Opinion ID: 2162437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Separate Hearing for Sentence Enhancing Factor

Text: Defendant next asserts that his right to due process was violated because the jury was asked to decide whether the murder charged was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty at the guilt phase of trial. Defendant maintains that the trial court should have granted his motion to present this question to the jury in a separate, posttrial hearing because a separate hearing is required under section 9-1(d) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 2004)). The State responds that defendant forfeited review of this claim. Alternatively, the State argues that the trial court's decision to conduct a unitary hearing during the guilt phase was proper. Defendant was charged with first degree murder and the charging instrument contained the allegation that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. During the jury instruction conference, defendant objected to instructing the jury on the exceptionally heinous and brutal factor and instead requested that the trial court conduct a separate, posttrial hearing to allow the jury to decide this issue. Counsel stated: I'll tell you exactly what we're worried about.    That if the jury looks at both of these allegations, the allegation of murder and the allegation of exceptionally brutal and heinous in the same proceeding, there's naturally going to be a tendency for bargaining or discussion among what appears to be one charge and might be a higher charge. And, therefore, what we're afraid of is that the jury is going to    look at the murder charge as a lesser included of murder plus exceptionally brutal and heinous. And there's going to be a natural tendency to compromise as to first-degree murder and not find exceptionally brutal and heinous.    And there's also an additional problem with this, for instance, because they won't know what exceptionally brutal and heinous means in terms of a consequence, number one. And number two, the way the law is structured, he could be found innocent of exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior and given the death penalty on a different ground.    [B]y the way, the State is not precluded from seeking eligibility if they lose exceptionally brutal or heinous. The trial court denied defendant's motion, stating: I don't see the danger that there's going to be some sort of a compromise if it's part of the original instructions that they get during phase one. So the request for a separate hearing will be denied. The jury was subsequently given the relevant instruction and found defendant guilty of first degree murder accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In his posttrial motion, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his request for a separate hearing. To preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must both object at trial and present the issue in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988); People v. Coleman, 227 Ill.2d 426, 433, 317 Ill.Dec. 869, 882 N.E.2d 1025 (2008). A specific objection at trial forfeits all grounds not specified. People v. Cuadrado, 214 Ill.2d 79, 89, 291 Ill.Dec. 638, 824 N.E.2d 214 (2005); People v. O'Neal, 104 Ill.2d 399, 407, 84 Ill.Dec. 481, 472 N.E.2d 441 (1984). An issue raised by a litigant on appeal does not have to be identical to the objection raised at trial, and we will not find that a claim has been forfeited when it is clear that the trial court had the opportunity to review the same essential claim. People v. Mohr, 228 Ill.2d 53, 65, 319 Ill.Dec. 339, 885 N.E.2d 1019 (2008); People v. Heider, 231 Ill.2d 1, 18, 324 Ill.Dec. 453, 896 N.E.2d 239 (2008). In this case, defendant asserted at trial that a separate hearing on the brutal or heinous conduct issue was required because jurors might be tempted to return a compromise verdict. Defendant now asserts that a separate hearing on this issue was required because section 9-1(d) of the Criminal Code requires a bifurcated hearing. The claim defendant raises on appeal is significantly different from the claim he raised below. Accordingly, we find that it is forfeited. Defendant urges us to consider his forfeited claim under plain error. [T]he plain-error doctrine bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 186-87, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005). Defendant bears the burden of persuasion, and if he fails to meet this burden, the `procedural default must be honored.' People v. Walker, 232 Ill.2d 113, 124, 327 Ill.Dec. 570, 902 N.E.2d 691 (2009), quoting People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 17, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995). Before considering whether the plain-error exception applies, we must first determine whether any error occurred. Herron, 215 Ill.2d at 187, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467; People v. Johnson, 218 Ill.2d 125, 139, 299 Ill.Dec. 677, 842 N.E.2d 714 (2005). Section 9-1(d) provides: Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). 720 ILCS 5/9-1(d) (West 2004). The State requested a separate death sentencing hearing in this case, and its request was granted. Defendant argues that, pursuant to section 9-1(d), the State's request bound the trial court to conduct a separate hearing on any factor which pertained to the defendant's sentence, as the statute does not grant the trial court discretion to deny the State's request for a separate hearing. We disagree with defendant's interpretation of the statute. Section 9-1(d) does require the trial court to conduct a separate sentencing hearing at the State's request, for purposes of determining the existence of death penalty eligibility factors and aggravation and mitigation factors explicitly set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of the statute. Subsection (b) contains 21 factors that, if proven, would permit a sentence of death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) (West 2004). Proof that the murder committed was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous conduct indicative of wanton cruelty is not one of the factors listed in section 9-1(b), unless the victim was under the age of 12 or over the age of 60. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1 (b)(7), (b)(16) (West 2004). The victim in this case did not fall into either age category. Subsection (c) lists seven factors that can be considered in aggravation and mitigation. The heinous or brutal nature of the crime is not a factor considered under this category. The plain language of section 9-1(d) demonstrates that it does not mandate a separate sentencing hearing for a sentence-enhancing factor that is not a basis for imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, it was not error for the trial court to reject defendant's request for such a hearing. Because we find that no error occurred, defendant cannot meet his burden of proving plain error, and the procedural default must be honored. Walker, 232 Ill.2d at 124, 327 Ill.Dec. 570, 902 N.E.2d 691.