Opinion ID: 2325672
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Majority View Adopted

Text: Based upon the different considerations involved in pretrial and in-court identifications, we join the majority of courts in concluding that the two-step Biggers analysis does not apply to in-court identifications that do not come following an impermissibly suggestive pretrial identification. The inherent suggestiveness in the normal trial setting does not rise to the level of constitutional concern. Rather, as stated by the court in State v. Smith , [25] [t]he manner in which in-court identifications are conducted is not of constitutional magnitude but rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. [26] Accordingly, we hold that the remedy for any alleged suggestiveness of an in-court identification is cross-examination and argument. [27] In this case, Officer Blackston's in-court identification was subject to cross-examination and argument. The issues raised on appeal by Byrd, such as the brief time that Officer Blackston observed Byrd's face, the amount of time that had passed, and that Officer Blackston never made an identification before trial are all issues that affect the weight of the identification, not the admissibility of the identification. All of these issues were addressed during the cross examination of Officer Blackston and argued to the jury during the closing remarks by Byrd's attorney. It was within the discretion of the trial judge to allow or strike Officer Blackston's testimony. The circumstances that preceded his in-court identification of Byrd were no more suggestive than the normal inherent suggestiveness that is present in any trial. The record reflects that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the in-court identification of Byrd by Officer Blackston.