Opinion ID: 71376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quantum of Proof

Text: 25 I.D.P. and W.L.G. posit that the district court should have required the government to prove the factors underlying its motion to transfer to adult status by clear and convincing evidence rather than a preponderance of the evidence. We conclude, however, that the district court did not err in applying the preponderance standard to its findings regarding whether the interest of justice demanded that I.D.P. and W.L.G. be transferred and tried as adults. It is worth noting that our conclusion is in accord with every other circuit that has addressed and decided this issue. See, e.g., United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir.1995) (stating that [t]he clear and convincing standard is also incompatible with the discretionary nature of the transfer determination, which involves balancing the often conflicting goals of promoting juvenile rehabilitation and protecting the public safety.); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 868 (2nd Cir.1995) (reasoning that the clear and convincing standard would not be required in a transfer proceeding because [a] transfer hearing under the JDA is not a criminal proceeding designed to explore the defendant's guilt or innocence ... [n]or does the hearing under the Act affect whether the defendant will be confined, either prior to or after trial.). Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the use of the clear and convincing standard of proof is reserved to protect particularly important interests in a limited number of civil cases, California v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93, 102 S.Ct. 172, 173, 70 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981), and has approved the use of this standard in a restricted number of cases involving such matters as civil commitment, 7 deportation, 8 denaturalization, 9 and libel. 10 Although we do not minimize the importance of the interest at stake for these appellants, the interest does not rise to the level of constitutional gravity identified by the Court in those rare instances in which it has found the clear and convincing burden of proof to be necessary. See, e.g., Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 122-23, 63 S.Ct. at 1335 ([The] right [of citizenship] once conferred should not be taken away without the clearest sort of justification and proof ... [T]his burden must be met with evidence of clear and convincing character that when citizenship was conferred upon petitioner ... it was not done in accordance with strict legal requirements.); Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 50, 91 S.Ct. at 1823 ([T]he vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom of speech persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to use reasonable care would not provide adequate 'breathing space' for these great freedoms.). 26 Perhaps more significantly, the determination at issue in this case has no bearing on the eventual resolution of the underlying case. Stated differently, in deciding whether the government has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest of justice weighs in favor of transfer, the court solely decides whether the defendants will be tried as juveniles or adults. It is critical to emphasize that this determination neither influences nor affects any issue regarding the defendants' innocence or guilt. As we emphasized in the context of certification, the court's findings with respect to transfer is the beginning--not the end--of the adjudicatory process. We therefore conclude that the district court properly required the government to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the interest of justice weighed in favor of transfer.