Opinion ID: 4535063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sex Offender Registration Act

Text: ¶15 SORA, §§ 16-22-101 to -115, C.R.S. (2019), provides for a “centralized registration system to track offenders in order to ‘protect the community and . . . aid law enforcement officials in investigating future sex crimes.’” Ryals v. City of Englewood, 2016 CO 8, ¶ 60, 364 P.3d 900, 912 (Hood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (omission in original) (quoting People v. Carbajal, 2012 COA 107, ¶ 37, 312 P.3d 1183, 1189). Relevant here, section 16-22-103(2)(a), C.R.S. (2019), states that “any person who is convicted in the state of Colorado of unlawful sexual behavior . . . shall be required to register” as a sex offender. ¶16 However, section 16-22-113 of SORA allows individuals to petition the court to deregister under certain circumstances. § 16-22-113(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3)” of section -113, “any person required to register pursuant to section 16-22-103 . . . may file a petition with the court . . . for an order to discontinue the requirement for such registration” as set forth in the statute.). ¶17 Relevant here, section 16-22-113(1)(d) expressly provides that a person (such as McCulley) who was required to register “due to being placed on a deferred 9 judgment and sentence . . . for an offense involving unlawful sexual behavior,” can petition for removal from the registry after the successful completion of the deferred judgment and sentence . . . if the person prior to such time has not been subsequently convicted of unlawful sexual behavior or of any other offense, the underlying factual basis of which involved unlawful sexual behavior and the court did not issue an order either continuing the duty to register or discontinuing the duty to register. Id.5 ¶18 In addition, section 16-22-113(1)(b) provides that a person (such as McCulley) convicted of the class 1 misdemeanor of “sexual assault in the third degree as described in section 18-3-404, C.R.S., as it existed prior to July 1, 2000,” may petition the court for an order discontinuing the duty to register “after a period of ten years from the date of such person’s . . . final release from the jurisdiction of the court for such offense, if such person has not subsequently been convicted of unlawful sexual behavior.” ¶19 But section 16-22-113(3) also provides that certain offenders “are not eligible” for deregistration. This exception includes “[a]ny person who is a 5 Section 16-22-108(1)(d)(I), C.R.S. (2019), of SORA correspondingly recognizes that a person convicted of felony sexual assault has “a duty to register for the remainder of his or her natural life; except that, if the person receives a deferred judgment and sentence . . . the person’s duty to register may discontinue as provided in section 16-22-113(1)(d).” 10 sexually violent predator,” “[a]ny person who is convicted as an adult” of certain enumerated sexual offenses, and—critically here—“[a]ny adult who has more than one conviction . . . for unlawful sexual behavior in this state or any other jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added.) ¶20 SORA defines both “convicted” and “conviction” as “having received a verdict of guilty by a judge or jury, having pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, having received a disposition as a juvenile, having been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent, or having received a deferred judgment and sentence or a deferred adjudication.” § 16-22-102(3) (emphasis added). This definition of “conviction” does not expressly address successfully completed deferred judgments and sentences. Id. Also, SORA’s definition of “conviction” applies for purposes of the Act “unless the context otherwise requires.” § 16-22-102. ¶21 Context is what drove the court of appeals’ analysis in Perry. In that case, a division of the court of appeals addressed whether a person who has successfully completed a deferred judgment on an offense nonetheless “is convicted” of the offense for purposes of section 16-22-113(3)(b) and is therefore ineligible to petition to deregister. Perry, 252 P.3d at 48. The court concluded that, viewed in context, the phrase “is convicted” in subsection (3)(b) does not encompass a successfully completed deferred judgment. Id. at 49. 11 ¶22 The defendant in Perry pled guilty to sexual assault on a child. Id. at 46. He successfully completed a deferred judgment and sentence, and the court dismissed the charge. Id. at 47. The defendant thereafter petitioned the court to deregister under section 16-22-113(1)(d). Id. The court denied the petition, reasoning that section 16-22-113(3)(b) states that any person who “is convicted” as an adult of sexual assault on a child is ineligible to petition to deregister, and, in its view, an offender “is convicted” of an offense when he receives a deferred judgment— regardless of the ultimate disposition of the case. Id. at 47–48. ¶23 The court of appeals reversed the order. It acknowledged that, “[i]f read in a vacuum,” the SORA definition of “convicted” could be construed to encompass a successfully completed deferred judgment, even though no judgment of conviction ever entered, “because, arguably, an offender who has received a deferred judgment does not lose his status as a past recipient of a deferred judgment when the case is dismissed based on his successful completion.” Id. at 48. But reading the statute as a whole, the division concluded that a person no longer “is convicted” for purposes of subsection (3)(b) after the successful completion of the deferred judgment and dismissal of the case. Id. at 49–50. The division reached this conclusion for three reasons. ¶24 First, it reasoned that to construe the phrase “is convicted” to include a successfully completed deferred judgment would conflict with section 12 16-22-108(1)(d)(I), which states that a person who receives a deferred judgment and sentence for sexual assault on a child “may petition the court for discontinuation of the duty to register as provided in section 16-22-113(1)(d).” Id. at 48–49 (quoting § 16-22-108(1)(d)(I)). In other words, it would make no sense to construe “is convicted” in section 16-22-113(3)(b) to disallow what section 16-22-108(1)(d)(I) expressly allows. Id. Thus, to ensure that the language in section 16-22-108(1)(d)(I) permitting an offender who successfully completed a deferred judgment to petition for deregistration retained meaning, the court interpreted the phrase “is convicted” in subsection (3)(b) not to encompass a successfully completed deferred judgment. Id. ¶25 Second, it reasoned that to construe the phrase “is convicted” to include a successfully completed deferred judgment would be at odds with the General Assembly’s “deliberate decision to speak in the present tense, rather than referring to persons who had been previously convicted of an enumerated disqualifying offense.” Id. at 49. ¶26 Third, it concluded that to read the phrase “is convicted” in subsection (3)(b) to include a successfully completed deferred judgment would be inconsistent with precedent from other contexts recognizing that a successfully completed deferred judgment no longer constitutes “a conviction.” Id. (collecting cases). 13