Opinion ID: 2166105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegations of Ineffective assistance of counsel.

Text: The standard by which we measure ineffective assistance of counsel is found in Strickland v. Washington. [26] A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, [27] and was so prejudicial that the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial and reasonable result. [28] Counsel is constitutionally ineffective only if performance below professional standards caused the defendant to lose what he otherwise would probably have won. [29] Thus, Bussell must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [30] The reasonable probability standard of Strickland is the same reasonable probability standard used to prove a Brady violation, viz., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [31] However, the purpose of RCr 11.42 is not to provide an opportunity to conduct a fishing expedition for grievances, but rather to provide a forum for known grievances. [32] There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. [33] As a reviewing court, we must focus on the totality of evidence before the judge or jury and assess the overall performance of counsel throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. [34] As a reviewing court, we must defer to the findings of fact and determinations of witness credibility made by the trial judge. [35] Moreover, in an RCr 11.42 proceeding, the movant has the burden of establishing that he was deprived of some substantial right which would justify the extraordinary relief afforded by the post-conviction proceeding. [36] In Bussell's RCr 11.42 motion, he alleged that, during the guilt phase of his trial, Embry failed to investigate and interview prospective witnesses and that he failed to retain experts to refute scientific evidence proffered by the Commonwealth. Additionally, Bussell argued in his RCr 11.42 motion that defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of the trial because it put forth no mitigating evidence despite an alleged abundance of such evidence. Specifically, Bussell alleged that Embry failed to investigate and interview Kay Bobbett and Robert Joiner. Bussell argued that had Embry investigated Joiner, he would have discovered that Joiner was mentally limited; that he was routinely taken advantage of by neighbors and Bobbett; that he told at least three different versions of his story to Sgt. Over regarding the ring allegedly sold to him by Bussell; that his trial testimony directly contradicted his statements to the 911 operator and the police; that he had a bad reputation for truthfulness in the community; and, that he had told Bobbett the location of Lail's body before it was discovered. Bussell also argued that had Embry investigated Bobbett, he would have discovered that she took advantage of Joiner and also lied during her testimony that she had only received one other ring from Joiner when in fact she had received two other rings from him before being given the ring found to have been stolen from Lail. Bussell also alleged that Embry failed to offer the statement of the victim's daughter-in-law, Patty Lail, during the trial despite the fact that a copy of her statement was found in the case file. Patty Lail's statement directly contradicted testimony offered by her husband, Mrs. Lail's son Webb Lail, that Webb had seen the sapphire ring only a week before Lail disappeared. Patty, however, stated to police that Lail had not shown the ring to her or Webb at any time during the week before her disappearance. The RCr. 11.42 court commented that [w]ith Patty Lail's statement coming to light, even had Bussell stolen the ring, a credible argument that the ring was not stolen when Mrs. Lail was killed could have been made. . . . It is disturbing and certainly pertinent to our inquiry that defense counsel had a key piece of evidence within his possession, but his investigation was so deficient he failed to review reasonably his own case file. Bussell further claimed that Embry failed to reasonably educate himself in the various forensic fields and thus his future decisions to retain experts in these fields was unreasonable. During Bussell's trial, the Commonwealth employed experts from the Kentucky State Police (KSP) Crime Lab to testify concerning tree bark found near Lail's body as well as on the damaged fender of Bussell's car, automobile paint found on the tree, and hair and fiber analysis of samples taken from Bussell's car and Lail's home. However, during the RCr 11.42 hearing, Bussell presented testimony from two experts in these same fields, Dr. Richard Saferstein and Dr. Terry Connors, which discredited that offered by the Commonwealth's experts. Doctor Saferstein, former Director of the New Jersey State Police Crime Lab, testified that the analysis of the paint evidence by the Commonwealth's expert Laurence King was erroneous, was not scientifically valid and was a false characterization of the evidence. King had testified during Bussell's trial that the samples of paint from Bussell's car and from the damaged tree were identical regarding the top two layers of paint. The circuit court found that Mr. King's ultimate conclusion was contradicted by the facts and by his own testimony. Doctor Saferstein also disagreed with the hair and fiber analysis conducted by Linda Winkle of the KSP Crime Lab. Of the four hairs found in Bussell's car that Winkle reported were similar to Lail's hair, Dr. Saferstein testified that three of the comparisons were not valid, finding that one was not a valid comparison, that he fervently disagreed with Winkle's comparison of another, and that the third was of limited value given the fact that it was white in color, making it inappropriate for comparison. Doctor Saferstein was unable to analyze the fourth hair because the Hopkinsville Police Department had lost the hair. Additionally, Dr. Saferstein found Winkle's approach to hair comparison quite disturbing and that there was no indication in Winkle's notes that a comparison microscope had been used, which in his opinion was a very basic notation he would have expected to see. In essence, Embry failed to consult an expert in this area and failed to request Winkle's bench notes detailing her analysis. Finally, Dr. Saferstein testified that the analysis of fibers found in Bussell's car and compared to fibers from the housecoat Lail was wearing when her body was discovered was preliminary at best. Lonnie Henson of the KSP Crime Lab had testified that the fibers were the same. Saferstein disagreed, noting that Henson used a stereoscopic microscope to conduct the comparison and that this was the wrong type of microscope to use for fiber comparison, although Henson testified at Bussell's trial that he used a comparison microscope. Embry, however, failed to address this contradiction to limit Henson's credibility. Moreover, Dr. Saferstein's statement that Henson's comparison was preliminary was based on the fact that Henson did not conduct microspectrophotometry analysis of the fibers. Doctor Saferstein further testified that he could have rendered these same opinions in 1991. Doctor Terry Connors testified at the hearing as an expert in tree and wood identification and found that the samples were suitable for analysis, contrary to King's testimony on behalf of the Commonwealth at Bussell's trial. Doctor Connors further testified that he conducted the tests himself, using a method of analysis that has been generally accepted in the scientific community since at least 1970, and concluded that no one could say to any degree of certainty that the bark on Bussell's car came from the tree located near where Lail's body was discovered. In fact, Dr. Connors noted that the bark on Bussell's car could have come from any one of seven species of tree. After reviewing the evidence, the circuit court found that Embry's failure was a result of his failure reasonably to investigate and interview prospective witnesses. Moreover, it found that [t]he scientific evidence presented in November 1991 was not nearly as compelling as the jury was led to believe. . . . If Embry had educated himself, his decision not to consult an independent expert could have potentially been described as tactical. However, there is no evidence that Embry made such an attempt. Therefore, his decision cannot be described as tactical. Ultimately, the court found that Bussell had established, in his RCr 11.42 hearing, that the Commonwealth's scientific evidence could have been controverted. In reviewing the record before us, we cannot say that the trial judge erred in finding Bussell's trial defense counsel deficient such that he was deprived of a fair trial. Embry's performance during both the guilt phase and penalty phase of Bussell's trial fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Moreover, we discern no error in the trial court's view that but for Embry's deficiencies, the result of the trial would have been different. Thus, both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland, supra , have been satisfied. Bussell was deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his trial, entitling him to a new trial. On this appeal, the Commonwealth argues that Bussell was effectively assisted by counsel during the penalty phase of his trial, and thus is not entitled to a new penalty phase. However, the circuit court's order specifically granted Bussell a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. Although we have found Bussell's trial counsel ineffective in his representation during the guilt phase of the trial, we will nonetheless address the Commonwealth's arguments. This Court has held that defense counsel has an affirmative duty to make reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence or to make a reasonable decision that particular investigation is not necessary. [37] In evaluating whether defense counsel has discharged this duty, the court must determine whether a reasonable investigation should have uncovered such mitigating evidence. [38] If so, then the court must determine if the failure to present this evidence to the jury was a tactical decision by defense counsel. [39] If the decision was tactical, it is given a strong presumption of correctness, and the inquiry is generally at an end. [40] However, if the decision was not tactical, then the court must evaluate whether there was a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the result would have been different. [41] Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that both Embry and Milburn were unable to locate mitigation witnesses to testify on Bussell's behalf. However, nineteen mitigation witnesses testified over the course of the RCr 11.42 hearing. Despite Embry's and Milburn's claim that they did not know how many siblings Bussell had and that they were unable to locate them, they had in their possession a Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center report, which listed all eleven of Bussell's siblings and the towns in which they lived. Furthermore, Embry testified at the RCr 11.42 hearing that he never sought medical, school, employment or jail records. As the circuit court found, Embry was unable to show the jury that Bussell had a single positive character trait because he had not taken the time to find if he possessed any. The Commonwealth argues that Bussell was uncooperative in assisting his defense team in mounting a proper mitigating case during Bussell's sentencing. Although Embry testified at the hearing that Bussell was uncooperative and that the only mitigation evidence they had was residual doubt, we have specifically held residual doubt not to be a mitigating factor. [42] Moreover, Bussell's uncooperativeness did not relieve Embry of his duty to conduct a reasonable investigation for mitigating evidence. Initially, we note that defense counsel is required to abide by the wishes of his or her client. [43] Furthermore, counsel may not be constitutionally ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial in deference to the defendant's instructions to forego presentation of such evidence. [44] And, the decision not to conduct an investigation into a defendant's background in search of mitigating evidence may be supported by reasonable professional judgment. [45] However, the investigation must still be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. [46] Based on the findings of the circuit court, there was not a reasonable investigation into Bussell's background in an attempt to find mitigating evidence. Had Embry made a reasonable investigation, he would have discovered the evidence necessary to present a proper mitigation case during Bussell's sentencing. [47] Furthermore, such a decision cannot be described as merely tactical, as the record does not support the conclusion that Embry or Milburn even attempted to ascertain whether all possible mitigating evidence might actually assist their client. Moreover, there is a reasonable probability that, but for Embry's deficient performance during the penalty phase of the trial, the outcome would have been different. [48] Quite simply, Embry and Milburn failed to present a mitigation case. Thus, the circuit court did not err in finding that Bussell was also deprived of effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase of his trial. [49]