Opinion ID: 788670
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Would the adverse employment action have been taken absent Herrera's protected speech?

Text: 44 Independently, Herrera's employment file provides the answer to the question whether he would have suffered the adverse employment action but for the protected speech. His employment record contains no negative marks, comments, or references to any other incidents of misconduct whatsoever. And, even though that record on its face indicates that Herrera was disciplined for insubordination, it goes on to make abundantly clear that the insubordination for which he was punished arose from Durham's thrice-repeated, unconstitutional order to correct a dress code violation. 56 The record even notes the dress code's policy number. Under these circumstances, it is specious at least — mendacious at most — for the Hospital to contend that it would have reached the same [employment] decision ... in the absence of the protected conduct. 57 Like Poor Richard's proverbial horse-shoe nail, if Herrera had not engaged in the protected speech, he would not have been ordered to cease; if he had not been so ordered repeatedly, he would not have repeatedly refused to cease; if he had not repeatedly (and increasingly emphatically) refused to cease, the charge of insubordination and the ensuing adverse employment decision would never have been made. 58 This is a generous characterization, as the claim that insubordination was the motivation for the disciplinary action has the distinct ring of provocation and post-hoc rationalization. 45 The Hospital's attempt to cast its adverse action as disciplining Herrera only for insubordination, which action would have been taken regardless of the protected speech, proves too much. Under this theory, any public employer could stifle the First Amendment speech rights of employees with impunity. If an employer wanted to stop an employee from engaging in constitutionally protected speech (that is, speech on a matter of public concern that does not impede the employer's efficient operation), it need only order the employee to cease. If the employee obeys, the employer has succeeded in quashing protected speech; if the employee refuses, he has been insubordinate and is subject to being fired or suspended, thus again stopping the protected speech. This would be win-win for public employers interested in quashing protected speech, but it would be lose-lose for the First Amendment. 46 Still the Hospital protests that it was not Herrera's continued breach of the dress code and refusal to desist that constituted the insubordination; rather, it was his fighting words (I'm not going to take it off. If you want it off, then you take it off) to Durham for which he was disciplined. Not only does Herrera's employment record put the lie to this pretextual explanation by referring to the dress code by policy number; the record facts eschew the Hospital's attempt to portray the incident as some highly charged belly bumping altercation. There was no indication at trial that Herrera had been insubordinate or disruptive in any way on the day of his suspension, other than in the brief, Durham-provoked confrontation. That episode clearly was incited (or exacerbated) by Durham himself. 59 Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the protected speech and the supervisor's persistent, unconstitutional efforts to squelch that speech.