Opinion ID: 458862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court case: jurisdiction

Text: 21 At issue in Case No. 84-5253 is whether the District Court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction once the FDA rejected Appellants' request for a hearing. In spite of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act's commitment to exclusive review in the Court of Appeals of final agency orders, appellants contend that policy dictates permit the District Court to retain jurisdiction over a case even where the predicate for jurisdiction, here the lack of a final order, has evaporated. The policies underlying Appellants' argument are that first, a contrary holding would permit an agency to delay review by simply withholding final action until just before a district court holds a hearing; under this scenario, the FDA could lengthen the time for review of its action by the amount of time it takes to file in the District Court and obtain a hearing. Second, appellant argues that where there is no record to review, it is appropriate for a district court to have review in the first instance in order to develop the record. 22 We agree that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to review what had become a final order; by statute, such jurisdiction lies exclusively in the Court of Appeals. However, we find that the District Court erred in asserting jurisdiction over the case even before the FDA issued a final order; the FDA's ruling had no effect on the District Court's jurisdiction. Under the law of this circuit, the District Court never had jurisdiction over the agency's delay in ruling on the request for a hearing, neither before nor after the FDA denied the hearing request. 23 The question of where jurisdiction lies over interlocutory appeals from agency action (or inaction) has occasioned some anomalous results in the past. Compare, e.g., Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1157 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921, 100 S.Ct. 3011, 65 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1980) (District Court had general federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 over nonfrivolous constitutional claims of agency bias and prejudgment); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Commissioner, Food & Drug Administration, 740 F.2d 21, 34-35 (D.C.Cir.1984) (original jurisdiction of District Court not questioned, Court of Appeals remands to District Court for further evidence) with Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1032-33 (D.C.Cir.1983) (initially brought in Court of Appeals, jurisdiction upheld); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322 (D.C.Cir.1980) (same). These inconsistent results signaled the need for close examination of the question of jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals. See Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C.Cir.1984). 24 In TRAC, this court fully resolved the issue, holding that 25 Because the statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals to review on the merits may [pursuant to the All Writs Act] be defeated by an agency that fails to resolve disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of unreasonable delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction. 26 750 F.2d at 76 (citations omitted). The jurisdiction to review agency inaction lies exclusively in this court. Id. at 77. We affirm the District Court's dismissal of the request for the hearing because that case could be heard only in this court. 27 Although jurisdiction over claims of nonfinal agency action or of agency inaction lies in this court, we exercise this jurisdiction reluctantly. Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy; we require similarly extraordinary circumstances to be present before we will interfere with an ongoing agency process. In assessing claims of agency delay, we are guided by a rule of reason. 750 F.2d at 80. While there is no absolute definition of what is a reasonable time, we know that it may encompass months, occasionally a year or two, but not several years or a decade. See MCI Communications Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340 (D.C.Cir.1980). In the past, unreasonable delays have been found where the agency had not acted in six years, see Abbott Laboratories v. Harris, 481 F.Supp. 74, 76-77 (N.D.Ill.1979), and after eight years, see Potomac Electric Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d at 1033-35. 28 The delay complained of in the instant case was five months. Our precedents suggest that this is not an unreasonable delay. In addition, we note that the FDA's procedures, designed to be thorough and well-reasoned, do not permit quick decisions. A request for a hearing requires the agency to examine the record closely, because hearings are appropriate only where material objections to the FDA's actions exist. See Pineapple Growers Ass'n v. FDA, 673 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.1982); Pactra Industries v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 555 F.2d 677, 684 (9th Cir.1977); Dyestuff and Chemicals, Inc. v. Flemming, 271 F.2d 281, 286 (8th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911, 80 S.Ct. 681, 4 L.Ed.2d 619 (1960). Requests for hearings must be accompanied by objections specifying with particularity the provisions of the order deemed objectionable, stating reasonable grounds therefor. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 348(f) (1982). The FDA has promulgated regulations that require the FDA to take a hard look at the objections. See 21 C.F.R. Sec. 12.24(b)(1)-(3). While the FDA's denial of the hearing obviates our need to assess whether the instant case meets the mandamus standard, we could not say that a period of five months to accomplish the statutory mandate approached an excessive period. 29 In addition to a ruling on the request for a hearing, Appellants also sought a stay of the effective date of the rules approving both wet and dry use of aspartame until the hearing was held. Appellants argue that the District Court's jurisdiction over the stay continues even after the FDA issued its denial of the request for a hearing. As with the request for a hearing, we find that the District Court never had jurisdiction over the request for a stay. Stays of administrative action are properly sought in this court under a writ of mandamus. See In re GTE Service Corp., 762 F.2d 1024, 1026 (D.C.Cir.1985). The exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals means that mandamus to obtain a stay also is available only in this court. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 78-79. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court dismissing the request for a stay for want of jurisdiction.