Opinion ID: 621569
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Enhancement for Commission of a Sex Act

Text: Watkins first challenges the District Court's imposition of a sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A). This subsection of the Guidelines provides for a two level increase in a defendant's offense level if the offense involved the commission of a sex act or sexual contact. Watkins does not argue that the District Court clearly erred by finding that he committed a sex act with Doe during the course of the offense. Rather, he argues that the § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement constitutes [i]mpermissible double counting because it punishe[s] defendant for the same conduct which made up defendant's offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Appellant's Br. 10 (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. Impermissible double counting occurs when one part of the [G]uidelines is applied to increase a defendant's sentence to reflect the kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by another part of the [G]uidelines. United States v. Volpe, 224 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, when the challenged part of the Guidelines aim[s] at different harms emanating from the same conduct, there is no impermissible double counting. Id. [E]nhancements are not duplicative when they reflect different facets of the defendant's conduct. . . . United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 251 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there was no impermissible double-counting. The District Court set Watkins' base offense level at 28 because of his violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), which prohibits the knowing transportation of an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (2006) (emphasis supplied). One may commit this offense without actually having committed a sex act. Therefore, given that Watkins transported a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), and the overwhelming and undisputed evidence demonstrates that he committed a sex act with Doe, a minor, the District Court's application of the § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement is not error, let alone clear error. The enhancement punishes Watkins for committing a sex act, which would not otherwise be reflected at a base offense level of 28. Accordingly, we reject Watkins' challenge to the District Court's application of the § 2G1.3(b)(4)(A) enhancement.