Opinion ID: 2758003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L.R. 1266 [(1939)], designates the statute as a

Text: statute of limitation. Other cases to the same effect are Schweer v. Schweer, Mo. App., 86 S.W.2d 969 [(1935)]; Ludington v. Patton, 111 Wis. 208, 86 N.W. 571 [(1901)]; In re Zweig's Estate, 145 Misc. 839, 261 N.Y.S. 400; Akin v. Kellogg, 119 N.Y. 441, 23 N.E. 1046 [(1890)]. ... .... Numerous cases announce the rule that under a statute similar to ours, the surviving spouse must dissent from the provisions of the will within the time fixed by statute, excepting cases involving fraud or the like. ... .... In Stearns v. Stearns, 103 Conn. 213, 130 A. 112, 116 [(1925)], the court stated: 25 1120848 'The statute is too plain to require construction. The will did give to the husband a portion of the estate of the testatrix. The husband made no election in writing as to whether he would accept or reject the provisions of the will in lieu of his statutory share as husband of the testatrix. The terms of this statute are explicit, and however unfortunate the result, the facts of record bring the case exactly within the statute and require us to hold that the husband shall be taken to have accepted the provisions of the will, and shall be barred of said statutory share.' [In] In re Daub's Estate, 305 Pa. 446, 157 A. 908, 911, 81 A.L.R. 735 [(1931)], the court stated: 'No matter how hard the decision in a particular case may seem to be, if a widow does not make her election within the statutory period, the courts, because of that act, must declare that she is deemed to have made an election to take under the will, for this statute here fixes the time as definitely as does that relating to taking appeals, and both are mandatory. ... In view of the positive provisions of the statute we are not persuaded that relief could be granted ex gratia. In re Minnich's Estate or Sherwood's Estate, 288 Pa. 354, 358, 136 A. 236, 237 [(1927)]. 'A different conclusion will, of course, be reached in cases where actual fraud has been committed to obtain the widow's election, and no laches appears, for fraud vitiates everything it touches.' .... 26 1120848 Notwithstanding [a] great array of authorities[] in which the courts have considered the statutory provisions to be mandatory, counsel for respondents contend that we should follow the common law rule of election, in which time is not considered to be of the essence, and that equity will give relief. We have already seen that Stephens v. Gibbes, 14 Fla. 331 [(1873)], and Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503 [(1854)], followed by another Maryland case, hold the contrary. Perhaps the leading case on the subject before us, because of the comprehensive discussion of all the phases on this subject, is In re Zweig's Estate, 145 Misc. 839, 261 N.Y.S. 400. Counsel for respondents say that the case is distinguishable because the probate court of New York has no equitable jurisdiction. But it has jurisdiction, by statute, to extend the time within a limited period, which itself seems to be equitable in its nature. Further the court expressly considers the subject of whether or not a court of equity can give relief after the expiration of the time fixed by statute, and states that courts of equity are powerless to vary the direct mandate of legislative enactments as are courts of law, and that this has been determined on innumerable occasions. 75 Wyo. at 339-43, 295 P.2d at 995-96 (emphasis added; emphasis omitted). The Hartt court concluded that it was constrained to hold that our statute hereinbefore quoted is mandatory, and that [Pearl] Hartt had no right to dissent from the will after the expiration of six months mentioned in the statute. 75 Wyo. at 346, 295 P.2d at 998. And, of particular import to 27 1120848 our consideration of Korie's arguments in the present case, the Hartt court noted that Pearl contends that the executors should have advised her of her rights. It is stated in 90 C.J.S., Trusts, § 247, p. 225 that: 'By accepting the trust, a trustee (executors are trustees) becomes bound to administer it, or to execute it, in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument and the intent of the settlor.' In determining his duty, the intention of the testator is of controlling importance. ... Hence the first and primary duty of the executors in this case was to see that the intent of the testator was carried out. It was not their duty, in fact it would have been a violation of their duty, to do anything that would nullify the provisions of the will. True the executors had no right to defraud the widow or by chicanery induce her not to dissent from the will. But no fraud or chicanery is shown herein. The court in Stephens v. Gibbes, 14 Fla. 331, 356 [(1873)], stated: 'Neither the executors, the other devisees or legatees, not the creditors, are in any legal sense under an obligation to give the widow notice of the provisions of the will. The law presumes her knowledge of the will and its contents as well as her knowledge of her right of dower and its nature, and she is bound to know that if she omits for the space of one year to signify her dissent, she cannot claim dower.' That, of course, applies as well to her right to take under the statute or descent and distribution. 75 Wyo. at 348, 295 P.2d at 999; see also, e.g., In re Estate of Pritchard, 37 Kan. App. 2d 260, 272-73, 154 P.3d 24, 33 28 1120848 (2007) (holding that, absent a statutorily created obligation, a personal representative or his or her attorney has no duty ... to inform or give notice to [the surviving spouse] of [his or] her homestead and/or spousal rights).9 See also Allen v. Guthrie, 469 So. 2d 204, 205-06 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (A surviving spouse has no right to an elective share absent a timely election to take that share. Order and finality in the administration of estates, as is reflected in [the elective-share statute's] time limits, are paramount concerns; 9 In some states, the personal representative is statutorily required to disclose the financial status of the estate to the surviving spouse where the surviving spouse requests such disclosure. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-4- 103. In such states, where the spouse requests disclosure and the personal representative fails timely to provide the information required by the statute, the statutory time for filing a dissent will not bar the widow from making that election. Merriman v. Jones, 620 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). Alabama has no such requirement as part of its elective-share statutory scheme. Also, we note that Korie is not arguing that the attorney for the estate had a legal duty to inform her that she had a right to claim an elective share; Korie states in her reply brief that that argument has actually never been made. Nevertheless, Korie states that this Court should recommend that counsel for the estate inform the surviving spouse of his or her right to claim an elective share in every instance. ... A counsel for the estate should not favor the individual rights of the person named as administrator of the estate. We must decline Korie's invitation. 29 1120848 and failure to elect within the period prescribed by the Legislature bars a claim.); Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 578, 880 A.2d 343, 353 (2005) (When [the] period [for filing a request for an extension of time] expires, the authority to extend it expires as well. The same underlying principles apply: there has been no retreat from the principle that the ability to renounce a Will in favor of a statutory share is to be strictly construed and the law still favors the expeditious administration and early settlement of Estates. (citation omitted)); In re Estate of Kruegel, 551 N.W.2d 718, 719 (Minn. 1996) (affirming the denial of an untimely filed notice of election where the surviving spouse failed to timely request an extension of the time in which she must elect and rejecting surviving spouse's argument that equity should relieve her of the pertinent time limitations because she had been actively engaged in negotiations with the estate as to how the distributions should be made); In re Estate of Hesemann, 214 Neb. 842, 336 N.W.2d 568 (1983) (affirming the denial of the surviving spouse's untimely claim for an elective share where the surviving spouse failed to establish that the attorney for the estate had made any material 30 1120848 misrepresentation in response to the surviving spouse's inquiries concerning his right to file a claim for an elective share); Simpson v. Sanders, 314 S.C. 413, 445 S.E.2d 93 (1994)(requiring strict compliance with elective-share statute and denying untimely petition); and In re Estate of Lingscheit, 387 N.W.2d 738, 741 & n. (S.D. 1986) (holding that the trial court should have denied the surviving spouse's petition for an elective share where it was filed three weeks after the pertinent time limit and she could have requested an extension before her time expired but did not).10 As to the Alabama cases cited by Korie in support of her argument, we first note that in Adams this Court addressed the issue whether a widow who had timely filed a claim for dower could prosecute that claim even though she had accepted money that had been bequeathed to her in her deceased husband's will: Can she, while retaining all the property bequeathed to her ..., recover dower in the probate court? 39 Ala. at 279. The Adams Court concluded that she could not. In so doing, the Court noted that the widow had elected to receive 10 Estate of Lingscheit was superseded, in part, on other grounds, as recognized in In re Estate of Geier, 809 N.W.2d 355, 358 (S.D. 2012). 31 1120848 what the will provided for her by accepting property pursuant to the terms of the will. But, the Court continued: Although she may have made an election, she is not concluded by it, if made in ignorance of the circumstances calculated to influence her choice. But we are not to infer from the expression that she is not concluded by an election unadvisedly made, that she can treat her election as a nullity, while she retains all that she may have received by virtue of the election. On the contrary, it is manifest justice, that she should avoid the election, only upon a restoration of what she has received. Such is also the teaching of the cases upon the subject. Having made an election, she must abide by it as long as she retains the legacy which she has received. If she has been defrauded, or if she has made an unadvised election, her remedy is in equity, to obtain relief upon the restoration of the benefit she has taken under the will. 39 Ala. at 280 (citations omitted). The foregoing discussion from Adams is of no avail to Korie. Unlike Korie, the widow in Adams timely asserted her right to dower. The issue in Adams was not whether equity permitted a widow to pursue an untimely claim for her statutory right to take against the will, i.e., her claim for dower, but whether equity permitted a widow to revoke her decision to receive the property bequeathed her under the will and to pursue a timely filed claim to take against the will. As the Adams Court noted, equity did permit such a revocation, 32 1120848 provided the widow restor[ed] ... the benefit she has taken under the will. But Adams does not stand for the proposition that equity allows a widow to pursue an untimely claim for the statutory rights granted to her.11 As to Korie's argument from Steele, in which this Court held that the widow there was not entitled to belatedly assert her right to dower, Korie contends that this Court impliedly recognized that equity may excuse an untimely election. She draws her conclusion from the following statement by the Steele Court: [I]f there be an extension of time within which to elect, under an equitable construction of our statute, neither the pleadings nor proofs in the present record justify its exercise. 64 Ala. at 461. The language quoted by Korie may be read as implying that equity can be used to evade the statutory time limits 11 Also, allowing a widow to revoke the exercise of her statutory rights and to accept the provisions of the deceased spouse's will is materially different than allowing a surviving spouse to untimely assert her statutory rights and thereby disrupt the provisions of the deceased spouse's will. In the former circumstance, the surviving spouse is not thwarting any purpose expressed by the legislature. In the latter circumstances, however, the surviving spouse would be thwarting the legislature's purpose as to the timely assertion of the surviving spouse's rights, and, unlike the former circumstance, the surviving spouse would also be thwarting the execution of the will according to its terms. 33 1120848 applicable to the exercise of a surviving spouse's statutory rights vis-à-vis the deceased spouse's estate. But a closer reading of Steele reflects that Korie's claim is nevertheless unavailing. The Steele Court stated: The statute law of this State provides that the widow, for whom provision has been made by the will of her deceased husband, may dissent from such provision, and 'take her dower in the lands, and of the personal estate such portion as she would have been entitled to in case of intestacy.' Code of 1876, § 2292. 'Such dissent must be made in writing, and deposited within one year from the probate of the will,' &c. -- Ib. § 2293. It would seem that the language of this statute is imperative, and, to be availing, the dissent must be deposited within one year after the probate of the will. 64 Ala. at 461 (emphasis added).12 The Steele Court continued: But, if there be an extension of time within which to elect, under an equitable construction of our statute, neither the pleadings nor proofs in the present record justify its exercise. There is no averment, and no attempt at proof, that Mrs. Steele was at any time ignorant of any fact or circumstance, calculated to influence her choice. Neither is it shown, or even possible, that she can, 12 The Steele Court referenced Adams and acknowledged that equity permitted a widow to revoke 'an election ... made in ignorance of the circumstances calculated to influence her choice,' 'upon restoration of what she has received.' 64 Ala. at 461 (citations omitted). But, as noted above, Adams did not concern the issue whether a widow could pursue an untimely filed claim. 34 1120848 by restoration, place the property of the estate in statu quo. More than twenty years ago, she was in possession of the property devised to her by the will, and it is not shown she has ever been disturbed in its enjoyment. It is clear that no adverse claim was asserted during the administration of the executor, which lasted more than thirteen years. She has no right now to dissent from the provisions of the will, and claim dower in the lands of which her husband died seized. -– See Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503 [(1854)]. 64 Ala. at 461-62 (emphasis added). In turn, in Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503 (1854), which the Steele Court cited in support of the foregoing discussion, the surviving spouse, who was insane, died four years after her husband. The administrator of her estate attempted to belatedly assert the deceased wife's right to dower, i.e., to take against the will. The trial court rejected the claim, and the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed its judgment. The Collins court noted that [t]he law admits of no excuse for a failure to renounce. ... To acquire ... rights in opposition to the will, the law makes the renunciation [of the will] a necessary act. 5 Md. at 530-32. See generally 2 John Norton Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 513a (5th ed. 1941) (In very many of the states statutes have been passed which prescribe definite periods of time within which the right of election 35 1120848 between dower and a provision made by will must be exercised. [... If dissent is not indicated within the prescribed time and in the manner required by law, the widow is conclusively presumed to have elected to take under the will, no matter how hard the decision in a particular case may seem to be. This is so except in cases of fraud, and perhaps under some other exceptional circumstances.] (bracketed material added by Spencer W. Symms, ed.)). Also, as to any analogy that might be drawn from our precedents regarding dower, we find it instructive that in Hilliard, supra, we stated that the evil intended to be obviated by the legislature's enactment of a statutory time limit as to the assertion of the widow's right to receive her dower interest was the difficulty which previously existed of ascertaining when and how an election was to be made by [the widow]. ... This seems to have been the only change made by the statute in the existing law -– a fixed, a definite term was introduced within which she is compelled to signify her dissent to the will; and if this is not made, it then, if any provision [in the will] is made inconsistent with her right under the statute, becomes obligatory on her. 10 Ala. at 991. Also, in McGhee v. Stephens, 83 Ala. 466, 3 So. 808 (1888), this Court noted that the statutory procedures 36 1120848 enacted regarding dower claims were intended to provide for a speedy and summary election and that failure to dissent within one year from the probate of the will bars [the widow's] right of dower. 83 Ala. at 469, 3 So. at 810. See also Sanders v. Wallace, 118 Ala. 418, 426, 24 So. 2d 354, 356 (1898)(We are of opinion, that the widow by her failure to dissent from the provisions of her husband's will, in the time and manner required by the statute, is barred of her right of dower in her husband's lands ....); Vaughan v. Vaughan's Heirs, 30 Ala. 329, 333 (1857) (holding that surviving spouse's failure to signify her dissent from the will, within one year after its probate, is a bar to her right of dower). As it did by adopting a time limit for the assertion of a dower claim, the legislature adopted a limitation period for the surviving spouse's assertion of his or her right to elect against the will. There is no indication that the purposes of the time limitation as to the right of election are any different from the purposes for a dower claim, namely certainty as to the assertion of the surviving spouse's rights that could adversely affect the will and efficiency as to the administration of the estate. To allow an untimely claim 37 1120848 would be directly contrary to those purposes and unwarranted in the absence of fraud or the like. The circuit court in the present case found no fraud or undue influence. The lack of justification for allowing an untimely claim under such circumstances is bolstered by the fact (1) that a surviving spouse may timely request an extension of time until he or she can obtain information concerning the assets composing the estate, see Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-73(a) (providing that a timely filed request for an extension of time may be granted for good cause shown) and (2) that the legislature has limited any prejudice the surviving spouse might suffer from asserting his or her right of election based on insufficient information. Ala. Code 1975, § 43-8-73(c) (The surviving spouse may withdraw his demand for an elective share at any time before entry of a final determination by the court.). In addition to Korie's reliance on the above-referenced Alabama cases, she also relies on a few cases from other jurisdictions that have allowed a surviving spouse to pursue an untimely filed claim for an elective share. We find those cases either to be distinguishable from the present case or 38 1120848 simply to be contrary to the much greater and more compelling body of authority described above. To take one example, Korie cites In re Estate of Bersin, 98 Ohio App. 432, 129 N.E.2d 868 (1955). That decision, however, was based on the failure of certain statutory prerequisites (not present here) to the right of a surviving spouse to make an elective share against the decedent's will. Similarly, Korie discusses Mann v. Peoples-Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 256 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1953). In Mann, a wealthy testator had a complicated estate plan, which he failed to revise after the birth of his youngest child: The possible effect of this pretermission on the powers of the executors and trustees under the will has resulted in the widow, Frances S. Mann, refusing to qualify as either co-executor or co-trustee until it can be determined whether it would be better for both herself and her children to renounce the will ... and elect to take her dower and distributable share of her husband's estate. Ordinarily, this statutory power of renunciation must be exercised within a year of the probate of the will which occurred February 5, 1952, but the chancellor granted her 'to any time within two months after the determination of her rights in this estate by our courts by a judgment which shall have become final by expiration of time for appeal or affirmance on appeal.' Where an intelligent election is impossible, as we believe it is in the case at bar, the chancellor has the power to extend the time for making an election, if requested to do so within the one-year period. 39 1120848 256 S.W.2d at 492 (citations omitted; emphasis added). Mann too is distinguishable. In the present case, the record does not reflect that it would have been impossible for Korie to make an intelligent election absent some construction of the will, nor did she timely request an extension of time within which to file her elective-share claim so that she could obtain whatever information she thought she might need. Korie notes that an accurate inventory and accounting as to the financial status of the estate would have enabled her to make an intelligent choice as to whether to claim an elective share. Although that is true, the legislature has not required that an inventory and accounting be filed as a precondition to triggering the time periods pertinent to the elective share. And, as noted above, Korie could have filed a timely request for an extension of time and concurrently requested that the court order an accounting so that she could make an informed decision as to whether to file an electiveshare claim. See § 43-8-73(a) (The court may extend the time for election for cause shown by the surviving spouse before the time for election has expired. (emphasis added)); Ala. Code 1975, § 43-2-530 (providing that the court may require 40 1120848 the personal representative to file an accounting notwithstanding any provision in any will or other instrument to the contrary). Korie did not seek financial information concerning the estate, however, until after her right of election was time-barred.13 Korie also asserts that she was unaware of her right of election. But, as the Hartt court discussed, such a claim is insufficient to entitle the surviving spouse to relief. As another court has stated: In this case the widow pleads that she was illiterate, and ignorant of the law and of her rights; that she did not know that, by failing to renounce her husband's will within a year of its probate, she was thereby accepting it and electing to take under it; that the provisions made for her 13 In her argument, Korie references the personal representative's failure to file an inventory until after he was ordered to do so by the probate court, and she also takes issue with the contents of the inventory the personal representative ultimately filed with the circuit court. As noted above, however, Woodie's will exempted the personal representative from the requirement of filing an inventory. Thus, the personal representative had no legal obligation to file an inventory until ordered to do so by the court. And no such order was requested until after the expiration of the time in which Korie might claim an elective share. Nor is there any evidence indicating that the personal representative actively thwarted any effort Korie might have made to obtain information about the assets and liabilities of the estate so that she could evaluate whether it might be in her interests to file a timely claim for an elective share. 41 1120848 and the infant by the will were less than she was entitled to under the statute; and that the whole of her husband's estate was less than, under the statutes, she, as widow, and her three infants, would have been entitled to have set apart to them during her life and their minority. The maxim, 'Ignorance of the law excuses no one,' has not been applied in this state with the rigor that it has been elsewhere. ... [But] [t]his court has never held that one's nonaction, through ignorance of the law, could extend or enlarge his legal rights. Such a practice would be not alone to put a premium upon ignorance, but would be an inducement to perjury, as well as to unsettle and render insecure titles which the statute had aimed to fix as of a definite period, and by not uncertain evidence. Logsdon v. Haney, 25 Ky. L. Rptr. 245, 245, 74 S.W. 1073, 1073 (1903); see also, e.g., Shelton v. Sears, 187 Mass. 455, 460, 73 N.E. 666, 668 (1905)(The only excuse offered for her inaction is that she was ignorant of the law, but this is not sufficient in equity, any more than at law, to overcome the express limitation fixed by statute within which she must act or be forever barred. (citation omitted)). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court correctly rejected Korie's untimely petition for an elective share. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. 42 1120848 AFFIRMED. Moore, C.J., and Bolin and Main, JJ., concur. Bryan, J., concurs in the result. 43