Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Campaign

Text: (18a) Defendant did not register any objection in the trial court to Massini's representation. Therefore, contrary to defendant's assertions, the automatic reversal rule enunciated in Holloway v. Arkansas, supra, 435 U.S. 475 ( Holloway ), is inapplicable to this case. ( People v. Easley, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 724; Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 348 [64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347, 100 S.Ct. 1708].) Further, defendant's assertions of an actual conflict with Massini during her campaign are unpersuasive. On this record, we do not find that Massini's personal interest in winning the election for district attorney threatened her loyalty to defendant. It is not the law that a public defender creates a conflict of interest merely by seeking employment with the district attorney's office or even by campaigning to assume that office while continuing to represent criminal defendants. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 196 Cal. App.3d at p. 1257 [defense counsel's acceptance of employment with district attorney does not require finding of actual conflict of interest].) Any conflict between an attorney's personal interest in obtaining employment and his or her client's interest in loyal and effective representation is too attenuated to impute a violation of professional ethics in each such case. Moreover, the record does not support a conclusion that Massini's alleged conflict of interest adversely affected defendant's representation. [20] Defendant was also represented by Allen during Massini's campaign. [21] Allen did not suffer from any alleged conflict of interest and was not an employee of Massini. Allen was an experienced death penalty and criminal defense attorney. He appeared for defendant during the motions to suppress and his name appeared on the numerous pretrial motions along with Massini's name. (19)(See fn. 22.) Allen's participation in the defense supports our conclusion that the defense was neither constitutionally inadequate nor tainted by the alleged conflict. [22] (18b) Allen was in a unique position to observe whether Massini's representation of defendant was adversely affected as a result of her campaign. Allen's silence regarding any deficiencies in his cocounsel's representation of their mutual client reinforces our conclusion, which is based on our review of the record, that Massini's representation of defendant was not adversely affected by her personal interest in winning the election. Nevertheless, defendant urges two examples of instances where Massini's representation was impaired by the conflict of interest. First, defendant points out that his motion to suppress did not specifically argue that Detective Kelley's search of the clothing found in Smith's car constituted an impermissible independent search. This argument, however, lacks merit. (See, ante, at pp. 979-980.) This lack of merit, rather than the conflict of interest, is the likely reason why this specific argument was not pursued. Another reason to explain this purported failure could be that Arizona v. Hicks, supra, 480 U.S. 321, was not decided until after defendant's motion was heard. Finally, Allen, not Massini, wielded the laboring oar on this motion. Defendant wisely refrains from contending that Allen's representation was adversely affected by Massini's alleged conflict of interest. Second, defendant challenges defense counsel's failure to explicitly argue that the necessary probable cause and exigent circumstances were not present to justify the taking of defendant's blood without a search warrant. While the record does not indicate that defense counsel raised this particular argument, defense counsel did argue that the blood sample should be suppressed on Fourth Amendment grounds. Defendant contends that his counsel's failure to raise the specific argument that he has raised on appeal must be attributed to Massini's desire not to anger the police with whom she might soon be closely working. We cannot ascertain from this record the reasons why the argument was not pursued. To impute this decision to Massini's campaign, however, would be to engage in sheer speculation. For example, we would have to assume that Allen, as well as Massini, was laboring under divided loyalties and harbored some reason not to anger the police. Such an assumption does not make sense, since Allen no longer even regularly practiced in Northern California during the time in question. On this record, we do not find that `it is demonstrated ... that the nature of the defense afforded deprived the defendant of a constitutional right.' ( People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d at 86, 105 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835], quoting People v. Keesee (1967) 250 Cal. App.2d 794, 798 [58 Cal. Rptr. 780].) We also reject defendant's related contention that the alleged conflict warrants a per se reversal of his conviction and sentence based upon the public policy rule announced in People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180 [115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 363] (hereafter Rhodes ). In Rhodes, this court reversed the conviction of a defendant who was represented by a part-time city attorney, who simultaneously discharged prosecutorial responsibilities in the county in which the defendant was tried. In so doing, this court announced a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure that city attorneys, who exercise prosecutorial responsibilities, may not represent criminal defendants. ( Id. at pp. 186, 187.) Since Rhodes, however, we have recognized that in cases where the conflict between prosecutorial and criminal defense responsibilities is less direct, reversal is not required in the absence of prejudice to the representation. ( People v. Pendleton (1979) 25 Cal.3d 371, 381 [158 Cal. Rptr. 343, 599 P.2d 649].) The serial nature of Massini's criminal defense and prosecutorial responsibilities removes this case from the ambit of the Rhodes rule. (Cf. People v. Marshall, supra, 196 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1257-1259.)