Opinion ID: 2754957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Olugbenga Adeniran

Text: Adeniran argues the government failed to prove the existence of a single conspiracy to commit bank fraud. He asserts the nature of the activities involved in this case shows there were two conspiracies: the one in which he participated, involving the use of fraudulent credit cards to get cash advances and gift cards; and the other, involving the opening of fraudulent bank accounts for the purpose of depositing, and then cashing, stolen and fraudulent checks. He notes that his use of fraudulent credit cards occurred solely in Minnesota during a two-month period, while the conspiracy involving the fraudulent bank accounts was a multi-state endeavor that spanned from 2006 to March 2011. He asserts the variance between the government’s indictment—which alleged a single conspiracy—and the evidence at trial—which, he asserts, proved two or more conspiracies—infringed on his substantial rights. Adeniran notes that he did not know many of the people involved in the overall conspiracy, including Okeayainneh, and few people knew him. “Whether a given case involves single or multiple conspiracies depends on whether there was one overall agreement to perform various functions to achieve the objective of the conspiracy.” United States v. Radtke, 415 F.3d 826, 838 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). We look at the totality of the circumstances, and “because it is a question of fact, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict.” Id. Adeniran’s arguments are well-taken, but he overlooks several key points. First, “to be guilty of a single conspiracy, the conspirators need not know each other or be privy to the details of each enterprise comprising the conspiracy as long as the evidence is sufficient to show that each defendant possessed full knowledge of the -21- conspiracy’s general purpose and scope.” United States v. Chantharath, 705 F.3d 295, 301–02 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “That the conspirators entered the conspiracy at different times and played discrete roles does not compel a finding of multiple conspiracies.” United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 881 (8th Cir. 2007). It is sufficient that there was an agreement to commit bank fraud, that Adeniran knew of the agreement, and that he intentionally joined in the agreement. Morris, 723 F.3d at 939–40 (quotation omitted). “A single conspiracy may exist even if the participants and their activities change over time and even if many participants were unaware of, or uninvolved in, some the transactions. Further, the agreement need not be explicit, but may be tacit, based upon the actions of the defendant.” United States v. Ramon-Rodriguez, 492 F.3d 930, 941 (8th Cir. 2007). Adeniran may have known a relatively small number of fellow conspirators, but that fact alone does not support a finding of multiple conspiracies. Second, the ultimate “objective of the conspiracy” in this case was to commit bank fraud by various means. As the government notes, the indictment alleged that the purpose of the conspiracy to commit bank fraud “was to obtain and use means of identification of other persons to create false bank and credit card accounts” and “to obtain money and merchandise through the use of fraudulently obtained bank account information, credit cards, and counterfeit checks.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, based on the evidence presented at trial, Adeniran had regular contact with others who were involved in both the credit card and the bank account aspects of the conspiracy—further supporting the conclusion that he understood the purpose and scope of the conspiracy. For example, evidence showed that Coker recruited people to help open fraudulent bank accounts; Adejumo, too, was involved in the fraudulent bank account aspect of the bank fraud. Adeniran was connected to both of these men. Coker was in the car with Adeniran on January 7, 2010, at Southdale Center shortly before Adeniran’s arrest, and Coker continued to use the same counterfeit credit card Adeniran had used that led to his arrest. Telephone records also linked Adeniran to both Adejumo and Coker, active members of the bank-fraud -22- conspiracy, during the relevant time period.6 Other witnesses also testified that Adeniran had knowledge of the bank-account aspect of the conspiracy. Cooperating co-defendant Borode Akinropo heard Adeniran discuss opening fraudulent bank accounts and depositing stolen checks for later withdrawal with both Coker and Adejumo. Cooperating co-defendant Jude Okafor overheard Adeniran, Coker, and Adejumo discussing how to open fraudulent bank accounts for the purpose of committing bank fraud. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict, the evidence supported a finding of a single conspiracy with one “general purpose and scope.” In this case, the jury could reasonably find that Adeniran knew of the agreement to commit fraud and that he intentionally agreed with at least Coker and Adejumo to join the agreement, largely through the use of counterfeit and stolen credit cards and fraudulent identification documents. See Morris, 723 F.3d at 939.
Adeniran asserts the district court erred when it determined his “offense otherwise involved sophisticated means.” Section 2B1.1(b)(10) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a 2-level enhancement for using “sophisticated means” in a fraudulent scheme. United States v. Kieffer, 621 F.3d 825, 835 (8th Cir. 2010). “[S]ophisticated means” consists of “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10) cmt. n.9(B). The enhancement applies “when the offense conduct, viewed as a whole, was notably more intricate than that of the garden-variety [offense].” United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation 6 Records showed 321 telephone calls between numbers associated with Adeniran and Adejumo from November 4, 2009, to January 7, 2010, and 178 telephone calls between numbers associated with Adeniran and Coker from November 19, 2009, to January 13, 2010. -23- omitted). The enhancement may be appropriate when a defendant’s scheme “did not involve a single fraudulent act, but a complex series of fraudulent transactions.” Kieffer, 621 F.3d at 835 (quotation omitted). The factual finding that a scheme qualifies as “sophisticated” is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Huston, 744 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). Contrary to Adeniran’s assertions, his offense was not a simple, straightforward enterprise such as stealing a credit card out of a mailbox and using it to purchase gift cards or get cash advances. See United States v. Hance, 501 F.3d 900, 909 (8th Cir. 2007). Evidence at trial showed that he used multiple stolen credit cards diverted from their true owners by others in the conspiracy. When arrested, he was in possession of three stolen credit cards and corresponding identification documents, specifically created with his picture on them. In addition, he had handwritten notes with personal information about the people whose credit cards had been stolen, which he used when obtaining cash advances and gift cards. Adeniran’s conduct was complex—including obtaining identification documents to match the stolen credit cards—and it was repetitive in nature. Adeniran also benefitted from his co-conspirator’s activities in rerouting the credit cards and creating fake identification documents to assist him in his credit-card scheme. See United States v. Pizano, 421 F.3d 707, 734 (8th Cir. 2005). We cannot say the district court clearly erred when imposing this enhancement. Adeniran next asserts the district court improperly applied a 3-level enhancement for being a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity involving five or more participants. See USSG § 3B1.1(b). Adeniran does not dispute that more than five people participated in the conspiracy; rather, he contests the role he played in the conspiracy. The government argues Adeniran’s phone calls with Coker and Adejumo—both classified by the government as high-level members of the conspiracy—demonstrate that he was likewise a manager or supervisor. The government asserts Adeniran’s calls from the jail to Adejumo and Coker indicate Adeniran was quite concerned that the handwritten notes seized from him at the time -24- of his arrest could compromise the ongoing bank-fraud conspiracy, and that a “mere foot soldier would not be expected to possess” such documents.7 “The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the aggravating role offense is warranted.” United States v. Gaines, 639 F.3d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 2011). “The district court’s factual findings, including its determination of a defendant’s role in the offense, are reviewed for clear error, while its application of the guidelines to the facts is reviewed de novo.” Id. at 427–28 (quotation omitted). We broadly define what constitutes evidence sufficient to support an aggravating role enhancement. Despite the breadth of our definition, however, “[w]e have always required evidence that the defendant directed or procured the aid of underlings.” United States v. Irlmeier, 750 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Rowley, 975 F.2d 1357, 1364 n.7 (8th Cir. 1992)). “To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants.” Irlmeier, 750 F.3d at 763 (quoting USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2). In this case, the evidence is simply insufficient. The district court relied on the trial testimony of co-defendants Okwuchukwu Jidoefor, Kabaso Manda and Jude Okafor and the presence of Adeniran’s photos in Okeayainneh’s storage locker to support its finding that Adeniran played a managerial role in the conspiracy. Neither Jidoefor, Manda, nor Okafor testified that Adeniran recruited them, planned or organized their criminal activity, or exercised any decision-making authority over 7 Okeayainneh also supplied Grigsby, Thomas, and Bryntensen with the names, birth dates, social security numbers, and phone numbers of the people they impersonated when opening business bank accounts. A notebook containing similar information was found in Grigsby’s purse when she was arrested. The government has never alleged Grigsby or Bryntensen was anything but what it terms a “foot soldier,” and Thomas was not indicted. -25- their participation in the bank-fraud scheme. Jidoefor, one of Coker’s close associates, saw Adeniran only once. Jidoefor did not speak to Adeniran and was not introduced to him. Manda testified he was recruited into the conspiracy by his friend “Chris,” who paid for his flight to Minnesota. It was not until the day after his arrival that Manda met “the man from New York”—whom he identified as Adeniran—at Adejumo’s house. While Manda went with Adejumo to various banks to get cash using fraudulent documents, Adeniran “did his own thing.” Finally, although Okafor pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting Adeniran from November to December 2009 by allowing Adeniran and others to meet at his shop, he conceded on cross examination that Adeniran came to his shop only once and never discussed credit-card fraud with him. The one time Adeniran was in the shop, Okafor testified, he offered to let Adeniran work in exchange for food because Adeniran had no money. The mere presence of Adeniran’s photo in the storage locker, where numerous and varied forms of identification also were located, does nothing to suggest a leadership role in the conspiracy. Likewise, phone calls to managers in the conspiracy, without more, does not mean Adeniran is necessarily a manager as well; and concern for the success of the conspiracy is likely to be a sentiment shared by all conscientious participants. The evidence in this case does not support a finding that Adeniran was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of any other person in the conspiracy, and it was error to impose a 3-level enhancement pursuant to USSG § 3B1.1(b). Finally, Adeniran argues the district court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines definition of “relevant conduct” in determining his sentence for the conspiracy conviction. Relevant conduct is determined under the Guidelines based on a defendant’s own acts and, in the case of jointly undertaken activity,“all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). “Actions are reasonably foreseeable to a defendant when they fall within the scope of the agreement between the defendant and the co-conspirators.” United States v. Hodge, 594 F.3d 614, 620 -26- (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Casares–Cardenas, 14 F.3d 1283, 1288 (8th Cir. 1994)). Adeniran argues he should be held accountable for only the loss amount and number of victims directly attributable to his use of fraudulent credit cards to obtain cash advances or buy gift cards in the Minneapolis metro area from November 2009 to January 2010. Based solely on the substantive counts on which he was convicted, according to Adeniran, the loss is $122,175 with a total of four victims. He contends the district court erred because the amount of loss and number of victims attributed to Okeayainneh—an intended loss of over $50 million and more than 250 victims—was not part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity in which he agreed to participate and was not reasonably foreseeable to him. “We review the district court’s findings as to scope of the defendant’s undertaking, foreseeability to the defendant, and furtherance of the conspiracy for clear error.” United States v. Spotted Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 677 (8th Cir. 2008). We review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo. Id. “[A] defendant’s conviction for conspiracy does not automatically mean that [he] has foreseen the [total amount of bank fraud] involved in the entire conspiracy.” Id. at 674. In determining the individual defendant’s relevant conduct, the district court must look at what the individual has agreed to do and whether the actions of others in the conspiracy were foreseeable from his vantage point. Id. Ample evidence supports Adeniran’s involvement in the charged conspiracy from November 2009 to his January 7, 2010, arrest. Lacking in the record, however, is any evidence of Adeniran’s involvement in the conspiracy before or after these dates. “The commentary to § 1B1.3 expressly states that conduct of the other conspirators that occurred before the defendant joined the conspiracy is ordinarily not ‘relevant conduct,’ comment. (n.2), and we have reasoned from this exclusion that a person should also not be held responsible for the losses that occur after he exits the conspiracy.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Guidelines require an individualized -27- assessment of Adeniran’s criminal undertaking, and being convicted on the same charge as a co-defendant—here, Okeayainneh—does not necessarily equate to a calculation of the same offense level. Okeayainneh’s offense level was calculated based on his participation in nearly all aspects of the conspiracy to commit bank fraud over a substantial period of time. As we have concluded, the record supports the district court’s findings that a loss of at least $50 million and involvement of at least 250 victims were reasonably foreseeable to Okeayainneh. In contrast, based on the evidence presented at trial, Adeniran was significantly less involved in the conspiracy in scope and time. On appeal, the government argues “[t]he district court concluded that the entire intended loss amount should be attributable to Adeniran as relevant conduct because ‘Adeniran had a managerial role in the conspiracy.’” But as we concluded previously, the evidence does not support a finding that Adeniran was a manager for purposes of the enhancement. The district court improperly inferred from that enhancement the amount of loss and number of victims reasonably foreseeable to Adeniran. After removing that inference, there is insufficient evidence to support the district court’s findings regarding Adeniran’s plans in connection with the conspiracy and what was foreseeable to him. Because of this, we conclude the district court clearly erred in finding Adeniran was responsible for at least $50 million in loss and at least 250 victims. We leave to the district court on remand to make the individualized determination of what was reasonably foreseeable to Adeniran for purposes of these enhancements.