Opinion ID: 1243559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence and defendant's continuous state of unlawfully remaining over. Defendant was charged with first-degree burglary under two theories:

Text: (1) that Dible entered his former girlfriend's, Sundy's, residence uninvited with intent to commit an assault on one or more of the residents therein, Sundy and Melissa; and, in the alternative, (2) that Dible remained over in Sundy's residence with intent to commit an assault and intentionally inflicting bodily injury on the residents in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3. Burglary is defined in Iowa Code section 713.1. That section provides: Any person, having the intent to commit a felony, assault or theft therein, who having no right, license or privilege to do so, enters an occupied structure, such occupied structure not being open to the public, or who remains therein after it is closed to the public or after the person's right, license or privilege to be there has expired, or any person having such intent who breaks an occupied structure, commits burglary. (Emphasis added.) One commits burglary in the first degree, if among other alternatives, one intentionally or recklessly inflicts bodily injury on any person. Id. § 713.3. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that at the time he remained over at Sundy's residence he had the specific intent to commit an assault. Defendant contends that he first decided to remain over when Sundy and then Melissa asked him to leave and that only later, when Sundy was telephoning 911, he formed the intent to commit an assault. He argues that without evidence that his decision to remain over and his formation of an intent to assault occurred contemporaneously, his first-degree burglary conviction cannot stand. The State disagrees with defendant and rejects his argument as being based on the invalid premise that remaining over is confined to that exact moment when a defendant's right, license, or permission to be on the premises terminates and the defendant makes the decision not to leave the premises. The State counters with a different interpretation of the legal standard set forth in the statute, arguing that remaining over is a continuous state which begins at the moment a defendant decides to unlawfully remain on the premises and ends only when the defendant actually leaves the premises. During that time, the State contends, a defendant makes a continuous decision to stay on the premises unlawfully. If, at any point on this continuum, a defendant forms the intent to remain on the premises with the intent to commit an assault or theft, at that point, the defendant commits burglary. Like the trial court, we find the State's argument persuasive. The statute does not contemplate the defendant's decision to remain as occurring at a specific point in time. See Iowa Code § 713.1. Rather, the statute contemplates the decision as a continuous event, beginning when a defendant determines to unlawfully remain on the premises and ending when the defendant leaves the premises. Cf. State v. Franklin, 368 N.W.2d 716, 719-20 (Iowa 1985) (defendant convicted of having requisite intent to commit first-degree burglary by picking up machete after entering an occupied structure); State v. Riley, 454 N.W.2d 595, 596 (Iowa App.1990) (defendant convicted of having requisite intent to commit both burglary in the first degree and sexual abuse after breaking into victim's home carrying a hammer). One commentary indicates the language of Iowa's burglary statute supports the State's argument that remaining over occurs over a continuum of time: [W]ill the [S]tate have to prove that [the defendant] formed the necessary intent at the time his presence in the place became unlawful, or will it be sufficient to prove that at some time while he was unlawfully present he formed the intent ... to commit an assault? The [statutory] language suggests the latter. John L. Yeager & Ronald L. Carlson, 4 Iowa Practice, Criminal Law & Procedure § 294 (1979). Viewed in this manner, Dible's decision to remain may have begun when he refused to comply with Sundy and Melissa's request that he leave, but it remained intact from the time he returned to the kitchen up until the time he left Sundy's home. Because he also formed an intent to assault when he returned to the kitchen, Dible satisfied the statute's contemporaneous intent requirement: he was remaining over and doing so with the intent to commit an assault. Defendant disagrees with this interpretation of the statute and urges us to follow two New York decisions, People v. Gaines, 74 N.Y.2d 358, 547 N.Y.S.2d 620, 546 N.E.2d 913 (1980) and People v. Konikov, 160 A.D.2d 146, 559 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1990). Without unduly extending this opinion, we conclude these cases are factually distinguishable and not persuasive here for defendant. III. Ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Next, defendant claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his federal and state constitutional right to counsel. Specifically, he asserts that his trial attorney had several conflicts of interest and breached numerous essential duties in violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. Because the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion for new trial concerning this matter and made extensive findings of fact, we review defendant's ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal. See State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). Upon our de novo review, we conclude that defendant's ineffective assistance claim lacks merit because defendant has failed to meet his burden of proof. A. Scope of review. Defendant has alleged a violation of constitutional rights. Therefore, we must make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. Id. This is tantamount to a de novo review. Id. We have recently set forth the general principles guiding our review of an ineffective assistance claim in Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d at 739, so we do not repeat them all here. We do reiterate that a presumption exists that counsel is competent and that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance. Id. Defendant must overcome this presumption and has the burden of establishing ineffective assistance. Id. As we stated in Hepperle, to meet this burden defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Id. B. Analysis of the effectiveness of defendant's attorney's representation during trial. Defendant asserts a long list of alleged conflicts of interest and breaches of duty by his trial attorney as follows: Alleged Conflicts of Interest protected complainant's interests rather than defendant's, as demonstrated by the attorney's failure to cross-examine the complainant concerning alleged thefts from the hospital where she worked as a nurse; believed that defendant should be held accountable for his actions, as demonstrated by the attorney's notes; and located evidence, a bent screwdriver and a stick match, used by the prosecution. Alleged Breaches of Duties failed to investigate allegations that the complaining witness stole drugs and medical supplies from her employer; failed to cross-examine the complaining witness regarding her alleged stealing of drugs and equipment from her employer to assist defendant's brother; failed to introduce evidence that the window to complainant's residence appeared to have been broken from the inside; failed to introduce evidence of prior tenant's boyfriend's prior break-in of complainant's residence; failed to introduce evidence of defendant and Sundy's serious, romantic relationship; failed to introduce evidence that a testifying witness was unable to pick defendant from a photo array; failed to introduce sufficient testimony about defendant's presence at Max's on the night of the fire; failed to introduce evidence that the white glove found in defendant's Jeep did not belong to defendant; failed to introduce evidence that Sundy may have planted defendant's glasses at the fire scene; and failed to introduce evidence that others had a motive to commit the crimes. The trial court reviewed each of defendant's assertions and concluded that defendant's trial attorney did not fall below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney. See Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d at 739 (stating the ultimate test for determining whether a defendant has been denied effective assistance of counsel is whether, considering the entire record and all of the circumstances, the attorney's performance was within the range of normal competency). After making individual analyses and conclusions regarding each of defendant's assertions, the trial court stated: Mr. Stenander [defendant's trial attorney] exercised his judgment in representing the defendant and the court does not believe that there was any failure to perform an essential service. I would again emphasize it must be kept in mind that Mr. Stenander made his decisions under very difficult circumstances with respect to [the inconsistent facts and unreliable witnesses presented to him] by the defendant. Therefore, under the first prong of the test stated in Hepperle, we agree with the trial court that Dible failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty during the course of the attorney-client relationship. Turning to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, the trial court easily concluded that not only was there not a reasonable probability that but for the attorney's alleged errors the court would have reached a different verdict, see State v. Hildebrant, 405 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984), but that there was an absolute certainty that the trial attorney's alleged errors did not affect the verdict. [2] In making this conclusion, the trial court stated: I don't think that there wasthat there would be any judge or a jury that would not conclude that the defendant is the one that committed those offenses.... .... If I look at the matter from the point of view of being the trier of the facts, I can state with absolute certainty that none of the evidence which has been presented at this hearing on postconviction motions would have made any difference in the verdicts which were reached. .... [Also, reviewing] it from the point of view of ... the effect upon some other hypothetical finder of fact, [a]gain, the court ... finds that there is no reasonable probability that any of this evidence would have resulted in a different verdict because it really just did not tend to cast doubt upon the facts which were decisive in the verdict in this case. (Emphasis added.) In sum the trial court concluded: [T]he defendant has failed to prove that Mr. Stenander failed to perform an essential service, that his representation was not within the normal realm of competency. [The] [c]ourt also finds that presentation of the evidence which has been presented at this hearing on motions would not have had any reasonable probability of changing the verdict. .... The court is convinced that the defendant received a fair trial with competent counsel in this case. Likewise, we are convinced that defendant had competent representation. Defendant has failed to meet either his burden of proving that his trial attorney breached an essential duty or that he was prejudiced by his attorney's representation. As a result, we affirm the trial court's judgment overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. IV. Disposition. Upon our limited review of defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim, we conclude that substantial evidence supports defendant's conviction of first-degree burglary in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3. Also, upon our de novo review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we conclude that the trial court did not err in holding the defendant received effective representation at trial. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgments convicting defendant of the several enumerated offenses and overruling his motion for a new trial. AFFIRMED.