Opinion ID: 1739464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in overruling the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment and the case?

Text: The crux of Kinzey's assertion is that retrial, after a mistrial has been declared, should take place within the 270 days following the first trial in order to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. Kinzey wishes to use the statutory time frame specified in § 99-17-1 Miss. Code Ann., as amended, to establish a reasonable period of time within which retrial should take place. However, that section requires only that indictments be tried within 270 days of arraignment. The use of § 99-17-1 is foreclosed by Carlisle v. State, 393 So.2d 1312 (Miss. 1981), where this Court stated: Some states take the position that under speedy trial statutes, a mistrial constitutes a trial and therefore the statutory period begins anew. Other states hold that when a mistrial results, the speedy trial statute has been complied with and the time for retrial is discretionary with the court.       In Ruester v. Turner, 250 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1971) the Florida Supreme Court summarized the positions taken by other states with reference to speedy trial statutes after a mistrial and stated: We now agree with those courts that have determined that if a mistrial results compliance with the statutory requirements is satisfied. The time for retrial then becomes a matter of discretion with the trial court, which is to be measured by constitutional standards of reasonableness and fairness under the constitutional speedy trial right... . (250 So.2d at 267). We agree with the conclusion stated in Ruester and hold that if a mistrial results, or if a case is reversed on appeal for retrial compliance with section 99-17-1 is satisfied. The time for retrial then becomes a matter of discretion with the trial court to be measured by the constitutional standards of reasonableness and fairness under the constitutional right to a speedy trial as enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). In Barker the United States Supreme Court announced a four part balancing test involving the following four factors: 1. Length of delay, 2. Reason for delay, 3. The defendant's assertion of his right 4. Prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court, in Barker, promulgated the balancing test because, The right to a speedy trial is a more vague concept than other procedural rights. It is, for example, impossible to determine with precision when the right has been denied. The balancing test set forth in Barker must be applied on a case by case basis under the particular facts of the case under consideration. Id. at 1314. See also Darby v. State, 476 So.2d 1192, 1194 (Miss. 1985). No one of these Barker factors is dispositive; all must be considered together. Burgess v. State, 473 So.3d 432 (Miss. 1985); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Miss. 1985). Kinzey was retried on September 21, 1984,  approximately 352 days after the mistrial of October 5, 1983. On April 7, 1984, the state requested a continuance because of a congested docket. The trial judge continued the cause until the next term of court. Simpson County has three circuit court terms: 1) the 24 days following the 2nd Monday in March; 2) the 24 days following the 1st Monday in September and, 3) the 12 days following the 1st Monday in December. See, § 9-7-37 Miss. Code Ann. (Supp. 1984). The state's continuance on April 7 was requested during the March term; the continuance was granted until the September term. The state urges that, as the continuance was granted on good cause, the 150 days intervening between the close of the March term and the opening of the September term should be deducted. When this is done (and an additional eight (8) days delay added), a balance of 194 days remains chargeable to the state. Even if the entire 352 day delay is charged to the state, this is the only Barker factor in Kinzey's favor. The second factor, reason for delay, is justified by prior case law. In both State v. Davis, 382 So.2d 1095, 1097 (Miss. 1980) and Diddlemeyer v. State, 398 So.2d 1343, 1344-1345 (Miss. 1981) overcrowded dockets were considered good cause for continuance. The third factor, the defendant's assertion of his right, also weighs in the state's favor. Here Kinzey asserted his right to a speedy trial on August 31, 1984  approximately three weeks before his new trial was to begin on September 21, 1984. In Darby v. State, 476 So.2d 1192, 1193-1194 (Miss. 1985), the defendant failed to move to dismiss his indictment until approximately one week before his trial. Such militated against his appeal and his conviction was affirmed. The final factor, prejudice to the defendant, also favors the state. See, Diddlemeyer, 398 So.2d at 1345 ([A]ppellant has not shown prejudice, and we find no merit in this contention.) But see, Burgess v. State, 473 So.2d 432 (Miss. 1985) (Lack of prejudice alone insufficient to support affirmance.)