Opinion ID: 2516667
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multi-County Signature Requirement under Burdick v. Takushi

Text: ¶ 81 It is argued that the United States Supreme Court case of Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), supplies the rule as to when strict scrutiny applies in election cases. [14] The Supreme Court explained in Burdick : A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quotations omitted). Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. Accordingly, when those rights are subjected to `severe' restrictions, the regulation must be `narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.' Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)). If the challenged election law provision imposes only `reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, `the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). ¶ 82 Because Moore v. Ogilvie controls the outcome of this case regardless of the level of scrutiny applied, we apply Moore and its related United States Supreme Court precedent to this case and find it dispositive. See supra part I.B.1. Nevertheless, under Burdick strict scrutiny applies. In this case, there are severe restrictions on the rights of registered voters in Utah's most populous counties, compelling us to use strict scrutiny analysis. The United States Supreme Court explained: Restrictions on access to the ballot burden two distinct and fundamental rights, the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.. . . When such vital individual rights are at stake, a State must establish that its classification is necessary to serve a compelling interest. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 99 S.Ct. 983, 59 L.Ed.2d 230 (1979) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968)). The multi-county signature requirement discriminates against urban voters because it allows voters in rural counties to wield disproportionate power over the placement of initiatives on the ballot. See supra ¶¶ 45, 78-79. Thus, the multi-county signature requirement does not impose a `reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction[]' upon the . . . rights of voters in the more populous counties of the state. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564). ¶ 83 Accordingly, under Burdick, the multi-county signature requirement must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; see also Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 185, 99 S.Ct. 983 (noting that where restrictions on access to the ballot are involved, `a State may not choose means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty,' [and must] adopt the least drastic means to achieve their ends (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59, 94 S.Ct. 303, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973)). The justifications advanced in support of the multi-county signature requirement, set forth in paragraph 47 of this opinion, are not narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059. First, the proffered justifications fail to meet our own heightened-scrutiny analysis under the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, see supra ¶¶ 47-63, which is at least as exacting if not more so than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 889 (Utah 1988). Second, the proffered justification that the multi-county signature requirement exists to ensure statewide support for initiatives fails under Moore. Moore itself rejected this as a justification for a law that discriminates against the political rights of registered voters in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Moore, 394 U.S. at 818-19, 89 S.Ct. 1493. The Court explained in Moore : It is no answer to the argument under the Equal Protection Clause that this law was designed to require statewide support for launching a new political party rather than support from a few localities. This law applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely settled counties and populous counties alike, contrary to the constitutional theme of equality among citizens in the exercise of their political rights. The idea that one group can be granted greater voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government. Id. Therefore, although Moore governs this case, the multi-county signature requirement does not pass constitutional muster under the strict scrutiny test of Burdick.