Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limited Questioning of Prospective Alternate Juror Duvall G.

Text: Finally, defendant claims the court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to question Prospective Alternate Juror Duvall G. Before jury selection, the court announced its intention to question the jurors itself but also allow each side one hour for the attorneys to hone in on areas that they really believe are necessary. No objections were raised to this procedure. Each prospective juror had completed a detailed, 36-page questionnaire, and the record reflects that the court questioned each juror individually. After the court questioned Duvall G., defense counsel requested leave to ask a couple of questions. The court declined, remarking that the attorneys were both out of time. Defendant did not challenge Duvall G. for cause or exercise a peremptory challenge against him. Duvall G. was sworn as an alternate juror and substituted onto the jury during the guilt phase. In his questionnaire, Duvall G. revealed that he had been physically and mentally abused by his father. When the court asked about this abuse at sidebar, Duvall G. explained that his mother had abandoned the family, leaving Duvall G. with his alcoholic father. Duvall G. remarked on the experience: To me, it's no big deal. I'm here. I work every day. ... [¶] I never had any psychological counseling. So I guess I'm just a regular kind of guy, you know. Duvall G. thought he could objectively weigh evidence about similar abuse, because I never think about it. It doesn't bother me. Asked if a person subjected to such abuse can still make the right choices in life, Duvall G. responded, [of] course they can. He believed that if an abused person later made wrong choices in life, they would be accountable for such choices. He explained: It's not like they're still being abused. To me, it's not that deeply rooted .... That's just my personal opinion. Despite this opinion, Duvall G. averred that he could consider evidence of abuse as a factor in causing a person to make bad decisions. Duvall G. was arrested for joyriding and driving while intoxicated when he was 13 or 14 years old. When the court asked about this experience, Duvall G. confirmed that he had been treated fairly by the criminal justice system. He regretted the incident because he could have hurt someone. Duvall G.'s questionnaire also mentioned that he had been the victim of a burglary and a robbery. In response to the court's questions, Duvall G. disclosed that two men had robbed him at knifepoint eight or nine years earlier. He did not contact the police because robberies happened all the time in that neighborhood, and he thought it was, like, no big deal as long as I didn't get hurt. That's what you pray for, not to get hurt. Also, he did not think the police could catch the robbers, who ran away on foot, and they only got a couple dollars. Duvall G. did not try to find the culprits. He affirmed that he could be fair in the present case even though it involved an allegation of robbery with a knife. Duvall G. also stated in his questionnaire that he could find defendant not guilty if the evidence did not support the charges, and he commented, Robbery is not murder. In his questionnaire, Duvall G. agreed that it is important to know a person's life circumstances when deciding between the death penalty and life imprisonment, and he said he could follow an instruction directing him to consider these circumstances. On voir dire by the court, Duvall G. affirmed that he could give fair and objective consideration to all the evidence bearing upon penalty, and he could personally impose either penalty depending on what the evidence showed. Defendant now contends the trial court's refusal to allow further questioning by defense counsel rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Because defendant did not challenge Duvall G. for cause, did not exercise a peremptory challenge against him, and expressly accepted the panel of alternate jurors sworn, he has forfeited any claim of error regarding Duvall G.'s suitability as a juror. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 866 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1]; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1160.) His argument also fails on the merits. (14) The trial court ... has a duty to restrict voir dire within reasonable bounds to expedite the trial. [Citation.] ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 536 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) We review a trial court's limitations on voir dire for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 88; see Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) No such abuse appears here. The court thoroughly questioned Duvall G. on his background and relevant experiences and probed his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Defense counsel never told the trial court what additional questions he sought to ask, what subjects needed to be explored further, or why the information elicited from Duvall G.'s detailed questionnaire and the court's questioning was not sufficient to allow him to exercise his challenges intelligently. Defendant did not ask the court to pose further questions. As a result, defendant's argument that the time limits on attorney voir dire deprived him of an opportunity to establish that Duvall G. could not serve as a fair and impartial juror is purely speculative. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 693 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11].) Duvall G.'s responses in the questionnaire, and in court, consistently showed that he was qualified to serve as a juror. Defendant had sufficient information from the questionnaire and in-court voir dire to exercise his challenges intelligently. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defense counsel's request to question this prospective juror further. (See Roldan, at p. 694.)