Opinion ID: 2570739
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Sengupta's Independent Action to Set Aside Prior Judgments.

Text: On December 11, 1997, the superior court dismissed Sengupta's independent action to set aside the prior judgments of Hearing Officer Rice and Judge Hodges terminating his employment. In granting summary judgment, Judge Greene ruled that the UAF faculty regulations in effect from 1991 to 1993  granting tenured professors the right to a pre-termination hearing before a faculty panel  did not apply to Sengupta's 1994 termination proceedings. She also ruled that under the 1989 regulations, reinstated in 1993, Sengupta had no right to a pre-termination hearing before a faculty panel. Further, she held that the nondisclosure of the 1991 regulations did not constitute a fraud, accident, or mistake. On appeal, Sengupta argues that summary judgment was improper because genuine issues of fact existed with respect to whether UAF's failure to disclose the 1991 regulations created a fraud, accident, or mistake. [61] We reject Sengupta's contention and affirm the dismissal. Alaska Civil Rule 60(b) expressly reserves the power of the courts to entertain independent actions to relieve parties from judgments, and to set aside judgments for fraud upon the court. [62] The phrase fraud upon the court describes conduct so egregious that it undermines the integrity of the judicial process. [63] An independent action to relieve a party from judgment is also considered a most unusual remedy, historically available only where there was extrinsic, as opposed to intrinsic, fraud. [64] The United States Supreme Court, in a recent case also involving an alleged failure to disclose relevant information, held that relief from judgment through an independent action is available only to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice. [65] In these rare instances, courts have granted relief from judgment where the plaintiff has demonstrated fraud, accident, or mistake as an indispensable element of the independent action claim. [66] Sengupta claims that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the decisions by Rice and Hodges to terminate his employment were void for fraud, accident, or mistake. As a basis for this claim, he asserts that UAF concealed from Sengupta, Hearing Officer Rice, and Judge Hodges the 1991 amendments to the UAF regulations, which permitted a pre-termination hearing before a faculty panel rather than a hearing officer. UAF Regulations for the Evaluation of Faculty were adopted in 1989 and provided for the termination of tenured faculty members for cause. The UAF Regulations were amended in 1991 to comply with the procedural requirements of the Alaska Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Under these 1991 regulations, a terminated faculty member could appeal the termination decision to a hearing panel appointed from the University faculty. The Board of Regents repealed the 1991 amendments in 1993, when the legislature exempted the University of Alaska from the APA, and reinstated the original 1989 regulations, effective May 26, 1993. Thus, the 1989 regulations were in effect when Sengupta's termination proceedings commenced in September 1994. Because the 1989 regulations did not provide for any pre-termination due process hearing, UAF followed the termination procedures of BOR Policy 04.08.08 XI, which did not provide for a hearing before a faculty panel, but rather afforded Sengupta a hearing before an independent hearing officer. [67] Sengupta claims he did not learn of the 1991 amendments until approximately March 1997. Sengupta's claim of fraud, mistake, or accident implicitly assumes that the 1991 amendments applied to his termination proceedings, at least to the extent that he had the choice to use the 1991 procedures. Sengupta asserts that the repealed 1991 amendments were applicable because they were vested in his employment contract. But the amendments were not in effect either at the time he was awarded tenure or at the time termination proceedings began. As support for his vesting argument, Sengupta only cites this passage from his 1990-1991 employment contract with UAF: This is a tenured appointment. Other conditions of your employment are subject to UAF and BOR policies, regulations, and salary schedules currently in effect and as they may subsequently be amended. Even if such language created vested contract rights, [68] such contract rights would only exist for the 1990-1991 term of that annual employment contract. Sengupta was subject to the termination regulations under the employment contract in effect when the termination proceedings began; [69] Sengupta has offered no legal support for his contention that he was entitled to the application of regulations from a previous contract period. Because the 1991 amendments were repealed in May 1993, they are not applicable to Sengupta's 1994 employment contract that was in effect when termination proceedings were instituted. [70] Moreover, Sengupta has not cited a single instance, where UAF flatly denied or otherwise affirmatively misrepresented the existence of the 1991 amendments, that could be construed as fraud. And Sengupta never requested copies of repealed procedures. Thus, we agree with Judge Hodges's conclusion that [t]he University supplied Sengupta and his counsel with copies of the applicable regulations in effect during Sengupta's termination process and that University employees had no obligation to provide Sengupta with copies of repealed regulations without a specific request for them. Finally, Sengupta claims that the 1989 date printed on the UAF Regulations for the Evaluation of Faculty constitutes a misrepresentation. This meager evidence does not warrant the extraordinary remedy of overturning a final judgment. [71] In sum, Sengupta has not demonstrated a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was entitled to the pre-termination hearing before a faculty panel as provided in the 1991 amendments. Mere nondisclosure of inapplicable regulations does not constitute fraud, mistake, or accident. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Sengupta's independent action claim.