Opinion ID: 3167409
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Drug Smuggler Profile Testimony

Text: Ramos next contends that the district court erred in admitting expert testimony from a Texas Department of Public Safety narcotics agent regarding the practices and habits of individuals who smuggle drugs across the border. Ramos contends that the testimony did not simply provide information about drug smuggling operations but instead compared his actions with the profile of a drug trafficker, thereby providing inadmissible opinion testimony about his guilt. This court generally reviews a district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2002). The government argues that although Ramos filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the use of the drug smuggler profile testimony, because Ramos did not object at trial, the claim should be reviewed for plain error. In his reply brief, Ramos contends that because the district court definitively ruled on the motion in limine regarding the evidentiary objection, no further objection was required under Rule 103(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 103(b) provides as follows: “Once the court rules definitively on the record–either before or at trial–a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” Here, during a pretrial conference, the district court denied the motion in limine regarding the challenged expert testimony, explaining that the government was entitled to present expert testimony of “drug courier conduct in general.” Additionally, the court explained that the government was prohibited from soliciting 10 Case: 14-50846 Document: 00513330455 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/05/2016 No. 14-50846 testimony “as to the ultimate guilt or state of mind of the defendant.” The court directed the government “to be very careful to school your expert not to be making any references directly to the defendant, but rather just to give expert testimony as long as they’re properly qualified.” (emphasis added). At oral argument before this court, Ramos asserted that the district court’s ruling failed to exclude testimony that implicitly amounted to an opinion that the defendant had knowledge of the drugs in the hidden compartment. We are not necessarily convinced that Ramos sufficiently raised this particular argument before the district court. Nonetheless, because we conclude the testimony was admissible, we assume for purposes of this appeal that the claim is properly preserved.
At trial, when the prosecutor moved to qualify Agent Sanchez as an expert, Ramos’s attorney expressly stated that there was no objection. Thus, the issue on appeal is not whether the agent was an expert but whether the expert’s testimony was inadmissible. The Federal Rules of Evidence circumscribe when an expert witness may testify with respect to a disputed matter at trial. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d at 662. Rule 702(a) provides that an expert may testify if his “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” However, “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” FED. R. EVID. 704(b). In the case at bar, the principal issue was whether Ramos knew that the cocaine was in his truck’s hidden compartment. Thus, Rule 704(b) prohibited Agent Sanchez from stating an opinion as to whether Ramos knew that the drugs were in the compartment. 11 Case: 14-50846 Document: 00513330455 Page: 12 Date Filed: 01/05/2016 No. 14-50846 Additionally, this court has explained that a drug smuggler profile is “a compilation of characteristics that aid law enforcement officials in identifying persons who might be trafficking in illegal narcotics.” United States v. Medeles-Cab, 754 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “In ‘pure profile evidence’ cases, law enforcement personnel seek to testify that because a defendant’s conduct matches the profile of a drug courier, the defendant must have known about the drugs he was transporting.” Id. (citation omitted). This court has made clear that “drug courier profile evidence is inadmissible to prove substantive guilt based on similarities between defendants and a profile.” Id. (internal citation marks and citations omitted). Testimony regarding methods that are unique to the drug business can help a jury understand the importance and implications of evidence presented at trial. Id. On the other hand, testimony that a defendant fits a drug smuggler profile runs the risk of suggesting that an innocent person had knowledge of the illegal drug offense. Id. “Our cases demonstrate that inadmissible drug courier profile testimony involves an agent drawing a direct connection between a drug courier characteristic (or characteristics) and the defendant in order to establish the defendant’s guilt.” Id. If, instead, an agent only testifies regarding certain characteristics of drug trafficking and does not draw a connection between the characteristic(s) and the defendant, that testimony is admissible. Id. The government contends that Agent Sanchez’s testimony was properly admitted because he never made any direct reference to Ramos and did not opine as to Ramos’s knowledge or guilt regarding the cocaine. The government correctly contends that Sanchez never referenced Ramos or his state of mind; however, that does not completely resolve the issue. The proper inquiry is whether the expert’s “testimony is the ‘functional equivalent’ of an opinion that the defendant knew he was carrying drugs.” United States v. Gonzalez12 Case: 14-50846 Document: 00513330455 Page: 13 Date Filed: 01/05/2016 No. 14-50846 Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 364 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d at 663–64). In Gutierrez-Farias, although the expert witness did not specifically reference the defendant, his testimony “presented the jury with a simple generalization: In most drug cases, the person hired to transport the drugs knows the drugs are in the vehicle.” 294 F.3d at 663. Accordingly, this court concluded that the expert testimony crossed the line between an explanation of the witness’s analysis of the facts and an impermissible opinion on the ultimate legal issue in the case. Id. Thus, we must determine whether Agent Sanchez’s testimony was an explanation of the facts of the case or an impermissible opinion regarding whether Ramos knew that the cocaine was in his vehicle. During Agent Sanchez’s direct examination, he testified regarding several characteristics of drug couriers, including: (1) drug smugglers being matched to the type of vehicle they drive (example of cowboy-type to a pickup truck); (2) drug smugglers use the voids in the vehicle to hide the drugs; (3) drug smugglers change license plates to avoid detection; (4) drug smugglers use “burner” cell phones that have virtually no history or personal information attached to the phone; and (5) the time line for the travel pattern of a drug smuggler from Mexico to a hub city in the United States and back to Mexico. A careful reading of Agent Sanchez’s testimony indicates that it was an explanation of the facts of the case, and it made no assertion or generalization regarding Ramos’s knowledge. Thus, we conclude that Sanchez’s testimony was not the “functional equivalent” of an opinion that Ramos knew he was transporting drugs. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 364. In a related argument, Ramos contends that the government’s closing argument was improper because it connected the dots between the expert’s testimony and the evidence admitted at trial regarding Ramos’s conduct. In other words, the government relied upon Agent Sanchez’s testimony to argue 13 Case: 14-50846 Document: 00513330455 Page: 14 Date Filed: 01/05/2016 No. 14-50846 that Ramos knew that the cocaine was in his truck. However, Ramos did not object to the government’s closing argument. Thus, this argument is reviewed for plain error. To succeed on plain error review, an appellant must show (1) a forfeited error (2) that is clear or obvious and (3) that affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he makes that showing, this court may exercise its discretion “to remedy the error . . . only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). In United States v. Sanchez-Hernandez, this court rejected a similar challenge to the government’s closing argument. 507 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2007). In that case, although the government had avoided eliciting an inadmissible opinion from the expert witness that the drug smugglers would not have allowed an outsider to participate, the prosecutor had made that argument to the jury. Id. at 833. This court acknowledged that its precedent criticizes the admission of this kind of direct testimony. Id. Nonetheless, it held that it was not error for the government to argue this inference when a defendant possessed illicit drugs and claims he had no knowledge of the drugs. Id. Thus, in the case at bar, it was not error, plain or otherwise, for the government to rely on Agent Sanchez’s testimony in support of its argument that Ramos had knowledge of the cocaine in his truck’s hidden compartment.