Opinion ID: 198945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the Arroyo Exception

Text: 12 The first question before us is whether the district court was correct in its determination that Negron's cause of action for wrongful discharge was not barred by Law 80. The legislature of Puerto Rico enacted Law 80 to alter the employment-at-will doctrine by providing a statutory remedy for employees terminated without just cause. Although Law 80 is recognized as the exclusive remedy for a wrongful discharge, it is subject to limited exceptions, only one of which is at issue today, the Arroyo exception. See generally Arroyo, 117 P.R. Offic. Trans. 49. 13 In Arroyo, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that Law 80 cannot operate to deprive the worker of the adequate remedies for effectively vindicating his constitutional rights. Id. at 76. Accordingly, the court concluded that dismissal of an employee who refused to submit to a polygraph test subverts a constitutional-ranking public policy. Id. In reaching this determination, the court explicitly relied on section 1 of the Puerto Rico Bill of Rights, which provides, [t]he dignity of the human being is inviolable . . . , and section 8, which provides, [e]very person has the right to the protection of law against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life. See id. at 69 (also discussing sections 7 and 16). 14 Only a few courts have had an opportunity to explore the constitutional policy exception articulated in Arroyo, see, e.g., In re El San Juan Hotel Corp., 149 B.R. 263, 273-74 (D.P.R. 1992), aff'd sub nom. Kagan v. El San Juan Hotel & Casino, 7 F.3d 218 (1st Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion), and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico did not directly address the scope of the exception again until 1998 in Segarra Hernandez v. Royal Bank of Puerto Rico, No. CE-94-499, slip op. offic. trans., 98 J.T.S. 37 (P.R. April 1, 1998). See also Santiago v. Western Digital Caribe, Inc., No. RE-91-129, slip. op. offic. trans. at 2, 98 J.T.S. 42, at 2 (P.R. Mar. 21, 1996) (referring to Arroyo exception when the dismissal has the purpose or effect of thwarting or defeating a clear public policy); Rodrguez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., No. RE-93-125, slip. op. offic. trans. at 9 n.11, 135 D.P.R. 500 (P.R. Mar. 18, 1994) (referring to Arroyo exception when discharge frustrates or subverts clear public policy, as, for example, those which allow the workers to vindicate their constitutional rights). In Segarra, the constitutional claim amounted to a charge of harassment based on a series of internal transfers and memoranda that the employee deemed offensive. After reviewing the evidence, the court held that her treatment did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because it did not involve[] the indiscriminate dissemination of private or personal information, unreasonably impinge[] on her personal or family tranquility, disseminate false or slanderous information, or limit Segarra Hernandez's faculty to make decisions about her private or family life. Segarra, slip op. offic. trans. at 12. 15 Here, the district court relied on both Arroyo and Segarra in determining that Negron could maintain her cause of action under Puerto Rico law because her discharge implicated a constitutional ranking public policy. Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A. Inc., No. 95-2478, slip op. at 3-4 (D.P.R. May 19, 1999) [hereinafter Opinion] (citing Arroyo, 117 D.P.R. 35, 65-66; Segarra, 98 J.T.S. 37). The court reasoned that Negron was exposed by her employer to a catch 22 situation, that is, either breach her duty under the code of ethics of her profession and run the risk of losing her license . . . or fight for her principles and still loose [sic] her job. Id. at 9. The court then concluded that placing an employee in such a precarious position is against the constitutional right [as guaranteed by the Constitution of Puerto Rico] of every worker to the protection against risks to their personal integrity in the workplace. Id. at 10. 16 The appellant contends that the district court improperly construed the constitutional exception, because despite the broad language of Arroyo, subsequent cases, particularly Segarra, have narrowly confinedthe exception to the core concerns of privacy. However, we find nothing in Segarra that limits the constitutional policy exception in the manner suggested by the appellant. Quite to the contrary, the Supreme Court discusses the exception in the same broad terms as it did in Arroyo, referring to the right of privacy and personal dignity, and the right to be protected against attacks on the honor and personal reputation. Segarra, slip op. offic. trans. at 5-7 (discussing sections 1 and 8 of the Puerto Rico Bill of Rights). To support its position, the appellant makes much of Segarra's discussion of a zone of individual autonomy in matters related to personal and family life -- for instance use of birth control, obtaining a divorce, protection from defamatory statements. Id. at 11-12. Indeed, the court used those examples, but solely to illustrate the weakness of Segarra's claim; by no means did the court confine the Arroyo exception to those examples. In fact, the court went on to suggest that under different circumstances a pattern of transfers and internal communications could create a climate of harassment that would violate a worker's constitutional rights, with the caveat that the employee must show that the employer's actions are not related to the normal workplace performance and that they constitute harmful attacks on the plaintiff's dignity and personal or family integrity. Id. at 15. 17 Applying the reasoning of Segarra to the case at hand, we conclude, consistent with the appellant's concession at oral argument, that a chemist's constitutional rights to privacy and dignity could be implicated if she were pressured to make illegal alterations to lab reports that would jeopardize her license or subject her to civil and criminal liability. Such a scenario would distinguish the appellant from an ordinary whistleblower who is terminated in retaliation for reporting illegal activities of others and has no constitutional protection. See In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 149 B.R. at 273-74 (declining to read Arroyo exception as a general public policy exception to protect whistleblowers). 2 Forcing an employee to choose between her employment and her profession, its code of ethics, and the law, is certainly a matter of personal integrity, and thus, the district court did not err in its legal determination that Negron's claim is within the constitutional policy exception to Law 80 created by Arroyo. Whether Negron's evidence supports such a claim or shows only that she suffered [a] mere feeling of uneasiness in the workplace due to some labor-management situation, as the appellant contends, is an entirely different question, to which we will now turn. Segarra, slip op. offic. trans. at 14. 18