Opinion ID: 2017275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence and Contributory Negligence

Text: With regard to negligence on the part of Detroit Edison, there is no testimony in this case from which a jury could find that the operation carried on with the crane was dangerous because of Detroit Edison's distribution line. The testimony is to the effect that there was sufficient room in which to work; that ironworkers fully understood the danger from electric wires and the importance of staying away from them; that there was no reason to expect trouble from the line or to alert Detroit Edison that a crane was to be used; that Koehler, Beard, Pankey, and others were aware of the existence of the line and could have requested Detroit Edison to insulate the line if they considered it necessary that such a step be taken; and that Detroit Edison was not apprised of the operation or requested to take any precautions. The mere fact that Detroit Edison knew a building was under construction near its power line and that, from time to time, mobile cranes were being brought upon the premises to be used in construction work, would not, standing alone, create a duty upon Detroit Edison to remove the charge, insulate the line, or notify the parties of a dangerous condition. We agree with the finding of the trial judge that there was no negligence on the part of Detroit Edison. While there is no dispute with regard to the facts as to Detroit Edison, the question of the negligence of the other defendants and the contributory negligence of Koehler is quite a different matter. The legal relationships between Beard, Pankey, and Koehler are all in dispute. There is testimony that Beard was in the business of renting cranes; that customarily Beard rented cranes with a furnished operator; that Pankey was hired the day before the accident by Koehler to replace a crane operator furnished by Beard with whom Koehler was dissatisfied; and that on the day of the accident Beard was on the premises, talked with Pankey and agreed to or did hire him. A jury might conclude that Pankey was Beard's employee, or that he was Beard's employee borrowed by Koehler, or that he was Koehler's employee, or finally that he was Koehler's employee borrowed by Beard. Beard's liability could be predicated upon a finding that Pankey was his employee or a finding that Pankey was Koehler's employee borrowed by Beard. Just as the legal relationships of the parties are disputed, the testimony with regard to how the accident occurred, as has been noted, is also conflicting. There is testimony from which a jury might conclude that Koehler gave erroneous signals, thereby causing Pankey to swing the cable into the power line; that Pankey became confused, disregarded the signals of Koehler, and swung Koehler into the power line; or that, as the crane was swinging away from the building, for some reason wholly unconnected with the power line, Koehler lost his hold and fell. Finally, with regard to the question of contributory negligence by Koehler, there is considerable testimony that the act of riding down the cable was dangerous. There is also some testimony that such activity goes on and may sometimes be necessary. Koehler had ridden down the cable before on the day of the accident. Presumably he would have had no difficulty in riding it down again 1) unless he lost his hold; or 2) unless he contacted the high tension wire. Assuming Koehler had placed himself in a position of peril, could Pankey have acted to protect Koehler when he discovered the position he was in? Was it solely Pankey's acts that caused Koehler to fall, or the acts of Pankey and Koehler, or Koehler's acts alone? What conduct on the part of an individual constitutes due care for his own safety is ordinarily a question of fact for determination by the jury under all the circumstances of the case and, therefore, is not a question of law. Ingram v. Henry (1964), 373 Mich 453, 457; Barnebee v. Spence Brothers (1962), 367 Mich 46; Dismukes v. Michigan Express, Inc. (1962), 368 Mich 197; Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad Company v. Van Steinburg (1868), 17 Mich 99, 117-119. For favorable comment on the Van Steinburg case and the significance of its holding, see concurring opinion of Justice BLACK in Davis v. New York Central Railroad Company (1957), 348 Mich 262, 274-275. Contributory negligence cannot be imputed to a plaintiff for failure to anticipate negligent acts of a defendant. Detroit & Milwaukee Railroad Company v. Van Steinburg, supra, 119; Winckowski v. Dodge [] (1914), 183 Mich 303, 312; Wright v. Delray Connecting Railroad Company (1960), 361 Mich 619; Pace v. Gibson [] (1959), 357 Mich 315, 325; Hoffman v. Burkhead (1958), 353 Mich 47, 56. On the record before us, the jury could have found that Koehler's death was caused not by a fall from the dangerous position he had taken at the end of the cable to ride it to the ground but by the intervening negligent act of Pankey in swinging the cable into the power line. Finally, when defendant's proof of contributory negligence presents a question of fact for the jury, plaintiff is entitled to a presumption of due care. Mack v. Precast Industries, Inc. (1963), 369 Mich 439, 454; Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corporation (1965), 374 Mich 194, 208, et seq. We conclude that upon favorable view of the plaintiff's case there was sufficient evidence to present questions for jury resolution under proper instructions from the court. Ackerberg v. Muskegon Osteopathic Hospital (1962), 366 Mich 596, 600; Davis v. New York Central Railroad Company (1957), 348 Mich 262. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to Detroit Edison with costs to Detroit Edison. The judgment as to defendants Beard and Pankey is reversed. As to them, a new trial is ordered. Costs may be taxed by plaintiff against defendants Beard and Pankey.