Opinion ID: 1609069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Helping to Prevent Abuses of the Disciplinary Process

Text: The fourth and final potential compelling interest asserted by the ODC is the state's interest in helping to prevent abuses in the disciplinary process. The example abuses given by the witnesses testifying on behalf of the ODC at the hearing before the commissioner were modeled after the fact pattern in the instant matter. The witnesses noted that under Rule 8.1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer is obligated to cooperate with the ODC in its investigation of any matter. As discussed in the section above, in the process of responding to a disciplinary complaint, an attorney is allowed to reveal privileged client information under Rule 1.6(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The record in the present case demonstrates that sometimes, to serve the practical needs of an investigation, the ODC forwards the accused attorney's response to the complaint, including any confidential information disclosed, to the complainant for further comment and response. In a situation where the complainant is an opposing attorney in ongoing litigation, this situation is ripe for abuse. The attorney disciplinary investigation process may place information that would normally be protected from discovery in parallel civil or criminal litigation, under the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine, into the hands of the opposition. The ODC argues the confidentiality rule is necessary to prevent the opposing attorney/complainant from then using the otherwise unobtainable information that they receive during the investigation of a disciplinary complaint to their benefit in the pending civil or criminal litigation. If allowed to go unchecked, the ODC asserts that this second avenue of discovery could threaten the separation of powers, hindering the legislature's ability to enact rules of discovery. [74] Assuming arguendo that the state's interest in preventing abuse of the disciplinary process is a compelling interest, we find that the confidentiality rule created by La. S.Ct. Rule XIX, § 16(A) and (I) still fails to survive strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to promote this asserted interest. A less-speech restrictive alternative which would adequately serve this interest is readily apparent. This court could simply adopt a rule which specifically prohibits the use of information gained in a disciplinary proceeding in civil or criminal proceedings. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666, 124 S.Ct. at 2791 (noting that the least restrictive alternative test does not begin with the status quo of existing regulations, but rather the court should ask whether the challenged regulation is the least restrictive means among available, effective alternatives); Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 542 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. at 2336 (noting a readily apparent less-speech restrictive alternative was available that would address the state interest). [75]