Opinion ID: 160815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: leon good faith exception

Text: 25 Although the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, we conclude that the evidence seized at Tuter's residence need not be suppressed because of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct, id. at 916, and that the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered . . . only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule, id. at 918. Where an officer acting with objective good faith obtains a search warrant from a detached and neutral magistrate and the executing officers act within its scope, there is nothing to deter. United States v. Nolan, 199 F.3d 1180, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999). (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21). 26 The Supreme Court recognizes four situations in which an officer would not have reasonable grounds for believing a warrant was properly issued. In these situations, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would not apply. Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1007 (citation omitted). 27 First, evidence should be suppressed if the issuing magistrate was misled by an affidavit containing false information or information that the affiant would have known was false if not for his reckless disregard of the truth. Second, the exception does not apply when the issuing magistrate wholly abandons [his] judicial role. Third, the good-faith exception does not apply when the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Fourth, the exception does not apply when a warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer could not reasonably believe it was valid. 28 Id. (citations and quotations omitted). 29 The district court denied application of the good-faith exception, stating only that Agent Magalassi's affidavit was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant. The applicability of Leon's good faith exception is a question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1206 (10th Cir. 1998). Applying that standard, we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the good faith exception does not apply. 30 Tuter contends that the first and third exceptions listed above are applicable here to preclude use of the good faith exception. We are satisfied that the first exception is not present here. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), if a defendant establishes that a police officer made false statements in an affidavit supporting a search warrant knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth, and that the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause, the evidence seized during the resultant search must be excluded. Id. at 155-56. Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake, however, are insufficient. Id. at 171. The district court conducted a Franks hearing on the veracity of the affidavit here, and listened to the testimony of Agent Magalassi. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the mistakes in the supporting affidavit were insubstantial and did not contribute to the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause, and that nothing in his testimony would show that Agent Magalassi deliberately lied or recklessly disregarded the truth. 31 We are also satisfied that the third exception does not preclude application of Leon. At the time the underlying affidavit was prepared and the warrant was issued, neither the Supreme Court's J.L. decision nor this court's Danhauer decision had been issued. Agent Magalassi thus had reason to believe that corroboration of innocent facts, coupled with his investigation leading to discovery of Tuter's criminal history, would be sufficient to establish probable cause. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 244 n.13 ([I]nnocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause and the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of non-criminal acts.). Further, Agent Magalassi testified that he contacted an attorney in the U.S. Attorney's office who told him he had sufficient probable cause. See Appellant's App. at 153. 32 Just as reviewing courts give 'great deference' to the decisions of judicial officers who make probable-cause determinations, police officers should be entitled to rely upon the probable-cause determination of a neutral magistrate when defending an attack on their good faith for either seeking or executing a warrant. United States v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 939 (10th Cir. 1990). 33 In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination. . . . Once the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law. Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. 34 Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 (quotations, citations and internal brackets omitted). 35 We conclude it was not unreasonable for Agent Magalassi and the ATF agents to rely on the magistrate judge's authorization of the warrant. See United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that in considering the Leon good-faith principles, it must . . . be remembered that the knowledge and understanding of law enforcement officers and their appreciation for constitutional intricacies are not to be judged by the standards applicable to lawyers); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. (quotations omitted)). 36 Although we have determined that the supporting affidavit did not establish probable cause, we cannot say it was so facially insufficient under the state of law at the time he obtained the warrant that Agent Magalassi should have known the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. See id. at 922 n.23; Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1007 (The absence of information establishing the informant's reliability or basis of knowledge does not necessarily preclude an officer from manifesting a reasonable belief that the warrant was properly issued, particularly when the officer takes steps to investigate the informant's allegation.). At the time Agent Magalassi obtained the search warrant, he reasonably believed the fruits of his investigation provided sufficient corroboration of the information provided by the anonymous caller to WeTIP to establish probable cause. 37 Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.