Opinion ID: 3030701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Decision “In Writing”

Text: [1] Under the Telecommunications Act, “[a]ny decision by a State or local government . . . to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). In the proceedings below, the district court ruled that the Board’s decision was adequately “in writing” under the TCA and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on this issue. 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. MetroPCS now appeals this ruling and moves for summary judgment. The TCA’s simple directive that all local zoning decisions adverse to wireless service providers be “in writing” seems clear enough, and the City’s five-page written decision overturning the grant of MetroPCS’s CUP certainly qualifies as “in writing” under any colloquial or common-sense understanding of that term. (See Board Decision, ER 12, Exh. 5.) However, while the plain meaning of the TCA’s text supports the district court’s ruling, the circuits are split in their interpretations of the “in writing” requirement, and this Circuit has yet to take an authoritative position on the issue. See New Par v. City of Saginaw, 301 F.3d 390, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting the split and outlining the various interpretations); S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd, 244 F.3d 51, 59 (1st Cir. 2001) (giving a summary of the different interpretations). At one interpretive extreme, some courts have required that local governments explicate the reasons for their decision and link their conclusions to specific evidence in the written record. See, e.g., Omnipoint Communications, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 83 F. Supp. 2d 306, 309 (D. Conn. 2000) (“A local zoning authority must issue a decision in writing setting forth the reasons for the decision and linking its conclusions to evidence in the record.”) (citations omitted); Cellco P’ship v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm’n, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184 (D. Conn. 1998) (similar standard); Ill. RSA No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732, 743 (C.D. Ill. METROPCS, INC. v. SAN FRANCISCO 2719 1997) (same). The rationale for this approach is that anything short of this standard “ ‘places the burden on [the] Court to wade through the record below’ ” in order to determine the decision’s reasoning and assess its evidentiary support. Omnipoint, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (quoting Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Zoning Comm’n, 995 F. Supp. 52, 57 (D. Conn. 1998)). At the other end of the spectrum lies the Fourth Circuit, which has applied a strict textualist approach to hold that merely stamping the word “DENIED” on a zoning permit application is sufficient to meet the TCA’s “in writing” requirement. AT & T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City Council, 155 F.3d 423, 429 (4th Cir. 1998); see also AT & T Wireless PCS v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment, 172 F.3d 307, 312-13 (4th Cir. 1999). According to the Fourth Circuit, the bare language of the TCA requires nothing more, and so adhering to a more stringent standard would involve “importing additional language into the statute.” AT & T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 429. [2] The First and Sixth Circuits have charted a middle course, requiring local governments to “issue a written denial separate from the written record” which “contain[s] a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the . . . denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons.” Todd, 244 F.3d at 60; Saginaw, 301 F.3d at 395-96 (adopting the Todd standard). This approach attempts a compromise between the demands of strict textualism and the requirements of more pragmatic policy values. The Todd court observed that while the statutory language of the TCA does not explicitly require detailed findings of fact or conclusions of law, and while local zoning boards are often staffed with laypersons ill-equipped to draft complex legal decisions, written decisions must be robust enough to facilitate meaningful judicial review. See Todd, 244 F.3d at 59-60. In the proceeding below, the district court ultimately chose to apply the Todd standard and held that the Board’s written 2720 METROPCS, INC. v. SAN FRANCISCO denial of MetroPCS’s CUP application was adequate as a decision “in writing” under this standard. 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1009. The district court asserted that the Todd standard best “reconciles both the statutory language and Congressional intent of the ‘in writing’ requirement” and held that, in accordance with Todd, the City “has issued a written denial separate from the written record . . . which summarizes the proceedings, articulates the reasons it rejected MetroPCS’[s] application, and provides sufficient information for judicial review in conjunction with the written record.” Id. We agree with the district court that the Todd standard ultimately strikes the most reasonable balance between the text of the Act and the practical demands of meaningful judicial review. While the bare language of the Act may not require more than the briefest written disposition, it also does not compel a strictly minimalist construction, and the purposes of the “in writing” requirement would be ill-served by allowing local zoning authorities to issue the kind of opaque, unelaborated ruling approved by the Fourth Circuit in AT & T Wireless v. City Council. Indeed such a minimalist approach is in direct tension with the Act’s requirement — discussed more fully in the next section — that all local zoning decisions be supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). If such an evidentiary review is to be undertaken at all, courts must at least be able to ascertain the basis of the zoning decision at issue; only then can they accurately assess the evidentiary support it finds in the written record. Therefore, the zoning decision must be sufficiently elaborated to permit this assessment. [3] Similarly, the text of the TCA does not compel the more demanding standard outlined in Omnipoint, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 309, and we find persuasive the Todd court’s observation that such a standard might place an unduly heavy burden on lay zoning boards. As a general matter, we see no reason to insist upon a standard more exacting than is required to facilitate meaningful judicial review. We therefore adopt the Todd stanMETROPCS, INC. v. SAN FRANCISCO 2721 dard and hold that the TCA requires local zoning authorities to issue a written decision separate from the written record which contains sufficient explanation of the reasons for the decision to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting those reasons. [4] As to the merits of the case at bar, we are persuaded that the district court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim under the Todd standard. As the district court correctly noted, the Board of Supervisors issued a five-page written decision, separate from the record, which summarized the facts of the dispute, recounted the proceedings it conducted, articulated its reasons for overturning the Commission’s grant of the CUP and explained the evidentiary basis for its ruling. Whatever else might be said about the decision or its reasoning, it does contain sufficient explanation to enable judicial evaluation of the evidentiary support for its rationale. In fact MetroPCS itself devotes many pages of its brief to discussing and critiquing the decision’s reasoning and evidentiary support.2 [5] In light of all these considerations, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was properly “in writing” under § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) of the TCA. 2 Incidentally, we believe that the Board’s decision would arguably pass muster under any of the aforementioned legal standards. It easily passes the Fourth Circuit’s test, under which merely stamping the application “DENIED” is sufficient. AT & T Wireless, 155 F.3d at 429. And with regard to the more stringent test outlined in Omnipoint and its ilk, the Board’s decision “[sets] forth the reasons for the decision” and does at least a passable job of “linking its conclusions to evidence in the record.” Omnipoint, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 309. While the Board’s decision is phrased in somewhat general terms, it does make reference to “the record,” recounts the testimony offered during its hearing on the issue, articulates its findings and discusses its objections to many of the specific findings of the Planning Commission. Thus although the decision does not offer formal findings of fact and conclusions of law as a full-blown judicial decision might, it is not clear that the Omnipoint standard demands such rigor. 2722 METROPCS, INC. v. SAN FRANCISCO