Opinion ID: 201324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Genao's Claims

Text: Genao first complains that the district court should have granted him a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 based on his post-trial discovery of exculpatory evidence. Rule 33 allows a court to grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). We will only overturn the court's refusal to do so upon a showing that it manifestly abused -22- its discretion. United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 160 (1st Cir. 2000). Genao claimed in his Rule 33 motion that two co- defendants, Peña and Valle-Lassalle, each proffered sworn statements after the trial claiming that Genao did not participate in Caballo's murder. He also claimed that a private investigator, Benny Soto, had interviewed Santodomingo, a leader of the conspiracy, who had been arrested for money laundering in 1994 and later pled guilty to drug trafficking charges arising out of the first superseding indictment in this case. The investigator reported that Santodomingo would testify that Genao had not been involved in the drug conspiracy. The district court denied Genao's motion for a new trial without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Upon receiving Genao's motion for reconsideration, the court held a hearing to consider it, and Peña, Valle-Lassalle, and Santodomingo testified. Citing Genao's lack of diligence in seeking this evidence prior to trial and the witnesses' lack of credibility, the court again denied his motion for a new trial. A motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence will ordinarily not be granted unless the moving party can demonstrate that: (1) the evidence was unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to lack of diligence by the defendant; (3) the evidence is material, and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and -23- (4) it will probably result in an acquittal upon retrial of the defendant. United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1980). The defendant must meet all four prongs of the Wright test in order to succeed on a Rule 33 motion. A defendant's new trial motion must be denied if he fails to meet any one of these factors. United States v. Colon-Munoz, 318 F.3d 348, 360 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Peña testified that he was the triggerman in Caballo's murder and that Genao was not present at the murder scene. In fact, he testified that he did not meet Genao until the two were imprisoned together prior to their federal trial. When Genao's lawyer asked him why he had failed to present this testimony earlier, he answered: Well, I was in negotiation [with the government]. I mean, at one point in time, I was thinking of fighting my case, you know, of going to trial in my case, but then I started to think a lot about Genao and the fact that he had nothing to do with [Caballo]'s death. Because I really had never met Genao out in the street at all. I never saw him. So when I finally made my agreement and I was already sentenced, I said, Well, I'm going to help him out because he really had nothing to do with any of this killing, because I was the one who killed [Caballo], and the ones involved in [Caballo]'s murder, the ones who were there for [Caballo]'s murder, was me and [Llaurador], and we were the only ones who were there at the lake when [Caballo] was killed. -24- On cross-examination, Peña admitted that, as part of his plea agreement, he accepted as true and correct the version of facts in counts one and three of the second superseding indictment, which stated that Genao participated in Caballo's murder. However, he claimed that he thought that this affirmation meant that he was admitting to the accusations in the indictment relating to his own actions and culpability, not necessarily to the facts and accusations relating to his co-conspirators. Valle-Lassalle said that Genao never assisted with any of the drug loads and that Genao had nothing to do with Caballo's murder. Even though Genao asked him in jail to say that he was not guilty, Valle-Lassalle said that he did not come forward with this evidence earlier because he was awaiting trial. Valle-Lassalle repeatedly refused to implicate some of his co-conspirators in the murders and drug smuggling operations, prompting the government to ask: It goes against every grain of your being to testify and implicate anyone that's not a cooperator or a dead person in criminal conduct; isn't that correct? Valle-Lassalle answered simply, Yes. Santodomingo's testimony was less detailed. He stated that he met Genao through Ramos and that Genao did not do any drug work for him. We have previously characterized post-sentencing exculpatory testimony of co-conspirators as being inherently -25- suspect. United States v. Montilla-Rivera, 171 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 1999). Such witnesses have little to lose by fabricating stories designed to free their comrades, especially when, as here, the stories do not run the risk of implicating the witnesses in other criminal acts.5 United States v. Simmons, 714 F.2d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1983) ([O]nce sentence has been imposed on a co-defendant, '. . . there is very little to deter the . . . co-defendant from untruthfully swearing out an affidavit in which he purports to shoulder the entire blame.') (citation omitted; ellipses in original). Valle-Lassalle's admission that he was only willing to inculpate dead people and informants, and the contradictions between Peña's testimony at the evidentiary hearing and the facts recounted in his plea agreement, capture the limitations of the post-trial testimony of all three witnesses produced at the evidentiary hearing. Having presided at the lengthy trial of Genao and the co-defendants, and having heard the testimony of the co-conspirators produced at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, the district court did not remotely abuse its discretion in rejecting the argument that the testimony from Genao's co-conspirators will probably result in an acquittal upon 5 Santodomingo is serving a 276 month sentence after being indicted in the first superseding indictment and pleading guilty to narcotics trafficking. The record does not identify the crimes to which the other two witnesses pled guilty; however, Valle-Lassalle admitted that he is serving a life sentence and Peña admitted that he is serving a thirty year sentence. -26- retrial. Wright, 625 F.2d at 1019.
At trial, the government called Edgar Delgado García, a Puerto Rico Commonwealth judge who was the local prosecutor when Llaurador started cooperating with authorities prior to his murder. Judge Delgado read two sworn statements that Llaurador had given to the police in the summer of 1996 regarding Caballo's murder. In the first statement, Llaurador provided a detailed account of the night of the murder, including the plan that Genao and Peña developed to trap Caballo; the manner in which they killed him; and the way in which Caballo's truck got stuck on the side of the road after the murder. In the second statement, Llaurador explained that Valle-Lassalle told him that he had given the order for Caballo's death because Caballo was going to tell the Colombians about the cocaine theft. Genao objected to the admission of this hearsay testimony against him immediately before Judge Delgado testified. The argument over the admissibility of Llaurador's statements principally involved the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine,6 which, as embodied in Rule 804(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, creates an exception to the general 6 The government also argued that Llaurador's statements contained sufficient indicia of reliability to be admissible under the catch-all provision in the hearsay rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 807. -27- prohibition on the admission of hearsay testimony for statement[s] offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness. Genao claimed that he was in jail awaiting trial for Caballo's murder when Llaurador was murdered; therefore, he had nothing to do with the killing. Noting that Rule 804(b)(6) allows the admission of evidence against defendants who acquiesced in a hearsay declarant's murder, the government responded that the mere fact that Genao did not directly participate in the murder was immaterial. According to the government, a portion of Ramos's testimony demonstrated that Genao knew that Llaurador was going to be murdered and that Genao acquiesced in the murder. Specifically, Ramos had testified that Genao asked him for bail money when the two were imprisoned; when Ramos called Valle-Lassalle to tell him about this request, ValleLassalle told him to tell Genao that he should not be worried because he would be out soon. Nine days later, according to the government, Llaurador was murdered and Genao was set free. Therefore, according to the government, Genao acquiesced in Llaurador's murder. Apparently agreeing with the government's theory of acquiescence (the court did not elaborate on its ruling), the court admitted Llaurador's statements to the former Commonwealth prosecutor as evidence against Genao. -28-
As we recently noted, the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004), changed the legal landscape for determining whether the admission of certain hearsay statements violates the accused's right to confront witnesses.7 Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir. 2004). Overturning earlier precedent that allowed a court to consider hearsay testimony against a criminal defendant if that testimony bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, see, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), the Crawford Court held that, absent other grounds for admissibility, the Confrontation Clause categorically bars the admission of testimonial hearsay unless the declarant is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374 (Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.). Although the Court left for another day a comprehensive definition of testimonial hearsay, it stated that [w]hatever else the term covers, it 7 Genao filed a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter, pro se, on March 30, 2004, citing Crawford. The government never filed a Rule 28(j) letter regarding that case. We heard oral argument in this case on March 2, 2004, and Crawford was published on March 8, 2004. Although Crawford was decided after Genao was convicted, we must apply this new precedent in his appeal. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 (1974) ([A] change in the law occurring after a relevant event in a case will be given effect while the case is on direct review.). -29- applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations, or other extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Llaurador's signed confession, presented under oath to the prosecutor in Puerto Rico, is testimonial hearsay within the meaning given by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing the parameters of testimonial hearsay in light of Crawford). Since Genao did not have the prior opportunity to confront Llaurador regarding his statements, we conclude that, absent some independent ground for admissibility, it was a constitutional error for the court to admit Llaurador's statements against Genao.
As noted, the government drew upon the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in arguing to the district court that Llaurador's hearsay statements were admissible against Genao because he had acquiesced in Llaurador's murder. Forfeiture by wrongdoing is an independent ground for the admissibility of hearsay testimony that survives Crawford. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. -30- Curiously, on appeal, the government essentially abandons the forfeiture by wrongdoing argument, limiting itself to this one statement in its brief: Genao was aware of the order to kill Llaurador because he had been informed by Victor Manuel Valle Lassalle, a/k/a 'Manolo,' through David Ramos-Rivera, a/k/a 'Pecas' not to worry. Instead, it simply argues that both of Llaurador's statements were admissible because they were declarations against penal interest and were otherwise reliable. See Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Crawford makes these traditional hearsay arguments irrelevant. According to Crawford, Genao had a constitutional right to confront Llaurador that, as to testimonial hearsay, could not be overridden merely by showing indicia of reliability. Under appropriate circumstances, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine can provide an exception to the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. But the glancing reference to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing in the government's brief does not give us any assistance in addressing this difficult waiver issue.8 We believe it is apodictic that 8 Without purporting to resolve anything, we suggest some of the difficulties involved in determining whether a defendant has acquiesced in wrongdoing that would forfeit his confrontation rights. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have held that the scope of imputed responsibility for procuring the unavailability of a witness, under both Rule 804(b)(6) and the Confrontation Clause, is coextensive with conspiratorial liability under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2000); accord United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (adopting Cherry). Under Cherry, the hearsay and Confrontation Clause exceptions are met if the wrongful -31- 'issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.' United States v. Caraballo-Cruz, 52 F.3d 390, 393 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990)). This rule, though most commonly applied to defendant-appellants, may be applie[d] with undiminished vigor when, as now, a prosecutor attempts to rely on fleeting references to unsubstantiated conclusions in lieu of structured argumentation. Caraballo-Cruz, 52 F.3d at 393. Although in certain circumstances we have the discretion to overlook waiver by inadequate argument by the government in a criminal case, see United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir. 1997) (court of appeals has discretion to overlook government's waiver of harmless error argument), it would be inappropriate in this case to make the government's argument for it on an issue both factually and legally complex. procurement [of the witness's unavailability] was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy. 217 F.3d at 820. However, Cherry requires the district court to determine the factors supporting conspiratorial liability at an evidentiary hearing conducted outside the jury's presence. Id. at 815. Here, the district court did not make any factual findings on the applicability of conspiratorial liability, let alone conduct a separate hearing outside the presence of the jury. While Cherry may represent a sensible rule of law, the government's failure to argue it means that we lack the benefit of arguments on whether to apply Cherry to this case, either in its substantive (scope of liability) or procedural (determination of liability by separate hearing) aspects. These difficulties highlight the necessity of fully developed arguments on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine. -32-
Although the government argued wrongly that Llaurador's statements were admissible as declarations against penal interest, it failed to argue in the alternative that, if the statements were erroneously admitted, the error was harmless. See generally Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (holding that harmless error review applies to Confrontation Clause violations); United States v. Reyes-Echevarria, 345 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2003) (We review challenges to the admissibility of evidence under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause for harmless error.). Because the government has not argued harmless error, we could simply deem the issue waived, as we did for the forfeiture by wrongdoing issue, and vacate the relevant convictions of Genao. However, as noted, we have discretion to overlook the government's failure to argue that the admission of the challenged evidence, if error, was harmless, and that [we] may therefore consider the issue of harmlessness sua sponte. Rose, 104 F.3d at 1414. Exercising this discretion involves the balancing of many elements. Id. at 1415. If our sua sponte harmless error analysis led us to affirm Genao's conviction, we would have to engage in a nuanced analysis of the appropriateness of that sua sponte review. Here, for the sake of completeness, and in light of our decision to vacate the -33- convictions for the serious crimes under review, we choose to explain why admission of Llaurador's statements cannot be deemed harmless. The government, not the defendants, bears the burden of establishing harmlessness. United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 121 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Segui-Rodriguez v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2405 (2004). The analysis is casespecific, considering, among other things, the centrality of the tainted material, its uniqueness, its prejudicial impact, the uses to which it was put during the trial, the relative strengths of the parties' cases, and any telltales that furnish clues to the likelihood that the error affected the factfinder's resolution of a material issue. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1182. We begin our harmless error analysis by describing the evidence implicating Genao in the murder of Caballo apart from Llaurador's hearsay statements. Ramos, the co-conspirator turned informant, described a conversation that he had with Genao in which Genao explained the course of events on the night of Caballo's murder. Genao explained to Ramos that Caballo wanted Peña to kill Llaurador because Caballo suspected Llaurador of stealing his all terrain vehicle (ATV). Genao joined Peña and Caballo in Caballo's white pickup truck to hunt for Llaurador. When they finally found Llaurador, Genao got in the car with him and explained that Caballo wanted to kill him but that he should not -34- worry because Genao and Peña were planning on killing Caballo instead. They drove to a remote location with Caballo's white pickup following behind and then disembarked. When Caballo told Peña to kill Llaurador, Peña shot Caballo instead. The three then loaded Caballo's body into the back of the pickup truck and were planning to dismember the body at Valle-Lassalle's when the truck became stuck. They were forced to abandon the truck and the body on the side of the road. The government offered some corroboration of Ramos's testimony implicating Genao in the murder of Caballo. Soto testified that Valle-Lassalle told [him] what had happened with [Caballo], that it had been [Genao] and [Peña], and that he had to do it because of the Colombian thing. Caballo's girlfriend testified that the last time that she saw Caballo was when he left her house with Peña and Genao on the night of his murder. She confirmed that Caballo's ATV had vanished and that the men brought weapons with them in Caballo's white pickup truck to search for Llaurador. Finally, Puerto Rico Police Agent Jorge Nazario Torres testified that he found Caballo's body in his pickup truck, which was stuck on the side of the road. There is certainly some force to this evidence. If the issue before us was the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that Genao engaged in a conspiracy to murder Caballo or that he aided and abetted the murder of Caballo, we would -35- conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support those convictions. However, the issue before us is not the sufficiency of the evidence. Instead, we must decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the error at issue (the admission of Llaurador's statements) influenced the jury in finding Genao guilty of these murder-related charges. Before stating our conclusion on that issue, we summarize the statements of Llaurador that were presented to the jury by Judge (and former prosecutor) Delgado. Delgado testified that he put Llaurador under oath and asked him to tell him everything that he knew about Caballo's murder. Llaurador responded in detail. He said that he saw Caballo's truck stopped near his home at 2:00 AM on July 15, 2000. Knowing that Caballo was mad at him for stealing the ATV, Llaurador thought that Caballo was either looking for the ATV or was on his way to visit Llaurador's girlfriend. So he drove to his girlfriend's house to see if Caballo was there. He was not; however, Caballo eventually drove near the house, and Genao got out of Caballo's truck and asked Llaurador to take him to buy gasoline. While they were driving in Llaurador's truck, Genao explained that Caballo wanted Genao and Peña to kill him for stealing the ATV but that they were planning on killing Caballo instead because Caballo was going to snitch regarding the cocaine theft. Genao repeatedly reassured Llaurador that nothing was going to happen to -36- him, and he told him to drive toward the cockfighting arena to meet Caballo and Peña. After meeting the other two at the arena, Genao and Llaurador drove to a lake with Peña and Caballo following behind in Caballo's truck. Genao continued to reassure Llaurador that they were not planning to kill him. Peña and Genao switched trucks when they arrived at the lake. Llaurador then implored, if you're going to kill me, kill me here and just leave me here. Peña responded: Are you going to keep up with this? Just take it easy, we're not going to do anything to you. Llaurador followed Caballo's truck a little further up a path, and then all four men got out of their vehicles. Caballo grabbed Llaurador's shirt, pushed him up against one of the trucks, and told Peña to [p]ump four shots into [his] face. Raising his arm, Peña said that he was going to pump four shots into Caballo's face and shot him in the face. Genao and Peña then began to argue about whether they should leave Caballo's body there or take it with them. They decided to put the body in the back of Caballo's truck, and Llaurador, driving alone in his truck, led the group away from the lake, with Peña and Genao quickly following in Caballo's truck. At some point, Llaurador noticed that the truck was not behind him anymore, and he turned back and found it stuck in a ditch on the side of the road. He heard two shots as he was backing up and, upon reaching the truck, was told that Peña shot Caballo two more -37- times because he got up and asked why Peña had shot him. Peña answered, [b]ecause you're a mother fucker. Llaurador then drove Genao to his car and drove Peña to a public housing complex in Aguadilla. As they were driving, Genao told Llaurador that the original plan was to make Caballo disappear so that Genao could keep the truck. Delgado testified that Llaurador provided another statement on September 13, in which he discussed Valle-Lassalle's relationship to the murder. Llaurador said that Genao told him on the way to the cockfighting arena that Valle-Lassalle told them to kill Caballo because he was going to snitch about the cocaine and that they were planning on taking the body back to Valle-Lassalle's afterward to chop him up and make him disappear. That is why they took the body with them after the murder. Genao also told Llaurador that he was planning to dismantle the truck. Llaurador added that he saw Valle-Lassalle a week after the murder, and the gangleader explained his rationale for killing Caballo and said that Peña had left the country. Valle-Lassalle also mentioned another death9 at a parking lot of the Ducos housing project. Llaurador presciently noted to prosecutor Delgado that Valle-Lassalle would kill him if he found out about the statements he was then making and that he omitted the leader's involvement in his earlier statement because Manolo is the one who orders the 9 We take this to be a reference to Martin's murder. -38- killings. Finally, he said that he had not seen Peña since the murder and that he had not seen Genao since the two attended Caballo's wake. These detailed statements of Llaurador, so similar in some of their details to the testimony of Ramos, are powerfully corroborative of the testimony offered by Ramos and others implicating Genao in the murder of Caballo. To treat these hearsay statements of Llaurador as merely cumulative (the harmless side of corroborative) would be unrealistic. Moreover, these statements were read into the record by a Commonwealth judge who was so identified to the jury. That association inevitably added to the weight of the hearsay testimony being offered, particularly since the principal non-hearsay evidence consisted of testimony by a coconspirator (Ramos) and a cooperator (Soto), both of whose integrity might be more open to question than Llaurador's. Under these circumstances, we cannot exclude the reasonable possibility that the constitutional error at issue in the admission of Llaurador's statements influenced the jury in reaching its verdict that Genao was guilty of participating in a conspiracy to murder Caballo and that he aided and abetted that murder. Therefore, we must vacate those convictions. We reach a different conclusion regarding the impact of the court's error on the jury's consideration of the drug conspiracy (count one) charge. Focusing almost exclusively on the -39- events surrounding Caballo's murder, Llaurador's erroneouslyadmitted statements say little about Genao's involvement in the drug smuggling work of the conspiracy. Moreover, the testimony of the two cooperating witnesses firmly established his participation in those activities. Ramos testified that Genao worked as a drug courier for him before Genao became a member of the conspiracy, delivering pounds of marijuana for Ramos to sell at the Montana housing complex. He described Genao's participation in two large drug shipments, a nine hundred to one thousand kilogram shipment in the fall of 1995 that the group smuggled on behalf of Ayala; and a shipment of cocaine in February 1996, which Genao also helped to transport and from which the conspirators stole kilos. Soto testified that Genao participated in an aborted effort to smuggle a large load of marijuana in June 1996. Genao was one of the captains of the boats and was supposed to be paid between fifty thousand and sixty thousand dollars, but they were never able to connect with their supplier. On the basis of this evidence, we readily conclude that the district court's erroneous admission of Llaurador's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in securing convictions on count one of the second superseding indictment. See Casas, 356 F.3d at 121 (upholding a drug conspiracy conviction where [o]ther evidence presented at trial, as well as the admissible testimony of -40- [the investigating agent] based on personal knowledge, clearly established that [the defendant] was a member of the conspiracy). -41-