Opinion ID: 2548125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clerical Mistake

Text: Rogers contend that if the time noted on the warrant is erroneous, it was a judicial rather than clerical error and not subject to correction. In fact, the erroneously entered time was a clerical error. RCr 10.10, allows for the correction in orders and other parts of the record of clerical mistakes. A clerical mistake, we have noted, is a mistake made by a clerk or other judicial or ministerial officer in writing or keeping records. Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Ky.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Stated otherwise, it is [a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence, esp. in writing or copying something on the record, and not from judicial reasoning or determination. Black's Law Dictionary, 622 (9th ed.2009). Rogers's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, in issuing the search warrant in this case, the trial court was not judicially determining the time of issuance. It was not making a finding or applying a legal standard. It was merely observing the time and marking it on the record. Its minor inadvertence in doing so was thus a clerical error, not a judicial error. The mistake having become apparent, the trial court did not exceed its authority or contravene the rules by correcting it. This result is consistent with the many federal cases finding that minor clerical errors, such as misdated or unsigned jurats, generally are not fatal to a search warrant, at least where other information makes the error apparent. See, e.g., United States v. Waker, 534 F.3d 168 (2nd Cir.2008) (noting the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal that have so found). Under RCr 9.78, we review a trial court's ultimate decision to grant or deny a suppression motion de novo, but its factual findings we review only for clear error, upholding findings supported by substantial evidence. Peyton v. Commonwealth, 253 S.W.3d 504 (Ky.2008). Here, the trial court found that the search warrant, mistakenly dated as having been issued at 4:50 p.m., had in fact been issued at 3:50 p.m., an hour before the search of Rogers's residence. That factual finding was supported by substantial evidence: the detective's testimony that, notwithstanding the discrepancy on the face of the warrant, he obtained the warrant prior to the search, and the September 9 court record the trial court appropriately noticed showing that the warrant could not have been issued at 4:50 that day, but likely was issued at 3:50. Given that evidence, the trial court's finding of fact that the warrant was issued prior to the search was not clearly erroneous. The search was pursuant to a validly issued warrant and was therefore lawful, justifying the trial court's decision to deny Rogers's suppression motion.