Opinion ID: 198352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Degree of Difficulty in Communicating

Text: 18 The record on appeal would not support a contention that Ademaj was totally unable to communicate with counsel at any stage in the proceedings. More to the point, his extensive correspondence and numerous colloquies with the trial judge in the English language belie any claim that pretrial communications with court-appointed counsel were so severely impeded as to deprive him of the right to counsel at any relevant time. Furthermore, although Ademaj raised many pretrial issues below, including claims that he needed more time to prepare for trial and did not understand court procedures, his complaints with counsel were premised on the assertion that he was not being afforded a sufficiently vigorous defense. 19 The only time Ademaj even arguably broached the instant claim was on the first day of trial, by requesting new counsel and a continuance. Under questioning by the district court, however, Ademaj responded that he was not ready for trial because he did not have certain evidence, then added through the interpreter: 20 COURT INTERPRETER: [H]e's not prepared he said, your Honor. He's had a problem understanding Mr. Laymon. 21 COURT: What is it that you want me to do to get prepared? 22 COURT INTERPRETER: He wants another lawyer. 23 COURT: Why do you want another lawyer? 24 COURT INTERPRETER: He doesn't believe in Mr. Laymon. He said he has no confidence in him. 25 Prior to the first day of trial, Ademaj mentioned no language or other communication problem, either with counsel or in regard to trial preparations generally. Moreover, in two letters to his attorney, written in English approximately three weeks prior to trial and made available to the district court, there was no reference to any problem with court-appointed counsel. 4 Finally, the motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel asserted that court-appointed counsel was substandard, but mentioned no communication problem. 26 Thus, Ademaj utterly failed to allege, let alone demonstrate, how any language difficulties he may have encountered impeded pretrial communications with court-appointed counsel. In fact, the letters Ademaj wrote to counsel, which he typed himself, are comparable in English-language fluency--if not superior--to those drafted by many pro se litigants whose only language is English. See supra note 4. Thus, there has been no plausible demonstration that any language barrier which may have existed worked a constructive denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.