Opinion ID: 1163156
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Board Err in Imputing $33,000 Income to Arnesen?[9]

Text: Alaska Statute 23.30.200(a) sets an injured employee's TPD compensation as a percentage of the difference between the employee's spendable weekly wages before the injury and his or her wage-earning capacity after the injury in the same or another employment. Alaska Statute 23.30.200(b) provides: The wage-earning capacity of an injured employee is determined by the actual spendable weekly wage of the employee if the actual spendable weekly wage fairly and reasonably represents the wage-earning capacity of the employee. The board may, in the interest of justice, fix the wage-entering [sic] capacity that is reasonable, having due regard to the nature of the injury, the degree of physical impairment, the usual employment, and other factors or circumstances in the case that may affect the capacity of the employee to earn wages.... Arnesen's actual earnings after his injury as a real estate sales agent were approximately $500 per month. However, under AS 23.30.200(b), the Board found that those earnings did not fairly represent his wage-earning capacity: [T]hat level of earnings is associated with the employee's choice to work alone, after a considerable period of absence from full-time real estate sales, without funds for advertisements. The Board fixed his wage-earning capacity at $33,000 a year. Arnesen challenges the Board's decision. This court has noted with respect to the calculation of TPD benefits: [E]arning capacity and post-injury earnings are not synonymous.... Actual post-injury earnings raise a presumption of actual earning capacity; the presumption may be rebutted with evidence showing that they are an unreliable indicator of earnings capacity. ... Actual post-injury earnings may be an unreliable indicator of earning capacity, especially where they are of a temporary or unpredictable character. Pioneer Constr. v. Conlon, 780 P.2d 995, 997 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted). The evidence offered by Anchorage Refuse to rebut the presumption consisted of the report submitted by Virginia Collins. [10] The Board found that Arnesen could have earned $33,000 per year if as an experienced real estate salesperson he had pursued employment at an established real estate company. The report by Collins incorporated information from, among other sources: a National Association of Realtors survey which listed by region median agent and broker compensation, which in each category was greater than $30,000; occupational outlook information from the Alaska Department of Education which reported that many new agents average about $1,500 per month but that full-time experienced agents can earn about $2,750 per month; wage rate information from the Department of Labor reporting essentially the same thing; and an Anchorage labor market survey in which Collins contacted twelve different real estate companies, most of whom indicated that there was a wide range of earnings by sales agents but that the Department of Labor figures were reasonable and that most agents would make between $30,000 and $40,000 annually. The legitimacy of the Board's determination that Arnesen's earning capacity was $33,000 per year rests, therefore, upon whether he could properly be considered an experienced real estate salesperson. Although Arnesen presented testimony that he was not an established salesperson, we do not independently reweigh the evidence concerning findings of fact by the Board. Yahara v. Construction & Rigging, Inc., 851 P.2d 69, 72 (Alaska 1993). The Board could have considered his long-time maintenance of both agent's and broker's licenses, and his operation of his own business, Arnesen and Associates, since the mid-1980's, as evidence that he was experienced enough to make $33,000 per year. It also clearly considered that many of the obstacles he faced in terms of start-up costs were a result of his choice to work by himself rather than with a well-known larger firm, and that there were positions available with larger, established real estate firms in Anchorage. Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind, viewing the record as a whole, might accept as adequate to support the Board's decision. Yahara, 851 P.2d at 72 (citing Morrison v. Afognak Logging, Inc., 768 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Alaska 1989)). Given the degree of deference afforded findings of fact by the Board under the substantial evidence standard, we affirm the judgment of the Board. [11]