Opinion ID: 1026199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: al-marri received the process he was due.

Text: The concurring opinion in this case (the opinion authored by Judge Traxler) finds that al-Marri may be detained as an enemy combatant under the AUMF. As expressed earlier in this opinion, I share fully my good colleague's views on this matter. My agreement ends there, however. The concurrence asserts that the process afforded al-Marri to challenge his detention did not meet the minimal requirements of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Ante at 253-54. I think this view is in error, and its consequences are serious. The district court offered al-Marri each of the procedures required by the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision, but al-Marri believed he was entitled to something akin to a full criminal trial and refused to avail himself of any of these protections. As a result, it is quite wrong to suggest that al-Marri did not receive the full benefits of due process as articulated by what all concede is the most relevant Supreme Court decision. In addition, al-Marri also received protections that satisfied any requirements that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Boumediene could reasonably be read to impose. Al-Marri asserts that due process requires additional procedures be afforded him because he was not a person initially detained ... on a battlefield in Afghanistan. Ante at 267-69. But these additional procedural safeguards are not required by Hamdi, and there is no necessary connection between the lack of a foreign battlefield presence and the need for enhanced procedural protections. In fact, as discussed earlier in this opinion, a sleeper agent hiding in the United States may present a more serious security threat and raise more pronounced evidentiary problems than an enemy soldier located on a battlefield. Moreover, nothing could be more contrary to the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence than the ab initio imposition of inflexible procedural requirements based on artificial and categorical distinctions. Procedures should be ordained not at the outset but as necessary to ensure accurate determinations. To impose such requirements ab initio disregards the prudent and incremental approach required by Hamdi and neglects the fact that accuracy must be the touchstone of any procedural due process inquiry. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539, 124 S.Ct. 2633; see also Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2268. The approach of my concurring colleague will thus have significant consequences. By forsaking Hamdi and categorically insisting on more rigorous procedural safeguards at the outset of al-Marri's habeas hearing, the concurrence would accomplish through constitutional means much of what the plurality would accomplish through statutory interpretation, namely a future disablement of legitimate legislative efforts to authorize Hamdi -style proceedings for even the most dangerous terrorist suspects within this country.
A brief review of the proceeding below will illustrate the soundness of the district court's approach. In July 2004, counsel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on al-Marri's behalf in the District of South Carolina. The petition claimed that al-Marri could not be detained as an enemy combatant, and that the government had to either criminally charge or release him. In the alternative, al-Marri sought a hearing at which he would be able to challenge, with the assistance of counsel, the factual basis for his detention. It should be noted that al-Marri has had the assistance of counsel in every proceeding since the filing of this habeas petition. One year later, after further pleadings from each party, the district court determined that, based on the facts alleged, al-Marri could be detained as an enemy combatant. See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F.Supp.2d 673, 680 (D.S.C.2005). The district court further recognized that, under the Supreme Court's Hamdi decision, al-Marri had the right to challenge the factual basis of his detention at a hearing that satisfied the constitutional requirements of procedural due process. See id. at 681-82. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge to determine what process was constitutionally due al-Marri under Hamdi. See id. at 682. In proceedings before the magistrate judge, al-Marri sought procedural protections similar to those afforded civilian criminal defendants, such as extensive discovery rights and an opportunity to cross-examine the government's sources, including high-level Department of Defense officials. See ante at 265-66 & n. 8. The magistrate judge refused to provide al-Marri with these extensive protections, however, and instead adopted incremental procedures consistent with the burden-shifting approach outlined in Hamdi. See Al-Marri v. Wright, 443 F.Supp.2d 774, 778-80 (D.S.C.2006). First, it required the government to provide notice of the factual basis for al-Marri's detention. Next, if the government was able to produce credible evidence that al-Marri was indeed an enemy combatant, the burden would shift to al-Marri to rebut the government's evidence. Finally, the magistrate judge noted that, if al-Marri met his burden by presenting more persuasive evidence, the government would either have to release al-Marri or participate in a full-blown adversary hearing, which would include greater procedural and evidentiary safeguards than the first stage of the burden-shifting process. J.A. 191. Pursuant to these procedures, the magistrate judge found that the Rapp Declaration  which, as described earlier, presented the government's evidence supporting al-Marri's detention, see supra at 135  satisfied the government's initial burdens of providing al-Marri with notice of the factual basis for his detention and producing credible evidence that al-Marri was indeed an enemy combatant. The magistrate judge then gave al-Marri sixty days to present rebuttal evidence. During this sixty day period, al-Marri protested that his ability to respond to the Rapp Declaration was impeded by the fact that large portions of the Declaration were classified and, therefore, unavailable to him. The magistrate judge agreed with al-Marri and advised the parties that, in determining whether an adversary hearing was necessary, he would only consider evidence disclosed to al-Marri. In response to this ruling, the government filed an updated version of the Rapp Declaration, with many portions declassified. Al-Marri subsequently filed a response to the updated Rapp Declaration. In his response, al-Marri generally denied the government's claims, but decline[d] . . . to assume the burden of proving his own innocence. Al-Marri, 443 F.Supp.2d at 784. Claiming that the procedures developed by the magistrate judge were unconstitutional, unlawful, and un-American, al-Marri refused to offer any sort of rebuttal to the government's evidence. Id. Because al-Marri failed to offer  any evidence on his behalf, the magistrate judge recommended the dismissal of al-Marri's petition. Id. at 785 (emphasis in original). The district court subsequently conducted a de novo review of the proceedings before the magistrate judge, and over al-Marri's objections, adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations in full. See id. Because al-Marri failed beyond question to rebut his classification and detention . . . as an enemy combatant, the district court dismissed al-Marri's habeas petition. Id.
The district and magistrate judges handled this case admirably. I can find no fault with their conclusion that the habeas proceedings provided al-Marri satisfied Hamdi 's due process requirements. As Hamdi made clear, a detainee held in the United States has the right to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant. [10] Though not entitled to a full criminal trial, enemy combatants are entitled to the core protections that constitute the minimum requirements of due process. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535, 538, 124 S.Ct. 2633. These core procedural rights are threefold: first, a detainee must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification; second, a detainee must have a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions; and, third, the hearing must occur before a neutral decisionmaker. Id. at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633. The Hamdi opinion repeatedly makes clear that it is these three essential constitutional promises [that] may not be eroded. Id. Even a brief examination of al-Marri's proceedings demonstrate that he received the benefit of each of these essential promises. To begin, the district court was unquestionably a neutral decision-maker. Similarly, al-Marri certainly received sufficient notice of the factual basis for his classification. In fact, the magistrate explicitly stated that he would only consider information made available to al-Marri when determining whether al-Marri was indeed an enemy combatant. To this end, the government put forth the Rapp Declaration, which contained extensive evidence of al-Marri's affiliation with al Qaeda and his destructive designs. For instance, it alleged that al-Marri attended an al Qaeda terrorist training camp in Afghanistan for fifteen to nineteen months; that he subsequently cultivated personal relationships with the most senior members of the al Qaeda hierarchy, including Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaykh Muhammed, and Mustafa Ahmed al-Hawsawi; that he wanted to martyr himself for the al Qaeda cause; and that he was planning to commit chemical and technological attacks in the United States. See supra at 135. This detailed information certainly provided al-Marri with sufficient notice of the factual basis for his detention. Likewise, al-Marri was provided a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions. The magistrate judge gave al-Marri sixty days to respond to the Rapp Declaration, and stated that a full-blown adversary hearing would follow if al-Marri was able to adequately rebut the government's evidence. Since the government relied almost exclusively on evidence directly imputable to him, al-Marri had personal knowledge of the government's factual basis, and, therefore, ample ability to offer a meaningful response. Put simply, the procedures developed by the magistrate judge provided al-Marri a fair and meaningful opportunity to be heard in his own defense, and thus were more than sufficient under Hamdi. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Boumediene does not change this analysis. To begin, the Court in Boumediene explicitly distinguished the question of what procedures are required under the Suspension Clause from the question of what procedures are required under the Due Process Clause. See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2270-71. In doing so, the Court explicitly stated that it made no judgment as to the issue addressed in Hamdi and presented by al-Marri's case: what process is constitutionally due to a detainee when [t]he § 2241 habeas corpus process remained in place. See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2270, 2271. Thus, Hamdi is still the controlling opinion for our inquiry, and it is therefore our duty to apply it. Moreover, even if Boumediene were applicable to the matter before us, the process employed by the district and magistrate judges would still be constitutional. Al-Marri received each of the protections required by Boumediene : (1) he was given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the legal basis for his detention, (2) his petition was considered by a court that had the remedial power to order his release, and (3) he was granted the ability to rebut the factual basis for the Government's assertion that he is an enemy combatant. Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2267-68. Al-Marri benefitted from the assistance of counsel and was aware of the allegations against him from the very outset of his proceedings, and Boumediene recognized these protections as necessary to the extent they aid in challenging the factual accuracy of a detention, something al-Marri did not do in this case. Id. at 2269-70. In fact, there is every indication that al-Marri would have received the procedures that Boumediene could reasonably be read to impose if he had sought to contest the government's allegations in some way. It is true that Boumediene recognizes that both the ability to confront witnesses and some limit on the government's use of hearsay evidence may be necessary to ensure that a detainee has the capacity to rebut the factual basis for his detention. Id. at 2269-70. But the Court in Boumediene never indicated that it was establishing procedures to be followed inflexibly in every case. See id. at 2271, 2272, 2273 (noting that the extent of the showing required of the Government in these cases is a matter to be determined). Instead, the Court emphasized that habeas corpus procedures must be adaptable so that they can assure the petitioner a meaningful opportunity to contest the legal and factual bases for his detention. Id. at 2267-68. If al-Marri had cast any doubt on the accuracy of his detention, there was every indication that the magistrate and district judges would have done what was needed to confirm or to dispel that doubt, including the provision of those procedures that Boumediene could reasonably be read to require. But severing the need for procedural protections from the need to reach accurate determinations loses sight of the whole purpose of due process. Thus, the problem here was not, as the concurrence alleges, a failure on the part of the lower court to provide al-Marri with constitutionally adequate procedures, but rather the unwillingness of al-Marri to participate in the process set forth under Hamdi in any meaningful way. Neither the magistrate nor the district judge gave al-Marri short shrift, and both were open to any evidence al-Marri had to offer. Instead, al-Marri offered nothing. In fact, if a general denial were deemed sufficient to bring the accuracy of the Declaration into question, then the whole Hamdi burden-shifting framework would be rendered useless. I thus find it remarkable that al-Marri now complains about procedures he did not even attempt to utilize. Indeed, a civilian criminal defendant cannot refuse to avail himself of the protections offered him at trial and then claim a procedural due process violation; there should be no reason to treat al-Marri any differently. As the district court correctly recognized, [n]either due process nor the rule of law in general grant a party the right to participate only in the court procedures he deems best or to present his proof whenever it suits him. Al-Marri, 443 F.Supp.2d at 785.
Although al-Marri received the full benefit of Hamdi 's protections, the concurrence argues that because al-Marri is not a battlefield detainee, he is entitled to more rigorous procedural safeguards than those afforded him by the district court. See ante at 267-70. In particular, the concurrence contends that al-Marri has the right to requir[e] the government to demonstrate through `the most reliable available evidence' that he is an enemy combatant. Ante at 272. Since the district court did not afford al-Marri this right, the concurrence insists that the proceedings below were unconstitutional. I cannot agree for two reasons. First, the battlefield/non-battlefield distinction is not to be found in Hamdi and is unreflective of the realities of the current conflict. Second, the imposition of a most reliable available evidence requirement rests on a misreading of Hamdi and contradicts the basic tenets of procedural due process.
I begin with the lynchpin of the concurrence's opinion: the notion that al-Marri is entitled to more rigorous procedural protections than those guaranteed by Hamdi, because al-Marri was apprehended in the United States, rather than on a foreign battlefield, and thus subject to a higher risk of being erroneously detained. Ante at 267-70 & n. 13. This categorical imposition of different procedural requirements based on a neat division between battlefield and homeland is unsound for several reasons. To begin, the battlefield/non-battlefield distinction is nowhere to be found in Hamdi, the case on which the concurrence relies. See ante at 267-70. Hamdi 's discussion of the constitutional requirements for enemy combatant proceedings contains no limitation or qualification based on locus of capture. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633; see also id. at 524, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (framing the issue as what process is constitutionally due a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status); id. at 532, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (applying the Mathews framework to identify a process that strikes the proper constitutional balance when a United States citizen is detained in the United States as an enemy combatant). Indeed, Hamdi makes plain that the procedures required in the enemy-combatant setting apply equally to all enemy combatants, not just those captured on a foreign battlefield. Id. at 535, 124 S.Ct. 2633. Furthermore, although the concurrence claims that the risk of erroneously detaining a civilian is much greater inside the United States than on a conventional battlefield within the borders of a foreign country, this is often not the case. Ante at 270. Indeed, the modern battlefield is often cluttered with shifting alliances and the lack of distinguishing uniforms. One only need to think of the villages in Vietnam or the hills of Afghanistan to recognize that discerning friend from foe can be very elusive on a foreign battlefield. Hamdi 's refusal to categorically distinguish detainees based on their locus of capture reflects the true nature of the current conflict. As Congress recognized in the AUMF and as the nature of the 9/11 attacks made pellucidly clear, the struggle against al-Qaeda is not bound to foreign lands or distant shores. See supra at 320-22. The need for legislatively sanctioned procedures in accordance with the laws of war does not dissipate simply because an enemy combatant is apprehended domestically rather than on a foreign battlefield. See supra at 306-11. In fact, the concerns underlying the need for more limited procedures in enemy combatant hearings, such as the presence of highly sensitive information and the risk of such information being transmitted to terrorist networks, confederates, and affiliates, is equally, if not more, pronounced when dealing with a sleeper al Qaeda agent operating within our borders. Despite its contention to the contrary, see ante at 270 n. 14, the concurrence thus commits the same error as the plurality: it categorically rests its decision on an artificial distinction between battlefield and non-battlefield capture. Indeed, it offers no other meaningful rationale for distinguishing between the procedures approved of in Hamdi and the procedures afforded al-Marri. See, e.g., ante at 267, 267-70 & n. 13, 269-70. The Supreme Court has refused to resolve issues concerning the process due enemy combatants based on the faux simplicity of inflexible categories, and we should not deny the realities of contemporary conflict by contravening its directive.
In addition to its distinction between battlefield and non-battlefield detainees, the concurrence develops another procedural innovation: the most reliable available evidence requirement. The requirement posits that al-Marri has the right to require the government to produce `the most reliable available evidence' that he is an enemy combatant. Ante at 271. This requirement is just as problematic as the attempt to dictate the appropriate level of procedure based on the locus of capture. In deriving this standard, the concurrence relies on the following observation made in Hamdi : [E]nemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, 124 S.Ct. 2633; see ante at 264-65, 269 (quoting Hamdi ). Rather than take this comment for what it clearly is  an example of how the procedures afforded enemy combatants need to account for the evidentiary burdens that are frequently present in such cases  the concurrence develops a hardline requirement that the government must always show, in its initial presentation, that the evidence offered is the most reliable evidence available. Imposing a most reliable available evidence standard at the very outset would be a fundamental misapplication of Hamdi. To begin, this approach abandons the careful incrementalism and the actual burden-shifting scheme set forth by the Supreme Court in that decision. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 124 S.Ct. 2633. As discussed earlier, Hamdi only requires the government to initially put[ ] forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria. Id. The government need not put on further evidence unless the detainee responds with at least some evidence that he falls outside the criteria. Id. By forsaking the framework envisioned by Hamdi, the concurrence relieves al-Marri of any obligation to contest the factual basis of his detention. The concurrence, however, indicates that the Rapp Declaration may be insufficient under Hamdi. This is simply not the case. Indeed, Hamdi expressly recognized that the government's initial burden may be satisfied by a knowledgeable affiant who summarize[s] the evidence on which the detention was based. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534, 124 S.Ct. 2633. Likewise, Hamdi explicitly held that in an enemy combatant proceeding, a habeas court . . . may accept affidavit evidence like that contained in the Mobbs Declaration, so long as it also permits the alleged combatant to present his own factual case to rebut the Government's evidence. Id. at 538, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (emphasis added). Because the Rapp Declaration is far more extensive and detailed than the Mobbs Declaration, the former satisfies the government's initial burden and serves the basic purpose of affording notice to al-Marri of why he is detained. Moreover, beyond being a misapplication of Hamdi, this most reliable available evidence approach is also plainly contrary to the fundamental tenets of procedural due process. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the touchstone of any due process inquiry must be accuracy. Indeed, the imposition of additional procedural protections has traditionally been linked to the ability of those safeguards to prevent erroneous deprivations of protected interests. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2268-69; Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529, 534, 124 S.Ct. 2633; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (noting that due process requires the retroactive application of procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-13, at 714 (2d ed.1988) (noting that the value [of] procedural safeguards is primarily determined by their potential to minimize factual error in the application of the relevant substantive rules). In order to allow for adjustments that help ensure accuracy, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the need for flexible procedures that would permit district courts to employ protections pursuant to the demands presented by a particular case. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); see also Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2268 (noting that habeas is an adaptable remedy, requiring more protections in situations of greater factual uncertainty); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893; Tribe, supra, § 10-14, at 718 (noting that the Court's flexible approach to procedural due process allows courts to apply protections on a case to case basis). In fact, the Court has made plain that due process never requires any fixed set of procedures that cannot be adapted to the circumstances of the case at hand. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). Furthermore, as the Court explained in Hamdi, the procedures for reviewing enemy combatant detentions should be both prudent and incremental,  with adjustments made only as the need for additional protections became apparent in a given case. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539, 124 S.Ct. 2633 (emphasis added). By imposing a most reliable available evidence requirement on the government at the very outset of a Hamdi hearing, the concurrence has adopted an approach that neglects these foundational principles of procedural due process. Indeed, by categorically applying its additional requirement even though al-Marri has never cast the slightest bit of doubt on the accuracy of his enemy combatant status, the concurrence fails to recognize that due process is first and foremost about accuracy. And by forcing the government to produce the most reliable available evidence at the outset of all cases involving non-battlefield detainees, the concurrence diminishes the ability of district courts to prudently and incrementally apply procedures based on the particular circumstances and need for accuracy in the case at hand. This approach threatens large consequences. As the concurrence recognizes, the breadth of al-Marri's procedural demands are staggering. Ante at 265-66 & n. 8. Not only does al-Marri request the opportunity to depose various government officials, including high-level officers in the Executive Branch, but he also seeks discovery of the following evidence: all statements made by al-Marri; all documents relied upon by Rapp or describing the sources of information referenced in the Rapp Declaration; all documents upon which the government intended to rely; all documents upon which the CIA, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and the President relied in determining whether al-Marri was an enemy combatant; all documents describing the standard for the designation; [ ] any exculpatory evidence;. . . [and] all documents pertaining to interrogations and interviews conducted by United States officials or others acting on their behalf. Id. The most reliable available evidence requirement would provide al-Marri with access to this evidence unless the government demonstrated that its production was impractical, outweighed by national security interests, or otherwise unduly burdensome. Id. at 273. In other words, under this approach, the default scenario would grant al-Marri extensive discovery rights regardless of whether he could raise even the slightest doubt as to the basis of his detention. It is difficult to think of a more dangerous way to handle the highly sensitive information that is invariably used to apprehend terrorist sleeper agents such as al-Marri. The fuzzy most reliable available evidence standard provides district courts with precious little guidance. Indeed, district courts are given little direction as to what constitutes the most reliable available evidence or as to the procedures that should be used to make such a determination. Instead, district courts are merely told to resolve these threshold evidentiary questions to their satisfaction. Id. at 273. This lack of clarity provides detainees with nothing less than an invitation to engage in graymail and other harassing tactics. See supra at 308-09. Judge Gregory recognizes that the concurrence's approach will leave the district court with more questions than answers. Ante at 277. He attempts, however, to resolve this uncertainty by suggesting procedures of his own. In particular, he suggests that the district court employ at the outset of proceedings an in-camera, ex-parte hearing, modeled after circuit precedent and CIPA, to determine which evidence should be turned over to al-Marri. Id. at 281-83. While I respect my good colleague's attempt to provide guidance for the district court on remand, I find the procedures he proposes to be equally as problematic as those suggested by the concurrence. To begin, relying on CIPA at the outset risks transporting wholesale a statute specifically passed to address criminal prosecutions into the completely different context of military detention. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. app. III § 8 (stating that the protections of CIPA are designed to prevent unnecessary disclosure of classified information involved in any criminal proceeding (emphasis added)). As discussed earlier in Section II, Congress passed the AUMF fully aware of the existence of CIPA, but it nevertheless authorized the President to detain enemy combatants because of the inherent limitations of the criminal justice system in dealing with matters of war. Moreover, under this in-camera hearing approach, al-Marri is once again provided with all sorts of procedures before having to cast the slightest doubt on the accuracy of his detention. There is simply no reason to risk, at the very outset of every enemy combatant habeas proceeding and without any benefit in ensuring accurate determinations, the extraordinary costs that may result from the compelled disclosure of sensitive information. Of course, the sorts of procedures requested by al-Marri and contemplated by the concurrence's most reliable available evidence requirement may eventually come into play in some Hamdi proceedings. So too may CIPA protections. But these procedures should only be used if they are necessary to ensure the accuracy of a detention. Applying additional procedures at the outset is, to understate the matter, ill-advised. Hamdi recognized that the imposition of additional safeguards in the enemy combatant setting has the uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533, 124 S.Ct. 2633; Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 440 (2007). Granting al-Marri the benefit of additional protections, even though he has never used the procedures available to him, and even though no evidence has emerged to suggest that these additional protections are needed, imposes procedural burdens without any indication that these burdens will produce a corresponding reduction in the likelihood of erroneous deprivation. Due process simply does not require such a result.
Process is of inestimable value to law. It is vital in ensuring fair treatment to individuals, in preventing the arbitrary exercise of power by the state, and in holding the vast arsenal of executive authority in check. And yet, as with so much else, there is a balance. Taken to sufficient lengths, process can accomplish the dismemberment of meaningful democratic prerogatives and the frustration of vital substantive ends. Taken too far, process can essentially paralyze public officials in their attempts to promote the public welfare and, in this area, to provide even the most basic assurances of public safety. The Supreme Court in Hamdi sought to strike the balance between the beneficial use of process, on the one hand, and its detrimental overuse on the other. As noted, Hamdi placed the initial burden in enemy combatant proceedings on the government, required the government to give notice of the factual basis for detention, and provided the detainee with an opportunity to controvert the government's evidence before a neutral decisionmaker. At the same time, however, Hamdi was keenly conscious of the need not to deprive the executive and legislative branches of the tools to deal with the new danger in our midst. Its seminal requirement is that the detainee place the government's evidence in some doubt before the refinements of the criminal justice process come into play. By relieving the detainee of that threshold burden, we take at least the first initial steps toward making Hamdi hearings ever more replicative of the criminal justice process  a process whose full and familiar regalia our profession may soon enough adopt. This would be a mistake. The transgressions that al-Marri is accused of committing are not ordinary crimes, although both the plurality and the concurrence appear to treat them in varying degrees as such. Instead, the destructive acts of 9/11 are more akin to warfare than to crime. That was the view that Congress expressed in passing the AUMF. That was the view the Supreme Court expressed in its Hamdi decision. Whether by declining to apply the AUMF or by casting aside the Hamdi framework, we move toward the criminal justice model, the concurrence accomplishing procedurally much of what the plurality attempts to accomplish substantively  a limitation on the elected branches' ability to prosecute the ongoing struggle against global terror in accordance with the laws of war. I am reluctant to supplant the wisdom of others on so grave a matter with my own, and I would hold that under the AUMF and in accordance with Hamdi, al-Marri was accorded the process he was due  the process which he never once sought to utilize.