Opinion ID: 855223
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zimmerman Order

Text: In order to assess the Union’s claim, we must first define “corruption” under the RLA.14 The legislative history behind the 1966 amendments is explicit that Congress intended that review for corruption under the RLA would mirror review for corruption in arbitral decisions generally. H. Rep. 89-1114, at 3, 16. Because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), initially enacted in 1925, allows vacatur “where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means,” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1), one might expect to find reasonably developed federal doctrine on what constitutes “corruption” in cases under the FAA. In fact, while many FAA cases discuss “fraud” or “undue means,” no case by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals discusses the “corruption” prong of arbitral decisions. 14 Because we analyze the Union’s claim as one of corruption, we do not respond in detail to the district court’s discussion applying the fraud test, as set forth in Pacific & Arctic Railway, 952 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1991). Because the Railway’s brief on appeal mirrored the district court’s reliance on fraud, we also do not respond to its contentions. This should not, however, be read as an endorsement of the district court’s reasoning in applying the fraud doctrine. Indeed, the district court’s suggestion that Peterson could not have committed fraud because he mentioned the Union’s arguments before dismissing them is plainly incorrect. Mentioning a party’s arguments (and then ruling against the party) does not show a lack of fraud or corruption. 32 UNITED TRANSP . UNION V . BNSF RAILWAY CO . Despite the absence of FAA doctrine specifically defining what constitutes corruption, we are not left without guidance. As explained in Section I.A, Congress created the NRAB scheme to ensure an expeditious resolution to minor disputes in the railroad industry. Accordingly, it intended that NRAB decisions be accorded a degree of finality and thus limited judicial review to the narrow grounds set forth in 45 U.S.C. 153(q) First. Being mindful of Congress’s interest in the finality in the NRAB scheme, we must ensure that the definition of corruption under the RLA encompasses only serious misconduct—i.e., conduct of the sort that would justify vacatur of an NRAB decision. See Pacific & Arctic Railway, 952 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting a more rigorous test for “fraud” under the RLA than the test for “fraud” under common law because of the “strong federal policy favoring finality”); Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]n order to protect the finality of arbitration decisions, courts must be slow to vacate an arbitral award . . . .”); see also Toyota of Berkeley v. Auto. Salesman’s Union, Local 1095, United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 834 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the “appearance of impropriety, standing alone, is insufficient to” vacate an arbitral proceeding), amended, 856 F.2d 1572 (9th Cir. 1988).15 We therefore hold that corruption under the RLA encompasses three categories of conduct. First, corruption 15 Courts have also recognized that arbitration omits many of the niceties of federal courts, and “whatever indignation a reviewing court may experience in examining the record, it must resist the temptation to condemn imperfect proceedings without a sound statutory basis for doing so.” Forsythe In’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). UNITED TRANSP . UNION V . BNSF RAILWAY CO . 33 includes acts that threaten the integrity of arbitral proceedings that are either quasi-criminal or criminal in nature, including, but not limited to, acts of violence or threats thereof. Second, corruption encompasses acts of bribery and extortion16 that threaten the integrity of arbitral proceedings, the latter of which includes, but is not limited to, threats of economic injury.17 Third, corruption extends to similarly egregious abuses of office that threaten the integrity of arbitral proceedings. Additionally, as with fraud under the RLA, corruption must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Dogherra v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 679 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1982). By limiting corruption to the categories set forth above and by adopting a heightened evidentiary standard, we ensure that NRAB determinations maintain the presumption of finality that Congress intended. We turn now to the facts of the case. If the Union’s allegations are taken in the light most favorable to it as the non-moving party, we conclude that Boldra’s statement to the neutral member, upon reviewing her proposed decision, that “[i]f you are going to issue these kinds of opinions, you will never work for a Class One railroad again,” can, if proven in subsequent proceedings, plausibly bear the Union’s interpretation as a threat of economic retaliation that threatens the integrity of arbitral proceedings. We explained supra that 16 W e also agree with the argument that “extortion” is a species of “bribery.” Cf. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 564 n.12 (2007) (“[T]he Hobbs Act expanded the scope of common law extortion to include private perpetrators while retaining the core idea of extortion as a species of corruption, akin to bribery.”). 17 An act of attempted bribery or extortion, so long as it threatens the integrity of arbitral proceedings, would also constitute corruption under the RLA. 34 UNITED TRANSP . UNION V . BNSF RAILWAY CO . a threat of economic injury that threatens the integrity of arbitral proceedings is a form of extortion, which is a category of corruption under the RLA. Thus, if we take the Union’s allegations as true and accept the meaning of Boldra’s statement that the Union imputes to it, as we must at this stage of the proceedings, Boldra committed an act of attempted extortion, and his conduct would therefore constitute corruption under the RLA. The Union’s understanding of Boldra’s statement is not, of course, the only possible interpretation. Under other interpretations, the statement might not support a finding of corruption, and we do not, by this opinion, prejudge whether Boldra’s conduct actually constituted corruption under the RLA. The Railway, for example suggests a very different interpretation of Boldra’s alleged statement. It claims that, at the executive session, Zimmerman said that her notes reflected that Boldra had previously agreed that reinstating employee Kite would be an acceptable result. Boldra swore by declaration that he told Zimmerman that her notes were incorrect and that he had never so agreed. He further claims that he made the alleged statement in order to remind Zimmerman of the importance of the case to Railway because it involved what the Railway understood to be an employee’s second-time alcohol violation. Under the Railway’s interpretation, Boldra likely meant to convey his belief that Zimmerman’s draft award was so erroneous, or apparently biased, that it would destroy Zimmerman’s credibility in the labor arbitration industry. Such a prediction, though potentially inappropriate in a professional setting, may not be tantamount to extortion. As with the Union’s interpretation, this is a possible construction of Boldra’s statement, but a fact-finder would UNITED TRANSP . UNION V . BNSF RAILWAY CO . 35 have to determine whether, in the context of the particular case before it, the statement warranted a finding of extortion. This is true with respect to the Union’s interpretation, the Railway’s, and other possible interpretations as well. The question of the meaning of Boldra’s statement cannot be resolved at the stage of a motion to dismiss, and we leave to the fact-finder the ultimate determination of what Boldra actually said and whether any statement he may have made constituted corruption.