Opinion ID: 2622835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Guilt by Association

Text: In her closing statement, the prosecutor argued to the jury: [H]ow do we assess [defendant's] credibility? ... [I]t is not enough to bolster his credibility that the defendant is a priest in the Catholic Church. And I imagine [defense counsel] will make much of that fact, the fact that he is a priest. And he will want you, as the defendant did, ... to think about the fact that priests do good works and they are motivated by good intentions. But we know that priests are human just like any other person. They commit sins as the defendant said, and they commit crimes, and they commit horrendous crimes. (Italics added.) That comment, according to the Court of Appeal, was improper. Noting the almost daily news accounts of the scandal in the Catholic Church over pedophile priests, the Court of Appeal reasoned that the jury was certain to think the prosecutor was referring to this scandal and suggesting that defendant played a part in it. To argue guilt by association, the court stated, constitutes misconduct. [1] The latter statement correctly reflects the law. (See generally People v. Castaneda (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 395; People v. Galloway (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 551, 563, 160 Cal.Rptr. 914; People v. Chambers (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 23, 28, 41 Cal.Rptr. 551.) But the prosecutor here did not argue guilt by association by linking defendant to highly publicized acts of sexual misconduct by Catholic priests. The prosecutor pointed to testimony by prosecution witnesses that defendant ordinarily dressed casually, wearing short sleeved shirts, jeans, and sandals. But at trial defendant wore his clerical collar, and defense counsel mentioned in his opening statement that defendant was loved in the church. The defense presented testimony that defendant was known as Father Fernando, that he became a priest to help people, and that he was a pretty popular priest who was still a clergyman notwithstanding the criminal charges against him. By reminding the jury of defendant's profession as a priest, the prosecutor argued, the defense was conveying to the jury the subtle message that because defendant was a priest he must be telling the truth when he denied the accusations of sexual molestation, because, in the prosecutor's words, priests do good works and they are motivated by good intentions. The prosecutor urged the jury to judge defendant by the evidence, not by his occupation as a priest. She explained: [I]t is not enough [for defendant] to just say he is a priest so you should believe him. That's a violation of what the jury instructions tell you. That argument simply asked the jury not to give defendant favorable treatment just because he happened to be a priest. This was proper. (See generally People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1219, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199 [prosecutor's argument that jury should not give the defendant favorable treatment merely because he could afford a nationally known attorney was proper].) There was another argument by the prosecutor that the Court of Appeal characterized as an improper theory of guilt by association. The prosecutor argued to the jury: The defendant also revealed in direct examination with me [sic] a general philosophy, for lack of a better word, that rules do not apply for him. He made it very clear that he was given a lot of training, that [his pastor] explained to you as well, about how to behave with minors here in Los Angeles. And we all know why those rules are in place. This is not a surprise to any of us that the Church has these rules, [¶] What did the defendant tell you about those rules? Well, he said they are in place for a good reason, but since I had a good reason to violate them that was okay. What does that mean? That means that, in general, the defendant thinks rules don't apply to him. (Italics added.) Unlike the Court of Appeal, we do not view this comment as asking the jury to find defendant guilty by association, by linking him to pedophile priests. Both defendant and his superior, Father Jarlath Cunnane, testified at trial that the Archdiocese of Los Angeles had a policy prohibiting priests from having minors in their living quarters and discouraging priests from having minors alone with them in their cars. It is reasonable to infer that the purpose of this policy was to avoid accusations of sexual misconduct with minors by priests. Although the prosecutor made a passing reference to this policy in her argument to the jury, she did not tell the jury that it should find defendant guilty by association, by linking him to pedophilic priests. Her mention of the archdiocese's policy was simply to point out to the jury that defendant knew of the rules and deliberately broke them. Because the prosecutor's arguments discussed above were not improper, there was no reason for a defense objection. Therefore, the failure to object did not result in a violation of defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 915, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647, 111 P.3d 921.)