Opinion ID: 151783
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitations on Suppression of Electronic Communications

Text: Having determined that the telephone numbers obtained from the interception of the pager have been preserved in a way that does not meet federal requirements, we next consider whether suppression of that evidence and the evidence subsequently obtained from the search warrants that relied in part on that evidence is the appropriate remedy for such a violation. We note that although the ECPA extends many of Title III's regulations and protections to electronic communications, electronic communications are not covered by Title III's general statutory suppression remedy. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(a). Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(c) specifically provides that [t]he remedies and sanctions described in this chapter with respect to the interception of electronic communications are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter involving such communications. As noted in the legislative history of the ECPA, Congress sought to limit suppression of electronic communications to those instances in which the Fourth Amendment has been violated, except where the statute provides an exclusionary remedy in specific circumstances (we discuss one such instance below). The Senate Report comments note: subsection 2518(10) of title 18 [was amended] to add a paragraph (c) which provides that with respect to the interception of electronic communications, the remedies and sanctions described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions available for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter involving such communications. In the event that there is a violation of law of a constitutional magnitude, the court involved in a subsequent trial will apply the existing Constitutional law with respect to the exclusionary rule. S.Rep. No. 99-541, at 23 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3577; H.R.Rep. No. 99-647, at 48 (1986) (same). The district court held that the government's conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation and ordered the suppression of the contents of the intercepted communications along with all evidence derived from the intercepted communications. In determining whether a constitutional violation occurred here, we are aided by the Supreme Court's opinion in Ojeda Rios. There, the Court noted that the recording and sealing requirements of § 2518(8)(a) are designed to ensure the reliability and integrity of evidence obtained by means of electronic surveillance. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. at 263, 110 S.Ct. 1845. Those requirements are evidentiary in nature and were enacted to ensure that the intercepted communications are admissible under the rules of evidence rather than to protect privacy interests. See United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 719 (4th Cir.1977). In Clerkley, the Fourth Circuit declined to suppress evidence after the agents failed to record it, noting that [t]here is no indication that § 2518(8)(a) was intended to or could fulfill the same function as exhaustion of investigatory procedures, judicial authorization and review, and minimization in protecting an individual's right to privacy. Id.; see also United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 442 (8th Cir.1976) (citing to the legislative history of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 in finding that the purpose of § 2518(8)(a) is to ensure admissibility of intercepted communications at trial). We agree. The failure properly to record communications may result in difficulties in admitting such communications into evidence, but it does not follow that such difficulties result in a constitutional violation. Indeed, our own Court has indicated that the sealing requirement under § 2518(8)(a) is not a constitutional exclusionary device but is, rather, a statutory safeguard designed to insure the integrity of the evidence. See United States v. Ricco, 566 F.2d 433, 437 n. 3 (2d Cir.1977) (The sealing requirement is not a 4th Amendment exclusionary device, but a statutory safeguard designed to indicate the necessary reliability of evidence ....) (quoting approvingly from appellant's reply brief). In concluding that the government's failure to seal rose to the level of a constitutional violation, the district court relied on a footnote from United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977), which states that the notice and return provisions [of Title III] satisfy constitutional requirements. Id. at 429 n. 19, 97 S.Ct. 658. The district court's reliance is misplaced. In Donovan, the defendants did not allege a violation of the recording and sealing requirements of § 2518(8)(a), but, rather, that the Government had failed to comply with the notice and inventory requirements of § 2518(8)(d). Nor did the defendants allege that the Government's violation of § 2518(8)(d) rose to the level of a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the issue of whetherand whena violation of § 2518(8)(a) might also be an error of constitutional magnitude was not before the Court in Donovan. Further, in the Donovan footnote relied on by the district court, the Supreme Court cited to its decision in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). In Katz, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction based on evidence obtained by agents conducting electronic surveillance of the defendant's telephone conversationsbecause the agents had not first obtained a warrant authorizing the use of electronic recording devices. The Court observed that, while the agents in that specific case had failed to obtain authorization for the recording, generally a federal court may empower government agents to employ a concealed electronic device so long as the warrant authorizing such surveillance afforded similar protections to those ... of conventional warrants authorizing the seizure of tangible evidence. Katz, 389 U.S. at 355, 88 S.Ct. 507 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, [t]hrough these protections, no greater invasion of privacy was permitted than was necessary under the circumstances. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The footnote in Donovan and the holding in Katz lead to the well-established conclusion that law enforcement authorities seeking to engage in electronic surveillance must comply with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Those authorities do not, however, require us to determine that violations of § 2518(8)(a) are per se constitutional violations. Given that the purpose of the statute's recording and sealing requirements is to protect the integrity of the evidence, see Ricco, 566 F.2d at 437 n. 3, and that we have held that a Fourth Amendment claim based on the violation of the statutory requirement for prompt sealing would not be sustainable, id. at 436, we cannot conclude that the violations of § 2518(8)(a) in this case automatically rise to the level of constitutional errors. This does not mean that the failure properly to record and seal could never implicate a privacy right. See United States v. Paredes-Moya, 722 F.Supp. 1402, 1408 (N.D.Tex.1989) (Because the purpose of [§ 2518(8)(a)] is evidentiary, failure to record is not a ground for exclusion of the wiretap evidence absent an allegation that incriminating statements were taken out of context while omitting related mitigating statements.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665 (5th Cir.1991). By itself, however, the failure to record and seal does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Here, Appellees focus only on the investigators' recording methods and their resulting inability to seal the evidence obtained. Appellees do not assert that the investigators selectively omitted any mitigating pager communications or otherwise intruded on their Fourth Amendment rights. Under these circumstances, therefore, we conclude that Appellees have failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation. Absent a constitutional violation, blanket suppression of the intercepted communications and all evidence derived therefrom is inappropriate. There are within Title III, however, remedial provisions that do apply.