Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Change of Venue to Santa Clara County

Text: Defendant claims the trial court violated his right to a fair trial when, after granting defendant's motion for a change of venue, it transferred the case to Santa Clara County, rejecting a defense request to hold the trial in a county farther from the location of the murder. As we explain, we find no error.
Venue was originally in Sonoma County, as all of defendant's charged crimes took place in that county. After more than six weeks of jury selection, however, the parties and the assigned Sonoma County trial court judge, Lawrence Antolini, agreed that a change of venue was necessary because of concerns that defendant could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Sonoma County. During the change of venue proceedings, the trial court noted that the search for Polly Klaas had created enormous personal involvement for residents of Sonoma County that surprised probably all of us, even those who have been born and raised in this county. In addition, despite the court's repeated admonitions during the sequestered jury selection, prospective jurors often discussed the case in the waiting areas, making inflammatory comments about defendant's guilt and calling for his execution, with some expressing the desire that defendant be castrated by means of a rope and a truck. The Administrative Office of the Courts proposed San Diego, Los Angeles, Fresno, and Santa Clara Counties as possible venue sites. (See Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 842, now rule 4.152.) After the parties were unable to agree as to the new venue site, the trial court appointed Steven Schoenthaler, Ph.D., a professor of sociology at California State University, Stanislaus, to conduct telephone surveys of the four candidate counties as well as Sonoma County (used a basis for comparison). The survey sampled 300 people per county, consisted of 21 questions, and was designed to measure knowledge of specific facts obtained from pretrial publicity, the magnitude of prejudgment of defendant's guilt, and the magnitude of prejudgment of defendant's penalty. At the hearing to determine the new venue site, Professor Schoenthaler presented the results of the survey for each county in question and then extrapolated the data using six models to analyze the survey results. His preferred model was his Model 1 because, in his view, it best minimized the probability of error. Model 1 focused on those participants who had prejudged defendant as guilty (and could not set aside this opinion or were unsure about their ability to set aside this opinion) and/or those who had prejudged defendant as deserving the death penalty (and were absolute in their belief as to this penalty). To focus on the effect of pretrial publicity, Schoenthaler included only participants who recognized at least one of three facts: the kidnapping of a little girl from her Petaluma home, the name Richard Allen Davis, or the name Polly Klaas; and he subtracted participants who could not recognize any of these facts. According to these criteria, Model 1's publicity-induced total prejudgment rate was 55 percent in Sonoma County, 37 percent in Santa Clara County, 34 percent in Fresno County, 27 percent in Los Angeles County, and 21 percent in San Diego County. Professor Schoenthaler testified that the 16-percent-point difference in his Model 1 prejudgment rate between Santa Clara and San Diego Counties was statistically significant and would translate to two fewer eligible potential jurors per panel of 12 in Santa Clara County. Using the same criteria, but focusing only on those prejudging defendant as deserving the death penalty and being absolute in that belief, Schoenthaler calculated the sentence prejudgment rate as 12 percent in Sonoma County, 4 percent in Santa Clara County, 13 percent in Fresno County, 11 percent in Los Angeles County, and 6 percent in San Diego County. Because the case had generated massive publicity, the percentage of survey participants who were unaware of the case (those who were unaware of the kidnapping of a little girl from her Petaluma home and did not recognize the names Richard Allen Davis or Polly Klaas) was only 1 percent in Sonoma County, 4 percent in Santa Clara County, 7 percent in Fresno County, 21 percent in Los Angeles County, and 22 percent in San Diego County. In Schoenthaler's opinion, based on his Model 1 for prejudgment of both penalty and guilt, San Diego County was the best venue site for the defense, followed by Los Angeles, Fresno, and Santa Clara. Aside from a high rate of prejudgment of penalty in Fresno County, Schoenthaler found no statistical difference among the remaining counties. The prosecution's expert, Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Ph.D., a professor of psychology at the University of California, San Diego, presented his own four models to measure prejudgment. Although these models showed that, of the four candidate counties, San Diego had the lowest prejudgment (or tied for lowest with Los Angeles) and Santa Clara had the highest prejudgment, in Ebbesen's view, the ability of participants to set aside their knowledge of the case and their opinions of defendant's guilt did not differ significantly among the four candidate counties. He based this opinion on a survey question asking participants if they could set aside their opinions of defendant's guilt and base their decision on the evidence presented in court alone. The percentage of participants who answered yes to this question was 46 percent in Sonoma County, 58 percent in Santa Clara County, 60 percent in Fresno County, 63 percent in Los Angeles County, and 67 percent in San Diego County. According to Professor Ebbesen, the only significant difference was between Sonoma and the remaining four counties, a finding that, in his opinion, reflected the unsuccessful attempt to select a jury in Sonoma County. Professor Ebbesen's analysis showed that in each of the candidate counties, the more a participant knew about the case, the greater the likelihood that he or she would prejudge defendant as guilty and deserving a death sentence. Ebbesen found no significant differences between the counties with regard to the participants' prejudgment of penalty, with the percentage of participants selecting the death penalty being 59 percent in Sonoma County, 61 percent in Santa Clara County, 62 percent in Fresno County, 56 percent in Los Angeles County, and 57 percent in San Diego County. As the effect of pretrial publicity did not appear to generate particularly strong, fixed opinions of guilt, Professor Ebbesen theorized that no matter where the case was tried, publicity would shift to that county, thereby increasing knowledge and prejudgment and creating a saturation level at the time of jury selection that would equalize differences in knowledge or prejudgment measured by the survey. According to Professor Ebbesen, jury selection in Sonoma County had failed because prospective jurors were emotionally involved in the case, which resulted from the circumstance that the crime had occurred in their backyard, making it more difficult for them to set aside their opinions. This factor, he noted, would be absent in other counties. He acknowledged that the survey was not specifically designed to measure this factor. Professor Schoenthaler agreed with Professor Ebbesen that transferring the case to a new county would generate more publicity in the new venue, but he disagreed with Ebbesen's conclusion that this would equalize the level of knowledge among the candidate counties, because each county started with a different knowledge level. He conceded, however, that there might not be a statistically significant difference if trial were to begin more than 90 days after selection of the new venue, because the increased publicity would spread knowledge and eventually infect potential jurors in the new venue like the flu. The defense expert, Edward J. Bronson, Ph.D., a professor of public law at California State University, Chico, presented several of his own models, including Model 4, which calculated the percentage of participants who were absolute in their opinion that defendant should receive the death penalty but excluded those who had no knowledge of the case. In Model 4, the percentage of participants who recognized the case and had an absolute belief that defendant deserved a death sentence was 45 percent in Sonoma County, 41 percent in Santa Clara County, 43 percent in Fresno County, 32.3 percent in Los Angeles County, and 31.3 percent in San Diego County. In Model 5, Professor Bronson created a category of high risk respondents, comprising those who recognized the kidnapping of a girl from her home in Petaluma or the name Polly Klaas, who prejudged defendant as guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and could not or were unsure if they could set that opinion aside, and who determined death was the appropriate penalty. The percentage of participants who met this high risk category, Bronson testified, was 28.7 percent in Sonoma County, 19.3 percent in Santa Clara County, 14.3 percent in Fresno County, 11.7 percent in Los Angeles County, and 8 percent in San Diego County. Professor Bronson testified that his Models 4 and 5 and Professor Schoenthaler's Model 1 demonstrated substantial differences between the candidate counties. The models showed a continuum, with Santa Clara County the worst and prejudgment dropping off as one headed southward, with San Diego County being the best. He was particularly concerned about Santa Clara, as it was in the Bay Area, not far from Sonoma County, where the crimes occurred. Bronson disagreed with Professor Ebbesen's conclusion that the survey participants in each of the four candidate counties showed equal hostility toward defendant. According to his analysis, the percentage of participants who expressed strong feelings and/or hostility toward defendant was 18 percent in Santa Clara County, 13 percent in Fresno County, and 9.67 percent in San Diego County (Bronson did not have time to examine the results in Los Angeles or Sonoma County). Professor Bronson disagreed with Professor Ebbesen's theory that publicity following the change of venue would equalize the degree of prejudgment. He reasoned that the baseline for each county was different and beliefs that have been held for a couple of years tend to be more deep seated than beliefs created by new information. He stated that a county's population size was important because larger communities could better absorb the impact of a large case such as this. He gave these population estimates for the pertinent counties: 432,000 in Sonoma, 1,607,700 in Santa Clara, 764,800 in Fresno, 9,244,600 in Los Angeles, and 2,720,900 in San Diego. All three experts agreed that, generally speaking, participants' knowledge of the case and their prejudgment dropped the farther away they were from Sonoma County. The parties stipulated that Santa Clara County would be the most convenient and least expensive venue for travel and hotel costs. In deciding to set the case in Santa Clara County, the trial court expressed the view that an unbiased jury could have been selected in Sonoma County if its residents had not been so personally involved in the search for Polly Klaas, the prayers at local churches, her memorial service, and the amount of social networking in the county. The court discounted the models presented by the prosecution and defense experts and gave greatest weight to Professor Schoenthaler's Model 1, noting that any difference in prejudgment of penalty was negligible between Santa Clara and San Diego Counties under that model. The court compared San Diego with Los Angeles and Fresno Counties; it concluded that Los Angeles was not substantially different from San Diego in costs and hardship and that Fresno, although less costly, had a higher prejudgment of penalty because of publicity, making San Diego the preferred county among the three. Comparing San Diego with Santa Clara, the court found that the cost and hardship to the witnesses would be substantially less in Santa Clara County and that this benefit outweighed the 16-percentage-point difference in total prejudgment between the two counties because this difference would only necessitate identification of an additional 16 out of 100 potential jurors during jury selection in Santa Clara. The court noted that Santa Clara County's population (though smaller than San Diego County) was nearly four times that of Sonoma County, making the jury pool much larger. The court mentioned that the factors measured by the survey would change after a transfer because continued publicity would drive knowledge and prejudgment up regardless of where the case is sent. Finally, the court stressed that the survey did not measure the country atmosphere, the networking, and the personal involvement in Sonoma County, none of which would be present in Santa Clara County. For these reasons, the court transferred the matter to Santa Clara County.
Defendant claims the change of venue to Santa Clara County amounted to no change of venue at all and that the trial court abused its discretion by transferring the case there, instead of to Los Angeles County or San Diego County. He relies heavily on the results of the survey and the testimony of Professors Schoenthaler and Bronson to argue that the people of Santa Clara County were as prejudiced against him as those in Sonoma County. We disagree. (1) After a motion to change venue is granted, absent an agreement as to the new venue, the parties have a right to an evidentiary hearing to determine where the case should be transferred. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 790-791 [42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 804 [281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865]; McGown v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 648, 652 [142 Cal.Rptr. 262].) The presence or absence of prejudicial publicity in [a successor county] is one of many facts and circumstances which should be considered by [a] court in the exercise of its discretion to decide where the cause should be transferred. ( McGown, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 653.) Even if the magnitude of pretrial publicity in a successor county may not otherwise merit a change of venue from that county, it may still be large enough to persuade a court not to transfer the case to that county. ( People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 804; McGown, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at p. 653.) In addition, we have previously held that, even in capital cases, considerations of relative hardship, and the conservation of judicial resources and public funds, are important factors in deciding between various possible venue sites. ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 805.) This may include choosing a new venue site near the original venue site for the convenience of witnesses, attorneys, and interested residents of the original venue site. ( Ibid. ) After hearing any evidence, the court must make a decision in the interest of justice in choosing where the case should be transferred, and we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. ( Id. at pp. 804-805; McGown, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at pp. 653-654.) Of the four candidate counties in this case, Santa Clara, in virtually every model presented by all three experts, had a level of knowledge and prejudgment of guilt and sentence significantly higher than those found in Los Angeles County or San Diego County. But the media attention remained pervasive throughout the state, including the four candidate counties, even though the crime had occurred two years before the hearing. As a result, the trial court could reasonably conclude that, regardless of where the case would be tried, media attention would shift to the new venue. As in People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 102 [132 Cal.Rptr. 265], another high-profile case, media coverage of defendant's crimes permeated every corner of this state with varying degrees of intensity, and, despite relocating the case to a different venue, nothing could have prevented the public media from swinging its attention to that place because [t]he magnetic pull of such notorious cases is compelling. ( Id. at p. 177; see also Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717 [6 L.Ed.2d 751, 81 S.Ct. 1639]; Note, Prejudicial Publicity in Trials of Public Officials (1975) 85 Yale L.J. 123, fn. 2.) Consequently, because all three experts agreed (and the surveys confirmed) that the more knowledge a person had about this case, the more likely that person would judge defendant guilty, it was reasonable to assume that a transfer to either Los Angeles County or San Diego County would cause the jury pools in those venues to experience an increase in knowledge and prejudgment rates, perhaps reaching rates similar to those in Santa Clara County. (2) This did not necessarily mean, however, that defendant had no fair or impartial venue available to him or that moving the case out of Sonoma County was a useless gesture. We have never required potential jurors to be ignorant of news accounts of the crime or free of `any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused.' ( People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 950 [171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240], quoting Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at p. 723; see also People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 281 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363]; In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 295 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600].) The mere presence of such awareness on the jurors' part, without more, does not presumptively deny a defendant due process, because to hold otherwise `would be to establish an impossible standard.' ( People v. Harris, supra, 28 Cal.3d at pp. 949-950, quoting Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at p. 723.) In the absence of some reason to believe otherwise, it is only necessary that a potential juror be willing to set aside his or her `impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' ( Harris, at p. 950, quoting Irvin v. Dowd , at p. 723; see People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 281.) Because it is impossible to control heightened media attention in any new venue, it also is virtually impossible to prevent the knowledge and prejudgment rates for potential jurors living in a new venue from increasing after the change of venue has occurred. Thus, when evaluating a county under consideration as the site for the trial of a high-publicity case, the ability of potential jurors in that county to disregard the information they have learned from the media, and to set aside opinions they have formed based on that information, is significant, because it bears on the likelihood that the defendant will be able to receive a fair trial there. The survey in this case showed that the ability of persons to set aside their opinion of defendant's guilt was not dramatically different between Santa Clara County (58 percent), Los Angeles County (63 percent), and San Diego County (67 percent), especially when compared to Sonoma County (46 percent). But the survey did not explain why Sonoma County differed so significantly from the candidate counties in the ability of potential jurors to set aside their opinions. The Sonoma trial court identified the problem as being Sonoma County's personal involvement in the case. Defendant argues that personal involvement is an intangible based on intuition and that no evidence in the record reliably supported this factor or showed that it would be absent in Santa Clara County. We disagree. The 598 Sonoma County questionnaires paint a picture of a growing county suddenly exposed to a crime that jolted many of its residents out of their smalltown sense of security and peace. When asked whether the crime affected their lives, 72 percent of the Sonoma County prospective jurors responded affirmatively, with many expressing shock over the nature of the kidnapping and sorrow over the young girl's death. One wrote: It saddened me to know that this type of crime can happen in my home town. Another explained: Because I also come from a small town and not far away from Miss Klaas' home town, I felt like someone I knew had been murdered.... Another wrote: A sense of general anguish and pain spread through the entire community. At least two prospective Sonoma jurors cried while filling out their questionnaires. Not only did many prospective Sonoma County jurors indicate they cried or felt sorrow when they learned that Polly was dead, 23 percent took steps to improve the security around their homes, such as locking their doors and windows. As one prospective juror put it: It has become unsafe. We used to leave our doors unlocked and didn't have to fear for our lives. Another wrote: It took from us our last safe place, our own homes. Yet another observed: I feel that we have lost the trusting way that we once enjoyed. It has made us a suspicious and untrusting society. Thirty-nine percent either listened to the broadcast of the memorial services for Polly or personally attended the services, and dozens indicated that they cried while watching the service. Over 14 percent of the 598 prospective Sonoma County jurors said they knew one of three victims or the victims' family members or one of the potential witnesses or attorneys associated with the case. Nearly 12 percent of those jurors either participated in the search for Polly Klaas or volunteered or contributed money to the Polly Klaas Foundation. According to a prospective juror who mailed fliers during the search: Everyone seemed `closer,' she became like part of the family. This emotional involvement continued after Polly's death, with 11 percent of the 598 prospective Sonoma County jurors indicating that they personally visited the site where her body was recovered. If the 598 prospective Sonoma County jurors' social networks are included, 23 percent of the prospective jurors' family members, friends, or coworkers participated in the search; volunteered or contributed to the Polly Klaas Foundation; knew the victims, the victims' families, a potential witness, or an attorney associated with the case; or visited the site where Polly's body was found. As a measure of the total personal and community involvement in this case, if we include any prospective juror who met at least one of the above criteria, some 500 of the 598 prospective jurors (84 percent) in Sonoma County had some kind of personal or community involvement in this case. Therefore, contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, the personal involvement factor was not merely rooted in the trial court's intuition; it was overwhelmingly evident from the record of the failed Sonoma County jury selection. Given the unique circumstances faced in Sonoma County, the trial court there reasonably concluded that a more urban county would not experience a similar small town reaction or connection to the crime (see Martinez v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 574, 581 [174 Cal.Rptr. 701, 629 P.2d 502]), and, as we will explain in defendant's second claim, a review of the Santa Clara County jury selection confirms this conclusion. In counties geographically removed from the locale of the crime, lack of a sense of community involvement will permit jurors a degree of objectivity unattainable in that locale. ( Corona v. Superior Court (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 872, 883 [101 Cal.Rptr. 411]; see also Powell v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 785, 802 [283 Cal.Rptr. 777].) In addition, [l]ocal consciousness of the community's reputation for peace and security will be eliminated. ( Corona, supra, 24 Cal.App.3d at p. 883.) For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in transferring defendant's case to Santa Clara County. The court reasonably concluded that the personal involvement factor, not pretrial publicity by itself, was why jury selection had failed in Sonoma County, and that this factor was unique to Sonoma County and would not be present in any of the four candidate counties. The differences in knowledge and prejudgment rates among the candidate counties were not decisive because the media would descend on any new venue site and effectively equalize these rates. This equalization made it reasonable to consider costs and convenience as the primary differentiating factors in choosing a new venue. As a result, the court acted within its discretion in selecting Santa Clara County, which, because of its proximity to the crime scene, was the most convenient and least expensive of the four counties for the trial in this case.