Opinion ID: 783986
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ordinary Meaning & Legislative History

Text: 32 Keeping in mind the requirements of Morrissey, and following the two general principles that (1) [c]ourts can and should ... adopt statutory interpretations, when feasible, that will avoid serious constitutional issues, United States v. Hernandez, 322 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 2003) (as amended), and (2) penal statutes must be strictly construed, Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1432 n. 11 (9th Cir.1994) (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 18 U.S. 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820)), we now turn to the language in the Guidelines discussing revocation. 33 The particular provision at issue here requires that the original term of imprisonment [be added] to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)(1). Neither the Guidelines nor Commentary to the provision provides a definition of revocation. However, the conventional understanding of `revoke' [is] `to annul by recalling or taking back.' Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 704, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1944 (1981)). Under this definition, revocation occurs when the privilege of remaining under parole or probation supervision, as opposed to imprisonment, is annulled or cancelled. Modifications of the terms of parole or probation, under which the parolee or probationer remains under the supervision of probation, are not covered, as parole or probation supervision continues and is therefore not annulled. 6 34 This construction is consistent with the Guidelines' own probation scheme, which gives sentencing courts discretion to revoke ... or [] extend the term of probation or supervised release and/or modify the conditions of supervision. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). By articulating a clear distinction between formal revocation proceedings and modifications imposed as a result of lower-level violations, the Guidelines contemplate the serious nature of revocation and distinguish it from lesser sanctions imposed without the full protections Morrissey requires. Where the terms of probation are modified, including imposition of temporary periods of confinement, but the probationer remains under the supervision of the probation entity, revocation has not occurred. But see United States v. Glover, 154 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir.1998) (discussed infra ) (rejecting defendant's argument that modifications cannot be treated as revocations under the Guidelines). 7 Thus, the term revocation, as used in § 4A1.2(k)(1), requires that before probation or parole supervision can continue after a revocation, the sentencing authority must sentence the defendant anew. 35 The rule of lenity favors such a narrow construction. We will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended. Latimer, 991 F.2d at 1514 (quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387, 100 S.Ct. 2247, 65 L.Ed.2d 205 (1980)) (citation omitted). In this case, the government has presented no evidence that Congress intended any violation accompanied by a confinement sanction to be treated as a revocation for the purposes of § 4A1.2(k). As discussed above, we believe that the plain language suggests the contrary. Given that neither the text nor the commentary contemplate such an interpretation, and given the constitutional concerns raised by subsequently recategorizing informal modification procedures as implicitly compliant with the requirements of Morrissey, we must construe the statute narrowly. 36 Finally, we note that this construction of § 4A1.2(k) does not preclude the use of evidence of parole or probation conduct that the government believes is relevant to sentencing, nor does it undermine the general premise that repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful rehabilitation. U.S.S.G. ch. 4, pt. A., introductory cmt. (2001); contra Glover, 154 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Glidden, 77 F.3d at 40) (indicating that failing to treat probation violations as revocations under § 4A1.2(k) would be contrary to the purpose of the Guidelines). The government is still free to present to the court reliable information ... [that] indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect ... the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. 37 The government nevertheless argues that any term of confinement presumptively reflects an intent to annul the privilege of parole or probation, regardless of whether the parole or probation entity expresses such an intent in a formal determination. Essentially, the government is arguing that a narrow construction is at odds with the generally accepted contemporary meaning of revocation. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 596, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (citing Perrin, 444 U.S. at 49 n. 13, 100 S.Ct. 311). We agree that any uniform federal definition should comport with state and federal probation practice. Interpretation of the Guidelines can be informed by how the states interpret and apply their own criminal laws. United States v. Wood, 52 F.3d 272, 276 n. 4 (9th Cir.1995). We therefore turn to practice in order to address whether the government's suggested presumption is warranted.