Opinion ID: 2773017
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Instruction on Duress Defense

Text: González claims that he was also entitled to a jury instruction on duress. Duress is a common law defense that excuses criminal conduct if the defendant violated the law only because [he] was unlawfully threatened by another person with death or serious bodily injury. United States v. Vázquez, 724 F.3d 15, 27 (1st Cir. 2013). A duress defense requires proof that the defendant committed a crime as a result of: (1) an immediate threat of serious bodily injury or death, (2) a well-grounded belief that the threat will be carried out, and (3) no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise to frustrate the threat. United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Díaz-Castro, 752 F.3d at 108. In support of his duress defense, González points to his testimony that, because he was involved in a drug transaction and -14- he was providing security for [ ] an important person who had control of everything and who knew where González lived, González believed that his own life and the lives of his family members were in danger. It was implied, González claimed, that if anyone went to the police, Eddie would take care of them in a violent way. Also, according to González, Cotto told him that González had to continue participating in the drug transactions. The district court concluded that the record lacked evidence to support the duress defense and, thus, it declined González's requested instruction. Since González's objection was preserved below, we review de novo whether he made a threshold showing that the record evidence, construed in his favor, supported his requested instruction. Díaz-Castro, 752 F.3d at 108; United States v. Baird, 712 F.3d 623, 627 (1st Cir. 2013). Here, González has not made such a showing. The alleged threat was not immediate, or even imminent. If a threat at all, it was no more than a 'vague threat of future harm,' which is insufficient to support a duress instruction. Vázquez, 724 F.3d at 28 (quoting Arthurs, 73 F.3d at 450) (refusing to consider alleged threat of what gang-members do to people [who] . . . snitch as immediate or imminent). In addition, the alleged threat would be irrelevant to the crimes charged, as it was directed at those who would go to the police, rather than to those who refused to provide armed security for drug transactions. -15- In analyzing duress, the relevant threat is that which 'caused the actor to engage in conduct violating the literal terms of the criminal law.' Id. (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409 (1980)). González faces drug charges, not charges for failing to report drug crimes. See Vázquez, 724 F.3d at 28 (rejecting a duress defense and concluding that because defendant was charged with violating the laws criminalizing the sale of cocaine, not with failing to report those crimes, the threat against snitches was irrelevant). Even accepting that González might have construed the alleged threat against those who would go to the police to be the equivalent of a threat of harm for not actively committing the drug crimes, such a subjective belief would not constitute a 'wellgrounded' fear. Id. (quoting United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1999)). The evidence required is that of threats causing a defendant of ordinary firmness and judgment to believe that he would face immediate danger if he did not commit the criminal acts. Vázquez, 724 F.3d at 28 (citing United States v. Castro-Gómez, 360 F.3d 216, 219 (1st Cir. 2001)). The evidence in the record does not meet that standard. In fact, it shows the opposite. There is no evidence that González was threatened before making the initial choice to participate, when he already knew that he would be providing security for a dangerous and powerful person, who was involved in something illegal. Then, after the -16- first transaction, González told Eddie that he was at his service and chose to return fourteen additional times, in which he showed excitement at the prospect of participating in additional transactions. In fact, he reproached Cotto for not picking up the phone when González had been trying to call him asking for additional work. González also took his close friends and family to participate in some of the transactions. Based on that evidence, a reasonable juror could not plausibly conclude that the defendant faced immediate danger if he did not commit the crimes charged. In addition, the record is devoid of evidence suggesting that González lacked a reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the alleged threat against him. Vázquez, 724 F.3d at 28; Arthurs, 73 F.3d at 448. Instead, the record shows that he was enjoying himself, drinking beer, and hugging Eddie. See Díaz-Castro, 752 F.3d at 108-109 (rejecting defendant's claim that he was unable to withdraw because there was no record evidence of any effort to withdraw and the video showed defendant enjoying himself). Furthermore, the duress defense is unavailable if the defendant placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. Id. at 109. Here, the record shows that González put himself in this situation not once, -17- but numerous times, by making himself available and at Eddie's service. In light of this, the evidence at trial, even when construed in González's favor, could not have supported a finding of duress. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on the duress defense. C. Denial of Instruction on Impeachment by Prior Conviction González next claims that the district court committed reversible error when it failed to give his requested instruction concerning the impeachment of witnesses by prior conviction. We review the district court's refusal to give this requested jury instruction under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st Cir. 2008). The refusal to give a requested instruction constitutes a reversible error only if the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to effectively present a given defense. United States v. González-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir. 1984)). Under the third requirement, reversal is not required unless a defendant suffers substantial prejudice. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d at 139. -18- Here, González requested a jury instruction on impeachment of witnesses by prior conviction because government witnesses Cotto and Eusebio Hernández (Hernández) both had prior felony convictions.9 The government did not object to the instruction. The district court, however, denied the instruction because it understood that the instruction is warranted only if the witness denies the prior conviction. Since both Cotto and Hernández had admitted their prior convictions while testifying, the district court declined to give the requested instruction. González is correct that the district court misunderstood the applicable law. Impeachment by prior conviction means that the witness's character for truthfulness may be attacked by evidence of certain criminal convictions. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a). It does not require that the witness first deny the prior criminal conviction. Id. However, this does not amount to a reversible error in this case. This circuit's pattern instruction on impeachment of witness testimony by prior conviction reads: You have heard evidence that [witness] has been convicted of a crime. You may consider that evidence, together with other pertinent evidence, in deciding how much weight to give to that witness's testimony. 9 Cotto's conviction related to the bribery incident when he was a police officer, while Hernández's conviction resulted from his own participation in the sham drug transactions with González. -19- Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 1st Cir. § 2.03 (1998) (alteration in original). The jury instruction provided by the district court included the following language: You have heard the testimony of Héctor Cotto and Eusebio Hernández, that they provided evidence under agreements with the government and or participated in the crime charged against the defendant and or received money from the government in exchange for providing information. Some people in this position are entirely truthful when testifying. Still you should consider the testimony of these persons with particular caution. You may consider they may have had reason to make up stories or exaggerate what others did because they wanted to help himself [sic]. You must determine whether the testimony of such a witness has been affected by any interest in the outcome of this case, any prejudice for or against the defendant, or by any of the benefits he has received. You may consider their guilty pleas in assessing their credibility, but you are not to consider their guilty pleas as evidence against this defendant in any way. (Emphasis added). Although the instruction given by the district court did not contain the specific language sought by González, there is no reversible error if the jury charge taken as a whole substantially covered the issues contained in the requested instruction. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1207 (1st Cir. 1990). The charge need not follow the exact form and wording of the defendant's proposed instructions. González-Soberal, 109 F.3d at 70 (internal quotations omitted). -20- We conclude that the instruction given to the jury substantially addressed issues of credibility with respect to both government witnesses. The fact that both Cotto and Hernández each had a prior felony conviction was elicited, and thus, the jury was aware of their criminal backgrounds. The district court then reminded the jury that the two witnesses had guilty pleas and had cooperation agreements with the government. It instructed the jury that they had the duty to determine credibility, that the jury should consider the testimony of these two witnesses with greater caution, and that they were to consider all the factors they deemed relevant in assessing their credibility, including the prior guilty pleas of both Cotto and Hernández. González has presented no evidence that would lead us to believe that the jury felt prevented from viewing the testimony of these two government witnesses with particular skepticism or greater caution. Therefore, we find no error in the instructions given. See González-Soberal, 109 F.3d at 71 (finding no error where the district court failed to give the impeachment by prior conviction instruction, because the instruction provided reminded the jury that the two witnesses had been convicted, that they had cooperation agreements with the government, and that the jury should view their testimony with greater caution). -21- D. Closing Arguments
González alleges that during his closing argument the district court made several unjustified sua sponte interruptions, and sustained various unfounded objections interposed by the government, which prevented him from making an effective closing argument and thus rendered the trial unfair. Based on these alleged interruptions and objections, González moved for a new trial. The district court denied González's motion under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 33, finding that the court's interjections were warranted and that it had been correct in its rulings sustaining objections made during González's closing argument. The court also found that even if error occurred, González had not been prejudiced by the court's interjections and rulings. González appeals the denial of his motion for a new trial. We review the denial of a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Valerio, 676 F.3d 237, 246 (1st Cir. 2012). A new trial is granted sparingly, and only where there would be a miscarriage of justice and where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict. United States v. Merlino, 592 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 251 F.3d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 2001)). When determining the prejudicial effect of challenged acts, a court -22- should not grant a motion for a new trial where a process, although imperfect, adequately protected the defendant's rights. United States v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 321 (1st Cir. 1987). Rather, the court must decide whether the alleged errors affected the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Meserve, 271 F.3d 314, 332 (1st Cir. 2001). After all, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a mistake-free trial. Id. (quoting United States v. Sepúlveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993)). In general, we have recognized that, a judge is not a mere umpire; he is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct, and has a perfect right -- albeit a right that should be exercised with care -- to participate actively in the trial proper. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 33 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997)) (quotation marks omitted). Trial judges also have broad discretion over the scope of summations. United States v. Grabiec, 96 F.3d 549, 552 (1st Cir. 1996). González alleges that, while defense counsel was arguing that Cotto was unworthy of belief, the district court improperly interrupted him and stated: Counsel, I assume that is your position, it will be for the jury to determine based on the evidence whether he lied or not. González claims that this statement by the court improperly sent the message that his -23- position was not one shared by the court. We disagree. First, counsel should refrain from making statements that convey a personal opinion relating to a witness's credibility. See United States v. Auch, 187 F.3d 125, 131 (1st Cir. 1999); Grabiec, 96 F.3d at 550 (observing that the rule that counsel must not express a personal opinion, though generally applied to prosecutors, applies both ways). Second, the court's statement did not indicate, either explicitly or implicitly, that the court did not share defense counsel's position. Furthermore, even if the jury could have inferred anything from the court's statement, any prejudice from such inference would have been cured by the court's instruction to disregard its comments and admonishments to counsel. Specifically, the court gave the following instruction: Do not assume from anything that I may have said that I have any opinion concerning any of the issues in this case. Except for my instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything that I may have said during the trial in arriving at your own findings as to the facts. . . . You are to draw absolutely no inference against the side to whom an admonition of the Court may have been addressed during the trial. We assume the jury to have followed the court's instructions. See United States v. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d 48, 63 (1st Cir. 2012). González also complains that when defense counsel intended to use transcripts to refresh a witness testimony to the jury, the district court interrupted him and said I will request that you argue, the transcript is not in evidence. Although -24- González avers that the use of transcripts may ensure the accuracy of the recitation of a testimony, here, defense counsel was not merely reading from transcripts. Rather, he was also projecting the transcripts from the overhead projector and referencing them as evidence. Since these transcripts were not in evidence, we find no error in the court's interjection. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (recognizing the broad discretion of the trial judge in closing arguments). We note that the court did not prevent defense counsel from arguing the content of the transcripts or otherwise getting his point across. Rather, it only instructed him not to refer to something as evidence that had not been admitted as such. Next, González alleges that while defense counsel was arguing that the sting operation was poorly planned and that out of 17 people, we have 15 or 16 who were mechanics, truck drivers, the court interrupted him and said that he was misquoting the evidence, that there was no evidence for that amount of people and that he should stick to the evidence. There was no error. The evidence admitted at trial simply did not support defense counsel's contention. Faced with this misquoting of the evidence, it was within the district court's discretion to interrupt defense counsel's argument. See United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the district court is best situated to make a battlefield assessment of the impact that a -25- particular piece of improper information may have on a jury (quoting United States v. Rivera-Gómez, 67 F.3d 933, 998 (1st Cir. 1995))). González also alleges that, while defense counsel was arguing about the timing for retrieving the firearms from his home, the district court improperly interrupted him and concluded that he was making reference to punishment and that there was an issue of jury nullification. The court's interruptions responded to defense counsel's reference to González having been in prison since October 2010, not being back home since his arrest, and not being back home for more than a year. Because the arguments were directed at the gun charges and the jury acquitted González of all such charges, we need not decide whether the district court's ruling on this matter was correct, as any error would be harmless. See United States v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233, 236 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the acquittal rendered the alleged error harmless). González also challenges the court's interjections when defense counsel was arguing that the design of the sting operation was flawed. In making his point, defense counsel stated that the operation attracted people simply down and out, and in need of money; that those attracted were simply poor and vulnerable; and that the government should go after the real drug traffickers, [that] this island is full of drug traffickers. The government objected to these statements and the court sustained the -26- objections. There was no error. Although jurors have the power to set an accused free for any reason or for no reason, their duty is to apply the law as given to them by the court. United States v. Appolon, 695 F.3d 44, 65 (1st Cir. 2012). Neither the court nor counsel should encourage jurors to exercise their power to nullify. Id. (quoting United States v. Bunchan, 626 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, by suggesting that there are worse people out there, and that the government should go after them and not after the poor and vulnerable, defense counsel was encouraging the jury to disregard the law and acquit González. Thus, the statements were aimed at jury nullification and the government's objections were properly sustained. We need not recount in detail the additional interjections and government objections about which González now complains. For present purposes, it suffices to say that we have reviewed each of them in the context of the record as a whole. They involved either defense counsel's attempt to instruct the jury as to legal issues, to argue the entrapment defense despite being precluded from doing so by a prior court order, defense counsel's opinion about the credibility of witnesses, or arguments specifically related to the gun charges for which González was acquitted. Even if the court's ruling on these matters were -27- erroneous, they would be harmless. See Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 61-62. Additionally, as discussed supra, following closing arguments, the court explicitly instructed the jury that, in rendering its decision, it should not consider the court's comments and admonishments to counsel, nor the objections or arguments made by counsel. Consequently, we conclude that González was not prejudiced by the trial court's rulings and interjections, nor was his right to a fair trial infringed upon. Thus, the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in denying González's motion for a new trial. See Merlino, 592 F.3d at 32.
Finally, González claims that the government made some improper remarks in its rebuttal argument which rendered the trial unfair. Where a timely objection was made, [w]e review de novo whether the challenged portion of the government's closing argument was improper and, if so, whether it was harmful. Appolon, 695 F.3d at 66. The prosecutor's improper statements during closing argument are considered harmful if they so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected, thus warranting a new trial. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62 (quoting United States v. Azubike, 504 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2007)); United States v. Garza, 435 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2006) (A non-constitutional evidentiary error is harmless . . . so long as it is highly probable that the -28- error did not influence the verdict. (quoting United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 56 (1st Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In making this determination, we focus on (1) the severity of the misconduct, including whether it was isolated and/or deliberate; (2) whether curative instructions were given; and (3) the strength of the evidence against the defendant. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 62. In contrast, we review for plain error any part of the government's rebuttal argument which the defendant failed to object to. Id. at 64. To meet this exacting standard, id., the defendant must show that an error occurred, which was clear or obvious and which not only affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.; United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2011). [P]lain error review tends to afford relief . . . only for 'blockbuster' errors. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64 (citations omitted). During the rebuttal argument, the government responded to González's reference that the government ha[d] a problem by stating: Do you know how many times the government doesn't have evidence like you saw in this case? The government also stated that defense counsel wanted to confuse the jury, since defense counsel was unable to make González disappear from the videos played at trial. González timely objected to both statements, and -29- the district court overruled both objections. González now claims that the government improperly compared the evidence in this case to that in other cases and, thus, engaged in bolstering,10 and that it misstated and disparaged the defense strategy by taking aim at defense counsel. The challenged government statements were not improper. Regarding the first statement, defense counsel invited the prosecutor's comparison to other cases by stating that the government ha[d] a problem in this case . . . . They are very concerned that they had to rely so much on Cotto and Eusebio Hernández to prove their charges. It was reasonable for the prosecutor to respond that it did not have a problem because in this case, unlike many others, there was video evidence linking González to the crimes charged. See United States v. Ayala-García, 574 F.3d 5, 18 (1st Cir. 2009) (Our cases establish that some leeway is appropriate when the government's challenged comments may fairly be seen as a response to comparable remarks by defense counsel.). And contrary to González's contentions, the government's comments cannot fairly be read to suggest that evidence not presented at trial supported the defendant's guilt. 10 We note that bolstering generally occurs when a prosecutor implies that a witness's testimony is corroborated by evidence known to the government but not known to the jury. United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). -30- Instead, the prosecutor was pointing out how much inculpatory evidence the government had introduced at trial. The prosecutor's further suggestions that defense counsel was trying to confuse the jury because he could not make González disappear from the videos, while perhaps impolitic, did not render the trial unfair. These comments, too, referred to the strength of the government's case (specifically, the fact that there was video evidence). Moreover, United States v. Manning, which González cites for his argument that the comments were improper, involved statements much more egregious than those in this case: there, the prosecutor stated that the role of the defense counsel in a criminal trial is to cloud the issues or make smoke screens, and he liken[ed] them to Shakespeare's players, full of sound and fury signifying nothing. 23 F.3d 570, 573 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994). Nothing like that was said in this case. Finally, González alleges that the government misstated the law as to reasonable doubt and criminal intent. Since González did not contemporaneously object to these allegedly improper statements, we review them only for plain error. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64. González fails to meet that standard. The statement regarding reasonable doubt was made in the context of the firearm charges and González was acquitted of all such charges, which makes clear that such alleged error does not meet the standard for plain error. As to the other statement, -31- the government said that all criminal intent means is that [González] knew he was breaking the law. González has failed to show that, when read in context, the statement was clearly and obviously erroneous. Moreover, after closing arguments, the district court gave specific instructions as to what both criminal intent and reasonable doubt meant. González does not point to anything indicating that the jury disregarded these instructions and we ordinarily presume that juries follow instructions. See id. at 63. He has simply failed to show that the alleged misstatements of the law affected his substantial rights and seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Pires, 642 F.3d at 14; see also Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 65 (noting that the fact that defendant had objected to the prosecutor's statements during closing argument, but had failed to do so during rebuttal suggested that even the defendant failed to regard the comments as having a damaging effect (citations omitted)). Thus, the alleged errors do not constitute the blockbuster errors required to satisfy the plain error standard. Rodríguez, 675 F.3d at 64.