Opinion ID: 549855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: deciding the four cases

Text: 85 Our conclusion that the district court's order dismissing the litigation remained potentially subject to appeal by the Secretary to challenge the earlier, adverse remand order is sufficient to dispose of the issues in Parker, Grimes, and Cohen. In each of these three cases, the magistrate's recommendation as adopted by the district court contained one or more rulings adverse to the litigating position of the Secretary. Because the law in this circuit prohibited the Secretary from immediately appealing those remand orders, it remained unclear whether the Secretary would seek appellate review of those orders once a final decision had been issued by the district court. Given that the Secretary gave no clear indication that he would not file appeals, the district court's dismissal orders remained potentially subject to appeal until the time for filing an appeal expired--sixty days after the district court's orders were filed. At that point, the district court's orders became final under the EAJA, and the claimants had an additional thirty days in which to file their applications for attorney's fees. Parker, Grimes, and Cohen each filed their petitions for fees within this remaining thirty-day period. Consequently, the fee petitions were timely filed. 86 Because the Myers remand order stands in a different posture from the remand orders in Parker, Grimes, and Cohen, it must be addressed separately. In contrast to the contested remand orders in the latter three cases, the Secretary in Myers concurred with Myers's motion for a remand. Additionally, the Secretary admitted error and represented to the court that he would award Myers the full amount of disability benefits requested on remand. 87 At no point in the proceedings before the district court did the court issue a ruling adverse to the Secretary. As a result, the Secretary possessed no grounds for filing an appeal of any district court order. The Secretary clearly conceded that his earlier decision denying benefits was erroneous and that he intended to award Myers full benefits. On remand, the Secretary remained true to his word. 88 Thus, at the time the district court entered its post-remand final judgment dismissing the litigation, Myers had full knowledge that the Secretary's decision to award full benefits was wholly volitional and was not reached in an attempt to comply with an adverse order of the district court. Without any compulsion or coercion from the district court, the Secretary fully acquiesced in Myers's claim that she was entitled to receive benefits from May 2, 1986. 89 For all practical purposes, therefore, the situation in this case is functionally analogous to the situation in which the parties reach a settlement on all issues. The legislative history of the EAJA indicates that the thirty-day time period commences when a case is dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement. When the district court dismissed Myers's case following the remand proceedings, this was the equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to a settlement agreement. Our holding in Myers easily falls within the exception to the general rule that the thirty-day time period will commence when the sixty-day time for appeal expires. We conclude that the government provided clear and unequivocal notice to Myers that it would not appeal. Under these special circumstances, Myers had ample knowledge that the Secretary could not and would not be appealing. As a result, we conclude that Myers's application for fees, filed more than thirty days after the district court's final order dismissing the case, was untimely. Cf. Dunn v. United States, 775 F.2d 99, 105 (3d Cir.1985) (filing of uncontested consent judgment was final, nonappealable under the EAJA when no party opposed or was aggrieved by the judgment; hence, neither side could appeal it); contra LaManna v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 651 F.Supp. 373 (N.D.N.Y.1987). 90 In sum, we conclude that the fee petitions filed by Parker, Grimes, and Cohen were timely filed and that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petitions. Accordingly, we REVERSE the contrary judgments of the district court in these three cases. Because we conclude that the application for attorney's fees filed by Myers, however, was not within the EAJA's time constraints, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment denying her application for fees. 20 91 REVERSED in part, and AFFIRMED in part.