Opinion ID: 3012753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Thorpe’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Text: Thorpe claims that the DOC’s policy, as enforced by the Prison Officials, of denying sex offender therapy treatment to those refusing to admit guilt violated his Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest because he was thereby not considered for parole. The Prison Officials respond that the authority to grant parole under Pennsylvania law is vested solely in the Parole Board, see 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 331.17 (2003),2 and Thorpe “has sued the wrong parties.” Thorpe replies that such “real party in interest” argument constitutes an affirmative defense that may not be raised for the first time on appeal. In 2 The Pennsylvania statute states: The board shall have exclusive power to parole and reparole, commit and recommit for violations of parole, and to discharge from parole all persons heretofore or hereafter sentenced by any court in this Commonwealth to imprisonment in any prison or penal institution thereof, whether the same be a state or county penitentiary, prison or penal institution, as hereinafter provided. 61 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 331.17 (2003). 6 the alternative, Thorpe argues that the Prison Officials as DOC employees enforcing DOC policies are the “real party in interest” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We need not resolve this “real party in interest” issue because the facts demonstrate that the Parole Board considered Thorpe for parole on no less than three occasions during his incarceration. On each occasion, the Parole Board rejected Thorpe’s application because he had not completed the sex offender treatment program and had not received a favorable recommendation from the DOC. Even if existing DOC policy regarding treatment programs and parole recommendations may have adversely affected Thorpe’s parole applications, the Parole Board’s duty was merely to review these applications as required under Pennsylvania law. See Marshall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 638 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (stating that under Pennsylvania statute, the Parole Board has mandatory duty to consider parole applications by prisoners). Thorpe’s claim, therefore, is not supported by the facts.3 The Parole Board’s consideration of Thorpe’s parole applications is sufficient for Fourteenth Amendment due process purposes because “[t]here is no constitutional right or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) 3 Thorpe’s counsel argues that Thorpe submitted five applications and notes the absence of any record evidence of consideration of the other two applications. Inasmuch as the applications that were denied both preceded and succeeded the other two applications, we decline to make the assumption that they would have been treated differently by the Board. 7 (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal. & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). While “States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause,” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long held that “a denial of parole does not implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest.” Coady v. Vaughn, 770 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. 2001); see also Rogers v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 724 A.2d 319, 322-23 (Pa. 1999) (affirming Parole Board’s discretion to grant or deny parole because “parole is a matter of grace and mercy shown to a prisoner who has demonstrated to the Parole Board's satisfaction his future ability to function as a law-abiding member of society upon release before the expiration of the prisoner's maximum sentence”). The District Court, therefore, did not err in granting summary judgment on Thorpe’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim.