Opinion ID: 2778011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analyzing a Vagueness Challenge

Text: A penal statute is vague if it does not define a criminal offense “with sufficient definiteness [so] that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. Thus, a statute is void for vagueness under article I, § 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution22 if (1) it is internally inconsistent and incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence, or (2) it invites delegation of basic policy matters to police for 22 Article I, § 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution states as follows: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry. - 32 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Id. at 153, 172 P.3d at 465. The United States Supreme Court “has often noted that criminal statutes are subject to stricter vagueness analysis than civil statutes.” Goldsmith, supra, at 281 (citing Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 498-99; Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998)) (referring to the criteria for issuing NEA grants and noting, “The terms of the provision are undeniably opaque, and if they appeared in a criminal statute or regulatory scheme, they could raise substantial vagueness concerns.”). “Subject to an even stricter standard are criminal statutes that reach expression protected by the First Amendment, any other constitutional right, or any ‘fundamental right.’” Id. (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974); Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 499; Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 n.3 (1975) (per curiam)).23 Thus, as a criminal statute, HRS § 707-756 is subject to a “stricter vagueness analysis” than a civil statute. However, the standard for demonstrating that a statute is contrary to our constitution remains high: “Every enactment of 23 Four justices also have suggested that statutes creating new crimes also require special precision. Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-forVagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revisited, 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 279, 281 & n.19 (2003) (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 634 (1954) (Jackson, J., dissenting); United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1947) (Reed, J., dissenting, joined by Murphy and Rutledge, JJ.)). - 33 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER the Hawaiʻi Legislature is presumptively constitutional, and the party challenging a statute has the burden of showing the alleged unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Bui, 104 Hawaiʻi 462, 466, 92 P.3d 471, 475 (2004). This court has recognized that a statute may be found void for vagueness on its face or as applied. See State v. Bates, 84 Hawaiʻi 211, 222, 933 P.2d 48, 59 (1997) (observing that where a case does not involve any first amendment issues, a “defendant has standing to raise a vagueness challenge only insofar as the statute is vague as applied to his or her specific conduct”); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440, 573 P.2d 945, 955 (1977) (“A statute may be overbroad because its vagueness extends its reach too far, and yet it may define the core of its coverage with sufficient specificity to avoid challenge for facial vagueness.”). In order for a defendant to succeed on an as-applied challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that the disputed statute is vague with respect to his or her conduct. Id. However, when a statute burdens a significant constitutional right, such as the freedom of expression, a defendant whose rights are not violated may raise the constitutional rights of others. See Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 151 n.4, 172 P.3d at 463 n.4. - 34 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER In Beltran, this court held that a camping regulation was facially overbroad and vague. Id. at 151, 155, 172 P.3d at 463, 467. The camping regulation was found to “conceivably” implicate activities “relating to freedom of movement and association, or that involve expressive conduct.” Id. at 152, 172 P.3d at 464. In finding the statute facially overbroad and vague, the Beltran court relied on Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983). Kolender “concerned a facial vagueness challenge to a criminal statute that require[d] persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide a ‘credible and reliable’ identification and to account for their presence when requested by a peace officer.” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353. The Kolender court based its application of facial analysis on concerns for First Amendment liberties and the right to freedom of movement. Id. at 358; see also Beltran, 116 Haw. at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. The Kolender court observed that a facial challenge of a law is permitted where the law “reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct.” 461 U.S. at 358 n.8. Kolender also concluded that that “where a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher.” Id. The Kolender court expressly rejected the idea that a statute “should not be held unconstitutionally vague on its face unless it is vague in all of its possible applications.” Id.; - 35 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER see also Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 155, 172 P.3d at 467 (“Kolender, however, indicated that ‘[t]his concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal statute on its face even when it could conceivably have had some valid application.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8)). Therefore, under Beltran’s adoption of Kolender, because a criminal statute requires higher certainty, it may “at times” be challenged for vagueness on its face “even when it could conceivably have had some valid application,” just as a facial challenge is permitted for overbreadth if the statute reaches a substantial amount of protected conduct.24 Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 151, 172 P.3d at 463. Thus, in analyzing vagueness challenges, this court first considers the meaning and specificity of the statute, and if the statute is vague, then the court determines whether the statute is vague as applied to the person’s specific conduct or implicates a significant constitutional protection, such as a first amendment right. 24 Kolender buttresses this argument by noting The dissent concedes that “the overbreadth doctrine permits facial challenge of a law that reaches a substantial amount of conduct protected by the First Amendment.” However, in the dissent's view, one may not “confuse vagueness and overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being vague as applied to conduct other than his own.” But we have traditionally viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related and similar doctrines. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 n.8. - 36 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER For example, in Bates, 84 Hawaiʻi at 222, 933 P.2d at 59, the court initially evaluated the challenged statute to determine whether a person of ordinary intelligence would know what conduct was prohibited. Bates, 84 Hawaiʻi at 222-226, 933 P.2d at 59-63. Bates began its analysis by examining the legislative history of the relevant statute and reviewing federal courts’ interpretation of similar statutes in order to define the statutory terminology at issue. Id. at 222-224, 933 P.2d at 59-61. Having properly defined the statute, the Bates court concluded a person of ordinary intelligence would know what conduct was prohibited, and therefore the court found the law was not unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 224-225, 933 P.2d at 61-62. Having reached this determination, the Bates court was not required to address the defendant’s standing in order to determine whether “the defendant [can] succeed on a vagueness challenge.” Id. at 222, 933 P.2d at 59. Similarly, in Bui, a defendant challenged his prosecution for possession of burglar’s tools, arguing that “burglar’s tools,” as described in the statute, “could include anything used in the commission of a burglary.”25 Bui, 104 25 The statute stated that the subject offense was knowing[ ] possess[ion of] any explosive, tool, instrument, or other article adapted, designed, or commonly used for committing or facilitating the commission of an offense involving forcible entry into premises or theft by a (continued. . .) - 37 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Hawaiʻi at 463, 465; 92 P.3d at 472, 474. This court held that the statute was not vague because it described the proscribed conduct in ordinary and understandable terms and also adequately informed the public of how to avoid committing the offense. Id. at 465, 92 P.3d at 474. Thus, as in Bates, the court initially determined that the challenged statute was not vague, and as a consequence of its determination, the court had no reason to address whether the statute was vague as applied to the defendant’s conduct. Bui, 104 Hawaiʻi at 465, 92 P.3d at 474. In summary, in resolving a challenge to a criminal statute as vague, the challenged statute is analyzed to determine if it (1) is internally inconsistent and incomprehensible to a person of ordinary intelligence, or (2) invites delegation of basic policy matters to police for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Beltran, 116 Hawaiʻi at 153, 172 P.3d at 465. If the statute is determined to be vague, the challenger is then required to demonstrate that “the statute is vague as applied to his or her specific conduct” (. . .continued) physical taking and the person intends to use the explosive, tool, instrument, or article, or knows some person intends ultimately to use it, in the commission of the offense of the nature described aforesaid . . . . Bui, 104 Haw. at 465, 92 P.3d at 474 (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting HRS § 708–812(1)(a) (1993)). - 38 - FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER or demonstrate that the statute burdens a significant constitutional right such as a first amendment right.26 We have already determined that HRS § 707-756 does not burden freedom of expression under the First Amendment or Article I, § 4 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution or the freedom of movement. Alangcas has not alleged other significant constitutional rights that are burdened by the asserted vagueness of HRS § 707-756. Thus, we look first to determine whether HRS § 707-756 is unconstitutionally vague, and if so, whether it is vague as applied to Alangcas’ conduct.