Opinion ID: 2534147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Brevity of argument

Text: Defendant next contends defense counsel was ineffective because his penalty phase argument was brief. It was brief; in transcript, three pages long. (The prosecutor's argument was longer by only a page.) However, the effectiveness of an advocate's oral presentation is difficult to judge accurately from a written transcript, and the length of an argument is not a sound measure of its quality. ( Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 979, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 634-635, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) Defense counsel argued the trial was conducted on an aider and abettor theory; that Richard Cullumber was the actual killer; that defendant had expressed remorse as he told his story to Goldman and Buchanan; that the prosecutor in argument had acknowledged only a burglary had been planned; that life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant that defendant would never get out of prison; that sending another man to his death was not an appropriate response to this tragedy; that sentencing defendant to life imprisonment without possibility of parole was the second most severe penalty the law allowed and would not serve to condone defendant's crime; that the aggravating factors had to substantially outweigh the mitigating factors to warrant the death penalty; and that any lingering doubt the jurors may have had during the guilt phase, even though not amounting to a reasonable doubt, was sufficient for mitigation. We conclude defense counsel's argument, though brief, did not fall below the standard of reasonably competent representation, and we find no reasonable probability that a different argument would have convinced the jury to vote for life over death. ( Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 979, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 675, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392 [penalty phase argument two pages in length not inadequate representation]; Mayfield, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331 [brief, perfunctory penalty phase argument not inadequate representation].) 6. CALJIC No. 8.85 Defendant contends the standard instruction given here with regard to the factors the jury might take into account in determining the penalty (§ 190.3; CALJIC No. 8.85) failed to adequately guide its discretion, in violation of defendant's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant's various attacks on CALJIC No. 8.85 have been repeatedly rejected by this court, and we conclude he gives us no compelling reason to reconsider our decisions. CALJIC No. 8.85 does not encourage the double-counting of aggravating factors. ( People v. Lewis, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 669, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 288-289, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) The federal Constitution does not bar consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976-977, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 237, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222; People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 601, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Moreover, defendant seems to complain the jury was permitted to consider prior criminal activity involving use or attempted use of force, whereas the prosecutor candidly acknowledged to the jury, There is no evidence at all of any previous violent activity on the part of [defendant]. [A] reasonable juror would readily have identified the emotional disturbance and diminished capacity factors as mitigating. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 802, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; see People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 268-269, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The presumption that the jurors in this case understood and followed the mitigation instruction supplied to them is not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross-examination. [Citation.] ( Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) [17] Finally, failure to delete inapplicable statutory sentencing factors from CALJIC No. 8.85 as given did not violate defendant's rights under the federal Constitution. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 207-208, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Likewise, the failure to identify which factors were aggravating and which mitigating was not error; the aggravating or mitigating nature of the factors is self-evident within the context of each case. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 509, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754; see Box, at p. 1217, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) 7. CALJIC No. 8.88 Defendant contends giving the standard instruction on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors (CALJIC No. 8.88) violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have repeatedly rejected similar claims, and defendant gives us no compelling reason to reconsider our decisions. Defendant contends that the standard instruction on the weighing of mitigating and aggravating factors was impermissibly vague and misleading in that it failed to inform the jury that unless it found that the factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation, it could not impose a sentence of death, and in that it failed to inform the jury that if factors in mitigation outweighed those in aggravation, it must impose a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. He also complains that the instruction's direction that before the jury may return a verdict of death, it must find that the aggravating circumstances are `so substantial' as to warrant a sentence of death and not life imprisonment without possibility of parole, was vague and led to arbitrary decisionmaking. He claims violation of his right to due process of law and to a reliable and nonarbitrary penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. [¶] We repeatedly have rejected identical claims and decline defendant's invitation to reconsider our prior rulings. [Citations.] ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 174, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 ( Catlin ).) Defendant also contends the standard instruction, in referring to the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, erroneously implied a single mitigating circumstance could not outweigh any and all aggravating circumstances. However, the instruction was not susceptible of this interpretation. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1099-1100, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Finally, no instruction defining life imprisonment without possibility of parole was required. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 405, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 ( Hughes ).) 8. Reasonable doubt and penalty determination Defendant contends failure to instruct the jury that the reasonable doubt standard governs the penalty determination violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We have rejected the identical contention, and defendant gives us no reason to reconsider our decision. Defendant claims that it is unconstitutional to impose a sentence of death unless the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim was first rejected by our court in People v. Rodriguez [(1986)] 42 Cal.3d [730,] 777-779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113], and has been rejected ever since. (See, e.g., [ People v. ] Snow [(2003)] 30 Cal.4th [43,] 125-127 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749]; Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 884, fn. 7 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1]; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1150-1151 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572]; Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 691 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705].) As we recently stated: `The Constitution does not require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular factor in aggravation exists, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, or that death was the appropriate penalty.' ( Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 884 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1].) ( People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 971, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277.) Defendant acknowledges this court has previously rejected similar arguments. However, as did the defendant in Cox, defendant asks us to reconsider this position in light of two recent United States Supreme Court cases, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435], and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556]. Specifically, defendant argues that the two cases read together mandate that the aggravating circumstances necessary for the jury's imposition of the death penalty be found beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. As this court recently stated in [ People v. ] Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at page 126, footnote 32 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749]: `We reject that argument for the reason given in People v. Anderson [, supra, ] 25 Cal.4th [at pp.] 589-590, footnote 14 [106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347]: [U]nder the California death penalty scheme, once the defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances has been found true beyond a reasonable doubt, death is no more than the prescribed statutory maximum for the offense; the only alternative is life imprisonment without possibility of parole. (§ 190.2, subd. (a).) Hence, facts which bear upon, but do not necessarily determine, which of these two alternative penalties is appropriate do not come within the holding of Apprendi.  The high court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona [, supra, ] 536 U.S. 584 [122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556] does not change this analysis. Under the Arizona capital sentencing scheme invalidated in Ring, a defendant convicted of first degree murder could be sentenced to death if, and only if, the trial court first found at least one of the enumerated aggravating factors true. ( Id. at p. 603 [122 S.Ct. 2428].) Under California's scheme, in contrast, each juror must believe the circumstances in aggravation substantially outweigh those in mitigation, but the jury as a whole need not find any one aggravating factor to exist. The final step in California capital sentencing is a free weighing of all the factors relating to the defendant's culpability, comparable to a sentencing court's traditionally discretionary decision to, for example, impose one prison sentence rather than another. Nothing in Apprendi or Ring suggests the sentencer in such a system constitutionally must find any aggravating factor true beyond a reasonable doubt.' (Accord, People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302]; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 275 [133 Cal. Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123] [( Prieto )].) ( People v. Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277.) 9. Constitutionality of California's death penalty statute Defendant raises a number of other constitutional challenges to California's death penalty statute, claims we have consistently rejected and find no persuasive reason to reexamine. Accordingly, we continue to hold: The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-eligible offenders. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244 ( Brown ); Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) The jury is not constitutionally required to presume life imprisonment without possibility of parole is the appropriate punishment. ( Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 404, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 196, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960.) Nor is the jury constitutionally required to achieve unanimity as to aggravating factors. ( Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) The absence of a requirement that the jury make written findings does not render the law unconstitutional. ( Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 462, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Nor is it defective in failing to require intercase proportionality review. ( Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 402, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 394-395, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) The law is not constitutionally defective because the prosecutor retains discretion whether or not to seek the death penalty. ( Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 403, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 404, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) The method of execution does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, matters bearing on the legality of the execution of the sentence, rather than the validity of the sentence itself, are not a basis for the reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1176-1177, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 864, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Finally, we need not consider whether a violation of state or federal constitutional law would also violate international law, `because defendant has failed to establish the premise that his trial involved violations of state and federal constitutional law....' ([ People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p.] 1055 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) Moreover, had defendant shown prejudicial error under domestic law, we would have set aside the judgment on that basis without recourse to international law. ( People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 511, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754; see Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 403-404, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 885, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.)