Opinion ID: 151633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Flemming sentenced “based on a sentencing

Text: range” that has been lowered by Amendment 706? Consistent with the District Court’s reasoning, the Government contends that our decision in Mateo compels the conclusion that Flemming was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range” that was lowered by Amendment 706 because his Guidelines range was calculated under the Career Offender Guidelines in § 4B1.1, rather than the Crack Cocaine Guidelines in § 2D1.1(c). We disagree. In Mateo, we held that a career offender, who received no downward departures and was sentenced within the Career Offender Guidelines range, was not eligible for a reduction in 11 sentence even though his base offense level under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines had been subsequently lowered by Amendment 706. 560 F.3d at 155. We rejected the defendant’s argument that his sentence was “based on” the Crack Cocaine Guidelines in § 2D1.1(c) simply because “the District Court consulted that section in calculating his offense level.” Id. In addition, we emphasized the language from § 3582(c)(2) that the sentence imposed must have been “‘based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,’” id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)) (emphasis in original), and reasoned that the term “sentencing range” “‘clearly contemplates the end result of the overall guideline calculus, not the series of tentative results reached at various interim steps in the performance of that calculus.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added). Thus, “‘if an amended guideline does not have the effect of lowering the sentencing range actually used at sentencing, the defendant’s sentence was not based on that range within the intendment of the statute.’” Id. (quoting Caraballo, 552 F.3d at 10) (emphasis added). Far from compelling the conclusion that he is ineligible for a sentence reduction, Mateo supports Flemming’s argument that his sentence was “based on” the sentencing range calculated under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines. Though the District Court agreed that Flemming technically qualified as a career offender, it declined to sentence him within that range, and instead applied the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range after determining under 12 § 4A1.3 that the career offender enhancement overstated the seriousness of his criminal history. In other words, the District Court “actually used” the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range, rather than the Career Offender Guidelines range, when it sentenced Flemming. The First, Second, and Fourth Circuit Courts—as well as numerous district courts, including several in our own Circuit7 —have reached the same conclusion in nearly identical 7 See United States v. Poindexter, 550 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that career offender granted a downward departure under § 4A1.3 and sentenced within the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range was eligible for a sentence reduction: “[I]n the end, [the Crack Cocaine Guidelines] played a far more significant role than Section 4B1.1, the section that the Government argues [the defendant’s] sentence was based on.”); see also United States v. Stratton, No. 99-326, 2009 WL 506365, at -6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2009); United States v. Clark, No. 00-037, 2008 WL 2705215, at  (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2008); United States v. Cornish, No. 05-337, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50577, at -8 (D.N.J. June 25, 2008) (“[A]lthough these downward departures were from the § 4B1.1 Guidelines based on the Court’s determination that [the defendant’s] criminal history was overstated, they resulted in a sentence that was exactly as proposed by the Sentencing Guidelines under § 2D1.1. In effect, the Court did not sentence [the defendant] as a career offender.”). 13 circumstances.8 In United States v. McGee, 553 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam), the District Court granted a career offender a downward departure under § 4A1.3, stating that it was departing from the Career Offender Guidelines range “to the level that the defendant would have been in absent the career offender status calculation.” Id. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court applied the sentencing range calculated under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines and sentenced the defendant within that range. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that the defendant was eligible for a sentence reduction, as it was “apparent that [the defendant] was sentenced ‘based on’ a sentencing guideline range that was subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission because the district court premised [its] ultimate sentence on the crack cocaine guidelines.” Id. Indeed, because the district court “sentenced [the defendant] based on the crack cocaine guidelines[, it] would likely have considered a different sentence from the one imposed if the applicable crack guidelines had so provided.” Id. at 228. Importantly, the Second Circuit perceived no conflict between the result it reached in McGee and the conclusion, consistent with Mateo, that “a defendant who is sentenced as a 8 The Eleventh Circuit has also expressed agreement with this conclusion, albeit in a dictum. See United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2008) (agreeing that defendants granted a downward departure under § 4A1.3, and sentenced under the Guidelines range that “would be in effect absent the career offender guideline[s],” would be eligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). 14 career offender, but does not receive a downward departure, [does not] qualif[y] for a reduced sentence.” Id. at 227; see also United States v. Martinez, 572 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing the defendant in McGee—who “could have been sentenced under § 4B1.1 but was in fact sentenced under [the Crack Cocaine Guidelines in] § 2D1.1”—from a defendant who is sentenced within the Career Offender Guidelines range and thus ineligible for a sentence reduction based on Amendment 706) (emphases in original). The First and Fourth Circuit Courts similarly have concluded that a career offender who is granted a downward departure under § 4A1.3 to the Crack Cocaine Guidelines range is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Cardosa, 606 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Munn, 595 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).9 And, like 9 The Munn Court did not analyze separately the two statutory requirements for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)—i.e., that (1) the defendant’s sentence was “based on” a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered, and (2) that any sentence reduction be consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements—but rather focused its analysis on the second requirement, which we discuss below in Part III.B. In that regard, the Fourth Circuit appears to have assumed (as at least one other Circuit has) that the two requirements of § 3582(c)(2) are interchangeable. See Munn, 595 F.3d at 187 (“Together, § 3582(c)(2) and the Policy Statement make clear that a defendant whose offense of conviction involved crack is 15 the Second Circuit in McGee (and our Court in Mateo), these Courts agree that a defendant sentenced within the Career Offender Guidelines range would not be eligible for a sentence reduction. See Cardosa, 606 F.3d at 19 (citing United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 551 F.3d 84, 85 (1st Cir. 2008)); Munn, 595 F.3d at 187 & n.7. We agree with the reasoning of these Courts. The Government’s contention that Flemming’s sentence was “based on” the sentencing range calculated under the Career Offender Guidelines cannot be squared with the ordinary meaning of that phrase. See United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 883, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Construed in its ordinary sense, the phrase ‘based on’ refers, for purposes of section 3582(c)(2), to a guideline range that determined the defendant’s sentence.”); see also Cardosa, 606 F.3d at 5. In applying the § 4A1.3 departure, the District Court did not specify the number of offense levels or criminal history categories by which it was departing. Rather, it simply reverted, without further comment, to the base offense level calculated under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines (24) and the criminal history category that applied to Flemming absent the career offender enhancement (V), and imposed a sentence within that range. Indeed, we have little doubt that had eligible for a reduced sentence only if Amendment 706 lowers the defendant’s applicable guideline range.”); cf. United States v. Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the two requirements are “identical” and “convey[] the same meaning”). 16 Amendment 706 been in effect when Flemming was sentenced—and, thus, had Flemming’s offense level under the Crack Cocaine Guidelines been two levels lower—the District Court would have applied the resulting lower Guidelines range after departing under § 4A1.3.10 To ignore these facts and conclude nonetheless that Flemming was sentenced “based on” the Career Offender Guidelines range would put form over substance. See McGee, 553 F.3d at 228 (reasoning that “a defendant who was, even if by virtue of a departure, sentenced ‘based on’ the crack guidelines [is] eligible for a reduction” under § 3582(c)(2), and noting that “a different reading would lend itself to excessive formalism”). In sum, we conclude that Flemming satisfies the first requirement of § 3582(c)(2), as his sentence was “based on a sentencing range” that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.