Opinion ID: 198094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellant's Pro Se Arguments

Text: 42 Appellant contends that the district court erred in allowing the testimony of Susan Cronin, whom the government failed to include on its initial witness list. Prior to trial, the court attributed the government's omission to inadvertence, but agreed to allow Cronin to testify as long as none of the jurors knew or had heard of her. Appellant's counsel did not object to this approach either when it was proposed, or at the time the trial judge asked the jurors whether they knew Cronin. We note that [e]ven when the government has produced a witness list ... in advance, when a witness ... not previously listed is offered, the decision to admit the testimony ... is within the discretion of the trial judge. See United States v. Reis, 788 F.2d 54, 58 (1st Cir.1986). 43 It was well within the district court judge's discretion to allow Cronin to testify. Nothing in the record suggests that appellant was prejudiced by the government's failure to include Cronin's name on the initial witness list. Since no member of the jury had heard of Cronin prior to trial, the integrity of the jury remained intact. Furthermore, appellant had sufficient time to prepare for Cronin's testimony because she did not testify immediately after being offered as a potential witness, but rather, later in the trial, as the government's ninth witness. 44 Appellant also objects to the substance of Cronin's testimony, which helped authenticate photographs of bruises inflicted on Ericka Thibodeau by appellant on September 4, 1996. Appellant avers that, under Fed.R.Evid. 403, the prejudicial impact of the photographs far outweighed their probative value. On appeal, we afford a district court's Rule 403 balancing substantial discretion. See United States v. Lowe, 145 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir.1998). The district court allowed the photographs into evidence as probative of Thibodeau's credibility. The trial judge, after due consideration of the photographs' potential prejudicial impact, determined that while the photographs were unpleasant, they were not gruesome. Accordingly, the trial judge concluded [t]here is nothing prejudicial about the jury being able to see by way of corroboration of [Thibodeau's] testimony what it is that [appellant] did to her. Finding no abuse of discretion, we decline to disturb the district court's ruling on the admissibility of the photographic evidence. 45 Appellant contests the admission of Thibodeau's statements to Cronin as excited utterances under Fed.R.Evid. 803. Rule 803(2) allows the admission of hearsay, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is one relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). The statements at issue were made on September 4th at approximately 8:00 a.m., shortly after Thibodeau arrived at the battered women's shelter where Cronin was employed. The evidence suggests that while the September 4th beating lasted until 4:00 a.m., Thibodeau was unable to escape the apartment where the assault occurred until some period after that time. It is likely that Thibodeau continued to suffer from the trauma of the beating when she fled to the women's shelter, and thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing her statements into evidence as excited utterances. 46 Finally, appellant challenges statements made by the government in its opening statement to the jury. Since appellant failed to object to any of these challenged statements on the record, we engage in plain error review. See United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 748 (1st Cir.1996). Under the plain error standard of review, appellant bears the burden of persuasion to establish that there was an error, that the error was clear or obvious, and that the error affected substantial rights. United States v. Shifman, 124 F.3d 31, 38-39 (1st Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In its opening statement, the government told the jury that a weapon was found in the police cruiser where appellant had been detained when, in fact, only ammunition had been discovered. The prosecution also stated that appellant admitted to owning the ammunition found in the cruiser to a police officer, but the evidence shows that appellant did not make such a statement to the officer. Lastly, the government stated that a shotgun and cocaine had been found in certain parts of an apartment although evidence failed to link the weapon and drugs to those exact locations. 47 Appellant does not make any particularized allegations of bad faith on the part of the government in making its opening statement. Moreover, the evidence presented at trial would have corrected any jury misperception arising from the government's opening statement. The arresting officer testified that he had discovered only ammunition, not a weapon, in his cruiser. In addition, the evidence showed that appellant told Thibodeau he had dropped his ammunition in the cruiser. Finally, the evidence connected appellant to the shotgun and drugs found in the apartment, rendering the exact location of the contraband irrelevant. It is important to note that, while a curative instruction was neither requested of nor issued by the district court, appellant's counsel, in his opening statement, which immediately followed the government's opening, stated, I would like to make it clear these opening statements are not evidence. Under these circumstance, we find no plain error. Cf. United States v. Ferrera, 746 F.2d 908, 910-11 (1st Cir.1984) (no plain error where very little prejudice resulted from improper remark in government's opening statement). 48 The rulings of the district court are affirmed in all respects.