Opinion ID: 414195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prima Facie Case Under Title VII

Text: 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2, makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual ... because of such individual's race .... 15 The basic allocation of burdens and order of presentations of proof in a Title VII case was set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The elements of the prima facie case are: (1) that the complainant belongs to a racial minority; (2) that the complainant applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that, despite his qualifications, the complainant was denied employment; and (4) that the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons with the same qualifications as the complainant. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. 16 Once the Title VII plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to hire the plaintiff. The ultimate burden of proving discriminatory treatment remains with the plaintiff. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). 17 The district court below found that Lee had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination in hiring. Although National Can then articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to hire Lee, i.e., the falsification of at least one of his applications for employment, the district court held that National Can had violated Title VII in rejecting Lee's application. 18 Ordinarily, an appellate court will not set aside a trial court's findings, particularly where those findings are based primarily upon the credibility of witnesses. Klockner, Inc. v. Federal Wire Mill Corp., 663 F.2d 1370 (7th Cir.1981); Holbrook v. Institutional Ins. Co., 369 F.2d 236, 241-42 (7th Cir.1966). We are not bound by the district court's findings, however, when our review satisfies us that those findings are clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court, speaking to this standard of review in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948), stated that [a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. at 395, 68 S.Ct. at 542. Our review of the record convinces us that such a mistake has been made here. 19 The evidence in this case is inconsistent with the district court's finding that Lee met his burden of proving even a prima facie case of racial discrimination. It is undisputed that Lee belongs to a racial minority. Also undisputed is that National Can continued to seek journeyman machinists after June 7, 1977, the date Lee was refused employment. Proof of a Title VII violation, however, requires more. 20 In Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 2319, 68 L.Ed.2d 842 (1981), the District of Columbia Circuit noted that: 21 In the guidelines for a prima facie case McDonnell Douglas suggested one critical element for evaluating Title VII claims of employment discrimination. That factor is one of adequate qualification for the job on the part of the complainant employee. Qualification on the part of the employee, then, would seem to be almost indispensable to a Title VII violation. 22 Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d at 116 (footnotes omitted). 5 The record in this case lends no credence to the district court's finding that Lee was qualified to work as a journeyman machinist. 23 National Can was seeking employees who were skilled in the operation of a variety of machines including lathes, grinders, and drill presses. Lee's witnesses, however, testified to his competency in operating only two types of machines: milling machines and jig boring machines. 24 Lee's employment history further undercuts his contention that he is qualified as a journeyman machinist. This history is characterized by extended periods of unemployment, short-term jobs, and numerous firings. The district court chose to overlook Lee's unsatisfactory employment work record in finding that Lee was qualified for the position at National Can. 6 In doing so, however, the district court went beyond the record in this case--noting that many people are discharged wrongfully for discriminatory reasons. Nothing in the record supports the district court's sub silentio conclusion that racial discrimination explains away Lee's inability to hold a job. 7 25 Title VII does not compel employers to hire unqualified applicants with questionable employment histories. The Supreme Court described the policy underpinnings of Title VII in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, noting that [t]he broad, overriding interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions. 411 U.S. at 801, 93 S.Ct. at 1823. Neither the testimony of Lee's witnesses as to his qualifications, nor his employment history, supports a conclusion that Lee would have contributed to efficient and trustworthy workmanship at National Can. 26 On the record before us, then, we are forced to conclude that Lee failed to prove his qualifications, and thus failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination against National Can. 27