Opinion ID: 2160832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: comments on myers' declining to make statement

Text: Myers argues that the prosecution impermissibly violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent by eliciting testimony about his lack of explanation of the killing and by commenting on the same during closing argument. This argument is directed at three separate occurrences. The first occurrence was after a deputy sheriff had testified that Myers had said a trace metal test on his hands was not necessary because he had shot Thomas. The prosecutor asked, When Mr. Myers made that statement in response to your request, did he offer any explanation or excuse for the action he had taken? The deputy answered, None. The defense made no objection to this question and answer. The second occurrence was during the State's cross-examination of Myers. The prosecutor asked, Did you show the sheriff any marks on your neck from [Thomas] grabbing you by the neck? Myers replied, No, I didn't talk to anybody when I came in. Although Myers' answer following the word no is unresponsive to the question asked, there was no objection by defense counsel or motion to strike Myers' voluntary statement that he had not talked to anybody. Finally, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated: [I]f a guy was claimingif he were claiming that he shot a guy because he was defending himself from him, wouldn't he have said, Look at the marks on my neck, or, He was trying to get me, or, Look at this, look what he did, or, He was trying to knock me down. He didn't say that. He just said, Why brother [sic] [with the trace metal test], I shot him. Now, you know, he's explained later what he says happened, but why didn't he explain that to the officer on the scene when he was first in custody in the sheriff's office? The defense made no objections to these statements. [T]he due process clause of the 14th amendment forbids prosecutors from using a defendant's postarrest, post- Miranda silence for impeachment purposes. State v. Lofquest, 227 Neb. 567, 568, 418 N.W.2d 595, 596 (1988), citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). It is clear from the record that the above testimony and comments about Myers' lack of explanation for the killing were in reference to a postarrest, post- Miranda timeframe. However, the crucial difference between Lofquest and the present case is the fact that the testimony and comments in Lofquest were objected to, while those in Myers' case were not. Myers' brief and defense counsel's comments at oral argument indicate that the failure to object was a matter of trial strategy in at least some of the above instances. One may not waive an error, gamble on a favorable result, and, upon obtaining an unfavorable result, assert the previously waived error. Wolfe v. Abraham, 244 Neb. 337, 506 N.W.2d 692 (1993). Because all of the statements of which Myers now complains were not objected to at the time of trial, at least in part due to a consciously chosen trial strategy, Myers waived error in regard to the statements. We decline to further review this assignment of error.