Opinion ID: 2184643
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation of PowersReview Authority

Text: Sims claims that the assignment of the duty to conduct a risk assessment hearing to the circuit court is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine because it places a burden on the circuit court. We cannot agree. A hearing to review the classification of risk as recommended by the certified provider pursuant to the statute is not a delegation of a purely legislative or executive responsibility to the court system. It does not unreasonably interfere with the function of the judiciary and is not a violation of the separation of powers principles. Commonwealth v. Raines, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 724 (1993), overruled on other grounds in Commonwealth v. Howard, Ky., 969 S.W.2d 700 (1998), recognizes that a statute may confer on the courts the duty to administer certain types of laws but not to legislate. Raines, supra , a case involving the revocation of drivers licenses found that nothing in the constitution prevented the administration of traffic laws including the suspension of licenses from being lawfully delegated to the courts and that such a statute did not impose a purely executive function on the judiciary. The same is true in this situation, thus the statute here does not constitute a separation of powers violation. Cf. Mullins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 956 S.W.2d 210 (1997). The argument by Sims that the hearing should be conducted by the parole board is unconvincing. It is within the power of the legislature to determine what unit of government is best suited to perform certain civil responsibilities. Here, the legislature determined that the sentencing courts were most familiar with the facts surrounding the offender, and therefore, would be most capable of handling the risk determination efficiently. The assignment of this responsibility to the circuit courts is a legitimate policy decision by the legislature and does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. The circuit courts have the constitutional authority to review sex offender classifications and to conduct hearings in connection therewith. Such action does not constitute an impermissible separation of powers violation. The Arizona Court of Appeals, where the separation of powers doctrine approach is similar to that of Kentucky, has found that its sexually violent persons act did not violate separation of powers by providing that rules of civil procedure and evidence would apply in the proceedings. The Arizona Court concluded that: The critical question is whether the exercise of power usurps the power of another branch of government. Such usurpation was not found in Arizona and there is no usurpation here. See Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 987 P.2d 779 (App.1999). In the cross-appeal by Sims, in addition to the challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes, he raises other lengthy arguments in regard to constitutional Sections 1, 26, 27, 28, 47 and 51. None of these arguments are convincing, but we will comment on some of them. We have previously held in this Opinion that the statutes in question were not intended and are not any form of punishment. Section 51 is not violated. The legislation does not relate to more than one subject and is not misleading. Registration and notification are not punishments for a previous sex crime. They are remedial measures, not punitive, and do not constitute punishment. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). The arguments by Sims regarding his right to privacy have no foundation. The limitation on the right to privacy was expressed by a delegate to the 1890 constitutional convention when he stated, My rights end where another gentleman's rights commence. Const. Debates p. 597. The laws enacted here are for the direct protection of society. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 133 Ky. 50, 117 S.W. 383 (1909). The contention that the statutes violate section 47 of the constitution is unpersuasive. Chapter 401 of the 2000 version of the acts does not violate the constitution because it is not a taxation or revenue bill. The purpose of the legislation is to promote public safety. The fact that the latest version of the statute was necessary to prevent Kentucky from losing federal funding does not change the statute into one of a revenue raising type. Yeoman v. Health Policy Board, Ky., 983 S.W.2d 459 (1998), indicates that if there is a revenue aspect to a bill that is incidental to its primary purpose, the statute survives scrutiny under Section 47. The funds received by Kentucky from the federal government are not revenue raised by means of local or state taxation. The application of the statutes in question will not result in ex post facto, double jeopardy or bill of attainder violations. The Kentucky legislation establishes a remedial and regulatory system regarding registration and notification of convicted sex offenders similar to all the other states in the union and the federal government. From any aspect, the intended purpose of this legislation is to promote public safety. The title of the bill is An Act concerning criminal justice matters and in practice, the statutes relate to criminal justice matters because they apply to individuals previously convicted of sexual offenses. It should be noted that the law is not styled An Act Relating to Crimes and Punishments.