Opinion ID: 2785662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cobb's Remaining Arguments

Text: 14 Cobb's argument relies on Meier v. Smith, 254 Wis. 70, 35 N.W.2d 452 (1948), in which this court held that a Wisconsin statute requiring six months' notice prior to eviction did not conflict with a federal statute requiring at least 60 days' notice. We reasoned that the federal statute required a minimum amount of notice and the Wisconsin statute did not go below that minimum. Meier, 254 Wis. at 74-75. We also reasoned that the Wisconsin statute does not take any right from the landlord to possession of property granted by [federal law]. Id. at 79. Meier thus hurts Cobb's position. A right to remedy his lease violation would deprive the Housing Authority of its right under 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) to evict Cobb and take possession of his housing unit. 26 No. 2013AP2207 ¶38 Cobb makes several arguments in addition to his argument that the right to remedy does not conflict with 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6). Although we have already determined that the right to remedy conflicts with § 1437d(l)(6) in the present case, we nevertheless briefly address these remaining arguments. ¶39 Cobb argues that his lease provides a right to remedy his drug use. He relies on section 9.C. of his lease, which requires the Housing Authority to provide termination notices in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2). Section 9.C. has several express exceptions, including section 9.C.2., which states that the Housing Authority shall give written notice of termination of the Lease as of: . . . 2. A reasonable time commensurate with the exigencies of the situation (not to exceed 30 days) in the case of . . . any drug-related criminal activity . . . . Cobb argues that section 9.C.2. does not eliminate the right to remedy but rather extends the five-day notice period under § 704.17(2) to up to 30 days. However, other lease provisions belie Cobb's argument. Section 6.J. of the lease states that the Housing Authority will provide one written warning prior to a proposed termination of tenancy, except . . . in the case of a violation of 5.Q. or a termination per 9.C.2. Section 5.Q., which uses language that closely follows 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6), prohibits a tenant from engaging in [a]ny activity that threatens the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises . . .  or [a]ny drug-related or violent criminal activity. . . . Such activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy. Thus, sections 6.J. 27 No. 2013AP2207 and 5.Q. plainly state that a written warning——i.e., a right to remedy——does not apply to drug-related criminal activity. ¶40 Cobb relies on several statements of federal policy for the proposition that the right to remedy is not preempted. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Cobb points to the preamble to a HUD rule, which amended HUD regulations to strengthen public housing authorities' ability to evict tenants who engaged in illegal drug use or other criminal activity. Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 66 Fed. Reg. 28776-01 (May 24, 2001). The preamble states that [t]his final rule does not . . . preempt State law within the meaning of Executive Order 13132. Id. at 28791. However, that statement sheds no light on whether 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) preempts state law.15 ¶41 Cobb also relies on a HUD regulation that states that a notice to vacate which is required by State or local law may be combined with, or run concurrently with, a notice of lease termination under . . . this section. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(3)(iii). However, this regulation does not indicate 15 An earlier, proposed version of this rule stated that federal housing policy created a one strike policy with respect to illegal drug use. One–Strike Screening and Eviction for Drug Abuse and Other Criminal Activity, 64 Fed. Reg. 4026201 (proposed July 23, 1999). The final version of this rule does not use the phrase one strike. Cobb argues that HUD's omission of that phrase from the final version of this rule further indicates that HUD did not intend for this rule to preempt state law. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) preempts state law regardless of whether this HUD rule does as well. 28 No. 2013AP2207 whether a state law may require a public housing authority to provide an opportunity to remedy drug-related criminal activity. ¶42 Cobb relies on a letter issued in response to Rucker by then-HUD Secretary Mel Martinez, which states that [e]viction should be the last option explored . . . . Letter from Mel Martinez, HUD Secretary, to Public Housing Directors (Apr. 16, 2002). However, this letter does not shed any light on whether a statutory right to cure may limit a public housing authority's power to evict once it explores that option. See Boston Hous. Auth., 871 N.E.2d at 1078-79 & n.14. ¶43 Finally, Cobb relies on a HUD guidance that provides, State or local law governing eviction procedures may give tenants procedural rights in addition to those provided by federal law. Tenants may rely on those state or local laws so long as they have not been pre-empted by federal law. HUD Directive No. 96–16, Notice PIH 96–16(HA) (April 12, 1996); see also 24 C.F.R. § 247.6(c). Cobb argues that Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b)'s right to cure is a procedural right allowed under that HUD guidance. However, that HUD guidance expressly states that local or state law cannot provide rights that are preempted by federal law. We have already determined that federal law preempts the right to cure in the present case. See also Scarborough, 890 A.2d at 258 (holding that [a] 'procedural' right to a second chance to refrain from criminal activity endangering other tenants would conflict fundamentally with federal housing law). 29 No. 2013AP2207 ¶44 In sum, for the reasons previously set forth as well as those briefly addressed above, we reject Cobb's additional arguments that Wis. Stat. § 704.17(2)(b)'s right to cure is not preempted in the present case.