Opinion ID: 2584166
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretion To Waive the Transcript Filing Deadline

Text: The Coalition argues that the Assembly's prior policy of lenity should govern the Board of Adjustment's current application of the transcript filing deadline. The Hultquists counter that the Assembly's past practice was a mistake of law, not an exercise of discretion, and that the Board of Adjustment was correct in strictly applying the ordinance. Whether a party must strictly comply with a procedural rule, regulation, or statute turns on whether the language of the law is mandatory or directory. [9] If a statute is mandatory, strict compliance is required; if it is directory, substantial compliance is acceptable absent significant prejudice to the other party. [10] A statute is considered directory if (1) its wording is affirmative rather than prohibitive; (2) the legislative intent was to create guidelines for the orderly conduct of public business; and (3) serious, practical consequences would result if it were considered mandatory. [11] We conclude that the language of the ordinance at issue satisfies these criteria and hold that it is, therefore, directory. Anchorage Municipal Code 21.30.050(B) reads: The appellant shall arrange for the preparation of the transcript of the board hearing by a court reporter or the current board and commission recording secretary and shall pay the cost of such preparation. The appellant shall file the transcript with the municipal clerk. If the appellant fails to file the transcript within 30 days of the filing of the notice of appeal, the appeal shall be automatically denied. First, the ordinance's language is in no respect prohibitive; the ordinance assigns responsibility for the preparation and filing of the transcript, but never speaks to what the appellant, the municipal clerk, or the Board of Adjustment can or should not do. As to the second prong of the test, the language of the ordinance is more equivocal. The last clause of the provision, the appeal shall be automatically denied, arguably imposes a penalty on the appellant for failing to meet the filing deadline. Alternatively, this clause can be interpreted to be a ministerial directive guiding the municipal clerk's management of the case. Seen this way, the ordinance falls more squarely into that category of provisions intended to be guidelines for the orderly conduct of public business. [12] We favor this construction for several reasons. For one, the plain language of AMC 21.30.050 as a whole speaks directly to the duties of the municipal clerk rather than to the broader requirements for establishing the Board of Adjustment's ultimate jurisdiction over the case. [13] In other words, the task at issue here  namely the filing of a transcript  is set apart from the three steps an appellant must take to perfect an appeal to the Board of Adjustment: (1) file a notice of appeal; (2) pay an appeal fee; and (3) post a cost bond within twenty days of the Platting Board's final decision. [14] Once an appellant has accomplished these steps, jurisdiction over the appeal is conferred on the Board of Adjustment. The timely filing of a transcript has no bearing on this jurisdictional process; failure to meet the transcript filing deadline is simply a failure to follow guidelines for the orderly conduct of public business [15] that triggers another such guideline: automatic dismissal. A guideline of this kind should not irreversibly jeopardize the Board of Adjustment's jurisdiction to control the course of the appeal. The language of the provision does use the word shall, which, in its ordinary use, is an affirmative command that is often taken to be mandatory. [16] But we have held that in some contexts, namely in the absence of injury to the defendant and in the absence of a penalty for failure to comply with the statute, `shall' denotes simple futurity rather than a command. [17] In State v. Schnell, for example, we applied that rule to hold that a statute providing that [w]ithin 30 days after termination of the hearing, . . . the director shall make an order on hearing was directive, not mandatory, because the statute imposes no penalty or consequences for failing to rule timely. [18] We further noted that to read the statute as imposing an absolute bar on state action after the thirty-day period expired would lead to absurd and undesirable results. [19] In another case, we relied on Schnell to hold that a rule stating that a hearing committee will promptly schedule a hearing to take place within 30 days of the filing of the petition was directive. [20] In addition to the factors discussed in Schnell, we emphasized that the primary purpose of the time limits is merely to provide a broad set of guidelines for how the Hearing Committee . . . should proceed. [21] We likewise noted that serious, practical consequences were at stake in that a strict time limit in this context would fail to take into account the many common exigencies and contingencies of litigation and would clearly inhibit the discretion of the Hearing Committee to make adjustments for these or other similar events. [22] As in these cases, the primary purpose of the time limit at issue here is to set guidelines directing how the clerk should proceed when a timely transcript has not been filed. The deadline for filing briefs in platting board appeals starts with service of the record upon the parties. [23] A late-filed transcript  which is part of that record  merely delays the start of this thirty-day period; this does not necessarily prejudice an appellee in the presentation of a case, and the Hultquists have not advanced any specific claim of prejudice here. In our view, the primary purpose of the directive is to guide the clerk's orderly management of the case, not to impose a litigation-ending sanction on the appellant. The third prong of the test is also met here: serious practical consequences would result if the deadline were considered mandatory. To dismiss an appeal for failure to timely file a transcript, without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, would present procedural due process concerns. [24] Apart from amounting to an automatic litigation-ending sanction, [25] an unalterable consequence of this kind would inhibit the discretion of the Board of Adjustment to entertain potentially meritorious appeals. [26] As we have observed before, [i]t is always within the discretion of a court or an administrative agency to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted for the orderly transaction of business before it when in a given case the ends of justice require it. [27] Accordingly, we hold that the Board of Adjustment has the discretion to relax the filing deadline set forth in AMC 21.30.050(B) and to allow the appeal to proceed. [28]