Opinion ID: 179728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of Presbyterian Church

Text: Before proceeding, a few words about the substance of the underlying injunction and its relationship to the civil-procedural questions at issue in this case. The injunction was entered in 1966, before the Supreme Court's decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969), but after Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). Kedroff constitutionalized the general common-law principle announced in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1871), that civil authorities may not make judgments about religious controversies when deciding church property disputes. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. 143 (The church-autonomy principle recognized in Watson must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.). Building on Kedroff the Supreme Court held in Presbyterian Church that the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601. The Court acknowledged that [c]ivil courts do not inhibit [the] free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. Id. But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. Id. The [First] Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Id.; see also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. of Am. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976) (noting the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry). Civil courts may decide church property claims based on neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, but have no authority to resolve religious disputes. [2] Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449, 89 S.Ct. 601. Considered in light of these First Amendment limitations on the court's authority, certain aspects of the 1966 injunction are troubling. The decree declares that there is only one Baha'i Faith, that Shoghi Effendi was its last Guardian and none has come since, and the National Spiritual Assembly was its representative and highest authority in the United States and was entitled to exclusive use of the marks and symbols of the Faith, including the exclusive use of the word Bahá'í. Declarations of this sort push the boundaries of the court's authority under Kedroff and Presbyterian Church. In church property disputes (trademark suits obviously qualify), the First Amendment limits the sphere in which civil courts may operate. When a district judge takes sides in a religious schism, purports to decide matters of spiritual succession, and excludes dissenters from using the name, symbols, and marks of the faith (as distinct from the name and marks of a church), the First Amendment line appears to have been crossed. But a contempt proceeding is ordinarily not the proper place for collateral attacks on the underlying injunction. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 439-40, 96 S.Ct. 2697, 49 L.Ed.2d 599 (1976); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967); Reich v. Sea Sprite Boat Co., 50 F.3d 413, 415 (7th Cir.1995); see also 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2960, at 391 (2d ed. 1995) ([T]he general principle appears to be that obedience to a decree is required, even though the issuing court has based its decision on an incorrect view of the law, unless there was no opportunity for effective review of the decree.). We do not have the substance of the 44-year-old decree before us. Still, resolving the procedural questions at issue in this case requires some sensitivity to the constitutional concerns inherent in church property claims. Presbyterian Church is in the background and circumscribes the inquiry. Applying neutral privity principles is permissible; pronouncing on matters of religious succession is not.