Opinion ID: 1812441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: date claim may be withdrawn

Text: We must next determine whether Schirmer's withdrawal of the claim was premature. The evidence reflects that the claim was withdrawn on either October 20 or 21, 2003. Because we are reviewing a summary judgment, we give Geddes the favorable inference of the later date. Geddes contends that § 13-906 allows a claimant to withdraw a tort claim on the last day of the 6-month period after filing notice of the claim with the appropriate governing body. The district court, on the other hand, determined that a governing body has a full 6 months to render or not render a final disposition after which the claimant may then withdraw the claim. On the undisputed facts of this case, the difference between the two interpretations is a single day. Absent anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [17] Section 13-906 states, in relevant part, that if the governing body does not make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed, the claimant may, by notice in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration of the governing body and begin suit. The key phrase for purposes of this case is within six months after it is filed, which designates the period in which the governing body may consider a tort claim before it can be withdrawn for purpose of filing suit. Within is defined as not beyond in. . . time or before the end of. [18] The plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase within six months includes the last day of the 6-month time period. As we have noted, the language of § 13-906 explicitly provides that no suit can be brought in district court unless 6 months have passed without a resolution of a properly filed claim by the political subdivision. [19] Similarly, we have construed an analogous provision in the State Tort Claims Act [20] as requiring the State Claims Board be given at least 6 months to consider a claim before suit may be filed. [21] There is some conflicting language in two of our cases arising under the State Tort Claims Act. In Collins v. State, [22] we were presented with a statute of limitations issue where the claimant elected to leave her claim pending before the State Claims Board until it reached a final determination. In presenting the facts, we stated that the claimant alleged that on November 1, 1999, she filed a claim with the State Claims Board . . . . May 1, 2000, was the date at which [claimant] could withdraw her claim. [23] Likewise, in Hullinger v. Board of Regents, [24] another case presenting a statute of limitations issue under the State Tort Claims Act, we noted that the claimant filed his claim with the claims board on March 24, 1992 and was thus prevented by § 81-8,213 from withdrawing his claim until 6 months after he made his written claim to the claims board. We noted that the first day on which he could withdraw his claim would be September 24, 1992. [25] However, the claim was not withdrawn until several months after that date. The precise date on which the claim could be withdrawn was not determinative of the outcome in either Collins or Hullinger. A case is not authority for any point not necessary to be passed on to decide the case or not specifically raised as an issue addressed by the court. [26] To the extent that language in Collins and Hullinger conflicts with our analysis regarding computation of the 6-month period specified in § 13-906, that language is disapproved. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Schirmer's claim was withdrawn prior to the expiration of the 6-month period specified in § 13-906, resulting in a failure to comply with a condition precedent to suit under the PSTCA. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the action. For the sake of completeness, we note that the district court further concluded that the statute of limitations on Geddes' claim had expired. Geddes does not specifically assign or argue this finding as error. In the absence of plain error, an appellate court considers only claimed errors which are both assigned and discussed. [27] We acknowledge the apparent harshness of our application of the timing requirement in § 13-906 to this case. But we also recognize our duty to strictly construe the PSTCA in favor of the political subdivision and against the waiver of sovereign immunity. [28] In discussing the counterpart to § 13-906 in the Federal Tort Claims Act, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: The most natural reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. Every premature filing of an action under the [Federal Tort Claims Act] imposes some burden on the judicial system and on the Department of Justice which must assume the defense of such actions. Although the burden may be slight in an individual case, the statute governs the processing of a vast multitude of claims. The interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is best served by adherence to the straightforward statutory command. Moreover, given the clarity of the statutory text, it is certainly not a trap for the unwary. . . . As we have noted before, in the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law. .. . The [Federal Tort Claims Act] bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. [29] Here, § 13-906 bars the filing of suit before a claimant has complied with the requirements of that statute. Because Schirmer withdrew her claim before it was pending for a full 6 months, the district court did not err in dismissing her suit.