Opinion ID: 654597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severability of the Ordinance

Text: 14 Courts considering constitutional challenges to statutes often analyze standing problems in terms of the severability doctrine. Under this principle, when a court determines the legislature intended the challenged sections of a statute to operate independently of the unchallenged sections and finds these sections can so operate, it will consider only the challenged sections, leaving the remainder of the statute intact. SeeUnited States v. Raines, 362 U.S. at 23, 80 S.Ct. at 523-24; 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3531.9, at 585 (2d ed. 1984). Severing statutes to limit standing promotes the twin goals of avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication and sharpening the presentation of the issues. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2873-74, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). 5 15 The severability doctrine governs whether the Contractors have standing to challenge the entire Ordinance, or just those provisions of the Ordinance affecting the construction industry. As we have noted, the Contractors only have a personal interest in obtaining construction contracts because these are the only types of contracts they are ready and able to bid on within the meaning of Northeastern Florida, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2303. The Contractors do not dispute this fact but contend they should be allowed to challenge the Ordinance in its entirety, because the construction provisions are inseverable from the remainder of the statute. 16 Because [s]everability of a local ordinance is a question of state law, City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 2152, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), we look to Pennsylvania law in determining whether the Ordinance is severable. As evidenced by its general severability provision, 1 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 1925 (Supp.1991), Pennsylvania law favors severability. Commonwealth Dept. of Educ. v. First School, 471 Pa. 471, 478, 370 A.2d 702, 705 (1977). 6 Additionally, there is a presumption in favor of severability where, as here, the Ordinance contains a specific severability provision. Sec. 17-508. 7 17 Equipped with these principles, we must decide whether the Ordinance's provisions on different types of contracts are distinct and not so interwoven as to be inseparable. Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 320, 196 A.2d 664, 666 (1964). The Saulsbury standard turns largely on functional concerns. Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court severed a statute authorizing financial aid to sectarian and nonsectarian private schools because the statute was readily capable of being administered along a sectarian-nonsectarian dichotomy. First School, 471 Pa. at 479, 370 A.2d at 706. Accordingly, the court held aid could continue to be provided to nonsectarian schools despite the fact that aid to sectarian schools violated the Establishment Clause. Id. We applied similar reasoning in severing portions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 978 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir.1992), finding [t]he basic statutory scheme remains intact and can operate independently of the unconstitutional sections. 18 In urging the Ordinance is not severable, the Contractors rely on Wyoming v. Oklahoma, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 789, 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). There, the Supreme Court considered a Commerce Clause challenge to an Oklahoma statute requiring all entities providing electric power for sale to the consumer in Oklahoma and generating said power from coal-fired plants located in Oklahoma [to] burn a mixture of coal that contains a minimum of ten percent Oklahoma mined coal.... --- U.S. at ---- n. 1, 112 S.Ct. at 793 n. 1. The state of Oklahoma urged the Court to construe the statute as constitutional when applied to a state-owned utility under the market participant exception to the Commerce Clause, a ruling that would require severing application of the statute to private utilities. Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court held: 19 there are no parts or separate provisions in the invalid [section] of the Act [because] it applies to all entities providing electric power for sale to the consumer in Oklahoma and commands them to purchase 10% Oklahoma-mined coal. Nothing remains to be saved once that provision is stricken. Accordingly, the Act must stand or fall as a whole. 20 --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 803. The Contractors argue Wyoming dictates a finding of inseverability in this case because, like the statute there, the Ordinance applies to all city contracts. 21 In assessing this contention, we look to the language of the Ordinance. The Ordinance provides it applies to: all types of city contracts, Sec. 17-502(2), and defines Types of City Contracts to include: all city contracts, whether competitively bid or negotiated, according to the following classes: (a) Vending, to include material, equipment, services and supplies; (b) Construction; and (c) Personal and professional services, Sec. 17-501(6). 22 These provisions reveal the Ordinance differs critically from the Oklahoma statute at issue in Wyoming. Here, the challenged and unchallenged provisions appear in different subsections, containing the separate provisions the Supreme Court found lacking in the Oklahoma statute. Also, the severability provision in the Ordinance is broader than that in the Oklahoma statute. The provision there only authorized severance of any part or provision of the statute found void, while the Ordinance directs severance of any section, subsection, clause, sentence or phrase. Sec. 17-508. Because the provisions dealing with non-construction contracts constitute subsections of the Ordinance, Sec. 17-508 authorizes severing these provisions. 23 Moreover, the Ordinance makes clear that severance of the construction provisions would not prevent the non-construction provisions from continuing to operate. It expressly provides that the percentage goals for minority-owned and women-owned businesses, and businesses owned by handicapped persons, shall be calculated by examining independently each type of City contract for each agency which lets such contracts. Sec. 17-503. This language demonstrates severance is feasible and indicates City Council envisioned the Ordinance would be administered separately for each type of contract. Therefore, we hold the provisions of the Ordinance dealing with construction contracts are severable from the remainder of the Ordinance. Because the Contractors only have a personal stake in the construction contract provisions, we must limit our review to these provisions unless we find the Contractors have standing to assert the rights of other businesses affected by the sections of the Ordinance dealing with contracts for vending and services.