Opinion ID: 158826
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Different Levels of Benefits between Physically Disability and Mental Disablity under the ADA

Text: 44 Mr. Kimber and the EEOC argue Thiokol violated the ADA by employing a disability plan which distinguished between physical and mental disabilities. They argue that such a plan discriminates against disabled employees because of [their] disability. 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). This issue has been argued extensively in the other circuits and we see no need to address it at length here. 45 While [Thiokol's disability] plan differentiated between types of disabilities, this is a far cry from a specified disabled employee facing differential treatment due to her disability. Every [Thiokol] employee had the opportunity to join the same plan with the same schedule of coverage, meaning that every [Thiokol] employee received equal treatment. So long as every employee is offered the same plan regardless of that employee's contemporary or future disability status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers different coverage for various disabilities. The ADA does not require equal coverage for every type of disability; such a requirement, if it existed would destabilize the insurance industry in a manner definitely not intended by Congress when passing the ADA. 46 Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 608 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 850 (1999). The Fourth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits have also addressed the same issue and arrived at the same conclusion. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA does not require a long-term disability plan that is sponsored by a private employer to provide the same level of benefits for mental and physical disabilities.); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 871 (1998) (The disparity in benefits provided in the policy at issue is also not prohibited by the ADA because the ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with different disabilities.); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (a plan that promised [employees] long-term benefits from the onset of disability until age 65 if their problem was physical, and long-term benefits for two years if the problem was mental or nervous did not violate the ADA). See also Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that excluding one disability from coverage is not a disability-based distinction violating the ADA so long as the exclusion applies equally to all individuals). 47 The D.C. Circuit also has ruled on this issue in analyzing the Rehabilitation Act and upheld distinctions in benefits based on physical and mental disabilities. Modderno v. King, 82 F.3d 1059, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 772 (1997). Because the language of disability used in the ADA mirrors that in the Rehabilitation Act, we look to cases construing the Rehabilitation Act for guidance when faced with an ADA challenge. See Bragdon v. Abbot, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998); see also Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77 F.3d 1235, 1245 (10th Cir. 1996). 48 We adopt the reasoning of these cases and hold that the ADA does not prohibit an employer from operating a long term disability benefits plan which distinguishes between physical and mental disabilities. 49 AFFIRMED.