Opinion ID: 2979559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Molony’s expert witness testimony

Text: Schneider claims that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Molony’s expert witness, Dr. Jennings, to testify regarding the standard of care when, during discovery, Benton disclosed to the court and Metz that the subject matter of Jennings’s testimony would only cover damages and not standard of care. Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires parties to disclose to each other the names of expert witnesses retained to provide expert testimony and “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Dr. Jennings testified about more than just Schneider’s damages when he stated that: (1) physicians always perform a risk/benefit analysis before prescribing treatment; (2) physicians use “guidelines” to determine which kind of treatment is appropriate in a given case; and (3) sometimes physicians encounter situations that require them to go beyond the recommendations of a guideline. Allowing this testimony might have been an abuse of discretion by the district court, but none of this testimony affected Schneider’s substantial rights at trial. No. 09-5156 Schneider v. Molony Page 6 Jennings’s statements concerning standard of care were not surprising revelations. To the contrary, his statements described practices employed by almost any human being in daily life—weighing costs versus benefits when making decisions, consulting the normal approach taken in a certain situation, considering a variance from the normal approach when necessary. Cf. King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 900-901 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony regarding highly technical, specialized car parts that was unlikely commonly known to a lay jury because the testimony exceeded scope of expert reports and opposing party was prevented from preparing for this “surprise” testimony). Indeed, almost any adolescent Eagle Scout would know these maxims, and we have confidence that the jury would have as well, even without Jennings’s testimony. Therefore, these statements were not prejudicial. Schneider also claims that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Jennings to testify that he thought Schneider’s bone density was probably close to normal based upon bone density measurements included in Schneider’s records. This testimony, however, directly concerns Schneider’s damages—his osteopenia. Thus, this testimony was in line with the scope of testimony expected by Metz and the court. Accordingly, reversal is unwarranted here because any errors regarding Jennings’s testimony did not affect Schneider’s substantial rights.