Opinion ID: 195860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review

Text: The legislative history of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), P.L. 99-499, 101 et seq., clearly indicates that, when reviewing a proposed consent decree in the CERCLA context, a trial court does not write on a pristine page. Instead, its function is circumscribed: it must ponder the proposal only to the extent needed to `satisfy itself that the settlement is reasonable, fair, and consistent with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve.' United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting House Report). This circumscription has important ramifications for appellate oversight. We elucidated the standard of review 3The amount also includes incremental interest and enforcement costs arising after the effective date of the settlement between SESD and the United States. See supra note 1. 6 governing the entry of CERCLA consent decrees in Cannons, and reaffirmed that standard in United States v. Charles George Trucking, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081 (1st Cir. 1994). We noted that, by the time CERCLA consent decrees reach this court, they are encased in a double layer of swaddling. In the first place, a trial court, without abdicating its responsibility to exercise independent judgment, must defer heavily to the parties' agreement and the EPA's expertise . . . . The second basis for deference is equally compelling. Because an appellate court ordinarily cannot rival a district court's mastery of a factually complex case . . . the district court's views must be accorded considerable respect. Largely in consequence of these layers of protective swaddling, an appellate tribunal may overturn a district court's decision to approve or reject the entry of a CERCLA consent decree only for manifest abuse of discretion. [In other words], the decision below stands unless the objectors can show that, in buying into [the decree], the lower court made a serious error of law or suffered a meaningful lapse of judgment. Id. at 1085 (quoting and citing Cannons, 899 F.2d at 84). It is this yardstick which must be used to measure the lower court's acceptance of the SESD decree.