Opinion ID: 2524378
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: {7} Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support either her conviction for false imprisonment or for felony murder. We review the sufficiency of the evidence under a substantial evidence standard. State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 131, 753 P.2d 1314, 1319 (1988). [T]he relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Garcia, 114 N.M. 269, 274, 837 P.2d 862, 867 (1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, resolving all conflicts and indulging all permissible inferences to uphold the conviction, and disregarding all evidence and inferences to the contrary. State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 19, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829. In making this determination, the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder, nor does it reweigh the evidence. State v. Hernandez, 115 N.M. 6, 26, 846 P.2d 312, 332 (1993). The evidence presented in this case supports the convictions for false imprisonment and felony murder.
{8} Defendant was charged as both a principal and an accessory to the crime of false imprisonment. See Section 30-4-3; NMSA 1978, § 30-1-13 (1972). To convict Defendant of false imprisonment, the State had to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. The defendant confined [the victim] against his will; 2. The defendant knew she had no authority to confine [the victim][.] See UJI 14-401 NMRA 2001. The jury was also given the following instruction on accessory liability: The defendant may be found guilty of a crime even though she herself did not do the acts constituting the crime, if the state proves to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1. The defendant intended that the crime be committed; 2. The crime was committed; 3. The defendant helped, encouraged or caused the crime to be committed[.] This instruction does not apply to the charge of felony murder. See UJI 14-2822 NMRA 2001. {9} The State presented evidence about the events of that night through the testimony of the eyewitness, Apodaca, and that of Jennifer and Brian Jones, who testified about Defendant's separate admissions to each of them about the victim's death. The jury heard testimony that (1) Defendant was armed; (2) she decided, along with Smith and Apodaca, to snatch a stranger off the street; (3) the victim was forced into the back of a two-door car from which he could not get out except through the driver door or the passenger side door; and (4) as they drove from Albuquerque to Bernardo, Defendant pressed her foot on the gas pedal to keep the car on course while the driver turned around to beat the victim with the butt of his weapon. {10} We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. A rational jury could reasonably have determined that Defendant either confined the victim against his will without authority to do so, or helped or encouraged that to happen. See State v. Muise, 103 N.M. 382, 388, 707 P.2d 1192, 1198 (Ct.App.1985) (The restraint constituting false imprisonment may arise out of words, acts, gestures or similar means which result in a reasonable fear of personal difficulty or personal injuries if the victim does not submit.).
{11} Defendant's claim that her felony murder conviction is not supported by substantial evidence has two parts. As we understand Defendant's argument, she contends that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction because there was no underlying felony inherently dangerous to life due to the fact that false imprisonment is a fourth degree felony. She argues that there was insufficient evidence of false imprisonment for it to have served as the underlying felony. Because we have already determined that the false imprisonment conviction was supported by substantial evidence, this part of Defendant's claim is resolved. {12} [T]he killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse . . . in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony is first degree murder. Section 30-2-1(A)(2). In New Mexico, the underlying felony must be a first degree felony, an inherently dangerous lesser degree felony, or a lesser degree felony committed under inherently dangerous circumstances. State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 442, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1977) [B]oth the nature of the felony and the circumstances surrounding its commission may be considered to determine whether it was inherently dangerous to human life. Id. This is a factual matter for the jury to decide in each case, subject to review by the appellate courts. Id. {13} Defendant was charged with felony murder as a principal and as an accessory. The jury was instructed that to find Defendant guilty of felony murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1. The defendant, Darcy Smith, committed the crime of false imprisonment, under circumstances or in a manner dangerous to human life; 2. Darcy Smith caused the death of [the victim] during the commission of false imprisonment; 3. Darcy Smith intended to kill or knew that her acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm[.] See UJI 14-202 NMRA 2001. To convict Defendant as an accessory to felony murder, the State had to prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. The felony of false imprisonment was committed under circumstances or in a manner dangerous to human life; 2. The defendant Darcy Smith helped, encouraged or caused the felony of false imprisonment to be committed; 3. The defendant Darcy Smith intended that the false imprisonment be committed; 4. During the commission of the felony [the victim] was killed; 5. The defendant Darcy Smith helped, encouraged, or caused the killing to be committed; 6. The defendant Darcy Smith intended the killing to occur or knew that she was helping to create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm[.] See UJI 14-2821 NMRA 2001. {14} False imprisonment is a fourth degree felony, so in order for it to serve as the predicate felony for felony murder, the State would have to prove that it was committed in circumstances that were inherently dangerous to human life. See Harrison, 90 N.M. at 442, 564 P.2d at 1324. The evidence presented at trial showed that the victim was forced into the back of a two-door car at gunpoint and was beaten with a gun as he was driven to an isolated location. Defendant, Smith, and Apodaca were armed and had been drinking throughout the evening. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could have found that Defendant committed the crime of false imprisonment under circumstances or in a manner dangerous to human life. See UJI 14-202. {15} Defendant's second claim is that no causal connection was established between the victim's death and her acts. This claim is without merit. In Harrison, this Court defined causation in the context of felony murder as those acts of defendant or his accomplice initiating and leading to the homicide without an independent force intervening. 90 N.M. at 441-42, 564 P.2d at 1323-24 (footnote omitted). The testimony was sufficient to establish a causal connection between the false imprisonment and the murder and that Defendant's acts initiated and led to the victim's death. See State v. McGruder, 1997 NMSC 023, ¶ 19, 123 N.M. 302, 940 P.2d 150 (The State proved a nexus between those two felonies and the murder that excluded the possibility the murder was not committed in the commission of a felony.). Moreover, the jury was instructed on accessory liability for felony murder. The jury could have found Defendant guilty of felony murder if they determined that she helped, encouraged, or caused the killing to be committed. See UJI 14-2821. {16} Defendant also appears to argue that there was insufficient evidence because the testimony of Apodaca was suspect. However, in New Mexico, it is the factfinder that determines credibility. See State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 47, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280. Further, Apodaca's testimony was corroborated by that of Jennifer and Brian Jones and also supported by the physical evidence as testified to by the chief medical investigator and the expert witness on firearms.