Opinion ID: 1634827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the foster claim

Text: A summary judgment was granted plaintiff attorneys on the issue of liability for attorneys fees. The only issue to be submitted to the jury is succinctly stated in the pretrial order as follows: There is a genuine issue as to the terms of the oral contract relating to the amount of compensation to be paid. The plaintiffs contend that the amount to be paid was a fixed sum, namely, $5,000.00 for the services of Leo Foster and $2,500.00 for the services of Rivers Buford, Jr. and that such sum would be payable at the termination of the litigation regardless of the outcome. The defendants contend that the compensation to be paid was a reasonable sum not to exceed $5,000.00 and $2,500.00 respectively and to be based upon the extent of the services performed in contemplation of extensive preparation and participation in the trial court and also with regard to an anticipated appeal. It thus appears to the Court that there is an issue as to what the terms of the contract with regard to compensation were, and if in accordance with the defendants' contentions, the amount the defendants are obligated to pay. The evidence on this question by both parties establishes a contract to pay a fee of $5,000.00 win, lose, or draw. The quoted language was used by Foster in his discussion of fees and the defendant Holcomb repeatedly confirmed the use of such a phrase. Holcomb's contention as to his understanding of the contract is summarized in the following answer given to the last question propounded to him: I agreed to a fee of Five Thousand Dollars and one not to exceed Five Thousand Dollars, and I agreed to that predicated upon these things, not to exceed, and I would expect a reasonable fee if the things were not done. The fact that the case was disposed of in a manner that was a complete victory for Holcomb without Foster and Buford having to perform all the services they contemplated having to render was not only favorable to the client but a break for the attorneys. What effect the standing reputation and ability of counsel had in the ultimate victory is, of course, impossible to measure. Such is universally recognized, however, as a factor in determining the reasonableness of professional fees. Moreover, had the case involved all the services contemplated and more, the attorneys, under the contract, would have been limited to the amount agreed on. There is another  and more basic  reason why the attorneys were entitled to recover here as a matter of law. Under the pleadings and the pre-trial order the burden was on Holcomb to prove not only that he had no contract for a fixed fee but that the reasonable value of the services performed by Foster for Holcomb was less than that charged. There is no evidence in the record to support that claim. This seems to have been recognized by the trial judge at the conclusion of the evidence when he said  in a colloquy with counsel out of the jury's presence: MR. HOLCOMB: Your Honor, there was a case that holds that if an attorney goes in and asks for a certain amount and does not put any testimony on as to the reasonableness of the fee, that they have waived the right of putting anything on then as to what is a reasonable fee and that the jury can find anything that is a matter of fact in the absence of the evidence. THE COURT: What could this jury or this judge do if it was up to the judge? What is there to determine what is a reasonable fee in this case, getting down to dollars and cents? MR. HOLCOMB: I think it would be predicated upon what they would feel reasonable if they went to an attorney under the same circumstances, how much they feel would be reasonable to charge and things of this nature. THE COURT: They're not experts on that. MR. HOLCOMB: They're not experts on it, but it is a question of fact as to what is or is not reasonable. Whether they're experts on it is beside the point. THE COURT: I think it may have been incumbent on you to have shown some evidence that it was worth less than $5,000 or $2,500. You say it is unreasonable, but what would be reasonable? MR. HOLCOMB: I think an amount considerably less than $7,500 would be reasonable. THE COURT: I know, but what? MR. HOLCOMB: Again, the only thing I have to go on is the cases that say that reasonable attorney's fees are facts for the jury. THE COURT: I know, but you've got to give some evidence to the jury to base that on. MR. HOLCOMB: I don't know how I could get an attorney to come up and testify as to the reasonableness of it. THE COURT: I don't want you to misunderstand me at all. It may be that after I have reflected on this that I may conclude that they're entitled to what they're asking for now, but I'm going to withhold that and submit it to a jury, but there is a question in my mind as to what it is they could consider. MR. HOLCOMB: There is a case on this subject and I think the case held that it was incumbent on attorneys asking for fees to show what is reasonable by expert testimony. THE COURT: That is where there is no agreement. I'm going to submit it to the jury and see what they come up with, but I don't want anybody to be misled. It could be that after I have considered , I'm not saying whether there is or isn't, but there is some doubt in my mind as to whether the motion is well taken at this time. Most of the cases referred to in the trial court's order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict, supra, fall within the category of cases heretofor alluded to concerning fees as costs in legal proceedings. [11] Baruch v. Giblin [12] was a suit like this and the statement in that opinion as to opinion evidence must be considered in the light of the facts in that case. The record there shows that many witnesses testified as to the value of the services rendered by Giblin to Baruch. The opinion evidence varied from $1,000 to $15,000. The fee awarded was $6,250.00, well within the range of the evidence. In Folmar v. Davis, [13] referred to by the trial judge, there was opinion evidence above and below the amount awarded. In Lyle v. Lyle [14] the late Judge Sturgis speaking for the court reversed an award for attorney fees in a divorce case but made the following comments concerning attorneys fees generally. [15] As between a lawyer and his client the matter of the fee is one of contract between the two, but a fee to be allowed by the court is something else and must be proved as any other fact, and determined and allowed by the court in its judicial discretion. The reasonableness of the attorney's fee is not the subject of judicial notice, neither is it to be left to local custom, conjecture or guesswork. Each award must be made on its own merits and should be justified by the circumstances in each particular case. Most of the other cases, as recognized by the trial judge, fall within the category of costs and the rule there is not applicable here. It is pertinent to re-emphasize the fact that the law governing the recovery of attorneys fees in suits of this nature is exactly the same as any other professional fee. Judge Sturgis in the Lyle case, supra, summed up the situation here when he said: [16] In all litigation involving professional fees proof is required of the nature of and the necessity for, the services rendered, and the reasonableness of the charge made therefore. In this respect the legal profession stands on the same plane with other professions. The decision of the District Court, as modified, is approved. ERVIN, C.J., and ROBERTS, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.