Opinion ID: 1693450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeals by the State

Text: When the state files an interlocutory appeal or an appeal from a dismissal of an indictment or information, the state must request an extension of the speedy trial time period in accordance with rule 3.191(d)(2). In ruling on the request, the trial court's only responsibility is to ensure that an extension does not violate the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial pursuant to the standards set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The trial court should liberally allow requests for extension, and, when entering its order, it should provide a reasonable time period for the state to proceed to trial upon completion of the appeal. The trial court should deny a request only when the defendant affirmatively shows that his right to a speedy trial under the Barker standards is constitutionally prejudiced by the extension. There are three ways that orders granting extensions have been entered and each has a different effect. First, if the trial court's order grants an extension for the period of the appeal but is silent as to the time when the defendant must be brought to trial after the appellate court's mandate, then the state must try the defendant within the time remaining as of the date of the notice of appeal of the original ninety-day or 180-day period. This is consistent with our decision in State v. Williams, 350 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1977). In Williams 135 days of the 180 days under the speedy trial rule had elapsed when the state filed an appeal. The trial court ordered a stay of the speedy trial rule but only for the period of time necessary to complete appellate procedures... . Id. at 82. When the trial was not commenced within forty-five days after issuance of the appellate court's mandate, we held the defendant was entitled to a discharge under the order entered by the trial judge. Second, if the trial court grants an extension for the period of the appeal plus a reasonable period after issuance of the appellate mandate without specifying the number of days, the time period under rule 3.191(a) is not controlling, and only the constitutional test of reasonableness is applied under the existing rule. The ninety-day period under rule 3.191(g) as it presently exists does not apply since the defendant is not being tried again. This provision, however, has been changed effective January 1, 1981, and the ninety-day period under the new rule 3.191 will be applicable to state appeals. Third, it is our view that the best practice in granting an extension under the present rule is for the trial court to specify the number of days, preferably ninety days, from the date of receipt of the appellate mandate as the time period in which the defendant must be brought to trial. It is important for the trial court to let both sides clearly know the period in which the case must be tried, and ninety days is the allowed period under the new rule 3.191(g) effective January 1, 1981.