Opinion ID: 791166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Culver's Ability to Establish Causation

Text: 10 Culver contends that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on her Title VII and Equal Pay Act retaliation claims. To establish a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the protected expression and the adverse action. Krause v. City of La Crosse, 246 F.3d 995, 1000 (7th Cir.2001). For purposes of summary judgment only, Gorman concedes that Culver engaged in protected activity and that she suffered an adverse employment action. A causal link between the protected expression and an adverse employment action may be established by showing that the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's decision. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). A motivating factor does not amount to a but-for factor or to the only factor, but is rather a factor that motivated the defendant's actions. Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 (7th Cir.2004). 2 11 In her appellate brief, Culver relies on the direct method to establish a causal link between her allegations of sex discrimination and her termination. The direct method can be supported either with direct or with circumstantial evidence; direct evidence essentially requires an admission by the decision maker that his actions were based on the prohibited animus and so is rarely present. Rogers v. City of Chicago, 320 F.3d 748, 753 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation omitted). Culver presents no evidence that Gorman admitted a retaliatory termination. But circumstantial evidence can establish a causal link if the trier of fact can infer intentional discrimination. Id. 12 Once the plaintiff has succeeded in making a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same action would have occurred in the absence of the protected conduct. Spiegla, 371 F.3d at 943. The persuasiveness of the defendant's explanation is normally for the finder of fact to assess, unless the court can say without reservation that a reasonable finder of fact would be compelled to credit the employer's case on this point. Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir.1997). Summary judgment should be granted only if the defendant presents unrebutted evidence that he would have taken the adverse employment action against the plaintiff even if he had no retaliatory motive. Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.2002). 13 Viewing Culver's evidence in the light most favorable to her, as the summary judgment standard requires, Culver has satisfactorily demonstrated a causal link between her protected expression—complaints concerning gender discrimination—and an adverse employment action—her termination. Of major significance is the fact that only three days had elapsed between Culver's initial complaint of discrimination and her termination. This short 72-hour period clearly gives rise to an inference of suspicious timing. But this is not the only evidence of retaliation. We have never said that [temporal proximity] is dispositive in providing or disproving a causal link. Sitar v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir.2003). We have, however, noted that it will rarely be sufficient in and of itself to create a triable issue. Stone, 281 F.3d at 644. 14 This case is not one of the rare occasions envisioned by Stone where suspicious timing alone is enough to establish causation. For suspicious timing may permit a plaintiff to survive summary judgment if there is other evidence that supports the inference of a causal link. Lang v. Ill. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 361 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir.2004). Suspicious timing is thus often an important evidentiary ally of the plaintiff. Lalvani v. Cook County, Ill., 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir.2001). When an adverse employment action follows on the close heels of protected expression and the plaintiff can show the person who decided to impose the adverse action knew of the protected conduct, the causation element of the prima facie case is typically satisfied. Id. Here, there is no question that Schroeder knew of Culver's complaints, and a mere 72 hours elapsed between the time Culver first complained to him of discrimination and his abrupt decision to terminate her, rendering close temporal proximity utterly transparent. 15 But the evidence also suggests more than closeness in time between Culver's allegations of discrimination and her termination. Culver's termination followed closely on the heels of her annual performance evaluation completed by Schroeder, in which he stated that she had met or exceeded all expectations. Contrary to Gorman's argument to the contrary, an employer's sudden dissatisfaction with an employee's performance after that employee engaged in a protected activity may constitute circumstantial evidence of causation. Lang, 361 F.3d at 419-21 (considering plaintiff's previous five-year flawless employment record as circumstantial evidence giving rise to an inference of causation when combined with other circumstantial evidence). Culver's satisfactory performance review, together with Schroeder's insistence that he harbored no desire to fire her at the time of her annual review, establish that she was in no danger of losing her job until after she made her allegations of gender discrimination. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Culver, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the radical reversal of Gorman's perception of Culver's fitness as an employee was closely associated with her protected activity, and thus contributes to an inference of causation. 16 The final piece of circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of causation is Schroeder's alleged warning to Culver that her meeting with Jorde was ill-advised. Schroeder ostensibly advised Culver several times that her meeting with Jorde would not alter anything since Gorman's budget was already set, and apparently also warned her that she was making a mistake talking with Peter. Schroeder ultimately fulfilled his own prophecy by firing Culver immediately after she repeated, at Jorde's direction, the very same allegations of discrimination that she had previously made to Jorde. When viewed in the light most favorable to Culver, Schroeder's warning, together with the highly probative timing and the rapid reversal of Gorman's evaluation of her work performance, creates a triable inference that her complaints of discrimination were a substantial and motivating factor in her termination. 17