Opinion ID: 349677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay Declarations of Coconspirator Standish.

Text: 27 As one error, appellant contends that the trial court should not have permitted agent Campion to testify as to conversations made by codefendant Standish that tended to implicate appellant Lambros in the distribution scheme. The trial court admitted the testimony on the theory that, although hearsay, it related statements by a coconspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). 28 Appellant disputes this ruling, suggesting that the requisite independent proof of the conspiracy did not exist and therefore that admission of the statements was wrong. The rule for admissibility of such evidence requires that the Government prove the existence of the conspiracy by evidence that is independent of the questioned statement. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); United States v. Frol, 518 F.2d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 984 (8th Cir. 1975). The independent evidence must establish that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, and (3) the statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Rich, supra, 518 F.2d at 984. In United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977), we discussed the necessary quantum of such independent evidence. 4 29 (T)he standard for the admissibility of co-conspirator statements requires the showing of a likelihood of illicit association between the declarant and the defendant. The trial judge determining admissibility preliminarily has wide discretion and must be satisfied only that there is independent evidence, credible and sufficient to support a finding of a joint undertaking. The independent evidence of illicit association may be completely circumstantial, or may consist of the conspirators' own conduct and admissions. (Id. at 1117.) 30 The trial court has discretion over the order of proof of the conspiracy. We stated in United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 533 (8th Cir. 1977) that: 31 There is no requirement that the independent evidence of conspiracy be introduced prior to the introduction of the co-conspirator's statement. The order of proof is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, the co-conspirator's statement may be conditionally admitted subject to being connected up subsequently by independent proof of conspiracy, which may be totally circumstantial. (Citations omitted.) 32 In this case, ample independent evidence of the conspiracy and appellant's connection with the conspiracy existed. The series of meetings between appellant and codefendant Standish before and after each heroin sale, appellant's arrest with marked money in his possession, and appellant's admission of complicity to his cellmate all conclusively establish the existence of the conspiracy and appellant's connection with it. 33 The third requirement, that the statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, is also satisfied on this record. This court has repeatedly held that statements of a coconspirator identifying a fellow coconspirator as his source of narcotics are statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Carlson, supra, 547 F.2d at 1362; United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484, 491 & n. 16 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 915, 94 S.Ct. 2616, 41 L.Ed.2d 219 (1974). 34