Opinion ID: 1946175
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of Sharon Pearson

Text: In his fifth claim, Weiss argues that the trial court erred in permitting the testimony of his ex-wife, Sharon Pearson. Weiss and Ms. Pearson were married under the common law at the time of Bruzda's death, but were no longer married at the time of his July 1997, murder trial. Weiss claims that the statutory basis to exclude her testimony is found in Section 5914 of the Judicial Code, which states as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, in a criminal proceeding neither husband nor wife shall be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege is waived upon the trial. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5914.The proper foundation for the privilege governing confidential communications made during a marriage subsequently terminated by death or divorce is not Section 5914 as cited by Weiss; rather, it is the common law. See Commonwealth v. Chiappini, 2001 WL 826757, No. 125 MAP 1998 (Pa. 2001); Commonwealth v. Borris, 247 Pa.Super. 260, 372 A.2d 451 (1977). Nevertheless, Weiss is correct in asserting that disclosure of confidential communications made during a marriage is prohibited even following the dissolution of the marriage. Cornell v. Vanartsdalen, 4 Pa. 364 (1846). However, because Ms. Pearson did not testify to confidential communications at Weiss' trial, the trial court did not err in allowing her testimony. The crux of Ms. Pearson's testimony concerned two discrete observations; the blood she found in the back of her car the morning after Bruzda disappeared, and the identity of the quilt in which Bruzda's body was found. See N.T. 7/8/97 pp. 504-526. No part of this testimony includes any confidential communications and accordingly, it was not subject to the privilege. See generally Commonwealth v. Chiappini, supra. [7]