Opinion ID: 175190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Marquez, Bretzke, Barr, and Brown

Text: In granting qualified immunity to Marquez, Bretzke, Brown, and Barr, the district court identified four instances of conduct protected by the First Amendment: (1) Montaño’s earlier legislative testimony about the Lab’s alleged violation of federal anti-discrimination laws in October 2002; (2) his “hotline” complaint with the DOE IG on March 9, 2004; (3) his subsequent disclosure of 11 This remark occurred during a January 2003 meeting between Hook, Marquez, and Reed, and surfaced during discussions about Reed’s knowledge of auditing improprieties occurring within the Lab. See J.A. at 597-98. 30 the data underlying SAPR’s auditing report; and (4) his later legislative testimony in October 2004. Id. at 1140-41. The district court also concluded that Montaño had sufficiently demonstrated that the removal of work following SAPR’s October 20, 2003 report qualified as an adverse employment action. Montaño’s claims failed, however, because he could not demonstrate causation—that is, Montaño could not show that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to deny him work. “[T]he record [was] devoid of evidence that . . . Bretzke, Barr, or Brown knew about Montaño’s protected speech.” Id. at 1145. And even though Marquez was aware of Montaño’s public persona, the district court concluded that “a jury could not reasonably infer both knowledge and bad motive by Marquez.” Id. at 1146. The thrust of Montaño’s argument on appeal is to link the retaliatory conduct these defendants took against him with the incriminating auditing work he was performing with SAPR, and to that end, Montaño contends that the district court failed to recognize other instances of protected conduct, and failed to recognize several other instances of retaliation as adverse employment actions. His argument, however, fails in two fundamental respects. First, the theory of Montaño’s case misapprehends the nature of a claim of First Amendment retaliation: to prevail, Montaño must show a retaliatory link between an adverse employment action and an instance of protected conduct. Whatever retaliation Montaño experienced for the work he performed as a SAPR auditor did not 31 violate his First Amendment rights. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“[W]hen public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). Second, even if we consider the additional instances of protected conduct that Montaño offers, and grant him the benefit of the doubt by assuming his transfer also qualifies as an adverse employment action, Montaño still fails to demonstrate causation. Montaño cannot demonstrate that Bretzke, Brown, and Barr were aware of any instances of his protected conduct. And for Marquez, the retaliatory link is simply too attenuated and too disconnected for any reasonable jury to conclude in Montaño’s favor. Turning first to the additional instances of protected conduct, Montaño contends that the appearance of his quotations in two newspaper articles also qualifies as protected conduct. The first quote appeared in a December 4, 2002 Albuquerque Journal article that quoted Montaño regarding the Lab’s practice of discouraging the reporting of improprieties, J.A. at 814-16; the second quote appeared in the July 25, 2004 Los Angeles Times article quoting Montaño regarding his lack of work, id. at 838-40. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume without deciding that both examples of speech merit First Amendment protection. We cannot give Montaño the same latitude for every additional adverse 32 employment action he claims to have suffered. From the list he offers, we discern only one action that would potentially deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights: Montaño’s ultimate transfer from being a veteran auditor within SAPR to being a “recruiter of accounting and finance staff for the Lab’s CFO Division.” Id. at 666. Thus, we assume without deciding that Montaño’s transfer qualifies as an adverse employment action, and reject the remaining actions for lack of merit. 12 12 Montaño contends that “Marquez’s refusal to respond to [his] complaints about Ms. Chatterjee, and preparing a ‘timeline’ to monitor his public advocacy,” qualified as an adverse employment action. Aplt. Br. at 35. But Marquez’s refusal to respond to Montaño’s complaints would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. And the “timeline” that Marquez created was post hoc. Marquez stated during his unsworn interview that “I actually created a little bit of a chronology . . . . I tried to kind of go back and focus on kind of what I call singular Tommy Hook or Chuck Montaño interactions with me.” J.A. at 784 (emphasis added). Montaño also contends that “Marquez’s forcing plaintiffs to share their findings with Ms. Brittin” qualified as an adverse employment action. Aplt. Br. at 35. This contention refers to an e-mail that Lab management sent to all employees, which would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. See J.A. at 654 (Montaño aff. ¶ 35) (“Lab management emailed all employees, on December 6, 2002, to encourage us to share any information we had about the DOE investigations with Lab managers, particularly with Ms. Brittin.”); id. at 596 (Hook aff. ¶ 27) (same). Montaño also contends that “Marquez’s downgrading [of] the SAPR Team” qualified as an adverse employment action. Aplt. Br. at 35. As the district court reasoned, the downgrading of SAPR’s reporting relationship might have constituted a demotion for Hook, SAPR’s leader, but it cannot qualify as a demotion for Montaño. Moreover, this downgrading occurred in the context of a massive structural reorganization of the Lab, and would therefore not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. Montaño also contends that the “downgrading [of his] job evaluation[] based on . . . lack of work,” and “Marquez’s refusal to respond to [Montaño’s] (continued...) 33 What remains, then, is whether Montaño can demonstrate that his protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to (1) remove work from Montaño after SAPR completed its October 20, 2003 report or (2) transfer him to a recruiting position within CFO. Axiomatic to establishing causation in 12 (...continued) requests that this be corrected,” qualified as an adverse employment action. Aplt. Br. at 36. But Montaño’s job evaluation was never downgraded. Rather, Montaño “proposed to Mr. Marquez that the Lab adjust [his] performance evaluation[] for FY 2004 to match [the one] for FY 2003 . . . .” J.A. at 664. Marquez directed Albert Jiron, a non-party in this case, to give Montaño the “same ORC score as the prior year,” id. at 477, and Jiron gave Montaño “credit for work [he] did not do,” id. at 668. However unusual this practice appears to be, it does not qualify as an adverse employment action. Montaño also contends that several instances where Lab management allegedly pressured and threatened him qualified as adverse employment actions. But the record reveals that this conduct was directed at Hook, not Montaño. Therefore, these instances would not deter a reasonable person from exercising his First Amendment rights. For instance, Montaño contends that “Bretzke[] and Barr[] refus[ed] to allow plaintiffs to provide the SAPR Team’s findings and reports to DOE, and threaten[ed] them with losing their jobs if they did so.” Aplt. Br. at 35-36. But the record reveals threats toward Hook, not Montaño. See J.A. at 612 (Hook aff. ¶ 67) (“Barr continued to threaten me with termination if I released the report to DOE.”). And Montaño’s own affidavit avers that management refused to transmit the report, but says nothing about management preventing Montaño from doing so. See id. at 661 (Montaño aff. ¶ 54) (“The Lab never transmitted the SAPR report to DOE . . . . Mr. Marquez refused to provide it.”). The same is true of Montaño’s contention that “Barr and Brown[] pressur[ed] plaintiffs to change the facts in the SAPR Team Report . . . .” Aplt. Br. at 36. The pressure was directed at Hook, not Montaño. See J.A. at 612-13 (Hook aff. ¶ 69) (“Barr and Brown continued to pressure me to change the facts in the self assessment report. . . . Marquez and Bretzke had told [Barr] directly that they would fire me if I released the SAPR report directly to DOE.”). For the same reasons, we also reject Montaño’s claim that Pace’s threat to Hook qualified as an adverse employment action against Montaño. See J.A. at 617 (Hook aff. ¶ 83) (“Pace also told me that he would fire me if I wrote emails and reports like those I sent to Mr. Barr, or if I became a problem.”). 34 this context is proof that the employer knew of the employee’s protected conduct. See, e.g., Morfin v. City of Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1005 (7th Cir. 2003); Ambrose v. Township of Robinson, Pa., 303 F.3d 488, 493 (3d. Cir. 2002); Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). Beyond this threshold requirement, we have summarized the causation standard as follows: Adverse action in close proximity to protected speech may warrant an inference of retaliatory motive. But temporal proximity is insufficient, without more, to establish such speech as a substantial motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. An employer’s knowledge of the protected speech, together with close temporal proximity between the speech and challenged action, may be sufficiently probative of causation to withstand summary judgment. Other evidence of causation may include evidence the employer expressed opposition to the employee’s speech, or evidence the speech implicated the employer in serious misconduct or wrongdoing. On the other hand, evidence such as a long delay between the employee’s speech and challenged conduct, or evidence of intervening events, tend to undermine any inference of retaliatory motive and weaken the causal link. Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1189 (citations omitted). We agree with the district court that summary judgment was appropriate for Bretzke, Brown, and Barr because Montaño cannot demonstrate that these defendants were aware of any of his instances of protected conduct. Montaño contends that the Albuquerque Journal and Los Angeles Times articles “clearly show that [these] defendants – just as members of the general public – had knowledge of Mr. Montaño’s protected conduct.” Aplt. Br. at 41. But the existence of two newspaper articles, without more, is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the knowledge of these defendants. 35 Montaño also points to some of Brown’s comments as circumstantial evidence of knowledge. In early March 2004, Brown told Montaño and Hook that “he had his ‘hand slapped by Bretzke for giving [them] work.’” J.A. at 616. On March 29, 2004, Brown wrote an e-mail to Bretzke stating that “[w]e should put some work in [Hook’s] hands –Or we will be forced to explain how we let him sit by when there is work to be done.” Id. at 978. This evidence is unpersuasive, however, because it does not demonstrate that these defendants knew of Montaño’s protected conduct—i.e. his public disclosures of Lab improprieties. 13 Because Montaño cannot demonstrate knowledge in this regard, summary judgment was appropriate for these defendants. Marquez was aware of some of Montaño’s protected conduct. Marquez testified at the same legislative hearing as Montaño in October 2002. Marquez also admitted to being “well aware” of Montaño’s “public persona,” and acknowledged that he kept “pretty meticulous files relative to articles and internal memos, internal news bulletin.” Id. at 784, 786. It is reasonable to infer from these statements that Marquez was aware of Montaño’s October 2002 legislative testimony, as well as his quotations in the Albuquerque Journal and the Los Angeles Times articles. However, it is not reasonable to infer from these 13 For the same reason, we reject Montaño’s argument that the termination threats Bretzke, Brown, and Barr allegedly communicated are probative of their knowledge of Montaño’s protected conduct. The threats were directed at Hook, not Montaño, and it is simply unreasonable to infer knowledge of Montaño’s protected conduct from threats that were directed at Hook. 36 statements that Marquez was aware of Montaño’s March 9, 2004 “hotline” complaint to the DOE or his subsequent disclosure of SAPR data, and Montaño has not identified any other facts from which it would be reasonable to infer knowledge of these particular instances of protected conduct. Despite Marquez’s knowledge of some instances of Montaño’s protected conduct, no reasonable jury could conclude that these instances of protected conduct were a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to remove work from Montaño after SAPR completed its October 20, 2003 report. The protected conduct predating this decision includes Montaño’s October 2002 legislative testimony and the December 4, 2002 Albuquerque Journal article. The “long delay” between Montaño’s speech and the denial of work, as well as the conceptual disconnect between the content of Montaño’s legislative testimony and the work he performed as a SAPR auditor, “undermine any inference of retaliatory motive.” Maestas, 416 F.3d at 1189. And absent a sufficient retaliatory link at that juncture, no reasonable jury could conclude that the July 25, 2004 Los Angeles Times article was a significant or motivating factor in what Montaño calls the “continued . . . retaliatory actions of denying him work commensurate with his experience and qualifications.” Aplt. Br. at 40. The simple fact that Montaño’s work status remained unchanged at that point in time undermines any inference of retaliation. For similar reasons, no reasonable jury could conclude that Montaño’s 37 protected conduct was a significant or motivating factor in the decision to transfer him to a position as a recruiter of accounting and finance staff within the CFO division. His earlier instances of protected conduct, the October 2002 legislative testimony and the December 4, 2002 Albuquerque Journal article, are years apart from his transfer, and are therefore too attenuated to support any inference of retaliatory motivation. And the July 25, 2004 Los Angeles Times article was published after Montaño’s transfer to a human resources position had largely been finalized. In April 2004, Montaño was offered the opportunity to join the CFO division. Later that month, Montaño e-mailed CFO employees about his specific expectations for the new position, at which time he referred to the position as the “designated recruiter and trainer for professional CFO staff.” J.A. at 395. The record also contains a subsequent e-mail conversation that occurred in early July 2004, in which a CFO employee informed Montaño that the proper title for his position would be “Project Administrator, SSM-3,” and in which Montaño explained how an “HR Generalist has basically concluded that I’d be taking a major step backwards career-wise if I were to accept the position in question.” Id. at 999. Because the terms of Montaño’s CFO position were largely finalized prior to the publication of the Los Angeles Times article, the chronology of events undermines any inference that Montaño’s ultimate transfer to the CFO division was in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly granted Marquez 38 summary judgment on Montaño’s § 1983 claim.