Opinion ID: 810837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extraneous Influences on the Jury

Text: Middlebrook claims that his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the jurors were exposed to extraneous influences. He contends that this violation denied him the right to an impartial jury. Middlebrook further argues that he was entitled to a mistrial or at least a proper hearing to determine the impact of the extraneous influences on the jurors. Middlebrook relies on Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), and Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), to support his arguments. But neither does. No. 10-2172 Middlebrook v. Napel Page 5 In Smith v. Phillips, a defendant convicted of murder moved to vacate his sentence after the prosecuting attorney, upon completion of the trial, informed defense counsel and the court that during trial a juror submitted an application for employment as an investigator in the District Attorney’s Office. 455 U.S. at 212. The district court granted the defendant habeas relief and ordered him released unless the State court granted him a new trial. Id. at 214. The United States Court of Appeals, without considering whether or not the juror was actually prejudiced, affirmed the district court’s holding. Id. The Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that “due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.” Id. at 217. The Supreme Court further noted that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Id. at 215. The Court in Remmer v. United States was faced with a case where the petitioner did not find out until the conclusion of the trial that the jury foreman had been approached and told that he could profit by rendering a verdict favorable to the petitioner. 347 U.S. at 228. The petitioner moved for a new trial arguing that he was denied the opportunity to request a hearing to determine the circumstances surrounding the incident. Id. at 228-29. The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion. Id. at 229. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the judgment with instructions to hold a hearing to determine whether the incident was harmful to the petitioner. Id. at 230. In this case, James Logan, juror number 7, presented the trial court with a letter stating that he believed the jurors were engaging in talks that may have been contrary to the court’s instructions to not discuss the case with anyone, including associate jurors, prior to deliberations. Upon receiving the letter, the trial court judge questioned James Logan, the juror accused of engaging in the inappropriate discussions, and one other juror. During the individual interviews, James Logan stated that the “colored” juror told other jurors that her family told her to “watch her back” and that the defendant had “quite a family.” The other two jurors denied discussing any portions of the case with No. 10-2172 Middlebrook v. Napel Page 6 anyone, including family members. The allegedly problematic juror stated that any comments her family made were in jest and related to her jury duty generally, not to the case. The trial court offered defense counsel the opportunity to question the entire panel, but defense counsel declined. The court, along with the parties, agreed that Logan was the actual problematic juror and dismissed him from the jury. The court then determined that its investigation of the matter was sufficient. Sixth Circuit precedent places the burden on the defendant to show actual bias where there are claims of juror bias. See Phillips v. Bradshaw, 607 F.3d 199, 223 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95 (6th Cir. 1988). Here, all parties were satisfied with the trial court’s questioning of the three jurors on the extraneous influences allegation. Under Supreme Court precedent, the trial court is not required to interview every juror. Rather, it must “determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not [they were] prejudicial.” Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230. This is exactly what the trial court did by questioning the complaining juror and the juror accused of engaging in the inappropriate discussions. Middlebrook argues that the hearing was insufficient. However, he was given the opportunity to question other jurors but decided it was unnecessary. He cannot now assert his request for a “proper” Remmer hearing when he stated that he was satisfied with the trial court’s course of action. Furthermore, Middlebrook has not demonstrated any actual bias. His constitutional claims are therefore without merit. “Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on only the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen.” Smith,455 U.S. at 217. Middelbrook’s due process rights were not violated, and he received a fair trial by an impartial jury. Based upon the applicable federal law, it is clear that the trial court conducted the necessary inquiry into the allegation of extraneous influences on the jury. This conclusion is in accordance with the holding of the Michigan Court of Appeals. For this reason, we find that the state court’s conclusion is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. No. 10-2172 Middlebrook v. Napel Page 7