Opinion ID: 289589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the decision by the dcca dismissing the appeal

Text: 14 On remand to clarify its decision dismissing the appeals, the DCCA gave the following explanation: 15 Respondent's motion to dismiss was granted for the reasons that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 27(f) and 27(h) of this court, that petitioner failed to show good cause or to give an adequate explanation for his failure to comply with our Rules, and that petitioner has not once requested of this court an extension of time under Rule 27(q) in which to comply with the Rules despite respondent's repeated motions to dismiss on that ground. 10 16 Rule 27(q) of the Court of General Sessions provides in relevant part: There shall be no enlargement of the time for taking any of the other steps above enumerated, except by this court, or a judge thereof, and for extraordinary reasons. The DCCA, or any individual judge, thus clearly had the power to extend the time limits for filing the papers involved in this case. Furthermore, we have held that it can be reversible error for the court to refuse to allow late filings under certain circumstances. 11 But we need not decide whether the DCCA abused its discretion in this case since we conclude that by its rulings denying motions to dismiss the court had effectively allowed the late filings already made by appellant. 17 On October 30, 1967, appellee Habib moved to docket and dismiss Lee's appeal to the DCCA for failure to comply with Rule 27's procedural requirements. Appellant filed a brief in opposition. He pointed out that Habib could not be prejudiced by any delay since the stay of the eviction had been predicated on an agreement that Lee would make future rent payments to Habib as they became due. Lee's counsel filed an affidavit explaining that late filing was occasioned by her lack of familiarity with the rules of the court and her preoccupation with obtaining a stay of the eviction pending appeal. Lee also argued that delays in filing such subsidiary papers should not result in automatic dismissal, that the court should consider the reasons for the delays and the issues presented by the appeal in exercising its discretionary power to allow the late filings. Faced squarely with a request to dismiss for late filing and only that issue, the DCCA denied the motion to dismiss. We hold that the denial of the motion to dismiss amounted to a grant of an extension of time to file. Our view is confirmed by the DCCA's refusal to grant a second motion of Habib to dismiss the appeal for essentially the same reasons. 18 Appellee has argued and the DCCA stated on remand that appellant should have made a formal motion for an extension of time to file under Rule 27(q). While we agree that in the usual case a formal motion would be preferable practice, the rule nowhere requires such a formal motion. 12 Before Habib's first motion to dismiss, Lee had completed his filings. He had filed the designation of record and statement of errors. Of course, he had not filed a physical copy of the transcript at this time. He had, however, taken steps to obtain the transcript by moving in the trial court to obtain a free copy. 19 It would seem totally superfluous to require appellant to make a formal motion for extension of time after the documents in question had already been filed, and after the DCCA had refused to dismiss the appeal because of the late filings. 13 The DCCA, by twice refusing to dismiss Lee's appeal on the sole ground that these papers had been filed late, in effect exercised its discretionary power to allow the late filings. It could not give a different cast to those rulings without at least alerting Lee that something more was required if his appeal was to be maintained. 20