Opinion ID: 177996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Exclusion of USDA policy

Text: Bahrani contends [t]he district court erroneously excluded evidence of USDA policy by striking testimony of Dr. Joyce Bowling, an Assistant Director for the Technical Trade Services Department of the USDA's Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and excluding government documents reflecting that policy.... Aplt. Br. at 39. We review for abuse of discretion the district court's evidentiary rulings. Frederick, 616 F.3d at 1082-83. Following this court's decision and remand in Bahrani I, Bahrani located a new witness, Bowling, to testify on his behalf regarding the issue of what certificate changes were major or significant and thus violative of the FCA under the law of the case. In turn, Bahrani filed a pleading with the district court indicating he intended to present Bowling as a witness at trial and stating she would testify that, according to a memo she drafted and purportedly distributed to USDA area offices and veterinarians, i.e., USDA Memorandum 594.1, the making of any changes to hide export certificates was a prohibited practice. In other words, Bahrani sought to present testimony from Bowling that all certificate changes were significant or major. ConAgra moved for an order prohibiting Bowling from so testifying. In support, ConAgra argued that this court in Bahrani I had already considered and rejected Bahrani's assertion that all certificate changes were prohibited under the FCA, and that Bowling's proposed testimony was thus in conflict with Bahrani I. The district court held a hearing on ConAgra's motion. The district court stated at the outset that it was not going to consider or reconsider the legal standards articulated and applied by the Tenth Circuit in [ Bahrani I ], certainly not before trial.... Aplt.App. at 1233. Bahrani's counsel argued that the decision in Bahrani I was [b]ased in [sic] the limited summary judgment record, the snapshot in 2004, id. at 1236, and that the record developed since 2004 was different and should be submitted to the jury. Id. at 1237. Bahrani's counsel further argued that [n]either the Tenth Circuit nor [the district court] ha[d] made any findings of law on [USDA] policy, and that Bowling would testify regarding USDA policy (specifically that it was contrary to the conclusions reached by this court in Bahrani I ). Id. at 1247. The district court ultimately rejected Bahrani's position and granted ConAgra's motion. In doing so, the district court stated: But I cannot read the Tenth Circuit opinion the way that the relator wants me to read in this case. It is totally inadmissible whether Dr. Bowling thinks there is no such thing as a minor change or not. The Court of Appeals has spoken, and at 465 F.3d in its conclusion under Part 3 the Court says this, and I quote: As applied to these circumstances we read Section 3729(a)(7) more narrowly than Mr. Bahrani, but more broadly than ConAgra. Like the District Court, we are not persuaded that every change to a signed export certificate made by a ConAgra employee creates an obligation under the statute. However, to the extent that ConAgra employees made `major' or `significant' changes without applying for `in lieu of' or replacement certificates, they avoided an obligation under Section 3729(a)(7). We emphasize that the appropriate inquiry is certificate-specific, it's not a policy issue. I am interposing that statement. To continue with the quote, Because of their interpretations of the regulatory scheme, both Mr. Bahrani and ConAgra have advanced arguments that pertain to all changes to original export certificates no matter how extensive. In our view, however, whether a given change to an original certificate triggers a 3729(a)(7) obligation depends upon the nature of the change, whether it is `major' or `significant' and thus requires a new certificate. Although many of the unauthorized changes alleged by Mr. Bahrani appear to be minor, there is evidence that at least some of them fell within the `major' or `significant' class. Further development of the record is required to determine the extent to which ConAgra employees made `major' or `significant' changes without obtaining `in lieu of' or replacement certificates and paying the accompanying fee. We have to have a trial in which the hide certificates are examined and determine whether they contain major or minor changes; and if major, then they are required to apparently get the fee and whatever damage might ensue from that. But the testimony of Dr. Bowling, or the proposed testimony, to the effect that all changes require the certificate will not be admitted, and the motion is granted to that extent.     And I have to instruct the jury that as a matter of law decided by the Tenth Circuit, not U.S.D.A. policy, which won't go before them, but as a matter of law a legal obligation occurs only when there is a major change, and the jury's decision will have to be based upon expert testimony. It cannot be and it would be highly prejudicial to have some government official come in at the eleventh hour after all the discovery and say: They're all major. That is a direct contradiction of what the instructions are to us. So, as I've indicated, she will not be allowed to testify to that at all.     I don't know whether you [Bahrani] are going to try to call Dr. Bowling or not. But I can tell you she's going to be on a very short leash, and any attempt on her part to contravene or attempt to contravene the holding as I have read it and as I interpret it will be met with severe response. So I don't know if you want to call her or not, that's up to you. Id. at 1251-55. The district court subsequently issued a written order reiterating its conclusions. Aplee. Supp.App. at 356 (Because only the making of a `major or significant' change to an export certificate triggers a § 3729(a)(7) obligation for purposes of FCA liability, Dr. Bowling's testimony that there is no such thing as a `minor' or authorized change under the USDA regulatory scheme does not justify a change in the Tenth Circuit's reasoning or the law of the case.). At trial, Bahrani proceeded to present Bowling as a witness. Bowling testified, among other things, about how export certificates are reissued and the frequency with which certificates are reissued. Although Bahrani's counsel sought to question her about the contents of USDA Memorandum 594. 1, the district court prohibited him from doing so. Aplt.App. at 1777. The district court also prohibited Bahrani's counsel from questioning Bowling about the specific hide export certificates at issue in the case. Id. at 1780. Indeed, the district court ruled that Bowling could not testify at trial as an expert witness because she did not, prior to trial, file a proper expert report. [8] Id. at 1781. On appeal, Bahrani contends the district court erred in interpreting Bowling's proposed testimony as inconsistent with Bahrani I. More specifically, he contends that this court in Bahrani I clearly did not anticipate that all of the evidence that would be developed had been developed and there would be no further evidence freezing the record in time. Aplt. Br. at 45. We reject Bahrani's contentions. As the district court correctly noted in precluding Bowling's proposed testimony, Bahrani I expressly rejected Bahrani's argument that every change necessitated a new certificate. 465 F.3d at 1199 (concluding that Bahrani's submitted evidence d[id] not support the theory that new certificates are required every time a correction must be made), (we therefore do not agree with Mr. Bahrani's expansive reading of the USDA statutes and regulations). Further, Bahrani I held that only major or significant changes necessitated a new certificate. Id. at 1200. Although the Bahrani I decision employed the phrase we conclude from this record, id., and also stated that [f]urther development of the record [wa]s required, id. at 1209, nothing in Bahrani I indicated that Bahrani was free to gather additional evidence for the purpose of reasserting that all export certificate changes required replacement certificates. Rather, the clear import of Bahrani I was that the parties would engage in additional limited discovery regarding only the extent to which Con[A]gra employees made `major' or `significant' changes without obtaining `in lieu of' or replacement certificates and paying the accompanying fee. Id. Although Bahrani and Bowling clearly disagreed with Bahrani I's distinction between major or significant changes and other minor certificate changes, they were bound by that ruling under the law of the case doctrine, as was the district court. See McIlravy v. Kerr-McGee Coal Corp., 204 F.3d 1031, 1034 (10th Cir.2000) (The law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case. (quotations, alterations, and citations omitted)). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Bowling from testifying.