Opinion ID: 884843
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 27 Did the District Court err when it denied Smith's application for a writ of mandate? ¶ 28 Whether to grant or deny a writ of mandate is a legal conclusion that we will review to determine if it is correct. Becky v. ButteSilver Bow Sch. Dist. No. 1 (1995), 274 Mont. 131, 135, 906 P.2d 193, 195. A twopart standard must be satisfied for the issuance of a writ of mandate. Becky, 274 Mont. at 135, 906 P.2d at 195. The writ is available where the party who applies for it is entitled to the performance of a clear legal duty by the party against whom the writ is sought. If there is a clear legal duty, the district court must grant a writ of mandate if there is no speedy and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Section 27-26-102, MCA. For a court to grant a writ of mandate, the clear legal duty must involve a ministerial act, not a discretionary act. Withers v. County of Beaverhead (1985), 218 Mont. 447, 450, 710 P.2d 1339, 1341. Where the person has a specific right and the public officer is acting ministerially and has no discretion in the matter, mandamus will lie. State v. Cooney (1936), 102 Mont. 521, 529, 59 P.2d 48, 53. In determining whether an act is ministerial or discretionary we have said: [W]here the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial, but where the act to be done involves the exercise of discretion or judgment, it is not to be deemed merely ministerial. Cooney, 102 Mont. at 529, 59 P.2d at 53. ¶ 29 With respect to the first element, legal duty, Smith contends the District Court should have granted his application for a writ of mandate because the sheriff had a legal duty to issue him a concealed weapon permit. He relies on Phillips v. Livingston (1994), 268 Mont. 156, 885 P.2d 528. In Phillips, the City of Livingston suspended a fireman because he was suspected of stealing money and equipment. We reversed the district court's denial of the fireman's application for a writ of mandate. We stated: [T]here is no question that a clear legal duty exists. Under § 7-33-4124, MCA, the Livingston city council is directed to conduct a termination hearing at its next meeting following a firefighter's suspension. Since they failed to do so, the relief specifically provided by § 7-33-4124(2), MCA, is Phillips' reinstatement to his former position. Phillips, 268 Mont. at 162, 885 P.2d at 532. ¶ 30 This case is distinguishable from Phillips. Section 45-8-321(2), MCA, vests the sheriff with discretion to deny an application for a concealed weapon permit based on good cause. The statute at issue in Phillips permitted no discretion; it mandated that the city hold a hearing, and provided a specific remedy for failure to do so. Here, the sheriff exercised his discretion to deny Smith's application for good cause. The sheriff had no legal duty to issue Smith a concealed weapons permit. ¶ 31 Therefore, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it denied Smith's application for a writ of mandate or mandamus. ¶ 32 The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. J.A. TURNAGE, C.J., and JIM REGNIER, KARLA M. GRAY, JJ., concur.