Opinion ID: 2978251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Walker’s Firearm Enhancement

Text: Walker argues that the district court erred in applying the two-level firearm enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1. He argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller requires this court to renounce the presumptive connection between an offense and a weapon when the defendant possessed the weapon during the commission of the offense. See United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996) (“‘Once it is established that a defendant was in possession of a weapon during the commission of an offense, a presumption arises that such possession was connected to the offense.’” (quoting United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1460 (6th Cir. 1991) (abrogated on other grounds))). See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008) (declaring the citizenry’s limited right to keep and bear arms). We do not consider the merits of Walker’s claim here. Walker accepted the two-level enhancement by signing a plea agreement before sentencing, and in doing so waived any challenge regarding the government’s burden of proof. II. Walker’s Prior Convictions and Criminal History Walker argues that since a jury did not determine that his prior convictions qualified as criminal history points, the use of those convictions to enhance his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. In general, a fact that increases a criminal penalty beyond the statutory maximum falls within the Sixth Amendment’s protections. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). However, the fact of a prior conviction remains an exception to the rule. Id.; see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998). Furthermore, Walker’s sentence of 108 months does not exceed the statutory maximum. 21 U.S.C. § 843(d)(1) (2006) (each of the three offenses to which Walker pled guilty carries a maximum of 48 months, a total maximum of 144 months, compared to his 108-month sentence). For these two reasons, Apprendi allows the district court’s actions. Walker argues that the precedent of Apprendi and Almendarez-Torres no longer constitutes good law. See generally Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The parties do not request it here, but in an appropriate case, this Court should consider Almendarez-Torres’ continuing viability.”). However, this court has already refused Walker’s argument; the Supreme Court maintains “‘the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.’” United States v. Hill, 440 F.3d 292, 299 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005)).