Opinion ID: 70542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DURHAM v. JONES

Text: The preceding analysis illuminates the futility of the plaintiffs' efforts to distinguish Durham v. Jones, 698 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir.1983), this circuits's only precedent addressing property interests in the context of a wrecker rotation list. In Durham, a wrecker service operator brought a section 1983 action based on a Georgia sheriff's refusal to place him on the wrecker rotation list that the sheriff informally maintained. Id. at 1180. We held that the plaintiff did not have a property interest in being on that list. Id. at 1181. The plaintiffs point to two facts in an attempt to distinguish this case from Durham: (1) a written policy is involved in this case, and (2) unlike the Durham plaintiff, the plaintiffs in this case have already received the benefits of wrecker service referrals. Yet these factual distinctions can lead to no difference in the result unless they operate to create a constitutionally protected property interest where there would otherwise be none. As to the first factual distinction, we know of no authority for the proposition that the act of reducing a wrecker rotation policy to writing can create a legally enforceable entitlement. There is no statute of frauds doctrine in procedural due process law. As a matter of logic, it does not follow from the fact that no written policy was involved in the Durham case where no property interest was found, that the presence of a written policy would create such an interest. As to the second factual distinction, it is axiomatic that the mere receipt of a benefit from the government does not automatically create an entitlement to that benefit. Therefore, the factual distinctions urged by the plaintiffs do not persuade us to reach a result different from that in Durham.