Opinion ID: 1122532
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Foreseeability

Text: Steffensen next contends that the trial court incorrectly stated the law concerning foreseeability in instructing the jury about her second theory of negligence, i.e., Smith's actions following the stop and detention. We review challenges to jury instructions under a correctness standard. Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 490. Jury instruction 32 stated: Foreseeability in these instructions means injury or harm, if any, to a customer which the defendant and its employees could have reasonably anticipated as the natural consequences of their actions, if any, even though they were not able to anticipate the particular injury which did occur. In determining what is foreseeable, you must determine that the actions by Burnett were predictable by Smith's employees and not just a mere possibility. (Emphasis added.) Steffensen argues that this instruction improperly focused on the specific actions of Burnett rather than on shoplifters in general. Like the court of appeals, we agree that the instruction was harmless error but for different reasons. By directing the jury to examine the acts of a specific shoplifter in determining foreseeability, instruction 32 somewhat misstated the law. What is necessary to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause is that it be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident would occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of the same general nature. Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978); Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 265 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Utah 1954). A business owner need not predict the exact injury that flows from his negligence. The foreseeability requirement is not so exacting. Because instruction 32 included a requirement that the jury find that Burnett's actions were predictable, it is possible that a juror could interpret such a requirement to mean that the precise accident was foreseeable. This is an erroneous characterization of our previous decisions. The court of appeals recognized this error but concluded that it was harmless. Steffensen, 820 P.2d at 490. We agree with the court of appeals that the specific identity of the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of foreseeability. Id. However, the court of appeals also reasoned that the error within instruction 32 was harmless because the question of foreseeability goes to the issue of negligence, and the jury found Smith['s] negligent. Therefore, any error in defining foreseeability did not affect the jury's verdict. Id. We disagree with this reasoning and conclude that the question of foreseeability does not exclusively go to the issue of negligence, but that it similarly involves proximate cause. In Rees, we determined that foreseeability is required to meet the test of negligence and proximate cause. 587 P.2d at 133. In fact, foreseeability may relate to negligence, as proximate cause itself relates to negligence, but foreseeability is an element of proximate cause. Black's Law Dictionary 584 (5th ed. 1979). The court of appeals' harmless error analysis was oversimplified. While we agree with the court of appeals that the mischaracterization of the law within instruction 32 was harmless error, we reach that conclusion on different grounds. Steffensen argues that this misstatement, coupled with an erroneous directed verdict, constrained the jury to find that Smith's did not proximately cause Steffensen's injuries. This argument is unpersuasive. First, as discussed previously, the directed verdict was proper. Second, instruction 32 itself remedied its own error of focusing on Burnett's specific acts. The sentence preceding the erroneous portion states, Foreseeability in these instructions means injury or harm, if any, to a customer which the defendant and its employees could have reasonably anticipated as the natural consequences of their actions, if any, even though they were not able to anticipate the particular injury which did occur.  (Emphasis added.) This sentence correctly stated the law that only the general nature of the injury need be foreseeable. The minor inaccuracy in instruction 32 which specifically referred to Burnett does not amount to prejudicial error. It would have been natural for the jury, in any event, to evaluate the specific actions of Burnett in determining whether his criminal actions were foreseeable. No trial is perfect, and in many proceedings there is some technical error. However, to reverse a trial verdict, this court must find not a mere possibility, but a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the result. Even if the instruction had been worded correctly, there is no reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been more favorable to Steffensen. See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). This technical error in instruction 32 does not undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict. See State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992).