Opinion ID: 799597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prima Facie Case of Gender Discrimination

Text: Regan appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to Faurecia on her claims of gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 37.2101-.2803. Cases brought pursuant to the [Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act] are analyzed under the same evidentiary framework used in Title VII cases. Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2004). To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination through circumstantial evidence, Regan must show that: (1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside the protected class, or similarly situated non-protected employees were treated more favorably. Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 2004). Regan claimed that Faurecia discriminated against her based on her gender by permitting male employees to work through lunch and leave work early on a regular basis, but not permitting her to do the same. On appeal, she argues that the district court erred in finding that she had failed to establish a prima facie case because she did not demonstrate that (1) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (2) she was treated differently than similarly situated males for the same conduct. Regan's gender discrimination claims fail because she did not show that she suffered an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action is an action by the employer that constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 402 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Regan relies on the evidence set forth above to claim that Faurecia's denial of her request to regularly work through lunch or to work different hours was an adverse employment action. Faurecia's denial of Regan's request to have a modified work schedule and work through the lunch hour is not a significant change in employment status. Id. A `mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities'... is not enough to constitute an adverse employment action. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)). Therefore, the denial of her request does not constitute an adverse employment action. Alternatively, Regan argues that her resignation following Faurecia's denial of her request to shift her work schedule an hour earlier was constructive discharge and, thus, constituted an adverse employment action. To demonstrate constructive discharge, a plaintiff must adduce evidence to show that (1) the employer deliberately created intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person, (2) the employer did so with the intention of forcing the employee to quit, and (3) the employee actually quit. Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732, 739 (6th Cir. 2012) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). [B]oth the employer's intent and the employee's objective feelings must be examined. Id. In evaluating the first prong of this test, Saroli v. Automation & Modular Components, Inc., 405 F.3d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2005), we ask: Whether a reasonable person would have [felt] compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a [male] supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement or continued employment on terms less favorable than the employee's former status. Regan has not put forth evidence showing that Faurecia deliberately created intolerable working conditions, or that there was any intention that the [new work schedule] was designed to force [Regan] to quit. Tepper v. Potter, 505 F.3d 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2007). She has not argued that Faurecia's schedule modification fit any of the Saroli factors. The new work schedule requires Regan and others in her department to work the exact same number of hours as the previous schedule; the only change is that the schedule has been shifted one hour later. The new work hours are daytime hours as were the previous hours, and the company has still allotted one hour for lunch, just as under the previous schedule. A reasonable person would not find that the new work hours instituted by Faurecia were intolerable. We do not need to examine the other elements of constructive discharge because we find that Regan's constructive discharge argument fails to establish the first element. Therefore, she cannot use a claim of constructive discharge to establish an adverse employment action for purposes of demonstrating gender discrimination. Because Regan has failed to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action, we need not examine the other elements of her gender discrimination claims to find that these claims fail. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for Faurecia on Regan's claims of gender discrimination.