Opinion ID: 741743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The In Limine Ruling

Text: 5 Prior to trial, Ethan Allen moved to preclude Perry from introducing at trial any evidence concerning, inter alia, harassment of Perry that was not included in her EEOC charge, harassment experienced by Ethan Allen employees other than Perry, and harassment that occurred earlier than the start of the applicable statute-of-limitations periods. In a January 26, 1996 Ruling on Pre-Trial Motions (In Limine Ruling), the district court denied the motion to limit Perry's proof to incidents that occurred within the statute-of-limitations periods but granted the motion in most other respects. 6 The applicable limitations period for Perry's claims of sexual harassment, given the date on which Perry filed her EEOC charge, would normally not have permitted recovery for acts that occurred prior to July 1990. The district court, however, noted the possible application of the continuing-violation doctrine, given that Perry alleged in her EEOC charge that she had been harassed since June 1989. See In Limine Ruling at 3-4. The court concluded that in light of the proximity of the harassment to her return to Ethan Allen after maternity leave in December 1988, the court could not conclude that Perry's anticipated testimony with respect to events shortly after her return to work would be irrelevant. Id. at 3, 4. The court therefore denied Ethan Allen's motion to limit Perry's proof to the statute-of-limitations period. Instead, the court ruled that Perry would be permitted to relate incidents of sexual harassment of which she has personal knowledge and which occurred after January 1989. Id. at 3. 7 However, stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide limits on the admissibility of such evidence and allow the exclusion of testimony on incidents which are too remote in time or dissimilar on the ground that they are irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative, id. at 2, the court largely granted the remainder of Ethan Allen's motion, stating as follows: 8 By contrast, the Court will prohibit all witnesses and testimony regarding alleged incidents of sexual harassment occurring either before January 1989, or after January 1989 which either were not witnessed by the plaintiff or are not related to sexual harassment of the plaintiff while she was on the job. Such evidence is both irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative on this plaintiff's specific claims of sexual harassment. 9 Id. at 4. 10 In sum, Perry was not to be allowed to present any evidence with respect to sexual harassment at Ethan Allen prior to 1989. With respect to the period beginning in January 1989, she was to be allowed to testify to her own sexual harassment experiences, but she was not to present evidence that other female Ethan Allen employees had been harassed unless she herself had witnessed the harassment and it was related to her. 11