Opinion ID: 1298407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the admissibility of the gun

Text: 3. Taylor argues that, if her statement is held inadmissible, the gun should also be inadmissible as the fruit of the poisonous tree . [19] The trial court found that the gun was admissible regardless of the admissibility of the statement because it would have been inevitably discovered by the police. Under the inevitable discovery doctrine, if the State can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence derived from police error or illegality would have been ultimately or inevitably discovered by lawful means, then the evidence is not suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. [20] In Nix v. Williams , the police obtained the defendant's statement about the location of the victim's body in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights and the statement was suppressed. [21] The United States Supreme Court concluded, however, that the victim's body discovered as a result of that statement need not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because it would have been discovered anyway. [22] A search party was a short distance from the body and moving in its direction and would have soon discovered it even if the defendant had not revealed its location. [23] While discussing proof under this doctrine, the Supreme Court stated, inevitable discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or impeachment. [24] In considering the elements of the inevitable discovery rule, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has established that there must be a reasonable probability that the evidence in question would have been discovered by lawful means, and the prosecution must demonstrate that the lawful means which made discovery inevitable were possessed by the police and were being actively pursued prior to the occurrence of the illegal conduct. [25] Because this definition is consistent with the way our state appellate courts have applied the inevitable discovery rule, we expressly adopt it as our own rule. [26] Applying these elements, we conclude that the evidence was too speculative to support the trial court's finding that the gun would have been inevitably discovered. Taylor did not live with her mother and, absent Taylor's statement, the State does not advance any reason why police would have interviewed her mother other than that they would have interviewed all of Taylor's friends, acquaintances, and family members for information about a .38 revolver. Captain Simmons testified at the probable cause hearing that the police learned of the mother's gun for the first time in Taylor's statement, and there is no evidence that they learned of a connection not resulting from her statement. Asked about the investigation plan after the discovery of the fingerprint match, Captain Simmons responded, We were in the process at that time [of] getting our heads together on what to do, what route we were going to take and the interview was actually the first. The State then relies on the fact that Taylor's mother voluntarily turned over the gun when asked about it after Taylor's confession. Since Taylor's mother did not testify, it is unclear what was said to her at that time or what motivated her to turn over the gun. Without more information, her cooperation under different circumstances cannot be accurately predicted. The trial court's findings show an absence of demonstrated historical facts that the police were moving inevitably to the discovery of the gun absent Taylor's statement. [27] The police also did not possess other lawful means of uncovering the gun prior to Taylor's statement. [28] Without more than the fingerprint match on the cup, there was no probable cause to obtain a search warrant of the mother's trailer where Taylor did not live. [29] The trial court erred by finding that the gun would have been inevitably discovered. 4. The State argues an alternative reason for the admission of the .38 revolver if Taylor's statement is suppressed. In Wilson v. Zant, [30] this Court held that the fruit of a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona is not subject to the exclusionary rule. [31] The Wilson holding was supported by a later United States Supreme Court decision, Oregon v. Elstad, [32] which held that the fruit of a voluntary Miranda -tainted statement need not be suppressed. The rationale for not suppressing the fruits of a voluntary statement taken in violation of Miranda and Edwards is that these cases announced prophylactic rules designed to protect suspects' Fifth Amendment rights, but the rules were not themselves constitutional. [33] Referring in Elstad to the admissibility of the fruit of a Miranda -tainted statement, the Supreme Court stated, If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. [34] The police in this case failed to honor Taylor's request for counsel, but they did not violate her Fifth Amendment right against coerced self-incrimination. Therefore, because the gun was the fruit of a voluntary statement, we conclude that it is admissible at Taylor's trial. [35] We reject Taylor's argument that the recent United States Supreme Court case of Dickerson v. United States [36] requires a different result. Taylor argues that Dickerson undermined the rationale in Wilson and Elstad because the Supreme Court held in Dickerson that Miranda announced a constitutional rule [37] and a constitutional violation in the taking of her statement would mandate the suppression of the gun. [38] The Supreme Court, however, discussed Elstad in the Dickerson opinion by stating, Our decision in [Elstad] refusing to apply the traditional `fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment casesdoes not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. [39] Therefore, we conclude that the Supreme Court intends to preserve a distinction in the law permitting the fruits of voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda to be admissible. [40] Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, J., who concurs in Divisions 1, 2, 4 and in judgment.