Opinion ID: 1162670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Civil Rights Claim Against City Valid.

Text: [18-20] A city cannot be held liable in damages for the mere enforcement of an unconstitutional or void ordinance in the nature of a police power regulation. R/L Assocs., at 412. A land use decision denying substantive due process states a cause of action under section 1983 only if it is invidious or irrational, see R/L Assocs., at 412, or arbitrary, Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1988). However, in this case we conclude that the Robinsons state a proper claim for violation of substantive due process under section 1983, and further that genuine issues of material fact remain. Therefore, the Robinsons' action should be allowed to proceed to trial for a decision on the facts. We so hold not merely because the City enforced an invalid or unconstitutional ordinance, but because the City continued to enforce ordinance provisions after they had been declared on separate, respective occasions to be invalid by trial courts. We first consider whether the Robinsons adequately plead a violation of substantive due process for the purposes of section 1983. To successfully challenge a governmental action or regulation in a section 1983 action on substantive due process grounds, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the challenged government action is wholly arbitrary and capricious or irrational, or utterly fails to serve a legitimate purpose. See Regulating the Timing of Development: Takings Clause and Substantive Due Process Challenges to Growth Control Regulations, 24 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1205, 1225 (1990-1991) (citing Nelson v. Selma, 881 F.2d 836, 839 (9th Cir.1989); Greenbriar, Ltd. v. Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir.1989); Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1034-35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906, reh'g denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987)). The Robinsons' allegation in the complaint that Defendants have maliciously, recklessly, and/or wantonly violated constitutional rights is sufficient to plead either irrational or invidious or arbitrary and capricious conduct as required. A substantive due process claim does not require proof that all use of one's property has been denied. Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488, 1498 (9th Cir.1987). Rather, the plaintiff must show that the interference with property rights was irrational or arbitrary. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 49 L.Ed.2d 752, 96 S. Ct. 2882 (1976). Where a plaintiff seeking section 1983 relief alleges that a municipality's land use authorities violated plaintiff's rights to substantive due process, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the governmental action was arbitrary, irrational, or tainted by improper motive. De Botton v. Marple Township., 689 F. Supp. 477, 481 (E.D. Pa. 1988). The plaintiff's complaint must allege facts that would support a finding of irrational or arbitrary action. De Botton, at 481 (citing Pace Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, supra ). In Pace Resources, the court upheld the denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's substantive due process claims since the plaintiff alleged facts from which a jury could conclude the municipality acted in an arbitrary or irrational manner in land use decisions. The court noted that although the town claimed its actions were taken in an entirely reasonable manner, this was a question that could be addressed at trial. De Botton, at 481. [21] Property owners may also raise due process claims without first seeking just compensation through state court remedies. Sinaloa Lk. Owners Ass'n v. Simi Vly., 882 F.2d 1398, 1404-05 (9th Cir.1989) (amended opinion), cert. denied sub nom. Doody v. Sinaloa Lk. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 494 U.S. 1016, 108 L.Ed.2d 493, 110 S.Ct. 1317 (1990). A plaintiff is not required to seek compensation from a state entity before bringing a substantive due process claim because substantive due process is violated at the moment harm occurs; thus, the existence of postdeprivation state remedies does not bar a section 1983 action. Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir.1988) (citing Rutherford v. Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir.1986)). In Bateson, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court finding that the Billings, Montana, city council's refusal to issue a building permit to the plaintiff after he had satisfied all permit requirements was an arbitrary and capricious act which denied Bateson substantive due process. The City points to distinctions between this case and Bateson, such as the fact that in Bateson the city council acted contrary to the advice of counsel and singled out one individual for its conduct. [22] Because a finder of fact could determine the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in repeatedly continuing enforcement of the HPO, rather than seeking to stay the force or effect of rulings of invalidity and injunctions against enforcement, genuine issues of material fact remain to be determined. CR 56(c). This determination is for the finder of fact after hearing testimony and receiving evidence. We hold the Robinsons properly stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.  1983, having alleged their constitutional rights (to substantive due process) were violated by persons (the City of Seattle and its officials) acting under color of law (the Housing Preservation Ordinance). Their claim is based in an impairment of constitutional property rights caused by the City of Seattle's unreasonable, continued enforcement of a land use regulation previously invalidated by a trial court. As genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided, the trial court erred in dismissing the Robinsons' civil rights action against the City on summary judgment. The liability of the City to the Robinsons under section 1983, and to what degree possible civil rights damages are available, are matters to be determined in trial court.