Opinion ID: 2654933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adequacy of the Government’s Search

Text: An agency‟s search conducted in response to a FOIA request “need not be perfect, only adequate, and adequacy is measured by the reasonableness of the effort in light of the specific request.”51 In order to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the “agency must show that it made a good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the information requested.”52 The burden is on the agency to establish “through reasonably detailed affidavits that its search was reasonable.”53 It is not enough for an affidavit merely to state in conclusory terms that the 51 Meeropol v. Meese, 790 F.2d 942, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 52 Doe v. District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t, 948 A.2d 1210, 1220 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). 53 Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 560 (1st Cir. 1993). 25 locations searched were “most likely to contain the information which had been requested”; rather, the affidavit must demonstrate “with reasonable detail, that the search method . . . was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”54 If the agency meets its burden, the FOIA requester can prevail in a motion for summary judgment only by showing that the agency‟s search was not made in good faith.55 “Purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents” are not sufficient to rebut the presumption of good faith accorded to an agency affidavit.56 On the other hand, if the agency fails to meet its 54 Doe, 948 A.2d at 1221. ―At the same time,‖ we have emphasized, there is no requirement that an agency search every record system, and a search is not presumed unreasonable simply because it fails to produce all relevant material. Nor need an agency demonstrate that all responsive documents were found and that no other relevant documents could possibly exist, and an agency‘s failure to turn up specific documents does not undermine the determination that it conducted an adequate search for the requested documents. Id. at 1221 n.19 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 55 Maynard, 986 F.2d at 560. 56 Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). 26 burden, a FOIA requester may prevail on a motion for summary judgment “merely by showing that the agency might have discovered a responsive document had the agency conducted a reasonable search.”57 The search in this case encompassed the electronic communications of seventeen MPD employees and the paper files and hard drives of two of them. FOP argues that the District should have searched the electronic correspondence of at least eleven more individuals, some of whom work not for the MPD but in the Executive Office of the Mayor, and the hard-copy files of all seventeen individuals whose electronic correspondence was searched. FOP states that it has a “good faith belief” that these additional individuals possess responsive documents based on the fact that they are identified in the documents that have so far been produced. In support of the adequacy of its search, the District submitted two declarations under penalty of perjury by Ms. Natasha Cenatus. Cenatus identified herself as the D.C. Freedom of Information Act Specialist (or “Officer”) for the MPD. She averred that, upon receiving FOP‟s FOIA request, she arranged for the Office of the Chief Technology Officer to search “all MPD electronic 57 Id. 27 correspondence, including data . . . stored on District computer servers,” of seventeen named MPD employees. Cenatus said she had selected “these particular custodians based on [her] determination that they were—by virtue of their positions, titles and responsibilities—the individuals within MPD most likely to possess electronic communications responsive to” FOP‟s FOIA request.58 In addition, Cenatus stated that she forwarded the FOIA request to the departments within MPD that would “most likely have” responsive documents. “Those departments,” she said, “included the Office of Resource Accountability of the Executive Office of the Chief of Police and the Grants Unit in the Office of Fiscal Accountability of the Executive Office of the Chief of Police.” Her declarations do not name the other departments that received the FOIA request. Cenatus was aware of “only two individuals” who conducted a further search as a result of this transmittal.59 One of them was Leeann Turner, who (according to 58 Cenatus specified the several search terms that she directed be used for the electronic search, such as ―‗peaceoholics‘ AND ‗grant‘‖; as previously mentioned, the adequacy of the search terms is not at issue in this appeal. 59 Cenatus added that ―other staff may have been involved in the searches within those departments.‖ This indicates that Cenatus lacked knowledge as to whether or how searches were conducted in response to her transmittal of the FOIA request to the departments she thought ―mostly likely‖ to possess responsive documents, or why searches may not have been conducted in some departments or by other recipients. 28 Cenatus) reported that she had searched for documents responsive to the FOIA request in her electronic files, her computer hard drive, and the paper files in her office and file cabinets.60 The other, Janice Sullivan, reported to Cenatus that she had conducted a comparable search. (Sullivan did not provide a declaration.) Cenatus averred that Sullivan was “the single employee within MPD responsible for acting as the point of contact concerning all grants to the Peaecoholics. As a result of these responsibilities, Sullivan was the only MPD employee likely to maintain hard copy records responsive to [FOP‟s] FOIA request.”61 In our view, the District did not meet its burden of establishing that it conducted a search “reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”62 The stumbling block is that the Cenatus declarations do not enable a judicial arbiter to evaluate whether the search was, in fact, reasonably comprehensive. Even 60 Cenatus did not specify the department or office with which Turner was associated. Turner stated in her own declaration (discussed earlier in this opinion in connection with the District‘s assertion of the deliberative process privilege) that she was a former Executive Director for the Office of Resource Accountability, but she did not make clear whether she occupied that position at any time relevant to the FOIA request. It should be noted that Turner‘s declaration did not even mention her search for documents. 61 Cenatus‘s declaration did not specify (and the record does not otherwise reveal) Sullivan‘s position either. 62 Rein v. Patent & Trademark Office, 553 F.3d 353, 362 (4th Cir. 2009). 29 accepting the somewhat conclusory assertion that Sullivan was the “only” employee likely to have hard copies of documents responsive to the FOIA request—though we think it would be necessary to know more about her role in the activities covered by the request to be confident of that assertion—the declarations do not come close to justifying the choices made and the limitations imposed on the search for electronic communications. Because the declarations do not disclose anything about the “positions, titles, and responsibilities” of the other sixteen named MPD employees, a judge has no way of knowing whether they were in fact “most likely” (or likely at all) to have responsive documents, or whether other MPD employees should have been added to the search list. Similarly, it is unclear from the declarations whether any MPD offices other than the two Cenatus identified were likely to have relevant documents or, if so, whether other offices were searched.63 Indeed, it even is unclear how thoroughly the two named offices were searched. Because the District has not met its burden, FOP needs to show only that the District “might have discovered a responsive document had [the District] 63 Cf. Doe v. District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t, 948 A.2d 1210, 1221 (D.C. 2008) (―At the very least, the agency is required to explain in its affidavit that no other record system was likely to produce responsive documents.‖) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 30 conducted a reasonable search” in order to defeat the District‟s motion for summary judgment.64 FOP has made this showing; it has demonstrated that there are other MPD employees who may possess responsive documents, namely, the employees (whose electronic communications were not searched) referenced in the documents the District did produce. This is not to say that the District now must conduct the precise search that FOP demands in order to fulfill its obligation to perform an adequate search. For one thing, the fact that the District should not have been awarded summary judgment with respect to the sufficiency of its search does not mean FOP was entitled to judgment on that issue. If the District, on remand, supplements the Cenatus declarations with a sufficiently detailed declaration, it may yet be able to establish that its previous searches were adequate and that no further search is necessary. Even if further searching is required, the District is not necessarily obliged to search the files of the specific MPD employees that FOP has identified as possibly having responsive documents.65 That certain individuals are referenced 64 Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 560 (1st Cir. 1993). 65 Nor is the District obligated to search the files of persons in the Executive Office of the Mayor, as FOP asserts, even if it is likely such persons do have relevant documents. The FOIA request asked only for ―documents and information in the possession, custody, or control of the Metropolitan Police (continued…) 31 in responsive documents found in the District‟s previous searches does not automatically mean the District must search their files too, “following an interminable trail of cross-referenced documents.”66 However, the District cannot claim that its search is adequate by ignoring evidence that suggests otherwise.67 If the results of an initial search contain “leads” indicating that additional responsive documents are likely to be found in another location, those leads must be followed. Such “leads” change the agency‟s, and the court‟s, assessment of what is reasonable; “[c]onsequently, the court evaluates the reasonableness of an agency‟s search based on what the agency knew at its conclusion rather than what the agency speculated at its inception.”68 This does not mean that the District will be put to a never-ending series of searches or that it must proceed beyond the point of diminishing returns.69 Once it has met its burden of demonstrating that it (continued…) Department.‖ If FOP wants to request documents from other agencies or departments of the District of Columbia Government, it is free to do so. 66 Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 67 See Valencia-Lucena v. United States Coast Guard, FOIA/PA Records Management, 180 F.3d 321, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (―[I]t is well-settled that if an agency has reason to know that certain places may contain responsive documents, it is obligated under FOIA to search barring an undue burden.‖). 68 Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 69 Id. (continued…) 32 performed a search reasonably calculated to uncover all responsive documents, the District will not be “required to chase rabbit trails that may appear in documents uncovered during their search.”70 At that point, the District will be entitled to prevail on summary judgment unless FOP can show that the search was not carried out in good faith.