Opinion ID: 1846175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: misapplication of the tipsy coachman doctrine

Text: The first issue we address in this case is whether the Third District majority, in concluding that the evidence that Robertson threatened his ex-wife with an AK-47 constituted permissible Williams rule evidence, erred in affirming the trial court on grounds neither raised by the State nor considered by the trial court. The State concedes that at no time, either before trial or on appeal, did it argue that the evidence that Robertson threatened his ex-wife with an AK-47 six years earlier was admissible under the Williams rule. The State's sole argument was that Robertson's ex-wife's testimony constituted proper impeachment because of the answers that Robertson gave in response to the questions the State asked him on cross-examination. We start with the proposition that [g]enerally, if a claim is not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d at 644. However, notwithstanding this principle [i]n some circumstances, even though a trial court's ruling is based on improper reasoning, the ruling will be upheld if there is any theory or principle of law in the record which would support the ruling. Id. (emphasis supplied). This longstanding principle of appellate law, sometimes referred to as the tipsy coachman doctrine, allows an appellate court to affirm a trial court that reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons so long as there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record. Id. at 644-45. [2] As we explained in Radio Station WQBA, this Court has adhered to this principle on many other occasions. See id. (citing Applegate v. Barnett Bank, 377 So.2d 1150, 1152 (Fla.1979) (The written final judgment by the trial court could well be wrong in its reasoning, but the decision of the trial court is primarily what matters, not the reasoning used. Even when based on erroneous reasoning, a conclusion or decision of a trial court will generally be affirmed if the evidence or an alternative theory supports it.)); see also Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 359 (Fla.2001) ([T]he trial court's ruling on an evidentiary matter will be affirmed even if the trial court ruled for the wrong reasons, as long as the evidence or an alternative theory supports the ruling.). The key to the application of this doctrine of appellate efficiency is that there must have been support for the alternative theory or principle of law in the record before the trial court. Thus, following Radio Station WQBA, the First District in Morris, 736 So.2d at 42, correctly refused to affirm on an alternative ground not argued to the trial court, reasoning that the record does not reflect an evidentiary basis sufficient to permit us to make a determination as to whether these defenses are applicable in the instant case. (Emphasis supplied.) In the present case, the Third District improperly affirmed the admission of Robertson's ex-wife's testimony on the alternative Williams rule ground because there was no evidence in the record to support the Third District's holding that the previous threat was admissible under the Williams rule. Regarding the admissibility of Williams rule evidence, we have explained: Similar fact evidence that the defendant committed a collateral offense is inherently prejudicial. Introduction of such evidence creates the risk that a conviction will be based on the defendant's bad character or propensity to commit crimes, rather than on proof that he committed the charged offense. Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122, 124 (Fla. 1987). In affirming the trial court in this case, the Third District found the evidence admissible as relevant under Section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). Robertson, 780 So.2d at 110. Section 90.404(2)(a) is the codification of the Williams rule and provides: Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but it is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or propensity. Section 90.404(2)(b)1 also requires that the State file a notice of intent to rely on evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct: When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evidence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no fewer than 10 days before trial, the state shall furnish to the accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal. The requirement of pretrial notice allows the trial court to make an initial determination of whether the Williams rule evidence is admissible. Before admitting Williams rule evidence, it is incumbent upon the trial court to make multiple determinations, including whether the defendant committed the prior crime, [3] whether the prior crime meets the similarity requirements necessary to be relevant as set forth in our prior case law, [4] whether the prior crime is too remote so as to diminish its relevance, [5] and finally, whether the prejudicial effect of the prior crime substantially outweighs its probative value. [6] As the above-mentioned requirements suggest, the determination of whether evidence properly may be admitted as Williams rule evidence is a highly individualized, factually intensive inquiry. Moreover, even if the evidence is admitted pursuant to the Williams rule, a cautionary instruction is required when requested pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b)(2) so that the jury is specifically apprised of the limited purpose for which the jury is to consider the evidence: When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if requested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the evidence is received and is to be considered. After the close of the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited purpose for which the evidence was received and that the defendant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the indictment or information. Because the State never filed a notice of intent pursuant to section 90.404(2)(b) and because the State never indicated it intended to introduce this evidence as Williams rule evidence, the admissibility of the evidence in question was never litigated within the parameters of section 90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1997). Because the matter was not at issue, defendant did not have an opportunity to present evidence or arguments against the admissibility of this evidence under the Williams rule. Robertson, 780 So.2d at 118 (Sorondo, J., dissenting). Thus, the record as it existed was insufficient for the Third District to determine whether the evidence was properly admitted under the Williams rule. Because the matter was never litigated on the basis of the Williams rule, the trial court never made determinations as to whether clear and convincing evidence existed that Robertson committed the prior crime, whether the prior crime was substantially similar, or whether the prior crime was too remote so as to minimize any potential relevance. Further, as pointed out by this Court in Heuring, 513 So.2d at 123-24, where the evidence is being offered to prove absence of mistake or accident, the fact-intensive inquiry must include an analysis of the crime's remoteness as well as the absence of any intervening similar acts. Regarding remoteness, Judge Sorondo stated in his dissent: In the present case, the record simply does not permit a full examination of the factors necessary to determine whether defendant's prior misconduct is too remote to be relevant. Assuming for the sake of argument that the introduction of a prior threat of violence against a different victim is admissible at all, it would be reasonable and relevant to explore whether there were any domestic relationships between defendant's previous marriage and his marriage to the victim in this case. The existence of intervening relationships without any threats of violence would certainly raise the possibility considered by the Supreme Court in Heuring that the prior misconduct is no longer characteristic of the defendant. Robertson, 780 So.2d at 120 (Sorondo, J., dissenting) (quoting Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124). Moreover, because no notice was provided and because the State never attempted to seek the admission of this evidence on the basis of the Williams rule, Robertson never received an opportunity to present evidence or make argument as to why the incident involving his ex-wife should not have been admitted under the Williams rule. In short, the record did not permit the Third District to affirm the trial court's admission of collateral crime evidence as Williams rule evidence. Thus, in so doing, the Third District improperly relied upon the tipsy coachman doctrine to affirm the trial court's admission of this evidence. Finally, even if the record were sufficiently developed to allow affirmance on this alternate ground, we conclude as a matter of law that the Third District erred in holding that the testimony regarding a prior threat six years earlier against a different victim and involving a different weapon was admissible under the Williams rule. The Third District concluded that this evidence was admissible because the critical issue at trial was whether the defendant accidentally shot the victim. Robertson, 780 So.2d at 110. Thus, the Third District reasoned, and the State now contends, that the evidence of the prior threat was admissible to prove absence of mistake or accident, which is one of the permissible purposes for the admission of similar fact evidence under the Williams rule, as codified in section 90.404(2)(a). The State concedes, and we agree, that substantial similarity of crimes is a requirement when the evidence is sought to be admitted for the specific purpose of establishing absence of mistake or accident. See Duffey v. State, 741 So.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). As we have explained, [t]o minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction, the similar fact evidence must meet a strict standard of relevance. The charged and collateral offenses must be not only strikingly similar, but they must also share some unique characteristic or combination of characteristics which sets them apart from other offenses. Heuring, 513 So.2d at 124. In this case, the crime with which Robertson was charged was the completed offense of murder against his girlfriend utilizing a handgun. The prior offense, assuming it occurred, involved a threat of violence against Robertson's former wife, involving an assault rifle. Neither the crimes, the weapons, nor the victims are similar. Indeed, we have been unable to find, and the parties have not cited, any cases in Florida where a prior threat against a different victim was admitted under the Williams rule to prove the absence of mistake or accident of the present offense. The out-of-state cases cited by the parties and cited in the Third District's majority opinion and dissent are illuminating in that where the prior acts involved different victims and different offenses, the prior criminal acts were uniformly excluded. [7] The cases relied on by the majority involved either prior crimes against the same victim as the charged offense, [8] or the charged offenses and the prior offenses involved similar completed crimes of violence. [9] As stated by Judge Sorondo: The defendant in this case was charged with the completed, violent offense of second degree murder. The prior, alleged misconduct was an offense that threatened violence. Although such a prior threat against the victim in this case, if not too remote, may have been admissible to show intent and the absence of mistake or accident, the same cannot be said of a threat against another. Reducing these events to their simplest and most common formif the defendant had been charged with aggravated battery by punching his wife in the nose and breaking it, and he defended by claiming that he accidentally struck her while flailing his arms during an argument, under the majority's reasoning, evidence that the defendant had threatened to punch a former wife in the nose six years earlier would be admissible to rebut his claim of accident. As morally satisfying as this type of evidence may be, in my judgment, such evidence serves only to establish defendant's propensity to commit violent crimes. Robertson, 780 So.2d at 121-22 (Sorondo, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Accordingly, the Third District erred in applying the tipsy coachman doctrine because support for affirming the trial court on the alternative Williams rule basis was absent from the record. Furthermore, the record affirmatively shows that it would have been error for the trial court to have allowed the State to present, as Williams rule evidence, an alleged threat six years earlier involving a different victim and a different weapon to prove absence of mistake or accident.