Opinion ID: 753787
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amount of marijuana attributable to McCloud.

Text: 10 The parties discuss eight possible sources of marijuana which might be attributable to McCloud in determining the proper offense level. We conclude, however, that only one of these sources is necessary to determine that over 100 kilograms of marijuana was attributable to McCloud. FBI Agent Bratcher reported that Quinn informed him that he had delivered ten pounds each month for 24 months, which equals 240 pounds or 109 kilograms. The PSI properly relied on this amount in recommending a sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 80 F.3d 1194, 1204 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that this court has deemed acceptable the approach of estimating the minimum number of times they had purchased crack from [the distributer] and multiplying that figure by what [the probation officer] believed to have been the minimum quantity sold on each occasion); United States v. Taylor, 72 F.3d 533, 543-44 (7th Cir.1995) (in calculating amount of drugs attributable to defendant, the district court was entitled to multiply approximation of average amount of cocaine delivered by the probable frequency of trips); United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097, 1102 (7th Cir.1994) (proper to base sentence on defendants' selling 800 pounds of marijuana where that amount fell within the range of 500 and 3,000 pounds estimated by witnesses at trial). 11 McCloud relies on the sentencing hearing testimony of codefendant Quinn, who told the court that he did not recall what statement he had previously made to the FBI, but he now thought that he had delivered only 160 pounds (72.7 kilograms) on behalf of McCloud. The district court stated: [W]ith respect to the testimony of Mr. Quinn, this Court is going to make a finding that his testimony is not trustworthy I find that, from his appearance and demeanor and the way he responded to questions, it appeared to me that he seemed to be under some kind of duress or some kind of influence that precipitated him doing what he did. We conclude that the district court was entitled to disbelieve Quinn's testimony at the sentencing hearing. See United States v. House, 110 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir.1997) (arguments which simply urge a reassessment of a district court's credibility determination are wasted on an appellate court' ), quoting United States v. Molinaro, 877 F.2d 1341, 1347 (7th Cir.1989). Quinn never denied telling the FBI that he had delivered approximately 240 pounds for McCloud. Instead, he testified at the sentencing hearing that he simply could not remember what amount he had mentioned in his statement to FBI Agent Bratcher; could not remember how much marijuana he had delivered to the Tows; and could not remember the amount of marijuana he delivered for McCloud. Moreover, the district court had a strong basis for inferring duress: Quinn recanted his former statements to the investigating law enforcement officers about the amount of marijuana he had delivered for McCloud only after he had spent time housed in the same jail cell with McCloud, where the two men talked about Quinn's upcoming sentencing hearing testimony all the time. It was during this time that Quinn was instructed by McCloud to write a letter to McCloud's attorney. 12 Thus, the district court had a strong basis for finding that it did not believe the testimony Quinn offered at the sentencing hearing, and we cannot say that this credibility determination is clearly erroneous. See United States v. Burns, 128 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir.1997) (defendant has given us no reason to believe that [the district judge] was obliged to credit his testimony and to disregard his own post-arrest estimates of the drug amounts for which he was responsible). As a result of this credibility determination, we affirm on the basis that the district court properly rejected Quinn's testimony given at the sentencing hearing, which leaves the 240-pound (109-kilogram) figure used by the PSI and FBI intact. 4 See United States v. Rivera, 6 F.3d 431, 447 (7th Cir.1993) (affirming sentence, despite the possibility of a double-counting problem; we affirm outright rather than return the issue to the district court because it is clear from the record that [absent the double-counting] the district court ... still would have found Rivera responsible for 15 kilograms of cocaine based on trial testimony). 13 The district court was also entitled to consider the fact that, as part of the written guilty plea agreement and incorporated stipulations, McCloud admitted that 175.5 kilograms 5 of marijuana were attributable to him. The stipulation does not automatically preclude any later challenge at the sentencing hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Isirov, 986 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir.1993) (rejecting the government's argument that the defendant had waived any challenge to the PSI's allegations as to amount of drugs attributable to him by stipulating to those facts in his plea agreement). Nevertheless, a district court is still permitted to consider the defendant's admission in a plea agreement that he was responsible for a certain amount of drugs. Isirov, 986 F.2d at 186 (finding that district court did not rely exclusively on plea agreement stipulations, but also considered the findings contained in the PSR that were based on investigative reports and statements of cooperating witnesses). Although a sentencing court is not bound by stipulations contained in a plea agreement, the court need not ignore the stipulations. Id. The court may, in determining the factual basis for the sentence, ... consider the stipulation, together with the results of the presentence investigation, and any other relevant information. U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4, comment. We also note that McCloud has made no attempt to withdraw his guilty plea, and a sentencing court is entitled to rely on a presentencing stipulation as to the amount of drugs involved or attributable to defendant. Cf. United States v. Dailey, 918 F.2d 747, 748 (7th Cir.1990) (A stipulation made for trial purposes is no less binding at sentencing.). See United States v. Carmack., 100 F.3d 1271, 1279 & n. 5 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a subsequent change in law had occurred which might affect a stipulation made as part of the guilty plea; however, although this would perhaps be cause for withdrawal of a plea agreement, [defendant] has never argued for withdrawal of her plea agreement.). 14 Thus, we conclude that no clear error occurred in determining that the amount of marijuana attributable to McCloud falls within the 100 to 400 kilogram range. McCloud was properly sentenced based on that amount.