Opinion ID: 4584805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, the plaintiff makes two primary arguments. First, it argues that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard to evaluate the decision to discontinue McMillan Lane — specifically, that the trial court utilized a balancing test that was inconsistent with the balancing test we set forth in Town of Hinsdale v. Town of Chesterfield, 153 N.H. 70, 73-74 (2005). Second, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that the Town’s interests in discontinuing the road outweighed the interests of the plaintiff and the public in the road’s continuance. We first address the plaintiff’s argument challenging the legal standard applied by the trial court.
Because the trial court’s decision to apply a particular legal standard is a question of law, we review the decision de novo. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 72. Moreover, to the extent that this appeal requires that we engage in statutory interpretation, our review is also de novo. Balise v. Balise, 170 N.H. 521, 524 (2017). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of legislative intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Id. We first examine the language of the statute and ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. Unless we find statutory language to be ambiguous, we need not examine legislative history. See id. RSA 231:48 governs appeals from the discontinuance of a public way. It provides, in relevant part: Any person or other town aggrieved by the vote of a town to discontinue any highway . . . may appeal therefrom to the superior court for the county in which such highway is situate by petition within 6 months after the town has voted such discontinuance. . . . [L]ike proceedings shall be had on such petition as in the case of appeals in the laying out of class IV, V and VI highways. 5 We have held that the statute “plainly requires that appeals of the discontinuance of any highway should proceed similarly to appeals of the laying out of such a highway.” Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 72-73. Therefore, like appeals of a town’s decision to lay out a highway, an appeal of a town’s decision to discontinue a highway receives de novo review by the superior court. See id. at 73; Rodgers Dev. Co. v. Town of Tilton, 147 N.H. 57, 61 (2001) (explaining that, in an appeal of a town’s decision to lay out a highway, the superior court reviews the town’s decision de novo). However, “[a]lthough RSA 231:48 provides for like proceedings, the statute does not set forth the substantive legal standard to apply in discontinuance appeals.” Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 73. In Town of Hinsdale, we addressed, for the first time, the substantive legal standard to be applied to discontinuance appeals. See id. at 73-74. There, the Town of Hinsdale appealed the Town of Chesterfield’s decision to discontinue a portion of a highway that extended into both towns. See id. at 71. The trial court reversed Chesterfield’s decision, concluding that the numerous negative consequences that resulted from the discontinuance — including the elimination of access to the only reasonable route for Hinsdale residents to reach a main highway and to escape from potential disasters in the area — outweighed Chesterfield’s burden of maintaining that discontinued portion of the highway. See id. at 71, 74-75. On appeal, Chesterfield argued that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard. Id. at 72. To determine the proper standard, we “consider[ed] the policy sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme.” Id. at 73. We first reasoned that, because the legislature “manifested an intent to protect the interests of adjoining towns” by requiring notice to adjoining towns of the discontinuation, see RSA 231:44 (2009), “the legal standard in this case must consider the interest that an aggrieved town has in continued use of the highway.” Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 73. As for the town that voted to discontinue the highway, we noted that we have previously recognized the burden of maintaining a highway as a “significant consideration for a town in deciding whether or not to discontinue the highway.” Id. at 73-74; see New London v. Davis, 73 N.H. 72, 74 (1904). Thus, we also reasoned that “the legal standard in this case must also consider the burden that the appellee town would bear in continuing the road.” Id. at 74. Based upon these considerations, we concluded that the standard “in this case balances the aggrieved town’s interest in the road’s continuance against the burden that maintenance of the road would impose on the town that voted to discontinue the road,” and upheld the trial court’s decision under that standard. Id. at 74-75. The trial court here correctly noted that we have not yet addressed the substantive legal standard that applies when, as here, an appeal of a public highway discontinuance is brought by an abutting property owner, rather than 6 an abutting town. Nevertheless, the trial court found that a “similar balancing test” to that in Town of Hinsdale was appropriate “[b]ecause abutting property owners are afforded similar statutory protections as adjoining towns, and because Conway clearly has an interest in the discontinuance of McMillan Lane.” However, the trial court determined, based upon the language of RSA 231:43, I, that “a town’s statutory authority to discontinue roads need not be premised solely upon reduced maintenance costs.” The trial court therefore determined that it would consider the Town’s “other interests in discontinuing McMillan Lane,” in addition to the burden of maintaining the road, and “balance Bellevue’s interests in the road’s continuance against Conway’s interests in discontinuing the road.” The plaintiff does not contend that the trial court erred in utilizing the balancing test in Town of Hinsdale as the substantive legal standard in this case. Rather, it argues that the substantive legal standard we articulated in Town of Hinsdale “specifically restricts the trial court’s consideration of a Town’s interest to the burden that maintenance of the road would impose on the Town.” The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in considering the Town’s other interests in the road’s discontinuance, rather than limiting its analysis to the burden of maintaining the road. We disagree. RSA 231:43, I, authorizes a town to discontinue a class IV, V, or VI highway. As relevant here, it provides, simply, that “[a]ny class IV, V or VI highway, or any portion thereof, in a town may be discontinued by vote of a town.” RSA 231:43, I. Accordingly, the statute does not “specifically require that there be any particular grounds to justify discontinuance.” 16 Peter J. Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice: Municipal Taxation and Road Law § 54.04, at 54-7 (2008); see RSA 231:43, I. Thus, it follows that, when the town’s decision to discontinue a highway is based upon other interests, in addition to the interest in alleviating the burden of maintenance, the trial court may consider those interests in reviewing the town’s decision. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 73-74. Our articulation of the balancing test in Town of Hinsdale implicitly recognized this principle. See id. In determining the proper legal standard, we characterized the burden of maintaining a highway — the only factor that could have reasonably supported Chesterfield’s decision, see id. at 71, 74-75 — as “a significant consideration” for a town in deciding whether to discontinue a highway, and determined that the legal standard “in this case must . . . consider the burden that the appellee town would bear in continuing the road.” Id. at 74 (emphases added). Thus, while we recognized that the burden of maintaining a highway was a relevant consideration in evaluating Chesterfield’s decision to discontinue the highway based upon the specific facts of the case, we did not state that it was the only factor a town may consider in every case. See id. We further highlighted the narrow application of the balancing test to the specific facts of the case when we expressly noted that the 7 balancing test was “the substantive legal standard” to be applied “in this case,” thereby leaving open the consideration of other factors when they are relevant. Id. at 74 (emphasis added). The plaintiff does not identify, nor can we find, any language in Town of Hinsdale that restricts a trial court from considering factors other than the burden of maintenance costs when other considerations are relevant in evaluating a town’s decision to discontinue a road.1 See id. at 73-74. In light of the language of RSA 231:43, I, and our articulation of the balancing test in Town of Hinsdale as applied to that particular case, we conclude that Town of Hinsdale does not limit a trial court to considering only the burden of maintenance costs in reviewing a town’s decision to discontinue a highway. The plaintiff makes no argument that the legal standard set forth in Town of Hinsdale or the trial court’s consideration of specific interests of the Town — such as indirect economic benefits that may result from the road discontinuance — is unconstitutional or otherwise legally erroneous. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 12-a. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it considered the Town’s other interests in addition to maintenance cost savings.
The plaintiff next argues that, “even if it were appropriate for the trial court to consider factors in addition to the maintenance burden on the Town,” the benefits to the Town that would result from the discontinuance of McMillan Lane do not outweigh the plaintiff’s interest in its continuance. The plaintiff contends that, because the new road will remain privately owned and maintained by Settlers, the discontinuance of McMillan Lane as a public road deprives the plaintiff and its employees, guests, and other invitees of the “unfettered legal right to access [its] property” from Route 302 “by a legally protected public way.” Because the Town has no legal obligation to maintain and provide public access to a private road, the plaintiff argues that it will have no recourse if Settlers or its successors do not maintain or otherwise deny access to the road due to the “fail[ure] to act cooperatively and in good faith” or due to financial failure. The plaintiff contends that, in disregarding the plaintiff’s concerns about future access as “too uncertain to outweigh Conway’s interests,” the trial court erroneously overlooked the legal distinction between a public road and a private road open for public use and the potential negative consequences that may flow from the new road’s private status. 1 Such a limited scope of review is also contrary to the balancing test that applies to appeals of a town’s decision to lay out a public highway, see Rodgers Dev. Co., 147 N.H. at 59-60, upon which we relied, in part, in Town of Hinsdale to determine the proper balancing test, see Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. 8 Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision in a discontinuance appeal is deferential. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. We will uphold the trial court’s decision in a discontinuance appeal if it is “supported by some evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will not disturb its determination in the absence of gross mistake or fraud. Id. The burden of proof rests on the plaintiff to demonstrate that its interests outweigh those of the Town. See id. We find the plaintiff’s argument to be unavailing. As an initial matter, evidence in the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Settlers will not cease maintaining the new road or close it to the public. Historically, Settlers has not failed to maintain and provide public access to Settlers’ Green Drive or the private portion of Common Court, and, once the Town voted to discontinue McMillan Lane, Settlers has kept it open to the public and has consistently maintained it. Indeed, it is in Settlers’ interest to continue to maintain all of its private roads that provide access to Settlers’ Green, including the new road, which will abut and provide public access to the businesses within the retail village. As the principal of Settlers testified, Settlers believes that the new road is “paramount” to ensure public access to the development, and that, even if the proposed grocery store failed, Settlers “would still maintain that road just like” it maintains Settlers’ Green Drive. Additionally, Settlers’ principal understood the planning board’s site plan approval to require Settlers to keep the new road open to the public, and that, if Settlers failed to do so, the planning board could revoke its approval. Thus, not only does the evidence demonstrate that the plaintiff currently has access to the now-privately owned McMillan Lane, it shows that this access will continue given Settlers’ significant business and legal interests in continuing to keep the new road open to the public and maintained. Furthermore, although the plaintiff contends that it has no legal recourse to ensure its access to the new road, the evidence in the record suggests otherwise. First, although the plaintiff complains that it has not been granted an easement over the new road, the principal of Settlors provided undisputed testimony that the plaintiff has never requested an easement, and that, if it did, Settlers would “be happy to” provide it with one. Second, the trial court heard testimony from the Town’s planning director that the planning board’s conditional approval required Settlers to open the new road to the public prior to closing McMillan Lane. He further testified that, “if there is a violation” of a requirement set forth in the planning board’s approval, “anybody can bring that [violation] to the attention of the Town,” which can then “take action on it” by revoking the certificate of occupancy, obtaining injunctive relief, or imposing fines. See RSA 676:4-a, I(c) (Supp. 2019), :15 (2016), :17 (2016). The plaintiff makes no contention that these remedies are unavailable to it should Settlers fail to maintain or provide access to the new road. Finally, even if Settlers or its successors failed to maintain or provide access to the new road — whether due to intentional malfeasance or 9 circumstances beyond its control — the plaintiff fails to identify any evidence demonstrating that the plaintiff would suffer harm as a result. According to the record, hotel guests can continue to access the hotel from Settlers’ Green Drive over which the plaintiff holds an easement, and which, unlike McMillan Lane, connects directly to Route 302 and includes signs for the hotel. According to the testimony of the plaintiff’s principal, Settlers’ Green Drive, which he described as the hotel’s “main entrance,” is the primary way in which guests access the hotel. Hotel guests can also access the hotel from NorthSouth Road by using Fairway Lane, a public road, where a sign for the hotel also appears. The plaintiff does not contend, and the record fails to demonstrate, that these two ways would not provide sufficient access to the hotel should public access to the new road somehow become restricted. Thus, based upon the record, it was reasonable for the trial court to give less weight to the plaintiff’s concerns over future access when balancing the interests of the parties. The plaintiff further asserts that, in weighing the interests in favor of the Town, the trial court considered factors that are not supported by the record. First, it argues that the record does not support the trial court’s finding that the new development would provide additional residential housing to the area. However, even if we accept the plaintiff’s argument and cast aside any consideration of the addition of residential housing or the other indirect economic benefits that may flow from the private development, there is still some evidence in the record to support the trial court’s decision, such as the public benefits gained by the Town by virtue of: (1) the reduction in yearly maintenance costs; and (2) the use of a new road, at no cost to the public, to replace McMillan Lane — an approximately $1 million project, according to undisputed testimony. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. According to the record, Settlers and the Town agreed that the road would be built to current standards and would include sidewalks, bike paths, and a 10-foot grass esplanade, providing a significant upgrade from McMillan Lane, an older road originally constructed in 1992. The cost-free construction of this new road with additional amenities and the elimination of the Town’s yearly maintenance obligations support the trial court’s conclusion that the benefits to the Town of discontinuing McMillan Lane outweigh the plaintiff’s interests in continuing the road. Accordingly, even if unsupported by the record, the trial court’s consideration of residential housing did not constitute “gross mistake or fraud” in light of the other evidence in the record that supports its decision. See Town of Hinsdale, 153 N.H. at 74. Second, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erroneously found that the new road would revert to the Town when it stated that the road would be “dedicated to public use.” The plaintiff contends that this statement is a “faulty finding of fact and of law” that is not supported by the record. As a legal matter, the dedication of land for public use occurs when an owner devotes “land to a public use,” which, if accepted by the town, “turns the street 10 into a public highway, and thereby renders the accepting . . . town liable for its construction and maintenance.” Hersh v. Plonski, 156 N.H. 511, 515 (2007) (quotations omitted). Despite the trial court’s use of this phrase, the trial court’s findings and rulings demonstrate that it found that Settlers, not the Town, would be responsible for operating and maintaining the new road upon its completion. Specifically, in weighing the potential harm to the plaintiff against the benefits to the Town, the trial court found “no evidence . . . to suggest that Settlers or its successors will cease to maintain . . . [the new road] once it is built.” The trial court also considered the amount of yearly maintenance costs that the discontinuance would save the Town. Thus, the trial court’s order demonstrates that its use of the phrase “dedicated to public use” did not constitute a finding that Settlers would legally dedicate the new road to the Town, but instead, that it would construct and maintain the new road for public use.