Opinion ID: 3165718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Physical and Testimonial Evidence Presented

Text: Before examining whether the circumstantial evidence of the defendants’ pattern of transactions can support the one kilogram quantity finding, we first consider whether the government otherwise presented sufficient evidence to establish that amount. The government contends that the district court’s finding of 750 grams, inferred from Burns’s testimony, plus the 274 grams conceded by Navarrette, exceeds one kilogram, and thus the jury’s finding is supported by substantial evidence. Navarrette, in turn, argues that even if the district court failed UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 19 to add all of the 274 grams of physical evidence in reaching the 750 gram estimate, “it is fair to assume that [the district court] counted at least the 62 grams seized from EquihuaRamirez, as this amount was earmarked for Burns.” Even adding the remaining 212 grams to the 750 grams inferred from Burns’s testimony, the quantity still falls short of one kilogram. Navarrette further argues that the district court erred when it determined that the conspiracy continued for ten weeks, because it was “undisputed that the heroin went ‘bad’ for a while during which time Burns purchased heroin from Equihua-Ramirez only once,” and, moreover, “EquihuaRamirez testified that this was a substantial period during April and May.” While it is true that Equihua-Ramirez testified at one point that the period during which the heroin went bad lasted most of April, at another point during the trial, he testified that it lasted approximately fifteen days. Burns likewise testified that he did not purchase heroin from EquihuaRamirez for a period, although he did not testify how long that lasted. Because we must resolve all conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution, we will use the lower of EquihuaRamirez’s estimates (that is, fifteen days), and conclude that the period in which Equihua-Ramirez and Burns conducted their transactions spanned eight weeks, not ten (ten weeks minus fifteen days). Using the district court’s 75 gram per week calculation (from Burns’s testimony that he purchased “a few” each week) the total would thus come to 600 grams. Even adding 75 grams for the single instance in which Burns purchased three pieces, and all of the 274 grams that Navarrette conceded, the total amount of heroin established would come to 949 grams. There was no evidence presented that Equihua-Ramirez’s additional gram-level customers would make up the difference. 20 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR Turning to Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony, even if we attempted to determine the quantity of heroin from his testimony regarding his sales to Burns (instead of the 699 grams based on the number of Equihua-Ramirez’s purchases), it still would not reach a kilogram. Equihua-Ramirez testified that Burns bought “sometimes two, sometimes three” pieces a week from him (fifty or seventy-five grams), but also testified that Burns stopped buying from him for a period. Equihua-Ramirez also testified repeatedly that he only sold Burns three pieces on one single occasion. Thus, a relatively liberal calculation based on his sales to Burns, as well as his admitted four-ounce buy (which risks double-counting, since some of that could have been sold to Burns) and the 200 grams found on Guzman-Arias (his last order) would still not total a kilogram: 50 grams multiplied by 8 weeks (two pieces per week, and not counting the period the heroin went bad) plus 75 grams (the single three piece buy) plus 112 grams (the four ounce order) plus 200 grams (the final controlled buy) totals 787 grams. The district court did not attempt to determine an average amount of heroin distributed either from Burns’s testimony or from Equihua-Ramirez’s testimony, instead relying on the least amount that either defendant testified was his minimum sale or purchase. We have previously approved the “multiplier method,” for approximating drug quantity “by determining a daily or weekly quantity, selecting a time period over which it is more likely than not that the defendant was dealing in that quantity and multiplying these two factors together,” United States v. Culps, 300 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). However, we have done so only in the sentencing context, in which the government was required to prove quantity by a preponderance of the evidence for sentencing purposes, and not, as here, where the factual issue had to be UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR 21 proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Jackson standard, we are obliged to construe the evidence of drug quantity adduced at trial “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and only after viewing the evidence in this light, determine whether, resolving all conflicting inferences in favor of the prosecution, “any rational trier of fact could have found” the one kilogram quantity “beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319. Applying the Jackson standard, we conclude that the district court did not err in declining to apply the multiplier method given the facts of this case. We further conclude that the district court did not err in disregarding the circumstantial evidence of the secret storage compartment in Navarrette’s vehicle, capable of holding 30 pounds of drugs. The government offered no evidence that the storage compartment was used to transport heroin, as opposed to any other kind of contraband, or that Navarrette ever used the compartment. We also note that the drug-sniffing dog did not alert to the compartment during the search.5 Therefore, as did the district court, we conclude that the testimonial and physical evidence cannot support a finding of one kilogram. 5 While we have stated that a defendant’s mere access to equipment capable of producing a kilogram of cocaine “supports the jury’s verdict that it was reasonably foreseeable that the conspiracy involved 500 grams or more of cocaine,” Rosales, 516 F.3d at 755, the government did not raise this argument on appeal, and therefore we do not address it here. “Our circuit has repeatedly admonished that we cannot manufacture arguments for an appellant.” Ind. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001)). 22 UNITED STATES V. NAVARRETTE-AGUILAR