Opinion ID: 2320353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Temporal Context

Text: In determining his likelihood to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment, W.Z. urges this Court to require the State to prove that it is substantially likely that the acts would occur within the reasonably foreseeable future. The courts below held that to be committed an individual must be determined to be likely to engage in acts of sexual violence in the reasonably foreseeable future, employing a sensible temporal context to the threat of harm posed by the sex offender. See IMO Commitment of W.Z., supra, 339 N.J.Super. at 574-75, 773 A. 2d 97. However, the trial court explained the likely standard in the phrase likely to engage in acts of sexual violence as if comparable to a preponderance, or fifty-one percent chance of probability, and the Appellate Division accepted that explanation, although with additional explication. Id. at 578-80, 773 A. 2d 97 (explaining that court must find by clear and convincing evidence that person has a propensity, inclination or tendency, to commit acts of sexual violence and must establish by clear and convincing evidence the degree of such a propensity). The Appellate Division rejected W.Z.'s argument that the State must prove that an individual is substantially likely to engage in acts of sexual violence in order to satisfy the clear and convincing burden of proof required for commitment under the SVPA. Id. at 580, 773 A. 2d 97. The court viewed the two concepts probability of reoffending and burden of proofas distinct, stating that they can coexist and operate independently. Id. at 579, 773 A. 2d 97. That they are distinct is correct. The clear and convincing burden of proof required in any civil commitment matter applies to all trial court findings. That does not mean that in explaining the degree of likelihood of future dangerousness, the Act's burden of proof terminology controls the substance of the required finding. A difficulty arises here because the courts below linked the probability of reoffending to a description that suggests a quantum of proof, calling it a preponderance, or a more than fifty-percent chance. Those descriptions can cause confusion where the parties must present and the trial court must evaluate difficult, nuanced medical evidence and reduce it to specific findings affecting a person's liberty. Predictions of future dangerousness have been for some time a permitted basis for restriction of a citizen's liberty when that dangerousness is tethered to a finding of mental illness or abnormality. Hubbart, supra, 81 Cal.Rptr. 2d 492, 969 P. 2d at 600 n. 26 (noting that United States Supreme Court has long upheld civil commitment statutes where dangerousness is expressed in terms of a `probability,' `threat,' or similar risk that a person who is presently mentally disturbed will inflict harm upon himself or others in the future if not confined (citations omitted)). However, we can and must attempt to be as precise as possible when describing the required level of likelihood of that harmful behavior. Because we see no basis for separating the court's determination of a person's likelihood to engage in acts of sexual violence from the court's assessment of the person's loss of control over his or her harmful behavior specifically, we are persuaded that we should construe the term likely to engage in acts of sexual violence in light of the constitutionally required standard for loss of control. To be committed under the SVPA an individual must be proven to be a threat to the health and safety of others because of the likelihood of his or her engaging in sexually violent acts. Pursuant to our holding today, the State must prove that threat by demonstrating that the individual has serious difficulty in controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that he or she will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend. Those findings incorporate a temporal sense that will require an assessment of the reasonably foreseeable future. No more specific finding concerning precisely when an individual will recidivate need be made by the trial court. Commitment is based on the individual's danger to self and others because of his or her present serious difficulty with control over dangerous sexual behavior. The Act requires annual court review hearings on the need for continued involuntary commitment. Those periodic reviews will allow adequate opportunity to assess fresh information concerning the committee's dangerousness. See In re Ewoldt, 634 N.W. 2d 622, 624 (Iowa 2001) (holding that Iowa SVPA's provision of annual periodic reviews for committees does not suggest that upon initial commitment State must prove that risk of reoffense would otherwise occur within one year).