Opinion ID: 66378
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Osborne

Text: We agree with the district court that Osborne’s appointment of Littleton occurred in excess of his statutory authority, but that Osborne did not lack jurisdiction altogether. There is no doubt that as a Mississippi youth court judge, Osborne had statutory authority over the assault case against Kemp, including her detention. See M ISS. C ODE A NN. §§ 43-21-151, 301 (1979). In addition, Osborne had the statutory authority to appoint special judges. See M ISS. C ODE A NN. § 43-21-113. Indeed, the 2004 standing order appointing Littleton as special judge shows that Osborne had some subject matter jurisdiction to appoint a special judge. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court eventually held that Osborne was without statutory authority to appoint Littleton in this particular matter and vacated Littleton’s orders, such ruling did not render Osborne wholly without jurisdiction to appoint a special judge under § 43-21-113. Osborne had the authority to appoint Littleton as special judge in particular circumstances; he simply exercised that authority incorrectly here. The Supreme Court has explained, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. at 351). In Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d at 298-99, this Court found “some subjectmatter jurisdiction” where a state criminal court judge improperly punished the mother of three defendants for “constructive contempt” after she sent him an accusatory letter complaining of his treatment of her sons. There, the district judge summarily sentenced Adams to thirty days in jail, despite the fact that she was provided no due process rights and Texas law did not empower judges to 6 No. 08-60883 punish out-of-court contempt without affording the alleged contemnor the assistance of counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the opportunity to present relevant testimony. Id. at 296, 298 (citing Ex parte Ratliff, 3 S.W.2d 406, 407 (1928)).2 Regardless, the Court held that the district judge’s general jurisdiction to punish contempt was sufficient to show that Judge McIlhany had “some” subject-matter jurisdiction for judicial immunity purposes, and, accordingly, found McIlhany immune. Id. at 299. Here, too, we conclude that Osborne’s misapplication of the Mississippi special judge statute does not wholly strip him of subject matter jurisdiction.