Opinion ID: 530286
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fair Representation Claims

Text: 21 The duty of fair representation owed by a union to its members has been implied by the courts from national labor statutes. The Supreme Court has stated that the duty of fair representation imposes on the exclusive bargaining representative a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 910, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). More succinctly, A breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Id. at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916. 22 ALPA would have us adopt a standard which requires intentional or deliberate misconduct by the union in order to find a breach of the duty of fair representation. We consistently have held, however, that the Supreme Court's definition of the duty of fair representation enunciated in Vaca v. Sipes recognizes three distinct standards of conduct. Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 533 F.2d 952, 957 n. 6 (5th Cir.1976). See Hammons v. Adams, 783 F.2d 597, 601 (5th Cir.1986) ([The union's] conduct, however, must not be 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith;' a standard that has since been repeated by the Court with only minor rephrasing.) (citations omitted); Christopher v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 644 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.1981); Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 332 (5th Cir.1980); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110 (5th Cir.1973). See also Griffin v. Int'l Union, United Automobile A & AIW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir.1972) (A union must conform its behavior to each of these three separate standards.... Each of these requirements represents a distinct and separate obligation, the breach of which may constitute the basis for civil action.). 23 A breach of the duty of fair representation does not require that a union's conduct be taken in bad faith or with hostile discrimination, but may rest upon the arbitrariness or irrationality of the union's acts. See Bache v. AT & T, 840 F.2d at 291. Addressing the arbitrariness standard this circuit has stated in Tedford: 24 We think a decision to be non-arbitrary must be (1) based upon relevant, permissible union factors which excludes the possibility of it being based upon motivations such as personal animosity or political favoritism; (2) a rational result of the consideration of these factors; and (3) inclusive of a fair and impartial consideration of the interests of all employees. 25 Tedford, 533 F.2d at 957 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 26 A breach of the duty of fair representation requires more than a showing of negligence or honest, mistaken conduct. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, etc. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301, 91 S.Ct.1909, 1925, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971). Accord Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1059-60, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976); Coe v. United Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam) (carelessness or inadvertence neither constitutes nor is evidence of a breach of fair representation duty). Particularly in the bargaining context, a union's responsibilities permit the exercise of judgment within a wide range of reasonableness, subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. Hammons v. Adams, 783 F.2d at 601, quoting, Hines 424 U.S. at 564, 96 S.Ct. at 1056. In order to prove a breach of the union's duty to the membership, it is insufficient to show merely that the union improperly balanced the rights and obligations of the various groups it represents. Freeman v. Grand Int'l Bro. of Locomotive Engineers, 375 F.Supp. 81, 93 (S.D.Ga.), aff'd, 493 F.2d 628 (5th Cir.1974). 27 ALPA argues that the bankruptcy court's approval of the order and award gives rise to a presumption that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. We disagree; all the terms of the settlement the pilots complain of in this litigation had been resolved by ALPA and CAL before the proposed order was submitted to the bankruptcy court. The order and award therefore constituted in essence a consent decree, embodying primarily the results of negotiation rather than adjudication. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir.1981). We agree with the pilots that the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement does not insulate ALPA's conduct from scrutiny, nor bar the pilots' claims. See Ibarra v. Texas Employment Com'n., 823 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.1987). 28 We now turn to the pilots' specific arguments of how ALPA breached the duty of fair representation. The pilots' most fundamental complaint is that ALPA's strike settlement was irrational and arbitrary because of the gross disadvantages the pilots suffered under the settlement that they would not have suffered if they had simply surrendered to CAL's demands and returned to work. We are persuaded that a jury would be entitled to infer that ALPA was arbitrary in accepting the strike settlement if it finds that the union should have expected much more favorable treatment for the pilots had the pilots simply given up the strike effort and offered to return to work. In other words, a jury might reasonably find the union's conduct irrational or arbitrary if the union inexplicably agreed to a settlement that left its members in a substantially worse position than if no settlement had been made. We conclude that a jury could find that the order and award left the striking pilots worse off in a number of respects than complete surrender to CAL. 29 ALPA contends that the strike settlement provided for CAL to reemploy strikers who would not have otherwise been entitled to return to work at CAL. We disagree. The striking CAL pilots who had not obtained substantially similar jobs (as pilots) continued to be employees of CAL. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378, 88 S.Ct. 543, 545, 19 L.Ed.2d 614 (1967). Because this strike was an economic one, CAL was entitled to hire permanent replacement workers to continue business operations. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46, 58 S.Ct. 904, 910-11, 82 L.Ed. 1381 (1938). Had the strike terminated without the settlement, CAL was not required to discharge these replacement workers in order to rehire the former strikers. But absent exceptional circumstances discussed below, the returning strikers, as CAL employees, were entitled to reinstatement as vacancies occurred. Id. 30 ALPA asserts several possible justifications which CAL potentially could have offered to avoid rehiring the returning strikers. These justifications include legitimate and substantial business reasons, and striker misconduct. See OCAW v. American Petrofina Co., 820 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir.1987). But the summary judgment evidence provides no clear basis for this concern. Furthermore ALPA's outside legal counsel advised the ALPA leadership in September 1985 that CAL had not practiced dilatory tactics in reinstating individual strikers who offered to return to work, and consequently he felt such tactics were unlikely should ALPA submit an offer to return on behalf of all strikers. Thus a factfinder could infer that ALPA knew that CAL would not have refused to rehire strikers if ALPA had tendered an unconditional offer for the pilots to return to work. 31 The most fundamental rights the strikers lost in the order and award were their rights that flowed from seniority. ALPA argues that the pilots had absolutely no assurance that CAL would have recognized any of their seniority rights if they had unconditionally offered to return to work. Thus, ALPA contends that the limited seniority secured by the settlement was beneficial to the pilots. The pilots submitted strong summary judgment evidence however that CAL intended to reinstate strikers with ordinary seniority rights and privileges after the strike ended. 3 ALPA was advised by its legal counsel in September 1985 that CAL would be obligated to recall strikers in seniority order if they were still employees of the company. Accepting the pilots' evidence as true as we are required to do, a jury could reasonably conclude that if ALPA had unconditionally offered to return the pilots to duty, CAL likely would have returned striking pilots to work according to seniority, and would have permitted strikers to bid for vacancies according to CAL's seniority-based assignment procedures. 32 Furthermore, if the pilots had unconditionally agreed to return to work, CAL could not have changed its policy of assigning work by seniority, thereby adversely affecting returning strikers, unless it had a legitimate and substantial business justification for doing so. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1147, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963); George Banta Co. v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 10, 19 (D.C.Cir.1982); Lone Star Industries, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 550, 122 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1986). Yet the order and award allowed CAL to disregard the seniority of returning strikers in awarding jobs and to assign less senior nonstriking pilots to vacant positions. If a jury accepts the pilots' evidence that CAL likely would have recognized the returning strikers' seniority rights and privileges if they had unconditionally agreed to return to work it could further infer that ALPA was arbitrary in accepting the unfavorable settlement. 33 We reject ALPA's argument that the 85-5 bid positions were not vacancies at the time the order and award issued because they had been assigned to working pilots by that date. In August 1985, ALPA prevailed on this issue in another suit: a federal district court held that bid positions were not filled until pilots were trained and serving in these positions. ALPA v. United Air Lines, Inc., 614 F.Supp. 1020 (N.D.Ill.1985), aff'd in relevant part, 802 F.2d 886 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987). See also Indep. Federation of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.1987). ALPA, in the face of this favorable ruling in an analogous case involving striking United Airlines pilots, approved the terms of the order and award, generally permitting replacement pilots to keep the 85-5 bid vacancies awarded them, except in isolated instances where the transition provisions of the settlement otherwise provided. 34 In sum, the returning strikers were generally senior to the working pilots and under ordinary seniority rules entitled to fill the vacancies announced in the 85-5 bid. Yet the terms of the order and award gave the nonstriking, working pilots most of these positions. Also returning strikers who wanted to return to work were required to waive any claims for damages they had against CAL. A factfinder could infer that had ALPA unconditionally offered to return the pilots to work, the strikers would have been recalled in seniority order, and would have been able to successfully bid for these vacancies and also preserve their litigation rights against CAL. 35 The pilots also contend that ALPA breached its duty of fair representation by negotiating a settlement which impermissibly discriminated against strikers. The pilots argue that the order and award impermissibly preserved strikers and nonstrikers as two distinct groups after recall so CAL could reward the nonstrikers and punish the strikers. ALPA argues it must be given broad negotiating discretion and that agreeing to an arrangement which divides CAL pilots into strikers and nonstrikers for a transitional period is not per se illegal or a breach of its duty to the pilots. The Supreme Court has stated that a wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents, but a union's broad authority in negotiating and administering effective agreements is not without limits. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554. 36 The Supreme Court has expressed special concern for post-strike working conditions which create[ ] a cleavage ... continuing long after the strike is ended. Employees are henceforth divided into two camps: those who stayed with the union and those who returned before the end of the strike and thereby gained extra seniority. This breach ... stands as an ever-present reminder of the dangers connected with striking and with union activities in general. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. at 230. These are the types of employer action that have been held inherently destructive of employee rights. NLRB v. American Olean Tile, Co., 826 F.2d 1496, 1500 (6th Cir.1987). The pilots have raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the adverse, discriminatory post-strike treatment of strikers under the strike settlement can be justified. Depending upon the explanation offered by ALPA, a factfinder might infer that the negotiated division of pilots into strikers and nonstrikers and the subsequent unfavorable discriminatory treatment of returning strikers constituted a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.