Opinion ID: 4024341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp.

Text: v. Waldburger does not support Appellees’ arguments. Appellees’ heavy reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (2014) is misplaced. The statute at issue in CTS fundamentally differs from the Extender Statute in numerous ways. Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s analysis of that statute does not compel a contrary conclusion to the one we reach here. In CTS Corp., the Supreme Court considered the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 9658, an amended provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), that by its terms preempted “State statutes of limitations.” The Court concluded that the statute preempted only statutes of limitations, not statutes of repose.3 134 S. Ct. at 2180. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 3 CERCLA § 9658 reads in pertinent part as follows: (a) State statutes of limitations for hazardous substance cases
In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 15 exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute.
Except as provided in paragraph (1), the statute of limitations established under State law shall apply in all actions brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility. ... (b) Definitions ... (2) Applicable limitations period The term “applicable limitations period” means the period specified in a statute of limitations during which a civil action referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section may be brought.
The term “commencement date” means the date specified in a statute of limitations as the beginning of the applicable limitations period. 16 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN first discussed the differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, noting that a “statute of limitations creates ‘a time limit for suing in a civil case based on the date when the claim accrued.’” Id. at 2182 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009)). In contrast, a statute of
(A) In general Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the te r m “f e d e r a l l y r e q u i r e d commencement date” means the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages referred to in subsection (a)(1) of this section were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned. (B) Special rules In the case of a minor or incompetent plaintiff, the term “federally required commencement date” means the later of the date referred to in subparagraph (A) or the following:
which the minor reaches the age of majority, as determined by State law, or has a legal representative appointed.
individual, the date on which such individual becomes competent or has had a legal representative appointed. NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 17 repose, “puts an outer limit on the right to bring a civil action.” Id. The Court explained that a statute of limitation therefore encourages plaintiffs to pursue their known claims diligently whereas a statute of repose reflects a legislative judgment that defendants should be free from any liability after the passage of a certain amount of time. Id. at 2183. In determining that § 9658 did not apply to statutes of repose, the Court pointed to several things. First, it noted that § 9658 provides only a limited exception to state statutes of limitations. This exception concerns only the commencement date of the limitations period. Id. at 2185. The state statutes continue to provide the limitations period itself. “Under this structure,” the Court stated, “state law is not pre-empted unless it fits into the precise terms of the exception.” Id. Second, the Court identified a 1982 Study Group Report recommending that in the same discovery rule later embodied in § 9658, Congress repeal state statutes of limitations as well as state statutes of repose. Id. at 2186. The Court reasoned that if Congress decided not to mention statutes of repose despite this clear indication that it considered doing so, then Congress must have intended to omit statutes of repose from § 9658’s scope. Id. The Court then noted the text of the statute “describing the covered [limitations] period in the singular[,]” which the Court explained “would be an awkward way to mandate the pre-emption of two different time periods with two different purposes.” Id. at 2186–87. FIRREA’s Extender Statute is “fundamentally different” from § 9658. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1208.4 Whereas the 4 We note that in light of its holding in CTS Corp., the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit’s original holding that the NCUA’s extender 18 NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN Extender Statute sets entirely new time limits for claims brought by the NCUA, § 9658 establishes only a new commencement date for the limitations period set by state law. CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2185. Thus, while § 9658 is properly characterized as a limited exception to the otherwise applicable state law, the Extender Statute provides the exclusive limitations framework for any action by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent, leaving no room for any state limitations period that might otherwise apply. Moreover, unlike in CTS, there is no evidence in this case that Congress considered separately addressing statutes of repose, and then declined to do so. In contrast to the enactment of § 9658, where the existence of the 1982 Study Group Report reflected that Congress intentionally limited the scope of preemption to state statutes of limitations, there is “no evidence Congress distinguished between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose” when it enacted FIRREA. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1215. Absent such evidence, the “limitations period,” viewed in isolation, provides little insight into Congress’s intent. Indeed, it is well understood that “the term ‘statutes of limitations’ is sometimes used in a less formal way . . . [to] refer to any provision restricting the time in which a plaintiff must bring suit,” and that “Congress has used the term ‘statute of limitations’ when enacting statutes of repose.” CTS Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2185 (citing statute displaced the 1933 Act’s statute of repose. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 134 S. Ct. 2818 (2014). On remand, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its conclusion, finding little difficulty distinguishing § 9658 from the NCUA’s extender statute. Nomura II, 764 F.3d at 1208. The Supreme Court denied certiorari when the case returned from the Tenth Circuit. Nomura Home Equity Loan, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). NCU ADMIN. BD. V. NOMURA HOME EQUITY LOAN 19 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I)(aa) (2012 ed.) (placing a statute of repose in a section entitled “Statute of limitations”)). Finally, unlike § 9658, the Extender Statute uses the singular word “period” not to refer to the state law timeframe(s) being replaced, but rather to refer to the new timeframe being established. That new exclusive timeframe adopts “the period applicable under State law” only when that period is longer than the period otherwise prescribed. Thus, the Extender Statute’s use of the word “period” by no means operates to exclude statutes of repose from its scope. In sum, we reject Appellees’ arguments that the Supreme Court’s holding in CTS Corp. requires a contrary conclusion to the one we reach here. We hold that in actions by the NCUA as conservator or liquidating agent, the Extender Statute displaces all preexisting time limitations, including the 1933 Act’s statute of repose.