Opinion ID: 4549553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court’s Dismissal of the Search

Text: Claims Based on the State Secrets Privilege As a threshold matter, before determining whether FISA displaces the state secrets privilege with regard to electronic surveillance, we first consider which of Plaintiffs’ claims might otherwise be subject to dismissal under the state secrets privilege. Although the Government expressly did not request dismissal of the Fourth Amendment and FISA claims based on the privilege, the district court nonetheless dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim on that basis. That was error. The Government must formally claim the Reynolds privilege. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7–8. The privilege is “not FAZAGA V. WALLS 53 simply an administrative formality” that may be asserted by any official. Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1080 (quoting United States v. W.R. Grace, 526 F.3d 499, 507–08 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Rather, the formal claim must be “lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter.” Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8. The claim must “reflect the certifying official’s personal judgment; responsibility for [asserting the privilege] may not be delegated to lesserranked officials.” Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1080. And the claim “must be presented in sufficient detail for the court to make an independent determination of the validity of the claim of privilege and the scope of the evidence subject to the privilege.” Id. Such unusually strict procedural requirements exist because “[t]he privilege ‘is not to be lightly invoked,’” especially when dismissal of the entire action is sought. Id. (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7). Here, although the Government has claimed the Reynolds privilege over certain state secrets, it has not sought dismissal of the Fourth Amendment and FISA claims based on its invocation of the privilege. In light of that position, the district court should not have dismissed those claims. In doing so, its decision was inconsistent with Jeppesen’s observation that, “[i]n evaluating the need for secrecy, ‘we acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena.’” 614 F.3d at 1081–82 (quoting Al-Haramain I, 507 F.3d at 1203). Just as the Executive is owed deference when it asserts that exclusion of the evidence or dismissal of the case is necessary to protect national security, so the Executive is necessarily also owed deference when it asserts that national security is not threatened by litigation. 54 FAZAGA V. WALLS Indeed, Jeppesen cautioned that courts should work “to ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted no more frequently and sweepingly than necessary.” Id. at 1082 (quoting Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Dismissing claims based on the privilege where the Government has expressly told the court it is not necessary to do so—and, in particular, invoking the privilege to dismiss, at the pleading stage, claims the Government has expressly told the court it need not dismiss on grounds of privilege—cuts directly against Jeppesen’s call for careful, limited application of the privilege. Although the Government Defendants expressly did not request dismissal of the search claims under the state secrets privilege, the Agent Defendants did so request. In declining to seek dismissal of the search claims based on the state secrets privilege, the Government explained: At least at this stage of the proceedings, sufficient non-privileged evidence may be available to litigate these claims should they otherwise survive motions to dismiss on non- privilege grounds. The FBI has previously disclosed in a separate criminal proceeding that Monteilh collected audio and video information for the FBI, and some of that audio and video information was produced in that prior case. The FBI has been reviewing additional audio and video collected by Monteilh for possible disclosure in connection with further proceedings on the issue of whether the FBI instructed or permitted Monteilh to leave recording devices unattended in order to collect non-consenting FAZAGA V. WALLS 55 communications. The FBI expects that the majority of the audio and video will be available in connection with further proceedings. Thus, while it remains possible that the need to protect properly privileged national security information might still foreclose litigation of these claims, at present the FBI and official capacity defendants do not seek to dismiss these claims based on the privilege assertion. The Agent Defendants note that the Government focuses on the public disclosure of recordings collected by Monteilh, and point out that Plaintiffs also challenge surveillance conducted without Monteilh’s involvement—namely, the planting of recording devices by FBI agents in Fazaga’s office and AbdelRahim’s home, car, and phone. Allegations concerning the planting of recording devices by FBI agents other than Monteilh, the Agent Defendants argue, are the “sources and methods” discussed in the Attorney General’s invocation of the privilege. The Agent Defendants thus maintain that because the Government’s reasons for not asserting the privilege over the search claims do not apply to all of the surveillance encompassed by the search claims, dismissal as to the search claims is in fact necessary. The Agent Defendants, however, are not uniquely subject to liability for the planted devices. The Fourth Amendment claim against the Government Defendants likewise applies to that category of surveillance. See infra Part III.A. The Agent Defendants—officials sued in their individual capacities—are not the protectors of the state secrets evidence; the Government is. Accordingly, and because the Agent Defendants have not identified a reason they specifically 56 FAZAGA V. WALLS require dismissal to protect against the harmful disclosure of state secrets where the Government does not, we decline to accept their argument that the Government’s dismissal defense must be expanded beyond the religion claims.24 In short, in determining sua sponte that particular claims warrant dismissal under the state secrets privilege, the district court erred. For these reasons, we will not extend FISA’s procedures to challenges to the lawfulness of electronic surveillance to the degree the Government agrees that such challenges may be litigated in accordance with ordinary adversarial procedures without compromising national security. C. FISA Displacement of the State Secrets Privilege Before the enactment of FISA in 1978, foreign intelligence surveillance and the treatment of evidence implicating state secrets were governed purely by federal common law. Federal courts develop common law “in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress.” City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981). “Federal common law is,” however, “a ‘necessary expedient’ and when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears.” Id. (citation omitted). Once “the field has been made the subject of 24 Although the Government may assert the state secrets privilege even when it is not a party to the case, see Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1080, we have not found—and the Agent Defendants have not cited—any case other than the one at hand in which a court granted dismissal under the privilege as to non-Government defendants, notwithstanding the Government’s assertion that the claims at issue may be litigated with nonprivileged information. FAZAGA V. WALLS 57 comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards,” federal common law no longer applies. Id. (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241 (10th Cir. 1971)). To displace federal common law, Congress need not “affirmatively proscribe[] the use of federal common law.” Id. at 315. Rather, “to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law.” United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). As we now explain, in enacting FISA, Congress displaced the common law dismissal remedy created by the Reynolds state secrets privilege as applied to electronic surveillance within FISA’s purview. 25 We have specifically held that because “the state secrets privilege is an evidentiary privilege rooted in federal common law . . . the relevant inquiry in deciding if [a statute] preempts the state secrets privilege is whether the statute ‘[speaks] directly to [the] question otherwise answered by federal common law.’” Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1167 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236–37 (1985)).26 Nonetheless, the Government maintains, in a vague and short paragraph in its brief, that Congress cannot displace the state secrets 25 Our holding concerns only the Reynolds privilege, not the Totten justiciability bar. 26 Applying this principle, Kasza concluded that section 6001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6961, did not preempt the state secrets privilege as to RCRA regulatory material, as “the state secrets privilege and § 6001 have different purposes.” 133 F.3d at 1168. 58 FAZAGA V. WALLS evidentiary privilege absent a clear statement, and that, because Plaintiffs cannot point to a clear statement, “principles of constitutional avoidance” require rejecting the conclusion that FISA’s procedures displace the dismissal remedy of the state secrets privilege with regard to electronic surveillance. In support of this proposition, the Government cites two out-of-circuit cases, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, and Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1991). ElMasri does not specify a clear statement rule; it speaks generally about the constitutional significance of the state secrets privilege, while recognizing its common law roots. 479 F.3d at 303–04. Armstrong holds generally that the clear statement rule must be applied “to statutes that significantly alter the balance between Congress and the President,” but does not apply that principle to the state secrets privilege. 924 F.2d at 289. So neither case is directly on point. Under our circuit’s case law, a clear statement in the sense of an explicit abrogation of the common law state secrets privilege is not required to decide that a statute displaces the privilege. Rather, if “the statute ‘[speaks] directly to [the] question otherwise answered by federal common law,’” that is sufficient. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1167 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Oneida, 470 U.S. at 236–37); see also Texas, 507 U.S. at 534. Although we, as a three-judge panel, could not hold otherwise, we would be inclined in any event to reject any clear statement rule more stringent than Kasza’s “speak directly to the question” requirement in this context. The state secrets privilege may have “a constitutional ‘core’ or constitutional ‘overtones,’” In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. FAZAGA V. WALLS 59 2d at 1124, but, at bottom, it is an evidentiary rule rooted in common law, not constitutional law. The Supreme Court has so emphasized, explaining that Reynolds “decided a purely evidentiary dispute by applying evidentiary rules.” Gen. Dynamics, 563 U.S. at 485. To require express abrogation, by name, of the state secrets privilege would be inconsistent with the evidentiary roots of the privilege. In any event, the text of FISA does speak quite directly to the question otherwise answered by the dismissal remedy sometimes required by the common law state secrets privilege. Titled “In camera and ex parte review by district court,” § 1806(f) provides: Whenever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of this section, or whenever a motion is made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, or whenever any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States or any State before any court or other authority of the United States or any State to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance under this chapter, the United States district court or, where the motion is made before another authority, the United States district court in the same district as the authority, shall, notwithstanding any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit under oath that 60 FAZAGA V. WALLS disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm the national security of the United States, review in camera and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials relating to the surveillance as may be necessary to determine whether the surveillance of the aggrieved person was lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this determination, the court may disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order, or other materials relating to the surveillance only where such disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (emphasis added). The phrase “notwithstanding any other law,” the several uses of the word “whenever,” and the command that courts “shall” use the § 1806(f) procedures to decide the lawfulness of the surveillance if the Attorney General asserts that national security is at risk, confirm Congress’s intent to make the in camera and ex parte procedure the exclusive procedure for evaluating evidence that threatens national security in the context of electronic surveillance-related determinations. Id. (emphasis added). That mandatory procedure necessarily overrides, on the one hand, the usual procedural rules precluding such severe compromises of the adversary process and, on the other, the state secrets evidentiary dismissal option. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 91 (1978) (“It is to be emphasized that, although a number of different procedures might be used to attack the legality of the FAZAGA V. WALLS 61 surveillance, it is the procedures set out in subsections (f) and (g) ‘notwithstanding any other law’ that must be used to resolve the question.”).27 The procedures set out in § 1806(f) are animated by the same concerns—threats to national security—that underlie the state secrets privilege. See Jeppesen, 614 F.3d at 1077, 1080. And they are triggered by a process—the filing of an affidavit under oath by the Attorney General—nearly identical to the process that triggers application of the state secrets privilege, a formal assertion by the head of the relevant department. See id. at 1080. In this sense, § 1806(f) “is, in effect, a ‘codification of the state secrets privilege for purposes of relevant cases under FISA, as modified to reflect Congress’s precise directive to the federal courts for the handling of [electronic surveillance] materials and information with purported national security implications.’” Jewel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (quoting In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1119); see also In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (holding that “the Reynolds protocol has no role where section 1806(f) applies”). That § 1806(f) requires in camera and ex parte review in the exact circumstance that could otherwise trigger dismissal of the case demonstrates that § 1806(f) supplies an alternative mechanism for the consideration of electronic state secrets evidence. Section 1806(f) therefore eliminates the need to dismiss the case entirely because of the absence of any legally sanctioned 27 Whether “notwithstanding” language in a given statute should be understood to supersede all otherwise applicable laws or read more narrowly to override only previously existing laws depends on the overall context of the statute. See United States v. Novak, 476 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Here, the distinction does not matter, as the Reynolds common law state secrets evidentiary privilege preceded the enactment of FISA. 62 FAZAGA V. WALLS mechanism for a major modification of ordinary judicial procedures—in camera, ex parte decisionmaking. This conclusion is consistent with the overall structure of FISA. FISA does not concern Congress and the President alone. Instead, the statute creates “a comprehensive, detailed program to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance in the domestic context.” In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1118. FISA “set[s] out in detail roles for all three branches of government, providing judicial and congressional oversight of the covert surveillance activities by the executive branch combined with measures to safeguard secrecy necessary to protect national security.” Id. at 1115. And it provides rules for the executive branch to follow in “undertak[ing] electronic surveillance and physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes in the domestic sphere.” Id. Moreover, FISA establishes a special court to hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance under certain circumstances. See 50 U.S.C. § 1803. FISA also includes a private civil enforcement mechanism, see id. § 1810, and sets out a procedure by which courts should consider evidence that could harm the country’s national security, see id. § 1806(f). The statute thus broadly involves the courts in the regulation of electronic surveillance relating to national security, while devising extraordinary, partially secret judicial procedures for carrying out that involvement. And Congress expressly declared that FISA, along with the domestic law enforcement electronic surveillance provisions of the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act, are “the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). FAZAGA V. WALLS 63 The legislative history of FISA confirms Congress’s intent to displace the remedy of dismissal for the common law state secrets privilege. FISA was enacted in response to “revelations that warrantless electronic surveillance in the name of national security ha[d] been seriously abused.” S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3908. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, a congressional task force formed in 1975 and known as the Church Committee, exposed the unlawful surveillance in a series of investigative reports. The Church Committee documented “a massive record of intelligence abuses over the years,” in which “the Government ha[d] collected, and then used improperly, huge amounts of information about the private lives, political beliefs and associations of numerous Americans.” S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755, at 290 (1976). The Committee concluded that these abuses had “undermined the constitutional rights of citizens . . . primarily because checks and balances designed by the framers of the Constitution to assure accountability [were not] applied.” Id. at 289. Urging “fundamental reform,” id. at 289, the Committee recommended legislation to “make clear to the Executive branch that it will not condone, and does not accept, any theory of inherent or implied authority to violate the Constitution,” id. at 297. Observing that the Executive would have “no such authority after Congress has . . . covered the field by enactment of a comprehensive legislative charter” that would “provide the exclusive legal authority for domestic security activities,” id. at 297, the Committee recommended that Congress create civil remedies for unlawful surveillance, 64 FAZAGA V. WALLS both to “afford effective redress to people who are injured by improper federal intelligence activity” and to “deter improper intelligence activity,” id. at 336. Further, in recognition of the potential interplay between promoting accountability and ensuring security, the Committee noted its “belie[f] that the courts will be able to fashion discovery procedures, including inspection of material in chambers, and to issue orders as the interests of justice require, to allow plaintiffs with substantial claims to uncover enough factual material to argue their case, while protecting the secrecy of governmental information in which there is a legitimate security interest.” Id. at 337. FISA implemented many of the Church Committee’s recommendations. In striking a careful balance between assuring the national security and protecting against electronic surveillance abuse, Congress carefully considered the role previously played by courts, and concluded that the judiciary had been unable effectively to achieve an appropriate balance through federal common law: [T]he development of the law regulating electronic surveillance for national security purposes has been uneven and inconclusive. This is to be expected where the development is left to the judicial branch in an area where cases do not regularly come before it. Moreover, the development of standards and restrictions by the judiciary with respect to electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes accomplished through case law threatens both civil liberties and the national security because that development occurs generally in ignorance of the facts, circumstances, and techniques of foreign FAZAGA V. WALLS 65 intelligence electronic surveillance not present in the particular case before the court. . . . [T]he tiny window to this area which a particular case affords provides inadequate light by which judges may be relied upon to develop case law which adequately balances the rights of privacy and national security. H. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21. FISA thus represents an effort to “provide effective, reasonable safeguards to ensure accountability and prevent improper surveillance,” and to “strik[e] a fair and just balance between protection of national security and protection of personal liberties.” S. Rep. No. 95604, pt. 1, at 7. In short, the procedures outlined in § 1806(f) “provide[] a detailed regime to determine whether surveillance ‘was lawfully authorized and conducted,’” Al-Haramain I, 507 F.3d at 1205 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f)), and constitute “Congress’s specific and detailed description for how courts should handle claims by the government that the disclosure of material relating to or derived from electronic surveillance would harm national security,” Jewel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 1106 (quoting In re NSA, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 1119). Critically, the FISA approach does not publicly expose the state secrets. It does severely compromise Plaintiffs’ procedural rights, but not to the degree of entirely extinguishing potentially meritorious substantive rights. 66 FAZAGA V. WALLS D. Applicability of FISA’s § 1806(f) Procedures to Affirmative Legal Challenges to Electronic Surveillance Having determined that, where they apply, § 1806(f)’s procedures displace a dismissal remedy for the Reynolds state secrets privilege, we now consider whether § 1806(f)’s procedures apply to the circumstances of this case. By the statute’s terms, the procedures set forth in § 1806(f) are to be used—where the Attorney General files the requisite affidavit—in the following circumstances: [w]henever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of this section, or whenever a motion is made pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, or whenever any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of the United States or any State before any court or other authority of the United States or any State to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance under this chapter. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f). From this text and the cross-referenced subsections, we derive three circumstances in which the in camera and ex parte procedures are to be used: when (1) a governmental body gives notice of its intent “to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, FAZAGA V. WALLS 67 agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance,” id. § 1806(c) (emphases added);28 (2) an aggrieved person moves to suppress the evidence, id. § 1806(e); or (3) an aggrieved person makes “any motion or request . . . pursuant to any other statute or rule . . . to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance under this chapter,” id. § 1806(f) (emphasis added). The case at hand fits within the contemplated circumstances in two respects. First, although the Government has declined to confirm or deny in its public submissions that the information with respect to which it has invoked the state secrets privilege was obtained or derived from FISA-covered electronic surveillance of Plaintiffs, see id. § 1806(c), the complaint alleges that it was. The Attorney General’s privilege assertion encompassed, among other things, “any information obtained during the course of” Operation Flex, the “results of the investigation,” and “any results derived from” the “sources and methods” used in Operation Flex. It is precisely because the Government would like to use this information to defend itself that it has asserted the state secrets privilege. The district court’s dismissal ruling was premised in part on the potential use of state secrets 28 The text of § 1806(f) refers to notice “pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of this section.” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (emphasis added). Section 1806(d) describes verbatim the same procedures as contained in § 1806(c), except as applied to States and political subdivisions rather than to the United States. Id. § 1806(d). For convenience, we refer only to § 1806(c) in this opinion, but our analysis applies to § 1806(d) with equal force. 68 FAZAGA V. WALLS material to defend the case. Because the district court made the ruling after reviewing the surveillance materials, it is aware whether the allegations in the complaint concerning electronic surveillance are factually supported. Of course, if they are not, then the district court can decide on remand that the FISA procedures are inapplicable. For purposes of this opinion, we proceed on the premise that the Attorney General’s invocation of the state secrets privilege relied on the potential use of material obtained or derived from electronic surveillance, as alleged in the complaint. Second, in their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs have requested injunctive relief “ordering Defendants to destroy or return any information gathered through the unlawful surveillance program by Monteilh and/or Operation Flex described above, and any information derived from that unlawfully obtained information.” Plaintiffs thus have requested, in the alternative, to “obtain” information gathered during or derived from electronic surveillance. See id. § 1806(f). The Government disputes that FISA applies to this case. Its broader contention is that § 1806(f)’s procedures do not apply to any affirmative claims challenging the legality of electronic surveillance or the use of information derived from electronic surveillance, whether brought under FISA’s private right of action or any other constitutional provision, statute, or rule. Instead, the Government maintains, FISA’s procedures apply only when the government initiates the legal action, while the state secrets privilege applies when the government defends affirmative litigation brought by private parties. The plain text and statutory structure of FISA provide otherwise. To begin, the language of the statute simply does FAZAGA V. WALLS 69 not contain the limitations the Government suggests. As discussed above, § 1806(f)’s procedures are to be used in any one of three situations, each of which is separated in the statute by an “or.” See id. The first situation—when “the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance . . . against an aggrieved person” in “any trial, hearing, or other proceeding,” id. § 1806(c) (emphasis added)—unambiguously encompasses affirmative as well as defensive challenges to the lawfulness of surveillance.29 The conduct governed by the statutory provision is the Government’s intended entry into evidence or other use or disclosure of information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance. “[A]gainst an aggrieved person” refers to and modifies the phrase “any information obtained 29 In full, § 1806(c) reads: Whenever the Government intends to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person, any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance of that aggrieved person pursuant to the authority of this subchapter, the Government shall, prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a reasonable time prior to an effort to so disclose or so use that information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved person and the court or other authority in which the information is to be disclosed or used that the Government intends to so disclose or so use such information. 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c). Again, we refer to the text of § 1806(c) because § 1806(f)’s procedures apply “[w]henever a court or other authority is notified pursuant to subsection (c) or (d) of this section.” Id. § 1806(f). 70 FAZAGA V. WALLS or derived.” Id. As a matter of ordinary usage, the phrase “against an aggrieved person” cannot modify “any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States.” Id. Evidence—such as “any information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance”—can properly be said to be “against” a party. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[O]ur accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.” (emphasis added)). But a “trial, hearing, or other proceeding” is not for or against either party; such a proceeding is just an opportunity to introduce evidence. Also, as the phrase is set off by commas, “against an aggrieved person” is grammatically a separate modifier from the list of proceedings contained in § 1806(f). Were the phrase meant to modify the various proceedings, there would be no intervening comma setting it apart. The third situation—when a “motion or request is made by an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule . . . before any court . . . to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance or to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or information obtained or derived from electronic surveillance under this chapter,” id. § 1806(f)—also by its plain text encompasses affirmative challenges to the legality of electronic surveillance. When an aggrieved person makes such a motion or request, or the government notifies the aggrieved person and the court that it intends to use or disclose information FAZAGA V. WALLS 71 obtained or derived from electronic surveillance, the statute requires a court to use § 1806(f)’s procedures “to determine whether the surveillance . . . was lawfully authorized and conducted.” Id. In other words, a court must “determine whether the surveillance was authorized and conducted in a manner which did not violate any constitutional or statutory right.” S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 57; accord S. Rep. No. 95-701, at 63. The inference drawn from the text of § 1806 is bolstered by § 1810, which specifically creates a private right of action for an individual subjected to electronic surveillance in violation of FISA. FISA prohibits, for example, electronic surveillance of a U.S. person “solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A). Here, Plaintiffs allege they were surveilled solely on account of their religion. If true, such surveillance was necessarily unauthorized by FISA, and § 1810 subjects any persons who intentionally engaged in such surveillance to civil liability. It would make no sense for Congress to pass a comprehensive law concerning foreign intelligence surveillance, expressly enable aggrieved persons to sue for damages when that surveillance is unauthorized, see id. § 1810, and provide procedures deemed adequate for the review of national security-related evidence, see id. § 1806(f), but not intend for those very procedures to be used when an aggrieved person sues for damages under FISA’s civil enforcement mechanism. Permitting a § 1810 claim to be dismissed on the basis of the state secrets privilege because the § 1806(f) procedures are unavailable would dramatically undercut the utility of § 1810 in deterring FISA violations. Such a dismissal also would undermine the overarching goal of FISA more broadly—“curb[ing] the practice by which the Executive 72 FAZAGA V. WALLS Branch may conduct warrantless electronic surveillance on its own unilateral determination that national security justifies it.” S. Rep. No. 95-604, pt. 1, at 8. FISA’s legislative history confirms that § 1806(f)’s procedures were designed to apply in both civil and criminal cases, and to both affirmative and defensive use of electronic surveillance evidence. The Senate bill initially provided a single procedure for criminal and civil cases, while the House bill at the outset specified two separate procedures for determining the legality of electronic surveillance.30 In the end, the conference committee adopted a slightly modified version of the Senate bill, agreeing “that an in camera and ex parte proceeding is appropriate for determining the lawfulness of electronic surveillance in both criminal and civil cases.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 32. In the alternative, the Government suggests that § 1806(f)’s procedures for the use of electronic surveillance in litigation are limited to affirmative actions brought directly under § 1810. We disagree. The § 1806(f) procedures are expressly available, as well as mandatory, for affirmative claims brought “by an aggrieved person pursuant to any . . . 30 Under the House bill, in criminal cases there would be an in camera proceeding, and the court could, but need not, disclose the materials relating to the surveillance to the aggrieved person “if there were a reasonable question as to the legality of the suveillance [sic] and if disclosure would likely promote a more accurate determination of such legality, or if disclosure would not harm the national security.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 31 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4060. In civil suits, there would be an in camera and ex parte proceeding before a court of appeals, and the court would disclose to the aggrieved person the materials relating to the surveillance “only if necessary to afford due process to the aggrieved person.” Id. at 32. FAZAGA V. WALLS 73 statute or rule of the United States . . . before any court . . . of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(f) (emphasis added). This provision was meant “to make very clear that these procedures apply whatever the underlying rule or statute” at issue, so as “to prevent these carefully drawn procedures from being bypassed by the inventive litigant using a new statute, rule or judicial construction.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 91 (emphasis added). Had Congress wanted to limit the use of § 1806(f)’s procedures only to affirmative claims alleging lack of compliance with FISA itself, it could have so specified, as it did in § 1809 and § 1810. Section 1810 creates a private right of action only for violations of § 1809. 50 U.S.C. § 1810. Section 1809 prohibits surveillance not authorized by FISA, the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the pen register statute. Id. § 1809(a). That § 1809 includes only certain, cross-referenced statutes while § 1810 is limited to violations of § 1809 contrasts with the broad language of § 1806(f) as to the types of litigation covered—litigation “pursuant to any . . . statute or rule of the United States.” Id. § 1806(f) (emphasis added). Furthermore, if—as here—an aggrieved person brings a claim under § 1810 and a claim under another statute or the Constitution based on the same electronic surveillance as is involved in the § 1810 claim, it would make little sense for § 1806(f) to require the court to consider in camera and ex parte the evidence relating to electronic surveillance for purposes of the claim under § 1810 of FISA but not permit the court to consider the exact same evidence in the exact same way for purposes of the non-FISA claim. Once the information has been considered by a federal judge in camera and ex parte, any risk of disclosure—which Congress 74 FAZAGA V. WALLS necessarily considered exceedingly small or it would not have permitted such examination—has already been incurred. There would be no point in dismissing other claims because of that same concern. We are not the first to hold that § 1806(f)’s procedures may be used to adjudicate claims beyond those arising under § 1810. The D.C. Circuit expressly so held in ACLU Foundation of Southern California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991): When a district court conducts a § 1806(f) review, its task is not simply to decide whether the surveillance complied with FISA. Section 1806(f) requires the court to decide whether the surveillance was “lawfully authorized and conducted.” The Constitution is law. Once the Attorney General invokes § 1806(f), the respondents named in that proceeding therefore must present not only their statutory but also their constitutional claims for decision. Id. at 465; accord United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 571–73, 571 n.4 (1st Cir. 1991) (using § 1806(f)’s in camera and ex parte procedures to review constitutional challenges to FISA surveillance). In sum, the plain language, statutory structure, and legislative history demonstrate that Congress intended FISA to displace the state secrets privilege and its dismissal remedy with respect to electronic surveillance. Contrary to the Government’s contention, FISA’s § 1806(f) procedures are to be used when an aggrieved person affirmatively challenges, FAZAGA V. WALLS 75 in any civil case, the legality of electronic surveillance or its use in litigation, whether the challenge is under FISA itself, the Constitution, or any other law.31 31 The Agent Defendants suggest that using the § 1806 procedures would violate their Seventh Amendment jury trial right and their due process rights. Any Seventh Amendment argument is premature. Any hypothetical interference with a jury trial would arise only if a series of contingencies occurred on remand. First, given our various rulings precluding certain of Plaintiffs’ claims and the narrow availability of Bivens remedies under current law, there are likely to be few, if any, remaining Bivens claims against the Agent Defendants. See infra Part I; supra Part III.B; supra Part IV.B. Second, as to any remaining claims against the Agent Defendants, the district court might determine that there was no unlawful surveillance after reviewing the evidence under the in camera, ex parte procedures, or the Agent Defendants may prevail on summary judgment. Moreover, it is possible that the district court’s determination of whether the surveillance was lawful will be a strictly legal decision—analogous to summary judgment—made on the record supplied by the government. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (noting that procedural devices like summary judgment are not “inconsistent” with the Seventh Amendment). Should the various contingencies occur and leave liability issues to be determined, the Agent Defendants are free at that time to raise their Seventh Amendment arguments on remand. But, as the Seventh Amendment issue was not decided by the district court, may never arise, and, if it does, may depend on the merits on exactly how it arises, we decline to address the hypothetical constitutional question now. With respect to the Agent Defendants’ due process arguments, we and other courts have upheld the constitutionality of FISA’s in camera and ex parte procedures with regard to criminal defendants. See United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 117–29 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476–77, 477 n.5 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 148–49 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 76 FAZAGA V. WALLS E. Aggrieved Persons We now consider more specifically whether FISA’s § 1806(f) procedures may be used in this case. Because the procedures apply when evidence will be introduced “against an aggrieved person,” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c), and when “any motion or request is made by an aggrieved person,” id. § 1806(f), Plaintiffs must satisfy the definition of an “aggrieved person,” see id. § 1801(k). We addressed the “aggrieved person” requirement in part in the discussion of Plaintiffs’ § 1810 claim against the Agent Defendants. As we there explained, because Fazaga had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, and AbdelRahim had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, car, and phone, Plaintiffs are properly considered aggrieved persons as to those categories of surveillance. See supra Part I.C. And although we noted that the Agent Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ FISA § 1810 claim with respect to the recording of conversation in the mosque prayer halls, Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those conversations and thus are still properly considered aggrieved persons as to that category of surveillance as well. See supra Part I.B. Again, because Plaintiffs are properly considered “aggrieved” for purposes of FISA, two of the situations referenced in § 1806(f) are directly applicable here. The Government intends to use “information obtained or derived from an electronic surveillance” against Plaintiffs, who are 588, 590–92, 590 n.3 (E.D. Va. 1997) (collecting cases). Individual defendants in a civil suit are not entitled to more stringent protections than criminal defendants. FAZAGA V. WALLS 77 “aggrieved person[s].” 50 U.S.C. § 1806(c). And Plaintiffs are “aggrieved person[s]” who have attempted “to discover or obtain applications or orders or other materials relating to electronic surveillance.” Id. § 1806(f).