Opinion ID: 1193732
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: S-7965: The Tort Action

Text: Debra argues that it was error for Judge Jahnke to dismiss her tort suit.
Although the dismissal order did not invoke Civil Rule 56 or refer to summary judgment, it granted the relief Ken's summary judgment motion sought and appears to have been based on the court's review of materials outside the pleadings. We therefore treat it as a summary judgment. [37] `When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court must determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment on the law applicable to the established facts.' [38] We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. [39] We may consider any argument ascertainable from the record, even if the superior court did not rule on it, when reviewing the summary judgment order. [40]
The superior court dismissed Debra's tort action in part because she impermissibly split her causes of action. The superior court gave res judicata effect to the Rule 60(b) proceeding, because the prohibition against splitting a cause of action is based on the principles of res judicata. [41] Citing Nelson v. Jones , Debra contends that she did not have to join the tort action into the dissolution action. [42] She implies that the superior court should never have examined whether her two actions were predicated on the same transaction. We stated in Nelson that the principles of res judicata do not require tort claims between married persons to be litigated in their divorce proceedings, because that requirement would hinder the resolution of divorce actions. [43] But Nelson held only that res judicata did not require that interspousal tort claims be joined in the original divorce action. Debra asks us to extend Nelson, and to hold that res judicata does not require that a tort claim be joined in a Rule 60(b) application that seeks relief from the original divorce or dissolution decree. As a result, tort actions filed after a party moves for Rule 60(b) relief would be exempt from the principles of res judicata. In Nelson we approvingly quoted from a Wisconsin Court of Appeals opinion identifying reasons why divorce and tort actions should be litigated separately: Although joinder is permissible, the administration of justice is better served by keeping tort and divorce actions separate.... Divorce actions will become unduly complicated if tort claims must be litigated in the same action. A divorce action is equitable in nature and involves a trial to the court. On the other hand, a trial of a tort claim is one at law and may involve, as in this case, a request for a jury trial. Resolution of tort claims may necessarily involve numerous witnesses and other parties such as joint tortfeasors and insurance carriers whose interests are at stake. Consequently, requiring joinder of tort claims in a divorce action could unduly lengthen the period of time before a spouse could obtain a divorce and result in such adverse consequences as delayed child custody and support determinations. The legislature did not intend such a result in enacting the divorce code.[ [44] ] These well-articulated concerns strongly weigh against joint litigation of such claims. We conclude that they apply to a tort action filed after Rule 60(b) relief is sought in a divorce or dissolution matter. We are also persuaded in this case by the difficulty inherent in providing to Debra in the Rule 60(b) proceeding the same rights and remedies she would have been entitled to in her tort action, e.g., a jury trial and an opportunity to seek punitive damages. [45] For these reasons, res judicata does not bar a tort action based on the same claim as a party's prior Rule 60(b) motion.
Although principles of res judicata do not bar Debra's tort action, we conclude that collateral estoppel barred the re-litigation of Debra's entitlement to the quota shares. [46] The superior court dismissed Debra's tort action, stating that Debra impermissibly split her causes of action, because the matter is moot, and because the second claim is merged with the dissolution case, and barred by the decision in the dissolution case. The fact that the superior court did not use the term collateral estoppel in its order does not prevent us from considering whether that doctrine applies. [47] We apply a three-element test to determine whether collateral estoppel bars an action: (1) collateral estoppel must be asserted against a party or one in privity with a party to the first action; (2) the issue to be precluded must be identical to that decided in the first action; and (3) the issue in the first action must have been resolved by a final judgment on the merits.[ [48] ] The first element is undisputably present because the Rule 60(b) motion and the tort action involved the same parties. The third element is also undisputably present. The grant or denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is a final judgment, despite a pending appeal. [49] Therefore, entry of Rule 60(b) relief was a final judgment. The critical question is whether the Rule 60(b) motion and the tort action addressed identical issues. By filing her Rule 60(b) motion, Debra re-opened the property distribution agreement and litigated the question of her right to the quota shares. But the issue of whether Ken intentionally misrepresented his ownership of the boat was not litigated or decided in the Rule 60(b) proceeding. The superior court predicated Rule 60(b) relief solely on the property settlement, rather than on Ken's alleged misconduct. [50] We therefore conclude that Debra is collaterally estopped from re-litigating her right to the quota shares, but that it was error to dismiss her entire tort action. Still outstanding is the issue of whether Ken's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to permit punitive damages; if it was, the amount of any punitive damages award is also in issue. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Because we have reversed the dismissal of Debra's tort suit, and because Debra is precluded from relitigating only one issueher right to the quota sharesin the tort suit, Ken is no longer the prevailing party in the tort suit. It is therefore necessary to vacate Ken's attorney's fees award.