Opinion ID: 1192433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court

Text: Hummel appealed the denial of his PCRA petition to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which affirmed by a divided decision. The two-judge majority concluded that under sections 7402(c) and (e) of the Pennsylvania statute governing competency hearings, the Mental Health Procedures Act, 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7101 et seq., Bell had no obligation to push for a competency hearing. The relevant portion of section 7402(c), which deals with requests by counsel for incompetency hearings, states: Application to the court for an order directing an incompetency examination may be presented by an attorney for the Commonwealth, a person charged with a crime, his counsel, or the warden or other official in charge of the institution or place in which he is detained. 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7402(c) (emphasis added). The Superior Court interpreted this provision to mean the decision to request a hearing lay within the discretion of counsel. It contrasted this provision with section 7402(e) which states, [w]hen ordered by the court, an incompetency examination ... shall be conducted by at least one psychiatrist.... 50 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7402(e). The Superior Court majority found that section 7402(e) was indeed mandatory, but that it was only triggered after an evaluation had been ordered. Based on these conclusions, the court held that Bell could not be considered ineffective for failing to have Hummel examined by a psychiatrist because the mandatory provisions of the statute had not been triggered by a court ordered evaluation. The Court also found that Bell could not be considered ineffective for failing to request a competency hearing because the statute was explicitly permissive and he was therefore under no legal requirement to do so. The Court then noted, in language similar to that presented in the Commonwealth's brief to us: We also observe that Appellant has failed to demonstrate that counsel's actions caused him prejudice. Appellant failed to show that had counsel requested a competency examination under the Act, the trial court would have exercised its discretion and ordered the examination. Appellant also failed to show the examination would have established Appellant was incompetent to stand trial. Appellant in addition failed to show that this evidence, together with any other evidence offered by Appellant, would have been clear and convincing on the issue of competence [the standard a defendant was required to prove at the time of Hummel's trial to show incompetence]. Thus, Appellant fails to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective with respect to the issue of competency to stand trial. Commonwealth v. Hummel, No. 1169 WDA 1999, maj. slip op. at 17-18 (Pa.Super.Ct. Sept. 28, 2001). Judge Brosky, the dissenting judge, stated that, under the circumstances of this case, Bell was required to ask for a hearing, and that the use of may in the statute merely indicated groups of individuals who were authorized to petition the court for a hearing. Judge Brosky opined that Hummel met his burden to show that this action prejudiced him by a preponderance of the evidence (the standard in Pennsylvania to prove prejudice). He also suggested that Bell's inexperience may have been a factor, noting that although Bell had ten years experience as a public defender, this was his first experience with a client who had a competency issue. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thereafter denied Hummel's appeal. Having thus exhausted his options in the state court, Hummel filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.