Opinion ID: 3039495
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: what constitutes a crime of violence?

Text: In determining whether a state criminal statute is a “crime of violence,” we must follow the path set for us in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) — we look to the statutory elements of the prior offense, not the underlying conduct giving rise to the offense itself or the statutory label affixed to the crime in question, and compare it to the generic definition of the offense. See Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (court “make[s] a categorical comparison of the elements of the statute of conviction to the generic definition [of a ‘crime of violence’], and decide[s] whether the conduct proscribed [by the state statute] is broader than, and so does not categorically fall within, this generic definition” (citing Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002))). Such a categorical approach is an outgrowth of the fact that USSG section 2L1.2 refers to predicate offenses not in terms UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ 18523 of the defendant’s prior conduct but to his prior “convictions” and the “elements” of that prior offense. A limited exception exists to this categorical approach. Taylor recognized that state criminal statutes that define their offenses broadly enough to go beyond that covered by the generic definition may nonetheless be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence when the defendant’s prior conviction necessarily rested on those elements identifying the crime as a generic offense. 495 U.S. at 602. Significant for this case, in conducting this modified categorical approach in cases where the prior conviction was obtained through a guilty plea, the Supreme Court has limited the court’s review to those documents “made or used in adjudicating guilt” such as “the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or [the] transcript of [the] colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20, 26 (2005). [1] At the outset some background is in order. The sentencing enhancement at issue in this case provides that the base offense level for a person convicted of violating section 1326 is eight. See USSG § 2L1.2(a). That base level, however, is increased by sixteen if the defendant was “previously . . . deported . . . after a conviction for a felony that is . . . a crime of violence . . . .” USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The commentary to this section of the Sentencing Guidelines defines a “crime of violence” as including those offenses “under federal, state, or local law that [have] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” USSG § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 1(B)(iii) (2006). As we noted in Cortez-Arias, “[n]either this guideline nor its commentary in explicit words refer to [what] crimes involve ‘conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another.’ ” 403 F.3d at 1114. Cortez-Arias filled this gap in 18524 UNITED STATES v. MARTINEZ-MARTINEZ the context of an offense involving the discharge of a firearm at structures. The primary issue pressed by the parties in this case concerns the scope of the generic definition for a crime of violence with respect to state laws proscribing the discharge of firearms at buildings pursuant to Cortez-Arias. Posed another way, what was it about the California statute at issue in Cortez-Arias that convinced this court that a conviction for violating that statute amounted to a “crime of violence”? Only by understanding this point can we determine whether Arizona’s comparable statute meets the generic definition and, if not, whether any judicially noticeable document demonstrates that Martinez-Martinez’s 2001 prior conviction necessarily rested on those elements we identified in Cortez-Arias that render the crime a generic offense.