Opinion ID: 2277144
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Heading: The Attorney General's Obligation to Represent the Superintendent

Text: The Superior Court ruled that 5 M.R.S.A. § 191 (1979) imposes a mandatory duty on the Attorney General to represent agencies and officers of the State of Maine in all civil actions involving their official acts. Under the Superior Court's ruling the Attorney General could decline representation only if he determined that the agency's or officer's decision was legally, ethically or morally indefensible and not in the public interest. We reject such an interpretation of section 191. The common law duties of the Attorney General, even as modified by statute, involve a greater degree of discretion than is permitted under the ruling of the Superior Court. We have previously described the office of the Attorney General in general terms as follows: The Attorney General, in this State, is a constitutional officer endowed with common law powers. See, Constitution of Maine, Article IX, Section 11. As the chief law officer of the State, he may, in the absence of some express legislative restriction to the contrary, exercise all such power and authority as public interests may, from time to time require, and may institute, conduct, and maintain all such actions and proceedings as he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the State, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights. Lund ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554, 558 (Me.1973) (emphasis in the original). As the historical successor to the English Attorney General, the Attorney General in Maine, as well as in other states, is vested with considerable discretion and autonomy. In this respect, the position of a state attorney general has been accurately summarized in the following terms: As a result, the attorneys general of our states have enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. Their duties and powers typically are not exhaustively defined by either constitution or statute but include all those exercised at common law. There is and has been no doubt that the legislature may deprive the attorney general of specific powers; but in the absence of such legislative action, he typically may exercise all such authority as the public interest requires. And the attorney general has wide discretion in making the determination as to the public interest. State of Florida ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268-69 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829, 97 S.Ct. 88, 50 L.Ed.2d 92 (1976). It is undisputed that at common law the Attorney General did not represent every state official nor was he required to do so. In fact, in 1904 Attorney General George M. Seiders expressed concern over private representation of state agencies and urged that the legal matters of the state should be attended to exclusively by his office. 1904 Report of the Attorney General 22. The following year, the Legislature responded by enacting the statute now codified as 5 M.R.S.A. § 191. We must determine what change, if any, results from the following language of the statute: The Attorney General, a deputy, assistant, or staff attorney shall appear for the State, the head of any state department, the head of any state institution and agencies of the State in all civil actions and proceedings in which the State is a party or interested, or in which the official acts and doings of said officers are called in question, in all the courts of the State; and in such actions and proceedings before any other tribunal when requested by the Governor or by the Legislature or either branch thereof. All such actions and proceedings shall be prosecuted or defended by him or under his direction. Writs, summonses or other processes served upon such officers shall forthwith be transmitted by them to him. All legal services required by such officers, boards and commissions in matters relating to their official duties shall be rendered by the Attorney General or under his direction. Said officers or agencies of the State shall not act at the expense of the State as counsel, nor employ private counsel except upon prior written approval of the Attorney General.... 5 M.R.S.A. § 191. We are not persuaded that the use of the word shall removes all discretion and requires that the Attorney General represent all state agencies regardless of his view of the public interest. Both the history of the enactment of section 191 and its plain language support our conclusion that the Legislature directed the Attorney General to control state litigation and consolidated control in his office without mandating representation in all cases. A contrary conclusion would ignore the provisions of the statute authorizing the employment of private counsel with written approval of the Attorney General. Our sister Court in Massachusetts has rendered a similar interpretation of a comparable statute. In Secretary of Admin. and Finance v. Attorney General, 367 Mass. 154, 326 N.E.2d 334 (1975), the Court held that the Attorney General's control of the conduct of litigation includes the power to make a policy determination not to prosecute the Secretary's appeal in this case. Id. at 159, 326 N.E. at 336-37. Accord, Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359, 366 N.E. 2d 1262 (1977). We need not decide whether approval could be withheld for the employment of private counsel because of a disagreement over the public interest. It is sufficient for our purposes to hold that the Attorney General is not obligated to render representation to the Superintendent in these circumstances. Accordingly, in Superintendent of Insurance v. Attorney General, the Superior Court erroneously granted relief in the nature of mandamus.