Opinion ID: 1378242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statement Made by Mickens to the Police

Text: Mickens filed a pretrial motion to suppress statements he had made to the police, contending that the statements were not freely and voluntarily made and were obtained in violation of [his] rights under the 4th, 5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion, and Mickens has assigned error to the ruling. As previously noted, on April 4, 1992, the police detained Mickens about 6:35 p.m. and arrested him at 7:00 p.m. on the charges involving the juvenile. At that time, Mickens was advised of his Miranda rights. Mickens then was taken to the police station. At 7:30 p.m., he was placed in an interview room, and, at 8:08 p.m., Officer Coleman entered the room and asked Mickens his name and address. After obtaining that information, Coleman left the room. No one else entered the interview room until 11:20 p.m., and, at that time, Mickens was taken before a magistrate. Detective Mitchell questioned Mickens from 12:05 a.m. until 3:30 a.m., a period of only slightly more than two hours because of the change from Standard time to Daylight Savings time. During this period, a 15-minute break was taken at 1:15 a.m., during which time Mickens drank some water. According to Mitchell, Mickens became very emotional and started sweating real bad when informed that evidence obtained at the crime scene was being subjected to DNA analysis. Mitchell told Mickens that he knew Mickens had killed Hall, but Mitchell did not mention a knife or how Hall had been murdered. Nevertheless, Mickens volunteered, You didn't find any knife on me; did you? At no time during the interview by Mitchell did Mickens request a lawyer, and Mickens appeared to understand what transpired. At 4:10 a.m., on April 5, 1992, the police took Mickens to Riverside Hospital so that physical evidence could be recovered for laboratory analysis. At 6:30 a.m., Mickens was taken to jail, and, at 7:25 a.m., he was taken from jail to the police station, arriving there at 7:55 a.m. Officer Coleman again interviewed Mickens from 7:55 a.m. until 9:30 a.m. Mickens told Coleman that he remembered his rights. Mickens also said, [I]f you think you're going to get me to implicate myself in these murders, you're crazy. At 9:30 a.m., Officer Seals again advised Mickens of his Miranda rights and of the charges in the warrants. Mickens put his fingers in his ears and rocked back and forth. As we have said, when Seals handed Mickens copies of the warrants, Mickens said, I accept the warrants, I accept the charges. When Seals asked Mickens what was meant by that statement, Mickens responded, Mother f___r, if I told you I accept the warrants that means I'm guilty, don't it? At 9:41 a.m., Mickens told Seals that he wanted to go to jail, and the interview was terminated. At the suppression hearing, Mickens testified that, to his knowledge, he was not advised of his Miranda rights. He said he asked the officers to leave him alone, but they refused. He testified further that he asked the police whether he had a right to an attorney and that he was told the police needed to ask him more questions. On appeal, Mickens contends that his statements to the police were not made voluntarily. Whether a waiver of Miranda rights was made knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact. A trial court's resolution of the question is presumed to be correct and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong. Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 581, 423 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992); Watkins, 229 Va. at 477, 331 S.E.2d at 429-30. The Commonwealth must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an accused's statement was voluntary. Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 172, 360 S.E.2d 361, 364 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988). Although the voluntariness of a statement is a legal determination, subsidiary factual questions are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Id.; Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110-12, 106 S.Ct. 445, 449-51, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). In determining whether an accused's will has been overborne, a court must look at the totality of the surrounding circumstances, including the accused's background and experience and the conduct of the police. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 324, 356 S.E.2d 157, 163, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). In the present case, the trial court found that Mickens had been advised of his Miranda rights, that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, and that he, at no time, requested an attorney or even talked about an attorney. The court further found that his statements to the police were given knowingly, voluntarily, and freely. We conclude that the record fully supports the trial court's findings and ruling. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.