Opinion ID: 1266339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Private Enforcement of the RLA

Text: Beyond the arbitral scheme for resolving disputes between employers and unions, the RLA also provides for federal criminal enforcement. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (It shall be the duty of any United States attorney to whom any duly designated representative of a carrier's employees may apply to institute in the proper court and to prosecute under the direction of the Attorney General of the United States, all necessary proceedings for the enforcement of the provisions of this section.). Although the RLA does not explicitly provide a private civil cause of action, the Supreme Court has found such an action by a union implicit in the statutory scheme. In Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, the Supreme Court recognized a private right of action by a union alleging that the defendant company was interfering with, influencing, or coercing the clerical employees of the railroad company in the matter of their organization and designation of representatives in violation of § 152, Third. 281 U.S. 548, 555, 50 S.Ct. 427, 74 L.Ed. 1034 (1930). The Court concluded that Congress, in the legislation of 1926, while elaborating a plan for amicable adjustments and voluntary arbitration of disputes between common carriers and their employees, thought it necessary to impose, and did impose, certain definite obligations enforceable by judicial proceedings. Id. at 567, 50 S.Ct. 427. In fact, private civil proceedings constitute the bulk of cases arising under the RLA. See United States v. Winston, 558 F.2d 105, 108 & n. 3 (2d Cir.1977) (noting [t]he paucity of criminal proceedings under § 152, when contrasted with the active pursuit of civil relief thereunder). Although much of the case law involving private causes of action under § 152 concerns claims brought by or against a certified union, our sister circuits have recognized an implied private right of action for individual employees against their employer under certain RLA provisions, notably § 152, Third and Fourth. See, e.g., Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d 298, 318 (3d Cir.2004) (collecting cases); Fennessy v. Sw. Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1362-64 (9th Cir.1996); Stepanischen v. Merchs. Despatch Transp. Corp., 722 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir.1983). The Third Circuit explained that [i]mplying a private cause of action for individual employees under 45 U.S.C. § 152, Third & Fourth is appropriate given that those sections prohibit carriers from discriminating against employees in connection with union organizing activities. [1] Bensel v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 387 F.3d at 318 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the Third Circuit declined to find an implied private cause of action for individual employees in § 152, Second and Ninth because, although the statute may indicate a congressional intent to create a private cause of action for a duly certified representative that is injured pursuant to these provisions, that does not imply that Congress intended to create a private right of action for any group or groups of individual employees claiming to act on behalf of the relevant employees. [2] Id. at 319.