Opinion ID: 480961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effectiveness of the Bureau's Letter-Order Pending Commission Review

Text: 32 A Commission rule, which has been in effect since 1962, provides (at 47 C.F.R. Sec. 1.102(b)) that unless the Bureau specifies otherwise, its orders are to be effective upon release. Subsection 1.102(b)(3) provides that an application for Commission review will not preclude their taking effect unless the Commission, in its discretion, decides to stay the effectiveness of a Bureau's order pending completion of its review. 33 Appellant contends that this rule violates the relevant provisions of the Act. Thus we are presented with a dispute over an agency's interpretation of its organic statute of the kind addressed in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). In that case, the Supreme Court held that if a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, id. at 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 9, determines that Congress left the statute silent or ambiguous with respect to a particular issue and simply failed to directly address[ ] the precise question at issue, the court must defer to the agency's construction of the statute if it is reasonable. Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. 34 Title 47 U.S.C. Sec. 155(c)(3) (1982) provides that any Bureau 35 order, decision, report or action ..., unless reviewed [by the Commission] as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection, shall have the same force and effect, and shall be made, evidenced, and enforced in the same manner, as orders ... of the Commission. 36 Paragraph (4) of the subsection requires that the Commission pass upon any petition for review that is timely filed by any person aggrieved by any such order. 37 Appellant argues that as it had filed a timely application for review which the Commission was required by paragraph (4) to pass upon, the Bureau order could not become effective under the terms of paragraph (3) until after the Commission review had been completed. While I believe appellant has the better part of the linguistic argument, the other members of the panel find the statutory language ambiguous and see nothing in the statute or its legislative history to preclude the transfer of the license pending final action by the Commission. The panel majority conclude that the Commission's rule represents a permissible construction of the statute, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866, 104 S.Ct. at 2793, and see no reason to set aside a practice that has been in effect for more than a quarter of a century. 38 The full panel notes that although WEAM and Viacom were able to consummate the assignment of the station license on the strength of the Bureau's letter-order, they did so with full knowledge of the risk that the Commission might reverse the Bureau's decision and order the assignment rescinded. Thus, the effective but not final procedure did not deprive appellant of the opportunity to challenge the assignment before the Commission and this court. Rather, the procedure merely prevented appellant from insisting on the maintenance of the status quo pending review.