Opinion ID: 390271
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements of a Claim under Section 43(a)

Text: 7 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), forbids the use of false designations of origin and false descriptions or representations in the advertising and sale of goods and services. See New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979). The statute provides in pertinent part as follows:Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services a false designation of origin, or any false designation or representation and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce shall be liable to a civil action by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false designation or representation. 8 Appellant argues that defendants violated section 43(a) by affixing or using a false designation or representation, i. e., another actor's name in place of appellant's, in connection with the movie's advertising and credits. Appellant claims standing under section 43(a) as a person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of another actor's name in place of his. Thus, appellant's claim, although one of first impression, appears to fall within the express language of section 43(a). 9 The district court appears to have rejected appellant's argument on the ground that, to state a claim under section 43(a), a complaint must allege merchandising practices in the nature of, or economically equivalent to, palming off and/or misuse of trademarks and trade names. 10 Palming off or passing off is the selling of a good or service of one's own creation under the name or mark of another. See 2 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 25.1 (1973); 1 R. Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, § 18.2(b)(1), at 294 (1980 Supp. to 3d ed.). Passing off may be either express or implied. Express passing off occurs when an enterprise labels goods or services with a mark identical to that of another enterprise, or otherwise expressly misrepresents that the goods originated with another enterprise. Implied passing off occurs when an enterprise uses a competitor's advertising material, or a sample or photograph of the competitor's product, to impliedly represent that the product it is selling was produced by the competitor. 1 R. Callman, supra. Such practices have consistently been held to violate both the common law of unfair competition and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See id. 2 J. McCarthy, supra, § 25.1; and cases cited infra. 11 To the extent that the district court's standard for section 43(a) claims could be read as limiting such claims to cases of palming off, such a narrow rule would be contrary to established case law. As one commentator has explained, the law of unfair competition and trademarks has progressed far beyond the old concept of fraudulent passing off, to encompass any form of competition or selling which contravenes society's current concepts of 'fairness'  2 J. McCarthy, supra, § 25:1. See also, e. g., L & L White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F.Supp. 1349, 1356 (E.D.N.Y.1975) (The purpose of (section 43(a)) was to create a new federal cause of action for false representation of goods in commerce in order to protect persons engaged in commerce from, among other things, unfair competition, fraud and deception which had theretofore only been protected by the common law. While this section is broad enough to cover situations involving the common law 'palming off' of the defendants' products by the use of the plaintiff's photographs, it is also comprehensive enough to include other forms of misrepresentation and unfair competition not involving 'palming off.' ) (citations omitted). 1 12 The district court's ruling was entirely consistent with the vast majority of section 43(a) cases, however, to the extent that it indicated that a section 43(a) claim may be based on economic practices or conduct economically equivalent to palming off. Such practices would include reverse passing off, which occurs when a person removes or obliterates the original trademark, without authorization, before reselling goods produced by someone else. See Borchard, Reverse Passing Off Commercial Robbery or Permissible Competition?, 67 Trademark Rep. 1 (1977). Reverse passing off is accomplished expressly when the wrongdoer removes the name or trademark on another party's product and sells that product under a name chosen by the wrongdoer. See 1 R. Callman, supra, § 18.2(b)(1). Implied reverse passing off occurs when the wrongdoer simply removes or otherwise obliterates the name of the manufacturer or source and sells the product in an unbranded state. Id. 13 In the instant case, appellant argues that the defendants' alleged conduct constitutes reverse passing off and that appellant's complaint therefore stated a section 43(a) claim even under the district court's own standard. Appellees argue, however, that the protection afforded by the Lanham Act is limited to sales of goods and does not extend to claims that a motion picture shown to the public might contain false information as to origin. 14 The short answer to appellees' argument is that the Lanham Act explicitly condemns false designations or representations in connection with any goods or services. The prohibitions of this section have been applied to motion picture representations. See, e. g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 467 F.Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). Moreover, the names of movie actors and other performers may, under certain circumstances, be registered under the Lanham Act as service marks 2 for entertainment services. See, e. g., Re Carson, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 554 (Trademark Trial & App.Bd.1977); Re Ames, 160 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214 (Trademark Trial & App.Bd.1966). Although appellant has not alleged that his name is registered as a service mark, registration of a trademark or service mark is not a prerequisite for recovery under section 43(a). See New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979) (To recover for a violation of this section it is not necessary that a mark or trade-mark be registered. The dispositive question is whether the party has a reasonable interest to be protected against false advertising.) (citations omitted). 3 15 Appellant's allegations of reverse passing off are analogous to those of other complaints which have been held to state a cause of action under section 43(a). For example, in Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S.Ct. 164, 50 L.Ed.2d 139 (1976), a farm equipment manufacturer used photographs of a competitor's grain trailer in its sales literature. In the photos, the competitor's labels were removed and the trailer was labeled as a product of the defendant. The court rejected the defendant-appellant's contention that the use of the photos was not a false representation prohibited by section 43(a), holding that the practice was of the same economic nature as trademark infringement. 536 F.2d at 1216 (emphasis added). The court also noted that The use of another's product, misbranded to appear as that of a competitor (i. e., reverse passing off), has been repeatedly found to be 'a false designation of origin' actionable under section 43(a). Id. 16 In John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F.Supp. 292 (E.D.Penn.1976), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1978), the court stated that section 43(a) prohibits 'reverse palming off,' i. e., conduct whereby the defendant purchases or otherwise obtains the plaintiff's goods, removes plaintiff's name and replaces it with his own. 419 F.Supp. at 325. 4 Similarly, in FRA S.p.A. v. SURG-O-FLEX of America, Inc., 415 F.Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y.1976), the court denied a motion to dismiss, and reaffirmed its previous grant of a preliminary injunction, based on allegations that a bandage manufacturer's former distributor violated section 43(a) by continuing to sell boxes of the manufacturer's bandages, after termination of the distributorship, by pasting the distributor's trademark over the manufacturer's name. Finally, in Matsushita Electric Corp. v. Solar Sound Systems, Inc., 381 F.Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y.1974), the court found a clear violation of section 43(a) based on the defendant's conduct in slightly modifying the control panel on plaintiff's radio, removing plaintiff's nameplate to substitute defendant's, and scraping off the embossed labeling on the back. 5 17 According to appellant's complaint, defendants not only removed appellant's name from all credits and advertising, they also substituted a name of their own choosing. Appellees' alleged conduct therefore amounts to express reverse passing off. As a matter of policy, such conduct, like traditional palming off, is wrongful because it involves an attempt to misappropriate or profit from another's talents and workmanship. Moreover, in reverse palming off cases, the originator of the misidentified product is involuntarily deprived of the advertising value of its name and of the goodwill that otherwise would stem from public knowledge of the true source of the satisfactory product. See Borchard, supra, at 4; 1 J. McCarthy, supra, § 3:5; F. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 22 Trademark Bull. 139, 144-45 (1927), reprinted in 60 Trademark Rep. 334, 337 (1970). The ultimate purchaser (or viewer) is also deprived of knowing the true source of the product and may even be deceived into believing that it comes from a different source. Borchard, supra, at 4-5. 18 In the film industry, a particular actor's performance, which may have received an award or other critical acclaim, may be the primary attraction for movie-goers. Some actors are said to have such drawing power at the box office that the appearance of their names on the theater marquee can almost guarantee financial success. Such big box office names are built, in part, through being prominently featured in popular films and by receiving appropriate recognition in film credits and advertising. Since actors' fees for pictures, and indeed, their ability to get any work at all, is often based on the drawing power their name may be expected to have at the box office, being accurately credited for films in which they have played would seem to be of critical importance in enabling actors to sell their services, i. e., their performances. We therefore find that appellant has stated a valid claim for relief under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 6