Opinion ID: 2599746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individuals Subject to the Statutory Limit

Text: By its plain language, the statutory limit on damages applies to the category of persons who would otherwise have been compensated under the WCA. § 8-41-401(3). The final sentence of the section describes those persons subject to the statutory limit: The total amount of damages recoverable pursuant to any cause of action resulting from a work-related injury brought by such individual that would otherwise have been compensable under articles 40 to 47 of this title shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars. . . . Id. Standing alone, it is impossible to determine who such individual[s] are and what otherwise would have made them eligible for workers' compensation. We therefore look to the rest of the subsection's language for contextual meaning and conclude that the individuals referred to in the last sentence are the individuals listed in the first sentence of this subsection of the statute. The first sentence of subsection 8-41-401(3) begins: Notwithstanding any . . . provisions to the contrary, any individual who is [identified in this statute] shall have no cause of action under [the WCA]. Id. (emphasis added). The individual who has no cause of action under the WCA is identified by the statute as a person who falls within one of three groups. The first group with no cause of action under the WCA is any individual who is excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-40-202(2) which generally describes independent contractors. Id. The second group is a working general partner or sole proprietor who is not covered under a policy of workers' compensation insurance. Id. The third group is a corporate officer or member of a limited liability company who executes and files an election to reject coverage under section 8-41-202(1). Id. Thus, this sentence unambiguously states that individuals in these three groups, who can not make workers' compensation claims according other parts of the statute, are excluded from recovery under the WCA. The individuals described in each group share the characteristic of being individuals who could have obtained coverage but did not because they either did not elect to cover themselves, see § 8-40-302(5), C.R.S. (2006) (allowing a person who is a sole proprietor or an independent contractor to voluntarily elect WCA coverage), or chose to opt out, see § 8-41-202(1), C.R.S. (2006) (permitting corporate officers to reject coverage). Thus, the first sentence of the statute describes individuals who have common law causes of action for work-related injuries who could have WCA protection but for their choice rejecting coverage. These are the individuals referred to in the third sentence. The third sentence applies the statutory limitation on damages to any such individual who would otherwise have been compensated under the WCA. Therefore, it refers to any individual described in the first sentence. Thus, the statutory limit applies to any individual who is excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-40-202(2)(b), or a working general partner or sole proprietor who is not covered under a policy of workers' compensation insurance, or a corporate officer or member of a limited liability company who executes and files an election to reject coverage under section 8-41-202(1). § 8-41-401(3); see Kelly v. Mile Hi Single Ply, Inc., 890 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Colo.1995) (holding that a rejecting officer is subject to the statutory limitation on damages in section 8-41-401(3)). This interpretation is also consistent with the legislative history. In 1987, the General Assembly amended the WCA and created what is now section 8-41-401(3). 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 399. The first sentence began, as the version of the statute we now interpret does, with a list of persons who shall not have any cause of action [under the WCA]. [3] Id. The third sentence began, as it does now: [t]he total amount of damages recoverable by such individual . . ., but then repeated the list and applied the statutory limitation to the individuals listed. Id. In 1988, the listed individuals were replaced with the words independent contractor in both sentences. 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 374, 375. Then in 1993, the words independent contractor were replaced in the first sentence by the current language referring to an individual excluded from the definition of employee; [4] while in the third sentence independent contractor was deleted and replaced with individual, a word appearing in the original 1987 version of the statute. From this history it is clear that the General Assembly meant for the individual subject to the statutory limitations to be an individual in one of the listed groups in the first sentence. Here, Pulsifer, as a sole proprietor and a person excluded from the definition of employee, [5] is within the group of individuals generally subject to the statutory limit on damages. We now turn to the central issue presented in this appeal: whether Pulsifer is excepted from the statutory limit because PPC was another not in the same employ with Pulsifer.