Opinion ID: 2162544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Common Law Collateral Estoppel

Text: As we have noted, there is some division of authority as to whether, under common law principles, the resolution of an issue of law or fact by an administrative agency can preclude the relitigation of that issue in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Courts in California and Michigan have applied collateral estoppel to preclude a prosecution for welfare fraud after an administrative agency determined that there was no fraudthat the father of the children did not live in the defendant's home. See People v. Sims, 32 Cal.3d 468, 186 Cal.Rptr. 77, 651 P.2d 321 (1982); People v. Watt, 115 Mich.App. 172, 320 N.W.2d 333 (1982). See also United States v. Abatti, 463 F.Supp. 596 (S.D.Cal.1978), dismissing a tax evasion case based on a ruling of the Tax Court that there was no deficiency. Other courts have reached a different conclusion, ruling either that cross-over collateral estoppel does not apply between administrative and criminal proceedings or that, while it might in some circumstances, it does not generally. See Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Doctrine of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel as Barring Relitigation in State Criminal Proceedings of Issues Previously Decided in Administrative Proceedings, 30 A.L.R.4th 856 (1984 and Supp.1997). See also United States v. Alexander, 743 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.1984); United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Payne, 2 F.3d 706 (6th Cir.1993). It is of some interest to note that, following the ruling of the California court in People v. Sims , the California legislature enacted a statute to make clear that collateral estoppel did not preclude the prosecution of defendants for driving while intoxicated or while under the influence based on findings made in § 16-205.1-type proceedings. See Gikas v. Zolin, supra, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d at 506-07, 863 P.2d at 751-52. We need not determine here whether common law collateral estoppel would operate to preclude a criminal prosecution under § 21-902 based on an MVA finding in a § 16-205.1 proceeding, for the General Assembly has made clear through the enactment of § 16-205.1( l )(1) that criminal proceedings under § 21-902 and administrative proceedings under § 16-205.1 are independent of one another and that the findings made in one do not affect the other. That decision was deliberate and must be given effect, whatever the common law might otherwise be. [9] We traced some of the legislative history of § 16-205.1 in Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 597 A.2d 939 (1991), noting that it emanated from a legislatively-created Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving. Among the several matters studied by that task force were (1) an administrative per se law, making both the refusal to take an alcohol test and the taking of such a test that revealed 0.10 or greater alcohol concentration an administrative offense that would lead to the rapid and mandated suspension of the offender's driver's license, and (2) a criminal per se law, that would make driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more a per se criminal offense. See TASK FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING MINUTES, September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 13, 1988. When juxtaposed with existing laws on driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence of alcohol, those proposed laws raised a number of res judicata, collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, and merger concerns, and both the Staff to the Task Force and the Attorney General's Office were asked to address those issues. The principal concern emanated from the proposed mandated suspension resulting from a test result of 0.10 or greater, rather than from the suspension following a refusal to take the test, but the latter was also viewed as a potential problem. In November, 1988, the Department of Legislative Reference submitted a memorandum addressing, among other things, the relationship between an administrative per se offense and a violation of § 21-902. The memorandum noted, in that regard, that collateral estoppel and res judicata may frustrate the regulatory purpose of the legislative scheme under certain circumstances (particularly when the state fails to prove its case in the first proceedings) and should be considered when structuring the legislative scheme. See Memorandum from William Dickerson to Members of the Drunk & Drugged Driving Task Force, ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS FOR DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING, November 22, 1988. Citing Bowling v. State, supra, 298 Md. 396, 470 A.2d 797, and assuming that the administrative proceeding would normally precede the criminal trial, Mr. Dickerson warned that, [i]f in some context an administrative determination is held to be the equivalent of a final judgment then an accused party prevailing at the administrative level with the lesser burden of proof could use the determination to collaterally estop relitigation of a necessarily determined issue in a later criminal prosecution. Dickerson, supra, at 10. He noted as well that [i]n the unlikely event the criminal proceeding precedes the administrative hearing any determination of an issue at the criminal stage meeting the aforementioned requirements for collateral estoppel would foreclose relitigation of an identical issue at the administrative level. Id. The Assistant Attorney General representing the MVA, in a memorandum to the Task Force, addressed some of the collateral estoppel issues. Her particular concern was whether a dismissal, nol pros, stet, or acquittal in the criminal proceeding could affect a suspension previously ordered by MVAthe reverse of the situation presently before usand she concluded that, because of the different burdens of proof, it would not. She opined that, in any event, there was no privity between the prosecutor and MVA and that the issues in the two proceedings were not the same. In that latter regard, she noted that, at the administrative proceeding, the issue was solely whether the person refused a proper request to take the test or took a test showing an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or greater, and that neither was required to be proved in the criminal proceeding. See Memorandum from Ann E. Singleton, Assistant Attorney General, to Peter J. Cobb, Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Drivers, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PER SE PROVISIONS, February 3, 1989. Aware of the problem, and apparently not content to rest entirely on the Assistant Attorney General's assurances, the Legislature dealt with it expressly. As of July, 1988, States and the District of Columbia had enacted administrative per se statutes. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DRUNK AND DRUGGED DRIVING 1988 INTERIM, at 12. There was also in existence the 1987 edition of the Uniform Vehicle Code, prepared by the National Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, which contained an implied consent and administrative per se law. Except for the Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, and Maine laws, neither the existing statutes in other States nor the Uniform Vehicle Code dealt specifically with the res judicata or collateral estoppel issues that might arise from the relationship between the license suspension proceeding and the criminal case, and, although the Task Force warned the General Assembly of the problem, the bill proposed by the Governor to implement the Task Force recommendations (House Bill 556), as initially introduced, also was silent on those issues. In the course of the legislative process, however, the General Assembly addressed the preclusion concerns (1) by enumerating, and circumscribing, the issues to be considered at the MVA hearing, and (2) by adding a provision, now codified as § 16-205.1( l )(1), that [t]he determination of any facts by the [MVA] is independent of the determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal charges arising out of the same occurrence. To meet the particular concern of the Assistant Attorney General of whether a ruling in the criminal case favorable to the defendant might impact on the ability of MVA to order or continue in effect a suspension, the Legislature added to subsection ( l ) the further provision, subsection ( l )(2), that the disposition of criminal charges may not affect any suspension imposed under § 16-205.1. Section 16-205.1( l )(1), however, operates in both directions and is not limited in scope only to suspensions ordered upon a test result of 0.10 or more. See State v. Hoyt, supra, 922 S.W.2d 443; State v. Warfield, supra, 854 S.W.2d 9. The unmistakable intent behind that provision was to make clear that ( 1 ) whatever issues were addressed and decided at an MVA hearing under § 16-205.1, the findings, rulings, and decisions made by MVA would have no effect on any subsequent criminal proceedings under § 21-902, and (2) conversely, a judgment entered in the criminal case would have no effect on the administrative proceeding or on any order entered in such a proceeding. In light of these conclusions, we need not resolve here the narrower issue raised by the Statethat the question before the MVA was not whether Janes was, in fact, the driver of the van but only whether Trooper Barth had reasonable grounds to believe that he was, and that, accordingly, the ALJ's finding that Janes was not the driver was gratuitous and, for that reason, cannot serve as the basis for collateral estoppel. ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED TO CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS; APPELLANT TO PAY THE COSTS.