Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination of Powell and Owens

Text: Ciavarella contends that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when it limited his cross-examination of Powell and Powell‟s CFO, Patrick Owens, on substantial facts in controversy that went to the core of his defense and undermined Powell‟s credibility.11 To determine whether limitations on cross-examination violate the Confrontation Clause, we employ the following two-step test: First, we must determine whether that ruling significantly inhibited [a defendant‟s] effective exercise of her right to inquire into [the] witness‟s “motivation in testifying”; and second, if the District Court‟s ruling did significantly inhibit [the defendant‟s] exercise of that right, whether the constraints it imposed on the scope of [the] cross-examination fell within those “reasonable limits” which a trial court, in due exercise of its discretion, has authority to establish. 11 We review the District Court‟s limitations on crossexamination based on relevancy for abuse of discretion. United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008). We review for plain error objections that were not specifically raised before the District Court. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying plain error review for claim that admission of testimony violated the Confrontation Clause). 33 United States v. Chandler, 326 F.3d 210, 219 (3d Cir. 2003). Ciavarella sought throughout the trial to portray Powell as a large and powerful figure, who was incapable of being extorted by Ciavarella and instead was embezzling from his companies to support his lavish lifestyle. The defense inquired into Powell‟s credit card statements, confronting him about a December 2003 statement containing over $21,000 in charges, a January 2004 statement containing over $13,000 in charges, and a February 2004 statement containing over $15,000 in charges. After the questioning of Powell about his third credit card statement, the District Court asked the defense about the relevance of the line of questioning and subsequently sustained an objection by the Government. Ciavarella also attacked Powell‟s credibility through the testimony of Owens regarding Powell‟s demeanor and his structuring of transactions. Owens testified that Powell‟s demeanor changed in 2006 and 2007 and that Powell had become paranoid, quick tempered, and demanding. Around that time, according to Owens, Powell had directed Owens to withdraw large amounts of cash from Powell‟s companies. The defense on cross-examination sought to demonstrate that it was Powell‟s embezzlement from his companies that had led to his changed demeanor and not Ciavarella‟s alleged extortion demands. However, after Ciavarella had asked Owens about Powell‟s business partner Greg Zappala‟s lack of knowledge of Powell‟s withdrawals from the companies they jointly owned, the District Court inquired as to the relevance of Powell‟s embezzlement, prompting an objection from the Government that the District Court sustained. The Government then conceded that “[t]he issue of paranoia, 34 however, as a motive separate from the extortion may be marginally relevant.” App. 729. Nevertheless, the District Court maintained its ruling. “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness‟ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). “Van Arsdall requires us to strike a balance between the constitutionally required opportunity to crossexamine and the need to prevent repetitive or abusive crossexamination.” United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 919 (3d Cir. 1991). Although Ciavarella initially argued at trial that Powell‟s testimony addressing his credit card statements was relevant to the defense‟s theory that Powell‟s lavish lifestyle made him incapable of being extorted, on appeal, Ciavarella now argues that the evidence was relevant instead to show that Powell was embezzling from his companies to support his lifestyle. However, Ciavarella failed to demonstrate either at trial or on appeal any different conclusion that the jury might have reached had it learned more about Powell‟s specific spending habits, and thus we cannot conclude that the District Court abused its discretion. Regarding Owens‟s testimony, while we agree that evidence related to Powell‟s change in demeanor and structuring of transactions may have been relevant to support Ciavarella‟s argument that Zappala did not know that Powell was stealing from their companies, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence. Ciavarella had already questioned 35 Owens about Zappala‟s lack of knowledge about Powell‟s withdrawals from his companies, and further questioning would have been repetitive. Ciavarella has not explained what the jury may have learned from further testimony on Powell‟s withdrawals. As “the Confrontation Clause does not grant unfettered rights to cross-examine witnesses,” United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 356 (3d Cir. 2011), we conclude that the District Court‟s ruling “fell within those „reasonable limits‟ which a trial court, in due exercise of its discretion, has authority to establish.” Chandler, 326 F.3d at 219.