Opinion ID: 202876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ACCA Status of a Juvenile Adjudication

Text: The ACCA provides that certain juvenile conduct, including an act of juvenile delinquency that involved use of a knife and physical force against another person, is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA, and a finding of such conduct qualifies as a conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). [6] It is undisputed that appellant's 1992 adjudication of juvenile delinquency meets the statutory requirements. [7] However, he argues that the Constitution prohibits the use of his juvenile conduct as an ACCA conviction. Under Massachusetts law, a juvenile adjudication is not deemed to be criminal in nature, see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 53, and appellant asserts that Congress may not constitutionally classify a juvenile adjudication as a criminal conviction when state law provides otherwise. In addition, he claims that, because juvenile proceedings lack important procedural safeguards, the fact of a juvenile adjudication may not be used to enhance a sentence without proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) (establishing the fact of a prior conviction as an exception to the jury finding requirement for facts that increase the statutory maximum penalty); see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999) (recognizing that, unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the possible penalty for an offense, . . . a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees). We can quickly dispose of appellant's contention that a juvenile proceeding classified as non-criminal under state law may not be treated as criminal in nature under federal law. This argument was not made in the district court, and it therefore is reviewable only for plain error. See United States v. Leahy, 473 F.3d 401, 409-10 (1st Cir.2007). Appellant falls far short of meeting that standard, offering only indirect support for the claim. He asserts that the Apprendi-Booker line of cases requires courts to closely examine statutory sentencing requirements for constitutional infirmity, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), and he maintains that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and possibly also the Tenth, are implicated by Congress's attempt to override the traditional state law treatment of juvenile adjudications as non-criminal proceedings. However, he cites no cases holding that Congress oversteps constitutional bounds by ignoring state law classifications and treating particular juvenile acts as criminal in nature. The ACCA does not effect a wholesale conversion of juvenile adjudications into criminal convictions. Instead, it narrowly extends the statute's reach to specific juvenile conduct. We see no basis for denying Congress that prerogative. See United States v. Gray, 177 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir.1999) (States enjoy a broad range of flexibility in choosing how they will treat those who offend their laws. But they may not dictate how the federal government will vindicate its own interests in punishing those who commit federal crimes.); cf. Lopez v. Gonzales, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 625, 633, 166 L.Ed.2d 462 (2006) (holding that federal classification of certain drug crimes as misdemeanors prevails over state's felony classification for the designated conduct). A more substantial question is whether the assumption of reliability that underlies Apprendi 's exception for prior convictions  eliminating the need to prove the fact of conviction to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt  is properly extended to juvenile adjudications. See United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1031-32 (8th Cir. 2002) ([W]hether juvenile adjudications can be characterized as `prior convictions' for Apprendi purposes is a constitutional question implicating [the defendant's] right not to be deprived of liberty without `due process of law,' and Congress's characterization, therefore, is not dispositive.) (citation omitted). Four circuits have held that juvenile adjudications may be deemed qualifying convictions under the ACCA, consistent with Apprendi, and therefore need not be submitted to the jury for factfinding. See United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750-51 (6th Cir.2007); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190-91 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir.2003); Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033. However, the Ninth Circuit, in a decision that provoked a dissent, held to the contrary in United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir.2001). The majority in Tighe reasoned that juvenile adjudications did not feature the fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections that guaranteed reliability  fair notice, reasonable doubt and the right to a jury trial. Id. at 1193. Noting its concern about the absence of one of those fundamentals  the right to trial by jury  the Ninth Circuit majority held that  Apprendi 's narrow `prior conviction' exception is limited to prior convictions resulting from proceedings that afforded the procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1194. In so concluding, the court pointed to language in Apprendi and Jones suggesting that the reliability of the jury process provides a basis for distinguishing between the fact of a prior conviction and other sentence-enhancing facts. Id. at 1193-94 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496, 120 S.Ct. 2348 [8] ; Jones, 526 U.S. at 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215 [9] ). The four circuits that count juvenile adjudications as predicate crimes, whose decisions came after Tighe, also focused on whether juvenile adjudications are accompanied by sufficient procedural protections to justify the Apprendi exception. They disagreed, however, that a jury trial was a prerequisite. Recognizing that defendants in juvenile proceedings have no constitutional right to a jury trial, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (plurality opinion), the Eighth Circuit concluded that the use of a jury in the juvenile context would `not strengthen greatly, if at all, the fact-finding function,' Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033 (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547, 91 S.Ct. 1976). The court also cited In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), [10] in observing that the safeguards that are required for juvenile offenses  the right to notice, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt  are more than sufficient to ensure the reliability that Apprendi requires. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033. [11] The Third Circuit in Jones adopted the Eighth Circuit's reasoning and held that [a] prior nonjury juvenile adjudication that was afforded all constitutionally-required procedural safeguards can properly be characterized as a prior conviction for Apprendi purposes. 332 F.3d at 696. Because the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required in the juvenile context, its absence . . . does not automatically disqualify juvenile adjudications for purposes of the Apprendi exception. Id. The Eleventh Circuit in Burge and the Sixth Circuit in Crowell subsequently came to the same conclusion. See Burge, 407 F.3d at 1190-91 (We base our holding on the reasoning of our sister circuits in Smalley and Jones. ); Crowell, 493 F.3d at 750-51 ([W]e join the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits in finding that the imposition of a sentence enhancement under the ACCA based on a defendant's juvenile adjudication without a jury trial does not violate the defendant's due process rights or run afoul of Apprendi. ). Thus, while their outcomes differed, all of the courts to consider the issue have agreed that the question of whether juvenile adjudications should be exempt from Apprendi 's general rule should [] turn on . . . an examination of whether juvenile adjudications, like adult convictions, are so reliable that due process of law is not offended by such an exemption. Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032-33. We share that view of the question. For purposes of Apprendi 's recidivism exception, we see no distinction between juvenile adjudications and adult convictions; both reflect the sort of proven prior conduct that courts historically have used in sentencing. If their reliability is also equivalent, the prior conviction exception presumably would apply to juvenile adjudications with equal force. We need not resolve in this case, however, whether trial by jury  the only one of the fundamental triumvirate of procedural protections not constitutionally mandated in juvenile proceedings  is a necessary assurance of reliability for Apprendi purposes. Massachusetts law gives juveniles the right to a jury trial, see Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 55A, [12] and the certified copy of the docket in appellant's juvenile case shows that he was offered, and declined, a jury. [13] Appellant therefore was provided more process than he was constitutionally due in his juvenile proceeding and, even under the Ninth Circuit's more restrictive approach, his adjudication of delinquency would qualify as a predicate conviction for purposes of the ACCA. [14] In sum, we detect no constitutional barrier to the use of that adjudication to support appellant's enhanced sentence.