Opinion ID: 71643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rolland’s Testimony

Text: Senegal argues that the district court should have barred as hearsay Rolland’s testimony regarding Senegal and York’s conversations about planning to attack Mason. He alleges that the conversations did not further any 6 Senegal argues that because some of the statements were not made to coconspirators, the district court abused its discretion by admitting them under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Nothing in the rule suggests that a member of the conspiracy must report the statement in order to satisfy the rule, and we have held that the Government satisfies the rule even when the target of a murder conspiracy testifies as to statements made by coconspirators. See Robinson, 367 F.3d at 291–92. 12 Case: 08-40406 Document: 00511059611 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/23/2010 No. 08-40406 conspiracy, but amounted only to “idle chatter.” Cf. United States v. Cornett, 195 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 1999) (“‘Mere idle chatter’, [sic] even if prejudicial and made among co-conspirators, is not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)([E]).”) (citing United States v. Means, 695 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1983)). At trial, Rolland testified explicitly that she did not overhear any conversation between Senegal and York in which they discussed their plan to kill Mason. Senegal’s argument seems to refer to the Government’s introduction of Rolland’s grand jury testimony in which she reported overhearing Senegal and York plotting their attack. The district court, however, instructed the jury that it could only consider Rolland’s grand jury testimony for impeachment purposes, and not as substantive evidence as to any of the charged counts. Senegal’s argument, therefore, entirely lacks merit.