Opinion ID: 2330342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the evidence question.

Text: Appellant proffered to prove that a witness, as a result of a conversation with Albina Altevogt, could testify that she [the witness] knows that [Albina Altevogt] was acting on behalf of the children [in procuring the deed from appellant], two of whom are defendants in this case, and that she [the witness] knows the reasons why this deed, which is in controversy here was executed. This proffer was rejected by the chancellor. The proffer, as it is worded and presented to us, leaves us little to rule upon. Albina is not a party to the suit. The witness' testimony, apparently, was offered upon the theory that it was an admission by the agent of the appellees, and therefore should have been received against them. The first portion of the proffer is an attempt to establish the fact of agency. We have held above that appellees' answer disclosed a ratification by appellees of Albina's actions in their behalf; consequently no harm resulted to appellant by a refusal of this part of the proffer, even if it were, in fact, admissible. In addition, it is well-established law that an alleged agent's own declarations are insufficient to establish his agency, Whittle v. Brown, 217 Md. 161, 167, although they may become admissible to impeach his testimony, if he takes the stand. 4 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1078. The record extract makes no attempt to date the alleged conversation between the witness and Albina. And, even though it might be very interesting to learn this witness' version of the reasons why this deed    was executed, the proffer makes no showing that these reasons have any bearing whatsoever upon the issues here involved. Litigation is necessarily expensive; it would, indeed, be unfortunate if a case were reversed on the assumption that a witness' testimony, offered under a broadly worded proffer such as we have here, would be to a certain effect, only to discover, when the witness testifies, that the testimony has no relevance to the issues involved. We hold that the chancellor was correct in rejecting the above proffer. From what we have said above, it is seen that the chancellor closed the doors of the equity court to appellant's request for relief, holding that the unclean hands doctrine was applicable. He made no other findings of fact and stated no other conclusions of law; consequently, we shall neither affirm nor reverse, but remand the case for further proceedings, which will include the right of both sides to take additional testimony, if they so desire. Judgment neither affirmed nor reversed, and case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, costs to abide the result.