Opinion ID: 1665997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the statute of limitations for plaintiff's claim against defendant huron was tolled under mcl 600.5856(d).

Text: This Court ordered supplemental briefing on whether, if a defendant professional corporation is not an entity to whom notice is required to be provided under MCL 600.2912b, the applicable statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805(6), was nonetheless subject to statutory tolling provided in former MCL 600.5856(d). [22] If the statute of limitations was not tolled under former subsection (d) of the tolling statute, MCL 600.5856, then plaintiff's claim against defendant Huron was filed after the period of limitations expired and defendant Huron would be entitled to dismissal with prejudice. I am persuaded that the statute of limitations for plaintiffs claim against Huron was tolled under former subsection (d). The tolling statute applicable here provided: [23] The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled: (a) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint are served on the defendant. (b) At the time jurisdiction over the defendant is otherwise acquired. (c) At the time the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute is not tolled longer than 90 days after the copy of the summons and complaint is received by the officer. (d) If, during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose, for not longer than a number of days equal to the number of days in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given in compliance with section 2912b. [Emphasis added.] Plaintiff argues that because subsection (d) uses the indefinite article a, not the definite article the, it is not claim specific and, therefore, tolls all claims in the complaint. Defendant argues that tolling only applies for a claim to which  the applicable notice period under section 2912b applies. I believe that the dispositive question is  what is being tolled? The first sentence of the tolling statute states that [t]he statutes of limitations or repose are tolled. The plural form suggests that more than one statute of limitations can be tolled by each subsection, including subsection (d). By their nature, each of the other tolling provisions,  5856(a) through (c), apply to all claims in a complaint, not just individual claims. Thus, the plural form in the prefatory clause is consistent with those provisions because they could involve multiple statutes of limitations. Based on the prefatory provision, there is a strong textual argument that under subsection (d), [t]he statutes of limitations... are tolled for all claims in a complaint when during the applicable notice period under section 2912b, a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose. Thus, for example, in a complaint alleging a malpractice claim and a negligence claim, if the requirements of subsection (d) are met, the statutes of limitations ... are tolled for both claims. I believe that this is the superior textual argument. Although the prefatory clause does not specify which statutes of limitations are tolled, there is no textual basis for restricting tolling to a single claim. [24] Subsection (d) only requires a claim to be barred during the notice period and notice to be given in compliance with the NOI statute; the prefatory clause provides that multiple statutes are tolled as a result. [25] I note that the current tolling provision is more precise on this issue. MCL 600.5856(c) provides: The statutes of limitations or repose are tolled in any of the following circumstances:    (c) At the time notice is given in compliance with the applicable notice period under section 2912b, if during that period a claim would be barred by the statute of limitations or repose; but in this case, the statute is tolled not longer than the number of days equal to the number of days remaining in the applicable notice period after the date notice is given. [Emphasis added.] As indicated by the highlighted text, the significant distinction between current subsection (c) and former subsection (d) is that the current provision restates what is tolled (the statute), which specifies that tolling is limited to only one statute while the former provision remained unlimited by the prefatory clause (The statutes). Thus, current subsection (c) is expressly claim specific and only tolls  the statute for the previously referenced claim that would be barred. [26] Here, plaintiff's NOI was sufficient as to co-defendant Murry. [27] Subsection (d) applied to plaintiff's claim against Murry because the period of limitations would have expired during the notice period if the statute of limitations was not tolled. Thus, notice [was] given in compliance with section 2912b for a claim that would [have been] barred by the statute of limitations, so [t]he statutes of limitations... [were] tolled. Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that defendant Huron was not entitled to dismissal.