Opinion ID: 4503119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: delay in guagua-alarcon’s presentment

Text: For the first time on appeal, Guagua-Alarcon argues that his convictions should be vacated because the government deliberately and tactically took seven weeks in order to transport him to Florida—rather than bringing him promptly before a magistrate judge in California, the closest U.S. state—for a probable cause 32 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 33 of 97 determination.16 He asserts that the government purposely delayed his presentment to a magistrate judge in order to forum shop because federal courts in California require the government to prove a U.S. “nexus” to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, whereas federal courts in Florida do not. Nonetheless, Guagua-Alarcon concedes that we should review his delay challenge for plain error since he raises it for the first time on appeal. Under the plain-error standard, we will vacate a judgment only if there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and the error both (3) affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Ramirez-Flores, 743 F.3d 816, 822 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hernandez, 906 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 2018). A defendant cannot prevail on plain-error review “where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving” the issue in favor of the defendant. United States v. Lange, 862 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). As a preliminary matter, we note that the MDLEA does not prohibit the government from taking offenders to Florida rather than California. A person violating the MDLEA “may be tried in any district,” “if the offense was begun or committed upon the high seas,” as was the case here. 46 U.S.C. § 70504(b)(2); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (assigning jurisdiction over all offenses committed upon the 16 Only Guagua-Alarcon makes this delay claim on appeal. 33 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 34 of 97 high seas to the district in which the offender is arrested or is first brought). Accordingly, the issue here is not where the defendant was taken, but why it took the government 49 days to present the defendant arrested outside the United States before a magistrate judge in the United States for a probable cause hearing. In this regard, Rule 5(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that “[a] person making an arrest outside the United States must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate judge, unless a statute provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). In Mallory v. United States, the Supreme Court indicated that the purpose of Rule 5(a) is to prevent oppressive police interrogations and other “third-degree” tactics before bringing the accused in front of an officer of the court; the remedy was the exclusion of evidence which was gained during the delay by the use of such tactics. 354 U.S. 449, 451-54, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1357-59 (1957); see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345, 63 S. Ct. 608, 615 (1943) (“[T]o permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviction in the federal courts would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into law.”); 17 United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697, 17 The McNabb-Mallory exclusionary rule—under which an arrestee’s confession, whether voluntary or involuntary, is inadmissible if given after an unreasonable delay in bringing him before a judge—was superseded in part by 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which immunizes voluntary confessions given within six hours of a suspect’s arrest. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 306-11, 322, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1562-64, 1571 (2009). The Supreme Court in Corley held that Congress intended merely to modify McNabb-Mallory’s exclusionary rule, rather than supplant it, when it enacted § 3501. Id. at 306, 322, 129 S. Ct. at 1562, 1571. 34 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 35 of 97 702 (5th Cir. 1973) (“A violation of [Rule 5(a)] renders the evidence obtained per se inadmissible.”).18 In United States v. Purvis, this Court expressly addressed “unnecessary delay” under Rule 5(a)(1)(B). 768 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 1985). This Court held that various factors are considered in determining whether a delay was unnecessary, including: (1) the distance between the location of the defendant’s arrest in international waters and the U.S. port he was brought to; (2) the time between the defendant’s arrival at the U.S. port and his presentment to the magistrate judge; (3) any evidence of mistreatment or improper interrogation during the delay; and (4) any reason for the delay, like exigent circumstances or emergencies. Id. Here, the timeline and location of defendant Guagua-Alarcon’s arrest are not disputed. Guagua-Alarcon was brought onboard the Hamilton cutter on October 25, and the cutter was located 200-plus miles off the coast of Guatemala/El Salvador. On December 12, Guagua-Alarcon made his first entry into the Key West port. On December 13, he was presented for his initial appearance before a magistrate judge. There was a 49-day delay between Guagua-Alarcon’s arrest and his presentment. 18 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 35 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 36 of 97 As to the first Purvis factor, the distance between the arrest location outside the United States and Key West was quite lengthy. As to the second Purvis factor, Guagua-Alarcon arrived at Key West on December 12 and was presented immediately to the magistrate judge on December 13. As to the third Purvis factor, there is no claim that Guagua-Alarcon was mistreated or improperly interrogated during transit. Thus, the first, second, and third Purvis factors arguably help the government. As to the fourth Purvis factor, the problem for Guagua-Alarcon is that he did not raise this delay issue below, much less claim the delay was “unnecessary,” and thus he has presented no evidence (at trial or a pre-trial hearing) indicating the reasons or circumstances behind the delay. Guagua-Alarcon’s allegation that the government deliberately and tactically delayed in order to forum shop is pure speculation and unsupported by any record evidence. 19 By failing to develop the factual predicates for his claim in the district court, Guagua-Alarcon has failed to carry his burden to show the particular delay here was “unnecessary” and thus a Rule 5(a) violation. 20 19 Guagua-Alarcon argues that California was closer to the location of his arrest than Florida. There is no record evidence regarding the distances between Guagua-Alarcon’s arrest and those U.S. states. Because of the Panama Canal route, geographical calculations are needed to reveal the distances. 20 The government (without evidence too) asserts that the delay could have been caused by any number of valid reasons, such as the Coast Guard opting to continue their normal law enforcement patrolling activities through the conclusion of their mission, “diplomatic wrangling” 36 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 37 of 97 Given this problem, Guagua-Alarcon argues that we should remand for an evidentiary hearing, but such further hearing and fact finding at this point in the proceedings would undermine the plain-error doctrine. See United States v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 565, 570 (11th Cir. 1991) (“We note that the plain error doctrine should be applied sparingly lest the contemporaneous objection rule, requiring timely objections to preserve issues for appeal, be swallowed by the plain error exception.”). In any event, Guagua-Alarcon points to no controlling precedent from the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit establishing that a 49-day delay, no matter the circumstances of this interdiction on the high seas 200 miles off the coast of Guatemala/El Salvador, presumptively constitutes “unnecessary delay” under Rule 5(a). In other MDLEA cases, this Court has concluded that delays, albeit shorter ones, were reasonable. See Purvis, 768 F.2d at 1239 (holding that a five-day delay was reasonable for defendants arrested on the high seas approximately 350 miles from Key West); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 342-43 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that a five-day delay was reasonable for a defendant arrested on the high between the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments, a mechanical mishap, or some other emergency. In short, both Guagua-Alarcon and the government speculate as to the cause of the delay. However, on appeal, Guagua-Alarcon has moved to vacate his convictions based on “unnecessary delay” under Rule 5(a), and thus he as movant has the burden to establish the delay was “unnecessary.” Yet, he has not developed the required factual predicate to do so. To be clear, our ruling is based on the lack of evidence or factual predicate for the “unnecessary delay” claim, not on the merits of the claim. 37 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 38 of 97 seas approximately 200 miles from the United States); see also United States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208, 1217-18 (11th Cir. 2018) (Martin, J., concurring) (discussing Rule 5(a)(1)(B) and determining that a 19-day delay was reasonable for a defendant arrested off of “[t]he Pacific coast of Guatemala,” “approximately 1,000 miles from the port of Miami”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 796 (2019).21 No case, however, has addressed a 49-day delay or held what circumstances or reasons would make such a delay unnecessary. Because no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent has ruled whether a delay in presentment similar to GuaguaAlarcon’s was “unnecessary delay” under Rule 5(a), Guagua-Alarcon has failed to show plain error. Despite Rule 5(a), Guagua-Alarcon asserts that his case is controlled by the constitutional, 48-hour rule established by the Supreme Court in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S. Ct. 1661 (1991). Prior to McLaughlin, the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 126, 95 S. Ct. 854, 869 (1975). Then, in McLaughlin, the Supreme Court ruled that “a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, 21 The majority in Castillo held that the defendant’s guilty plea waived his right to challenge his detention and did not address the Rule 5(a) issue. 899 F.3d at 1214-15. 38 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 39 of 97 comply with the promptness requirements of Gerstein.” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 56, 111 S. Ct. at 1670. Guagua-Alarcon contends McLaughlin established a per se 48-hour outerlimit rule and thus his detention violated the Fourth Amendment. However, McLaughlin did not establish 48 hours as a per se outer limit. See id. at 56, 111 S. Ct. at 1670 (“[W]e hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific time limit.”). Rather, in McLaughlin, the Supreme Court held that, generally, when a probable cause determination does not happen within 48 hours, “the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.” Id. at 47, 56, 111 S. Ct. at 1665, 1670; Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 83-84, 114 S. Ct. 1280, 1283 (1994). Again, because Guagua-Alarcon did not raise his McLaughlin claim in the district court, we must review his McLaughlin claim too for plain error. Here, Guagua-Alarcon has not shown error, much less plain error, because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches and seizures (arrests) by the United States of a non-citizen/non-resident alien arrested in international waters or a foreign country. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1066 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment protects only “the people” of the United States and has no application to search-and-seizure challenges where the challenger is a non-citizen/non-resident alien with no 39 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 40 of 97 voluntary attachment to the United States and the area searched is located outside of the United States);22 United States v. Vilches-Navarrete, 523 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying Verdugo-Urquidez and holding the district court properly dismissed the MDLEA defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim regarding the U.S. Coast Guard’s actions because the defendant was Chilean, he was not residing in the United States, and the Coast Guard’s actions occurred in international waters); United States v. Bravo, 489 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding the district court properly denied the MDLEA defendants’ motion to suppress evidence seized from their vessel because, under Verdugo-Urquidez, “the Fourth Amendment does not apply to activities of the United States against aliens in international waters”); United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, because the alleged unconstitutional delay took place outside of the United States in international waters and there was no suggestion that Zakharov, as neither a U.S. citizen nor U.S. resident, had any substantial connection to this country, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to him and his claim); see also United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that, under Verdugo-Urquidez, the defendants—Colombian citizens and residents—had no Fourth Amendment 22 The Supreme Court explained in Verdugo-Urquidez that, “[t]here is likewise no indication that the Fourth Amendment was understood by contemporaries of the Framers to apply to activities of the United States directed against aliens in foreign territory or in international waters.” 494 U.S. at 267, 110 S. Ct. at 1061. Rather, “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country.” Id. at 271, 110 S. Ct. at 1064. 40 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 41 of 97 protections to challenge the admission of wiretap conversations, which were recorded in Colombia, in their drug trafficking prosecutions under 21 U.S.C. §§ 959, 960, and 963). While not in a drug trafficking case under the MDLEA, this Court similarly has applied the Verdugo-Urquidez rule in drug trafficking cases brought against non-resident aliens. See, e.g., United States v. Valencia-Trujillo, 573 F.3d 1171, 1173, 1182-83 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that, under Verdugo-Urquidez, “[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . does not apply to actions against foreign citizens on foreign soil” and thus a non-resident alien charged with drug smuggling crimes could not challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds the district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing in which he sought to invalidate his arrest and involuntary extradition in Colombia);23 United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding, in a drug trafficking case, that “[t]he Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to the interception of wire communications in the Bahamas of a Bahamian resident”). In this drug trafficking case under the MDLEA, we too must follow Verdugo-Urquidez and conclude that defendant Guagua-Alarcon, who is a non- U.S. citizen and non-U.S. resident, and who has no significant connection to the 23 In Valencia-Trujillo, this Court added that “[t]he allegedly improper seizure of Valencia-Trujillo occurred in Colombia,” and “[b]ecause there can be no violation of our Fourth Amendment in that country, there can be no entitlement to a Franks hearing to establish that one occurred there.” Id. at 1183. 41 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 42 of 97 United States, cannot challenge under the Fourth Amendment and McLaughlin the Coast Guard’s conduct in taking 49 days on the high seas outside of the United States to transport him to Florida for presentment to the magistrate judge. 24 Rather, the correct analytical framework for Guagua-Alarcon’s delay-inpresentment challenge is under Rule 5(a) and the Purvis factors as outlined above. Thus, Guagua-Alarcon has shown no plain error to establish his Fourth Amendment and McLaughlin claims.25 VIII. DEFENDANTS’ POST-ARREST, PRE-MIRANDA SILENCE Palacios-Solis argues that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine to preclude the government from presenting evidence of the defendants’ post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as “consciousness of guilt.”26 As Palacios-Solis concedes, this Court’s binding precedent forecloses his 24 Once Guagua-Alarcon was brought to Florida on December 12, he appeared before a magistrate judge on December 13. The issue here is only about the Coast Guard’s conduct in taking 49 days to transport Guagua-Alarcon to Florida (or, as Guagua-Alarcon alleges, deliberately delaying his transit). 25 In his initial brief, Guagua-Alarcon stated that his remedy for the unreasonable delay in presentment was to vacate his convictions. While we need not, and do not, reach this issue, we note that federal courts have concluded that the remedy for a McLaughlin or Rule 5(a) delay-inpresentment violation is suppression of the evidence obtained during the delay, not the vacatur of a conviction. See Corley, 556 U.S. at 309, 129 S. Ct. at 1563 (explaining that, generally, confessions made during periods of detention that violate the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) are rendered inadmissible); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 119, 95 S. Ct. at 865 (explaining the “established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction” and that “a conviction will not be vacated on the ground that the defendant was detained pending trial without a determination of probable cause”); Mendoza, 473 F.2d at 702. 26 We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1275 (11th Cir. 2007). 42 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 43 of 97 argument. Once a defendant is in custody and receives Miranda warnings, he indisputably has a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05, 311, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1290-91, 1294 (1985). Yet, the Supreme Court has expressly held that the Fifth Amendment allows the use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach the defendant. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 628, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (1993). This Court, in United States v. Rivera, went one step further. 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). In Rivera, this Court held that, in its case-in-chief, the government may use a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as direct evidence tending to prove the defendant’s guilt. Id. Palacios-Solis points out a circuit split on this issue. This Court has already noted this circuit split in Wilchcombe and again upheld our precedent in Rivera. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d at 1190-91 (“Whatever the state of the law in other circuits, in our circuit it was permissible for the government to comment on [the defendant’s] silence.”). Given our precedent, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palacios-Solis’s motion in limine on this basis.