Opinion ID: 4103812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Peter B.

Text: According to his written answers in the jury questionnaire, Prospective Juror Peter B. was 65 years old and had spent much of his life serving in the military. He explained he was generally in favor of the death penalty, having ―actively supported‖ the 1978 initiative to reinstate the death penalty and opposed the confirmation of Chief Justice Rose Bird based on his assessment of her views on capital punishment. Asked what purpose was served by capital punishment, Peter B. answered: ―It removes from society a very bad person who is a danger to all.‖ But asked whether a person who intentionally kills should either always, or never, receive the death penalty, he indicated that he ―disagreed somewhat‖ with both propositions, noting that it ―depends.‖ His feelings about the death penalty were not so strong that he would vote one way or the other in every case. He elaborated on his views during voir dire, telling the trial court ―there are certain cases where a crime is so vicious that I believe [the death penalty] would fit the crime.‖ He would not vote against a conviction or a special circumstance allegation in order to avoid facing the penalty question and, asked to place himself on a spectrum of persons who would either always or never impose the death penalty, he located himself in the center, a five on a scale of 10. He would have no problem voting for death in a case involving a vicious, multiple killing, but he did not know whether he would vote for the death penalty for a murder with a single victim. When the trial court asked whether he could vote for the death penalty for an intentional murder for financial gain, Peter B. initially replied he would ―favor life imprisonment,‖ but then amended that view, saying he would ―always‖ vote 18 for life imprisonment in that situation. In follow-up questioning, he explained that sentencing someone to death would be ―awfully difficult,‖ but that ―I wouldn‘t say never; I wouldn‘t use the word never. The potential is there.‖ In response to the prosecutor‘s questioning, the juror further stated he had ―some really strong feelings against killing people‖ due to his training and experiences in the military and in the Vietnam War. He continued: ―I‘ve seen slaughters in Vietnam. I never killed anybody. I never came close to being killed, but the danger was always there. [¶] You see all these pictures, and training is brutal in the Armed Forces. The things they show you, the things you go through, the public doesn‘t see. And I come back, and I don‘t like that any more. [¶] And I see people that are being sentenced to death, and I sort of sympathize with them. [¶] I understand some of them deserve it, and I said that they got what they should have, but overall the thought of people being put to death sometimes doesn‘t go well with me. It would have to be [a] very vicious crime for me to [vote for the death penalty].‖ He would vote for the death penalty for mass killings, like if ―somebody . . . went into a dormitory, and killed seven nurses,‖ ―but I don‘t know if I would put a person to death for killing one on one, you know, in a one-on-one situation.‖ Asked by the prosecutor to place himself on a scale of one to 100 for one-on-one murders, with one representing someone who would never vote for the death penalty and 100 as someone who would always do so, he said he was in the ―bottom 10.‖ The prosecutor challenged Peter B. for cause and the trial court sustained the challenge, saying: ―With the exception of where he put himself at a 5, and I don‘t reconcile that with the rest of his answers, other than he seems to be a man who wants to answer his own questions, rather than questions that are put to him, I find he is substantially impaired. [¶] Again, the scale I don‘t think is a total litmus test, but he sure puts himself in the 1 to 10 down at the—I think every one 19 of his answers, but for the 5—that‘s a conflict with his scale of one to 100. [¶] I find he‘s substantially impaired.‖ Defendant first contends Prospective Juror Peter B.‘s views on the death penalty were less objectionable than two jurors the United States Supreme Court found were improperly dismissed in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38. In Adams, the high court articulated for the first time what has become known as the Witt standard, i.e., ―a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‖ (Adams, supra, at p. 45.) Citing two of the jurors in Adams—Juror Mahon and Juror Coyle—defendant gleans their voir dire responses from the appendix in the high court‘s Adams opinion and compares them to the voir dire for Peter B. But using Adams as a reference point for evaluating the excusal of Peter B. is inapt because Adams concerned the particular statutory scheme in Texas, whereby ― ‗[p]rospective jurors shall be informed that a sentence of life imprisonment or death is mandatory on conviction of a capital felony. A prospective juror shall be disqualified from serving as a juror unless he states under oath that the mandatory penalty of death or imprisonment for life will not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact.‘ ‖ (Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 42, quoting Tex. Pen. Code, § 12.31(b), italics added.) As the Adams court explained, the statutory scheme is inconsistent with the standard demanded by the federal Constitution because ―neither nervousness, emotional involvement, nor inability to deny or confirm any effect whatsoever is equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability on the part of the jurors to follow the court‘s instructions and obey their oaths, regardless of their feelings about the death penalty.‖ (Adams, supra, at p. 50.) Those concerns are not pertinent to the excusal of Peter B. Moreover, the individual responses by the two jurors in Adams 20 played little or no part in the Adams court‘s decision to reverse the conviction in that case. The high court‘s reasoning was more global, explaining that the Texas statute permitted the excusal of jurors who would otherwise be qualified under federal constitutional principles, and thus ―the Constitution disentitles the State to execute a sentence of death imposed by a jury from which such prospective jurors have been excluded.‖ (Adams, supra, at p. 51.) Accordingly, Adams does not require reversal here.4 Defendant further contends the trial court‘s suggestion that Peter B.‘s responses were inconsistent—first ranking himself as a five on a scale of 10, and then in the ―bottom 10‖ on a scale of 100—is inaccurate. We agree the trial court may have been mistaken on this particular point, for the two metrics concerned different questions. Peter B. described himself as a five on a scale of 10 on the death penalty generally, but in the ―bottom 10‖ out of 100 of those willing to impose the death penalty in the particular circumstance of a criminal having killed a single victim for financial gain. But the juror equivocated when he first said he would always vote for life in a case of a single murder victim killed for financial gain but then said he would not use the word ―never‖ and the ―potential is there‖ for imposing the death penalty in that circumstance. Defendant argues the juror merely experienced ―a moment of confusion,‖ but that is not the only possible explanation, and the trial court was entitled to resolve the ambiguity concerning the juror‘s true state of mind in favor of dismissal. 4 Defendant makes the same comparison to the jurors in Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. 38, in arguing the trial court erroneously excused Prospective Jurors Nancy N., Maria G., Brenda M., Kusum P., Betty F., and Yolanda N., because of their views on the death penalty. We reject those arguments for the same reason, i.e., that the comparisons to Adams, which concerned a very different Texas statute, are inapt. 21 More importantly, in resolving the larger question—whether the juror‘s views would substantially impair his ability to be fair and impartial—the court‘s ruling is substantially supported by the record. Noting that the scales were not the ―total litmus test‖ and considering the totality of the circumstances, it appeared to the court the juror was so unlikely to vote for death in a single killing committed for financial gain—in the ―bottom 10‖ out of 100—that he was substantially impaired within the meaning of Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412. As noted, ante, a prospective juror‘s inability to fairly weigh the facts and apply the law need not be demonstrated with unmistakable clarity. (People v. Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 25–26.) We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court‘s decision that Prospective Juror Peter B.‘s views permitted his dismissal from the venire.