Opinion ID: 74409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: damages and causation

Text: Before leaving Plaintiffs' illegal stop claims, we address a causation issue. Even if under Plaintiffs' evidence a reasonable police officer would have known that he violated clearly established law in making this stop, Defendants claim that Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries were caused by Stearn's shooting and not their illegal stop, and thus Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds for any damages arising from Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries. However, we find that Plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient to create jury issues regarding whether Defendants' illegal stop proximately caused Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries and the damages flowing therefrom.15 In so finding, we are guided by certain common law tort principles of damages and causation which apply in this § 1983 context. See, e.g., Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305-06, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). 15 The sufficiency of the evidence issues related to whether Defendants' allegedly illegal stop caused Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries are inextricably intertwined or part and parcel of the core qualified immunity issues in this case. See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1489-92 (11th Cir.1996) (in an interlocutory appeal, turning first to plaintiff's evidence of the constitutional violation itself and holding that plaintiff has failed to show a violation of due process, and it necessarily follows that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds); Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1033 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996) (in an interlocutory appeal, focusing on the predicate element of the underlying constitutional tort, which is part and parcel of the core qualified immunity issue which is immediately appealable or is inextricably intertwined with the core issue); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537 (11th Cir.1995) (in an interlocutory appeal, holding defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiffs failed to present evidence of deliberate indifference to support their Eighth Amendment claim). See also, e.g., Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1361-63 (11th Cir.1999); Mencer v. Hammonds, 134 F.3d 1066, 1069-71 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 445, 142 L.Ed.2d 399 (1998); Johnson v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1090-91 (11th Cir.1996). 15 Although § 1983 addresses only constitutional torts, § 1983 defendants are, as in common law tort suits, responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-45 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (stating that  § 1983 should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions) (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961)); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-59, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). For damages to be proximately caused by a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must show that, except for that constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred and further that such injuries and damages were the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the tortious acts or omissions in issue.16 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants' illegal stop set off and caused the chain reaction of Stearns's shooting and hitting Sauls, Sauls's shooting and hitting Wimbish, and Pinckney's shooting and killing Jackson. According to the Plaintiffs and other witnesses, Defendants in plain clothes never identified themselves as police officers, drew their guns, yelled obscenities, and ordered the Shop's occupants to lie down on the floor. Only then did Stearns shoot, fearing for his safety and believing that the blue-jean-clad Defendants were armed robbers about to harm them. Plaintiffs assert that Stearns's three round burst was his effort to escape injury from armed robbers and was directly caused by Defendants' illegal stop. Plaintiffs stress that Defendants' illegal stop not only caused Stearns to shoot but also created the need for the officers to use deadly force in responding to Stearns and thus caused Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, and we agree, that jury issues exist regarding whether, except for Defendants' 16 Under traditional tort principles, causation has two required elements: cause-in-fact and legal or proximate cause. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keaton on the Law of Torts, §§ 41-42, at 263-80 (5th ed.1984). A plaintiff must first show that the constitutional tort was a cause-in-fact of the injuries and damages claimed. To establish cause-in-fact, the plaintiff must show that except for the constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred. Id. Secondly, a plaintiff must show that the constitutional tort was the legal or proximate cause of the injuries and damages claimed. An act or omission is a legal or proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries or damages if it appears from the evidence that the injury or damage was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act or omission. Id. 16 illegal stop, Stearns would not have shot, the officers would not have shot back, and Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries would not have occurred. Plaintiffs further argue that their evidence also raises jury issues regarding foreseeability and whether Stearns's shooting, the officers' shooting back, and Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries were natural and foreseeable consequences of the officers' illegal stop. We first caution that a police officer cannot foresee all conduct occurring after a stop or arrest, even if illegal. For example, when a uniformed officer, or an undercover officer identifying himself as a policeman, draws his gun during an illegal stop or arrest, third party civilians and detained persons do not normally begin shooting. Thus, in those situations, an officer would not reasonably foresee a shooting in response to a stop or arrest, even if illegal. However, under Plaintiffs' evidence in this case, a jury could find that it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendants' dress and illegal stop of persons at this business would make Defendants appear to the Shop's occupants as armed robbers about to harm them. Under Plaintiffs' version of the events, a jury could further find that it was reasonably foreseeable that an illegal stop in this manner at a business might result in the discharge of firearms by the Shop's occupants, the officers' firing back, and injuries to the Shop's occupants being illegally stopped. Thus, we find that Plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient to create jury issues regarding whether, except for Defendants' illegal stop, the damages from Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries would not have occurred and regarding whether Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries were reasonably foreseeable consequences of Defendants' illegal stop.17 Therefore, the district court properly denied Defendants summary judgment on their qualified immunity defenses to Plaintiffs' illegal stop claims for these damages. 17 Additionally, under this causation analysis, Officer Fields's never firing his weapon does not necessarily relieve him of potential liability for these damages because under Plaintiffs' evidence, a jury could find that it was the concerted effort of the three Defendant officers that set off the chain of events that Plaintiffs argue caused Jackson's death and Wimbish's injuries. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir.1989) (stating [i]t was eminently foreseeable that an encounter with a civilian by four [undercover] policemen with weapons drawn and ready to fire might result in a discharge of the firearms and an injury to the civilian). Of course, if the jury found that Fields was chasing Dean and did not join Sauls in drawing his gun and making the stop, then a different result ensues for Fields. 17