Opinion ID: 1774223
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probable Cause Information Supplied by Informant

Text: The issues we address are deeply rooted in probable cause. This follows from the fact that the constitutional validity of the search and seizure is wholly dependent upon the legality of the warrantless arrest, which, in turn, must be bottomed upon probable cause. This determination depends upon whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense. (Emphasis supplied). Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142, 145 (1964). Our courts, state and federal, have considered the matter of probable cause as supported by disclosures made to police officers by informants, and have sought to balance the State's privilege to withhold disclosure of the identity of informants against the fundamental requirements of fairness. In so doing certain rules have emerged. The privilege must yield and the identity of the informant must be disclosed when his identity or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628, 1 L.Ed.2d 639, 645 (1957); see also Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487 (1955); or when the informant is a participant in the crime, State v. Campbell, 549 S.W.2d 952 (1977); or when he has knowledge favorable to an accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). But the precise question with which we deal is not disclosure of the identity of the informer. There is no showing in the instant case that the informer was an eyewitness or a participant. Indeed, his very existence is questioned. Nor is there any showing that the contents of his alleged communication would have been helpful to the accused, nor that he had any knowledge favorable to him. This, however, does not end the inquiry. We are concerned with the rules governing the action of a trial judge when a challenge is made to the existence and credibility of the informer and the entitlement of law enforcement officers to rely upon information so obtained. A resolution of cases and controversies involving these considerations does not necessarily require identity disclosure. We recognize that the use of informants is a vital, and perhaps indispensable, part of society's defense against the ravages of the illicit traffic in drugs, and that forcing an undercover agent or informer to blow his cover is generally not in the public interest. We must balance against this, however, the right of the citizen to be secure in his person and possessions against false charges secretly made by the hidden faces of false accusers, or even worse, by overzealous officers of the law relying upon non-existent informants. Hence, the existence and credibility of an informant and the bona fide character of the law enforcement officer's reliance on such information must be the subject of penetrating analysis and searching scrutiny by trial judges. Indeed, the law so requires. A law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, upon reliable and credible information that a felony has been committed. Jones v. State, 161 Tenn. 370, 33 S.W.2d 59 (1930), reaffirmed in Simmons v. State, 198 Tenn. 587, 281 S.W.2d 487 (1955). In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964) the Court reversed a warrantless arrest and search, stating: When the constitutional validity of an arrest is challenged, it is the function of a court to determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed. (Citations omitted). If the court is not informed of the facts upon which the arresting officers acted, it cannot properly discharge that function.       It is possible that an informer did in fact relate information to the police officer in this case which constituted probable cause for the petitioner's arrest. But when the constitutional validity of that arrest was challenged, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to show with considerably more specificity than was shown in this case what the informer actually said, and why the officer thought the information was credible. We may assume that the officers acted in good faith in arresting the petitioner. But good faith on the part of the arresting officers is not enough. (Citations omitted). If subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and the people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, only in the discretion of the police. (Emphasis supplied). 379 U.S. at 96-97, 85 S.Ct. at 228-229, 13 L.Ed.2d at 148. The Court is simply saying that the information must be credible and the officer's acceptance of its credibility must be founded in reason. Credibility of the informant and the reliability of his information are the touchstones of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and these factors must be shown by the prosecution when a challenge of probable cause is made in a no-warrant arrest based upon information supplied by an informant. In McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967) the Court makes it clear that it is the duty of the trial judge to satisfy himself on the basis of an evidentiary hearing that the informant's information is credible and reliable. Perhaps the most significant case pertinent to the issue under discussion is Wallis v. State, 220 Tenn. 400, 417 S.W.2d 781 (1967). There the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Humphreys, reversed and remanded because the constitutional safeguard of an independent investigation by the trial judge of the reliability and dependability of the arresting officer's information was not made. In Wallis the Court relied heavily upon Simmons v. State, supra , which, as the Court noted, held it to be the duty of the trial judge, upon objection to the evidence gained by a search made in connection with [a warrantless] arrest, to conduct an inquiry for the purpose of satisfying himself, as a judge, that the arresting officer actually had information that a felony had been committed, and that the information came from a reliable and dependable source. 417 S.W.2d 784. We adopt and reiterate these holdings. To justify a warrantless arrest based upon the testimony of an informant, he must be reliable and his information must be credible. When a question as to the reliability and credibility of an informant or his information is fairly raised, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of satisfying himself not only that the informant was reliable but that the law enforcement officer was justified in accepting and acting upon the information so conveyed. The record in the instant case falls far short of meeting the requisite standard. There was no proof of credibility or reliability. Reference to our cases will indicate that the application of the proper standard does not necessarily entail a revelation of the identity of the informant. In McCray, supra , the requirement was fulfilled where the officer testified that the informant gave specific information that was corroborated by investigation and that he was personally known to the officer and had in the past given reliable information that resulted in convictions. Similar proof of reliability has been held acceptable in Tennessee cases, such as Holder v. State, 490 S.W.2d 170 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972) where there was testimony as to past reliability, and State v. Parker, 525 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. 1975) where the informant had previously supplied reliable information. We hold on the basis of the record before us, that the petitioner was arrested without probable cause and the resulting searches and seizures were constitutionally infirm under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under Article 1, Sections 7 and 8 of the Constitution of Tennessee. This holding, however, will yield to proper findings pursuant to the evidentiary hearing directed in Section V, infra.