Opinion ID: 1865033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues of constitutional dimension

Text: Braun argues that the prosecutorial misconduct claim raised under sec. 974.06; (a) was distinct from the prosecutorial misconduct claim raised in her initial postconviction motion before Judge Raskin; (b) was not finally adjudicated by Judge Raskin's dismissal; and (c) was of such a constitutional nature as to justify her right to collateral relief. Although Braun raised several prosecutorial misconduct claims in her 1977 sec. 974.02 motion, she argues that she has now alleged one new ground in support of those prosecutorial misconduct claims in her sec. 974.06 motion. Specifically, Braun alleges that during her trial, the prosecutor misrepresented the actual plea negotiations between the state and Seymour. She argues that Seymour gave untruthful testimony at her trial because he testified that the state would recommend prison at his sentencing hearing. When Seymour was in fact sentenced in January, 1977, the state made no specific recommendation and left sentencing up to the discretion of the court. Braun looks to the case of Bergenthal v. State, 72 Wis.2d 740, 242 N.W.2d 199 (1976), which held that if a constitutional issue in a sec. 974.06 motion might properly have been raised in the direct appeal, but was not, the trial court must still consider the merits of the claim. She argues that since this prosecutorial misconduct claim was not raised in her prior motion, she can now litigate that issue pursuant to sec. 974.06. However, we are today overruling Bergenthal in Escalona-Naranjo, at 185 Wis.2d at 182 because the holding in Bergenthal is contrary to sec. 974.06(4), Stats. [6] Seymour's sentencing hearing occurred in January, 1977, and Braun's sec. 974.02 motion was not filed until August of that year. Braun fails to allege any reason why this claim was not asserted in her sec. 974.02 motion. Consequently, Braun has failed to establish a sufficient reason, pursuant to sec. 974.06(4), why the second prosecutorial misconduct claim was not raised in her earlier motion. Finally, Braun argues that the circuit court did not have authority to dismiss her sec. 974.02 motion under sec. 805.03, Stats., because sec. 805.03 is a civil procedure statute. We need not address that issue here. When Braun escaped from prison and failed to prosecute her sec. 974.02 motion, the circuit court had the inherent authority to dismiss her motion with prejudice. The court of appeals correctly concluded that a circuit court has the inherent authority to dismiss a sec. 974.06 motion when the fugitive defendant `obstruct[s] the administration of justice' by failing to prosecute the motion because of the escape. Braun, 178 Wis. 2d at 257 (quoting John, 60 Wis. 2d at 735-36). [7] Due to her escape, Braun forfeited her right to pursue postconviction claims in a direct appeal. The forfeiture served as a final adjudication of those issues. Braun is now precluded from relitigating her claims in a sec. 974.06, Stats., motion. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.