Opinion ID: 3063726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lis Pendens1

Text: 1 As an initial matter, on appeal, Bohning points out that his plea agreement contained an appeal waiver and offers reasons why the waiver should not preclude his instant arguments. Bohning’s argument is unnecessary, as the appeal waiver contained in his plea agreement was a sentence appeal waiver and he does not now seek to appeal his sentence 2 In the indictment, the grand jury charged that Bohning must forfeit any property used to commit or promote the commission of the charged offenses. Bohning was appointed a federal public defender. The government filed a bill of particulars, indicating that it would seek forfeiture of Bohning’s residence. Accordingly, pursuant to Florida law, the government filed a notice of lis pendens on Bohning’s residence, notifying prospective buyers or recipients of the property that the government claimed an interest in the property. Subsequently, the property was sold, and the government filed a notice discharging the lis pendens and a motion to deposit the proceeds of the sale in the district court’s registry to await the disposition of the forfeiture proceedings. The district court granted the motion. Ultimately, at sentencing, the district court denied forfeiture of the residence. In United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 834, 837 (11th Cir. 1999), we considered and rejected the argument now raised by Bohning. In that case, the defendant argued that the government’s filing of a lis pendens on his only assets, two pieces of property, violated his Sixth Amendment right to use his assets to hire an attorney of his choice to represent him and his Fifth Amendment right to due process as a person with an interest in property it seized. Id. at 834. Specifically, as to the Fifth Amendment, the defendant argued that he was entitled to a “hearing 3 to determine whether the government had probable cause to demand forfeiture.” Id. With regard to the Sixth Amendment argument, we reasoned that, although a defendant has a right to hire counsel of his choice, he does not have a right to spend money not rightfully his to do so. Id. at 834-35 (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 631, 109 S.Ct. 2646, 2655, 105 L.Ed.2d 528 (1989) (rejecting an argument that the federal criminal forfeiture statute violated the Sixth Amendment by failing to provide an exception for assets a defendant would use to retain an attorney and reasoning that the government’s interest in “obtaining full recovery of all forfeitable assets . . . overrides any Sixth Amendment interest in permitting criminals to use assets adjudged forfeitable to pay for their defense”)). Assets “subject to forfeiture” do not rightfully belong to a defendant and, in that respect, are no different than stolen bank money seized by the government. Id. (citing United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir.1989) (“[T]he right to counsel of choice belongs solely to criminal defendants possessing legitimate, uncontested assets”)). With regard to the Fifth Amendment argument, we reasoned that, although a notice of lis pendens on a defendant’s property is constraining, making it virtually impossible to sell or mortgage the property because the interest of a purchaser or 4 mortgagee would be subject to the eventual outcome of the lawsuit, a lis pendens does not constitute a “seizure” because the defendant retains the “right to alienate the property.” Id. at 836. Therefore, a notice of lis pendens does not affect the defendant’s property interests “to an extent significant enough to implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 837. Given our reasoning in Register, Bohning did not have a right to use the proceeds of the sale of his residence to retain private counsel because the residence was subject to forfeiture and, therefore, not rightfully his. See Register, 182 F.3d at 834-35. That the district court ultimately denied forfeiture of the residence does not affect this conclusion. See id. at 834. Therefore, the government and district court did not violate Bohning’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. Also, Bohning was not entitled to a hearing with regard to the lis pendens on his residence, as it did not constitute a seizure. See id. at 836-37. Therefore, the district court did not violate Bohning’s Fifth Amendment right to due process. See id. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.