Opinion ID: 1702203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the court err in granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant?

Text: When a defendant moves for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case in chief, the circuit court must consider evidence before it at the time in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from that evidence. Benjamin v. Hooper Electronic Supply Co., Inc., 568 So.2d 1182, 1187 (Miss. 1990). This Court must review a motion for a directed verdict in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Benjamin, 568 So.2d at 1187. Credibility determination, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Benjamin, 568 So.2d at 1187, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 216 (1986). Tortious breach of contract requires, in addition to a breach of contract, some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or negligence so gross as to constitute an independent tort. Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Fritz, 523 So.2d 12, 19-20 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied 493 U.S. 889, 110 S.Ct. 232, 107 L.Ed.2d 183 (1989). Considered in the light most favorable to Eselin-Bullock, the facts and inferences point to a breach of the Agency-Company Agreement by National General by virtue of its cancellation of policies for reasons other than those allowed by the terms of the agreement. Policies that had been in effect for sixty days were being cancelled and there had been no non-payment of premium or non-report of the basis of premium, no misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact at the time of acceptance, and no apparent increase in hazard and/or material change in risk, although this last is subject to the exclusive opinion of National General. While National General claims that the increase in hazard or material change in risk was its inability to obtain reinsurance coverage, there is nothing in the record to support that argument. National General alleged only that it anticipated that reinsurance would be cost prohibitive if it was indeed available. Hurricane Elena could hardly be the event which caused an increase in hazard or material change in risk as the possibility of hurricanes existed at the time the coverage became effective, and Hurricane Elena did nothing to increase the hazards or risks involved in insuring coastal homeowners. National General takes the position that it has the complete and unfettered discretion to determine whether there has been a change in risk. Although the agreement states that whether an increase in hazard or material change in risk occurs is left to the exclusive opinion of National General, certainly it must be an increase in hazard or material change in risk as contemplated by the contract. The contract is ambiguous on this point and offers no further clarification. The risk insured by the policies which were cancelled was damage to the insured homes. The anticipated high cost of available reinsurance does not increase the risk of damage to the homes insured. Giving Eselin-Bullock the benefit of all favorable inferences, as we must in reviewing a directed verdict motion, there was no increase in hazard or material change in risk such that the risk insured by National General was materially increased. It follows that National General breached its agreement with Eselin-Bullock. Even if the prohibitive price and unavailability of reinsurance is found to constitute an increase in hazard, as alleged by National General, the only evidence that reinsurance was unavailable was National General's anticipation of such. If the cost of acquiring reinsurance would have severely affected National General's solvency and ability to pay future claims, a material change in risk might have occurred. However, at the close of Eselin-Bullock's case it was too early to make such a determination. In addition to a breach of contract we must find some intentional wrong, insult, abuse, or negligence so gross as to constitute an independent tort in order to support a claim for tortious breach of contract. Fritz, 523 So.2d at 19-20. Punitive damages, although not usually recoverable in breach of contract cases, are available when the breach results from an intentional wrong, insult, or abuse as well as from such gross negligence as constitutes an independent tort. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Maas, 516 So.2d 495, 496 (Miss. 1987). In Fritz, punitive damages were sought based on an allegation of tortious breach of contract. In discussing whether a tortious breach of contract existed, this Court said we are of the opinion that the facts of this case do not justify punitive damages. Id. at 20. This Court may well reach the same conclusion in this case when it has all the facts before it, which in the present posture of the case it does not have. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, National General intentionally cancelled homeowner policies with knowledge that it was breaching its Agency-Company Agreement. This is an intentional wrong and it is a question of fact as to whether or not it rises to the level necessary to constitute an independent tort which would justify punitive damages. The trial court committed reversible error when it directed a verdict on this issue. A claim of defamation requires a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff, an unprivileged publication to a third party, fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher, and either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or existence of some special harm caused by publication. Blake v. Gannett Co., Inc., 529 So.2d 595, 602 (Miss. 1988). It must be pointed out that here the defamation charged is not against a public person but a private person and therefore, requires a much less extreme standard for purposes of allowing the plaintiff to prove its case. In Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the court held the First and Fourteenth Amendments require at a minimum a showing of negligence before a private figure may recover an award of actual damages for libel; a public figure must show actual malice, defined as ill will or reckless disregard of the falsity of the statements made. Whitten v. Commercial Dispatch Publishing Co., Inc., 487 So.2d 843, 844 (Miss. 1986). Therefore all that is required on the part of the plaintiff in this case to pursue the claim for defamation is a showing of negligence by a preponderance of the evidence. In this state a communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him. Gulf Publishing Co., Inc. v. Lee, 434 So.2d 687, 694 (Miss. 1983); and Manasco v. Walley, 216 Miss. 614, 63 So.2d 91, 95 (1953). Whitten, 487 So.2d at 845. Regarding the question of the substantial truth of the statement made in the letter of cancellation, the agency no longer represents National General, the defendant claims that the representation is true and the plaintiff adamantly denies that the representation is substantially true. The question as to what was or was not implied in the notice of cancellation is a question of fact for a jury to determine. Giving Eselin-Bullock the benefit of every inference, a reasonable jury could find that the statement at issue was defamatory on its face and defamed Eselin-Bullock without either innuendo or inference. Therefore, it was error to grant the directed verdict regarding the defamation claim.