Opinion ID: 1931276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's consent to be searched

Text: A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless it falls within a few specific and well-established exceptions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Burton v. United States, 657 A.2d 741, 745 (D.C.1994). One such exception is a search conducted with the consent of the person being searched. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Burton, 657 A.2d at 745. To justify a search under the consent exception, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Oliver v. United States, 618 A.2d 705, 709 (D.C.1993). A finding of voluntariness is essentially factual; therefore, appellate review of such a finding is limited. Oliver, 618 A.2d at 709. This court is bound to uphold the trial court's finding that a search was consensual unless such a finding is clearly erroneous. Kelly v. United States, 580 A.2d 1282, 1288 (D.C.1990). [T]he voluntariness of a consent to search is `a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.' In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 500 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-249, 93 S.Ct. 2041). The test is subjective, focusing specifically on the consenting person's characteristics and subjective understanding and on whether consent was freely given. [16] Burton, 657 A.2d at 745; see Jackson v. United States, 805 A.2d 979, 985 (D.C.2002). The court can take into consideration the youth of the accused . . . his lack of education . . . or his low intelligence . . . . Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (citations omitted). Additional factors include the length of the detention prior to consent, repeated and prolonged questioning, and physical punishment. Id. [A]ccount must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. Id. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In situations where a juvenile has purportedly consented to a search, the trial court must expressly and thoroughly deal with the significance of age, In re J.M., 619 A.2d at 504, although its findings on that issue need not be in writing. Id. at 503. Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider his age and lack of maturity in determining his ability to give a voluntary consent. He bases his argument on this court's en banc decision in In re J.M., in which a fourteen-year-old juvenile consented to an officer's request to search him. The issue that troubled the court was the lack of any specific findings concerning how the juvenile's age and relative lack of maturity affected his ability to consent voluntarily to a search. In re J.M., 619 A.2d at 502. Consequently, the court remanded the case so that the trial court could make explicit findings on this issue. Id. at 502-504. In the case at bar, appellant testified at the suppression hearing, and the court was able to assess his age, intellect, and maturity in rendering its decision. The court was fully aware that appellant was nineteen years of age (not fourteen, like the appellant in In re J.M. )  in other words, he was legally an adult  and had a GED high school diploma. The difference between nineteen and fourteen years of age is most significant. It distorts the holding in In re J.M. to suggest that the procedural safeguards intended to protect juveniles would apply to a person who has reached adulthood. [17] Furthermore, appellant testified that he knew the police were supposed to ask for consent before searching him, and that he had had prior contact with police officers. This level of sophistication persuades us that there was no need for the trial court to consider appellant's age expressly in finding voluntariness. There is nothing in the record to suggest that coercion, fear, or intimidation was used to obtain appellant's consent to the search. Although there were three officers present, rather than just one as in Berkemer, the traffic stop still took place during the day and on a public street. The officers never drew their weapons or spoke in a loud voice, and appellant was not dragged from the car. Despite the arrest of the driver in appellant's presence and the modest number of questions asked of appellant by two officers, the court could  and did  reasonably conclude that it did not see anything that shows there is any coercion or over display of authority here. Furthermore, the court found appellant's telling the officer to go ahead with the search to be very clear consent. Appellant has not shown that the trial court's finding of voluntariness was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (2001). The judgment of conviction is therefore Affirmed.