Opinion ID: 3064185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Convictions & Forfeiture Order

Text: Pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, an issue decided at one stage of a case is binding at later stages of the same case. United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1997). Likewise, a “legal decision made at one stage of the litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity existed, becomes the law of the case for future stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.” Id. The purpose of this doctrine is “to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided.” Id. Moreover, under the mandate rule, which is simply an application of the law-of-the-case doctrine, a district court acting under an appellate court’s mandate “cannot vary [the mandate], or examine it for any other purpose than execution; or give any other or further relief; or review it, even for apparent error, upon a matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle 6 with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2007). The law-of-the-case doctrine applies in all instances, save those in which (1) the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different, (2) controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of the law applicable to such issues, or (3) the decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1561. Here, Guerra is barred from re-litigating the question of whether she committed health care fraud. See Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1560. In Medina, we affirmed certain of her health-care-fraud convictions, holding that her promise not to pay kickbacks and subsequent payment of kickbacks rendered the claims she submitted to Medicare fraudulent. See Medina, 485 F.3d at 1298-1304. We remanded the case to the district court for the sole purpose of re-sentencing and, more specifically, making sufficient findings of fact on the amount of loss for which Guerra was responsible. Id. at 1304-05. Therefore, our decision that Guerra indeed committed health care fraud is binding absent appeal to the Supreme Court. See Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1560. Also, the district court was precluded from addressing matters outside the question of re-sentencing. See Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 830. Guerra has not argued, and the record otherwise does not demonstrate, that any of the exceptions to the law-of-the-case doctrine bar this conclusion. See 7 Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1561. Guerra also is barred from challenging the forfeiture order. See id. Because she failed to pursue the issue of forfeiture on first appeal to this Court, she has waived the right to challenge the order now. See id. Although the district court altered the order at re-sentencing, the new order of forfeiture is less than that previously issued, such that it does not appear that Guerra first declined to pursue the matter on appeal because she was satisfied with the amount ordered and now wishes to pursue the matter because she is unsatisfied. Guerra has not argued, and the record otherwise does not demonstrate, that any of the exceptions to the law-ofthe-case doctrine bar this conclusion. See Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d at 1561. Accordingly, we affirm as to these issues.