Opinion ID: 2419596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony of Elizabeth Foster

Text: One of Pyles's defenses was that someone else, namely David Landry, could have committed the murder. Testimony of Elizabeth Foster, a former girlfriend of Landry's, was proffered. In a suppression hearing before the trial judge, she testified that Landry had a knife similar to the one that was used in the murder, but she could not identify the murder weapon as Landry's knife. She testified that Landry was a violent person, that he had a drinking problem, and that he had previously threatened her. Also, she testified that he once told her that he would cut someone's throat if he ever murdered someone. However, she testified that she had never heard Landry make any threats against the victim. The trial court excluded this testimony, and Pyles challenges that ruling based upon the contention that it is relevant evidence which should have been allowed. In Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993), we addressed the issue of admitting evidence intended to incriminate others of a crime charged against a defendant. We cited language from a North Carolina case and a California case as the rule which was being adopted. Specifically, we examined Killian v. State, 184 Ark. 239, 42 S.W.2d 12 (1931), and West v. State, 255 Ark. 668, 501 S.W.2d 771 (1973), where the defendants attempted to introduce testimony that other parties had been responsible for the offense for which they were being tried. In each case, we upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the testimony because there was no evidence showing the other party was guilty. In quoting two other jurisdictions, we noted: The Supreme Court of North Carolina stated: A defendant may introduce evidence tending to show that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged, but such evidence is inadmissible unless it points directly to the guilt of the third party. Evidence which does no more than create an inference or conjecture as to another's guilt is inadmissible. State v. Wilson [322 N.C. 117], 367 S.E.2d 589 (N.C.1988). The Supreme Court of California has recognized that a defendant has the right to present evidence of third party culpability but stated: [T]he rule does not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party's possible culpability ... [E]vidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. People v. Kaurish [ 52 Cal.3d 648, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788], 802 P.2d 278 (Cal.1990). Following our holding in Zinger , it is evident that any inference that could be gained by allowing Foster's testimony does not directly prove a link between Landry and the murder. The testimony is speculative and remote. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the exclusion of this testimony.