Opinion ID: 201385
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Initial Stop, Subsequent Order, and Frisk

Text: 26 Fox first challenges the validity of the initial stop, the order that he exit his vehicle and stand with his feet apart with his hands on the hood of the cruiser, and the frisk. A traffic stop constitutes a seizure within the purview of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2001). Thus, at its inception, it must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, and the officer's actions must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 6. Accordingly, an inquiring court must ask whether the officer's actions were justified at their inception, and if so, whether the officer's subsequent actions were fairly responsive to ... the circumstances originally warranting the stop, informed by what occurred, and what the officer learned, as the stop progressed. Id. 27 Here, Bergquist encountered a vehicle that appeared to be without a working plate light, which he knew to be a violation of Maine law. Although he tried, he was unable to determine whether it had a functioning plate light. Thus, there was justification for stopping the vehicle to investigate, as the stop was supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle was traveling in violation of a traffic law. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 (A traffic stop must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity.). The challenge to the initial stop fails. 6 28 The challenges to the ensuing order and frisk also fail. Before Bergquist issued the order, he: (1) saw Fox make a ducking motion, as if reaching for something under the seat or placing something under the seat; (2) realized that he had previously arrested Fox for possession of brass knuckles and a concealed firearm; and (3) noticed a large bulge in Fox's jacket pocket. Moreover, before he frisked Fox, he learned that Fox possessed brass knuckles. Under the circumstances, both the order and frisk were reasonable. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) ([O]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment[ ]....); Chhien, 266 F.3d at 6 ([W]hile an officer's actions must bear some relation to the purpose of the original stop, he may shift his focus and increase the scope of his investigation by degrees if his suspicions mount during the course of the detention.).