Opinion ID: 1379313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: contentions regarding responses to jury questions

Text: A juror sent a note to the court, apparently before the case was submitted to the jury, asking a set of questions as follows: (1) Can conditions be placed on the penalty? (2) Can the jury request additional testimony? (3) What sentence would result from a hung jury? (4) How long will the jury be allowed to deliberate? (5) May the jury request additional psychological tests on defendant or his crime partners? (6) May the jury see the testimony of the codefendants? Defendant filed a postjudgment motion to settle the record, contending that defense counsel were unaware of this note from the jury until after the trial. At a hearing on the motion, all defense counsel testified that they did not recall having seen the note during the penalty trial; that if they had seen it, they would have remembered it because of the significance of its contents; and that it might have affected their conduct of the defense. The prosecutor testified he recalled seeing the note and a similar one during the trial, and that there was at least some comment about the notes between him and one of the defense attorneys. The judge denied the motion, stating, It is inconceivable to me that defense counsel as well as the prosecution were not made aware of the questions addressed to the court. (29) On appeal and in a separate motion (see People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d 883, 921), defendant asks us to overturn the trial judge's determination that defense counsel had been made aware of the note. The settlement of the record, however, is primarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. ( People v. Mitchell (1964) 61 Cal.2d 353, 371 [38 Cal. Rptr. 726, 392 P.2d 526].) Once settlement is ordered, the trial court has broad discretion to accept or reject counsel's representations in accordance with its assessment of their credibility. ( People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 585, fn. 2 [186 Cal. Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145].) The court did not abuse its broad discretion. In addition to the court's own recollection and the deputy district attorney's testimony, another circumstance supports the finding. Upon excusing the jury on the last day on which they heard evidence, the court referred to some questions concerning the instructions it had received. A comparison of the court's subsequent comments with the note at issue suggests strongly the court was discussing that note. Defense counsel did not suggest in any way they were ignorant of the questions the court was discussing. We find no basis upon which to overturn the court's resolution of the conflicting evidence.
On the second day of penalty deliberations, the jury sent the court this note: Would Don [defendant] receive either `group attack' therapy or psychiatric help if given life without parole? The judge immediately responded: Disposition by the Department of Corrections is not a part of the decision you must make. This court has no jurisdiction over the Department of Corrections. The next day, both the note and the court's response were read to defense counsel, and they were invited to add anything or instruct the jury to anything else regarding that question.... Counsel answered in the negative. Defendant concedes that he has waived the procedural irregularity of the court's initial ex parte response. ( People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal. App.3d 422, 432-433 [193 Cal. Rptr. 711].) (30) He argues, however, that any complaint regarding the content of the court's response has not been waived, and that the response was error. Defendant's psychiatric expert, Dr. Wilkinson, had testified that defendant's antisocial personality disorder might be improved through psychiatric help, particularly attack therapy, though the doctor conceded on cross-examination that because of budgetary constraints, psychotherapy is usually not available to the general prison population. Defendant argues that the court's statement to the jury misled it into thinking it should disregard any possibility of his being rehabilitated through whatever psychiatric help would in fact be available in prison. We disagree. The court correctly stated that the jury could not control or determine any aspect of defendant's treatment in prison, and it should not speculate on the conditions in prison. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 482.) When read together with the question to which it responded, the statement did not tell the jury to disregard the evidence it heard, or to disregard any possibility of rehabilitation. Defense counsel's approval of the response as given bars the contention that the court should have elaborated upon it to avoid possible misunderstanding. ( People v. Medina, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 902.) If defendant had wanted further clarification, he should have proposed it when given the opportunity. ( Ibid. )