Opinion ID: 2101520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government Power Intended to Support Individual Freedom

Text: Section 9 forbids the General Assembly from passing any law restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever. Ind. Const. art. I, § 9. A corresponding clause stipulates that for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible. Id. Common in state constitutions, this formulation is sometimes called the freedom-and-responsibility standard. [3] Under this standard, a legislature may not impair the flow of ideas; instead, its sole authority over expression is to sanction individuals who commit abuse. Understanding the notion of abuse is therefore critical to resolving cases under § 9. When the import of a given word is at issue, a useful starting point is the documentary evidence which illuminates the contemporaneous understanding of its meaning. See, e.g., Fordyce v. State (1991), Ind. App., 569 N.E.2d 357. Dictionaries published proximate to the adoption of § 9 define abuse variously as a thing established by usage, though contrary to good order, Law Lexicon 11 (J.J.S. Wharton ed. 1860); accord I Bouvier's Law Dictionary 78 (1883); the destruction of the substance of a thing in using it, id.; and [t]he ill use of any thing, John Walker, Critical Pronouncing Dictionary 109 (1815). These descriptions yield an acceptable working definition which we characterize as follows: Abuse is the use of a thing in a manner injurious to the order or arrangement from which it derives its function. The free expression guarantee of the Indiana Constitution is one of thirty-seven provisions in our Bill of Rights and, we may assume, was calibrated consonant with its overall design. This design reflects the influence of the natural rights paradigm ascendant during Indiana's formative years. Under that theory, individuals are deemed to have ceded a quantum of their natural rights [4] in exchange for receiving the advantages of mutual commerce. Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England I:125 (Thomas M. Cooley ed. 3d ed. 1884). The aggregate of these concessions, often called the state's police power, constitutes the authority by which the advantages of political community are secured. Viewed in this light, police power is properly understood as the right of individuals, collectively, to ensure and promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the community. Cf. Bruck v. State ex rel. Money (1950), 228 Ind. 189, 91 N.E.2d 349. This right of the majority to define and effect salubrious conditions is sometimes viewed as being at odds with the ability of individuals to pursue their personal ends. Our founders, however, perceived no dichotomy between individual rights and communal needs. See Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in Constitution and Rights in the Early American Republic 55 (William E. Nelson & Robert C. Palmer eds., 1987); see also State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall (1947), 225 Ind. 360, 365, 74 N.E.2d 914, 916 (It is a duty of government in so far as possible to avoid conflict [between individual rights and communal needs] and to provide a way of life and safety that will protect both rights.). Instead, they viewed the needs which gave rise to state powers as impediments to the full enjoyment of rights. State powers were thus intended to perform an ameliorative function and were considered liberty-enhancing when exercised by a properly structured republican government. Providing this structure is the principal task for which the powers and restrictions in our Constitution and our Bill of Rights were designed. Applying these assumptions to the skeletal definition of abuse set out above, we conclude that § 9 derives its function from a constitutional arrangement calculated to correlate the enjoyment of individual rights and the exercise of state power such that the latter facilitates the former. Abuse then lies in that expression which injures the retained rights of individuals or undermines the State's efforts to facilitate their enjoyment. As such, § 9 limits legislative authority over expression to sanctioning encroachments upon the rights of individuals or interference with exercises of the police power. See also Gibson v. Kincaid (1966), 140 Ind. App. 186, 221 N.E.2d 834 (expression will be curtailed only when it infringes another's rights). Though earnestly given, the promise that § 9 shields all expression from penalty save that which impairs a state prerogative may appear illusory, given the broad sweep of those prerogatives. The State may exercise its police power to promote the health, safety, comfort, morals, and welfare of the public. State v. Gerhardt (1896), 145 Ind. 439, 44 N.E. 469. In furthering these objectives, it may subject persons and property to restraints and burdens, even those which impair natural rights. Weisenberger v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 424, 429, 175 N.E. 238, 240. Further, courts defer to legislative decisions about when to exercise the police power. See Peachey v. Boswell (1960), 240 Ind. 604, 167 N.E.2d 48, and typically require only that they be rational. From this, one might conclude that the Indiana Constitution permits punishing expression any time the courts are willing to indulge the presumption that the statute which penalizes it is rational. Such a conclusion fails to recognize, however, that in Indiana the police power is limited by the existence of certain preserves of human endeavor, typically denominated as interests not within the realm of the police power, see Milharcic v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning Appeals (1986), Ind. App., 489 N.E.2d 634, 637, upon which the State must tread lightly, if at all. Put another way, there is within each provision of our Bill of Rights a cluster of essential values which the legislature may qualify but not alienate. See Palmer, supra, at 65-66. A right is impermissibly alienated when the State materially burdens one of the core values which it embodies. [5] Accordingly, while violating a rational statute will generally constitute abuse under § 9, the State may not punish expression when doing so would impose a material burden upon a core constitutional value. We now proceed to apply this standard to Price's case.