Opinion ID: 2974343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mr oh ’s motion for acquittal

Text: We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for acquittal. United States v. Keeton, 101 F.3d 48, 52 (6th Cir. 1996). We “must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (emphasis original) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, provides: Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, 11 signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. To obtain a conviction of Mr. Oh for wire fraud, the Government needed to prove “(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) intent to deprive a victim of money or property.” United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2000). Although the second element is uncontested, and is easily satisfied by Mr. Oh’s faxing of three DD-250 forms to Charles Hall, Mr. Oh contests the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the first and third elements of wire fraud. He argues that the Government failed to show that he “developed a scheme to defraud the Government” or that he “intended to defraud the Government of money or property.” We disagree. The district court concluded that as to the first element, a scheme or artifice to defraud, the Government presented sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Oh knew that the speed brakes he supplied pursuant to the 2003 contract did not conform to the Government’s specifications and that he deliberately kept this information from the Government. The Government put on evidence that included testimony that Mr. Oh received letters from military officials explaining the problems with the speed brakes; testimony regarding the meeting at Kelly Air Force Base with Mr. Oh’s brother in which officials explained how the brakes failed to conform to the Government’s specifications; and Boyd Taylor’s testimony that he told Mr. Oh that the parts were out of tolerance even before they were shipped the first time. From this evidence a rational jury could conclude that Mr. Oh intended to sell to the Government brakes that he knew did not meet the contract specifications. 12 The district court also concluded that the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that under the 2003 contract Mr. Oh intentionally withheld information from the Government regarding the defects in the brakes. The jury heard that Mr. Oh did not inform Mr. Hall that in 1991 Kelly Air Force Base had issued a product quality deficiency report indicating the brakes’ non-conformance or that the Government had terminated the 1988 contract because the parts did not meet the contract specifications. Mr. Oh argues that the jury lacked sufficient evidence to convict because he disclosed the 1988 T-38 speed brake contract number on his 2003 bid for the speed brakes contract. He maintains that both he and Charles Hall understood that the only reason that Mr. Oh could deliver the speed brakes so rapidly and so cost effectively was because he had spare brakes from the 1988 contract. Mr. Oh claims that he provided the Government with all of the information it needed to determine if there were any problems in accepting his bid for parts that he admitted he manufactured pursuant to the 1988 contract. He contends that he made no false statements or material misrepresentations that would have misled the Government about the parts. We have some sympathy with Mr. Oh’s implicit contention that the Government failed to undertake the kind of investigation that would have revealed the entire history of these speed brakes. We conclude, however, that because Mr. Oh’s failure to disclose a material fact to the Government constitutes a misrepresentation for purposes of the wire fraud statute, the Government’s failure to investigate is not material to the issue of Mr. Oh’s guilt. In United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 764 (6th Cir. 1998), we held that in the fraud context an affirmative misstatement is not required. Rather, a scheme or artifice to defraud may simply involve a knowing omission of a material fact. Id. To be sure, that knowing omission “must have the purpose of inducing the victim of the fraud 13 to part with property or undertake some action that he would not otherwise do absent the misrepresentation or omission.” Id. The district court relied on DeSantis, and concluded that from the evidence presented at Mr. Oh’s trial, a rational factfinder could reasonably have believed that Mr. Oh deliberately sought to conceal material information from the Government when he failed to provide the results of subsequent product quality deficiency reports, that he misled the Government by omitting this information, “the one piece of information that likely would have affected the government’s choice whether or not to accept Mr. Oh’s bid.” We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that the jury’s verdict on Count 1 is supported by sufficient evidence.