Opinion ID: 1134428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Significant benefit

Text: Defendants contend alternatively that the denial of attorney fees can be upheld without remand on the ground that plaintiffs' litigation did not confer a significant benefit ... on the general public or a large class of persons as required by section 1021.5. Again, although the statute does not define with precision the nature of the benefit that is contemplated by the provision, the statutory language and prior authorities afford some guidance on the issue. (9) First, the explicit terms of the statute provide that the significant benefit conferred by the litigation may be either pecuniary or nonpecuniary in nature; thus, the fact that the chief benefits afforded by an action have no readily ascertainable economic or monetary value in no way forecloses an attorney fee award under the statute. This language recognizes that in many cases the important gains or contributions rendered by public interest litigation will be reflected in nonmonetary advances. Second, as our Serrano III explains, under the private attorney general doctrine, unlike the substantial benefit doctrine discussed below, the significant benefit that will justify an attorney fee award need not represent a tangible asset or a concrete gain but, in some cases, may be recognized simply from the effectuation of a fundamental constitutional or statutory policy. (20 Cal.3d at p. 42.) In Serrano III itself, for example, our court recognized the propriety of an attorney fee award under the private attorney general doctrine simply because of the magnitude and significance of the fundamental constitutional principles involved in that litigation and the benefit that flowed to the general public in having such principles enforced. We concluded that the absence of any guarantee of a concrete benefit resulting from the litigation constituted no insurmountable obstacle to an attorney fee award on a private attorney general theory. Of course, the public always has a significant interest in seeing that legal strictures are properly enforced and thus, in a real sense, the public always derives a benefit when illegal private or public conduct is rectified. Both the statutory language ( significant benefit) and prior case law, however, indicate that the Legislature did not intend to authorize an award of attorney fees in every case involving a statutory violation. We believe rather that the Legislature contemplated that in adjudicating a motion for attorney fees under section 1021.5, a trial court would determine the significance of the benefit, as well as the size of the class receiving benefit, from a realistic assessment, in light of all the pertinent circumstances, of the gains which have resulted in a particular case. (See, e.g., La Raza Unida v. Volpe, supra, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99-100.) (2f) Defendants appear to suggest that under such a realistic assessment plaintiffs' attorney fee request must fail in this case because, in defendants' view, the benefits from this litigation were not significant but rather were confined to a small group of homeowners who live in the immediate vicinity of the proposed subdivision. Plaintiffs vigorously contest defendants' belittling of the benefits conferred by the litigation, arguing (1) that in light of the unique aesthetics of the existing terrain and the nature of the proposed subdivision, all residents of the city were significantly benefited by the litigation's success in requiring the particular project to conform with the general plan and (2) that the litigation provided an additional, and in some respects more significant benefit, by compelling the city to abandon its alleged prior practice of general noncompliance with the Subdivision Map Act. In connection with this latter assertion, plaintiffs maintain that, as a direct result of the litigation, the residents of all neighborhoods of the city can be assured that when subdivisions are proposed in their vicinity in the future, the city will withhold approval if the subdivision conflicts with the general plan. In support of their claim, plaintiffs rely on a number of federal decisions which, in awarding fees on a private attorney general theory, have pointed out that the particular litigation benefited large numbers of people by successfully compelling the alteration of a widespread illegal governmental practice. (See, e.g., Wilderness Society v. Morton, supra, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032-1034; Callahan v. Wallace (5th Cir.1972) 466 F.2d 59, 62; NAACP v. Allen (M.D.Ala. 1972) 340 F. Supp. 703, 705, 709, affd. (5th Cir.1974) 493 F.2d 614.) (10) (See fn. 12.) Once again, because section 1021.5 was not yet on the books, the trial court did not pass on these conflicting claims to determine whether, in realistic terms, the action at bar conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, [12] and contrary to defendant's argument, we do not believe that this court is in a position to decide the question in the first instance. On remand, we believe both parties should be given an opportunity to present evidence in support of their claims, and the trial court should resolve the issue on the basis of such showing.