Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecutor's Penalty Phase Argument

Text: (51a) Defendant next argues reversal of his death sentence is required because the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in his argument to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial. Specifically, defendant argues the prosecutor wrongfully and repeatedly urged the jury to sentence defendant to death on the basis of an alleged lack of remorse, inappropriately appealed to the fears of the community in urging a verdict of death, wrongly implied in his argument that only evidence relating to the crime itself could be mitigating and improperly vouched for a government witness. [8] Defendant's arguments respecting prosecutorial misconduct rely primarily on mischaracterizations of the prosecutor's comments. First, defendant contends the prosecutor wrongfully and repeatedly urged the jury to sentence defendant to death because he lacked remorse. Defendant argues the prosecution in essence urged the jury to penalize defendant for failing to take the stand and confess his guilt. In fact, the prosecution did not specifically argue lack of remorse as a factor in aggravation of penalty. The record reveals no prosecutorial reference linking remorse (or its lack) and aggravation. [9] Having reviewed the relevant portions of the record, we agree with the People that the specific prosecutorial statements cited by defendant (Where is the remorse?  Did you see any remorse?  [H]ave you seen the remorse?) were simply comment on the absence of remorse as a mitigating factor, such as we repeatedly have held proper. (See, e.g., People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 464-465 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992].) In People v. Sims we considered prosecutorial remarks similar to those defendant complains of here, observing that, [a]lthough a defendant's lack of remorse may not be considered by the jury as a factor in aggravation, defendant's prosecutor did not describe the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor. ( People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 465.) We found no misconduct. ( Ibid. ) In any event, defendant did not object at trial to the prosecutor's arguments respecting defendant's lack of remorse. Accordingly, defendant is deemed to have waived his right to raise on appeal any misconduct claim based on those arguments. ( People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 465.) (52) Defendant suggests he adequately preserved a prosecutorial misconduct claim by objecting in the context of a motion for new trial. We are not persuaded. The primary purpose of the requirement that a defendant object at trial to argument constituting prosecutorial misconduct is to give the trial court an opportunity, through admonition of the jury, to correct any error and mitigate any prejudice. (See People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1051.) Obviously, that purpose can be served only if defendant is required to, and does, raise any objection before the jury retires. Defendant offers no authority for his implied suggestion that subsequent arguments in a motion for new trial may substitute for a timely objection. (51b) Second, defendant contends the prosecutor wrongly appealed to the fears of the community in urging a verdict of death. Specifically, defendant complains of the prosecutor's arguing: How many nights do children go to parks in South Central Los Angeles, talk and gather in Torrance, Redondo Beach, Hermosa Beach. Throughout the city. At those times that they go to that park, do they expect to die? Well, death came on June 16, 1981, and it came in the persona of the defendant. A jury much like yourself found that to be a fact. Defendant argues that these remarks encouraged the jurors to view defendant, not as an individual accused of a particular crime, but as the embodiment of all of their fears for their children's safety. Any misconduct claim was waived. We have repeatedly held that failure to object and request an admonition waives a misconduct claim on appeal unless an objection would have been futile or an admonition ineffective. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 159.) Defendant does not dispute that his trial counsel failed either to object, or to request an admonition, when the prosecutor made his remarks. Defendant, citing People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at page 440, insists the prosecutor's argument respecting children visiting parks at night was so emotional and inflammatory that an objection would have been ineffective; thus, his failure to object may not be deemed a waiver of the present claim. We discern no aspect or quality of the cited remarks that must have called forth from defendant's jury an emotional response impervious to a timely, curative admonition. Defendant fails to demonstrate the contrary; accordingly, we agree with the People that any misconduct claim must be deemed waived. (Cf. People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 66 [47 Cal. Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129].) [10] Even had defendant preserved the right to advance on appeal a misconduct claim based on the prosecutor's remarks about children visiting parks at night, we are not persuaded such a claim would have merit. Defendant compares the prosecutor's comments to those a dissenting Eleventh Circuit justice, writing in a habeas corpus matter, thought so inflammatory as to suggest that they were intended to appeal to the jury's generalized fear of violence. ( Brooks v. Kemp (11th Cir.1985) 762 F.2d 1383, 1430 (dis. opn. of Johnson, J.), remanded 478 U.S. 1016 [106 S.Ct. 3325, 92 L.Ed.2d 732].) In Brooks, the prosecutor argued: `It was Mrs. Galloway's daughter this time, Bobby Murray's girl friend; whose girl friend or daughter will it be next time ...?' (762 F.2d at p. 1430.) The majority of the court, however, found the prosecutor's comments to be appropriate inferences from the record. (762 F.2d at pp. 1429, 1430.) We view similarly the remarks made by defendant's prosecutor. Even if the prosecutor's remarks about children visiting parks at night were improper appeals to juror emotions, and even if defendant had not waived any misconduct claim based on them, we could not conclude they prejudiced defendant. [I]n People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 361 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680], ... we found ... no prejudice, when the prosecutor unmistakably appealed to the sympathy of the jury, asking them to `think of yourself as [the victim].' ( People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 527.) In People v. Sanders we held, even if the prosecutor's brief and relatively bland references to `victims, their loved ones' and `survivors' constituted misconduct, it was ... not prejudicial. ( Ibid. ) Similarly, here, defendant fails to demonstrate the prosecutor's single reference to children visiting parks throughout the city prejudiced his penalty jury. Third, defendant contends the prosecutor wrongly implied that only evidence relating to the crime itself could be mitigating. He cites the following words: Do you really believe things have been brought forward to you during the defense case that takes any severity away from the murder of Don Billingsley? Takes anything away from your verdict on Jerome Dunn? Takes anything away from what happened in 1980 from the shooting of Patricia Lewis' house in 1983? And he grasps at straws in the hopes to tangle one of your hearts for sympathy. We agree with the People that the prosecutor's argument does not imply any improper limitation on what evidence the jury could consider as mitigating. Rather, the gist of the prosecutor's remarks was that, while mitigating evidence was in fact presented for the jury's consideration, it should not persuade them. There was no misconduct. In any event, defendant fails to demonstrate prejudice. The jury was instructed to consider anything related to defendant's background or character offered by the defense in mitigation of penalty, and we presume they followed their instructions. Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for prosecution witness Arthur Cox, who testified, among other things, about defendant's involvement in the Green Meadow Park shooting. Defendant claims, specifically, that improper vouching occurred when the prosecutor stated that Cox had cut a deal with the prosecution, agreeing to testify truthfully and honestly in return for being allowed to plead guilty to robbery on certain charges pending against him. Defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks, and thereby waived his objection on appeal. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) Moreover, even assuming the claim was preserved, we discern no error. (53a) Impermissible `vouching' may occur where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity or suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 211.) The People acknowledge it is improper for a prosecutor to argue that he has a superior knowledge of sources unavailable to the jury ( People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 212-213 [152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396]), but deny the prosecutor stated or implied any such thing. (51c) There was no error in the prosecutor's faithfully recounting the nature of the prosecution's agreement with Cox as an aid to the jury's evaluation of his credibility. (53b) Prosecutorial assurances, based on the record, regarding the apparent honesty or reliability of prosecution witnesses, cannot be characterized as improper `vouching,' which usually involves an attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts outside the record. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 757, original italics.) No impermissible vouching occurs where the prosecutor properly relie[s] on facts of record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief. ( Ibid., citing People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 479 [276 Cal. Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107] and People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1059 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756].) In light of the preceding, we conclude defendant has failed to demonstrate a valid misconduct claim based upon the prosecutor's remarks respecting either defendant's lack of remorse, his age, children visiting parks at night or Arthur Cox's deal.