Opinion ID: 2519950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Model Penal Code and Attempt

Text: ¶ 26 Contrary to the State's argument, the Model Penal Code does not provide support for the contention that a knowing mens rea is sufficient to obtain an attempted murder conviction under Utah law. Though we have noted that the Utah attempt statute is based on the M.P.C. definition of attempt, see Vigil, 842 P.2d at 846; State v. Pearson, 680 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 1984), our statute, in contradistinction to the M.P.C., requires intentional conduct. ¶ 27 The M.P.C. identifies four levels of culpability, providing that a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently. Model Penal Code § 2.02 (1985). [8] The commentary to the M.P.C. notes that the narrow distinction between purposely and knowingly is one of the elements of ambiguity in legal usage of the term `intent.' Model Penal Code and Commentary § 2.02 cmt. 2, at 233 (1985). The commentary also notes that the distinction [between purposely and knowingly] is inconsequential for most purposes of liability; acting knowingly is ordinarily sufficient. But there are areas where the discrimination is required and is made under traditional law, which uses the awkward concept of specific intent. This is true in treason ... and in attempts ... where a true purpose to effect the criminal result is requisite for liability. Id. at 234 (emphasis added). While the difference between these two levels of culpability may be minimal, the M.P.C. commentary notes that the distinction becomes important in attempt crimes. ¶ 28 In the M.P.C. formulation of attempt, however, a person can be convicted of an attempt crime if the person acted in one of two ways: purposely engag[ing] in conduct, or, when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, do[ing] ... anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result without further conduct on his part. Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(a), (b) (1985). According to the commentary, the M.P.C. definition is, in general, designed to follow the conventional pattern of limiting the crime of attempt to purposive [or intentional] conduct. Model Penal Code and Commentary § 5.01 cmt. 2, at 301 (1985). Nevertheless, while the M.P.C. expressly rejects the notion that an attempt can be committed recklessly or negligently, it does allow for attempts to be committed purposely or knowingly. When... a person actually believes that his behavior will produce the proscribed result, it is appropriate to treat him as attempting to cause the result, whether or not that is his purpose. Id. at 304. As an example, the M.P.C. commentary provides that [i]f ... the actor's purpose were to demolish a building and, knowing that persons were in the building and that they would be killed by the explosion, he nevertheless detonated a bomb that turned out to be defective, he could be prosecuted for attempted murder even though it was no part of his purpose that the inhabitants of the building would be killed. Id. at 305 (emphasis added). ¶ 29 Though the M.P.C. would allow a conviction for attempt based on knowledge alone, Utah's attempt statute does not. Instead it allows convictions for attempt crimes only upon strong corroboration of the actor's intent to commit the offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2) (1999) (emphasis added); see also Vigil, 842 P.2d at 848 (interpreting, in the main holding of the opinion, the attempt statute to require intentional conduct). Because the Utah legislature did not adopt the particular wording of the M.P.C. that would have allowed a knowing attempt, we assume that it did so deliberately in order to limit the reach of the attempt statute to intentional conduct. See Vigil, 842 P.2d at 847.