Opinion ID: 187427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The President's Passport Policy Regarding the Designation of Jerusalem Is an Exercise of the Recognition Power

Text: The Executive and Congress historically have shared authority over the regulation of passports. However, [f]rom the outset, Congress [has] endorsed not only the underlying premise of Executive authority in the areas of foreign policy and national security, but also its specific application to the subject of passports. Early Congresses enacted statutes expressly recognizing the Executive authority with respect to passports. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981); see also id. at 292-300, 101 S.Ct. 2766 (discussing history of congressional legislation and Executive control over passports); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 122-24, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958) (same). Congress passed the first Passport Act in 1856, endorsing the Executive's power to control passports, Kent, 357 U.S. at 123, 78 S.Ct. 1113. The current Passport Act maintains this recognition of Executive authority. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic and consular officers of the United States and by such other employees of the Department of States....). Although Congress often has recognized the authority of the Executive to regulate the issuance of passports, this obviously does not confirm that the Executive retains exclusive control over all matters relating to passports. Indeed, the history of congressional legislation in this area suggests otherwise. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 211a (restricting the Executive department from designating a passport as restricted for travel [u]nless authorized by law). It is clear, however, that Congress lacks the power to interfere with a passport policy adopted by the Executive in furtherance of the recognition power. Appellant Zivotofsky does not dispute this. Rather, Zivotofsky contends that the passport rules regarding Israel do not embody a policy in furtherance of the Executive's recognition power. Zivotofsky's position fails. The record in this case supports the Secretary's claim that the policy relating to the designation of Jerusalem on passports lawfully govern[s] the question of recognition. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229, 62 S.Ct. 552. The status of Jerusalem is one of the most sensitive and long-standing disputes in the Arab-Israeli conflict, having remained unsettled since 1948. Appellee's Br. at 6. The United States has long refrained from recognizing Jerusalem as a city located within the sovereign state of Israel. See Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) 56-57. Instead, United States policy since the Truman Administration has been to promote a final and permanent resolution of final status issues, including the status of Jerusalem, through negotiations by the parties and supported by the international community. Id. at 57. U.S. Presidents have consistently endeavored to maintain a strict policy of not prejudging the Jerusalem status issue and thus not engaging in official actions that would recognize, or might be perceived as constituting recognition of, Jerusalem as either the capital city of Israel, or as a city located within the sovereign territory of Israel. Id. at 59. These points are uncontested. The Secretary's rules regarding the designation of Jerusalem on passports obviously aims to further the United States' policy regarding the recognition of Israel. The State Department's policies and procedures for preparing passports and reports of birth are outlined in its Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM). J.A. 376. The FAM includes a Birthplace Transcription Guide, which details the acceptable name and spelling for specific countries and territories to be used in U.S. passports, in accordance with United States policy. J.A. 381. The rules provide that, as a general matter, the country recognized by the United States as having sovereignty over the place of birth of a passport applicant is recorded on the passport. See 7 FAM 1383.5-4, J.A. 378. However, [w]here the birthplace of the applicant is located in territory disputed by another country, the city or area of birth may be written in the passport ... if shown on the application and if included for use on the birthplace transcription guide. 7 FAM 1383.5-2, J.A. 377. There are special rules for Jerusalem because it is a disputed territory. For citizens born after 1948 in Jerusalem, the Birthplace Transcription Guide instructs that only Jerusalem should be recorded as the place of birth. See id. at 1383.1, J.A. 376, 387; 7 FAM 1383.5-6, J.A. 379. The Guide specifically indicates that the official is not to write Israel or Jordan. J.A. 387. The Guide further instructs that Israel [d]oes not include Jerusalem or areas under military occupation, and Jordan [d]oes not include Jerusalem. Id. These rules plainly implement the Executive's determination not to recognize Jerusalem as part of any sovereign regime. Zivotofsky contends that the designation of a passport holder's place of birth does not involve the `recognition of foreign sovereigns.' Appellant's Br. at 27. This argument misperceives the issues in this case. As noted above, the recognition power is not limited to a determination of the government to be recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to govern the question of recognition. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229, 62 S.Ct. 552. The rules regarding the designation of Jerusalem are part of the Executive's overarching policy governing the recognition of Israel. Zivotofsky also claims that the `birthplace' entry on a passport ... is nothing more than one means of identifying the passport-holder. Appellant's Br. at 37. This attempt to downplay the significance of a passport is futile. As the Supreme Court has said, [a] passport is, in a sense, a letter of introduction in which the issuing sovereign vouches for the bearer. Agee, 453 U.S. at 292, 101 S.Ct. 2766. It is a political document that is addressed to foreign powers, by which the bearer is recognized, in foreign countries, as an American citizen. Id. (quoting Urtetiqui v. D'Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 698, 9 L.Ed. 276 (1835)). A political document indicating that a person born in Jerusalem is from the sovereign nation of Israel misstates the United States' position on the recognition of Israel. So long as the Executive remains neutral on the question of Jerusalem, the Secretary surely may adopt polices declining to issue official documents that suggest otherwise. Finally, Zivotofsky argues that, because the Secretary's passport rules concerning Jerusalem have only a negligible impact on American foreign policy, the rules cannot be viewed as policy governing the recognition of Israel. Appellant's Br. at 33. The Secretary responds by pointing to evidence of the international reaction to the enactment of § 214 in 2002. According to the State Department, Palestinians from across the political spectrum strongly condemned the Jerusalem provisions of the [Act], interpreting those provisions as a reversal of longstanding U.S. policy that Jerusalem's status should be determined by Israel and the Palestinians in final status talks. J.A. 398-99. One need not assess the international reaction to § 214 to find that the Secretary's rules regarding the designation of Jerusalem on passports aims to further the United States' policy of neutrality on the question of Jerusalem. It is obvious. The Executive's policy is not to prejudge the status of Jerusalem, and any official statement to the contrary impinges upon the Executive's prerogative. The Executive has the exclusive authority to implement policies in furtherance of the recognition power and this court has no authority to second-guess the Executive's judgment when, as here, it is clear that the disputed policy is in furtherance of the recognition power.