Opinion ID: 2399306
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims related to Cook's testimony

Text: Appellant contends that, for several reasons, the trial court erred in permitting Cook's testimony regarding his encounter with Johnson and Starks at Berks County Prison before trial. He challenges the following exchange which took place between the district attorney and Cook at trial: Q Did the defendant say anything to you? A He said, don't let these crackers kill me.    Q Did he say anything else? A [Starks] said, it's kind of f____ed up when people's families die, you know what I'm saying. Q What happened next? A I was just looking, like, bugged out. I was like, all right, all right. I understand. I got you. The defendant said the same thing. Q What did he say? A Its' [sic] kind of f____ed up when people's families die. Q. Did the defendant say anything in addition about you testifying in the trial? A He said I shouldn't testify....    Q Did you know what he meant when he said crackers? A You know, like the jury, you know the D.A., and all of you.... Q Okay. How did you interpret what they said to you, when they said, it's kind of f____ed up when people's families die? A I kill my people or something, you know what I mean. N.T., at 277-78. Appellant does not dispute that the Commonwealth may introduce evidence of threats made to a witness to demonstrate the defendant's consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lark, 518 Pa. 290, 308-09, 543 A.2d 491, 500 (1988). He contends, however, that in the present case it is not clear that the comments were intended as a threat to Cook. Also, Johnson finds the comments objectionable as they informed the jury that he was incarcerated, thereby prejudicing him in the eyes of the jurors. Finally, because the statement contains hearsay statements made by Starks, Johnson contends that it should have been deemed inadmissible against him. This Court has long recognized that any attempt by a defendant to interfere with a witness's testimony is admissible to show a defendant's consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 384, 398-99, 668 A.2d 97, 104 (1995) (concluding that a witness's testimony that a defendant offered him a bribe not to testify at trial was admissible to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt); Commonwealth v. Goldblum, 498 Pa. 455, 472, 447 A.2d 234, 243 (1982) (citing cases for the proposition that the Commonwealth may demonstrate consciousness of guilt through attempts by a defendant to intimidate or influence a witness). Here, regardless of whether or not Johnson's statements constituted threats, it is apparent that they were intended to influence Cook's testimony at trial. Accordingly, they are relevant. Although the evidence was adduced via the testimony of a non-declarant listener, courts generally admit such statements (subject to an assessment of probative value versus prejudicial impact) as verbal acts, a form of nonhearsay. See, e.g., Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 779 n. 3 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 653 n. 12 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Pate, 543 F.2d 1148, 1149 (5th Cir.1976). This is so, because the evidence is not offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted (here, for example, that people's families die), but rather, to demonstrate the fact of the attempted influencing. See id. Moreover, influential statements by third parties have been admitted on identical grounds where, as here, the defendant is aware of and authorizes the statements. See generally 29A AM.JUR.2D EVIDENCE § 809 (2003); accord United States v. Miller, 276 F.3d 370, 373-74 (7th Cir.2002) (finding that threat against potential witness by person connected with the defendant in several ways was admissible to show the defendant's consciousness of guilt). With regard to the revelation by the remarks that Johnson was incarcerated, although generally no reference may be made at trial in a criminal case to a defendant's arrest or incarceration for a previous crime, see Commonwealth v. Williams, 541 Pa. 85, 94, 660 A.2d 1316, 1321 (1995), there is no rule in Pennsylvania which prohibits reference to a defendant's incarceration awaiting trial or arrest for the crimes charged. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 538 Pa. 485, 506-07, 649 A.2d 435, 445-46 (1994). Moreover, although the Court has disapproved forcing a defendant, who was incarcerated prior to trial, to attend trial in identifiable prison clothing, this prohibition is based primarily upon the impact that the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire might have upon the jury. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); Commonwealth v. Moore, 534 Pa. 527, 543-44, 633 A.2d 1119, 1127 (1993) (interpreting the concern over the constant reminder of the defendant's incarcerated status as the focal point of Estelle ). Here, the reference to Johnson's incarcerated status was passing, and not the type of constant reminder proscribed by Estelle. Accord Wilson, 538 Pa. at 506-07, 649 A.2d at 445-46 (concluding that testimony indicating that the defendant was incarcerated prior to trial was not improper where the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's detention was the result of the criminal acts for which the defendant was on trial).