Opinion ID: 212425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal jurisdiction and the Elams' negligence per se claim

Text: A federal district court has removal jurisdiction over an action if the district court could have exercised original jurisdiction over it. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). We hold the district court could have exercised original federal question (and supplemental) jurisdiction over this action because the ICCTA completely preempts the Elams' negligence per se claim.
A plaintiff is the master of his complaint and may allege only state law causes of action, even when federal remedies might also exist. Bernhard v. Whitney Nat'l Bank, 523 F.3d 546, 551 (5th Cir.2008). Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal court does not have federal question jurisdiction unless a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. Id. Accordingly, there is no federal [question] jurisdiction if the plaintiff properly pleads only a state law cause of action. Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bernhard, 523 F.3d at 551). That federal law might provide a defense to a state law cause of action does not create federal question jurisdiction. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). An exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule arises when Congress so completely preempt[s] a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily federal in character. Gutierrez, 543 F.3d at 252 (quoting Johnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.2000)). Under the complete preemption doctrine, what otherwise appears as merely a state law claim is converted to a claim `arising under' federal law for jurisdictional purposes because the federal statute so forcibly and completely displaces state law that the plaintiff's cause of action is either wholly federal or nothing at all. New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Franks, 593 F.3d at 407. The question in complete preemption analysis is whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be the exclusive cause of action for the particular claims asserted under state law. Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331; see also Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). Complete preemption must be distinguished from defensive preemption (i.e., conflict preemption or ordinary preemption). Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331. Defensive preemption does not create federal jurisdiction and simply declares the primacy of federal law, regardless of the forum or the claim. Id. As a general matter, complete preemption is less common and more extraordinary than defensive or ordinary preemption. Id. Indeed, complete preemption is a narrow exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 5, 123 S.Ct. 2058. In determining the nature and reach of federal preemption, Congress's intent is the ultimate touchstone. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996). Congress can indicate its preemptive intent either expressly through a statute's plain language, or impliedly through a statute's structure and purpose. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 129 S.Ct. 538, 543, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008). Regardless of how Congress indicates its intent, we begin with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Franks, 593 F.3d at 407. This assumption applies with particular force when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by state law. Altria, 129 S.Ct. at 543. On the other hand, the assumption applies with less force when Congress legislates in a field with a history of significant federal presence. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135, 146 L.Ed.2d 69 (2000). Historically, federal regulation of railroads has been extensive. . . . Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle Servs., LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.2008). The Elams' well-pleaded complaint asserts only state law claims of negligence and negligence per se. Ordinarily, these state law claims would not support original federal question jurisdiction. The issue is whether any of these claims is completely preempted by federal law.
The Elams assert KCSR was negligent per se in violating Mississippi's antiblocking statute. [2] The Elams specifically allege KCSR failed to uncouple its cars so as not to obstruct traffic on Pine Crest Road and obstructed the Pine Crest Road crossing for a period in excess of five minutes at the time of the accident. Effective January 1, 1996, the ICCTA abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and created a new Surface Transportation Board (STB) to regulate, inter alia, rail transportation in the United States. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(a)(1); Friberg, 267 F.3d at 442. The purpose of the ICCTA is to build[] on the deregulatory policies that have promoted growth and stability in the surface transportation sector. H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 93 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 805. With respect to rail transportation, the ICCTA seeks to implement a [f]ederal scheme of minimal regulation for this intrinsically interstate form of transportation, and to retain only regulations that are necessary to maintain a `safety net' or `backstop' of remedies to address problems of rates, access to facilities, and industry restructuring. Id. at 93, 96, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 805, 808; see also 49 U.S.C. § 10101(2). The ICCTA creates exclusive federal regulatory jurisdiction and exclusive federal remedies. Specifically, the ICCTA provides: The jurisdiction of the [STB] over (1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and (2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, entirely in one State, is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State law. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). Section 10501(b) thus has two sentences: the first defining the authority of the STB in dealing with the fundamental aspects of railroad regulation, and barring others from interfering with those decisions by making the jurisdiction exclusive; and the second providing that the remedies available at the STB dealing with `rates, classifications, rules, . . . practices, routes, services, and facilities of such carriers,' are exclusive. Franks, 593 F.3d at 409-10. We refer to these two sentences as the exclusive-jurisdiction provision and the exclusive-remedies provision, respectively. The exclusive-remedies provision is the relevant part of Section 10501(b) for determining the scope of the ICCTA's preemption of state law. Id. at 410. Focusing on the word regulation in the exclusive-remedies provision, we have held that § 10501(b) expressly preempts only laws that have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation. Id. (emphasis added). [3] Similarly, [t]o the extent remedies are provided under laws that have the effect of regulating [i.e., managing or governing] rail transportation, they too are expressly preempted. Id. [4] On the other hand, § 10501(b) does not expressly preempt generally applicable state laws that have a mere remote or incidental effect on rail transportation. Id. [5] If a state law is not expressly preempted by the ICCTA, it still may be impliedly preempted if, as applied to a particular case, it has the effect of unreasonably burdening or interfering with rail transportation. Id. at 414. As a final matter, we observe Congress was particularly concerned about state economic regulation of railroads when it enacted the ICCTA. The House Report on the ICCTA states that § 10501(b) reflects a [f]ederal policy of occupying the entire field of economic regulation of the interstate rail transportation system and establishes the direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulation of railroads. H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807, 808. The House Report explains: [a]lthough States retain the police powers reserved by the Constitution, the Federal scheme of economic regulation and deregulation is intended to address and encompass all such regulation and to be completely exclusive. Any other construction would undermine the uniformity of Federal standards and risk the balkanization and subversion of the Federal scheme of minimal regulation. . . . Id. at 96, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 808. The preemptive effect of § 10501(b) may not be limited to state economic regulation, [6] but economic regulation is at the core of ICCTA preemption. See Friberg, 267 F.3d at 443 ([I]t appears manifest that Congress intended the ICCTA to further that exclusively federal [regulatory] effort, at least in the economic realm.); see also Fayus Enters. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 602 F.3d 444, 451 (D.C.Cir.2010) (recognizing that the core of ICCTA preemption is `economic regulation'); PCS Phosphate Co., Inc. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir.2009) (observing that voluntary agreements do not fall into the core of economic regulation that the ICCTA was intended to preempt).
In Friberg v. Kansas City Southern Railway, we held the ICCTA at least defensively preempted a negligence per se claim based on a state antiblocking statute substantially identical to the Mississippi statute at issue in this case. [7] 267 F.3d at 444. We reasoned that the ICCTA does not permit states to directly regulate a railroad's economic decisions such as those pertaining to train length, speed or scheduling. Id. at 444. Sitting en banc, we confirmed this holding in Franks Investment v. Union Pacific Railroad. 593 F.3d at 411. The only issue here is whether Friberg applies to the context of complete preemption. We have already held the ICCTA completely preempts state law tort actions that fall squarely under § 10501(b). PCI Transp. Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir.2005); [8] Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331. We have not yet defined what it means to fall squarely under § 10501(b), but our cases provide some guidance. First, as discussed above, § 10501(b) expressly preempts only state laws that manage or govern rail transportation. Franks, 593 F.3d at 411; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-422, at 167 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 850, 853 (stating that exclusivity is limited to remedies with respect to rail regulationnot State and Federal law generally). This suggests a state law does not fall squarely under § 10501(b) unless it attempts to manage or govern rail transportation. Second, we have recognized the core purpose of § 10501(b) is to prevent states from regulating rail transportation in the economic realm. Friberg, 267 F.3d at 443; see also Fayus, 602 F.3d at 451. This recognition is consistent with Congress's intent regarding the completely preemptive effect of § 10501(b). See H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807, 808 (asserting the direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulation of railroads.). This suggests a state law does not fall squarely under § 10501(b) unless it attempts to manage or govern rail transportation in the economic realm. Lastly, we have specifically determined that a state law tort remedy that would directly regulate a railroad's switching rates and services falls squarely under § 10501(b). PCI, 418 F.3d at 540; see also Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir.2008) (citing PCI and finding state law tort remedy targeting delivery services on rail spur completely preempted). Implicit in our determination was a recognition that a rail operator's decisions about switching rates and services are economic decisions. See Friberg, 267 F.3d at 444 (finding that a railroad's economic decisions include those pertaining to train length, speed or scheduling). We read these cases together as establishing that § 10501(b) completely preempts state laws (and remedies based on such laws) that directly attempt to manage or govern a railroad's decisions in the economic realm. [9] Put another way, when a plaintiff's tort claim directly attempts to manage or govern a railroad's decisions in the economic realm, that claim is either wholly federal or nothing at all. Barrois, 533 F.3d at 330. The Elams' negligence per se claim fits this mold. Mississippi's antiblocking statute directly attempts to manage KCSR's switching operations, including KCSR's decisions as to train speed, length, and scheduling. The statute thus reach[es] into the area of economic regulation, Friberg, 267 F.3d at 443-44, in a direct way. Franks, 593 F.3d at 411. Because Mississippi's antiblocking statute is a direct attempt to manage KCSR's decisions in the economic realm, the statute is completely preempted by the ICCTA. And because the Elams' negligence per se claim is based solely on Mississippi's antiblocking statute, it too is completely preempted. We note the economic effects of Mississippi's antiblocking statute are not merely incidental to an otherwise valid state law. See Franks, 593 F.3d at 411. Unlike generally applicable state property laws and rules of civil procedure that on their face have nothing to do with railroad crossings, id., Mississippi's antiblocking statute homes in on railroad compan[ies] and rail cross[ings]. MISS.CODE § 77-9-235. Indeed, the statute has no application except with respect to the operation of railroads at rail crossings. The Elams point out that their negligence per se claim, unlike the negligence per se claim at issue in Friberg, involves safety issues. But focusing on the Elams' particular reason for enforcing Mississippi's antiblocking statute misses the point. Regardless of why the Elams brought their negligence per se claim, the effect of the claim is to economically regulate KCSR's switching operations. To be sure, not every state law targeting rail operations is completely preempted by the ICCTA. Under the standards we have discussed, the ICCTA will not completely preempt valid exercises of a state's police powers in most cases. See Fayus, 602 F.3d at 451 (distinguishing economic regulations from public health, safety, and environmental regulations). [10] Indeed, the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) expressly provides that states may enact (and citizens may enforce) rail safety laws in certain circumstances. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2), (b)(1); see also Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 248 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.2001) ([T]he ICCTA and its legislative history contain no evidence that Congress intended for the STB to supplant the FRA's authority over rail safety.). But we have already determined that a state antiblocking statute like the one at issue in this case does not pertain to traditionally state-controlled safety issues. Friberg, 267 F.3d at 444 n. 18. The statute therefore is incompatible with the ICCTA and not saved by the FRSA. [11] We emphasize our holding so far is not broad. We do not anticipate many state law claims will be completely preempted (and thus removable to federal court) under the standards we have discussed. Complete preemption applies only when a plaintiff's claim directly attempts to manage or govern a railroad's decisions in the economic realm. A negligence per se claim based on Mississippi's antiblocking statute happens to be one such claim.