Opinion ID: 2319400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Mr Long's Sentence

Text: Mr. Long argues that the trial court's sentence is unconstitutional in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because the trial court found three aggravating factors that were not determined by the jury: (1) the murder was especially heinous, (2) the crime involved substantial planning, and (3) the victim was vulnerable because of his age (14). We conclude that Mr. Long is procedurally barred from raising this argument, and even if he were not, his argument is still unpersuasive because Apprendi does not apply retroactively. We first examine the relevant procedural history of the sentencing issue. The trial court sentenced Mr. Long on September 4, 1998, to concurrent terms; it imposed a prison term of life without parole for the first degree murder while armed conviction, and lesser terms for the other charges. Mr. Long first raised his Apprendi arguments via a pro se motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Super. Ct.Crim. R. 35(a), [11] on July 27, 2004, after his counsel had filed his first § 23-110 motion in 2003, and during the pendency of his direct appeal. He argued that his sentence was illegal because [t]he jury which deliberated [his] case held no knowledge of these aggravating factors. The trial court issued an order denying his pro se motion on August 9, 2004, and Mr. Long did not appeal that order. The trial court later denied his § 23-110 motion without a hearing on November 15, 2004. Mr. Long filed a notice of appeal for that denial on November 29, 2004. The collateral case was ultimately consolidated with his direct appeal, which resulted in our decision in Long I, supra . When we decided Mr. Long's consolidated appeal in 2006, Long I, we d[id] not reverse Mr. Long's convictions outright, but we vacate[d] the order denying his § 23-110 motion and remand[ed] the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the motion in accordance with our opinion. Long I, supra, 910 A.2d at 310-11. Later, on April 15, 2008, Mr. Long's new counsel (Mr. Heslep) filed a renewed motion for correction of sentence, repeating his argument that the trial judge, not the jury, made the factual findings to support the enhanced sentence of life without parole. On June 24, 2008, the government filed an opposition to the renewed motion. On December 11, 2008, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the court issued an order on Mr. Long's § 23-110 motion pursuant to our instructions on remand. However, the trial court took no action on Mr. Long's renewed motion to correct his sentence, and he filed a notice of appeal on December 15, 2008. We subsequently remanded the record to the trial court with directions to rule, on an expedited basis, on the defendant's renewed motion to correct his sentence or, in the event that the trial court has previously ruled on this motion, to memorialize the previous ruling in writing. Judge Christian entered an order dated January 7, 2011, which denied Mr. Long's renewed motion. The judge attached her 2004 order, indicated that Mr. Long did not appeal that order, stated that the 2004 order addressed all of Mr. Long's contentions, and that he had raised no additional evidence in his renewed order. As a threshold matter, we do not believe that Mr. Long's sentence is illegal within the meaning of Rule 35, as he claims. Rule 35(a) specifies that: The Court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. In Ruffin v. United States, 25 A.3d 1 (D.C.2011), we reiterated the distinction between an illegal sentence and a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. An illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule 35(a) is a sentence that is inconsistent with the defendant's conviction, and that exceeds the limits authorized by the relevant statute, even if there was no irregularity in the sentencing proceeding. By contrast, a sentence imposed in an illegal manner is one that reflects defects in the process or proceedings prior to the imposition of the sentence. 25 A.3d at 4-5 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence imposed in an illegal manner generally is subject to the 120-day time limitation reflected in Rule 35(b); the motion must be made not later than 120 days after the sentence is imposed . . ., or not later than 120 days after receipt by the Court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment. . . ., or not later than 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. . . . Rule 35(b). Mr. Long's motion to correct sentence was based on his assertion that the judge rather than the jury made the Apprendi findings. Thus, his actual claim is that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner, and it is subject to the 120-day time limitation of Rule 35(b). Whether Mr. Long's renewed motion runs afoul of the 120-day time limitation in Rule 35(b) depends on whether it is characterized as a new motion or merely as a memorialization of his 2004 motion. When we remanded Mr. Long's case to the trial court in 2006, after deciding Long I, we return[ed it] . . . to the trial court for all purposes. Bell v. United States, 676 A.2d 37, 41 (D.C.1996). Mr. Long filed his renewed motion for correction of sentence on April 15, 2008, prior to the commencement of his remand evidentiary hearing on his D.C.Code § 23-110 motion. Thus, at the time that Mr. Long filed his renewed motion, we retain[ed] no jurisdiction over the case; jurisdiction remained with the trial court. See id. On December 15, 2008, Mr. Long appealed the trial court's denial of his D.C.Code § 23-110, motion, and his case returned to this court. However, because the trial court had not addressed the renewed sentencing motion, we remanded the record, at which point we retained jurisdiction over the case. . . . Id. Arguably, under these circumstances, the trial court's 2011 order denying Mr. Long's renewed motion technically was a new order. But, it could be characterized as nothing more than a memorialization of the 2004, order since [t]he point of such a remand is to give the trial judge the opportunity to complete or clarify the record so that this court will have an adequate basis for review of the trial court's rulings. Id. Characterizing the trial court's 2011 order as a mere memorialization of the court's 2004 order gives us some pause, however, because Mr. Long failed to appeal the 2004 order and did not lodge his renewed motion until four years later. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that Mr. Long's 2004 motion and his 2008 renewed motion were procedurally barred for the reasons set forth below. We have stated that [w]here a defendant has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure. Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985). Mr. Long did not raise the Apprendi issue in his direct appeal, or his first § 23-110 motion, nor did he appeal the denial of his first Rule 35 challenge in 2004. He acknowledges that the sole purpose of our remand of the case in 2006 was for a hearing on [his] § 23-110 motion. He complains that his appellate counsel did not raise this issue [pertaining to Apprendi ] above, yet, he fails to articulate the cause of, and any prejudice resulting from, his counsel's failure to do so. Moreover, his arguments in his renewed motion encompassed the same arguments contained in his original motion, the denial of which he failed to appeal four years earlier. As [s]ection 23-110 is not designed to be a substitute for direct review, id., we cannot agree that Mr. Long's motion remains ripe for resolution on collateral attack. [12] Despite the procedural bar, Mr. Long urges us to reach the merits of his claim. Even if we were not foreclosed from reviewing Mr. Long's sentencing challenge, the government argues that his claim is barred because Apprendi does not apply retroactively. In Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), the Court declared that while [n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively (emphasis in original), [n]ew rules of procedure . . . generally do not apply retroactively. Id. at 351-52, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Court clearly stated that rules that regulate only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability are procedural. Id. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998)). Apprendi addressed the adequacy of [sentencing] procedure,  not the substantive basis for [sentencing] enhancement[s]. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 475, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). Federal courts consistently have concluded that  Apprendi is about nothing but procedurewho decides a given question (judge versus jury) and under what standard (preponderance versus reasonable doubt). Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir.2002); see also United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 488 (3d Cir.2003) (The courts of appeal that have considered this issue have held that Apprendi establishes a procedural rule.). The Court has recognized an exception allowing retroactive application for a new rule of criminal procedure, but that exception has very limited application. The Court give[s] retroactive effect to only a small set of watershed rules . . . implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Schriro, supra, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We conclude, as have federal courts, that the rule in Apprendi is not a `watershed' rule that improved the accuracy of determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant[;] [r]ather, the accuracy improved by Apprendi is the imposition of a proper sentence, and Apprendi did not alter our understanding of bedrock elements essential to a fundamentally fair proceeding. Swinton, supra, 333 F.3d at 490 (citing United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir.2002)); see also United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir.2001). In sum, like the federal courts, we conclude that Apprendi is neither a substantive rule nor a watershed rule of criminal procedure, and it does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Apprendi was decided in 2000, after Mr. Long's conviction became final, and he cannot pursue this issue on a collateral attack. Thus, even if his claim was not procedurally barred, his challenge would fail. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction, and its judgment denying Mr. Long's D.C.Code § 23-110 motion. We also affirm the trial court's denial of Mr. Long's Super. Ct. Civ. R. 35 renewed motion for correction of sentence. So ordered. SCHWELB, Senior Judge, dissenting: At Long's first trial, Michael Plummer testified that Long's codefendant, William Tilghman, admitted that it was he (Tilghman) who killed the decedent, that Long was innocent, and that he (Tilghman) had decided to place the blame on Long. The first trial ended with a hung jury with respect to the principal charges. At Long's second trial, Plummer's counsel indicated that his client proposed to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify. Whatever the merit or lack thereof of this proposed assertion of the privilege may have been, see infra p. 388, it is undisputed, and indeed indisputable, that Long had the right to introduce into evidence a transcript of Tilghman's first trial testimony (both the direct and cross-examination) and to have it read to the jury. Long's attorney, Mitchell Baer, did not attempt to introduce this evidence, and Long was convicted of all charges. Long contends that his attorney's failure to present this potentially powerful exculpatory evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The government contends, the trial court held, and my colleagues in the majority now appear to agree, that Baer made a strategic or tactical decision not to present Plummer's first trial testimony, and that this decision is therefore largely insulated from our review. The record demonstrates beyond peradventure, however, that Baer did not make, and could not have made, a strategic or tactical decision with respect to this point because, as he effectively acknowledged on the witness stand, he did not make any decision at all. Specifically, Baer admitted, under cross-examination by Long's attorney, that the introduction of a transcript of Plummer's testimony into evidence probably had not even occurred to him, that he did no research on the issue, and that he did not discuss the matter with his client. It is surely self-evident that a lawyer cannot have declined to take a course of action for strategic or tactical reasons when he was, by his own admission, unaware that the course of action was available to him or that there was a decision on the matter to be made. In my view, counsel's decision-making at trial notwithstanding lack of preparedness on such a major issue satisfies the deficient performance prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The question whether Long has made the requisite showing of prejudice is closer, but for the reasons stated in detail below, I do not believe that this court can have the requisite confidence in the verdict. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.