Opinion ID: 2791314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Waterfront Terminals

Text: The question remains whether Continentalʹs stevedoring activities take place at an ʺother waterfront terminal.ʺ N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9806. The 112 Warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ if it is a ʺwarehouse, depot or other terminalʺ that ʺis located within [1,000] yards of any pier . . . and . . . is used for waterborne freight in whole or substantial part.ʺ Id. ‐ 14 ‐ Continental argues that the 112 Warehouse is not within 1,000 yards of a ʺpierʺ because a ʺpierʺ is limited to structures located on the water that are used for loading and unloading waterborne freight from vessels. Under Continentalʹs definition, a pier does not include the area where containers are stored after being removed from a vessel. Thus, according to Continental, the correct measurement should be from the Global Marine Terminal stringpiece that directly abuts the water (the actual structure next to which boats dock) to the corner of the 112 Warehouse, which is 1,119.70 yards. Continental contends that the Container Yard that is part of the Global Marine Terminal should not be included. The Commission argues that a ʺpierʺ is an area where waterborne freight is loaded, unloaded, and stored, including any area where containers are stored once removed from the vessel. The Commission contends that the correct measurement is from the Global Marine Terminal fence line (the border of the Container Yard where containers are stored) to the corner of the 112 Warehouse. It is undisputed that the distance from the Global Marine Terminal fence line to the corner of the 112 Warehouse is 521.99 yards. ‐ 15 ‐ The district court held that the 112 Warehouse is an ʺother waterfront terminalʺ because it is located within 1,000 yards of a ʺpier.ʺ Continental Terminals, Inc., 2013 WL 5477487, at . Specifically, the district court found that the ʺpierʺ included the Container Yard within the Global Marine Terminal, and that therefore the correct measurement was from the Global Marine Terminal fence line to the corner of the 112 Warehouse. Id. Using that pinpoint, the 112 Warehouse lies within 1,000 yards of a ʺpier.ʺ We agree. As the district court noted, the definition of ʺpierʺ includes a ʺwharf.ʺ Id. at  (relying on N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9806). While a ʺwharfʺ is not defined in section 9806, it is defined in Blackʹs Law Dictionary as a ʺstructure on the margin of navigable waters, alongside of which vessels can be brought for the sake of being conveniently loaded or unloaded, or a space of ground, artificially prepared, for the reception of merchandise from a ship or vessel, so as to promote the discharge of such vessel.ʺ Blackʹs Law Dictionary 1767 (4th ed. 1951) (emphasis added); see Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 132 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (2012) (holding that ʺ[w]hen a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning,ʺ and then consulting ʺdictionaries in use when Congress enacted [statute in question]ʺ for ordinary meaning); see also The Maritime and ‐ 16 ‐ Shipping Dictionary 654 (2006 ed.) (defining ʺwharfʺ as ʺ[a] structure of open, rather than solid construction, along a shore or bank which provides berthing for ships and which generally provides cargo‐handling facilities. A platform alongside navigable water where ships are loaded and unloaded.ʺ); Oxford‐ English Dictionary Vol. XX 185 (2d ed. 1989) (defining ʺwharfʺ as ʺ[a] place raised or otherwise marked out on which stuff is deposited for subsequent removal to another placeʺ). Because a ʺwharfʺ includes the area where containers are temporarily placed upon discharge while awaiting removal to another location, the Container Yard at the Global Marine Terminal is part of a ʺpier.ʺ Therefore, the Commission correctly used the fence line at the Container Yard as the point of measurement, which is 521.99 yards from the corner of the 112 Warehouse. In urging otherwise, Continental argues that the Commissionʹs interpretation equates a pier with a marine terminal, rendering the latter term superfluous under the Act. We disagree. A ʺmarine terminalʺ is statutorily defined as ʺan area which includes piers, which is used primarily for the moving, warehousing, distributing or packaging of waterborne freight or freight from such piers, and which, inclusive of such piers, is under common ownership or control.ʺ N.Y. Unconsol. Laws § 9905(10). Thus, a marine terminal is distinct ‐ 17 ‐ from a pier because it consists of a larger area, including piers, which is under common ownership or control. Further, the movement of waterborne freight within a marine terminal is subject to more stringent licensing and registration requirements under the Act. Compare id. § 9806 (defining ʺother waterfront terminalʺ to include any warehouse located within 1,000 yards of a pier ʺand which is used for waterborne freight in whole or substantial partʺ (emphasis added)), with id. § 9905(10) (defining ʺother waterfront terminalʺ to include any warehouse located in a marine terminal and ʺany part of which is used by any person to perform labor or services involving, or incidental to, the movement of waterborne freightʺ (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we identify no error in the Commissionʹs interpretation. Our conclusion is consistent with the modern‐day realities of the handling of waterborne freight and port operations. Containerized freight is carried in large container ships, large cranes are used, and piers have expanded to accommodate the high volume of containers discharged from vessels. There must be room for ʺthe reception of merchandise,ʺ Blackʹs Law Dictionary 1767, and thus there must be storage areas adjacent to the stringpieces to which ‐ 18 ‐ containers can be moved and held temporarily until they can be carried away.7 These storage areas ‐‐ such as the Container Yard at the Global Marine Terminal ‐‐ are an important part of the ʺpierʺ as they facilitate the high‐volume discharge of merchandise from container ships. See Continental Terminals, Inc. v. Waterfront Commʹn of N.Y. Harbor, 486 F. Supp. 1110, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that Continentalʹs definition of a ʺpierʺ as being limited to the stringpiece is ʺexcessively restrictiveʺ); Mahoney v. City of Chelsea, 478 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (experts agreeing that ʺcommercial dockʺ includes ʺa storage area to which the cargo can be efficiently moved from the stringpiece and where it can be held until it is carried awayʺ). Because the 112 Warehouse is within 1,000 yards of a ʺpier,ʺ it is an ʺother waterfront terminal,ʺ and Continental is within the jurisdiction of the Commission.8 7 As the Supreme Court has noted, ʺ[c]ontainerization permits the time‐consuming work of stowage and unstowage to be performed on land in the absence of the vessel. The use of containerized ships has reduced the costly time the vessel must be in port and the amount of manpower required to get the cargo onto the vessel. In effect, the operation of loading and unloading has been moved shoreward; the container is a modern substitute for the hold of the vessel.ʺ Ne. Marine Terminal Co., 432 U.S. at 270. 8 In light of our conclusion that the Commissionʹs first pinpoint, the fence line at the Container Yard, is within 1,000 yards of the 112 Warehouse, we do not discuss the second and third pinpoints relied upon by the Commission. ‐ 19 ‐