Opinion ID: 168611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interstate Agreement on D etainers

Text: Pursley argues the United States violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD or Agreement), 18 U.S.C. App. § 2 [hereinafter IAD]; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-60-501 (2004), by transferring him from a state to federal prison and then allowing state officials to escort him to state proceedings on new state charges while he was in federal custody. Accordingly, he contends that the district court erred by failing to dismiss the federal indictment and that we should reverse his conviction. The IAD creates among its contracting parties uniform procedures for lodging and executing a detainer, “a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is currently imprisoned to hold that individual . . . so that he may be tried by a different State for a different crime.” Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. -4- 146, 148 (2001). For purposes of the IAD, the state in which a prisoner is initially serving a sentence is classified as the “sending state” (here, Colorado), and the state that subsequently indicts the prisoner and obtains custody is the “receiving state” (here, the United States). 1 IAD, Art. II(b)–(c). The Agreement “provides for expeditious delivery of the prisoner to the receiving State for trial prior to the termination of his sentence in the sending State” and “seeks to minimize the consequent interruption of the prisoner’s ongoing prison term.” Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 148. The Agreement is based on the premise that prison treatment and rehabilitation programs are negatively impacted when a prisoner is indicted and transferred to a new jurisdiction and then returned to the original place of imprisonment before trial is had on the new charges. See IA D, Art. I. The Agreement authorizes transfer of a prisoner from a sending state to a receiving state as follow s: The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment . . . is pending [i.e., the receiving state] shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and w ho is serving a term of imprisonment in any party State made available in accordance with article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the State in which the prisoner is incarcerated [i.e, the sending state]. Id. at Art. IV(a). The A greement protects the prisoner from excessive transfers through the so-called “anti-shuttling” provision, which states, 1 The United States and Colorado are party “States” to the Agreement. IA D § 2; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-60-501 (2006), -5- If trial is not had on any indictm ent . . . contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment to article V(e) hereof, such indictment . . . shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. Id. at Art. IV(e). Accordingly, by its express terms, the IAD is violated under two conditions— when a prisoner, who is serving a sentence in the sending state and indicted by the receiving state, is (1) transferred to the receiving state based on its lodging a detainer against him and requesting custody, id. at Art. IV(a), and then (2) returned to the “original place of imprisonment” before standing trial on the untried indictment, id. at Art IV(e). In this case, the first condition of an IAD violation was clearly met. While serving his sentence in Colorado state prison, Pursley was indicted by the United States, which lodged a detainer against him and, by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, obtained custody and transferred him to a federal facility. See U nited States v. M auro, 436 U.S. 340, 348 (1978) (holding the combination of lodging a detainer and obtaining custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum triggers application of the IA D). 2 2 The government contends that because Colorado only filed a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to obtain custody over Pursley from the federal government, the IAD is not implicated. W hile the Supreme Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum by itself does not trigger the IA D, see M auro, 436 U .S. at 349, the IAD was already triggered by the federal government’s (i.e., the receiving state’s) actions in this case and the anti-shuttling provision is thus applicable. The government’s argument would only have relevance if the federal government was the sending state. -6- The principal issue here is whether the second condition of an IAD violation was met. The prosecution argues Pursley was never “returned to the original place of imprisonment” within the meaning of the IAD because he was never sent back to a Colorado prison. Pursley objects to this literal reading of the text and argues that the anti-shuttling provision be interpreted to include any type of custody over the prisoner by the sending state. Pursley argues that the Supreme Court in Alabama v. Bozeman interpreted the IAD to require dismissal of pending charges by the receiving state when a prisoner is placed in the custody of the sending state, even in circumstances where a prisoner’s custody is of short duration. In that case, the prisoner, Bozeman, was serving time in a federal prison when Alabama indicted him on an unrelated crime. Bozeman, 533 U.S. at 151. Alabama lodged a detainer against him and subsequently obtained custody over him. The state then transported him approximately 80 miles to a county jail, where he spent the night before appearing for his arraignment the next morning. He was returned to federal prison that evening and resumed serving his original sentence. At the outset, the Supreme Court acknowledged, “Alabama does not deny a violation of A rticle IV(e) as literally interpreted, for it concedes that its officials ‘returned’ Bozeman to his ‘original place of imprisonment,’ before Bozeman’s county court ‘trial’ was ‘had.’” Id. at 152 (emphasis in original). The Court rejected Alabama’s argument that spending one night in state prison constituted -7- only a “de minimus” or “technical” violation. Id. at 153. Rather, the C ourt reasoned, “every prisoner arrival in the receiving State, whether followed by a very brief stay or a very long stay in the receiving State, triggers IV(e)’s ‘no return’ requirement.” Id. at 154 (emphasis in original). In other words, Article IV(e)’s anti-shuttling provision applies whenever a prisoner is provided to a receiving state pursuant to a detainer. The length of the prisoner’s custody by the receiving state has no bearing on the operation of the “no return” requirement. Accordingly, the Court concluded, the Alabama charges should have been dismissed. Pursley’s attempt to compare his case to Bozeman is unpersuasive because he was not “returned to [his] original place of imprisonment” under A rticle IV (e). In Bozeman, the prisoner w as serving time in a federal penitentiary under a federal sentence. After his short foray into state court and prison pursuant to a detainer, Bozeman was returned to the same federal prison to resume serving his original federal sentence. The Supreme Court has held that this is a clear violation of Article IV(e). 3 In this case, Pursley was never returned to Colorado to resume serving his original state sentence. Instead, his only trip back into Colorado state jurisdiction was to answer a third set of state charges unrelated to 3 Pursley’s reliance on United States v. Kelley, 300 F. Supp. 2d 224 (D . M ass. 2003), is equally unavailing considering the district court in that case also found the receiving state shuttled the defendant back to the sending state to resume serving his original sentence prior to trial being had. Id. at 233. This is not the case here. -8- his original sentence or federal charges. He never was transferred to the Colorado Department of Corrections to begin anew his service of his original state sentence. Furthermore, the one-day excursion to the Colorado state courthouse for arraignment was only by chance in Colorado, the state of his original imprisonment. If any other state, such as W yoming, had asked the federal government to provide Pursley for a one-day arraignment under similar circumstances, we do not see how this would have violated the anti-shuttling provision. W e note that our interpretation is supported by the plain language of the anti-shuttling provision and the IAD’s purpose. First, Article IV(e) applies when the prisoner is “returned . . . to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e).” IAD (emphasis added). Article V(e) provides that, “[a]t the earliest practical time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State.” Id. Read together, these words suggest that the prisoner must be sent back to recommence serving his original sentence to trigger the anti-shuttling provision. Under Article V(e), a prisoner should be returned to the sending state to resume his original sentence following the disposition of the receiving state’s trial. Article V(e), on its face, does not contemplate other reasons to send a prisoner back to the sending state. Second, the purpose of the IAD’s anti-shuttling provision is to minimize the uncertainties attendant with outstanding charges which interfere with a prisoner’s rehabilitation and treatment programs and to encourage the expeditious -9- and orderly disposition of such charges. See IAD, Art. I. As we have said, Congress did not want prisoners to “have programs of treatment and rehabilitation obstructed by numerous absences in connection with successive proceedings related to pending charges in another jurisdiction.” United States v. Wilson, 719 F.2d 1491, 1494 (10th Cir. 1983). The mere temporary transfer of a prisoner to a different jurisdiction to answer pending charges while in the custody of a receiving state does not implicate these concerns so long as it does not impermissibly lengthen a prisoner’s stay in the receiving state. 4 W here a transfer is of short duration and does not interrupt trial proceedings in the receiving state in violation of the IAD’s other provisions, as is the case here, a prisoner spends no additional time away from the sending state and, thus, there can be no impact on a prisoner’s rehabilitative programs and treatment in the sending state. On the other hand, the expeditious resolution of untried charges in a different jurisdiction, such as the third set of Colorado charges Pursley faced, is fully consistent w ith the purposes of the IA D. For these reasons, we conclude that the IA D’s anti-shuttling provision is not triggered by the circumstances presented here. 5 4 A receiving state must comm ence trial on untried indictments within one hundred twenty days from the arrival of the prisoner. IAD, Art. IV(c). 5 The government alternatively argues that Pursley waived his IAD argument by failing to raise it before the pre-trial motions deadline had passed. Pursley responds by contending that this issue is jurisdictional and non-w aivable. W e had not addressed whether violations of the IAD constitute jurisdictional claims on direct appeal. Nevertheless, we have stated, “Absent special (continued...) -10-