Opinion ID: 2058758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tort choice of law

Text: The defendant, citing Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977), argues that this court should apply the law of Tennessee, the place where the plaintiff's injuries were sustained, because the action brought by the plaintiff is a tort. This choice of law rule is also certain and easy to apply. But like the contract choice of law approach, the place-of-the-injury rule affords only an unsatisfactory resolution to the workers' compensation choice of laws problem. The application of Connecticut's tort choice of law principles to compensation cases would bestow upon temporary visitors injured in Connecticut all the relief which the Connecticut compensation act affords, but deny that same relief to Connecticut residents injured while on temporary business outside the state, even when all other incidents of employment, such as in this case, are in Connecticut. Moreover, if this court were to adhere to a strict application of the place-of-the-injury rule, a Connecticut resident and employee of a Connecticut employer under a Connecticut contract, who was injured while on temporary business in another jurisdiction might be left with no tort remedy whatsoever if that other jurisdiction applied a different choice of law rule. For example, if the other jurisdiction applied the contract choice of law rule supported by the plaintiff, the lack of symmetry between the jurisdictions would leave the employee unable to satisfy either state's choice of law rules and the compensation commissioners unable to award a remedy. 4 Larson, supra § 84.20, pp. 16-3, XX-X-XX-X; see, e.g., House v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 167 Or. 257, 117 P.2d 611 (1941). The Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act defines employee as any person who has entered into or works under any contract of service or apprenticeship with an employer, whether such contract contemplates the performance of duties within or without the state.... General Statutes § 31-275. Under §§ 31-293 and 31-293a, such employees may be entitled to damages against fellow employees as well as compensation. [5] The act clearly contemplates an award of damages against the defendant for injuries arising out of and in the course of the plaintiff's employment while she temporarily performed duties in Tennessee. This is still another reason for rejecting the place-of-the-injury rule argued by the defendant. Given the inapplicability of tort choice of law rules to conflict of laws problems in the workers' compensation area, there is no reason to discuss the plaintiff's interpretation of Tennessee law or her argument that the rule of lex loci delicti enunciated in Gibson v. Fullin, supra, 411, and prior cases should be overruled. [6] WORKERS' COMPENSATION CHOICE OF LAW The proper choice of law rules to apply in determining whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to strike the special defense are the rules traditionally applied to workers' compensation conflicts cases. Although there are various widely accepted approaches, all of which have been constructed within the workers' compensation framework, each of these approaches compels the conclusion that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to strike and in rendering summary judgment. In Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1980), the United States Supreme Court adhered to an interests analysis approach to determine whether the District of Columbia could award supplemental benefits to an employee who had already received compensation in the state of Virginia without violating the full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution. The employee was a resident of the District and was hired by a company in the District. Although he worked primarily in the District of Columbia, he also worked in Virginia where he was injured. Virginia law excluded any other remedy at common law or otherwise on account of the injury in Virginia. The court held that a State has no legitimate interest within the context of our federal system in preventing another State from granting a supplemental compensation award when that second State would have had the power to apply its workmen's compensation law in the first instance. The Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be construed to preclude successive workmen's compensation awards. Id., 286. In this case the plaintiff received workers' compensation under Connecticut law. The parties do not question the propriety of such an award. Connecticut's interest in compensating the injured employee, a Connecticut resident, to the fullest extent possible is clear and legitimate. Connecticut's other articulable interest lies in permitting the plaintiff's employer, a Connecticut corporation, to recover from the defendant the amount of compensation already paid or to be paid in the future under General Statutes § 31-293. Although Tennessee did not in fact award compensation to the plaintiff in this case, there is no question that Tennessee could have compensated the plaintiff had she applied for compensation there because the state of the injury has an interest in compensating employees injured within its borders. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 75 S. Ct. 804, 99 L. Ed. 1183 (1955). To this extent the two states' interests coincide. Tennessee's interest in limiting the liability of employers doing business in Tennessee is not of controlling importance; Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., supra, 280; particularly on the facts of this case. Just as Virginia had no legitimate interest in preventing the District of Columbia from awarding relief supplemental to that awarded in Virginia, Tennessee has no legitimate interest in preventing Connecticut from providing the injured employee with a right of action for damages against a third party, particularly where both the employee and the alleged tortfeasor are Connecticut residents, the employer is a Connecticut corporation and the employee was hired and is principally employed in Connecticut. Beyond an interest analysis, both the second Restatement of Conflict of Laws and Professor Larson's treatise on workers' compensation; Restatement (Second), 1 Conflict of Laws § 181; 4 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 87.40, pp. XX-XX-XX-XX; suggest approaches which lead to the same result. The Restatement provides that: A State of the United States may consistently with the requirements of due process award relief [not merely compensation] to a person under its workmen's compensation statute, if (a) the person is injured in the State, or (b) the employment is principally located in the State, or (c) the employer supervised the employee's activities from a place of business in the State, or (d) the State is that of most significant relationship to the contract of employment with respect to the issue of workmen's compensation under the rules of §§ 187-188 and 196, or (e) the parties have agreed in the contract of employment or otherwise that their rights should be determined under the workmen's compensation act of the State, or (f) the State has some other reasonable relationship to the occurrence, the parties and the employment. Restatement (Second), 1 Conflict of Laws § 181. On the facts of this case, the right of action provided by the Workers' Compensation Act is clearly available to the plaintiff under (b), (d) or (f) above. The action may also be available to the plaintiff under criterion (c) upon a showing of additional supporting facts. According to Professor Larson, the applicable law in a workers' compensation case is the law of the place of the employment relation, because the existence of the employer-employee relation within the state gives the state an interest in controlling the incidents of that relation, one of which incidents is the right to receive and the obligation to pay compensation. 4 Larson, supra, § 87.40, p. 16-84. There is no question that the employment relation in this case exists in Connecticut, not in Tennessee. For all of the foregoing reasons, the right of action provided by the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act cannot be denied the plaintiff by Tennessee law. There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to grant the plaintiff's motion to strike the special defense.