Opinion ID: 695556
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of a Firearm: U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1)

Text: 36 Price challenges the district court's determination that he possessed the .44 handgun for purposes of applying the two-level increase under Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1). He concedes that in light of our intervening decision in United States v. Mumford, 25 F.3d 461 (7th Cir.1994), Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) is not limited to those instances where the firearm was possessed during the offense of conviction. Rather, it applies where the defendant is accountable for the possession of a weapon by a co-conspirator during drug trafficking conduct relevant to the offense of conviction, of which the defendant was charged but not convicted, even where the weapon was not present during the offense of conviction. Id. at 468 (footnote omitted). Price argues instead that the facts in Mumford which gave rise to a finding of co-conspirator liability are not present in this case. Price argues that a finding in Mumford that the defendant was liable for his co-conspirator's possession of a weapon was warranted because the record demonstrated that the co-conspirator brandished and shot the gun in the presence of the defendant while they were en route to a drug deal. Here, Price argues, there is nothing in the record indicating that the gun was ever retrieved from the trunk of Pierce's car, let alone brandished or discharged in Price's presence. 37 We will review Price's challenges to the district court's factual findings under the clear error standard, which is to say that we will not reverse those findings unless left with a definite and firm conviction that the court made a clear mistake. See Mumford, 25 F.3d at 465. 38 We do not agree with Price's understanding of Mumford. Mumford did not base its determination of co-conspirator liability solely on the fact that the co-conspirator brandished and shot the weapon in the defendant's presence. Rather, it was sufficient in that case that the defendant was aware of the co-conspirator's possession of the weapon during the drug offenses in which both were involved. See Mumford, 25 F.3d at 469. This is so because the presence of firearms can provide an additional sense of security which in turn can facilitate the purchase and protection of drugs, as well as increase the danger of violence that all too often attends such activities. Id. at 469. 39 Here the record demonstrates that Price knew that Pierce had brought along a weapon. Price testified at Pierce's trial that Pierce told him during their trip that there was a gun in the trunk of the car. According to Mumford, Pierce's possession of the gun, of which Price was aware and which was part of the same course of conduct as Price's offense of conviction, was properly imputed to Price for purposes of applying the two-level enhancement of Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1). Moreover, Price has not urged, nor could we conclude, that this is a situation in which it is clearly improbable that the weapon was unconnected with the offense. Application Note 3 to U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1). Therefore, the district court's finding that Price possessed the gun for purposes of the Sec. 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement was not clearly erroneous.