Opinion ID: 1585194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the instructions at the penalty phase unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof in violation of francis v. franklin?

Text: Johnson here suggests that he was unfairly saddled with a burden of proof in the sentencing phase of his trial, via the judge's granting of Instruction S-7. We note that this instruction remained unchallenged throughout the trial, direct appeal, and Petitioner's previous Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, rendering applicable a rule of procedural forfeiture, in the event the Petitioner fails to establish cause under the appropriate statute. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985) offers an excuse of new law, it is inapplicable to this case, since we further find that there was no illicit burden-shifting instruction given in this case. Under both Francis and a long line of state cases, see e.g., Roberts v. State, 458 So.2d 719 (Miss. 1984); Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1984), charges to the jury are examined as a whole to assess whether a jury was fairly and fully instructed on the law. When such examination is performed on the instruction at issue in this case, it is clear that the jury was unequivocally and properly advised on the unwavering burden of proof shouldered by the state prerequisite to the jury's consideration of the death penalty. Specifically, Instruction S-12, read together with S-7, sets forth a complete statement of the law, the jury's understanding of which is borne out in their verdict finding the existence of two aggravating circumstances. In sum, S-7 in no way effectively shifted the burden within the meaning afforded that term in Franklin.