Opinion ID: 759791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wording of the Instruction

Text: 63 Defendant next argues that the district court's instruction does not accurately reflect the responsible corporate officer doctrine. Defendant is incorrect. 64 Although defendant is entitled to a jury instruction that accurately reflects the law, he is not entitled to his choice of wording in the instruction. See United States v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.1994) ( Defendants are entitled to have a court instruct a jury on their theory of defense if the instruction is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence. Defendants, however, are not entitled to their preferred wording of the instruction.) (citation omitted). 65 As noted above, the district court's instruction required the government to prove that defendant had the authority and capacity to prevent the discharge of pollutants to the sewer system. By requiring the jury to find that defendant had both the authority and the capacity to prevent the discharges, the district court ensured that the jury could convict defendant only if he had actual authority to exercise control over the drum-cleaning operation. See Park, 421 U.S. at 673, 95 S.Ct. at 1912 (The theory upon which responsible corporate agents are held criminally accountable for causing violations of the Act permits a claim that a defendant was powerless to prevent or correct the violation to be raised defensively at a trial on the merits.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That being so, the district court's instruction was not erroneous in the way that defendant asserts.E. Underlying Violation of the CWA 66 Defendant also argues that the responsible corporate officer instruction allowed the jury to convict him without finding a violation of the CWA. Defendant's focus is too narrow. The relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate. United States v. Moore, 109 F.3d 1456, 1465 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 108, 139 L.Ed.2d 61 (1997). The district court first instructed the jury that, as to all five counts, the government had to prove that: 67 1. During on or about the dates charged in the indictment, the defendant knowingly caused a pollutant to be discharged to a publicly owned treatment works; 68 2. The discharges were made in violation of a federal or state pretreatment standard, or [for count 5] a requirement of the City of Olympia code; and 69 3. The defendant knew that the material discharged was a pollutant, that is, that it consisted of chemical waste or industrial waste. 70 The court also told the jury that, [i]n addition to a defendant who discharges or causes the discharge of pollutants directly [Requirement 1 in the instruction above], the Clean Water Act also holds accountable 'responsible corporate officers.'  Read together with the previous instruction, the responsible corporate officer instruction relieved the government only of having to prove that defendant personally discharged or caused the discharge of a pollutant. The government still had to prove that the discharges violated the law and that defendant knew that the discharges were pollutants. Thus, read as a whole, the instructions were not erroneous in the manner that defendant asserts. 71 ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS 72 The district court admitted evidence of defendant's prior discharges of industrial waste, including discharges of industrial waste (1) on the plant property, (2) into the sewer at an apartment complex that defendant owned, (3) into the sewer at defendant's house, and (4) resulting from a chemical spill at the plant. A. Standard of Review 73 We review a district court's admission of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 986, 117 S.Ct. 445, 136 L.Ed.2d 341 (1996). A district court abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law or rests its decision on clearly erroneous findings of material fact. United States v. Alviso, 152 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir.), as amended. B. Analysis 74 Evidence of a prior bad act may be admissible when it is introduced for a purpose other than to prove that a defendant acted in conformity therewith. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); United States v. Luna, 21 F.3d 874, 878 (9th Cir.1994). For example, evidence of a prior act can be admissible to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); Luna, 21 F.3d at 878. 75 Before such evidence is admissible, however, the government must establish that (1) the prior act tends to prove a material issue in the action, (2) the prior act is not too remote from the charged offense, (3) the prior act is similar to the charged offense, and (4) the defendant committed the prior act. United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 267, 142 L.Ed.2d 220 (1998). Despite those requirements, the rule is one of inclusion, and evidence of a prior act is admissible unless it tends to prove only criminal propensity. See Jackson, 84 F.3d at 1159 (Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion. Unless the evidence of other crimes tends only to prove propensity, it is admissible.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 76 Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion by holding that the government had satisfied the first two requirements. First, defendant argues that the prior discharges did not tend to prove a material issue, because the government did not prove that the prior discharges were similarly unlawful, even though those acts were bad. 77 The CWA has a knowledge requirement: A defendant must know that the substance was a pollutant (i.e., industrial waste). Defendant's prior discharges tend to prove the material issue of knowledge, even if they were lawful. See United States v. Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir.1993) ( Prior acts need not be unlawful to be admissible under Rule 404(b)--the rule refers to evidence of other 'crimes, wrongs, or acts.' (Emphasis added.) The critical requirement is that the evidence be offered for a purpose other than to prove the defendant's propensity to engage in the conduct charged.). 78 In particular, defendant's involvement with the prior discharges tended to prove his familiarity with the company's industrial waste. The prior discharges also pertained to CH2O's drum-cleaning operation, which was the same activity that defendant observed here. Thus, defendant's first argument is not well taken. 79 Second, defendant argues that the prior acts are presumptively too remote, because some of them occurred seven years before the acts charged in the indictment. Defendant relies on a footnote in United States v. Brown, 880 F.2d 1012, 1015 n. 3 (9th Cir.1989), in which the court in dictum stated that 80 the seven year-old incident in which Brown allegedly recovered his property at gunpoint is substantially more remote in time than prior acts usually admitted under 404(b). 81 However, after Brown, this court repeatedly has upheld the admission of evidence of prior acts that are more than seven years old. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.1997) (13 years); United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir.1990) (10 years); United States v. Ross, 886 F.2d 264, 267 (9th Cir.1989) (13 years). 82 Whether a prior act is too remote depends on the theory that makes it admissible and the similarity of the act to the current charge. See United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514, 519 (9th Cir.1989) (Depending upon the theory of admissibility and the similarity of the acts, ... some remote acts may be extremely probative and relevant.). Here, defendant's prior acts involved the discharge of industrial waste originating from CH2O's drum-cleaning operation. Because of the similarity between the prior and charged acts, and because defendant's knowledge of CH2O's industrial waste did not change over the seven years, the prior acts were sufficiently recent for the purposes of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). See, e.g., id. (Given the fairly close similarity of the offenses, [the defendant's] prior conviction was not [too] remote, even though it occurred more than 10 years before the charged offense.) (citation omitted). 83 In summary, evidence of defendant's prior acts satisfied the requirements of Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence. 9 84 AFFIRMED.