Opinion ID: 2974596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence of Franks

Text: The negligence theories asserted against William Mark Franks are similar to those asserted against Home-Mart, i.e., that Franks was negligent in directing his driver to drive into the wet field and in requesting Smith’s assistance when the truck got stuck. The district court rejected both theories for lack of evidence of proximate causation. In addition, regarding the latter theory, the court held that Franks had no duty to refrain from asking for help. For the reasons discussed above in relation to the claim against Home-Mart, we find no fault in the district court’s analysis. First, as explained above, the causal connection between the decision to drive into the wet field and the Smiths’ eventual injuries is too tenuous to be considered “substantial.” The second theory poses an arguably closer question of causation. Yet, again, causation is relevant only if Franks’s conduct that allegedly caused the Smiths’ injuries was in breach of a duty owed to them. The district court held that Franks had no duty to refrain from asking for help in pulling the truck out of the field. The Smiths have not challenged this ruling and we find no error in it.4 4 W hether Franks owed the Smiths a duty is a question of law. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership, 937 S.W .2d 891, 894 (T enn. 1996). “Stated succinctly, a duty of reasonable care exists if defendant’s conduct poses an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to persons or property.” McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W .2d 150,153 (Tenn. 1995). The record is devoid of evidence to support a finding that Franks’s mere request for help posed an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm. The record presents no reason to believe the law of T ennessee would, under these circumstances, impose a duty upon a trucking company to impede a purchaser’s opportunity to use his equipment to help with the installation of his mobile home on his property. -9- No. 06-5024 Smith v. Frank Further, the district court concluded the request to help with pulling the truck was not a proximate cause of the Smiths’ injuries because Kevin Smith voluntarily agreed to help out. The conclusion is not challenged on appeal. Franks’s request for help was therefore properly deemed not to be a substantial contributing factor. Even if the request for help was a factor that led to Kevin Smith’s participation in the extrication effort, no reasonable juror could conclude that the request itself was a substantial factor in bringing about the Smiths’ injuries. The request was just that, a request. There is no evidence that Kevin Smith’s agreement to help was other than a volitional act, an exercise of free will, motivated at least in part by his desire to spare himself additional expenses. As the district court observed, Smith had experience operating the tractor to pull out pieces of equipment and was confident in his ability to help. In light of his apparent familiarity with the demands of the task at hand, there was no reason for Franks to reasonably anticipate that Smith’s voluntary participation posed a foreseeable risk of harm. Entry of summary judgment in favor of Franks was therefore appropriate.