Opinion ID: 1955771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether sdcl 21-3-11 is an affirmative defense.

Text: The day after the jury returned its verdict, Clinical Lab's counsel wrote the trial judge requesting to be heard on the applicability of SDCL 21-3-11. [13] Sander asserts this statute is an affirmative defense or an avoidance which is required to be pled in responsive pleadings pursuant to SDCL 15-6-8(c). Sander then concludes Clinical Lab has waived its opportunity to avail itself of that statute's limitation on damage awards because it did not formally assert this statute until after a jury verdict adverse to it was returned. The trial court found the statute was not an affirmative defense and did not have to be pled in responsive pleadings. SDCL 15-6-8(c) contains an extensive list of affirmative defenses to be pled in responsive pleadings. [14] That list does not include the statute capping medical malpractice damage awards, nor does the language of SDCL 21-3-11 indicate the legislature intended that statute to be an affirmative defense. The statutory list of affirmative defenses concludes with the phrase any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. Id. Sander asserts this phrase encompasses SDCL 21-3-11. We again look to federal court decisions for assistance in interpreting this phrase. Brasel, 89 S.D. at 116, 229 N.W.2d at 570; Wilson, 83 S.D. at 211, 157 N.W.2d at 21. One purpose behind the federal counterpart to our affirmative defense statutes is to give the opposing party notice. Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 1453, 28 L.Ed.2d 788, 812 (1971). The notice purpose of pleading an affirmative defense has here been served as it is beyond dispute that Sander was made aware several months before trial, and again at trial, that Clinical Lab intended to seek the benefits of SDCL 21-3-11. Another purpose of pleading an affirmative defense is to give the plaintiff a chance to rebut the asserted defense. Id. However, here the question is not whether Sander has had a chance to rebut an application of SDCL 21-3-11, for that chance can hardly be questioned in view of the fact that Sander had ample notice of Clinical Lab's intention. Rather, the question is whether the statute raises any issues of fact which can be rebutted by a plaintiff. While the enumerated defenses in SDCL 15-6-8(c) may or may not be applicable in any particular case, as determined by the trier of fact, the medical damages cap statute applies in every medical malpractice case, though the statute may or may not have an ultimate effect in a particular case. The only questions this statute raises are legal questions and they do not arise until after a verdict has been obtained. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err when it determined SDCL 21-3-11 is not an affirmative defense.