Opinion ID: 767636
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Eviction of Mr. Walker

Text: 155 Mr. Walker's case contains an element not present in the cases of Ms. Rucker,Mr. Lee, and Ms. Hill. He contends that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S 12101, et seq., protects him from eviction despite the use of drugs in his apartment by his caretaker and his caretaker's guests. As the majority opinion correctly observes, Mr. Walker unquestionably has a right under the ADA to a live-in caretaker, but he does not have a right under the ADA to have a live-in caretaker who violates the drug laws. If deciding the case de novo on the current record, I might conclude that Mr. Walker had both knowledge of his caretaker's activities and the ability to replace the caretaker. However, this court is not at liberty independently to reweigh the evidence presented to the district court. The district court's findings of fact must be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Roe v. Anderson, 134 F.3d at 1400, 1402 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). Although Mr. Walker clearly had knowledge of his live-in caretaker's drug-related activity after she was initially found to be keeping drugs and drug paraphernalia on the premises, the district court could reasonably have believed that Mr. Walker was, because of his disability, powerless to stop her or find a replacement any sooner than he did. 156 Mr. Walker claims that his disability prevented him from complying with the anti-drug policy without a reasonable accommodation. The evidence about the extent of Mr. Walker's disability and the degree to which it prevented him from complying with the anti-drug policy is disputed, with both sides presenting conflicting declarations. The majority ignores this dispute and simply adopts appellants' version of the facts as it own. Appellants may be able to establish their version of the facts at trial, but on the record now before us the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mr. Walker's claim was sustainable. 157 Accepting for present purposes that Mr. Walker may have been prevented from complying with the anti-drug policy by his disability, the question then becomes whether a reasonable accommodation can be made that will bring Mr. Walker into compliance with his lease agreement. Appellants maintain that a blanket waiver of the anti-drug policy is not a reasonable accommodation. I agree. The district court's order, however, does not require such a waiver. Rather, the district court specifically rejected appellants' claim that a blanket waiver was the only possible accommodation, and held that, based on the complaint, Mr. Walker may be able to show that another accommodation is reasonable. While the district court may ultimately decide in favor of appellants once the record is developed further, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that, on the record before it, Mr. Walker had a fair chance of sustaining his claim under the ADA.