Opinion ID: 1972056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Under Breakiron and Zola

Text: We issued our decisions in Breakiron and Zola on October 29, 1987, and August 16, 1988, respectively. Consequently, the trial court did not have the benefit of our decisions in Breakiron and Zola when it instructed Reyes's jury on diminished capacity. The Appellate Division, in its review of the post-conviction-relief hearing, found that the charge had failed to comply not only with Humanik, but also with the principles enunciated in Breakiron and Zola. We agree that the charge does not comply with Humanik, but find that, taken as a whole, it does comply with the requirements of Breakiron and Zola. The court charged the jury, as defense counsel requested, on voluntary intoxication and diminished capacity. The trial court's instruction on diminished capacity, in pertinent part, read: Now, while the State has the burden of proof on each and every element of the offense, including state of mind or intent, the defendant has the burden by the preponderance of the evidence to show a mental disease or defect which prevented him from being able to form the requisite state of mind.... .... [D]efendant ... must carry the burden of proving the defense of mental disease [or] defect by a preponderance of the evidence.... Keep in mind, however, although the burden rests upon the defendant to establish the defense of mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the credible evidence, the burden of proving the defendant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt is on the State and that burden never shifts. The State must prove all of the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, including the element relating to the necessary state of mind or intent. I have told you that the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant purposely or knowingly caused serious bodily injury resulting in Emie Pagan's death.... You must consider whether the defendant was harboring a mental defect and by virtue of that fact, that he did not have the mental capacity to knowingly or purposefully kill Emie Pagan. .... Now, you will also have to consider the defense of diminished capacity due to mental disease or defect with respect to the [count] charging felony murder, burglary and attempted aggravated sexual assault. .... In summary, while the State may prove or must prove all of the elements of the offense, including state of mind, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has the burden by a preponderance of the evidence of showing a mental disease or defect which prevented him from being able to be capable [sic] of forming the requisite intent he had in this case. If he satisfies his burden as to inability or incapacity to form the requisite intent due to mental disease or defect or intoxication by drugs and/or alcohol, he can't be convicted of a crime requiring proof of that state of mind. It is a well-established proposition that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed. 2d 368, 373 (1973) (citing Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107, 46 S.Ct. 442, 443, 70 L.Ed. 857 (1926)). Therefore, we look at the allegedly erroneous jury instruction not on its own, but in context of the entire charge. Although some portions of the judge's charge to the jury, which consisted of approximately twenty-four pages of transcript, might have been confusing, we find that the charge nonetheless comported with Breakiron and Zola. The trial court made abundantly clear that the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was capable of forming the necessary intent at the time of the murder, despite the presence of mental disease or defect, always remained on the State. The charge, read as a whole, never removed from the State the ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had acted purposely or knowingly, regardless of his intoxication and/or diminished capacity due to mental disease or defect. The jury charge was valid under the law as then understood. Defendant's direct appeal was heard by the Appellate Division on March 7, 1989, and decided on March 27, 1989. At that time, those mental diseases or disorders that constituted diminished capacity were based mainly on our analysis in Breakiron. Although we declined in that case to define the content of the phrase `mental disease or defect' as embraced by the Code, Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. at 619, 532 A. 2d 199, we did note that the drafters of the Model Penal Code recognized that `many mentally disturbed persons are [quite] capable of acting purposefully or knowingly in the minimal senses intended by the Model Code.' Id. at 618, 532 A. 2d 199 (quoting American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), at 220, (comment to § 4.02) (1985)). We further stated: Not every mental disease or defect has relevance to the mental states prescribed by the Code. The variety and forms of mental disease are legion. They range from paranoia and schizophrenia to affective disorders and psychopathy. Some, such as depression and anti-social disorders, have little or no relevance to knowledge. Others, such as schizophrenia, are clearly relevant. Some states have attempted to define the relevant mental diseases. Our Code does not. But [b]oth jurists and mental health professionals recognize that there is no perfect correlation between legal standards of `insanity' and psychiatric classifications of mental disorder. [ Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. at 618-19 n. 10, 532 A. 2d 199 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).] Consequently, on that basis, a reviewing court looking at the evidence introduced on Reyes's behalf to demonstrate his mental disease or defect would have concluded that defendant's rage and intoxication, his depression, personality type and lack of control of behavior, as described by his expert witness, did not constitute that quantum of evidence sufficient to support a diminished-capacity charge. That determination is reenforced by our decision in State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989), issued just two months after Reyes's unsuccessful direct appeal. In a case strikingly similar to Reyes's, Pitts alleged that he could not form the requisite mental state because of mental disease or defect, and that the trial court had committed plain error when it failed to charge diminished capacity. Id. at 607, 562 A. 2d 1320. Pitts's expert witness testified to the defendant's cyclothymic personality disorder, a mood disorder that can, at times, cause significant depression, but is not as severe as manic depression, where the manic depressive loses touch with reality. Id. at 608, 562 A. 2d 1320. That expert witness also testified that the defendant had a chronic anxiety disorder, characterized by unrealistic or excessive anxiety manifested by tension and hyperactivity. Id. at 608-609, 562 A. 2d 1320 (citation omitted). Like Reyes's expert, Pitts's psychiatric expert testified, based on tests of and interviews with the defendant, that Pitts had manifested a loss of control under the influence of extreme emotions and what I would say, combining all the data, a rage reaction, a reaction in which his anger reached the point of rage, which I would define as an anger that goes out of control and an anger which interferes with the cognitive ability a person has, planning, judgment, recognizing consequences, deliberating, that in my opinion, he experiences such a loss of control. [ Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 609, 562 A. 2d 1320.] Despite this testimony, we refused to find that the trial court had committed plain error when it failed to give Pitts the benefit of a diminished-capacity charge, reiterating our earlier admonition that `[n]ot every mental disease or defect has relevance to the mental states prescribed by the Code.' Ibid. (quoting Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. at 618 n. 10, 532 A. 2d 199). Under the law as it developed during defendant's direct appeal, Reyes's case is remarkably similar to Pitts. Both defendants killed in a fit of rage, but neither linked that rage to an underlying mental disease or defect. As it was not error to deny Pitts a diminished-capacity jury charge, neither was it error to give Reyes a flawed diminished-capacity jury charge because he had not been entitled to such a charge in the first place. If there was any error in Reyes's jury charge, it was harmless because he received the potential benefit of a charge to which he had not been entitled.