Opinion ID: 844200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusal of two prospective jurors for cause

Text: The prosecution challenged four prospective jurors for cause on the basis of their views concerning capital punishment, and the trial court, over defendant‘s objection, excused one, Prospective Juror C.B. Without objection, the prosecution also successfully challenged two alternate jurors for cause, including Prospective Juror L.L. Defendant asserts the excusal of Prospective Jurors C.B. and L.L. for cause, based on their alleged bias against the death penalty, was reversible error. We disagree. 43
A prospective juror‘s personal views concerning the death penalty do not necessarily afford a basis for excusing the juror for bias in a capital case. (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 6 (Uttecht) [― ‗[a] man who opposes the death penalty, no less than one who favors it, can make the discretionary judgment entrusted to him by the State,‘ [citation] . . .‖].) Rather, ―[t]o achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital punishment ‗would ―prevent or substantially impair the performance of his . . . duties as a juror‖ ‘ in accordance with the court‘s instructions and the juror‘s oath.‖ (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741, quoting Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) Under this standard, a prospective juror is properly excluded in a capital case if he or she is unable to follow the trial court‘s instructions and ―conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate. [Citations.]‖ (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 340; see also People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987 (Jenkins).) The analysis is the same whether the claim is the failure to exclude prospective jurors who exhibited a pro-death bias, or wrongful exclusion of prospective jurors who exhibited an anti-death bias. (See People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 906.) During voir dire, jurors commonly supply conflicting or equivocal responses to questions directed at their potential bias or incapacity to serve. When such conflicting or equivocal answers are given, the trial court, through its observation of the juror‘s demeanor as well as through its evaluation of the juror‘s verbal responses, is best suited to reach a conclusion regarding the juror‘s actual state of mind. (People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 890 (Hamilton).) ― ‗ ―There is no requirement that a prospective juror‘s bias against the death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity. [Citations.] Rather, it is sufficient 44 that the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case before the juror.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497-498.) ―[T]he [trial court‘s] finding may be upheld even in the absence of clear statements from the juror that he or she is impaired because ‗many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ―unmistakably clear‖; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings.‘ [Citation.] Thus, when there is ambiguity in the prospective juror‘s statements, ‗the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman‘s] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the State.‘ ‖ (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7.) A trial court‘s determination concerning juror bias is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 497-498.) ―[A]ppellate courts recognize that a trial judge who observes and speaks with a prospective juror and hears that person‘s responses (noting, among other things, the person‘s tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor) gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on the record.‖ (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451 (Stewart).). As such, ―the reviewing court generally must defer to the judge who sees and hears the prospective juror, and who has the ‗definite impression‘ that he is biased, despite a failure to express clear views.‖ (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1007 (Lewis and Oliver); see also Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9 [―Deference to the trial court is appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.‖].) Even when ― ‗[t]he precise wording of the question asked of [the venireman], and the answer he gave, do not by 45 themselves compel the conclusion that he could not under any circumstance recommend the death penalty,‘ the need to defer to the trial court remains because so much may turn on a potential juror‘s demeanor.‖ (Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 8.) In applying these principles, however, we must keep in mind that a prospective juror who is firmly opposed to the death penalty is not necessarily disqualified from serving on a capital jury. ―[T]hose who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‖ (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176, italics added; see also People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 699 [―A juror whose personal opposition toward the death penalty may predispose him to assign greater than average weight to the mitigating factors presented at the penalty phase may not be excluded, unless that predilection would actually preclude him from engaging in the weighing process and returning a capital verdict.‖]; see Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 446.)

In her questionnaire, Prospective Juror C.B. rated herself as ―strongly against the death penalty‖ based on religious considerations related to her Christian background. She described her general feelings about the death penalty as follows: ―I don‘t feel the death penalty is the appropriate action to take against a person. I do believe in punishment when the individual lives with the consequences of their actions. For example prison term [sic].‖ She also indicated in her questionnaire, however, that she would not ―automatically refuse to vote in favor of the penalty of death and automatically vote for the penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, without considering any of the 46 evidence, or any of the aggravating and/or mitigating factors.‖ She further confirmed she could not think of any reason she could not be a fair and impartial juror. During voir dire for the selection of sitting jurors, the court asked Prospective Juror C.B. whether, in light of her feelings about the death penalty, she would ―automatically tend to reject the penalty of death [and] automatically vote for life imprisonment regardless of the evidence.‖ She twice responded that it was ―hard to say.‖ After several other prospective jurors were questioned by the court and counsel, during which time the duties and obligations of jurors in determining a penalty were explained to the panel in some detail, Prospective Juror C.B. told the prosecutor, ―now I‘ve heard the judge speak, I have a better understanding of it now. I would be fair. I would keep my own beliefs to myself.‖ The prosecutor followed up by asking Prospective Juror C.B. whether she would be able to ―walk into this courtroom, look at the defendant and say ‗I sentence you to die. I sentence you to death.‘ ‖ She responded, ―I don‘t really know. It‘s tough. . . . I‘m not very comfortable with it, but I would respect the law.‖ The prosecutor again asked Prospective Juror C.B. whether she could ―come back, look the defendant in the face, and say ‗I sentence you to death,‘ ‖ to which she replied, ―Personally, I don‘t think I could do it just because of my beliefs.‖ Asked more specifically whether she could impose a death sentence if she found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, Prospective Juror C.B. indicated she was ―[n]ot sure.‖ The prosecutor challenged Prospective Juror C.B. for cause, and over defense counsel‘s objection the court granted the challenge stating: ―The Court‘s evaluation of [Prospective Juror C.B.‘s] responses is that although saying ultimately at the end she didn‘t know what she would do, everything else about her answers and her body language made it unmistakably clear that she had a 47 position in this case with regard to the ultimate punishment. And she did not appear to the court to be open to the possibility of considering equally, based on the evidence, the two possible alternative punishments in this matter.‖ As the above discussion demonstrates, Prospective Juror C.B.‘s answers to questions directed at her potential bias concerning the death penalty were equivocal and conflicting, and indicated that she harbored very serious doubts concerning whether, if seated on a capital jury, she could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty. She repeatedly and candidly admitted that she did not know or was not sure whether she could follow the law and consider all of the sentencing alternatives in light of her ―strong‖ opposition to capital punishment based on her religious beliefs. Those answers, in combination with the trial court‘s firsthand observations of her body language and demeanor, could give rise to a definite impression that C.B.‘s views concerning the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. At best, her equivocation in response to questioning requires that we defer to the trial court‘s assessment of her initial and ultimate state of mind. We therefore conclude that the court acted within its discretion in excusing Prospective Juror C.B. (Cf. People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 134 [upholding dismissal of prospective juror for cause]; People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 705 (Roldan) [same].) Defendant argues that Prospective Juror C.B.‘s answers suggested, at most, that she would have extreme difficulty imposing the death penalty, and contends that mere difficulty in this regard is insufficient to justify a Witherspoon/Witt excusal. His citation to, and lengthy quotation from, Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th 425, in support of this premise, is inapposite. There we confirmed that, when the court chooses to rely solely on a prospective juror‘s written questionnaire answers to justify excusal, the answers themselves must clearly indicate the juror‘s unwillingness or inability to determine the appropriate penalty under the 48 instructions. We indicated that a brief written response to a question whether the juror‘s death penalty views would ― ‗prevent or make it very difficult‘ ‖ to do so would not suffice. (Id. at pp. 446–447 & fn. 12.) Here, however, the court and both counsel subjected C.B. to substantial oral examination, and the court was able to observe C.B. during this process. Under such circumstances, a juror‘s conflicting or ambiguous answers may indeed give rise to the court‘s definite impression about the juror‘s qualifications, and its decision to excuse the juror deserves deference on appeal.
Defendant also challenges the trial court‘s excusal for cause of Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. The People contend that defendant forfeited any objection to the trial court‘s ruling on the basis of alleged Witherspoon/Witt error because in response to the prosecution‘s motion to dismiss Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. for cause, defense counsel submitted the matter to the trial court. ― ‗Hence, as a practical matter, he ―did not object to the court‘s excusing the juror, but . . . also refused to stipulate to it.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Lynch (2010) 50 Cal.4th 693, 733.) As we recently held in People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 643, ―counsel (or defendant, if proceeding pro se) must make either a timely objection, or the functional equivalent of an objection, such as a statement of opposition or disagreement, to the excusal stating specific grounds under Witherspoon/Witt in order to preserve the issue for appeal. Nevertheless, . . . because at the time of this trial we had not expressly held that an objection is necessary to preserve Witherspoon/Witt excusal error on appeal, we do not apply this rule here. [Citation.]‖ In any event, we need not reach the merits of defendant‘s claim because Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. was under consideration solely as an alternate juror and no alternate jurors were ever substituted in defendant‘s case. In People 49 v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 Cal.3d 609, 617-618, we held that the error, if any, in excluding a venireman by reason of his views on capital punishment was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where, at the time of the ruling, the regular panel of 12 jurors had been chosen, the prospective juror was under consideration solely as an alternate juror, and, as matters turned out, no alternate juror was called upon to participate in the deliberations of the jury. (See also People v. Terry (1969) 70 Cal.2d 410, 416, fn. 1 [noting that although there were prospective alternate jurors who were excused on the ground of their opposition to the death penalty, no alternates were substituted for any member of the trial jury]; People v. Risenhoover (1968) 70 Cal.2d 39, 56, fn.6 [same]; cf. In re Hill (1969) 71 Cal.2d 997, 1097, fn.6 [defendants were prejudiced by dismissal of prospective alternate veniremen in violation Witherspoon/Witt because one alternate juror participated in the deliberations in the penalty phase].) Similarly here, any error in excusing Prospective Alternate Juror L.L. could not possibly have prejudiced defendant.9 9 Defendant‘s citation at oral argument to Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648 is inapposite. In that case, the Court declined to adopt a harmless error analysis for the exclusion of a prospective actual juror in violation of Witherspoon/Witt even if the state retained unexercised peremptory challenges at the end of jury selection. (Gray, supra, at p. 664.) In so holding, it noted that the relevant inquiry in the harmless error analysis is ― ‗whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court‘s error‘ ‖ and concluded that the nature of the trial counsel‘s on-the-spot decisionmaking with respect to the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection ―defies any attempt to establish that an erroneous Witherspoon-Witt exclusion of a juror is harmless.‖ (Gray, supra, at p. 665.) By contrast, in the situation presented here, the alleged improper exclusion of a prospective alternate juror in a trial where no alternate juror sat on the jury, we can say with confidence that the composition of the relevant jury panel — the one from which the sitting jurors were selected — could not possibly have been affected by the trial court‘s alleged error. 50 2. Denial of challenges to five prospective jurors for cause Defendant challenged 10 prospective jurors on the basis of their views concerning the death penalty. The trial court granted five challenges, but denied the challenges as to Prospective Jurors E.R., P.P., P.N., B.D., and M.B. Defendant now contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to excuse for cause the five ―death inclined‖ prospective jurors and forcing him to use peremptory challenges to excuse these jurors. However, defendant, without objection, accepted the jury as finally constituted with five peremptory challenges remaining. ―As a general rule, a party may not complain on appeal of an allegedly erroneous denial of a challenge for cause because the party need not tolerate having the prospective juror serve on the jury; a litigant retains the power to remove the juror by exercising a peremptory challenge. Thus, to preserve this claim for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually exercise a peremptory challenge and remove the prospective juror in question. Next, the litigant must exhaust all of the peremptory challenges allotted by statute and hold none in reserve. Finally, counsel (or defendant, if proceeding pro se) must express to the trial court dissatisfaction with the jury as presently constituted.‖ (People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 186; see also People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 581 (Davis) [―the existence of unused peremptory challenges strongly indicates defendant‘s recognition that the selected jury was fair and impartial‖]; Hamilton, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 892 [―it is possible that, despite counsel‘s initial misgivings about the composition of the jury, he ultimately was satisfied with the jury as sworn, and, had he expressed dissatisfaction, the trial court may have allowed him to exercise additional peremptory challenges‖].) Here, although defendant used peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors E.R., P.P., P.N., B.D., and M.B., he did not exhaust his peremptory challenges during jury selection, nor did he communicate to the trial court any dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately 51 impaneled. Defendant‘s claims of error as to these five prospective jurors, therefore, were not preserved for appeal. 3. The prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges Of the 22 peremptory challenges exercised by the prosecution, defendant contends that ―most, if not all,‖ were exercised against prospective jurors who had expressed reservations against the death penalty, and that this violated his right to a fair and impartial jury because it ―purged‖ the panel of the life-inclined jurors that remained after the trial court‘s rulings on the challenges for cause. In order to preserve this claim for appeal, defendant was required at trial to object to the prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges. (People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 907; People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1005.) He failed to do so and thus forfeited any claim of error regarding such use. Even assuming it were not forfeited, and that the prosecution in fact exercised all its peremptory challenges based on the prospective jurors‘ views concerning capital punishment, this claim still would fail on the merits. As defendant acknowledges, ―we have repeatedly rejected any claim of constitutional infirmity in a prosecutor‘s use of peremptory challenges to remove jurors with reservations about the death penalty.‖ (People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 186; see, e.g., People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 432 [―Because both parties may exercise peremptory challenges to remove jurors with unfavorable attitudes, the practice does not produce a jury biased toward death.‖].)