Opinion ID: 1985054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Specific Conduct Leading to a Previous Conviction

Text: The defendant suggested on appeal that the details of conduct resulting in his previous conviction of stalking complainant were erroneously admitted because the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative value. Recognizing that the trial justice admitted the evidence for the sole purpose of demonstrating complainant's state of mind when she received the new communications, defendant argued that complainant's state of mind was not an element of the offense. Instead, he proposed that the subjective state of mind of complainant was wholly irrelevant because the prohibited conduct had to cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and hence the appropriate test was an objective standard. Under Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. The rule is designed to prohibit the introduction of evidence that is only relevant to show that the defendant is a bad person and, therefore, likely to have committed the offense with which he is charged. State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 79 (R.I.2000). We have held, however, that evidence of the commission of another crime that is relevant to the proof of the crime in issue is not prohibited by Rule 404(b) or by the common law principles that preceded it. Clark, 754 A.2d at 79. Therefore, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, [or] identity   . State v. Robertson, 740 A.2d 330, 335 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Rule 404(b)). The decision on whether evidence of other crimes is relevant to a permissible purpose is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice, and on appeal we shall only disturb his or her decision when it constitutes an abuse of discretion, State v. Gabriau, 696 A.2d 290, 294 (R.I.1997), and the evidence was both prejudicial and irrelevant. State v. Martinez, 651 A.2d 1189, 1194 (R.I.1994). To prove the elements of stalking based on harassment, the state carried the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that complainant was seriously alarmed, annoyed, or bothered and that the course of conduct was such that it would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. Testimony by complainant describing her reaction to the new series of contacts immediately after defendant's probationary period had ended demonstrated that the subjective part of this test had been met. Several examples will suffice to illustrate that separating the reasonable person standard entirely from an analysis of the surrounding circumstances or the person's position would offend established legal principles. For instance, the rationale for admitting into evidence a statement against one's interest is that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. State v. Firth, 708 A.2d 526, 531 (R.I.1998). Similarly, in the context of informed consent in a medical malpractice case, the question of materiality depends on the significance that a reasonable patient would attach to the disclosed risk when deciding whether to submit to treatment. Lauro v. Knowles, 739 A.2d 1183, 1186 (R.I.1999) (per curiam). When determining whether a person is entitled to Miranda warnings, the analysis of whether a person is subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest turns on how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand the situation. State v. Hobson, 648 A.2d 1369, 1372 (R.I.1994) (quoting State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 579 (R.I.1987)). And, finally, in deciding the existence of a contract, we examine the expectation of a reasonable person in [the contracting party's] position, in light of the prior course of dealing and past history between the parties. Kenney Manufacturing Co. v. Starkweather & Shepley, Inc., 643 A.2d 203, 209 (R.I.1994). Because the Legislature enacted the stalking statute relatively recently, we have not yet interpreted the chapter, apart from the constitutional challenge in Fonseca. The case law of other jurisdictions, although not determinative, is instructive therefore in addressing the issue. For instance, in assessing whether a person had suffered emotional distress or reasonably apprehended bodily injury, the Supreme Court of Montana applied the standard of a reasonable person under similar circumstances. State v. McCarthy, 294 Mont. 270, 980 P.2d 629, 633 (1999). The Court supported a finding by the trial jury in McCarthy that given the protracted and tumultuous relationship between these two individuals, [complainant's] distress at receiving [defendant's] letters was reasonable    . Id. The trial justice in the case at bar allowed the evidence of defendant's previous conduct to be admitted for the limited purpose of showing that this conduct would cause a reasonable person in complainant's position to suffer substantial emotional distress. He instructed the jury during complainant's direct examination that the only relevance that events which took place prior to December of '92 have in this case relate[s] to her state of mind in December of '93 and [at subsequent contacts]. The trial justice explained and instructed the jury several times that defendant was not on trial for those events, and he could not be tried for them again. He continued, [h]er state of mind is an element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. That's the only relevance. At the close of trial, the trial justice instructed the jury: The prior activity between the complaining witness and the defendant is material and relevant only on the issue of her frame of mind    . The fact that he had been charged and arrested for a prior stalking charge    is not to be considered by you as evidence that he acted in conformity with that prior charge. It is our opinion that to establish the reasonable person objective element in the Rhode Island stalking statute, it is necessary to understand the circumstances under which the contacts occurred. A prominent characteristic of the offense is the likelihood that a defendant will repeat the same pattern of conduct with a particular victim. The Legislature responded to this fact by elevating a second conviction to the level of a felony. The complainant had availed herself of all legal measures to discourage defendant from further contact, and it was understandably distressing to her to receive new communications the day after defendant's probationary period ended. Although the cards and letters were not inherently threatening, they did demonstrate that defendant would continue to contact complainant regardless of her express wishes that he not continue, explicit prohibitions against his behavior, and a previous conviction for stalking the same individual. The evidence of defendant's prior conviction of stalking complainant and the details of his conduct were entirely relevant to prove an element of the offense, and hence, we are of the opinion that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting such evidence.