Opinion ID: 2583901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Agent Immunity Under Section 1983

Text: County, on behalf of its sheriff's department and sheriff (hereafter defendants) contends that California sheriffs conducting criminal investigations are acting on behalf of the state when performing law enforcement activities. Accordingly, defendants claim that, as a state agent, the sheriff enjoys the state's immunity from prosecution for the asserted violations of section 1983 occurring in this case. Contrary to the Court of Appeal, we agree with defendants. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... Is a sheriff engaged in a criminal investigation a person under section 1983? The United States Supreme Court has held that cities, counties, and local officers sued in their official capacity are themselves persons for purposes of section 1983 and, although they cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983 for their subordinate officers' unlawful acts, they may be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried out under their own regulations, policies, customs, or usages by persons having final policymaking authority over the actions at issue. ( McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, 784-785, 117 S.Ct. 1734, 138 L.Ed.2d 1 ( McMillian ); Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services (1978) 436 U.S. 658, 690-692, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 ( Monell ); see Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 348, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920 ( Pitts ); County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1171, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860 ( Peters ).) On the other hand, states and state officers sued in their official capacity are not considered persons under section 1983 and are immune from liability under the statute by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. ( Howlett v. Rose (1990) 496 U.S. 356, 365, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332; Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 63-67, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45; Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 348, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1171, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) As Will stated, it does not follow that if municipalities are persons then so are States. States are protected by the Eleventh Amendment [of the United States Constitution] while municipalities are not.... ( Will, supra, at p. 70, 109 S.Ct. 2304.) Will continued, noting that Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. [Citation.] As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304.) The rule exempting the state and its officers applies to officers such as sheriffs if they were acting as state agents with final policymaking authority over the complained-of actions. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 784-785, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Defendants claim they are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment on the ground that in California, the sheriff acts on behalf of the state rather than the county when engaged in investigating crime. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the sheriff was acting as an agent of County, not the state, while engaged in the warrantless search of plaintiffs' home. The court relied primarily on two federal cases that had concluded that California sheriffs act on behalf of the county in performing at least some of their law enforcement functions. ( Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo (9th Cir.2002) 291 F.3d 549 ( Bishop ); vacated on other grounds and remanded in Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony (2003) 538 U.S. 701, 123 S.Ct. 1887, 155 L.Ed.2d 933 [Indian tribes lack standing to sue under section 1983]; Brewster v. Shasta County (9th Cir.2001) 275 F.3d 803, 807-808 ( Brewster ), cert. den. sub nom. Shasta County v. Brewster (2002) 537 U.S. 814, 123 S.Ct. 75, 154 L.Ed.2d 17.) Defendants argue these federal decisions are inapposite, and they claim that two California cases are controlling. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) We agree with defendants that the state cases more accurately reflect California law. The Court of Appeal in the present case concluded that the sheriff, exercising his or her crime investigation functions (here, searching plaintiffs' house and seizing certain documents), acted as an agent of County, not the state. The court, largely ignoring Pitts, found Peters factually distinguishable because it involved the limited question whether the sheriff in setting policies concerning the release of persons from county jail, acts on behalf of the state or county. The Court of Appeal therefore found Peters not dispositive of the issue whether sheriffs act for the state in carrying out crime investigations. Accordingly, the appellate court looked to the two above cited federal cases holding that California sheriffs are county actors when investigating crime occurring within the county. ( Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 566; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808; see also Cortez v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir.2002) 294 F.3d 1186, 1191-1192 [sheriff's department acts as county agent in administering county jail policies]; Streit v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir.2001) 236 F.3d 552, 559-565 [same].) Based on its analysis of these federal cases, and its belief that a contrary rule would preclude all section 1983 suits against local law enforcement officers, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the County, its sheriff's department, and sheriff. We disagree. As is apparent, resolution of the question before us inevitably involves careful analysis of several state and federal cases. We start with the two California cases deemed by defendants to be most apposite, and then consider the principal federal cases cited by plaintiffs and relied on by the Court of Appeal.
In Pitts, persons whose child molestation convictions were reversed on appeal brought civil actions against County of Kern, its district attorney, and his employees, asserting civil rights violations under section 1983 arising from alleged misconduct during the criminal prosecution. The district attorney and his employees prevailed under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity and, accordingly, Pitts was concerned only with the liability of the county. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 345-347, 352, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) The plaintiffs' action against the county alleged that its district attorney had established a pattern or practice of procuring false statements and testimony by threats, promises, and intimidation, and also failed to provide adequate training procedures and regulations to prevent such conduct. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 352, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) As noted above, although the county could not be held vicariously liable under section 1983, it could be held directly liable for constitutional violations carried out under its own policies. ( Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-692, 98 S.Ct. 2018.) Pitts held, however, that a district attorney represents the state rather than the county when preparing to prosecute crimes and training and developing policies for prosecutorial staff. Although Pitts involved district attorneys rather than sheriffs, the court relied on statutes and analysis applying to both kinds of officers. In Pitts, we first observed that the question whether a public official represents a county or a state when acting in a particular capacity is analyzed under state, not federal law. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 352-353, 356, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920; see McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734 [determining actual functions of government officer is dependent on relevant state law].) For guidance in resolving this question, Pitts next turned to McMillian, which had examined Alabama state law to determine whether a sheriff was a state or county official. In McMillian, after his murder conviction was reversed due to suppression of exculpatory evidence, the plaintiff sued an Alabama sheriff for damages under section 1983 for intimidating a witness and withholding evidence. The United States Supreme Court examined Alabama's constitutional and statutory provisions concerning sheriffs and concluded that, while executing their law enforcement duties in Alabama, sheriffs are executive officers of the state, not the county, and accordingly are immune from section 1983 liability. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 791-793, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Among other factors, the McMillian court considered the role of sheriffs as state representatives under the Alabama Constitution and Alabama statutes, the authority of Alabama sheriffs to enforce state criminal laws in their counties, and the lack of similar enforcement authority by the counties themselves. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 787-791, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) McMillian concluded that these factors outweighed several countervailing factors that supported the conclusion that Alabama sheriffs were officers of the county, namely, that the county paid the sheriffs' salary and provided them with equipment, lodging and expenses, that the sheriffs' jurisdiction was limited by county borders, and that county voters elected these sheriffs. ( Id. at pp. 791-792, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Pitts applied McMillian's analytical framework to conclude that a California district attorney acts on behalf of the state rather than the county in preparing to prosecute crimes and in training and developing policies for prosecutorial staff. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 356-366, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) In reaching its conclusion, the court considered several constitutional and statutory provisions tending to support or negate state agency, but placed special emphasis on article V, section 13, of the state Constitution, providing that [t]he Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney ... in all matters pertaining to the duties of their ... offices.... Under this same provision, the Attorney General may require district attorneys to make appropriate reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions, and may prosecute violations of law if, in his or her opinion, state laws are not adequately being enforced in any county. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 356-357, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) We also noted in Pitts that Government Code sections 12550 and 12524, and Penal Code section 923 contain similar provisions placing county district attorneys under the supervision of the state Attorney General. ( Pitts, supra, at pp. 357-358, & fn. 5, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) We observed in Pitts that, in contrast to the broad supervisory powers of the Attorney General over district attorneys, Government Code section 25303 bars county boards of supervisors from affecting or obstructing the district attorneys' investigative or prosecutorial functions. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 358, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) We also pointed out that a district attorney acts in the name of the people of the state when prosecuting criminal violations of state law. ( Id. at p. 359, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) Pitts readily acknowledged that other constitutional and statutory provisions would support a conclusion that a district attorney is a county officer: For example, county voters elect district attorneys (Cal. Const., art. XI, ง 4, subd. (c)), who are listed as county officers (Gov.Code, ง 24000, subd. (a)), are generally ineligible to hold office unless they are registered voters of the county in which they perform their duties (Gov.Code, ง 24001), and are compensated as prescribed by the county board of supervisors (Gov.Code, ง 25300). ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-361, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) Furthermore, under Government Code section 25303, the county board of supervisors supervises the district attorney's official conduct and expenditure of funds, although it cannot affect the district attorney's independent investigative and prosecutorial functions. ( Pitts, supra, at p. 361, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) Necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney in the prosecution of criminal cases are considered county charges. (Gov.Code, ง 29601, subd. (b)(2).) Yet, after balancing the competing factors, and relying on McMillian's similar analysis, we concluded in Pitts that, when preparing to prosecute and prosecuting crimes, a district attorney represents the state, and is not considered a policy maker for the county. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 362, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) We similarly concluded that a district attorney does not represent the county when training staff and developing policy in the area of criminal investigation and prosecution. We stated that [n]o meaningful analytical distinction can be made between these two functions [i.e., prosecuting crime on the one hand, and training/ policymaking regarding criminal investigation and prosecution on the other]. Indeed, a contrary rule would require impossibly precise distinctions. ( Ibid. ) Thus, the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above give the Attorney General oversight not only with respect to a district attorney's actions in a particular case, but also in the training and development of policy intended for use in every criminal case. ( Id. at p. 363, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.)
As noted, Pitts involved the question whether district attorneys were state agents when investigating and prosecuting crime, or when training staff and developing policy involving such matters. Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 1166, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860, applied Pitts's analysis and extended it to California sheriffs, concluding that in setting policies concerning the release of persons from the county jail, the sheriff acts as a state officer performing state law enforcement duties. Although Peters did not consider whether a sheriff acts as a state or county officer when, as here, investigating criminal activity, Peters's reasoning would clearly apply to the present case. The plaintiff in Peters brought a civil rights action under section 1983 alleging that the sheriff and his deputies, relying on an inapposite arrest warrant, improperly detained her in county jail after she had posted bail. Peters applied the McMillian/Pitts analysis to determine whether a California sheriff acts as a state or county officer in setting policies governing release of prisoners from the county jail. Peters found Pitts to be controlling, noting that the same constitutional and statutory provisions governing district attorneys considered in Pitts also apply to sheriffs. ( Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1170, 1174-1175, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) For example, article V, section 13 of the California Constitution provides that subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, [t]he Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as the Attorney General may seem advisable. (Italics added.) Similarly, Government Code section 12560, which relates to sheriffs, is substantially identical to Government Code section 12550, which relates to district attorneys and was relied on in Pitts. Section 12560 gives the Attorney General direct supervision of all sheriffs, with power to order reports concerning the investigation, detection and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions, and to direct their activities regarding these investigations. Peters also cited Government Code sections 26600 (sheriffs' duty to preserve the peace through crime prevention projects), 26601 (sheriffs' authority to arrest criminal offenders), and 26602 (sheriffs' duty to prevent breaches of peace and investigate public offenses). Like Pitts, the court in Peters found all these provisions instructive on the issue whether a sheriff acts as a state or county agent in establishing policies for the release of arrestees from jail. ( Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1174-1175, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) In addition, Peters pointed out that, as in Pitts with respect to district attorneys, the county board of supervisors has no direct control over a sheriff's performance of law enforcement functions. Government Code section 25303, upon which Pitts relied for this proposition, applies to both offices. Among other things, that section reaffirms the independent and constitutionally and statutorily designated investigative and prosecutorial functions of the sheriff and district attorney of a county. The board of supervisors shall not obstruct the investigative function of the sheriff of the county nor shall it obstruct the investigative and prosecutorial function of the district attorney of a county. [ถ] Nothing contained herein shall be construed to limit the budgetary authority of the board of supervisors over the district attorney or sheriff. (Gov.Code, ง 25303, italics added; see Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1175, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) As in Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 360-361, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920, Peters acknowledged that other constitutional and statutory provisions tended to support a theory of county agency. For example, article XI, sections 1, subdivision (b), and 4, subdivision (c), of the state Constitution provide for an elected sheriff in each county, and Government Code section 24000 includes sheriffs within the general category of county officers. But as in Pitts, Peters concluded that these provisions were outweighed by those supporting the argument that sheriffs are not policy makers for the county board of supervisors but are functionally independent of county control when performing their law enforcement functions. ( Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1176-1177, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.)
As indicated above, the Court of Appeal in this case relied on federal Ninth Circuit cases that had reached conclusions seemingly contrary to Pitts and Peters. ( Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 566; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808.) These cases, while purporting to defer to state law as required by McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at page 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734, nonetheless ultimately took the position that questions regarding section 1983 liability implicate federal law and accordingly were not necessarily controlled by Pitts or Peters. (See Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at pp. 562, 564-565 [ Pitts factually distinguishable]; Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807, 811 [expressly declining to follow Peters ].) Lower federal decisions such as Brewster and Bishop may be entitled to great weight but they are not binding on this court. (E.g., People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000; People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86, 81 Cal.Rptr. 457, 460 P.2d 129.) In any event, having reviewed those federal decisions, we conclude that they erred in failing to follow the guidance given by McMillian, Pitts, and Peters. 1. Brewster โ In Brewster, Shasta County and its sheriff's department allegedly violated the plaintiff's civil rights during a murder investigation by manipulating a witness into making a false identification, failing to test physical evidence, and ignoring exculpatory evidence. ( Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 805.) Brewster concluded that the sheriff was acting as a county agent during the investigation. The court concentrated on such factors as (1) inclusion of sheriffs as county officers in the state Constitution, article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), and Government Code section 24000, and (2) county supervision of sheriffs' activities under Government Code section 25303. ( Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 806-808.) Yet, as we noted above, Pitts and Peters found these factors insufficient to establish a county agency relationship with, respectively, district attorneys and sheriffs when performing law enforcement functions. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-362, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) Brewster, like Justice Werdegar's concurring and dissenting opinion herein, also deemed significant the fact that monetary damages assessed against sheriffs for section 1983 claims would be paid by the counties, not the state. ( Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pp. 807-808, citing Gov.Code, ง 815.2, subd. (a) [vicarious liability of government agencies for employee's torts].) Section 815.2, subdivision (a), applies, however, to both the state and counties ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 360, fn. 7, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920), and although it may provide a general basis for vicarious public liability, significantly subdivision (b) of the section immunizes both the state and county from torts that are committed by employees who are themselves immune. So, we dispute the present relevance of section 815.2, as it fails to answer the questions whether the sheriff was indeed acting as a county, not state, employee during the events in question, and whether he lacked immunity from federal civil rights actions โ the very questions we are attempting to answer here. In addition, we think the Brewster analysis is faulty for other reasons. As Brewster earlier acknowledged, if sheriffs indeed are acting as state agents in crime investigations, they would be immune from liability under section 1983 if sued in their official capacity, and their counties would not be liable for their actions. ( Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 805 [if [the sheriff] is a policy maker for the state, then the county cannot be liable for his actions].) To the extent Brewster was referring to a sheriff's liability when sued in his personal capacity, we have no occasion here to consider whether the Los Angeles County Sheriff is personally immune under any California statute. We note, however, that apart from the immunity sheriffs would enjoy while acting as state agents, sheriffs enjoy additional immunities under Government Code sections 820.2 (discretionary acts) or 820.4 (executing or enforcing laws). Significantly, Pitts discarded a similar argument under section 815.2, subdivision (a), because of the immunity of the district attorney under section 821.6 (instituting or prosecuting an action). (See Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 360, fn. 7, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) In any event, even assuming California sheriffs lack such immunity, the fact that their counties may be called on to pay any tort damage judgment rendered against their sheriffs sued in their personal capacity is only one of the many factors McMillian requires us to consider. That single factor, if it truly exists, is outweighed by the constitutional and statutory provisions discussed above, demonstrating that a sheriff represents the state, not the county, when performing law enforcement duties in his official capacity. The concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Werdegar suggests that the high court in McMillian found the vicarious liability point critical to its holding, but we read the case differently. What the high court found critical was the fact that the Alabama Supreme Court had determined that the framers of the Alabama Constitution took steps to ensure that its sheriffs would be considered executive officers of the state. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. 788-789, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Based on these critical factors, Alabama cases later concluded that sheriffs are state officers so that tort claims against them are deemed suits against the state. ( Id. at p. 789, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) The analysis in this opinion is consistent with McMillian, for our review of our state's Constitution and statutes similarly convinces us that sheriffs while performing law enforcement duties are state agents, so that the present suits should be deemed suits against the State of California. Justice Werdegar relies in part on Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation (1994) 513 U.S. 30, 48, 115 S.Ct. 394, 130 L.Ed.2d 245, as emphasizing the importance of the vulnerability of the State's purse (conc. & dis. opn., post, at 11 Cal.Rptr.3d p. 718, 87 P.3d at p. 23), but that case did not involve a section 1983 claim but was an action brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act against a multi-state port authority, which unsuccessfully sought Eleventh Amendment immunity as a state agent. Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg wrote Hess, and several years later, she wrote the dissent in McMillian, joined by three other justices. In the latter case, as Justice Werdegar observes, the majority noted that the state would be liable for tort judgments against an Alabama sheriff. However, in her dissent in McMillian arguing that sheriffs are county, not state officers, Justice Ginsburg fails even to mention this factor. Rather, she cites such factors as the inclusion of Alabama sheriffs in the executive department, and impeachment of sheriffs by state officers, and says, these measures are the strongest supports for the Court's classification of county sheriffs as state actors. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 798, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Surely, if payment of tort judgments were indeed the critical factor in determining whether a sheriff was a state officer, Justice Ginsburg, who authored Hess, would have at least mentioned that factor, and indeed would have been required to distinguish it, in her subsequent dissent in McMillian. Thus, it appears that we are instead instructed by both the majority and the dissenting opinions in McMillian to consider a variety of factors, not simply one, under state law in reaching an understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area. ( McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at p. 786, 117 S.Ct. 1734.) Justice Werdegar's opinion also asserts that unquestionably a California sheriff is a county employee for purposes of Government Code section 815.2, citing Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12 Cal.3d 710, 717, 117 Cal.Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865. But Sullivan was not faced with the question whether such a sheriff might be deemed a state agent for purposes of federal section 1983 civil rights liability, or indeed for any other purpose. The question simply was not before us in that case. Thus, section 815.2 seemingly adds nothing helpful to the resolution of the question whether sheriffs are state or county agents. 2. Bishop โ In Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d 549, a Native American tribe and its wholly owned gaming corporation sued the County of Inyo, its district attorney, and its sheriff, seeking equitable and monetary relief and alleging these defendants conducted an unlawful records search on tribal property. The federal appeals court in its now vacated opinion in Bishop, concluded that both the district attorney and sheriff were acting as county officers in obtaining and executing an invalid search warrant aimed at uncovering welfare fraud. ( Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at pp. 562-566.) As in Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at pages 806-808, the Bishop court relied on such factors as (1) inclusion of district attorneys and sheriffs as county officers in the state Constitution, article XI, section 1, subdivision (b), and Government Code section 24000, and (2) county supervision of the district attorney and sheriff activities under Government Code section 25303. ( Bishop, supra, at pp. 563-564.) As we noted above, Pitts and Peters deemed these factors insufficient to establish a county agency relationship with, respectively, district attorneys and sheriffs when performing law enforcement activities. ( Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 360-362, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1176, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) Acknowledging the constitutional and statutory supervisory authority of the state Attorney General over district attorneys and sheriffs in their law enforcement functions, bishop nonetheless expressed concern that to allow the Attorney General's supervisory role to be dispositive ... would prove too much, for if taken to its logical extreme, all local law enforcement agencies in California would be immune from prosecution for civil rights violation, contrary to Monell's holding ( Monell, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 690-692, 98 S.Ct. 2018) preserving section 1983 actions against local agencies. ( Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 564.) To the contrary, merely because the sheriff is a state officer, as demonstrated by the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, does not mean that all local law enforcement officers are also to be deemed state officers. Pitts and Peters are clearly confined, respectively, to situations in which district attorneys and sheriffs are actually engaged in performing law enforcement duties, such as investigating and prosecuting crime, or training staff and developing policy involving such matters. (See Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 366, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920; Peters, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) Immunizing these persons when actually engaged in such activities would not violate Monell's broad refusal to find all local agencies immune from suit under section 1983. Other torts or civil rights violations by these and other local officers might well be deemed acts committed by county agents, for which they and their counties could be responsible. As Peters states, This determination does not require an `all-or-nothing' categorization applying to every type of conduct in which the official may engage. Rather, the issue is whether the official is a local policymaker with regard to the particular action alleged to have deprived the plaintiff of civil rights. [Citations.] ( Peters, supra, at p. 1172, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 860.) Moreover, Bishop's analysis appears to express a policy concern (overly broad immunity from suit) that is extraneous to the high court's factor-balancing test employed in McMillian, supra, 520 U.S. at pages 786, 790-791, 117 S.Ct. 1734, a test that, as Brewster acknowledged, requires a weighing of the state's Constitution, statutes, and case law. ( Brewster, supra, 275 F.3d at p. 806.) Bishop also stressed the fact that the search warrant at issue there sought to disclose evidence of welfare fraud, a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the county's health and human services department. ( Bishop, supra, 291 F.3d at p. 565.) The fact remains, however, that welfare fraud is a state offense (e.g., Welf. & Inst.Code, งง 11482-11483). Attempting to distinguish Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th 340, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920, the Bishop court observed that Pitts involved prosecutorial conduct, whereas Bishop concerned investigating possible welfare fraud in advance of prosecution. ( Bishop, supra, at pp. 564-565.) But nothing in Pitts supports such a fine distinction. Indeed, Pitts's precise holding was that a district attorney is a state official when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law. ( Pitts, supra, at p. 360, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920, italics added.) It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs in Pitts had alleged misconduct (procuring false witness statements and failing to provide adequate training procedures) squarely falling in the pre-prosecution category. ( Id. at p. 352, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 823, 949 P.2d 920.) 3. Conclusion โ In short, we are unconvinced that either Brewster or Bishop affords cogent reasons for ruling that in California, sheriffs act as county officers in performing their law enforcement activities. We conclude that, following the analysis prescribed in McMillian, Pitts and Peters, California sheriffs act as state officers while performing state law enforcement duties such as investigating possible criminal activity. Plaintiffs assert that even if the sheriff acted as a state agent in this case, County's other agents and employees played such a significant role in the events as to justify its liability. The limited issue before us, however, involves the potential liability of the County for the acts of its sheriff. The question of the County's liability for the acts of other persons is not before us. We conclude the trial court properly sustained the demurrers of County, its sheriff's department, and sheriff to plaintiffs' civil rights action under section 1983.