Opinion ID: 2361145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ellen's Claim

Text: Ellen challenges the court's award of joint legal parental rights and responsibilities. She argues that this provision of the court's order violates 15 V.S.A. § 665(a), which states in part: When the parties cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and responsibilities, the court shall award parental rights and responsibilities primarily or solely to one parent. As Tom and Ellen did not form an agreement to divide or share their parental rights and responsibilities, see 15 V.S.A. § 666, Ellen maintains that the court lacked authority under the statute to make a joint award. The court justified its order by noting that the parties, despite their many arguments, for the most part agree on the major issues affecting the child's welfare. The court emphasized that the parties have similar backgrounds and values, as well as similar aspirations for the child's future. Despite the parties' lack of agreement, and their frequent disputes over the child, the court concluded that it was worth a try to entrust the couple with joint legal parental rights and responsibilities, and ordered that [e]ach shall involve the other in decisions regarding [the child's] health, education, religion, and welfare. We agree with Ellen that the court exceeded its authority by ordering joint legal parental rights and responsibility. A joint parental rights and responsibilities order such as this one violates both the language of § 665(a) and the policy underlying the provision. The meaning of § 665(a) is plain: where the parents cannot agree, the court must award primary (or sole) parental rights and responsibilities to one parent. Here, the court's order cannot be characterized as awarding primary parental rights and responsibilities to Ellen. Although Ellen, as the parent with sole [3] physical rights and responsibilities, is primarily responsible for the routine daily care and control of the child, see 15 V.S.A. § 664(1)(B), she can make no important decisions on behalf of the child without consulting and reaching agreement with Tom. Neither she, nor Tom, has primary responsibility for this child; rather, they have been forced to share that responsibility. [4] Under the statute, the court does not have authority to order this arrangement absent the consent of the parents. Our reading of § 665(a) as prohibiting an award of joint legal parental rights and responsibilities absent agreement of the parties is reinforced by the provisions of § 666, which governs agreements between parents. This statute requires parents who do agree to share or divide parental rights and responsibilities to complete an agreement that addresses, among other things, procedures for communicating about the child's welfare and for resolving disputes, see 15 V.S.A. § 666(b)(6) & (7)  issues that, ironically, the court did not discuss in its order in this case. By requiring parents who are willing to work together to nonetheless consider and resolve these issues in advance, the Legislature recognized the difficulties inherent in shared-parenting arrangements. In light of these provisions, it seems unlikely that the Legislature intended to allow courts to force such an arrangement on parents. We recognize that the court in this case was frustrated by Ellen's violation of its earlier order and by her unwillingness to foster Tom's relationship with the child. The court tried to ensure Tom's meaningful involvement in the child's life by requiring Ellen to share decisionmaking authority with him. But a court-imposed joint-parenting arrangement cannot solve the problem of fighting parents. Instead, by forcing unwilling parents to share parental rights and make joint decisions, a court risks placing a child in the middle of constant and harmful disputes over everything from how much television the child watches to what school or church the child attends. Divorced or separated parents who agree to share responsibility for their children take on, to their credit, a challenging task requiring communication, cooperation, and flexibility. Where parents have not evinced a willingness to work together, they are very unlikely to successfully negotiate this process. [5] As we recognized in Gazo v. Gazo, ___ Vt. ___, 697 A.2d 342 (1997), awarding primary parental rights and responsibilities to one parent does not mean that the other parent must be completely shut out of decision-making about the child. If it serves the best interests of the child, the court may, for example, require the primary parent to consult with the other parent on some issues. See id. at ___, 697 A.2d at 347. The court may also award substantial parent-child contact to the noncustodial parent. Thus, we do not view our decision as requiring the court to take an all or nothing approach, ___ Vt. at ___, 697 A.2d at 658, as suggested by the dissent. As always, family courts have broad discretion to craft parental rights and responsibilities orders that serve the best interests of children. Although we strike the provision awarding joint legal parental rights and responsibilities, we recognize that the family court may wish to alter other provisions in the order. We therefore remand the parental rights and responsibilities order for reconsideration in light of this opinion.