Opinion ID: 4076467
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the interests sought to be advanced by the

Text: actor, (e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s conduct to the interference and (g) the relations between the parties. The factors in that test are laden with subjective value judgments that will rarely be answerable as a matter of law. Nonetheless, and in the face of the already-recounted unflattering evidence against TLI, the District Court concluded that “[e]very single factor strongly indicates that [TLI’s] conduct d[id] not rise to the level ... the law proscribes.” (J.A. 227.) We disagree. First, the District Court stated that TLI acted with proper competitive motive and interest.29 But, even assuming 29 Although the District Court was not explicit in enumerating which factors of the Restatement’s seven-factor test it was considering, we infer from its argument that it here considered factors (a), (b), and (d) together – respectively, the 50 that were true, a pro-competitive motive or interest does not absolve misconduct that falls afoul of the first factor’s consideration of the nature of the conduct. Again, “[w]hile competition may constitute justification, a defendantcompetitor claiming a business-related excuse must justify not only its motive and purpose but also the means used.” Ideal Dairy Farms, 659 A.2d at 933. Second, the Court considered the nature of the protected interest, and it observed – without further comment or citation to authority – that “the law does not protect as forcefully a firm’s economic interest in possible, future customers as it does interests in contracting parties.” (J.A. 228.) Whether or not that is true, TLI was in fact interfering with Avaya’s relationships with then-existing maintenance customers. There was nothing speculative, or underwhelming, about that economic interest. Third, in considering society’s interest, the District Court found that TLI’s conduct “brought greater competition to the market and challenged widespread and vexatious threats of litigation.” (J.A. 228.) We do not believe the District Court was in a position to weigh the relative social merits of TLI’s conduct with Avaya’s proprietary interests in its software and its legitimate business expectations with its maintenance customers. That is exactly the kind of factual and ethical determination meant for the jury rather than the Court. nature of TLI’s conduct, its motive, and the interests it sought to advance. 51 Fourth, in considering the proximity of TLI’s conduct to the interference, the District Court emphasized that TLI’s “interference was far removed from their allegedly improper conduct” because it only accessed the ODMCs after the customer in question had left Avaya. (J.A. 229.) But the customers never would have left Avaya if TLI had not been able to promise ODMC access. The allegedly tortious conduct that enabled that access was therefore the sine qua non of TLI’s business. Finally, in considering the relations of the parties, the District Court determined that that factor “counsels for a finding of lawful conduct, as a mere four months after it signed the modified Avaya One agreement, and not long after originally encouraging TLI to invest in its maintenance business, Avaya cancelled the contract, thereby jeopardizing [TLI’s] monetary investment and business model.” (J.A. 22930.) That TLI chose to compete against Avaya rather than accept the standard Business Partner arrangement – and therefore prompted Avaya to terminate their relationship – cannot insulate TLI’s allegedly tortious conduct. Avaya’s supposed bad acts and predatory conduct may end up supporting TLI’s antitrust counterclaims, but the District Court provided no authority to suggest that those acts permitted TLI to engage in hacking or fraud in retaliation for its termination as a Business Partner. A straightforward application of New Jersey’s test for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage leads, we believe, to the conclusion that Avaya presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that TLI tortiously interfered with Avaya’s prospective business advantage. Avaya had a reasonable 52 expectation of ongoing business with its own customers, who are the targets of TLI’s sales efforts. As to the “malicious interference” element, we hold that a jury could reasonably have concluded that TLI’s methods – including, as examples, its hacking, dishonest login requests, and use of proprietary information learned while an Avaya Business Partner – were fraudulent, dishonest, or otherwise contrary to the ethical standards of the industry. TLI presented no evidence that its actions were consistent with industry norms, and we would be loath to hold that there was no jury question here, even if it had. That leaves only the loss and causation element. The evidence could support a conclusion that TLI’s interference resulted in Avaya losing direct maintenance contracts with customers. Moreover, even if customers independently terminated their direct service contracts with Avaya, if they had turned to other authorized maintenance methods instead of using TLI – whether using a Business Partner or selfmaintaining – Avaya would still have profited because, as earlier noted, those methods also produced revenue for Avaya. Avaya thus presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Avaya suffered damages, given that any money earned by TLI must have come from Avaya’s pockets to at least some extent. In sum, the District Court improperly made inferences in favor of the moving party, TLI, as to both contract interpretation and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, and it failed to recognize the sufficiency of the evidence Avaya had adduced. If the jury had been allowed to draw its own inferences from the evidence, it may have agreed with the District Court that TLI’s conduct was somehow permitted by Avaya’s customer contracts. But the jury may very well have determined that TLI’s actions were 53 not shielded by the customer contracts and were instead unethical, against the public interest, and ultimately tortious. We express no opinion on the correct answer in this dispute, holding only that the matter was for the jury to decide.