Opinion ID: 1387022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Text: Prior to trial, the court entered an Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Filed on October 22, 1991, specifically finding that prior to the vasectomy procedure [Dr. Strode] failed to specifically state to [Carr] that the vasectomy procedure might fail[,] and if such failure were to occur that it would or could cause the plaintiff to remain fertile or become fertile again in the future. The court further stated that its order [did] not limit any party's right to offer testimony concerning information provided to Carr prior to the procedure or the surrounding circumstances thereto at the trial. At trial, after the close of the plaintiffs' case-in-chief, the court read the following statement to the jury: The [c]ourt has already determined that Doctor Strode and Straub Clinic and Hospital, properly performed and supervised a vasectomy procedure on December 9, 198[5], and thereafter provided proper follow-up, verification and care.... The [c]ourt has already also determined that prior to the vasectomy procedure, defendant Walter S. Strode[,] M[.]D[.] failed to specifically state to plaintiff, Robin Carr, that the vasectomy procedure might fail, and if such failure were to occur, that it would or could cause plaintiff, Robin Carr, to remain fertile or become fertile again in the future. The [c]ourt, however, has not limited any parties' right to offer testimony concerning information provided to Mr. Carr prior to the procedure or the surrounding circumstances.... The [c]ourt has not made any determination as to any duty owed by defendants to plaintiffs or that any duty owed was violated. (Emphasis added.) At the outset, we note that HRCP Rule 56(d) does not authorize the circuit court to make factual findings such as that sought by plaintiffs in their motion for partial summary judgment. HRCP Rule 56(d) provides: If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court ... shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy[.] Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. (Emphasis added). Plaintiffs' motion was limited to the factual finding that Defendant Strode failed to inform the Plaintiffs of the risk of failure or a failure rate associated with a vasectomy operation and that Defendant Strode was required by law to make that disclosure. HRCP Rule 56(d) is identical to its federal counterpart, and it is clear that the issue-narrowing provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 56(d) operates only in the wake of an unsuccessful (and proper) motion under Rule 56(a) or 56(b). Arado v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp., 626 F.Supp. 506, 509 (N.D.Ill.1985) (citations omitted). Moreover, as Professor Moore notes: Certainly, while Rule 56 contemplates summary judgment for a part or all of the claim made in a prayer of the claimant, it does not contemplate summary judgments on evidentiary matters en route to that goal. Or, as the court stated in the Yale Transport [ v. Yellow Truck & Mfg. Co. ] case [3 F.R.D. 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)], Rule 56(d) does not authorize the initiation of motions the sole subject of which is to adjudicate issues of fact which are not dispositive of any claim or part thereof. This objection may properly be achieved at a pretrial conference under Rule 16. The use of the pretrial procedure does, however, lie in the district court's discretion. A party should not, therefore, by an improper motion for summary judgment attempt to compel the district court to pre-try a case. 6A Moore's Federal Practice, § 56.20[3.-2] at 56-691 and 56-692 (footnotes omitted). Professor Moore further notes that: The court should not, however, make an order under Rule 56(d) eliminating for trial factual issues where the facts are in genuine controversy. It should in due course proceed to a trial on the facts which remain in dispute. At the close of the trial on the disputed facts[,] it should make findings of facts and conclusions of law on the whole case, if the case is a court case as distinguished from a jury case. If a case be a jury case[,] the disputed issue should, of course, be submitted to the jury under proper instructions. Id. at 56-700 and 56-701 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). First, pursuant to the Arado case, plaintiffs' motion improperly sought a factual determination wholesale, outside the context of a failed motion under HRCP Rule 56(a) or (b). Second, even if the motion was proper, defendants correctly argue that in the instant case, the circuit court erroneously made a finding concerning a material fact in substantial controversy. On appeal, we apply the same standard that the trial court used in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Amfac, 74 Haw. at 104, 839 P.2d at 22. Neither party disputes that the finding of the circuit court was a fact material to plaintiffs' informed consent claim. However, plaintiffs contend that the circuit court merely made a narrow factual finding that the evidence available to the court was not in substantial controversy. According to plaintiffs, the court expressly found only that Dr. Strode had not uttered certain specific words; that is, Dr. Strode did not specifically state to the plaintiffs that the vasectomy procedure might fail, and if it does, Mr. Carr might either remain fertile or become fertile again. Plaintiffs contend that the circuit court, by so finding, did not necessarily rule that such words constituted any part of Dr. Strode's duty under the informed consent claim, or that Dr. Strode's failure to utter these words constituted a breach of that duty. Defendants retort by asserting that, although Dr. Strode may not have uttered certain specific words, his discussions with plaintiffs prior to performing the vasectomy on Carr constituted a statement that the procedure might fail. Defendants claim that Dr. Strode informed Carr about the failure rates associated with vasectomies and told Carr that he could not guarantee his permanent sterility. Additionally, defendants note that Carr himself admitted that Dr. Strode informed him that the surgery had a ninety-nine percent success rate, which necessarily implies that Carr was made aware that the procedure had at least a one percent failure rate. Defendants therefore contend that the material fact found by the circuit court was actually in substantial controversy. We agree with defendants. The factfinder's analysis of a claim for relief based upon a physician's alleged failure to secure his or her patient's informed consent necessarily involves the close examination of all of the physician's statements to the patientoral, written or otherwise. The scope of inquiry accordingly is narrow, often focusing upon the specific wording of statements made and often resting exclusively on oral testimony. Because of this narrow scope and the meticulous nature of the analysis, we believe the trial court's factual finding that Dr. Strode had failed to specifically state that the vasectomy procedure might not succeed also amounted to the finding of a fact in substantial controversy. The finding was made in excess of the court's authority to so find pursuant to HRCP Rule 56(d) because it had the propensity to foreclose the jury's examination and analysis of the ultimate issue. The inquiry before the jury for resolution was whether Dr. Strode provided Carr with sufficient information so as to insure that Carr's consent to submit to the vasectomy procedure was informed. The circuit court's finding that Dr. Strode failed to specifically state to Carr that the vasectomy procedure might fail, and if such failure were to occur, that it would or could cause Carr to remain fertile or become fertile again in the future not only foreclosed the jury's consideration of one of, if not the most, effective means of informing Carr of an important recognized risk associated with the vasectomy procedure, but closely paralleled the ultimate issue before the jury. Under the narrow circumstances surrounding the informed consent inquiry and, because of the similarity between the issue resolved by the circuit court's finding and the ultimate issue in the case, we believe the circuit court's finding amounted to reversible error due to the likelihood that it prejudiced the jury's consideration and resolution of the issue of Dr. Strode's liability on the informed consent claim. Notwithstanding plaintiffs' contention that the court's finding implied nothing about either Dr. Strode's duty or its breach, it is clear that, in any informed consent case, the primary issue necessarily will be focused on some kind of purported failure by the defendant to tell the plaintiff something material about the medical procedure in question. Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court only found that Dr. Strode had failed to specifically state  something of significance to Carr, and thereby did not preclude the possibility that Dr. Strode adequately informed Carr in some other way that the procedure might fail. We believe, however, that this subtle distinction easily could have escaped the jury. Based on the language of the partial summary judgment order, as read by the trial judge, the jury could have concluded that the trial court had already determined that Dr. Strode had breached his duty to inform Carr of serious possible risks and complications of the proposed vasectomy. Moreover, we do not believe that the evidence tending to prove that Dr. Strode informed Carr of a ninety-nine percent success rateand thereby also implicitly informed Carr of a one percent failure rateassociated with a vasectomy procedure, possesses a probative value of sufficient magnitude so as to adequately alleviate the potential prejudice stemming from the circuit court's finding. As previously noted, after finding that Dr. Strode had failed to utter certain words, the circuit court, in its order granting partial summary judgment, stated that [t]his Order does not limit any party's right to offer testimony concerning information provided to Mr. Carr prior to the procedure or the surrounding circumstances thereto at the trial. Plaintiffs contend that, even if the circuit court's finding had the potential to mislead the jury, the court obviated such potential by including the above-quoted language, thereby alleviating any potential confusion. We disagree. We emphasize that the potential to mislead the jury with the prior finding of Dr. Strode's failure was too significant to be cured by the above disclaimer. We therefore hold that the circuit court's finding in connection with its purported grant of partial summary judgment constituted prejudicial error as to the informed consent claim; accordingly, we vacate the order granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and remand this case for a new trial on the issue of lack of informed consent.