Opinion ID: 3054704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Pollydore and Dr. Kelley

Text: The Coopers also sought to admit the testimony of their treating physician, Dr. Shevin Pollydore, and their surgeon, Dr. Lee Kelley, who would have testified that the 2010 collision caused the Coopers’ need for treatment. Dr. Pollydore’s method of determining causation consisted of reviewing the Coopers’ medical histories and his examinations of them from before and after the 2010 collision. In describing his methodology, Dr. Kelley testified that doctors have studied basic physics principles and the effects of force on the spine. Dr. Kelley also stated that he had looked at several photographs and had spoken with the Coopers. After reviewing the Coopers’ medical histories, the district court explained that determining causation in this case was difficult because of the Coopers’ history of back pain, the fact that they both possessed degenerative back conditions, and the fact that those conditions were compounded by the Coopers’ obesity and a different car accident in 2009. As such, a review of the Coopers’ medical histories could not establish that the 2010 collision caused their current back problems. The court then concluded that causation could not be determined through physical examination and the chronology of events alone. The district 6 Case: 13-10920 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 7 of 12 court further noted that neither Dr. Pollydore nor Dr. Kelley explained why they believed the 2010 collision caused the Coopers’ injuries, rather than the 2009 collision or their preexisting conditions. On appeal, the Coopers argue the district court rejected the doctors’ use of nerve studies, x-rays, discograms, and other diagnostic tests as a valid methodology for finding causation. Moreover, both doctors conducted differential etiologies and considered the Coopers’ medical histories and the 2009 collision as possible causes of the Coopers’ current injuries. The Coopers contend the district court misapplied the law because it required them to completely rule out degenerative disc disorder as a contributing factor to their injuries, when, under Georgia law, they simply had to prove that the 2010 collision contributed to or aggravated their degenerative disc disorder. As with Dr. Hutton’s testimony, we cannot say the district court’s exclusion of the medical doctors’ testimony was manifestly erroneous. As an initial matter, the Coopers conflate their burden on causation, which is a matter of state law, with the reliability analysis required by Daubert, which is a separate inquiry governed by federal law. See Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1193. We also note that, although the Coopers attempt to classify the doctors’ methodology as that of a differential etiology, it is plain that no such methodology was, in fact, employed in this case. Differential etiology “is a medical process of elimination whereby the possible 7 Case: 13-10920 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 8 of 12 causes of a condition are considered and ruled out one-by-one, leaving only one cause remaining.” Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1195. Drs. Pollydore and Kelley, by comparison, simply conducted physical examinations and reviewed the Coopers’ medical histories to arrive at the conclusion that the 2010 collision caused the Coopers’ injuries in this case. The doctors never compiled a comprehensive list of possible causes that they subsequently “systematically and scientifically rul[ed] out . . . until a final, suspected cause remain[ed].” Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1342; see also Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1197 (indicating that “an expert must provide reasons for rejecting alternative hypotheses using scientific methods and procedures and the elimination of those hypotheses must be founded on more than subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation” (quotation omitted)). The methodology employed by Drs. Pollydore and Kelley was unreliable, as it amounted to simple reliance on a temporal relationship. The doctors concluded that, because the Coopers did not manifest their specific injuries or need for surgery until after the 2010 collision, the 2010 collision was the cause of those injuries. Such reasoning “is a classic ‘post hoc ergo propter hoc’ fallacy which ‘assumes causation from temporal sequence.’” Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1343. We have previously held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting such a methodology, or a methodology that consisted of reliance on medical literature and a temporal relationship. See id. at 1342-43. In this case, the district 8 Case: 13-10920 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 9 of 12 court did not abuse its discretion in finding Dr. Pollydore’s and Dr. Kelley’s methodologies for establishing specific causation unreliable under Daubert. See id. at 1343-44 (explaining “the abuse of discretion standard ‘thrives’ when addressing Daubert issues.”).