Opinion ID: 2982465
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michigan Statutory Immunity

Text: Loosvelt also appeals the district court’s denial of statutory immunity with respect to Wells’s state-law claims for gross negligence, defamation, and tortious interference. We exercise jurisdiction over Loosvelt’s interlocutory appeal of the denial of statutory immunity under Mich. Ct. R. 7.202(6)(a)(v). See Bennett v. Krakowski, 671 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir. 2011). - 11 - Case No. 13-2127 Wells v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms Genuine issues of material fact preclude Loosvelt’s claim to statutory immunity for each statelaw claim.
Michigan law defines gross negligence as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407(8)(a). Should a reasonable jury credit Arnone’s account, it could find Loosvelt grossly negligent insofar as he made false and defamatory statements about Arnone to her employer in retribution for her constitutionally-protected insults and criticism, as such actions could demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether Arnone would lose her job. Loosvelt insists that even if his conduct fit the gross-negligence standard, Wells cannot establish that his acts proximately caused Arnone’s termination. For the purposes of statutory immunity, Michigan law defines the proximate cause as “the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding an injury.” Robinson v. City of Detroit, 613 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Mich. 2000). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Arnone, a reasonable factfinder could find that HFHS terminated Arnone as a direct result of Loosvelt’s making a false report about Arnone to HFHS. Yeager attributed Arnone’s termination to Loosvelt’s report. And HFHS Vice President Thomas Nantais said that “the reason she was being terminated was that, based on the complaint made by the officer, it is not acceptable that any employee use her employment within HFHS in a threatening manner.” (emphasis added).
Loosvelt also claims statutory immunity from Wells’s intentional-tort claims for defamation and tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship. To establish immunity from liability for the reporting to Arnone’s employer, Loosvelt must show that “he - 12 - Case No. 13-2127 Wells v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms was acting in ‘good faith,’” meaning that he did not act “maliciously or with a wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of another.” Odom v. Wayne Cnty., 760 N.W.2d 217, 225 (Mich. 2008). Again, a reasonable jury could find that Loosvelt acted “maliciously, or for an improper purpose.” Id. at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted).