Opinion ID: 852968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possible Approaches to Sentencing

Text: American jurisdictions have embraced a variety of methods for imposing criminal sentences, and most states and the federal government have revised their practices over time. Indeterminate sentencing arrangements, for example, provide for sentences stated as a range of years, such as ten to twenty years. Black's Law Dictionary 1367 (7th ed. 1999). Indiana used this system until 1977, so that, for example, the punishment for child molesting used to be either one to five years for molesting children between twelve and sixteen years old, or two to twenty-one years for molesting children under twelve years of age. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-1-54-4 (Michie 1975). [1] Under indeterminate sentencing systems, the actual number of years of incarceration was decided by officials of the executive branch, typically based on the behavior of the prisoner. Under Indiana's old system, it was the task of the parole board to determine when an offender was ready for release. See generally Hon. Louis B. Meyer, North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act: An Ineffective Scarecrow, 28 Wake Forest L.Rev. 519, 557 n. 249 (1993). A leading alternative to such arrangements has been determinate sentencing, under which the court imposes a penalty stated as a specific number of years. The current version of this system employed in Indiana provides for a standard sentence, from which the trial judge may add or subtract based on findings of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, the standard sentence for the crime of child molesting as a class A felony is thirty years, to which the trial judge may add as much as twenty or subtract as much as ten years. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-4 (West 1998). One could characterize this system as one in which judicial discretion is guided within a range. It thus produces widely varying sentences for similar crimes, especially when the prosecutor elects to file multiple charges arising out of the same basic events. Of course, a respectable legal system attempts to impose similar sentences on perpetrators committing the same acts who have the same backgrounds. While it is widely recognized that this is extremely difficult to achieve in any court system that makes thousands of such decisions annually, serious efforts to achieve it continue. In the federal system, judges are bound by a scheme of guidelines in which points are assigned for various factors relevant to sentencing. The 2003 sentencing guidelines, prepared by the Office of Special Counsel of the United States Sentencing Commission, are promulgated pursuant to the PROTECT Act, Pub.L. 108-21. Several states have undertaken similar exercises. Georgia adopted a comparable but non-binding guideline to reserve the hardest bed for the hardest criminal. Walter C. Jones, Panel recommends sentencing guidelines, The Augusta Chronicle, December 2, 1999. Likewise, Oregon adopted an indeterminate structure and added a parole matrix. It reasoned, [a] corrections system that overruns its resources can increase the risk to life and property within the system and to the public. See Oregon Sentencing Guidelines, (2003) available at http:// www.ocjc. state.or.us/ SG.htm. Arizona adopted the indeterminate sentencing structure, but later opted to revise the scheme to a presumptive term. Arizona v. Wagner, 194 Ariz. 1, 976 P.2d 250, 255 (Ct.App.1998) (citing Rudolph J. Gerber, Criminal Law of Arizona, ch. 7, at 702-08 (2nd ed. 1993)). [2] Several states have abandoned indeterminate sentencing and instead adopted a Truth-in-Sentencing system to reduce the likelihood of confusion and uncertainty regarding a particular sentence. In 1995, Ohio offered greater protection for victims of crime, broadened discretion for trial judges in sentencing, limited appellate review of sentencing, and abolished the traditional good time concept. See Ohio Bar Association (2003), available at http://www.ohiobar. org/. The Congress has fostered this movement by adding provisions in federal grant programs that promote state adoption of Truth-in-Sentencing laws. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13704 (2002) (lists eligibility and exceptions for Truth-in-Sentencing incentive grants); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13703 (2002) (applies Truth-in-sentencing law to violent offender incarceration). As for serious grid systems, Massachusetts used one scheme whereby the grid cell represented the governing offense and the classification of the criminal history to determine an appropriate sentence for the offender. See http:// www.state.ma.us/ courts/ formsandguidelines/ index.html. Michigan also followed a system to reduce unwarranted disparities in sentencing decisions. See People v. Hegwood, 465 Mich. 432, 636 N.W.2d 127, 131 (2001). Likewise, Minnesota adopted similar guidelines to promote proportionality and uniformity in sentencing. See Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, (2003), available at http:// www.msgc.state.mn.us/ goals_of_the_guidelines. htm (explains goals of sentencing guidelines). The American Law Institute has a major project under way to develop a model for sentencing commissions and guidelines. A.L.I., Model Penal Code: Sentencing, Preliminary Drafts No. 2, June 3, 2003. The federal system is the one most well known, though complaints about it abound. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem Is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 833, 861-63 (1992) (discussing the Guidelines' inflexibility toward departures); see also Paul J. Hofer, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 19, 20 (2003) (discussing the Guidelines' failure to express a coherent philosophy of punishment). The debate about the best way to devise effective sentences is current and local. The Indiana General Assembly has recently created a Sentencing Policy Study Committee, part of whose mission will be to assure that sentencing laws protect the public and promote fairness and uniformity in sentencing. See H.B. 1145, 113th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind.2003), P.L. 140.