Opinion ID: 2104630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Construction of Present Statute

Text: Section 5933 was amended in 1981 to strike the sentence added by the 1975 amendment and substitute the following: Whenever an officer or employee of the State, including those exempt from the classified service, qualifies for workmen's compensation benefits, such officer or employee, for a period not to exceed 3 months from the date such compensation begins, shall not be charged sick leave and shall receive from the State the difference, if any, between the total of: (1) The amount of such compensation, (2) any disability benefits received under the Federal Social Security Act, and (3) any other employer supported disability program, and the amount of wages to which the officer or employee is entitled on the date such compensation begins, provided the injury or disease for which such compensation is paid is not the direct result of such officer or employee's misconduct and occurs during a period of employment for which the employee is entitled to receive wages. (emphasis added). The language of the 1981 amendment was referred to by this Court in Lillard and is the subject of the case sub judice. In Lillard, this Court recognized that [s]tatutory language, where possible, should be accorded its plain meaning. State v. Lillard, 531 A.2d at 617. This principle of construction is well established in Delaware: It is fundamental that the Courts ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly as clearly expressed in the language of a statute. A & P Stores v. Hannigan, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 641 (1976); Keys v. State, Del. Supr., 337 A.2d 18 (1975). There is judicial discretion to construe a statute when its language is obscure and ambiguous, Balma v. Tidewater Oil Co., Del.Supr., 214 A.2d 560 (1965); but when no ambiguity exists, and the intent is clear from the language of the statute, there is no room for statutory interpretation or construction. Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp., Del.Supr., 449 A.2d 232, 238 (1982), The Superior Court found that Section 5933(a) was ambiguous. The Superior Court opined that the significant statutory language was whenever an ... employee... qualifies for workmen's compensation... for a period not to exceed 3 months from the date such compensation begins.... 29 Del.C. § 5933(a). According to the Superior Court, that language was not so clear that the processes of interpretation need not be applied. After concluding that the language of Section 5933(a) was ambiguous, the Superior Court interpreted the statute. The Superior Court determined that when Section 5933(a) was amended in 1981, the General Assembly intended an eligible State employee to receive salary supplementation benefits for up to three months from the date of the work-related injury. The Superior Court also determined that the General Assembly intended an otherwise eligible State employee to receive salary supplementation benefits for only one three-month period for each injury. This Court finds that the language of Section 5933(a) is clear and unambiguous. We agree that the pertinent part of Section 5933(a) is the language which provides that a State employee is entitled to receive salary supplementation benefits  whenever an employee ... qualifies for workmen's compensation benefits ... for a period not to exceed 3 months from the date such compensation begins.... However, in the absence of any ambiguity, the Superior Court erred in construing or interpreting that language in the statute. The plain language of Section 5933(a) states that certain State employees are entitled to salary supplementation benefits, for a period not to exceed 3 months,  whenever  they qualif[y] for workmen's compensation. There is no language in Section 5933(a) limiting that unambiguous mandate. If the Delaware General Assembly had intended that only one three-month period of salary supplementation benefits was available for any given injury, it could easily have said so. [3] The precision with which the General Assembly has amended Section 5933(a) precludes a judicial interpretation of any legislative intent other than that which is expressed in the plain language of the statute. General Motors Corp. v. Burgess, Del.Supr., 545 A.2d 1186 (1988).