Opinion ID: 200004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Strickland Doctrine.

Text: 30 The controlling principles for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims are limned in Strickland. Under these principles, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must establish two elements in order to prevail: 31 First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 32 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 33 As to the first element, [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The practice of law is not a mechanical exercise (like, say, kicking a foot press), and an inquiring court must leave ample room for variations in professional judgment. See id. By like token, a reviewing court must not lean too heavily on hindsight: a lawyer's acts and omissions must be judged on the basis of what he knew, or should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made and implemented. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1854, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir.1991). Only if, in light of all the circumstances, the [alleged] acts or omissions of counsel were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, can a finding of deficient performance ensue. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 34 The second Strickland element ensures that, even if a lawyer's performance is constitutionally unacceptable, relief will be withheld unless the quondam client has demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. While this level of prejudice may be presumed in a few settings, id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, that is the exception, not the rule. For the most part, the petitioner must carry the devoir of persuasion and prove that he was prejudiced, i.e., that his attorney's parlous conduct may have altered the outcome of the case. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-86, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). In this regard, we caution that, although the possibility of a different out-come must be substantial in order to establish prejudice, it may be less than fifty percent. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (explaining that a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the case).