Opinion ID: 2032067
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: comparative negligence and the structural work act

Text: Sachs requests that, if it is liable, this court apply the principles of comparative negligence to the conduct of Simmons in this Structural Work Act action. Inconsistent decisions have been reached on the applicability of comparative negligence to the conduct of a workman injured as a result of a faulty scaffold. (Compare Schmidt v. First Bank Builders (1984), appeal granted, No. 60644 (circuit court allowed inclusion of defense of comparative negligence in Structural Work Act Claim), with Prewein v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 687, appeal granted, No. 60182 (holding that comparative negligence did not apply to the conduct of a workman's claim under the Structural Work Act).) Sachs argues that our recent holdings incorporating the principles of comparative negligence into the fabric of tort law (see Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 1; Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1; Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill.2d 104; Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill.2d 1) should be expanded to include an action under a safety statute. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 1, was this court's first recent application of the doctrine of contribution. That case, in which there was a claim of strict liability, applied the theory of comparative fault as a basis for contribution as between two defendants who were equally unintentionally responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The court in Skinner reasoned that it was inequitable to place the entire burden of the loss on a single defendant when another defendant was also at fault. This equitable doctrine was expanded in Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, this court's next major decision in this tort area. The holding that comparative negligence should be applied in place of contributory negligence was premised on the inequitable results in negligence actions where contributory negligence was available as a defense and a minor amount of fault on the part of the plaintiff doomed his otherwise worthy claim. The Alvis decision pointed out that contributory negligence was a court-promulgated doctrine and therefore the court could replace it with comparative negligence. Alvis was followed by Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill.2d 104, which extended comparative negligence by applying it to strict liability actions. This was also a change in a judicially created doctrine and was adopted because application of comparative fault principles in strict products liability actions would not frustrate this court's fundamental reasons for adopting strict products liability   . ( Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. (1983), 97 Ill.2d 104, 116.) Sachs contends that here, as in Coney, applying comparative negligence would not frustrate the fundamental reasons for the legislature's determination that contributory negligence, a defense in other negligence actions at the time the Act was adopted, would not be available to a defendant in actions under the Act. Our most recent decision applying the principles of comparative negligence, Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill.2d 1, held that the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 70, par. 301 et seq. ) was intended to codify our decision in Skinner, allowing for comparisons between joint tortfeasors. This application of the Contribution Act, Sachs argues, requires us to extend comparative negligence to safety statutes because it allows comparative negligence between joint tortfeasors in a statutory context. Sachs overlooks, however, that in Doyle comparative negligence was applied, as between the employer of the injured party and a third party whose automobile struck the injured party, to determine the extent to which each contributed to the injury. It did not apply to negligence, if any, on the part of the injured plaintiff. Consequently, in Doyle, we noted, fully aware of the trend already established in this area, that we venture no opinion here as to whether a defendant whose liability arises from a safety statute may be excused from paying damages to the extent that the injured plaintiff, rather than a third-party tortfeasor, was concurrently negligent. ( Doyle v. Rhodes (1984), 101 Ill.2d 1, 17.) The question we are now required to answer, whether the principles of comparative negligence apply to the conduct of the plaintiff whose claim arises under a safety statute, calls for an examination of the policies of the Act and our decisions concerning safety statutes. We first look to our opinion in Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co. (1981), 84 Ill.2d 461, which involved another safety statute, the Road Construction Injuries Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 121, par. 314.1 et seq. ), and required us to determine whether contributory negligence was a defense to claims brought under that statute. In holding that it was not, we noted that the legislature's use of the wilfullness standard of liability indicated an intention to foreclose the use of contributory negligence. We observed that this type of legislation fixes a broad and distinct exception from the general rule of contributory negligence. ( Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co. (1981), 84 Ill.2d 461, 466, citing Carterville Coal Co. v. Abbott (1899), 181 Ill. 495, 503.) Because the Act continues to present an exception to the presently prevailing common law principle that an injured person seeking recovery should be penalized to the extent of his own negligence, we hold that comparative negligence does not apply to the conduct of a workman who is eligible to rely upon the Act. Instead, the sole inquiry under the Act is an assessment of the defendant's culpability and not the plaintiff's conduct. Treating claims under the Act differently from common law actions does not conflict with our previous holdings which first allowed and then expanded the use of comparative negligence. It has been determined that the Structural Work Act protects work activities of a particularly hazardous nature and is designed to lessen the extent of the danger. [Citations.]    To effectuate this purpose a liberal construction has been adopted [citation] in order to afford `broad protection to working men.' [Citation.] ( Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1973), 55 Ill.2d 121, 127.) This statute is dissimilar to a common law remedy designed to compensate an injured party for the damage he has suffered because of the negligence of another and even to the protection afforded under the common law products liability doctrine, which is designed to compensate consumers injured by unsafe products. The purpose of this safety statute, like the one involved in Vegich, is to prevent accidents before they occur; failing that, to compensate those injured by extrahazardous but socially useful activities. ( Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co. (1981), 84 Ill.2d 461, 467; see also Davis v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 494, 498.) [I]t is apparent that the act was intended to remove fault of the employee as a defense and place full responsibility on the `person in charge' who knowingly violated the act. ( Bryntesen v. Carroll Construction Co. (1963), 27 Ill.2d 566, 569.) Applying comparative negligence would be inconsistent with the legislature's intent, which was to provide full compensation for their injuries for workmen covered by the Act. In Vegich we advanced the idea that a person injured as the result of the violation of a safety statute was entitled to have his injuries fully compensated. When the statutory purpose of prevention is frustrated by a wilful violation and an accident follows, the full burden of the loss must be laid on the wrongdoer, even if the victim was himself negligent. The Road Construction Injuries Act is no exception. As one commentator has put it, `[T]he dominant legislative purpose of the Construction Injury Act is to protect and fully compensate persons injured by its violation.' Sinder, Chapter 121, Section 314.1 et seq.: Another Scaffold Act??? (1971), 59 Ill. Bar J. 842, 843. (Emphasis added.) ( Vegich v. McDougal Hartmann Co. (1981), 84 Ill.2d 461, 467.) The explanation for our conclusion in Vegich that contributory negligence was not applicable in the case of a safety statute is equally relevant to our conclusion here that comparative negligence is also inapplicable. Applying comparative negligence might result in a party injured by a violation of the Act being less than fully compensated for his injuries. Application of comparative negligence to the plaintiff's action conflicts with our established rules of statutory construction. In Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Ry. Co. (1961), 22 Ill.2d 305, 317, the court noted that we must apply the legal axiom that the words of a statute should be construed to give effect to the legislative intention, which must be ascertained not only from the language of the entire act, but from the evil to be remedied and the object to be attained. The Act, first passed as an exception to the common law, can only continue to remedy the evil envisioned by the legislature by excluding any consideration of the plaintiff's alleged fault. Otherwise, the Act would be indistinguishable from a common law construction negligence action. Comparative negligence must be disregarded so as to conform with the legislature's intent which was to afford complete protection for construction workers. Sachs also argues that it is entitled to implied indemnity or contribution from the plaintiff. Just as the plaintiff under the Act is not penalized for his own negligence, the statute also precludes any liability which might otherwise be passed on to him through an indemnity or contribution claim. To hold otherwise would conflict with the conclusion we reach on the use of comparative negligence and with the intent of the legislature when it passed the Structural Work Act. Cf. Flora v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Association (7th Cir.1982), 685 F.2d 209 (upholding the district court's denial of an injured workman's motion to strike the defendant's counterclaim for indemnification against him because he was the sole owner of the employer corporation, but noting that the Act provided protection for a plaintiff injured while working for a separate legal entity). Likewise, Sachs calls attention to the provision of the Act which makes [a]ny owner, contractor, sub-contractor, foreman or other person liable for injuries to workmen. (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 48, par. 69.) It argues that because foremen are specifically listed as parties liable for violations of the Act, Simmons, who was a foreman, is subject to being held accountable to Sachs under an indemnity theory. However, this construction would conflict with our analysis of the Act and its underlying purpose, which is the protection of workers, regardless of their title, engaged in hazardous activities which benefit society. As we read the Act, the use of the word foreman does not include a foreman when he, himself, is the injured workman. Union Electric also contends that the damage award of $219,000 to Simmons was excessive in light of the evidence presented to the circuit court. However, Sachs, the third-party appellant which will be required to satisfy the judgment, has not raised this issue either in its petition for leave to appeal or in its briefs. We therefore see no reason for considering it.