Opinion ID: 2436066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Omission of Independent DNA Testing

Text: As part of his first point on appeal, appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to secure DNA testing on the semen samples collected from the victim and appellant. Appellant argues that had counsel sought DNA analysis he would have been completely cleared as the perpetrator. Appellant submits that at the time of his trial, DNA analysis was widely accepted as a means of scientific testing. The state does not dispute this. At the Rule 37 hearing, Mr. Vollman testified that DNA testing was both widely accepted and available to defendants. Mr. Vollman indicated that if appellant had not had sexual intercourse with the victim, the results of a DNA test would likely have excluded him as the perpetrator. On the other hand, Mr. Vollman stated, if appellant had engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, a DNA test could likely identify him as the perpetrator. In defense of his decision not to seek independent DNA testing, Mr. Hardin stated that, although he was aware of the availability and acceptance of DNA testing, he did not seek a DNA test because he was concerned that once he had requested the test, he would have been obligated to provide the results to the state, and if the results had nailed appellant as the perpetrator, there would have been no possibility of getting him acquitted. As it was, the evidence against appellant consisted of the testimony of the victim and those persons she told about the rape. Mr. Hardin stated that he felt appellant had a better chance at acquittal with the alibi witnesses he had prepared, especially if they would have been better witnesses, and with his argument attacking the state's case for lack of evidence. We are convinced that the decision not to seek independent DNA testing was a decision clearly within the realm of counsel's professional judgment and trial strategy. In Dumond, this court observed: There are numerous scientific tests which could be conducted on physical evidence in a criminal trial and failure of counsel to seek a particular test will not amount to a denial of the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment unless it can be concluded that the test was one which any competent attorney under the same circumstances would have sought. 294 Ark. 379, 386, 743 S.W.2d 779, 782-83 (emphasis added). We cannot say that any competent attorney defending a client on a charge of rape would necessarily have sought independent DNA testing in an attempt to bolster the client's defense. This is especially true in a situation where the evidence against a defendant consists solely of the victim's testimony. The decision whether or not to seek such a test is a big gamble in that the evidence is likely to be conclusive one way or the other either eliminating the defendant as the perpetrator or implicating him as such. Mr. Hardin's explanation of his decision not to seek DNA testing is reasonable, especially in light of the fact that had the test been completed and the results were unfavorable to appellant, the state would have been able to use that evidence against appellant in its case-in-chief. Appellant offers no proof that any competent attorney in Mr. Hardin's situation would have sought such a test, let alone any proof that but for counsel's failure to request a DNA test, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. This court is unwilling to view counsel's conduct in hindsight, and we are not convinced that the results of any scientific testing would have altered the outcome of appellant's trial. This is especially true in light of this court's previous determination that a victim's testimony alone provides substantial evidence to support a conviction of rape. See Bishop v. State, 310 Ark. 479, 839 S.W.2d 6 (1992). Furthermore, since we do not know what the outcome of the tests would have been, we cannot gauge whether DNA testing would have caused the jury to have a reasonable doubt of appellant's guilt. Thus, we cannot hold that the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to seek independent DNA testing.