Opinion ID: 70224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: haynes' claim to a jury trial on her age discrimination claim

Text: 4 Haynes argues on appeal that she retains a right to a jury trial on her age discrimination claim because she filed a valid jury demand pursuant to Rule 38, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a) provides in relevant part: 5 When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury.... 6 On November 6, 1992, the parties, through their attorneys of record, signed and filed with the court a Joint Preliminary Statement and Scheduling Order [R1-15-3] which provided in relevant part: 7 (c) The legal issues to be tried are as follows: 8 The issue presented to the Court is whether the Defendant discriminated against the Plaintiff by reason of age or sex with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 9 The parties' Joint Preliminary Statement and Scheduling Order was filed on November 6, 1992, almost a year after the case was referred to the magistrate judge. Immediately thereafter, on November 19, 1992, the magistrate judge scheduled the case for trial before him. It is clear that this order was based upon the parties' Joint Preliminary Statement and Scheduling Order, and thus contemplated a trial before the magistrate judge of both the Title VII sex discrimination claim and the age claim. Moreover, the trial was conducted before the magistrate judge with no objection from Haynes. Haynes did not object to the nonjury trial of her age claim until after the magistrate judge issued his report and recommendation; Haynes first raised the issue in her objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 2 10 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Haynes consented to nonjury trial of both her sex discrimination and her age discrimination claims before the magistrate judge. The aforementioned Joint Preliminary Statement and Scheduling Order was signed by the attorneys of record for both parties and filed with the court. That Joint Preliminary Statement and Scheduling Order clearly submitted to the magistrate judge for decision both the sex claim and the age claim. In the language of the Joint Preliminary Statement and Scheduling Order itself, [t]he issue presented to the Court is whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff by reason of age or sex. In context, the language presented to the Court clearly submitted the age claim as well as the Title VII sex claim to the magistrate judge for a bench trial. 11 Although a waiver of a valid jury demand  'is not to be lightly inferred' , Dell'Orfano v. Romano, 962 F.2d 199, 202 (2d Cir.1992) (citation omitted), and waivers should be scrutinized  'with the utmost care' , Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 599, 126 L.Ed.2d 564 (1993), we have no difficulty in this case finding a clear consent to a nonjury trial before the magistrate judge. 3 12