Opinion ID: 1060680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Willfully failed to support

Text: In 1951, the General Assembly overhauled Tennessee's adoption laws and listed abandonment as a ground for termination of parental rights. 1951 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 202 (codified as Williams Tenn.Code §§ 9572.15 to 9572.52 (Supp.1952)). The Act provided that: an abandoned child shall be any child under the age of eighteen years who shall be willfully abandoned at least four consecutive months immediately preceding institution of an action or proceeding to declare the child to be [an] abandoned child. Id. § 2 (codified as Williams Tenn.Code § 9572.16(5) (Supp.1952)). The definition was amended in subsequent years. In 1961, the General Assembly enacted the following provision: For the purpose of this chapter an abandoned child shall be: 1. A child whose parents have willfully failed to visit or have willfully failed to support or make payments toward his support for four consecutive months immediately preceding institution of action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child; ... 1961 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 227, § 1 (codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-102(5) (Supp.1962)). In 1978, the statutory definition was changed to provide as follows: Abandoned child means a child whose parents have wilfully failed to visit or have wilfully failed to support or make reasonable payments toward his support for four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding institution of an action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child. For purposes of this chapter, a father who has wilfully failed to visit or wilfully failed to support or make reasonable payments toward the support of the child's mother during the four (4) months immediately preceding the birth of the child shall be deemed to have wilfully failed to visit or wilfully failed to support or make reasonable payments toward the support of said child. In no instance, however, shall a final order terminating the parental rights of a parent pursuant to this section be entered until at least thirty (30) days have elapsed since the date of the birth of the child. [4] 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 704, § 1 (codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (1984)). [5] These definitions applied only to proceedings to terminate parental rights filed in circuit or chancery courts. In 1970, the General Assembly enacted statutory definitions of abandonment for failure to support that were to be used in proceedings to terminate parental rights filed in juvenile court. These definitions tracked the language found in Title 36 of the Code. See 1970 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 600, § 2 (codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-202(7) (Supp.1970)); 1978 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 704, § 3 (codified as Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-102(1)(A) (1984)); Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(1) (Supp.1994). The courts of this state also articulated a standard that was used to determine abandonment in adoption cases. In 1959, the Court of Appeals held that trial courts were not bound by the statutory definition of abandonment when making such a determination in an adoption proceeding. The Court held that `[a]bandonment imports any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child....' Ex parte Wolfenden, 49 Tenn.App. 1, 5, 349 S.W.2d 713, 714 (1959) (quoting 1 Am.Jur. Adoption of Children § 42). This Court adopted an identical standard in In re Adoption of Bowling, 631 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Tenn.1982). To determine whether the parent's conduct had evinced a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and to relinquish all parental claims to the child, the courts developed several factors: (1) the parent's ability to support the child; (2) the amount of support provided; (3) the extent and nature of the contact between the parent and the child; (4) the frequency of gifts; (5) whether the parent voluntarily relinquished custody of the child; (6) the length of time the child has been separated from the parent; and (7) the home environment and conduct of the parent prior to removal. See O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). It was against this background that the legislature amended the adoption code in 1995. See 1995 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 532 (codified as Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-1-101 to 36-1-206 (1996 & Supp.1998)). Since the petition to terminate parental rights in this case was filed on January 25, 1996, this case is governed by the new adoption law enacted in 1995 and effective January 1, 1996. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-103(b) (Adoptions and terminations of parental rights pending on January 1, 1996, and surrenders and consents executed prior to January 1, 1996, shall be governed by prior existing law.). Section 36-1-113 provides in relevant part: (g) Termination of parental or guardianship rights may be based upon any of the following grounds: (1) Abandonment by the parent or guardian, as defined in § 36-1-102, has occurred; Id. § 36-1-113(g)(1). Also, section 36-1-102(1)(A) provides: Abandonment means, for purposes of terminating the parental or guardian rights of parent(s) or guardian(s) of a child to that child in order to make that child available for adoption, that: (i) For a period of four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of a proceeding or pleading to terminate the parental rights of the parent(s) or guardian(s) of the child who is the subject of the petition for termination of parental rights or adoption, that the parent(s) or guardian(s) either have willfully failed to visit or have willfully failed to support or make reasonable payments toward the support of the child; .... (B) For purposes of this subdivision (1), token support means that the support, under the circumstances of the individual case, is insignificant given the parent's means; (C) For purposes of this subdivision (1), token visitation means that the visitation, under the circumstances of the individual case, constitutes nothing more than perfunctory visitation or visitation of such an infrequent nature or of such short duration as to merely establish minimal or insubstantial contact with the child; (D) For purposes of this subdivision (1), willfully failed to support or willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support mean that, for a period of four (4) consecutive months, no monetary support was paid or that the amount of support paid is token support; [6] (E) For purposes of subdivision (1), Willfully failed to visit means the willful failure, for a period of four (4) consecutive months, to visit or engage in more than token visitation; (F) Abandonment may not be repented of by resuming visitation or support subsequent to the filing of any petition seeking to terminate parental or guardianship rights or seeking the adoption of a child; and (G) Abandonment does not have any other definition except that which is set forth herein, it being the intent of the general assembly to establish the only grounds for abandonment by statutory definition. Specifically, it shall not be required that a parent be shown to have evinced a settled purpose to forego all parental rights and responsibilities in order for a determination of abandonment to be made. Decisions of any court to the contrary are hereby legislatively overruled; Id. § 36-1-102(1)(A) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals determined that this case was entirely controlled by the statute, that the proof was clear and convincing regarding Mr. Swanson's non-support, and that it was therefore bound with regard to the result reached. [7] Mr. Swanson contends that the statutory definition of willfully failed to support and willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support is unconstitutional because the definition contains no element of intent with regard to failure to support. He argues that the definition creates a conclusive presumption that a failure to provide monetary support for four months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate renders a parent unfit. He further argues that this presumption fails to comport with a parent's fundamental constitutional right to the care and custody of his or her children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972); Bond v. McKenzie (In re Adoption of Female Child), 896 S.W.2d 546 (Tenn.1995). Conversely, the Baptist Children's Home asserts that the Court of Appeals correctly construed the statutory definition of abandonment and correctly found that Mr. Swanson abandoned Brittany within the meaning of the statute. It also asserts that the statutory definitions of willfully failed to support and willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support do not violate Mr. Swanson's fundamental right to parent his child. Since the constitutionality of a state statute has been questioned, the Attorney General was requested file a brief and has done so. See Tenn. R.App. P. 32. The Attorney General asserts that the element of willfulness should be read into the definition of willfully failed to support. He contends that reading the element into the statutory definition avoids constitutional problems. [8] The first issue we must address is whether it is appropriate to read an element of intent into the statutory definition of willfully failed to support. It is abundantly clear from the language used by the General Assembly that it intended to limit the discretion of trial judges when making a determination as to whether abandonment has occurred. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(G) (1996 & Supp.1998) (`Abandonment' does not have any other definition except that which is set forth herein, it being the intent of the general assembly to establish the only grounds for abandonment by statutory definition. Specifically, it shall not be required that a parent be shown to have evinced a settled purpose to forego all parental rights and responsibilities in order for a determination of abandonment to be made. Decisions of any court to the contrary are hereby legislatively overruled.). Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, Mr. Swanson and the Attorney General would have us read the word willfully into the definition of willfully failed to support and willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support. They argue that the word willfully should be included in order to effectuate the intent of the legislature and in order to preserve the constitutionality of the statute. We recognize that there are occasions in which it is appropriate to reject a literal reading of a statute when it would result in the statute being declared unconstitutional. State v. Hudson, 562 S.W.2d 416, 418-19 (Tenn.1978); Kirk v. State, 126 Tenn. 7, 13, 150 S.W. 83, 85 (Tenn.1911). Moreover, courts may supply words when reasonably called for. Metropolitan Gov't v. Poe, 215 Tenn. 53, 74, 383 S.W.2d 265, 274 (1964). Nevertheless, it is the prerogative of the legislature, and not the courts, to amend statutes. Manahan v. State, 188 Tenn. 394, 397, 219 S.W.2d 900, 901 (1949). In this case, we find that it is inappropriate for this Court to supply the element of intent in the definition of willfully failed to support and willfully failed to make reasonable payments toward such child's support. It appears to us that the definition was carefully crafted by the legislature against a backdrop of both judicial interpretation and legislative enactment. Throughout its forty-four-year history, the definition of abandonment as it pertained to failure to support always contained an element of intent or purposefulness. We cannot conclude that the legislature excluded the willfulness aspect of failure to support inadvertently or mistakenly, particularly in light of the legislature's pronouncement that the only definition of abandonment which should be applied is that which is included in the statute. [9] It is evident that the legislature consciously and deliberately excluded the element of intent. We therefore decline to read the statute as suggested by Mr. Swanson and the Attorney General, but instead we will construe its constitutionality as drafted and enacted by the General Assembly.