Opinion ID: 2549542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 20] Daniel contends that the district court properly granted a judgment of acquittal on the third count of first degree sexual assault because of the unreliability of the victim's testimony, but erred in refusing to grant a judgment of acquittal on the remaining counts. Daniel contends that, despite trial counsel's failure to renew that motion at the close of the defense's presentation of evidence, sufficient evidence does not exist to sustain his convictions on the two counts of first degree sexual assault. [¶ 21] Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges is: This Court assesses whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Robinson v. State, 11 P.3d 361, 368 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo.1995)) (citing Baier v. State, 891 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo.1995)). [¶ 22] Daniel contends that the record shows that a comparison of the victim's several statements to police and her testimony from both trials reveals that she has told a fantastic, self-contradictory story that is internally inconsistent and patently unbelievable. Additionally, he claims that the disinterested expert witnesses could not confirm that the victim's injuries were caused by sexual assault as opposed to consensual sexual intercourse and testified that a blood type inconsistent with either the victim's or Daniel's blood type was found on the victim's underwear. Noting that the jury failed to believe the victim when she claimed that she had been kidnapped, Daniel asks this Court to find that the victim's testimony itself creates reasonable doubt, and the jury's verdict was the result of speculation. [¶ 23] The record shows that the victim's testimony was self-contradictory; however, those inconsistencies were argued to the jury by counsel in closing argument. Inconsistencies and contradictory testimony are relevant to the weight and credibility of the witness and, therefore, it is the jury which must assess those matters as the trier of fact. Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 578 (Wyo.1994). This Court cannot reweigh the evidence or reexamine the credibility of the witnesses. Id.; Pisano v. State, 828 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo.1992). We must assume that the jurors believed only the evidence adverse to the defendant. Walston v. State, 954 P.2d 987, 988-89 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 24] Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record shows that physical evidence corroborated the victim's version of events that her injuries were received when sexually assaulted. Pictures demonstrated and medical personnel testified that she had suffered injuries from physical restraint and battery, and the police found her bra, a string consistent with string that she claimed was used to tie her hands and feet, and bloodstained sheets. Medical tests indicated the presence of fluids consistent with the defendant's blood type. An expert testified that a blood type not belonging to Daniel was found on the victim's underwear but could not determine if that different blood type result was caused by fluid from another person or by bacterial, soil, or a detergent contaminant. Although this evidence was all consistent with the defense theory that consensual sexual intercourse had occurred and the victim was beaten by her boyfriend later that night, the jury was solely responsible for that determination. The conviction is supported by sufficient evidence. Legality of Imposing Two Consecutive Life Sentences Under The Habitual Criminal Statute [¶ 25] Daniel challenges the imposition of two consecutive life sentences under the habitual criminal statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201 (LexisNexis 2003), [2] on two grounds: first, that the statutory language does not permit more than one sentence enhancement, and second, that the imposition of two consecutive life sentences is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [¶ 26] Since our decision in Rich v. State, 899 P.2d 1345 (Wyo.1995), the law has been settled that life sentences for a fourth and fifth felony are required under § 6-10-201, when a defendant is adjudicated a habitual criminal. Id. at 1347. Rich upheld the trial court's decision to impose three consecutive life sentences for first degree sexual assaults constituting distinct crimes. Daniel contends, however, that Rich is distinguishable from his convictions arising out of just one sexual assault occurrence. He contends that the disproportionate harshness of two consecutive sentences to life is demonstrated because he is ineligible for parole [3] although this is his only violent felony conviction, and this disproportionality constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The State contends that we have previously decided that the portion of the habitual criminal statute enhancing a sentence to ten to fifty years for two prior convictions is not cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and that reasoning applies to a sentence enhancement of life imprisonment, citing Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.1986). [¶ 27] In Oakley, we considered the several decisions by the United States Supreme Court addressing when sentence enhancement constituted cruel and unusual punishment to arrive at our decision that § 6-10-201(b)(i) does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court recently reviewed this same jurisprudence in its latest consideration of this issue in connection with California's three strikes law, statutory schemes that are designed to increase the prison terms of repeat felons. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, ___, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1182, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003). Ewing had been convicted of felony grand theft in excess of $400 for stealing three golf clubs; however, because he had previously been convicted of three burglaries and a robbery, all considered serious or violent felonies, the three strikes law applied and Ewing was sentenced to 25 years to life. Id. at 1183-85. [¶ 28] Ewing resulted in a majority decision that California's three strikes law constitutionally addresses recidivism without violating the Eighth Amendment ban of cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 1190. However, the Court's analysis for arriving at that conclusion garnered only plurality support, and its application of those principles relied upon in Ewing are unclear enough to have caused the Court to reject the opinion that its case law was clear or consistent enough to be clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, ___, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). The Court did find that it was clearly established that a gross disproportionality principle does apply to sentences for terms of years; [4] however, the precise contours of that principle are unclear, applicable only in the `exceedingly rare' and `extreme' case. Id. The Court held that Lockyer was not one of those exceedingly rare or extreme cases. Id. [¶ 29] Lockyer stole about $150.00 worth of videotapes and was convicted of two counts of petty theft. He had previously been convicted of three counts of residential burglary, which California's three strikes law considers serious or violent felonies, and which made him eligible for sentence enhancement. Lockyer received two consecutive sentences of twenty-five years to life imprisonment, although he will be eligible for parole in about fifty years. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at ___-___, 123 S.Ct. at 1169-71. [¶ 30] In both Ewing and Lockyer, the Court considered its previous decisions in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), and Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Rummel held that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a state from sentencing a three-time offender to life in prison with the possibility of parole for the justified purpose of addressing recidivism. Ewing, 538 U.S. at ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1185. In another recidivism case, Solem found that a life sentence without possibility of parole for a seventh nonviolent felony was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed. Ewing, at 1186. Harmelin held that a life sentence without possibility of parole was not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment although the first time offender was convicted only of possessing 672 grams of cocaine and was not the subject of a recidivism statute. Ewing, at 1186. Based on this precedent, Ewing and Lockyer gleaned that its guiding principles for deciding whether a sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing three golf clubs or videotapes required the threshold determination of whether the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Ewing, 538 U.S. at ___-___, 123 S.Ct. at 1188-90. Neither contention of an Eighth Amendment violation survived the Court's threshold determinations and both enhanced sentences were upheld. Id. at 1190; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at ___-___, 123 S.Ct. at 1175-76. [¶ 31] In considering this precedent as well as our own established in Oakley and Rich with respect to the facts of this case, we first find that, contrary to his assertions, Daniel has been convicted of two distinct sexual assaults permitting imposition of consecutive life sentences under the habitual criminal statute. We have said that [i]n appeals alleging imposition of multiple sentences for a single act, the focus is on those facts proven at trial. Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 25, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶ 25 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Rouse v. State, 966 P.2d 967, 970 (Wyo.1998)). The ultimate question is whether those facts reveal a single criminal act or multiple distinct offenses against the victim. Id. Where the acts required for the commission of one offense are a necessary and indispensable precursor to commission of a second offense, the offenses merge for purposes of sentencing. Id. Such merger is mandatory where the second offense cannot be committed absent commission of the first offense. Id. [¶ 32] The evidence showed that Daniel subjected the victim to both vaginal and anal sexual penetration and these acts constitute separate, forcible sexual intrusions on the victim. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (LexisNexis 2003). Proof of different facts was required to establish the elements of each crime, creating a record showing that Daniel's convictions were for separate and distinct crimes. It was, therefore, appropriate for the district court to consider Daniel's convictions as separate and distinct crimes for the purpose of imposing consecutive life sentences pursuant to the habitual criminal statute. [¶ 33] Daniel's Eighth Amendment violation claim requires that we examine the gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the penalty. Daniel's two first degree sexual assault convictions followed a history of felony convictions. Wyoming's habitual criminal statute is long-standing and serves to address recidivism by simply removing from society those members who have proved themselves incapable of conforming to the laws by virtue of multiple, previous felony convictions. Our review of Wyoming legislation indicates that the habitual criminal statute, § 6-10-201, is directed at repeat offenders of violent crimes and § 6-2-306 imposes a life sentence for those with two previous first degree sexual assault convictions. The sentence enhancement under the sexual assault statute does not apply to Daniel, but from this scheme, we see that the legislature enacted § 6-10-201 with the intent of removing from society those recidivists who continue to commit felonies and the legislature has further acted to incapacitate those recidivists with three first degree sexual assault convictions by imposing life sentences under § 6-2-306. [¶ 34] Daniel, a felony recidivist, now stands convicted of two violent felonies as defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(xii) (LexisNexis 2003), [5] namely, first degree sexual assault, and, because of his criminal history, Daniel was properly subjected to a life sentence in furtherance of the legislative goal of halting recidivism. We hold that his two consecutive life sentences for his convictions is not a rare case where the crimes compared to the penalty are grossly disproportionate. No violation of the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment has occurred.