Opinion ID: 2092615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent Statutes

Text: In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth , the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the constitutionality of a state statute that contained a mandatory parental consent provision, and rejected that part of the statute prohibiting unmarried minors from procuring abortions during the first trimester of their pregnancies without a parent's consent. Id. at 75, 96 S.Ct. at 2844, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 808. Five members of the Court determined that a state could not subject a minor's right to terminate her pregnancy to a parent's absolute veto without a sufficient justification for the restriction. Id. at 74-75, 96 S.Ct. at 2844, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 808. Shortly thereafter in 1979, the Court assessed the constitutionality of a Massachusetts parental consent statute. Bellotti, supra, 443 U.S. at 622, 99 S.Ct. at 3035, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 797. The statute in Bellotti required unmarried minors to obtain consent from both parents before a physician could perform an abortion. Id. at 625, 99 S.Ct. at 3038, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 802. If the parents refused consent, however, a state court judge could, but was not required to, give judicial consent to an abortion without involving the young woman's parents. Ibid. A plurality of the Court announced that states requiring parental consent from one or both parents had to provide an alternative process in which a minor could obtain a waiver by demonstrating either that she is sufficiently mature to make the decision on her own with her physician, or that an abortion is in her best interests. Id. at 643-44, 99 S.Ct. at 3048, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 813-14. The process, said Justice Powell, must guarantee anonymity and occur expeditiously so that the minor has a realistic opportunity to procure an abortion. Id. at 644, 99 S.Ct. at 3048, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 814. The Massachusetts statute was deemed unconstitutional by four members of the Court because it failed to meet those essential conditions. Id. at 651, 99 S.Ct. at 3052, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 818. Four other justices concurred in the judgment of the plurality by application of Danforth but expressed reservations regarding the burden imposed under a bypass process. Id. at 655-56, 99 S.Ct. at 3054, 61 L.Ed. 2d at 821. [3] In 1983, the Court considered an Ohio statute that, among other things, specifically proscribed abortions for minors under fifteen years of age who did not secure the informed, written consent of one parent. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 422 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2488 n. 4, 76 L.Ed. 2d 687, 698 n. 4 (1983) ( Akron I ), overruled in part by Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 833, 112 S.Ct. at 2791, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 674. Although the statute contained an exception for minors who obtained a court order permitting the abortion, the exception did not provide adequate alternative waiver procedures. The Court concluded that Akron may not make a blanket determination that all minors under the age of 15 are too immature to make this decision or that an abortion never may be in the minor's best interests without parental approval. Id. at 440, 103 S.Ct. at 2497, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 709. On the same day Akron I was decided, however, the Court sustained a Missouri parental consent statute that contained an acceptable judicial bypass provision. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 2526, 76 L.Ed. 2d 733, 746 (1983); id. at 504, 103 S.Ct. at 2532, 76 L.Ed. 2d at 754 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and dissenting in part) (concluding parental consent statute does not impose undue burden on minors). Most recently, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute requiring one parent's consent before a physician can perform an abortion on an unemancipated minor. Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at 899, 112 S.Ct. at 2832, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 728-29. [4] That statute passed muster because it too permitted a bypass of parental approval if the minor could show that she was sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision, or that the abortion was in her best interests. Ibid.; id. at 970, 112 S.Ct. at 2868-69, 120 L.Ed. 2d at 776 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).