Opinion ID: 2584947
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Factual Statements, Evidentiary Characterizations, and Personal Opinion

Text: Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating facts, mischaracterizing the evidence, and injecting his own personal opinions regarding the mental health evidence. The prosecutor's deliberate misrepresentation of the evidence, he argues, denied him his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, impartial jury, effective assistance of counsel, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and due process of law. Although the prosecutor argued that marks found on Schmiedt's neck demonstrated defendant's intent to strangle and kill her, he also argued that defendant was [m]aybe trying to feel for a pulse in her neck so that if she isn't dying, he could hit her again because he wanted her dead. [¶] Isn't that thoughtful premeditation and deliberate conduct. Defendant claims this latter argument misrepresented Dr. Reiber's cross-examination testimony that (1) given the number and severity of the blows to Schmiedt's head, a rage-induced overkill may have occurred; and (2) the neck marks reflected partial strangulation that probably would have occurred fairly early in the entire episode, and perhaps as part of the initial attempt to restrain the individual so that blows [to the head] could be administered. Even assuming this claim was preserved for review, we see no basis for a finding of misconduct. The prosecutor's argument rested on inferences drawn from Dr. Reiber's testimony, and the record does not support defendant's charge of prosecutorial misrepresentation. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 133-134.) Dr. Reiber clearly explained that a rage-induced overkill was but one theory indicated by the physical evidence, [17] and he expressly stated his testimony regarding the circumstances of the strangulation was something he could easily envision but was simply [a] hypothetical scenario. Notably, the doctor was not asked whether the neck marks could not have resulted from an attempted pulse checking, so his testimony did not rule that out as an alternative possible scenario. Dr. Reiber did, however, testify that Schmiedt's skull had been shattered by one of the first head blows, which would have rendered her unconscious. He also testified that all but maybe one of the head blows were likely delivered premortem, and he agreed with the prosecution that a person might check for a pulse to ascertain whether a victim who was injured but not moving or responding was in fact dead. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence presented was susceptible to the interpretation that Schmiedt was rendered unconscious after the first head blow, that defendant may have checked for a pulse at that point and may have pressed hard enough on her neck to leave marks, and that defendant then continued bashing at her skull to make sure she was dead. No misconduct appears. [18] Defendant next contends the prosecutor misrepresented the testimony and expert finding of Dr. Wicks that defendant was mild to moderately impaired, and improperly injected his own unqualified opinion on the matter. He claims the prosecutor misled the jury in arguing that defendant was a malingerer and that Dr. Wicks's finding of impairment could not be trusted because defendant likely faked his illness. In particular, defendant asserts the prosecutor lied when he told the jury that defendant faked chest pains in 1986, and that the doctor who examined him in 1986 said, `Hey, this guy is just faking it, there is nothing wrong.' To support the claim of misconduct, defendant refers to Dr. Globus's cross-examination testimony that, according to 1986 records, defendant's condition at that time was serious enough to warrant a CT (computerized tomography) scan and three days of hospitalization. Defendant further argues the prosecutor substituted his own unqualified opinion of the evidence when he argued that all the tests really showed was a little bit of slowing in thinking, and that defendant's actual impairment was meaningless in the context we have here and not really a biggie. Even assuming these claims were preserved for review, our review of the record discloses no misconduct. In challenging the significance of Dr. Wicks's finding that defendant was mild to moderately impaired, the prosecutor properly referred to the evidence that defendant, at the time of Schmiedt's murder, engaged in a number of activities demonstrating he can get along just fine. As the prosecutor pointed out, defendant appeared to have no trouble when he used the telephone, talked the victim into letting him into her apartment, socialized with the victim enough to get her to feel comfortable so that she becomes more vulnerable to his attack, went from Sacramento to Stockton after the murder, figured out the victim's ATM PIN to gain access to her bank accounts, checked into a motel, and then fled from the motel and got all the way to Vancouver, Washington to escape apprehension. Given such evidence, the prosecutor did not mislead the jury or otherwise offer an unqualified opinion when he argued, among other things, We really have to wonder if there is really any deficit at all. [¶] If there is, it's not much and it's really meaningless in the context we have here. As for the prosecutor's argument that a doctor said in 1986 that defendant was `just faking it, there is nothing wrong,' it appears he was referring to the circumstances that a 1986 medical record indicated that the examining doctor was suspicious of malingering, that the doctor nonetheless ordered tests for defendant, and that the test results came back negative. Although we do not condone this particular argument to the extent it inaccurately equated the examining doctor's suspicions of malingering with an actual medical conclusion that defendant was just faking it, it had no conceivable impact on the verdict and was, at most, harmless prosecutorial hyperbole. (See People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1235 [283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163] [addressing claimed factual inaccuracies in prosecutor's guilt phase argument].) Finally, defendant argues the prosecutor made a number of unfounded assumptions regarding Dr. Globus's findings concerning defendant's PET and MRI results. Among other things, he challenges the prosecutor's argument that a hypometabolism in the right temporal lobe and asymmetry is not that big a kind of deal. It's like being right-handed or left-handed. One hand may be stronger than the other. He also claims the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence when he suggested that the PET and MRI scans did not indicate mental damage, and that the doctor who actually performed the scans did not specify that a defect existed. Even if this claim was preserved for review, we would reject it on the merits. Taken in context, the prosecutor's remarks constituted fair comment on the state of the expert testimony. For instance, Dr. Globus agreed it was possible that this asymmetry has no effect whatsoever on [defendant's] behavior. With regard to asymmetry, the doctor also agreed it generally was a matter of degree . . . that may account for some functional deficit, and that the greater the difference between the two sides, the more likely it is to be abnormal. On this point, Dr. Globus admitted the difference is not large here, and he further agreed it was possible to describe defendant's hippocampus structure as showing that one side was different from the other, instead of characterizing the structure as abnormal. He also conceded that most people who have some kind of brain deterioration or damage are able to control their aggressive impulses. In light of Dr. Globus's equivocal testimony, the challenged arguments were proper.