Opinion ID: 1237936
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Aggravating Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that several forms of improper aggravating evidence were erroneously admitted or argued. He asserts that the errors denied him his rights to due process of law and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.
Over defense objection, the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's 1967 felony conviction in this state for possession of marijuana. (102) Defendant contends that this prior conviction could not be used in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (c) (The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction), because at the time of trial the offense of marijuana possession was no longer punishable as a felony and because any record of a marijuana possession conviction cannot be considered accurate, relevant, timely, or complete for any purposes if the record is more than two years old (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361.7, subd. (a)). The latter provision makes any record falling within its terms `useless and for all intents and purposes nonexistent.' ( People v. Boyd (1979) 24 Cal.3d 285, 293 [155 Cal. Rptr. 367, 594 P.2d 484] [record of prior felony conviction for marijuana possession will not support a charge of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon].) Defendant is correct that the evidence was inadmissible, but there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) In his penalty phase testimony, defendant admitted both possession and sale of marijuana, and the offense of marijuana possession is insignificant in light of the evidence of far more serious violent offenses committed by defendant ( People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 191 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]). Because the erroneously admitted evidence was inconsequential in the context of the evidence properly received, the error did not deprive defendant of any right under the federal Constitution.
(103) The documentary evidence the prosecution introduced to prove defendant's 1967 felony conviction for marijuana possession also showed that defendant had been convicted and sentenced at the same time for the misdemeanor offense of possession of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Although evidence of this misdemeanor offense was not admissible, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the jury instructions or the arguments of counsel suggested to the jury that it could or should consider this conviction in determining penalty, and the evidence was insignificant in light of defendant's record of violent behavior, including the offenses proved in this case.
During argument to the jury, the prosecution commented on the defense efforts to portray defendant in a sympathetic light, contrasting these efforts with the prosecution's evidence of defendant's out-of-court behavior that showed him in a less favorable light. During this argument, the prosecutor said, You know, the least you can do is look remorseful. Ask you people to spare his life. The defense did not object to this remark or request an admonition. (104) Defendant contends that the remark was improper because it is unfair to expect an expression of remorse from one who denies guilt, and also because lack of remorse is not one of the statutory aggravating factors. In words applicable to this case, we recently said: While an argument asking the jury to return a death verdict because the defendant had failed to confess or had maintained his [or her] silence would be improper [citations], the argument here did not ask this. The prosecutor is entitled to counter the argument that the jury should spare defendant's life out of pity for him [or her], and we have said that the jury may consider lack of remorse in fixing penalty. [Citations.] When comments on lack of remorse do no more than suggest the inapplicability of a potentially mitigating factor, they are appropriate. ( People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1270-1271 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899].)
Under section 190.3, factor (b) (prior criminal activity involving violence), the prosecution introduced evidence of the December 1971 incident in Montana in which defendant escaped from custody and used motorist John Digalis as a hostage. Under section 190.3, factor (c) (prior felony conviction), the prosecution introduced evidence of defendant's 1972 Montana conviction resulting from the same incident. (105) Defendant contends that the manner in which these two items were presented to the jury caused an unacceptable risk that the jury would double count these separate but related circumstances. As defendant acknowledges, we have held that when a capital defendant's prior violent criminal conduct has resulted in a felony conviction, the prosecution is not required to choose between factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3 but may present evidence and argument to establish both factors, and the jury may properly consider both factors in making its penalty determination. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 764 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) Defendant argues that this holding does not control here because it presupposes the jury's understanding that the prior felony conviction is based on the criminal conduct described in the testimony. The error here, he asserts, is that the prosecution presented and argued the evidence in a manner that improperly suggested there were two separate incidents. Having reviewed the record, we find no significant risk of juror confusion on this issue. The prior conviction was proved by documentary evidence. Among the documents was the Montana information, which charged that the incident occurred on December 29, 1971, and that John Digalis was the victim. No reasonable juror could have concluded that John Digalis's testimony, which described his encounter with defendant on December 29, 1971, related to some other incident.