Opinion ID: 1679284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: NDCC section 39-08-03 Fails to Charge a Crime

Text: Syring was charged with aggravated reckless driving as defined by subsection 39-08-03(2), NDCC. [1] He relies on two cases in which we have addressed language similar to that contained in this particular subsection: State v. Hagge, 211 N.W.2d 395 (N.D.1973), and State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 272 (N.D. 1955). In Tjaden, this Court held that the reckless driving statute, as codified in 1943, [2] only sets forth two ways of committing reckless driving rather than three. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d at 281. Basically, this Court concluded that the codifiers had incorrectly separated the phrase, [w]ithout due caution and circumspection, from the phrase, [a]t a speed or in a manner to endanger or likely to endanger any person, and that the two phrases together defined the crime of reckless driving. Id. at 280, 281. In the instant case it appears that this is almost exactly the same language that was used when charging Syring. We therefore conclude that Tjaden not only fails to support Syring's argument, it supports the State's position. State v. Hagge , on the other hand, deals with North Dakota's Care Required in Operating a Motor Vehicle statute currently codified at NDCC section 39-09-01.1. [3] Hagge, 211 N.W.2d at 396. In Hagge we faced a constitutional void for vagueness challenge to the statute as it then existed. Id. at 398. Syring points out the similarities between North Dakota's current reckless driving statute and the prerevision care required statute. [4] Syring then suggests that since this Court stated that it could conclude that certain language in the original care required statute, when viewed in isolation, might be void for vagueness, we should hold that use of similar language in the reckless driving statute is void for vagueness. [5] Id. at 398. We cannot reach this issue, however. We are barred from addressing the constitutional void for vagueness issue here because Syring moved the trial court for a new trial. Upon reviewing that motion we find that nowhere within it was this issue raised. When a party moves for a new trial, any subsequent appeal by that party is limited to review of grounds presented in the motion to the trial court. City of Fargo, 512 N.W.2d at 703 (citing State v. Jordheim, 508 N.W.2d 878, 880-81 (N.D.1993)). The constitutionality of the statute was raised for the first time in the briefs to this Court, and then only summarily mentioned. The depth and the magnitude of constitutional arguments requires those making such challenges either to prepare an adequate and thorough foundation to support their argument, or forego its presentation. See Southern Valley Grain Dealers Ass'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Richland County, 257 N.W.2d 425, 434 (N.D. 1977). The mere reference to a statute's constitutionality, with nothing more, does not meet the standard of persuasion required to mount an attack on constitutional grounds. See City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 377 n. 5 (N.D.1994). We therefore cannot reach the issue of the constitutionality of NDCC subsection 39-08-03(2). Affirmed. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and SANDSTROM, J., concur. MESCHKE, J., concurs and dissents in which LEVINE, J., joins.