Opinion ID: 155737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Possession Element

Text: In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, this court reviews the record de novo. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997). Evidence sufficiently supports a verdict if, when considered in the light most favorable to the government, it would allow a reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. In evaluating the evidence under this standard, the court will not question a jury’s credibility determinations or its conclusions about the weight of the evidence. See United States v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1995). The defendant argues that the government did not prove, as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) requires it to do, that the defendant “knowingly possessed” the Browning shotgun. See United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 1997) (listing knowing possession as one of three elements of the offense). The statute does not require a defendant to have had actual possession of a firearm; constructive possession is enough. See United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994). “A person has constructive possession when he or she knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over the object and the premises -5- where it was found.” Id. at 549. If a defendant controls part of a premises, such as a bedroom, rather than an entire premises, a fact-finder can infer that the defendant constructively possessed a firearm found in that room. See United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1127 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding sufficient evidence of possession where police found gun in bedroom that defendant did not share). In this case, the government put forth undisputed evidence that the defendant, and only the defendant, used the bedroom in which the police discovered the gun. That fact alone satisfies the minimal evidentiary requirement for constructive possession under Owens. The other evidence in this case made the factual basis upon which the jury found constructive possession even more ample. Detective Jackson, for instance, testified that the defendant referred to the gun as “his” on three different occasions. Also, although the gun was kept in a case and the defendant contended that he only moved it from one room to the next, one of his fingerprints was found on it. Under the applicable legal standard, the evidence presented in this case allowed a reasonable juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly possessed the shotgun.
We review a court’s refusal to give a particular jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lee, 54 F.3d 1534, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995). A trial court does not abuse its discretion in issuing jury instructions if the -6- instructions that it gives fairly state the governing law and provide the jury with an understanding of the issues and applicable standards. United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1991). The disputed instructions concern constructive possession. We noted above that a defendant has constructive possession of an object if he has exclusive possession of the premises--or part of a premises--in which the object is found. See Owens, 70 F.3d at 1127. When a defendant has joint, rather than exclusive, possession of a premises with another, however, the government must also prove a “nexus” between the object and the defendant strong enough to show that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband. See Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1145. The district court’s instructions 23 and 24 read, in pertinent part: [Number 23] [P]ossession is constructive when a person does not have actual possession of the object but knowingly holds ownership, dominion, or control over the object and the premises where it is found. ... [Number 24] Where a defendant jointly occupies or shares a premises (such as a dwelling, house or building) constructive possession may be shown by direct evidence . . . or by circumstantial evidence, which establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge that the firearm(s) was contained in the premises and the defendant had the ability to access the firearm(s). Vol. 2, Tab 41. The defendant’s proposed instructions 33 and 34 read, in pertinent part: -7- [Number 33] Where the defendant jointly occupied a dwelling or was present when a firearm is found, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a connection or nexus between the defendant and the firearm. Mere proximity of the defendant Lonnie Eugene Wilson to the firearm is not enough to establish that he actually or constructively possessed the firearm. [Number 34] The fact that Lonnie Eugene Wilson touched the firearm is not, in itself, enough to prove actual or constructive possession. Vol. 1, Tab 31. The first sentence of the defendant’s proposed instruction 33 does not add anything to the district court’s instructions. Although it uses the word “nexus,” in Taylor we equated the nexus requirement with a finding of knowledge of and access to the weapon. See Taylor, 113 F.3d at 1145. The district court’s instructions require both knowledge and access to the weapon. The defendant’s proposed instruction 34 and the second sentence of the proposed instruction 33 are very similar to each other. The district court refused these instructions, but did inform the jury in instruction 23 that the government was required to show ownership, dominion, or control of the gun. Furthermore, it gave the jury a fair summary of the evidentiary requirements in a case involving constructive possession. These instructions sufficiently covered the issues presented. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion with regard to the jury instructions. See United -8- States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1492 (10th Cir. 1991) (“In deciding whether the judge properly exercised his discretion, we must examine the other instructions as a whole to determine if they sufficiently cover the issues in the case and focus on the facts presented by the evidence.”).