Opinion ID: 1228779
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: required proof for summary judgment (issue 1). permissible data (issue 2)

Text: GCR 1963, 117.2(3) and 117.3 state: .2 Grounds. The motion for summary judgment shall state that the moving party is entitled to judgment in his favor because of any 1 of the following grounds:    (3) that except as to the amount of damages there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. .3 Motion and Proceedings Thereon. A motion based upon sub-rule 117.2(3) shall be supported by affidavits, and the opposing party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The affidavits submitted by either party shall be governed by the provisions of subrules 116.4, 116.5, and 116.6. Such affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties shall be considered by the court at the hearing. Each party shall be given opportunity to amend his pleadings as provided by Rule 118 unless the evidence then before the court shows amendment would not be justified. Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings show that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if the affidavits or other proof show that there is no genuine issue of fact. If it appears that the opposing party rather than the moving party is entitled to judgment, the court may render summary judgment in his favor without necessity of a motion therefor. In the Authors' Comments to this rule, Honigman & Hawkins [5] states: When summary judgment is claimed for lack of factual merit, the court must be careful not to substitute a summary hearing for a trial. The trial may be avoided only if the record presented at the hearing shows that,   ; or (2) an essential element of proof of the claim or defense cannot be supplied.    If a motion asserts a hiatus in essential proof, the court must be satisfied that it is impossible for the claim or defense to be supported at trial because of some deficiency which cannot be overcome.    Motions grounded upon sub-rule 117.2(3) must be supported by affidavits. The purpose of the affidavit is to assert the dispositive fact or facts upon which the moving party claims no genuine dispute exists. Although the Rule does not require opposing affidavits, it is the obligation of the opposing party to make a showing by opposing affidavits, testimony, depositions, admissions or documentary evidence on file that a genuine issue of disputed fact does exist as to the questioned element of the claim or defense. Durant v. Stahlin, 1965, 375 Mich. 628, 135 N.W.2d 392.    In motions under sub-rule 117.2(3), the court must look beyond the pleadings to determine whether a question of fact exists. The supporting affidavit, which must be filed with such a motion, identifies those facts which may appear to be controverted in the pleadings but which, the mover asserts, cannot be genuinely disputed. The party opposing the motion must then come forward with a showing that there is evidence to make an issue on which a dispute truly exists. If no such showing is forthcoming, summary judgment is granted. See Durant v. Stahlin, 1965, 375 Mich. 628, 135 N.W.2d 392; Podvin v. St. Joseph Hospital, 1963, 369 Mich. 65, 119 N.W.2d 108.    [T]he test more carefully stated would be whether the kind of record which might be developed, within the limits indicated by the pleadings and the affidavits or other material supporting and opposing the motion for summary judgment, interpreted to give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party, would leave an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ or upon which a directed verdict would be proper. (Emphasis added.) As to the first issue then, what do defendants' motions for summary judgment require to avoid trial? Obviously, the court rule requires there be trial unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. As Justice SOURIS stated in Durant v Stahlin, 375 Mich 628, 646 (1965) in spelling out the summary judgment procedure when a motion is made under 117.2(3): [T]he hearing of such motions,   , should be in the nature of an inquiry in advance of trial for the limited purpose of determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. The courts are liberal in finding that a genuine issue does indeed exist. As Honigman & Hawkins correctly comments, (1) the court will give the benefit of any reasonable doubt to the opposing party and (2) the court must be satisfied that it is impossible for the claim or defense to be supported at trial because of some deficiency which cannot be overcome. (Emphasis added.) For example, the point made by Justice SOURIS in his opinion in Durant v Stahlin, 375 Mich 628, 650-651 (1965) [6] is very illuminating. He says: By insisting that summary judgment is not available whenever a presented issue of material fact turns upon the credibility of an affiant or witness whose deposition has been taken, we intend thereby to limit severely the circumstances in which summary judgments properly may be entered. The alternative would require our abandonment of what has been called the `truth-testing process of cross-examination' and would encourage unwarranted invasion by judges of the jury's exclusive province. United States v. United Marketing Association (CCA 8, 1961), 291 F2d 851, 853, 854. (Emphasis added.) See also Arber v Stahlin, 382 Mich 300, 309 (1969); American Parts Co, Inc v American Arbitration Association, 8 Mich App 156, 170 (1967). As to the second issue, what data may be considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment after interrogatories and depositions but before trial testimony, reference to GCR 1963, 117.3 is particularly appropriate. To reiterate, the rule in part states: Such affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed in the action or submitted by the parties shall be considered by the court at the hearing   . Also appropriate is commentary from Honigman & Hawkins, supra, as to what data plaintiffs in opposing the motion for summary judgment may have considered. It states: Although the Rule does not require opposing affidavits, it is the obligation of the opposing party to make a showing by opposing affidavits, testimony, depositions, admissions or documentary evidence on file that a genuine issue of disputed fact does exist as to the questioned element of the claim or defense. As we previously pointed out, the trial judge incorrectly failed to consider all of plaintiffs' answer to defendants' motions for summary judgment. [7] The defendants in their motions for summary judgment also appear to have been under the mistaken impression that the trial judge was limited to the depositions as far as deciding the motion. [8] The original pleadings had properly alleged a cause of action and the defendants obviously could not have profitably attacked them. As indicated by the tenor of their motions for summary judgment the defendants sought to attack the depositions alone as failing to raise a genuine issue as to a material fact. The rule, however, is broader than depositions alone. It reads affidavits, together with the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary evidence then filed. In their answer plaintiffs promised to produce competent medical evidence    that Contardi was under the influence of intoxicating beverages after drinking four (4) beers. This could be considered included under then appropriate pleadings or even as a substitute for an affidavit as affidavits are not required from the opposing party. In any event, the trial judge should have taken this data into consideration in reaching his conclusion, as we shall below in reaching our determination. IV  SUFFICIENT PROOFS FOR A GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT (ISSUE 3) 1. Does proof of the amount of liquor consumed by itself raise a genuine issue of fact as to the lawfulness of the sale? To reiterate, plaintiffs had proof as to the amount of intoxicants Contardi consumed but no witness testifying Contardi was intoxicated when served or after service. By Contardi's own deposition, he admitted having at least four bottles of beer before visiting the first of the two remaining defendant bars and drinking about three screwdrivers in them. In Schratt v Fila, 371 Mich 238, 248 (1963) this Court had before it the question of whether the proofs were sufficient to send to the jury the question of an unlawful sale to three men. There was testimony as to the amount of alcohol consumed before going to the defendant bar (seven-eight bottles, each between mid-afternoon and 11 p.m.). The men testified that they were not drunk. They admitted drinking while in defendant bar. The Court found that this testimony was ample to go to the jury on whether the 3 men were intoxicated upon entering Janes Bar, and whether purchases were made therein. Schratt is supported by Higdon v Kelley, 339 Mich 209, 215 (1954), where this Court said: We do not believe that expert testimony is necessary to show that 10 to 12 glasses of beer in an afternoon are sufficient to cause intoxication. See also Mason v Lovins, 24 Mich App 101, 109, n 6 (1970). We realize that certain language in Wyatt v Chosay, 330 Mich 661 (1951) appears to be in conflict with the Schratt case. In Wyatt, we affirmed the decision for defendants stating: The fact that liquor was consumed is not sufficient to establish intoxication at the time of, or immediately prior to, the accident. 330 Mich 661, 670. Wyatt, however, is not controlling. In the first place, Wyatt can be distinguished from the case at bar on the facts. In the second place the quoted sentence can be correct only in the sense that proof of consumption of an undefined amount of liquor under unspecified circumstances does not for all purposes establish intoxication. The outstanding difference between Wyatt and the instant case is that there was not a single witness who testified to his drunkenness while five testified to his sobriety, whereas here plaintiff promises an expert witness to testify that the amount consumed would produce drunkenness. The quoted sentence may correctly state a theoretical concept that the mere proof of consumption alone as an isolated fact does not establish intoxication, but that is not the dispositive issue in this case any more than it was in Wyatt. The dispositive fact is the consumption of a particular amount of liquor under particular circumstances. [9] As we have said the quoted sentence is in no way controlling. On the authority of Schratt, it appears that proof of a particular amount consumed may be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether there was an unlawful sale. In the instant case the number of bottles of beer consumed is less than in Schratt, but at least by the time of service in the last bar there were screwdrivers served in addition. This might very well, particularly in light of the rule that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt, raise the necessary genuine issue at this stage in the proceedings. However, we do not have to rest our opinion on such a rule here because the plaintiffs promise competent medical testimony that four beers is intoxicating. 2. Does the plaintiffs' answer promising medical testimony to prove that Contardi was intoxicated after four beers raise a genuine issue of fact? The offer to produce competent medical evidence    that Contardi was under the influence of intoxicating beverages after drinking four (4) beers along with Contardi's admission in his deposition of drinking that amount certainly creates an issue of fact as to Contardi's intoxicated condition prior to the subsequent service of screwdrivers by defendants according to further testimony in his deposition. As stated above, it is true that this offer to produce medical evidence cannot be totally characterized as an affidavit, deposition, admission, or documentary evidence under GCR 1963, 117.3. This, however, is data in the form of the permitted category of a pleading (i.e., plaintiffs' answer to defendants' motions for summary judgment) or in lieu of an affidavit which is not required of an opposing party. It is supportive of plaintiffs' claim and should have been considered by the trial judge in ruling on the motions. 3. Can the state of intoxication 1/2 hour after leaving the last bar raise an inference that Contardi was intoxicated while at the last bar or bars thus raising a genuine fact issue? Plaintiff relies heavily on the testimony taken through the deposition of Officer Sabon who aided Officer Young in the questioning of Contardi after the accident. Officer Sabon testified: He had been drinking. Whether he was under the influence, this is open for debate to a point.    I would think he was under the influence to a point.    His speech being slurred, his eyes blurry. His clothes were disarranged. See deposition of Officer Sabon, pp 6, 9. Testimony which ran counter to Officer Sabon's was that given by Officer Young. In his deposition, he stated in response to questions: Q. Did he have any tendency to slur his speech? A. No.    Q. Would that indicate, then, that it was your opinion that Mr. Contardi was not under the influence of alcohol? A. Yes. See deposition of Officer Young, pp 8, 10. The evidence presented by plaintiffs in these depositions would help the jury to make necessary determinations of fact by permissible inferences from the submitted evidence. See Butrick v Snyder, 236 Mich 300, 305 (1926); Fletcher v Flynn, 368 Mich 328, 334 (1962); Villa v Golich, 42 Mich App 86, 89 (1972). This evidence alone might be sufficient to raise the genuine issue as to any material fact necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Certainly this evidence in combination with the evidence as to the amount of alcohol consumed plus promised competent medical testimony that such amount was intoxicating does raise such a genuine issue. Therefore, plaintiffs' several proofs at this stage of the proceedings did raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether or not Contardi was intoxicated when served. Plaintiffs have presented admissible evidence from which this question could be resolved in their favor. In conclusion it is important to note what the office of a motion for summary judgment at this point in the proceedings is and is not. It is not as is the case of a motion for summary judgment before interrogatories and depositions a test as to whether a cause of action has been stated. Presumably the case has proceeded beyond that point, although obviously if the original pleadings did not state a cause of action, the pleadings would have to be amended or the case dismissed. At this point the test is whether the data properly produced after the original pleadings is sufficient to permit the plaintiff to go to trial and proceed with his proofs. It is no more than that. It is not a judgment that the plaintiff necessarily has a case sufficient to go to a jury. In the instant case, for example, the plaintiffs might not in fact be able to produce a competent medical expert at all or one who would indeed testify that four bottles of beer would make Contardi intoxicated. To recapitulate, the office of a motion for summary judgment by a defendant after interrogatories and depositions is to test whether plaintiff's appropriate data raises a genuine issue as to any material fact on which defendant challenges him. If plaintiff's data does raise such a genuine issue he may proceed to trial and his proofs, win or lose. If plaintiff's data fails to raise such a genuine issue defendant is entitled to a summary judgment. The Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed, the judgment is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [10] Costs to the plaintiffs.