Opinion ID: 1257147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sixth Did the prosecutor's comments and the court's instruction on defendant's failure to testify constitute harmless error?

Text: Yes. [12] At the time of defendant's trial, the California Constitution permitted comment by the court and counsel on an accused's failure to testify (art. I, § 13). Thereafter, on April 28, 1965, the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229]. held that adverse comment violated the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Griffin rule is applicable to cases pending on direct appeal at the time it was announced. (See Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 409, fn. 3 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 86 S.Ct. 459]; People v. Perez, 65 Cal.2d 615, 620 [4], fn. 2 [55 Cal. Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597]; People v. Ing, 65 Cal.2d 603, 609 [1], fn. 2 [55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590].) In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824], the Supreme Court held that constitutional errors do not require automatic reversal of convictions without regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, but that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) We have recently recognized that the Chapman rule does not permit us to affirm a conviction simply because we deem it improbable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the Griffin error. ( People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 712 [59 Cal. Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788].) The Supreme Court required in Chapman that we focus on reasonable possibility rather than probability (386 U.S. at p 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710]) and that we cast on someone other than the person prejudiced by [a federal constitutional error] a burden to show that it was harmless. ( Id. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) The court did not, however, require that we ignore the possible impact of the error upon the outcome of the case. In this connection the meaning of the court's reference to errors which `might have contributed to the conviction' ( id. at p. 23 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710]) becomes clear in the context of the entire opinion, since the court expressly stated that it sought a rule that will save the good in harmless-error practices while avoiding the bad. ( Ibid. ) The court explained the good which it wished to preserve by its formulation: Harmless error rules, the court said, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.  ( Id. at p. 22 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 709]; italics added.) [13] In essence, then, the court avoided any statement of intention to compel the reversal of convictions on the basis of errors which are harmless' ' in the sense that there is no reasonable possibility of their having affected the outcome of the trial. The prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal constitutional error proved harmless in this sense; once that burden has been discharged, the error no longer serves as a basis for reversal. ( People v. Modesto, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 712.) [14a] Thus, in applying its rule to the circumstances of the case before it, the court in Chapman stressed the fact that absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fairminded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts. (386 U.S. at pp. 25-26 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) On the compelling record which we have summarized above, we can conceive of no reasonable possibility that this jury could have reached any verdict other than one of guilt even if the prohibited comments [2] had never been uttered. Defendant's attorney in no way suggested here, either through the testimony of witnesses or in argument to the jury, that someone other than the defendant might have perpetrated this crime and that the defendant might simply have driven the getaway car from the scene of the robbery or that he might have replaced the robber in the car at some later time. Thus, as the case was presented to this jury, only two conclusions were possible: Either the defendant's possession of a vehicle matching the getaway car and containing the proceeds of the robbery was purely fortuitous, or the defendant must have been the robber. Given the fact that the defendant fled from the police and fired at them with a sawed-off shotgun similar to that used in the course of the robbery, the first of these two possibilities evaporated into the inherently incredible, leaving no real gap in the prosecution's case. [15] Under these circumstances, our remarks in People v. Modesto, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 714, bear repetition here: In order to prove prejudicial, a comment which could not serve to fill an evidentiary gap in the prosecution's case must at least touch a live nerve in the defense, not one which has been rendered inert by such intrinsic improbability as would prevent it from generating any real doubt in the mind of a reasoning juror. Thus the posture of the defense in the instant case minimized to the point of insignificance the possible impact of the comment. [14b] We need not speculate here whether the comment might have assumed significance if the defense had planted the suggestion that the defendant had an accomplice who actually committed the robbery and did the shooting; our function under Chapman is not to assess the prejudicial impact of an error in a trial which did not occur but to evaluate that impact as the case in fact unfolded at this trial. Placing the burden of proof upon the prosecution, we have concluded that the challenged comments proved entirely inconsequential in the case before us. Accordingly, Chapman does not require the state to conduct a new trial. The judgment is affirmed.