Opinion ID: 1903282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the lower Court committed reversible error by unconstitutionally chilling the Defendant's right to freely and voluntarily exercise his Fifth Amendment right to testify?

Text: ¶ 13. At trial, the following dialogue took place outside the presence of the jury: COURT: Before we break and go off the record, Mr. Negrotto [defense counsel], have you discussed with your client that he has a constitutional right not to testify? NEGROTTO: Yes, sir; I have. COURT: Mr. Gilley, do you understand whether you testify is not your attorney's decision; it's not my decision. It's your decision; do you understand that? GILLEY: Yes, sir. COURT: And do you understand that if you choose not to testify, the Court will read to the jury an instruction submitted by your attorney, which basically states that you have that constitutional right; and that if you choose to exercise that right, the jury can make no negative inference from your failure to testify? Do you understand that? GILLEY: Yes, sir. COURT: I believe that instruction goes on to say that they can't even discuss the fact that you didn't testify; do you understand that? GILLEY: Yes, sir. COURT: Do you understand that if you take the stand and you waive your constitutional right to testify, and if your attorney asks you one question: Did you sell this cocaine? then at that time, the D.A. can ask you questions from now until the sun goes up and down two or three times? Do you understand? GILLEY: Yes, sir. COURT: Mr. Negrotto, do you believe that your client has understood your explaining his constitutional right to him not to testify? NEGROTTO: That's correct. I believe he understands that, yes, sir. (Emphasis added). ¶ 14. Gilley claims that the above high-lighted statement by the trial judge infringed upon and chilled his exclusive right to determine whether or not to take the witness stand in his own defense by threatening to permit the prosecutor to subject Defendant to unfettered and boundless cross-examination should Defendant elect to testify on his own behalf. ¶ 15. In the case of Culberson v. State, 412 So.2d 1184 (Miss.1982), this Court held that Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution gives a criminal defendant the constitutional right to testify on his own behalf, id. at 1186, and that the defendant should be advised on the record outside the presence of the jury of this right to testify, so that no question regarding waiver should ever arise. Id. at 1186-87; see also Miss. Const. of 1890, art. 3, § 26. Trial judges must walk a fine line because they must advise a criminal defendant that he has the right to testify under the Mississippi Constitution and the right not to testify under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. ¶ 16. In the case sub judice, the trial judge informed Gilley that (1) he had a right not to testify, (2) the jury would be instructed that they could draw no negative inference from his refusal to take the stand, (3) he had a right to testify, and (4) the decision of whether or not he testified would be his decision alone. This discourse took place on the record outside the presence of the jury. Culberson requires no more. ¶ 17. However, the trial judge went a step further and told Gilley that if he did testify, he would be subject to cross-examination. Although the judge was very emphatic in making this statement and implied that Gilley might suffer negative consequences if he did testify, there is no indication that the judge intended to persuade Gilley one way or another. In fact, when the judge inquired as to whether Gilley had been advised of his right to testify, the State had not rested. Defense counsel responded that Gilley's decision would be determined by what further evidence the State introduced. Because it was clear that Gilley had not yet decided whether to take the stand, the judge advised Gilley to consult with his attorney privately to make sure that he understood his rights. After the State rested, the court again asked defense counsel if he had further discussed with his client whether or not he would testify. Defense counsel responded that he had done so and that Gilley would not testify. The record shows that Gilley was well advised of his rights and made an informed choice. We find this assignment of error to be without merit.