Opinion ID: 2633065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: scope of the unnecessary rigor clause

Text: ¶6 Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution states as follows: Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. [6] ¶7 Although the first sentence of article 1, section 9 closely approximates the language of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, [7] the unnecessary rigor provision has no federal counterpart. Nearly identical provisions, however, exist in only four other state constitutions. [8] The relative rarity of unnecessary rigor clauses results in a dearth of unnecessary rigor jurisprudence in other jurisdictions, and we have had few opportunities to interpret or apply the unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution. ¶8 In our 1996 decision in Bott v. DeLand, we said that the guarantee against unnecessarily rigorous treatment . . . protects [prisoners and arrestees] against unnecessary abuse. [9] We also said that the applicable definition of `abuse' focuses on `needlessly harsh, degrading, or dehumanizing' treatment of prisoners. [10] ¶9 Defendants argue that the somewhat broad interpretation of unnecessary rigor in Bott should be rejected and that a historical analysis supports a more narrow interpretation of the clause. The unnecessary rigor clause, they contend, was meant by the framers and Utah citizens as a proscription only against the physically cruel and barbarous treatment of prisoners that characterized the American colonial era. According to Defendants, the only important distinction between the unnecessary rigor clause and the cruel and unusual punishment clause is the stage of criminal proceedings at which the protection applies, rather than in the scope of the protection granted. ¶10 Dexter, on the other hand, argues that the interpretation of the unnecessary rigor clause in Bott is supported by the plain language and historical context of the provision, and that Defendants' proposed interpretation must be rejected because it would render the unnecessary rigor clause meaningless. Dexter further asserts that the authors of the Utah Constitution intended the clause to provide protection from inhumane treatment and to regulate conditions of confinement and treatment of inmates. ¶11 In interpreting provisions of the Utah Constitution, we begin with a review of the constitutional text. We also inform our textual interpretation with historical evidence of the framers' intent. [11] Finally, we may consider well-reasoned and meaningful decisions made by courts of last resort in sister states with similar constitutional provisions. [12] ¶12 The term rigor is defined as an act or instance of strictness, severity, harshness, oppression, or cruelty. [13] Such a meaning applies well in this context. It appears supported by the plain language of the unnecessary rigor provision itself, which prohibits unnecessarily rigorous treatment of persons arrested or imprisoned, particularly when considered in conjunction with the other language of the same section regarding excessive fines, bail, or punishments. The history of the provision, which remains unchanged since statehood, is also consistent with such a use of the word. ¶13 At the Utah constitutional convention of 1895, Delegate, and later Governor, Heber M. Wells proclaimed that the object of the unnecessary rigor provision was to protect persons in jail if they shall be treated inhumanely. [14] ¶14 By today's standards, the conditions in the prison and county jails at the time of the Utah constitutional convention were bleak. Surely this inhumane treatment influenced the convention delegates to include the unnecessary rigor clause in the Utah Constitution. The territorial prison was reportedly in terrible condition, and the county jails were reported to have barbarous practices. [15] In Utah, the desire to eliminate brutality and to ensure decent and humane treatment for convicts may have been the catalyst of the unnecessary rigor provision. [16] ¶15 Statutes in effect at the time suggest the same meaning. Officers guilty of willful acts of inhumanity or oppression toward a prisoner were themselves subject to prosecution resulting in imprisonment or fines. [17] Officers who, without lawful necessity, assaulted or beat anyone were likewise punishable. [18] Any injury to a prisoner not authorized by law was also punishable as if the prisoner had not been convicted. [19] ¶16 The prohibition against unnecessary rigor clearly includes intentional physical abuse of persons under arrest or imprisoned. [A]lthough police may use `reasonable and necessary force' in making an arrest, the prohibition against unnecessary rigor does not allow police officers to commit assault and battery on a criminal suspect. [20] ¶17 The unnecessary rigor clause of the Utah Constitution protects persons arrested or imprisoned from the imposition of circumstances on them during their confinement that demand more of the prisoner than society is entitled to require. The restriction on unnecessary rigor is focused on the circumstances and nature of the process and conditions of confinement. By contrast, the cruel and unusual punishment clause in the state constitution is directed to the sentence imposed. While there is some overlap on a factual level, the purposes are different. Torture may be cruel and unusual but strict silence during given hours may not. Strict silence, however, may impose unnecessary rigor or unduly harsh restrictions on the service of one's otherwise proper sentence. ¶18 As with all such fact-intensive inquiries, the particular event or act in question, and the context in which it arose, are necessary elements to a determination of whether a particular set of circumstances rises to the level of a constitutionally prohibited act.