Opinion ID: 2070372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Statutory Definitions

Text: As a definitional statute pertaining to sexual assaults, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-318 (Reissue 1985) provides in part: (4) Serious personal injury shall mean great bodily injury or disfigurement, extreme mental anguish or mental trauma, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a sexual or reproductive organ; (5) Sexual contact shall mean the intentional touching of the victim's sexual or intimate parts or the intentional touching of the victim's clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's sexual or intimate parts. Sexual contact shall also mean the touching by the victim of the actor's sexual or intimate parts or the clothing covering the immediate area of the actor's sexual or intimate parts when such touching is intentionally caused by the actor. Sexual contact shall include only such conduct which can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either party; (6) Sexual penetration shall mean sexual intercourse in its ordinary meaning, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the actor's or victim's body or any object manipulated by the actor into the genital or anal openings of the victim's body which can be reasonably construed as being for nonmedical or nonhealth purposes. Sexual penetration shall not require emission of semen.... Jackson contends his conviction must be set aside because the evidence does not support the jury's findings concerning the elements of attempted sexual assault in the second degree (§ 28-320(1) and (2)). Jackson argues there is no evidence that he made any effort to contact the sexual or intimate areas of his victim's body. Also, according to Jackson, the only force used was an effort to quiet the victim and not a means to achieve any sexual act or contact with the victim. Therefore, Jackson argues, there is the absence of force necessary to sustain a conviction for sexual assault in the second degree (§ 28-320(1)(a)) and the absence of serious personal injury sustained by his victim, which injury is an element required in the offense of sexual assault in the second degree (§ 28-320(2)). Jackson further argues that the evidence fails to establish that his victim was physically or mentally incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of Jackson's conduct toward the victim (§ 28-320(1)(b)). To sustain a conviction for the offense of criminal attempt in violation of § 28-201(1)(a) or (b), evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally engaged in conduct which (1) would constitute a particular crime, if the attendant circumstances were as the defendant believes such circumstances to be, or (2) under the circumstances as the defendant believes such circumstances to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the defendant's commission of the crime. See, State v. Swoopes, 223 Neb. 914, 395 N.W.2d 500 (1986); State v. Benzel, 220 Neb. 466, 370 N.W.2d 501 (1985); State v. Sodders, 208 Neb. 504, 304 N.W.2d 62 (1981). Whether a defendant's conduct constituted a substantial step toward commission of a particular crime is, generally, a question for the trier of fact. State v. Sodders, supra . To commit the crime of attempted sexual assault in any degree, actual sexual penetration or sexual contact between the victim and the defendant is not required. State v. Swoopes, supra . Before we consider whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Jackson's conviction, we must dispose of an issue implicit in Jackson's claim that his conviction is contrary to law. The information charged Jackson with attempted sexual assault in the first degree. The court instructed not only on the offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree but, also, at Jackson's request, instructed on the offenses of attempted sexual assault in the second and third degrees. In reference to the question whether attempted sexual assault in the second degree is a lesser-included offense regarding the crime or offense of attempted sexual assault in the first degree, we note our opinion in State v. Swoopes, supra , which recited background for a charge of Swoopes' attempted sexual assault in the first degree. In Swoopes, the defendant, wielding a knife, fondled his female victim's breast during a struggle in which the victim sustained a knife laceration, but managed to extricate herself and fled. Although the court instructed the jury on attempted sexual assault in the first degree, Swoopes claimed he was entitled to an instruction on sexual assault in the third degree. See § 28-320(1) and (3). An issue in State v. Swoopes, supra , was the relationship between criminal attempt and another crime, insofar as such other crime may be a lesser-included offense concerning the offense of criminal attempt. In Swoopes, we stated: Because an attempted crime as defined by § 28-201 may be committed without the crime itself being committed, no offense can be a lesser-included offense of an attempted crime prosecuted under § 28-201. There are no lesser-included offenses to § 28-201, and the district court was correct in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. (Emphasis in original.) 223 Neb. at 922, 395 N.W.2d at 506. This court has recognized that in a prosecution for sexual assault in the first degree, where there is a factual dispute concerning an element of first degree sexual assault, but there is evidence which reasonably may establish a sexual assault in a degree less than first, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on the lesser degree of sexual assault as a lesser-included offense concerning the charge of sexual assault in the first degree. For instance, in State v. Tamburano, 201 Neb. 703, 705-07, 271 N.W.2d 472, 474-75 (1978), this court stated: All parties concede that the offense of sexual assault, second degree, is a lesser-included offense of sexual assault, first degree.... ... Second degree sexual assault requires only sexual contact as opposed to sexual penetration.... .... ... The test which must be applied in determining whether or not to submit a lesser-included offense is whether there is evidence which produces a rational basis for a verdict acquitting defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the lesser offense. [Citing and quoting from State v. McDonald, 312 Minn. 320, 251 N.W.2d 705 (1977).] ... As for the type of evidence which would require the lesser charge... The controverted evidence to dispute the proof of the element separating the crime charged from the lesser offense can be supplied by inference as well as by direct testimony. [Citing and quoting from Barnett, The Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine, 5 Conn.L.Rev. 255 (1972).] Acknowledging that there must be some basis in the evidence to rebut the greater charge as a prerequisite to an instruction on a lesser offense, we then observed in Tamburano: Evidence which requires the submission of a lesser-included offense is necessarily left to a case-by-case basis. It is sufficient to say that that evidence does not rise to that required level by speculating that an essential element uncontroverted in the evidence may be disbelieved by the jury. 201 Neb. at 708, 271 N.W.2d at 475. A similar conclusion was reached in State v. Beasley, 214 Neb. 918, 336 N.W.2d 601 (1983), where the only evidence established defendant's forcible sexual penetration of his victim, although the defendant denied such penetration and asserted he was not at the victim's home when the sexual assault occurred. Beasley claimed error in the trial court's refusing to instruct on sexual assault in the second and third degrees, but we expressed: These lesser offenses do not require penetration as an element of the offense. Rather, only sexual contact is required. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-320 (Reissue 1979).... .... Here, the evidence did not rise to the level of proof required by Tamburano. In that case we held that if, under a different but reasonable view, the evidence would be sufficient to establish guilt of the lesser offense and leave a reasonable doubt as to some element included in the greater offense but not the lesser, the jury should be instructed on the lesser offense. The defense here was an alibi, and the evidence relied upon by the defendant did not tend to support a view that sexual contact occurred but a reasonable doubt existed as to penetration. Id. at 922-23, 336 N.W.2d at 604. See, also, State v. Schwartz, 219 Neb. 833, 366 N.W.2d 766 (1985) (fact of sexual assault was undisputed, but dispute existed whether the victim had sustained a serious personal injury; held, under the circumstances, sexual assault in the third degree was a lesser-included offense regarding sexual assault in the second degree). The test for determining whether a lesser-included offense exists in this jurisdiction is that a lesser-included offense is one which is necessarily established by proof of the greater offense. To be a lesser-included offense, the elements of the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without at the same time having committed the lesser. State v. Miller, 215 Neb. 145, 337 N.W.2d 424 (1983); State v. Ebert, 212 Neb. 629, 324 N.W.2d 812 (1982); State v. Lovelace, 212 Neb. 356, 322 N.W.2d 673 (1982). State v. White, 217 Neb. 783, 785, 351 N.W.2d 83, 85 (1984). Recently, in State v. Pribil, 224 Neb. 28, 32, 395 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1986), we noted: When some of the elements of the crime charged in the information, without the addition of any element irrelevant to the original crime charged, may constitute another crime or crimes, such other crime or crimes are included within the crime charged. [Emphasis in original.] [Citing and quoting from State v. McClarity, 180 Neb. 246, 142 N.W.2d 152 (1966).] In view of the definitions or characterizations in § 28-318 pertaining to sexual assault, there may be sexual contact without sexual penetration, but, ordinarily, sexual penetration does not exist without some form of sexual contact. Thus, sexual assault in the second degree (sexual contact), under appropriate circumstances, may be a lesser-included offense concerning a charge of sexual assault in the first degree (sexual penetration). In the present case the question becomes: As a result of the charge of an attempt to commit a sexual assault in the first degree, may an attempt to commit a sexual assault in the second degree be a lesser-included offense concerning the attempted first degree sexual assault? Under the circumstances, the answer to the immediately preceding question is in the affirmative. Bearing in mind our previous statements in this opinion concerning criminal sexual assaults, and depending on the context in which an attempted sexual assault occurs, a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in a sexual assault in the first degree (sexual penetration) may include a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in achievement of sexual contact as well, that is, commission of a sexual assault in the second degree. Consequently, within the offense of criminal attempt, § 28-201, an attempt to commit a particular crime may also include an attempt to commit a lesser-included offense in reference to the designated crime alleged to have been attempted. However, in State v. Swoopes, 223 Neb. 914, 922, 395 N.W.2d 500, 506 (1986), we stated: [N]o offense can be a lesser-included offense of an attempted crime prosecuted under § 28-201. (Emphasis in original.) To the extent that State v. Swoopes, supra , indicates or holds that an attempt to commit a sexual assault in a degree less than first degree cannot be a lesser-included offense in a prosecution for an attempt to commit a sexual assault in the first degree, Swoopes is disapproved and overruled. Thus, the information charging Jackson with attempted sexual assault in the first degree permitted the court to submit to the jury resolution of the charge concerning attempted sexual assault, including the offenses of attempted sexual assault in the first and second degrees, and the verdict, if sustained by sufficient evidence, is not contrary to law.