Opinion ID: 1709662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the 1978 spills law

Text: ถ 45. The second issue we consider is whether Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) is applicable to post-1978 discharges of hazardous wastes resulting in part from the pre-1978 dumping of waste drums at the Bark River site, when Chrysler did not own or possess the site, but generated the wastes and failed to remediate their subsequent spillage. Once again, upon review of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler, we exercise a de novo standard of review and apply the law without deference to the circuit court's conclusion of law. See Le Fevre, 167 Wis. 2d at 736. ถ 46. Chrysler makes three primary arguments before this court relating to the Spills Law. First, Chrysler contends that the Spills Law does not allow the State to seek remediation from a party who caused a pre-Spill Law enactment discharge of a hazardous substance, but who does not currently possess or own the property which requires remediation. Second, Chrysler argues that Wis. Stat. ง 144.76(3) (1977) is intended to apply prospectively. Finally, Chrysler asserts that even if the remedial provision of the Spills Law could be applied retroactively, applying its penalty and forfeiture provisions would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions. We address these arguments in turn.