Opinion ID: 444181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contents of Instruction

Text: 9 The instruction given in this case was taken almost verbatim from the instruction on the permissible inference from possession of recently stolen property approved for use in this circuit. See II Fed.Crim.Jury Instructions of the 7th Cir. at 2 (1984). The defendant does not argue that any part of the instruction incorrectly states the law. 1 Rather, he argues that such an instruction is only correct if it contains an explicit statement that the jury is never required to draw the inference. 2 Without such a statement, the defendant reasons, a jury might believe that it is required to draw the inference unless the defendant explains his possession satisfactorily, thus impermissibly shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. 10 We reject the defendant's argument that the instruction in this case shifted the burden of proof on the issue of knowledge to him. The jury was repeatedly told that the inference was permissive, and that it might draw the inference if it was supported by the facts and circumstances of the case. The jury was further told that the defendant need not testify or present any evidence, and that it was the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the facts warranted any such inference in this case. The instruction given here is in no way similar to the instructions condemned in the cases cited by defendant. See McKnight v. United States, 309 F.2d 660, 661 (D.C.Cir.1962) (exclusive possession of recently stolen property is sufficient to support a verdict of guilty); United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir.1960) (burden of explaining possession on those holding stolen goods; jury should consider whether defendant has explained ... facts which would enable you to conclude that he was innocent); United States v. Allegrucci, 258 F.2d 70, 73 (3d Cir.1958) (same); Brubaker v. United States, 183 F.2d 894, 898 (6th Cir.1950) (possession of stolen property raises a presumption of guilt); McAdams v. United States, 74 F.2d 37, 40 (8th Cir.1934) (possession prima facie evidence that possessor knows of guilty possession; defendant must offer proof that he did not know [property was stolen before] presumption of guilt ... is overdone). The instructions cited by defendant suffer from two defects not present in this case: they either raise the inference of guilty knowledge to a presumption, see McKnight, supra; Brubaker, supra; McAdams, supra; or they require the defendant to prove his innocence, see Lefkowitz, supra; Allegrucci, supra; McAdams, supra. 11 Considering the instruction given as a whole, we find no language that would suggest that the jury was required to infer guilty knowledge or that the defendant was required to produce any evidence. The Supreme Court has noted that the practical effect of instructing the jury on the inference arising from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is to shift the burden of going forward with evidence to the defendant. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n. 11, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 2363 n. 11, 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973). As the Court made clear in Barnes, however, the instruction remains proper where, as here, it does not shift the burden to the defendant to prove his innocence, imply that he is forced to take the stand, or treat the inference as a presumption.