Opinion ID: 1690236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hancock

Text: ¶ 32. The Commission further asserts that Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Hancock, 309 So.2d 867 (Miss. 1975), which this Court reaffirmed in Oughton, supra, is inapplicable because, as distinguished from the case sub judice, where the land could be used either for agricultural purposes or residential development, there is only one highest and best use of the land now at issue: commercial. However, as we recognized in Potters II, [w]ithin commercial properties, there are many uses of differing values. 608 So.2d at 1233. Indeed, Harris testified that while the larger parcel was suitable for future commercial sales, the highest and best use of the 5.658 acres at the intersection was high intensity commercial, such as service stations, motels, and fast food restaurants. His findings, too, were well within the parameters of the property's zoning for commercial use. ¶ 33. Next, the Commission suggests that even if Hancock is applicable, then it is bad law and should be overruled. The Commission argues that [i]n all cases where a road is widened, the portion of the property adjacent to the highway is always the most valuable, particularly in a commercial situation. If we view the law as the Court in Hancock did then the Court would always pay the landowner an inflated value for the commercial footage even though the landowner has the same frontage after condemnation. In essence, the Commission's objection to Hancock appears to be based on its reinforcement of the principle that fair market value should be paid for property taken. ¶ 34. In Hancock, the Commission condemned property on either side of Highway 49 to widen it to four lanes. While the larger parcel from which the land was taken was used for agricultural purposes, there was evidence that the highest and best use for the land along the highway was rural residential. Hancock, 309 So.2d at 868-869. Thus, the Commission championed a valuation based on $300 to $350 an acre based on agricultural use of the entire parcel. The landowner, however, introduced evidence that anywhere from 100 to 280 acres of the 1,359 acre larger parcel was valued at $1,250 per acre for residential use. Id. The Hancock Court found that this evidence was both relevant and competent, and properly before the jury to consider its weight and credibility. Id. at 870. It summarized the Commission's argument as follows: Apparently, the appellant is actually contending the testimony of the witnesses for the landowners has no probative value because they failed to take into consideration the fact that following the widening of the highway, the landowners have other land that is now classified as farm land, which can afterwards be substituted for the residential property taken. Thus, the landowners will still have as much residential property as they had before the taking. Consequently, the appellant argues that the appraisers could only value the land taken as farm land. We find no merit in this contention. Hancock, 309 So.2d at 870-871. This is essentially the same argument the Commission appears to make in the case sub judice in its assertion that the landowners still have the same high intensity commercial acreage they did before, even though they have less land for large scale commercial development. However, as we further explained in Hancock, The rule in this state is that when a part of a larger tract of land is taken for public use, the owners should be awarded the difference between the fair market value of the whole tract immediately before the taking and the fair market value of the remaining property immediately after the taking, without considering the general benefits or injuries to the use of the taken land. This rule leaves no room for a deduction for any enhancement of the remaining land due to the nature of the facility to be built on the land taken. Furthermore, the landowner is entitled to due compensation not only for the value of the property actually taken, but also for the damages, if any, which may result to the landowner as a consequence of the taking without any deduction therefrom on account of any supposed benefits incident to public use for which the application is made. Pearl River Val. Water Supply District v. Wood, 252 Miss. 580, 172 So.2d 196 (1965) and Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Hillman, 189 Miss. 850, 198 So. 565 (1940). Although approaching it in a novel manner, what appellant is contending amounts to nothing more than a contention that the widening of the highway will enhance the value of other land not taken and consequently, it is entitled to a set off of the value of the enhancement from the value of the land taken. While this is the rule in some jurisdictions, it is not the rule in this state. Hancock, 309 So.2d at 871 (emphasis added). See also State Highway Commission v. Chatham, 173 Miss. 427, 433, 161 So. 674 (1935)(the rule in this state is familiar to all that when a part of the property so enhanced in value is to be taken for the public improvement, no deduction is to be made out of the value of the part taken on account of the enhancement to the value of the remainder not taken.). We find no merit or authority for the Commission's invitation to overrule Hancock, save its apparent desire to pay less than fair market value for properties taken.