Opinion ID: 2231137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duckett's Jurisdictional Challenge.

Text: Alliant claims we need not address Duckett's challenge to the jurisdiction of the court to hear the cross-claim because Duckett waived the challenge. We have stated previously: When a party claims a jurisdictional challenge has been waived, it is often necessary to determine whether the specific challenge to jurisdiction targets subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction of a particular case. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the authority of the court to hear and determine the general class of cases to which the proceeding belongs. It cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel. This is because parties to a lawsuit cannot establish jurisdiction where it has not been first conferred by the constitution or legislation. On the other hand, the failure to properly invoke the authority of the court in a particular case can be obviated by consent, waiver, or estoppel. Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999). Based on Duckett's arguments, it is difficult to determine whether her objection targets subject matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction of a particular case. [4] In her motion to dismiss, [5] Duckett argued the IUB had exclusive jurisdiction of Alliant's cross-claim and a party could raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time. She also argued the IUB retained primary enforcement authority of the matter. Accordingly, Duckett argued the summary judgment against her should be void. [6] The district court properly noted Duckett's motion to dismiss referred to separate jurisdictional concepts that are not identical. In her appellate brief, Duckett still refers to her argument as one based on jurisdiction/authority. Thus, we find it once again helpful at this juncture to point out the difference between a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its authority. State v. Emery, 636 N.W.2d 116, 119 (Iowa 2001). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to `the authority of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the court's attention.' Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450 (emphasis added) (quoting Wederath v. Brant, 287 N.W.2d 591, 594 (Iowa 1980)). A court may have subject matter jurisdiction but for one reason or another may not be able to entertain a particular case. In such a situation we say the court lacks authority to hear that particular case. Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 119. Importantly, [a] court may lack authority to hear a particular case `where a party fails to follow the statutory procedures for invoking the court's authority.' Id. (quoting Schrier v. State, 573 N.W.2d 242, 244-45 (Iowa 1997)). Although Duckett argues in terms of jurisdiction and authority, she ultimately argues Alliant failed to follow statutory procedure because it was required to exhaust its administrative remedies through the IUB. Regarding this specific issue we have said: It is well-established that a party must exhaust any available administrative remedies before seeking relief in the courts. The district court is deprived of jurisdiction of the case [7] if administrative remedies are not exhausted. . . . . Generally, the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. This is because the exhaustion-of-remedy doctrine does not preclude judicial review, but merely defers it until the administrative agency has made a final decision. Our legislature has given the district court subject matter jurisdiction to act in response to challenges to decisions made by administrative agencies, but requires this authority to be withheld until any available administrative remedies have been exhausted. Thus when a litigant requests judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies, the district court merely lacks authority to entertain a particular case. This is the type of challenge that can be waived. Keokuk County, 593 N.W.2d at 122. Thus, even if we interpreted Duckett's argument to encompass an objection to subject matter jurisdiction, such jurisdiction is not at issue here. Instead, the issue before us is whether the court lacked the authority to hear the case. As a result, the defect can be waived if not timely raised by an objection. See Emery, 636 N.W.2d at 120 ([A] defect in the court's authority to hear a particular case may be waived, whereas any defect in its subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to waiver. (citing State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993))). Alliant argues Duckett failed to timely challenge the court's authority and therefore waived this defense. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 85, at 114 (2006) (An objection that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any time; generally, an objection to jurisdiction on any other ground is waived if not made at the first opportunity or seasonably. . . . An objection to jurisdiction based on any ground other than lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter . . . is usually waived by failure to raise the objection at the first opportunity, or in due or seasonable time, or within the time prescribed by rule or statute.); accord In re Marriage of Ivins, 308 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Iowa 1981) (It is true that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by consent. However, this is not true in the case of objections to personal jurisdiction, such as involved here, which will be deemed waived unless raised `at the first opportunity, or in due or reasonable time. . . .' (Citations omitted.)). Duckett admits she did not raise her objection when Alliant first filed its cross-claim with the district court. She insists, however, the objection was raised as soon as practicable. She contends she did not know Alliant was relying on the indemnification provision in the tariff for its cross-claim, and was not in a position to argue the cross-claim should be heard by the IUB until she learned the tariff provision was at issue. [8] Duckett is correct Alliant's cross-claim for contribution and indemnity did not mention the tariff provision. Thus, when Duckett filed her answer to Alliant's cross-claim she may not have been responsible for raising the issue of the court's authority to hear the claim. However, Duckett subsequently learned the tariff was at the heart of the cross-claim, and failed to raise the issue until January 2004, more than a year later. Duckett even invoked the court's authority to grant summary judgment based on her claim the tariff did not permit Alliant to be indemnified before she finally decided to challenge the court's authority to hear the cross-claim. In fact, Duckett did not raise the issue until after the district court ruled on the summary judgment motions filed by the parties. Based on these facts, it becomes clear that Duckett did not timely raise her objection to the court's authority. [9] Her failure to do so results in waiver.