Opinion ID: 791199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance — Nichols and Gomez

Text: 9 Both Nichols and Gomez assert that the district court erred in refusing to sever the trial. They maintain that their mutually antagonistic defenses necessitated severance. We review a district court's denial of a motion to sever for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Mickelson, 378 F.3d 810, 817-18 (8th Cir.2004). In order to reverse, the appellant must show that his or her right to a fair trial was prejudiced. Id.; see also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). Defendants who are jointly indicted on similar evidence from the same or related events should normally be tried together; to warrant severance a defendant must show real prejudice; that is, something more than the mere fact that he would have had a better chance for acquittal had he been tried separately. Mickelson, 378 F.3d at 817-18. (citations omitted). A defendant can demonstrate real prejudice to his right to a fair trial by showing: (1) his defense is irreconcilable with that of his co-defendant; or (2) the jury will be unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to the separate defendants. Id. However, severance is not required merely because evidence that is admissible only against some defendants may be damaging to others. Id. 10 In this case, Gomez's defense strategy was that he knew nothing about the Bowers's estate or the scheme to sell estate cars at low prices. He explained that he was a professional gambler and that Nichols was backing his play as an investment. Nichols, on the other hand, claimed that he was duped and misled by Gomez who alone masterminded the entire scheme. To that extent, Nichols claimed that he actually believed Gomez was the heir of the Bowers's estate and that the sale of the estate cars was completely legitimate. 11 Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per se.  Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). The Supreme Court specifically rejected the notion that defendants who have contradictory defenses are inherently prejudiced simply because a jury will conclude [either] that both defendants are lying and convict them both on that basis, or that at least one of the two must be guilty without regard to whether the Government has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 540; see also United States v. Blankenship, 382 F.3d 1110, 1125 (11th Cir.2004) (The Supreme Court has held that co-defendants do not suffer prejudice simply because one co-defendant's defense directly inculpates another, or it is logically impossible for a jury to believe both co-defendants' defenses.). 12 We first examine whether the defenses asserted by Gomez and Nichols are actually irreconcilable. As already stated, Gomez asserts that Nichols was backing his gambling and Nichols asserts that Gomez duped him. These two stories are reconcilable. Specifically, Nichols could very well have been duped by Gomez while at the same time giving Gomez money to finance his professional gambling. Stated another way, Nichols's contention that he was duped did not necessarily require that the jury either accept or reject the defense that Gomez merely received gambling support funds. Likewise, Gomez's contention did not require the jury to accept or reject the defense that Nichols was an unwilling participant. 13 Neither Gomez nor Nichols disputes that nonexistent cars were sold with much of the proceeds funneled through Nichols to casinos where Gomez received the funds in the form of gambling chips. See United States v. Serafino, 281 F.3d 327, 330 (1st Cir.2002) (Serafino never disputed that the MBC vendors funneled payments through his companies' accounts, and Peckham's contention that he was neither the mastermind nor the driving force behind the scheme did not necessarily require that the jury either accept or reject the defense that Serafino was an unwitting participant.). At their core, both Nichols's defense and Gomez's defense asserted that they did not know of the fraud. See United States v. Jackson, 64 F.3d 1213, 1217 (8th Cir.1995) cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1137, 116 S.Ct. 966, 133 L.Ed.2d 887 (1995) (holding that defenses by drug offense co-defendants that neither had knowledge of drugs in a package were reconcilable). 14 We next examine whether the jury could compartmentalize the evidence. We have held that in reviewing the consideration of the jury's ability to compartmentalize the evidence against the joint defendants, we consider 1) the complexity of the case; 2) if one or more of the defendants were acquitted; and 3) the adequacy of admonitions and instructions by the trial judge. United States v. Pherigo, 327 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir.2003). The case against Gomez and Nichols was not complex. At trial, the government contended that Gomez pretended to be the heir of a fictitious estate while Nichols acted as the executor of that estate. According to the government, Gomez and Nichols both claimed that the estate was selling automobiles at reduced prices that would be delivered upon the probate court's closing of the estate. They collected money from sales of phantom vehicles which went to Nichols, who then diverted a portion of that money to Gomez through casinos. Indeed, the charges against Gomez and Nichols were virtually identical, save a few independent incidents. Neither party was acquitted. 15 Lastly, neither defendant objected to the district court's jury instructions. We, therefore, do not find the trial judge's admonitions and instruction to the jury inadequate. Blame-shifting on the part of the defendants is not a sufficient reason for severance. United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1310 (8th Cir.1997) (en banc) (citing United States v. Bordeaux, 84 F.3d 1544, 1547 (8th Cir.1996)). Here, Nichols and Gomez simply pointed the finger, each admitting that a scheme was employed, but both asserting that they had no knowledge of the fraud. They have failed to show that the jury could not have considered the evidence against each of them independently. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.