Opinion ID: 204477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Motion in This Court

Text: Our first concern is whether the government's motion to dismiss the appeal was a proper procedure for challenging the district court's grant of an extension of time to Mr. Madrid to file his notice of appeal. There is authority for the proposition that an appellee challenging such an extension of time should file a cross-appeal. See Amatangelo v. Borough of Donora, 212 F.3d 776, 780 (3d Cir.2000); 16A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Catherine T. Struve, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3950.3 at 307-08 (4th ed. 2008) (relying on Amatangelo without further discussion). But we are not persuaded. The office of a cross-appeal is to give the appellee more than it obtained by the lower-court judgment. See Gregory A. Castanias and Robert H. Klonoff, Federal Appellate Practice and Procedure in a Nutshell 134 (2008) (It is well settled that absent a cross-appeal, a party may not use his opponent's appeal as a vehicle for attacking a final judgment in an effort to diminish the appealing party's rights thereunder. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court recently affirmed the cross-appeal rule, stating that [u]nder that unwritten but longstanding rule, an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party. Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244-45, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008). Three justices asserted (and were not contradicted by the majority on this point) that the rule is not a jurisdictional requirement but simply a rule of appellate practice. See id. at 256-59, 128 S.Ct. 2559 (Alito, J., dissenting). Considering the cross-appeal requirement in this light, we believe that it was not necessary for the government to file a cross-appeal from the district court's order granting an extension of time to appeal. In moving for dismissal of the appeal, the government was not seeking alteration of the judgment below in its favor. For decades we have permitted motions by appellees seeking to dismiss appeals as untimely, even when the district court has granted an extension of time that is being challenged by the motion. See Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366, 367-68 (10th Cir.1974). One might distinguish our prior practice on the ground that we were treating the timeliness of an appeal as a jurisdictional matterone that we had an obligation to address regardless of how, or even whether, it had been presented to the court by a party. See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1045 n. 8 (10th Cir.1994). But recently we held that even though the timeliness of a criminal appeal is not a jurisdictional matter, we can sua sponte dismiss such an appeal as untimely. See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 740, 750-51 (10th Cir.2008) (considering whether to dismiss appeal on ground that district court improperly granted motion to extend time for appeal). If we can do so sua sponte, surely the failure to cross-appeal does not automatically bar our consideration of a motion to dismiss. Moreover, this circuit's local rules permit a party to file a motion to dismiss the entire case for lack of appellate jurisdiction or for any other reason a dismissal is permitted by statute, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or these rules. 10th Cir. R. 27-2(A)(1)(a) (emphasis added). Timeliness of a criminal appeal, although not a matter of jurisdiction, is such a reason for dismissal. Indeed, when a challenge to the timeliness of a criminal appeal is properly presented by the appellee, we must enforce the time bar. See Mitchell, 518 F.3d at 744. Accordingly, we hold that the timeliness of Mr. Madrid's appeal was properly brought before this court by the government's motion.