Opinion ID: 166613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Arguments for Overturning Conviction or Granting New Trial

Text: 51
52 Nickl argues there was insufficient evidence to convince a reasonable juror that Nickl possessed criminal intent. After the prosecution's case, and again after the trial, Nickl moved for a judgment of acquittal. The court denied both motions. Nickl contends the court erred in denying these motions, and that his convictions should be reversed. 53 To convict Nickl of bank fraud, the jury had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt Nickl possessed the intent to defraud or injure the bank. Nickl claims evidence of his intent was limited to Steward's testimony. Steward told the jury Nickl never asked her to use bank funds to pay checks drawn on the Brooks Accounts and Nickl was not aware of the process by which Steward paid the checks. This limited evidence, Nickl argues, is insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Nickl intended to defraud or injure NBA. 54 This court reviews de novo the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1274 (10th Cir.2002). Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the government. United States v. Nelson, 383 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir.2004). More often than not, intent is proved by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Nguyen, 413 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir.2005). 55 Here, Nickl is incorrect in asserting Steward's testimony is the only evidence relevant to Nickl's intent to defraud. A jury may — and often must — consider circumstantial evidence when determining whether a defendant had the requisite intent. Id. In this case, evidence showed Nickl's actions included nearly 900 transactions totaling nearly $900,000 over a period of thirty months. Further, Nickl discussed with Steward which checks to pay and which checks to hold. He also knew Steward was engaging in improper activity contrary to NBA policy. Given this circumstantial evidence, there is no doubt a reasonable juror could have concluded Nickl intended to defraud or injure NBA. 56
57 Nickl asserts he was forced to defend against multiplicitous charges because, under the circumstances, the government's charges of conspiracy and aiding and abetting were indistinguishable. This court reviews de novo claims of multiplicity. United States v. McIntosh, 124 F.3d 1330, 1336 (10th Cir.1997). The government may submit multiplicitous charges to the jury, but if a defendant is convicted of both charges, the district court must vacate one of the convictions. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). Here, a jury acquitted Nickl of the conspiracy count, and we reverse Nickl's aiding and abetting conviction on other grounds. Therefore, the conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges did not result in multiplicitous convictions, and Nickl's claim fails. 58
59 Nickl contends the government's superceding indictment failed to state a charge and therefore deprived the district court of jurisdiction. As noted above, after the Supreme Court decided Blakely, the government obtained a superceding indictment which added language relevant to sentence enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Nickl argues the sentencing language did not address criminal conduct as defined by Congress and thus had no place in an indictment. He not only contends the district court has no jurisdiction over matters asserted in the sentencing language, he claims the addition of the language to the indictment deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the indictment in general. 60 Nickl's claim has no merit. A part of the indictment unnecessary to and independent of the allegations of the offense proved may normally be treated as a useless averment that may be ignored. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 136, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Harper, 579 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (10th Cir.1978) (When the language of the indictment goes beyond alleging the elements of the offense, it is mere surplusage and such surplusage need not be proved.). Moreover, a defective indictment does not deprive a court of jurisdiction. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002).