Opinion ID: 1953866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burden-Shifting

Text: Appellant also asserts that the government engaged in impermissible burden-shifting with respect to the DNA testing done by the FBI. This contention arises from the defense's cross-examination of the government's DNA expert, when defense counsel elicited that although 29 items of evidence collected during the investigation of the case were sent to the FBI laboratory, not all of these items were tested for the presence of DNA even though the MPD requested DNA testing on all applicable items. During re-direct examination, the government sought leave to ask the analyst whether the defense, as well as the government, had the right to test the items. The defense objected, asserting that such a question would involve shifting the burden of proof to the defense. The trial court granted the government's request on the basis that the defense's questions had attempted to create the impression that the FBI's testing had been selectively performed to skew the results by focusing only on the items most damaging to appellant, while ignoring items that could have helped to exculpate him. That is, left unaddressed, the defense's questions would have tended to indicate that the FBI's testing procedures were biased. Thereafter, the government asked only one more question on re-direct: [W]ith regard to the items that were submitted to the DNA Analysis Unit for evaluation . . . in the District of Columbia does the defense have the right to have those items also scientifically tested? The DNA expert responded that he believed so. [12] A trial court's decision to admit evidence as more probative than prejudicial may be reversed only for abuse of discretion. Hartridge v. United States, 896 A.2d 198, 216 (D.C.2006); ( William ) Johnson v. United States, 452 A.2d 959, 960 (D.C.1982). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the government to ask this one question to counter the implication that the FBI's approach to testing the evidence in this case was biased. See Hartridge, supra, 896 A.2d at 216. Redirect examination is limited to matters which were first raised on cross-examination, to which the opposing party is merely responding on redirect. Rose v. United States, 879 A.2d 986, 993 n. 3 (D.C.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). That is exactly what happened here. See also Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1286-87 (D.C.2000).