Opinion ID: 2565663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Mexico's Dual Credit System for Parole and Probation

Text: {21} In addition, we bear in mind that New Mexico adheres to a dual credit system with the time served on parole credited as time served on the period of probation. NMSA 1978, § 31-20-5(B)(1) (2003); see also State v. Muniz, 119 N.M. 634, 894 P.2d 411 (Ct.App.1995) (holding that the legislature intended parole time served prior to probation to be credited to the probation period in all cases). It is only when the defendant violates any condition of parole, resulting in parole revocation and the balance of parole being served in custody of a correctional facility, that the time cannot be credited as time served on probation. Section 31-20-5(B)(2). {22} We find it unnecessary to decide whether Earned Meritorious Deductions can be applied to shorten retroactively a mandatory term of probation or whether the courts have the authority to shorten retroactively a mandatory term of probation, the answers to which the Attorney General has urged are in the negative. Such interpretation is unnecessary because we find the dispositive issue to be that if Garcia's procedural due process rights were indeed violated in the disciplinary hearing, and if Garcia was, thereby, wrongfully convicted of the disciplinary violation, resulting in the wrongful forfeiture of his Meritorious Deductions and wrongfully rendering him unable to earn additional Meritorious Deductions, Garcia's current incarceration is illegal. Garcia and the Attorney General disagree as to whether Garcia, if he prevails on the merits, could be awarded Meritorious Deductions for the sixty days he was held in disciplinary segregation. Nevertheless, if Garcia had never been convicted of the disciplinary violation and if he had, therefore, been released to his concurrent parole and probation terms on time, it appears that he would complete his probation on December 20, 2006, if not sooner. {23} As Garcia points out, he is not seeking and, indeed, admits he is not entitled to concurrent probation credit for the period when his parole was in process of revocation. See § 31-20-5(B). However, since his parole and probation were running concurrently, he was released as to both at the same time and, as he contends, was released one hundred fifty days late as to both due to the allegedly wrongful disciplinary conviction. With this in mind, Garcia is not, as the Attorney General argues, seeking retroactive application of his Meritorious Deductions to shorten his mandatory probation period. Rather, because he was released to his concurrent parole and probation late, he seeks credit for that time. {24} This Court's finding that Garcia's claim is not moot does not shorten Garcia's mandatory probation period in any way. It would simply restore to Garcia the Meritorious Deductions he had earned during his period of incarceration, as contemplated by the statute. See § 33-2-34(A). Garcia would not, as the Attorney General would have us characterize, be earning credits anew at this time nor would the district court be shortening his mandatory period of probation. Rather, if Garcia prevails on the merits, the district court would merely give effect to the ninety days of Earned Meritorious Deductions that Garcia indeed earned and were forfeited. The district court might also give effect to sixty days of Earned Meritorious Deductions that Garcia could have earned while in disciplinary segregation. As noted above, we do not pass on the precise number of Earned Meritorious Deductions to which Garcia is entitled. However, if Garcia prevails on the merits in the district court, it appears that he would be eligible for release on December 20, 2006, if not sooner.