Opinion ID: 711207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Agent Lewis

Text: 35 Prior to trial, Warren Adams filed a motion for severance. The district court denied the motion but instructed the Government that it could not make reference to Warren Adams when presenting out-of-court statements uttered by Jones. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). 36 Despite the district court's ruling, during direct examination of Agent Lewis the following occurred: 37 Q: Did you speak to Mr. Jones in that March 2nd interview regarding the SWAT Great Western Bank Account? 38 A: Yes. 39 Q: And what Did Mr. Jones tell you? 40 A: He, he told me that when they took over SWAT, Mr. Adams had a SWAT Bank account at Great Western Bank. And that he told me-- 41 Following Agent Lewis' response, counsel for Warren Adams objected and moved for a mistrial. The district court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard any statement that Mr. Adams might have made or that Mr. Jones might have made about Mr. Adams. 42 On appeal, the Adamses and Jones maintain that the district court's decision not to grant a mistrial was error. They specifically contend that the prosecutor emphasized the Great Western account in her closing argument and that the Bruton violation cannot be viewed as harmless. Conversely, the Government maintains that if there was error, the error was harmless because other evidence presented at trial established that Warren Adams maintained a SWAT account at Great Western. 43 We hold that no Bruton violation occurred and that the district court's curative instruction sufficiently addressed the problem. No Bruton violation occurred because the statement was not facially incriminating. It was not facially incriminating because the reference to the bank account required linkage to other evidence. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) ([w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard evidence.). 44 Moreover, even if there was a Bruton violation, it was harmless. See United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1579 (11th Cir.1995) (Bruton violations subject to the harmless error doctrine). This statement was clearly harmless. First, the curative instruction immediately followed the statement. See United States v. Marolla, 766 F.2d 457, 460 (11th Cir.1985) ([t]he fact that the corrective instructions were contemporaneous with the out-of-court statements increases the effectiveness of the corrective instructions.). Second, the statement regarding Warren Adams having a SWAT bank account at Great Western was cumulative because other evidence showed that he had opened and maintained the account. Specifically, documentary evidence and the testimony of Charles McGuire demonstrated Adams' involvement with the account. Compare United States v. Key, 725 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (7th Cir.1984) (Bruton violation existed because codefendant's confession was the only evidence that defendant committed fraud). 45 Therefore, when the prejudicial effect of the statement is compared to the properly admitted evidence of guilt, it appears clear that there is no reasonable probability that the improper statement contributed to the conviction. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 1060, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1967).