Opinion ID: 561210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sheriff as Bailiff.

Text: 18 Petitioner raises numerous challenges regarding Sheriff Peavy's role in his trial. As summarized by the district court, petitioner asserts that Sheriff Peavy: 19 1) was biased against him, 20 2) had information about the petitioner and the offense that the jury did not have, 21 3) was a major participant in the investigation of the murder, 22 4) housed the prosecution's star witness in his home,5) assisted the prosecution in the selection of the jury, and 23 6) acted as bailiff and was solely responsible for the jury during the trial. 32 24 Petitioner also contends, as he has previously, that references made by prosecution witnesses to Sheriff Peavy during the trial, in effect, made the sheriff a witness against the petitioner. 25 This court considered, and rejected, these contentions on petitioner's first federal habeas petition. There, we noted that the sheriff never took the witness stand, and there has been no allegation that the jury even knew of his participation in the jury selection process. 33 We conclude, now as then, that [g]iven that the sheriff's participation in the state's actual presentation of its case was at most peripheral as far as the jury could tell, petitioner presents no more than a speculative possibility that the sheriff's dual role influenced its deliberations. 34 And, absent some showing of actual impropriety by the sheriff to influence the jury, petitioner cannot rely on Booth v. Maryland as new law applicable to his claim. As the district court reasoned: 26 Booth has no application to petitioner's claim. In Booth, the Court held that a Victim Impact Statement introduced during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violated the Eighth Amendment. The Booth Court found that the Victim Impact Statement contained information irrelevant to the sentencing decision and the risk that the jury may have relied on that information required that the petitioner be resentenced. However, in Booth the jury had the improper evidence before it in making its sentencing determination. Here, there is no suggestion of any improper conduct by the sheriff which might have influenced the jury. Booth has no effect on this Court's prior determination. 35 27 Petitioner also argues that new facts, unavailable to Mr. Johnson on direct appeal and in the prior proceedings, have been discovered and counsel reconsideration on the question whether actual prejudice has been shown. 36 These facts, petitioner concludes, establish the extent of the sheriff's bias toward Mr. Johnson and provide what this Court found lacking in 1985--they show actual prejudice in that the sheriff was far from the neutral and detached officer of the court his role as bailiff required. 28 The district court, after reviewing this new evidence, concluded that, even considering the newly discovered facts, petitioner did not establish any actual impropriety on the part of Sheriff Peavy. We agree. Petitioner has offered no new evidence to suggest that the sheriff's participation in the state's presentation of its case or his contact with the jury, as we had previously concluded, was more than minimal. Thus, under the standard set forth by the Court in Gonzales v. Beto, 37 some showing of actual prejudice is required. 38 29 The central issue with respect to actual prejudice is whether the actions of the sheriff through his responsibilities as bailiff have undermined the impartiality of the jury. 39 Applying this standard, petitioner has failed to explain how the actions of the sheriff adversely and tangibly affected the reliability of the outcome of the state court proceedings. Thus, for example, there is no suggestion that Sheriff Peavy ever spoke to the jurors about Mr. Johnson's case outside the courtroom. 40 As we concluded in our earlier opinion, petitioner, again, has made no showing of actual prejudice sufficient to overcome the procedural bar. 41 30 Finally, petitioner argues that this court, in its earlier opinion, failed to address whether an evidentiary hearing was appropriate so that the relevant facts concerning the prejudice could be assessed. An evidentiary hearing is not required unless the petitioner alleges facts that, if proved, entitle him to relief. 42 Because the district court properly concluded that, accepting the facts argued as true, no actual impropriety on the part of the sheriff had been shown, no evidentiary hearing was required. 31 Petitioner has failed to establish that new law justifies renewal of his claim or that newly discovered evidence bears on his contention that Sheriff Peavy's role in the trial resulted in a due process violation. We, therefore, hold that the district court properly dismissed petitioner's claim as an abuse of the writ. 32