Opinion ID: 1812932
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court erred in denying Ruffin's motion to suppress.

Text: ¶ 8. This Court will reverse the denial of a motion to suppress only if the trial court's ruling is manifest error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Palm v. State, 748 So.2d 135, 142 (Miss.1999) (citing McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 235 (Miss.1997)). This Court will not reverse the lower court's finding that the confession was voluntary and admissible so long as the court applied the correct principles of law and the finding is factually supported by the evidence. Palm, 748 So.2d at 142 (citing Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 826 (Miss. 1998)). Once a trial judge determines admissibility, the defendant/appellant faces a heavy burden in trying to reverse on appeal. Greenlee, 725 So.2d 816, 826 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996)). ¶ 9. A valid waiver of Miranda [4] rights must be made `voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.' Chim v. State, 972 So.2d 601, 603 (Miss.2008) (citing Coverson v. State of Mississippi, 617 So.2d 642, 647 (Miss.1993)). The State's burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility is met, and a prima facie case is made out by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward. Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss.1991). The defendant must rebut the State's prima facie case by offering testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession. Cox, 586 So.2d at 763. ¶ 10. A waiver is voluntary if it is the result of `free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.' Chim, 972 So.2d at 603 (Miss. 2008) (citing Coverson, 617 So.2d at 647). `[A] waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.' Chim, 972 So.2d at 603 (citing Coverson, 617 So.2d at 647). ¶ 11. On the evening of July 8, 2002, Ruffin gave two statements at the Yazoo City Police Department. These statements were tape-recorded and subsequently were transcribed. The first statement began at 8:00 p.m., with only investigator Snow and Ruffin in the room. Snow testified that he read Ruffin his Miranda rights before handing him the Miranda form to read for himself. Snow stated that Ruffin appeared to understand and signed the form, just below the statement of rights. Snow then read Ruffin the lower portion of the Miranda form regarding waiver of rights and handed the form to Ruffin for his review. Ruffin did not sign beneath the waiver portion of the form, but nevertheless agreed to talk. At no time did Ruffin indicate that he wished to stop talking or attempt to invoke his right to an attorney. Snow testified that he did not threaten Ruffin, and that Ruffin gave his statement freely and voluntarily. The first statement concluded at 8:28 p.m. ¶ 12. Following the first statement, and before either person left the room, Ruffin volunteered to give another statement. The second statement commenced at 8:36 p.m., with Detectives Thomas Ervin, Charles Taylor, and Larry Davis present. [5] Before this second statement, Snow stated, I ADVICED [SIC] YOU OF YOUR MIRANDA RIGHTS ON THE OTHER TAPE. DO YOU KNOW WHAT YOUR RIGHTS ARE? YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AND YOU CAN STOP THIS INTERVIEW ANYTIME YOU LIKE. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? Ruffin indicated that he understood and proceeded to give the second statement. Snow testified that no threats, coercion, or promises were made to Ruffin, and that this second statement also was made freely and voluntary. ¶ 13. Ruffin testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he was enrolled in a special-education program and suffered from dyslexia, which made it difficult for him to read unless the words were large. When asked whether he had any recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, Ruffin responded, I can't remember. He said that he did not understand what was happening at the time of the interrogation because he had never been subjected to an interrogation. ¶ 14. The trial court denied Ruffin's motion to suppress as follows: The evidence presented is that Officer Snow advised the defendant of his rights orally. The defendant testified that he does not recall, that he does not remember whether or not he was given his rights. Therefore, this Court has to take the statement of Officer Snow that he did orally inform him of his Miranda rights. Therefore, the evidence before the Court indicates that the defendant was given his Miranda rights, that he understood. There was no indication that he did not understand his rights. There's nothing, no testimony from the defendant or the officers that he advised him that he was dyslexic or he did not understand his rights. Therefore, the Court finds that [Ruffin's statements] are voluntary, freely-made.... ¶ 15. Ruffin argues that he did not voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination. For support, he points to the fact he did not sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form, and did not execute another Miranda form prior to the second interrogation. More significantly, he alleges that he was coerced to talk. He submits that Snow threatened or intimidated him with comments made both on and off the record. Additionally, Ruffin contends that his mental impairment(s) rendered him unable knowingly and intelligently to waive his rights. ¶ 16. Ruffin first submits that his statements should have been suppressed because he did not sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form or execute a second Miranda form. Yet, there is no requirement that a valid waiver must be in writing and signed for an incriminating statement to be admissible. Armstead v. State, 978 So.2d 642, 648 (Miss.2008) (citing Davis v. State, 320 So.2d 789, 790 (Miss. 1975)). All that is required is that the accused be afforded the protection of the Miranda warning and [ ] thereafter knowingly and intelligently waive[ ] his rights and freely and voluntarily make[ ] the statement. Davis, 320 So.2d at 790. Therefore, Ruffin's failure to sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form or execute a second Miranda form is non-dispositive. ¶ 17. We find sufficient evidence to support that Ruffin was adequately advised of his Miranda rights. Snow testified that he read Ruffin his Miranda rights prior to the first interrogation. Ruffin also signed a Miranda form confirming that he had been advised of his rights. The second interrogation commenced just eight minutes after the first interrogation ended, and before Ruffin had exited the room. At the beginning of the second interrogation, Snow referred to his prior administration of rights and readvised Ruffin that he had the right to an attorney and could stop the interrogation at any time. Ruffin affirmed that he understood his rights. Snow's general recitation of Ruffin's rights at the beginning of the second interrogation may or may not have been sufficient to re- Mirandize him. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202-03, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2880, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, 176-77 (1989) (citing California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 2810, 69 L.Ed.2d 696, 702 (1981)) ([t]he inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably `convey to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda '). But regardless of whether Ruffin was re- Mirandized, he had been read his rights before the first interrogation, which had ended just eight minutes earlier. Given the small passage of time between interrogations, and considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that Ruffin was adequately advised of his rights. See Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1145 (Miss.1985) (statement admissible where rights were given in the first interrogation, but were not fully given in a second interrogation one hour later); cf. McCarty v. State, 554 So.2d 909, 913 (Miss.1989) (defendant was not adequately warned where he was under arrest during each interrogation, was subjected to constant interrogation, had learned of his rights only after asking others around the jail, and the time between first and third interrogations was three-and-a-half to four hours). ¶ 18. Having determined that Ruffin was adequately advised of his rights, we consider next whether Ruffin voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived such rights. Snow testified that Ruffin was not threatened, intimidated, or offered any promises or rewards in exchange for talking. Ruffin, however, argues that his statements were coerced. As support, he points to statements made by Snow during the first interrogation, and contends that other statements were made off the record. ¶ 19. Ruffin points to the following exchange that took place during his first interrogation as evidence of coercion: [Snow:] WHAT HAPPENED AFTER YALL [SIC] GOT HOME? [Ruffin:] WE HAD GONE TO CRYSTAL [SIC] HOUSE. I'M TRYING TO [SIC] I REMEMBER WE WENT TO THE PARTS [SIC] WE STOPPED BY THE STORE SO THE GIRLS COULD GET THEM SOMETHING TO WEAR. [Snow:] SO THEY COULD GET THEM SOMETHING TO WEAR? [Ruffin:] YES SIR. [Snow:] WHAT DID THEY DO[,] BOUGHT [SIC] CLOTHES? [Ruffin:] YES SIR. BRAS AND PANTIES AND SOCKS[.] [Snow:] WHO PAID FOR THAT? [Ruffin:] I DON'T KNOW. I SAT OUT IN THE CAR. I DIDN'T GO INTO THE STORE. [Snow:] IS THIS STATEMENT TRUE? [Ruffin:] (INAUDIBLE) [Snow:] IT'S NOT TRUE. I TOLD YOU I KNEW WHAT HAPPENED. [6] IF THAT'S ALL YOU WANT TO SAY THAT'S FINE. BUT THAT IS NOT THE TRUTH. I KNOW THE TRUTH. YOU KNOW THE TRUTH. I AM GOING TO GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO TELL ME THE WHOLE TRUTH. WHO HAD THE GUN? [Ruffin:] (INAUDIBLE) [Snow:] WHO TOOK IT OUT OF THE CAR? [Ruffin:] I DO NOT KNOW. IT WAS IN THE TRUNK. [Snow:] WHO TOOK IT OUT OF THE TRUNK? [Ruffin:] I DO NOT KNOW WHO TOOK IT OUT OF THE TRUNK. (INAUDIBLE) [Snow:] WHO'S [SIC] GUN WAS IT? [Ruffin:] I DON'T KNOW WHERE HE GOT IT FROM. [Snow:] WHO TOOK THE GUN OUT OUT [SIC] THERE AT THE CORN FIELD? [Ruffin:] INAUDIBLE ¶ 20. This Court has distinguished between an interrogator's mere exhortation to tell the truth, and an inducement to confess. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 668 (Miss.1991). [A] mere exhortation or adjuration to speak the truth will not exclude a confession.... Robinson v. State, 247 Miss. 609, 612-13, 157 So.2d 49 (1963) (citing Matthews v. State, 102 Miss. 549, 59 So. 842 (1912)). Whether an interrogator's statement is a mere exhortation or an inducement generally depends on the circumstances surrounding the confession, such as the defendant's youth, good reputation, lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system, and relationship with or trust in the interrogating officer(s). Willie, 585 So.2d at 668 (citing Miller v. State, 243 So.2d 558, 559 (Miss. 1971); Dunn v. State, 547 So.2d 42, 46 (Miss. 1989)). This Court has considered these surrounding circumstances in close cases where the interrogator implies that leniency will be granted if the defendant agrees to talk. Willie, 585 So.2d at 668 (circumstances considered where sheriff told the defendant that it was best to tell truth, that he only wanted the defendant to tell the truth, and that it would be better for him to tell the truth); Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 839 (Miss. 1994) (circumstances considered where officer told the defendant that his co-defendant was laying everything on him, and that it would be best for the defendant and would help him if he talked to them); Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1243-44 (Miss.1994) (circumstances considered where officer told defendant that it would be better for him if he told the truth); Miller v. State, 243 So.2d 558, 559 (Miss.1971) (circumstances considered where officer told the defendant that he would be better off telling the truth). ¶ 21. We find that, even by the most liberal interpretation, Snow's comments were mere exhortations. Snow simply stated that he knew what happened and pressed Ruffin to tell the truth. No direct or implied promises of leniency were made. See Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989) (citing Moore v. State, 493 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Miss.1986)) (indicating that urging a defendant to go ahead and tell the truth is not an implied promise of leniency). ¶ 22. Notably, there are surrounding circumstances which weigh in Ruffin's favor. He was only twenty-two years old, he offered testimony of his good reputation, and he had no prior experience with the criminal justice system. Such circumstances, however, are given little weight where there is no basis for coercion or inducement. We have stated that distinguishing between a mere exhortation and an inducement generally depends upon the surrounding circumstances. Willie, 585 So.2d at 668 (citing Miller, 243 So.2d at 559) (emphasis added). Here, a plain reading of Snow's comments reveals no coercion or inducement. Accordingly, we find the aforementioned circumstances insufficient to render his statement the product of coercion. [7] ¶ 23. As to the allegation that coercive statements were made which were not recorded, Ruffin offered no evidence as to what Snow or any other officer said off the record. There is only some indication that Snow might have told Ruffin that he knew what really happened. Thus, we find this argument to be without merit. ¶ 24. Ruffin further submits that he was unable knowingly and intelligently to waive his rights due to his mental impairment. The record reveals that Ruffin suffers some mental impairment, including dyslexia. Pursuant to Ruffin's motion for a psychiatric examination, the trial court appointed Dr. W. Criss Lott, a clinical psychologist at St. Dominic Hospital in Jackson, Mississippi, to perform a mental examination of Ruffin. Lott estimated that Ruffin had a verbal IQ of 73, and a non-verbal IQ of 90, for a total score of 79. He assessed Ruffin's word recognition and reading ability to be at a fourth-grade level. Nevertheless, during his examination of Ruffin, Lott administered a test in which he gave Ruffin an explanation of his rights, and told Ruffin to read it out loud. He later had Ruffin restate those rights. Lott stated that Ruffin had no difficulty reading the rights, and appeared to understand and recall everything very well. Likewise, when Snow asked Ruffin whether he understood his rights, Ruffin responded affirmatively. Snow stated that Ruffin appeared to understand his rights. Accordingly, we find sufficient evidence to support that Ruffin appreciated the nature of his rights and the consequences of his decision to abandon those rights. ¶ 25. For the aforementioned reasons, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Ruffin's motion to suppress.