Opinion ID: 2656159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compelled Immunity

Text: Wilkes contends that the district court’s failure to compel use immunity for Williams violated his right to a fair trial under Straub. In support of this argument, Wilkes points to eight alleged contradictions between Williams’s proffered testimony and testimony offered by Combs, who was granted use immunity, and Wade, who received a favorable plea agreement from the government. The record, however, makes clear that Williams never directly contradicts testimony offered by Combs or Wade. 8 UNITED STATES V. WILKES
In Straub, we held that a defendant could establish a Fifth and Sixth Amendment violation by showing that: “(1) the defense witness’s testimony was relevant; and (2) either (a) the prosecution intentionally caused the defense witness to invoke the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination with the purpose of distorting the fact-finding process; or (b) the prosecution granted immunity to a government witness in order to obtain that witness’s testimony, but denied immunity to a defense witness whose testimony would have directly contradicted that of the government witness, with the effect of so distorting the fact-finding process that the defendant was denied his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial.”1 Straub, 538 F.3d at 1162. Straub also recognized that “[a] survey of our opinions suggests that in the majority of cases where a defendant seeks to compel immunity for a witness, that witness’s testimony will not be ‘directly contradictory’ to that of the prosecution’s witness, or there will have been no distortion of the fact-finding process, and the district court may deny immunity on those bases.” Id. at 1161. 1 Our cases make clear that government witnesses who are granted favorable plea deals in return for their testimony are encompassed by Straub’s use of the term “immunized.” See United States v. Young, 86 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Of the remaining four witnesses who testified against Young, two . . . had entered into plea agreements with the government, and two . . . received immunity. In light of these plea agreements and grants of immunity, there is a serious danger that the government’s denial of immunity to Delfs—the only witness who could have impeached Drake as the government’s critical witness—distorted the fact-finding process.”). UNITED STATES V. WILKES 9 We have found direct contradictions where witnesses offer differing accounts of factual circumstances. For example, in Straub, immunized government witness Adams admitted that, if asked, he would deny that he had walked into a bar in 2003 and confessed to Mike Baumann that he had “just shot a guy.” Straub, 538 F.3d at 1162. The defense sought to compel immunity for Baumann, who was prepared to testify that Adams, the key prosecution witness, had arguably confessed to the very crime attributed to Straub. Id. at 1162–63. Similarly, in United States v. Young, the government offered testimony from John Drake to the effect that two defendants, Tamez and Young, used Drake as a middleman to distribute cocaine. 86 F.3d at 946. Tamez and Young sought immunity for David Delfs, who was prepared to testify that he had heard government witness Drake state that he was “falsely accusing somebody as being [his] supplier in the Tri-Cities.” Id. at 947. Delf’s testimony—that Drake said either Tamez or Young was falsely accused—directly contradicted Drake’s own testimony—that Tamez and Young both supplied him with cocaine. Accordingly, we remanded the case to the district court for the purpose of determining whether the failure to grant immunity had intentionally distorted the fact-finding process. Id. at 949; see also Benjamin v. Prosper, No. 2:03–cv–1166, 2010 WL 4630252 at –14 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that proffered witness who would testify that she had stolen Sudafed directly contradicted police offer’s statement that the defendant had stolen the drugs). By contrast, in United States v. Alvarez we held that failure to immunize a defense witness was appropriate where that witness “had been to several ‘stash’ house locations and 10 UNITED STATES V. WILKES would have testified that [the defendant’s] home was not one of those she visited.” 358 F.3d at 1216. We held that “this does not directly contradict the testimony of the government’s witnesses that [the defendant’s] house was in fact used to store cocaine in 1996. In fact, [the defense witness] was not present during any of the shipments of cocaine to various ‘stash’ houses, so she was not in a position to directly contradict the government’s witnesses’ testimony that implicated [the defendant] in the scheme.” Id. Our cases thus illustrate what Aristotle expressed more than two-thousand years ago—that “contradictory propositions are not true simultaneously.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book IV 1011b13–14. Thus, a witness directly contradicts another witness if their respective testimonies cannot simultaneously be true, although in this context the proffered defense testimony “need only support (as opposed to compel) a finding by the jury that it was ‘directly contradictory.’” Straub, 538 F.3d at 1163. We next turn to the question of whether Williams’s testimony directly contradicts testimony given by either Combs or Wade.
Wilkes alleges that Williams’s proffered testimony would have directly contradicted immunized government witness Combs’s testimony in six respects: (1) the level of demand for Wilkes’s VP-Max Software; (2) the identity of the Panama Project Manager; (3) whether ADCS had billed the government for equipment that it had not purchased; (4) whether ADCS had billed for work that it had not completed; (5) the reason that Wilkes opposed bar-coding the equipment used in Panama; and (6) whether ADCS had billed the government for a useless “ROI Task Plan.” UNITED STATES V. WILKES 11
When Combs started at ADCS in late 1995, he was tasked with selling document-scanning software (VP-Max) to the DoD. ADCS hoped to sell more copies of the software. However, after an initial software purchase, the DoD declined to purchase any more copies of VP-Max. Combs testified that Wilkes sent him to “creat[e] a demand amongst the military to buy the software” but that he did not discover much demand for the product and was unable to generate any additional sales. Combs further testified that Wilkes showed him a letter—written by Wilkes and signed by Cunningham—aimed at pressuring the DoD to purchase more VP-Max software. After Cunningham’s involvement, the DoD purchased more software. At the evidentiary hearing conducted by the district court for the purpose of ascertaining the contents of Williams’s potential testimony, Williams testified he was “familiar” with VP-Max, that he thought it was a worthwhile product, and that “there seemed to be” demand for the product. These general impressions about VP-Max’s merits do not directly contradict Combs’s testimony about his specific experiences selling VP-Max—both statements can simultaneously be true.
In 1998, ADCS secured a contract to scan documents in Panama. Wilkes put his nephew Combs in charge of the project, despite the fact that Wilkes thought he was a “ball dropper.” At Wilkes’s trial, Combs testified that he was the manager of the Panama Project on October 27, 1998. Combs also testified on cross-examination that he was the project 12 UNITED STATES V. WILKES manager before Williams was hired, and that he believed that Williams had been hired in November of “1998, 1999.” Williams testified that he was hired in September of 1998, and that he became the manager of the Panama Project “relatively soon after” that, a time period of “a couple of months.” Williams again does not directly contradict Combs, who noted that Williams took over the Panama Project sometime in November of 1998.
On October 27, 1998, ADCS submitted a $3 million invoice for equipment purchased in connection with the Panama Project. Combs testified that ADCS had not actually purchased any of the equipment listed on the invoice at the time it was submitted. Williams testified that “most of the equipment that was used [in Panama] was . . . there when [he] arrived.” He further testified that “subsequent to the equipment being there, [he] did an analysis on the invoices and the purchases of [that] equipment. And I did know, from that, that [Wilkes] did purchase it.” Finally, in response to the question of whether ADCS had ever invoiced the government for equipment it never purchased, Williams responded, “not to my knowledge.” None of this testimony contradicts what Combs actually said. Combs testified that the equipment listed on the October 27, 1998 invoice had not been purchased at the time ADCS submitted an invoice seeking payment for purchasing that equipment. By contrast, Williams stated after he had taken over the project, some time later he reviewed invoices UNITED STATES V. WILKES 13 and determined that Wilkes had purchased the equipment being used in the Panama project. It is entirely possible that the equipment was purchased between the time that ADCS submitted the invoice that Combs identified as false and the time that Williams observed that the equipment had been purchased.
ADCS also submitted two invoices for services rendered on the Panama Project on October 27 and 28, 1998. Combs testified that ADCS had not actually completed the tasks reflected in the invoices at the time they were submitted. By contrast, Williams testified that “to the best of [his] knowledge” ADCS did not bill the government for work that it did not do, but admitted that “[he] didn’t always see the invoices that were submitted.” Combs’s testimony states that two invoices, submitted in late October 1998, billed the government for work that was not completed. Williams does not state that those two invoices accurately reflected work that ADCS had completed, nor is it clear that he could have done so, as he was not involved in the Panama Project at the time. Further, Williams’s testimony that he did not recall any fraudulent invoices being submitted does not contradict Combs, because Williams admitted that he did not see all of the invoices.
Combs testified that the government wanted to place barcodes on equipment used in the Panama Project for identification, but that Wilkes told Combs that he did not want the equipment labeled because “[h]e wanted to be able 14 UNITED STATES V. WILKES to move it to other projects or anywhere,” and bar-coding would identify the equipment as belonging to the government. Combs further testified that the government had paid for the equipment, but that Wilkes had moved the equipment to other locations. Williams testified that the bar-coding problem was “that if the equipment belonged to ADCS and not the government, then by the government applying bar-codes to that equipment it would imply their ownership.” Williams further testified that it “was [his] understanding” that at the time the barcoding dispute arose the government had not paid for the equipment. Finally, Williams testified that he and Wilkes had not talked about opposing bar-coding because ADCS was trying to steal the equipment. Combs testified about a private conversation that he had had with Wilkes. Even if Wilkes gave Williams other reasons for not bar-coding the equipment, that does not contradict Combs’s testimony about the meeting. Furthermore, Williams only states that “it was his understanding” that the equipment was owned by ADCS. Clearly he could have held that understanding concurrently with the events described in Combs’s testimony.
On September 30, 1998, ADCS submitted a $135,795 invoice for an “ROI.” An “ROI Task Plan” was attached to the invoice. Combs testified that he prepared the task plan, but that he had no experience doing so. Combs also testified that the document was incomplete, and that when he submitted the document to the government “[t]here was immediate push-back” because the document was useless. UNITED STATES V. WILKES 15 Williams testified that ADCS was responsible for preparing an ROI report, and that ADCS had subcontracted that work to PricewaterhouseCoopers. He further testified that “to the extent that it was completed and delivered, [he] believed that [it was of value to the government].” Williams also admitted that he had never seen the “ROI Task Plan” appended to the September 30 invoice, and that it was not the document he prepared with PricewaterhouseCoopers. Williams and Combs appear to be referencing completely different documents. The document that Combs worked on, and which he describes as useless, titled “ROI Task Plan,” is appended to the September 30 invoice. Williams admits to never having seen that document, nor did he have any involvement with the Panama Project at that point. Williams’s testimony at most indicates that ADCS later completed a full ROI analysis, but does nothing to dispute Combs’s contention that the September 1998 invoice sought payment for poor-quality work.
Wilkes argues that Williams’s testimony would have contradicted Wade’s testimony in two respects: (1) whether DoD officials’ concerns about ADCS’s performance on the Panama Project were “justified,” and (2) whether ADCS planned a “change in focus” involving hardware sales. As with Combs’s testimony, Williams’s testimony does not directly contradict Wade’s. 16 UNITED STATES V. WILKES
in Panama Wade testified that Gary Jones and Paul Behrens, two officials with the DoD, expressed concerns over “pricing and performance,” including issues surrounding the inventory of equipment. Wade further testified that those concerns were “justified,” and that he and Wilkes had met to discuss their response. Wade noted that the plan was to meet the officials, and if Wilkes and Wade did not allay their suspicions, to involve Cunningham. Wade also testified that Bob Fromm, a different DoD official, expressed concerns, and that they were “justified.” Williams testified that government concerns that Wilkes was blocking the bar-coding effort to steal the equipment were not “justified.” He also testified that concerns about ADCS billing for work that it did not do were not “justified.” These statements do not directly contradict Wade’s testimony in the manner contemplated by Straub. Wade’s statement that the concerns were “justified” is a matter of opinion. Two parties can truthfully hold differing opinions at the same time. Accordingly, Williams’s testimony does not amount to a direct contradiction.
Wade also testified that he and Wilkes discussed a “change in focus” from “scanning to buying hardware and software.” Wade further testified that he and Wilkes would mark up, sometimes by 600 percent, the cost of the equipment sold to the government, which was more lucrative than providing scanning services. UNITED STATES V. WILKES 17 Williams testified that he did not believe ADCS was only awarded a hardware contract due to a “change in focus.” But this does not directly contradict Wade’s testimony regarding a specific conversation between Wade and Wilkes. Williams merely notes that, as far as he was aware, one specific contract awarded to ADCS for hardware was not awarded “because ADCS decided to have a shift in focus.” Wilkes thus fails the first prong of the Straub test. He is unable to identify a single direct contradiction between the testimony Williams would have offered at trial and testimony offered by an immunized government witness. Accordingly, the district court’s conclusion that failure to compel use immunity for Williams did not violate Wilkes’s right to a fair trial is correct. Straub, 538 F.3d at 1162.