Opinion ID: 1685078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the stop and detention

Text: ¶ 32. The constitutional validity of a search and seizure raises a question of constitutional fact. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶ 23, 236 Wis.2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72. When a defendant moves to suppress evidence, the circuit court considers the evidence, makes findings of evidentiary or historical fact, and then resolves the issue by applying constitutional principles to those historical facts. Id. (citing State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶¶ 16-17, 231 Wis.2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552). We review a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress in two steps. We examine the circuit court's findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous standard, and then review de novo the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶ 9, 245 Wis.2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625; State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, ¶ 16, 241 Wis.2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891.
¶ 33. The circuit court determined that Becker was not arrested, but was merely detained to freeze the status quo while awaiting a search warrant, and to engage in Terry-style inquiries in the meanwhile. [15] The court reached its conclusion after it made numerous findings of fact regarding the investigative detention of Becker. [16] It found that Becker was detained for approximately one hour before the search warrant was executed, and at least two and one-quarter hours before being released. The court found that [t]he degree of restraint was modest, noting that while the officers used handcuffs, they did not draw their guns or use any additional restraints. It found that the police repeatedly stressed to defendants that they were not under arrest, . . . the police limited their questioning (to a scope more befitting a Terry stop than a custodial interrogation), and the police maintained the detention only as long as was necessary to effectuate its purpose (until they received and executed the search warrant). Finally, the court noted that Becker was not moved out of the motel, and was not questioned in a police vehicle. ¶ 34. The court did not specifically note the number of officers present at the motel, but it determined that the number of officers involved was appropriate for the number of defendants involved. The court considered the totality of the facts and circumstances and concluded that the police officers' actions and words would have reasonably communicated to the defendants [] that they were not free to go, but that they were not under arrest. ¶ 35. As noted above, we review the circuit court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Vorburger disputes none of the circuit court's factual findings, and our review of the record finds that each finding is supported by testimony at the preliminary hearing or motion hearing. We therefore cannot conclude that any of the factual findings made by the circuit court was clearly erroneous. [4] ¶ 36. The circuit court determined that under these facts and circumstances, Becker's detention did not constitute an illegal arrest. The court of appeals disagreed. It noted that Becker was read Miranda warnings in a closed-off room. Although her handcuffs had been removed, Becker had little if any indication of how long [she] would be detained or what [she] might have to do before [she was] free to go. Vorburger, 2001 WI App 43, ¶¶ 17-18. The court of appeals concluded that Becker was confined and interrogated, and thus, arrested. Id. at ¶ 18. We review de novo the circuit court's determination that Becker was not arrested, benefiting from the analysis of the circuit court and the court of appeals.
¶ 37. The critical issue in this case is whether the detention of Amerie Becker was constitutional at the time she consented to the search of her apartment. A second issue is whether the consent she gave was voluntary. [5] ¶ 38. The constitutionality of Becker's detention is governed by the Fourth Amendment, which protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . . U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). Reasonableness is the ultimate standard embodied in the Fourth Amendment. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 699 (1981). It is the central inquiry, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), and the key principle. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700 n.12 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219 (1979) (White, J., concurring)). [6] ¶ 39. The investigative stop and detention of Becker constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16 (concluding that a person is seized when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of [the] citizen . . . .). Consequently, the question is whether this seizure was reasonable under all the circumstances, or whether it violated the Fourth Amendment. ¶ 40. Cory Cramer, Brad Vorburger, and Amerie Becker were detained by officers of the Dane County Narcotics and Gangs Task Force at 9:20 on a Wednesday evening. Law enforcement officers were already in the process of obtaining a warrant to search room 230 of the motel. The warrant authorized a search of said premises and persons unknown within said premises. Had Cramer, Vorburger, and Becker not been stopped at the door of room 230, they might still have been within said premises when the warrant was executed. ¶ 41. The police had been working on the warrant for more than four hours. Detective Olson completed her part of the paperwork about 8:45, 35 minutes before the detention began. After conferring with an assistant district attorney, she drove the warrant and the lengthy supporting affidavit to the home of Circuit Judge Angela Bartell, who read it and signed the warrant at 9:34. This was 14 minutes after commencement of the detention. Detective Olson then left and headed directly to the motel. Shortly after obtaining the warrant, she informed the Task Force that the warrant was on its way. ¶ 42. Hence, at the time Cramer, Vorburger, and Becker were detained, the Task Force officers knew that a warrant was nearly ready. They had probable cause to search room 230 and probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, as they had tested the substance taken from the room. They were already detaining Peter Kokoros, who had appeared unexpectedly with a key to the room several hours earlier. They knew Kokoros was on probation for a drug offense, that he had stayed in room 215 the night before, and that room 215 smelled of marijuana and contained physical evidence of marijuana. They knew Kokoros had been with Cory Cramer earlier in the day and that Cramer had been using Kokoros's car when he checked into the motel at 2:30 that afternoon. Finally, they knew that during his detention, Kokoros had given the police several explanations of his activities that made them wary of his truthfulness. [17]
¶ 43. We first address the stop and initial detention. Wisconsin Stat. § 968.24 authorizes temporary questioning without arrest. It provides: After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped. Wis. Stat. § 968.24. ¶ 44. Vorburger does not dispute that the Task Force officers had reasonable suspicion that Cramer had committed a crime and that Vorburger and Becker were committing, were about to commit, or had committed a crime. There clearly was reasonable suspicion that Vorburger and Becker were about to commit a crimeit was 9:20 on a Wednesday evening and they were at the door of a motel room that smelled strongly of marijuana, accompanying the person who had rented the motel room several hours earlier. [7] ¶ 45. We conclude that the stop and initial detention were based on reasonable suspicion and therefore lawful. The police were entitled to demand the names and addresses of the three persons and an explanation of their conduct. They also were entitled to pat down the three suspects to assure that they were not armed. See State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶¶ 20, 32, 234 Wis.2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795.
¶ 46. We next address the detention of Amerie Becker pending the arrival and during the execution of the warrant. In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that the legality of temporarily detaining a person at the scene of suspected drug activity to secure a search warrant may be an open question. The defendant in Rawlings was a visitor at a house where police smelled and observed marijuana. The Court more or less assumed that when the police detained Rawlings while they obtained a search warrant, they were violating the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 106. Nonetheless, the Court upheld Rawlings' conviction. Id. at 111. ¶ 47. In the years since 1980, there has been a clear evolution in the law. In Summers, the Court reviewed the case of a man who was detained as he was leaving his home and then held while the police executed a search warrant of his house. Summers, 452 U.S. at 693. Thereafter the man was arrested and searched. The Court said: [F]or Fourth Amendment purposes, we hold that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted. Id. at 705. The Court explained that: The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies a detention of that occupant. Id. at 703-04. ¶ 48. Applying Summers to this case, it seems clear that law enforcement officers could have validly detained Cramer, the person to whom the room was registered, while the search warrant for contraband was executed. However, Vorburger attempts to distinguish the Summers case as applied to Becker. He contends that Becker was neither a resident nor occupant of the room. The answer to this argument is found in two federal cases, United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990), and United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656 (6th Cir. 1993). ¶ 49. In Pace, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied Summers to a situation in which officers went to a condominium to execute a search warrant for gambling records and money and found the owner and three non-residents. Pace, 898 F.2d at 1223. The officers patted down all four men and detained them while they searched the condominium. Id. Two of the nonresidents later claimed that they had been unlawfully detained during the search and, therefore, were arrested. Id. at 1238. They argued that Summers did not apply because they were not occupants or residents of the condominium. Id. at 1239. The court determined that Summers did apply because: While it turned out that [the two men] were not residents of [the] condominium, it is still significant that they were present in a condominium that a neutral magistrate had found probable cause to believe contained evidence of illegal gambling activities. The police officers could not be sure whether or not [the two men] were involved in the gambling, nor could they even be sure whether or not [the two men] were occupants of the condominium. Thus as in Summers, the connection of [the two men] to the condominium gave the officers an easily identifiable and certain basis for detaining [the two men] during the search. Id. ¶ 50. Similarly, in Fountain, the Sixth Circuit applied Summers to a situation in which law enforcement officers looking for drugs executed a search warrant at a house where the owner and three other people were present. Fountain, 2 F.3d at 659. The officers gathered the four people they found in the house, handcuffed them, and had them lie face down on the floor. Id. In executing the warrant, the officers found illegal drugs. Id. at 660. They then questioned each of the four detainees separately. Id. One of the nonresident defendants moved to suppress the evidence against him, claiming that the officers could not have detained him under Summers because he was not a resident of the house and was therefore not an occupant. Id. at 663. The Fountain court determined that the officers acted reasonably in detaining the defendant because his apparently voluntary connection with the home provided the agents with `an easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifie[d] detention.' Id. The court rejected the argument that the Supreme Court intended Summers to apply only to residents. Id. [8] ¶ 51. We agree with the Pace and Fountain interpretations of Summers. The Task Force officers acted reasonably in detaining Becker and Vorburger even though they were not the persons to whom room 230 was registered. Becker and Vorburger voluntarily connected themselves to the motel room and its occupant. Without investigation, they could not be dismissed as innocent bystanders. There was reasonable suspicion that they were present at the motel room for criminal activity. ¶ 52. Vorburger points out that Becker was not in the room at the time the officers stopped her. Under the circumstances, we find this distinction meaningless. Becker was standing outside the room with the person to whom the room was registered. The registrant was putting his key in the lock. Becker was seconds away from entering the room and later admitted that she intended to enter the room. The fact that Becker and Vorburger were standing immediately outside the room when they were stopped does not destroy their required voluntary connection to the room. ¶ 53. A third distinction between this case and Summers is that the officers in Summers already had their warrant when they detained the defendant. Here, Becker was detained before the warrant had arrived and before it was signed. ¶ 54. This concern was substantially allayed in United States v. Ritchie, 35 F.3d 1477 (10th Cir. 1994). An FBI agent was traveling to the defendant's home with a search warrant when the defendant began to leave the premises in an automobile. Agents on the scene detained him for about ten minutes until the arrival of the warrant. The Tenth Circuit determined that the agents on the scene were justified in stopping and detaining the defendant because they knew that a neutral party had issued a search warrant for [the] premises, thus giving them reasonable suspicion to detain him. Id. at 1483. ¶ 55. The Supreme Court affirmed this principle on different facts in Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). In McArthur, a police officer with probable cause to believe that the defendant had marijuana in his trailer home, prevented him from entering the home unless the officers accompanied him inside. Id. at 329. In the meantime, another officer left to obtain a search warrant. Id. The Court reversed an Illinois court's suppression of the drug evidence found in the trailer. Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer explained: When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable. . . . . . . . . . . [T]he police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy. They neither searched the trailer nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a warrant. Rather, they imposed a significantly less restrictive restraint, preventing McArthur only from entering the trailer unaccompanied. . . . . . . [T]he police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time, namely, two hours. . . . As far as the record reveals, this time period was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. Id. at 330-32. ¶ 56. The rationale for detentions involving search warrants is fully explained in the Summers opinion. The Court noted the difference between the detention of Summers and the detention of a suspect on the street, à la Terry: A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there. The detention of one of the residents while the premises were searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was surely less intrusive than the search itself. Summers, 452 U.S. at 701. ¶ 57. The involvement of a neutral and detached magistrate also impressed Justice Souter in the McArthur case. Justice Souter wrote that the legitimacy of the decision to impound [McArthur's] dwelling follows from the law's strong preference for warrants . . . . The law can hardly raise incentives to obtain a warrant without giving the police a fair chance to take their probable cause to a magistrate and get one. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 338 (Souter, J., concurring). ¶ 58. The Summers court evaluated the law enforcement interests in the detention of Summers and found significant: (1) the law enforcement interest in preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found; (2) the law enforcement interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; and (3) the law enforcement interest in the orderly completion of the search. Id. at 702-03. ¶ 59. The Court expanded on the second point, stating: Less obvious, but sometimes of greater importance, is the interest in minimizing the risk of harm to the officers. . . . [T]he execution of a warrant to search for narcotics is the kind of transaction that may give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence. Id. at 702. ¶ 60. The Summers decision provides the framework for evaluating Becker's detention pending the arrival and during the execution of the warrant for contraband. ¶ 61. Becker was detained at approximately 9:20. She and her companions were told that the officers were conducting an investigation, that the three were being detained and were not free to leave, but that they were not under arrest. The three were patted down, handcuffed, and held in the second floor corridor of a motel. All three were offered chairs. Becker declined to sit down. At one point she asked to go to the bathroom. There is a dispute about what she said and what Officer Kosovac said, but Becker did not go to the bathroom until the search warrant was executed. Her purse was not searched until later, with her consent. ¶ 62. Vorburger complains that several elements of the detention during this period were unreasonable and transformed the detention into an arrest. He argues that Becker's detention lasted for a period exceeding two hours, that she was handcuffed with her hands behind her back and directed to sit in the hallway with one or more police officers continually present, and that she was not allowed to use the bathroom privately. [9] ¶ 63. The circuit court found that Becker was detained for approximately one hour before the search warrant was executed. According to the record, her detention began at 9:20; the warrant arrived at 10:05; the warrant was read to Cramer at 10:15; and the warrant was executed at 10:17. Shortly after 10:30, Becker was taken into room 229. Thus, the period of detention related to the procurement and execution of the search warrant was roughly one hour and ten minutes. This period of detention was not unreasonable given the time of day and the distance separating police headquarters, the judge's residence, and the motel, which is located in the Town of Blooming Grove, east of Monona. In Justice Breyer's words, this time period was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain [and execute] the warrant. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332. ¶ 64. The officers handcuffed the three detainees. In analyzing this fact, the circuit court quoted State v. Swanson, 164 Wis.2d 437, 448, 475 N.W.2d 148 (1991): Many jurisdictions have recognized that the use of handcuffs does not necessarily transform an investigative stop into an arrest. Many federal courts have made similar pronouncements. See e.g., United States v. $109,179 in U.S. Currency, 228 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680, 685 (9th Cir. 1998); Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995)); Fountain, 2 F.3d 656; United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 972 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983). ¶ 65. The Supreme Court stated in Summers that a warrant to search a premises for drugs may give rise to sudden violence . . . . The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03 (citing 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.9 (1978)). ¶ 66. In this case, the officers' concern for their safety and the safety of others is well grounded in the record. There were three detainees at the motel. They were stopped in a second floor corridor. Cory Cramer, then 22, was 5 feet 10 inches tall and weighed 195 pounds. Police did not know then but later discovered in Cramer's car an electric weapon, which Cramer's girlfriend described as Cory's stun gun. Vorburger, also 22, was 6 feet 10 inches tall, 265 pounds. One of the officers at the motel recognized him as having worked as a bouncer at a local nightclub. We conclude that the officers did not act unreasonably in their efforts to protect themselves, secure the site, and preserve the status quo. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984). ¶ 67. We also conclude that there is no merit to Vorburger's complaint about Becker's use of the bathroom. The testimony on this issue was disputed, and the circuit court did not find that the police had acted unreasonably. We agree. [12] ¶ 68. We recognize that in Swanson, this court stated that we use an objective test, assessing the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether a seizure has escalated into an arrest: The standard generally used to determine the moment of arrest in a constitutional sense is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have considered himself or herself to be in custody, given the degree of restraint under the circumstances. The circumstances of the situation including what has been communicated by the police officers, either by their words or actions, shall be controlling under the objective test. Swanson, 164 Wis.2d at 446-47 (citations omitted). [18] The court of appeals utilized the Swanson language as the basis for its decision. Vorburger, 2001 WI App. 43, ¶¶ 14, 18. ¶ 69. We find it difficult to reconcile this Swanson language with the clear precedent in Summers, McArthur, Pace, Fountain, and Ritchie. The critical factor in this casethe factor that distinguishes it from Swanson is the presence of a valid search warrant for contraband. The search warrant is central to this case and to our analysis because it injects an objective justification, based upon the determination of a detached magistrate, into the totality of the circumstances. In Summers, the Supreme Court, in effect, recognized the concept of detention incident to the execution of a valid search warrant. This limited detention is based upon the same factorsconcern for the safety of officers and the possible destruction of evidencethat underlie searches incident to arrest. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). We think such a concept applies to this case from the moment of initial detention to the completion of the search, because a search warrant was in the works and its execution was imminent, and because the police had articulable, reasonable suspicion for each of the people they detained. Becker and Vorburger cannot claim that their propinquity to room 230 was the result of pure coincidence.
[13] ¶ 70. After 10:30, the status quo that the Task Force sought to preserve, changed. Amerie Becker was taken into room 229. Her handcuffs were removed and she used the bathroom. When she indicated she was thirsty, she was given a plastic cup of water. Several times throughout the evening, Becker was advised that she was not under arrest. She testified that the officer told her over and over again that I was being detained, but I was not under arrest. Objectively, she never was arrested in the sense that she was taken to the police station or the jail, and she never was charged with any offense involving Cory Cramer or room 230. ¶ 71. After the warrant had been executed, Becker was given Miranda warnings and asked if she would answer questions. She was told that police were present at the motel on a drug investigation and that they had found drugs. Becker agreed to answer questions about the day's activities, which included sharing a blunt with Vorburger, and she spoke about their occasional drug use at the apartment. During this discussion, Becker consented to a search of her purse. After police advised Becker that Vorburger had told them there were marijuana stems and buds at the apartment, she consented to a search of the apartment. Becker calculated whether consent to a search would be preferable to a search warrant, which police probably could have obtained based upon her own admissions, and she made a choice. ¶ 72. Becker never refused to answer questions, never asked for an attorney, never withdrew her consent. When she was driven to her home in Fitchburg by officers, she instructed them what door to enter so as not to attract the attention of neighbors. ¶ 73. The record indicates that Becker gave her consent to search the apartment within 40 minutes of being taken into room 229 and within 20 to 30 minutes after the onset of questioning. [14] ¶ 74. A police officer can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot, even if the officer lacks probable cause. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). [15] ¶ 75. The length of an investigative detention is one of the factors to weigh in determining whether a lawful detention has escalated into an arrest. In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983), two officers stopped Royer in an airport because he fit the profile of a drug courier. They asked him for identification and his airline ticket, and when he gave them his driver's license and ticket, they took him into a police interrogation room 40 feet away for questioning. Id. at 494. They retrieved his luggage without consent, then searched his suitcases with consent and found drugs. Id. Royer's detention lasted approximately 15 minutes. Id. at 495. ¶ 76. The Supreme Court affirmed Royer's motion to suppress the drug evidence, concluding that, What had begun as a consensual inquiry in a public place had escalated into an investigatory procedure in a police interrogation room, where the police, unsatisfied with previous explanations, sought to confirm their suspicions. Id. at 503. The court noted that the officers had Royer's ticket, identification, and luggage, and that they never informed him he was free to leave. Id. It concluded that, As a practical matter, Royer was under arrest. Id. The Royer court summed up the law as follows: The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. Id. at 500 (citations omitted). ¶ 77. The Royer decision was followed by two other airport cases, United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), and Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1. Sokolow appears to have neutralized some of the impact of Royer's plurality opinion as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. [16] ¶ 78. All three cases are distinguishable from the facts here. First, unlike the three airport cases that involved only suspicion that the defendants were drug couriers, this case involved unquestionable evidence that someone had committed a felony. When the warrant was executed, police found approximately 14 pounds of marijuana in Cramer's room, together with a digital scale and plastic bags, evidence with all the hallmarks of major drug dealing. Second, unlike the three airport cases, this case involves a search warrant. The purpose of Becker's continued detention, after execution of the warrant, was to determine what she knew about the major felony across the hall. ¶ 79. On the one hand, Becker could have been a party to the felony, present at the motel to make a major drug purchase. On the other hand, she could have been a mere witness who could explain her presence and tell authorities what she knew about Cory Cramer. Peter Kokoros may have intended to remove all marijuana from the room when he stopped by the motel at 5:45. If he had done so, Vorburger and Becker would have had no known connection with the drugs. Police were entitled to try, in a reasonable follow-up to the search, to verify or dispel their suspicions about Becker's involvement. Becker ultimately disavowed any knowledge of the marijuana in room 230 and was never charged with any offense in connection with that room.
¶ 80. While the Supreme Court determined in Royer that a 15-minute detention was impermissible, and in Place that a 90-minute detention was impermissible, it did not establish an absolute time limitation on investigative detentions. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 494, 503; Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99. In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that the focus in Royer was primarily on facts other than the duration of the defendant's detention particularly the fact that the police confined the defendant in a small airport room for questioning. The court held that an investigative detention is not transformed into an arrest solely because of the length of the detention. Id. at 686, 688. [19] ¶ 81. The court determined that the length of the detention in that case (approximately 40 minutes) was not impermissible because it did not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. Id. at 687. We reach the same conclusion in this case. [20] ¶ 82. Vorburger asserts that even if Becker's detention were permissible before the warrant was executed, her detention became an arrest when she was taken into room 229 and questioned, instead of being released. Vorburger contends that the officers found nothing in room 230 linking Becker to the drugs in the room and consequently they no longer had reasonable suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity. ¶ 83. We find this suggestion unpersuasive. Contraband is seldom invoiced and neatly labeled for a buyer. [21] We find more realistic the Seventh Circuit's comments in United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1984), that it strikes us as incredible that [a drug dealer] would have a person accompany him to a drug deal where that person did not have [the dealer's] utmost trust and confidence, implying that the trust and confidence was most likely based on the person's involvement in the deal. See Pace, 898 F.2d at 1240. Here, Cramer was escorting Becker and Vorburger into a room containing 14 pounds of pungent marijuana in open view. Police were entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these facts. ¶ 84. We agree with the State that the officers continued to have reasonable suspicion about Becker after the warrant had been executed and that it was not unreasonable to question her in light of their discoveries in room 230. ¶ 85. Becker testified at the motion hearing that she and Officer Kosovac talked in room 229 for probably ten minutes. She stated that Officer Kosovac asked her about the events that had preceded us coming to the hotel room, and if Becker ever drank or used marijuana or used any other type of drugs. After Becker told Officer Kosovac about how she and Vorburger had smoked marijuana that day in their apartment, Officer Kosovac asked if officers could search the apartment. ¶ 86. Vorburger correctly points out that when Becker was taken into room 229, Officer Kosovac did not inform her again that she was not under arrest. We do not believe, however, that a reasonable person in Becker's position would have believed that she had been placed under arrest when her handcuffs had been removed and she was allowed to use the bathroom. For Becker, police were deescalating the conditions of her detention. [17] ¶ 87. Upon thorough review of the record, we determine, as the circuit court did, that the officers in this case acted reasonably in stopping and detaining Becker for questions and that the detention did not escalate into an arrest.