Opinion ID: 2044356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: summary judgment on battery claim

Text: The Yoders next argue that the district court erred when it granted Cotton summary judgment on their claim of battery. The Yoders claim that Yoder's consent was ineffective because he was required to undergo the IME in order to pursue his workers' compensation claim. Alternatively, the Yoders argue that Cotton's actions went beyond the scope of Yoder's consent. [8] The tort of battery requires actual infliction of unconsented injury upon or unconsented contact with another. [11] The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892 [12] states that [c]onsent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. It may be manifested by action or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor. And, [i]f words or conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact. [13] Battery committed by a physician has been distinguished from claims of medical malpractice. Courts have generally noted that a claim for battery arises out of an action which `depends on neither professional judgment nor the physician's surgical skill.' [14] Battery actions in the medical context have been limited to situations where the physician did not gain consent for his or her actions or greatly exceeded the scope of that consent, e.g., operating on the wrong limb. [15] In all cases, consent to a procedure defeated a battery claim. In Nebraska, battery cases against physicians have been largely limited to claims of sexual assault. [16] However, in Jones v. Malloy, [17] we found that a patient's consent to chiropractic services defeated her battery claim against the physician, even though the physician acted outside the explicit scope of her consent. In that case, the patient had asked the chiropractor not to work on her lower back and had even refused him permission to x-ray her lower back. [18] The patient alleged that the chiropractor disregarded her explicit instructions and that by adjusting her lower back, he committed a battery on her. [19] [9] We held that [a]s a practical matter, health professionals cannot be required to obtain express consent before each touch or test they perform on a patient. [20] We further stated that implied consent may be inferred from the patient's action of seeking treatment or some other act manifesting a willingness to submit to a particular course of treatment. [21] Questions of whether a physician overstepped his or her bounds of the patient's initial consent by failing to inform the patient of the risks of treatment is an issue of negligence properly addressed under a medical malpractice claim. [22] Yoder gave implicit consent when he arrived at Cotton's office to undergo the IME. Yoder cooperated with Cotton's directions during the course of the examination and gave no indication that he was not giving his consent. In his deposition, Yoder testified that he tape recorded his visit, and a transcript of the tape was included in the record. Although much of the tape is indistinguishable, there is no indication that Yoder ever refused to give consent or that he asked Cotton to stop the examination. Yoder's argument that his consent was ineffective because he was required to attend the examination is unpersuasive. We also find Andrew v. Begley [23] instructive. In that case, plaintiff was required to undergo a physical examination as part of her regularly scheduled review of disability benefits. Plaintiff claimed the physician punctured her skin during the sensory examination, tore her rotator cuff while testing range of motion in her arm, and caused further injury to her back and legs. Plaintiff then filed claims for negligence and battery. The battery claim was dismissed, because plaintiff could not show that she did not give consent or that she had withdrawn her consent. [24] [10] The court's analysis in Andrew addressed what constituted consent and stated that where as in these circumstances, a physician is conducting an examination with express or implied consent, a plaintiff must prove that she withdrew her consent. [25] In a medical examination context, a court must first ask whether a party used language that unequivocally revoked his or her consent and was subject to no other reasonable interpretation. Second, a court must ask whether stopping the treatment or examination was medically feasible. [26] The plaintiff in Andrew made no statement during the examination that could be interpreted as a request to stop, although she did protest that certain movements hurt. The court in that case stated that [p]rotestations by a plaintiff of pain and discomfort ... are not enough to meet the first prong of the test for effective withdrawal. [27] Without proof that she did not consent, or that she had unequivocally withdrawn her consent, the plaintiff could not pursue her battery claim. [11] As in Andrew, Yoder was required to undergo an IME and he complied with the requirement. Like the plaintiff in Andrew, Yoder stated that he felt some pain but he never asked Cotton to stop the examination. We find that Yoder implicitly consented to the IME. Whether Cotton acted beyond the scope of that consent is an issue of informed consent, a matter properly addressed in a medical malpractice claim, which we discuss below. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Cotton on the battery claim.