Opinion ID: 2613228
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's references to securing a lawyer

Text: Midway during the March 28 interview, Officer McCarthy indicated (as he had already done several times during the interview) that murder charges would be brought against defendant. He replied that My mother will put out money for a high price lawyer out of New York. McCarthy asked for the name of defendant's lawyer, but he refused to furnish it, stating, I don't want you talking to my lawyer. Thereafter, following a discussion (initiated by defendant) of the possible penalties that might be imposed for the murders, including death or life without possibility of parole, defendant stated, Give me a minute, I might tell you something you want to hear. After a few moments of silence, defendant then said, Maybe I ought to talk to my lawyer, you might be bluffing, you might not have enough to charge murder. Officer McCarthy immediately asked defendant if he wanted to talk to a lawyer before answering more questions, and defendant simply repeated that he thought McCarthy was bluffing. He made no further mention of lawyers during this interview. Defendant contends that each of the foregoing references to lawyers invoked his right to counsel and should have induced the officers to terminate the interview. (8) The trial court ruled that defendant's initial remark regarding his mother securing a high price lawyer was not an expression of an intent to terminate the interview at that time, but instead related to a future trial and not to present questioning. We agree. The cases hold that if a defendant indicates in any manner that he wishes to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must cease. ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-707]; People v. Boyer, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 271.) The California courts have found invocations of the right to counsel in such varying statements or inquiries as `I don't know if I should have a lawyer here or what' ( People v. Russo, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d at p. 1177), `Do you think we need an attorney?' and `I guess we need a lawyer' ( People v. Superior Court ( Zolnay ) (hereafter Zolnay ) (1975) 15 Cal.3d 729, 735-736 [125 Cal. Rptr. 798, 542 P.2d 1390]), `Well, maybe I should talk to my attorney, Mr. Corbin' ( People v. Munoz (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 993, 995 [148 Cal. Rptr. 165]), and `Tell me the truth, wouldn't it be best if I had an attorney with me?' ( People v. Hinds, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d at p. 234.) Yet we have found no case suggesting that a suspect's statement concerning the possible retention of a lawyer for future proceedings would require termination of a police interrogation. (See Zolnay, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 736 [suspect's expressed need for attorney was immediate, not merely in the future (italics omitted)].) In our view, the trial court properly deemed defendant's statement mere bragging about his ability to secure high priced legal representation for future proceedings, and not a request to consult with an attorney during the present interrogation. This interpretation of defendant's remarks is reinforced by his refusal or inability to give Officer McCarthy the name of his lawyer. (9) Defendant's second remark, Maybe I ought to talk to a lawyer, is considerably more troublesome. The trial court ruled that the word maybe rendered the statement equivocal, and that in context the reference to a lawyer was not intended as an invocation of defendant's right to remain silent. Defendant's intent to continue the interview was confirmed by his failure to respond to McCarthy's immediate inquiry as to whether defendant wanted an attorney, and by defendant's subsequent request of McCarthy to Tell me what you have and I might make you a proposition. As previously indicated, the courts have found Miranda violations despite considerable equivocation by the defendant. We briefly review the apposite decisions. In Zolnay, supra, 15 Cal.3d at page 735, we observed that the suspect's question, `Do you think we [referring to himself and a codefendant] need an attorney?' and his statement, `I guess we need a lawyer,' were a direct result of the interrogation. The record discloses that the query interrupted the interrogation at a point when defendants' choice seemed all but limited to confession or silence. Moreover, defendants' subsequent specific request that the deputies recommend an attorney indicates both their continuing concern and their specific and pointed desire to consult counsel. We think the record discloses sufficient invocation of their right to remain silent. We stressed in Zolnay ( id. at p. 736) that `no particular form of words or conduct is necessary' to invoke the self-incrimination privilege. (Quoting from People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955.) The present case is factually distinguishable from Zolnay, supra, in several respects. Initially, on this record it is highly unlikely that defendant's reference to an attorney disclosed his confusion or uncertainty about continuing the interview. A reading of Officer McCarthy's notes of the interrogation reveals that from start to finish defendant maintained a confident, cocky attitude, verbally sparring with the officer, expressing doubts about the strength or admissibility of the evidence against him, negotiating with McCarthy for a possible reduced sentence, and bragging about his good looks, his various girlfriends, his ability to produce an alibi for any date you want, and his mother's ability to hire an expensive lawyer. As McCarthy noted, defendant appeared to almost relish[] his role as the focus of our attention.... Unlike the situation in Zolnay, supra, defendant never asked the deputies to recommend an attorney, and he declined to respond to McCarthy's attempts to learn his lawyer's name or to determine whether he in fact truly wanted to speak to an attorney. In People v. Munoz, supra, 83 Cal. App.3d 993, the officers took a robbery suspect to an interview room and began to interrogate him. As soon as the interrogating officer introduced himself, the suspect stated, Well, maybe I should talk to my attorney, Mr. Corbin. Rather than terminate the interview, the officer agreed that the suspect could talk to his attorney, but first the officer wanted to explain what information he had, and what he needed to learn. Eventually, the suspect confessed. The Munoz court, citing our Zolnay decision, supra, 15 Cal.3d 729, held that the continued interrogation was improper. The court noted that although the suspect's remark was ambiguous, it could be construed as an invocation of his right to speak to an attorney before questioning. (83 Cal. App.3d at p. 996.) The court also relied on the fact that the suspect had mentioned his attorney by name, indicating he already had retained counsel. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Hinds, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d 222, a murder suspect was arrested and interrogated after being advised of his Miranda rights. The suspect asked the officer, `Tell me the truth, wouldn't it be best if I had an attorney with me?' Rather than stop the interrogation, the officer indicated to the suspect that although this matter was for him to decide, the attorney would not be the one going to jail, possibly facing `first degree murder, special circumstances and the death penalty.' ( Id. at p. 231.) Eventually, the suspect admitted the killing. The Hinds court, explaining that `Ambiguous statements are to be construed as invocations ...,' found that the suspect's initial inquiry was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel. (154 Cal. App.3d at p. 235, quoting from People v. Duran (1983) 140 Cal. App.3d 485, 492 [189 Cal. Rptr. 595].) Hinds likewise is factually distinguishable, however, for the interrogating officer in that case, rather than attempt to clarify the suspect's ambiguous remark, improperly tried to dissuade him from terminating the interview. (See 154 Cal. App.3d at p. 235.) People v. Bestelmeyer, supra, 166 Cal. App.3d 520, 527-528, seems more closely on point. There, after the suspect was arrested for molesting his stepdaughter, the arresting officer gave Miranda warnings and commenced an interview. At the outset, after being told he could terminate the interview at any time, the suspect was asked by one officer what he was thinking. The suspect replied, `I was just thinkin', maybe I shouldn't say anything without a lawyer and then I thinkin' ahh.' ( Id. at p. 524.) The officer continued explaining to the suspect that he could waive his rights, agree to talk to the officers, and then reinvoke his rights and stop talking to them. The suspect made no further references to an attorney, and eventually he made incriminating statements. The Bestelmeyer court found that the suspect's initial remark was too ambiguous to amount to an invocation of his right to the presence of counsel, and that substantial evidence supported the lower court's finding that the suspect knowingly waived that right. (166 Cal. App.3d at pp. 527-528.) Turning to the present case, we think that in light of the whole record, including defendant's overall conduct and demeanor during the interrogation, the ambiguous and tentative nature of his reference to an attorney, Officer McCarthy's immediate attempt to clarify defendant's remark, and defendant's refusal to respond thereto, there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's determination that defendant did not invoke his right to counsel. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to determine whether the asserted Miranda error was prejudicial. (See pt. III. C.4.d., post. )