Opinion ID: 1042995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to discharge

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to discharge retained counsel. We disagree.
Defendant was indicted on December 12, 1995, and counsel was appointed to represent him on December 18, 1995. On January 30, 1996, retained counsel Erick Larsh was substituted in. About a week later, Larsh declared a conflict of interest, and defendant informed the court he was not indigent and would retain a different attorney. On February 14, 1996, defendant‘s new retained counsel, Edward Esqueda, informed the court he was ready to go forward on the case and was substituted in. On September 3, 1996, defendant‘s case was severed from that of his codefendants. On January 16, 1997, Esqueda informed the court he would be ready for trial on January 28, 1997, but the prosecutor was not ready. Esqueda also expressed disappointment that it appeared defendant‘s trial would be held last, 33 after the trials of his former codefendants. Trial was then continued several times in 1997. On November 17, 1997, Esqueda filed a motion to continue the trial because he was in trial on a different case. On that same date, defendant filed an in propria persona ―ex parte motion to dismiss defense counsel and to appoint new counsel and for an in camera hearing.‖ At the November 17, 1997 hearing, the trial court continued the trial to December 12, 1997 and ordered seven witnesses to return at that time. It denied defendant‘s motion without prejudice and scheduled an in camera hearing on the motion for December 12, 1997. Defendant unsuccessfully objected, saying he was ―already prepared‖ to argue the motion. The court observed it was denying the motion because it was ―untimely in the extreme,‖ defendant had previously had different counsel and had Esqueda as an attorney for a long time, the case had been continued several times, and witnesses, some of whom had already testified four or five times in other trials, had appeared that day and were being inconvenienced. The court also noted that the witnesses were reluctant to come forward due to the nature of the charges and ―the players,‖ and that the ―longer the case goes [on], the more that reluctance hardens and the more difficult it becomes to obtain the testimony of witnesses.‖ It informed defendant that ―if I grant your request, what I am doing, in effect, is continuing the case for probably a year‖ because new counsel would need to become familiar with the former codefendants‘ trials as well as with this case. The court observed that ―it would have been certainly much better had the matter come to the court‘s attention in any of the many, many, many appearances that you had before me.‖ On December 12, 1997, Esqueda filed, and the court granted, another motion to continue the trial until December 29, 1997 because he was again in trial in a different case. The trial court ordered counsel not to become engaged in any other 34 jury trials without first contacting the court and said that if any other court ordered counsel to trial, counsel should have that court contact the trial court in this case. Also on this date, at the in camera hearing on defendant‘s motion to discharge counsel and appoint new counsel, defendant delineated various ways in which he found counsel‘s representation deficient. Defendant asked the court to dismiss counsel and appoint new counsel. He also said: ―We‘ve been trying to go to trial for the longest [time], because he felt that we were ready. I felt that we were ready at the beginning. We‘ve been trying to go to trial, and we‘ve been getting put [off] and put [off] and put [off].‖ The trial court denied the motion. It noted that through no fault of anyone, the case had been pending for a long period of time. The court said it understood defendant‘s frustration at ―not going to trial sooner‖ and estimated it would take a new attorney at least six months to ―get up to speed on the case.‖ It observed that the district attorney also had a right to a speedy trial. It also noted: ―[T]he matter is brought to my attention right on the eve, literally, of a trial date, . . . [which] makes me think it‘s not the most timely request I‘ve ever had. You know, at some point in the last year if Mr. Esqueda is not getting it all ready one might think, well, [defendant], do something about it, don‘t wait for a year.‖ Defendant said, ―Yeah.‖ The court repeated its concern about witnesses being reluctant, saying: ―You have to keep ordering these guys back every day under the threat of death, practically, to get them down here, some of them. So, again, the longer the case goes [on] the more difficult it is to ever get the case tried.‖ The court said it was convinced defendant could get a fair trial with current counsel if they both would ―give a little.‖ The court did not ―think‖ that counsel was ―incompetent‖ or had ―abandoned‖ defendant, or that there had been ―some breakdown between you two 35 to the point where there is an actual conflict of interest,‖ noting, ―I‘m not even hearing you fellows tell me that.‖ On December 29, 1997, the case was called for jury trial, and the court denied a defense motion to continue trial. Jury selection began on January 5, 1998.
―The right to retained counsel of choice is — subject to certain limitations — guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140, 144, 151-152; People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 422.) In California, this right ‗reflects not only a defendant‘s choice of a particular attorney, but also his decision to discharge an attorney whom he hired but no longer wishes to retain.‘ (People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 983 . . . ; see Code Civ. Proc., § 284.)‖ (People v. Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 310-311 (Verdugo).) When a defendant makes a ―timely motion to discharge his retained attorney and obtain appointed counsel,‖ unlike when a defendant seeks to substitute one appointed counsel for another, he is not required to demonstrate ―inadequate representation by his retained attorney, or to identify an irreconcilable conflict between them.‖ (People v. Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d, at p. 984 (Ortiz); see People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89.) ―The right to discharge a retained attorney is, however, not absolute. (Ortiz, [supra, 51 Cal.3d] at p. 983.) The trial court has discretion to ‗deny such a motion if discharge will result in ―significant prejudice‖ to the defendant [citation], or if it is not timely, i.e., if it will result in ―disruption of the orderly processes of justice.‖ ‘ ‖ (Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 311; see Morris v. Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11 [―Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials.‖].) 36 We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant‘s motion to discharge counsel. At the time the motion was made, the case had been pending for two years. Trial was imminent and, in fact, began about six weeks later. Defendant had no substitute counsel in mind; rather, he requested that the court appoint counsel. New counsel would have had to study the records in each former codefendant‘s trial as well as in this case, resulting in significant delays. A trial court may properly consider the delay inherent in changing counsel in evaluating timeliness. The trial court, which had been through at least one trial of the former codefendants, expressed concern that further delay would exacerbate the witnesses‘ reluctance to testify. The trial court also noted the absence of abandonment or inadequate representation by counsel or an actual conflict of interest. The court reasonably found that relieving counsel under these circumstances would result in ― ‗disruption of the orderly processes of justice‘ ‖ and thus denied defendant‘s motion. (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983.) Defendant asserts that the trial court incorrectly applied the standard in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 for substituting one appointed counsel for another rather than the Ortiz standard for discharging retained counsel and appointing new counsel. Under Marsden and its progeny, a ― ‗defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.‘ ‖ (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.) Defendant relies on the fact that the trial court stated at the conclusion of the hearing: ―The court has denied the — we‘ll call it a Marsden motion.‖ Defendant also cites the trial court‘s statements that it did not ―think‖ that counsel was ―incompetent‖ or had 37 ―abandoned‖ defendant, or that there had been ―some breakdown between you two to the point where there is an actual conflict of interest.‖ Contrary to defendant‘s assertion, the trial court did not deny the motion merely because defendant had failed to demonstrate that counsel was incompetent or had abandoned him or that there was an irreconcilable conflict between defendant and counsel. In evaluating whether a motion to discharge retained counsel is ―timely, i.e., if it will result in ‗disruption of the orderly processes of justice‘ ‖ (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983), the trial court considers the totality of the circumstances. (See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 152; Verdugo, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 311.) Although a defendant seeking to discharge his retained attorney is not required to demonstrate inadequate representation or an irreconcilable conflict, this does not mean that the trial court cannot properly consider the absence of such circumstances in deciding whether discharging counsel would result in disruption of the orderly processes of justice. Here, defendant raised numerous concerns about retained counsel in his declaration filed in support of the motion to discharge counsel, and the trial court did nothing improper in discussing those concerns with defendant at the hearing. Defendant further contends that the trial court ―failed to conduct an adequate hearing to determine whether there was any merit‖ to defendant‘s complaints about counsel. But the transcript of the in camera hearing spans nearly 60 pages and demonstrates that defendant was given considerable leeway to identify and discuss with the court each of his concerns about counsel‘s representation, including what aspects of his investigation defendant found wanting and what motions defendant believed should have been filed. Further, counsel was given an opportunity to respond to these concerns. The trial court‘s findings that counsel was not incompetent and that no irreconcilable breakdown had occurred are 38 supported by the record. Moreover, as discussed above, the nondisclosure order did not prevent defendant from receiving a fair hearing on his motion to discharge counsel. (See ante, at p. 32.) Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in excluding his investigator, who had filed a declaration in support of the motion to discharge counsel, from the in camera hearing. Before the December 12, 1997 in camera hearing, the trial court asked everyone other than defendant and his counsel to leave the courtroom. Defendant personally asked, ―Your honor, is there any way that I could have [the investigator] present?‖ The court replied: ―No. I think that would not be appropriate to have others here. To do that in my opinion would constitute probably a waiver.‖ Defendant said, ―I understand.‖ According to defendant, the ―court had no legitimate reason to exclude‖ the investigator and ―no legal basis upon which to advise [defendant] that his privileged communications would be compromised by allowing [the investigator] to be present at the hearing.‖ But even assuming this is correct, defendant fails to delineate what aspects of the investigator‘s declaration filed in support of the motion to discharge counsel required elaboration by the investigator at the hearing, what information the investigator possessed that defendant did not, or how the investigator‘s presence was otherwise material to the question of whether replacement of counsel would or would not disrupt ― ‗the orderly processes of justice.‘ ‖ (Ortiz, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 983.)