Opinion ID: 1735417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Third Aggravator.

Text: ś 194. Walker claims that the trial court erred in giving the third aggravator offered, which stated: 3. Whether the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. ś 195. In support of his claim, Walker argues in his brief that the murder was nothing more than a stabbing in the commission of a robbery, with no lingering suffering, no lingering pain, no mutilation, no dismemberment, and no severing. In his brief, Walker states: There was no evidence before the jury to suggest any additional acts to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies as conscienceless, pitiless or unnecessarily torturous. This aggravating circumstance was improperly submitted to the jury. Furthermore, Walker claims that there is absolutely no proof whatsoever that Walker intended to torture. Walker, during oral argument before this Court, argued that, There was nothing out of the ordinary in this killing. This issue has been fully discussed in Issue XI, subsection A, supra. For the sake of conciseness, we will not again discuss this issue because to do so would be repetitive. Suffice is to say, Walker stabbed and/or slashed Richardson twenty-five times in his head, neck, face, temple, ear, nose, cheeks, arms, chest, scalp, hand, abdomen, back, chin and lip. Richardson attempted to ward off the attack, but Walker kept on stabbing and slashing. Walker then waited for Richardson to bleed to death before taking Richardson's personal belongings, and setting Richardson's house afire. There was testimony that Richardson's murder was torturous and that Richardson suffered excessive pain. ś 196. We hold that there was an abundance of evidence to support the giving of the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravator. Moreover, Walker has cited no relevant authority requiring Walker to have intended to torture Richardson in order for the murder to be, in fact torturous. As such, this issue fails. See Simmons, 805 So.2d at 487 (citing Williams, 708 So.2d at 1362-63) (failure to cite any relevant authority obviates our obligation to review such issues).
ś 197. Walker argues that the trial court erred in refusing instructions DS-1 and DS-2, which Walker alleges accurately state the law.
ś 198. Proposed Sentencing Phase Instruction DS-1 read as follows: The fact that Derrick Demond Walker has been convicted of capital murder is not in itself an aggravating circumstance and may not be considered by you when deciding to impose a death sentence. The fact of conviction of capital murder does not justify imposition of the death sentence. ś 199. The aggravating circumstances are listed in C-17, which instructs the jury to [c]onsider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed. (Emphasis added). Walker's conviction for capital murder is not listed as being one of the only aggravators the jury was instructed to consider in deciding whether the death penalty should be imposed. Consequently, the jury was properly instructed that the murder itself was not an aggravator, and as such, there was no requirement to separately instruct the jury. Jury instructions are to read as a whole. Thomas, 818 So.2d at 349. DS-1 was cumulative as the jury was already properly instructed on the aggravating factors it could consider. It is not error to refuse a repetitious instruction. Edwards, 737 So.2d at 317; Walker, 671 So.2d at 613; Griffin, 494 So.2d 376, 381 (Miss. 1986). ś 200. Additionally, the use of the word justify is confusing and inappropriate. Had it not been cumulative, it would have been error to submit this instruction to the jury, if justify was utilized, as opposed to compel, obligate, require or similar words.
ś 201. Proposed Sentencing Phase Instruction DS-2 read as follows: You are instructed that you need not find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or early release. Moreover, even if you find that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh one or more of the aggravating circumstances, you can impose a life sentence without the possibility of parole or early release. ś 202. This Court has previously rejected the same instruction. In Edwards, this Court reviewed a verbatim instruction proposed by the defendant. 737 So.2d at 317. Finding that the proposed instruction was a mercy instruction, this Court rejected Edwards' claim that he was entitled to such instruction. Id. Following our prior ruling in Edwards, we find the exact same instruction Walker proposed here to be a mercy instruction, which he is not allowed. See Doss v. State, 709 So.2d 369, 394 (Miss.1996) (quoting Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 761 (Miss.1991)) (This Court has explicitly held that a `defendant has no right to a mercy instruction.'). Therefore, the instruction was properly refused. ś 203. In each of the subsections listed in this issue, we find that there is no error. A review of the given sentencing instructions, reveals that the jury was properly instructed. Therefore, Walker's assignment of error is without merit.