Opinion ID: 561304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Insufficiency of Evidence Under an Aiding and Abetting Theory

Text: 165 Roberto Gonzalez also argues that his conviction should be reversed because the jury might have based its verdict upon an aiding and abetting theory of liability rather than a theory of vicarious liability under Pinkerton. As noted above, [i]n order for [a defendant] to be convicted for aiding and abetting ... possession with intent to distribute cocaine, all the evidence need show is that [the defendant] ' in some sort associate[d] himself with the venture, that he participate[d] in it as in something he wishe[d] to bring about, [and] that he s[ought] by his action to make it succeed. '  Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1235, that quoted, in turn, Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402). Gonzalez speculates that the evidence in the record allegedly supporting a theory that he played a role in facilitating the possession of cocaine of Chao, Ortega, Pena or Tobon was by its very nature insufficient to support his conviction under an aiding and abetting theory. 166 In contrast to Gonzalez' contention that the evidence was insufficient to convict him on the aiding and abetting theory, he admits there was sufficient evidence to convict him of being a knowing participant in the conspiracy. He also admits that guilt of the substantive offenses could be appropriately premised upon a Pinkerton vicarious liability theory. We believe this admission to be determinative. As discussed in Sections XI-C and XII-A, the jury received a proper Pinkerton instruction which applied to Gonzalez as well as the other defendants. Since Gonzalez admits that the evidence was sufficient to convict him of the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute counts under a Pinkerton theory, there is a proper basis for his conviction. As referred to in our discussion of the severance issue in Section V-B, supra, the Supreme Court observed: To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to follow instructions. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95, 75 S.Ct. 158, 165, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954). Where a properly instructed jury had sufficient evidence upon which it could base a verdict of guilt based upon a Pinkerton vicarious liability theory, we refuse to indulge in speculation that the jury relied upon an aiding and abetting theory that allegedly was not supported by sufficient evidence.