Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Re-voir Dire the Jury.

Text: (11) After completion of the guilt phase of trial, defendant moved for a new jury pursuant to section 190.4, subdivision (c) or, in the alternative, that the jury be voir dired to determine if there were good cause why any juror could not sit in the penalty phase. Both motions were based on the assertion that in light of the inflammatory evidence presented at the guilt phase and the relatively short time it took the jury to reach a verdict (three to four hours), there was a likelihood the verdict was based on passion and the jury therefore could not approach the question of penalty with an open mind. The trial court denied the motions on grounds there was no legal basis for voir dire of the sitting jurors and a new jury would in any event hear the same evidence as the guilt phase jury. Section 190.4, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. Defendant maintains the authority to voir dire the jury is implicit in the section, as voir dire is the only meaningful way to determine whether the jurors could consider the penalty phase evidence with open minds and not automatically vote for death by reason of the passions engendered in the first phase of trial. As we observed in People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301], there is no direct authority on the meaning of good cause in the context of impanelling a new penalty phase jury. Neither is there any authority concerning how good cause may be shown. Nevertheless, we believe that defendant's assertions of possible juror bias in this case, based on the inflammatory nature of the guilt phase evidence and the promptness of the verdict, were insufficient to impose any duty of inquiry on the court. First, since the evidence in every capital case is likely to be somewhat inflammatory, defendant's argument, extended to its logical conclusion, would require the court routinely to re-voir dire the jury. This clearly is not the intent of the statute. (Cf. People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480] [due process does not require separate penalty jury].) Second, as the trial court observed, the inflammatory guilt phase evidence would be presented to the penalty phase jury in any case. That the guilt phase jury initially heard the evidence without mitigating evidence is, like the admission of inflammatory evidence itself, common to all capital cases and thus cannot be sufficient cause for discharge. In sum, defendant's showing raised no duty on the part of the court to question the jurors. (See People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1028-1029 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]; People v. Gates, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1199.)