Opinion ID: 2026681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Jury Question Regarding the Imposition of the Death Penalty for Two Murders

Text: In Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held that a capital defendant has a right to challenge for cause a juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty upon conviction. See generally People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 180, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999). Pursuant to Morgan, the circuit court in this case stated, prior to voir dire, that it intended to ask each prospective juror the following question: Are your beliefs such that regardless of the facts of the case or the background of the defendant, that if the defendant were found guilty of first degree murder, you would automatically vote to impose the death penalty, and would not consider signing a verdict which would result in a sentence of imprisonment? Defense counsel objected to the circuit court's question. Counsel moved to have the court's question replaced with one which asked the prospective jurors whether they would automatically impose the death penalty if the defendant were found guilty of two murders. The circuit court denied counsel's motion, stating that the question proposed by the court was consistent with the state of the law. Thereafter, the circuit court's question, as set forth above, was asked of each prospective juror. Defendant contends that the circuit court erred when it declined to ask his proposed question. According to defendant, the court's refusal to ask the prospective jurors whether they would always impose a death sentence if the defendant was convicted of murdering two persons denied him his right to an impartial jury. Defendant acknowledges that this claim has been forfeited because it was not included in his posttrial motion. Defendant maintains, however, that the circuit court's rejection of his proffered question constitutes plain error. We disagree. The argument that defendant raises here has been rejected by this court on several previous occasions. See People v. Buss, 187 Ill.2d 144, 180-83, 240 Ill.Dec. 520, 718 N.E.2d 1 (1999); People v. Jackson, 182 Ill.2d 30, 57-62, 230 Ill.Dec. 901, 695 N.E.2d 391 (1998); People v. Brown, 172 Ill.2d 1, 29-31, 216 Ill.Dec. 733, 665 N.E.2d 1290 (1996); People v. Hope, 168 Ill.2d 1, 28-31, 212 Ill.Dec. 909, 658 N.E.2d 391 (1995). Defendant presents no compelling reason to depart from our holdings in these cases and we decline to do so. In light of our prior decisions, we conclude that the circuit court did not err when it declined to ask the prospective jurors defense counsel's proposed question. Accordingly, we also conclude that the circuit court's ruling did not constitute plain error. See Keene, 169 Ill.2d at 17, 214 Ill. Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (all plain errors are reversible errors).