Opinion ID: 2599511
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Heading: Basic Principles of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Text: Colorado codified the common law attorney-client privilege at section 13-90-107(1)(b), which states: An attorney shall not be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment. The privilege is rooted in the principle that candid and open discussion by the client to the attorney without fear of disclosure will promote the orderly administration of justice. See Law Offices of Bernard D. Morley, P.C. v. MacFarlane, 647 P.2d 1215, 1221 (Colo.1982) (quoting A. v. District Court, 191 Colo. 10, 22, 550 P.2d 315, 324 (1976)). Protecting confidential communications between an attorney and a client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of a client but also encourages the general public to seek early legal assistance. National Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co., 718 P.2d at 1047. Despite the strong policy reasons that give rise to the privilege, the attorney-client privilege is not absolute, and when the social policies underlying the privilege conflict with other prevailing public policies, the attorney-client privilege must give way. See Bernard D. Morley, P.C., 647 P.2d at 1220. The attorney-client privilege extends only to matters communicated by or to the client in the course of gaining counsel, advice, or direction with respect to the client's rights or obligations. See id. Furthermore, the privilege applies only to statements made in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation that the statements will be treated as confidential. Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 499 (Colo.1992). `A mere showing that the communication was from client to attorney does not suffice, but the circumstances indicating the intention of secrecy must appear.' D.A.S. v. People, 863 P.2d 291, 295 (Colo.1993) (quoting John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 91, at 333 (4th ed.1992)). Communications between an attorney and his client that are not confidentiali.e., communications that are disclosed to third parties outside of the attorney-client relationship [17] are not protected. See People v. Tippett, 733 P.2d 1183, 1192-93 (Colo.1987) (holding that because information at issue was known to third parties and not confidential, it was not protected by the attorney-client privilege). The United States Supreme Court noted that the attorney-client privilege protects not only information and advice communicated from the attorney to the client, but also information given to the attorney to enable him to give sound and informed legal advice. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390, 101 S.Ct. 677. However, the privilege protects only the communications to the attorney; it does not protect any underlying and otherwise unprivileged facts that are incorporated into a client's communication to his attorney: The client cannot be compelled to answer the question, `What did you say or write to the attorney?' but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his communication to his attorney. Id. at 396, 101 S.Ct. 677 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F.Supp. 830, 831 (E.D.Pa.1962)); see also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 1.6:103, at 137 (2d ed. Supp.1997) ([T]he fact that a client has discussed facts with a lawyer does not protect the client from thereafter being asked about the facts . . . [otherwise,] a client could immunize herself against interrogation about the facts simply by telling them to her lawyer.) (emphasis in original).