Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Terry Buchanan's Life and Death

Text: (24) Defendant next renews his objection that the evidence regarding Terry Buchanan's continued depression and suffering for over 16 years from the time of the murder, the details of his use of alcohol near the end of his life, and the circumstances of his death as related by his sons exceeded the scope of permissible victim impact evidence and was irrelevant to the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a). Not so. The circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a) are not merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime, but extend to that which surrounds the crime materially, morally, or logically. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835.) Defendant urges us to restrict victim impact evidence to the immediate injurious impact of the murder, and argues that evidence of Terry Buchanan's state of mind at the time of his own death is irrelevant to the circumstances of the capital offense. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 397, in which we held it was logical to conclude that the psychological and physical effects of a violent murderous assault more than 20 years earlier would endure, and were relevant as direct results of the defendant's crimes. The same reasoning applies here. Further, the rationale behind allowing victim impact evidence is that `[t]he State has a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.' ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.) The federal Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. (501 U.S. at p. 825.) State law under section 190.3, factor (a) bars victim impact evidence if it `diverts the jury's attention from its proper role or invites an irrational, purely subjective response.' ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.) Defendant was entitled to, and did, present in mitigation evidence regarding productive aspects of his life in the years of his incarceration for the capital crime up to the time of the penalty retrial. He presented numerous witnesses who testified to the positive aspects of the artwork defendant created during his incarceration for the capital crime and the positive responses the artwork generated in the statewide and national communities committed to the abolition of the death penalty. Evidence that the Buchanan family continued to suffer the effects of the capital crime up to and during the penalty retrial was relevant to `remind[] the sentencer that just as the murderer should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.' ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825.) Nothing in the testimony of any of the prosecution's witnesses who testified to the Buchanans' sufferings was unduly inflammatory or prejudicial, nor did it invite an irrational or purely emotional response from the jurors. Rather, the evidence was short, not overly sentimental, melodramatic or emotional, and not unexpected from the sons, parents, and in-laws of a young woman brutally murdered shortly after the birth of her second son. That Terry Buchanan suffered the effects of the crime up to the day of his own death was not unexpected, and testimony to that effect was not prejudicial.