Opinion ID: 2626902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: we decline to judicially create visitation rights by adopting a de facto parent or psychological parent doctrine

Text: ¶ 30 What Jones essentially asks us to do is recognize a new judicial doctrine in Utah that creates in a third party the right to seek visitation with a child in contexts outside those recognized by this state's domestic relation laws. Whatever label is applied to such a doctrine, it is clear that the common law concept of in loco parentis does not reach so far. Were we to recognize such a right in this case, it would have to be under one of several judicially created doctrines that have been used recently in other jurisdictions to confer visitation rights upon someone other than a parent. Most prominent among these other doctrines are those labeled psychological parent, or de facto parent. [7] E.g., Carvin v. Britain (In re Parentage of L.B.), 155 Wash.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161, 163 (2005); V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 748 A.2d 539 passim (2000); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (1999). Rather than creating temporary rights and obligations that last as long as a surrogate parent stands in the place of an actual parent, these doctrines create permanent and abiding rights similar to those of an actual parent. See L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (We thus hold that henceforth in Washington, a de facto parent stands in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.); V.C., 748 A.2d at 552 ([A] psychological parent-child relationship . . . may not be unilaterally terminated after the relationship between the adults ends.). ¶ 31 We decline to craft such a doctrine. First, adopting a de facto parent doctrine fails to provide an identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily and uniformly applied in all cases. A de facto parent rule for standing, which rests upon ambiguous and fact-intensive inquiries into the surrogate parent's relationship with a child and the natural parent's intent in allowing or fostering such a relationship, does not fulfill the traditional gate-keeping function of rules of standing. Under such a doctrine, a party could try the merits of her case under the guise of an inquiry into standing, unduly burdening legal parents with litigation. We agree with the Supreme Court of Vermont that jurisdiction should not rest upon a test that in effect would examine the merits of visitation or custody petitions on a case-by-case basis. In reality, such a fact-based test would not be a threshold jurisdictional test, but rather would require a full-blown evidentiary hearing in most cases. Thus, any such test would not prevent parents from having to defend themselves against the merits of petitions brought by a potentially wide range of third parties claiming a parent-like relationship with their child. Titchenal v. Dexter, 166 Vt. 373, 693 A.2d 682, 687-88 (1997). ¶ 32 In addition to providing an unsure jurisdictional threshold, adopting a de facto parent doctrine would exceed the proper bounds of the judiciary. The essential questions presented to the court in this case are some of the most intimate and important that our society faces. In the abstract, we are asked to define perhaps the most influential and personal relationship ever experienced that of parent and child. In particular, we are asked to determine the future upbringing of a child and Jones' continued participation in that process. ¶ 33 Faced with these questions, and without the benefit of binding applicable law, Jones asks us to craft a judicial doctrine with broad social implications that attempts to adjudicate between competing policy considerations. On the one hand, we recognize that mutual bonds of affection can be formed between a child and an adult who does not fit within the traditional definition of a parent and that such a relationship has the potential to enrich the lives of both the surrogate parent and the child. However, in carving out a permanent role in the child's life for a surrogate parent, this court would necessarily subtract from the legal parent's right to direct the upbringing of her child and expose the child to inevitable conflict between the surrogate and the natural parents. Such a doctrine raises concerns that a legal parent could be deprived of a portion of her parental rights on the basis of elusive factual determinations as to whether she intended to relinquish those rights to a third party. [8] Van v. Zahorik, 227 Mich.App. 90, 575 N.W.2d 566, 570 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 34 Although principled arguments can be made for the adoption of a de facto parent doctrine, such arguments are ultimately based upon policy preferences, rather than established common law. In such situations, we find the Michigan Supreme Court to be persuasive when it stated: As a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts. This is especially true when the determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest at the expense of another: The responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as oursof identifying priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between competing alternativesis the Legislature's, not the judiciary's. Van v. Zahorik, 460 Mich. 320, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 (1999) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State ex rel. Skeen v. Ogden Rapid Transit Co., 38 Utah 242, 112 P. 120, 125 (1910) (holding that exceeding the judiciary's own authority results in an undue usurpation of legislative powers). ¶ 35 Jones asks this court to exercise the wisdom of Solomon by adopting a de facto parent doctrine based upon our weighing of the competing policies at play. Although this court is routinely called upon to make difficult decisions as to what the law is, or even to fill the interstices of jurisprudence, in this case we are asked to create law from whole cloth where it currently does not exist. While the distinction between applying the law to unique situations and engaging in legislation is not always clear, by asking us to recognize a new class of parents, Jones invites this court to overstep its bounds and invade the purview of the legislature. ¶ 36 Courts are ill-suited for such ventures. Courts are unable to fully investigate the ramifications of social policies and cannot gauge or build the public consensus necessary to effectively implement them. Unlike the legislature, which may craft a comprehensive scheme for resolving future cases and then may repeal or amend it at any time should it prove unworkable, courts are not agile in developing social policy. If we miscalculate in legislating social policy, the harm may not be corrected until an appropriate case wends its way through the system and arrives before us once againa process that may take years or even decades. Moreover, our attempt to correct a prior misstep could then damage the legal system's reliance upon the principle of stare decisis. ¶ 37 In addition to our reticence to assume an essentially legislative role, the creation of a de facto parent rule absent any precedent in Utah law would be an unwarranted expansion of the common law. We agree with the dissent that the common law is a dynamic and growing thing. 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Law § 2 (2000); see infra ¶¶ 60-61. However, the common law decisionmaking process is inherently incremental in nature; the very `genius of the common law is that it proceeds empirically and gradually, testing the ground at every step' . . . [and] calls for devising a rule that does not stray too far from the existing regime. PM Group Life Ins. Co. v. W. Growers Assurance Trust, 953 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting R. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers 8 (1989)); accord McClure v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 84 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir.1996); Falcone v. Middlesex County Med. Soc., 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791, 799 (1961) (The persistent movement of the common law towards satisfying the needs of the times is soundly marked by gradualness. Its step by step process affords the light of continual experience to guide its future course.). Creating a de facto parent doctrine for Utah would be a dramatic expansion of the common law thereby defying the principle of incremental development. ¶ 38 Such a divergence from Utah's established common law is also inappropriate because there are no broadly accepted principles to guide us to a de facto parent doctrine. We agree that our courts should avoid effecting change in the common law of this State when there is no substantial body of agreement that such change is necessary and when it is patent that such change can be better effected by legislative action. Duhan v. Milanowski, 75 Misc.2d 1078, 348 N.Y.S.2d 696, 701 (Sup.Ct.1973). As we have noted, this case presents us with conflicting policies upon which there is no broad consensus. There are simply no bedrock principles upon which to construct a doctrine creating visitation rights for nonparents. ¶ 39 To the extent that there are guiding principles within the common law, they militate against a common law right of visitation for nonparents. It is a fundamental tenet of our common law that the only persons having any actually vested interest in the custody of a child cognizable by the law are the parents. Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d 227, 229 (Utah 1976). Other relatives of a child merely have some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody and welfare of children that matures only upon the death or termination of the rights of the parents. [9] Id. at 230-31. Finally, courts may not make a best interests inquiry into nonparent custody of a child absent a determination that the legal parents are unfit. In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982); see also A.N. v. M.I.W. (In re Adoption of P.N.), 2006 UT 64, ¶ 15, 148 P.3d 927. [10] Although our precedent in this area involves custody rather than visitation, the common law nevertheless evidences a strong presumption that parental rights shall not be disturbed absent a determination that the legal parents are unfit. [11] This presumption is in direct contradiction to a de facto parent doctrine, which interferes with a parent's right to direct the upbringing of her child. Thus, adopting such a doctrine would not be a natural development of the common law, but rather a legislative act in derogation of recognized common law principles. ¶ 40 Finally, the de facto parent doctrine conflicts with Utah statutory law. The legislature has defined the manner in which a parent-child relationship is established. The mother-child relationship is established by (a) the woman's having given birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in Part 8, Gestational Agreement; (b) an adjudication of the woman's maternity; (c) adoption of the child by the woman; or (d) an adjudication confirming the woman as a parent of a child born to a gestational mother if the agreement was valid under Part 8, Gestational Agreement, or is enforceable under other law. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 (Supp.2006). The legislature has also designated which nonparents have standing to seek visitation of a child. Statutes grant standing to an immediate family member to seek visitation in the context of a divorce, id. § 30-3-5(4)(a), and to grandparents in certain circumstances, id. § 30-5-2. ¶ 41 Because the legislature has spoken in this area, we are reluctant to adopt a common law doctrine that implicitly controverts this statutory scheme. The addition of a new class of de facto parents would conflict with the legislature's apparently exhaustive list of who is considered a mother under the law. Also, granting visitation rights to de facto parents contradicts the legislature's narrow grant of standing to certain immediate family members to petition for visitation. As the dissent notes, the legislature has not explicitly addressed the standing of a surrogate parent. See infra ¶ 46. The grant of standing to immediate family members under certain well-defined circumstances, however, creates the negative implication that all other categories of nonparents are prohibited from seeking visitation rights. Otherwise, the standing requirement would not serve its function as a jurisdictional bar to litigation because every unmentioned class of nonparent could attempt to establish visitation rights under the common law. We decline to expand the common law into an area occupied by statute so as to contradict the apparent legislative intent. ¶ 42 In sum, we decline to adopt a de facto parent doctrine because it would be an improper usurpation of legislative authority and would contradict both common law principles and Utah statutory law. Although we have no reason to doubt the sincerity of Jones' parental feelings for the child, we are unwilling to craft a doctrine which would abrogate a portion of Barlow's parental rights.