Opinion ID: 1293641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Defense Request for a Continuance

Text: Charges were filed against the defendant on December 6, 2001. On November 19, 2002, the first day of trial, the defendant moved for a continuance because he was unable to locate a witness, Joanne Hersfeld. The defense proffered that Hersfeld, a close friend of S.B., had called and spoken with S.B. on December 13, 1982, a few days after the defendant left Kansas. Hersfeld could also testify that Czarnowski's demeanor at the funeral was inappropriate for someone who had just suffered such a personal loss. The State opposed the continuance, arguing that Hersfeld was not real firm that she had talked to the victim on that date and that the call did not appear on Hersfeld's phone records. The defense responded that Hersfeld would explain that her check with the telephone company revealed the possibility it was having computer billing problems at that point in time. Defense counsel told the district court that Hersfeld had been interviewed by law enforcement officers in Ellsworth in March 2001. The defense sent an investigator to Ellsworth at that time but was unsuccessful in locating her. Based on different leads, the defense had unsuccessfully searched for Hersfeld in Wichita, Kansas; Oregon; and Wyoming. The defense suspected that she was living with her brother-in-law in Castle Rock, Colorado, and had identified two individuals with matching names, but it had yet to make contact because the individuals did not have telephone service. The district court denied the motion reasoning that the defense seemed to be saying it might be impossible to find the witness, that the defense knew about the witness for some time and had months to prepare for trial, and that some witnesses may have disappeared based on the age of the crimes. The district judge concluded, Nothing I can do. I'm sorry it happened. Wish you had her here, but there's nothing the Court can do. You've had months to look for her, she's just not available. The defendant argues the district court violated his right to present a complete defense by denying his motion for a continuance. Under the state and federal constitutions, a defendant is entitled to present the theory of his or her defense and the exclusion of evidence that is an integral part of that theory violates a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial. However, the right to present a defense is subject to statutory rules and case law interpretations of the rules of evidence and procedure. State v. Evans, 275 Kan. 95, 102, 62 P.3d 220 (2003). K.S.A. 22-3401 provides that [c]ontinuances may be granted to either party for good cause shown. In a criminal case, the granting or denial of a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Snodgrass, 252 Kan. 253, Syl. ¶ 5, 843 P.2d 720 (1992). The defendant relies primarily upon the following two cases in support of his argument. In Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974), an action by a real estate broker to recover a commission, the district court refused to grant a 1-day continuance when weather conditions prevented an expert witness from being present. The witness had not been subpoenaed because he was not a hostile witness. This court agreed that expert testimony regarding standards of the real estate industry concerning a qualified buyer was crucial and the denial of the continuance was prejudicial. 214 Kan. at 34. In State v. Jones, 226 Kan. 503, 601 P.2d 1135 (1979), the identity of the defendant as one of the perpetrators of the robbery was a principal issue. An eyewitness who would testify that the robber had a noticeable goatee and no firearm failed to show up at trial. Defense counsel twice attempted to subpoena the witness through the sheriff, personally served a third subpoena on the witness, spoke with the witness and his family about his appearance and testimony, spent the noon recess searching for the witness, and requested a continuance until the next morning and a bench warrant so that the sheriff could find and bring the witness to the court. The district court mistakenly ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to issue the warrant. On appeal, this court found that defense counsel was diligent in seeking to obtain the witness' testimony. We concluded that the witness' testimony was crucial to the defense, since the defendant had presented evidence that the defendant was clean shaven at the time of the robbery, and the failure to grant a continuance was an abuse of discretion and prejudicial error. 226 Kan. at 509-10. This case is distinguishable from Jones and Winkelman, where defense counsel had been in contact with the witnesses and were only requesting 1-day continuances. In contrast, defense counsel in this case had unsuccessfully attempted to locate the absent witness in several different states over a 20-month period and could not assure the court that the witness would ever be found. This case is more analogous to a case only incidentally cited by the defendant, State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 55, 557 P.2d 1280 (1976). In Howard, the defendant issued two subpoenas for an alibi witness, but the sheriff was unable to find the witness. A typographical error was subsequently found in the address of the subpoena. A message was left with a family member, but the witness failed to appear at trial. The court granted a half-day continuance but denied the defendant's request for a 2-week continuance. No showing was made of what the witness would say,nor was there any indication that the witness could be reasonably expected to appear if a continuance was granted. 221 Kan. at 54. In finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 2-week continuance, this court set forth the following test to be used when a continuance is requested to secure the attendance of a witness: When a continuance is requested during the trial of a case [to secure attendance of a witness], the trial judge must weigh the many factors involvedpossible prejudice to the defendant, the diligence (or lack of it) disclosed in attempting to secure the attendance of the witness, the materiality and importance of the probable testimony, and the probability of the witness' appearance at a later date if the continuance is granted. Howard, 221 Kan. at 55. Application of the Howard factors to this case supports the district court's decision. The proffered testimony that S.B.'s boyfriend was acting inappropriately at the funeral was not particularly relevant and would not establish, as the defendant suggests, that the boyfriend killed S.B. out of jealousy over the defendant. In contrast, the proffered testimony that the witness spoke with S.B. 2 days after when the State suggested S.B. had been murdered was material and important to refute the time of death. However, the State's argument that the witness was not firm on what date she spoke with S.B. and that the call did not appear in the witness' telephone phone records were also important factors to be considered. The defense was essentially asking for an indefinite continuance the day of trial in this 20-year-old murder case. Two of the State's witnesses had already died before trial. Several months had elapsed since the trial setting, and the defendant's search for the absent witness had proved unsuccessful. The defendant's inability to secure an out-of-state subpoena without a location suggested that the witness did not want to and probably would not be found. After weighing the Howard factors, it cannot be said that no reasonable person would have denied the motion for continuance. The district court did not err in denying a continuance and did not prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.