Opinion ID: 2742088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination for Cause

Text: Butterworth contends there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that LabCorp’s stated reason for her termination was a pretext for an unlawful motive, her termination constituted a breach of contract, and she was therefore entitled to advance notice or pay in lieu of notice. For a breach of contract claim, Florida law requires the plaintiff to plead and establish, among other things: (1) the existence of a contract; and (2) a material breach of that contract. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009). A material breach of contract allows the non-breaching party to treat the breach as a discharge of its contractual liability. Hospital Mort. Grp. v. First Prudential Dev. Corp., 411 So. 2d 181, 182 (Fla. 1982). Summary judgment was appropriate on Butterworth’s notice/severance pay breach of contract claim, because evidence did not refute LabCorp’s contention that Butterworth violated company policy by setting up the RTS website. The existence of Butterworth’s employment contract is undisputed, and its terms included a provision requiring LabCorp to either provide her with six months’ notice of pay in lieu of notice if it terminated her without cause, but neither notice nor severance pay was required if LabCorp terminated her for cause. LabCorp’s code of conduct, which contained its conflicts of interest policy, clearly stated that 10 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 11 of 15 violations could result in termination, and the conflicts policy prohibited actual and potential conflicts, including but not limited to outside employment and any interests that impact the objectivity and efficiency with which an employee can perform her work for LabCorp. With undisputed evidence of deliberation and the termination of an identically situated comparator for both potential and actual conflicts of interest, including discussions among LabCorp management about the conflicts of interest potential RTS posed that predate Butterworth’s June 15 email regarding operational deficiencies and gender discrimination, 5 the district court drew the reasonable inference that Butterworth was terminated for cause. See Kragor v. Takeda Pharms. Am., Inc., 702 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2012). There was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether LabCorp was contractually 5 E-mails between Farrell, Sumison, and Gornto on June 12 indicated LabCorp’s concern with RTS work being done on LabCorp time, and specifically stated a concern with conflicts of interest, as did a June 19 email from Eric Feldman to Nelson and Miller. Nelson emailed Farrell on June 19, expressing his desire to terminate all four employees. Emails between Farrell and Nelson on June 20 and 21 demonstrate they were concerned with the fact Sznapstajler answered an RTS call during LabCorp working hours, and Nelson supported Farrell’s desire to terminate all four employees. Sumison submitted a draft reprimand letter to Farrell regarding Butterworth, which stated that Butterworth would at the least be removed from her managerial position for violating LabCorp Code of Conduct Business Practices and Ethics by having a conflict of interest in a business venture with subordinates. Sumison also verified in her deposition that LabCorp management had multiple conversations as early as June 12 about firing the employees involved with RTS or disciplining while still retaining them, which was her preference, although she was convinced termination of Butterworth was proper during the June 22 meeting. Finally, Sznapstajler was terminated on the same day for his involvement with RTS, and his answering an RTS call while at work at LabCorp verified management’s concerns about conflicts of interest. 11 Case: 13-15021 Date Filed: 10/14/2014 Page: 12 of 15 entitled to terminate Butterworth for cause and without notice. We affirm on this claim.