Opinion ID: 1111213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Jury Instruction Issues

Text: Defendant raises several issues concerning jury instructions. He argues the trial court erred in giving CALJIC No. 2.10 regarding medical expert witness testimony about statements the defendant made during an examination. Defendant also contends that CALJIC No. 17.10, together with the prosecutor's closing argument, impermissibly restricted the jury's deliberations solely to the capital offense. He claims the lack of a cautionary instruction on the use of juror notes is reversible error. Defendant also contends his absence from the jury instruction conference violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. We discuss each of these claims below and conclude they have no merit. a. CALJIC No. 2.10 (29a) At the prosecutor's request, the trial court's jury instructions included CALJIC No. 2.10 (4th ed. 1979 bound vol.): There has been admitted in evidence the testimony of a medical expert of statements made to him by the defendant in the course of an examination of the defendant which was made for the purpose of diagnosis. The testimony of such statements may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of showing the information upon which the medical expert based his opinion. Such testimony is not to be considered by you as evidence of the truth of the facts disclosed by defendant's statements. Defendant contends that giving this instruction was error with respect to Dr. Benson's testimony, although defendant concedes the court properly could have limited the use of that testimony in accordance with the instruction. However, he argues that the court's omission of the instruction until the end of trial, without previously limiting the jury's consideration of the testimony or alerting defense counsel and defendant to this limited use, denied him a fair trial as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant asserts that because both sides had rested before the prosecutor requested the instruction, his trial counsel had no doubt relied on the full admissibility of Dr. Benson's testimony in choosing to have appellant waive his right to testify at the guilt phase. Thus, in defendant's view, [b]y restricting the testimony of Dr. Benson after the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury to ignore [defendant's] only opportunity to present his version of the facts of the killings. Defendant's arguments in this regard derive from a misconception of the import of statements the prosecutor made to the court when Dr. Benson began to testify about his interviews of defendant: Your Honor, I would ask specifically that anything that the doctor says in terms of any interview or technique that he used is being offered not for the truth of the matter that is asserted in the interview, whether it was chemically assisted or not, but merely that the words were spoken, that somehow those words affected the doctor's opinion and that the content is not true as to those words and that the jury be so instructed. The court responded: Objection overruled. Defendant's counsel said nothing. Defendant characterizes this exchange simply as the prosecutor's hearsay objection that the trial court overruled. He therefore argues that defendant's statements, to which Dr. Benson testified, were admitted for the truth of the statements. Defendant concludes that he was entitled to rely on this ruling. However, as the Attorney General argues, the prosecutor's objection, fairly read, included a request for a limiting instruction during trial. (30) Evidence Code section 355 requires the court to give appropriate limiting instructions if properly requested. However, the timing of these instructions is in the trial court's discretion. ( People v. Johnson (1967) 253 Cal. App.2d 396, 399 [61 Cal. Rptr. 225]; see § 1093, subd. (f).) Thus, the trial court is not obliged to give limiting instructions the moment they are requested or when the limited evidence is presented; subsequent instruction can be sufficient in a proper case. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 253 Cal. App.2d at pp. 399-400.) (29b) Consequently, the trial court's ruling in this case on the prosecutor's objection and midtrial request for a limiting instruction would not have precluded a later request for instruction under CALJIC No. 2.10. The propriety of the instruction was manifest, inasmuch as defendant could not offer his own hearsay statements as evidence of the truth of what he told Dr. Benson. (See People v. Clay (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 433, 457 [200 Cal. Rptr. 269]; People v. Williamson (1977) 71 Cal. App.3d 206, 213-214 [139 Cal. Rptr. 222].) We see no merit in defendant's assertion of surprise and prejudice from the trial court's decision to give CALJIC No. 2.10 after the defense and prosecution had rested. Defendant argues this action amounted to changing the rules and that it deprived the jury of his version of the killings. However, there was no change in the rule against a party's offering his own hearsay statements for the truth of the matters stated; defendant's statements to Dr. Benson always were inadmissible for that purpose. Moreover, the thrust of Dr. Benson's opinion testimony was that defendant's claimed impaired ability to perceive, comprehend, or relate the events surrounding the killings evidenced mental disease. As the Attorney General observes, there is no reason to believe defendant would have tried to testify to those events, and subjected himself to cross-examination concerning them, had the hearsay rule's familiar limitations on Dr. Benson's testimony been formally announced earlier. (31) Furthermore, the long-established general rule is that a claim of unfair surprise at trial may not be raised for the first time after the verdict. ( People v. Toro (1989) 47 Cal.3d 966, 975-976 [254 Cal. Rptr. 811, 766 P.2d 577].) The rule applies generally to criminal cases and prevents counsel from speculating on a favorable verdict once a situation arises that might constitute legal surprise. ( Id. at p. 976.) Counsel must act at the earliest possible moment after discovering the surprise, because counsel waives the ground by failing to make it known to the court through a motion for mistrial or for a continuance. ( Ibid. ) (29c) Here, defendant took none of the steps expected of a party who desires to claim unfair surprise, nor did he ask to reopen his case. Although section 1259 allows us to review  even in the absence of an objection  instructional error that affects substantial rights, the trial court's decision to give CALJIC No. 2.10 was not erroneous in any of the usual senses of being legally incorrect, misleading, or unrelated to the facts of the case. (Cf. People v. Toro, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 977.) Under the circumstances of this case, only defendant could have known whether giving CALJIC No. 2.10 would affect any substantial right of his to testify. As a result, although a failure to object does not bar review of the instruction, it does bar a contention based on unfair surprise. ( People v. Toro, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 977.) [13] Defendant also argues that the prosecutor ignored her own requested instruction. He contends that the prosecutor referred, in cross-examination of Dr. Benson and in closing argument, to defendant's statements to Dr. Benson as if they had been admitted for the truth of the matters he stated. Defendant's counsel never objected to this claimed impropriety, and so defendant waived any claim in that regard. (See People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 413.) In any event, defendant's contention lacks support in the record. Defendant refers to transcript pages setting out the prosecutor's arguments based on inferences she drew from testimony and evidence other than defendant's statements to Dr. Benson. Defendant also refers to part of the prosecutor's argument that Dr. Benson's diagnosis was not credible in light of defendant's statements and the rest of the evidence available to the doctor. [14] The prosecutor specifically told the jury the doctor's account of defendant's statements was offered not for their truth, but for assessing the premises and credibility of the doctor's diagnosis. The prosecutor argued that to the extent she relied on these matters, the facts had independent proof. No basis exists for claiming the prosecutor ignored her requested instruction or argued defendant's statements to Dr. Benson were true. b. CALJIC No. 17.10 (32) The trial court gave the jury CALJIC No. 17.10 (1984 rev.): If the jury is not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged and it unanimously so finds, it may convict him of any lesser offense, if the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of such lesser offense. [¶] The offense of voluntary manslaughter is a lesser offense to the offense charged in Count One. Defendant argues this instruction, in conjunction with the prosecutor's argument, channeled deliberations away from noncapital offenses if even one juror voted for first degree murder. [15] In defendant's view, the instruction and argument precluded jury deliberation of voluntary manslaughter by suggesting a verdict of not guilty of murder was a prerequisite to considering manslaughter. We have held that a court may restrict a jury from returning a verdict on a lesser included offense before acquitting on a greater offense, but may not preclude it from considering lesser offenses during deliberations. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1073; People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 324-325 [250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) Thus, a trial court should not tell the jury it must first unanimously acquit the defendant of the greater offense before deliberating on or even considering a lesser offense. ( People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 328, 335.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, neither the jury instruction nor the prosecutor's argument  separately or in combination  precluded the jury from considering voluntary manslaughter during their deliberations on Doreen's killing. Plainly, the prosecutor did not tell the jury it could not or should not consider a lesser offense unless it first acquitted of the greater offense. Instead, the prosecutor did no more than offer the jury a suggested approach to its formal decisionmaking and completion of the verdict forms. Similarly, a reasonable juror would have understood the instruction, which the court told the jury to consider in context and with the other instructions as a whole, as governing how to return the verdicts and findings after completing deliberations. Other instructions implicitly told the jury that its deliberations should include consideration of the lesser offenses. For example, the court told the jurors they must give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt they might have if they were deciding between manslaughter and murder or first and second degree murder. (CALJIC Nos. 8.71, 8.72.) No reasonable likelihood exists the jury construed the challenged instruction in a manner contrary to the rule of People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 322. (See People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1077.) Consequently, we find no merit to defendant's contention the jury's deliberations were channeled improperly toward a capital conviction to the exclusion of lesser offenses. The challenged instruction and prosecutor's comments did not impermissibly enhance the risk of an unwarranted capital conviction. Therefore, we find no support for defendant's claims that his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. Defendant also contends he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney expressly decided to forgo a request for CALJIC No. 8.75. [16] The claim must fail because defendant's counsel reasonably could conclude that forgoing CALJIC No. 8.75 was a sound tactical choice. As we observed in Kurtzman, the version of CALJIC No. 8.75 then in use had the potential to confuse jurors on how deliberations should proceed and might create ambiguity as to what was prohibited and what was required. ( People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 336.) We also there noted that the wording of CALJIC No. 17.10 was less likely to be misunderstood. ( People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 335-336.) To the extent defendant argues his counsel should have foreseen, and requested, CALJIC No. 8.75 as revised in 1989 after Kurtzman, the constitutional standard for effective assistance of counsel has never required such prescience. In any event, it is not reasonably likely the jury construed or applied the instructions in a manner that precluded its consideration of lesser included offenses. (See People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1077-1078, fn. 7 and accompanying text.) Therefore, the absence of CALJIC No. 8.75, either in its prior form or in the revised version, did not prejudice defendant. c. Instruction on Jurors' Notes (33) The court permitted the jurors to take notes during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. The trial court twice gave the jurors essentially the same cautionary instruction regarding the use of notes. At the conclusion of trial, the court instructed the jurors that their notes are your own personal notes and not for the use of any other juror, and that if a juror's notes and memory differ, the reporter's notes must prevail. Defendant claims the instruction was insufficient. He asserts the court also should have instructed the jurors not to permit their notetaking to distract them from the trial proceedings, advised them to use their notes only as an aid to their memories, and admonished them not to be influenced by other jurors' notetaking. (See People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 747 [205 Cal. Rptr. 810, 685 P.2d 1161] [recommended cautionary instruction]; CALJIC No. 1.05 [same].) Defendant failed to request a more complete instruction and therefore waived the point for appeal. The trial court has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction regarding use of jurors' notes. (E.g., People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 180 [19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331], and cases cited.) d. Absence From the Instructions Conference (34) Defendant contends he was improperly denied the right to be personally present at the conference held to frame appropriate guilt phase instructions after the parties had rested their cases. Although defendant did not ask to be personally present, neither did he expressly waive his right to attend the conference. In general, the defendant's absence from various court proceedings, `even without waiver, may be declared nonprejudicial in situations where his presence does not bear a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' [Citations.] ( People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 18, and cases cited, italics omitted.) Moreover, Defendant is not entitled to be present either in chambers or at bench discussions on questions of law because his presence on these occasions does not bear a reasonable relation to his ability to defend against the charges. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 210 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949]; see also People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 178 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) We find it unlikely that defendant, a layperson, would have contributed in any way to the discussions regarding appropriate instructions on issues of law. Defendant stresses the importance of the court's ruling limiting Dr. Benson's testimony through the language of CALJIC No. 2.10, as previously discussed, and he suggests he might have insist[ed] that his version [of events surrounding the murders] be admitted before the jury. As in People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at page 19, The point seems unduly speculative....