Opinion ID: 1941931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Testimony of Keri Dugan.

Text: In his second assignment of error, Davlin argues that appellate counsel erred in failing to raise on appeal the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel with regard to the cross-examination of Dugan, an acquaintance of Davlin. Dugan testified for the State. On direct, Dugan was asked about the events preceding the fire in the early morning of Ligenza's death. Dugan testified that she went to visit Richard Guilliatt, who resided in an apartment in a duplex. (Ligenza resided in the other apartment in the duplex.) Dugan testified that after entering the apartment, she said hello to Davlin, who was in the apartment with Guilliatt. In response to Dugan's greeting, Davlin replied, `That bitch kicked me out.' On cross-examination, Dugan was asked about Davlin's apparently unsolicited statement about being kicked out. Trial counsel had Dugan refresh her memory from police notes taken during the interview in the hours after the fire. Upon refreshing her recollection, Dugan then testified that at the time, she told the officer that she just said hi [to Davlin], and that was it. The State then questioned Dugan on redirect, and asked whether in that interview the officer had specifically asked her whether Davlin had said anything to her. Dugan replied that the officer did not ask her that question, but that in fact, Davlin had said something to her, namely that the `bitch kicked me out.' As we understand Davlin's argument on appeal, he contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to allege that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to Dugan's testimony, on redirect, that Davlin told her that the bitch kicked him out. Davlin argues that allowing Dugan to testify to this a second time was unduly prejudicial. Davlin's argument is without merit. Most, if not all, evidence is intended to be prejudicial; it is only that evidence which is unduly prejudicial that is inadmissible. [18] And this testimony was brief, was impeached by trial counsel (as having not been initially told to police), and, given the weight of the remaining evidence against Davlin, was not likely to have changed the results of the proceedings. We conclude that Davlin was not prejudiced by any alleged deficiency in trial counsel's performance and therefore was not prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue on direct appeal. We additionally note Davlin appears to argue that trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine Dugan with regard to prior statements made stating that everyone, including Davlin, was asleep when Dugan entered the apartment, and thus Davlin could not have told Dugan that Ligenza had kicked him out. However, the district court was not presented with this allegation in any of Davlin's three motions for postconviction relief, and we need not address it here. Finally, to the extent Davlin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the district court to admonish the jury that Dugan was lying, such argument is without merit. It is the province of the fact finder, in this case the jury, to judge the credibility of a witness [19] ; it would be improper for the trial court to suggest that a witness was not being truthful. As such, trial counsel could not have been ineffective in failing to ask for such an admonishment, nor could appellate counsel have been ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Davlin's second assignment of error is without merit.