Opinion ID: 807543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Thompson's Prior Arrest

Text: Thompson first argues that evidence of a prior arrest for drug trafficking was improperly admitted as character evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the -17- character, but allows this evidence for other purposes, such as to show knowledge or intent. The evidence at issue is a transcript of a telephone call between Thompson and DeLeo, in which Thompson discusses Tri Cam Le, who was trafficking cocaine for Thompson, having been stopped on the interstate and found to be in possession of 2.2 kilos. In that call, Thompson tells DeLeo that Le's bond is really low, and says: Yeah. Donna said it was 50,000, they, hell they caught me with six grams. They caught me with six grams and charged me a 100,000 bond. We first note that this statement might not be character evidence at all, and Federal Rule Evidence 403 might thus be more apt to analyze its admissibility. Even assuming the statement was character evidence, however, it was not inadmissible. The government introduced the statement as evidence of Thompson's intent to distribute illegal drugs, to refute Thompson's and DeLeo's defense that they were ignorant of Le's drug trafficking activities. The quoted statement shows Thompson's knowledge of the drug trafficking business. [E]vidence of prior possession of drugs, even in an amount consistent only with personal use, is admissible to show such things as knowledge and intent of a defendant charged with a crime in which intent to distribute drugs is an element. Franklin, 250 F.3d at 658 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the district court gave a limiting instruction to the jury, reminding the jurors that even if you find that Mr. Thompson may have committed a similar act in the past, this is not evidence that he committed such an act in this case. . . . [Y]ou may consider the evidence of the prior act only on the issue of knowledge. This limiting instruction further minimized any danger that the jury would interpret Thompson's statement merely as character evidence, and there was no error in allowing the government to introduce it. -18-