Opinion ID: 2513985
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: On remand, the trial court must determine if Richard was adversely affected by Henderson's representation of Leslie.

Text: Richard argues that the superior court's refusal to dismiss Henderson from Leslie's representation requires reversal of the court's order terminating his parental rights. The state, however, maintains that Richard did not suffer any harm, as the state only needed to prove that the children were in need of aid under one jurisdictional basis and evidence of Richard's conviction for sexual abuse of a minor would have come in as evidence in any event because it was a matter of record. We have not yet addressed the proper remedy for a failure to disqualify counsel because of a conflict of interest in a termination of parental rights proceeding. We begin with the propositions that the right to parent is a fundamental right, [39] and that appointed counsel is guaranteed for indigent parents when their parental rights are at stake. [40] Accordingly, a parent who faces termination of parental rights is entitled to an attorney who is free of any conflict. But this case does not present that problem: Richard was throughout the termination case represented by an independent, conflict-free attorney. Richard's argument relies upon the quasi per se rule of reversal adopted in LaPierre v. State and other cases from criminal law in which defendants allege a conflict of interest. [41] But those cases involve criminal defendants who had been represented by attorneys with conflicted interests. In that situation, the conflict obviously threatens to deprive the defendant of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel; the rule of almost automatic reversal simply recognizes that this constitutional right has been traditionally deemed nearly absolute. LaPierre's harmless error test, then, is uniquely tailored to the fundamental nature of the constitutional right it protects: the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel in the proceeding at issue. In the case at issue here, by contrast, Richard was not represented by the conflicted attorney; rather, his former attorney in an earlier matter improperly represented another partyRichard's codefendant, Leslie in the present action. In this situation, there is no reason to believe that the disputed conflict of interest deprived Richard of his right to effective assistance of counsel in the present case. Although Henderson & Kay's conflict undeniably exposed Richard to a risk of prejudice by potentially enabling the firm to use previously gained confidences unfairly against Richard, this form of prejudice has little bearing on the interests protected by Richard's constitutional right to counsel: his right to effective representation in the present case by his own attorney. Throughout these termination proceedings, Richard received the services of a nonconflicted attorney whose loyalty and competence remain unchallenged. To be sure, improprieties directed against a defendant by a codefendant's attorney can cause serious prejudice and, in that sense, can hamper the defendant's attorney's ability to present a successful defense. But error of that kind is no different than any other error emanating from sources beyond the defense counsel's control. Because such errors do not derive from or reflect any shortcoming in the quality of the defendant's legal representation in the case at issue, they cannot fairly be said to infringe the defendant's constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Richard offers no authority to the contrary. The only case he cites involving a codefendant's improper representation by an attorney who formerly represented the defendant, State v. Sanders, [42] is readily distinguishable: because the conflicted attorney in Sanders initially represented the defendant in the same case, the conflict at issue there directly implicated the defendant's right to counsel in that case. We therefore see no reason to assume that Richard suffered the same kind of fundamental, constitutionally subversive harm that LaPierre and Cuyler presume will occur when a defendant's own counsel actively serves interests adverse to the defendant's. Moreover, Richard suggests no other sound reasons to apply a harmless error test like LaPierre's, which builds in a presumption of prejudice. Although he cursorily asserts that a presumption of prejudice is necessary because the prejudicial effects of conflicted representation may be difficult to prove, Richard fails to explain why this is so. The assertion that prejudice is difficult to prove may have considerable merit when a defendant is represented by a conflicted attorney, and perhaps even when a codefendant is improperly represented by an attorney who formerly represented the defendant in the same case. [43] But the inherent difficulty of proving prejudice does not seem self-evident when the conflict arises from former representation in a different proceeding. Assisted by current counsel, the defendant would presumably be able to recall or discover most previously revealed confidences and would be capable of identifying and guarding against their possible exploitation by defendant's former counsel. Hence, it would not seem unreasonable to require some showing of actual prejudice as a prerequisite to reversal. Nor would any deterrent purpose be served in this case by replacing the conventional harmless error test, which demands a showing of actual prejudice, with a rule that presumes prejudice. To the contrary, in the present case a reversal based on presumed prejudice would have perverse consequences: it would have no direct impact on the offending attorneys or their client; yet it would severely penalize the state and, consequently, the three children whose interests the state representseven though the state actively sought to disqualify Kay at the superior court level. This is not to say that a conflict like this could never have constitutional ramifications. But if the ethical breach in this case raises constitutional concerns, they center on notions of fairnessprocedural due process. [44] We can imagine circumstances in which representation of a codefendant by the defendant's former counsel might generate a risk of unfair prejudice so grave as to violate the defendant's right to due process. But beyond showing the bare existence of a conflict here, Richard points out no specific circumstances suggesting fundamental unfairness. Nor are any such circumstances readily apparent. Given the numerous allegations underlying the state's termination petition and the strength of its evidence, Richard's prior sexual abuse prosecutionthe case in which he was represented by Kaywas not essential to the superior court's decision. Richard's conviction in that case was a matter of public record. Given that any attorney representing Leslie, conflicted or not, would be free to exploit this information, it seems difficult to fathom what confidences Richard might have revealed in the prior proceeding that could have caused him any significant incremental damage. And finally, it seems relevant to consider that Kay personally played only a minor role in the termination case, representing Leslie in the case's earliest stages and then handing it off to Henderson. Once Kay stepped out of the picture, his firm made diligent efforts to screen him from Henderson. Although as an ethical matter these screening measures did not meet Rule 1.9's stringent requirements or authorize Henderson & Kay to represent Leslie, they did, as a practical matter, eliminate much of the risk of actual prejudice to Richard. They thus cut strongly against a finding of fundamental unfairness. Absent a more particularized showing of actual prejudice, then, we see no basis for concluding that the circumstances of this case implicate Richard's constitutional right to due process. It follows that the error in allowing conflicted representation is a non-constitutional error. For these reasons, we conclude that our conventional test for non-constitutional error must be used to determine if Henderson & Kay's ethical breach amounted to reversible error. [45] On remand, the superior court must determine if there is a realistic likelihood that Henderson & Kay's conflicting interest had any appreciable effect on the outcome of the termination proceedings.