Opinion ID: 4505178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure-to-Accommodate Claim Under the ADA

Text: Woolf argues on appeal that Bloomberg violated the ADA by failing to accommodate his alleged work-induced disability—serious migraines caused by the stress of working under certain supervisors. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation, Woolf must show by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (3) he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) the employer refused to make a reasonable accommodation. See McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125–26 (2d Cir. 2013). Moreover, the ADA defines “disability” to include, among other things, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Woolf argues that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA because his migraine condition substantially limited his major life activities of seeing, speaking, and concentrating. Notably, Woolf’s limited references to having “suffered loss of vision” and “language difficulties” during some migraine episodes are invariably framed in terms of Woolf’s inability to work in his particular job as a result of the work-related stress caused by his supervisors. App’x at 573; see also id. at 344–45. In that regard, Woolf’s contention appears to be duplicative of the claim rejected in the opinion filed simultaneously herewith. Even assuming, for the sake of argument only, that Woolf has a disability within the meaning of the ADA because his migraines substantially limit his vision, speech, and concentration, Woolf “fail[s] to identify a suitable position” that was open, that he was qualified for, and “to which [he] could have been transferred.” McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 96–97 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that an employee “bears the burdens of both production and persuasion as to the existence of some accommodation . . . including the existence of a vacant position for which she is qualified”). Accordingly, we hold that no rational factfinder could conclude that Woolf carried his burden to make a prima facie case under the ADA. II. Retaliation Claims Under the ADA, FMLA, and Title VII Woolf also argues that Bloomberg retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity under the ADA, FMLA, and Title VII. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under these statutes, a plaintiff “must show that: (1) he engaged in an activity protected by the[se statutes]; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against him; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.” Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the employer “to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged employment decision.” Id. at 721. If the “defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must point to evidence that would be sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to conclude 3 that the employer's explanation is merely a pretext for impermissible retaliation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Upon de novo review of the record on appeal and upon consideration of the arguments advanced by the parties, we affirm the holding of the District Court dismissing Woolf’s retaliation claims, substantially for the reasons set forth in its thorough March 5, 2019 Opinion and Order. See See Woolf v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 16-cv-6953 (PKC), 2019 WL 1046656, at –, – (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019). Specifically, we agree with the District Court that even if Woolf could make out a prima facie case of retaliation, Woolf failed to produce evidence demonstrating that Bloomberg’s professed non-retaliatory reason for his dismissal and any other adverse employment action, i.e., Woolf’s lengthy history of performance deficiencies, was pretextual. See id. at –, –. “[I]n this case the adverse employment actions were both part, and the ultimate product, of an extensive period of progressive discipline which began” before Woolf engaged in any protected activity, such as making requests for reasonable accommodation and for FMLA leave and his letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance America Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Where timing is the only basis for a claim of retaliation and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.”).