Opinion ID: 184887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supervisors

Text: 11 Section 2(3) of the NLRA excludes from the term employee any individual employed as a supervisor. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Section 2(11) defines supervisor as follows: 12 any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 13 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). The first portion of section 2(11) is stated disjunctively--the possession of any of the enumerated powers is sufficient to establish supervisory status. Section 2(11)'s conjunctive language, however, mandates that the exercise of any of the powers must require independent judgment, ... and cannot be merely routine, clerical, perfunctory, or sporadic. Desert Hosp., 91 F.3d at 193. In short, to be considered a supervisor, one must exercise only one of the enumerated supervisory functions, using independent judgment in doing so. 14 In its main attack on the ALJ's and the Board's findings, Saipan asserts that Edwin Melon should have been considered a statutory supervisor. Melon was one of three housekeeping supervisors reporting directly to Atsushi Suzuki, the Assistant Front Manager in charge of Saipan's housekeeping department. According to the ALJ's finding, Melon was the only employee with that title from at least 1993 until six months before the election. 6 Even though the ALJ found that Melon possessed several supervisory indicia 7 and exercised this authority in the interest of Saipan, see NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 578, 114 S.Ct. 1778, 128 L.Ed.2d 586 (1994) ([A]cts within the scope of employment or on the authorized business of the employer are 'in the interest of the employer.' ), he nevertheless concluded that Melon was not a section 2(11) supervisor because he failed to meet the independent judgment test of section 2(11). JA 130-31. The Board adopted the ALJ's findings, concluding that there was no evidence that Melon's duties required the exercise of independent judgment or that Melon effectively recommended changes in the employees' terms and conditions of employment. JA 195 n.2. For the following reasons, we reject the Board's conclusion that Melon did not exercise independent judgment as unsupported by substantial evidence. 15 The Board's conclusion that Melon exercised no independent judgment but rather performed duties that were routine for the most part and decidedly clerical for the remainder contradicts the ALJ's factual findings, which manifest that Melon had substantial autonomy in dealing with the housekeeping staff regarding scheduling, assignment and discipline. JA 130. As to assignments and scheduling, the record established that Melon dealt with these issues often without regular or concerned oversight by Suzuki or another assistant manager. JA 127; see Eskaton Sunrise Community, 279 N.L.R.B. 68, 75 (1986) (employee who assigned housekeeping duties, checked employees' work, obtained replacements for sick employees and performed written evaluations held to be supervisor); Mr. Steak, Inc., 267 N.L.R.B. 553, 555 n. 3 (1983) (scheduling employee working hours confers supervisory status). As the ALJ noted, [T]he more typical handling [of overtime] was for Melon to recognize [a] need, [and] merely inform Suzuki as to what he would do. JA 128 (when the late shift maid did not report, the problem devolved to Melon for solution, and he was both initiator of the overtime inquiry, and also did so by one-on-one conversations rather than throwing the opportunity open to shift members as a whole). [M]anagers [also] did not participate in the decision as to who received back-to-back assignments. Id. 8 Moreover, because of the focused, sudden needs associated with occupancy surges, Melon was often required to draw on his awareness from experience and observation about whether the composite capabilities of scheduled housekeepers on a given day was sufficient to complete all readying work throughout the hotel's guest rooms. JA 127, 128; see Glenmark, 147 F.3d at 343 ([T]he decisions of whether to call in additional staff and whether to reorganize the schedule to accommodate ... emergencies require the exercise of independent judgment.). Thus, rather than being practically automatic, JA 130, guest room preparation was greatly affected by surges of people [which], in turn, created an array of special procedures and required Melon to make independent determinations in scheduling and assigning the employees, JA 123; JA 860-61 (if Melon did not deem maid's reasons for switching days important enough, he did not permit switch even though another maid agreed); id. 714 (Melon assigned bonus rooms without management oversight or complaint); id. 127 (when need arose to have rooms quick cleaned, Melon's assignment process was not given regular or concerned oversight by Suzuki or another assistant manager). 16 Moreover, it appears that Melon exercised independent judgment in rewarding employees. For instance, the ALJ found that the potential of rewarding housekeeping employees was constantly present and mentioned the distribution of back-to-back room assignments, with their prized overtime guarantees, as the most striking instance of Melon's ability to reward. JA 127. Although the selection process is unclear, managers did not participate in the decision. JA 127. We also note that Melon's usual practice of coupling a backto-back assignment with days off was not always carried through that mechanically. JA 127-28. The ALJ, however, suggested that, in making the prized assignments, Melon was not rewarding employees within the meaning of the Act since the employees earned their extra pay either by extending their shift or by appearing for odd late night times when back to back was performed. JA 131 (emphasis original). But we disagree with the ALJ's underlying inference that a reward must be wholly gratuitous--Melon used independent judgment in determining who received the choice assignments notwithstanding the fact he did not control their compensation. 9 17 Furthermore, the Board counsel's endorsement of the Board's conclusion is based on insufficient evidence arbitrarily culled from the record. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488 ([A] reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.). For example, the Board counsel relied on eleven portions of transcript to support his conclusion that Suzuki [rather than Melon] preassigned the housekeepers to specific sections, rotating their assignments periodically. Resp't Br. at 15. Eight of the citations, however, involve witnesses whom the ALJ disbelieved, two provide only weak support and the last contradicts the Board's conclusion, see JA 864-65 (testimony of Darlin Rebusquillo, noting that Melon assigned all bonus rooms on days he acted as supervisor). Since the counsel relied on evidence the ALJ deemed unreliable or untrustworthy while at the same time accepting the ALJ's credibility findings, we reject his assertion that Melon's supervisory status is based on substantial evidence from the record as a whole. See Air Canada v. DOT, 148 F.3d 1142, 1151 n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1998) ([W]here credibility of witnesses is at stake, an [ALJ's] evaluation of the witness' testimony can be an indicator of the substantiality of the evidence.) (citations omitted); Capital Cleaning Contractors v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1004 (D.C.Cir.1998) ([A] court must uphold Boardapproved credibility determinations of an ALJ unless they are hopelessly incredible or self-contradictory or patently insupportable.) (quotations omitted). 18 Finally, we disagree with the Board's treatment of Perry d/b/a Holiday Inn-Glendale, 277 N.L.R.B. 1254 (1985), which Saipan relied on for the proposition that deciding whether an employee should be asked to work overtime requires the exercise of independent judgment. The ALJ initially refused to use the decision for any comparative purposes because (1) the individual held to be a supervisor in Glendale held the position temporarily and could only authorize 10 to 20 minutes of overtime and (2) if he had been found not to be a supervisor, there would have been 70 unsupervised employees in the department. JA 132. Melon exercised much more independent judgment than the temporary supervisor with limited overtime authority in Glendale. Not surprisingly, the Board also attempts to distinguish Glendale in its brief by pointing to several facts which it claims are not present here. See Resp't Br. at 29 n.l3. At least one fact in common with Glendale was present here: the housekeeping employees believed that Melon was in charge of them. He was identified by the maids as their primary supervisor in the months immediately before the election, and in December 1993, a number of housekeepers petitioned Saipan to replace him because of supervisory shortcomings. This situation and Saipan's response to it--which was to counsel Melon on improved supervisory techniques--would not have occurred unless Melon was both treated as a supervisor by Saipan and, more importantly, viewed as such by the other employees. 19 Saipan also argues that the Board erred by not finding Waiter Supervisor Paquito Gonzales, Waiter Supervisor Reynaldo Rojas and Bartender Supervisor Sesinando Laderas to be statutory supervisors. 10 As it does with regard to Melon, Saipan contends that Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas exhibited independent judgment by assigning, evaluating and disciplining other employees. But several factors distinguish Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas from Melon. Accordingly, we affirm the Board's decision not to classify Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas as section 2(11) supervisors. See International Union, 41 F.3d at 1536. 20 Although Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas had some authority to make assignments within shifts and to assign occasional overtime, their decisions were reviewed by management and, in the case of Laderas, often overruled. We agree with the ALJ that the hotel's rigidly structured management team for food and beverage operations ... was a dominating feature of the various restaurant and food serving operations. JA 138, 140. We find this finding significant because the managers' overlapping six-day work weeks and their continuous, on-site oversight of operations leaves no doubt that they, rather than the waiter and bartender supervisors, were in charge. Thus, the Board reasonably concluded that Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas acted only as leadmen regarding assignments and scheduling with limited authority to assist in operations but with no true decision making power. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 280-81, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (Congress sought to distinguish between supervisory personnel, vested with genuine management prerogatives, and employees--such as straw bosses, leadmen, and set-up men, and other minor supervisory employees--who enjoy NLRA's protections even though they perform minor supervisory duties. (quotation omitted)); see JA 138-43 (all true judgmental factors were absorbed into the layered array of manage[rs] above). 21 In addition, Gonzales and Rojas occasionally informed management about the performance of other employees but the Board reasonably found no evidence that Saipan made any decision to adjust the wages of any employee based upon their opinions. See Beverly-Enters.-Pa., Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.3d 1269, 1270 (D.C.Cir.1997); see also NLRB v. Adco Elec., Inc., 6 F.3d 1110, 1117 (5th Cir.1993) (reporting problems is nothing more than ... any ... employer would expect of experienced employees). Although a manager suggested that Rojas effectively evaluated other employees, the ALJ discredited his testimony with Rojas's own statement. See JA 140-41. Nor does Saipan advance its case by showing that Laderas completed written evaluations of other employees. The evaluations contained no recommendation and failed to affect any employee's terms and conditions of employment. Laderas received no instructions about the evaluations and never spoke to employees about them. Instead, Laderas believed that Saipan used the evaluation to choose the employee of the year. 22 Similarly, we find no evidence that Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas ever effectively disciplined other employees. Although Saipan relied on (to support their disciplinary authority) a document that they were asked to draft, the document speaks of voluntary compliance and the ALJ reasonably discredited evidence suggesting that Gonzales had in fact exerted his disciplinary authority. See Capital Cleaning Contractors, 147 F.3d at 1004; JA 137, 982-87 (policy statement). Thus, the Board reasonably refused to classify Gonzales, Rojas and Laderas as section 2(11) supervisors because their exercise of supervisory authority was at best perfunctory and sporadic. Desert Hosp., 91 F.3d at 193.