Opinion ID: 1122547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's motion to strike the Nash testimony

Text: At the conclusion of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the defense moved to strike the testimony of prosecution witnesses Eddie Nash, Tony Sylvester, Ronald Coen, and Michelle Christie (whose collective testimony we refer to as the Nash testimony). The motion to strike was made upon relevancy grounds and under Evidence Code section 352. [12] Outside the presence of the jury, the parties argued the relevancy of the evidence, and whether the evidence unfairly sought to establish defendant's guilt by association with Nash, a man defense counsel described as obviously disreputable. The trial court denied the motion to strike, accepting the prosecution's argument that the testimony was relevant to three distinct issues  defendant's motive, defendant's state of mind, and the corroboration of other witnesses' testimony. The trial court found that the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to strike. Defendant argues this evidence was irrelevant under Evidence Code section 210 and, even if the evidence was relevant, the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 because the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the possibility it would unduly prejudice defendant. We shall address these contentions in turn.
(13a) The central issue at trial was the identity of the person who fatally stabbed Maureen and Telesforo Bautista. The prosecution sought to establish that defendant had both the motive (fear of snitches) and the opportunity (time spent alone with the victims, and their trust of him) to commit the murders. The prosecution offered the Nash testimony in order to help establish the identity of the killer, insofar as the evidence suggested that: (1) defendant had a motive to kill Maureen; (2) defendant's state of mind could have led him to commit the killings; and (3) the Nash testimony corroborated the testimony of other prosecution witnesses. In contrast, the defense theory was that defendant was not the perpetrator of the killings, that he lacked the motive to commit the crimes in view of his close relationship with the victims, and that the killings more likely were committed by a third party, such as Larry Tom Whittington, who was involved in a lucrative drug operation and had no personal relationship with the victims. In determining the admissibility of the challenged evidence, we apply well-settled rules. (14) Only relevant evidence is admissible. (Evid. Code, § 350; People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. ( People v. Daniels, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 856; People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 631 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126].) The trial court retains broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. ( People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 681.) (13b) The Nash testimony was relevant to demonstrate defendant's motive for killing the Bautistas and to establish premeditation, in view of defendant's frequently voiced hatred of snitches and his expressed fear that Maureen Bautista would snitch him off to Eddie Nash. The Nash testimony suggested that defendant's motive in killing the Bautistas was self-preservation  a desire to avoid having Nash, a man with a reputation for violence, learn of defendant's whereabouts and activities. In the absence of physical evidence linking defendant to the Bautista killings, the presence of a motive was particularly significant in this case. (See People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1027-1028 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1] [evidence of spousal rape charge of which defendant was acquitted held relevant to issue of motive in prosecution for murder of the spouse]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 109 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37] [motive an important issue where defense asserts that defendant and victim had a good relationship].) We therefore discern no error in the trial court's determination that the Nash testimony was relevant.
(15a) Defendant contends that even if the Nash testimony were relevant, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to exclude it as unduly prejudicial pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [13] Defendant further contends that, contrary to the admonition contained in numerous decisions of this court (see, e.g., People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016-1017, and cases cited), the trial court failed to state on the record that it had weighed prejudice against probative value. The basis for defendant's motion to strike pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 was his assertion that the prosecution improperly sought to link defendant with Nash based upon testimony likely to compel the jury to speculate as to defendant's guilt by reason of Nash's illegal activities, reputation, and previous encounters with the law. (16) In opposing the motion, the prosecution relied upon this court's decision in People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585 [217 Cal. Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106], in which we adopted the following view: `The prejudice referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against ... [one party] as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 358, 377 [191 Cal. Rptr. 859]; see also People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) (15b) After hearing the parties' arguments as to the alleged probative value and prejudicial effect of the Nash testimony, the trial court took the matter under submission, noting on the record four days later that it was denying the motion based upon the prosecution's arguments and would consider giving the jury a limiting instruction. [14] We discern no error in the trial court's ruling. The admission of the Nash testimony did present a risk of undue prejudice to defendant in view of Nash's criminal conduct, his violent reputation, and his prior association with defendant. Nevertheless, the danger that the jury might rely upon the Nash testimony for an improper purpose (e.g., to conclude that defendant also was a violent individual) was minimized by the trial court's decision to give a limiting instruction. That instruction directed the jury to consider the Nash testimony only if it tended to establish the identity and the motive of the perpetrator of the killings, defendant's state of mind at the time of the killings, corroboration of other evidence, or the credibility of any other witness. The instruction directed the jury not to consider the Nash testimony as proof that defendant had a bad character or a disposition to commit crimes. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the risk of undue prejudice was not great. By contrast, the probative value of the Nash testimony was considerable, because it bore directly upon the issue of defendant's motive to kill the Bautistas. In light of the testimony that defendant had told others that he feared Maureen Bautista would inform Eddie Nash of defendant's whereabouts, evidence pertaining to Nash's past criminal conduct and violent reputation plainly was of substantial importance in explaining why defendant might have killed a close acquaintance and her son. Moreover, the trial court's limiting instruction rendered it unlikely that the testimony establishing defendant's former association with Nash would evoke an emotional bias against defendant. Although the Nash testimony might have been damaging to defendant, it was not unduly prejudicial. (See People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 637-638.) We conclude that, in admitting the Nash testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352, because it properly could find that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. Nor do we discern error in the trial court's failure to provide a more precise description of the weighing process it engaged in pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The parties argued at length the issue of alleged probative value versus prejudice. The trial court, after taking the matter under submission, denied defendant's motion to strike, stating: The Court accepts the arguments of the People regarding the offer of the testimony. The Court will consider a limiting instruction.... The record, including the trial court's comments, sufficiently establishes that the court weighed and rejected the arguments of defense counsel. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 660; People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 1016-1017.)