Opinion ID: 901011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summaries

Text: [¶ 62.] I also dissent because I disagree with the Court's evidentiary analysis of summaries. The summary at issue was Scotts' amortization schedule, which was prepared by their certified public accountant, Kyle Repp. Although the Court correctly observes that this schedule could establish the defense of payment and create a dispute of material fact, see supra ¶ 25, the court incorrectly excludes the schedule from consideration. It does so because the Court concludes that it is a summary that is inadmissible under SDCL 19-18-6, Fed R Evid 1006. The Court concludes it inadmissible because the documents from which the summary was created no longer exist. The Court reasons that: (1) Scotts failed to establish their burden of proving the loss or destruction of records supporting such secondary evidence, and (2) Scotts failed to establish a foundation for it. See supra ¶ ¶ 26-31. [¶ 63.] I dissent from the Court's analysis because the amortization was not a summary; i.e. secondary evidence of the underlying documents. On the contrary, the Court concedes that this amortization was not a summary within the meaning of Rule 1006. See supra ¶¶ 32-33. [¶ 64.] Summaries are admissible under Rule 1006 because [t]he contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. SDCL 19-18-6 (Rule 1006) (emphasis added). However, the Scotts did not offer their amortization schedule to prove the contents of the underlying records used to arrive at the amortization. The amortization was simply used to illustrate Repp's reconstruction of the payments made in his deposition. Moreover, Repp's amortization was the same kind of opinion that the Bank submitted through its amortization (which was also constructed despite lost or destroyed records). [¶ 65.] These types of expert opinions are not covered by Rule 1006. [N]ot all expert testimony that is seemingly summary in form falls within the parameters of Rule 1006. Opinion evidence, even if based upon review of voluminous data, remains opinion evidence ... and it need not satisfy Rule 1006. 2 Gregory P. Joseph Stephen A. Salzburg, Evidence in America: The Federal Rules In the States, ch 70, 3 (1987). Therefore, the Court incorrectly analyzes the admissibility of Repp's opinion under Rule 1006. Because the Scotts' amortization was not offered as a summary (secondary evidence) of the underlying records, and because it was simply an opinion of the Scotts' certified public accountant, it was not excluded from consideration by Rule 1006.