Opinion ID: 2569468
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether delay without prejudice can be a denial of due process

Text: We have stated that delay can constitute a violation of due process in the criminal context, if it results in actual prejudice to the defendant, [45] and in certain civil contexts, if the delay causes the deprivation of a private interest. [46] But we have never held that delay alone, with no accompanying prejudice, constitutes a violation of the right to due process. [47] The facts of the present case do not justify such a holding. The CFEC's handling of this case was inexcusable, and Brandal may experience significant harm, but the CFEC's delay is not the reason for Brandal's difficulties. Contrary to Brandal's claim that [t]he delay caused him to become almost entirely economically dependent on the fishery and lulled him into not learning another occupation, Brandal had ample notice that the CFEC was likely to reject his claim. In 1978 and 1982 hearing officers found that he lacked sufficient points to qualify for a permit. Brandal had no reason to assume that the cause of the delay was that his case was deemed exceptionally close: courts and administrative agencies often face exceptionally close cases, but they almost never sit on them for decades on end. Brandal elected not to learn another occupation in spite of having received notice that he was unlikely to be awarded a permit. Because the CFEC's delay did not prejudice Brandal, we hold that the delay did not constitute a violation of Brandal's right to due process.