Opinion ID: 2444297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Declining the Default Request

Text: [¶ 9] Smith argues that the court abused its discretion by failing to grant his motion and award him primary residence by default after Rideout failed to appear for both the case management conference and the call of the docket. Rideout responds that she did not receive notice of either pre-trial proceeding because of a mistaken address. [¶ 10] We review the denial of a motion for default for an abuse of discretion, with the presumption being that justice is better served by adjudicating cases on their merits than by the use of default judgments. Sheepscot Land Corp. v. Gregory, 383 A.2d 16, 23 (Me.1978). [¶ 11] Default requests must be approached with particular caution when parental rights are at issue. A court's primary concern in parental rights matters must be the best interests of the child, and resolution of the issues affecting children is accomplished most appropriately if both parents can be heard, unless one parent has evidently abandoned the field. Further, in parental rights matters, as has occurred in this case, judgments are subject to being reopened and reconsidered upon a showing of a substantial change of circumstances. Thus, a default may give only a temporary victory and add little to the stability of a child's living situation or other interests that are important to a child's well-being. [¶ 12] Rule 109 of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure states that if a party fails to appear at a case management or pretrial conference, the court may take appropriate action including issuing a default judgment. Further, M.R. Civ. P. 117 provides that no default judgment shall be issued in a parental rights and responsibilities action without all parties being given notice and opportunity to appear and be heard before entry of judgment. Applying the very deferential abuse of discretion standard, we have approved the entry of defaults or refusal to strike defaults resulting from failures to appear at preliminary proceedings in parental rights matters. See Ezell v. Lawless, 2008 ME 139, ¶¶ 18-33, 955 A.2d 202, 206-10; Conrad v. Swan, 2008 ME 2, ¶¶ 9-11, 940 A.2d 1070, 1074-75. Those opinions do not mandate entry of a default here. [¶ 13] We have previously determined that a trial court has exceeded the bounds of its discretion when, in discretionary decision-making, the court: (1) considers a factor prohibited by law, see Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074, 1077-78; Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1029-31 (Me.1980); (2) declines to consider a legally proper factor under a mistaken belief that the factor cannot be considered, see State v. Svay, 2003 ME 93, ¶ 11, 828 A.2d 790, 794; (3) acts or declines to act based on a mistaken view of the law, see Shaw v. Packard, 2005 ME 122, ¶¶ 11-12, 886 A.2d 1287, 1290; State v. Mason, 408 A.2d 1269, 1272-73 (Me.1979); or (4) expressly or implicitly finds facts not supported by the record according to the clear error standard of review, Pettinelli, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d at 1077-78. [¶ 14] None of the criteria for vacating the trial court's exercise of discretion are met in this case. As discussed above, trial courts should be, and here the trial court was, cautious in addressing requests for defaults in parental rights cases. Rideout's failure to appear at a pre-trial conference or the call of the docket does not mandate the entry of a default judgment against her. The court had the discretion to decide whether it was in the interest of justice and in the best interest of the child to enter a default judgment or hold a hearing on the merits. The court did not abuse its discretion by declining to grant, by default, Smith's motion to change primary residence.