Opinion ID: 2632950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due Process in Neglect and Abuse Proceedings

Text: {12} We have held that neglect and abuse proceedings must be conducted in a manner that affords parents constitutional due process, because [t]he interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is a fundamental liberty interest. In re Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 11, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 746. Therefore, at a minimum, due process in neglect and abuse proceedings requires timely notice reasonably calculated to inform the person concerning the subject and issues involved in the proceeding; a reasonable opportunity to refute or defend against a charge or accusation; a reasonable opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and present evidence on the charge or accusation; representation by counsel, when such representation is required by constitution or statute; and a hearing before an impartial decision-maker. Id. ¶ 12 (quoting State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Lorena R ., 1999-NMCA-035, ¶ 26, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164) (internal quotation marks omitted). {13} In her pro se motions, Mother requested the appointment of an expert to give her a second opinion at the cost of the State, because she was indigent. On appeal she argues that an expert would almost certainly have significantly decreased the risk of an erroneous decision by allowing full evaluation by the court of Dr. Campbell's conclusions and full consideration of alternative explanations for Child's condition. {14} [D]ue process is a flexible right and the amount of process due depends on the particular circumstances of each case. State ex rel. Children, Youth & Families Dep't v. Lorena R. (In re Ruth Anne E.), 1999-NMCA-035, ¶ 17, 126 N.M. 670, 974 P.2d 164. In Pamela A.G., this Court adopted the well-known test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to determine whether the trial court's procedures met the requirements of due process. Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 13, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 746. This test requires the consideration and balancing of three factors: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the government's interest; and (3) whether the procedures used by the trial court increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. Id.; see also Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 19, 133 N.M. 827, 70 P.3d 1266. A parent's interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child and the government's interest are strong countervailing interests, id. ¶ 20, which are equally significant. Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 13, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 746. Therefore, the determinative factor is whether the procedures used by the trial court increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's interest, and whether additional or substitute safeguards would eliminate or lower that risk. Mafin M., 2003-NMSC-015, ¶ 20, 133 N.M. 827, 70 P.3d 1266. This determination does not depend on whether the parent can prove that he or she would have prevailed with additional or substitute safeguards. Pamela A.G., 2006-NMSC-019, ¶ 14, 139 N.M. 459, 134 P.3d 746. The parent need only demonstrate that there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome might have been different. Id. (quoting Maria C., 2004-NMCA-083, ¶ 37, 136 N.M. 53, 94 P.3d 796) (internal quotation marks omitted). {15} The main issue at the adjudicatory proceeding in the present case was the cause of Child's injuries. This is a complex issue that is difficult to address without expert assistance. See Laderer v. St. Rita's Med. Ctr., 122 Ohio App.3d 587, 598, 702 N.E.2d 476, 483 (1997) (Expert testimony is needed on complex issues outside the area of common knowledge, such as an injury's cause and effect.). The only expert to testify was CYFD's expert, who also served as the medical director for CYFD. The trial court based its conclusion that Mother abused Child almost exclusively on the expert's determination that the only possible cause of Child's injuries was manual strangulation. {16} Thus, in certain circumstances, due process may require the appointment of an expert witness at the State's expense to an indigent parent in a neglect and abuse proceeding. We hold that when there is an increased risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's interest without the appointment of an expert, an indigent parent is entitled to the appointment of an expert witness at the State's expense. {17} However, due to the particular facts and circumstances of the present case, unless Mother has an expert willing to testify regarding alternative causes of Child's injuries, we cannot determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial might have been different. Thus, we conclude that whether there was an increased risk of an erroneous deprivation of Mother's interest depends on whether she has such an expert. The record is unclear. The record shows that Mother gave the name of a doctor to her attorney to contact regarding an alternative theory of the cause of Child's injuries. At the pretrial hearing, Mother's attorney stated that he still needed to interview this doctor and another potential witness. However, the expert did not testify at the adjudicatory proceeding. Thus, we do not know whether Mother's attorney contacted the doctor or any other expert. It is possible that the attorney contacted the doctor or searched for other potential experts and could not locate one, or decided that an expert would not be helpful to Mother's defense. {18} Therefore, before we can conclude that without the appointment of an expert there was an increased risk of an erroneous deprivation of Mother's interest, further proceedings in the trial court are necessary. Mother must show that she has a viable expert, that is, one who will testify regarding alternative causes of Child's injuries.