Opinion ID: 2973887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contested Findings Related to Sentencing

Text: We turn first to defendant’s contention that the district court exceeded its authority by relying upon various aspects of his criminal history to enhance his sentence. When a defendant preserves a constitutional challenge to his sentence by raising it in the district court, we review the issue de novo on appeal. United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 601 (6th Cir. 2003). -3- No. 05-5327 United States v. Johnson In Booker, the Court reaffirmed the “prior conviction” exception that it first enunciated in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and retained in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): “Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked defense counsel why the prior conviction exception should not apply. After conceding that she could not cite any cases in support of a contrary view, counsel stated, “[M]y primary position is that the prior conviction exception needs to be revisited.” Although Justice Thomas has given some indication that “a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided,” see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1264, 161 L.Ed.2d 205, 219 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring in part), the Court has not yet done so and, unless and until it does, the prior conviction exception retains its validity. Consequently, the district court did not err when it took note of defendant’s three prior felony convictions, which increased defendant’s base offense level from 12 to 24. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6). Whether the factors relied upon by the district court when calculating defendant’s criminal history category – that he was on probation at the time of the offense and had been released from imprisonment within the past two years – fall within the prior conviction exception presents a closer question. We do not write on a clean slate, however. This court has recently taken the following approach when faced with sentencing considerations similar to those present in the instant case: -4- No. 05-5327 United States v. Johnson “[T]his circuit has repeatedly held . . . [that] certain aspects of the character of prior convictions are so basic as to be implicit in the fact of a prior conviction.” United States v. Hollingsworth, 414 F.3d 621, 623 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 524 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This Court, among others, has rejected the argument that Apprendi requires the nature of prior convictions to be determined by a jury, holding instead that the district court’s authority to determine the existence of prior convictions was broad enough to include determinations regarding the nature of those prior convictions.”); United States v. Burgin, 388 F.3d 177, 186 (6th Cir. 2004) (“In the usual case, we expect that a district court’s determination that a defendant has a record of prior convictions will be accompanied by the judge’s determination of when those convictions were entered.”); United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing, in a pre- Booker and pre- Blakely case, the “different occasions” requirement for prior crimes in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and stating that “[j]udges frequently must make factual determinations for sentencing, so it is hardly anomalous to require that they also determine the ‘who, what, when, and where’ of a prior conviction”). [Defendant] alleges that the district court made five impermissible factual determinations regarding his prior convictions: (1) the date of commission, (2) the date the convictions were entered, (3) his age on the date of commission, (4) the length of the sentences imposed, and (5) whether [defendant] was still under a criminal-justice sentence when he committed the . . . offenses at issue. But [defendant] does not cite any authority holding that the district court is prohibited from making these findings. Common sense dictates that these facts are “so basic as to be implicit in the fact of a prior conviction.” See Hollingsworth, 414 F.3d at 623. The date the offense was committed, the date of entry of the conviction, the duration of the sentence, and whether the sentence had expired before the offense at issue are facts basic to the conviction – the “when[s].” See Santiago, 268 F.3d at 156-57. United States v. Johnson, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 623595 at  15-16 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2006) (amended opinion). Just as in Johnson, defendant raises arguments that involve the “whens” of his prior convictions and, consonant with the reasoning of Johnson and Hollingsworth, we hold that they are sufficiently “implicit in the fact of his prior convictions” to fall within the prior conviction exception. For that reason, the calculation of defendant’s criminal history did not violate the Sixth Amendment. -5- No. 05-5327 United States v. Johnson