Opinion ID: 1119859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructional Contentions

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of insanity in pertinent part as follows: It is now your function to determine the issue raised by the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Such plea now places before you the issue as to whether he was legally sane or legally insane at the time of the commission of each of these crimes. This is the sole issue for you to determine in this proceeding. Although you may consider evidence of his mental condition before and after the time of the commission of the crime, such evidence is to be considered for the purpose of throwing light on the defendant's mental condition as it was when the crime was committed. Mental illness and mental abnormality, in whatever form either may appear, are not necessarily the same as legal insanity. A person may be mentally ill or mentally abnormal and yet not be legally insane. A person is legally insane when by reason of mental disease or mental defect he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense. (CALJIC No. 4.00.) (28a) Defendant contends the instruction is ambiguous and misleading in several ways. However, we find no error. The standard instruction correctly and adequately explained the applicable law to the jury, and the court was not required to rewrite it sua sponte. (29) The trial court cannot reasonably be expected to attempt to revise or improve accepted and correct jury instructions absent some request from counsel. ( People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 108-109 [192 Cal. Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520].) (28b) Defendant first contends that the reference to a mental disease or mental defect prevented the jury from considering the effects of both in combination. This is an unreasonable interpretation of the instruction. Although the court did not expressly state the jury could consider both a disease and a defect, it did not prohibit such consideration. No reasonable juror would believe an insanity finding could be based upon a mental defect or upon a mental disease, but not both. If defendant believed the instruction was incomplete or needed elaboration in this regard, it was his responsibility to request an additional or clarifying instruction. ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 550 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129] [no penalty phase error in referring to mental disease without also referring to mental defect].) Defendant next asserts that the instruction erroneously presents the two prongs of the M'Naghten test as being synonymous. He quarrels with the instruction's punctuation, gives us a lengthy lesson on grammatical theory, and insists that a semicolon was required to separate the two prongs. (In addition to the oral instruction, the court supplied the jury with a copy of the written instructions.) We believe, however, that the standard instruction is sufficiently clear. If defendant believed the jury might engage in the same tortuous grammatical analysis as he does on appeal, and that a semicolon was needed, he should have requested one. He did not. Defendant next contends the phrase knowing or understanding is grammatically confusing. Again, if defendant believed the jury might engage in a form of grammatical analysis that would make the phrase confusing, he should have requested some sort of clarification. He did not. Defendant finally contends that instructing that mental illness and mental abnormality are not necessarily the same as legal sanity, while also requiring that insanity be based upon a mental disease or mental defect, is confusing and misleading. The same answer suffices. Defendant should have requested clarification if he believed it was necessary. Absent such a request, we find no error in use of the standard instruction.
At the sanity phase, the court gave a modified version of CALJIC No. 1.00, including that, As jurors you must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him. You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. [ถ] Both the people and the defendant have a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the laws of the case, and you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequence of such verdict may be.  (Italics added.) (30) Defendant now objects to the emphasized language as improperly diminishing the jurors' sense of responsibility for the sanity decision. He appears to contend that in deciding the question of sanity, the jury may be swayed by sentiment, conjecture and sympathy, and need not reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences. He relies primarily on language in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], reversed on related grounds sub nomine California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], that this language should not be given in a capital penalty trial. (40 Cal.3d at p. 537 & fn. 7.) He equates a sanity phase with a penalty phase for this purpose. The equation fails. In People v. Brown, supra , we pointed out that unlike the guilt phase, where the possible punishment is not a proper matter for juror consideration, at the penalty phase the consequences are precisely the issue the jury must decide. (40 Cal.3d at p. 537, fn. 7.) For purposes of this issue, a sanity phase is similar to a guilt phase, not a penalty phase. A sanity phase jury does not decide what punishment to impose, but whether a defendant was insane at the time of the crime. This decision, like a guilt decision, has obvious penal consequences. But, unlike a penalty trial, these consequences are prescribed by law, not determined by the jury. A sanity decision, like that of guilt, and unlike that of penalty, is rendered without regard to the consequences. Defendant also argues that under People v. Skinner, supra, 39 Cal.3d 765, the second prong of the M'Naghten test is a `moral' test, thus making sympathy a valid consideration. As we explained in rejecting defendant's vagueness challenge to section 25(b), this is incorrect. The jurors do not decide questions of morality, but only whether the defendant was incapable of distinguishing moral right from wrong. This decision must be based upon the evidence of the defendant's mental state at the time of the crimes, not feelings of sympathy or consideration of the consequences of the decision. There was no error.
The court read CALJIC No. 4.01, which informs the jury that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not mean the defendant will be released from custody, briefly explains the procedures that would be followed in the event of such a verdict, and admonishes the jury not to be concerned about whether or when the defendant would be found sane and released. The court concluded, It would be a violation of your duty [as] the jury if you were to find the defendant sane at the time he committed the offenses because of a doubt that the Department of Mental Health or the courts will properly carry out their responsibilities. The court also instructed the jury under CALJIC No. 17.41, In your deliberations the subject of penalty or punishment is not to be discussed or considered by you. [ถ] This is a matter which must not in any way effect your verdict. (31) Defendant contends it was contradictory, and thus erroneous, to give the jury information regarding the consequences of an insanity verdict, but also to tell it not to consider such consequences. A brief review of the history behind CALJIC No. 4.01 is needed to place the contention into context. California law originally did not provide for this instruction. ( People v. Smith (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 51, 73 [108 Cal. Rptr. 698]; see Annot., Insanity Acquittal Instruction (1990) 81 A.L.R.4th 659, 679 & fn. 52.) Then came People v. Moore (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 540 [211 Cal. Rptr. 856], in which the defendant took the opposite position as urged here, and contended the court erred in refusing to give such an instruction. The appellate court agreed with the defendant, and found reversible error in not giving the instruction. It believed that the danger that a jury might find a defendant sane because of fear that he would be released if found not guilty by reason of insanity far outweigh[s] any danger involved in informing the jury about the consequences of an insanity verdict while also telling it not to consider such consequences. ( Id. at p. 556.) The court held that upon request by the defendant or jury, the trial court should give an appropriate instruction to ensure the jury does not erroneously believe an insanity verdict will result in the immediate release of the defendant. ( Ibid. ) The court in People v. Dennis (1985) 169 Cal. App.3d 1135 [215 Cal. Rptr. 750] promptly agreed with Moore. CALJIC No. 4.01 was drafted in response to these decisions. It is intended to aid the defense by telling the jury not to find the defendant sane out of a concern that otherwise he would be improperly released from custody. Defendant neither specifically requested nor objected to the instruction. Defense counsel stressed its contents in his argument to the jury. Given the instruction's intent to protect the defense, we do not find it error of which the defendant can complain to give it under these circumstances, and certainly not prejudicial error.