Opinion ID: 2632351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: viewing of surveillance videotape

Text: The surveillance videotape of the robbery was admitted at trial without objection. The tape was played to the jury in open court with the defendant present. After the jury began deliberations, it requested to once again view the surveillance tape. Outside Bolton's presence, but in the presence of his counsel and counsel for the State, the trial court requested that a VCR and television be placed in the jury deliberation room so that the jury could view the tape. Bolton's counsel did not object. A criminal defendant has the constitutional and statutory right to be present at all critical stages of his or her trial. See K.S.A. 2001 Supp. 22-3405(1); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 25 L. Ed.2d 353, 90 S. Ct. 1057, reh. denied 398 U.S. 915 (1970). Bolton contends that the trial court committed reversible error because it did not inquire of him personally whether he waived his right to be present during the replaying of the videotape. He asserts he had a constitutional and statutory right to be present during the viewing and was prejudiced by not being present because the videotape was emotionally charged critical evidence. Bolton's argument that the highly prejudicial nature of the videotape (a recording in real time of a murder) made the jury's repeated viewing of it unfair is not persuasive. The emotional impact of the videotape was unavoidable and undoubtedly felt by the jury at the initial viewing of the tape in open court where the defendant was present to mitigate the emotional impact in whatever manner possible. It cannot be assumed that the jury's viewing of the tape again in the jury room compounded the emotional impact, resulting in undue prejudice. K.S.A. 22-3420(3) provides: After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed as to any part of the law or evidence arising in the case, they may request the officer to conduct them to the court, where the information on the point of the law shall be given, or the evidence shall be read or exhibited to them in the presence of the defendant, unless he voluntarily absents himself, and his counsel and after notice to the prosecuting attorney. Because the videotape was evidence arising in the case, Bolton also contends he had a right under K.S.A. 22-3420(3) to be present when the tape was played back to the jury. The application of K.S.A. 22-3420(3) typically arises where, after retiring for deliberations, the jury submits questions to the court regarding clarification on a point of law, see, e.g., State v. Coyote, 268 Kan. 726, 731-34, 1 P.3d 836 (2000); where the jury requests a readback of testimony, see, e.g., State v. Miller, 268 Kan. 517, 527, 997 P.2d 90 (2000); and where there have been ex parte communications between the judge and members of the jury, see, e.g., State v. Rayton, 268 Kan. 711, 717, 1 P.3d 854 (2000). This court has consistently held that K.S.A. 22-3420(3) explicitly requires that any questions from the jury concerning the law or evidence pertaining to the case must be answered in open court in the defendant's presence unless the defendant is voluntarily absent. Coyote, 268 Kan. 726, Syl. ¶ 2. The defendant's right to be present extends to any communication between the trial court and the jury. State v. Bell, 266 Kan. 896, 920, 975 P.2d 239, cert. denied 528 U.S. 905 (1999). Here, the videotape was an exhibit which had been admitted into evidence during the course of the trial and had been played in open court before the jury and the defendant. A videotape is distinguishable from readback testimony in that the evidence on a videotape is static and is not susceptible to inflection or interpretation by a reader; regardless of the number of times a videotape is replayed or who plays the videotape, the message conveyed on the tape is the same. In State v. Fenton, 228 Kan. 658, 667, 620 P.2d 813 (1980), Fenton contended that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view exhibits a second time prior to its deliberations with only the bailiff supervising the viewing. We found that once a case is submitted to the jury, the jury is ordinarily given the exhibits to take into the jury room where the jurors can examine the exhibits as many times as they desire. The Fenton court noted that the manner in which exhibits are handled at trial is within the trial court's discretion, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except in cases of abuse. Fenton demonstrated no prejudice as a result of a second viewing. 228 Kan. at 667; see also State v. Poulos & Perez, 230 Kan. 512, 514, 639 P.2d 477 (1982) (no abuse of discretion in permitting jury to listen, in the jury room, to an audiotape recording that was an admitted exhibit). Therefore, we find a jury's second viewing of exhibits admitted into evidence is not subject to the requirements of K.S.A. 22-3420(3). Bolton was not denied his right to confrontation.