Opinion ID: 1172684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timely Request

Text: Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261 (9th Cir. 1997) is directly on point. Moore definitively holds a request to proceed pro se is timely if made prior to the impaneling of the jury and Faretta continues to mandate this result. Moore applied the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 to habeas procedures in federal court. The 1996 amendments provide a federal court will not grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of any person in custody pursuant to the judgment on the merits by a state court unless the adjudication of the claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.... 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1) (1996). Moore was charged with double murder in state court. Two weeks before trial was set to begin Moore moved to proceed pro se. The trial court denied his request because it believed any delay would interfere with the orderly administration of justice. The jury convicted Moore and sentenced him to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed Moore's direct appeal and denied eight habeas petitions. The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether the trial court's decision to deny Moore's request, as well as the California Supreme Court's affirmation of that decision, was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court. The court noted first that under previous Ninth Circuit opinions a request is timely if made before the jury is empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay. Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. But the ultimate issue was whether this conclusion was mandated by a decision of the United States Supreme Court. The court answered yes: The only Supreme Court decision to discuss the timeliness of a request to proceed pro se is the Faretta decision itself. Our first inquiry is thus whether Faretta clearly established a rule of law regarding the timeliness of a request. In Faretta, the Court twice described the timing of Faretta's request to represent himself: it was made weeks before trial, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, and well before the date of trial, id. at 807, 95 S.Ct. at 2527. The Court's acknowledgment of the timing of Faretta's request was neither a recitation of the background facts of the case nor obiter dictum; instead, it is mentioned not only in the opening paragraphs, but also in the very breadth with which the Court announced its decision. Id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. It is properly considered necessary to the Court's decision, and therefore is a holding of the Court ... As such, it is clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Moore, 108 F.3d at 265 (second emphasis added). Consequently, the court held denial of Moore's request abridged his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. This holding conclusively demonstrates the Sixth Amendment mandates a defendant's request to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is impaneled and is not a tactic to secure delay. Stenson satisfies the first requirement of the rule. He moved to proceed pro se twice: first, two days before the jury was impaneled; and second, at the end of void dire, but still before the jury was impaneled. The next question we must answer is whether Stenson made his motion to secure delay. We must keep in mind, though, that a defendant's assertion of his right to proceed pro se might stall or delay a trial is not dispositive. It is only when the defendant moves to proceed pro se solely to delay may the court deny the motion. Delay per se is not a sufficient ground for denying a defendant's constitutional right of self-representation. Any motion to proceed pro se that is made on the morning of trial is likely to cause delay; a defendant may nonetheless have bona fide reasons for not asserting his right until that time, and he may not be deprived of that right absent an affirmative showing of purpose to secure delay. Fritz v. Spalding, 682 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir.1982). The state may show a defendant makes a request to proceed pro se for purposes of delay in two ways. First, if a defendant accompanies his motion to proceed with a request for a continuance [this] would be strong evidence of a purpose to delay. Id. In State v. Breedlove, 79 Wash.App. 101, 107, 900 P.2d 586 (1995), the Court of Appeals considered a defendant's request made shortly before trial and which was accompanied by a motion to continue. The court rejected the State's contention that one could infer an improper purpose from the mere fact that the motions were made simultaneously. Such an inference [was] inappropriate because Breedlove did not condition his request to proceed pro se with a demand for a continuance and because the motion for continuance may, just as well, evince his expressed desire to prepare the defense his counsel had allegedly neglected to prepare. Id. at 109, 900 P.2d 586. The inquiry, however, does not stop there. Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784. The Ninth Circuit described what further inquiry the court must accomplish before it may conclude a motion for continuance is dispositive of the defendant's intent with respect to his request to proceed pro se: The court must also examine the events preceding the motion, to determine whether they are consistent with a good faith assertion of the Faretta right and whether the defendant could reasonably be expected to have made the motion at an earlier time. Fritz, 682 F.2d at 784-85. Stenson filed his initial request to proceed pro se unaccompanied by a motion for continuance. He did, however, request a continuance with respect to his motion for substitution of counsel. See RP (7/13/94) at 3133. It cannot be said Stenson made his motion to proceed pro se for purposes of delay as it was unaccompanied by a motion for continuance. While his subsequent requests for substitution of counsel were accompanied by motions to continue, it is also obvious that Stenson did not request said continuances to disrupt his trial but to allow any newly appointed counsel to become familiar with his case. As noted above, he had legitimate and considerable disagreements with Leatherman that led to his extreme position of requesting a new lawyer or proceeding by himself. Such is not the situation in Hamilton (cited by the majority at 1276). There, the Eighth Circuit considered defendant's request to proceed pro se untimely, although it was made three months before trial, because the defendant made his request in order to prepare his defense despite several months of trial preparation and a vague equivocation accompanied his request. Hamilton, 28 F.3d at 862. Moreover, Hamilton is inconsistent with the majority of cases which hold a request is timely if made prior to the jury's being impaneled. Even if we were to follow Hamilton, Stenson's request was far more reasonable than Hamilton's. Stenson clearly realized before trial his attorney had an agenda radically different from his own. Accordingly, Stenson made a timely and legitimate motion to proceed pro se.