Opinion ID: 2983027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Dobson’s Intent to Defraud

Text: Dobson contends that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he intended to defraud lending institutions by providing down payments to borrowers. This court reviews de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Algee, 599 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The defendant’s burden is a very heavy one. United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011). We must “give full credit to the 6 Unlike the government, we do not read Gott’s brief as asserting an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim. To the extent Gott does seek to assert such a claim, we decline to address the claim on direct appeal. See United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 461–62 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting this court’s practice, with rare exceptions, of declining to address ineffective-assistance claims because the trial record is generally insufficient to address counsel’s performance). 14 Nos. 14-5721/5722, United States v. Dobson, et al. responsibility of the jury to weigh the evidence, to make credibility determinations, and to draw inferences.” United States v. Washington, 715 F.3d 975, 979 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). A conviction for wire fraud requires the government to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) “the defendant devised or willfully participated in a scheme to defraud”; (2) the defendant “used or caused to be used an interstate wire communication in furtherance of the scheme”; and (3) the defendant “intended to deprive a victim of money or property.” United States v. Speer, 419 F. App’x 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Intent to defraud means to act with intent to deceive or cheat for the purpose of causing a financial loss to another or bringing about a financial gain to oneself.” United States v. Olds, 309 F. App’x 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2009). Dobson cites several facts that he contends demonstrate that he lacked an intent to defraud. However, these facts do not undermine the jury’s verdict. Some of the asserted facts— for example, contractor deed transactions involving Mr. Sanchez—are irrelevant to the counts of conviction. In addition, Dobson’s assertion that he never discussed gift letters with Connor is flatly contradicted by Connor’s testimony that Dobson requested her to sign a gift letter for the Joseph transaction and that he sent her an email with instructions on how to process a gift-letter transaction. Dobson also made the initial transfer of $40,000 from Southern’s account to Gott, who then transferred those funds to Connor for the Joseph transaction. Similarly, when Tahira Malik told Dobson that she had concerns about the gift-letter transaction, Dobson assured her that nothing serious would happen and that Southern would take care of everything. Moreover, the government presented ample evidence that Dobson played a central role in promoting Southern’s “no-money-down” program and assured prospective purchasers that everything was 15 Nos. 14-5721/5722, United States v. Dobson, et al. above board. Finally, although Dobson asserts that he believed in good faith that the lenders did not care who supplied the funds to the gifter for gift-letter transactions, Agent Ruffin testified that Dobson admitted in the initial interview that he knew it would be improper for anyone other than the purchaser to make the down payment. Thus, sufficient evidence supported Dobson’s wire fraud convictions.7