Opinion ID: 560456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Facial Challenges.

Text: 19 The facial challenges of the two groups of plaintiffs rest on a common foundation. In seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, both sets of plaintiffs must cross the threshold requirement imposed by Article III, Section 2, of the federal Constitution and show that an actual controversy exists. 6 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). To do so, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the mere enactment of the Ordinance constituted a taking without just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 295, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). 7 In this situation, the plaintiffs cannot cross the jurisdictional threshold. 20 The Court has set forth a fairly straightforward test to be used in considering facial challenges of this genre: A statute regulating the uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable use of his land....'  Hodel, 452 U.S. at 295-96, 101 S.Ct. at 2370 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, 100 S.Ct. at 2141). Applying this test to the Surface Mining Act, the Court held that its mere enactment could not constitute a taking because the statute (1) did not categorically prohibit surface coal mining, but provided for administrative relief in the form of variances or waivers from the statutory use restrictions, and (2) allowed property owners freedom to dedicate their coal-bearing lands to alternative uses. Id. at 296-97, 101 S.Ct. at 2370. 21 In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419 (1985), the Court refined the way in which this test relates to land use regulations containing provisions for administrative relief: 22 A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property does not itself take the property in any sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent economically viable use of the land in question can it be said that a taking has occurred. 23 Id. at 127, 106 S.Ct. at 459. 24 This jurisprudence could not be more directly on point, defenestrating appellants' claim that passage of the permit requirement, without more, itself infracted their constitutional rights. The Ordinance does not presume to prohibit landlords, categorically, from putting their property to the uses to which appellants aspire (e.g., condominium conversions). To the exact contrary, the Ordinance makes available a procedure that enables landlords wishing to convert buildings from clusters of rental units to condominiums or cooperatives, to do so upon application for, and receipt of, municipal approvals. Given the availability of such a permit system and the promise implied thereby--that landlords may be granted leave to use their property as they wish--the mere enactment of the Ordinance cannot constitute a taking in the fifth amendment sense. Accord, e.g., Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 187-90, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3117-18, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985); Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir.1990); Littlefield v. Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir.1986). 25 What is more, even if the permit process were, as appellants contend, an illusion, the Ordinance, on its face, preserves an economically viable property use to landlords; after all, the enabling legislation upon which the Ordinance depends explicitly provides that property owners retain an entitlement to receive a fair net operating income on all their rent-controlled units. Act Sec. 7(a). We view this assurance as adequate on its face to meet the second part of the Court's test. See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 127, 106 S.Ct. at 459 (quoted supra p. 56); see also United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 107, 105 S.Ct. 1785, 1799, 85 L.Ed.2d 64 (1985) (Regulation of property rights does not 'take' private property when an individual's reasonable, investment-backed expectations can continue to be realized as long as he complies with reasonable regulatory restrictions the legislature has imposed.). Thus, under the applicable caselaw, the Ordinance is safe from a facial challenge because an economically viable use of the property is preserved. 26 For these reasons, appellants' facial challenges to the Ordinance presented no justiciable controversy. Therefore, those challenges were properly dismissed as unripe. 8 27