Opinion ID: 706930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Failure To Advise of a Possible Order of Restitution

Text: 41 Rule 11 provides, inter alia, that before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands ... the maximum possible penalty provided by law, ... and ... that the court may ... order the defendant to make restitution to any victim of the offense. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) (emphasis added). This Rule is designed to ensure that a defendant's plea of guilty is a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. United States v. Renaud, 999 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1169, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969). [A]t bottom, the colloquy required by Rule 11 is meant to ensure that the defendant is aware of the consequences of his plea. United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir.1989) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we have generally required strict adherence to the provisions of the Rule. See, e.g., United States v. Renaud, 999 F.2d at 624; United States v. Lora, 895 F.2d 878, 880 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Gonzalez, 820 F.2d 575, 578 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam). 42 Although harmless-error analysis applies to violations of Rule 11, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(h) (Any variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.), it is fair to say that the kinds of Rule 11 violations which might be found to constitute harmless error upon direct appeal are fairly limited, 1983 Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11. The importance of ensuring that the defendant be aware of the consequences of pleading guilty has led us to exercise considerable caution before finding that an omission from the court's advice to the defendant, required by Rule 11(c)(1), as to the minimum and maximum penalties prescribed by law, was harmless. We ordinarily do not consider an understatement of the maximum authorized penalty, combined with the sentencing of the defendant to a penalty greater than that of which he was advised, to be an error that is harmless. See United States v. Renaud, 999 F.2d at 625; id. at 624-25 (imposition of three-year term of supervised release after court informed defendant that maximum was one year was harmless error only because the defendant took the position that even upon receiving correct information he did not want to withdraw his plea); see also United States v. Khan, 857 F.2d 85, 86-88 (2d Cir.1988) (discussed in detail below), modified on reh'g, 869 F.2d 661 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028, 111 S.Ct. 682, 112 L.Ed.2d 674 (1991). But see United States v. Taddeo, 987 F.2d 139, 140-41 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (error was harmless where court's failure to advise defendant of the maximum penalties was corrected at plea hearing in time to allow withdrawal of plea), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2451, 124 L.Ed.2d 667 (1993); United States v. Saenz, 969 F.2d 294, 296-98 (7th Cir.1992) (failure to advise of minimum eight-year supervised-release term was harmless error in light of advice that defendant could receive a maximum supervised-release term of life). 43 In Khan, we held that the district court's failure to advise a defendant of the possibility that his sentence could include an order of restitution, followed by a sentence that included such an order, was not harmless error. In the plea hearing in Khan, there apparently was no evidence to suggest that the defendant had any understanding, prior to entering his plea, that an order of restitution was a possible consequence of his plea agreement. The district court did not indicate at the plea hearing that the sentence might include a restitution order, nor did it ask the defendant whether he understood that such an order was a possibility. In addition, the government stated that as part of its plea agreement with the defendant, the government did not 'intend to ask for any victim restitution.'  857 F.2d at 86-88. We held that the court's error in failing to advise Khan that his sentence might include an order of restitution could not be deemed harmless because his decision to plead guilty might have been different had the possibility of such an order been explained to him. See id. at 87-88. 44 In the present case, though the communications between Showerman's attorney and the probation department reflect counsel's awareness that Showerman had agreed to make restitution, the record does not demonstrate that Showerman himself, at the time of the Plea Agreement or of his plea, understood that there was a possibility that the court could include a restitution order in his sentence. At the plea hearing, in summarizing the punishment that could be imposed on Showerman if he pleaded guilty, the court itself did not mention restitution. Following its own summary, the court asked Showerman, You understand all of that to be the consequences of your plea here? Showerman answered, Yes. Further, the punishments listed in Paragraph 2 of the Plea Agreement focused principally on the extent of incarceration, fine, and supervision that could be included in the sentence, without mentioning the possible inclusion of an order of restitution. Although Paragraph 8 of the Agreement dealt with restitution, that paragraph expressed the defendant's agreement to make restitution; it made no reference to the court's power to order restitution as part of the sentence. And when, at the court's request, the AUSA summarized the Plea Agreement, that summary did not include any mention of restitution. The court asked, Mr. Showerman, is that your understanding of the plea agreement as articulated by the Assistant United States Attorney? Showerman responded, Yes. If indeed Showerman understood the Agreement to be in accordance with the AUSA's description, which contained no mention of restitution, and understood the court to have explained the consequences of his plea, it is entirely possible that he did not understand that his sentence could include an order of restitution. We conclude that the district court's error was not harmless.