Opinion ID: 2330570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Reasonable Probability Materiality Test

Text: In their appellate briefs, both parties cite to a sliding scale materiality analysis, which this court has endorsed in past cases. See State v. Adams, 280 Kan. 494, 501, 124 P.3d 19 (2005); State v. Aikins, 261 Kan. 346, 381, 932 P.2d 408 (1997). This analysis was derived from the United States Supreme Court's materiality analysis in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-07, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), which varied depending upon the type of Brady violation, in other words, the level of intent behind the prosecutor's conduct and the specificity of the defendant's discovery request. See Adams, 280 Kan. at 501, 124 P.3d 19 (sliding scale applies as the level of intent supporting the State's conduct decreases). What the parties fail to recognize is that after Agurs the Supreme Court adopted a more narrow, uniform test for materiality governing all categories of Brady violations: The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; accord Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 470, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009). The Bagley Court emphasized that this reasonable probability test for materiality is sufficiently flexible to cover the `no request,' `general request,' and `specific request' cases of prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that had previously served as the lines of demarcation for applying the Agurs sliding scale test. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375. The Bagley Court did not specifically overrule Agurs, but it clearly rejected the use of a sliding scale analysis. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; see Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 Colum. L.Rev. 1369, 1392-93 (1991) (noting that Bagley adopted the narrowest of three potential materiality standards). Subsequently, the Supreme Court has explained that the reasonable probability test does not require a demonstration that disclosure of the evidence would have resulted in the defendant's acquittal. Instead, it must be shown that `the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' [Citation omitted.] Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 870, 126 S.Ct. 2188, 165 L.Ed.2d 269 (2006). Despite these rulings of the United States Supreme Court, which control our analysis of a due process issue brought under the United States Constitution, some Kansas cases decided after Bagley have continued to refer to the abandoned Agurs sliding scale materiality test. See, e.g., Adams, 280 Kan. at 501, 124 P.3d 19; Aikins, 261 Kan. at 381, 932 P.2d 408; State v. Carmichael, 240 Kan. 149, 152, 727 P.2d 918 (1986). These cases applying the sliding scale materiality test have not cited an independent Kansas basis for continuing to use the test and have failed to recognize the Supreme Court's disapproval of the test. Other cases have appropriately applied the reasonable probability test. Francis, 282 Kan. at 151, 145 P.3d 48; Haddock, 282 Kan. at 507, 146 P.3d 187; Ludlow v. State, 37 Kan.App.2d 676, 685, 157 P.3d 631 (2007). To reconcile these conflicting lines of cases, we clarify that the Agurs sliding scale test no longer applies and disapprove those cases utilizing the test. In our past cases applying the sliding scale test, this court reviewed the trial court's application of the test under an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., Adams, 280 Kan. at 501, 124 P.3d 19; Aikins, 261 Kan. at 381, 932 P.2d 408. In contrast, this court typically conducts a de novo review of materiality, at least in other contexts. E.g., State v. Inkelaar, 293 Kan. 414, 424, 264 P.3d 81 (2011) (determining materiality of evidence under K.S.A. 60-455); State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 586, 243 P.3d 352 (2010) (determining materiality of evidence as part of relevancy equation). Our treatment of materiality determinations in these other contexts raises the question of whether an abuse of discretion standard should be applied when reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding an alleged Brady violation under the reasonable probability test. Consistent with our general treatment of materiality determinations, federal courts uniformly hold that the determination of a Brady violation is a legal question. Consequently, that question is reviewed de novo with deference to any factual findings. E.g., United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420, 427-28 (5th Cir.2012). Some of these federal courts have explained that a de novo review of materiality does not conflict with the application of the abuse of discretion standard to the question of whether the trial court erred in ruling on a request for new trial. As one federal court explained: The district court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de novo, United States v. Miller, 161 F.3d 977, 987 (6th Cir.1998), but the district court's denial of [the defendant's] motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 647 (6th Cir.2005). `A district court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.' [Citation omitted.] United States v. Holder, 657 F.3d 322, 328 (6th Cir.2011). See also, e.g., Turner, 674 F.3d 420, 428 (We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion but consider alleged Brady violations de novo. This de novo review `must proceed with deference to the factual findings underlying the district court's decision.'); United States v. Pelisamen, 641 F.3d 399, 408 (9th Cir.2011) (While the standard of review for a trial court's denial for a motion for a new trial is generally abuse of discretion, review is de novo when the asserted basis for a new trial is a Brady violation.); United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 661 n. 24 (4th Cir.2010) ([M]otions for a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation are reviewed for abuse of discretion. It is an abuse of discretion for the district court to commit a legal errorsuch as improperly determining whether there was a Brady violationand that underlying legal determination is reviewed de novo.); United States v. Graham, 484 F.3d 413, 416-17 (6th Cir.2007), cert. denied 552 U.S. 1280, 128 S.Ct. 1703, 170 L.Ed.2d 513 (2008) (The appellate court reviews denial of a motion for a new trial based on Brady violations under an abuse of discretion standard, but reviews the district court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation ... de novo.); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir.2005), cert. denied 546 U.S. 1137, 126 S.Ct. 1141, 163 L.Ed.2d 999 (2006) (An appellate court ordinarily reviews a district court's ruling on a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion. But, where the motion for a new trial is based on a Brady claim, which presents questions of law as well as questions of fact, the appellate court `will conduct a de novo review of the district court's conclusions of law as well as a clearly erroneous review of any findings of fact.'). These decisions are consistent with one part of our three-part abuse of discretion standard, specifically, the one prong under which judicial discretion is abused if judicial action is based on an error of law. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801. Consequently, we hold that a trial court's determination as to the existence of a Brady violation is reviewed de novo with deference to a trial court's findings of fact, but the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. As a final note of clarification, we address the role of the harmless error standard in a Brady analysis because the State has cited to this standard, although it has done so in the context of the sliding scale test. The United States Supreme Court has explained that once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error, there is no need for further harmless-error review. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Although Kyles was a habeas actionin other words, a collateral attackthe federal courts and commentators have recognized there is no need to conduct a harmless error analysis if a Brady violation is found in a direct appeal. E.g., United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir.2011); Kahn, Presumed Guilty Until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful Conviction Claims under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 123, 160 n. 164 (Fall 2010) (noting that Brady violations are exempt from harmless error analysis); see United States v. Snipes, 751 F.Supp.2d 1279, 1288 n. 9 (M.D.Fla.2010) (The `reasonable probability' standard is substantially the same as the classic `harmless error' standard.). With these principles in mind we turn to application of the reasonable probability test to the facts of this case.