Opinion ID: 2159195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Charge Lesser-Included Offense of Aggravated Manslaughter

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to charge the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter deprived him of a fair trial and due process of law. Prior to summations in the guilt phase of the case, there was a colloquy between the trial court and counsel concerning the proposed jury charge. Initially, except for the prosecutor's inquiry to confirm that a charge concerning flight would be given, neither counsel submitted requests to charge to the court. The trial court then informed counsel that he did not intend to charge the jury on any lesser-included offenses, citing State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295 (1985). In response, defense counsel specifically requested a charge of aggravated manslaughter. The trial court denied the requested charge. Before us defendant first argues that the trial court incorrectly relied on State v. Choice as its source for the standard to apply in determining whether or not to charge aggravated manslaughter. In Choice we observed that when a defendant does not request a lesser included offense charge, [t]he trial court does not    have the obligation on its own meticulously to sift through the entire record in every murder trial to see if some combination of facts and inferences might rationally sustain a manslaughter charge. It is only when the facts clearly indicate the appropriateness of that charge that the duty of the trial court arises. [98 N.J. at 299.] The State concedes that since defense counsel requested the aggravated manslaughter charge, the Choice standard is inapplicable, and thus agrees with defendant's assertion that the controlling principles are set forth in State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265 (1986): [U]nder our Code it is improper for a trial court to charge manslaughter, even when requested by the defendant, if there is no evidence in the record to support a manslaughter conviction. To warrant the charge, there must be a rational basis for a manslaughter verdict.            [T]he rational-basis test of the Code imposes a low threshold, as did the pre-Code law    for permitting a charge on a lesser-included offense. When the lesser-included offense charge is requested by a defendant, as in this case, the trial court is obligated, in view of defendant's interest, to examine the record thoroughly to determine if the rational-basis standard has been satisfied. [102 N.J. at 276, 278 (citations omitted).] Defendant contends that although no defense witnesses were called in the guilt phase of the trial, evidence adduced during the State's case afforded a rational basis for the jury to conclude that defendant's fear and panic upon being approached by [Officer Garaffa] led him to mishandle the sawed-off shotgun and recklessly cause the officer's death. Defendant points to the testimony of his companion on the night of the shooting, Gerald Cuccolo, who confirmed that he was surprised and shocked when defendant shot Officer Garaffa, and to the testimony of Debra Wolfe that when defendant called her after the shooting, [h]e was crying and he was nervous. Primarily, however, defendant relies on the testimony of Trooper Gary Knight of the New Jersey State Police, who questioned defendant when he turned himself in. Trooper Knight testified that defendant told him that he reached into the sack and when he pulled it out of the sack it apparently had cocked and when it came out of the sack the gun went off striking the police officer in [the] abdomen. Supra at 472. Although defense counsel in his opening statement stated that [defendant] shot Officer Garaffa in an instantaneous act of fear and panic, the only direct testimony on this point came from Irvington police detective Eugene Czaplinski, who had interrogated Rose. Detective Czaplinski testified that he asked Rose, Why did you shoot the officer?, and defendant replied: I panicked, did not want to get caught. The State argues that Trooper Knight's testimony is simply a paraphrase of defendant's statement to him, that defendant never told Trooper Knight that the gun was fired accidentally, [2] and that the phrases apparently had cocked, and the gun went off were vague acknowledgments of guilt that omitted any explanation of how the hammer became cocked or how the shotgun was fired. The State asserts that defendant's written statement describing the shooting, given to Czaplinski and other Irvington police officers, refutes any possible suggestion that the shooting was accidental: I reached into the bag and as I reached into the bag I cocked the shotgun by pulling back the hammer with my thumb. I just looked at him and just fired the gun. The State also relies heavily on the uncontradicted testimony of its ballistic expert, Kenneth Salvato. He testified that the shotgun could not be fired accidentally; that to fire the weapon required a two-step procedure  cocking the hammer and pulling the trigger; and that approximately 4 1/4 pounds of pressure was required to pull the trigger. We have carefully scrutinized the record and independently reviewed all of the testimony pertinent to the requested lesser-included-offense charge. In our view the evidence would not have afforded the jury a rational basis for returning a verdict convicting the defendant of aggravated manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8e; State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), supra, 102 N.J. at 275. The Code defines aggravated manslaughter as follows: Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when the actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life. [ N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a.] Under the Code, one acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3). By contrast, conduct is knowing, with respect to a result, if the person is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2); it is purposeful, if it is the person's conscious object to cause such a result. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1). Defendant's principal contention is that aggravated manslaughter should have been charged because there was some evidence in the record suggesting that the shooting was accidental and not intentional. We find that the overwhelming weight of the proofs in the guilt phase establish that defendant's act of firing the shotgun was volitional. Defendant's familiarity with the operation of the shotgun and its destructive capacity was illustrated by evidence that he had practiced shooting it on several occasions during the weeks preceding the homicide. His use of the words and this as he fired the shotgun, his graphically candid statement to detective Czaplinski that I just looked at him and just fired the gun, and the uncontradicted testimony of the ballistics expert concerning the pressure required to pull the trigger combine to demonstrate that whatever may have prompted defendant to fire the shotgun, the defendant's conduct in firing the weapon was intentional and not accidental. In the context of all the guilt-phase testimony, defendant's statement to Trooper Knight could not rationally be construed as an assertion that the shooting was accidental. Rather, as argued by the State, the statement reflected an acknowledgment of defendant's responsibility for the shooting without any explanation of how it occurred. It constituted far too speculative and insubstantial a basis for a manslaughter verdict. Hence, the trial court's refusal to charge the jury with the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter, on the assumption that the jury could have concluded the shooting occurred accidentally, was not error since the evidence during the guilt phase did not afford a rational basis for such a jury verdict. Defendant's collateral argument that the shooting occurred because he panicked, and did not want to get caught does not relate to the question of volition nor negate the evidence that the shooting was knowing or purposeful. Panic is an emotional condition, characterized by sudden, even groundless, fright. It does not constitute a justification for conduct pursuant to the Code, see N.J.S.A. 2C:3-1 to -11 (codifying valid defenses, panic not included), nor was panic recognized as a defense to crime at common law. Further, defendant's panic at the time of the shooting was not offered as evidence in the guilt phase of a mental defect to prove diminished capacity, i.e., that defendant did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2; see State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 607-09 (1987). [3] Our dissenting colleagues assert that because of defendant's panic, his state of mind may have been reckless, rather than knowing or purposeful, with respect to the result of the shooting of Officer Garaffa. Their contention is that even if the firing of the shotgun was intentional, the record afforded the jury a rational basis for concluding that defendant's conduct was prompted by panic, and therefore defendant recklessly caused Officer Garaffa's death, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a, by consciously disregarding the substantial risk that death would result from the firing of the shotgun. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3). Post at 550-553, 554-560 (Handler, J. dissenting); post at 549, 550 (Wilentz, C.J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Handler hypothesizes that defendant's blind panic may have prevented him from realizing how close he was to Officer Garaffa or that the weapon was aimed at the officer's abdomen, and that he may have acted without thinking about the consequences of his actions. Post at 557 (Handler, J., dissenting). Our colleagues' position ignores the reality that in the absence of insanity or diminished capacity, a person firing a sawed-off shotgun into the abdomen of another at point-blank range necessarily is aware that it is practically certain that such conduct will cause the victim's death. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). Their position also appears to accord undue significance to an isolated reference to panic that appears once in the guilt-phase trial record. As noted, Detective Czaplinski testified that defendant, when asked why he shot Officer Garaffa, responded: I panicked, did not want to get caught. There was no other testimony in the guilt phase from defendant or any other witness that suggested that defendant was unaware of the inevitable consequence of firing the shotgun at Officer Garaffa's abdomen. There was no testimony, expert or otherwise, in the guilt phase that this defendant's capacity to be aware of the inevitable result of his conduct was diminished because of a mental or emotional condition. Hence, an aggravated manslaughter charge would have invited the jury to speculate, in the absence of evidence of defendant's mental processes, about whether defendant's panic interfered in some manner with his capacity to be aware of the consequences of his act. There simply was no evidence put before the jury in the guilt phase that would have supported such a determination. Defendant's statement that he panicked, did not want to get caught, does not constitute a rational basis for a jury to conclude that defendant was merely reckless and thus unaware that firing the shotgun into Officer Garaffa's abdomen was practically certain to cause his death. We therefore find no error in the trial court's refusal to charge aggravated manslaughter. [4]