Opinion ID: 1262335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Negligence Counts

Text: A municipal corporation is clothed with a two-fold functionone governmental, the other private or proprietary. In the performance of governmental functions, a municipality is immune from liability for its failure to exercise those functions and for its negligence in exercising them. In the performance of proprietary functions, however, a municipality is not immune from liability for its negligence. Fenon v. City of Norfolk, 203 Va. 551, 555, 125 S.E.2d 808, 811 (1962); Hoggard v. Richmond, 172 Va. 145, 147-48, 200 S.E. 610, 611 (1939). In Counts I, IV, VI, and VII of the motion for judgment, the Taylors allege that the City was negligent in failing to use reasonable care to install lights, a barricade, and other safety devices, and in designing and constructing Michie Drive. [1] These, essentially, were the negligent acts and omissions alleged in Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 266 S.E.2d 885 (1980). In Freeman, we held that the City was immune from liability because the alleged negligence concerned matters relating to traffic regulation. Such matters, unlike street maintenance when a city acts in a proprietary capacity, constitute the exercise of a discretionary governmental function. Id. at 59, 266 S.E.2d at 886; accord Transportation, Inc. v. Falls Church, 219 Va. 1004, 1005, 254 S.E.2d 62, 63 (1979). Consistent with our holding in Freeman, we conclude that the City is immune from liability for the claims of negligence asserted in Counts I, IV, VI, and VII of the motion for judgment. Accordingly, we will affirm the trial court's judgment that sustained the City's demurrer to those counts.