Opinion ID: 2219129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Meaning of the Sufficient Sureties Clause.

Text: The gradual emergence of the sufficient sureties clause and the very limited record of its eventual inclusion in our constitution requires us to draw our conclusions on its meaning and application from the historical development of the bail system and other contextual indicators of its meaning. Ultimately, we believe the core purpose of the clause was to guarantee a bailable individual access to a surety of some form. However, a number of factors leads us to conclude that the framers did not intend that such access be unfettered or tied specifically to a commercial bonding process. The strongest support for our conclusions rests on the language of the clause itself in historical perspective. We believe the framers were at least familiar with the history of the bailing process and the role of surety in that process. Moreover, we know that the framers were familiar with the provisions of other constitutive documents and regularly referenced them in the course of debating drafts of our constitution. See, e.g., 1844/46 Debates at 35, 40, 45; 1857 Debates at 98 (realizing the convention was to debate the report on the Bill of Rights, one delegate began to compare our Bill of Rights with the Bill of Rights in the constitutions of other States, noting, I suppose that was the reason why these constitutions were given to us, that we might have the opportunity of making these comparisons.). These factors indicate that the framers were conscious of the historical lineage of the words they chose and meant what they said: [a]ll persons shall ... be bailable, by sufficient sureties,  subject to some exceptions. Iowa Const. art. I, § 12 (emphasis added). We believe this was a clear creation of a right to access a surety of some form. However, this language does not indicate that the framers intended that a person should be bailable by any surety without limit. To the contrary, the framers chose an explicit limitation on access to a surety by using the word sufficient in the sufficient sureties clause. By including this qualification for a surety, the framers carved out a measure of discretion for the person overseeing the bailing process. This was consistent with the historical approach to sureties. See Yale article at 966 (noting that one of the innovations of the Statute of Westminster was its limitation on the power of the sheriff to determining sufficient security in each case, a power subsequently transferred to justices of the peace). Moreover, we believe this investment of discretion with the judicial officer was part of a quid pro quo for a bailable individual that reflected the historical relationship between the state, the prisoner, and the surety. Our framers chose to provide a limited right to bail in the Iowa Constitution, and provided some protection for this right in that a sufficient surety could bail an accused individual. In exchange, the framers created a potential exception by which the state could retain oversight over this process. Ultimately, this trade off served what has long been acknowledged to be the primary purpose of bail: assuring a defendant's appearance in court. See Ex Parte Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 709, 9 L.Ed. 280, 282 (1835); State v. Cain, 608 N.W.2d 793, 796 (Iowa 2000); State v. Costello, 489 N.W.2d 735, 737 (Iowa 1992); State v. Zylstra, 263 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1978); see also Rendel v. Mummert, 106 Ariz. 233, 474 P.2d 824, 828 (1970); People ex rel. Gendron v. Ingram, 34 Ill.2d 623, 217 N.E.2d 803, 806 (1966) (Sufficient, as used in the [Illinois] constitution, means sufficient to accomplish the purpose of bail, not just the ability to pay in the event of a `skip.'). The defendant was given a right to be bailed, subject to the state's analysis of a surety's sufficiency to provide adequate recompense if the prisoner did not show for his judicial proceedings. By allowing a court to judge the sufficiency of the surety, the court was also permitted to judgeimplicitlythe sufficiency of the surety's interest in making sure the prisoner was present for further court proceedings. Yet, no part of this process dictates unfettered access to a surety for a prisoner. In fact, unfettered access would be contrary to the language of our constitution and, indeed, the long history of the bail system's development and operation. We are also confident that the framers did not intend to favor one particular method of suretycommercial bondingby inclusion of the sufficient sureties clause. The historical record bears out that the concept of commercial bonding was emerging around the time of our constitution's framing. This emergence brought to light a new concept that deviated from the traditional methods of personal, monetary, or property surety that featured highly personalized contact between the state, the prisoner, and the surety. While it is possible that our framers had both traditional and commercialized surety in mind when drafting the sufficient sureties clause, we do not believe the traditional form of surety had been fully eclipsed nor was the commercial form truly ascendant. At most, our framers had both forms in mind. [6] To conclude the sufficient sureties clause extends an unfettered right to a commercial bail bondsmen contradicts the language of our constitution as well as historical reality. Iowa Code section 811.2 permits a district court judge to set cash only bail if such bail will best guarantee the accused's further presence for necessary judicial proceedings. See Iowa Code § 811.2(1)(d), (e). In light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that this is permissible under the sufficient sureties clause of the Iowa Constitution so long as the accused is permitted access to a surety in some form. [7] However, if the accused shows that the bail determination absolutely bars his or her utilization of a surety of some form, a court is constitutionally bound to accommodate the accused's predicament. Finally, we believe it is possible that a cash only bond could be found unconstitutional under the excessive bail clause of article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. However, we do not believe the excessive bail clause combines with the sufficient sureties clause so as to automatically prevent cash only bail. Instead, we believe the excessive bail clause works with the sufficient sureties clause to protect the interests of the prisoner in the interrelationship between the state, the prisoner, and the surety. Thus, it is conceivable that the use of cash only bail could violate the excessive bail clause even though its use does not automatically violate the sufficient sureties clause.