Opinion ID: 1354688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of the Prepayment Tender

Text: The trial court found that plaintiffs' attorney's letter of April 11, 1983 was not a tender of prepayment since it merely evidenced an intention to prepay. Plaintiffs assert that the letter was a sufficient tender, especially in view of the fact that Mr. Naumburg testified at trial that at the time the letter was sent, he was ready, willing and able to make full payment. In the alternative, plaintiffs argue that even if the letter were not a sufficient tender, a formal tender was not required since defendants' attorney's letter of April 20, 1983 rejected plaintiffs' offer to prepay. New Mexico has no statute or cases which define what constitutes a valid tender. The general common law rule, however, is that [a] tender is more than a mere offer to pay. It is an offer to perform coupled with the present ability of immediate performance, so that were it not for the refusal of cooperation by the party to whom the tender is made, the condition or obligation would be immediately satisfied   . A tender is the offer of a sum of money in satisfaction of a debt and is made by producing and showing the amount to the creditor and expressing verbally a willingness to pay it. Mr. U. Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 197 Neb. 612, 617, 249 N.W.2d 909, 912 (1977) (citations omitted). See also Action Development Corp. v. Woodall, 21 N.C. App. 567, 571, 205 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1974); Dunn v. Ligon, 430 S.W.2d 704, 707-08 (Tex.Civ. App. 1968); Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975). In the instant case, plaintiffs' letter states that Peter will shortly pay the outstanding balance   . Clearly, this was not an offer to pay coupled with the actual production of the amount owing. Rather, it was an offer to pay the balance at some uncertain time in the near future. Hence, it was not a proper tender. Plaintiffs attempt to excuse the insufficient tender by reliance on Guthrie v. Curnutt, 417 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.1969). There it was stated [w]hen a party, able and willing to do so, offers to pay another a sum of money and is told that it will not be accepted, the offer is a tender without the money being produced. Id. at 765-66. Plaintiffs reason that since defendants' letter manifested an intention not to accept prepayment, the money need not actually have been produced. Plaintiffs misconstrue Guthrie. In that case, the person seeking to tender money met with the creditor personally and at the time of the meeting, the tenderor carried the actual amount he owed with him. He offered to pay the sum and the creditor refused. The circuit court of appeals held that the tenderor need not actually have counted out the cash or presented a cashier's check since the creditor indicated that he would not accept the offer. In Guthrie, but for the non-co-operation of the creditor, the tenderor's obligation would have been immediately satisfied. In the case before us, the Pattisons' attorney indicated that his clients would probably decline the Naumburgs' written offer to prepay money available at some indeterminate time in the near future. [2] Thus, the Naumburgs were not excused from a formal tender under Guthrie, and the trial court was correct in concluding that no tender of prepayment had been made. There being no valid tender of prepayment, we need not address plaintiffs' fourth point that they are entitled to damages for defendants' refusal to accept prepayment. For all the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for proceedings not inconsistent herewith. IT IS SO ORDERED. FEDERCI, C.J., and RIORDAN, and WALTERS, JJ., concur.