Opinion ID: 848684
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: necessary

Text: For a public corporation to condemn property under MCL 213.23, a proposed taking must not only advance one of the three objectives listed in that statute, but it must also be necessary to that end. The Legislature has vested the authority to determine the necessity required under MCL 213.23 in those entities authorized to condemn private property under that statute. [32] Accordingly, Michigan's courts are bound by a public corporation's determination that a proposed condemnation serves a public necessity unless the party opposing the condemnation demonstrates fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion. [33] Defendants advance three basic arguments for the proposition that plaintiff has failed to establish that the takings are necessary as required by MCL 213.23 and therefore abused its discretion in condemning the subject properties. They contend, first, that the county has neither identified specific private purchasers for each of the defendants' parcels nor demonstrated that the parcels will be put to productive use now or in the immediate future. Thus, defendants argue that Wayne County is impermissibly using the power of eminent domain to stockpile land for speculative future use, a practice expressly prohibited fifty years ago in Grand Rapids Bd. of Ed. v. Baczewski. [34] We disagree. The proposed condemnations are quite unlike the exercise of eminent domain prohibited in Baczewski. There, a local board of education attempted to condemn property near a high school because it surmised that the high school would need to expand in approximately thirty years. The affected landowner challenged the condemnation under the 1908 Constitution, [35] which  in contrast to the 1963 Constitution [36]  expressly required any exercise of eminent domain to be necessary. This Court held that a condemnation is necessary only if the condemned property will be used immediately or within a period of time that the jury determines to be the `near future' or a `reasonably immediate use.' [37] The speculative need for property in thirty years time lacked any of the urgency of a necessary condemnation. Even if we grant, arguendo, that the definition of necessity under the 1908 Constitution applies to MCL 213.23 as well, the present case is nevertheless distinguishable from Baczewski. Whereas the school board in Baczewski admitted that it would not need the defendant's property for thirty years after its condemnation, plaintiff has a definite plan for defendants' properties and intends to construct a business and technology park as soon as possible. According to the trial court's summary of testimony at trial, the acquisition of defendants' properties would also enable the county to achieve a critical mass of property, and would thereby facilitate investment in the project. Baczewski does not bar an exercise of the power of eminent domain simply because the ultimate owner of the condemned land has yet to be identified. Second, defendants argue that the proposed condemnations are not necessary under MCL 213.23 because plaintiff must still clear a number of procedural hurdles in order to proceed with the Pinnacle Project. These include the need for a special exclusion from the FAA in order to use land acquired through the noise abatement program for the Pinnacle Project, environmental concerns that may arise if construction of the project disturbs extant wildlife habitats, and the creation of local district finance authority and tax increment finance plan under the Local Development Financing Act. [38] This argument is unpersuasive. MCL 213.23 requires a proposed condemnation to be necessary to advance one of the specified purposes. It does not, however, require that the condemning authority clear all other statutory and procedural hurdles before commencing condemnation proceedings. In arguing that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate necessity, defendants have essentially read new requirements into MCL 213.23. Finally, defendants assert, without supporting argument, that plaintiff has failed to establish that the [business and technology] park is necessary for the public. Given defendants' failure to brief the issue, this Court may consider it abandoned. [39] In any event, the argument erroneously shifts the burden of proof to plaintiff when the party opposing condemnation bears the burden of proving fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion by the condemning authority. [40]