Opinion ID: 1279007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The majority opinion overly complicates the issue and, by doing so, loses sight of the precise nature of the Association's challenge. The Association's challenge is that the County does not have authority to issue a CUP for the effected property. This is a classic issue for review by writ of certiorari. Interstate Power Co., Inc. v. Nobles County of Comm'rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Minn.2000) (ruling that the denial of a CUP is a quasi-judicial act that is reviewable by certiorari). The fact that the underlying basis for the Association's claim of lack of authority is that the County has not completed the zoning process that is a prerequisite to the issuance of a CUP is not a challenge to the legislative policy choices the County might make in the process of zoning. To the contrary, the Association complains because the County has not made those legislative policy choices. The challenge thus does not require review of legislative policy issues, which might raise separation-of-powers concerns, but only review of the statutes and regulations that confer authority to issue CUPs for development of shorelands of public waters. That challenge involves the interpretation of statutes and regulations, a task for which this court is particularly well suited and for which no deference need be given to the County. [11] It is conceivable that a challenge to the issuance of a CUP may, by its nature, be only a disguised challenge to the legislative zoning decisions made by the governmental body. But that is not the nature of the Association's challenge here because it focuses on the statutory authority for a county to issue a CUP for shoreland development. To the extent that zoning is part of the background, it is clearly ancillary to our jurisdiction to review by certiorari the quasi-judicial act of issuing a CUP. Further, while I agree with the first part of the majority's observation, that [d]isposition of this case on the merits would involve resolution of the question of whether the County may use the CUP process to develop lake property parcel by parcel, I do not agree with the second part, that disposition would require resolution of whether the County must engage in a zoning process that provides notice to the public as to how a particular parcel of land will be developed. The Association seeks to vacate the CUP based upon a negative answer to the first question. But the Association does not ask us to compel the County to engage in zoning. [12] To the contrary, if the Association is correct that the County cannot issue a CUP until it has completed zoning, the Association would likely be pleased if the County does not engage in zoning. The points to emphasize on jurisdiction are that the Association challenges the authority of the County to issue a CUP; the challenge is based on the statute and the regulations on shoreland development; the remedy requested is that the CUP be vacated; and the only record necessary for the review of the challenge is the CUP, the ordinance, the regulations and the statute. No testimony need or should be taken and no findings are required, or even appropriate. In fact, the district court would do exactly what we would do  review the CUP in light of the Ordinance, the regulations and the statute. We would then review the district court's conclusions de novo. Because I do not see the need to examine any legislative actions of the County, or the need to develop a record before the district court, I would conclude that we have jurisdiction.