Opinion ID: 1301279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time, Place, and Manner Regulation of Speech

Text: Finally, we turn to the Commission's claim that its order is an allowable time, place, and manner restriction in accordance with its constitutional responsibility to regulate public utilities. The Commission contends that the first amendment of the United States Constitution and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), allow for the time, place, and manner regulation of ScoopLines. Even if we agreed with the Commission's interpretation of the first amendment, Arizona's constitution does not permit the time, place, and manner regulation in question here. Under the first amendment, the United States Supreme Court has articulated a three-part test for determining whether a given time, place, and manner regulation is reasonable: is the regulation content-neutral, does it serve a significant governmental interest, and does it leave open ample alternate channels for communication. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771, 96 S.Ct. at 1830. Whether this approach implicitly requires that the government use the least restrictive alternative to achieve its purpose is unclear under federal constitutional jurisprudence. See generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23 (2d ed. 1988); see Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (invalidating restrictions on distribution of circulars where government could have achieved its purpose by less restrictive alternatives). On this question, we have held that any restriction on first amendment rights must be drawn with narrow specificity. New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Board of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 371, 519 P.2d 169, 173 (1974). In New Times, we stated this requirement within the context of discussing whether a Board of Regents' campus newspaper policy was a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. Id. As we have already determined that narrow specificity is a requirement of a time, place, and manner regulation under the first amendment, we must hold the same under the more stringent protections of the Arizona Constitution. A public utility is not exempt from the Commission's regulation simply because it is in the communications business. The Commission can regulate Mountain Bell's charges for ScoopLine service to the same extent that it has the right to regulate other Mountain Bell tariffs. Also, the Commission, like any other governmental department or agency, may impose content-neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner regulations that tangentially affect speech. E.g., New Times, 110 Ariz. at 371, 519 P.2d at 173. However, given Arizona's constitutional protections, when dealing with regulations that affect speech, the Commission must regulate with narrow specificity so as to affect as little as possible the ability of the sender and receiver to communicate. Id. The record here does not satisfy us that the Commission drew its regulation with narrow specificity. No doubt the Commission can require Mountain Bell to address the ScoopLine problems even though the problems relate to the transmission of protected speech. We assume, arguendo, that the Commission could require Mountain Bell to provide its customers with a method of adjusting disputes, to give adequate service to consumers, to make allowances in the tariffs for rebate of charges for unauthorized ScoopLine calls, and to provide a clear statement of the charges against ScoopLine users. Mountain Bell's proposals for self-imposed regulations and the statute both illustrate plausible means to solve the ScoopLine problems. They also demonstrate that the Commission did not choose its regulation with narrow specificity. Although the pre-subscription requirement might be a more convenient and certain method of accomplishing such objectives, governmental convenience and certainty cannot prevail over constitutionally guaranteed rights. The portion of the Commission's order that requires presubscription erects a direct barrier to communication and therefore offends art. 2, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution.