Opinion ID: 2053909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Explicit Words.

Text: The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a); Commonwealth v. Lurie, 524 Pa. 56, 60, 569 A.2d 329, 331 (1990). When the words of a statute are clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Id. at § 1921(b); Walker v. Fennell, 426 Pa.Super. 469, 472, 627 A.2d 771, 773 (1993). Only [w]hen the words of a statute are not explicit, may a court ascertain the intention of the General Assembly by considering: (1) The occasion and necessity for the statute. (2) The circumstances under which it was enacted. (3) The mischief to be remedied. (4) The object to be obtained. (5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects. (6) The consequences of a particular interpretation. (7) The contemporaneous legislative history. (8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c) (emphasis added); Freeze v. Donegal Mutual Insurance Co., 412 Pa.Super. 305, 312, 603 A.2d 595, 598, appeal denied, 532 Pa. 656, 615 A.2d 1312 (1992). Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a); Appeal of Hume Village, 51 Pa.Commw. 465, 468, 414 A.2d 768, 769-70 (1980); Township of Derry, Dauphin County v. Swartz, 21 Pa.Commw. 587, 589, 346 A.2d 853, 855 (1975). It is a presumption of statutory construction [t]hat the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1922(b); Jones v. W.C.A.B. (Midland-Ross Corp.), 148 Pa.Commw. 593, 597, 612 A.2d 570, 572 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 638, 621 A.2d 583 (1993). Whenever possible, each word in a statutory provision is to be given meaning and not to be treated as surplusage. In re Employees of Student Services, 495 Pa. 42, 52, 432 A.2d 189, 195 (1981); Habecker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 299 Pa.Super. 463, 471, 445 A.2d 1222, 1226 (1982); Fumo v. Hafer, 155 Pa.Commw. 520, 525, 625 A.2d 733, 735 (1993). The statute defines a new vehicle as a new vehicle which has never been registered or titled in Pennsylvania or any other state on which a tax for education . . . has not been paid prior to sale. 63 Pa.S.A. § 818.10(12) (emphasis added). It clearly and unambiguously defines a new vehicle as a new vehicle. As the Commonwealth Court stated, [t]he legislature could have chosen the words a vehicle or any vehicle but, rather, chose to include in its definition of a new vehicle that the vehicle must also be new. Alpha Auto Sales v. Dept. of State, 149 Pa.Commw. 621, 626, 613 A.2d 679, 682 (1992) (emphasis in original). By adopting the two prong test, the Majority completely ignores the presence of the term new, treating it as mere surplusage. As a result, the Majority eliminates a definitional requirement and violates a principle of statutory construction. [2] Because the word new is not technical and has not acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning, it shall be construed according to . . . [its] common and approved usage. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903(a). Pennsylvania courts have generally used dictionaries to determine the common and approved usage of a term. See Patricca v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 527 Pa. 267, 275, 590 A.2d 744, 748 (1991); In re Stout, 521 Pa. 571, 583-4, 559 A.2d 489, 495-6 (1989); Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 374, 543 A.2d 531, 532 (1988); McIntyre v. Board of Supervisors of Shohola Township, 150 Pa.Commw. 15, 20, 614 A.2d 335, 337 (1992); Hitchings v. Pennsylvania State Ethics Comm'n., 147 Pa.Commw. 384, 607 A.2d 866 (1992); Tobin v. Radnor Township Bd. of Comm'rs., 142 Pa.Commw. 567, 582-3, 597 A.2d 1258, 1266 (1991). Following sound principles of statutory construction, the Commonwealth Court referred to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Webster's) to ascertain the common and approved usage of new. Webster's defines new as having existed or having been made but a short time: . . . as opposed to old. Alpha Auto Sales, 149 Pa.Commw. at 626, 613 A.2d at 682. The Commonwealth Court then applied this definition to the statute and concluded that the vehicles were in fact not new.