Opinion ID: 22771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Failure to Apply the Enhancement for an Offense Committed while on Release

Text: 42 The government, in a cross-appeal, asserts that the district court should have adjusted Dadi's offense level under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3147, which provides for a sentencing enhancement for offenses committed while on release on another charge. The Sentencing Guidelines implement this statutory provision through § 2J1.7. Under that section: 43 If an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, add 3 levels to the offense level for the offense committed while on release as if this section were a specific offense characteristic contained in the offense guideline for the offense committed while on release. 44 That Dadi committed this offense while on release on another federal charge is not controverted. 45 First, we address Dadi's argument that the cross-appeal should be dismissed because it was not approved by an appropriate authority. Dadi argues that application of this enhancement is impermissible because the government failed to show that it secured personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General or a Deputy Solicitor General designated by the Solicitor General for this purpose. Therefore, he argues that we must dismiss the cross-appeal. See United States v. Thibodeaux, 211 F.3d 910 (5th Cir. 2000) (dismissing the government's appeal because the government had failed to brief or include in the record proof that it had received authority to appeal). In Thibodeaux, we held that the government's appeal of a sentence was subject to dismissal, absent evidence that it ever received approval to pursue the appeal. 211 F.3d at 912. Here, the government has provided the required proof as an attachment to its reply brief. Gov. Reply Br. App. B. The fact that the government has now demonstrated the requisite permission cures this defect and we will not dismiss the cross-appeal on these grounds. 46 The cross-appeal does fail, however, for lack of adequate notice to Dadi that he would be subject to this enhancement. The government concedes that this enhancement can only be imposed after sufficient notice has been given to the defendant by either the government or the court. Notice must be given at the time of the defendant's release from custody in order to be deemed sufficient. The government contends that Dadi was given notice on August 26, 1996, when he was released from custody to await the designation of a facility in which to serve his sentence on another criminal charge. But the government failed to offer any evidence of this. The government also argues that the formal notice it issued on June 23, 1999 was sufficient, because Dadi had the opportunity to object to the enhancement. 47 But such notice is clearly insufficient. This circuit held in United States v. Onick that failure by the releasing judge to give the defendant notice of the § 3147 enhancement bars the sentencing judge from applying it later. 889 F.2d 1425, 1433-34 (5th Cir. 1989). The government did not file its notice of intent to enhance Dadi's sentence until more than a month after the PSR was initially disclosed to counsel, and 19 days after the deadline for filing objections had passed. There is no support in the record for the belief that Dadi was advised about the possible enhancement when he was sentenced on the previous charge. 48 The government relies on an Eleventh Circuit case to assert that notice was adequate. In United States v. Bozza, 132 F.3d 659, 661 (11th Cir. 1998), the court concluded that notice of the § 2J1.7 enhancement did not have to be given prior to the guilty plea. But in that case, as Dadi correctly points out, the court noted a conflict with this circuit, because we had held that it was error not to inform the defendant of the enhancement prior to his guilty plea. See id.; United States v. Pierce, 5 F.3d 791, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1993). 9 More important, the defendant in Bozza had received notice upon release for the prior conviction. See id. The government can point to nothing in the record to show that Dadi received such notice upon his release. Therefore, the district court's decision not to apply the enhancement under § 3147 will stand. 10