Opinion ID: 183816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lay Witness Opinions

Text: Goodman also contends the district court erred in relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) to limit lay witnesses to non-opinion testimony only. We agree. The parties again differ on our standard of review. At oral argument, the government conceded the district court erred, but contends Goodman failed to preserve this issue for appeal and thus we should review only for plain error. The record shows the contrary. Goodman's counsel advocated specifically for lay witness opinions in a detailed pretrial memorandum that provided analysis and case citations. R. Vol. 1, Doc. 64 at 5. But the district court, relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), ordered the following: [D]efense counsel must limit his inquiry of any lay witnesses to observations of defendant's behavior only; no witness will be permitted to state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state of condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 66 at 2 (emphasis in original). The court thus made it plain that Goodman's witnesses would be restricted in the scope of their testimony. Goodman through his motion in limine thus preserved this issue for appeal, see Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d at 986, and we review de novo the legal question of whether the Federal Rules of Evidence impose a strict prohibition against lay witnesses from testifying as to the ultimate issue of sanity. United States v. Johnson, 584 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir.2009). The Federal Rules of Evidence permit lay witnesses to testify in the form of opinions or inferences given three general limitations. The opinions should (1) be rationally based on the perception of the witness, (2) be helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (3) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. FED.R.EVID. 701. Rule 704(a) further provides that opinions and inferences otherwise admissible are not objectionable because they embrace an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. FED.R.EVID. 704(a). The Federal Rules of Evidence do not, therefore, categorically prohibit lay witnesses from offering opinion testimony regarding the defendant's mental state. As the Second Circuit put it, the admission of lay opinion testimony is a sharp departure in theory, if not in practice, from the common law. . . . Since neither Rule 701 nor Rule 704(a) limits the subject matter of lay opinion testimony, there is no theoretical prohibition against allowing lay witnesses to give their opinions as to the mental states of others. United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (2d Cir.1992) (citing Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence ¶ 701[02], pp. 701-19 to 701-21 (1991) and 2 S. Saltzburg & M. Martin, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 1 (5th ed. 1990)); see also United States v. Hauert, 40 F.3d 197, 201 (7th Cir.1994) ([A] lay witness may, in appropriate circumstances, give an opinion on an `ultimate issue.'); United States v. Baur, No. 91-1868, 1993 WL 339707, at  (6th Cir. Sept.1, 1993) (noting that because witness was not testifying as an expert, his lay opinion was not barred by Rule 704(b)). Indeed, Rule 704(a) specifically allows testimony in the form of an opinion that `embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.' United States v. Awadallah, 401 F.Supp.2d 308, 313 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (The Government correctly argues that the fact that a lay witness's opinion testimony might go to an ultimate issue in this case does not, by itself, mean that it must be precluded.); Weinstein's ¶ 704.02, pp. 704-5 (2001) (Rule 704 permits testimony in the form of an opinion or inference about an ultimate issue, and abolishes the common-law ultimate fact rule barring such evidence.). As we said in United States v. LeRoy, 944 F.2d 787, 789 (10th Cir.1991), Lay opinion of a witness as to a person's sanity is admissible if the witness is sufficiently acquainted with the person involved and has observed his conduct and has personal knowledge regarding the person's unusual, abnormal or bizarre conduct. We would have a quite different result if the question were the scope of expert opinion testimony. Rule 704(b) provides an exception to Rule 704(a) and expressly forbids experts from offering opinions as to the state of mind of a criminal defendant if that mental state is an element of the crime of which they are accused: No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. FED.R.EVID. 704(b). Rule 704(b) does not, however, forbid lay witnesses from offering opinion testimony. Weinstein's Federal Evidence, ¶ 704.06[1], pp. 704-18 to 704-19 (2008) (Rule 704(b) applies only to bar expert testimony on a defendant's mental state, not lay testimony.). Indeed, the rule's plain text limits its application to experts only. See Rea, 958 F.2d at 1215 ([I]f the drafters had intended that the last sentence be read as applying to lay witnesses as well as expert witnesses, there would have been no need to include the word `expert' in the first sentence.). We recognize that Rule 704(b)'s last sentence (Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone) could be understood to bar both lay and expert witness opinions, but the sentence cannot be read without referring to the one preceding it, which is clearly directed only at expert witnesses. See id. ([The second sentence's] reference to `[s]uch' issues makes it unintelligible without reference to the first sentence.). Moreover, the legislative history of subdivision (b), which was added in 1984, indicates that the drafters and Congress focused only on problems with regard to expert witnesses, not lay witnesses. Id.; see also S.Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 230 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 3182, 3412 (The purpose of this amendment is to eliminate the confusing spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly contradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by the trier of fact.). We therefore find the district court erred in relying solely on Rule 704(b) to limit lay witnesses to non-opinion testimony only. We emphasize, however, that the district court still has the discretion to exclude lay witness testimony for other reasons contemplated by the Federal Rules of Evidence, among them (1) Rule 701 (whether the testimony is rationally based on perceptions of the witness and would be helpful to the trier of fact); and (2) Rule 403 (whether the evidence is cumulative or its helpfulness is outweighed by unfair prejudice). See Rea, 958 F.2d at 1216; Hauert, 40 F.3d at 202 (recognizing Rule 704(a) allows lay witness testimony as to the ultimate issue but affirming the district court's rejection of that testimony because it was not helpful to the jury, as required by Rule 701(b)). Thus, the lay witnesses would not have carte blanche to opine on Goodman's appearance or state of mind at the time of the crimes if they have no first-hand knowledge for such an opinion. Nor can we say on this record the district court's error in limiting lay witnesses to non-opinion testimony was harmless. As with the temporal limitations, this error likely affected how Goodman conducted his entire defense, from witness preparation to direct examination. For example, Goodman's father had contact with his son on the day of one of the robberies and may have been in a position to offer opinion testimony. Even so, the district court is free to review the admissibility of the proffered evidence in light of the limitations mentioned above or other reasons offered by the parties on remand.