Opinion ID: 748373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Impoundment of the Suburban

Text: 29 Given that the Suburban was lawfully stopped, with Castro and Vicencio lawfully under arrest at the side of the highway, the issue becomes what, if anything, transpired after the stop and arrest that violated the Fourth Amendment. The majority states that [t]he admissibility of the cocaine hinges on the validity of taking possession of the Suburban for purposes of an inventory search. (Majority Opinion at 755.) Assuming arguendo this to be true, the record in this case does not demonstrate that the defendants carried their burden of showing that the impoundment of the Suburban was pretextual. See United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 944, 113 S.Ct. 2427, 124 L.Ed.2d 647 (1993) (holding that the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the evidence in question was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). 30 In Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the discretionary power of the police to impound a suspect's car pursuant to the inventory search exception. The Supreme Court explained that: 31 Nothing ... prohibits the exercise of police discretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity. Here, the discretion afforded the [ ] police was exercised in light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather that impounding it. 32 Id. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743. 33 In the present case, the majority places great weight on the fact that the federal agents who trailed the Suburban were suspicious of illicit drug activity, but did not have probable cause to stop the vehicle themselves. The majority seems particularly concerned with the fact that the federal agents advised Deputy Nettles that he would have to develop his own probable cause. 34 But the critical issue is not whether the facts of this case give rise to a vague notion that the suspicions of the federal agents influenced Deputy Nettles' decision to stop and arrest the defendants. As discussed earlier, pretext cannot be used to challenge the lawfulness of a stop or arrest that is otherwise supported by probable cause. The question for decision, as framed by the majority, is whether the decision to impound the Suburban was pretextual, or made in bad faith. As to that precise inquiry, the majority opinion is conspicuously silent. 35 Nowhere in the majority opinion is there mention of evidence that the impoundment of the Suburban violated standardized criteria of the Polk County Sheriff's Department. Also absent is any mention as to who directed Officer Reeves to drive the vehicle to the impound lot, or why that decision was made. Indeed, there is nothing to indicate whether this issue was even raised in the district court. Nevertheless, the majority leaps to the conclusion that the impoundment was pretextual without any specific evidence to that effect.