Opinion ID: 529724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The waiver by Velasquez

Text: 48 Before commencing a totality of the circumstances analysis of Velasquez's waiver, we address a preliminary issue. The district court determined that Velasquez had waived her Miranda rights when she asked her second question, What is going to happen to Ivan? The court expressly declined to consider the effect of Glanz's deceptions on Velasquez's state of mind. 9 We think that the district court misapplied Bradshaw in determining that the waiver occurred immediately when Velasquez asked her first question. 49 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Bradshaw, the initiation of a conversation by defendant does not by itself constitute a waiver of previously invoked Miranda rights. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. at 2834. Rather, the Court held only that when the accused initiates a conversation--and, as discussed above, the conversation must evince a desire to discuss the case generally--then further interrogation of the accused may take place. See, id.; see also Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 46, 103 S.Ct. 394, 395, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (per curiam). After the first Bradshaw prong, initiation, has been satisfied, interrogation is permitted. Satisfaction of the second prong, voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, is then possible, depending on the totality of the circumstances. 50 By asking her first question (What is going to happen?), Velasquez initiated the conversation and evinced a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. The waiver did not occur, however, until after she had asked her second question regarding what would happen to Terselich. In response to that question, Glanz provided her with misinformation about Terselich. Immediately thereafter, she made the incriminating statements which are the focus of the present dispute, and, as discussed below, by doing so she waived her right to counsel and right to silence. Thus, the waiver occurred after the misinformation was given to Velasquez, and our assessment of the validity of the waiver must include examination of the effect of the misinformation. 10 51 We now address whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. An examination of Velasquez's background reveals that she is a mature adult, forty-three years of age. She was born in Colombia, South America, where she graduated from college and worked as a journalist. She is able to speak and understand English. She has lived in the United States for at least fifteen years, and has worked in Miami as a cosmetologist. 52 Velasquez evidently understood the import of the Miranda warnings given by Durnan, because she invoked her right to counsel one half-hour before she made her incriminating statements. Although a psychiatrist testified at the competency hearing that she had suffered psychological trauma arising from the arrest, sufficient evidence was presented to demonstrate that she understood the legal proceedings concerning her, and the functions of the judge, jury, and counsel. We conclude that Velasquez possessed a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. Thus, her waiver was knowing and intelligent. 53 We next turn to the more difficult issue of voluntariness. With regard to the nature of her confinement and interrogation, the district court found that Velasquez had been in custody for less than two hours at the time she made her statements, and that no threats or promises were made. App. at 474. Nor was she ill-treated. After the cocaine was found, she was given her Miranda warnings. The failure of Glanz to provide her with new Miranda warnings impacts only slightly on the validity of her waiver, because only a short time had passed between her receiving the Miranda warnings and her requesting to speak with Glanz. 54 Aside from her psychological problems, the only factor supporting a finding that her waiver was not voluntary was Glanz's false statement to Velasquez about Terselich making a statement against her and being set free. The Supreme Court has stated that a waiver must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421, 106 S.Ct. at 1141. The Court has also advised, however, that lies told by the police do not necessarily make a confession involuntary; rather, this is simply one factor to consider out of the totality of the circumstances. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969). We have stated that [w]hile a lie told to the detainee about an important aspect of the case may affect the voluntariness of the confession, the effect of the lie must be analyzed in the context of all the circumstances of the interrogation. Miller, 796 F.2d at 607. 55 In the Frazier case, Frazier was arrested in connection with a murder and was questioned by police. He admitted being with his cousin Rawls on the night in question, but he denied being with any third person. In the midst of questioning he was given his Miranda warnings, after which questioning became more vigorous. The officer questioning Frazier then told him, falsely, that Rawls had been brought in and had confessed. Shortly thereafter, Frazier began to confess and eventually he signed a written confession. 394 U.S. at 737-38, 89 S.Ct. at 1423-24. 56 The Supreme Court rejected Frazier's claim that his confession was involuntary and should have been excluded from evidence. 394 U.S. at 739, 89 S.Ct. at 1425. As the Court noted, the fact that a suspect was given warnings of his constitutional rights prior to making the incriminating statement is quite relevant to a finding of voluntariness. Id.; see also Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-41, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1763-64, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966). The Court looked at the age, intelligence, maturity and length of detention of Frazier, and concluded that [t]he fact that the police misrepresented the statements that Rawls had made is, while relevant, insufficient in our view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. 394 U.S. at 739, 89 S.Ct. at 1425. 57 In Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 585, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986), another case involving the voluntariness of a confession, the murder suspect, Miller, was given his Miranda warnings and was then interrogated. The interrogating police officer employed an approach which involved befriending and sympathizing with Miller. In addition, at the beginning of the interrogation, the officer informed Miller that the victim was still alive, which was false. During the interrogation, the officer told Miller that she had just died, when in fact she had been found dead several hours earlier. 796 F.2d at 602. 58 We concluded in Miller that the lie about the timing of the victim's death, by itself, did not constitute sufficient deception to overcome Miller's will. We stated that [b]ecause [the officer] never suggested that the time of [the victim's] death might be relevant in linking Miller to the crime, the only possible effect of [his] initial statement that she was alive, followed by his report that she had just died, would be an emotional response in Miller. Id. at 607. This response, we held, did not occur. 59 We recognize that both Frazier and Miller dealt with the issue of voluntariness of a confession, whereas the instant issue involves the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. However, there is a paucity of case law to guide us in the area of deception in the Miranda waiver context. Moreover, these cases are helpful to our analysis of the waiver issue, because the analytical framework applied in the confession context--the totality of the circumstances--is also the proper approach to the waiver issue. See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. 60 The instant case presents a deception which seems to fall closer to the facts of Frazier than those of Miller. As in Frazier, the false information here went directly to the suspect's connection to the crime. In Frazier, the false statement was that Frazier's cousin had confessed. This, in connection with Frazier's previous admission that he had been with his cousin on the night of the murder, was designed to make the suspect think that the evidence against him was stronger than it actually was. Likewise, in the instant case Velasquez was told that Terselich had stated that the drugs were hers and that she had been paid $5,000 to drive the drugs north from Miami. This falsehood, like that in Frazier, had the effect of greatly inflating the state's evidence of the suspect's guilt. 61 Finally, Velasquez specifically asked to speak with Agent Glanz, thus indicating that it was likely that she wanted to discuss the investigation and less likely that the statement was a spontaneous reaction to Glanz's falsehood. Moreover, the false statement was given to Velasquez in response to her own specific question about her co-suspect. It was not volunteered by the interrogating officer. 62 Although the deception may have been a partial cause of Velasquez's statements, we do not think that her will was overcome or her capacity for self-control vitiated. 11 Moreover, as in Frazier, all the other factors point towards voluntariness. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we think that Velasquez voluntarily waived her right to counsel and her right to remain silent. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision to deny her motion to suppress her statements.