Opinion ID: 1439456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Courtroom Security Measures

Text: Honken argues the district court abused its discretion by shackling Honken, bolting the shackles to the floor, and forcing him to wear a stun belt during trial. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's security decisions. See United States v. Mahasin, 442 F.3d 687, 691 (8th Cir.2006). The district court must balance the need to maintain courtroom security against the possibility of prejudice to the defendant. See id.
Shackling a defendant during trial causes two main constitutional concerns: (1) the shackles could impede the defendant's ability to participate in his defense, and (2) the shackles could suggest to the jury the defendant is guilty. See Hall v. Luebbers, 296 F.3d 685, 698 (8th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Like other security decisions, the district court's decision to shackle a defendant for security reasons is accorded broad discretion. Id. at 699. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court found a need to shackle Honken arising from Honken's prior escape attempts and his threats against witnesses, law enforcement officers, and prosecutors. See United States v. Honken, 378 F.Supp.2d 1010, 1034 (N.D.Iowa 2004). We could not agree more. As the district court recognized, we have concluded shackling is appropriate in similar situations. See Zeitvogel v. Delo, 84 F.3d 276, 283 (8th Cir.1996) (deciding [t]he trial court acted well within its discretion in deciding restraints were necessary to prevent [the defendant] from escaping and to protect others in the courtroom where the defendant had been convicted of murder, rape, and assault, and had escaped from custody before); Hellum v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary Leavenworth, 28 F.3d 903, 908-09 (8th Cir.1994) (concluding shackling was appropriate in light of the defendant's determination, ingenuity, ability to overcome normal security measures, and possible use of outside assistance in past escape attempts). Honken's potential for violence, history of escape attempts, and threats against witnesses and law enforcement is beyond serious dispute. Honken stood accused of murdering five people, including two young girls. The district court found ample evidence in the record from which to conclude Honken presented a serious escape risk and a threat to courtroom securityHonken plotted additional murders, including murdering officials in connection with his trial, and Honken planned various escape attempts, including training in martial arts, for the very purpose of escaping during his trial. These were compelling circumstances to shackle Honken at trial. [15] The district court took a number of measures to ensure prejudice to Honken would be minimized, including directing (1) that Honken not be moved in the presence of the jury; (2) that table skirts be placed on all counsel tables to prevent the jurors from seeing the shackles and bolt; [](3) that the Marshal determine the best available means to prevent the shackles from making any noticeable noise during ordinary movements of the defendant while seated[;] and (4) that the Marshal ensure the shackles be fitted with sufficient chain to allow Honken to stand naturally when required and to confer with his counsel. Honken, 378 F.Supp.2d at 1035. These measures sufficiently minimized, if not completely eliminated, the danger of the shackles suggesting to the jury that Honken was guilty. Honken presented no evidence any member of the jury was ever aware Honken was shackled and bolted to the floor during trial. See Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1071-72 (8th Cir.1988) (where the district court took precautions to ensure the jury would not observe the defendant's restraints, we have little difficulty concluding that the jury did not observe anything so prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to [the defendant's] right to a fair trial (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Honken argues the use of a stun belt interfered with his right to communicate with counsel and participate in his own defense. In support of his argument, Honken cites an Eleventh Circuit case which explains, although stun belts are not visible to the jury and are therefore unlikely to interfere with the presumption of innocence, the constant anxiety over the possible triggering of the belt interferes with a defendant's ability to follow the proceedings and participate fully in his defense. United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11th Cir.2002). Honken also contends, because he was shackled and bolted to the floor, he wasn't going anywhere, and the use of the stun belt constituted impermissible piling on. The district court agreed the use of a stun belt should be subjected to close judicial scrutiny, because of its potentially disruptive effect on the defendant's rights and the fairness of the factfinding process. Honken, 378 F.Supp.2d at 1037 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court then determined the use of a stun belt is justified by the same essential governmental interests that justify use of shackles. Id. The district court also determined, given Honken's extreme dangerousness, that multiple restraints were justified in case one method failed, reasoning the use of shackles and a stun belt together provides an appropriate level of mutually reinforcing deterrence and protection that is justified by the essential governmental interests in safety of the courtroom and prevention of escape and does so without additional prejudice. Id. at 1038. The district court explained using shackles and bolting the shackles to the floor provides a reliable `back-up' in the unlikely event the stun belt would fail, while at the same time lessening the likelihood the stun belt would ever have to be discharged. Id. Considering Honken's dangerousness, martial arts training, and compelling desire to escape, we conclude the district court did not abuse its reasoned discretion in ordering Honken to be shackled, bolted to the floor, and forced to wear a stun belt during trial.