Opinion ID: 3162246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abandonment and procedural default

Text: Baker abandoned his substantive double jeopardy claim before the state post-conviction appellate court, as that claim was neither raised in Baker’s initial 9 Case: 14-14573 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Page: 10 of 12 counseled appellate brief, nor in his pro se appellate brief. See Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1252 (Fla. 2003) (holding that if an appellant does not raise and argue a claim in his or her initial appellate brief, then that claim is deemed abandoned because it is insufficiently presented for review). While both briefs challenged the state post-conviction court’s denial of Claim Two of Baker’s Rule 3.850 motion, which alleged that trial counsel’s failure to inform Baker of potential double jeopardy issues amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, neither brief challenged the state post-conviction court’s denial of Claim One of Baker’s Rule 3.850 motion on the grounds that Baker waived any double jeopardy argument by entering into a written plea agreement. Therefore, Baker’s substantive double jeopardy claim was not exhausted in state court because Baker abandoned it on appeal and, thus, did not raise the claim throughout one round of Florida’s established appellate review process. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S. Ct. at 1732. Accordingly, Baker’s substantive double jeopardy claim was subject to a procedural default because he failed to exhaust the claim in state court, and his state remedy was no longer available because the claim would be time-barred. 2 Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. 2 Florida requires a petitioner who seeks to challenge his judgment or sentence on the ground that it violates a constitutional right to file a motion, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, within two years after his judgment and sentence become final, unless, in relevant part, the petitioner claims that the judgment or sentence violates a fundamental constitutional right that was not established within that two-year period and has been held to apply retroactively. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(1), (b), (b)(2). 10 Case: 14-14573 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Page: 11 of 12