Opinion ID: 1128377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the death penalty is disproportionate in this case given the extent of crawford's mental health problems.

Text: ¶ 84. In all cases involving a sentence of death, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105 (1994) requires this Court to determine whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. See Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360, 1370 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 2014, 60 L.Ed.2d 386 (1979)(proportionality review involves comparison to other death penalty cases since Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d 1242 (Miss. 1976)); Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 423 (Miss. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (proportionality review insures that such penalty is neither wanton, freakish, excessive, nor disproportionate). ¶ 85. Crawford contends that the fact that he suffered from extraordinary mental problems raises doubt as to whether his execution would be constitutional given the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Conner, 632 So.2d at 1265. Crawford urges this Court to follow the case of Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84 (Miss. 1983), wherein the Court vacated a death sentence and remanded for imposition of a life sentence, with two justices being of the opinion that there was no credible evidence in the record which would support any view other than that the defendant ... was seriously mentally disturbed at the time of his crime. Id. at 97 (Robertson, J., joined by Prather, J., on sentence phase). This Court has held that Edwards is of no precedential value since it represents only a plurality vote. Conner, 632 So.2d at 1265. Nevertheless, the defendant in Edwards suffered from an extensive history of paranoid schizophrenia. Edwards, 441 So.2d at 93. ¶ 86. The Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded persons. Jones v. State, 602 So.2d 1170, 1175 (Miss. 1992). This Court has determined that mentally retarded persons may be subject to the death penalty under Mississippi law as well. Jones, 602 So.2d at 1175; Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 762 (Miss. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098, 105 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed.2d 716 (1984). In order to uphold a mentally retarded defendant's Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, the jury must be provided a vehicle with which to consider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of his mental retardation in rendering its sentence. Jones, 602 So.2d at 1174. ¶ 87. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6) (1994) sets forth the mitigating circumstances which the sentencing jury in death penalty cases must consider. Included are § 99-19-101(6)(b), [t]he offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and § 99-19-101(6)(f), [t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. Pursuant to this statute, the jury in the case sub judice was instructed to consider these mitigating circumstances. The jury also heard extensive argument from defense counsel regarding Crawford's mental condition and its impact on these mitigating factors. ¶ 88. Dr. Martin Webb, a psychologist, testified that Crawford was a manic depressive, and that at the time of Kristy Ray's death, he probably was under extreme duress. He also testified that Crawford's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the commission of the crime was substantially impaired. Dr. Stanley Russel testified that Crawford was acting under extreme duress at the time of the crime. He also testified during the guilt phase that Crawford suffered from psychogenic amnesia, meaning that he had no recollection of killing Kristy Ray. Dr. Reb McMichael, on the other hand, testified that Crawford was not manic at the time of the crime. McMichael stated that based on the evidence available, Crawford was not substantially impaired as to his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. Dr. Chris Lott, a clinical psychologist, testified that there was no evidence to suggest that Crawford ever suffered from manic depressive or bipolar disorder. He did state that he believed that Crawford knew right from wrong, and that the events from Crawford's childhood did not indicate a major mental disorder. ¶ 89. None of the experts testified regarding Crawford's IQ or his level of retardation, if any. The battle of the experts boils down to whether Crawford's emotional state at the time of the crime would preclude the imposition of the death penalty. In the recent Wells case, the State's expert, Dr. Donald Guild, testified that Wells's decision to stay at the crime scene for twenty to thirty minutes while the victim died and his subsequent decision to move the victim, bury him, and clean up the area were not consistent with a mental snap or true mental illness. Wells, 698 So.2d at 515. Guild testified that he did not believe that Wells was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Id. ¶ 90. Here, Crawford behaved in a similar fashion, dragging Kristy Ray by her feet to hide her body in a brush pile. Crawford covered her with leaves, because he wanted to hide the body. Then he sat at a nearby tree stump to decide what he would do. Once he got near his home, he sat on a hillside, watching patrol cars go back and forth, because he did not want anyone to see him. Because this factual scenario closely resembles that of the Wells, we find that the conclusion reached by the Court in Wells should apply here. This Court has determined that Mississippi's sentencing scheme in death penalty cases, together with appropriate jury instructions and appropriate argument, satisfies the constitutional concern expressed above regarding mentally retarded defendants. Wells, 698 So.2d at 515; Jones, 602 So.2d at 1174. This assignment of error is without merit.