Opinion ID: 2621348
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Heading: Evaluation of Affidavit

Text: In making the determination whether to issue a search warrant, a magistrate considers the totality of the circumstances presented and makes a practical, common-sense decision whether a crime has been or is being committed and whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Gates, 462 U.S. at 235-36, 103 S.Ct. 2317; Longbine, 257 Kan. at 718, 896 P.2d 367; Gilbert, 256 Kan. at 421-22, 886 P.2d 365; Abu-Isba, 235 Kan. 851, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 685 P.2d 856. Bald conclusions, mere affirmations of belief, or suspicions are not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Probst, 247 Kan. at 202, 795 P.2d 393. Further, while an affidavit may be based on hearsay, there must be sufficient affirmative allegations of fact as to an affiant's personal knowledge to provide a rational basis upon which a magistrate can make a determination of probable cause. Longbine, 257 Kan. at 718, 896 P.2d 367; Probst, 247 Kan. 196, Syl. ¶ 3, 795 P.2d 393; State v. Morgan, 222 Kan. 149, 151, 563 P.2d 1056 (1977). In the affidavit before us, there were essentially four different categories of information, four different elements. We explore each in turn. The first element was composed of complaints from concerned citizens. These complaints were at least hearsay, and some may have qualified as double hearsay, having come to officers other than the affiant. Hearsay is acceptable in such affidavits, but among the circumstances to be considered by the magistrate in determining whether probable cause exists to support a search warrant are the veracity and the basis of knowledge of any person providing hearsay information. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317; State v. Prewett, 246 Kan. 39, 46, 785 P.2d 956 (1990). Concern over these considerations falls by the wayside if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity  which if fabricated would subject him [or her] to criminal liability. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 [1972] ); see State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694, 700, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999) ([T]he most favored of the tips are those which are in fact not really anonymous at all. These tips occur when the person giving the tip gives the police his or her name and address or identifies himself or herself in such a way that he or she can be held accountable for the tip.); City of Pratt v. Stover, 272 Kan. 279, 32 P.3d 1143 (2001) (drunk driving tip from person who gave her name, address to police dispatcher); Prewett, 246 Kan. at 46-47, 785 P.2d 956 (information supplied by a named employee of hospital); State v. Hays, 221 Kan. 126, 129, 557 P.2d 1275 (1976) (reliability of identified citizen informer need not be established in same manner as that of unidentified informant); State v. Musick, 30 Kan.App.2d 76, 78, 38 P.3d 144, rev. denied 273 Kan. 1039 (2002) (informants who supplied police with their names, addresses enough information to make it clear they had firsthand knowledge of defendant's activities considered reliable); see also United States v. Downes, 2001 WL 121951 (D. Kan. unpublished opinion filed January 12, 2001) (citizen informant identified by name with first-hand knowledge of wrongdoing entitled to presumption of reliability without corroboration). Here the affidavit does not identify the concerned citizens who complained about defendant to Hoisington police. We do not know whether the police had reason to believe the citizens were honest. The only language in the affidavit that could lead to the conclusion they were knowledgeable are two references to their status as Hicks' neighbors. We do not know when the observations were made, or when they were reported. We also do not know how many citizens there were. The affidavit refers to at least two, but is nonspecific. The affidavit also does not state whether the complaints from concerned citizens were independent of each other. If so, they could be characterized as mutually corroborative. If they were not independent, they may not be fairly described as corroborative. An absence of police verification for the concerned citizens' complaints also is significant. When an affidavit for a search warrant is founded upon information from an unidentified informant, . . . [t]he probable cause determination . . . must be supported by some indication that the informant's information is accurate. Therefore, the veracity and basis of knowledge of the confidential informant must be considered as part of the substantial basis for finding probable cause. State v. Shively, 26 Kan. App.2d 302, Syl. ¶ 4, 987 P.2d 1119 (1999), aff'd 268 Kan. 589, 999 P.2d 259 (2000). Allegations without factual support should not be considered in determining whether probable cause existed to issue a search warrant. Littrice v. State, 31 Kan. App.2d 846, 851, 75 P.3d 292, rev. denied 276 Kan. 969 (2003). Although the affidavit tells us that police began surveillance of Hicks' residence after the complaints from concerned citizens came in, there is nothing in the affidavit saying police observed any activities to confirm those citizens' complaints. If police saw Hicks change colored lightbulbs on his porch, prompting increased traffic at his residence, or they detected marijuana smoke emanating from his home, the affidavit does not say so. The next element of the affidavit concerns visitors to Hicks' residence and their past involvement with drugs. The affidavit says that police over the past several weeks, observed three individuals arrive or show up at Hicks' house. Two of these three had a prior drug-related arrest and/or conviction, one of them 3 years before and the other 1 year before. One of these individuals visited the residence two times in 1 day. The other visited the house twice in 2 weeks. We first observe that these spotty police observations do not confirm the citizens' complaint of a lot of people coming and going. This handful of visits certainly did not constitute a protracted or continuous course of traffic indicating drug-related activity. See State v. Jacques, 225 Kan. 38, 42, 587 P.2d 861 (1978). The visitors' criminal histories can be relevant in the totality of the circumstances, and a seemingly innocent activity can become suspicious in light of a reliable tip or independent police investigation, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-46 & n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, but we discern no particular relevance here. At least one of the visitors' criminal histories was stale; there was no evidence that either visitor carried a suspicious package in or out of the residence or that Hicks was even home or aware of the visits at the times they occurred. The third element of the affidavit consists of Hicks' drug history. This element is extremely stale and cannot, without more, provide a basis to believe drugs would be found at the residence. Hicks' three convictions ranged in time from 1975 to 1997-28 years to 6 years before the affidavit was filed. The only other element of inculpatory information in the affidavit came from the results of two trash pulls from the alley behind Hicks' residence. On each of two successive Mondays, the normal days for trash pickup, 10 days and 3 days before the affidavit was filed, officers seized a bag from this location. The affidavit states without explanation that the place from which the bags were seized was the normal place Hicks placed his trash for pickup. Each bag contained drug evidence. The affidavit is silent on whether either or both bags contained any indices of Hicks' residency, i.e., anything tying their contents to him, such as a billing or bank statement containing his name and address. The affidavit also does not say Hicks was observed placing either or both bags in the alley. Generally, some evidence establishing a nexus between drug evidence discovered in a garbage bag and a residence to be searched is necessary to support the conclusion that the drug evidence came from the home. We note that this requirement has been consistently applied by our Court of Appeals. See, e.g., State v. Droge, No. 92,501, unpublished opinion filed February 25, 2005, 2005 WL 475264. The affidavit in this case falls short in this respect as well. Even when we view the affidavit at the heart of this case in the context of the totality of the circumstances and keep in mind our Gates obligation of deference to the issuing magistrate, we simply cannot conclude that the magistrate had enough before him to establish a substantial basis for the existence of probable cause. The parts are weak, and the whole is not greater than the sum of them. Although it is possible that the concerned citizens were not anonymous to the police, or, if so, that they were nevertheless worthy of trust and their complaints accurate and corroborated, the affidavit did not say so. Although the two visitors to Hicks' home may have had more recent drug abuse and distribution histories and more numerous or more frequent visitors with similar pasts may have congregated at the house, the affidavit did not say so. Although the affiant may have based his assertion that the trash pulls came from the normal place Hicks left his trash for pickup on his own or others' observation of Hicks' behavior or on indices of residency in the bags, the affidavit did not say so. With none of this information, the affidavit did not provide a substantial basis for a fair probability that evidence of crime would be found in Hicks' residence.