Opinion ID: 1951308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mandamus Appeal

Text: Quashing the writs of certiorari, however, is not dispositive of the town clerk's appeal in the mandamus proceedings. Ordinarily that appeal would not pose a serious problem because of the wellsettled principle that a state license permitting the establishment and conduct of a business cannot authorize the use of the premises contrary to a lawfully enacted zoning ordinance. Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, 190 Cal.App.2d 599, 12 Cal.Rptr. 182 (1961); Town of Lincoln v. Giles, 317 Mass. 185, 57 N.E.2d 554 (1944); Carnabuci v. City of Norwalk, 70 Ohio App. 429, 46 N.E.2d 773 (1942); In re Veltri, 355 Pa. 135, 49 A.2d 369 (1946); 8 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 25.12 at 33 (3d ed. rev. 1976). The clerk was constrained by this principle not to issue the license. A further constraint was that the request to him to issue the license coincided in time with the commissioners' initiation of certiorari proceedings challenging the administrator's decision. In addition, his conclusion was reinforced by the presence in this case of a local ordinance barring the issuance of any license which would involve a violation of the zoning ordinance of this town. Notwithstanding, some confusion exists here because under the South Kingstown zoning ordinance the sale of alcoholic beverages on premises located in a commercial waterfront district was not prohibited until after the Superior Court granted the hotel a special exception permitting it to operate under a class B liquor license. That permit would have been immunized from revocation had the hotel incurred substantial expenditures in good-faith reliance on that exception. A. Ferland & Sons, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Review, 105 R.I. 275, 279, 251 A.2d 536, 538 (1969); Shalvey v. Zoning Board-of Review, 99 R.I. 692, 699, 210 A.2d 589, 593 (1965). The record here, however, fails to disclose that the hotel took any action in reliance on the grant of a special exception or indeed that it even applied for a class B license until the day the amendment was enacted, which was almost a year after the exception was granted. In the circumstances, therefore, the controlling legislation was the version of the zoning ordinance that was in effect at the time the administrator rendered his decision. See Goodman v. Zoning Board of Review, 105 R.I. 680, 683, 254 A.2d 743, 745 (1969); Najarian Realty Corp. v. Zoning Board of Review, 99 R.I. 465, 468, 208 A.2d 528, 530 (1965). The administrator should have been guided by that provision and by the local ordinance barring the issuance of any license which would involve a violation of the zoning ordinance. Had he relied on the controlling law, he would have sustained the commissioners' refusal to issue the hotel a class B license. In issuing the writ of mandamus the Superior Court trial justice based his decision on the special exception granted under the old zoning ordinance. Mandamus is appropriate, however, only if the petitioner has a clear legal right to have the act done which is sought by the writ and if the respondent has a ministerial and legal duty to perform. Sun Oil Co. v. Macauley, 72 R.I. 206, 210, 49 A.2d 917, 919 (1946). In this case, for the reasons indicated, the hotel obviously did not have that right nor the town clerk that duty. Hence, it was error to issue a writ of mandamus. The writs of certiorari heretofore issued in these proceedings are ordered quashed as improvidently granted, and the records certified to this court are ordered remanded to the State Liquor Control Administrator with our decision endorsed thereon. The appeal of the Town Clerk of the Town of South Kingstown from the judgment of the Superior Court ordering the issuance of the writ of mandamus is sustained, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court.