Opinion ID: 435100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the cumulative weight of the evidence compels a finding of segregative intent.

Text: 66 In making its determination in respect to the Board's intent, the district court erred in failing to give weight to the cumulative impact of the evidence. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68, 97 S.Ct. at 563-65; Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 875, 101 S.Ct. 218, 66 L.Ed.2d 96 (1980). 67 The District repeatedly promised the public and state officials that it would desegregate its schools in compliance with state law. Yet, it deliberately ignored state guidelines in making decisions and consistently refused to implement suggestions for desegregation. Similarly, in Columbus, an element of the district court's finding of segregative intent was the Board's failure to employ workable suggestions for improving racial balance despite promises otherwise. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 453, 99 S.Ct. at 2944. 18 68 The Board sited new schools, rebuilt the Field Act schools, used portables and closed schools in a manner that maintained and, in some instances, intensified ethnic imbalance. The Supreme Court found such actions to evince segregative intent in Columbus, 443 U.S. at 462 & n. 11, 467, 99 S.Ct. at 2949 & n. 11, 2951 (site selection and construction), 19 in Dayton, 443 U.S. at 532, 533 n. 7, 540, 99 S.Ct. at 2976, 2976 n. 7, 2980 (siting, construction, and addition of classroom space at existing schools), in Swann, 402 U.S. at 20-21, 91 S.Ct. at 1278-1279 (construction and closures); and in Keyes, 413 U.S. at 192, 93 S.Ct. at 2689 (construction, mobile classrooms). 69 The Board used buses for one-third of its students, but refused to use those buses to achieve integration. See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486-87, 102 S.Ct. 3187, 3203-04, 73 L.Ed.2d 896 (1982) (invalidating a Washington initiative that treated busing for integration differently from busing for other purposes). Cf. Swann, 402 U.S. at 18, 91 S.Ct. at 1277 (existing policy of transportation an important consideration in identifying a segregated system). 70 The Board assigned faculty and staff on the basis of ethnic origin without any plausible neutral justification. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 460, 461, 467, 99 S.Ct. at 2948, 2948, 2951; Dayton, 443 U.S. at 532, 536 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 2976, 2978 n. 9; Swann, 402 U.S. at 18-19, 91 S.Ct. at 1277-1278; Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 1692, 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968). 71 The Board responded to overcrowding in the schools by instituting educationally disadvantageous double sessions and departed from its neighborhood school policy to avoid transferring Anglo students to predominantly Hispanic schools. See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 461-62 n. 8, n. 9, 99 S.Ct. at 2948-49 n. 8, n. 9 (departure from neighborhood school policy); Dayton, 443 U.S. at 539-40, 99 S.Ct. at 2980-81 (use of optional attendance zones); Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191, 93 S.Ct. at 2688 (manipulation of attendance zones). 72 The Board catered to a public that opposed segregation. This is evidenced by the Board's statements supporting the bond issues, in which it raised the spectre of busing for integration if the levy was not passed. The Board was instrumental in transforming the QUEST committee from a group of concerned citizens to one dominated by those opposed to desegregation. The Board ignored the recommendations the committee made and consistently rejected other suggestions for desegregating its schools. 73 An inescapable conclusion that the Board intended segregation emerges from a view of the evidence as a whole. The pattern of Board choices that consistently maintained or intensified segregation is apparent. Although many of the available alternatives would have presented an incomplete solution, each could have contributed incrementally toward reducing ethnic imbalance. In almost every instance, the Board chose to turn toward segregation rather than away from it. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 463 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2949 n. 12. We are left with the firm conviction that the district court was clearly erroneous in its ultimate conclusion that the Board did not act with segregative intent. 74