Opinion ID: 341470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requirements of a Purpose to Invade Constitutionally Protected Interests.

Text: 63 As we observed above in connection with our discussion of Screws and its progeny, specific intent under section 241 does not require an actual awareness on the part of the conspirators that they are violating constitutional rights. It is enough that they engage in activity which interferes with rights which as a matter of law are clearly and specifically protected by the Constitution. As we have already pointed out, in this case the law clearly establishes a violation of Dr. Fielding's Fourth Amendment right to be secure against the warrantless entry and search, the exceptions for entry without a judicial warrant being plainly inapplicable. 64 It is not a violation of section 241 for individuals who happen to be government agents to burglarize a doctor's office for purely personal gain. It is a civil rights conspiracy in violation of that section, however, if they enter his office in their capacity as government agents without proper authorization to secure information for an ostensible government purpose. The concern of Congress in enacting section 241 was to extend the federal police power to those who intentionally interfere with federally protected interests e. g., officials whose specific purpose is to accomplish the governmental objectives of punishment or obtaining confessions or searching private premises, individuals who act with the particular intent of preventing other citizens' equal use of the polls or the interstate highways. The objective must be governmental even though section 241, unlike section 242, does not require that conspirators act under color of law. The states can deal with those who kill or mug or burglarize out of passion or greed for purely personal reasons. 65 The District Court instructed the jury as follows: 66 To establish a violation of count one of the indictment, the conspiracy count, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that a conspiracy existed between one or more defendants or unindicted co-conspirators named in the indictment. 67 Second, that the purpose of the conspiracy was to carry out a warrantless entry and search of Dr. Fielding's office without his permission. 68 Third, that the conspirators were governmental employees or agents who intended to enter and to search Dr. Fielding's office without a warrant or permission for governmental rather than purely personal reasons. 69 Fourth, that Dr. Fielding himself was at the time an American citizen. 81 70 These instructions state the law exactly as we have outlined it, and Ehrlichman does not contest that if those instructions were legally correct there was substantial evidence to sustain his conviction under section 241. 82 71 Thus, we conclude that Ehrlichman's conviction of conspiracy as set forth in Count I of the indictment was in full compliance with the mens rea requirements of section 241. We turn now to a brief discussion of the defendant's remaining contentions on appeal.