Opinion ID: 1194220
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Heading: Was the Warrantless Search Justifiable Under Plain View?

Text: As noted previously, the majority opinion upholds the search of the cabin by reason of the plain-view exception to the warrant requirement. The leading case discussing this exception is Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), which the majority note we followed in McCutcheon v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 537 (1979). McCutcheon sets out the three elements generally required to support a claimed plain view justification. [4] While it is true that the presence of these three elements will sustain a plain-view claim, it is important to note, as the majority opinion does, that in Coolidge several limitations on the doctrine's application were identified. See: LaFave, Search and Seizure, Vol. 1, § 2.2, p. 244 (1978). These limitations were pointed up by Justice Stewart in his plurality opinion in Coolidge : The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the statement of its rationale. The first of these is that plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent `exigent circumstances.' Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. [5] (Emphasis added.) 403 U.S. at 468, 91 S.Ct. at 2039. From this it must be assumed that, absent some prior justification for the intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, a plain-view encounter with incriminating evidence cannot justify a warrantless seizure. As noted by Justice Marshall in Steagald v. United States, such justification for warrantless entry can come from a consent to enter, or it can be due to the presence of exigent circumstances. 101 S.Ct. at 1647. Other justification for the warrantless seizure can also arise when the police are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect or engaged in responding to an emergency. United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir.1981) citing from Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34-35, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 1971-1973, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). In the final analysis, the law requires not only that plain view satisfy the prior-intrusion standards (as in McCutcheon, supra) but also that any warrantless seizure be justified under one of the above exceptions. In this case, therefore, the actions of the officers must not only have satisfied the prior-intrusion rule of McCutcheon, but there must also have been exigent circumstances present to legalize the seizure since none of the other delineated exceptions are applicable. [6] With the above in mind, I can agree that the majority opinion applies the search of the cabin under the correct standards governing plain-view justifications to the cabin's search. My problems, however, arise because I am simply unable to agree that the facts of this case, as applied to the rules and standards discussed above, warrant any finding except that the initial entry into the cabin was illegal and violative of appellant's constitutional rights. I take issue with two of the conclusions reached in the majority opinion. First of all, I cannot conclude that the facts support a finding of inadvertence on the part of the police, nor can I agree with the further conclusion that the warrantless entry and subsequent seizure of the evidence was justified by the presence of exigent circumstances. In McCutcheon v. State, supra, we set out three requirements for justifying the discovery of evidence under the plain-view doctrine, the third of those being that the discovery be inadvertent. 604 P.2d at 540-541. [7] The majority support the conclusion that the officer's discovery was inadvertent. For me, the evidence can lead to but one conclusion  namely, that the officers stopped at this particular cabin, not because their curiosity was piqued by a flapping plastic or an interest in the area's historical attractions, but, rather, with the intent to see if Mr. Jessee was involved in the crime. The evidence leads unerringly to the conclusion that the officers arrived at the cabin site because Jessee furnished them a map and an oral description, showing them the way and describing the adobe-roof feature of the cabin. I also have trouble concluding that the officers, while looking for the Portschy trailer home, just happened to stop at this cabin. Was it that the cabin looked like a trailer? It is also noteworthy that both officers passed up investigating several other cabins in the vicinity, and by sheer coincidence decided to investigate only the one containing the stolen items. In summary, I say that the facts surrounding the officers' investigation of the cabin and its contents cannot support a conclusion that the discovery was inadvertent. I would have held that the claim of plain view did not satisfy this particular requirement of McCutcheon. However, for purposes of discussion only, permit me to assume, arguendo, that the McCutcheon inadvertence requirement was complied with. I would, nevertheless, hold that there is insufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the exigent-circumstance requirement for a warrantless intrusion into the interior of the premises. [8] The majority support their finding of exigent circumstances noting that the officers, upon discovery of the evidence, feared that if it was not seized immediately it might be destroyed. The majority also seek to support their position by pointing out that the investigation took place on a Sunday, Lander was some 45 miles away, and the officers were not clothed for the frigid weather in a way which would permit one of them to remain in the vicinity of the cabin while the other went for a warrant. These factors can all be taken into account but I do not believe that, even taken together, they constitute the exigent circumstances contemplated by the case law. As a general rule, threatened destruction of evidence can be a sufficient exigent circumstance to justify a warrantless intrusion. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948). To justify a warrantless seizure on the basis of destruction of evidence, the perceived danger must be real and apparent. The question is whether there is a real or substantial likelihood that the contraband or known evidence on the premises might be removed or destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. State v. Dorson, 62 Haw. 377, 615 P.2d 740 (1980). Courts have held that warrantless entry and seizure was not justified even though individuals were on the premises at the time a plain-view discovery occurred. State v. Dias, supra; State v. Schur, 217 Kan. 741, 538 P.2d 689 (1975); Coleman v. Reilly, 8 Wash. App. 684, 508 P.2d 1035 (1973). The mere fact that the evidence is of a type that is easily removed, hidden or destroyed, does not, in and of itself, constitute an exigent circumstance. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). The State, therefore, carries a heavy burden when it attempts to justify a warrantless entry on the basis of exigent circumstance. In this case, the State has not met this burden by any stretch of the imagination. Here the officers testified that no one was in the area when they were there, the cabin was located in a remote area, and the officers' presence were not detected. From these and other facts of record I would conclude that there was no showing that the threatened destruction of evidence was a real possibility. As stated in State v. Dorson, supra: The police must be able to point to specific and articulable facts from which it may be determined that the action they took was necessitated by the exigencies of the situation. 615 P.2d at 748. Thus I would conclude that a search of the record fails to disclose any specific factors which would lend support to the officers' subjective belief that in the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant the evidence would have been removed or destroyed. Mere inconvenience in procuring a warrant is never enough to justify warrantless seizure. Johnson v. United States, supra, 333 U.S. at 15, 68 S.Ct. at 369, State v. Texeira, 62 Haw. 44, 609 P.2d 131 (1980). Even though it was a Sunday and the officers were some 45 miles from town, such factors only reflect upon the inconvenience that was attendant upon the business of obtaining a search warrant. Admitting that some difficulty would have hampered the officers' attempts to obtain a warrant, I still cannot conclude that the law justified their warrantless seizure of the items in the cabin. Once in a while the law likes to make room for what it calls common sense [9] but in this case, where the question involves a warrantless intrusion into a man's home, the law, in my view, does not permit the justification for the search and seizure to stem from notions of common sense alone. As was eloquently discussed in Johnson v. United States, supra: The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers. 333 U.S. at 13-14, 68 S.Ct. at 369. We must jealously protect the warrant requirement found in our constitutions, and, in doing so, we must, when the facts necessitate a finding that a warrant was needed, exclude all evidence obtained as a result of the unconstitutional, warrantless entry. I would have held that the officers' entry into the cabin violated appellant's constitutional rights and that the items of evidence seized should have been suppressed. It was clear error not to do so, and I would have reversed. Lastly, I should say that I am not in agreement with the position of Justice Thomas where he advocates abandoning our historical position with respect to the exclusionary rule. If this court is not careful, we are going to chip away at the Fourth Amendment rights of the American citizen until  one day  they will have disappeared altogether. We must never forget that these rights were forged out of the steel and fire of bitter human experience which warns that, for all of those who may one day need the protecting arms of the criminal justice system (including you and me), there must be ground rules which will protect against the unscrupulous, the overzealous and their wiles. To pretend that these threatening forces have not found and will not find their way into the system is to close our eyes to reality, which we do at the risk of collapsing the greatest criminal justice system the mind of man has ever devised.