Opinion ID: 2622966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: Various individuals initiated separate actions against defendants alleging the grocery stores sold artificially colored farmed salmon without disclosing to consumers the use of color additives. [3] The separate actions were coordinated in Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4329. In March 2004, plaintiffs filed a coordinated complaint alleging as a class and representative action that fish farmers feed farm-raised salmon the chemicals as-taxanthin and canthaxanthin to obtain a color of flesh resembling that of wild salmon. [4] Plaintiffs allege the flesh of farm-raised salmon appears grayish without the chemical additives and that consumers believe the color of salmon is an indication of its origin, quality, freshness, flavor, and other characteristics. Plaintiffs allege that concerns have been raised about the potential health risks of consuming the artificial coloring agents in particular and farm-raised salmon in general. They further allege that parallel federal and state laws require food labeling to state that farmed salmon is artificially colored and defendants failed to comply with those requirements. Plaintiffs also allege the failure to disclose the use of artificial coloring has caused consumers to believe farmed salmon is wild salmon. The complaint asserts four state law causes of action: (1) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et seq.); (2) unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ.Code, § 1750 et seq.); (3) violation of the false advertising law (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17500 et seq.); and (4) negligent misrepresentation. The laws alleged to be violated as a predicate for the unlawful prong of plaintiffs' UCL claim ( id., § 17200) include provisions of the state Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law (Health & Saf.Code, § 109875 et seq.) (Sherman Law). [5] Defendants jointly demurred on several grounds, including that (1) section 337(a) [6] preempts plaintiffs' state law claims; (2) further consideration of the complaint could conflict with regulation and enforcement by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or California's Department of Health Services (DHS), so the action should be dismissed under the primary jurisdiction doctrine; and (3) plaintiffs failed to allege affirmative representation as required in order to state a cause of action under several provisions of the CLRA. Defendants also moved to strike portions of the complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to each count, with leave to amend. The court held that section 337(a) preempts plaintiffs' state law claims, that the dispute should be referred to the FDA or the DHS under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for violation of the CLRA because they failed to allege the necessary affirmative representation. Plaintiffs elected not to amend their complaint and instead challenged on appeal the sustaining of the demurrer. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding of preemption, holding that section 337(a) precludes private enforcement of the FDCA, that plaintiffs' state law claims are predicated on a violation of the FDCA, and, therefore, that section 337(a) impliedly preempts plaintiffs' state law claims. [7] In light of its holding, the Court of Appeal did not reach or discuss the other grounds asserted by defendants in support of their demurrer. We granted plaintiffs' petition for review.

The FDCA prohibits the misbranding of any food. (§ 331(b).) A food shall be deemed to be misbranded under the FDCA if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular.... (§ 343(a).) More important to this case, a food is also deemed misbranded if [i]t bears or contains any ... artificial coloring ... unless it bears labeling stating that fact.... (§ 34300.) FDA regulations permit the use of the chemical substances astaxanthin and canthaxanthin in the feed of salmonid fish as color additives to enhance the pink to orange-red color of the flesh of salmonid fish. (21 C.F.R. §§ 73.35(c) [astaxanthin], 73.75(c)(3) [canthaxanthin] (2007).) If used, however, the chemicals' presence must be declared as prescribed by the FDA ( id., §§ 73.35(d)(3), 73.75(d)(4)). Use of a color additive must be declared through the use of the phrases `Artificial Color,' `Artificial Color Added,' or `Color Added' (or by an equally informative term that makes clear that a color additive has been used in the food). ( Id., § 101.2200(2) (2007).) Alternatively, disclosing the actual color additive used satisfies FDA regulations. ( Ibid. ) The disclosure that a color additive has been used shall be placed on the food or on its container or wrapper, or on any two or all three of these, as may be necessary to render such statement likely to be read by the ordinary person under customary conditions of purchase and use of such food. ( Id., § 101.22(c).)
Congress amended the FDCA with the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA). (Pub.L. No. 101-535 (Nov. 8, 1990) 104 Stat. 2353.) The purpose of the NLEA was to create uniform national standards regarding the labeling of food and to prevent states from adopting inconsistent requirements with respect to the labeling of nutrients. (Remarks of Rep. Waxman, 136 Cong. Rec. 5840 (daily ed. July 30, 1990) [debate on H.R. No. 3562, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.].) To that end, the NLEA included an explicit preemption provision in the form of section 343-1(a) (Pub.L. No. 101-535, § 6 (Nov. 8, 1990) 104 Stat. 2362-2364), which provides that no State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly establish under any authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce[¶] ... [¶] (3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by section ... 343(k) of this title that is not identical to the requirement of such section.... (§ 343-l(a), italics added.) [8] Although section 343-1 speaks in terms of what states may not do, by negative implication, section 343-1 also expresses what states may do, i.e., states may establish their own requirements pertaining to the labeling of artificially colored food so long as their requirements are identical to those contained in the FDCA in section 343(k). (60 Fed.Reg. 57120 (Nov. 13,1995) [under FDA regulations, if the State requirement is identical to Federal law, there is no issue of preemption]; Consumer Justice Center v. Olympian Labs, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1065, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 749 ( Consumer Justice ) [[s]tates can enforce labeling rules which are identical (original italics) ]; cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996) 518 U.S. 470, 495, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 ( Medtronic ) [reaching same conclusion regarding similar FDCA preemption provision in section 360k].)
Like the FDCA, the Sherman Law broadly prohibits the misbranding of food. (Health & Saf.Code, § 110765.) Among various examples of what constitutes misbranded food (e.g., id., § 110660 et seq.), the Sherman Law uses language identical to section 343(k) to provide that food is misbranded if it bears or contains any ... artificial coloring ... unless its labeling states that fact. (Health & Saf.Code, § 110740.) The Sherman Law provides that disclosing the addition of color will suffice ( id., § 110725, subd. (a)) and requires that any disclosure be prominently placed ... and in terms as to render it likely to be read and understood by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase and use. ( Id., § 110705.) Additionally, the Sherman Law incorporates [a]ll food labeling regulations and any amendments to those regulations adopted pursuant to the [FDCA] as the food labeling regulations of this state. (Health & Saf.Code, § 110100, subd. (a).) Thus, California has adopted as its own the FDA regulations regarding the use of (and disclosure of the use of) astaxanthin and canthaxanthin in the feeding of farmed salmon (see 21 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.75 (2007)).
Originally enacted in 1938, section 337 is a standing provision, providing that all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of [ the FDCA ] shall be by and in the name of the United States.... [9] (Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, § 307, 52 Stat. 1046, italics added.) Section 337 precludes private enforcement of the FDCA (§ 337(a); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm. (2001) 531 U.S. 341, 349, fn. 4, 352, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 ( Buckman) ) and limits the circumstances under which states may seek to enforce the FDCA in federal court (§ 337(b)). Whether or not section 337 also precludes private claims predicated on state law is the crux of the present litigation and will be discussed at greater length below.
As we have previously explained, [t]he basic rules of preemption are not in dispute: Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2), Congress has the power to preempt state law concerning matters that lie within the authority of Congress. [Citation.] In determining whether federal law preempts state law, a court's task is to discern congressional intent. [Citation.] Congress's express intent in this regard will be found when Congress explicitly states that it is preempting state authority. [Citation.] Congress's implied intent to preempt is found (i) when it is clear that Congress intended, by comprehensive legislation, to occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law [citation]; (ii) when compliance with both federal and state regulations is an impossibility [citation]; or (iii) when state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' [Citations.] ( Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 955, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422 ( Bronco Wine ); Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 935-936, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569 ( Viva! International ).) It is well established that the party who asserts that a state law is preempted bears the burden of so demonstrating. ( Viva! International, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 936, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 956, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) The interpretation of the federal law at issue here is further informed by a strong presumption against preemption. (See Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240; see also Viva! International, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 938, 63 Cal. Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 974, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) [B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has `legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' [citation] we `start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' [Citations.] ( Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, 449, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 ( Bates ); Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1150, fn. 7, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 136 P.3d 821.) We apply this presumption to the existence as well as the scope of preemption. ( Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240.) There can be no doubt that the presumption applies with particular force here. (See Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 974, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) As the Court of Appeal acknowledged here, [c]onsumer protection laws such as the [UCL], false advertising law, and CLRA, are within the states' historic police powers and therefore are subject to the presumption against preemption. Laws regulating the proper marketing of food, including the prevention of deceptive sales practices, are likewise within states' historic police powers. ( Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 144, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 959-961, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422 [describing history of state regulation].) Indeed, as early as the 1860's, California was enacting laws regulating food marketing. (See, e.g., Stats. 1862, ch. 365, pp. 484-485 [prohibiting sale of adulterated and misbranded food]; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 961-963,17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) It is with these principles in mind that we consider whether it was the `clear and manifest purpose' of Congress ( Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240) to preclude states from providing private remedies for the violations of the state statutes at issue here.