Opinion ID: 2384642
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Heading: historical background of article i, section 19 of the tennessee constitution

Text: The Constitution of Tennessee that is currently in effect, including Article I, Section 19 thereof, was adopted on May 5, 1870. The 1870 Constitution replaced a Constitution that was adopted by convention in Nashville in 1834, submitted to a general vote in 1835 and became effective by a proclamation of the Governor on March 27, 1835. The 1834-35 Constitution, in turn, replaced Tennessee's first Constitution, which was adopted by convention on February 6, 1796. The language currently contained in Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of Tennessee was included, in almost identical form, as Section 19, Article XI of the 1796 Tennessee Constitution. There is no difference between the portion of Article I, Section 19 of the Constitution of 1870 that is pertinent to this litigation (the second sentence thereof) and the second sentence of Section 19 of Article XI of the 1796 Constitution. Article XI of the Constitution of 1796 was the only Article of that Constitution that had a title; its title was Declaration of Rights. Article I of the current (1870) Constitution of Tennessee is also entitled Declaration of Rights. Tennessee's Constitution of 1796 was adopted by a convention of 55 delegates, five from each of the state's 11 counties, who met in the early part of 1796. The adoption of a constitution was a preliminary step to the admission of Tennessee as the 16th state of the United States later that year. The historical records of the activity of the 1796 Constitutional Convention reveal very little regarding Article XI, Section 19 (Article I, Section 19 of the current Constitution). It is, however, clear that this portion of Tennessee's Constitution was taken from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. A Legal and Constitutional History of Tennessee, 1772-1972, Lewis L. Laska, 6 Mem.St.U.L.Rev., 563 (1976). The language in the second sentence of Section 19 of the Tennessee Declaration of Rights was contained, in virtually identical form, in Article 9, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. The same language is currently contained in Article I, Section 7 of Pennsylvania's current Constitution. The courts in Pennsylvania have examined, in considerable detail, the origin of the language from which Article I, Section 19 of Tennessee's current Constitution was derived. The Pennsylvania courts have also considered whether this constitutional language affords any greater protection to obscene material than is afforded by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown, 294 Pa.Super. 383, 440 A.2d 517 (1982), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania upheld an injunction prohibiting the sale or distribution of certain obscene publications and films. In doing so, the Court reviewed the history and meaning of Pennsylvania's constitutional provision dealing with freedom of expression. The Court quoted Article I, Section 7 of the current Pennsylvania Constitution as follows: The printing press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine the proceedings of the Legislature or any branch of government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. (Emphasis added.) 440 A.2d at 522. The Court, in Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown , contrasted the current provisions of Article I, Section 7 of Pennsylvania's Constitution with Pennsylvania's first Constitution. The Court stated as follows: The Commonwealth's Constitution of 1776 guaranteed the right to freedom of expression in these words: `That the people have a right to freedom of speech, and of writing, in publishing their sentiments; therefore, the freedom of press ought not to be restrained.' Pa. Const. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Section 12. 440 A.2d at 524. The Court then discussed the change that was made to the foregoing language in adopting Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790. The purpose of the change was to add an element of personal accountability for abuses of the freedom of expression. The Court stated as follows: The Constitution of 1776 did not address the question of a person's responsibility for his utterances or publications once they were made. The apparent absoluteness of the 1776 guarantee of freedom of expression and its capability for abuse gave rise to an exemption from its protection, for soon it became clear, that although the freedom of expression is arguably an absolute right, the right to protection from prosecution for abuse of the freedom is a limited one. As early as 1788 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated: `The true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinion; but it is due to the peace and dignity of society to inquire into the motives of such publications, and to distinguish between those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those which are intended merely to delude and defame. To the latter description, it is impossible that any good government would afford protection and immunity.' Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dallas) 319, 1 L.Ed. 155 (1788). (Emphasis in original.) 440 A.2d at 524, 525. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that the sentiment expressed in the Respublica v. Oswald case in 1788 was expressed in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's new Constitution two years later in 1790. With respect to Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1790, the Court stated as follows: The wording under our present Constitution is identical to that in the Constitution of 1790. Pa. Const. of 1790, art. IX, § 7; Pa. Const. of 1874, art. I, § 7. In this way the guarantees of free speech and press, which Blackstone had set down merely as principles of the common law, became part of the bedrock of Pennsylvania's constitutional system. See IV Blackstone's Commentaries, 151-152. Thus we see that under our Constitutions there are two distinct elements to the right to freedom of expression. The first, arguably an absolute right, guarantees to each citizen the freedom to make public whatever he may choose. The prohibition against the prior restraint of publication serves to protect the sanctity of this right. The second, clearly a limited right, guarantees to the same citizen protection from prosecution arising from the exercise of the right of publication, except when those publications are, as Blackstone put it, somehow `destructive of the ends of society. Id. It would seem that the right to trial by jury, Pa. Const., Art. I, Sections 6, 7 and 9, protects the sanctity of this more limited right. 440 A.2d at 525. The Court stated as follows regarding the second, limited right contained in Pennsylvania's Constitution: We have found no authority in this Commonwealth that extends to obscene matter the limited right to exemption from prosecution or punishment for its publication, which right many other forms of expression enjoy under the second element of our Constitution's free speech guarantee. 440 A.2d at 526. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated its conclusion in Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown , as follows: It follows therefrom that there is in Pennsylvania no fundamental right to protection from prosecution for the publication of matter abusive of the right of free expression, viz. obscene matter. In short, obscenity does not enjoy the full protection of Art. I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874. 440 A.2d at 526, 527. In Commonwealth v. Croll, 331 Pa.Super. 107, 480 A.2d 266 (1984), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania followed its earlier holding in Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown . In Commonwealth v. Croll , the Court upheld the conviction of a defendant for sales of obscene material under a statute very similar to T.C.A. §§ 39-6-1104(a) and § 39-6-1101(5). The Court described the background of the statute and the defendant's argument with respect to the validity thereof as follows: Appellant concedes that the Pennsylvania Act was amended `with slavish adherence to' the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881, 94 S.Ct. 26, 38 L.Ed.2d 128 (1973). In spite of that, he argues that `obscenity is impossible of definition' and that we should, therefore, `set a higher standard for the State of Pennsylvania in obscenity criminal matters.' 480 A.2d at 269. The Court's holding in Commonwealth v. Croll , was as follows: It is clear to us, and we therefore hold, that Art. I, § 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no greater protection from prosecution for the distribution and sale of obscene materials than do the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 480 A.2d at 269. The holdings of the decisions in Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown and Commonwealth v. Croll , have been reaffirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Hulehan, 338 Pa.Super. 309, 487 A.2d 980 (1985), and in Commonwealth v. Stock, 346 Pa.Super. 60, 499 A.2d 308 (1985).