Opinion ID: 1708793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Architect's Motion

Text: Witherspoon alleges he engaged the architect, How, to design the house and to inspect the construction thereof as it progressed. He further alleges How was negligent in failing to specify ductile pipe, in accepting the engineer's description of cast iron pipe, in failing to inspect the pipe installation, and in accepting the use of a cast iron pipe; and having accepted a cast iron pipe, in failing to cause the design of adequate stress protection; and in designing an inadequate water system. The foregoing discussion as to the nature of the action against the general contractor applies as well to the true nature of the action against the architect. Again, however, whether pled in tort or contract, there can be no question that the period of professional repose contained in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-222 (Reissue 1979) applies. A professional act or service is one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor or skill involved is predominantly mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual. Marx v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 157 N.W.2d 870 (1968). Accordingly, in addition to the traditional professions of law, Rosnick v. Marks, supra , and medicine, Smith v. Dewey, 214 Neb. 605, 335 N.W.2d 530 (1983), we have applied professional periods of limitations to an accountant, Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 215 Neb. 289, 338 N.W.2d 594 (1983); a medical technician, Swassing v. Baum, 195 Neb. 651, 240 N.W.2d 24 (1976); and to one giving investment advice, Educational Service Unit No. 3 v. Mammel, O., S., H. & S., Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974). The relevant period of repose is stated in § 25-222 as follows: [I]n no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action. Witherspoon argues that the continuing nature of his relationship with How means the period of repose did not begin to run until construction of the house was completed. On the other hand, How argues our prior cases hold that the period of repose began to run when he allegedly performed, or failed to perform, the specific acts about which complaint is made. How cites us to Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, supra , which discusses the continuing relationship concept but finds none existed, and applied the 2-year period of limitation to an act of alleged accountant malpractice; Smith v. Dewey, supra , which holds that in medical malpractice the period of repose begins to run when the treatment about which complaint is made ceases, irrespective of whether the physician-patient relationship continues; and Williams v. Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121 (1941), which applies the same rule. Although not cited, Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982), another medical malpractice case, rests on the same rationale. Additionally, in Interholzinger v. Estate of Dent, 214 Neb. 264, 333 N.W.2d 895 (1983), we ruled the cause of action against an attorney who allegedly negligently subjected private lands to corporate debts accrued when the alleged negligent act took place, notwithstanding the fact that the attorney continued to represent the clients. As we noted in Interholzinger, the point at which a period of limitations begins to run must be determined from the facts of each case. The feature which distinguishes How's situation from the basis of the holdings in the legal and medical malpractice cases discussed above is that, here, all the acts or omissions about which complaint is made are related to How's alleged duty to inspect the construction [of the house] as it progressed. Under these circumstances the failure which provides the basis for the cause of action ended when construction of the house was completed. The action is therefore not barred by the professional period of repose. See Cacace v. Morcaldi, 37 Conn.Supp. 735, 435 A.2d 1035 (1981).