Opinion ID: 1186363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Showing of Prejudice to Plaintiff in Maintaining an Action on the Merits

Text: Although Monarch's failure to satisfy the first requirement of rule 36(b) relieves Langeland of the burden of showing that he would suffer prejudice as a result of the withdrawal or amendment of the admissions, he has met that burden nevertheless. Langeland defines prejudice as some harm or injury that the party obtaining admissions has detrimentally suffered in prosecuting the action and argues that he will be prejudiced by withdrawal of the admissions because the rule is designed to expedite litigation, and it permits the party securing admissions to rely on their binding effect. Rainbolt v. Johnson, 669 F.2d 767, 768 (D.C.Cir.1981) (citations omitted). He contends, therefore, that when the party obtaining the admissions cannot, in fact, rely on them, [w]itnesses become unavailable or forget facts about an incident, meager resources will be expended in combating another [party's] disregard for court rules thereby preventing a party from being able to prosecute a matter in court. Monarch correctly maintains that the mere necessity of proving matters formerly admitted does not constitute prejudice but does admit that difficulties in proof specifically occasioned by the delay may qualify. It relies on Brook Village North Associates v. General Electric Co., 686 F.2d 66 (1st Cir.1982), for the proposition that the prejudice contemplated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) is not simply that the party who initially obtained the admission will now have to convince the fact finder of its truth. Rather, it relates to the difficulty a party may face in proving the case, e.g., cause[d] by the unavailability of key witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to the questions previously answered by the admissions. Id. at 70-71 (citation omitted). Additionally, Monarch quotes 10A Lawyers Edition, Federal Procedure § 26:591 (1994), that the test of whether a party will be prejudiced by the withdrawal of an admission is whether the party is now any less able to obtain the evidence required to prove the matter which was admitted than he would have been at the time the admission was made. On this issue, we find the interpretation of the Federal Rule analogous to Utah Rule 36(b) to be logical and persuasive. Langeland alleges that during the time the admissions went unanswered, American Bonding Company went into receivership, and Monarch Motors, Inc., dissolved as a corporation, which significantly alters the case and prejudices Langeland. We agree that the dissolution of Monarch in and of itself makes witnesses unavailable, or at the very least more difficult to contact, and complicates all aspects of the legal procedures, thus obstructing Langeland's ability to prosecute the matter in court. Therefore, by Monarch's own test, Langeland has shown prejudice to himself as a result of the withdrawal of the admissions.