Opinion ID: 200140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Citation 2—Repeat Violation

Text: 21 MCC was also charged with a repeat violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.550(a)(19), which provides that [a]ll employees shall be kept clear of loads about to be lifted and of suspended loads. Id. Although it is apparent that the standard was violated — the accident itself shows that Elías was not clear of the suspended load — MCC argues it should not be held accountable because the violation resulted from idiosyncratic employee conduct that it could not, and was not required by law to, control. MCC argues further that the ALJ erred in concluding that MCC's failure to abide by § 1926.550(a)(19) constitutes a repeat violation, which is subject to additional penalties under the OSH Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a). 22 We first address MCC's argument that it established a complete defense to the violation. As this Court has explained before: 23 The OSH Act requires that an employer do everything reasonably within its power to ensure that its personnel do not violate safety standards. But if an employer lives up to that billing and an employee nonetheless fails to use proper equipment or otherwise ignores firmly established safety measures, it seems unfair to hold the employer liable. 24 P. Gioioso & Sons, 115 F.3d at 109. We have therefore recognized an affirmative defense of unpreventable employee misconduct. In order to reach the safe harbor of this defense, an employer must demonstrate: (1) that it established a work rule to prevent the reckless behavior or unsafe condition from occurring; (2) that it adequately communicated the rule to its employees; (3) that it took steps to discover incidents of noncompliance; and (4) that it effectively enforced the rule whenever employees transgressed it. Id. at 109. Our review of the ALJ's analysis of these factors comports with the usual deferential standards. 25 As to the first element of the defense, MCC contends that it had an established work rule, often repeated to employees, to stay clear of the load and stay away from the hole. The ALJ concluded that these general admonitions were insufficient as a work rule to prevent violations of the standard. The ALJ pointed out that this general rule gave no indication of when employees were required to stay clear of the hole, a necessary consideration, given the fact that the employees in the enclosed area were expected to continue working near the hole at times when no load was being hoisted. The ALJ also credited evidence from the Secretary indicating that the employees working below the loads had an obstructed view of the access hole and thus had no knowledge of when a load was being hoisted. 3 Given the total lack of specificity in MCC's rule and the obvious insufficiency of its command, we have no problem affirming the ALJ's conclusion that the admonition to stay away from the hole was not an adequate work rule. See PBR, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 643 F.2d 890, 895 (1st Cir.1981) ([The employer] cannot escape responsibility for the violation because it warned its employees to exercise caution. Such delegation of employee safety to the employees themselves is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the Act.). 26 The ALJ also found that MCC failed to establish the second prong of the affirmative defense—namely, that the work rule was adequately communicated to employees. In particular, the ALJ found that the training provided was not tailored to the needs of those employees with little experience or with limited understanding of English, such as Elías, the employee injured in the accident. The ALJ observed that MCC's training materials were provided only in English, despite a large number of employees with limited English proficiency. 27 Furthermore, the ALJ found that MCC did not establish that it took steps to discover violations of the rule or that it took any disciplinary action when such violations were discovered. Testimony from Rice, Cappuccio, and Pezzano supported this finding. Rice admitted that MCC did not note violations in personnel files and that the company's foremen, who have direct supervision over laborers, were reluctant to issue warnings. In addition, Cappuccio and Pezzano testified that they could not recall any employee who had been written up, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for violating the work rule to stay clear of a load. MCC thus failed to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of their proposed defense. 28 Based on this evidence, the ALJ found that MCC had not met its burden in proving unpreventable employee misconduct. Again, we decline to upset a ruling so firmly rooted in the administrative record. 29 As a backup argument, MCC claims that, even if it violated the standard, the ALJ erred in concluding that the violation was a repeat violation for purposes of the additional penalty provisions of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(a). A violation is `repeated' if the employer `violated the same standard on an earlier occasion in a substantially similar fashion.' Modern Cont'l/Obayashi, 196 F.3d at 283 (citing P. Gioioso & Sons, 115 F.3d at 103 n. 2.). The Secretary establishes substantial similarity by showing that the prior and present violations are for failure to comply with the same standard, at which point the burden shifts to the employer to rebut that showing. Sec'y of Labor v. Monitor Constr. Co., 16 OSHC (BNA) 1589, 1594 (OSHRC 1994). 30 MCC raises two arguments to the imposition of this assessment. First, MCC argues that there is no prior violation because the earlier citation resulted only in a settlement agreement that contained exculpatory language. Second, MCC argues that, even assuming the informal agreement was evidence of a prior violation, the facts and circumstances of the prior violation were substantially different from the current violation. Though we address each argument, we find that neither has merit. 31 In February 2000, MCC was cited for violation of § 1926.550(a)(19). The citation was resolved by means of an informal settlement agreement. MCC argues that this settlement cannot form the antecedent for a consequent finding of a repeat violation under 29 U.S.C. § 666(a). As MCC notes, courts have generally held that repeated violations require a previous final order against the employer for a substantially similar violation of the same standard. See, e.g., Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 860 (3d Cir.1996). 32 However, settlement agreements, even those with some exculpatory language, have often been found to qualify as a final order against an employer. See Sec'y of Labor v. Ford Dev. Corp., 15 OSHC (BNA) 2003 (OSHRC 1992) (holding that a settlement agreement has the force and effect of an adjudication and can serve as the basis for finding a later violation repeated within the meaning of the OSH Act); Sec'y of Labor v. DIC-Underhill, 9 OSHC (BNA) 2223 (OSHRC 1980) (same); Sec'y of Labor v. Dun-Par Engineered Form Co., 8 OSHC (BNA) 1044 (OSHRC 1980) (same). Moreover, the language contained in the settlement agreement at issue here does not exempt MCC from the possibility of a repeat violation. Indeed, the agreement provides that the agreements, statement, stipulations, findings and actions taken herein ... shall not be used for any purpose, except for proceedings and matters arising under the OSHA Act [sic] (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.) (emphasis added). We therefore find no error in the ALJ's conclusion that this settlement agreement could be used to prove a repeat violation. 33 MCC also argues that the facts and circumstances of the prior violation were substantially different from the present one. MCC bore the burden of making this showing, and the ALJ concluded that it failed to do so. MCC's previous violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.550(a)(19)occurred when it allowed employees to work in a confined underground space below a suspended man-basket. The current violation concerns employees working in a confined underground space below suspended shoring materials. The ALJ found that in both instances, the employees were exposed to the same hazard: working below suspended materials in an enclosed area. Based on the record and evidence before us, we conclude that the ALJ had substantial evidence to support such a finding. We therefore affirm the classification of this violation as repeated.