Opinion ID: 2367442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The federal precedents

Text: It seems clear under the line of federal precedents to which reference has been made that a recess appointment can be made upon the expiration of a stated term. But there is no provision in the Constitution of the United States providing that public officers shall hold their offices until their successors shall be qualified and this is a fundamental difference. In Staebler v. Carter , D.C.D.C., 464 F.Supp. 585 (1979), cited by the Relator as containing an exhaustive review of the law on this topic, the district court found that a statutory holdover provision, contained in the Federal Election Campaign Act at 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(2)(B), could not be construed to limit the President's constitutional recess power and that even if the statute were so intended, such an attempt would produce an almost certainly unconstitutional result. Id. at 591. In Staebler, the holdover incumbent, a member of the Federal Election Commission, had contended that the statutory holdover provision limited the exercise of the recess appointment power and, further, that the terms of the statute provided for appointment only with senatorial consent. The Court determined, assuming arguendo that the incumbent's assertions were correct, that such a broad construction of the statute would result in an unconstitutional constraint on the recess appointment power. Further, it found that an examination of the language of the statute did not support that interpretation of legislative intent. The Court reinforced its conclusion through the use of secondary materials: legislative history, state court decisions, past executive custom and practice, and constitutional purpose and scheme. It said that the legislative history of the statute did not provide significant information and that the state court decisions were too inconsistent to be persuasive. However, the Court found that a history of executive practices was somewhat helpful although in prior exercise of the recess power this precise situation had rarely been encountered. The Court noted these prior recess appointments had previously gone unchallenged by the Senate and generally resulted in ultimate confirmation. Finally, and most pivotal, the Court considered the relationship of the statute to the purpose of the constitutional recess appointment clause and the constitutional system of checks and balances. The incumbent had argued that the recess appointment clause was designed to operate only when no person was available to occupy an office, that its sole purpose was to prevent a hiatus in public functions. However, the Court was persuaded that the framers did not intend this clause to have subordinate standing in the constitutional scheme as a lesser method of appointment. It found that any intent on the part of the framers to limit the operation of the power was clearly expressed in the restrictions contained in the clause itself. [T]hey [the limitations] may be presumed to express the view of the framers concerning the degree to which the executive authority in this area was to be circumscribed. There is no justification for implying additional restrictions not supported by the constitutional language. Ibid. at 597. The Court concluded that the constitutional scheme of checks and balances favored the Executive regarding this particular statute, not only because of the primary role of the Executive in appointments but also because this statute created a most sensitive political body. Further, validation of the right of a holdover commissioner would upset the carefully designed statutory scheme and the executive branch would be without constitutional means to protect its powers from Congressional usurpation. We can readily determine that the premises for the Staebler decision are entirely absent in this case. We are not examining the effect of a statutory limitation on a constitutional power. We are evaluating the effect of two constitutional provisions which must be reconciled if reasonably possible. To repeat the summary of the law contained in the Opinion of the Justices, Del.Supr., 330 A.2d 764, 766-67 (1974): As was stated in State v. Roberts, Del.Supr., 282 A.2d 603, 606 (1971): `Cardinal are the rules that the Constitution and each part thereof must be harmonized and construed as a whole; that it cannot be presumed that any clause of the Constitution is intended to be without full force and effect.' And in Opinion of the Justices, Del., 225 A.2d 481, 484 (1966), the controlling precepts are stated as follows: `The applicable rules of construction require that effect be given, if possible, to the whole Constitution and to every word thereof. If different portions of the Constitution seem to conflict, they must be harmonized if possible. That construction must be favored which will render every word of the instrument operative; and that construction must be avoided which would make any provision idle and nugatory. Every provision of the Constitution must be construed, whenever possible, to give effect to every other provision. Otherwise stated, whenever avoidable, no constitutional provisions should be so construed as to nullify, or substantially impair, any other constitutional provision or to produce an irrational result.' The framers of our Constitution clearly displayed an intent to affect expired terms by enacting Article XV, § 5. One effect could limit the recess appointment power found in Article III, § 9. Just such a limiting effect was noted by this Court in State ex rel. Satterthwaite v. Highfield, Del. Supr., 152 A. 45, 52, n. 1 (1930), although further analysis was not necessary to the decision in that case. Thus, on the crucial issue, the federal precedents, which arise in a context without a constitutional holdover provision, are simply not helpful.