Opinion ID: 802823
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Adjustment For Aggravated Felony

Text: Conviction Ramos’s challenge to the enhancement of his sentence based on his prior conviction for a “crime of violence” requires us to apply the current Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of that term. The Guidelines’ Application notes define a “crime of violence” to include “burglary of a dwelling” and any other “offense under federal, state, or local law that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iii); Aguila-Montes, 655 F.3d at 919. As explained in the previous section, because the residual clause of this definition focuses on the “use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force” against a person, Becker’s holding regarding crimes involving a mere risk of physical force is no longer applicable. [2] Instead, we must look to whether Ramos’s burglary conviction qualified as a “burglary of a dwelling.” The 7312 UNITED STATES v. RAMOS-MEDINA Supreme Court has held that the generic definition of burglary “ha[s] the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990). As described above, we held in Aguila-Montes that a conviction for burglary under California Penal Code § 459 does not categorically fall within that definition because “California’s definition of ‘unlawful or unprivileged entry,’ unlike the generic definition, permits a conviction for burglary of a structure open to the public and of a structure that the defendant is licensed or privileged to enter.” 655 F.3d at 944. Because a conviction under California Penal Code § 459 is not categorically a “burglary of a dwelling” constituting a “crime of violence,” we must therefore apply the modified categorical approach to determine whether Ramos was in fact convicted of all the elements of generic burglary. See id. at 945-46. We conclude that he was. We therefore affirm the district court’s application of the crime of violence sentence enhancement. The modified categorical approach “ ‘permit[s] the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction’ ” and look at the judicial records of the defendant’s prior conviction. Id. at 920 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). When a defendant is convicted in conjunction with a guilty plea, the sentencing court may look to “the statement of factual basis for the charge . . . shown by a transcript of plea colloquy or by written plea agreement presented to the court.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 20 (2005) (internal citation omitted). When a defendant stipulates during his plea colloquy that a police report, probation report or similar document contains the factual basis for his plea, the court may also examine the incorporated document. See id.; United States v. AlmazanBecerra, 537 F.3d 1094, 1097-1100 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2006). In applying the modified categorical approach, the court may take into account only facts on which the defendant’s UNITED STATES v. RAMOS-MEDINA 7313 conviction “necessarily rested.” Aguila-Montes, 655 F.3d at 935-36. That does not mean, however, that courts are limited only to facts that show an element of the offense. Id. at 93640. As long as the prosecution’s theory of the case made proof of a given fact “necessary” to the defendant’s conviction, that fact is within the scope of the modified categorical approach, irrespective of whether the fact is directly relevant to an element of the offense or merely incidental. Id. [3] During Ramos’s plea colloquy, Ramos and his attorney confirmed that the admissions in Ramos’s probation report formed the factual basis of Ramos’s guilty plea. Ramos admitted to gaining entry to his neighbor’s apartment through a window without permission or privilege, stealing some jewelry, and fleeing out the window when the neighbor returned. These facts demonstrate that the neighbor’s apartment was not open to the public and that Ramos was not licensed or privileged to enter the apartment. Because Ramos’s conviction for burglary “necessarily rested” on facts showing that he made an unlawful or unprivileged entry into the apartment with intent to commit a crime, Aguila-Montes, 655 F.3d at 941, we conclude that Ramos was convicted of a “burglary of a dwelling,” which is a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, the district court’s application of a sixteen-level sentencing enhancement was not erroneous. C. Sentencing Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility The Sentencing Guidelines allow district courts to grant a two-level downward adjustment to a defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of showing that he has accepted responsibility for his actions. Cortes, 299 F.3d at 1038 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)). Ramos argues that the district court erroneously interpreted the Sentencing Guidelines to forbid a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility when a defendant pleads not 7314 UNITED STATES v. RAMOS-MEDINA guilty and goes to trial. We disagree with Ramos’s characterization of the district court’s decision. The district court did not base its denial of the adjustment on Ramos’s decision to put the government to its proof alone, but searched Ramos’s conduct as a whole to determine whether he nevertheless accepted responsibility. We hold that this analysis met the standard described in our previous cases. [4] A guilty plea is one way a defendant can demonstrate acceptance of responsibility, but it is not the only way. Cortes, 299 F.3d at 1038. A defendant’s right to contest his guilt before a jury is protected by the Constitution, and his decision to do so “cannot be held against him.” Id. (citing United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, a defendant who puts the government to its proof may still be eligible for a downward adjustment if, and only if, he has “otherwise demonstrated sincere contrition.” Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2 (2007); Ochoa-Gaytan, 265 F.3d at 842-43; United States v. McKinney, 15 F.3d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1994). We decided Ochoa-Gaytan, Cortes, and McKinney before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory. 543 U.S. at 245. Booker makes the rule we announced in those cases less urgent, for a defendant’s sentence now ultimately depends on the district court’s judgment, not on the defendant’s eligibility for certain sentencing range adjustments prescribed by the Guidelines. Apart from the calculation of the appropriate range under the advisory Guidelines, the sentencing court may consider acceptance of responsibility separately in imposing a sentence, even if the court determined that the defendant did not qualify for a formal adjustment on those grounds under the Guidelines. This case was an example of that. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (listing grounds for departing from the otherwise-recommended range); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing factors on which district courts may base a below-Guidelines sentence). As described above, the district court imposed a sentence substantially UNITED STATES v. RAMOS-MEDINA 7315 below the advisory guideline range in part because of Ramos’s admissions. Nevertheless, we continue to review whether the district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range as the first step in our review of criminal sentences. See United States v. Barsumyan, 517 F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). Pursuant to this task, we review how district courts have applied the acceptance of responsibility adjustment. See, e.g., United States v. Garrido, 596 F.3d 613, 617-18 (9th Cir. 2010). We vacated the sentence in Ochoa-Gaytan because we concluded that the district court denied an acceptance of responsibility adjustment based on the defendant’s decision to contest the evidence against him at trial. 265 F.3d at 842. The court ignored the fact that “at the time of [the defendant’s] arrest, he did admit . . . his [immigration] status,” and “made no findings concerning whether Ochoa-Gaytan demonstrated contrition.” Id. at 842, 844 (internal quotations omitted). Instead, it took into account only the fact that the defendant “moved to suppress his statements. He went to trial. The issue was factual guilt. It wasn’t to protect or preserve some constitutional issues. I mean, it’s been an all-out attack on his conviction. And I don’t see how 3E1.1. acceptance applies. Basically, that is a whole guideline inducement to facilitate pleading guilty and to sweeten the pot. ... [L]egally, I do not believe in any way that this adjustment applies on this kind of case. . . .” Id. at 842 (quoting the district court; alterations in OchoaGaytan). On appeal, we concluded that the district court mistakenly applied a per se bar against downward adjustment based on the defendant’s decision to go to trial. Id. at 844. 7316 UNITED STATES v. RAMOS-MEDINA Similarly, we concluded that the same mistake had been made in Cortes. 299 F.3d at 1039. The sentencing court had stated: “In terms of acceptance of responsibility, I also find that’s a legal issue, and that the defendant in putting into question, and determination by the jury, the issue of . . . specific intent . . . . And this Court does not believe it is appropriate to award him any points for acceptance of responsibility.” Id. (quoting the district court). Because it appeared that “the district court may have believed, as a matter of law, that Cortes was ineligible for the reduction,” we vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded “to allow the district court to fully explicate the issue in the first instance.” Id. [5] In this case, the district court did not make the same mistake of law. It noted the fact that “this case went to a full blown jury trial,” but it also took into account other relevant considerations, including the fact in Ramos’s favor that “upon apprehension Mr. Ramos did admit the elements of the conviction.” It based its final decision on “the facts of this case and on this particular record” as a whole. This was the correct analytical approach. See Cortes, 299 F.3d at 1038. Moreover, the district court’s ultimate decision that Petitioner had not adequately accepted responsibility was not clearly erroneous. “[A] defendant who . . . frivolously contests[ ] relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A). Ramos contested the fact and validity of his deportation at trial. The district court asked Ramos’s counsel not to pursue this line of argument any further because it “r[an] afoul of the in-limine motion order with respect to the deportation order” and was not supported by any “offer of proof.” In addition, Ramos disputed during trial and in a motion for judgment of acquittal that he UNITED STATES v. RAMOS-MEDINA 7317 ever re-entered the United States. The court denied the motion, holding that “[t]he evidence is rather overwhelming that . . . the defendant was detected and detained” in the United States. On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Ramos’s actions were inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. Accordingly, we affirm Ramos’s sentence. AFFIRMED.