Opinion ID: 623659
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Disparities

Text: Another factor is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct[.] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). The sentencing guidelines already take into consideration Robinson's lack of significant criminal history and specific conduct in violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Yet his guidelines range was 78 to 97 months' imprisonment. As we articulated in Bistline, [w]e do not mean to imply that only a sentence in or around that range will avoid disparities with other similar defendants. But we do not see how the sentence imposed here avoids them. 665 F.3d at 767. At the sentencing hearing, the district court discussed several cases in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed sentences in child pornography cases that significantly varied from the guidelines. (R. 25 at 18-23.) The court noted that the cases involved distinguishing characteristics as to each individual and the decisions were distinguishable because the individual[s] involved [were] much more active in either creating or distributing the material. (R. 25 at 16, 21.) However, as we have stated before: [It] is not logical to justify a more lenient sentence on the basis that [the defendant] did not make or distribute child pornography or molest a child. Just as the federal sentencing laws impose greater sentences upon sellers of controlled substances than upon those who are caught possessing such substances. . . the federal child sexual offense laws do so as well. Indeed, the Sentencing Guidelines take into account only the criminal conduct of which [the defendant] was charged. United States v. Camiscione, 591 F.3d 823, 834 (6th Cir.2010). We note that the sentencing guidelines relating to child pornography have generated much controversy and are currently under review by the Sentencing Commission. This case is grimly typical in a number of aspects which enhanced the offense level under the guidelines. Robinson was assessed two extra levels for use of a computer, which now occurs in almost every case. Enhancements to the base offense level are meant to increase a sentence for conduct more aggravated than the typical type of offense, making this guideline an anomaly. In Robinson's case, he was assessed six additional levels because the visual conduct included depictions of prepubescent children being subjected to rape and sadomasochistic or violent conduct. These enhancements have received far less criticism than that of using a computer. Perhaps the most criticized enhancement involves the number of child pornography images possessed by a defendant. In this case, Robinson was assessed five levels because the offense involved more than 600 images. In a number of offense guidelines, amounts involved in criminal conduct are used to adjust the guidelines range by adding points to the base offense level; e.g., drug quantities in § 2D1.1, amount of loss in § 2B1.1; number of firearms in § 2K2.1. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual §§ 2D1.1, 2B1.1, 2K2.1 (2011). In many cases, the extent and degree of criminal conduct bears a relationship to such quantifiable measurements. [3] In the computer age, we have some doubt that the number of pictures alone captures the gravity of the crime of possession of child pornography. A defendant who knowingly shares files containing child pornography does not necessarily know the number to be received. A saver of files, who has viewed and traded as many images as a non-saver of files, is subjected to a far greater sentencing guidelines range. These issues bear upon the facts in this case. While this Court is not tasked with crafting sentencing guidelines or randomly critiquing the work of the Sentencing Commission, it is noteworthy that Robinson acquired a large number of images of child pornography over a five-year period. This fact seems much more appropriate to a sentencing enhancement under the guidelines than a large number of images, all of which could have been downloaded on a single day. Robinson paid money for some of the images and engaged in the criminal conduct over a long period of time, all of which are factors to be considered at sentencing. In sum, while aspects of the sentencing guidelines for child pornography have generated substantial controversy, two enhancements particular to this case make the conduct of the defendant more aggravating. We pause to explain why our decision in this case is not controlled by our decisions in United States v. Stall, 581 F.3d 276 (6th Cir.2009) and United States v. Prisel, 316 Fed.Appx. 377 (6th Cir.2008), where we considered whether one-day sentences of imprisonment for possession of child pornography were substantively reasonable. In both cases, we affirmed the sentences under the more stringent plain-error standard of review. The sentences imposed in those cases, however, were more severe than Robinson's sentence. The sentences in Stall and Prisel imposed very restrictive conditions as part of the defendants' supervised release, as well as significant fines. See Stall, 581 F.3d at 281 (affirming, under plain-error review, sentence of one day of imprisonment, ten years of supervised release, the first year of which was under home confinement, and $5,000 fine for possession of eighteen images of child pornography, where applicable guidelines range was 57 to 71 months); Prisel, 316 Fed.Appx. at 380 (affirming, under plain-error review, sentence of one day of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, the first eighteen months of which were under home confinement with electronic monitoring, and a $6,000 fine for possession of 1,189 images and five digital movies containing child pornography, where applicable guidelines range was 27 to 33 months). Unlike the facts in Stall, here, the district court did not conduct an extensive analysis of how a [five-year] term of supervised release would restrict [the defendant's] freedom and protect the public or explain why the district court believed this sentence will deter similar offenders and why this case warranted a variance. 581 F.3d at 287. Although the courts in Stall and Prisel rejected the applicable guidelines ranges, they nevertheless sentenced the defendants to lengthy periods of supervised releaseperiods of which required home confinementand substantial fines. Robinson's sentence of one day of imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release under a recommended guidelines range of 78 to 97 months' imprisonment for possessing 7100 images of child pornography does not begin to approach the severity of the sentences imposed in Stall or Prisel. Ultimately, the factors that the district court relied on, as articulated in the record, do not justify a variance of this size. Accordingly, we find the variance here to be substantively unreasonable based on the current record. [W]e recognize that our substantive review of sentences is deferential. . . [e]ven so, the sentence in this case can withstand review only if deference amounts to abdication[.] United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir.2010) (en banc).