Opinion ID: 725095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Alleged Breach Of The Plea Agreement

Text: 17 Flores next argues that the government breached its plea agreement by not arguing for the low end of the applicable Guideline range and by advising the court to consider all relevant conduct. Flores did not raise these issues at his sentencing. Breach of a plea agreement cannot be raised for the first time on direct appeal. D'Iguillont, 979 F.2d at 614 (citing United States v. Pryor, 957 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir.1992)). Forfeiture of an allegation of breach of a plea agreement is subject to the plain error exception. Id. This court will intervene only if the breach caused a different outcome at the sentencing hearing. Id. The government agreed in the plea agreement, that [a]t the time of sentencing, the government shall recommend that the court impose a sentence at the lower end of the applicable guideline range.... The district court had this agreement. At the sentencing hearing, the court advised Flores that it need not follow the government's recommendation, a point about which the sentencing agreement itself had warned Flores. Flores indicated he understood. In this light, the government's failure to state its position on the record at the sentencing hearing did not violate the agreement. The government had already conveyed to the court its position pursuant to the agreement and the court had in its possession written evidence of that agreement. Orally stating what was contained in the written agreement, with which the court was familiar already, would have been unlikely to change the court's sentence. Therefore, even were the government required by the agreement to recite orally its recommendation, its failure to do so did not prejudice Flores and does not constitute grounds for resentencing. Cf. United States v. Pryor, 957 F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir.1992) (no plain error where government's breach of plea agreement is technical failure to inform court of information about which court is already aware). 18 Flores also argues the government breached its agreement when it advised the court to consider all relevant conduct in increasing Flores' base offense by three levels. At paragraph 7(b) of the plea agreement the government had stated that [b]ased on the facts known to the government, there is no increase in offense levels pursuant to Guideline § 1B1.3. But the government also stated in the following paragraph, 7(c), [i]t is the government's position that the defendant's offense level should be increased by three levels pursuant to Guideline § 3B1.1(b), based on his aggravating role in the offense. When the government advised the court to consider all relevant conduct in increasing Flores' base offense level by three levels, it did so pursuant to paragraph 7(c). Flores argues that 7(b) precluded the government advancing this position no matter what was contained in 7(c). However, paragraph 7(b) is more reasonably read as limiting 7(a), in which the government limited the quantity of drugs on which the base offense level would be calculated, than as nullifying entirely paragraph 7(c). Further, the government was merely stating what the law requires the court to do. Sentencing judges may use all information they possess. 'No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person ... for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.'  United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3661). Even if paragraph 7(b) should be read as Flores argues, it is unlikely the district court would have entered a different sentence because it was merely complying with the Guidelines' mandate to consider all relevant conduct, conduct which Flores had agreed was relevant in the plea agreement. The plea was not conditional and the agreement acknowledged that the sentencing recommendation was not binding on the court in any event.