Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Special Factors Identified by the Majority

Text: The special factors cited by the majority fall into one of two general categories: those involving security, secrecy, and confidentiality, and those involving other policy considerations. We turn to the latter category first, briefly summarizing each factor as the majority describes it and then setting forth our view of the factor's weight.
 This action asks for damages, but it functionally operates as a constitutional challenge to the policies promulgated by the executive. Supra at 574. We should hesitate to allow such an action to proceed because to do so would tacitly decide, id., that Bivens can subject federal officers to the kind of enterprise liability that was established for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), but has not been established for Bivens actions. This paraphrase sets forth the strongest argument (factor), we think, for denying a Bivens remedy to Arar. After Iqbal, it would be difficult to argue that Arar's complaint can survive as against defendants who are alleged to have been supervisors with, at most, knowledge of Arar's mistreatment. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; see also id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting). And to the extent that the United States remains a defendant, perhaps it should be dismissed for want of possible liability under Bivens too. But that does not dispose of the case against the lower-level defendants, such as Blackman, McElroy, and the Doe defendants, who are alleged to have personally undertaken purposeful unconstitutional actions against Arar. It also may be that to the extent actions against policymakers can be equated with lawsuits against policies, they may not survive Iqbal either. But while those championing Arar's case may in fact wish to challenge extraordinary rendition policy writ large, the relief Arar himself seeks is principally compensation for an unconstitutional implementation of that policy. That is what Bivens actions are for.  Actions for damages against federal officers who implement rendition policy implicate sovereign immunity concerns, by influenc[ing] government policy, prob[ing] government secrets, invad[ing] government interests, enmesh[ing] government lawyers, and... elicit[ing] government funds for settlement. Supra at 574.  Recognizing a Bivens action for Arar would entail a judicial assessment of the validity and rationale of rendition, which directly affect[s] significant diplomatic and national security concerns. Supra at 575. The concern here is in part one of separation of powers, see supra at 575, and in part one of institutional incompetence, see supra at 575. Aside from diplomatic and national security considerations, which we address below, this consideration applies to all civil rights actions. Bivens by its nature implicates government interests, enmeshes government lawyers, and elicits government funds for settlement. Bivens by its nature authorizes courts to invalidate exercises in executive power. A Bivens action, like any other civil rights action, is an attempt to hold members of the executive accountable for their allegedly unconstitutional acts, through the courts. If these special factors were persuasive grounds on which to deny Bivens actions, they would not only not be permitted in new contexts, they would not be permitted at all. Similarly, insofar as this Bivens action may influence executive policy, we doubt that that should be a factor counseling hesitation either. Civil rights actions influence policy: They make it more costly for executive officers to violate the Constitution. That is their point. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.). Finally, the majority suggests that [i]n the small number of contexts in which courts have implied a Bivens remedy, it has often been easy to identify both the line between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct, and the alternative course which officers should have pursued, a distinction [the majority says] may or may not amount to a special factor counseling hesitation in the implication of a Bivens remedy. Supra at 580. It should be noted to the contrary that in the two Supreme Court decisions that did extend a Bivens remedy in a new context, such identification was anything but easy. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), involved the line between constitutional and unconstitutional medical treatment and medical facilities in prisons, whose management the Supreme Court has found peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials  and thus outside of the competence of judges  and instructed courts to ordinarily defer to [prison officials'] expert judgment, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). And Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), addressed the line between constitutional and unconstitutional discrimination in public employment, which the Court later observed raises issues requiring decisions [that] are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify, Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2154, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). The factors relied upon by the majority that do not relate to secrecy or security therefore do not appear to us to counsel strongly against recognition of a Bivens remedy here. 2. Factors involving secrecy or security. The other special factors cited by the majority focus our attention on the ability of the executive to conduct the business of diplomacy and government in secret as necessary and to protect public and private security. It is beyond dispute that the judiciary must protect that concern. See, e.g., Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95 (2d Cir.2009). But inasmuch as there are established procedures for doing just that, we think treating that need as giving rise to special factors counseling hesitation is an unfortunate form of double counting. The problem can be, should be, and customarily is, dealt with case by case by employing the established procedures of the state-secrets doctrine, see id.; see also section VI, below, rather than by barring all such plaintiffs at the courtroom door without further inquiry.