Opinion ID: 1302154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jeross: Presentence Report

Text: Jeross also argues that the district court erred in failing to inquire about whether he and his counsel had read and discussed the PSR. He did not, however, raise an objection regarding this issue at his resentencing. Because Jeross failed to object before the district court, we review the alleged error under the plain-error standard. See United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 757 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002) (A defendant's right to review of error he let pass in silence depends upon the plain error rule.)). A procedural challenge to a sentence for failure to inquire about a defendant's review of his PSR arises under Rule 32(i)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule provides that [a]t sentencing, the court . . . must verify that the defendant and the defendant's attorney have read and discussed the presentence report and any addendum to the report. Although we require literal compliance with Rule 32(i)(1)(A), United States v: Mitchell, 243 F.3d 953, 955 (6th Cir.2001), [a] trial judge need not expressly ask the defendant if he and his counsel have read and discussed the report. United States v. Osborne, 291 F.3d 908, 910 (6th Cir.2002). [I]nstead, the court need only somehow determine that defendant and counsel have had an opportunity to read and discuss the [PSR]. Id. (emphasis and second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 851 F.2d 140, 143 (6th Cir.1988)). The district court at Jeross's resentencing hearing did not specifically inquire of Jeross whether he and his attorney had reviewed and discussed the PSR, but the court was not required to so inquire if it could somehow determine that Jeross and his counsel had had the opportunity to review and discuss it. See Osborne, 291 F.3d at 910. A review of the transcript from Jeross's sentencing and resentencing hearings reveals that the district court had ample grounds on which to determine that Jeross and his counsel had had the opportunity to review and discuss his PSR, which was not revised after Jeross was initially sentenced. Prior to Jeross's initial sentencing, the government prepared a sentencing memorandum that cited to, and extensively discussed, the information contained in the PSR. The parties then discussed at Jeross's initial sentencing hearing a downward departure that was set forth in the PSR. Jeross's lawyer also told the court that he had discussed with Mr. Jeross certain objections to Jeross's role in the enterprise and the quantity of drugs involved  information that was contained in the PSR  and that Jeross had decided to withdraw those objections. Defense counsel also explained that Mr. Jeross understands the sentence that the Court is about to impose, and . . . has cooperated with the government to provide information for the sentence of 270 months. Following remand, Jeross raised the same challenges in two resentencing memoranda and two replies to the government's resentencing memorandum, each of which included explicit references to the PSR. One of Jeross's resentencing memoranda, for example, summarizes the method by which the probation department calculated the sentencing guidelines and cites to page eight of the PSR in challenging the weight of the pills attributed to Jeross. At the resentencing hearing itself, Jeross's counsel raised these same, and other, challenges that took issue with information contained in the PSR. The government attorney, moreover, specifically reminded the district court at resentencing that Jeross has previously withdrawn and waived all objections to the presentence investigation report in this matter. Jeross's counsel then confirmed that fact to the court. On the basis of this record, the district court had ample grounds on which to determine that Jeross and his counsel had had the opportunity to review and discuss the PSR. Accordingly, the court did not err in failing to specifically inquire of Jeross whether he had discussed and reviewed it with his counsel. H. Jeross: Reassignment to a different judge upon remand Because we are affirming Jeross's sentence, we have no need to reach his request to remand the case to a different district judge for resentencing.