Opinion ID: 1179904
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the law of the case doctrine

Text: Lyden contends that the district court erred in concluding that the law of the case doctrine dictated that Winer continued to have summary judgment as to his agency/joint enterprise and violation of building code claims. Lyden argues that our holding and mandate in Lyden did not rule that summary judgment applied to those claims. The law of the case doctrine stands for the proposition that a court's decision on an issue of law made at one stage of a case becomes a binding precedent to be followed in successive stages of the same litigation. Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo.1993); see also 1B Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.404[1] (2d ed. 1991). This doctrine is designed to avoid repetitious litigation and to promote consistent decision making; thus, it is related to res judicata, collateral estoppel and stare decisis. Triton Coal, at 667. Usually the law of the case doctrine requires a district court to adhere to its prior rulings, adhere to the rulings of an appellate court, or adhere to another judge's rulings in the same case or a closely related case. Triton Coal, at 668; see also 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: § 4478 (1981). In Lyden, 878 P.2d at 520, we held: Likewise, whether landlord's control of the premises may be inferred from the facts present in this case is a question for the trier of fact.    We thus reverse and remand for a determination by the trier of fact. As noted earlier, if the trier of fact determines that appellee landlord retained control of the rented premises, or the portion in question, then appellee owes the same duty of care to both the tenant and her social guest.    Landlord owes a duty, to his tenant and any person on the premises by right of the tenant, to exercise reasonable care in maintaining those areas of the rented premises over which he retains control. Whether appellee landlord retained control over any area of the premises is a question of fact, and, in this case, a genuine question of fact does exist. We reverse the decision of the district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. The mandate states, in relevant part: MANDATE REVERSING JUDGMENT The referenced cause was taken under advisement and the opinion of this Court was delivered on July 27, 1994, reversing the judgment of the district court. Therefore, in accordance with WYO.R.APP.P. 9, it is, ORDERED that the judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court, Natrona County, Wyoming, be and hereby is, reversed. Even though the mandate is stated in fairly general terms, the language in Lyden is very clear and specifican issue of material fact existed as to whether Winer retained control of the premises. This court made no findings concerning other claims. Our reversal, without affirming any part of the summary judgment order, necessarily meant that the entire order was reversed. Accordingly, because the summary judgment order became a nullity, the district court was in error for relying on the law of the case doctrine in ruling that Winer continued to have summary judgment as to Lyden's other claims. However, we find this to be harmless error. The effect of a general reversal of a summary judgment order is to nullify it completely and to leave the case standing as if such judgment, order, or decree had never been rendered, except insofar as rights to a new trial or further proceedings may survive. Triton Coal, 846 P.2d at 668; see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 959 at 457 (1993). Following a complete reversal, the issues are open to a district court except as qualified by the appellate court. Triton Coal, at 678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This general principle is embodied in 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 792 (1995): [A] trial court taking a case on remand may generally consider or decide any matter left open by the remanding appellate court. Moreover, a court on remand    is ordinarily free to make an order or direction on questions not presented or settled by the appellate court which is not inconsistent with the appellate court's opinion.    In addition, issues that were not, or could not have been, dispositively resolved on their merits in the appellate court may be considered on remand. (Footnotes omitted.) When there is nothing in the terms of the mandate to prevent it, the district court has the power, on reconsideration, to find the same facts and determinations regarding an issue as in its original holding or to find different facts and determinations and change its original holding. In the case on appeal, after we issued Lyden and its mandate, Winer moved for partial summary judgment regarding Lyden's other claims. Nothing in the terms of the mandate or Lyden prevented the district court from reconsidering the other claims and finding that Winer was still entitled to summary judgment on those claims. The purpose of summary judgment is to dispose of those issues that are not in dispute or that cannot be proved at trial. The initial burden was on Winer to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Once that showing was made, it was incumbent upon Lyden, as the party opposing summary judgment, to come forward with specific facts to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to those claims. Mostert v. CBL & Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Wyo. 1987). Conclusory affidavits are insufficient and specific facts must be shown. Id. In this regard we are somewhat hindered by the fact that Lyden's memorandum brief in opposition to Winer's motion for partial summary judgment was not designated as part of the record on appeal; and, therefore, we are constrained to review only those materials Lyden presented in the original summary judgment proceeding. The record discloses no specific fact or evidence that Winer knew that the stairs were in violation of building codes or that the tenant was Winer's agent. Thus, no genuine issues of material fact existed as to those claims. As such, summary judgment was appropriate. The district court could have found, and in all likelihood did find, that nothing had changed regarding those claims since the original summary judgment order and, therefore, Winer was still entitled to summary judgment because no dispute over genuine issues of material fact existed regarding those claims. This determination is not inconsistent with our holding in Lyden, 878 P.2d 516. Consequently, Lyden was not entitled to have the jury instructed regarding these claims, and the district court did not err in refusing such instructions.