Opinion ID: 6351996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Personal Jurisdiction and Due Process

Text: {¶ 9} This court’s “issuance of a writ of prohibition based on the alleged lack of personal jurisdiction is, even more than a claimed lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, an ‘extremely rare occurrence.’ ” State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok, 85 Ohio St.3d 645, 647, 710 N.E.2d 710 (1999), quoting Clark v. Connor, 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 315, 695 N.E.2d 751 (1998). In the “extremely rare cases” in which this court has issued the writ, “the lack of jurisdiction was ‘premised on a complete failure to comply with constitutional due process.’ ” Id., quoting Fraiberg v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 76 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 667 N.E.2d 1189 (1996). {¶ 10} An Ohio trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when (1) the long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the Rules of Civil Procedure confer jurisdiction and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 4 January Term, 2022 930 N.E.2d 784, ¶ 28. LG Chem’s argument focuses on the constitutional dueprocess requirement. {¶ 11} The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). For a court’s exercise of jurisdiction to comport with due process, the defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that “the maintenance of the suit” is reasonable and “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). {¶ 12} The United States Supreme Court has recognized two types of personal jurisdiction: “general” and “specific.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco Cty., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1779-1780, 198 L.Ed.2d 395 (2017). The “paradigm forum” for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a corporation is a state “in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). The Darrow plaintiffs conceded in the trial court that LG Chem is not subject to general jurisdiction in Ohio. Thus, the issue before us is whether the trial court has specific jurisdiction over LG Chem. {¶ 13} Specific jurisdiction exists when the matter before the court arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Bristol-Myers Squibb at ___, 137 S.Ct. at 1780. For a court to lawfully exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must have taken “some act[ion] by which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Purposeful availment occurs when “the defendant 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO deliberately ‘reache[s] out beyond’ its home—by, for example, ‘exploit[ing] a market’ in the forum state or entering a contractual relationship centered there.” (Second brackets added in Ford Motor Co.) Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1025, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (2021), quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014). Even when purposeful availment has occurred, personal jurisdiction extends only to certain cases: the plaintiff’s claims must “ ‘aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant’s contacts’ ” with the forum state. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984), fn. 8. “In other words, there must be ‘an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum state and is therefore subject to the state’s regulation.’ ” (Brackets added in Bristol-Myers Squibb.) Bristol-Myers Squibb at ___, 137 S.Ct. at 1780, quoting Goodyear at 919. When there is no connection between the plaintiff’s claims and the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state, specific jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of the defendant’s unconnected activities in the state. Id. at __, 137 S.Ct. at 1781. B. Personal Jurisdiction and Writs of Prohibition {¶ 14} LG Chem argues that a writ of prohibition is appropriate in this case because it did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Ohio and the benefits of Ohio law and that, even if it had, there is no causal connection between its contacts with Ohio and the Darrow plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, LG Chem contends that a writ of prohibition should issue because personal jurisdiction over it is patently and unambiguously lacking. {¶ 15} We have found a patent and unambiguous lack of personal jurisdiction to support a writ of prohibition only twice in the past 40 years. In State ex rel. Stone v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div., 14 Ohio 6 January Term, 2022 St.3d 32, 34, 470 N.E.2d 899 (1984), we affirmed a court of appeals’ grant of a writ of prohibition to restrain a juvenile court from adjudicating a paternity action when it was undisputed that (1) the child was conceived and born outside of Ohio and (2) there was no evidence that the putative father had had any contacts with Ohio. And in State ex rel. Connor v. McGough, 46 Ohio St.3d 188, 189, 192, 546 N.E.2d 407 (1989), we granted a writ of prohibition to enjoin proceedings in an estate administrator’s wrongful-death action in an Ohio common pleas court arising from a car accident in Germany that killed the decedent, who had lived in Ohio. In both cases, it was undisputed that the defendant had had no contacts with Ohio. The only connection to Ohio in each case was that Ohio was where the plaintiff resided. Thus, the availability of an appellate remedy was immaterial because personal jurisdiction was totally lacking. Id. at 191; Stone at 33-34. {¶ 16} LG Chem argues that it never served a market in Ohio (or any other state) for “standalone, replaceable consumer batteries.” It contends that it never designed, manufactured, distributed, advertised, or sold LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries for individual consumer use in electronic cigarettes or for any other purpose and that it never conducted any business with the retailers who sold the products to the Darrow plaintiffs or any retailer who sold the batteries to consumers as a replaceable, standalone product. LG Chem argues that “it is undisputed” that the batteries arrived in Ohio due to the “unilateral actions of third parties” who brought the products to Ohio for sale as consumer products for electronic-cigarette equipment. And it notes that the unilateral activity of third parties cannot satisfy the due-process requirement that an out-of-state defendant such as LG Chem have minimum contacts with the forum state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (a defendant’s placing a product into the stream of commerce supports a finding of personal jurisdiction if the defendant purposefully directed activity at the forum state); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 882, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 180 L.Ed.2d 765 (2011) 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO (plurality opinion) (“The defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum State”). {¶ 17} The record, however, contains an affidavit from Kiwon Choi, a sales professional who was responsible for LG Chem’s sale of LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries during the time that Vape Super Center and Vapors Electronic Smoke Shop sold the allegedly defective batteries in Ohio. Choi testified: I have confirmed, through a review of LG Chem’s sales records, that LG Chem did not sell or distribute any 18650 lithiumion batteries to any customer located in Ohio from January 1, 2013 through March 31, 2016, the month Plaintiffs were allegedly injured. During that time period, LG Chem received three orders from an original equipment manufacturer, located in Macao, for sample 18650 cells. LG Chem shipped 200 sample 18650 cells to Ohio for the Macao customer for an order dated October 15, 2013; LG Chem shipped 200 sample 18650 cells to Ohio for the Macao customer for an order dated November 11, 2013; and LG Chem shipped 760 sample 18650 cells to Ohio for the Macao customer for an order dated June 17, 2014. {¶ 18} Choi’s affidavit appears to be inconsistent: he testified that LG Chem did not sell or distribute LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries “to any customer located in Ohio” in the three-year period preceding the Darrow plaintiffs’ injuries, yet he stated that LG Chem had shipped 1,160 such batteries to Ohio to fulfill three orders of an equipment manufacturer in 2013 and 2014. Even accepting the assertion that the manufacturer was “located in Macao,” the delivery of the batteries 8 January Term, 2022 to Ohio shows that LG Chem had some connection to Ohio, unlike the defendants who challenged the courts’ personal jurisdiction over them in Stone and McGough. Indeed, in Stone and McGough, the defendants in the underlying actions had had no contacts whatsoever with Ohio and (unlike this case) none of the acts giving rise to the actions took place in Ohio. {¶ 19} Moreover, the Darrow plaintiffs allege that LG Chem conducted substantial activities in Ohio relating to the distribution and sale of the batteries. In their complaint in the underlying action, they alleged the following: • The LG 18650 lithium-ion battery “was designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed, placed into the stream of commerce, and sold by defendants LG, Vape Defendants, Vapors, and Unknown Defendants in Toledo, Lucas County, Ohio”; • All the defendants “conducted activity that gave rise to the claim” in Toledo, Lucas County; • On their information and belief, “all defendants were present or transacted, solicited, and engaged in business in Lucas County, Ohio through their employees, agents, or sales representatives, and derived substantial revenue from such business”; • LG Chem “expected or should have expected” that its acts would have consequences in Lucas County; • The batteries that injured the Darrow plaintiffs were “placed into the stream of commerce, and sold by” LG Chem, and the Darrow plaintiffs were foreseeable users of the batteries; and • LG Chem “labeled, prepared, marketed, sold, supplied, and introduced” the batteries for use in electronic cigarettes “and knew that such batteries were sold or marketed in Ohio for such purpose.” 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 20} The Darrow plaintiffs sought discovery related to their allegations, which is germane to the personal-jurisdiction defense raised by LG Chem. The Darrow plaintiffs asked LG Chem for information and/or documents related to, among other things, (1) the names and locations of LG Chem’s distributors in Ohio, (2) where LG Chem manufactured lithium-ion batteries that were distributed and sold to consumers from 2014 through 2016, (3) LG Chem’s business activities in Ohio, and (4) shipments of lithium-ion batteries distributed to retailers and sold in the United States. LG Chem did not respond substantively to many of these requests, instead objecting on numerous grounds, including the requests’ purported overbreadth, lack of relevance, and involvement of confidential proprietary business information.1 {¶ 21} In the underlying action, Judge Goulding did not hold an evidentiary hearing on LG Chem’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. “Accordingly, he was required to view allegations in the pleadings and the documentary evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, resolving all reasonable competing inferences in their favor.” Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 638 N.E.2d 541 (1994). This court has heeded that standard when deciding whether a writ of prohibition should issue due to a lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 236-238. {¶ 22} Here, viewing the allegations in the complaint combined with the negative inferences that can be drawn from LG Chem’s discovery responses (or lack thereof), we conclude that personal jurisdiction over LG Chem is not patently and unambiguously lacking in the trial court. The Darrow plaintiffs’ claims are related to LG Chem’s activities in Ohio, because the allegations in the complaint 1. The Darrow plaintiffs filed a motion to compel in the trial court, seeking full responses to their discovery requests. They agreed to withdraw the motion to compel in reliance on LG Chem’s representation that it would provide fuller responses to the disputed requests. According to an affidavit from the Darrow plaintiffs’ counsel sworn to on November 8, 2021, complete responses to the requests had not been provided and the discovery dispute had not been resolved. 10 January Term, 2022 and inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the record arguably show that (1) LG Chem served a market for LG 18650 lithium-ion batteries in Ohio, (2) the Darrow plaintiffs purchased such batteries in Ohio, and (3) the batteries injured the plaintiffs in Ohio. See Ford Motor Co., ___ U.S. at ___, 141 S.Ct. at 1027, 209 L.Ed.2d 225 (personal jurisdiction attaches when a defendant “serves a market for a product in the forum state and the product malfunctions there”). {¶ 23} This is not to say that the Darrow plaintiffs will be able to prove that LG Chem engaged in activities in Ohio that satisfy the due-process requirements for personal jurisdiction. But we need not decide the ultimate personal-jurisdiction issue today, because our review in prohibition “is limited to whether personal jurisdiction is patently and unambiguously lacking.” (Emphasis sic.) Goldstein at 238. When, as here, the finding of personal jurisdiction turns on the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts, “[the court’s] ruling that it has jurisdiction, if wrong, is simply error for which prohibition is not the proper remedy.” Id. On the record before us, we cannot say that Judge Goulding’s denial of LG Chem’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is tantamount to “a complete failure to comply with constitutional due process,” Fraiberg, 76 Ohio St.3d at 378, 667 N.E.2d 1189.