Opinion ID: 778685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michael Zimmer

Text: 12 The district court sentenced Zimmer on January 4, 2001. It determined that Zimmer was accountable for more than 1.5 but less than 5 kilograms of methamphetamine, supporting a base offense level of 34. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2D1.1(c)(3) (Nov.2000). The district court applied a four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(a), finding that Zimmer was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more persons, and also applied a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to USSG § 3C1.1 because Zimmer failed to appear for a judicial proceeding. Thus, Zimmer's total adjusted base offense level amounted to 40. Based on Zimmer's criminal history category VI, the Guidelines provided a sentencing range of 360 months to life imprisonment. The district court sentenced Zimmer to 360 months imprisonment and 5 years supervised release. Zimmer raises four challenges to his sentence, which we address seriatim. 13 Zimmer argues that the district court should have applied the version of the Sentencing Guidelines in effect when the conspiracy began and not the more punitive Sentencing Guidelines — amended effective November 1997 — in effect at the time of sentencing. He contends that the application of the later, amended version of the Guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. This court has previously determined that the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to the ex post facto clause. United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir.1994), vacated by 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1820, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated by 63 F.3d 761 (8th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1158, 116 S.Ct. 1548, 134 L.Ed.2d 650 (1996). As a general rule, the sentencing court should apply the Sentencing Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing unless doing so is violative of the ex post facto clause. Id. at 1250. Such a violation occurs where the operative Guidelines at sentencing produce a sentence harsher than one permitted under the Guidelines in effect at the time the crime is committed. United States v. Reetz, 18 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir.1994). Zimmer has not shown that his sentence under the post-1997 Guidelines is harsher than the sentence he would have received had the earlier version of the Guidelines been applied. Assuming this is the case, however, we still find no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 14 We have recognized a distinction between the application of a particular version of the ... Guidelines to offense conduct occurring exclusively before the effective date of that version and the application of a particular version of the Guidelines to an offense or offenses whose conduct occurs both before and after the version's effective date. Cooper, 35 F.3d at 1251. The former implicates the ex post facto clause, the latter does not. Id. Thus, as a general rule, where a defendant's offense conduct straddles an enactment, the enactment can be applied to the defendant without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause even when the enactment would result in a harsher sentence. See United States v. Warren, 149 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where a conspiracy straddles the enactment of a statute, then the court may sentence the defendant in accord with that statute without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir.) (A conspiracy begun before the effective date of a relevant statute, but continued after that date, may constitutionally be punished under that statute. Conspiracy is a continuing offense.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1028, 116 S.Ct. 2570, 135 L.Ed.2d 1086 (1996); United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir.1994) ([A]pplying the Sentencing Guidelines to a conspiracy that straddles the Sentencing Guidelines' effective date is not violative of the ex post facto clause. We have noted that with conspiracy and other continuing offenses it is the completion date of the offense that controls the use of the Sentencing Guidelines to be applied.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1067, 115 S.Ct. 1700, 131 L.Ed.2d 562 (1995); United States v. Pregler, 925 F.2d 268, 269 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that the application of the Guidelines themselves poses no ex post facto dilemma when applied to a defendant involved in a conspiracy begun before the effective date of the Guidelines and continuing after the effective date of the Guidelines). Zimmer was convicted of participating in a conspiracy which began in October 1996 and continued through March 1998. Because the jury convicted Zimmer of a conspiratorial offense which straddled the amendment of the Guidelines, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the post-1997 Guidelines. 15 We reject Zimmer's argument that he had withdrawn from the conspiracy before the amended version of the Guidelines went into effect. Zimmer bears the burden of proving that he withdrew from the conspiracy. United States v. Granados, 962 F.2d 767, 773 (8th Cir.1992). [I]t is not easy to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. United States v. Grimmett, 236 F.3d 452, 453 (8th Cir.2001). Zimmer must do more than demonstrate that he undertook no conspiratorial activity after the cut-off date; he must demonstrate that he took affirmative action to withdraw from the conspiracy either by making a clean breast to the authorities or by communicating his withdrawal in a manner reasonably calculated to reach his coconspirators. Granados, 962 F.2d at 773; United States v. Askew, 958 F.2d 806, 812-13 (8th Cir.1992). To make a clean breast of a conspiracy, the conspirator must sever[ ] all ties to the conspiracy and its fruits, and act[ ] affirmatively to defeat the conspiracy by confessing to and cooperating with the authorities. Grimmett, 236 F.3d at 456. The [m]ere cessation of activities is not enough, to establish withdrawal from a conspiracy. Granados, 962 F.2d at 773. 16 Zimmer presented no evidence at trial that he had taken affirmative action to defeat the conspiracy or that he had communicated his intent to withdraw to his coconspirators. On the contrary, the evidence showed, and the jury apparently believed, that after November 1997, Zimmer continued to be involved with the conspiracy. In January 1998, prison officials intercepted mail from Zimmer addressed to inmates containing pictures of Zimmer seated in his kitchen with his arms wrapped around the precursor materials needed to make methamphetamine. After arrest, Zimmer forgave Baumgartner's $10,000 debt to Stoltz in exchange for a car in anticipation that he would later receive $40,000 from Stoltz for his share of the drug proceeds. While incarcerated and awaiting trial, Zimmer attempted to cover up the conspiracy by propositioning another inmate to intimidate or eliminate two witnesses who were prepared to testify against him. In sum, we conclude that Zimmer did not withdraw from the conspiracy prior to the effective date of the 1997 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines and that the district court did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the later, amended Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing. 17 Zimmer claims that the district court erred in failing to apply a two-level sentence reduction pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2 for playing only a minor role in the offense instead of applying the four-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1 for acting as an organizer or leader of the conspiracy. The Sentencing Guidelines require that the defendant's offense level be increased by four levels [i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. USSG § 3B1.1(a). [T]he government bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts necessary to establish a defendant's role in the offense. United States v. Rodgers, 122 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1061, 118 S.Ct. 721, 139 L.Ed.2d 660 (1998). We review the district court's sentencing decision for clear error. Id. 18 We have broadly defined the terms organizer and leader. United States v. Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 804 (8th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1181, 121 S.Ct. 1163, 148 L.Ed.2d 1023 (2001). The defendant need not be the organizer or leader of a criminal organization for the purposes of § 3B1.1, as there can be more than one organizer or leader of a criminal enterprise. Id. Nor is it necessary that the defendant organized or led all of the other participants in the activity. Id. We have previously determined that a defendant who recruits accomplices and directs their activities is an organizer and leader of the criminal activity. Id. at 804-05; see also USSG § 3B1.1, comment. (n. 4) (including the recruitment of accomplices as a relevant factor militating in favor of finding that a defendant is an organizer or leader). Zimmer organized the conspiracy and was the lever which set it into motion. It was Zimmer who recruited Carver and Stoltz. It was Zimmer who arranged for Carver to move to Minnesota and meet with Stoltz. It was Zimmer who brokered an arrangement whereby Stoltz would pay for Carver's travel to Minnesota and provide Carver with transportation and a residence. It was Zimmer who provided Carver and Stoltz with the lithium or Nazi dope recipe. It was Zimmer who claimed that he was entitled to thirty percent of the proceeds generated by this criminal enterprise. See USSG § 3B1.1, comment. (n. 4) (including the claiming of a large share of the fruits of the crime as a factor militating in favor of finding that a defendant is an organizer or leader). We need not be worried that Zimmer did not exercise direct control over his coconspirators, for we have previously held that such direct influence and control was not a prerequisite to finding that a defendant was an organizer or leader within the meaning of § 3B1.1. United States v. Thompson, 210 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 996, 121 S.Ct. 1658, 149 L.Ed.2d 640 (2001). Accordingly, we conclude that the enhancement is supported by sufficient evidence and that the district court did not err in finding that Zimmer was an organizer or leader of this criminal conspiracy. 19 Zimmer challenges the district court's finding of drug quantity. The Guidelines permit a district court to approximate the quantity of drugs for sentencing purposes where ... there has been no direct seizure of drugs directly establishing the relevant amount. United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 851 (8th Cir.2002). The district court may consider any evidence in its sentencing determination as long as it has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. United States v. Behler, 14 F.3d 1264, 1273 (8th Cir.) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 960, 115 S.Ct. 419, 130 L.Ed.2d 335 (1994). Moreover, the court can determine drug quantity using imprecise evidence, so long as the record reflects a basis for the court's decision. United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 413-14 (8th Cir.1998) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845, 120 S.Ct. 117, 312, 145 L.Ed.2d 99 (1999). We review the district court's drug quantity determination for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 239 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir.2001). A reviewing court will overturn a finding of drug quantity only if the entire record definitely and firmly convinces us that a mistake has been made. Id. (internal quotation omitted). This record does not convince us that the district court made a mistake in finding that Zimmer was accountable for more than 1.5 kilograms but less than 5 kilograms of methamphetamine. 20 `[I]n a drug conspiracy, the district court may consider amounts from drug transactions in which the defendant was not directly involved, provided that those other dealings were part of the same course of conduct or scheme.' United States v. Smith, 240 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting United States v. Brown, 148 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 1998)). The defendant can only be held accountable for a drug transaction or activity involving drugs where the activity was undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy and was known to the defendant or reasonably foreseeable to him. Id.; USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1) (stating that defendant is accountable in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity [for] ... all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity). Zimmer facilitated Carver's introduction to Stoltz and initiated the criminal enterprise. He expected to receive a sizable portion of the proceeds from the criminal enterprise. It was certainly foreseeable to Zimmer that after placing Carver in Princeton, Minnesota, to manufacture and sell methamphetamine, Carver would do exactly that. Thus, we conclude that Zimmer can be held accountable for the entire drug quantity produced by the various members of this conspiracy. 21 May testified that he helped Carver cook between 5 and 6 eight-balls of methamphetamine on 30 to 36 occasions. An eight-ball is an eighth of an ounce or 3.5 grams. Using the most conservative figures, May helped Carver cook approximately 525 grams of methamphetamine. Sandberg testified that he accompanied Carver on two different trips during which they purchased approximately $1400 to $1500 worth of pseudoephedrine or approximately 34,000 sixty-milligram tablets of pseudoephedrine. The DEA chemist testified that the ratio of precursor material needed to make methamphetamine is almost one to one, i.e., a gram of pseudoephedrine can yield approximately one gram of finished product. Using the chemist's ratio, Sandberg helped Carver manufacture approximately 1.8 kilograms of methamphetamine. Chandler learned how to cook methamphetamine from Carver. He successfully cooked on 20 occasions between one-half and 5 ounces, or approximately 1.1 kilograms of methamphetamine. Chandler and Stoltz taught Baumgartner to use the lithium method of manufacturing methamphetamine, and Baumgartner manufactured one-half pound to a pound, or 224-448 grams of methamphetamine. The sum total is clearly in excess of 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine and provides sufficient support to affirm the finding of the district court. 22 Zimmer claims that the district court erroneously classified him as a career offender within the meaning of USSG § 4B1.1. Zimmer argues that the district court erred when it concluded that one of his prior convictions for negligent discharge of a firearm was a crime of violence within the meaning of the Guidelines. This argument has no merit. As aforementioned, Zimmer's ordinary adjusted base offense level was 40. The relevant career offender offense level was 37. The Guidelines provide that if the offense level for a career criminal from the table below is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense level from the table below shall apply. USSG § 4B1.1. Based on the `fair meaning' of § 4B1.1, it logically follows that if the `otherwise applicable'... offense level is greater, then the sentencing court must apply that offense level. [This] reading of § 4B1.1 ... is consistent with the legislatures' manifest intent [that] ... § 4B1.1 is intended as a sentence enhancement. United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir.) (internal citation omitted), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 939, 121 S.Ct. 2571, 150 L.Ed.2d 735 (2001); accord United States v. Marrone, 48 F.3d 735, 740 n. 9 (3d Cir.) (A career offender's offense level is the greater of the offense level applicable to the underlying conduct or the appropriate offense level specified in section 4B1.1.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 836, 116 S.Ct. 115, 133 L.Ed.2d 66 (1995); United States v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 201, 205-06 (11th Cir.1991) (It would appear the negative corollary of that statement must also apply; i.e., if the offense level from the career offender table is less than the otherwise applicable offense level, the greater of the offense levels shall apply.), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1037, 112 S.Ct. 885, 116 L.Ed.2d 789 (1992). The district court applied the otherwise applicable adjusted base offense level of 40 and not the applicable career offender offense level of 37. Thus, Zimmer's argument is moot.