Opinion ID: 1323067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Parole Status

Text: During the penalty phase of the trial, Pope objected to evidence offered to show that he was, on the date of the offense, free on parole from a penitentiary sentence imposed for a prior crime. Pope concedes that his prior criminal record was admissible, and that prior unadjudicated criminal conduct might be used at the penalty phase to prove future dangerousness. He argues, however, that the parole system is not part of a criminal prosecution, but is part of a separate administrative system, and that his parole status was therefore irrelevant. The objection was without merit. Code § 19.2-264.4 requires the jury, as a prerequisite to imposition of the death penalty based on the future dangerousness predicate, to consider the prior history of the defendant. We upheld the constitutionality of that section in LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 593-94, 304 S.E.2d at 660, and in Smith, 219 Va. at 477-78, 248 S.E.2d at 148-49. We relied on the reasoning of Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976): What is essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual defendant whose fate it must determine. Id. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958 (emphasis added). In Bassett, 222 Va. at 852, 284 S.E.2d at 849, we held that future dangerousness could reasonably be inferred from the fact that a defendant had committed additional crimes within six months of his release on parole from a 99-year sentence for armed robbery. That fact, we noted, tended to show a predisposition to commit other crimes upon release from custody. The evidence here is equally relevant and probative on the issue of future dangerousness. In addition to showing a predisposition to commit acts of increasing violence after punishment for earlier crimes, it demonstrates that Pope was undeterred by the constraints of parole supervision. The court correctly overruled Pope's objection.