Opinion ID: 2330535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Impact of Kelo

Text: Mr. Franco's first defense alleged that the legislation authorizing NCRC to take his property violated the Takings Clause of the Constitution because the actual purpose of the condemnation was to confer a private benefit on a private party (the Purchaser/Developer). He claimed that the asserted public purpose for the taking was pretextual. In its decision, the trial court stated: [T]he issue Franco raises, that private property cannot be taken for private use even if there is an overriding public purpose as determined by the legislature, is foreclosed by Kelo, in a situation like this, where the stated reason for the taking is the removal of slum and its replacement by an economically developed area that will provide substantial benefits to the public. As mentioned above, that was the Council's purpose in enacting the authorizing legislation, and it should not be second-guessed here. The trial court did not undertake any factual inquiry to determine that the legislation had an overriding public purpose and will provide substantial benefits to the public. Thus, its discussion suggests that, once the legislature has declared that there is a public purpose for a condemnation, an owner is foreclosed as a matter of law from demonstrating that the stated reason is a pretext. We do not interpret Kelo so broadly. To be sure, the decision in Kelo emphasized that, apart from determining what compensation is just, courts play a limited role in condemnation cases. Without exception, our cases have defined th[e] concept [of public purpose] broadly, reflecting our longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field. 545 U.S. at 480, 125 S.Ct. 2655. The Court was satisfied that its public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the takings power. Id. at 483, 125 S.Ct. 2655. (Similarly, courts will not second-guess the legislature's considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan . . . [or its] determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in order to effectuate the project. Id. at 488-89, 125 S.Ct. 2655.) Some questions have been settled. Promoting economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of government. . . . Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development from our traditionally broad understanding of public purpose. Id. at 484-85, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Moreover, it is not a valid objection that private parties will benefit from the taking. Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private parties. Id. at 485, 125 S.Ct. 2655. See also id. at 485 n. 14, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (Any number of cases illustrate that the achievement of a public good often coincides with the immediate benefiting of private parties.); Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984) (The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.). On the other hand, it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Thus, the Kelo majority reaffirmed that the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party. Id. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (A purely private taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.). Importantly for this case, the Court added: Nor would the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478, 125 S.Ct. 2655. Finally, the question [of] what is a public use is a judicial one. City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446, 50 S.Ct. 360, 74 L.Ed. 950 (1930). See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (The disposition of this case . . . turns on the question whether the City's development plan serves a `public purpose.'). The Kelo Court did not address the sufficiency of the pleadings filed by the landowners. An extensive record had been developed during a seven-day bench trial, and the Court noted that [t]he trial judge and all the members of the Supreme Court of Connecticut agreed that there was no evidence of an illegitimate purpose in this case. Id. Based on the record presented, the Court concluded that the City's development plan was not adopted `to benefit a particular class of identifiable individuals.' Id. at 478, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321). Although the Court determined that the taking at issue in Kelo was not pretextual, it emphasized, as we have noted, that a government would not be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478, 125 S.Ct. 2655. [8] Thus, Kelo recognized that there may be situations where a court should not take at face value what the legislature has said. The government will rarely acknowledge that it is acting for a forbidden reason, so a property owner must in some circumstances be allowed to allege and to demonstrate that the stated public purpose for the condemnation is pretextual. It may be difficult to make this showing, and the Supreme Court's decision may raise many more questions than it answers, but a pretext defense is not necessarily foreclosed by Kelo.