Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sentencing Phase Challenges

Text: We now turn to Higgs’s challenges to various rulings pertaining to the capital penalty phase of his trial. A. Challenges to the Statutory Aggravating Factors We begin with Higgs’s independent challenges to the four statutory aggravating factors that were submitted to the jury for consideration during the capital penalty phase. Prior to the hearing, Higgs moved to strike each of the proposed statutory aggravating factors, and each motion was denied by the district court. We review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. See United States v. Helem, 186 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999).
For the charges of first-degree premeditated murder and firstdegree murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetra42 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS tion of a kidnapping, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111(a), the court submitted as a statutory aggravating factor the fact that the death[s] . . . occurred during the commission or attempted commission of . . . an offense under . . . section 1201 (kidnapping), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(1). Higgs argues that this aggravating factor merely repeated the substantive elements of the section 1201 kidnapping counts for which he was also found guilty during the guilt phase of the trial and, therefore, failed to narrow or channel the jury’s discretion to impose the sentence of death. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877 (holding that an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder). In other words, Higgs asserts that the aggravating factor served no narrowing function because the government improperly used the fact that death occurred during the commission of a kidnapping as both an element of the substantive crimes for which he was charged and as an aggravating factor for his crimes. This claim is without merit. Death during commission of another crime was not submitted as an aggravating factor for the substantive kidnapping counts charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201. It was only submitted as an aggravating factor for the first-degree premeditated murder and first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of a kidnapping charged under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111(a). As to the § 1111(a) murder counts for which it was submitted, the kidnapping factor clearly did serve the requisite narrowing function for the jury. In order to convict Higgs of the § 1111(a) first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of a kidnapping charge, the jury had to find that a kidnapping had occurred. However, the narrowing function mandated by the Eighth Amendment in death penalty cases may . . . be performed by jury findings at either the sentencing phase of the trial or the guilt phase. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244-45 (1988). And, the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the use of an aggravating factor during the sentencing phase that duplicates one or more elements of the offense of the crime found at the guilt phase. See id. at 246; see also United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding submission of the § 3592(c)(1) statutory aggravating factor in prosecution for kidnapping resulting in death); UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 43 United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 249 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting defendant’s contention that a statutory aggravating factor providing that the defendant caused the death of the victim during the commission of a kidnapping failed to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1502 (3rd Cir. 1994) (noting that federal courts of appeals have consistently held that a sentencing jury can consider an element of the capital offense as an aggravating circumstance even if it is duplicitous). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s submission of the statutory aggravating factor to the jury.
Involving a Firearm Higgs next challenges the district court’s submission as a statutory aggravating factor the fact that Higgs had been previously convicted of a violent felony involving a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(2). The aggravating factor was based upon Higgs’s participation in the December 1995 Cherry Lane shooting. Higgs pleaded guilty in Maryland state court to assault and reckless endangerment for the offense in April 1997. During the plea colloquy, which was admitted into evidence in Higgs’s sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor stated that Higgs had fired a .38 caliber handgun and Haynes had fired a 9 mm handgun during the incident. In response, Higgs claimed that he didn’t have a .38. It was the other way around. J.A. 1104. On appeal, Higgs argues that the court must take a categorical approach to determining whether a prior felony conviction involved the use of a firearm, i.e., the court may only look to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the crime of conviction to determine whether a firearm was involved, not to the particular facts of the case. Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 588-89 (1990) (holding that courts must employ a categorical approach when determining whether burglary was a predicate crime of violence for armed career offender status under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)); United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that, in determining whether a state felony offense of taking indecent liberties with a child falls within the federal definition of a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the court must employ a similar categorical approach, which takes into account only the definition of the 44 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS offense and the fact of conviction). According to Higgs, because use of a firearm is not a specific element of the Maryland offenses of assault and reckless endangerment, the crimes to which he pled guilty, and he did not specifically admit the use of a firearm during the Cherry Lane incident, the prior conviction did not involv[e] the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm . . . against another person as required by § 3592(c)(2). We reject this claim as well. Higgs correctly points out that the Supreme Court has called for such a categorical approach when Congress has specified that a predicate offense have certain elements. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588; Pierce, 278 F.3d at 286; United States v. Ward, 171 F.3d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1999). However, this same approach is not required under § 3592(c)(2) of the federal death penalty scheme. Section 3592(c)(2) provides, as a statutory aggravator, the fact that the defendant has previously been convicted of a Federal or State offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year, involving the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm (as defined in section 921) against another person. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(2) (emphasis added). Because the language quite plainly requires only that the previous conviction involv[e] the use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm, it authorizes and likely requires the court to look past the elements of the offense to the offense conduct. See United States v. Chong, 98 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (D. Haw. 1999). Additionally, whereas the court in Taylor noted that the categorical approach was proper to avoid the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach, Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601, the Court has made it clear that an individualized determination is required in the death penalty context, Zant, 462 U.S. at 877-79. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in submitting the challenged statutory aggravating factor to the jury for its consideration. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 45 Volume 2 of 2 3. Previous Conviction of a Serious Federal Drug Offense Higgs next claims that the district court erred in refusing to strike as an aggravating factor the fact that he had previously been convicted of a serious drug offense carrying a potential sentence of five years or more. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(12). 46 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS The federal drug offense at issue involved Higgs’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, which arose from the drugs seized during the search of his apartment on March 21, 1996. Higgs pled guilty in May 1997 to the drug offense, and judgment was entered in December 1997. Higgs argues that, for purposes of the death penalty statute, a defendant has been previously convicted of a federal drug offense only if the predicate drug conviction occurred prior to the conduct giving rise to capital murder. Had Congress intended to include any conviction prior to the sentencing hearing, the argument goes, it would have framed the issue as whether the defendant has been convicted of a predicate offense, rather than had previously been convicted of a predicate offense. Because his drug arrest and conviction for a serious drug offense occurred after the murders, Higgs asserts that the statutory aggravator was improperly submitted for consideration by the jury. The district court disagreed, ruling that the aggravator refers to any conviction for a serious drug offense that occurred prior to sentencing and, therefore, denied the motion to strike the factor. As support for their respective interpretations of the language of the statute, the parties direct us to analogous language and practice under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The government, for example, points us to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 (2002), which provides that, for purposes of calculating a defendant’s criminal history category under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a prior sentence includes any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. As correctly pointed out by the government, the commentary makes clear that [a] sentence imposed after the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense, but prior to sentencing on the instant offense, is a prior sentence if it was for conduct other than conduct that was part of the instant offense. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1. For purposes of establishing whether a defendant is a career offender, however, the guidelines are equally clear that prior convictions only count if they occurred before commission of the federal crime. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(c). Higgs, for his part, points us to the case of United States v. Barton, 100 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1996), which interprets a more ambiguous provision of a now-defunct guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, which provided UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 47 for an increase in the base offense level for a firearms offense if the defendant had one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2000). The Barton court held that the use of the words had and prior reflected an intent to only encompass predicate convictions occurring prior to the conduct which formed the basis for the federal offense. See Barton, 100 F.3d at 46. Those circuits that have addressed the issue of whether use of the past-tense verb had when referring to prior convictions under § 2K2.1 encompassed post-offense convictions, however, ultimately reached differing results. Compare United States v. Oetken, 241 F.3d 1057, 1058-60 (8th Cir. 2001) (reaching same conclusion as Barton court), with United States v. Laihben, 167 F.3d 1364, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that post-offense convictions do count as prior felony convictions for purposes of § 2K2.1); United States v. Pugh, 158 F.3d 1308, 1309-1312 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Gooden, 116 F.3d 721, 724-725 (5th Cir. 1997)(same); United States v. McCary, 14 F.3d 1502, 1505-06 (10th Cir. 1994)(same). In 2001, the Sentencing Commission put an end to the difference of opinion, amending § 2K2.1 to provide that a defendant’s base offense level would be increased where the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(2001) (emphasis added). Thus, the Sentencing Commission adopted the minority view, but it did not make that view retroactive. See Cofske v. United States, 290 F.3d 437, 442 (1st Cir. 2002) (adopting the minority view for purposes of sentencings which occurred prior to the amendment, but noting that [o]ne could as easily call [the change] a revision as a clarification). In the end, we find the parties’ reliance upon the sentencing guidelines to be of limited utility. We hold that the § 3592(c)(12) statutory aggravating factor encompasses all predicate convictions occurring prior to sentencing, even those occurring after the conduct giving rise to the capital charges. In short, we can discern no basis upon which to conclude that Congress intended that the prior serious drug offense aggravator encompass only drug offenses or convictions that occurred prior to the conduct giving rise to the murder or kidnapping charges. Unlike others contained within § 3592(c), the aggravator does not 48 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS concern matters directly related to the death penalty offense. Rather, it is concerned with the characteristics of the offender as of the time that he is sentenced. Although it easily could have done so, Congress did not specify that either the prior offense or conviction had to occur before the death penalty offense. On the contrary, the entire section speaks in terms of those things that must be considered when the death sentencing hearing is conducted and the petit jury begins its weighing process. And, we note that where Congress has intended a different practice in other circumstances, it has made that intent clear. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 2003) (providing for an enhanced penalty [i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000) (stating [i]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted . . . to [commit specified violations]). At bottom, Higgs’s argument is that the prior drug conviction aggravator of § 3592(c)(12) is to be treated differently than every other prior conviction aggravator because it directs us to inquire as to whether the defendant had previously been convicted, (i.e., uses the past-perfect tense), rather than has previously been convicted (as does every other statutory, prior conviction aggravator contained within § 3592(c), as well as § 3592(b) and (d)).8 This grammatical difference is far too tenuous a basis upon which to conclude that Congress intended that the prior serious drug offense aggravating factor for homicide was to be treated differently than every other prior conviction aggravating factor and every other prior serious drug offense aggravating factor for other crimes under the FDPA.9 8 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(b) and (d) address aggravating factors for espionage and treason and the aggravating factors for drug offense death penalties. They contain identical aggravators for a previous conviction of a serious drug offense, but use the term has instead of had when referring to them. 9 Higgs contends that this reading of § 3592(c)(12) would be inconsistent with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because statutory aggravators must be found by the grand jury and included within the indictment. Because we have concluded that prior convictions need not be alleged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt, see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 226-27, we need not interpret § 3592(c)(12) as requiring prior convictions to be prior to the grand jury’s indictment in order to pass constitutional muster. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 49 Finally, even if the aggravator was improperly submitted for consideration, the error was harmless. The prior drug offense aggravator was only one of six aggravating factors submitted to and found by the jury, and the jury found only three mitigating factors (and only one of these unanimously — that Higgs was not the sole proximate cause of the deaths). Accordingly, Higgs would not be entitled to relief on this basis. 4. Multiple Killings Finally, Higgs contests the district court’s denial of his motion to strike multiple killings in a single criminal episode as a statutory aggravating factor, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c)(16), because reliance upon the aggravating factor violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the aggravating factor was not a substantive change because it did not increase the punishment that was available when the murder was committed. As discussed earlier, we agree that the multiple killings aggravator was improperly submitted to the jury as a statutory aggravating factor. Reliance upon a statutory aggravating factor that was added to the death-penalty statute after a murder is committed would run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause if the aggravating factor served as the sole aggravating factor that rendered the crime death-eligible because it would clearly increase the punishment for [the] criminal acts. Morales, 514 U.S. at 504; see Carmell, 529 U.S. at 521-525. It does not follow, however, that Higgs’s death sentences are infirm. In Higgs’s case, the jury found the existence of four statutory aggravators for the first-degree murder convictions and three statutory aggravators for the kidnapping conviction. Accordingly, although the district court’s submission of the multiple killings aggravating factor as a statutory aggravating factor was error, its submission as such was harmless error. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 884 ([A] death sentence supported by at least one valid aggravating circumstance need not be set aside . . . simply because another aggravating circumstance is ‘invalid’ in the sense that it is insufficient by itself to support the death penalty.); United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 1001 (8th Cir. 2000) (consideration of inapplicable statutory aggravator was harm50 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS less error where jury found two other statutory aggravators existed). Because the jury found the existence of at least one intent factor and at least one other properly-submitted statutory aggravating factor, the murder was death-eligible. Any additional statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors did not increase the available punishment and were, instead, appropriately considered by the jury in determining whether to impose the death sentence. B. Constitutional Challenges to the Nonstatutory Aggravators The government submitted two nonstatutory aggravating factors for the jury’s consideration — victim impact and obstruction of justice — after having given appropriate notice to the defendant.10 On appeal, Higgs asserts that the statute’s authorization of the jury’s consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors is unconstitutional for four separate reasons. We also review these challenges de novo. See Helem, 186 F.3d at 454. 1. The Consideration of Nonstatutory Aggravators by the Jury First, Higgs argues that the FDPA violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution because the submission of nonstatutory aggravating factors at the penalty phase allows for the random and unguided imposition of the death penalty by jurors. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (providing that the jury’s decision to impose death must be guided by carefully defined standards that must narrow a sentencer’s discretion). We disagree. Once a defendant has been rendered eligible for the death penalty by the jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating factor, the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors serves only to individualize the sentencing determination.11 See Zant, 462 U.S. at 878-79 (holding that the use of 10 Prior to the start of the penalty phase, the government withdrew future dangerousness, for which notice had also been given, as an additional nonstatutory aggravating factor. 11 A nonstatutory aggravating factor is improper if it is not relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 967 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Higgs does not claim that either of the nonstatutory aggravating circumstances submitted to the jury was invalid on this basis. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 51 nonstatutory aggravating factors is appropriate after the jury finds the existence of at least one statutory aggravating factor that narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 1996) (The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of non-statutory aggravating factors in state capital punishment statutes and has held the use of non-statutory aggravating factors permissible.). Thus, we reject the contention that the FDPA is unconstitutional merely because it allows the sentencing jury to weigh nonstatutory aggravating factors when deciding whether to impose the sentence of death upon a defendant convicted of a death-eligible offense. 2. Proportionality Review by the Court Higgs next claims that the FDPA is facially unconstitutional because it does not require proportionality review of a death sentence. Although acknowledging that the Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not require state courts to conduct such a review, see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984), Higgs asserts such review is required when a death penalty scheme allows a jury to weigh nonstatutory aggravating factors in deciding whether to impose a death sentence. Higgs bases this argument on two cases in which the Supreme Court observed that proportionality review is a useful safeguard against arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. See Zant, 462 U.S. at 890; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976). Neither case, however, holds that proportionality review is mandated, and both predate the Court’s decision in Pulley. As noted by the Court in Pulley, that some schemes providing proportionality review are constitutional does not mean that such review is indispensable. . . . Examination of our [prior] cases makes clear that they do not establish proportionality review as a constitutional requirement. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-45. Nor are we persuaded by Higgs’s attempt to distinguish Pulley because it did not deal with a death penalty scheme involving nonstatutory aggravating factors. See Jones, 132 F.3d at 240-41 (rejecting attempt to distinguish Pulley from application to the FDPA on this basis, and holding that the Constitution does not mandate proportionality review when the capital sentencing scheme permits the jury to consider nonstatutory aggravating factors as long as the 52 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS statute provides for other safeguards against an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty); see also United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 760 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the FDPA has sufficient safeguards —notably the requirements that a jury find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one statutory aggravating factor and at least one of four requisite levels of specific intent on the part of a defendant, not to mention various other procedural protections—such that proportionality review is not required in order for the FDPA to pass constitutional muster), vacated on other grounds, 536 U.S. 953 (2002). Accordingly, we reject Higgs’s claim that the FDPA violates the Eighth Amendment because it does not require proportionality review.
Higgs next contends that, by affording prosecutors virtually unlimited discretion in identifying and defining nonstatutory aggravating factors, the FDPA impermissibly delegates legislative power to government prosecutors in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. We likewise reject this argument. First, the statute does not delegate a legislative function to the prosecutor. The prosecutor’s discretion with regard to defining what is a death-eligible offense is wholly circumscribed by the statute’s requirement that the jury unanimously find at least one intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor before the defendant becomes death eligible. Cf. Jones, 527 U.S. at 376-77 (noting that, [e]ven on a finding of intent, . . . a defendant is not death eligible unless the sentencing jury also finds that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating factors set forth at § 3592). Only after the selection of those critical, legislatively-defined factors is made is the prosecutor afforded discretion to argue that additional nonstatutory aggravators combine with the statutory aggravators to outweigh any mitigating factors that have been submitted for consideration, thus assisting the jury in its task of determining whether a death-eligible defendant should indeed receive that maximum sentence. See, e.g., id. at 377-78; Jones, 132 F.3d at 240. Moreover, to the extent that this discretion could be viewed as a delegation of legislative power, such delegation is constitutionally UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 53 permissible. See Tipton, 90 F.3d at 895 (rejecting facial challenge to the death sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848, which also permits the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors, because any delegation involved was sufficiently circumscribed by ‘intelligible principles’ to avoid violating separation of powers principles); Paul, 217 F.3d at 1003 ([T]he prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’ legislative power.); Jones, 132 F.3d at 239-40 (same); McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1106 (holding that [t]he prosecutorial discretion to promulgate non-statutory aggravating factors falls squarely within the permissible delegation of power to the Executive Branch).
Higgs’s final constitutional challenge to the FDPA’s authorization of the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors centers on his claim that the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because it allows the prosecution to define aggravating factors after the crime was committed. The district court rejected this argument based on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Although Higgs correctly points out that Walton was overruled by Ring, he is not entitled to relief. Although aggravating factors do make[ ] more burdensome the punishment for [the] crime, Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 292, nonstatutory aggravating factors and mitigating factors are weighed by the jury to make the individualized determination to impose the death sentence upon a defendant who has already been found eligible. They do not increase the possible punishment or alter the elements of the offense. C. Evidentiary Challenges to the Obstruction Aggravator Higgs also raises challenges to the evidence admitted by the district court in support of the nonstatutory aggravating factor of obstruction of justice. The government argued that Higgs obstructed the investigation into and prosecution of the murders based upon evidence that Higgs, along with Haynes and Gloria, got rid of the .38 caliber murder weapon and disposed of any physical evidence that the three women had been in Higgs’s apartment that evening; that Higgs solicited false statements and testimony from Phyllis Smith, Smith’s fam54 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS ily members, and Darby concerning his whereabouts on the night of the murder in order to establish an alibi; that Higgs, while incarcerated, made plans with at least one accomplice to eliminate Gloria as a witness; and that Higgs attempted to intimidate an eyewitness to the Chaconia shooting to help defeat the D.C. charges against him. We review the district court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 744 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 1. Admission of Evidence of Unadjudicated Crimes We begin with Higgs’s contention that it was improper to allow the government to introduce evidence that Higgs engaged in obstruction of justice by getting rid of the murder weapon, destroying the physical evidence of the victims’ presence in his apartment, directing Smith and her family to lie to the police and the grand jury regarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder, and planning the elimination of Gloria as an eyewitness against him. Because prior convictions are specifically included as statutory aggravating factors, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c), Higgs asserts that only conduct that results in a conviction for listed crimes may constitute an aggravating factor. Accordingly, the argument goes, the district court erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged and unadjudicated offense of obstruction of justice. This argument is plainly without merit. Although the FDPA does specify certain types of convicted criminal conduct that may be used as a statutory aggravating factor authorizing imposition of the death penalty, it also provides that [t]he jury . . . may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists when making the individualized decision of whether the authorized sentence of death should indeed be imposed. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c). There is no question that the government gave Higgs appropriate notice that it would pursue obstruction of justice as an additional, nonstatutory aggravator, and we have no doubt that Higgs’s destruction of evidence and tampering with witnesses in order to cover his tracks, impede the investigation into the murders, and increase his chances of being acquitted were highly relevant aggravating circumstances which were properly submitted to the jury for its consideration in making the requisite individualized determination. For the same reasons, we also reject Higgs’s contention that its probative UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 55 value was outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice and confusion. We may summarily reject Higgs’s assertion that introduction of the evidence was prohibited by the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution because the evidence lacked the requisite indicia of reliability necessary to impose a sentence of death and because the jury would be unable to fairly evaluate that evidence. The jury was carefully instructed that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant tampered and attempted to tamper with evidence and witnesses for the purpose of obstructing the investigation of the kidnappings and murders of the three women. J.A. 1932. Accordingly, we find no error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s submission of this evidence to the jury for its consideration as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. 2. Admission of Evidence Referring to Haynes’s Confession Higgs next challenges the district court’s decision to allow Captain Robert Rule of the United States Park Police to introduce statements made by Haynes in his confession, which corroborated the testimony of Gloria and others, regarding the actions they took to eliminate physical evidence immediately after the murders. During the guilt phase, Gloria testified that either Higgs or Haynes disposed of the murder weapon in the Anacostia River immediately after the murders and that the three men then returned to the apartment to clean it and dispose of any items the women might have touched. Corroborating testimony was also introduced that the rented videotapes were never returned to the video store and that no victim fingerprints were found in the apartment. According to Captain Rule, Haynes’s statements corroborated Gloria’s testimony that Higgs drove from the murder scene to the Anacostia River, where Haynes threw the gun into the water, and that the three men then returned to Higgs’s apartment where they cleaned it of potentially incriminating evidence. Higgs objected to Captain Rule’s testimony regarding Haynes’s statements, asserting that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative. The district court rejected this assertion and admitted the testimony because, even if the rules of evidence applied, the statement 56 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS was a declaration against interest. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c) (Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.). On appeal, Higgs now argues that the admission of Haynes’s statements through Captain Rule violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which he contends does remain applicable during the penalty phase of the proceedings. Because this constitutional claim was not raised below, we review it only for plain error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. In order to prevail under this standard, Higgs must establish that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights. Id. Further, even if Higgs can make such a showing, we would exercise our discretion to correct such error only if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. Amend. VI. Assuming arguendo that the admission of Haynes’s statements would be a violation of Higgs’s rights under the Confrontation Clause during the guilt phase, see Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 139 (1999) (plurality) (holding that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when an out-of-court statement made by his nontestifying co-defendant, which incriminated the defendant, was admitted into evidence at their joint trial), such presumed error was not plain in the context of Higgs’s sentencing phase. It is far from clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to a capital sentencing proceeding. Cf. United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1990) (United States courts have a long history of using reliable hearsay for sentencing and a trial court may properly consider uncorroborated hearsay evidence that the defendant has had an opportunity to rebut or explain) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Bassette v. Thompson, we rejected an argument that the admission of a psychiatrist’s report during a capital sentencing proceeding violated the defendant’s confrontation rights, relying in part on the Supreme Court’s prior holding that the rules of evidence do not apply in such proceedings. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 57 See 915 F.2d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949)); but see Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1254 (11th Cir. 1982) (reaching contrary conclusion). And, in Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 414 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991), we noted that the question of whether the Confrontation Clause applies in sentencing proceedings remains undecided. Thus, even if the introduction of Haynes’s statements through Captain Rule during the sentencing proceeding was error, we cannot say that the error was plain since it even now remains unclear whether the Confrontation Clause applies in this circumstance. See Promise, 255 F.3d at 160 (An error is plain when the settled law of the Supreme Court or this circuit establishes that an error has occurred.). In addition, even if we were to assume error that was plain, we would not grant relief. Haynes’s statements were merely corroborative of Gloria’s eyewitness testimony regarding Haynes’s and Higgs’s acts of disposing of the gun and any physical evidence in the apartment, as well as the corroborative testimony that no fingerprints were found and that the videotapes were indeed never returned. Given the cumulative nature of the precise evidence challenged, and the overwhelming evidence otherwise proffered in support of the obstruction aggravator, we cannot say that Rule’s limited testimony regarding Haynes’s statements affected Higgs’s substantial rights, nor would we exercise our discretion to correct the error as it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 3. Admission of Evidence Pertaining To The Chaconia Shooting Higgs also challenges the admission of evidence that he attempted to obstruct the prosecution of charges filed against him related to the Chaconia Nightclub shooting, in order to minimize the damaging effect of that looming conviction in his murder case. Higgs was charged with the Chaconia shooting in the D.C. Superior Court and housed at the D.C. jail. Higgs’s counsel for the Chaconia charges believed that Richard Diolamou, who was at the Chaconia Nightclub on the night of the shooting and incarcerated elsewhere on unrelated charges, could offer testimony that would be helpful to Higgs’s case. Thus, Diolamou was transferred to the D.C. 58 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS jail in April 1999, pursuant to a writ issued on Higgs’s behalf, and was questioned by Higgs’s counsel on three occasions. On the first two occasions, Diolamou failed to offer any helpful information. On the third occasion, Higgs personally attended the meeting with his attorney, but Diolamou again failed to offer any helpful information. Later, Higgs and another inmate, known by the name Doc to Diolamou, entered the room where Diolamou was watching television. After Higgs and Doc conversed privately for a short time, Doc left the room and returned with a screwdriver or shank. According to Diolamou, Higgs had a smirk on his face. J.A. 1555. Diolamou became concerned about his safety and asked to be moved away from Higgs. He was not moved from Higgs’s unit, but after the Chaconia case was dismissed in May 1999, Higgs wrote Diolamou a note stating that there were no hard feelings between them and wishing him luck on the street. J.A. 1537. The government argued that Higgs’s intimidation of Diolamou was designed to obtain either a dismissal or acquittal on the Chaconia charges so that it would not harm his case on the murder charges. Higgs first complains that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Diolamou’s testimony because he did not receive pretrial notice that the government intended to introduce evidence concerning Diolamou or the Chaconia shooting in support of the obstruction of justice nonstatutory aggravator. This argument is plainly without merit. The FDPA and the Constitution require that the defendant receive adequate notice of the aggravating factor, which Higgs admittedly received in this case, not notice of the specific evidence that will be used to support it. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a) (requiring only that the government’s notice set[ ] forth the aggravating factor or factors that the government, if the defendant is convicted, proposes to prove as justifying a sentence of death); United States v. Battle, 173 F.3d 1343, 1347 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that notice given to a defendant of the applicable aggravating factors in a death penalty case is not the same as notice of the specific evidence that the government intends to present at a sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1022 (2000); cf. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1996) (noting that there is no constitutional right to advance notice of the government’s evidence in aggravation at a capital sentencing hearing). UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 59 Higgs also challenges the district court’s conclusion that the evidence was relevant to the obstruction aggravator because it reflected Higgs’s attempts to dissociate himself from the bullet in the Chaconia shooting that is tied to the deaths. J.A. 1394. Higgs asserts that no such relevance exists because the bullet recovered from the Chaconia shooting was not the same type of bullets used to murder the three women, i.e., it was not a wadcutter bullet. While true, this distinction does not render the evidence irrelevant. The bullet used in the .38 caliber revolver during the Chaconia shooting was only of a different type than those used in the murders. Indeed, while forensic evidence could not establish an exact match, the bullets examined from the murders, the Chaconia shooting, and the Cherry Lane shooting all had the same land and groove impressions, consistent with being fired from the same .38 caliber weapon. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. D. Challenges to the Mitigation Case 1. Challenges to Rulings Regarding Higgs’s Culpability As a mitigating factor in his case, Higgs argued that Haynes was equally culpable in the crimes, but had not been sentenced to death. See 18 U.S.C.A. §3592(a)(4). On appeal, Higgs contends that the district court violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by (1) denying his motion to preclude the government from offering the contrary argument that Higgs was more culpable than Haynes, the admitted triggerman, and (2) denying his motion to introduce arguments made by the government during Haynes’s trial about the relative culpability of the two men, which Higgs believed to be irreconcilable with the government’s current position. We review the district court’s rulings for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 816 (4th Cir. 2000). In some situations, the Due Process Clause prohibits the government from presenting mutually inconsistent theories of the same case against different defendants. For example, due process may be violated if an inconsistency . . . exist[s] at the core of the prosecutor’s cases against the defendants for the same crime, see Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding due process violation where prosecution obtained two convictions for the same murder 60 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS based on conflicting statements from the same cooperating codefendant) (emphasis added), or where the evidence used at the two trials is factually inconsistent and irreconcilable, Paul, 217 F.3d at 998 (holding that government’s argument that both defendants were the triggerman and killed the victim was not inconsistent). See also United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant could inform the jury that the government had pursued a different theory during a previous trial). No such inconsistency exists in this case. The inconsistent arguments relied upon by Higgs stem from arguments the government made in response to Haynes’s tactic of conceding that he was the triggerman, but arguing that he committed the murders under duress from Higgs. Specifically, the government argued that, even though Higgs may have told Haynes to shoot the women, Haynes acted of his own free will and made the voluntary choice to commit three brutal acts of violence. Higgs asserts that the government’s argument that Higgs was the mastermind and driving force behind the murders, and, therefore more culpable than Haynes because he ordered Haynes to kill the women, was inconsistent with the argument it advanced in Haynes’s trial. We disagree. The government argued precisely the same factual predicate for Haynes’s and Higgs’s convictions, i.e., that Higgs retrieved the gun from his apartment, drove the van to the murder scene, and handed the gun to Haynes after the women got out of the vehicle. And, the government has consistently represented that Haynes was the sole triggerman in the murders. The government did not argue at Haynes’s trial that Haynes was more culpable than Higgs, but rather that Haynes deserved the death penalty because he was no less than an equal partner in crime with Higgs. Nor did the government take any other position in the prior trial that would preclude it from arguing that Higgs was actually more culpable than Haynes. In short, the argument that Haynes was a partner in crime with Higgs because he could have chosen not to murder the women is not inconsistent with the argument that Higgs was more culpable because he brought the murder weapon to the scene and told Haynes to do it. It was certainly not so inconsistent as to amount to a due process violation. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 61 2. The Jury’s Failure to Find Equal Culpability In a similar vein, Higgs argues that his death sentence must be vacated and the case remanded because the jurors failed to find as a mitigating factor that Haynes was equally culpable in the crime, but did not receive a death sentence. Higgs contends that the mitigating factor was established by uncontradicted evidence and, therefore, that the jury’s failure to find the factor reflects an arbitrary and unreliable decision requiring us to vacate the sentence. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3595(c)(2)(A) (Whenever the court of appeals finds that . . . the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor[,] . . . the court shall remand the case for consideration under section 3593 or imposition of a sentence other than death.). Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(a)(4), the jury is to consider, as a mitigating factor, whether [a]nother defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(a)(4). At Higgs’s request, the district court submitted the factor to the jury. However, although the jury unanimously found that Higgs was not the sole proximate cause of the victims’ deaths, it unanimously refused to find that Haynes was equally culpable in the commission of the three capital murders. Higgs argues that his death sentence must be reversed because the mitigating factor was supported by uncontradicted evidence that Haynes had been convicted on identical charges and sentenced to life. This argument fails, however, because the Constitution only requires that the jury be allowed to consider evidence that is proffered as mitigating. See generally Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality). There is no constitutional requirement that the jury find a mitigating factor even when it is supported by uncontradicted evidence. See Paul, 217 F.3d at 999-1000. In addition, the jury’s failure to find that Haynes’s life sentence was a mitigating factor for Higgs was supported by the evidence. Although it was undisputed that Haynes was the triggerman, a rational juror could well have found that Higgs had the dominant role in the murders and, therefore, that Higgs and Haynes were not equally culpable in the crime. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(a)(4). Equal culpability was simply not established by uncontradicted evidence. 62 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 3. Evidence of Higgs’s Death-Eligibility under Maryland Law We review de novo Higgs’s claim that the district court violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to submit to the jury, as a mitigating circumstance, that Higgs would not have been eligible for the death penalty if the murders had occurred within the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland. Higgs sought to introduce expert testimony that, under Maryland law, the death penalty may only be imposed on the triggerman in cases such as this and to argue that, because the murders took place in an area where Maryland had an easement over federal property, he could not have known that he was on federal land when he committed the murders. We find no error in the district court’s refusal to submit the proposed mitigating factor to the jury. Section 3592(a) provides that [i]n determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed on a defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(a). In addition to seven enumerated factors, the statute requires consideration of [o]ther factors in the defendant’s background, record, or character or any other circumstances of the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence. Id. Higgs asserts that his unknowing presence within federal jurisdiction, as opposed to the jurisdiction of the State of Maryland where he would have been ineligible for a death sentence, is a circumstance[ ] of the offense that mitigate[s] against imposition of the death sentence. Id. We disagree. The Constitution requires that the jury not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record or any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. However, evidence not falling within these categories may be excluded as irrelevant. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 n.12. We are satisfied that the district court properly rejected Higgs’s request. An assertion that the death penalty is improper in one jurisdiction because it is not allowed in another is, at bottom, a reflection of the debate surrounding the propriety of the death penalty, which is a matter of policy for the legislative branch. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 675 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming the district court’s UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 63 refusal to allow the defendant to argue that life imprisonment was sufficient punishment because such an argument was better addressed to the legislature). As such, it was not error to refuse to submit it as a mitigating factor in this case. E. Challenge to the Government’s Rebuttal Evidence Higgs also contends that the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce as rebuttal evidence numerous prison infractions committed by Higgs while he was incarcerated. In support of his mitigation case, Higgs presented testimony of a mitigation expert and family members regarding his family history and educational background. This evidence revealed that Higgs was born to a single mother and that his father was uninvolved in his childhood. When Higgs was ten years old, his mother died of breast cancer. Higgs went to live with his aunt and uncle, Constance and Hugh McKinnon, and was cared for by his extended family. When Higgs was eleven years old, another uncle was killed in a mugging and his grandmother died. His grandfather died a few years later. With regard to his educational background, Higgs repeated the second grade because of reading difficulties. However, he was an average student in high school, played high school sports, and graduated at the age of nineteen. Mrs. McKinnon, Higgs’s aunt, testified that Higgs assisted his mother during the last days of her battle with cancer, but that money he received from a medical malpractice suit after his mother’s death, in her opinion, had a negative effect upon Higgs’s work ethic. However, Mrs. McKinnon offered positive testimony concerning Higgs’s relationship with his four-year-old son Daquon and testified that she believed the contacts between Daquon and Higgs were important for Daquon. Higgs’s cousins, Gerard McKinnon and Alexa Cave, both testified that they viewed Higgs as their brother and were supportive of him. Cave testified that Higgs also had a positive relationship with her son, whom she refers to as Higgs’s nephew, which had continued during his incarceration. In support of her testimony, three letters that Higgs had written to Cave while he was incarcerated were introduced into evidence. In the letters, Higgs wrote that he was try[ing] to stay out of trouble and that he was trying to be the best father, uncle and 64 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS brother that he could be. J.A. 1802. In short, Higgs sought to establish, as potentially mitigating factors, the fact that a sentence of death would have an adverse impact on Higgs’s son and Cave’s son, that he was trying to be a good prisoner, and that other factors in Higgs’s background, record, character, or other circumstances of the offense mitigated against imposition of the death sentence. In rebuttal, the government elicited testimony about a sealed juvenile adjudication for an armed robbery committed by Higgs when he was a senior in high school, as well as information that Higgs had been arrested in 1996 for possession of a gun on college grounds. The government also presented evidence of multiple prison infractions that Higgs had committed while incarcerated. Among other incidents, the government introduced evidence that Higgs had failed to cooperate with an institutional count; had demonstrated disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful behavior on a number of occasions; had been caught in possession of a weapon; had engaged in a theft and fighting incidents; had thrown a cup of urine on another inmate; and had refused to provide information or cooperate in the investigation of a stabbing of Higgs by another inmate. Higgs objected to the introduction of his prison infractions, contending that the evidence lacked any nexus with Higgs’s mitigation case and amounted instead to the improper admission of evidence of his future dangerousness, a nonstatutory aggravator that the government had withdrawn prior to starting the penalty phase. The district court admitted the evidence, over Higgs’s objection, ruling that it was proper and fair evidence to rebut the picture that the defendant has drawn with regard to who he is now and his future relationship with his son. J.A. 1803. [W]hen otherwise inadmissible, rebuttal evidence must be reasonably tailored to the evidence it seeks to refute. Stitt, 250 F.3d at 897 (footnote omitted). Rebuttal evidence is [e]vidence given to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party or which tends to explain or contradict or disprove evidence offered by the adverse party. Id. (alterations in original). Rulings related to admission and exclusion of evidence are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. at 896. Here, we find no error in the district court’s decision to allow evidence of Higgs’s prison infractions as rebuttal to his mitigation case. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 65 Higgs’s mitigation evidence was directed in part to establish that he was attempting to stay out of trouble while incarcerated and that he was and intended to continue to be a good influence on his son and his nephew from prison. By presenting such evidence, Higgs opened the door to the subject of his staying out of trouble in prison and the evidence of Higgs’s numerous infractions of prison rules at various facilities was reasonably tailored to refute the image Higgs attempted to create in mitigation. In addition, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction prior to admission of the evidence, informing them that the rebuttal evidence could only be considered by [them] insofar as it may rebut the mitigating factors that ha[d] been specified by the defendant and was not to be considered by [the jury] for any other purpose. J.A. 1835. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the rebuttal evidence. F. The Penalty Phase Summation Higgs next contends that the government engaged in improper argument during its penalty phase summation and rebuttal that deprived Higgs of a fair sentencing hearing. Specifically, Higgs claims that the prosecutor (1) improperly argued that the jurors were required by the law and their oath to impose a sentence of death, (2) improperly argued that Higgs was more culpable than Haynes for what occurred that night and that the jury should disregard the equally culpable mitigating factor argued by the defense, (3) improperly argued that the jury could not consider mercy in rendering its decision, (4) improperly interjected her personal opinion of Higgs and the verdict in her argument, and (5) improperly argued that Higgs would lead a soft life in prison if not executed. Improper remarks during closing argument do not always mandate retrial. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. United States v. Mitchell, 1 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to obtain a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, Higgs must demonstrate (1) that the government’s remarks were in fact improper and (2) that the remarks prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Id. (internal quota66 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS tion marks omitted). In evaluating prejudice, a number of factors should be considered: (1) the degree to which the prosecutor’s remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters. Id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, [t]he issue of whether improper argument by government counsel has so prejudiced the trial process as to require reversal must be gauged from the facts of each trial. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 1. The Jurors’ Duty to Impose Death Higgs’s first claim of prosecutorial misconduct, that the government improperly argued that the jurors were required by their oath and law to impose the death penalty, is without merit. In support of this claim, Higgs points to a number of statements in which the government reminds the jury of its oath to impose the death sentence if justified by the facts and the court’s instructions and to the government’s argument that the death penalty is the only just resolution of the case. The government’s arguments strongly urged imposition of the death penalty given the egregious nature of the murders. However, they did not contradict the instructions given by the trial court regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances or exceed the bounds of proper argument concerning the propriety of imposing the sentence under those instructions. Nor, in any event, would we conclude that the comments so prejudiced the trial process as to require reversal. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The complained-of comments were isolated, did not rise to the level of argument that might mislead or inflame the jury concerning its duty or divert it from its task, and were made in the context of a case involving compelling evidence of numerous aggravating factors. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 67 2. The Equal Culpability Factor We also reject Higgs’s contention that the prosecution improperly argued that Higgs was more culpable than Haynes for what occurred that night and that the jury should disregard the equally culpable mitigating factor argued by the defense. The first claim essentially repeats Higgs’s argument that the government impermissibly presented contradictory theories of the case in the trials of Haynes and Higgs and, for the reasons previously set forth in the discussion of that issue, is also without merit. The related second claim likewise fails. The government did not tell the jury that it should disregard the proffered mitigating factor, i.e., that Haynes was an equally culpable defendant who received a life sentence. Rather, the government argued that the jury was not required to reach the conclusion that Haynes was equally culpable or otherwise reach the same sentencing result in Higgs’s case as the jury did in Haynes’s case. There was nothing improper about this argument. 3. The Consideration of Mercy Higgs next contends that the government impermissibly made the following argument during summation: [M]ercy is not what this case is about. Mercy is not in the instructions. It is not something you do in this case. Put aside all of those things. J.A. 2037. Higgs contends that this statement was improper because it misrepresented and misstated the law concerning capital sentencing. The district court instructed the jury that, regardless of the findings on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the death penalty was not required to be imposed. In a nutshell, Higgs argues that mercy is always an implicit sentencing consideration, and that the government improperly argued that the jury should set aside such a consideration. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(a)(8); Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549, 155557 (11th Cir. 1993). Higgs correctly argues that the jury is empowered to show mercy to reject a death sentence. Here, the prosecutor appropriately argued 68 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS that mercy is not what this case is about and that the jury should [p]ut aside all of those things. J.A. 2037. However, the prosecutor’s statements that mercy is not in the instructions, and not something you do in this case (as opposed to not something it should do) arguably crossed into an argument in contradiction of the district court’s instructions. However, we need not definitively determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper. Even if Higgs could demonstrate that the comments amounted to error, they did not prejudicially affect Higgs’s substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair trial. The challenged remarks amounted to isolated statements in a lengthy closing argument. There is no indication that the comments were made to confuse or mislead the jury, and the district court explicitly instructed the jury that it need not impose the death sentence regardless of the findings on mitigation and aggravation. See J.A. 1996 (Even if you find that all of the aggravating factors are established beyond a reasonable doubt and that none of you ha[ve] [found] that any mitigation has been established at all, you still have the right to decide against the death penalty in the case. . . .). 4. The Expression of Personal Opinion Higgs next argues that the prosecutor improperly injected her personal opinion about Higgs by repeatedly using the personal pronoun I. In particular, Higgs objects to the following statement from the conclusion of the prosecutor’s argument: I keep coming back to these beautiful young women and I look at them and I can’t believe . . . Mr. Higgs has caused this hell for so many people, that he has ruined so many lives with his actions and the way he has chosen to live his life. I have to think, ladies and gentlemen, this world would have been a better place without Dustin Higgs. The hard truth is, ladies and gentlemen, it would be a better world in the future without Dustin Higgs. J.A. 1982. As a general premise, a prosecutor’s repeated references to his or her personal opinion about a defendant may indeed be found improper. See Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 328-329 (4th Cir. 1998). UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 69 However, a prosecutor’s use [of] the phrase ‘I think’ in an innocuous, conversational sense does not violate due process because such use do[es] not suggest an attempt to replace the evidence with the prosecutor’s personal judgments. United States v. Adam, 70 F.3d 776, 780 (4th Cir. 1995). Prosecutors must remain mindful to avoid the expression of personal opinions. However, in this case, the prosecutor’s statements did not so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Mitchell, 1 F.3d at 240.
We summarily reject Higgs’s final claim that the government improperly argued that life imprisonment would be soft because Higgs could go to school, have a job, establish friendships, talk on the phone to his friends and family, eat food, watch television, read the newspaper, and generally establish a life within the prison community. We find no impropriety in the government’s argument, much of which followed similar, but opposing, notions argued by Higgs that life in prison meant life in a high security place of confinement where Higgs would be continuously monitored. In any event, we would not grant him relief. The remarks did not so prejudicially affect Higgs’s substantial rights so as to deprive him of a fair sentencing hearing. G. Passion and Prejudice The FDPA requires us to consider whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3595(c)(1), in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. In undertaking this duty, we look to the record to see if these factors motivated the jury’s recommendation of the death penalty, including an analysis of the aggravating factors to see if the jury had an abundance of evidence to support imposition of the death penalty. Barnette, 211 F.3d at 821. Higgs argues that the emotional content of this case was so extreme as to render his death sentences invalid under this provision. We disagree. We find no basis upon which to conclude that the jury imposed the death penalty under improper influence. [W]hile [death penalty] proceedings must be free from passion, prejudice, and other arbitrary factors, a death penalty case will not be emotionless. Id. Here, we find no indication that 70 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS the jury was swayed by emotion rather than reason in deciding to impose the sentences of death upon Higgs. H. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Higgs preserves for appellate review his argument that the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment under all circumstances and, therefore, violates the Eight Amendment. As acknowledged by Higgs, this argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 300-03; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187; Jones, 132 F.3d at 242.