Opinion ID: 699544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Declarations of Doris Rodriguez

Text: 21 Hearsay is evidence of a declarant's out-of-court statement to prove the truth of what is asserted in the statement, United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1994); see also Fed.R.Evid. 801, the principal vice of which is that it deprives the opponent of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, see Reyes, 18 F.3d at 69. Nonetheless, the government may be permitted to offer an out-of-court statement for the purpose of showing an investigating agent's state of mind in order to help a jury understand the agent's subsequent actions. Id. at 70. Such evidence may be admitted to rebut initiatives launched by the defendant. Id. The government's identification of a relevant non-hearsay use for such evidence, however, is insufficient to justify its admission if the jury is likely to consider the statement for the truth of what was stated with significant resultant prejudice. Id. Forrester challenges the admission of two statements made by Rodriguez and conveyed to the jury through the testimony of government agents. 22
23 The government's first witness was Stamford police sergeant Richard Colwell (Colwell), who had responded to Rodriguez's phone call alerting the authorities to activity at the Ramada Inn. Colwell was called to testify to the activities of February 3, 1989. When asked by the government on direct examination whether he had been involved in a narcotics-related incident on that date at the hotel, Colwell responded affirmatively. The government believed it necessary that the jury understand that officers had gone to the Ramada Inn in response to Rodriguez's plea for assistance. Reluctant, however, to put a witness on the stand who was seventeen at the time of the contested events, the government asked Colwell to tell the jury what Rodriguez wanted when she asked for help. The government withdrew the question after the defense objected on the ground that the testimony would constitute hearsay. 24 In pursuing its argument that the Ramada Inn incident involved prostitution, not drugs, the defense asked Colwell on cross-examination whether he had previously testified that the investigation was narcotics-related. When the sergeant affirmed his earlier answer, the defense established that he held his view despite the scene he confronted: two casually-dressed women were present in a hotel room with one man, they were cooperative and produced identification, no search of the room was conducted, and no narcotics were found. On re-direct examination, the prosecution asked Colwell the basis for his conclusion that the incident at the Ramada Inn involved narcotics. Over objection, Colwell was permitted to tell the jury that information provided by Rodriguez led him to believe that the investigation involved drugs. The government reasons that this testimony was permissible because, having attacked Colwell's conclusion about the nature of the happening at the Ramada, the defense opened the door to Colwell's counter-explanation. 25 We are not persuaded. It seems clear that the government was attempting to establish the truth of Rodriguez's assertion. Indeed, in this case, the government created the very predicament in which it found itself by asking Colwell whether he had been involved in a narcotics-related incident at the Ramada Inn. Further, the government cannot assert that Colwell's state of mind was relevant to the determination of any material fact. See Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70 (court must determine whether the asserted non-hearsay purpose of the evidence is relevant, i.e., whether it supports or diminishes the likelihood of any fact 'that is of consequence to the determination of the action'  (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 401)). Colwell's concept of the nature of the investigation was not relevant to any fact 'that is of consequence to the determination of the action.'  See id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 401). Nor can Forrester's defense--that he was at the hotel for purposes of prostitution--be considered a tactic that justifiably open[ed] the door to such evidence to avoid prejudice to the Government. See id. at 70. 26 In asserting the admissibility of the testimony, the government relies on cases in which the defense had invited the use of hearsay in order to counter a suggestion of wrongdoing on the part of the investigators. See United States v. Pulley, 922 F.2d 1283, 1287 (6th Cir.) (where defense suggested that government planted incriminating evidence, government was entitled to explain its persistence with respect to protracted investigation that initially proved fruitless), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 815, 112 S.Ct. 67, 116 L.Ed.2d 42 (1991); United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1495 (11th Cir.1990) (limited testimony admissible to rebut defense claim that postal service investigation was baseless), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1038, 111 S.Ct. 707, 112 L.Ed.2d 696 (1991). In such a case, the government need not sit idly by while being maligned. 27 The law in this circuit, however, is clear that the opening the door principle--also called curative admissibility--gives the trial court discretion to permit a party to introduce otherwise inadmissible evidence on an issue (a) when the opposing party has introduced inadmissible evidence on the same issue, and (b) when it is needed to rebut a false impression that may have resulted from the opposing party's evidence. United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1565, 128 L.Ed.2d 211 (1994). In other words, the door must have been opened by the prior use of inadmissible evidence. See id. That circumstance does not obtain here, and the government has not argued that it does. Forrester mounted a defense that alleged no government wrongdoing, but was predicated instead on Forrester's wrongdoing of a different sort: prostitution. This defense did not require use by Forrester of inadmissible evidence. Had Rodriguez testified, of course, the jury could have drawn its own conclusion as to the character of the assignation at the hotel. Colwell's statement was improperly admitted because his state of mind was irrelevant to the issue being tried: The question of the defendant's guilt. Reyes, 18 F.3d at 71. 28
29 In addition to Colwell's challenged testimony, Forrester claims that the district court erred in admitting certain testimony of DEA agent Seymour, who had interviewed DeLuco, Bagley, and Golemba. Over objection, Seymour was permitted to testify to statements made to him by declarant Rodriguez that tended to explain certain deficiencies in the written reports in which he summarized his interviews with the three couriers. 30 Called by the defense to impeach Golemba, Seymour was questioned about the omission of the names of the two alleged ringleaders from his reports. The agent testified that when he interviewed Golemba on March 1, 1989 he already knew about the role of Sam in the scheme described by the couriers, thus suggesting that references to the ringleaders did not appear in his field reports because the information was not new to him and therefore was not significant for purposes of the report. 31 When the government cross-examined the agent, it inquired as to his testimony that he already knew about Sam: 32 Government: Now, you mentioned on direct examination that you already knew that Sam was involved? 33 Seymour: Yes. 34 Government: Sam and Tony? 35 Seymour: Yes. 36 Government: And how did you know that? 37 Defense: Your honor, I'm going to object, just at the side bar, I'm not sure what we're getting into here. 38 (At the side bar:) 39 Defense: He's asking him a wide open question which may produce all types of hearsay, so I'd want an offer of proof, how he knows about that. 40 Opposing the request for an offer of proof, the government argued that the defense had opened the door to the proposed testimony: that Seymour had been told about Sam by Rodriguez. The government theorized that the defense's earlier questioning had placed Seymour's state of mind in issue. 41 Apparently persuaded, the district court overruled the objection and allowed Seymour to testify that he already knew about Sam through information received from the Stamford police and the seventeen year old declarant. After offering to give any limiting instruction thought sufficient by the defense, the court further allowed Seymour to repeat specific statements made by Rodriguez to him. 42 Government: What did she tell you about Sam? 43