Opinion ID: 442000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assertion of Jones Act Claim

Text: 14 In determining whether a Jones Act claim has been alleged, we are limited to a review of the plaintiff's pleadings. Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., 375 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.1967). Accordingly, an analysis of Addison's state court amended complaint is most pertinent to the propriety of Texaco's removal. American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14, 71 S.Ct. 534, 540, 95 L.Ed. 702 (1951). Addison's amended complaint asserts that Texaco is indebted to him on a claim having arisen pursuant to Title 46, section 688, of the United States Code. This conclusory assertion presumably invokes the Jones Act; however, remand is not required where the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support a cause of action under the Jones Act. Preston v. Grant Advertising, Inc., supra 375 F.2d at 440. Gulf Coast properly points out that an employer-employee relationship is a necessary element of a true Jones Act claim. Volyrakis v. M/V ISABELLE, 668 F.2d 863 (5th Cir.1982); Rohde v. Southeastern Drilling Co., Inc., 667 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir.1982). Therefore, Addison was required to allege an employer-employee relationship with Texaco in order to properly assert a claim under the Jones Act. Gulf Coast's reading of Addison's amended complaint does not find any allegation that Addison was Texaco's employee. We disagree. 15 While Addison does refer to himself as an employee of Gulf Coast, his pleadings fail to specifically refer to his relationship with Texaco as employee-employer. Our review of Addison's pleadings, however, is not so cursory. We note that Addison repeatedly alleged that he performed his duties under the direct supervision, management, direction and control of Gulf Coast and Texaco. The law is well settled that an injured worker may prove that he was a borrowed servant at the time of his injury by establishing that the defendant against whom recovery is sought had the power to control, manage and direct the servant in the performance of his work. Baker v. Raymond Intern., Inc., 656 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983, 102 S.Ct. 2256, 72 L.Ed.2d 861 (1982); Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1975). By alleging the degree to which Texaco maintained supervision and control over him in the performance of his duties, Addison has properly alleged the requisite facts to establish an employment relationship with Texaco. Accordingly, we find that Addison has alleged sufficient facts to establish a claim under the Jones Act against Texaco. 16