Opinion ID: 1042347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Free Exercise and Equal Protection

Text: 3 This result is consistent with that in another of Williams‟s appeals that he identifies as a “related case.” See Williams v. Sec‟y Pa. Dep‟t of Corr., 450 F. App‟x 191 (3d Cir. 2011). In that case, we concluded that Williams‟s religious exercise was substantially burdened by a policy that required him to pray during work detail in a break room where inmates held disruptive conversations and tracked urine from the bathroom, that did not permit any “ritual or display,” and that thus did not permit Williams to prostrate himself as required during Islamic prayer. Id. at 195-196. That policy did more than “diminish the sacredness of the area” in which Williams prayed, Washington, 497 F.3d at 279, because it actually prevented him from praying in the required manner and thus forced him to “choose between offering prayers in the manner consistent with his religious beliefs and being disciplined[.]” Williams, 450 F. App‟x at 196. Such is not the case here because Williams does not allege that defendants‟ conduct interfered with the manner in which he prayed during Jumu‟ah in any way. 5 Williams‟s free exercise and equal protection claims required him to prove that defendants‟ conduct was not “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” under the four factors set forth in Turner. See DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see also id. at 61 (explaining that “Turner is equally applicable” to equal protection claims).4 The first Turner factor is whether there is “a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Williams argues that defendants‟ asserted penological interest in reasonably accommodating different religious beliefs is belied by the placement in the chapel of what he calls religion-specific symbols. But Williams‟s quarrel is not with the placement of the Christmas decorations in the chapel per se. Instead, his complaint is that defendants refused to allow their complete removal during Islamic services. And defendants‟ policy regarding the decorations during Islamic services was to permit the removal of the Christmas tree to the back of the chapel, the partial covering of the tree with a blackboard, the removal of the large wreaths from the chapel door and, until they became damaged, the smaller wreaths on the sides of the 4 We recently clarified that, although the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the prisoner, the defendants bear the initial burden of making a showing on the first Turner factor. See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 41. The District Court issued its decision before we decided Sharp and did not specifically address who bore the burden on this factor, but “[t]his burden is slight,” id., and the record leaves no doubt that defendants carried it here. 6 chapel as well. There is no genuine dispute that this conduct is rationally related to defendants‟ interest in reasonably accommodating different religions in the chapel. The second Turner factor is “whether inmates retain alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right.” DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51 (quoting Waterman, 183 F.3d at 213); see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Williams argues, quoting O‟Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987), that the Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]here are, of course, no alternative means of attending Jumu‟ah.” Id. at 351. As the Supreme Court immediately thereafter emphasized, however, this factor focuses on the inmate‟s ability to practice his or religion generally, not to engage in any religious activity in particular. See id. at 351-52; DeHart, 227 F.3d at 53-54. The record shows that Williams had ample alternative means of practicing Islam, including by praying in his cell and continuing to attend Jumu‟ah despite the partial presence of the decorations.5 The remaining Turner factors are the burden of accommodating the right and whether there are alternatives that could fully do so at a de minimis cost to valid penological interests. See DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91. Williams‟s primary argument on these factors is that they cannot weigh in defendants‟ favor because, after he filed his complaint in 2008, they stopped placing the Christmas 5 We reached the same conclusion in Williams‟s other appeal, in which we affirmed the judgment against him on his free exercise claim. See Williams, 450 F. App‟x at 195. 7 tree in the inter-faith chapel altogether.6 Defendants‟ subsequent conduct can be relevant to the last two Turner factors, see Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam), but the fact that defendants later decided to accommodate diversity of worship in a different way does not call into question the District Court‟s analysis of defendants‟ proffered reason for acting as they previously did. On this record, and given the deference due to prison officials in this context, see DeHart, 227 F.3d at 51, we agree that Williams has not adduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants‟ conduct was not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Our ruling is based solely on the record before us, and we express no opinion on whether reinstituting the former policy would pass constitutional muster.