Opinion ID: 1906647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Balancing Benefits Versus Social Costs

Text: Respondent also argues that even if we classify section 297 forfeiture actions as quasi-criminal, we still should decline to apply the exclusionary rule because the Supreme Court recently noted that the rule applies only in situations where its deterrence benefits outweigh its `substantial social costs.' Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 2019, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). Respondent contends that applying the rule to this case would provide minimal deterrence because the loss of the ability to use the evidence in petitioner's criminal prosecution alone would deter the police, especially given the severity of the criminal penalty versus the loss of his car. As we have indicated, this approach would result in the applicability of the exclusionary rule being dependent, at least in part, on the value of the vehicle seized. Such an approach, in our view, would not be feasible. Scott, moreover, is distinguishable because that case dealt only with parole revocation hearings, a type of proceeding completely unrelated to any issue determinative to this case. Scott, 524 U.S. at ____ _ ____,____, 118 S.Ct. at 2017-18, 2022, 141 L.Ed.2d 344. The Court noted that parole is essentially an agreement, i.e., a contract, between the state and a prisoner, granting a limited degree of freedom in return for the parolee's assurance that he will comply with the often strict terms and conditions of his release. Id. at ____, 118 S.Ct. at 2020, 141 L.Ed.2d 344. To allow an exclusionary rule in that context would hinder the state's ability to maintain close supervision over a parolee and, in turn, prove to the parole board that a parolee has violated his or her end of the deal, i.e., contract, thus exacting great societal costs which outweigh any deterrence effect. See id. By contrast, in a civil drug-related forfeiture case, the need for deterrence exceeds the societal costs. Without the application of the exclusionary rule to section 297 forfeiture actions, officers could seize contraband, absent sufficient probable cause to do so, even if that same evidence would be inadmissible in a criminal context to prove the wrongdoer's criminality. We already have recognized that this consideration, whether, at the time of the illegal search, the police were aware of the potential effect of using such evidence in civil proceedings is one factor of several in considering the motivation behind an improper search and seizure. Sheetz, 315 Md. at 216, 553 A.2d at 1285. The lack of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule under circumstances in which probable cause is lacking could lead to a separate line of police work devoted to forfeiture. We are keenly aware that governments increasingly have filed civil forfeiture actions in lieu of criminal charges, knowing that constitutional protections provide greater obstacles to their criminal cases, and that forfeitures have a great financial impact not only on the defendant but on the government's coffers as well. See Nelson, supra, at 1328 (noting one study in which eighty percent of property owners who lost their assets to forfeiture were never charged with a criminal offense). This practice has become more commonplace despite our repeated warning that in this state, forfeitures are disfavored in law because they are considered harsh extractions, odious, and to be avoided when possible. State ex rel. Frederick City Police Dept. v. One 1988 Toyota Pick-up Truck, 334 Md. 359, 375, 639 A.2d 641, 649 (1994) (citing United States Coin & Currency v. Director of Finance, 279 Md. 185, 187, 367 A.2d 1243, 1244 (1977); Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 199, 265 A.2d 748, 752 (1970)). We believe that the benefits of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule outweigh the costs society may incur with its proper application to forfeitures under section 297.