Opinion ID: 1906837
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Of serious bodily injury or death; or

Text: (ii) That a third person likely will suffer serious bodily injury or death. (b) Prohibited conduct. A person may not engage in stalking. The threats and statement concerning Ms. Streater being placed in fear of imminent serious bodily harm further the State's case in proving that Mr. Streater maliciously engage[d] in a course of conduct that alarm[ed] or seriously annoy[ed] Ms. Streater. § 121A. That Ms. Streater was alarmed and/or seriously annoyed is supported by the factual finding that Mr. Streater had previously threatened harm and had committed some sort of battery or assault and battery. The threat noted in the order provides some evidence of Mr. Streater's intent, which must be proven as part of the harassment, stalking, and telephone misuse offenses. The battery or assault and battery referred to in the protective order also may have special relevance to the intent elements of both the harassment and stalking charges and to the reasonableness of Ms. Streater's fear of serious bodily injury or death for the purposes of establishing the elements of the stalking charge. See, e.g., Fetty v. State, 268 Ga. 365, 489 S.E.2d 813, 817 (1997)(applying a similar test and allowing in murder prosecution evidence of several prior difficulties between the victim and defendant, including evidence that they had fought, that the defendant pointed a gun at a friend of the victim who warned the defendant to stay away from the victim, and that defendant verbally threatened the victim a week before her death, all of which showed the defendant's bent of mind and pattern of behavior in harassing, stalking, and threatening [the victim]). Furthermore, coupled with the testimony concerning the events that led to Mr. Streater being prosecuted, which occurred after the protective order became effective, the threat and battery and/or assault could help to establish the course of conduct and continuity of purpose necessary to establish the offenses of harassment and stalking. See Culbreath v. State, 667 So.2d 156, 164 (Ala.Crim.App.1995)(admitting prior bad acts to establish course of conduct necessary for stalking charge); Com. v. Urrutia, 439 Pa.Super. 227, 653 A.2d 706, 709-10 (1995)(same). Any special relevancy of the second factual findingthe handwritten note in the protective order declaring that Mr. Streater broke into the house and took her moneyhowever, is doubtful without further evidence as to the nature of the conduct or its impact on Ms. Streater. There is no indication that the bad acts referenced by this statement occurred in the victim's presence. A house may be broken into and money taken outside of the owner's presence. Breaking in and taking money may have no special relevance relating to any contested issue concerning Mr. Streater's intent to violate the telephone misuse, harassment, or stalking statutes. At best, it could be argued that the breaking and taking help to prove a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person. § 121A(c). Even that argument may fail, however, because there was no indication that prior to the time the protective order was issued Mr. Streater had been given notice to stay away from Ms. Streater.