Opinion ID: 453007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: propriety of prosecutor's argument

Text: 33 Tucker asserts that various portions of the sentencing argument made by prosecutor Donald Thompson were instances of misconduct. 13 We consider his claims as raised. 14 34 1. Tucker first complains of a remark in Thompson's opening argument at the sentencing phase. In explaining his request that the jury impose death, the prosecutor stated: 35 There are not many times that I come before a trial jury and make the request that I will be making of you in this case. In effect, I think this is the seventh time in seven years that I've stood in the same position, so I do not take this lightly. 36 This statement, invoking the expertise of the prosecutor to suggest the special seriousness of the crime, was improper. Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 1410; Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 951 (11th Cir.1983); see also Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266, 276 (The portion of the prosecutor's argument referring to his prior criminal experience and the frequency with which he had sought the death penalty was not supported by any evidence and, moreover, was irrelevant to any issue in the case. The argument was therefore improper), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 203, 78 L.Ed.2d 177 (1983). We will consider the effect of this statement in Part IV of this section of the opinion. 37 2. The most serious problem with Thompson's closing was the following argument about the possibility of sexual assault: 38 During the course of the main case there was not a great deal of evidence that you could consider about whether or not ... [the victim] was sexually assaulted, but additional things have come in since that time and I think that you can consider the fact that she was unclothed and the fact that he says at one point she was on her knees, I think you can consider--I think you consider this history right here: On the 25th day of December, 1964, Christmas Day, Richard Tucker did unlawfully and with force and arms feloniously break and enter into ... [a] dwelling house ... with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: rape. I think you can consider the medium brown pubic hair that was found on his clothing, and I think in your own mind you should be settled that this defendant not only killed ... [the victim]--and I hate to say this with the family sitting in the courtroom because I know they don't want to believe this; they don't want to believe the type of punishment that this defendant imposed on their mother or their wife--but I think in your own mind you should be settled now by knowing that this man is a rapist and a murderer, that he forced ... [the victim] to commit acts of oral sodomy on him, and that he committed the offense of rape. That's the reason she was unclothed, not this nonsense about fingerprints on clothing. 39 Tucker argues that there was no evidence in the record to support claims of rape or oral sodomy. 40 The prosecutor had not charged Tucker with sexual assault. Because of the body's decomposition, medical analysis could not prove whether or not an assault had taken place. The Georgia Supreme Court stated that the medical testimony effectively eliminated any issue of sexual assault from the guilt phase of Tucker's trial. Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 263 S.E.2d 109, 110 (1980). The state conceded as much in argument before this court. We therefore assume, for purposes of argument only, that there was insufficient evidence at the guilt phase to have supported a finding of guilt for either rape or oral sodomy. Such an assumption does not, however, necessarily resolve the issue in Tucker's favor. 41 Concerning the mention of rape, there was ample evidence to support the inference. The victim was found nude in a secluded location. Medical analysis could neither confirm nor discount assault. A confession introduced at trial contained Tucker's statement that he had made the victim kneel before him, struck and killed her, and then undressed her. Tucker told Mahone that he had killed a woman and that she was lying naked on a platform. Examination of clothes seized from Tucker's abode a few days after the murder uncovered a caucasian pubic hair on or near the pants apparently worn by Tucker the night of the murder. All this information was adduced at the guilt phase of the trial. 42 At the sentencing phase, more information was placed before the jury on the issue of sexual assault, adding to the arguably insufficient evidence introduced during the trial on guilt. Tucker testified and contradicted his confession, claiming that Mahone had killed the victim. He claimed to know nothing about the pubic hair on his clothes. He claimed that neither he nor Mahone had committed rape or forced the victim to perform any act of sex. He claimed not to know why the victim was kneeling down naked. He claimed that he undressed the woman to destroy evidence of his own fingerprints, but also stated that he had never touched the woman. The jury, of course, was able to judge his credibility as he testified in a manner inconsistent with some aspects of his confession. The state introduced the testimony of Tucker's parole officer that Tucker admitted to making the victim undress before he killed her, thus contradicting Tucker's claim that he undressed her after death in order to destroy fingerprint evidence. 43 It has long been held that a prosecutor may argue both facts in evidence and reasonable inferences from those facts. Alvarez v. Estelle, 531 F.2d 1319, 1323 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044, 97 S.Ct. 748, 50 L.Ed.2d 757 (1977); 15 Spain v. State, 243 Ga. 15, 252 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1979); see also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3.5-8(a) (1980) (The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record). That such inferences are available in a capital sentencing proceeding is demonstrated by the propriety of argument about future dangerousness or rehabilitative prospect. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2957-58, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 1406 - 1407. The propriety of Thompson's mention of rape and oral sodomy depends, therefore, on whether the activities could reasonably be inferred from the evidence before the jury. 44 Given the physical evidence (nudity of the victim and pubic hair on Tucker's clothing), the inconsistencies between Tucker's confession and testimony (on the issues of who killed the victim, whether Tucker undressed her before or after death, whether she knelt down naked before being killed, whether concern about fingerprints was the real reason for removing the victim's clothes), and the ability of the sentencing jury to observe Tucker's credibility as he testified, we have no trouble concluding that Thompson could argue rape as a reasonable inference. 45 The allegation of oral sodomy, on the other hand, was unreasonable. The body's complete nudity and the pubic hair on Tucker's pants were both more consistent with Tucker raping the victim than they were with his forcing her to commit oral sex. Aside from the testimony about the victim kneeling down before Tucker, which we view as too insubstantial to support a reasonable inference of oral sex, Thompson's allegation appears to be a gratuitous and unsupported charge. It was a serious professional impropriety and its effect will be considered in Part IV of this section. 46 3. Tucker complains about some of the terms Thompson used to describe him to the jury (less than human; not somebody in our society that we can afford to keep; he is a danger like a time bomb). These references, part of an argument about Tucker's lack of mercy and danger to society, were supported by the evidence and not improper. 47 4. Tucker complains of Thompson's various suggestions that he would kill again if given the chance. In addition to general assertions that Tucker would kill, Thompson argued about the possibility of his killing a guard or prisoner if he was given a life sentence. 48 These comments were proper because they concerned the valid sentencing factor of Tucker's future dangerousness. Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 1411. In addition to evidence about his prior murders, the jury heard testimony about Tucker's hatred for prison guards at the state prison and his statement to Mahone that he enjoyed killing and would kill again. Thus, there was ample evidence to support the prosecutorial reference to the possibility of future crimes. 49 5. Thompson made various references to parole during his closing argument. He first referred to the fact that Tucker had not been rehabilitated during the prison sentence for his first murder and that he had killed again within six months of being paroled. He then argued the following: 50 Can we afford--can you afford as a jury and as a citizen to take the chance if you impose a life sentence on this Defendant? Can we afford to take the chance that some day 13 years or so from now when a Pardon and Parole Board looks at this Defendant and says, Well, he hasn't killed anybody in 13 years. At that time he will be somewhere in his 40's, and that Pardon and Parole Board says, Well, he's doing all right. Let's let him out again. Are you going to feel safe on the streets? Are you? Are you? 51 It scares me every time I get a letter from the Pardon and Parole Board. We're considering Richard Tucker for parole. It scared me so badly I wrote a two-page letter. You know what? They let him out anyway. That's why you have an interest in this case. That's why you as a juror, Ms. Brooks, Ms. Jones, you individually and you collectively, have an interest in this case and that is to protect society against Richard Tucker. 52 Arguments to the jury about the possibility of parole are forbidden in Georgia and will lead to a declaration of mistrial upon objection. Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 17-8-76 (1982). See also, Tucker v. State, 245 Ga. 68, 263 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1980). No objection was made by Tucker's counsel. 53 Despite the impropriety under state law of arguments about parole, Thompson's first reference to Tucker's previous parole was not improper. First, the evidence of previous parole was introduced by Tucker himself during his testimony at the sentencing phase. Second, the Georgia prohibition of argument about parole envisions argument about future activities by state officials. Discussing a past parole does not violate the statute. 54 The discussion of future parole was improper, however. Thompson's claim that he wrote a letter to the Parole Board to block Tucker's release was not supported by any evidence. Neither was it relevant. It allowed him to strongly imply that the Board would be derelict in its duties and release Tucker again. This extended beyond a mere argument about future dangerousness into a claim that the jury had to account for errors to be committed by other actors in the criminal justice system. The capital sentencing jury should not be burdened with such speculative assertions. This problem will be further examined in Part IV. 55 6. Finally, Tucker complains of various comments made by the prosecutor to emphasize the serious responsibility the jury was charged with in choosing punishment. Thompson told the jurors you are the only people in the entire world that can stop Richard Tucker from killing. He informed them that the next victim of Richard Tucker will be on your conscience. Finally, he discussed the seriousness of the decision, recognized its difficulty, but told the jury that it must carry out its responsibility. 56 It is completely appropriate to remind the jury of the importance of its sentencing decision. By contrast, arguments which trivialize that decision may be improper. Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142, 240 S.E.2d 37 (1977) (prosecutor cannot argue that appellate court will correct any errors made by the jury). 57 While the importance of the decision can and should be stressed, the prosecutor went beyond appropriate limits in this case by portraying the jury as the last line of defense against Tucker. Arguing that any future victim would be on the jury's conscience, and that jurors were the only people who could stop Tucker from killing, derogated the role that others would have in seeing to it that Tucker, if given a life sentence, would be effectively incapacitated. As a factual matter, it is flatly wrong to assert that jurors are the only people who can control a defendant's future behavior. Neither the future diligence of an appellate court nor the possibility of future incompetence of corrections and parole personnel should be invoked to alter the jury's perception of its role at capital sentencing. 58