Opinion ID: 1405904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective Juror Warne.

Text: Prospective juror Warne testified to having mixed feelings about the death penalty, and stated, I don't know that taking a life is a proper form of punishment. When asked whether she personally could return a verdict that would result in the death penalty, she responded, No, I don't think so. She stated that the way she felt right now was that she would not under any circumstances return a death verdict. She further stated that her ideas might change, that she had no way of knowing if they would, but that she was not convinced that taking another life is the way to go. Defense counsel then sought to explain the balancing of aggravating factors against mitigating factors, but gave an explanation later determined to be inaccurate in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440] (revd. on other grounds California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837]). Counsel stated that if a juror weighed the evidence and determined that the evidence in aggravation outweighed the evidence in mitigation, the law mandates that you come in with a finding of death, no matter what your personal feelings may be. Under those circumstances he asked if she could impose a death penalty, and Ms. Warne replied, No, I don't think I could. In response to the district attorney, Ms. Warne stated that she could perhaps conceive of voting for death if a crime were committed against one of her children, but could think of no other situation. Finally, the district attorney reiterated that the law requires a death verdict where aggravation outweighs mitigation, even if you personally don't think the crime is worth it ... and asked whether she would be able to follow her oath as a juror and return the verdict. She replied that she could not: No, couldn't do it. I would have to disobey. Prospective juror Warne's responses indicated that she would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at trial. ( Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 522, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785].) The only situation in which she would be willing to vote for the death penalty was one which she would never encounter, since she would never be permitted to be a juror in a case involving a crime against her child. The fact that defense counsel and the prosecutor may have misstated the decisionmaking process under People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, does not alter our conclusion. The question at hand was whether prospective juror Warne would be willing to follow the law and vote to impose the death penalty in an appropriate case. She indicated that she would not, and that qualified her for excusal under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412.