Opinion ID: 2634596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(4)(B) (1993 Furse)

Text: While a finding of Butanda's violation of K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(4)(A) (1993 Furse) is sufficient to affirm the district court, the question of whether her actions constituted a violation of K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(4)(B) (1993 Furse), the obtaining of workers compensation benefits by concealing a material fact, is a question ripe for resolution by this court. The answer to this question depends upon whether the concealment of her true identity amounted to the concealment of a material fact. Material fact is not defined under the Act. However, material fact has been defined in cases involving a fraudulent misrepresentation claim: `A fact is material if it is one to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction involved.' Koch v. Koch Industries, Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Timi v. Prescott State Bank, 220 Kan. 377, 389, 553 P.2d 315 (1976); see also Orr v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 335 Syl. ¶ 1, 627 P.2d 1193, aff'd 230 Kan. 271, 634 P.2d 1067 (1981) (when the Workers Compensation Act is raised as a defense to a common-law negligence action, the identity of the employer of the injured worker is a material fact). Butanda admits that her preexisting medical condition, work history, and any preexisting impairments are material facts in a workers compensation proceeding because of the manner in which permanent partial disability benefits are computed. However, she argues that NBP's actions in terminating her employment made her eligible for a permanent partial general disability compensation award beyond her functional rating before she testified to the false identity. She also states that she eventually provided her full work history to NBP, but NBP had no interest in her medical history based on its failure to inquire, with five opportunities to do so. Butanda's argument ignores the fact that she filed the claim for workers compensation under the false identity before she was terminated from her position. She also fails to note that the prior employment information she listed in her application was false, and at her April 21, 2000, deposition, she refused to answer any questions which might incriminate her, including questions as to her name, social security number, whether she had any prior work-related injuries, and whether she had worked for any other employer. Finally, Butanda's medical condition, work history, and any preexisting impairments are relevant because permanent partial disability benefits are computed by examining Butanda's work tasks for the past 15 years. Moreover, any award is reduced by the amount of preexisting functional impairment. See K.S.A. 44-501(c) (1993 Furse); K.S.A. 44-510e (1993 Furse). Without knowledge of Butanda's true identity, NBP would not be able to obtain and verify her previous medical or work history. Because of the importance of accurate information in the establishment of final awards, we conclude that one's true identity in a worker compensation proceeding is a material fact. Thus, its concealment or its misrepresentation is the concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact. Contrary to Butanda's contention, it does not matter whether the employer actually inquired into these areas; rather, it is the fact that Butanda intentionally and willfully concealed the material fact of her true identity in the proceedings which gives rise to the finding that her acts of concealment constituted both fraudulent and abusive acts under the statute. We conclude that the district court determination that Butanda's intentional and willful acts in misrepresenting and concealing the material fact of her identity constituted fraudulent and abusive acts under K.S.A. 44-5,120(d)(4)(B) (1993 Furse) is also correct.