Opinion ID: 1841302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Validity of Duration Provision

Text: ¶ 171. The majority ultimately concludes that the Governor was without authority to agree to the duration provision in the 2003 amendments. [85] It raises an ominous specter with the warning that such a provision could terminate the legislature's ability to make law. [86] In suggesting such a foreboding result, the majority opinion exaggerates the consequences of the provision. ¶ 172. To further the exaggeration, the majority describes the duration provision as perpetual. [87] By employing such a term, it is apparent that the majority attempts to inflame a negative response. ¶ 173. The problems with the majority's analysis extend well beyond its exaggerated consequences. The majority mischaracterizes the differences between the 1992 compact together with the 1998 and 2003 amendments. What the majority fails to acknowledge is that not only is the 2003 duration provision substantively similar to those in the original 1992 compact and 1998 amendments, but it actually places the legislature in a better position to regulate gaming. Ultimately, the majority's analysis seems uncertain, raising more questions than it answers. ¶ 174. All of the duration provisions, whether in the 1992 compact or in the 1998 and 2003 amendments, were of a similar term. If the parties did nothing, the original compact and the amendments would continue in effect with no time limitation. ¶ 175. The 1992 compact provided that it would continue indefinitely, subject to the right of either party to issue a notice of non-renewal at specified intervals initially after seven years, and then every five years thereafter. [88] In the event of nonrenewal, the Tribe could request the State to enter into negotiations, and the State was required to negotiate with the Tribe in good faith under IGRA. [89] ¶ 176. The 1998 amendments had no effect on the indefinite nature of the compact. Although it was renewed for a five-year period, from June 3, 1999, to June 3, 2004, the compact was still subject to the automatic rollover provision. [90] ¶ 177. With the 2003 amendments, the duration provision in the compact was revised. The 2003 amendments deleted each party's unilateral right of nonrenewal, but the compact could still terminate on the occurrence of specified conditions. The 2003 changes provided for amendment of any provision of the compact every 25 years and of gaming regulation provisions every five years. [91] ¶ 178. The majority describes this change in part by noting the following language: This Compact shall continue in effect until terminated by mutual agreement of the parties, or by a duly adopted ordinance or resolution of the Tribe . . . . [92] ¶ 179. Significantly, the majority omits the rest of the changes, which qualify this provision. These include revisions to Section XXX, Amendment and Periodic Enhancement of Compact Provisions. That section previously stated, this compact shall not be modified, amended or otherwise altered without the prior written agreement of both the State and the Tribe. [93] In 2003, the section was expanded to include a time frame (five and 25 years) to address the parties' desires to change the provisions along with a dispute resolution process (last best offer arbitration). [94] ¶ 180. Additionally, the parties maintained the requirement of good faith negotiations. [95] The concept of good faith excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving `bad faith' because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness. [96] This is not a meaningless provision; rather, it is a substantive limitation on the parties. A breach of contract may occur if a party violates an express or implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [97] ¶ 181. Accordingly, the majority's characterization of the amended compact as perpetual is inaccurate. Under the 1992, 1998, and 2003 version, the compact could be amended every five years. [98] Under all versions, the compact extended indefinitely absent an affirmative action by the Tribe, the State, or both. [99] Finally, the new process maintains the requirement that the parties negotiate in good faith when discussing proposed amendments. [100] ¶ 182. The majority also fails to recognize that the 2003 amendments actually place the legislature in a better position to regulate gaming. Before, the legislature had delegated all of its power to the governor under Wis. Stat. § 14.035. To have any influence over the amendment process it needed to repeal that statute, which it twice failed to do. With the new provisions, however, the legislature is expressly granted an oversight role in the negotiation process. After 25 years, any provision of the compact may be amended. The Tribe or the Governor as directed by an enactment of a session law by the Wisconsin legislature  may propose an amendment. [101] ¶ 183. After highlighting and bemoaning the duration of the 2003 amendments, the majority shifts course and contends that the legislature could not delegate to the Governor the power to enter into such a term because it binds future legislatures. [102] Since the majority makes this determination without citing to authority, the legal underpinnings upon which its conclusions rest are uncertain. ¶ 184. By agreeing to the duration provision in the 2003 amendments, the Governor and the Tribe were hardly plowing new ground. Including Wisconsin, seven of the 24 states with Class III tribal gaming under IGRA have compacts of similar duration that cannot be unilaterally terminated by the State. [103] Indeed, the parties have stipulated that Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, and Mississippi all have such provisions. [104] ¶ 185. The fact is that interstate compacts of indefinite or long-term duration are commonplace throughout the country. [105] Wisconsin itself is a signatory to an interstate compact of indefinite duration, the Midwest Interstate Low-level Radioactive Waste Compact, codified at Wis. Stat. § 16.11. That compact remains in effect indefinitely, unless the signatory states unanimously agree to dissolve the compact or Congress withdraws its consent. [106] A state cannot unilaterally withdraw from the compact. [107] ¶ 186. The majority attempts to distinguish the Midwest Interstate Low-level Radiation Waste Compact on grounds that the legislature ratified it. [108] What the majority fails to mention, however, is that the legislature effectively ratified the 2003 amendments by including the revenue in the state budget, which expressly relies upon the receipt of nearly $207 million in compact payments by the tribes over the next biennium. [109] We do not understand how the legislature can simultaneously ratify the terms of a compact with one hand and attack it with the other. ¶ 187. If the governor cannot make commitments, binding future legislatures, compacts like the ones just described are necessarily invalid. Such a sweeping rule would have profound consequence. ¶ 188. Long-term contracts or compacts of indefinite duration reflect the need for government to make agreements that extend well beyond the current legislative session. The operation of government would be handcuffed if a compact, or any other type of contract, could not extend more than two years. ¶ 189. Even the petitioners do not agree with the majority's extreme position. They have conceded that long-term compacts lasting many years are both constitutionally permissible and desirable as a matter of public policy. Just last year, both petitioners supported a bill that would have recognized a governor's authority to enter into gaming compacts lasting as long as 15 years without the need for any legislative oversight. Senator Panzer was a co-sponsor of that legislation. [110] It passed both houses of the legislature but was subsequently vetoed by the Governor. ¶ 190. Ultimately, the majority's analysis regarding the duration provision raises more questions than it answers. It is unclear upon what legal basis the majority is declaring invalid the duration provision in the 2003 amendments to the compacts. Is it based on statutory interpretation discerning the intent of the legislature? Is the provision unconstitutional as applied? If it is the latter, one would expect such a profound conclusion to appear with supporting analysis and citation. Yet, the majority leaves the reader guessing. ¶ 191. Why would it be unconstitutional for Governor Doyle to bind future legislatures, but not unconstitutional for former Governor Thompson? Why would it be permissible to enact the legislation supported by the petitioners which allowed the governor to enter into compacts without legislative direction with 15 years duration but impermissible for the Governor to enter a compact without legislative direction with 25 years duration? Why would the difference of 10 years transform a valid compact into an invalid compact? Where is the legal authority or analysis to support such a transformation? ¶ 192. In the end, the majority attempts to accomplish by judicial override what the petitioners could not accomplish legislatively. [111] The majority's analysis cannot withstand scrutiny. The exaggerated consequences combined with the lack of citation to authority and the uncertain legal underpinnings of its conclusion undermine the majority's result. ¶ 193. The majority fails to acknowledge that the 2003 duration provision is substantively similar to those in the original 1992 compact and 1998 amendments. It likewise fails to grasp that compacts of long-term or indefinite duration are commonplace throughout the country. Contrary to the majority's conclusion that the compacts are invalid because they bind future legislatures, such compacts reflect the government's need to enter agreements that extend well beyond a current legislative session.