Opinion ID: 2643963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carpenter's Alternative Arguments

Text: Recognizing that this court on appeal is free to affirm the district court's decision on any independently sufficient ground, see United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995), Carpenter argues that the trial contained several other errors that support affirmance of the new trial order. He identifies four errors within the government's closing: (1) the government unduly emphasized Carpenter's losses; (2) the government unduly emphasized the riskiness of Carpenter's investing strategy; (3) the government mischaracterized parts of the evidence; and (4) the government improperly gave a personal opinion (that's fraud). He also points to an error during the government's principal case at the trial, contending that the government knowingly relied on false testimony. The district court properly did not find that any of Carpenter's arguments on these points justified a new trial when it considered them in its new trial order. Carpenter did not preserve the personal opinion argument because he failed to object contemporaneously or to include it in -21- his objections immediately after the closing argument. See, e.g., United States v. Goodhue, 486 F.3d 52, 55 (1st Cir. 2007) (An issue is preserved for appeal when the appellant adequately preserved the issue through a timely and contemporaneous objection to the district court.). However, he preserved each of the other four arguments by objecting to them at the closing (or during the trial as to the false testimony, which was not at issue in the closing) and highlighting them in his briefs on the new trial motion in the district court and on appeal. We review preserved objections of this sort for harmless error. See United States v. Sasso, 695 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2012). That is because Carpenter's assertions of error are not of constitutional dimension, and so the conviction will stand despite any error as long as it can be said 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.' Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). We review the unpreserved objection for plain error. See United States v. Andújar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 561 (1st Cir. 2007). Applying these standards, we conclude that none of Carpenter's alternative grounds is sufficient to affirm the new trial order. -22- 1. Government's Focus on Actual Losses and Riskiness Carpenter attacks the government's focus on Carpenter's actual losses and on the riskiness of his investments within its closing argument. But the government's arguments properly went to its theory of Carpenter's fraud: as to risk, misrepresentations of how the money would be invested, and as to the losses, misrepresentations of the financial state of his company and the likelihood that exchangors would actually be paid back their principal with the promised interest. 2. Government's Knowing Use of False Testimony Within his complaint about the government's focus on the riskiness of his investments, Carpenter also argues that the government knowingly introduced false testimony from one of its witnesses. That claim asserts an error under Napue v. People of the State of Ill., 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Under Napue, a new trial is required if the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury. United States v. Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)) (internal quotation mark omitted). However, we have recognized that this rule is not absolute; for example, we have declined to require a new trial when the defendant has knowledge of the false testimony and fails to raise the issue. See Mangual-Garcia, 505 F.3d at 10-11. -23- The district court, in a separate order denying Carpenter's motion for a mistrial on these grounds, explicitly considered Carpenter's claims regarding the lying witness and concluded that the witness was in fact lying and that the government knew the testimony was false. However, it also explained that the government made all necessary disclosures and that Carpenter consequently was able to and did cross-examine the lying witness vigorously. The district court therefore determined that a mistrial was not warranted on this basis. On appeal, Carpenter has not identified any reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict in this case was impacted by the false testimony in light of his vigorous cross-examination.8 That ends this attack. 8 Carpenter's sole contention on this point is that the false testimony arguably raised doubt as to whether Carpenter was forthright with Merrill Lynch, and that this doubt could have permitted the jury to believe that he was less than forthright with his clients as well. Though he neither refers to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) nor invokes its language, he essentially argues that the testimony could have been improperly used as propensity evidence in violation of that rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1) (prohibiting use of evidence of crimes, wrongs, or bad acts to prove action in accordance with that character). But Carpenter's Rule 404(b)(1) argument falls far short of the requisite reasonable likelihood showing. For one thing, Carpenter claims that the testimony only arguably raised doubts about his forthrightness with Merrill Lynch; he does not show that the testimony likely raised such doubt. For another thing, even if doubt were raised, Carpenter asserts merely that it could have permitted the jury to believe that he was dishonest with his clients as well. He does not show that such an inference was reasonably likely. -24- 3. Government's Alleged Mischaracterization of Carpenter's Knowledge Carpenter next complains that the government on rebuttal characterized him as having direct knowledge of the contents of the marketing materials and personally deleting certain words from them. These characterizations are possible inferences but are far from required by the evidence. Throughout the trial, Carpenter consistently protested against treating them as required inferences or proven facts. The district court took prompt steps to address any error in precisely the way that Carpenter's counsel requested, granting a curative instruction. The court's instruction told jurors explicitly that [t]here is no evidence that Mr. Carpenter was responsible for changing the agreement. You have evidence of two different agreements, but there's no evidence as to how they came to be different, and so that would not be an appropriate thing for you to take into consideration. In light of that clear and prompt instruction, it is not likely that the outcome swayed. See Olszewski v. Spencer, 466 F.3d 47, 60 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that where the prosecutor unintentionally misstates the evidence during closing argument, a jury instruction ordinarily is sufficient to cure any error, particularly where the instruction was given immediately after the statement). -25- 4. Government's Use of Personal Opinion Carpenter's final argument is that the government improperly introduced a personal opinion during its closing by declaring at multiple points, that's fraud. Because Carpenter did not contemporaneously object to this point, our review is for plain error.9 To prevail on plain error review, Carpenter must show that the comments were prejudicial and affected his substantial rights, and that the error caused a 'miscarriage of justice' or seriously undermined the 'integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 105 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). Carpenter has not met that burden. Although they may sound like the prosecutor's opinions in isolation, the comments 9 Carpenter argues that his objection was preserved because the district court interrupted his attorney while his attorney was making a set of objections immediately after the government's closing argument, citing United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 769 (1st Cir. 1996). That argument fails for three reasons. First, Wihbey did not hold that an objection is preserved in such a situation, but merely assumed arguendo that it could be. See id. Second, Wihbey is distinguishable on its facts, as counsel there moved for a mistrial after the prosecution's rebuttal -- essentially the first opportunity after the earlier attempt to object was rebuffed -- whereas the new trial motion here was filed after the jury returned its verdict. See id. Finally, even if interruptions generally could be sufficient to preserve objections, there is simply no evidence here that Carpenter's attorney was attempting to make the objection Carpenter now claims is preserved; the district court interrupted him only after he had discussed at length his objections to the government's emphasis on Carpenter's losses and appeared primed to continue discussing that topic alone. -26- that Carpenter cites as improper opinions actually came in the context of properly encouraging the jury to evaluate the evidence. For example, one of the two instances of improper opinion-giving that Carpenter identifies is in the very last sentence of the government's rebuttal: This is fraud, ladies and gentlemen, and this is why you should find him guilty on each and every count. Taken in context, it is clear that the prosecution's comments were permissible comments on the evidence in the case rather than the prosecutor's own opinion. See United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Cain, 544 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir. 1976). Because these comments in context were not prejudicial, and certainly did not cause a miscarriage of justice, they do not constitute plain error.