Opinion ID: 2593051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: How strong was the officer's reasonable suspicion?

Text: Under the reasonable suspicion requirement, the officer must have some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [35] The objective justification must be something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. [36] The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, under the totality of the circumstances known to the officer and in light of the officer's experience, support making the stop. [37] In noting the difference between the quantum of information an officer must have in order to justify a stop compared to that needed in order to justify an arrest, the court of appeals has stated that in the case of an investigative stop it will suffice that there exists a substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. [38] And relevant information known to a police dispatcher may be `imputed' to a police officer who conducts an investigative stop and so may be considered for purposes of evaluating whether the stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion. [39] Here, Officer Mickelson was responding to a report from the police dispatcher of a verbal domestic [dispute] ... at the end of the building in the parking lot near Henry's, and the call was that the subjects were standing near a white Subaru with the doors open. When Officer Mickelson came into view of the parking lot he observed the white Subaru parked at Henry's, ... and the people were getting in the Subaru. Officer Mickelson's decision to stop the vehicle, therefore, was based on the specific and articulable facts that he had received a report from his police dispatcher indicating that there was a domestic dispute involving individuals near a white Subaru at the parking lot of Henry's bar, and that when he arrived at the location he observed individuals entering into the white Subaru. Additionally, Officer Mickelson interpreted the facts reported to him by the police dispatcher, along with his own observations, in the light of his own experience as a police officer. [40] Officer Mickelson testified that he had experience investigating domestic disputes and that in his experience almost every domestic situation I've been involved with has started out verbally. Accordingly, even though the report of fighting described not like physical punching, but like yelling, ... fighting and pointing, and like waving of arms, and a verbal domestic disturbance, Officer Mickelson's experience led him to believe that there was a substantial possibility that the dispute could escalate into physical violence, or may already have escalated. [41] Miller argues that the information provided by the 911 caller could not support a reasonable suspicion because the 911 call itself indicates that the caller did not have personal knowledge. But a review of the relevant law and the evidence in this case refutes that claim. In Alaska, [a] stop may be based upon an informant's tip, so long as there is reason to believe that the informant is credible and a basis for concluding that the information provided by the informant was based on personal knowledge. [42] The court of appeals has held that information provided by an anonymous caller can be sufficient to justify an investigative stop when the tip has some indicia of reliability. [43] Miller's assertion that the caller did not have personal knowledge is based on the fact that a third person can be heard on the recording of the 911 call providing the caller with the specific make and model of Miller's vehicle. On the recording of the 911 transcript, the caller identifies the vehicle as a car with its doors open ... a white one, and then, after another voice can be heard in the background, adds I guess it's a white Subaru, its like newer, a WRX. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed at the trial court, [44] it is clear from the 911 transcript that the caller herself had observed the arguing couple and the vehicle but had not known the name of that particular make and model. It is also evident that the third party offered the specific make and model to provide more detail to the police. The transcript of the 911 call does not show that the caller did not have personal knowledge of the events she was describing; it shows only that the caller was not familiar with the particular model of vehicle. In addition, some of the information relayed by the caller to the dispatcher and by the dispatcher to Officer Mickelson was immediately confirmed when the officer approached the location provided by the caller and observed the white Subaru with individuals entering the vehicle. The information provided by the 911 caller, therefore, was credible, and based on first-hand knowledge, and had indicia of reliability. Because the 911 call was sufficiently credible, and because the information conveyed from the caller to the dispatcher described a verbal argument between a man and a woman involving pointing and arm waving, the police dispatcher had a reasonable basis for describing the incident to Officer Mickelson as a verbal domestic dispute. [45] And because Officer Mickelson personally observed the individuals described by the police dispatcher entering the Subaru, because a domestic assault may occur even in the absence of a physical attack, and because the officer's personal experience indicated that incidents of physical domestic violence usually begin as verbal domestic disputes, Officer Mickelson had a strong suspicion that he was responding to an incident where there was a substantial possibility that a crime had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur. The court of appeals erred, therefore, in concluding that Officer Mickelson ... had no objective basis for believing that a crime had occurred or that one was imminent. [46]