Opinion ID: 2377179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Variance In Testimony

Text: At a bench conference requested by Respondent's counsel as Trooper Byrd was being called to the stand, the trial judge was informed that the State would attempt to elicit testimony concerning the statements heard on the CB radio. Respondent's counsel objected to any reference being made to the statements in the presence of the jury, and Judge Cameron agreed to excuse the jury when the testimony of Trooper Byrd reached that point. Consistent with this understanding, Trooper Byrd's initial testimony concerning the statements was given out of the presence of the jury. Following that testimony, and following argument by both counsel, Judge Cameron ruled the statements admissible, and the jury was recalled. As Jones points out, Trooper Byrd's testimony before the jury differed in some respects from that given before the judge. In first describing the statements he heard, Trooper Byrd cast them in the language of each declarant: Look at Smokey Bear southbound with no lights on at a high rate of speed. Look at that little car trying to catch up with him. Before the jury, Trooper Byrd cast his testimony in the narrative form: On the CB radio in the state police car, Channel 19, I overheard a trucker on the CB said [sic] that it was Smokey the Bear southbound in a police car with no lights on and right after that ... another trucker on Channel 19 advised that there was a little car just took off behind Smokey the Bear trying to catch him at a high rate of speed. Because the content of a statement may contain the requisite evidence of spontaneity, or of the fact that the statement is the product of personal perception by the declarant, Booth, supra, 306 Md. at 330, 508 A.2d 976, the wording of the statement may be important. Here, the statements in the form first related by Trooper Byrd are self-evidently spontaneous. However, the statements as related to the jury, at least when standing alone, give rise to questions concerning their spontaneity. [4] The record discloses that Judge Cameron ruled on the admissibility of the statements based upon the initial testimony of Trooper Byrd. After the jury was recalled, and Trooper Byrd was asked to recount what he had heard, Respondent's counsel interposed a timely objection. However, counsel did not make any additional objection, or move to strike the answer, when Trooper Byrd gave what Respondent now suggests was a different version of the statements. Thus, Judge Cameron was given an opportunity to rule only on the basis of the testimony presented to him. He was never given an opportunity to determine whether the change in language would affect his ruling on admissibility. Nor was the prosecutor given an opportunity to inquire through further questioning whether the change in language reflected simply a different method of presenting the same information, or represented a change in Trooper Byrd's recollection of what had occurred. Although Respondent's counsel has fully preserved for review the question of admissibility based upon the testimony given at the hearing, he has not preserved any question concerning the possible legal effect of the change in words used to recount the statements.