Opinion ID: 159644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of Attorney's Hours and Rate

Text: 1) Standard of Review 8 Defendants argue the district court granted Shaw excessive attorney's fees. Specifically, they argue the district court should have 1) required a more detailed explanation by Shaw's counsel as to the number of hours spent on specific tasks; 2) given more weight to the disparity between the hours claimed by Shaw's counsel and the hours billed by Defendants' counsel; and 3) allowed Defendants to cross-examine Shaw's counsel concerning her fee agreement with Shaw. 9 This court reviews the district court's determination of the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded for an abuse of discretion. See Wolfe v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 28 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (10th Cir. 1994). A court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or when there is no rational basis in evidence for its ruling. See Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995). 2) Number of Hours Spent on Specific Tasks 10 Defendants contend the district court should have required Shaw's counsel to give a detailed analysis of her reasons for the amount of time she spent on specific tasks. For example, Shaw's counsel recorded thirteen hours for preparing suggested voir dire questions in the qui tam case, six hours for writing two Freedom of Information Act letters, approximately forty hours for responding to a summary judgment motion, and eight hours for drafting a complaint. 11 Shaw responds that she did present evidence explaining much of this time. For example, her expert witness testified that in preparing voir dire questions for a qui tam case, he would have to spend more time than in a typical employment law case, and that he was not surprised 13 hours were spent preparing voir dire. He also testified that six hours spent writing Freedom of Information Act letters was even less surprising. In addition, Shaw's counsel also offered some explanation for the time she spent drafting the qui tam complaint, noting the FCA has specific requirements which she had to follow. Additionally, Defendants' counsel cross-examined Shaw's attorney, yet only questioned her briefly about the time spent on voir dire and not at all about time spent on the other matters now raised on appeal. Defendants themselves did not call any witnesses to testify that the amount of time spent on these tasks was excessive. 12 Shaw is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under both the qui tam and wrongful discharge provisions of the FCA. 31 U.S.C. 3730(d)(2), (h). This court has previously noted that when examining an attorney's fee claim, the district court should examine the hours spent on each task to determine the reasonableness of the hours reported. See Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1983) (reviewing award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988). The district court, however, does not have to justify every hour allowed in awarding attorney's fees under federal statutes. See Malloy v. Monahan, 73 F.3d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1996). [W]hat is reasonable in a particular case can depend upon factors such as the complexity of the case, the number of reasonable strategies pursued, and the responses necessitated by the maneuvering of the other side. Ramos, 713 F.2d at 554. The district court's superior perspective on the presence or absence of these particular factors in the underlying merits litigation counsels deference to the district court's decision as to whether the number of hours claimed is reasonable. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 13 In this case, the district court reviewed Shaw's counsel's records and heard testimony that the posture and complexity of this case required substantial expenditure of time. The Defendants failed to meaningfully question this testimony. This court concludes the district court had a sufficient basis for its determination that the claimed hours were reasonable, and there was no abuse of discretion in the award of attorney's fees for the hours claimed. Malloy, 73 F.3d at 1018. 3) Comparing Counsels' Time 14 In her initial fee request, Shaw's counsel claimed approximately 804 hours for prosecuting the underlying merits lawsuit, while Defendants' counsel billed approximately 425 hours for defending the action. Defendants argue the district court should have given more weight to this time difference, and that testimony by Shaw's counsel was not adequate to explain the amount of time which she recorded. 5 15 Evidence of the hours expended by opposing counsel may be helpful in determining whether time expended on a case was reasonable, but the opponent's time is not an immutable yardstick of reasonableness. Robinson v. City of Edmond, 160 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) (reviewing attorney's fees award under 42 U.S.C. 1988). The district court had first hand knowledge of the complexity of the case and the voluminous number of documents Shaw, who had the burden of proof, presented at trail. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding counsel's hours reasonable in spite of the contrast with defense counsel's time. 4) Hourly Rate 16 The district court received into evidence the affidavit of Shaw's counsel, which indicated that Shaw's agreement with her counsel was for a contingency fee and that Shaw paid only costs and expenses. The affidavit thereafter refers to an hourly rate of $150. It would appear, however, that Shaw's counsel was explaining that $150/hour was her normal billing rate at the time of the fee arrangement, some two years antedating the affidavit and claim premised on a $175/hour rate. 17 After the admission of this affidavit, Defendants asked Shaw's counsel in cross-examination, [Y]ou say in your affidavit that you had a contract with your client. What was that, please, ma'am, and did you bring it to court today? Shaw objected to this line of questioning, arguing that the fee agreement was irrelevant to a determination of a reasonable fee. The district court sustained this objection, though without specifically stating the reasons for its ruling. 18 On appeal, Defendants argue that if the trial court had allowed them to address the terms of the representation agreement, this could have led to a revelation that the agreement reflected a rate of $150/hour. This, Defendants argue, in turn might have convinced the district court to apply an hourly rate less than the $175/hour on which it ultimately settled. The affidavit of Shaw's counsel, however, established that her regular hourly rate was $150/hour, the very rate Defendants suggest is the reason cross-examination on the fee arrangement should have been allowed. Therefore, any error by the district court in sustaining Shaw's objection was harmless. See United States v. Rothbart, 723 F.2d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1983); Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . is a ground for . . . vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.).