Opinion ID: 2521248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duress and Choice of Evils

Text: Pautler further argues that the traditional defenses of duress [7] and choice of evils [8] provide examples of appropriate defenses to allegations of ethical misconduct. He also refers the court to the comment after Rule 4.1 where attorneys permissibly misrepresent their client's position as part of generally accepted conventions in negotiations. Colo. RPC 4.1 cmt. Pautler does not assert that any of these exceptions apply in his case, but that their existence demonstrates that exceptions are, at times, available to the otherwise strictly interpreted ethics rules. This court has never examined whether duress or choice of evils can serve as defenses to attorney misconduct. [9] We note that the facts here do not approach those necessary for either defense: Pautler was not acting at the direction of another person who threatened harm (duress), nor did he engage in criminal conduct to avoid imminent public injury (choice of evils). A review board in Illinois examined a similar scenario and decided against such an exception. In re Chancey, No. 91CH348, 1994 WL 929289, at  (Ill. Att'y Reg. Disp. Comm'n Apr. 21, 1994). In Chancey, a prosecutor with an impeccable reputation drafted a false appellate court order for the sole purpose of deceiving a dangerous felon who had abducted his own child and taken her abroad. Id. at -4. Chancey signed a retired judge's name to the order. Id. at . He never intended to file the order and did not file the order, nor was the order ultimately used to deceive the felon. Id. Despite its non-use, and despite Chancey's undeniably worthy motive, the Illinois board reprimanded Chancey for his deceit. Id. at . Rather than consider an exception in light of valid concerns over the safety of an abducted child, the board insisted on holding attorneys, especially prosecutors, to the letter of the Rules. Further, the board observed, and we agree, that motive evidence was only relevant in the punishment phase, as either a mitigating or aggravating factor. Id. Nor does the commentary to Colo. RPC 4.1 persuade us that an exception to Colo. RPC 8.4(c) is appropriate. If anything, the fact that the commentary to Rule 4.1 made explicit an already acknowledged exception demonstrates that, where applicable, the Rules and commentary set forth their own exceptions. Neither Colo. RPC 8.4(c), nor its comment, contain any such exception. On a related point, the hearing board noted, Both of the rules under which Pautler was charged are imperative, not permissive in application. Compliance with their mandatory provisions is required and is not subject to the exercise of discretion by the lawyer.