Opinion ID: 6335209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resignation for “Good Reason”

Text: Ms. Miller first argues that the circuit court erroneously dismissed her claim for severance pay after concluding that she was not entitled to this relief since she did not resign for “Good Reason” as defined by the Employment Agreement. Ms. Miller further contends that after the circuit court found that SJRC had materially breached the Employment Agreement by failing to pay her on time, the court’s subsequent finding that Ms. Miller did not resign because she had been paid late was wrong. Per Ms. Miller’s argument, the record overwhelmingly supports the notion that Ms. Miller resigned because she was not being paid in a timely manner. In rebuttal, SJRC does not contest that it breached its duties under the Employment Agreement; however, SJRC maintains that the circuit court did not err in finding that Ms. Miller did not resign for “Good Reason” because the issue of “cause” pursuant to the Employment Agreement is a subjective, factual matter. It contends that the record reflects that the circuit court was presented with evidence and testimony which allowed the court to make a decision as to whether “Good Reason” existed. According to SJRC, after reviewing and weighing such evidence, i.e. Ms. Miller’s 12 resignation letter, testimony, etc., the circuit court correctly decided that “Good Reason” did not exist. We disagree. This Court has long recognized that “[w]here the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be applied and not construed.” Syl. Pt. 2, Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Haden, 153 W. Va. 721, 172 S.E.2d 126 (1969). Furthermore, “[i]t is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous language in their written contract or to make a new or different contract for them.” Syl. Pt. 3, Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 147 W. Va. 484, 128 S.E.2d 626 (1962). By applying these principles to the case sub judice, it is evident that the circuit court erred in balancing the concurrent motivations for Ms. Miller’s resignation. Here, we have a valid Employment Agreement that clearly sets forth in Section 4.4 that when an employee “voluntarily resigns, the [e]mployee will give a minimum of three (3) months advance written notice to the Company, except in the case of voluntary resignation for Good Reason as provided for in this Agreement.” (Emphasis added). Section 4.4 also states that “[i]n the event that the [e]mployee resigns for Good Reason, [s]he shall be entitled to the Severance Package set forth in Section 4.6 below.” In accordance with Section 4.6, “Good Reason” exists when SJRC “breaches its obligation to provide the [employee] compensation or benefits or breaches any other material term of this Agreement[.]’” (Emphasis added). 13 In the trial order, the circuit court specifically found that “SJRC materially breached its obligation to provide [Ms. Miller] compensation or benefits by failing to make payments of the base salary in accordance with the Company’s regular payroll practices.” SJRC’s breach of its obligations impelled Ms. Miller to seek employment elsewhere. These findings are clearly supported by the record. The analysis should have ended there, and the circuit court should have applied the clear terms of the Employment Agreement; however, the circuit court continued its analysis and found that the evidence was “inconsistent with the position [of Ms. Miller] that at the time of the presentation of her letter of resignation that she believed she was entitled to the severance package set forth in the [E]mployment [A]greement.” While it is true that Ms. Miller wrote that she resigned because she found another job opportunity that was “too exciting to decline,” the record is clear that Ms. Miller sought out that other job because of SJRC’s material breach of its contract obligations. The parties’ relationship was, in part, governed by the terms of the Employment Agreement. The terms of the Employment Agreement, as set forth above, are clear: if SJRC breached the agreement, then “Good Reason” existed, and a resigning employee was entitled to the severance package. Nothing in the Employment Agreement required the parties or the court to search for another underlying or concurrent motivation or reason. Here, the circuit court made a clear finding that SJRC breached its written contract obligations, and therefore, Ms. Miller met the definition of a “Good Reason” for resigning as defined by the contract. Ms. Miller was indisputably entitled to the severance 14 package in accordance with the unambiguous terms of the Employment Agreement, and the circuit court erred in finding otherwise.