Opinion ID: 522231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the district courts abused their discretion in the cases before us.

Text: 24 The Secretary's final line of argument is that even if some form of factor analysis were appropriate rather than focusing on the lodestar, the district courts erred in their analysis of the fee requests in these cases. He asserts that [t]he district court must do more than merely recite a factor and conclusively decide that it applies to support an extraordinary multiplication of fees. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 27. The Blankenship factors include time and labor required; skill required; contingency of fee; amount involved and result attained; experience, reputation, and ability of attorney; and awards in similar cases. Blankenship, 676 F.2d at 118. 25 In order to show abuse, the Secretary repeats many of the arguments already made in favor of the lodestar approach. In addition, he argues that the court in McGuire erred by relying on Mr. Fobes' notable success, since the denial of EAJA fees showed that the case was a close one and substantial evidence was available to support a denial or an award of benefits. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 28. However, it is obvious that a close case is a risky one and a difficult one, since it could have gone either way. 26 The Secretary attempts to rebut the district courts' reliance on the fact that the Gruber and Green cases were turned down before Mr. Fobes finally took them on by stating that the reasons an attorney might decline a case are myriad. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 32. However, the record includes affidavits from the attorneys who refused the cases stating that they did not take the cases because of their difficulty. In short, none of the Secretary's arguments establish that the trial courts abused their discretion. We do, however, have an additional concern as to whether the district courts sufficiently reviewed the reasonableness of the contingency agreements in each case. 27