Opinion ID: 12207
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Suppletive/Imperative Distinction

Text: 53 One tenet that is basic to every Civilian legal system is the distinction between imperative and suppletive laws. Former Article 11 of the Louisiana Civil Code (which was in effect when the Mortgage was executed and recorded and the substance of which was not affected when in 1988 it and Article 12 were replaced by Article 7) expressed this distinction succinctly: 54 Individuals cannot by their conventions, derogate from the form of laws made for the preservation of public order or good morals. 55 But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they can renounce what the law has established in their favor when the renunciation does not affect the rights of others, and is not contrary to the public good. 28 56 Although neither former Article 11 nor its replacement employ the precise terms imperative or suppletive, traditional civilian doctrine has, in the words of Professor Alejandro Garro, long characterized: 57 as imperative those legal precepts rooted in public policy which may not be set aside by private agreement. Suppletive laws, on the other hand, are those legal norms designed to supplement the parties' will in cases wherein its application is not excluded. 29 58 With this clear distinction in mind, then, we must ask whether former Article 3411(1)'s provision for the extinguishing of mortgages when the thing mortgaged ceases to exist is imperative or suppletive. 59