Opinion ID: 1404810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Negligence/Negligent Misrepresentation

Text: For several reasons, County contends the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment as to Quail Hill's claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation. We agree with each of County's arguments. As a threshold matter, County claims the negligence claim should be treated solely as a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation because the crux of Quail Hill's complaint is that County furnished erroneous information regarding the subject property's zoning. Next, County asserts the Court of Appeals failed to address the fact that Quail Hill did not present any evidence to support its negligent misrepresentation claim. Specifically, County contends Quail Hill could not have justifiably relied on a mistaken representation regarding the proper zoning classification. County avers that a misrepresentation as to the correct zoning status is not actionable given the zoning of the property was a legal issue, not a factual issue, and claims for negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on mistaken statements of law, Finally, County contends Quail Hill could have discovered the proper zoning classification had it exercised reasonable diligence. We agree with County that Quail Hill's claims of negligence and negligent misrepresentation should be treated as solely one for negligent misrepresentation. Notably, the circuit court judge and the Court of Appeals did not address these two claims in seriatim, but instead merely ruled on the negligent misrepresentation cause of action. Although pled separately, we find Quail Hill's claim for negligence is essentially subsumed in the negligent misrepresentation cause of action. To prove a claim for the common law tort of negligent misrepresentation, Quail Hill was required to establish the following elements: (1) the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant had a pecuniary interest in making the statement; (3) the defendant owed a duty of care to see that he communicated truthful information to the plaintiff; (4) the defendant breached that duty by failing to exercise due care; (5) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the representation; and (6) the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss as the proximate result of his reliance on the representation. West v. Gladney, 341 S.C. 127, 134, 533 S.E.2d 334, 337 (Ct.App.2000). There is no liability for casual statements, representations as to matters of law, or matters which plaintiff could ascertain on his own in the exercise of due diligence. AMA Mgt. Corp. v. Strasburger, 309 S.C. 213, 223, 420 S.E.2d 868, 874 (Ct.App.1992). [W]hile issues of reliance are ordinarily resolved by the finder of fact, `there can be no reasonable reliance on a misstatement if the plaintiff knows the truth of the matter.' McLaughlin v. Williams, 379 S.C. 451, 457-58, 665 S.E.2d 667, 671 (Ct.App.2008) (quoting Gruber v. Santee Frozen Foods, Inc., 309 S.C. 13, 20, 419 S.E.2d 795, 800 (Ct.App.1992)). Thus, if the undisputed evidence clearly shows the party asserting reliance has knowledge of the truth of the matter, there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 458, 665 S.E.2d at 671. A determination of justifiable reliance involves the evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, which includes the positions and relations of the parties. West, 341 S.C. at 134, 533 S.E.2d at 337. Turning to the facts of the instant case, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that there exists a genuine issue of material fact with respect to Quail Hill's claim for negligent misrepresentation. We find this claim is controlled by the question of whether Quail Hill could have justifiably relied on the representations of County staff. As previously stated, Quail Hill could have reviewed the Official Zoning Map to ascertain the correct zoning classification. Moreover, given the fact that Brown, as the agent of Quail Hill, was an experienced real estate broker, it would be difficult to conclude that his reliance solely on the statements of Gosline and the Tax Assessor's records was reasonable. Furthermore, there is authority to support County's contention that misrepresentations as to matters of law are not actionable. See, e.g., Meyer v. Santema, 559 N.W.2d 251, 255 (S.D.1997) (affirming grant of summary judgment to City as to purchasers' cause of action for negligent misrepresentation stemming from erroneous representations regarding zoning given the misrepresentation involved a matter of law and county officials may not be held liable in damages when they negligently misrepresent the legal requirements of their zoning ordinance to members of the public who rely on that misrepresentation). In view of our conclusion that Quail Hill's negligence/negligent misrepresentation claim fails as a matter law, we need not address County's remaining argument regarding immunity under the Tort Claims Act.