Opinion ID: 166134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drug Trafficking Offense

Text: 9 The Guidelines define drug trafficking offense as an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), Application Note 1(B)(iv). Mr. Herrera was convicted under a Texas statute prohibiting mere possess[ion] 1 — not possession with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. Id. Based solely on the fact of conviction and the terms of the Texas statute, then, we conclude that Mr. Herrera's prior conviction was not a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). Cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (holding that the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense). 2
10 The government argues that we can look beyond the terms of the Texas statute, which makes no mention of an intent to distribute, and infer such an intent from Mr. Herrera's underlying conduct. Mr. Herrera was convicted of possessing more than 50 pounds, but not more than 2000 pounds, of marijuana. The government argues that from such a large quantity we should infer an intent to distribute. According to the government, this inference is permissible because the relevant Guidelines provision, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), Application Note 1(B)(iv), defines drug trafficking offense not with reference to the elements of the state crime but with reference to the underlying conduct. In other words, we should draw inferences from Mr. Herrera's underlying conduct because the relevant guideline allows us to do so. 11 On this point the government offers, by way of comparison, the definition of crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, Application Note 1(B)(iii). A crime of violence includes any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. Id. (emphasis added). According to the government, the phrase that has as an element directs the court's attention to the terms of the statute of conviction, see, e.g., United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993); no such phrase appears in the definition of drug trafficking offense, and therefore we can draw inferences about the prior conviction from Mr. Herrera's underlying conduct. 12 We disagree. The Guidelines define drug trafficking offense as an offense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits... the possession of a controlled substance ... with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1), Application Note 1(B)(iv). This definition requires us to ask whether the federal, state, or local law [under which the defendant was convicted] prohibits possession with intent to distribute. The focus is not on the defendant's conduct, but on what the state law prohibits. This confines our inquiry to the terms of the statute of conviction just as much as the phrase (in the definition of crime of violence) that has as an element. 13 A more illuminating comparison is to the Guidelines' definition of firearms offense, which includes [a]n offense under state or local law consisting of conduct that would have been an offense under [certain federal statutes] if the offense had occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, Application Note 1(B)(v)(VI) (emphasis added); see also id., Application Note 1(B)(ii) (defining child pornography offense in similar terms). This definition asks whether the offense ... consist[s] of conduct that would violate other federal statutes. Thus, it at least arguably directs our attention to the defendant's underlying conduct; the definition of drug trafficking offense (whether the federal, state, or local law ... prohibits possession with intent to distribute) does not. We therefore decline the government's invitation to draw inferences about an intent to distribute from Mr. Herrera's underlying conduct.
14 The government also asks us to infer an intent to distribute based on the structure of the Texas statutory scheme. It bases this argument on the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (11th Cir.2003), where the question was whether a defendant's prior Georgia conviction for possessing more than 28 grams of methamphetamine constituted a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). Georgia divided drug crimes into three tiers with increasing levels of punishment: (1) possession of any amount of a controlled substance, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a); (2) manufacture, delivery, distribution, dispensing, administering, selling, or possession with intent to distribute any amount of a controlled substance, O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(b); and (3) an offense called trafficking, which the Georgia Supreme Court says is a yet more serious offense, and which includes manufacture, delivery, importation — or mere possession — of more than a specified amount of a controlled substance (28 grams of methamphetamine or cocaine, 10 pounds of marijuana, etc.), O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31. See Bassett v. Lemacks, 258 Ga. 367, 370, 370 S.E.2d 146 (1988). The defendant in Madera-Madera pled guilty to possession of 87 grams of methamphetamine, a trafficking offense under Georgia law. 15 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the conviction also constituted a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). According to the court, because the Georgia trafficking statute punished possession of more than a specified amount of drugs more severely than either simple possession or possession with intent to distribute, the statute necessarily infers an intent to distribute once a defendant possesses a certain amount of drugs. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d at 1232. The Georgia trafficking statute therefore satisfied the Guidelines' definition of drug trafficking offense, subjecting the defendant to a twelve-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). 16 The government argues that the reasoning of Madera-Madera applies equally here because Texas punishes possession of more than 50 pounds, but 2000 pounds or less, of marijuana more severely than it punishes possession (and sometimes even delivery) of lesser amounts of marijuana. According to the government, Logically, the Texas criminal code punishes the possession of greater amounts of marijuana because greater amounts indicate an intent to distribute the marijuana. Aplt. Br. 13. We, however, find Madera-Madera distinguishable based on differences between the Georgia and Texas drug statutes. Georgia draws a clear line at a particular quantity of drugs — 10 pounds, for marijuana — at which point it no longer distinguishes between simple possession and other acts, such as manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to distribute. Instead, it lumps all of those acts together, including simple possession, and subjects the entire category to more severe punishment. This is what gives rise to the inference that Georgia is punishing not just simple possession, but possession with an implied intent to distribute. By contrast, the Texas code gradually increases punishment for both possession and delivery based on the quantity of drug; 3 there is no designated quantity of drugs at which possession is treated the same as delivery and subjected to more severe punishment. In Mr. Herrera's case, for example, possession of more than 50 pounds, but no more than 2000 pounds, of marijuana is a second-degree felony. Texas Health & Safety Code § 481.121(b)(5). Delivery of the same amount of marijuana is punished more severely, as a first-degree felony. Id. § 481.120(b)(5). The Texas statutory scheme therefore does not imply an intent to distribute from the fact of possession, and we are left with the conclusion, based solely on the fact of conviction and the terms of the Texas statute, that Mr. Herrera's prior conviction was not a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). 17