Opinion ID: 867554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Current Definition of Premeditation

Text: ¶ 23 To resolve the conflict and clarify the distinction between first and second degree murder, the legislature amended the definition of premeditation in 1998 to include the clause [p]roof of actual reflection is not required. A.R.S. § 13-1101(1). This amendment, however, has not eliminated the confusion regarding the interpretation of premeditation. Indeed, it may have compounded it. In this case, the court of appeals interpreted the legislature's 1998 amendment of A.R.S. § 13-1101(1) as ensuring that premeditation was defined solely as the passage of a period of time, ... eliminat[ing] actual reflection as part of the definition, and ... overrul[ing] the case law to the contrary. State v. Thompson, 201 Ariz. 273, 278, ¶ 15, 34 P.3d 382, 387 (App.2001). [5] ¶ 24 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the statute was not constitutionally infirm because it determined that a fair reading of the statute, combined with a common-sense consideration of how jurors perform their function, demonstrates that the time period employed by the statute to describe premeditation has enough substance to provide a workable method for distinguishing between degrees of murder. Id. at 278, ¶ 16, 34 P.3d at 387. The court reasoned that only when the phrase any length of time to permit reflection is understood in light of the cases allowing the time to permit reflection to be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind that the statute became unconstitutionally standardless. Id. at 280-81, ¶¶ 25, 27, 34 P.3d at 389-90. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the statute is constitutional in the case now before us, but is unconstitutional when a jury is instructed that reflection can occur as quickly as successive thoughts of the mind, for when premeditation is just an instant of time and nothing more, irrebuttable evidence of premeditation will exist in every case of intentional or knowing murder. Id. at 281-82, ¶¶ 29-33, 34 P.3d at 390-91; see also State v. Cecil, 201 Ariz. 454, 36 P.3d 1224 (App.2001) (same). ¶ 25 We have not, until this case, had the opportunity to address the confusion surrounding the issue of premeditation. See State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 415, ¶ 18 n. 4, 984 P.2d 16, 23 n. 4 (1999) (declining to address contradictory conclusions in Ramirez and Haley because the issue was not properly before the court). Thompson urges us to overturn his conviction on the ground that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The State, on the other hand, argues that the statute is constitutional and that the current definition of premeditation meaningfully distinguishes between first and second degree murder. ¶ 26 We conclude, as did the court of appeals, that if the only difference between first and second degree murder is the mere passage of time, and that length of time can be as instantaneous as successive thoughts of the mind, then there is no meaningful distinction between first and second degree murder. Such an interpretation would relieve the state of its burden to prove actual reflection and would render the first degree murder statute impermissibly vague and therefore unconstitutional under the United States and Arizona Constitutions. ¶ 27 We are, however, mindful of our duty to construe this statute, if possible, in a way that not only gives effect to the legislature's intent, see Korzep, 165 Ariz. at 493, 799 P.2d at 834, but also in a way that maintains its constitutionality. See Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. at 202, 928 P.2d at 626. As a starting point, we note that the words chosen by the legislature do not say that actual reflection is no longer required to distinguish first from second degree murder. Rather, the legislature provided that  [p]roof of actual reflection is not required. A.R.S. § 13-1101(1) (emphasis added). Recognizing that direct proof of a defendant's intent to kill often does not exist, the legislature sought to relieve the state of the often impossible burden of proving premeditation through direct evidence. But by this act the legislature did not intend to eliminate the requirement of reflection altogether or to allow the state to substitute the mere passing of time for the element of premeditation. While the phrase proof of actual reflection is not required can be interpreted in a way that relieves the state of the burden of proving reflection, such an interpretation would not pass constitutional scrutiny, and the legislature could not have intended such a result. [6] Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature intended to relieve the state of the burden of proving a defendant's thought processes by direct evidence. It intended for premeditation, and the reflection that it requires, to mean more than the mere passage of time. ¶ 28 We find support for our interpretation in the admonition that an act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Id. This language distinguishes impulsive killings from planned or deliberated killings and confirms the legislature's intent that premeditation be more than just a snap decision made in the heat of passion. ¶ 29 Our decision today distinguishes the element of premeditation from the evidence that might establish that element. Although the mere passage of time suggests that a defendant premeditatedand the state might be able to convince a jury to make that inferencethe passage of time is not, in and of itself, premeditation. [7] To allow the state to establish the element of premeditation by merely proving that sufficient time passed to permit reflection would be to essentially relieve the state of its burden to establish the sole element that distinguishes between first and second degree murder. ¶ 30 Indeed, even those jurists who interpret the amended definition of premeditation to mean only the passage of time to permit reflection seem to assume that a jury will eventually determine that actual reflection occurred before convicting of premeditated murder. See Cecil, 201 Ariz. at 456, ¶ 11, 36 P.3d at 1226 (Weisberg, J., concurring) (stating that the judiciary and the legislature have left it to the jury to examine the particular facts and circumstances of each case and determine from those facts and circumstances whether the defendant had sufficient time to premeditate, and whether he did so); Thompson, 201 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 47, 34 P.3d at 393 (Ehrlich, J., concurring) (positing that `premeditation' is a period of time during which the mind actually considers the performance of an act). ¶ 31 As we noted earlier, only in rare situations will a defendant's reflection be established by direct evidence such as diary entries or statements to others. See Ramirez, 190 Ariz. at 69, 945 P.2d at 380 (Premeditation can, of course, be proven by circumstantial evidence; like knowledge or intention, it rarely can be proven by any other means.); Thompson, 201 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 48, 34 P.3d at 393 (Ehrlich, J., concurring, noting that premeditation relates to mental processes, which are not always susceptible to proof of actual reflection). But the state may use all the circumstantial evidence at its disposal in a case to prove premeditation. Such evidence might include, among other things, threats made by the defendant to the victim, a pattern of escalating violence between the defendant and the victim, or the acquisition of a weapon by the defendant before the killing. In short, the passage of time is but one factor that can show that the defendant actually reflected. The key is that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, must convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actually reflected.