Opinion ID: 2137081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legality of checkpoint

Text: Temporary checkpoint stops of vehicles are seizures under the Fourth Amendment. Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3082, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). Accordingly, we must determine whether the checkpoint in this case was reasonable under Fourth Amendment standards. State v. Wetzel, 456 N.W.2d 115, 118 (N.D.1990). In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the United States Supreme Court disapproved the use of random stops to apprehend unlicensed drivers and unsafe vehicles. Noting that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to impose a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, the Court employed a two-pronged balancing test to weigh the competing interests of the government in highway safety against an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her automobile in determining whether the random, roving spot checks by the patrolman in that case were constitutional. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 653-654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. The Court held that except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his driver's license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Prouse, supra, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401. The Court added, however, that states were not precluded from developing systematic methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. Prouse, supra . The Prouse dictum did not fall into obscurity. See cases collected in Annotation, Validity of Routine Roadblocks by State or Local Police for Purpose of Discovery of Vehicular or Driving Violations, 37 A.L.R.4th 10 (1985). We have applied the Prouse rationale to vehicle safety inspections on two occasions. In State v. Goehring, 374 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.1985), the defendant's vehicle was stopped by a patrolman for a routine safety check of the vehicle. The patrolman discovered that the defendant's driver's license had been suspended. We noted several factors to be considered when applying the Prouse balancing test, including: the importance of the governmental interest at stake, the amount of physical and psychological intrusion upon the individual's Fourth Amendment interests, the subjectiveness of the intrusion, the availability of practical alternatives, and the efficiency of the procedure used. Goehring, supra, 374 N.W.2d at 887. We reversed the trial court's denial of the defendant's suppression motion because the record did not show the guidelines or procedures the patrolman was operating under in conducting the safety checks: We have no way of knowing whether these procedures allow officers no discretion, some discretion, or total discretion in deciding which vehicles are flagged over and checked. Goehring, supra, 374 N.W.2d at 888. In Wetzel, supra, we upheld the constitutional validity of a vehicle safety inspection checkpoint. The procedure used by the Highway Patrol officer who conducted the checkpoint was to stop a car, conduct an inspection, and then `stop the next available vehicle when safe' in accordance with Policy 3-7 of the North Dakota Highway Patrol Policy Manual. Wetzel, supra, 456 N.W.2d at 116. We recognized the state's vital interest in ensuring that the vehicles on its roads are safe for operation, and that licensing requirements are being observed. Wetzel, supra, 456 N.W.2d at 120. We found that the state's interest outweighed the intrusiveness of the checkpoint into the defendant's privacy rights under the circumstances. We noted that what disturbed the Court in Prouse was the patrolman's unconstrained discretion in randomly stopping any car, at any time, and under any procedure he desired, and concluded the procedure used by the officer was sufficiently systematic to pass constitutional muster. Wetzel, supra, 456 N.W.2d at 118, 120. The stop of the defendant's vehicle wasn't merely an act of unbridled whim, but was a part of a calculated pattern established for inspecting vehicles at a fixed checkpoint. Wetzel, supra, 456 N.W.2d at 121. One month after we rendered our decision in Wetzel, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Sitz, supra, in which the Court considered the constitutionality of an investigatory roadblock, a sobriety checkpoint, operated by Michigan's state police. The checkpoint was operated under guidelines governing checkpoint publicity, site selection, and police procedure at the checkpoint itself which were created by an advisory committee composed of law enforcement officials and transportation researchers from the University of Michigan. Under the guidelines, all drivers passing through the checkpoint would be stopped and briefly examined for signs of intoxication. Only if the checkpoint officer detected signs of intoxication would a driver be directed out of the traffic flow for a driver's license and registration check and, if warranted, further sobriety tests. Otherwise, the drivers would be allowed to proceed. During the checkpoint, which was maintained for one hour and fifteen minutes, 126 vehicles were stopped for an average of 25 seconds each. The checkpoint yielded two arrests for driving under the influence, approximately 1.5 percent of the stopped drivers. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2484. In analyzing the constitutionality of the checkpoint, the Supreme Court used the balancing test developed in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), which involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. [1] The Supreme Court recognized the magnitude of the drunken driving problem [and] the States' interest in eradicating it, and, when viewed in light of the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, concluded that the states' interest outweighs the slight intrusion on drivers stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2485, 2486. In rejecting the lower court's determination that the subjective intrusion caused by the checkpoints was unreasonable, the Court reasoned that the intrusion was to be measured objectively by the duration of the stop and the nature of the investigation, which it found, for constitutional purposes, indistinguishable from the checkpoint stops for illegal aliens it upheld in Martinez-Fuerte. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. The Court determined that the drunk-driver arrest rate adequately demonstrated that the checkpoint advanced the state interest and that the lower court, which had concluded based on extensive testimony that the checkpoint failed the effectiveness part of the test, had erroneously applied that prong. The Court held that this factor was not meant to transfer from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2487. Balancing the three factors, the Court concluded that the state program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2488. In analyzing the constitutionality of the checkpoint in this case, we begin by noting the trial court's apparent determination that the checkpoint was unconstitutional because it was conducted as a pretext or subterfuge to check for the presence of controlled substances. The State does not challenge the trial court's finding that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was to look for controlled substances, but asserts that this fact should not in itself invalidate the checkpoint. We agree. The Sitz Court, in upholding the constitutionality of an investigatory checkpoint designed to apprehend drunk drivers, recognized the magnitude of, and the states' important interest in eradicating, that problem. Everson concedes, and we agree, that attempting to alleviate the problem of drugs being transported by vehicles on state highways in North Dakota also encompasses an important state interest. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized the veritable national crisis in law enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics [ United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3309, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985)], and has characterized drug trafficking as one of the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 1392, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989). If a state may validly conduct a checkpoint for the purpose of apprehending drunk drivers, we think the state may validly conduct a checkpoint for the purpose of apprehending drug traffickers, a societal harm at least equal in magnitude to drunk driving. On this point we concur with the reasoning of the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Bartley, 109 Ill.2d 273, 93 Ill.Dec. 347, 486 N.E.2d 880, 888-889 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068, 106 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed.2d 608 (1986): [T]he circuit judge found, as a matter of fact, that the true purpose of this roadblock was to apprehend DUI violators and that the drivers' license check was a subterfuge. The State, in argument before this court, did not quarrel with this finding. The official subterfuge with respect to the true purpose of the roadblock is not entitled to significant weight in the balancing process. The subjective reaction of drivers stopped at the roadblock would not have been substantially different had the participating officers been instructed that the primary purpose of the stop was to check on drunken drivers rather than on license violations. In this case the officers' observations of evidence of intoxication entailed slight, if any, additional intrusion on defendant. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, this checkpoint is not rendered unconstitutional merely because its true purpose was to apprehend narcotics traffickers. Contra Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990 (D.C.Ct.App.1991) [suspicionless stop at roadblock established for primary purpose of combating illegal drug activity violates Fourth Amendment]. As we have noted, the State has a vital interest in eradicating the problem of narcotics trafficking. We have also recognized that the State has a vital interest in ensuring that the vehicles on its roads are safe for operation, and that licensing requirements are being observed. Wetzel, supra, 456 N.W.2d at 120; Prouse, supra . These state interests must be balanced with the degree to which this checkpoint advances the public interests, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty caused by the checkpoint. The Highway 85 checkpoint was planned more than one month before it occurred and was organized by state and local law enforcement officers. The officers in charge of establishing the checkpoint were assigned that duty by their supervisors. Sheriff Rice chose the days the checkpoint would be in operation and the location was chosen because of the officers' belief that Highway 85 would be a very busy traffic area during that time period due to the Sturgis rallies and it being [the] main route into North Dakota into the western part of the state. Written directives were issued requiring that all vehicles traveling in an assigned direction be stopped and outlining the officers' duties at the checkpoint. The vehicle safety inspections were conducted pursuant to written procedures found in Policy 3-7 of the North Dakota Highway Patrol Policy Manual. See Wetzel, supra, 456 N.W.2d at 116 n. 1. Supervisors monitored the checkpoint on occasion. Contrary to the assertion by Everson, this was not a checkpoint that was operated in a haphazard manner or organized without sufficient supervisory control. The officers had no discretion over which vehicles to stop. All vehicles were stopped. Although the point man did not direct Everson to the search area in this case, Everson asserts, and the trial court apparently agreed, that the checkpoint was constitutionally defective because the point man had unconstrained discretion to send vehicles to the search area or the inspection area. In Martinez-Fuerte, supra, 428 U.S. at 562-563, 96 S.Ct. at 3085, the Supreme Court said in the context of checkpoint stops for illegal aliens that it is constitutional for a point agent to refer motorists selectively to secondary inspection areas for further questioning on the basis of criteria that would not sustain a rovingpatrol stop. Moreover, even though the Court in Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2485, indicated that detention of particular motorists beyond the initial stop for more extensive questioning or testing may require satisfaction of an individualized suspicion standard, we do not view the point man's decision to send a vehicle to either the search area or the inspection area as being unconstrained by any reasonable standards or guidelines. When asked the basis for sending vehicles to the search area, Detective Buck testified: A Could have been probable cause, the officer could have seen an open container. Could have been that the officer smelled odor of alcohol on a person. Could have seen a controlled substance in a vehicle. There may have been a lot [of] different indicators about the person and/or the vehicle that could tell the officer that something isn't right here. A person may have controlled substances, stolen property, a lot of factors involved. Detective Buck further testified that, prior to going on duty, law enforcement officers were briefed on what to look for at the checkpoint. Also, each officer was given a copy of a drug courier profile. [2] The officers in this case were instructed to refer vehicles to the search area upon observation of possible illegal activity. Of the 1,023 vehicles that were stopped at the roadblock, only 34 searches were conducted. Based on this record, we are unable to conclude that the point man had unconstrained discretion to refer vehicles to the search area. We view the intrusion on individual liberties occasioned by the checkpoint to be minimal. Although the checkpoint was set up in a small valley so it could not be seen from a long distance, the operation was conducted during daylight hours and law enforcement vehicles could be observed when a driver approached it. Most officers were in uniform and drivers could see that all vehicles were being stopped. It is apparent that a driver's contact with the point man was brief and that the vehicle safety inspections lasted between three and ten minutes depending on the violations detected on the vehicle. Drivers were not questioned unless suspicions were aroused. Searches were conducted only with the consent of the drivers. Everson challenges the effectiveness of the checkpoint. The record reflects that 1,023 vehicles passed through the checkpoint during the four days it was conducted. Officers detected 135 equipment violations, two driver's license violations, and one studded tire violation. Several truck-enforcement permits were also issued. Criminal charges resulting from the checkpoint included one for carrying a loaded firearm, one for being an escaped prisoner, and two for minor in possession of alcohol. Only two controlled substance arrests were made, amounting to .196 percent of the vehicles stopped. In rejecting the argument that an arrest rate of only 1.5 percent showed that the sobriety checkpoint was ineffective in combating the drunk driving problem, the Court in Sitz, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 2488, responded: By way of comparison, the record from one of the consolidated cases in Martinez-Fuerte, showed that in the associated checkpoint, illegal aliens were found in only 0.12 percent of the vehicles passing through the checkpoint. See 428 U.S., at 554, 96 S.Ct., at 3081. The ratio of illegal aliens detected to vehicles stopped (considering that on occasion two or more illegal aliens were found in a single vehicle) was approximately 0.5 percent. See Ibid. We concluded that this `record ... provides a rather complete picture of the effectiveness of the San Clemente checkpoint', ibid., and we sustained its constitutionality. We see no justification for a different conclusion here. Likewise, we cannot say that the rather low percentage of arrests for possession of controlled substances resulting from this checkpoint shows that the checkpoint is ineffective for constitutional purposes. [3] Balancing the State's interest, the extent to which the checkpoint reasonably advances that interest, and the relatively minimal degree of intrusion upon individual liberties caused by the checkpoint, we conclude that the Highway 85 checkpoint did not violate the Fourth Amendment.