Opinion ID: 2916030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Cross-Examination of Husband

Text: About Extramarital Affair During his cross-examination of Husband, defense counsel attempted to establish that Husband was engaged in an extramarital affair with Rebecca Harris, his ex-wife, at the time the victim was murdered. The State objected on relevance grounds, and a juryout hearing ensued. Defense counsel explained that the affair gave Husband a motive to kill, or have killed, the victim and also was relevant as impeachment evidence. The trial court permitted defense counsel to conduct a voir dire examination of Husband. Husband admitted that he was having an extramarital affair with Rebecca Harris during his marriage to the victim. The affair began in November 2009 and included five sexual encounters. Husband also admitted that he sent several text messages to Harris on the afternoon of the victim‟s murder with the goal of arranging a meeting later that night. Husband denied that he wanted to “get back with Rebecca.” During the prosecutor‟s voir dire examination of Husband, Husband stated that he told the police about the affair “immediately after.” Defense counsel then questioned 19 Husband about the written statement that he gave to the police on June 2, 2010. Husband acknowledged that his written statement included no reference to the affair. Defense counsel also questioned Husband about the written statement he provided to the police on June 8, 2010. Husband acknowledged that his second written statement included no reference to the affair. Husband also testified that he could not remember the names of the persons in law enforcement that he told about the affair. At the conclusion of Husband‟s voir dire examinations, the trial court ruled as follows: The Court is going to sustain the State‟s objection to this line of questioning for this reason: The Rules require that proof of another wrong or act has to go to credibility. It‟s not just a bad conduct, but to truthfulness or untruthfulness. And the Court doesn‟t believe this line of questioning, while the Court acknowledges it‟s conduct that might involve moral turpitude or certainly inappropriate conduct, does not go to truthfulness or untruthfulness or would aid the jury really in any way in determining the credibility of the witness. So the Court will sustain the objection with regard to this line of questioning. When defense counsel inquired if the trial court‟s ruling was the same with regard to the admission of Husband‟s affair as proof of motive, the court responded, “He is not a criminal defendant. So you can certainly ask him the other questions that have to do with whether he committed a crime, whether he committed this crime, any of those type of questions.” The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred in disallowing this line of questioning but concluded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Bell, 2014 WL 2547721, at -47. Before this Court, the Defendant contends that the trial court‟s ruling violated his constitutional right to present a defense and also erroneously deprived him of the right to impeach Husband‟s credibility. The State contends that the trial court committed no error in its ruling.
Generally, this Court reviews a trial court‟s rulings on evidentiary matters for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 116. A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases 20 its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party. Id. Defense counsel sought to introduce evidence of Husband‟s affair both as substantive proof supporting his defense that Husband murdered the victim and also as impeachment evidence. We first will examine the admissibility of this proof as substantive evidence. B. Husband‟s Affair as Proof that Husband Committed Murder In this case, there was no eyewitness proof and no confession. The Defendant‟s defense was that someone else committed the murder. The Defendant‟s primary suspect in this regard was Husband.7 Accordingly, the Defendant wanted to establish that Husband was having an affair in order to prove that Husband had a motive to kill (or have killed) the victim. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that “the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants „a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.‟” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). This Court has recognized that this right to present a defense is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 432 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1976)). “A proper defense includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused committed the crime.” State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 671 (Tenn. 2006); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 (2006) (explaining that a state rule barring defense evidence of thirdparty guilt in a capital murder case denied the defendant a fair trial); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 394 (Tenn. 2003) (recognizing that “an accused is entitled to present evidence implicating others in the crime”) (citing Sawyers v. State, 83 Tenn. (15 Lea) 694, 695 (1885)). In Powers, we held that our Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 were adequate for determining the admissibility of proof of another‟s motive and opportunity to commit a murder. 101 S.W.3d at 394-95. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 401. “In a criminal case, evidence that a third party had the motive and opportunity to commit the offense certainly would be relevant.” Powers, 101 S.W.3d at 395. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ observation in State v. Brock that a husband‟s extramarital affair “is suggestive of a motive for . . . murder” of the husband‟s 7 The defense also adduced proof that Arcutt disliked the Defendant and was angry at him, permitting the inference that Arcutt had a reason to “frame” the Defendant for the victim‟s murder. 21 wife. 327 S.W.3d 645, 704 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2009); see also State v. Robinson, 73 S.W.3d 136, 152 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001) (holding that husband‟s extramarital sexual conduct before he killed his wife was probative of motive). In short, proof of Husband‟s ongoing affair with Rebecca Harris was relevant to the Defendant‟s defense that Husband was responsible for the victim‟s murder.8 Nevertheless, relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Tenn. R. Evid. 403. We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals‟ conclusion in this case that none of the criteria set out in Rule 403 justified excluding the proof of Husband‟s affair. See Bell, 2014 WL 2547721, at . Accordingly, we also agree with our intermediate appellate court‟s conclusion that the trial court erred when it refused to allow the defense to cross-examine Husband about his affair with Rebecca Harris. See id. Although rulings about the admissibility of evidence generally do not rise to the level of constitutional error, Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 673 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 689), the erroneous exclusion of evidence that thwarts a criminal defendant‟s right to present a defense is constitutional error. Id.; see also, e.g., Brown, 29 S.W.3d at 436 (holding that “depriving the defendant of the right to present critical, reliable hearsay evidence of an alternative explanation for the injury is constitutional error”). To determine whether the erroneous exclusion of evidence violated a defendant‟s constitutional right to present a defense, we consider whether the excluded proof is critical to the defense; whether it bears sufficient indicia of reliability; and whether the interest supporting exclusion of the proof is substantially important. Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 673; see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315 (1998) (recognizing that the exclusion of proof violates the constitutional right to present a defense when it “significantly undermine[s] fundamental elements of the defendant‟s defense”).9 As to the latter two criteria, Husband admitted to his affair. Therefore, this proof bore sufficient indicia of reliability. The trial court‟s reasons for excluding the proof 8 In its brief to this Court, the State contends that “any testimony regarding [Husband‟s] extramarital affair would scarcely have been probative of a motive to kill the victim.” The State offers no citation in support of this proposition, which is contrary to reported Tennessee decisions. 9 It is important to determine whether the erroneous exclusion of evidence rises to a constitutional violation because non-constitutional error is evaluated on the basis of whether it is “harmless” pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(b). See State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371-72 (Tenn. 2008). Non-structural constitutional error, on the other hand, is presumed to entitle the defendant to a reversal unless the State demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 371. 22 were that it was not admissible as impeachment evidence under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608 and that Husband was not a criminal defendant. While we agree with the trial court that this evidence was not admissible under Rule 608, see infra, Husband‟s status as a witness rather than as a criminal defendant was not a basis for excluding this proof. Moreover, the inadmissibility of proof for impeachment purposes is not a sufficient basis on which to exclude substantive proof of a criminal accused‟s defense to the crime for which he is being tried. As to the first of these criteria, “whether excluded evidence is critical to a defense is a fact-specific inquiry.” State v. Flood, 219 S.W.3d 307, 317 (Tenn. 2007). The specific facts of this case convince us that proof of Husband‟s extramarital affair was critical to the Defendant‟s defense that he did not commit the murder. Although motive is not an element of the crime of first degree murder, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (2010), first degree murder trials frequently include proof from which a jury can infer why the accused killed the victim. For instance, a suspect robs a convenience store and, in order to eliminate the only witness, shoots and kills the cashier. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that, “[w]hile motive is not an element needed to be proven in order to support a conviction for [premeditated] murder, jurors often require such explanatory proof before they will convict an accused of this offense.” Hawkins v. State, No. M2000-02901-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1768995, at  n.3 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 31, 2002), perm. appeal denied (Tenn. Dec. 9, 2002); see also State v. Leach, 148 S.W.3d 42, 58 (Tenn. 2004) (recognizing that “[e]vidence proving motive necessarily serves the purpose of completing the story of the crime” of first degree premeditated murder). While the State did not seek a conviction of premeditated murder in this case, the manner in which the victim was killed made clear that her death was not an unintended consequence that occurred during the course of another crime. In this case, the State adduced no proof as to why the Defendant killed the victim. Although the State presented evidence that the Defendant thought that Husband had underpaid him by $50, the prosecutor asserted during his closing argument that the Defendant “did not kill Starr Harris because he was short $50 on his pay.” Rather, the prosecutor contended, the victim‟s murder was “senseless.” In stark contrast to a senseless, motiveless murder, the Defendant proffered a different scenario: that Husband wanted the victim dead because he was engaged in an extramarital affair with his ex-wife. Proof of such a motive would have given the jury an opportunity to consider the possibility that it was Husband who killed, or had killed, the victim, and not the Defendant. Accordingly, under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, this proof was crucial to the Defendant‟s defense, and the trial court‟s erroneous exclusion of this evidence compromised the Defendant‟s constitutional right to present a defense. 23 Because of the trial court‟s violation of the Defendant‟s constitutional right to present a defense, the Defendant is entitled to a new trial unless we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, and on the basis of the entire record, that this error did not contribute to the jury‟s verdicts. See Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 672-73; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (“The inquiry . . . is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.”); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (“The test used to determine whether a non-structural constitutional error is harmless is „whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‟”) (quoting State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Tenn. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn. 1999) (recognizing that “the goal of [constitutional] harmless error analysis is to identify the actual basis on which the jury rested its verdict”) (citing Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279).10 Factors we consider in determining whether the erroneous exclusion of defense proof was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt include (1) the importance of the proof to the defense‟s case; (2) the extent to which the excluded proof was cumulative; (3) the extent of other evidence corroborating or contradicting the excluded proof; and (4) the overall strength of the State‟s case. See Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 168 (considering harmlessness of trial court‟s erroneous denial of defendant‟s right to testify). We hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. First, although defense counsel was unable to question either Husband or Rebecca Harris about their affair, the defense was successful in alerting the jury to its theory that Husband was responsible for the victim‟s murder. Indeed, Husband testified during cross-examination, “I would think that I was the prime suspect, probably would be a 10 Numerous prior decisions of this Court describe constitutional harmless error review as the State having “the burden of proof” to “prove” on appeal that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 444 S.W.3d 554, 591 n.50 (Tenn. 2014) (referring to State‟s “burden of proving unconstitutional prosecutorial comment or argument harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Nagele, 353 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tenn. 2011) (referring to State‟s “burden of proving harmless error”); Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 476 (Tenn. 2010) (“Where, as here, the trial court has committed constitutional error . . . , the judgment of conviction must be set aside unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Momon, 18 S.W.3d at 167 (“Once a constitutional error has been established, . . . the burden is upon the State to prove that the constitutional right violation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The use of the terms “burden of proof” and “prove” in this context are unfortunate because no litigant can offer proof on appeal. More precisely, because constitutional error is presumed to entitle the defendant to a new trial, the State bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by persuading the reviewing court that a trial court‟s constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based on all of the proof properly admitted at trial and contained in the record on appeal. 24 prime suspect from other people‟s view.” Later, during closing argument, the defense highlighted Husband‟s concern during the trial that the hairs found in the victim‟s hand were his; that he had scratches on his hands and arms at the relevant time; that he never produced the photographs he claimed to have taken on the afternoon of June 1; that the police did not confiscate his boots to be tested for the victim‟s blood; and that only his DNA was found on the victim‟s body. Defense counsel also stated the following: “[O]ne of Mr. Harris‟s actions that is questionable at best are [sic] his repeated text messages to his ex-wife. And as he testified yesterday those text messages were not work related. . . . If [Mr. Harris] care[d] so deeply about [the victim], why [was he] texting [his] ex-wife?” This rhetorical question, combined with Husband‟s admissions that he was speaking with his ex-wife during the trial and that others would likely view him as the “prime suspect,” was sufficient to alert the jury to the defense theory that all was not right between Husband and the victim. Second, as set forth in more detail below, the proof in this case points to the Defendant and the Defendant alone as the victim‟s killer. While Husband had scratches on his hand and arm on the day of the murder, there was no proof that the victim had Husband‟s DNA under her nails. While there was proof that Husband had had sex with the victim, there was no proof that the contact was nonconsensual. Multiple witnesses placed Husband at a location miles away from the House between 1:30 p.m., the time of the victim‟s last known phone conversation, and the discovery of her body later that evening. Specifically, Ray Horne testified that he left the House with Husband and Son in the same vehicle and that the three of them drove to Munford Tire, arriving between 11:00 a.m. and noon.11 There, they arranged for some tire work to be done. Josh Harris joined them. The four men walked to a nearby restaurant and ate lunch together. After lunch, and after waiting together at Munford Tire for the work to be finished, the four men left together to begin work on several properties. The four men stayed together in the same work crew until early evening when Husband learned that there was a possible problem at the House. Son testified consistently with Horne about Husband‟s whereabouts on June 1, 2010. Logan Tate, the manager of Munford Tire, testified that Husband and his work crew arrived at Munford Tire before lunch on June 1, 2010. The work that they had to do for Husband took “[a] few hours.” Husband was at Munford Tire when the work was finished. Tate also saw Husband during the course of the work because Husband was concerned about how long the work was taking. Thus, multiple witnesses gave uncontroverted testimony that Husband was miles from the House from late morning on the day of the murder through the time Husband received the phone call informing him that the victim was missing. 11 Ray Horne was no longer employed by Husband at the time of trial. 25 Of course, it is theoretically possible that Husband arranged for someone else to kill the victim. However, the record is devoid of any proof that Husband did so. Moreover, the record contains no proof suggesting that someone other than the Defendant struck and strangled the victim.12 On the other hand, the proof implicating the Defendant as the victim‟s assailant was strong: undisputed proof placed the Defendant near the House and the victim at approximately 1:30 p.m. on the day in question; the victim was never heard from by anyone else after 1:30 p.m.; the handgun replica and the condom, both bearing DNA consistent with the Defendant‟s, were located near a branch bearing hairs consistent with the victim‟s head hair; these latter items were found not far from the victim‟s body; and the victim had suffered blunt force injuries to her head. Based on this and the remaining proof in the record, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted the Defendant of murdering the victim even had the jury been informed about Husband‟s affair. “[A]n otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); see also, e.g., State v. Cook, 816 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tenn. 1991) (recognizing that constitutional errors do not require reversal “if the reviewing court determines that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the entire record”). The entire record in this case includes the testimony of multiple witnesses establishing an uncontroverted alibi for Husband. This evidence is critical in determining whether the trial court‟s error in excluding proof of Husband‟s affair was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.13 12 We acknowledge that Sp. Agent Sullivan observed scratches on Husband‟s arm and hand. However, Husband had spent the latter part of the day doing yard work for his business. Sp. Agent Sullivan‟s uncontroverted explanation that Husband‟s injuries were consistent with yard work combined with Husband‟s three-witness alibi of being miles from the site of the victim‟s murder between her last phone conversation at 1:30 p.m. and the time her body was found allow us to conclude that there was “no proof” that he physically participated in killing her. 13 The dissent emphasizes that the Defendant‟s conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. Ever since this Court‟s opinion in State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tenn. 2011), this Court repeatedly has held that circumstantial evidence is no different than direct evidence for purposes of establishing guilt and is to be analyzed under the same standard as direct evidence, regardless of whether the case involves a sentence of death. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 461 S.W.3d 469, 501-02 (Tenn. 2015) (capital case); State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791 app. at 824 (Tenn. 2014) (capital case); State v. Sexton, 368 S.W.3d 371, 399 (Tenn. 2012) (capital case). 26 Moreover, we emphasize: The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant‟s guilt or innocence and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 681 (citation omitted). “Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.” Id. (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error 50 (1970)). The basis on which the jury actually rested its verdict in this case consisted of the physical proof linking the Defendant to the fatal attack on the victim and the uncontroverted proof placing Husband miles away from the victim at the relevant time.14 Thus, although we have acknowledged the importance of the affair to the Defendant‟s defense, and although there was no actual direct proof admitted into evidence regarding Husband‟s extramarital conduct, the overall strength of the State‟s case results in our conclusion that the trial court‟s erroneous exclusion of proof about Husband‟s affair was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis. C. Proof of Husband‟s Affair as Impeachment Evidence Defense counsel sought to impeach Husband with proof about the affair in two distinct ways. First, the defense argued that Husband‟s extramarital conduct was probative of his character for truthfulness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). Second, defense counsel wanted to demonstrate that, while Husband claimed on the witness stand during voir dire to have informed the police about the affair, Husband‟s written statements to the police included no reference to it, allowing the inference that Husband was lying on the witness stand. See Tenn. R. Evid. 613.
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that a party may inquire during cross-examination about the witness‟ “[s]pecific instances of conduct” when those instances of conduct are “probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 14 The dissent places emphasis on the lack of a definitive time of death of the victim. The more relevant time is when the attack took place, not the actual time of death. Additionally, the body was already in a state of early decomposition when it was found, indicating that the victim had been dead for some time. 27 608(b).15 As noted by the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case, Bell, 2014 WL 2547721, at , our Court of Appeals has held that a witness‟ involvement in an extramarital affair is not probative of his or her truthfulness under the precursor to Rule 608(b). See Bull v. Fey, No. 87-367-II, 1988 WL 72408, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1988) (citing State v. Morgan, 541 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. 1976) (adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)). Additionally, while not referring specifically to Federal Rule 608, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[e]vidence of non-commercial, nonfelonious and private sex acts will not impeach or discredit a witness‟s testimony and such evidence is not admissible for that purpose.” Walden v. State, 542 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) (citing Merriman v. State, 71 Tenn. 393 (1879)).16 Other courts construing comparable rules of evidence are in accord. See, e.g., Robinson v. Canon USA, Inc., No. 99-0339-CV-W-3, 2000 WL 564203, at  (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2000) (holding that evidence of plaintiff‟s extramarital affairs had no bearing on her character for truthfulness under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b)17); Mullins v. State, No. CA CR 88-267, 1989 WL 64190, at  (Ark. Ct. App. June 14, 1989) (holding that, under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 608(b)18 past sexual activity was not relevant to the witness‟ character for truthfulness absent a prior false statement regarding the conduct). We agree with this analysis. An extramarital affair, in and of itself, is not necessarily probative of the adulterer‟s truthfulness.19 A straying spouse may be participating in his or her affair after fully informing the other spouse. Indeed, in this matter, the defense did not question Husband about what, if anything, he told the victim about his relationship with Rebecca Harris.20 We hold that Husband‟s affair with 15 Before permitting cross-examination about conduct probative of truthfulness, the trial court must, upon request, hold a jury-out hearing to determine “that the alleged conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists for the inquiry.” Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b)(1). Other procedural requirements also may need to be met. See id. 608(b)(2), (b)(3). 16 Morgan was filed mere days before Walden was filed. 17 Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that witnesses may be cross-examined about specific instances of conduct “if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of . . . the witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)(1). 18 Arkansas Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides that witnesses may be cross-examined about specific instances of conduct for impeachment purposes “if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” 19 Our holding should not be construed as precluding a finding of probative value under appropriate circumstances. 20 During the jury-out hearing, defense counsel asked Husband, “And you knew that you weren‟t 28 Rebecca Harris was not probative of his truthfulness for purposes of Rule 608(b). Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it refused to allow the impeachment of Husband on this basis.
The defense also wanted to cross-examine Husband about the affair in order to demonstrate that he had not told the police about it although he testified during voir dire that he had. That is, the defense wanted to establish that Husband‟s testimony was inconsistent with his prior statements. A prior statement by a witness that is inconsistent with his trial testimony is valuable impeachment evidence, and our Rules of Evidence provide for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment purposes. See Tenn. R. Evid. 613; see also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 279 (Tenn. 2000) (“Our cases have consistently held that a prior inconsistent statement is admissible under the Rules of Evidence when the prior statement is used to impeach the credibility of a witness.”). Our first task, then, is to determine whether Husband‟s written statements to the police, which contained no reference to Husband‟s affair, were “inconsistent” with his voir dire testimony that he told the police about the affair. This Court recently has held that facts included in a prior statement may render the prior statement “inconsistent” when the witness‟ current testimony omits those facts. See State v. Davis, __ S.W.3d __, __, No. W2011-01548-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL 3504853, at  (Tenn. June 3, 2015). The reverse also may be true. In this case, Husband testified at trial that he told the police about the affair. However, Husband also acknowledged that his prior two written statements to the police omitted any mention of the affair. We hold that Husband‟s written statements to the police were prior inconsistent statements for the purposes of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 613. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied defense counsel the opportunity to question Husband about the discrepancy between his testimony about what he told the police and the written statements that he provided to the police.21 This Court has recognized that the “undue restriction” of a criminal defendant‟s right to impeach witness credibility “may violate a defendant‟s right to confrontation supposed to run around on [the victim], right?” Husband answered, “Yes, sir.” Defense counsel then asked, “But you did so anyway, right?” Husband responded, “Done so all my life.” 21 Defense counsel did not attempt to introduce Husband‟s written statements into evidence. Accordingly, the provisions of subsection (b) of Rule 613, dealing with the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements, are not implicated in this appeal. 29 under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution.” State v. Sayles, 49 S.W.3d 275, 279 (Tenn. 2001) (citing State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 924 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 177 (Tenn. 1991)). However, even applying the constitutional error standard of review, we have no difficulty in concluding that the trial court‟s erroneous refusal to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Husband about his prior inconsistent statements to the police does not entitle the Defendant to relief. Husband‟s alibi was established by several other witnesses and, as noted above, there was absolutely no proof (other than motive) tying Husband to the victim‟s murder, either by his own hands or through the actions of another. Husband‟s testimony could have been entirely discredited with no significant impact on the prosecution‟s case. Cf. United States v. Hurn, 368 F.3d 1359, 1363 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that, under the “closely related” federal Compulsory Process and Due Process guarantees, “a defendant generally has the right to introduce evidence that is not itself tied to any of the elements of a crime or affirmative defense, but that could have a substantial impact on the credibility of an important government witness”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, because we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of this evidence for impeachment purposes had no impact on the jury‟s verdicts, we hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.