Opinion ID: 2198880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: (A.) Assumption of risks.

Text: Defendant contends that plaintiff assumed the risk of being struck by defendant's ball by voluntarily exposing himself to a position of danger. He contends that plaintiff saw, or should have seen, defendant on the fairway; that it was clear from the evidence that plaintiff received adequate warning that defendant was about to strike the ball and that by placing himself in a position of danger under such circumstances he necessarily assumed the risks incidental thereto. A golfer assumes the obvious and ordinary risks incidental to the use of the golf course, but he does not assume a risk which cannot be reasonably anticipated and which may be the result of the negligent act of another. Brady v. Kane, Fla., 111 So.2d 472; Benjamin v. Nernberg, 102 Pa. Super. 471, 157 A. 10. Usually this doctrine is not applicable unless there was knowledge, express or implied, of the existence of the risk with a corresponding appreciation of the extent of the danger. Lewis v. Vermont Gas Corp., 121 Vt. 168, 151 A.2d 297; Cummings v. General Motors Corp., 146 Conn. 443, 151 A.2d 884. With such knowledge of the circumstances, plaintiff must have voluntarily exposed himself to the danger. Brady v. Kane, supra. See Prosser on Torts (2d ed.), 309, 311. In this case, according to the testimony most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff did not even see defendant and had no knowledge of his presence until after the injury. We do not see how it can be said under such circumstances that plaintiff voluntarily exposed himself to a danger which he did not know existed. (B.) Plaintiff's contributory negligence other than allegations treated under assumption of risks. Defendant contends that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and that such negligence exposed plaintiff to the risk of being injured and contributed to the accident. Defendant says that this negligence consisted of plaintiff's failure to look around and observe how many golfers were playing on the course at that particular time and in not wearing his glasses, particularly where he was having hearing difficulties. The trial judge found that the injury was caused by defendant's failure to give plaintiff adequate and timely warning. He stated that but for this failure, the accident would not have occurred. Plaintiff was required to make reasonable use of his faculties and to discover any dangers or any conditions to which he might become exposed. His responsibility is that of an ordinary prudent person under similar conditions. See citations in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 11, note 10. But a failure to look for any danger when there is no reason to apprehend any is not contributory negligence. Standard Oil Co. v. Burleson, 5 Cir., 117 F.2d 412; Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin, 6 Cir., 224 F.2d 120, 229 F.2d 434, 50 A.L.R.2d 882. The fact that plaintiff was where his duties called him to be is also a matter to be considered in determining this question. Maskell v. Alexander, 91 Wash. 363, 157 P. 872. We believe that under all the circumstances in this case, it was for the trier of facts to say whether a reasonably prudent person would see, or should have seen, defendant and heard the warning which defendant says he gave and after such observation and warning could have removed himself from a place of danger before being struck by defendant's golf ball. We have stated that it was the duty of defendant to give plaintiff an adequate and timely warning. The assumption that defendant would perform that duty, where there is no occasion to assume otherwise, does not amount to contributory negligence. Piatek v. Swindell, 84 N.H. 402, 151 A. 262. The failure to anticipate another's negligence is not negligence which will defeat recovery of injuries sustained. Ross v. Pittsburgh Motor Coach Co., 156 Pa. Super. 45, 39 A.2d 148.