Opinion ID: 775998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Variance Between Indictment and Proof at Trial

Text: 11 Jones first argues that the government never established beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones was a member of a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine for the entire period alleged in the indictment, that is, until January 2000. According to Jones, two prejudicial consequences flow from this expansion of the length of the conspiracy: (1) it allowed the government to introduce Gephardt's testimony, which should have been treated as a wholly separate conspiracy; and (2) it enabled the government to introduce the evidence obtained during the December 10, 1999 traffic stop. 12 Generally, a defendant claiming a variance between the indictment and the proof at trial will succeed in obtaining reversal of his conviction only if he establishes that (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's finding of a single conspiracy, and (2) he was prejudiced by the variance. United States v. Mojica, 185 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Curtis, 37 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1994)). We are unable to agree that the government failed to introduce evidence supporting a single conspiracy. Moreover, even if Jones did engage in two separate conspiracies-- which he did not--any alleged error was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against him. 13 Initially, the government provided sufficient evidence to prove a single conspiracy. In defining a conspiracy, this Court looks to the nature of the agreement. United States v. Marhsall, 985 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1993). So long as the evidence demonstrates that the co-conspirators embraced a common criminal objective, a single conspiracy exists, even if the parties do not know one or another and do not participate in every aspect of the scheme. See United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1186 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1507 (7th Cir. 1990)). In contrast, multiple conspiracies exist when there are separate agreements that effectuate distinct purposes. United States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 254 (7th Cir. 1999). 14 In this case, there was ample evidence to support the jury's finding of a single conspiracy. Jones does not dispute the fact that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove a conspiracy for the period ending in May 1999. In fact, in his brief, Jones states that the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, established that the defendant participated in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine through May 1999. However, according to Jones, the only evidence of a conspiracy from June 1999 through January 2000 derives from Tonya Gephardt's testimony, which the district court improperly admitted over Jones's objection. Jones notes that by June 1999 Jonathan Norris, Denver Wheeler and Gabriel Folks either were incarcerated or had agreed to cooperate with the government. As a result, Jones claims that all of his co-conspirators necessarily withdrew from the conspiracy by the end of 1999. 15 Jones bases his assertion on the incorrect premise that Norris, Wheeler and Folks were the only co-conspirators involved in Jones's scheme. The indictment against Jones specified only that he conspired with others to distribute crack cocaine, which certainly does not mean that the conspiracy could not involve individuals other than Norris, Wheeler and Folks. Indeed, the evidence at trial proved that Huey Whitley, Casey Jones and McCall Cleveland participated in the conspiracy as well. So, too, did Tonya Gephardt, who traveled with Jones to Chicago, hid crack cocaine in her vagina on the return trip, and accompanied Jones while he sold crack in Springfield. 16 Faced with this testimony, Jones contends that the government conceded during sentencing that Tonya Gephardt was not a member of the conspiracy. Jones maintains that this concession necessarily precludes a finding of criminal activity beyond June 1999 because Gephardt provided the only testimony regarding the conspiracy past that time. This argument requires further explanation. United States Sentencing Guideline sec.3B1.1 enhances a sentence when the conspiracy involved five or more participants. At sentencing, the prosecutor noted that the Probation Office applied a four level enhancement based upon sec.3B1.1 because the conspiracy involved more than five individuals. The prosecutor acknowledged that the evidence at trial did not necessarily establish that one individual, Huey Whitley, was a member of the conspiracy. Because Whitley was one of the individuals counted in the probation report, and because the enhancement did not affect the sentencing range, the prosecutor stated: I know there was testimony at the trial that [other individuals] were involved in the offense, but there certainly wasn't as much detail with respect to their particular role like Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Folks and Mr. Norris. And while I think it is certainly reasonable to come to that four level enhancement, Your Honor, given that we're talking about a life sentence here, my thought was that to be as cautious as possible, two levels would certainly be more than sound, and that's why I came to that conclusion. 17 Sent. Tr. At 8-9. This is hardly a concession that Gephardt (or others) did not participate in the conspiracy. While the government never formally charged Gephardt, she testified in some detail that Jones continued his practice of traveling to Chicago, purchasing crack, and distributing it in Springfield. Thus, the jury's finding is not insufficient to support the jury's finding of a single conspiracy. Mojica, 185 F.3d at 786. 18 While we hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove a single conspiracy, we also note that any alleged error in this case was harmless. Jones's allegation that Gephardt's testimony prejudiced him does not withstand scrutiny. Despite Gephardt's testimony, the jury considered the following: testimony from Wheeler, Norris and Whitley, recorded conversations between Jones and Norris, evidence from two traffic stops, and physical evidence seized during the searches of residences where Jones dealt drugs. In short, the evidence against Jones during the period between March 1999 and June 1999 was overwhelming, and there can be no question that Jones participated in a conspiracy to deal crack cocaine. See United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1989). As a result, Jones cannot establish that he suffered any prejudice from the alleged error. See United States v. Noble, 754 F.2d 1324, 1330 (7th Cir. 1985).