Opinion ID: 109729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Bill of Attainder Clause

Text: Finally, we address appellant's argument that the Act constitutes a bill of attainder proscribed by Art. I, § 9, of the Constitution. [30] His argument is that Congress acted on the premise that he had engaged in `misconduct,' was an `unreliable custodian' of his own documents, and generally was deserving of a legislative judgment of blameworthiness, Brief for Appellant 132-133. Thus, he argues, the Act is pervaded with the key features of a bill of attainder: a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. See United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 445, 447 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S. 303, 315-316 (1946); Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 377 (1867); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1867). Appellant's argument relies almost entirely upon United States v. Brown, supra , the Court's most recent decision addressing the scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause. It is instructive, therefore, to sketch the broad outline of that case. Brown invalidated § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U. S. C. § 504, that made it a crime for a Communist Party member to serve as an officer of a labor union. After detailing the infamous history of bills of attainder, the Court found that the Bill of Attainder Clause was an important ingredient of the doctrine of separation of powers, one of the organizing principles of our system of government. 381 U. S., at 442-443. Just as Art. III confines the Judiciary to the task of adjudicating concrete cases or controversies, so too the Bill of Attainder Clause was found to reflect . . . the Framers' belief that the Legislative Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of ruling upon the blameworthiness of, and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific persons. 381 U. S., at 445. Brown thus held that § 504 worked a bill of attainder by focusing upon easily identifiable members of a classmembers of the Communist Partyand imposing on them the sanction of mandatory forfeiture of a job or office, long deemed to be punishment within the contemplation of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, supra, at 316; Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 320. Brown, Lovett, and earlier cases unquestionably gave broad and generous meaning to the constitutional protection against bills of attainder. But appellant's proposed reading is far broader still. In essence, he argues that Brown establishes that the Constitution is offended whenever a law imposes undesired consequences on an individual or on a class that is not defined at a proper level of generality. The Act in question therefore is faulted for singling out appellant, as opposed to all other Presidents or members of the Government, for disfavored treatment. Appellant's characterization of the meaning of a bill of attainder obviously proves far too much. By arguing that an individual or defined group is attainted whenever he or it is compelled to bear burdens which the individual or group dislikes, appellant removes the anchor that ties the bill of attainder guarantee to realistic conceptions of classification and punishment. His view would cripple the very process of legislating, for any individual or group that is made the subject of adverse legislation can complain that the lawmakers could and should have defined the relevant affected class at a greater level of generality. [31] Furthermore, every person or group made subject to legislation which he or it finds burdensome may subjectively feel, and can complain, that he or it is being subjected to unwarranted punishment. United States v. Lovett, supra, at 324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). [32] However expansive the prohibition against bills of attainder, it surely was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine, [33] invalidating every Act of Congress or the States that legislatively burdens some persons or groups but not all other plausible individuals. [34] In short, while the Bill of Attainder Clause serves as an important bulwark against tyranny, United States v. Brown, 381 U. S., at 443, it does not do so by limiting Congress to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all. Thus, in the present case, the Act's specificitythe fact that it refers to appellant by namedoes not automatically offend the Bill of Attainder Clause. Indeed, viewed in context, the focus of the enactment can be fairly and rationally understood. It is true that Title I deals exclusively with appellant's papers. But Title II casts a wider net by establishing a special commission to study and recommend appropriate legislation regarding the preservation of the records of future Presidents and all other federal officials. In this light, Congress' action to preserve only appellant's records is easily explained by the fact that at the time of the Act's passage, only his materials demanded immediate attention. The Presidential papers of all former Presidents from Hoover to Johnson were already housed in functioning Presidential libraries. Congress had reason for concern solely with the preservation of appellant's materials, for he alone had entered into a depository agreement, the Nixon-Sampson agreement, which by its terms called for the destruction of certain of the materials. Indeed, as the federal appellees argue, appellant's depository agreement . . . created an imminent danger that the tape recordings would be destroyed if appellant, who had contracted phlebitis, were to die. Brief for Federal Appellees 41. In short, appellant constituted a legitimate class of one, and this provides a basis for Congress' decision to proceed with dispatch with respect to his materials while accepting the status of his predecessors' papers and ordering the further consideration of generalized standards to govern his successors. Moreover, even if the specificity element were deemed to be satisfied here, the Bill of Attainder Clause would not automatically be implicated. Forbidden legislative punishment is not involved merely because the Act imposes burdensome consequences. Rather, we must inquire further whether Congress, by lodging appellant's materials in the custody of the General Services Administration pending their screening by Government archivists and the promulgation of further regulations, inflict[ed] punishment within the constitutional proscription against bills of attainder. United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S., at 315; see also United States v. Brown, supra, at 456-460; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., at 320.

The infamous history of bills of attainder is a useful starting point in the inquiry whether the Act fairly can be characterized as a form of punishment leveled against appellant. For the substantial experience of both England and the United States with such abuses of parliamentary and legislative power offers a ready checklist of deprivations and disabilities so disproportionately severe and so inappropriate to nonpunitive ends that they unquestionably have been held to fall within the proscription of Art. I, § 9. A statutory enactment that imposes any of those sanctions on named or identifiable individuals would be immediately constitutionally suspect. In England a bill of attainder originally connoted a parliamentary Act sentencing a named individual or identifiable members of a group to death. [35] Article I, § 9, however, also proscribes enactments originally characterized as bills of pains and penalties, that is, legislative Acts inflicting punishment other than execution. United States v. Lovett, supra, at 323-324 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Cummings v. Missouri, supra, at 323; Z. Chafee, Jr., Three Human Rights in the Constitution of 1787, p. 97 (1956). Generally addressed to persons considered disloyal to the Crown or State, pains and penalties historically consisted of a wide array of punishments: commonly included were imprisonment, [36] banishment, [37] and the punitive confiscation of property by the sovereign. [38] Our country's own experience with bills of attainder resulted in the addition of another sanction to the list of impermissible legislative punishments: a legislative enactment barring designated individuals or groups from participation in specified employments or vocations, a mode of punishment commonly employed against those legislatively branded as disloyal. See, e. g., Cummings v. Missouri, supra (barring clergymen from ministry in the absence of subscribing to a loyalty oath); United States v. Lovett, supra (barring named individuals from Government employment); United States v. Brown, supra (barring Communist Party members from offices in labor unions). Needless to say, appellant cannot claim to have suffered any of these forbidden deprivations at the hands of the Congress. While it is true that Congress ordered the General Services Administration to retain control over records that appellant claims as his property, [39] § 105 of the Act makes provision for an award by the District Court of just compensation. This undercuts even a colorable contention that the Government has punitively confiscated appellant's property, for the owner [thereby] is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken. United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 16 (1970); accord, United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 373 (1943). Thus, no feature of the challenged Act falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment.
But our inquiry is not ended by the determination that the Act imposes no punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause. Our treatment of the scope of the Clause has never precluded the possibility that new burdens and deprivations might be legislatively fashioned that are inconsistent with the bill of attainder guarantee. The Court, therefore, often has looked beyond mere historical experience and has applied a functional test of the existence of punishment, analyzing whether the law under challenge, viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes. [40] Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall., at 319-320; Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 193-194 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 128 (1889); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 96-97 (1958) (plurality opinion); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144, 168-169 (1963). Where such legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, it is reasonable to conclude that punishment of individuals disadvantaged by the enactment was the purpose of the decisionmakers. Application of the functional approach to this case leads to rejection of appellant's argument that the Act rests upon a congressional determination of his blameworthiness and a desire to punish him. For, as noted previously, see supra, at 452-454, legitimate justifications for passage of the Act are readily apparent. First, in the face of the Nixon-Sampson agreement which expressly contemplated the destruction of some of appellant's materials, Congress stressed the need to preserve [i]nformation included in the materials of former President Nixon [that] is needed to complete the prosecutions of Watergate-related crimes. H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, p. 2 (1974). Second, again referring to the Nixon-Sampson agreement, Congress expressed its desire to safeguard the public interest in gaining appropriate access to materials of the Nixon Presidency which are of general historical significance. The information in these materials will be of great value to the political health and vitality of the United States. Ibid. [41] Indeed, these same objectives are stated in the text of the Act itself, § 104 (a), note following 44 U. S. C. § 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V), where Congress instructs the General Services Administration to promulgate regulations that further these ends and at the same time protect the constitutional and legal rights of any individual adversely affected by the Administrator's retention of appellant's materials. Evaluated in terms of these asserted purposes, the law plainly must be held to be an act of nonpunitive legislative policymaking. Legislation designed to guarantee the availability of evidence for use at criminal trials is a fair exercise of Congress' responsibility to the due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S., at 713, and to the functioning of our adversary legal system which depends upon the availability of relevant evidence in carrying out its commitments both to fair play and to the discovery of truth within the bounds set by law. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 (1972); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273, 281 (1919). Similarly, Congress' interest in and expansive authority to act in preservation of monuments and records of historical value to our national heritage are fully established. United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co., 160 U. S. 668 (1896); Roe v. Kansas, 278 U. S. 191 (1929). [42] A legislature thus acts responsibly in seeking to accomplish either of these objectives. Neither supports an implication of a legislative policy designed to inflict punishment on an individual.
A third recognized test of punishment is strictly a motivational one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S., at 308-314; Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, supra, at 169-170. The District Court unequivocally found: There is no evidence presented to us, nor is there any to be found in the legislative record, to indicate that Congress' design was to impose a penalty upon Mr. Nixon . . . as punishment for alleged past wrongdoings. . . . The legislative history leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the Act before us is regulatory and not punitive in character. 408 F. Supp., at 373 (emphasis omitted). We find no cogent reason for disagreeing with this conclusion. First, both Senate and House Committee Reports, in formally explaining their reasons for urging passage of the Act, expressed no interest in punishing or penalizing appellant. Rather, the Reports justified the Act by reference to objectives that fairly and properly lie within Congress' legislative competence: preserving the availability of judicial evidence and of historically relevant materials. Supra, at 476-478. More specifically, it seems clear that the actions of both Houses of Congress were predominantly precipitated by a resolve to undo the recently negotiated Nixon-Sampson agreement, the terms of which departed from the practice of former Presidents in that they expressly contemplated the destruction of certain Presidential materials. [43] Along these lines, H. R. Rep. No. 93-1507, supra, at 2, stated: Despite the overriding public interest in preserving these materials . . . [the] Administrator of General Services entered into an agreement . . . which, if implemented, could seriously limit access to these records and . . . result in the destruction of a substantial portion of them. See also S. Rep. No. 93-1181, p. 4 (1974). The relevant Committee Reports thus cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contain no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment. Rather, they focus almost exclusively on the meaning and effect of an agreement recently announced by the General Services Administration which most Members of Congress perceived to be inconsistent with the public interest. Nor do the floor debates on the measure suggest that Congress was intent on encroaching on the judicial function of punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. When one of the opponents of the legislation, mischaracterizing the safeguards embodied in the bill, [44] stated that it is one which partakes of the characteristics of a bill of attainder . . . , 120 Cong. Rec. 33872 (1974) (Sen. Hruska), a key sponsor of the measure responded by expressly denying any intention of determining appellant's blameworthiness or imposing punitive sanctions: This bill does not contain a word to the effect that Mr. Nixon is guilty of any violation of the law. It does not inflict any punishment on him. So it has no more relation to a bill of attainder . . . . than my style of pulchritude is to be compared to that of the Queen of Sheba. Id., at 33959-33960 (Sen. Ervin). In this respect, the Act stands in marked contrast to that invalidated in United States v. Lovett, 328 U. S., at 312, where a House Report expressly characterized individuals as subversive. . . and . . . unfit . . . to continue in Government employment. H. R. Rep. No. 448, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1943). We, of course, do not suggest that such a formal legislative announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is necessary to an unlawful bill of attainder. United States v. Lovett, supra, at 316. But the decided absence from the legislative history of any congressional sentiments expressive of this purpose is probative of nonpunitive intentions and largely undercuts a major concern that prompted the bill of attainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the mantle of judgeor, worse still, lynch mob. Cf. Z. Chafee, supra, at 161. [45] No such legislative overreaching is involved here. We also agree with the District Court that specific aspects of the Act . . . just do not square with the claim that the Act was a punitive measure. 408 F. Supp., at 373. Whereas appellant complains that the Act has for some two years deprived him of control over the materials in question, Brief for Appellant 140, the Congress placed the materials under the auspices of the General Services Administration, § 101, note following 44 U. S. C. § 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V), the same agency designated in the Nixon-Sampson agreement as depository of the documents for a minimum three-year period, App. 40. Whereas appellant complains that the Act deprives him of ready access to the materials, Brief for Appellant 140, the Act provides that Richard M. Nixon, or any person whom he may designate in writing, shall at all times have access to the tape recordings and other materials. . ., § 102 (c). [46] The District Court correctly construed this as safeguarding appellant's right to inspect, copy, and use the materials in issue, 408 F. Supp., at 375, paralleling the right to make reproductions contained in the Nixon-Sampson agreement, App. 40. And even if we assume that there is merit in appellant's complaint that his property has been confiscated, Brief for Appellant 140, the Act expressly provides for the payment of just compensation under § 105 (c); see supra, at 475. Other features of the Act further belie any punitive interpretation. In promulgating regulations under the Act, the General Services Administration is expressly directed by Congress to protect appellant's or any party's opportunity to assert any legally or constitutionally based right or privilege. . . . § 104 (a) (5). More importantly, the Act preserves for appellant all of the protections that inhere in a judicial proceeding, for § 105 (a) not only assures district court jurisdiction and judicial review over all his legal claims, but commands that any such challenge asserted by appellant shall have priority on the docket of such court over other cases. A leading sponsor of the bill emphasized that this expedited treatment is expressly designed to protect Mr. Nixon's property, or other legal rights . . . . 120 Cong. Rec. 33854 (1974) (Sen. Ervin). Finally, the Congress has ordered the General Services Administration to establish regulations that recognize the need to give to Richard M. Nixon, or his heirs, for his sole custody and use, tape recordings and other materials which are not likely to be related to the articulated objectives of the Act, § 104 (a) (7). While appellant obviously is not set at ease by these precautions and safeguards, they confirm the soundness of the opinion given the Senate by the law division of the Congressional Research Service: [B]ecause the proposed bill does not impose criminal penalties or other punishment, it would not appear to violate the Bill of Attainder Clause. 120 Cong. Rec. 33853 (1974). [47] One final consideration should be mentioned in light of the unique posture of this controversy. In determining whether a legislature sought to inflict punishment on an individual, it is often useful to inquire into the existence of less burdensome alternatives by which that legislature (here Congress) could have achieved its legitimate nonpunitive objectives. Today, in framing his challenge to the Act, appellant contends that such an alternative was readily available: If Congress had provided that the Attorney General or the Administrator of General Services could institute a civil suit in an appropriate federal court to enjoin disposition . . . of presidential historical materials . . . by any person who could be shown to be an `unreliable custodian' or who had `engaged in misconduct' or who `would violate a criminal prohibition,' the statute would have left to judicial determination, after a fair proceeding, the factual allegations regarding Mr. Nixon's blameworthiness. Brief for Appellant 137. We have no doubt that Congress might have selected this course. It very well may be, however, that Congress chose not to do so on the view that a full-fledged judicial inquiry into appellant's conduct and reliability would be no less punitive and intrusive than the solution actually adopted. For Congress doubtless was well aware that just three months earlier, appellant had resisted efforts to subject himself and his records to the scrutiny of the Judicial Branch, United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), a position apparently maintained to this day. [48] A rational and fairminded Congress, therefore, might well have decided that the carefully tailored law that it enacted would be less objectionable to appellant than the alternative that he today appears to endorse. To be sure, if the record were unambiguously to demonstrate that the Act represents the infliction of legislative punishment, the fact that the judicial alternative poses its own difficulties would be of no constitutional significance. But the record suggests the contrary, and the unique choice that Congress faced buttresses our conclusion that the Act cannot fairly be read to inflict legislative punishment as forbidden by the Constitution. We, of course, are not blind to appellant's plea that we recognize the social and political realities of 1974. It was a period of political turbulence unprecedented in our history. But this Court is not free to invalidate Acts of Congress based upon inferences that we may be asked to draw from our personalized reading of the contemporary scene or recent history. In judging the constitutionality of the Act, we may only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of Congress who voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legitimate explanations for its apparent effect. We are persuaded that none of these factors is suggestive that the Act is a punitive bill of attainder, or otherwise facially unconstitutional. The judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.