Opinion ID: 1540571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Interest on Judgment Accrues from Date of Entry

Text: The third and final issue raised in this appeal concerns the Superior Court's decision to change the date from which interest should accrue on the plaintiff's judgment from the date of the entry of judgment (January 7, 1993) to the date of the amendment of the judgment (July 19, 1993). Carroll contends that the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in so modifying its judgment. The right to interest on money judgments is secured by the common law of Delaware. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. Warrick, Del.Supr., 22 A.2d 865, 868 (1941). In Warrick, this Court held that a decree in the Court of Chancery bears interest from the date of its entry, by analogy to judgments in actions at law. Id. at 868-69. This Court subsequently stated that [i]nterest is awarded in Delaware as a matter of right and not of judicial discretion. Moskowitz v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, Del.Supr., 391 A.2d 209, 210 (1978). In Moskowitz, we explained that [a]s a general rule, interest accumulates from the date payment was due the plaintiff, because full compensation requires an allowance for the detention of the compensation awarded and interest is used as a basis for measuring that allowance. Id. In the Superior Court, Moffitt contended that the July 19, 1993 order was, in effect, a remittitur because it decreased the amount of the award to plaintiff, and that interest does not accrue in the context of a remittitur until the reduced award takes effect through the parties' manifestations of consent and entry of an order to that effect. Moffitt supported this contention with a citation to Stewart v. Storm's Shoes, Inc., Del. Supr., 426 A.2d 839, 841 (1981). As the Superior Court correctly recognized in the August 13, 1993 order, Moffitt's reliance upon Stewart was misplaced because the judge's reduction of Carroll's award of damages did not constitute a remittitur. Nevertheless, the Superior Court judge changed the date on which interest accrued to July 19, 1993. That action by the Superior Court constituted an error of law. Procedurally, in ordering a remittitur, the trial judge vacates the original judgment and offers the plaintiff the option of either accepting a new judgment, with a reduced amount of damages, or submitting to a new trial. See Stewart v. Genesco, Inc., 406 A.2d at 26-27. In contrast, in the case sub judice the Superior Court judge amended rather than vacated the judgment entered on January 7, 1993 to reflect the judge's correction of a prior misunderstanding of the factual record. The effect of the July 19, 1993 order with regard to interest was simply to quantify the correct amount of damages to which Carroll's legal right to interest had attached as of the entry of judgment on January 7, 1993. See Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. Warrick, 22 A.2d at 868. The unmodified portion of the judgment of the Superior Court entered on January 7, 1993 had an inchoate binding effect upon Moffitt from that date and continued to remain vested for Carroll. Compare Stewart v. Storm's Shoes, Inc., 426 A.2d at 841. Consequently, when the Superior Court judge denied the motion for a new trial and reduced the amount of damages awarded in the July 19, 1993, order, the judge properly awarded accrued interest on the reduced net recovery of $56,000 as of the date of the entry of judgment. Therefore, the Superior Court erred, as a matter of law, in modifying the July 19, 1993 judgment. Carroll is legally entitled to interest on the judgment of damages, $56,000, from the date of the original nonjury verdict and the entry of judgment, January 7, 1993. [4]