Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence of Privileges Received by Prison Inmates

Text: Defendant's sixth point for review is that the State presented irrelevant evidence of privileges received by prison inmates. Glen Jackson, the chief records officer for the DOC, testified regarding privileges offered to inmates serving a term of natural life imprisonment. He explained that these inmates are allowed privileges based upon their good behavior. They initially could be assigned to a maximum-security facility, where there are fewer programs than in other institutions, but they could be stepped down to a medium-security facility based upon their behavior. He said that the natural life inmates received recreation privileges like other inmates, including going to the yard for two hours a day to play basketball, softball, and lift weights; that they were able to engage in vocational training, such as educational adult basic education, General Educational Development (GED) programs, culinary arts programs, wood shop, and auto shop; and that they were able to use the library and the commissary, as well as have a television and a radio in their cell. In a typical day, the inmates are counted in the morning and then eat breakfast. After breakfast, inmates go to their assignments and then eat lunch. After lunch they go to the yard, then to dinner, and after dinner they return to their cells. Defendant's motion in limine to preclude the State from presenting this evidence was denied. Defendant argues that [evidence] is not proper at the sentencing hearing if it does not bear on the aggravating or mitigating factors, the circumstances of the offense or the character or rehabilitative potential of the particular defendant, citing People v. Barrow, 133 Ill.2d 226, 280, 139 Ill.Dec. 728, 549 N.E.2d 240 (1989). He contends the evidence about prison privileges did not bear on his character or the nature of the offense, and it was therefore irrelevant. Defendant also argues that this prison-privileges evidence was prejudicial when the prosecutor in closing argument said that defendant should be sentenced to death [b]ecause if he knows he's going to spend the rest of his life walking around the yard, lifting weights, playing basketball, watching TV, he'll do whatever he wants. He'll take that sentence as a joke. The State also appears to refer to this evidence, stating, Don't give him what he wants. Life in general population is like sending him to his room. The State contends that the trial court properly admitted evidence regarding privileges received by inmates at the DOC, citing People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 223 Ill.Dec. 558, 680 N.E.2d 291 (1997). In Smith we stated: `Wide latitude is granted to the parties in introducing evidence in aggravation and mitigation at a capital sentencing hearing. The testimony presented need not satisfy the more restrictive rules of evidence that govern the guilt-innocence phase.' People v. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d 341, 380, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (1993); 720 ILCS 5/9-1(e) (West 1994). Rather, the only requirement is that the evidence be relevant and reliable. Smith, 176 Ill.2d at 242-43, 223 Ill.Dec. 558, 680 N.E.2d 291. See also People v. Caffey, 205 Ill.2d 52, 125, 275 Ill.Dec. 390, 792 N.E.2d 1163 (2001). The State and defendant agree that the only issue is whether the prison-privileges evidence was relevant. Defendant relies heavily on the South Carolina Supreme Court case of State v. Burkhart, 371 S.C. 482, 640 S.E.2d 450 (2007). During the sentencing phase in that capital case, the Director of Inmate Classification for the Department of Corrections testified that an inmate receiving a sentence of life without parole was eligible to receive privileges that include[d] access to the yard, work, education, meals, canteen, phone, library, recreation, mail, television, and outside visitors. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 487, 640 S.E.2d at 453. On cross-examination, the Director acknowledged that prison life is very regimented and is not a country club. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 487, 640 S.E.2d at 453. Burkhart presented evidence through his own witness that prison is a harsh environment with violent predators where one's freedom is severely curtailed. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 487, 640 S.E.2d at 453. The South Carolina court stated: [E]vidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial must be relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. We are aware of the tension between evidence regarding the defendant's adaptability to prison life, which is clearly admissible, and this restriction on the admission of evidence regarding prison life in general. We note, however, that evidence of the defendant's characteristics may include prison conditions if narrowly tailored to demonstrate the defendant's personal behavior in those conditions. (Emphasis omitted.) Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 488, 640 S.E.2d at 453. The five-member South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously found that the evidence concerning prison conditions was not relevant and should not have been admitted into evidence. Based on a South Carolina statute, three of the justices found the admission of this evidence was reversible error and two found it was harmless error. The majority stated, A capital jury may not impose a death sentence under the influence of any arbitrary factor. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(C)(1) (2003). When the jury is invited to speculate about irrelevant matters upon which a death sentence may be based, § 16-3-25(C)(1) is violated. State v. Sloan, 278 S.C. 435, 298 S.E.2d 92 (1982). Accordingly, we reverse appellant's death sentence and remand for resentencing. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 488-89, 640 S.E.2d at 453. The dissenting justices stated they would find that although the trial court admitted irrelevant evidence during the sentencing proceeding, they could find nothing that indicated the introduction of this evidence prejudiced the defendant. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 490, 640 S.E.2d at 454 (Toal, C.J., dissenting, joined by Burnett, J.). They further held that the South Carolina statute was subject to harmless-error analysis. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 490-95, 640 S.E.2d at 454-57 (Toal, C.J., dissenting, joined by Burnett, J.). Here, the State asserts that the evidence of inmate privileges was offered to help the jurors make their determination regarding whether defendant would be able to adjust to a life of incarceration. It argues that the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that there is an important distinction between permissible evidence designed to show a defendant's adaptability to prison life and evidence of prison conditions in general. Burkhart, 371 S.C. at 488, 640 S.E.2d at 453. However, at trial, the State did not argue that the evidence of privileges in prison showed that defendant could not adapt to prison life. Rather, the prosecutor argued that the prison privileges meant life in prison was too good for defendant. Accordingly, the prison-privileges evidence was not relevant to the circumstances of the offense or the character or rehabilitative potential of defendant ( People v. Williams, 97 Ill.2d 252, 301, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220 (1983)) and it should not have been admitted. Because of this error, defendant argues that this court should grant him a new sentencing hearing. We have previously found that the admission of improper aggravation evidence during a sentencing proceeding is subject to harmless-error analysis and reversal is not mandated in every instance. People v. Towns, 174 Ill.2d 453, 469, 221 Ill.Dec. 419, 675 N.E.2d 614 (1996); see also People v. Chapman, 194 Ill.2d 186, 246, 252 Ill.Dec. 474, 743 N.E.2d 48 (2000). Here the State's evidence was very strong and showed that defendant was a repeat offender with a history of preying on innocent victims for whom he showed no remorse or concern. The State's case included 23 witnesses in aggravation, many of them DOC officials. These DOC witnesses discussed defendant's many disciplinary infractions during his incarcerations, which included fights with other inmates, abusive behavior toward guards and civilian staff, and refusal to conform to the rules and regulations of the institutions. The State also offered testimony from Pamela Tiggins, who told how defendant sexually assaulted her while holding an ice pick to her friend's neck and testimony regarding defendant's murder of Alfred Evans, whom he gunned down from the back, allegedly in retaliation for the killing of another gang member. Defendant, on the other hand, presented testimony from family members and a clinical psychologist, all of whom spent most of their time detailing defendant's childhood as the reason behind his criminal behavior. This mitigation did not present any reason sufficient to preclude the death penalty and was far outweighed by the aggravation evidence. We find that the error in admitting the improper testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and that no prejudice resulted to defendant from its admission.