Opinion ID: 6337968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Examination of Victim Witnesses

Text: Perez argues that the district court’s preclusion of the cross-examination of certain victim witnesses about their sexual contacts with other Bureau of Prisons officials violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. He asserts that such evidence could have negated the force-related elements of the charges against him and created reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds about the truthfulness of the victim witnesses’ allegations. We disagree. “We review evidentiary rulings, including a trial court’s decision to limit the scope of cross-examination, for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 287, 308 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012)). Yet “we review interpretations of law de novo, including whether an evidentiary ruling violates a defendant’s constitutional rights.” United States v. Rivera, 799 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2015). Federal Rule of Evidence 412 forbids the admission of evidence “in a civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct” that is offered to prove that a “victim engaged in other sexual behavior” or that a victim has a “sexual predisposition.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(a). Rule 412 provides for certain exceptions in criminal cases, including for the admission of “evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(C). “The constitutional rights contemplated by this exception include . . . a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense at trial, and to confront witnesses, including by impeaching the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination.” Rivera, 799 F.3d at 184–85 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Provisions such as Rule 412 not only “serve the broad purpose of protecting the victims of rape from harassment and embarrassment in court,” but also “reinforce the trial judge’s traditional power to keep inflammatory and distracting evidence from the jury.” Agard v. Portuondo, 117 3 F.3d 696, 703 (2d Cir. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 529 U.S. 61 (2000). Thus, we found no error in a trial court’s limitation of cross-examination of an alleged victim about her sexual history in part because the inquiry “carried a risk of distracting and prejudicing the jury.” Id. Likewise, we upheld the exclusion of evidence of alleged victims’ prior commercial sex work because the evidence was “irrelevant” to the allegation that they “were coerced into working as prostitutes.” Rivera, 799 F.3d at 185. We stressed that the “very purpose” of Rule 412 “is to preclude defendants from arguing that because the victim previously consented to have sex — for love or money — her claims of coercion should not be believed.” Id. Noting that the defendants nonetheless “effectively cross-examined the victims” and elicited testimony “suggesting consent,” we held that the exclusion of the evidence “did not prejudice” the defendants. Id. at 186. We reject Perez’s contention that the district court’s evidentiary ruling violated his constitutional rights, warranting reversal, and conclude instead that the district court acted within its discretion to exclude evidence regarding the victim witnesses’ sexual contacts with other Bureau of Prisons officials. 1 As the district court found, evidence of the victim witnesses’ sexual contacts with other officials was irrelevant to the charges against Perez and therefore did not implicate his right to present a complete defense. Perez essentially argues that, because the victim witnesses engaged in sexual contacts with other officials, their allegations against him “should not be believed” — the exact type of argument that we have held is “preclude[d]” by Rule 412. Id. at 185. Moreover, Perez had other opportunities to impeach the victim witnesses, suggesting that the limitation of his questioning did not prejudice his right to confront the witnesses 1 Perez did not indicate on the docket that he gave the victim witnesses notice of his motion to admit evidence under an exception of Rule 412, thus rendering his motion procedurally improper. See Rule 412(c)(1). Still, because the district court nonetheless considered his motion on the merits, we do the same on appeal. 4 against him. Finally, the excluded evidence certainly “carried a risk of distracting and prejudicing the jury.” Agard, 117 F.3d at 703. Thus, the district court acted within its “wide latitude” to “impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination,” Fuller v. Gorczyk, 273 F.3d 212, 219 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)), and we affirm its evidentiary ruling.