Opinion ID: 868362
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: by deception; and

Text: (ii) with a purpose to deprive the other person of property. Mr. Esparza-Recendez suggests these are not crimes of moral turpitude because there is no element of permanent deprivation. We determine whether the convictions constitute crimes of moral turpitude by analyzing the elements of the state-law offenses “using the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 921 (10th Cir. 2011). A crime of moral turpitude “refers to conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to accepted rules of morality and duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.” Id. “It is well settled that theft or larceny offenses involve moral turpitude.” Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 33 (BIA 2006); see also Briseno-Flores v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d 226, 228 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “theft or larceny, whether grand or petty, has always -6- been held to involve moral turpitude” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that theft is a crime of moral turpitude and virtually every circuit considers it a crime of moral turpitude for immigration purposes). Although the BIA cited several agency decisions for the proposition that theft ordinarily involves moral turpitude only when a permanent taking is intended, e.g., Matter of Grazley, 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 333 (BIA 1973), the BIA has recognized that “offenses involving theft of goods from a retail establishment are crimes involving moral turpitude,” Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 33. Moreover, the theft by deception statute employs the phrase “purpose to deprive,” which the BIA recognized means “[t]o withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(3)(a). Thus, even if there must be an intent to permanently deprive for a theft offense to constitute a crime of moral turpitude, we would agree that Mr. Esparza-Recendez’s crimes satisfied that requirement. All this is beside the point, however, because Mr. Esparza-Recendez must show a “realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007); see also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2013) (stating that “a noncitizen would have to demonstrate” an actual scenario in which the State offense would be prosecuted in -7- the manner alleged). This means that Mr. Esparza-Recendez “must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the state courts in fact did apply the statute[s] in the special (nongeneric) manner for which he argues.” Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193. And on this score, his argument fails. Indeed, his brief is conspicuously silent with regard to whether his convictions or any others ever resulted from a prosecution for a temporary taking. Instead, Mr. Esparza-Recendez merely hypothesizes that the statutes could be applied to such conduct. But such postulating is insufficient to show the statutes here apply to conduct beyond the scope of crimes of moral turpitude. Accordingly, the BIA correctly determined that Mr. Esparza-Recendez’s convictions for retail theft and attempted theft by deception constitute crimes of moral turpitude.