Opinion ID: 2357569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Intent Element of Child Sexual Abuse Count

Text: In the District of Columbia, an individual commits the offense of Second-Degree Child Sexual Abuse when he or she, being at least four years older than a child [defined as `a person who has not yet attained the age of 16 years,' D.C.Code § 22-3001(3) (2001)], engages in sexual contact with that child or causes that child to engage in sexual contact. D.C.Code § 22-3009 (2001). Sexual contact is defined as the touching with any clothed or unclothed body part or any object, either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.  Id. § 22-3001(9) (emphasis added). At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury as follows with respect to the charges of Second-Degree Child Sexual Abuse: The essential elements of second degree child sexual abuse, each of which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are . . . that the defendant knowingly touched the breasts, thighs, and buttocks of [the complainants], and that the defendant was at least four years older than the complainant[s]. Although the jury instruction failed to include any instruction with respect to the intent element of the crime, appellant neither brought this to the attention of the court nor objected to the instructions as given. In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), the Supreme Court examined the scope of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), identical to Superior Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which reads, Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the Court. Quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944), the Court noted that `a constitutional right' or a right of any other sort, `may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.' Olano, 507 U.S. at 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770. As the Court explained, when a right has not been asserted through objection stated to the court or otherwise, we must apply the plain error test to our review of the claim. In order to prevail under the plain error test, an appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain or obvious, (3) that affected the appellant's substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. at 731-38, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). [4] As an initial matter, we note that the failure to instruct on an element of an offense does not per se satisfy the plain error test. In Johnson, the Supreme Court analogized the error of the trial judge  in taking the issue of materiality from the jury  to the error of failing to instruct on an element of an offense. It concluded that, even assuming that the failure to submit materiality to the jury affect[s][a] substantial right, it did not seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of [the] judicial proceedings. Johnson, supra, 520 U.S. at 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544. Two years later, in Neder, supra, note 4, 527 U.S. at 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, the Supreme Court wrote: [A]n instruction that omits an element of the offense does not necessarily render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Id. at 4, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Indeed, this court has had several occasions to confront the issue of whether the failure to instruct on an element of an offense automatically requires reversal of a conviction. In White v. United States, 613 A.2d 869 (D.C. 1992) (en banc), we held that unless an objection is made at trial to the instructions as given, a failure to instruct on an element of an offense will not be the cause for a reversal at least where . . . the relevant facts are so closely related that no rational jury, shown by its verdict to have found the facts necessary to convict the defendant under the instructions as given, could have failed, if fully instructed on each element, to have found in addition the facts necessary to comprise the omitted element. Id. at 870; cf. Jenkins v. United States, 877 A.2d 1062, 1069-70 (D.C.2005) (reversing under harmless-error analysis where appellant contemporaneously objected to erroneous jury instruction). Applying this rule in Bellamy v. United States, 810 A.2d 401 (D.C.2002), we upheld the appellant's convictions for distributing cocaine in a drug-free zone, in that case within 1000 feet of a school, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, despite the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the drug-free zone element of the charges. Id. at 402. In affirming the convictions, we found it critical that the government's evidence showed that the crimes took place within 1000 feet of the school, and appellant did not dispute it. Id. at 407. Rather, the appellant's only defenses were his denial that he had sold any drugs and his assertion that the bags of cocaine found at his feet belonged to someone else or had been planted by the police. Id. at 403. Because the jury in Bellamy obviously did not believe the appellant's defense, and the only evidence in the case as to the proximity to the school was the undisputed testimony of the government's witnesses, we reasoned that, given the overwhelming evidence, no rational jury could have failed to find that the crimes occurred within a drug-free zone and therefore that the error did not seriously affect `the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' Id. at 407 (quoting Johnson, supra, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544). [5] Having demonstrated that the omission of an element of the offense from the jury instructions does not warrant automatic reversal, and that it does not per se satisfy the plain error test, we now analyze the issue before us under that test. The government concedes that the trial court committed error when it failed to instruct the jury on the intent element of Second-Degree Child Sexual Abuse. It further concedes that the error was plain or obvious. Thus, we address whether the error affected the appellant's substantial rights and whether this error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We conclude that it did not. In order to show that the non-structural error in this case affected his substantial rights, appellant must show a reasonable probability that the error had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of his trial. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81-82, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (In cases where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the defendant seeking relief, we have invoked a standard with similarities to the Kotteakos [ v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)] formulation in requiring the showing of a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Just as the appellant in Bellamy did not seriously dispute whether the element of the offense omitted from the instructions  i.e., whether his actions took place in a drug-free zone  had been met, Bellamy, supra, 810 A.2d at 407, here appellant submitted no evidence nor made any argument to the jury contesting his intent. [6] In contrast, the government's evidence overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that appellant's actions were taken with the intent of gratifying himself sexually. Both daughters testified that appellant touched their thighs, buttocks, breasts and vagina, and both testified that the touching made them feel uncomfortable. E.F. further testified that appellant told her that she needed to comb [her] pubic hair, that he continued to try to touch her vagina even as she tried to stop him, and that he looked at her as a girlfriend rather than as a daughter. S.F. gave similar testimony concerning appellant's disregard for her requests that he stop touching her. She also testified that appellant would repeatedly state, See how you do me while he touched her, a statement that the jury could reasonably infer was an expression of appellant's sexual arousal. [7] E.F. testified that appellant took nude photographs of her more than 20 times, directing her to get up on the bed and . . . show your butt, turn around and smile, and pose like the girls in porno magazines. Given this evidence, we conclude, in accord with Bellamy, that no rational jury could have found that appellant touched his daughters in a way consistent with the trial court's jury instruction on Second-Degree Child Sexual Abuse without also finding the requisite intent. [8] Just as the appellant in Bellamy never argued that he was not within a drug-free zone, the issue of intent in this case was essentially uncontroverted at trial. Johnson, supra, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. [9] Appellant's trial counsel put it bluntly while discussing jury instructions, They believe her if they believe her. If they don't, they don't. Here, it is clear that the jury believed the daughters' accounts that their father touched them for inappropriate reasons. Indeed, with no evidence to the contrary, a logical jury could not have concluded on this record that appellant lacked the requisite intent. Therefore, it cannot have affected appellant's substantial rights, and reversal for plain error is unwarranted.