Opinion ID: 78026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grave Risk Exception

Text: Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention states: Notwithstanding the provisions [providing a remedy of return for wrongfully removed children], the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person . . . wh[o] opposes [the child's] return establishes that . . . there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The respondent opposing a child's return bears the burden of establishing the grave risk exception by clear and convincing evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A). Whether a grave risk of harm to a child exists under the terms of the Hague Convention is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo. Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir.2007); Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 896 (8th Cir.2003).
Before denying Baran's petition, the district court heard testimony from Beaty, reviewed affidavits submitted by Beaty and Baran, and heard argument from counsel for both parties. After noting Baran's conclusory affidavit (which had been drafted in connection with his initial petition and not for the evidentiary hearing) did not provide any counter-explanation for the events to which Beaty had testified, see Baran, 479 F.Supp.2d at 1260 n. 1, the district court found the following facts: Baran abuses alcohol on a daily or near-daily basis, that he is susceptible to lengthy drinking and gambling binges that in no way abated during the five months that Sam habitually resided with him, that he is only marginally able to care for his own basic needs, that he has no close family members or friends that could reasonably be expected to have meaningful involvement in Sam's day-to-day care and protection, that he is emotionally unstable and prone to uncontrolled destructive outbursts of rage, that he was physically and verbally abusive toward Beaty in Sam's presence, that he physically endangered Sam (both intentionally and unintentionally) when Sam lived under his roof, and that Baran repeatedly and pointedly stated to Beaty after Sam's birth that he did not want Sam, that Sam should have been aborted, that Sam would die if Sam became an American, and that Beaty could not blame him if something happened to Sam. Id. at 1270-71. Based on these facts, the district court concluded Beaty had met her burden of showing Samuel's return to Australia would expose him to grave risk of physical or psychological harm. Baran challenges the district court's conclusion, contending that his drunkenness and temper are not the sort of grave risks to which Article 13(b) is directed. Citing persuasive authority, Baran contends that, to establish grave risk, Beaty was required to show Samuel had been mistreatednot that she herself had been verbally or physically abused. See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 376-77 (8th Cir.1995) (holding physical and sexual abuse of mother insufficient to establish grave risk of harm to child); Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 460 (1st Cir. 2000) (concluding verbal abuse of child's mother and sibling and shoving of child's mother insufficient to establish grave risk of harm to child). But see Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 219-20 (1st Cir.2000) (finding grave risk of harm to child established by evidence father disobeyed court orders, engaged in general acts of violence, and had severely beaten pregnant wife in front of child's siblings). Although it is true there was no evidence to suggest Baran intentionally harmed Samuel, the district court was presented with evidence Baran had threatened to do so both before and after Samuel's birth. Moreover, the court heard testimony that Baran had placed Samuel in harm's way by abusing Beaty while she was pregnant, verbally berating Beaty for hours on end while she held Samuel in her arms, and handling newborn Samuel irresponsibly while drunk. To deny return, the district court was not required to find Samuel had previously been physically or psychologically harmed; it was required to find returning him to Australia would expose him to a present grave risk of physical or psychological harm, or otherwise place him in an intolerable situation. Convention, art. 13(b). The evidence presented was sufficient to support the court's conclusion that Baran's violent temper and abuse of alcohol would expose Samuel to a grave risk of harm were he to be returned to Australia.
Baran contends the grave risk analysis does not end when a court concludes the conditions to which the child will be returned pose a grave risk of harm. Rather, he argues, before denying a petition for return, the court must first determine whether the child's country of habitual residence is capable of protecting the child from the identified risk. Neither the Convention nor ICARA specifies the manner in which a reviewing court must assess whether a grave risk of harm to the child exists and whether that risk alone justifies denying a petition for return. Nevertheless, before denying a petition for return, some federal courts have required respondents to present evidence the child's country of habitual residence is not equipped to protect the child upon return. As counsel conceded at oral argument, this proposed requirement appears to have originated with the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Friedrich, in which that court stated in dicta: [W]e believe that a grave risk of harm for the purposes of the Convention can exist in only two situations. First, there is a grave risk of harm when return of the child puts the child in imminent danger prior to the resolution of the custody disputee.g., returning the child to a zone of war, famine, or disease. Second, there is a grave risk of harm in cases of serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069 (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit's formulation has been repeated by courts throughout the country, and has been accepted by many lower courts as a governing principle of law. See, e.g., In re Application of Adan, 437 F.3d 381, 395 (3d Cir.2006) (stating in dicta that the petitioner must demonstrate that `the court[s] in the country of habitual residence, for whatever reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection'); Garcia v. Angarita, 440 F.Supp.2d 1364, 1381-82 (S.D.Fla. 2006); In re D.D., 440 F.Supp.2d 1283, 1299 (M.D.Fla.2006). But see Van De Sande v. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570-71 (7th Cir.2005) (criticizing Friedrich formulation of grave risk and noting its overuse). What makes the Friedrich standard attractive is its emphasis on the primacy of the country of habitual residence. ICARA emphasizes [c]hildren who are wrongfully removed or retained within the meaning of the Convention are to be promptly returned. . . . 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4). This rule is designed to protect the interests of the state of habitual residence in determining any custody dispute, and to deter parents from unilaterally removing children in search of a more sympathetic forum. Simcox, 511 F.3d at 604. Moreover, the requirement acknowledges comity between reviewing courts and courts in other signatory countries. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068 (In thinking about these problems, we acknowledge that courts in the abducted-from country are as ready and able as we are to protect children. If return to a country, or to the custody of a parent in that country, is dangerous, we can expect that country's courts to respond accordingly.). Not all courts, however, have accepted the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the grave risk analysis. Relying on the plain language of Article 13(b), many courts hold when a respondent proves returning a child would expose him to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm, the reviewing court has discretion to deny the petition for return outright. That position is consistent with the Convention's official commentary and with directives from the United States State Department. In discussing the balance between the Convention's goals of protecting children and ensuring their speedy return, the official commentary to the Convention states, [T]he interest of the child in not being removed from its habitual residence . . . gives way before the primary interest of any person in not being exposed to physical or psychological danger or being placed in an intolerable situation. Elisa Prez-Vera, Explanatory Report: Hague Conference on Private International Law, in 3 Actes et Documents de la Quatorzieme Session 426 (1980) (Prez-Vera Report), ¶ 29. [1] The commentary says nothing about a reviewing court's duty to assess the home country's ability to protect a child from harmit says only that return need not be ordered when the risk of grave harm exists. Similarly, in official comments regarding the use of an Article 13(b) defense, the United States State Department has made no mention of any obligation on the part of district courts to determine whether a country of habitual residence is able to provide children at risk of harm with protection or services. As one official comment explains: Under Article 13(b), a court in its discretion need not order a child returned if there is a grave risk that return would expose the child to physical harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.     An example of an intolerable situation is one in which a custodial parent sexually abuses the child. If the other parent removes or retains the child to safeguard it against further victimization, and the abusive parent then petitions for the child's return under the Convention, the court may deny the petition. Such action would protect the child from being returned to an intolerable situation and subjected to a grave risk of psychological harm. Hague Int'l Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10510. The State Department's pronouncements, while not binding, are entitled to deference. Baxter, 423 F.3d at 373 n. 7 (Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.). Although a court is not barred from considering evidence that a home country can protect an at-risk child, neither the Convention nor ICARA require it to do so: [T]o define the issue not as whether there is a grave risk of harm, but as whether the lawful custodian's country has good laws or even as whether it both has and zealously enforces such laws, disregards the language of the Convention and its implementing statute; for they say nothing about the laws in the petitioning parent's country. The omission to mention them does not seem to have been an accidentthe kind of slip in draftsmanship that courts sometimes correct in the exercise of their interpretive authority. If handing over custody of a child to an abusive parent creates a grave risk of harm to the child, in the sense that the parent may with some nonnegligible probability injure the child, the child should not be handed over, however severely the law of the parent's country might punish such behavior. Van De Sande, 431 F.3d at 571. To require a respondent to adduce evidence regarding the condition of the legal and social service systems in a country she has fled creates difficult problems of proof, and appears not to have been contemplated by the Convention. Although we are cognizant of the Convention's goal of quickly returning abducted children to their countries of habitual residence, the text of the Convention and the commentaries on it place a higher premium on children's safety than on their return. Consequently, we decline to impose on a responding parent a duty to prove that her child's country of habitual residence is unable or unwilling to ameliorate the grave risk of harm which would otherwise accompany the child's return. [2]