Opinion ID: 2609844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Land Purchase Agreement

Text: Finally, JGP argues that Moomuku's appeal is frivolous because, regardless of whether the limited warranty deed was breached, Moomuku has not challenged the circuit court's primary reason for granting summary judgment below; the principal basis on which JGP claims it moved for summary judgment was that [a]ppellant Moomuku breached the Land Purchase Agreement when it failed to deliver title to [JGP] free from the Utsunomiya lien. JGP concludes that the circuit court's decision should be upheld on this ground alone. In particular, JGP argues: In the present case, ¶ 6 of the Land Purchase Agreement specifically provided that [a]ppellant Moomuku was to convey title to [JGP] by way of Limited Warranty Deed subject only to non-delinquent real property taxes and to such other matters as were agreed upon in writing by the parties. Further, when taken in the context of the entire Agreement ... it was proper for the trial court to conclude that under ¶ 6 of the Land Purchase Agreement ... [Moomuku was] required to deliver title to [JGP] which was free from encumbrances or other defects which were not agreed to in writing.... [This] covenant ... survived closing under ¶ 18 of the Land Purchase Agreement. (Emphasis in original.) We find this argument to be without merit. First, it has been long established under the doctrine of merger that, upon delivery and acceptance of the deed, the provisions of the underlying contract for conveyance are merged into the deed and thereby become extinguished and unenforceable. Dobrusky v. Isbell, 740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987); B-E Construction v. Hustad Dev. Corp., 415 N.W.2d 330, 331 (Minn.App.1987). Excepted from this doctrine are those promises `which are additional or collateral to the main promise to convey the land and are not inconsistent with the deed as given.' Snyder v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 368 Mass. 433, 442, 333 N.E.2d 421, 427 (1975) (citation omitted). The covenant in the contract to be deemed collateral and independent so as not to be merged or satisfied in the execution of the deed must not look to or be connected with the title, possession, quantity or emblements of the land which is the subject of the contract. Thompson, supra, § 4458, at 44 (Supp.1981) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, the exception is limited to covenants which would naturally be omitted from the deed so that their absence in the deed does not manifest an intent by the parties that they be there merged.... Covenants respecting the existence of encumbrances... do not fall within this exception, for they go to the very essence of what is to be conveyed and will almost certainly be the subject of provisions in the deed. Sperry, 368 Mass. at 442, 333 N.E.2d at 427 (citations omitted). Based on our review of the land purchase agreement, we conclude that it imposed no obligation on Moomuku to convey title above and beyond that which it covenanted to do in the limited warranty deed. Therefore, the duties set forth in ¶ 6 of the land purchase agreement merged with and were extinguished by delivery and acceptance of the deed. Consequently, we hold that the land purchase agreement afforded no independent right upon which JGP was entitled to summary judgment.