Opinion ID: 2635293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Administrative Hearing

Text: Hartman requested a hearing, and one was scheduled for October 21, 2003. On October 15 he requested that the hearing be postponed due to the fact that [he had] so far been unable to gather all the evidence that [he] need[ed]. He also requested that Tuckwood be subpoenaed, and stated that his defense would be based on AS 04.16.051(b) [2] and Snyder v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehicles. [3] On October 21 Hartman participated telephonically and pro se in the hearing. At the beginning of the hearing, the request for a continuance was denied [4] on the ground that Hartman could have requested discovery, but did not. The hearing officer heard testimony from Tuckwood, Hartman, Hartman's mother, and Crystal Mercer, the driver of the Ford Taurus. Tuckwood's initial testimony mirrored his police report. Specifically, he claimed that Hartman tried to tell [him] that he wasn't intoxicated because he doesn't drink. Hartman testified that he was contesting the license revocation because he did not become intoxicated until after he left the Honda. He claimed that he was driving the Honda off-road [5] with two friends, and that he parked it when the transmission malfunctioned. At that point, he asserted, he had not yet had anything to drink. After the car broke down, Hartman and his friends began walking to Hartman's house, but soon saw Mercer pass by in a tan Ford Taurus. Mercer gave them a ride, and Hartman invited all of them to have dinner with his family. Hartman had several beers during dinner. [6] The four then left in the Ford Taurus, with Mercer driving. When they were pulled over, Hartman testified, he told Tuckwood that he was drinking after [he] drove, a claim that Tuckwood must have misinterpreted. The hearing officer called Tuckwood again, and asked if he had a tape recording of the contact and arrest. Tuckwood responded in the affirmative, and the hearing officer noted that she did not have a copy of it. Tuckwood proceeded to testify about the tape, claiming that it supported his account of what Hartman had said. Hartman did not have a copy of the tape and was thus unable to verify Tuckwood's recollection of its content or cross-examine Tuckwood about it. Hartman's mother corroborated her son's claim that he had been drinking at dinner but not earlier. She also described Hartman's earlier unsuccessful attempt in his criminal case to procure a tape recording of the arrest and his public defender's response that no tape existed: And as far as the tapes, Ma'am, supposedly Officer Tuckwood said he  there's a tape in existence that said [Hartman] said he was drinking. But then there is no tape. There's no such thing. We tried to get the tape. [Hartman] tried to get a copy of it from his public defender. The reason why he can't is because there is none. It doesn't exist. On October 30 the hearing officer issued a decision. In her findings, she noted that Hartman was the driver of the Honda, and that Hartman was highly intoxicated when Tuckwood arrested him. She also found that the contact tape does exist and that Tuckwood's testimony about its contents was credible. Based on these findings, the breath alcohol test, and her negative assessment of Hartman's credibility, the hearing officer determined that Hartman had been driving while under the influence. She therefore affirmed the ninety-day revocation of his license. Hartman appealed this decision to the superior court. The superior court held that Tuckwood had reasonable suspicion to make the stop and probable cause to arrest Hartman. It also determined that DMV's failure to furnish Hartman a copy of the recording absent any request did not violate Hartman's right to due process. Similarly, it ruled that Tuckwood's reliance on a recording that had not been furnished to Hartman did not violate Hartman's rights under the confrontation clause, because Tuckwood merely used it to confirm his memory of Hartman's statements. Finally, the superior court held that the hearing officer did not abuse her discretion by denying Hartman's request for a continuance. For these reasons, the superior court affirmed the hearing officer's decision. Hartman's subsequent petition for rehearing was denied, and this appeal followed.