Opinion ID: 495432
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Questions of Statutory Interpretation

Text: 45 The Supreme Court has held that the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine are also not applicable where the question is solely one of statutory interpretation ... [and t]he resolution of th[e] issue does not require any particular expertise on the part of the [arbitrator].... McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-98, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1664-65, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969); accord Dorn's, 787 F.2d at 903 (arbitration may be bypassed when the district court faces only questions of statutory interpretation). 19 Under this second exception to exhaustion doctrine, Tiger argues that Count I of its complaint should be decided by a court because it raises questions of statutory interpretation. 46 The factors that led this Court in Dorn's to bypass arbitration are not present in the case at bar. The dispute there focused on whether a withdrawal occurred when a contributing employer and principal stockholder sold all of his stock to a corporation that continued to make contributions to the same multiemployer pension plans pursuant to an identical collective bargaining agreement. 787 F.2d at 901. The Dorn's issue arose under MPPAA section 1398, which states that, 47 [n]otwithstanding any other provision of this part, an employer shall not be considered to have withdrawn from a plan solely because 48 (1) an employer ceases to exist by reason of 49 (a) a change in corporate structure described in Section 1362(d) of this title.... 50 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1398 (1982). Accordingly, one of the issues decided in Dorn's was whether the requirements of MPPAA section 1362(d) 20 had been satisfied. Our analysis of that provision did not, however, contravene the clear mandate of MPPAA section 1401 to arbitrate disputes that arise under sections 1381 through 1399. In addition, while the funds in Dorn's alleged that discovery was necessary to prove whether the transaction violated the good faith requirement of Sec. 1392(c), it was undisputed that the stock purchaser was unaware that the seller was attempting to escape withdrawal liability. See supra note 16. We concluded that, [s]ince the ... transaction did not involve the kind of bad faith addressed by Sec. 1392[ (c) ], there was no disputed issue of material fact. Dorn's, 787 F.2d at 902. In reaching the merits of the dispute, we therefore emphasized that it was a rare case in which there was no need for the development of a factual record.... Id. at 903 (emphasis added). 51 Our case differs from Dorn's in two significant respects. First, as we have noted throughout this opinion, the statutory interpretation in this case involves only a MPPAA section that Congress explicitly reserved for arbitration. Second, the district court here concluded that [t]he present factual submissions and allegations before the Court indicate that there is a genuine factual dispute surrounding the [bona fides of the] 1985 transaction. 21 Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. Central States, at 17. By contrast, Dorn's --and the other decisions Tiger has cited as supporting its position that the district court, and not an arbitrator, should address this dispute in the first instance--concerned a set of undisputed facts that allowed the court to identify the MPPAA employer therein as a matter of law. 22 52 This Court has recently reaffirmed that, under MPPAA, determinations of fact ... are well within the province of an arbitrator. Warner-Lambert Co., Inc. v. United Retail & Wholesale Employee's Teamster Local No. 115 Pension Plan, 791 F.2d 283, 288 (3d Cir.1986). In addition, even when a dispute raises a mixed question of law and fact, the Act's statutory framework dictates that arbitration should be the initial forum for dispute resolution. The fact that the arbitrator will ultimately have to apply the statute to the facts it finds does not render these issues inappropriate for arbitration in the first instance. Id. Distinctions between questions of fact and law are, after all, often rather tenuous, 23 and MPPAA's language and purposes convince us that any doubt concerning fact/law differentiation as a means of determining whether arbitration is appropriate should be resolved in favor of arbitration. MPPAA section 1401, for instance, does not differentiate between legal and factual questions; it simply dictates that [a]ny dispute between an employer and the plan sponsor ... shall be resolved through arbitration. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1401 (1982) (emphasis added). In accordance with such a clear statutory directive, we conclude that whether an employer's defense is a question of fact, or of law, or a mixed question of fact and law, is often difficult to discern, and should not be left for the employer itself to decide in the first instance. Chipman Trucking, 8 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1261. 53 The District of Columbia Circuit recently held that when MPPAA provisions earmarked for arbitration are involved in a dispute, questions of statutory interpretation should not alter the forum for dispute resolution. From the unambiguous language by which Congress established the primacy of arbitration in withdrawal liability disputes and in light of our decisions interpreting those terms, it should be beyond cavil that the existence of an issue of statutory interpretation, standing alone, does not justify bypassing arbitration. I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund, Plan A, A Benefits v. Clinton Engines Corp., 825 F.2d 415, 418 (D.C.Cir.1987) (Clinton Engines ); accord Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Va. Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 635 (4th Cir.1983) (MPPAA requires that a nice [mixed] question of fact and law must be decided by an arbitrator), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259, 104 S.Ct. 3553, 82 L.Ed.2d 855 (1984); Chipman Trucking, 8 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) at 1262 (The purposes of the arbitration requirement are best served by the parties resorting first to arbitration, even where one of the parties believes the issues are limited to statutory interpretation.); Combs v. Pelbro Fuel, Inc., No. 83-1524, mem. op. at 14 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1984) (.... Congress has devised an elaborate statutory scheme for resolving disputes that may arise over the determinations and amounts of withdrawal liability. To permit an employer to stylize his [or her] claim into a 'question of law' and thereby bypass this framework would surely frustrate the intent of Congress and should not be sanctioned by the courts.). 24 V. CONCLUSION 54 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court's order staying Count I of Tiger's complaint pending MPPAA arbitration.