Opinion ID: 494572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reuber's appeal

Text: 9 Reuber's most basic contention is that HHS violated Section 552a(e)(1) of the Privacy Act by keeping copies of the reprimand letter in its NCI records. 28 This section provides that each agency subject to the Act shall maintain in its records only such information about an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a legitimate agency purpose. 29 Reuber believes that NCI had no justifiable interest in such a personal letter of reprimand, since [t]he hiring, discipline and supervision of Litton employees was the responsibility of Litton, not the NCI. 30 Reuber further asserts that Litton's contract with NCI proscribed disclosure of the letter, and thus precluded any rightful interest of NCI. 31 10 The District Court granted summary judgment for HHS on this claim, 32 and we deem its decision perfectly sound. Litton was an important government contractor, and the controversy generated by Reuber, a Litton employee, enmeshed NCI in a scientific debate over the carcinogenicity of malathion and the reliability of NCI bioassays. Given NCI's unquestionable need to ensure public confidence in its work and to avoid public association with Reuber's private dissenting views, some assurance from Litton that the problem had been addressed and would not recur was certainly required. The reprimand letter was an excellent means of demonstrating to NCI Litton's awareness of the delicate circumstances and its commitment to better in-house discipline. We cannot say that retention of this information on file at NCI was irrelevant or unnecessary to a valid agency purpose. 11 Moreover, the contract between Litton and NCI did not prohibit communication to NCI of personnel decisions directly affecting it. Insofar as this contract bears on the controversy, it contained only a standard prescribed clause providing that confidential information ... of a personal nature about an individual could not be disclosed without the individual's consent. 33 Although the relevant HHS regulations indicate that this prohibition includes data ... generated by the contractor, 34 the intent of these regulations is to foreclose premature public dissemination by contractors of sensitive studies or research. 35 There is nothing in the administrative record to indicate that this clause was designed to prevent release to the contracting governmental agency of information important to it. 36 Indeed, the regulations specifically call for prior governmental approval when distribution of certain information is contemplated by the contractor. 37 The contract provision upon which Reuber relies in this connection simply does not cover Litton's disclosure to HHS of personnel decisions directly affecting the agency.
12 Closely related to Reuber's position on Section 552a(e)(1) is his assertion that HHS violated one of its own regulations, which imposes a general prohibition on internal distribution of documents. The regulation in question 38 authorizes intra-agency disclosure of an individual's records only when he consents in writing 39 or when the disclosure is made [t]o those officers and employees of [HHS] who have a need for the record in the performance of their duties. 40 Because NCI officials on the original distribution list of the reprimand letter made copies thereof for other concerned NCI employees, 41 Reuber insists that he is entitled to damages under the regulations. 42 13 Reuber's argument depends upon establishment of one of two propositions. He could have attempted to show that the NCI officials on the original distribution list had no need for the letter, in which event further dissemination to other NCI employees would have constituted a violation. 43 We have already approved, however, the District Court's conclusion that these NCI officials did have a work-related need for the letter, 44 and subsequent distribution would not be deemed unlawful on that account. 14 Alternatively, Reuber might have demonstrated that although the initial distribution was proper, the NCI employees who additionally received the letter did not themselves have any legitimate need for it. We have searched in vain for support on this point by Reuber. He makes the general assertion that the letter was not relevant or necessary to any NCI function, and NCI employees had no need for it, 45 but we can find no indication of any individual NCI staff member to whom release was improper. Reuber's claim must fail on this account as well. 46
15 Reuber next contends that the censorious letter constituted ... a determination by NCI to reprimand him, 47 and that this determination in turn was based upon a number of NCI record documents that were inaccurate and irrelevant. 48 According to Reuber, NCI thereby transgressed Section 552a(e)(5) of the Privacy Act, which provides that each agency shall maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination. 49 16 The District Court stated unequivocally that [t]he ... letter [of reprimand] itself did not represent an NCI determination. 50 The decision to reprimand Reuber was made by Hanna, a Litton official, who also gauged its severity. 51 The District Court thus found no agency action, without which no claim lies under Subsection (e)(5). 17 Reuber nonetheless divines some ambiguity in the court's finding and invites us to adopt his reading of the court's opinion, which is that Hanna simply effectuated an NCI determination. This argument is strained at best; the District Court left no doubt that it fully intended to rule against Reuber on this score. The court's finding is far from clearly erroneous, and we accordingly affirm it.
18 Reuber also asserts a claim of disclosure of the reprimand letter to persons outside HHS. Section 552a(e)(6) prohibits such a dissemination unless reasonable efforts are made to ensure the accuracy of the records. 52 Reuber insists that possession of the letter by outside parties and its appearance on a public EPA bulletin board lead ineluctably to the conclusion that NCI breached its duties under the Privacy Act. 53 We disagree. 19 In the District Court proceedings, Reuber relied on circumstantial evidence in an effort to show that Dr. Hartwell of NCI was the likely source of the leak; he theorized that Hartwell must have been the anonymous sender of the packet mysteriously received by Dr. Hollis of NACA. After carefully examining the evidence and assessing the credibility of the witnesses, however, the District Court held that Reuber had not carried his burden of showing that NCI, rather than Litton or someone else, was responsible for disseminating the letter. 54 20 Reuber's argument on appeal is simply a restatement of his view of the evidence. 55 Our standard of review, however, demands detection of a clear error on the part of the District Court, and does not permit us to reexamine and overturn factual findings simply on the basis of a litigant's alternative version of the truth. 56 Perhaps anticipating our unwillingness to engage in untrammeled de novo review, Reuber invites us to shift the burden of proof on this issue to the agency. 57 We are aware of no authority for such a maneuver, 58 and we therefore must affirm the findings of the District Court. 59 21 Reuber also contends that he should have been awarded damages for EPA's maintenance of the letter on a public bulletin board. 60 This argument is fraught with deficiencies, perhaps the most serious of which is Reuber's failure to demonstrate any adverse effect therefrom. Given that Reuber argued in the District Court that the letter did not appear on the bulletin board, 61 this shortcoming is not surprising, but it is nonetheless fatal. 62 22
23 The most troubling claim advanced by Reuber is that HHS, by retaining the reprimand letter in its NCI files, contravened Section 552a(e)(7). 63 This section specifies that affected agencies shall maintain no record describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity. 64 Reuber maintains that the letter of reprimand, because it in part discussed publication of his malathion research, constitutes just such a proscribed record. 24 The District Court dismissed this contention holding that Reuber had no first amendment right to dispute NCI bioassays without either getting NCI clearance or insuring that his views would not be taken for those of NCI. Plainly he had a right to speak out on malathion, but not in the manner described in the ... letter. 65 The court thus found the letter to be outside the scope of Subsection (e)(7). 66 25 We think the District Court focused prematurely on whether Reuber's communications commanded constitutional protection. The relevant question is not whether rights secured by the First Amendment have been invaded but whether the agencies kept a record on how such rights were exercised. The threshold inquiry under Subsection (e)(7) is whether the agency maintains a record describing activity of the subject potentially implicating the First Amendment; 67 only if so will courts proceed to determine whether the activity depicted therein merits constitutional protection. 68 When that approach is utilized, Reuber's claim stumbles at the starting gate, for the letter of reprimand does not amount to a proscribed record of expressional speech activity. 69 26 The term record is defined in the Privacy Act as encompassing any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency ... and contains his name[,] ... identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular.... 70 Since the letter clearly identifies Reuber by name and address, 71 it unmistakably constitutes a record for Privacy Act purposes. 27 The next step under Subsection (e)(7) is to determine whether the record describe[s] how Reuber engaged in First Amendment activity. 72 Since Congress has not elaborated upon this critical phase of the injury, we look to judicial precedents for guidance. In Albright I, 73 we considered Subsection (e)(7)'s applicability to a videotape made during a meeting attended by Social Security Administration analysts. The videotape, which depicted the employees strenuously objecting to agency policies, ostensibly was to be used to explain to analysts not in attendance what had transpired at the meeting. 74 We held that the videotape was a record of the exercise of First Amendment rights, and its creation violates subsection (e)(7). 75 We emphasized that the videotape showed employees complaining to their employer about work-related grievances, 76 an activity clearly within the First Amendment's scope. 77 Beyond peradventure, it was the portrayal of the employees airing their grievances that was the gravamen of the violation of Subsection (e)(7). 28 In Clarkson v. IRS, 78 there was a challenge to a practice of the Internal Revenue Service of maintaining surveillance reports, newsletters, and press accounts documenting Clarkson's disenchantment with federal taxation. 79 The Eleventh Circuit declared that it cannot be disputed that memoranda reflecting the contents of Clarkson's political speech would be subject to First Amendment protection, 80 and held that to the extent that the IRS has engaged in the practice of collecting protected information unrelated to law enforcement, subsection (e)(7) of the Act has been violated. 81 29 Perhaps more to the point is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Boyd v. Secretary of the Navy. 82 Boyd, a civilian employee of the Navy, sent letters to his supervisors complaining about training programs, 83 and on one occasion sent a letter directly to his department head. His supervisors drafted a memorandum remonstrating him for bypassing the normal chain of command and placed a copy of the reprimand in his personnel file. 84 The court, addressing Boyd's claim that the memorandum was an infringement of Subsection (e)(7), held that the memorandum did not implicate Boyd's First Amendment right, in part because [t]he memorandum did not discuss the contents of his prior memos.... 85 30 It is in this important regard that Reuber's claim must fail. There is no question that Reuber engaged in communicative activity when he formulated and disseminated his views on the carcinogenicity of malathion, nor is there doubt that it was this activity that precipitated the rebuke by his employer. 86 But the sole record maintained by agencies functioning under the strictures of the Privacy Act--the letter of reprimand itself--makes but scant reference to the specifics of these underlying events. To be sure the letter reveals that Hanna was bitterly disappointed with Reuber's putative indiscretions, and believed that substantial injury would flow therefrom. 87 But the letter makes not a single reference to the content of Reuber's position on malathion, and only vague allusions to the manner in which he expressed his views. Since the letter does not describe how Reuber engaged in arguably protected activity, its retention by the agencies did not run afoul of the proscription of Subsection (e)(7). 88 31 There is, too, another ground demanding denial of Reuber's claim under Subsection (e)(7). The Privacy Act authorizes an award for damages under that subsection only for an intentional or willful agency violation. 89 The degree of culpability required is somewhat greater than gross negligence; 90 damages will be assessed against an agency for committing [an] act without grounds for believing it to be lawful, or ... flagrantly disregarding others' rights under the Act. 91 Reuber points out that the District Court made no findings respecting intentional or willful conduct, and suggests that we either remand for such findings or declare the agencies' putative transgressions intentional or willful as a matter of law. 92 We hold, instead, that the record falls short of establishing unlawful intent or willfulness. There is no evidence tending to show that the agencies' maintenance of the letter was anything other than a good-faith effort to preserve an unsolicited and possibly useful piece of information. This absence of proof leads us to conclude that the actions of the Government in this case, however disjointed or confused, were neither willful nor deliberate in the sense demanded by the Privacy Act, 93 thus Rebuer's (e)(7) claim must fail. 94