Opinion ID: 2258725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title to Island Avenue and Marginal Street

Text: [¶14] According to Norton, the earlier judgments left open his opportunity to bring claims in state court to quiet title to the relevant portions of Island Avenue and Marginal Street, and to establish damages. He contends that the United States District Court declined jurisdiction over the issue of title, thereby declining supplemental jurisdiction. [¶ 15] The Town contends that the District Court would have asserted supplemental jurisdiction over Norton Sr.'s quiet title claim if he had pursued it in his initial federal proceeding because the federal claim and the current state claim share a nucleus of operative facts. Further, the Town argues, the judgment did not indicate that it was entered without prejudice and did not contain any equivalent language. [¶ 16] We review a dismissal on the ground of res judicata de novo for errors of law. Town of Boothbay v. Jenness, 2003 ME 50, ¶ 19, 822 A.2d 1169, 1175. [¶ 17] Claim preclusion, which is the relevant component of the res judicata doctrine, bars relitigation if: (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; and (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been litigated in the first action. Macomber v. MacQuinn-Tweedie, 2003 ME 121, ¶ 22, 834 A.2d 131, 139 (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine prevents a party from relitigating issues that were tried, or that may have been tried, between the same parties or their privies in an earlier suit on the same cause of action. Blance v. Alley, 1997 ME 125, ¶ 4, 697 A.2d 828, 829 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). [¶ 18] In determining whether a claim is precluded, we apply a transactional test, examining the aggregate of connected operative facts that can be handled together conveniently for purposes of trial to determine if they were founded upon the same transaction, arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts, and sought redress for essentially the same basic wrong. Draus v. Town of Houlton, 1999 ME 51, ¶ 8, 726 A.2d 1257, 1260 (quotation marks omitted). In such circumstances, the newly pleaded claim is precluded even if the latest suit `relies on a legal theory not advanced in the first case, seeks different relief than that sought in the first case, or involves evidence different from the evidence relevant to the first case.' Blance, 1997 ME 125, ¶ 4, 697 A.2d at 829 (quoting Petit v. Key Bancshares of Me., Inc., 635 A.2d 956, 959 (Me.1993)); see also Harriman v. Border Trust Co., 2004 ME 28, ¶ 5, 842 A.2d 1266, 1267. Claim preclusion does not, however, apply when a court reserves a party's right to maintain a second action, as happens when a court dismisses a claim without prejudice. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F.Supp.2d 206, 213 (D.R.I.2002). [¶ 19] The question, then, is whether either of the federal court actions could have resolved a quiet title action had Norton's father included such a claim in his complaints. The federal district courts have the power to determine state law claims that arise from the common nucleus of operative facts that constitute the federal law claims. Draus, 1999 ME 51, ¶ 7, 726 A.2d at 1260. Arguments that the federal court was not required to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction ... have met with little sympathy. Id. ¶ 7 n. 3, 726 A.2d at 1260. [4] If, however, it is clear that the federal court would have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in the earlier proceeding, the subsequent state claim is not precluded. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e (1982) (stating that, as between federal and state courts, if the court considering the first action would clearly have declined to exercise jurisdiction over a claim as a matter of discretion, the claim is not precluded in the second court); see Waterville Indus., Inc. v. Fin. Auth. of Me., 2000 ME 138, ¶ 19, 758 A.2d 986, 991 (citing First Interstate Bank v. Cent. Bank & Trust Co., 937 P.2d 855, 858 (Colo.Ct.App.1996)). [¶ 20] We conclude that the federal court would have declined to exercise jurisdiction over a quiet title claim. The United States District Court articulated an intention that Norton Sr.'s title question remain a live issue for the State to address in the future: the resolution of [the title] issues should be left to the state courts, which are better positioned to definitively adjudicate them. Because the District Court so strongly indicated that it would decline supplemental jurisdiction based on a healthy sense of federal-state comity, we conclude that the matter presented for discussion herethe title to the roadscould not have been litigated in the federal proceeding and therefore the doctrine of res judicata does not bar Norton's claim to quiet title to the roads at issue. See Waterville Indus., Inc., 2000 ME 138, ¶ 19, 758 A.2d at 991 (citing First Interstate Bank, 937 P.2d at 858); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 25 cmt. e. Accordingly, we must vacate the court's dismissal of the claim to quiet title to the roadways (count one), and the corresponding claim for damages (count three) to the extent that those alleged damages arise from the facts alleged in count one. [5]