Opinion ID: 2518577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Government Code Section 6254, Subdivision (c).

Text: As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 676, 165 P.3d at p. 475), in resisting disclosure, the Commission also relies on Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), which provides that the CPRA does not require disclosure of [p]ersonnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. (Gov.Code, § 6254, subd. (c).) The majority rejects this argument, finding that the privacy and safety interests of peace officers in general do not outweigh the public's interest in the disclosure of the information sought. (Maj: opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 679, 165 P.3d at p. 477.) In light of my conclusion that the requested information is encompassed within Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8, subdivision (a), I need not decide whether Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), also applies. I do, however, have several comments about the majority's analysis. In my view, the majority's analysis of the public interest in disclosure is inconsistent with the view of that interest the Legislature and the voters have expressed. Like its analysis of Penal Code section 832.8, the majority's analysis of Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), depends heavily on the majority's view that [t]he public's interest in the qualifications and conduct of peace officers is substantial. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 676, 165 P.3d at p. 475.) According to the majority, the public has a legitimate interest in discovering why peace officers leave a department and whether a department is hiring officers who have been dismissed from other departments, because this information will facilitate identification of specific instances of potentially inappropriate employment practices. ( Ibid. ) In my view, the Legislature has already spoken on this subject, by expressly providing in sections 832.7 and 832.8, subdivisions (d) and (e), that an officer's personnel file is not an appropriate source of information on these subjects. And, the voters have ratified the Legislature's policy decision by passing a constitutional provision that expressly preserves statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace officer. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 3, subd. (b)(3).) The majority's analysis improperly ignores these expressions of policy by the Legislature and the voters. I also question several other aspects of the majority's analysis. In light of its holding that sections 832.7 and 832.8 do not protect an officer's name, employing department, and dates of employment, the majority concludes that these statutes do not support the argument that peace officers have a recognized privacy interest in that information. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 678, 165 P.3d at p. 476. Because, as earlier explained, I disagree with the majority's construction of sections 832.7 and 832.8, I disagree with the majority's conclusion. I also question the majority's view that disclosure of all officers' names is necessary to serve the public's interest in tracing officers' movements and identifying general trends and specific instances of potentially inappropriate employment practices. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 677, fn. 10, 165 P.3d at p. 475, fn. 10.) To serve this asserted interest, it is unnecessary to disclose the identity of all officers in the Commission's records, most of whom no doubt have rarely or never transferred from one department to another. Instead, this asserted interest can be fully satisfied by using a two-step process in which the requested information is first disclosed with nonidentifying tracking designations substituted for the officers' names, followed by disclosure of the names of the relatively few officers whose movements may merit further inquiry. This approach would be entirely consistent with the CPRA, which requires deletion of any exempt material that is reasonably segregable from nonexempt material. (Gov.Code, § 6253, subd. (a).) I next question the majority's reliance on the fact that officers' names may be otherwise accessible to the public in various ways. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 678, 165 P.3d at p. 476.) In construing exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552,(b)(6)), which is similar to Government Code section 6254, subdivision (c), in that it applies to personnel files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, the high, court stated: The privacy interest protected by Exemption 6 `encompass[es] the individual's control of information concerning his or her person.' [Citation.] An individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because that information may be available to the public in some form. ( U.S. Dept. of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority (1994) 510 U.S. 487, 500, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325.) The majority's analysis gives no consideration to this aspect of an officer's privacy interest. Finally, I am also not convinced of the majority's view that release of the requested information poses no threat to the safety of officers and their families. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 678-680, 165 P.3d at pp. 476-478.) Notably, in 1990, the Legislature amended subdivision (a) of section 832.8 by adding home addresses to the list of examples of confidential [p]ersonal data. (Stats.1990, ch. 264, § 1, p. 1535.) According to the amendment's legislative history, one of the Legislature's purposes in adding home addresses to the list was to protect officers and their families. (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill 1985 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended May, 16, 1990, p. 2.) Given that publicly available databases on the Internet make it easy to link a name to an address, the release of an officer's name would not seem to pose much, if any, less of a safety risk than would disclosing an officer's home address. (See Frank r. City of Akron (6th Cir.2002) 290 F.3d 813, 819 [Most individuals' addresses ... are readily available on the Internet].) Contrary to the majority's suggestion, in light of the accessibility of information through the Internet, it would be entirely feasible for someone hostile toward the police to use the list of names to locate peace officers' addresses in order to harass them or their families. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 679, 165 P.3d at p. 477.) Moreover, in light of the Legislature's acknowledgment of the dangers faced by officers and their families, I do not agree with the majority ( id. 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 678, 165 P.3d at p. 476) that we can simply dismiss this threat as being purely speculative. [9] (See King County v. Sheehan, supra, 57 P.3d at p. 315 [it is naive ... to believe that police officers who are identified on anti-police web sites ... by name and home address ... could not thereby be placed in danger or subjected to harassment].) Ultimately, the majority concedes that in light of the privacy and safety interests of some officers, the requested records may contain some information that should be exempted from disclosure. (Maj. opn., ante, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 679-680, 165 P.3d at p. 477.) The majority assigns to the Commission the responsibility for making the showing necessary to establish that information concerning particular officers should not be disclosed. ( Id. 64 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 679-680, 165 P.3d at p. 477.) In my view, the Commission, which is not the officers' employing department but is merely an agency that collects information from numerous employing departments, is poorly suited to identify and assert the privacy and safety interests of the individual officers identified in its records.