Opinion ID: 185900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Family certification

Text: Biltmore argues that both the July 9 Notice and the Commission’s regulations require that Liberty’s application  Intervenor Orion also argues the Commission arbitrarily and capriciously refused to determine whether the Cumulus loan amounted to a change in ownership that would disqualify Liberty under 47 U.S.C. § 309(l )(2). Because no party raises this argument, it is not properly before the court, and we shall not consider it. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (‘‘Except in extraordinary cases TTT intervenors may only join issue on a matter that has been brought before the court by another party’’). 8 be dismissed for failure to file the required family certification. The July 9 Notice stated that ‘‘Bidders must certify TTT compliance with the Commission’s policies relating to media interests of immediate family members,’’ 14 F.C.C. Rcd. at 10641, and 47 C.F.R. § 73.5002(b) requires that the short form application contain ‘‘all required certifications, information and exhibits, pursuant to the provisions of 47 C.F.R. 1.2105(a) and any Commission public notices.’’ Regarding the effect of an applicant’s failure to submit required information, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b) provides two different sanctions. First, § 1.2105(b)(1) states: Any short-form application TTT that does not contain all of the certifications required pursuant to this section is unacceptable for filing and cannot be corrected subsequent to the applicable filing deadline. The application will be dismissed with prejudice and the upfront payment, if paid, will be returned. Other omissions are not subject to such Draconian treatment, however. Section 1.2105(b)(2) provides: ‘‘The Commission will provide bidders a limited opportunity to cure defects specified herein (except for failure to sign the application and to make certifications) and to resubmit a corrected application.’’ The Commission’s grace is not unlimited; if the applicants ‘‘fail to correct defects in their applications in a timely manner as specified by public notice,’’ then they ‘‘will have their applications dismissed without opportunity for resubmission.’’ § 1.2105(b)(3). As for the July 9 Notice, it states only that ‘‘[f]ailure to submit required information by the resubmission date will result in dismissal of the application and  Liberty responds with the claim that it was not subject to this filing requirement because ‘‘there could be no certification of compliance as to interests which were nonexistent.’’ We shall not consider this attempt by intervenor Liberty obliquely to appeal the Commission’s decision that Liberty was required to file the certification. To contest this aspect of the Commission’s decision, Liberty should have filed a conditional cross-appeal. See generally 15A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3902, at 78-79 (1992) (collecting cases). 9 inability to participate in the auction. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b).’’ 14 F.C.C. Rcd. at 10697. The Commission argues that neither 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b) nor the Notice requires Liberty’s disqualification: The regulation applies by its terms only to ‘‘the certifications required pursuant to this section.’’ Because the family certification was required by the July 9 Notice rather than by § 1.2105, according to the Commission, the disqualification provided in § 1.2105(b)(1) does not apply to the omission of that certification. Rather, the applicable provisions are the more forgiving §§ 1.2105(b)(2)-(3), which afford an applicant the opportunity to make corrections before the Commission dismisses its application with no opportunity for resubmission. The parenthetical exception in subsection (b)(2) taking ‘‘failure to TTT make certifications’’ out of the class of ‘‘defects’’ curable under that subsection does not apply to the family certification, the Commission’s argument suggests, because the ‘‘certifications’’ in question are only those implicated in subsection (b)(1), namely ‘‘the certifications required pursuant to’’ § 1.2105. As for the July 9 Notice, the Commission contends it simply is not clear enough to require Liberty’s automatic disqualification for failure to submit the family certification: Although the Notice stated that a bidder that failed to submit ‘‘required information’’ before the auction would be ‘‘[unable] to participate in the auction,’’ it did not state that such an omission was incurable if it came to light after the auction was held. Because the Notice did not directly speak to Liberty’s situation, the Commission goes on, disqualifying Liberty based upon the Notice would deprive it of fair warning that its application might be disqualified without an opportunity to correct it, contrary to the rule we endorsed in High Plains Wireless, L.P. v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599, 607 (2002) (‘‘That the rule did not afford adequate notice reflexive bidding was unlawful is itself sufficient justification for the Commission not to penalize [the bidder]’’). We give ‘‘controlling weight’’ to the Commission’s interpretation of its own regulation ‘‘unless it is plainly erroneous or 10 inconsistent with the regulation.’’ Id. at 606. Here the Commission’s interpretation does not fall below that standard. The Commission is, of course, correct in pointing out that the family certification is not among those required pursuant to § 1.2105, the omission of which incurably disqualifies the applicant as specified in § 1.2105(b)(1). It was not unreasonable for the Commission to treat the omission of a certification required only by a public notice as a ‘‘defect[ ]’’ other than ‘‘failure to TTT make [a] certification[ ]’’ as that term is used in § 1.2105(b), and thus to provide the opportunity for correction that § 1.2105(b)(2) allows for such a defect. We also agree with the Commission that it should not – more properly, that it need not – disqualify Liberty after the auction on the basis of an omission that, according to the Notice, would disqualify an applicant if discovered prior to the auction. Biltmore’s arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, neither McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955), nor Superior Oil Co. v. Udall, 409 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1969), requires a different conclusion. In each case we reversed the Secretary of the Interior’s award of a lease based upon an incurably defective application. Indeed, in those cases the Secretary had awarded the lease after finding specifically that the defect was incurable. See McKay, 226 F.2d at 40 (‘‘The Secretary found that his application was defective and that it was filed in an inherently unfair situation which would have caused it to be rejected had the real situation been disclosed before the drawing’’); Superior Oil, 409 F.2d at 1119 (quoting the Secretary, ‘‘the deficiency in Union’s bid cannot be waived, nor can it be supplied after the time for receipt of the bids’’). In this case the Commission made the opposite finding: Because the family certification was not required by § 1.2105, the omission could be cured. Hence, McKay and Superior Oil are not controlling.