Opinion ID: 4557311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Strong’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

Text: Although the district court elected to skip to the merits of Strong’s claims, we resolve his appeal on the basis of procedural default. See Sheffield v. Burt, 731 F. App’x 438, 441 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]here a straightforward analysis of settled state procedural default law is possible, federal courts cannot justify bypassing the procedural default issue.”). The doctrine of procedural default provides that “[f]ederal habeas review is generally precluded where a state court decides not to address a petitioner’s federal claims because he has failed to meet a state procedural requirement ‘that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.’” Awkal v. Mitchell, 613 F.3d 629, 648 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). The doctrine is based on concerns of comity and federalism. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 730. Procedural default can be excused only if a petitioner demonstrates “cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate[s] that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 750; accord, e.g., Richardson v. Palmer, 941 F.3d 838, 847 (6th Cir. 2019). Strong’s claims are procedurally defaulted only if (1) Strong failed to comply with a state procedural rule; (2) the state court actually enforced that rule against Strong, and (3) the rule is an 4 No. 19-2426, Richard Strong v. Noah Nagy “‘adequate and independent’ state ground foreclosing review of a federal constitutional claim.” Taylor v. McKee, 649 F.3d 446, 450 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir. 2006)). Each of those elements is satisfied here. To begin, Strong failed to comply with Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3), and the Michigan trial court actually enforced that rule against Strong. “Rule 6.508(D)(3) is the state procedural default rule requiring petitioners to show cause and prejudice before raising a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal.” Peoples v. Lafler, 734 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2013). In Guilmette v. Howes, this Court, sitting en banc, recognized that Michigan Rule 6.508(D) “has both a procedural and a substantive component.” 624 F.3d 286, 291 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc); accord Stermer v. Warren, 959 F.3d 704, 723–24 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, we held that when the Michigan Supreme Court issues a form order simply citing to Rule 6.508(D), as here, such orders “are ambiguous as to whether they refer to procedural default or to denial of relief on the merits because the provision encompasses both options.” Lafler, 734 F.3d at 511 (citing Guilmette, 624 F.3d at 289–92). “In such cases, then, we must look to the last reasoned state court opinion to determine the basis for rejection” and whether the state court actually enforced Rule 6.508(D)(3) as a procedural bar to the petitioner’s claims. Id. (citing Guilmette, 624 F.3d at 289–92) (emphasis omitted). The last reasoned state court opinion is the Michigan trial court’s decision denying Strong’s motion for relief from judgment. In that decision, the Michigan trial court unambiguously enforced Michigan Rule 6.508(D)(3) against Strong. It began by analyzing whether Strong had demonstrated good cause for his failure to raise the claims on direct appeal, and concluded that he had not. It found that Strong’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were meritless, and therefore that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them on direct appeal. It 5 No. 19-2426, Richard Strong v. Noah Nagy then held that even if Strong could show cause, he had failed to show actual prejudice under Michigan Rule 6.508(D)(3)(b)(i) and (b)(iii). Because the state court denied Strong’s motion for failure to show cause and prejudice under Michigan Rule 6.508(D)(3), the first and second elements of procedural default are satisfied. The final element of procedural default is also satisfied because Michigan Rule 6.508(D)(3) is an adequate and independent state ground foreclosing federal habeas review. See, e.g., Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 477 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established in this circuit that the procedural bar set forth in Rule 6.508(D) constitutes an adequate and independent ground on which the Michigan Supreme Court may rely in foreclosing review of federal claims.”).