Opinion ID: 2585033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CFEC Acted Within Its Statutory Authority when It Combined the Pre-Moratorium 1996 Geoduck Fishery Opening and the 1995 Calendar Year.

Text: Wilber's central argument in this case is that the legislature's use of the term year in AS 16.43.250 limits CFEC to measuring past participation in twelve-month increments. Wilber argues that the meaning of the term year is plain, and that CFEC has failed to offer any evidence of legislative intent or judicial construction that would permit departing from that plain meaning. Wilber argues that CFEC's authority to choose among the AS 16.43.250 hardship factors does not include the authority to modify those factors. Finally, Wilber argues that CFEC's interpretation of year in this case is contrary to its other regulations and normal practice. CFEC maintains that year is subject to different interpretations, many of which exceed 365 days. CFEC argues that it also has broad discretion to assess hardship as required by AS 16.43.250, and that its decision in this case falls well within that discretion. CFEC contends specifically that the legislature's amendment of AS 16.43.250(a) in 1985 to use the term when reasonable for the fishery, gave it discretion to craft point systems tailored to the peculiarities of a particular fishery. The superior court held that CFEC's approach was reasonable, in part because the statute affords CFEC broad discretion to account for peculiarities of a fishery. The superior court noted that the regulation gave Wilber credit for his past participation in the fishery, consistent with the statute's purpose, and that nothing about CFEC's approach, including its treatment of the 1995 and 1996 harvests, placed the agency's rule outside of its discretionary authority. We agree with the superior court. The Limited Entry Act's purpose is to promote the conservation and the sustained yield management of Alaska's fishery resource and the economic health and stability of commercial fishing in Alaska by regulating and controlling entry . . . into the commercial fisheries in the public interest and without unjust discrimination. [22] We have held that avoiding unjust discrimination requires ranking applicants for the limited number of permits `according to the degree of hardship which [the fisherman] would suffer by exclusion from the fishery.' [23] The specific moratorium legislation in this case also required that the point system be weighted towards recent participants. [24] These broad purposes are well served by 20 AAC 05.808. CFEC took into account the amount of geoduck caught by divers each year, came up with a ranking system that compared each diver's catch, and awarded more points for those divers who had caught more geoduck in the most recent years preceding the moratorium. Wilber advances a narrow interpretation of the statutory term year, and asserts that the term's meaning constrains CFEC's authority to assess hardship based on past participation. We are not convinced that the legislature intended to tether CFEC's authority in this manner. CFEC's regulation in this case considers both factors by looking at how much geoduck a given diver caught during four different periods: 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995 to July 1, 1996. The last, anomalous category simply measures participation during the 1995 season for all but the nineteen divers who participated in the four-day opening of the fishery in Symonds Bay prior to the 1996 mid-season moratorium. CFEC hence considers a diver's history over a number of years, and it considers the diver's history during each of those years. The regulation gives more points to divers who fished more years, more recently prior to the moratorium, and caught more geoduck. It gives fewer points to divers who fished fewer years, less recently, and caught less geoduck. The regulation thus presents a reasonable, straightforward means of evaluating the economic hardship that would befall individuals excluded from the fishery, consistent with the Limited Entry Act's mandate. [25] The conclusion we draw from our analysis of the text is reinforced by the broad discretion afforded CFEC to craft point systems for measuring hardship. The legislature confirmed this grant of discretion by amending AS 16.43.250 in 1985, following our decision in Rutter v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission. [26] In Rutter, we considered former AS 16.43.250(a), which provided that CFEC was to consider certain enumerated factors in assessing an applicant's degree of economic dependence on  and past participation in  a fishery. [27] We interpreted subsection .250(a) as requiring that CFEC consider all of the statutory factors, and invalidated a CFEC regulation that failed to do so. [28] The legislature responded by amending the statute in 1985 to replace the phrase preceding the enumerated factors  including but not limited to  with the phrase when reasonable for the fishery. [29] The letter of intent accompanying the amending legislation stated that the legislature's intent was to allow CFEC to disregard one or more particular hardship standards when ranking applicants if the standards were unreasonable in light of the particular fishery. [30] The letter further stated: The legislature recognizes that patterns of participation and extent of economic dependence vary from fishery to fishery and intended that, in developing point systems for limited fisheries, [CFEC] should exercise some discretion in how to measure past participation and economic dependence. [31] We revisited our decision in Rutter in a separate case not long after the legislature passed its amendment. In Haynes v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, [32] we recognized that the amendment clearly grants discretion to the CFEC to award points for economic dependence based on less than all four indicia, effectively overruling Rutter.  [33] Wilber points out that the Haynes decision does not give CFEC carte blanche to modify factors under AS 16.43.250 once it has decided to consider them. But this was not the kind of prerogative exercised by CFEC below, nor is it the kind of authority that CFEC argues for on appeal. As CFEC notes, its approach can only be considered a modification if one accepts Wilber's narrow interpretation of AS 16.43.250. We decline to adopt that interpretation, however, because CFEC responded reasonably to the legislature's mid-year moratorium, a situation not expressly contemplated by the statute. This falls well within the discretion envisioned by the legislature in its 1985 amendments to AS 16.43.250, as it enables CFEC to tailor its point system to a unique circumstance of the geoduck fishery. [34] As we have already noted, determining the hardship an individual would suffer from exclusion from a fishery requires both administrative expertise and the formulation of fundamental policy. [35] Not only did CFEC have the broad discretion to create a geoduck fishery point system, it needed to use this discretion because the legislature's imposition of a moratorium in the middle of a year was unusual. Though Wilber notes that CFEC has not combined calendar years in other point systems, he fails to cite examples where the legislature has imposed the type of mid-year moratorium that occurred here. The other point systems created by CFEC in response to the legislature's dive fishery moratorium were also necessarily unusual. [36] In light of the unusual circumstances presented to it, CFEC created a valid point system for measuring hardship in the geoduck fishery, and acted well within its broad discretion under the Limited Entry Act.