Opinion ID: 23874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues regarding partial summary judgment

Text: Booker raises two issues regarding whether the magistrate judge’s grant of partial summary judgment was appropriate. First, Booker contends that the district court did not specifically refer the case to the magistrate judge as is required under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1993), and also that, at the time 4 the partial summary judgment was entered by the magistrate judge, Booker was the only party to have consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. Second, Booker asserts that summary judgment was improper because he raised genuine issues of material fact on his claims of failure to intervene and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. A. The Magistrate Judge’s Jurisdiction For the first time on appeal, Booker contends that the case was not properly referred to the magistrate judge and that the Defendants failed to consent prior to the magistrate judge’s grant of partial summary judgment. Even though these contentions are raised now for the first time, we must address them because they implicate the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction. See United States v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1999); Mendes Jr. Int’l Co. v. M/V SOKAI MARU, 978 F.2d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[A]bsence of the appropriate consent and reference (or special designation) order results in a lack of jurisdiction (or at least fundamental error that may be complained of for the first time on appeal).”). 1. Effectiveness of Referral As stated above, the district court referred the case to the magistrate judge on June 28, 1999. However, the referral order failed to expressly indicate that the district court was referring the case to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 5 § 636(c).1 Instead, the order simply stated: “This action is referred to Robert W. Faulkner, Magistrate Judge in Sherman, Texas, for further proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.” Booker contends that the lack of a specific designation under § 636(c) at the time of the grant of partial summary judgment precluded the magistrate judge from exercising jurisdiction over the case. We disagree. 1 Section 636(c) provides in relevant part: Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary-- (1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves. . . . (2) If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the parties of the availability of a magistrate to exercise such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of court. . . . Rules of court for the reference of civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent. (3) Upon entry of judgment in any case referred under paragraph (1) of this subsection, an aggrieved party may appeal directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals from the judgment of the magistrate in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a district court. The consent of the parties allows a magistrate designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection to direct the entry of a judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 6 In civil matters, the district court must specifically indicate that it is referring a case to a magistrate judge pursuant to § 636(c). See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (“Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves.” (emphasis added)). This is referred to as § 636(c)’s “special designation” requirement. See Hill v. City of Seven Points, 230 F.3d 167, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2000). Conceding that the district court may not have “specially designated” the case to the magistrate judge, we conclude that, in this case, such a designation was not required. Pursuant to a general order of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, prisoner civil suits are automatically assigned to the magistrate judge when the parties consent to trial and entry of judgment by a magistrate judge. See E.D. TEX. GEN. ORDER NO. 98- 10.II.A (1998)2; see also Hill, 230 F.3d at 169. 2 General Order No. 98-10 provides: 1. Prisoner suits shall be referred at the time of