Opinion ID: 1761033
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Attorney General has Standing to Seek an Injunction.

Text: Among the reasons the Franklin Circuit Court declined to issue a temporary injunction was its holding that the Attorney General lacked standing to seek an injunction in this case because the Attorney General did not allege the violation of a personal right. We do not fault the Franklin Circuit Court for reaching that conclusion because it is based upon precedent, Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson . [67] But, upon reflection, we have concluded that we erred in Wilkinson by holding that the Attorney General lacked the ability to seek an injunction in that case because he did not have a personal right of any kind in the action. [68] In the waning days of his administration, then-Governor Wallace Wilkinson appointed himself as a member of the Board of Trustees of the University of Kentucky. The Attorney General sued, and the Franklin Circuit Court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting Governor Wilkinson from taking the oath as a trustee. Wilkinson appealed, and the Court of Appeals dissolved the temporary injunction. [69] The Attorney General then asked the Court to vacate or modify the order of the Court of Appeals. Over the dissent of Justice Leibson, a majority affirmed the Court of Appeals. [70] In the majority's analysis, it recited the proposition that [i]n order to demonstrate a right to a temporary injunction, the movant must first allege possible abrogation of a concrete personal right. Some substantial claim to a personal right must be alleged in order for a movant to be entitled to a temporary injunction. [71] The majority then concluded that the Attorney General has not demonstrated or made a clear showing by affidavit or verified complaint that his rights are being or will be violated so as to cause immediate and irreparable injury. [72] Going further, the majority opined that [h]ere the Attorney General has no personal right of any kind [in this case]. A doubtful case should await a trial on the merits. This is clearly a very doubtful case as to the standing of the Attorney General. [73] Having fully considered the law and the arguments of the parties, we now state categorically that we have no doubt that the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Kentucky has standing to seek injunctive relief on behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth, as was done in the Franklin Circuit Court case at hand. So, to the extent that Wilkinson holds otherwise, it is overruled. KRS 15.020 provides, in the role as chief law officer of the Commonwealth of Kentucky[,] the Attorney General shall exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the Attorney General under the common law, except when modified by statutory enactment. [74] It is unquestioned that [a]t common law, [the Attorney General] had the power to institute, conduct[,] and maintain suits and proceedings for the enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights. [75] Or, in other words, [u]nder the common law, the attorney general has the power to bring any action which he or she thinks necessary to protect the public interest, a broad grant of authority which includes the power to act to enforce the state's statutes. [76] So we readily conclude that the Attorney General, by virtue of that office, had the right to file an action in the Franklin Circuit Court seeking injunctive relief to prevent the DOC from, in the Attorney General's view, improperly and unconstitutionally applying HB 406 retroactively. These bedrock principles of law giving the Attorney General broad powers to initiate and defend actions on behalf of the people of the Commonwealth were overlooked by the majority in Wilkinson . Instead, Justice Leibson's dissent correctly recognized: It is the Attorney General's responsibility to file suit to vindicate public rights, as attorney for the people of the State of Kentucky. The rights of the people, as the body politic, are identical to the personal rights of a private individual, and enjoy at least the same, if not more, standing to seek a declaratory judgment, and to seek injunctive protection against injury. Under KRS 415.050, the Attorney General may proceed directly against a usurper. Under KRS 15.020, the Attorney General is the state's chief law officer and may exercise all common law duties and authority pertaining to the office of the Attorney General under the common law. It is the personal right of the people as the body politic and not any personal right of the person holding the office of Attorney General that is being represented here. It is unreasonable to suggest that because the person with the official responsibility to seek protection on the people's behalf has no personal stake in the outcome, there is no right of redress and no right to injunctive relief against the Governor's usurpation of power, if such has occurred. [77] Accordingly, we overrule Wilkinson to the extent that it holds that the Attorney General must have a personal interest in the outcome of the litigation in order to have standing to seek redress. Instead, we now hold that the Attorney General has a sufficient personal right in these types of cases by virtue of the office and the duties commensurate with that high office. [78] Therefore, we reject the DOC's argument that the Attorney General lacked standing to bring the Franklin Circuit Court action.