Opinion ID: 1580541
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: jury instruction on felony-murder

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred by granting the state's special request that the jury be instructed that a felony participant is responsible for any death that ensues as a result of the felony. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court took no precautions to ensure the limited applicability of the instruction to the charge of felony-murder, and thus, the jury could have believed that the state did not have to prove mens rea for the charge of premeditated murder. We disagree. It appears that the trial court instructed the jury first on premeditated murder. The jury was then instructed on murder during the perpetration of a burglary, on murder during the perpetration of a theft, and theft of property. At the end of these instructions, the trial court gave the following charge: When one enters into a scheme with others to commit a burglary or a theft and a killing ensues, all participants in the burglary or theft may be held responsible for the death, regardless of who actually committed the murder and whether the killing was specifically contemplated by the others. As long as the defendant intended to commit the burglary or theft and a killing resulted during the attempt to perpetrate the burglary or theft, each defendant is responsible for the murder, regardless of whether he intended for the victim to die or participated in the act of murder. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on second-degree murder. The trial court also gave a criminal responsibility instruction later in the charge. The defendant's argument that the trial court failed to limit the instruction to the felony-murder charge and thus, eliminated the state's responsibility to prove mens rea on the premeditated murder charge is without merit. First, the trial court specifically instructed the jury on the elements of premeditated murder, and the jury is presumed to have followed the trial court's instruction. State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn.1998). Moreover, a challenge to a single jury instruction must be judged in context of the entire jury charge. See Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); State v. Bolin, 678 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tenn.1984). In the present case, the contested instruction, albeit unnecessary, was given in conjunction with the felony-murder instructions, and in the context of the entire jury charge, we find that the special instruction was not error.