Opinion ID: 809700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sergeant De La Garza’s Affidavit

Text: Mr. Gutierrez argues that Leon’s good-faith exception does not apply because Sergeant De La Garza’s affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that reliance on it was entirely unreasonable. He contends that the district court’s good-faith ruling improperly considered facts that are not contained in the affidavit. The Government responds that the methamphetamine evidence was admissible under Leon because Sergeant De La Garza’s affidavit contains facts that form “a minimally sufficient nexus between the suspected illegal activity of possessing and transporting narcotics and [Mr.] Gutierrez’s car.” Aplee. Br. at 17.3 We conclude that the Leon good-faith exception applies because it was objectively reasonable for officers conducting the search of Mr. Gutierrez’s vehicle to rely on the warrant. In this case, the supporting affidavit is not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quotations omitted). Sergeant De La Garza’s affidavit is not bare bones or devoid of facts in support of probable cause. See Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d at 934. For example, the affidavit states 3 The Government acknowledges that the district court’s Leon analysis considered some facts outside the affidavit. It urges this court to join those circuits that allow courts conducting a good-faith analysis to consider uncontroverted facts known to officers but inadvertently omitted from the supporting affidavit. See, e.g., United States v. McKenzieGude, 671 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 131819 (11th Cir. 2002). Because we affirm the district court’s decision based solely on the facts contained in Sergeant De La Garza’s affidavit, we need not decide whether courts may consider uncontroverted facts outside the affidavit. -11- that Mr. Gutierrez was “extremely nervous,” his hands were “shaking profusely,” and he exhibited “evasive” behavior. ROA, Vol. I at 53-54. This court has explained that “extraordinary and prolonged nervousness can weigh significantly in the assessment of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Ledesma, 447 F.3d 1307, 1318 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Although normal nervousness exhibited by those stopped for a traffic citation is usually entitled to limited significance in the probable cause analysis, in this case it is entitled to somewhat more weight because of the extreme and continued nervousness exhibited by [the defendant].”). The affidavit also recounts that Mr. Gutierrez and Ms. Martinez gave inconsistent travel descriptions. Mr. Gutierrez stated they had been in Tucson for a couple of hours, but Ms. Martinez said they had been in Tucson all day. Mr. Gutierrez also hesitated in stating the name of the friend he had allegedly visited just hours earlier. Inconsistent and vague travel descriptions are proper considerations in the probable-cause determination. See Ledesma, 447 F.3d at 1318; United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990). The affidavit further states that Ms. Martinez was “very lethargic” and that her eyes were “droopy and glossy.” ROA, Vol. I at 53. Mr. Gutierrez argues that this description does not mention that Ms. Martinez appeared to be under the influence of narcotics. He is correct that Sergeant De La Garza could have stated more clearly that, in his training and experience, Ms. Martinez appeared to be under the influence of narcotics. -12- But the affidavit also mentions twice that Ms. Martinez and Mr. Gutierrez were traveling on a route known for narcotics transportation. In the context of this information, a reasonably well-trained officer could infer that Ms. Martinez’s appearance and behavior suggested she was under the influence of narcotics, constituting further indicia of probable cause. Cf. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1205 (10th Cir. 1998) (“In making the probable cause determination, the issuing magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the material provided in the warrant application.”). Finally, as noted above, the affidavit indicates that Lordsburg is on a pipeline for narcotics distribution and that Mr. Gutierrez was “returning from [Tucson] . . . a known path where narcotics are being distributed to and from.” ROA, Vol. I at 54. The relevance of this information to the probable cause determination may be minimal. See United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 951-52 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because law enforcement officers have offered countless cities as drug source cities and countless others as distribution cities, . . . the probativeness of a particular defendant’s route is minimal.”); United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Standing alone, a vehicle that hails from a purported known drug source area is, at best, a weak factor in finding suspicion of criminal activity.”). But it is objectively reasonable for an officer to place some reliance on this fact as relevant to probable cause. Although a route’s designation as a “pipeline” for narcotics may not by itself indicate criminal activity, it is at least one consideration in the totality of the circumstances supporting probable cause. -13- We conclude that Sergeant De La Garza’s affidavit is not so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance on the warrant entirely unreasonable. Sergeant De La Garza may have omitted from the affidavit facts made known to him during the stop that would have provided further indicia of probable cause. But the affidavit contains information that provides a minimal nexus between the suspected illegal activity (transporting narcotics) and the place to be searched (Mr. Gutierrez’s vehicle). Given the facts in the affidavit, a reasonably well-trained officer would be entitled to rely on the warrant and would not be required to second-guess the issuing judge’s probable cause determination.