Opinion ID: 2818145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Alienage

Text: Gonzalez also challenges his illegal reentry conviction by arguing the district court erred by instructing the jury it could infer he was an alien from a prior deportation order. It is true a deportation order, on its own, is insufficient to establish alienage. See United States v. Ruiz-Lopez, 749 F.3d 1138, 14 UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-CORN 1141 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘[N]either a deportation order, nor the defendant’s own admissions, standing alone,’ is sufficient to prove alienage.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000))). But the district court did not instruct the jury to the contrary. Instead, the court instructed the jury that a deportation order is insufficient, by itself, to establish alienage, but that Gonzalez’s prior deportation in combination with his prior admissions “may establish alienage.” This was a correct statement of the law. See United States v. GalindoGallegos, 244 F.3d 728, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A defendant’s admissions that he is an alien, together with a deportation order, suffice to establish alienage.”), amended on other grounds, 255 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001). Gonzalez’s argument that the jury should have been prohibited from relying on his prior deportation order at all has no support in the law. He cites United States v. Medina, 236 F.3d 1028, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 2001), but that case merely confirms a deportation order alone cannot establish alienage. See id.; see also United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 722 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (interpreting Medina to hold a deportation order “may be considered only as relevant, but not conclusive, evidence” of alienage). The district court therefore did not misstate the law in its jury instruction.3 3 The government argues Gonzalez waived this issue because he jointly proposed a jury instruction that was materially indistinguishable from the one given. See United States v. Hui Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 2015). Alternatively, the government contends we should review the jury instruction for plain error because Gonzalez did not object to it in the district court. See United States v. Armstrong, 909 F.2d 1238, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 1990). We decline to address these arguments because, assuming the issue was properly preserved for appeal, the district court’s jury instruction clearly was not erroneous. UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-CORN 15