Opinion ID: 51003
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bank and Mail Fraud

Text: Suarez argues that it was impossible for him to actually commit bank fraud because he was unable to submit an appraisal on his own. He also argues that he could not have intended to commit bank fraud because he knew his work would be reviewed and any efforts to commit fraud would be detected by the reviewer. A defendant can be found guilty of bank fraud if his conduct was designed to deceive a federally chartered or insured financial institution into releasing property with the intent to expose it to actual or potential loss. See United States v. Key, 76 F.3d 350, 353 (11th Cir. 1996). A reasonable jury could have found that Suarez committed bank fraud. William Rutan testified that Suarez often asked him to sign off on an appraisal at the last minute, without providing the requisite supporting documentation. A jury could find that this was conduct designed to overcome the limitations of Suarez’s trainee status, for the purpose of deceiving the banks into approving loans that were disproportionate to the fair market value of the properties in question. 10 Suarez raises no specific challenges to his mail fraud convictions. He seems to argue that, because the evidence does not support his bank fraud convictions, it does not support the attendant mail fraud convictions. We have concluded, however, that the evidence is sufficient to support the bank fraud convictions. Because Suarez raises no further challenges to his mail fraud convictions, we address them no further. B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Refused to Dismiss the Indictment for Pre-Indictment Delay. Suarez argues that the indictment should have been dismissed for preindictment delay, because more than five years passed between the preparation of some of the appraisals and the day he was indicted. Suarez argues that, although the statute of limitations is the primary defense against pre-indictment delay, the Due Process Clause also protects a defendant against pre-indictment delay. This argument fails. The Due Process Clause allows for dismissal of an indictment for preindictment delay when the defendant establishes that the delay was (1) the product of a deliberate act by the government to gain a tactical advantage, and (2) caused the defendant actual, substantial prejudice. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S. Ct. 455, 466 (1971). Suarez established neither element. There is no 11 allegation that the delay was deliberate, and because Suarez knew he was under investigation in 2001, there was no prejudice to Suarez. C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Refused to Admit Into Evidence the Handwritten Note Found at Aaron’s Residence. Suarez argues that the handwritten note which the district court refused to enter into evidence on the ground of hearsay should have been admitted under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Suarez cannot invoke this rule. The rule is one of several exceptions that fall under the broader heading, “Admissions of a Party Opponent.” The government is the party opponent to Suarez, and the note is not an admission of the government. Nor are we convinced that the note “bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” and was admissible hearsay. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 1049 (1972). D. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Admitted Rule 404(b) Evidence Regarding Suarez’s Prior Theft Offense. Suarez argues that the testimony of Marcelino Vega about Suarez’s failure to remit to Excel portions of the fees he received from Aaron was impermissible character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for which he received no notice. This argument fails. Evidence falls outside the ambit of 404(b) when it 12 is: “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1205 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Vega testified that Suarez failed to remit a portion of the fees he received for preparing appraisals for Doyle Aaron. His testimony was about “an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense,” and was admissible without prior notice to Suarez. E. The District Court Did Not Violate Booker When It Enhanced Suarez’s Sentence Based on Special Skill. Suarez argues that the special skill enhancement violated Booker because the jury never found, and Suarez never admitted, that he possessed a special skill, and that, after Booker, judges may not enhance sentences based on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. Suarez misunderstands Booker, which held that a judge could not enhance a sentence based on judicially-found facts if the guidelines are mandatory. The district court did not apply the guidelines as mandatory when it sentenced Suarez; the court reviewed the 3553(a) factors before imposing a sentence “at the low end of the advisory guideline range.” 13 F. The Amount of Restitution is Not an Excessive Fine in Violation of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, Suarez objects to the amount of restitution imposed by the district court as excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The court imposed restitution on all of the conspirators, jointly and severally, for $1,051,537.20, the entire amount of the loss. When calculating Suarez’s sentence, the court found that Suarez was only responsible for approximately half of the loss, and enhanced his sentence under 2F1.1(b)(1)(L) accordingly. Suarez argues that the amount of restitution is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense and violates the Excessive Fines Clause. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S. Ct. 2028 (1998). This argument fails. When a defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the district court can hold him responsible for the entire amount of the loss attributable to the conspiracy. United States v. Rayborn, 957 F.2d 841, 844 (11th Cir. 1992). A district court can likewise order that restitution be paid in the full amount of the loss of the conspiracy. See United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004). When it enhanced Suarez’s sentence under guidelines section 2F1.1(b)(1), the district court chose to be lenient and enhance Suarez’s sentence based only on the amount of loss attributable to the appraisals he prepared. This act of leniency does not allow us to conclude that the restitution was excessive. 14