Opinion ID: 525654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Darrell's Claim to Benefits:

Text: 22 Pursuant to federal regulations in effect at the time of Darrell's application, a displaced person entitled to replacement-housing benefits had to be the head of a Navajo or Hopi household residing within the JUA and relocated as a consequence of the Settlement Act. 25 C.F.R. Sec. 700.147 (1982). Residency was established by fulfilling either of the following criteria: 23 (1) Current Occupancy. 24 (2) Maintenance of substantial recurring contacts with an identifiable homesite although the individual is temporarily away for any of the following reasons:(i) Employment.... 25 (ii) Education.... 26 Id. Sec. 700.97. 27 The NHIRC Certification Officer denied Darrell's application for benefits because: 28 (1) He did not qualify as a resident; 29 (2) He was not a current occupant; and 30 (3) He did not maintain substantial contacts with an identifiable homesite. 31 For all relevant periods of time up to August 11, 1978, the date of Darrell's marriage, he remained an unemancipated minor. Prior to this date, Darrell could not qualify as a head of household and, therefore, was not entitled to replacement-housing benefits in his own right. See Id. Sec. 700.69. The Certification Officer and the NHIRC, pursuant to an agency review of the Certification Officer's denial of benefits to Darrell, correctly concluded that any pre-emancipation claim that Darrell had to benefits was derived through his parents. 32 The NHIRC Hearing Officer on Darrell's agency appeal also determined that the fact that the Bedonis failed to include Darrell on their application while he was a minor did not give him the right to assert a separate ownership claim after his emancipation. The Hearing Officer concluded that such a result was not sanctioned by statute or regulation. This conclusion is neither arbitrary nor an incorrect interpretation of the law. 33 Darrell thus had standing to receive replacement-housing benefits after 1978--when he married and became a head of household. As to all relevant periods of time after Darrell was emancipated, the Hearing Officer determined that Darrell owned no homesite on the former JUA and was, for the most part, off JUA land for educational purposes. Darrell's contacts with the JUA were characterized by the Certification Officer as infrequent, of short duration and for social purposes. On internal administrative appeal, Darrell's contacts were described as so tangential as to be ephemeral and clearly recreational and social. These findings are not disputed and support a conclusion that Darrell, though a head of household, was not a resident after his emancipation. The NHIRC's determination in this regard was not arbitrary, capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence. 34 Plaintiffs cite two bases for reversible error, both of which are meritless. First, they argue that Darrell was a resident as defined by Arizona law, i.e., residence ... [of a]n infant ... is that of his parents. In re Webb's Adoption, 65 Ariz. 176, 177 P.2d 222 (1947). Here, as described above, Darrell's pre-emancipation residency is irrelevant. Furthermore, federal statutory law defines residency for the purposes of conferring replacement-housing benefits and would preempt state law. The NHIRC's interpretation of its regulation is not incorrect. 35 Second, plaintiffs assert that the NHIRC failed to follow its own internal rules in the NHIRC Management Manual. Pursuant to subsection 206.62 of the Manual, an applicant is eligible for replacement-housing benefits if he ceased to be a dependent and becomes a head of a household before the parent signed the Relocation Contract. Darrell satisfied this criterion. As pointed out by the NHIRC, however, this is but one of two criteria. The applicant must also qualify as a resident as a threshold matter. See NHIRC Management Manual Sec. 206.6. As noted above, the NHIRC determined that Darrell failed in this regard and that determination was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or unsupported by substantial evidence. 36 Accordingly, we affirm the NHIRC's denial of replacement housing benefits to Darrell. 37