Opinion ID: 783508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Commerce Clause under Lopez and Morrison

Text: 12 Holston contends that the materials-in-commerce prong of § 2251(a) exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause in light of Lopez and Morrison. In these two decisions, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the proposition that the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001). Both Lopez and Morrison involved statutes that regulated local noneconomic activity under the theory that the activity, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce. 13 In Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V), which criminalized the knowing possession of a firearm within a school zone. 514 U.S. at 551, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Lopez court identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Court noted that the GFSZA would have to be sustained, if at all, as a category-three regulation, as it involved neither the channels nor the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See id. at 559, 115 S.Ct. 1624. 14 The Court observed, first, that § 922(q) was a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, id. at 561, 115 S.Ct. 1624, and thus could not be sustained under the Court's cases upholding regulations of activities that ... are connected with a commercial transaction that, when viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. Next, the Court noted that the statute contained no jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. Id. Finally, the Court noted the absence of congressional findings, which, although not required to sustain legislation, would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye. Id. at 563, 115 S.Ct. 1624. On this reasoning, the Court held the statute unconstitutional. See id. at 567-68, 115 S.Ct. 1624. 15 Five years later, the Court decided Morrison and struck down the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 529 U.S. at 616-17, 120 S.Ct. 1740. Elaborating on Lopez, the Court identified four factors to be considered in determining the existence of a substantial effect on commerce. They were whether: (1) the activity at which the statute is directed is commercial or economic in nature; (2) the statute contains an express jurisdictional element involving interstate activity that might limit its reach; (3) Congress has made specific findings regarding the effects of the prohibited activity on interstate commerce; and (4) the link between the prohibited conduct and a substantial effect on interstate commerce is attenuated. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610-12, 120 S.Ct. 1740. 16 Applying these principles to § 13981, the Court noted, first, that [g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. Id. at 613, 120 S.Ct. 1740. Further, § 13981 contained no jurisdictional element establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Id. The Court acknowledged that the provision was supported by numerous findings regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families, id. at 614, 120 S.Ct. 1740, but held that these findings were insufficient, especially when the methodology relied upon by Congress had been undermined by Lopez. See id. at 615, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Finally, the Court found that the link between gender-related violence and a substantial effect on interstate commerce was attenuated. See id. The Court accordingly held the provision insufficiently grounded in the Commerce Clause. See id. at 616-17, 115 S.Ct. 1624. 17