Opinion ID: 789140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court Sentencing After Booker/Fanfan

Text: 26 Prior to Booker/Fanfan , the section 3553(a) requirement that the sentencing judge consider all of the factors enumerated in that section had uncertain import because subsection 3553(b)(1) required judges to select a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range unless the statutory standard for a departure was met. Now, with the mandatory duty to apply the Guidelines excised, the duty imposed by section 3553(a) to consider numerous factors acquires renewed significance. 27 It is important to bear in mind that among the matters that section 3553(a) requires the sentencing judge to consider are: 28 (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for — 29 (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines — 30 (I) issued by the Sentencing Commission.... 31 (5) any pertinent policy statement — 32 (A) issued by the Sentencing Commission.... 33 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (5). 34 Thus, the excision of the mandatory aspect of the Guidelines does not mean that the Guidelines have been discarded. On the contrary, sentencing judges remain under a duty with respect to the Guidelines — not the previously imposed duty to apply the Guidelines, but the continuing duty to consider them, along with the other factors listed in section 3553(a). 35 In order to fulfill this statutory duty to consider the Guidelines, a sentencing judge will normally have to determine the applicable Guidelines range. A judge cannot satisfy this duty by a general reference to the entirety of the Guidelines Manual, followed by a decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence. 9 Subsection 3553(a)(4) contemplates consideration of the Guidelines range applicable to the defendant, 10 and subsection 3553(a)(5) contemplates consideration of policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, including departure authority. The applicable Guidelines range is normally to be determined in the same manner as before Booker/Fanfan . Moreover, although the Court in the Substantive Opinion prohibits a sentencing judge from finding any facts that enhanced a Guidelines sentence above the range that is based solely on facts found by the jury in its verdict or admitted by the defendant, the Court in its Remedy Opinion contemplates that, with the mandatory use of the Guidelines excised, the traditional authority of a sentencing judge to find all facts relevant to sentencing will encounter no Sixth Amendment objection. 11 Thus, the sentencing judge will be entitled to find all of the facts that the Guidelines make relevant to the determination of a Guidelines sentence and all of the facts relevant to the determination of a non-Guidelines sentence. 36 In one circumstance, however, precise calculation of the applicable Guidelines range may not be necessary. Now that the duty to apply the applicable Guidelines range is not mandatory, situations may arise where either of two Guidelines ranges, whether or not adjacent, is applicable, but the sentencing judge, having complied with section 3553(a), makes a decision to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, regardless of which of the two ranges applies. This leeway should be useful to sentencing judges in some cases to avoid the need to resolve all of the factual issues necessary to make precise determinations of some complicated matters, for example, determination of monetary loss. Similarly, close questions may sometimes arise as to the precise meaning or application of a policy statement authorizing a departure, and a judge who has considered policy statements concerning departures need not definitively resolve such questions if the judge has fairly decided to impose a non-Guidelines sentence. 37 In the pre- Booker/Fanfan era, we had encountered a similar situation where the resolution of a disputed fact could sometimes be avoided if the alternative Guidelines ranges were adjacent in the Sentencing Table. Because these ranges partly overlap, we ruled that a judge imposing a sentence within the limits of the overlap between two adjacent ranges and indicating that the sentence would be the same regardless of which Guidelines range applied, need not resolve the disputed issue to determine which of the two ranges actually applies. See United States v. Shuster, 331 F.3d 294, 296-97 (2d Cir.2003); United States v. McHugh, 122 F.3d 153, 158 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925, 930-32 (2d Cir.1988). 12 We had also ruled that a dispute as to which of two arguably applicable ranges applied need not be resolved by a judge who had decided to make a permissible departure, regardless of which range was applicable. See United States v. Borrego, 388 F.3d 66, 68-70 (2d Cir.2004). 38 Once an applicable Guidelines range has been determined, the sentencing judge will have the duty, imposed by subsection 3553(a)(4), to consider it, along with all of the factors listed in section 3553(a). We have previously encountered a sentencing judge's duty to consider matters relevant to sentencing. We have done so in applying section 3583(e), which requires a court deciding whether to revoke a term of supervised release and the length of any imprisonment for violation of supervised release, to consider[] many of the factors listed in section 3553(a), including those listed in subsection 3553(a)(4). See United States v. Pelensky, 129 F.3d 63, 69-70 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Sweeney, 90 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 281-84 (2d Cir.1994). Although these decisions do not rule definitively on the meaning of consider, they have refrained from imposing any rigorous requirement of specific articulation by the sentencing judge. In this respect, our approach has been similar to that taken in applying subsection 3663(a)(1)(B), which requires a judge imposing restitution to consider, for example, the loss sustained and the defendant's financial circumstances. See United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 99-100 (2d Cir.2001) ([S]entencing judge acted within the bounds of his discretion in not making detailed findings.); United States v. Harris, 79 F.3d 223, 232-33 (2d Cir.1996) (court not required to set forth detailed findings as to relevant factors). 39 We need not on this appeal endeavor to determine what degree of consideration is required, or, to put it another way, what weight the sentencing judge should normally give to the applicable Guidelines range. We think it more consonant with the day-to-day role of district judges in imposing sentences and the episodic role of appellate judges in reviewing sentences, especially under the now applicable standard of reasonableness, to permit the concept of consideration in the context of the applicable Guidelines range to evolve as district judges faithfully perform their statutory duties. Therefore, we will not prescribe any formulation a sentencing judge will be obliged to follow in order to demonstrate discharge of the duty to consider the Guidelines. In other words, we will no more require robotic incantations by district judges than we did when the Guidelines were mandatory. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 98 F.3d 690, 694 (2d Cir.1996). 40 Thus, at this point, we can identify several essential aspects of Booker/Fanfan that concern the selection of sentences. First, the Guidelines are no longer mandatory. Second, the sentencing judge must consider the Guidelines and all of the other factors listed in section 3553(a). Third, consideration of the Guidelines will normally require determination of the applicable Guidelines range, or at least identification of the arguably applicable ranges, and consideration of applicable policy statements. Fourth, the sentencing judge should decide, after considering the Guidelines and all the other factors set forth in section 3553(a), whether (I) to impose the sentence that would have been imposed under the Guidelines, i.e., a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range or within permissible departure authority, or (ii) to impose a non-Guidelines sentence. Fifth, the sentencing judge is entitled to find all the facts appropriate for determining either a Guidelines sentence or a non-Guidelines sentence. 41 These principles change the Guidelines from being mandatory to being advisory, but it is important to bear in mind that Booker/Fanfan and section 3553(a) do more than render the Guidelines a body of casual advice, to be consulted or overlooked at the whim of a sentencing judge. Thus, it would be a mistake to think that, after Booker/Fanfan , district judges may return to the sentencing regime that existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered discretion to select any sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and minimum. On the contrary, the Supreme Court expects sentencing judges faithfully to discharge their statutory obligation to consider the Guidelines and all of the other factors listed in section 3553(a). 13 We have every confidence that the judges of this Circuit will do so, and that the resulting sentences will continue to substantially reduce unwarranted disparities while now achieving somewhat more individualized justice. In short, there need be no fear of judging. 42