Opinion ID: 697321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: additional penalty phase claims

Text: 23 Jones's additional contentions as to the penalty phase and sentencing are all procedurally barred. Jones claims that the bar should be lifted as to these claims because the Missouri Supreme court must review sentencing decisions for error. This argument fails because we have previously found this mandatory review to be limited to matters of state law. LaRette, 44 F.3d at 687. Jones further asserts that the retroactive application of Missouri's procedural requirements is inimical to the constructs of constitutional justice. This argument too must fail. Former Missouri Rule 27.26 did not allow a petitioner free hand in filing successive petitions, see Gilmore, 861 F.2d at 1065-66, and these claims would have been barred under either the old scheme or the new. See Jones, 767 S.W.2d at 42-43 (noting that all but the claim as to mitigating circumstances were abandoned by Jones). Additionally, Jones contends that any procedural bar must fail because Missouri's rapid setting of execution dates constitutes cause for his procedural defaults. This argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in LaRette, 44 F.3d at 687. Jones also asserts as cause for his default the ineffective assistance of counsel at each and every stage of the legal process. Our earlier discussion of trial counsel's actions under the Strickland analysis sufficiently counters this contention. Accordingly, appellate counsel was not then inadequate in failing to brief every merely colorable claim on appeal. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666-67, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). Also, [t]here is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction hearings; there can be, therefore, no constitutionally ineffective assistance that could justify issuing the Great Writ on this ground. Foster v. Delo, 39 F.3d 873, 877 (8th Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1719, 131 L.Ed.2d 578 (1995); see Sidebottom, 46 F.3d at 751 (post-conviction counsel's ineffective assistance cannot serve as cause for procedural default); Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1553 (8th Cir.1994) (same). Nor has Jones shown by 'clear and convincing evidence' that but for the claimed constitutional error[s], no reasonable juror would find him eligible for the death penalty under Missouri law. Battle, 19 F.3d at 1554 (quoting Sawyer, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2523). 24 Moreover, we find that Jones's penalty phase claims also lack merit. Counsel made a remark during his statement to the jury that Jones asserts equated an organic brain disease with the aggravating factor of depravity of mind. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that to give counsel's remark the interpretation advanced by Jones would strain the language used beyond a permissible reading. Counsel's further erroneous mention of a prior assault conviction was predicated on a belief that the prosecution would attempt to prove the offense as a potential aggravating factor for the jury's consideration. Additionally, because no evidence of this conviction was actually adduced, it can be presumed that the jury properly fulfilled its role and disregarded the comment. As to Jones's assertion that his sentence was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner because of the actions of counsel and the trial court, there is no evidence that the state trial judge was unaware of his proper role in sentencing or of Jones's relevant background information. Thus, there is no merit to the contention that there was not the consideration of individualized factors required as a condition to imposing a sentence of death. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).