Opinion ID: 202377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Element: Substantial Limitation of a Major Life Activity

Text: 19 Mulloy argues that he is disabled under the ADA because his occupational asthma substantially limits his ability to breathe and work. 3 Acushnet argues that Mulloy is not disabled because his breathing was only affected at a particular job at a particular location and, with respect to the major life activity of working, he did not show that he was limited from a broad range or class of jobs. We need not decide whether Mulloy was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The second element of an ADA claim — i.e., whether Mulloy was a qualified individual capable of performing the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation — provides a sufficient basis for the decision. We therefore assume without deciding that Mulloy was disabled under the ADA. 20 2. Second Element: Qualified Individual Capable of Performing Essential Functions With or Without Reasonable Accommodation 21 In order to be a `qualified individual' under the Act, the burden is on the employee to show: first, that she possesses the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements for the position, and second, that she is able to perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation. García-Ayala, 212 F.3d at 646 (internal citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). There is no dispute that Mulloy satisfies the first of these requirements. 22 Turning to the second requirement, we must analyze whether the individual can perform the essential functions of her position without reasonable accommodation; and if not, whether any reasonable accommodation by her employer would allow her to do so. Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2001). An `essential function' is a fundamental job duty of the position at issue . . . [it] does not include the marginal functions of the position. Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir.2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)) (internal citations omitted). Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: [t]he employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job; and [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3); see also Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 55. In the absence of evidence of discriminatory animus, we generally give substantial weight to the employer's view of job requirements. Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst., Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.2000). In other words, our inquiry into essential functions is not intended to second guess the employer or to require the employer to lower company standards. Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir.2004); see also 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630 (It is important to note that the inquiry into essential functions is not intended to second guess an employer's business judgment with regard to production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to require employers to lower such standards.). 23 A reasonable accommodation is one which would enable [the plaintiff] to perform the essential functions of her job [and] . . . at least on the face of things . . . is feasible for the employer under the circumstances. Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir.2001); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (The term reasonable accommodation means . . . [m]odifications or adjustments to the work environment . . . that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position.). An employer who fails to mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability violates the ADA, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship — financial or otherwise — on the operation of the business of such covered entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 24 Before we proceed further with the analysis of Mulloy's claim that Acushnet should have allowed him to work at a remote location, we must decide whether the ADA requires us to evaluate this claim as an essential function issue or as a reasonable accommodation issue. Courts have treated the issue both ways. Compare Mason, 357 F.3d at 1122 ([T]he district court properly held Mason's physical attendance at the administration center was an essential function of the service coordinator position because the position required supervision and teamwork.), and Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir.1998) ([R]egular attendance is an essential function of most jobs.), with Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 54 (The particular question we face here is whether appellant can `perform the essential functions of the position' if given the accommodation he seeks, working at home.), and Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 867 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that plaintiff failed to propose an objectively reasonable accommodation for his disability because he could not perform any of his job functions from home). The district court referred to both approaches in its decision. See Mulloy, 2005 WL 1528208, at  n. 2, 11 (referring to physical presence as both necessary for [Mulloy] to be able to perform the essential functions of his position, on the one hand, and as an essential function of Mr. Mulloy's position and a shorthand for [essential] functions, on the other). We think it makes more sense on the facts of this case to treat Mulloy's remote location claim as a question of essential functions. 25
26 Here, the parties do not dispute that Mulloy's essential functions as a senior electrical engineer at Acushnet's Ball Plant II included designing and programming; troubleshooting 4 ; and training, supervising, and supporting personnel. They disagree about whether physical presence was required to perform these functions and was thereby, itself, an essential function of the job. Mulloy bears the burden of establishing that he can perform his job remotely. See Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 55. Acushnet produced voluminous evidence in the summary judgment record to challenge that proposition. We turn now to an evaluation of the evidence on this essential function issue.
27 Acushnet argues that, in the judgment of those most familiar with Mulloy's job functions, Mulloy's physical presence at Ball Plant II was an essential function of his job. Kimberly Francis, who was Acushnet's Director of Engineering and Mulloy's supervisor, stated that [t]o carry out the full responsibilities of the job, [Mulloy] was required to have interaction with the operator of the machine and the machine itself, which necessarily required entrance into the Ball Plant. Specifically, Francis stated that in order to troubleshoot, support electrical safety programs, lead investigations, and take corrective actions, Mulloy had to enter the plant floor, plug his computer into the system to access the program and observe how the machine was reacting to the program commands. . . . This task could not be efficiently performed from a remote location since many of the adjustments are time sensitive. According to Francis, [Mulloy] needed to be able to visually watch the equipment to be able to troubleshoot it. While he could see the controls operation from a remote location, he could not assess [] what the operator is doing, product quality, whether or not [the machine is] shooting balls in the air. 28 In order to design and program the machines, Francis stated that Mulloy had to work with technicians and other engineers on the plant floor . . . [and] enter the area with the machine to make adjustments and finalize the program. To fully perform this function, the engineer must have access to the machines. Francis stated that Mulloy also needed to be able to physically access the machines in order to perform manual adjustments on them and to fully perform the hands-on training function of his job. 29 Francis stated that from May 2000 to November 2001, when Mulloy was restricted from accessing machines in the red zones, Mulloy was reassigned to machines outside of the red zone in the Ball Plant so that he could fully perform all of the necessary functions of the job. During this time, approximately eighty percent (80%) of his work was on machines located outside of the red zone. Mulloy continued to perform a small amount of work — presumably, approximately 20% — on machines inside the red zones, but relied on others physically to access the machines for him. When Mulloy was restricted from Ball Plant II, however, Francis stated that he no longer had regular[] access [to] the machines and the machine operators and, thus, was unable to perform the necessary responsibilities and functions of his job as a senior electrical engineer. Eric Bartsch, Acushnet's Vice President of Golf Ball Manufacturing, who had supervised Acushnet's electrical engineers during his eighteen years at Acushnet, also stated that Mr. Mulloy could not perform the necessary responsibilities and functions of the electrical engineering job from a remote location. According to Francis, Mulloy's job in Fairhaven consisted of finishing up the documentation of previous projects on which he worked in Ball Plant II. Francis stated that [Mulloy] was no longer assigned work that required access to the machines, and instead, [these] assignments were given to other engineers or technicians in the Ball Plant or to outside vendors. Bartsch similarly stated that after Mulloy was transferred to Fairhaven, his tasks were reprioritized and he was instructed to work on documentation and a few small tasks that did not require him to enter the Ball Plant. 30 Not surprisingly, Mulloy rejects the views of his employer. Instead, he asserts that his physical presence in Ball Plant II was not required, and that he performed — and could have continued to perform — his essential job functions remotely from the Fairhaven facility. Mulloy presents five arguments challenging the judgment of his employer. 31
32 Mulloy first offers his own testimony that he did not have to see the machines or those operating them in order to perform his job functions, given his long experience and familiarity with the programming, the machines, the electrical circuits, and the machine operators, and his ability to communicate with mechanical engineers and technicians on the manufacturing floor using telephone communications and remote computer technology. In light of the substantial weight we must accord Acushnet's view of Mulloy's job requirements, together with the wealth of authority recognizing physical attendance as an essential function of most jobs, 5 we agree with the district court that Mulloy's own self-serving testimony that he could perform the essential functions of his job from Fairhaven is insufficient under Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) to create a `genuine' issue of material fact concerning the essential functions of [his job]. Mason, 357 F.3d at 1121; see id. at 1122 (We are reluctant to allow employees to define the essential functions of their positions based solely on their personal viewpoint and experience.). 33
34 Mulloy points to his performance of the essential functions of his job on-site but outside of the red zones as evidence of his ability to work off-site. We find this comparison unavailing. Acushnet does not dispute that Mulloy performed the essential functions of his job when he was on-site. 6 After being restricted from the red zones, Francis stated that 80% of Mulloy's work assignments were reallocated to machines located outside of the red zones. The other 20% of his work related to machines located within the red zones that did not require physical access. Francis stated that, with respect to those machines located in the red zones, Mulloy relied on another electrical engineer, Ken Souza, and one of Acushnet's electrical technicians, George Desrosiers, to access the restricted areas. Mulloy similarly testified that when he was restricted from the red zones, his focus shifted to problems in the non-restricted half of the plant, while Desrosiers switched places with him. In this way, Mulloy was able to perform the essential functions of his job while on-site, even though he was not able to access all of the manufacturing machines because some of them were located in the red zones. 35 When Mulloy was transferred off-site, however, he could no longer access any of the manufacturing machines, including those outside of the red zones. As the district court stated, the fact that Mulloy may have been able to perform the essential functions of his job on-site despite not [being] able to see some of the machines upon which he directed work to be done . . . does not support an inference that he could adequately perform his job without being able to see any of the machines or be easily accessible to those working on them. Mulloy, 2005 WL 1528208, at . In short, Mulloy's ability to perform his job functions on-site has nothing to do with his ability to perform his job remotely and, therefore, does not support his argument that he could perform the essential functions of his job from Fairhaven. 36
37 Mulloy argues that Francis' positive evaluation of his work on February 19, 2002, more than two months after he was transferred to Fairhaven, demonstrates that he was able to perform the essential functions of his job remotely. We disagree. While the evaluation does not set forth the period of evaluation, it appears to be an annual evaluation based on the numerous work projects listed and its reference to last year's review. It is undisputed that after his transfer to the Fairhaven facility at the end of November 2001, Mulloy continued performing some of the tasks that he had performed at Ball Plant II for approximately one and a half months, until January 10, 2002, when Mulloy was asked to spend 90% of his time typing manuals and his projects were assigned to other engineers. Therefore, regardless of when the annual evaluation began, Mulloy's off-site work on Ball Plant II assignments comprised only one and a half months of the work reviewed in that evaluation period. Francis' positive evaluation of Mulloy's performance for the entire year thus provides inadequate support for Mulloy's argument that he could work remotely from Fairhaven. In fact, Francis states unequivocally in both her deposition testimony and affidavit that Mulloy could not work remotely. 38
39 Mulloy also argues that the district court should not have credited Francis' statements because Riall did not consult Francis prior to terminating Mulloy, and thus did not rely on the information that she provided in his decision to terminate. We disagree. Francis' statements mirror the conclusions of Bartsch who was consulted prior to Mulloy's termination and, therefore, corroborate Acushnet's basis for terminating him. The district court, therefore, did not err in considering this evidence. The district court likewise did not err in considering the statements of Bartsch, who ha[d] worked at Acushnet for eighteen (18) years, was knowledgeable of the necessary responsibilities and functions of the senior electrical engineering job at Ball Plant II, and who determined that Mr. Mulloy was unable to perform the necessary responsibilities and functions of the senior electrical engineer job from a remote location. 40
41 Mulloy also argues that the district court erred in crediting Francis' statement that Mulloy needed to see the machines in order to troubleshoot them. Mulloy notes that the job description refers only to training and supporting maintenance personnel to troubleshoot. According to Mulloy, it is the maintenance personnel — not Mulloy — who need to be able to see the machines. Even if we ascribe this meaning to the words cited by Mulloy, Mulloy's argument is not significantly probative and, in all events, it is directly contradicted by other items in the record. In a second, more detailed job description not referenced by Mulloy, the duties of an electrical engineer include troubleshoot[ing] process-related issues using proven problem solving techniques as well as [t]rain[ing] and support[ing] maintenance personnel to troubleshoot. And in his Statement of Material Facts, Mulloy expressly agreed with Acushnet's list of job responsibilities, which included training and supporting maintenance personnel, [and] troubleshooting electrical and electronic controls, as well as with Acushnet's statement that Mulloy was responsible for troubleshooting and developing new equipment. The district court did not err in considering Francis' statements about troubleshooting. 42
43 Acushnet points to the job description for an electrical engineer at Acushnet in support of its argument that physical presence was an essential function. Among the essential functions listed in the job description are teamwork, troubleshooting, evaluating, and training and supporting — all of which imply some level of interaction with the machines and personnel at Ball Plant II. We are not persuaded the absence of [physical attendance] from the job description demonstrates th[at] function [was] non-essential. As commonsense suggests, [the employer] probably did not even consider informing its employees that they were actually required to show up at the workplace . . . when it drafted the [] job description — that is a given. Mason, 357 F.3d at 1122; see also Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 57 n. 17 (holding that claims adjudicator's duties as advisor to other call center staff, which include troubleshooting, teamwork, and training staff members, demonstrate[] that the position cannot be performed at home); id. at 57 (Courts that have rejected working at home as a reasonable accommodation focus on evidence that personal contact, interaction, and coordination are needed for a specific position. (quoting EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1999 WL 33305876, at  n. 93 (March 1, 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544 (Most jobs in organizations public or private involve team work under supervision rather than solitary unsupervised work, and team work under supervision generally cannot be performed at home without a substantial reduction in the quality of the employee's performance.). We therefore agree with Acushnet that the job description for an electrical engineer supports Acushnet's argument that Mulloy's physical presence was an essential function of his job. 44 Mulloy argues that since the job description specifies that the troubleshooting oversight function represents only 10% of Mulloy's overall responsibilities, troubleshooting is a marginal — not an essential — function. This argument also lacks merit. Mulloy explicitly states that the parties stipulated that the `essential functions' of Mulloy's former position as a senior electrical engineer in Acushnet's Ball Plant II are accurately represented in a company-drafted job description for Mulloy's position. This job description lists trouble-shooting as one of those functions. Mulloy cannot now claim that troubleshooting is only a marginal function. Even if Mulloy had not stipulated to the essential nature of this function, a job function requiring 10% of Mulloy's time is not insignificant when considered in relation to the five remaining essential functions of his job, each of which requires only 10% to 25% of his time. 45
46 Mulloy offers no evidence that any electrical engineer at Acushnet has ever performed the job remotely. As the district court stated, Mulloy has no testimony from other former and current employees — and in particular, from the other senior electrical engineer at Acushnet — to substantiate his view of the essential duties of his position. Mulloy, 2005 WL 1528208, at ; see id. (Appellant could have, but did not, depose current claims adjudicators about their duties. (quoting Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 58) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The absence of such evidence, together with Francis' testimony that she was not aware of any electrical engineer working out of Fairhaven, supports Acushnet's argument that physical presence was an essential function of Mulloy's job. 47 The experience of those who have taken over Mulloy's job functions since his termination also supports the conclusion that the job cannot be performed remotely. It is undisputed that over 70% of Mulloy's former job functions are performed in Ball Plant II by either employees or outside vendors. Based on the work experience of past and current employees, Mulloy has failed to present an adequate basis to challenge the company's contention that his physical presence was an essential function of his job. 48
49 Having determined that Mulloy's physical presence was an essential function of his job, we next ask whether his proposed accommodation — working remotely from Fairhaven — was reasonable. It is well established that, while a reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B), [t]he law does not require an employer to accommodate a disability by foregoing an essential function of the position or by reallocating essential functions to make other workers' jobs more onerous. Kvorjak, 259 F.3d at 57 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Mason, 357 F.3d at 1124 ([A] request to work at home is unreasonable if it eliminates an essential function of the job.); Phelps, 251 F.3d at 26 (Although a reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring, an employer need not exempt an employee from performing essential functions, nor need it reallocate essential functions to other employees. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). Here, Mulloy requests an accommodation which would prevent him from performing an essential function of his job, namely, being physically present at Ball Plant II. 50 As the district court stated, Mulloy's request to work from Fairhaven in essence requires not an accommodation but a redefinition of his job. Mulloy, 2005 WL 1528208, at . But [a]n employer is not required by the ADA to create a new job for an employee. Phelps, 251 F.3d at 27. Mulloy's proposed accommodation is therefore per se unreasonable. See Mason, 357 F.3d at 1124 ([Employee's] request for an at-home accommodation is unreasonable on its face because it seeks to eliminate an essential function of [employment] position.). 7 The district court did not err in concluding that Mulloy's proposed accommodation was unreasonable, and that he thus was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. 8 51 D. Application of Massachusetts' Counterpart to the ADA, Chapter 151B, § 4 52 1. Consistency Between ADA and Chapter 151B, § 4 53 Our analysis so far has focused on whether Mulloy was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA. We must now address whether Mulloy was a qualified handicapped person under Massachusetts' state-law counterpart to the ADA, Chapter 151B, § 4. We have previously noted that this statute tracks the ADA in virtually all respects. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 20 n. 5; see also Labonte v. Hutchins & Wheeler, 424 Mass. 813, 678 N.E.2d 853, 856 n. 5 (1997) ([O]ur statutes in the area of employee discrimination law closely mirror the [ADA].). The action proscribed by Chapter 151B, § 4 is nearly identical to the action proscribed by the ADA. Under Chapter 151B, an employer shall not discriminate against, because of his handicap, any person alleging to be a qualified handicapped person, that is, a handicapped person who is capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job, or who would be capable of performing the essential functions of a particular job with reasonable accommodation to his handicap. Id. §§ 1(16), 4. In order to establish a claim of unlawful employment discrimination under Chapter 151B, a plaintiff must demonstrate the same three requirements as under the ADA: (1) she suffers from a handicap, i.e., a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, id. § 1(17); (2) [s]he is a `qualified handicapped person'; and (3)[s]he was fired solely because of h[er] handicap, Labonte, 678 N.E.2d at 859. 54 In light of these similarities, [t]he Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has indicated that federal case law construing the ADA should be followed in interpreting the Massachusetts disability law. Ward, 209 F.3d at 33 n. 2 (citing Wheatley v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 418 Mass. 394, 636 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1994) (It is our practice to apply Federal case law construing the Federal anti-discrimination statutes in interpreting [Chapter 151B].)). Accordingly, while we write in terms of the ADA, our comments apply with equal force to [Mulloy's] claim under [Chapter 151B]. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 20 n. 5; see also Whitney v. Greenberg, Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, P.C., 258 F.3d 30, 32 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2001) (Given the similarity [between ADA and Massachusetts disability law], our singular analysis disposes of both the federal and state claims.). 55