Opinion ID: 786183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: perez's vagueness challenge also fails

Text: 29 Perez also contends that section 4022.13 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because the regulation's prohibition against any action detrimental to the best interests of racing is not specific or definite enough to capture his conduct. We reject Perez's vagueness arguments because we find that the language of the regulation clearly embraces his conduct. In addition, after the initial $500 fine was imposed, Perez was on explicit notice that his continued disruptive conduct would be fined. 30
31 The Due Process Clause requires that laws be crafted with sufficient clarity to `give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited' and to `provide explicit standards for those who apply them.' Gen. Media Communications, 131 F.3d at 286 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974) (explaining that the due process doctrine of vagueness.... incorporates notions of fair notice or warning [and] requires legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of fact in order to prevent `arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement'). We have clearly held, however, that a statute or regulation is not required to specify every prohibited act. See Rock of Ages Corp. v. Sec'y of Labor, 170 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.1999) ([R]egulations need not achieve `meticulous specificity' and may instead embody `flexibility and reasonable breadth.' (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. 2294)). Limitations inherent in the English language often prevent the drafting of statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159-60, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972)). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed greater tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. 5 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). 32 The evaluation of whether section 4022.13 is vague as applied to Perez must be made with respect to Perez's actual conduct and not with respect to hypothetical situations at the periphery of the [regulation's] scope or with respect to the conduct of other parties who might not be forewarned by the broad language. diLeo v. Greenfield, 541 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that statute that permitted termination of teachers for due and sufficient cause was not vague as applied); see also United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir.2003) ( in banc ) (explaining that as-applied vagueness challenges involve examination of the specific facts of the case at hand) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, although the prohibition against any action detrimental to the best interests of racing is admittedly flexible, and officials implementing this standard will undoubtedly exercise some discretion in interpreting and applying the regulation, our primary focus must be on whether the specific conduct at issue in this case falls with sufficient clarity within the ambit of the regulation. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (One to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness.); Allen v. City of Greensboro, N.C., 452 F.2d 489, 491 (4th Cir.1971) (While the argument that the regulation prohibiting conduct `unbecoming an officer and a gentleman' is so vague as to provide no guidance to police officers in ascertaining the proper standard of conduct may well be valid under other circumstances, the argument is without merit where the plaintiff admitted making improper advances toward a young woman during an official investigation.). 33 In evaluating Perez's vagueness claim, we must consider the context in which the regulation was enforced, i.e., we must evaluate Perez's underlying conduct by reference to the norms of the racing community. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 754, 94 S.Ct. 2547 (finding military's conduct unbecoming provision was not void for vagueness and noting that further content may be supplied to areas of uncertainty in the provision by less formalized custom and usage); Rock of Ages, 170 F.3d at 156 ([R]egulations satisfy due process as long as a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the conditions the regulations are meant to address and the objectives the regulations are meant to achieve, has fair warning of what the regulations require.) (emphasis added); San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1137 (3d Cir.) (finding that professor's as-applied vagueness challenge to regulation requiring that professors engage in sound scholarship and competent teaching failed because he knew that his conduct violated the mores of the academic community), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908, 113 S.Ct. 305, 121 L.Ed.2d 228 (1992); Finucan v. Maryland Bd. of Physician Quality Assurance, 380 Md. 577, 846 A.2d 377, 386-87 (Md.2004) (A statute prohibiting unprofessional conduct or immoral conduct, therefore, is not per se unconstitutionally vague; the term refers to conduct which breaches the rules or ethical code of a profession, or conduct which is unbecoming a member in good standing of a profession.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cranston v. City of Richmond, 40 Cal.3d 755, 221 Cal.Rptr. 779, 710 P.2d 845, 851 (1985) (rejecting vagueness challenge to conduct unbecoming statute) ([W]here the language of a statute fails to provide an objective standard by which conduct can be judged, the required specificity may nonetheless be provided by the common knowledge and understanding of members of the particular vocation or profession to which the standard applies.). 34 We believe that there could be no misunderstanding by a veteran of the horse-racing industry like Perez — indeed, by any reasonable person — that banging on tables, repeatedly shouting obscenities and threatening to choke a racing official at an official Stewards' meeting would impede the Stewards' efforts to investigate Perez's very serious allegations — that Lakow was fixing races by manipulating race entries — and, thus, constitute conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing generally. See Hadges v. Corbisiero, 739 F.Supp. 792, 793 (S.D.N.Y.1989) (holding that harness-racing regulation prohibiting conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing was not vague as applied to plaintiff who was an experienced horseman and should have known that passing wagering information was prohibited); cf. LeRoy v. Illinois Racing Bd., 39 F.3d 711, 715 (7th Cir.1994) (observing that although regulation prohibiting improper language and improper conduct might be seriously deficient as a norm addressed to the general public for the conduct of daily affairs, the regulation is not vague because, inter alia, it is addressed only to Illinois horse-racing licensees and is administered by an agency that, through a series of decisions, can add details), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1131, 115 S.Ct. 2555, 132 L.Ed.2d 809 (1995). Although Perez attempts to cast his misconduct as merely the use of inappropriate language or some sort of mild decorum violation, the record does not support his characterization of events. 6 Each of the Stewards testified that Perez's conduct was so disruptive that the meeting had to be adjourned. In light of Perez's outrageous behavior, which effectively precluded investigation of his very serious charges against Lakow, we have little difficulty finding, as the District Court and the Racing Board did, that Perez's actions, taken together, qualify as conduct detrimental to the best interests of racing generally. 35 In addition, although section 4022.13 could be read to apply to a wide range of conduct (that is not at issue in this case) and despite the fact that the Stewards are invested with broad discretion under the regulation, we do not believe that these features provide a basis for a vagueness finding under the facts of this case. Section 4022.13 and the other regulations that outline the Stewards' authority do channel the discretion of the Stewards. See Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 143. Those regulations provide the Stewards with general oversight of all aspects of the race meetings at which they preside but they also provide more specific authority including, e.g., reviewing any complaints against officials, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4022.7 (2000), supervising race entries, id. § 4022.10, and regulating the conduct of officials, owners, trainers, jockeys, grooms and other horsemen, id. § 4022.11. Here, Perez made serious allegations against Lakow that, if true, implicated one of the Stewards' core concerns: the integrity of the races being run at the meeting. Perez's disruptive conduct prevented the Stewards from investigating those weighty charges and their decision to fine him for his behavior does not represent an abuse of the discretion afforded the Stewards under the regulations. 7 36
37 Because [t]he vagueness doctrine is based on `notions of fair notice or warning,' the fact that Perez received explicit notice from the Stewards further undermines his vagueness challenge. Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 27 (2d Cir.1979); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 (explaining that the Court's concern about vague laws is that they do not give people a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited and may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning). In this case, it is undisputed that Perez was warned by the Stewards that his conduct would subject him to a fine. 8 See Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 27 (rejecting vagueness challenge where plaintiff received a specific warning to cease his conduct and holding that plaintiff should have recognized that his actions would be viewed as a violation of the rule prohibiting unbecoming conduct detrimental to the welfare or good name of the Department); In re Bithoney, 486 F.2d 319, 324 (1st Cir.1973) (holding that because respondent received a direct and specific warning from the court that his continued abuse of ... process would constitute conduct unbecoming a member of the bar, regulation under which respondent was penalized was not vague); cf. diLeo, 541 F.2d at 953 (finding that because teacher's persistent pattern of neglecting his professional duties and harassing and humiliating students ... continued and worsened after [plaintiff] met with school administrators, plaintiff could not reasonably claim not to know that his behavior constituted due and sufficient cause for dismissal). 38 According to Hicks, [Perez] started [cursing] and I sa[id], [Perez], I'm going to recommend a fine. In addition, an employee seated in an adjacent room who overheard the meeting reported, I heard Mr. Hicks say to Mr. Perez, if you keep yelling and you keep cursing, I'm going to fine you. The District Court found, based on this testimony, that even [p]rior to the (initial) fine Perez was warned about his language and knew that he would be fined for his behavior. Perez, 248 F.Supp.2d at 200 n. 15. The record, however, is not entirely clear about whether the initial $500 fine was imposed before or after Perez received warning that further cursing would subject him to sanction. 39 This issue need not be resolved because, at the very least, after the first $500 fine was imposed, Perez was on notice that he would be fined if he did not cease his disruptive behavior. In other words, Perez cannot dispute that he was on notice for the remaining $4,500 in fines that were imposed incrementally after the initial warning. In spite of the Stewards' repeated warnings, Perez continued to shout obscenities, even taunting the Board to raise the fine by cursing further. As one Steward explained, every time I recommended a fine [, Perez] cursed more. Any unconstitutionality that may have resulted from imposition of the first $500 fine was cured when the Board subsequently discounted Perez's fine from $5,000 to $3,000. 9 40 We conclude that section 4022.13 is not void for vagueness as applied to Perez in this case because Perez's vulgar and disruptive behavior, which prevented the Stewards from investigating his very serious allegations against the Racing Secretary, was obviously detrimental to the best interests of racing generally. Perez's position is further undercut by the fact that he was provided with actual, personal notice that his outrageous conduct would subject him to sanction.