Opinion ID: 524995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Generic Overbreadth Versus Substantial Overbreadth Doctrine

Text: 108 Because of the linguistic overlap between thread one and thread two, 9 the district court's use of word overbroad introduces an ambiguity into the district court's opinion. One may read the opinion to be discussing either thread one--generic use of the word overbroad--or thread two--the legal doctrine of substantial overbreadth--or both notions. In Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 962, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 2851-52 n. 13, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984), the Supreme Court discussed this sort of ambiguous use of the word overbroad: 109 The dissenters appear to overlook the fact that overbreadth is not used only to describe the doctrine that allows a litigant whose conduct is unprotected to assert the rights of third parties to challenge a statute, even though as applied to him the statute would be constitutional. E.g. New York v. Ferber, [458 U.S. 747, 768 n. 21, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3360, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) ]. Overbreadth has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts protected First Amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. [citations omitted; cf. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For Vincent, [466 U.S. 789, 797, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) ] (recognizing the validity of a facial challenge but suggesting that it should not be called 'overbreadth') [citations omitted]. 110 Thus, the Supreme Court in Munson recognizes that the words overbroad and overbreadth have been confused but properly should be separated. In City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 797, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984), the Supreme Court articulates two quite different ways by which a court may declare a statute or rule facially invalid. The first reason, which has deep historical roots in constitutional adjudication, is because the statute is unconstitutional in every conceivable application. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2124, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); see City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2143-45, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (4-3 majority opinion; facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers). The second reason for a court to strike down a statute on its face is because the statute seeks to prohibit such a broad range of protected conduct that it is unconstitutionally 'overbroad.'  Vincent, 466 U.S. at 796, 104 S.Ct. at 2124. In Vincent, the Supreme Court also stated, 111 [t]he seminal cases in which the Court held state legislation unconstitutional 'on its face' did not involve any departure from the general rule that a litigant only has standing to vindicate his own constitutional rights. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 51 S.Ct. 532, 73 ALR 1484 (1931), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 82 L.Ed. 949, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938), the statutes were unconstitutional as applied to the defendants' conduct, but they were also unconstitutional on their face, because it was apparent, that any attempt to enforce such legislation would create an unacceptable risk of suppression of ideas. In cases of this character a holding of facial invalidity expresses the conclusion that the statute could never be applied in a valid manner. 112 Vincent, 466 U.S. at 797-98, 104 S.Ct. at 2124 (footnotes omitted); see City of Lakewood, 108 S.Ct. at 2145; Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 1921, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987). 113 The Munson court, after pointing out the ambiguous use of the word overbroad, went on to state that it was on the basis of the latter failing [overbroad because in all applications a statute directly restricts protected First Amendment activity and does not serve a compelling governmental interest] that the Court in Schaumburg [v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980) ] struck down the Village ordinance as unconstitutional. Whether that challenge should be called 'overbreadth' or simply a 'facial' challenge, the point is that there is no reason to limit challenges to case-by-case 'as applied' challenges when the statute on its face and therefore in all its applications falls short of constitutional demands. Munson, 104 S.Ct. at 2852 n. 13 (1984). 114 Under Vincent, Munson and the string of cases they rely upon, if a rule is unconstitutional in all its applications, a plaintiff may challenge the rule as unconstitutional on its face. Under the substantial overbreadth doctrine, a person whose speech may be prohibited constitutionally may nevertheless prevail upon a facial challenge if the statute covers too much speech, and the statute's provisions are unseverable. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915-17, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The extra coverage is determined by examining what hypothetical speakers might say, and determining whether constitutionally protected speech is included within the coverage of the statute. Because one looks at the speech of hypothetical third parties, the substantial overbreadth doctrine is often considered to be a third party standing notion. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 2801, 86 L.Ed.2d 394 (1985). 115 Others quite properly understand the substantial overbreadth doctrine in terms of first party standing. In first party terms, the doctrine is grounded on twin notions: that a litigant's conduct may be regulated only in accordance with a valid rule, Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum.L.Rev. 277, 285 (1984); Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1; and if the rule applies to hypothetically protected areas of speech, the rule must be declared facially unconstitutional if the permissible and impermissible parts of the statute are not severable. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 244 (1988); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-14, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2916-17, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (facial overbreadth not invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute). Severability is the key to understanding the overbreadth doctrine in first party terms. 10 Cases in which a court decides that the statute or rule is unseverable involve, most typically, the decision that, given the nature and range of the act's invalidity, the lawmaker--federal, state, or local--would not want the severed statute to stand, or for federalist reasons, a federal court should not sever the statute. See Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup.Ct.Rev. 1, 10-15. 116