Opinion ID: 2611854
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unrelated Successive Accidents

Text: Courts have applied the Newbury rule to successive accidents, where the pre-existing condition resulted from a previous accident rather than from a pre-existing disease or congenital condition. In Hylton v. Wade, 29 Colo.App. 98, 478 P.2d 690 (1970), the Colorado Court of Appeals, in an action against the second of two tortfeasors, applied the Newbury rule where the pre-existing condition resulted from a prior accident for which a recovery had been obtained. The appellate court refused to distinguish a diseased or congenital pre-existing condition from one caused by a prior trauma. Because a Newbury instruction was not given, the court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on damages. Id. at 100, 478 P.2d at 691. [15] Furthermore, where successive tortfeasors are involved, the right to recovery sometimes depends upon which tortfeasor is being sued. In Bruckman v. Pena, 29 Colo.App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 (1971), the plaintiff was involved in two unrelated accidents that occurred eleven months apart. The plaintiff brought an action against the driver and owner of a truck involved in the first accident only. At trial, the court correctly instructed the jury that: Where a subsequent injury occurs which aggravated the condition caused by the collision, it is your duty, if possible, to apportion the amount of disability and pain between that caused by the subsequent injury and that caused by the collision. Id. at 359, 487 P.2d at 567. However, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury: But if you find that the evidence does not permit such an apportionment, then the Defendants are liable for the entire disability. Id. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and defendants appealed. The Bruckman court held that the erroneous instruction permit[ted] the plaintiffs to recover damages against the defendants for injuries which the plaintiff received subsequent to any act of negligence on the part of the defendants and from causes for which the defendants were in no way responsible. Id., 29 Colo.App. at 360, 487 P.2d at 568. The court, therefore, remanded the case for a new trial on damages. Taking note of the Newbury rule, the Bruckman court recognized that the rules [announced in Newbury ] also apply where the pre-existing condition was caused by trauma. Id. (citing Hylton v. Wade, supra ). However, the court distinguished Newbury and Hylton, reasoning that: it is one thing to hold a tort-feasor who injures one suffering from a pre-existing condition liable for the entire damage when no apportionment between the preexisting condition and the damage caused by the defendant can be made, but it is quite another thing to say that a tortfeasor is liable, not only for the damages which he caused, but also for injuries subsequently suffered by the injured person. We hold that the defendants here cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's subsequent injury and this is so whether or not such damage can be apportioned between the two injuries. Bruckman, 29 Colo.App. at 361, 487 P.2d at 568. Thus, given Newbury and Bruckman, a plaintiff's recovery could differ depending upon which tortfeasor's liability is at issue. [T]he mere substitution of the second tortfeasor for the first, would have compelled a different result in Bruckman.  Comment, Torts  Apportionment of Damages  Indivisible Injuries, 49 Den.L.J. 115, 120 (1972) [hereinafter, Comment]. If liability of the first negligent tortfeasor is at issue, and if a jury is unable to apportion damages, under Newbury and Hylton, the plaintiff recovers fully from the defendant. The juxtaposition of Bruckman with Hylton exemplifies the competing policy concerns at issue when apportioning damages in successive tortfeasor situations. On the one hand, in order to recover damages, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the damages were legally caused by a defendant's negligence. See, e.g., Gibo v. City & County of Honolulu, supra . When damages cannot be apportioned, holding the original tortfeasor liable for injuries caused by subsequent incidents unfairly holds the tortfeasor liable for a portion of damages that the tortfeasor did not cause. See Bruckman, 29 Colo.App. at 361, 487 P.2d at 568. On the other hand, the Bruckman result has been criticized because a plaintiff may recover nothing even though the defendant is negligent, merely because the jury is unable to apportion damages among successive tortfeasors. See, e.g., Comment, supra, at 119-120; W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 52, at 350 n. 53 (5th ed.1984) [hereinafter, Prosser].