Opinion ID: 2648112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Key Fob Evidence

Text: Wells asserts the district court erred when it refused to admit at trial recordings from the key fob possessed by Joker at the initiation of the sting operation. 25 In particular, Wells asserts it was necessary to admit the key fob recordings to disprove testimony from McDoulett and FBI Agent Matt Lotspeich 26 25 The government argues convincingly that Wells did not preserve this issue in the district court with a specific objection. See United States v. Renteria, 720 F.3d 1245, 1255 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Because [the appellant] made no specific objection below, we review this argument for plain error.”). In particular, issues surrounding the key fob were litigated exclusively by Wells’s codefendants, on the basis that the key fob recordings portrayed the actions of the codefendants in a potentially positive light. The key fob was actually in the possession of both of Wells’s codefendants, but there is no indication in the record it was ever in Wells’s possession. Even after the government raised this preservation argument in its response brief, Wells’s reply brief fails to identify a district court objection specifically explaining the necessity of admitting the key fob recordings to explain or make complete other evidence relevant to Wells adduced by the government. See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir 2010) (setting out test for admissibility under rule of completeness). In the end, however, it is unnecessary to engage in a lengthy analysis of this procedural question because Wells cannot show the district court erred under the normally applicable abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Phillips, 543 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2008). 26 Lotspeich testified he participated in the sting operation at the Super 8 Motel. Lotspeich was part of a surveillance team located in a hotel room across the parking lot from the motel. Lotspeich provided the foundation necessary to (continued...) -33- that Gray and Wells discussed with Joker a profit sharing agreement. See supra Section III.B.2.a (setting out McDoulett’s testimony as to this point). 27 We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the key fob recordings. At trial, the defendants contended there were suspect gaps in the recordings from the floor lamp and clock radio. In an effort to fill those gaps, 28 the defendants sought to admit recordings from the key fob. The government opposed the defendants’ requests on the ground the key fob recordings amounted 26 (...continued) admit the electronic surveillance evidence from the floor lamp and clock radio. 27 In his reply brief, Wells identifies numerous additional misleading impressions he contends were created by the oral testimony of the government’s witnesses and the electronic surveillance the government adduced at trial. Because these issues were raised for the first time in Wells’s reply brief, we do not consider them. SEC v. Thompson, 732 F.3d 1151, 1169 n.16 (10th Cir. 2013). 28 There is no question the floor lamp and clock radio failed to record all events in Joker’s motel room. Likewise, there are gaps in the recording on the key fob. Both before and during trial, the defendants contended the gaps were either the result of government manipulation or the process of minimization. Cf. United States v. Yarbrough, 527 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 2008) (describing the process of minimization). The government, on the other hand, argued the gaps in the floor lamp and clock radio recordings were caused by the physical manipulation of those items during the search of the motel room and the gaps in the key fob recording were the result of officers depressing the buttons on the fob while they were trying to identify Joker’s car. The district court concluded the presence of those gaps went to the issue of the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See United States v. Oslund, 453 F.3d 1048, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 2006) (so holding). Wells does not challenge this ruling on appeal. Instead, he argues that having admitted the floor lamp and clock radio recordings, the rule of completeness compelled the admission of the key fob recordings. Thus, we limit our consideration to that narrow issue. -34- to unreliable hearsay. In particular, the government noted that unlike the other recording devices, the key fob recorder was controlled exclusively by the user. Furthermore, immediately upon his detention by Hill, the key fob was taken away from Joker and not returned to him until the end of his encounter with the Tulsa Police Department officers at the Super 8 Motel. In the interim, the key fob was passed around to several different officers, some of whom drove around the area adjacent to the Super 8 Motel depressing the buttons on the fob in an effort to locate Joker’s vehicle. For that reason, the government argued that neither McDoulett nor any other government agent could provide a necessary foundation for the accuracy of the recordings on the key fob. The district court agreed, concluding that if the defendants wanted to adduce the key fob recordings, they would have to adduce witnesses to provide the necessary foundation. Wells asserts on appeal that the rule of completeness, Fed. R. Evid. 106, overcomes any hearsay concerns with the key fob recordings and, thus, the district court erred in refusing to admit them. 29 29 This court has very serious doubts as to whether the rule of completeness operates in the all-encompassing way advocated by Wells. Wells suggests the rule of completeness allows him to adduce hearsay recordings to call into doubt oral testimony from a witness, even when the witness’s testimony is not based in any way on that recording. In support of this assertion, Wells cites to the following passage from Lopez-Medina: “While Rule 106 applies only to writings and recorded statements, we have held the rule of completeness embodied in Rule 106 is substantially applicable to oral testimony as well by virtue of Fed. R. Evid. 611(a), which obligates the court to make the interrogation and presentation (continued...) -35- In determining whether a disputed piece of evidence must be admitted under the rule of completeness, this court considers “whether (1) it explains the admitted evidence, (2) places the admitted evidence in context, (3) avoids misleading the jury, and (4) insures fair and impartial understanding of the evidence.” United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 735 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). None of the recorded episodes on the key fob explain or place in context McDoulett’s or Lotspeich’s testimony as to the nature of the deal Wells and Gray tried to strike with McDoulett’s Joker persona. McDoulett testified that after he was detained by Hill and gave consent to Wells to search the motel room, he sat in Hill’s patrol car for approximately fifteen minutes. He was then returned to the motel room and questioned by Wells and Gray. In particular, he testified that at this point they discussed the profit sharing arrangement with 29 (...continued) effective for the ascertainment of truth.” 596 F.3d at 734 (quotations omitted). Wells’s arguments take this language out of context. At issue in Lopez-Medina was whether a coconspirator’s fact allocution at a plea hearing was admissible under the rule of completeness when that coconspirator’s guilty plea from that same hearing had already been admitted. Id. at 732-35. That is, are all parts of an oral plea admissible to provide context to a simple plea of guilty? Thus, Lopez-Medina did not involve unrelated hearsay used to impeach oral testimony; instead, it involved the use of contemporaneous fact allocution to explain and give context to testimony that an individual had pleaded guilty to a crime. Id. at 735 (holding individual’s fact allocution could come in to provide context when defendant argued that individual’s guilty plea demonstrated the individual accepted sole responsibility for the crime). Nevertheless, as with questions about the proper standard of review, this court need not define the breadth of the rule of completeness because Wells cannot prevail even under the incredibly broad reading he advocates. -36- him outside the presence of any other officer and well before an officer with the key fob returned to the room much later in the evening. The record makes absolutely clear the key fob was not in the room during this time period. 30 Thus, in contrast to Wells’s contentions, the absence of any such discussion in the recordings captured on the key fob does not bear on or relate to McDoulett’s or Lotspeich’s testimony in any meaningful way. Because the rule of completeness is not implicated by McDoulett’s and Lotspeich’s testimony, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the hearsay recordings contained on the key fob.