Opinion ID: 2650680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The judicial proceedings in Dickens’s case.

Text: The procedural posture for Dickens is different. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Dickens, 926 P.2d 468 (Ariz. 1996). In August 1999, Dickens filed an action for postconviction relief (“PCR”) in the state trial court. In October 2000, the trial court issued a 33-page order denying relief. Most of the order addressed the nine allegations of IAC by trial and appellate counsel, which included a claim that Dickens “was denied the effective assistance of counsel in the penalty stage.” Dickens presented a mitigation specialist who testified that, in her opinion, defense counsel’s preparation for the mitigation and sentencing phase was inadequate and unreliable. The trial court disagreed, writing: 46 DICKENS V. RYAN The record reflects that defense counsel effectively elicited the testimony of mental health experts, family members and support witnesses who were well qualified and credible. Defense counsel presented numerous mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing. The performance of defense counsel is not to be judged by the outcome. Of course a person, exercising hindsight, can urge that more should have been done, however, under the circumstances at the time, defense counsel’s assistance to Petitioner both in trial and during the penalty phase was professional, reasonable and effective. Most certainly, it did not fall to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Strickland. Further, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any performance of defense counsel. Concluding on this claim, it is noted that it was the defendant/Petitioner’s conduct, state of mind and participation in these crimes that led to the jury verdicts and the sentence imposed. It was not any inadequacy upon the part of either trial counsel or appellate counsel. Dickens filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court, which the court summarily denied. Dickens then filed a habeas petition in the District Court for Arizona. On July 14, 2008, the district court denied the petition in a 145-page decision. Among the claims the court DICKENS V. RYAN 47 considered and denied was Dickens’s claim of IAC by trial counsel (Claim 19). The district court carefully considered the performances of both trial counsel and PCR counsel and concluded that trial counsel’s performance at sentencing was neither deficient nor prejudicial.