Opinion ID: 1766222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to call moon herrington

Text: As authority for Harrison's claim that the State's failure to call Herrington fatally flaws the conviction, the defendant cites the ancient rule of the common law requiring the prosecution, in criminal cases, to introduce all the eyewitnesses to the crime. There is some doubt that this rule was ever anything more than a matter of custom between the English Bench and Bar. In fact, this custom apparently developed as an offshoot from the practice of calling all witnesses whose names were endorsed upon the indictment. Notwithstanding, the notion of such a rule became firmly established only in Michigan, while elsewhere it has been either modified or repudiated altogether. 7 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 2079 (Chadburn Rev. 1978). In Mississippi, the rule has received general recognition, but with some modification. An issue was presented to the Mississippi Supreme Court in Morrow v. State, 57 Miss. 836 (1880). The Morrow court viewed the English rule, as adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court, as a rule making it impermissible for the prosecution to present an isolated part of the res gestae without a full development of all that occurred, and not a declaration that it must examine all the witnesses who were present at the transaction. Id. at 838. While refusing to repudiate the rule entirely, the court in Morrow placed the enforcement of the rule in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the court's words: If the prosecuting officer should content himself with proving the bare fact of killing by one who had witnessed that act only, resting his case upon the legal presumption of guilt thereby implied, and if it was made evident by the testimony produced that there were other witnesses present who saw the whole transaction, it would, we think, be always within the sound discretion of the court to compel their production by the State, if in attendance or easily attainable. Whether a refusal to exercise such discretion could ever be ground of reversal, we will not decide, except to say that it could only be so where it was made to appear that actual injustice had been done to and injury sustained by the accused, as where he had been compelled by such imperfect presentation of the facts, and by the legal presumptions thereby raised, to produce as his own a witness with strong bias against him, whose testimony militated against the general theory of his defence. When such a case is presented, we shall be in a better situation definitely to settle the point. No such case is before us. 57 Miss. at 838-839. The rule of Morrow, adopted with modification from the common law custom, has been subsequently followed in Mississippi. See Hale v. State, 72 Miss. 140, 144, 16 So. 387, 388 (1894); Carlisle v. State, 73 Miss. 387, 395, 19 So. 207, 208 (1896); Patty v. State, 126 Miss. 94, 98, 88 So. 498 (1921), Mitchell v. State, 171 Miss. 4, 6-7, 156 So. 654, 654-55 (1934), Ross v. State, 185 Miss. 438, 188 So. 295 (1939), Sullivan v. State, 213 Miss. 14, 27, 56 So.2d 93, 100 (1952), and Phillips v. State, 183 So.2d 908, 911-12 (Miss. 1966). The upshot of these cases is that the State is required to put some, but not all, of the eyewitnesses to a crime on the stand. If the State is always required to put on some eyewitnesses, then a fortiori, when there is only one eyewitness, the State must introduce that eyewitness. We must question whether the trial court has any discretion when requested by the defendant to compel the introduction of a sole eyewitness. The broader question we must ask, however, is whether such a rule is justified in modern day criminal practice. When we examine the reason for the rule, it has no justification in modern day criminal practice. According to Wigmore, the singular argument in favor of this so called rule is that the burden and risk of calling a hostile witness ... should fall upon the prosecution rather than upon the accused. 7 Wigmore, Evidence, Section 2080 at page 542 (Chadburn Rev. 1978). Clearly, the purpose behind the rule requiring the State to introduce at least some eyewitnesses is the voucher rule. However, the voucher rule is no longer the rule in Mississippi. It is clear, therefore, that the singular purpose behind the ancient common law rule being argued by Harrison has been stripped away. A defendant can no longer claim any restrictions on calling witnesses as his own. Consequently, we are left with a rule which, once stripped of its purpose, serves no purpose at all. In addition, the defendant's access to and use of the witness in this case was guaranteed by the compulsory process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. U.S. Constitution Amendment VI; Mississippi Constitution, Article III, Section 26; Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409 (Miss. 1985), reversed on other grounds, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622; Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation does not impose upon the government the duty to call a particular witness, or to call all witnesses who are competent to testify. U.S. v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir.1972); U.S. v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 579 (2nd Cir.1969) (the Sixth Amendment safeguards the right of cross-examination, but it does not require the calling of any particular witness); Clingan v. U.S., 400 F.2d 849, 851 (5th Cir.1968). Harrison could have called Herrington to testify. His right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment was satisfied by the available opportunity to examine the witness. The right of confrontation gives the prosecutor discretion in putting on his case, and does not require that all witnesses to a crime be called by the prosecution. U.S. v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 789 (9th Cir.1974); U.S. v. Harper, 460 F.2d 705, 706 (5th Cir.1972). Admittedly there are cases where the prosecution, as a matter of due process, will be required to call a witness who the State believes will offer exculpatory testimony. U.S. v. Bryant, supra ; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). These cases, however, can be decided by reference to the constitutional guarantee of due process without resort to any common law rule requiring the prosecution to call certain witnesses. The principle does not apply in this case because Harrison admits that the witness, Herrington, was not favorable to the defense. Similarly, there is no hint that this case presents unusual circumstances involving the prosecutor's attempt to knowingly conceal exculpatory evidence. See U.S. v. Bryant, supra . Harrison had equal access to the witness, Herrington, and he would not have been limited in his examination of Herrington by the voucher rule. Therefore, to the extent that the Mississippi cases heretofore cited endorse, in any fashion, a rule requiring the prosecution in criminal cases to introduce certain witnesses, those same cases are hereby overruled. The fundamental, constitutional guarantees of an accused in a criminal case provide an adequate benchmark by which issues such as this can be decided. There is no longer a need, if ever there was one, for this so called ancient rule of common law. [2] The primary claim disposed of, the only question remaining is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The jury was instructed on murder as well as manslaughter and returned a verdict of murder. Harrison argues, that because of insufficient proof as to malice, the evidence could support nothing more than a verdict of manslaughter. Malice aforethought is the single most important element of murder, and serves to distinguish murder from manslaughter. Taylor v. State, 452 So.2d 441, 443 (Miss. 1984); Patterson v. State, 289 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1974). Malice may be established expressly or impliedly from the evidence. Motley v. Smith, 172 Miss. 148, 152, 159 So. 553, 554 (1935). The homicide in this case is undisputed. The defendant's voluntary confession admitting the killing was received into evidence. Furthermore, there is ample evidence to support the jury's finding of malice, and ultimately murder. When the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is clear that there is sufficient support for the verdict, and the defendant's request for a peremptory instruction was properly denied. Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 316 (Miss. 1985). Similarly, defendant's motion for new trial was properly overruled, there being no unconscionable injustice resulting therefrom. Id. at 317. There is no merit to this assignment of error.