Opinion ID: 1636806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Errors Relating to Victim Impact Evidence and Argument

Text: The defendant next contends that admission of victim impact evidence under the guidelines of State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn.1998), infringed upon his right to be free from ex post facto laws and violated this Court's decision in State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 919 (Tenn.1994), holding that capital sentencing proceedings must be conducted in accordance with the law in effect at the time the offense is committed. The defendant argues that under the law in effect in 1997, when these offenses were committed, victim impact evidence was not admissible because this Court had held in Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tenn.1979), that evidence was admissible at a capital sentencing hearing only if it was relevant to an aggravating circumstance or to a mitigating circumstance raised by the defendant. Initially we note that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not by its own terms apply to judicial decisions. See generally U.S. Const. Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10; Tenn. Const. Art. I, § 11; Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 456, 121 S.Ct. 1693, 1699, 149 L.Ed.2d 697 (2001). To the extent that due process protects interests similar to those protected by the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions, retroactive application of an alteration of a common law doctrine of criminal law violates due process only where the alteration is unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461, 121 S.Ct. at 1700. A review of Nesbit immediately reveals that the decision did not alter a common law doctrine of criminal law or apply a new interpretation to the capital sentencing statute. In Nesbit , this Court held that victim impact evidence and argument is not barred by the federal or state constitution. 978 S.W.2d at 889; see also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (holding that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar against the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument). This Court further stated that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c)(1997) enables the sentencing jury to be informed about the presence of statutory aggravating circumstances, the presence of mitigating circumstances, and the nature and circumstances of the crime. The statute allows the sentencing jury to be reminded that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. at 2608). In so stating, this Court expressly rejected the interpretation of Cozzolino now advanced by the defendant, and pointed to many prior decisions admitting evidence about the nature and circumstances of the crime, even though such proof is not necessarily related to a statutory aggravating circumstance, and emphasized that victim impact evidence is encompassed within the statutory language nature and circumstances of the crime. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 890. While the decision in Nesbit expressly clarified existing practice in Tennessee relating to victim impact evidence, the decision did not change existing law. The defendant's sentencing hearing was conducted pursuant to the statute discussed in Nesbit ; therefore the defendant's assertion that admitting victim impact evidence constituted an ex post facto violation is without merit. The defendant next asserts that the victim impact testimony in this case exceeded the scope of permissible victim impact testimony established by Nesbit . Although victim impact evidence is admissible, such evidence generally should be limited to information designed to show those unique characteristics which provide a brief glimpse into the life of the individual who has been killed, the contemporaneous and prospective circumstances surrounding the individual's death, and how those circumstances financially, emotionally, psychologically or physically impacted upon members of the victim's immediate family. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 891. Victim impact evidence may not be introduced if it is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair or its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. See Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 891 (citations omitted). To enable the trial court to adequately supervise the admission of this evidence and ensure that it is properly limited: (1) the State must notify the trial court of its intent to introduce victim impact evidence; (2) the trial court must then hold a jury-out hearing to determine the admissibility of the evidence; and (3) the evidence should not be admitted until the trial court determines that evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances is already present in the record. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 891. The trial court in this case meticulously followed these procedural safeguards before admitting the testimony of Steve Hampton's wife and mother and the testimony of Sarah Jackson's parents and older brother. This testimony has previously been thoroughly recited and need not be reiterated here. The defendant maintains that the trial court should have excluded certain portions of this testimony, including the testimony of Gina and Wayne Jackson regarding Sarah Jackson's suffering and fear at the time of the crimes; the testimony of Gina Jackson that she thought that her daughter was safe while working at Captain D's; the testimony of Deanna Hampton that her daughter asked who would walk her down the aisle at her wedding; the testimony of Jerry Jackson about how difficult it was for him to see other fathers march the bride down the aisle; the testimony about how the Jackson family set out Sarah's picture, a candle, and a place setting for her at family gatherings; and the testimony about how the Jackson family felt guilty about Sarah's death and allocated fault among themselves. The defendant also complains that the victim impact evidence presented was different from the evidence approved by the trial court at the jury-out hearing. Specifically, he points to Deanna Hampton's testimony about the effect of her husband's death on her son's birthday celebration and her husband's character as a good father, Jerry Jackson's testimony about how Sarah and her family were robbed of her potential and money is money but you can't replace someone's life, and Wayne Jackson's testimony about his opinion of the crime and his sister's fear and suffering. The defendant says that this evidence rendered the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair and that, even if individual portions of the testimony alone do not warrant reversal, the cumulative prejudicial effect of this testimony mandates reversal. We disagree. As stated, victim impact evidence should be limited to information designed to show those unique characteristics which provide a brief glimpse into the life of the individual who has been killed, the contemporaneous and prospective circumstances surrounding the individual's death, and how those circumstances financially, emotionally, psychologically or physically impacted upon members of the victim's immediate family. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 891 (citations omitted). The testimony about which the defendant complains is well within these parameters. Most of this testimony demonstrated how the contemporaneous circumstances surrounding the victims' deaths had psychologically affected their immediate family members. While the testimony was not word-for-word the same, the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly noted that the testimony offered before the jury did not differ in kind or scope from that offered at the jury-out hearing. The victim impact evidence complained of by the defendant was not unduly prejudicial and clearly falls within the parameters established in Nesbit . See generally State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447 (Tenn.2002); State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 828 (Tenn.2002); State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 309-10 (Tenn.2002); Smith, 993 S.W.2d at 17. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that admission of this evidence rendered the sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair. As previously stated, the trial court scrupulously followed the dictates of Nesbit and, with respect to the conduct of the victims' families during this proceeding, stated: The victims' family members were present during the pretrial hearings, the trial, and portions of jury selection. Despite the trauma they suffered when their loved ones were senselessly murdered, they showed the utmost respect for the judicial process at all times. While a few of the jurors shed tears during portions of the victim impact testimony, the trial court noted none of the jurors became overly emotional. They simply demonstrated a normal reaction to [such] testimony. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals that the victim impact evidence was not unduly prejudicial and did not render the sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair. Next, the defendant avers that a contradiction exists between Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(g)(1) and the jury instruction regarding victim impact evidence set out by this Court in Nesbit . The defendant maintains that this contradiction renders victim impact evidence irrelevant. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(g)(1) provides in pertinent part: If the jury unanimously determines that (A) At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and (B) Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; then the sentence shall be death. The jury instruction set out by this Court in Nesbit is as follows: The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. This evidence has been introduced to show the financial, emotional, psychological, or physical effects of the victim's death on the members of the victim's immediate family. You may consider this evidence in determining an appropriate punishment. However, your consideration must be limited to a rational inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, not an emotional response to the evidence. Victim impact evidence is not the same as an aggravating circumstance. Proof of an adverse impact on the victim's family is not proof of an aggravating circumstance. Introduction of victim impact evidence in no way relieves the State of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance which has been alleged. You may consider this victim impact evidence in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty only if you first find that the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence independent from the victim impact evidence, and find that the aggravating circumstances found outweigh the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 892 (emphasis added). The defendant says a contradiction exists because the statute provides that the jury shall return a verdict of death upon finding the existence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt that outweighs any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, while the Nesbit instruction allows the jury to consider victim impact evidence only after it has found that at least one aggravating circumstance exists, and that the aggravating circumstance outweighs the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant concludes that victim impact evidence is mooted by the instruction and serves no purpose in the sentencing scheme. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the defendant is correct, he certainly has no basis to complain because, as the State points out, any contradiction between the statute and the instruction inures to his benefit. See, e.g., Smith, 993 S.W.2d at 13, n. 7; State v. Bush, 942 S.W.2d 489, 506, n. 10 (Tenn.1997); State v. Carter, 714 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn.1986). Therefore, this complaint does not entitle the defendant to relief. During oral argument, the State indicated that it is not opposed to this Court reconsidering the Nesbit instruction and stated that the portion of the instruction challenged by the defendant unnecessarily limits the jury's consideration of victim impact evidence. Although the State's brief includes no discussion of the instructions used by other jurisdictions, at oral argument the State indicated that some jurisdictions do not provide a jury instruction on victim impact evidence and other jurisdictions take a minimalist approach by simply advising the jury that victim impact evidence is not an aggravating circumstance. It is beyond dispute that any effective instruction on this subject must advise the jury that victim impact evidence is not the same as an aggravating circumstance. As to the instructions used by other jurisdictions, we note that the Nesbit instruction was based upon precedent from other jurisdictions, in particular Oklahoma and Georgia. [7] Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize that the Nesbit instruction was simply a suggestion. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 892 ([W]e hereby suggest the following instruction....). By suggesting this language we did not intend to preclude individual trial judges or the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) of the Tennessee Judicial Conference (Committee) from making necessary and appropriate revisions to this instruction. Indeed, trial judges and the Committee, which is composed of trial judges, are often better situated to assess the practical effectiveness or ineffectiveness of this particular instruction and make needed language changes. [8] The defendant also complains that the prosecutors engaged in improper closing argument regarding the function of victim impact evidence and argues that the trial court erred by failing to grant a mistrial based upon this improper argument. As previously stated, the decision of whether to grant a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be reversed absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Adkins, 786 S.W.2d at 644; Inlow, 52 S.W.3d at 105. As the State asserts, the defendant failed to contemporaneously object to the prosecutor's argument that the jury should consider what the victim's death meant to the community and that the jury should show [the defendant] the same mercy that he showed to Steve and Sarah. Despite defense counsel's failure to object, the trial court provided a curative instruction, stating, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, you are to do an individualized sentencing based on the law and facts with regard to the case and Mr. Reid. You are to do so without regard to the effect on the community. The defendant's failure to object to these comments constitutes waiver on appeal. See State v. Green, 947 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997); State v. Little, 854 S.W.2d 643, 651 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (failure to object to prosecutor's alleged misconduct during closing argument waives later complaint); State v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (citing Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a)). Moreover, a review of the record clearly indicates that these comments do not amount to plain error. In light of the limited nature of the comments and the trial court's curative instruction, any error was harmless. See State v. Burns, 979 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tenn.1998) (finding more extensive argument harmless error). The defendant also contends that during rebuttal argument the prosecutor improperly told the jury that it could consider the victim impact evidence during the weighing process and engaged in inflammatory argument designed to elicit an irrational and emotional response from the jury. The defendant contends that the cumulative effect of this improper argument mandates reversal. The following is an excerpt of the argument to which the defendant objects: GENERAL THURMAN: Aggravating circumstances. We've talked about those. General Moore talked about them, and they are really not an issue. Mr. Engle admits that all those aggravating circumstances are present in this case, so that is not the issue now. Now you have the weighing issue, and if you weigh what we've talked about, if you weigh it, any mitigation you found for Mr. Reid, and I submit it is very slight, I think there is but one verdict under the law. You weigh it in your mind. What is the verdict? When you weigh it, I want you to consider the facts about these aggravating circumstances, the facts that this is a robbery, the facts that they were killed in cold blood because they were witnesses. You've seen that picture a lot, but when you weigh the circumstances of this crime, you have to think what was in Steve Hampton's mind, when he was shot and when he was still alive and was reaching up? What was he thinking in the last few seconds? And you weigh that against the mitigation. Sarah Jackson MR. ENGLE: Objection, Your Honor, you cannot, the law doesn't allow the weighing of the facts of the crimes as against the mitigating evidence. THE COURT: Sustained. Rephrase. GENERAL THURMAN: They can consider all the facts and circumstances of the crime, which I'm asking. THE COURT: They can consider. I willladies and gentlemen of the jury, I will instruct you as to how you are to weigh things. GENERAL THURMAN: But you can consider that. You consider what Sarah Jackson had to go through in considering these aggravating factors, after she was shot, after she had to wait knowing Steve Hampton was being shot, and she was next, and how after she was shot, she was struggling to get up, thinking maybe, maybe I've survived, maybe he is gone, and when you are weighing his background, his childhood, weigh what kind of man could stand there and calmly reload, one shell at a time, in that pistol while she is struggling there, and what kind of man cannot have pity, and what kind of man did walk in there and execute that young girl? This kind of man, and he can't blame his mother. He can't blame his father. He can't blame the Texas Department of Correction. He is responsible. This man. That is the man the expert witnesses for the defense didn't want you to see. That is the man that suffered from this psychosis that can't hardly deal with the world. That is the man. Paul Reid celebrating, spending his money, shopping. It looks like he is functioning pretty well; doesn't it? While he is toasting his margarita and you are weighing the circumstances, think about the three children that are saying where is my daddy? Think about the parents struggling to get through one more day while he is celebrating. Now even though a lot of this case is about Paul Reid and the mitigation that you have to consider, you don't have to forget those faces, those lives, and the lives that were destroyed, besides those two, of the families. The Judge will tell you you can consider that. You consider that when you weigh those aggravating circumstances. They were real people with real dreams MR. ENGLE: Your Honor, I'm sorry, but, again, this is a misstatement of the law. GENERAL THURMAN: It is not a misstatement of the law. They can consider that, Your Honor. THE COURT: Consider itI will instruct the jury in terms of how they should consider this. GENERAL THURMAN: But don't forget all the lives, not only theirs, that were destroyed by Paul Reid, and it's time for him to face the responsibility for that. It's time for him to have the ultimate punishment. Each of you know what that is. It's time for justice. Thank you. In evaluating the prejudicial effect of any improper prosecutorial argument, this Court must consider: 1. The conduct complained of viewed in light of the facts and circumstances of the case; 2. The curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecution; 3. The intent of the prosecutor in making the improper arguments; 4. The cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; and 5. The relative strength and weakness of the case. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 894. Applying these factors, we are of the opinion that any error was harmless. Any impropriety in the prosecutor's closing argument is slight. While the prosecutor should have used the word consider rather than weigh, there is no evidence that the prosecutor acted in bad faith, and in fact, his responses to defense objections indicated that he was attempting to comply precisely with the dictates of Nesbit . Moreover, the trial court sustained defense objections, properly instructed jurors as to the nature and function of victim impact evidence, emphasized that jurors should apply the law as provided by the court, and reminded jurors that argument of counsel is not evidence. This was a well-tried case from beginning to end, and the cumulative effect factor simply does not apply because this trial was nearly error-free. Finally, the State's case at sentencing was very strong, with clear proof of the three aggravating circumstances and substantial proof rebutting the mitigating evidence. Accordingly, under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in finding any improper argument during the prosecutor's closing harmless. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d at 893-94.