Opinion ID: 217959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Polling Issue

Text: Penniegraft argues that the district court's continued polling of the jury after it became clear that the verdict was not unanimous was reversible error.
As defendant did not object to the court's continued polling of the jury, this issue is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 222 (4th Cir.2008) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Under the plain error standard of review, to establish the authority to notice an error not preserved by a timely objection, a defendant must demonstrate (1) that an error occurred, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that it affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 154 (4th Cir.2001) (en banc). If the defendant satisfies these threshold requirements, correction of the error is within the appellate court's discretion, which is appropriately exercised only when failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice, such as when the defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 161 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Unquestionably, it is plain error for a trial judge to inquire as to the numerical division of a jury. The United States Supreme Court so held in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926). In that case, the defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess and transport intoxicating liquors in violation of the National Prohibition Act. After some hours of deliberation the jury had not agreed on a verdict. The judge called in the jury and inquired as to their division. The jury foreman informed the court that the jury stood nine to three without indicating whether the majority favored conviction or acquittal. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Stone, held the practice to be per se reversible error, declaring: We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some degree, serious, although not measurable, an improper influence upon the jury, from whose deliberation every consideration other than that of the evidence and the law as expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not to be sanctioned. Brasfield, 272 U.S. at 450, 47 S.Ct. 135. But Brasfield, however strong the language of the Court and inflexible the rule established, does not answer the present inquiry. In Brasfield, there was clearly no verdict and the trial judge asked about the division sua sponte. Here, the situation is quite differentthe trial judge, upon being informed that there was a verdict, proceeded to poll the jury at the request of the defendant. Jury polls are governed by Rule 31(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which is designed to insure that the verdict is indeed unanimous and to uncover coercion, if any exists. United States v. Edwards, 469 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (5th Cir.1972). The rule reads as follows: After a verdict is returned but before the jury is discharged, the court must on a party's request, or may on its own, poll the jurors individually. If the poll reveals a lack of unanimity, the court may direct the jury to deliberate further or may declare a mistrial and discharge the jury. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(d). Accordingly, when Penniegraft asked for a poll the trial court was under a mandate to complyit had no choice in the matter. Defendant contends that, when the court continued the poll after Juror No. 5 said she was still kind of iffy about the defendant's guilt, it brought the case within the inflexible rule of Brasfield, with the result that reversal is required. We disagree. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was confronted with this issue in Lyell v. Renico, 470 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir.2006). There, the defendant was convicted in state court of assault with intent to commit murder and brought a claim for habeas corpus relief in federal court. In that case, the judge, having been informed that there was a unanimous guilty verdict, polled the jury at defendant's request. During the poll, the first eleven of fourteen jurors concurred in the guilty verdict, but Juror No. 12 responded, No. I am sorry, Judge. Id. at 1181. The court continued the poll and both of the remaining jurors concurred in the guilty verdict. The defendant did not object to the continued polling, but moved for a mistrial after the court gave the jury a truncated Allen charge and sent them out to continue deliberations. An hour later, the jury came back with a unanimous verdict; Juror No. 12 had joined the majority. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error in continuing to poll the jury after learning the verdict was not unanimous. Acknowledging Brasfield, the court explained why that decision did not control the inquiry in the case before it: Brasfield and all of the other cases upon which Lyell relies stem from judicial inquiries into the numerical division of a deadlocked jury. Yet there is a world of difference between juror-coercion claims arising from deadlocked juries and those arising from post-verdict juror polling. In the former situation, there is never any reason to expose the numerical division of the jurors. The trial court may decide to give a seemingly deadlocked jury an Allen charge to urge it to continue its deliberations in good faith, but the court has no reason to ask, or find out, which jurors stand where on the charges. The same is not true with juror polling. There, it is not only necessary but desired (at least from the defendant's perspective) for the public to learn that at least one juror has opted to take a stand against conviction. Id. at 1183. The Lyell court continued: [T]here seemed to be little point to continuing to poll the last two jurors (save with defense counsel's consent) because one holdout suffices to send the jury back to deliberate. But there is nothing about the judge's actions that suggests that this was anything more than a slip in inertia after polling the first 12 jurors. Nor, it bears adding, did defense counsel do anything to stop the judge, which itself suggests a non-coercive environment. Id. The decision on this point in Lyell is weakened somewhat by the fact that defendant's conviction was overturned on other grounds and because one of the three appellate judges filed a concurring opinion that vigorously disagreed with the majority on the polling issue. The concurring judge argued that there is nothing in Brasfield that narrows its holding to deadlocked jury cases where the court inquires, on its own motion, how the jury stands numerically. According to the concurrence, Brasfield extends to any disclosure of numerical division regardless of whether a jury is deadlocked, at an impasse, or in a different stage of jury deliberations. Id. at 1190 (Clay, J., concurring). Other circuits, however, have reached the same conclusion on the polling issue as the majority in Lyell, and the weight of authority is of the opinion that Brasfield does not apply where the judge continues to poll the jury after learning there is not a unanimous verdict. In United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.1991), numerous defendants were tried on various narcotics offenses. After five days of deliberation, the foreperson of the jury sent a note to the court informing it that the jury had reached a verdict. Counsel for two of the defendants requested a poll. Both Juror No. 2 and Juror No. 7 indicated that they did not agree with the guilty verdict. On each occasion, counsel moved for a mistrial but did not object to continued polling of the jury. The court denied the motions for mistrial and indicated it would instruct the jury to resume deliberations, but insisted nevertheless on completing the poll. The jury deliberated two more hours and returned unanimous verdicts of guilty. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions holding that continued polling violates a defendant's rights only when it is coercive. According to the Gambino court: [W]hen the trial judge continues to poll the jury after one juror disagrees with the verdict, reversible error occurs only when it is apparent that the judge coerced the jurors into prematurely rendering a decision, and not merely because the judge continued to poll the jury.    Whether the method employed in conducting a jury poll is coercive must be evaluated on the facts and circumstances of the particular case and not simply because the trial judge continued to poll the jury after a juror dissented from the reported verdict. Id. at 501-02. Three other circuit courts of appeal have joined the courts in Lyell and Gambino. In United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172 (3d Cir.1988), the court continued to poll the jury after Juror No. 10 indicated he disagreed with the verdict of guilty as to defendant John Fiorilla. [2] Instructed to resume deliberations, the jury reached a unanimous verdict of guilty as to defendant John Fiorilla after two additional days. [3] The Third Circuit reviewed the facts and circumstances of the case and found continued polling to be non-coercive. The court summarized the rationale for its conclusion as follows: Here, the trial court carefully considered and rejected appellants' request for a new trial. In so ruling, the court referred to a number of factors surrounding the continuation of the jury poll after Mr. Fonseca's dissent. They include counsels' failure to voice a specific and contemporaneous objection to the polling, which demonstrates to some degree the absence of a coercive atmosphere. Upon learning of the dissidence, the trial judge dismissed the jurors for the day. This removed Mr. Fonseca from the immediate attacks of his peers. Before deliberations resumed the next day, the trial judge delivered a cautionary instruction asking the jurors to carefully weigh and consider the views of their fellow jurors. Most important was the trial court's reliance on the deliberations having continued for an additional two days before the jury returned unanimous guilty verdicts against the appellants. The district court concluded that this lapse of time before the return of guilty verdicts demonstrated that the lone dissenting juror was not coerced by the poll to capitulate to the views of the majority. Cf. Brooks, 420 F.2d at 1353-54 (jury's returning verdict after twenty minutes of deliberations after poll upheld). Although Mr. Fonseca initially stood as the lone vote for acquittal on Thomas Fiorilla's and Frances Scullion's verdicts, the jury ultimately acquitted them. His view on these two defendants in the end carried the day. Thus, it was plain to the district judge, as it is to us, that Mr. Fonseca was not afraid to stand up for his convictions and that his peers took his opinions seriously during their two days of further deliberations. Id. at 176-77. In Amos v. United States, 496 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir.1974), the jury announced it had reached a verdict of guilty as to all counts in a fourteen-count indictment for tax fraud. A poll of the jury, however, revealed that Juror No. 8 had consented to the verdict of guilty only as to count four. The judge continued the poll as to count four only, said it would receive the guilty verdict on count four, and indicated it would send the jury back for further deliberations on the remaining counts. At this point, counsel for defendant Amos asked the judge to repoll the jury on count four only and the court did so. After the repoll and hearing Juror No. 8's response, the judge changed his mind about accepting a partial verdict and instructed the jury to resume deliberations on all counts. After twenty-five minutes the jury found Amos guilty on all fourteen counts. The court repolled the jury again and made further inquiry of Juror No. 8 to make sure he agreed with the guilty verdict on all counts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit indicated that whether the judge's actions were erroneous depends on whether it is likely that the proceedings conducted by the trial court coerced the juror in arriving at his final verdict. Id. at 1272. The court noted further that since the trial judge is present on the scene, we must pay due deference to his views on whether the recalcitrant juror's ultimate acquiescence in the verdict came freely, without pressure from the court. Id. at 1273. The court found no error in the trial court's actions, noting that it gave an objective and balanced instruction to the jury to resume deliberations, that it made specific inquiry of the reluctant juror after the second verdict was returned, and that defendant did not object to the court's action or move for a mistrial. In United States v. Brooks, 420 F.2d 1350 (D.C.Cir.1969), the defendant requested that the court continue the poll after one juror disagreed with the verdict of guilty on a certain count. Further polling revealed that a second juror also had reservations regarding the same count. The appellate court found no error in the judge's action indicating that the trial judge is in a much better position than an appellate tribunal to determine whether a recalcitrant juror's eventual acquiescence in a verdict was in fact freely given. Id. at 1353. Acknowledging that a majority of the federal appellate courts to have considered the issue have rejected his argument that it is plain error to continue to poll a jury after one juror indicates there is a lack of unanimity, Penniegraft directs the court's attention to United States v. Spitz, 696 F.2d 916 (11th Cir.1983). In Spitz, after one juror dissented from the verdict, the judge continued to poll the jury. Upon completing the poll, the judge directed the dissenting juror to stand and ordered her once again to repeat in open court that she disagreed with the verdict. While the juror was still standing, the judge proceeded to give an Allen charge and then excused the jury to return to its deliberation. The jury returned a half hour later with a unanimous guilty verdict. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the trial court's failure to stop polling as soon as the lack of unanimity was revealed was reversible error. We reject the rigid rule of Spitz [4] and conclude that each case involving continued polling of a jury after one juror dissents must be viewed on its own merits (or demerits), considering all the facts and circumstances and giving due deference to the trial judge. Here we find no error. There was no objection to continued polling of the entire jury. [5] The court denied defendant's request to question the recalcitrant juror further, fearing that singling the juror out would be coercive. In fact, a review of the record makes clear the district court in this case took great pains to avoid doing anything that the jury would perceive as coercive. Furthermore, the court gave a fair and perfectly balanced Allen charge when it instructed the jury to deliberate further. In conclusion, we join the majority of circuits to have considered the issue and hold that in conducting a poll of the jury at defendant's request, pursuant to Fed. R.Crim.P. 31(d), when the trial judge continues the poll after a lack of unanimity is revealed, absent an objection by the defendant, reversible error occurs only when it is apparent that the judge coerced the jurors into prematurely rendering a decision, and not merely because the judge continued to poll the jury. Gambino, 951 F.2d at 501. Accordingly, we find the district court's continued polling of the jury in this case was not reversible error.