Opinion ID: 2654911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of Unlawful Entry

Text: We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. Nero v. United States, 73 A.3d 153, 157 (D.C. 2013). But before we can assess whether the government presented sufficient evidence to sustain Mr. Ortberg‟s conviction for unlawful entry in this case, we must understand the elements of the offense. Mr. Ortberg argues that the government failed to “establish the requisite criminal intent as to his initial entry” into Studio One because it failed to prove that he knew he was prohibited from moving from the publicly accessible lobby of the W Hotel into the restricted event space of Studio One. His attack on the sufficiency of the evidence in this case thus appears to turn on whether the government proved that he knowingly or deliberately defied the wishes of the organizers of the event in Studio One or willfully violated the law. The preliminary question before us is whether the law requires the government to present such proof. We conclude it does not. D.C. Code § 22-3302 (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: Any person who, without lawful authority, shall enter, or attempt to enter, any private dwelling, building, or other 6 property, or part of such dwelling, building, or other property, against the will of the lawful occupant or of the person lawfully in charge thereof, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.[3] Our case law distilling the elements of this crime has set them out in a variety of ways,4 but it is clear at the least that the government must prove (1) entry that is (2) 3 The relevant language of the statute setting forth the elements of the crime reads much as it did when it was first enacted in 1901. Recent changes have no bearing on this case. In 2009, § 22-3302 was divided into two subsections, distinguishing between unlawful entry of a public building and unlawful entry of a private building. See Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2009, D.C. Law 18-88, § 215, 56 D.C. Reg. 7413 (Dec. 10, 2009). In doing so, the Omnibus Public Safety and Justice Amendment Act of 2009 made unlawful entry of a private building a non-jury demandable offense (by decreasing the potential term of imprisonment for 180 days) while unlawful entry of a public building remained jury demandable (the potential prison term was maintained at 6 months). The Comment to the jury instruction on unlawful entry contemplates a scenario in which the nature of the building is contested. Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 5.401 cmt (“If the nature of the building is in issue, the instruction may need to be modified.”). However, the private nature of the W Hotel is not contested. In 2013, this statute was amended to clarify the amount a defendant could be fined at sentencing. See Criminal Fine Proportionality Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Law 19-317, § 201 (h), 60 D.C. Reg. 2064 (February 22, 2013). But this amendment likewise does not affect our analysis. 4 See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 505 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C. 1986) (“The offense of unlawful entry, on the other hand, is committed when a person invades property without lawful authority and against the will of the occupant.”); Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 1176 (D.C. 1985) (“In prosecuting a charge of unlawful entry, the government must prove that: (1) the accused entered or attempted to enter public or private premises or property; (2) he did so without lawful authority; (3) he did so against the express will of the lawful occupant or owner; and (4) general intent to enter.” (citing Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.44)); Carson v. United States, 419 A.2d 996, 998 (D.C. 1980) (noting that “„[the statute] prohibits the act of entering or remaining upon (continued…) 7 unauthorized — because it is without lawful authority5 and against the will of owner or lawful occupant. What is less clear is the mental state or culpable state of mind that must be proved. The statute does not expressly address this subject. But “where „a criminal statute is silent on the question of mens rea, it is ordinarily subject to a presumption requiring a culpable mental state unless it is clear the legislature intended to create a strict liability offense.” Conley v. United States, No. 11-CF589, slip op. at 43 n.91 (D.C. Sept. 26, 2013) (quoting Santos v. District of Columbia, 940 A.2d 113, 116-17 (D.C. 2007)). The legislature has not signaled its intent to impose strict liability for the offense of unlawful entry. And while we have no legislative history on this provision, we have decades of case law interpreting this provision. (…continued) any property when such conduct is both without legal authority and against the expressed will of the person lawfully in charge of the premises‟” (quoting Leiss, 364 A.2d at 806), and referring to “both elements of the crime”). 5 Although there is little case law addressing the meaning of “without lawful authority,” see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 444 F.2d 919, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1971), it appears this element would protect from prosecution for unlawful entry emergency responders, members of the law enforcement community entering pursuant to a warrant, or individuals otherwise authorized by law to enter certain properties. Mr. Ortberg has never asserted that he had some official authority to enter Studio One, and thus this element requires little discussion in this case. 8 Turning to this case law, it has been long understood that the “only state of mind that the government must prove is appellant‟s general intent to be on the premises contrary to the will of the lawful owner.” Artisst v. United States, 554 A.2d 327, 330 (D.C. 1989); see also Culp v. United States, 486 A.2d 1174, 1176 (D.C. 1985) (explaining that the government need only establish “general intent” to enter). But what is meant by this “venerable” common law classification “has been the source of a good deal of confusion.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980); see also Perry v. United States, 36 A.3d 799, 809 n. 18 (D.C. 2011) (noting that categorizations of general and specific intent “can be too vague or misleading to be dispositive or even helpful”). Moreover, the statement that a crime as a whole requires proof of “general intent” fails to distinguish between elements of the crime, to which different mental states may apply. “[C]lear analysis requires that the question of the kind of culpability required to establish the commission of an offense be faced separately with respect to each material element of the crime[.]” Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted). Even though our prior discussions of mental state have lacked some precision, we are nonetheless able to look to our precedent to determine that the mental states for entry and for doing so “against the will” of the lawful occupant are both clearly discernible and distinct. To begin with, our cases make clear that 9 the physical act of entry must be purposeful and voluntary — not accidental or mistaken. See Kozlovska v. United States, 30 A.3d 799, 801 (D.C. 2011) (noting that the trial court found, inter alia, that “appellant entered the property voluntarily and on purpose, not by mistake or accident”); Culp, 486 A.2d at 1176 (observing that the government must prove a “general intent to enter”); see also Dauphine v. United States, 73 A.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. 2013) (“It is well settled that the general intent to commit a crime means the intent to do the act that constitutes the crime.”). Furthermore, our cases make clear that the mental state with respect to acting against the will of the owner or lawful occupant is not one of purpose or actual knowledge. Rather, it is sufficient for the government to establish that the defendant knew or should have known that his entry was unwanted. Thus, we have held that the government need only prove that the “will” of a lawful occupant was objectively manifest through either express6 or implied7 means, not that the 6 See Artisst, 554 A.2d at 330 (evidence sufficient to demonstrate entry was against the will of the lawful occupant where entry to a dormitory was “in contravention of a prominently posted warning”); Smith v. United States, 281 A.2d 438, 440 (D.C. 1971) (evidence sufficient to demonstrate entry was against the will of the lawful occupant where a construction company occupying a lot “posted signs indicating its rightful control of the site”); Bowman v. United States, 212 A.2d 610, 611 (D.C. 1965) (will of the lawful occupant expressed “by sign and by public announcement”). 10 will was subjectively understood by the defendant. Likewise we have rejected the argument that the government must establish that the defendant was personally advised that he did not have permission to enter.8 That the government need only prove that a defendant knew or should have known that his entry was unwanted is additionally apparent from our prior recognition that a defendant “lacks the requisite criminal intent for unlawful entry” “[w]hen a person enters a place with a good purpose and a bona fide belief in his or her right to enter.” Darab v. United States, 623 A.2d 127, 136 (D.C. 1993) (…continued) 7 See Culp, 486 A.2d at 1177 (where “at least some of the windows” of a home were “boarded over” but there may not have been a sign forbidding entry, evidence was sufficient to demonstrate entry was against the will of the lawful occupant); Smith, 281 A.2d at 440 (no need to post “keep out” sign where access to property was restricted by locked gates and mesh chain link fence topped by barbed wire); Bond v. United States, 233 A.2d 506, 514 (D.C. 1967) (even where there were no signs or warnings forbidding entry, conviction for unlawful entry upheld where appellant was found in areas of an office “which were not open to the public”); McGloin v. United States, 232 A.2d 90, 91 (D.C. 1967) (noting that “no one would contend that one may lawfully enter a private dwelling house simply because there is no sign or warning forbidding entry”). 8 McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 (rejecting appellant‟s argument that he could not be convicted of unlawful entry because he “was not warned verbally or by sign to refrain from entering the premises” and holding instead that “it is more than plain that wandering through [a four-unit apartment] building, climbing on the roof or perching on the fire escape would be against the will of the owner”); Bowman, 212 A.2d at 611 (rejecting appellant‟s contention “that there can be no unlawful entry under the statute unless such entry is contrary to a personal warning or instruction not to enter.”). 11 (quoting Smith, 281 A.2d at 439).9 This “bona fide belief” is generally discussed as a defense that the government must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt if it is fairly raised by the evidence,10 but it nonetheless informs what the government must prove when it pursues a conviction for unlawful entry. Such a bona fide belief not only “must be based in the pure indicia of innocence,”11 but also must be reasonably held.12 In other words, the existence of a reasonable, good faith belief is a valid defense precisely because it precludes the government from proving what it must — that a defendant knew or should have known that his entry was against the will of the lawful occupant. 9 See also McGloin, 232 A.2d at 91 (“[O]ne who enters for a good purpose and with a bona fide belief of his right to enter is not guilty of unlawful entry.”). 10 See Darab, 623 A.2d at 136 (government must disprove bona fide belief beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Smith, 281 A.2d at 439 (bona fide belief instruction only given to the jury if fairly raised by the evidence). 11 Gaetano v. United States, 406 A.2d 1291, 1294 (D.C. 1979); see also Darab, 623 A.2d at 136 (same). 12 Culp, 486 A.2d at 1176 (“innocent entry upon unmarked or ambiguously marked premises may constitute a defense to a charge of unlawful entry” so long as it has “some reasonable basis” (citations omitted)); Smith, 281 A.2d at 439 (“A bona fide belief must have some justification — some reasonable basis.”); accord Darab, 623 A.2d at 136; Gaetano, 406 A.2d at 1293. Thus, “to warrant an instruction it is not sufficient that an accused merely claim a belief of a right to enter.” Gaetano, 406 A.2d at 1293 (quoting Smith, 281 A.2d at 439). 12 This understanding of the law aligns with the current jury instruction for unlawful entry, to which the trial court in this case looked to discern the elements of the crime. The instruction identifies five elements, the second and fifth of which explicitly define the distinct mental states required: (1) The defendant “entered, or attempted to enter,” a private dwelling or part thereof; (2) The defendant “entered, or attempted to enter the property voluntarily, on purpose, and not by mistake or accident”; (3) The defendant “did so without lawful authority”; (4) “The entry or attempt to enter was against the will” of “the person lawfully in charge of the premises”; and (5) The defendant “knew or should have known that s/he was entering against that person‟s will.” Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 5.401 (emphasis added). This instruction is relatively new, dating back to 2009, and the commentary does not indicate the impetus for clarification of the requisite mental states nor the sources on which the committee relied. Its lack of annotations notwithstanding, we conclude that this instruction articulates the elements of unlawful entry with accuracy and helpful precision.