Opinion ID: 1465613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Evidence Involving S.M.

Text: Hanlin argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting hearsay evidence, over his objection, that he had raped S.M. in Alabama. He points out that even the circuit judge stated that he believed admitting the statement regarding S.M.'s rape was reversible error and that the judge had previously ruled on motions in limine that the statement was hearsay and inadmissible. Our standard of review on matters relating to the admissibility of evidence was set out in Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 30-31, 8 S.W.3d 472, 480 (2000): This court has repeatedly recognized that matters pertaining to the admissibility of evidence are left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse such a ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. See, e.g., Bell v. State, 334 Ark. 285, 973 S.W.2d 806 (1998); Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 972 S.W.2d 239 (1998). Nor will we reverse absent a showing of prejudice, as prejudice is not presumed. Hill v. State, 337 Ark. 219, 988 S.W.2d 487 (1999); Bell, supra . Hanlin's argument, boiled down to its essence, is that a statement made by a twelve-year-old girl to Alabama police officers that he raped her was highly prejudicial, considering that the girl was not present in the courtroom and subject to cross-examination and that Hanlin was never charged with that crime in Alabama. He claims that the statement was admitted merely to prove bad character and to bolster the State's case against him. Hence, the testimony was more prejudicial than probative under Arkansas Rules of Evidence 403. He further contends that the statement was hearsay under Arkansas Rules of Evidence 801, because it was an unsworn statement made to Alabama police officers and offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted that he had raped S.M. He adds that S.M.'s hearsay statement does not fall within any hearsay exception. Hanlin also underscores the fact that the judge reversed himself twice on this matter, knowing full well that admitting S.M.'s statement was reversible error. The judge first ruled that Hanlin opened the door to admitting these statements on cross-examination. Then he sustained defense counsel's objection to any allegations made against Hanlin by S.M. in Alabama. And then later, he ruled that the prosecutor could elicit testimony from Detective Harper, gleaned from the Alabama statement about what S.M. told her mother, because defense counsel opened the door to this cross-examination. The State relies on our decision in Harmon v. State, supra , to support the circuit judge's ruling. In Harmon , the circuit judge admitted evidence over the defense counsel's objection that was elicited during the prosecutor's cross-examination of a police investigator about that investigator's affidavit of probable cause used to obtain the arrest warrant. In our review, this court looked at the testimony and trial counsel's colloquy with the judge and determined that the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the evidence, because the defendant opened the door to the testimony. We further held that the testimony was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted but was introduced to show what information the investigator relied on in preparing his affidavit. The instant case is distinguishable from the Harmon case in that here the hearsay statement made by S.M. in Alabama about her rape was offered by the State for the truth of the matter asserted. The Harmon case is also distinguishable on the question of when the door is opened for hearsay testimony. In Harmon , defense counsel called the police officer who prepared the affidavit of probable cause and specifically asked him about what a witness to the battery had told him, which led to his affidavit. When the prosecutor, on cross-examination, asked that same police officer about other witnesses mentioned in the affidavit and whether they had identified the defendant, defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. The prosecutor countered that defense counsel had opened the door for inquiry into what all witnesses had told the police officer about the beating. This court affirmed. The facts of the Harmon case are entirely different from the case at hand. Here, defense counsel posed the following question to Detective Harper: Just so this is clear for the jury because I got a little confused there and I want to make sure they're not, [S.M.], in Alabama talked to her mother in December of `98 and told her some things. Her mother at some point in time and we're not sure when, called her sister, Debbie, in Arkansas. And Debbie in Arkansas at some point in time, apparently, possibly, reported to you, at least around May, told [L.H.]'s mother what she had heard, right? It is clear to this court that defense counsel's question pertained only to how the information about L.H.'s rape started with S.M., who conveyed it to her mother, who then conveyed it to Debbie Stringfellow in Arkansas, who told Kathy Hanlin. That question had absolutely nothing to do with the rape of S.M. in Alabama but only had to do with the rape of L.H. Accordingly, we fail to see how defense counsel opened the door to what S.M. told Alabama authorities about her own rape. [2] We hold that the circuit judge abused his discretion in permitting the prosecutor to inquire into a statement received by Detective Harper relating to S.M.'s rape in Alabama. Not only was the testimony double or even triple hearsay, but the effect of it was to label Hanlin as a person of bad character who had engaged in similar activity previously. Bad character evidence is generally inadmissible unless it fits within some recognized exception. See Ark. R. Evid. 404; Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954). We are, of course, aware of the pedophile exception to Arkansas Rules of Evidence 404(b) and have summarized that exception as follows: We have further stated that testimony is admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) if it is independently relevant to the main issue  relevant in the sense of tending to prove some material point rather than merely to prove that the defendant is a criminal or a bad person. In recognizing the so-called pedophile exception to Rule 404(b), this court has approved allowing evidence of similar acts with the same or other children in the same household when it is helpful in showing a proclivity for a specific act with a person or class of persons with whom the defendant has an intimate relationship. Mosley v. State, supra , citing Free v. State, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (1987). The rationale for recognizing this exception is that such evidence helps to prove the depraved sexual instinct of the accused. Greenlee v. State, 318 Ark. 191, 884 S.W.2d 947 (1994). Berger v. State, 343 Ark. 413, 419, 36 S.W.3d 286, 290 (2001). The problem with this court's application of the pedophile exception, sua sponte, is that it was not raised by the State before the circuit judge or in this appeal. Thus, Hanlin has not had an opportunity to address it or raise any defense to it. Though this court will go, on occasion, to the record to affirm for a different reason, typically this is done when that alternative reason was raised by a party and has been developed at the circuit court level. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 343 Ark. 343, 37 S.W.3d 191 (2001); Heagerty v. State, 335 Ark. 520, 983 S.W.2d 908 (1998). We have also affirmed for a different reason when the documentary evidence in the record clearly gave us a basis for doing so ( State of Washington v. Thompson, 339 Ark. 417, 6 S.W.3d 82 (1999)), or when a statute, not argued by either party, is used by this court to affirm the trial court's determination ( Robinson v. State, 274 Ark. 312, 624 S.W.2d 435 (1981)). This court has been resolute in stating that we will not make a party's argument for that party or raise an issue, sua sponte, unless it involves the trial court's jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ilo v. State, 350 Ark. 138, 85 S.W.3d 542 (2002). Moreover, we will not consider an argument unless it has been properly developed. See Haire v. State, 340 Ark. 11, 8 S.W.3d 468 (2000). Though the Ilo and Haire opinions address the development of an issue by the defendant, we believe the same rationale should apply to the State. In short, under these circumstances, for this court to raise a new theory or ground for affirmance on our own motion such as the pedophile exception would deprive Hanlin of his right to be heard on the issue. This we will not do. Our decision not to raise the pedophile exception, sua sponte, is bolstered by the fact that we have before us no direct proof establishing that the rape of S.M. occurred in Alabama. In cases where this court has applied the pedophile exception, the other victims typically testified at trial about the defendant's actions, or there was other direct proof of those offenses. See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 348 Ark. 230, 72 S.W.3d 461 (2002); Munson v. State, 331 Ark. 41, 959 S.W.2d 391 (1998); Mosley v. State, 325 Ark. 469, 929 S.W.2d 693 (1996); Free v. State, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (1987). But here, all that was presented at trial was the unsworn statement of S.M. taken by Alabama authorities and relayed to Detective Harper, which is triple hearsay. The Alabama statement is not even part of the record in this case but was simply conveyed to the jury through the testimony of Detective Harper. Sufficient proof of the rape of S.M. was, therefore, lacking.