Opinion ID: 223162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Cumulative Impeachment Evidence

Text: Mr. Cooper acknowledges that his cross-examination of Mr. Gleason at trial establish[ed] that he testified falsely on direct about falsifications of his resume and about the substance of much of the tax advice that he provided to Renaissance. Aplt. Opening Br. at 41. However, despite the fact that he successfully impeached Mr. Gleason on the stand, Mr. Cooper argues that the impeachment evidence drawn out at trial concerned the distant past, while the suppressed evidence would have allowed the defense to show that at that very moment  while testifying as a government witness  [Mr.] Gleason was executing an extensive scheme to defraud the government. Id. Thus, according to Mr. Cooper, the suppressed evidence is not cumulative because it would have opened an entirely new line of cross-examination. Id. at 42. Where evidence insignificantly impact[s] the degree of impeachment, it generally will not be sufficient to meet the ... materiality standard. Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1174 (10th Cir. 2009). For example, where the credibility of a witness has already been substantially called into question in the same respects by other evidence, additional impeachment evidence will generally be immaterial and will not provide the basis for a Brady claim. Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1267 n. 8 (10th Cir.2000) (quoting Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 251 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, we have indicated that an incremental amount of impeachment evidence on an already compromised witness does not amount to material evidence. United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1336 (D.C.Cir. 1993)). Accordingly, we have discarded as immaterial ... undisclosed impeachment evidence where it was cumulative of evidence of bias or partiality already presented `and thus would have provided only marginal additional support for [the] defense.' Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1174 (alteration in original) (quoting Trujillo, 136 F.3d at 1394). In contrast, suppressed evidence that significantly enhanc[es] the quality of the impeachment evidence usually will satisfy the materiality standard. Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1174. For example, [e]vidence that provides a new basis for impeachment is not [considered] cumulative and could well be material. United States v. Robinson, 583 F.3d 1265, 1273 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Merely because other impeachment evidence was presented does not [necessarily] mean that additional impeachment evidence is cumulative .... Torres, 569 F.3d at 1284. Contrary to Mr. Cooper's assertions, the evidence suppressed here does not provide an entirely new basis for impeachment. The suppressed evidence  which Mr. Cooper characterizes as showing that Mr. Gleason was executing an extensive scheme to defraud the government, Aplt. Opening Br. at 41  would provide an impeachment avenue by which to establish that Mr. Gleason is a liar and a tax cheat. But, as noted, Mr. Cooper concedes that he already was able to establish that [Mr. Gleason] testified falsely on direct about falsifications of his resume and about the substance of much of the [fraudulent] tax advice that he provided to Renaissance. Id. The evidence available to Mr. Cooper at trial and the suppressed evidence both impeach Mr. Gleason's credibility by suggesting that he is a dishonest person. Therefore, the suppressed evidence regarding Mr. Gleason would have insignificantly impact[ed] the degree of impeachment, and would have provided only marginal additional support for [the] defense. Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1174 (second alteration in original) (quoting Trujillo, 136 F.3d at 1394) (internal quotation marks omitted). This does not satisfy the materiality standard. The cases in which this court has found that a new basis for impeachment existed generally involved a much starker contrast between the available and suppressed impeachment evidence. In Robinson, the defendant was able to cross-examine a confidential informant on his criminal history, the payments he received from the [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)], and the ATF's intervention on his behalf following `scrape[s]' with the law, 583 F.3d at 1269 (second alteration in original), but the suppression of the confidential informant's medical records left the defendant unable to argue that the [confidential informant's] drug use, mental health problems, and use of prescription drugs at the time of trial affected his testimony, id. at 1273. In Nuckols, the suppressed evidence would have provided the defense with the opportunity to call into question whether [the witness] had a motive for his testimony and could also have been used to question whether [the witness] had a motive to goad Mr. Nuckols into waiving his right to counsel during the interrogation and confessing to the crime. 233 F.3d at 1267. Similarly, the Douglas court held that there was a reasonable probability the result of [the defendant's] trial would have been different if the defense had had the ability to impeach [the witness] with evidence of the deal the prosecution made in exchange for his testimony, where [the defendant's] counsel attempted to impeach [the witness] on the issue of his motive to testify, [but] was stonewalled by [the witness's] repeated denials of the existence of a deal. 560 F.3d at 1175. [8] In contrast, the relationship between the available and suppressed impeachment evidence here is similar to that in cases in which this court has concluded that the suppressed evidence was merely cumulative. In Trujillo, the government witness testified on direct examination [that] he had three prior felony convictions and was testifying against Mr. Trujillo as a result of a plea agreement ... [and] further admitted to using cocaine and being a car thief. 136 F.3d at 1394. We rejected Mr. Trujillo's argument that the suppressed evidence was of a different type and magnitude than that presented at trial because it contained statements inconsistent with [the witness's] trial testimony and went beyond the potential motive and bias implicit in [the witness's] plea agreement. Id. Although we acknowledge[d] [that] there may be a difference in the degree to which [the witness] could have been impeached [by the suppressed evidence] ..., we fail[ed] to see any meaningful difference in the type of impeachment evidence [that was] available to the defense. Id. The jury, we concluded, was well aware of [the witness's] criminal propensities and motive for testifying .... Id.; see United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 726, 730, 732-33 (10th Cir.1987) (concluding that suppressed evidence that the witness had been arrested was cumulative where he had seven felony convictions, and that testimony concerning whether certain payments were bribes was cumulative where checks were introduced into evidence and other witnesses testified on this issue). In this case, due to the impeachment evidence displayed at trial on cross-examination, the jury was well aware that Mr. Gleason was a dishonest person, and equally aware that he had been involved in fraudulent tax activity. Furthermore, as discussed infra, because Mr. Gleason's testimony was itself cumulative, he was not a critical witness for the prosecution. In the end, because the impeachment evidence was merely cumulative, we are not convinced that the government's suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of Mr. Cooper's trial. See Trammell v. McKune, 485 F.3d 546, 552 (10th Cir. 2007) (We need to be convinced only that `the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995))). Accordingly, we conclude that the impeachment evidence suppressed here was not material.