Opinion ID: 1436435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Monica and Benny Thomas

Text: Bar Counsel alleged that Maignan had represented Monica and Benny Thomas in connection with a case in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County and that he agreed to represent the Thomases in an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Maignan was paid $110 and an appeal was noted in September, 2002. Maignan failed to file an Information Report, as required by Maryland Rule 8-205, however, and, on or about October 25, 2002, the appeal was dismissed. Bar Counsel contended that notice of the order of dismissal and the ultimate mandate were forwarded to Maignan and that Maignan failed to disclose the dismissal to the Thomases. In July, 2003, according to Bar Counsel, Maignan advised Mr. Thomas that, to continue with the appeal, Thomas would have to pay $3,500 plus $1,000 on an outstanding balance. In August, 2003, the Thomases paid Maignan $3,000 to pursue the appeal. In October and November, a nonlawyer employee, Erica Gayle, prepared a brief to be filed in the appeal, for which the Thomases were charged $100/hour. On November 24, 2003, Maignan informed the Thomases that he was ceasing work on the appeal because of their failure to tender payment on overdue invoices. Complaining that Maignan had inappropriately charged the Thomases for work on an appeal that had already been dismissed, refused to refund the moneys paid by them, and failed to supervise Ms. Gayle, Bar Counsel charged Maignan with violations of MRPC 1.1 (Competent representation), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4(a) and (b) (Keeping client informed), 1.5 (Reasonable fee), 1.16(d) (Returning unearned fee), 5.1 (Assuring professional conduct by lawyer-employees), 5.3 (Assuring professional conduct by nonlawyer employees), 8.4(a) (Violating other MRPC), 8.4(c) (Dishonest conduct), and 8.4(d) (Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice). After hearing evidence from the Thomases and Maignan, Judge Jackson determined, as he had with respect to the Fuller complaint, that Bar Counsel had failed to prove any of the alleged violations. He found that, in March, 2002, the Thomases retained Maignan to represent them in a lawsuit pending in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County against Mercedes Benz Credit Corporation and other entities. In September, 2002, the action was dismissed, and Maignan, on behalf of the Thomases, filed a notice of appeal, for which he was paid or reimbursed $110. The retainer agreement that the parties had did not include the appeal, and, when Maignan advised that he would not continue with the appeal unless the balance then due him was paid, Ms. Thomas informed Maignan that the Thomases would be handling the appeal pro se. Judge Jackson made no finding as to when that conversation took place. Although neither of the Thomases was a lawyer, Ms. Thomas had worked in some capacity for the U.S. Department of Justice and one or both of them had litigated pro se in the past. It appears that neither Maignan nor the Thomases ever filed an Information Report with the Court of Special Appeals, which is required in civil cases by Maryland Rule 8-205. As a result, the appellate court, on October 25, 2002, dismissed the appeal. The mandate reflecting that dismissal was issued a month later, on November 25. Although Maignan's name appears on both the notice of dismissal and the mandate, Maignan denied receiving those documents, and Judge Jackson noted that there was no evidence that the Respondent received the documents . . . [3] Maignan, it thus appears, was unaware at the time that the appeal had been dismissed. In July, 2003, the Thomases advised Maignan that the appeal was ongoing and that their brief was due on September 1. Maignan agreed to prepare the brief if the Thomases paid (1) money owed for the Circuit Court case, (2) money owed for his representation of the Thomases' son in a different matter, and (3) a retainer for writing the appellate brief. In August, the Thomases paid Maignan $3,000, of which $1,000 was allocated to preparation of the brief, and advised that the time for filing the brief had been extended to December. Maignan testified that he prepared a brief, had it printed, and sent a copy to Mr. Thomas, but at some point noticed that it had no case number, and that, when he called the Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals to get the case number, he was informed that the appeal had been dismissed. He relayed that information to Ms. Thomas, who denied that the appeal had been dismissed. Maignan did no further work and billed nothing more than the $1,000 paid in August. Upon these findings, Judge Jackson concluded that Maignan had never actually represented the Thomases in the appeal, and, for that reason, had not committed any of the violations alleged by Bar Counsel. He stated: An attorney has a duty to keep himself informed as to the status of a case, but in the instant case Respondent did not represent the Thomases on the appeal of the Mercedes Benz matter since they initially elected to pursue the appeal in proper person. The Respondent reasonably relied upon the representations of the Thomases that they were actively pursuing the appeal because he thought he was preparing an appellate brief due initially on September 1, 2003 and extended until December 2003. The Respondent believed he could rely upon the representations made by the Thomases since they were active litigators with a history of pro se filings. This Court recommends these charges be dismissed and no disciplinary violations found. Bar Counsel excepts to Judge Jackson's failure to find any violations. He complains that the Judge relied exclusively on the testimony of the Respondent and gave no credence to the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas nor to the documentary evidence presented. The short answer to Bar Counsel's complaint is that Judge Jackson had every right to make that kind of credibility determination. Paraphrasing what we said recently in Attorney Grievance v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006), we accept a hearing judge's findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous, precisely because he or she is in the best position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of the witnesses. Some of the evidence was in dispute  the stories told by Maignan and the Thomases differed in some respects. Judge Jackson had the opportunity to evaluate their credibility, and we have no occasion, on this record, to second-guess that evaluation. Judge Jackson could find that, although Maignan actually filed the notice of appeal, he properly relied on the Thomases' statement that they would thereafter handle the appeal pro se, that he never did receive notice of the dismissal, that, when asked and paid to do so, he prepared a brief, but that he ceased work when advised by the Court of Special Appeals that the appeal had been dismissed. Upon those findings, the judge could properly conclude that Bar Counsel had failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the alleged violations. We shall therefore overrule Bar Counsel's exceptions and dismiss that aspect of the petition as well.