Opinion ID: 733247
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 16 Burns claims that the district court erred in rejecting his motion for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the government failed to present evidence sufficient to convict him on Counts Two, Three and Four. 1 Burns bears a heavy burden to succeed on this claim. We will not disturb a conviction on grounds of legal insufficiency of the evidence at trial if 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  Chalmers v. Mitchell, 73 F.3d 1262, 1272 (2d Cir.) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 106, 136 L.Ed.2d 60 (1996). We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all inferences and resolving all issues of credibility in its favor. United States v. Millar, 79 F.3d 338, 344 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted). We apply this exacting criteria, in turn, to each count on which Burns was convicted.
17 In Count Two of the indictment, the government charges that Burns violated 18 U.S.C. § 1343, which provides: 18 Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice [is guilty of an offense.] 19 Burns argues that the district court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal on this count was clear error because the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish the existence of a scheme to defraud and that [Burns] knowingly and willfully participated in it. Burns maintains that (1) the evidence introduced at trial was clear that [Burns] had the authority to open a Boston office without National's prior approval, and (2) the evidence shows that [Burns] did not attempt to withhold his attendance at Harvard from Northeast or National. 20 First, whether or not Burns had the authority to open another office for Northeast, 2 is not determinative of whether he engaged in a scheme to defraud. Even if the jury concluded that Burns had authority to open an office, a reasonable jury could easily conclude that Burns leased the apartment, or the Boston office, as Burns refers to it, for the very purpose of having Northeast pay part of his living expenses while he attended Harvard, in furtherance of an illegal scheme to defraud. 21 Second, the government did produce evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that Burns attempted to conceal his attendance at Harvard from National and Northeast. For example, the government introduced time sheets which Burns directed his sister Tess Carp, also a Northeast employee, to fill out on his behalf. The time sheets indicate that Burns was working for Northeast full time, during regular business hours from July 1990 through June 1991. This is the same period of time that Burns was a full-time student at Harvard. The government introduced detailed attendance records kept by one of Burns' professors, showing that Burns was in class when his time sheets indicated he was working for Northeast. With regard to the time sheets, the government focuses in particular on January 1991. Burns' time sheets state that he was working full-time regular hours for Northeast during January, when apparently he was attending an intensive negotiation workshop every weekday in January 1991. In addition to the inaccurate time sheets themselves, the jury was also presented with evidence that a National employee, Mr. Wade, complained to Burns about the manner in which he completed the time sheets. From this the jury could infer that Burns was aware of the importance of accurate time sheets, but nevertheless submitted inaccurate records, implying intent. Although Burns testified that he did not, in fact, attempt to deceive Northeast by filling out the time sheets as he did, the jury was free to disbelieve him, and infer from the circumstantial evidence that he did so intend. 22 Further, Burns' travel vouchers document frequent travel to and from the Boston office, ostensibly for official business. However, Harvard is not mentioned in the vouchers. The government also introduced evidence that Burns was required to be in Massachusetts for Northeast business only on a few occasions. From this, the jury properly could infer that Burns completed the travel vouchers in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. 23 Burns also argues that he introduced evidence indicating that he disclosed to several members of the Northeast Board of Directors that he was attending Harvard, and therefore, did not attempt to conceal this fact. Although Burns did introduce evidence that he had mentioned his enrollment at Harvard to other Northeast employees, a reasonable jury could conclude that Burns was purposefully evasive or misleading about his studies at Harvard, in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. For example, Ardyce Cochran, a Northeast board member, testified that although she had spoken to Burns about Harvard, Burns never told her that he was making a full time commitment to Harvard.
24 In Count Three, the government charges that Burns violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which provides, in pertinent part: Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact [is guilty of an offense.] 25 Burns argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he intentionally withheld from National his attendance at Harvard. As discussed above in regard to Count Two, the government introduced time sheets Burns submitted indicating that he was working full-time during regular business hours on behalf of Northeast when he was a full time student at Harvard, and travel vouchers Burns submitted charging the government for numerous trips to and from Massachusetts, without any mention of Harvard. From this a reasonable jury could conclude that Burns knowingly and willfully falsified or concealed material facts from a government agency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
26 In Count Four, the government alleges that Burns violated the portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that states: Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry [is guilty of an offense.] 27 This Count again focuses attention on the time sheets. Burns argues that his testimony, and that of his sister, Tess Carp, establishes that the true purpose of the time sheets was only to inform National of vacation time, sick leave, and holidays, not to document all of his work hours. Again, the jury was free to reject this testimony, and to infer, based on the circumstantial evidence discussed above, that Burns made fraudulent statements, in violation of the portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 quoted above. The government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find guilt.