Opinion ID: 1159631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnson's Plea Agreement

Text: Our primary task in this case is determining the parties' obligations under the plea agreement, which we do de novo. The agreement requires that Johnson successfully pass a DA polygraph in order to receive a sentence reduction. The trial judge at the providency hearing confirmed the parties' understanding that the statement of the DA's polygraphist would be conclusive as to whether Johnson's performance on the polygraph examination was indeed successful. The question for resolution is whether the DA breached its obligation of good faith and fair dealing by refusing to permit the polygraphist to proceed without the information the polygraphist believed necessary to conduct a reliable examination. See, e.g., Jones, 58 F.3d at 692. The good faith performance doctrine is generally used to effectuate the intentions of the parties or to honor their reasonable expectations. Good faith performance of a contract involves faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ervin, 908 P.2d 493, 498 (Colo.1996) (citations omitted).
We now proceed to our first responsibility, construing the parties' agreement. Johnson and the DA agree that the purpose of the DA's polygraph was to determine whether Johnson knew that Mayo intended to kill Charbonneau when they went to the hotel. The parties expressly agreed that the polygraphist would conclusively determine whether Johnson passed the examination. The problem arose when the polygraphist asked a series of questions and learned of the defense polygraphs for the first time. In ascertaining whether Johnson has established his compliance with the sentence reduction provision of the plea bargain, we look to the agreement he made to abide by the polygraphist's determination: THE COURT: And, in addition, if you successfully pass a polygraph administered by the district attorney's office, the district attorney agrees to reduce the sentence, and you would ... review the sentence, and that you would be sentenced within a range that would not allow the court to sentence you to more than six years. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, it's actually not a review. We would agree that if he passes it, then he would be resentenced, and the sentence could not exceed six years. THE COURT: In other words, if you passed the polygraph and then instead of 20, you would be looking at [a cap of] 6. THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: You understand that if you don't pass the polygraph, there won't even be a review? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir. THE COURT: Under those circumstances, do you still wish to enter into that kind of plea bargain? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: I take it both counsel are stating that the polygrapher has the say on whether he passed or not, correct? [DA]: That would be our position. They are computer scored. THE COURT: So the defense is accepting that whatever statement of the people who administer the polygraph is whether he passes or not is conclusive to that issue? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: That's agreeable to you, Mr. Johnson? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. [8] Consistent with the expressed intent of the parties, we construe the sentence reduction agreement as providing unequivocally that the DA's polygraphist would determine whether Johnson had passed the polygraph exam. We now proceed to our second responsibility, reviewing the trial court's finding that the DA did not breach the agreement.
When Johnson appeared before the DA's polygraphist, the polygraphist asked questions he determined necessary to conduct a reliable examination. At the evidentiary hearing, the polygraphist explained that the questions, answers, and results of Johnson's prior two polygraphs were necessary for him to formulate a reliable and accurate test on the issue of whether Johnson was involved in the planning, formation, or commission of the murder of Charbonneau: [DA'S POLYGRAPHIST]: Preplanning of the incident itself was an issue; whether he knew before the murder took place that it was going to happen; whether he touched the weapon, questions along those lines. [DA]: All right. [DA'S POLYGRAPHIST]: Um, not knowing the questions that were asked in both polygraphs before and not knowing the results of those polygraphs would make it very difficult for me. And I would suspect that if I asked the same questions the result may be the same, if they were inconclusive or whatever thosethose charts came out to be, and I don't know at this point what they were. I would suspect the validity of my testor better put, I would question the validity of the test that I gave not knowing those things. THE COURT: And is my understanding that you learned of the existence of these prior tests through the routine questioning that you do in the pretest that you were about to administer? [DA'S POLYGRAPHIST]: Yes, sir, that's exactly right. After explaining his rationale for requiring this information, the polygraphist stated he would have accepted one of Johnson's prior polygraph examinations, if reliably and accurately conducted to test Johnson's alleged non-involvement with Charbonneau's murder: [DA]: If, in fact, one of those polygraphs on those issues indicated he passed and you believed it was properly and reliably validly conducted, would you feel comfortable relying on that private polygraph? [DA'S POLYGRAPHIST]: Yes. The trial court evaluated Johnson's refusal to disclose information from the prior tests and his claim that the DA breached by refusing to proceed. It found to be valid the polygraphist's concern regarding the reliability of his own examination without knowing the questions, answers, and results of the two prior polygraphs. This finding is not clearly erroneous based on the evidence in this record. [9] Hence, we uphold it. See St. James, 948 P.2d at 1031 ([T]he ... question of whether a party has materially and substantially breached a plea agreement is left to the discretion of the trial court.) The plea agreement did not contemplate that the DA's polygraphist would administer his examination under suspect conditions. To the contrary, it provided that the polygraphist's statement would be conclusive as to whether Johnson had passed the test. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that Johnson had not qualified under the agreement to have his sentence reduced from twenty years to six years.
Johnson claims the DA did not bargain for the disclosure of privileged information and Johnson never consented to waive the work product and attorney-client privileges as part of his agreement. The DA does not dispute the privileged nature of the prior polygraphs, and the trial court upheld applicability of the privilege to them. Accordingly, for purposes of this case, we assume that the information the DA's polygraphist requested was privileged. In considering Johnson's privilege claims, we are mindful that the standards for interpreting plea agreements require us to consider constitutional safeguards and the defendant's right to be treated fairly by the government. Craig, 986 P.2d at 961. Although the attorney-client privilege is not itself a constitutional doctrine, in the criminal context preservation of the privilege may implicate a defendant's Sixth-Amendment right to counsel. See Hutchinson v. People, 742 P.2d 875, 882 (Colo.1987). We therefore agree with the trial court that it could not, under the circumstances, order Johnson to surrender the requested material to the DA's polygraphist. Nevertheless, under the sentence reduction provision of the agreement, Johnson must accept the DA polygraphist's opinion that he cannot reliably and accurately determine Johnson's success without the requested information. Johnson cannot assert the privilege and, at the same time, successfully contend that he has qualified for the sentence reduction. Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, we do not view this dilemma as a Hobson's choice foisted upon Johnson in violation of his expectations, or fundamental fairness, thereby requiring imposition of the sentence reduction. Rather, this dilemma flowed from Johnson's bargain; he agreed to stand for examination by the DA's polygraphist. Only a statement of successful passage from the polygraphist would trigger the resentencing provision of the plea agreement. Thus, if Johnson wished to invoke the resentencing feature of the agreedupon disposition, he had to satisfy the polygraphist's good-faith request for information needed to accurately test Johnson's contention that he was not involved in Charbonneau's murder. The essence of a plea agreement is the waiver of important rightsoften including constitutional rightsin exchange for an agreed upon disposition. See People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo.1999). We conclude that, although Johnson was under no obligation to provide the DA's polygraphist privileged information, he cannot assert the privilege to defeat the essence of the resentencing bargainthat he pass the test to the DA polygraphist's satisfaction. [10]