Opinion ID: 175021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Petty Offense Exception

Text: Vartelas contends that his crime involving moral turpitude was a nonremovable offense under § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) because he was sentenced to a prison term of less than six months. We reject this contention because it disregards one of the criteria stated in that section. Section 212(a)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), defines classes of aliens who are excludable on [c]riminal and related grounds. In 1992 and 1994, when Vartelas committed and pleaded guilty to, respectively, the crime of conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security, subsection (a)(2)(A) provided, in pertinent part, as follows: (i) In general Except as provided in clause (ii), any alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of (I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such a crime, .... is excludable. (ii) Exception Clause (i)(I) shall not apply to an alien who committed only one crime if  .... (II) the maximum penalty possible for the crime of which the alien was convicted (or which the alien admits having committed or of which the acts that the alien admits having committed constituted the essential elements) did not exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the alien was convicted of such crime, the alien was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed). 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. Ill 1992) (emphases added); see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A) (2006) (substituting inadmissible for excludable). By its terms, therefore, § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) is not applicable unless, inter alia, both the prison term actually imposed was not more than six months and the maximum prison term  possible for the crime (emphasis added) was not more than one year. The section of the Criminal Code under which Vartelas was convicted authorizes, inter alia, imprison[ment of] not more than five years, 18 U.S.C. § 371. Thus, following his plea of guilty, Vartelas could have been sentenced to five years' imprisonment. His reliance on the fact that the range of imprisonment recommended by the Guidelines for his offense was 4-10 months ( see Vartelas brief on appeal at 19) is misplaced. The plain meaning of  maximum penalty possible  (emphases added) is the highest penalty that the applicable statute allows. The maximum ... possible does not refer to a Guidelines-recommended range of imprisonment that is less than what a court could lawfully impose. Accord Mejia-Rodriguez v. Holder, 558 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir.2009) (`maximum penalty possible' is determined in reference to the relevant statutory range of imprisonment and not the federal Sentencing Guidelines range); Mendez-Mendez v. Mukasey, 525 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir.2008) (The plain language of the statute indicates that the phrase, `the maximum penalty possible,' refers to the statutory maximum, not the maximum sentence under the sentencing guidelines.). As the crime of which Vartelas was convicted carried a statutory maximum prison term of five years, that crime was not one for which he could not lawfully be imprisoned for more than one year, and it thus did not qualify as a petty offense within the scope of § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). Accordingly Vartelas was not prejudiced by his attorneys' failure to argue that he was nonremovable under that section.