Opinion ID: 844147
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Good cause for the delay

Text: Petitioner alleges that if we find the claims in the petition are substantially delayed, as we now do, he has shown good cause for the delay because the facts were unknown and present counsel only recently discovered the bases of the claims. These attempted justifications largely echo the arguments previously made and addressed above and are patently meritless for the same reasons; that is, it appears the facts were known either at the time of trial or the first habeas corpus petition, and a change in attorneys does not reset the clock for habeas corpus purposes. Petitioner‘s further complaint that he is unschooled in the law is irrelevant, as he has been represented by legal counsel throughout the postconviction period. Petitioner also avers that ineffective assistance of prior counsel demonstrates good cause for the delay. He claims he was ―unable‖ to raise these claims earlier because Attorney Thomas Nolan, who represented him on appeal and in his first habeas corpus petition, was ineffective for failing to raise these issues either on appeal or in that first petition. ―[A] petitioner who is represented by counsel when a petition for writ of habeas corpus is filed has a right to assume that counsel is competent and is presenting all potentially meritorious claims.‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at 32 p. 780, italics omitted.) Thus, ―[i]n limited circumstances, consideration may be given to a claim that prior habeas corpus counsel did not competently represent a petitioner‖ (id. at p. 779) which, if established, ―may be offered in explanation and justification of the need to file another petition‖ (id. at p. 780). The pleading required for a claim that prior habeas corpus counsel was ineffective in omitting a particular issue tracks what a habeas corpus petitioner must plead and prove in order to obtain relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel generally. The basic standard of performance is whether the conduct of counsel—including counsel in capital cases—―fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,‖ ― under prevailing professional norms.‖ (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688; see In re Hardy, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1018.) Thus, ―[t]he petitioner must . . . allege with specificity the facts underlying the claim that the inadequate presentation of an issue or omission of any issue reflects incompetence of counsel, i.e., that the issue is one which would have entitled the petitioner to relief had it been raised and adequately presented in the initial petition, and that counsel‘s failure to do so reflects a standard of representation falling below that to be expected from an attorney engaged in the representation of criminal defendants.‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 780.) The mere fact that prior counsel omitted a particular nonfrivolous claim, however, is not in itself sufficient to establish prior counsel was incompetent. Habeas corpus counsel, like appellate counsel, ―performs properly and competently when he or she exercises discretion and presents only the strongest claims instead of every conceivable claim.‖ (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 810.) Many of the claims now before us were actually raised on appeal or in petitioner‘s first habeas corpus petition; as to these claims, the allegations of ineffectiveness of prior counsel are belied by the record. For most of the remaining claims (what petitioner terms the ―non-repetitive‖ claims), the facts in 33 support were known, or should have been known, earlier, rendering it possible prior counsel knew of the facts and unreasonably failed to assert claims based on them. Indeed, petitioner alleges prior counsel Nolan had no tactical reason for failing to raise these claims, a fact Nolan asserts—but does not explain—in his declaration accompanying the traverse. But the ―mere omission of a claim ‗developed‘ by new counsel does not raise a presumption that prior habeas corpus counsel was incompetent, or warrant consideration of the merits of a successive petition. Nor will the court consider on the merits successive petitions attacking the competence of . . . prior habeas corpus counsel which reflect nothing more than the ability of present counsel with the benefit of hindsight, additional time and investigative services, and newly retained experts, to demonstrate that a different or better defense could have been mounted had . . . prior habeas corpus counsel had similar advantages.‖ (In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 780; accord, Harrington v. Richter, supra, 562 U.S. at p. ___ [131 S.Ct. at p. 788].) Therefore, Nolan‘s asserted lack of a tactical reason for omitting certain claims does not necessarily establish that he was ineffective for failing to raise them on appeal or in the first habeas corpus petition. Unless counsel‘s failure to raise the issue earlier was objectively unreasonable and the omission caused the petitioner actual prejudice, counsel‘s omission of the claim does not justify the presentation of the claim in a subsequent petition. Petitioner contends it was objectively unreasonable that Nolan did not bring certain omitted claims because those claims were ―potentially meritorious.‖ (Clark, at p. 780.) But, as discussed further below, the omission of these claims did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of Clark. The mere fact that present counsel has identified some legal claims not previously pressed on appeal or in a prior habeas corpus petition does not 34 necessarily suggest prior counsel was constitutionally ineffective, for we presume such unraised claims exist in all cases. For example, because the range of permissible mitigating evidence admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial is ―virtually unlimited‖ (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 916), the mere fact that new counsel has discovered some background information concerning a defendant‘s family, educational, scholastic or medical history that was not presented to the jury at trial in mitigation of penalty is insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate prior counsel‘s actions fell below the standard of professional competence. Even if we could conclude prior counsel knew, or should have known, of such information, counsel‘s decision regarding which issues to raise and how vigorously to investigate them given time and funding restraints ― ‗falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance‘ ‖ (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689) and is entitled to great deference. In short, the omission of a claim, whether tactical or inadvertent, does not of itself demonstrate ineffectiveness unless it was objectively unreasonable, meaning that the omitted claim was one that any reasonably competent counsel would have brought. Even if the omission of a claim was objectively unreasonable, a petitioner must further show that the claim entitles him or her to relief. Absent such a showing supported by specific facts, repeated and continual filings based on the justification that one‘s prior attorney was ineffective are, in the end, infinitely reductive and thus untenable. Petitioner contends the duty to raise all potentially meritorious claims required prior habeas corpus counsel to raise claims that had been previously rejected in other cases because the law might change in petitioner‘s favor. (See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of those who were under 18 years of age when they committed their crime], overruling Stanford v. Kentucky (1989) 492 U.S. 361; Atkins v. Virginia, supra, 35 536 U.S. 304 [Eighth Amend. prohibits execution of the mentally retarded], overruling Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393 [Florida jury instruction limiting jury to mitigating circumstances specifically enumerated by statute is unconstitutional], reversing Cooper v. State (Fla. 1976) 336 So.2d 1133.) This argument ignores the rule that, should the law change while a defendant is still pressing his or her appeal or seeking postconviction relief, the defendant is entitled to file a new petition to take advantage of a change in the law. For example, we held in In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th 813, that a habeas corpus petitioner may raise ―an issue previously rejected on direct appeal when there has been a change in the law affecting the petitioner.‖ (Id. at p. 841, and cases cited.) A change in the law will also excuse a successive or repetitive habeas corpus petition. (In re Martinez, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 950 & fn. 1.) The possibility that an inmate could be executed before an appellate court at some future date changes the law in his favor is not a reason to repeatedly present a claim to the same court that has previously rejected it, absent a legitimate and asserted ground for revisiting the issue, rooted in the doctrine of stare decisis. (See, e.g., People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 347-348 [explaining the court‘s abandonment of the M‘Naghten test for insanity].) Thus, prior counsel‘s failure to raise claims that we have previously rejected in other cases does not justify the inclusion of such claims in a successive petition. Petitioner argues both the California Rules of Professional Conduct and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (ABA Model Rules) support the notion that counsel is ethically obligated to raise defaulted claims. He is mistaken. The Rules of Professional Conduct merely require counsel to act competently, that is, with ―diligence,‖ ―learning and skill,‖ and ―mental, emotional, and physical ability reasonably necessary for the performance 36 of [legal] service.‖ (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3-110(B).) As noted, ethical and diligent counsel may winnow the available claims so as to maximize the likelihood of obtaining relief. (See Jones v. Barnes (1983) 463 U.S. 745, 751-754.) Considering the ABA Model Rules requires a different analysis. California has not formally adopted those rules as an ethical standard (General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1164, 1190, fn. 6), but rule 1-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, applicable to California attorneys, provides that ―[e]thics opinions and rules and standards promulgated by . . . bar associations may also be considered‖ when judging the actions or omissions of an attorney. ―Thus, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct may be considered as a collateral source, particularly in areas where there is no direct authority in California and there is no conflict with the public policy of California.‖ (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644, 656.) ―[C]ourts and attorneys find the [ABA Model Rules] helpful and persuasive in situations where the California rules are unclear or inadequate.‖ (Witkin, 1 Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Attorneys, § 407(3), p. 521.) Our state‘s ethical rules concerning counsel in capital cases are neither unclear nor inadequate, rendering resort to the ABA Model Rules unnecessary. Although counsel for petitioner and amici curiae point especially to the American Bar Association‘s Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Feb. 2003 rev.) (ABA Guidelines) as the source of their ethical obligation to raise defaulted claims,19 those standards are not congruent with constitutional standards for effective legal representation. For 19 [as of Aug. 30, 2012]. 37 example, guideline 10.15.1(C) of the ABA Guidelines provides: ―Post-conviction counsel should seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality capital defense representation, including challenges to any overly restrictive procedural rules. Counsel should make every professionally appropriate effort to present issues in a manner that will preserve them for subsequent review.‖ (ABA Guidelines, p. 123, italics added.) Commentary to this guideline states: ―As with every other stage of capital proceedings, collateral counsel has a duty in accordance with Guideline 10.8 to raise and preserve all arguably meritorious issues. These include not only challenges to the conviction and sentence, but also issues which may arise subsequently. Collateral counsel should assume that any meritorious issue not contained in the initial application will be waived or procedurally defaulted in subsequent litigation, or barred by strict rules governing subsequent applications.‖ (Id. at pp. 128-129, italics added, fns. omitted.) Along these same lines, commentary accompanying guideline 10.8 states: ― ‗One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage of appellate and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may result in the client being executed even though reversible error occurred at trial.‘ ‖ (ABA Guidelines, p. 87, italics added.) The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the ABA Guidelines