Opinion ID: 2594007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Proof of elements of the crime charged

Text: The State argues that the district court improperly invalidated the statute by misconstruing the word knowingly in the statute. The district court construed knowingly as factual impossibility. In its order granting Colosimo's motion to dismiss, the district court held that: [T]he Defendant could not knowingly communicate with a child less than sixteen years of age because there was no such person communicating with the Defendant, but rather the Defendant was communicating with a police officer forty one years of age representing [herself] to be a child less than sixteen years of age. Citing United States v. Meek , [28] the State contends that Colosimo had the requisite mens rea to violate the statute and that Colosimo's mistaken belief about the age of the victim is irrelevant. The State claims that the district court committed plain error in entering what amounts to a pretrial judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that Colosimo violated the statute. Colosimo responds that because the word knowingly is not defined in the statute, the general provisions of NRS Chapter 193 apply. Colosimo claims that NRS 193.017, which defines knowingly, [29] mandates that the accused must have knowledge that facts exist which constitute the act or omission of a crime, and that reasonable belief of those facts is not enough. In its criminal complaint, the State charged Colosimo on the basis of his reasonable belief that the person he was luring was fourteen years old. [30] Colosimo distinguishes the Meek decision by asserting that Meek dealt with a violation of the attempt portion of the federal statute, whereas here Colosimo was not charged with attempt but with the actual crime. We agree. In Meek, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a conviction under a federal statute criminalizing the luring and attempted luring of minors for sexual activity. [31] The Ninth Circuit analyzed the language of the statute and concluded that taking the more restrictive view of requiring an actual minor to be involved, as suggested by the defendant, would frustrate the purpose of the statute and would come at the cost of either rarely securing a conviction or putting an actual child in harm's way. [32] We do not find the Ninth Circuit analysis persuasive here because the defendant in Meek was charged with an attempt crime instead of being charged with the actual commission of the crime. In this case, Colosimo was charged with the actual commission of the crime, and he was never charged with an attempt crime. This court has stated that when the language of a statute is plain, its intention must be deduced from such language, and the court has no right to go beyond it. [33] Where the language of a statute is susceptible of a sensible interpretation, it is not to be controlled by any extraneous considerations. [34] The rules of statutory construction for penal statutes are different. [R]ules of statutory interpretation that apply to penal statutes require that provisions which negatively impact a defendant must be strictly construed, while provisions which positively impact a defendant are to be given a more liberal construction. [35] However, application of those rules necessarily begins with a finding that the statute or statutory provision at issue is ambiguous. [36] We find it plain and clear from the language of the statute that in order to commit the offense described, a defendant's intended victim must be less than 16 years of age and that victim must have actual parents or guardians whose express consent was absent or avoided. [37] Because the actual intended victim here was not less than 16 years of age, it was legally impossible for the prosecution to prove that element of the crime charged. [38] Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court granting dismissal. [39] ROSE, C.J., BECKER, MAUPIN, GIBBONS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.