Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony Criticizing State's Evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding from the penalty-phase criticism of the State's physical evidence, thereby depriving the jury of the ability to consider residual doubt in its sentencing decision. Prior to commencement of the penalty trial, the court heard argument on the State's motion to exclude the proposed testimony of a forensic scientist who was hired by defendant to evaluate the physical evidence and to present a crime scene reconstruction for the jury. Defendant sought to call the forensic scientist to illuminate the inadequacies in the State's crime-scene processing and evidence collection. Defendant intended to rely on that testimony with respect to the circumstances of the crime and the State's burden to prove aggravating factor 4(g); to suggest defendant's lesser role in the crime from that of Junior's; and to establish a basis to support a passion/provocation jury charge. Because residual doubt concerning a defendant's guilt is not relevant to character or the circumstances of the offense, defendants do not have the right under the United States Constitution to have the jury instructed on residual doubt as a mitigating factor. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2327, 101 L.Ed. 2d 155, 165-66 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution limits the penalty-phase jury in capital cases to consider, as a mitigating factor, evidence of any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, under the New Jersey Constitution, the proffered evidence must be relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors; therefore, [r]etrial of issues relevant only to guilt is not permitted. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130. Thus, [w]hile defendant may lose whatever advantage inheres in the `residual doubts' that the original jury may have had regarding defendant's guilt, the State may also lose whatever `advantage' inheres in the emotional impact that often surrounds the initial guilt phase. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 71, 524 A. 2d 130 (citation omitted). Defendant urges reconsideration of our prior decisions, seeking a holding that evidence of residual doubt is admissible at the penalty phase. We decline to do so and reaffirm the principle that the only evidence admissible in the penalty phase is evidence relevant to the aggravating and mitigating factors. Defendant also argues that he was improperly precluded from presenting evidence that was both critical of the aggravating factors and relevant to the circumstances of the offense. Because we are requiring the State to reprove the elements of murder to establish aggravating factor 4(g), defendant will have the opportunity to criticize the evidence presented in support of aggravating factor 4(g) and to present his own evidence relevant to the circumstances of the offense on retrial.