Opinion ID: 1886239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The First Aggressor Jury Instruction

Text: Mr. Tyler argues that the trial court's first aggressor jury instruction constituted error. He objected to the instruction, and now maintains that no evidence suggests that [he] `voluntarily placed [himself] in a position which [he] could [have] reasonably expecte[d] would result in violence.' [26] Rather, the victims took aggressive action against him [c]ommencing with the plan to hunt for and find [him] to fight with him, [and continuing with] the possession and displaying of a weapon, ... accosting Jones and Pollard in their automobile while making threatening remarks against [him] ..., following Jones's vehicle in order to locate [him], [and] jumping from their car and approaching him.... The government contends that the trial court properly gave the first aggressor instruction (at the government's request) because the evidence supported an inference that Mr. Tyler came to the scene armed and, inferentially, looking for a fight. Moreover, the government asserts that although the victims intended to engage in a fist fight ... their conduct did not entitle [Mr. Tyler] to use deadly force in self-defense, especially when [Mr. Tyler] had the ability to avoid the confrontation altogether by staying at home or by fleeing from 20th and N ... once he encountered the victims. We begin with the factual and procedural context for Mr. Tyler's claim. The first aggressor issue surfaced when the trial court inquired why it should give a self-defense instruction and commented that there is sort of conflicting testimony. Eventually, from the parties' conflicting characterizations of the evidence, [27] the court concluded that a self-defense instruction was supported by some of the evidence in the case, but that the jury should also decide whether appellant had forfeited the defense in the manner the first aggressor instruction [28] explains. The trial judge explained her reasons for giving the first aggressor instruction: The testimony that the Court must consider when determining whether or not to give these instructions on first aggressor is not just the Defense testimony but it's the Government testimony as well. And the testimony, if you believe [defense witness] Candice Pollard ... she never even thought the two men were following them. So she couldn't have told Mr. [Tyler] ... that the boys were up there and to meet her somewhere else. Well, she didn't tell him, according to her, that they were following her. But if you credit the testimony of ... [government witness] Linda Jones ... that Ms. Pollard ... told [her] that the boys were following them. And ... the testimony that she was on the phone with Mr. Tyler ... three, probably four times, during this short period of time ... that they were being followed, ... she could have told them [sic] that. ... And then there's the testimony of the Government's witnesses ... that the other people didn't do anything, that they just got out of the car.... If there's testimony in the record from which the jurors could believe that the other people just got out of the car and then they got shot by Mr. Tyler that in my view, warrants a first aggressor instruction and I don't think Rory [sic] precludes that at all. In addition to instruction no. 5.16, the trial court gave instructions relating to self-defense. [29] When the trial court gives a jury instruction that the defense has challenged, we review the instructions for abuse of discretion. [30] A trial court has broad discretion in fashioning appropriate jury instructions.... [31] The court's decision to grant or deny an instruction request should `be based upon and drawn from a firm factual foundation.' [32] Our case law teaches that for a defendant to invoke self-defense, the record must reflect that: (1) there was an actual or apparent threat [to the defendant]; (2) the threat was unlawful and immediate; (3) the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; and (4) the defendant's response was necessary to save himself from danger.[ [33] ] In short, [i]f one has reason to believe that he will be attacked, in a manner which threatens him with bodily injury, he must avoid the attack if it is possible to do so.... [34] Hence, a defendant cannot claim self-defense if the defendant was the aggressor, or if s/he provoked the conflict upon himself/herself. [35] Here, of course, the trial judge did not withhold the issue of self-defense from the jury, but instead allowed the jury to consider, as part of it, whether appellant had forfeited the doctrine's protections because he was the first aggressor. Appellant's reliance on Rorie is misplaced because the evidence of first aggression by the defendant presented in Rorie was very different from the evidence here. Rorie involved a first aggressor jury instruction issue where defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter while armed. The victim and defendant in Rorie had three encounters or altercations, separated by time and a period of disengagement. In the first encounter, defendant choked a female and the victim began to swing a baseball bat at him. Around two and one-half hours later and during the second encounter, the female complained that defendant was messing with her again and the victim and defendant exchanged words inside and outside of the residence. The final episode occurred around one to one and one-half hours after the second encounter. The victim instructed defendant to leave the premises and cursed defendant. While defendant was gathering his possessions, the victim approached him and began choking defendant. Defendant was about to lose consciousness and felt as though he was beginning to die; he reached for his knife and struck or stabbed the victim once but the victim continued to choke him and defendant struck or stabbed him again. [36] We concluded that the trial court committed reversible error in giving the first aggressor instruction; that the defendant's aggression toward a third party [the female] did not turn [him] into an aggressor against or provocateur toward [the victim]; that the court should have focused on the final encounter in determining whether to give the first aggressor instruction; and that there was no factual predicate for th[e] charge because there was no basis on which the trial court reasonably could infer that [defendant] was the aggressor toward or provoked [the victim] during the final episode.... [37] [I]nstruction no. 5.16(B) is appropriately given when there is both evidence of self-defense and evidence that the defendant provoked the aggression from which he was defending himself. [38] Unlike Rorie, the trial court's decision to give the first aggressor instruction in this case was consistent with the fundamental legal principles pertaining to the first aggressor or provocation. There was some evidence, if believed by reasonable jurors, that Mr. Tyler engaged in self-defense because Mr. Miller and Mr. Turner approached him and he took steps backward before shooting. However, as we set forth at length in note 9, supra, there also was some evidence, again if believed by reasonable jurors, supporting a reasonable inference that Mr. Tyler provoked the aggression from which he was defending himself by traveling from Northeast Washington to the Northwest Dupont Circle area to confront Mr. Miller and Mr. Turner while he was in frequent cell phone contact with Ms. Pollard. As is clear from the record, some of the government and defense testimony not only differed but was in conflict. In State v. Wingate, [39] as here, the defense version of key events differed from the government's version, especially as to whether or not the victim had a weapon and as to the circumstances under which the defendant shot the victim. The State requested a first aggressor instruction, the defense objected, and the trial court gave the instruction. [40] The Supreme Court of Washington declared that the trial court properly gave the first aggressor instruction in light of the conflicting evidence regarding who precipitated the confrontation between [the defendant], [the victim] and [the victim's] companions. [41] Similar to Wingate, and based on the evidentiary record in this case and the conflicting testimony from government and defense witnesses, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the government's request to give the jury a first aggressor instruction. [42]