Opinion ID: 1059810
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parham Case

Text: Payne pleaded guilty to the capital murder of Ruth Parham while in the commission of or subsequent to object sexual penetration and to the capital murder of Parham while in the commission of or subsequent to attempted rape, both in violation of Code § 18.2-31(5) (the Parham case ). The trial court accepted Payne's voluntary pleas and found him guilty of both capital murders. In a separate sentencing proceeding, the court found that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt both aggravating factors; i.e., vileness and future dangerousness. The court imposed the death penalty for each offense. Payne filed a motion to waive his appeal of right, and we remanded the case to the trial court for a determination whether the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Payne was examined, at his request, by a psychologist and was found to be competent to waive his appeal. Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing and determined that Payne's waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and we conclude that the record supports that determination, Although Payne waived his appeal of right, we must review the death sentences nonetheless. Former Code § 17-110.1 (now Code § 17.1-313). As previously noted, this mandatory review directs this Court to consider and determine whether the sentences were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor and whether the sentences are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Former Code § 17-110.1(C).
The evidence in the Parham case is undisputed. On June 5, 1997, Payne saw Parham enter an office building in Hanover County. Payne concealed a large hammer inside his pants and entered the building. He found Parham, a 61-year-old woman who cleaned the offices, in a lunchroom. Payne asked Parham if he could use the telephone, and she consented. Parham had turned her back on Payne and had taken about three steps when Payne hit her in the back of her head with the hammer. Parham fell facedown, and Payne began to rip off her clothes. Payne fondled Parham's breast and inserted his finger into her vagina. During the attack, Payne repeatedly struck Parham's head with the hammer. Parham sustained four depressed skull fractures, each of which was potentially fatal, and she also sustained a fractured nose and numerous facial and skull bruises and lacerations. Parham's left hand had on it traces of her blood and strands of her hair, indicating that she was alive during the bludgeoning, and her brain was extruding through one of her skull fractures. After the murder, Payne removed his shirt and used it to wipe doorknobs and other items he may have touched in the room. He then went throughout the building looking for another female victim before leaving. Payne had decided not to rape Parham because she did not appeal to him. In the sentencing proceeding, the trial court received evidence about Payne's prior criminal history. Less than five months before Payne murdered Parham, he had been released on parole after serving approximately five years in prison for drug possession. Payne told the police that, during the entire time he had been in prison, he had thought about raping and killing a woman. The trial court heard about Payne's attack upon Fleck and her young son and Payne's murder of Fazio, details of which are more fully set forth in Part I, B hereof.
We first consider and determine whether the death sentences in the Parham case were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. Former Code § 17-110.1(C)(1). Payne contends that the Commonwealth's Attorney made improper remarks in the sentencing proceeding. Payne complains that the prosecutor used the evidence of the Fazio and Fleck crimes to justify the death penalty. He specifically complains about the prosecutor's referring to Payne as a predator and a monster and showing photographs of the victims to the court during the argument. Payne asserts that the prosecutor's argument had the desired effect on the court because the court described [him] as a mad dog who should be put in a gunny sack with some bricks and dropped off a bridge. Payne opines that this language by the court is ample evidence that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion and prejudice. We do not agree. When all of the trial court's remarks are read, it is apparent that, before imposing the death sentences, the court considered not only Payne's criminal history, but also his evidence in mitigation. With respect to the prosecutor's argument, we conclude that it constituted fair comment upon properly admitted evidence. The Commonwealth had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant ... that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. Code § 19.2-264.4(C) (emphasis added). Therefore, evidence of Payne's other crimes was admissible. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 346-47, 356 S.E.2d 157, 175-76, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987); Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 283-85, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 706 (1987). Having considered the entire record, we determine that the death sentences imposed upon Payne were not the product of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.
Payne makes no argument that his death sentences are excessive or disproportionate. He assumes that we will consider all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court, and we have done so. Suffice it to say, the evidence, including that of the crimes themselves and Payne's criminal history, is gruesome and shocking, and, when this case is compared to other attempted rape and/or robbery capital murder cases, we conclude that the sentences were neither excessive nor disproportionate. See, e.g., Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 96, 501 S.E.2d 134, 140-41 (1998); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 625, 499 S.E.2d 538 (1998); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 89, 445 S.E.2d 670, 682, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971, 115 S.Ct. 442, 130 L.Ed.2d 353 (1994); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 261, 421 S.E.2d 821, 845-46 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933, 113 S.Ct. 1319, 122 L.Ed.2d 705 (1993).