Opinion ID: 2973451
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Holley

Text: On May 19, 2003, Holley was terminated for “authoriz[ing] the nurse’s pay sheet . . . [and for] authoriz[ing] more time than [the nurse] worked.” Holley admits that she was not authorized to do either. Termination is unquestionably an adverse action. See Cockrel v. Shelby County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, the key issue with Holley is whether her termination was motivated at least in part by her speech. See id. As the district court noted, Holley’s case is close because of “the fairly short passage of time between presentation of the petition in February, to Holley’s participation in the . . . lawsuits and ADA charges in April, to her termination in May.” Holley relies entirely on the temporal proximity between her speech and her termination, and -6- on her personal belief that her termination was in retaliation for the personal injury suits.1 However, even a strong temporal connection, without more, is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. See Farmer v. Cleveland Pub. Power, 295 F.3d 593, 602 (6th Cir. 2002); Bailey, 106 F.3d at 145. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Holley’s termination belie her claim that her speech was a motivating factor for her termination. When Holley realized that she could not verify when the nurse was at the jail, she called Cathy Hood, another department secretary, to discuss the dates. Sheriff Bass knew this but did not terminate Hood, even though Hood, like Holley, signed and delivered the petition, because Hood did not authorize the pay sheet. Holley, however, was terminated, because she personally authorized the nurse’s pay sheet. Further, the nurse was also forced to resign and even apologized to Holley for causing Holley to lose her job. Therefore, we agree with the district court that Holley has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her speech was a motivating factor for her termination.