Opinion ID: 786582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jimenez Recio's Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: 46 In Recio I, we held that Jimenez Recio's counsel's failure to move for acquittal on the possession conviction following the first trial amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. We found the failure to move for acquittal on the possession count was so inadequate that it obviously denie [d] [Jimenez Recio] his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Recio I, 258 F.3d at 1074(quoting United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir.2000), in turn quoting United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.1992)). Furthermore, we held that the fact that Jimenez Recio was denied a new trial constitutes prejudice in its own right. Recio I, 258 F.3d at 1074. We now hold that although Jimenez Recio's counsel erred in failing to move for acquittal on the possession count, the fact that Jimenez Recio was denied a new trial no longer constitutes legally cognizable prejudice in its own right. 47 In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply a two-part test: First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.... Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 366, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993), the Supreme Court addressed whether counsel's failure to make an objection in a state criminal sentencing proceeding — an objection that would have been supported by a decision which subsequently was overruled — constitutes `prejudice' within the meaning of our decision in Strickland v. Washington.  The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial, and therefore, an analysis focusing solely on mere outcome determination, without attention to whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable, is defective. Id. at 368, 369, 113 S.Ct. 838. In other words, the court making the prejudice determination may not consider the effect of an objection it knows to be wholly meritless under current governing law, even if the objection might have been considered meritorious at the time of its omission. Id. at 374, 113 S.Ct. 838 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 48 Fretwell applies directly to the case at hand. In Recio I, we based our determination that Jimenez Recio's counsel's performance was prejudicial on the Cruz rule. The district court in the first trial granted Lopez-Meza a new trial on the possession count because of its omission of the Cruz rule, holding that the inclusion of a Pinkerton jury instruction created the possibility that the jury had convicted Lopez-Meza based on post-seizure involvement in the conspiracy. Our grant of Jimenez Recio's ineffective assistance claim in Recio I assumed that Jimenez Recio would have successfully raised the same claim as Lopez-Meza. However, applying post- Cruz conspiracy principles in hindsight, as Fretwell requires us to do, the inclusion of the Pinkerton instruction on the possession count alone cannot be said to have denied Jimenez Recio his fundamental right to a fair trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We can no longer say that Jimenez Recio's legal representation was so inadequate that it obviously denie[d] him his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Recio I, 258 F.3d at 1074. Jimenez Recio may have other grounds for claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, but these should be raised in habeas corpus proceedings. See Ross, 206 F.3d at 900.