Opinion ID: 758679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Contact with a Juror

Text: 242 Murga and Parada argue that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial because of contact between Mona Smith Watson's brother and a juror. During a break in closing arguments Watson's brother, Christopher Smith, approached one of the jurors, handed her a business card with his phone number, and told her not to tell anyone. The juror took the card into the jury room, placed it on the table, and told several other jurors how she had received it. 243 A deputy marshal retrieved the card from the jury room and brought the matter to the district court's attention. The court promptly interviewed the juror privately in chambers. The juror stated that she had discussed the incident in the jury room, and that based on negative comments she had heard about Watson's attorney, Mike DeGeurin, through her employment at the police department she had speculated that it was possible that the incident could be a totally innocent thing or it could have been instigated by DeGeurin. The district court instructed the juror not to say anything more about the matter and then discussed with counsel the interview with the juror. DeGeurin asked the court to instruct the jury that he did not have anything to do with the incident and that it was an innocent act that should not have been done. DeGeurin and counsel for Murga also moved to dismiss the juror who received the card, but counsel for defendant Roy Ford objected, viewing the juror as favorable to his client. Counsel for Murga moved for a mistrial. 244 The district court denied the motions to dismiss the juror and for mistrial. Before DeGeurin's closing argument the court again called the juror into chambers and told her I wanted to tell you that I have done an investigation of this whole incident and I am convinced that Mr. DeGuerin [sic] had nothing whatsoever to do with it. So I just wanted you to put that out of your mind.... The juror responded [f]ine ... I felt like it was an innocent thing on the guy, I felt like it was really innocent. But once I brought it back [into the jury room] and threw it on the table and told them where I had gotten it from, ... it seemed to escalate from that.... The court then related the second private discussion with the juror to all counsel. Murga renewed her motion for mistrial, and the court again denied it. The court then instructed the jury: 245 Ladies and Gentlemen, yesterday I was informed that one of the spectators handed to one of you a business card, and the juror to whom the business card was handed told the rest of you about it in the jury room and that there was some discussion about it, and I understand that some of that discussion was as to whether or not Mr. DeGeurin had had anything to do with the spectator handing the juror the card. I want to assure you that I have spoken to Mr. DeGeurin and made an investigation of this incident and I am convinced that Mr. DeGeurin did not have anything whatsoever to do with that. And I want you all to simply put that out of your minds and not to consider or think about that incident whatsoever during your consideration of the case. 246 After jury arguments were concluded the court conducted a hearing. The court inquired of each juror what he or she had heard about the card incident, whether they were concerned about it, whether they believed DeGeurin was involved, and whether the incident could affect their ability to be a fair and impartial juror. Not all of the jurors heard the discussion of the card in the jury room or any mention of DeGeurin's name. Each juror told the court that the incident would not affect his or her deliberations. The court then again denied the defendants' motions for mistrial after concluding that none of the jurors had been influenced in any way by the card incident. 247 In Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), the Court held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias. Drawing on its previous decision in Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), the Court explained in Smith that the trial judge is to 'determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the jurors, and whether or not [they were] prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate.'  Smith, 455 U.S. at 216, 102 S.Ct. 945 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 230, 74 S.Ct. 451) (emphasis in Smith ). This is exactly what the district judge did in this case. 248 A district court has broad discretion in handling allegations of outside influences on the jury. See United States v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1150, 1153 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1227, 116 S.Ct. 1864, 134 L.Ed.2d 962 (1996) (We do not understand Smith to require a full-blown evidentiary hearing in every instance in which an outside influence is brought to bear on a petit juror. Our precedents allow the trial judge the flexibility, within broadly defined parameters, to handle such situations in the least destructive manner.). Neither Murga nor Parada has shown any abuse of discretion by the district court in handling this incident.