Opinion ID: 1628268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Out-of-Court Statements of Victim

Text: Mr. Strong alleges that the motion court erred in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that trial counsel should have objected to the reading of statements made by Ms. Washington to police regarding an earlier assault on her by Mr. Strong. During the penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to introduce Ms. Washington's statements made to an officer at the scene of an assault by Mr. Strong against Ms. Washington approximately one year prior to her murder. The trial court allowed the prosecutor to submit Ms. Washington's excited utterances. Mr. Strong now asserts that trial counsel should have objected to the hearsay statements because they were inadmissible under the reasoning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Prior to Crawford , courts focused on whether the out-of-court statements had adequate indicia of reliability to justify their admission. Glass, 227 S.W.3d at 472. In Crawford , the United States Supreme Court changed that analysis and held that testimonial out-of-court statements by a witness are barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The United States Supreme Court further clarified the circumstances under which out-of-court statements are testimonial in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). Both Crawford and Davis, however, were decided after Mr. Strong's trial and conviction. In Glass, this Court faced an identical situation, wherein the defendant attempted to claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of evidence on the basis that it violated the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights under Crawford , but the alleged defect occurred before Crawford was decided. Glass, 227 S.W.3d at 472. This Court found that: In reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, counsel's conduct is measured by what the law is at the time of trial. Counsel will generally not be held ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law. [The defendant] was tried and convicted before the Crawford case was decided. In order to make the Crawford objection at trial, counsel would have had to anticipate the Supreme Court's holding in an opinion that had not yet been issued. Id. (citations omitted). Likewise, in this case, because trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to anticipate the holding of Crawford prior to its issuance, the motion court did not clearly err in denying Mr. Strong relief on this claim.