Opinion ID: 177345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Apprendi and New York's PFO Statute

Text: The New York Court of Appeals has interpreted the PFO statute on three occasions since the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi, each time affirming its constitutionality in response to Sixth Amendment challenges. See People v. Quinones, 12 N.Y.3d 116, 131, 879 N.Y.S.2d 1, 906 N.E.2d 1033 (2009); People v. Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d 61, 71, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (2005); People v. Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d 329, 336, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407, 752 N.E.2d 844 (2001). Of course, we do not defer to that court's interpretation of federal law, but we are bound by its construction of New York law in conducting our analysis. We examine each case in turn. In Rosen, the New York Court of Appeals rejected for the first time an Apprendi challenge to New York's PFO statute. See 96 N.Y.2d at 335, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407, 752 N.E.2d 844. The court acknowledged the familiar rule of Apprendi: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 334, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407, 752 N.E.2d 844 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348). But the court went on to hold that the only fact necessary to impose a PFO sentence under § 70.10 is the fact of recidivism, placing the PFO statute squarely within the exception to the rule: It is clear from the ... statutory framework that the prior felony convictions are the sole determin[ant] of whether a defendant is subject to enhanced sentencing as a persistent felony offender. Id. at 335, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). Only after that finding is made will a court look to the defendant's history and character, and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct, to determine where, within this now expanded sentencing range, a sentence should be imposed. See id. To that end, the sentencing court is thus only fulfilling its traditional role giving due consideration to agreed-upon factorsin determining an appropriate sentence within the permissible statutory range. Id. In Rivera, the New York Court of Appeals revisited the constitutionality of § 70.10 in light of Blakely and Ring, and repeated its conclusion that recidivism findings are the only necessary factual predicates to impose a PFO sentence. Because [t]he statute authorizes indeterminate sentencing once the court finds persistent felony offender status, Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 66, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (emphasis added), the court held, the predicate felonies are both necessary and sufficient conditions for imposition of the authorized sentence for recidivism; that is why we pointedly called the predicate felonies the `sole' determinant [in Rosen ], id. at 68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (quoting Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 335, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407, 752 N.E.2d 844). The court acknowledged that the statute, as written, is susceptible to a construction that would pose an Apprendi problem: We could have decided Rosen differently by reading the statutes to require judicial factfinding as to the defendant's character and criminal acts before he became eligible for a persistent felony offender sentence. If we had construed the statutes to require the court to find additional facts about the defendant before imposing a recidivism sentence, the statutes would violate Apprendi. Id. at 67, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (emphasis in original). But, as the court explained, the statutes raise no constitutional concern because we did not read the law that way. Under our interpretation of the relevant statutes, defendants are eligible for persistent felony offender sentencing based solely on whether they had two prior felony convictions. Id. (emphasis in original). In thus reiterating its construction of the PFO statute in Rosen, the court in Rivera clearly construed state law to provide for an expanded range of authorized sentences once a defendant is adjudged a persistent felony offender, at which point the trial judge is directed to exercise discretion in determining where within that newly expanded range to impose a sentence: The statutory language requiring the sentencing court to consider the specified factors and to articulate the reason for the chosen sentence grants defendants a right to an airing and an explanation, not a result. .... [A] defendant adjudicated as a persistent felony offender has a statutory right to present evidence that might influence the court to exercise its discretion to hand down a sentence as if no recidivism finding existed, while the People retain the burden to show that the defendant deserves the higher sentence. Id. at 68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. In other words, according to New York's highest court, the maximum range of available sentences is established once the defendant is proven to have two prior qualifying felonies: The judge may impose a sentence within the range permitted for an A-I felony, or may instead impose a lower sentence within the range permitted for a second felony offense. Rivera also addressed the statute's mandatory consideration and articulation of those factors that a trial judge finds relevant in determining what sentence to impose. Id. at 69, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. The court interpreted that legislative directive to serve two distinct functions. First, it provides a defendant with notice and an opportunity to respond to those factors that the court deems relevant to the exercise of its sentencing discretion within the ranges authorized by the PFO statute. The statutory language requiring the sentencing court to consider the specified factors and to articulate the reason for the chosen sentence grants defendants a right to an airing and an explanation, not a result. Id. at 68, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194; cf. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (Confidence in a judge's use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.). And second, the judge's articulation of reasoning facilitates an appellate review function that is distinct from the issue of whether the PFO sentence was lawfully imposed. In New York, intermediate appellate courts are vested with the capacious authority to review and modify criminal sentences in the interests of justice. See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 470.15(3)(c). [9] Notably, that oversight power is unrelated to the legality of the sentence; the power to reverse or modify a sentence based on a legal error is addressed separately in the statute. See id. § 470.15(3)(a). Even absent legal error, it rests within the discretion of the Appellate Division to modify a sentence in the interest of justice if it is deemed to be unduly harsh or severe. [10] In that light, Rivera notes, a sentencing judge should set forth those considerations deemed relevant to the imposition of a PFO sentence for the benefit of an appellate court that must later determine whether the sentence was too severe. Rivera explains: [O]nce a defendant is adjudged a persistent felony offender, a recidivism sentence cannot be held erroneous as a matter of law, unless the sentencing court acts arbitrarily or irrationally. The court's opinion is, of course, subject to appellate review, as is any exercise of discretion. The Appellate Division, in its own discretion, may conclude that a persistent felony offender sentence is too harsh or otherwise improvident. In this way, the Appellate Division can and should mitigate inappropriately severe applications of the statute. A determination of that kind, however, is based not on the law but as an exercise of the Appellate Division's discretion in the interest of justice as reserved uniquely to that Court. 5 N.Y.3d at 68-69, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194 (emphasis added) (citing N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 470.20(6)). Rivera thus concluded that the PFO statute does not violate the principle announced in Blakely, because it simply creates a recidivist sentencing scheme: the only factual predicates necessary for a judge to impose a class A-I sentence are those respecting the defendant's criminal history, and it therefore falls within the carve-out of Almendarez-Torres. Id. at 67, 800 N.Y.S.2d 51, 833 N.E.2d 194. Most recently, in Quinones, the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the validity of the PFO statute in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Cunningham, which it found readily distinguishable. It reiterated much of the reasoning of Rivera, concluding that the New York sentencing scheme, after a defendant is deemed eligible to be sentenced as a persistent felony offender, requires that the sentencing court make a qualitative judgment about, among other things, the defendant's criminal history and the circumstances surrounding a particular offense in order to determine whether an enhanced sentence, under the statutorily prescribed sentencing range, is warranted. Stated differently, New York's sentencing scheme, by requiring that sentencing courts consider defendant's history and character and the nature and circumstances of defendant's conduct in deciding where, within a range, to impose an enhanced sentence, sets the parameters for the performance of one of the sentencing court's most traditional and basic functions, i.e., the exercise of sentencing discretion. 12 N.Y.3d at 130, 879 N.Y.S.2d 1, 906 N.E.2d 1033.
Our Court has examined the PFO statute on two prior occasions. Each was presented in the posture of a habeas petition, and in both cases we denied relief. In Brown I, we deemed it a reasonable conclusion by the state court that the judicial finding of at least two predicate felony convictions comported with the dictates of Apprendi, and noted that the second-prong inquiry called for under the PFO statute is of a very different sort from the judicial factfinding proscribed by Apprendi. 409 F.3d at 534. It is a vague, amorphous assessment of whether, in the court's `opinion,' `extended incarceration and life-time supervision' of the defendant `will best serve the public interest.' Id. (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 70.10(2)). In sum, [w]e [could not] say the New York Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Apprendi when it concluded that this second determination is something quite different from the fact-finding addressed in Apprendi and its predecessors. Id. at 534-35. In Brown II, we revisited the issue in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Ring, and found the PFO statute to be distinguishable from the Arizona capital sentencing scheme invalidated in Ring. Brown II, 451 F.3d at 59. [11] We noted that Ring did not expound upon the rule announced in Apprendi in a way that is significant to the disposition of this case. Id. Each case involved a statute that required the sentencing judge to find some specified fact before imposing an enhanced sentence. Id. Thus, we concluded that it was not unreasonable for the state court to identify a crucial distinction between the unconstitutional factfinding required under the statutes at issue in both Ring and Apprendi, and the discretionary assessment called for by the PFO statute. Id. But neither Brown I nor Brown II speaks to the question that we face today: In light of the New York Court of Appeals' construction of the PFO statute in Rivera, and the Supreme Court holdings in Blakely and Cunningham, does the PFO statute suffer from a constitutional defect that the state courts were objectively unreasonable to overlook? We hold that it does not.