Opinion ID: 2640351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence of First Degree Felony Murder and the Robbery Special Circumstance

Text: Defendant concedes sufficient evidence establishes he murdered Ly and intended to kill Ly from the moment he hit him and knocked him to the ground. He contends, however, the evidence was insufficient to prove first degree murder on an attempted robbery-felony-murder theory because the prosecution failed to prove that he attempted to rob Ly. Even assuming there was sufficient evidence he attempted to rob Ly, defendant contends the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to support the special circumstance finding that he murdered Ly during the attempted commission of a robbery because any intent to steal was incidental to the murder. The insufficiency of the evidence, he claims, violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sections 1, 7, 12, 15, 16 and 17 of article I of the California Constitution. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].) When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a special circumstance, the relevant inquiry is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 225 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365], quoting People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 678 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. ( People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 463 [46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64].) If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 104.) A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluates a witness's credibility. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1129 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) (5) As discussed above, to be convicted of attempted robbery, the perpetrator must harbor a specific intent to commit robbery and commit a direct but ineffectual act toward the commission of the crime. ( People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 694.) The jury may infer a defendant's specific intent to commit a crime from all of the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence. (See People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698] [Evidence of a defendant's state of mind is almost inevitably circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction.].) (6) Under the felony-murder rule, a murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate one of several enumerated felonies, including robbery, is first degree murder. (§ 189.) The robbery-murder special circumstance applies to a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in ... the commission of, [or] attempted commission of robbery. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) [T]o prove a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, the prosecution must show that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150]; see also People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61-62 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99].) To prove a robbery-murder special circumstance, the prosecution must prove the defendant formed the intent to steal before or while killing the victim. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 105.) The prosecution theorized that defendant approached Ly and attempted to rob him before savagely stabbing him to death because he was Vietnamese. Relying on People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 19 [249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843], overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544, footnote 5 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527], and People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pages 52-54, defendant initially argues that, at most, a theft or attempted theft occurred because he asked Ly, Do you have a car? only after he had already knocked Ly to the ground. To be clear, a conviction of robbery cannot be sustained in the absence of evidence that the defendant conceived his intent to steal either before committing the act of force against the victim, or during the commission of that act; if the intent arose only after the use of force against the victim, the taking will at most constitute a theft. ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 19, italics added, citing People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 52-54.) Defendant's argument fails, however, because it erroneously presumes proof of defendant's use of force against Ly is required to sustain the attempted robbery -felony-murder conviction. The crime of attempted robbery requires neither the commission of an element of robbery nor the completion of a theft or assault. ( People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 694; see also People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 454-455 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) In any event, as discussed below, defendant pressed his knife against Ly's throat before he asked a second time whether Ly had a car. We conclude the record contains substantial evidence supporting the finding that defendant attempted to rob Ly, the attempted robbery-felonymurder conviction and the special circumstance finding that the murder occurred during the commission of an attempted robbery. Defendant's admissions in his February 23d letter to Dulaney established, in horrific detail, the circumstances of the attempted robbery and murder. The letter was handwritten and addressed to Dulaney (Dear Bro, Ex-con 2/11, Rob) with a large drawing of the characters 2/11, prominently appearing in the top margin. Defendant described to Dulaney how he and Christopher approached Ly as he Rollerbladed alone on the Tustin High School tennis courts. Defendant saw that Ly was scared and used a ruse whereby defendant indicated to Ly that he thought he knew Ly in order to have Ly think he wasn't gona get jumped. Defendant then hit Ly, knocking him to the ground. Ly responded, `what the fuck' and `you can have what ever I got.' I have nothing only a keyyou can have it.' (Errors in original.) Defendant then asked Ly if he had a car and pulled out his knife. After Ly said, No, defendant pressed his knife against Ly's throat, and again asked Ly if he had a car. Ly grabbed defendant's hand that held the knife and looked at him. Because defendant thought Ly was trying to get his description, defendant stomped on his head three times and each time told Ly to stop looking at him. Defendant then repeatedly and fatally stabbed Ly with his knife. Ly's body was discovered on the tennis courts the next morning. Near the body, the police found a hat and a single key that fit the locks at Ly's residence. The prosecution also introduced evidence of the Reyes-Martinez and Tillman robberies on the issue of defendant's intent during his assault of Ly. Based upon this evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that defendant harbored an intent to steal Ly's property when he knocked Ly to the ground, demanded to know whether he had a car, and put his knife to his throat before asking him again whether he had a car. (See People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1129 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1] [rejecting the defendant's contention that the accomplice's unadorned question`where do you have it?,' did not reflect an intent to steal the victims' property].) Defendant's own observation that Ly was scared before he knocked him to the ground, and Ly's statement to defendant that he could take Ly's (house) key before defendant first asked him whether he had a car, strongly suggest that defendant, accompanied by Christopher, initially approached Ly in a manner that communicated nonverbally this intent to steal. Further, defendant's reference to 2/11 at the top of his confessional letter to Dulaney, a term that defendant admitted meant armed robbery, and evidence he previously assaulted and robbed Reyes-Martinez and Tillman of their money justified the jury's implied finding that defendant intended to permanently deprive Ly of his property. Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he intended to permanently deprive Ly of his property, citing People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 321 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883]. In Thompson, this court held evidence that the defendant demanded and took the car belonging to the victim of the uncharged robbery was inadmissible to prove his specific intent to steal a car from the victim of the charged robbery. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 320-321.) Because the evidence of the uncharged robbery established that the defendant intended only to temporarily use the car, which was recovered by police shortly after it was taken, we reasoned this evidence did not tend to prove the defendant's intent to permanently deprive the victim of her car in the charged robbery. ( Ibid. ) Here, unlike Thompson, the evidence of the Reyes-Martinez and Tillman robberies established that defendant intended to permanently deprive his victims of their money. This evidence, in turn, reasonably supports an inference that defendant intended to permanently rob Ly of his property. Defendant further contends the evidence is insufficient to prove he attempted to rob Ly because he did not take any property from Ly, such as his Rollerblades. To find an attempted robbery, however, the jury was not required to find that Ly possessed or defendant took anything of value. ( People v. Lee (1932) 125 Cal.App. 709, 712 [13 P.2d 943].) Under general attempt principles, a completed theft is not required for attempted robbery. ( People v. Medina, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 694; see also People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 454-455 [proof of an attempted crime does not require proof of an actual element of the offense attempted].) We conclude sufficient evidence supports the jury's implicit finding that defendant attempted to rob Ly. (See People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1129 [the totality of the circumstances justified the jury's finding that an attempted robbery and burglary occurred and that the defendant and his accomplices acted jointly to rob the victims].) Defendant additionally argues that, even if the record contains sufficient evidence to support an implied finding that he attempted to rob Ly, the evidence nonetheless was insufficient to establish that the murder was committed during the commission of an attempted robbery. Defendant argues any attempted robbery was incidental to the murder, that is, any intent to rob Ly was incidental to his primary intent to kill Ly. Defendant cites People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1, overruled on another ground in In re Sassounian, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pages 543-544, footnote 5, and People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, in support. In People v. Morris, the victim was fatally shot at close range in a public bathhouse while wearing only socks and shoes. The only witness to the shooting observed defendant standing in the doorway of the restroom, facing and firing inside, and then fleeing the scene. After the murder, the defendant attempted to use a credit card belonging to the victim. The defendant had admitted to an acquaintance that he had been making money off `dates' with homosexuals and had killed one. The only reason defendant provided for the killing was `he had to kill one.' ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 11.) We held this evidence was insufficient to sustain the robbery conviction or the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding because the evidence was insufficient to prove the victim had been robbedthe record contain[ed] no evidence that any personal property was in the victim's possession at the time of the murder.... ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 20.) The defendant's admission to his acquaintance suggested he may have gone to the bathhouse to engage in prostitution and committed murder, but it did not support a reasonable inference that the defendant committed a robbery. ( Id. at pp. 21-22.) The prosecution, therefore, failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was murdered during the commission of a robbery. ( Id. at p. 22.) In People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, the defendant entered the residence of a man and a woman and demanded money at gunpoint. The victims produced money and jewelry, but the defendant said that he did not want them. The defendant motioned to the victims to go downstairs, ordered them to sit, and demanded and obtained the man's car keys. ( Id. at pp. 310-311.) The defendant then said to the woman, `You know why I'm here and you know who sent me,' and shot the victims, killing the man. ( Id. at p. 311.) The victims' car was never moved and the car keys were dropped in a park near the victims' residence. ( Ibid. ) We held the evidence was insufficient to establish the defendant had an intent to steal independent of his intent to kill and set aside the special circumstance findings that the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery and burglary. The defendant's refusal to accept the victims' valuables and his statement to the victims just before shooting them showed his primary intent was to kill them, with property gain a secondary goal. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 323.) Moreover, the defendant's demand for the victims' car keys immediately before the shootings, viewed in context, evinced his desire to use the car to effectuate his getaway from the shootings he intended. ( Id. at p. 324.) Because the prosecution's evidence established at most a suspicion that the defendant harbored an intent to steal independent of his intent to kill, it precluded a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder to advance an independent felonious purpose of stealing the car keys. ( Ibid. ) The present case is distinguishable from both Morris and Thompson. As discussed above, defendant's detailed admissions in his February 23d letter to Dulaney established his intent to rob and kill Ly. Hence, there is no ambiguity in the record, as in Morris, about whether an attempted robbery occurred, and ample evidence supports the jury's implied findings that defendant attempted to rob Ly and killed him during the commission of that attempted robbery. Unlike in Thompson, moreover, no evidence compelled a finding that defendant attempted to rob Ly in order to facilitate or conceal the murder. Defendant's February 23d letter to Dulaney, in which he admitted he twice demanded to know if Ly had a car and threatened Ly with a knife before he stomped on his head and stabbed him to death, shows he intended to rob Ly but then abandoned his plan when Ly said he had no car to steal. In addition, a rational jury could infer that defendant harbored an intent to rob Ly independent of his intent to kill Ly based on his multiple references to 2/11 in the February 23d letter, his admission during his police interview that 2/11 meant armed robbery, Dulaney's testimony that he and defendant used that term to mean armed robbery, and the evidence that defendant previously had robbed Reyes-Martinez and Tillman. The evidence therefore fully supports the conclusion that defendant's attempted robbery of Ly served an independent purpose and was not merely incidental to Ly's murder. (See People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1261 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544] [evidence that the defendant obtained the murder victim's bank account password before fatally strangling her supported the inference that the defendant harbored an intent to rob the victim independent of his intent to kill her].) Although not argued during closing argument by the prosecutor, an additional basis for concluding the murder was committed during the commission of an attempted robbery appears on the record. Defendant admitted in the February 23d letter that while he held a knife to Ly's throat and demanded to know if he had a car, he became worried that Ly was trying to get a description of him. Defendant stomped on his head, told him to stop looking at him, and then brutally stabbed him to death. While in custody awaiting trial in this case, defendant wrote a letter to Samantha Roby, in which he recounted that after knocking Ly to the ground, we waited for him to get up. When he did he layed [ sic ] there, and was looking at me. I was already on the run from Mt. Vernon shooting some people with a shot gun. So I thought he was trying to get a discription [ sic ] of me, so I stomped on his head, then stabbed him over 51 times, and slashing [ sic ] his neck. Defendant did not otherwise explain his statements about being on the run for shooting people, and no evidence that defendant assaulted individuals by shooting at them was presented during the guilt phase. [9] In any event, based on defendant's concession that he killed Ly to eliminate him as a witness and the trial court's instruction to the jury under CALJIC No. 8.81.17 [10] , the jury reasonably could conclude the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery and the robbery was not merely incidental to the murder. (See People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 46-48 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 896, 163 P.3d 896]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 628-629 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].) (7) Finally, that defendant intended both to forcibly steal from Ly and to kill him because of his race does not alter our conclusion. `Concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felonymurder special circumstance.' ( People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 554 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931], quoting People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 903 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712].) We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports the jury's special circumstance finding that the murder was committed during the commission of an attempted robbery.