Opinion ID: 213922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction Omission

Text: Diaz argues the district court committed reversible error by providing the jury with erroneous instructions. During a three to five minute period, the jury was outside the courtroom, beginning to deliberate with instructions that omitted one word from the Fifth Circuit pattern jury instructions. From all indications, the omission resulted from inadvertence. The error was noted soon after the jurors left the courtroom; jurors were immediately brought back and given a corrected version of the jury instructions. Diaz contends that he first objected to the instruction during the government's rebuttal argument. After the government quoted the erroneous instruction, Diaz's counsel interrupted the rebuttal. He then quizzically repeated what the government had said. The trial judge stated that she had not heard what the government said and requested he rephrase the statement. The government then said, I'm reading from the charge, Your Honor. It was not until after the jury had been instructed to deliberate and the district court was charging the alternate juror that Diaz's counsel raised a specific objection to the jury charge. Where a party fails to offer a timely objection to jury instructions, claims of error are reviewed for plain error. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 388-89, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). A plain error is a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and affects the defendant's substantial rights. United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 625 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). When those elements are shown, this court has the discretion to correct the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Diaz contends that this court ought to apply an abuse of discretion standard. Diaz did not, however, offer a specific objection until after the jury had begun deliberating. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30(d); Jones, 527 U.S. at 387-88, 119 S.Ct. 2090. Thus, we review for plain error. See Jones, 527 U.S. at 389, 119 S.Ct. 2090. Under a plain error analysis, we first inquire into whether error even occurred. Id. Where a party alleges jury confusion as a result of incorrect jury instructions, this court considers whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Id. at 390, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (quotation marks and citations omitted). To make this determination, we look at the alleged error, which occurred on page nine of an 11-page document. The original jury instruction omitted the word in brackets, while the corrected one inserted it: If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that plan or scheme on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated [before] and even though the defendant played only a minor part. The sentence as originally written is not internally consistent, first stating a defendant did not have to participate, then stating a defendant could have played only a minor part. Stepping back from the caselaw as argued by the defendant, we find it sufficient to sustain the district court's action that the error was quickly caught and corrected. This case is not one in which the jurors arguably reached a result based on a flawed but perhaps harmless omission. The only alleged error is that jurors for a few minutes possessed an erroneous instruction. There was no reason for the district court on these facts to declare a mistrial and start over after the error was corrected. We now turn to the Supreme Court's opinion in Jones. Id. We are not to focus only on the location of an erroneous jury instruction, but we look at the context of the entire charge. Id. at 391, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (citations omitted). It is particularly informative that immediately preceding the sentence in question was a recitation of the four elements of the charged crime, spelling out the extent of participation required to convict. They read: First: That two or more persons, directly or indirectly, reached an agreement to possess with intent to distribute or distribute marijuana; Second: That the defendant knew of the unlawful purpose of the agreement; Third: That[] the defendant joined in the agreement willfully, that is, with the intent to further its unlawful purpose; and Fourth: That the overall scope of the conspiracy involved at least 100 kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectible amount of marijuana. Viewing the entire charge as a whole and taking into account the brief period in which the jury deliberated under this charge, we do not find a reasonable likelihood that the jury . . . applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Id. at 390, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court did not commit reversible error.