Opinion ID: 462745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: bill of attainder challenge

Text: 30 Appellants' final contention is that the incentives in Sec. 2306 for physicians to become participating physicians (providing Medicare enrollees with lists of the specialties and phone numbers of participating physicians, more efficient processing of claims and the recognition of increased billing charges to non-Medicare patients in future calculations of participating physicians' customary charges) and the statutory enforcement mechanism (civil fines and/or barring non-participating physicians from treating Medicare patients for a period of up to five years) constitute a bill of attainder prohibited by Article I, Sec. 9 of the United States Constitution. 14 31 A bill of attainder has been defined as a  'law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial.'  Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 3348, 82 L.Ed.2d 632, 640 (1984) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468, 97 S.Ct. 2777, 2803, 53 L.Ed.2d 867 (1977)). In determining whether a statute is a bill of attainder, the Supreme Court has cautioned that [t]he judicial function is 'not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.'  Selective Service System, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3355, 82 L.Ed.2d at 642 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2893, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973)). Because we find that Sec. 2306 does not inflict punishment forbidden by Article I, Sec. 9 of the Constitution, we hold that it is not a constitutionally prohibited bill of attainder. 32 A statute inflicts constitutionally forbidden punishment if (1) the statutory penalty falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment, (2) the statute fails to further any nonpunitive legislative purpose, or (3) the legislative history establishes a congressional intent to punish. See, e.g., Selective Service System, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3355, 82 L.Ed.2d at 643; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-76, 97 S.Ct. at 2806-07. The civil penalty and incentive provisions do not run afoul of the foregoing guideposts. First, the challenged civil penalty and incentive provisions do not fall within the historical meaning of legislative punishment. In upholding the constitutionality of a statute denying federal financial assistance under the Higher Education Act of 1965 to students who fail to register for the military draft, the Supreme Court reasoned that the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit did not approach the penalties traditionally associated with bills of attainder. 15 Selective Service System, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3356, 82 L.Ed.2d at 644; see also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) (The disqualification of certain deportees from receipt of Social Security benefits does not constitute a bill of attainder because the sanction is the mere denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit. No affirmative disability or restraint is imposed, certainly nothing approaching the 'infamous punishment' of imprisonment .....). Similarly, the challenged provisions in the instant case--the civil enforcement mechanism and the incentives for doctors to become participating physicians--do not impose the punishment historically associated with bills of attainder but rather are simply examples of statutory civil penalties frequently enacted to aid the executive branch in the enforcement of the law. See, e.g., Zwick v. Freeman, 373 F.2d 110, 119-20 (2d Cir.) (statute prohibiting licensee from employing, without government approval, any person responsibly connected with anyone found to have committed flagrant or repeated violations of the unfair conduct provisions of Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act is not bill of attainder), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835, 88 S.Ct. 43, 19 L.Ed.2d 96 (1967); Bearden v. Commissioner, 575 F.Supp. 1459, 1462 (D.Utah 1983) (statute prescribing $500 penalty for filing of frivolous tax return does not constitute bill of attainder). 16 33 With respect to the second and third prongs of the test, the legislative history convincingly establishes that Sec. 2306 was intended to further nonpunitive goals, not to punish nonparticipating physicians. As discussed above, the temporary freeze was intended to prevent Medicare beneficiaries alone from bearing the burden of reduced Medicare expenditures. Moreover, the various incentive provisions of Sec. 2306 were designed to encourage physicians to participate in the Medicare program and to provide beneficiaries with the information necessary to obtain the services of physicians who would not charge them more than the reasonable rate recognized by Congress. 17 Neither the text of Sec. 2306 nor its legislative history suggests that Sec. 2306 was intended to punish physicians who elect not to participate in the Medicare program. Under these circumstances, we hold that Sec. 2306 does not constitute a bill of attainder prohibited by the Constitution. 18 IV. CONCLUSION 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is therefore 35 AFFIRMED.