Opinion ID: 2996964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bickers’ Alleged Out-of-Court Statements

Text: Hite’s other argument is that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of William D. Hite and Eddie Kemper, Jr. While the defense conceded that Bickers’ alleged statement falls within the definition of hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), the defense claims the testimony should be allowed under Rule 804(b)(3) as a statement against the declarant’s penal interest. We review the district court’s decision to exclude hearsay evidence under Rule 804(b)(3) for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Westmoreland, 240 F.3d 618, 626 (7th Cir. 2001). An inculpatory statement is only admissible under Rule 804(b)(3) if the proponent of the statement can 14 No. 02-2808 establish that: “(1) the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial; (2) the statement was against the declarant’s penal interest; and (3) corroborating circumstances bolster the statement’s trustworthiness.” United States v. Shukri, 207 F.3d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 2000). The trial judge ruled that the defense had failed to meet its burden regarding Bickers’ alleged out-of-court statements. We agree. The district court was correct in finding that the defense’s efforts in attempting to locate Bickers fell far short of exhibiting a reasonable effort. Under Rule 804, “the party seeking to introduce hearsay statements[] bears the burden of showing that the declarant was unavailable.” United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 804(a)(5), for a witness to be “unavailable” the proponent of the hearsay statement must be unable to produce the declarant as a witness at trial “by process or other reasonable means.” Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(5). To satisfy the reasonable means mandate of Rule 804(a)(5), a goodfaith effort must be made to obtain the declarant’s presence at trial. See United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968)). We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Hite had failed to pursue reasonable means to determine Bickers’ unavailability.11 The record shows that the “search” for Bickers did not begin until four months before the trial began, in December of 2001. The record also reveals that, before that time, Bickers was in and out of the court system in Coles County on numerous occasions 11 At trial the government conceded that Bickers was unavailable. However, the defendant cites no legal authority—nor have we discovered any—which supports the proposition that the prosecution’s concession of Bickers’ unavailability releases Hite from the requirement to exercise reasonable efforts to procure Bickers’ testimony. No. 02-2808 15 between February and July of 2001. However, an attempt was never made to contact Coles County law enforcement, ask for their assistance in the issuance of compulsory process, or otherwise secure Bickers’ testimony at trial. Indeed, the only attempt made to locate Bickers was made by the defense’s investigator, Donald Espinoza, who testified that “I’ve talked to family members . . . [but] that’s about as far as I’ve gone.” We hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that Hite had not made a reasonable effort to secure Bickers’ testimony because “[b]oth the [C]onstitution and Rule 804 strongly favor live testimony.” Kehm, 799 F.2d at 360-61. Next, the district court found that the defendant had failed to establish the trustworthiness of the evidence corroborating Bickers’ alleged hearsay statements as to ownership of the illegal firearms. A trial court judge has discretion to exclude out-of-court exculpatory statements proffered by the defense unless “the corroborating evidence does not clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statements.”12 United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 684 (7th 12 However, this proposition may no longer be true for inculpatory out-of-court statements proffered by the prosecution in criminal cases. See Crawford v. Washington, 72 U.S.L.W. 4229 (March 8, 2004). In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court recently overruled the longstanding framework for the admissability of out-of-court statements under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 (1980), which allowed hearsay evidence, absent the opportunity by defense to cross-examine, if the declarant was truly unavailable and the evidence fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or was shown to have “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 448 U.S. at 66-74. In Crawford, the Court held that, under the Confrontation Clause, out-of-court statements are to be excluded unless the witnesses is found to be unavailable and the defense was provided a prior opportunity to cross-examine that person, regardless of whether the trial court deems the statements to be (continued...) 16 No. 02-2808 Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1112 (7th Cir. 1999)). We will not disturb a trial court’s finding that a statement is untrustworthy unless we are convinced a clear error has been committed. See Amerson, 185 F.3d at 684. As the district court noted, the only corroborating evidence establishing the trustworthiness of Bickers’ statement is testimony by William D. Hite, the defendants’s father, and Eddie Kemper, Jr., the defendant’s cousin, indicating Bickers merely showed them the firearms in question. However, ATF Agent Fritzsche refuted this evidence when he testified that Bickers’ mother told him that Bickers denied owning the firearms. In addition, the Motion for Return of Items signed by Bickers did not list the illegal firearms Hite was charged with possessing, thereby refuting any alleged prior claim of ownership, leaving one to question whether he was the lawful owner of the firearms. Therefore, because the available evidence is contrary to Bickers’ alleged hearsay statement, we conclude the district court did not err when it determined that Bickers’ alleged statement lacked trustworthiness. Because we hold that the district court properly ruled as to the declarant’s unavailability and the trustworthiness of his statement, we need not address whether the court correctly found that the statement was contrary to Bickers’ penal interest. (...continued) reliable or not. See Crawford, 72 U.S.L.W. at 4235-38. Because we hold Hite was not truly unavailable, i.e., no good-faith effort was made to secure his presence at trial, and because the hearsay statements concerned were offered by the defense and not the prosecution, the Sixth Amendment is not implicated and the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford would not change our reasoning. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . .”). No. 02-2808 17 However, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the district court’s exclusion of Bickers’ hearsay statement was in error, the result would be harmless. The inappropriate exclusion of Bickers’ statements would not be grounds for disturbing the jury’s verdict. A jury’s verdict should not be disturbed unless failing to do so would garner results that are “inconsistent with substantial justice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. Under this standard, a trial court’s evidentiary errors will be held to be harmless unless there is significant chance that they affected the outcome of the trial. See Hasham v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000). The great weight of evidence in this case clearly established the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Patricia Stuart testified that she witnessed Hite in possession of the firearms in question while they were dating. In addition, the firearms Hite is accused of possessing were found among his belongings in the room he was occupying at his grandmother’s house. Indeed, the defendant linked the guns to himself when he requested that Officer Baumunk “take care” of the guns because they were family heirlooms. Also, the hearsay testimony suggesting Bickers’ ownership of the firearms itself was placed in serious doubt by Bickers’ Motion for Return of Items making no reference to them. Accordingly, this Court holds that Hite’s challenge to the district court’s granting of the government’s motion in limine lacks merit and, therefore, must fail.