Opinion ID: 2519745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: affirm on any ground

Text: ¶ 9 We first must address whether the court of appeals erred in affirming on alternate grounds and then whether the court of appeals denied Bayles due process of law by resorting to the affirm on any ground rule. Bayles contends that he was deprived of his fundamental right to timely and adequate notice and opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way when the court of appeals chose to affirm on alternate grounds the trial court's issuance of a permanent protective order against him. Bayles argues that he was unfairly surprised by and unable to adequately respond to the novel legal theory relied upon by the court of appeals when it affirmed on alternate grounds. ¶ 10 It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ¶ 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969) (citation and emphasis omitted)); see also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (applying Limb ); 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 714 (1993) (Generally, the appellate court may affirm the judgment where it is correct on any legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adopted by the trial court.). Moreover, [a] party to an appeal does not have a constitutional right to have a cause of action decided on a particular ground. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). ¶ 11 Bayles raises in this appeal the same issue we previously decided in DeBry when he argues that the court of appeals denied him due process of law by affirming the trial court's decision on an alternate ground. In DeBry, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of a complaint on the basis that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity. Id. The DeBrys argued before this court that they had been denied procedural due process because the court of appeals based its affirmance on an issue that was not briefed or presented to the court of appeals or to the trial court. Id. We rejected the DeBrys' due process argument and held that the affirm on any ground rule does not deprive a party of due process. [2] Id. ¶ 12 Bayles has not provided us with any cogent reason to abandon our holding in DeBry, and he certainly has not met the substantial burden of persuasion we require of [t]hose asking us to overturn prior precedent. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). Therefore, we will not revisit our settled precedent on this point but simply apply it to the present case. ¶ 13 As an initial matter in the case at hand, we do not find that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's order on alternate grounds. As the rule states, an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from `if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record. ' Dipoma, 2001 UT 61 at ¶ 18, 29 P.3d 1225 (emphasis added) (quoting Limb, 23 Utah 2d at 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d at 293 n. 2). [3] ¶ 14 Here, the court of appeals based its affirmation of the lower court's decision on the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Bailey, 2001 UT App 34 at ¶ 11, 18 P.3d 1129. The applicability of the Cohabitant Abuse Act was apparent on the record. The record is rife with references to this statute. The verified petition itself, on its first page, makes reference to a provision of the Cohabitant Abuse Act. [4] Moreover, the record clearly indicates that, at least at the early stages of the action in the lower court, the parties themselves were proceeding under the assumption that the Cohabitant Abuse Act was the applicable statute. After the verified petition was filed and the ex parte protective order was issued, Bayles moved to strike Jeff Bailey and Sharo Burtenshaw from the ex parte order and sought to vacate the order altogether. In bringing his motions and challenging the verified petition and the ex parte protective order, Bayles relied upon the Cohabitant Abuse Act. The stated basis for his motions as explained in his memorandum of law in support of the motions was the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Bailey's memorandum of law in opposition to Bayles' motions also relied on the Cohabitant Abuse Act. Finally, during the course of the bench trial, Bailey explicitly referenced and based her position on the Cohabitant Abuse Act and the case of Strollo v. Strollo, 828 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct.App.1992). [5] ¶ 15 In view of these numerous references in the record, we conclude that the alternate ground relied upon by the court of appeals in affirming the trial court's decision was apparent on the record, and therefore, under the affirm on any ground rule, was a proper ground on which to affirm. ¶ 16 As to Bayles' argument that he was surprised when the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision based upon the Cohabitant Abuse Act, and as such, was denied adequate and timely notice and an opportunity to be heard, we find Bayles' position to be disingenuous at best given the fact that he relied earlier in the course of the action upon the very statute used by the court of appeals in affirming the trial court's decision. [6] Bayles cannot claim to have been denied adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard on issues arising under the Cohabitant Abuse Act when he himself made resort to it in opposing the verified petition and ex parte protective order before the trial court. Knowing that the Cohabitant Abuse Act was the applicable statute and having previously relied upon it, Bayles could have appealed the trial court's decision on the grounds that the trial court applied the wrong statute and that the facts as found by the trial court were insufficient under the correct statute. He did not do so. ¶ 17 Therefore, Bayles was not deprived of his rights of due process of law and due course of law when the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on alternate grounds, and the court of appeals did not err when it found from the record that the trial court's decision could be affirmed based on the alternate legal ground of the Cohabitant Abuse Act.