Opinion ID: 2604616
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Overruling Rousseau Contrary to Stare Decisis

Text: The majority overrules Rousseau without statutory necessity and contrary to the rule of stare decisis. The majority attacks Rousseau, claiming one of the cases upon which it relied, State v. Gum, 68 W.Va. 105, 69 S.E. 463 (1910), although still good law in itself, nevertheless relied heavily on cases from Iowa, California, and Florida, which are no longer controlling in their jurisdictions. Majority at 1298. Although this thread is thin enough, the majority neglects to note these jurisdictions have not, unlike our majority, judicially overruled hundreds of years of common law, but changed the rule by legislation. See Majority at 1302 n. 11. Yet our majority is apparently inclined to legislate from the bench what other courts have left to their legislatures, although our Legislature, to its credit, has resisted the temptation to impose such an innovation. Under the heading The Trend Away from the Common Law Rule (Majority at 1302-04), the majority seems to claim the common law rule should be overruled because now there are 20 states which adhere to it whereas previously there were 45. This rationale is no reason at all. It would be preferable for our state to adhere to an appropriate rule than an inappropriate one, even if we were the only state in the 50 so to do. If anything, the numerical observation of the majority causes one to soberly reflect upon Justice Douglas's metaphor that As nightfall does not come all at once, neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of change in the airhowever slightlest we become unwitting victims of the darkness. [7] Absent legislative intervention [t]he doctrine [of stare decisis] requires a clear showing that an established rule is incorrect and harmful before it is abandoned. In re Stranger Creek, 77 Wash.2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508 (1970). A thorough discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis by a closely divided Supreme Court in the context of a determined claim that prior precedent be overruled is propounded in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2808, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921). Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16. At the other extreme, a different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed. Id. at 854, 112 S.Ct. at 2808. The right to rely upon fixed standards to determine one's future course of conduct is, of course, an important consideration supporting the rule. Although I doubt Mr. Valentine spent the evening preceding this incident searching out precedents in his local law library, it is equally apparent that the majority in Casey followed the doctrine in the abortion context more out of a respect for precedent than any illusion that pronouncements of the court would realistically affect the incidence of future pregnancies. [8] Beyond that, Casey clarifies the very heart of stare decisis as a bar to reexamining the prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come out differently.... Casey, 505 U.S. at 864, 112 S.Ct. at 2813-14. I see no grounds advanced by the majority today to overrule Rousseau for any reason new or unique to our time. Neither human nature nor the essential aspects of coercive state power have changed much over the centuries, much less over the past 40 years. Beyond that I would assert the clearly incorrect rule is the one created by the majority today. It does not even examine the true principled basis of the common law rule, much less reasonably, or persuasively, disprove it. At most it misapplies a policy argument made in State v. Westlund, 13 Wash.App. 460, 467, 536 P.2d 20, 77 A.L.R.3d 270, review denied, 85 Wash.2d 1014 (1975), that resisting lawful arrest is disfavored and the courts are the best place to vindicate one's rights. While that is a widely held and commendable view, it has nothing to do with the issue here. Westlund itself suggests that the policy reasons against forcibly resisting lawful arrests are inapplicable to unlawful ones. Moreover, the rule adopted by the majority is inconsistent with the lawful entitlement to use force to protect one's person and property, or, to put it another way, protect one's property in his person and his estate. It is well established that determinations as to when force may be used in self-defense are not made (as the majority suggests) on the basis of where the right can best be vindicated. Indeed, in this state the citizen has the right to use force to defend property against trespass and invasion. RCW 9A.16.020(3); Coffel v. Clallam County, 58 Wash.App. 517, 524, 794 P.2d 513 (1990). If one can use force to defend his property, why not use force to defend his person? John Locke, the 17th Century English political philosopher whom Thomas Jefferson acknowledged as the philosophical father and guiding spirit of the American Revolution, [9] recognized a person's property in his person is foremost among his rights to property. John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, in 35 Great Books of the Western World 30 (R. Hutchins ed., 1952). And James Madison agreed one has a property interest not only in his land, or merchandise, or money, but also in the safety and liberty of his person.... James Madison, Essay on Property for the National Gazette (Mar. 27, 1792), in 14 The Papers of James Madison 266, 266-68 (Robert A. Rutland & Thomas A. Maron et al. eds., 1983). The majority opinion, therefore, conflicts with RCW 9A.16.020(3) and can be explained more by a political preference for an enlarged government prerogative than by a general and principled rule proven by equal application within the private sector. Similarly, this state adheres to the no duty to retreat rule. One who is assaulted in a place he has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has a right to respond with force no matter how reasonable flight may be. State v. Williams, 81 Wash.App. 738, 743-44, 916 P.2d 445 (1996). As the court held just last year, While the wisdom of such a policy may be open to debate, the policy is one of long standing and reflects the notion that one lawfully where he is entitled to be should not be made to yield and flee by a show of unlawful force against him. Williams, 81 Wash.App. at 744, 916 P.2d 445 (citing W. LaFave and A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 5.7(f) (2d ed.1986)). Apparently the private violator of another's legal rights may face lawful resistance but the rogue government actor may proceed with comparative impunity. The majority then contends recognition of the lawful right to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest promotes lawlessness or anarchy. Majority op. at 1304. But to the extent we distinguish between the rule of law and the rule of men, [10] the majority's purblind stand actually promotes lawlessness, while strict enforcement of the common law right to lawfully resist an unlawful arrest is not anarchy but its prevention. Anarchy is lawlessness. Black's Law Dictionary 84 (6th ed.1990). And anarchism is a game at which the police can beat you. [11] An unlawful arrest is the essence of anarchy. American history is rich in forms of lawlessness, and not all of them stand outside the legal system as enemies of `law and order.' Many, in fact, take place `inside' the legal system itself, or are aspects of that systempolice brutality, for example. Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History 172 (1993). [12] The citizen who stands by his legal rights in the face of lawless government misconduct upholds the law and renders a service not only to himself but the public generally. [13] Many other jurisdictions prefer the common law rule to mandatory abject submission to unlawful arrest. [14] There is no indication these jurisdictions are plagued by anarchy.