Opinion ID: 203863
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jackson Standard

Text: Turning to the underlying constitutional right asserted here, O'Laughlin maintains that his due process rights were violated because after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have identified him as the assailant beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.) (emphasis in original); United States v. Ayala, 289 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir.2002) (Identification of the defendant as the person who committed the charged crime is always an essential element which the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt.) (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Jackson standard is as easy to articulate as it is difficult to apply. Newman v. Metrish, 543 F.3d 793, 796 (6th Cir.2008); see generally Hon. Jon O. Newman, Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 68 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 979 (1993) (discussing difficulty of defining term); Note, Reasonable Doubt: An Argument Against Definition, 108 Harv. L.Rev.1955 (1995) (same). This is particularly the case where we have no eyewitness to identify the perpetrator. In cases based on circumstantial evidence such as the instant case, [17] we face head-on the disturbing truth that guilty verdicts rest on judgments about probabilities and those judgments are usually intuitive rather than scientific. Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610, 614 (1st Cir.1995). Despite the lack of precision in determining what constitutes reasonable doubt and the inherent difficulty in defining the term, this court and others have attempted to explicate the standard. For example, we have stated that [g]uilt beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be premised on pure conjecture. But a conjecture consistent with the evidence becomes less and less a conjecture, and moves gradually toward proof, as alternative innocent explanations are discarded or made less likely. Id. at 615-16. As we have stated on multiple occasions, `[b]eyond a reasonable doubt' does not require the exclusion of every other hypothesis; it is enough that all `reasonable' doubts be excluded. Id. at 616 (quoting United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 753 (1st Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Dwinells, 508 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Olbres, 61 F.3d 967, 976 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1025 (1st Cir.1979) (The prosecution may prove its case by circumstantial evidence, and it need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence so long as the total evidence permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.). We note that although the circumstantial evidence is permissible to discern the identity of the perpetrator, there are some limits to its probative value. [A] reviewing court should not give credence to `evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative.' Leftwich, 532 F.3d at 23 (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir.1995)); see also United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir.1995) (we are loath to stack inference upon inference in order to uphold the jury's verdict). Further, [i]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the conviction. This is so because... where an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir.1995) (alterations, ellipses, and emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we give great deference to jury verdicts, we have held that evidence may sometimes be insufficient to sustain a jury verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. García-Torres, 280 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2002) (holding evidence insufficient to show proof beyond reasonable doubt that defendant knew he was aiding in drug conspiracy when participating in kidnapping and murder); United States v. Blasini-Lluberas, 169 F.3d 57, 62-64 (1st Cir.1999) (holding evidence insufficient to support convictions of bank officer on four of five counts of misapplication of bank funds); United States v. Morillo, 158 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir.1998) (holding evidence insufficient to support inference of knowledge of conspiracy's purpose); United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (1st Cir.1997) (holding evidence insufficient to show defendant intended to carry out a scheme to defraud the IRS under wire fraud statute); United States v. de la Cruz-Paulino, 61 F.3d 986, 1001 (1st Cir.1995) (holding evidence insufficient to support conviction for aiding and abetting where prosecution failed to show defendant shared the specific intent of the principal); Valerio, 48 F.3d at 65 (holding evidence insufficient to support a finding of intent to distribute cocaine).