Opinion ID: 2219494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Treatment of Evidence

Text: In its second assignment of error, HEP alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Venter's opinions were entitled to a rebuttable presumption of correctness. But the fact is that the Court of Appeals made no such ruling. Moreover, the statute clearly states that the only opinion regarding vocational rehabilitation or loss of earning power entitled to a rebuttable presumption is that of a vocational rehabilitation counselor chosen or selected by the procedures set forth in the statute. § 48-162.01(3) (Reissue 1993). Venter was not chosen or selected by those procedures, so his opinion is not entitled to a rebuttable presumption. Therefore, neither is there any merit to HEP's second assignment of error. (c) Waiver of Error Finally, in its third assignment of error, HEP urges that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to find that Stansbury waived his right to claim error in the misapplication of the statute. HEP bases this argument on two different grounds. First, HEP argues that it was error for the Court of Appeals to utilize the doctrine of plain error. Plain error exists where there is error, plainly evident from the record but not complained of at trial, which prejudicially affects a substantial right of a litigant and is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would cause a miscarriage of justice or result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. Long v. Hacker, 246 Neb. 547, 520 N.W.2d 195 (1994); Dike v. Dike, 245 Neb. 231, 512 N.W.2d 363 (1994); Hoch v. Prokop, 244 Neb. 443, 507 N.W.2d 626 (1993). HEP states that in order for the Court of Appeals to reach its result, it was required both to find that the subject statute was `procedural' for purposes of determining whether it should be applied and `substantive' in that it effected [sic] a litigant's substantial right for purposes of applying the doctrine of plain error. Brief in support of petition for further review at 8. According to HEP, these findings are inherently inconsistent. However, this assertion is incorrect. As determined in part IV(1)(a), the statute in question is procedural. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent in these two precepts. Second, HEP asserts that Stansbury was not prejudiced by the application of the old statute. Under the new statutory scheme, Stansbury would not have had the ability to select a rehabilitation counselor of his choosing without the agreement of HEP. In addition, the only rehabilitation expert whose opinions were admitted into evidence and considered by the compensation court was Stansbury's own rehabilitation expert. Finally, any rehabilitation plan proposed under the new statute would be subject to the priority scheme set forth therein: The following priorities shall be used in developing and evaluating a rehabilitation plan. No higher priority may be utilized unless all lower priorities have been determined by the rehabilitation counselor to be unlikely to result in a job placement for the injured employee that is consistent with the priorities listed in this section. If a lower priority is clearly inappropriate for the employee, the next higher priority shall be utilized. The priorities are, listed in order from lower to higher priority: (a) Return to the previous job with the same employer; (b) Modification of the previous job with the same employer; (c) A new job with the same employer; (d) A job with a new employer; or (e) A period of formal retraining which is designed to lead to employment in another career field. § 48-162.01(3) (Reissue 1993). The plan proposed for Stansbury is for a period of formal retraining and is in the highest priority category. Under the new statute, any plan of formal retraining could be utilized only if all lower priorities were shown to be clearly inappropriate for the employee, and the vocational rehabilitation counselor would be required to show that all lower priorities were unlikely to result in a job placement for Stansbury. Thus, it cannot be said that Stansbury was prejudiced by having the compensation court consider the only plan entered into evidence, proposed by a vocational rehabilitation counselor selected solely by himself, constituting the highest priority category under the new statute. As for the loss of earning power evaluation, under the new statutory scheme only the evaluation performed by the vocational rehabilitation counselor selected or chosen pursuant to the new statute is entitled to a rebuttable presumption. Whether a vocational rehabilitation counselor so selected would have determined that Stansbury's loss of earning potential was greater than the 10 percent determined by the compensation court is mere speculation. Hypothetically speaking, if Venter's opinion on loss of earning power was given a rebuttable presumption effect, the result need not necessarily be different from that reached by the compensation court. Venter opined that if the functional capacity assessment was an accurate portrayal of Stansbury's physical condition, his loss of earning capacity would be minimal. The trier of fact was free to accept the functional capacity assessment over the opinion of Banta as to Stansbury's physical condition. See Vredeveld v. Gelco Express, 222 Neb. 363, 383 N.W.2d 780 (1986). Therefore, even with a rebuttable presumption in favor of Venter's opinion, the trial court could nonetheless have concluded that Stansbury's loss of earning power was minimal. Stansbury introduced into evidence opinions ranging from minimal to 30 percent. Because on this record it cannot be said that Stansbury was prejudiced by a finding of 10 percent by the compensation court or by the application of the old statute, there is merit in HEP's third assignment of error. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that application of the old statute constituted plain error.