Opinion ID: 1057905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues raised by george t. lewis

Text: Lewis contends that the Governor's rejection of Gordon and Lewis, following Dinkins' withdrawal, was impermissibly based solely upon the race of the two remaining nominees. As Lewis states in his brief, the [Governor's July 24, 2006] letter leads to the inescapable conclusion that solely because Lewis and Gordon are both Caucasian, the Governor rejected the panel. That contention forms the basis for the two issues raised in Lewis's brief. As his first issue, Lewis asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that the Tennessee Human Rights Act does not apply to the Governor's rejection of Gordon and Lewis. As his second issue, Lewis argues that the trial court erred in ruling that Lewis and Gordon's state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the law did not restrict the Governor's discretion to reject a panel of nominees based solely upon the race of the nominees. We first will address Lewis's claims under the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The THRA is set out in Title 4, Chapter 21 of the Tennessee Code Annotated. Lewis relies upon various portions of the THRA in arguing that the Act applies to the Governor's rejection of Lewis and Gordon on alleged racial grounds. He first cites section 4-21-101, which provides: (a) It is the purpose and intent of the general assembly by this chapter to: (1) Provide for execution within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the Pregnancy Amendment of 1978, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended; (2) Assure that Tennessee has appropriate legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment, public accommodations and housing sufficient to justify the deferral of cases by the federal equal employment opportunity commission, the department of housing and urban development, the secretary of labor and the department of justice under those statutes; (3) Safeguard all individuals within the state from discrimination because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin in connection with employment and public accommodations, and because of race, color, creed, religion, sex or national origin in connection with housing; (4) Protect their interest in personal dignity and freedom from humiliation; (5) Make available to the state their full productive capacity in employment; (6) Secure the state against domestic strife and unrest that would menace its democratic institutions; (7) Preserve the public safety, health and general welfare; and (8) Further the interest, rights, opportunities and privileges of individuals within the state. (b) The prohibitions in this chapter against discrimination because of age in connection with employment and public accommodations shall be limited to individuals who are at least forty (40) years of age. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-101 (2005). In addition, Lewis relies upon section 4-21-401(a), which states that [i]t is a discriminatory practice for an employer to do the following: (1) Fail or refuse to hire or discharge any person or otherwise to discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin; or (2) Limit, segregate or classify an employee or applicants for employment in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the status of an employee, because of race, creed, color, religion, sex, age or national origin. Lewis argues that the Governor, as agent for the State of Tennessee, is an employer for purposes of the THRA. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-102(4) (2005) (including the state in the THRA's definition of employer). Similarly, Lewis asserts that he and Gordon, as nominees to fill the judicial vacancy on the Supreme Court, must be considered as employees (or, more accurately, as applicants) [4] covered by the THRA. Lewis therefore contends that the Governor's rejection of Lewis and Gordon, which allegedly was based solely on their race, violated the provisions of the THRA. The Governor argues in response that the Governor's appointment to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court of Tennessee is not an employment decision under either federal or state law. For that reason, the Governor contends that the THRA is inapplicable to such appointments. The respective briefs filed by Lewis and the Governor each contain detailed and well-reasoned arguments as to whether a nominee for a judicial vacancy is an employee for purposes of the THRA (and therefore covered, or not covered, by the Act). Each party compares and contrasts various portions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, with portions of the THRA in support of their respective arguments. The parties also cite pertinent cases  Tennessee and federal cases, as well as cases from other states  on the employee issue. We begin by emphasizing that the question in this case is not whether judges are employed by the State. The question is whether a nominee or applicant [5] to fill a judicial vacancy is an employee for purposes of the THRA. For the reasons stated below, we answer that question in the negative. Although the THRA contains a definition of employer, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-21-102(4), the Act does not contain a definition of the word employee. We observe, however, that section 4-21-101(a)(1) states that one of the primary purposes of the THRA is to [p]rovide for execution, within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 1968 and 1972, the Pregnancy Amendment of 1978, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended[.] As the Tennessee Court of Appeals has stated: In light of the intended overlap in purpose between the Tennessee Human Rights Act and federal anti-discrimination laws, Tennessee's courts regularly consult the decisions of their federal counterparts for guidance when called upon to construe and apply the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Wilson v. Rubin, 104 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Tenn. Ct.App.2002); [6] see also Lynch v. City of Jellico, 205 S.W.3d 384, 399 (Tenn.2006) (stating that because [t]he intent of the THRA is to provide for execution within Tennessee of the policies embodied in the federal civil rights statutes . . . an analysis of claims under the THRA is the same as under Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act). Given that the THRA is generally interpreted consistently with Title VII, we note that the latter defines employee as an individual employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). Although this definition taken alone is rather unhelpful, we find it significant, as did the trial court, that the Title VII definition excludes certain individuals such as elected state officials, personal staff of elected state officials, appointees by elected state officials on the policymaking level, and immediate advisors to elected state officials. Id. In any event, we further note that the question of whether an individual is an employee for purposes of Title VII is resolved by applying common law principles of agency. See Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir.2004) (stating, in a case brought under federal discrimination statutes, we apply the common law agency test to determine whether a hired party is an independent contractor or an employee); O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir.1997) (stating, it is well established that when Congress uses the term `employee' without defining it with precision, courts should presume that Congress had in mind `the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by the common-law agency doctrine'). Cf. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444-51, 123 S.Ct. 1673, 155 L.Ed.2d 615 (2003) (applying common law principles in determining whether physician-shareholder was an employee for purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act). The Supreme Court of the United States has summarized the relevant common-law agency principles as follows: In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. See Restatement § 220(2) (setting forth a nonexhaustive list of factors relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee). No one of these factors is determinative. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989) (footnotes omitted); see also Galloway v. Memphis Drum Serv., 822 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Tenn.1991) (stating comparable factors for determining whether a work relationship is that of employer-employee or independent contractor for purposes of workers' compensation statutes). In Thompson v. City of Austin, 979 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.App.1998), the Texas Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether municipal court judges were employees for purposes of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA), sections 21.001-.405, Texas Labor Code Annotated. In that case, two municipal court judges had not been reappointed by the city council, and the judges filed suit under the TCHRA, alleging that the city council had not reappointed them because of their respective disabilities. [7] The Texas court held that the municipal court judges were not employees for purposes of the TCHRA. [8] Id. at 682. In reaching that conclusion, the court focused primarily on the fact that the city council lacked any authority to control the means and manner of the municipal court judges' performance of their duties. Id. After considering the common-law factors set out above for determining whether an individual is an employee, we reach the same conclusion that was reached in Thompson  state court judges (and hence nominees to fill a judicial vacancy) are not employees for purposes of the THRA. Most importantly, the Governor (the hiring party) has no authority to control, in any way, the manner and means by which judges perform their official duties. Nor does the Governor (nor any other state officer) have the power to demote or terminate a state court judge. Judges may be removed from office only in limited circumstances, i.e., by the electorate in a retention election, see Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 17-4-114 and 17-4-115, or by constitutional means, see Tenn. Const. art. V, § 4 (providing that [t]he Governor, Judges of the Supreme Court, Judges of Inferior Courts, [and] Chancellors . . . shall be liable to impeachment, whenever they may, in the opinion of the House of Representatives, commit any crime in their official capacity which may require disqualification) and art. VI, § 6 (providing that Judges and Attorneys for the State may be removed from office by a concurrent vote of both Houses of the General Assembly). [9] Additionally, none of the other common-law factors quoted above weigh in favor of finding nominees to fill a judicial vacancy to be employees for purposes of the THRA. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that the THRA does not apply to this proceeding. We turn next to consider Lewis's equal protection claims. In his second issue, Lewis asserts that the Governor's rejection of the first panel violated the equal protection provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. He contends that the first panel was rejected solely due to the racial classification of Lewis and Gordon and that the rejection of the first panel is presumptively invalid. Lewis goes on to argue that: (1) this Court must review the rejection of the first panel applying strict scrutiny; (2) the rejection of the first panel was not necessary to achieve a compelling state interest; and (3) the rejection of the first panel was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Lewis relies primarily upon three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, dealing with the extent to which state government may classify applicants on the basis of race in the interest of diversity: Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 156 L.Ed.2d 257 (2003); and Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978). [10] Lewis asserts that, as stated in his brief: These decisions considered collectively indicate that race may sometimes be considered as a plus factor along with all of the other individual characteristics of the applicants, but only when there is proof of a compelling state interest and only when there is proof that the racial classification is necessary and is part of a narrowly-tailored policy. Lewis argues that those criteria have not been met in the pending case and that the Governor's rejection of the first panel therefore violated equal protection principles. The Governor denies that an equal protection violation occurred. He argues that Grutter , Gratz , and Bakke are cases involving the admissions programs of certain public educational institutions, programs that included special provisions aimed at increasing admission of minority applicants. The Governor asserts that the pending case is wholly different from those three cases; this is a case involving the exercise of a governor's discretionary authority, acting pursuant to a statute enacted by the legislature, to appoint members of the judicial branch of state government. The Governor contends that the fundamental issue in this case is whether he may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, consider diversity in making appointments to the judiciary under the Tennessee Plan. In addition, the Governor argues that the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that cases involving discretionary-appointment challenges require a more circumspect approach. In Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974), the Supreme Court was presented with an equal protection challenge to Philadelphia's system for appointment of members of the Board of Education, a scheme that parallels the Tennessee Plan. An Educational Nominating Panel (made up partly of appointees by the Mayor) would certify a list of three nominees to the Mayor for appointment to the Board of Education. Id. at 607, 94 S.Ct. 1323. The Mayor would then have the option of rejecting the nominees and asking for another list of three nominees. Id. The suit was brought by African-American members of the community alleging that the Mayor violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against African-Americans when appointing members of the Educational Nominating Panel, which in turn, had an adverse disparate impact on the African-American population of the Board of Education. Id. at 608-10, 94 S.Ct. 1323. Although the Court decided the case on other grounds, the Court discussed the delicate issues presented in equal protection challenges to discretionary appointments by state and local executive officers: [T]o the degree that the principles cited by the Mayor reflect concern that judicial oversight of discretionary appointments may interfere with the ability of an elected official to respond to the mandate of his constituency, they are in point. There are also delicate issues of federal-state relationships underlying this case. The federalism questions are made particularly complex by the interplay of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with its special regard for the status of the rights of minority groups and for the role of the Federal Government in protecting those rights. . . . [A]s recently as in Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, . . . [we] recognized the problems that would be involved in a federal court's ordering the Governor of a State to exercise his discretion in a particular way. . . .  Id. at 615, 94 S.Ct. 1323 (quoting Carter, 396 U.S. 320, 338, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970)). Although the Governor concedes that the federalism issue mentioned in Educational Equality League is not present in the pending case because it has been brought in state, not federal, court, he argues that the delicate issues identified in Educational Equality League are no less significant in this proceeding. The Governor goes on to argue in the alternative that even if discretionary executive appointments to fill judicial vacancies are regulated in some fashion by the Equal Protection Clause, the trial court correctly found that the undisputed facts of this case do not make out a prima facie showing that Lewis was discriminated against on account of his race. Again in the alternative, the Governor contends that, if the Court concludes that equal protection analysis must be applied, his actions concerning the rejection of the first panel satisfy the strict-scrutiny test applied in such an analysis. In considering the parties' arguments, we cannot overlook the doctrine of separation of powers and the related political-question doctrine that in part dictates our resolution of this issue. Article II, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides: The powers of the Government shall be divided into three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. Article II, section 2, which is titled Limitation of powers, provides: No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the cases herein directed or permitted. These two constitutional provisions are the cornerstone of the doctrine of separation of powers. As we previously have stated: The separation of powers doctrine arises from the precept that [i]t is essential to the maintenance of republican government that the action of the legislative, judicial, and executive departments should be kept separate and distinct. Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn. 471, 492, 125 S.W. 664, 668 (1910). The Court of Appeals has summarized the doctrine as follows: In general, the legislative power is the authority to make, order, and repeal law; the executive power is the authority to administer and enforce the law; and the judicial power is the authority to interpret and apply law. The Tennessee constitutional provision prevents an encroachment by any of the departments upon the powers, functions and prerogatives of the others. The branches of government, however, are guided by the doctrine of checks and balances; the doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute. State v. Brackett, 869 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993) (citations omitted). Thus, while the three branches of government are independent and co-equal, they are to a degree interdependent as well, with the functions of one branch often overlapping that of another. Underwood v. State, 529 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn.1975). State v. King, 973 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Tenn. 1998); see also Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995). Occasionally a court case involves a particular issuein this case, an alleged violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the lawwhich collides with the constitutional separation of powers. In such cases, the court must consider whether the issue presented is a non-justiciable political question; in rare cases, the court must conclude that the doctrine of separation of powers precludes consideration of the particular issue or claim raised by the party. The political-question doctrine was summarized by the Court of Appeals in Mayhew v. Wilder: Article II, Section 2 of our Constitution prohibits a person belonging to one of the three great departments of government from exercising the powers delegated to another department, except as the Constitution itself directs or permits. The courts may, of course, hold an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, Town of South Carthage v. Barrett, 840 S.W.2d 895 (Tenn.1992), and in certain limited cases the courts may provide a remedy where the action (or inaction) of the executive or legislative branches deprive the people of their constitutional rights. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), the United States Supreme Court held that the Tennessee Legislature's refusal to re-apportion the state's legislative districts violated the equal protection provisions of the United States Constitution. In Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), the same court held that the House of Representatives could not exclude a member who had been duly elected and possessed all the requirements of membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution. However, these incursions are rare. Where the question presented and the relief sought are of the type that do not admit of judicial resolution, or if the issue presented is a purely political question, the separation of powers provisions of our constitutions make it non-justiciable. Id. at 516, 517, 89 S.Ct. 1944. In Baker v. Carr [369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691], the court discussed what makes a question non-justiciable: Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 46 S.W.3d 760, 773 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001), perm. appeal denied (Tenn. March 19, 2001), reh'g denied (Tenn. Apr. 30, 2001). Under the principles stated in Mayhew, we are faced in the pending case with the question of whether the equal protection claim asserted by Lewis is a non-justiciable political question. The first two factors quoted from Baker v. Carr are particularly prominent in this case. First, Lewis's equal protection claim is a challenge to the Governor's appointment to fill the current vacancy on this Court; on the subject of filling vacancies in office, there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political departmentthe Tennessee Constitution provides that [t]he election of all officers, and the filling of all vacancies not otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such manner as the Legislature shall direct. Tenn. Const. art. VII, § 4. Pursuant to this constitutional provision, the General Assembly enacted the Tennessee Plan, setting out the manner in which judicial vacancies are to be filled. Under the Tennessee Plan, the Governor alone is empowered to make appointments to fill such vacancies. Regarding the second factor from Baker v. Carr (lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [the issue]), we note the far-reaching implications of Lewis's equal protection challenge. If judicial appointments made pursuant to the Tennessee Plan are subject to equal protection challenges, every such appointment could theoretically be the subject of litigation. And although pre-appointment equal protection challenges, similar to Lewis's claim in this case, could merely forestall the filling of a judicial vacancy, nothing would appear to preclude a post-appointment equal protection challenge to judicial appointments. The consequences to the Tennessee judicial system could be chaotic. For example, what remedy would exist after a judge is duly appointed by the Governor? If the judge were retained in office following the statutorily-mandated retention election, what would be the effect on the challenged judge's status? Moreover, Lewis's own suggested remedy for a pre-appointment challenge illustrates the lack of a manageable standard for resolving the issuehe asks this Court to order the Governor to fill the current vacancy by appointing either Lewis or Gordon, but assuming arguendo that the reason advanced by the Governor in rejecting Lewis and Gordon violated equal protection principles, Lewis's proposed remedy overlooks the fact that the Governor still would have the statutory prerogative under the Tennessee Plan to ask for a second panel, if he has any additional reason for doing so. It clearly would be a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine for us to preclude the Governor from asking for a second panel for some reason other than the one stated in his letter rejecting the remaining panel of Lewis and Gordon. For these reasons, we conclude that the second factor stated in Baker applieswe conclude that there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving Lewis's equal protection claim. Our conclusion that Lewis's equal protection challenge presents a non-justiciable political question does not imply that the Governor's rejection of the two remaining nominees on the first list (Lewis and Gordon) violated equal protection principles. Indeed, we believe that the Governor's actions neither implicated nor ran afoul of equal protection principles. As a threshold matter, we conclude, as did the trial court, that the unusual circumstances of this case did not make out a prima facie showing that Lewis was discriminated against on the basis of race. As discussed in great detail in this opinion, the Tennessee Plan required the Commission to certify a panel of applicants that were the best qualified to fill the Supreme Court vacancy; it did so by certifying the panel consisting of Dinkins, Gordon, and Lewis. The Tennessee Plan then gave the Governor the option of appointing one of the three applicants or requesting a second panel of three applicants. The Governor's July 24 letter reveals that he rejected the first panel presented to him by the Commission because one of the three applicants, Dinkins, voluntarily withdrew from consideration. Indeed, the letter specifically stated: I have received a letter from Chancellor Richard Dinkins withdrawing his name as one of the three nominees, and therefore I am requesting pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-4-112(a) that the Commission submit a new panel of nominees.  Notwithstanding, Lewis's claim that he was denied equal protection by virtue of his race hinges solely on the fact that the Governor's letter stated that diversity is a significant factor that I believe should be considered. In our view, this glimpse into but one of the Governor's considerations must be read in the context of the entire letter, which unequivocally stressed that the Governor's goal was to appoint judges who meet the highest professional and personal standards. Upon Dinkins' withdrawal, the Governor no longer had a full panel of the best qualified applicants from which to exercise his discretion by examining any number of considerations, of which diversity was just one. As a result, the Governor exercised his statutory option to reject the first panel for another panel containing three applicants from which to make the appointment. We will not speculate or otherwise interpret the letter as meaning the Governor would not appoint a white applicant or would only appoint a minority applicant; instead, the Governor, after determining that the first panel was no longer a complete panel with which to evaluate the best qualified applicants, took a course of action available to him by statute under the Tennessee plan. As noted above, the factual basis for Lewis's claim resembles none of the cases he has cited in support of his position in which the United States Supreme Court found racial classifications. See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306, 123 S.Ct. 2325; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244, 123 S.Ct. 2411; and Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733. These cases involve the admissions programs of public educational institutions that included provisions for increasing the admission of minority applicants. In contrast, this case involves the exercise of a governor's discretionary authority pursuant to a comprehensive statute enacted by the legislature to appoint members of the judicial branch of state government. See Educ. Equality League, 415 U.S. at 614, 94 S.Ct. 1323. However, even assuming for the purpose of argument that the Governor's July 24 letter constitutes a racial classification, we conclude that there was no equal protection violation. The Supreme Court summarized in Grutter the analytical framework for equal protection cases: We have held that all racial classifications imposed by government must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. This means that such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests. Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, we have no way to determine what classifications are `benign' or `remedial' and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to `smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. Strict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact. Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it. As we have explained, whenever the government treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. But that observation says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny. When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-27, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In upholding the University of Michigan Law School's written admission policy, which included consideration of class diversity in making admission decisions, the Court found a compelling state interest which supported the use of race as a factor in admissions. Id. at 328, 123 S.Ct. 2325. The Court went on to discuss the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce and concluded that those benefits are substantial. Id. at 330, 123 S.Ct. 2325. As the Court stated: This Court has long recognized that education . . . is the very foundation of good citizenship. For this reason, the diffusion of knowledge and opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity. The United States, as amicus curiae, affirms that [e]nsuring that public institutions are open and available to all segments of American society, including people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount government objective. And, [n]owhere is the importance of such openness more acute than in the context of higher education. Effective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized. Moreover, universities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training ground for a large number of our Nation's leaders. Individuals with law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the seats in the United States House of Representatives. The pattern is even more striking when it comes to highly selective law schools. A handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of the more than 600 United States District Court judges. In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. Id. at 331-32, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (emphases added; citations omitted). The general principles stated in the preceding quotation, especially the last sentence, could hardly be improved upon as a statement of the compelling state interest in seeking to have a diverse judiciary. Indeed, the interest in achieving a diverse judiciary, particularly at the state level, has been the subject of numerous studies. See Barbara L. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts, 10 Mich. J. Race & L. 153 (2004); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 405 (2000). As one commentator has expressed: The case for diversity is especially compelling for the judiciary. It is the business of the courts, after all, to dispense justice fairly and administer the laws equally. It is the branch of government ultimately charged with safeguarding constitutional rights, particularly protecting the rights of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities against encroachment by the majority. How can the public have confidence and trust in such an institution if it is segregated  if the communities it is supposed to protect are excluded from its ranks? Edward M. Chen, The Judiciary, Diversity, and Justice for All, 91 Cal. L.Rev. 1109, 1117 (2003) (footnote omitted). Similarly: The lack of racial and ethnic diversity at the capstone of the legal profession, the judiciary, is one of the most compelling and contentious issues surrounding judicial selection in the United States. In broad perspective, the lack of judicial diversity overlaps a range of other important issues involving the judicial system: judicial independence, public confidence in the courts, and the commitment to democratic principles of equality and justice. Graham, Toward an Understanding of Judicial Diversity in American Courts, 10 Mich. J. Race & L. at 153. Accordingly, we conclude it entirely appropriate for a Governor to include diversity as a single factor among many other important factors which he or she considers in making judicial appointments, e.g., educational background, professional experience, likely judicial temperament, professional and civic activities, etc. Interestingly, Lewis appears to concede that the Governor could have permissibly considered race in choosing an appointee from the original list of three nominees: Dinkins (assuming he had not withdrawn), Gordon and Lewis. As Lewis states in his brief: The issue, of course, is not whether the Governor could have permissibly considered race as a factor along with other individual characteristics in making his appointment had Chancellor Dinkins not withdrawn. Likewise, the issue is not whether the Governor could have permissibly considered race as a factor along with other individual characteristics when appointing from a second panel. The issue is the rejection, not the appointment. Lewis and Gordon had the right to be considered as individuals based upon their individual characteristics. They had the right to be judged upon characteristics other than their race. In other words, race may have been one factor which the Governor would have used to decide who to appoint, but race was the exclusive reason for his decision to reject the first panel. (Emphasis added.) As discussed above, we disagree that race was the exclusive reason for the Governor's action. Moreover, Lewis's purported distinction between considering race in appointing but not in rejecting nominees is a distinction without a difference. In appointing one individual from among three, the Governor necessarily would be rejecting two nominees. The next step in an equal protection analysis would be to consider whether the means chosen to accomplish the government's asserted purpose is `specifically and narrowly framed to accomplish that purpose.' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908, 116 S.Ct. 1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996)). Once Chancellor Dinkins withdrew from consideration for appointment to this Court, Tennessee Code Annotated section 17-4-112(a) gave the Governor only one option to allow him to consider diversity (among other factors) in making his appointmentthat option was to reject the two remaining nominees on the first panel and to request a second panel (asking the Judicial Selection Commission to include qualified minority candidates). Accordingly, the Governor's action was narrowly tailored to accomplish the purpose of considering diversity in making judicial appointments. [11] In summary, we hold that: (1) the THRA does not apply to this case, (2) Lewis's equal protection challenge to the Governor's actions presents a non-justiciable political question, and (3) Lewis's equal protection challenge is otherwise without merit. Having considered and rejected Lewis's arguments, we turn next to consider the issues raised by the Judicial Selection Commission.