Opinion ID: 2803111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard of Review for the Denial of a New Trial

Text: On appeal, only Ramos and Omar renew their contentions that the withheld evidence warranted a new trial, so we evaluate the Brady issue solely with respect to them.7 The appellants brought their new trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which provides that [u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. We review the district court's denial of a Rule 33 motion for manifest abuse of discretion. González-González, 258 F.3d at 20. As this circuit has previously explained, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence generally require a 6 The court's denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment due to the government's alleged prosecutorial misconduct is not at issue in this appeal. 7 Sandra's trial counsel joined Ramos and Omar in petitioning the district court for a new trial after the prosecutor turned over Delgado's letter and notes in 2010. Her appellate counsel has not renewed this claim on appeal. Counsel was clearly aware of his ability to adopt a co-appellant's arguments in a consolidated case pursuant to Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 28(i), since he reserved his right to do so in Sandra's opening brief. But counsel never filed a reply brief after the court granted him an extension, nor did he make a motion to adopt the other appellants' arguments. Sonia did not make a motion for a new trial below and does not attempt to piggyback on her co-appellants' motions on appeal, even though her appellate counsel was clearly aware of the Brady issue, since she is also representing Ramos in this appeal. Sonia's opening brief includes a footnote referencing Delgado's letter but makes no argument in relation to it. -19- four-pronged showing that: (1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to lack of diligence by the defendant; (3) the evidence is material, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) it will probably result in an acquittal upon retrial of the defendant. Id. (quoting United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1980)). However, when the basis for the motion is that the government failed to disclose evidence required to be disclosed under Brady, either willfully or inadvertently, we apply the more defendant-friendly Kyles v. Whitley standard to the test's third and fourth prongs. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995); United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 151—52 (1st Cir. 2000). Instead of requiring that the defendant show that an acquittal would have probably resulted had the material been produced, we require only that the defendant show a reasonable probability that had the government disclosed the evidence prior to trial, the result of the proceeding would have been different. González-González, 258 F.3d at 20. Answering that question requires that we determine whether a trial held in the absence of such evidence can be described as a trial that can produce a verdict worthy of confidence. Id. (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434). This somewhat delphic 'undermine confidence' formula suggests that reversal might be warranted in some cases even if there is less than an even chance that the evidence would -20- produce an acquittal. Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).