Opinion ID: 1188992
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: physician's testimony

Text: Stafford next argues that the State impermissibly questioned a witness concerning an issue about which the State had previously objected when that witness was questioned by defense counsel. Dr. Teeter testified on behalf of the defendant. Stafford saw Dr. Teeter on September 12, 1991, complaining of chest pains which Stafford related to extreme emotional distress and being upset over the breakup of a relationship with his girlfriend. When defense counsel asked Dr. Teeter if Stafford described the nature of the breakup, the State objected to any testimony concerning statements that Stafford had made to Dr. Teeter as hearsay because Stafford was not available as a witness. (Stafford had not yet testified.) The trial court sustained the State's objection. Dr. Teeter then testified that he saw Stafford every couple of weeks and that he prescribed Valium. On October 22, 1991, Stafford presented himself at St. Francis Hospital complaining of suicidal ideation; he had taken 30 milligrams of Valium plus alcohol, though his prescribed dosage of Valium was only 10 milligrams. Dr. Teeter testified that Stafford was admitted to the psychiatric unit at Stormont-Vail Hospital. Dr. Teeter saw Stafford during the hospitalization. The State inquired: On October 22nd when you talked to him, it wasn't only the question about the depression about the breakup with his girlfriend, but he also acted agitated and homicidal at that time, didn't he? Dr. Teeter answered: That's what he stated to me, yes. Defense counsel objected on the same hearsay grounds the State had earlier asserted and asked that the answer be stricken. The State argued that it was an admission against interest, but the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard Dr. Teeter's response. The defendant contends this exchange between the State and Dr. Teeter was improper and requires reversal of his conviction. He states: There was no legitimate basis for the prosecutor to pose the question; it was asked simply to present the jury with inadmissible evidence that Mr. Stafford allegedly had told his doctor that he was homicidal. Stafford points out that it is improper for a lawyer to place an improper matter before the jury. State v. Crowley, 220 Kan. 532, 536, 552 P.2d 971 (1976); State v. Carson, 216 Kan. 711, 713, 533 P.2d 1342 (1975). The jury was instructed to disregard Dr. Teeter's response. An admonition to the jury to disregard evidence normally cures prejudice resulting from the improper submission of that evidence. See State v. Mick, 229 Kan. 157, Syl. ¶ 3, 621 P.2d 1006 (1981). Nothing reflects that the judge's admonition was not sufficiently curative here. Stafford suggests that even though other witnesses had previously testified about threats Stafford had made to kill Workman and King, the other witnesses indicated that Stafford was drinking and abusing prescription medication at the time he made those threats and, therefore, the jury was more likely to give credence to Dr. Teeter's testimony. We disagree. Stafford was also abusing alcohol and prescription medication at the time he made the statement to Dr. Teeter. Further, Dr. Teeter's testimony indicated a general statement made by Stafford that he was homicidal, with no indication toward whom Stafford was homicidal. The other witnesses, conversely, testified about exactly whom Stafford wanted to shoot and, in some instances, how the shooting would occur. A general statement made to a doctor is not necessarily more credible than much more specific statements made to other witnesses. The judge's admonition to the jury to disregard Dr. Teeter's response cured any error that occurred when the jury heard Dr. Teeter's response. See State v. Hollis, 240 Kan. 521, 535-36, 731 P.2d 260 (1987).