Opinion ID: 1707195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Public Interest Argument.

Text: If advertising concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading under the Central Hudson test, a state may restrict only if (1) the governmental interest is substantial; (2) the regulation directly advances that governmental interest; and (3) the restriction is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d at 351. I believe the restrictions imposed in this case fail that test because the Committee has not made the necessary showing of a substantial state interest. The majority concludes that the state-interest issue is only secondary, stating [i]t is perhaps unnecessary, under our analysis, to explore the state interests involved. The analysis which the majority says makes it unnecessary to address the issue is apparently that the advertisements are actually misleading under the first prong of the Central Hudson test, therefore not subject to any first amendment protection regardless of a supporting state interest. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d at 349. As I have already noted, however, the ads are not even claimed to be actually misleading, and any risk of possible misleading is minimalcertainly not sufficient to justify denial of first amendment protection without even considering the state interest. I believe, in fact, analysis of the state interest is the pivotal issue in this case. What is that interest? The majority identifies only one in support of the restrictive rules: fostering rational, intelligent, and voluntary decision making in determining the need for legal services and selecting a lawyer, citing Bates and R.M.J. It is interesting, however, that both Bates and R.M.J. used this language to expand the scope of lawyer advertising, not to throttle it. Moreover, there is a strong state interest in what is essentially a by-product of attorney advertising. This is the need for members of the public to be informed about the nature of their legal rights and the means of pursuing them. As the Supreme Court has said, it would be unusual to meet the need for more informed judgments by reducing the scope of available information: Advertising does not provide a complete foundation on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed decision.... Moreover, the argument assumes that the public is not sophisticated enough to realize the limitations of advertising, and that the public is better kept in ignorance than trusted with correct but incomplete information. We suspect the argument rests on an underestimation of the public. In any event, we view as dubious any justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75, 97 S.Ct. at 2704, 53 L.Ed.2d at 829-30. In providing information for the formation of an informed judgment, it seems to me that it is preferable to provide an excess of information, rather than too little. Viewers are sophisticated enough to accept or reject it as they see fit. Broad areas of information necessary to an informed judgment are prohibited by our rules. In the present case, the advertisements inform the viewer that, if one is hurt through the negligence of others, he should see a lawyer and imply that recovery for losses might be obtained. One advertisement points out that legal rights may be lost by failure to talk to a lawyer. These and many other types of information including, most obviously, such matters as statutes of limitation, the early filing requirements of our tort claims act, and the problems of uninformed releases of claims are all of great importance to an informed decision of the viewer. Yet these, and all other items of general information on the rights of litigants are prohibited by the rules, because they are not included in the laundry list of contents. I believe the state interest served by this type of information far outweighs any interest in denying it. Bates and R.M.J. make it clear that present methods of delivering legal services are ineffective. In Bates, the court said: The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach out and serve the community: Studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or because of an inability to locate a competent attorney. Indeed, cynicism with regard to the profession may be created by the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising, while condoning the actions of the attorney who structures his social or civic associations so as to provide contacts with potential clients. Id. at 370-71, 97 S.Ct. at 2702, 53 L.Ed.2d at 827-28. American Bar Association statistics cited in Bates show that the middle 70% of our population is not being reached or served adequately by the [legal] profession. Id. at 376, 97 S.Ct. at 2705, 53 L.Ed.2d at 831. In Iowa, a recent study shows that there is only one Legal Services Corporation lawyer for each 8700 eligible recipients. Equal Access to Services Study, Legal Services Corporation of Iowa (1984). Moreover, many of the traditional points of contact between lawyers and potential clients, such as the country club or Rotary Club are simply not viable sources of preliminary legal information for a great segment of our population. I believe the thrust of the Rule 2-101 laundry list largely misses the point of public information. What difference does it make to potential litigants when the lawyer was born, the legal fraternities, societies or bar association of which the lawyer is a member (especially since membership usually is not based on any required level of professional competency) or whether the lawyer has had military service? This is relatively unimportant information, in view of the possibility that litigants might lose their claims, through lack of information, to a statute of limitation or other legal impediment as to which they remain ignorant. I believe our rules, insofar as they ban advertising which is false or misleading, are valid. This is basically the model rule of the American Bar Association [1] and the rule of most states. Beyond that, I believe the additional restrictions of our rules fail the state interest test and are therefore invalid. I believe, moreover, that the model rule illustrates the less restrictive means of control alluded to in Central Hudson, and that the Committee has failed to show that they would not be effective here. For that additional reason, I believe the restrictions imposed here fail the test of constitutionality. I would dissolve the injunction and grant judgment for the defendants on their counterclaim. McCORMICK, J., joins this dissent.