Opinion ID: 77040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Must be able to lift 50 lbs

Text: Duties: 88 transport product from dept to freezers misc. 89 Nothing in this description even mentions working on a conveyor belt, let alone characterizes it as an essential function of the product transporter job. 90 In addition, D'Angelo introduced into the summary judgment record a document entitled, Job Safety Analysis for the product transporter position, which D'Angelo and her supervisor signed and dated May 9, 2001. The document lists various functions of the transporter job, the safety hazards they pose, and methods of avoiding these hazards. The job functions listed are these: Working in production areas Working in wet slippery conditions Work in freezers Operate powered stacker Working around running equipment Remove empty pallets from line Shrink wrap full pallets Transport pallets to ACS Working in warehouse Work near ammonia & nitrogen refrigerant Work around hot oil, thermal fluid 91 Again, this document in no way indicates that working on a conveyor belt is an essential function of the product transporter job. No other written job description was ever offered by the employer. Thus, application of the first factor in our analysis — the employer's own assessment — suggests the existence of a genuine issue of material fact about whether conveyor belt work was an essential function of the product transporter job. 92 The next factor — the amount of time D'Angelo spent working on a conveyor belt during her tenure as a product transporter — further raises a genuine issue of material fact. D'Angelo's description of her experience working as a product transporter indicates that working on a conveyor belt was at most an occasional function of her job. Regarding her duties as a product transporter in the shrimp division, D'Angelo stated: 93 According to the [product transporter] job description, you transport product using a pallet jack. And so what I did a lot was stand near a chute where the shrimp comes out when the machine gets messed up, and the shrimp is coming out backwards and it falls into a box. And when the box is filled up, I move another box under there and fill that one up. 94 And then those boxes would get stacked on a pallet by me, and I would either pull them away with a jack or a forklift driver would get in there and pull them away. 95 D'Angelo acknowledged that, in addition to this primary function, she sometimes performed other tasks including transporting boxes of shrimp on her shoulders; working as a stacker; working as a packer; and making boxes. 96 When D'Angelo transferred to Singleton's fish division, she continued to work as a product transporter. After her transfer, her new supervisor asked her, What do you do over there? What can you do? to which she replied, Well, I'm a product transporter. I can do anything except work over the spreader belt because when I stand there staring at it for any period of time, I start getting sick and dizzy. Her supervisor said, Okay, and asked her, Can you go up in the triangle? Are you afraid of heights? to which D'Angelo replied, No, I've got no problem with that. 97 D'Angelo testified that her responsibilities as a transporter in the fish division differed from those of her transporter position in the shrimp division. She said: [I]t wasn't the same as the shrimp department where the machines would back up and dump out shrimp and need somebody monitoring that constantly. So there wasn't the need for the same type of work. The machines were functioning better in the fish department. D'Angelo described her typical responsibilities in the fish department in these terms: [M]y title was product transporter. Sometimes I stacked. Sometimes I pulled the pallets away with a jack. Sometimes I packed. Sometimes I went up in the triangle . . . when the fish was coming down, just kind of [to] make sure it doesn't clog up the machine. On occasion, D'Angelo also weighed product, unloaded boxes of fish, and dumped fish into a grinder. 98 Indeed, the record before us reveals only one time during the year and a half D'Angelo worked as a product transporter that she was assigned to work on a conveyor belt. D'Angelo was promoted to the transporter position in March 2000, and was apparently not asked to work on a conveyor belt until shortly before she was fired some eighteen months later in September 2001, when a new supervisor took over in the fish division. D'Angelo's deposition testimony mentions no other instance in which she was asked to work on a belt, and ConAgra has offered no evidence to the contrary. In the absence of any indication that D'Angelo worked on a conveyor belt more than once during her product transporter tenure, the second factor in our analysis — the amount of time D'Angelo spent performing that function — also arguably weighs against finding it to be essential as a matter of law. 99 The third factor in our analysis — the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the disputed function — cuts both ways. ConAgra says that the consequences of exempting D'Angelo from conveyor belt work would be serious, since maintaining the flexibility to move employees around the factory floor to perform different functions tasks is vital to the efficient operation of the plant. Both Cordy and Yates testified that Singleton employees are regularly moved around in this fashion. While the employer's view is entitled to substantial weight in the calculus, on this record we are not persuaded that this factor conclusively tips the balance in favor of final summary judgment. 100 For one thing, all Singleton employees are qualified to work on a conveyor belt. It is not a specialized function, and indeed, D'Angelo testified that all employees are required to start at the entry-level position of spreader, working over the spreader belt separating product. Since employees are eligible to work in any job at or below the level of their primary position, all can work on a conveyor belt. Thus, virtually any employee in the plant apparently could fill in on the belt as needed, minimizing any consequences of D'Angelo's inability to work on the belt. 101 In addition, while D'Angelo's testimony confirms that she performed a variety of different tasks with regularity as product transporter, working on a conveyor belt was not one of them. She held the product transporter position from March 2000 until September 2001 without ever being asked to work on the conveyor belt, suggesting that her difficulty working on a conveyor belt may have been of little, if any, consequence to her employer. 102 The remaining factors in our essential-function analysis are inapplicable here. The collective bargaining agreement says nothing about the functions of the product transporter position, and the record contains no evidence regarding the work experience of either past product transporters (other than D'Angelo) or incumbents in similar jobs. Moreover, none of the circumstances we have previously identified as bases on which a job function may be deemed essential — circumstances the district court did not acknowledge — is found here. The federal regulations implementing the ADA establish — and our case law affirms — that [a] job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons, including but not limited to the following: (1) the reason the position exists is to perform that function; (2) there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; or (3) the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2); see also, e.g., Holbrook, 112 F.3d at 1526. 103 As to the first possibility, it is undisputed that the position of product transporter does not exist to perform the function of working on a conveyor belt. The job description and the testimony of Cordy, Yates, and D'Angelo suggest that the primary function of the product transporter position is to move product around the plant using a jack. On this record, working on the conveyor belt at least arguably appears to be no more than a secondary responsibility. 104 As to the second possibility, the record reveals no shortage of employees among whom conveyor belt work could be distributed. According to Cordy's testimony, approximately 300 people work in the Singleton plant, including 19 to 20 on the night shift in the fish division — the shift D'Angelo worked at the time she was fired. All Singleton employees are required to start in the spreader position, and thus all of these individuals are qualified to work on the conveyor belt. As to the third possibility, working on the conveyor belt is not a specialized function, but rather entry-level work requiring no particular expertise. As D'Angelo testified, all Singleton employees start on the spreader belt and may bid on other jobs only after acquiring some seniority at the plant. 105 Thus, applying the factors we have previously identified does not point decisively to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, working on the conveyor belt is an essential function of the product transporter position. While this may truly be an essential function — and the employer's judgment on the matter is entitled to substantial weight — on this record we see a genuine issue of material fact, and accordingly reverse the district court's grant of final summary judgment for ConAgra on this question. 6 2. 106 In disposing of D'Angelo's claim that she was regarded as disabled, the district court held also that an individual like D'Angelo, who does not actually suffer from a disabling impairment, but rather is disabled only in the regarded as sense, is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Thus, the district court reasoned, because D'Angelo could not perform her job as a transporter at Singleton without an accommodation — namely, an exemption from working on the spreader and box-former belts — she had no claim under the ADA. 107 Whether the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement applies to the regarded-as category of disabled individuals is an issue of first impression in this Circuit and a question on which our sister Circuits are split. The district court based its holding that it does not on the decisions of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See Kaplan v. N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1233 (9th Cir.2003); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir.1999); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir.1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir.1998). The Third Circuit has parted ways with these courts, holding that under the plain language of the ADA, employers are obliged to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals falling within any of the ADA's definitions of disabled, including those regarded as being disabled. Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir.2004). The First Circuit has also addressed the issue but only indirectly, assuming without expressly holding that the ADA requires reasonable accommodations for employees regarded as disabled. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 32-34 (1st Cir.1996). 108 Because a review of the plain language of the ADA yields no statutory basis for distinguishing among individuals who are disabled in the actual-impairment sense and those who are disabled only in the regarded-as sense, we join the Third Circuit in holding that regarded-as disabled individuals also are entitled to reasonable accommodations under the ADA. 109 In interpreting a statute, it is by now axiomatic that our first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997); see also, e.g., Country Best v. Christopher Ranch, LLC, 361 F.3d 629, 632 (11th Cir.2004). We therefore turn to the text. 110 Again, the ADA bars employment discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of such disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A qualified individual with a disability means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. Id. § 12111(8). Accordingly, reading the prohibition and the definition together, the ADA bars discrimination against an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position. . . . 111 A disability, in turn, is defined by the statute as either a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual, or a record of such an impairment, or  being regarded as having such an impairment.  Id. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (emphasis added). Inserting this definition into the statute's prohibition, the ADA can only be read as barring discrimination against an individual with a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position, and as barring discrimination against an individual with a record of such an impairment who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position, and, finally, as barring discrimination against an individual regarded as having such an impairment who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position. In other words, the statute's prohibition on discrimination applies equally to all statutorily defined disabilities. 112 Moreover, discrimination includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. Id. § 12112(b). The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability. Accordingly, the statute plainly prohibits not making reasonable accommodations for any qualified individual with a disability, including one who is disabled in the regarded-as sense no less than one who is disabled in the actual-impairment or the record-of-such-an-impairment sense. 113 The text of this statute simply offers no basis for differentiating among the three types of disabilities in determining which are entitled to a reasonable accommodation and which are not. Accord Williams, 380 F.3d at 774 ([A]s all would agree, the statutory text of the ADA does not in any way distinguish between actually disabled and `regarded as' individuals in requiring accommodation. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Cf. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 398, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 152 L.Ed.2d 589 (2002) (holding that the [ADA]'s silence about the exempting effect of neutral rules favored finding no exemption from reasonable accommodation requirement even when accommodations interfered with employer's neutral seniority system). Thus, the ADA's plain language — which treats an individual who is disabled in the actual-impairment sense identically to an individual who is disabled in the regarded-as sense — compels us to conclude that the very terms of the statute require employers to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals it regards as disabled. 114 It bears noting that this straightforward reading of the ADA is altogether consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of a nearly identical provision of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987). In Arline, the Court considered the claim of a school teacher afflicted with tuberculosis who argued that she had been fired because her employer regarded her as handicapped, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act's prohibition on excluding otherwise-qualified handicapped individuals from participation in federally funded state programs. The Act's definition of handicapped individual, then codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B), included any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment. 115 Finding the teacher to be a handicapped individual within the Act's regarded as definition, the Court remanded for the district court to determine whether the school board could have reasonably accommodated her, since [e]mployers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288-89 & n. 19, 107 S.Ct. 1123. 116 The Court explained the rationale for the regarded-as definition in these terms: 117 By amending the definition of handicapped individual to include not only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. . . . The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound judgments: the definition of handicapped individual is broad, but only those individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief. 118 Id. at 284-85, 107 S.Ct. 1123. Excluding individuals regarded as disabled from the coverage of the Rehabilitation Act, the Court reasoned, would leave them vulnerable to discrimination on the basis of mythology — precisely the type of injury Congress sought to prevent. Id. at 285, 107 S.Ct. 1123. 119 We agree with the Third Circuit that in light of Arline and the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998), the conclusion seems inescapable that `regarded as' employees under the ADA are entitled to reasonable accommodation in the same way as are those who are actually disabled. Williams, 380 F.3d at 775 In Bragdon, the Court explained: 120 The ADA's definition of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of handicapped individual included in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. . . . Congress' repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations. In this case, Congress did more than suggest this construction; it adopted a specific statutory provision in the ADA directing as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq. ) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). The directive requires us to construe the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act. 121 Id. at 631-32, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (citations omitted). 122 Moreover, the ADA's legislative history expressly states that [t]he ADA incorporates many of the standards of discrimination set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations unless it would result in an undue hardship on the operation of the business. S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 2 (1989); see also id. at 31 (The duty to make reasonable accommodations applies to all employment decisions, not simply hiring and promotion decisions. This duty has been included as a form of non-discrimination on the basis of disability for almost fifteen years under section 501 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and under the nondiscrimination section of the regulations implementing section 503 of that Act.). 123 Since the Rehabilitation Act required employers to accommodate employees who were disabled in the regarded-as sense, we can find no principled basis for concluding that the more expansive ADA does not. At all events, the plain language of the ADA yields this conclusion. 124 The Circuits reaching the opposite conclusion have reasoned that requiring employers to accommodate individuals they merely regard as disabled would produce anomalous results that Congress could not have intended. As the Eighth Circuit put it, providing accommodations to impaired individuals who are regarded as disabled would create a disparity in treatment among impaired but non-disabled employees, denying most the right to reasonable accommodations but granting to others, because of their employers' misperceptions, a right to reasonable accommodations no more limited than those afforded actually disabled employees. Weber, 186 F.3d at 917; see also Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. 125 This rationale, we think, ignores the vital principle that [c]ourts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of improvement. Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. IRS, 92 F.3d 1539, 1552 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Badaracco v. C.I.R., 464 U.S. 386, 104 S.Ct. 756, 78 L.Ed.2d 549 (1984)). As the Supreme Court explained in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978): 126 Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of veto. . . . [I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords with common sense and the public weal. Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches. 127 Id. at 194-95, 98 S.Ct. 2279; see also Country Best v. Christopher Ranch, LLC, 361 F.3d 629, 632 (11th Cir.2004) (We presume `that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.' (quoting United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.1998))). 128 Thus, as a court, we are not free to question the efficacy of legislation that Congress validly enacted. Within constitutional limits, Congress may improvidently elect to legislate what the Ninth Circuit has characterized as a windfall for employees regarded as disabled, or may compel employers to waste resources that, in our sister Circuit's judgment, would be better spent assisting those persons who are actually disabled. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. We do not think that these judgements and the complex legislative calibrations that underlie them are for us to make. Quite simply, we are without authority to pass judgment on the wisdom of a congressional enactment. 129 The Ninth Circuit, in reaching the opposite conclusion, reasoned: The absence of a stated distinction [between the three alternative prongs of the `disability' definition] . . . is not tantamount to an explicit instruction by Congress that `regarded as' individuals are entitled to reasonable accommodations. Kaplan, 323 F.3d at 1232. We disagree. To say that the statute contains no such explicit instruction from Congress simply because it is necessary to plug the statutory definitions into the statute's substantive prohibition on discrimination in order to understand the precise contours of Congress' directive wholly disregards the plain meaning of the statute's language. 130 Moreover, because we could craft a hypothetical that produces a result we might find anomalous is insufficient reason for disregarding the terms of the statute. The Supreme Court has admonished that [t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the `rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)); see also Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir.2003) ([C]ourts may reach results inconsistent with the plain meaning of a statute [only] `if giving the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meaning produces a result that is not just unwise but is clearly absurd.' (alterations in original) (quoting CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir.2001))). 131 This is decidedly not one of those rare cases. For one thing, the ADA's language is unambiguous, and none of the courts to depart from its plain meaning have pointed to anything — congressional findings, legislative history, or other materials — suggesting that the so-called bizarre results yielded by a faithful reading of the ADA are contrary to Congress' plainly expressed intent. 132 We also question whether the results may be as bizarre as our sister Circuits make them out to be, for two reasons. First, the notion that a literal reading will produce a disparity among impaired but non-disabled employees, Weber, 186 F.3d at 917, fails to appreciate that the ADA defines individuals with impairments that do not substantially limit their ability to perform a major life activity, but that are nonetheless treated by the individual's employer as constituting such a limitation, as disabled. The so-called regarded as plaintiffs are not impaired but non-disabled individuals, but rather are disabled within the meaning of the statute. 133 Second, insofar as the ADA will sometimes entitle one employee with a particular impairment to an accommodation while not entitling another with the same impairment to the same accommodation, it is because these individuals are not similarly situated: the employee entitled to statutory protection will have suffered some wrongful adverse employment action that the other employee has not. As one court has put it, an employee who is simply impaired and an employee who is impaired and `regarded as' disabled are not similarly situated since the `regarded as' disabled employee is subject to the stigma of the disabling and discriminatory attitudes of others. Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y.2002). Thus, [t]he employee whose limitations are perceived accurately gets to work, while [the plaintiff] is sent home unpaid. Williams, 380 F.3d at 775. Cf. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 398, 122 S.Ct. 1516 (holding that the ADA required accommodation even when it interfered with the employer's seniority system, reasoning, [t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a `preference' — in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate a rule that others must obey — cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the accommodation is not `reasonable' (emphasis omitted)). 134 Like the Third Circuit, [w]hile we do not rule out the possibility that there may be situations in which applying the reasonable accommodation requirement in favor of a `regarded as' disabled employee would produce `bizarre results,' we perceive no basis for an across-the-board refusal to apply the ADA in accordance with the plain meaning of its text. Williams, 380 F.3d at 774. Based on the text of this statute and the absence of any contrary expression of congressional intent, we hold that an individual falling within the regarded as category of disability under the ADA is entitled to a reasonable accommodation no less than an individual satisfying the actual-impairment definition of disability.