Opinion ID: 2013856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Kathleen Jackson

Text: Defendant also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to call Kathleen Jackson as a witness at trial. In his post-conviction petition, defendant states that Jackson, who lived in an apartment building adjacent to Entrata's building, would have testified that, on August 10, 1987, at approximately 6:15 to 6:20 a.m., she was in an elevator in her building, along with a black male. The man was in his early twenties and was wearing white sunglasses. Defendant also alleges that Jackson would testify that defendant was not the man she saw in the elevator. Defendant argues that Jackson's testimony would have rebutted the testimony of prosecution witnesses who identified defendant as the man in the parking lot outside Entrata's building on the morning of August 10, 1987. Although defendant failed to support this claim with an affidavit from Jackson, her testimony is sufficiently documented in this court's opinion on direct review of defendant's first conviction. See Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 279-82, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. Therefore, on direct review of defendant's second conviction, defendant could have raised the issue of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to call Jackson as a witness. We agree with the State that defendant has waived review of this issue. See Olinger, 176 Ill.2d at 365, 223 Ill.Dec. 588, 680 N.E.2d 321. Defendant also contends, however, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. We therefore consider whether this claim of trial counsel's ineffectiveness would have been successful if it had been raised on direct review. See Childress, 191 Ill.2d at 175, 246 Ill.Dec. 352, 730 N.E.2d 32. At defendant's first trial, the State moved in limine to preclude defendant from introducing Jackson's testimony. The trial court granted the State's motion. On direct review to this court, defendant challenged the trial court's in limine order. We held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring Jackson's testimony. Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 281-82, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. We observed that [t]here is nothing connecting the person Jackson saw with the crime, nor does it necessarily follow that her testimony would have cast doubt over the identification of defendant as the offender. Enis, 139 Ill.2d at 282, 151 Ill.Dec. 493, 564 N.E.2d 1155. Defendant cannot now argue that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to press for the admission of Jackson's testimony, where this court previously held the exclusion of such testimony to be nonprejudicial. See Evans, 186 Ill.2d at 103, 237 Ill.Dec. 118, 708 N.E.2d 1158 (holding, in the context of post-conviction review, that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to evidence and argument which was previously found on direct appeal to be nonprejudicial). Because defendant's underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim would not have been successful if raised on direct appeal, we reject defendant's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this claim.