Opinion ID: 3030367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel 26 See Bradley, 315 F.3d at 1101. 27 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. 28 Id. at 694. 29 See Williams I, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 30 Id. at 406. 31 See Cooperwood, 245 F.3d at 1046. COOPER-SMITH v. PALMATEER 1947 claim, Petitioner has to show that his attorney’s competence fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.”32 To conduct that analysis, “Strickland requires a reviewing court to ‘determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.’ ”33 “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential”34 and “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable[.]”35 In this case, the Oregon post-conviction trial court made the following findings of fact:36 1. Trial counsel filed a motion to suppress on petitioner’s behalf. Prior to the motion being heard, petitioner decided to enter into a negotiated settlement. Trial counsel was prepared to pursue all of petitioner’s challenges to the search, had not petitioner decided to enter into a stipulated agreement. 32 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 383-87 (1986); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 33 Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 386 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The parties have argued that we must adopt one of two potentially applicable standards from Supreme Court precedent to decide this case. They are: (1) the ineffectiveness standard for failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim, see Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375, 383-87, or (2) the ineffectiveness standard from the guilty plea context. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 57. We need not decide which test to apply because under either approach, Petitioner has to show that his attorney’s competence fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375; Hill, 474 U.S. at 57. 34 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 35 Id. at 690. 36 We presume these findings of fact to be correct and Petitioner has “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 1948 COOPER-SMITH v. PALMATEER 2. Trial counsel adequately explained petition- er’s options and rights to him before he decided to enter into the negotiated settlement. Petitioner has failed to rebut these facts.37 Moreover, the record strongly suggests that Counsel’s decision not to pursue the motion to suppress after Petitioner agreed to a stipulated facts trial was a strategic decision. [7] Accordingly, we conclude that Counsel was prepared to pursue the motion to suppress and that Counsel and Petitioner made a strategic choice not to pursue that motion. That choice falls within the broad range of constitutionally adequate representation. As a result, Petitioner’s claim fails the first prong of the Strickland test.38 Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based on this claim and we affirm. B. Failure to Call Dr. True at the Sentencing Hearing [8] When the Supreme Court established the test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland, the Court expressly declined to “consider the role of counsel in an ordinary sentencing, which . . . may require a different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance.”39 Since Strickland, the Supreme Court has not decided what standard should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the noncapital sentencing context. Consequently, there is no clearly established law in this context. Because the Supreme Court has not clearly established what constitutes ineffective assistance in this context, other courts are free to do so.40 37 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 38 Because Petitioner must meet both prongs to be entitled to habeas relief, we do not reach the second prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 39 Id. at 686. 40 See Williams I, 529 U.S. at 412-13. COOPER-SMITH v. PALMATEER 1949 [9] The Oregon post-conviction trial court appears to have applied the two-prong Strickland analysis to Petitioner’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on Counsel’s failure to call Dr. True at sentencing. In doing so, the court concluded that Counsel’s decision not to call Dr. True to testify at the sentencing hearing did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the Supreme Court has not expanded Strickland to this context, the Oregon postconviction trial court was free to do so. Accordingly, the Oregon post-conviction trial court’s conclusion was not “contrary to”, or “an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”41 Consequently, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim and we affirm.