Opinion ID: 1060628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Cross-Examination of Detective Nichols

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to cross-examine Detective Nichols with a statement the defendant later made to other officers. The underlying circumstances are as follows: On the day after the killing, the defendant, having waived his Miranda rights, gave an oral statement to Detective James Nichols. The defendant admitted that he had been looking for the victim when he found her in a bar in the company of another man, and that, following an argument, he stabbed both the victim and the man. The record indicates that Nichols took notes of the interview, but the statement was not transcribed or recorded. When Nichols was then called away on another case, the defendant, after receiving his Miranda rights a second time, gave a statement to Detectives Sullivan and Stewart. This statement was placed in writing; it was similar to what the defendant had told Nichols, but contained the defendant's assertion that the victim carried a gun and had shot at him on an earlier occasion. At trial, Nichols testified as to the defendant's oral statement. Nichols' notes from the interview were not introduced. The defense then sought to cross-examine Nichols by introducing the portion of the defendant's written statement in which he told Sullivan and Stewart that the victim carried a gun and had once shot at him. The trial court refused to allow the cross-examination on the basis that Nichols did not have personal knowledge of what the defendant may have told the other officers. The State maintains that this ruling was proper. In support of his position, the defendant relies primarily on the following language found in Espitia v. State, 199 Tenn. 696, 288 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1956), and later cases: When a confession is admissible, the whole of what the accused said upon the subject at the time of making the confession is admissible and should be taken together; and if the prosecution fails to prove the whole statement, the accused is entitled to put in evidence all that was said to and by him at the time which bears upon the subject of controversy including any exculpatory or self-serving declarations connected therewith. Id. (quoting 20 Am.Jur. Evidence § 488 (1939)). At least one treatise contains similar language, 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 885 (1989 & Supp.1999). In a later case, Sambolin v. State, 215 Tenn. 569, 387 S.W.2d 817, 819 (1965), citing language similar to that found in Espitia , the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in allowing an officer to testify as to the defendant's statement when the State had failed to furnish a copy of the summary found in the police report to the defendant. Likewise, in State v. Robinson, 622 S.W.2d 62, 69-70 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980), the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that the defendant should have been permitted to introduce his statement, including an exculpatory portion, following the State's introduction of a version that had been redacted to comply with the Bruton rule. [5] These Tennessee decisions relied on by the defendant are, however, factually distinguishable from the present case and, in any event, predate the enactment of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence. We therefore turn to the analogous provision found in Tenn. R. Evid. 106, which states: When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. Id. As one commentator has said, this so-called rule of completeness allows the trier of fact to assess related information at the same time rather than piecemeal. Neil P. Cohen et al., Tennessee Law of Evidence § 106.1, at 33 (3d ed.1995). In our view, Rule 106 reflects the concern for fairness found in cases such as Espitia that the trier of fact be permitted to assess related information without being misled by hearing only certain portions of evidence. Cohen, § 106.1, at 33. Accordingly, it appears that where the prosecution introduces a statement made by the defendant, the trial court may in the interest of fairness order that the remainder of the statement be admitted as well under Rule 106. Indeed, it would not be consistent with fundamental fairness to allow the prosecution to introduce only the most incriminating portions of a defendant's statement without regard to the overall context or relevant exculpatory portions found in the same statement. As Espitia indicates, the jury is to determine which statements to accredit. In any event, we conclude that Rule 106 is not applicable and that the defendant is not entitled to relief in this case. In short, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the defendant, in essence, gave two statements: an oral statement to Detective Nichols followed by a written statement to Detectives Sullivan and Stewart. The statements were given to different officers, and the defendant was read his Miranda rights before giving each statement. Moreover, it appears that Detective Nichols did not have personal knowledge of what the defendant later told Sullivan and Stewart. The State did not call Sullivan or Stewart as witnesses, nor did it attempt to introduce the written statement. [6] Likewise, the defendant did not call these witnesses. Finally, we observe that the defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue because there was other evidence in the record that the victim had threatened to kill the defendant on the day in question. Under these circumstances, our narrow holding is that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to cross-examine Nichols with a statement made by the defendant to two other officers.