Opinion ID: 1808830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of the 2006 Act

Text: Woodruff and the Talladega County Judicial Commission contend that Woodruff's status as the nominee of the Alabama Democratic Party makes him a quasi-incumbent. They rely upon State ex rel. Norrell v. Key, 276 Ala. 524, 526, 165 So.2d 76, 78 (1964), in which this Court held, in the context of measuring the timeliness of a quo warranto proceeding, that the holder of a certificate of nomination has the status of a quasi-officer, thereby obliging the relator to initiate his action prior to the election. Article VI, § 151, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.), authorizes the legislature to increase or decrease the number of circuit judges. Section 151(c) provides: An act decreasing the number of circuit or district judges shall not affect the right of any judge to hold his office for his full term. This limitation on legislative authority is confined to officeholders and is silent as to nominees. Woodruff and the Talladega County Judicial Commission have not cited any authority applying the concept of quasi-officer in the context of a statutorily created office that has been abolished whereby the quasi-officer was deemed a quasi-incumbent and thereby insulated from the effects of the abolition of the office. We decline to rely upon the concept of quasi-officer, useful in settings not involving vested rights to public offices of statutory creation, as the basis to limit further the authority of the legislature provided in § 151. This result is consistent with the view that a public office that is a creature of the legislature confers no vested right. See Lane v. Kolb, 92 Ala. 636, 640, 9 So. 873, 874 (1891): When an office is not provided for by the Constitution, but is the creature of statute, there is no element of contract between the officer chosen and the public, or constituent body which confers the office. Being created, and its functions and emoluments conferred, by the legislature, the same body may abolish it, take away or reduce its functions and emoluments, or make any change its wisdom or caprice may suggest, not inhibited by the organic law. Applying similar principles, other courts have rejected a contention by a candidate that his status protects him from the impact of legislation abolishing the office for which he is a candidate. See State ex rel. Weller v. Schirmer, 131 Ohio St. 455, 3 N.E.2d 352 (1936), in which an individual filing a petition for nomination as a candidate for judge of a court of common pleas before the repeal of a statute providing for such office was held not entitled to have his name placed on the ballot at an election held after the repeal; State ex rel. Core v. Green, 160 Ohio St. 175, 181, 115 N.E.2d 157, 160-61 (1953) (While the statute was in effect, the petitioners had the privilege to demand an election, but when the statute was repealed before the election was held, such privilege was taken away without any impairment of vested or contractual rights.); and Corn v. City of Oakland City, 415 N.E.2d 129, 133 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981): The question of whether or not an office holder or candidate or officer-elect has any vested right to an office has been clearly settled contrary to Corn's position. In State, ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, [129 Ind. 296, 28 N.E. 186 (1891)], our Supreme Court, at 129 Ind. 302, 28 N.E. 186[,] said: `Offices are neither grants nor contracts, nor obligations which can not be changed or impaired. They are subject to the legislative will at all times, except so far as the Constitution may protect them from interference. Offices created by the Legislature may be abolished by the Legislature. The power that creates can destroy. The creator is greater than the creature. The term of an office may be shortened, the duties of the office increased, and the compensation lessened, by the legislative will. (Citations omitted.)' Woodruff's status as the nominee of the Democratic Party does not insulate him from the effects of the 2006 Act in amending the 1999 Act.
The Talladega County parties contend that the provision in the 2006 Act allowing the governor to fill the office of the third circuit judgeship by appointment violates §§ 152 and 153, Ala. Const.1901 (Off.Recomp.). [8] An act of the legislature arrives with a presumption of constitutionality; a party challenging that constitutionality has the burden of overcoming that presumption. State ex rel. King v. Morton, 955 So.2d 1012 (Ala.2006). We note at the outset that the challenged provision of the 2006 Act (The additional judgeship created by this act shall be filled by appointment of the Governor on or after October 1, 2009, from a list of nominees by the Talladega County Judicial Commission.) does not refer to a vacancy. The 2006 Act admits of only one rational construction the governor shall appoint the first holder of the office. The State relies upon Griggs v. Bennett, 710 So.2d 411, 412 (Ala.1998), in which this Court stated: Although § 6.14 [of Amendment No. 328, now § 153, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off.Recomp.)] lists the usual causes of vacancydeath, resignation, retirement, or removal of an incumbent judgeit has long been recognized that vacancies may occur for reasons other than the usual causes listed in an appointment provision. [9] In Griggs, a statute enacted in 1990 created a judgeship; the initial officeholder was to be elected at the general election to be held in 1992. Litigation dealing with clearance of the statute under the Voting Rights Act prevented the election contemplated by the statute from taking place. In 1996, the United States Department of Justice granted preclearance for the new judgeship. The attorney general issued an opinion stating that under what is now § 153, the governor could fill a vacancy by appointment. The plaintiffs in Griggs filed an action seeking an order directing the secretary of state to place the judgeship on the ballot for the primary and general elections in 1996, rather than filling the office by appointment. The trial court denied relief, holding that the judgeship should be slated for election in 1998. On appeal, this Court affirmed, noting that vacancies may occur for reasons other than the usual causes listed in an appointment provision. 710 So.2d at 412. However, in no instance has this Court ever upheld the authority of the governor to fill a vacancy pursuant to a statute providing for appointment of the initial officeholder. We decline to extend Griggs so as to permit the complete disregard of § 153 and the emasculation of § 152, which provides: All judges shall be elected by vote of the electors within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. We do not have the prerogative, by judicial fiat, of reviving a practice once permitted by our Constitution but subsequently repealed. [10]
The remaining issue is whether the offending portion of the 2006 Act can be severed, thereby allowing the remainder of the 2006 Act, including the provision deferring the election until 2010, to remain in place. This Court is required to sever and save what can be saved in a statute in the event a portion of the statute is determined to be unconstitutional. See § 1-1-16, Ala.Code 1975: If any provision of this Code or any amendment hereto, or any other statute, or the application thereof to any person, thing or circumstances, is held invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, such invalidity shall not affect the provisions or application of this Code or such amendment or statute that can be given effect without the invalid provisions or application, and to this end, the provisions of this Code and such amendments and statutes are declared to be severable. The absence of a severability provision is not determinative. See State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d 1156, 1158 (Ala. 1999): To be sure, `[t]he inclusion of a severability clause is a clear statement of legislative intent to that effect, but the absence of such a clause does not necessarily indicate the lack of such an intent or require a holding of inseverability.' [ City of Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So.2d 1312, 1315 (Ala.1987)] (emphasis added). Nevertheless, `the authority of a court to eliminate invalid elements of an act and yet sustain the valid elements is not derived from the legislature, but rather flows from powers inherent in the judiciary.' 2 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 44.08 (5th ed.1992). Here we have a severability clause within the original actthe 1985 Actcreating the additional judgeship for the 29th Judicial Circuit, thereby justifying the conclusion that there exists a clear statement of legislative intent in favor of severability. See § 15 of the 1985 Act, which was left unchanged by the amendment in the 2006 Act (The provisions of this Act are severable. If any part of the Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the part which remains.). This Court addressed the standard for ascertaining severability in Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. 209, 217, 36 So.2d 487, 493 (1948): A criterion to ascertain whether or not a statute is severable so that by rejecting the bad the valid may remain intact is: The act `ought not to be held wholly void unless the invalid portion is so important to the general plan and operation of the law in its entirety as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that it would not have been adopted if the legislature had perceived the invalidity of the part so held to be unconstitutional.' A. Bertolla & Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271, 24 So.2d 23, 25 [(1945)]; Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Blan, 229 Ala. 180, 155 So. 612 [(1934)]; 6 R.C.L. 125, § 123. Also further guiding our analysis is State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin : Under these well-established principles, the judiciary's severability power extends only to those cases in which the invalid portions are `not so intertwined with the remaining portions that such remaining portions are rendered meaningless by the extirpation.' Hamilton v. Autauga County, 289 Ala. 419, 426, 268 So.2d 30, 36 (1972) (quoting Allen v. Walker County, 281 Ala. 156, 162, 199 So.2d 854, 860 (1967)). If they are so intertwined, it must `be assumed that the legislature would not have passed the enactment thus rendered meaningless.' Id. In such a case, the entire act must fall. 2 [Norman J.] Singer, [ Sutherland Statutory Construction ] § 44.04, at 502 [(5th ed.1992)]. Nevertheless, `if the remaining portions of an Act are complete within themselves, sensible and capable of execution, the Act will stand.' Mitchell v. Mobile County, 294 Ala. 130, 134, 313 So.2d 172, 174 (1975). 735 So.2d at 1159 (emphasis added). See also City of Mobile v. Salter, 287 Ala. 660, 666-67, 255 So.2d 5, 10 (1971), in which this Court quoted from Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U.S. 80, 83, 26 L.Ed. 318 (1880), as follows: `It is an elementary principle that the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. But, ... if they are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.' In Springer v. State ex rel. Williams, 229 Ala. 339, 157 So. 219 (1934), the county school board had had the authority to appoint a superintendent of education until a statute enacted in 1931 called for the election in 1932 of a county superintendent of education for a four-year term commencing in 1933. The incumbent superintendent had been appointed in 1930 to a term of four years. The election took place in 1932, and a candidate qualified and was elected. In 1934 the school board reappointed the incumbent for a term of two years. The winner of the election in 1932, after waiting until the conclusion of the four-year appointive term, instituted a quo warranto proceeding seeking the ouster of the incumbent. This Court struck down as unconstitutional the provision calling for the ouster of the incumbent during his four-year term that had commenced in 1930. However, the Court upheld the portion of the act calling for election in 1932 for a term that exceeded the period of the incumbent's initial appointment. In upholding a portion of the act, the Court in Springer stated: In the case of State ex rel. Crumpton v. Montgomery et al., Excise Commissioners, 177 Ala. 212, 59 So. 294, 302 [(1912)], this court, speaking through Mr. Justice McClellan, held: `An enactment may be valid in part and invalid in part, and the general rule is that, if the valid and invalid parts are independent of each other, separable, and the valid competent to stand without the invalid, leaving an enactment sensible and capable of being executed, the valid parts will survive and the invalid will be stricken. Powell v. State, 69 Ala. 10 [(1881)]; Doe ex dem. Davis v. Minge, 56 Ala. 121 [(1876)]; State v. Davis, 130 Ala. 148, 30 So. 344, 89 Am. St. Rep. 23 [(1901)]; 36 Cyc. pp. 976-978. It is also to be said, in the nature of limitation of the rule stated, that the whole statute will be stricken if the valid and invalid parts are so connected and interdependent in subject-matter, meaning, and purpose that it cannot be presumed that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other, or where the striking of the invalid would cause results not contemplated or intended by the lawmakers, or where that invalid is the consideration or inducement of the whole act, or where the valid parts are ineffective and unenforceable in themselves, according to the legislative intent.' 229 Ala. at 342-43, 157 So. at 222. See also City of Birmingham v. Smith, 507 So.2d 1312, 1317 (Ala.1987), describing the test as whether the legislature would have enacted the statute without the void provision. Addressing severability in its February 21, 2007, order, the trial court held: The general purpose and intent of Act No. 2006-355 was to change the manner of filling the judgeship from an elective position to an appointed position. To accomplish this radical change after 20 years of the position being subject to an election, the legislature had to delay the judgeship. The delay was only the means to accomplish the filling of the judgeship by an appointment as opposed to an election. The trial court further found that the language in the 2006 Act dealing with the election following the initial appointment was merely surplusage because our constitution schedules elections subsequent to appointment. The trial court thus concluded: An appointment and subsequent election of the judgeship as provided in Act No. 2006-355 are so connected and interdependent in subject matter that the whole must be stricken. The appointment was a consideration and inducement to a subsequent election. The election language was surplusage because Constitutional Amendment 615 [now, Local Amendments, Talladega County, § 6 (Off.Recomp.)] provides for elections after valid and legal appointments. The two (appointment and election) are intertwined in a manner that one logically cannot fall without the other. Therefore the whole act must fail. The 2006 Act unquestionably accomplished three departures from what was then the existing law, i.e., the 1999 Act: 1. It postponed the time for the commencement of service on the part of a third judge in the 29th Judicial Circuit from the second Tuesday in January 2007 to October 1, 2009; 2. It provided for filling the office by appointment, rather than by election; and 3. It provided for filling the office at the general election to be held in 2010 with the judge so elected serving a full term of office beginning on the first Monday following the second Tuesday in January 2011. We must determine whether we agree with the trial court's ultimate conclusion that the appointment was a consideration and inducement to a subsequent election. Our review of an issue concerning the intent of the legislature is confined to the terms of the legislative act itself, unaided by the views of observers of or participants in the legislative process. City of Daphne v. City of Spanish Fort, 853 So.2d 933, 945 (Ala.2003). We can look to `the history of the times, the existing order of things, the state of the law when the instrument was adopted, and the conditions necessitating such adoption.' City of Birmingham v. Hendrix, 257 Ala. 300, 307, 58 So.2d 626, 633 (1952) (quoting In re Upshaw, 247 Ala. 221, 223, 23 So.2d 861, 863 (1945)). We can also look to an act's `relation to other statutory and constitutional provisions, view its history and the purposes sought to be accomplished and look to the previous state of law and to the defects intended to be remedied.' Hendrix, 257 Ala. at 307, 58 So.2d at 633 (quoting Birmingham Paper Co. v. Curry, 238 Ala. 138, 140, 190 So. 86, 88 (1939)). The Talladega County parties call our attention to the provision of the 2006 Act requiring that the inaugural term of the third judge should commence on or after October 1, 2009, significantly before the second Tuesday in January 2011. Striking only that portion of the 2006 Act while maintaining the balance of the act, they argue, would result in a delay not intended by the legislature. So, although it is irrefutable that the 2006 Act contemplated delay, by severing only the portion providing for the appointment of the new judge and leaving in place the portion providing for the election, we will have effectuated a further delay. If the legislature had intended that the judgeship not be filled into 2011, it would not have set a date as early as 2009 for the appointment. [11] On the other hand, if we do not sever the provision for appointment and save the portion deferring filling the office until January 2011, the election of 2006 and the commencement of a term in January 2007 is a fait accompli. Of course, this circumstance is flatly contrary to the timetable clearly contemplated by the 2006 Act with its deferral to a date no earlier than October 1, 2009, for the commencement of service by the third circuit judge. If we decline to sever and save, thereby striking down the 2006 Act in its entirety, the legislature could not restore the timetable contemplated by the 2006 Act by subsequent legislation because § 151 preserves from legislative action the right of a judge to hold office for the full term. The legislature has not shown any reluctance to defer the filling of this seat, as evidenced by three previous postponements of the time for creation of the office. If we sever and save, we preserve the status quo contemplated by the 2006 Act no immediate occupant of the office. Under this alternative, if it comports with legislative will to have an occupant in place earlier than January 2011, the legislature could act early in the 2008 regular legislative session so as to permit filling the seat in the 2008 election or provide for a special election at some time before the 2010 election. When we reject severability and strike down in its entirety an act that contains an invalid provision, we must be comfortable with the conclusion that a majority of the legislators voting in favor of the bill that became the act would prefer no statute at all to the alternative of eliminating only the provision that violates the constitution. In this context, the question posed would be: If the provision in the 2006 Act allowing the governor to appoint at some time after October 1, 2009, is struck down, are you content to allow that circumstance to nullify the separate provision of the 2006 Act repealing the election this year (2006) and replacing it with an election in 2010? Section 1 of the 2006 Act, in the first sentence, creates an additional judgeship. There follows two separate sentences. The first of these two sentences calls for filling the office by appointment on or after October 1, 2009. The second of these two sentences subjects the judgeship to election at the general election in 2010. The record of three previous postponements (1987, 1993, and 1999) of the time for filling the additional judgeship for the 29th Judicial Circuit is convincing evidence that the deferral of the commencement of the term from 2006 to a later date was not a secondary consideration wholly subordinate to the provision for commencement of the term by gubernatorial appointment. The answer to the hypothetical question whether the legislature would have been satisfied by the result of striking down the entire 2006 Act would therefore have to be an emphatic no. A legislator so polled would be cognizant of the fact that saving that part that is constitutional would permit subsequent enactment of a statute that passed constitutional muster while continuing to provide for a term beginning at a date other than in 2006, as was clearly intended by the 2006 Act, consistent with the will of three preceding legislatures. On the other hand, if we conclude that the will of the legislature would have been to see the entire 2006 Act fail by reason of constitutional infirmity as to only a portion of it and thus to allow an election to take place in 2006, we will have ignored the clearly expressed will of the legislature in that portion of the 2006 Act unaffected by constitutional infirmity. Such aggressive exercise of the power of judicial review is inconsistent with our obligations under the constitutional mandate for separation of powers. As this Court stated in Springer, If the act thus deleted of the invalid part is competent to stand without the invalid part, and leaves an enactment complete within itself, sensible, and capable of being executed, it will stand, unless the two parts the valid and invalidare so inseparable as to raise the presumption that the Legislature would not have enacted the one without the other. 229 Ala. at 343, 157 So. at 223. Applying that standard to this case, the portion of Section 1 of the 2006 Act amending the provision in the 1985 Act, as last amended, which called for an election in 2006, and providing instead for an election in 2010 for a term of office to begin in 2011, clearly constitutes an enactment complete within itself, sensible, and capable of being executed. In summary, we conclude that it is more logical to presume that the legislature did not contemplate election of a third circuit judge in the 2006 election than it is to assume that, if the legislature knew that the office could not be filled by gubernatorial appointment on or after October 1, 2009, it would prefer the status quo before the 2006 Act of an election in 2006. This is especially so in light of the legislature's previous disposition to postpone repeatedly the effective date and of the availability to the legislature of the means to adjust further the effective date by subsequent legislation if we decline to sever and save. We therefore cannot conclude that the primary intent of the legislature was to change the method of filling the judgeship from that of an election to appointment. The unconstitutional provision of the 2006 Act is not `so important to the general plan and operation of the law in its entirety as reasonably to lead to the conclusion that it would not have been adopted if the legislature had perceived the invalidity of the part so held to be unconstitutional.' Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. at 217, 36 So.2d at 493 (quoting A. Bertolla & Sons v. State, 247 Ala. 269, 271, 24 So.2d 23, 25 (1945)). Nor can we find that the appointment clause and the deferral of the election to 2010 are so intertwined that it must be assumed that the legislature would not have passed an act that, shorn of the offending provision, has become meaningless, where, as here, the remaining portions of the 2006 Act are complete within [themselves], sensible, and capable of execution. State ex rel. Jeffers v. Martin, 735 So.2d at 1159. That aspect of the 2006 Act deferring the onset of the term until January 2011 remains in effect, thereby amending the provision for an election in 2006 in the 1999 Act.