Opinion ID: 1619261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: a final decision by a strike vote is inadequate to provide a procedurally fair decision

Text: We now address the issue before us. As we have stated, the effect of the Court of Appeals conclusion in the instant case is that the settlement of the merits of plaintiff's grievance is the decision of his fellow union members not to strike over his grievance. Does such a final decision come within the protection of the finality rule? Our answer is no. As we have seen in our analysis of the Hines, Rothlein and Bieski cases, the Federal labor law mandates that when the final step of a grievance procedure is inadequate to provide an aggrieved employee with a procedurally fair decision, the aggrieved employee may seek judicial review on the merits of his claim. Adopting and applying this rule, we hold that a strike vote by plaintiff's fellow union members was inadequate to provide plaintiff the kind of procedurally fair decision to which he was entitled under the Federal labor law. We find the strike vote decision unsatisfactory for the essential reason that such a procedure placed those adjudging the substance of plaintiff's claim in a legally unacceptable conflict of interest position. [12] Even if we assume that plaintiff's fellow union members believed he was wrongfully discharged under the collective bargaining contract, some may have felt that it was not worth imperiling their own economic or employment status by going out on strike over his grievance. From another perspective, it is crucial to note that in such a procedure the union, as plaintiff's agent, played no active part in the decision-making process itself. In the instant case, the union did not breach its duty of fair representation toward plaintiff permitting the employee to take the matter to court. Thus, plaintiff, left without a court remedy, is left instead to the remedy of a procedure in which the decision of whether he was wrongfully discharged is adjudged by persons in a conflict of interest position. We believe that such a procedure was inadequate to provide plaintiff any kind of fair merits decision. In addition, we recall, with emphasis, what Justice BRENNAN, speaking for our unanimous Court, forcefully declared in Lowe v Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 705, 389 Mich 123; 205 NW2d 167 (1973): Every man's employment is of utmost importance to him. It occupies his time, his talents, and his thoughts. It controls his economic destiny. It is the means by which he feeds his family and provides for their security. It bears upon his personal well-being, his mental and physical health. In days gone by, a man's occupation literally gave him his name. Even today, continuous and secure employment contributes to a sense of identity for most people. It is no solace to a man fired from his job that his union acted without spite, animosity, ill will, and hostility toward him. If he has been wrongfully discharged by his employer, in violation of his contract of employment, a collective bargaining agreement made for his benefit and protection, it is unthinkable that he should be denied relief  denied justice  by the courts. 389 Mich 123, 148. To leave the determination of the merits of plaintiff's claim to a strike vote by his fellow union members not only denies plaintiff adequate legal relief, it also denies him the basic justice he is legally assured under the Federal labor law. Therefore, plaintiff should not be barred from maintaining a § 301 suit for breach of contract against the employer; to hold otherwise, [t]he contractual system would then cease to qualify as an adequate mechanism to secure individual redress for damaging failure of the employer to abide by the contract. Hines v Anchor Motor Freight, Inc, 424 US 571. Plaintiff, under his § 301 statutory right, must be allowed to vindicate his rights in a forum which will assure him adequate procedural fairness. We are well aware that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, confronted with a fact situation similar to that before us, arrived at a different legal conclusion in Haynes v United States Pipe & Foundry Co, 362 F2d 414 (CA 5, 1966). [13] The Fifth Circuit's finality rule which evolved out of the Haynes case [14] was succinctly expressed by that court in Harris v Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc, 437 F2d 167 (CA 5, 1971): Assuming that grievance procedures have been exhausted by the union, the individual grievant is ordinarily bound by a resulting adverse decision which is `final' and `binding' on the parties to the contract. Boone v Armstrong Cork Co, 384 F2d 285 (CA 5, 1967); Haynes v United States Pipe & Foundry Co, 362 F2d 414 (CA 5, 1966). `Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties' being the declared goal of federal labor policy [§ 203(d), Labor Management Relations Act, 29 USCA 173(d)] courts will refuse to review the merits of such a decision [ United Steelworkers of America v Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp, 363 US 593; 80 S Ct 1358; 4 L Ed 2d 1424 (1960); United Steelworkers v Warrior & Gulf Nav Co, supra; United Steelworkers v American Mfg Co, 363 US 564; 80 S Ct 1343; 4 L Ed 2d 1403 (1960).] 437 F2d 167, 171. With all due respect to the Fifth Circuit, we question the soundness of this rule in light of the Federal labor law policy we have analyzed supra. The Fifth Circuit substantiates its finality rule by citing the first case of the Steelworkers trilogy, American Mfg Co, supra, where the Supreme Court recognized congressional policy as stated in § 203(d) of the LMRA: Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat 154, 29 USC 173(d), states, `Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.   ' That policy can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining agreement is given full play. 363 US 564, 566. The Fifth Circuit, in its finality rule, interprets this language to the effect that § 203(d), read in conjunction with the Steelworkers trilogy, sanctions any means chosen by the parties for settlement of their differences   . We do not believe Federal labor law permits such a conclusion. In American Mfg Co, the Court quite clearly cited § 203(d) of the LMRA as congressional endorsement of the stabilizing influence of arbitration. As we have noted, inherent to the Court's recognition of arbitration in the Steelworkers trilogy is the recognition of the procedural safeguards afforded employees in final arbitral decisions (see fn 11). Therefore, there is an inherent procedural limitation to the scope of § 203(d), and the full play parties are given for settling their differences. The Fifth Circuit, in affirming a strike vote as the final decision on the merits of an aggrieved employee's claim in the Haynes case, essentially undermines this procedural dimension of the Steelworkers trilogy. Our analysis has shown this procedural dimension of § 203(d) as cited in the Steelworkers trilogy has been given clear judicial recognition by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Rothlein, supra, Bieski, supra, and by the Supreme Court in Hines, supra . As the Supreme Court declared in Hines, supra : Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements provided in collective agreements, but it was anticipated, we are sure, that the contractual machinery would operate within some minimum levels of integrity. 424 US 571. Under the Fifth Circuit's finality rule a strike vote merits decision can legally constitute an aggrieved employee's sole, exclusive mode of redress. But such a merits determination is clearly contrary to the rule which arises out of Rothlein, Bieski, and, most importantly, Hines, that a culminating merits determination be adequate to provide an aggrieved employee a procedurally fair decision. If we were to endorse such a procedurally inadequate, unfair final decision, we would be endorsing contractual machinery which operated without the minimal level of integrity mandated by the Supreme Court in Hines. We are compelled, therefore, to reject such a final merits decision and any legal rule which supports the finality of such a decision as radically at odds with both the spirit and the Federal labor law policy articulated by the Supreme Court in every important case pertaining to an individual employee's rights under a collective bargaining contract. V  CONCLUSION Because in the instant case the resolution of plaintiff's grievance, a strike vote by his fellow union members, was procedurally inadequate to provide the kind of fair decision to which plaintiff is entitled under the Federal labor law articulated in Hines, Bieski, and Rothlein, we vacate the summary judgment and remand to the trial court for action not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs to plaintiff.