Opinion ID: 2534266
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Buckel's Evidence in Response to the Commissioner's Motion.

Text: ¶ 21. In response to the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, supported by Cromeans's affidavit, Buckel argues that MID's Market Conduct Report created a reasonable inference that MID was in possession of the public records he had requested relating to claims paid and filed. He also points to Commissioner Dale's press releases and news story.
¶ 22. Buckel asserts the State Farm Market Conduct Report indicated that MID was in possession of the requested documents because the Report stated that Commissioner Dale had subpoenaed 43,000 files from State Farm. Buckel, however, overstates the limited evidentiary value of the Market Conduct Report. ¶ 23. Buckel contends that the Report stated that MID had requested the claims information he sought and had in fact received this information provided by State Farm. Yet, nowhere in the Report did it specifically state that MID had requested this information. The Report stated that the examiners, whom MID had contracted to gather data and to complete the Report, had requested and received this information and that [t]his examination was performed by examiners, adjusters, and attorneys appointed by the Commissioner of Insurance [...] in accordance with his statutory authority. While Buckel also argues that a MID employee, Jimmy Blissett, was the examiner in charge, Buckel offers no proof that Blissett was an actual employee of MID, rather than an independent contractor. ¶ 24. While there is no doubt that the contractors/examiners had this data relating to claims filed and paid, there is no evidence that MID possessed the information sought in Buckel's records request. The Market Conduct Report does not indicate with any certainty that MID possessed the data underlying this Report. Nowhere does the Report state that MID was, at any time, in possession of this underlying data or storing this information. MID did not compile information for the Report. At best, the Report creates an inference that because MID contracted to have the Report completed, then MID also had/stored the information underlying the Report. However, this inference, without more, fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Commissioner has ever possessed the documents. Buckel has not brought forth probative evidence legally sufficient to make apparent the existence of a triable issue of fact. Smith v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Grenada, 460 So.2d 786, 792 (Miss.1984) (quoting Union Planters Nat'l Leasing, Inc. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir.1982)). To create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MID had possession of the requested information, Buckel certainly could have conducted more discovery via the examiners, former Commissioner Dale, and other persons, but failed to do so.
¶ 25. Buckel also points to the press releases and the news story in which former Commissioner Dale updated the public on the number of claims filed and paid. Buckel argues that it is simply not credible to believe that the former Commissioner either guesses at the [exact] figures or recalled the figures from memory based on the data provided from a third party source. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Buckel, this evidence does create an inference that Commissioner Dale had access to the data Buckel seeks, because the press releases do provide exact numbers of claims filed and paid. This evidence, however, does not create a reasonable inference that, years later, MID, under a new Commissioner, currently possesses the data underlying these press releases or news story. In fact, to draw the conclusion that MID possesses the data, one would have to pile inference upon inference. Specifically, one has to infer that Commissioner Dale possessed the data and then infer through Commissioner Dale's possession that MID must have possessed and currently possesses the information sought. Importantly, at the summary judgment hearing, Buckel even appreciated that MID might not have this material he had requested and conceded that MID had no responsibility to compile this information on claims. ¶ 26. Nonetheless, in support of his argument that the Report, the press releases, and the news story create circumstantially a reasonable inference sufficient to withstand a summary judgment motion, Buckel argues, [S]ummary judgment is improper when the plaintiff has advanced enough circumstantial evidence to take [his] claims out of the realm of `mere conjecture' and plant them in the solid ground of `reasonable inference.' Thomas v. The Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 233 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir.2000) (citing Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567, 570 (Miss. 1997)). ¶ 27. From the record before us, this Court is constrained to find that Buckel has not presented circumstantial evidence sufficient for a trier of fact to find that the Commissioner possessed the documents requested. Commissioner Dale made these referenced statements more than two years before MID issued the Market Conduct Report in October of 2008 and almost three years before Buckel's request. These documents do not state that MID possessed this information and only create attenuated inferences that MID currently possesses the information compiled by the examination team. Moreover, Buckel has cast no doubt on the affidavit in support of the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. ¶ 28. The law is clear that the party opposing the motion is required to bring forward significant probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact. Brown, 444 So.2d at 364 (citing Woods, 687 F.2d at 119). Without more supporting evidence, Buckel's theory remains merely possible, not probable. Thomas, 233 F.3d at 330. Buckel's evidence consists of mere general allegations and unsupported conclusions, not detailed and precise facts, and is not sufficient to withstand entry of summary judgment in light of Cromeans's uncontroverted affidavit. Brown, 444 So.2d at 362 (citing Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corp., 380 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir.1967)). ¶ 29. In sum, we find no error in the chancellor's entry of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner, because Buckel did not put forth sufficient evidence to create a reasonable inference to satisfy this element of his claim, namely that the Commissioner possessed the records requested under Mississippi Code Section 25-61-3(b) (Rev.2006).