Opinion ID: 371157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior Discrimination

Text: 55 The holding of the district court on which this appeal essentially turns is that there was no showing of prior discrimination against blacks by the Detroit Police Department. This conclusion, based on errors of law and an impermissibly restrictive view of the evidence, must be reversed. 56 The district court's findings of fact are binding on this court unless they are clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). However, whether prior discrimination occurred is a conclusion of law based on subsidiary findings of fact. As stated by the Seventh Circuit: 57 The statement that discrimination exists for the purposes of establishing liability under Title VII or under the Constitution . . . is as much a conclusion of law as a finding of fact. A distinction must be drawn between subsidiary facts to which the clearly erroneous standard applies, and the ultimate fact of discrimination . . . . Accordingly, we will make an independent examination of whether the Police Department's employment practices, as a matter of law, were proscribed under Title VII or the equal protection clause. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 425 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S.Ct. 225, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); See also Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 528 F.2d 508, 516 (5th Cir. 1976). 58 Reexamination of the law and evidence reveals that the district court's conclusion that the Detroit Police Department did not engage in unlawful discrimination was erroneous. 59 1. Employment Data. The district court held that statistical evidence of prior discrimination was not entitled to any weight whatever. Statistical evidence of racially disparate impact of employment practices alone may establish a statutory violation. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-8, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977). Under some circumstances, such evidence may also demonstrate a constitutional violation. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 and n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1972). 60 The evidence in this case showed that the number of whites appointed far outdistanced the number of blacks appointed from 1944 to 1968, and from 1968 to 1975 there existed a significant difference between the number of black and white applicants and the number of black and white appointees. 446 F.Supp. at 998. However, the court rejected the evidence because of a lack of statistical verity. Id. 61 The conclusion that flaws in the data deprived it of any probative value is itself flawed. The court dismissed the 1944-1968 data for want of labor market data from the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) for the same period. This data would be compared to police employment to determine whether the black proportion of the police department was much smaller than the black component of the labor market, a condition which would support an inference of discrimination. 62 The rejection of the data on this basis was proper only if the district court's insistence on this metropolitan-wide labor market benchmark was proper. Defendants presented evidence based on city population and city labor market comparisons. For example, their evidence indicated that from 1944 to 1973, new hires by the Department included 13.7 percent blacks. If hiring had conformed to the racial proportion of the Detroit labor market, 6 black new hires would have constituted 23.6 percent of all appointments in that period. 63 The district court also rejected the statistical evidence because of a lack of applicant flow data until 1968 and data reporting errors thereafter. The district court seemed to require proof to a mathematical certainty, but there is no such requirement. Vulcan Society of N. Y. C. Fire Dept. v. Civil Service Commission, 490 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973). Deficiencies in the data base may, of course, detract from the value of such evidence, Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. at 1857 n. 20, but ordinarily would not obliterate its evidentiary value. There was no indication that the reporting errors accounted for the striking racial imbalance indicated by the data. Vulcan, 490 F.2d at 392. In short, none of the defects cited by the district court were fatal and it was unfair to ignore (the figures) entirely. Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1021 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1974), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910, 95 S.Ct. 1561, 43 L.Ed.2d 775 (1975). 64 Viewed in the light of all the evidence we hold that the district court's finding that the statistical evidence is susceptible to a multitude of conclusions, 446 F.Supp. at 998, is clearly erroneous. The court found that the disparity between white and black police employment was significant and that the pre-1973 entry level examinations may have constituted a source of discrimination against blacks. 446 F.Supp. at 1000. A number of black officers testified to the existence of a pattern of specific discriminatory practices which they had experienced and observed. No explanation for the underrepresentation of black officers and sergeants other than systematic exclusion appears on the record. 65 Even standing alone, the statistical data was evidence of discrimination. As the Supreme Court stated in Teamsters, supra: 66 Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired. 67 431 U.S. at 340 n. 20, 97 S.Ct. at 1856-1857 n. 20. 68 The district court found that the defendants had not presented the proper statistical data, even if it were otherwise reliable. The court concluded that a comparison of the racial proportions of the police force and the Detroit SMSA labor market demonstrated no 'significant disparity' regarding black representation on the Detroit Police Department. 446 F.Supp. at 1006. This conclusion is dependent on the court's selection of the Detroit SMSA labor market as The proper labor market for comparison. 446 F.Supp. at 996 (emphasis added). 69 While the metropolitan labor market may be A proper comparison, Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308, 97 S.Ct. 2736 (emphasis added), the availability of one appropriate benchmark is no warrant for rejection of other data which are also probative. The courts of appeals have recognized the value of other benchmarks and approved the use of city population a standard specifically rejected by the district court in cases involving public agencies which provide services citywide. E. g., Afro American Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294, 299 (6th Cir. 1974) (police); Boston Chapter, NAACP, supra, 504 F.2d at 1020 n. 4, 1027 n. 17 (firefighters, city and metropolitan population); Vulcan Society, supra, 490 F.2d at 398 (firefighters); Erie Human Relations Commission v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 372-73 (3d Cir. 1974) (police). 70 The selection of the SMSA labor market as the sole benchmark was not warranted on the basis that the Department recruited some officers from outside the boundaries of the city. This is especially true in view of the adoption of a city-residency requirement during the period in question. Rather, the usefulness (of statistics) depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1857. In this case, the fact that the police department had a residency requirement and served a city-only population made a comparison with city population and labor market data eminently proper. 71 Application of these benchmarks indicates a gross disparity between black employment in the Department and black representation in the city's labor market and general population. In 1974, the Department was 17.23 percent black, the district court found. Data from the 1970 census show that the Detroit labor market was 45.8 percent black and the city population was 43.7 percent black. 72 The metropolitan labor market was only 18.6 percent black in 1970. But the district court's comparison of 1970 census data, the most recent available, to 1974 police employment could not refute the pattern of racial disparity standing alone. If general population trends were any guide, it was distinctly possible that by 1974 the metropolitan labor force had become increasingly black. Thus, 1970 census data could not be compared fairly with 1974 police employment data. A proper comparison, between 1970 labor market and police statistics, yields a significant disparity. The metropolitan labor market was 17.23 percent black in that year while the Department employed only 11 percent black officers. 73 2. Prior Discrimination: The Title VII Claim. The district court rejected the defense of prior discrimination in part because 74 . . . statistics regarding pass/fail rates on the entry examination antedating March 24, 1972 are inconsequential in determining if there had been a prior Title VII violation. Further, as the Findings of Fact demonstrate, shortly after March 24, 1972, there was no disparate impact upon blacks as a result of entry examinations or any other portion of the entry process. 75 446 F.Supp. at 1006 (footnote omitted). 76 March 24, 1972 is the effective date of Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, which amended Title VII to include governments, governmental agencies (and) political subdivisions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). The district court relied on Hazelwood, supra, for the proposition that a governmental employer who provides equal employment opportunities on that date and thereafter cannot be held liable solely on the basis of prior discrimination. 433 U.S. at 309, 97 S.Ct. 2736. 77 However, the Supreme Court in Hazelwood made clear that only a public employer who made All its employment decisions in a Wholly nondiscriminatory way after the effective date of the Act would be immune from liability. Id. (emphasis added). In a footnote to the portion of the opinion quoted by the district court, the Supreme Court wrote:This is not to say that evidence of pre-Act discrimination can never have any probative force. Proof that an employer engaged in racial discrimination prior to the effective date of Title VII might in some circumstances support the inference that such discrimination continued, particularly where relevant aspects of the decisionmaking process had undergone little change. 78 433 U.S. at 309-310 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2742-2743 n. 15. 79 Where there is at least some evidence of post-Act discriminatory practices and effects, pre-Act evidence of a similar nature is relevant to the conclusion of post-Act discrimination. If there is no evidence of post-Act discrimination, the public employer cannot be held liable under Title VII. 80 There was evidence of post-Act discrimination in this case which made the evidence of pre-Act employment practices relevant. The district court conceded that it was not until shortly after the effective date of the Act that the Department was able to eliminate the racially disparate impact of the hiring process. 446 F.Supp. at 1007. In fact, it was not until 1973 that the unvalidated entry level exam which failed greater numbers of black than white applicants was finally abandoned. See 446 F.Supp. at 1000. In addition, changes in other aspects of the entry level hiring process which had racially disparate effects or afforded opportunities for discrimination continued until 1973. 81 Moreover, discriminatory acts which might not give rise to legal liability may nonetheless be sufficient to justify a voluntary remedial affirmative action plan. Thus evidence of pre-Act discrimination in the present case was relevant to a legitimate defense. The test under Title VII of voluntary affirmative action is whether the action is consistent with the anti-discrimination policy of the statute. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979). Prior discrimination which would constitute a violation but for the effective date of the statute is cognizable in concluding that the employer's purpose in implementing affirmative action was consistent with the statutory purpose of eliminating discriminatory employment practices and their effects. When the question is what a public employer May do rather than what it Must do, evidence of pre-Act discrimination is relevant to the propriety of ostensibly remedial racial preferences. 7 82 In Weber, the Supreme Court rejected many of the legal principles on which the district court based its decision. The Court held that Title VII does not prohibit all remedial, race-conscious affirmative action plans. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. 2721. The district court in this case relied heavily on the court of appeals decision in Weber in concluding that Section 703(j) of Title VII required rejection of defendants' claim that racial balancing is a permissible reason for employment preferences. 446 F.Supp. at 1004. 83 In reversing the court of appeals in Weber, the Supreme Court found that Section 703(j) states only what Title VII does not Require of an employer. That section contains no explicit prohibition against voluntary employer action. The Court found a natural inference from this omission that Congress chose not to forbid all voluntary race-conscious affirmative action. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. 2721. 84 The district court also relied on McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976), in concluding that Title VII prohibits the implementation of an affirmative action plan which in any way prefers black employees over white. 446 F.Supp. at 1003. However, in Weber, the Supreme Court held that McDonald expressly left this question open. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. 2721. Further, it found that a principal purpose of Title VII is to induce voluntary solutions to racial discrimination, one form of which is race-conscious affirmative action employment. In view of the statutory purpose, § 703(a) and (d) cannot be read as literal, absolute prohibitions against race-conscious action to eliminate discrimination. --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 99 S.Ct. 2721. 85 The basic error in the district court's approach to the Title VII issue was that it determined what the Act requires of employers and then concluded that all other actions with racially disparate consequences are forbidden. But as the Supreme Court made clear in Weber, in a case of this kind where reverse discrimination is claimed, the question is not what Title VII requires or what a court might order to remedy a proven Title VII violation. Rather, the question is what voluntary actions may lawfully be taken. As Justice Blackmun noted in his concurring opinion in Weber, a preferential hiring plan which seeks to alleviate an imbalance caused by traditional practices of job segregation is a reasonable voluntary response whether or not a court, on these facts, could order the same step as a remedy. --- U.S. at ----, 99 S.Ct. at 2731. Under Weber, the district court's holding that  quota relief, when fashioned by the employer without the assistance and direction of the court, is not permitted . . ., 446 F.Supp. at 1010, cannot stand as a matter of law. 86 Consideration of the uncontroverted evidence before the district court and the very findings made by the court compel the conclusion that the Department was guilty of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Hiring data spanning the period 1944 to 1975 demonstrated a consistent,  significant racial disparity. Police work force statistics revealed a gross underrepresentation of black police officers when compared with city population, city labor market, and proper metropolitan labor market data. 87 No nondiscriminatory explanation for these disparities was offered. On the contrary, there was substantial evidence that the Department had a custom or tradition of racial discrimination in job assignments, conducted unvalidated entry tests with racially disparate effects, maintained physical job requirements with discriminatory impact, and created opportunities for racial discrimination in the background investigation of job applicants. 88 In addition, where judicial findings of discrimination in a particular job category are so numerous as to be a proper subject for judicial notice, affirmative action is permissible. Weber, --- U.S. at ---- n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2721. Racial discrimination by law enforcement agencies in the employment of police officers has resulted in numerous findings of unlawful discrimination. See, e. g., Afro American Patrolmens League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991, 95 S.Ct. 1997, 44 L.Ed.2d 481 (1975); Erie Human Relations Commission v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Mims v. Wilson, 514 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1975); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. en banc), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895, 95 S.Ct. 173, 42 L.Ed.2d 139 (1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir.), Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S.Ct. 225, 54 L.Ed.2d 155 (1977); see also President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 169, 174 (1967) (citing surveys which found racially exclusionary hiring practices and racially discriminatory job assignments in Detroit Police Department). 89 Based on the findings of the district court and uncontroverted evidence of prior discrimination by the Department we conclude that the affirmative action program did not violate Title VII. See Weber, supra. 90 3. Prior Discrimination: Title VI and § 1981. The district court did not explain its holding that the affirmative action plan violated Title VI. It apparently concluded that a public entity which receives federal funds may not establish any race-conscious preference program even to remedy past discrimination. We find this reading of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to be too expansive. 8 91 The Supreme Court has held that states may take voluntary race-conscious action to achieve compliance with the law. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 97 S.Ct. 996, 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977) (reapportionment); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 91 S.Ct. 1287, 28 L.Ed.2d 582 (1971) (school desegregation). Moreover, the Constitution imposes on states a duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of past unconstitutional discrimination. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 15, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). The district court erred in holding that only a court can effect a remedy upon a judicial finding of prior discrimination, for as Chief Justice Burger wrote in Swann, Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults. 402 U.S. at 16, 91 S.Ct. at 1276. 92 Title VI must be construed to avoid the conclusion that the statute interferes with the operation of the Constitution. It is presumed that Congress did not intend to prohibit state and local governments from performing their constitutional duty to eliminate discrimination and its effects. Therefore, while Title VI may prohibit acts of discrimination, it cannot be read to forbid remedies which are constitutionally required and unavoidably race-conscious. 93 The validity of the affirmative action plan under Title VI thus turns on whether it was effected to comply with a constitutional duty to remedy prior discrimination. This construction of Title VI is not inconsistent with the view that the statute forbids only that discrimination which offends the Constitution, as expressed by at least four Justices in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978): 94 In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment. 95 438 U.S. at 287, 98 S.Ct. at 2747 (Opinion of Powell, J.). 96 We agree with Mr. JUSTICE POWELL that, as applied to the case before us, Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. 97 438 U.S. at 325, 98 S.Ct. at 2767 (Opinion of Brennan, White, 9 Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). 98 The district court also held without explanation that the affirmative action plan violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Apparently, the court interpreted the statute as a prohibition of all race-conscious programs without regard to whether they fulfill a constitutional duty to remedy past discrimination. 99 Section 1981 is derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That Act was intended to implement the Thirteenth Amendment and eliminate the vestiges of slavery. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-440, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968). The statute also has a close relationship to the Fourteenth Amendment. The statute was a model for the Amendment, Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1029-30 and n. 21 (3d Cir. 1977), Cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3122, 57 L.Ed.2d 1147 (1978), and was reenacted after approval of the Amendment. Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 144; see Jones, 392 U.S. at 436, 88 S.Ct. 2186. 100 What the Constitution forbids generally, § 1981 forbids with some specificity. The constitutional genesis of § 1981 also means that what the Constitution permits, § 1981 must also permit. Because the Constitution not only permits but requires race-conscious action to remedy a constitutional violation, it was error to hold that § 1981 bars such action. 101 4. Prior Discrimination: The Constitutional Claim. The district court held that no race-conscious affirmative action program was permissible unless the defendants proved by unequivocal direct evidence that any disadvantages suffered by black applicants and candidates for promotion resulted from purposeful, intentional discrimination. Typical of several statements to this effect is the following: 102 Aside from statistical comparisons defendants have claimed that prior to the installation of the voluntary affirmative action plan blacks were treated differently than whites, essentially a claim of disparate treatment. While there was no evidence in this record showing such an allegation to be true, even if defendants had shown prior differential treatment to blacks vis a vis whites the claim of prior unconstitutional discrimination against blacks, without more, would fall short of a constitutional violation as it must be shown that the alleged differential treatment was Because of the race of the group. Proof of discriminatory Purpose, intent, or motive, be it evil or innocent, is required and absent such proof, as in the case at bar, there can be no constitutional violation. 103 446 F.Supp. at 1013-14 (footnote and citation omitted). 104 The district court relied primarily on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), and quoted extensively from the majority opinion. Washington v. Davis holds that proof of discriminatory purpose or intent is required to establish a constitutional violation and that proof of disparate racial impact from state action is not alone sufficient. This requirement applies to allegations of racial discrimination in various factual contexts. 426 U.S. at 239-41, 96 S.Ct. 2040. 105 However, the district court failed to follow those portions of the Supreme Court's opinion which give guidance on evaluating proof of discriminatory purpose: 106 This is not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that a law's disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination. A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, (6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220) (1886). 107 Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds. Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. 108 426 U.S. at 241-42, 96 S.Ct. at 2048-2049. 109 In Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68, 97 S.Ct. 555, 565, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), the Supreme Court set forth a number of subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed. The racial impact of the official action was identified as an important starting point. The historical background of decisions having disparate racial impact and the contemporary statements of members of the decision-making body were also types of evidence considered relevant. The Court quite recently reviewed the standard of proof for constitutional violations and held that actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden purpose. Columbus Bd. of Education v. Penick, --- U.S. ----, ----,99 S.Ct. 2941, 2950, 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979). The foreseeable effects standard may be employed as one of the several kinds of proofs from which an inference of segregative intent may be properly drawn. Id. In short, discriminatory intent may be established by any evidence which logically supports an inference that the state action was characterized by invidious purpose. 110 The district court erred in treating evidence of disparate impact of hiring and promotion practices as having no probative value. It found no relevance in the longstanding and gross underrepresentation of blacks on the Detroit police force. Its suspicions were not aroused by its own finding that the pre-1973 entry level written examination had serious flaws which tended to work against black applicants. 111 The court similarly erred in finding that there was no evidence on the record of disparate treatment. 446 F.Supp. at 1013. In light of uncontradicted evidence of discriminatory treatment in job assignments, this finding was clearly erroneous. There was uncontradicted evidence that the traditional practice of the Detroit police department had been to assign black officers to foot patrols only, denying them the use of patrol cars for years. After assignment of black officers to scout cars was begun, there were white and black cars. If the only black car was in use or out of operation black officers were required to walk rather than being permitted to use a white car. Black officers were permitted to work only in black neighborhoods. It was also uncontradicted that the traditional practice had been to exclude black officers from assignments to certain desirable details. Further, black officers were rarely given visible posts at headquarters and for many years black and white officers were never paired. 112 The natural consequence of these practices was to make police work unattractive to blacks and to limit the experience of blacks who were employed as police officers in ways which could hinder their chances for advancement. No non-discriminatory explanation was given for any of these practices. On the contrary, past and present uniformed police officers and civilian officials were convinced that these practices represented purposeful discrimination. Unlike the district court, we believe that evidence of these practices and their consequences was entitled to serious consideration. 113 When veteran police officers attempted to state the reasons for these practices as related to them by their former police supervisors, the evidence was excluded as hearsay. Thus, while the district court required proof of discriminatory purpose, it excluded the most probative evidence on the issue: contemporaneous statements by persons in positions to know the purpose of the Department's traditional practices. Exclusion of this evidence of discriminatory purpose as hearsay was error under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 803(3) 10 makes such testimony admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness. 114 The City's own determination that it had been guilty of racial discrimination in the past was also entitled to more serious consideration than the district court gave it. The resolution approved by the Board of Police Commissioners conceded the role of prior discrimination in creating the Department's racial imbalance. In light of this admission, the statistical evidence of disparate impact, the tradition of discriminatory treatment and the testimonial evidence of discriminatory purpose, we believe it was error for the district court to require the city to prove specific acts of discrimination and produce the individual victims of these acts. 115 We have no such clear authority in dealing with the constitutional issues as Weber supplies with respect to Title VII. However, we conclude that the opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, supra, 438 U.S. at 324, 98 S.Ct. 2733, offers the most reasonable guidance. Applying the principles set forth in that opinion, we conclude that the district court committed a number of errors of law. 116 Thus it was error to require proof that the persons receiving the preferential treatment had been individually subjected to discrimination, for it is enough that each recipient is within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination. Bakke, supra, 438 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 2786. 117 And, rather than requiring a direct showing of past intentional discrimination by the City of Detroit against identified individual black applicants for hiring and promotion, the district court should have determined first whether appropriate findings were made by a public body with competence to act in this area. Id. at 325, 98 S.Ct. at 2766. 118 It was also error to require that there be judicial determination of past discrimination for a state to undertake a race-conscious remedy, as stated by the district court. This requirement would be self-defeating and would severely undermine voluntary remedial efforts. Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 2733. 119 It is apparent that the district court misapprehended the nature of remedial race-conscious action and failed to conduct the proper inquiry into such action. As the four Justices wrote in Bakke, earlier cases involving discrimination against minorities are often inapposite and a more precise meaning of strict scrutiny is required when considering state action taken for the purpose of remedying past discrimination. 438 U.S. at 357, 98 S.Ct. 2733. 120 Thus it appears that, rather than requiring a direct showing of past intentional discrimination by the City of Detroit against identified individual black applicants for hiring and promotion, the district court should have considered the finding by the BPC, a public body with competence to act. This should have led to the following inquiries, at least: whether there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access (and promotion) of minorities . . . Id. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 2785; whether any discrete group or individual is stigmatized; and whether use of race is reasonable in light of the objectives of the plan. Id. at 373-76, 98 S.Ct. 2733. If this analysis establishes the need for remedial action, the test of reasonableness requires a showing that no other approach offers a practical means of achieving the ends of the program in the foreseeable future. Id. at 376, 98 S.Ct. 2733. If the affirmative action plan satisfies these criteria, it does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court conducted none of these inquiries, and its finding that the affirmative action program violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs must be reversed.