Opinion ID: 2590922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Pase's Actions

Text: The federal district court employed the substantial factor test when analyzing whether there was a material question of fact as to causation on Rhoten's federal claim. Kansas employs a different test with a higher burden of proof. In Kansas, an injured party's right to recover is limited to when the injury is a direct and proximate result of a defendant's negligence. Deal v. Bowman, 286 Kan. 853, 859, 188 P.3d 941 (2008). Proximate cause is cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred, the injury being the natural and probable consequences of the wrongful act. Yount v. Deibert, 282 Kan. 619, 624-25, 147 P.3d 1065 (2006). To satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proof on the causation element, the plaintiff must produce evidence that `affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result.' 282 Kan. at 628, 147 P.3d 1065 (quoting Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 41, pp. 269-70 [5th ed. 1984]). Pase and the City erroneously argue Kansas employs the substantial factor test used by the Tenth Circuit, relying primarily on a decision by this court, Roberson v. Counselman, 235 Kan. 1006, 686 P.2d 149 (1984). Roberson is a medical malpractice loss of chance to survive case that applied the substantial factor test for causation. 235 Kan. at 1021, 686 P.2d 149. But this court later clarified that the substantial factor test only applies to loss of chance cases. Delaney v. Cade, 255 Kan. 199, 211, 873 P.2d 175 (1994). In Delaney, this court held [t]he loss of a chance cause of action, although grounded in negligence, relies upon a lesser or reduced standard of causation than the traditional standard applied in negligence cases. 255 Kan. 199, Syl. ¶ 3, 873 P.2d 175. The substantial factor test was adopted in loss of chance cases to allow plaintiffs who have less than a 50 percent chance of survival to bring a medical malpractice action. Roberson, 235 Kan. at 1021, 686 P.2d 149. Under the more likely than not standard, plaintiffs with less than a 50 percent chance of survival could not bring a negligence claim for even the grossest forms of malpractice. 235 Kan. at 1021, 686 P.2d 149. Since Rhoten could not satisfy the lower burden of proof in the federal action, the district court properly held that issue preclusion applied to bar her negligence claims based on Pase's actions.