Opinion ID: 835146
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: RPC 3.3(a)(1), RPC 8.4(a)(3), and RPC 8.4(a)(4)

Text: RPC 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from making a false statement to a tribunal. RPC 8.4(a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law. RPC 8.4(a)(4), as earlier discussed in connection with the Brady-Aiello matter, prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Bar alleged, and the trial panel found, that the accused violated each of those rules by representing in his several motions to abate and postpone, and in his declarations in support of those motions, that his disciplinary proceeding was on appeal as of October 15, 2006. [14] Without any development of the point, the accused merely states in his summary of facts that his representation was true. As the trial panel concluded, however, the accused's sworn representation that his disciplinary case was on appeal was patently not true. The procedural facts pertinent to the issue are straightforward. This court had issued its decision on June 8, 2006. The accused timely petitioned for reconsideration, and this court denied the petition on August 15, 2006. The appellate judgment issued the next day. As a result, the accused's suspension went into effect on October 15, 2006. On that same date, the accused filed the motions representing that his disciplinary matter was on appeal. That was not so. The accused, as of that date, had pursued to conclusion the only appellate remedy available to him as a matter of right viz., review by this court. His only remaining remedies were discretionary ones, and he had taken no action to pursue any of them. To be sure, the accused evidently intended to seek discretionary review by the United States Supreme Courtas opposed to appeal as a matter of right, which was not available to him. [15] He had not done so, however. And the accused, we presume, likewise intended to apply for a stay by this court, as he later did on November 13, 2006, without success. When the accused represented in his motions that his disciplinary case was on appeal, however, no appellate proceeding was pending. This court had issued its appellate decision several months before; the appellate judgment had issued; the Bar had written the accused advising him when his suspension would take effect; and the suspension had become effective on the very day that the accused prepared, dated, and signed the motions containing the representation. As the trial panel concluded, the accused falsely represented in his several motions to abate and postpone that his disciplinary matter was on appeal. The trial panel further concluded that the accused knew that the representations were false. The trial panel explained: The Accused clarified during trial that what he meant by this statement was that the case was still pending before the Oregon Supreme Court. He acknowledged that as of October 15, 2006, the Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was not yet in the works, and the motion to stay his suspension filed with the Oregon Supreme Court was not filed until almost a month after the [] October 15 motions were prepared and filed. The declarations to the various trial courts regarding the status of Paulson II were false and the Accused knew they were false at the time he made them. Each of the `declarations' filed by the Accused include the statement `I hereby declare that the above statements are based on personal knowledge, are true to the best of my knowledge and belief, and I understand they are made for use as evidence in Court and are subject to penalty for perjury.' Thus, it would seem that the Accused was well aware of the importance of telling the truth to these trial courts. (Transcript citations omitted.) The trial panel further found that the accused's false representations in his motions to postpone and abate were designed to mislead. In that regard, the trial panel specially noted that, based on its observations of the accused throughout the disciplinary hearing before the trial panel, the accused was someone who chooses his words carefully to convey an intended meaning. That demeanorbased observationthat the accused deliberately crafts his words for an intended effectled the trial panel to expressly find that, [i]n the declarations at issue here, he chose words to convey a meaning that was not true. We believe he did this deliberately, to add strength to his motion. [16] We defer to that express, credibility-based determination on the trial panel's part, which, in all events, is confirmed by our de novo review of the record. See generally Fitzhenry, 343 Or. at 103, 162 P.3d 260 (discussing when court defers to credibility-based findings of disciplinary trial panel). The trial panel concluded that the accused, by deliberately making a false statement in his several circuit court motions, violated each of several rules. We agree. We find that the accused's intentional conduct in making the false representations in his several circuit court motions violated RPC 3.3(a)(1) (knowingly making a false statement of law or fact to a tribunal), RPC 8.4(a)(3) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law), and 8.4(a)(4) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).