Opinion ID: 2581377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidence of the defendants prior accidents

Text: Third, Jenkins argues the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his prior accidents. The admission of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Lumley, 266 Kan. 939, 950, 976 P.2d 486 (1999). An appellate court's standard of review regarding a trial court's admission of evidence, subject to exclusionary rules, is abuse of discretion. Judicial discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. If reasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion. One who asserts that the court abused its discretion bears the burden of showing such abuse of discretion. 266 Kan. at 950. Evidence of a prior crime or civil wrong is admissible to prove his or her knowledge under K.S.A. 60-455. This court in State v. Simkins, 269 Kan. 84, 92, 3 P.3d 1274 (2000), described the general rule governing admission of evidence under K.S.A. 60-455: Three requirements must be met in order to introduce evidence under K.S A. 60-455: (1) The evidence is relevant to prove one of the facts specified in the statute; (2) the fact is a disputed, material fact; and (3) the probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential prejudice. If the requirements for admission are met, the scope of appellate review is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion. [Citation omitted.] Jenkins argues evidence of the prior collisions was clearly irrelevant. Furthermore, Jenkins argues the prejudicial effect of the prior collisions outweighed what probative value the prior collisions could have provided. The thrust of Jenkins argument is that it was unfair to prove his behavior was reckless when he was in compliance with state licensing requirements. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Jenkins' prior collisions. The prior collisions were relevant because they demonstrated Jenkins' knowledge through a pattern of accidents. The State had the burden to prove to the jury Jenkins drove realizing the imminence of danger to other motorists. See K.S.A. 21-3201(c). This burden was satisfied by proof of the prior collisions, which Jenkins admitted were caused by seizures. Jenkins also argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury as follows: It is a defense to the charge made against the defendant if the defendant reasonably believed that his conduct did not constitute a crime and the defendant acted in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statutes, regulations and orders made by an agency legally authorized to interpret such statutes, regulations and orders. The requested instruction is based in large part on K.S.A. 21-3203(2)(d); however, it differs in one important respect from the statute, which provides in relevant part: (2) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute a crime is a defense if .... (d) He acts in reliance upon an official interpretation of the statute, regulation or order defining the crime made by a public officer or agency legally authorized to interpret such statute. (Emphasis added.) As the emphasized language in the above quotation shows, the reliance must be on an interpretation of the statute defining the crime. Jenkins' proposed instruction did not require the interpretation to be one defining the crime. The crime in the present case is involuntary manslaughter. The DOR's issuance of a driver's license cannot be considered to be an official interpretation of the statute defining involuntary manslaughter. On the contrary, the issuance of a driver's license should merely be viewed as the DOR's execution of its administrative duties as directed by Chapter 8 of the Kansas statutes. See K.S.A. 8-234a et seq. Thus, Jenkins' proposed instruction was properly rejected by the trial court because it erroneously implied that reliance upon a DOR interpretation of licensing statute would be a sufficient defense. Further, Jenkins was free to argue that his compliance with the licensing requirements proved that he did not realize the imminence of danger to other motorists. Indeed, this is what his counsel argued in closing arguments: And the Department of Revenue, they had all the copies of those six prior accidents. They had that coded into their computer as the law requires them to do. And they submitted this around to the committee, the medical review committees that look at these things and say, Guys, ladies, what do you think? And the State of Kansas said, We think he is safe to drive. It is hypocrisy for the State of Kansas to tell him, You may drive, in our opinion it is safe; and then the State of Kansas to come in nine years later and say, What in the world were you thinking? And yet their argument, almost 15 minutes of it, dealt solely with the 1992, the 1993, the Dr. Mandelbaum and all of that. Later, Jenkins' counsel argued: And the State of Kansas maintainsby law they maintain their computer records, and they knew all of this, and they told Mike, You can continue to drive. And every time he submitted one of those forms, he [sic] said, You are, in our opinion, safe to drive. And it is wrong for that same State in this courtroom to come in this courtroom and say, Oops, changed our mind, send him away, put him in, second-degree murder, involuntary manslaughter, vehicular homicide, he is a bad guy. In a sense, Jenkins would have this court hold that a defendant is not reckless as long as he or she holds a valid license from the State. Jenkins cites no authority for this proposition, and that is not the law. The matter of recklessness was for the jury to decide. Most importantly, the fiction that the DOR was dealing with correct information provided by Jenkins is rejected. As the State pointed out in its brief on appeal, Jenkins did not provide the DOR with accurate information. The jury also convicted Jenkins in this case of making false information. The DOR in its March 8, 1999, letter continued Jenkins' license [biased on the information presented. That information, which was signed by Jenkins on February 15, 1999, indicated Jenkins' last blackout spells, dizzy spells, epilepsy, seizures, loss or alteration of consciousness was during November 1996. Dr. Hassan's portion of the report confirmed Jenkins had not had an episode since November 1996, based on the information he was provided by Jenkins. During cross-examination, Jenkins admitted the information that he had not had an episode since November 1996 was false: Q. And when you faxed that form to Dr. Hassan's office on March 2nd, 1999, you knew that the information contained on the front part of that form, that the last episode of blackout spells, dizzy spells, epilepsy, seizures, loss or alteration of consciousness was incorrect, didn't you? A. On that date I would have, yes. Q. And you went ahead and you sent that form to Dr. Hassan, didn't you? A. Yes. Jenkins cannot rely on the actions of the DOR when he was untruthful with the information he provided. Jenkins cites no authority supporting his requested instruction. His argument that the trial court erred is rejected for the reasons cited above.