Opinion ID: 2262991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Admission of Dwayne Warren's Former Testimony

Text: During Flonnory's first trial, the prosecution called Dwayne Warren. Warren testified and the defense then had the opportunity to cross-examine him. At the first trial, Warren claimed that he did not carry a weapon and that, while he was initially going to retaliate for the shooting, he had given up the idea of retaliation. [66] Two days after his testimony, Warren was arrested and later convicted of robbery and assault. [67] Warren attempted to plead guilty but mentally ill in connection with the robbery/assault proceedings. During a court-ordered evaluation relating to the plea, Warren reported to the doctor conducting the evaluation that the events underlying the robbery/assault were triggered by a psychological trauma such that every time he saw a white van he went off because the vehicle driven by the perpetrators of the crime for which Flonnory was charged was a white van. Before Flonnory's second trial, the State moved for an Order in Limine admitting the former testimony ... of various potentially unavailable witnesses under D.R.E. 804. With certain conditions (i.e., the State was required to demonstrate the unavailability of the witness at trial), the trial judge granted the State's motion. During Flonnory's second trial, the State called Warren to the stand. Out of the presence of the jury, Warren invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination based on his own set of pending First Degree Murder charges. Consequently, he was unavailable to testify in Flonnory's retrial. After Warren invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, the State had Warren's former testimony read into the record. On appeal, Flonnory claims that it was error for the trial judge to allow the State to introduce Warren's former testimony because doing so violated Flonnory's constitutional rights to confront and to cross-examine Warren. Specifically, Flonnory argues that he had no meaningful opportunity to cross-examine or to confront Warren's claim of non-violence in his former testimony, with Warren's later convictions for robbery and assault. Flonnory also argues that he had no opportunity to cross-examine the doctor who conducted Warren's psychological evaluation about Warren's white van statement which, Flonnory claims, supports Flonnory's return gunfire defense. Because Warren reported this allegedly critical and potentially case-dispositive fact after Warren's former testimony, Flonnory contends that defense counsel should have been entitled to cross-examine Warren on this fact. We review alleged constitutional violations relating to a trial court's evidentiary ruling de novo. [68] Under D.R.E. 804(b) a declarant's former testimony is not excluded as hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a witness in a later proceeding and the party against whom the testimony is offer had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the declarant's former testimony by direct, cross or redirect examination. Crawford holds essentially the same: testimonial evidence offered against a defendant by a witness not present at trial can be admitted only where the witness is unavailable and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. [69] In Johnson v. State we discussed Crawford's cross-examination requirement as follows: Crawford did not expressly require any specific quality of cross-examination.... The Confrontation Clause only guarantees a defendant the opportunity for effective cross-examination of the declarant, not effective cross-examination in whatever way and in whatever manner a defendant may wish. Thus, when a witness takes the stand at trial, and is subject to cross-examination, the traditional protections afforded under the Confrontation Clause are satisfied. [70] In the present case, Flonnory had a similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine Warren during Flonnory's first trial. At the retrial, Flonnory may not have had the opportunity for effective cross-examination in whatever way an in whatever manner he may have wished, but the cross-examination at the first trial [71] was sufficient to satisfy Crawford and D.R.E. 804(b). [72] Assuming arguendo that it was error to admit Warren's former testimony at Flonnory's second trial, the error would have been harmless. At the retrial, after Warren's testimony was read into the record, the trial judge read the jury a stipulation the parties had reached regarding Warren's conviction. The trial judge informed the jury that Warren pled guilty to Robbery First Degree and a charge of Assault second degree, both felonies, as a result of an incident which occurred on October 16, 1998. The gun used in that offense was a nine-millimeter semi-automatic, [with] which Dwayne Warren struck the victim. Moreover, the defense also introduced into evidence the doctor's notes from Warren's psychiatric evaluation, which included the following statement: [Warren] reported experiencing panic and paranoia when seeing white vans reminiscent of ones used by the perpetrators. Even though Flonnory did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Warren about the events that occurred after Warren's former testimony or his statement during the psychiatric evaluation in connection with his guilty plea, Flonnory still had the opportunity to put that evidence before the jury and to comment on it in his closing argument. Accordingly, Flonnory's fifth argument on appeal must fail.