Opinion ID: 1837756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred when it allowed evidence of the defendant's actions on the day prior to the incident in question

Text: ¶ 27. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine asking the circuit court to allow evidence showing that Jones assaulted Thomas on September 6, 2003. In its motion, the State argued that this evidence, which concerned a related event which took place just one day before the incident for which Jones was ultimately indicted, was admissible under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) to establish motive, intent, plan and absence of mistake or accident. At the hearing on this motion, Jones asserted the evidence was inadmissible because the acts were too far removed from the charged conduct; that the State was improperly attempting to offer evidence of another crime; and, that the acts of September 6, 2003, were not part of the res gestae of the crime. ¶ 28. Miss. R. Evid. 404(b) specifically provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. We have expounded upon the well-defined exceptions to this rule and stated: Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. Such proof of another crime is also admissible where it is necessary to identify the defendant, where it is material to prove motive, and there is an apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge. Neal, 451 So.2d at 758-59 (citations omitted).... Underwood v. State, 708 So.2d 18, 31-32 (Miss.1998). ¶ 29. In Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1257 (Miss.1995), we explained further: [T]he State has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened.... Turner v. State, 478 So.2d 300, 301 (Miss.1985); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 759 (Miss.1984). Where substantially necessary to present to the jury the complete story of the crime evidence or testimony may be given even though it may reveal or suggest other crimes. State v. Villavicencio, 95 Ariz. 199, 388 P.2d 245 (1964). Ballenger, 667 So.2d at 1257 (citing Brown v. State, 483 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 30. The evidence stemming from Jones's September 6 assault on Thomas is clearly admissible under the exceptions to Rule 404(b). Not only are Jones's actions relevant to his motive for tracking Thomas down and assaulting her again the following day, they also directly pertain to the continuing act of violence to the extent that Jones ultimately accomplished a series of interrelated criminal acts which began the day before on September 6. To hold this evidence inadmissible as evidence of a prior bad act would be to hamstring the State in the presentation of the complete story of Jones's crime. The evidence of the incident of September 6 was not offered to show Jones's character or that he was acting in conformity with a particular character trait. Instead this evidence was offered as part of the very actions for which he was indicted. Thus, we find this issue to be without merit as it relates to admissibility under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). However, further discussion is necessary on the ultimate issue of admissibility of this evidence pursuant to Miss. R. Evid. 403. This discussion continues below.