Opinion ID: 203229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duffy, Edward McGinn, James Moore[,] or

Text: Jose Ortiz to accept service of process on -13- their behalf for lawsuits in which they are being sued, whether in their individual capacity or their official capacity, and I was not so authorized or appointed by them in November 2002. Thus, McNamara specifically denied being appointed an agent by any of the defendant officers for whom returns of service were filed. Additionally, Officer Thomas Dowd provided an affidavit denying that he had authorized any individual or entity to accept service of process on my behalf. Under Massachusetts law, an affidavit is sufficient to refute the prima facie presumption created by a return of service. See Konan v. Carroll, 638 N.E. 2d 936, 938 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Farley v. Sprague, 372 N.E.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Mass. 1978)); see also Maniscaclo v. Kenworthy, No. 03-P-626, 815 N.E.2d 656 (table), 2004 WL 2185422, at  (Mass. App. Ct. Sept. 28, 2004) (per curiam) (Where, as here, [the] affidavit is uncontradicted other than by the deputy's return, the affidavit controls.). Similarly, federal courts have held that an affidavit denying agency, standing alone, may be sufficient to overcome the presumption of proper service created by the return of service. See Hornick v. S. & M. Trucking Co., 208 F. Supp. 950, 952 (M.D. Pa. 1962); Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 16 F.R.D. 391, 392-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Puett Elec. Starting Gate Corp. v. Thistle Down Co., 2 F.R.D. 550, 551 (N.D. Ohio 1942); see also Elibee v. Leonard, 226 F. App'x 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2007) (per -14- curiam) (unpublished) (holding averments of defendants sufficient to refute agency relationship); Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 452 F.2d 510, 514 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1971) (stating that although a marshal's return is not conclusive on the question of service on an agent, it will stand in the absence of proof to the contrary). Hence, the defendants effectively rebutted any presumption that might have arisen from the returns of service executed by Deputy Richard. At that point, the ultimate burden of proving proper service returned to the plaintiffs. See RiveraLopez, 979 F.2d at 887 (indicating that, once challenged, plaintiffs have the burden of proving proper service). We emphasize, however, that the real issue at hand is not whether the plaintiffs proved service--but merely whether they adduced sufficient evidence to warrant limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing. See id. The plaintiffs have mustered evidence--specifically, the Second Affidavit of Theresa Labriola (one of their attorneys), a document known as Worcester Police Policy and Procedure No. 351 (Policy No. 351), and returns of service for Officers Daniel Dowd, Thomas Dowd, Duffy, McGinn, Moore, Ortiz, and Towler in a different case--to refute McNamara's and Officer Thomas Dowd's affidavits. We examine each of these items in turn. First, we address the Labriola affidavit. In the affidavit, Labriola indicates that Deputy Richard informed her that -15- he had served Worcester police officers hundreds of times in the past by leaving copies of the complaint and summons at the office of the chief of police, as he did here. At some point, he was supposedly informed that the Chief's Office would no longer accept any summonses or complaints for the Worcester City Police Officers (emphasis added). The affidavit further states that Labriola corroborated this information with another Deputy Sheriff, Rusty Valery. Neither Deputy Richard nor Deputy Valery provided an affidavit substantiating these remarks. While not based on firsthand knowledge, Labriola's representations are sufficient to militate in favor of discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Although Deputy Richard apparently refused to supply an affidavit, he would presumably answer to a court-authorized subpoena. Moreover, the Labriola affidavit alleges that the plaintiffs attempted to obtain cop[ies] of all documents concerning all summonses received by the Worcester Police Department from June 2002 through December 2002, to ascertain whether the defendant officers routinely acquiesced to service of process via the method attempted in this case. According to Labriola, the Worcester Police Department never responded to this request; moreover, she stated that Rider, the City's attorney, agreed to help her obtain the information, but that he never followed through. Limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing would permit the plaintiffs to uncover whether there is additional -16- evidence of service effected in the manner attempted in this case. If the defendant officers have accepted service in this fashion on a number of occasions, then a strong argument exists that McNamara possessed implied, actual authority to accept service of process on their behalf. See In re Focus Media Inc., 387 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that, while a purported agent must possess actual authority to accept service of process, such authority may be implied rather than express); accord United States v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1956); see generally Inn Foods, Inc. v. Equitable Co-op. Bank, 45 F.3d 594, 597 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining basic, common law principles of agency and implied authority in different context). Second, the plaintiffs point to Policy No. 351, which they suggest establishes apparent authority for McNamara to accept service of process on behalf of the defendant officers. We disagree; the policy lends negligible support to the plaintiffs' assertion of agency. The policy states that [a]ll summonses received by the Worcester Police Department shall be recorded in the office of the Chief of Police. The summons and travel fee shall be forwarded to the officer named in the summons. As the district court recognized, however, the policy is labeled Revenue Management and concerns the acceptance of summonses and fees for police officers to appear as witnesses. Indeed, Policy No. 351 -17- states that its purpose is to provide guidelines for the acceptance and receipt of monies received by any police personnel, so as to prevent conflicts of interests. The language of the policy simply does not comport with the interpretation that the plaintiffs ascribe to it. Even if it did, nothing in the policy indicates that any of the defendant officers actually appointed--or were required to appoint--McNamara, or any other individual, as an agent for service of process. See Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 2002) (requiring actual authority) (citing United States v. $184,505.01, 72 F.3d 1160, 1164 n.10 (3rd Cir. 1995)); see also Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d at 881 (mandating express or implied actual authority, but noting that some courts have found implied actual authority based on 'the doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel' (quoting 1 Robert C. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Action § 301.[2][b], at 3-12 to 3-13 (1991))). At most, Policy No. 351 serves as circumstantial evidence that McNamara may have accepted summonses on the defendant officers' behalf in a different context. Third, the plaintiffs point to a related case, Boucher v. City of Worcester, No. 04-12673-REK (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2006), in which certain of the defendant officers appear to have been served in a similar manner without any objection. Thus, the plaintiffs have shown that the defendant officers have, on at least one occasion, acquiesced to a similar attempt at service. In Rivera- -18- Lopez, a factually similar case, we reversed a lower court's determination that a defendant was estopped from denying an agency relationship with a secretary because [t]he acceptance of service [by a secretary] in prior cases unconnected with plaintiff might have been specially authorized, or defendant . . . might have chosen to waive formalities. 979 F.2d at 887. Nevertheless, we remanded for further proceedings to determine the actual authority of the secretary to accept service of process for the defendant. Id. We explained that, [i]n view of [the issue's] importance, there should be a hearing on live testimony, not on conflicting affidavits. Id. The record before us is silent as to why the defendant officers did not challenge service in Boucher. The plaintiffs' posited explanation--that they did not because McNamara was an agent of the defendant officers--is plausible. It is also credible that the defendants, for reasons of their own, affirmatively decided to waive service in that case, or even that their attorneys simply neglected to raise a valid defense. See Rivera-Lopez, 979 F.2d at 887. An evidentiary hearing, with live testimony, would help to resolve this unanswered question. In summary, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the plaintiffs gives rise to a permissible inference that the defendant officers, in the past, authorized McNamara--or, perhaps, the clerks in the Office of the Chief of Police--to act as their agent for -19- service of process. The self-serving10 affidavits submitted by the defendants are not so powerful as to resolve the matter definitively, at least where the plaintiffs have introduced some contravening evidence and have had no opportunity to conduct related discovery and elicit testimony from McNamara and the defendant officers. Thus, the district court was mistaken in its assessment that the plaintiffs' request for limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing was nothing more than a grasp at straws. Moreover, the plaintiffs have quite clearly demonstrated substantial prejudice, given the district court's reasons for dismissing the original action. Accordingly, we hold that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the action without first permitting limited discovery and holding an evidentiary hearing, given the persistent factual uncertainty concerning agency.11 See id.; see 10 Although McNamara is not a defendant, she is nevertheless affiliated with them. 11 Because we remand for limited discovery and an evidentiary hearing, we decline to address the plaintiffs' additional challenges. We note, however, that evidence adduced following remand might alter the calculus for application of the Massachusetts renewal statute by elucidating the nature of Deputy Richard's erroneous service or the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' reliance upon it, should the district court again dismiss the original action based on a finding that McNamara was not authorized to serve as an agent for the defendant officers. For example, if the defendant officers accepted service of process in this manner in many cases, but only due to multiple acts of waiver, the plaintiffs might be deemed justified in mistakenly-butreasonably relying upon such an attempt at service. -20- also Surpitski, 362 F.2d at 256 (When the fish is identified, and the question is whether it is in the pond, we know no reason to deny a plaintiff the customary license [to conduct discovery].). However, the record is devoid of evidence describing any attempt at service of either Thomas or Falcone, and the plaintiffs have not offered any explanation to mitigate this apparent failure. Additionally, the plaintiffs have abandoned their claims against the City and Chief Gallagher. Consequently, these defendants were properly dismissed from the case. If after discovery the district court allows the first action to proceed, it may dismiss the second action as duplicative; if the district court dismisses the first action based on insufficient service of process, then it should proceed to reconsider whether the renewal statute saves the second action.