Opinion ID: 3011928
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of strict scrutiny

Text: Because the Borough’s decision to remove the eruv is not neutral toward conduct motivated by Orthodox Jewish beliefs, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546. To be permissible under the Free Exercise Clause, it must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Borough attempts to justify its decision to remove the eruv, and distinguish the lechis from the violations of Ordinance 691 it has tolerated, on the grounds that the lechis are permanent and religious in nature. Neither ground is persuasive. Much of our strict scrutiny analysis parallels our earlier discussion of why the Borough’s decision is not religionneutral. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47 (stating that lack of neutrality eviscerates contention that restriction is narrowly tailored to advance compelling interest). First, for many years--and, the record shows, after the plaintiffs sued--the Borough has allowed its residents to nail house numbers to utility poles. Because the Borough has tolerated equally permanent house numbers, it hardly has a compelling interest in refusing to allow the inconspicuous lechis on the ground that they are permanent. Further, it is hard to see how the allegedly permanent nature of the unobtrusive lechis somehow undermines Ordinance 691’s objective of avoiding visual clutter and maintaining control over municipal property more than items like bright orange ribbons and lost animal signs. Moreover, even if the Borough had a compelling interest in preventing permanent fixtures on its utility poles, its decision to remove the eruv while allowing the house numbers is not narrowly tailored to promote that interest. Though the Borough’s claim that it can remove the eruv because of its religious nature requires more discussion, it is similarly unpersuasive. The Borough maintains that its decision to remove the eruv is justified by its compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause controversy. Contrary to the Borough’s position, however, a government interest in imposing greater separation of church and state than the federal Establishment Clause mandates is not 37 compelling in the First Amendment context. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276 (rejecting state university’s contention that its interest in complying with the state constitution’s prohibition on religious establishments, which was more restrictive than its federal counterpart, justified discriminating against religious speech, and explaining that the state interest asserted here--in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution --is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case by the Free Speech Clause as well)33 Davey, 299 F.3d at 759 (same in context of free exercise claim). _________________________________________________________________ 33. In 1990, a divided panel of our Court suggested in dictum--in a case that did not involve a Free Exercise Clause claim, and without citing Widmar--that public schools have a compelling interest in maintaining the appearance of religious neutrality in their classrooms, and that this interest, even if not required by the Establishment Clause, might outweigh public employees’ free exercise right to wear religious garb. United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882, 889 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Title VII does not require public schools to allow teachers to wear religious garb, as this would impose anundue hardship on the schools under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e(j)). The opinions cited in support of this proposition were Cooper v. Eugene School District, 723 P.2d 298 (Or. 1986)--which also did not cite Widmar--and the Supreme Court’s onesentence order dismissing an appeal from the Oregon Supreme Court’s ruling for want of a substantial federal question. 480 U.S. 942 (1987). To the extent that the Oregon Supreme Court held in Cooper that concerns about appearing neutral toward religion could outweigh employees’ free exercise rights in the public school context, we do not believe the United States Supreme Court’s summary disposition approved that reasoning. Instead, we believe, especially in light of subsequent doctrinal developments, that the dictum in United States v. Board of Education may be inconsistent with Widmar’s principle that an interest in more separation between church and state than the Establishment Clause requires cannot justify restricting rights shielded by the Free Exercise Clause. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276. First, summary dispositions by the Supreme Courtcannot be taken as adopting the reasoning of the lower court, Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. Wrigley Co., 505 U.S. 214, 224 n.2 (1992); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 n.13 (1982) (same), and they can be used as precedent only if the [lower court’s] decision[ ] rested solely on established constitutional principles and did not break any new ground. Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice S 4.29, at 284 (8th ed. 2002). Hence the Supreme 38 The Borough further argues, however, that leaving the eruv in place would constitute an actual Establishment Clause violation, and that the need to avoid such a violation justifies discriminating against the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct. Before explaining why this argument is also unavailing, we must examine the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncements in the area.34 Until the past _________________________________________________________________ Court’s summary disposition in Cooper cannot be interpreted as endorsing the Oregon Supreme Court’s reasoning, particularly since that reasoning flatly contradicts Widmar. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n.15 (1975) (stating that, even though a lower court’s interpretation of a summary affirmance by the Supreme Court was plausible, it was improper because it wouldleave little vitality to an earlier Supreme Court decision); see also id. at 391-92 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (An unexplicated summary affirmance settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this Court of doctrines previously announced in our opinions after full argument.). Since Cooper, moreover, the Supreme Court has held in several cases that a government interest in appearing neutral toward religion, where not necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause, cannot justify limiting First Amendment rights. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112-19 (2001); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-46; Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-63 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). Because subsequent doctrinal developments remove whatever precedential authority a summary disposition inconsistent with them might have, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1975); Lecates v. Justice of Peace Ct. No. 4, 637 F.2d 898, 902 (3d Cir. 1980), we believe that in all likelihood the Supreme Court summarily dismissed the appeal in Cooper under the principle of Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), which held that government can impose restrictions on the First Amendment rights of public employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the public at large. United States v. Nat’l Employees Treasury Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995). Thus the Supreme Court had no need in Cooper to consider whether an interest in appearing neutral toward religion can trump free exercise rights outside the context of public employment. 34. Two courts have held that the Establishment Clause allows a municipality affirmatively to grant Orthodox Jews access to public property so they can create an eruv. See ACLU of N.J. v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293, 1295-97 (D.N.J. 1987); Smith v. Community Bd. No. 14, 491 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586-87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), aff’d, 518 N.Y.S.2d 356, 357 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Those cases are not on point here because the Borough has not approved the eruv. 39 decade, the Supreme Court generally applied the threeprong test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), under which government action is consistent with the Establishment Clause if it (1) has a secular purpose; (2) does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion; and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). 35 Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have not applied the Lemon test. Instead, in cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to private individuals’ use of government resources, the Court has applied the endorsement test developed by Justice O’Connor, which dispenses with the entanglement prong of the Lemon test and collapses its purpose and effect prongs into a single inquiry: would a reasonable, informed observer, i.e., one familiar with the history and context of private individuals’ access to the public money or property at issue, perceive the challenged government action as endorsing religion?36 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, ___ U.S. ___ , ___, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2468-69 (2002) (upholding school voucher program where 96% of participating students attended religiously affiliated schools because parents’ genuine and _________________________________________________________________ 35. Compare, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-75 (applying Lemon test to hold that Establishment Clause does not bar state university from allowing religious groups to use generally available facilities); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-86 (1984) (applying Lemon test to uphold city-sponsored Christmas display that included creche alongside various secular symbols), with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1992) (invalidating prayer at public school graduation led by clergyman chosen by school officials without relying on Lemon test); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983) (upholding practice of opening state legislative sessions with prayers by state-employed chaplain without mentioning Lemon test); see generally Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 39899 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (chronicling Court’s erratic invocation of Lemon test). 36. Entanglement still matters, however, in the context of direct aid to public schools, where the Court subsumes it within the effect analysis, see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-33 (1997), and in the rare case where government delegates civic power to a religious group. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet , 512 U.S. 687, 696-705 (1994); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982). 40 independent choices determined where children went to school); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. , 533 U.S. 98, 117-19 (2001) (holding that Establishment Clause did not require public school to bar evangelical Christian student group from using facilities accessed by various other groups);37 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763 (1995) (relying on the endorsement analysis in Lamb’s Chapel to hold that Establishment Clause did not require state to prevent private group from erecting cross on statehouse grounds, a traditional public forum)38; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (reciting the Lemon test but relying primarily on the endorsement test to hold that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit school district from letting evangelical church group use publicly available school facilities to show film series on Christian family values); see also ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 103, 105-07 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test is the governing standard and applying it to uphold government-sponsored holiday display _________________________________________________________________ 37. When presented with Establishment Clause claims in the context of public education, the Supreme Court considers not only whether a reasonable, informed observer would perceive an endorsement of religion, but also whether the challenged government practice coerces students into participating in religious activity. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115-16; Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93. The Court has not applied its coercion test outside the public education context. 38. Seven Justices in Capitol Square agreed that the reasoning of Lamb’s Chapel controlled, Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 762, three of these seven expressly applied the reasonable, informed observer test, see id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., joined by Souter & Breyer, JJ.), and the two dissenting Justices also applied the endorsement test, see id. at 797-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 817-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Four Justices, however, recognized that the endorsement test controls when government discriminates in favor of religion, but argued that there is no need to apply the test to purely private religious expression that occurs in a public forum open to all on equal terms because such expression can never violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 770 (opinion of Scalia, J.). Notwithstanding the Justices’ divergent approaches, subsequent Supreme Court decisions treat the reasonable, informed observer test discussed at length in Justice O’Connor’s opinion as representing Capitol Square’s holding with respect to the appropriate Establishment Clause test. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000). 41 against Establishment Clause attack). Each of these decisions upheld the challenged government action because it treated religion neutrally, and thus would not be viewed by a reasonable, informed observer as endorsing religion.39 In contrast, government runs afoul of the endorsement test and violates the Establishment Clause when it affirmatively supports religion on preferential terms. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305-10 (2000) (invalidating school policy of encouraging and sponsoring student-initiated, student-led prayers before high school football games because reasonable, informed observer would perceive school as endorsing religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 598-601 (1989) (holding that county violated Establishment Clause by giving Roman Catholic group preferential access to display stand-alone creche depicting birth of Jesus on main staircase of its seat of government because reasonable observer would believe county’s action was meant to support and promote Christianity); see also ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1484-88 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (invalidating scheme that allowed public high school students to choose graduation prayer, but not any secular speech, by plurality vote).40 In addition, some Justices have held out the possibility that, even if government grants equal rather than preferential access to religion, a reasonable, informed observer could perceive an endorsement of religion in _________________________________________________________________ 39. While the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence consistently emphasizes neutrality toward religion, it allows government to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special burdens on religious practice unless the accommodation delegates political power to a particular religious group or otherwise singles out a particular religious sect for special treatment. Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 705-06. 40. The Allegheny Court also held, with no majority opinion on this point, that local officials did not endorse religion by erecting a display including a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a sign entitled Salute to Liberty in front of another government building. See 492 U.S. at 613-21 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id. at 632-36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 663-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 42 extraordinary cases. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 777-78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For instance, if one or more religious groups dominated property the government made available to the public, a reasonable observer might perceive an endorsement of religion. See id.; cf. Freedom from Religion Found. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489, 494-96 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Establishment Clause was violated where sole display in public forum was fifteen-foottall white marble statue of Jesus bearing inscription Christ Guide Us On Our Way in twelve-inch block letters and facing oncoming traffic on adjacent highway). Applying these principles to this case, we believe that, if the Borough ceased discriminating against the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct to comply with the Free Exercise Clause, a reasonable, informed observer would not perceive an endorsement of Orthodox Judaism because the Borough’s change of heart would reflect[] nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality toward religion. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409. A reasonable observer must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community, Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2468-69; Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1486, and presumed to possess a certain level of information that all citizens might not share. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118 (stating that reasonable observer would know about nonneutral implementation of policy); ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d at 106 (noting that reasonable observer would be aware of city’s year-round practices regarding cultural displays and celebrations). Thus the reasonable, informed observer would know that the lechis are items with religious significance and that they enable Orthodox Jews to engage in activities otherwise off limits on the Sabbath, but would also know that the Borough was allowing them to remain on the utility poles only because its selective application of Ordinance 691 renders removing the lechis a free exercise violation. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (In cases involving the lifting of government 43 burdens on the free exercise of religion, a reasonable observer would take into account the values underlying the Free Exercise Clause in assessing whether the challenged practice conveyed a message of endorsement.). Cognizant of the Borough’s secular purpose of complying with the Free Exercise Clause, see Mergens, 496 U.S. at 249, and the religion-neutral effect of treating the lechis like other postings, the reasonable observer would not believe that the Borough was promoting Orthodox Judaism. See Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1380 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that religion-neutral treatment of Christian group seeking access to public school facilities sent message of neutrality toward, not endorsement of, religion). This is true a fortiori because there is no evidence in the current record that the unobtrusive lechis are intended to send a religious message to anyone. Further, there is a vital difference between purely private religiously motivated conduct and conduct initiated or sponsored by government. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841. No reasonable, informed observer would perceive the decision of the plaintiffs to affix lechis to utility poles owned by Verizon and to do so with Cablevision’s assistance as  ‘a choice attributable to the State.’  Santa Fe Indep., 530 U.S. at 311 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 587). Similarly, because the eruv is maintained solely with private funds, and because allowing the lechis to remain in place would represent neutral rather than preferential treatment of religiously motivated conduct, no reasonable, informed observer would believe the Borough is affirmatively sponsor[ing] an Orthodox Jewish practice. Santa Fe Indep., 530 U.S. at 313. To the extent that access to the utility poles on Borough land constitutes a benefit, the ‘guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended’ when religious persons benefit incidentally from ‘neutral criteria and evenhanded policies.’ Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839). In this context, there is no realistic danger that, if the Borough treated the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct on religion-neutral terms, reasonable, informed observers would perceive an endorsement of Orthodox Judaism. Lamb’s Chapel , 508 44 U.S. at 395. Moreover, even if there is some slight risk that a reasonable, informed observer might misperceive the endorsement of religion, there is a much greater risk that the observer would perceive hostility toward Orthodox Jews if the Borough removes the lechis. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 118; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Withholding access would leave an impermissible perception that religious activities are disfavored.).41 Because the Free Exercise Clause requires neutral treatment of religion, see Smith, 494 U.S. at 879, only in a most unusual case could compliance with free exercise norms offend the Establishment Clause. Cf. Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 717 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from favoring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating against religion.) (emphasis in original). This is not such a case. Therefore, the Borough has no Establishment Clause justification for discriminating against the plaintiffs’ religiously motivated conduct. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are reasonably likely to prevail on their free exercise claim. 3. Requirements for preliminary injunctive relief Where a district court has denied a motion for a preliminary injunction, we may order the injunction to issue if the four factors required to grant a preliminary injunction are apparent on the record before us. Tanimura & Antle, Inc. v. Packed Fresh Produce, Inc., 222 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 883-84 (3d Cir. 1997); Polaroid Corp. v. Disney, 862 F.2d 987, 1006 (3d Cir. 1988). _________________________________________________________________ 41. To the extent that the Lemon test retains some trace of vitality, see Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1484, even after Zelman, Good News Club, and Santa Fe eschewed it in favor of the endorsement test, it does not support the Borough’s Establishment Clause defense. Allowing the eruv to remain in place serves the secular purpose of complying with the Free Exercise Clause, does not have the effect of advancing religion because no reasonable, informed observer would perceive an endorsement of religion, and involves no government entanglement with religion because the Borough will not monitor or support the maintenance of the eruv. 45 Our review of the record leaves us convinced that, in addition to the reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on their free exercise claim, the remaining three factors for injunctive relief--irreparable injury, the balance of hardships, and the public interest-- also favor a preliminary injunction. Limitations on the free exercise of religion inflict irreparable injury. Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2002) (‘The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). The plaintiffs have demonstrated that, if the eruv is removed, they will be unable to push and carry objects outside the home on the Sabbath, and those who are disabled or have small children consequently will be unable to attend synagogue. This showing easily satisfies the irreparable injury requirement. With respect to the balance of hardships, a preliminary injunction would not harm the Borough more than denying relief would harm the plaintiffs. Enjoining removal of the eruv would cause neither the Borough nor its residents any serious injury. Without an injunction, on the other hand, the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion will be impaired. The balance easily tips in the plaintiffs’ favor. Finally, where there are no societal benefits justifying a burden on religious freedom, the public interest clearly favors the protection of constitutional rights. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 884 (3d Cir. 1997). We do not see how removing the lechis could advance any interests sufficient to outweigh the infringement of the plaintiffs’ free exercise rights. In this context, the District Court should have preliminarily enjoined the Borough from removing the lechis pending a trial.