Opinion ID: 1036439
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Under Fraser, schools may restrict plainly

Text: lewd speech regardless of whether it could plausibly be interpreted as social or political commentary. As the Supreme Court made clear in Fraser, though, schools may restrict plainly lewd speech regardless of whether it could plausibly be interpreted to comment on a political or social issue. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (“[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s [“Fuck the Draft”] jacket.”). That is true by definition. Plainly lewd speech “offends for the same reasons obscenity offends” because the speech in that category is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas” and thus carries very “slight social value.” Id. at 683 (quoting Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 746 (plurality opinion)). As with obscenity in general, obscenity to minors, and all other historically unprotected categories 51 of speech, “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required” because “the balance of competing interests is clearly struck.” Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585–86 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982)). In other words, we do not engage in a case-by-case determination of whether obscenity to minors—and by extension, plainly lewd speech under Fraser—carries social value. As a result, schools may continue to regulate plainly lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive speech under Fraser even if a particular instance of such speech can “plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue.” Morse, 551 U.S. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring). In response, the School District recites a mantra that has Fraser providing schools the ultimate discretion to define what is lewd and vulgar. It relies on the Supreme Court’s sentiment that schools may define their “basic educational mission” and prohibit student speech that is inconsistent with that mission. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266–67.21 Indeed, before Morse, some courts of 21 See also Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“[T]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”); Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (“[F]ederal courts should not ordinarily ‘intervene in the resolution of conflicts 52 appeals adopted that broad interpretation of the Supreme Court’s student-speech cases. See, e.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A] school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission.”); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 470 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here Boroff’s T-shirts contain symbols and words that promote values that are so patently contrary to the school’s educational mission, the School has the authority, under the circumstances of this case, to prohibit those T-shirts [under Fraser].”). Whatever the face value of those sentiments, such sweeping and total deference to school officials is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s teachings. In Tinker, Hazelwood, and Morse, the Supreme Court independently evaluated the meaning of the student’s speech and the reasonableness of the school’s which arise in the daily operation of school systems.’” (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (“It is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”); see also Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 (“[T]he education of the Nation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of