Opinion ID: 2306903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Zugehoer Was Properly Charged and the Jury Was Properly Instructed on the Essential Elements of Home Improvement Fraud.

Text: Zugehoer contends that the indictment failed to charge him with conduct constituting a crime, an error that the Superior Court compounded by refusing to instruct the jury that it must find fraudulent conversion to render Zugehoer's conduct unlawful. This Court will review a refusal to give a `particular instruction' (that is, an instruction is given but not with the exact form, content or language requested) for an abuse of discretion. [1] Because Zugehoer never raised below his claim that the indictment was defective for failure to charge criminal intent, that claim will only be reviewed on appeal for plain error. [2] 11 Del. C. § 916(b) contains five subsections that prescribe different methods by which home improvement fraud can be perpetrated. [3] The prefatory language of Section 916(b) incorporates the intent element for theft specified in 11 Del. C. § 841. [4] Section 841, in turn, sets forth two separate avenues to establish the requisite intent. Section 841(a) provides that [a] person is guilty of theft when the person takes, exercises control over or obtains property of another person intending to deprive that person of it or appropriate it. [5] Section 841(b) states that [a] person is guilty of theft if the person, in any capacity, legally receives, takes, exercises control over or obtains property of another which is the subject of theft, and fraudulently converts the same to the person's own use. [6] Zugehoer claims that he should have been charged, and that the jury should have been instructed, under Section 841(b) rather than Section 841(a). That error, he argues, resulted in his being charged with conduct that is not unlawful, and in the failure to instruct the jury properly on an essential element of the crime. Specifically, Zugehoer argues that intending to appropriate money under a contract for the purpose of performing the contract is not unlawful. Rather, the crime of Home Improvement Fraud requires that the person fraudulently convert the property of another. Zugehoer asserts that as charged, he could be convicted of lawfully taking money, then negligently or recklessly failing to substantially complete the project, pay the subcontractors or divert funds, none of which is conduct targeted by Section 916 or is consistent with the statute's purpose. [7] We conclude, for the following reasons, that Zugehoer's claims lack merit.
Zugehoer was charged with three counts of Home Improvement Fraud under 11 Del. C. § 916(b)(4). The indictment charged that Zugehoer did take, obtain, or exercise control over with intent to appropriate or deprive the owner of United States currency in excess of $500 for the purpose of obtaining or paying for services, labor, materials or equipment and did fail to apply such money for such purpose by: [Count I] failing to substantially complete home improvement for which the funds were provided; [Count II] diverting said funds to a use other than that for which they were received; and [Count III] failing to pay for the services, labor, materials or equipment provided incident to such home improvement. The indictment tracked the statutory language of Section 916(b)(4) and alleged the requisite intent under Section 841(a). Therefore, the indictment gave Zugehoer proper notice of the charges against him and properly stated the charges and intent under that statute. [8] Zugehoer's argument that the indictment failed to do so is contrary to, and ignores, the plain language of Section 916. Accordingly, there is no plain error necessitating further review. Zugehoer's argument is rejected. [9]
The jury instructions were consistent with the indictment. After reading the relevant language of Section 916(b) verbatim, the trial judge instructed the jury on intent, consistent with Section 841: Now, in order to find the defendant guilty of Home Improvement Fraud you must find that all of the following elements have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. One, the defendant entered into a home improvement contract, to provide home improvements to Paul and Christine Berkeley. Home improvement means any alteration, repair, addition, modification or improvement to any dwelling or the property on which it is located. Home improvement contract is any agreement, written or oral in which a person offers or agrees to provide home improvement in exchange for payment of money, whether such payments have been made or not. And the second element is that the defendant received money for the purpose of obtaining or paying for services, labor, materials or equipment, and failed to apply the money for this purpose by not substantially completing the requirements of the home improvement contract, or by not paying for the services, labor, materials, or equipment furnished to the home improvement project, or by diverting the money to some other use. And the third element is that the defendant intended to appropriate the money paid by Paul and Christine Berkeley under the home improvement contract or to deprive them of itthat is, it was the defendant's conscious object or purpose to take the money. Appropriate means to exercise control, or to aid a third party to exercise control over property of another permanently or for so extended a period of time, or under such circumstances as to acquire a major portion of its economic value or benefit, or to dispose of property for the benefit of the actor or third person. And the fourth and final element is that the contract price or amount paid by Paul and Christine Berkeley was $500 or greater. Thus, the jurors were instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zugehoer failed to use the money he received from the Berkeleys to substantially complete the improvement project, pay the subcontractors or suppliers, and that he used the money for something else. The jury was also told that it must find that Zugehoer intended to deprive the Berkeleys of the value of their money. Zugehoer has not shown how an instruction under Section 841(b)that he fraudulently convert[ed] the moneywould have assisted the jury. Section 916(b)(4) itself provides the jury with specific counts which presume that the defendant fraudulently converted funds for purposes of committing the offense. An instruction based on Section 841(b) would therefore be redundant. [10] In Edwards v. State, [11] this Court rejected the suggestion that the jury should be instructed under the more generalized Section 841(b) [12] and call[ed] upon the Delaware Legislature to eliminate the `unnecessary' second paragraph of § 841 to remove the ambiguity created by that law.... [13] Accordingly, in Delaware, when the jury is instructed on the intent required by Section 841(b), the settled practice is to use the language of Section 841(a), rather than of Section 841(b). Here, the trial court ruled that the languagewith intent specified in Section 841was intended to incorporate only subsection (a), and not subsection (b) and so instructed the jury. The trial court properly instructed the jurors that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Zugehoer failed to use the money he received from the Berkeleys to substantially complete the improvement project, pay the subcontractors or suppliers, and that he used the money for some unrelated purpose.