Opinion ID: 2273504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admissibility of the Bryant Evidence as Statements Against Penal Interest

Text: After carefully reviewing the Bryant evidence, the trial court concluded that the evidence was admissible as trustworthy declarations against penal interest. Although a statement against penal interest may be admissible even when not all of the trustworthiness factors have been satisfied, in the present case, the trial court expressly found that each and every one of those considerations had been satisfied. Specifically, the trial court stated: In the present case, full consideration of the totality of the circumstances supports the admissibility of ... Bryant's statements.... Bryant's statements were made under circumstances [that] support admission, are corroborated by sufficient evidence, and are clearly against his penal interest. [29] Before reviewing the analytical underpinnings of the trial court's ruling, it first must be noted that the newly discovered Bryant evidence is highly relevant, and, therefore, the evidence would be admissible at a second trial if the petitioner is able to establish that Bryant's statements fall within an exception to the rule against hearsay. The standards governing the admissibility of third party culpability evidence are well established. [A] defendant has a right to introduce evidence that indicates that someone other than the defendant committed the crime with which [he] has been charged.... The defendant must, however, present evidence that directly connects a third party to the crime.... It is not enough to show that another [person] had the motive to commit the crime ... nor is it enough to raise a bare suspicion that some other person may have committed the crime of which the defendant is accused.... The admissibility of evidence of third party culpability is governed by the rules relating to relevancy.... Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.... Accordingly, in explaining the requirement that the proffered evidence establish a direct connection to a third party, rather than raise merely a bare suspicion regarding a third party, we have stated ... [that] [s]uch evidence is relevant, exculpatory evidence, rather than merely tenuous evidence of third party culpability [introduced by a defendant] in an attempt to divert from himself the evidence of guilt.... In other words, evidence that establishes a direct connection between a third party and the charged offense is relevant to the central question before the jury, namely, whether a reasonable doubt exists as to whether the defendant committed the offense. Evidence that would raise only a bare suspicion that a third party, rather than the defendant, committed the charged offense would not be relevant to the jury's determination. A trial court's decision, therefore, that third party culpability evidence proffered by the defendant is admissible... necessarily entails a determination that the proffered evidence is relevant to the jury's determination of whether a reasonable doubt exists as to the defendant's guilt.  (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn. 597, 609-10, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). Because the Bryant evidence implicates Hasbrouck and Tinsley as the parties responsible for the victim's murder, thereby exonerating the petitioner, it is inarguable that the Bryant evidence would be highly relevant at a second trial. Indeed, the evidence bears directly on the central issue of whether the state has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner, and not some other person or persons, murdered the victim. Consequently, the admissibility of the evidence depends solely on whether it consists of trustworthy statements against penal interest. I also note, as a preliminary matter, the standard of review that governs this court's consideration of the trial court's determination that the Bryant evidence does satisfy the requirements of the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. To the extent [that the] trial court's admission of evidence is based on an interpretation of the Code of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary. For example, whether a challenged statement properly may be classified as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception properly is identified are legal questions demanding plenary review. They require determinations about which reasonable minds may not differ; there is no `judgment call' by the trial court, and the trial court has no discretion to admit hearsay in the absence of a provision providing for its admissibility. State v. Saucier, 283 Conn. 207, 218, 926 A.2d 633 (2007). When the trial court's ruling, however, is premised on a correct view of the law, that is, when, as in the present case, the trial court properly has determined that a particular statement is or is not hearsay, or is subject to a hearsay exception; id., at 219, 926 A.2d 633; this court affords the utmost deference to the trial court's determination [of admissibility]. [30] Id. In the present case, therefore, we must make every reasonable presumption in favor of upholding the trial court's ruling ... and ... upset it [only] for a manifest abuse of discretion. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bonner, 290 Conn. 468, 496, 964 A.2d 73 (2009). Accordingly, the question is not whether [the reviewing court], had [it] been sitting as the trial judge, would have exercised [its] discretion differently. Our role as an appellate court is not to substitute our judgment for that of a trial court that has chosen one of many reasonable alternatives. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Day, 233 Conn. 813, 842, 661 A.2d 539 (1995). Thus, the party seeking to overturn a discretionary evidentiary ruling has the heavy burden; State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 226, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S.Ct. 1133, 130 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1995); of establishing that the trial court rationally could not have decided as it did. E.g., State v. Orr, 291 Conn. 642, 667, 969 A.2d 750 (2009) ([i]n determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did); State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1, 224-25 n. 192, 836 A.2d 224 (reviewing court will not find abuse of discretion if trial court rationally could have decided as it did), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 908, 124 S.Ct. 1614, 158 L.Ed.2d 254 (2004). I now turn to the trial court's findings with respect to the three part test for evaluating the trustworthiness of a statement against penal interest. As for the timing of Bryant's statements, the court recognized that there [were] actually two sets of disclosures relevant to this factor; first, the disclosure from Hasbrouck and Tinsley to Bryant and, second, from Bryant to [Mills, Kennedy and Colucci].... [T]he statements by Hasbrouck and Tinsley were made immediately following the commission of the crime, which fits well within the traditional view of a time frame indicative of trustworthiness. The trial court also observed, however, that, [b]eyond the initial disclosure of Hasbrouck and Tinsley to Bryant ... the timeline of the present case is far from typical. That is, Bryant's failure to disclose the information known to him about Hasbrouck's and Tinsley's involvement in the victim's murder for more than twenty-five years is unusual and, ordinarily, would render his information highly suspect. [31] The trial court explained, however, why that delay was understandable in the wholly atypical circumstances of the present case. The court stated: The context of the longer time span in the present case is tied into the twenty-five year delay in reopening the investigation of [the victim's] murder. This unique circumstance, rather then a twenty-five year opportunity for reflection and contrivance, is the central factor that distinguishes it from typical cases [in which] investigation and prosecution of the defendant [do] not even approach the length of time present here.... Because of the length of the state's investigation, [Bryant] had an incentive to keep himself out of a case that he reasonably thought would never be solved.... Bryant indicates that even after the petitioner was arrested and brought to trial, he still refused to come forward because he thought there was no way that [the petitioner] would be convicted.... [Moreover] [a]t the time of the murder in 1975, [Bryant] was a fourteen year old black male who was suddenly faced with information that, by his own admission, was clearly against his penal interest.... The court further observed that Bryant had not come forward immediately after the murder because, as he had told Colucci, he was afraid of being automatically pinned... as a suspect. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The court also underscored the fact that Bryant had told Colucci that it would have been easier for the state to have convicted Bryant than the petitioner and, further, that Bryant's family had far fewer resources than the petitioner's family to provide for Bryant's defense if Bryant had become a suspect. The trial court concluded, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, and in light of the fact that Bryant, who has a law degree, had knowledge that there is no statute of limitations on prosecuting the crime of murder in Connecticut, that his reluctance to tell his story [was] reasonable. With respect to the second part of the first prong of the test, that is, the person or persons to whom the declarant made the inculpatory statement and the nature of the declarant's relationship with that person or persons, the trial court concluded that [c]onsideration of the individuals to whom ... Bryant made his statements supports their trustworthiness. The court found: [T]he fact that ... Bryant's first disclosure regarding the details of his whereabouts on October 30, 1975, was to ... Mills [a friend whom he trusted] supports the trustworthiness of his statement. Bryant and Mills shared a connection to the facts of this case, dating back to their shared experiences [in] Belle Haven during the time leading up to the murder. Following this disclosure to [Mills], Bryant repeated the events of October 30, 1975, to [Kennedy] and [the petitioner's] investigator, which further confirm[s] its trustworthiness. With respect to the petitioner's investigator, namely, Colucci, the trial court underscored that Colucci explicitly informed Bryant that [Bryant] was being sought out in connection with a court proceeding. Bryant was further aware that his statements were being [video recorded] and that the recording was clearly being made in anticipation of being presented in court. Bryant graduated from the University of Tennessee Law School. Bryant's knowledge of [Colucci's] official role provides a greater indication of trustworthiness than the normal individual with whom the declarant does not have a close relationship. The trial court then considered the second factor, namely, the extent to which Bryant's statements were corroborated, and found that the existence of corroborating circumstances supported the conclusion that those statements were trustworthy. The court identified the following corroborating circumstances in its memorandum of decision: (1) Bryant went to... Brunswick School and was classmates with the children in the Belle Haven neighborhood; (2) [s]everal witnesses, including... Mills and ... Walker, confirm[ed] that Bryant socialized [in] Belle Haven; (3) witnesses confirm[ed] that Bryant [previously had] indicated that he [had been] present in Belle Haven on the night of the murder; [32] (4) [o]ne witness recall[ed] seeing ... Hasbrouck and ... Tinsley in Belle Haven with Bryant during the fall of 1975; (5) [b]oth Hasbrouck and Tinsley admitted to [Kennedy] that they had been in Belle Haven with Bryant on several occasions; (6) Bryant also provide[d] detailed descriptions of the layout of Belle Haven, including accurate recitations of where people in the neighborhood lived; (7) [a]ccording to Bryant, Hasbrouck was [six feet, two inches tall], at least 200 pounds on the date of the [murder], and `very strong'; (8) Bryant stated that ... Hasbrouck was obsessed with [the victim], and `wanted to go caveman on her,' meaning that he would club her, drag her away by the hair and sexually assault her; (9) [o]n the night of the murder, Bryant stated that he, Hasbrouck and Tinsley walked around Belle Haven with golf clubs from the [Skakels'] residence, with Hasbrouck stating that he had his `caveman club' and that he would not leave Belle Haven unsatisfied; (10) [t]he victim had suffered multiple and severe injuries to her head and stab wounds to her neck, which were consistent with being caused by a piece of golf club shaft; (11) [p]ieces of the golf club found near the victim's body were the same brand of golf club found at the [Skakels'] residence; and (12) [e]vidence presented at the petitioner's criminal trial show[ed] that these clubs were commonly left about the [Skakels'] property. The trial court further stated: Corroboration of Bryant's statements [also] can be found in the very reason that he is unavailable to testify. In the present case, Bryant, Hasbrouck and Tinsley have all invoked their [privilege against self-incrimination] after being served with subpoenas to testify at a deposition. In concluding that Bryant's, Hasbrouck's and Tinsley's invocation of their privilege against self-incrimination supports the reliability of Bryant's incriminating statements, the trial court necessarily also concluded that the three men had asserted their privilege because to do otherwise would expose them to possible criminal prosecution on the basis of the truth of Bryant's statements. [33] With respect to the third and final factor, the trial court found that Bryant's statements were  clearly against his penal interest. (Emphasis added.) Although not a confession to the victim's murder, Bryant's statements place him at or near the scene of the murder, with Hasbrouck and Tinsley, immediately before the victim was murdered. Bryant also acknowledged possessing a golf club, the instrumentality used to kill the victim, that he had obtained from the Skakels' property. The information that Bryant provided demonstrates an insider's knowledge of the crime and would constitute highly incriminating evidence of guilt if Bryant were to be the target of a prosecution for an offense or offenses relating to the death of the victim. Indeed, Bryant's mother had urged him not to come forward because he would be implicated [in the murder by] putting himself at the scene of the crime. Furthermore, when he finally did come forward, Bryant, a law school graduate, was acutely aware of the incriminating nature of his information. The trial court also observed that Bryant's [e]fforts to explain away possible physical evidence indicate a consciousness of guilt. [Bryant's statements concerning his presence in Belle Haven on the day of the murder and his possession of a golf club at that time represent an attempt] to explain away the possibility that his fingerprints might be found on the murder weapon or another golf club nearby. [34] Finally, although Bryant eventually disclosed the information that he had been so wary of revealing, he subsequently invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, further demonstrating his understanding of the incriminating nature of his statements. I fully agree with the trial court's conclusion that the Bryant evidence, although hearsay, would be admissible at a second trial under the exception to the hearsay rule for trustworthy declarations against penal interest. Indeed, because, as the trial court found, the Bryant evidence satisfies each of the three factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of such declarations, including the requirement that the reliability of the statements must be clearly demonstrated by corroborating circumstances, a contrary conclusion would deny the petitioner a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process. Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. For the reasons set forth in part III G of this opinion, the trial court, having properly recognized the trustworthiness of Bryant's statements, improperly failed to consider that evidence in the context of the original trial evidence. Before turning to that issue, however, it is necessary, first, to identify certain additional facts in the record that support the trial court's trustworthiness determination; see part III D of this opinion; second, to address the view expressed by the concurrence that the trial court improperly concluded that the Bryant evidence would be admissible at a new trial as trustworthy statements against penal interest; see part III E of this opinion; and, third, to explain why the Bryant evidence would be admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule even if that evidence did not satisfy the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. See part III F of this opinion.