Opinion ID: 4241107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Investigative Exemption

Text: The antitrust exemption incorporated into the Freedom of Information Act relied on by the Attorney General must be viewed in the context of his powers and duties under the Antitrust Act. In investigating a suspected violation in the form of a monopoly, restraint of trade or illegal bidding process, the Attorney General is authorized under W.Va. Code, 47-18­ 7(a) [1978], of the Antitrust Act to “administer oaths or affirmations, and may subpoena witnesses, compel their attendance, adduce evidence, and require the production of any 12 matter which is relevant to the investigation.” The Attorney General may direct a local prosecutor to assist him. Remedies for violations of the Act include injunctive relief, a penalty and treble damages. Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 47-18-16 [1978], the Antitrust Act “shall be construed liberally and in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes.” A necessary component of the Antitrust Act is the investigative exemption set forth in W.Va. Code, 47-18-7(d) [1978], which states: “The attorney general shall not make public the name or identity of a person whose acts or conduct he investigates pursuant to this section or the facts disclosed in the investigation, but this subsection does not apply to disclosures in actions or enforcement proceedings pursuant to this article.” As the parties agree, the Antitrust Act’s investigative exemption is incorporated in the Freedom of Information Act through W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(a)(5) [2015], i.e., information “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.”10 10 The comparable federal statute to the nondisclosure provisions of W.Va. Code, 47-18-7(d) [1978], is subsection (h) of 15 U.S.C. § 18a. [2000] concerning “premerger notification.” Subsection (h) states in part: Any information or documentary material filed with the Assistant Attorney General or the Federal Trade Commission pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of Title 5 [regarding public information], and no such information or documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding. 13 In the November 25, 2014, confidentiality agreement executed by St. Mary’s, Cabell Huntington and the Attorney General, the statutory investigative exemption was expressly relied upon: The Transaction [merger] Information covered by this Agreement shall be treated by the Attorney General as if such Transaction Information were received pursuant to W.Va. Code § 47-18-7, whether received directly from [Cabell Huntington, St. Mary’s and/or the FTC], before or after the execution of this Agreement, and the Attorney General agrees not to disclose such Transaction Information to any person or entity except as expressly provided in this Agreement or W.Va. Code § 47-18-7.11 In Associated Press v. Canterbury, 224 W.Va. 708, 688 S.E.2d 317 (2009), this Court held that certain e-mails of a personal nature withheld by a public official from a FOIA request were not subject to disclosure. We determined that the e-mails were irrelevant to the conduct of public business and found the e-mails comparable to a note scheduling a family dinner or a private letter from a friend. We concluded, in Canterbury, that the e-mails were not “a public record” under the Freedom of Information Act. With regard to the disclosure of information to the public, this Court has recognized “the close relationship between the federal and West Virginia FOIA.” Farley v. Worley, 215 W.Va. at 420, 599 S.E.2d at 843. 11 In syllabus point 5 of Hechler v. Casey, 175 W.Va. 434, 333 S.E.2d 799 (1985), we recognized that “[a]n agreement as to confidentiality between the public body and the supplier of the information may not override the Freedom of Information Act, W.Va. Code, 29B-1-1 et seq.” However, our holding in these consolidated appeals is not based on the November 25, 2014, confidentiality agreement. Rather, our holding is based on the Attorney General’s statutory investigative exemption incorporated in the Freedom of Information Act through W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(a)(5). 14 In Canterbury, the status of the e-mails was determined by a “content analysis” of what the e-mails actually said, rather than a “context analysis” which could have warranted disclosure under FOIA based on the interest of the general public in the e-mails. However, we acknowledged in Canterbury that our cases permit a context-based analysis for writings that are, in fact, public records, “but which are specifically exempted from disclosure by FOIA.” 224 W.Va. at 725 n. 18, 688 S.E.2d at 334 n. 18. In other words, a context-based analysis can be applied in determining whether public records are to be disclosed pursuant to a FOIA request, but the determination is subject to the specific exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act listed in W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4 [2015].12 At the time Canterbury was decided, “public record” was defined in W.Va. Code, 29B-1-2 [1977], as “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public’s business, prepared, owned and retained by a public body.” The later 2015 and 2016 versions of the statute, however, define “public record” as “any writing containing information prepared or received by a public body, the content or context of which, judged either by content or context, relates to the conduct of the public’s business.” (emphasis added) 12 See Farley v. Worley, 215 W.Va. at 419-25, 599 S.E.2d at 842-48 (2004) (decided under the 1977 version of the statute but making clear that a public body cannot simply refuse a FOIA request without specific justification.). 15 The “content” versus “context” distinction per se is less significant in this proceeding because the Attorney General relies on the express investigative exemption set forth in the Antitrust Act. Although that exemption is broad based, it has its own statutory exceptions or caveats as indicated below. Prior to Steel’s FOIA request, a description of the merger and its prospective operation were set forth in the original and amended Assurances of Voluntary Compliance. The Assurances were publically filed by the Attorney General pursuant to statute. See n. 3, supra. After the FOIA request, the Attorney General provided Steel with copies of a number of documents relating to the merger. Later, upon analyzing the Vaughn Index, Steel agreed that in excess of 200 documents were exempt from disclosure. Thereafter, the circuit court ordered the disclosure of the Vaughn Index itself, as a sanction, and the 89 documents listed therein. Among the 89 documents ordered disclosed were the original bidding documents that were submitted to St. Mary’s by other hospital systems and other interested buyers. Those documents reveal the identity of the bidder, the amount of the bid and detailed bid specifications. Of the documents in question under the FOIA request, the parties’ primary focus is on the bidding documents. St. Mary’s asserts that the disclosure of the bidding documents would give its competitors an unfair business advantage whether or not the 16 merger takes place. Steel asserts that it needed to present the bidding documents to the Health Care Authority. In December 2015, however, Steel unsuccessfully petitioned this Court for mandamus relief to obtain the bidding documents. During that proceeding, the Authority indicated that, for its purposes, the original bidding documents were irrelevant. See n. 8, supra. The Antitrust Act, however, provides the Attorney General with an independent interest in the bidding documents. Pursuant to W.Va. Code, 47-18-3(b)(2) [1978], the following activities are unlawful: A contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more persons whereby, in the letting of any public or private contract: (A) The price quotation of any bid is fixed or controlled; or (B) One or more persons submits a bid intending it to be higher than another bid and thus complementary thereto, submits a bid intending it to be substantially identical to another bid, or refrains from the submission of a bid. Consequently, the bidding process and its associated documents are within the scope of the Attorney General’s investigative powers and, specifically, the investigative exemption of the Antitrust Act, W.Va. Code, 47-18-7(d) [1978].13 13 To be clear, the Antitrust Act’s investigative exemption, incorporated in the Freedom of Information Act through W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(a)(5) [2015], is to be distinguished from the investigation-related FOIA exemption set forth in W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(a)(4) [2015], which exempts: “Records of law-enforcement agencies that deal with the detection and investigation of crime and the internal records and notations of such law-enforcement agencies which are maintained for internal use in matters relating 17 Steel’s FOIA request to obtain “all public records and incoming and outgoing correspondence relating to the proposed merger” directly implicates the Attorney General’s investigative exemption. We hold that the West Virginia Freedom of Information Act, W.Va. Code, 29B-1-4(a)(5) [2015], which excepts from public accessibility “information specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” incorporates the investigative exemption from disclosure of information set forth in the West Virginia Antitrust Act, W.Va. Code, 47­ 18-7(d) [1978]. The investigative exemption is mandatory in specifying that the Attorney General “shall not” make public the name or identity of a person whose acts or conduct he investigates or “the facts” disclosed in the investigation. Nevertheless, the Legislature has provided an exception or caveat in that the investigative exemption in W.Va. Code, 47-18­ 7(d) [1978], “does not apply to disclosures in actions or enforcement proceedings pursuant to this article.” An additional caveat pertains to the Assurance of Voluntary Compliance which must be publically filed pursuant to W.Va. Code, 47-18-22 [1978]. However, in the current matter, the Assurances of Voluntary Compliance concerning the merger provided that, in the event the Attorney General were to request further information, the request would be deemed “made in the investigation of a potential violation of state and/or federal antitrust laws and to law enforcement.” See, e.g., Ogden Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Williamstown, 192 W.Va. 648, 453 S.E.2d 631 (1994) (discussing subsection (4) in the context of a police incident report). Subsection (4) is not relevant to the current matter. 18 as such both the request and any response thereto, including documents or things produced, are subject to confidentiality provisions contained in state and/or federal law.” This Court finds W.Va. Code, 47-18-7(d) [1978], to be free from ambiguity in its admonition that the Attorney General “shall not” make public the name or identity of a person whose acts or conduct he investigates or “the facts” disclosed in the investigation. Syllabus point 2 of Crockett v. Andrews, 153 W.Va. 714, 172 S.E.2d 384 (1970), makes clear: “Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, its plain meaning is to be accepted and applied without resort to interpretation.” Accord syl. pt. 5, Leggett v. EQT Prod. Co., 239 W.Va. 264, 800 S.E.2d 850, cert. denied, 138 S.Ct. 472 (2017). See syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. W.Va. Pub. Employees Ins. Bd., 171 W.Va. 445, 300 S.E.2d 86 (1982) (“It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.”); accord, syl. pt. 10, Thomas v. McDermitt, 232 W.Va. 159, 751 S.E.2d 264 (2013). A denial of the full import of the Attorney General’s statutory exemption would place investigations of illegal conduct under the Antitrust Act at a disadvantage and would be contrary to the public’s interest in the enforcement of the law. We therefore reverse the 19 October 28, 2016, order which directed the Attorney General to produce the 89 documents.14