Opinion ID: 2994957
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Heading: L.M. 679). Most famously, jus cogens

Text: norms supported the prosecutions in the Nuremberg trials. See Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715 (9th Cir. 1992) (The universal and fundamental rights of human beings identified by Nuremberg--rights against genocide, enslavement, and other inhumane acts . . . --are the direct ancestors of the universal and fundamental norms recognized as jus cogens.). Courts seeking to determine whether a norm of customary international law has attained the status of jus cogens look to the same sources [as for customary international law], but must also determine whether the international community recognizes the norm as one ’from which no derogation is permitted.’ See id., 965 F.2d at 715 (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan (CUSCLUN), 859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). While jus cogens and customary international law are related, they differ in one important respect. Customary international law, like international law defined by treaties and other international agreements, rests on the consent of states. Id. In contrast, a state is bound by jus cogens norms even if it does not consent to their application. International law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a sovereign act. Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718. Thus, a violation of jus cogens norms would not be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law. See id. Sampson and Amicus note that Germany’s crimes against humanity during World War II are not entitled to immunity as sovereign acts under international law because they violate jus cogens norms. In addition, they note that the House Report when the FSIA was enacted stated that the central premise of the bill [is] [t]hat decisions on claims by foreign states to sovereign immunity are best made by the judiciary on the basis of a statutory regime which incorporates standards recognized under international law. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 6613. Accordingly, they urge us to hold that the FSIA’s implied waiver exception to sovereign immunity extends to violations of jus cogens norms. Initially, we note that we have held in other contexts that the implied waiver provision of the FSIA is to be narrowly construed. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1985). In fact, courts rarely find that a nation has waived its sovereign immunity, particularly with respect to suits brought by third parties, without strong evidence that this is what the foreign state intended. Id. See also Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174; Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Cf. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442-43 (holding that a foreign state cannot waive its immunity under sec.1605(a)(1) by signing an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the United States.). Thus, an implied waiver depends upon the foreign government’s having at some point indicated its amenability to suit. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174. In this case, there is no evidence that Germany indicated, either expressly or implicitly, that it was willing to be sued in the United States based on actions during World War II. See id. (concluding no evidence existed that Germany indicated, even implicitly, a willingness to waive immunity for actions arising out of the Nazi atrocities.). Sampson responds that the following constitutes evidence that Germany waived its sovereign immunity: a letter from the German government stating that the German people is responsible for the past; a letter from the Claims Conference stating that Sampson was eligible to receive compensation payments; and a holding by the German Supreme Constitutional Court regarding jus cogens norms. See Pl. Br. at 14. But these statements do not indicate an intent by the state of Germany to be subject to suit in United States courts; they merely demonstrate that Germany recognizes that its actions during World War II constituted violations of jus cogens norms. Nor is there any other evidence in the record, much less the strong evidence sufficient to demonstrate Germany’s intent to waive its immunity. Our conclusion that Germany did not impliedly waive its sovereign immunity under the FSIA finds support in decisions rendered by three of our sister circuits. In Siderman, the Ninth Circuit addressed a claim that Argentina had impliedly waived its sovereign immunity based on the jus cogens norm against torture. The Court concluded that the Supreme Court’s holding in Amerada Hess, that the FSIA was the sole basis of jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns, precluded a finding that an implied waiver exception existed for jus cogens violations. In Princz, a case involving claims similar to Sampson’s, the D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion. The court based its holding on its determination that the implied waiver exception to the FSIA required an indication that the foreign sovereign intended to waive its sovereign immunity. And in Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1997), a case involving international terrorism, the Second Circuit held that Congress did not intend the implied waiver provision to extend to jus cogens violations. Amicus argues in response that while an implied waiver under Section 1605(a)(1) must generally demonstrate a clear intent by the state to waive its sovereign immunity, that principle does not apply to cases involving violations of jus cogens norms of international law. This