Opinion ID: 19557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentence for Interstate Domestic Violence

Text: 49 Lankford was given a sentence of 135 months imprisonment for his conviction of interstate domestic violence. He contends, for the first time on appeal, that his sentence for violating 2261(a)(1) exceeds the statutory maximum, because evidence supports an offense of aggravated sexual abuse as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2241, an offense he was not charged with committing, but does not support an offense of sexual abuse as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2242(1). As a result, he argues, he cannot be sentenced under 2261(b)(4), which dictates that a person violating 2261(a) shall be fined under this title, imprisoned . . . as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A if the offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A . . . . Instead, he must be sentenced under 2261(b)(5), which specifies a term of not more than five years. Because Lankford's argument requires that we interpret 2261(b)(4), we review the district court's action de novo, see United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 525 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1571 (1998), and in this case must determine whether the court committed plain error. See United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 988 F.2d 1408, 1410 (5th Cir. 1993). 50 Section 2261(b) provides for penalties that vary according to the degree of the injury sustained by the victim. See United States v. Page, 167 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 1999). The language of 2261(b)(4) instructs that if the offense would constitute an offense under chapter 109A, then the penalties as provided for the applicable conduct under chapter 109A are applicable, without regard to whether the offense was committed in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison. We find that the district court did not commit an obvious error in interpreting 2261(b)(4) to be applicable to the circumstances of this case.