Opinion ID: 2085062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Arbitrariness of New York's Death Penalty Statute Racial Discrimination

Text: It is a sad and ugly badge of shame that the imposition of death in this country has been tainted with racial prejudice. It is no coincidence that when the Supreme Court in Furman v Georgia (408 US 238 [1972]) declared that the death penalty as then enacted constituted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Constitution, the three defendants in the case were Black. The Court's opinion is terse, but the opinions of the individual Justices make the case one of the longest in the United States Reports. The first of the opinions is that of Justice Douglas, who concluded that [t]hose who wrote the Eighth Amendment knew what price their forebears had paid for a system based, not on equal justice, but on discrimination. In those days the target was not the blacks or the poor, but the dissenters . . . [W]e know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively applied feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised, and lacking political clout, or if he is a member of a suspect or unpopular minority, and saving those who by social position may be in a more protected position ( id. at 255). Examining the raw numbers of those executed, Justice Marshall noted that Negroes were executed far more often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population. ( Id. at 364.) He then added that [s]tudies indicate that while the higher rate of execution among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of racial discrimination ( id. ). Although concluding that racial discrimination in the cases before the Court was not established, Justice Stewart referred to Justices Douglas's and Justice Marshall's demonstrat[ion] that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race ( id. at 310). Although Justice Brennan did not mention race, he concluded that the death penalty did not comport[ ] with human dignity because of, among other things, the strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily ( id. at 305). Similarly, Justice White concluded that the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not. ( Id. at 313.) Furman represents, to varying degrees, a certain distrust of jurors' ability to consistently make rational and nondiscriminatory judgments as to which defendants are deserving of the ultimate punishment. Just one year before Furman, the Court had held, in McGautha v California (402 US 183, 207 [1971]), that [i]n light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. To Justice Marshall, one of the dissenters in McGautha, the holding was an open invitation to discrimination ( Furman, 408 US at 365). In his dissenting opinion in Furman, Chief Justice Burger stressed the assumption underlying the McGautha ruling is that juries `will act with due regard for the consequences of their decision' ( Furman, 408 US at 387-388). He added that jurors are the conscience of the community ( id. at 388) and that to assume from the mere fact of relative infrequency that only a random assortment of pariahs are sentenced to death, is to cast grave doubt on the basic integrity of our jury system ( id. at 388-389). Chief Justice Burger did seem to concede that the studies presented to the Court showed that jurors had discriminated in imposing death, but he brushed them aside by noting that they cover[ed] periods when Negroes were systematically excluded from jury service and when racial segregation was the official policy in many States ( id. at 389 n 12). Justice Powell, the author of another dissenting opinion, also conceded that the death penalty had been applied in a discriminatory manner in the past, but concluded that this did not justify invalidating death penalty sentences in all cases in which sentences were handed out to members of the class discriminated against. ( Id. at 450.) Expressing a rather optimistic view, he stated that [t]he possibility of racial bias in the trial and sentencing process has diminished in recent years ( id. ). Four years later, in Gregg v Georgia (428 US 153, 198 [1976]), the Court condoned Georgia's revised sentencing procedures in death penalty cases because jurors were required to make specific findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant. In addition, the Georgia Supreme Court was required to compare a sentence to other similarly situated defendants to ensure that it was not disproportionate. Although the Court did not focus on race, it is fair to say that, in light of Furman, the purpose of limiting jury discretion was to ensure that it would not be exercised in a discriminatory manner. One would expect then that after Furman and Gregg, there would be a change in the statistical landscape of those who are subjected to the death penalty and those who are not. It has not occurred. The jury discretion limits imposed by Georgia in 1972, after Furman, did not have an immediate profound effect on the collective racial consciousness of Georgia jurors. This was shown by an academic study spearheaded by Professor David C. Baldus which analyzed data on about 2,500 homicides committed in Georgia from 1973 to 1979. Taking into account 230 nonracial variables, Professor Baldus made the following findings, as noted by the Supreme Court in McCleskey v Kemp (481 US 279 [1987]): [T]he death penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 1% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims. Similarly, Baldus found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims. ( McCleskey at 286-287.) The numbers seem to make clear that in a significant number of cases, the taking of a White life by a Black defendant deserved a harsher punishment, namely death, than any other type of case. By a slim majority, the Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's equal protection and Eighth Amendment challenges to the Georgia statute. Of course, McCleskey could not prove directly that the jurors who sentenced him to death did so because of his race. But he relied on the study to show an inference of discrimination in cases involving White victims and Black defendants. As in Furman, the argument was a salvo aimed at jury discretion, the heart of the criminal justice system. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court rejected the argument by finding as follows: Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in this case also counsels against adopting such an inference from the disparities indicated by the Baldus study. Accordingly, we hold that the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's case acted with discriminatory purpose (481 US at 297). Addressing jury and prosecutorial discretion in the context of the Eighth Amendment challenge, the Court found that: [w]here the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process. ( McCleskey at 313.) The Court also stated that an acceptance of McCleskey's claim would place into jeopardy cases not involving race and noncapital cases. For example, the Court reasoned, unattractive people could make an argument similar to that of McCleskey. Finally, the Court ended with the caution that McCleskey, or rather those who supported his arguments, should appeal to the legislatures. It is noteworthy that Furman, Gregg, and McCleskey all dealt with Georgia defendants. The Court in Furman analyzed data from the entire nation, while Gregg and McCleskey were limited to Georgia defendants. While many other states do not share the same legacy of institutional racism common to Georgia ( see McCleskey, 481 US at 328-330 [dissenting op of Brennan, J.]) and the rest of the South, when it comes to the application of the death penalty, Georgia and the other states with death penalty statutes are not so far apart. That much can be gathered from a report, entitled Death Penalty Sentencing: Research Indicates Pattern of Racial Disparities, prepared by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), an independent and nonpartisan agency, pursuant to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (Pub L 100-690). [10] The report evaluated 28 carefully selected studies covering the period of post- Furman to 1988. The report undertook this approach because of the availability of both . . . sufficient quality and quantity [of research concerning discrimination] to warrant the evaluation synthesis approach (at 2). The synthesis showed a pattern of evidence indicating racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, and imposition of the death penalty. (At 5.) With respect to the race of the victim, the evidence was clear: In 82 percent of the studies, race of victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or receiving the death penalty, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death than those who murdered blacks. This finding was remarkably consistent across data sets, states, data collection methods, and analytic techniques. . . . The evidence for the race of victim influence was stronger for the earlier stages of the judicial process (e.g., prosecutorial decision to charge defendant with a capital offense, decision to proceed to trial rather than plea bargain) than in later stages. This was because the earlier stages were comprised of larger samples allowing for more rigorous analyses. However, decisions made at every stage of the process necessarily affect an individual's likelihood of being sentenced to death. .. . The analyses show that after controlling statistically for legally relevant variables and other factors thought to influence death penalty sentencing (e.g., region, jurisdiction), differences remain in the likelihood of receiving the death penalty based on race of victim (at 5-6). With respect to the race of the defendant, the findings were not as clear cut. The report determined that more than half of the studies found that race of defendant influenced the likelihood of being charged with a capital crime or receiving the death penalty, and that three fourths of these studies found that black defendants were more likely to receive the death penalty. (At 6.) The report cautioned, however, that the relationship between race and outcome was complex. For example, in rural areas Black defendants were more likely to receive death sentences, but in urban areas White defendants were more likely to receive death sentences. A few studies revealed that the black defendant/white victim combination was the most likely to receive the death penalty. (At 6.) The GAO report is now 15 years old. Since its publication, a number of additional studies have been prepared. Many of these studies have concluded that race, whether of the victim or the defendant, or both, plays a role in the imposition of the death penalty. [11] Others have found no statistically significant evidence that race plays a role in capital sentencing. [12] The GAO report did not include New York. While the imposition of the death penalty in New York is older than the state itself, [13] the last execution took place in 1963, several years before Furman. When the death penalty was in place, New York was often a leader in the number of executions carried out. [14] Unlike Georgia, however, New York has often been a leader in enacting legislation prohibiting discrimination. [15] Yet New York is no less deserving of a badge of shame for the role race has played in capital punishment. An analysis of those executed from 1888, the year capital punishment was centralized, to 1963, reveals the following: [W]hile in the 1920s Blacks comprised only 1.9% of New York's population, they represented 14% of those executed. Similarly, during the 1930s the Black population in New York accounted for only 3.28% of all New York residents, yet Black men constituted 17% of all persons executed during this time. . . . By the 1960s, Black people comprised 80% of all capital defendants executed in New York while representing only 8.45% of the state's population. [16] As to the makeup of the race of the victims, the statistics are not much different. In 90.4% of the cases resulting in executions in New York since 1890, the victims were White. On the other hand, only 6.3% of the victims were Black and 3.3% . . . were from other racial groups. [17] Moreover, [w]hile there have been ninety-six cases where a Black person was executed for killing a White person (14% of all cases), there has been only a single case in New York where a White person was executed for killing a Black person (0.1% of all cases). [18] The foregoing numbers, of course, involve a time before Furman. As the People point out, the current death penalty statute contains numerous safeguards against racial discrimination. During voir dire, parties may question jurors on the possibility of racial bias (CPL 270.16 [1]). Upon a conviction of first degree murder, but before the sentencing stage, the court must determine whether any juror has a state of mind that is likely to preclude the juror from rendering an impartial decision based upon the evidence adduced during the proceeding (CPL 400.27 [2]). On direct appeal, this Court must determine whether the sentence was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary or legally impermissible factor including whether the imposition of the verdict or sentence was based upon the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime (CPL 470.30 [3] [a]). Similarly, in determining whether the sentence was excessive or disproportionate in comparison to other cases, the Court must, if requested by the defendant, review whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases by virtue of the race of the defendant or a victim of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. (CPL 470.30 [3] [b].) Yet, it is questionable whether racial prejudice can really be extirpated from capital proceedings. It is undeniable that racial prejudice is alive in many aspects of society, and no one expects it to die any time soon. There are numerous laws and agencies charged with stamping out discrimination from employment, housing and public accommodation. Yet, discrimination in those areas continues. The criminal justice system, of course, is supposed to be different. Prominently carved on top of the United States Supreme Court building are the powerful words Equal Justice Under Law. But we must acknowledge that equality under the law is an ideal the system strives for, not a reality. Despite the well-established mass of jurisprudence, from Congress, the New York State Legislature, the United States Supreme Court, and this Court, prohibiting discrimination in the criminal justice system, as recently as 1988, a study conducted by the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, established by the then-Chief Judge of this Court, concluded that there are two justice systems at work in the courts of New York State, one for Whites, and a very different one for minorities and the poor. The system serving most minorities does not conform to our society's notion of individualized justice, of hallowed halls, of impartial, reflective decision-making. Many minorities in our courts receive `basement justice' in every sense of the phrase . . . [I]nequality, disparate treatment and injustice remain hallmarks of our state justice system. Moreover, a study by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, entitled Disparities in Processing Felony Arrests in New York State, 1990-1992, concluded that similarly situated minorities and Whites were not treated equally, with the former held in jail on indictment and sentenced to incarceration more often, particularly in counties outside of New York City. There is no doubt that conditions have improved, but try as it might, the justice system cannot immunize itself against racial prejudice. At the heart of the system are jurors with a great deal of discretion. It is probably the case that no safeguards are needed to ensure that many jurors exercise their discretion in a nondiscriminatory manner. But how many jurors who hold views determined largely by race, which can range from virulent to latent, will publicly acknowledge their views during voir dire? And can it be said that such jurors who sit in judgment of minority defendants will invariably put their views aside and decide the case on the law? Can the justice system realistically protect minority defendants against jurors who hold these views? [19] In noncapital cases, the claims that sentencing determinations were race-influenced are generally not pursued or investigated. But should the danger be tolerated in cases where the penalty is death? Does the need to have the death penalty as a punishment outweigh the danger that it will be applied in a discriminatory manner? Are the efforts of the Legislature to insure that a death sentence will not be imposed because of race sufficient in light of the history of capital punishment in New York State? Under McCleskey, the importance of jury discretion outweighs the danger that it could be used in a discriminatory manner. Although the Supreme Court has said that death is different, in McCleskey it made no distinction between death and other penalties. [20] Another ignored imperfection of the criminal justice system is a difference in the treatment of similarly situated defendants that results from prosecutorial discretion. Like jurors, prosecutors can use their broad discretion ( United States v Goodwin, 457 US 368 [1982]) in a discriminatory manner. While it may not be difficult to imagine a juror whose vote for death may be tainted by views on race, it jars the mind to think that the race of a defendant or victim would influence a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty. The difficulty is diminished, however, if determinative views on race, whether blatant or latent, exist in the collective consciousness of the community that elected the prosecutor. The Supreme Court has had to repeatedly state[ ] that prosecutorial discretion cannot be exercised on the basis of race ( McCleskey, 481 US at 309 n 30). Perhaps the most prominent example of a curb on prosecutorial discretion in order to protect minority defendants is Batson v Kentucky (476 US 79 [1986]) which held that prosecutors may not exclude jurors on account of race. Up until then, prosecutors had the unfettered discretion to peremptorily exclude jurors without having to offer any reasons. After Batson, upon a defendant's showing of a prima facie case of discrimination, a prosecutor must offer race-neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge to a juror. If prosecutorspublic officialsnever used their discretion to discriminate, Batson would not be needed. The important interests served by peremptory challenges gave way to the need to ensure that prospective jurors are not excluded based on race. While a prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty is limited by the nature of the crime, within the class of death-eligible homicides (first degree murders as defined in Penal Law § 125.27), prosecutors retain broad discretion. There is no safeguard to ensure that race plays no role in the decision to seek the death penalty. In addition, other factors, such as the availability of the resources to prosecute a death penalty case, may also play a role. When the death penalty is sought against a defendant in one county, but not against a similarly situated defendant in another county, the decision as to who gets the death penalty may be said to be arbitrary. The death penalty statute does not prohibit this kind of arbitrariness. It must be acknowledged that so far there is no apparent indication that the race of the defendant has played a role in the determination to seek the death penalty in New York under the present statute. According to raw numbers compiled by the New York Capital Defender Office, from 1995 to 2001, district attorneys across the state filed death notices in 43 cases. [21] Nineteen of those cases involved Black defendants, who were a subgroup of the larger group of about 194 Black defendants who were indicted for first degree murder. The number of White defendants against whom a death notice was filed was 18, although the larger group of eligible defendants was about 65. The race of the victims, however, is a different matter. Of the 43 cases in which prosecutors sought the death penalty, 21 (or 48.8%) of the victims were White, while only 11 (or 25.6%) were Black. Thus, of the victims of defendants charged with first degree murder whose race is known, the number of Black victims is half the number of White victims. Concededly, these are raw numbers, but they are startling nevertheless. The numbers for geographic disparities are even more startling: Although upstate counties experience approximately 19% of all homicides, they nonetheless account for 61% of all capital prosecutions. ( Id. ) The question in death penalty cases is whether the New York State Constitution should provide more protection against the risk of racial discrimination than McCleskey. Historically, the New York Constitution has at times provided greater guarantees for individuals than those provided by the Federal Constitution ( People v Scott, 79 NY2d 474, 491 [1992]; People v Bora, 83 NY2d 531, 535 [1994]; People v Harris, 77 NY2d 434, 437-441 [1991]; People v Torres, 74 NY2d 224, 226 [1989] People v Griminger, 71 NY2d 635, 637-639 [1988]; People v P.J. Video, Inc., 68 NY2d 296, 304 n 4 [1986]). As this Court stated in People v Barber (289 NY 378, 384 [1943]): [I]n determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of fundamental rights of the individual in the Constitution of the State of New York, this court is bound to exercise its independent judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the Constitution of the United States. ( See also People v Alvarez, 70 NY2d 375, 379 [1987]; Sharrock v Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 NY2d 152, 159 [1978].) New York must remain committed to the ideal of equality under the law. A defendant should not have to show direct evidence of discrimination, as effectively required by McCleskey. While the administration of the death penalty in New York was tainted with racial and ethnic bias, and minorities have not always received equal justice, New York has been particularly steadfast in its condemnation of racial discrimination. Both the Federal and State Constitutions prohibit the denial of equal protection. Article I, § 11 of the New York Constitution provides as follows: No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof. No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of the state. Under the New York State Constitution, the death penalty cannot be imposed if the risk that race played a role in its imposition is significant. Thus, I conclude, along with Judge Ciparick, that the deadlock jury instruction required by CPL 400.27 (10) is coercive and unconstitutional. While I make no determination on the issue of the arbitrariness of the death penalty, I conclude that before a death sentence can be imposed, the issue must be addressed and resolved. GRAFFEO, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with Point I of the majority's opinion. But I believe the jury's determination of James Cahill's guilt of murder in the first degree, based on two statutory aggravating factorsfelony murder ( see Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [vii]) and witness elimination ( see Penal Law § 125.27 [1] [a] [v])should be upheld. In my view, a majority of this Court now rewrites the first-degree felony-murder statute in a manner contrary to the plain language of the provision and clear public policy enacted into law by our elected representatives. Equally disturbing, the majority concludes that the witness elimination murder charge was supported by sufficient proof, yet reverses that conviction without explaining why the jury, which had the ability to assess the credibility of witnesses, could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt thatregardless of whatever else motivated defendanthe intended to eliminate Jill Cahill as a potential witness. In addition, I cannot agree with the majority that the trial court erred in life and death qualification of the prospective jurors and fully concur with Judge Read's jury selection analysis. I therefore dissent from so much of the majority decision that overturns defendant's first-degree murder convictions.