Opinion ID: 1642534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Eligibility and Timeliness of the Appeal

Text: The plaintiffs have moved to dismiss the appeal based on two arguments: (1) that the trial court granted Bowater's motionto the letter and [i]t is well settled that a party cannot appeal from a favorable decision, citing Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 535 U.S. 682, 684, 122 S.Ct. 1780, 152 L.Ed.2d 911 (2002), and Davis v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 335 So.2d 688, 690 (Ala. Civ.App.1976); and (2) that the appeal was untimely. The plaintiffs' favorable ruling theory is that Bowater's motion to compel arbitration contained only the simple request that the court enter an order compelling Plaintiffs to submit their claims to arbitration and staying all proceedings pending the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings and that the trial court's order gave Bowater exactly what it asked for. We cannot agree with this analysis. As noted above, Bowater explained to the trial court in its various submissions, including its original memorandum brief and its reply brief, that it sought to have arbitration compelled in accordance with the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement, which specifically required that the arbitrators chosen by the parties be members of at least 20 years standing in the Society of American Foresters. In particular, before the trial court entered its order compelling arbitration, Bowater had presented extensive argument, supported by citations to federal and state statutory law and caselaw, in opposition to the plaintiffs' contention that the arbitrators had to be Alabama attorneys. The trial court's order of September 17, 2003, noting that the court had reviewed the briefs of the parties, leaves no doubt that the court understood the positions of the parties and was simply refusing to enforce the provision of the arbitration agreement concerning the qualifications of the arbitrators, based on the court's conclusion that the arbitrators had to be duly licensed attorneys. That such a deviation from the terms of the arbitration provision would be prejudicial is clearly recognized by our caselaw: McDonald v. H & S Homes L.L.C., 853 So.2d 920 (Ala.2003), and BankAmerica Housing Servs. v. Lee, 833 So.2d 609 (Ala.2002). Therefore, Bowater's appeal is not due to be rejected as being from a favorable ruling. The plaintiffs timeliness argument is based upon the fact that Bowater filed its notice of appeal 48 days after the trial court entered its order compelling arbitration. The plaintiffs rightly point out that the timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional ( Gold Kist, Inc. v. Tedder, 580 So.2d 1321, 1323 (Ala.1991)) and that Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., requires that, [e]xcept as otherwise provided herein, a notice of appeal must be filed within 42 days of the date of the entry of the judgment or order appealed from, unless the 42-day period is extended pursuant to Rule 77(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. Bowater argues that the pendency of its Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to alter, amend, or vacate a portion of the September 17 order tolled the time for taking an appeal under Rule 4(a)(3), which provides, in pertinent part, that [t]he filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rules 50, 52, 55, or 59 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure . . . shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. The plaintiffs counter that before subdivision (a)(3) comes into play, one encounters the directive in subdivision (a)(1): For an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration, see Rule 4(d). As the plaintiffs read Rule 4, [t]he reader is specifically and unequivocally instructed to proceed directly to Section 4(d), effectively bypassing (a)(3); and subdivision (d), which the plaintiffs say exclusively sets forth the procedure for an appeal from an arbitration order, states that an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration must be taken within 42 days (6 weeks) of the date of the entry of the order, subject to any extension allowed pursuant to Rule 77(d), Ala. R. Civ. P. The plaintiffs rely on the recent holding by this Court in Ex parte Troutman Sanders, LLP, 866 So.2d 547 (Ala.2003), for their further argument that because an order granting arbitration must be regarded as an interlocutory order, Bowater's Rule 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, which cannot apply to interlocutory orders, was unavailing as a tolling mechanism. It is true that before this Court adopted Rule 4(d), effective October 1, 2001 (see this Court's order appearing at page XIV of that volume of the Alabama Reporter containing 783-788 So.2d), this Court reviewed an order compelling arbitration by entertaining a mandamus petition, but it accepted an appeal as a matter of right from an order denying arbitration. Jack Ingram Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 768 So.2d 362, 365 (Ala.1999). The Court became increasingly concerned about the disparities created by those differing standards of review, however, and invited its Standing Committee on the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure to draft and propose procedures for [this Court's] adoption procedures for appellate review of orders either compelling or denying arbitration. 768 So.2d at 366. The Court suggested that [a] new subparagraph of Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.App. P., treating all such orders as being appealable as of right, within a stated time period, would assure that both sides to an arbitration controversy could come to this Court subject to the same standards of review and that both sides would be bound by the same principles of finality. Id. As noted, this Court ultimately amended Rule 4(a)(1) to refer the reader to Rule 4(d) for the procedure governing an appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to compel arbitration and subsection (d) now evenhandedly states that both an order granting and an order denying a motion to compel arbitration are appealable as a matter of right within 42 days from date of the entry of the order. The finality of the order is thus assured, because failure to take an appeal from it within the 42-day time period forecloses later appellate review. Ex parte Roberson, 749 So.2d 441 (Ala.1999). At one point, this Court reviewed orders denying or granting motions to compel arbitration by way of petition for a writ of mandamus. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Clark, 558 So.2d 358, 360 (Ala.1990). After Congress amended the FAA to allow an appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration, this Court concluded that it similarly would recognize an appeal as the proper procedure by which to challenge a denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Id. The Court acknowledged, however, that [a]n order denying arbitration has always been considered an interlocutory order and [the amendment to the FAA] does nothing to alter the nature of the order as non-final. Id. at 361. Nonetheless, the Court deemed the 42-day period for taking an appeal prescribed by Rule 4, Ala. R.App. P., as the appropriate time limit to apply to appeals from an order denying a motion to compel arbitration. In Ex parte Roberson a plurality of this Court opined: While the denial of a motion to compel arbitration ... may not fit neatly within the categories of `interlocutory' and `final' orders, this Court has held. . . that such an order is appealable, but only within the 42-day time limit. 749 So.2d at 447. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cobb, 717 So.2d 355 (Ala.1998), we had held: The trial court denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration on December 10, 1996. The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is an appealable order, and the defendants had 42 days in which to appeal. A.G. Edwards and Sons v. Clark, 558 So.2d 358 (Ala.1990). However, on December 27, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the order, pursuant to Rule 59(e), Ala.R.Civ.P., and the running of the 42-day appeal period was suspended pending the trial court's ruling on that motion. Rule 4(a)(3), Ala.R.App.P.; Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Insurance Co. v. Boswell, 430 So.2d 426, 428 (Ala.1983). 717 So.2d at 356 (emphasis supplied). The Roberson plurality noted that this Court had held in Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co., 765 So.2d 649 (Ala.1998), that an appealable order entered by a trial court is a `judgment.' Justice Houston, writing for the Court, held that Mutual Savings could appeal the grant of a new trial and stated that `Rule 54(a)... defines a judgment as including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.' [765] So.2d at [650]. In Mutual Savings, the Court [held] that, because § 12-22-10, Ala.Code 1975, provides for the right to appeal from a circuit court's order granting or denying a motion for new trial, such an order constitutes a `judgment,' and a timely filed `motion to reconsider' (construed as a Rule 59(e) motion to alter, to amend, or to vacate) tolls the time for appeal. 749 So.2d at 448 (emphasis added). Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. is significant by analogy to our present analysis, for the following reasons: Ala.Code 1975, § 12-22-10, provides that [e]ither party in a civil case, or a defendant in a criminal case, may appeal to the appropriate appellate court from an order granting or refusing a motion for a new trial by the circuit court. Before the predecessor to that Code section was enacted in 1891, there was no right to appeal from a ruling of the circuit court either granting or refusing to grant a new trial. Trammell v. Vane Calvert & Co., 62 Ala. 301 (1878); Johnson v. State, 87 Ala. 39, 6 So. 400 (1889); Walker v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87 (1891); and Cobb v. Malone, 92 Ala. 630, 9 So. 738 (1891). Therefore, the Code section is the sole authorization of an appeal from judgments granting or refusing a new trial. Drennen Motor Co. v. Patrick, 225 Ala. 36, 37, 141 So. 681, 682 (1932). Such orders were accorded only interlocutory status before the statute provided a right of appeal from them. In Ex parte Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, pursuant to Rule 59(a), Ala. R. Civ. P. Within 30 days thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate, which the trial court never ruled on. Within 42 days of the 90th day following the filing of that motion, the defendant filed its notice of appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. This Court granted certiorari review and concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals had erred in holding that the appeal was untimely. As [the defendant] correctly points out, the September 23, 1996, order granting Smith a new trial was a new `judgment' within the meaning of our Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rule 54(a), which defines a `judgment' as including `a decree and any order from which an appeal lies.' See, also, § 12-22-10, which provides that `[e]ither party in a civil case ... may appeal to the appropriate appellate court from an order granting or refusing a motion for a new trial by the circuit court.' A party may challenge an adverse judgment by filing, within 30 days of its entry, a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment, pursuant to Rule 59(e). A timely filed Rule 59(e) motion suspends the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. Rule 4(a)(3), Ala.R.App.P. An examination of [the defendant's] October 22, 1996, motion, although styled as one to `reconsider,' clearly reveals that it was a Rule 59(e) motion. This Court looks to the essence of a motion, not just to its title, to determine how the motion should be treated under our Rules of Civil Procedure. Ex parte Alfa Mutual General Ins. Co., 684 So.2d 1281 (Ala.1996). We conclude that [the defendant's] October 22, 1996, motion, being a Rule 59(e) motion, suspended the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal, until that motion was denied by operation of law after 90 days, pursuant to Rule 59.1, Ala.R.Civ.P. Because [the defendant] filed its notice of appeal within 42 days after the denial of its motion, its appeal was timely. 765 So.2d at 650. Thus, because the statute created a right of appeal from an order granting or refusing a motion for a new trial and because Rule 54(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., defines a judgment as including a decree and any order from which an appeal lies, a motion to alter, amend, or vacate made pursuant to Rule 59(e) served to toll the running of the time for appeal as to an order that, before the enactment of the statute, would not have been deemed to be final and appealable. The interaction between Rules 54(a) and 59(e), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P., is therefore recognized: 54(a) provides that `[j]udgment' as used in these rules includes a decree or any order from which an appeal lies (emphasis supplied). Rule 59(e) provides that [a] motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment shall be filed not later than thirty (30) days after entry of the judgment  (emphasis supplied). Rule 4(a)(3) provides that the timely filing of a post-judgment motion pursuant to Rule[]... 59 [Ala. R. Civ. P.] shall suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal (emphasis supplied). In Troutman Sanders, we held: By its express terms, Rule 59(e) applies only where there is a `judgment.' That term is specifically defined in Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(a) as `a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. ' (Emphasis added.) Rule 59 does not apply to interlocutory orders, because such orders remain `within the breast of the court.' 866 So.2d at 549-50. As noted, an order granting or denying arbitration is no longer interlocutory in the sense that it remains within the breast of the court subject to revision at any time before final judgment, because it is now established that unless an appeal is timely taken from the order, the order is final. As the plaintiffs properly note in their brief to this Court, this Court has declared that it is its duty to notice the filing date and dismiss the appeal upon [its] own motion when the notice of appeal is not filed with the trial court within the prescribed time. Stewart v. Younger, 375 So.2d 428, 428 (Ala.1979). This Court more recently stated that `[i]t is the duty of this Court to take notice of the filing date of an appeal and, if finding the appeal to be untimely, to dismiss it ex mero motu.' Bagley v. Mazda Motor Corp., 864 So.2d 301, 317 (Ala.2003) (quoting Lewis v. State, 463 So.2d 154, 155 (Ala.1985)). Further, the construction of rules of court are for the court which promulgated them. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 281 Ala. 111, 115, 199 So.2d 653, 656 (1967). See also Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So. 909 (Ala.2004). Accordingly, it is instructive to consider this Court's implicit recognition of the appeals filed in the following cases as timely: In McDonald v. H & S Homes, supra, comparing the dates of events stated in the opinion and consulting the record as to other pertinent dates, we find that the appeal in that case, from an order directing the parties to select an arbitrator in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the arbitration provision, would have been one day late (i.e., filed on the 43d day after that order) but for the intervening filing and denial by the aggrieved party, later the appellant, of a Rule 59(e) motion asking the trial court to alter, amend, or vacate that order. Likewise, in Anderson v. Ashby, 873 So.2d 168 (Ala.2003), the Court denied the defendants' motion to compel arbitration on January 22, 2002, and on February 20, 2002, the defendants moved, pursuant to Rule 59(e), to alter, amend, or vacate that order. The trial court denied that motion on May 8, 2002, and the subsequent appeal was accepted as timely, which it would not have been but for the tolling effect of the intervening Rule 59(e) motion. We hold that Bowater's Rule 59(e) motion to alter, amend, or vacate that portion of the trial court's September 17, 2003, order requiring that the arbitrators be duly licensed attorneys served, under Rule 4(a)(3), Ala. R.App. P., to suspend the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal from that order. Because, under Rule 4(d) Bowater was entitled to appeal the trial court's order as a matter of right, the order was due recognition as a judgment under Rule 54(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 59(e) is operative with respect to a judgment. Therefore, Bowater's appeal was timely and the motion to dismiss that appeal is denied.