Opinion ID: 1661518
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Heading: The Search Warrant. Two issues regarding the search warrant are presented its issuance and its execution.

Text: (a) Defendant contends that probable cause for issuance of the search warrant was not shown. The controlling decisions are Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed.2d 637; State v. Spier, 173 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa); and State v. Salazar, 174 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa). See also Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306; United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723. Under those decisions, search warrants cannot be issued on an affiant's opinions, conclusions, or beliefs. The written application presented here to the magistrate was of that character; if the search warrant depended on that document alone, it would fall. Moreover, if an application for a search warrant is predicated on information furnished the applicant by another individual, as this one substantially was, the magistrate must be provided with the facts and circumstances both underlying such informant's knowledge and supporting his reliability. If search warrants could be handed out on conclusions that some illegal activity is going on or that someone has so informed the affiant, search warrant proceedings would become a mere ritual and the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects would become a worthless guaranty. On the other hand, recognizing that law enforcement is practical business, the United States Supreme Court has said, [W]e do not retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause   ; that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial   ; that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense   ; and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts   . Spineli v. United States, supra, 393 U.S. at 419, 89 S.Ct. at 590, 21 L.Ed.2d at 645. The factual information presented under oath to the magistrate in this case goes much farther than the opinions and conclusions and the informants' statements in the cited cases. In Aguilar, only an affidavit was presented, which recited in relevant part: Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept in the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law. 378 U.S. at 109, 84 S. Ct. at 1511, 12 L.Ed.2d at 725. This of course was held insufficient. In Spinelli the affidavit recited in essence that the officers saw the defendant's car cross a bridge on certain days and park at a certain place, the place had two telephones with separate numbers, the defendant was known to affiants and officers as a gambler and an associate of gamblers, and the officers had been told by an informant that the defendant was engaged in making book. This too was held insufficient. The search warrant in the Spier case was issued on hearsay upon hearsay and on opinions and was, of course, held invalid. In Salazar only general opinions and conclusions supported the warrant, and it was invalidated. In fact, the affiant in the Salazar case did not divulge the underlying factual information to the magistrate when he obtained the warrant because he didn't feel it would be right to put it through before the hearings. State v. Salazar, 174 N.W.2d at 454 (Iowa). Apparently the officer thought that securing the search warrant was a perfunctory matter and that the magistrate was not to be informed about the factual basis for the raid until after it had been conducted. This, obviously, is the reverse of what the Fourth Amendment contemplates. In the case at bar, however, the affiant gave testimony under oath before the magistrate. The identity of the informant was divulged, and indeed the magistrate knew him. The informant had been in trouble over bad checks as a result of gambling and in that connection had explained to the county attorney what was going on at defendant's place. The county attorney had put the place under surveillance and had provided the informant with money to carry on gambling so that a raid could be set up. On the night in question, the informant went to defendant's place, and a poker game was going on. He got word to the prosecutor to that effect, and even told who was at the game. The prosecutor went before the magistrate, related this information under oath, told the magistrate that the informant was in defendant's place at that very time and a poker game was in fact in progress, and identified individuals who were thereone of whom, Grady, the magistrate also knew through court appearances. On the question of probable cause, no two cases are alike, and a great variety of factual situations have reached appellate courts. Annots., 14 A.L.R.2d 605, 100 A. L.R.2d 525, 10 A.L.R.3d 359. We hold on the evidence here that sufficient factual information was given the magistrate to support his finding of probable cause. (b) As to defendant's contention that the search warrant was illegally executed, about four hours elapsed after the warrant was issued before the raid was conducted. Agents of the Iowa Bureau of Criminal investigation and officers of the Ames Police Department went with the county attorney to defendant's place and searched it. Had the county attorney gone alone we would be confronted with the question of whether he could legally execute the warrant and, if not, whether such illegality rendered the fruits of the search inadmissible. But this group of law enforcement personnel conducted the search and seizure in a body. Application for a search warrant may be made by any credible resident of this state. § 751.4. The County attorney could therefore make the application. Execution of a search warrant is governed by § 751.7: A search warrant may in all cases be served by any peace officer, but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requisition, he being present and acting in its execution. The agents of the bureau and the policemen were all peace officers. § 748.3(3) and (4). The county attorney is enjoined by law to enforce or cause to be enforced in his county, all of the laws of the state   . § 336.2(1). We think we would be unduly technical if we held that the search warrant was illegally executed. It was in fact carried into execution by the posse, all of whom were peace officers save one and he was a law enforcement official. The presence of that one person did not invalidate execution of the warrant. See Simmons v. Louin, 213 Miss. 482, 57 So.2d 133; White v. State, 81 Okl. Cr. 399, 165 P.2d 151; Commonwealth v. Orwig, 96 Pa.Super. 383. That the return on the back of the warrant was subsequently signed by the county attorney does not change the result. The manner in which legal process is in fact executed controls. United States v. Greene, 141 F.Supp. 856 (D.C.); People v. Daily, 157 C.A.2d 649, 321 P.2d 469; Carson v. State, 204 Ind. 273, 183 N.E. 544; Wince v. State, 206 Miss. 189, 39 So.2d 882; McMillon v. State, 95 Okl.Cr. 409, 247 P.2d 295; Jackson v. State, 73 Okl. Cr. 149, 118 P.2d 1044; Tymer v. State, 43 Okl.Cr. 212, 277 P. 676; State v. Calvert, 219 Tenn. 534, 410 S.W.2d 907. The trial court rightly held the search warrant was properly issued and executed. III. Sufficiency of Evidence. Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to generate a jury question as to guilt. When the officers burst in, several individuals were seated around a cloth-covered table on which was lying a pot of $21, sums in money in front of the participants, and cards. Certainly these students and others had not gathered to read poetry. Green testified they were gambling and that they regularly gambled there, and the jury could reasonable so find. Green further testified positively and without objection that defendant instigated the games, that they took place in the basement portion of the house, that defendant rented the basement portion, and that defendant was in possession of the poker tables. Defendant's testimony that the area in which the gambling occurred was used by all the tenants created a factual dispute as to whether he was in control of it but did not nullify the State's prima facie case. The case was properly for the jury. State v. Mabrey, 245 Iowa 428, 60 N.W.2d 889. Other matters argued are not likely to arise on retrial. Reversed.