Opinion ID: 2056377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Petition For Postconviction Relief And Motion For New Trial

Text: On December 15, 2006, Thompson filed a Petition for Postconviction Relief and Motion for New Trial. Thompson contended that [n]ewly discovered DNA testing conclusively establishes that two innocent men were wrongly convicted for the 1987 rape and murder of Colleen Williar. The motion stated that the laboratory results excluded both Owens and Thompson as depositors of the sperm on the cytology slide and that the testing on Thompson's blue jeans at the location of the bloodstain showed that the blood did not come from the victim. Owens, through separate counsel, also filed for relief. At Thompson's June 27, 2007 hearing, it was revealed that the State joined in Owens's petition for a new trial because the newly discovered evidence would assist the defense and was not available in 1987, but that the State did not take this posture toward Thompson's postconviction case. In the postconviction court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, issued October 5, 2007, it denied the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The postconviction court collectively addressed the following two allegations of error by Thompson: 1. The Petitioner is entitled to a new trial because the jury did not fairly consider the real controversy and because the State's theory of the case has been refuted. 2. The Petitioner claims that neither the false confession nor the microscopic hair analysis outweighs the DNA evidence. The postconviction court acknowledged that DNA evidence has a strong and almost persuasive finality in criminal law as well as in countless case law where people have confessed to things for which they did not commit or professed their innocence and have DNA evidence exculpate them from the crime they were accused. The postconviction court went on to address Thompson's felony murder conviction and stated that the DNA evidence removed the possibility that Thompson was the rapist: The Petitioner in the instant matter professed his innocence regarding the actual perpetration of this murder. His story evolved to include not only breaking into the home but willfully standing by as the victim was raped. The Petitioner initially claimed that he was not involved in the murder but was a concerned citizen who had located the murder weapon. Subsequently, he claimed that he was a mere burglar and never touched the victim. Despite the evolution of his story, there has been little shown to refute the actual testimony he gave at the trial of James Owens. At the trial of James Owens, the Petitioner admitted his involvement in the crime as a burglar. [Defense Counsel]: So what you're feeling is that you're a burglar, but you're not a killer, right? [Thompson]: That is exactly right. The Petitioner under oath retold the story of how James Owens and he broke into the house of the victim, Collen Williar, ransacked the apartment as the Petitioner watched as another person raped and murdered the victim while he masturbated. The Court does take notice of the inconsistencies between the DNA evidence and the evidence at trial. Nonetheless, this Court has examined the ever-evolving story of the Petitioner from the time of the James Owens trial to that of his own. The State was adamant in its assessment that the Petitioner participated not only in the burglary but also the rape and murder. The State utilized the confession of James Thompson at the trial of James Owens in addition to the blood found on his pants, the pubic hairs discovered on the victim and the spermatozoa evidence. The evidence was collected and used against the Petitioner to convict him of first-degree felony murder, rape and burglary. The DNA evidence eliminates the possibility that the Petitioner had in fact raped the victim. Furthermore, the evidence presented at the Post Conviction hearing usurps the State's arguments all together concerning the scientific evidence in regard to the semen, pubic hairs and blood on the Petitioner's clothing. Thus, this Court is convinced because of the prevailing evidence that the Petitioner was not the actual rapist. The postconviction court concluded that the DNA evidence did not remove Thompson from the scene of the crime and thus could not exculpate him on a felony murder charge: However, the standard as provided in the Maryland Rules does not require this Court to examine the weight of evidence or even the efficiency of counsel. The standard before this Court is whether the DNA evidence will exculpate the Petitioner from the crime for which he was convicted. Maryland Rules 4-331(c)(3). The Petitioner was convicted of felony murder, the underlying felony being burglary. It seems readily apparent from the Petitioner's testimony that he indeed burglarized the home of the victim the night of the murder. The DNA evidence does not remove the Petitioner from the scene of the crime. The DNA evidence does eliminate the Petitioner from being the ultimate rapist. Yet, even in the Petitioner's testimony at the trial of James Owens, he never claims to be the actual murderer or rapist. His claim was that he stood by as the event occurred. Since the DNA evidence does not show that the Petitioner is innocent of the underlying crime of burglary, coupled with his confession stating that he burglarized the house as the victim was murdered, this Court does not concur with the Petitioner that the DNA evidence exculpates him of the primary crime of which he was accused-felony murder. This Court denies the Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial.