Opinion ID: 1766379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: IS McCULLOUGH AS ASSIGNEE A CONTRACTOR WITH CHICKASAW COUNTY?

Text: Concerning the argument that the result might have been entirely different if section (3)(c) instead of (a) had been used, the court makes a distinction between (3)(a)'s terms, contractor and member, and (3)(c)'s terms, security and employee. The distinction between member and employee is unfounded. As discussed previously, the chancery clerk is a member of the governmental entity, the county. It is not surprising that (3)(a) and (3)(c) may cover similar acts, and thus are overlapping in scope. The reason is that the legislature, through its repeated passage into law of its statement of public policy for this ethics legislation, intended these provisions to be liberally construed, to prevent violations from slipping through loopholes. In cases where it is not clear whether a specific act is within the scope of a statute based on its language only, legislative intent is the next indicator. Since the legislature has declared its intent for us, our job is easy. Apparently the legislature foresaw that this statute, like many others, would be tested for loopholes due to limits on human ability to write down every possible violation we intend to punish. Therefore, to cover such potential loopholes, a broad policy statement is made. Such a statement has been made, and must not be ignored in this case. As to the distinction between contractor and security, the definitional section in the chapter at issue defines contract. It seems logical to infer that this definition also applies to contractor. Contract means: (i) Any agreement to which the government is a party; or (ii) Any agreement on behalf of the government which involves the payment of public funds. MISS. CODE ANN. 25-4-103(f). It is not surprising that the legislature defined such terms so generally, in light of their legislative intent. The facts here involve an agreement. That would fall under the statutory language of any agreement. One who makes a contract is a contractor, thus, one who makes any agreement under the statute would be a contractor under the statute. I do not see any reason for limiting the terms of this section further. Securities are formed or purchased through a bargained for exchange, a contract. A subcontractor, vendor, and one with a material financial interest in such a party is likewise prohibited by the statute; McCullough certainly falls under one of these categories. The majority cites the case United States v. McCullough, 760 F. Supp. 101 (N.D.Miss. 1991). This is troublesome for two reasons. The first is that this Erie guess opinion is admittedly based on state circuit court decisions which were pending appeal at the time, one of which is the lower court decision in the instant case. 760 F. Supp. at 102. Hence, for the Mississippi Supreme Court to rely so heavily on this case, when additional, independent authority and reasoning is available, is logically circular. Second, the federal district court was incorrect in concluding that McCullough's involvement in this business transaction did not fall under the scope of a contractor, subcontractor, or vendor with the governmental entity... . The federal district court stated that since McCullough purchased the account from Miss. Road Supply Co., McCullough was not a contractor with the government. United States v. McCullough, 760 F. Supp. at 104. The federal district court's opinion ignores the statutory definitions of Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-103 (1972). United States v. McCullough, 760 F. Supp. at 102. Moreover, since Miss. Road Supply Co. had a contract with Chickasaw County, which it assigned to McCullough, the result was that McCullough stepped into the shoes of Miss. Road Supply Co. for the purposes of that business venture. Great So. Nat. Bank v. McCullough Environmental Services, Inc., 595 So.2d 1282 (Miss. 1992) (assignee can enforce all the right, title, or interest which assignor previously had); Ford v. White, 495 So.2d 494, 496 (Miss. 1986) (assignee can enforce provisions of original contract); International Harvester v. Peoples Bank & Trust, 402 So.2d 856, 861 (Miss. 1981) (assignment of debt conveys entire interest to assignee). Although McCullough did not participate in the formation of the contract, he can now enforce a contract to which the government is a party. The fact that McCullough became a party to this contractual relationship after its formation is irrelevant. In fact, the statute includes parties to a subcontract, who can become a subcontractor without having participated in the formation of the original contract. As assignee, McCullough can directly enforce the terms of this contract against the county without going through Miss. Road Supply Co. As stated previously, his involvment as a public servant of Chickasaw County while simultaneously having enforceable legal rights against the county would place him in a position with conflict of interest implications. Therefore, in my opinion the trial judge committed reversible error by holding that there was no violation of Section 25-4-105(3)(a) and I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial. McRAE, J., joins this dissent.