Opinion ID: 6500749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Refuge Act

Text: The Refuge Act requires a CCP to “identify and describe . . . the purposes of each refuge.” 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(e)(2)(A). The Secretary may “permit the use of any area” within a refuge “whenever [s]he determines that such uses are compatible with the major purposes for which such areas were established.” Id. § 668dd(d)(1)(A). Subject to an exception not relevant here, the Secretary “shall not . . . expand, renew, or extend an existing use of a refuge, unless 16 TULELAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USFWS the Secretary has determined that the use is a compatible use.” Id. § 668dd(d)(3)(A)(i). A “compatible use” is a “use of a refuge that . . . will not materially interfere with or detract from the fulfillment of the . . . purposes of the refuge.” Id. § 668ee(1). TID argues that agriculture on lease land in the refuges is a “purpose” rather than a “use” within the meaning of the Refuge Act, and that agriculture on lease land therefore has co-equal status with waterfowl management. As a result, according to TID, agricultural use of lease land is not subject to a compatibility determination by the Service. We disagree. “It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that similar language in similar statutes should be interpreted similarly.” United States v. Sioux, 362 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973)); see also Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 738–39 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). When the Refuge Act is read in conjunction with the Kuchel Act, it is apparent that agriculture on lease land in the refuges is not a “purpose” holding co-equal status with waterfowl management, and that lease land agriculture is not insulated from a compatibility determination. We look to the Kuchel Act to understand the distinction drawn in the Refuge Act between a “purpose” and a “use.” Section 695l of the Kuchel Act, quoted above, characterizes “waterfowl management” as the “major purpose” of the refuges, and provides that agriculture is a “use.” For the convenience of the reader, here it is again in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, [refuge] lands . . . are hereby dedicated to TULELAKE IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USFWS 17 wildlife conservation. Such lands shall be administered by the Secretary of the Interior for the major purpose of waterfowl management, but with full consideration to optimum agricultural use that is consistent therewith. 16 U.S.C. § 695l (emphases added). We recognize that the Executive Orders establishing the Lower Klamath and Tule Lake Refuges in the 1920s characterized reclamation (i.e., agriculture) as a purpose of the refuges. However, as made clear by its introductory phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” § 695l supersedes those orders. We therefore reject TID’s argument that agriculture is a co-equal purpose rather than a “use” within the meaning of the Refuge Act. With respect to the textual argument made by TID, the language of § 695l is unambiguous, making it unnecessary to proceed to step two of the Chevron analysis. We hold that the Refuge Act permits agricultural “use” within the Klamath Refuge Complex only when the Service determines that it is “compatible with the major purposes” for which such the area was established.