Opinion ID: 1289889
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Atoui Had Authority (or Apparent Authority) to Consent

Text: Helpful to assessing Atoui's authority to consent here  especially in light of Ayoub's asserted superior possessory interest in the searched home  is our decision in United States v. Jones, 335 F.3d 527 (6th Cir.2003), where we concluded that officers lacked lawful authority to enter a home. Federal officers had information that the defendant possessed firearms and drugs and was wanted on an outstanding federal arrest warrant. Id. at 529. An officer pulled the defendant over in his car and arrested him on the federal warrant. Id. The defendant refused to consent to a search of his home. Id. As a result of surveillance conducted before the arrest, the officers knew that two other individuals were at the defendant's home. Id. The officers had observed a man, later determined to be an overnight guest named Dickason, working on a car in the driveway, and a second man, later determined to be one Teasley, bringing food and water to dogs that were living at the home. Id. Two officers went to the home to identify these individuals. Id. Teasley let one of the officers inside the home, where the officer saw Dickason. Id. at 530. After some questioning, Dickason allowed the officer to look for Dickason's identification in a duffel bag in a back bedroom. Id. While in the bedroom, the officer saw firearms and, in the duffel bag, a pipe for smoking crack cocaine. Id. After being convicted on this evidence, the defendant contended on appeal that neither Teasley nor Dickason, both of whom had lesser possessory rights to the premises than [he did], could give lawful consent for the officers to enter the premises. Id. We agreed. We explained that Teasley, who first let the officer inside the home, was simply a handyman, and therefore the defendant's employee. Id. (We noted, however, that even if he were an overnight guest, such as Dickason, the outcome would be the same. Id. ) We explained that courts have engaged in a fact-specific analysis of the level of responsibility given to the employee when assessing whether the employee has authority to consent to a search of a residence. Id. at 531. If the employee's job duties include the granting of access to the premises, authority to consent is more likely to be found. Id. We first noted that Teasley clearly lacked actual authority to permit the officer to enter the residence. Id. His authority, even assuming that he had any, would have ceased at the point that [the defendant] denied consent to a search. . . . Id. We stated that, although an employee does in some instances have sufficient authority to consent to entry into or a search of his employer's residence, the lesser, and necessarily derivative, interest of the employee cannot override the greater interest of the owner. Id. When the primary occupant has denied permission to enter and conduct a search, his employee does not have the authority to override that denial. Id. (citing United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir.1984) ([W]hen police intentionally bypass a suspect who is present and known by them to possess a superior privacy interest, the validity of third party consent is less certain.)). We then concluded that no reasonable person would have believed that Teasley had apparent authority to consent to the entry and search. Id. at 532. We explained that the officer knew that Teasley was simply a handyman. Id. This fact, we continued, combined with the defendant's prior denial of consent to a search, made it impossible for a `man of reasonable caution' to believe that Teasley had the authority to consent to a search of the residence, or even to permit entry. Id. Accordingly, we held that the warrantless entry was unlawful. Id. The preliminary question before us is whether Atoui had authority to consent to a search of her parents' home while they were in Lebanon, regardless of Ayoub's interest in the home. Agent Howe testified that the informant, Puzai, told the officers that Atoui was the person who had actual control of the house, as far as who goes in and out, [and] makes sure there's nothing wrong going on at the house. . . . (JA 101.) Agent Howe further testified that he learned, when talking to Atoui, that she did in fact have control over the residence while her parents were in Lebanon, and she had a key to open and lock the door. (JA 102.) Additionally, Officer Cosenza acknowledged in his testimony that she confirmed that she was the care taker of the home. (JA 146.) He explained that she confirmed that her parents were in Lebanon and that she was given, basically custodial care of the home. (JA 146-47.) She had the keys, she was the person dealing with the home. (JA 147.) Officer Cosenza also explained that she lives one block from her parents' home. The district court accordingly found that Atoui provided confirmation of her own authority to consent and that this confirmation provided, at a minimum, apparent authority as the caretaker. . . . (JA 154.) The court added, just the fact that she had the key would tend to support such an inference on the part of the officers when combined with the statements made to them by Mrs. Atoui at her residence. (JA 154.) The district court reasonably concluded that Atoui had authority to consent to a search of the home. As mentioned, we noted in Jones that, although the handyman there  present on only a limited basis  could not consent to a search, [a] caretaker left in charge of a home for several weeks, for example, might have authority to permit entry. . . . 335 F.3d at 531. Here, not only was Atoui the caretaker of the home during the time her parents were in Lebanon, [1] she of course also has greater authority than a typical employee as the daughter of the homeowners who were not occupying the premises at the time. As a leading treatise explains, [i]t has been held that where the guest was the married daughter of the hosts and was considered to be in charge of the premises during her parents' temporary absence, the guest's consent was effective. And even when there is not such a family relationship, the guest's consent may suffice if the host was away from the premises for a significant period of time and had left the guest in full charge. 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 8.6 (4th ed. 2004) (citing Garr v. Commonweath, 463 S.W.2d 109 (Ky.App.1971), and Morrison v. State, 508 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Crim.App.1974)). Atoui's role during her parents' absence thus distinguishes her from mere handymen, landlords, hotel staff, or former tenants who  though perhaps having keys and limited access to a residence  lack common authority over the residence. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961) (landlord lacks authority to consent to search); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (hotel manager); Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (holding that former occupant who moved out of residence nearly a month before the search and possessed a key did not have authority to allow search where she never went to residence when owner was not present). Having established that Atoui possessed authority to consent to a search of her parents' home, the next question is whether Ayoub's asserted possessory interest in the home eliminated Atoui's authority to consent to the search. Even assuming that Ayoub had a possessory interest in the home and that it was greater than Atoui's  a colorable assumption, as he was seen going to and from the house  he never cut off Atoui's authority to consent to the search. Unlike the defendant in Jones, Ayoub never denied consent. See Jones, 335 F.3d at 531 (stating that handyman's authority to consent would have ceased at the point that [defendant] denied consent); see also United States v. Elam, 441 F.3d 601, 604 (8th Cir.2006) ([W]e have acknowledged (but never invoked) intentional bypass as a narrow exception to the Supreme Court's third party consent principles, explaining that `police may not rely on a third party's consent to intentionally bypass a person who is present, has a superior privacy interest in the premises, and actively objects to the search.') (quoting United States v. Esparza, 162 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir.1998) (emphasis added)); United States v. Brokaw, 985 F.2d 951, 954 (8th Cir.1993) ([A]though appellant was present at the time of the search, there is no evidence that he objected to the search or that he was `intentionally bypassed' by the officers.); but see Hembree v. Tennessee, 546 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tenn.Ct.Crim. App.1976) (We hold that when parents are in custody of the law along with their son and are equally accessible to give or withhold consent to search, the consent and cooperation to a search by the son does not waive constitutional rights of his parents.). To be sure, we find it curious that the officers never asked Ayoub for consent to search, though they had every opportunity  especially when they pulled him over as he left the house. Indeed, one might suspect that the officers believed that Ayoub would deny consent and they instead went to Atoui, even though she may have had a lesser possessory interest in the home. Worse, the officers failed simply to get a search warrant, which  given the information they possessed before the consent search  they had ample time to secure. That would have been the preferred course in light of the Fourth Amendment's strong partiality to searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 117, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (noting the law's general partiality toward `police action taken under a warrant [as against] searches and seizures without one') (citation omitted) (alteration in original); Impink, 728 F.2d at 1231 (Where the police have ample opportunity to obtain a warrant, we do not look kindly on their failure to do so.). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recently made clear that a consensual search will stand where a potential objector, such as Ayoub, never refused consent  even if he was available. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 126 S.Ct. 1515 (concluding that an objector who is present and actually objects to a search trumps a third party's authority to consent, yet the potential objector who is nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy  even if in a police car near the scene (as in Matlock ) or asleep inside the residence (as in Rodriguez )  loses out); see also United States v. Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742, 744-45 (7th Cir.2007) (finding valid third-party consent where potential objector was kept in squad car 40 feet from residence because the police were not obligated to bring [him] to [the consenting party] so he could be a party to the discussion regarding consent); United States v. Alama, 486 F.3d 1062, 1066 (8th Cir.2007) (finding valid third-party consent where potential objector remained hidden inside home when officers knocked on door). Consent is valid in these circumstances [s]o long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, 126 S.Ct. 1515. Here, though the officers had the opportunity to ask Ayoub for consent, they did not remove him from the entrance of the home to avoid his possible objection. See United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75, 2006 WL 2252515, at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57666, at  (D.Ind. Aug. 3, 2006) (noting that the Randolph Court's requirement that the objector be `at the door' is underscored by the care with which the Court crafted its opinion, referring always to one who `is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent'). Additionally, Atoui never stated that she desired to obtain Ayoub's consent to search. Cf. United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 321 (7th Cir.2006) (remanding in light of Randolph where officer admitted that he waited to search until potential objector was not home, where consenting party stated that she repeatedly asked to call objector, and where parties did not focus on whether the officers procured objector's absence for purpose of avoiding an objection). In short, because Ayoub was not present and objecting, Atoui had authority to consent to the search. Because Atoui had actual authority to consent to the search, it is not necessary to consider whether she had apparent authority. In any event, that analysis would largely overlap with the actual-authority analysis because the officers' impressions of the facts largely coincided with the objective facts. In other words, this is not a case in which a person lacks actual authority but the facts nonetheless could have provided the officers reasonable basis to believe that authority existed. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181-82, 189, 110 S.Ct. 2793 (concluding that former occupant with key who moved out lacked authority to consent to search owner's apartment but remanding for consideration of whether officers had a reasonable belief that she had that authority). Additionally, as discussed, Ayoub was not present and objecting at the time of the search  something that would otherwise suggest the officers acted unreasonably. Cf. State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 52 P.3d 329, 332 (Idaho Ct.App.2002) (The fact that . . . the person who was known to be renting the room was present and was refusing to allow entry[ ] is a significant factor in assessing the reasonableness of the officers' reliance upon [another person's] consent.); State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 983 P.2d 225, 233 (Idaho Ct.App.1999) (holding that officers' reliance on apparent authority was unreasonable where they relied on third-party consent despite objectors' strong vocal objections, which showed that the officers knew full well that they could not obtain such consent from either [objector]). Finally, lesser showings of apparent authority than Atoui provided here have sufficed to validate a search. See, e.g., United States v. Gillis, 358 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir.2004) (apparent authority where ex-girlfriend had no key and used another residence). In short, at a minimum, Atoui had the apparent authority to consent to the search. The next question is whether she actually did so.