Opinion ID: 2634887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bad Faith Witness Endorsements

Text: The majority holds that the trial court, when it disqualified the district attorney's office, abused its discretion in taking into account the prosecution's witness endorsements for the penalty phase of the capital trial. Maj. op. at 1233. The trial court found that the prosecution endorsed eighty inmate witnesses without any basis in fact for believing that these witnesses would testify consistently with the description of their testimony provided by the prosecutors. The trial court found that the listing of these witnesses was not in good faith, and that the endorsement was compiled as a shotgun effort by the prosecution. Although I would not find that this conduct is sufficient by itself to disqualify the district attorney's office, it is nonetheless a relevant factor supporting the reasonableness of the court's disqualification order. Section 18-1.3-1201(3)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2008), and Crim. P. 32.1(d)(2) together set forth the special obligation of a prosecutor in a death penalty sentencing hearing to furnish a list of witnesses the prosecutor may call at the hearing within twenty days of the prosecutor's filing of a statement of intention to seek the death penalty. Under the statute and the rule, the prosecutor shall furnish, along with the names of each witness, the witness' address and date of birth, the subject matter of the witness' testimony, and any written or recorded statement of that witness, including notes. Crim. P. 32.1(d)(2); see also § 18-1.3-1201(3)(b)(II). This obligation is separate and distinct from a prosecutor's ordinary discovery obligations under Crim. P. 16(a). It is undisputed that a prosecutor who makes any representation to the court or to opposing counsel must do so in good faith. This fundamental requirement derives from the prosecutor's role as both a minister of justice and an officer of the court. Hence, in the context of a prosecutor's disclosure obligations under section 18-1.3-1201 and Crim. P. 32.1, a prosecutor must disclose witnesses whom she in good faith, with some factual basis for her representation, believes she may call at the penalty phase of the defendant's capital trial. Similarly, the prosecutor shall disclose, among other things, the subject matter of the witness' testimony in good faith with some factual basis for believing that the witness will testify as described. Crim. P. 32.1(d)(2); § 18-1.3-1201(3)(b)(II), C.R.S. In this case, the prosecution endorsed eighty inmate witnesses to testify at Perez's sentencing. The first inmate witness listed by the prosecution in its witness endorsement is Perez himself. Obviously, the prosecution had no good faith basis for representing to both the court and to the defense that the defendant would testify on the People's behalf. In addition, the prosecution endorsed at least one inmate witness who was deceased. As the trial court noted, with the possible exception of five of the endorsed inmate witnesses, the disclosures relating to the substance of the witnesses' expected testimony is virtually identical for all inmate witnesses. The deputy district attorney responsible for assembling the inmate component of the Crim. P. 32.1 endorsement list acknowledged that he had cut and pasted these boilerplate disclosures for each witness. The trial court concluded, while the People have set forth the information that an eye or ear witness may possess, the evidence indicates that in no instance were the People specific with respect to the subject matter to be testified to by any particular inmate. As noted by the trial court, twenty-two of the twenty-six endorsed inmate witnesses who testified in the pre-trial proceedings denied that they ever made statements consistent with the description of their expected testimony set forth in the endorsements. In some instances witnesses denied that they ever talked to an investigator or, despite being endorsed as eye or ear witnesses, denied that they were anywhere near the scene of the murder. The trial court also received as evidence letters from endorsed inmate witnesses stating clearly that they were neither percipient witnesses nor willing to testify in the Perez matter. The testimony of those twenty-two endorsed inmate witnesses was corroborated by the testimony of both the deputy district attorney who prepared the inmate endorsements and the testimony of prosecution investigator Frese. They testified that with respect to all but four of the inmate witnesses, there existed nothing in the discovery, including investigative reports generated by Frese, that supported the representation that the witnesses endorsed would testify in the manner described by the prosecution's endorsements. [17] In its briefing before this court, the prosecution acknowledges that that its representations concerning the subject matter of the inmate witness testimony were not based on statements [the witnesses] had made during the investigation. Finally, the trial court noted that, contrary to the requirements of the statute and the rule, in numerous instances the addresses of witnesses were not provided nor were witness names listed with specificity until the People were ordered to do so. Under section 18-1.3-1201(3)(h), a broad range of sanctions for noncompliance with the endorsement provisions can be imposed at the court's discretion. Notably, the court may enter any order that it deems just under the circumstances. Id. Crim. P. 32.1(d)(8), relating to sanctions for violation of, inter alia, the witness list requirement, contains identical language. The majority cites two of our cases for the proposition that a trial court should impose the least restrictive sanction for discovery violations. Maj. op at 1233 (citing People v. Dist. Court, City & County of Denver, 808 P.2d 831 (Colo.1991), and People v. Dist. Court, Seventeenth Judicial Dist., 793 P.2d 163 (Colo.1990)). However, these cases are inapposite. Both cases dealt with violations of pre-trial discovery under Crim. P. 16, not violations of Crim. P. 32.1 and section 18-1.3-1201, which are special rules applicable only to the penalty phase of a capital case. The requirements of these rules are different, the purposes of these rules are different, and the sanctions imposed by each for violation should be different. Different standards apply when the People seek the death penalty. The majority states that Perez made no showing as to how the defective Crim. P. 32.1 witness endorsements might interfere with his right to a fair trial. Maj. op. at 1233. I disagree. Perez's capable attorneys argued that, as a result of the endorsements made not in good faith, the defense expended unnecessary time and effort investigating these eighty witnesses. The defense team was distracted from preparation of legitimate defense issues in this capital case. Such a needless diversion of the defense's resources compromised the fairness of Perez's trial. Consideration of this inappropriate prosecution conduct by the trial court as support for its order disqualifying the district attorney's office under section 20-1-107 was not manifestly arbitrary, manifestly unreasonable, or manifestly unfair.