Opinion ID: 670485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: leblanc's appeal

Text: 39 At sentencing, LeBlanc moved for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines based upon his physical condition. LeBlanc suffered his first heart attack in 1981 at the age of 34. After pleading guilty in the instant case, while awaiting sentencing, LeBlanc suffered a second heart attack on March 18, 1993. 40 Prior to the first disposition hearing, LeBlanc submitted a medical report to the court from his own physician, Dr. Solomon A. Gabbay. The report stated that Mr. LeBlanc has a [known] history of coronary artery disease and that Mr. LeBlanc will probably require long term therapy for his cardiac history. Dr. Gabbay concluded: [a]t this point in time I would expect [LeBlanc] to require medicine for the rest of his life. 41 The initial disposition hearing was held on May 20, 1993. The court then continued the hearing and ordered that an independent cardiologist examine LeBlanc, at Government expense, and report the medical findings to the court to determine the extent and seriousness of LeBlanc's cardiac problems. 42 A second disposition hearing was held on June 25, 1993. Pursuant to the court's previous order, LeBlanc had been examined by Dr. Guy L. Reed on June 10, 1993. Dr. Reed issued a report in which he stated that LeBlanc had coronary artery disease. He concluded that LeBlanc's heart disease is likely to be largely controlled with medication but he is also at risk for recurrent myocardial infarction. Because of his coronary artery disease and hypercholesterolemia, he will continue to need ongoing medical care indefinitely with check-ups at 4-6 month intervals. 43 After reviewing Dr. Reed's report, the court refused to grant LeBlanc a downward departure based on health reasons. The court stated: 44 I don't read this report as being one that would even permit me, let alone persuade me, to go beyond the guidelines. 45 Now, I would put it in those terms; because, if I am wrong, then you can appeal that. In other words, I determine that this report, which we will mark as a Court Exhibit, does not permit me, or there is nothing here that would permit me to go below the guidelines. If I am wrong as a matter of law, you can appeal it, and you can come back and we will re-sentence him.
46 As a general rule, a district court's refusal to grant a downward departure is not appealable. United States v. Lombardi, 5 F.3d 568, 571 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Hilton, 946 F.2d 955, 957 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Romolo, 937 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir.1991). Appellate jurisdiction does attach, however, where the sentencing court's decision not to depart is based on the court's mistaken view that it lacks the legal authority to consider a departure. Hilton, 946 F.2d at 957 (quoting Romolo, 937 F.2d at 22). Thus, in order to have jurisdiction, we must conclude that the district court misunderstood its authority to depart under the guidelines. United States v. DiIorio, 948 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1991). If we find that the court understood its power to depart, but refused to exercise that power, we lack jurisdiction to consider the appeal. Id. In fact, the district court acknowledged our ability to review its decision when the court stated that it lacked the legal authority to depart based upon the circumstances presented to it, and that LeBlanc could appeal this determination if the court was wrong as a matter of law. 47 We believe that based upon the record, the district court fully understood its ability to depart under the guidelines, but found that it was unable to do so under the facts of this case. LeBlanc contends that the district court erroneously concluded that it was forbidden by the guidelines to consider his heart condition as a basis for departure. We do not agree. At the first disposition hearing, LeBlanc moved for a downward departure based on his heart condition and presented supporting evidence from his physician, Dr. Gabbay. The court then continued the hearing and ordered the parties to have a court appointed physician examine LeBlanc to determine the severity of his heart condition. If the court had believed that a downward departure was forbidden, it would not have required the parties to engage in the useless exercise of obtaining an independent physician's opinion. Thus, the court considered the possibility that LeBlanc's heart condition warranted a downward departure, but after reviewing the facts, found that his condition was not serious enough to justify such a departure. 48 The court correctly understood that a departure for medical reasons was discouraged by the guidelines. Departures based upon health problems are discouraged and can only be justified if the medical problems are present in unusual kind or degree. Rivera, 994 F.2d at 948. U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.4 states in pertinent part: 49 Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range.... 50 Based upon the facts presented to it at sentencing, the district court did not believe that LeBlanc's heart condition presented an extraordinary physical impairment within the meaning of U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.4 that would permit the court to depart, much less persuade it to do so, under the Guidelines. LeBlanc suffers from a heart condition. Both Dr. Gabbay and Dr. Reed stated, however, that LeBlanc's heart condition could be treated with medicine. There was no indication in either physicians' medical report that LeBlanc's life would be threatened or shortened by virtue of being incarcerated. Additionally, there was no evidence that the Bureau of Prisons would be unable to adequately accommodate LeBlanc's medical needs. 51 There was nothing in the record which indicated that the sentencing court was mistaken about its power to depart downward. Rather, the court fully understood its departure ability, but concluded that U.S.S.G. Sec. 5H1.4 simply did not permit departure under the circumstances. This was a judgment call which was supported by the record. As such, the court's departure decision is not reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., DiIorio, 948 F.2d at 9. 52 For the foregoing reasons, with respect to the Government's appeals, we vacate the sentences of LeBlanc and Weinstein, and remand the case to the district court for resentencing. With respect to LeBlanc's cross-appeal, the appeal is dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction.