Opinion ID: 1426752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense

Text: The juvenile court also found the minors had rebutted the presumption of unfitness regarding the fifth statutory criteria: The circumstances and gravity of the offense[].... (§ 707, subd. (e), criteria (E).) The charged crimemurderis, of course, extremely serious. The statutory presumption of unfitness, however, presupposes the crime will be at least this serious, for a 15year-old cannot be tried as an adult unless at the threshold he or she is charged with murder. By requiring that a minor rebut the presumption of unfitness by showing amenability, after an evaluation of the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the Legislature must have intended something over and above the mere fact the People allege the minor committed a murder. I have already explained that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination the minors lacked the intent to kill. Their lack of intent alone constitutes sufficient mitigation of the circumstances and gravity of the offense[] (§ 707, subd. (e), criteria (E)) to uphold the juvenile court's decision concerning mitigation. There was, however, more. The juvenile court found intoxication played a large part in the crime. This conclusion is supported by the statements of the minors themselves (they regarded themselves as faded) as well as by the behavioral studies. Dr. Kennedy's study reported both minors repeatedly ingested large quantities of [alcohol and marijuana] prior to the incident and concluded Melvin was a fit subject for the juvenile court under section 707, subdivision (e), criteria (E). Dr. Rothberg also concluded Marcus drank a substantial quantity of the alcohol, and [was] intoxicated. There was no real factual dispute the minors were intoxicated at the time of the crime. The majority misconstrues the import of this evidence, reasoning the evidence suggests the minors were not so intoxicated that they were unable to form the intent to plan the robbery and that their intoxication was merely to fortify themselves for the difficult task ahead. Perhaps so. These circumstances, however, cast no serious doubt on the juvenile court's finding that the minors' state of intoxication diminished to some extent their impulse control and sense of right and wrong. Stated differently, the minors' state of intoxication at the time of the crime mitigated the circumstances and gravity of the offense[]. (§ 707, subd. (e), criteria (E).) [4] To the extent, moreover, that the majority simply emphasizes inferences regarding the minors' intoxication different from those drawn by the juvenile court, the majority might do well to heed its own cited authority: When a trial court's factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination.... ( Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874, 197 Cal.Rptr. 925, italics in original, underscoring added, also quoted at maj. opn., ante, at p. 650 of 76 Cal.Rptr.2d, at p. 402 of 958 P.2d.) In other words, mere contradictions in the evidence are insufficient to overturn a factual finding by the trier of fact. There being substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's findings that the minors' lack of intent to kill and intoxication at the time of the crime mitigated the circumstances and gravity of the offense[] so as to render them amenable to the care and treatment of the juvenile justice system, the juvenile court did not abuse its broad discretion in finding the minors had rebutted the presumption of unfitness under section 707, subdivision (e), criteria (E). IV. Although the majority purports to apply the substantial evidence test, which is a deferential standard of appellate review, it instead merely substitutes its own view of the evidence. The danger of this approach is greater than any potential harm to these two adolescents. Although ample evidence supports the juvenile court's exercise of discretion, the majority fails to show appropriate deference to that court's decision. This sends to our lower appellate courts the unfortunate message that, although we say appellate courts should show deference to a trial court's decision on a minor's fitness to remain in juvenile court, what we apparently mean is that appellate courts should reweigh the evidence, decline to construe the juvenile court's findings of fact in a light favorable to the party who prevailed below, make de novo credibility determinations based on the appellate record and reach an ultimate decision preferred by the appellate court. The majority's ad hoc approach is not only a departure from past practice, it also has the unfortunate by-product of encouraging unnecessary litigation, for without appellate deference to the trial court's factual decisions, a losing party has a much greater incentive to seek appellate review, seeking a second bite of the apple. Such a scheme ignores the basic function of our trial courts and the historic role of the appellate courts and threatens to add to an already overburdened appellate caseload. I dissent.