Opinion ID: 476836
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Polizzi's Severance Motion

Text: 54 Polizzi contends that the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for a separate trial prejudiced him because: (1) he was prevented from presenting an individual defense; (2) he was prevented from fully impeaching Matranga's credibility; and (3) there was a spill-over effect because the evidence against Matranga was far more incriminating and the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence. 55 The denial of a motion for severance under Fed.R.Crim.P. 14 will not be disturbed unless the defendant can show that the district court abused its discretion. See United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 696 (9th Cir.1979). The test for abuse of discretion is whether a joint trial was so manifestly prejudicial as to require the trial judge to exercise his discretion in but one way, by ordering a separate trial. United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856, 101 S.Ct. 154, 66 L.Ed.2d 71 (1980). 56 Defendants jointly indicted ordinarily should be jointly tried. United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 900 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982). Serious consideration must be given to judicial economy. United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 1526, 55 L.Ed.2d 541 (1978). The burden is on the defendant to show clear, manifest, or undue prejudice from a joint trial. Sears, 663 F.2d at 901; Escalante, 637 F.2d at 1201. 57 Polizzi's argument that he was prevented from presenting an individual defense is without merit. To justify a severance on the ground of antagonistic defenses, there must be a showing of mutual exclusivity--Polizzi's acquittal had to preclude Matranga's acquittal. United States v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 (9th Cir.1984); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 546 (9th Cir.1983). Polizzi has made no showing that his acquittal depended on Matranga's conviction. 58 There was no showing that Polizzi was impeded in any substantial way in impeaching Matranga's credibility by the denial of the severance. Nor did the court abuse its discretion by denying severance because of any spill-over effect. The mere fact that there may be more incriminating evidence against one codefendant than another does not provide a sufficient justification for separate trials. United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir.1984). The court's inquiry as to prejudice focuses on whether the jury can reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants in light of its volume and limited admissibility. Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 546, (quoting United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 849, 59 L.Ed.2d 41 (1979)). 59 The trial court instructed the jury that it had a responsibility to keep the evidence against the two defendants separate, that it should give separate, personal consideration ... to each individual defendant and analyze what the evidence ... shows with respect to that individual, leaving out of consideration entirely any evidence admitted solely against the other defendant, and that [e]ach defendant is entitled to have his case determined from evidence as to his own acts or statements or conduct. The trial court's instructions sufficiently alerted the jury to its obligation to compartmentalize the evidence, and the potential spill-over effect was not so great as to preclude the jury from doing so. See Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 546. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for severance.