Opinion ID: 2361734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The D.C. Human Rights Act

Text: The District of Columbia did not raise the argument that the Human Rights Act preempts any common law torts, and the majority concludes that it did not. Supra at p. 702 n. 8. I agree, but would analyze the issue differently. The majority relies primarily on Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019-20, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), for the proposition that victims of discrimination should not have their avenues of redress curtailed by an act designed to expand their remedies. Supra at 702 n. 8. This begs the question whether the act was in fact designed to expand both remedies and channels. Moreover, the Alexander case involved an interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The analogy to the Human Rights Act is imperfect because Title VII applied to the context of private employment and thus did not implicate sovereign immunity. More importantly, the legislative history behind Title VII explicitly manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. Alexander, supra, 415 U.S. at 48, 94 S.Ct. at 1019; see also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1719, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Brown v. General Services Administration, supra , reached precisely the opposite preemption conclusion with regard to the federal employment antidiscrimination provisions that were added to the Civil Rights Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. See also Kizas v. Webster, 227 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 707 F.2d 524 (1983). From the fact that Congress perceived then current remedies to be ineffective, the Supreme Court inferred that the congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination. Brown v. General Services Administration, supra, 425 U.S. at 829, 96 S.Ct. at 1966. The Court's primary reliance, however, was on the balance, completeness, and structural integrity of the act. Id. at 832, 96 S.Ct. at 1967. In upholding the dismissal of the employee's other statutory claims, the Court wrote that the: crucial administrative role ... in the eradication of employment discrimination would be eliminated `by the simple expedient of putting a different label on [the] pleadings.' Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, [93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439] (1973). It would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading. Id. at 833, 96 S.Ct. at 1968. Finally, the Court cited the proposition that, in a variety of contexts, a precisely drawn, detailed statute preempts a more general remedy. Id. at 834, 96 S.Ct. at 1968. Under the D.C. Human Rights Act, only public employees are required to submit their claims through an administrative proceeding. Thus, the instant case is facially more similar to Brown than it is to Alexander. The Human Rights Act is structurally different from the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Employment Act, however, because it makes a single general, and substantively identical, grant of protection from discrimination to the entire public. District Government employees are only treated differently from a procedural perspective. Section 1-2543 provides that: Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the Mayor shall establish rules of procedure for the investigation, conciliation and hearing of complaints filed against District government agencies, officials and employees alleging violations of this chapter. The final determination in such matters shall be made by the Mayor or his designee. Also, unlike the Equal Employment Act, the Human Rights Act does not impose liability on the District through an elaborate and comprehensive structure. Instead, it merely requires the Mayor to establish a system that will allow the District to process such claims before making an appearance in court. Therefore, in looking at the statute alone, there is insufficient evidence to support the proposition that the Council of the District of Columbia intended to eliminate any common law rights. Accordingly, Alexander would govern the rights given to the public, and the statute gives District Government employees the same protections. Common law causes of action can also be abrogated by regulations promulgated within the scope of the administrator's authority. No direct abrogation can be found in this case, but the granting of any additional rights could also be considered evidence that the administrator, in this case the Mayor or his delegate, intended to replace a particular cause of action. Section 101.1 of the Mayor's Equal Employment Opportunity Rules, 31 D.C.Reg. 56, states that the provisions of these rules shall govern the processing of any matter involving discrimination ... (emphasis supplied), and other provisions include and define actions such as sexual harassment as a form of discrimination. Still, nothing in these regulations gives any indication of an intent to alter substantive rights, [2] and there is no reference to the intentional infliction of emotional distress or to the pertinent compensatory damages. The survival of a common law cause of action, however, does not also decide the question whether administrative remedies must be exhausted. In this case, § 101.1 of the Mayor's rules suggest that all claims arising out of discrimination in the work-place should be processed through the established administrative procedures. While § 1-2543 of the Human Rights Act refers only to violations of this chapter, this language does not speak to the question whether other claims supported by the same facts must await administrative adjudication of claims under this chapter. But requiring such exhaustion would ensure coherent, consistent, and complete development of the factual record, would incorporate the agency's expertise or policy preferences in the final result, and may lead to the satisfactory resolution of many questions without judicial review. See K. DAVIS, supra, at 414-15. The objection that requiring Newman to exhaust his administrative remedies would be futile because the agency will not adjudicate a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he will inevitably have to enter a court in order to obtain compensatory damages for emotional distress, fails for several reasons. First, the futility doctrine is ordinarily confined to situations in which the agency lacks the power to address the central issue, such as the scope of its authority or a constitutional claim, or in which there is no reasonable chance that it will do so. See, e.g., Apartment & Office Building Association v. Washington, supra (challenge of statutory authority). Second, there is a strong possibility that Newman would be able to obtain a full redress of his injuries through the prescribed proceedings. There are no cases on the subject, but the statutory language of § 1-2556 refers only to damages, which presumably would be interpreted in the standard broad fashion. [3] See also Lamont v. Rogers, 479 A.2d 1274, 1277 (D.C.1984) (some compensatory damages available under section 19(b) of Mayor's Order). Finally, the factors in favor of imposing an exhaustion requirement outweigh any futility present. Cf. Williams v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 140, 142 n. 7 (D.C.1983).