Opinion ID: 676565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Against Penal Interest

Text: 25 The admission of out-of-court statements by an unavailable declarant to inculpate a third party requires careful thought. United States v. One Star, 979 F.2d 1319, 1322 (8th Cir.1992). Indeed, [d]epending upon the circumstances in which it is made, a particular statement which is ostensibly disserving may in fact be either neutral or self-serving. Riley, 657 F.2d at 1384. This is particularly true if the declarant is in custody when the statement is made, for a statement admitting guilt and implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and hence fail to qualify as against interest. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3), Advisory Committee Notes Exception (3); see also Riley, 657 F.2d at 1384; United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir.1979). Such cases require a close examination of the circumstances in which a statement is made. 26 In addition, an unavailable declarant's lengthy narrative is not admissible under 804(b)(3) merely because some portion of the narrative subjects the declarant to criminal liability. Williamson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2432, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994); see also United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182, 188 (8th Cir.1978). Those portions which are not in and of themselves against the declarant's penal interest are not admissible. Williamson, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2432. 27 As to the disputed statements in this case, we realize that in a sense they were against King's penal interest, for they could have been used as evidence in her prosecution. However, [t]he question under Rule 804(b)(3) is always whether the statement was sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest 'that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.'  Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. Upon examination of the context in which King made her statements, we are convinced that, at least as to the remarks implicating Hazelett, this test has not been satisfied. 28 King's statements were made following her arrest in Springfield, where she had been caught with two kilograms of cocaine. Once those drugs were discovered, for all practical purposes King's conviction was assured. Consequently, she had nothing to lose by confessing, and she certainly had nothing to lose by implicating another person, particularly someone more culpable. In fact, we believe King is a good example of a declarant possibly motivated by 'the very natural desire to curry favor from the arresting officers, [and] the desire to alleviate culpability by implicating others....'  Riley, 657 F.2d at 1384 (quoting United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d 1092, 1102 (5th Cir.1981)). Several courts, including our own, have rejected out-of-court statements in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1986) (declarant's post-arrest statement inadmissible because it was highly logical for him to trivialize own involvement by implicating another as the kingpin of the drug operation); United States v. Monaco, 735 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.1984) (declarant's testimony in presence of state attorney general, in bankruptcy proceeding similar to deposition, was not admissible in defendant's prosecution because declarant minimized own responsibility while implicating defendant); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir.) (statement not against penal interest because made in police custody in response to police questioning), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819, 102 S.Ct. 100, 70 L.Ed.2d 90 (1981); Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F.2d at 1102 (excluding custodial confession, given under potentially coercive circumstances that could not at trial--and cannot now--be adequately examined); Lilley, 581 F.2d at 188 (husband's statements to secret service agent admitting guilt but implicating wife as more culpable party, made while husband was the prime suspect in investigation, were not admissible in wife's prosecution). 29 Our conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Williamson, which is factually similar to this case. In Williamson, the declarant was arrested following a traffic stop during which large amounts of cocaine were found in declarant's car. Shortly after the arrest, and while in custody, the declarant made statements to a DEA agent indicating that he was transporting the drugs for Williamson. Though the Court remanded to the Eleventh Circuit for a fact-intensive inquiry as to which portions of the declarant's confession were truly self-inculpatory, 3 it expressed doubt that all of the statements, particularly those implicating Williamson, were in fact against the declarant's penal interest. For example, the Court noted that some of the statements making no reference to Williamson were possibly against the declarant's interest. In particular, when he said he knew there was cocaine in the suitcase, he essentially forfeited his only possible defense to a charge of cocaine possession, lack of knowledge. Williamson, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. However, 30 other parts of his confession, especially the parts that implicated Williamson, did little to subject [declarant] himself to criminal liability. A reasonable person in [declarant's] position might even think that implicating someone else would decrease his practical exposure to criminal liability, at least so far as sentencing goes. Small fish in a big conspiracy often get shorter sentences than people who are running the whole show, ..., especially if the small fish are willing to help the authorities catch the big ones,.... 31 Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, Justice Ginsburg stated in a concurring opinion that 32 [declarant] was caught red-handed with 19 kilos of cocaine.... He could have denied knowing the drugs were in the car's trunk, but that strategy would have brought little prospect of thwarting a criminal prosecution. He therefore admitted involvement, but did so in a way that minimized his own role and shifted blame to petitioner.... 33 To the extent some of those statements tended to incriminate [the declarant], they provided only marginal or cumulative evidence of guilt. They project an image of a person acting not against his penal interest, but striving mightily to shift principal responsibility to someone else. 34 Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2439-40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 35 Because we hold that King's statements implicating Hazelett were not sufficiently against her interest, they were not admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). 4 The district court's ruling to the contrary was an abuse of discretion. 36 Furthermore, we do not believe the error was harmless, for King's statements were the only evidence that Hazelett originally gave the cocaine to her. Had they not been admitted, the jury may well have concluded that Hazelett had no knowledge of the drugs. Moreover, in such circumstances the jury might very well have accepted Hazelett's explanations for his presence in St. Louis, his arrival at the bus station, and his attempt to flee. Therefore, we cannot say that admission of King's statements did not substantially influence the jury's verdict. See United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Drummond, 903 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1049, 111 S.Ct. 759, 112 L.Ed.2d 779 (1991). 37 Because we reverse and remand for a new trial, 5 we need not decide Hazelett's other claims of error. Nevertheless, we take the opportunity to briefly discuss those issues as they may arise in further proceedings.