Opinion ID: 1233056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conviction on Count II

Text: ¶ 31 The heart of this case is Campbell's challenge to Count II, parental interference with the legal custody of Cody. Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-98) reads: [W]hoever intentionally . . . takes a child away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours beyond the court-approved period of physical placement or visitation period from a legal custodian with intent to deprive the custodian of his or her custody rights without the consent of the custodian is guilty of a Class C felony. ¶ 32 In 1997 Campbell repeatedly challenged the validity of his wife's standing as the adoptive mother of Cody before the Walworth County Family Court. He claimed the Missouri adoption was invalid because it had been obtained by fraud. He also claimed that Vickie's rights to Cody had never been terminated. Hence, he claimed that Denise misrepresented her status as Cody's adoptive mother when she petitioned the court for a divorce, sought sole custody and primary placement of Cody, and alleged that [t]wo children have been born or adopted by the parties to the marriage[.] In effect, Campbell claimed that every time Denise said she was the adoptive mother of Cody, she was committing a fraud on the court, thereby invalidating the family court's custody order and custody determinations of September 22, November 11, and December 23, 1997. Thus, Campbell contends that when the circuit court excluded evidence of Denise's fraud, the court infringed upon his right to present a defense. ¶ 33 The Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause right to present a defense requires that a defendant be allowed to introduce relevant evidence, subject to reasonable restrictions. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998). A defendant's right to present a defense is not absolute. Id.; see also Holmes v. South Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006). So long as the rule under which a court excludes evidence is not arbitrary and serves a legitimate state interest, the right to present a defense is not abridged. Holmes, 126 S.Ct. at 1731. ¶ 34 The right to present a defense does not require that a defendant be allowed to present irrelevant evidence. State v. Robinson, 146 Wis.2d 315, 332, 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Wis. Stat. § 904.01. Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible. Wis. Stat. § 904.02. ¶ 35 In this case, before Campbell can collaterally attack the family court's custody order for fraud, it must appear that Campbell's collateral attack, if successful, would tend to negate an element of a crime or raise an affirmative defense. In other words, the evidence adduced by the collateral attack must be relevant.
¶ 36 To evaluate whether Denise's alleged fraud negates an element of interfering with legal custody of a child, we first examine the elements of the crime. ¶ 37 For Campbell to be convicted of interfering with custody of Cody, the State had to prove five elements: (1) Cody was younger than 18 years; (2) Denise had legal custody of Cody under a court order in an action for divorce; (3) Campbell took Cody from Denise and withheld him from Denise without her consent for more than 12 hours past the time allowed by the custody order; (4) Campbell took Cody away from Denise intentionally; and (5) Campbell knew that Denise had legal custody of Cody under a court order and knew that Denise had not consented to him withholding Cody. See Wis JI  Criminal 2166. Campbell asserts Denise never had legal custody of Cody, which implicates the second and fifth elements. ¶ 38 Campbell challenges the exclusion of evidence that Denise lied to the family court commissioner and procured the custody order through fraud. Specifically, he claims that Denise misrepresented to the court that she was Cody's adoptive mother. This alleged misrepresentation, in turn, originated in an alleged fraud perpetrated on a court in Missouri. Campbell contends that although Denise presented the family court with Missouri adoption papers that declared her the adoptive mother of Cody, these adoption papers were void because Denise and Campbell lived in Wisconsin at the time of the adoption. Campbell posits that if Denise is not Cody's adoptive mother, then the family court commissioner erred in giving her custody and primary placement of Cody. Thus, he argues, if the custody order is invalid, Denise did not have legal custody of Cody, and Campbell did not violate the statute by taking Cody. In short, Campbell insists that the Walworth County custody order was void because of fraud. ¶ 39 The State responds that if Denise committed any fraud, it did not negate an element of the crime of interference with custody unless the fraud was jurisdictional fraud that deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction over the action or personal jurisdiction over Campbell. We agree with the State and conclude that since the family court had both subject matter jurisdiction to make the custody determination and personal jurisdiction over Campbell, there was no jurisdictional fraud. ¶ 40 Our analysis begins with the meaning of legal custody. Once again, Wis. Stat. § 948.31(1)(b) (1997-98), states in part: [W]hoever intentionally causes a child to leave, takes a child away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours beyond the court-approved period of physical placement or visitation period from a legal custodian with intent to deprive the custodian of his or her custody rights without the consent of the custodian is guilty of a Class C felony. Wisconsin Stat. § 948.31(1)(a)1. defines legal custodian of a child as [a] parent or other person having legal custody of the child under an order or judgment in an action for divorce .... Legal custody is defined in part as the right and responsibility to make major decisions concerning the child .... Wis. Stat. §§ 948.01(1r) & 767.001(2)(a). ¶ 41 Because Denise had custody of Cody pursuant to a court order, the only way Campbell could negate the second element is if he could show that the order was void and did not need to be obeyed. ¶ 42 Where a valid order or judgment is a necessary condition for one of the elements of a crime, a collateral attack upon the order or judgment can negate an element of the crime if the order or judgment is void. See State v. Orethun, 84 Wis.2d 487, 490-91, 267 N.W.2d 318 (1978); State v. Jankowski, 173 Wis.2d 522, 528, 496 N.W.2d 215 (Ct.App.1992). A void judgment is a nullity and cannot create a right or obligation. Kett v. Cmty. Credit Plan, 222 Wis.2d 117, 127-28, 586 N.W.2d 68 (Ct.App.1998) ( affirmed 228 Wis.2d 1, 596 N.W.2d 786) (citing Fischbeck v. Mielenz, 162 Wis. 12, 17-18, 154 N.W. 701 (1915)). It is not binding upon anyone. Id. On the other hand, a voidable judgment has the same force and effect as a valid judgment until it has been set aside. Id. at 128, 586 N.W.2d 68 (citing Slabosheske v. Chikowske, 273 Wis. 144, 150, 77 N.W.2d 497 (1956)); Stimson v. Munson, 251 Wis. 41, 44, 27 N.W.2d 896 (1947) (The order or judgment, however erroneous, must stand until reversed, modified, or set aside . . . . It is not subject to collateral attack merely because it is erroneous, nor is it void for that reason.) (quoting Pugh v. Fowlie, 225 Wis. 455, 471, 274 N.W. 247 (1937)). ¶ 43 As a general rule, a judgment or order is valid  i.e., not void  when the following elements are present: (1) the court has subject matter jurisdiction; [5] (2) the court has personal jurisdiction; [6] and (3) adequate notice has been afforded the affected persons. [7] See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 1 (1982) (setting forth the requisites for a valid judgment). ¶ 44 Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state. This provision recognizes very broad subject matter jurisdiction in circuit courts. Nonetheless, the validity of judgments in these courts is complicated by our concept of competency, which refers to the power of a court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case. See State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶ 18, 283 Wis.2d 57, 699 N.W.2d 508; Kohler Co. v. Wixen, 204 Wis.2d 327, 336, 555 N.W.2d 640 (Ct.App.1996). In Mueller v. Brunn, 105 Wis.2d 171, 178, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982), the court stated that [i]f a court truly lacks only competency, its judgment is invalid only if the invalidity of the judgment is raised on direct appeal. Mueller, 105 Wis.2d at 178, 313 N.W.2d 790. Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶ 8, 273 Wis.2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, went well beyond Mueller, stating that a lack of competency does not negate subject matter jurisdiction or nullify the judgment. Lack of competency is not `jurisdictional' and does not result in a void judgment. Mikrut, 273 Wis.2d 76, ¶ 34, 681 N.W.2d 190 (citation omitted). ¶ 45 There are exceptions to these principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency. For instance, the legislature may try to provide subject matter jurisdiction to the courts but fail by enacting an unconstitutional statute. Thus, if a statute is unconstitutional on its face, any judgment premised upon that statute is void. See State v. Bush, 2005 WI 103, ¶¶ 14-19, 283 Wis.2d 90, 699 N.W.2d 80; State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis.2d 528, 538-39, 280 N.W.2d 316 (Ct.App.1979). In addition, a criminal complaint that fails to allege any offense known at law is jurisdictionally defective and void. Bush, 283 Wis.2d 90, ¶ 18, 699 N.W.2d 80 (citing Champlain v. State, 53 Wis.2d 751, 754, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis.2d 646, 648, 133 N.W.2d 349 (1965)). ¶ 46 There may be other exceptions to the principles about subject matter jurisdiction and competency. But none of this helps Campbell. In this case, for the custody order to be void, the family court would have had to lack subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, or Campbell would have had to receive inadequate notice of the divorce proceedings. Nothing of this nature has been alleged. Even if we assume arguendo that Denise misrepresented her status as the adoptive mother of Cody, her misrepresentation would not have deprived the family court of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. ¶ 47 The family court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 767.23(1)(a) and (am) (granting a circuit court commissioner authority to award legal custody and physical placement), 767.015 (requiring all child custody proceedings to comply with Wis. Stat. ch. 822), and 822.03(1)(a) (granting any court jurisdiction to decide child custody matters where Wisconsin is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proceeding). [8] The record reveals that Denise filed for divorce on September 16, 1997, and the family court commissioner issued the temporary custody order on September 22, 1997. As early as November 5, 1996, Denise and Campbell had established residency in Wisconsin. By the time Denise filed for divorce, Cody had been living in Wisconsin for more than six months, making Wisconsin Cody's home state. Therefore, the family court commissioner had authority to enter the custody order. [9] Wis. Stat. § 767.23(1)(a) and (am). ¶ 48 The family court also had personal jurisdiction over Campbell. A deputy sheriff of Walworth County served the summons and petition for divorce upon Campbell on September 16, 1997. Campbell does not dispute that the family court commissioner had personal jurisdiction over him or that he received adequate notice of the proceedings. Because the family court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction and because Campbell received adequate notice, there was no jurisdictional fraud, and the custody order was not void. Denise, therefore, had legal custody of Cody. This is precisely what the circuit court ruled. ¶ 49 Even if the family court commissioner erred in granting custody and primary placement to Denise, Campbell had to abide by the terms of the custody order until he succeeded in reversing it through the applicable review process. See Orethun, 84 Wis.2d at 490, 267 N.W.2d 318 (Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, the fact that an order or judgment is erroneously or improvidently rendered does not justify a person in failing to abide by its terms.); Anderson v. Anderson, 82 Wis.2d 115, 118-19, 261 N.W.2d 817 (1978); cf. Kett, 222 Wis.2d at 128, 586 N.W.2d 68 (A voidable judgment ... has the same effect and force as a valid judgment until it has been set aside.). ¶ 50 Since Campbell's allegation of fraud, even if true, cannot deprive the family court of subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction, and cannot render the custody order void, evidence of Denise's alleged fraud cannot negate an element of interference with custody.
¶ 51 Campbell also contends he should have been allowed to present evidence at trial of Denise's alleged misrepresentation as part of an affirmative defense. [10] Campbell argues that, similar to the now-abrogated common law privilege to resist an unlawful arrest, see State v. Hobson, 218 Wis.2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998), Wisconsin allows a defendant to disregard an order procured by fraud and then collaterally attack the fraudulently obtained judgment when the judgment supplies the basis for a criminal prosecution. He relies on Boots v. Boots, 73 Wis.2d 207, 243 N.W.2d 225 (1976); Zrimsek v. American Automobile Insurance Company, 8 Wis.2d 1, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959); State v. Bouzek, 168 Wis.2d 642, 484 N.W.2d 362 (Ct.App.1992); Schramek v. Bohren, 145 Wis.2d 695, 429 N.W.2d 501 (Ct.App.1988); and State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835 (Ct.App.1984), as authority for his collateral attack on the custody order. ¶ 52 A party's ability to collaterally attack a judgment for fraud has had a checkered history in Wisconsin. Early in Wisconsin jurisprudence, a judgment could not be collaterally attacked for fraud. Werner v. Riemer, 255 Wis. 386, 403, 39 N.W.2d 457 (1949) (citing Cody v. Cody, 98 Wis. 445, 452, 74 N.W. 217 (1898)). In Cody this court held that a judgment could be collaterally attacked only if the court that rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 53 Subsequently, this court revised the Cody rule to permit a party to collaterally attack a judgment that was procured by fraud. See Boots, 73 Wis.2d at 215-16, 243 N.W.2d 225 (discussing the evolution away from the rule in Cody ). Now, Wisconsin courts may exercise their equitable powers to relieve an aggrieved party from a judgment procured by fraud in a collateral attack if the party acts seasonably and was without excusable negligence in the action, and where refusing to afford relief would subject the party to an unconscionable judgment. Weber v. Weber, 260 Wis. 420, 430-31, 51 N.W.2d 18 (1952); see also State Cent. Credit Union v. Bayley, 33 Wis.2d 367, 373, 147 N.W.2d 265 (1967); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45, 248, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944) (overruled on other grounds). Thus, [e]quitable relief against fraudulent judgments . . . is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the general rule that judgments should not be disturbed .... Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 248, 64 S.Ct. 997. ¶ 54 In Bouzek, the court quoted at length from Schramek: A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid, evade or deny the force and effect of a judgment in an indirect manner and not in a direct proceeding prescribed by law and instituted for the purpose of vacating, reviewing, or annulling it.... For [plaintiff] to ... request consideration in separate proceedings of any cause of action [based on the invalidity of the domestic abuse injunction] would be sanctioning a collateral attack on the order of another [ ] judicial body. [Her] only basis for [an] attack [on the injunction would be] if she had demonstrated fraud in the procurement of the injunctive order. Bouzek, 168 Wis.2d at 644-45, 484 N.W.2d 362 (quoting Schramek, 145 Wis.2d at 713, 429 N.W.2d 501). ¶ 55 In an earlier criminal case, the court of appeals said: As a general rule a judgment is binding on the parties and may not be attacked in a collateral action unless it was procured by fraud. Madison, 120 Wis.2d at 154, 353 N.W.2d 835 (citing Boots, 73 Wis.2d at 216, 243 N.W.2d 225). Though the court of appeals has stated in criminal cases that a judgment or order may be collaterally attacked if procured by fraud, the court of appeals has never applied the rule in these cases. See Madison, 120 Wis.2d at 154, 353 N.W.2d 835; Bouzek, 168 Wis.2d at 645, 484 N.W.2d 362. ¶ 56 There are good reasons not to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud to interference with child custody. ¶ 57 One species of affirmative defense  exemplified by self-defense and the now-abrogated privilege to resist unlawful arrestthat courts recognize arises where a person is faced with the difficult decision whether to commit a crime or suffer an injury not otherwise susceptible to effective redress. See Hobson, 218 Wis.2d at 373-80, 577 N.W.2d 825. In Hobson the court recognized that the privilege to resist unlawful arrest developed at a time when arrest was likely to lead to illness, torture, or prolonged detention without an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 374, 577 N.W.2d 825. Hobson, however, abrogated this privilege because judicial process had advanced to the point that it offered a more effective response to unlawful arrest than physical resistance. Id. at 375-76, 577 N.W.2d 825. ¶ 58 For similar reasons, no affirmative defense for fraud can justify interference with legal custody of a child unless there is a credible threat of physical harm. See Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a); State v. McCoy, 143 Wis.2d 274, 295-96, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988). Adequate judicial processes exist to attack an order or judgment for fraud. In this case, Campbell received a de novo hearing on the family court order in the circuit court. See Wis. Stat. § 757.69(8). If he had fully pursued the de novo hearing, he would have received a decision, and he could have sought an appeal of an adverse determination. In addition, he could have attacked the order for fraud after the appeal period lapsed. See Wis. Stat. § 806.07. [11] It is in the courts that disputes [over the custody of children] should be resolved except in those situations where action is required by one parent to protect a child from imminent physical harm. McCoy, 143 Wis.2d at 296, 421 N.W.2d 107. ¶ 59 Recognition of an affirmative defense entails the balancing of competing policy considerations. We believe the legislature properly balanced the competing policies when it established four affirmative defenses to interference with legal custody of a child. See Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a). Interference with legal custody will not result in a conviction where the action: 1. Is taken by a parent or by a person authorized by a parent to protect his or her child in a situation in which the parent or authorized person reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to the child; 2. Is taken by a parent fleeing in a situation in which the parent reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to himself or herself; 3. Is consented to by the other parent or any other person or agency having legal custody of the child; or 4. Is otherwise authorized by law. Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a). ¶ 60 None of these legislatively created affirmative defenses applies in this case. There is no suggestion in the record that Denise posed a threat either to the boys or to Campbell; Denise did not consent to Campbell taking the boys to Mexico; and Campbell's actions were not authorized by law. The family court commissioner's custody order was a valid order, with which Campbell was obligated to comply. See Orethun, 84 Wis.2d at 490-91, 267 N.W.2d 318. Campbell's position would require us to overrule cases like Orethun and Anderson, which held that an injunctive order must be obeyed even if erroneous. See Orethun, 84 Wis.2d at 490, 267 N.W.2d 318. ¶ 61 Furthermore, even if we were inclined to recognize an affirmative defense to interference with legal custody for fraud, the facts of this case would not warrant relief. Requiring Campbell to obey the custody order does not shock the conscience. Campbell not only raised the question of fraud before the family court commissioner, but also had the opportunity to contest the validity of the custody order at the 1998 de novo hearing in circuit court. Instead of pursuing the de novo hearing, he abandoned judicial process in favor of absconding to Mexico with Randy and Cody in contravention of a valid court order. In short, Campbell should be precluded from litigating the alleged fraud since he already had the opportunity to do so. Cf. Smith, 283 Wis.2d 57, ¶ 22, 699 N.W.2d 508. ¶ 62 Under the facts of this case, we refuse to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud. [12] Therefore, the circuit court properly prevented Campbell from collaterally attacking the underlying custody order despite his allegations of fraud. This holding does not eviscerate the Bouzek rule; it helps define and give substance to the Bouzek rule. Were we to hold otherwise, we would be rewriting decades of law on the operative effect of voidable judgments.