Opinion ID: 901368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Quick `In Pari Delicto' With Burke

Text: [¶ 8.] The doctrine of in pari delicto is defined as [t]he principle that a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing may not recover damages resulting from the wrongdoing. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed 2004). The doctrine ... is an application of the principle of public policy that `[n]o court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or illegal act.' Evans v. Cameron, 121 Wis.2d 421, 360 N.W.2d 25, 28 (1985) (citing Clemens v. Clemens, 28 Wis. 637, 654 (1871)). [¶ 9.] Quick relies upon two exceptions to the doctrine. These exceptions are applicable: (1) when the parties are on unequal footing, the client relies on the advice of their attorney, and therefore, there is inequality or undue influence between the lawyer and client, Cameron, 360 N.W.2d at 28-29; and, (2) when denying relief would offend public morals to a greater extent than granting relief. Gaines v. Wolcott, 119 Ga.App. 313, 167 S.E.2d 366, 370 (1969). These exceptions were more fully explained by a Michigan Court of Appeals: ...two exceptions to the bar of in pari delicto [are] both drawn from Justice Story: And indeed in cases where both parties are in delicto concurring in an illegal act, it does not always follow that they stand in pari delicto; for there may be and often are, very different degrees in their guilt. One party may act under circumstances of oppression, imposition, hardship, undue influence, or great inequality of condition or age; so that his guilt may be far less in degree than that of his associate in the offense. And besides, there may be on the part of the court itself a necessity of supporting the public interests or public policy in many cases, however reprehensible the acts of the parties may be. Pantely v. Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C., 180 Mich.App. 768, 447 N.W.2d 864, 867-868 (1989) (citing 1 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (14th ed), § 423, pp 399-400). [¶ 10.] Considering the public policy exception first, Quick argues that Burke's use of the in pari delicto defense is a greater violation of public policy than any wrong committed by Quick. He contends that Burke should not be allowed to assert the defense because his conduct was more egregious. However, as is further explained below, this is not a case in which a client innocently relied on an attorney's advice. This is a case where Quick's conduct was obviously wrongful and fraudulent, even to a layperson. Therefore, Burke's forgery does not offend public morals to a materially greater extent than Quick's forgery. [¶ 11.] Moreover, we have applied the doctrine even when lesser degrees of fault are involved in the use of fraudulent documents. The doctrine of pari delicto does not require equal degrees of negligence to preclude indemnity.... If a person seeking indemnity personally participates in an affirmative act of negligence, or is physically connected with an act of omission by knowledge or acquiescence in it on his part, or fails to perform some duty in connection with the omission which he has undertaken, he is deprived of the right of indemnity. Massey Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Bice, 450 N.W.2d 435, 440 (S.D.1990) (emphasis added) (applying the doctrine of in pari delicto from indemnity among joint tort feasors to indemnity among joint fraud feasors) (citing Degen v. Bayman, 86 S.D. 598, 604, 200 N.W.2d 134, 137 (1972)). Therefore, even if Burke were slightly more culpable, where the wrongful conduct was obvious to all, the parties' relative degree of fault is not a public policy justification requiring indemnity. [¶ 12.] Quick also asserts that denying him relief would offend public policy because an attorney who anticipates a possible malpractice action will be in a position where he can create his own built-in defense by involving his client in the fraud. However, this built-in defense theory could only have merit if an attorney were able to convince an innocent client to partake in activity that is not knowingly and openly fraudulent. In such a case, presumably involving a more legally complex or obscure fraud, a more compelling argument could be made to relieve a client of unintentional, but wrongful, conduct. Here, however, Quick was fully aware of the forgery by which he was assisting his cause. Under such circumstances, relief is precluded. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained in a similar case involving perjury: There may be circumstances in which the advice given by an attorney is so complex that the client would be unaware of the wrongfulness involved in following that advice. In such circumstances, more weight may be given to the influence an attorney will have over the client and the amount of reliance which the client can justifiably place in the attorney. The wrongfulness of lying while under oath, however, is apparent. Absent some allegation of special circumstances constituting an exception to the rule of in pari delicto independent of the attorney-client relationship, the client's deliberate act of lying under oath places that client in pari delicto with the attorney who advised that client to lie. Cameron, 360 N.W.2d at 28-29. [¶ 13.] We see no distinction with forgery. Thus, we find no merit to Quick's public policy arguments under these facts. When a client participates in obviously fraudulent conduct, the courts may not permit a fraudfeasor who invokes the court's jurisdiction to profit from his own fraud by recovering damages. Mettes v. Quinn, 89 Ill.App.3d 77, 44 Ill.Dec. 427, 411 N.E.2d 549, 551 (1980) (citations omitted). [¶ 14.] Quick next contends that he was on unequal footing when he engaged in the fraudulent conduct. The unequal footing exception, as applied in this case, would require circumstances of ... undue influence, or great inequality of condition.... Cameron, 360 N.W.2d at 28 (citing Feld & Sons v. Pechner, Dorfman, Etc., 312 Pa.Super. 125, 458 A.2d 545 (1983)). [¶ 15.] Quick claims entitlement to this exception because he deferred to Burke's expertise and was told the Action in Writing was merely a housekeeping matter. Although we acknowledge the undue influence and great inequality of condition exception, we believe that it is inapplicable here because backdating a document, counseling in a forgery, and allowing the use of forged evidence in court are so obviously fraudulent that no deferral to Burke's expertise was necessary. Clearly, Quick's conduct was not premised upon such legally complex concepts that Quick would have been unaware of the wrongfulness of his conduct. See Pantely, 447 N.W.2d at 868 (stating that a law degree does not add to one's awareness that perjury is immoral and illegal, any more than an accounting degree adds to one's awareness that tax fraud is immoral and illegal). Therefore, Quick's obviously wrongful conduct disqualified him from using the unequal footing exception. That result is fully justified by this record reflecting that Quick had actual knowledge of his wrongful conduct; i.e. he specifically deferred to Burke to sign his ex-wife's name, explaining that he could not replicate the signature convincingly enough. [¶ 16.] In the final analysis, it is not important that Quick's knowledge of the legal ramifications of the document was less than Burke's, as it was clear to a layperson that Quick was participating in a forgery. It was also obvious that he was submitting a forgery to a fact finder in a judicial proceeding. See Bice, 450 N.W.2d at 439-440. Therefore, Quick cannot escape his own conduct. When parties seek equity in the court, they must do equity, which includes entering the court with clean hands. A [party] who does not come into equity with clean hands is not entitled to any relief herein, but should be left in the position in which the court finds him.... The maxim that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands, is most often utilized where granting affirmative equitable relief would run contrary to public policy or lend the court's aid to fraudulent, illegal or unconscionable conduct. Himrich v. Carpenter, 1997 SD 116, ¶¶ 21-22, 569 N.W.2d 568, 573 (internal citations omitted). Because Quick came to the court with unclean hands, and because his conduct was obviously wrongful and fraudulent, he was in pari delicto with Burke.