Opinion ID: 1386193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: appellate review, the foreclosure decree, and dismissing and recasting the appeal

Text: We need not theorize about in rem and in personam judgments to resolve the problem before us at this stage of the proceeding. The record clearly shows that the FSLIC sought a personal judgment against the Tidwells in its petition for foreclosure of its mortgage. Such requested relief is proper under the jurisprudence of this State. Mehojah v. Moore, 744 P.2d 222 (Okla. App. 1987), (approved for publication by Supreme Court). [1] The record before us contains no request by any party for an in rem judgment. There can be only one judgment or one final judicial determination upon a single cause of action. See Stubblefield v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 619 P.2d 620, 624 (Okla. 1980) and Oklahomans For Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Okla., 634 P.2d 704, 706 (Okla. 1981). In a strict sense, this one judgment in a foreclosure proceeding is the order determining the amount due and ordering the sale to satisfy the mortgage lien. Jones v. England, 782 P.2d 119, 121 (Okla. 1989); Mehojah v. Moore, 744 P.2d at 225. See also Willis v. Nowata Land and Cattle Co., Inc., 789 P.2d 1282, 1285 n. 11 (Okla. 1989), (deficiency judgment [2] described as a post-judgment order). This view is nothing new to the jurisprudence of this State. See Funk v. Payne, 183 Okl. 332, 82 P.2d 976 (1938), wherein we explained that in order to appeal errors in a judgment of foreclosure it was necessary to appeal from that judgment, and First National Bank v. Colonial Trust Co., 66 Okl. 106, 167 P. 985, 987, 988 (1917), wherein we observed that the order of foreclosure was final as it was not appealed. In Reliable Life Ins. Co. of St. Louis v. Cook, 601 P.2d 455, 457 (Okla. 1979), we observed that the appellant did not appeal the foreclosure judgment prior to the motion for the deficiency. In Burton v. Mee, 152 Okl. 220, 4 P.2d 33, 36 (1931), we said that a judgment of foreclosure could not be attacked in the context of a motion to confirm a sale but that the parties' remaining remedy in attacking the judgment at that point in the proceedings was by vacating the judgment. In Wyant v. Davidson & Case Lumber Co., 173 Okl. 467, 49 P.2d 151, 154 (1935) we did the same. The trial court order before us states the amounts due. The trial court, however, did not adjudicate the amounts due, and that is because it failed to adjudicate the sufficiency of the Tidwells' defense to the motion for summary judgment. In other words, the plaintiff's cause of action was not fully adjudicated. A judgment that adjudicates a plaintiff's cause of action must also adjudicate all defenses and interrelated counterclaims to that particular cause of action that were properly raised by the defendant. For example, in Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Engineering, 755 P.2d 669 (Okla. 1988), we said that [w]hen a counterclaim is interrelated with the plaintiff's claim, no judgment is rendered in the case until all issues raised by both claims have been resolved. Id. 755 P.2d at 670 n. 1. See also Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 572 P.2d 966, 968 (Okla. 1977), wherein we explained that the concept of a cause of action exists to satisfy the needs of plaintiffs for a means of redress, of defendants for a conceptual context within which to defend an accusation, and of the courts for a framework within which to administer justice. (Emphasis ours). The order before us specifically declined to adjudicate the legal sufficiency of the Tidwells' defense to the foreclosure of the mortgage. Thus, the order does not adjudicate the cause of action and is not a judgment. See Teel v. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, 767 P.2d 391, 395 (Okla. 1985), in which we explained that a summary adjudication of less than all of a cause of action is not appealable as a judgment. However, the order does include two characteristics of a judgment since it authorizes execution [3] and awards attorney's fees. [4] We have held that an order of sale after judgment in a foreclosure proceeding is an execution within section 732 of title 12. See Bartlett Mortgage Co. v. Morrison, 183 Okl. 214, 81 P.2d 318 (1938). We have also explained that an execution is premature when issued on a judgment that shows on its face that it is not final. Thornburgh v. Ben Hur Coal Co., 203 Okl. 553, 224 P.2d 249 (1950). An erroneous execution arising from a foreclosure proceeding, by itself, is insufficient to warrant extraordinary relief by prohibition. See Schuman v. Sternberg, 179 Okl. 118, 65 P.2d 413 (1937). Here, the authorized execution and sale of the Tidwells' property prior to an adjudication of their alleged defense is not only premature but a fundamental flaw in the order. [5] Due process mandates that a party be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and an opportunity to controvert the claims of the opposing party. Cate v. Archon Oil Co., Inc., 695 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Okla. 1985); Jackson v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 648 P.2d 26, 31 (Okla. 1982). As the present case now stands below, the defendants' property is subject to forced sale prior to any judicial review of the legal sufficiency of their alleged defenses to the seizure and sale of the property. Such a result contravenes due process. Cate v. Archon Oil Co., Inc., supra , and Jackson v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, supra . This court on occasion, and when justice so requires, will treat a petition in error as an original action for a writ, or vice versa. In the Matter of B.C., 749 P.2d 542, 544 (Okla. 1988); Prock v. District Court of Pittsburg County, 630 P.2d 772, 775 (Okla. 1981). This is such a case. We dismiss the appeal herein and recast a portion of the Tidwells' petition in error as an application for extraordinary relief. In the Matter of B.C., supra . We issue a writ and prohibit the respondent district judge, or any other assigned judge in this cause, from enforcing that part of the present interlocutory order that authorizes execution on the property and its sale. The trial court remains free on remand to adjudicate the claims and defenses and then render any appropriate judgment of foreclosure. HODGES, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., concur. OPALA, C.J., concurs in result. SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., dissent.