Opinion ID: 2555689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Slang or Code Conversations

Text: At trial, Shipley and Swist testified that the defendant and Bell-Rogers used the phrases I'm hungry and my ribs are touching just before the robbery and that these phrases meant that they were looking for a place to rob. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting these statements as evidence from which the jury could have concluded that he had committed other robberies, because only seasoned robbers would have developed code words ... to describe their conduct. This  `bad character' inference, he contends, prejudiced his defense. Thus, he argues, the trial court erred in failing to exclude the evidence under New Hampshire Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. We accord the trial court considerable deference in determining the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Giddens, 155 N.H. 175, 179, 922 A.2d 650 (2007). To demonstrate that the trial court exercised unsustainable discretion, the defendant must show that the ruling was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. Id. Rule 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Ordinarily, prior to the admission of such evidence, the following three determinations must be made: (1) that the evidence is relevant for a purpose other than character or disposition; (2) that there is clear proof that the defendant committed the prior offenses; and (3) that the prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. State v. Martin, 138 N.H. 508, 518, 643 A.2d 946 (1994). Here, however, Rule 404(b) does not apply. The defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit robbery, which required the State to prove that he agreed with one or more persons to commit robbery. See RSA 629:3, I. The evidence at issue is direct evidence of the defendant's agreement with Bell-Rogers to commit the robbery, and accordingly, does not constitute evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts. See Martin, 138 N.H. at 518, 643 A.2d 946; State v. Kulikowski, 132 N.H. 281, 287, 564 A.2d 439 (1989). The appropriate test for admissibility in this instance, therefore, is contained in Rule of Evidence 403, which permits the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Martin, 138 N.H. at 518, 643 A.2d 946 (quotation omitted). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury's sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. State v. Ainsworth, 151 N.H. 691, 696, 867 A.2d 420 (2005). Unfair prejudice is not, of course, mere detriment to a defendant from the tendency of the evidence to prove guilt, in which sense all evidence offered by the prosecution is meant to be prejudicial. Giddens, 155 N.H. at 180, 922 A.2d 650. Rather, the prejudice required to predicate reversible error is an undue tendency to induce a decision against the defendant on some improper basis, commonly one that is emotionally charged. Id. Among the factors we consider in weighing the evidence are: (1) whether the evidence would have a great emotional impact upon a jury; (2) its potential for appealing to a juror's sense of resentment or outrage; and (3) the extent to which the issue upon which it is offered is established by other evidence, stipulation or inference. State v. Howe, 159 N.H. 366, 378, 986 A.2d 631 (2009). The trial court is in the best position to gauge the prejudicial impact of particular testimony, and what steps, if any, are necessary to remedy that prejudice. State v. Sonthikoummane, 145 N.H. 316, 324, 769 A.2d 330 (2000) (quotation and brackets omitted). Thus, we give the trial court broad latitude when ruling on the admissibility of potentially unfairly prejudicial evidence. Id. Here, the State offered the evidence at issue to prove that the defendant agreed with Bell-Rogers to commit the robbery. See RSA 629:3, I. Their comments to each other, coupled with Swist's and Shipley's explanations, reflected the agreed-upon criminal motives, intent and plans of the defendant and his co-conspirators. The conversations occurred several times during the hours just before the robbery while the four were observing potential places to rob. In short, the evidence was highly probative of the crime charged. Moreover, its prejudicial effect does not substantially outweigh its probative value. Neither the words I'm hungry and my ribs are touching, nor the witnesses' explanations constitute the type of evidence that would appeal to a jury's sympathies or arouse its sense of horror. While we acknowledge that the defendant could have potentially suffered prejudice by the jury inferring from the code or slang that he was a seasoned robber, we do not think that any such prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence, and we cannot say that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion. To the extent that the defendant argues that failure to exclude this evidence violated his rights under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, he has not briefed these arguments and, accordingly, we decline to address them. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49, 816 A.2d 1014 (2003). Affirmed.