Opinion ID: 1133490
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discriminatory impact

Text: {95} As to the question of discriminatory impact, House argues that, in ordering the venue change, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conclude that an unfair trial was more probable because fewer Native Americans live in Doņa Ana than in Taos. We disagree. There is simply no constitutional requirement in New Mexico that, prior to a venue change, a court must consider the percentage of prospective jurors who are of the same race as the defendant. There is no outstanding precedent for requiring a trial court to consider demographic composition sua sponte every time a venue change is requested. The Equal Protection Clause does not require exactitude of this nature. Rogers v. Director, TDCJ-ID, 864 F.Supp. 584, 598 (E.D.Tex.1994). {96} Courts have overwhelmingly been unwilling to summarily conclude that the citizens in an entire geographical regionâ all the potential jurors in a county or judicial districtâ are tainted by racial prejudice. This is why the mere statistical measure of a venue's ethnic proportions cannot, by itself, lead to the presumption that a person of a given race will be unable to receive a fair trial in that venue. There may be such homogenous geographical pockets of prejudice in America, but, even in such cases, the unsuitability of a venue can only be demonstrated in the microcosm of the venire, not in the macrocosm of census figures about the venue's ethnic composition. It is, in fact, preposterousâ and a form of racismâ to presume that persons of a particular color will perform jury duty in a particular way. A person's race is utterly unrelated to his or her suitability as a juror. State v. Guzman, 119 N.M. 190, 192, 889 P.2d 225, 227 (1994); see also Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227, 66 S.Ct. 984, 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (stating the color of a man's skin is unrelated to his fitness as a juror). In the selection of a jury, race may be used neither to justify a person's removal nor to compel a person's inclusion. Cf. Powers, 499 U.S. at 409, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (An individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race.). {97} That is why Judge Blackmer emphasized that Doņa Ana was chosen to promote and protect BOTH Parties' RIGHT to a fair and impartial trial and a fair and impartial jury and that his decision and order selecting Doņa Ana County as Venue for retrial of this case is NOT based (in whole or in part) on any other factor or consideration (including, but not limited to, ethnic/racial considerations or racial/ethnic populations or proportions in various Counties of New Mexico. . .). Venue Order, slip op. at 19 (Finding of Fact 22). Only by conducting voir dire, and listening to the racial opinions of individual potential jurors, can it be demonstrated that a particular venue cannot provide a jury free from racial prejudice. Through careful voir dire, fair-minded jurors can most likely be found, even in a community which has few members of the defendant's race. {98} That is what happened in this case. The trial court conducted exhaustive voir dire in Doņa Ana County. After voir dire, House did not object that, because he is Native American, he would receive an unfair trial before the petit jury that was finally seated. Nor has he suggested in retrospect that it has been revealed that the jury was tainted by racial prejudice. There is simply no evidence that House received an unfair trial because Doņa Ana County has a Native American population of less than 1%. {99} Thus, in the selection of the venue of Doņa Ana County, House has shown neither that the State acted with discriminatory intent, nor that the venue change had a discriminatory impact on his fight to a fair trial.