Opinion ID: 172808
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevant conduct as criminal conduct

Text: Six other circuits have held that relevant conduct under the Guidelines must be criminal or unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Chube, 538 F.3d 693, 702 (7th Cir.2008) (explaining that relevant conduct must be unlawful); United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 657-59 (6th Cir.2007) (reciting 6th Circuit precedent to the effect that relevant conduct must amount[ ] to an offense for which a criminal defendant could potentially be incarcerated); United States v. Culverhouse, 507 F.3d 888, 895 (5th Cir.2007) (An offense need not have resulted in a conviction to constitute relevant conduct under the guidelines, but the conduct must be criminal.); United States v. Dove, 247 F.3d 152, 155 (4th Cir.2001) (concluding that relevant conduct under the Guidelines must be criminal conduct); United States v. Dickler, 64 F.3d 818, 830-31 (3d Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 595, 600 (8th Cir.1994) (same). Like this court, see Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d at 1095, the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits have held that uncharged and even acquitted conduct may constitute relevant conduct under the Guidelines, but have not explicitly held that such conduct must be criminal or unlawful, see, e.g., United States v. Juwa, 508 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir.2007); United States v. Reyes-Echevarrํa, 345 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Peyton, 353 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir.2003). Our description of relevant conduct as including uncharged and even acquitted conduct, Altamirano-Quintero, 511 F.3d at 1095 (quotation omitted), strongly suggests that the conduct at issue must at least be criminally chargeable. That suggestion comports with the reasoning of courts that have held that relevant conduct must be criminal or unlawful. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 101 F.3d 375, 385 (5th Cir.1996) (To hold otherwise would allow individuals to be punished by having their guideline range increased for activity which is not prohibited by law but merely morally distasteful or viewed as simply wrong by the sentencing court.); Dove, 247 F.3d at 155 (explaining that if relevant conduct need not be criminal, sentencing courts would become mired in the impossibly subjective task of determining the relative `benignness' of various legally permissible acts). Among those courts that have held that relevant conduct must be criminal, those that have taken up the question have also held that the criminal violation may be of either a federal or a state statute. See, e.g., Maken, 510 F.3d at 657-58; Dickler, 64 F.3d at 831; United States v. Bell, 46 F.3d 442, 445 (5th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Newbert, 952 F.2d 281, 285 (9th Cir.1991) (holding that under U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3, conduct which could be the basis of state prosecution may be considered for sentencing purposes on a federal conviction for other conduct which was part of the same common scheme or plan). Agreeing with the reasoning of our sister circuits, and making explicit what has been implicit in our own precedent, we hold that for a district court to consider a defendant's conduct as relevant under the Sentencing Guidelines, the Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant (1) engaged in conduct (2) related to the offense of conviction pursuant to U.S.S.G. ง 1B1.3 and (3) constituting a criminal offense under either a federal or a state statute. [7]