Opinion ID: 674673
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Time Limits On The Decisionmaker

Text: 20 The first procedural safeguard required by FW/PBS is that the expressive activity may only be restrained prior to judicial review for a specified brief time period in order to maintain the status quo. Section 2-5 of the Ordinance places a forty-five-day time limit on the Administrator's decision to grant or deny the license. We agree with other federal courts that have found similar time limits to be reasonable. E.g., Wolff v. City of Monticello, 803 F.Supp. 1568, 1574 (D.Minn.1992) (ninety days); Ellwest Stereo Theater, Inc. v. Boner, 718 F.Supp. 1553, 1571 (M.D.Tenn.1989) (sixty days). Nevertheless, two other provisions of the Ordinance create the risk that expressive activity will be suppressed for indefinite time periods. 21 First, under section 2-5, the forty-five-day time limit is illusory, in that the Administrator's failure to comply with the time limit does not necessarily allow the applicant to begin engaging in the expressive activity for which the license is sought. Section 2-5(a)(1) of the Ordinance provides that in the event the Administrator exceeds the 45-day time limit, the applicant may be permitted to begin operating the establishment for which a license is sought, unless and until the County Administrator notifies the applicant of a denial of the application. Citrus County Ordinance No. 88-05, Sec. 2-5(a)(1) (emphasis added). Dean argues that the word may in the provision should be interpreted to mean shall because the Ordinance gives operators an absolute right to begin operating establishments immediately upon the expiration of the forty-five-day period. Appellant's Brief at 41. He contends that the Board has applied the provision in this manner and that we should defer to the Board's interpretation. 22 We disagree. Redner presents a facial challenge to the Ordinance, and we must analyze it as written. The issue ... is whether the ordinance, on its face, meets the requirements of FW/PBS. Wolff, 803 F.Supp. at 1575. We cannot depend on the individuals responsible for enforcing the Ordinance to do so in a manner that cures it of constitutional infirmities. Section 2-5 says that applicants may be permitted to begin operation; it does not say shall. We do not read this language to create an absolute right to operate at the expiration of forty-five days. On its face, therefore, section 2-5(a)(1) risks the suppression of protected expression for an indefinite time period prior to any action on the part of the decisionmaker or any judicial determination. 23 A second provision of the Ordinance also may result in the indefinite suppression of expressive activity. In the event the Administrator denies the license, section 6-1 provides the applicant fifteen days to appeal the decision to the Board. Citrus County Ordinance No. 88-05, Sec. 6-1(1). The Ordinance then directs the Clerk of the Board to schedule a hearing for as soon as the Board's calendar will allow. Id. Sec. 6-1(2) (emphasis added). No time limit is placed on the Board. Like section 2-5, this appeal mechanism creates the risk that protected expression will be restrained for an indefinite time period prior to any form of judicial review. Thus, based on these two provisions, we find that the Ordinance fails to impose reasonable time limits on the decisionmaker, as required by Freedman and FW/PBS.