Opinion ID: 1169183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: question of ambiguity

Text: In an attempt to retain the favorable decision of the Court of Appeals, the residuary legatees contend that an examination of the entirety of the will indicates that the testator appears to have divided his property into two classifications, separate and community, for disposition purposes, and that he contemplated a distribution of the community property to the residuary legatees. These beneficiaries argue that an ambiguity exists where the testator defined his separate property as that acquired prior to marriage and then devised by specific bequest all of the separate property owned by me at the time of my death ... The residuary legatees contend that extrinsic evidence would establish that the testator intended the specific bequest to devise only the separate property acquired prior to his marriage that he retained at the time of his death and that the residuary clause would devise his marital property. [2, 3] The primary duty of a court called upon to interpret a will is to ascertain the intent of the testator. In re Estate of Bergau, 103 Wn.2d 431, 435, 693 P.2d 703 (1985); In re Estate of Riemcke, 80 Wn.2d 722, 728, 497 P.2d 1319 (1972). Although a will speaks at the time of death, the testator's intentions, as viewed through the surrounding circumstances and language, are determined as of the time of the execution of the will. In re Estate of Bergau, at 436; In re Estate of Robinson, 46 Wn.2d 298, 280 P.2d 676 (1955). The testator is presumed to have known the law at the time of execution of his will. In re Estate of Patton, 6 Wn. App. 464, 471, 494 P.2d 238 (1972). The intent must, if possible, be derived from the four corners of the will and the will must be considered in its entirety. In re Estate of Bergau, at 435; In re Estate of Douglas, 65 Wn.2d 495, 499, 398 P.2d 7 (1965). When, after reading the will in its entirety, any uncertainty arises about the testator's intent, extrinsic evidence, including testimony of the drafter, may be admitted to explain and resolve the ambiguity. In re Estate of Bergau, at 436; In re Estate of Torando, 38 Wn.2d 642, 645, 228 P.2d 142, 236 P.2d 552 (1951). There is no indication in the language of the will that the second clause was intended to express anything other than a description of the circumstances as they existed at the time of execution of the will. That the testator indicates that he owns separate property at the date of execution does not convey an intention to limit his bequest of separate property to that described at the time of execution of the will. The testator is presumed to have known the law at the time of execution of his will and, consequently, would recognize that if his wife predeceased him community property would be transposed into his separate property. Nor does a finding that only separate property existed at the time of testator's death render the residuary clause meaningless. The residuary clause governed the contingency of the testator's wife surviving the death of the testator. In such event, he would have a one-half share of community property at his death that would pass through the residuary clause. This interpretation is supported by the fifth clause of the will wherein the testator provides that in the event his wife survives the testator, the executor will administer both his separate property and the community property belonging to the testator and his wife. From this provision we can infer that the testator was aware that if he survived his wife, community property would cease to exist and his estate would consist entirely of separate property at his death.