Opinion ID: 1987627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Grounds for Withdrawal

Text: With these principles in mind, we now consider whether the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant failed to establish that withdrawal of his plea was necessary to correct manifest injustice. The defendant contends that withdrawal is appropriate because his nolo contendere plea was not supported by a sufficient factual basis. As grounds for this assertion, the defendant relies upon Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f), which provides: Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. In response, the State argues that the plea was supported by a sufficient factual basis. Alternatively, the State contends that a factual basis need not be established when a defendant enters a nolo contendere plea rather than a guilty plea. The State points out that Rule 11(f) refers only to acceptance of a plea of guilty and does not mention acceptance of a plea of nolo contendere. The application of the factual basis requirement to nolo contendere pleas is an issue of first impression in Tennessee. [11] We conclude that the State is correct in its assertion that Rule 11(f) does not mandate the establishment of a factual basis for nolo contendere pleas. Although nolo contendere pleas were part of the common law in England and have always been permitted in federal courts, [12] such pleas first became available in Tennessee in 1978 with the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Tenn. Advisory Commission Comments, Tenn. R.Crim. P. 11 (Rule 11 establishes for the first time in Tennessee practice the availability of a plea of nolo contendere . . . .). Our analysis begins therefore with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (Rule 11). In Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 104 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tenn. 2003), we held that the well-established and well-known rules of construction which courts apply when interpreting statutes enacted by legislative bodies also apply when courts interpret rules of procedure. Thus, in determining whether the factual basis requirement applies to nolo contendere pleas, we must afford to Rule 11 an interpretation which does not unduly restrict or expand its coverage beyond its intended scope. Id. (citing State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000); State v. Butler, 980 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tenn.1998)). We apply the natural and ordinary meaning of the language as it is used in the context and construe together all sections of the rule in light of its general purpose and plan. Doe, 104 S.W.3d at 469 (citing State v. Netto, 486 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tenn.1972)). Rule 11 consists of seven subsections, enumerated alphabetically (a) through (g). Rule 11(a), the general prefatory subsection, lists the three plea options available to criminal defendants-[a] defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere. Rule 11(b) is limited in scope to nolo contendere pleas and directs that a defendant may enter such a plea only with the consent of the court. Rule 11(b) further explains that [s]uch a plea shall be accepted by the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the interest of the public in the effective administration of justice. Rule 11(c) and (d) apply to both guilty pleas and nolo contendere pleas. Rule 11(c) [13] is designed to ensure that a defendant's plea is entered with knowledge and understanding of its consequences, while Rule 11(d) [14] is designed to ensure that a plea is voluntarily entered. Rule 11(e), which also applies to both guilty and nolo contendere pleas, prescribes the procedure for plea negotiations, for disclosing the agreement to the court, and for advising the defendant of the trial court's authority pertaining to the plea agreement. Subsection (e) also describes the evidentiary parameters which apply to pleas, offers of pleas, and related statements. [15] Subsection (g), which directs that a verbatim record be made of the proceedings at which a plea is entered, also expressly applies to the entry of guilty pleas and nolo contendere pleas. [16] In contrast, subsection (f), upon which the defendant relies, expressly applies only to the acceptance of a plea of guilty.  Tenn. R.Crim. P. 11(f) (emphasis added). The fact that subsection (f) is the only provision of Rule 11 which does not expressly refer to nolo contendere pleas logically leads to our conclusion that Rule 11(f) does not apply to nolo contendere pleas. Our conclusion is also supported by the Advisory Committee Comments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and by federal decisions interpreting the federal rule. As previously stated, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, and in particular, the nolo contendere plea, derived from the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and from federal practice. In construing Rule 11, it is thus appropriate to look to federal authorities, particularly in light of the Advisory Commission Comment to Rule 11 which recognizes that uniformity . . . with the federal courts in procedural matters such as those contemplated under Rule[ ] 11 . . . is beneficial to the public and to the legal profession. The 1966 Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 state in relevant part: For a variety of reasons it is desirable in some cases to permit entry of judgment upon a plea of nolo contendere without inquiry into the factual basis for the plea. The new third sentence [the factual basis requirement] is not, therefore, made applicable to pleas of nolo contendere. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, Notes of the Advisory Committee on the Rules, 1966 Amendment. In a subsequent decision, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the inapplicability of the factual basis requirement to nolo contendere pleas, stating: Throughout its history . . . the plea of nolo contendere has been viewed not as an express admission of guilt but as a consent by the defendant that he may be punished as if he were guilty and a prayer for leniency. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11 preserves this distinction in its requirement that a court cannot accept a guilty plea unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea; there is no similar requirement for pleas of nolo contendere, since it was thought desirable to permit defendants to plead nolo without making any inquiry into their actual guilt. See Notes of Advisory Committee to Rule 11. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 35-36 n. 8, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) (emphasis added). Other state and federal courts, interpreting either Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a state rule patterned upon Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 have also concluded that the factual basis requirement does not apply to nolo contendere pleas. [17] Applying the rules of construction, and considering the plain language of Rule 11(f), the Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, and decisions from other jurisdictions considering this issue, we hold that Rule 11(f) does not mandate the establishment of a factual basis before a trial court may accept a nolo contendere plea. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the defendant's motion to withdraw on the ground that the plea lacked a factual basis. [18]
Our holding that Rule 11(f) does not require a factual basis in no way lessens the importance of the requirement that a nolo contendere plea be voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. See Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 932, 943-44 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988) (perm. app. denied June 5, 1989) (holding that a nolo contendere plea must be entered in accordance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) and State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn.1977), and setting aside Teague's nolo contendere plea because it was not voluntarily and knowingly entered). While a defendant who is permitted to plead nolo contendere does not expressly admit his guilt, [19] such a defendant effectively consents to being punished as if he were guilty. Alford, 400 U.S. at 35-36 n. 8, 91 S.Ct. 160; State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn.1984) (holding that a nolo contendere plea has the same effect as a guilty plea, absent some statute or rule to the contrary); Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d at 943 (stating that entry of a nolo contendere plea is tantamount to an admission of guilt for purposes of the case in which it is entered). [20] By entering a nolo contendere plea, a defendant waives several constitutional rights and consents to the judgment of the court. Because [w]aivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but also must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the record must affirmatively disclose that a plea of nolo contendere was voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly entered. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709; Mellon, 118 S.W.3d at 345; Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d at 943-44. Where a defendant enters a plea to a crime without having been informed of the crime's elements, this standard is not met and the plea is invalid. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)). To ensure that a plea is entered knowingly and understandingly, Rule 11(c)(1), provides: [b]efore accepting a plea of . . . nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that he or she understands,. . . [t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law[.] As this Court explained in Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn.1993): Federal law recognizes the well-established [principle] that a plea of guilty cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed the offense unless the accused has received `real notice of the true nature of the charges against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.'  Hence, there must be a full explanation of the offense to which the defendant is pleading . . . . (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Bryan v. State, 848 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (perm. app. denied Nov. 30, 1992); Evans 265 Ga. at 335 n. 1, 454 S.E.2d 468. In order to find that a plea was entered knowingly and understandingly a trial court must canvass[] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence[s]. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709; see Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904. A court charged with determining whether a plea has been voluntarily and understandingly entered must consider the totality of various circumstantial factors, including: the relative intelligence of the defendant; the degree of his familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether he was represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about the options available to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might result from a jury trial. Blankenship, 858 S.W.2d at 904 (citing Caudill v. Jago, 747 F.2d 1046, 1052 (6th Cir.1984)). We conclude that the defendant in this case established that his plea was not voluntarily, understandingly, or knowingly entered and therefore conclude that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw. The transcript of the plea submission hearing reflects that the trial judge advised the defendant of the possible penalty for facilitation of first degree murder, but the trial court did not, in accordance with Rule 11(c)(1), explain to the defendant the nature of the offense of facilitation of first degree murder or determine that the defendant understood the offense to which he was entering a plea. Admittedly, the defendant signed a plea agreement in which he stated that his plea had been voluntarily entered, but the plea agreement did not explain the nature of facilitation of first degree murder. We are unwilling to assume that because the defendant signed a plea agreement, the defendant entered his plea with a complete understanding of the charge against him. See McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 464-65, 89 S.Ct. 1166. Like the United States Supreme Court, we conclude that such an assumption would ignore the purposes of Rule 11: First, although the procedure embodied in Rule 11 has not been held to be constitutionally mandated, it is designed to assist the [trial] judge in making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant's guilty plea is truly voluntary. Second, the Rule is intended to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas. Id. at 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (footnotes omitted). A single plea submission hearing was held in this case for the purpose of accepting the defendant's nolo contendere plea to facilitation of first degree murder and Poe's guilty plea to second degree murder. The trial court did not discuss the plea offenses with either defendant, but chose apparently to rely upon their representations that counsel had discussed their cases and all possible defenses with them and that they were satisfied with their attorneys' representation. The better practice is for trial judges to inquire personally of pleading defendants into the matters set out in Rule 11. As the United States Supreme Court said in Boykin : What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories. 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (citations omitted); see also Chamberlain v. State, 815 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tenn.Crim.App.1990). Granted, in many cases it may be possible to determine that a defendant entered a plea with knowledge and understanding of the nature of the plea offense, even when a trial court fails to conduct the Rule 11(c)(1) inquiry. However, under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, it is not possible to do so. This case is quite similar to Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). In Henderson, the Supreme Court held the defendant's guilty plea to second degree murder was invalid because the defendant entered the plea without having been informed or having understood that an intent to cause the victim's death was an element of the offense. Id. at 645-47, 96 S.Ct. 2253. The Court held that due process of law requires that an accused who pleads guilty understand the nature of the charge to which he is admitting guilt. Id. at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253. In so holding, the Court emphasized that the defendant had been formally charged with first degree murder and had not had access to a document charging him with second degree murder. The Court also assum[ed] without deciding that notice of the true nature, or substance, of a charge does not always require[ ] a description of every element of the offense . . . . Id. at 647 n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 2253. The Court further commented that [n]ormally the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused and pointed out that even without such an express representation, it may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice . . . . Id. at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253. Nonetheless, the Court pointed out that the District Court had found that the element of intent had not been explained to the defendant and held that intent is such a critical element of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is required. Id. at 647 n. 18, 96 S.Ct. 2253. The United States Supreme Court has recently again emphasized that a trial judge need not personally explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record so long as the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. See Stumpf, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. 2398. We also agree that a reviewing court may be able to determine that a defendant gained from other sources an adequate understanding of the offense and notice of the nature of the charge to which he or she is entering a plea, even if a trial court fails to comply with Rule 11(c)(1). For example, the defendant may be informed of the nature of the offense by the allegations of the indictment. See, e.g., Henderson, 426 U.S. at 649 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 2253 (White, J. concurring) (In those cases in which the indictment is read to the defendant by the court at arraignment or at the time of his plea, his plea of guilty may well be deemed a factual admission that he did what he is charged with doing so that a judgment of conviction may validly be entered against him.); Bryan, 848 S.W.2d at 76 (rejecting the defendant's claim that he had not understood the nature of the offenses to which he had pleaded guilty and noting that the elements of the offenses had been alleged in the indictment). Another source from which a defendant may gain an understanding of the nature of the offense is the prosecution's summation at the plea submission hearing of the facts relevant to the elements of the plea offense. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 253 Conn. 1, 751 A.2d 298, 322 (2000) (citing cases). Furthermore, in some cases the reviewing court may be able to determine that the offense or the relevant element of the offense is a self-explanatory legal term, so simple in meaning that a lay person can be expected to understand it. See, e.g. Easter v. Norris, 100 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that terms enter and intent in context of burglary did not require further explanation at taking of guilty plea); United States v. Wetterlin, 583 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir.1978) (stating that charge of conspiracy is not a self-explanatory legal term so simple in meaning that it can be expected or assumed that a lay person understands it); Waits v. People, 724 P.2d 1329, 1334-35 (Colo.1986) (holding that district court was not required to define terms intent, specific intent, and theft for crime of burglary); State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 84 P.3d 579, 584 (App.2004) (stating that, with respect to the element of penetration, the layperson's meaning of `rape' corresponds with the legal definition set out in [the statute]); State v. Young, 646 So.2d 445, 447 (La.Ct.App.1994) (rejecting the defendant's claim that his plea was involuntary and noting that DWI, fourth offense is a crime in which the title conveys its elements); see generally 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure, § 21.4(c) (2d ed. 1999 & 2005 Supp.). Finally, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, in many cases it will be possible for a reviewing court to determine that the defense lawyer advised the defendant about the nature of the plea offense, even when the trial court fails to do so. Stumpf, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. 2398 (Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.); Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253. In this case, the record does not reflect that the defendant gained an understanding of the nature of the plea offense from either the trial judge, or defense counsel, or any other source. The record contains neither an explanation of the charge by the trial judge nor a representation by defense counsel that the defendant had been advised about the nature of the offense. The trial judge simply failed to discuss with the defendant the nature of the offense to which he was pleading nolo contendere. The indictment had charged the defendant with first degree murder rather than facilitation of first degree murder. As previously detailed, in his motion to withdraw, in his testimony at the hearing on the motion to withdraw, and on appeal the defendant has consistently maintained that he did not understand the legal definition of facilitation when he entered the plea. He has also maintained that he and his family had repeatedly advised his attorney that he was willing to enter the nolo contendere plea to facilitation only if it meant I didn't have nothing [sic] to do with the murder of Mr. Smith. The defendant has further consistently maintained that he entered the plea believing it meant that he had been present at the crime scene and witnessed the murder. As the dissenting judge on the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, the prosecution's recitation of the proof, to which the defendant's attorney stipulated, was wholly consistent with the defendant's assertions about his understanding of the offense of facilitation to commit first degree murder. When the defendant later realized that facilitation means I had something to do with it, he sought advice from another attorney, his present counsel, and filed the motion to withdraw because he had not furnish[ed] any assistance in the commission of the felony. The defendant reiterated, I had nothing to do with this. I was there. I admit it. But that's all. I was just there. The defendant explained: I didn't know . . . facilitation . . . meant that you had something to do with it, because, see if I'd knowed it, I wouldn't have pled to it, because I didn't have nothing [sic] to do with the death of Mr. Smith. . . . . See, I am guilty of being there and seeing it, you know, and I thought that's what I was pleading guilty to. And if that's what the time carries just for me being there and seeing it is, you know, then I'm ready to do it. But I didn't have anything to do with the death of Mr. Smith. Although the defendant is a high school graduate, he had no prior convictions and no prior familiarity with criminal proceedings. Facilitation of first degree murder is not a self-explanatory legal term or a concept so simple in meaning that lay persons can be expected to understand it. At the hearing on the defendant's motion to withdraw, the State failed to offer evidence or elicit testimony on cross-examination which contradicted the defendant's consistent and strenuous assertions that his attorney had not advised him about the nature of facilitation and the offense to which he entered a plea. Cf. Chamberlain, 815 S.W.2d at 541 (holding that the State may present as a witness at a post-conviction hearing the attorney who represented the defendant and recognizing that the State may establish by the cross-examination of the defendant that he knew the . . . constitutional rights omitted by the trial judge). Finally, in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw, the trial court neither discounted the defendant's credibility nor determined that the defendant's allegations were without basis. The trial court instead assessed the strength of the prosecution's proof against the defendant and found that a jury question would have been presented. The trial court's findings failed to address the defendant's contention that he had not understood the nature of facilitation of first degree murder and would not have entered the nolo contendere plea had he understood the nature of the offense. Considering the totality of the circumstances [21] in this case, we are unable to conclude that the defendant's plea was knowingly and understandingly entered. Simply put, the record supports the defendant's assertion that he did not understand the nature of facilitation to first degree murder when he entered his nolo contendere plea. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw. We hold that withdrawal of the defendant's plea is necessary to correct manifest injustice.