Opinion ID: 1924529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hedonic Damages as a Measure of the Value of Life.

Text: ¶ 86. If Hailey's hedonic damages were not based on anything he actually experienced, then they must derive from some other basis. Professor McCurley argues that an analysis of hedonic damages based solely on what the decedent experienced prior to death is too limitedthat there should be a damages award for the intrinsic worth of the life lost. See generally McClurg, supra. While I strongly agree that all life has intrinsic worth, I strongly disagree that society is served by attempting to put a dollar value on a life that was not lived, and awarding that money to a third party. That would be totally at odds with the compensatory nature of our tort system. ¶ 87. My final concern is the highly speculative and subjective nature of assessing damages for the life that cannot be lived. In expressing the inherent subjective nature of hedonic damages, the House of Lords wrote in Rose v. Ford, for the happy and contented no damages would be adequate; for the man on the point of suicide any damage would be excessive. Rose, App. Cas. at 830. Loss of the pleasures of life can never be properly compensated by money damages. The emotional nature of the loss makes defining and quantifying damages difficult, if not impossible, and may lead to disproportionate awards. Appellate courts would be without adequate bases for meaningful review. Would defendants, under the rule proposed by the majority, be entitled to put on evidence that the decedent's life was worth very littlebecause he was a habitual criminal or a drug user, a member of some disfavored social, political or religious group, or physically or mentally handicapped, or just unhappy? Or, would such evidence be excluded as prejudicial, leaving defendants no meaningful way to rebut? ¶ 88. In contrast, evidence of hedonic damages in personal injury cases does not present the same concerns because the injured party can usually testify as to the enjoyments of life he or she has lost as a result of the injury. The majority's ruling will require juries to make arbitrary judgments about the worth of people who can neither testify as to the quality of their lives nor be cross-examined by defendants, with no evidentiary basis for these judgments except emotional appeals designed solely to inflame the jury's passions. ¶ 89. I had hoped that this Court would learn from fifty years of experience of our brethren in England, and not wander down this less traveled road, as they did, before realizing that awarding hedonic damages in wrongful death actions only risks speculative, arbitrary awards and windfalls to plaintiffs. This is a pandora's box we should not open. ¶ 90. For all the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent. SMITH, P.J., AND WALLER, J., JOIN THIS OPINION.