Opinion ID: 4558795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction over Differing Claims

Text: The Contract Disputes Act (“CDA”), 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101– 09, “provides for the resolution of contract disputes arising between the government and contractors.” England v. The Swanson Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004). One prerequisite for the exercise of CDA jurisdiction by the Court of Federal Claims “is a final decision by a contracting officer on a valid claim.” Northrop Grumman Computing Sys., Inc. v. United States, 709 F.3d 1107, 1111–12 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (emphases omitted); see 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a). Although “a CDA claim need not be submitted in any particular form or use any particular wording, it must contain a clear and unequivocal statement that gives the contracting Case: 19-2125 Document: 30 Page: 9 Filed: 08/26/2020 KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE WEST CO. v. UNITED STATES 9 officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim.” M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Hejran Hejrat Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 930 F.3d 1354, 1357–59 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Here, there is no dispute that Kiewit properly presented its constructive change claim to the contracting officer. See J.A. 39, 397–99. Nor is there any dispute that the contracting officer issued a final decision on that claim. See J.A. 45. The government contends, however, that the Court of Federal Claims “erred in exercising jurisdiction over Kiewit’s differing site condition claim because Kiewit failed to submit a certified claim for a differing site condition to the contracting officer and, consequently, the contracting officer never issued a final decision upon such a claim.” Br. of Appellee 24. As we have previously made clear, two claims may be considered the “same” for CDA jurisdictional purposes if “they arise from the same operative facts, claim essentially the same relief, and merely assert differing legal theories for that recovery.” Scott Timber, 333 F.3d at 1365; see K- Con, 778 F.3d at 1006 (explaining that “merely adding factual details or legal argumentation does not create a different claim, but presenting a materially different factual or legal theory . . . does create a different claim”). Here, we need not, and therefore do not, resolve the question of whether Kiewit’s differing site condition and constructive change claims should be considered separate claims for CDA jurisdictional purposes. Because Kiewit’s request for an equitable adjustment—which turns on the proper interpretation of solicitation provision RSS 105.06—can adequately be assessed under a constructive change rubric, it is unnecessary to consider its alternative theory of recovery based upon an alleged differing site condition. See, e.g., States Roofing Corp. v. Winter, 587 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (resolving the parties’ “divergent interpretation[s]” of solicitation language and concluding that the Case: 19-2125 Document: 30 Page: 10 Filed: 08/26/2020 10 KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE WEST CO. v. UNITED STATES contracting agency’s requirement that the contractor perform according to the agency’s erroneous interpretation of that language was a constructive change to the contract); Lockheed Martin IR Imaging Sys., Inc. v. West, 108 F.3d 319, 322–24 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (accepting a contractor’s reasonable interpretation of a solicitation provision and concluding that the contracting agency’s contrary interpretation effected a constructive change); Aydin Corp. v. Widnall, 61 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“To identify a constructive change, this court consults the contract language.”).