Opinion ID: 2978443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discovery at Sentencing

Text: Vassar takes issue with the district court’s decision denying him discovery for sentencing purposes. Appellant’s Br. at 72–73. Vassar does not, however, specify the information he would have sought in discovery. Nor does he explain how the publically available sources of information proved inadequate for his purposes, a defect that other circuit courts have relied on in affirming denials of sentencing discovery. See, e.g., United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 672 (8th Cir. 2008) (affirming decision denying defendant access to his coconspirators’ PSRs). Vassar merely maintains that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(ii) and U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 support his discovery requests. We read those rules more narrowly. Rule 32(i)(4)(ii), rather than providing a broad right to discovery, only requires a sentencing court “to address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” The rule, in other words, allows defendants to present the information they have. - 24 - No. 07-5299 United States v. Vassar Nor does U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 aid Vassar. That Guideline tells us, among other points, that “[w]hen any factor important to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall be given an adequate opportunity to present information to the court regarding that factor.” Id. U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 mentions nothing concerning discovery. In the absence of express statutory authority, and without explicit guidance from the Sentencing Commission, we leave the matter of sentencing discovery to the district court’s sound discretion. And because we discern no abuse of discretion here, we reject Vassar’s discovery arguments. Vassar makes a related argument that U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3 somehow constrains the timing of sentencing hearings. More specifically, he says that the district court erred by “set[ting] Vassar’s sentencing after co-conspirators who were not asserting §3553(a)(1)(6) disparity, [thereby failing] to provide Vassar an adequate opportunity to present relevant information.” Appellant’s Br. at 73–74 (internal quotation marks omitted). Vassar again runs roughshod over the actual language of U.S.S.G. § 6.A1.3, which says nothing about scheduling sentencing hearings. Vassar raises other arguments challenging his conviction and sentence. We have considered those arguments and view them as lacking. AFFIRMED. - 25 -