Opinion ID: 880024
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Documentation

Text: Employees are legally entitled to fair treatment. In the event of an arbitration dispute, it is frequently the employer who must present evidence to support their actions. This evidence comes in the form of written warnings, reviews, and/or termination reports. Without written support, judgments frequently are rendered in the employee's favor. Make certain that you document any disciplinary actions taken or problems experienced with your employees. Be specific. Failure to follow company policy is not sufficient. What policy? Was the employee warned? Are your warnings signed by the employee as well as the Zone Manager? Be thorough, be fair, and be professional. Disciplining for results is a skilled activity. Although Herring indicated that he had counseled Stark on prior occasions, the August 15, 1984 employee counseling report indicates that it was the initial counseling session. Stark denied that there was prior counseling. Herring also testified that an employee does not have the right to refuse to sign a counseling report he or she deems incorrect. Stark indicated that company policy allowed an employee to refuse to sign an inaccurate or unfair report. The testimony of Alan Brown, Circle K's personnel expert, and Jim Estes, a Circle K employee and Stark's former supervisor, tends to support Stark's position. Stark also testified that other zone managers had inventory shortages in excess of $2,000 for two or more months without receiving an employee counseling report. The evidence confirmed Stark's testimony. Those managers were also located within the Great Falls District. Near the end of Stark's case in chief, Joseph Kasperick, a business and economics professor at Montana Tech, testified concerning Stark's damages. Professor Kasperick testified, inter alia, that his calculations were based on national and state data concerning average work life, interest rates, price increases, and cost of living increases; that he had interviewed Stark; that he had examined Stark's tax records and pay slips; that his calculations were based on the assumption that Stark would live to the end of his expected work life and that he would have held a job with similar pay; that the present value of the future difference between what Stark would have made and what he would make based on his current earnings is approximately $146,000; that Stark had suffered approximately $40,000 in foregone income to date; and that economic predictions were not exact. Counsel for Circle K did not object to Professor Kasperick's conclusions. Professor Kasperick was cross-examined by counsel and damages were argued during closing argument. Stark also presented an employment expert who testified similar jobs were not available in the Butte area. Following the adverse jury verdict, Circle K moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. Both motions were denied. This appeal followed. Circle K contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, it is alleged the District Court improperly denied the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The standard of review is stringent. The courts will exercise the greatest self-restraint in interfering with the constitutionally mandated processes of jury decision. Barmeyer v. Montana Power Co. (1983), 202 Mont. 185, 191, 657 P.2d 594, 597. A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is proper only where the evidence presented demonstrates a complete absence of proof in support of the prevailing party. Jacques v. Montana National Guard (1982), 199 Mont. 493, 504, 649 P.2d 1319, 1325. When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence and all inferences therefrom will be considered in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. Kukuchka v. Ziemet (Mont. 1985), 710 P.2d 1361, 1363, 42 St.Rep. 1916, 1917. A court will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. Evidence may be inherently weak and still be sufficient to uphold the jury verdict. Anderson v. Jacqueth (1983), 205 Mont. 493, 668 P.2d 1063, 1064, 40 St.Rep. 1451, 1453. Circle K contends the contractual provision providing that Stark could be terminated with or without cause overcomes this heavy burden and precludes a finding of breach of good faith and fair dealing. It is alleged that the written contractual provision allowing termination without cause cannot be modified by oral representations which would give rise to a reasonable expectation of anything but at will employment. Circle K misunderstands the nature of good faith and fair dealing. In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. (1982), 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (Gates I) , we recognized that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is applicable to employment contracts. The covenant is implied as a matter of law based on the public policy of this State. It does not depend on contractual terms for its existence, nor is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing subject to contractual waiver, express or implied. See § 28-2-701(2), MCA. The duty arises out of the employment relationship yet the duty exists apart from, and in addition to, any terms agreed to by the parties. Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. (1983), 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213, 214, 40 St.Rep. 1287, 1289 (Gates II) . Despite the express contract, the question of whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in a particular case depends upon objective manifestations by the employer giving rise to the employee's reasonable belief that he or she has job security and will be treated fairly. Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co. (Mont. 1984), 687 P.2d 1015, 1020, 41 St.Rep. 1735, 1739. The record demonstrates Stark experienced objective manifestations reasonably giving rise to a belief of job security. Circle K repeatedly acknowledged Stark's positive input to the company. Stark received several promotions; his wages increased from minimum wage to $20,000 per year including benefits; he consistently received positive job evaluations; he was deemed an asset to the company; the company guide book indicated that generally employees should be terminated only after attempts to correct deficiencies; and Alan Brown indicated that Stark was a permanent employee. We find the evidence considerably more than sufficient for the jury to find that Stark had an objectively reasonable belief that he would be fired only for good cause. In the alternative, Circle K argues that good cause did exist to fire Stark. Implicit in Circle K's argument is the contention that an employer's determination of good cause is not subject to review by the jury. Circle K argues that the jury cannot decide whether Herring's instructions [were] fair or unfair, necessary or unnecessary; that Stark must blindly obey the commands of a superior. We disagree. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is designed to prevent the abuses of unfettered discretion inherent in a situation of unequal bargaining power. Dare, 687 P.2d at 1020, 41 St.Rep. at 1740. An employee is not required to leap at his master's every command. See Delaney v. Taco Time International (1984), 297 Or. 10, 681 P.2d 114 (employee wrongfully terminated for refusal to sign false report concerning fellow employee); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital (1985), 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (hospital employee stated cause of action following discharge for refusal to take part in skit in which buttocks are exposed); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980), 27 Cal.3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330 (employee who refused to participate in gasoline price-fixing wrongfully discharged); O'Sullivan v. Mallon (1978), 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (x-ray technician cannot be discharged for refusal to perform catheterizations when the law requires such procedures be performed by a registered nurse or doctor); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R. Co. (1978), 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (recognizing potential cause of action for wrongful discharge resulting from refusal to falsify pollution control reports); and Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (1959), 174 Cal. App.2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (employee cannot lawfully be discharged for refusal to commit perjury). We will not require an employee to sign a written statement he believes to be false so that an employer can later justify termination. An employee is entitled to some protection from injustice. Gates I, 196 Mont. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067. Although an employer is entitled to latitude in making business decisions, that latitude cannot be used as a facade to justify a breach of the covenant good faith and fair dealing. To rebut Stark's allegation, Circle K need only have shown a fair and honest reason for termination. Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. (Mont. 1986), 720 P.2d 257, 43 St.Rep. 941. Circle K apparently failed to do so, however. Contrary to Circle K's assertion, the jury, as the trier of fact, does determine whether good cause existed. Flanigan, 720 P.2d at 261, 43 St.Rep. at 946, Dare, 687 P.2d at 1019, 41 St.Rep. at 1739. The jury is not bound by the employer's explanation. See Flanigan, supra (employee allegedly terminated as part of reduction in force); Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital (Mont. 1984), 693 P.2d 487, 41 St.Rep. 2251 (employee allegedly terminated for disrupting continuity of care, continually getting in the way of patient care, disorderly conduct, breach of confidentiality, etc.); Dare, supra (employee allegedly terminated for refusing to clean designated areas, having men hang around the station, closing the station early, coming in late, and lack of responsibility). The cases above indicate that the proffered reason does not always conform to the evidence. In the instant case, Herring's apparent lack of candor may have caused the jury to disbelieve Circle K's entire explanation. The record demonstrates that Herring was impeached on several matters, that his testimony conflicted with prior testimony given at an unemployment compensation hearing, and that his testimony conflicted with the documentary evidence. This situation led Judge Davis to comment: [Herring] was not a very good witness. I was restless and twisting in my chair at the way he responded. I am wondering how that may have affected the jury. Circle K contends that the inconsistencies in Herring's testimony were only matters of opinion and not fabrication. We need not reach the issue. The jury as trier of fact, determines the credibility of a witness and the reason for termination. Flanigan, 720 P.2d at 261, 43 St.Rep. at 946. Herring's apparent lack of credibility is sufficient for the jury to find Circle K did not have a fair and honest reason for termination. Flanigan, supra. The jury also could have found that Circle K failed to follow company policy as set forth in the Zone Managers Guide. We hold there is sufficient credible evidence to support the jury verdict. Circle K also contends the award of compensatory damages is excessive and speculative because Professor Kasperick and the jury improperly assumed Stark would have remained with Circle K the remainder of his work life. We disagree. The standard of review for reversal requires a finding that the jury award is so grossly out of proportion as to shock the conscience. Frisnegger v. Gibson (1979), 183 Mont. 57, 598 P.2d 574. Where it appears that the jury did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, its decision on the amount of damages must stand. The litigants agree that the jury determined the amount of damages based on the testimony of Professor Kasperick. We do not find such a method of determination to be arbitrary or capricious. Section 27-1-203, MCA, provides that damages may be awarded ... for detriment ... certain to result in the future. However, no person can foretell the future. In Frisnegger, we construed § 27-1-203 to require that damages need only be reasonably certain. While no case in Montana has construed this statute, it has always been the practice in Montana to instruct juries that future damages need only be reasonably certain, and not absolutely certain as the statute seems to imply. In holding, as we do, that future damages need only be reasonably certain under the evidence, it must be granted that in determining an award for future damages, a jury, or an expert testifying on the subject, must to some degree engage in conjecture and speculation. When the conjecture and speculation is based upon reasonably certain human experience as to future events, the jury or trier of fact is entitled to rely on that degree of reasonable certainty in fixing and awarding future damages. 183 Mont. at 71, 598 P.2d at 582. The record demonstrates that compensatory damages, as awarded by the jury, were reasonably certain within the meaning of Frisnegger. Professor Kasperick properly relied upon state and national data, Stark's records and interviews with Stark to derive input for his calculations. See Rule 703, M.R.Evid. (expert may base opinion upon facts or data made known to him at or before the hearing). Professor Kasperick then stated his conclusions and engaged in an exhaustive explanation of his methodology. The fact that Professor Kasperick relied upon Stark's hearsay statement that he planned to stay with Circle K is not dispositive. See Azure v. City of Billings (1979), 182 Mont. 234, 596 P.2d 460 (expert may rely upon facts that would not be admissible by themselves because they constituted hearsay). It is not unusual for a person who has found success in a chosen profession to remain with a company until retirement. The jury, as trier of fact, apparently agreed. Circle K argues, in effect, that an award of 28 years lost income is per se excessive. We disagree. It is self-evident that the purpose of damages is to make an injured party whole. Stark presented evidence that similar work was not available in the Butte area and the amount of income he had lost as a result. Stark's evidence went substantially unrebutted. Circle K did not object to Professor Kasperick's conclusion nor did it present its own expert on damages or employment opportunity. Circle K had the opportunity to cross-examine Professor Kasperick and to argue the amount of damages in closing argument. Jury instructions 7, 25 and 26 informed the jury they were not to speculate and should only award reasonable damages. Under these circumstances, we do not find 28 years to be per se excessive. Stark presented sufficient credible evidence for the jury to find he would not be able to find comparable employment in Butte. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. As the District Court indicated, it would be the height of judicial arrogance [for the court] to substitute its own findings and beliefs for those [of the] tried and true women of the jury. The third issue before the Court concerns the admission into evidence of an economic damages summary. Following settlement of instructions, counsel for Stark moved to reopen his case-in-chief and offered an economic damages summary into evidence. The document was admitted over Circle K's objection that testimony had closed. It has long been the rule in Montana that the propriety of a motion to reopen the case is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Alderson v. Marshall (1888), 7 Mont. 288, 16 P. 576; Cole v. Helena Light & Railway Co. (1914), 49 Mont. 443, 143 P. 974; Brange v. Bowen (1920), 57 Mont. 77, 186 P. 680. No rigid nor fixed formula can or should be employed to determine when a motion to reopen is proper. The trial court, which has a feel for the case, can best determine what is necessary and appropriate to achieve substantial justice. Absent a clear abuse of discretion, the determination of the trial court will be upheld. Alderson, supra. In the instant case, the material contained within the economic damages summary had been thoroughly presented during Stark's case-in-chief. Circle K was not unduly surprised by its contents. We find no abuse of discretion. See Brange, supra. Finally, Circle K contends there is an absence of proof to support a verdict granting Stark punitive damages against Circle K and therefore a judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted. We find there is sufficient credible evidence to uphold the jury verdict. At the time in question, § 27-1-221, MCA, (1983), provided that punitive damages may be awarded where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed ... In Flanigan, we recognized that the jury can infer malice from a lack of candor on the part of the employer. 720 P.2d at 265, 43 St.Rep. at 951. The apparent lack of candor on the part of Herring is sufficient for the jury to have inferred malice. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. WEBER, HUNT and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.