Opinion ID: 2737823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fuller’s Title VII claims

Text: Fuller argues that the district court erred in finding that he failed to timely file his Title VII claims relating to his discharge (Fuller’s claims related to the 2010 promotion issue were filed only under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act). The district court concluded that Fuller failed to file his lawsuit within 90 days after receiving his March 13, 2012 right-to-sue letter from the EEOC as required by Title VII. Fuller argues on appeal that a jury could - 12 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation determine that he received his right-to-sue letter two weeks after it was mailed, which he contends would make his lawsuit timely. Title VII requires a plaintiff claiming that he suffered a violation of his Title VII rights to submit his charge to the EEOC and any applicable state agency before he may file suit in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If the EEOC declines to pursue the charge on the plaintiff’s behalf, it must so notify the plaintiff. See id. The plaintiff then has 90 days from receiving this notice to file a civil lawsuit. Id. In the present case, Fuller’s charge was filed with the EEOC and the Michigan Department of Civil Rights in October 2011. His charge alleged that his termination in September of that year was discriminatory and in retaliation for his recent internal complaints to the Bridge Authority regarding racial slurs. On March 13, 2012, the EEOC issued Fuller a rightto-sue letter stating that it was closing the file on Fuller’s discharge claim and that he had 90 days from receipt of the letter to file a civil lawsuit. Fuller filed this lawsuit on June 26, 2012, 99 days after his presumptive receipt of the EEOC’s letter on March 19, 2012. The parties do not dispute these facts. Instead, the parties dispute when Fuller actually received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The Bridge Authority contends that Fuller has not overcome the presumption, articulated in Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc., 209 F.3d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 2000), that a Title VII claimant receives the EEOC’s letter by the fifth day after the indicated mailing date. Fuller responds that his own deposition testimony overcomes this presumption. Specifically, he points to the following answers that he gave in his deposition in response to questions from the Bridge Authority’s attorney: Q. And could you describe this document? A. Dismissal and notice of rights. - 13 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation Q. And this shows that it was mailed on March 13th of 2012. Do you recall when you received this document? A. Yes. Q. When was that? A. Shortly after a week or two. Q. You don't recall the specific date? A. No. Fuller argues that a jury could infer from this exchange that he received the EEOC’s letter two weeks after March 13, 2012, which would be on March 27, 2012. He then contends that the 90day limitations period expired on June 26, 2012, the day that he filed his complaint. This argument, however, fails for two reasons. First, even if Fuller did not receive the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter until March 27, 2012— a full two weeks after it was mailed on March 13, 2012—the 90-day filing deadline would have expired on June 25, 2012, one day before he filed this lawsuit. (Four remaining days in March, 30 days in April, 31 days in May, and 25 days in June equal 90 days.) See Pete v. Am. Standard Graphic, 885 F.2d 331, 331–32 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying Pete’s Title VII claims because of a similar 91-day gap between the dates of March 26 and June 25, 1987). Second, this court imposes a strict presumption on the limitations period following the mailing of a right-to-sue letter: The Sixth Circuit has resolved that notice is given, and hence the ninety-day limitations term begins running, on the fifth day following the EEOC’s mailing of an RTS [right-to-sue] notification to the claimant’s record residential address, by virtue of a presumption of actual delivery and receipt within that five-day duration, unless the plaintiff rebuts that presumption with proof that he or she did not receive notification within that period. Graham-Humphreys, 209 F.3d at 557 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). Fuller’s vague deposition testimony does not provide the kind of proof required to overcome this presumption. This court has previously “recognize[d] the difficult situation in - 14 - Case No. 13-2717 Fuller v. The Michigan Department of Transportation which an addressee is placed: what evidence, other than her denial of receipt, is available to rebut the presumption that a letter is received?” Cook v. Providence Hosp., 820 F.2d 176, 179 n.3 (6th Cir. 1987). Nonetheless, this court concluded that a plaintiff’s “denials are not sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that the letter was not received.” Id. So too here. This court has deemed even certain documentary evidence insufficient to rebut the five-day-delivery presumption. In Hunter v. Stephenson Roofing, Inc., 790 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1986), this court considered a case where the plaintiff had specified an address on his EEOC filings, but later moved because of disagreements with his roommate. “Plaintiff obtained his [right-to-sue] letter from the post office after his former roommate notified him that the postman had attempted to deliver a certified letter to him.” Id. at 475. Despite this evidence that the plaintiff did not actually receive the letter within five days of mailing, the court “conclude[d] on these facts that plaintiff’s ninety day time period began to run five days after the date the EEOC mailed plaintiff's right-to-sue letter to his address of record.” Id. (footnote omitted). Fuller cites no authorities in support of his argument that his vague testimony, standing alone, creates a triable issue on the 90-day window. Furthermore, as pointed out above, his 90day deadline had expired even under his own theory of receipt. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Fuller’s Title VII claims.