Opinion ID: 1213716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: Did the District Court err when it denied Johnston's motion for a continuance of the trial? On the date of trial, two of Johnston's witnesses did not appear, even though they had agreed to appear and had been subpoenaed. They reportedly were in Nevada on that date. The trial court, while agreeing that defense counsel had made a good faith effort to secure the presence of those witnesses, refused to continue the trial so that their testimony could be presented. Defendant contends that these witnesses would have corroborated Johnston's testimony that he had a financial relationship with Pearson which he explained as the basis for his presence in her home and her participation in consensual intercourse with him. We have held that the district court does not err when it denies a motion for continuance absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Walker (1986), 225 Mont. 415, 419, 733 P.2d 352, 355 (citing State v. Harvey (1979), 184 Mont. 423, 431, 603 P.2d 661, 666). Section 46-13-202(3), MCA, states: All motions for continuance are addressed to the discretion of the trial court and must be considered in the light of the diligence shown on the part of the movant. This section must be construed to the end that criminal cases are tried with due diligence consonant with the rights of the defendant and the prosecution to a speedy trial. The State argues that the District Court's exercise of its discretion when it denied Johnston's motion for a continuance is supported by the fact that the motion was made just prior to Johnston's presentation of evidence, rather than prior to trial, the fact that both witnesses were related to Johnston, and that collusion between them and Johnston was justifiably suspected, and the fact that defense counsel knew prior to trial that both witnesses were out of state, but had not had out-of-state subpoenas issued. The reason the District Court is given broad discretion to decide motions for a continuance is because of its superior position to consider the merits of such a motion in the context of the factors set forth in § 46-13-202(3), MCA. Based on the sterile record before us, we are unable to conclude that the District Court clearly abused that discretion. For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and GRAY, NELSON and WEBER, JJ., concur.