Opinion ID: 737483
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable Discretion Under FOIA

Text: 17 Both sides acknowledge on appeal that the district court lacked authority to deny a FOIA request on the first ground on which it relied--equitable discretion. We agree. We reserved this question in Hardy, 631 F.2d at 655 & n. 1, but the answer is clear. FOIA itself states that it does not authorize withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated. 5 U.S.C. § 552(d). In enacting FOIA, Congress created a scheme of categorical exclusion; it did not invite a judicial weighing of the benefits and evils of disclosure on a case-by-case basis. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 2064, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982). We have held, in the converse of the present case, that a district court lacks inherent authority to require disclosure of materials that are exempt under FOIA. Spurlock v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir.1995). In doing so, we flatly rejected the argument that the broad discretion of the federal courts to fashion remedies enabled the district court to require the disclosure of exempt materials: Congress provided a comprehensive scheme under FOIA specifying when governmental disclosure is required. The Supreme Court has held this scheme to be 'explicitly exclusive.'  Id. at 1017 (quoting Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 151, 109 S.Ct. at 2851-52) (citations omitted). 18 The notion that a district court may exempt materials that do not fall within one of FOIA's nine enumerated exemptions runs contrary not only to the fact that the exemptions are explicitly exclusive, Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. at 151, 109 S.Ct. at 2851 (quoting FAA Administrator v. Robertson, 422 U.S. at 262, 95 S.Ct. at 2146), but also to the unmistakable intent of Congress: Congress sought to insulate its product from judicial tampering and to preserve the emphasis on disclosure by admonishing that the 'availability of records to the public' is not limited, 'except as specifically stated.'  Id. (quoting Abramson, 456 U.S. at 642, 102 S.Ct. at 2070 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) (emphasis in Abramson ). Moreover, as the government itself points out, the notion that courts may exercise equitable discretion in FOIA cases runs entirely contrary to Congress' 'intent to provide 'workable' rules of FOIA disclosure.'  Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 779, 109 S.Ct. at 1485 (quoting FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27-28, 103 S.Ct. 2209, 2214-15, 76 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983)). As the Court has noted, Congress has repeated[ly] reject[ed] any interpretation of the FOIA which would allow an agency to withhold information on the basis of some vague 'public interest' standard. Federal Open Market Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354, 99 S.Ct. 2800, 2809, 61 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979). We conclude that a district court lacks inherent power, equitable or otherwise, to exempt materials that FOIA itself does not exempt. To put it simply, FOIA provides a right to disclosure if the information is not exempt. Spurlock, 69 F.3d at 1017. 4 19