Opinion ID: 4376408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Habeas Relief Based on State Law Error

Text: Nevertheless, as the state concedes on appeal, the state post-conviction court’s rejection of Trice’s claim on the ground that his convictions already had become final at the time that Weiand issued was an incorrect application of state law. Under Florida law, Trice’s convictions were not final when Weiand was decided because his petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court was still pending. See Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1250 (Fla. 1990) (explaining that if the defendant files a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, his conviction and sentence do not become final until the writ is determined for purposes of Rule 3.850). The question we must answer then is whether Trice is 19 Case: 17-14476 Date Filed: 03/13/2019 Page: 20 of 26 entitled to federal habeas relief based on this state law error. We conclude that he is not. As an initial matter, since it was obvious that the state post-conviction court’s reason for denying this claim was wrong, the state argues on appeal that the Second DCA most likely relied on different alternative grounds in affirming the court’s decision. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192, 1196 (“[T]he unreasonableness of the lower court’s decision itself provides some evidence that makes it less likely the state [appellate] court adopted the same reasoning.”). We agree. The record shows that the state expressly conceded in its briefing to the Second DCA that Trice’s convictions were not yet final when Weiand was decided and, therefore, the state post-conviction court’s reasoning was faulty. Nonetheless, the state argued that Trice was not entitled to benefit from the change of law announced in Weiand because he did not preserve the issue by making a timely objection at trial. Under Florida law, to benefit from a recent change in law, a defendant must have preserved the issue for appeal by timely objecting at trial. Smith, 598 So. 2d at 1066. Here, while Trice requested the castle doctrine jury instruction at trial, he specifically argued that the instruction was proper because Darla was not permitted in his office and, thus, he was the sole occupant. He did not argue that Darla was a co-occupant of the office or that the castle doctrine should apply to co-occupants. 20 Case: 17-14476 Date Filed: 03/13/2019 Page: 21 of 26 In any event, Trice also did not raise any challenge to the state trial court’s self-defense instruction on direct appeal. Accordingly, it was reasonable for the Second DCA to determine that Trice could not benefit from Weiand’s change of law because he did not adequately preserve the issue. See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982) (“[I]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below [in the trial court].”); Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1140 (Fla. 2006) (same). We are bound by state-court determinations on state-law questions. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68, 112 S. Ct. at 480; Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 691, 95 S. Ct. at 1886. Moreover, the crux of Trice’s Weiand claim on appeal is that the state trial court’s jury instructions were erroneous under Florida law because the court failed to instruct the jury that he had no duty to retreat from his home. But the fact that a jury instruction “was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief” because federal habeas review “is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68, 71-72, 112 S. Ct. at 480-82. The only question we may address is “whether the ailing instruction itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Id. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482. In making that determination, the jury instruction “‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but 21 Case: 17-14476 Date Filed: 03/13/2019 Page: 22 of 26 must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Id. Significantly, on appeal, Trice does not make any argument as to that question. He does not argue at all that the allegedly erroneous jury instruction infected his trial in violation of due process. As a result, Trice has abandoned the issue and waived his right to have us consider it. See United States v. Willis, 649 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal must plainly and prominently so indicate . . . . Where a party fails to abide by this simple requirement, he has waived his right to have the court consider that argument.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1268 n.9 (11th Cir. 2011) (same). Without a federal due process dimension, Trice’s claim that the jury instructions were erroneous is not a basis for federal habeas relief.