Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: shackling during guilt and penalty phases

Text: The court ordered Clark to appear in shackles on the first day of voir dire. He was not shackled for the remainder of the guilt phase but was again shackled when the verdict was read, and throughout the special sentencing proceeding. Clark claims this restraint violated his rights to a fair trial and sentencing, and constituted an impermissible judicial comment on the evidence. Without reaching the question of whether the shackling was an impermissible judicial comment, we agree that shackling Clark was constitutional error. However, we find the shackling error harmless. Our analysis on this point need go back no further than our decision in State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 842, 975 P.2d 967, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999), where we restated the long-standing rule in this jurisdiction and many others is that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); State v. Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d 383, 635 P.2d 694 (1981); State v. Ollison, 68 Wash.2d 65, 411 P.2d 419 (1966); State v. Sawyer, 60 Wash.2d 83, 371 P.2d 932 (1962); State v. Williams, 18 Wash. 47, 50 P. 580 (1897); State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 226 S.E.2d 353 (1976); Snow v. Oklahoma, 489 F.2d 278 (10th Cir.1973); Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.1973); United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 556 (5th Cir.1973); United States v. Roustio, 455 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.1972); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970); United States v. Thompson, 432 F.2d 997 (4th Cir.1970); United States v. Samuel, 431 F.2d 610 (4th Cir.1970); Loux v. United States, 389 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1968); Blaine v. United States, 136 F.2d 284 (D.C.Cir.1943); People v. Thomas, 1 Mich. App. 118, 134 N.W.2d 352 (1965); Commonwealth v. Brown, 364 Mass. 471, 305 N.E.2d 830 (1973); State v. Borman, 529 S.W.2d 192 (Mo.Ct.App.1975); State v. Roberts, 86 N.J.Super. 159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965); French v. State, 377 P.2d 501 (Okla.Crim.App.1962); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 226 Pa.Super. 241, 311 A.2d 691 (1973); Thompson v. State, 514 S.W.2d 275 (Tex.Crim.App.1974); Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis.2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776 (1965). This rule is to ensure a fair and impartial trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3, and article I, section 22, of the Washington Constitution. See Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 567, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 398, 635 P.2d 694. In Finch we explained: A trial judge must exercise discretion in determining the extent to which courtroom security measures are necessary to maintain order and prevent injury. That discretion must be founded upon a factual basis set forth in the record. A broad general policy of imposing physical restraints upon prison inmates charged with new offenses because they may be `potentially dangerous' is a failure to exercise discretion. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 846, 975 P.2d 967 (quoting Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 400, 635 P.2d 694). Furthermore this court and courts of other jurisdictions have universally held that restraints should `be used only when necessary to prevent injury to those in the courtroom, to prevent disorderly conduct at trial, or to prevent an escape.' Id. (quoting Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d at 398, 635 P.2d 694). Finch was shackled during the entire trial and special sentencing proceeding, and was further restrained during certain witness testimony by use of handcuffs. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 850, 975 P.2d 967. The trial court's reasoning was based on Finch's large size and threatening remarks he had made with respect to certain witnesseswitnesses during whose testimony he was further restrained by handcuffs. Id. at 850-52, 975 P.2d 967. Contrary to the trial court's reasoning, we thought, was the fact that Finch had no history of violence or escape in custody, and observed courtroom decorum while appearing for many pretrial hearings. Id. at 852, 975 P.2d 967. As the trial judge made no finding that Finch was an escape risk, an imminent threat to those in the courtroom, or that he was a disruptive presence, we found his shackling during the trial and sentencing to be an abuse of discretion a clear error. Id. at 862, 975 P.2d 967. Here, Clark was shackled when entering the jury auditorium on the first day of voir dire, in front of the entire jury venire. Despite defense counsel's objection, the trial court found the jury venire would not be able to see Clark actually in shackles. However we think it clear, as we did in Finch, that the jury could infer shackling from Clark's stilted and restrained movement. The jury could observe the impact of the restraints because the Defendant's walk was slow, his stride obviously shortened. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 858, 975 P.2d 967. [4] Here, the court overruled counsel's objection without entering any findings or making any statements that would lead us to believe he considered shackling an impelling necessity or whether there were less restrictive means of achieving whatever result was desired by the shackling. The state concedes the trial court went through no individualized assessment of the need for shackling. Br. of Resp't at 88. The state directs us to no evidence in the record, nor do we find any, that would imply Clark posed a threat of violence, escape, or disruption. Nor was there evidence of anything other than decorous behavior during pretrial hearings. Therefore the logic of Finch leads us to conclude Clark's shackling at points during the guilt phase was constitutional error and therefore presumptively prejudicial. With respect to the shackling on the day the verdict was returned, and throughout the special sentencing proceeding, Finch again controls. Like Finch, Clark was shackled throughout the sentencing phase. We found Finch's shackling inherently prejudicial. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 865-66, 975 P.2d 967; see also Duckett, 67 F.3d at 748 (Unlike prison clothes, physical restraints may create the impression in the minds of the jury that the court believes the defendant is a particularly dangerous and violent person. Therefore, in the absence of a compelling need to shackle the defendant during his sentencing hearing, such a practice is inherently prejudicial.); Tyars v. Finner, 709 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir.1983) (when a defendant's level of dangerousness is at issue, it is a violation of due process to force the defendant to appear in restraints); Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1450-51 ([A] jury might view the shackles as first hand evidence of future dangerousness and uncontrollable behavior which if unmanageable in the courtroom may also be unmanageable in prison, leaving death as a proper decision.), opinion withdrawn in part on other grounds on denial of rehearing by 833 F.2d 250 (11th Cir.1987). Applying the analysis of Finch, it follows that here, where no balancing or analysis as to the need to restrain Clark was done, his shackling was constitutional error. However a claim of unconstitutional shackling is subject to a harmless error analysis. Elmore, 139 Wash.2d at 274, 985 P.2d 289 (citing Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 859-62, 975 P.2d 967). The state argues that Clark's shackling was harmless error on each occasion in light of overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The overwhelming evidence in this case is claimed to be the DNA linking Clark to the crime, his lack of a credible alibi, and his efforts to conceal the crime. The test for harmless error is whether the state has overcome the presumption of prejudice when a constitutional right of the defendant is violated when, from an examination of the record, it appears the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Belmarez, 101 Wash.2d 212, 216, 676 P.2d 492 (1984), or whether the evidence against the defendant is so overwhelming that no rational conclusion other than guilt can be reached. State v. Guloy, 104 Wash.2d 412, 425, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). But see United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 516, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (A federal appellate court should not find harmless error merely because it believes that the other evidence is `overwhelming'.... `The crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total setting.') (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-64, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). In the guilt phase, Clark was shackled on the first day of voir dire and the day the verdict was returned, but sat unrestrained in-between. From this, two observations follow. First, Clark was not shackled throughout the two-and-a-half-week trial (unlike Finch, who sat throughout his trial in restraints). Second, the jury had already arrived at its verdict of guilt or innocence prior to the second time they saw Clark shackled. Because the impact of shackling on the presumption of innocence is the overarching constitutional concern, it would logically follow that in the minds of the jurors Clark's shackling on the first day of voir dire was more than logically offset by over two weeks of observing Clark in the courtroom without shackles. See Dennis J. Sweeney, An Analysis of Harmless Error in Washington: A Principled Process, 31 Gonz. L.Rev. 277 (1996) (advocating a theory of harmless error that takes into account the logical connection of a putative error with the outcome of a trial). Furthermore the presumption of innocence was not at stake on the day the verdict was read because the jury had already judged Clark guilty. Therefore we can say Clark's shackling on the first day of voir dire and the day of the verdict was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. As for the harmless error analysis regarding the sentencing phase, on June 13, 2000, we remanded the case for determination of whether it was possible
2. [T]o know the defendant was restrained in any way based on a restriction of his movements by seeing the defendant in motion at any point during the penalty phase? State v. Clark, Order For Remand Hearing (June 13, 2000). The trial court conducted a reference hearing and submitted findings of fact answering both questions in the negative. Id., Findings Of Fact Re: Reference Hearing (Oct. 31, 2000). According to the trial court the jurors were never present when Clark entered or left during the penalty phase, a protective skirt concealed the shackles at counsel table, and Clark never moved from his seat during the penalty phase except to stand for the entry of the judge and jury. Id. In Finch it was `clear that the defendant's movements were restricted,' and clearly possible that the jury could have known that the Defendant was restrained. Finch, 137 Wash.2d at 857, 975 P.2d 967, and id. (quoting RP (Remand Hearing) at 12). Here there appears to be no such possibility. The trial court made sure Clark was not moved in or out of the room in the presence of the jury, both counsel tables had protective skirts, the shackles were taped to eliminate any noise, and the jury never saw Clark in motion during the guilt phase. Clark, Findings Of Fact Re: Reference Hearing at 1-3. Therefore, although Clark's shackling during both the guilt and penalty phases was constitutional error because no appropriate individualized assessment took place, we find he was not prejudiced and hold the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.