Opinion ID: 409640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The employer's motivation

Text: 19 It remains for us to consider whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the hospital fired Walsh because of his exercise of section 7 rights and without a legitimate business reason. In evaluating a charge of unlawful discharge the Board must give careful consideration to the employer's 'good reason' as well as to the general counsel's evidence of improper motive. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 907 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1612, 71 L.Ed.2d 848 (1982). Though the employer has the burden of coming forward with credible evidence to meet a prima facie case of improper motive, the burden of persuasion remains with the general counsel to show a causal link between an improper motive and discharge. Id. at 904-06. 2 20 It is undisputed that Walsh's discharge resulted from his giving a statement to McCarthy and surrounding circumstances. Having accepted the Board's conclusion that giving the statement was protected activity, it follows that a prima facie case has been made for a § 8(a)(1) violation. In addition, there was specific evidence in the record that Walsh's firing was precipitated by the hospital's concern that Walsh's statement gave McCarthy's union a basis for successfully grieving his discharge. 3 21 The hospital contends, however, that it discharged Walsh for legitimate business reasons. Its discharge letter told Walsh he had been terminated for: (1) disobeying a lawful command not to converse with McCarthy; (2) meeting with McCarthy and giving him the written statement; (3) leaving his post to give McCarthy the statement without proper authorization to do so; and (4) exercis(ing) poor judgment against Hospital policy which was not in the best interest of the Safety-Security Department. The ALJ found, in effect, that these reasons were a sham: In short, Folker (a hospital vice-president), annoyed at and embarrassed by Walsh's 'compulsion to tell the truth' about this incident, fired him, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 22 There is ample evidence to impeach the credibility of the first three reasons given by the hospital. The ALJ found on the record that no one had commanded Walsh not to speak to or meet with McCarthy, that Walsh's eight-to-ten minute meeting with McCarthy in front of the hospital ... did not cause him to leave his post, and that guard employees would leave their duty stations for personal matters for more substantial periods without being disciplined or fired. 23 Indeed, on appeal, the hospital urges the legitimacy of only the fourth reason. It claims that in discharging Walsh it did no more than enforce a standing rule essential to the integrity of its safety-security system. That rule, read into the minutes of a regular monthly meeting of the Safety Security Department approximately a year-and-half before the events relevant here, stated: 24 All reports submitted become hospital property, shall not be altered without (the Chief of Safety and Security's) permission, and shall not be discussed outside of (the Safety and Security) Department. 25 The ALJ's decision did not mention the hospital's rule or discuss the contention that Walsh's actions compromised the integrity of the hospital's security reporting system. The Board's order affirming the ALJ's decision did deal directly though summarily with this justification for discharge. 26 While Respondent further contends that Walsh's letter compromised the integrity of its security system, the evidence in this regard contains no factual basis demonstrating any specific manner in which Walsh's letter actually or potentially compromised the security of Respondent's facility in a manner warranting an intrusion upon Walsh's exercise of concerted activities otherwise protected by the Act. 27 The hospital is no more forthcoming on appeal in demonstrating that Walsh's actions-even if they can be fairly characterized as violating the cited rule-were a breach of hospital security serious enough to motivate the firing of a long-term employee whose previous work record was admittedly exemplary. The hospital points to no instances in which it has discharged other employees for single violations of a similar rule. We are thus satisfied that there was substantial evidence upon which to conclude that Walsh was in fact fired because his superiors were annoyed and embarrassed that Walsh had given another employee a statement which undermined their position in a pending union grievance. 28 But because the grievant was not one of the hospital's own employees, we do not think this quite makes an end of the matter. We are not prepared to say that an employer's embarrassment in its dealing with another company could never be a legitimate business reason for discharging an employee who came to the aid of the other company's employee in disregard of official channels. Cf. Keosaian v. NLRB, 630 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1980). Here, however, there is evidence that Walsh, before he gave a statement directly to McCarthy, made repeated attempts to persuade his superiors to permit the correction of what he considered the misuse of his report. Furthermore, the hospital was closely allied with Balco in effecting the discharge of McCarthy, an employee who worked at the hospital. 4 In another case involving less closely allied employers it might be easier to conclude that the discharge was motivated by a legitimate concern over business credibility and not by a desire to thwart mutual aid and protection among employees. 29 On this record, the Board had substantial evidence upon which to conclude that the hospital discharged Walsh for activity protected by § 7 of the Act, thus violating § 8(a)(1) of the Act. 30 The petition for enforcement is granted.