Opinion ID: 73172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Anderson Decisions

Text: 7 We would proceed immediately to applying Anderson 's balancing test were it not for a more recent decision of this Court finding uncertainty about the standard to be applied. In Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1992), this Court noted that although Anderson deviated from the strict scrutiny model of analysis, the Supreme Court in Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992), returned to the traditional strict scrutiny analysis in striking down two provisions of an Illinois law that made it difficult for a new political party to obtain a position on the ballot. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1530 (citing Norman v. Reed ). Thus, the Duke court found uncertainty in the specific standard to be employed, but held that the plaintiffs seeking an injunction were unlikely to prevail even under a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. A few months after Duke, the Supreme Court decided Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), which sheds further light on the standard for analyzing state election laws that burden First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In Burdick, the Supreme Court stated that the mere fact that a State's system creates barriers ... to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose ... does not of itself compel close scrutiny.' Instead, as the full Court agreed in Anderson, a more flexible standard applies. Id. at 433-34, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (internal citations omitted). After repeating the Anderson test, the Supreme Court in Burdick instructed specifically how to apply that test. Citing Norman v. Reed, the Supreme Court stated that when the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights are subjected to severe' restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.'  Id. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059. Then citing Anderson again, the Supreme Court continued that when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions'  on those constitutional rights, 8 then  the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions. Id. A few months after Burdick this Court addressed the Anderson test again. In Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir.1992), this Court stated that the approach used by the Anderson Court can be described as a balancing test that ranges from strict scrutiny to a rational-basis analysis, depending on the circumstances. Id. at 1543 (emphasis added). After that description, this Court in Fulani also noted that in Burdick v. Takushi, the Supreme Court reiterated the Anderson test and reaffirmed that to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest ... would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently.'  Id. (quoting Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059).10 After this review, we conclude that the Anderson balancing test still controls challenges to ballot access requirements and proceed to apply that test in the manner instructed in Burdick. D. Florida's Statutes Are Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory The first step is to determine whether Florida's alternative qualifying fee and signature petition requirements impose reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions or severe restrictions. We readily conclude Florida has adopted reasonable, nondiscriminatory ballot access restrictions for several reasons. 10 The Fulani court did observe that Burdick, Tashjian, and Anderson each involved challenges based solely on the First Amendment and not equal protection. Id. Nonetheless, the Fulani court cited this Court's prior decision in Bergland v. Harris, 767 F.2d 1551, 1552 (11th Cir.1985), and held that [i]n this circuit, however, equal protection challenges to state ballot-access law are considered under the Anderson test. Id. 9 First, filing fees have long been considered a reasonable, non-discriminatory means of regulating ballot access so long as there is an alternative means of ballot access as exists in Florida's signature petition alternative. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718-19, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144-45, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). This Court already upheld the constitutionality of Florida's filing fee in 1994 when it was four and half percent of the annual salary of the office sought, noting that an alternative method is also available. Little v. Florida Dept. of State, 19 F.3d 4, 5 (11th Cir.1994). In Little, this Court also noted that a filing fee of up to five percent of the salary of the state office sought had been upheld in Adams v. Askew, 511 F.2d 700, 704-05 (5th Cir.1975).11 Second, conceding that a five percent qualifying fee has been held constitutional, Green presents no evidence that raising the fee to seven and a half percent reduced the total number of people qualifying for major party primaries or in any other manner unnecessarily burdened his constitutional rights given the petition alternative. Indeed, when the fee was lowered back to six percent in 1998, there was no concomitant increase in candidates qualifying. Thus, we agree with the Florida appellate courts that have held that Florida's qualifying fee of seven and a half percent of the annual salary of the office sought in 1996 is reasonable. Boudreau v. Winchester, 642 So.2d 1 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (upholding total seven and a half percent qualifying fee against challenge to its partial disbursement to candidate's party and to trust fund); McNamee v. Smith, 647 So.2d 162 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1994) (same). 11 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 1981 and all Fifth Circuit Unit B decisions after October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc); Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 33 (11th Cir.1982). 10 Turning to the petition alternative, the Supreme Court has upheld petition requirements more onerous than the three percent requirement at issue here. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438-39, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (finding it constitutional to require signatures from five percent of electorate within 180 days). Addressing Florida's ballot access restrictions in particular, this Court already has upheld another section of Florida's election code that requires minor political parties to file a petition signed by three percent of the state's registered voters in order to have the names of its candidates placed on ballots for statewide offices. Libertarian Party of Florida v. State of Florida, 710 F.2d 790 (11th Cir.1983) (upholding Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.096(1) (West 1982)); see also U.S. Taxpayers of Florida v. Smith, 871 F.Supp. 426 (N.D.Fla.1993), aff'd, 51 F.3d 241 (11th Cir.1995). Thus, Florida's petition alternative for major-party candidates is likewise reasonable, especially under the particular facts here. In 1998, candidates had three months-or approximately ninety-six days-to collect signatures. Green needed to collect approximately fifty-two signatures per day. The magistrate judge aptly noted that Green could comply by asking five volunteers each to collect ten signatures a day. Moreover, Green admits that he never tried to collect signatures. Some Libertarian plaintiffs testified they had not even attempted to undertake a petition drive because in their view the 3% requirement was simply impossible to meet. Id. at 794. Thus, this Court in Libertarian concluded that those plaintiffs' [c]onclusory allegations cannot prevail. Id. Likewise, Green's conclusory allegations about the three percent petition requirement here do not show that the signature requirement is unreasonably burdensome. We recognize that one distinction between Libertarian and Green's claims is that only registered Democratic voters in the Tenth Congressional District may sign Green's petition. 11 Although the available pool of voters is smaller, the number of signatures required is also smaller.12 Green's petitioning efforts are eased by the limited geographic area in which eligible signers live. Green stresses several other candidates attempted petitioning but failed to obtain the requisite number of signatures. However, since 1992, sixty-five candidates have qualified for Congressional seats in Florida's major party primaries by petition, which defeats Green's argument. Green also complains that Florida charges a verification fee of ten cents per signature or the actual cost of verification, whichever is less. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.097(4) (West Supp.1998).13 However, this does not make Florida's petition requirement unreasonable or unduly burdensome for two reasons. First, a candidate also may collect fifteen percent more than the required number of signatures and thereby qualify to pay for only a random sampling of the signatures to be checked. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.097(2).14 Second, the verification fee is waived for candidates who swear that the charges impose an undue burden on their resources. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.097(4).15 After acknowledging Florida's charges for verifying signatures, this Court in Libertarian likewise pointed out that Florida provides petitions free of charge, and that although [c]ounty election supervisors charge 10 cents per signature to cover the costs of verifying the petitions, ... 12 The plaintiffs in Libertarian needed 144,492 signatures statewide, id. at 792, whereas Green needed only 4,077 from the Tenth Congressional District. 13 The supervisor shall be paid the sum of 10 cents for each signature checked or the actual cost of checking such signature, whichever is less.... Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.097(4). 14 When a petitioner submits petitions which contain at least 15 percent more than the required number of signatures, the petitioner may require that the supervisor of elections use the random sampling verification method in certifying the petition. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.097(2). 15 However, if a candidate ... cannot pay such charges without imposing an undue burden on personal resources or upon the resources otherwise available to such candidate ..., such candidate ... shall, upon written certification of such inability given under oath to the supervisor, be entitled to have the signatures verified at no charge. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 99.097(4). 12 they may use random sampling techniques which reduce the number of signatures checked and therefore the cost. Libertarian, 710 F.2d at 794. Like the plaintiffs in Libertarian, Green has cited no case holding that states must provide free access to the ballot in all circumstances. Id.16 Having concluded that Florida's fee and petition alternatives impose reasonable restrictions on ballot access, we also conclude that the requirements are justified by the state's compelling objectives. As noted above, the Supreme Court long has emphasized the importance of restricting ballot access: in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organizations's candidate on the ballot-the [state's] interest, if no other, [is] in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970. Florida's strong regulatory interests are sufficient to justify the reasonable restrictions at issue here. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (explaining Anderson as holding that when a state election law provision imposed only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions'  then  the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions); Libertarian, 710 F.2d at 793 (noting that under Burdick, a state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable restrictions). E. Other States' Filing Fees and Petition Requirements Green argues at length that this Court must find Florida's ballot access requirements unconstitutional because most other states either charge fees that are less than Florida's or require 16 After Libertarian, this Court held it was unconstitutional for Florida categorically to exclude minor parties from the waiver of the verification fee that was available to indigent major party candidates. Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539. 1547 (1992). However, Green sought ballot access in a major party primary and thus the charges were waivable. 13 fewer signatures for petitions. We disagree. There is a range of fees and signature requirements that are constitutional, and the Florida legislature is free to choose its ballot access requirements from that constitutional spectrum. The fact that Florida may be at the high end of that range does not make its ballot access restrictions unconstitutional. The shortcomings of such a comparative approach were recognized in Libertarian: First of all, the argument that Florida's 3% requirement must be stricken as unconstitutionally burdensome because a majority of states protect interests similar to Florida's by imposing a lesser requirement is unavailing. A court is no more free to impose the legislative judgments of other states on a sister state than it is free to substitute its own judgment for that of the state legislature. 710 F.2d at 793-94 (internal citations omitted). In this case, as in Libertarian, this Court cannot impose the legislative judgments of sister states on Florida but instead must determine whether Florida's legislative judgment expressed in its ballot access requirements passes constitutional muster. It does.