Opinion ID: 768555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of immunity agreements

Text: 41 Naiman claims that the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce evidence on redirect examination that two witnesses had entered into immunity agreements with the government, because defendant had not challenged the witnesses' credibility during cross-examination. The government responds that the district court properly allowed it to introduce the immunity agreements to rebut the witnesses' testimony that they believed they had done nothing wrong. We agree. 42 Evidentiary rulings are reviewable only for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 181 (1999). Redirect examination may be used to rebut false impressions arising from cross-examination and the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether such a false impression was created. Id. at 80 (internal quotation omitted). The scope of redirect examination is a matter entrusted to a trial judge's broad discretion. Id. Here, Naiman opened the door for the government's redirect examination by eliciting testimony from COJO bookkeeper Rachel Cooper that she did not think she had done anything wrong when she accepted tax-free grants for yeshiva tuition from COJO in lieu of a raise. Similarly, Naiman's secretary, Esther Jacobs, testified on cross-examination that she did not think she did anything wrong by helping COJO provide state-subsidized health insurance to individuals whom COJO did not employ. We therefore find no abuse of discretion here. In fact, the district court specifically limited the scope of the government's inquiry and instructed the jury to consider the fact that Jacobs and Cooper had entered into immunity agreements as simply another circumstance[ ] under which the witness has testified. In light of the limited purpose for which the immunity agreements were offered and admitted, we find in Naiman's arguments no basis for reversal.