Opinion ID: 381346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Test for Granting Preliminary Injunctions

Text: 23 Over twenty years ago, this court articulated these four factors to be weighed by a court before granting a stay or a preliminary injunction: 24 (1) Has the petitioner made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its appeal? . . . (2) Has the petitioner shown that without such relief, it will be irreparably injured? . . . (3) Would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the proceedings? . . . (4) Where lies the public interest? 25 Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Association v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). These factors have assisted analysis ever since, and we see no reason to depart from them now. 26 The district court indicated no consideration of factors (2), (3), and (4) listed above, each of which weighs in plaintiffs' favor. Indeed each of these factors supports a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo pending a decision on the merits, 35 based on a balance of the equities between injuries to the parties and the public. 36 Therefore, we address these factors. 27
28 Interlocutory injunctions are sometimes necessary to assure that rights sought are not so eviscerated during trial that final relief would be to no avail. The injury to plaintiffs, absent interim relief, must also be evaluated to permit a comparison with harms to other parties and to the public. 29 Here plaintiffs represent children 37 who might work as hand harvesters if the Secretary is not enjoined from administering the waiver provision according to the challenged regulations. As a result, these children would be exposed to the pesticides and chemicals approved by the Secretary for use according to the listed minimum entry times, intended to reduce risks of exposure. 38 30 The risk of harm from such exposure pendente lite would not be eliminated even if plaintiffs ultimately were to win on the merits. 39 Thus, plaintiffs convincingly make out a case of irreparable harm, absent interlocutory relief. In arguing that plaintiffs have not provided evidence of adverse effects to children, the government neglects the evidence in the record. The EPA, the agency most expert in hazards from pesticide exposure, identified some substances approved by the challenged regulations as high-risk pesticides and others as highly toxic. 40 The EPA further noted that the regulation's reentry intervals may not be sufficient in light of the complex nature of pesticide degradation. 41 Further, OSHA and Clement Associates emphasized the known heightened susceptibility of pubescent children to harm from pesticide exposure. 42 It is in this context that the EPA, OSHA, and Clement Associates all stressed the insufficiency of current scientific information to assist the setting of safety standards for children exposed to pesticides. 43 These expert statements evidence insufficient knowledge of methods to combat known hazards. The hazards exist, and children's exposure to them constitutes the kind of irreparable departure from the status quo that necessitates interlocutory relief. 44 31
32 The obviously interested parties here are the defendant Department of Labor, and the agricultural employers, or the growers, who are advantaged by the availability of waivers under the Department's regulation that lists approved pesticides. A preliminary injunction enjoining application of that list would permit waiver only on satisfaction of the statutory requirement of objective data reviewed by the Department and provided by applicant employers establishing that employment conditions and pesticide exposure would not adversely affect 10 and 11 year olds. 45 A foreseeable result is that fewer waivers would be granted. The proof process would be more difficult, and the case-by-case evaluation more time-consuming, than would simple application of the list of approved pesticides here under challenge. 46 33 Growers seeking waivers thus would suffer from a diminished labor pool and would either be short on labor or have to pay more to attract employees. We assume that this result would indeed be burdensome, because under the statutory and regulatory schemes, waiver applications can be approved only based on objective data that the industry would suffer severe economic disruption without the child employees available through a waiver. 47 We note also, however, that the industry obviously has survived without any 10- and 11-year-old hand harvesters during the extended period preceding the passage of the statutory waiver provision in 1977. 48 With the restricted availability of waivers even subsequent to 1977, 49 we must conclude that the industry would not be significantly harmed if the Secretary is enjoined from approving applications supported by statements of pesticides used. 34 The other interested party possibly harmed by a preliminary injunction is the defendant Department of Labor. The harm to it would be the suspension of its list of approved pesticides, and the pressure to respond to demands by both growers and child protection groups. These results do not constitute substantial harm for the purpose of delaying injunctive relief. Indeed, these consequences are no different from the Department's burdens under the statutory scheme. The Department could still seek sufficient information to support reliable safety standards, and the Department could also initiate notice and comment rulemaking for that same purpose. Especially when compared with the irreparable harm from children's exposure to known dangers, the foreseeable consequences to the Department of Labor and to growers are insignificant.
35 The public interest is a uniquely important consideration in evaluating a request for a preliminary injunction. As the Supreme Court has held, Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests are involved. 50 36 Here, two competing problems for the public interest arise. First, how will the price of produce be affected if a preliminary injunction limits the availability of 10- and 11-year-old hand harvesters? Second, what health effects would 10- and 11-year-old children risk if allowed employment? Thus, consideration of the public interest requires us to replay the analysis of the two previous factors. We must ask what is the proper balance between the economic burdens to growers denied waivers, a burden ultimately shifted to consumers, and the irreparable harm to children exposed to pesticides and chemicals through employment allowed waivers? Once again, the balance must be struck in favor of the protection of children. 51 Especially in the context of a motion for preliminary relief, equity requires protection against irreparable harm. Plainly, any possible reduction in the price of produce that might result from denying preliminary relief would be only short-term, and would never approach the value of the children's health to the nation. 37 In sum, we conclude that the three factors ignored by the district court clearly favor the plaintiffs. It may well be that a preliminary injunction was warranted even if the district court had correctly concluded that plaintiffs would not be likely to prevail on the merits. Even if that were the case, plaintiffs needed only to present a serious legal question for preliminary relief to be granted under the other circumstances of their case. 52 Moreover, we conclude that the district court incorrectly assessed plaintiffs' likelihood of prevailing on the merits.