Opinion ID: 900409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Codefendant's Other Homicide

Text: [¶ 18.] New claims Molstad disregarded evidence that White Horse participated in another murder. White Horse allegedly made repeated admissions about beating to death a person named Dale Williams. This evidence, according to New, could have been used to impeach White Horse's testimony about his role in Mousseaux's death (reverse 404(b) evidence). New asserts that any reasonably competent attorney would have questioned White Horse at trial about killing Dale Williams just weeks earlier. Failure to do so cannot be fairly explained. Molstad, at the habeas hearing, testified he did not offer this evidence, as he was concerned about its admissibility. New argues that his does not justify entirely disregarding the evidence. [¶ 19.] At the time of trial, no charges were pending against White Horse for Williams' death. Molstad was uneasy about the admissibility of the evidence and did not want a trial within a trial. He also worried that the jury might disregard the whole matter as immaterial. Although reverse 404(b) evidence is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, [5] we conclude, as the habeas court did, that failure to offer this prior act evidence did not adversely affect the result of New's trial, given the totality of the circumstances. First, inculpating White Horse in this murder or any other murder would not necessarily exculpate New. Showing that White Horse killed before may have only implanted in jurors' minds the belief that New associated with murderous individuals like himself. Second, regardless of whatever impeachment value evidence of White Horse's other murder may have had, as we have previously noted, both Reber's and Young's testimony against New was highly implicating. Third, whether the trial court would have admitted this evidence over the State's objection is speculative. See, e.g., SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403)(allowing the exclusion of relevant evidence if prejudicial, misleading or cumulative). Moreover, we conclude that Molstad's lack of cross-examination on this point, even if deficient, was not sufficiently prejudicial to deny New effective assistance of counsel under Strickland.