Opinion ID: 4678281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Legal Arguments

Text: Ellison raises several additional arguments in support of her trespass-to-try-title claim that we address in turn. First, Ellison argues that equitable defenses like ratification are categorically unavailable in a trespass-to-try-title action. 17 We disagree. The procedural rules provide that, upon pleading “not guilty” in a trespass-to-try-title suit, “the defendant may give in evidence any lawful defense to the action except the defense of limitations, which shall be specially pleaded.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 789. As a general matter, we have held that such a plea allows the defendant to “interpose any legal or equitable defense that tends to defeat the plaintiff’s right to recover.” Kauffman v. Brown, 18 S.W. 425, 427 (Tex. 1892) (emphasis added); see also Hancock v. Booker, 608 S.W.2d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—Waco 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (same) (citing Guest v. Guest, 12 S.W. 831 (Tex. 1889) (holding that estoppel is a valid defense to a trespass-to-try-title claim)). To the extent Ellison frames the issue as one of Concho’s “standing,” we agree with Concho that 17 standing has nothing to do with the availability of equitable defenses. Ellison, not Concho, is the trespass-to-try-title plaintiff who must establish standing to assert her claim. 17 Ellison relies on Rogers v. Ricane Enterprises, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989) (Rogers I), to support her assertion regarding the unavailability of equitable defenses, but that reliance is misplaced. In Rogers I, we said only that the defense of laches, which is premised on a plaintiff’s unreasonable delay in asserting claims, “is not a defense in a trespass to try title suit where the plaintiff’s right is based on legal title.” Id. at 80. We said nothing about any other equitable defense. Ellison further claims that we foreclosed ratification as a trespass-to-try-title defense in a subsequent appeal in the same case. See Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763, 769–70 (Tex. 1994) (Rogers II). Again, Ellison is mistaken. In Rogers II, we rejected the jury’s ratification finding because the evidence did not support it, not because the defense was categorically unavailable. Id. Next, Ellison contends that abandonment of title to real property is not recognized in Texas. 18 On that point, she is correct. Rogers I, 772 S.W.2d at 80. However, Concho is not claiming that Ellison abandoned her title. See Trenolone v. Cook Expl. Co., 166 S.W.3d 495, 500–01 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (explaining that “abandonment” of personal property is “the relinquishment of possession of a thing by the owner with the intention of terminating his ownership, but without vesting it in any one else” (emphasis added) (quoting Pearson v. Black, 120 S.W.2d 1075, 1079 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1938, no writ))). Rather, Concho claims, and conclusively demonstrated, that Ellison ratified the location of the boundary line between Ellison’s leasehold and the adjacent leasehold. Ratification is not abandonment. 18 Though Ellison primarily argues that she obtained leasehold title to all 301 acres north of the public road via written conveyance, she alternatively argues that she obtained such title by adverse possession and that title obtained by adverse possession similarly cannot be abandoned. 18 Ellison also relies on the doctrine of estoppel by deed, which “[i]n the broadest sense . . . stands for the proposition that all parties to a deed [and their privies] are bound by the recitals in it, which operate as an estoppel.” Trial v. Dragon, 593 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. 2019). This appears to be a modified version of the argument that objective ambiguity is required to justify a boundary agreement. As discussed, adjacent owners are free to resolve uncertainty amongst themselves regarding a boundary location. Singleton, 44 S.W.2d at 481. The estoppelby-deed doctrine simply does not apply to written boundary agreements. Finally, as a general matter, Ellison’s briefing paints a picture of an elaborate land-grab scheme orchestrated by Samson. To be sure, the title opinions Samson obtained expressed serious concerns about Samson’s leasehold interest, both because of the vague legal description of the “493 acres” in its lease and the deeds passing title to the southeast tract, and because of the 1927 deed’s reference to the public road. Further, Samson does not dispute that it drafted the boundary stipulation that the Farmars and Richey signed. But we fail to see how those facts render the stipulation invalid. Moreover, to the extent Ellison asserts that Samson “preyed upon and/or instigated” uncertainty among the mineral owners, there is simply no evidence to support such an assertion. The parties to the boundary stipulation agreed to resolve their uncertainty about the location of the boundary between the mineral estates, and Ellison ratified that boundary location with respect to the leasehold interests. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on Ellison’s trespass-to-try-title claim and bad-faith trespass claim. 19