Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assessment of Defendant's Culpability

Text: The first step in comparing defendant's case to the similar cases is an evaluation of defendant's own culpability. This assessment requires us to examine three elements: (1) defendant's moral blameworthiness; (2) the degree of victimization; and (3) defendant's character. See DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 203, 662 A. 2d 442; Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 74-75, 651 A. 2d 949; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 366, 645 A. 2d 685. In determining defendant's culpability, we consider objective criteria derived from both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating and mitigating factors. Marshall II, supra , 130 N.J. at 159, 613 A. 2d 1059. These criteria are rooted in traditional sentencing guidelines, were clearly presented to the sentencing jury, and are likely to influence a jury's sentencing decision, Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 368, 645 A. 2d 685. Also, when considering the catch-all mitigating factor, we recognize that defendant's jury may have rejected a specific mitigating factor, but nevertheless been influenced by the evidence presented in support of that mitigating factor. DiFrisco III, supra, 142 N.J. at 185, 662 A. 2d 442; Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 368, 645 A. 2d 685.
To determine defendant's moral blameworthiness, we examine such characteristics as motive, premeditation, justification or excuse, evidence of mental defect or disturbance, knowledge of helplessness of the victim, defendant's age or maturity level, and defendant's involvement in planning the murder. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 155, 613 A. 2d 1059. Defendant's motive for his murder of Gary Marsh is clear: to steal money from the gas station and, as the jury found, to escape detection and punishment for his crime. Whether the murder of Gary Marsh was premeditated for any length of time is less clear. Although the Public Defender admits that the robbery was carefully planned and premeditated, the fact that a face mask was found in defendant's car and that defendant drove many miles from home to commit the crime may suggest that he originally intended to disguise his identity and thus escape detection in that way. There is no evidence of any justification or excuse for defendant's crime, nor is there any evidence of provocation on the part of the victim. As we noted in Loftin I, defendant presented no evidence of a struggle or an accidental discharge .... [or] that Marsh might have done something to provoke defendant. 146 N.J. at 353, 680 A. 2d 677. Evidence was presented by the defense psychologist that defendant had a borderline personality disorder, and one juror found that the c(5)(a) mitigating factor (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) was present. In addition, three jurors found the catch-all mitigating circumstance that defendant was under the influence of mental and emotional pressure at the time the crime was committed. However, the State's expert concluded that defendant exhibited narcissistic and antisocial personality traits and not a borderline personality disorder. Defendant was clearly aware of the helplessness of the victim. Defendant was armed, there was no indication Gary Marsh had any weapon, and they were in an isolated area very late at night. However, because defendant did not know Marsh, and there were no other persons present during the murder, defendant cannot be presumed to have specific knowledge of the effects of the murder on any nondecedent victims. But see State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 46, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996) (While a defendant might be unaware of the specific characteristics of his victim or of the particular survivors that the victim will leave behind, it is completely foreseeable that the killing will eliminate a unique person and destroy a web of familial relationships.). Although defendant was only twenty-six at the time of the murder, and two jurors found that his age should be considered a mitigating factor, the State correctly points out that defendant lived as an adult with adult responsibilities, i.e., he was married with two children, owned a home, and had served in the United States Navy. Finally, it is clear that defendant was alone in planning the murder and that, whether or not the murder itself was premeditated, the underlying felony, the robbery, was meticulously planned ahead of time.
The characteristics to be examined in determining the degree of victimization include the violence and brutality of the murder and the injury to nondecedent victims. Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 155, 613 A. 2d 1059. In comparison to other murder cases we have examined, this was not a particularly violent or brutal killing. Aside from the gunshot wound that killed him, there is no evidence of any other type of assault on Marsh by defendant. Indeed, as we noted in Loftin I, the killing was performed almost execution-style, 146 N.J. at 387, 680 A. 2d 677, in that Marsh was shot in the head at close range, id. at 353, 680 A. 2d 677. Marsh was, however, undoubtedly terrorized by defendant and in fear for his life from the time he was confronted by defendant until the time he was shot.
Finally, in determining the character of defendant we examine defendant's prior record, whether defendant has committed other unrelated acts of violence, whether defendant cooperated with authorities, defendant's remorse, and his capacity for rehabilitation. Although, as three jurors found, defendant led a crime-free existence for the first twenty-five years of his life, defendant had committed a prior murder only five weeks before the murder of Gary Marsh. Thus, the jury unanimously found that the c(4)(a) prior murder aggravating factor was present. As we have noted, a two-time murderer is among the most blameworthy of defendants. Bey IV, supra, 137 N.J. at 367, 645 A. 2d 685. In addition, the jury heard evidence that defendant had struck his wife and their young children. There is no evidence that defendant cooperated in any way with authorities, although the defense psychologist testified that defendant has the capacity for rehabilitation within a prison setting. Finally, although defendant expressed remorse for his crime when he spoke with the defense and the state psychologists, and when he addressed the jury during his allocution, he also wrote that his mistake was being incarcerated, not that he had killed two human beings. The jury unanimously rejected the catch-all mitigating circumstance that defendant has sincere and heartfelt remorse.