Opinion ID: 2653990
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: With respect to any other person who is insured under this policy:

Text: The amount of coverage for damages due to “bodily injury” to one person is limited to the Statutory Financial Responsibility Bodily Injury Limit for one person. The total amount of coverage for all damages due to “bodily injury” to two or more persons in the same occurrence is limited to the Statutory Financial Responsibility Bodily Injury Limit for two or more persons. The maximum for all damages to all property in any one occurrence is limited to the Statutory Financial Responsibility Property Damage Limit for any one accident. A [¶17] The claimants argue the step-down endorsement violates N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40- 16 because the statute requires the named insured’s written acquiescence for a coverage reduction endorsement and Mary Gwyther’s mother did not sign it or otherwise acquiesce in it. [¶18] Section 26.1-40-16, N.D.C.C., provides: By written agreement with the named insured, a private passenger automobile insurance policy covering an automobile or other motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state may exclude a named individual, individuals, or class of individuals from coverage. The policy may contain a restrictive endorsement reducing the limits of liability, uninsured motorist coverage, underinsured motorist coverage, basic no-fault benefits coverage, or collision coverage while the vehicle is operated by a named individual or class of individuals. However, if the policy does provide liability coverage to a person named in a restrictive endorsement, the coverage may not be less than the minimum provided under section 26.1-40-15.2, section 26.1-40-15.3, subsection 2 of section 26.1-41-01, and section 39-16.1-11. If the policy excludes a named individual, individuals, or class of individuals from all coverage and the named insured expressly or impliedly consents to the operation of a secured motor vehicle by the excluded party, the named insured is not relieved of personal liability as provided by subsection 5 of section 26.1-41-02. [¶19] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. Haugland v. City of Bismarck , 2012 ND 123, ¶ 47, 818 N.W.2d 660. Words in a statute are given their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, unless defined by statute or unless a contrary intention plainly appears. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. Statutes are construed as a whole and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-07. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, “the letter of [the statute] is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” N.D.C.C. § 1-02-05. If the language of a statute is ambiguous, a court may resort to extrinsic aids, including legislative history, to resolve the ambiguity. N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings. Leno v. K & L Homes, Inc. , 2011 ND 171, ¶ 13, 803 N.W.2d 543. [¶20] Section 26.1-40-16, N.D.C.C., is not ambiguous. The first sentence of the statute requires a written agreement with the insured before individuals or a class of individuals may be excluded from coverage. The second and third sentences of the statute address restrictive endorsements containing step-down provisions, which are a different subject matter than exclusions from coverage, and do not mention the requirement of a written agreement. We conclude N.D.C.C. § 26.1-40-16 does not require a “written agreement” or other form of an insured’s acquiescence for a valid restrictive endorsement containing a step-down provision.