Opinion ID: 2508217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Submission of False Information in Police Report

Text: KSU Police Policy and Procedure § 12.3.24 provides: An officer shall not make or submit any false or inaccurate reports or knowingly enter or cause to be entered into any departmental books, records or reports, any inaccurate, false or improper information. Relevant to this issue, the Board made the following relevant factual findings: 8. Mr. Jones then returned to Ms. Esping's car and informed her that he didn't care what she did with her car once he left. He then returned to the patrol car and departed the area with Ms. Esping remaining. . . . . 11. Mr. Jones stated in his report that Ms. Esping's vehicle was legally parked at the time of the stop and that the driver had agreed to leave the vehicle where it was until a friend could return the vehicle to her apartment building. Ms. Esping's vehicle was not legally parked at the time of the traffic stop. 12. The Manhattan city prosecutor requested from the KSU Police Department, a copy of the video and audiotape of the traffic stop of Ms. Esping. In complying with this request, the KSU Police Department discovered that Mr. Jones had turned off the in-car camera prior to the completion of the traffic stop and that his report differed from the information on the tape regarding whether Ms. Esping's vehicle was legally parked at the time of the traffic stop. The videotape of the stop clearly shows that the car was illegally parked 6 feet from the curb and perpendicular to marked parking spaces, but the written report indicates that it was legally parked. We conclude that substantial competent evidence supports the Board's finding that Esping's vehicle was illegally parked at the time of the traffic stop and that Jones indicated that it was legally parked in his report. The Board did not explicitly find that Jones intentionally falsified his report or that he violated this policy. Where an administrative agency's findings of fact and conclusions of law are inadequate to disclose the controlling facts or the basis of the agency's findings, meaningful appellate review is precluded. Citizens' Utility Ratepayer Bd. v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 28 Kan. App. 2d 313, 317, 16 P.3d 319 (2000), rev. denied 271 Kan. 1035 (2001). The appropriate remedy for inadequate findings in a final order of an administrative agency is to remand for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law. Gas Service Co. v. Kansas Corporation Commission, 4 Kan. App. 2d 623, 626, 609 P.2d 1157, rev. denied 228 Kan. 806 (1980). However, we find it reasonable to conclude that the Board believed the policy was violated and the misstatement in the report was intentional in concluding that Jones committed gross misconduct and conduct grossly unbecoming a state officer and employee and by finding that the appointing authority's decision, which found the policy was violated, was reasonable. As such, remand is unnecessary for resolution of this issue. The Court of Appeals majority concluded that no evidence was presented that Jones intentionally falsified the report so as to warrant a finding of gross misconduct. However, intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence and does not need to be directly proven. State v. Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, 275, 13 P.3d 887 (2000). In this case, circumstantial evidence was presented to support the conclusion that Jones intentionally indicated that the vehicle was legally parked. First, the videotape clearly shows that Esping's car was parked approximately 6 feet from the curb, perpendicular to marked parking spaces. Second, Jones acknowledges the car was illegally parked in the video by offering to put his card on the car so that it would not be towed. Third, Jones gave inconsistent explanations for the inaccuracy in his report, saying it was legally parked because it was a Saturday, he was not thinking about it when he wrote the report, or the status of the car was meaningless detail. Fourth, Jones failed to log in the stop in the videotape recording log, which made locating the videotaped stop more difficult. Fifth, Captain Beckom testified that at most times this information, i.e., that the car was legally parked and she agreed to leave it until friends would pick it up, would not be included in the report and thus opined that it was an intentional false statement to cover up something. Finally, Jones admitted that he turned off the video camera to hide the fact that he was going to tell Esping that she could do whatever she wanted after he left. Based on these actions, we agree with Judge Malone's dissenting conclusion that it is hard to believe this was an unintentional misstatement of fact. Both the Court of Appeals and this court are charged only with determining if the Board applied the correct standard of review and if its conclusion that the appointing authority's actions were reasonable and supported by substantial competent evidence. As the circumstantial evidence described above supported a finding that Jones intentionally falsified the report, the Court of Appeals majority mistakenly disregarded its limited standard of review in this case by reweighing the evidence and substituting its own judgment for that of the Board. Although Jones attempts to argue that this court may not look outside the findings of fact made by the Board, this court must review the evidence presented before the Board to determine whether its findings were supported by substantial competent evidence. Contrary to the Court of Appeals majority, substantial competent evidence supports the finding that Jones intentionally falsified the police report.