Opinion ID: 776367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Expert Testimony of DEA Agent

Text: 17 Special Agent Debbie Podkoa, a veteran of the DEA with sixteen years of experience, investigated the Rodriguez house on the day after Amezcua was arrested. At trial she testified that (1) the house contained a large-scale methamphetamine lab requiring the participation of numerous workers and that (2) as a typical method of operation, large-scale manufacturers of methamphetamine do not allow uninvolved persons near their operations because of fear of theft. On appeal, Amezcua argued that this testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Because no objection was made to the DEA agent's testimony at trial, we may not give relief on this ground unless plain error is shown. United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir.1999). To review for plain error, Amezcua must establish error that was clear or obvious and affected his substantial rights. Id. Even after that showing is made, we then will exercise discretion to correct an error only if it seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 18 As a general rule, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R.Evid. 401. As a more specific rule, pertinent here, it is commonplace that expert testimony regarding the structure of criminal enterprises is admissible to help the jury assess a defendant's involvement in that enterprise. See United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1458 (9th Cir.1987). Government agents or other persons may testify as to the general practices of criminals to establish the defendants' modus operandi. United States v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.1984). This evidence helps the jury to understand complex criminal activities, and alerts it to the possibility that combinations of seemingly innocuous events may indicate criminal behavior. Id. 4 19 Even when expert testimony is otherwise relevant and admissible, this evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ... Fed. R.Evid. 403. Amezcua makes no particularized argument on prejudice but merely combines his argument that the expert testimony was irrelevant with an assertion of prejudice. He is incorrect on both relevance and undue prejudice. 20 Here, the jury was presented with specific and detailed evidence on the structure and scope of the methamphetamine lab operations at the Valencia-Rodriguez house. They were tasked with a duty to decide whether Amezcua was involved or was merely an unknowing visitor. Agent Podkoa's general testimony on the aversion of large-scale methamphetamine producers to allow unaffiliated individuals near clandestine operations was relevant to help the jury form a true and correct picture of the facts. 21 The admissibility of this expert testimony is persuasively supported by our several prior decisions endorsing the admission of modus operandi testimony and in particular those suggesting that drug traffickers generally do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters. United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1176-77 (9th Cir.2001); United States v. Alatorre, 222 F.3d 1098, 1104, n. 8 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 718-19 (9th Cir.2000) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1016 (9th Cir.2001), amended by 246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2001). We see no reason to disallow similar modus operandi testimony concerning the general structure and organization of large-scale methamphetamine labs where the defendant (1) claims to be an unknowing visitor to a house used for the large-scale manufacture of methamphetamine; (2) was positioned adjacent to a secret drug production facility; and (3) appeared to be cooperating to hide its presence. Agent Podkoa's expert testimony was relevant to show general modus operandi for methamphetamine labs, was probative of Amezcua's guilt from participation in the methamphetamine lab, and cannot be considered to be unduly prejudicial. 22 Amezcua erroneously argues that our decision in United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir.2001), amended by 246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.2001), requires in every case the exclusion of expert testimony on the structure of drug organizations where, as here, the defendant is not charged with conspiracy. Amezcua misreads Vallejo and is wrong because Vallejo expressly approved admissibility of modus operandi testimony. 5 Id at 1016. 23 Agent Podkoa's testimony was directly relevant to rebut Amezcua's assertion that, although he was discovered adjacent to a secret methamphetamine lab at the Valencia-Rodriguez house, he had nothing to do with the drug production activities that occurred there. Agent Podkoa's expert testimony was admissible, for such weight as the jury might give it, and the district court did not commit plain error by failing to exclude it.