Opinion ID: 2544453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Association's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Text: As noted earlier, the Association filed a motion for partial summary judgment against WRC and the County, seeking a declaration that: (1) WRC and the County were owners of easements in the twenty-four inch and fifty-four inch drainpipes traversing Wailea Elua; (2) the pipes were not common elements of Wailea Elua; and (3) WRC and the County were liable for their pro rata share of past and future repair and maintenance costs associated with the pipes. In its motion, the Association first argued that WRC, as the successor to the mauka property owned by WDC, owned implied easements in the drainpipes which were appurtenant to the Golf Course. [6] Relying upon Henmi Apartments, Inc. v. Sawyer, 3 Haw. App. 555, 655 P.2d 881 (1982), the Association argued that the intent of the parties to create an implied easement could be discerned from all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the conveyance of the Wailea Elua properties to individual owners. Second, the Association contended that the County owned implied easements in the drainpipes because the deed to Wailea Alanui Drive conveyed Easements 61, 62, and 63 to the County, presumably arguing that the deed also implied the existence of easements in the locations of the pipes connecting Easements 61, 62, and 63. Third, the Association contended that, under Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 443 P.2d 142 (1968), WRC and the County were liable for the repair and maintenance of the pipes. In support of its motion, the Association submitted, by affidavit, the following: (1) the chains of title and purchase agreement demonstrating that WDC had conveyed the Golf Course to WRC; (2) an example of an original apartment deed in which WDC conveyed condominium units to initial Wailea Elua owners, and the horizontal property declarations, both of which showed that WDC had conveyed the property subject to Easements 61, 62, and 63 and had reserved, for itself, easements for drainage under the Wailea Elua property; and (3) copies of three different drainage and erosion control reports written at various stages of the development and construction of the Wailea Elua property, along with accompanying correspondence between various engineers, WDC representatives, and County officials, purporting to show, presumably, that the drainage plan for Wailea Elua was part of a comprehensive plan for the overall development of the area. Finally, the Association also submitted documentation of the damage and repair costs related to the collapsed pipe and roadway. In opposition to the Association's motion, WRC did not address WDC's intent at the time it severed the Wailea Elua portion of the properly. Instead, WRC argued that: (1) it was never an owner of the Wailea Elua property and was not involved in the designation of any easements over Wailea Elua and, accordingly, was not the successor in interest to WDC; (2) even if it owned implied easements beneath the Association's property, it was not responsible for maintaining the pipes; and (3) the language of the apartment deeds established that the pipes were common elements of Wailea Elua. The County opposed the Association's motion, contending that: (1) it had never accepted an easement over the Wailea Elua property and could not be forced into accepting such easements; and (2) it was not required to obtain an easement over Wailea Elua because [t]he drain pipes under the surface [of Wailea Elua] are there for the benefit of the [Association.] Were it not for these drain pipes, the water would merely drain down the natural gullies or gulches that existed prior to the creation of an underground drainage system. The County, however, presented no evidence supporting this statement. The trial court granted the Association's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to WRC, ruling that WRC is the owner of and holds an implied easement for drainage purposes over, under, across, along and through that portion of the Wailea Elua condominium project which is occupied by the 24 and 54 storm drains. The court's primary reasoning appeared to be that the Hawai`i test [to determine whether an implied easement exists] seems to be really a more general test according [to] the intent of the parties. And given the fact that [WDC] obviously planned thiscreated theI'm not sure how to describe it technicallythe areas where the water collects, where they granted the express[]easement, can there really be any genuine issue of fact but the intent of the parties is that this system benefit the mauka property? I don't see how you can say that any other conclusion could be reached[.] With respect to the County, the trial court denied the Association's motion, appearing to rule that a genuine issue of fact remained as to whether the County accepted any easements or could be required to accept any easements. The trial court also ruled that the pipes were not common elements of Wailea Elua. The partial summary judgment order was filed March 14, 1996. Ultimately, following trial, the court entered the following pertinent conclusions of law (COLs): 5. Pursuant to the [c]ourt's Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment With Respect to [WRC] . . . on March 14, 1996, WRC is an owner of an easement through the Wailea Elua property in the location of and through the 24 and 54 drainage systems located under the Wailea Elua property. 6. As owners of easements in and to the 24 and 54 drainage systems located under the Wailea Elua property, County and WRC are responsible for their proportionate share of the cost of repairing and maintaining the 24 and 54 drainage systems (which systems include the 18 and two 36 drainpipes under Wailea Alanui). Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 443 P.2d 142 (1968); Powers v. Grenier Construction Inc., 10 Conn.App. 556, 524 A.2d 667 (1987).
This court reviews a circuit court's award of summary judgment de novo. Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 86 Hawai`i 262, 269, 948 P.2d 1103, 1110 (1997). Summary judgment is proper where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In other words, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. State ex rel. Bronster v. Yoshina, 84 Hawai`i 179, 186, 932 P.2d 316, 323 (1997) (citations and internal block quotation format omitted).
WRC presents three arguments in support of its contention that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the Association by ruling that WRC owned implied easements in the drainpipes and was responsible for its pro rata share of maintaining them. According to WRC, the trial court erred because: (1) WRC does not need implied drainage easements through Wailea Elua inasmuch as WRC is entitled to discharge reasonable amounts of water onto Wailea Elua property; (2) the Association presented insufficient evidence to support its implied easement theory; and (3) even if WRC owned implied easements, it is not legally responsible for maintaining the easements. Neither of the first two arguments were raised at the summary judgment proceeding. We being our discussion by first reviewing the law concerning the genesis of implied easements.
In Neary v. Martin, 57 Haw. 577, 561 P.2d 1281 (1977), this court explained the theory of the genesis of an implied easement: All implications of easements necessarily involve an original unity of ownership of the parcels which later become the dominant and servient parcels. When A owns Blackacre, it is not possible for A as the owner of the west half of Blackacre to have a true easement with respect to the east half of Blackacre; but it is both possible and frequent to find A using the east half of Blackacre for the service of the west half of Blackacre, as for example, when the east half of Blackacre contains drains, or sewers, or irrigation ditches, or roadways or stairways which increase the usability of the west half of Blackacre. It is then possible to describe A's utilization of one part of Blackacre for the service of another part thereof as a quasi-easement, and to speak of the served part as the quasi-dominant tenement, and of the burdened part as the quasi-servient tenement. Where such a quasi-easement has existed and the common owner thereafter conveys to another the quasi-dominant tenement, the conveyee is in a position to claim an easement by implication with respect to the unconveyed quasi-servient tenement. Id. at 580, 561 P.2d at 1283 (quoting Tanaka v. Mitsunaga, 43 Haw. 119, 122-23 (1959) (in turn quoting 3 Powell on Real Property, § 411)). In addition to circumstances involving the conveyance of the former quasi-dominant parcel, the owner of the former quasi-dominant parcel, as the grantor, may also retain an implied easement over the former quasi-servient parcel if the former quasi-servient parcel is conveyed. See Neary, 57 Haw. at 580-81, 561 P.2d at 1284. In the instant case, WDC was the common owner of the mauka properties and Wailea Elua when WDC severed that ownership by selling individual condominium properties to Wailea Elua owners beginning at some point in the late 1970s. Because the issue in this case concerns whether WDC retained an implied easement to serve its mauka Golf Course over the property it conveyed to Wailea Elua owners, the Golf Course is the former quasi-dominant parcel and the Wailea Elua property is the former quasi-servient parcel. [7] The primary factor in determining whether WDC, as the grantor, retained an implied easement over Wailea Elua in favor of its mauka properties, is the parties' intent at the time WDC severed the parcels. See Neary, 57 Haw. at 581-82, 561 P.2d at 1284; see also Tanaka, 43 Haw. at 123 (the basis of an implied easement is the presumption of grant arising from the circumstances of the case); Henmi Apartments, Inc. 3 Haw.App. at 559, 655 P.2d at 885 (Whether an implied easement exists depends on the intent of the parties as shown by all the facts and circumstances under which the conveyance was made.). [8] Determination of the intention of the parties is a question of fact. See Neary, 57 Haw. at 582, 561 P.2d at 1284; Tanaka, 43 Haw. at 123; Henmi, 3 Haw.App. at 559, 655 P.2d at 885. At the summary judgment stage of this case, the only evidence introduced concerning WDC's intent at the time it severed the properties was evidence demonstrating that it intended to reserve an easement for the Golf Course. First, the documents suggested that WRC believed that it needed to reserve drainage easements for itself under the Wailea Elua property. Second, because the pipes served as receptacles for the water draining from the mauka properties, their location and arrangement suggests that they were intended, in part, to benefit the mauka portions of the common property and impose a servitude upon the Wailea Elua portion of the common property. WRC, on the other hand, presented no evidence regarding WDC's intent that contradicted the Association's evidence. WRC did not argue that it was not WDC's intent, as the original common owner, to create an implied easement. Instead, WRC argued that it had never owned the Wailea Elua property and was not involved in the designation of easementsan irrelevant argument given that the implied easement at issue was appurtenant to the land. See generally Peck v. Bailey, 8 Haw. 658, 661 (King.1867) (An easement appurtenant to land will pass by a grant of the land, without mention being made of the easement or the appurtenances.). Under these circumstances, the only evidence available to the trial court suggested that WDC installed the drainpipes at least in part to benefit the mauka properties. Given that the mauka drainage included drainage from a golf course, it would not have been incorrect for the trial court to believe that the golf course diverted the natural flow of surface water on the mauka properties and that the drainage system existed in part to collect the altered flow of runoff water. Indeed, this reasoning is supported by the trial court's statement that WDC obviously created the areas where the water collects.
Relying primarily upon Carter v. County of Hawai`i, 47 Haw. 68, 384 P.2d 308 (1963), and Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970), WRC contends that it does not need a drainage easement because, as an upslope landowner, it is entitled to discharge reasonable amounts of surface runoff water along the natural course and flow of the terrain which empties onto the Wailea Elua property. Under the reasonable use rule cited by WRC, each possessor of land may interfere with the natural flow of surface water for the development of his land so long as such interference is not unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case. Rodrigues, 52 Haw. at 164-65, 472 P.2d at 516. WRC's second argument is dependent upon its first argument: because WRC is entitled to discharge reasonable amounts of surface water downslope, the Association has not shown that the pipes are strictly necessary, see supra note 8, for the enjoyment of the golf course. Therefore, according to WRC, the evidence is insufficient to support an implied easement claim. To support these two arguments [hereinafter, collectively, the reasonable use rule], WRC relies upon evidence produced at trial, discussed infra, that the upslope water was being drained through the culverts under Wailea Alanui Drive into a natural drainage way on the Wailea Elua portion of the property and was diverted by the drainpipes once it reached the Wailea Elua property in order to build buildings on the natural drainage plain of Wailea Elua. Such evidence suggests that: (1) the purpose of the pipes on the Wailea Elua property was solely to benefit Wailea Elua rather than for the benefit of draining the mauka properties; and (2) the mauka waters may have flowed towards the direction of the natural drainage way on Wailea Elua irrespective of any mauka development. As the Association points out, there are two significant problems with WRC's arguments. First, WRC is raising the reasonable use argument for the first time on appeal. Legal issues not raised in the trial court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal. See Molinar v. Schweizer, 95 Hawai`i 331, 339-40, 22 P.3d 978, 986-87 (2001); Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Products, 86 Hawai`i 214, 248-49, 948 P.2d 1055, 1089-90 (1997); Mauna Kea Power Co., Inc. v. Board of Land and Natural Resources, 76 Hawai`i 259, 262, 874 P.2d 1084 n. 2, 76 Hawai`i 259, 874 P.2d 1084, 1087 n. 2 (1994). Second, in order to buttress its legal argument, WRC is relying upon evidence presented after the summary judgment proceeding. When reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court's consideration of the record is limited to those materials that were considered by the trial court in ruling on the motion. Munoz v. Yuen, 66 Haw. 603, 605-06, 670 P.2d 825, 827 (1983). Thus, this court will not examine evidence not specifically called to the attention of the trial court. Id. at 606, 670 P.2d at 827; see also Leary v. Poole, 5 Haw.App. 596, 599, 705 P.2d 62, 65 (1985). In its reply brief, WRC relies upon Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973), for its contention that, although this court is limited [in its consideration] to the submissions of fact before it at the [summary judgment] motion, it is well-established law that an appellate court may rely upon other legal bases in its review of the summary judgment. (Emphases in original.) In other words, WRCfor the first time in its reply briefcites Fujioka for the proposition that, even if this court did not consider subsequently-admitted facts in reviewing the summary judgment ruling, this court may still review the ruling using an alternative legal theory. In Fujioka, the plaintiff was injured when a portion of the roof of a supermarket fell on her; she sued the owners of the building, who in turn filed a third-party complaint against the engineer and contractor who had designed and constructed the building, respectively. Fujioka, 55 Haw. at 8, 514 P.2d at 569. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the engineer and contractor on the ground that HRS § 657-8 absolved them from liability because their services were rendered more than ten years before the incident. Id. at 8-9, 514 P.2d at 569. Considering legal arguments raised by the owners for the first time on appeal, this court agreed that HRS § 657-8 violated the owners' right to equal protection because it treated them differently than the engineer and contractor by exposing the owners, but not the contractor and engineer, to liability. See id. at 9-12, 514 P.2d at 569-71. In deciding to exercise its discretion to consider the owners' argument despite the fact that they had not presented it to the trial court, this court looked to whether the consideration of the issue requires additional facts[;] whether the resolution of the question will affect the integrity of the findings of fact of the trial court; and whether the question is of great public import. Id. at 9, 514 P.2d at 570; Reasoning that the question of the constitutionality of the statute was a purely legal question that did not require additional facts and was of great public import, this court decided to address the owners' argument. Id. at 9-10, 514 P.2d at 570; see also Bertelmann v. Taas Assocs., 69 Haw. 95, 103, 735 P.2d 930, 935 (1987) (A judgment will not ordinarily be reversed based on a theory an appellant failed to raise at the trial level unless justice so requires. Because the existence of the Survivors' cause of action is of public importance and does not require additional facts, though, we will consider this issue.). Unlike Fujioka, full consideration of the reasonable use rule raised by WRC in this appeal will require additional facts, as illustrated by the fact that WRC itself relied on evidence adduced at trial to present its argument on appeal. Moreover, unlike Fujioka, the constitutionality of a statute is not at issue in the instant case. Furthermore, WRC does not explain why justice requires this court to address a newly-raised issue, and the question whether WRC is the holder of an implied easement in the Wailea Elua property is not of great public import. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to address WRC's argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the reasonable use rule implicated by Carter and Rodrigues is applicable to this case.
WRC contends that, even if it owns implied easements to drain surface water under Wailea Elua, the trial court erred in ruling that WRC was partly responsible for repairing and maintaining the easements. According to WRC, the trial court erroneously relied upon Henmi in its ruling. WRC is incorrect. The transcript indicates that the trial court relied on Henmi primarily for determining the existence of the easements in the first placenot for determining who was responsible for maintaining them. See supra at 104, 58 P.3d at 615 (the Hawai`i test [to determine whether an implied easement exists] seems to be really a more general test according to the intent of the parties); Henmi, 3 Haw.App. at 559, 655 P.2d at 885 (Whether an implied easement exists depends on the intent of the parties as shown by all the facts and circumstances under which the conveyance was made.). As COL No. 6 clearly indicates, the trial court's determination that WRC was responsible for sharing maintenance costs of the pipes was based upon Levy v. Kimball, 50 Haw. 497, 443 P.2d 142 (1968), and Powers v. Grenier Construction Inc., 10 Conn.App. 556, 524 A.2d 667 (1987). See supra at 105, 58 P.3d at 616. In Levy, the plaintiff fell while walking on the top of a seawall. Levy, 50 Haw. at 497-98, 443 P.2d at 143. The State of Hawai`i owned an easement over the seawall that had been obtained for the purpose of providing a path for public travel. Id. at 498, 443 P.2d at 144. The plaintiff sued the State, alleging that it had negligently maintained the wall. See id. In determining that the State had negligently maintained the wall, this court noted that [i]t is a well established rule that an owner of an easement has the right and the duty to keep it in repair. Id. Similarly, in Powers, the owner of the dominant estate, which possessed an express and implied drainage easement over the servient estate, was held liable for damages caused by failing to repair the drainage system on the servient estate. Powers, 524 A.2d at 668-69. Although Levy and Powers sound in torta circumstance in which one would expect most such cases to arise,they are consistent with the general equitable principle that the users of an easement have an obligation to help maintain the easement so as not to unreasonably burden the servient estate. According to Restatement (Third) of Property [hereinafter, Restatement ] § 4.13(1) comment b (1998): If the servient estate is being used by the servitude owner in common either with holders of other similar servitudes or with the owner of the servient estate, the owner of the servitude does not have an affirmative duty to make repairs, but does have a duty to contribute to the reasonable costs of repairs or maintenance undertaken by others. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the easement is being utilized by both the easement holder (WRC) and the servient (the Association). Accordingly, WRC has a duty to contribute the reasonable costs of repair and maintenance undertaken by the Association. See also Nixon v. Welch, 238 Iowa 34, 24 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Iowa 1946) (the owner of an easement in a drainage ditch was responsible for the cost of clearing it); Rehwalt v. American Falls Reservoir District No. 2, 97 Idaho 634, 550 P.2d 137, 139 (1976) (the owner of an easement for an irrigation canal and maintenance road had a duty to maintain and repair the easement so as not to create a burden on the servient estate). Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that WRC was partly responsible for paying for the maintenance and repair of the drainpipes. Justice Ramil's concurring opinion contends that WRC owns Easements 61, 62, and 63 by express grant. We respectfully disagree. Initially, we note that the parties did not argue before the trial court, nor do they argue on appeal, that ownership of the easements was expressly conveyed to WRC. Nevertheless, as noted supra, Easements 61, 62, and 63 were expressly made appurtenant to Wailea Alanui Drive. However, nothing in the record indicates that the easements were made an express part of the conveyance of the Golf Course to WRC. Accordingly, there is neither evidence nor argument that WRC owns the easements by virtue of an express grant.