Opinion ID: 2448088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of the 1990 Bills

Text: Appellant claims that, as H.B. 974 was signed by the governor twenty-six days after S.B. 563, H.B. 974's repeal of Chapter 460 should be read as also repealing the sections reenacted in S.B. 563. Appellant cites a nineteenth century court of appeals case, Lang v. Calloway, 68 Mo.App. 393 (1897), as support for this claim. Appellant is incorrect for two reasons. First, to the extent that Lang implies a later in time rule for laws adopted in the same session, that decision was erroneous. The general rule in Missouri is and has been that acts adopted in the same session are to be construed in harmony, and, if they cannot be construed in harmony, then the more specific act takes precedence over the general. See Hull v. Baumann, 345 Mo. 159, 131 S.W.2d 721, 725 (1939); State v. Harris, 337 Mo. 1052, 87 S.W.2d 1026, 1029 (1936). In this case, it is clear that S.B. 563 is the more specific of the two actsamending two sections of Chapter 460 where H.B. 974 repeals the entire chapter. The logical underpinnings for this rule of construction are found in Article III, § 29 of the Missouri Constitution and § 1.130 RSMo 1986, and their predecessors, which create a uniform effective date for all laws passed in the same session of the legislature. Implicit in this provision is the recognition that the actual dates when the governor approves a bill or when the General Assembly passes a bill are not legally significant (except for emergency laws adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article III, § 29 of the Missouri Constitution). The history of these two bills demonstrates that point. Each house passed its own bill first. H.B. 974, however, was amended by the Senate, while S.B. 563 was not amended by the House. These amendments had no connection, however, with Chapter 460. These amendments did have the effect of requiring the House to approve the amended version of H.B. 974 after approving S.B. 563. As the Senate passed S.B. 563 before the House passed the original version of H.B. 974, appellant's argument requires the assumption that approximately two-thirds of the House members changed their minds twice about the existence of §§ 460.100, 460.250 in the space of 80 days with the second change occurring within the space of two weeks after the House's passage of S.B. 563. Both bills, however, were signed by the legislative presiding officers and presented to the governor on the same date. The effect of appellant's argument would be to give the governor a new veto power in these circumstances. Such a power would be contrary to the terms of Article III, § 31 of the Missouri Constitution and to the intent underlying that section. Thus appellant's argument is erroneous on the effect of the governor's date of approval on the validity of Chapter 460. Under the Missouri Constitution, both S.B. 563 and H.B. 974 have the same effective date. Mo. Const. Art. III, § 29. Therefore, neither is later in time for the purposes of statutory construction; and Lang is irrelevant to the present case. Second, even if Lang were relevant, it would dictate giving effect to S.B. 563. Under Lang , bills passed in the same session of the General Assembly were read in pari materia; and a bill passed later in the same session would not be read to repeal a prior bill unless the later bill expressly repealed the prior bill or the two provisions inherently conflict. That is not the case with the two bills at issue here. H.B. 974 does not expressly repeal S.B. 563 nor is there any clear conflict between the two bills. Both S.B. 563 and H.B. 974 repeal the version of §§ 460.100 and 460.250 in effect on August 27, 1990. While H.B. 974 repeals the provisions governing appointment of a trustee for an inmate, it does not prohibit a court from using its inherent powers to appoint such a trustee. As such, H.B. 974 can be read harmoniously with S.B. 563. Therefore, H.B. 974 does not operate to repeal §§ 460.100, 460.250 RSMo.Supp.1990. Appellant also claims that these two sections, §§ 460.100 and 460.250 RSMo.Supp. 1990, cannot legally stand alone, for lack of substance. These two sections empower the trustee of an imprisoned convict and authorize compensation for the trustee. Appellant's claim is based on the lack of specific provisions dealing with the procedures governing a Chapter 460 trustee. The failure of the General Assembly to enact specific procedures for the appointment of Chapter 460 trustees is not a fatal flaw. This Court has the power to make procedural rules governing all legal matters subject only to the limitations of federal law and the Missouri Constitution. Mo. Const., Art. V, § 5. In addition, the provisions of Chapter 456 contain procedures that can apply to all trustees including Chapter 460 trustees.