Opinion ID: 424730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retaliatory Lawsuit.

Text: 38 The Board found that the Union had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by filing its state court suit for $30,000 in damages against Gilson in retaliation for Gilson's filing of a charge before the Board. It ordered the Union to withdraw the suit and to reimburse Gilson for any legal expenses incurred in defending himself in the state court action. 39 The Union asserts on appeal that, for any one of several distinct reasons, we must deny enforcement of this portion of the Board's order. While we find that none of the Union's arguments compel the result it urges, we nonetheless deny enforcement of the injunction portion of the order on the authority of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983), a case decided after submission of this case, and remand to the Board for further proceedings. 40 The Union argues first that, regardless of the effects of or motivations behind the lawsuit, its filing could not be an unfair labor practice since retaliation against the filing of an unfair labor practice charge before the Board is not specifically enumerated in the Act as an unfair labor practice. We disagree. 41 Section 8(a) of the Act, which enumerates acts that are unfair labor practices when committed by employers, in its subsection 4 defines such practices to include discrimin[ation] against an employee because he has filed charges ... under this subchapter. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(4) (1976). Section 8(b), which covers unfair labor practices by labor organizations, does not include a counterpart. The lack of a definitional provision in section 8(b) directly comparable to that contained in section 8(a) does not, however, compel the result the Union urges. 6 Such union conduct nonetheless falls within the more general language of section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1)(A) (1976), that defines an unfair labor practice committed by a union to include restraint or coercion of an employee in the exercise of the employee's rights guaranteed under section 7 of the Act. 7 42 The Act does not explicitly state that the exercise of protected section 7 rights includes bringing a charge of an unfair labor practice before the Board. Nonetheless, a union commits a section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice when it restrains or coerces an employee who has filed a charge with the Board alleging that the union has in some way interfered with the sort of activity that is described in section 7. Philadelphia Moving Picture Machine Operators' Union, Local No. 307 v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir.1967); see NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of America, 379 F.2d 702, 706-07 (3d Cir.1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U.S. 418, 88 S.Ct. 1717, 20 L.Ed.2d 706 (1968); NLRB v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 470 F.2d 57, 60, 62 (2d Cir.1972). 43 In this case, Gilson initially filed with the Board a section 8(b)(2) charge, not an 8(b)(1)(A) charge. Although arguably he did not allege the Union's interference with concerted activity protected by section 7, the Board nevertheless found Gilson's filing protected activity under section 8(b)(1)(A). We agree. 44 The ability of an employee to air fully before the Board a charge of an unfair labor practice has been recognized as crucial in effectuating the purposes of the Act, both to deter and remedy the commission of unfair labor practices and to ensure the functioning of the Act as an organic whole. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S.Ct. at 2168 (rights secured by Sec. 7 of the Act to employees includ[e] ... the right to utilize the Board's processes); NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 424, 428, 88 S.Ct. 1717, 1721, 1724, 20 L.Ed.2d 706 (1968) (because [a]ny coercion used to discourage, retard, or defeat ... access [to the Board for relief] is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization); Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 238-39, 88 S.Ct. 362, 365-66, 19 L.Ed.2d 438 (1967) (Congress has made it clear that it wishes all persons with information about [unfair labor] practices to be completely free from coercion [by employers and unions] against reporting them to the Board.); Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 470 F.2d at 62 (charges of unfair labor practices are filed and adjudicated before the Board not to vindicate private rights but to  'give effect to the public policy as defined by Congress, viz: the prevention of unfair labor practices which by causing and increasing industrial strife, obstruct the free flow of interstate commerce' ) (quoting NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 116 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1940)). 8 These policy considerations favor keeping the Board freely accessible to Union members in all cases. The fact that an employee's original charge filed with the Board, like Gilson's, does not by its terms allege interference with section 7 rights is not fatal. Such a violation may nonetheless be recognized and addressed by the Board when discovered during the course of its investigation. See NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301, 306-09, 79 S.Ct. 1179, 1182-84, 3 L.Ed.2d 1243 (1959). 45 Similarly, even if an employee's charge of interference with section 7 rights ultimately proves unfounded, such a charge is indistinguishable on its face from a meritorious one. In order to keep the processes of the Board open for protection of employees whose section 7 rights are actually infringed by Union conduct, it is important that an employee not be restrained in bringing a charge of any unfair labor practice before the Board, whatever its verbal content and regardless of whether the Board ultimately determines that the union conduct alleged in the charge constitutes interference with section 7 rights. Consequently, we conclude that section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act affords protection not only to an employee's direct exercise of the substantive rights actually described in section 7, but also to his filing of a charge of any section 8(b) unfair labor practice before the Board. Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427, 428 (D.C.Cir.1965) (the right of an employee to file [any unfair labor practice charge] is protected under Section 7); NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 592 n. 1 (5th Cir.1972); NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 825, 420 F.2d 961, 961 (3d Cir.1970); Chauffeurs, Local 525, 202 N.L.R.B. 572, 577 (1973); Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers, 148 N.L.R.B. 679, 682 (1964). 9 46 The Union further argues that, even if a union's restraint of or retaliation against an employee who files a charge before the Board ordinarily is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A), the filing of a suit in state court cannot possibly constitute such restraint or retaliation. 10 We reject the argument. 47 The Supreme Court has held that it is an enjoinable unfair labor practice to prosecute a baseless lawsuit with the intent of retaliating against an employee for the exercise of rights protected by Sec. 7 of the NLRA. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S.Ct. at 2171. Consequently, where a union, acting in bad faith, files a baseless civil lawsuit against an employee that tends to restrain or retaliate against an employee's filing of a charge of an unfair labor practice before the Board, the union commits an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A). 11 48 The Union contends that the filing of the suit against Gilson does not constitute an unfair labor practice both because there is no restraint against the employee and because the lawsuit was not filed in bad faith. Compare United Stanford Employees, Local 680 v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 980, 982-83 (9th Cir.1979) (union commits unfair labor practice by bringing suit against employee which did and was intended to restrain employee in the exercise of his section 7 right not to join the Union) with Bergman v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 100, 103-04 (9th Cir.1978) (union commits no unfair labor practice by bringing suit against employee where no indication that union acted other than in good faith to enforce facially valid and binding labor agreement) and Lodges 743 & 1746, IAMAW v. United Aircraft Corp., 534 F.2d 422, 464-65 (2d Cir.1975) (union commits no unfair labor practice by bringing suit where no showing of malicious prosecution or abuse of process), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825, 97 S.Ct. 79, 50 L.Ed.2d 87 (1976). 12 We find these contentions equally unpersuasive. 49 We have no difficulty in agreeing with the Board that a $30,000 state court suit is likely to discourage an employee from bringing charges before the Board, since a union member faced with such a suit must defend himself in the state court action with all the attendant monetary cost, anxiety, and loss of time while continuing to press charges before the Board. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S.Ct. at 2169; see Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 64, 86 S.Ct. 657, 663, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966). A lawsuit such as the one brought against Gilson not only sends a clear message to the member sued to drop the charges filed before the Board, but also implicitly warns other members of the union that if they are to file charges against the union they too will find themselves in court. Bill Johnson's, 103 S.Ct. at 2169. Finally, the chilling effect of a state lawsuit upon an employee's willingness to file charges before the Board is multiplied where the state court complaint seeks damages. Id. Where, as here, a state court suit is filed against individuals who lack the backing of a union, the need to allow the Board to intervene and provide a remedy is at its greatest. Id. 50 We next address the Board's finding that the suit was filed in bad faith. Questions of subjective motivation are questions of fact to be decided by the Board, and the Board's finding must stand if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir.1978) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)); Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir.1966). 51 The Board's finding of retaliatory motivation is supported by substantial evidence. 13 The fact that the suit was filed within a few weeks after the General Counsel had issued a complaint against the Union in response to Gilson's charges is some evidence that the Union primarily intended the lawsuit as a retaliatory or coercive measure. Even more suggestive of a retaliatory motive is the fact that the Union sought $30,000 in compensation for unspecified damages allegedly resulting from Gilson's conduct. The only conduct mentioned in the Union's state court complaint was Gilson's assertion before the Board that the Union had breached its fiduciary duty to him by procuring his discharge. 52 The Union's repeated explanation of the suit as an attempt to preempt the choice of forum to litigate the controversy over Gilson's discharge is further evidence that the Union thereby sought to deter Gilson from pressing the unfair labor practice charge before the Board. The record before the Board is devoid of evidence that would lend support to the Union's claim that the suit was not intended predominantly to retaliate against Gilson for bringing his charge before the Board or to restrain him from pursuing that charge, but rather largely to remedy some wrong done to the Union by Gilson's filing of the charge. In the absence of such evidence, there is no basis on which this court may conclude that the Board's factual finding that the Union initiated the state court lawsuit with a retaliatory motivation was error. 53 The Union argues finally that, even if its conduct would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A), it has an absolute right to litigate in state court the question of whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation by causing Gilson's discharge. The Union urges that Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), holds that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Board, in all fair representation cases. Accordingly, the Union could seek in state court a declaration that it had not given Gilson an extension and that it therefore had not violated its duty. We find this argument unpersuasive. 54 First, since Vaca itself was rendered on facts substantially different from those before us in this case, it does not readily support the Union's contention. In Vaca, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Missouri courts over a civil suit brought by an employee against a union alleging the union's breach of its duty of fair representation. 386 U.S. at 188, 87 S.Ct. at 915. In determining that the Board's power to adjudicate such a dispute under its unfair labor practice jurisdiction did not preempt the jurisdiction of state courts, the Court found critical the possibility that the unreviewable discretion of the Board to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint, in the absence of jurisdiction of the state courts over such controversies, could prevent an individual from securing redress for arbitrary union conduct. 386 U.S. at 182-83, 87 S.Ct. at 912-13. Here, by contrast, the union member, himself, prior to the initiation of the Union's state court suit, had filed a section 8(b)(2) unfair labor practice charge before the Board, a charge whose substance it is conceded was precisely the same as that of the claim which the union sought to have decided in state court. 14 Even if we were to assume that the policy considerations in favor of ensuring the ability of an employee to secure redress for a grievance against a union are as strong as those in favor of ensuring a union's ability to seek a determination of a claim that may potentially be brought against it, those concerns certainly do not run in favor of upholding the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts over a controversy that is already before the Board and, by virtue of the Board's issuance of a complaint, will be fully and fairly adjudicated in that forum. We decline the Union's invitation to so read Vaca. 55 To adopt the Union's position would also be inconsistent with the Court's most recent explication of the Board's jurisdiction, which emphasizes that the Board as a general matter is to have primary jurisdiction over controversies involving activity that may be prohibited by section 8 of the Act. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). In Sears, the Court reemphasized the fundamental principles of Board preemption established in San Diego Building Trades v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). It stated that a labor-related controversy may legitimately be heard in state court only where the controversy could not have been presented to the Board, or although within the Board's jurisdiction, the party who could have presented the ... issue to the Board has not done so and the other party to the dispute has no acceptable means of doing so. See Sears, 436 U.S. at 197, 202-203, 98 S.Ct. at 1757, 1760-1761; see Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-45, 79 S.Ct. at 779-80. The Court listed several examples of conduct that is so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that state court jurisdiction must be deemed to survive the conferral of jurisdiction on the Board under the Act. 436 U.S. at 195, 98 S.Ct. at 1756. Yet the Court failed to mention duty of fair representation claims as such a fundamentally local variety of dispute. Id. Thus, even if dictum in Vaca does support an unrestricted right of a union to litigate a duty of fair representation question in state court, which we doubt, that aspect of Vaca has been cast aside sub silentio by Sears. We conclude therefore that absent a showing that the state court suit was intended to adjudicate a controversy between the Union and the employee that is at least in part separate from the controversy before the Board, that the Board itself had no power to adjudicate the subject matter of the state court suit, or that the Union had no ability to bring the controversy to decision before the Board, Vaca, as viewed through the filter of Sears, imposes no barrier to treating a union's prosecution of a state court action as an unfair labor practice. See United States Credit Bureau of America v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 1017, 1026 (4th Cir.1981) (employer's bad faith filing of state court suit based on employee's alleged abuse of Board's processes treated as unfair labor practice, where the same controversy was already before the Board). 56 In this case, the controversy underlying the Union's state court suit was in fact already before the Board, was within the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction, and was being actively pursued. Accordingly, nothing in Vaca prevents the Board's conclusion that the Union's filing of the state court action was an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A). 57 While none of the Union's arguments lead us to conclude that the filing of the state court suit was not an unfair labor practice, the recent Supreme Court case of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983), requires us to deny enforcement of the portion of the Board's order enjoining further prosecution of the state court suit. 58 Under Bill Johnson's, a conclusion that a union's state court lawsuit both was intended to restrain and has the likely effect of restraining employees in the exercise of protected activities is not by itself an adequate basis to enjoin prosecution of the suit. The Board must further determine that the lawsuit lacks any reasonable basis. 103 S.Ct. at 2173. If the state court suit has any possible reasonable basis, the Board has no power to enjoin the prosecution of the union's claim in state court. Id. The Supreme Court explicitly defined the narrow inquiry which the Board may make about a suit which a state court has entertained: 59 The Board's reasonable basis inquiry must be structured in a manner that will preserve the state plaintiff's right to have a state court jury or judge resolve genuine material factual or state-law legal disputes pertaining to the lawsuit. Therefore, if the Board is called upon to determine whether a suit is unlawful prior to the time that the state court renders final judgment, and if the state court plaintiff can show that such genuine material factual or legal issues exist, the Board must await the results of the state-court adjudication with respect to the merits of the state suit. 60 Id. Although the Board need not be limited to the bare pleadings when it makes the inquiry, it may not enjoin the suit if there is a genuine issue of material fact that turns on the credibility of witnesses or on the proper inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2171. 61 [W]eighty countervailing considerations operate to restrain the Board's injunction against a state court suit when there are genuine material factual or legal issues. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2169. Justice White explained in Bill Johnson's: 62 When a suit presents genuine factual issues, the state plaintiff's First Amendment interest in petitioning the state court for redress of his grievance, his interest in having the factual dispute resolved by a jury, and the State's interest in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens, lead us to construe the Act as not permitting the Board to usurp the traditional fact-finding function of the state court jury or judge.... [The Board] likewise must not deprive a litigant of his right to have genuine state-law legal questions decided by the state judiciary. 63 Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2171-72. The limitation these considerations impose on the Board's power was specially emphasized in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion: 64 The most reasonable inference to draw from the structure of state-federal relations in this area is that the Board may enjoin prosecution of a state lawsuit if, in addition to whatever other findings are required to decide that an unfair labor practice has been committed, it determines that controlling federal law bars the plaintiff's right to relief, that clear state law makes the case frivolous, or that no reasonable jury could make the findings of fact in favor of the plaintiff that are necessary under applicable law. I can understand the phrase genuine material disputes,    no other way. 65 Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring). 66 While we could legitimately be concerned by the implications of a rule that might permit a respondent to avoid or delay unfair labor practice charges by the device of filing groundless lawsuits, the Board is not without means of protecting the integrity of its mission. It need not stay its hand if the plaintiff's position is plainly foreclosed as a matter of law or is otherwise frivolous. Bill Johnson's, 103 S.Ct. at 2172. A suit which raises no genuine issue will not sidetrack the Board. But the agency may not, in the face of contested genuine issues of material fact or law, prevent the state court's exercise of its jurisdiction. 67 In this case, the Board did not consider the baselessness of the Union's state court complaint before concluding that the Union had committed an unfair labor practice by filing the suit. Consequently, we deny enforcement to the Board's injunction and order to reimburse legal expenses and remand the case to the Board for further proceedings. 68 Upon remand, the Board must determine whether the Union could conceivably prevail against Gilson on the basis of defamation or any other theory of liability under California law. 15 If the Board determines that the Union's state lawsuit presents no genuine issue of material fact or is plainly foreclosed as a matter of California law, it may reinstate its injunction against prosecution of the state court action. 16 Bill Johnson's, 103 S.Ct. at 2171. However, if it cannot make such a finding, it must hold the section 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practice charge in abeyance pending the outcome of the state court action. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2170. If the state court rules against Gilson, the section 8(b)(1)(A) charge must then be dismissed. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 2172. If, however, the state court rules against the Union, the Board is free, as Bill Johnson's makes clear, to order the Union to reimburse its member for state court legal fees and to order other appropriate relief. See id. 103 S.Ct. at 2172-73.