Opinion ID: 1216672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statements of sheldon wright

Text: The State introduced two statements made by the victim. One was made to Marcella Cremeans who was acquainted with him and who testified that on the day before his death, Mr. Wright came into the drive-in where she worked. He had her count the money in his wallet and then stated that the defendant had struck him and taken $100 from him. A second statement was made to a Huntington police dispatcher, who testified from a telephone log that he kept as a regular part of the department's records. It revealed that a Sheldon Wright had called on June 24, 1983, at 3:00 p.m. to complain that a Russell Smith had taken a red Buick Opel from his residence. He identified Mr. Smith as his stepson and indicated there was also a gun missing. He stated that he was not going to press charges, but if Mr. Smith returned to the house and started to beat him up that he would shoot him. The officer testified that Mr. Wright's speech was slurred and he could tell he was an elderly man. [11] As to the testimony of the police dispatcher, there was no objection made regarding its inadmissibility. The only comment made by defense counsel was that he had not been advised the witness would be called until that morning. Counsel did admit that he had prior knowledge of the telephone log. On appeal, the only claim made is that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Without an objection below, the rule stated in Syllabus Point 9 of State v. Humphrey, ___ W.Va. ___, 351 S.E.2d 613 (1986), applies: Our general rule is that nonjurisdictional trial error not raised in the trial court will not be addressed on appeal. See also State v. Manns, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 329 S.E.2d 865, 871 (1985); Syllabus Point 7, State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). The testimony of Ms. Cremeans was objected to on hearsay grounds and the court appeared to admit the testimony under the general catch-all exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 804(b)(5). [12] We do not believe that this testimony fitted that narrow exception. It is generally recognized from the language of Rule 804(b)(5) and its counterpart in Rule 803(24) that five general factors must be met in order for hearsay evidence to be admissible under the rules. First and most important is the trustworthiness of the statement, which must be equivalent to the trustworthiness underlying the specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. Second, the statement must be offered to prove a material fact. Third, the statement must be shown to be more probative on the issue for which it is offered than any other evidence the proponent can reasonably procure. Fourth, admission of the statement must comport with the general purpose of the rules of evidence and the interest of justice. Fifth, adequate notice of the statement must be afforded the other party to provide that party a fair opportunity to meet the evidence. [13] Taking these points in inverse order, it is apparent that the State failed to show requisite compliance with the rule. First, there is no showing that the State, at any time prior to the actual trial, disclosed the hearsay evidence it intended to offer through Ms. Cremeans as provided under Rule 804(b)(5) in order to give the defense a fair opportunity to meet this testimony. The prosecution had in its possession a written statement containing this information which had been obtained on July 16, 1983, more than a year and a half before the trial. As to factors four, three, and two, it must be recalled that the materiality of Ms. Cremeans' testimony was only on a subsidiary issue, that of a collateral crime under Rule 404(b), i.e., that the defendant had shortly before the homicide assaulted the deceased and had taken $100 from him. As we have earlier indicated, such a fact may be relevant to prove malice, motive, and criminal intent. We have consistently held, however, that evidence of a collateral crime is admissible only for limited purposes and is not to be regarded as proof of the commission of the offense charged. State v. Dolin, ___ W.Va. ___, 347 S.E.2d 208, 216 (1986); State v. Pancake, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 296 S.E.2d 37, 41 (1982). Courts that have evaluated factors four, three, and two generally conclude that where evidence is offered under Rule 804(b)(5), which is not crucial to a material issue in the case, its materiality and probative value are reduced and the ends of justice are not served by its admission. This is particularly true in criminal cases, where there is a strong preference for live testimony. United States v. Cain, 587 F.2d 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 975, 99 S.Ct. 1543, 59 L.Ed.2d 793 (1979); United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Yates, 524 F.2d 1282 (D.C.Cir.1975); Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo.1986). With regard to the first factor, trustworthiness, we do not believe that the State's simple assertion that the declarant, Mr. Wright, had no reason to lie is a sufficient indicator of trustworthiness. There was no corroborative evidence to support what amounts to a bare assertion that the defendant had stolen the $100. There was nothing in the deceased's statement that supplied any detail about the time of the alleged theft or about its circumstances which would give it verisimilitude. See United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 57 (N.D. Ga.1979), aff'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2300, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1982). It can hardly be said that the deceased was without bias toward the defendant at the time the statement was made as there was a history of antagonism between them which may bear on its trustworthiness. See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961, 100 S.Ct. 1647, 64 L.Ed.2d 236 (1980). Moreover, as we pointed out in Naum v. Halbritter, ___ W.Va. ___, 309 S.E.2d 109 (1983), where we discussed what amounted to a Rule 804(b)(5) [14] issue, there can exist a Sixth Amendment right of confrontation problem notwithstanding the fact that not all hearsay exceptions violate the Confrontation Clause: In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 [495-96] (1970), the Supreme Court stated, `[M]erely because evidence is admitted in violation of a long established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic conclusion that confrontation rights have been denied.' Nevertheless we do believe that where the crucial witness for the prosecution will be unavailable for any form of cross-examination a serious constitutional issue exists. Indeed in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970), the Supreme Court allowed the use of an out of court admission only after noting that the evidence presented was tangential to the central issue in the case and that the evidence was heavily corroborated. ___ W.Va. at ___, 309 S.E.2d at 114. (Emphasis in original). In Naum, we concluded that the attempted use of hearsay statements which constituted the heart of the prosecution's case and which were not admissible under any traditional exception could not be admitted under a general catch-all provision analogous to Rule 804(b)(5). We emphasize in closing that Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) cannot be viewed as an open door to thrust hearsay statements into a trial. Here, the State failed to show compliance with the requisite factors embodied in Rule 804(b)(5). Even though we find that error was committed in the introduction of Ms. Cremeans' statement, we do not find this to be reversible error under Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Atkins, 163 W.Va. 502, 261 S.E.2d 55 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1081, 63 L.Ed.2d 320 (1980): Where improper evidence of a nonconstitutional nature is introduced by the State in a criminal trial, the test to determine if the error is harmless is: (1) the inadmissible evidence must be removed from the State's case and a determination made as to whether the remaining evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) if the remaining evidence is found to be insufficient, the error is not harmless; (3) if the remaining evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, an analysis must then be made to determine whether the error had any prejudicial effect on the jury. See also State v. Thompson, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 342 S.E.2d 268, 274-75 (1986); State v. Tanner, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 301 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1982); State v. Church, 168 W.Va. 408, 414-15, 284 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1981). Under the analysis adopted in Atkins, we must first determine whether there was sufficient evidenceabsent the improperly admitted evidenceto sustain a conviction. We believe sufficient evidence to convict was presented. All of the circumstantial evidence pointed to a homicide. When the body was discovered, no weapon was observed. Later, a handgun was retrieved which had been secreted in an adjoining room. A ballistics test showed that the fatal bullet had markings consistent with having been fired from this gun. Finally, and most convincingly, the medical examiner concluded on the basis of the autopsy that the fatal wound could not have been self-inflicted. That the defendant had committed the crime was also ably demonstrated, particularly by the testimony of Ms. Underwood. She testified that immediately prior to the shooting, the defendant and the deceased had been arguing about money, thereby providing a motive for the killing. Her testimony also proved both means and opportunity. The defendant was in the house when the shots were fired and Mrs. Wright's exclamation seconds later implicated him. We believe this evidence, both direct and circumstantial, was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Syllabus Point 1 of State v. Starkey, 161 W.Va. 517, 244 S.E.2d 219 (1978): In a criminal case, a verdict of guilt will not be set aside on the ground that it is contrary to the evidence, where the state's evidence is sufficient to convince impartial minds of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. To warrant interference with a verdict of guilt on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, the court must be convinced that the evidence was manifestly inadequate and that consequent injustice has been done. We also are of the view that the improper evidence was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal as required by Atkins. In that case, we touched on several factors that bore on the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible evidence. We considered whether the evidence was critical testimony of the defendant or was only tangential to the issue of guilt. Also considered was whether special or repeated emphasis had been made by the prosecution with regard to the inadmissible evidence. In the present case, the statement, as we have previously indicated, was extremely conclusory and bore only on a collateral issue, a prior taking of money from the deceased by the defendant. It was not given any special or repeated emphasis by the prosecution. Taken in the entire context of the trial, we find the admission of this evidence not to be reversible error.