Opinion ID: 1396611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shifting the Burden of Proof During Voir Dire

Text: Appellant maintains on appeal that the prosecutor repeatedly violated the parameters and purposes of voir dire. Specifically, he contends that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof such that the court had an obligation to intervene and correctly instruct the potential jurors. We note at the outset that we hold prosecuting attorneys to a high standard because the State's attorney acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, and it is the prosecutor's duty to use fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure a conviction in a fair and impartial trial. Williams v. State, 742 S.W.2d 932, 294 Ark. 345 (1988); Garza v. State, 735 S.W.2d 702, 293 Ark. 175 (1987); Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 342, 645 S.W.2d 690 (1983); Mays v. State, 264 Ark. 353, 571 S.W.2d 429 (1978). We will not reverse the action of a trial court in matters pertaining to its control, supervision, and determination of the propriety of arguments of counsel in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. Cook v. State, 316 Ark. 384, 386-87, 872 S.W.2d 72, 73 (1994). Generally, such an error may be cured by a remedial instruction from the court. Id. (holding that [a]t most, it was an attempt to shift the burden of proof, and we cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that the instruction [at the time] remedied that wrong. (emphasis added)). Before we can examine the prosecutor's comments, we must consider whether the issue is properly before this court. The defense attorney did not object to the prosecutor's comments at the time, and a contemporaneous objection is generally required to preserve an issue for appeal, even a constitutional issue. Bader v. State, 344 Ark. 241, 40 S.W.3d 738 (2001); Christopher v. State, 340 Ark. 404, 10 S.W.3d 852 (2000). However, we have recognized four exceptions to the contemporaneous-objection rule, commonly referred to as the Wicks exceptions. Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980). The four Wicks exceptions are (1) when the trial court fails to bring to the jury's attention a matter essential to its consideration of the death penalty itself; (2) when defense counsel has no knowledge of the error and hence no opportunity to object; (3) when the error is so flagrant and so highly prejudicial in character as to make it the duty of the court on its own motion to have instructed the jury correctly; and (4) Ark. R. Evid. 103(d) provides that the appellate court is not precluded from taking notice of errors affecting substantial rights, although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002) (citing Wicks v. State, supra ). The issue in the instant case is the application of the third Wicks exception, that is, whether the prosecutor's comments during voir dire were so flagrant and so highly prejudicial in character as to make it the duty of the court on its own motion to have instructed the jury not to consider the same. Wicks, 270 Ark. at 786, 606 S.W.2d at 370. Analysis of this issue requires us to address three questions. First, whether appellant made a Wicks argument to this court. Second, if so, whether incorrect burden-of-proof statements made during voir dire the type of remarks that would require intervention under the third Wicks exception. Third, whether the prosecutor's comments in the instant case so prejudicial as to require reversal.
The threshold issue is whether appellant has even presented a Wicks argument to this court. [2] Appellant does not cite Wicks in either his initial brief or his reply brief; rather, it is the State's brief that expressly mentions and addresses the third Wicks exception. In framing this point on appeal, appellant contends the prosecutor's comments to the potential jurors during voir dire constituted such a serious error that the circuit court should have intervened and admonished the jury as to a correct statement of the law. Without specifically citing Wicks , appellant has effectively made the argument identified by this court as the third Wicks exceptionthe error is so flagrant and so highly prejudicial as to make it the duty of the court on its own motion to have the jury instructed correctly. Thus, the issue of a possible Wicks exception has been presented to this court in the instant appeal. Having concluded that the applicability of the third Wicks exception is properly before us, the question becomes whether there was a violation so fundamental as to require reversal.
In the past we have only allowed issues to be considered under the third Wicks exception where the error affected the very structure of the criminal trial. In Calnan v. State, this court considered what constituted waiver of a defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial. 310 Ark. 744, 841 S.W.2d 593 (1992). The State contended that the issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant did not object at the circuit court level. Id. We stated that [t]he third exception applies in this case. There need be no contemporaneous objection to raise an issue on appeal if otherwise a serious error will result. Id. at 748, 841 S.W.2d at 596. On the same date that this court handed down Calnan , we also decided Winkle v. State, 310 Ark. 713, 841 S.W.2d 589 (1992). Winkle was similar to Calnan in that both were DWI cases, both involved the fundamental right to a jury trial, both considered the issue without a contemporaneous objection as Wicks three exceptions, and both reversed the trial court. Id. The holding in Winkle is instructive on the application of the third Wicks exception: The right to jury trial is part of the basic structure of our courts. Every judge, on his own motion, should accord such a basic right. In Wicks v. State, supra , we set out various exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule, and we provided that the rule is not applicable when the trial court should intervene on its own motion to correct a serious error. This is such a serious error. The right to a trial by jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right of our jurisprudence and is recognized by the Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, the federal constitution, and our state constitution. Id. at 717-18, 841 S.W.2d at 591. In 1995, we considered an appellant's conviction for disorderly conduct that was tried before a six-member jury. Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff, 322 Ark. 45, 907 S.W.2d 690 (1995). Relying on Winkle and Wicks , this court reversed: In both cases, neither the appellants nor their counsel objected to the violation of their jury trial right. In Winkle , this court stated that denial of the right to trial by jury in a criminal case, without the requisite waiver in accordance with the law, is a serious error for which the trial court should intervene, and is therefore an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Winkle, 310 Ark. 713, 717, 841 S.W.2d 589, 591 (citing Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980)). Id. at 49, 907 S.W.2d at 692. Grinning extended Winkle and Calnan by holding that the right to a jury trial included not only having a jury, but having a properly constituted jury with twelve members rather than only six. Id. Our case law is clear that Wicks presents only narrow exceptions that are to be rarely applied. Specifically, the third Wicks exception has only been applied to cases in which a defendant's fundamental right to a trial by jury is at issue. Calnan, supra ; Winkle, supra ; Grinning, supra . The third Wicks exception has not been applied to consider possible prosecutorial errors in relation to cross examination, Vaughn v. State, 338 Ark. 220, 992 S.W.2d 785 (1999), to privileged testimony, Hale v. State, 343 Ark. 62, 31 S.W.3d 850 (2000), or closing arguments, Buckley, supra and Greene v. State, 343 Ark. 526, 37 S.W.3d 579 (2001). The issue here is whether prosecutorial misstatements during voir dire concerning the State's burden of proof rise to the level of a Wicks -three exception. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the significance of the right to a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). After explaining that the right to a trial by jury is founded on centuries of common law, the Supreme Court stated: Equally well founded is the companion right to have the jury verdict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The `demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula beyond a reasonable doubt seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.' C. McCormick, Evidence § 321, pp. 681-682 (1954); see also 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2497 (3d ed.1940). [ In re ] Winship, 397 U.S. [358], at 361, 90 S.Ct. 1068 [25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)]. We went on to explain that the reliance on the reasonable doubt standard among common-law jurisdictions `reflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.' Id., at 361-362, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (quoting Duncan [ v. State of La. ], 391 U.S. [145], at 155, 88 S.Ct. 1444 [20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)]). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 478-79, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial is a fundamental right even though not expressly guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980). The State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the only mechanism by which the State may overcome the presumption of innocence that surrounds a criminal defendant until and unless proven guilty. [3] In 1976, we reversed a conviction where the prosecutor, in closing arguments, stated that the defendant was lying to the court and jury. After an objection, the trial court admonished the jury and reminded them that the defendant had not testified. This court found reversible error because the prosecutor's statement constituted error beyond doubt. We explained that the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt attach when the defendant pleads not guilty. He had entered a plea of not guilty. By so doing, he availed himself of any defense and all matters of justification and excuse available under the law, which are not required to be specifically pleaded. He put all material facts alleged in the information in issue. Even the most patent truths were in issue. This plea was a continuing denial of every bit of evidence and every statement of every witness who testified against him. More importantly, he invoked his right to the presumption of his innocence and put the burden upon the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as the right to remain silent in the hope that the jury would not be convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Williams v. State, 259 Ark. 667, 672, 535 S.W.2d 842, 846 (1976) (citations omitted). We then penned the oft-quoted statement: The presumption of innocence is so strong that it serves an accused as evidence in his favor throughout the trial and entitles him to an acquittal unless the state adduces evidence which convinces the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged. It is a fundamental right in the American system antedating any constitution and an essential of due process of law. It alone puts in issue the truth and credibility of all of the evidence offered against an accused. Id. at 672-73, 535 S.W.2d at 846. (citations omitted). See e.g. Williams v. State, 347 Ark. 728, 67 S.W.3d 548 (2002). We have referred to the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as constitutional guarantees protecting every accused person being tried by a jury. Rector v. State, 280 Ark. 385, 389, 396, 659 S.W.2d 168, 169-70, 173 (1983). In a long line of cases, we have emphasized the inviolability of the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof. For example, in 1922, we stated: The law will not countenance any presumption, which by overcoming the presumption of innocence will cast the burden of proving his innocence upon the defendant. Hence, where presumptions apparently conflict, the law will recognize the presumption of innocence alone, and will impose no restriction on its operation, but will apply it to the whole scope of the charge, against the accused and to every fact essential to the crime. Gilcoat v. State, 155 Ark. 455, 462, 244 S.W. 723, 726 (1922) (quoting Section 19, p. 35, UNDERHILL ON CRIMINAL EVIDENCE). [4] In 1990, we restated the fundamental nature of the presumption of innocence and set out our requirement that a challenge to this presumption calls for close judicial scrutiny. The presumption of innocence is not articulated in the Constitution of the United States; however, it is a basic component of a fair trial and the right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the fourteenth amendment. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 [96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126] (1976). Consequently, courts must be vigilant in guarding against dilution of the presumption of innocence so that guilt will be established beyond a reasonable doubt by probative evidence. Deleterious effects on fundamental rights call for close judicial scrutiny. Id. at 504 [96 S.Ct. 1691]. Factors which might affect a juror's judgment, however, cannot always be avoided Id. at 505 [96 S.Ct. 1691]. Terry v. State, 303 Ark. 270, 273, 796 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1990). In Terry the conduct of the defendant required his removal from the courtroom in spite of his right to confront the witnesses against him; however, in a case where a prosecutor clearly shifts the burden of proof, the court can avoid depriving a defendant of the presumption of innocence by intervening to correct the misstatement of the law. The failure to provide a criminal defendant with a jury trial is an error so serious that the circuit court has an obligation to intervene, and this court may consider the issue on appeal without an objection below. Calnan, supra ; Winkle, supra ; Grinning, supra . Likewise, today we conclude that failure to secure the companion rights of the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an error so serious that the circuit court should intervene, and we will consider the issue on appeal even without a contemporaneous objection. This conclusion is consistent with the circuit court's proper role in voir dire, which is to direct the process and insure that no undue advantage is gained. Britt v. State, 334 Ark. 142, 974 S.W.2d 436 (1998). Since attorneys sometimes tend to take over the voir dire process and confuse the jurors, the judge may have to step in, especially in death cases, after the questioning to insure fairness by clarifying answers. Id. at 162, 974 S.W.2d at 446. [5] The burden of proof, either the State's or the defendant's, is necessary to preserve a defendant's presumption of innocence and is an issue akin to the right to a jury trial in that both are fundamental rights. Unlike many other constitutional rights, the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt may not be waived once the accused pleads not guilty. When the State clearly and unequivocally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant during voir dire, without a contemporaneous curative instruction from the circuit court, the defendant's fundamental right may be abridged. The defendant is entitled not only to the jury's consideration of the correct burden of proof in jury-room deliberations, but also when the jury is hearing, weighing, and sifting the evidence presented at trial. [6] Therefore, under the third Wicks exception, we will consider appellant's argument that the prosecutor shifted the burden of proof during voir dire.
Appellant alleges that the prosecutor attempted to shift the burden of proof in the following three ways: (1) his description of the meaning of reasonable doubt was confusing, at best; (2) his statement that conflicting evidence does not constitute reasonable doubt was not a correct statement of the burden of proof; and (3) his statements concerning the burden of proof for the justification of self-defense were incorrect. While the prosecutor's comments were questionable, after a careful reading of the voir dire of the potential jurors, we cannot say that the prosecutor's comments were so flagrantly incorrect as to require reversal; and, as such, the circuit court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by not intervening on its own to instruct the jury as to the law at that time. First, appellant argues that the prosecutor's comments concerning the State's burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, while not completely wrong, could have led to confusion. The prosecutor relied on the Arkansas Model Jury InstructionsCriminal as the basis for his definition and explanation of the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecutor's general statements on reasonable doubt were correct statements of the law and do not constitute error. Second, appellant asserts that the prosecutor incorrectly advanced a theme that conflicting testimony does not mean the State failed to meet its burden of proof, and conflicting testimony does not constitute reasonable doubt. His statements to the jury were not technically incorrect. Conflicting testimony does not necessarily require a jury to find a reasonable doubt. In fact, we have often stated that the resolution of conflicting testimony is a matter of credibility, and the determination of the credibility of witnesses is a proper matter for the jury as fact-finder. Mills v. State, 351 Ark. 523, 95 S.W.3d 796 (2003). While appellant is correct in his statement that conflicting testimony may be considered by a jury as a factor supporting reasonable doubt, a thorough and careful reading of the prosecutor's comments during voir dire does not reveal any comments concerning conflicting testimony that require reversal. Third, appellant claims that the prosecutor misstated the State's burden of disproving the justification of self-defense and misstated appellant's burden of raising the self-defense justification. We begin our analysis of this issue by reviewing the burden of proof for both the defendant and the State where the justification of self-defense is raised in a criminal case. The defendant's burden of proof was clearly stated in Doles v. State, 275 Ark. 448, 631 S.W.2d 281 (1982): Justification is not an affirmative defense which must be pled, but becomes a defense when any evidence tending to support its existence is offered to support it. Id. at 450, 631 S.W.2d at 282 (emphasis added). It does not matter whether the evidence of self-defense comes from the defense's case or the prosecution's case. Peals v. State, 266 Ark. 410, 584 S.W.2d 1 (1979). According to the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions-Criminal, the defendant's burden of proof is merely to raise a reasonable doubt. AMI Crim.2d 705. The State's burden of proof is equally clear: Because justification is not an affirmative defense, the State has the burden of negating the defense once it is put in issue. Humphrey v. State, 332 Ark. 398, 408, 966 S.W.2d 213, 218 (1998). By statute, a justification, such as self-defense, is considered an element of the offense, and once raised, must be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-102(5)(C) (Supp.2001); see also Comment to AMI Crim.2d 705 ([T]he prosecution has the burden to prove as an element of its case the negation of any defense beyond a reasonable doubt.). If the prosecutor tells the jury during voir dire that the defendant's burden is greater than it is, or if the prosecutor tells the jury during voir dire that the State's burden of disproving self-defense is less than it is, then the prosecutor has attempted to shift the burden of proof. In this case, the prosecutor stated that appellant had the burden of raising a reasonable doubt. However, he also described appellant's burden as a little bit similar to the way the State has to prove its case. You know, I have to prove my case beyond a reasonable doubt. And [appellant] likewise, has to raise a reasonable doubt; that is, prove it.... The State's burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt; whereas, appellant's burden is merely to raise a reasonable doubt, the exact opposite of the State's burden. While not a flagrant shift, the prosecutor's statements represent a subtle attempt to shift the burden of proof by equating appellant's burden of proof with the State's burden. Although appellant's counsel did not object, he did counter the prosecutor's statements with his own explanation of his burden to raise a reasonable doubt by way of asserting self-defense. Appellant's counsel explained to the potential jurors that the prosecutor was correct in his brief description of the burden that is on the Defendant in raising a defense of self-defense. Appellant's counsel repeatedly told the potential jurors that he need only raise a reasonable doubt. For example: DEFENSE COUNSEL: Now, you remember, it's the State's case to prove. I mean, we don't have to prove self-defense. All we got to do is raise a reasonable doubt. ... [I]f we succeed in raising a reasonable doubt, would you find him not guilty of all charges? POTENTIAL JUROR: Uh-huh. Therefore, between the prosecutor and defense counsel, the potential jurors were correctly instructed on appellant's burden to raise a reasonable doubt when asserting self-defense. We, therefore find no error. The issue of the prosecutor's statements concerning the State's burden of proof is a much closer issue. On at least five occasions, the prosecutor told the potential jurors that the State did not have to disprove that appellant acted in self-defense, for example: [I]t is [appellant's] job, his burden, to raise a reasonable doubt in your mind that self-defense exists. It is not the State's burden to prove that it doesn't. All right? To go in and prove the negative, to prove that it doesn't exist. Again, the prosecutor stated [i]t's not my duty to show that it didn't exist, and he also stated, would you still put that burden on me and make me prove that he didn't act in self-defense ... ? Finally, he stated, That's not the State's burden, it's not my duty to show that [self-defense] didn't exist.... It's his burden to show or raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he was acting in self-defense. Under certain circumstances, the prosecutor's statements of the State's burden to disprove self-defense would be correct statements of the State's burden of proof, but under other circumstances they would be incorrect. Until some evidence tending to support the justification of self-defense is offered, in either the State's case or the defendant's case, the State has no burden of disproving self-defense. However, once any evidence tending to support [the] existence [of justification] is offered to support it, then the State does indeed have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Doles v. State, 275 Ark. 448, 450, 631 S.W.2d 281, 282 (1982); Humphrey v. State, supra ; Ark.Code Ann. § 5-1-102(5)(C); Comment to AMI Crim.2d 705. We cannot say, from reading the record, that the prosecutor clearly and unequivocally misstated the State's burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We, therefore, defer to the superior position of the circuit court to control and manage the arguments of counsel. We conclude that the circuit court did not manifestly abuse its discretion, and that, in this case, there was no fundamental, structural error in the trial as to require reversal. [7]