Opinion ID: 4421122
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WPCA’s Claims Against Flowserve and Gilbane

Text: The district court granted summary judgment against WPCA on all of WPCA’s claims against Flowserve and Gilbane. We conclude that without Hodgson’s testimony, WPCA is unable to succeed on any of its claims. As to WPCA’s products liability claims, in Connecticut, a plaintiff must show (among other elements) that “the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user.” Bifolck v. Philip Morris, Inc., 324 Conn. 402, 433–36 (2016). Connecticut employs two tests to analyze whether a product was unreasonably dangerous: (1) the risk-utility test; and (2) the consumer expectation standard. Id. The risk-utility test is the “primary test” that “will govern most cases.” Id. at 416, 434–35. That test governs this case as well.3 Under the test, a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user if: (1) A reasonable alternative design was available that would have avoided or reduced the risk of harm and the absence of that alternative design renders the product unreasonably dangerous. In considering whether there is a reasonable alternative design, the jury must consider the feasibility of the alternative. Other relevant factors that a jury may consider include, but are not limited to, the ability of the alternative design to reduce the product’s danger without unreasonably impairing its usefulness, longevity, maintenance, and esthetics, without unreasonably increasing cost, and without creating other equal or greater risks of danger; or (2) The product is a manifestly unreasonable design in that the risk of harm so clearly exceeds the product’s utility that a reasonable consumer, informed of those risks and utility, would not purchase the product. The factors that a jury may consider include, but are not limited to, the magnitude and probability of the risk of harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying the product, the utility of the product in relation to the range of consumer choices among products, and the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the product, including expectations arising from product portrayal and marketing. deposition, and other related materials, the court acted within its discretion in excluding Hodgson without holding a hearing. 3 WPCA attempts to argue that the consumer expectation standard should apply here. This argument was not raised below and is waived. See Booking, 254 F.3d at 418. 7 Id. at 434–35. Expert evidence is necessary to satisfy the risk-utility test where “the nexus between the injury and the alleged cause would not be obvious to the lay juror,” because expert knowledge is often required in such circumstances “to establish the causal connection between the accident and some item of physical or mental injury.” Sanders v. Fireline, Inc., 295 F. App’x 373, 374 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 46 (2d Cir. 2004)). We agree with the district court that “this is the type of complex case which requires an expert opinion as to defect and as to feasible alternative design.” SPA-53. Lay jurors simply are not equipped with the relevant background knowledge about wastewater pumps to know, for instance, whether such pumps require vents, or what the appropriate pipe diameter is, or whether pumps can be run dry, or what horsepower pump motors should have. Because WPCA has presented no admissible expert evidence as to design defect or feasible alternative design, its products liability claims necessarily fail. WPCA’s CUTPA claim against Flowserve also fails. The CTPLA contains an exclusivity provision, making it the “exclusive means by which a party may secure a remedy for an injury caused by a defective product.” Gerrity v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 263 Conn. 120, 126 (2003). Here, the supposed CUTPA claim is that Flowserve refused to repair or replace defective equipment based on false denials of warranty claims. The CUTPA claim thus rests on an allegation that is the exclusive province of products liability claims under the CTPLA—that the pumps were defective. For this reason, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Flowserve on this claim. As to WPCA’s express and implied warranty claims against Flowserve, the district court correctly determined that Flowserve had disclaimed all of the warranties alleged by WPCA. Flowserve’s final agreement states, in all capital letters: 8 THESE WARRANTIES ARE EXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, WHETHER WRITTEN, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. JA-1828. The only express warranty in the final agreement reads as follows: Vendor warrants at time of shipment to Gilbane Building Company its equipment will comply with applicable Vendor drawings and will be free from defects in workmanship and material. JA-1827. WPCA asserts that Flowserve violated an express “certificate of proper pump functionality,” as well as the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. But the terms of the final agreement clearly exclude any such warranties, as the district court rightly concluded.4 Finally, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Gilbane on WPCA’s breach of contract claim. WPCA argues that Gilbane breached a fiduciary duty contained in its contract with WPCA by negotiating additional contract terms with Flowserve. To make out a breach of fiduciary duty claim, WPCA must show, inter alia, that Gilbane “advanced [its] own interests to the detriment of” WPCA. See Godina v. Resinall Intern., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 560, 575 (D. Conn. 2009). The only argument WPCA makes that Gilbane advanced its own interests is that “Gilbane benefited by keeping the project on schedule.” Appellant Br. 70. However, both parties to the contract—WPCA and 4 WPCA’s argument that Gilbane lacked actual or apparent authority to negotiate new contract terms with Flowserve is unavailing. Gilbane’s contract with WPCA explicitly stated that Gilbane is responsible for “supplementing the bidding documents,” and that Gilbane may “analyz[e] . . . bids” and “mak[e] any and all necessary revisions.” JA-209. An agent has “actual authority” when its “action [is] expressly authorized.” Ackerman v. Sobol Family P’ship, LLP, 298 Conn. 495, 508–09 (2010) (citation omitted). Here, the contract expressly authorized Gilbane to make revisions to bids as necessary. Even if Gilbane did not have actual authority, it clearly had “apparent authority,” meaning that “semblance of authority which a principal, through his own acts or inadvertences, causes or allows third persons to believe his agent possesses.” Id. WPCA held out Gilbane as its agent and acted as if Gilbane had authority to negotiate with Flowserve by, inter alia, choosing not to attend a scope review meeting at which Gilbane, Flowserve, and CDM discussed Flowserve’s bid and its additional contract terms. 9 Gilbane—benefited by keeping the Project on schedule. WPCA entered into the contract and set the Project schedule because it presumably had a certain time that it wanted to have the Plant upgrade completed by. Flowserve was the low bidder on the pumps, and Gilbane helped secure Flowserve’s prompt participation in the project by working with Flowserve to ensure the bid would be accepted. In short, by negotiating with Flowserve to ensure its bid was acceptable and timely, Gilbane served both parties’ interests.5