Opinion ID: 809920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant waived his right to appeal

Text: THE DENIAL OF HIS MOTION TO DISMISS We review de novo issues involving waiver, United States v. Pacheco-Navarette, 432 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir. 2005), and the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act, United States v. PenaCarrillo, 46 F.3d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1995). [1] An unconditional guilty plea waives all non- jurisdictional, antecedent defects. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea. . . .”); United States v. Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is well-settled that an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all antecedent constitutional defects.”). This principle applies to Speedy Trial Act challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Bohn, 956 F.2d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1992) (“By pleading guilty, Bohn waived his right to assert a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. . . . The right to a speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act is nonjurisdictional.”). This Court maintains jurisdiction to consider the appeal, but typically will dismiss the appeal when the government properly and timely raises the waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We recently reached a similar conclusion in determining that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) is a forfeitable, nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. . . . We ultimately UNITED STATES v. JACKSON 12245 dismissed the appeal, however, because we found that the government had properly raised the untimeliness argument, and under the rules we were required to dismiss.”) (en banc). [2] Appellant was represented by counsel in the district court. Because the plea was unconditional despite the availability of a conditional plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(a)(2), Appellant has waived his right to appeal non-jurisdictional, antecedent defects including his right to assert a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss based on the Speedy Trial Act.