Opinion ID: 785658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reasonableness of the January 30, 1999 Search and Seizure

Text: 21 Despite Shaul's failure to retrieve his belongings on January 19, 1999, defendants afforded him a second opportunity. Shaul now asserts that the hour and a half afforded him on January 29th was insufficient for this task, that his expectation of privacy continued until full retrieval was made, and, therefore, that defendants removal of his belongings from the classroom on January 30, 1999 was an unreasonable search and seizure. We disagree. 22 Preliminarily, we observe that Shaul's insufficient time claim, even when viewed in the light most favorable to him, is unconvincing. Notably, Shaul makes no claim that he attempted on January 29th to retrieve any personal effects from the locked file cabinet, wherein he presumably had the greatest expectation of privacy. Neither does he claim that he could not empty the contents of his desk — the room's next most private area — into a box or bag within the allotted time. To the extent there was a problem with timely removal, it stemmed largely from the fact that Shaul had made little attempt to maintain privacy of large quantities of his personal materials, intermingling sports memorabilia, yearbooks, and personal correspondence throughout the classroom with school property. Brief of Appellant at 6. 23 Even if we were to assume that Shaul had a reasonable expectation of privacy that continued after January 29, 1999, Shaul would not be entitled to reversal of the district court judgment because by January 30th, it was certainly reasonable for defendants themselves to remove Shaul's personal belongings from the classroom. 24 As the Supreme Court has recognized, government offices are not provided to employees for the maintenance of personal effects. They are provided for the sole purpose of facilitating the work of an agency. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725, 107 S.Ct. 1492. Thus, the government interest in the efficient and proper operation of the workplace will often require intrusions on employee privacy. Id. at 723, 107 S.Ct. 1492. Such intrusions, whether for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, or for investigations of work-related misconduct do not require either a warrant or probable cause; rather, their constitutionality is judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Id. at 725-26, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (plurality opinion); see id. at 732, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 25 The reasonableness standard must be satisfied both at the inception of an employer's intrusion and throughout its scope. The first requirement is satisfied if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. Id. at 726, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (plurality opinion); see Leventhal, 266 F.3d at 75. The second requirement is met when `the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light ... the nature of the [misconduct].' O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985)). 26 In this case, there is no question that defendants' January 30th search of Shaul's former classroom and the removal of his personal belongings therefrom were reasonably necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose — that is, to clean and organize the classroom so that a new teacher could have the materials, equipment, and space necessary to assume Shaul's responsibilities for the remainder of the school year. 27 Shaul does not dispute this fact. Instead, he asserts that this avowed non-investigatory purpose was a subterfuge for defendants' real investigatory goal: the procurement of evidence of misconduct that could be used against him at his disciplinary hearing. To support this argument, Shaul observes that defendants unsuccessfully attempted to offer into evidence at the disciplinary hearing one item found while searching his locked file cabinet, i.e., a photograph of the former student whom he allegedly stalked. But even if we assume that defendants' search was motivated, at least in part, by an investigatory purpose, the search would not have been unreasonable. By January 30, 1999, defendants certainly possessed individualized suspicion that Shaul had recently engaged in professional misconduct. Id. (discussing individualized suspicion standard without holding it essential to a reasonable investigatory workplace search). Their challenged search was prompted by Shaul's suspension for alleged sexual harassment of a sophomore student in his homeroom class. Thus, it was entirely reasonable for defendants to think that evidence relating to Shaul's dealings with the student — which had included written correspondence — might be found in the classroom where much of their interaction had occurred. 28 In sum, we agree with the district court that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Shaul's claim of unreasonable search and seizure of his property on January 30, 1999. Whatever reasonable expectations of privacy Shaul may have had in personal property maintained in his classroom while he was a teacher in good standing, that expectation ended when, after being suspended for professional misconduct and barred from his classroom, he surrendered all school keys, including a key to a locked file cabinet in his classroom, at the same time that he failed to avail himself of an opportunity to retrieve his personal belongings. To the extent Shaul complains that defendants did not give him enough time to remove all his belongings on a subsequent occasion, we hold that even if that were the case, by January 30th defendants had reasonable investigatory and non-investigatory grounds for searching the classroom and removing plaintiff's personal property so that a new teacher could complete the school year. 29