Opinion ID: 2229658
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: motion for blood testing

Text: The siblings contend that the district court erred in affirming the county court's overruling of their motion for genetic blood testing of Chaney and Johnson pursuant to Neb.Ct.R. of Discovery 35 (rev. 1992). Subsection (a) of that rule provides: When the mental or physical condition (including the blood group) of a party ... is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order the party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician.... The order may be made only on motion for good cause shown.... We agree with the county court that [t]he alpha and omega of this suit can be found in the Nebraska Probate Code at Sec. 30-2309. Section 30-2309 states in relevant part: If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine succession by, through, or from a person, .... (2) ... a person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also a child of the father, if: ... (ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or is established thereafter by strict, clear and convincing proof. (Emphasis supplied.) When Donna Trew filed her complaint in divorce, she alleged that two children, Rickie and Sandra, had been born as issue of her marriage to Earl Trew. In those divorce proceedings, Earl Trew was ordered to pay child support for the minor children of the parties. He was granted visitation rights with the minor children of the parties. The record reflects that Earl Trew was represented by counsel at all stages of the divorce proceedings and was present in the divorce court when an oral and a written stipulation of the parties concerning the parties' minor children were offered and received in evidence by the divorce court. Although he could have contested his paternity of Chaney and Johnson at that time, he obviously chose not to do so. The Colorado divorce proceedings involving Earl and Donna Trew constituted a final adjudication of paternity many years before the death of Earl Trew within the meaning of § 30-2309(2)(ii). Although § 30-2309(2) applies specifically to children born out of wedlock, the county court is correct in its finding that the statute applies a fortiori to children born in wedlock. Section 30-2309(2) does not give illegitimate children rights of inheritance superior to those of legitimate children. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518, 58 L.Ed.2d 503 (1978) (noting that the purpose of a statutory evidentiary standard for proof of paternity allowing illegitimate children to inherit from their intestate fathers is to grant illegitimates insofar as practicable rights of inheritance on a par with those of legitimate children). In probate proceedings, there is no rational basis for making a distinction between a determination of paternity in a filiation proceeding and a determination of paternity in a divorce or dissolution proceeding. We hold as a matter of law that when the paternity of a person has been established by final order in a lawsuit in which the father has participated as a party during his lifetime, the person's paternity cannot be relitigated in connection with the distribution of the father's estate. To hold otherwise would permit an inferior court to invalidate prior final determinations of paternity by courts of general jurisdiction. It would also raise havoc with the efficient and orderly settlement of estates and the dependability of titles to property passing under the intestacy laws of this state. Although the county court invoked the doctrine of collateral estoppel in combination with § 30-2309 to overrule the siblings' motion for blood testing, we find § 30-2309 alone to be dispositive of the issue on the facts of this case. We therefore affirm the order of the district court affirming the county court's judgment. When the record demonstrates that the decision of the trial court is correct, although such correctness is based on different grounds from those assigned by the trial court, an appellate court will affirm. State v. $15,518, 239 Neb. 100, 474 N.W.2d 659 (1991).