Opinion ID: 1133901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does this case present an issue of first impression?

Text: The heirs cite no case authority, contending that this case presents an issue of first impression because the cases cited in the annotations to § 43-8-227 were all decided before the enactment of that Code section in 1982. However, the editor's note to the annotation states: In light of the similarity of the subject matter, decisions under former § 43-1-10 are included in the annotations for this section. Furthermore, the Commentary following § 43-8-227 states: Prior Alabama law can be said to be in accord with the general policy stated in this section. Former § 43-1-10 provided that `when any testator, after making his will, makes any contract for the conveyance of any property devised in such will, and the whole or any part of the purchase money remains unpaid to such testator at his death, the disposition of the property by such contract is not a revocation of the devise, . . . unless it clearly appears by the contract, or some other instrument in writing to be intended as a revocation. . . .' However, this section specifically mentions additional situations. Alabama did not previously have any statement of law specifically covering the situation mentioned in subsection (b) of this section. Subsection (b) does not apply to this case; it refers to sales by, or proceeds paid to, a guardian or curator. In other words, the enactment of § 43-8-227 has not abrogated the judicial precedent that applies to the heirs' case. The heirs attempt to distinguish § 43-8-227 from the former § 43-1-10 by stating: There is a significant difference between the two sections in that Section 43-1-10 does not use either the term `general devise' or `specific devise,' whereas Section 43-8-227(a) uses the words `specific devisee' and `specifically devised' in the first eleven words of the statute. (Heirs' brief at 8.) However, the Commentary to § 43-8-227 again refutes the heirs' argument that the addition of these words expressed an intent by the legislature to change the law as it existed before the enactment of § 43-8-227: The intent of this section is to prevent ademption in all cases involving sale, condemnation or destruction of specifically devised assets where testator's death occurred before the proceeds of the sale, condemnation or any insurance, had been paid to the testator. In other words, the intent of § 43-8-227 remained the same as the intent of former § 43-1-10. A devisee remained entitled to the proceeds due on specifically devised land sold subsequent to the execution of the will devising the land when those proceeds have not been paid to the testator before the testator's death. Furthermore, the predecessor statute to § 43-1-10, Title 61, § 13, Ala. Code 1940, its predecessor, § 10588 (6163), Ala.Code 1923, and all the predecessor statutes on nonademption expressed this same intent. This Court has explained that under former § 43-1-10 and its predecessors: For the purposes of the will, the statute treats the unpaid purchase money as real estate. It may be said the statute is written into every devise of lands situate in Alabama, as if to say, on the face of the will, `I devise this land or any unpaid purchase money due me thereon at my death, to the persons named in the will.' Phillips v. Phillips, 213 Ala. 27, 28, 104 So. 234, 236 (1925). Thus, the conveyance by any contract of property devised by a will does not revoke the devise of the property in the testator's will, but passes the unpaid purchase money to the devisee. This clearly is not a case of first impression. The enactment of § 43-8-227 merely incorporated the former § 43-1-10. The decisions under the predecessor statutes to former § 43-1-10 and under former § 43-1-10 are still good law and still apply to this case.