Opinion ID: 2509547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of Dawson's First Case

Text: In discussing the landlord's attorney's fees motion, the superior court reasoned that Dawson lost and/or would have lost two of the three separate cases that she filed, and therefore declined to award fees with respect to the first action and the associated interlocutory appeal. This conclusion was based in part on the court's agreement with the magistrate and the tenants that the unclaimed notice of termination and notice to quit that Dawson sent by certified mail in September did not satisfy AS 34.03.290(c). The superior court also reasoned that AS 34.03.290(c) requires a separate notice to quit following termination of the tenancy. Dawson argues that because the notice issues had been mooted, the superior court erred when awarding fees by considering the mooted issues. She also addresses the merits of the notice issues, and argues that under Alaska law a landlord can send a notice of termination and a notice to quit together by certified mail and that the notices satisfy AS 34.03.290 and AS 09.45.100 even though they are sent simultaneously. Alaska Statute 34.03.290(b) specifies that a landlord may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a written notice given to the [tenant] at least 30 days before the rental due date specified in the notice. Alaska Statute 34.03.290(c) states that if a tenant remains in possession after the termination, the landlord may, after serving a notice to quit, bring an action for possession. Finally, AS 09.45.100(c)(3) provides for service on the tenant of a notice to quit sent by registered or certified mail. Both Dawson and the tenants rely on AS 09.45.100(c) in arguing how notice to quit must be effected under AS 34.03.290(c). Dawson argues that the plain meaning of sent in AS 09.45.100(c) and the lack of contrary legislative history establish that sending notice by certified mail is sufficient. The tenants respond that the purpose of the statute and basic fairness require that a landlord must establish the tenants' actual receipt or refusal to accept the notice. Although the notice issues are potentially important to other landlords and tenants, we choose not to decide them in this appeal. The only issues squarely before us concern the attorney's fees award. The court declined to award Dawson fees with respect to legal services concerning the first FED action. Whatever the merits of the notice issues in that case, Dawson was not in fact the prevailing party in that case as to those issues because the superior court dismissed her appeal in that case for mootness and Dawson has not appealed from that dismissal. Nor has she appealed from the judgment that awarded her unpaid rent for January 1-19, 2002, but no rent for the period November 5 through December 31. We have sometimes chosen to consider the merits of mooted issues when, to resolve an attorney's fees dispute, it is necessary to determine who was, or would have been, the prevailing party. [9] But here there is no genuine dispute about whether Dawson was ultimately the prevailing party in proceedings that she describes on appeal as inexorably intertwined. The court treated Dawson as the prevailing party who regained possession and recovered damages, and consequently awarded fees to her. The prevailing-party issue is therefore of little or no importance because the important issue here is whether the award was too small. For reasons we discuss in Part III.D, the main question is whether it was an abuse of discretion to award about fifteen percent of the fees incurred from January 7 forward. We therefore see little need to address the merits of the mooted notice issues in this case, and decline to do so.