Opinion ID: 1103334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: motion to suppressdna

Text: A trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress is clothed with a presumption of correctness with regard to determinations of historical fact. However, appellate courts must independently review mixed questions of law and fact. See Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001) ([T]he determination of whether the application of the law to the historical facts establishes an adequate basis for the trial court's ruling is subject to de novo review.). Fitzpatrick claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the DNA results obtained from his blood sample because he did not give voluntary consent but was merely acquiescing to the authorities' requests to avoid violating his parole and being returned to prison. In this action, Fitzpatrick's parole officer, George Kranz, testified in a suppression hearing that he never informed Fitzpatrick that if Fitzpatrick did not cooperate with the authorities he was going to revoke Fitzpatrick's parole. Kranz testified that he simply advised [Fitzpatrick] that the best course of action was for him to be truthful in all matters, and that it would be reported. All he needed to do was be truthful. This Court has held that a confession is not rendered inadmissible because the police tell the accused that it would be easier on him if he told the truth. Bush v. State, 461 So.2d 936, 939 (Fla. 1984). Fitzpatrick's consent, therefore, is not rendered involuntary because his parole officer advised him that it would be easier on him if he stated the truth. Further, Kranz testified that he informed Fitzpatrick that everything would be reported whether he answered truthfully or not. This testimony does not indicate that Kranz promised Fitzpatrick that only by cooperating with the police would Fitzpatrick avoid violating his parole and being returned to prison. The testimony reveals that Kranz merely told Fitzpatrick that the information he provided would be given to the parole commission, irrespective of whether Fitzpatrick cooperated or not, simply to keep the parole commission informed regarding the situation. Kranz's explaining to Fitzpatrick that he would inform the parole commission, regardless of whether Fitzpatrick cooperated, supports our determination that Kranz's conversation with Fitzpatrick does not rise to the level of coercion sufficient to render Fitzpatrick's statement involuntary. Moreover, even if there was police misconduct in pressuring Fitzpatrick to provide a blood sample, the DNA evidence was properly admitted because Fitzpatrick's DNA would ultimately have been discovered. In Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984), the United States Supreme Court adopted the inevitable discovery exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Under this exception, evidence obtained as the result of unconstitutional police procedure may still be admissible provided the evidence would ultimately have been discovered by legal means. Maulden v. State, 617 So.2d 298, 301 (Fla.1993). In adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Supreme Court explained, Exclusion of physical evidence that would inevitably have been discovered adds nothing to either the integrity or fairness of a criminal trial. Nix, 467 U.S. at 446, 104 S.Ct. 2501. In making a case for inevitable discovery, the State must demonstrate that at the time of the constitutional violation an investigation was already under way. Moody v. State, 842 So.2d 754, 759 (Fla.2003) (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 457, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)); see also Jeffries v. State, 797 So.2d 573, 578 (Fla. 2001); Maulden, 617 So.2d at 301. In other words, the case must be in such a posture that the facts already in the possession of the police would have led to this evidence notwithstanding the police misconduct. See Moody, 842 So.2d at 759. In this case, the police had initiated an investigation of Fitzpatrick prior to requesting a blood sample. See id. (determining that the evidence did not support the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine where the police had not initiated any investigation of the defendant for the murder prior to the police misconduct, and the police had no reason to suspect the defendant had any involvement in the murder). The record reveals that the police considered Fitzpatrick a suspect prior to requesting a blood sample from him based on evidence that Fitzpatrick was the last person to be seen with Romines alive leaving Howard's house at approximately midnight three hours before she was found. Based on this evidence, requesting a blood sample from Fitzpatrick or obtaining it through a warrant would have been a normal investigative measure that would have occurred regardless of any police impropriety. See Jeffries, 797 So.2d at 578 (concluding that the evidence would have been found independently by means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure). Therefore, even if Fitzpatrick's consent to the taking of his blood was involuntary, the error is harmless because the police had probable cause for a warrant requiring a blood sample, and the blood sample would have been inevitably obtained.