Opinion ID: 1995761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: amended affidavit for failure to provide for children

Text: Loretta Mae Leed, being first duly sworn upon her oath says: That on the 27th day of December, 1960, at and within the County of Marshall and State of Indiana, one Roger C. Leed was then and there the father of the following children, to-wit: Katherine Lucille Leed, a girl seven (7) years of age. Stephen Roger Leed, a boy six (6) years of age, David Charles Leed, a boy five (5) years of age, Elizabeth Ann Leed, a girl three (3) years of age, and Peggy Sue Leed, a girl one (1) year of age, all of said children under the age of fourteen (14) years living in said County and State, and the said Roger C. Leed then and there being in said County and State and being able by reason of having means and by personal services, labor and earnings so to do, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously neglect and refuse to provide his said children, Katherine Lucille Leed, Stephen Roger Leed, David Charles Leed, Elizabeth Ann Leed, and Peggy Sue Leed, with  necessary and proper home, care, food and clothing, Contrary to the form of the Statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Indiana. Loretta Mae Leed Loretta Mae Leed Approved by me, this 29th day of March, 1961. Donald K. Travis Donald K. Travis Prosecuting Attorney 72nd Judicial Circuit of Indiana My Commission expires: December 31, 1962 (LS) Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of March, 1961. Roy Sheneman (LS) Roy Sheneman, Judge of The Marshall Circuit Court. Courts are divided as to whether, under statutes containing no specific provision as to residence of the father, jurisdiction of a criminal offense of non-support of the children is defeated by the fact that the father has moved to another state or county during the period of time for which he is charged with non-support. See: Annotations, 44 A.L.R.2d 899. We are not concerned here with the policy of the law and the argument made that the denial of jurisdiction in such cases encourages the evasion of a parental duty by a delinquent father. The Indiana statute does fix the jurisdiction by the phrase living in this state. The question here is, to which antecedent does the phrase refer? Normally, in a sentence the grammatical constructions in such cases create a reference to the nearest antecedent. In this case it is the children and not the father to whom the reference is made. This construction has been followed in this state. The statute does not fix the jurisdiction by reference to the father's location or residence, but rather that of the children.  In Groenendyk v. State (1926), 197 Ind. 697, 151 N.E. 730, this court reversed a trial court which refused to quash an indictment for the reason that the charge omitted the words of the statute living in this state and hence did not allege that the child was living in this state. This court said: It is plain that the words of the statute `living in this state' do not refer to the father of the child, but refer to the child. The fact that the child must live in this state becomes a material element of the offense. The offense is not well pleaded unless it is stated as a fact that the child is living in this state, from which it follows that the indictment is subject to the defect alleged in the motion to quash. In State v. Yocum (1914), 182 Ind. 478, 106 N.E. 705, the mother, following a decree of divorce in which she was granted the custody of the children, moved to another county where she could better provide for them and herself, while the father remained in the county of their original home. The appellant was charged by affidavit for non-support in the county to which the children and their mother had moved. This court held that jurisdiction with reference to the enforcement of the support order made in the divorce action was still with the original county in which the divorce was granted. However, the crime of non-support (as distinguished from civil contempt proceedings) was committed in the county to which the children had moved and were presently living. This court said: By this statute the State has created a sharper and more effective spear for a dull or dormant sense of parental duty than that which was before the instrument of a court of equity in a divorce proceeding. It was the duty of appellee to support his infant children and the fact that he has been deprived of their custody at the  instance of the wife can not serve to relieve him of that duty. ... Personal presence is not an indispensable element in the locality of crime. A neglect to do an act is punishable in the county where the act should have been done. Again, in Gilmour v. State (1952), 230 Ind. 454, 104 N.E.2d 127, this court had before it a similar situation. This court there said: This court has further said that where the crime charged is an omission to do an act, the venue of the offense is in the county where the act should have been performed. The act in the case at bar to be performed was the support of the children. The place to perform the act, the omission of which act resulted in the crime charged, was in Rush County where the children resided. In view of the decisions in this state, we must hold that the phrase living in this state in the statute (Burns' § 10-1402) refers to the children and not to the father. The affidavit, being substantially in the words of the statute, is sufficiently definite as against the motion to quash. Crumley v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 396, 184 N.E. 533; Nicholas v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 463, 165 N.E.2d 149; Taylor v. State of Indiana (1957), 236 Ind. 415, 140 N.E.2d 104. The order and judgment of the trial court is reversed, with directions to overrule the motion to quash and with further proceedings therein. Landis, J., concurs. Achor, J., concurs with opinion. Jackson, J., concurs in result. Bobbitt, J., dissents without opinion.