Opinion ID: 181573
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objective and Subjective Inquiry

Text: Appellants contend that [a] substantive due process claim for deliberate indifference in a foster home placement requires examination of both objective and subjective components and that neither component is met in this case. This court has only addressed the application of the deliberate indifference standard with respect to foster children in one case. See Gibson v. Merced County Department of Human Resources, 799 F.2d 582, 589-90 (9th Cir.1986). In Gibson, we held that state officials were not deliberately indifferent to a foster child's liberty interest when they removed the child from uncooperative foster parents who were attempting to prevent the child's reunification with her natural mother. See id. Although we did not discuss the deliberate indifference standard in Gibson, we have addressed that standard at length in resolving cases involving prisoners alleging deliberate indifference. In the prisoner cases we have held that deliberate indifference requires an objective risk of harm and a subjective awareness of that harm. Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th Cir.2010), as amended (citation and emphasis omitted); see also, Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir.2010) (concluding that [a] prison official cannot be liable for deliberate indifference unless he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1242 (9th Cir.2010) (recognizing that the objective component requires a showing of a substantial risk of serious harm and the subjective component requires a showing that the official was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and he ... also dr[e]w the inference). These cases inform our analysis and our review of precedent from our sister circuits. In the specific context of cases involving foster care, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held that deliberate indifference is established if an official [was] both aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed] and [the official]... also dr[e]w the inference. Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir.2004) (citation omitted); Arledge v. Franklin County, Ohio, 509 F.3d 258, 261, 263 (6th Cir.2007) (same); James ex rel. James v. Friend, 458 F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir.2006) (same). This analysis is identical to the subjective deliberate indifference component that we have articulated in prisoner cases and includes by implication the objective component requiring the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm. The Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have each phrased the deliberate indifference test along the same lines. See Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir.1981) (explaining that deliberate indifference cannot exist absent some knowledge triggering an affirmative duty to act ...); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811-12 (3d Cir.2000) (defining deliberate indifference as conduct [that] shocks the conscience while assuming that the should have known standard applies); White by White v. Chambliss, 112 F.3d 731, 737 (4th Cir.1997) (including a requirement that state officials were plainly placed on notice of a danger and chose to ignore the danger notwithstanding the notice); J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir.2003) (requiring subjective actual knowledge or suspicion of the risk); Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that state actors may be liable for placing children in a foster home they know or suspect to be dangerous to the children ...) (citation omitted); H.A.L. ex rel. Lewis v. Foltz, 551 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (11th Cir.2008) (assigning liability if the official was deliberately indifferent to a known and substantial risk to the child of serious harm). We are persuaded by our precedent and cases from other circuits analyzing the issue, that the deliberate indifference standard, as applied to foster children, requires a showing of an objectively substantial risk of harm and a showing that the officials were subjectively aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed and that either the official actually drew that inference or that a reasonable official would have been compelled to draw that inference. See Clouthier, 591 F.3d at 1242; see also Conn, 591 F.3d at 1095-96; Arledge, 509 F.3d at 263; James, 458 F.3d at 730; Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881. We also conclude that the subjective component may be inferred from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious. Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881 (citation and emphasis omitted); Arledge, 509 F.3d at 263. The district court ruled that the Appellants were deliberately indifferent because they were aware of facts that would have led reasonable people in their position to know or suspect that Fabregas was abusing [Appellees]. However, the district court did not analyze whether there was an objectively substantial risk of serious harm and whether Appellants actually drew the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm to Appellees existed or that a reasonable official would have been compelled to draw that inference. Failure to apply the correct standard constituted reversible error. See Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir.1999), as amended.