Opinion ID: 2598959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Summary judgment was proper as Ozawa failed to avail himself of an available remedy in federal court

Text: Ozawa argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim for retaliatory discharge because terminating an employee for organizing his coworkers to collectively seek increased compensation violates the public policy of this state and, thus, should constitute an additional exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Ozawa cites to NRS 614.090, NRS 613.220, and the National Labor Relations Act as support for the exception he seeks to the at-will employment doctrine. He argues that failing to protect this public policy will have a chilling effect on Nevada employees who might seek collectively to better their compensation or working conditions. Vision Airlines, however, argues that the district court correctly dismissed the retaliatory discharge claim because termination for seeking increased compensation does not constitute an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. This court reviews an order granting summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 731, 121 P.3d at 1031. Since employees in Nevada are presumed to be at-will, an employer can dismiss an at-will employee with or without cause, so long as the dismissal does not offend this state's public policy. State of Nevada v. Dist. Ct. (Anzalone). 118 Nev. 140, 151, 42 P.3d 233, 240 (2002). While this court has recognized certain exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, see D'Angelo v. Gardner, 107 Nev. 704, 719, 819 P.2d 206, 216 (1991) (adopting an exception based on the public policy of this state favor[ing] safe employment practices and the protection of the health and safety of workers on the job), these exceptions are severely limited to those rare and exceptional cases where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy. Sands Regent v. Valgardson, 105 Nev. 436, 440, 777 P.2d 898, 900 (1989) (declining to create an additional exception to the at-will employment doctrine for age discrimination). Further, this court will not recognize an action for tortious discharge when a plaintiff has an adequate, comprehensive, statutory remedy. D'Angelo, 107 Nev. at 720-22, 819 P.2d at 217-18. Here, we decline to recognize the claim for tortious discharge. While Ozawa has identified NRS 614.090 [2] and NRS 613.220 [3] as support for his contention that it is the public policy of this state to protect the ability of employees to enhance or protect the conditions of their employment, we have previously explained that the mere identification of a public policy is not the entire analysis. See D'Angelo, 107 Nev. at 719-20, 819 P.2d at 216-17 (noting that a determination that public policy has been violated does not end the matter of whether an additional exception to the at-will employment doctrine should be recognized). In D'Angelo, this court explained that it will not recognize a claim for tortious discharge when an adequate statutory remedy already exists, as it would be unfair to a defendant to allow additional tort remedies under such circumstances. 107 Nev. at 720, 819 P.2d at 217. Having reviewed the parties' briefs and researched the availability of alternative remedies, we conclude that Ozawa had an alternative remedy under the federal Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (2006). Specifically, 45 U.S.C. section 152 Fourth sets forth in relevant part that [e]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and that it is unlawful for an airline to interfere with an employee's efforts to organize or participate in a labor union. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this provision as addressing primarily the precertification rights and freedoms of unorganized employees. TWA, Inc. v. Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1225, 103 L.Ed.2d 456 (1989). Further, federal courts have read in an implied private right of action from this provision in recognition that since the National Mediation Board lacks authority to redress [an allegedly wrongful discharge for labor union activity], and since there is apparently ... no board of adjustment to which these grievances might be brought, [the federal courts are] not without power to decide this case. Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Etc. v. Altair Airlines, 481 F.Supp. 1359, 1360 (E.D.Pa. 1979). Determinative in our resolution of this matter is the fact that this private right of action is recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Fennessy v. Southwest Airlines, 91 F.3d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1996); but see Carmack v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 486 F.Supp.2d 58, 94 (D.Mass.2007) (noting that the existence of a private right of action has not been finally decided in the First or Fifth Circuits). Thus, we conclude that Ozawa had the opportunity to avail himself of this remedy but did not. Accordingly, because Ozawa had an adequate remedy, we affirm the district court order in Docket No. 49435 granting summary judgment on his claim for tortious discharge. [4] D'Angelo, 107 Nev. at 720-22, 819 P.2d at 217-18.