Opinion ID: 3135345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supervisory Relief

Text: As noted above, J.T. concedes that the rational for the appellate court=s decision is no longer viable in light of Jones. He argues, however, that fundamental fairness requires this court to exercise its supervisory authority and either remand the cause to the trial court for proper Rule 605(b) admonitions, direct the appellate court to allow him to file a late notice of appeal, or hold that he can litigate this issue in a postconviction proceeding. Article VI, section 16, of our constitution vests this court with supervisory authority over all the lower courts of this state. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, '16. Supervisory orders are disfavored and, as a general rule, this court will issue a supervisory order only if the normal appellate process will not afford adequate relief and the dispute involves a matter important to the administration of justice, or where intervention is necessary to keep an inferior court or tribunal from acting beyond the scope of its authority. People ex rel. Birkett v. Bakalis, 196 Ill. 2d 510 (2001). In considering the question of whether J.T. was prejudiced or denied real justice and therefore that Afundamental fairness@ requires the court to grant supervisory relief, we find the rationale of People v. Henderson, No. 98887 (August 18, 2005), persuasive. In Henderson, we found that the defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court=s improper admonitions concerning the steps necessary to challenge his sentence on appeal because he raised no sentencing issues on appeal. Here, J.T. was admonished by the trial court, at the time he was placed on probation, that he had 30 days in which to appeal, and that if he wished to appeal he first had to file a petition with the trial court Ato take everything back.@ While these admonitions did not strictly comply with Rule 605(c), they were sufficient to put J.T. on notice that he could challenge his guilty plea, and that some action on his part within 30 days was necessary if he wished to appeal. J.T. took no action whatsoever, even though he appeared in court five times with counsel after he was placed on probation and before he was committed to the DOC. He did not file any pleading evidencing an intention to Atake everything back,@ he did not file a notice of appeal, nor did he seek leave to file a late notice of appeal. It was not until his probation was revoked and he was sentenced to the DOC that J.T. -6- took any action to challenge his guilty plea or the conviction and sentence entered thereon. Further, the record demonstrates that J.T. is familiar with the criminal justice system. J.T. had nine previous station adjustments, 19 court referrals which included three findings of delinquency, five periods of probation, and six violations of probation. Moreover, J.T. was represented by counsel at the time he pled guilty and was sentenced to probation. J.T=s argument that because of the faulty admonition he was unaware of his right to appeal or the steps necessary to preserve and exercise that right are unpersuasive. Rather, we conclude that he chose not to appeal because he was satisfied with his sentence. This is not a case where the normal appellate process cannot provide adequate relief, nor does it involve an issue important to the administration of justice. The normal appellate process could have provided adequate relief had J.T. availed himself of it. Having chosen not to, J.T. is in no different position than any other defendant who chooses not to file an appeal. Under these circumstances, supervisory relief is not warranted. Alternatively, J.T. requests this court to exercise its supervisory authority and address the issue of whether juveniles can seek relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122B1 et seq. (West 2004)). We decline to do so for the same reasons we declined to address this issue in In re William M., 206 Ill. 2d 595 (2003). As in William M., the parties offer minimal argument on this issue. As