Opinion ID: 1678545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: preventive procedure

Text: As a condition for admissibility of a defendant's impeaching conviction, the State must satisfy the 10-year prerequisite under Neb.Evid.R. 609(2). However, a problem exists as soon as a prosecutor asks: Have you, defendant, been convicted of a felony during the last 10 years? If the defendant responds no, a jury might wonder whether the defendant was convicted more than 10 years ago. Such speculation by a jury is unnecessary and undesirable. A similar problem is created when a prosecutor inquiries: During the last 10 years, have you been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement? What is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement? The determination whether a crime involves dishonesty or false statement depends on the law of the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted. What if the defendant has been convicted in a jurisdiction other than Nebraska? Requiring a defendant to correctly classify a crime in the context of Neb.Evid.R. 609 necessarily demands a defendant's accurate knowledge of criminal law pertaining to the defendant's conviction, including knowledge of statutory definitions and judicial opinions construing criminal statutes. Also, regarding impeachment, there is the inadmissibility of a conviction which is the subject of a pardon, see Neb.Evid.R. 609(3), or a conviction from which an appeal is pending, see Neb. Evid.R. 609(5). Apart from evidential aspects of Neb.Evid.R. 609, consideration must be given to professional ethics for lawyers as prosecutors. See State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47, 57, 395 N.W.2d 551, 558 (1986): `In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: (1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.' (Quoting from Canon 7, DR 7-106(C)(1) of the Code of Professional Responsibility.) Generally the question of which convictions will be usable to attack credibility should be determined prior to trial. Counsel need to know what the ruling will be on this important matter so that they can make appropriate tactical decisions. For example, the opening of defense counsel or the decision of the defendant to take the stand may be affected. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 609[05] at 609-95 to 609-96 (1988). As expressly required by Neb. Evid.R. 104(3) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-104(3) (Reissue 1985)), a hearing on preliminary matters concerning admissibility of evidence shall be conducted when the interests of justice require, or when a defendant is a witness, if the defendant so requests. Regarding a prosecutor's contemplated use of a known conviction to impeach the defendant, it is preferable that the hearing pursuant to Neb.Evid.R. 104(3) occur before trial at the request of the State or the defendant and provide the court with pretrial information regarding prospective evidence of the defendant's prior conviction. As a source of information quite likely to be prejudicial to a defendant and a source of inadmissible evidence, the hearing pursuant to Neb.Evid.R. 104 to determine admissibility of a defendant's prior conviction, sought to be used for impeachment in accordance with Neb.Evid.R. 609, is conducted on the record but outside the jury's presence. Thus, whether a defendant's prior conviction is admissible for the defendant's impeachment pursuant to Neb. Evid.R. 609 is a preliminary question of admissibility to be determined in accordance with Neb.Evid.R. 104(3). If there is no constitutional impediment to using a defendant's prior conviction for impeachment, see Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972), the trial court, as a result of the suggested hearing under Neb.Evid.R. 104, will be able to ascertain the admissibility of a defendant's prior conviction for impeachment in accordance with Neb.Evid.R. 609. If the court determines that the defendant's conviction is inadmissible under Neb.Evid.R. 609, the State, in the jury's presence, is not permitted to initiate interrogation directed at the defendant's conviction or offer any public record of the defendant's conviction. However, if the court determines that Neb. Evid.R. 609 allows admitting evidence of the defendant's conviction for impeachment, the prosecutor, in the jury's presence, may then inquire whether the defendant has been convicted of a crime particularized in Neb.Evid.R. 609(1), but shall not name or identify the crime in the defendant's conviction and shall not inquire into details surrounding the crime underlying the conviction used for impeachment. The prosecutor may also inquire into the number of times a defendant has been convicted during the last 10 years, provided the convictions have been determined to be admissible under Neb.Evid.R. 609. A defendant's denial of a prior conviction, which the court has determined to be admissible under Neb.Evid.R. 609, may result in the State's introduction of the appropriate public record of the defendant's prior conviction. See, State v. Caradori, 199 Neb. 691, 260 N.W.2d 617 (1977); Latham v. State, 152 Neb. 113, 40 N.W.2d 522 (1949). The foregoing procedure for criminal cases should foster recognition of the boundaries for admissibility of a prior conviction to impeach a defendant pursuant to Neb.Evid.R. 609, reduce the opportunity for misuse of a conviction to impeach a defendant, and enable a defendant to make a better informed decision whether to take the stand in the face of potentially impeaching evidence in the form of a prior conviction. Adherence to the suggested procedure is not a prerequisite to admissibility of evidence authorized by Neb.Evid. R. 609. Rather, the suggested procedure appears to be a practicable measure which may be an ounce of prevention at the trial level, obviating a pound of appellate cure and a ton of mistrials and retrials on account of improper impeachment from contravention of Neb.Evid.R. 609. Because cross-examination of Olsan went beyond the scope of inquiry allowed under Neb.Evid.R. 609, the district court's admitting evidence concerning the number of Olsan's escape convictions prejudiced Olsan's right to a fair trial and, consequently, constituted reversible error, not harmless error. We must, therefore, reverse the convictions of Olsan and remand this matter for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.