Opinion ID: 169649
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FEC v. Beaumont

Text: In Beaumont, the plaintiff was an officer of North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. (NCRL), a not-for-profit corporation organized under North Carolina law. NCRL's funding came almost entirely from donations from individual members, but it also accepted a small amount in corporate donations. NCRL used its general treasury funds to make both independent expenditures and contributions to candidates for state office, as allowed by North Carolina law. NCRL challenged the federal prohibition on contributions from its treasury to candidates for federal office. NCRL, like CRLC, based its challenge on MCFL, contending that as an MCFL entity, NCRL had a constitutionally protected right to make contributions to candidates. The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that contributions by such a group, like independent expenditures, fell within the MCFL exemption to prohibitions on corporate activity. The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the case was correctly characterized as a contributions, rather than an expenditures, case, and thus subject to reduced scrutiny. The Court admonished that advocacy corporations may also raise corruption concerns, as they too benefit from significant state-created advantages. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 159-60, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court asserted that [n]on-profit advocacy corporations are, moreover, no less susceptible than traditional business companies to misuse as conduits for circumventing the contribution limits imposed on individuals. Id. (emphasis supplied). The district court here rejected the Secretary's reliance on Beaumont because the case focuses on contributions, not expenditures, and is thus not analogous. Cf. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 164, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ( MCFL contains language supporting the Court's holding here that corporate contributions can be regulated more closely than corporate expenditures.) (emphasis supplied). Because we focus on Article XXVIII's restrictions on expenditures, we agree with this distinction, and reject the Secretary's argument on appeal.