Opinion ID: 614579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction in Partial Recovery Restoration Appeals

Text: 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3, entitled appellate jurisdiction, states, in relevant part, that the Board has jurisdiction over appeals from agency actions when the appeals are authorized by law, rule, or regulation ... [including f]ailure to restore ... following partial or full recovery from a compensable injury (5 C.F.R. 353.304). Thus, the Board's jurisdiction over appeals from certain denials of restoration is established by 5 C.F.R. § 353.304, which provides (emphasis added): (a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, an injured employee or former employee of an agency in the executive branch (including the U.S. Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission) may appeal to the MSPB an agency's failure to restore, improper restoration, or failure to return an employee following a leave of absence. All appeals must be submitted in accordance with MSPB's regulations. (b) An individual who fully recovers from a compensable injury more than 1 year after compensation begins may appeal to MSPB as provided for in parts 302 and 330 of this chapter for excepted and competitive service employees, respectively. (c) An individual who is partially recovered from a compensable injury may appeal to MSPB for a determination of whether the agency is acting arbitrarily and capriciously in denying restoration. Upon reemployment, a partially recovered employee may also appeal the agency's failure to credit time spent on compensation for purposes of rights and benefits based on length of service. Thus, subsection (c) limits the otherwise broad jurisdiction established by subsection (a) in the case of an employee who is only partially recovered from a compensable injury. The Board has held that in order to establish jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c), a petitioner must prove that: (1) [s]he was absent from her position due to a compensable injury; (2) she recovered sufficiently to return to duty on a part-time basis, or to return to work in a position with less demanding physical requirements than those previously required of her; (3) the agency denied her request for restoration; and (4) the denial was arbitrary and capricious. Chen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 97 M.S.P.R. 527, 533 (2004) (quotation omitted). The basis for jurisdiction established by 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c) reflects the limited substantive right enjoyed by partially recovered employees. Employees who recover fully within a year have the unconditional right to restoration under 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(a) and 5 U.S.C. § 8151(b)(1). See Gallo v. United States, 529 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2008) (explaining that section 8151 provides an absolute right to an employee who is injured and who recovers within one year... [to] return to his old job or an equivalent position. (emphasis added) (quoting S.Rep. No. 93-1081, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5341, 5352)). By contrast, partially recovered employees only enjoy a right to have the agency make every effort to restore them in the local commuting area and according to the circumstances in each case. 5 C.F.R. § 353.301(d). In other words, partially recovered employees do not have an absolute or unconditional right to restoration; and a partially recovered petitioner alleging nothing more than that she has been denied restoration, has not invoked a legally protected interest before the Board. Because partially recovered employees do not have an unconditional right to restoration, they do not have the right to appeal every denial of restoration. The arbitrarily and capriciously requirement of section 353.304(c) limits jurisdiction to appeals where the substantive rights of partially recovered petitioners under section 353.301(d) are actually alleged to have been violated. See, e.g., Palmer v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 550 F.3d 1380, 1383-4 (Fed.Cir.2008) (The word `except,' as used in section 353.304(a), simply alludes to the fact that not all employees to whom sections 353.304(b) and 353.304(c) apply have restoration rights in all circumstances ... and the Board has jurisdiction over a restoration appeal by an employee who has partially recovered from an injury only in the situations enumerated in 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c). (quotations and citations omitted; emphasis added)); Sanchez v. U.S. Postal Serv., 114 M.S.P.R. 345, 350 (2010) (finding jurisdiction because [e]vidence that the agency failed to search the commuting area as required by 5 C.F.R. 353.301(d) constitutes a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying restoration.). While it might seem natural, at first blush, to view subsection 353.304(c)'s inclusion of the term arbitrarily and capriciously to be nothing more than a standard of review, rather than a jurisdictional requirement, to do so would be to ignore the text of sections 353.301(d) and 353.304(a) and (c) and would foist jurisdiction upon the Board over appeals brought by partially recovered petitioners who do not even allege that they did not receive the requisite effort to restore. The Board would then have jurisdiction to decide the merits of a right-to-restoration claim that does not actually exist. Not even the Article III jurisdiction cases, cited above, support such a result. Cf. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1247, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (holding, in Article III context, that copyright registration requirement... imposes a precondition to filing a claim that is not clearly labeled jurisdictional, is not located in a jurisdiction-granting provision, and admits of congressionally authorized exceptions ... [and] thus imposes a type of precondition to suit that supports nonjurisdictional treatment.); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235 (also in Article III context, holding statutory element that appears in a separate [statutory] provision that does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts to be nonjurisdictional (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, we hold that to establish jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c) the petitioner must prove by preponderant evidence: (1) absence due to a compensable injury; (2) sufficient recovery from the injury to return to duty on a part time basis or in a less physically demanding position; (3) agency denial of a request for restoration; and (4) denial of restoration rendered arbitrary and capricious by agency failure to perform its obligations under 5 C.F.R. 353.301(d).