Opinion ID: 1591968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admissibility of the Affidavit

Text: Plaintiffs put forward two arguments against the use of the affidavit to satisfy the statute of frauds: (1) an affidavit is inadmissible to establish facts material to the issue being tried, and (2) use of the affidavit is barred by the parol evidence rule. Defendants counter by asserting that plaintiffs cannot complain of this use of the affidavit, since plaintiffs offered it into evidence in the first place. We have held that as a general rule a litigant cannot introduce evidence and later complain that it was error to consider such evidence. Mandery v. Chronicle Broadcasting Co., 228 Neb. 391, 423 N.W.2d 115 (1988). Plaintiffs, however, do not contend that it was error to admit the affidavit or that the district court used it improperly. Indeed, the affidavit clouds their title by failing to reveal whether the trustee had the power to sell the mineral estate; there is nothing inconsistent in plaintiffs' considering it relevant as a cloud on their title while simultaneously asserting that its use to change the meaning of the mineral deed is prohibited by the parol evidence rule. While one who has invited error cannot be heard to complain of it, see, e.g., State v. Zima, 237 Neb. 952, 468 N.W.2d 377 (1991), First West Side Bank v. Hiddleston, 225 Neb. 563, 407 N.W.2d 170 (1987), Fuel Exploration, Inc. v. Novotny, 221 Neb. 17, 374 N.W.2d 838 (1985), and Bohaty v. Briard, 219 Neb. 42, 361 N.W.2d 502 (1985), that is not the case before us. Plaintiffs are not complaining of any error in the admission of the evidence; they are simply responding to an argument put forward by defendants on appeal. Defendants' contention being without merit, we turn to the first of plaintiffs' arguments. They rely on statements by this court that the general rule in Nebraska is that an affidavit cannot be used to establish facts material to the issue being tried. Doyle v. Union Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 385, 308 N.W.2d 322 (1981); Banks v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 142 Neb. 823, 8 N.W.2d 185 (1943). While this may be the general rule, the Legislature has provided an exception. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 76-271 (Reissue 1990), an affidavit explaining or correcting an apparent defect in the chain of title may be recorded as an instrument affecting real estate, and such record shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein recited. Floyd E. Wright's affidavit was recorded as an instrument affecting real estate; it explains the use of the word trustee in the January 13, 1969, oil and gas lease ratification and also states that no minerals were ever produced from the property, thus addressing concerns raised by plaintiffs' attorney in his abstract opinion. As an affidavit recorded under § 76-271, it is prima facie evidence that Floyd E. Wright took the mineral estate under an agreement whereby he was to hold the mineral rights in trust for the designated beneficiaries. Plaintiffs' second challenge to the use of the affidavit is the parol evidence rule. The parol evidence rule renders ineffective proof of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement which alters, varies, or contradicts the terms of a written agreement. Harmon Cable Communications v. Scope Cable Television, 237 Neb. 871, 468 N.W.2d 350 (1991). Plaintiffs contend that since the mineral deed is plain and unambiguous, the parol evidence rule bars use of the affidavit to prove a contemporaneous oral trust, since to prove such a trust would be to change the terms of the deed from an absolute grant of the mineral estate into a trust of that estate. However, plaintiffs' application of the parol evidence rule is incompatible with the rule that a later writing signed by the trustee may satisfy the statute of frauds. Part IV(1)(a), supra. This is so because the only facts which could give rise to such a rule would include an earlier absolute deed to the purported trustee. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 38 (1959) states that if the owner of property makes an inter vivos transfer by a written instrument which declares that the transferee is to take the property for his or her own benefit, then absent proper grounds for rescission or reformation, the parol evidence rule will bar extrinsic evidence that the transferee was intended to hold the property in trust. But if the instrument does not declare that the transferee is to take the property either for his or her own benefit or in trust, then extrinsic evidence may be admitted to show how the transferee was intended to hold the property. Under this rule, the affidavit would be admissible, since the mineral deed is silent as to how Floyd E. Wright was to hold the property. The reason the parol evidence rule is not applied in situations such as that now before us is simple, though rarely articulated. The parol evidence rule is applicable only where there is a completely integrated written agreement, and a deed is not, generally, intended to be a complete integration of the underlying agreement. Therefore, the rule is rarely applicable. See 3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 587 (1960). Where the instrument states that the transferee is to take for his or her own benefit, then that much of the agreement is integrated and parol evidence is barred. But as we have said, that is not the case here. Plaintiffs also contend that the statements of Floyd E. Wright, as contained in the affidavit and the warranty deed, are inconsistent (the affidavit saying there was a trust and the warranties in the deed stating he had power to convey) and that we therefore should disregard both. Aside from the fact that the authority plaintiffs cite is clearly inapplicable to the facts before us, if we were to disregard the warranty deed, plaintiffs would be unable to claim it was meant to pass title to the minerals. The authority cited by plaintiffs is inapplicable because it deals with situations where a person changed his or her testimony, and the change was `clearly being made to meet the exigencies of the pending action....' Momsen v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 210 Neb. 45, 53, 313 N.W.2d 208, 213 (1981). As far as the record discloses, the statements of Floyd E. Wright were not made to the exigencies of any action, pending or otherwise. In addition, Momsen applies to the testimony of parties to an action, and Floyd E. Wright was not a party here. See Palmer v. Forney, 230 Neb. 1, 429 N.W.2d 712 (1988). Thus, the parol evidence rule does not bar use of the affidavit. Moreover, as concluded in part IV(1)(a), supra, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds, and, under § 76-271, it is prima facie evidence of the facts it recounts. All the other elements of a valid trust are present: (1) a competent settlor (Elizabeth R. Wright), (2) a trust property (the mineral estate), legal title to which has been transferred to (3) a competent trustee. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 2, comment h. (1959). The district court thus erred in concluding that there existed no trust of the mineral rights.