Opinion ID: 1395220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As held in McGarger v. Moore, 89 Or. 597, 599, 175 P. 77 (1918), after considering the provisions of § 6 of Article VII (Original) of the Constitution of Oregon and § 2 of Article VII (Amended) of that constitution: This court, therefore, is one of limited jurisdiction aside from the instances just mentioned, [ mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus ]. It cannot acquire authority to act except in the manner provided by statute, in a case of the kind before us, and can exercise only the power expressly conferred upon it by statute. To the same effect, see City of Portland v. Duntley, 185 Or. 365, 371, 203 P.2d 640 (1949), and State ex rel. Venn v. Reid, 207 Or. 617, 630-31, 298 P.2d 990 (1956). [4] The question to be decided is whether any statute conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to consider the appeal in this case. As previously stated, defendants were convicted in municipal court of violating municipal ordinances. They then appealed to the circuit court per ORS 221.350. [5] This appeal to the circuit court was not an appeal in the usual sense, [6] but was a trial de novo as provided by ORS 221.390. [7] Following their conviction in circuit court, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. That appeal was considered by that court on its merits in spite of the provisions of ORS 221.360, which provide: In all cases involving the constitutionality of the charter provision or ordinance under which the conviction was obtained as indicated in ORS 221.350, such person shall have the right of appeal to the circuit court in the manner provided in ORS 221.350, regardless of any charter provision or ordinance prohibiting appeals from the municipal court because of the amount of the penalty or otherwise. An appeal may likewise be taken in such cases from the judgment or final order of the circuit court to the Court of Appeals in the same manner as other appeals are taken from the circuit court to the Court of Appeals in other criminal cases. Where the right of appeal in such cases depends upon there being involved an issue as to the constitutionality of the charter provision or ordinance, the decision of the appellate court shall be upon such constitutional issue only.  (Emphasis added) This court held in City of Salem v. Polanski, 202 Or. 504, 276 P.2d 407 (1954), that when, as in this case, defendants do not attack the validity of the underlying city charter provisions or ordinances, then, by reason of the provisions of ORS 221.360, no right of appeal exists beyond the circuit court. The court stated (at 509-10, 276 P.2d 407): By specifically providing for appeals to the Supreme Court in cases involving constitutional questions, but omitting to make similar provision for the appeal of other municipal court cases involving violations of city ordinances (except to the circuit court), the legislature clearly indicated its intention that appeals to the Supreme Court from the judgment of the circuit court in the latter type of cases should not be permitted. As will be subsequently discussed, the Court of Appeals held that ORS 221.360 violated equal protection guarantees    by limiting the appeal rights of persons convicted of municipal violations in cities where such violations are initially triable in municipal courts, while persons charged with municipal violations in certain other cities are tried in district courts pursuant to ORS Chapter 46 and, if convicted, have a right to plenary appeal to the Court of Appeals under ORS 46.047. 42 Or. App. at 227, 600 P.2d 478. The Court of Appeals then held that because defendants had been convicted in circuit court upon a trial de novo, jurisdiction to hear the appeal was conferred by ORS 138.040, which states in part: The defendant may appeal to the Court of Appeals from a judgment on a conviction in a district or circuit court   . In other words, the Court of Appeals appears to have reasoned that ORS 138.040 grants a general right of appeal and that ORS 221.360 restricts that right in cases originating in municipal court. Thus, upon holding ORS 221.360 to be invalid as unconstitutional, an appeal was permitted under ORS 138.040. We cannot agree with that interpretation of these statutes. In Portland v. White, 106 Or. 169, 173, 211 P. 798 (1923), this court held that: The violation of a municipal ordinance is not necessarily a crime. It is we think, usually denominated in this state as a quasi-criminal offense. (Citations omitted) Therefore, it follows that Chapter XII, Title XVIII of the code (now ORS Chapter 138) relating to appeals in criminal actions is not applicable to offenses against the city law. [8] That opinion further held that because the statute limited appeals to judgments in criminal actions, it did not grant appellate jurisdiction in cases involving municipal ordinance violations. Since 1923 the Oregon legislature has enacted a series of statutes granting appellate jurisdiction in cases involving violations of municipal ordinances. In 1927 the legislature enacted a statute granting a right of appeal from convictions in municipal courts to the circuit court and further to the Supreme Court in the same manner as other appeals are taken from the circuit court to the Supreme Court in other criminal cases. 1927 Or.L., c. 114, § 1. In 1929 the legislature amended that statute, eliminating the right of any appeal to the Supreme Court. 1929 Or.L., c. 196, § 1. That statute became OCLA § 95-2802 and was amended in 1943 (1943 Or.L., c. 277), in 1947 (1947 Or.L., c. 462), and again in 1949 (1949 Or.L., c. 121). That statute, as amended so as to limit appeals to the Supreme Court to issues involving the constitutionality of city charter provisions or ordinances, was then codified in 1953 as ORS 221.350, 221.360, 221.370 and 221.380. For an extended discussion of these amendments, see City of Salem v. Polanski, supra . In State v. Kingsley, 19 Or. App. 379, 527 P.2d 744 (1974), the Court of Appeals, citing Polanski, held that a person charged and convicted of violating a municipal ordinance in a district court could not appeal to the Court of Appeals. The following year the legislature enacted ORS 46.047 (1975 Or.L., c. 611, § 15) granting a right of appeal to the Court of Appeals in such cases. [9] We also note that the 1979 legislature considered a bill which would have repealed ORS 221.360 and amended ORS 221.350 to grant an unlimited right of appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases originating in municipal courts. That bill (SB 814) was defeated. Defendants contend that in recent years this court has changed its position regarding the characterization of municipal ordinance violations and now regards those violations as crimes, particularly when, as in this case, a penalty of imprisonment can be imposed. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Holzman, 245 Or. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (1969); Grayson; Heer v. State, 249 Or. 92, 436 P.2d 261 (1968), and State v. Hayes, 245 Or. 179, 184, 421 P.2d 385 (1966). Thus, according to defendants, it would then follow that because the municipal ordinance violations in this case are crimes, they are included in the grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals under ORS 138.020 and 138.040. Defendants then contend that ORS 221.350 and 221.360 should also be regarded as grants of appellate jurisdiction, rather than restrictions on that jurisdiction. Thus, according to defendants, the legislature has provided two overlapping grants of appellate jurisdiction and a defendant convicted of violating a municipal ordinance is free to take either a limited appeal under ORS 221.360 or an unlimited appeal under what defendants contend to be the grant provided by ORS 138.040. We cannot agree with these contentions. The cited cases dealt with the question whether violations were criminal in nature in the constitutional sense of requiring certain due process protections. They did not purport to give meaning to statutory words beyond that intended by the legislature. In our opinion, it is clear that in cases involving violations of municipal ordinances the legislature has chosen to grant appellate jurisdiction under a statutory scheme that is separate and distinct from that provided by ORS 138.020 and ORS 138.040. For over fifty years the legislature has separately treated appeals in such cases based upon the assumption that these statutes did not apply to appeals from violations of municipal ordinances. For this court to now declare that these statutes provide a grant to the Court of Appeals of appellate jurisdiction over appeals by persons convicted of violating municipal ordinances so as to permit such persons to raise on such appeals issues other than the constitutionality of the charter provision or ordinance involved would be contrary to the obvious intention of the legislature, as evidenced by this long legislative history. As previously stated, however, defendants contend that a denial of jurisdiction over their appeal in this case would result in a violation of their constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. If this be true, it is arguable that the remedy for such a constitutional violation would be to grant defendants a right to appeal in spite of the lack of any specific statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction. Also, if that contention by defendants compels the conclusion that the municipal ordinances under which defendants were prosecuted and convicted are themselves invalid for constitutional reasons, the Court of Appeals would have had jurisdiction under ORS 221.360 to consider that question. For these reasons, we shall proceed to consider these constitutional questions.