Opinion ID: 494186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Jamison's Request to Protest Silently

Text: 17 Although the district court declared the defendants' protest policy unconstitutional, it nevertheless upheld the denial of Jamison's request as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. 18 The government may regulate the time, place, and manner of expression in public forums as long as its regulations are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 954, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). The district court held that the defendants' refusal to allow Jamison to protest because of his mental afflictions satisfied these criteria: 19 The exclusion of mentally incompetent persons whose presence might pose a danger to others satisfies the requirement that the restriction be content neutral and intended to further a significant state interest. Airport officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to protect persons at airports from mentally ill people. Further, the exclusion of plaintiff from the airport leaves him other avenues of protest, albeit some not as efficacious as the course of action he proposes. 20 Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 671 F.Supp. 641, 646 (E.D.Mo.1986). 21 We disagree with the district court's reasoning and conclusion. It is true, as the City urges, that the airport authorities have legitimate interests in security and operational efficiency. It is also true that Jamison has been diagnosed as manic-depressive. The City has utterly failed to demonstrate, however, how excluding all persons suffering from some form of mental illness will further the City's interests in security and operational efficiency. 22 The City argues that certain persons, including Jamison, have mental illnesses which increase their propensity for violent or disruptive conduct, and that barring these persons will further their goals of security and operational efficiency. Yet a broad assertion that some manic-depressive persons may be prone to violence cannot justify depriving all mentally ill persons of their first amendment rights. 6 Nor did the evidence demonstrate that Jamison would in fact pose a danger to the public. 7 23 We find the Supreme Court's language from Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), applicable here: [U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Id. at 508, 89 S.Ct. at 737; see also Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 628 (5th Cir.1981) (Punishment for criminal behavior must be government's response to an abuse of the privilege to use a public forum; prospective restraints are unconstitutional.). 24 Although we thus reject the lower court's ruling on the constitutionality of the defendants' exclusion of Jamison, we agree that it is unnecessary for the court to issue an injunction directing the City to allow Jamison to protest silently. Rather, on remand the district court should fashion an appropriate order declaring the parties' rights, in accordance with this opinion. Upon further violation of plaintiff's rights, if such were to occur, plaintiff is free to renew his request for an injunction to allow him the right of peaceful picketing.