Opinion ID: 831187
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: public policy enacted by this court must be consistent with the existing public policy of this state

Text: For the reasons discussed in the preceding section, this Court must practice restraint when considering a change in the common law. I believe we must limit the exercise of our authority by creating public policy that is consistent with the existing public policy of this state. Doing so protects against unwarranted and unwanted societally dislocating change[s] to the public policy of this state. [55] We have previously defined the proper sources of public policy to guide our analysis: In identifying the boundaries of public policy, we believe that the focus of the judiciary must ultimately be upon the policies that, in fact, have been adopted by the public through our various legal processes, and are reflected in our state and federal constitutions, our statutes, and the common law. [56]
The preferred practice is to follow the lead of the institution best suited to make public policy for the state. Accordingly, I begin with the positive law enacted by the Legislature to determine whether public policy supports the change in the common law sought by defendant. The Legislature has affirmatively acted to protect and preserve minors' property interests. [57] With respect to a minor's cause of action, the Legislature has taken two significant steps. Pursuant to MCL 600.5851, the minority tolling provision, the period of limitations for a cause of action that accrued during minority is tolled. The minor is permitted to bring his cause of action within one year of reaching majority. [58] Thus, the Legislature has acted to preserve a minor's ability to pursue and control the minor's own claim. Furthermore, although a parent as next friend of his child may settle a claim with the approval of the court, [59] the parent's authority to receive settlement proceeds on the child's behalf is strictly limited. Under MCL 700.5102, a guardian or person with the care and custody of a minor may receive no more than $5,000 each year on that minor's behalf, [60] and an individual receiving money or property for a minor is obligated to apply the money to the minor's support and education, but shall not pay himself or herself except by way of reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses for goods and services necessary for the minor's support. An excess amount shall be preserved for the minor's future support and education. A balance not used for those purposes and property received for the minor shall be turned over to the minor when majority is attained. [61] Notably, the Court of Appeals has held that MCL 700.5102 does not authorize a parent to settle his child's tort claims. [62] Furthermore, in recognizing these legislative policy choices, this Court has provided by court rule that all settlements in favor of minors for payments of less than $5,000 in a single year are controlled by MCL 700.5102 and all greater settlements require the appointment of a conservator. [63] These statutes evince a public policy firmly at odds with the autonomous parental control over a minor's property rights that defendant asserts. The Legislature has consistently acted to preserve a minor's property interest in his tort claims, and nothing in Michigan's positive law indicates a legislative intent to abrogate the common law or extend a parent's authority. Accordingly, positive law does not provide an anchor for altering the common law rules.
The common law is also a valid source for identifying the public policy of this state. [64] If the change required by defendant in order to have the parental waiver upheld were consistent with other common law doctrines, this Court could consider creating consistent public policy. Here, however, the change necessitated to validate the parental waiver is at odds with other pertinent common law doctrines. Defendant, in seeking to enforce a parental right to bind his child by contract, requires the abrogation of not one, but two common law tenets. First, as stated, a minor lacks the capacity to contract: Their contracts are not void but voidable, and it is for the [minor] to avoid the contract or ratify it.... [65] Second, a guardian cannot contractually bind his minor ward. It should be noted that the modification defendant requires would not merely give a parent the same authority as the minor, given that a minor has no contractual authority and the minor's waiver would not bar this action. Rather, defendant requires a modification of the common law rule that would give the parent authority to contractually bind the minor superior to that the minor himself enjoys. In short, defendant requires that the common law be changed to permit a parent to do what a minor could not do on his own behalfenter into a contract that binds the minor. As we have previously stated, the rule that a minor lacks capacity to contract exists solely for the minor's protection. [66] The protection of infancy is a substantial one, and is not to be put aside and overcome by indirect methods. [67] The exception required by defendant does precisely that: it removes the protections of a minor's incapacity to contract by the indirect means of permitting the guardian to enter into a binding and enforceable contract for the minor. Moreover, under the common law, minors are generally protected by the placement of greater burdens and increased potential liability on those coming into contact with minors. Thus, permitting the waiver of liability for negligent harm done to a child is inconsistent with public policy broadly recognized in the common law. For example, a landowner is generally not liable for injuries suffered by a trespasser, [68] but the attractive nuisance doctrine imposes liability for injuries suffered by trespassing children. [69] Thus, the common law doctrine protects children by imposing greater liability on landowners when minors are involved. [70] Also, under the common law, a minor under seven years old was incapable of contributory negligence. [71] For minors older than seven, contributory negligence was based on whether the child had conducted himself as a child of his age, ability, intelligence and experience would reasonably have been expected to do under like circumstances. [72] Accordingly, the common law protects children by creating an incentive to exercise greater care for minors because it limits a defendant's ability to escape liability on the basis of the child's contributory negligence. [73] The public policy of this state reflected in these common law liability doctrines is to protect children by imposing greater liability on adults for conduct involving potential harm to children. It would therefore require an extremely compelling argument to change the common law and permit defendant to limit its liability involving children. [74] Defendant has offered none.