Opinion ID: 183762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Dunthorne Construction of Arising Out Of

Text: The parties agree that the phrase arising out of should be interpreted according to English law. [7] There are two strains of English law construing the phrase arising out of. The district court held, and appellees agree, that the phrase is properly understood through the lens of Scott v. Copenhagen Reinsurance Co. (UK), [2003] EWCA (Civ) 688, (2003) 2 All E.R. (Comm.) 190. Appellants maintain that Dunthorne v. Bentley, [1999] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 560, is more on point. In Scott, the court concluded that the theft of a Kuwait Airways fleet and the destruction of a British Airways plane were not losses arising from one event, namely Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and closure of Kuwait International Airport. [2003] EWCA (Civ) 688, [83]. The court held that the phrase arising from one event requires a significant causal link, which was not present in that case. Id. at [68]. In Dunthorne, the insured's car ran out of gas on the side of a road. [1999] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. at 561. After an acquaintance pulled over on the opposite side, the insured ran across, presumably to get help. The claimant, who was driving on the road, hit the insured and suffered injuries. The insured was killed. The court concluded that the claimant's injuries ar[ose] out of the use of the [insured's] vehicle. Id. at 561. The court explained that the phrase `arising out of' contemplates more remote consequences than those envisaged by the words `caused by,' but `excludes cases of bodily injury in which the use of the vehicle is a merely casual concomitant, not considered to be, in a relevant causal sense, a contributing factor.' Id. at 562 (citing Gov't Ins. Office of New S. Wales v. Green & Lloyd (1965) 114 C.L.R. 437, 447 (Aust.)). [8] Given the absence of the significant causal link standard adopted in Scott, appellants argue that Dunthorne imports a more expansive view of causation into the arising out of language of the insurance contract, and should apply here. We need not decide which interpretation of the phrase arising out of applies here as a matter of law. Instead, we conclude that Custadio's injuries and death did not aris[e] out of business visits by directors or non-manual employees, even assuming the application of appellants' broader construction of the phrase. Under the Dunthorne construction, the business visits must have been not only a contributing factor to the accident, but they also must have been a contributing factor in a relevant causal sense. Here, the evidence proffered by appellants does not establish the necessary degree of causation. As a majority of the English court acknowledged, the facts of Dunthorne put [the case] close to th[e] line demarcating the boundaries of the phrase arising out of. Id. at 563 (Hutchison L.J.); id. (Pill L.J.) (explaining that the facts make it a difficult case and that [f]inding in the plaintiff's favour ... has the danger of opening the door to situations that fall on the other side of the line); see also Slater v. Buckinghamshire Cnty. Council, [2004] EWHC 77, [118] (stating that, in Dunthorne, the insured's actions only just fell within the right side of the line of `arising out of the use of the vehicle'). As the court in Dunthorne explained: The reason for a pedestrian to be in the road is or may be relevant when deciding whether what occurred arose out of the use of the car, but the mere activity of crossing the road must not be looked at in isolation. There may be many reasons for a pedestrian to cross the road. In each case how the act of crossing the road is categorised and whether it can be said to arise out of another activity is to be judged objectively looking at all the circumstances including the reason why the pedestrian was there. [1999] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. at 562. The court concluded that [t]he plaintiff's injuries were caused by [the insured] seeking help to continue her journey. They arose out of her use of the car as she would not have crossed the road if she was not out of petrol and seeking help to continue her journey. Id. at 563. Thus, in Dunthorne, the court relied on the proximity of the injuries, in both time and space, to the use of the car. The court found that the former arose out of the latter because the insured was in the road next to her car, immediately following the use of the car, in order to facilitate the continued use of the car.