Opinion ID: 2566898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Exigency Exception

Text: {21} The State argues that, under the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had a reasonable suspicion that waiting to enter the residence would have increased the threat to their safety because the search involved exigent circumstances due to the availability of multiple sawed-off shotguns and Mini-14's inside the residence. The State asserts that the Court of Appeals' analysis was inconsistent with the proper standard of review because it failed to indulge in all reasonable inferences in favor of the district court's ruling. See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. The State contends that the Court of Appeals failed to apply the proper standard when it concluded that the trial court did not find, nor did the State argue below, that the residence at issue contained a `large cache' of illegal or dangerous weapons. The State argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously required the State, in whose favor the district court ruled, to have argued that there was a large cache of weapons and effectively required the district court to make this specific finding. We agree. We have previously held that explicit findings are not required and that the reviewing court indulges in all reasonable presumptions in favor of the trial court's ruling. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. {22} Our example in Attaway concerning a suspect who possesses a large cache of illegal or unusually dangerous weapons did not require a specific finding to this effect. Rather, we were setting out examples of specific evidence that can support an officer's inference that a suspect has a propensity for violence to justify an exception to the knock and announce rule because direct evidence of a suspect's propensity rarely will be available. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 152, 870 P.2d at 114. We explicitly concluded that, when reviewing the reasonableness of partial compliance with the knock and announce rule, we consider all of the circumstances as found or impliedly found by the trial court to be present at the time of entry. Id. at 153, 870 P.2d at 115 (emphasis added). We further noted with approval a case from another jurisdiction that upheld a search following a brief announcement period where the suspect had `an array of firearms.' Id. at 154, 870 P.2d at 116 (quoted authority omitted). The fact that another district court could have drawn different inferences on the same facts does not mean this district court's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 10, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856; accord Attaway, 117 N.M. at 153, 870 P.2d at 115. Here, as in many other cases, the district court did not make specific findings of fact; thus, we must draw from the record to derive findings based on reasonable facts and inferences and determine whether those facts and inferences support the conclusion reached by the court. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 153, 870 P.2d at 115, accord Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856 (noting that a lack of findings of fact from the district court is a regular occurrence and that the appellate court indulge[s] in all reasonable presumptions in support of the district court's ruling) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). As determined by our standard of review, we agree with the State that, since the district court ruled that there were exigent circumstances, this Court must view the facts in the light most favorable to that ruling and indulge in all reasonable inferences in favor of the district court's ruling. Thus, we accept, based on reasonable inferences, the district court's determination that the affidavit's statement that the occupant has/sells stolen firearms to include fully automatic Mini-14's and sawed off shotguns meant that the occupant had multiple weapons of this type in his possession. We take this fact into consideration in determining whether exigent circumstances existed under the totality of the circumstances. {23} The State argues that the three-second wait should be measured by how long it would take drug dealers in possession of automatic weapons to arm themselves rather than, as the Court of Appeals concluded, the time it would take a person to get up and answer the door. We agree that the appropriate length of time should not be based on the time it takes for one to respond and open the door in the context of exigent circumstances. [T]he police claim exigent need to enter, and the crucial fact in examining their actions is not time to reach the door but the particular exigency claimed. Banks, 540 U.S. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 521. In Banks, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's arguments that a fifteen to twenty second time was too short a period to allow him to respond to the knock and answer the door, and concluded that when circumstances are exigent because a pusher may be near the point of putting his [or her] drugs beyond reach, it is imminent disposal, not travel time to the entrance, that governs when the police may reasonably enter. Id. Thus, in the present matter, we view the officers' actions in terms of the exigency at issue, the time it would take for occupants to retrieve fully automatic Mini-14's and sawed-off shotguns in order to arm themselves. We note that, if there are exigent circumstances, the officers can altogether dispense with the knock and announce rule or partially comply by knocking and announcing their identity and purpose before forcible entry, leaving the decision to the officers' judgment based on their experience. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 151, 870 P.2d at 113 (stating that, in a case involving the exigency of peril to officers, partial compliance or non-compliance with the rule of announcement may be excused); Ortega, 117 N.M. at 163, 870 P.2d at 125 (holding that if an officer has good reason to believe that evidence will be destroyed, that officer is justified in making an unannounced entry into a person's residence). {24} Defendant argues that Attaway requires that the officers have knowledge of the suspects' violent propensities and that, in the present matter, the officers knew nothing of the occupants' propensities. While we agree that Attaway requires knowledge of the specific individual's propensity to use violence, we also concluded that direct evidence rarely will be available, thus necessitating liberal construction of this specificity requirement and allowing evidence which gives rise to an inference of an individual's propensity, as discussed above. 117 N.M. at 152, 870 P.2d at 114. The State contends that the district court could have reasonably found that a suspect who deals not only in drugs but also in weapons is likely to use those weapons to protect his or her inventory as well as prevent his or her capture with that evidence. The State notes that Defendant, during the hearing, argued that the mere presence of guns was not sufficient without a finding of propensity to resort to violence, and that this Court could thus presume that the district court found such a propensity by finding in favor of the State. {25} We agree that the district court's ruling reasonably supports a finding of propensity based on the officers' belief that there were two to four individuals at the residence with access to multiple firearms. In the present case, the officers believed that the occupants, including an alleged drug dealer, had weapons consisting of fully automatic Mini-14's and sawed-off shotguns. The specific, articulable facts in the present matter of multiple fully automatic Mini-14's and sawed-off shotguns, as well as the allegation that the resident was a drug dealer, viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, was the basis for the officers' reasonable suspicion that the occupants had a propensity for violence and justified the exigency exception to the announcement rule. {26} In Attaway, this Court concluded that the knock and announce rule has at least three purposes: preventing the needless destruction of property, protecting both the occupant and police from the possible violent response of a startled occupant suddenly confronted with an unannounced entry by an unknown person, and protecting the sanctity of the home and individual privacy. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 147, 870 P.2d at 109. The State observes that, in the present matter, there was no destruction of property because the officers opened the unlocked door and entered the residence, while continuing to announce their identity and purpose. Because the officers wore clearly marked vests and repeatedly announced their identity, the second purpose, protecting against a violent response from a startled occupant suddenly confronted with unannounced entry by unknown people, was also served. The State also contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously focused only on the protection of the privacy interest without consideration of the legitimate interest of police safety, the factor upon which the district court based its ruling. We agree that a reviewing court must consider the issue of officer safety. The right of the officers to enter the premises matures the moment a detached and neutral judicial officer determines that there is probable cause to search the premises. From that moment, governmental interests in the expeditious and safe execution of a search warrant are legitimate and strong. Id. at 151, 870 P.2d at 113. As noted above, we specifically endorse the general exception to the rule of announcement based on the officer's objectively reasonable belief that full or partial compliance with the rule would increase the risk of danger to the officers executing the warrant. Id. at 151, 870 P.2d at 113. Regarding the balance between the degree of intrusion and the risk to officer safety, the State argues that the privacy intrusion was not relatively high because the warrant was executed in the middle of the day, when most people are awake, and that it would be difficult to choose a time which is less invasive. We agree. Cf. id. at 143, 870 P.2d at 105 (upholding forcible entry by officers executing the warrants at 6:00 a.m. on a Saturday morning). The State contends that the threat to officer safety was very significant. Based on the presence of multiple firearms and the allegation of drug dealing where the officers are executing a warrant on a residence, we agree. See generally Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990) (The risk of danger in the context of an arrest in the home is as great as, if not greater than, it is in an on-the-street or roadside investigatory encounter.... [A]n in-home arrest puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his [or her] adversary's `turf.' An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.). [T]he essential and difficult question raised by this balancing is how much risk police officers can reasonably be expected to assume before disregarding the rules society has adopted to otherwise circumscribe the exercise of their considerable discretionary authority in carrying out their vital law enforcement duties. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 145, 870 P.2d at 107 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). We agree that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the degree of intrusion, the execution of a warrant in the late afternoon, balanced against the threat to officer safety, officers executing a warrant involving an alleged drug dealer believed to be in possession of automatic weapons and sawed-off shotguns, weighs in favor of the safety of law enforcement. {27} In New Mexico, the ultimate question in all cases regarding alleged search and seizure violations is whether the search and seizure was reasonable. Attaway, 117 N.M. at 149, 870 P.2d at 111. An otherwise legal search pursuant to a warrant is not made unreasonable by an unannounced entry when privacy and occupant safety interests are minimal and the interests of law enforcement are strong. Id. at 151, 870 P.2d at 113. Under the facts of this case, [t]he state's interests in safe execution of a warrant, when coupled with specific knowledge that the occupants of the place to be searched pose a serious risk to the officers, outweigh the occupants' interests in privacy of the home. Id. at 152, 870 P.2d at 114. Absent exigency, the police must knock and receive an actual refusal or wait out the time necessary to infer one. But in a case like this, where the officers knocked and announced their presence, and forcibly entered after a reasonable suspicion of exigency had ripened, their entry satisfied ... the Fourth Amendment, even without refusal of admittance. Banks, 540 U.S. at 43, 124 S.Ct. 521. The information in the affidavit provided the officers with the information that the occupant was an alleged drug dealer and had multiple fully automatic Mini-14's and sawed-off shotguns, supporting the officers' reasonable suspicion that the occupants presented a serious risk and that compliance with the announcement rule was excused.