Opinion ID: 1796517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury as to the proper burden of proof, since the proof against tina hunt was circumstantial?

Text: At trial, the State requested and received jury instruction S-1, which stated that the burden of proof for the State is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused Tina's proposed circumstantial evidence instruction, which would have stated that the burden of proof is proof beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. The trial court found that the evidence of Tina's oral statements in which she wished for Thomas' death was direct evidence, making S-1 correct. In addition, the State argues that since Tina gave an inculpatory statement to the police, the circumstantial evidence instruction was inappropriate. This Court has held that a circumstantial evidence instruction is necessary only where the evidence is wholly circumstantial. Windham v. State, 602 So.2d 798, 800 (Miss. 1992). See cf., Jones v. State, 635 So.2d 884, 886-87 (Miss. 1994). Where a confession exists, a circumstantial evidence instruction is unnecessary. Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 750 (Miss.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1015, 112 S.Ct. 663, 116 L.Ed.2d 754 (1991). Tina admits that her statement wishing Thomas dead is circumstantial evidence of intent in the crime charged. However, this Court has recently distinguished the element of intent from other elements by allowing the State to use circumstantial evidence to prove intent, without the circumstantial evidence instruction. Jones v. State, 635 So.2d 884, 886-87 (Miss. 1994). Therefore, this Court affirms on this issue. [4]