Opinion ID: 158381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Option to Return a Life Sentence

Text: 50 Bryson argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it had the option to return a life sentence even if it found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected this argument, and held that there is no entitlement to such an instruction. See Bryson, 876 P.2d at 262-63. On habeas, the district court determined that the instructions fairly and adequately charged the jury that imposition of the death penalty was not required even if the aggravating circumstances were found. Dist. Ct. R. Doc. 27 at 93. Instruction No. 12 provided that 51 Should you unanimously find that one or more aggravating circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be authorized to consider imposing a sentence of death. 52 If you do not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed, you are prohibited from considering the penalty of death. In that event, the sentence must be imprisonment for life or imprisonment for life without parole. 53 Original R. Vol. 2 at 675; Trial Tr. Vol. VI at 1744. 54 This court has upheld this instruction in cases raising the same argument Bryson raises here. See Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254 (10th Cir. 1999); Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 789-91 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 345 (1998); see also Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting same argument for substantially similar jury instruction), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 14, 1999) (No. 98-9420). In Duvall, this court held that this particular instruction contains permissive language, which informs the jury that they were not required to impose the death penalty upon a finding of an aggravating circumstance. See Duvall, 139 F.3d at 790. Rather, it authorized [the jury] to consider imposing a sentence of death if it found unanimously that one or more aggravating factors existed. Original R. Vol. 2 at 675 (emphasis added); Trial Tr. Vol. VI at 1744 (same). Neither this instruction nor any other instruction precluded the jury from considering mitigating evidence. Furthermore, the trial court did not instruct the jury that it was required to impose the death penalty if it found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. See Duvall, 139 F.3d at 790. 55 Instruction No. 12 is, therefore, constitutionally permissible. See id. It effectively instructed the jury of its discretion to decline to impose the death penalty, including by implication the option to impose life imprisonment even if the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating. See id. at 790 & n.8; see also Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 277 (1998) (approving instruction providing that when aggravating circumstance exists beyond reasonable doubt, jury may impose death penalty); Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1394 (10th Cir. 1989) (requiring instructions to preserve jury's responsibility and authority to exercise discretion in sentencing determination). 56 Bryson relies upon the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction Criminal Second (OUJI-CR 2d) adopted in 1994. OUJI-CR 2d 4-80 expressly instructs a jury that if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, it may impose either a life sentence or a life sentence without parole. Bryson contends Duvall is not controlling because it did not consider OUJI-CR 2d 4-80 and that the instructions given did not set forth existing Oklahoma law. 57 This uniform instruction clearly sets forth the settled law. Under Duvall and Johnson, however, the failure expressly to give such an instruction is not constitutional error.