Opinion ID: 545263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Closing Arguments and the Jury Instruction

Text: 45 The trial court issued jury instructions to the parties to which the government failed to object until Gill's counsel had begun his closing argument. The court amended the instructions to conform to the government's objection. Gill contends this is reversible error. 46 Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that written jury instruction requests be filed by the parties by the close of evidence. Technical infractions of Rule 30 require reversal only where the defendant can show actual prejudice. United States v. Baker, 722 F.2d 343, 346 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1037, 104 S.Ct. 1312, 79 L.Ed.2d 709 (1984). The government submitted an instruction on the first element of wire and mail fraud requiring a finding that Gill [k]nowingly advised a scheme to defraud ... or obtained money or property by means of false pretenses, representations or promises as described in the indictment.... (emphasis added). Gill submitted an instruction as to the first element requiring a finding that the defendant knowingly obtained money or property by means of false pretenses, representations, or promises as charged in the indictment. However, after an instruction conference, the parties agreed to an instruction which conformed with neither of those submitted (but did conform with the indictment) by requiring [t]hat the defendant knowingly devised a scheme to defraud and to obtain money or property by means of false pretenses, representations, or promises.... (emphasis added). 47 The trial judge recounted what occurred during the instruction conference in his January 9, 1989 order denying Gill post-conviction relief: 48 The original jury instruction used the language charged in the indictment.... Although there were no objections to the instruction at the jury instruction conference, the government objected to the instruction the following day.... Neither of the proposals required the government to prove a scheme to defraud and to obtain money. The original draft of the court's instructions erroneously inserted that requirement. When this came to the court's attention [during closing arguments], the instruction was amended to follow federal law. 49 Gill now contends that he was unfairly prejudiced because, relying on a belief that the trial court would charge in the conjunctive (that the prosecution must prove a scheme to defraud and to obtain money, rather than a scheme to defraud or to obtain money), his counsel so argued to the jury. However, Gill's counsel did not rely on the mistaken instruction; his argument to the jury during opening and closing was that Gill lacked the intent to defraud, and that Cohen and Heine lacked credibility. 50 During closing arguments, Gill's counsel touched upon the conjunctive/disjunctive issue, but only to the extent of pointing out the language of the indictment: 51 We spent forty minutes this morning listening to Ms. Lamelas (the prosecutor) go through the exhibits, the financials, and I understand that's the government's theory on why there were false statements made, but, ladies and gentlemen, look at the indictment when you are in your deliberations because the indictment doesn't say, at least in my view, what Ms. Lamelas is telling you it says. She says you have to make the false pretenses and it's got to be scheme or artifices, and she puts an or in there, at least the way I interpret her remarks. In their indictment it's and. You have got scheme and artifice. It has to be the intent to defraud, and you have to make the false statements. I hold the government to that, ladies and gentlemen, because that's the law. 52 At that point the prosecutor objected: Judge, I think he is misstating the law. I doubt very much the government has to prove in the disjunctive of 'or,' or prove in the conjunctive of 'and.' Now, Mr. Coffey knows that. The court ordered a side bar, after which the defense counsel continued his closing argument without further reference to the conjunctive/disjunctive distinction. 53 Following closing arguments, the trial court conducted a hearing on whether the jury should be charged in the conjunctive or disjunctive. The court decided to instruct in the disjunctive. However, when charging the jury the court stressed that Gill's counsel had correctly stated that the indictment charged in the conjunctive: 54 You may have been aware this morning that there was a controversy between counsel and we had a side bar conference as to whether it was, what had been said by defense counsel and what the contention was of the government as to what had to be proved in order to meet the first element of this charge. I have read the Indictment to you exactly as it appears in the indictment, and the indictment used the word, quote, and, unquote: that the defendant knowingly devised a scheme to defraud and to obtain money or property by means and false pretenses, representations, and promises as described in the indictment, and in his closing argument defense counsel urged that you read the indictment and consider that in your deliberations, and he was absolutely correct in saying that it read quote, and, unquote. 4 55 In United States v. Baker, supra, the government's indictment charged that defendant had embezzled, abstracted, or purloined funds. Without objection, the trial court agreed to give the government's jury instruction, which only charged that Baker had embezzled funds (mistakenly leaving out the terms abstract and purloin). During closing argument, defense counsel argued that defendant had not embezzled the checks, but instead had stolen them. Over defense counsel's objection, the trial court subsequently added the words abstract and purloin to the jury instruction, and the defendant was convicted. In affirming the conviction, the Seventh Circuit determined that Baker's counsel had not relied on the incorrect instruction during closing argument. Baker's counsel had stated that his client was a thief and not an embezzler, [but] he never actually argued that the defendant should be acquitted on this technical ground. Id. at 346. 56 Similarly, Gill's counsel did not rely on the original mistaken instruction. He referred to the use of the word and in the indictment (which was a correct characterization of the indictment). But he never referred to the original instruction's use of the conjunctive. He never contended Gill should be acquitted because he only intended to defraud or obtain money by false pretenses but did not intend to do both. Because Gill did not detrimentally rely on the initial instruction, the trial court's decision to change that instruction did not prejudice him. For these reasons, the judgment below is 57 AFFIRMED.