Opinion ID: 2627584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Opportunity to assert her constitutional challenges

Text: [¶ 46] Having concluded that Ms. Yoeuth had standing, in her own right, to challenge the initial stop, her subsequent detention, and the search of the trunk, we turn to the next part of her argument, as stated in the reply brief: Ms. Yoeuth desired to dispute the existence of probable cause for the stop on two grounds and was prohibited from doing so by the trial court's erroneous oral ruling on standing. The two grounds she desires to raise are the incredibility of the officer's testimony and the conduct of the officer in creating the circumstances that he used to justify the stop. (Emphasis added.) This contention is contradicted by the record. [¶ 47] As noted above, Ms. Yoeuth agreed to a joint hearing with Mr. Loo on their motions to suppress. At the joint hearing, counsel for Ms. Yoeuth was given an opportunity to participate fully and completely in the hearing, and she did so. She had an opportunity to cross-examine Trooper Green, and she did so. The prosecution made one objection during this cross-examination, and it was overruled. None of the evidence offered by Ms. Yoeuth was excluded by the district court. Even if it harbored doubts about Ms. Yoeuth's standing, the district court placed no boundaries or limits on the questions her counsel asked Trooper Green. The district court's questions about standing arose during closing argument, but did not prevent or deter Ms. Yoeuth's counsel from making any arguments she chose on Ms. Yoeuth's behalf. In short, Ms. Yoeuth did have an opportunity to present all of the facts she chose to offer, and all of the arguments she chose to make, in support of her claim that her constitutional rights had been violated. [¶ 48] As counsel for Ms. Yoeuth told the district court in the exchange quoted above, Ms. Yoeuth is incorporated into Mr. Loo's argument that if his stop is deemed illegal and the search is deemed illegal, then hers  the evidence against her should be suppressed as well. The district court denied Mr. Loo's motion to suppress. It is apparent from the record that the district court either denied Ms. Yoeuth's motion implicitly, or would have done so explicitly. [¶ 49] The record contains the entire transcript of the joint hearing on the motions to suppress, so all of the evidence is before us. The decision letters in Ms. Yoeuth's case and Mr. Loo's case contain very nearly identical recitations of the facts, and deal with Trooper Green's interactions with both Ms. Yoeuth and Mr. Loo. From these detailed findings of fact, we can determine how the district court evaluated the credibility of the witnesses, and weighed the evidence. Compare Wells Fargo Bank Wyoming, N.A., v. Hodder, 2006 WY 128, ¶ 32, 144 P.3d 401, 413 (Wyo. 2006) ([T]he trial court's decision letter sets forth detailed findings of fact, including its assessment of witness credibility, making it possible for this Court to review without re-weighing disputed evidence.). We have affirmed the district court's conclusions of law in Mr. Loo's case. The same legal standards apply in Ms. Yoeuth's case. [¶ 50] Trooper Green testified that he observed a traffic violation when the silver car followed another vehicle too closely. Ms. Yoeuth wants to assert now that the officer's testimony was not credible, but the district court found that testimony credible as a factual matter, and sufficient as a matter of law to establish probable cause to stop the car. Ms. Yoeuth presented no authority, either to the district court or on appeal, suggesting that an officer with probable cause for a traffic stop is permitted to stop the driver but constitutionally prohibited from stopping the passenger. [¶ 51] Ms. Yoeuth's detention by Trooper Green was of lesser scope than Mr. Loo's, involving even fewer questions and broaching no topics beyond those found acceptable in Mr. Loo's case. Her detention was of comparable duration. It was of lesser intensity, as she remained in the rental car while Mr. Loo was taken to the patrol car. There is no indication that Trooper Green behaved any differently toward Ms. Yoeuth than he did toward Mr. Loo. Because Ms. Yoeuth's detention was reasonable in scope, duration, and intensity, it did not violate her constitutional rights. [¶ 52] The district court found that Trooper Green had reasonably articulable suspicions of illegal activity allowing him to detain Mr. Loo during the dog sniff. The same suspicions applied to Ms. Yoeuth. The district court concluded that the dog's alert at the trunk provided Trooper Green with probable cause to search the trunk. That conclusion applies equally to Mr. Loo and Ms. Yoeuth. In sum, Ms. Yoeuth did have a full opportunity to present the district court with all of the facts and arguments in support of her motion to suppress. She did so, but provided no basis for the district court to reach a different result in her case than it did in Mr. Loo's. On appeal, she provided no basis for this Court to reach a different result. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Ms. Yoeuth's motion to suppress the evidence.