Opinion ID: 676701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Racial Composition of Georgia-Pacific's Workforce

Text: 25 Stringfield argues on appeal that evidence of disparity in the racial composition of the Wakefield Mill's salaried and hourly workforce is probative of Georgia-Pacific's discriminatory motive in demoting him. Stringfield claims that the District Court erroneously concluded that it could not consider certain evidence related to the racial composition of the employer's workforce. Br. of Appellant at 2. 26 It is undisputed that the evidence regarding the racial composition of Georgia-Pacific's workforce was admitted at trial. In its conclusions of law, however, the district court found that 27 [a]lthough gross statistical disparities ... alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination, (footnote omitted) because this is not a disparate impact claim, the Court cannot draw any inference from the statistical distribution of Georgia-Pacific's employees. 28 Slip Op. at 8. Even if the district court erred in deciding that it could not consider Stringfield's statistical evidence, such an error would by no means require reversal. In short, Stringfield could not prevail on the basis of his statistical evidence. 29 Stringfield contends that the segregation of the hourly workforce among the various departments in the Mill as well as the predominately white salaried workforce (as compared with the predominately black hourly workforce) is evidence of the racial motivation behind his demotion. This statistical data, however, even if it were to be accepted as true, is not probative of anything material. [I]n order to prove a prima facie case, the complainant[ ] must compare the racial composition of the jobs in question and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor pool. Mallory v. Booth Refrigeration Supply Co., Inc., 882 F.2d 908, 912 (4th Cir.1989). Stringfield offered no evidence regarding which hourly employees might be qualified for which salaried jobs. Moreover, Stringfield offered no persuasive evidence regarding the promotional opportunities which allegedly had been denied to black candidates. As a result, any statistical disparity between the hourly and salaried workforce is meaningless. The Court also does not believe that any meaningful inferences be drawn from the alleged segregation among the various departments in the Mill. Thus, the trial court's decision not to consider the statistical evidence, if erroneous at all, does not constitute reversible error. 30 3. Admission of Evidence Related to Qualifications Necessary to Fill the Position for Which Georgia-Pacific Chose Carr Over Stringfield 31 Stringfield contends that the district court erred in permitting Georgia-Pacific to place in evidence testimony and exhibits related to the duties of Quality Control Supervisor. In the Fourth Circuit, evidentiary rulings are reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. See Persinger v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 920 F.2d 1185, 1187 (4th Cir.1990). This Court cannot find error in the admission of this evidence. 32 It is hardly an abuse of discretion to admit evidence in a Title VII case that is clearly relevant, if not to a plaintiff's prima facie case, then to the defendant's asserted reason for taking the adverse employment action at issue. It is Georgia-Pacific's contention that having made the business decision to consolidate the Quality Control and Planer Mill Supervisor positions, it chose Carr to fill that position (and demoted Stringfield) because Carr had the necessary qualifications. Evidence regarding the duties of Quality Control Supervisor, which were subsumed in the new consolidated position, is thus relevant to the determination of whether Stringfield or Carr was more qualified for the new position. Stringfield's objection to the admission of the evidence must therefore be rejected. 33 4. The Acknowledgement of the EEOC Determination 34 Included in the Findings of Fact appended to its Final Order, the district court noted, in laying out the procedural history of the case that 35 [i]n December 1991, Stringfield filed a race discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that Georgia-Pacific had demoted him as a result of his race. The EEOC ruled that Stringfield had not proven race discrimination, either directly or through circumstantial evidence. 36 Slip Op. at 6. Other than in this paragraph, the district court did not mention the EEOC determination in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Final Order. Nonetheless, Stringfield contends that by acknowledging the EEOC determination, the district court committed prejudicial error, because neither party offered it in evidence at trial. 37 It is undisputed that the EEOC's reasonable cause determination was never admitted in evidence at trial.  It appears that the trial judge included a reference to it in his Findings of Fact solely to set out the procedural history of the case. 38 Even if this Court were to assume that the trial court erred in admitting the result of the EEOC determination, such error does not require reversal. In short, there is no indication that the trial judge relied on the EEOC determination in reaching his decision. In view of the complete absence of anything tending to show that the result of the EEOC's investigation induced the district court to make an essential finding which he would not otherwise have made, reversal would be neither required nor appropriate, even if the evidence had been admitted in error. See Multi-Medical Convalescent and Nursing Center of Towson v. N.L.R.B., 550 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977) (It has long been settled (footnote omitted) that an appellate court will not reverse a judgment in a nonjury case because of the admission of incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent evidence is insufficient to support the judgment or unless it affirmatively appears that the incompetent evidence induced the court to make an essential finding which could not have otherwise have been made.) 39 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the trial court's factual determinations were not clearly erroneous and that the trial court made no procedural errors warranting reversal. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED