Opinion ID: 2150580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The testimony showed defendant was in possession of a 1964 Corvette automobile within a few hours after it had been stolen in Iowa City.

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that such evidence is a circumstance to be taken into consideration by you in arriving at your verdict and that unless satisfactorily explained it is sufficient upon which to base a conviction, provided upon the whole case you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Defendant made timely objection to this instruction, alleging that it placed upon him the burden of explaining his recent possession of stolen property and, further, that it implied guilt on his part for failure to testify or offer proof. Defendant asserts the instruction deprived him of his constitutional right to a presumption of innocence and violated his privilege against self incrimination. Although conceding instructions in substantially similar form have been approved by this court, defendant urges we must now reassess our position in the light of Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106, and State v. Kimball (Iowa, 1970), 176 N.W.2d 864, 869. In Griffin the Supreme Court held it was reversible error for either the prosecutor or the court to comment on defendant's failure to testify as being evidence of guilt. In Kimball, decided five years after Griffin, we held the trial court should be careful not to violate the spirit of Griffin. We said any instruction on defendant's failure to testify, even one which cautions the jury to draw no inference therefrom, would be reversible error unless specifically requested by the defendant. While we do not approve the wording of the instruction as a model to be followed, we do not believe it constitutes reversible error nor that it conflicts with either Griffin or Kimball. Unlike those cases, here it is not defendant's silence which is said to raise an inference. It is his possession of recently stolen property which does so. The propriety of such an instruction has been considered by various federal circuit courts since the Griffin case. It has invariably been approved. United States v. Coppola (1970), 2 Cir., 424 F.2d 991, 994; United States v. Brotherton (1970), 8 Cir., 427 F.2d 1286, 1288; Kramer v. United States (1969), 8 Cir., 408 F.2d 837, 839; Anderson v. United States (1969), 8 Cir., 406 F.2d 529, 535; Kowalewski v. United States (1969), 9 Cir., 418 F.2d 118, 121, and Smith v. United States (1969), 5 Cir., 413 F.2d 1121, 1125. See also Volume I, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Devitt and Blackman, sections 13.11, and 13.12, pages 284-290 and 52A C.J.S. Larceny § 105, page 586. These circuit court opinions refute every argument raised by defendant. The Anderson case holds such an instruction does not shift the burden of proof nor constitute an adverse comment by the court. Kowalewski refers to the instruction as a correct statement of the law. Coppola and Smith hold to the same effect. Further support may be found in Harding v. United States (1964), 8 Cir., 337 F.2d 254, 257, which although decided before Griffin v. California was approved by the Brotherton case in 1970. These cases all confirm our own opinions. See State v. Everett (Iowa 1968), 157 N.W.2d 144, 146. We have cited the federal authority because defendant so vigorously insists Griffin v. California, supra, controls. We do not believe it does. Nor do we believe there is anything in State v. Kimball, supra, to help defendant. In any event the prospective application of that case is limited to trials starting after May 5, 1970. Defendant was tried in 1969. In this regard, too, we point out the transcript (but not the record) discloses defendant requested, and the court gave, a cautionary instruction concerning his failure to testify. (This is the procedure we later approved in the Kimball case.) When we consider, as we must, all the instructions togetherincluding the cautionary one given at defendant's request and when we note no objection was made to those on burden of proof, presumption of innocence, or reasonable doubt, we are satisfied they fully and fairly set out the law for the jury. See United States v. Brotherton and Smith v. United States, both supra.