Opinion ID: 2512182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Existence of Personal Jurisdiction

Text: [¶14] As stated above, after review of the record, we find the underlying basic facts are not in dispute, only their characterization and application to the law. The question of whether personal jurisdiction can properly be exercised in Wyoming is therefore a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Cheyenne Publishing, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d at 469; Eddy v. Oukrop, 784 P.2d 610, 612 (Wyo. 1989). [¶15] Pursuant to Wyoming's long-arm statute, Wyoming courts are authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant on any basis which is not inconsistent with the Wyoming or United States constitutions. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-107(a) (LexisNexis 2007). This case involves the question of the existence of personal jurisdiction based on a single act. In such a case, personal jurisdiction exists if three conditions are satisfied: 1) the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in Wyoming or of causing important consequences in Wyoming; 2) the cause of action must arise from the consequences in Wyoming of the defendant's activities; and 3) the activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough connection with Wyoming to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. Cheyenne Publishing, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d at 470; Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 886 P.2d 265, 267 (Wyo. 1994); First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Rawlins v. Trans Mountain Sales and Leasing, Inc., 602 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Wyo. 1979). [¶16] Our analysis begins and ends with the first factor. Purposeful availment is a threshold requirement meant to ensure `that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.' O'Bryan [ v. McDonald, 952 P.2d 636 (Wyo. 1998)] at 639 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). Goodwin v. Hall, 957 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Wyo. 1998). [¶17] In this case, we agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the district court, which states in part: The contacts the Defendants had with the State of Wyoming are two in character. First, while in Hawaii, they contracted with the Plaintiffs, who were Wyoming residents, to design a home to be built in Hawaii. Second, they communicated with the Plaintiffs and the Plaintiffs' contractors by telephone and email who were in Wyoming. There is no evidence that the Defendants came to Wyoming in furtherance of their contractual obligation; nor is there any evidence that they solicited business from the Plaintiffs in Wyoming. The telephone and email communications were not the fruit of any solicitation of the Defendants in Wyoming. Rather the contacts were the product of a contract entered between the parties in Hawaii and the choice of the Plaintiffs to return to Wyoming and to employ Wyoming contractors.     The Defendants' contact with the State of Wyoming through telecommunications are [sic] attenuated at best. These contacts came about only because the Plaintiffs chose to return to Wyoming after they entered into a contract with the Defendants and after the Plaintiffs chose to use building contractors who hail from Wyoming. The Defendants had no choice in those matters. The Defendants did not purposefully avail themselves to the privilege of acting in Wyoming and whatever contacts they had with people in Wyoming came about as a result of Plaintiffs' decisions to return to Wyoming and utilized [sic] Wyoming contractors. [¶18] The Meyers argue that, in entering the Agreement, Design Workshop became part of a design team based primarily in Wyoming. It is true Design Workshop knew of the possibility of extensive contact with various people in Wyoming when it entered into the Agreement. Indeed, potentially in anticipation of the added expense of such long-distance communications, the Agreement specifically excluded telecommunications and mailings from the general fee due Design Workshop. Instead these expenses were to be reimbursed separately. [¶19] However, Wyoming does not acquire [personal] jurisdiction by being the `center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. . . . [The issue] is resolved in this case by considering the acts of the [defendant]. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254, 78 S.Ct 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Thus, the constitutional right to exercise personal jurisdiction hinges upon a sufficient contact initiated by the defendant. Affiliations with Wyoming that involve Design Workshop but are instituted by the Meyers do not meet the constitutional minimum. The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. Id. at 253, 78 S.Ct. at 1239-40. [¶20] Instead, the analysis regarding the existence of personal jurisdiction revolves around the quality and nature of Design Workshop's contacts, not the quantity. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 160, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945) (the validity of assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonconsenting defendant who is not present in the forum depends upon the quality and nature of [his] activity in relation to the forum). The fact that Design Workshop knew it would have to communicate with people in Wyoming in order to fulfill its contractual obligations does not qualify as purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in Wyoming. See, e.g., Moyer Associates, Inc. v. The Grad Partnership, 1082 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15356 (Illinois company may not sue New Jersey business in Illinois for personal services rendered related to a building project in New Jersey absent broader contacts). [¶21] In Anderson v. Shiflett, 435 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a similar situation. An Oklahoma architect, Anderson, entered into a contract with a Texas resident, Shiflett, for the design of a building in Texas. The contract was made in Texas. Anderson attempted to sue Shiflett in federal district court in Oklahoma. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In affirming the dismissal, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: We have here a single, isolated transaction in the form of a contract for personal service. The totality of the contacts with Oklahoma was the performance of certain phases of the work at the plaintiff's Oklahoma City office. Nothing in the record discloses the reasonable anticipation of contractual consequences in Oklahoma. To support jurisdiction, the plaintiff relies on his own unilateral activities. Under the decision in Hanson v. Denckla [sic] this is not enough. To become subject to Oklahoma jurisdiction, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of doing business in that state and thereby invoke the benefits and protections of its laws. The record before us does not satisfy this requirement. Instead, it shows no more than the unilateral performance of contracted personal service in the forum. The idea that such performance alone can subject the employer to the jurisdiction of the forum has frightening consequences. Id. at 1038. We find the same reasoning pertinent here. In this case, Design Workshop simply did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Wyoming.