Opinion ID: 2449444
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trooper Williams's Further Detention of Mr. Morris Was Reasonable

Text: ¶ 18 Having concluded that the traffic stop was justified at its inception, we now examine the scope of the remainder of the detention. We have previously stated that [o]nce a traffic stop is made, the detention `must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' [17] Both the length and [the] scope of the detention must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. [18] If during the encounter, new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity arises, an officer may temporarily detain the driver. However, the scope of the stop is still limited, and officers must diligently [pursue] a means of investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. [19] ¶ 19 The court of appeals concluded that Trooper Williams's detention of Mr. Morris exceeded a lawful scope. The court of appeals held that a police detention is no longer justified as soon as the exception initially justifying the intrusion is absent. [20] Trooper Williams's original reasonable suspicion was related to the validity of the car's registration and this concern disappeared when the Trooper spotted Mr. Morris's temporary registration tag. The court of appeals reasoned that once reasonable suspicion was lost, any contact with the driver was unreasonable. Thus, the Trooper's approach, acceptance of Mr. Morris's identification, registration, and proof of insurance, along with his decision to question Mr. Morris `exceeded the limits of a lawful investigative detention and violated the Fourth Amendment.' [21] ¶ 20 Under the court of appeals' holding, if a police officer is objectively mistaken as to the facts forming the basis for reasonable articulable suspicion, the officer may not come into contact with the driver to explain his mistake. Instead, he must wave the car on or simply drive away without any further communication. Although the court of appeals recognized its holding could lead to momentary motorist confusion and individual bewilderment, it reasoned that promotion of police politeness was not a significant enough concern to outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share in having their constitutional rights fully protected. [22] ¶ 21 While we agree that an individual's constitutional rights must be fully protected, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Mr. Morris's constitutional rights were violated during the traffic stop. Although we have examined the constitutional parameters of many traffic stops in the past, we have never squarely addressed the question of what an officer may lawfully do after discovering that the reason for his traffic stop was erroneous. For analytical clarity, we approach this issue by examining the Trooper's conduct in two stages. We first discuss the Trooper's decision to approach the driver to explain the mistaken grounds for his reasonable suspicion. We then consider the Trooper's actions after the explanation is offered. For the reasons explained below, we ultimately conclude that in both instances, the Trooper's conduct was constitutionally reasonable.