Opinion ID: 1410756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Consistency with Sokol requirements.

Text: It is argued that rule 31 does not comply with the requirements set forth in Sokol insofar as it fails to specify a pretermination procedure comprehending the entire panoply of rights, rules and restrictions concerning the issuance of [search] warrants. Petitioner misreads our opinion in this respect. In indicating that the pretermination procedure should demonstrate probable cause to act, in a manner reasonably comparable to a proceeding before a magistrate to obtain a search warrant (65 Cal.2d at p. 256; italics added), we certainly did not suggest that the procedure must be in all respects identical to that involved in securing a search warrant. The fundamental requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are a showing of probable cause, supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person, and particularly describing the property and the place to be searched. (Pen. Code, § 1525.) (12) Rule 31 provides for discontinuance of service only upon a finding of probable cause by a magistrate. We interpret this requirement as including a supporting showing by affidavit indicating the particular numbers to be affected and their location. As is apparent from the record in this case, the Commission has interpreted it in the same fashion. We find no variation from the requirements of Sokol in this respect.
We now turn to a group of contentions directed to the manner in which the provisions of rule 31 were applied in the context of the instant proceedings. The basic arguments presented are three in number: (1) that petitioner was improperly precluded from challenging the magistrate's finding of probable cause in the proceedings before the Commission; (2) that the Commission improperly considered evidence obtained by law enforcement officials by means of an invalid search warrant; and (3) that petitioner was denied his right to discovery. (1) In both its interim and final decisions the Commission held that it was under no obligation to review the showing made before the magistrate in order to determine whether probable cause for summary termination existed. This was so, the Commission concluded, because petitioner's remedy in this respect lies in the criminal courts through a motion to suppress evidence under section 1538.5 of the Penal Code. In its answer to the petition for writ of review, however, the Commission appears to have abandoned this position, urging instead that whereas it was empowered to rule on the issue of the adequacy of the showing made before the magistrate, its failure to do so resulted in no fatal error in the circumstances of this proceeding. (13) We believe that, as petitioner contends and as the Commission now appears to concede, the remedy set forth in section 1538.5 of the Penal Code is not applicable in the instant circumstances. That section may be invoked only by a defendant in a criminal case; petitioner, insofar as this proceeding is concerned, is not a defendant. This does not mean, however, that as petitioner would appear to contend, that he is therefore entitled to invoke before the Commission the full range of procedures available to a defendant under section 1538.5 of the Penal Code (see, e.g., Theodor v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 77 [104 Cal. Rptr. 226, 501 P.2d 234]). In a civil administrative proceeding of this nature, where the liberty of the subscriber is not at stake, it is sufficient for purposes of the interim protection involved that the Commission limit itself to the face of the affidavits and an assessment of their adequacy to support the magistrate's finding. [17] It should be noted in this respect that the above matter will normally arise in the context of an application by the subscriber for interim relief pending final determination of his complaint. If the Commission concludes that there is inadequate basis for the magistrate's finding, it should thereupon grant interim relief. Even in cases when it appears to the Commission that the finding is adequately supported by the affidavits presented to the magistrate, it may wish to consider the strength and character of the showing made as a factor to be weighed, along with pressing need or imminent economic damage, in its determination whether or not interim relief should be afforded to the subscriber. We do not consider that the failure of the Commission in the instant case to undertake the indicated examination requires any present relief. Complete hearings have now been held and the decision rendered. For present purposes, therefore, the matter of support for the magistrate's finding must be considered moot. (14) (2) It is urged that the Commission was without legal authority to determine the validity of a search warrant pursuant to which certain evidence presented was obtained. Again, we do not agree. Although the Commission is not required to undertake the kind of examination which would be necessary if the subscriber, as a defendant in a criminal case, would be entitled to invoke pursuant to a motion under section 1538.5 (cf. Pub. Util. Code, § 1701), we believe that its authority in cases of this nature includes the power to make an assessment of the affidavits presented in support of a search warrant pursuant to which evidence sought to be introduced before it was obtained, and to determine therefrom whether they contain a sufficiently objective and credible basis for the magistrate's finding. (15) (See fn. 19.) In making this assessment, of course, the Commission should be cognizant of applicable constitutional safeguards, [18] but it should admit the subject evidence if it determines, disregarding those aspects of the affidavits which clearly fail to withstand constitutional scrutiny, [19] that a sufficient basis for admission exists. (Cf. People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 759 [117 Cal. Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1]; Theodor v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d 77, 100-101, fn. 14 at p. 101.) We find no violation of this standard in the instant case. (3) It is claimed by petitioner that he was improperly denied the opportunity to proceed with and perfect discovery. It appears, however, that ample time, including a continuance expressly for the purpose, was granted petitioner, and that in any event he failed to pursue his request.
Finally, we reject petitioner's contention that the Commission failed to make findings and conclusions on all issues necessary to its decision. (Pub. Util. Code, § 1705; see Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1967) 65 Cal.2d 811 [56 Cal. Rptr. 484, 423 P.2d 556]. Although as we have indicated we do not agree with all of the determinations made by the Commission, we believe that its findings and conclusions adequately dispose of all issues raised by petitioner which were necessary and relevant to its decision.
For the foregoing reasons we have concluded that rule 31, while it must be modified in certain respects in order to insure the full future protection of constitutional rights to due process of law  and while it may bear further examination from the standpoint of overbreadth in some future case presenting a different factual situation  is generally consistent with the requirements of our Sokol decision and the requirements of applicable principles of state and federal constitutional law. We have also concluded that the application of the rule to petitioner in this case involved no violation of his legal or constitutional rights. As we have indicated, our scrutiny of rule 31 and its application in particular cases will not end with this decision, but for the present we are convinced that, subject to the observations we have made above, it effects a constitutional accommodation of the conflicting interests of the parties. ( Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., supra, 416 U.S. 600, 607 [40 L.Ed.2d 406, 413].) The order is affirmed.