Opinion ID: 852465
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Life Without Parole and Felony Murder

Text: Felony murder is a term usually used to describe a crime punishable as murder under Indiana Code subsections 35-42-1-1(2) and (3) but where the defendant did not necessarily intentionally or even recklessly kill the victim, or may not have been the killer at all. E.g., Palmer v. State, 704 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. 1999) (affirming felony murder conviction for death of accomplice when law enforcement officer killed the accomplice during course of kidnapping). The deaths of both Myrtle and Hobert were charged as felony murders defined in section 35-42-1-1(2). That crime requires no proof of mens rea other than that required for the underlying crime, in this case burglary. Palmer, 704 N.E.2d at 127 (citing Vance v. State, 620 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind.1993)). A sentence of death or life without parole under the (b)(1) aggravator requires a further showing that the defendant intentionally killed the victim. As explained above, this was proved as to Myrtle but not as to Hobert. Because an intentional killing is murder under both XX-XX-X-X(1) and, if committed in the course of a burglary, also under XX-XX-X-X(2), Pittman's conviction of felony murder with the additional finding of the (b)(1) aggravator supports life without parole as to the murder of Myrtle. Hobert's murder presents a more difficult problem. Indiana Code subsection 35-50-2-9(a) permits the death penalty or life without parole for murder if one of the aggravating circumstances listed under subsection (b) is found. In this case the State alleged three aggravators: subsection (b)(1), the defendant intentionally kill[ed] in the course of another listed felony; (b)(3), the defendant committed the murder by lying in wait; and (b)(9), the defendant was on probation after being sentenced for a felony. As to Hobert, the jury did not find the (b)(3) aggravator, and there is insufficient evidence to support the (b)(1) aggravator, leaving only the (b)(9) aggravator. Here, even if we assume Pittman or Naylor killed Hobert, and each was an accomplice of the other, and each is punishable for felony murder, the issue remains whether the (b)(9) probation aggravator is met by proof that Pittman is guilty of felony murder without proof that he was the killer. We think it is not. The (b)(9) aggravator, unlike the (b)(1) and (b)(3), turns on the defendant's status as a probationer, not on any act or omission. As such, it does not explicitly state that the defendant must have killed the victim, with or without a specified mens rea. But we think the structure of this statute leads to the conclusion that the defendant must have been the sole killer or an active participant in the killing to be eligible for death penalty or life without parole. Otherwise stated, we think subsection 35-30-2-9(a) uses murder as defined in subsection 35-42-1-1(1) (knowingly or intentionally kills another human being), and does not include felony murders defined in subsections 35-42-1-1(2) and (3) that do not also constitute murders under subsection (1). Murder as defined under the felony murder provision includes deaths, even accidental, that occur while the defendant is committing a specified felony. Subsection 35-50-2-9(b)(1) allows the death penalty or life without parole for intentional killing in the course of some, but not all, of these felonies, omitting, for example, consumer product tampering or dealing in a section 35-48-2-10 lower-scheduled controlled substance, such as Ambien, Valium, or Xanax. Most other eligibility aggravators require that the defendant have committed some act, such as lying in wait, hiring to kill, etc., that makes clear the defendant is assumed to be the killer. A few, however, require a murder but do not require some additional act by the defendant. If a felony murder satisfied the murder requirement, an accidental death caused by an accomplice in a felony not listed in subsection 35-50-2-9(b)(1), such as consumer product tampering, would subject the defendant to the death penalty. We think such a disproportionate result was not contemplated by the legislature. Rather, we think the statute contemplates the definition of murder as described in XX-XX-X-X(1). As discussed above, the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Pittman killed Hobert and therefore there is insufficient evidence to establish that the killing of Hobert was a murder as described in XX-XX-X-X(1). We reach this conclusion purely as a matter of statutory interpretation. We find one sentence of life without parole that is supported by the evidence as to all three aggravators and one that is not supported by any aggravators. We are required to set aside the life sentence as to Hobert's death for lack of proof as to a subsection 35-50-2-9(b) aggravator. We revise Pittman's sentence for the murder of Hobert to a term of sixty-five years, the current maximum sentence for murder under section 35-50-2-3, under our constitutional power to review and revise sentences. Ind. Const., art. 7, § 4.