Opinion ID: 1906701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: tamika jones

Text: Mercer and Terrell challenge the admission of evidence showing that Tamika Jones entered the witness protection program due to an alleged threat on her life. [11] The prosecution claims this evidence was admissible on two separate grounds. First, the prosecution claims the evidence is admissible on an independent basis as relating to Jones' credibility. Second, the prosecution claims the evidence was admissible, anticipatorily, under the doctrine of curative admissibility. With respect to the prosecution's first argument that the evidence was independently admissible, even where this evidence is relevant, as previously noted, the evidence would still be subject to exclusion if its probative value were substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See ( William) Johnson, supra, 683 A.2d at 1090. Jones' state of mind became an issue due to her conflicting accounts. First, Jones told police that she did not see anything. At this time, she was not in the witness protection program. Then, Jones approached the police and gave a detailed description of Yappy's murder. Jones told the police that she saw Terrell shoot Yappy. Mercer and Terrell then got into Terrell's car. Mercer opened his door to knock down Yappy. Then, Mercer stood over Yappy's body and shot him again. Jones repeated this version of events before the grand jury. At trial, Jones recanted her grand jury testimony, testifying that she did not see the actual shooting. Jones claimed that she fabricated the story she told to the grand jury in order to enter the witness protection program. Jones left the witness protection program before trial began. Due to the fact that Jones gave three different accounts of Yappy's murder, evidence of her state of mind became relevant to assess her credibility. The danger of unfair prejudice with respect to Jones' reasons for entering the witness protection program, however, is clear. Jones testified that she received a threat. As stated above, this type of testimony has the danger of appealing to the emotions of the jury by implying  without evidence  that a defendant made the threat, thereby creating the danger of unfair prejudice. While Jones did recant her grand jury testimony at trial, the prosecution could have explained this in a less prejudicial manner by showing that she testified before the grand jury while she was in the witness protection program, and that she had left the witness protection program before testifying at trial. This alternative approach would have minimized the potential prejudice involved in disclosing the alleged threat, coupled with an appropriate limiting instruction. The prosecution next argues that the evidence was admissible, anticipatorily, under the doctrine of curative admissibility. This doctrine provides that in certain circumstances the prosecution may inquire into evidence otherwise inadmissible, but only after the defense has opened the door with regard to this evidence. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Jenkins v. United States, 374 A.2d 581, 585-86 (D.C.1977) (citing 1 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 15 (3d ed.1940)). We note that [t]he doctrine of curative admissibility is one dangerously prone to overuse. United States v. McClain, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 216, 440 F.2d 241, 244 (1971). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that the doctrine should not be used unfairly to prejudice the defendant: The doctrine is to prevent prejudice and is not to be subverted into a rule for injection of prejudice. Introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under shield of this doctrine is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence. United States v. Winston, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 71, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1971) (quoting California Ins. Co. v. Allen, 235 F.2d 178, 180 (5th Cir.1956)). The Court of Appeals in Winston quoted the trial judge (Judge William B. Bryant) with approval: This business about opening the door is a much overused issue and it carries with it an oversimplification. Opening the door is one thing. But what comes through the door is another. Everything cannot come through the door. Id. See also Jenkins, supra, 374 A.2d at 585-86. The government further relies on the principle that, under the proper circumstances, the prosecution may anticipate an attack on the credibility of its own witness and disclose facts relating to that witness' credibility on direct examination. See, e.g., Reed v. United States, 452 A.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 839, 104 S.Ct. 132, 78 L.Ed.2d 127 (1983); United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 881 F.2d 866, 875-76 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083, 102 S.Ct. 639, 70 L.Ed.2d 617 (1981); United States v. Hasenstab, 575 F.2d 1035, 1040 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827, 99 S.Ct. 100, 58 L.Ed.2d 120 (1978). There is, however, always a danger in permitting a party to defang prejudicial evidence on direct examination where the admissibility of the evidence depends upon the curative admissibility rationale. This is so because it is often difficult at best to anticipate what will be done on cross-examination to open the door and the extent to which, if any, curative admissibility is appropriate. That becomes evident when we consider the facts of this case. Before presenting the witness, the prosecution discussed potential problems concerning Tamika Jones at a bench conference, out of the presence of the jury. The prosecution informed the court of its understanding that Jones only came forward because of a threat made by Mercer. The court gave the prosecution permission to ask about the threat, without giving the specifics of who may have given the threat. The prosecution wanted to leave the specifics of the threat to the defense attorneys, if they so chose. Defense counsel wants to explore it with her, they can do so, but I don't want  I don't want any missteps regarding that. At this point, the two defense counsel chose different strategies. The attorney for Mercer did not want to question Jones at all about her entry into the witness protection program. Mercer's attorney stated, Your Honor, I think we would  we would waive the value of impeachment testimony if we could avoid talking about the witness protection program as well as the threat to her in this case. The attorney for Terrell, however, wanted to question Jones about her reasons for entering the witness protection program. Specifically, Terrell's attorney wanted to establish that her reason for entering the witness protection program was to get paid by the government. The judge made it clear to Terrell's attorney that if he wanted to attempt to show that Jones was motivated by money, the prosecution would be allowed to show that her motivation was actually fear. To this, Terrell's attorney responded, I'm prepared to take  to deal with the risk involved in the witness saying that she received a threat, in order to get the benefit that the  that she's on the Government payroll or however it is I choose to characterize this. [12] Mercer then moved to sever his case from that of Terrell, but the motion was denied. Given this bench conference, our analysis of the propriety of the admission of this evidence becomes bifurcated. Terrell's attorney made it clear that he was prepared to accept the risk of the potential prejudice in order to impeach Jones concerning her entry into the witness protection program. Had Terrell done so, the prosecution could have rehabilitated Jones on redirect by presenting the evidence of the alleged threat in the manner prescribed by the trial judge. Thus, with respect to Terrell, while the wiser course would have been to await actual cross-examination before ruling on the curative admissibility, we cannot say the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to anticipate this challenge to Jones' credibility, and thereby disclose Jones' claimed true reason for entering the witness protection program on direct examination. The situation is different as to Mercer. Mercer's attorney emphatically argued that he did not want to create the possibility that the jury would use this evidence in an unfairly prejudicial manner against his client. Mercer's attorney, therefore, was willing to forego the opportunity of impeachment for what he perceived to be the greater benefit of avoiding the potential for unfair prejudice. If means lay at hand for accommodating that wish while respecting Terrell's strategy as well, the trial court was obligated to seriously consider them, which brings us to Mercer's motion for severance.