Opinion ID: 3047863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pelullo’s Sentencing Appeal.

Text: Pelullo describes what is before us as sui generis and notes that the factual situation is one of a kind. The government does not disagree. Indeed, neither party has suggested that there is any case on point, and none has been located by us. Pelullo’s argument, in broad summary, goes something like this: On January 12, 2005, when Booker was decided, Pelullo was not under a sentence of imprisonment — his original sentence had been vacated on May 17, 2002, when the District Court granted his motion for a new trial. Because we reversed the grant of a new trial subsequent to the decision in Booker, Pelullo contends that he was entitled to be resentenced and that that resentencing should be in accordance with Booker. At first blush — and, much credit to the superb and creative defense lawyering, even at second blush — Pelullo’s argument seems to make sense. After all, when Pelullo stood before the District Court on May 18, 2005, he was arguably under no sentence and the sentence that we directed be reinstated had been calculated pursuant to the thenmandatory Guidelines which became advisory as to sentences imposed after Booker. So why, Pelullo asks, should not the advisory Guidelines be applied to him? The answer, at the end of the day, is really quite simple. Prior to the District Court’s order granting Pelullo a new trial, his conviction and sentence were final, having become so when the Supreme Court denied certiorari. When, in Pelullo II, we reversed 7 the order granting a new trial, our reversal essentially rendered that order void ab initio such that Pelullo was in the same position as if the order had never been entered and the conviction and sentence never vacated. See CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RNA Health Services, Inc., 499 F.3d 184, 190 n.2 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1106 (2007)) (“the effect of a reversal of a judgment ‘is to nullify it completely and leave the case standing as if such judgment had never been rendered . . . .’”).7 Viewing Pelullo’s case through this prism, there is no question that the original (and long final) judgment of sentence was properly reinstated (assuming that reinstatement was even required), and that Booker did not apply. See Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 611-12 (3d Cir. 2005) (Booker does not apply retroactively to sentences that were final).