Opinion ID: 1196731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the hearsay evidence

Text: A long-time friend of appellant, Glenda Pinckney, testified that in May, 1977, she asked appellant whether he burned down the Powe house in April, 1977. He replied: I'm not saying. Two witnesses, Jacqueline Powe and Wilma Harris, testified that Pinckney told them appellant actually said he had burned down the Powe house and he was going to burn it down again. This evidence was introduced as the prior inconsistent statement of Pinckney. To be admissible, both appellant's and Pinckney's statements must be excepted from the hearsay rule. NRS 51.365. Either version of what appellant said is admissible. Maginnis v. State, 93 Nev. 173, 561 P.2d 922 (1977); Fish v. State, 92 Nev. 272, 549 P.2d 338 (1976); NRS 51.035(3)(a). A prior inconsistent statement of a witness need not be given under oath to be admissible as substantive evidence in this state; in this respect, we differ from Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1) after which NRS 51.035(2)(a) is patterned. See Bein, Prior Inconsistent Statements: The Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(1)(A) and 803(24), 26 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 967, 968, n. 2 (1979). Therefore, the testimonies did not violate the hearsay rule.