Opinion ID: 2276022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Errors in the Majority Standard

Text: The lengthy analysis of the majority opinion seemingly ignores the relatively recent, dispositive and contrary holding of this Court in DeGrella . The majority opinion attempts to hoist itself into intellectual integrity and judicial consistency with DeGrella by asserting that DeGrella did not require us to reach the `best interests' analysis as the case could be decided on the basis of substituted judgment. Actually, intellectual honesty compels the recognition that DeGrella specifically rejected the substituted judgment test now embraced by this majority and improperly attributed to DeGrella . In fact, DeGrella made clear: We do not approve permitting anyone to decide when another should die on any basis other than clear and convincing evidence that the patient would chose to do so ... 858 S.W.2d at 702. DeGrella also stated: There is one prefatory issue which we must address before embarking on this discussion lest our words be misunderstood as the first step onto a slippery slope, or misapplied by trial courts in future cases: that is the quality of life issue. As long as the case is confined to substituted decision making by a surrogate in conformity with the patient's previously expressed wishes, the case involves only the right of self-determination and not the quality of life. Id. The majority opinion ignores the fact that the district court order deprived Woods of the following rights: to dispose of property, to execute instruments, to enter into contractual relationships, to determine living arrangements, to consent to medical procedures, to obtain a motor vehicle operator's license, and to manage his own financial affairs. The majority attempts to persuade that Woods would nonetheless be within the purview of the Kentucky Living Will Act, citing a variety of inapplicable cases that hold that a person can make a testamentary will even if he does not have the requisite mental capacity to transact business, generally. The opinion ignores the crucial distinction between the jealous protection by the law of every testator's right to dispose of his property as he sees fit on the one hand, and the necessity for the law to protect the sanctity of innocent human life on the other hand. Life issues are certainly not disposed of appropriately by cases dealing with property issues. The legislative intent that the act should apply only to adults who are at least 18 years of age and who are of sound mind patently excludes such persons as Woods who had been a ward of the state since his 18th birthday, had a mental age of 8 or 9 years and had never been shown to be of sound mind or testamentary capacity. Even testamentary wills disposing of property cannot be made unless a person is 18 years of age and of sound mind, much less decisions regarding the furnishing of food and water and essential medical care.