Opinion ID: 4533287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Drug Offender Surcharge

Text: ¶16 Section 18-19-103(1)(a) provides that “each drug offender who is convicted . . . shall be required to pay a surcharge . . . in the following amount[]: . . . [f]or each . . . level 1 drug felony . . . , four thousand five hundred 9 dollars[.]”7 § 18-19-103(1)(a) (emphasis added). Like the division, we read the statutory phrase “shall be required to pay” as a mandate to the trial court to impose the drug offender surcharge whenever it sentences a drug offender. As we explained in People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 28, 393 P.3d 962, 969, the “use of the word ‘shall’ in a statute generally indicates [the legislature’s] intent for the term to be mandatory.” See also Ryan Ranch Cmty. Ass’n v. Kelley, 2016 CO 65, ¶ 42, 380 P.3d 137, 146 (comparing “shall” to “must” and noting that each “connotes a mandatory requirement”). ¶17 Relying on subsections (6)(a) and (6)(b) of the drug offender surcharge statute, however, Waddell insists that the surcharge cannot be deemed mandatory because the trial court has discretion to waive it. We are unpersuaded. ¶18 Subsection (6)(a) provides that “[t]he court may not waive any portion of the surcharge . . . unless the court first finds that the drug offender is financially unable to pay any portion of said surcharge.” § 18-19-103(6)(a). And subsection (6)(b) states that such a finding “shall only be made after a hearing at which the 7 It is undisputed that Waddell is a “drug offender” for purposes of section 18-19-103(1)(a) based on his level 1 drug felony conviction. See § 18-19-102(2), C.R.S. (2019) (“‘Drug offender’ means any person convicted of any offense under article 18 of this title or an attempt to commit such offense as provided by article 2 of this title.”). 10 drug offender shall have the burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that he is financially unable to pay any portion of the surcharge.” § 18-19-103(6)(b). To be sure, when a defendant presents clear and convincing evidence at a hearing that he lacks the financial means to pay any portion of the drug offender surcharge, the trial court is vested with discretion to waive that portion of the surcharge. But absent a subsection (6)(a) finding following a subsection (6)(b) hearing, the trial court lacks authority to waive any portion of the surcharge. Because the trial court here did not hold the necessary hearing or make the necessary finding, it had no choice but to impose the mandatory surcharge. Consequently, the sentence imposed in open court was not authorized by law. See People v. Baker, 2019 CO 97M, ¶ 19, 452 P.3d 759, 762 (“[A] sentence is not authorized by law within the meaning of Rule 35(a) if any of the sentence’s components fail to comply with the sentencing statutes.”). ¶19 We are aware that a different division of the court of appeals reached a contrary conclusion in People v. McQuarrie, 66 P.3d 181 (Colo. App. 2002). The division there held that “the drug offender surcharge is . . . not mandatory” and that double jeopardy principles required the trial court to impose it during the sentencing hearing “in open court.” Id. at 183. Because McQuarrie is inconsistent with this opinion and Yeadon, we now overrule it. 11 ¶20 In sum, the sentence Waddell received on his level 1 drug felony conviction was not authorized by law because it did not include the mandatory drug offender surcharge. As such, the sentence was subject to correction by the trial court at any time pursuant to Rule 35(a) without violating Waddell’s rights under the Double Jeopardy Clauses.