Opinion ID: 2614620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Form/Substance Distinction

Text: The first degree criminal trespass statute, section 18-4-502, 8B C.R.S. (1986 & 1993 Supp.) provides: A person commits the crime of first degree criminal trespass if such person knowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in a dwelling of another or if such person enters any motor vehicle with intent to steal anything of value or with intent to commit a crime therein. (Emphasis added). [6] The information charging Williams with criminal trespass contained the statutory language, with intent to commit a crime therein, but did not state the specific crime that Williams allegedly intended to commit upon the trespass. Thus, the threshold issue is whether an information charging a defendant with first degree criminal trespass must specify the ulterior crime as a jurisdictional prerequisite. An analysis of precedent, legislative history, and Williams' due process rights lead us to conclude that failure to allege the underlying offense is not substantive error and, therefore, does not require automatic reversal. An information is a written statement, signed by the prosecutor and filed in the court having jurisdiction over the offense charged, alleging that a person committed the criminal offense described therein. Crim. P. 7(b)(1). Section 16-5-202(1), 6 C.R.S. (1998), sets forth the requisites of an information: The information is sufficient if it can be understood therefrom: (a) That it is presented by the person authorized by law to prosecute the offense; (b) That the defendant is named therein or described as a person whose name is unknown to the informant; (c) That the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court or is triable therein; (d) That the offense charged is set forth with such degree of certainty that the court may pronounce judgment upon a conviction. Rule 7(b)(2) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure mirrors section 16-5-202(1). When an information satisfies each of these requirements, it invokes jurisdiction of the court. An information serves two vital interests of a constitutional dimension: (1) it provides the defendant with notice of the offense charged, as well as the factual circumstances surrounding the offense so that the defendant can adequately defend him or herself; and (2) it protects the defendant from further prosecution for the same offense. See Cervantes v. People, 715 P.2d 783, 785 (Colo. 1986); People v. Albo, 195 Colo. 102, 106, 575 P.2d 427, 429 (1978). Colorado has followed the modern trend of testing the sufficiency of the information based upon the fundamental objectives the information serves rather than technical pleading requirements of the common law. See Robert J. Dieter, Colorado Criminal Practice and Procedure § 2.10, at 114 (1996). This functional approach mirrors the efforts of the federal criminal code and follows the lead of the Supreme Court. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974) (noting that a charging document is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense); Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c) (liberalizing the technical common law pleading requirements). In determining the sufficiency of a particular count alleged in an information, we have restricted our examination to the four corners of that count to make sure that the essential elements of a crime were alleged therein directly or incorporated by specific reference, and we have not allowed a defect in one count to be compensated for by averments contained in another count. Cervantes, 715 P.2d at 786; see also People v. Moore, 200 Colo. 481, 485, 615 P.2d 726, 729 (1980); Martinez, 163 Colo. at 507, 431 P.2d at 767. An information that fails to charge an essential element of an offense is substantively defective. See Cervantes, 715 P.2d at 786; People v. Bowen, 658 P.2d 269, 270 (Colo.1983). This essential element requirement is satisfied if the language in the charge tracks the statutory language. See People v. Hunter, 666 P.2d 570, 573 (Colo. 1983); People v. Moreno, 176 Colo. 488, 496, 491 P.2d 575, 580 (1971); Gallegos v. People, 166 Colo. 409, 413, 444 P.2d 267, 269 (1968). It is generally sufficient that the indictment [or information] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as `those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.'  Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1882)). The information charging Williams with first degree criminal trespass contained essential language identical to that found in the first degree criminal trespass statute, section 18-4-502. It alleged that Williams entered the motor vehicle of Loren Eisele with the intent to commit a crime therein. Because the information at issue utilized the language prescribed by our legislature, we must conclude that it sufficiently ... advise[d] the defendant of the nature of the charges against him. Hunter, 666 P.2d at 573. Williams argues that precedent mandates the opposite conclusion. He contends that prior cases preclude this court from holding that repetition of the statutory language alone satisfies the requirement that an information charge the defendant with all essential elements of the offense of first degree criminal trespass. We disagree. Our precedent to this effect has been substantively altered by subsequent legislation. In Gomez, we held that an information count charging a defendant with burglary was fatally defective because it failed to state the specific crime which the defendant allegedly had intended to commit. 162 Colo. at 80, 424 P.2d at 389. Gomez was charged in a criminal information with feloniously, willfully, and maliciously breaking and entering the building of Edith Rosamond, located at 2339 West 33rd Avenue with the intent then and there to commit a crime. Id., at 78, 424 P.2d at 388. We concluded that, by the great weight of authority, an information charging a defendant with burglary must specify by name, at least, the ulterior crime which it is alleged the accused intended to commit upon entry of the building. Id. at 80, 424 P.2d at 389. Subsequently, in Martinez, we re-articulated this holding. 163 Colo. at 506, 431 P.2d at 766. Martinez involved a multi-count information, one of which charged the defendant with burglary. Id., at 505, 431 P.2d at 766. Relying upon Gomez, the court held that the burglary charge, charging defendant with intent then and there to commit a crime, was fatally defective because it failed to specify the ulterior crime the accused intended to commit upon entry. See Id. at 506, 431 P.2d at 766; see also Henson v. People, 166 Colo. 428, 430, 444 P.2d 275, 276 (1968) (citing Gomez and Martinez for the proposition that a burglary count is fatally defective where it fails to specify the underlying crime); Garcia v. People, 174 Colo. 372, 374, 483 P.2d 1347, 1348 (1971) (stating that specific intent to commit a specific felony is an essential element of the offense of burglary); State v. Deedon, 189 A.2d 660 (Del.1963) (finding an indictment charging the defendant insufficient where it failed to specify the underlying crime). By way of analogy, Williams contends that the holdings in the burglary cases of Martinez, Gomez, and Henson govern the disposition of his case, involving first degree criminal trespass. Williams claims that such a comparison is justified due to the similar language in the current burglary and criminal trespass statutes. While the first degree criminal trespass statute requires that the defendant enter with intent to commit a crime therein, § 18-4-502, the first degree burglary statute requires that the defendant enter with intent to commit therein a crime. § 18-4-202, 6 C.R.S. (1998). However, despite the parallelism in statutory language, the Martinez-Gomez line of cases addressed the law prior to significant legislative amendments that altered both the burglary and the criminal trespass statutes. In both Gomez and Martinez, we based our reasoning upon the statute then in place. In Gomez we stated, [I]t is to be noted that Colorado has no statute providing that, in the case of burglary, a general allegation of felonious intent, without naming the particular felony intended to be committed, is sufficient. 162 Colo. at 79-80, 424 P.2d at 388. Similarly, and perhaps more explicitly, in Martinez, we explained, [o]ne of the essential elements in a charge of burglary under C.R.S. 1963, [section] 40-3-5 is that the accused have the intent to commit a specific crime at the very time and place of breaking and entering. 163 Colo. at 506, 431 P.2d at 766 (emphasis added). The General Assembly's subsequent action in amending the burglary and trespass statutes leads us to conclude that an information charging a defendant with criminal trespass that fails to state the ulterior crime is not substantively defective. In construing a statute, we give effect to the intent of the General Assembly whenever possible. See Cooper v. People, 973 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Colo.1999). In Cooper, we recently analyzed the meaning of Colorado's burglary statute. Therein, we observed that, although the General Assembly abolished common law crimes not described by the 1971 reenacted Colorado Criminal Code, it took care to note that this abolition did not `affect the use of case law as an interpretative aid in the construction of the provisions of this code.' Id. When we decided Gomez and Martinez, the burglary statute then in existence required that a person enter with intent to commit murder, robbery, rape, mayhem, larceny, or other felony or misdemeanor.... § 40-3-5, 3 C.R.S. (1963). In 1971, however, the legislature amended the language of the statute to read: with intent to commit therein a crime. Ch. 121, sec. 1, § 40-4-202, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 427. Colorado's criminal trespass statute underwent a similar change. Prior to its 1992 amendment, the first degree criminal trespass statute encompassed only those circumstances in which a defendant enters or remains in a dwelling or if he enters any motor vehicle with intent to steal anything of value.  § 18-4-402, 8B C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). In 1992, the Colorado legislature supplemented the provision by adding the phrase, or with intent to commit a crime therein. Ch. 73, sec. 16, § 18-4-502, 1992 Colo. Sess. Laws 404. Upon introducing the amendment to the criminal trespass statute, a presenter for the Colorado District Attorneys Council stressed that the purpose of the change was to bring first degree criminal trespass ... in line with the language that we have used in burglary counts. You don't necessarily have to go in simply to commit a theft. [7] Hearings on H.B. 92-1078 before the House Judiciary Committee, 58th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (January 23, 1992). The presenter further explained that, under prior law, if the defendant did not intend to do criminal mischief, harass, or sexually assault his or her victim, the defendant's conduct did not satisfy the criminal trespass statute. See id. Thus, while the prior criminal trespass statute applied only to instances in which a defendant entered with an intent to steal, the amended statute encompasses all instances in which a defendant enters with the intent not only to steal, but to commit a crime any crimetherein. See § 18-4-502, 6 C.R.S. (1998). Thus, the change in the criminal trespass and burglary statutes triggered a change in the required pleading of elements in the charging documents. Earlier versions of both statutes required a prosecutor to set forth the specific crime underlying the burglary charge or to specify that the defendant intended to commit theft. Subsequent amendments to the statutory language altered the specificity requirement. When interpreting legislative amendments, we assume that the General Assembly was apprised of existing case law. We do not presume that the General Assembly makes its deletions and substitutions of statutory language idly. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 982 P.2d 310, 315 (Colo.1999). Decisions of several state and federal courts comport with our holding. The Florida Supreme Court has held that an information charging burglary is not required to specify the offense which the accused is alleged to have intended to commit. State v. Waters, 436 So.2d 66, 68 (Fla.1983). Basing its reasoning upon broad reciprocal discovery rules, the court held that, in a burglary charge, it is not per se required that the information specify the underlying charge. Id. Specification of the offense intended is not so essential a part of the intent element as to require that it always be set out in the charging document. Id. Some states have concluded that an information charging a defendant with burglary is defective when it fails to specify the underlying offense; however, such an omission amounts to a defect of form, not of substance. In State v. Skelton, for example, the Kansas Supreme Court held that an information charging burglary is defective in form unless the ulterior felony intended by the accused in making the unauthorized entry is specified, but this defect does not automatically result in prejudicial error. 247 Kan. 34, 795 P.2d 349, 359 (1990). Similarly, in State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 443 S.E.2d 68 (1994), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that an indictment charging a defendant with burglary was not fatally defective where it did not specify the particular felony the defendant intended to commit. The court stated that the indictment adequately informed the defendant of the nature of the charges against him so that he could prepare his defense. [8] Id. at 74. This determination was based, in part, upon the fact that any confusion the defendant may have had regarding the ulterior crime could have been raised by moving for a bill of particulars. [9] Id.