Opinion ID: 2141839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: school zone penalty enhancer

Text: ¶ 75 This court must now determine whether the violent crime in a school zone penalty enhancer [37] is unconstitutional as applied to Quintana. Quintana argues, under the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, that the statute creates an irrational and arbitrary classification, and he questions whether school zone laws ever have or ever will protect a single child. The State, however, argues that Quintana fails to meet his burden and show beyond a reasonable doubt that the school zone penalty enhancer is unconstitutional as applied to him. We conclude that Quintana has not met his burden of proof to show that the penalty enhancer is unconstitutional as applied to him. The legislature has determined that safety zones around our schools serve the public interest. An increased penalty for those who commit violent crimes within 1,000 feet of school premises is a reasonable approach by the legislature to accomplish this legislative goal. Quintana has failed to show that the penalty enhancer is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 76 This court presumes that Wisconsin statutes are constitutional. Radke, 259 Wis.2d 13, ¶ 11, 657 N.W.2d 66. Moreover, the heavy burden of overcoming this presumption lies with the person attacking the statute. Id. A party bringing the challenge must show the statute to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McManus, 152 Wis.2d 113, 128-36, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) (applying this standard to both facial and as-applied challenges to Wis. Stat. § 346.63(1)(b)); State v. Matthew A.B., 231 Wis.2d 688, 710, 605 N.W.2d 598 (Ct.App. 1999) (stating the challenger, [] bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Chapter 980 is unconstitutional as applied to him). ¶ 77 `Every presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality.' McManus, 152 Wis.2d at 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (citation omitted). A statute must be sustained as constitutional if any reasonable basis for the statute exists. Radke, 259 Wis.2d 13, ¶ 11, 657 N.W.2d 66. That reasonable basis need not be expressly stated by the legislature; if the court can conceive of facts on which the legislation could reasonably be based, it must uphold the legislation as constitutional. Id. ¶ 78 Quintana argues that the school zone penalty enhancer violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. This court has held the due process and equal protection clauses of the Wisconsin Constitution are the substantial equivalents of their respective clauses in the federal constitution. McManus, 152 Wis.2d at 130, 447 N.W.2d 654. The analysis under both the due process and equal protection clauses is largely the same. State v. Jorgensen, 2003 WI 105, ¶ 32, 264 Wis.2d 157, 667 N.W.2d 318 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991)). ¶ 79 The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws. McManus, 152 Wis.2d at 130, 447 N.W.2d 654. When neither a fundamental right has been interfered with nor a suspect class been disadvantaged as a result of the classification, the legislative enactment `must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.' Id. at 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 683, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583 (1973)). Equal protection, however, does not preclude the state from treating persons within its jurisdiction differently so long as the classification it creates has a reasonable basis. Id. ¶ 80 Due process bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions. Radke, 259 Wis.2d 13, ¶ 12, 657 N.W.2d 66. Substantive due process forbids a government from exercising `power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.' Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 81 We conclude that the school zone penalty enhancer is not unconstitutional as applied to Quintana. The legislature has sought to increase the penalty for those who commit violent crimes within 1,000 feet of school premises. Under Wis. Stat. § 939.632, the crime of mayhem is specifically included in the definition of Violent Crime. Violent crime also includes a number of other crimes, such as homicide, battery, sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, intimidation of a witness, robbery by use of a dangerous weapon, child enticement, sexual exploitation of a child, and soliciting a child for prostitution. ¶ 82 Thus, the legislature seeks to deter a broad swath of violent or potentially violent crimes by increasing penalties for those crimes that occur within 1,000 feet of school premises. One possible reason for such a law is to create a safe, or at least safer, zone around our schools where the population of children is likely higher. Achieving safety zones around our schools is a legitimate governmental interest. Children should feel safe at school and, if possible, on their way to school. The legislature seeks a safety zone in order to create a safe haven that children may not have further away from school. Moreover, a safety zone around schools fosters a good learning environment. ¶ 83 The 1,000-foot perimeter is rationally related to the government's interest. One thousand feet is a reasonable distance around schools so as to further the legislature's goal of creating safety zones around our schools. The legislature has clearly concluded that children congregate on or near school premises and are more likely to live near school premises. While one may argue that any number of feet is to some extent arbitrary in that the legislature chose a particular distance, the 1,000-foot perimeter is not patently arbitrary. Moreover, it is rationally related to the government's interest. ¶ 84 Quintana argues that no legitimate reason exists to punish more severely those who commit battery near a school from those who commit battery away from a school. However, the legislature desires not only safe playgrounds, but also safe neighborhoods. As a result, it has attempted to create a safety zone of 1,000 feet, approximately the length of three football fields, around schools. The legislature certainly would not achieve its goal of a safety zone around schools if the increased penalties applied only to violent crimes on school grounds. The benefits of safe school grounds dissipate substantially when the area surrounding the school is plagued with violent crime. This is true regardless of whether that crime occurs inside or outside the home. ¶ 85 Quintana argues that because the statute has no limitation as to the time of day or a requirement that children actually be present, the public safety goal of the legislation is not achieved. However, the legislature has concluded that a safety zone around schools is desirable, and those advantages do not disappear when the school day is over. It is unreasonable to believe that once the day is over, children cease to benefit from a safety zone around their school. ¶ 86 Furthermore, requiring children to be present when the crime is committed is unworkable and would frustrate the purpose of the statute. [38] Deterring violence can be difficult enough without placing requirements that only serve to confuse the legitimate goals of the statute. The desire to deter violent crime around schools cannot be subjected to an unworkable patchwork of criteria for determining whether the statute should or should not apply based on factors such as: did the violent crime take place within a structure, were weapons used, were children present, or would crime likely spill out into the streets? Any deterrent effect would be eliminated if the law applied only during school hours or contained other such restrictions. The switch to criminal activity is not so easily turned on and off. ¶ 87 Whether the violence takes place on the streets or in a home within 1,000 feet of school premises is irrelevant to our analysis. The penalty enhancers would certainly be worthless if violent crime in the home was not punished the same as outside the home. There is simply no way to restrain the impact of violent crime to the four walls of the home. The goals of the statute would be crippled if such a distinction were drawn. A reasonable method to deter violent crime near schools is to clearly punish more severely, without variation, violent crime that occurs near schools. We cannot expect to achieve safety zones around our schools if the homes around our schools are filled with violence. The increased penalties further the state's legitimate objective. ¶ 88 Quintana argues that State v. Hermann [39] can be distinguished from the case at hand. He argues, as the circuit court concluded, that the rationale for an enhanced penalty changes when a drug crime is not at issue. We do not disagree, but this does not render another rationale unpersuasive or illogical. ¶ 89 In Hermann, the court of appeals concluded that enhanced penalties for drug transactions near schools did not violate the equal protection or due process clause. It concluded that drug transactions create a dangerous atmosphere, and thus, deterring those transactions near schools was not patently arbitrary or irrational, and enhanced penalties for drug transactions near schools did bear a reasonable and rational relationship to deterring such activity. The advantages of having fewer drug transactions near schools are similar to the advantages of having less violent crime near schools. Violent crime creates a dangerous atmosphere, so deterring such violent crime near schools is neither patently arbitrary nor irrational. Moreover, the 1,000-foot perimeter for increased penalties bears a reasonable and rational relationship to creating safety zones around schools.