Opinion ID: 170720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Role of the probation officer

Text: In fashioning a restitution order, the court is required to order the probation officer to obtain and include in the PSR information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a). United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir.2007) (applying 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (Victim and Witness Protection Act). As amended by the Sentencing Reform Act, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provides for focused, adversarial development of the factual and legal issues relevant to determining the appropriate Guidelines sentence. Rule 32 frames these issues by directing the probation officer to prepare a presentence report addressing all matters germane to the defendant's sentence. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 134, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (citation omitted). Pursuant to Rule 32(c)(2), the PSR is to contain (a) information about the history and characteristics of the defendant, including his prior criminal record; (b) the classification of the offense and the defendant under the Sentencing Guidelines, possible sentencing ranges, and any factors that might warrant departure from the Guidelines; (c) any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (d) the impact of the defendant's offense upon any victims; (e) information relating to possible sentences not requiring incarceration, unless the court orders otherwise; and (f) any other information requested by the court. See id.; FED. R.CRIM.P. 32. When preparing a PSR under Rule 32, it is evident ... that the probation service is an arm of the court. It is not an investigative arm for the prosecution. A presentence report is prepared exclusively at the discretion of and for the benefit of the court. United States v. Dingle, 546 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (10th Cir. 1976). The purpose of the presentence report, including associated interviews, is neither prosecutorial nor punitive. It is essentially neutral in those respects. The probation officer acts as an agent of the court for the purpose of gathering and classifying information and informing the court in the exercise of its sentencing responsibility. United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979-80 (10th Cir.1990) (emphasis added). Although the probation officer acts as the court's agent, it seems the role is certainly more substantive than that of a message bearer; indeed, probation officers can exercise some discretion on their own. There is little doubt that Probation Officer Budzinsky performed his duties as required by the district court pursuant to Rule 32. He filtered all the information he received from his investigation and prepared the Net Worth Statement and finally the PSR, which was subjected to adversarial testing by the parties. See FED. R.CRIM.P. 32(i)(1)(c) (mandating that the parties be given an opportunity to comment on the probation officer's determinations and on other matters relating to an appropriate sentence); Burns, 501 U.S. at 135, 111 S.Ct. 2182. Only after such testing does the court exercise its discretion and fashion a restitution order. Given this background and the statute's legislative history, we are informed in our analysis by a divided Ninth Circuit decision, which recently immunized a similar false statement to a probation officer. See United States v. Horvath, 492 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.2007), reh'g en banc denied, 522 F.3d 904, 907 (Apr. 9, 2008) (The worst aspect is in the majority deciding that we should be the entity to grant immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b), where Congress did not see fit to grant such immunity. If Congress had wanted to exempt statements made by a defendant to a probation officer, then Congress knew how to do it.) (Bea, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). Mr. Horvath made a false statement (that he had served in the United States Marine Corps) to the probation officer during the presentence interview. The probation officer included this statement in the PSR, and the court ultimately relied on Mr. Horvath's purported military service as a mitigating factor during the imposition of his sentence. The panel majority determined that § 1001(b)'s judicial function exception insulated the statement, because Mr. Horvath's false statement was submitted, via courier (i.e. the probation officer) to the district court judge. [A] defendant does not lose the protection of § 1001(b) simply by using an intermediary. 492 F.3d at 1081. However, we believe that the dissent's logic and reasoning as to the role of the probation officer in this instance appears to be the better approach, and also squares with Congressional intent. The dissent agreed that documents or writing provided to a judge via a courier or a clerk or secretary, are submitted to a judge for purposes of § 1001(b). Id. at 1082 (Rymer, J., dissenting). However, Judge Rymer believed, and we agree, that a probation officer, in preparing the PSR pursuant to Rule 32, acts with greater authority than does a courier pigeon. Id. [T]he probation officer's obligation is to submit a report that contains information on the defendant's history and characteristics, not from the defendant. Id. Here, as in Horvath, the probation officer picked and chose what to include and exclude in the PSR, based on his understanding of what is expected of him and what he believes is important for the court and the parties to know. Id. at 1083. The process involves the probation officer's exercise of his discretion, and not a mere transmission of information. See Horvath, 522 F.3d 904, 2008 WL 943951, at  ([The probation officer is] not like a court reporter whose only responsibility is to take down what people say and transmit it verbatim. The probation officer also has the independent duty to figure out the truth and so advise the court. The probation officer is therefore not simply an extension of the court, even if he's required to report all of defendant's false statements.... The probation officer has a separate role to play as an investigator and truth-finder.) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc) (citations omitted). Furthermore, the dissent noted, pre- Hubbard case law from the Ninth Circuit supported the determination that certain pre-sentencing misrepresentations are subject to prosecution under § 1001. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.1985) (stating that probation officer's questions regarding the use of aliases and prior convictions were a routine exercise of administrative responsibility and upholding conviction when false statements to probation officer impaired the basic functioning of the probation department); United States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 768 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir.1985) (upholding a conviction of an individual who orally gave a false name to the magistrate at his arraignment stating the magistrate's inquiry of [defendant] as to his true identity was not an exercise of the magistrate's judicial powers, but was a function of the magistrate's administrative duties); see also United States v. Barber, 881 F.2d 345, 350-51 (7th Cir.1989) (holding that defendant's mailing of false recommendation letters to U.S. Attorney's Office on behalf of another defendant was covered by § 1001 because facts presented a unique setting and one ill-suited to regulation through the perjury statutes and because sentencing recommendations are within jurisdiction of U.S. Attorney's Office); Masterpol, 940 F.2d at 766 (holding defendant's spurious letters of recommendations submitted to the court to influence sentencing were not covered by § 1001); Mayer, 775 F.2d at 1390-92 (adopting exception and finding submission of false letters of recommendation to sentencing judge within court's adjudicative function). Finally, the Horvath dissent persuasively concludes that to hold Mr. Manning's false statement to the probation officer within the ambit of § 1001(a) also supports Congressional intent. Congress did not intend to allow defendants to avoid restitution obligations through lies or misrepresentations made to a probation officer. While Congress obviously did intend to allow some false statements, ... to be made to a judge in the course of adversarial litigation to avoid chilling of advocacy on the margin between pushing the envelope and being misleading and lying, it did not immunize falsehoods altogether even in the judge's arena as it drew a line at knowingly making a false material statement under oath. 18 U.S.C. § 1623. Additionally, the adversary system, counsels' ethical obligations, and other means available to judicial officers kick in to further truth-seeking in the courtroom. Similar balances do not apply in the probation officer's arena. Statements to probation officers are not made under penalty of perjury and the process is not adversarial. Absent § 1001, there are scant incentives for truth-speaking. Horvath, 492 F.3d at 1083 (Rymer, J., dissenting). Indeed, the procedure for the issuance of a restitution order indicates that Congress intends to include all of a defendant's assets in a restitution calculation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(3) (Each defendant shall prepare and file with the probation officer an affidavit fully describing the financial resources of the defendant, including a complete listing of all assets owned or controlled by the defendant..., the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other information that the court requires relating to such other factors as the court deems appropriate.). Congress did not intend to excuse Mr. Manning for omitting financial assets from his statement to Probation Officer Budzinsky. Horvath, 522 F.3d 904, 912 (observing that to hold otherwise encourages defendants to lie during the presentence investigation) (Bea, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). This is a close and difficult case. While some aspects of the probation officer's actions seem to be those of an agent, other functions allow discretion. Yet we cannot hold that Congressional intent encompassed allowing a defendant to conceal resources when such evidence is critical to the final judicial decision, at which time the advocates can have their say protected by § 1001(b). Thus, although it seems the government could have chosen another route, it was fully empowered to prosecute Mr. Manning under § 1001.