Opinion ID: 2460175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Necessary Facts of Dependency Were Found at Jenkins' Termination Trial

Text: ¶ 27 The statutory scheme of dependency, review, and termination proceedings incorporates a careful balance between two critical considerations: the constitutionally protected parent-child relationship and the obligation of the State to ensure the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child. RCW 13.34.020. The statute protects the parent-child relationship in several ways: a child must be returned to the parents unless the court enters an order of dependency; if the child is found dependent, the State must make available remedial services to improve parenting ability and to ameliorate impediments to effective parenting. The interests of the child are protected by the availability of dependency proceedings and the ability of the State to move to terminate parental rights if the parents fail to overcome parenting shortcomings. ¶ 28 The State argues that even if the review proceedings did not provide the required finding of dependency, the termination hearing findings were sufficient to prove dependency. The findings required for termination of the parent-child relationship implicitly mean the child is dependent, effectively providing a second determination of dependency. This court recently reaffirmed its earlier decision that an appellate court may infer a finding of current parental unfitness (the equivalent of Washington's statutory definition of dependency), even though the trial court has not made the finding explicitly. In re Welfare of A.B., 168 Wash.2d 908, 921, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010). But we also noted that because the facts and circumstances of parental rights cases vary so widely, the appellate court can imply or infer the omitted finding ifbut only ifall the facts and circumstances in the record (including but not limited to any boiler plate findings that parrot RCW 13.34.180) clearly demonstrate that the omitted finding was actually intended, and thus made, by the trial court. Id. ¶ 29 The omitted finding here is a finding of dependency. A child is dependent if the child [h]as no parent, guardian, or custodian capable of adequately caring for the child, such that the child is in circumstances which constitute a danger of substantial damage to the child's psychological or physical development. RCW 13.34.030(6)(c). We cannot rely on the termination trial court's finding that K.N.J. is dependent because the court simply relied on the void dependency order. But the trial court made findings of fact that establish dependency: 1.39. The father has had sporadic employment. He has had no stable home. He seems to rely on other people to take care of him. 1.40. Even though he has fathered children, Mr. Jenkins doesn't have any of the parenting skills required. He certainly has no hands-on type of parenting skills. 1.41. The father has shown little interest in any of his children, including [K.N.J.] 1.42. The father has not actively engaged in the necessary drug/alcohol treatment; he has aborted treatment and has numerous failed treatment attempts. The father has not ever engaged in a domestic violence assessment, or any other parenting/psychological assessment or evaluation. The father has shown no interest in addressing his parental deficiencies, and little to no interest in the children. 1.43. The father has failed to substantially improve parental deficiencies within twelve months following entry of the dispositional order. He has been expressly and understandably offered and/or provided all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting his parental deficiencies. . . . . 1.50. If there was a continuation of the parent-child relationship with the father, there is absolutely no reason to believe that he would take advantage of any of the necessary services. CP at 305-07 (Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship Regarding Father). The trial court made each of these findings upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. These findings support the conclusion that K.N.J. is dependent, i.e., has no parent capable of adequately caring for her and that returning her to Jenkins' custody would place her in danger of substantial damage to her psychological and/or physical development. [9] These findings and the other findings satisfy the remaining statutory elements of proof required before the parent-child relationship can be terminated: K.N.J. has been removed from the custody of Jenkins for at least six months (indeed, K.N.J. has never been in Jenkins' custody); services necessary for correction of Jenkins' parental deficiencies have been expressly and understandably offered or provided; there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that K.N.J. can be returned to Jenkins in the future; and the continuation of the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes K.N.J.'s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. ¶ 30 Jenkins was present at the termination trial, represented by counsel, and testified as a witness; additionally, his counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the State's witnesses. The ultimate goal of State intervention is reunification of the family. This case proceeded toward that goal as if there had been a valid dependency order; Jenkins was offered services and dependency review hearings were held. All procedural safeguards were met except for the initial dependency order that was later determined to be void. Inferring a finding of dependency does not violate any of Jenkins' constitutionally protected due process rights; the outcome here would have been the same had an elected judge issued the dependency order. This opinion should not be read as a license for the State to skip statutorily required steps; we reach this result on the specific facts of this case. Although we hold that the finding of dependency at the termination trial may satisfy the requirement of entry of a dependency order, a trial judge must scrutinize the evidence and enter an order of termination only if all factors are proved by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. ¶ 31 Having satisfied RCW 13.34.180, we now address the best interest of K.N.J. K.N.J. is nearly six years old and has never been in her father's custody. The trial court found that termination was in her best interest. We see no reason to disrupt the only permanency K.N.J. has ever known. Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Jenkins' parental rights to K.N.J.