Opinion ID: 787203
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Challenges to the District Court's Restitution Orders15

Text: 55 All three defendants argue that the District Court exceeded the scope of the mandate from this Court by ordering, for the first time at the resentencing following remand, the payment of restitution. They note that, when we remanded, we did not direct the District Court to order restitution, and they draw our attention to the general mandate rule that absent explicit language in the mandate to the contrary, resentencing should be limited when the Court of Appeals upholds the underlying convictions but determines that a sentence has been erroneously imposed and remands to correct that error. Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1228. 56 The Government does not dispute that the District Court did not order, nor did the Government request, restitution during the defendants' initial sentence proceedings. Nevertheless, the Government asserts that the District Court was free to consider restitution orders for the first time at resentencing because of an applicable exception to the general mandate rule. 57 The Government correctly observes that a district court may resentence beyond the scope of the mandate, or may resentence a defendant on a limited remand using fresh considerations, if it has cogent or compelling reasons, including the need to correct a clear error. Id. at 1230 (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 The Government argues that the District Court was permitted to order restitution during resentencing because the failure to do so previously was clear error. We agree. 58 The MVRA provides for mandatory restitution in criminal cases where an offense is a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), 17 (c)(1)(A)(i). 18 The extortion offense of which each of appellants was convicted is a crime of violence. See id. § 16(b); 19 see also United States v. Friedman, 300 F.3d 111, 128 (2d Cir.2002). It is therefore indisputable that the MVRA required the District Court at the initial sentencing proceedings to enter orders of restitution with respect to each defendant. Defendants do not contest this proposition; they argue only that, having failed to impose such orders at the initial sentencing proceedings, the narrow scope of the District Court's mandate on remand for resentencing prohibited it from entering orders of restitution at resentencing. See Johnson's Br. at 38-39; Hunter's Br. at 14-18; Carnes's Br. at 11-12. 59 Because the mandate rule does not forbid a district court to resentence beyond the scope of a limited remand for a cogent, compelling reason, such as correcting a clear error, and because it was error for the District Court to have failed during the initial sentencing proceedings to order mandatory restitution as required by the MVRA, we hold that the District Court did not err by ordering restitution during resentencing proceedings.
60 Carnes argues that the District Court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to Defoe, because Defoe declined restitution. In a related argument, Hunter argues that the District Court erred when it directed that, should Felix refuse to accept restitution payments, the funds should be paid to the government's Crime Victims Fund. See August 2, 2002 Transcript, at 33. These questions of statutory interpretation are issues of first impression in our Circuit. 61 Contrary to Carnes's argument, a district court may — indeed, must — impose orders of restitution on defendants convicted of crimes identified in the MVRA even if their victims decline restitution. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the MVRA's statutory scheme of mandatory restitution, and it would undermine the power of the criminal justice system to punish defendants, where appropriate, through orders of restitution. Cf. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir.1984) (Restitution undoubtedly serves traditional purposes of punishment.). 62 The central provision of the MVRA requires that, [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, ... the court shall order... that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) 20 (emphasis added). For defendants convicted of a crime of violence, such as Carnes and Hunter, the MVRA provides for no exception to this mandatory provision, see id. § 3663A, though it provides some exceptions for other categories of offenses, see id. § 3663A(c)(3), (c)(1)(A)(ii). The language of § 3663A expressly prohibits interpretation of any other provision of law to create an exception to the obligations imposed on sentencing courts. See id. § 3663A(a)(1) (Notwithstanding any other provision of law....). 63 Hunter and Carnes draw our attention to two provisions from the following section, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(1) and (g)(2), which, they argue, indicate that when an identified victim declines restitution, the District Court is not only relieved of its obligation to order restitution under § 3663A, but, indeed, is powerless to impose an order of restitution, unless the victim himself chooses to assign his interest in restitution to the Crime Victims Fund. 64 It is true that the MVRA provides that orders of restitution entered under § 3663A should be administered according to procedures laid out in § 3664. See id. § 3663A(d) (An order of restitution under [§ 3663A] shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664.). However, neither of the provisions cited in § 3664 by defendants can reasonably be interpreted as carving out an exception to the mandatory nature of § 3663A. See id. § 3664(g)(1) (No victim shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order.) & (g)(2) (A victim may at any time assign the victim's interest in restitution payments to the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury without in any way impairing the obligation of the defendant to make such payments.). Indeed, these subsections state only that a victim need not accept restitution and that a victim may assign his interest in restitution to the Crime Victims Fund. Without some evidence in the text or history of the legislation to supersede the plain language of § 3663A that restitution is mandatory, the defendants' arguments must be rejected. 65 Our conclusion that § 3663A requires restitution regardless of the consent of victims is consistent with our long-held understanding of the purposes of restitution, which include not only the compensation of victims, but also the punishment of offenders. See Brown, 744 F.2d at 909. In view of these two purposes of restitution and the explicit language of the MVRA rejecting any exceptions to the requirement of restitution drawn from any other provision of law, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), we conclude that defendants' victims may not veto the obligation of the District Court to impose orders of restitution. 66 Hunter also urges us to vacate the District Court's restitution award on the basis that it was error for the District Court to assign Felix's interest in restitution, should Felix renounce it, to the Crime Victims Fund. Hunter argues that § 3664(g)(2) provides the statutory authority to assign interest in restitution only to victims, and that the Court therefore had no authority to do so. We disagree. Although § 3664(g)(2) authorizes victims to make such an assignment, it does not preclude the Court from doing so. See id. § 3664(g)(2) (A victim may at any time assign the victim's interest in restitution payments to the Crime Victims Fund in the Treasury without in any way impairing the obligation of the defendant to make such payments.). 21 67 The District Court did not err in directing that, if the victim renounced its interest in Hunter's restitution payments, those funds would be assigned to the Crime Victims Fund.