Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failing to Order Counsel to Tell Defendant the Defense Strategy

Text: As described ante, page 856, before the penalty phase began, defendant moved that counsel either be relieved or not present a penalty defense. He complained that they would not tell him the defense strategy. Counsel acknowledged that defendant would not be told the names of specific witnesses, but explained that defendant was trying to get witnesses not to cooperate when he learned of their identity. From the beginning of pretrial proceedings, the record reveals that defendant wanted no meaningful penalty defense. His refusal to mount a penalty defense continued throughout the trial. It culminated in his statement to the jury urging his execution. ( Ante, p. 817.) Just before the penalty phase began, his counsel told the court, Mr. Memro would rather we not proceed with presenting evidence at a penalty phase. He has informed us that if we were to call some of these people or tell him that we are going to call them that he would make sure that they wouldn't appear. Defendant replied, I believe I have a right to know what is going to be done at the penalty phase or what isn't going to be done. The court ruled, I am not going to tell [counsel] to do anything. The court also refused to appoint new counsel who might tell defendant what witnesses would be called at the penalty phase. (50) Defendant contends in effect that the court's refusal either to compel counsel to adequately confer with him regarding penalty phase strategy or to relieve them for refusing to do so denied him the assistance of counsel in violation of the state and federal Constitutions. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution conferred a right to the assistance of counsel on defendant. ( Maine v. Moulton, supra, 474 U.S. 159, 168 [88 L.Ed.2d 481, 490-491]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) But we have concluded that the right is not infringed when `the opportunity [of the defense] to participate fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process' [citation] is not significantly limited. (46 Cal.3d at p. 695, first bracketed material added in Bonin. ) No such limitation occurred here. Rather, it was defendant who was trying to thwart the ability of the defense to participate fully in the factfinding process, and counsel who were trying to present a defense as fully as possible. At the time of the retrial, counsel was obligated to present evidence in mitigation even over defendant's objection. ( People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 712, 716-717 [280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181].) Neither the right to counsel nor any right to a reliable penalty determination was violated by the court's refusal to accede, in effect, to defendant's desire to prevent his counsel from presenting evidence in mitigation. Nor do we discern any other federal constitutional violation. Defendant also asserts that the state Constitution's guaranty of the right to be personally present with counsel (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15) would be illusory if counsel were allowed to keep secret from [their] client [their] plans for trial. We disagree with the premise, however. Counsel obviously told him that they would introduce evidence in mitigation. They did refuse to reveal who the witnesses might be after he told them he would try to stop them from testifying. We do not see how the right to be personally present with counsel was violated by counsel's refusal to aid him in that quest.