Opinion ID: 1539955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Meyer Complaint Untimely Summary Judgment Was Appropriate

Text: Having determined that the statute of limitations for medical negligence actions begins to run from the date on which the allegedly negligent act or omission occurred and that the affidavit of merit requirement does not alter the beginning of the statute of limitations, we must next consider whether the defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based on the undisputed material facts. This Court's scope of review of the Superior Court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment is de novo. [80] Summary judgment is only appropriate where, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [81] This Court will review the questions of statutory interpretation, which are questions of law, do novo [82] to determine whether the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in formulating or applying legal precepts to the material facts presented. [83] We conclude that the Superior Court erred when it determined that the date of Meyer's injury was a question of fact for the jury. It is undisputed that the date of the allegedly negligent act was March 8, 2005, when the defendants failed to diagnose Meyer's cancer following her mammogram. It is also undisputed that Meyer filed her complaint on November 24, 2007. Section 6856 provides that no medical negligence action shall be brought after the expiration of two years from the date upon which such injury occurred. [84] This Court has held that there is no doubt that the phrase `injury occurred' refers to the date when the wrongful act or omission occurred. [85] Therefore, Meyer's injury occurred on March 8, 2005, the date of the allegedly negligent act, and there is no material factual dispute as to this issue. The Superior Court acknowledged that Meyer did not file her claim within two years of [the date of the allegedly negligent act]. [86] The Superior Court also noted that there are no grounds to extend that date beyond two years. [87] The Superior Court further recognized that [t]he undisputed facts reveal that the injury of which Meyer complains (the spread of her breast cancer) became known to her prior to the expiration of two years from the date of the alleged [medical negligence]. [88] Because the defendants demonstrated that no material facts were in dispute, the burden shifted to the plaintiff, as the non-moving party, to show the existence of material facts in dispute. [89] The plaintiff made three arguments: (1) her injury did not occur until her cancer metastasized on November 1, 2005; (2) her injury was unknowable until May 4, 2006, when she returned for her next annual mammogram; and (3) her injury occurred as part of a negligent course of treatment that continued until May 4, 2006. The Superior Court correctly rejected the second argument because [t]he undisputed facts reveal that Meyer became aware that she had metastasizing breast cancer in May 2006, well within the two years following the date of the alleged misdiagnosis in March 2005. [90] The Superior Court also correctly rejected the third argument because the undisputed facts reveal that the last alleged `negligent act' occurred on March 8, 2005. [91] As to the plaintiff's first argument, however, the Superior Court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that the enactment of the affidavit of merit requirement in 2003 changed the date on which the injury occurred for purposes of the statute of limitations in cases where the allegedly negligent act is failure to diagnose cancer or some other disease. Nothing in the language of section 6853 alters the application of section 6856 in medical negligence cases, even in those cases in which the allegedly negligent act is a failure to diagnose cancer. Absent legislative action, this Court's interpretation of section 6856 in Dunn and Meekins remains the law and, therefore, Meyer's injury occurred on March 8, 2005, the date the allegedly negligent act occurred. [92] This Court cannot rewrite clear statutes of limitations to provide exceptions. [93] The General Assembly made exceptions to the statute of limitations for some cases, such as with unknowable injuries and with children up to age six. [94] The 2003 amendments did not change this Court's holdings in Dunn or Meekins. There is no statutory basis to extend the exceptions to the statute of limitations beyond those expressly provided in the statute by the General Assembly. Based on the undisputed facts, summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law because the complaint failed to comply with the requirements of section 6856, as it was filed after the two-year statute of limitations for medical negligence claims had expired.