Opinion ID: 1935444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the filing of an objection to the inventory give the probate court personal jurisdiction over Gerhard with respect to his interest in the cash?

Text: Gerhard argues that Manfred's petition to the probate court, entitled Objection to the Inventory, was the wrong procedure for bringing the issue of omissions from the inventory before the probate court. He claims that the procedure used failed to give the court personal jurisdiction over him with respect to his interest in the cash at issue. Gerhard's position is based on sec. 879.63, Stats. That statute provides for an action to be brought by any interested party to secure uninventoried assets of the estate: 879.63 Action by person interested to secure property for estate. Whenever there is reason to believe that the estate of a decedent as set forth in the inventory does not include property which should be included in the estate, and the personal representative has failed to secure the property or to bring an action to secure the property, any person interested may, on behalf of the estate, bring an action in the court in which the estate is being administered to reach the property and make it a part of the estate. If the action is successful, the person interested shall be reimbursed from the estate for the reasonable expenses and attorney's fee incurred by him in the action as approved by the court but not in excess of the value of the property secured for the estate. Gerhard does not contend that he had no actual notice of the hearing on the objection to the inventory. Rather, he contends that by setting forth this specific statutory procedure requiring the commencement of an action the legislature has made it exclusive and that because his brother failed to commence an action by service of process the probate court did not obtain personal jurisdiction to compel him to pay the disputed amount of approximately ten thousand dollars to the personal representative. Manfred counters that any action brought under sec. 879.63, Stats., is actually a special proceeding for which a summons is unnecessary. He also contends that, even if sec. 879.63 requires an action to be commenced by service of process, that procedure is not exclusive and that a petition to the probate court under sec. 879.01, Stats., is an acceptable alternative to the commencement of an action under sec. 879.63. [5] Sec. 879.63, Stats., was first enacted in the new probate code. Ch. 339, Laws of 1969. No similar statute existed prior to that time. Although matters in probate are special proceedings rather than actions, [2] sec. 879.63 explicitly authorizes an action . . . on behalf of the estate . . . in the court in which the estate is being administered to reach [uninventoried] the property and make it a part of the estate. The Comment of the drafters of sec. 879.63, Stats., published along with the statute in the session law, provides evidence that sec. 879.63 constitutes an exception to the rule that matters in probate are not actions. It states that: This section is new. It gives all persons interested rights similar to creditors under s. 859.40. 40H Wis. Stat. Ann. at 786 (1971). Sec. 859.40, Stats., in turn, also expressly provides for the commencement of an action to reach uninventoried property of the decedent to be brought by a creditor, in behalf of all creditors [w]henever there is reason to believe that the estate of a decedent as set forth in the inventory may be insufficient to pay his debts. See also: Sec. 859.41, Stats., entitled Creditor's action for property fraudulently sold by decedent. In State Department of Public Welfare v. LeMere, 19 Wis.2d 412, 415-6, 120 N.W.2d 695 (1963), this court said of the predecessors to sec. 859.40, Stats.: These sections provide a remedy for creditors of a deceased, whose claims have been allowed, but cannot be paid, `to reach and subject to sale any property, not included in such inventory, which is liable for the payment of such debts.' State Department of Public Welfare v. LeMere was in itself an action in the circuit court brought under the predecessor statutes to sec. 859.40, Stats. Thus the reference to sec. 859.40 in the Comment to sec. 879.63, Stats., suggests that sec. 879.63 was intended to create a remedy for the personal representative and interested parties analogous to that provided for creditors in sec. 859.40, Stats., and that this remedy is to be pursued by commencing an action. [6] In State ex rel. Ashley v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 219 Wis. 38, 261 N.W. 737 (1935), this court distinguished between actions and special proceedings as follows: By statute, sec. 260.02, remedies are divided into (1) actions and (2) special proceedings. An action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which a party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense (sec. 260.03). Every other remedy is a special proceeding (sec. 260.04). 219 Wis. at 43. A proceeding brought under sec. 879.63, Stats., by analogy to secs. 859.40 and 859.41, Stats., is brought by a specific interested party in behalf of the estate against another specific party to protect or enforce a substantive right of the estate and therefore fits the definition of action in State ex rel. Ashley. A typical proceeding under sec. 879.63 would be brought on a theory of conversion or fraud, theories that ordinarily give rise to an action. Moreover, since an action authorized by sec. 879.63 may often be brought against uninterested parties, service of process may be appropriate because uninterested parties would not otherwise have had notice of the probate proceedings. Therefore we conclude that, when the legislature used the term action in sec. 879.63, Stats., it meant precisely that. [7] But the probate court also has the power to adjudicate in a special proceeding title to property in the hands of any person whenever the controversy is incidental and necessary to the administration of the estate. Estate of Corey, 73 Wis.2d 644, 648, 245 N.W.2d 902 (1976); see also: sec. 253.10(2) (a), Stats. In Corey an interested party filed an objection to the inventory on the ground that it included an item of personal property that he claimed had been given to him by the decedent as an inter vivos gift. After a hearing on the objection, the probate court directed the personal representative to serve a complaint on the interested party to recover the property for the estate. This court approved of the use of such an action to adjudicate title to the disputed item of the inventory but emphasized that since the probate court had the subject matter jurisdiction to decide incidental questions of title other procedures could have been adopted. Id. at 650. [8, 9] Gerhard contends, however, that because the legislature has enacted a statutory procedure for vindicating a right, this procedure must be exclusive. Ordinarily, an aggrieved party must resort to a statutory remedy which was designed to redress a particular injury rather than to common law remedies. See, e.g., Kultgen v. Mueller, 3 Wis.2d 346, 350, 88 N.W.2d 687 (1958) (aggrieved party may not sue in equity to set aside a condemnation award where statute provides a procedure for appealing the award); Industrial Credit Co. v. Inland G. M. Diesel, Inc., 51 Wis.2d 520, 527, 187 N.W.2d 157 (1971) (aggrieved lienholder could not sue for unjust enrichment, but is limited to his rights under statutory lien law). However, a statutory remedy may not be considered exclusive when the statutes themselves supply alternatives. [10] The probate code authorizes applications to the probate court by means of petitions. Sec. 879.01, Stats. Though the code does not expressly provide for an objection to an inventory, a review of the case law shows that an objection to the inventory has been a frequently used petition to challenge a particular item included in an inventory. See, e.g., Estate of Corey, supra ; Estate of Schreiber, 68 Wis.2d 135, 227 N.W.2d 917 (1975) (objection filed to challenge the inclusion of a partnership interest in the inventory). Compare: Estate of Gibson, 7 Wis.2d 506, 96 N.W.2d 859 (1959); Estate of Bean, 261 Wis. 26, 51 N.W.2d 555 (1952); Estate of Nols, 251 Wis. 90, 28 N.W.2d 360 (1947), cases in which the objection to an item in the inventory was made by means of a motion to strike the item from the inventory. If an objection is an appropriate way to challenge an inclusion in an inventory, we conclude that it is also an appropriate way to challenge an omission from the inventory. The probate code also provides other procedures for challenging an omission from an inventory. Under sec. 858.09, Stats., the probate court, at the request of any person interested in the estate or the property listed in an inventory, or on its own motion, may examine the personal representative on oath in relation to a proposed addition or deletion from the inventory. See, e.g., Estate of Budney, 2 Wis.2d 389, 86 N.W.2d 416 (1957), where an interested party examined the personal representative concerning the ownership of property discovered at the residence of the deceased. Under sec. 869.13, Stats., any person interested may file an objection to any item or omission in an account by a personal representative, including his accounting of the decedent's property. Sec. 879.61, Stats., expressly permits an interested party to accomplish by a petition what Manfred intended to accomplish by filing his objection to the inventory. Under sec. 879.61 any interested person who suspects that any other person has concealed, stolen, conveyed or disposed of property of the estate, . . . may file a petition in the probate court so stating, and the court upon such notice as it directs, may order the other person to appear before the court . . . for disclosure, . . . and may make any order in relation to the matter as is just and proper. This discovery process is an alternative to commencing an action under sec. 879.63, Stats., to secure uninventoried assets of the estate. [11] Although Manfred's petition was labeled an Objection to the Inventory and although its language recalls the language of sec. 879.63 rather than sec. 879.61, these are merely defects of form. [3] Manfred's objection is in substance a petition to discover concealed assets of the estate. Indeed the only witness at the hearings on this objection was Gerhard whose testimony disclosed the possible existence of other assets of the estate. In concluding, based on the evidence contained in the agreement that Gerhard should be required to pay over $10,114.50 in cash to the personal representative to be included in the inventory, and by inviting Gerhard to bring an objection to determine conclusively whether the cash was a gift from the deceased, the probate court made an order that it deemed just and proper, as authorized by sec. 879.61, Stats. Thus Manfred's objection to the inventory need not have been brought as an action. The probate code contains other alternatives, the procedural requirements of which have been complied with here. Manfred's compliance with the notice requirements of the probate code was sufficient to bring the matter properly before probate court and to give the court personal jurisdiction over Gerhard to adjudicate title to the money.