Opinion ID: 2346437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Instruct the Jury on the Lesser-Included Offense of Murder in the Second Degree

Text: The defendant's final contention on appeal is that the trial justice erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder in the second degree. He insists that the evidence warranted such an instruction. During the trial, defendant sought a jury instruction on second-degree murder, but the trial justice refused to give one, concluding that the evidence at trial did not warrant such an instruction: The defendant also requested I instruct the jury as to second degree murder. I will not do that. I will give only first degree murder. I see no evidence whatsoever in this record that in any way would suggest that a second degree murder instruction is appropriate. All the evidence before me indicates that the defendant armed himself with a weapon prior to the shooting; that there is evidence before the [c]ourt from other witnesses who indicated that the defendant was intent on killing Angel Cruz, and that, in sum and substance, this was a planned, executed shooting on the streets of our city, fully premeditated with malice aforethought, with ample time prior to the shooting attributed to this defendant's intent to kill. So I will not give a second degree murder charge. A defendant who is on trial for first-degree murder is `also on trial for all lesser-included offenses and, thus, [is] simultaneously on trial for [second-degree murder]   .' State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1286 (R.I.1994). [S]econd-degree murder is a lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Id. at 1285. The distinction between first- and second-degree murder is whether the evidence indicates that premeditation existed for some appreciable length of time before the murder occurred or whether the evidence shows that premeditation, if it existed at all, occurred for just a mere moment before the murder. Id.; State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1271 (R.I.1987); State v. Myers, 115 R.I. 583, 591, 350 A.2d 611, 615 (1976). Thus, for first-degree murder to exist, premeditation must have existed for more than just a mere moment. Amazeen, 526 A.2d at 1271. But if premeditation existed only for a very brief time, then the killing is second-degree murder. Id. (quoting State v. Fenik, 45 R.I. 309, 315, 121 A. 218, 221 (1923)). Although a person accused of a crime may be found guilty of any lesser-included or lower offenses, [17] a defendant has a right to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense only when the evidence presented at trial warrants such a charge. State v. Brown, 744 A.2d 831, 838 (R.I.2000); see State v. Cipriano, 430 A.2d 1258, 1260-61 (R.I.1981); State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373, 1378 (R.I.1988). [W]e require that a lesser included offense instruction be given when warranted on account of the danger that, absent such an instruction, a jury may erroneously convict a criminal defendant of the principal offense charged, despite the prosecution's inability to prove an element of that offense, when the jury is convinced that the defendant's conduct was criminal. Brown, 549 A.2d at 1378 (quoting State v. Hockenhull, 525 A.2d 926, 930 (R.I.1987)); see also Cipriano, 430 A.2d at 1260-61. Although only a minimal quantum of relevant evidence is necessary for a lesser-included offense to go to the jury, State v. Figueras, 644 A.2d 291, 294 (R.I.1994), a trial justice is not required to instruct the jury on such an offense when the evidence adduced at trial shows no dispute as to an essential element that distinguishes the greater and the lesser offenses. Brown, 549 A.2d at 1378; see, e.g., Figueras, 644 A.2d at 294; State v. Muir, 432 A.2d 1173, 1175 (R.I. 1981); Cipriano, 430 A.2d at 1260-61. Therefore, when a defendant challenges the trial justice's refusal to give a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense, this Court will examine the record to determine whether the evidence warranted a jury charge on the lesser-included offense  in this case, murder in the second degree. If the evidence adduced at trial could not support a finding by a rational jury on the lesser charge, then the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included charge does not constitute reversible error. Amazeen, 526 A.2d at 1272; compare State v. Nunes, 788 A.2d 460, 464 (R.I.2002) (holding that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's request for a second-degree murder instruction because no evidence indicated that premeditation was either momentary or less) and State v. DePina, 810 A.2d 768, 778-79 (R.I. 2002) (holding that the trial justice's decision refusing to offer a jury instruction on eithervoluntary or involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder was not error because the evidence presented at trial failed to establish that defendants acted in the heat of passion, no evidence of other mitigating factors existed, and the defense of misidentification was irreconcilable with involuntary manslaughter); with State v. Ventre, 811 A.2d 1178, 1184 (R.I. 2002) (holding that the trial justice erred in not instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's testimony, if believed, offered a sufficient basis for the factfinder to conclude that the defendant was confronted with a brutal attack that placed him in fear of death or serious bodily harm). In any event, the trial justice should not weigh credibility when evaluating whether the evidence warrants charging the jury on a lesser-included offense. See State v. Mercier, 415 A.2d 465, 467 (R.I.1980). In this case, after examining the evidence presented at trial, we hold that the trial justice correctly denied defendant's requested instruction on second-degree murder. There was no evidence presented at trial that would support a finding that defendant murdered Cruz without premeditation or that he shot him on a mere moment's reflection. On the contrary, the overwhelming evidence showed that defendant repeatedly had threatened to harm the victim because he bore a grudge against him. Cruz's girlfriend, Figueroa, testified that defendant and Cruz did not get along because defendant had said something about her that offended Cruz. She also said that defendant told her that before the murder he had restrained himself from shooting Cruz on a previous occasion only because she was present in the same car with them. Adams, defendant's friend, observed defendant trying to buy a .38-caliber gun from Avelino a few days before the shooting, so that, as defendant put it, he could pop Cruz because Cruz and his friends had jumped him. Adams also described the murder scene where defendant drove up to the victim along with another man, exited the car, walked up to the victim and said What now, mother [expletive]?  while Cruz had his back turned to defendant. The defendant then shot Cruz four times. The fatal shot that entered the left side of Cruz's head, according to the chief medical examiner, could not have been the first one fired because it would have incapacitated him instantly. Myers, 115 R.I. at 591, 350 A.2d at 615 (holding that a murder clearly was premeditated when the fatal shots were not the first shots defendant fired). Thus, defendant did not produce even minimal evidence that would have justified a conviction on a lesser-included offense. In this case, it was evident that premeditation existed for more than a mere moment. We therefore conclude that a jury instruction for murder in the second degree would have been unwarranted. The trial justice, we hold, did not commit any error when he refused to charge the jury in accordance with the defendant's requested instruction.