Opinion ID: 4166518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Joinder Motion

Text: Finally, Ambrosecchia’s contention that the district court should have entered a default judgment against Perrigo Company, PLC instead of allowing it to join Paddock’s motion to dismiss is without merit. Allowing one party to join another party’s motion is a matter well within the district court’s “substantial case management discretion.” See United States v. Edwards, 159 F.3d 1117, 1130 (8th Cir. 1998) (reviewing a district court’s decision to enforce the parties’ pretrial discovery agreement); cf. Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir. 1974) (reviewing the decision to allow parties to join litigation for abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we may reverse only if the district court abused its discretion. See Edwards, 159 F.3d at 1130. Ambrosecchia originally named Perrigo Company, Inc. (an American corporation) in her complaint. During the litigation, Perrigo reincorporated in Ireland. As a result, its name changed to Perrigo Company, PLC. The named party in the case remained Perrigo Company, Inc. Paddock and Perrigo Company, Inc. jointly filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. Later, Ambrosecchia moved to amend the second amended complaint to correct the party’s name from Perrigo Company, Inc. to Perrigo Company, PLC. After the district court granted the motion, Perrigo Company, PLC filed a notice of joinder in the motion to dismiss. The district court allowed the joinder. 7 Ambrosecchia’s request to amend read as follows: “However, should the Court find Relator’s Second Amended Complaint lacking in detail or defective in any manner, Relator hereby requests leave to Amend her Complaint to correct any such defect.” -9- Ambrosecchia contends that this decision violates due process, but she fails to offer any relevant rationale for or cite any cases supporting this argument. Ambrosecchia cannot demonstrate that she lacked notice and the ability to brief arguments relating to Perrigo. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” (quotation omitted)). Indeed, her response to the motion to dismiss included specific arguments regarding Perrigo. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion.