Opinion ID: 1973500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: STATE'S RIGHT TO APPEAL UNDER SEC. 974.05 (1) (d), STATS.

Text: A threshold question is whether the state has a right to appeal from the order suppressing the statements of the defendant. The statute relied upon by the state in bringing this appeal is sec. 974.05(1) (d)2 and 3, Stats. 1975 (amended by ch. 187, sec. 129, Laws of 1977), which provides: 974.05 State's appeal. (1) A writ of error or appeal may be taken by the state from any: . . . . (d) Order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in: . . . . 2. Suppressing evidence; or 3. Suppressing a confession or admission. The defendant argues that the circumstances of this case do not fit into the provisions of sec. 974.05(1) (d) 2 or 3, Stats. 1975, because the statements of the defendant which were suppressed are not evidence, confessions or admissions. Specifically, the defendant contends that the word evidence in paragraph 2 of sec. 974.05(1) (d) must be limited to physical evidence since paragraph 3 refers to oral statements of the defendant  confession or admission, and therefore the statements which were suppressed are not evidence. The defendant's argument is without merit. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this court is to arrive at the intention of the legislature by giving the language its plain, ordinary and accepted meaning. State v. Engler, 80 Wis.2d 402, 406, 259 N.W.2d 97 (1977); Vigil v. State, 76 Wis.2d 133, 142, 250 N.W.2d 378 (1977); State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. WCCJ, 73 Wis.2d 237, 241, 243 N.W.2d 485 (1976). The word evidence is unambiguous and is generally understood to mean something that furnishes or tends to furnish proof. In a legal sense, it means something which is legally submitted to a competent tribunal as a means of ascertaining the truth of any relevant fact. This would include physical evidence as well as oral statements or testimony. Thus, the statements of the defendant which were suppressed in this case must be categorized as evidence. Furthermore, a statute should be construed to avoid an unreasonable or absurd result. Wis. Environmental Decade v. Public Service Comm., 84 Wis.2d 504, 528, 267 N.W.2d 609 (1978); Schwartz v. ILHR Dept., 72 Wis.2d 217, 222, 240 N.W.2d 173 (1976); State ex rel. Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. Bardwell, 71 Wis.2d 718, 729, 239 N.W.2d 78 (1976). If this court were to construe the word evidence in sec. 974.05(1) (d)2, Stats., as meaning only physical evidence, the state would be permitted to appeal under sec. 974.05(1) (d)2 and 3 only from orders or judgments which result in suppressing physical evidence, confessions or admissions, but would be prevented from appealing from the suppression of such evidence as oral statements of the defendant which are not confessions or admissions, an identification, or any oral statements or testimony of witnesses other than the defendant. The legislature did not intend such an unreasonable result. [1] This court, without specifically deciding the issue, has permitted the state to appeal pursuant to sec. 974.05 (1) (d)2, Stats., from an order suppressing a lineup, State v. Beals, 52 Wis.2d 599, 191 N.W.2d 221 (1971), and from an order suppressing the testimony of a police officer, State v. Smith, 72 Wis.2d 711, 242 N.W.2d 184 (1976). Accordingly, sec. 974.05(1) (d) 2 gives the state the right to appeal in the instant case from the order suppressing the oral statements of the defendant. Because we reach this conclusion, we will not determine whether the statements of the defendant constitute admissions so as to allow the state to appeal pursuant to sec. 974.05(1) (d)3.