Opinion ID: 1130080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: attempted subornation of perjury

Text: The OBA charged Eakin with giving tacit or overt encouragement to Hathaway in response to her threats (a) to commit perjury at the assets hearing  i.e. to testify falsely that she did not have a checking account  and (b) to conceal assets from her judgment creditors by closing her personal checking account and opening another in her aunt's name. These claims are but two elements of proof, among several others, in support of the Bar's charge that respondent breached Rule 8.4(c) and (d). [29] The OBA directs us to Eakin's admission that he told Hathaway he had never heard of anyone in the county being prosecuted for perjury committed in a small claims assets hearing. According to Eakin, he made the statement merely to allay Hathaway's fear that she could be charged with perjury even if she did nothing wrong. Moreover, Eakin urges, Hathaway's testimony indicates that (a) the perjury issue arose in the context of the entrapment scheme and (b) he never counselled her to commit perjury. The district attorney, who also investigated the charge of attempted subornation of perjury, testified that when he talked to Eakin about the charge, the latter had acquiesced in the allegation. He explained that by acquiescence he meant that Eakin was fairly unresponsive to the issue. Although he believed there was enough information to convict Eakin on this charge, the district attorney stated on cross examination that his assessment of the perjury issue was pretty loose. The PRT found that while the evidence of attempted subornation of perjury was not clear and convincing, Eakin's conduct, taken together with all of the facts, shows that he acted in a highly prejudicial manner. The OBA, noting Eakin's heavy reliance on Hathaway's exculpatory testimony on this point (the subornation of perjury charge), urges this court to disregard any statements she made at the PRT hearing. In support of this notion, the OBA directs us (a) to the PRT's conclusion that she was difficult to believe in her testimony, whether it favored the [OBA] or Eakin and (b) to Hathaway's testimony about her daily use of prescription drugs for the past two years, her confinement in a mental institution to get dried out, her use of the Halcion drug on the day before the PRT hearing, the drug's effect on her short-term memory and the fact that, even though she had taken drugs that day, she was experiencing withdrawal symptoms at the hearing. The terms of 21 O.S.1991 § 504 are: Whoever procures another to commit perjury is guilty of perjury by subornation. Whoever does any act with the specific intent to commit perjury by subornation but fails to complete that offense is guilty of attempted perjury by subornation.  (Emphasis added.) The offense of attempted perjury by subornation is made out whenever the accused instigates and procures the agreement of a prospective witness to testify falsely. [30] It is a necessary element of the crime that both the accused and the person to be suborned knew that the testimony sought to be elicited was false, material and would be used in actual or prospective litigation. [31] A pending or potentially pending legal proceeding is not a required element of proof to establish the commission of attempted subornation of perjury. [32] It is unnecessary to show that the person suborned did testify falsely or indeed did testify at all. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the test is whether a prima facie case has been made out. [33] We cannot say that on this record the OBA established by clear and convincing evidence that Eakin was guilty of encouraging or inducing Hathaway to commit perjury. Respondent's observation that no one in the county had ever been prosecuted for perjury committed in small claims assets hearings clearly does not rise to the level of attempted subornation of perjury. We hold that insofar as the OBA attempted to show, as an element of proof in support of a single count, that Eakin may have been guilty of attempted perjury by subornation, the evidence falls short of the clear-and-convincing standard of proof showing that he had concrete knowledge of or acted as an accomplice in Hathaway's unlawful scheme to obstruct execution for securing satisfaction of her adjudicated liability. Even if we disregard Hathaway's favorable testimony, the other proof in the case does not measure up to the mandated clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. [34]