Opinion ID: 1319383
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Publication Defamatory ?

Text: Civil Code section 45 defines libel as a false and unprivileged publication by writing ... which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation. (Italics added.) (1) We have said that libel includes almost any language which, upon its face, has a natural tendency to injure a person's reputation. [Citations.] ( Forsher v. Bugliosi (1980) 26 Cal.3d 792, 803 [163 Cal. Rptr. 628, 608 P.2d 716].) Plaintiff has alleged causes of action for both libel per se and libel per quod. (2) A statement is libelous per se when on its face the words of the statement are of such a character as to be actionable without a showing of special damage. A libel per quod, on the other hand, requires that the injurious character or effect be established by allegation and proof. These definitions are embodied in Civil Code section 45a: A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof. Plaintiff contends alternatively that defendants' communications either were libelous on their face, without the necessity of further explanation, or were libelous upon consideration of extrinsic facts showing inducement, innuendo and colloquium. Further, plaintiff purports to state separate causes of action based upon each of the various letters defendants sent to plaintiff's patients. (3a) Without analyzing the differing contents of each letter, we have no difficulty in concluding that those letters which accused plaintiff of charging excessive fees or performing unnecessary work reasonably may be deemed defamatory under section 45. (4) We noted in Forsher, supra, in reviewing a trial court's order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, that our inquiry is not to determine if the communications may have an innocent meaning but rather to determine if the communication reasonably carries with it a defamatory meaning. [Citations.] (26 Cal.3d at p. 803.) (3b) So viewed, plaintiff's patients reasonably may have understood defendants' letters as accusing him of charging excessive fees or performing unnecessary dental work. Such accusations, if false and unprivileged, would be actionable tending, as they do, to injure plaintiff professionally. Indeed, plaintiff's complaint includes allegations that the patients involved either have not paid for plaintiff's services or have terminated their relationship with him because of the alleged defamation. Defendants assert, however, that their letters contain mere statements of opinion, not fact. (See Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 600-601 [131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425].) Although accusations of excessive fees or unnecessary work when made by laymen might indeed constitute mere opinion, similar accusations by professional dental plan administrators carry a ring of authenticity and reasonably might be understood as being based on fact. As we recently generalized, Where ... the allegedly libelous remarks could have been understood by the average reader in either sense, the issue must be left to the jury's determination. [Citation.] ( Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc. v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 672, 682 [150 Cal. Rptr. 258, 586 P.2d 572].) We conclude that plaintiff adequately alleged the publication of defamatory matter. Defendants appear to concede that if a defamatory publication was pleaded, plaintiff's action for interference with his economic relationships with his patients likewise would lie, based upon allegations of loss of former and prospective patients, unless defendants' publication was justified by reason of the privileged nature of that publication. (See A.F. Arnold & Co. v. Pacific Professional Ins., Inc. (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 710, 714 [104 Cal. Rptr. 96].) We turn now to a consideration of the privilege issue.