Opinion ID: 1199986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause in this Case

Text: The operative facts of this case are these: the officers smelled marijuana being burned and, therefore, had probable cause to believe that a person within the motel room was committing an offense for which the legislature had prescribed a mandatory notice and summons procedure as to which custodial arrest was prohibited, i.e., section 18-18-406(1) & (2). [4] The police were in possession of no other information that would tend to show that Mendez possessed or was using drugs of a type or quantity that would trigger a jailable offense. Application of the exigent circumstances exception in the context of a home entry, said the Court in Welsh, should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753, 104 S.Ct. 2091 (emphasis added). Unless we are to read Welsh and Miller out of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, we must take into account the gravity of the offense that the police officers had probable cause to suspect under the circumstances known to them. [5] Unfortunately, the trial court and the majority, in my view, permit the police officers here  and others in similar circumstances  to indulge in the speculation and suspicion that a greater drug offense was being committed and that evidence of that offense might be destroyed. The majority states, for instance, that the potential gravity of the offense here was greater than that in Welsh. See maj. op. at 283. This approach effectively reverses the burdens imposed by the Fourth Amendment. It permits the prosecution to meet its burden other than through the facts objectively known to the police, contrary to the Fourth Amendment: Once the defendant has presented evidence that he was arrested without a warrant, the burden shifts to the prosecution.... The prosecution must prove two things: that there was probable cause to search, and that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry. These two requirements are determined by evaluating the facts known at the time of the warrantless entry and search. Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057 (citing People v. Jansen, 713 P.2d 907, 911 (Colo.1985)). In sum, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that there was probable cause to believe that more than a minor amount of marijuana was present in Room 209. It did not do so here. Once it is established that the police lacked probable cause to believe that more than a minor amount of marijuana was present in Room 209, the result of this case is clear to me. Our legislature has prescribed a $100 fine for the offense the police officers could have reasonably suspected Mendez of committing. The fact that the legislature authorized only non-custodial arrest, and prescribed a notice and summons procedure by which to initiate prosecution, underscores the legislature's determination that this offense is minor, triggering the application of Welsh and Miller. Taking into account this legislative background leads me to conclude that Welsh prohibits the very actions the police took here: the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an arrest, and ... one that can be easily identified both by the courts and by officers faced with a decision to arrest is the penalty attached to the offense. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. A real threat of evidence destruction related to this de minimus possession offense may have existed in this case, depending upon whether Mendez had heard the police radios in the hall and therefore would have been alerted to flush evidence down the toilet. [6] Nonetheless, the issue here, as in Welsh, is whether the threat of destruction of evidence related to this type of minor, non-jailable offense justified a warrantless entry.