Opinion ID: 2334405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Truk Away

Text: Although the motion justice observed that this Court's opinion in Blue Cross I did not include an order directing her to award the successful bidder attorneys' fees, she decided nonetheless to award defendant reasonable attorneys' fees based solely upon her belief that our decision in Truk Away mandated such an award. The plaintiff argues that the motion justice misconstrued Truk Away, which it believes requires no such automatic award. We agree. It is well settled that attorneys' fees may not be appropriately awarded to the prevailing party absent contractual or statutory authorization. Insurance Company of North America v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 770 A.2d 403, 419 (R.I.2001). Generally, when such contractual, statutory or legal basis exists, the award of attorneys' fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial justice. Women's Development Corp. v. City of Central Falls, 764 A.2d 151, 162 (R.I.2001). In Truk Away, we noted that at common law and under our case law, there was no liability    for damages suffered by reason of an injunction erroneously granted, unless suit was maliciously brought. Truk Away, 643 A.2d at 816 (citing Johnson Wholesale Perfume Co. v. Blumen, 63 R.I. 485, 490, 9 A.2d 857, 859 (1939)). Because of our desire to avoid encountering another situation in which a damaged party such as the Macera Corporation (Macera)the successful bidder that was wrongfully enjoined in Truk Away has no means of legal redress, we held that, henceforth, a security would be required upon the issuance of injunctions of public contract awards, even in the absence of a finding of corruption or bad faith, to provide a means for an aggrieved party to collect costs and damages incurred as a result of a wrongful injunction. Id. [3] This new requirement, however, could not serve as a means of compensating Macera for the significant damages it suffered as a result of having been wrongfully enjoined because no bond had been posted. As such, in light of the unique circumstances of Truk Away, [4] we granted the only remedy available to us at that time: by virtue of our inherent power, we required that Truk Away pay Macera's usual costs and reasonable attorneys' fees for defending against the wrongful injunction and for prosecuting the appeal. Truk Away, 643 A.2d at 817. Contrary to the motion justice's reading of Truk Away in the present case, we did not hold that the posting of security we prospectively required in Truk Away would be available for the payment of attorneys' fees in all cases. Rather, it was precisely the unique facts of Truk Away that prompted us to award attorneys' fees specifically to Macera. Simply put, Truk Away does not provide an independent basis for awarding attorneys' fees. In addition, none of the unique circumstances that faced this Court in Truk Away are present here to require us to use our inherent power to award attorneys' fees to the defendant as we did Macera. There is no question that the plaintiff's bid was responsive and that the plaintiff had standing to challenge the award of the state's health insurance contract to United. Perhaps more importantly, here the plaintiff posted a bond. Therefore, unlike Macera, if the defendant had claimed damages as a consequence of being wrongfully enjoined, it could have sought to charge the bond and would not have been left without a means of compensation. Moreover, the facts of this case as found by the motion justice do not fall into any of the categories that might convince this Court to deviate from the American rule and award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. [5] Accordingly, we did not invoke our inherent powers to award the defendant reasonable attorneys' fees in Blue Cross I, and we do not do so here.