Opinion ID: 2450547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Does the absence of direction in K.S.A. 3-307e render it unconstitutionally vague?

Text: The landowners also place a different spin on the lack of procedural and substantive detail in K.S.A. 3-307e and argue for the first time on appeal that K.S.A. 3-307e is unconstitutional in that it (1) does not provide standards of conduct to govern the County's authority to approve or disapprove the City's rezoning efforts and (2) contains an unlawful delegation of legislative powers. Generally, issues not raised before a district court, including constitutional grounds for reversal, cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Trotter v. State, 288 Kan. 112, 124, 200 P.3d 1236 (2009); Miller v. Bartle, 283 Kan. 108, 119, 150 P.3d 1282 (2007). Three exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, however. They are: (1) The newly asserted claim involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the claim is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights; and (3) the district court is right for the wrong reason. State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 159, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008). See Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, 80-81, 434 P.2d 858 (1967). The landowners argue this case falls within the first and second exceptions because the issue involves solely a question of law and relates to a fundamental right. While the question is one of law, it is not determinative of the case because there is no legal basis for the argument. See Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 160, 194 P.3d 1195 (`[T]o serve the ends of justice or to prevent the denial of fundamental rights, it follows that, on consideration, we must find reversible error occurred.'). As we have discussed, while K.S.A. 3-307e does not answer all of the points raised by the landowners, other applicable statutes fill in the gaps. Further, the landowners do not explain the fundamental right that is at issue, especially when previous Kansas cases analyzing vagueness questions have focused on criminal and regulatory statutes. See, e.g., Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 243, 834 P.2d 368 (1992) (relying on Guardian Title Co. v. Bell, 248 Kan. 146, 805 P.2d 33 [1991], and discussing existence of two vagueness analyses, criminal and business; statutes regulating business afforded greater leeway). K.S.A. 3-307e does not squarely fit into either exception.