Opinion ID: 4471851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eko’s ’855 Patent

Text: ARM contends that the district court erred in construing claim 8 of the ’855 patent as not requiring a “singleserve beverage brewer,” and that the judgment of infringement should be set aside. Claim 8 recites: A beverage brewing device for use with a single serve beverage brewer having a brewing holster, an inlet probe for dispensing water, the inlet probe moveable between a non-brewing position and a EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 13 brewing position, and an outlet probe extending upwardly into the brewing holster for outleting a brewed beverage, the beverage brewing device comprising: . . . . ’855 patent, col. 15, ll. 13–18 (emphasis added). 3 3 The remainder of claim 8 reads:
brewing holster of a single serve bever- age brewer, the body having at least one substantially vertical sidewall, a top opening, and a bottom surface intersect- ing the at least one substantially verti- cal sidewall, wherein the at least one substantially vertical sidewall and the bottom surface of the body define a brew chamber configured to contain a dry beverage medium;
fined in the body and extending from the bottom surface of the body and into the brew chamber such that the at least one outlet probe receptacle is config- ured to receive an outlet probe of the single serve beverage brewer when the body is received within the brewing hol- ster, wherein the at least one outlet probe receptacle is fluidly isolated from the brew chamber to prevent the outlet probe from penetrating the brew cham- ber, thereby preventing fluid from exit- ing the brew chamber through the outlet probe; 14 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. Because it sold only the brewing device and not the beverage brewer itself, ARM asserts that it did not infringe. But claim 8 on its face does not require a beverage brewer, even if the preamble is limiting. To the extent that claim 8 mentions a beverage brewer, it is only as a “reference point” to define the purpose and structure of the brewing device. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998). And there is nothing in the prosecution history suggesting that the beverage brewer itself is part of the claim. The district court correctly construed that claim 8 on its face does not require a beverage brewer.
On its cross-appeal, Eko challenges the district court’s jury instruction on willful infringement (Jury Instruction 40), the jury’s finding of no willful infringement based (c) a lid removably securable to the body, the lid engageable with the body to se- lectively enclose a top opening of the body; (d) an inlet probe opening defined in the lid, the inlet probe opening configured to receive an inlet probe of the single serve beverage brewer in a brewing po- sition for placing the inlet probe into fluid communication with the brew chamber; and (e) at least one filter defined within the body, the at least one filter configured to retain the dry beverage medium within the brew chamber while allow- ing the brewed beverage to exit the brew chamber. ’855 patent, col. 15, ll. 19–48 (emphases added). EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 15 on that instruction, and the district court’s denial of enhanced damages based on the jury verdict. Before trial, both parties proposed that the district court use the Federal Circuit Bar Association’s (“FCBA”) National Patent Jury Instructions (“NPJI”) No. 4.1 for willful infringement. The district court initially agreed to use the FCBA instructions. Jury Instruction 40, in its original form, provided: Eko argues that ARM willfully infringed the Eko 855 patent. For purposes of this case only, you are to assume direct infringement of amended claim 8 of the Eko 855 patent. Therefore, you must go on and address the additional issue of whether or not this infringement was willful. Willfulness requires you to determine whether Eko proved that it is more likely than not that the infringement was es- pecially worthy of punishment. You may not deter- mine that the infringement was willful just because ARM knew of the Eko 855 patent and in- fringed it. Instead, willful infringement is reserved for only the most egregious behavior, such as where the infringement is malicious, deliberate, con- sciously wrongful, or done in bad faith. To determine whether ARM acted willfully, con- sider all facts. These may include, but are not limited, to:
ied a product of Eko that is covered by the Eko 855 patent;
lieved it did not infringe or that the patent was invalid;
effort to avoid infringing the Eko 855 pa- tent, for example, whether ARM attempted to design around the 855 patent; and 16 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS.
its infringement. Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. June 6, 2018), ECF No. 233 at 23 (emphases added) (“Jury Instruction 40”). On the morning that the final jury instructions were to be read to the jury, Eko objected to the language of the jury instruction. Eko argued that the inclusion of the phrases “especially worthy of punishment” and “willful infringement is reserved for only the most egregious behavior” in Jury Instruction 40, “invite[d] the jury to make the legal decision as to whether damages should be enhanced, or whether it is an exceptional case, rather than limiting the jury to the underlying factual question of whether the infringement was willful,” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2018), ECF No. 234 at 1. The district court considered Eko’s proposed changes and revised the jury instruction to delete the phrase “only the most” from the instruction. Post-Trial Order at 5. The jury was instructed accordingly and returned a verdict of no willful infringement. There is no claim that the FCBA model instructions are afforded special status, nor could there be, since these instructions have not been endorsed or approved by this court. Here, we agree with Eko that the jury instruction contained language that in isolation was erroneous. As the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 284 makes clear, the issue of punishment by enhancement is for the court and not the jury. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1934 (2016) (holding that section 284 “‘commits the determination’ whether enhanced damages are appropriate ‘to the discretion of the district court’”). Under Halo, the concept of “willfulness” requires a jury to find no more than deliberate or intentional infringement. Id. at 1933 (“The subjective willfulness of a patent infringer, intentional or EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 17 knowing, may warrant enhanced damages, without regard to whether his infringement was objectively reckless.”); SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 930 F.3d 1295, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The question of enhanced damages is addressed by the court once an affirmative finding of willfulness has been made. See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34. It is at this second stage at which the considerations of egregious behavior and punishment are relevant. Questions of whether an accused patent infringer’s conduct was “egregious behavior” or “worthy of punishment” are therefore not appropriate for jury consideration. As the district court noted, Eko timely raised this objection to the jury instruction under Rule 51, and the claimed error has been preserved on appeal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. However, this is not the end of our consideration. In general, a party challenging jury instructions must “prove the jury instructions read in their entirety were incorrect or incomplete as given.” Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1307 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). We apply Federal Circuit law to review “the legal sufficiency of jury instructions on an issue of patent law without deference to the district court.” 4 Synqor, 709 F.3d at 1379 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. 4 This case is distinguishable from Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Voda, this court reviewed a cross-appellant’s challenge to jury instructions regarding willful infringement under the law of the regional circuit. Id. at 1328. But Voda did not involve a situation where this court was required to determine the legal sufficiency of a jury instruction. Instead, the parties in Voda agreed that the jury instruction on willfulness was erroneous under the correct standard at the time, and the only dispute was whether the erroneous jury instruction was harmless. Id. Therefore, the issue in this case— 18 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. v. JMS Co., Ltd., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part)). The question here is whether Jury Instruction 40, in its entirety, correctly stated the law. DSU, 471 F.3d at 1304 (citing Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). Although the inclusion of the phrases “especially worthy of punishment” and “reserved for egregious behavior” in Jury Instruction 40 was erroneous, we think that the instruction taken as a whole provides reasonable clarity as to the correct test for willful infringement. First, although the instruction states that willful infringement is “reserved for egregious behavior,” the same sentence also clarifies that willful infringement can simply be “deliberate” infringement. Therefore, the jury was apprised that “deliberate” behavior can qualify as “egregious” behavior for the purposes of willful infringement. Second, the latter half of Jury Instruction 40 provides a list of facts that the jury could properly consider, including “[w]hether or not ARM intentionally copied a product of Eko that is covered by the Eko 855 patent,” and “whether or not ARM reasonably believed it did not infringe or that the patent was invalid.” 5 See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1933 (“[C]ulpability is generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct.”); Omega Patents, LLC v. CalAmp Corp., 920 F.3d 1337, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“As to willfulness, an accused infringer’s reliance on an opinion of whether the jury instructions correctly state an issue of patent law—was never addressed by the court in Voda. 5 There is no contention that the other two factors (“[w]hether or not ARM made a good-faith effort to avoid infringing the Eko 855 patent, for example, whether ARM attempted to design around the 855 patent” and “[w]hether or not ARM tried to cover up its infringement”) are irrelevant to willfulness, and given the lack of objection we need not decide whether they are. EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 19 counsel regarding noninfringement or invalidity of the asserted patent remains relevant to the infringer’s state of mind post-Halo.”). This portion of the instruction again clarifies that the jury is to consider whether ARM’s infringement of the ’855 patent was intentional. In view of the entire jury instruction, the district court provided the jury an adequate test for willfulness. The jury was reasonably informed that it could make a finding of willful infringement if it found that ARM deliberately or intentionally infringed the ’855 patent. Also, it is significant that deletion of the only two phrases to which Eko objected would not have cured the problem that Eko identified, since Jury Instruction 40 would still have referred to “malicious,” “consciously wrongful,” and “bad faith” conduct. Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1305 (“A party seeking to alter a judgment based on erroneous jury instructions must establish that [the proposed instruction] would have remedied the error.” (alteration in original) (quoting Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2000))). We conclude that the instruction as a whole was not legally erroneous given the limited nature of Eko’s objection. We do not reach the question of harmless error. 6 AFFIRMED Costs to neither party. 6 We note that a legally erroneous jury instruction can only be harmless error if it “could not have changed the result.” Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1307 n.7 (quoting Ecolab, Inc. v. Paraclipse, Inc., 285 F.3d 1362, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ______________________ EKO BRANDS, LLC, Plaintiff-Cross-Appellant v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERPRISES, INC., ADRIAN RIVERA, Defendants-Appellants ______________________ 2018-2215, 2018-2254 ______________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington in No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD, Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue. ______________________