Opinion ID: 1909632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: bolstering of witness testimony

Text: Next, Taylor argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce Deputy Noble's prior consistent statement from his previous testimony at the hearing on Taylor's motion to suppress. The State utilized Noble's prior consistent statement to support his trial testimony that Taylor told him there was additional money under the passenger's seat of the rental car. [24] Generally, prior consistent statements are inadmissible to corroborate or bolster a witness's trial testimony. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 787 So.2d 732, 743 (Fla.2001); Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 197 (Fla.1997); Jackson v. State, 498 So.2d 906, 910 (Fla.1986); Van Gallon v. State, 50 So.2d 882 (Fla.1951). Because they are usually hearsay, [i]n order to be admissible, prior consistent statements, like any other hearsay statements, must qualify under a hearsay exception. See Bradley, 787 So.2d at 743. However, prior consistent statements can be admitted as non-hearsay if the following conditions are met: the person who made the prior consistent statement testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning that statement; and the statement is offered to `rebut an express or implied charge ... of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication.' See Chandler, 702 So.2d at 197-98 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 500 (Fla.1992)); see also § 90.801(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). However, a witness's prior consistent statements used for rehabilitation must have been made before the existence of a fact said to indicate bias, interest, corruption, or other motive to falsify the prior consistent statement. See Jackson, 498 So.2d at 910; see also Quiles v. State, 523 So.2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). The first condition of Chandler is met because Deputy Noble testified at trial and Taylor was given the opportunity to cross-examine Noble regarding his prior consistent statements. Thus, this issue turns on whether the second condition of Chandler is met, as well as whether the timing requirement in Jackson is satisfied, i.e., (1) whether Noble's statements were introduced to rebut an express or implied charge against the witness of improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication, and (2) if so, whether Noble's prior consistent statement was made before the existence of a fact said to indicate bias, interest, corruption, or other motive to falsify the prior consistent statement. Defense counsel's questioning of Noble did not expressly charge him with an improper influence, motive, or recent fabrication. Moreover, it is questionable that defense counsel's questions raised an implicit charge. Rather, the questioning dealt with the proper preparation of police reports and the observation that Noble's written report did not contain Taylor's statement. [25] In a similar situation, we found it questionable whether defense counsel's cross-examination of a police detective insinuated that he had recently fabricated his testimony: The trial court allowed Detective Steve Leary to testify about a statement made to him by Detective Redmond regarding whether Bradley had gotten his car cleaned prior to the car being seized and processed for blood evidence. Specifically, Detective Leary testified that Detective Redmond told him that Bradley's van had been detailed prior to the seizure of the van by the police. The trial court allowed the testimony as a prior consistent statement of Detective Waugh that Bradley had told him on a January 22 taped interview that he had detailed his van four or five times since the time of the killing. We conclude that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony. At the outset, it is questionable whether defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Waugh was an insinuation of recent fabrication. He merely asked the detective why Bradley's statement relating to the van being detailed was not on the tape like the rest of the interview. At no point did he charge the detective with having recently fabricated the story about the detailing of the van. Bradley, 787 So.2d at 743. Although the prior consistent statement that was introduced in Bradley was made by an officer who did not testify at trial, we noted that defense counsel's cross-examination of the detective about why a defendant's statement was not in a taped interview was not the equivalent of accusing the detective of having recently fabricated a story that implicated the defendant. See id. Likewise, Taylor's counsel did not expressly or implicitly charge Noble with recently fabricating his story. Taylor's questioning revealed that Deputy Noble's report detailed other aspects of the encounter with Taylor, but did not mention the fact that Taylor told him that there was additional money in the car. Thus, the admission of Noble's 1999 statement under the theory that it rebutted an allegation of a recent fabrication instead served to improperly bolster Noble's credibility regarding his trial testimony. Hence, the introduction of Noble's prior consistent statement was in error. Nevertheless, we find that this error was harmless. In his brief, Taylor argues that his impeachment implied that Noble fabricated the statement after he wrote his report and that Noble's motive to fabricate could have arisen at any time after he wrote his report. Aside from the simple assertion that Noble had some type of motive to fabricate his testimony, Taylor does not elaborate on what motive would have caused Noble to falsely testify in court while he was under oath. [26] Furthermore, even if there was evidence of a limited motive, Taylor had the chance to cross-examine Deputy Noble both at the January 1999 hearing and at trial. In fact, after Taylor's objection was overruled, Taylor used Deputy Noble's prior testimony on re-cross to further question him as to why he did not include Taylor's statement in his initial report. Furthermore, Taylor does not challenge the fact that Noble found the money in a Crown Royal bag under the passenger's seat. Moreover, this is not a case where one witness's testimony was corroborated by another individual's prior consistent statement. In effect, Noble's prior testimony was being used to corroborate his own trial testimony, both of which were given under oath. Although prior consistent statements of the same witness should generally not be used to bolster that witness's testimony, in the instant case the effect of introducing Noble's prior consistent statement was negligible. If the jury had questions as to Noble's credibility and testimony at trial or found him credible, it is unlikely his testimony at an earlier stage of the trial would have had any impact on the jury's determination. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court erred in admitting Noble's prior consistent statements, we find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1135 (Fla.1986); see also Bradley, 787 So.2d at 744-45 (finding improper admission of prior consistent statements was harmless); Chandler, 702 So.2d at 198-99 (same as Bradley ); Anderson v. State, 574 So.2d 87, 93 (Fla.1991) (noting that the improper admission of prior consistent statements is subject to harmless error analysis).