Opinion ID: 203905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Controlled Substances Convictions as Career Offender Predicates

Text: Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a controlled substance offense is an offense ... punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance... or the possession of a controlled substance ... with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute or dispense.  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the definition of controlled substance offense requires that the statute under which the defendant was charged involves an intent to distribute or other indicia of trafficking. [7] Bryant argues in the alternative that if the government has met its burden to prove the fact of the New York conviction, it nevertheless failed to prove that the New York conviction for attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance necessarily qualifies as a career offender predicate. [8] Bryant bases his argument on the Second Circuit's decision in Savage. See 542 F.3d at 965-66. In Savage, the Second Circuit reviewed a district court's decision to apply a sentencing enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). [9] Id. at 960. The district court in that case based its decision, in relevant part, on its determination that one of the defendant's prior felony convictions under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 21a-277(b) was for a controlled substance offense, as the term is defined in U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(b). [10] Id. In reversing the district court decision, the Savage court expressed its concern that an offer to sell under Connecticut law could include a fraudulent offer which would mean that the person making the fraudulent offer would not have the intent to distribute or sell an item. Id. at 965. Thus, it reasoned that the Connecticut statute, by criminalizing a mere offer to sell, criminalizes more conduct than falls within the federal definition of a controlled substance offense. Id. at 966. The Savage court further concluded that the defendant's sentence should be vacated [b]ecause nothing in the statute of conviction, the charging document, the plea colloquy or other comparable judicial record established with certainty that [the defendant] necessarily pleaded guilty to the elements of a controlled substance offense.... Id. at 960. Bryant argues that the statute upon which the New York conviction is based, like the Connecticut statute, criminalizes conduct that falls outside the federal definition of a controlled substance offense. Bryant argues that because the New York statute defines sale of a controlled substance to include offer, it criminalizes both predicate and non-predicate conduct. See N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00(1) (`Sell' means to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same.). Bryant claims that because the government failed to show the New York conviction was for conduct that would constitute a predicate offense, it cannot be used for career offender purposes. Bryant's argument fails because it is well-established under New York law that `in order to support a conviction under an offering for sale theory, there must be evidence of a bona fide offer to selli.e., that defendant had both the intent and ability to proceed with the sale.' People v. Samuels, 99 N.Y.2d 20, 750 N.Y.S.2d 828, 780 N.E.2d 513, 515 (2002) (quoting People v. Mike, 92 N.Y.2d 996, 684 N.Y.S.2d 165, 706 N.E.2d 1189, 1191 (N.Y.1998)); see also People v. Gondolfo, 94 Misc.2d 696, 405 N.Y.S.2d 890, 894-95 (1978). Thus, the instant case is distinguishable from Savage because concerns that Bryant could have been convicted for making a fraudulent offer, a non-predicate offense, do not exist here. At the time Bryant was allegedly convicted of the offense, he would have been found to have intent to proceed with a sale. It follows then that the New York conviction qualifies as a predicate offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which requires an intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
Bryant also challenges the Suffolk Superior Court conviction on the grounds that the government has failed to prove that he pleaded guilty to acts that would constitute a career offender predicate. In 1992, Bryant was initially charged with one count of trafficking in cocaine in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32E(b)(1), and one count of conspiracy to violate the drug laws of the Commonwealth (specifically, to traffic in cocaine) in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 40. The trafficking charge was dismissed and Bryant pleaded guilty only to the conspiracy charge. Where the predicate offense involves a conspiracy, the sentencing court must determine whether the object of the conspiracy falls within the scope of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). See Piper, 35 F.3d at 619 (To determine the status of a conspiracy conviction vis-a-vis the career offender rubric, the key question is `conspiracy to do what?'). Bryant correctly argues that the statute of conviction encompasses both conduct that would constitute a predicate offense and conduct that would not. [11] Therefore, the sentencing court is required to determine whether the guilty plea, defined by a more expansive statute, necessarily admitted the elements of a controlled substances offense for career offender purposes. See Shepard 544 U.S. at 20-21, 125 S.Ct. 1254. As noted above, to make this determination in a case involving a guilty plea, the sentencing court may review the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented. Id. at 16, 125 S.Ct. 1254. In this case the indictment underlying the Suffolk Superior Court conviction demonstrated that the object of the conspiracy fell within the scope of a controlled substances offense under U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(b). It stated that Bryant did conspire ... to unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a net weight of fourteen grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine .... (emphasis added). Reliance upon the indictment is also consistent with our precedent. See Santos, 363 F.3d at 24 (Where the charging instruments are instructive on the issue of whether a predicate offense [falls within the scope of § 4B1.2], we need not look further.) (citation omitted); United States v. Leavitt, 925 F.2d 516, 517-18 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing to the Sentencing Guidelines commentary to justify looking to the indictment to decide whether conduct can be a predicate offense for career offender purposes if it falls under a statute broad enough to encompass other conduct that would not be a predicate offense for career offender purposes). We conclude that since the indictment clearly narrowed the charge to a crime that qualifies as a controlled substances offense for career offender purposes and Bryant pleaded guilty to the same, the Suffolk Superior Court conviction qualifies as a career offender predicate offense.