Opinion ID: 170024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fifth Amendment Right to Remain Silent

Text: When Tally pled not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court advised him: A defendant who places his or her mental condition at issue by pleading not guilty by reason of insanity . . . waives any claim to confidentiality or privilege as to communications made by you to a physician or psychologist in the course of an examination . . . for the purpose of any trial or hearing on the issues of such mental condition. . . . You shall have the privilege against self incrimination during the course of an examination pursuant to this order. The fact that you are not cooperative with a psychiatrist or other personnel conducting the examination may be admissible in your trial on the issues of insanity or competency. (R. Vol. III at 5.) 2 2 The advisement conforms with Colo. Stat. Ann. § 16-8-106(2)(b) which provides: The defendant shall have a privilege against self-incrimination during the course of an examination under this section. The fact of the defendant’s noncooperation with psychiatrists and other personnel conducting the examination may be admissible in the defendant’s trial on the issues of insanity or competency and in any sentencing hearing . . . . Colo. Stat. Ann. 16-8-107(1.5)(a) provides in relevant part: [E]vidence acquired directly or indirectly for the first time from a communication derived from the defendant’s mental processes during the course of a court-ordered examination . . . is admissible only as to the issues raised by the defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the jury, at the request of either party, shall be so instructed; . . . -8- When Dr. Johnson evaluated Tally to determine his mental state at the time of the crime, Tally remained silent on the advice of counsel. At trial, Dr. Johnson testified as follows: Q: Were you able to interview Mr. Tally for the issue of sanity? A: No, I was not. Q: And was that because he refused to talk with you? A: Yes. (R. Vol. XII at 762.) Dr. Johnson explained how he was able to form an opinion despite Tally’s lack of communication: I actually have done other cases like this where the defendant has not wanted to talk to me about the incident or offense, or for whatever reason. Sometimes I feel like I can form an opinion anyway and sometimes I can’t. If I can’t form an opinion, I will just say that. I will just tell the Court . . . because the defendant wouldn’t talk to me, I’m not able to form an opinion within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. However, in this case, I feel I could form a reasonable opinion because I had such an abundance of other information. (Id. at 763.) He stated he paid particularly close attention to the video tape interview taken about an hour after Tally turned himself in. Tally claims the admission of this testimony violated his right to remain silent and was contrary to Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986) and Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected this argument because “[a] defendant’s sanity is not an element of the offense. Hence, a defendant’s right against self-incrimination is not implicated when testimony is admitted only for -9- the purpose of establishing defendant’s sanity.” Tally I, 7 P.3d at 182. Moreover, “[u]nlike in . . . Wainwright v. Greenfield, . . . in which the defendants had been affirmatively assured that their silence could not be used against them, no such advice was given defendant here. On the contrary, he was specifically informed that if he refused to cooperate with the examining physician, such non-cooperation could be referred to at his trial.” Id. The federal district court determined the conclusions of the Colorado Court of Appeals were not contrary to nor involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court was correct. Tally concedes he was advised that his non-cooperation could be used at trial. He contends he was not advised, however, that the exercise of his right against self-incrimination could be considered the equivalent of non-cooperation. While we question Tally’s rationale that failing to speak to the psychiatrist, for whatever reason, could be considered cooperation, the fact remains his silence was not used to overcome his insanity plea or establish his guilt. Therefore, this case is distinguishable from Wainwright and the other Supreme Court cases cited by Tally. See Wainwright, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986) (“it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony. It is equally unfair to breach that promise by using silence to overcome a defendant's plea of insanity.”) The prosecutor’s questioning allowed -10- Dr. Johnson to explain why he believed he could make a sanity determination without being able to communicate with Tally. While Dr. Johnson made a comparison between Tally’s initial silence and his later loquaciousness at the time he was declared incompetent, he was referring to the difference in Tally’s demeanor on the video tape and his later behavior, not Tally’s silence during the interview. In addition, there is no Supreme Court case stating the admission of statements made – or not made – in a mental evaluation violates the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the cases appear to indicate otherwise. For example, in Buchanan v. Kentucky, the Court held the state’s use of a psychiatric report solely to rebut defendant's “mental status” defense did not violate defendant's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights. 483 U.S. 402 (1987). The Court reasoned,“if a defendant requests [a psychiatric] evaluation or presents psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of an examination the defendant requested. The defendant would have no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of this psychiatric testimony by the prosecution.” Id. at 422-23. In Estelle v. Smith, the Court distinguished a judge-ordered competency exam used in sentencing without notice of his right to remain silent from “sanity examination[s] occasioned by a defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.” 451 U.S. 454, 465 (1981). The Court noted, “[w]hen a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces -11- supporting psychiatric testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case.” Id. Tally has not demonstrated the state court violated clearly established federal law.