Opinion ID: 2543856
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions assertedly undermining the reasonable doubt standard

Text: Defendant contends that several standard jury instructions drawn from CALJIC (5th ed.1988) and given here lowered the requisite standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He cites specifically those instructions pertaining to (1) circumstantial evidence (CALJIC Nos. 2.02 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent or mental state], 8.83 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a special circumstance], and 8.83.1 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove mental state]); and (2) witness credibility and weight of the evidence (CALJIC Nos. 1.00 [respective duty of judge and jury], 2.21.1 [discrepancies in testimony], 2.21.2 [witness willfully false], 2.22 [weighing conflicting testimony], 2.27 [sufficiency of testimony of one witness], and 2.51 [motive]). At trial, defendant did not object to these instructions. Notwithstanding his failure to do so, defendant's claim is cognizable on appeal to the extent it implicates his substantial rights. (§ 1259; see People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 235, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496 [notwithstanding a failure to object at trial, a defendant may raise on appeal an instructional error claim that affects his substantial rights].) Defendant initially argues that CALJIC Nos. 2.02, 8.83, and 8.83.1(1) misled the jury into believing it could convict defendant if he reasonably appeared to be guilty, even if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt and, (2) implied that defendant was required to present, at the very least, a reasonable defense to the prosecution's case. He complains specifically of language common to all three instructions stating that if one interpretation of the evidence appears to you to be reasonable and the other interpretation to be unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable. As defendant concedes, we have in the past rejected similar arguments. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 847, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) We see no reason to reconsider these decisions. Defendant contends, however, that none of these cited cases considered the possibility that the jurors might indeed apply the instructions in conjunction with CALJIC No. 2.90 (telling the jury that the defendant `is presumed to be innocent' and-that the prosecution bears `the burden of proving [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt'), and in the context of the jury instructions as a whole, and yet still be misled. Defendant appears to suggest that the jury, even though properly instructed, might still have been confused about the requisite standard of proof. We reject that argument. `Jurors are presumed to be intelligent, capable of understanding instructions and applying them to the facts of the case.' ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 390, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34; see also People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 771, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Moreover, we have in the past rejected the claim that CALJIC Nos. 2.02 and 2.90, when given together, erode the reasonable doubt standard of proof. ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 601, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 501, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) Defendant next argues that CALJIC Nos. 1.00 and 2.51 misinformed the jury that its duty was merely to decide whether defendant was guilty or innocent, rather than whether he was guilty, or not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have in the past rejected this argument. ( People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 847-848, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820; see People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 714, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190.) Pointing to CALJIC Nos. 2.21.1 and 2.21.2, defendant claims that these instructions lessened the burden of proof. CALJIC No. 2.21.1 bears on discrepancies within and between the testimony of witnesses, stating that two people will often see or hear the same event differently, an assertion we have characterized as a fact of common experience. ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1111, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; see Judicial Council of Cal.Crim. Jury Instns. (2006) CALCRIM No. 105 [Do not automatically reject testimony just because of inconsistencies or conflicts ... People sometimes honestly forget things or make mistakes about what they remember. Also, two people may witness the same event yet see or hear it differently.].) Defendant does not persuade us that CALJIC No. 2.21.1, dilutes the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. CALJIC No. 2.21.2 allows the jury to reject the testimony of a witness willfully false in one material part of his or her testimony unless from all the evidence, you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars. We have in the past rejected the contention that CALJIC No. 2.21.2 lowers the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. ( People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 848, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) Defendant offers no reason to reconsider that decision. Defendant also contends that CALJIC No. 2.22 effectively, replaced the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof with the lesser preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof in directing the jury to determine each factual issue in the case by deciding which witnesses were most convincing, regardless of the number of witnesses who testified to a particular version of events. Again, we previously have rejected this argument. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 428-129, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Finally, defendant argues that CALJIC No. 2.27 erroneously suggested to the jury that both the prosecution and the defense had a burden to prove facts. As defendant acknowledges, we have rejected this claim in our previous decisions. ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 889, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 633-634, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason why this court should reconsider its prior decisions rejecting the claims of instructional error raised.