Opinion ID: 784143
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The purpose of RLUIPA

Text: 18 The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Lemon's requirement of a secular purpose does not mean that the law's purpose must be unrelated to religion.... Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987). Instead, the purpose prong aims at preventing the relevant governmental decisionmaker ... from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters. Id. 19 In Amos, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress had violated the Establishment Clause by exempting religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination in employment. Amos held that it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions. Id. In the present case, plaintiffs argue that RLUIPA has a virtually identical purpose: to alleviate significant interference by prison officials with the ability of prisoners to exercise their religious beliefs. But material differences exist between the application of RLUIPA in a prison setting and the Title VII exemption at issue in Amos. 20 One key difference is that the exemption in Amos was arguably necessary to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. Without the exemption, Title VII would have required courts to interfere with the internal workings of religious organizations, and fear of liability might have affected the way religious organizations carried out their missions. Id. at 336, 107 S.Ct. 2862; see also id. at 344, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (Brennan, J., concurring) (A case-by-case analysis for all activities therefore would both produce excessive government entanglement with religion and create the danger of chilling religious activity.). Enacting RLUIPA, on the other hand, was not even arguably necessary to avoid a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court had previously held that government interference with prisoners' fundamental rights is not subject to strict scrutiny, as RLUIPA requires, but only to a rational-relationship review. See Turner, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64; O'Lone, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282. 21 Another key difference between RLUIPA and the exemption in Amos is that RLUIPA sweeps much more broadly. As one commentator noted about RFRA, the predecessor to RLUIPA that has identical substantive provisions: 22 Comparing RFRA to Amos is like comparing apples to oranges. RFRA, unlike Amos, does not exempt religion from regulation for the purpose of avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. Rather, RFRA institutes a standard of review in every case which implicates religious conduct.... Amos did not involve a law that exempted religion from every law in the country. Rather, it permitted the exemption of religious employers from a particular requirement in prescribed circumstances. The law in Amos lacked RFRA's vast scope; therefore, Amos cannot dictate how RFRA fares under the Establishment Clause. 23 Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1, 13-14 (1998). 24 The broader scope of RLUIPA suggests that its actual purpose is not to accommodate religion by removing a particular obstacle to religious exercise, but to advance religion in prisons relative to other constitutionally protected conduct. Ghashiyah, 250 F.Supp.2d at 1024. If that is indeed the true purpose of RLUIPA, then Congress has abandoned neutrality and acted with the purpose of furthering religion, in violation of the Establishment Clause's fundamental command of governmental neutrality. Id. at 1025. 25 Resolution of the question of whether RLUIPA has the proper purpose of alleviating government interference with religious exercise or the prohibited purpose of advancing religion in prisons is not necessary to our ultimate decision regarding the Act's constitutionality. Even if the purpose of RLUIPA fits within the rule of Amos, RLUIPA is still unconstitutional because it has the primary effect of advancing religion. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35, 107 S.Ct. 2862 (At some point, accommodation may devolve into an unlawful fostering of religion ....) (internal quotation marks omitted).