Opinion ID: 778993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Correctly Exclude Drake's Dying Declaration? 16

Text: 134 To the extent that our review of the District Court's determination implicates its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, our review is plenary, but where the District Court's ruling was based on a permissible interpretation of a rule, we review only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 656 (3d Cir.1993).
135 Peppers asks us to determine that the District Court erred in refusing to admit the statements made by Jorge Drake after he was shot, purportedly identifying the actual shooter to various persons. Although multiple statements were made, only the one made to Officer Rivera as Peppers was being prepared for transport to Hershey Medical Center, when he responded to the officer's question as to who shot him with Jun, may arguably be characterized as a dying declaration, and we will confine ourselves to discussing that statement. 136 A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to hearsay if the declarant makes the statement while conscious of impending death and under the belief that there is no chance of recovery. Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 1991). A court may infer knowledge of the seriousness of a declarant's condition from the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted. Id. ( quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 251, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895)). Accord, Commonwealth v. Cooley, 465 Pa. 35, 348 A.2d 103, 108 n. 8 (1975) (listing cases and types of wounds supporting an inference that the declarant sensed death was imminent). 137 In the District Court's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, it said, At the hearing, Defendant was unable to produce any evidence or testimony regarding the victim's physical or mental state at the time these statements were made. During the hearing on the government's motion in limine, the Court had stated that it needed some testimony regarding the mental status of the soon to be deceased at the time that he allegedly gave the statement to Officer Rivera. Counsel explained that he had tried to contact the physician who treated Drake in the emergency room, but that physician had left the hospital's employ, and he had been unable to locate him. Counsel did stipulate that the facts as to Drake's physical condition were as they had appeared in the report of the officer who interviewed Drake, namely that at the time of the interview, Drake was heavily sedated, his speech was slurred, and he had a bullet lodged in his head. 17 The District Court granted the government's motion in limine to exclude the statements. 138 Obviously, since the declarant had died, we — and the District Court — have no way of ascertaining precisely what Drake knew or what his state of mind was at the time. Even evidence regarding one statement made to him might not be conclusive, since we could not be sure whether other statements were made, how the information was conveyed to him, and how he received and responded to it. Accordingly, it is clearly not only permissible, but indeed necessary, consistent with our caselaw, that the trial judge draw and rely on inferences from the facts of record, including the type of wounds inflicted and the nature of the declarant's injuries. See Webb, 922 F.2d at 395. 139 Here, the only information we have as to what medical personnel may have communicated about Drake's condition immediately following the shooting was provided not to Drake himself, but to Officer Rivera. The officer was informed by an emergency physician that Drake had a good chance for recovery, but there is no evidence in the record as to statements made to Drake, or his own beliefs or information about his condition. The District Court refused to admit the declaration about Jun, expressing concern that it had not been provided with sufficient information as to Drake's perceptions of his condition at the time he made his statements. This rationale leaves us uncertain as to the District Court's understanding of its task. On the one hand, the District Court may have felt that it was the defendant's burden to provide direct proof, and that it was not enough for it to rely on inferences drawn from the record, including Drake's condition and the types of wounds inflicted. On the other hand, the District Court might have inferred from the information conveyed to Officer Rivera that Drake would have been told that he was not in danger of death, so something more was needed to convince the Court that the circumstances of Drake's injury and condition made the exception applicable. See, e.g., David v. Pueblo Supermarket of St. Thomas, 740 F.2d 230, 235 (3d Cir.1984) (noting that the burden of establishing an exception to hearsay — there, an excited utterance — lies on the movant of the evidence). The District Court erred if the first explanation — namely that a court must be provided with direct proof — was at the heart of its ruling. If the second rationale — that the inferences to be drawn from the proof were inadequate to tip the scales in favor of admissibility — motivated the Court, there would be no abuse of discretion. Ordinarily, we would remand to the District Court for clarification. See, e.g., United States v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 744 n. 8 (3d Cir.1996) (noting that where a District Court has not adequately set forth its basis for determining the admissibility of evidence (there under Rule 403), we may remand to the district court for clarification or even for a new trial). But here, as noted above, the issue may be raised anew at retrial, and on remand the Court should revisit this ruling if the Court misapprehended the evidence it should consider or the Defendant's burden.