Opinion ID: 2230049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Armed Violence and Armed Robbery Convictions

Text: The defendant next contends that he was improperly convicted of both armed robbery and armed violence based on the predicate felony of robbery. The defendant was charged with one count of armed robbery in that he while armed with a dangerous weapon, a gun, took property, being United States Currency, from the presence of Rane Baldwin, by the use of force, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a). The defendant was also charged with one count of armed violence in that he while armed with a dangerous weapon, a handgun, performed acts prohibited by Illinois Compiled Statutes, Chapter 720, Act 5, Section 18-1, in that he intentionally and without legal justification took property, being United States Currency, from the presence of Rane Baldwin, by the use of force, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/33A-2. The defendant was convicted of both offenses and sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 years' imprisonment on the armed robbery conviction and 30 years' imprisonment on the armed violence conviction. Relying on this court's recent decision in People v. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d 412, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830 (1996), the defendant contends that his conviction and sentence for armed violence must be vacated. The defendant argues that, because his armed robbery and armed violence convictions were both premised on his commission of robbery while armed with a handgun, he was convicted of two substantively identical offenses which carry sentences that are unconstitutionally disproportionate. In Lewis, we held that the penalties for armed robbery and armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon, such as a handgun, are unconstitutionally disproportionate. In reaching this holding, we first determined that the two offenses were substantively identical. Armed robbery, however, carried a minimum prison sentence of 6 years (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1994)), while armed violence carried a mandatory minimum term of 15 years' imprisonment (720 ILCS 5/33A-3(a) (West 1994)). Accordingly, we held that the penalty for armed violence predicated on robbery committed with a category I weapon violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution. On that basis, we upheld the circuit court's dismissal of the armed violence charge. Lewis, 175 Ill.2d at 418-19, 222 Ill.Dec. 296, 677 N.E.2d 830. The State essentially concedes that Lewis governs our decision in this case, and urges that we reconsider Lewis. We decline to do so. The State also argues that we should find that the defendant waived this error by failing to raise it in the trial court. The Lewis decision was premised on People v. Christy, 139 Ill.2d 172, 151 Ill.Dec. 315, 564 N.E.2d 770 (1990). In Christy, the defendant had failed to raise the disproportionate penalties argument in the trial court. Nevertheless, this court held that the defendant did not waive the issue because `a constitutional challenge to a statute can be raised at any time.' Christy, 139 Ill.2d at 176, 151 Ill.Dec. 315, 564 N.E.2d 770, quoting People v. Bryant, 128 Ill.2d 448, 454, 132 Ill.Dec. 415, 539 N.E.2d 1221 (1989). Waiver is therefore not appropriate here. Accordingly, under the authority of Lewis and Christy, the defendant's conviction and sentence for armed violence must be vacated. The defendant contends that he is therefore entitled to be resentenced on his remaining noncapital convictions. Because the defendant was sentenced to identical concurrent terms for armed violence and armed robbery, we agree with the State that resentencing is not required as a result of the vacatur of the armed violence conviction and sentence. See People v. Donaldson, 91 Ill.2d 164, 170-71, 61 Ill.Dec. 780, 435 N.E.2d 477 (1982). Given our holding, we need not consider the defendant's alternative argument that his armed robbery conviction must be vacated under the one act, one crime doctrine because that conviction and his conviction for armed violence were based upon the same conduct. In summary, we reject the defendant's contentions that he is entitled to a new trial. The defendant's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon are affirmed. The defendant's conviction and sentence for armed violence, however, are vacated.