Opinion ID: 2143146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of Subsection (d)

Text: According to the majority, subsection (d) grants the trial court full discretion to deny proper petitions under the Act because it provides that a trial court shall enter an order granting or denying the petition. See 20 ILCS 2630/5(d) (West 2006). In my view, subsection (d)'s use of this phrase has been given far more attention and consequence than it deserves. Of course subsection (d) uses the phrase grant or deny. If a petitioner files a verified petition setting forth that he received a gubernatorial pardon but the pardon was not one that specifically authorized expungement, everyone would agree that the trial court must deny the petition. The majority contends that the petitioners' argument would render the grant or deny language of subsection (d) mere surplusage. 233 Ill.2d at 220, 330 Ill.Dec. at 707, 909 N.E.2d at 729. Nothing could be further from the truth, and the majority is able to make this claim only because it never sets forth the petitioners' argument with respect to subsection (d). The petitioners' argument is not that the trial court has to grant every petition that comes before it, or that subsection (c) is the only relevant subsection to be considered (233 Ill.2d at 218, 330 Ill.Dec. at 706, 909 N.E.2d at 728), but that subsections (c) and (d) must be read together, and that the grounds for the State to object to a subsection (c) petition and for the trial court to deny a subsection (c) petition are limited to a failure to satisfy the requirements of subsection (c). The requirements of subsection (c) are: (1) the Governor must pardon the petitioner; (2) the pardon must specifically authorize expungement; and (3) the petitioner must file a proper verified petition in the circuit court. 20 ILCS 2630/5(c) (West 2006). Thus, the petitioners' argument would not render subsection (d)'s grant or deny language mere surplusage; it would properly require that it be read in conjunction with the substantive requirements of subsection (c). Subsection (d) applies to petitions filed under subsections (a), (b), and (c)three different provisions with different language, different requirements, and different levels of discretion. Petitioners correctly argue that the grant or deny language of subsection (d) must be read in conjunction with the substantive requirements of each of these subsections. As we will see, subsection (a), unlike subsection (c), grants broad discretion to the circuit court, so the grounds upon which the circuit court may deny a subsection (a) petition are much broader than those under subsection (c). As Howard correctly stated, [i]t is entirely logical that the grounds for objection, ceded to the prosecutor under subsection 5(d), be different for those who seek expungement under subsection 5(c) than for those who seek expungement under subsection 5(a) given the markedly different language employed in the two subsections respecting the discretion of the circuit court. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 506, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472. With respect to subsection (c), the State may merely object on the grounds that the defendant has not fulfilled the requirement of that subsection, and    the circuit court may only consider whether that statutory requirement has been met. Howard, 372 Ill.App.3d at 506, 310 Ill.Dec. 148, 865 N.E.2d 472. This is not reading limitations into subsection (d) that are not there; it is reading subsection (d) in conjunction with the substantive requirements of the particular subsection at issue, which is exactly what a court is supposed to do. See People v. Glisson, 202 Ill.2d 499, 505, 270 Ill.Dec. 57, 782 N.E.2d 251 (2002) (court should read statute as a whole rather than consider phrases in isolation); People v. Maggette, 195 Ill.2d 336, 348, 254 Ill.Dec. 299, 747 N.E.2d 339 (2001) (court must consider the entire statute and interpret each of its relevant parts together). In fairness to the majority, it should be noted that its construction of subsection (d) is not inconsistent with its construction of subsection (c). If one views subsection (c) as merely describing possible things that might happen, it is not illogical to view subsection (d) as granting complete discretion to the trial court to deny petitions that satisfy the statutory requirements. When subsection (c) is properly construed as a grant of permission to have a court order entered if the petitioner meets the statutory requirements, however, then it is clear that subsection (d)'s use of the word deny refers only to the ability to deny a petition that fails to meet the statutory requirements. The dispute is merely over the breadth of the word deny. In neither instance is the phrase grant or deny rendered mere surplusage. [2]