Opinion ID: 2570789
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Schlumberger Is Entitled to Summary Judgment As a Matter of Law.

Text: In order for the movant to be entitled to summary judgment, the movant must first present a prima facie case for summary judgment: using admissible evidence, the movant must prove the absence of genuine factual disputes and its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. [9] The non-moving party may rebut this prima facie case by setting forth specific facts showing that he could produce admissible evidence to demonstrate that a material issue of fact exists. [10] Sopko makes essentially two arguments to support his claim that Schlumberger is not entitled to summary judgment: (1) Schlumberger has failed to make the necessary prima facie showing with admissible evidence; and (2) the discovery rule prevents summary judgment either as a matter of law or because there are issues of material fact.
In order to make out its prima facie case for summary judgment, Schlumberger had to do so with admissible evidence. [11] The parties here disagree about the admissibility of the evidence relied upon by Schlumberger. Sopko claims that the evidence relied upon by Schlumberger is not admissible. Citing Concerned Citizens v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, [12] Sopko notes that unsworn and unauthenticated documents are not admissible, and are therefore not competent proof for summary judgment. Sopko claims that Schlumberger, in its motion for summary judgment, relied primarily on the unsworn and unauthenticated, and therefore inadmissible, report of Dr. Grace Ziem, who treated Sopko and diagnosed him with various maladies in 1996. As an initial matter, any statements by Sopko to Dr. Ziem are not hearsay as they are admissions by Sopko and fall within the scope of Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A). [13] Second, no party disputes the authenticity of the Ziem report; Sopko does not claim that the report relied on by Schlumberger was not actually written by Dr. Ziem. In fact, Sopko cited to Ziem's report himself to support his own factual claims on appeal. Therefore, Sopko cannot now claim that the Ziem report was not authentic and therefore inadmissible. Sopko has also waived his argument that the Ziem report was unsworn and therefore inadmissible. Sopko failed to object on this basis at the summary judgment hearing. Also, as noted, Sopko confirmed the relevant factual statements at the summary judgment hearing and relied on many of them in his opposition to summary judgment. Thus, if the superior court committed any error by allowing Schlumberger to rely on the unsworn Ziem report, the error was harmless. Therefore, Schlumberger properly presented admissible evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment.
The central controversy in this case concerns the application of the discovery rule, a rule that we adopted in the context of the limitations period for tort suits. The discovery rule tolls the usual two-year statute of limitations [14] and prevents the limitations period from starting to run until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all elements of his cause of action. [15] We adopted the discovery rule to protect plaintiffs from losing their cause of action when they have an injury that remained undiscovered or reasonably undiscoverable for longer than the limitations period. [16] It also protects plaintiffs whose injury is known but the cause is not reasonably discoverable during the limitations period. [17] The incident giving rise to this lawsuit occurred between September 11 and 16, 1990. Sopko did not file suit until April 11, 1996. The applicable limitations period, defined by AS 09.10.070, is two years. [18] The discovery rule bars Sopko's claim unless his cause of action accrued on or after April 11, 1994. [19] Under the terms of the discovery rule, Sopko's claim accrued before this date if Sopko discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all of the elements of his cause of action before April 11, 1994. [20] Sopko claims that he did not discover all of the elements of his cause of action until at least September 1995, and that he reasonably should not have been able to discover all of these elements until that time. Specifically, Sopko claims that he did not know that he had a permanent injury caused by the defendant's conduct until at least September 1995, when he was first diagnosed with a permanent condition based on the chemical exposure that had apparently taken place in 1990 at the Schlumberger warehouse. Also, Sopko implicitly claims that he could not reasonably have known of these elements until September 1995, because the doctors that he saw before September 1995 did not diagnose him with a permanent injury from chemical exposure, and because Schlumberger kept from him, until June 1994, the MSDS that would have shown him the connection between his injuries and the chemical exposure. Under the discovery rule, a plaintiff's claim accrues at the time that he discovers, or reasonably should discover, all of the elements of his cause of action. [21] The plaintiff reasonably should have discovered all of the elements of his cause of action at the point at which the plaintiff has sufficient information to prompt an inquiry into the cause of action, if all of the essential elements of the cause of action may reasonably be discovered within the statutory period at a point when a reasonable time remains within which to file suit. [22] Under this standard, the undisputed facts in the record indicate that Sopko should have discovered both his injury and its causation on September 20, 1990  long before the April 11, 1994 date required to preserve Sopko's claim. On his first day of work at the Schlumberger warehouse, September 11, 1990, Sopko became sick, experiencing symptoms including coughing, burning eyes, running nose, and mental confusion. By September 16, Sopko's symptoms had become more serious, including convulsions, vomiting, abdominal pain, incontinence, and a reduction in memory and attention span. Sopko sought treatment for these symptoms at a Prudhoe Bay clinic and requested evacuation from the site for medical attention. His request was granted on September 16, when Sopko was flown to Anchorage. On September 17 or 20, Sopko was diagnosed by Dr. Wilder as suffering from toxic fume exposure. By September 20, 1990, Sopko had sufficient information to prompt an inquiry into his cause of action. Dr. Wilder's diagnosis of toxic fume exposure and the severe symptoms that Sopko experienced while on the job at the Schlumberger warehouse and immediately afterward constituted sufficient information for Sopko to prompt an inquiry into his cause of action. As we held in Cameron v. State , under the discovery rule an injured plaintiff has sufficient information to prompt an inquiry into his cause of action once the plaintiff learns that he has a medically documented ... condition. [23] Sopko argues that his case should be viewed and analyzed as a toxic tort case. In toxic tort cases, such as cases where the plaintiff contracts silicosis or asbestosis from exposure to silicate dust or asbestos fibers, under the discovery rule the statute of limitations will generally not start running until the plaintiff's disease manifests itself in an illness. In such cases, the plaintiff initially does not have any symptoms of injury, and therefore has insufficient information to prompt an inquiry into his cause of action. [24] The undisputed facts indicate that Sopko did not suffer from this type of latent injury. Instead, between September 11 and 20, 1990, Sopko suffered severe symptoms of injury and was diagnosed with toxic fume exposure. And the undisputed facts indicate that these symptoms were ongoing. In 1992 Sopko complained of various ongoing chronic health conditions in a claim with the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board. In this June 8, 1992 claim, Sopko complained of rashes, lumps, tumors, joint stiffness, intestinal disorders, breathing problems, fluctuating blood pressure, and an inability to cope with stressful situations in a rational manner. Therefore, the undisputed facts indicate that Sopko had sufficient information on September 20, 1990 to prompt an inquiry into his cause of action. And, as we have required in the past, all of the essential elements of Sopko's cause of action could have been discerned within the limitations period, with reasonable time remaining to file suit. [25] As of June 8, 1992, Sopko by his own admission had many symptoms of injury and chemical exposure, which he complained of before the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board. And on June 8, 1992, Sopko still had more than three months to file suit before the limitations period ran out on September 20, 1992. Also, as we held in Smith v. Thompson [26] and Wettanen v. Cowper, [27] under the discovery rule it is irrelevant if the full scope of injury is not known immediately. Sopko had sufficient information to start an inquiry into his cause of action in 1990 even though the full extent of his injury was not revealed until 1995, when Sopko was diagnosed with permanent dementia caused by toxic exposure. [28] In Smith, the plaintiff was involved in an auto accident, and did not discover the serious nature of her injuries (and file suit against the other driver) until four and one-half years after the accident. [29] At the time of the accident the plaintiff's neck and head were sore, and she was diagnosed with a muscle strain. However, four and one-half years later, she developed serious neck problems that necessitated two surgeries and the installation of a head brace. In Smith, we held that the plaintiff's suit was time barred because the plaintiff knew or should have known that she had some injury at the time of the accident, even if the injury's full extent was then unknown. [30] In Wettanen, an attorney malpractice case, we held that the statute of limitations began to run when the attorney committed the harm by negligently failing to prepare for or appear at his client's trial. [31] In Wettanen we noted that commencement of the statute [of limitations] will not be put off until one learns the full extent of his damages. [32] Similarly, Sopko had sufficient knowledge on September 20, 1990 to prompt an inquiry into his cause of action, and it is irrelevant that the full extent of his injuries did not become apparent until later. Indeed, by his own admission, Sopko did not make any kind of inquiry at all following the September 1990 diagnosis  he pretty much forgot about it. Therefore, by September 20, 1990, Sopko reasonably should have discovered all of the elements of his cause of action, and under the discovery rule his claim is time barred.