Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct in Guilt-Phase Summation

Text: The State's case was based almost exclusively on the inculpatory statements made by defendant after the murder. The State presented evidence that defendant and Mills sought to borrow a car and that both men left the Columbia Cafe in Renee Burkhardt's car, with Michael Mills in the driver's seat. The State also provided circumstantial evidence suggesting that the two men had a gun in their possession, and that they returned to the bar roughly one hour after they had left. However, the State presented no evidence other than the fact that Donaghy was murdered and robbed, along with defendant's later descriptions of the murder, to show what actually occurred during that time frame. Nevertheless, during the State's summation the prosecutor sought to provide some of the missing pieces: So what happens? Around 8:00 Mills and [defendant] pull out. Mills is the driver. Somewhere along that route this man's first act of intent to kill, first act of purpose, preplanned, premeditated, intent to kill occurs. He takes the shotgun and loads it with the slug. Defense counsel immediately objected, asking for support in the record justifying the comment. The court stated that it was a permissible inference to be drawn, and ordered defense counsel to sit down. The prosecutor continued: Well, maybe he doesn't do it during the ride, but the act of putting this slug into this weapon is an intent, an intent to use this gun, use it with a slug. It's not the bird shot, or whatever you would use for small game. This is a slug, this is a three quarter ounce piece of lead. That's his first act of intent. .... [T]his man and Mills are headed towards the gas station with him intent on killing Keith. As [Wr]igley puts it, he wanted to feel what it was like to kill. And what you find from the pictures and the [crime-scene] video is that's what his intent was when he went in that station, first to kill. What do they do? They drive down the front. Here is Ogden Road. They drive in front of the station. And here are the windows. Keith is seated here. They can see that he's alone, seated there doing his job. They continue down. And they go down the road between the Texaco and Again, defense counsel objected, asking for support in the record. The court admonished the prosecutor not to ask for speculation. The prosecutor continued: [Mills and defendant] [p]ulled down Georgetown Road and park. Mills is going tohe's going to be the getaway driver. What does [defendant] do? It's loadednot now. Counsel objected for the third time. The court characterized the statement as a permissible inference to ask the jury to draw based on facts in the record. At side bar, the court recited the facts contained in the record supporting such an inference: The Court: Fact one, Mills and [defendant] leave the bar together. Fact two, they take a car to which Mills got the keys and was seen as the driver driving it when it left the bar. Fact three, they returned to the bar and Mills hands the girl back the keys. Fact four, [defendant] admits to several people that while they were out he killed this guy. I think it is a logical and reasonable inference that can be drawn, doesn't have to be drawn, but is a permissible and reasonable and logical inference that he was the driver and [defendant] was the killer. [Defense]: How about that he said he would be the getaway car driver? [Prosecutor]: I never said that. The Court: I don't think he did, either. Defense counsel then declined the court's offer to recite the facts for the benefit of the jury. The prosecutor resumed his summation: The second act of his intent of this premeditation to kill is, Sergeant Hannigan says you can pull the trigger all day long on this shotgun and it doesn't go off. All day long. What do you have to do in order for the shotgun to fire? You have to cock the hammer back. That act is intent to use this to kill someone, armed with the pumpkin ball slug in this gun. And that is done before he gets into the gas station, because he does not have time once he's in the station to cock this gun. That is done while he is on his way into the station. And how does he go? He goes along this way, from the bays, he sneaks across, and there is the door. Keith, who is looking out the windows, doesn't see him because he's coming from the blind side. And what does he do? With the hammer cocked, he shoulders into the door. Remember, it opens inside, from the inside. He shoulders in the door like this. The prosecutor then described the shooting, and stated: It take[s] seconds and he's gone and back in the car with Mills. And they head towards National Park. Keith, his body found by Mrs. Smolenski and the others. And why this route? On the way back to National Park they ditch the gun in the creek. Mills is driving.... Mills drops [defendant] off, maybe at his house.... Given the order of summation, defense counsel never responded to the statements made by the prosecutor. Nor did defense counsel request a curative instruction or a mistrial. In fact, defense counsel offered a curious concession upon completion of the State's closing: I had a series of objections during Mr. Warburton's closing, none of which I believe would have amounted to reversal [sic] error, anything close to it.... I need to make, merely to complete the record, what I think is my obligation as counsel. Judge, I think cocking the gun in the car is pure speculation, not based on any fact I can think of. Defendant asserts that the State's summation brought forth the ghost of Michael Mills by informing the jury of facts that could have been known only by Mills. Mills's statement to the police was inadmissible in view of his suicide. Defendant contends that the seriousness of the prosecutor's improper comments is compounded because the comments went to two critical issues in the trial: whether defendant committed the murder by his own conduct, that is, whether defendant and not Mills was the shooter, and, assuming defendant was the shooter, whether the shooting was accidental or intentional. A prosecutor is entitled to sum up the State's case graphically and forcefully. State v. Marquez, 277 N.J.Super. 162, 171, 649 A. 2d 114 (App.Div.1994)(quoting State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 510-11, 158 A. 2d 11 (1960)), certif. denied, 141 N.J. 99, 660 A. 2d 1198 (1995). Moreover, we have recognized that the highly emotional nature of criminal trials often tests a prosecutor's duty to remain strictly within the bounds of propriety. State v. Bucanis, 26 N.J. 45, 56, 138 A. 2d 739, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 910, 78 S.Ct. 1157, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1160 (1958). Nevertheless, a prosecutor's summation is limited to commenting upon the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 296, 576 A. 2d 834 (1990)(quoting Bucanis, supra, 26 N.J. at 56, 138 A. 2d 739); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935)(noting that although prosecutor may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-5.8(a)(2d ed. 1980)(It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to ... mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.). Indeed, a prosecutor's primary obligation is not to win convictions but to see that justice is done. State v. Farrell, 61 N.J. 99, 104, 293 A. 2d 176 (1972). Particularly in the delicate context of a capital trial, conduct that falls short of a prosecutor's special duty to seek justice will be scrupulously reviewed. Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 40, 524 A. 2d 130. A prosecutor is guilty of misconduct if he implies to the jury that he possesses knowledge beyond that contained in the evidence presented, or if he reveals that knowledge to the jury. State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 519, 548 A. 2d 1058 (1988). Nevertheless, prosecutorial misconduct will not serve as the basis for reversal unless it was so egregious as to work a deprivation of a defendant's right to a fair trial. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322, 524 A. 2d 188; see also Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 426, 548 A. 2d 1022 (noting that prosecutorial misconduct is not reversible error unless it deprived defendant of fair trial). In resolving whether the misconduct is prejudicial and thus denied defendant a fair trial, we will consider whether counsel registered a timely objection, whether the remark was withdrawn promptly, and whether the court struck the remarks and ordered the jury to disregard them. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 323, 524 A. 2d 188; State v. Bogen, 13 N.J. 137, 141-42, 98 A. 2d 295, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 825, 74 S.Ct. 44, 98 L. Ed. 350 (1953). In State v. Wilson, 128 N.J. 233, 242, 607 A. 2d 1289 (1992), we found improper a prosecutor's statement that he would not provide leniency to a State witness because that witness was part of the murder, when no testimony supported that assertion. Although that assertion led to the objectionable inference that the witness had no self-serving reason to testify for the State, we observed that the issue whether the witness had hoped to secure favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony was placed in dispute before the jury, and contested to an extent sufficient to minimize the impact of the prosecutor's infraction. Id. at 243, 607 A. 2d 1289 (quoting Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 157, 586 A. 2d 85). Thus, we found no reversible error. Ibid. In Rose, supra, we concluded that the cumulative effect of numerous prosecutorial improprieties required reversal of a death sentence. 112 N.J. at 523, 548 A. 2d 1058. The most egregious improprieties included the prosecutor's intimation to the jury that it had no responsibility for defendant's death sentence because its duty was to weigh evidence and [t]he law then takes over. Id. at 510, 548 A. 2d 1058. In addition, the prosecutor warned the jury that a death sentence was necessary to prevent defendant from murdering again, id. at 520, 548 A. 2d 1058, and suggested that a sentence other than death would violate the law. Id. at 523, 548 A. 2d 1058. Moreover, the prosecutor exhorted the jury to send a message by delivering a death sentence. Id. at 520, 548 A. 2d 1058. Without support in the record, the prosecutor also suggested that defense experts had fabricated testimony, that the prosecutor could have produced ten experts to testify differently than the defense experts, and that defendant had extorted food from other inmates while in prison. Id. at 518-19, 522, 548 A. 2d 1058. See also State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 342, 580 A. 2d 221 (1990)(criticizing as beyond the record prosecutor's assertion that defendants attempted to come through the door and massacre the family). We are satisfied that the prosecutor's comments in this case are less prejudicial than were the prosecutor's statements in Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 510-14, 518-24, 548 A. 2d 1058. At the outset, we note that defense counsel's subsequent concession that none of the prosecutor's remarks would have amounted to reversal [sic] error, anything close to it, revealing though that might be, does not foreclose the possibility of our finding prejudicial error in the prosecutor's remarks. Defense counsel registered his objection to the comments on three separate occasions, thus adequately preserving the issue for appeal. Clearly, some of the summation comments are less troubling than others. The prosecutor's description of the route taken by the two men from the Columbia Cafe to the Family Texaco, although improper because it was not based on evidence adduced at trial, did not have the capacity to prejudice defendant. Simply put, what route defendant and Mills followed to the crime scene had no direct bearing on the determination of defendant's guilt. Moreover, the prosecutor's observation that Mills drove the car and dropped defendant off after the murder are logical inferences that may be drawn based on testimony presented to the jury. Mills obtained the car keys from Renee Burkhardt, drove the car from the Columbia Cafe, and gave the keys back to Burkhardt upon returning to the bar (whereas defendant had yet to come back). Although the prosecutor's statement that Mills dropped defendant off at home is beyond the record, that comment, much like the description of the travel route taken by the two men, had no specific bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence aside from the subtle implication that if Mills was the driver defendant must have been the shooter. Where defendant was dropped off after the murder was of minimal import in the jury's deliberations. Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment regarding the shotgun being discarded in the creek was a fair and logical inference to be drawn based on the record. In addition to the testimony concerning the gun being found in the creek, Wrigley testified that defendant said he threw the gun in a body of water. Other aspects of the summation, however, present closer questions. The qualitative difference distinguishing those comments from the others discussed above lies in their relation to key issues in the case, whether defendant and not Mills was the shooter and whether the shooting was intentional or the result of a botched robbery. Evidence presented to the jury established neither that defendant loaded the gun during the car ride nor cocked the hammer of the weapon en route to the Family Texaco, although the prosecutor couched both assertions as fact. However, in view of the numerous inculpatory statements made by defendant, including his expressed desire to kill to see what it felt like, it obviously can be inferred that defendant loaded the weapon at some point prior to the shooting. Nevertheless, the prosecutor's statement that defendant loaded the weapon during the car ride had no basis in the record and was highly improper. We note that upon defense counsel's objection the prosecutor did concede that maybe [defendant] doesn't do it during the ride. Secondly, there was no evidence in the record to support the prosecutor's assertion that defendant cocked the hammer of the weapon back during the car ride. Defendant contends that extra-record statement impermissibly suggested that the murder was intentional, when it may have been the product of a botched robbery. However, the crucial question is not when the hammer was cocked but whether the shooting was intentional or not. That this killing was intentional was essentially uncontroverted, in view of the evidence suggesting that Donaghy suffered a contact wound, that he had been seated when shot as inferable from the bullet's downward trajectory, and that defendant robbed Donaghy only after shooting himnot to mention defendant's statement to Wrigley that he wanted to feel what it was like to kill someone. We also conclude that the prosecutor's characterization of Mills as the getaway driver and his observation that the murder take[s] seconds and [defendant is] gone and back in the car with Mills, although approaching the fine line that separates forceful from impermissible closing argument, Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 518, 548 A. 2d 1058, are fair inferences to be drawn from the record. The jury did receive testimony that the two men left the bar with Mills driving, and that Mills returned to the bar and gave Renee Burkhardt her car keys. More importantly, we note the testimony that indicated defendant pursued numerous other avenues to pick up money from [his] boss at the Columbia Cafe. Defendant asked Shiplee if Sadlowski could use her car to drive defendant, then asked Shiplee if she would drive him, and then inquired whether he could borrow her car to drive himself. Additionally, he asked Zuzulock if she could get her car so he could collect his money. A fair and logical inference to be drawn from the foregoing was that defendant cared little about who drove him, or if he simply drove himselfthus supporting the conclusion that whoever drove defendant was destined to play a relatively insignificant role in the crime in comparison to that of defendant. However, the prosecutor's assertions that defendant approached the victim from the blind side and that he shoulder[ed] in the door like this were entirely inappropriate. The State's submission of the generalized need for the element of surprise as supporting this comment is simply inadequate. Equally unavailing is the State's argument that because Georgetown Road runs on the blind side (the garage side) of the Family Texaco, an inference that defendant approached in this manner was supportable. That argument ignores the fact that no evidence adduced at trial indicated what route the men had taken to the gas station in the first place. Nevertheless, as inappropriate as they were, we are not persuaded that in the context of the entire trial the prosecutor's comments had the capacity to deprive defendant of a fair trial. The direction from which defendant approached and the way in which he entered the door did not establish whether this was an intentional murder. As noted above, that fact was demonstrated forcefully by the evidence presented at trial. Concededly, the prosecutor's assertion that it was defendant who entered the office and shot Donaghy went directly to the crucial own-conduct determination. However, the evidence detailed at length above overwhelmingly indicated that defendant, and not Mills, was the shooter. We are fully satisfied that it was the weight of the evidence, particularly the damning statements uttered by defendant himself, that led to this capital murder conviction rather than the prosecutor's improper comments during summation. We also recognize that the prosecutor's summation is best reviewed within the context of the trial as a whole. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 323, 524 A. 2d 188. Of particular relevance is the line of argument defense counsel pursued in summation, which portrayed Mills as the principal offender: The [S]tate made a better case against Michael Mills than they have against [defendant]. It couldn't be more clear. Who borrowed the car? Michael Mills. Who stopped on the [W]hite [B]ridge? Although we are not privy to the conversations that occurred, the shotgun is pulled from the water. Who? Michael Mills. Who moved the bag out of Shiplee's car? Michael Mills. .... Who committed suicide? The prosecutor introduced to you in his opening statement, Michael Mills isn't here because he committed suicide. Although the court did instruct the jury not to draw any inferences from the fact of Mills's suicide, a fair reading of the closing arguments indicates that the prosecutor's comments were a response to the defense portrayal of Mills as principal, and were designed to advance the State's theory that defendant was the shooter. Therefore, at least with regard to the own-conduct determination, the issue was contested to an extent sufficient to minimize the impact of the prosecutor's infraction. Wilson, supra, 128 N.J. at 243, 607 A. 2d 1289 (quoting Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 157, 586 A. 2d 85). Moreover, despite the improper nature of certain aspects of the summation, the unambiguous instruction provided by the court at the end of the guilt phase reassures us that the prosecutor's closing comments did not deprive this defendant of a fair trial: Regardless of what counsel may have said in their arguments to you, their discussions with you, as to what they recall about the evidence in the case, it is your recollection of the evidence that must guide you as judges of the facts. So, if there was something that they said, and I'm sure it would have been in good faith, but if there was something they said about how they recall the evidence to be, what they said a witness said, if that is different than the way you recall it, you must rely upon your own recollection in determining what the evidence is and what the facts are. Arguments, statements, remarks, openings and summations of counsel are not evidence in the case and may not be treated as evidence. Although the attorneys may point out to you properly what they think important in the case, you must rely solely upon your understanding and your recollection of the evidence that was admitted during the trial. We will presume that the jury adhered to the court's instruction. State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 52, 678 A. 2d 164 (1996); State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259, 270, 255 A. 2d 193 (1969). In the interest of completeness, we also briefly address and reject defendant's challenge to the manner in which the trial court dealt with the objections to the State's summation. We reject the contention that the trial court improperly endorsed the State's position in front of the jury. In this hard-fought trial, both sides received favorable and unfavorable rulings on objections. Furthermore, we find no evidence in the record to suggest that defendant was prejudiced by, or even that the jury witnessed, an angry tone on the part of the trial court in dealing with defense counsel at sidebar. As defense counsel conceded on the occasion he aired concerns with the court's demeanor, I want the record to be clear, I think the defendant got, regardless, an incredibly fair, clean, and evenhanded judge throughout.