Opinion ID: 772395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Direct Evidence Supporting the Title VII Claim

Text: 57 We now turn to the consideration of the County's affirmative action plans as direct evidence of discrimination supporting Bass' Title VII, 1981 and Florida Civil Rights Act claims. The affirmative action issues in this case arise in a somewhat unusual posture. In a typical Title VII case involving an affirmative action plan, an employer asserts in response to a plaintiff's prima facie showing of discrimination that its employment decision was made pursuant to an affirmative action plan and that its compliance with such a plan was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Calif., 480 U.S. 616, 626-27, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1449 (1987). The question in those circumstances is whether the employer's affirmative action plan is valid. 58 In this case, the County seeks no cover from its affirmative action plans (and, in fact, seems to distance itself from them), and it is Bass who relies on the County's affirmative action plans in support of his claims. Of course, a defendant who in fact acts pursuant to an affirmative action plan cannot avoid judicial review of the plan by disavowing reliance upon it, where there is evidence that the plan played a part in the employment decision. 59 The first step in ascertaining whether the County can be held liable for discrimination as a result of its affirmative action plans is a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence that it acted pursuant to those plans. The mere existence of an affirmative action plan by itself does not constitute direct evidence of discrimination unless there is also evidence that the employer acted pursuant to the plan in making employment decisions. See Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 904 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that affirmative action plan is only relevant if defendant acted pursuant to plan); Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 976 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1987) (same). 60 However, the existence of an affirmative action plan, when combined with evidence that the plan was followed in an employment decision, is sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discrimination. See McGarry v. Board of County Comm'rs of Pitkin, 175 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that county personnel director's statements that those hired were not better qualified than white applicant and that those hirings were minority affirmative action hirings, made against the backdrop of the county's policy statements regarding hiring and affirmative action, constituted direct evidence of discrimination). Furthermore, even when a defendant denies having acted pursuant to its affirmative action plan, if there is evidence that it may have done so, a jury must decide whether the defendant in fact acted pursuant to its stated plan. See Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 139 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that jury could conclude that defendant acted pursuant to affirmative action plan in light of circumstantial evidence even though defendant denied having taken plan into account). When a jury finds that a government employer acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan, then the employer should be held liable for discrimination unless the plan satisfies the demanding scrutiny required by Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause. This is because, regardless of good intentions, a government employer commits unlawful discrimination when it takes race into account in an employment decision and acts pursuant to an invalid affirmative action plan. 5 61
62 For the reasons that follow, we hold that where there is an affirmative action plan in effect that relates to the employer's actions which are the subject of a discrimination claim, the affirmative action plan constitutes direct evidence of discrimination if there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a jury reasonably to conclude that the employer was acting pursuant to its plan in taking the employment action in question. 63 Because we believe that the phrase has been a source of confusion, we begin by discussing the meaning of direct evidence in the context of a Title VII race discrimination claim. First, we note that the phrase direct evidence, when used in the context of discrimination claims, does not refer to whether evidence is direct or circumstantial in the ordinary evidentiary sense in which we normally think of those terms. Instead, direct evidence refers to a type of evidence which, if true, would require no inferential leap in order for a court to find discrimination. We do not believe that the status of evidence as direct in this context, however, changes simply because a defendant contests the validity of the evidence, thereby requiring the plaintiff to offer proof related to the disputed evidence through other means. Therefore, an affirmative action plan may constitute direct evidence, even when a defendant denies having acted pursuant to its stated plan. 64 This view of direct evidence is supported by this Court's case law addressing other types of direct evidence of discrimination. We have held that [w]here the non-movant presents direct evidence that, if believed by the jury, would be sufficient to win at trial, summary judgment is not appropriate even where the movant presents conflicting evidence. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Furthermore, [w]e have defined direct evidence as `evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.' Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added). Therefore, direct evidence of discrimination may be disputed, and it may well be that a plaintiff will have to establish the direct evidence by introducing circumstantial evidence. For example, in Merritt, we considered whether an alleged statement by an employer constituted direct evidence in support of the plaintiff's retaliation claim. Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1189-91. In that case, the employer denied that a decisionmaker had made a statement which, if true, clearly showed a retaliatory motive behind the termination of the plaintiff's employment. Id. Nonetheless, we concluded that because the plaintiff could prove - whether by circumstantial evidence or any other means - that the decisionmaker did make the statement, there was direct evidence of retaliation precluding summary judgment. Id. Given this approach, we hold, for the following reasons, that Bass has put forth direct evidence of discrimination in the form of the County's affirmative action plans even though there is conflicting evidence concerning whether the Division acted pursuant to those plans. 65
66 We begin with the facts concerning the County's affirmative action plans. All parties agree that the County had affirmative action plans in place at the time of the Fire and Rescue Division's reorganization, and that those plans were applicable to the Division. Bass showed that in November 1990, the Board of County Commissioners adopted a five-year affirmative action plan. The plan stated that the underutilization of blacks and Hispanics at the Division existed division wide. It set county-wide goals for the hiring of minorities and instructed division directors and department managers to establish annual numerical hiring and promotion objectives to alleviate the underutilization of women and minorities. 67 Bass also presented evidence that in July 1993, the County adopted another plan, the 1993 Diversification Plan, to ensure that Orange County's workplace is devoid of discrimination and is generally reflective of the County's diverse population. The 1993 Diversification Plan required county departments and divisions to suspend the hiring process when no qualified minority or female applicant was available and provide written justification to the EEO/Professional Standards Department stating job related reasons why diversity cannot be obtained via the particular hiring process. The 1993 Diversification Plan also set percentage hiring goals in positions that were found to have few minorities or women. That 1993 plan was in effect during the time Bass interviewed for the Training Instructor position in October 1995, and it covered hiring at the Fire and Rescue Division. In its response to Bass' EEOC charge, the County acknowledged the existence of an affirmative action plan covering the Division and stated that one of the paramount objectives of the plan was to increase the percentage of women and minorities in job categories where they have been traditionally underrepresented. 68 Although the County clearly had affirmative action plans in place during the 1995 reorganization, it argues, based on testimony from the interview panel members, that the decision not to offer the Training Instructor position to Bass was unrelated to its affirmative action plans. To support this position, the County points to testimony from the panel members indicating that the Training Instructors were selected solely on the basis of their interview scores and that no other factors, such as race, were taken into consideration. Valle specifically testified that there was no discussion of race at any time. Furthermore, the County notes that the three Training Instructors selected represented the top three interview scores of the applicants who were still in consideration. 69 Although the parties dispute whether the Fire and Rescue Division was acting pursuant to the County's affirmative action plans, we must bear in mind that this case is before us at the summary judgment stage. This means the County is entitled to judgment at this time only if it shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, Bass, as the non-movant, is entitled to have all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record drawn in his favor. Ryder Int'l Corp. v. First American Nat'l Bank, 943 F.2d 1521, 1523 (11th Cir. 1991). 70 There is substantial circumstantial evidence in the record upon which a jury reasonably could conclude that the Division acted pursuant to the County's affirmative action plans. We have outlined above various types of circumstantial evidence which, independent of the County's affirmative action plans, permit Bass' Title VII claim to go to a jury. That same evidence would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that, despite its denials, the Division was acting pursuant to the County's affirmative action plans when it decided to deny Bass a Training Instructor position during the 1995 reorganization. While the mere existence of an affirmative action plan does not constitute direct evidence of discrimination, the existence of a plan combined with other circumstances of the type present in this case make available to a jury the reasonable inference that the employer was acting pursuant to the plan despite statements to the contrary from the decisionmakers involved. Therefore, given the admitted fact that the County had affirmative action plans which were in effect at the time of the actions that are the subject of this lawsuit, and given the evidence (all of which is circumstantial and some of which is disputed) that the Division acted pursuant to those affirmative action plans, there is direct evidence of discrimination. 71
72 Ordinarily, if a defendant were found to have acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan, the next question would be whether the plan was valid under Title VII. The validity of the plan would then be determined under the following test: 73 We must first determine whether the [government employer's] consideration of the race of promotional candidates was justified by a manifest racial imbalance that reflected under-representation of [the affirmative action plan's beneficiaries] in traditionally segregated job categories. . . . If such a justification was present when the plan was developed, we must then determine whether the plan itself provides a proper remedy for that imbalance. A remedy is proper if the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the rights of non-black employees or create an absolute bar to their advancement. 74 In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1537 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632, 637, 107 S. Ct. at 1452, 1455). 75 As we have noted above, however, the County has consistently denied that the Fire and Rescue Division acted pursuant to its affirmative action plans with respect to Bass. The jury may ultimately choose to believe that this is true. In the event that the jury disbelieves the County's denials, however, the County is not entitled to retrench and argue that its affirmative action plans are valid and constitute a defense to the race discrimination claims. The County has put forth no evidence suggesting that its affirmative action plans could satisfy the requirements of Title VII, nor has it asked for an opportunity to do so. At no time has the County argued, even in the alternative, that, if Bass is right about the Division's actions being a product of the County's affirmative action plans, the plans were nevertheless valid. Having chosen its strategic path, the County should not be allowed to disrupt the orderly course of litigation by belatedly requesting a hearing on or judicial determination about the validity of its affirmative action plans if the factual premise of the County's strategy is rejected by the jury. Therefore, the district court should instruct the jury that if it finds that the Division acted pursuant to the County's affirmative action plans in failing to hire Bass for one of the Training Instructor positions, the County is liable under Title VII for discrimination.