Opinion ID: 1149193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Susan McAdams and Francis Lewis

Text: The United States Supreme Court announced the standard for the exclusion of potential jurors in death penalty cases in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). However in 1985, because of a general confusion surrounding the application of Witherspoon, Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 418, 105 S.Ct. 844, 849, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), the Court revisited the issue in Wainwright v. Witt. In Witt, the Court began by stating that recent opinions of this Court demonstrate no ritualistic adherence to a requirement that a prospective juror make it `unmistakably clear ... that [she] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment.' Id. at 419, 105 S.Ct. at 849 (emphasis supplied). The court also recognized, as it had previously done in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), that the State has a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who could follow their instructions and obey their oaths. Id. at 44, 100 S.Ct. at 2526. Therefore, [t]he state may insist... that jurors will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court. Id. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526. The Witt Court then explicitly recognized that it had previously placed the lower courts in a very difficult position. The state of this case law leaves the trial courts with the difficult task of distinguishing between prospective jurors whose opposition to capital punishment will not allow them to apply the law or view the facts impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital punishment, will nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at trial. Id., at 421, 105 S.Ct. at 850. Therefore, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the Witherspoon decision. [T]he proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment ... is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. (quoting from Adams) Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. Significantly, the Court explicitly noted that this standard does not have to be proved with `unmistakable clarity.' Id., 105 S.Ct. at 852. This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-andanswer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many venireman simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear.... Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law ... [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852. The defendant claims the trial court erroneously excluded for cause potential jurors Susan McAdams and Francis Lewis, who, as required by law, indicated a willingness to consider the defendant's age as a mitigating circumstance. The language of La.Code Crim.P. art. 798(2)(b) clearly conforms with the Witt standard. The article in pertinent part reads: It is good cause for challenge on the part of the state ... [t]hat his (the potential juror's) attitude toward the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Furthermore, La.Code Crim.P. art. 797, sections (2) and (4) state that either the state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the ground that: [t]he juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality ... (or) [t]he juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court. This court has further held that a trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and his ruling will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the judge abused his discretion. State v. Robertson, 92-2660, (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1281. In Robertson, a potential juror was not excused for cause even though he stated he would not consider mitigating circumstances if the crime involved the killing of more than one person. In that case, we found the juror should have been dismissed for cause because he was unable to accept the law as given, and he was not impartial to the sentence to be imposed. The instant case is the first time this court has had to consider the converse of the Robertson situation, i.e., where a juror has indicated they may give too much consideration to a mitigating circumstance. However, a survey of our sister states reveal they have dealt with this issue. In Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 246 (Fla.1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 130, 139 L.Ed.2d 80 (1997), the Florida Supreme Court held that a prospective juror was properly dismissed because he expressly stated that he could not follow the law and could not recommend a death sentence for the defendant because of his young age. The defendant was eighteen when he committed crime. In State v. Richardson, 923 S.W.2d 301, 309 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 403, 136 L.Ed.2d 317 (1996), an en banc panel of the Missouri Supreme Court held that a potential juror was properly dismissed, despite the fact his reservations about returning the death penalty were based on statutory mitigating factors, when the juror indicated an inability to consider the death penalty based on accomplice liability and the defendant's age. In Garcia v. State, 919 S.W.2d 370, 389 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that a potential juror was properly excused when he indicated he could not impose a death sentence upon a youthful offender. The defendant was eighteen years old when the offense was committed. In People v. Fudge, 7 Cal.4th 1075, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36, 45 (1994)( en banc ), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021, 115 S.Ct. 1367, 131 L.Ed.2d 223 (1995), an en banc panel of the California Supreme Court found that a potential juror was properly dismissed where she stated she could not impose the death penalty due to the defendant's age. The defendant was eighteen years old when he committed the crime and twenty years old at trial. In People v. Kirkpatrick, 7 Cal.4th 988, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248, 257 (Cal.1994)( en banc ), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1015, 115 S.Ct. 1357, 131 L.Ed.2d 215 (1995) again, an en banc panel of the California Supreme Court addressed a similar issue and stated: A prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of the aggravating circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, is therefore subject to challenge for cause. In People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 206 (Colo.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991), the Colorado Supreme Court found that a potential juror was properly excused when he stated he did not think he could return a death verdict in a case where intoxication, a statutory mitigating defense, could be an issue. In State v. Sparks, 147 Ariz. 51, 54, 708 P.2d 732, 735 (1985), the Arizona Supreme Court found that a potential juror was properly dismissed when her responses as a whole indicated her inability to sit on a jury without distraction because she could be sidetracked by reservations about the death penalty and the defendant's youth. In State v. Martin, 41 Wash.App. 133, 138-40, 703 P.2d 309, 312 (1985), the Washington Court of Appeal found that a potential juror was properly dismissed from the jury when he repeatedly stated he could not impose the death penalty on a defendant so young because he had children the defendant's age. In Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 718 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1221, 105 S.Ct. 1209, 84 L.Ed.2d 351, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1229, 105 S.Ct. 1229, 84 L.Ed.2d 366 (1985), the Mississippi Supreme Court found that two potential jurors were properly dismissed when they both indicated they could not vote for the death penalty regardless of the evidence because of the defendant's age. Finally, in Magill v. Florida, 386 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927, 101 S.Ct. 1384, 67 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the Florida Supreme Court found that a potential juror was properly dismissed when it became apparent she could not vote for the death penalty because the defendant was under twenty-one. We, like our sister states who have addressed the issue, hold that when a potential juror indicates his or her attitude regarding the mitigating circumstances would substantially impair his or her ability to return the death penalty, then that juror is properly excludable for cause. The record of the voir dire reveals that Ms. McAdams initially expressed reservations about the death penalty and indicated she was a theoretical supporter of the death penalty but could not necessarily vote for the death penalty as a member of a jury. In response to the district attorney's query about her ability to return a sentence of death, she responded, I think in some circumstances I could. In some circumstances I could vote for a death penalty. And in some I maybe couldn't. The State then asked her whether she could return the death penalty in a case which involved an intentional killing occurring during the perpetration of an attempted armed robbery. To that question, Ms. McAdams ultimately responded that she might be able to return a death verdict. The State responded to her, noting that she was shaking [her] head and that she appeared to be having a struggle with this, to which Ms. McAdams responded affirmatively. Later, in response to questions from the State, Ms. McAdams expressed considerably stronger reservations about her ability to return a death verdict. The relevant voir dire demonstrating those reservations reads: Q: Let's trylet me start this over. You do have some reservations against the death penalty? A: I have some reservations. Q: You do have reservations. That's okay. Could those reservations impair your ability to return a death verdict? Could they? A: I think they could. I mean, I've never had to Q: The reason I put onthat record doesn't show the struggle that you're having with this. But am I fair that you are having a struggle with this? A: Yes. Yes. Q: You cannot clearly and succinctly tell me that your reservations would not have an affect [sic] on whether or not you can return a death penalty in this case; isn't that correct? A: Yeah. I think you could do all your proving that this had been done by that particular person and I would feel that maybe it would be an appropriate thing, and I would have a very hard time saying it was. Q: And for reasons extraneous to that, because of your reservations against the death penalty? A: Yes. Yes. Q: That's what I'm getting at. What I'm talking about here is personal feelings extraneous to the evidence or reservations against the death penalty that would keep you from returning it. A: Yes. Q: So you do have those; is that correct? A: Yes. The defense attempted to rehabilitate Ms. McAdams, asking her whether, in spite of her reservations, there were some circumstances under which she could possibly vote for the death penalty to which she responded affirmatively. She also indicated that she would consider mitigating factors during the penalty phase and that although it would bother her to return a death verdict against an 18-year-old defendant, she would consider all the evidence. The trial court excluded Ms. McAdams, first stating that its notes did not reflect that she stated she could return a death verdict in some circumstances. However, the court concluded whether she said it or not, her final statement in that regard was that her feelings would substantially impair her ability to return a sentencing recommendation with the death penalty. The trial judge went on to state that it was obvious from... viewing the juror and what she went through in responding to those questions, that it is a troubling issue for her. Accordingly, he concluded that her answers taken as a whole warranted her exclusion. Ms. Lewis originally expressed little hesitation about her ability to return a death verdict. The record reveals that when the State first asked her if she could return a death penalty verdict, she responded, It's possible I could, if they proved everything, and proved him guilty. Yeah. In response to the district attorney's question about reservations against the death penalty, Ms. Lewis answered, Not really. I mean, if the person deserved it andI guess if they deserved it and they deserved the death penalty, that's what they should get. Again, the district attorney observed that she appeared to be struggling with her answers and she responded, Yeah. A little bit. Because I guess I might have a little problem with it, but I just really don't know. The district attorney then referred to the defendant's age and it's possible effect on the verdict in the penalty phase. Lewis responded, ... if they're young, to me, I think they should get life, not the death penalty. When pressed on her ability to return a death verdict to a defendant 18 years of age at the time of the offense, she responded, I might have a difficult time with it. I probably will. Defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate Ms. Lewis asking her if she had any real reservations against the death penalty. She responded, I really don't have nothing against it if the person is found guilty on it. Finally, she told defense counsel that she could look at all the evidence ... and if it comes to the death penalty, yeah. If that's what they deserve. Defense counsel did not ask any question to clarify Ms. Lewis' statement to the district attorney that, if they're young, to me, I think they should get life, not the death penalty. Again, the court granted the State's cause challenge focusing particularly on the difficulty Lewis expressed about returning a death verdict against a young defendant and ultimately concluding that she was excludable under Witt. As this court recognized in State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 227 (La.1993), rev'd on other grounds by, State v. Comeaux, 93-2729 (La.7/1/97), 699 So.2d 16, when determining whether or not a juror should be dismissed for cause, the trial judge should consider the potential juror's answers as a whole and not merely consider correct answers in isolation. We also note, as did the Court in Witt, that the written transcript cannot convey the full impact of the voir dire experience; thus we often defer to the trial court's discretion. Upon a review of the entire voir dire process, paying particular attention to the discussion of the State's challenge as to both Ms. McAdams and Ms. Lewis, it is absolutely clear Ms. McAdams and Ms. Lewis, if chosen for service, could not have returned a death verdict because of the defendant's age. Ms. McAdams admitted to having reservations which would impair her ability to return the death penalty and, like Ms. Lewis, admitted to be struggling with the issue. Furthermore, Ms. Lewis clearly stated that if the defendant is young, they should not be given a death sentence. Although both Ms. McAdams and Ms. Lewis were theoretical supporters of the death penalty, a full reading of the voir dire clearly indicates they could not have imposed the penalty in this case. This is clearly not a case of a juror being dismissed because of a mere willingness to consider age as an appropriate mitigating circumstance, as asserted by the defendant. In the case of these two potential jurors, age would have been the controlling factor in their determination of whether the death sentence should have been imposed. As in Robertson, we find it is clear Ms. McAdams and Ms. Lewis could not accept the law as given and were not impartial to the sentence to be possibly imposed. Furthermore, it is obvious the trial judge was an active, rather than a passive, participant in the voir dire process. The record clearly indicates the trial judge was actively listening and making note of the demeanor and the responses elicited from all of the potential jurors and actively participating in the discussions concerning the challenges for cause. Specifically, during the discussion of the challenge of Ms. McAdams, the trial judge, as noted earlier, frankly admitted he had not made note of the fact that Ms. McAdams had responded affirmatively that under some circumstances she could vote for the death penalty. However, the trial judge was obviously left with the definite impression that Ms. McAdams could not return a death verdict in this case. The trial judge stated that he did not base his ruling exclusively on one correct or incorrect answer, but rather based his decision on his perceptions of the voir dire as a whole. In the case of Ms. McAdams, it is clear we should defer to the trial judge's discretion because he was clearly an active participant in the voir dire. He, like the attorneys, was actively working toward seating an impartial jury. Likewise, the trial judge demonstrated his active participation during the voir dire of Ms. Lewis. For example, as the discussion of the challenge for cause to Ms. Lewis began, the trial judge stopped the attorneys to ensure he was clear as to which juror they were talking about. The trial judge then proceeded to describe what Ms. Lewis wearing and was able to point out which seat she was sitting in during voir dire. Furthermore, during the discussion of the challenge, the trial judge stated Ms. Lewis said she could not return a death verdict against a nineteen-year-old. [5] Based on the entire voir dire and given the trial judge's obvious active participation in the voir dire, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in sustaining the State's challenge for cause. For these reasons, we find, based on the entire voir dire, the trial court did not err in dismissing Ms. McAdams and Ms. Lewis for cause.