Opinion ID: 1155452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the rich creek loan and the determination of improper assessment

Text: Article six of chapter six of the West Virginia Code is concerned with the removal of persons from public office, and the petitioners base this action, specifically, upon W.Va.Code, 6-6-7 [1931]. Under that statute, a circuit court may remove a person from a county office upon any of the grounds, or for any of the causes, for which a state officer may be removed under section five of this article or for any of the causes or on any of the grounds provided by any other statute. W.Va.Code, 6-6-7 [1931], provides, in part as follows: The court, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall, without a jury, hear the charges and all evidence offered in support thereof, or in opposition thereto, and upon satisfactory proof of the charges shall remove any such officer or person from office, and place the records, papers, and property of his office in possession of some other officer or person for safekeeping, or in the possession of the person appointed ... to fill the office temporarily. W.Va.Code, 6-6-5 [1931], referred to above, provides in relevant part that [a]ny state officer holding any elective office (except the governor, any judge, or a member of the legislature of this State) may be removed from office ... for official misconduct, malfeasance in office, incompetence, neglect of duty, or gross immorality. Furthermore, W.Va.Code, 6-6-1 [1931], provides, in part, as follows: The term neglect of duty, or the term official misconduct, as used in this article, shall include the willful waste of public funds by any officer or officers, or the appointment by him or them of an incompetent or disqualified person to any office or position and the retention of such person in office, or in the position to which he was appointed.... Finally, under W.Va.Code, 6-6-1 [1931], the term incompetence, as used in article six, is stated to include the wasting or misappropriation of public funds by any officer, habitual drunkenness, habitual addiction to the use of narcotic drugs, adultery, neglect of duty, or gross immorality, on the part of any officer. In Smith v. Godby, 154 W.Va. 190, 174 S.E.2d 165 (1970), the petitioners, pursuant to W.Va.Code, 6-6-7 [1931], sought to remove the Assessor of Logan County from office. The respondent in this action was that assessor. The Circuit Court of Logan County in Smith v. Godby removed the assessor from office, stating, inter alia, that the assessor had retained incompetent employees and, further, had not complied with statutory assessment provisions. This Court, however, determining the evidence to be insufficient to justify removal, restored the assessor to his office. Syllabus points 2, 3 and 4 of that action provide as follows: 2. The remedy for the removal from office of a public officer is a drastic remedy and the statutory provision prescribing the grounds for removal is given strict construction. 3. Section 7, Article 6, Chapter 6, Code, 1931, expressly requires that to remove a person from office the charge against him must be established by satisfactory proof. 4. When the finding of a trial court in a case tried by it in lieu of a jury is against the preponderance of the evidence, is not supported by the evidence, or is plainly wrong, such finding will be reversed and set aside by this Court upon appellate review. In conjunction with syllabus point 3, above, this Court, in Smith v. Godby stated that the evidence to sustain a removal in a proceeding to remove a public officer must be clear and convincing. 154 W.Va. at 199, 174 S.E.2d at 172. Similarly, in Evans v. Hutchinson, 158 W.Va. 359, 214 S.E.2d 453 (1975), which action involved the removal from office of certain members of the Wayne County, West Virginia, Board of Education, syllabus point 9 states as follows: To warrant removal of an official pursuant to Code 1931, 6-6-7, clear and convincing evidence must be adduced to meet the statutory requirement of satisfactory proof. See also syl. pt. 2, Kemp v. Boyd, 275 S.E.2d 297 (W.Va.1981), and syl. pt. 3, In the Matter of Boso, 160 W.Va. 38, 231 S.E.2d 715 (1977). Moreover, the meaning of official misconduct, malfeasance in office, etc., has been considered by this Court in previous cases. Syllabus point 4 of Evans v. Hutchinson, supra , states that [o]fficial misconduct warranting removal from public office need not arise from or involve the precise duties enjoined upon the office held; it is, rather, any unlawful behavior relevant to the duties of the office. This Court in Kesling v. Moore, 102 W.Va. 251, 135 S.E. 246 (1926), affirmed the removal from office of certain members of a school district board of education. In that action, the officers were found to be guilty of misconduct because they had a financial interest in various contracts to provide supplies and services to school properties of the district. Syllabus point 2 of that action states as follows: Misconduct in office is any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. [7] See also syl. pt. 3, Daugherty v. Day, 145 W.Va. 592, 116 S.E.2d 131 (1960). In another West Virginia case, Wysong v. Walden, 120 W.Va. 122, 52 S.E.2d 392 (1938), citing syllabus point 2 of Kesling v. Moore , it was stated that [t]he term `neglect of duty' or the term `official misconduct'... `shall include the wilful waste of public funds by any officer or officers.' Code 1931, 6-6-1. 120 W.Va. at 125, 52 S.E.2d at 395. See also Painter v. Heironimus, 97 W.Va. 579, 125 S.E. 525 (1924). Daugherty v. Ellis, 142 W.Va. 340, 97 S.E.2d 33 (1956), cited in Smith v. Godby , involved a situation where this Court affirmed the removal from office of a county commissioner. It was determined that the commissioner was guilty of malfeasance within the meaning of article six of chapter six of the West Virginia Code. Specifically, the commissioner made an unauthorized sale of county livestock to certain individuals at an inordinately low price. The definition of malfeasance was discussed in Daugherty v. Ellis and was said to include acts which are unlawful or wrongful. Referring to a decision from Tennessee, this Court stated as follows: [M]alfeasance is the doing of an act which an officer had no legal right to do at all and that when an officer, through ignorance, inattention, or malice, does that which he has no legal right to do at all, or acts without any authority whatsoever, or exceeds, ignores, or abuses his powers, he is guilty of malfeasance. 142 W.Va. at 358, 97 S.E.2d at 43. This Court also said in Daugherty v. Ellis that [t]o establish malfeasance in office it is not necessary to show a specific intent to defraud, or that the act is criminal or corrupt in character. 142 W.Va. at 357-58, 97 S.E.2d at 42-43. It is undisputed that during the period in question the respondent received a $10,000 loan from Rich Creek Mining Company, a taxpayer in Logan County. Rich Creek is not a corporation primarily in the business of lending money. Furthermore, the record indicates that not only did the respondent fail to repay the loan, he sold to others part of the collateral described in the written loan agreement. It is also undisputed that, prior to any involvement of the Logan County Commission, the respondent marked improper personal property tax tickets of the Logan County Sheriff's Office for Rich Creek Mining Company and for four other corporations associated with Rich Creek, i.e., C.C. & E. Coal Co., Deerfield Mining Co., Laramie Mining Company, Inc., and Spring Branch Mining Co., Inc. See n. 4, supra. Such activity upon the part of the respondent must be viewed in light of W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939]. That statute provides as follows: Any taxpayer, or the prosecuting attorney or tax commissioner upon behalf of the State, county and districts, claiming to be aggrieved by any entry in the property books of the county, including entries with respect to classification and taxability of property, resulting from a clerical error, or a mistake occasioned by an unintentional or inadvertent act as distinguished from a mistake growing out of negligence or the exercise of poor judgment, may, within one year from the time the property books are delivered to the sheriff, apply for relief to the county court [county commission] of the county in which such books are made out. Before the application is heard, the taxpayer shall give notice to the prosecuting attorney of the county, or the State shall give notice to the taxpayer, as the case may be. The application, whether by the taxpayer or the State, shall have precedence over all other business before the court [county commission]; but any order or judgment shall show that either the prosecuting attorney or the tax commissioner was present defending the interests of the State, county and districts: Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not be construed as giving county courts [county commissions] jurisdiction to consider any question involving the classification or taxability of property which has been the subject matter of an appeal under the provisions of section twenty-four-a of this article; and any other such clerical error or mistake involving the classification or taxability of property, may be corrected by the county court [county commission] under the provisions of this section only when approved, in writing, by the county assessor. In the event it is ascertained that the applicant is entitled to relief, any excess taxes already paid shall be refunded and, if charged but not paid, the applicant shall be released from the payment of such excess. Whenever any correction is made by the county court [county commission], the clerk shall certify copies of the order to the auditor, to the sheriff and to the assessor, and in the case of real estate, the assessor shall thereupon make a correction in accordance with the order in his land book for the next year. Any such order delivered to the sheriff or other collecting officer shall restrain him from collecting so much as is erroneously charged against the taxpayer, and, if already collected, shall compel him to refund the money if such officer has not already paid it into the treasury. In either case, when indorsed by the person exonerated, it shall be sufficient voucher to entitle the officer to a credit for so much in his settlement which he is required to make. If the applicant be the State, the order certified to the sheriff shall show the correct amount of taxes due the State, county and districts and shall be sufficient to authorize collection in the same manner as for other State, county and district taxes. According to the provisions of W.Va. Code, 11-3-27 [1939], the respondent was not authorized to simply alter the tax tickets of the sheriff and then notify the Logan County Commission. Under the above statute, action by the county commission should have preceded the alteration of the tax tickets. This Court is of the opinion that the action of the respondent concerning the impropering of the personal property tax tickets in question constitutes the type of official misconduct, malfeasance in office, etc., contemplated by the removal statutes upon which the petitioners have proceeded in this action. Specifically, we hold that where a county assessor cancelled or marked improper certain personal property tax tickets of associated corporations, one of which corporations had made a loan to the assessor which was never repaid, and the action of the assessor in cancelling or marking the tax tickets improper was done without prior authorization of the county commission under W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939], that assessor was subject to removal from office under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 6-6-7 [1931]. Upon the record in this action, we can justify no other conclusion but removal of the respondent from office. The action of the respondent in marking the tax tickets improper was wrongful and cannot be condoned. Such activity cannot be excused as de minimis. The evidence reveals an inappropriate mixture of the respondent's financial obligations and his violation of W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939]. See Kesling v. Moore, supra . As indicated by respondent's exhibit 12 and petitioner's exhibit 35, the respondent corresponded upon county stationery with Rich Creek Mining Company and Gilbert Imported Hardwoods, Inc. ( see n. 1, supra ) concerning his loans from those companies. The trial judge determined that the respondent's failure to follow the provisions of W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939], did not constitute grounds for removal from office, absent clear and convincing evidence that the respondent's actions resulted in a waste of public funds. Based upon the above authorities, however, waste of public funds is a factor to be considered, rather than an absolute requirement, in removal proceedings such as the proceeding now before this Court. We therefore, hold that waste of public funds is not an absolute requirement to removal of a person from office under the provisions of W.Va.Code, 6-6-7 [1931]; however, waste of public funds may be considered with respect to the removal of a person from office under that statute. We recognize the concern expressed in the record that strict adherence to the provisions of W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939], may be somewhat impractical in view of the number of taxpayers potentially seeking relief under that statute. However, the integrity of W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939], must also be recognized, especially under the circumstances of this case where interwoven with the procedures called for under that statute were the respondent's personal, financial transactions. This Court does not find the evidence clear as to what the respondent was told in 1982 by representatives of the West Virginia State Tax Department subsequent to the written audit report for the period July 1, 1981 through June 30, 1982. With respect to Rich Creek Mining Company and its associated corporations, the respondent had all the more reason to closely follow the provisions of W.Va.Code, 11-3-27 [1939]. We therefore direct that, pursuant to W.Va.Code, 6-6-7 [1931], the respondent be removed from office.