Opinion ID: 2612476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Upon the Same Terms Equally

Text: The 1987 legislative act, although on its face applying only to ORS chapter 419 parental terminations, addresses an action identical to the first-step in ORS chapter 109 adoptions. In both proceedings, a trial judge may invoke the state's power permanently to terminate parental rights of birth parents. There is no question that giving an indigent parent an opportunity to receive assistance of appointed counsel to protect parental rights is a privilege within the meaning of the Article I, section 20, guarantee. That a person's parental rights are challenged in an ORS chapter 419 proceeding, as opposed to an ORS chapter 109 proceeding, is of no practical consequence to that parent. The challenge is the same in both proceedings  a challenge to presently enjoyed parental rights. ORS 109.430 confirms this similarity by expressly recognizing that adoption is based upon the legal termination of parental rights. At the time of the decree of adoption in this case, the elements of a parental default justifying termination were similar. See Or. Laws 1989, ch. 907, § 2. They still are, except that one statute permits termination after six month's neglect, the other requires a year. We conclude that the scope of the constitution's qualifying words, upon the same terms, in the context of this case, would cover all parents threatened by permanent termination of parental rights. The Zockerts make no contention that the termination of parental rights under a chapter 419 proceeding is inherently or factually distinguishable from a parental rights termination under chapter 109. That is, they do not contend that the legislature had in mind a distinction between the two proceedings when it provided a mechanism for assuring the right to counsel in one type of termination but was silent as to the other. Nonetheless, in the interest of complete analysis, we consider whether such a distinction was made. The state is involved similarly in both proceedings. A state agency, Children's Services Division, plays a significant role in adoptions under ORS 109.310(4) and 109.316, and also serves the juvenile court under chapter 419. No distinction may be founded upon the fact that a private person initiates an adoption. Under ORS 419.482, parental terminations need not be initiated by the state. No other reasonable and relevant distinction between the two proceedings to terminate parental rights occurs to us within the context of the Article I, section 20, claim made by father in this case. As noted above, the 1987 legislature consciously chose to declare that assistance of counsel is part of the process due to a parent threatened with permanent termination of parental rights. If the legislature had intended to create a case-by-case right of counsel, it knew how to do so. The legislature distinguished in just that fashion between parental terminations and other less drastic governmental intrusions in family matters. Compare ORS 419.525(2) with ORS 419.498(2)(d) (in juvenile court hearings, [c]ounsel shall be appointed for the parent or legal guardian whenever the nature of the proceedings and due process so require   ). Instead, the legislature went beyond the mandate of Lassiter by ensuring aid of counsel to all indigent parents faced with a chapter 419 termination proceeding. There is no indication that those parental terminations which are the first stage of a statutory adoption proceeding were called to the legislature's attention when it made the aid of counsel universally available in chapter 419 terminations. Legislative omission to amend a related statute  i.e., legislative silence  is not, in this instance, an indication that the legislature intended to except parental rights terminations sought via adoptions from its decision that assistance of counsel is part of the process due when a parental termination is sought under ORS 419.525. [12] No governmental policy choice can be said to support the unequal treatment, because no policy choice was made. This is, therefore, not a case where we are asked to apply Article I, section 20, to a class created by the challenged law itself, see Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387, 397, 788 P.2d 435 (1990), nor to a class composed of persons who are not otherwise identifiable until they are injured, see Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 525, 783 P.2d 506 (1989). Instead, parents are identifiable, apart from any statute, by their personal characteristics as such. See Hale v. Port of Portland, supra, 308 Or. at 525, 783 P.2d 506. Even if one refines the description of parents by limiting the group to those parents who are threatened with permanent loss of their parental rights, we need not resort to the language of a statute to sort them out from the mass. Parenthood, a personal characteristic, identifies each and every one. Parents are entitled to be treated upon the same terms, equally, under Article I, section 20.