Opinion ID: 397401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The McMurray Identification of Hood

Text: 86 As part of its case on Count Ten the government introduced the testimony of Milton E. McMurray who identified Thevis, Evans and Hood as the persons he had seen together shortly after the Underhill-Galanti murders. McMurray did not come forward as a witness until September 5, 1979, when he advised prosecutors and the FBI that he had seen Thevis, Evans, and an unidentified man together in Evans' car around 12:10 and 12:25 p. m. the day of the Underhill-Galanti murders. McMurray described the unidentified man, but was not shown a photospread, lineup, or otherwise asked to identify him as Hood. On September 7, McMurray was interviewed by prosecutors at the United States Courthouse in Rome, Georgia, prior to testifying at trial; after the interview, he left for breakfast. Hood, meanwhile, had arrived early at the courthouse and was sitting with his wife on a bench in the hallway when McMurray returned. McMurray saw Hood and identified him to prosecutors as the man he had seen with Thevis and Evans. Hood now claims that this encounter was staged by prosecutors and violated his sixth amendment right to counsel. In addition, Hood asserts that even if the encounter did not violate his sixth amendment rights, it violated due process because it was unduly suggestive and failed to meet the tests of reliability set forth in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). 87 We reject both contentions. The record is devoid of any evidence that the prosecutors staged the encounter between McMurray and Hood; hence we conclude that the encounter was a purely inadvertent one which did not violate the sixth amendment. The parties do not dispute that Hood enjoyed a sixth amendment right to counsel at this stage of his criminal prosecution. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972); Lomax v. Alabama, 629 F.2d 413, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1002, 101 S.Ct. 1712, 68 L.Ed.2d 205 (1981). In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the Supreme Court held that an accused was entitled to counsel at a post-indictment encounter 30 to help avoid possible abuses in the identification procedure which could rob the defendant of a fair trial. Id. at 228-39, 87 S.Ct. at 1933-39. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967). The rationale stated by the Court was that: 88 the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial. 89 Wade, supra, at 228, 87 S.Ct. at 1933 (emphasis added). 90 The Court's concern in these cases is with the misuse of identification procedures by the adverse party (prosecutor or police) which can result in a misidentification and erroneous conviction. Having opposing counsel present serves as a deterrent to such misuse and helps the defendant fully exercise his rights at trial by effectively reconstructing any unfairness in the identification procedures. Id. at 230-36, 87 S.Ct. at 1934-37. Consequently when an identification does not implicate the adversary process, the deterrent effect of counsel is unnecessary and the risk of prejudice negligible. A purely inadvertent meeting between the witness and the defendant does not involve any danger that the adverse party will abuse the identification process. Moreover, no procedures exist for defense counsel to reconstruct at trial. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973) (holding that risks inherent in photographic displays did not warrant assistance of counsel). See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1952-54, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (taking of handwriting exemplars did not require assistance of counsel because of minimal risk that the absence of counsel might derogate from (a) fair trial). We conclude, therefore, that the absence of counsel at a purely inadvertent meeting of a witness and defendant does not constitute a violation of the right to counsel. 31 See United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 936, 96 S.Ct. 2651, 49 L.Ed.2d 388 (1976) (dangers which prompted counsel requirement in Wade are absent in inadvertent identification). 91 Finding no sixth amendment violation, however, does not end the inquiry. As the Supreme Court noted in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690-91, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882-83, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), a court must scrutinize any pretrial confrontation for possible due process violations. The basic standard for due process violations is whether the identification procedure creates a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 971, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2254, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-98, 93 S.Ct. 375, 380-81, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). Accordingly, this circuit has adopted a two-step analysis of the due process issue: 92 First, as a threshold inquiry, the Court must decide whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. A finding of impermissible suggestiveness raises concern over the reliability of identification and triggers closer scrutiny by the Court to determine whether such a procedure created a substantial risk of misidentification. 93 Allen v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir. 1978). See Preacher v. Estelle, 626 F.2d 1222, 1223 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 930, 101 S.Ct. 1389, 67 L.Ed.2d 362 (1981). 94 We conclude that the identification at issue here was not unnecessarily suggestive. See United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 122 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981, 94 S.Ct. 1573, 39 L.Ed.2d 878 (1974) (observation of defendant by witness immediately prior to trial did not violate due process). The purely inadvertent meeting contained no hint of suggestiveness. The prosecutor did not show McMurray pictures of Hood or ask him to view Hood in a lineup. The prosecutor did not present Hood to McMurray and ask for an identification. Nor did the prosecutor even ask McMurray if he recognized the man in the hallway. Moreover, nothing about Hood suggested that he was a criminal defendant in this case. He was not handcuffed, for example, or standing alone among uniformed police officers. Far from being suggestive and unreliable, the spontaneous identification that resulted from McMurray's inadvertent meeting with Hood might be said to emphasize the witness' reliability, rather than the reverse. Allen v. Moore, 453 F.2d 970, 974 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969, 92 S.Ct. 2422, 32 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972). Our conclusion is supported by numerous cases from other circuits holding that identifications resulting from inadvertent meetings do not violate due process. E. g., United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094, 1101-1102 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Colclough, 549 F.2d 937, 941-42 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Freie, 545 F.2d 1217, 1223-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1645, 52 L.Ed.2d 356 (1976); United States v. Neverson, 463 F.2d 1224, 1230-31 (D.C.Cir.1972). 32