Opinion ID: 779452
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The nature of McFarland's claim

Text: 13 In her Memorandum in Opposition to the Postal Service's motion to dismiss, McFarland conceded that her EEOC grievance was not timely initiated: 14 Despite the fact that Plaintiff failed to comply with a 45-day time requirement for initiating EEO counseling, equitable principles of tolling, waiver, and estoppel mandate that Plaintiff's claims should survive and Plaintiff should have her day in court. 15 Given this concession, it is entirely understandable why the district court failed to address whether McFarland's grievance was in fact initiated within 45 days of the alleged discrimination. The court instead focused solely upon McFarland's equitable arguments. In light of the fact that both McFarland and the Postal Service have seen fit to submit documents and affidavits in support of their positions with respect to McFarland's ability to bring her case despite having missed the EEO filing deadline, the district court also found it appropriate to consider the motion to dismiss as if it were a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 With new counsel on appeal, McFarland now argues, contrary to her concession in the district court, that her EEOC grievance was timely initiated because she suffered from a continuing violation that was ongoing less than 45 days prior to June 23, 1999, the day that McFarland first contacted an EEO Counselor. A continuing violation exists where the plaintiff suffers from either (1) a series of discrete discriminatory acts that are anchored by at least one such act within the limitations period, or (2) where there has occurred a longstanding and demonstrable... over-arching policy of discrimination. Dixon v. Anderson, 928 F.2d 212, 216-17 (6th Cir.1991). This court has long recognized that an ongoing, continuous series of discriminatory acts may be challenged if one of those discriminatory acts occurred within the limitations period. Alexander v. Laborers' Int'l Union, 177 F.3d 394, 408 (6th Cir.1999). 17 In order to reach the issue of whether McFarland's EEOC grievance was timely initiated, we face the question of whether we should deviate from our general rule against considering new arguments on appeal. The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). This court has held that, in general, [i]ssues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal are not properly before the court. J.C. Wyckoff & Assoc., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1488 (6th Cir.1991). 18 The rule serves, among other things, to promote judicial economy. In the present case, the district court carefully considered each of McFarland's arguments in reaching its decision. The district court would presumably have addressed the timeliness issue if it had been raised. But judicial economy is not necessarily the highest value to consider in determining whether to hear a new argument on appeal. We have, on occasion, deviated from the general rule in exceptional cases or particular circumstances, or when the rule would produce a plain miscarriage of justice. Foster v. Barilow, 6 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in Pinney Dock and Transp. Co. v. Penn Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir.1988), we stated that it may be appropriate to consider a new issue on appeal if it is presented with sufficient clarity and completeness for us to resolve the issue. 19 The Pinney Dock exception is most commonly applied where the issue is one of law, and further development of the record is unnecessary. Foster, 6 F.3d at 407; See, e.g., In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 951 F.2d 718, 725-26 (6th Cir.1991) (Because the issue in this case involves the application of a legal standard to the factual findings of the trial judge in the bankruptcy court, we conclude that it is presented with sufficient completeness and clarity for this court to resolve it.). This is just such a case. In order to determine whether McFarland's grievance was timely initiated, we need only apply a principle of law to the facts as alleged in the complaint and McFarland's affidavit. We further note that our consideration of this issue will not unfairly prejudice the Postal Service, which has argued the substance of the continuing violation issue both in the district court and again on appeal. 20 Our decision to reach the issue of timeliness, despite McFarland's concession on this point, is being made in order to avoid a plain miscarriage of justice. Foster, 6 F.3d at 407. We are not bound by the failure of her trial counsel to apply the law. Furthermore, this is not a case where McFarland is barred by judicial estoppel, because the district court did not adopt a representation made by her under oath. Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party from (1) asserting a position that is contrary to one that the party has asserted under oath in a prior proceeding, where (2) the prior court adopted the contrary position either as a preliminary matter or as part of a final disposition) (internal quotation marks omitted). 21