Opinion ID: 201833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Delegation of Sentencing Authority.

Text: 56 As a final matter, Sánchez and Cruz assert that the district court improperly delegated its sentencing authority when it imposed a supervised release condition that allowed a probation officer to determine the number of drug tests that would be conducted during their respective periods of supervised release and to decide what should happen if either tested positive (that is, whether enrollment in a substance abuse treatment program would be required). 10 Because neither Sánchez nor Cruz objected to the supervised release conditions at sentencing, their current objections engender plain error review. United States v. Padilla, 415 F.3d 211, 218 (1st Cir.2005) (en banc). 57 There is a procedural twist. The government confessed error on both points in its brief and indicated that it would acquiesce in a remand. A concession by either party in a criminal case as to a legal conclusion is not binding on an appellate court. See United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1178 n. 14 (9th Cir.1999). Here, the government's concessions rested on our decision in United States v. Mel©ndez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 102-06 (1st Cir.2003) — a decision that has since been overruled in relevant part. See Padilla, 415 F.3d at 215. Given these unusual circumstances, we will not hold the government to its concessions, but, rather, will examine the issues afresh. See, e.g., United States v. Resendiz-Patino, 420 F.3d 1177, ___ (10th Cir.2005) (disregarding concession when government was too quick to concede the point). 58 To begin, we acknowledge that the sentencing court erred in structuring the disputed supervised release condition vis-à-vis the number of drug tests. In Mel©ndez-Santana, we held, as to the first disputed condition, that a sentencing court's delegation of discretion to a probation officer to determine the number of drug tests that a defendant must undergo, without capping that number, constituted a delegation error. 353 F.3d at 102-06 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)). The en banc decision in Padilla left intact that holding and, thus, the error satisfies the first two prongs of the plain error test. See Padilla, 415 F.3d at 217-18. 59 However, we overruled the automatic reversal rule of Mel©ndez-Santana and substituted conventional plain error review. See id. at 219-20. Upon undertaking that analysis, we held that the delegation error neither affected the defendant's substantial rights nor seriously impugned the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 220-23. Thus, the error did not warrant correction. Id. at 224. 60 For essentially the same reasons, we find no reversible error here. For Sánchez and Cruz to show that their supervised release conditions affected their substantial rights, they must point to circumstances indicating a reasonable probability that the trial court, but for the error, would have imposed a different, more favorable sentence. Id. at 221 (citing Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 75). As to the number of drug tests, this showing is nearly impossible because we can neither know what limit the trial court would have set on drug testing nor know the number of tests the probation officer will prescribe. Id. A fortiori, there is no reasonable probability that, but for the delegation error, the supervised release conditions would have operated more favorably. 61 To cinch matters, the delegation error vis-à-vis the number of drug tests is, as in Padilla, simply not of such magnitude or consequence that it would undermine faith in the judicial system were it to stand uncorrected. Id. That the authority to cap the number of drug tests lies with a judge and not a probation officer reflects a legislative choice, not a constitutionally grounded right. See id. at 222. In addition, the error's effects are limited by statute: should the probation officer require an inordinate number of tests, a defendant is free to invoke 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), which permits a court to modify the conditions of supervised release at any time. See Padilla, 415 F.3d at 223. 62 This leaves the condition that gives the probation officer discretion to place a defendant in a substance abuse treatment program. Although the Padilla court did not specifically address that exact condition, its reasoning and result extend to it. We continue to recognize that the treatment condition constitutes a delegation error. See Mel©ndez-Santana, 353 F.3d at 101. We find, however, that the error fails the third and fourth prongs of the plain error test. 63 We will not tarry. Suffice it to say that we encounter grave uncertainty in attempting to divine whether the sentencing court would be more or less likely to require substance abuse treatment than the probation officer, so the error cannot be said to affect substantial rights. See Padilla, 415 F.3d at 221. Moreover, the authority of the court to impose the treatment condition derives from a policy choice memorialized in the sentencing guidelines, not from any sort of fundamental interest in fairness. See USSG § 5D1.3(d)(4) (allowing the sentencing court to include a [supervised release] condition requiring the defendant to participate in a program . . . for substance abuse). Thus, allowing the probation officer, as opposed to the court, to make the determination does not call into question the integrity of the proceedings. See Padilla, 415 F.3d at 222. 64 The bottom line is that we should not waste scarce judicial resources by seeking to rescue forfeited errors of no importance, encouraging more such claims and more wasted time in the future. Id. at 225 (Boudin, C.J., concurring). A remand in this case to correct the modest imperfections in the supervised release conditions would be a theft of [judicial] time from cases where the dispute really matters. Id. We must respect the procedural constraints of plain error review and take a practical, common sense approach to determining which few forfeited errors merit correction.