Opinion ID: 3033991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Condition O

Text: Condition O requires Ruvo/Fein to “obtain a decision from an appropriate court that, as of the date of [TRPA’s final approval of] the permit, the owners of the Fein parcels (APN 01-070-16 and 01-070-17) do not have a legal right to use the GHOA community pier independent of actions by GHOA.”2 The court below held that “the Fein parcels where the [Ruvo/ Fein] pier is to be located acquired access to the [GHOA] community pier through a reserved right as Glenbrook Properties’ successor in interest.” (Report at 28.) Because this holding was in error, we reverse. 2 The GHOA community pier is a multiple-use pier owned and maintained by the GHOA. The GHOA pier is near the location where Ruvo/ Fein proposes their pier. The Fein parcels’ access to the GHOA pier is relevant because, under TRPA rules, Fein may construct the Ruvo/Fein pier only if it qualifies as a multiple-use pier. The Ruvo/Fein pier may qualify as a multiple-use pier only if the Fein parcels lack a right of access to an existing multiple-use pier. 13568 GLENBROOK HOMEOWNERS v. TAHOE REGIONAL The lower court determined that the relevant issue was “not whether Fein, as an individual has the right to use the [GHOA] community pier, but whether the parcels [owned by Fein] where the [Ruvo/Fein] pier is to be located have the right to use the community pier.” (Id. at 26.) The Glenbrook Parties appeal this holding, arguing that the court’s inquiry should have been extended to the other Ruvo/Fein parties. However, given the text of Condition O (which is explicitly limited to Fein), and the TRPA Board’s finding that Condition O “of the Proposed permit require[s] the applicants to demonstrate . . . the Fein parcels did not acquire access to the [GHOA] pier,” as well as the TRPA’s Staff Summary which describes the decision required by Condition O as “a decision from an appropriate court that at least the Fein parcels do not have the legal right to access GHOA’s pier,” the Glenbrook Parties’ argument is without merit. Thus, the relevant question is whether the Fein parcels have an appurtenant right to use the GHOA pier. The lower court held that through two deeds “the Fein parcels where the [Ruvo/Fein] pier is to be located acquired access to the [GHOA] community pier through a reserved right as Glenbrook Properties’ successor in interest.” (Report at 28.) Because neither of these deeds conveyed a right appurtenant to the Fein parcels to use the GHOA Pier, we reverse.
The court below held that in a 1976 deed (“1976 Deed”) “Glenbrook Company conveyed to Glenbrook Properties, which included the Fein parcels, the right to use designated recreational Areas in Glenbrook for recreational purposes.” (Report at 26.) Ruvo/Fein argues this holding is erroneous because the 1976 Deed is void and, in any event, the Fein property was not conveyed in the deed. Ruvo/Fein is correct on both points. [5] Under the doctrine of merger, when a single owner “acquires present possessory fee simple title to both the servient GLENBROOK HOMEOWNERS v. TAHOE REGIONAL 13569 and dominant tenements [of an easement], the easement merges into the fee . . . and is terminated.” Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp., 858 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Nev. 1993). The 1976 Deed on which the court below relied created an easement, in favor of the dominant tenement described in Exhibit A, upon the servient tenement described in Exhibit C (the recreational areas owned by Glenbrook Company). However, in a March 1977 Deed, Glenbrook Properties reconveyed Exhibit A to Glenbrook Company who still owned the property in Exhibit C. Through the March 1977 Deed, Glenbrook Company “acquire[d] present possessory fee simple title to both the servient and dominant tenements” and the easement “merge[d] into the fee . . . and [was] terminated.” Id. Thus, the holding that the easement created a right appurtenant to Fein’s parcels was erroneous. Moreover, as is clear from the surveys in the record, the Fein parcels are not part of Exhibit A dominant tenement, but rather are part of the servient tenement described in Exhibit C. Even if the easement in the 1976 Deed had not been extinguished by merger, it still would not create any rights appurtenant to the Fein parcels to use the GHOA pier.
The GHOA pier was transferred to GHOA by Glenbrook Properties via a deed executed in 1987. Referring to this transfer, the court below stated, “[i]t is . . . undisputed that Glenbrook Properties conveyed the existing [GHOA] pier to GHOA by deed reserving the right to use the pier as follows: ‘RESERVING, HOWEVER, unto grantors, their successors and assigns, the right to use said property in common with others entitled to use the same.’ ” (Report at 26.) In analyzing the right of use that Glenbrook Properties retained upon the transfer of the pier to GHOA, the court noted: 13570 GLENBROOK HOMEOWNERS v. TAHOE REGIONAL The parties mischaracterize the status of the [GHOA] pier in discussing whether it is subject to an easement or a license. In the deed, Glenbrook Properties conveyed the community pier to GHOA and an easement [over Glenbrook Properties’ real property] to maintain the pier. It did not convey title to the real property underlying the pier. (Id. at 27.) Accordingly, the court held, “Although the pier is affixed to land, the conveyance severed the pier from any realty and the pier became the personal property of GHOA.” (Id. (citing Bohle v. Thompson, 554 A.2d 818, 823 (Md. App. 1989) for the proposition that an owner of both the realty and fixtures upon the realty may effect severance of the fixtures as personalty in a sales agreement)). Neither Ruvo/Fein nor the Glenbrook Parties appeal this holding. On the basis of the holding that the GHOA pier is personal property, the court below held, “[n]ecessarily, because the reserved right to use the pier was not an interest in land, nor a privilege to use land, the reserved right does not derive from an easement or license. Rather, the right is purely contractual.” (Report at 27.) Again, neither party appeals this holding. The court below concluded its analysis by stating, “[i]n determining what contractual rights were reserved, ‘[t]he preeminent rule of construction is to ascertain the intention of the contracting parties,’ ” and further reasoned, “the language in the [1987 Pier] deed reserving the right for ‘grantors, their successors and assigns’ to use the pier is clear and unambiguous on its face.” (Id. at 27-28. (quoting Great Am. Airways, Inc. v. Airport Auth. of Washoe County, 743 P.2d 628, 629 (Nev. 1987)). On the basis of these principles, the court concluded that “the Fein parcels where the [Ruvo/Fein] pier is to be located acquired access to the [GHOA] pier as Glenbrook Properties’ successor in interest.” (Report at 28.) Ruvo/Fein first argues that this conclusion is erroneous because Glenbrook Properties never assigned to Fein its GLENBROOK HOMEOWNERS v. TAHOE REGIONAL 13571 “purely contractual” interest in access to the pier. Second, Ruvo/Fein points out that because Glenbrook Properties’ right was purely contractual, even if it did assign the right, it would only benefit Fein, not the Fein parcels (the relevant inquiry under Condition O), and would not run with the land. Ruvo/ Fein’s assignments of error are accurate. [6] It is well-settled that personal contracts do not run with the land. See, e.g., CLS Mortgage, Inc. v. Bruno, 937 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wash. App. Div. 1997); Davis v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 429 P.2d 886, 887 (Wash. 1967); Pelser v. Gingold, 8 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Minn. 1943). Thus, although the deeds by which Fein purchased the parcels at issue in Condition O conveyed the parcels “TOGETHER with all tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances, including easements if any, thereto belonging or appertaining, and any reservations, remainders, rents, issues or profits thereof,” because the reserved right to use the pier was “purely contractual,” the reserved right clearly was not conveyed as a “tenement[ ], hereditament[ ], [or] appurtenance[ ]” belonging to the Fein parcels. In sum, because the 1987 Pier Deed created a purely contractual right between Glenbrook Properties and GHOA, the conveyance to Fein of real property together with the appurtenances thereto simply could not have effected an assignment of Glenbrook Properties’ separate contractual rights. Accordingly, the Fein parcels do not have a right to use the GHOA community pier.