Opinion ID: 494142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statement Concerning Ryan's Previous Address.

Text: 27 Ryan contends that the question on the application asking for Ryan's previous address was inherently ambiguous, and, therefore, his answer to that question cannot be a false statement within the meaning of Sec. 1014. As a general rule, the fact that there is some ambiguity in a falsely answered question will not shield the respondent from a perjury or false statements prosecution. See United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75, 86 (3d Cir.1977); United States v. Long, 534 F.2d 1097, 1101 (3d Cir.1976). Normally, it is for the petit jury to decide which construction the defendant placed on the question. Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86. However, these general rules are not without limit, and if a question is excessively vague or fundamentally ambiguous, then the answer to such question may not, as a matter of law, form the basis of a perjury or false statements prosecution. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375; Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86. The purpose behind the rule of fundamental ambiguity is two-fold: 1) to preclude convictions that are grounded on little more than surmise or conjecture, and 2) to prevent witnesses (or loan applicants) from unfairly bearing the risks associated with the inadequacies of their examiners, and thereby to encourage participation in the judicial (or banking) system. Cf. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359, 93 S.Ct. at 600; Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86. It is difficult to define with precision the point at which a question becomes so ambiguous that it is not amenable to jury interpretation. We have stated that the point is reached when it [is] entirely unreasonable to expect that the defendant understood the question posed to him. Slawik, 548 F.2d at 86. Other courts have said that [a] question is fundamentally ambiguous when it 'is not a phrase with a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree, nor one which could be used with mutual understanding by a questioner and answerer unless it were defined at the time it were sought and offered as testimony.'  Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375 (quoting United States v. Lattimore, 127 F.Supp. 405, 410 (D.D.C.), aff'd by an equally divided court, 232 F.2d 334 (D.C.Cir.1955)). 28 The question on the credit card application asking Ryan to supply his PREVIOUS ADDRESS (Last 5 Years) is ambiguous on more than one level. First, the word address is imprecise and vague. The government asserts that address is synonymous with domicile or primary residence. While the government's position is not implausible, both the common parlance and legal authority instruct that address is a term which includes--but is not limited to--the concept of domicile or residence. A person may have an address, that is, a place where mail or other communications will reach him, at a place other than his residence. Munson v. Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co., 314 Mass. 485, 489, 50 N.E.2d 633, 636 (1943). Thus, while a person can have but one domicile or primary residence at any given time, he may have two or more addresses. This distinction is particularly significant under the facts of this case. At the time Ryan made the credit card application, his domicile was in Egg Harbor, New Jersey; however, he also maintained a home at 2401 Pennsylvania Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This Philadelphia address also happens to be the location of Ryan's last previous domicile, and it is the address that appears on the letterhead of the correspondence which Ryan attached to the credit card application. The government, taking the position that address and domicile are synonymous, argued at trial and on appeal that 2401 Pennsylvania Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was Ryan's last previous address. However, under the broader definition of address, Ryan could correctly have determined that his Philadelphia home was a present, not a previous address. Thus, his failure to list the Philadelphia address as his PREVIOUS ADDRESS on the credit card application might well have resulted from an ambiguity in the question itself. 29 Even if the word address were not vague, we still would find that the question asking Ryan to supply his PREVIOUS ADDRESS (Last 5 Years) is ambiguous. The question has at least three possible meanings. It could be viewed as asking the applicant to supply 30 1) any previous address that the applicant has had within the last five years, 31 2) the applicant's most recent previous address if and only if the applicant lived at that address within the last five years, or 32 3) all previous addresses that the applicant has had within the last five years. 33 If one views the question as asking the applicant to supply any previous address within the last five years, then the indictment failed to allege adequately that Ryan made a false statement. The pertinent part of the indictment states, the application [was] false in that defendant Ryan ... stated that his previous address for a ten year period had been in Frankfurt, West Germany, when in fact he had resided in various locations in the United States for at least four years prior to making this application. Indictment at 4 (emphasis added). Clearly, the fact that Ryan lived at various locations in the United States for a period of four years prior to making the application does not preclude the possibility that he resided in West Germany within five years of making the application. Nor does it preclude the possibility that he actually resided in West Germany for a total of ten years. Thus, assuming that the application merely asked Ryan to supply a previous address, then the indictment did not sufficiently aver that Ryan made a false statement in violation of Sec. 1014. 34 Though the word previous generally is understood to mean antecedent, prior, or before, the word is sometimes limited in meaning to next prior to or next preceding. Black's Law Dictionary 1070 (5th Ed.1979); see Syracuse Sav. Bank v. Brown, 181 Misc. 999, 42 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1943). If the word previous on the credit card application is viewed as having this more limited meaning, then the indictment arguably did properly allege that Ryan made a false statement (still assuming, of course, that address and domicile are synonyms). However, there is nothing on the application which indicates that the limited definition was intended. 2 35 Finally, one could construe the question as asking the applicant to list all previous addresses within the last 5 years. This is an unlikely construction since the question contains the singular address and since the application provides enough space for the applicant to write but one address. However, this is possibly the construction that the grand jury accepted. The indictment charges that in fact [Ryan] had resided in various locations in the United States for at least four years prior to making [the] application. Though the indictment is not clear, it appears that the grand jury found that a truthful answer would have contained the addresses of these various locations in the United States where Ryan resided. 36 As the foregoing discussion indicates, the question concerning Ryan's previous address is open to numerous interpretations and does not have a meaning about which men of ordinary intellect could agree. Lighte, 782 F.2d at 375. Further, the indictment does not clearly set forth the grand jury's understanding of the question, and as we stated in Slawik, a [false statements] conviction ... may not stand where the indictment fails to set forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis of its falsity with sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine its verity and to allow meaningful judicial review of the materiality of those falsehoods. Slawik, 548 F.2d at 83; see Tonelli, 577 F.2d at 195. Because of the insufficiency of the indictment and because of the inherent ambiguity of the previous address question, the jury should not have been allowed to consider Ryan's answer to the question as a possible basis for a conviction under count two. 37