Opinion ID: 1363940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: waiver of right to arbitrate

Text: MCDC asserts Sentry's acts in filing a petition for a prohibitory injunction allowing it to complete roof work are inconsistent with a right to arbitrate. It argues further that the prejudice resulting to it by Sentry's action constituted a waiver of arbitration. Sentry counters that the petition for injunction did not seek to litigate any issue raised by arbitration, but was simply an attempt to correct work complained of by MCDC. Federal decisions require a showing of prejudice when waiver is asserted. Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie , 389 F. (2d) 692, 696 (2d Cir.1968) holds that it is not inconsistency, but the presence or absence of prejudice which is determinative. In this context prejudice is undue burden on the objecting party, brought about by delay in the other party's making its demand for arbitration. Batson Yarn and Fabrics Machinery Group, Inc. v. Saurer-Alma GmbH-Allgauer Maschinenbau , 311 F. Supp. 68 (D.S.C. 1970); Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co. , 269 S.C. 631, 239 S.E. (2d) 647 (1977). MCDC shows no prejudice by delay, only the inconvenience of litigating the petition for injunction. [W]aiver may not be inferred from the fact that a party does not rely exclusively on the arbitration provisions of a contract, but attempts to meet all issues raised in litigation between it and another party to the agreement. Germany v. River Terminal Ry. Co. , 477 F. (2d) 546, 547 (6th Cir.1973). Sentry at all times sought to enforce its right to arbitrate under the contract; it is clear it had no intention to waive the right, and no waiver is shown.