Opinion ID: 1274732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Quasi-Legislative Action

Text: In Colorado, the General Assembly has chosen to vest part-time citizen bodies, like this Commission, with rulemaking authority. Under section 37-90-104, 15 C.R.S. (1990), the Commission consists of twelve members, nine of whom are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate. Six of the appointed members must be resident agriculturists of designated ground water basins, two shall represent municipal or industrial water users of the state, and one shall be from an area west of the Continental Divide. § 37-90-104(3)(b). The non-appointed members consist of the executive directors of the Department of Natural Resources (voting member), the State Engineer and the director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board (non-voting members). § 37-90-104(4). Agency [r]ule-making conducted in accordance with section 24-4-103 is quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, in character. Collopy v. Wildlife Comm'n, 625 P.2d 994, 1003 (Colo.1981). We recognize that agency determinations vary in range and in nature and that the scope of judicial review must be appropriately tailored depending upon whether the determination is predominantly policy-oriented or factual in nature. Citizens for Free Enterprise, 649 P.2d at 1064. For example, rules may reflect policy judgments of a generic character, with factual determinations playing a tangential role. Id. For such rules, specific factual support for the regulation should not be required, although the reasoning process that leads to its adoption must be defensible. Id. On the other extreme, the necessity for the rule may turn on a discrete fact that is capable of demonstrative proof. In that situation, the reasonableness of agency action will depend upon the presence of factual support for its determination. Id. More often, however, agency determinations are based upon a combination of policy considerations and factual determinations. Id. In these actions, the nature and scope of judicial review will depend upon which type of determination predominates. Id. Rulemaking does not involve the application of the policy to any specific person. City of Aurora v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1280, 1286-87 (Colo.1990). Rulemaking is the `issuance of regulations or the making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed or unspecified persons or situations.' 2 Kenneth C. Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 6.1 at 228 (3d ed.1994) (quoting Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rulemaking, 52 Harv. L.Rev., 259, 265 (1938)). When courts review rules, the administrative record provides the basis for relating the rule to the applicable law, in the process of ascertaining whether the agency has complied with the required legal standards. In Citizens for Free Enterprise, 649 P.2d at 1062, we articulated that based on the record review, pursuant to section 24-4-106, provides a concrete body of material for assessing the basis of the administrative agency's conclusions. We stated that [r]ather than engaging in a de novo inquiry into whether the basis and purpose of the rule have some foundation in fact, the court is directed to the administratively compiled record. Id. We concluded that the standard of review in the consideration of agency rulemaking is reasonableness. Id. at 1061-65. Rules adopted by an agency are presumed to be valid. Regular Route Common Carrier Conference v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 761 P.2d 737, 743 (Colo.1988). Any challenging party has a heavy burden to establish invalidity of the rule by demonstrating that the agency violated constitutional or statutory law, exceeded its authority, or lacked a basis in the record for the rule. Id. The court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Citizens for Free Enterprise, 649 P.2d at 1065. In contrast, quasi-judicial action involves determination of the rights, duties, or obligations of specific individuals on the basis of the application of presently existing legal standards or policy considerations to past or present facts developed at a hearing conducted for the purpose of resolving the particular interests in question. Cherry Hills Resort Dev. Co. v. Cherry Hills Village, 757 P.2d 622, 625 (Colo.1988). What distinguishes legislation from adjudication is that the former affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position of any particular individual will be definitively touched by it; while adjudication operates concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity. 2 Davis & Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.1 at 228 (quoting J. Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law 2 (1927)). In cases where we have interpreted statutory provisions for  de novo  review of legislative proceedings, we have concluded that such review does not take the traditional form of a new trial on the merits. See, e.g., Colorado Land Use Comm'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 199 Colo. 7, 13-14, 604 P.2d 32, 35-36 (1979); City & County of Denver v. Board of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d 753, 759 (Colo.1989). Rather, such review focuses on allegations of agency illegality or impropriety: The de novo term is included to indicate that any relevant evidence may be introduced to attempt to prove illegality such as fraud, sham, bribery, failure to comply with statutory requirements, or abuse of legislative discretion. Colorado Land Use Comm'n, 199 Colo. at 13-14, 604 P.2d at 36. In this case, we determine that the General Assembly did not intend to subject Commission rulemaking to de novo review of any type.