Opinion ID: 2627584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The canine sniff

Text: [¶ 28] Mr. Loo contends, and the State agrees, that if a person is not free to leave the scene while the dog performs its sniff, that person is effectively detained. See, e.g., Seymour, ¶ 25, 185 P.3d at 678. This detention is permissible only if based upon reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. Id. We must consider, first, whether the officer's actions were justified by a reasonably articulable suspicion of illegal activity, and second, whether the detention was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the detention. Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d at 704-05. [¶ 29] The district court provided this list of factors articulated by Trooper Green as giving rise to reasonable suspicion: 1) the odor of perfume that dissipated over time; 2) the Avis rental agreement in addition to the Hertz rental agreement; 3) [Mr.] Loo's unusually high nervousness; 4) Trooper Green's drug detection dog sniffing at [Mr.] Loo when [he] entered the patrol car; and 5) Trooper Green's knowledge from experience that drug traffickers often rent more than one vehicle in the course of transporting contraband. In addition, the district court noted that Trooper Green received conflicting information from Mr. Loo and Ms. Yoeuth. He said they had gambled in Reno. She denied gambling. He said they were going to Indiana to visit friends, then said they were going to visit her family. She said they were going to Indiana, but did not know why. The record contains evidence sufficient to support the district court's findings on all of these factors. [¶ 30] Based on all of these factors, the district court concluded that Trooper Green had reasonable and articulable suspicions of ongoing criminal activity. The district court further concluded that the detention of Mr. Loo during the dog sniff was reasonably related to the circumstances. Finally, we note that this detention could not have lasted more than a few minutes, because the dog was already on-scene, ready to be released from Trooper Green's patrol car. Compare State v. Welch, 873 P.2d 601, 605 (Wyo. 1994), in which the patrolman's reasonable suspicions justified a fifty-minute detention of Mr. Welch while the drug sniffing dog was brought to the scene by another officer. [¶ 31] Mr. Loo's attorney attacks some of the factors listed by the district court. For example, he questions Trooper Green's testimony about the perfume smell because, when the car was searched later, the source of the smell was never found. On this basis, he contends that Trooper Green's unsubstantiated statement that he smelled perfume is not an articulable fact leading to probable cause to search the car. This argument amounts to an attack on Trooper Green's credibility. But the district court found Trooper Green's testimony credible, and issues of credibility and the weight to be given to testimony are matters to be resolved by the trier of fact, not an appellate court. Thus, we may not substitute our judgment for that of a trial court with respect to issues concerning credibility. Carter-Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶ 10, 88 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wyo. 2004). Trooper Green further testified that, in his experience, perfume is sometimes used to mask the smell of an illegal substance. Contrary to Mr. Loo's contention, the perfume smell therefore constituted an articulable fact that, together with the other factors, gave rise to reasonable suspicion. [¶ 32] Mr. Loo relies on Damato, ¶ 20, 64 P.3d at 708, for the proposition that the `extreme nervousness' factor is generally considered of limited significance. [4] The district court actually agreed, saying that all of the listed factors are certainly of limited value by themselves, but together, were properly considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. This is entirely consistent with Damato, in which we said that each of the factors considered might be innocent, but under the totality of the circumstances test, individually innocuous factors can combine to arouse a reasonable suspicion for the experienced officer. Id. , ¶ 26, 64 P.3d at 710. Based on all of the circumstances, the district court concluded that Trooper Green possessed the articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity sufficient to detain Mr. Loo during the dog-sniff, and that the detention was reasonable in scope, duration, and intensity. We perceive no basis for reversing that conclusion. [¶ 33] Under the federal constitution, To justify a detention after the initial reason for the stop has concluded, an officer must be able to point to the presence of specific and articulable facts and rational inferences which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a crime. Flood v. State, 2007 WY 167, ¶ 22, 169 P.3d 538, 545 (Wyo. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). As found by the district court, Trooper Green established that this requirement was satisfied. The district court properly concluded that the detention during the dog sniff did not violate Mr. Loo's rights under the federal constitution.