Opinion ID: 201784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Braga's Employment Status

Text: 34 The district court held that workers' compensation bars this suit because Braga was employed by Lightolier/APC during its brief existence. Braga's employment status during the three-day period from January 15-18, 1982 is the primary issue the parties address on appeal. 35 Plaintiffs argue that this question cannot be resolved as a matter of law but requires a detailed, fact-specific inquiry into the relationship between Braga and Lightolier/APC. As explained below, we disagree. 36 Massachusetts business corporation law provides that all of the estate, property, rights, privileges, powers and franchises of the constituent corporations automatically vest in the surviving corporation upon merger without further act or deed. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 156B, § 80(a)(5). Despite the Bragas' hyperbolic claim that treating employees as assets that transfer by law upon merger means viewing them as chattels of the corporation, a corporation's employment contracts are counted among its assets. See, e.g., Modis, Inc. v. Revolution Group, Ltd., 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 246, 1999 WL 1441918, at  (Mass.Super.Ct. Dec. 29, 1999) (describing employment contracts and employment `arrangements' as assets [that] became the property of [the surviving corporation] after the merger); cf. Dickson v. Riverside Iron Works, Inc., 6 Mass.App.Ct. 53, 372 N.E.2d 1302, 1304-05 (1978) (plaintiff may enforce employment contract against surviving corporation after merger). 37 The Bragas argue that employees do not automatically continue working for a surviving corporation after a merger but must establish employment relationships anew with that entity. Cf. Holliday v. Pers. Prods. Co., 939 F.Supp. 402, 405-07 (E.D.Pa.1996) (rejecting argument that workers' compensation immunity would not apply after employer's merger with third party tortfeasor unless employee consented to be employed by new corporate entity). If that were the law, employees of merging corporations would lose their jobs instantaneously upon a merger, absent some affirmative conduct showing that they now worked for the surviving corporation. Similarly, the employment status of those in otherwise identical positions would vary with their awareness of, and view toward, changes in corporate status that did not affect the conduct of their jobs in any way. None of the cases plaintiffs cite, however, supports such odd results. See, e.g., Langevin's Case, 326 Mass. 43, 91 N.E.2d 920, 921 (1950); Abbott v. Link-Belt Co., 324 Mass. 673, 88 N.E.2d 551, 554 (1949). Indeed, none even addresses the relevant question, namely, how a merger affects continuity of employment. We see no basis for holding that there was a gap in Braga's employment during the January 15-18, 1982, period. He simply continued as an employee of the corporate entity that succeeded his employer, first Lightolier/APC, then Lightolier/BZ. 38 However, the question of whether Lightolier/APC employed Braga is not dispositive, but merely a red herring here. This can be seen by moving the analysis back one level, thus framing it in terms of the initial merger of Lightolier and APC (Braga's original employer) rather than the merger of Lightolier/APC and BZ Holdings three days later. Whether or not Lightolier/APC employed Braga during its three-day existence, Lightolier — which it succeeded—unquestionably never employed him. Since Lightolier owned the allegedly defective Press when it merged with Braga's then-employer, APC, Lightolier's merger with APC appears to raise the same liability issues that the Bragas claim are raised by Lightolier/APC's merger with BZ Holdings. But the mere fact that Lightolier did not employ Braga would not establish successorship liability. Lightolier/APC can inherit Lightolier's third-party liability only if such liability would have existed absent the merger. The plaintiffs in Gurry were able to sue the decedent's employer not merely because its predecessor, Dairy, had not employed him, but because Dairy  would have been susceptible to a third-party claim as a tortfeasor outside of the protection of workers' compensation if not for the merger. 550 N.E.2d at 131 (emphasis added). 39 The foregoing considered, the question we must answer is whether Lightolier would have been susceptible to a third-party claim but for the merger. If so, Genlyte may be sued. If not, it may not. 40