Opinion ID: 658170
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alternative Remedies Available to the Brickers

Text: 21 The Brickers next contend that a Bivens remedy should be judicially created because no comprehensive statutory remedial scheme is available to them; Congress accordingly could not have concluded that it had provided remedies that it considered adequate at that time. In particular, the Bickers assert that the remedies available to Edwin Bricker cannot bar a Bivens action because they are administrative, rather than statutory, remedies. We disagree. 22 The district court described the remedies available to Edwin Bricker as follows. First, the DOE requires that a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) at a contractor-operated facility should provide an effective grievance procedure with arbitration as its final step[.] 48 C.F.R. Sec. 970.2201(b)(5)(ii) (1992). The CBA between Westinghouse and the Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council contains a grievance procedure and requires that it be used to resolve claims and disputes on all matters subject to collective bargaining. The CBA also provides for arbitration of any unsettled grievances that involve either the interpretation or application of a provision of the CBA or [a] disciplinary penalty (including discharge) ... which is alleged to have been imposed without just cause[.] 23 Second, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(i)(3) (1988), the DOE is authorized to prescribe regulations and orders governing the design, location, and operation of facilities ... in order to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property[.] Pursuant to this statutory grant of authority, DOE issued Order 5438.1A, which establishes occupational health and safety standards for GOCO facilities and prohibits discrimination against an employee who files a complaint or otherwise exercises his or her rights under the order. DOE Order 5438.1A provides a procedure for investigating claims of discrimination and states that if it is found that such discrimination has occurred, the field organization shall assure that appropriate measures are taken by the contractor, including rehiring or reinstatement of the employee, restoration of lost seniority, and back pay. 24 Third, the National Labor Relations Act declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with an employee's right to engage in concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157, and gives the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) broad discretion to devise remedies for such unfair labor practices, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 158, 160. See, e.g., Zurn Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 683, 694 (9th Cir.1982) (the NLRB has jurisdiction to investigate unfair labor practices, which include discharges based on protected activity such as voicing safety complaints), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 3110, 77 L.Ed.2d 1366 (1983). The district court concluded that [although] these remedies, either alone or in combination, do not constitute a comprehensive statutory scheme, they are in fact a remedial mechanism designed to provide relief in circumstances that exist in the instant case[.] 25 We reject the Brickers' argument that these remedies are inadequate to preclude a Bivens action because they were not Congressionally authorized. First, this argument is inaccurate; the NLRA is a remedy created by Congress. Moreover, Edwin Bricker's remedies under DOE Order 5483.1A were created by the DOE pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(i)(3), in which Congress directed the DOE to create occupational safety and health regulations for its facilities. Thus, the remedies provided in DOE Order 5483.1A are authorized by Congress, by way of its grant of authority to the DOE. Indeed, this court previously has relied on administratively-created remedies to bar the creation of a Bivens remedy. Berry v. Hollander, 925 F.2d 311, 314-15 (9th Cir.1991) (relying in part on administrative remedies created by the Veterans Administration's Department of Medicine and Surgery to bar Bivens action); accord Heaney v. United States Veterans Admin., 756 F.2d 1215, 1220 (5th Cir.1985) ([w]here a coordinate branch of the government has provided a government employee with a procedure under which a constitutional claim arising out of the employment relationship is cognizable and some measure of relief may be obtained, a nonstatutory damage action is not available for discharge, demotion, or other adverse personnel actions absent clear evidence of an intent by the coordinate branch not to foreclose the nonstatutory damage remedy). Finally, courts have held that administratively-created remedies can bar the judicial creation of additional remedies, even in the absence of a comprehensive statutory scheme. See, e.g., Dynes v. Army Air Force Exchange Serv., 720 F.2d 1495, 1498 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that a comprehensive administrative remedial scheme established by Army and Air Force regulations barred creation of a Bivens remedy); Castella v. Long, 701 F.Supp. 578, 584 (N.D.Tex.) (same; rejecting plaintiff's argument that Bivens action was barred only where the remedial system was Congressionally created), aff'd mem., 862 F.2d 872 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936, 110 S.Ct. 330, 107 L.Ed.2d 319 (1989). 26 The Brickers rely heavily on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Krueger v. Lyng, 927 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir.1991), for the proposition that administratively created remedies cannot preclude a Bivens remedy. In Krueger, the Eighth Circuit held that an employee of a county office of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS), a division of the United States Department of Agriculture, could maintain a Bivens action against various federal officials who allegedly had fired him in retaliation for whistleblowing activities. Id. at 1051-52, 1057. Krueger, however, is distinguishable from this case for three reasons. First, as the Eighth Circuit explained: 27 [t]he statute creating the ASCS does not direct the Secretary of Agriculture to create a specific administrative scheme for overseeing the ASCS programs. Instead, the statute calls for the election of local county committees, and requires the Secretary to make such regulations as are necessary relating to the selection and exercise of the functions of the respective committees, and to the administration, through such committees, of such programs. 28 927 F.2d at 1055 (quoting 16 U.S.C. Sec. 590h(b)). Here, in contrast, the enabling statute pursuant to which the DOE promulgated Order 5483.1A specifically authorizes the DOE to create occupational health and safety regulations for its facilities. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(i). The specificity of this statutory provision distinguishes this case from Krueger. 29 Second, the only remedy made available to Krueger under the Secretary of Agriculture's regulations was appealing to the supervisor of those who fired him. Krueger, 927 F.2d at 1056. Here, in contrast, the remedies available to Bricker include a grievance procedure with arbitration as its final step, and the opportunity to file a formal complaint with the DOE, which it must investigate. Indeed, when Bricker filed his complaint pursuant to DOE Order 5483.1A, the DOE requested that a Department of Labor investigator examine the complaint. The investigator conducted an investigation and issued a report analyzing Bricker's claims. The DOE's final decision adopted the report's recommendations and granted monetary and other relief to Bricker. 30 Third, the Eighth Circuit found that Congress's failure to provide additional remedies for ASCS employees was inadvertent. Krueger, 927 F.2d at 1057 (it seems plain to us that Congress never has given a moment's thought to the question of what sort of remedies should be available to ASCS county office employees like Krueger). Here, as we already have explained, Congress did not inadvertently fail to provide additional statutory remedies for whistleblowers at DOE nuclear facilities prior to 1992. Accordingly, we conclude that the remedies available to Edwin Bricker are sufficient to bar the judicial creation of a Bivens remedy. Cf. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 421-22, 108 S.Ct. at 2466-67 ([t]he absence of statutory relief for a constitutional violation ... does not by any means necessarily imply that courts should award money damages against the officers responsible for the violation).