Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction Precluding Jury From Considering Defendant's Statements on a VESI Videotape for Their Truth

Text: As noted, ante (pts. II.B.5. & 9.), two videotapes of defendant answering questions from the VESI were played for the jury at the sanity phase. For that phase of trial, the jury was instructed that defendant's answers were not to be considered for their truth but only as demonstrating the basis for some of the medical experts' opinions. [27] That instruction was imported into the penalty phase when the trial court instructed the jury that all other instructions previously read to you which you find to be applicable to this part of the trial should be considered by you in reaching a decision as to the penalty to be imposed. After retiring to deliberate, the jury sent out a note, asking about the permissible way it could consider the VESI videotapes. The trial court instructed the jury: I will simply repeat the instruction that I gave you several times during the course of the trial and the video tape was played in the second phase of the trial. It is received and it may be considered by you only as supplying a part of a basis of this particular doctor's opinion. It may not be used for the truth of anything stated on the video tape, and to the extent that the doctor's opinion as reflected by the video tape played a part in this decision, yes, it can be used in that manner. But as I say, it is not to be used as the establishing of any fact, the truth of any fact that may have been stated on the tape. Just as when a doctor examines a patient in person and that patient made certain statements to the doctor about his condition, those statements may not be used for the truth of what was told the doctor but simply may be considered as a basis or part of a basis of the doctor's subsequent opinions. Although defendant did not object to the trial court's initial instruction or its reinstruction, he now complains that both were erroneous, and that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object. We disagree. Defendant's statements on the VESI videotapes were hearsay insofar as they might be considered for their truth, and we have implicitly concluded that, with some exceptions, the hearsay rule applies at the penalty phase of a capital trial. (See People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 68-71, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433 (plur. opn. of Broussard, J.); id. at p. 75, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433 (dis. opn. of Kaus, J.); People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 371, 52 Cal. Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.); see People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 372, 78 Cal.Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395 [under the then applicable death penalty law, [o]bjectionable hearsay evidence is no more admissible at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase].) Defendant argues the jury should have been permitted to consider the nonhearsay elements of the videotapes, such as defendant's demeanor, physical reaction to questions, and remorse. We do not read the trial court's instruction as precluding consideration of defendant's demeanor or physical reactions. In any event, even assuming the court erroneously deprived the jury of this evidence, there is no reasonable possibility the jury would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the alleged error. Defendant also contends that, given the finality of the death penalty, penalty phase juries should not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the accused's character that would permit the jury to return a sentence less than death, citing Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973. Stated differently, defendant would have us conclude that, because the death penalty is involved, we should dispense with traditional state-law-based rules of evidence. He cites Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738 in support. We previously addressed and rejected this broad reading of Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738, in People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481. In that case, the defendant claimed the trial court erred by refusing to modify an instruction so as to permit the jury to consider for their truth certain videotapes defendant had made while under the influence of sodium amytal. ( Id. at p. 833, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) We considered the rule of Green v. Georgia , in which the high court held that due process concerns could override state evidentiary rules at the penalty phase of a capital trial in circumstances where the evidence in question was highly relevant and reliable. ( Stanley, supra, at pp. 838-839, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) We concluded the videotapes bore no special indicia of reliability, so the rule did not require the trial court to dispense with the hearsay rule. Although we have recognized the potential importance of Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. 95, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738, explaining that [exclusion of hearsay testimony at a penalty phase may violate a defendant's due process rights if the excluded testimony is highly relevant to an issue critical to punishment and substantial reasons exist to assume the evidence is reliable ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 238, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145), the rule is not implicated in this case. The VESI videotapes were made by defendant to support his claim of insanity, and we cannot conclude they were particularly reliable as a result. Although defendant claims their reliability was shown by the testimony of other witnesses confirming that he had served in Vietnam and came home a changed person, we agree with respondent that such evidence shows only that defendant's assertions on the videotapes that he had served in Vietnam were not lies. The testimony of other witnesses cannot confirm the substance of defendant's war experiences, which is the aspect of his VESI responses that he claims is mitigating. In any event, even assuming for argument that the trial court should not have instructed the jury that it could consider the VESI videotapes only for a limited purpose, we agree with respondent that any error was harmless because the videotapes included potentially aggravating evidence. As defendant argued earlier when he claimed counsel was ineffective for eliciting damaging evidence on the videotapes and then failing to seek a redaction before they were played for the jury, the videotapes included such information as defendant saying women existed for his sexual satisfaction, that he hated all women except his mother, and that he had raped other women. These statements, if made available to the jury for their truth, could only have emboldened the jury to impose the death penalty. We conclude the trial court did not err in limiting the jury's consideration of the VESI videotapes to using them as a basis for the expert psychiatric testimony. Any contrary ruling would have permitted defendant to give self-serving testimony free from cross-examination as to its validity. ( People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 839, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) Even assuming the instruction was erroneous, defendant was not prejudiced thereby. It follows that counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the instruction.