Opinion ID: 2594735
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Object to Prosecution's Argument

Text: Defendant contends trial counsel should have objected to certain remarks by the prosecutor in her closing argument to the jury. He characterizes those remarks as (1) suggesting that the jury did not bear full responsibility for the decision to impose death, (2) arguing that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor, and (3) referring to facts not in evidence.
In her closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor contrasted defendant's legal rights against defendant's failure to recognize any of the rights of Mary Frances Litovich. The prosecutor noted that defendant had the right to counsel, to a jury trial, to being proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right to appellate review to see that we don't make any mistakes on the law and the procedure in this case. Seizing on the prosecution's passing reference to appellate court review, defendant argues the prosecution violated the constitutional prohibition against leading the sentencing jury to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 328-329, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231.) Not so. The prosecutor very briefly referred to appellate court review as she was describing the various legal rights to which defendant was entitled (see People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 554, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420 [arguments are reviewed in context]); she mentioned appellate review only in the context of legal and procedural mistakes, and she then reminded the jury of the duty of each of its members to come to a personal decision. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the prosecutor's passing reference to appellate review led the jury to believe that it was relieved of responsibility for the verdict. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 211-212, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781; Jeffries v. Blodgett (9th Cir.1993) 5 F.3d 1180, 1192.)
In her argument to the jury, the prosecutor said: Defendant has no conscience; and let's talk about how bad he feels. You know that within hours after burning this lady alive, he was bragging about it. `I burned your momma. Did you find my boots under her bed?' It was a joke to him. Did he care? Was there one ounce of remorse about what he had done to this woman? We reject defendant's claim that through these comments the prosecutor impermissibly argued to the jury that it could consider defendant's lack of remorse as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782.) A prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant's lack of remorse, as relevant to the question of whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance, so long as the prosecutor does not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 545, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100; see People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 148, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Here, the prosecutor never suggested that the jury should consider defendant's lack of remorse as a circumstance in aggravation.
In closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor said that defendant had the right to funds of the court to get any experts he wanted to get. We need not, however, decide whether the prosecutor's statement was improper or whether defense counsel's failure to object to it constituted deficient performance. We perceive no prejudice. The comment was merely a fleeting reference, made in the course of the prosecutor's listing of a number of legal rights to which defendant was entitled. At one point in her closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor also mentioned prison life in general in California. She said prisoners had access to libraries, television and videos; they could write and receive letters; and they could even get married and have children. Again, we need not here decide whether counsel's failure to object constituted deficient performance. (See People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 632, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788 [conditions of confinement are irrelevant to a jury's penalty determination].) It is not reasonably probable the result here would have been different if the prosecutor had not made these remarks to the jury. ( People v. May field, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 208, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331.) The remarks were effectively countered when defense counsel in closing argument described prison conditions, recounting his numerous visits to inmates in maximum security prisons. Under these circumstances, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the prosecution's comments in question.