Opinion ID: 1228032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Constitutional Challenge to the 1978 Statute

Text: (36) Defendant asserts the 1978 statute is unconstitutional because it fails to (1) specifically enumerate separately aggravating and mitigating factors; (2) exclude nonstatutory aggravating factors as a basis for the death penalty; (3) require written findings on the aggravating factors; (4) require that aggravating factors be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) require that the aggravating factors supporting a death verdict be found unanimously; (6) require the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh those in mitigation and that death is the appropriate punishment; and (7) require intercase proportionality review. We rejected an essentially identical constitutional attack in People v. Rodriguez, supra , ante, pp. 730, 777-779. For the reasons expressed therein we conclude the 1978 statute is not unconstitutional on the asserted grounds. (37) Defendant additionally argues that his sentence cannot stand under People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 477-482 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], and In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 423-429 [105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921]. In view of the facts set out ante, at pages 1236-1247, defendant simply cannot credibly assert that the punishment imposed is disproportionate to his individual culpability. Nor is there merit in any assertion that the punishment prescribed for the offense in question is more severe than that prescribed for less serious crimes, or that the death penalty for defendant's crime is disproportionate to the punishment prescribed for the same offense in other jurisdictions. (38a) Defendant further claims capital defendants are denied equal protection unless they receive the benefits of the disparate sentence statute, section 1170, subdivision (f). We cannot agree. (39) Section 1170, subdivision (f) was adopted to promote the uniform-sentence goals of the determinate sentencing law (DSL). ( People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437, 442 [229 Cal. Rptr. 131, 722 P.2d 905].) The statute requires the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) to review every sentence imposed pursuant to the DSL within one year to determine, by statistical simulation and review of comparable cases, whether it is substantial[ly] differen[t] from the expectable range of `sentences imposed on other offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances.' ( Id., at p. 441, see 60 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 143, 147 (1977).) Within 120 days after the BPT notifies the sentencing judge that a sentence is disparate, he must conduct a new sentence hearing, in which he gives great weight to the board's finding. Thus, he must accept the finding of disparity unless he determines on substantial evidence that the board selected the wrong comparison group, or that it erred in finding a significant difference from sentences in comparable cases. Further, if the finding of disparity is upheld, he must recall his sentence unless there is substantial evidence of [subjective] countervailing considerations which justify a disparate sentence.... ( Martin, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 446-448.) (38b) Bearing in mind the fundamental liberty interests implicated by such a classification, the Legislature could properly conclude that this statutory scheme, fashioned for use under the DSL, is entirely unsuited to the separate premises on which capital sentencing proceeds. First, although the trial judge in a capital case has authority to modify a death judgment (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), or even to strike special circumstance findings so as to render a defendant eligible for parole (see People v. Williams (1981) 30 Cal.3d 470, 489 [179 Cal. Rptr. 443, 637 P.2d 1029]), the primary sentencing authority in a capital case, unless waived, is a jury. This lay body represents and applies community standards in the capital-sentencing process under principles not extended to noncapital sentencing. Once the jury has exercised its function, it is discharged and cannot conveniently be recalled to reconsider a sentence that the BPT might determine to be disparate. It would contravene the jury's proper sentencing role to place in a judge's hands the responsibility for deciding whether the long-discharged jury would adhere to its sentence on substantial evidence if confronted with a finding of disparity. Second, the disparate sentence law is designed to isolate sentences that are beyond the normal range for similar offenses. ( Martin, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 445, fn. 5.) Even under the DSL, that range may be broad, because it can be affected by consecutive sentencing and by various statutory enhancements, employed in different ways by different judges. By contrast, when one stands convicted of first degree murder with one or more special circumstances, the range of possible punishments narrows to death or life without parole. The defendant becomes eligible for the law's two most severe penalties and for no others. By definition, therefore, either is within the normal range of expected sentences for offenses such as those the death-eligible defendant has committed. Third, although subjective factors play a role in noncapital sentencing, and in the BPT's determination of disparity (see Martin, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 445), the nonquantifiable aspects of capital sentencing are much greater. (40) A capital sentencing jury must be allowed to weigh all personal information about the defendant, however unrelated to his crimes, which suggests he should not suffer the unique and irreversible penalty of death. ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 990, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) As the community's representative, the jury has ultimate responsibility for determining if death is the appropriate penalty for the particular offense and offender. In exercising this essentially normative task, it may apply its own moral standards to the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-341 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 239-247, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2639-2646]; Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 540-541.) It may reject death if persuaded to do so on the basis of  any constitutionally relevant evidence or observation. ( Brown, supra, at p. 540, italics in original.) Thus the evidence or observation[s] that persuaded juries in apparently comparable cases not to assess the death penalty may not be immediately apparent from the record. (See Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at p. 330 [86 L.Ed.2d at p. 240, 105 S.Ct. at p. 2640].) (38c) Under these circumstances, the Legislature could properly conclude that superficial factual similarities among capital cases with opposite sentencing results establish no presumption that the cases in which the more severe sentence was imposed are disparate. For all these reasons, we cannot accept the notion that equal protection principles mandate that the disparate sentencing procedure of section 1170, subdivision (f) must be extended to capital cases. The judgment of guilt, the finding of three special circumstances, and the judgment of death are affirmed.