Opinion ID: 2557847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Case is Critically Different From Stevenson, and Reliance on Stevenson is Misplaced.

Text: Jackson analogizes the circumstances of his case to those in Stevenson v. State, and argues that on the basis of Stevenson, we should reverse his death sentence and grant him a new penalty hearing. We believe the two cases are meaningfully different.
A grand jury indicted Stevenson for first degree murder, among other charges, for his role in the death of a witness scheduled to testify against him in an unrelated theft case. A jury convicted Stevenson on all charges. After a penalty hearing, the jury unanimously found four statutory aggravating circumstances, voted eight to four that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and recommended a death sentence. In what this Court described as an extensive written opinion, [9] the trial judge sentenced Stevenson to death. On his direct appeal, Stevenson argued that the trial judge should have recused himself because he had conducted a suppression hearing in the theft case against Stevenson during which he heard the murder victim testify. This Court rejected that claim under a plain error standard of review, because the judge's familiarity with the victim resulted entirely from a judicial, rather than extra-judicial, source and recusal was therefore not required. Stevenson then filed a Rule 61 petition for postconviction relief. One of the grounds for his postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of counsel was that his trial attorney failed to file a motion for recusal based on the appearance of partiality. The same judge who had presided over Stevenson's trial denied Stevenson's petition for postconviction relief without granting an evidentiary hearing. Stevenson then appealed that judgment to this Court. We remanded the case to the Superior Court for development of the factual record. Specifically, we requested a report from the President Judge of the Superior Court detailing the general standards governing the assignment of judges to capital cases and commenting specifically on the assignment in Stevenson's case. We also requested a report from the trial judge explaining his involvement in the suppression hearing in Stevenson's unrelated theft case and the circumstances of his assignment to Stevenson's capital case. Both reports revealed, for the first time on the record, that the trial judge had requested, directly from the President Judge, to be assigned Stevenson's capital case. In his report on remand, the trial judge characterized the circumstances in this way: At the time of my request, I had no pending capital murder trials. President Judge Ridgely strives to divide murder cases equally among the judges and, quite naturally, considers volunteers in assigning high profile cases. I volunteered for two reasons. First, I had no capital cases assigned to me at the time, and second, I was familiar with the facts surrounding the [ ] theft case. . . . My familiarity with the theft case did not induce me to prejudge Stevenson [ ] on the murder charge[ ]. [10] The parties, like this Court, had never known about the trial judge's specific assignment request before the trial judge filed this report on remand. We reversed the Superior Court judgment on the basis that the circumstances of the trial judge's conduct in Stevenson created an unacceptable appearance of impropriety. We also remanded the case, mandating that a new Superior Court judge consider Stevenson's postconviction claims relating to the guilt phase of his trial and conduct a new penalty hearing. Specifically, we stated: [T]he appearance of partiality evident in this case creates too great a risk that a constitutional violation has occurred in the imposition of the death penalty. [11]
Canon 2 of the Delaware Judges' Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes generally that a judge should avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. [12] The Code of Judicial Conduct also instructs judges to avoid participation in proceedings by disqualifying themselves whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. [13] A judge may act in utmost good faith, yet nevertheless an appearance of impropriety may still arise. [14] Any inquiry into the question of whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is case specific. [15] Under Delaware's capital punishment procedures, a jury must find the existence of at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. [16] The jury vote on each question, however, is only a recommendation to the sentencing judge, who must engage in the same analysis and independently exercise ultimate sentencing responsibility. [17] Because the ultimate fixing of the sentence is in the hands of the trial judge, the risk that injustice might arise from a judge participating in a proceeding despite the appearance of partiality is particularly acute in a capital murder prosecution. [18] The standard in appearance of impropriety cases is objective. In that context, we must not examine whether or not the trial judge was actually influenced by bias. Instead, we examine whether his conduct created the unacceptable risk that a reasonable observer would so conclude. [19]
The circumstances surrounding Jackson's death sentence are meaningfully different from those in Stevenson, and yield a different outcome. In Stevenson, several circumstances were particularly critical to our holding. First, and perhaps most important, the trial judge took the affirmative act of requesting Stevenson's capital case even before the grand jury indicted Stevenson, and never disclosed that request to the parties until the case was on remand after denial of postconviction relief. In our opinion on appeal, we explained that [t]he willingness of a judge to accept an assignment carries no implication of impropriety, but a trial judge's initiation of the request for assignment may raise questions concerning motivation. [20] This request was particularly problematic because the trial judge had had earlier contact with the victim. [21] Also important, we found that the trial judge, in his written sentencing opinion, had demonstrated obvious strong emotions about the murder. [22] Specifically, we wrote that: While the trial judge's repulsion at the killing of an innocent witness is understandable, his sentencing findings carry a tone of personal affront. In the context of a capital punishment case, this is troubling, particularly when viewed in light of the trial judge's personal request for assignment of the [ ]Stevenson murder case[ ] even before the defendant[ ] [was] indicted. [23] These circumstances, combined with a jury vote recommending death by only an eight to four margin, and with no other factors affirmatively indicating a lack of bias, led us to conclude that the decision to impose capital punishment [was] subject to serious question. [24] We remanded for a new penalty phase hearing with a different judge. The relevant circumstances in Jackson's case are critically different. In Stevenson, the trial judge affirmatively requested the capital case. Here, the trial judge in this case had Hurley's unsolicited commentary thrust upon him without forewarning. In this case, the trial judge had no previous interaction with the murder victimjudicial or otherwise. In Stevenson, approximately 13 months passed between the trial judge's request for the case and his final sentencing opinion. In this case, nearly three years separated Hurley's comments from Jackson's final sentencing. Whereas in Stevenson, the jury at the penalty phase recommended a death sentence by an eight to four vote, in this case two different juries after two different penalty phases each recommended death by an eleven to one vote. The judge's final sentencing opinion in this case did not include language evincing a tone of personal affront similar to that in Stevenson. We also note other circumstances that affirmatively suggest a lack of bias on the part of the trial judge in this case. First, in his second sentencing opinion, the trial judge found fewer non-statutory aggravating factors than he found after the first sentencing phase. Also, the trial judge's decision to seal the transcript of Hurley's comments was protective of Jackson's right to a fair trial; had the media gotten wind of Hurley's sidebar commentary, sensational reports could have easily tainted the jury to be empanelled. We are acutely sensitive to the special scrutiny capital cases merit on review. Nevertheless, we believe it is important to note an important practical reality of our judicial system that we believe is relevant to this case. As a necessary consequence of their evidentiary gatekeeping function, trial judges hear, see, and make judgments about inadmissible evidence regularly. That is equally true for bench trials, where the judge sits as both arbiter of law and factfinder, and for jury trials. For that matter, trial judges instruct juriesand assume they are ableto disregard inadmissible evidence that, despite the gatekeeper's efforts, the jury still sees and hears. To be sure, review mechanisms exist to protect defendants in cases where the fact finder hearing of inadmissible evidence is so prejudicial as to create an unacceptable appearance of impropriety that could test reasonable lay persons' trust in the judicial system. But, although the appearance of impropriety standard is a potent tool, it does not invalidate judicial conduct in every instance. This case illustrates that point. Taking into account all the relevant circumstances in this casethe trial judge's unsolicited, passive receipt of Hurley's opinion, the lack of any previous contact between the judge and the victim, the significant time span between Hurley's commentary in November 1992 and the final sentencing in October 1995, the fact that the judge's sentencing decision relied heavily on the jury's recommendation and that two different juries had each recommended death by an eleven to one vote, the judge's nonuse of language suggesting personal affront, and the affirmative steps the judge took demonstrating a lack of biaswe do not find an unacceptable risk that a reasonable observer would believe that bias influenced this trial judge. The relevant circumstances do not disclose any appearance of impropriety sufficient to reverse the Superior Court judgment and grant a new penalty phase.