Opinion ID: 1180974
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Heading: the seat belt defense in arizona

Text: With the foregoing in mind, we must now decide whether Arizona will adopt some version of the so-called seat belt defense. To do so, we first examine the current validity of the principles underlying the Nash decision.
Because Nash held that motorists could assume that all who use the highways will drive with care, the decision imposed no duty to anticipate injury. Over a lifetime, however, it is almost certain that a motor vehicle accident will injure the average motorist. [27] The clear foreseeability of automobile accidents is the reason most courts now hold automobile manufacturers responsible to make vehicles capable of providing a reasonable level of protection to automobile occupants. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir.1968) (original case adopting crashworthiness doctrine). Our court of appeals recently applied this theory to the design of motorcycles. Cota v. Harley Davidson, A Division of AMF, Inc., 141 Ariz. 7, 12-14, 684 P.2d 888, 893-95 (App. 1984). Given modern-day conditions, we conclude as a matter of public policy that the law must recognize the responsibility of every person to anticipate and take reasonable measures to guard against the danger of motor vehicle accidents that are not only foreseeable but virtually certain to occur sooner or later. Rejection of the seat belt defense can no longer be based on the antediluvian doctrine that one need not anticipate the negligence of others. There is nothing to anticipate; the negligence of motorists is omnipresent.
In Nash, the court noted that seat belts may actually create or enhance injuries instead of preventing them. 21 Ariz. App. at 532, 521 P.2d at 163. There are reports of tragic situations when wearing a seat belt may trap a vehicle occupant in a burning, sinking, or disabled automobile. [28] Such cases are noteworthy precisely because they are so rare. [29] It is statistically far safer for motorists to remain in their vehicles than to suffer the vagaries of a violent ejection from the automobile. [30] There are also claims that properly worn seat belts can cause direct and serious harm to users. These assertions focus on abdominal and spinal injuries that may be attributable to seat belt use. However, it is also true that in almost every instance seat belt-induced injuries are far less drastic than those that would have been incurred without the seat belt use. [31] As a general rule, a motorist is simply better off wearing a seat belt. [32] We conclude from the technological data that continued nonrecognition of the seat belt defense cannot be based on the general concept that seat belts cause harm. The opposite is generally true.
Nash held there was no duty to wear seat belts. We acknowledge that duty to use restraints is generally considered the prime question in cases such as this. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Wright, 108 Ill.2d 129, 90 Ill.Dec. 950, 483 N.E.2d 268 (1985) (a decision relied upon by the trial court in the present action). Whatever its relevance to the Nash analysis, however, we do not believe that duty in its usual formulation remains a relevant component of the seat belt defense analysis. Duty is normally defined in terms of the obligation of care owed to one's neighbors. Markowitz v. Arizona Parks Board, 146 Ariz. 352, 706 P.2d 364 (1985). The problem, of course, is to determine who is a neighbor. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 535 (5th ed. 1984). Because in all but the rarest situation nonuse of a seat belt presents no forseeable danger to others, it is probably incorrect to conceptualize the seat belt defense in terms of duty. More importantly, evaluating seat belt nonuse under the rubric of duty fundamentally confuses that concept with the evaluation of the conduct that may or may not fulfill it. Duty is the obligation, recognized by law, which requires [an actor] to conform to a particular standard of conduct in order to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm. Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 354, 706 P.2d at 366, citing Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 667 P.2d 200 (1983). As indicated in Markowitz, we do not believe the concept of duty should be confused with specific details of conduct. 146 Ariz. at 355, 706 P.2d at 367, citing Coburn v. City of Tucson, 143 Ariz. 50, 52, 691 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1984). Everyone has a duty to use due care to prevent injury to others. Nonuse of a seat belt is not a question of duty but rather a matter of conduct which only occasionally impinges on others. [33] Thus, we believe that injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of his nonuse of an available seat belt are not so much a failure to use care to avoid endangering others but part of the related obligation to conduct oneself reasonably to minimize damages and avoid foreseeable harm to oneself. Markowitz, supra ; Coburn, supra . Thus, the seat belt defense would ordinarily raise issues concerning the doctrine of avoidable consequences  a theory that denies recovery for those injuries plaintiff could reasonably have avoided. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra, at 458. Plaintiffs argue that this doctrine is applied only to post-accident conduct and is inapplicable to events preceding the accident  a time when plaintiffs supposedly had a right to assume that others would not act negligently. [34] Assuming this is ordinarily true, we believe the common law conceptualization of the doctrine of avoidable consequences has been modified by our comparative negligence statute, which applies that doctrine to pre-accident conduct.
When the Arizona legislature enacted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1984, it added several important provisions to the model law delineated in 12 U.L.A. 63-107 (1975). These new sections constituted the statutory adoption of comparative negligence for our state. A.R.S. §§ 12-2505 to -2509. In any given case, the relevance of comparative negligence principles is normally a question for the jury. Cheney v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 446, 698 P.2d 691 (1985). If the jury does apply comparative negligence standards, the plaintiff's action is not barred, but the full damages shall be reduced in proportion to the relative degree of fault which is a proximate cause of the injury or death, if any. A.R.S. § 12-2505(A) (emphasis added). The essential question is whether a plaintiff who does not wear an automobile seat belt is at fault for injuries enhanced or caused by the failure to use the seat belt. Neither the Arizona comparative negligence statute nor its progenitor uniform law contains any definition of fault. We do note the instructive definition of this term given in § 1(b) of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA), 12 U.L.A. 39-40 (Cum.Supp. 1987). Fault includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes ... unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory fault. (Emphasis added.) As stated in the official comment to the UCFA, negligent failure to use a seat belt would reduce damages solely for those injuries directly attributable to the lack of seat belt restraint. Id. Thus, as far as the calculation of damages is concerned, the comparative negligence statutes apply the doctrine of avoidable consequences to pre-accident conduct. We are further guided in our determination of the fault issue by a series of well-reasoned seat belt cases from other comparative negligence jurisdictions. The first case is Insurance Company of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So.2d 447 (Fla. 1984), quashing 425 So.2d 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). In that case, defendant sought to reduce the overall damages by introducing evidence of plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the obvious importance of the seat belt as a safety precaution made its nonuse a pertinent factor for the jury to evaluate. The court properly refused to base its analysis on concepts of duty and focused instead on the plaintiff's conduct: Nonuse of the seat belt may or may not amount to a failure to use reasonable care on the part of the plaintiff. Whether it does depends on the particular circumstances of the case. Defendant has the burden of pleading and proving that the plaintiff did not use an available and operational seat belt, that the plaintiff's failure to use the seat belt was unreasonable under the circumstances, and that there was a causal relationship between the injuries sustained by the plaintiff and plaintiff's failure to buckle up. If there is competent evidence to prove that the failure to use an available and operational seat belt produced or contributed substantially to producing at least a portion of plaintiff's damages, then the jury should be permitted to consider this factor, along with all other facts in evidence, in deciding whether the damages for which defendant may otherwise be liable should be reduced. Nonuse of an available seat belt, however, should not be considered by the triers of fact in resolving the issue of liability unless it has been alleged and proved that such nonuse was a proximate cause of the accident. 451 So.2d at 454. In Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561 (D.Vt. 1985), the court responded as follows to assertions that it was improperly imposing a duty to wear seat belts: We are unpersuaded by such reasoning. First, admitting such evidence would not create a duty but would merely allow the jury to consider the information on the question of negligence. Second, the test of negligence would continue to be whether the person acted reasonably under the circumstances presented. The jury's discretion and common sense will remain as a check upon parties that might seek to make wild assertions of negligence. We do not presume to decide whether or not Plaintiff's failure to fasten his seat belt in the instant case was reasonable. We do believe, however, that the arguments on both sides of the issue are such that a reasonable jury could decide either way. 600 F. Supp. at 1564 (first emphasis added; second emphasis in original). Finally, in Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987), the Michigan Supreme Court considered the nonuse of seat belts as comparative negligence in an automobile products liability lawsuit. The Michigan Supreme Court also held that the duty issue was not the central problem. Id. at 461, 410 N.W.2d at 715. The court reinstated the trial judge's denial of the plaintiff's exclusionary motions. Id. at 475, 410 N.W.2d at 721. See also Hutchins v. Schwartz, 724 P.2d 1194, 1199 (Alaska 1986) (nonuse of seat belts is a relevant factor in apportioning damages in a state that has adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision). Our examination of the applicable caselaw and our analysis of the concept of duty lead us to the conclusion that the seat belt defense is not a question of duty at all. We reject those cases, such as Clarkson, supra, that rely on the absence of duty to reject the seat belt defense. We also disapprove the Nash analysis. At least under the comparative fault statute, each person is under an obligation to act reasonably to minimize foreseeable injuries and damages. Thus, if a person chooses not to use an available, simple safety device, that person may be at fault.
Plaintiffs claim that recognition of the seat belt defense is a matter we should leave to the legislature. The Arizona legislature has not passed any law mandating the use of seat belts except A.R.S. § 28-907, which basically requires the use of restraint systems only for children under four years of age. The child restraint law specifically precludes admission of evidence of nonuse in civil proceedings. A.R.S. § 28-907(H). Of course, young children could hardly be held at fault for failure to buckle up; with or without the statutory provision, we could not diminish a civil recovery for an infant whose parent, guardian, or custodian failed to place the child in a proper restraint system. See Town of Flagstaff v. Gomez, 23 Ariz. 184, 202 P. 401 (1921). Thus, we do not infer from this specific prohibition dealing with infants a general legislative intent to forbid the introduction of evidence that an adult motorist unreasonably failed to use a seat belt and enhanced his own injuries. Allowing the jury to assess damages by considering an adult's failure to use seat belts does not conflict with the seat belt statute and does conform to our statutory comparative negligence scheme. We are furthering the statutory objectives in this area, not contradicting them. Some courts hold that creation of a seat belt defense is solely a matter for legislative action. See, e.g., Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 (1985), rev'g 102 N.M. 417, 696 P.2d 1010 (App. 1984); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 62 (Okla. 1976). We believe, however, that this court has an obligation to participate in the evolution of tort law so that it may reflect societal and technological changes. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 (1985). In some cases, this responsibility has compelled us to recognize duties that further public policy and legislative objectives, even though the specifics have not been enacted by the legislature. See, e.g., Ontiveros, supra . Acceptance of the seat belt defense does not require us to violate the proper deference owed the legislature. We neither carry a legislative enactment past the intent which existed at the time of its passage nor recognize an obligation not already reflected in the lives of our citizens. We only acknowledge reality: the use or nonuse of a seat belt is an everyday matter of conduct which plays a significant role in determining the extent of injuries. To hold that we cannot let a jury consider such conduct on the issue of damages is to judicially transmogrify legislative nonaction on a common law damage issue into legislative intent to approve nonuse of seat belts. Such a conclusion has never been expressed by the legislature and is very far from the demonstrated legislative objectives in this area. Of course, if we are wrong, and if the legislature intends that in this state one may unreasonably refuse to use a seat belt and nevertheless hold another responsible for the resulting damages, it can easily enact such a policy.
Plaintiffs claim that by recognizing the seat belt defense, we would confer a windfall on tortfeasors. As noted ante, the crux of comparative negligence is a proper apportionment of damages based upon the fault of the respective parties. If a victim unreasonably failed to use an available, simple prophylactic device, then he will not be able to recover for damages created or enhanced by the nonuse. [35] Thus, although some tortfeasors may pay less than they otherwise would, they will not pay less than they should. We do not believe this rule creates a windfall to the tortfeasor; it is an unavoidable consequence of our comparative negligence system.
Petitioners maintain that allowing apportionment of damages based on failure to use seat belts will unnecessarily complicate and protract litigation. The defendant must establish several factual predicates before seat belt nonuse may be presented to the jury. See Pasakarnis, supra . To prove these factors, the defendant may utilize qualified experts in the medical, scientific, and accident reconstruction fields. It is then up to the factfinder to evaluate the evidence and quantify the results under comparative negligence principles. Of course, this process will take time and create new issues for the jury to decide. These problems are hardly insurmountable. Juries perform this type of operation on a regular basis in many types of civil and criminal cases. The very idea of comparative negligence requires that juries apportion fault. The same is true when juries apportion fault between joint tortfeasors. See A.R.S. § 12-2506 (apportionment of fault under comparative negligence and contribution statute). In some second impact or so-called crashworthiness cases, juries are required to determine the injuries attributable both to the original accident and to a manufacturer's failure to produce an automobile capable of withstanding foreseeable accidents. See discussion in General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1189 (Ala. 1985). Courts almost universally entertain such actions, even though some recognize the complications produced by injury apportionment. Id. There is no doubt that the seat belt defense will complicate and lengthen litigation in some cases. While this certainly does not militate in favor of its acceptance, we believe the problem is no different in principle from that posed by any legal, technological or scientific advance. Neither law nor society can ignore technological change simply because it makes decision more complex.
As the final argument, plaintiffs assert that introducing evidence of seat belt nonuse would propel our courts into a morass of unforeseen consequences. If seat belt nonuse is relevant, why not introduce evidence of failure to install air bags? Why not hold the plaintiff responsible for failure to buy a large car which is normally much safer in a crash than a small car? We are faced with a concrete application of comparative negligence principles. We deal in this case only with a plaintiff's use or nonuse of a common, simple safety device available in his or her car. In making use of an available seat belt, a motorist need not possess engineering expertise, suffer significant inconvenience, install special equipment or purchase a different vehicle. He or she need use only a few seconds to fasten a convenient safety device. The exact bounds of fault in other fact situations is a matter for the common law to address in its customary evolutionary fashion. Ontiveros, 136 Ariz. at 504, 667 P.2d at 204.