Opinion ID: 723914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Requested Reduced Mental Capacity Departure

Text: 56 Finally, Nunez argues that the district court erred in refusing a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, Diminished Capacity (Policy Statement), which provides: 57 If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. 58 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s. (emphasis added). Essentially, Nunez relied on a 1984 diagnosis of borderline mental retardation and paranoid schizophrenia, which conditions so affected his ability to make common-sense judgments, that he was unable to resist his coconspirators' requests that he join in the armed carjacking, or to foresee that a murder might ensue. Recognizing that we normally lack jurisdiction to review a district court's discretionary refusal to make a downward departure, see United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 560 (1st Cir.1996), Nunez instead argues that the court's refusal to depart was premised on its incorrect interpretation of the phrase non-violent offense. Id. 12 59 We need not linger over this claim. Without regard to whether the district court misapprehended the meaning of non-violent crime, see, e.g., United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 537-40 (4th Cir.1994) (discussing circuit split concerning proper interpretation of non-violent offense), it expressly ruled ---- after defense counsel cited to the 1984 psychiatric reports ---- that it believed Nunez did not suffer from the required significantly reduced mental capacity at the time of the 1994 carjacking: 60 This defendant had this meeting with his friend's nephew where they sat there in this apartment discussing precisely a carjacking, stealing of a car, to commit another crime [i.e., the jail break], and he was there. And then they start cruising around, finding a victim until they found him, found the victim. So ... [it] [s]eems to me that this is totally inconsistent with the diminished capacity to commit a crime. 61 Tr. at 22. The court pointed out that Nunez had admitted to long-term, daily use of marijuana, which would tend to support the conclusion that any diminished capacity he might have suffered on June 7, 1994 result[ed] from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s. 62 We thus lack appellate jurisdiction of this claim. [I]f the [sentencing] judge says, in effect, ... that 'this circumstance [viz., significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants] of which you speak has not been shown to exist in this case,' [then] ... no appeal lies. United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 619 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1119, 115 S.Ct. 919, 130 L.Ed.2d 799 (1995); see also United States v. Regan, 989 F.2d 44, 45 (1st Cir.1993) (defendant has the burden of proof under section 5K2.13). Nunez does not contend that the court misapprehended the criteria for determining whether he suffered from a significantly reduced mental capacity. Cf. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d at 561 (jurisdiction lies where district court misapprehended the relevant criteria for ascertaining aberrant behavior). 13 Since some causative reduction in mental capacity is the sine qua non of any downward departure under section 5K2.13, whether the murder-carjacking be deemed violent or non-violent, we need not ---- indeed we cannot ---- decide whether the court also relied on an incorrect interpretation of non-violent offense. 63 The sentence is vacated, and the case remanded to the district court for resentencing, consistent with our opinion and mandate.