Opinion ID: 1951916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impanelment of Salem County Jury, Midtrial Voir Dire, and Postverdict Polling of the Jury

Text: Defendant advances a three-pronged attack on the trial court's responses to the risk that prejudicial publicity affected the integrity of the jury's verdicts. Defendant contends that the court abused its discretion by empaneling a jury from Salem County instead of Cumberland County; that it committed reversible error by failing to conduct individualized voir dire regarding the jury's exposure to midtrial publicity; and that it erred by not individually polling the jurors after the death sentence about their knowledge of the other murder with which defendant was charged. Unlike our recent decision in State v. Harris, 156 N.J. 122, 716 A. 2d 458 (1998), this case does not involve saturated media coverage creating a presumption of prejudice to a defendant. See State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 273, 548 A. 2d 939 (1988)( Koedatich I ), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 813, 102 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1989); State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 33, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987)( Biegenwald II ). Where a presumption of prejudice has arisen in a capital case, the appropriate response is to transfer the trial to another county. Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 134, 716 A. 2d 463. Rather, defendant here raises a more discrete claim attacking the sufficiency of the measures the court adopted to prevent prejudice. Although defendant concedes that impanelment of a Salem County jury reduced the level of prejudice against defendant, he argues that the court's duty was to minimize prejudice, an obligation that would have been effectuated if the court selected jurors from Cumberland County. As noted, defendant was to be tried separately for the October 31, 1993 stabbing death of Ronald Pine, another gas station attendant. Much of the media coverage, although factual and not inflammatory in nature, contained references to the second murder. That reporting was contained primarily in The Philadelphia Inquirer (Philadelphia and southern New Jersey), The Courier Post (Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester Counties), The Gloucester County Times (Gloucester County), and Today's Sunbeam (Salem County). Recognizing the obvious prejudice to defendant if jurors with knowledge of his implication in the second murder sat on the jury, the trial court began jury selection in Gloucester County believing that voir dire would eliminate those with knowledge of the second murder. Problems associated with Gloucester County jury selection soon became apparent. Most significantly, it was difficult to determine whether potential jurors knew of the second murder without asking the question directly. Defendant moved for a change of venue. Citing the relatively limited and non-inflammatory coverage of the murders, and because the coverage was concentrated some two years prior to jury selection, the court denied the motion without prejudice. However, the court's faith in the Gloucester County jury pool was soon undermined. A number of jurors who were excused for other reasons revealed during post-dismissal questioning their knowledge of the second murder. The indirect manner in which voir dire attempted to elicit a potential juror's knowledge of the second murder obviously was ineffective. After conducting extensive voir dire in Gloucester County over several weeks, the court halted jury selection: It's my conclusion based upon between 150 and 200 jurors that have been interviewed that I cannot satisfy myself as the individual who is vested with this broad discretionary power and upon whom a reviewing court would rely to a significant extent and pay significant deference to in determining whether or not the voir dire was able to assure the selection of an impartial jury. I cannot say that I have sufficient confidence in the results of this voir dire to be so assured. As probing as it's been, with the considerable efforts of counsel on both sides, as well as by this Court, I simply do not have the confidence level that I feel I should have to be assured that this process will yield a fair and impartial jury, consisting of no one who is likely to have heard about the other murder and this defendant's implication in it. There have been a number of jurors, prospective jurors, who were very close to being qualified, who almost offhandedly or as an afterthought acknowledged that they knew something about the other murder. Sometimes it was vague information. .... The fact that in every article without exception, although the number of articles has not been that great, it really hasn't, but the fact that in every article these 2 cases have been linked and the results of the publicity come through to me with these prospective jurors, that there is a pervasive knowledge among the citizens of this county that the same person is charged in these 2 gas station murders, they're just linked, from the day he was arrested they've been linked, because I cannot ask detailed enough questions, nor can counsel, to ferret out that information with reasonable assurance, because by going too far with pointed questions prejudice would be created and because of that it is my conclusion that the motion for a change of venue should be granted, in order to avoid the likelihood of prejudice to the defendant resulting from pretrial publicity. After concluding that a change of venue was necessary, the court stated that a further decision would be made regarding whether to move the trial or simply impanel a foreign jury to sit in Gloucester County. Defense counsel expressed no preference for one option over the other, explaining that [t]he issue is the purity of the jurors we get, not where the court is held. The court accepted that concession and, taking into account the convenience to witnesses, family members and attorneys, concluded that a foreign jury would be impaneled to hear the case in Gloucester County. Defendant contended that the proper choice would be a jury from Cumberland County, because media penetration there was less intensive than in surrounding counties. The court, however, relying on the Appellate Division's decision in State v. Harris, 282 N.J.Super. 409, 660 A. 2d 539 (1995), concluded for several reasons that Salem County would be the source of the foreign jury. Although the murders were the subject of more press coverage in Salem County than in Cumberland County, the court observed that the articles published in Salem County's Today's Sunbeam were shorter, fewer in number, and less prominently placed than articles in the other papers. Additionally, the court noted that Salem County possessed a reserve juror panel sufficient to satisfy the court's need for a large jury pool, whereas Cumberland County would have required several months to assemble an adequate pool. Moreover, the demographic makeup of Salem County approximated that of Gloucester County more closely than Cumberland County. Finally, the court determined that because of the possibility of a second trial for the Ronald Pine murder, Cumberland County should be reserved for that case. The court reasoned that in view of its closer link to Gloucester County, Salem County would experience publicity no matter where the first trial was held. Thus, Salem would be a problematic location for a second trial. Conversely, holding the first trial in Gloucester County with a Salem County jury would be unlikely to result in significant publicity in Cumberland County, which is more detached from newsworthy events in Gloucester County, thereby preserving Cumberland for the possible second trial. Because a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to an impartial jury, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751, 755 (1961), a trial court must observe significant precautions to minimize adverse pretrial and midtrial publicity that is capable of affecting juror perception of the case. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 63, 459 A. 2d 641 (1983) ( Williams I ). Whether a realistic likelihood of prejudice from pretrial publicity, id. at 67-68 n. 13, 459 A. 2d 641, exists is the standard to be applied by trial courts in resolving what precautionary measures to take. Available options include a change of venue, selection of a foreign jury, and augmentation of the jury pool. Id. at 67, 459 A. 2d 641; Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 32, 524 A. 2d 130; see also R. 3:14-2 (authorizing change of venue or foreign jury if a fair and impartial trial cannot otherwise be had). A court must also conduct adequate voir dire to guard against the dangers of hidden bias. Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 68, 459 A. 2d 641; Biegenwald II, supra, 106 N.J. at 32, 524 A. 2d 130 (noting that searching voir dire examinations are means of protecting defendant's constitutional rights). We place great reliance on a trial court's voir dire examinations in determining a juror's actual bias. Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 274, 548 A. 2d 939 (citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-39, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2892-93, 81 L. Ed. 2d 847, 858 (1984)). In criminal prosecutions in which the level of pre-trial publicity does not justify a trial court in presuming prejudice to the defendant, we ordinarily will affirm a trial court's determinations regarding appropriate prophylactic measures unless they constitute an abuse of discretion. See State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 76, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 929, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1993). Here, the trial court relied on Harris, supra, 282 N.J.Super. at 421, 660 A. 2d 539, an Appellate Division decision that adopted the American Bar Association's recommended test to determine the source of a foreign jury or the appropriate venue. That test is comprised of five factors: (1) The nature and extent of pretrial publicity, if any, in the proposed venue; (2) The relative burdens on the respective courts in changing to the proposed venue; (3) The relative hardships imposed on the parties, witnesses, and other interested persons with regard to the proposed venue; (4) The racial, ethnic, religious and other relevant demographic characteristics of the proposed venue, insofar as they may affect the likelihood of a fair trial by an impartial jury; (5) Any other factor which may be required by the interests of justice. [ Ibid. (quoting Criminal Justice Standards: Trial by Jury ABA Criminal Justice Section Standard 15-1.4 (3d ed.1993)).] We are confident that impanelment of a Salem County jury was an appropriate exercise of the court's discretion. First, as this was not a case of sustained, inflammatory publicity, see Harris, supra, 156 N.J. at 145, 716 A. 2d 469, defendant concedes that a change of venue was not mandatory. Although Salem County was shown to have a higher level of publicity than Cumberland County, it was by no means inundated with publicity about the murders. Also, Cumberland County's lack of a large reserve juror pool weighed in favor of empaneling a Salem County jury. Additionally, the demographic makeup of Salem more closely reflected that of Gloucester County. The court meticulously identified and discussed each relevant factor and concluded that Salem County was the appropriate source for defendant's jury. We agree. Moreover, the searching voir dire conducted by both the court and counsel in Salem County reassures us that the jury considering defendant's case was fair and impartial. In addition to filling out a thirteen-page questionnaire, each potential juror who revealed his or her familiarity with either the defendant or any facts of the case was automatically excused. The court took that extra precaution even though we have not mandated automatic excusal for jurors whose impartiality is intact but who may have been exposed to publicity about some aspects of a pending prosecution. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 77, 586 A. 2d 85. In sum, we have no reason to believe that any juror was so tainted by pretrial publicity as to affect the deliberative process. Id. at 78, 586 A. 2d 85. During the trial itself, the court continuously admonished the jury to avoid any exposure to publicity about the case. The following comment is representative of the court's reminders to the jury: Continue please, to follow the instructions that I've given you all along. Do not discuss this case. Do not read anything about it. There's been quite a bit of coverage of this case. Be sure if you want to read the papers you have someone screen those papers for you ahead of time and pull out or cut out any articles that deal with this case in any way directly or indirectly. Additionally, on one occasion during the penalty phase the court stated on the record that it ordered sheriff's officers to place themselves in front of a newspaper vending box that contained a newspaper with a headline about the case. On at least three instances during the trial defense counsel requested individualized voir dire to determine whether jurors were exposed to prejudicial publicity. The court declined in each instance, choosing instead to conduct a collective voir dire of the jury. None of the jurors volunteered that they had heard or read anything about the case. During the penalty-phase deliberations, defense counsel requested that the court conduct individualized voir dire after the return of a verdict, and to ask each juror directly whether they had received any information about the second murder, either before or during the trial. The court denied this request, characterizing it as speculative and not a realistic possibility. The court discharged the jury without having inquired, either individually or collectively, about their knowledge of the second murder. Defendant contends that the court erred in failing to conduct individualized voir dire during the trial, and by rejecting defendant's request to poll the jury individually after its penalty-phase verdict to uncover any possible knowledge of the Pine murder. In the context of another death penalty case, we recently stated the principles that guide us in resolving these claims of prejudice based on alleged prejudicial publicity: Of particular significance here is that aspect of impartiality mandating that the jury's verdict be based on evidence received in open court, not from outside sources. As expressed by Justice Holmes, [t]he theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print. ... The Court has consistently required trial courts to protect both jurors and their deliberations from illegitimate influences that threaten to taint the verdict. [T]rial judges must seek out and expose outside factors impinging upon the jury's freedom of action and its impartiality and essential integrity. [ Harris, supra 156 N.J. at 142, 716 A. 2d 467-68 (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 75, 548 A. 2d 846)(1988) ( Bey I ) (citations omitted).] We address the problem of midtrial publicity in much the same manner as prejudicial pretrial publicity. Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. at 74-78, 548 A. 2d 846; Williams I, supra, 93 N.J. at 63, 459 A. 2d 641. Whether midtrial voir dire is necessary to uncover jury exposure to prejudicial publicity depends upon (1) the publicity's ability to prejudice the defendant, and (2) whether there is a realistic possibility that such information may have reached one or more of the jurors, focusing on the extent, notoriety, and prominence of the media coverage. Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. at 83-86, 548 A. 2d 846. Although noting that individualized voir dire was more likely to ferret out a juror's exposure to prejudicial publicity than an en banc examination, we declined to adopt a hard and fast rule mandating individualized jury voir dire. Id. at 86-87 n. 26, 548 A. 2d 846. In the context of this case, we find no error in the court's collective voir dire of the jury during the trial. We note that this was a trial that did not engender extensive publicity. Moreover, the realistic possibility that [prejudicial publicity] may have reached one or more of the jurors, id. at 86, 548 A. 2d 846, was minimized by the court's extensive pretrial voir dire and continuous instructions throughout the trial admonishing the jurors to avoid any publicity regarding the case. Unlike Bey I, supra, 112 N.J. at 79-80, 548 A. 2d 846, this was not a case in which the court simply told the jurors to come forward if they were ever exposed to publicity; the court did conduct collective voir dire on several occasions during the course of the trial. We find the court's discharge of its obligations in this regard to be cautious and conscientious, and do not perceive any abuse of discretion. Similarly, we find no error in the court's refusal to poll the jurors individually after the penalty-phase verdict to determine whether they had been exposed to publicity regarding the other murder. We have previously rejected similar contentions. See State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 382, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996)( Loftin I ) and Koedatich I, supra, 112 N.J. at 288-89, 548 A. 2d 939. We note that defendant's claim here is weaker than those presented in Loftin I and Koedatich I because he has not presented any evidence suggesting that any juror obtained prejudicial information. Defendant's assertion that this case is different because the request to poll was made before the jury was discharged is of no moment. Good cause must still be shown to poll jurors after a verdict under Rule 1:16-1, a showing that defendant has failed to make. In sum, defendant has not offered a persuasive reason either to question the adequacy of the trial court's precautionary measures or to undermine our confidence in the integrity of defendant's jury or in their verdict.