Opinion ID: 1806677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probable Cause to Arrest for Violation of Migratory Game Bird Regulations

Text: The court of appeal found that the officers were liable to Patrick Moresi and Kern Alleman under § 1983 for violating their constitutional rights by arresting them without probable cause to believe that they had violated any laws. We do not agree. The facts known to the officers at the time they detained the hunters were sufficient to give a reasonable officer probable cause to believe that Federal game laws and regulations had been violated. Except as permitted by regulations, it is unlawful at any time to pursue, capture, kill or possess any migratory bird included in the terms of the conventions between the United States and other nations for the conservation of migratory birds and their environments. 16 U.S.C. § 703. The regulations adopted in response to that statute provide that migratory game birds may be taken, possessed or transported only in accordance with the restrictions contained in 50 C.F.R. § 20.1 et seq. The regulations seek to conserve migratory birds by placing limits on the number of birds a hunter may take each day and the number of birds he may possess or transport. 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.11-20.40. As an integral part of these regulations, § 20.36 imposes a tagging requirement, which provides: No person shall put or leave any migratory game birds at any place (other than at his personal abode), or in the custody of another person for picking, cleaning, processing, shipping, transportation, or storage (including temporary storage), or for the purpose of having taxidermy services performed, unless such birds have a tag attached, signed by the hunter, stating his address, the total number and species of birds, and the date such birds were killed. Migratory game birds being transported in any vehicle as the personal baggage of the possessor shall not be considered as being in storage or temporary storage. Evidently, the purpose of the tagging requirement is to facilitate enforcement of the taking and possession limits by obliging a hunter to tag his kill after each day's hunt in order to distinguish it from game taken on another day or game taken by a different hunter. The tagging regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 20.36, specifically requires a hunter to tag his kill in four situations: when he leaves it (1) at any place other than his home; (2) in the custody of another for picking, cleaning, etc.; (3) for storage; and (4) for the purpose of having taxidermy services performed. The federal courts have interpreted the requirement to mean that a hunter who departs his camp in the area and leaves his untagged birds at the campsite has violated the statute and regulation; and that the regulation clearly prohibits the leaving of a game bird at any place other than the home without affixing the required tag. United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15 (10th Cir.1973); United States v. Mielke, 367 F.Supp. 518 (W.D.Okla.1973). The court of appeal concluded that the officers did not have probable cause to believe any game violation had occurred. Moreover, the appeals court indicated that counsel cannot assert for the state or its agents other grounds for the arrest of which the officers were unaware or unable to articulate. We disagree. The state and the agents are not foreclosed from proving probable cause simply because the officers were mistaken as to the legal principles supporting their action or were unable to precisely articulate them. The probable cause test is an objective, not a subjective, one. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 3.2(b) at p. 567. Probable cause may not be established simply by showing that the officer who made the challenged arrest or search subjectively believed that he had grounds for his action. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); The facts must be such as would warrant a belief by a prudent man, a man of reasonable caution, or a reasonably discrete prudent man. Beck v. Ohio, supra. In evaluating the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances it is imperative that the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action was appropriate. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Accordingly, the mere subjective conclusion of an officer as to probable cause is not binding on the court which must independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence of probable cause. Furthermore, since courts do not hesitate to overrule an officer's determination of probable cause when none exists, they may also find probable cause in spite of an officer's judgment that none exists. U.S. v. Pollock, 739 F.2d 187 (5th Cir.1984); State v. Collins, 378 So.2d 928, 930 (La. 1979); State v. Peebles, 376 So.2d 149, 150 (La.1979); State v. Davis, 359 So.2d 986, 988, 989, n. 4 (La.1978); State v. Nelso, 433 So.2d 73 (La.1983) Thus, the fact that an officer did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded on a consensual or Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the state from justifying the custody by proving probable cause. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (plurality); Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Consequently, when the officers stopped the hunters for questioning, learned that they had ducks in the ice chest that had been taken the day before, and discovered two limits of untagged ducks in the ice chest, they were aware of facts that would give a reasonable officer probable cause to believe that the hunters had violated 50 C.F.R. § 20.36. The regulation has been authoritatively construed to prohibit a hunter from leaving his slain birds at his campsite or anywhere except his home without tags. U.S. v. Ray, supra; U.S. v. Mielke, supra. Since the hunters had untagged ducks they had admittedly killed the previous day there was probable cause to believe they had not tagged their limits from the previous day but had left them untagged at their campsite while they were away hunting. Although § 20.36 provides that migratory birds being transported in any vehicle as personal baggage of the possessor shall not be considered as being in storage or temporary storage, this provision does not relieve a hunter of his obligation to affix the required tag before he leaves a game bird at his camp or any place other than his home. Even though the violations appear to have been relatively innocuous, and the United States Attorney did not accept the charges for prosecution, we cannot say that the agents violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, in view of the federal jurisprudence and the trial judge's finding that the agents conscientiously followed the law as they understood it. Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that, even if the arrests were valid initially, the agents violated the youths' civil rights by unreasonably detaining them and unlawfully seizing their mudboat. The record developed at trial shows that Patrick Moresi and Kern Alleman were detained for some 45 minutes to one hour while the officers continued their investigation at the hunting camp. The Fourth amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Gerstien v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). But the relatively short period of detention here was not such a significant pretrial restraint of liberty that a judicial determination of probable cause was required. Gerstien v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 125, 95 S.Ct. at 868; see, e.g., Chaffy v. Turoff, 804 F.2d 20 (2d Cir.1986) (detention of 45 minutes while issuing summonses did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Wilson v. Waldon, 586 F.Supp. 1235 (W.D.Mo.1984) (2 hour detention after arrest for killing deer out of season did not violate Fourth Amendment). In fact, the jurisprudence indicates that a significantly longer detention is required to violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436 (8th Cir.1989) (2 hour 20 min. detention after warrantless arrest for attempted burglary falls well short of the extended restraint of liberty prohibited by Gerstien.) See also McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir.1989) (4 or 5 hr. detention after a warrantless arrest for public intoxication would not violate constitution); Brown v. City of Chicago, 713 F.Supp. 250 (N.D.Ill.1989) (17 hour delay between warrantless felony arrest and probable cause hearing did not violate Constitution.) Generally, the courts have held that when a person is arrested away from home, the police may impound the personal effects that are with him at the time to ensure the safety of those effects. Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir.1975); see LaFave § 7.3(c). Pursuant to this principle, the police routinely are permitted to impound motor vehicles when the owner or operator has been arrested or when the vehicle is abandoned. Cabbler v. Superintendent, supra. See, e.g., United States v. Balanow, 528 F.2d 923 (7th Cir. 1976) (arrest of defendant driving without license, proper for police to protect the vehicle by removing it from the roadway); United States v. Ducker, 491 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.1974) (arrest of defendant at shopping center, impoundment of his car parked in center lot proper); Mattson v. State, 328 So.2d 246 (Fla.App.1976) (defendant arrested for driving while intoxicated, car parked on the side of the road, proper for police to return and impound it); State v. Wallen, 185 Neb. 44, 173 N.W.2d 372 (1970) (arrest of defendant while standing by car at side of highway, impoundment of car proper); State v. Williams, 97 N.M. 634, 642 P.2d 1093 (1982) (defendant arrested in act of robbery, proper to impound his car parked nearby); King v. State, 562 P.2d 902 (Okl.Crim.1977) (defendant arrested for speeding, impoundment proper as van would have otherwise been left unattended on a dark country road); State v. Patterson, 8 Wash.App. 177, 504 P.2d 1197 (1973) (defendant driving his car when stopped and arrested, impoundment of car proper). Therefore, we see no reason that the same rule should not apply here to permit the agents to impound the mudboat which would have otherwise been left unattended. Moreover, since the fathers of the two arrested hunters were at their campsite only a short distance away, and one of the fathers, Dr. Alleman, was the owner of the boat, the quickest and most practicable way to protect the boat was to take it to him at the camp. Viewing these circumstances objectively, we conclude that no clearly established constitutional or statutory rights were violated in the handling of the mudboat.