Opinion ID: 783723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Huff's motion

Text: 13 Huff argues in his brief that he believed that Scicluna would receive all necessary medical treatment at KCF when he transferred Scicluna there in May of 1992. But he offered no affidavit in support of this assertion. Scicluna, on the other hand, testified under oath that Huff knew that KCF officials would be unable to treat his condition. Viewing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Scicluna as the nonmovant, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Huff knew that he was transferring Scicluna to a facility that was unable to treat his injury. 14 Huff argues, alternatively, that even if his decision to transfer Scicluna to KCF constituted deliberate indifference, the constitutional right violated was not clearly established by 1992. But a right can be clearly established even if there is no case involving `fundamentally similar' or `materially similar' facts if the premise of a prior case alerts officials to the clear applicability of the legal principle to a subsequent set of facts. Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 743, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical condition was known to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment long before 1992. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (holding that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners is proscribed by the Eighth Amendment). Transferring a prisoner in need of urgent medical attention to a facility that the official knows is unable to provide the required treatment is conduct that would alert a reasonable person to the likelihood of personal liability. See Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir.1972) ([W]here the circumstances are clearly sufficient to indicate the need of medical attention for injury or illness, the denial of such aid constitutes the deprivation of constitutional due process.). Based upon the present record, the district court did not err in denying Huff's motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds.