Opinion ID: 749601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty as Principal

Text: 14 Under Washington law, one who hires an independent contractor, but contractually retains some control over the performance of that contractor's work or the method used, may assume a duty to insure the safety of that contractor's employees. Hennig, 802 P.2d at 791-92; Kelley, 582 P.2d at 505. The principal must have the right to be involved in the performance of the work, not merely the right to oversee compliance with the contract between it and the independent contractor. Hennig, 802 P.2d at 792. 15 In the contract between DeRuwe and the government, the government retained the ability to stop the contractor's work if the government believed that the safety of the public or government personnel was threatened: 16 (a) The Contractor shall provide and maintain work environments and procedures which will (1) safeguard the public and government personnel, property, materials, supplies, and equipment exposed to Contractor operations and activities.... 17 (d) Whenever the Contracting Officer becomes aware of any noncompliance with these requirements or any condition which poses a serious or imminent danger to the health or safety of the public or Government personnel, the Contracting Officer shall notify the Contractor orally, with written confirmation, and request immediate initiation of corrective action.... If the Contractor fails or refuses to promptly take corrective action, the Contracting Officer may issue an order stopping all or part of the work. 18 As the district court noted, this contractual provision does not grant the government any control over, or any responsibility for, the employees of DeRuwe. By contrast, where a contractual assumption of duty to provide a safe workplace has been found under Washington law, the contact unambiguously provided that the principal retained control over, and had responsibility for, the way in which work was performed by the employees of the independent contractor. See Kelley, 582 P.2d at 506 (holding that principal assumed a nondelegable duty of care to employees of its independent contractor where contract stated that principal had responsibility for initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions and programs). 19 General contract provisions which give the principal the right to insure compliance with the contract, including the right to insure that the independent contractor is fulfilling its contractual obligation to abide by state and federal safety regulations, do not give the principal the level of control that is needed to impose a duty of care on the principal. See Hennig, 802 P.2d at 792; see also Bozung v. Condominium Builders, Inc., 711 P.2d 1090, 1093 (Wash.Ct.App.1985) (General contractual rights as the right to order the work stopped ... do not mean that the [principal] controls the method of the subcontractor's work.); Campbell v. United States, 493 F.2d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir.1974) (holding that under Washington law, the government had no duty as to the employees of its independent contractor where government personnel were on-site and took part in safety meetings but were there only to insure that safety provisions of the contract were fulfilled and took no part in directing Plaintiff's job performance). 20 Nor is this the case, as Weimer asserts, in which the contract is ambiguous as to which party controlled the day-to-day operations of the independent contractor. In Kennedy v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 816 P.2d 75, 84-85 (Wash.Ct.App.1991), upon which Weimer relies, the contract had stated both that the independent contractor was to have complete control over the work done and that the independent contractor's supervision of its employees would be subject always to direction and supervision of the principal. Id. at 84. The contract further stated that the independent contractor would have to abide by the policies, rules and procedures that the principal may from time to time impose. Id. 21 The contract between DeRuwe and the government, however, contains no such ambiguities. Safety responsibilities vis-a-vis the employees were assigned to DeRuwe. DeRuwe was required to mandate that certain protective clothing and footwear be worn, comply with OSHA, develop a safety plan, and conduct safety training and meetings. As to these obligations, the government retained no right to intervene, beyond its capacity to insure compliance with the contract.
22 Weimer further contends that the text of the contract is not controlling if the government was actively involved in supervising the operations at the habitat. The courts in Washington look beyond the mere terms of the contract to determine if a principal has retained some control of the workplace. See Phillips v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 875 P.2d 1228, 1235 (Wash.Ct.App.1994) (Whether a right to control has been retained depends on the parties' contract, the parties' conduct, and other relevant factors. ). 23 Weimer's evidence of actual control includes the following: (i) The contracting officer, Ackerman, a wildlife biologist, had, in the past, instructed one of the workers to put on his hard hat; (ii) comments from the contracting officer at deposition implying that he believed that his duty when overseeing the operations at Skookum Habitat included looking out for the safety of the employees; 1 and, (iii) the government's request to DeRuwe to drill a hole into each dust cap that didn't already have one. (However, we have already ruled that this evidence should not be considered.) 24 To find duty, the courts in Washington require that plaintiffs show evidence that the principal controlled the performance or method of the work, not merely that the principal insured compliance with the contract. For example, in Phillips, liability of the principal was found where the principal directed that the work of the independent contractor's employees be performed with chain saws; conducted meetings each morning to address safety issues; and routinely gave directions to the employees related to safety. 875 P.2d at 1236. In Hennig, the Washington Supreme Court noted that something more than retaining the right to insure compliance with the contract was needed (even if compliance is directed to safety-related contractual terms), noting that because the defendant did not actively supervise [the independent contractor's] employees, liability would not attach. 802 P.2d at 792. And in Bozung, the Washington appellate court upheld summary judgment in the principal's favor because, although the principal had the right to order the work stopped or to control the order of the work or the right to inspect the progress of the work, such general contractual rights do not mean that the principal controls the method of the subcontractor's work. 711 P.2d at 1093 (emphasis added). 25 By contrast, Ackerman stated that his primary function was to insure compliance with the contract, that he gives DeRuwe leeway in the supervision of his own employees, that DeRuwe is the person responsible for training the employees to operate the system in a safe manner, that he never attends safety meetings, and that neither he nor any other government employee supervise the day-to-day activities of DeRuwe or his employees. 26 The evidence produced by Weimer suggests no more than that the government supervised the operation to the extent necessary to determine that DeRuwe was in compliance with the contract; there is no evidence to raise a genuine question regarding whether the government was actively involved in the supervision of DeRuwe's employees in terms of directing the performance or method of their work.