Opinion ID: 1759569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Cheryl converted equipment belonging to C.A.R. Transportation

Text: For its first point on appeal, C.A.R. Transportation argues that the trial court erred in finding that Cheryl Seay did not convert property belonging to it. According to C.A.R. Transportation, Cheryl acted in concert with Michael in converting the equipment located at 507 Paige Boulevard. C.A.R. Transportation avers that even if Cheryl did not physically convert the equipment, she is still guilty of conversion as the testimony indicated that she was aware that a trailer parked at her house contained items that the court had ordered returned, and by failing to comply with that order, she committed conversion. Cheryl argues that the trial court correctly determined that she did not have any dealings with the items that were found to have been converted and formed the basis for the damages assessed by the trial court. In addition, she avers that because the trial court's order directed the Seays not to move anything, she could not have moved any property that she might have seen for fear of violating the court's order. Findings of fact of a trial court sitting as a jury will not be reversed on appeal unless clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Graham Constr. Co. v. Earl, 362 Ark. 220, 208 S.W.3d 106 (2005). Since the question of the preponderance of the evidence turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, this court defers to the superior position of the trial court. Id. Conversion is a common-law tort action for the wrongful possession or disposition of another's property. Mack v. Sutter, 366 Ark. 1, 233 S.W.3d 140 (2006); Hatchell v. Wren, 363 Ark. 107, 211 S.W.3d 516 (2005). In order to establish liability for the tort of conversion, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant wrongfully committed a distinct act of dominion over the property of another, which is a denial of or is inconsistent with the owner's rights. Id. If the defendant exercises control over the goods in exclusion or defiance of the owner's rights, it is a conversion, whether it is for defendant's own use or another's use. Id. In the present case, Cheryl testified that the only items that she removed from 507 Paige Boulevard were a few trash cans, some cleaning supplies, and a curio cabinet. There was no evidence presented that Cheryl exercised any distinct act of dominion over any of the equipment found to have been converted by Michael. In fact, there was limited evidence presented with regard to Cheryl's actions in moving items from the Paige Boulevard property. Other than Cheryl's testimony that she only moved a few personal items, her daughter, Laura Henry, testified that it was her father, Michael, who called her and asked her to help move some office furniture. Laura stated that her mother was at the Paige Boulevard property and that they put a couple of things in my mom's vehicle. And most of the stuff went into a trailer. Laura also testified that she never saw anybody moving anything out, nor did she see any equipment being moved out of the shop. In addition, Clifford Riggins, President of C.A.R. Transportation, testified that he observed Michael, Cheryl, their children, and Mary and Gayle Robbins moving stuff from the office and shop and loading it into vehicles. Riggins further testified, however, that he observed these actions from a distance and could not tell exactly what they were hauling. As previously stated, this court gives due deference to the superior position of the trial judge to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Stewart v. Combs, 368 Ark. 121, 243 S.W.3d 294 (2006); Earl, 362 Ark. 220, 208 S.W.3d 106. In light of our deferential standard, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Cheryl did not commit the act of conversion where there was no evidence that she had any dealings with the converted items. Before leaving this point, we note that we are unpersuaded by C.A.R. Transportation's argument that evidence demonstrating that Cheryl knew that a trailer parked at her house contained items that had been removed from the Paige Boulevard property proves that Cheryl committed conversion. Likewise, C.A.R. Transportation's argument that joint and several liability attaches to Cheryl for conversion is not well taken. There was simply insufficient evidence to support a finding that Cheryl was jointly and severally liable, where her testimony that she took only a few items of personal property from the Paige Boulevard property was uncontroverted.