Opinion ID: 816266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of Torres-Garcia

Text: Carrillo de Palacios contends that the BIA impermissibly applied its decision in Torres-Garcia to her case, because she applied for adjustment of status several weeks before we issued our decision in Gonzales, in which we adopted TorresGarcia as the law of our circuit. In Gonzales, we deferred for the first time to the BIA’s determination in Torres-Garcia that aliens inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II) may not adjust their status under § 1255(i). Gonzales, 508 F.3d at 10 CARRILLO DE PALACIOS V . HOLDER 1241–42. We determined that we were required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation in Torres-Garcia under the Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services (Brand X), 545 U.S. 967, 980–82 (2005), because our earlier, contrary interpretation in Perez-Gonzalez “was an interpretation of a statutory ambiguity.” Gonzales, 508 F.3d at 1236. Carrillo de Palacios alleges that she applied for adjustment of status in reliance on Perez-Gonzalez.4 “[W]hen we overturn our own precedent following a contrary statutory interpretation by an agency authorized under Brand X, we analyze whether the agency’s statutory interpretation (to which we defer) applies retroactively under the test we adopted in Montgomery Ward, if the issue is fairly raised by the parties.” Garfias-Rodriguez, 2012 WL 5077137, at . Because Carrillo de Palacios has “fairly raised” the issue of retroactivity, the Montgomery Ward factors must be applied to determine whether she can avoid the retroactive application of Torres-Garcia. The Montgomery Ward test seeks to “balanc[e] a regulated party’s interest in being able to rely on the terms of a rule as it is written, against an agency’s interest in retroactive application of an adjudicatory decision.” 691 F.2d at 1333. Adopting the analytical framework set forth in Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union v. NLRB (Retail 4 “[O]ur decision in Perez-Gonzalez effectively allowed [§ 1255(i)] to function as a means to ‘circumvent the statutory 10-year limitation on section [1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)] waivers’ by allowing aliens to ‘simply reenter unlawfully before requesting the waiver.’” Garfias-Rodriguez, 2012 W L 5077137, at  (brackets omitted) (quoting Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 876). CARRILLO DE PALACIOS V . HOLDER 11 Union), 466 F.2d 380, 390–93 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the Montgomery Ward test considers: (1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard. Montgomery Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333 (quoting Retail Union, 466 F.2d at 390). Our application of the Montgomery Ward factors to the instant case necessarily follows the analysis undertaken in Garfias-Rodriguez, which involved a nearly identical retroactivity issue and a similarly situated petitioner. The first Montgomery Ward factor—whether this is a case of first impression—is “not . . . well suited to the context of immigration law” and does not favor either party. GarfiasRodriguez, 2012 WL 5077137, at . The second and third factors, however, strongly favor the government. Carrillo de Palacios cannot reasonably argue that Torres-Garcia represented an abrupt departure from any well-established practice, because “the tension between § 212(a)(9)(C) and § 245(i) was obvious. That ambiguity in the law—which resulted in a six-year dialogue between the BIA and us—should have given [Carrillo de Palacios] no assurances of [her] eligibility for adjustment of status.” Id. at . 12 CARRILLO DE PALACIOS V . HOLDER Additionally, Carrillo de Palacios could not have reasonably relied on our former decision in Perez-Gonzalez because she applied for adjustment of status after Torres-Garcia was issued and was thus “on notice of” Perez-Gonzalez’s “vulnerability.” Id. at . However, the fourth factor, which considers the degree of burden imposed on a party, weighs heavily in favor of Carrillo de Palacios. See id. at . The retroactive application of Torres-Garcia to her case forecloses any possibility she may have had under Perez-Gonzalez to adjust her status and avoid deportation. “‘There is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation.’” Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 952 (9th Cir. 2007)). Finally, the fifth factor favors the government, because “non-retroactivity impairs the uniformity of a statutory scheme, and the importance of uniformity in immigration law is well established.” Id. However, this factor “only leans in the government’s direction” because the rule established in Torres-Garcia “does not follow from the plain language of the statute,” since § 1182(a)(9)(C) and § 1255(i) are inconsistent, and when read together, ambiguous. Id. On balance, the majority of the Montgomery Ward factors favor the government. Accordingly, the BIA did not err in applying Torres-Garcia retroactively to Carrillo de Palacios. CARRILLO DE PALACIOS V . HOLDER 13