Opinion ID: 1134803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Issue 4: Did the Prosecutor Commit Misconduct When He Asked Pirtle's Sister Whether She Killed Anybody After She was Coming Down from Drugs?

Text: In this issue and issue six, Pirtle asserts prosecutorial error denied his right to a fair trial. Both of Pirtle's claims fail. To prevail on a prosecutorial misconduct argument, the defendant must establish both improper conduct by the prosecutor and prejudicial effect. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 672, 904 P.2d 245 (citing State v. Furman, 122 Wash.2d 440, 455, 858 P.2d 1092 (1993)). Prejudice is established only if there is a substantial likelihood the instances of misconduct affected the jury's verdict. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 672, 904 P.2d 245 (citing State v. Evans, 96 Wash.2d 1, 5, 633 P.2d 83 (1981)). In a PRP, the petitioner must show actual and substantial prejudice by a violation of his or her constitutional rights or by a fundamental error of law. Cook, 114 Wash.2d at 810, 792 P.2d 506; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 303, 868 P.2d 835. Pirtle's first claim of prosecutorial misconduct involves a question the prosecutor asked Pirtle's sister during cross-examination. Following testimony that Pirtle and his sister had been drinking and partying together the night before the two slayings, the prosecutor asked, [a]fter you were coming down, Miss Pirtle, did you go out and kill anybody? RP at 2037. Immediately following this question, a defense objection was sustained and a curative instruction was given. Pirtle argues this question was so improper that one juror has recently explained that he based his verdicts in this case on this one question. Pirtle Brief at 106. To support this contention, Pirtle relies on Investigator Rick Hays' declaration that juror Bingle, who was interviewed by Hays, explained that this question `brought everything home' for him and helped him to reach the verdict in this case. Pirtle Brief at 106. The State, as part of its motion to strike hearsay and incompetent evidence, asks that this hearsay statement of Investigator Hays be stricken on two bases. First, the State contends this statement is incompetent evidence because cases have long established that a jury's thought process cannot be probed post-trial since it inheres in the verdict. State's Response at 44 n. 27 (citing Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wash.2d 836, 841-43, 376 P.2d 651, 379 P.2d 918 (1962)). Second, the juror in question filed a certificate stating that Pirtle's allegations on this point are false. Specifically, this juror stated: I did describe the testimony of Davida Pirtle to Hays as the turning point of the case; however, I stated that this was an indication of a point in time or milestone in the trial, as opposed to a reference to the statement itself or its specific content. .... At no time was there any indication that jurors had engaged in improper conduct nor did we consider any evidence not received in the courtroom. Respondent's Appendices, app. O (Certificate of Karl Bingle). Even if we were to consider the evidence presented by Pirtle, the question asked by the prosecutor was argumentative and, since the trial court appropriately sustained the objection and struck the query, Pirtle does not show that his entire trial was made unfair by this question. Pirtle's second claim asserting prosecutorial misconduct is addressed in issue six.