Opinion ID: 1722207
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Heading: We deal first with a preliminary matter which seems to disturb the parties but which we feel is without significance under the facts before us.

Text: Big Jim's argues the right of the town to pass the ordinances depends upon power granted local authorities under the Home Rule Amendment to the Iowa Constitution and subsequent statutory enactments. Big Jim's further insists liquor control is among the powers the city had not elected to exercise under the optional provisions of the statute. See Chapter 1088, § 9, Acts of the 64th G.A. as amended by Chapter 1212, § 1, Acts of the 65th G.A. (1974). Cf. City of Burlington v. Citizens to Protect Our Freedoms, 214 N.W.2d 139, 140 (Iowa 1974). We give this matter no further consideration because we conclude the town's power to legislate as it did does not depend on home rule authority. The power of the State to regulate the liquor business is broad and comprehensive, much more so than in the conduct of other private endeavors. The general rule is stated this way in 45 Am.Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 24 at 503 (1969): The state has far broader power and greater latitude to regulate and restrict the use, distribution, or consumption of liquor than to regulate or restrict ordinary business, because of the effect of the former on the health and welfare of the public. This concept was formidably strengthened by the 21st Amendment to the federal constitution, which included this language: Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. In commenting on this matter in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114, 93 S.Ct. 390, 395, 34 L.Ed.2d 342, 349-350 (1972) the Supreme Court of the United States had this to say: While the States, vested as they are with general police power, require no specific grant of authority in the Federal Constitution to legislate with respect to matters traditionally within the scope of the police power, the broad sweep of the Twenty-first Amendment has been recognized as conferring something more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals.    These decisions did not go so far as to hold or say that the Twenty-first Amendment supersedes all other provisions of the United States Constitution in the area of liquor regulations.    But the case for upholding state regulation in the area covered by the Twenty-first Amendment is undoubtedly strengthened by that enactment   . Generally on the broad power to regulate beer or liquor operations see State v. Dahnke, 244 Iowa 599, 602, 57 N.W.2d 553, 555 (1953); State v. Arluno, 222 Iowa 1, 14, 268 N.W. 179, 185 (1936); DuPont v. Planning & Zoning Com'n, 156 Conn. 213, 240 A.2d 899, 902 (1968); State ex rel. Hart v. Parham, 412 P.2d 142, 147 (Okl.1966); Miller v. Zoning Com'n, 135 Conn. 405, 65 A.2d 577, 578 (1949); State ex rel. Galle v. City of New Orleans, 113 La. 371, 36 So. 999, 1003 (1904); cf. Craig et al. v. Boren et al., ___ U.S. ___, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976). Even conceding the authority of the State, Big Jim's contends this power is not delegable to municipalities. We do not agree. We hold § 123.39 includes a proper and valid delegation of authority to cities and towns. It provides in part: Local authorities shall have the power to suspend any retail beer permit or liquor control license for a violation of any ordinance or regulation adopted by such local authority. Local authorities are empowered to adopt ordinances or regulations for the location of the premises of retail beer and liquor control licensed establishments and are empowered to adopt ordinances, not in conflict with the provisions of this chapter and that do not diminish the hours during which beer or alcoholic beverages may be sold or consumed at retail, governing any other activities or matters which may affect the retail sale and consumption of beer and alcoholic liquor and the health, welfare and morals of the community involved.  (Emphasis supplied.) In an early case this court said in State ex rel . Witter v. Forkner, 94 Iowa 1, 13, 62 N.W. 772, 775-776 (1895): That it is competent for the legislature to empower municipalities to make ordinances and adopt regulations for controlling, licensing, or prohibiting the traffic in intoxicating liquors, is plain, and is not questioned in this case. It is entirely in accord with the principle of local self-government that the power to enact police regulations on matters so closely connected with the good order and prosperity of a city should be lodged with those best qualified to judge of measures adapted to meet the emergencies of these particular situations. And it is competent for the legislature, in its wisdom, to invest them with the authority necessary to the administration of the special purposes of their creation. Cf. Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal.3d 405, 107 Cal.Rptr. 681, 509 P.2d 497, 504 (1973), cert. denied, Owen v. Musick, 415 U.S. 931, 94 S.Ct. 1443, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974). We hold there is no merit to Big Jim's contention passage of the ordinance was beyond the town's municipal authority. Nor do we agree with the argument that the authority granted in § 123.39 is limited to the issuance or suspension of licenses. The italicized portion of the quoted statute refutes any such conclusion.