Opinion ID: 495206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Barr and the Doctrine of Absolute Immunity for Federal Officials

Text: 40 In Barr, the Supreme Court held that the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization, a federal agency, was immune from a libel suit arising out of actions taken within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty. 360 U.S. at 575, 79 S.Ct. at 1341; see also Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597, 79 S.Ct. 1331, 1333, 3 L.Ed.2d 1454 (1959) (scope of immunity afforded federal employees is a matter of federal law to be formulated by the courts in the absence of legislative action by Congress). The precise reach of the Barr holding as to other tortious acts and less elevated federal employees was not settled by the Court's decision; in sustaining Barr's immunity claim, Justice Black, whose vote was necessary to form a majority, stressed the importance of informed public opinion to the effective functioning of a free government. Barr, 360 U.S. at 577, 79 S.Ct. at 1342 (Black, J., concurring); see also id. ([I]f federal employees are to be subjected to ... restraint in reporting their views about how to run the government better, the restraint will have to be imposed expressly by Congress and not by the general libel laws of the States[.]). 28 41 Uncertainty as to the bounds, and even the endurance, of Barr developed in the years following announcement of the decision. As we recently observed: 42 In a series of mid 1970's decisions, the Supreme Court generally rejected state officials' pleas of absolute immunity from civil liability for torts committed in alleged violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). This series of decisions fueled debate earlier generated in commentary over the soundness, breadth, and continued vitality of Barr. See, e.g., Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institution, 566 F.2d 289, 303 (D.C.Cir.1977) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., concurring), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 3144, 57 L.Ed.2d 1160 (1978). 43 McKinney v. Whitfield, 736 F.2d 766, 768 (D.C.Cir.1984). 29 44 Doubts about Barr 's continuing vitality, however, were dispelled in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Butz was an action for damages against Agriculture Department officials alleged to have violated plaintiff's constitutional rights; the Court assumed Barr' § continuing sway, while holding that it does not control this case. Id. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 2902. The Butz Court distinguished Barr on the ground that Barr did not purport to protect an official who has not only committed a wrong under local law, but also violated those fundamental principles of fairness embodied in the Constitution. Id. at 495, 98 S.Ct. at 2905; see also id. (The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits was not confronted in ... Barr [.]) (emphasis added). 45 While assuming the endurance of Barr, the Butz Court rejected the attempt to extend Barr beyond state tort claims, id., into the realm of constitutional torts. Butz thus confined, but did not precisely define, Barr' § scope, for the Court left unresolved the extent to which Barr -style immunity adheres to all non -constitutional claims against federal employees. See id. (Whatever level of protection from state interference is appropriate for federal officials executing their duties under federal law, it cannot be doubted that these officials ... are subject to the restraints imposed by the Federal Constitution.) (emphasis added); cf. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 513-15, 92 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1972) (statement in prior case that immunity under Speech or Debate Clause does not attach to actions in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process does not imply as a corollary that all actions related to the legislative process are immune). It remains to be determined by the Supreme Court both (1) the character of claims--all or only some common law torts--within Barr, and (2) the universe of federal employees covered by the absolute immunity shield. 46 Lacking further instruction from the Supreme Court, some lower federal courts have moved toward adoption of this dichotomy: qualified immunity under Butz when a federal official is charged with a constitutional tort; absolute immunity under Barr when the charge is a common law tort. See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't, 812 F.2d 1425, 1428 n. 11 (D.C.Cir.1987) (courts have extended the absolute immunity defense to 'executive officials at all levels' of the federal hierarchy [and] to a full range of common law delicts), quoting McKinney, 736 F.2d at 769. See generally 5 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 112-21 (2d ed. 1984) (commenting critically on the position emerging in the wake of Butz that absolute immunity goes with common law tort claims, qualified immunity with constitutional tort claims). 30 47 But acceptance of this bipartite scheme is not universal, and diversity among federal courts remains marked, particularly as to the categories of employees sheltered by Barr. While two courts of appeals have indicated that Barr 's absolute immunity from common law tort liability extends to all federal employees, regardless of their duties or place in the federal hierarchy, see General Electric Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (4th Cir.1987); Poolman v. Nelson, 802 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir.1986), other courts have limited Barr to employees at the policymaking or planning level, as distinguished from employees working at the operational level who function day to day under established procedures and guidelines. See Heathcoat v. Potts, 790 F.2d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir.1986); Araujo v. Welch, 742 F.2d 802, 804 (3d Cir.1984); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737-38 (10th Cir.1977) (en banc); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 807-808, 102 S.Ct. at 2732-33 (Barr applies to high government officials). Still other courts stand someplace in between, applying Barr to officers exercising even limited discretion. See Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.1978); Green v. James, 473 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.1973). 48 Of particular relevance to the claims before us, the Supreme Court has never held or even hinted that federal law enforcement officers enjoy absolute immunity for wrongful conduct--however characterized (constitutional or common law tort)--engaged in during an arrest. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 319, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 2028, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973) (Barr ... made it clear that the immunity conferred might not be the same for all officials for all purposes.... Judges, like executive officers with discretionary functions, have been held absolutely immune.... But policemen and like officials apparently enjoy a more limited privilege.); cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967) (observing in dictum that [t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity). 31 We therefore resist taking either a mechanistic approach (as Butz attends constitutional tort claims so Barr attends common law tort claims), or one not suggested by the Supreme Court (holding police officers absolutely immune) to the tort liability of the officers before us in these consolidated actions. Instead, we have freshly and closely examined the Barr and Butz opinions; based on that examination, we decline to extend absolute immunity to the Park Police misconduct claims sub judice in these cases. 49 Three interlocking and mutually reinforcing goals figured prominently in Barr. The first is implicated whenever courts confront damage actions against government officials: [O]fficials of government should be free to exercise their duties unembarrassed by the fear of damage suits in respect to acts done in the course of those duties--suits which would consume time and energies which would otherwise be devoted to governmental service and the threat of which might appreciably inhibit the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government. Barr, 360 U.S. at 571, 79 S.Ct. at 1339. Second was a perceived need to exempt government officials from the burden of explaining and justifying their subjective motives for choosing a particular course of action. See id. at 575, 79 S.Ct. at 1341 (The fact that the action here was within the outer perimeter of petitioner's line of duty is enough to render the privilege applicable, despite the allegations of malice in the complaint [.]) (emphasis added); id. at 571, 79 S.Ct. at 1339 (Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, on the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to satisfy a jury of his good faith; public officials who have been honestly mistaken should not be exposed to suit.), quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498, 16 S.Ct. 631, 637, 40 L.Ed. 780 (1896) (federal officers should not be under an apprehension that the motives that control [their] official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages). 50 These two concerns, we stress, in the years since Barr, have been fully incorporated into the federal qualified immunity doctrine. 32 However, a third, and perhaps less obvious, concern animated the Barr Court, one which is of particular significance where, as here, state law claims are asserted against federal officers. As the Court commented in Butz, Barr did not ... purport to depart from the general rule, which long prevailed, that a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers. Butz, 438 U.S. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 2902 (emphasis added); see also id. at 495, 98 S.Ct. at 2905 ([N]either [Barr nor Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 16 S.Ct. 631, 40 L.Ed. 780 (1896), a case heavily relied upon in Barr ] purported to abolish the liability of federal officers for action manifestly beyond their line of duty [.]) (emphasis added); Barr, 360 U.S. at 573-74, 79 S.Ct. at 1340-41 (It is ... the duties with which the particular officer ... is enstrusted--the relation of the act complained of to 'matters committed by law to his control or supervision'--which must provide the guide in delineating the scope of the rule which clothes the official act of the executive officer with immunity[.]), quoting Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498, 16 S.Ct. at 637 (emphasis added). 51 The general rule to which the Butz Court referred can be harmonized with the blanket immunity Barr granted by recognizing this key point: state law normally does not establish the scope of a federal officer's line of duty or the matters committed by law to his control or supervision. Viewed in this light, federal supremacy concerns appear central to the continuing vitality of Barr -style absolute immunity; in the words of the Butz Court again, the immunity of federal executive officials began as a means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions based on state law. Butz, 438 U.S. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 2902 (emphasis added), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 865-66, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824) (exempting the trade of the [federal] bank, ... necessary to the fiscal operations of the [federal] government, from the control of the states). In sum, for the federal official, the law controlling ... his powers, Butz, 438 U.S. at 489, 98 S.Ct. at 2902, generally is federal (whether constitutional, statutory or common law in character); were it otherwise, the states would be capable of arresting all the measures of the [federal] government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the states. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819). 52 The official immunity doctrine thus ensures that if [the federal officer's] acts were authorized by controlling federal law, Butz, 438 U.S. at 490, 98 S.Ct. at 2902 (emphasis added), the officer [will be] protected for action tortious under state law. Id. On the other hand, where the official failed to observe obvious [federal] statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers, id. at 494, 98 S.Ct. at 2904, liability could be imposed. This protection from state interference, Butz, 438 U.S. at 495, 98 S.Ct. at 2905, we conclude, is a mainstay of the Barr absolute immunity doctrine, as revisited in Butz. 33 53 Against this background of concern for protecting federal officers, acting under color of federal law, from diverse, even possibly hostile, state law rules, the Park Police officers' absolute immunity pleas in the cases before us are particularly vulnerable. Park Police officers are statutorily authorized to make arrests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in [their] presence, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1a-6(a)(1); see also id. at Sec. 1a-6(c) (authorizing Park Police officers to conduct investigations of offenses against the United States); their authority to enforce federal law, however, is expressly augmented by the Secretary of the Interior's authority to cooperate, within the National Park System, with any State ... in the enforcement or supervision of the laws or ordinances of that State. Id. Sec. 1a-6(b)(2). Pursuant to that latter authority, Park Police officers may enforce District of Columbia law within all National Parks in the District of Columbia. 36 C.F.R. Sec. 50.3(a) (1986). 34 Additionally and uniquely, the District of Columbia authorizes Park Police officers operating anywhere in the District to perform the same powers and duties as the Metropolitan police of the District. D.C. CODE ANN. Sec. 4-201 (1981). 35 54 In short, Park Police officers are permitted to act, in all respects, as District of Columbia police officers both on and off National Parks territory, and it was in their District of Columbia law enforcement capacity that Officers Malhoyt, Stover, and Harasek took the actions complained of here. 36 It therefore cannot be maintained that local law was in no sense controlling in defining the line of duty of the Park Police officers in the episodes in suit. Local interference with the implementation of federal law and policy is not the overriding concern where the powers of federal officers have been augmented, with the express approval of both federal and state legislative authorities, to include the power to enforce local law, and where local law enforcement is at issue in the case. This point is all the more telling where the local law in question is that of the District of Columbia. As we have observed in another context, [v]iolations of the District of Columbia Code and violations of the United States Code are crimes against a single sovereign, namely, the United States. Goode v. Markley, 603 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C.Cir.1979). 55 We thus hold that the principle of Barr v. Matteo, as described in Butz v. Economou, is inapplicable to these cases, and that the officer defendants are not absolutely immune from liability for their allegedly tortious conduct in effecting the plaintiffs' arrests. We hold further, however, that the defendants are entitled to raise the federal qualified immunity plea, as developed in Harlow and progeny, 37 wherein they are shield[ed] ... from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Anderson v. Creighton, --- U.S. ----, ----, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3037-40, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); see infra Section III.B. 56 Doctrinal symmetry might seem to require according these officers, acting as they were to enforce local law, only whatever immunity local law might provide similarly situated local law enforcement personnel. Such a resolution, however, would ignore other, plainly federal interests at stake here, interests distinct from the interest in the unfettered enforcement of federal law referred to above. See Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. at 597, 79 S.Ct. at 1333 (immunity afforded federal officials presents a federal question; governing rules are designed to promote the effective functioning of the Federal Government). Park Police officers, no less than federal executive officers generally, must often act swiftly and on the basis of factual information supplied by others, [occasionally in an] 'atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events', Butz, 438 U.S. at 497, 98 S.Ct. at 2906, quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 246-47, 94 S.Ct. at 1691, which may often carry them across local political boundaries in the exercise of their duties. 38 If the purpose of an immunity rule is to provide government officials with the ability 'reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages,'  Anderson, --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3042, quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195, 104 S.Ct. 3012, 3019, 82 L.Ed.2d 139 (1984), that purpose would be utterly defeated if officials were unable to determine whether they were protected by the [immunity] rule without entangling themselves in the vagaries of the ... American common law. Anderson, --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3042; cf. id. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3040-41 (An immunity that has as many variants as there are modes of official action and types of rights would not give conscientious officials the assurance of protection that it is the object of the doctrine to provide.). 57 A uniform federal qualified immunity standard will avoid Balkaniz[ation], id. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3042, of the immunity doctrine, while providing federal police officers with adequate protection that they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American law. Id. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3042; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law). 39 In the following section, we examine salient characteristics of the federal qualified immunity standard before turning to its application to the cases before us. 58