Opinion ID: 2418557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accomplice-Status Instruction

Text: At trial, the court refused to give the following instruction, proffered at appellant's request: Mere presence, acquiescence, silence or knowledge that a crime is being committed, in the absence of a legal duty to act is not sufficient to make a person an accomplice. The trial court stated that it felt that this instruction was covered in A.M.I.Crim.2d 403, which was given, along with A.M.I.Crim.2d 401 on the same subject. The trial court further noted, in refusing to give appellant's proffered instruction, that nothing prevented appellant from arguing in closing that mere presence, acquiescence, silence, or knowledge that a crime was committed was insufficient to support a finding that she was an accomplice. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to give the proffered instruction. She argues that A.M.I.Crim.2d 403 was inadequate because it does not state that an individual may be present and not be an accomplice, and that because A.M.I.Crim.2d 403 does not state the law, a non-A.M.I. instruction should be allowed. We addressed this issue in Calloway v. State, 330 Ark. 143, 953 S.W.2d 571 (1997). In Calloway , the appellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give a proffered jury instruction, which is identical to the one before us, in conjunction with A.M.I.Crim.2d 401. Calloway, 330 Ark. at 148, 953 S.W.2d at 573. We stated that in reviewing the trial court's refusal to give the non-model jury instruction, the trial court should not use a non-model instruction unless it finds that the model instruction does not accurately reflect the law. Id. (citing Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 946 S.W.2d 678 (1997); Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994); Moore v. State, 317 Ark. 630, 882 S.W.2d 667 (1994)). We adhered to our previous decisions in which we had declined to alter A.M.I.Crim.2d 401 to reflect the legal principle that mere presence is not enough to establish accomplice liability, finding that our previous reasoning on the issue was sound. Id. (citing Williams, 329 Ark. at 21, 946 S.W.2d at 685; Webb v. State, 326 Ark. 878, 935 S.W.2d 250 (1996)). We have adopted the reasoning that under A.M.I.Crim.2d 401 and 403, both of which were given in this case, the State must prove that the accused was engaged in activity that aided in the commission of the crime and, by implication, that the accused was not merely present. Id. If the State proves that an individual was present when a crime was committed but does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual participated in some way in the crime, then the State has not met its burden. Id. Following this rationale, it would be redundant for the trial court to instruct the jury on what does not give rise to accomplice liability in addition to what does. Id. In both Williams and Webb , we rejected the requirement of a mere presence instruction and held that A.M.I.Crim.2d 401 accurately and completely reflects the law of accomplice liability. Id. Based on our clear language in Calloway and its predecessors, we affirm on this point.