Opinion ID: 4206792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Small Claims Court Information Document

Text: ¶ 43 We likewise conclude that the Small Claims Court Information document provided constitutionally adequate notice. The plaintiffs argue that this document was constitutionally deficient for two reasons: (1) because it misled them into believing that their only recourse to contest a hearing officer’s adverse determination was to appear in small claims court—where, if they did not prevail, they would potentially be exposed to significant litigation costs and an adverse credit report; and (2) because it misled them into thinking that they could not argue that the City ordinances did not apply to their conduct of parking without paying at pay stations. We address each of these points in turn. ¶ 44 With respect to the plaintiffs’ first contention, we reiterate that the core requirement of adequate notice is that it apprise a litigant of her right to a hearing. See Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1211; see also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 436 U.S. at 13. The Small Claims Court Information document satisfied this core requirement. And even though it may have overstated the consequences of failing to prevail in a challenge to a parking ticket, it did not do so in a way that undermined the plaintiffs’ right to a hearing. Cf. Williams v. Redflex Traffic Sys., Inc., 582 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A] notice that offers the ticketed the choice between paying a $50 fine and having to pay $67.50 to challenge it offers no choice at all.”). Here, a motorist who chose to settle instead of proceeding to small claims court would have concluded that the likelihood of prevailing in small claims court was not high enough to justify the risk of losing—not that the choice to proceed to small claims court was, in and of itself, irrational. This regime does not violate due process. Importantly, the plaintiffs neither allege nor argue that requiring them to litigate their parking tickets in small claims court would have violated their due process rights. And if the plaintiffs accept that small claims court was a constitutionally adequate forum, it is hard to see how a notice that only apprises them of their right to litigate their parking infraction in that forum could have violated their due process rights. See Amanatullah v. Colorado Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 1999) (due process clause requires lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused.” (citation omitted)). 17 BIVENS v. SALT LAKE CITY Opinion of the Court “an adequate forum” in which to pursue a claim (emphasis added)). ¶ 45 The plaintiffs’ second contention is that, even if the Small Claims Court Information document was sufficient to apprise them of their general right to a hearing, it was deficient as applied to this particular case because it told them they were only allowed to challenge their parking tickets on a limited number of legal grounds. Specifically, the document stated that [t]he judge will only hear evidence regarding your parking/civil notice and related violation . . . . If your complaint is regarding . . . whether or not you feel the ordinance is valid and should be changed . . . the courtroom is not the proper place for those types of complaints and will not be addressed by the judge. ¶ 46 According to the plaintiffs, this suggested that they could not press the argument that forms the basis of their class action. As the plaintiffs read this portion of the Small Claims Court Information document, it purports to bar them from arguing that their conduct of parking without paying at a pay station was not an infraction under the City Code. The plaintiffs argue that this created both a notice problem and, by “bar[ring] challenges to the validity of City ordinances and procedures, their implementation, and officers’ enforcement actions,” a problem with the hearing itself. ¶ 47 We are not persuaded that this portion of the Small Claims Court Information document is necessarily misleading. On a plausible reading of this portion of the document, it tells recipients that a small claims court judge will not hear evidence or arguments regarding “whether or not you feel the ordinance is valid”—i.e., it tells recipients that they may not challenge the statutory or constitutional legality of the City Code. But this is not what the plaintiffs claim they were barred from doing. Instead, the plaintiffs claim that the Small Claims Court Information document stated that they were barred from arguing that parking without paying at a multi-space pay station falls outside the ambit of the City’s parking ordinances and is therefore not an infraction. But this is more an argument that the plaintiffs did not violate the City Code than it is a challenge to the validity of the City’s parking ordinances. Indeed, the plaintiffs would presumably 18 Cite as: 2017 UT 67 Opinion of the Court agree that the City may validly make it an infraction not to pay for parking at a coin-operated, single-space parking meter. So we doubt the plaintiffs’ contention that the Small Claims Court Information document misleadingly suggested they could not argue that their conduct was not an infraction under the City Code. ¶ 48 More importantly, the plaintiffs have not alleged that they were, in fact, misled by the Small Claims Court Information document. Quite the contrary. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, Mr. Arias did not receive this document, so he could not have been misled by it. See supra ¶ 8. Mr. Bivens, far from being misled by the document, actually argued to the small claims court that parking without paying at a pay station did not violate City Code. See supra ¶ 12. And Ms. Reed decided not to challenge her ticket in small claims court because she did not want to “risk[] the additional expenses outlined in the Small Claims Court Information document”—not because the Small Claims Court Information document misled her into thinking small claims court would not entertain a meritorious challenge to her ticket. Thus, even if there are circumstances in which it is possible to state a due process violation based on the information contained in the Small Claims Court Information document, the plaintiffs here have not alleged that the Small Claims Court Information document violated their right to adequate notice. See Miller v. Potter, 198 F. App’x 794, 796 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In order to show that the notice . . . violated his due process rights, Miller must show that (1) the notice was defective, and (2) he detrimentally relied upon that notice.”); Gilbert v. Shalala, 45 F.3d 1391, 1394 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[A] plaintiff must demonstrate reliance on the allegedly defective . . . notice[].”); Noah v. McDonald, 28 Vet. App. 120, 132 (2016) (“To prevail on his [procedural due process claim] . . . Mr. Noah must also demonstrate that he relied to his detriment on the misleading notice.”); see also Monarrez v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2016 UT 10, ¶ 44, 368 P.3d 846 (Although he alleged a breach of duty, “[the plaintiff] provides no allegations of any actions taken by the . . . [d]efendants . . . that caused him harm. Thus, dismissal was proper because the allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim . . . .”). ¶ 49 We conclude that the plaintiffs received constitutionally adequate notice of their right to a hearing, and that the plaintiffs 19 BIVENS v. SALT LAKE CITY Opinion of the Court have failed to allege that the notice misled them into thinking they could not raise the basic challenge to the City’s parking regime on which they have predicated their putative class action lawsuit. To be sure, the constitutional adequacy of notice is a fact-specific inquiry, and we will scrutinize notice more carefully as the stakes rise—because, as the private interest at stake becomes more and more important, so too does the cost of an erroneous decision. Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (adequacy of process requires courts to balance the private interest that will be affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation through the procedures used and the probable value of additional procedures, and the State’s interest).5 But a $15 parking fine is comparatively low stakes, and the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim that the notices here did not adequately apprise them of their right to a hearing on their objections. The plaintiffs have therefore failed to state a claim for constitutionally inadequate notice under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.