Opinion ID: 202297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecution's Summation

Text: 43 Obershaw's final claim is that the prosecutor's summation was grossly improper, thereby rendering the resulting conviction a denial of due process. 6 He relies on Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). There, the Supreme Court held that certain comments made by the prosecution during closing argument undoubtedly were improper. Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 2464. Even so, the Court held, it is not enough that the prosecutors' remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors' comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Id. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (some internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). 44 We begin with those remarks to which Obershaw objected at trial. 7 The SJC reviewed these objected-to comments to determine whether there were improprieties, and if so, whether they were harmless. Obershaw, 762 N.E.2d at 287. There is a question, not briefed by the parties, as to whether the SJC applied a standard at least as favorable to Obershaw as the federal standard, in which case the deferential AEDPA standard of review would apply, or not, in which case we would review Obershaw's claim de novo. 8 See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 31-32 & n. 8 (1st Cir.2002). Obershaw assumes that de novo review is proper here, while respondents assume that the deferential AEDPA standard of review applies. It is unnecessary here to resolve the issue, because we would reach the same conclusion under either standard of review: the prosecutor's comments do not form a basis for habeas relief. 45 First, the prosecutor said, I suggest to you in no uncertain terms that Obershaw lied to you and to the police. In a similar vein, the prosecutor later called Obershaw's claim that he did not remember killing Brian an insult to your intelligence... as jurors. This theme, that the story Obershaw told the jury was a lie, was reiterated several more times. Obershaw argues that these statements were nothing more than the prosecutor's personal opinion. Not so; it was reasonable to view them as comments based on the evidence. As the SJC noted, there was ample evidence that Obershaw told the jury a story that not only was different from the one he told the police, but also was implausible. Obershaw, 762 N.E.2d at 288-89. The prosecutor was simply urging the jury to draw a particular conclusion from the evidence, and the comment that the apparent lie was insult[ing] was, as the SJC observed, no more than a `rhetorical flourish,' undoubtedly recognizable to the jury as such. Id. at 289 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 426 Mass. 67, 686 N.E.2d 975, 981 (1997)). 46 Second, Obershaw claims there was no evidence showing that Brian was struck with the ten blows to which the prosecutor referred. But the medical examiner testified that there were at least ten blows to the head (in addition to multiple injuries to other parts of the body). 47 Third, Obershaw notes that the court precluded the Commonwealth's forensic expert from testifying as to what caused several gouge marks on the bathroom wall. Citing that limitation, he challenges the prosecutor's claims that [the expert] show[ed] you ... gouge marks, that he showed you that photograph with the gouges in it, and that the marks showed that [you] can see where this defendant is pounding away on his skull. 9 The expert had in fact testified about the significance of certain aspects of the photographs. The prosecutor did not tell the jury that the expert had testified that it was Obershaw's blows with the Club that caused the marks. That was a reasonable inference supported by other evidence at trial, and the court had told the prosecutor he was free to so argue. 48 Fourth, Obershaw argues that there was no evidentiary support for the prosecutor's statements that at the time the gouge marks were made, Brian was alive and suffering, and that Brian was alive throughout the entire beating. But there was indeed such evidence: Obershaw himself testified that Brian, very badly hurt, covered in blood, and making ugly breathing sounds, died in his arms; further, the medical examiner testified that Brian lived for at least several minutes after the first blow, that he had defensive wounds, that he had brain injuries which required several minutes to develop, and that he sustained bruises to his ankles while still alive — bruises likely incurred after the beating, given Obershaw's testimony that, believing Brian already dead, he dragged Brian by the ankles down the stairs before putting him in the trunk of his car. 49 Fifth, Obershaw argues that the prosecutor improperly stated his personal opinion when he asked whether Obershaw was indifferent to his brother's suffering and answered, You bet he was. Look at what he did: backed him into a corner and beat him as he lay there defenseless. He showed him no mercy, he was indifferent to [Brian's] suffering. The prosecutor was not stating his opinion, but rather urging the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the evidence. As the SJC noted, the [y]ou bet language was simply a colloquial way of emphasizing the defendant's indifference. Id. at 289. 50 Finally, Obershaw takes issue with the prosecutor's suggestion that Brian died in agony, ... begging his brother to stop. Obershaw argues that there was no evidence to support the claim that Brian was begging him to stop. The SJC agreed. Id. at 288. It reasoned, however, that the remark had to be evaluated in the context of the entire summation, the jury charge, and all of the trial evidence, and that the begging claim was not central to the case. Id. The SJC also noted that the judge instructed the jury that the closing arguments of counsel were not evidence, id., and Obershaw concedes as much. We agree with the SJC that in context, the remark, though incorrect, was unlikely to have caused unfair prejudice to Obershaw. 51 There is one challenge which, although he did not raise it at trial, Obershaw raised on appeal to the SJC and raises again here. Obershaw points to the following passage: 52 Now, I'm going to be honest with you, ladies and gentlemen, I don't really give a crap what [Obershaw] went through. I'm here to tell you what his brother Brian went through, and those photographs, all 90 of them, show you what his brother Brian went through. And the testimony tells you what his brother Brian went through, and how his brother Brian died. I suggest to you [that] he died in agony, he died begging his brother to stop, he died with his hands over his head until he was pounded to the point of defenselessness, and ... this guy just went on swinging that Club. 53 Obershaw argues that this was an improper appeal to emotion. Because it found that this objection (as distinct from the evidentiary challenge to the begging claim) was not made at trial, the SJC reviewed only to determine whether there has been any error that creates a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 289. The SJC noted that it was improper for the prosecutor to interject his personal opinion to the effect that he did not really give a crap what [Obershaw] went through. Id. Even so, the SJC reasoned, the argument did not play[] to the emotions and sympathies of the jury, and in the context of the entire, lengthy closing argument, this one small portion could not have created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Id. 54 We cannot review this claim, because [i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). The default may be excused, and the bar to federal habeas review removed, only in certain circumstances: where the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. 55 Where, as here, the state court finds forfeiture because of the defendant's failure to object at trial, the fact that it reviews for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice does not constitute a waiver of the requirement that the defendant timely object. Lynch, 438 F.3d at 45; Horton, 370 F.3d at 81. In sum, there is an independent and adequate state ground for decision here. Obershaw makes no effort to challenge that conclusion by showing cause for the default and prejudice therefrom, or by demonstrating that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.