Opinion ID: 2575993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Restitution for Accident Damages

Text: ¶ 16 The authority to impose restitution in a juvenile case is purely statutory. State v. Hunotte, 69 Wash.App. 670, 674, 851 P.2d 694 (1993). RCW 13.40.190 authorizes joint and several responsibility for restitution for all participants in the crime to which the damages can be causally connected: the court shall require the respondent to make restitution to any persons who have suffered loss or damage as a result of the offense committed by the respondent .... If the respondent participated in the crime with another person or other persons, all such participants shall be jointly and severally responsible for the payment of restitution. RCW 13.40.190(1) (emphasis added). ¶ 17 We have already applied causation requirements to restitution. Restitution may be ordered only for losses incurred as a result of the precise offense charged. State v. Miszak, 69 Wash.App. 426, 428, 848 P.2d 1329 (1993). A restitution award must be based on a causal relationship between the offense charged and proved and the victim's losses or damages. State v. Johnson, 69 Wash.App. 189, 191, 847 P.2d 960 (1993). If, but for the criminal acts of the defendant, the victim would not have suffered the damages for which restitution is sought, a sufficient causal connection exists. State v. Landrum, 66 Wash.App. 791, 799, 832 P.2d 1359 (1992) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Blair, 56 Wash.App. 209, 214-16, 783 P.2d 102 (1989)). In determining whether a causal connection exists, we look to the underlying facts of the charged offense, not the name of the crime to which the defendant entered a plea. Id. (emphasis added) (citing State v. Harrington, 56 Wash.App. 176, 179-80, 782 P.2d 1101 (1989)). ¶ 18 The majority mischaracterizes these clear and direct holdings when it implies that no causal connection is required. Majority at 276. The majority does not even mention many of the cases cited above, choosing only to discuss the Landrum case. Landrum properly concluded that counseling expenses were a foreseeable result of fourth degree assault that included a sexual component. Landrum, 66 Wash.App. at 800, 832 P.2d 1359. But the Landrum court cited and relied upon extensive prior case law to conclude not that a court may look to the underlying facts of the offense charged, but rather that a court must look to such facts. See id. at 799-800, 832 P.2d 1359. ¶ 19 Here defendants pleaded guilty to taking a motor vehicle without permission (TMV). While the defendants did not actually take the vehicle, the TMV statute provided: Every person who shall without the permission of the owner or person entitled to the possession thereof intentionally take or drive away any automobile or motor vehicle whether propelled by steam, electricity, or internal combustion engine, the property of another, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and every person voluntarily riding in or upon said automobile or motor vehicle with knowledge of the fact that the same was unlawfully taken shall be equally guilty with the person taking or driving said automobile or motor vehicle and shall be deemed guilty of taking a motor vehicle without permission. Former RCW 9A.56.070(1) (1975). ¶ 20 Whether there is even but for causation in the present case sufficient to support the imposition of restitution first depends on the interpretation of the TMV statute. While the TMV statute does impose equal guilt upon an individual who rides in a vehicle he knows was stolen as upon the individual who himself stole the vehicle, the statute should be viewed as consisting of two separate ways to commit the crime of taking a motor vehicle. If the statute sets forth two ways to commit the charged crime, then Landrum and the cases cited therein require that we look to the underlying facts of the charged offense, not the name of the crime to which the defendant entered a plea. Landrum, 66 Wash.App. at 799, 832 P.2d 1359. One cannot logically conclude that the damage to the vehicle and the Les Schwab truck and building were causally connected to defendants' riding in the vehicle. ¶ 21 The Court of Appeals did not view the statute in this manner. The court stated: But for the taking of the motor vehicle without permission, none of the damage would have occurred. State v. Keigan C., 120 Wash.App. 604, 608, 86 P.3d 798 (2004). The court further concluded: While it is true that the act making the passenger culpable is riding in the car, it is not the only act constituting the charged offense. The earlier taking of the car by someone else is also an underlying fact of the offense charged against the passenger. Because the taker and the rider are culpable of the same offense involving the same vehicle, logically the rider can be held liable for the same damages as the taker. Id. ¶ 22 The majority adopts the Court of Appeals' construction. Majority at 276-77. But neither the majority nor the Court of Appeals cited authority for its construction of the TMV statute. The Court of Appeals' logic would appear to conflict with Landrum's requirement that the underlying facts of the criminal conduct be causally connected to the damage suffered by the victim. And if the TMV statute is viewed as containing multiple methods of committing the crime, [1] then the Court of Appeals' conclusions are tenuous at best. ¶ 23 While a vehicle must be taken for a rider to be charged with TMV, the rider  and the rider's conduct  is not the cause of the taking, and although as the Court of Appeals noted the taker and the rider are culpable of the same offense involving the same vehicle, Keigan C., 120 Wash.App. at 608, 86 P.3d 798, such culpability is not a synonym for causality. The majority substitutes the term guilty for culpable, majority at 277, but the argument is identical. The fact that both the rider and the taker are culpable or guilty of the same offense does not mean the underlying facts of the charged offense are the same, and if different, then under Landrum only those underlying facts that are causally connected to a victim's loss can be the basis of restitution. [2] ¶ 24 The Court of Appeals has also held that restitution cannot be imposed based on a defendant's `general scheme' or acts `connected with' the crime charged, when those acts are not part of the charge. State v. Dauenhauer, 103 Wash.App. 373, 378, 12 P.3d 661 (2000). While reckless driving and eluding a police officer may be connected with defendants' riding in the stolen vehicle, these acts were an independent, intervening cause of the car crash, and thus Dauenhauer bars imposition of restitution.