Opinion ID: 2514209
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commenting on defense's failure to adduce evidence, specifically, testimony of Valdivia

Text: Valdivia asserts that the DPA remarked as follows on his failure to testify and to adduce any evidence: . . . Ladies and gentlemen, a lot of evidence, a lot of testimony, a lot of things for you to consider. But if you remember common sense, what happened[,] and what is in evidence. And remember, opening statements are not evidence. And opening statements, you heard things [from defense counsel] about, oh, it's a mistake, the officer got tangled, this and that. Okay? That was not the evidence that was presented to you. The evidence that was presented to you about the kidnapping and the arm being pinned in the car  Defense counsel objected, arguing during a bench conference that the foregoing statements were a flagrant effort . . . to make a comment on the fact that defense did not present any evidence, and [did] not present Mr. Valdivia to testify[.] Defense counsel maintained that the DPA had, inter alia, comment[ed] on the defendant's right to remain silent. The circuit court overruled the objection but noted that it thought Mr. Bakke has improperly commented on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right [to remain silent]. The circuit court cautioned the DPA to restrict [his] argument to the fact that what was said in opening statements are not evidence, without trying to characterize it any way. The DPA's statements, however, were not stricken, nor did defense counsel move for them to be, and no curative instruction was given to the jury. This court has said that [t]he test to be applied in determining whether a prosecutor has improperly commented upon a defendant's failure to testify is whether the language used was `manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' State v. Padilla, 57 Haw. 150, 158, 552 P.2d 357, 363 (1976) (quoting United States v. Wright, 309 F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir.1962)). Utilizing this formulation, we disagree with Valdivia that the DPA's statement constituted misconduct. The most that can be said is that the DPA was highlighting the fact that the evidence adduced at trial did not comport with defense counsel's assertions during opening statements. So construed, the DPA's remark appears to be within the bounds of legitimate argument, inasmuch as a prosecutor is, in closing argument, given wide latitude . . . in discussing the evidence and may state, discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209 (1996) (citations omitted). Moreover, the statement did not expressly refer to Valdivia or to the fact that he did not testify. We do not believe that the jury would foreseeably interpret the DPA's statement as a comment on Valdivia's failure to testify. Accordingly, we hold that the DPA's statement did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in the first instance and need not reach the question whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.