Opinion ID: 2370478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: definition of property

Text: Wherever used in this bond Property shall be deemed to mean money, currency, coin, bank notes, Federal Reserve notes,    (1) in which the Insured has an interest or (2) which are held by the Insured for any purpose or in any capacity and whether so held gratuitously or not and whether or not the Insured is liable therefor, (3) and chattels which are not hereinbefore enumerated and for which the Insured is legally liable. The numbers in parentheses have been added for convenient reference. It is apparent that the items of property as set out in the above paragraph are restricted by clause (1) which requires the insured to have an interest , or by clause (2) which requires that the item be held by the insured although it does not matter in such instance if the insured is liable or not liable for the loss. The indemnity provided in clause (3) relating to chattels not enumerated requires that the insured be liable for the loss. The defendants' contention that rider 1-C does not apply to money of customers in which the Bank has no interest does not take into consideration the significant language of reference in rider 1-C, the specific modifying provisions of the rider and the provisions of the policy as a whole. The loss insured by rider 1-C is any of the items of property enumerated in the paragraph defining Property; there is a specific requirement that the item must be in the possession of a customer or his representative while on the Bank's premises. Terms of reference employed in other insuring clauses and in other parts of the bond are Property or loss of Property, capitalized as in the definition itself. If it were the intent of rider 1-C to incorporate the restrictive or qualifying phrases and not merely the items of property, that purpose could have been more consistently accomplished by starting the first paragraph of rider 1-C with the customary term Any loss of Property   . It is quite evident that the reference term in rider 1-C, items of property enumerated in the paragraph defining Property was deliberately chosen to limit the reference and to avoid a conflict between other portions of rider 1-C and the defining paragraph. The conflict which is pointed up by the defendants' contention is between the requirement of the defining paragraph that the insured Bank have an interest in the  property or that the property be held by it, and the requirement of the rider that the property be in the possession of the customer or his representative along with other qualifying circumstances. In other words, under the facts of this case, the customer would have to be in possession of money in which the Bank had an interest or which was held by the Bank. No one has undertaken to explain by what means a customer or his representative while on the Bank's parking lot would lawfully be in possession of money in which the Bank had an interest. As to the other modifier, obviously the money could not be in the possession of a customer on the parking lot and at the same time be held by the Bank. Moreover, if the Bank is the only party indemnified under rider 1-C, it would at least be a duplication because the same and greater coverage appears to be provided by other parts of the bond and in particular by the first paragraph of insuring clause (B) which covers loss of the Property while it is on the Insured's premises located anywhere. Furthermore, if the Bank alone is insured under rider 1-C, why should the Bank's loss be excluded if it is caused by such customer or any representative of such customer as provided in the last clause of the rider? The construction for which the defendants contend would render rider 1-C either redundant, unnecessary or entirely meaningless. A policy of insurance must be construed as a whole and every clause must be given some meaning if it is reasonably possible to do so. Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 359 Mo. 430, 222 S.W.2d 76, 78[1], 80[6]. Furthermore, it is the duty of the court to reconcile conflicting clauses in an insurance policy if it is possible to do so consistent with the intention of the parties as ascertained from the terms used. Soukop v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 341 Mo. 614, 108 S.W.2d 86, 92[8-12], 112 A.L.R. 149; Heald v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 340 Mo. 1143, 104 S.W.2d 379, 383[6]. The coverage of the bond appears to have been carefully planned and the bond and its riders are skillfully drafted to express the coverage intended. As we have pointed out, rider 1-C contains its own qualifications or restrictions, both with respect to the property loss insured and the activity in which the customer must be engaged at the time. The word items as used in rider 1-C denotes an individual thing as an article of household goods or something singled out from a category of things of the same kind. Webster's Third New International Dictionary. The words items of property enumerated in the paragraph defining Property, used in the rider appear to have been carefully and deliberately chosen to single out and isolate the enumerated articles of property to the exclusion of the modifying phrases relating to the interest and possession of the Bank. In this case the item of property involved is money. This is to be taken from the paragraph defining property and transferred to rider 1-C unencumbered by restrictions and qualifications of the definitive paragraph and subject only to the limitations imposed by rider 1-C. Consequently the insuring clause, rider 1-C, must be interpreted and applied to the facts of this case as if it read: Any loss of [money] in the possession of any customer of the Insured   , whether or not the Insured is legally liable for the loss thereof,    (c) through robbery or hold-up during banking hours while such customer    is    on any driveway, parking lot or similar facilities maintained by the Insured as a convenience for such customers    using motor vehicles provided that any such customer or representative is present   on such facility for the purpose of transacting banking business with the Insured at any of the Insured's offices covered hereunder; excluding, in any event, loss caused by such customer or any representative of such customer. The result is that the loss of plaintiff's money through robbery was within the  coverage of the bond and the plaintiff is an indemnitee under the bond even though the plaintiff is not a named insured and contributed nothing directly to the payment of the premium. He is a third-party beneficiary and, in the circumstances of this case, is entitled to sue the defendant Casualty Company directly. Crow v. Kaupp, Mo., 50 S.W.2d 995, 997[2]; Motley v. Callaway County, 347 Mo. 1018, 149 S.W.2d 875, 877[7]; McCoy v. St. Joseph Belt Ry. Co., 229 Mo.App., 506, 77 S.W.2d 175, 180[2]. Under the law and the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to recover against the defendant Casualty Company. We are not persuaded, however, that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the defendant Bank. Plaintiff's theory of liability is that the Bank under rider 1-D was designated as agent for all insureds including customers and that the Bank was guilty of a breach of trust in refusing to present a claim to the Casualty Company on plaintiff's behalf. Regardless of what authority or obligation was imposed on the Bank by the rider, the plaintiff was not prejudiced because he could and did present his demand to the Casualty Company, and there is no showing that the plaintiff was damaged by the Bank's inaction or refusal to make a claim. The plaintiff's claim against the Bank is denied. Section 375.420, RSMo 1959, V.A. M.S., provides that in any action against any insurance company to recover the amount of any loss under certain kinds of insurance policies, including indemnity, if it appear from the evidence that such company has vexatiously refused to pay such loss, the court or jury may, in addition to the amount of the recovery, allow damages not to exceed ten percent on the amount of the loss and a reasonable attorney's fee. The plaintiff contends he is entitled to the statutory allowance in this case. An extended review of the many cases on the subject is unnecessary since the disposition of the issue depends essentially on the language of the statute and the record in the particular case. The decisions have generally held that the word vexatiously, as used in the statute, means without reasonable or probable cause or excuse. Pfingsten v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., Mo., 330 S.W.2d 806, 817[17]; Dixon v. Business Men's Assurance Co. of America, 365 Mo. 580, 285 S.W.2d 619, 629[11]. Under the evidence and circumstances shown by the record, we are convinced that the refusal of the Casualty Company to pay the loss and the ensuing conduct of the litigation was not vexatious in the statutory sense. We are buttressed in this conclusion by the fact that an able trial judge initially found the issue of liability in favor of the defendant Casualty Company. Since this is a court-tried case and it appears that no additional evidence could be adduced at a new trial, we are admonished to render or direct the entry of such judgment as the trial court ought to have given. Section 512.160(3), RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.; Sebastian County Coal & Mining Co. v. Mayer, 310 Mo. 104, 274 S.W. 770, 773-774[6]; Young v. New York Life Insurance Co., 360 Mo. 460, 228 S.W.2d 670, 672. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the defendant Manufacturers and Mechanics Bank of Kansas City is affirmed. The judgment in favor of the defendant Maryland Casualty Company is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Casualty Company as of March 25, 1963, the date of the original judgment, for the sum of $16,800 with interest thereon at the rate of six percent from April 1, 1960, the date of demand, to said March 25, 1963, and that the judgment so rendered bear interest as provided by law. Section 408.040, RSMo 1959, V.A. M.S. All of the Judges concur.