have no reason or basis for second-guessing that finding. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the fact that at some point each of these prospective jurors may have stated or implied that she would perform her duties as a juror did not prevent the trial court from finding, on the entire record, that each nevertheless held views ... that substantially impaired her ability to serve. ( Id. at p. 561, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) Defendant's claim is without merit.