Opinion ID: 26298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: state’s comment on failure to testify

Text: We review Reeves’s claim that the prosecutor commented on his failure to testify to determine whether he “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”15 While the Fifth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from commenting directly or indirectly on a defendant's failure 12 See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 734. On direct appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Reeves raised two points of error that later surfaced in his second state application for habeas corpus. He asserted that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s negative answer to the mitigation issue and that the prosecutor improperly commented on his failure to testify. 13 Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229, 240-41 (5th Cir. 2001); In Re Goff, 250 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 270, 277 (5th Cir. 1999); Callins v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 210, 212 (5th Cir. 1996). 14 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). 15 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 6 to testify,16 a prosecutor may comment on the failure of the defense, as opposed to the defendant, to counter or explain the evidence.17 Such a comment is a basis for reversal only where it is “of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify,” and t here is no equally plausible explanation for the remark.18 For example, commenting on the absence of specific evidence in the record does not constitute a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify when witnesses other t han the defendant could have testified to such information.19 During the trial, the prosecutor made two remarks that defense counsel objected to as violating Reeves’s Fifth Amendment right not to testify. During closing arguments at the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, the prosecutor said: The thing that turns this into a capital murder ...[is] that it occurred in the course of committing an aggravated sexual assault. Mr. Davis [defense counsel] told you on Voir Dire that the evidence would show t hat it was consensual. That the evidence would show there was a fight and Jenny Weeks kicked Reginald Reeves in the groin. I’m still waiting to hear it. The district court correctly held that this comment did not violate Reeves’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent because there was an equally plausible explanation for the prosecutor’s remark. Reeves’s own opening statement referred to one potential eyewitness, two others in whom Reeves had confided, and physical evidence of the crime, all of which impliedly would be presented to the jury and exonerate Reeves. The prosecutor commented on the failure of the defense to counter or 16 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 17 United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1986). 18 Id. 19 Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 1042 (5th Cir. 1998). 7 explain the evidence of an aggravated sexual assault, and was, at the very least, invited by Reeves as a response to his opening statement. Under the circumstances, the prosecutor’s remarks could readily be construed as commentary on Reeves’s failure to present evidence through a witness other than himself and not a direct reference to his failure to testify. The second comment that Reeves’s counsel objected to came during closing argument at the sentencing phase of the trial when the pro secut or said, “The fact of the matter is, is that Reginald Reeves is, to coin an old phrase, a wolf in sheep’s clothing. You have seen him sit here quietly throughout this trial, head down . . . .” Defense counsel immediately objected, but the court overruled his objection. The prosecutor continued, “Maybe you’re sitting there, and he doesn’t look real scary. Well, now you kno w what’s inside. You know that this guy is a time bomb. He’s a human time bomb. Every time things go badly, he’s going to react violently. You know that now.” The prosecutor’s remark came after defense counsel had presented witnesses who had testified that Reeves appeared remo rseful for killing the victim and that he was not a violent or dangerous person. Defense counsel had then told the jury that Reeves was in tears when the State closed its case against him, indicating Reeves’s remorse for the crime. In context, the prosecutor’s remark can easily be interpreted as a response to defense counsel’s argument that Reeves’s demeanor indicated that he was remorseful, not as a comment on his failure to testify. Because there is another equally plausible explanation for the remark, the prosecutor’s intent was not manifestly impermissible, and no violation of the Fifth Amendment occurred. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the request for COA is DENIED. 8