Opinion ID: 844248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grand Jury Selection Process

Text: Defendant contends that the judicial nomination process long used in Los Angeles County to select prospective grand jurorsa process that led to the random draw of the grand juries that indicted defendant and, presumably, countless other personsinvolved intentional and invidious discrimination, and resulted in the substantial underrepresentation of women and Hispanics in the grand jury pools. The claim is based upon the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Defendant seeks automatic reversal of the indicted counts, including capital murder. In our view, no constitutional violation or reversible error occurred.
On June 3, 1993, the Grand Jury of Los Angeles County returned an indictment, which was filed in superior court, charging defendant with the Finzel crimes. [7] In a separate superior court case, an information was filed on November 30, 1993, charging defendant with burglary of the Kozak residence. Both cases were consolidated for trial on May 12, 1994. On May 23, 1994, defendant moved in writing to dismiss the indictment. At the hearing on November 4, 1994, defendant argued that the grand jury selection process discriminated against women and Hispanics, and thus violated the equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as set forth in Castaneda v. Partida (1977) 430 U.S. 482 [51 L.Ed.2d 498, 97 S.Ct. 1272] ( Castaneda ). Defendant claimed he had made a prima facie case, which the People did not rebut, by showing that both groups were substantially underrepresented in Los Angeles County Grand Jury pools over time, and that the nominating process was highly subjective and susceptible of abuse as applied. ( Id. at p. 497.) The prosecutor replied that to the extent the two cases conflict, Castaneda had been superseded by Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664] ( Duren ), which prohibits systematic exclusion in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. ( Duren, at p. 364.) The prosecutor insisted, however, that nothing in Duren affected Castaneda' s requirement that, for equal protection purposes, the defense actually has the burden of proving intentional discrimination. Extensive evidence was admitted at the hearing through (1) live witness testimony, (2) documentary exhibits, and (3) other voluminous materials that the court judicially noticed from the record in an unrelated criminal case. [8] First and foremost, two superior court employees, Gloria Gomez and Juanita Blankenship, testified about the Los Angeles grand jury selection process, as follows: [9] Unlike trial jurors, who are randomly summoned from Department of Motor Vehicle lists and voter registration rolls, grand jurors perform a voluntary public service and are not, in Blankenship's word, draftees of the court. A full-time commitment is involved. Grand jurors serve for one year. [10] They meet four or five days a week. The pay is $25 a day, plus mileage costs. Blankenship alluded to certain statutory eligibility requirements for grand jury service. Some, she noted, also apply to trial jurors (e.g., being a citizen age 18 or older, knowing the English language, and having no felony convictions). However, only grand jurors have a one-year county residence requirement, and cannot hold elective office. According to both witnesses, all grand jurors are first nominated by a superior court judge. At the time of Blankenship's testimony, there were 238 judges on the Los Angeles County Superior Court. Each judge is allowed to nominate up to two persons a year. However, nothing prevents any judge from nominating only one person or making no nomination at all. Blankenship made clear that there are two ways to be nominated: (1) be known to the judge or make yourself known to the judge and ask to be nominated (direct nominees), or (2) volunteer to be a candidate for a nomination (volunteer candidates). Either way, the person completes the same standard application, which the nominating judge eventually signs. It gives applicants the option of disclosing race or ethnicity, and seeks a brief biographical statement. The jury commissioner hands or mails an application to every person who requests one. It can be returned by mail or in person. For volunteer candidates (as opposed to direct nominees), submission of an application triggers a formal interview process. The person meets, at random, with one of the judges serving on the court's grand and trial juror committee (Committee). The interview concerns statutory requirements and qualifications for grand jury service, as set forth in written guidelines promulgated by the Committee. [11] Blankenship testified that the guidelines, in addressing technical and clerical skills, do not seek to exclude applicants who lack office jobs or college degrees. Gomez noted that administrative skills bear on the grand jury's civil function. After the interview, the interviewing Committee judge assigns a rating, and notes it on the form, as the guidelines provide. Copies of all applications submitted by volunteer candidates are distributed for nomination purposes to every judge on the superior court. As with direct nominees, a volunteer candidate is nominated when any one judge signs the form. A tentative list of grand jury nominees is published in the newspaper, and circulated to the entire superior court to lodge any objection. In Blankenship's experience, such objections are rare, and typically involve conflicts of interest, such as when a nominee is related to a sitting judge. (See ante, fn. 11.) Once this process is complete, a final list of nominees is compiled, filed, and published. According to Blankenship, the grand jury pool typically consists of 150 to 175 nominees. Many are volunteer candidates. [12] The next step is a random blind draw from a jury wheel of the names of 40 prospective grand jurors and 10 alternates. The sheriff's department conducts criminal record checks of these 50 individuals. The names of those nominees who survive this check are again placed in the jury wheel. Another random blind draw then occurs to select the actual grand jury. Gomez testified that there are 23 grand jurors and four alternate jurors in Los Angeles County. Both Blankenship and Gomez described the superior court's ongoing campaign to recruit grand jurors from a broad cross-section of Los Angeles County residents. In Blankenship's words, substantial affirmative efforts are made to attract Hispanics and members of other minority groups. Every year, a press release circulates to over 100 newspapers and media organizations, including most Spanish-language outlets. Public service announcements run in both English and Spanish on television and radio stations. Recruitment letters are sent to community groups, public officials, and consulates countywide. Judges personally consult with Hispanic community groups on the issue. [13] In a related vein, the record includes a sample Nomination Form. Consistent with Blankenship's testimony, the form asks grand jury applicants to disclose their race or ethnicity (e.g., Caucasian, Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Other Minority), and states that such information is optional and voluntary. The following explanation appears nearby: Recent Supreme Court decisions place added emphasis on the ethnic makeup of the pool from which Grand Jurors are drawn. Your answer will assist the Judges of the Court in establishing full compliance with these decisions. On an adjacent line, applicants are asked to specify whether they were Male or Female. In addition to information about the nominating process, defendant introduced statistical evidence. Regarding women in the grand jury pool, one chart indicated that, based on the 1990 census, women comprised 50 percent of the population of Los Angeles County 18 years and older. Another chart showed the gender of grand jury nominees from the 1986-1987 term through the 1993-1994 term. The percentage of women in the pool ranged from a low of 34 percent one year, to a high of 50 percent another year. However, for five of the other eight years, grand jury nominees were 40 to 45 percent female. At the hearing, defense counsel used an absolute disparity measure, which calculated the difference between the percentage of adult women in the population and the percentage of women in the grand jury pools. Such disparity ranged from zero to 16 percent at each extreme, and otherwise hovered mostly in the 5 to 10 percent range. Finally, demographic testimony by three experts was admitted, in transcribed and judicially noticed form, concerning Hispanics in the grand jury pool. Relying on the 1990 census and other sources, the witnesses used different assumptions, methodologies, and measures, and their calculations produced varying results. Notably, Dr. Nancy Bolton found an absolute disparity of 9.7 percent between the percentage of adult Hispanic citizens in Los Angeles County and the average percentage of Hispanics in the county's grand jury pools over a five-year period between 1986 and 1991. Dr. Bolton also found that 73 percent of the Hispanic volunteer candidates who were interviewed by superior court judges were nominated, compared to only 46 percent of their White counterparts. She inferred that the judges were enriching the Hispanic pool of nominees. By comparison, certain absolute disparity figures gleaned from the testimony of Dr. William Clark10.5 percentand Dr. Dennis Willigan11.4 percentwere similar to, but somewhat higher than, Dr. Bolton's figure. Dr. Clark and Dr. Willigan based these results on the percentage of the Los Angeles County population who were Hispanic voting age citizens and who spoke English well (as opposed to those who spoke only some English or who spoke English very well). Both of these witnesses used the six-year period from 1986 through 1992 to calculate the average percentage of Hispanics in Los Angeles County Grand Jury pools. Dr. Willigan opined that the various disparities might be attributable to judges not knowing, and therefore not nominating, persons from certain racial or ethnic groups. He admitted, however, that whatever goes on in the nomination process, or how or why it does, I don't know. After considering the foregoing evidence, the trial court rejected the grand jury challenge on the ground defendant had not presented a prima facie case of unconstitutional discrimination. In describing the principles and authorities used to make this decision, the court explicitly agreed with the People's position. Based on the above described arguments of the parties, the court apparently believed that Duren, supra, 439 U.S. 357, superseded Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, to some extent, but that the defense retained the burden of proving intentional discrimination under the latter case. In any event, after acknowledging that women and Hispanics were distinctive groups entitled to constitutional protection, the court declined to decide whether there was a meaningful difference between the percentage of women and Hispanics nominated as grand jurors, and the percentage of women and Hispanics in the population eligible for such service. Instead, under the third prong of the test being applied, the court found no evidence of any discriminatory system in place by the superior court. Hence, the motion to dismiss the indictment was denied.
On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court violated equal protection guarantees by purposefully discriminating against women and Hispanics in selecting nominees for the pool from which his grand jury was drawn. We first summarize the statutory scheme which regulates this process, and which gave rise to the challenged procedures. The grand jury scheme, which codified prior law, has been in effect for decades. (See § 888 et seq., added by Stats. 1959, ch. 501, § 2, p. 2443; see also Stats. 1959, ch. 501, § 20, p. 2458; People v. Superior Court ( 1973 Grand Jury ) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 436 & fn. 5 [119 Cal.Rptr. 193, 531 P.2d 761] ( 1973 Grand Jury ).) (1) Each county must have at least one grand jury drawn and impaneled every year. (§ 905; see Cal. Const., art. I, § 23.) The grand jury consists of the required number of persons returned from the citizens of the county before a court of competent jurisdiction, and sworn to inquire into both public offenses within the county and county matters of civil concern. (§ 888; see § 888.2 [specifying required number of grand jurors based on county size]; see also §§ 904.4-904.8 [authorizing additional grand juries depending on county size].) This general authority over both criminal and civil matters involves three functions: (1) weighing criminal charges and deciding whether to present indictments (§ 917), (2) evaluating misconduct claims against public officials and deciding whether to formally seek their removal from office (§ 922), and (3) acting as the public's watchdog by investigating and reporting upon local government affairs. (§§ 919-921, 925 et seq.; see McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1170 [245 Cal.Rptr. 774, 751 P.2d 1329] ( McClatchy ).) In counties with a single grand jury, that one body performs all three functions. (See 76 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 181, 182 (1993) [concluding that any additional grand jury authorized by statute is restricted to criminal matters and may not perform civil oversight functions].) [14] (2) In California, unlike other jurisdictions, the grand jury most often plays the civil oversight role. ( McClatchy, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1170; see 1973 Grand Jury, supra, 13 Cal.3d 430, 436, fn. 4 [distinguishing federal grand juries insofar as they do not report on public affairs].) Many statutes identify specific topics of inquiry. [15] In performing its functions, the grand jury operates in secret. (E.g., §§ 915, 924.2, 939; see § 911 [oath].) It may retain auditors, appraisers and other experts (§ 926), and has subpoena power (§ 939.2; see § 921 [access to public records]). At the end of its term, the grand jury must issue a final report to the presiding judge of the superior court (§ 933, subd. (a)), documenting all findings therein. (§ 916; see 1973 Grand Jury, supra, 13 Cal.3d 430, 434 [interim report].) (3) As shown by the testimony here, grand jurors must be citizens age 18 or older and have resided in the county for at least one year immediately before their service begins. (§ 893, subd. (a)(1).) A person who serves on this body also must have sufficient knowledge of the English language to perform the grand jury function ( id., subd. (a)(3)), and be in possession of his natural faculties, of ordinary intelligence, of sound judgment, and of fair character ( id., subd. (a)(2)). [16] The county pays grand jurors a modest daily fee, and reimburses mileage costs, upon the order of the superior court. (§§ 890, 890.1.) (4) The Legislature has vested the superior court with responsibility for selecting grand jury members. (See 1973 Grand Jury, supra, 13 Cal.3d 430, 438 & fn. 8 [noting close statutory relationship between grand jury and convening court].) Shortly before the county fiscal year begins, the court makes an order estimating the number of grand jurors required for that year. (§ 895.) Thereafter, the court shall select the grand jurors required by personal interview for the purpose of ascertaining whether they possess the qualifications prescribed by subdivision (a) of Section 893. (§ 896, subd. (a).) If, in the opinion of the court, these qualifications are met, the person selected must sign a statement declaring that he will be available for the number of hours required of grand jurors in the county. ( Ibid. ) The court makes a list of the prospective grand jurors it has selected, and gives it to the jury commissioner. (§ 896, subd. (b).) After receiving and filing the list of prospective grand jurors, the jury commissioner publishes it in a newspaper of general circulation, along with the name of the judge who selected each person on the list. (§ 900.) The jury commissioner then randomly draws the names from the `grand jury box,' using one of two methods. ( Id., subds. (a) [folded slips of paper], (b) [numbered markers].) Once drawn, the grand jury is certified and summoned (§ 906), and the grand jury is impaneled. (§ 905; see § 909 [before accepting anyone drawn as grand juror, court must be satisfied that they are duly qualified].) [17] Against this statutory backdrop, and based on the evidentiary record, defendant contends the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to present a prima facie case that the grand jury nomination process violated federal equal protection guaranties. He insists all essential elements were present under Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, to wit, substantial underrepresentation of a distinct class (women and Hispanics) in the grand jury pool over time, and a highly subjective nominating process that was susceptible of abuse. Defendant argues that whether or not any overt racism was shown, the evidence he presented below raised an inference of purposeful and intentional discrimination, which the People did not rebut. We now consider Castaneda in some detail. In Castaneda, defendant Partida was indicted and convicted of a felony in Hidalgo County, Texas, near the Mexican border. In seeking a new trial in state court, he claimed his federal equal protection rights had been denied because of the historical underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on grand juries in the county when he was indicted in 1972. Besides testifying about racial discrimination in the area, Partida introduced evidence from the 1970 census showing that 79.1 percent of the county's population was Mexican-American, and that the group was underprivileged by various socioeconomic measures. Partida also showed that the average representation of Mexican-Americans on grand jury lists over an 11-year period, from 1962 to 1972, was 39 percent. In rebuttal, the state offered no evidence to show that the alleged underrepresentation and discrimination had not occurred. Ultimately, the motion for a new trial was denied, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 485-489.) Partida renewed his equal protection claim on habeas corpus in federal district court. This time, the state outlined some of the procedures used to select grand juries in Hidalgo County, as follows: A state district court judge appointed from three to five jury commissioners. The commissioners, in turn, selected 15 to 20 persons to comprise the list from which the actual grand jury was drawn. When 12 persons on the list appeared by summons in court, the state district judge determined whether they were statutorily qualified to serve, examining them under oath on issues such as citizenship, voting age, literacy, mental soundness and moral character, and criminal record. As soon as the court found 12 qualified persons, they were impaneled as the grand jury. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 484-485.) Also, the state district judge who applied these rulescalled a key man systemtestified that in appointing the commissioners (including a greater number of Mexican-Americans than persons from other ethnic groups), he advised them on the qualifications and exemptions related to grand jury service. However, there was no evidence in any form, including from the commissioners themselves, on the manner in which they compiled the grand jury list. ( Id. at pp. 490-491.) The federal district court declined to grant habeas corpus relief on grounds the prima facie case of discrimination was weak, and sufficient rebuttal had occurred. The court surmised that the statistical evidence overstated the racial imbalance on the grand jury lists, and that it ignored the role of Mexican-Americans as a local governing majority who held prominent posts in the community. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 491-492.) The latter theory referred to the fact that, at the relevant time, a large percentage of Mexican-Americans served, among other things, as jury commissioners, prospective grand jurors, actual grand jurors, and trial jurors in Partida's case. However, the federal circuit court of appeals rejected this analysis and reversed the district court's decision. The court of appeals placed little weight on the governing majority approach, and otherwise found that Partida's prima facie showing of a constitutional violation had not been adequately rebutted by the State. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 491-492.) The United States Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari by the State of Texas, through the Sheriff of Hidalgo County, challenging the equal protection theory on which Partida had prevailed in the federal court of appeals. In a five-to-four decision, accompanied by three dissenting opinions, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court ruling invalidating the state's grand jury selection process. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492, 501; see id. at p. 504 (dis. opn. of Burger, C. J.); see also id. at p. 507 (dis. opns. of Stewart, J., and Powell, J.).) (5) At the outset, Castaneda embraced the venerable notion that equal protection precludes a defendant from being tried under an indictment issued by a grand jury from which persons `of his race or color' have been excluded `because of that race or color.' ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492.) Reviewing its prior decisions, the court observed that such conduct is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact. ( Id. at p. 493, italics omitted.) Rather, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment targets discrimination that is purposeful and intentional ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 493), and that selects grand jurors in a `racially non-neutral' way ( id. at p. 494). In evaluating how the key-man system was applied in Hidalgo County, Castaneda set forth the requirements that a criminal defendant must meet in order to establish a prima facie equal protection violation. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied. [Citation.] Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time.... Finally, [the court noted], a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 494, citations & fn. omitted.) Once the requisite showing has been made, and a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose appears, the burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case. ( Id. at p. 495.) Under this test, Castaneda held, Partida had presented a prima facie case. First, Mexican-Americans were a clearly identifiable class. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 495.) This conclusion rested on the common use of Spanish surnames in the group, and on the socioeconomic disadvantages its members had long endured. Second, Castaneda found the statistical showing clearly sufficient for prima facie case standards. Partida had established a 40 percent disparity between the percentage of Mexican-Americans in the county's population and the average percentage of Mexican-Americans summoned as prospective grand jurors over an 11-year period before he was indicted. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 495-496.) The court further indicated that the constitutional significance of the disparity would not change to the extent the relevant population could be limited, based on the available statistical evidence, to persons who were statutorily eligible to serve as grand jurors. ( Id. at pp. 486, fn. 6 [noting that exclusion of noncitizens resulted in only a negligib[e] 3 percent decrease in the number of Mexican-Americans in the county population], 488, fn. 8 [finding a 26 percent disparity between Mexican-Americans 25 years or older who have some schooling, and are presumably literate, and Mexican-Americans in grand jury pools].) Third, the substantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans in grand jury pools did not end the inquiry. Castaneda proceeded to address the final factor it had identified as bearing on the establishment of a prima facie casethe nature of the grand jury selection process itself. The court noted that, as a general proposition, the key-man system was not inherently unconstitutional, and that it had repeatedly been upheld against facial challenge. However, referring to the Texas system in particular, the court characterized it as both highly subjective and susceptible of abuse as applied. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 497.) In context, such criticisms seemed directed at evidence the court had previously described indicating that no known methods or standards regulated the manner in which the commissioners compiled the grand jury lists. ( Id. at pp. 490-491.) In any event, without further discussion, the court found that an inference of intentional discrimination arose, which the state was required to dispel. ( Id. at pp. 497-498.) In the final analysis, Castaneda determined that the state did not rebut the showing of intentional discrimination that Partida had made. The court emphasized the barren state of the record as to both the motivations and methods of the grand jury commissioners. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 499.) In light of the gross underrepresentation of Hispanics on the grand jury lists, the court indicated that proper rebuttal required some explanation as to how the commissioners determined the other qualifications for grand jurors prior to the statutory time for testing qualifications in state district court. ( Id. at p. 498.) Nor did the governing majority theory devised by the federal district court fill the evidentiary gap. The high court was not willing to assume that members of one definable group would never discriminate against other persons in the same group. It likewise did not matter to the court that certain local officials or prominent persons in Hidalgo County were Mexican-American. ( Id. at p. 499.) For all these reasons, Castaneda concluded that there had been a denial of equal protection in the selection of the grand jury in Partida's case. The United States Supreme Court has referred to Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, sparingly in the 35 years since it was decided, and has had no occasion to apply its equal protection analysis to a key man system under circumstances other than those at issue there. Nevertheless, the high court has reaffirmed, in closely related contexts, that Castaneda involved the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against purposeful and invidious discrimination. Thus, in Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 260-264 [88 L.Ed.2d 598, 106 S.Ct. 617], the court declined to adopt a harmless error standard where the grand jury had been selected in violation of equal protection guaranties. Consistent with a long line of cases, the court observed that such a fundamental structural flaw in the proceedings compelled reversal of the conviction. Few constitutional errors were as grave, the court said, as the state engaging in the intentional exclusion of grand jurors because of their race. ( Id. at p. 262; see Rose v. Mitchell (1979) 443 U.S. 545, 551-559 [61 L.Ed.2d 739, 99 S.Ct. 2993] [similar analysis].) [18] Against this backdrop, we are not entirely certain of the elements of a prima facie equal protection violation sufficient to shift the burden of proof from the defense, and to require rebuttal from the state. On the one hand, Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, speaks broadly of the presumption, or inference, of discriminatory intent raised by the constitutionally significant underrepresentation of a distinct group over time ( id. at p. 494), of the underlying support[] for such inference provided by a selection process that is susceptible of abuse or not racially neutral ( ibid. ), and of the highly subjective and malleable nature of the Texas key-man system in particular ( id. at p. 497). Read in its most literal and absolute manner, such language arguably implies that mere statistical disparity, coupled with some official discretion in the selection of grand jurors, is always sufficient, without more, to raise a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. (6) On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of a grand jury selection systemincluding one less unfettered and more objective than Castaneda' s in which no meaningful discretion guides the nominating process, and which would survive constitutional scrutiny under the foregoing view, assuming the requisite statistical showing was made. As reflected by the statutory requirement of personal interviews for grand jury nominees, and by the individualized screening process that the county used here, it seems inherent in the grand jury itself, and in its civic oversight role and strict schedule, that persons nominated and selected to that body not only be eligible and qualified to serve, but that they also be willing and able to do so. For this pragmatic reason, perhaps, Castaneda recognized that key-man systems are not unconstitutional per se, absent any evidence or inference of discriminatory intent as applied. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 497.) [19] We now determine whether defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment was properly denied. We begin by noting the parties' agreement that women (see Duren, supra, 439 U.S. 357, 364), and Hispanics ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 495), each qualify as a distinct class for equal protection purposes. Hence, the first prong of Castaneda' s prima facie test is met. Regarding Castaneda' s second prima facie prong, as to which considerable evidence was admitted below, the significance of defendant's statistical showing is less clear. Here, as under the Sixth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken definitively on either the means by which disparity may be measured or the constitutional limit of permissible disparity. ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d 502, 527-528, fn. omitted.) The exhibits showed various absolute disparities comparing adult women in the population to women in grand jury pools in Los Angeles over several years. While the difference spiked at one point, it otherwise was either zero or ranged between 5 and 10 percent. Likewise, there was no expert consensus concerning the absolute disparity between Hispanics in the county population and Hispanics in grand jury pools, with each witness defining and measuring such groups for statistical purposes differently. (See id. at p. 526, fn. 12 [defendants must use available jury-eligible population figures in fair-cross-section cases].) Some of the more relevant absolute disparity figures for Hispanics ranged from 9.7 percent to 11.4 percent. At bottom, none of the disparities shown for either women or Hispanics in this case approaches the 40 percent mark in Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482. Nor do they show substantial underrepresentation over time outside the more modest limits that courts have assumed are constitutionally permissible. (See Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [reviewing cases that deemed absolute disparity of 4.5 to 11.49 percent insufficient, and that seemingly reached opposite result as to 14 percent disparity]; see also People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856-857 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1] [declining to decide effect of 10.7 percent disparity on fair-cross-section claim].) However, we need not resolve these statistical issues. The same is true as to whether defendant has met Castaneda' s third prima facie prong by showing that the grand jury selection procedure was not racially neutral ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 494), or was highly subjective and susceptible of abuse as applied to women and Hispanics ( id. at p. 497). The reason is that even assuming a prima facie case exists under Castaneda, the evidence admitted and considered by the trial court is more than sufficient to dispel [any] inference of intentional discrimination and to show that no equal protection violation occurred ( Id. at pp. 497-498.) (7) To recap the process, grand jurors are randomly selected from a group of persons nominated by the judges of the Los Angeles County Superior Court. The original pool of applicants for nomination includes both volunteers from the community and individuals personally known to the judges. The superior court determines by personal interview whether prospective grand jurors meet the eligibility requirements under section 893, subdivision (a). (§ 896, subd. (a).) Section 893, subdivision (a) ensures that such persons have, among other things, the basic capacity to perform the grand juror function. Elsewhere, the scheme defines such function in terms of the responsibility to conduct criminal and civil inquiries, most of which concern investigating and reporting on the financial, administrative, and legal affairs of government agencies and officials. The relevant statutes further assume that this service, which is largely uncompensated, demands a high level of personal commitment from those sworn to perform it. Thus, in addition to determining eligibility and qualification to perform the grand jury function, the court must ensure that nominees can and will work the necessary hours. (§ 896, subd. (a).) These statutory requirements are neither uncommon nor inherently unconstitutional. (See Carter v. Jury Commission (1970) 396 U.S. 320, 331-337 [24 L.Ed.2d 549, 90 S.Ct. 518]; 1 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (14th ed. 2010) § 4:4, pp. 4-30 to 4-42.) The evidence in this case showed that the Los Angeles County Superior Court had adopted standard procedures and written guidelines to implement the foregoing rules. The jury commissioner gave the same application to all persons who wanted to serve as grand jurors, whether or not they were known to any judge. Similarly, the interview system used to nominate grand jurors was not limited to persons known to the judges, but was extended to everyone who volunteered to apply. To ensure that all applicants and interviewees were evaluated in a uniform and proper manner, the court used written guidelines focusing on statutory eligibility rules, relevant background and experience, and time and service requirements. Nominating responsibility was shared by the entire superior court bench, which consisted at the relevant time of 238 judges serving in courthouses located in different communities throughout Los Angeles County. Contrary to defendant's view, nothing in these rules or procedures authorized, encouraged, or established that the judges nominated grand jurors in a manner that discriminated against women, Hispanics, or any other distinct group. Rather, the criteria used to select nominees were gender and race neutral, and clearly sought to test qualifications without reference to any impermissible subjective factor. Far from seeking to exclude members of minority groups from the pool of nominees, the superior court operated under a prodiversity policy. It engaged in a widespread campaign to recruit grand jury volunteers from all segments of the county population. These efforts targeted Hispanics and other minority groups. (See People v. Burney, supra, 47 Cal.4th 203, 227 [rejecting 6th Amend. fair-cross-section challenge to Orange County Grand Jury pool where superior court made exhaustive efforts to invite Asian-Americans to apply].) In a related vein, the neutral selection criteria used by the Los Angeles Superior Court, consisting of statutory requirements and its own guidelines, were rationally related to the grand jury function. The pool of persons who were eligible, qualified, and willing to serve as grand jurors was not unlimited. Hence, in evaluating nominees, the court considered any traits, skills, and experience that would assist the grand jury in conducting its investigations and preparing its reports. The testimony indicated that these standards were broadly inclusive and did not seek to eliminate persons based on occupation or education. (See People v. Brown (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 916, 927 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 589] [rejecting equal protection challenge to selection of grand jury foreperson where presiding judge in San Francisco Superior Court used race-neutral, job related factors to make decision].) Finally, in implementing the screening process, the Los Angeles Superior Court was evidently aware of its constitutional duties in selecting grand jurors, including the requirement that no one be excluded `because of [their] race or color.' ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 492.) Such awareness can be inferred from the written form given to all grand jury applicants, and distributed (at least in the case of volunteer candidates) to the entire court, announcing full compliance with the law in this regard. Further, it appears that any racial or similar background information voluntarily provided on the form was used in a manner consistent with the diversity policy and outreach efforts we have described. Indeed, the evidence showed that the application and interview process was not used to eliminate Hispanic volunteer candidates, because they were nominated at a higher rate than Whites who were screened in the same manner. (8) Thus, unlike Castaneda, on which defendant so heavily relies, the present record is filled withnot devoid ofevidence of the nondiscriminatory motivations and methods of the judicial officers who selected the grand jury pool. ( Castaneda, supra, 430 U.S. 482, 499.) Accordingly, we conclude that the Los Angeles County procedure for the nomination of prospective grand jurors neither allowed, nor produced, purposeful or intentional discrimination against women and Hispanics. We therefore reject defendant's claim that his indictment violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the motion to dismiss was erroneously denied.