Opinion ID: 2982986
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct or Overreaching

Text: Under the second prong of the Rumery analysis, we consider whether “the prosecutor had an independent, legitimate reason to make this [release-dismissal] agreement directly related to his prosecutorial responsibilities.” 480 U.S. at 398. The existence of prosecutorial misconduct or overreach is determined by the court as a matter of law. See Hill, 12 F.3d 575, 578-79; see also Livingstone I, 12 F.3d at 1215. “Such a legitimate reason ensures that the prosecutor acts consistent with his duties to uniformly enforce the criminal law, rather than as the agent for the private interests of potential § 1983 defendants.” Gonzalez, 314 F.3d at 319. Rumery requires that, in order for a court to find lack of prosecutorial misconduct, the party invoking a release-dismissal agreement as a defense must present evidence of a legitimate criminal justice reason for conditioning the plea agreement on a release. For instance, the Rumery majority repeatedly emphasized that, in that case, the prosecutor’s purpose in fashioning the condition was to spare an alleged rape victim the trauma of testifying at either or both of Rumery’s civil and criminal trials. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 390, 398; see also id. at 402-03 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Moreover, the majority repeatedly emphasized that there had been extensive testimony, from both the prosecutor and the defense attorney, that protection of the alleged rape victim “was a significant consideration in the prosecutor’s decision.” Id. at 398; see also id. at 390, 402-03 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In this case, the district court erred in its analysis of the prosecutorial misconduct prong. The district court found, without elaboration, that “Brian also fails to show (and does not even argue) that there was any prosecutorial misconduct involved in obtaining his waiver or that it would not be in the public interest to uphold the waiver.” Patterson, 2009 WL 2733522, at . - 23 - Case No. 13-4321, Patterson, et al, v. City of Akron, OH, et al This statement improperly shifts Defendants-Appellee’s burden onto Brian. At summary judgment, it is the Defendants-Appellees’ burden to prove the absence of prosecutorial misconduct. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Coughlen 5 F.3d at 974. They have failed to do so. Before the district court, Defendants-Appellees also erroneously placed the burden of proving misconduct on Brian, (R. 39, Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., PageID #234), and repeat this error on appeal. (Appellee Br. at 11-12.) The record is devoid of evidence of a prosecutorial justification for conditioning Brian’s plea agreement, but not Derek’s, on the release of civil claims. Defendants-Appellees have offered no evidence, such as an affidavit or testimony from the prosecutor in Brian’s case, as to why a release was desired. See Hill, 12 F.3d at 579 (finding, in light of the prosecutor’s affidavit asserting that he did not know of arrestee’s potential civil rights claim until after criminal charges were drafted and the absence of evidence suggesting that circumstances surrounding arrest and threatened prosecution were suspicious, there was no evidence of prosecutorial overreaching apart from release-dismissal agreement itself); Gonzalez, 314 F.3d at 320 (finding no prosecutorial misconduct where prosecutor testified at his deposition that he entered into a release-dismissal agreement to avoid a costly and lengthy trial over minor criminal charges). Rather, Defendants-Appellees essentially ask this Court to presume that no prosecutorial misconduct or overreaching occurred because the state court judge “did not express any concern (or even inquire) about prosecutorial abuse or overreaching.” (Appellee’s Br. at 11.) DefendantAppellees’ overreliance on the plea hearing transcript, standing alone, to prove the absence of prosecutorial misconduct fails for the same reason that their reliance on the transcript to prove voluntariness fails. Courts do not participate in the negotiation of plea agreements. As such, a - 24 - Case No. 13-4321, Patterson, et al, v. City of Akron, OH, et al court cannot discern—solely from its supervision of the entry of a plea—whether prosecutorial misconduct or overreach contributed to the formation of an agreement. There is, therefore, simply no reason why the trial court would have inquired into the prosecutor’s conduct during Brian’s plea colloquy. Brian, meanwhile, argues that the prosecutor made the decision to condition Brian’s plea agreement on the release of civil claims because the prosecutor recognized Brian had a meritorious civil action because, in his account of events, he had not assaulted Officer Bickett and had himself been tased and assaulted by officers while he was handcuffed. (Appellant’s Br. at 22-23; Appellee’s Reply at 11-12.); see also Coughlen, 5 F.3d at 974. In the absence of any proof to the contrary from the Defendants-Appellees, the district court erred in dismissing Brian’s argument.