Opinion ID: 2282775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the plaintiff's question

Text: The plaintiff's question of law, as certified by the trial judge, is: Did the judge err in concluding that elderly electors, casting absentee ballots because of illness or physical disability, substantially complied with mandatory mailing requirements of section 9-146 (b) of the Connecticut General Statutes, when their ballots were mailed by a person other than persons specifically designated by such statute? The plaintiff contends that there has not been substantial compliance with the mailing requirements of § 9-146 (b), supra, and that, therefore, the ballots in question must be invalidated. The defendants, on the other hand, maintain that, in the absence of any showing of fraud, there was substantial compliance. In the alternative, the defendants maintain that the question of substantial compliance need not be reached because the mailing provisions of the statute should be viewed as directory rather than mandatory. This court acknowledges and concurs in the reluctance with which courts invalidate ballots, because such action effectively disfranchises the voters involved. ` Where the legislature in express terms says that a ballot shall be void for some cause, the courts must undoubtedly hold it to be void; but no voter is to be disfranchised on a doubtful construction, and statutes tending to limit the exercise of the ballot should be liberally construed in his favor. Unless a ballot comes clearly within the prohibition of some statute it should be counted, if from it the wish or will of the voter can be ascertained.` Dombkowski v. Messier, 164 Conn. 204, 207, 319 A.2d 373 (1972); Hurlbut v. Lemelin, 155 Conn. 68, 77, 230 A.2d 36 (1967); Scully v. Westport, 145 Conn. 648, 651-52, 145 A. 2d 742 (1958); State v. Bossa, 69 Conn. 335, 341, 37 A. 977 (1897). But the right to vote is not absolute and is subject to regulation by the legislature. Mills v. Gaynor, 136 Conn. 632, 636, 73 A.2d 823 (1950). See generally General Statutes, Title 9. In this case we are concerned with absentee votinga special type of voting procedure established by the legislature for those otherwise qualified voters who for one or more of the authorized reasons are unable to cast their ballots at the regular polling place. See General Statutes §§ 9-135, 9-133a. [16] We have previously recognized that there is considerable room for fraud in absentee voting and that a failure to comply with the regulatory provisions governing absentee voting increases the opportunity for fraud. Dombkowski v. Messier, supra, 209. In Flanagan v. Hynes, 75 Conn. 584, 588, 54 A. 737 (1903), we stated [i]f there is to be disfranchisement, it should be because the legislature has seen fit to require it in the interest of an honest suffrage, and has expressed that requirement in unmistakable language. In view of the express language of the absentee voting chapter and this court's decision in Dombkowski v. Messier, supra, there is no question that the provisions of § 9-146 [17] and specifically the mailing requirements of § 9-146 (b) are mandatory. The statutory provisions authorizing absentee voting at elections and primaries both state that such voting shall take place in the manner and subject to the conditions hereinafter stated. General Statutes §§ 9-135, 9-133a, supra. By its own terms § 9-146(a), in relevant part, unequivocally states: An absentee ballot shall be cast at any election only if the mailing requirements are fulfilled. (Emphasis added.) Section 9-146 (b) provides that the ballot of an ill or disabled elector shall only be mailed by the elector or by a designated person who may be only one of the persons on a specified list. Had the legislature intended that such clearly mandatory language not require the invalidation of a ballot not conforming to the statutory requirements, it could have so specified as it has in other sections of the absentee voting chapter. In § 9-138, for example, which requires that the elector or an authorized agent sign and date the statement on the ballot's inner envelope, the legislature specifically provided that [t]he failure of such applicant or such authorized agent to date such form shall not invalidate the ballot. An example of another type of saving provision employed by the legislature is found in § 9-145 which states: No absentee ballot shall be rejected as a marked ballot unless such ballot, in the opinion of the moderator, was marked in such way for the purpose of providing a means for its identification. The absence of any type of saving provision in connection with the mailing requirements of § 9-146 (b) leads to the conclusion that these requirements are mandatory and that noncompliance with them requires the invalidation of such a ballot. This court has previously held that the provisions of the absentee voting statute are mandatory. Dombkowski v. Messier, supra. In Dombkowski, we specifically concluded that the provisions of § 9-148 of the General Statutes, dealing with the handling of absentee ballots by the municipal clerk, were mandatory by reference to the mandatory language contained in an earlier version of § 9-146. [18] Though the specific language of § 9-146 has been modified since Dombkowski, the mandatory nature of the statute, as discussed above, remains unchanged. There is, therefore, no reason for us to disturb the holding of Dombkowski. Having concluded that the mailing requirements of § 9-146(b) are mandatory, we next consider whether there has been compliance with these provisions. In Dombkowski v. Messier, supra, 209, this court stated that where the legislature has provided mandatory requirements specifically designed to prevent fraud, at least a substantial compliance with such statutes is necessary. Because the ballots in question were not mailed personally by the absentee voters, in accordance with § 9-146(b) the ballots should have been mailed by one of the following persons: A licensed physician, registered or practical nurse or any other person who is caring for such elector because of such elector's illness or physical disability, a member of such elector's family or, if no such person consents or is available, then a police officer, registrar of voters or deputy registrar of voters in the municipality in which such elector resides. In § 9-146(b), the legislature has provided a detailed list of those categories of persons who could be designated to mail an absentee ballot. Had the legislature intended that any authorized agent could mail an absentee ballot, it could have so said, as it did, for example, in § 9-138 regarding an agent's signing of the statement on the inner envelope of the ballot. By specifying particular categories of persons, [19] the legislature has mandated that ballots mailed under § 9-146(b) shall be counted only if mailed by persons who come within one of the specified categories. It is clear from the stipulation that the person who mailed the ballots in question was not one of the persons specified by the legislature. The trial judge, however, after noting that the underlying intent of the absentee ballot law was to prevent fraud, concluded that in the absence of a showing of fraud or connivance, the actions of these electors and Mrs. Corradino evidence substantial compliance with the mandatory requirements of § 9-146(b). [20] We do not agree. The trial judge's reliance upon an absence of a showing of any fraud is misplaced. Whether fraud has been committed in the handling of certain absentee ballots is irrelevant to the question of whether there has been substantial compliance with all of the mandatory provisions of the absentee voting law. Dombkowski v. Messier, supra, 207. Had the legislature chosen to do so, it could have enacted a remedial scheme under which ballots would only be invalidated upon a showing of fraud or other related irregularity. The legislature has instead enacted a regulatory scheme designed to prevent fraud as far as practicable by mandating the way in which absentee ballots are to be handled. The validity of the ballot, therefore, depends not on whether there has been fraud, but on whether there has been substantial compliance with the mandatory requirements. Because the twenty-six absentee voters in this case did not substantially comply with the mandatory provisions of § 9-146(b) their votes may not be counted. While this may seem a harsh result when, as in this case, the intent of these voters is clear, it must be remembered that these voters have disfranchised themselves by not complying with § 9-146(b), about which they had been warned in the materials accompanying the ballot. [21] This case, therefore, differs from Dombkowski v. Messier, supra, in this respect because the voters in Dombkowski were disfranchised, not by their own actions, but by the noncompliance of the municipal clerk with the requirements of § 9-148. Thus, the trial judge erred in holding that there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of § 9-146 (b), because, in fact, there had been no compliance at all. Therefore, the answer to the plaintiff's certified question of law is that the trial judge did err in finding substantial compliance with the mandatory requirements of § 9-146(b).