Opinion ID: 2520995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meritor decision

Text: In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 ( Meritor ), an employee brought an action in federal district court under Title VII against her employer, seeking damages for sexual discrimination. At the trial, she testified that her supervisor had made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, had fondled her in front of other employees, had exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions. ( Meritor, supra, at p. 60, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) She admitted that she had never reported the supervisor's conduct to any of his superiors and had never tried to use the employer's complaint procedures. ( Id. at p. 61, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) The federal district court denied relief. Of relevance here, the district court relied both on a conclusion that the employee's relationship with the supervisor was `a voluntary one having nothing to do with her continued employment ... or her advancement or promotions' and on the employee's failure to report the supervisor's conduct to any of his superiors or to use the employer's complaint procedures. ( Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 61, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) The United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment ( Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 66, 106 S.Ct. 2399), if the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive `to alter the condition of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment' ( id. at p. 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399). It rejected the argument that an employee suing under Title VII for sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment must prove a resulting economic loss. ( Meritor, at pp. 67-68, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) It also found that in determining whether the supervisor's sexual advances had constituted harassment prohibited by Title VII, [t]he correct inquiry is whether [the employee] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary. ( Meritor, at p. 68, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) The United States Supreme Court declined to issue a definitive rule on employer liability, but it noted that Congress' decision to define `employer' to include any `agent' of an employer, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held responsible. ( Meritor, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 72, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) It added, however, that absence of notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate that employer from liability. ( Ibid. ) The court identified a flaw in the employer's grievance procedure that could explain the employee's failure to use it. The employer's grievance procedure apparently required an employee to complain first to her supervisor, who in this instance was the alleged perpetrator of the harassment. ( Id. at p. 73, 106 S.Ct. 2399.) As the court remarked: [The employer's] contention that [the employee's] failure should insulate it from liability might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to encourage victims of harassment to come forward. ( Ibid. )