Opinion ID: 1961489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Provision for Changed Circumstances

Text: As a practical matter, spousal agreements have great potential for ensuring the desired degree of stability in support arrangements. See, e.g., Petersen v. Petersen, 172 N.J. Super. 304 (App.Div. 1980); DeGraaff v. DeGraaff, 163 N.J. Super. 578 (App.Div. 1978). Such agreements have traditionally been more comprehensive and particularized than court orders, and thus more carefully tailored to the peculiar circumstances of the parties' lives. [7] In view of the current economic conditions and the changing social structure of the family  particularly with regard to women's roles, cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed. 2d 306 (1979)  courts, too, should make greater efforts to provide in advance for change. This would enhance the stability of judicially fashioned arrangements and make unnecessary a return to court. The power to distribute property equitably should be exercised to relieve the strain of total reliance on support payments for financial security. See Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229 (1974); see also Smith, 72 N.J. at 360; Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 218 (1974). Courts have refused to consider an alimony award in isolation; the earnings received from investments funded by an equitable distribution award have been considered when determining the adequacy of the dependent spouse's income. Esposito v. Esposito, 158 N.J. Super. 285, 300 (App.Div. 1978). As a result of the equitable distribution plaintiff will have available a substantial capital fund to invest in order to produce additional income. Lavene v. Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. at 203. A closer look should also be taken at the supported spouse's ability to contribute to his or her own maintenance, both at the time of the original judgment and on applications for modification. [8] The fact that our State's alimony and support statute is phrased without reference to gender, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, will accomplish little if judicial decision making continues to employ sexist stereotypes. The extent of actual economic dependency, not one's status as a wife, must determine the duration of support as well as its amount. See Lavene, 162 N.J. Super. at 203; Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313 (Ch.Div. 1978) (court reviewed purpose of alimony and, based on the equitable distribution award and the wife's anticipated earning capacity, awarded alimony only for 18 months). [9] Not only the realities of the marketplace, but also the constitutional guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, compels this approach. It is no longer permissible to ground the law of domestic relations in the `old notio[n]' that `generally it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials.' Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 279-280, 99 S.Ct. at 1112, 59 L.Ed. 2d at 319 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1375, 43 L.Ed. 2d 688, 692 (1975)). No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280, 99 S.Ct. at 1112, 59 L.Ed. 2d at 319 (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14-15, 95 S.Ct. at 1377-1378); see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 692, 700 n. 17, 42 L.Ed. 2d 690 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198, 97 S.Ct. 451, 457, 50 L.Ed. 2d 397 (1976). The law must be concerned with the economic realities of contemporary married life, not a model of domestic relations that provided women with security in exchange for economic dependence and discrimination. This does not mean that relative economic dependence  when proven  is irrelevant to the determination of support obligations. But a court of equity cannot rely on antiquated presumptions; gender is no longer a permissible proxy for economic need. See Orr, 440 U.S. at 281, 99 S.Ct. at 1112, 59 L.Ed. 2d at 320. The need for support must be assessed with a view towards the earning capacity of the individual woman in the marketplace. Careful consideration of all these factors at the time of divorce and at the time modification is sought will eventually reduce the necessity for otherwise well-founded postjudgment applications. It may also lessen the need for plenary hearings on modification motions. We are confident that any increased expenditure of judicial time necessitated by this expanded inquiry will be more than offset by savings from a reduced need for modification hearings.