Opinion ID: 199093
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Congress's Intent to Repeal Habeas Jurisdiction

Text: 17 Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), and Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869), we held in Goncalves that any repeal of the federal courts' historic habeas jurisdiction . . . must be explicit and make express reference specifically to the statute granting jurisdiction. 144 F.3d at 120. That is, we will not conclude that Congress intended to repeal the availability of § 2241 merely by implication. Id. at 119. Our task in the instant case, therefore, is to discern whether Congress has legislated in IIRIRA with the explicitness necessary to divest the federal courts of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction. 18 The Attorney General relies upon several specific provisions in INA § 242. She insists that these provisions individually, and viewed in their entirety, make clear Congress's intent that, under IIRIRA's permanent rules, judicial review for aliens like Mahadeo is available, if at all, only pursuant to INA § 242. 19 First, the Attorney General directs our attention to § 242(g), a provision that was effective under IIRIRA's transition rules, and which we determined previously did not repeal the availability of habeas jurisdiction. See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 122. 11 Section 242(g) provides:EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION. Except as provided in this section [INA § 242] and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter. 20 Although we characterized the notwithstanding clause as sweeping, we concluded that it does not contain an express intent to repeal the availability of § 2241. See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 122. We find no warrant for a different conclusion now. As we noted in Goncalves, to read § 242(g) as prohibiting all review of immigration cases except as available under § 242 would lead to the enormous consequence[] of precluding review under the judicial review provisions contained in old INA § 106, a result that would clearly conflict with Congress's intent to preserve review in the transition period under old INA § 106. See id. (noting that without access to old INA § 106, aliens whose proceedings were governed by IIRIRA's transition rules would be entirely without access to judicial review since the judicial review prescribed by INA § 242 only took effect with IIRIRA's permanent rules). If § 242(g)'s sweeping language does not repeal judicial review under old INA § 106, it is difficult to see how it repeals the availability of so significant a provision as the general habeas statute. Flores-Miramontes, 212 F.3d at 1138. 21 Second, the Attorney General draws our attention to INA § 242(a)(1), which provides that [j]udicial review of a final order of removal . . . is governed only by [the APA]. The APA, in turn, vests courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review certain agency orders. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351. She also points to INA § 242(b)(9): 22 Judicial review of all questions of law or fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. 23 She urges that these provisions read in conjunction channel judicial review of all questions relating to immigration proceedings into the APA. Neither § 242(a)(1) nor § 242(b)(9), however, contains an express reference to § 2241. Indeed, both provisions speak only of judicial review. 'Judicial review' and 'habeas corpus' have important and distinct technical meanings in the immigration context. Flores-Miramontes, 212 F.3d at 1140 (citing Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 235 (3d Cir. 1999)). [I]n the immigration context, the Court has historically drawn a sharp distinction between 'judicial review'-- meaning APA review--and the courts' power to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus. Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 235; see also Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953) (noting that a statute that eliminated judicial review over immigration proceedings to the maximum extent permissible under the Constitution did not eliminate habeas corpus); Liang, 206 F.3d at 320; Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999). We read judicial review to mean access to review under the APA, rather than access to a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 24 The Attorney General contends that in Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999), the Supreme Court construed INA § 242--and especially § 242(b)(9)--to require that all review of immigration proceedings be channeled through § 242 and the APA, precluding habeas relief. In American-Arab, the Court held that INA § 242(g) deprived the federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal brought by an alien claiming that he had been selectively chosen for deportation in violation of the Constitution. See id. at 482-83. Although the principal focus was on § 242(g), the Court also stated that § 242(b)(9) is an unmistakable 'zipper' clause that channels judicial review of all [decisions and actions.] See id. Relying on American-Arab, the district court ruled that it was compelled to dismiss Mahadeo's habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction because, to the extent he sought to declare the removal order contrary to the law, his claim was barred by the INA's zipper clause, § 242(b)(9). See Mahadeo v. Reno, 52 F. Supp. 2d 203, 204 (D. Mass. 1999). 25 Both the district court and the Attorney General read American-Arab too broadly. As we stated recently: nothing in American-Arab directly precludes deportees governed by the IIRIRA's transition rules from challenging their final deportation orders through habeas where they have no other way to assert in court that their deportation is contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States. Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 286 (1st Cir. 1999). Our reason for declining to find that American-Arab disturbed habeas jurisdiction was simple: American-Arab was concerned with a different issue--namely, whether the court had the subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear the case on direct appeal. Wallace, 194 F.3d at 283. Nothing in American-Arab, therefore, alters the rule announced in Felker and followed in Goncalves that repeal of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction can be achieved only by an express reference to that statute. See id. 12 26 Our conclusion that § 242(b)(9) does not affect jurisdiction under § 2241 is consistent with the Supreme Court's description of § 242(b)(9) as a zipper clause. Section 242(b)(9) is entitled Consolidation of questions for judicial review. It is a zipper clause in the sense that it consolidates or zips judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals. See Flores-Miramontes, 212 F.3d at 1140 (clarifying that before § 242(b)(9), some direct appeals from immigration proceedings were in the courts of appeals, while others were in the district courts). Section 242(b)(9) applies only with respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1), and review under subsection (a)(1), in turn, occurs only under chapter 158 of Title 28, [the APA]. Id. Although the APA governs judicial review of certain agency actions, it does not govern habeas proceedings brought under § 2241. See id. It follows that § 242(b)(9) does not apply to actions brought in habeas corpus, and certainly does not serve to repeal in whole or in part the general habeas statute. Id. But see Richardson v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1311, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the 'unmistakable zipper clause' of INA § 242(b)(9), along with the overall revisions to the judicial review scheme enacted by INA § 242 et seq., constitute a sufficiently broad and general limitation on federal jurisdiction to preclude § 2241 jurisdiction over challenges to removal orders). 27 Third, the Attorney General also contends that the aforementioned bar on judicial review for criminal aliens, § 242(a)(2)(C), repeals habeas jurisdiction--and indeed all judicial review for criminal aliens like Mahadeo (except for the narrow categories discussed above). We disagree. 28 Section 242(a)(2)(C) provides that:[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in . . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) [aggravated felony] of this title. 29 This provision is similar to its predecessor under IIRIRA's transition rules, which stated: 30 [N]otwithstanding any provision of section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . to the contrary-- 31 there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is . . . deportable by reason of having committed [certain] criminal offense[s] . . . . 32 IIRIRA § 309(c)(4). Neither § 309(c)(4) nor § 242(a)(2)(C) contain an express reference to § 2241. In Goncalves, we found the phrase, shall be no appeal permitted, indistinguishable from the limiting language in AEDPA, shall not be appealable, which the Supreme Court held in Felker to lack the explicitness necessary to repeal habeas jurisdiction. See 144 F.3d at 120-21. 13 We concluded, therefore, that § 309(c)(4) merely restricts one avenue of relief--an appeal under the APA--but does not abrogate habeas jurisdiction. See id. We fail to see how INA § 242(a)(2)(C)'s limitation, no court shall have jurisdiction to review, is significantly more explicit with respect to the elimination of habeas relief than the analogous bar on judicial review for criminal aliens in IIRIRA § 309(c)(4). The prohibition contained in § 242(a)(2)(C) on review of any final order is, in one sense, not even as broad as the prohibition in § 242(g) on jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim that we previously held to be inadequate to repeal habeas jurisdiction. See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 122; see also Flores-Miramontes, 212 F.3d at 1137. But see Max-George v. Reno, 205 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that § 242(a)(2)(C) eliminates § 2241 habeas jurisdiction for those cases that fall within its scope). 33 Finally, the Attorney General attempts to distinguish this case from Goncalves by insisting that § 242, viewed in its entirety, conveys an intent to make its provisions the exclusive avenue for judicial review of immigration proceedings. That reasoning, however, would turn Felker on its head by requir[ing] a specific reference to § 2241 to preserve such jurisdiction, rather than a specific reference to abolish it. Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 122. In Goncalves, we explicitly declined the Attorney General's invitation to find that in applying the APA to immigration decisions, Congress intended to create an exclusive forum for immigration appeals, thereby eliminating habeas jurisdiction. See id. (explaining that former INA § 106 made immigration decisions appealable under the APA). We emphasized that to infer an intent to repeal the availability of § 2241 from Congress' decision to make available another avenue for judicial review was precisely what Felker and Ex parte Yerger do not permit. Id. at 120. The existence of another available avenue for judicial review is simply insufficient to communicate an intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. See id. at 120. 34 Most decisively, none of the provisions relied upon by the Attorney General contain the kind of express reference to § 2241 habeas jurisdiction required by Goncalves and Felker. Absent explicit language repealing the availability of § 2241, we are not at liberty to reach a result different than Goncalves. It is axiomatic that a panel of this court cannot overrule a prior panel, see Wallace, 194 F.3d at 283. Moreover, Congress has shown in enacting IRRIRA that it knows how to use explicit language when it intends to place limitations on judicial review under particular statutes. See Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 121 (IIRIRA contains numerous provisions restricting or altering various avenues for judicial review, but in none of these provisions does IIRIRA mention § 2241.). For example, IIRIRA § 306, which enacts new INA § 242, contains provisions that refer specifically to the judicial review provision of the APA and the Declaratory Judgment Act. See id. Yet, IIRIRA's permanent rules do not mention habeas corpus jurisdiction under § 2241. The lack of any express reference to § 2241 is particularly revealing because the Supreme Court decided Felker just three months before IIRIRA was enacted, placing Congress on notice that any repeal of § 2241 jurisdiction requires an express reference to that statute. 35 To be sure, the permanent rules do not affirmatively authorize habeas review under § 2241. But an affirmative authorization has never been deemed necessary. Even when limited habeas review was available pursuant to old INA § 106(a)(10), it was well-recognized that this alternative basis for seeking a writ of habeas corpus did not supplant[] the general federal habeas statute. Flores-Miramontes, 212 F.3d at 1138-39 (citing Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 231 (1963)); see Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 121 (noting that in AEDPA § 401(e), Congress expressly repealed former INA § 106(a)(10)'s authorization that any alien held in custody pursuant to an order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings). Although § 2241 and § 106(a)(10) were independent bases for habeas review, Congress repealed only § 106(a)(10), creating the basis for an inference that Congress intended § 2241 to remain available. 14 36 In short, IIRIRA's permanent rules--like the transitional rules before them--lack a clear statement of intent to repeal § 2241 jurisdiction. The district court, therefore, erred in dismissing Mahadeo's habeas corpus petition for want of subject matter jurisdiction.