Opinion ID: 529763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Baldasar Claim

Text: 14 Moore argues that the gist of the Supreme Court's decision in Baldasar is that prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction[s] [cannot] be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 226, 100 S.Ct. at 1587 (Marshall, J., concurring). The State responds that Baldasar stands for the much narrower proposition that prior uncounseled convictions may not be used under an enhanced penalty statute to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a prison term. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 223, 100 S.Ct. at 1585 (per curiam). The State notes that at no point does section 40-6-391(c) elevate the offense to a felony, and imprisonment is never mandatory, regardless of the number of prior convictions offered in aggravation at sentencing. Thus, the State concludes, Baldasar is inapposite because section 40-6-391(c) is not an enhanced penalty statute within the meaning of that decision. 15 The district court agreed with the State, observing especially that the prior uncounseled conviction did not automatically require a sentence of incarceration and that [t]he sentencing judge's discretion, whether it be the defendant's first, second, third, or subsequent conviction, remains throughout to impose a period of incarceration of up to, but no more than, one year. Moore v. Jarvis, supra, mem. op. at 5-6. Although we tend to agree with the district court that O.C.G.A. Sec. 40-6-391 is not the sort of statute under which Baldasar forbids consideration of an indigent defendant's prior, uncounseled convictions, we need not reach that issue in order to resolve this case because Moore's factual allegations are insufficient to support a Baldasar claim. 14 16 In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require ... that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. 440 U.S. 367, 373-74, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) (emphasis added). In essence, the Scott holding set up a trade-off whereby states could choose between providing indigent defendants with appointed counsel and foregoing jail time for convictions obtained without appointed counsel. Scott holds that, if the state wants to incarcerate an indigent defendant, the state must provide appointed counsel. 17 In Baldasar, the Court overturned the sentence of an indigent petitioner [who], after his conviction of petit larceny, was sentenced to an increased term of imprisonment only because he had been convicted in a previous prosecution in which he had not had the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. 446 U.S. at 224, 100 S.Ct. at 1586 (Stewart, J., concurring). The common rationale of the three concurring opinions constituting the holding was that the period by which the sentence for the subsequent conviction was increased actually was attributable to the prior, uncounseled conviction. See, e.g., 446 U.S. at 226, 100 S.Ct. at 1587 (Marshall, J., concurring) (That [Baldasar] has been deprived of his liberty 'as a result of [the first] criminal trial' could not be clearer.) Thus, it appears that the concern raised by the Baldasar case was that a state prosecutor, by agreeing not to seek imprisonment of an indigent defendant upon conviction of a first or second prosecution, could deny the indigent defendant the services of appointed counsel while building a record of uncounseled convictions which, if offered in aggravation at a single subsequent proceeding for which counsel was provided, could trigger the imprisonment of the defendant for a much longer period than that to which he would have been subject for the single counseled conviction standing alone. In response to this apparent concern, the Court held that, having opted under Scott to deny counsel and forego incarceration with respect to the first proceeding, the state could not have it both ways by tacking onto the sentence for the subsequent, counseled conviction jail time which, as a practical matter, was attributable--under the enhancement scheme--to the prior, uncounseled conviction. See 446 U.S. at 224 n., 100 S.Ct. at 1586 n. (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that the brief submitted by the State of Illinois in the Scott case anticipated the Baldasar result). 18 The concern motivating Baldasar, and the rationale underlying it, however, apply only with respect to defendants who were indigent at the time of their prior conviction(s), for only in their cases will it have been the state's failure to provide appointed counsel during the prior proceeding that precipitated the defendant's incarceration for a term attributable to a conviction for which he received no representation. In short, a non-indigent defendant who eschews representation by retained counsel in one criminal proceeding has no claim under Baldasar when, in a subsequent proceeding, the state offers a conviction obtained in the first proceeding as the predicate for an enhanced penalty under a repeat-offender statute. In such a case, the state will not have circumvented its duty under Scott in the first proceeding, as none will have been owed, and the state will not have unconstitutionally had it both ways. 19 Expressed differently, we do not read Baldasar to forbid predication of an enhanced term of imprisonment upon any conviction obtained in a proceeding in which the defendant did not have counsel. Instead, we read Baldasar to forbid only the sentencing of a defendant to an increased term of incarceration solely upon consideration of a prior conviction obtained in a proceeding for which, due to the indigence of the defendant or some misconduct of the State, counsel was unavailable to the defendant. 20 Here, Moore has not alleged--let alone proven--that she was indigent at the respective times of her prior convictions or that the State somehow prevented her from obtaining the services of retained counsel. Consequently, she has failed to allege a Baldasar violation. 21 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN PART, and the case is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.