Opinion ID: 1275421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attempted Armed Robbery.

Text: Defendant assigns as error the admission of evidence tending to show that he had committed other crimes. There is no merit in this assignment. Harvey testified on redirect examination to the effect that defendant told him that he had obtained illegal drugs in Ohio by robbing drug stores in a manner similar to the attempted armed robbery in Fremont. In North Carolina, evidence of other crimes by a defendant on trial is not admissible where its only relevancy to the crime charged is its tendency to show defendant's disposition to commit a crime of the nature of the one for which he is on trial. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 259 S.E.2d 510 (1979); State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 81 S.E.2d 364 (1954); 1 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence (Brandis Rev. 1973) § 91, pg. 289. However, if such evidence tends to prove any other relevant fact it will not be excluded merely because it shows guilt of another crime. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 257 S.E.2d 551 (1979); State v. Barfield, supra ; 1 Stansbury's N.C. Evidence (Brandis Rev. 1973) § 91, pp. 289-90. The instances in which other crimes evidence is considered relevant are contained in the well-established exceptions to the general rule listed in State v. McClain, supra . We perceive at least two of these exceptions applicable to the case at bar. 1. Where a specific mental intent or state is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite mental intent or state, even though the evidence discloses the commission of another offense by the accused. (Citations omitted.) State v. McClain, supra, 240 N.C. at 175, 81 S.E.2d 364. Defendant was charged with an attempted armed robbery in violation of G.S. 14-87. One of the elements of an attempt to commit a crime is that the defendant must have the intent to commit the substantive offense. State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 265 S.E.2d 164 (1980). An attempted armed robbery occurs when a person with the requisite intent does some overt act calculated to unlawfully deprive another of personal property by endangering or threatening his life with a firearm. State v. May, 292 N.C. 644, 235 S.E.2d 178 (1977). State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 184 S.E.2d 866 (1971). As part of its burden of proof, the state was required to show that defendant had the specific intent to rob Mr. Stewart. The acid test of the admissibility of other crimes evidence is its logical relevance to the particular excepted purposes for which it is sought to be introduced. State v. McClain, supra . Evidence that defendant had committed several previous robberies of drug stores in Ohio is clearly relevant on the issue of his intent that night at the Fremont Drug Store. 2. Where evidence tends to prove a motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime charged, it is admissible, even though it discloses the commission of another offense by the accused. (Citations omitted.) State v. McClain, supra, 240 N.C. at 176, 81 S.E.2d 364. The state's evidence tended to show that defendant was a heavy drug user. Harvey testified to the effect that defendant had obtained some of his drugs by armed robberies of stores in Ohio. This testimony was directly relevant to defendant's motive in the attempted armed robbery of the Fremont Drug Store, and therefore properly admitted into evidence. Defendant next assigns as error the trial court's denial of his request for instructions as to the scrutiny of the testimony of an accomplice. Defendant requested that the jury be instructed that the rule of scrutiny applies to the testimony of an accomplice whether such testimony be supported or unsupported by other evidence in the case. An accomplice testifying for the state is generally considered an interested witness. Upon timely request, a defendant is entitled to an instruction that the testimony of the accomplice should be carefully scrutinized. State v. Abernathy, 295 N.C. 147, 244 S.E.2d 373 (1978); State v. Harris, 290 N.C. 681, 228 S.E.2d 437 (1976). However, the court is not required to charge in the exact language of the request but need only give the instruction in substance. State v. Abernathy, supra ; State v. Bradsher, 49 N.C.App. 507, 271 S.E.2d 915 (1980). In the present case, the trial judge instructed the jury as follows: If you find that the witness, Michael Richard Harvey was an accomplice in the commission of the crime charged in this case, or that he testified in whole or in part under an agreement with the prosecutor for a charge reduction or sentencing consideration in exchange for his testimony, or both, you should examine his testimony with great care and caution in deciding whether to believe him. If after doing so, you believe the testimony of Michael Richard Harvey in whole or in part, you should treat what you believe the same as any other believable evidence. We think that the trial court fairly and accurately instructed the jury on the rule of scrutiny of accomplice testimony. The instruction substantially complies with defendant's request. Furthermore, the instruction given has been approved in earlier decisions of this court. State v. Hairston, 280 N.C. 220, 185 S.E.2d 633 (1972). We find no merit in defendant's assignment.