Opinion ID: 1155448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence of a Prior Bad Act in the Penalty Phase

Text: During the penalty phase of the trial, Thomas Kucera (Kucera) testified that he formerly ran a halfway house for parolees and that Powell stayed there in early 1989. After Powell had been at the halfway house for two weeks, Kucera's twelve-year-old daughter informed him that Powell had molested her, whereupon Kucera told Powell to move out. Kucera telephoned Powell's probation officer to report the incident while Powell was present. Powell then said angrily, I am going to kill you. No, I am not going to do it. I will have somebody else do it. The trial court allowed the testimony, finding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the prejudice to Powell. Powell asserts that the testimony of the molestation should not have been admitted, as it was more prejudicial than probative. See NRS 48.035(1). Powell argues that the testimony of the death threat could have been introduced without the reference to the molestation and that the testimony created an impression in the jury's mind that Powell had a pattern of mistreating young girls. During a penalty hearing, evidence may be presented concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances relative to the offense, defendant or victim and on any other matter which the court deems relevant to sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible. NRS 175.552. This court has previously sanctioned the admission of testimony during a penalty hearing regarding an attempted sexual assault. Biondi v. State, 101 Nev. 252, 699 P.2d 1062 (1985). In Biondi, this court held that character evidence which is neither dubious nor tenuous is properly admitted during the penalty hearing. Id. at 257, 699 P.2d at 1065-66. Testimony regarding sexual assault is relevant to the defendant's character. Id. Powell fails to make any argument as to how Kucera's testimony was not credible. Further, the testimony regarding the molestation was an integral part of explaining the death threat against Kucera. We therefore conclude that the district court was within the range of its discretion in finding the testimony was more probative than prejudicial.