Opinion ID: 769467
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Torture Convention

Text: 17 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was drafted by the United Nations in an effort to make effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world. Preamble, Torture Convention. The Convention defines torture as follows: 18 any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per son for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or forany reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 19 Art. 1(1). The Convention includes provisions aimed at preventing torture, prosecuting torturers, and compensating victims of torture. Most relevant here, Article 3 prohibits ratifying states from returning or extraditing individuals who are likely to face torture. Regarding return or extradition, the Convention provides: Article 3 20 1. No State Party shall expel, return (`refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 21 2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State con cerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights. 22 The Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1984 and has been ratified by 119 nations, including the United States and Mexico. See U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties (May 15, 2000). The U.S. became a full state party to the Convention in November 1994. See U.N. Doc. 571 Leg. SER. E/ 13.IV.9 (1995). 23 C Statutory and Regulatory Scheme Implementing Article 3 24 In 1998, Congress passed legislation implementing Article 3 of the Torture Convention as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARR Act) of 1998. See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Pub.L. No. 105-277, S 2242, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat. 2681) 871. 6 This implementing legislation states that it is the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . .  FARR Act, S 2242(a). The FARR Act requires that treaty implementation be carried out by the appropriate agencies, in this case the Department of State, whose heads are directed to prescribe regulations to implement the obligations of the United States under Article 3 of the Torture Convention. FARR Act, S 2242(b). 25 Following the passage of the statute, regulations were adopted by the Department of State to implement its provisions (and thereby, Article 3 of the Torture Convention) in the extradition context. These regulations set out a procedure for the Secretary of State to identify individuals who qualify for relief under the Torture Convention. They state, in relevant part: S 95.2 Application 26 (b) Pursuant to sections 3184 and 3186 of Title 18 of the United States Criminal Code, the Secretary is the U.S. officialresponsible for determining whether to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country by means of extradition. In order to implement the obligation assumed by the United States pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention, the Department considers the question of whether a person facing extradition from the U.S. is more likely than not to be tortured in the State requesting extradition when appropriate in making this determination. 27 S 95.3 Procedures. 28 (a) Decisions on extradition are presented to the Sec retary only after a fugitive has been found extradit able by a United States judicial officer. In each case where allegations relating to torture are made or the issue is otherwise brought to the Department's attention, appropriate policy and legal offices review and analyze information relevant to the case in preparing a recommendation to the Secretary as to whether or not to sign the surrender warrant. 29 (b) Based on the resulting analysis of relevant information, the Secretary may decide to surrender the fugitive to the requesting State, to deny surrender of the fugitive, or to surrender the fugitive subject to conditions. 30 22 C.F.R. SS 95.2 95.3 (2000). 31 D. Judicial Review of the Secretary's Decisions 32 The Review and Construction  section of the FARR Act makes clear Congress' intention that the agencies -in the extradition context the Department of State -are to have the initial responsibility for implementing Article 3 of the Torture Convention in the United States. Toward this end, the statute directs the Secretary of State to implement the obligations of the United States to enforce the treaty. FARR Act, S2242(b). The Secretary of State has a statutory duty to carry out the dictates of Article 3, using her discretion to promulgate regulations in the manner she determines to be most effective. In other words, the Secretary may ascertain how best to ensure that the United States does not extradite an otherwise extraditable individual when there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture . . . . FARR Act, S 2242(a). 33 The government argues that we should decline to review the Secretary of State's decisions, noting that a provision of the Department of State's regulations implementing the FARR Act provides that [d]ecisions of the Secretary concerning surrender of fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion not subject to judicial review.  22 C.F.R. S 95.4. We disagree. As we demonstrate below, the underlying statute, as well as the background rules of administrative law and habeas jurisdiction, require the opposite conclusion.