Opinion ID: 1960935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Count of Contempt

Text: At the outset, we note that the conviction and sentence for the first act of contempt were proper, for the reasons stated in our original opinion. Kidd's contumacious behavior occurred in open court, and the judge notified him that he was in contempt of court. Thus his behavior was a direct contempt, defined in article 21 as one committed in the immediate view and presence of the court and of which it has personal knowledge, and was summarily punishable under article 22. It was also within the judge's discretion to reserve sentencing for a later time rather than imposing sentence simultaneously with the citation for contempt. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451, 96 L.Ed. 717 (1952). [1] As we held on original hearing, Kidd actually received a summons to appear in court for a hearing which would have afforded him the opportunity to present his defense and mitigation as required by article 22. We therefore confirm the conviction and sentence on the first count.