Opinion ID: 2115564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resort to one term of an unexecuted and unenforceable contract.

Text: The jury verdict broke down as follows: Architectural services $14,141.00 Plumbing consulting services 600.00 Heating, ventilating and air-conditioning consulting services 1,050.00 Electrical consulting services 787.50 Landscape architecture consulting services 2,870.00 __________ $19,448.50 On appeal, only the first item on this list is in dispute. Respondent contended at trial that the reasonable value of the architectural services rendered by himself and his staff could be arrived at in either of two ways. The first would be to simply accept his percentage computations based on the terms of the contract. [2] The second would be to accept the evidence he offered of the time spent on the project by his office. Respondent explained at trial that when he billed on an hourly basis, he took each employee's hourly rate, multiplied that by a profit and overhead factor of 2.5 and then multiplied the resulting figure by the number of hours worked by the employee. Under this approach Harper submitted the following figures as to the reasonable value of the services of himself and his staff: [3] Architect or Hourly rate Hours times gross Value of Draftsman times factor hourly rate services ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Harper 15 × 2.5 = 37.50 156 × 37.50 = $ 5,850.00 Drake 15 × 2.5 = 37.50 65 × 37.50 = 2,437.50 Kirsch 5 × 2.5 = 12.50 160.5 × 12.50 = 2,006.25 Kinnich 10 × 2.5 = 25.00 8 × 25.00 = 200.00 Arndt 7.5 × 2.5 = 18.75 7.5 × 18.75 = 140.63 Groff 5 × 2.5 = 12.50 6.5 × 12.50 = 81.25 Knoll 5 × 2.5 = 12.50 8 × 12.50 = 100.00 Guerin 10 × 2.5 = 25.00 6 × 25.00 = 150.00 __________ Total $ 10,965.63 The jury's award for architectural services was $14,141. There is no way of knowing how the jury reached that figure. If they used the hours expended approach, then the verdict is clearly excessive in the amount $3,175.37 ( i.e., he proved $10,965.63, but they gave him $14,141 or $3,175.37 more than he proved). On oral argument, respondent's attorney admitted that, as to this item, there was no specific evidence to support the extra $3,175.37. He speculated that the jury must have compromised and used parts of each approach ( i.e., a combination of the percentage of cost method and the hours expended method). Obviously, the respondent was only entitled to be compensated once, and since each method represents a separate and distinct means of answering the same question ( i.e., What is the reasonable value of respondent's architectural services?), a combination of those methods would be improper. Respondent acknowledges this, but points out that the demand in the complaint was for $21,727.12. He then argues that the jury might have used only the percentage of cost of construction method in arriving at its special verdict of $19,448.50. He contends that this court has previously approved the percentage cost of construction approach and, therefore, the court should not disturb the verdict. The respondent cites Barnes v. Lozoff (1963), 20 Wis. 2d 644, 123 N. W. 2d 543, for the proposition that a percentage of cost of construction is the proper measure of an architect's services in an action for quantum, meruit. The Barnes Case did so hold, but in Barnes the supreme court noted and accepted the trial court's conclusion of law to the effect that an actual contract existed between the parties. One of the terms of that contract was that the plaintiff would be paid on a percentage basis. The defendant builder in Barnes abandoned the project. As a result the plaintiff was unable to fully perform the contract. Consequently, his cause of action lay not in contract but in quantum meruit. The court first decided that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the value of his services, even though those services were of no value to the defendant, since he never used the plans and sketches. In other words, the plaintiff, to recover in quantum meruit, is not required to show that the defendant benefited from his services but merely that he rendered such services under the reasonable assumption that he would be paid therefor. The next issue in Barnes, supra, wasHow should the value of plaintiff's services be measured? The court held that the percentage method was the proper measure but, in doing so, it noted that: (1) There was a contract between the parties (unenforceable as such) which provided for compensation to the plaintiff on a percentage basis; and that (2) no evidence was introduced by the plaintiff as to what his services would be worth on an hourly basis. The court in Barnes did not hold, or even imply, that the hourly method of measuring value would be improper. [4] It simply did not discuss it because no evidence had been produced on that method. Consequently, the proper conclusion to be drawn from Barnes is this: Where the parties have made a contract which is certain as to its terms, but unenforceable for other reasons, then resort to one of those terms for finding the proper measure of recovery, in an equitable action like quantum meruit, is proper and equitable. Contrasted with Barnes, the case at bar differs in two significant respects. In this case: (1) There is evidence on both the percentage and the hourly method of measuring the value of respondent's services; and (2) If there is a contract at all, it is unenforceable because of indefiniteness as to the consideration agreed upon. In Barnes, the parties made a contract and specified how the architect would be compensated. There was mutual and simultaneous assent between the parties as to all the fundamental terms of the contract, including the measure of the value of Barnes' services. In the case at bar, Harper explained at a preliminary meeting that, if hired, his fee would be five percent of the total cost of construction. Much later, on July 12, Gardner called him and said words to the effect, Come on down and get started on the job. A month later Harper tendered the AIA contract. Gardner's phone call amounts to an offer, and Harper's subsequent part performance amounts to an acceptance of the offer. But at this point there is no valid contract because the parties never agreed to what the consideration would be. It cannot be argued that the parties impliedly agreed to use Harper's initial five percent statement for the element of consideration because that would still leave the term of consideration too indefinite to be enforceable. This is so because, at the time of the phone call, no dollars and cents figure as to the total cost of construction had yet come into existence. Without such a figure, the amount represented by five percent of the total is an unknown. It would abuse the fundamental precepts of contract interpretation to hold that Gardner bound himself and his company to pay five percent of whatever Harper should later decide would be the actual cost of the building. Therefore, since the oral agreement never embodied the element of consideration and since the subsequent written contract was never executed by either party, it is clear that no agreement was ever reached between Harper and Jewett & Sherman Company as to what Harper's fee should be. For that same reason (the absence of consideration), there was never any enforceable contract at all reached by these parties. Therefore, we think that appellant should not be allowed to recover on a percentage basis in this case. This because, unlike Barnes, no figure based on such a percentage was ever agreed upon by these parties and because an alternative and equally equitable means of measuring the recovery in this case is available, whereas in Barnes one was not available.