Opinion ID: 2716890
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Testimony of the Defendant

Text: i. Questions Regarding Defendant’s Conduct with his Former Wife The defendant’s next contention is that he was improperly asked a number of questions about an alleged past incident of violence involving his former wife. In order to properly assess defendant’s contention, we must detail the pertinent exchange, which occurred during crossexamination: “[The State]: And according to your testimony is [sic] that you never laid a hand on Ms. King, right? “[The Defendant]: No. “[The State]: Because you’re, I believe your words were, that you’re not violent, right? “[The Defendant]: I’m not. “[The State]: Well, this is – isn’t the first time that you were accused of hitting someone in the left side of the head, is it? “[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. “[The Court]: Sustained. “[The State]: You never hit your ex-wife on the left side of the head, sir? “[Defense Counsel]: Objection “[The Defendant]: No. “[The Court]: He denied it. “[The State]: You never gave her a bloody nose, sir? “[Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. “[The Court]: He denied ever striking her. “[The State]: You never got into a physical altercation with your wife that your children had to pull you apart? - 21 - “[Defense Counsel]: Same objection, Your Honor. “[The Court]: An altercation, you may answer that, Mr. Ceppi. “[The Defendant]: Yes. “[The State]: In fact, it was an altercation that your – [sons] were present for, right? “[The Defendant]: Yes. “[Defense Counsel]: And they were pulling you and their mother apart, right? “[The Defendant]: Their mother. “[Defense Counsel]: They weren’t pulling you apart? “[The Defendant]: No. “[Defense Counsel]: So – so [one of your sons] would be wrong if he stated to the police – to Shrewsbury, Mass. You were antagonizing their mother? “[Defense Counsel]: Objection. “[The Court]: [State], do you have an offer of proof in this?” The prosecutor then made an offer of proof by presenting a police incident report, and the trial justice ruled on the objection as follows: “[The Court]: “[W]ith reference to the incident report, March 10th, 2009, that report includes, under the introductory section, incidents on November 16th 2008, August 16th, 2008, followed by a nonspecific, a nonspecific date referenced to the bloody nose that you’re talking about. With reference to the March 10th incident, the report seems to indicate that the children reported to the officers that the wife – that Susan Ceppi became physical with Mr. Ceppi and started throwing things and that officers viewed a tape showing Susan, quote, becoming physically violent towards Mark and the children trying to restrain their mother, asking her to stop, followed by an admission by Susan Ceppi that she did become violent towards her husband, Mark. - 22 - So with reference to your last question, the objection is sustained. With reference to – you need to separate the other references by Mrs. Ceppi that do not include your question about [both sons’] observations on this last date of March 10th. “[The State]: Thank you, Your Honor. “[Defense Counsel]: And if I may, Your Honor, just to -- just for the record, I would make a general objection to anything -- “[The Court]: I understand. “[Defense Counsel]: -- any questioning related to these incidents.” “[The Court]: Sure. “[Defense Counsel]: For the mere fact that there’s no [Rule] 404(b) exception, I believe, that fits into this evidence. Thank you.” The prosecutor proceeded to ask questions with respect to whether defendant had ever “hit” or “kicked” his former wife. The defendant avers that “[t]he prosecutor was in effect accusing [him] of an assault on his former wife, even though the prosecution’s offer of proof included a police report which contained an admission by the defendant’s former wife that she assaulted the defendant.” He posits that the “impermissible implication that [defendant] had engaged in violent conduct with his former wife” was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. In accordance with Rule 404(b), any evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” committed by defendant was not admissible to prove that defendant had a certain character and acted in accordance with his character (i.e., propensity evidence) when allegedly committing the crimes with which he was charged.19 Our thorough review of the record indicates that, even if 19 Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence reads, in its entirety, as follows: - 23 - the questions with respect to defendant’s former wife were in violation of Rule 404(b), such a violation would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Clements, 83 A.3d 553, 563 (R.I. 2014) (concluding that, even if there had been a violation of Rule 404(b), it would have been “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); see also State v. Bailey, 677 A.2d 407, 411 (R.I. 1996). No documents with respect to any altercation between defendant and his former wife were admitted into evidence; and, in his testimony, defendant repeatedly denied ever kicking or hitting his former wife. Importantly, defendant was also given an opportunity during re-direct examination to testify that it was his then-wife, and not he, who was charged with respect to the alleged violent confrontation at issue. Additionally, as the state points out, this was a jury-waived trial—and the risk of prejudice is significantly reduced in that context. See Medeiros, 996 A.2d at 121. Moreover, the above-quoted comments by the trial justice make it clear that she understood that it was not defendant who had been charged with respect to the incident involving his former wife. Taking all those facts into account, we hold that, even if the questioning with respect to defendant’s former wife and any violent altercations between them had been in violation of Rule 404(b), such error would have been harmless. ii. The Opinion of Defendant as to the Intoxication of the Complaining Witness The defendant contends that the trial justice “erroneously refused to allow him to testify that [Ms. King] was under the influence of alcohol” on direct examination. He refers specifically to questions asked by defense counsel with respect to whether or not defendant had observed Ms. “Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was reasonable.” - 24 - King become intoxicated in the past and whether she was under the influence of alcohol on a particular evening.20 With respect to those questions the trial justice instructed defense counsel to ask the witness about his observations, not his “conclusion[s].” The defendant avers that the fact that he had been dating Ms. King for “ten months” was “adequate foundation” for the questions, and he contends the following: “This Court has said lay opinions of intoxication are permitted if the witness has had an adequate opportunity to observe the person about whom the testimony is offered and is able to offer a [sic] sufficient detail for an opinion.” We note that the trial justice did not in fact exclude all testimony with regard to Ms. King’s intoxication on various dates in question; rather, she simply required defendant to testify with respect to what he observed about Ms. King, rather than simply offering a conclusory statement that she was intoxicated. That requirement imposed by the trial justice was consistent with the relevant case law from this Court cited by defendant. See State v. Bruskie, 536 A.2d 522, 524 (R.I. 1988); State v. Fogarty, 433 A.2d 972, 975-76 (R.I. 1981). In our decision in Fogarty, we held that a lay witness may testify with respect to whether or not someone was intoxicated if the witness “had an opportunity to observe the person and [can provide] the concrete details on which the inference or description is founded.” Fogarty, 433 A.2d at 976. The trial justice in the instant case was merely requiring defense counsel to ask about the “concrete details” which formed the basis of his conclusion that Ms. King was intoxicated. Id.; see also State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249, 1258-59 (R.I. 1992) (holding that a portion of a deposition which was not read into evidence at trial due to the fact that the trial justice sustained the prosecutor’s objection to that portion, in which the witness stated that a certain individual 20 See Part I.A.4, supra. - 25 - was intoxicated, was properly excluded because the witness failed to provide any concrete “details” on which his determination was based). Moreover, defense counsel was permitted to continue asking questions about defendant’s observations of Ms. King’s behavior after she was drinking, and defendant was permitted to testify with respect to Ms. King’s behavior when she had been drinking. Therefore, there is no merit to defendant’s argument that the trial justice “erroneously refused to allow him to testify that [Ms. King] was under the influence of alcohol.”