Opinion ID: 1452936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: motion for judgment of acquittal as to moore charge

Text: Budd argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal on Count 3, which charged Budd with violating the constitutional rights of inmate Brandon Moore. This court reviews de novo, and asks whether any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Budd violated the Eighth Amendment rights of Brandon Moore, a convicted and sentenced inmate. Meyer, 359 F.3d at 826. Budd cannot meet this standard, and we reject this challenge. In Hudson, the Supreme Court clarified the law applicable to convicted prisoners' excessive-force claims. The Court held that when corrections officials use force to keep order, and this force is alleged to violate the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley [ v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)]: whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. 503 U.S. at 7, 112 S.Ct. 995. More recently, the Supreme Court has invoked Whitley to hold that the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.' Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). Hope went on to reaffirm that [a]mong `unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are `totally without penological justification.' Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Controlling an emergency situation and maintaining order are legitimate penological justifications, see, e.g., Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 546-47, 99 S.Ct. 1861, but when safety concerns have abated or an emergency has been dispelled, the justification may disappear. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, 122 S.Ct. 2508. In this case, several officials took Moore and his codefendants to wait in a witness room following their sentencing. Moore's hands and feet were shackled, and his hands were cuffed to a bellychain. Moore began making fun of the whole situation and bragging about how many years he received, but was not physically doing anything to threaten any of the deputies. Transcript at 68, 80-81. Budd told Moore to shut the f   up and sit down, and then forced Moore into a chair. [10] Id. at 69. Budd then ordered the two codefendants removed, leaving Budd, Deputy Tinkey, Deputy Oliver, and Moore in the witness room. After a few short minutes, Budd grabbed the seated and compliant Moore by the collar and slammed him into the steel frame of a window, leaving a crease in [Moore's] forehead. Id. at 69-70. Budd then ordered Tinkey to hold Moore against the window. Budd attempted to pull up Moore's sagging pants, and Moore, though still shackled, reacted by jumping at Budd. It is unclear whether this reaction was an attempt to harm Budd, mere surprise at Budd's actions, or a reflexive response to what was actually an attack by Budd on Moore. [11] In any event, Tinkey immediately took Moore to the ground to secure him. Tinkey then told Moore to remain on the ground and took a few steps back. Once on the ground, Moore did not move around, did not try to get back up, and did not verbally or physically threaten anyoneTinkey testified that Moore wasn't going anywhere and wasn't a threat to anyone. Id. at 73. Budd, agitated and cursing Moore, stepped on Moore's back with both feet. [12] Moore testified that his face was scratched up and his back was starting to feel numb; he later unsuccessfully requested medical attention. Id. at 108. Officer Oliver testified that he saw no law-enforcement reason for Budd's actions; Officer Tinkey testified that he did not see any need for Budd's actions and that being obnoxious is not a reason to use force on a prisoner. Id. at 75, 95. Budd disputed this characterization. He testified that when he slammed Moore into the window, he was trying to restore order to a volatile situation, and when he stepped on Moore's back, he was attempt[ing] to protect himself from injury. Transcript at 45. A rational factfinder could have concluded that Budd acted without penological justification and therefore unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain on Moore in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 737, 122 S.Ct. 2508. Given the other officers' testimony, the jury reasonably could have seen Budd's supposed justifications as incredible. That is, Tinkey testified that when Budd slammed Moore into the window, a few minutes had passed since Moore had mouthed off, and that in any event, being obnoxious does not justify the use of force. Moreover, Moore was restrained, compliant, and alone in the room with three officers. The jury rationally could have disbelieved that this was a volatile situation. Similarly, the jury could have disbelieved Budd's supposed concern for his safety when he stepped on Moore's back with both feet, given Tinkey's testimony that the prone, restrained inmate wasn't going anywhere and wasn't a threat to anyone. Moore's injuries here, which included a dented forehead and numbness to his back, in which a bullet had previously become permanently lodged, were also comparable to those of the inmate in Hudson, and thus not de minimis. Therefore, we reject this challenge. Budd also argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 3 because Moore never identified Budd as the person who assaulted him. This claim is totally meritless. Deputy Tinkey, on both direct and cross-examination, identified Budd as the one who assaulted Moore. Deputy Oliver did the same. The fact that Moore did not also identify Budd is irrelevant. [13]