Opinion ID: 2353669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Barber's Appeal

Text: The plaintiff argues that the justice erred by failing to grant reinstatement and by failing to award back pay from the hearing date to the reinstatement date. Violation of due process rights does not entitle the plaintiff to reinstatement. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570, 580-81 (1972) (proof of property interest would not entitle one to reinstatement, only to hearing); see Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 178-79 (5th Cir.1973) (school teacher denied due process not entitled to reinstatement); see also Wellner v. Minnesota State Junior College Board, 487 F.2d 153, 156 n. 2 (8th Cir.1973) (school teacher denied due process entitled to salary but not to reappointment unless Board decided to reinstate). Normally, denial of due process rights would entitle the plaintiff to a hearing to determine whether cause exists for dismissing the plaintiff. Perry, 408 U.S. at 603, 92 S.Ct. at 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d at 581; Wellner, 487 F.2d at 156. In this case, however, the plaintiff had a one-year employment contract. In addition, title 30 M.R.S.A. § 2256 (1978) states that unless otherwise provided, the term of all municipal officials shall be one year. See 30 M.R.S.A. § 2250(2) (1978) (municipal official defined as appointed or elected member of municipal corporation). The plaintiff was appointed to serve a term from March 22, 1978 to March 31, 1979. The plaintiff was suspended on March 6 and received his full wages until March 13. We have found that the plaintiff maintained his suspended status for the remainder of his term, sixteen days. Under the circumstances of this case, by awarding compensation for the remainder of the term of employment, sixteen days, as the Superior Court did, the plaintiff is made whole without the need for a remand of this case for a hearing at which the issue would be whether just cause existed for his dismissal. See Wardwell v. Inhabitants of Castine, 154 Me. 123, 127, 144 A.2d 530, 532 (1958) (because defendant had not legally removed plaintiff, plaintiff entitled to salary for duration of employment contract); cf. Mahoney v. City of Biddeford, 130 Me. 295, 296, 155 A. 560, 561 (1931) (under ordinance providing that plaintiff has position until successor is elected and qualified, plaintiff who was not legally removed entitled to office and salary); Andrews v. City of Portland, 79 Me. 484, 10 A. 458 (1887) (mayor with life-time appointment who was not legally removed entitled to back pay from date of removal to reinstatement). The plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to a hearing on that issue. Despite the termination of his one-year appointment, the plaintiff claims that he had a justifiable expectation of being reappointed as police chief. The issue posed is whether that expectation required the town to comply with due process by providing him with notice, a hearing, and removal for cause on the issue of the denial of his reappointment. The plaintiff is entitled to such due process protection only if he can show that by not renewing his contract, the town deprived him of a property interest in reappointment. Perry, 408 U.S. at 599, 92 S.Ct. at 2698, 33 L.Ed.2d at 578; Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-78, 92 S.Ct. at 2708-10, 33 L.Ed.2d at 560-61; see City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 515, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 2227, 37 L.Ed.2d 109, 117 (1973). As we stated earlier, the statutory restriction of the grounds upon which an employee may be removed may create a property interest in public employment requiring due process protection. Lovejoy, 434 A.2d at 50. A property interest may also be created if there are rules and mutually explicit understandings to support a claim of entitlement. Lovejoy, 434 A.2d at 50 (quoting Perry, 408 U.S. at 601, 92 S.Ct. at 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d at 580). Although a written contract with an explicit tenure provision would support such a claim, the absence of such a provision is not determinative. Perry, 408 U.S. at 601, 92 S.Ct. at 2699, 33 L.Ed.2d at 580. The plaintiff's written contract may be supplemented by an agreement implied from the employer's policy and practices. Lovejoy, 434 A.2d at 50; see also Perry, 408 U.S. at 602, 92 S.Ct. at 33 L.Ed.2d at 580 (words and conduct under surrounding circumstances). A property interest created by an implied contract may be decided by reference to state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684, 690 (1976). To claim a property interest, there must be an objective expectation of reappointment not a mere subjective expectancy. Zimmerer, 485 F.2d at 177; see Perry, 408 U.S. at 603, 92 S.Ct. at 2700, 33 L.Ed.2d at 580 (not mere subjective expectancy); Lovejoy, 434 A.2d at 50 (more than a unilateral expectation of it) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 561). The trial justice determined that neither the statute, 30 M.R.S.A. § 2317(1)(N), nor the town charter indicated that a police chief hired on a yearly contract is entitled to due process protection if his appointment is not renewed. The justice, therefore, determined that section 2317(1)(N) did not create a property interest in reappointment. [6] The justice, however, never considered whether the policy and practices of the town officials created a property interest by providing Barber with an objective expectation of reappointment. On this record, there is evidence that in 1978 Barber was granted a hearing to review Green's decision not to reappoint him for another term. The hearing was conducted; the town council in a 2-2 vote decided to reappoint Barber. This evidence is sufficient to generate the issue of whether Barber had an objective expectation of reappointment. We do not decide nor intimate any opinion on whether the trial justice properly determined that section 2317(1)(N) did not create a property interest in reappointment. We remand to the Superior Court for a factual hearing and a determination on the narrow issue of whether the policy and practices of the town manager and the town council provided Barber with a justifiable expectation of reappointment, thus constituting a protectable property interest. Finally, the plaintiff claims that he is entitled to attorney fees. The plaintiff recognizes the general rule in the United States that in the absence of statutory authority or a contract the prevailing party may not recover attorney fees; the plaintiff then argues that the case falls within an exception to the general rule which permits the prevailing party to recover attorney fees when the losing party unjustly, unfairly, and in bad faith prolongs the litigation. This issue is governed by the recent case of Jackson v. Inhabitants of the Town of Searsport, 456 A.2d 852 (Me.1983). We stated: In our state, as elsewhere in this country, the American Rule for attorney's fees is followed: each party pays the costs of his own lawyers. Here the rule is: Except for some kinds of tortious conduct, the Maine state courts have no authority to include attorney's fees as part of costs in the absence of statutory authorization or agreement of the parties. Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230, 238 (Me.1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555[1] (1980). See also Vance v. Speakman, 409 A.2d 1307, 1311 (Me.1979). 456 A.2d at 855-56 (footnote omitted). On the record of this case, there is no evidence of any tortious conduct warranting attorney fees. The entry is As to the town's appeal, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. With regard to Barber's appeal, we affirm in part the judgment of the Superior Court and remand to the Superior Court to determine whether the plaintiff had a justifiable expectation of reappointment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All concurring.