Opinion ID: 1201607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Christensen Requirements for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Text: After the Court of Appeal rendered its decision, we issued our opinion in Christensen v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d 868 (hereafter Christensen ), and asked the parties to address the impact of that opinion on the award of compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress in this case. As we will explain, it is questionable whether the record here supports a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress by Firestone. (9) The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: `(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.... Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.' [Citation.] The defendant must have engaged in `conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.' [Citation.] ( Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903.) In Christensen, supra, we held that `[t]he law limits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant.' [Citation.] The only exception to this rule is that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with reckless disregard, of the plaintiff and the probability that his or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress to that plaintiff. [Citations.] Where reckless disregard of the plaintiff's interests is the theory of recovery, the presence of the plaintiff at the time the outrageous conduct occurs is recognized as the element establishing a higher degree of culpability which, in turn, justifies recovery of greater damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than allowed on a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. [Citation.] ( Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 905-906, italics in original, fn. omitted.) (10) Thus, [i]t is not enough that the conduct be intentional and outrageous. It must be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is aware.  ( Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 903, italics added.) The requirement that the defendant's conduct be directed primarily at the plaintiff is a factor which distinguishes intentional infliction of emotional distress from the negligent infliction of such injury. ( Id., at p. 904; see Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159, 165, fn. 5 [216 Cal. Rptr. 661, 703 P.2d 1].) (11a) In this case, it is ambiguous whether the lower courts determined that Firestone's conduct was directed at these particular plaintiffs in the sense intended by Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 903-906. Although the Court of Appeal correctly rejected Firestone's contention that Firestone was not liable because it did not know the particular names of any individual whose groundwater was contaminated by the hazardous waste, it is unclear whether it believed that Firestone was actually aware of the presence of these particular plaintiffs and their consumption and use of the water. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the trial court made a finding that Firestone possessed the requisite knowledge, and if so, whether such a finding would be supported by substantial evidence. [22] Although the trial court concluded that Firestone had to realize that the eventual discovery of the toxic contamination by those drinking the contaminated water would almost certainly result in their suffering severe emotional distress, this may be interpreted in one of two ways. First, this may have been a finding that Firestone actually knew of these particular plaintiffs and their consumption of the water, and nevertheless sent prohibited wastes to Crazy Horse despite a realization that plaintiffs would almost certainly suffer severe emotional distress upon their discovery of the facts. Alternatively, this may have been a finding that Firestone had to have realized that its misconduct was almost certain to cause severe emotional distress to any person who might foreseeably consume the water and subsequently discover the facts. Although the knowledge requirement is met under the first interpretation of the court's ruling, it is not satisfied under the second because knowledge of these particular plaintiffs is lacking. This conclusion is consistent with the result reached in Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d 868, itself. There we held that, even though it was alleged that defendants' conduct in mishandling the remains of deceased persons was intentional and outrageous and was substantially certain to cause extreme emotional distress to relatives and close friends of the deceased, the plaintiffs' cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not sufficiently supported where there was no allegation that the defendants' misconduct was directed primarily at plaintiffs, or that it was calculated to cause them severe emotional distress, or that it was done with knowledge of their presence and with a substantial certainty that they would suffer severe emotional injury. ( Christensen, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 903, 906.)