Opinion ID: 2061073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Counsel's Testifying

Text: The defendant argues that her right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution was substantially infringed during the competency hearing of State's witness Tony Strong when her lead counsel, Michael Troemel, was called to the stand. Several months prior to the competency hearing, the defendant's co-counsel, Troemel and Mark Ryan, tape-recorded an interview with Tony Strong. The defendant provided the State a transcribed copy of the statement prior to trial. At the hearing, during cross-examination of Tony Strong, the defense questioned him about the prior statement. Following the defense counsel's admission that the original recording had been accidentally erased after its transcription, the trial court permitted the State to call Troemel to the stand. Troemel was required to read a portion of the transcribed statement relating to Tony Strong's ability to differentiate between the truth and a lie. At all times during Troemel's testimony, co-counsel Ryan remained and actively served as trial counsel for the defendant. Troemel's testimony occurred during the competency hearing, out of the presence of the jury. The defendant now argues that requiring Troemel to testify on behalf of the State ... permitted the State to use defense counsel's work product and trial preparation and thereby directly infringed upon [the defendant's] right to effective assistance of counsel. The defendant does not claim that her attorney was required to divulge confidential communications in violation of the statutory privilege. [1] Rather, she argues that by requiring her attorney to testify on behalf of the State and permitting the State to use defense counsel's work product and trial preparation, the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was infringed, resulting in fundamental error. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we disagree. Troemel's testimony consisted solely of reading a portion of his prior interview with Tony Strong. Troemel had previously furnished a copy of the transcription to the prosecutor. The content of his testimony did not provide evidence of any elements of the charged offense. Nor did it constitute the sole basis on which Tony Strong was found to be competent to testify. We agree with the State's contention that requiring Troemel to testify did not constitute a material interference with his function as an advocate or operate to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. The testimony occurred out of the presence of the jury, and the defendant's co-counsel remained present and actively participated. Merely requiring a defendant's lawyer to testify does not alone constitute a material interference with his function as an advocate. United States v. Freeman (9th Cir.1975), 519 F.2d 67. We find no error on this issue.