Opinion ID: 1111263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boundary by Implied Agreement.

Text: The Camerons assert that the district court erred in three respects by granting Neal summary judgment as to the doctrine of boundary by agreement. They point out that they had paid the property taxes on the land in dispute; that Neal never used the property; and that Jane Gough's affidavit created a material issue of fact regarding existence of the fence as a barrier. The doctrine of boundary by agreement has long been established in Idaho's case law. To have a boundary by agreement, the location of the true boundary line must be uncertain or disputed and there must be a subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 41, 794 P.2d 626, 630 (1990). The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. Id. The existence of such an agreement between adjoining landowners may appear where their property rights have been defined by the erection of a fence, followed by treatment of the fence by the adjoining owners as the boundary. Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359, 365, 262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953). Further, the long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary, in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that the fence was located as a boundary by agreement. Beneficial Life Insurance Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232, 241, 270 P.2d 830, 835 (1954). Also, the payment of taxes on the property by the party asserting ownership of the disputed parcel is not required when determining a claim based on the doctrine of boundary by agreement. Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527, 633 P.2d 592 (1981). Here, the Camerons contend that a material issue of fact existed as to whether Neal ever used the disputed property. Neal stated in her affidavit that the disputed property was used to grow hay and grain, and as pasture for horses and cattle. The district court found that the land in question was used exclusively by Neal, but then later stated that the court would presume no active use of the disputed land by Neal. In its summary judgment order, the district court finally concluded that although certain facts with respect to use of the land were in dispute, summary judgment nevertheless was appropriate. We agree with the district court that even if Neal's use of the property was in dispute, proof of use of property is not required to establish a boundary by agreement, although the fact of use by a party may be considered as evidence of whether such an agreement existed. Indeed, the mere fact of permitting land to lie fallow, or to remain wild, uncultivated and unimproved certainly may constitute a desired form of use of the property by the owner. Thus, the district court's confusing statements about use of the property by Neal do not make summary judgment improper.