Opinion ID: 1244797
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Oregon Cases

Text: In Whiffen II, supra, plaintiff contended, and the dissent agreed, that Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution protects private parties only from government laws and is a limitation only upon state action. It is true that in State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 228, 611 P.2d 1147 (1980), the court stated that Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution is a prohibition on the legislative branch. It prohibits the legislature from enacting laws restraining the free expression of opinion   . That statement was later quoted by this court in State v. Robertson, 293 Or. 402, 412, 649 P.2d 569 (1982). In neither of those cases, however, was the issue the question whether Article I, section 8, was limited to laws. Instead, the issue in both cases was whether the laws involved in those cases were valid. In both Spencer and Robertson, the only issue was whether statutes were unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. In neither case did this court consider the additional requirement of Article I, section 8, that every person shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. It follows that the statement by this court in both cases to the effect that Article I, section 8, is a restriction upon the legislative branch was not necessary to the decision in those cases and was no more than dictum. As previously noted, Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, in addition to stating that [n]o law shall be passed restricting the free expression of opinion or restricting the right to speak freely, write or print freely on any subject whatever[,] also goes on to state that every person shall be responsible for the abuse of that right. This added provision has been considered by this court in previous cases. In State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 514, 732 P.2d 9 (1987), the court stated that: Since State v. Jackson, [224 Or. 337, 356 P.2d 495 (1960),] this court has related the clause holding every person `responsible for the abuse of' the right of free expression to civil responsibility for harm done thereby. The issue presented for decision in that case, however, was whether an obscenity law violated Article I, section 8. Prior to this case, this court has not considered whether this added provision in Article I, section 8, imposes upon private persons any responsibility in addition to civil responsibility for harm done. In my opinion, this court should adopt the reasoning by the courts of California and New Jersey in PruneYard and Schmid, that no state action is required to trigger the guarantee of free speech, and hold that, for the same reasons, the remarkably similar provisions of Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution does not require state action to do so. In other words, I would hold that Article I, section 8, must be interpreted as a provision of the Oregon Constitution that protects Oregon citizens not only from abuse or restraint by state action, but also, by its express terms, protects them against abuse or restraint by private persons. In Minielly v. State, 242 Or. 490, 499, 411 P.2d 69 (1966), this court, in holding that the statute involved in that case violated Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, quoted with approval the following statement by the United States Supreme Court in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957): `Our form of government is built on the premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association.' and also the following statement by that Court in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150-51, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939): `This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of this court, the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these liberties.' Minielly v. State, supra, 242 Or. at 503-04, 411 P.2d 69 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). This court should also bear in mind the following fundamental canon of constitutional interpretation, as stated by this court in State ex rel Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 177, 269 P.2d 491 (1954): `It is a fundamental canon of construction that a Constitution should receive a liberal interpretation in favor of a citizen, especially with respect to those provisions which were designed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizen in regard to both person and property.'  (Emphasis added.) State action should not be a sacred cow, as the dissent apparently believes it to be. Instead, what is sacred should be a giving of broad protection to citizens in their fundamental right of free speech. In so holding, I would adopt the same interpretation of Article I, section 8, as did the California Supreme Court in Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, supra , and the New Jersey court in State v. Schmid, supra , in their interpretations of the remarkably similar provisions of the constitutions of California and New Jersey. As previously noted, 316 Or. at 480, 853 P.2d 1304, the decision by the California Supreme Court in PruneYard was approved by the Supreme Court of the United States. Unfortunately, there is no history that might demonstrate the intent of those who wrote Article I, section 8. See Carey, History of the Oregon Constitution 100-120 (1926). If, however, a delegate to the Oregon constitutional convention had been instructed to write as an article for its Bill of Rights a guarantee of freedom of speech that would provide protection against abuse or restraint both by laws enacted by the legislature and also against abuse or restraint by private persons, it is difficult to conceive of words that would more clearly express such an intent than the words: No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right. Or. Const. Art. I, § 8. For all of these reasons, I would hold that the provision of Article I, section 8, every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right, should be interpreted not as virtually meaningless words, but by giving these words their plain, clear and literal meaning, so as to extend the protection of free speech from abuse or restraint not only by state action, but also from abuse or restraint by private persons. Accordingly, I would hold that Fred Meyer is a person responsible for the abuse of defendant's right of free speech; that defendant, in seeking signatures on initiative petitions while standing on the sidewalk near the entrance to this store, was thereby attempting to exercise his constitutional right of free speech; that his right to do so under Article I, section 8, was entitled to recognition by the owners of this Fred Meyer one-stop shopping center, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, and that, as a result, and under the facts of this case, Fred Meyer abused defendant's right of free speech by having him arrested for criminal trespass. In my opinion, the time will come, sooner or later, when this court will abandon its presently restrictive interpretation of Article I, section 8, and give the words of its provision requiring every person to be responsible for the abuse of this right to freedom of speech their plain, clear and literal meaning. III. DELAYS ON APPEAL As a former member of this court who has always been devoted to this court as one of the best in the nation, it is difficult for me to be critical of its operation. I strongly believe, however, that the problem of delays on appeals to this court has become so serious as to make appropriate the writing of a concurring opinion calling attention to this problem. This is not my first opinion concurring in a decision by this court, but expressing concern over long delays between oral arguments and decisions. See, e.g., State v. Classen, 285 Or. 221, 238, 590 P.2d 1198 (1979); State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383, 407, 411, 623 P.2d 630 (1981). This case was argued on March 6, 1992. After mostly unnecessary delays for 13 months, it was reassigned on April 7, 1993, to Justice Van Hoomissen. Meanwhile, awaiting a decision of this case, the court withheld decision on a petition for review in State v. Cargill, 316 Or. 492, 851 P.2d 1141 (1993) (decided this date), also a criminal trespass case involving rights of persons seeking signatures on initiative petitions near the entrance to another Fred Meyer store. That case was argued on November 6, 1990two and one-half years ago. Upon inquiry, I find that long delays between oral arguments and final decisions by this court have not been unusual. Of 115 signed opinions in 1992 (not including per curiam or memorandum opinions), 28 were not decided until more than one year had elapsed after oral argument, including 10 cases not decided until 18 or more months after oral argument. Only 24 of these cases were decided within 90 days after oral argument. In addition to State v. Cargill, supra , one other case remains undecided after over two years. For the first four months of this year, ending May 1, 1993, there have been only 31 signed opinions, 15 of which were decided within 90 days, while 9 were not decided until more than 12 months after oral argument, including 4 not decided for more than 18 months. The Standards Relating to Appellate Courts, as adopted by the American Bar Association Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration (1977), provide for Standards of Timely Disposition, including Section 3.52(b)(4), which provides as follows:  Decision. For a court sitting in panels of three judges, the average time for rendering decision should not exceed 30 days; the maximum time for any case, except one of extraordinary complexity, should not exceed 60 days. For a court sitting in larger panels, the average time should not exceed 60 days; the maximum time, except in cases of extraordinary complexity, should not exceed 90 days.  (Emphasis added). ORS 1.050 provides that all Oregon trial judges shall sign a Certificate of Compliance, as a condition for payment of their salaries, that they have no cases under advisement or undecided for more than three months unless prevented by sickness or unavoidable casualty, or the time be extended by stipulation in writing[.] Because of an opinion by the Oregon Attorney General that this statute is unconstitutional, it is no longer enforced. It does, however, state the view of the citizens of Oregon, through their elected representatives, that courts should ordinarily decide cases within 90 days. This court is no longer required to hear all cases appealed to it, but hears mostly cases which it chooses to hear by the granting of petitions for review of decisions by the Court of Appeals. Because, as a result, this court can now control the number of cases to be heard and decided by it, there is no good reason why it should be unable to decide promptly those cases which it chooses to hear. Upon further inquiry, I am told that the following efforts have been and are being made to correct the problem of delays on appeal, with the following results: The court does promptly consider many cases other than those it decides by signed, published opinion following oral argument. The court considers about 1,000 petitions for review or for mandamus each year and analyzes each in an unpublished opinion; review is denied in approximately 90 percent of those cases in a decision that generally takes only about 60 days from the time of filing. The cases in which the court allows review are the legally challenging ones, and the delayed cases normally are the most challenging of all. The court's attempts to reach consensus on thorny issues of law is a process more time-consuming (and exasperating) than the parties, their lawyers, or the trial court judges imagine. The court realized about two years ago that, justifiable or not, decisional delay had become a serious problem. Serious efforts were undertaken to reduce the court's backlog and to issue opinions more promptly. All seven justices agreed to revised internal procedures designed to hasten circulation and publication of opinions. The result has been a sharp decrease in the backlog and a marked improvement in the time for decision. A year ago, before May oral arguments, the court had a backlog of 88 cases. This year, at the same time, only 34 cases were under advisement. Among those 34 cases, two-thirds had been argued within the past six months. Of the older cases, most have been reassigned after the court repeatedly tried but failed to agree upon either the rationale or the result proposed by the assigned author; after reassignment, opinions generally are published within weeks. The backlog is shrinking fast and is expected to disappear entirely within months. Already this year, 13 of the older backlog cases have been published. Only five cases remain that are more than a year old. Among signed opinions published in 1992, only 21 percent were issued within 90 days of argument. In 1993, nearly half of all the published opinions were issued within 90 days of argument. The majority of new cases the court hears this year will be published within 90 days. Of the 46 cases argued from January through April of 1993, 26 already have been decided. These efforts by the court and, in particular, by the Chief Justice, to overcome the problem of delays in its decisions and the apparent success of such efforts, as indicated by these current statistics, should come as welcome news to both the bar and the public. It remains to be seen, of course, whether these efforts will continue to be successful. Cases appealed to this court involve serious concerns of real people, such as those of defendants in criminal cases who contend that their convictions must be reversed because their constitutional rights have been violated, as in this case, and persons trying to collect substantial sums of money as the result of judgments for personal injury or breach of contract. These people are entitled to reasonably prompt decisions by a court that is efficient in its operation. To people such as these, and to many others,  Justice delayed is justice denied.