Opinion ID: 1205830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the counterclaim to state a claim under section 1985(3).

Text: Defendant's counterclaim alleged, in part: At all times herein mentioned [Bhagwan], his followers who have moved to the Antelope, Oregon area, and the plaintiffs, have been engaged in the urban development of farm and ranch lands in that area, including the incorporation and development of a city together with related facilities, such as electric transmission lines, public sewer systems and the like.    At some time or times between about November 1981 and July 23, 1982, the exact date or dates of which are presently unknown to defendant, plaintiffs    agreed among themselves to: 1. keep defendant and those of like views from exercising their fundamental rights of free speech and fair comment on public issues that affect the citizens of Antelope, and its environs, and the citizens of the state of Oregon; 2. coerce defendant, her neighbors and other opponents of their urbanization activities from expressing land use positions and other opinions that are disagreeable to plaintiffs and counterclaim-defendant; and 3. minimize the effectiveness of any opposition from defendant and others of like views, that they were unable to deter.    The plaintiffs' and [Bhagwan's] foregoing concerted actions and conspiracy have had as their objective and inevitable result the infringement of defendant's rights of free speech that are guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and by 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), all to defendant's general damage in the sum of $2,500,000. The trial court concluded that defendant failed to state a claim under section 1985(3) because her counterclaim did not adequately allege state involvement and because defendant was not a member of any class that section 1985(3) was designed to protect. [7] In United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3357, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a conspiracy to violate First Amendment rights is not actionable under section 1985(3) unless the state was involved in the conspiracy or the aim of the conspiracy was to influence state action. Here, defendant alleged that plaintiffs were engaged in the development and incorporation of a city, and that they conspired to infringe defendant's First Amendment rights in order to counteract her opposition to their land use policies. A city is considered a state entity for the purpose of state action. See e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 91 S.Ct. 1940, 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). We will assume that these allegations suffice to allege state involvement for the purpose of section 1985(3). A claim under section 1985(3) also requires some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirator's action. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). In United Brotherhood v. Scott, supra, the court held that section 1985(3) did not apply to conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus. 463 U.S. at 838, 103 S.Ct. at 3361. The court declined to decide whether section 1985(3) protects classes discriminated against on the basis of their political views or activities. It did, however, express some disapproval of that notion: [I]t is a close question whether § 1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than animus against Negroes and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans.    Although we have examined with some care the legislative history that has been marshaled in support of the position that Congress meant to forbid wholly nonracial, but politically motivated conspiracies, we find difficult the question whether § 1985(3) provided a remedy for every concerted effort by one political group to nullify the influence of or do other injury to a competing group by use of otherwise unlawful means. To accede to that view would go far toward making the federal courts, by virtue of § 1985(3), the monitors of campaign tactics in both state and federal elections, a role that the courts should not be quick to assume. If respondents' submission were accepted, the proscription of § 1985(3) would arguably reach the claim that a political party has interfered with the freedom of speech of another political party by encouraging the heckling of its rival's speakers and the disruption of the rival's meetings. 463 U.S. at 836, 103 S.Ct. at 3360. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has concluded that section 1985(3) provides a remedy only to groups that require and warrant special federal assistance in protecting their civil rights. Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 720 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 967, 102 S.Ct. 510, 70 L.Ed.2d 383 (1981). Defendant alleges that she belongs to a political class that opposes the plaintiffs' land use policies. We conclude that this is not the type of class entitled to protection under section 1985(3). The trial court correctly dismissed defendant's section 1985(3) counterclaim. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The decision of the trial court is affirmed.