Opinion ID: 160830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wal-Mart's Entitlement to a New Trial

Text: 13 In her complaint, Allen sought, inter alia, damages for loss of enjoyment of life. At the close of the evidence, the jury was instructed that Allen was claiming damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and medical expenses. The jury returned a general verdict in the amount of $40,000. Wal-Mart concedes, as it must, that Allen presented evidence that she incurred medical expenses of $21,236.66. Wal-Mart also concedes that Allen produced evidence regarding the pain and suffering she has experienced and will probably experience in the future. 14 Wal-Mart contends, however, that Allen failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her claim for loss of enjoyment of life damages and, therefore, the jury instruction on loss of enjoyment of life damages was improper. Wal-Mart requests this court to set aside the jury's award of $40,000 and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages. Wal-Mart argues that a new trial on the question of damages must be granted because it is impossible to ascertain from the general verdict whether the jury based its $40,000 verdict on the allegedly improper jury instruction. 15 This court has previously stated that, [i]n a diversity case, the substance of the jury instructions is determined by state law, while the grant or denial of tendered instructions is governed by federal law. A party is entitled to an instruction on their theory of the case so long as the instruction is supported by competent evidence on the issue or theory supporting the instruction. 16 Perlmutter v. United States Gypsum Co., 4 F.3d 864, 871 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). This court, thus, must first determine the basic elements of a claim for loss of enjoyment of life damages under Wyoming law and then determine whether the evidence presented in this case supported the granting of an instruction on such damages. 17 The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that loss of enjoyment of life is a compensable damage and can be taken into consideration by a jury when arriving at the total general damages. See Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12 (Wyo. 1980). A plaintiff can support her claim for loss of enjoyment of life damages by presenting evidence that she refrains from participating in activities she previously enjoyed in order to avoid or minimize pain. See id. at 15. At trial, Allen testified as follows: 18 Q: Do you have any fears about your neck? 19 A: Yes. 20 Q: What kind of fears to you have? 21 A: Well, I stopped well, I didn't just stop. I don't ride horses or do a lot of that stuff anymore. 22 Q: Why? 23 A: Because I'm afraid if I get bucked off of getting hurt. 24 Wal-Mart argues that this testimony is insufficient to support any damages for loss of enjoyment of life because on cross-examination Allen testified that she had stopped riding horses before the accident. Wal-Mart reads too much into Allen's testimony. Allen testified that she refrains from horseback riding because she is afraid of injury; Allen did not testify that at the time she stopped horseback riding she never intended to start again. The jury was certainly allowed to infer from Allen's testimony that any plans she may have had to engage in horseback riding in the future are now foreclosed because of the accident. The only thing clear from Allen's testimony is that as a result of the injury she sustained at the Wal-Mart store, she is fearful of engaging in an activity she once enjoyed. We conclude that the evidence supported an award of damages for loss of enjoyment of life under Wyoming law and, thus, the jury was properly instructed on the issue.
25 Wal-Mart also argues that it is entitled to a new trial because, under Wyoming law, the jury should not have been instructed on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This court reviews de novo the legal question of whether the jury was properly instructed on the governing law. See Thompson v. United States, 223 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000). If this court concludes that the district court erroneously instructed the jury on an improper theory and we are unable to determine with absolute certainty whether the jury relied on the erroneous instruction, a general verdict must be reversed. Farrell v. Klein Tools, Inc., 866 F.2d 1294, 1301 (10th Cir. 1989). 26 The res ipsa loquitur instruction given by the district court allowed the jury to infer Wal-Mart's negligence. 1 Wal-Mart, however, contends that Wyoming law precludes the giving of a res ipsa loquitur instruction when a party attempts to prove specific acts of negligence. See Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153, 1164-65 (Wyo. 1992). Wal-Mart argues that under Wyoming law, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the facts of this case because Allen proceeded on a negligence theory. We agree. 2 27 Under Wyoming law, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is limited to those situations where the thing which causes damage or injury, without the fault of the plaintiff, is shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as, in the ordinary course of things, does not occur if one having such control uses proper care. Wood v. Geis Trucking Co., 639 P.2d 903, 906 (Wyo. 1982). In Dellapenta, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the doctrine is inapplicable when a plaintiff presents specific evidence of presumably negligent acts and the defendant presents an equally-plausible, alternative explanation for the accident that is supported by some evidence. 838 P.2d at 1165. The court recently applied the Dellapenta holding in Reese v. Board of Directors of Memorial Hospital, 955 P.2d 425, 427 (Wyo. 1998), stating: the doctrine cannot be applied when an inference that the injury was due to a cause other than the defendant's negligence could be drawn as reasonably as one that it was due to his negligence. Under such circumstances, the thing does not speak for itself and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is inapplicable. See id. 28 The record, including the trial transcript and Allen's closing argument, clearly indicates that Allen attempted to prove specific acts of Wal-Mart's negligence. Allen testified that she observed a Wal-Mart employee standing on a bottom shelf and reaching for merchandise. A reasonable inference could be drawn from this evidence that the accident occurred as a result of Wal-Mart's negligence. Additionally, during closing arguments Allen's counsel stated, I'm going to tell you that I think the most important document that you may see in the jury room will be . . . the report of the customer incident that was taken within 24 hours, . . . and I think that explains the incident, or nearly explains the incident. The document to which Allen's counsel referred during closing arguments contained, inter alia, the following account of the accident given by Allen: a female associate stood on shelf to get item from riser and [ ] 20-30 'pink boxes' fell and hit [Allen] on the head and shoulders. 29 At trial, the Wal-Mart employee testified that she did not stand on the shelf. Instead, the employee testified that she observed Allen attempting to retrieve merchandise from the top shelf. This testimony is evidence from which a equally-reasonable inference could be drawn that the accident was due to a cause other than Wal-Mart's negligence. Wyoming law clearly provides that a res ipsa loquitur instruction is inappropriate under these circumstances. See Reese, 955 P.2d at 427; Dellapenta, 838 P.2d at 1164-65. The district court, therefore, erroneously instructed the jury on an improper theory. Based on the record before us, this court is unable to determine with absolute certainty whether the jury relied on the erroneous instruction when it returned its general verdict. Consequently, this court must reverse and remand for a new trial. See Farrell, 866 F.2d at 1301.