Opinion ID: 2073360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instructions on Equitable Estoppel

Text: At the close of the charge to the jury, plaintiff objected to the court's refusal to instruct in accordance with his previously submitted instruction regarding detriment as an element of equitable estoppel. In pertinent part plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury that it is not necessary in order to invoke the doctrine of estoppel that a party must, as a result of the inequitable conduct of the other party, have suffered some detriment or injury without regard to whether or not the estoppel is allowed but only that he will be prejudiced if the estoppel is not given effect. After plaintiff's objection the Superior Court for the second time declined to grant the instruction, indicating it had already covered the point in its principal charge and, in any event, that the instruction requested was an erroneous statement of the law. The court did not err in so ruling. In the body of its charge, the court stated the following with respect to detrimental reliance: [T]he plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, because Miss Martin was misled, if you find that she was, that she did something that she would not have done, or failed to do something that she would otherwise have done had she been aware of the true situation. In other words, it is necessary for Mr. Martin to prove that because his daughter was misled, that she changed her position, she either failed to do something that she otherwise would have done, or she did something which she would not have done had she known the true situation. And finally, in order to prevail it is necessary for Mr. Martin to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that because of this change of position, if you find that there was one, that is that Miss Martin did something she would not otherwise have done, or failed to do something she would have done, that Miss Martin or her family have suffered injury, harm, or damage as a result of being misled. This court has repeatedly held that in order for an estoppel to be made out the declarations or acts relied upon must have induced the party seeking to enforce an estoppel to do what resulted to his detriment, and what he would not otherwise have done. (Emphasis added) Allum v. Perry, 68 Me. 232, 234 (1878). In other words, the party seeking to enforce an estoppel must show more than that he relied upon another's representations to the extent of performing acts which, but for the inducement, he would not have done. It is in addition an essential ingredient of the cause of action that the induced reliance causes actual detriment or prejudice to the party induced. Whether detriment results necessarily depends upon the relative position of the party asserting the estoppel before and after acting on the inducement. Thus, no estoppel arises unless the party who was induced to act as a result has suffered some prejudice to the position initially held by him. E. g., Boston & Maine R. R. v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 144 Me. 306, 316, 68 A.2d 1, 7 (1949); Augusta Trust Co. v. Augusta, Hallowell & Gardiner R. R. Co., 134 Me. 314, 329, 187 A. 1, 8 (1936); 4-One Box Machine Makers v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 131 Me. 70, 78, 159 A. 496, 499 (1932); Blaisdell Automobile Co. v. Nelson, 130 Me. 167, 169-70, 154 A. 184, 186 (1931). Cf. Milliken v. Buswell, Me., 313 A.2d 111, 118-19 (1973). The quoted portions of the court's charge adequately apprised the jury of the law respecting detrimental reliance, and the court did not err in refusing to instruct on it further in keeping with plaintiff's request. [3]