Opinion ID: 848696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is manslaughter precluded because of a felony?

Text: Regarding the first issue, some insight into the early common-law history of the crime of manslaughter and, particularly, its development alongside the felony-murder doctrine, is necessary. Under Lord Coke's traditional felony-murder doctrine, a homicide that occurred during the commission of an unlawful act was murder punishable by death. See People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 692, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), in which this Court thoroughly articulated the elusive history of the felony-murder doctrine. The premise behind the traditional felony-murder doctrine was the idea that the intention to perpetrate the unlawful act sufficiently showed the existence of malice aforethought  the requisite mens rea for murder. [3] Id. at 717, 299 N.W.2d 304. This was considered true whatever the nature of the underlying crime may have been. Id. at 692, 299 N.W.2d 304. Lord Coke's traditional doctrine was heavily criticized for the harsh results it engendered, and it was severely limited even in early common-law history. Id. at 693-699, 299 N.W.2d 304. One of the earliest limitations on the traditional doctrine was limiting its application to those homicides that occurred during the commission of a felony or during the commission of an act that was intended to inflict great bodily injury. Id. at 696-697, 299 N.W.2d 304. Additionally, in the early days of the English common law, the crime of manslaughter was developed. The crime of manslaughter in Michigan is adopted from that early common-law crime. See People v. Datema, 448 Mich. 585, 594, 533 N.W.2d 272 (1995): `The law of manslaughter as it exists today has been adopted from the old English common law.' (Citation omitted). Whereas, as noted above, malice is the mens rea required for murder, manslaughter requires a less culpable mens rea. `Manslaughter is the unlawful and felonious killing of another without malice, either express or implied.' People v. Austin, 221 Mich. 635, 643, 192 N.W. 590 (1923) (citation omitted). Involuntary manslaughter has, first and foremost, always been considered the catch-all homicide crime. Thus, in Datema, supra at 594-595, 533 N.W.2d 272, we explained, quoting Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 105, that [i]nvoluntary manslaughter is a catch-all concept including all manslaughter not characterized as voluntary: `Every unintentional killing of a human being is involuntary manslaughter if it is neither murder nor voluntary manslaughter nor within the scope of some recognized justification or excuse.' Thus, the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter is typically characterized in terms of what it is not, and ascertaining whether a homicide is involuntary manslaughter requires essentially questioning first whether it is murder, voluntary manslaughter, or a justified or excused homicide. If it is none of those, then the homicide, generally, is involuntary manslaughter. In attempting to describe the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter in terms of what it is, as opposed to what it is not, it made sense, starting in the days of early common law, to refer to those homicides that occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that was not intended to cause great bodily injury. This is because, as already explained, under traditional common law, a homicide that occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that was intended to cause great bodily injury constituted murder. Thus, as early as 1886, this Court elucidated the difference between murder and manslaughter in the following manner: If an act is unlawful, or is such as duty does not demand, and of a tendency directly dangerous to life, however unintended, it will be murder. But if the act, though dangerous, is not directly so [i.e., is not directly dangerous to life], yet sufficiently dangerous to come under condemnation of the law [i.e., yet it is unlawful], and death unintended results from it, the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a nature to be lawful properly performed, and it is performed improperly, and death comes from it unexpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter. [ People v. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329, 340, 28 N.W. 883 (1886) (quoting 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 689).] [[[ [4] ] In 1923, in recognition of the felony-murder doctrine, which was by then widely accepted, this Court presented a somewhat modified version of Stubenvoll's manslaughter characterization, stating that manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty. People v. Ryczek, 224 Mich. 106, 110, 194 N.W. 609 (1923) (citation omitted). Until this Court issued Aaron, Ryczeks description of the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter as consisting of those homicides occurring without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, was more or less apt. This is because, generally, a homicide that occurred with malice or intentionally or in committing a felony or in committing an unlawful act naturally tending to cause death constituted murder. However, in Aaron, we formally abolished the traditional felony-murder doctrine in Michigan and held that a homicide that occurred during the commission of any crime, including a felony, constitutes murder only if the prosecutor specifically proves the existence of malice. Aaron, supra at 727-728, 299 N.W.2d 304. In other words, we held that the intent to commit the underlying felony by itself no longer sufficiently shows the existence of malice. Id. Since this Courts 1980 abrogation of the common-law felony-murder rule in Aaron, it is no longer the case that a homicide that occurs during the commission of a felony is, generally, murder per se and, thus, it is no longer apt to describe the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter as encompassing crimes that occur during the commission of an unlawful act that is not a felony. However, the premise of the Aaron decision was the rule that a crime is only murder if the prosecutor proves malice. We stated in Aaron, supra at 726-727, 299 N.W.2d 304, Both murder and manslaughter deal with the wrongful killing of another person.... To hold that in all cases it is murder if a killing occurs in the commission of any felony would take from the jury the essential question of malice.' (Citation omitted.)  If the jury concludes that malice existed, they can find murder.... Id. at 730, 299 N.W.2d 304 (emphasis added). Thus, Aaron relied on the long-standing principle that the distinguishing characteristic between murder and manslaughter is malice. This point was made by this Court as long ago as 1923, when we stated, [h]omicide is the killing of a human being by a human being. It ... is either murder or manslaughter.... To constitute murder, the killing must have been perpetrated with malice aforethought, either express or implied. Austin, supra at 644, 192 N.W. 590. `Manslaughter is the unlawful and felonious killing of another without malice, either express or implied.' Id. at 643, 192 N.W. 590 (citation omitted). [5] This point was recently reiterated by this Court in People v. Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 536, 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003), in which we stated, the sole element distinguishing manslaughter and murder is malice. (Emphasis added.) Thus, it becomes clear that any post- Aaron deficiency in Ryczeks description of involuntary manslaughter is not that the description fails now to expressly reference unlawful acts that are felonies, but rather that the description continues to reference unlawful acts that are not felonies. This is because the relevant question in determining whether a homicide is murder or involuntary manslaughter is whether it occurred with malice, and not whether it occurred during the commission of an unlawful act  felony or not. For this reason, defendants cannot opportunistically rely on Ryczeks pre- Aaron description of the catch-all crime of involuntary manslaughter to argue that, because the homicide at issue occurred during the commission of a felony, they cannot be guilty of manslaughter. That a felony has been committed is simply not dispositive in determining whether either murder or manslaughter has been committed and, thus, the felony language in Ryczeks manslaughter description is essentially irrelevant. [6] Defendants argue that, if we hold that a homicide that occurs during the commission of a felony may constitute manslaughter, we nonetheless may not apply the holding in this case because to do so would violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const, art I, § 10, cl 1: No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto Law.... In Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), the United States Supreme Court explained that an ex post facto law is one `that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action....' (Citation omitted). We disagree with defendants because a homicide committed during the course of a felony could never have been considered an innocent homicide merely because it occurred during the commission of a felony. On the contrary, espousing the defendants argument in this case  that a homicide that occurs during the course of a felony cannot, as a matter of law, be manslaughter  leads to the conclusion then that the homicide (unless justified or excused) is instead murder. It does not lead to a conclusion that the homicide is innocent, i.e., a non offense. Thus, our decision in this case does not criminalize that which was, before this decision, innocent. Moreover, Ryczeks description of involuntary manslaughter was never meant to define the elements of the crime of manslaughter. Rather, it was meant to provide guidance to the courts in understanding the circumstances under which the catch-all crime of manslaughter may occur. Therefore, it has never been held by this Court that the prosecutor must specifically prove that the homicide occurred during the commission of an unlawful act that was not a felony in order to prove a manslaughter charge. On the contrary, this Court has implicitly and expressly recognized in a number of cases, some decided even before Aaron, that while a homicide occurring during the commission of a felony could (pursuant to the felony-murder doctrine) constitute murder, the homicide also could constitute manslaughter  this despite the felony language in Ryczeks manslaughter description that, during the pre- Aaron days, actually had significance. In People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924), this Court considered whether a defendant could be convicted of manslaughter for a homicide that resulted from the commission of a felony. In Pavlic, a man died after drinking liquor sold by the defendant. At the time, selling intoxicating liquor was a felony. Notwithstanding the description of involuntary manslaughter given by this Court in Ryczek just one year before  which description, as noted, refers to manslaughter as `the killing of another... in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony, Ryczek, supra at 110, 194 N.W. 609 (citation omitted)  Pavlic held that the homicide at issue could constitute manslaughter if performed under such circumstances as to supply the intent to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury. Pavlic, supra at 566, 199 N.W. 373. The reason the Pavlic Court so held was because selling intoxicating liquor is only a malum prohibitum felony and not a malum in se felony. [7] Id. at 566-567, 199 N.W. 373. This may appear to be grounds to distinguish Pavlic from this case, but the essential point is that Pavlic recognized that a homicide occurring during the commission of a felony could be manslaughter. Moreover, in so holding, the Pavlic Court noted that the important consideration in determining whether a homicide is murder or simply manslaughter in felony cases is whether the felony is one that is in itself directly and naturally dangerous to life. Id. at 565, 199 N.W. 373. The implication is that the Pavlic Court understood that the important question is whether the defendant acted with malice. If the defendant committed a felony that is directly and naturally dangerous to life, then he acted with malice and, therefore, could be convicted of murder. If not, then a manslaughter conviction might be proper. Thus, even in 1924, one year after Ryczek and fifty-six years before Aaron, this Court impliedly acknowledged that, despite the commission of a felony and the felony language in Ryczek, the distinguishing element between murder and manslaughter is malice and, therefore, the killing of another in doing some unlawful act that amounts to a felony may constitute manslaughter rather than murder, depending on the facts of the case. In People v. Treichel, 229 Mich. 303, 200 N.W. 950 (1924), an elderly gentleman was tied to a bed during the commission of a robbery. He was eventually found dead, and the suspects were charged with first- and second-degree murder and manslaughter and were convicted of manslaughter. The defendants appealed, arguing that they should have been charged only with first-degree murder because the death was occasioned by act committed in the perpetration of a burglary.... Id. at 308, 200 N.W. 950. The defendants contended that they should have been either convicted of first-degree murder or acquitted, much as the instant defendants seem to be arguing. The Treichel Court, in affirming the defendants manslaughter convictions, stated: Conceding the verdict might have been for murder in the first degree, because death was occasioned by act committed in the perpetration of a burglary, was such a verdict the only one permissible? We cannot so hold. We think the evidence left the question of degree and the included crime of manslaughter to the jury and the court avoided instead of committed error in so submitting it. Id. Thus, in Treichel, again just one year after Ryczek, this Court affirmed a manslaughter conviction for a homicide that occurred during the commission of a felony despite the felony language in Ryczek. Presumably, if the Court intended to preclude such convictions by virtue of Ryczek's felony language, it would not have affirmed the convictions in Treichel, but, instead, would have agreed with the defendants that they should have been either convicted of first-degree murder or acquitted. In People v. Andrus, 331 Mich. 535, 50 N.W.2d 310 (1951), the defendants burglarized a store and, while doing so, inflicted severe wounds on the owner of the store, who eventually died. As in Treichel, the defendants were charged with first- and second-degree murder and manslaughter and were convicted of manslaughter. The defendants appealed, arguing that the manslaughter charge and convictions constituted error. Again, despite the felony language of Ryczek and the felony-murder doctrine, this Court affirmed the manslaughter convictions in Andrus. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the pivotal issue is the existence of malice: [W]here there is testimony from which the jury might find the absence of such a felonious intent as is necessary to constitute murder [i.e., malice], an instruction that they might convict of manslaughter should be given. Id. at 546, 50 N.W.2d 310. In People v. Carter, 387 Mich. 397, 197 N.W.2d 57 (1972), defendants stole a car in order to rob a bank and, in doing so, put the owner of the car in its trunk. The victim died as a result, and all three defendants were convicted of first-degree murder. In that case, the defendants appealed, arguing that the jury should have been instructed on manslaughter as well as murder. This Court, notwithstanding the felony language in Ryczek, agreed, vacated the defendants' convictions, and remanded for a new trial. Simply put, case law demonstrates that the felony language in Ryczek's description of manslaughter does not have the meaning ascribed to it that defendants would like to have. That is, this language does not mean, as was impliedly acknowledged as long ago as 1924 and was impliedly reaffirmed as recently as 2003, that a defendant may not be convicted of manslaughter if the homicide occurred during the commission of a felony. The pertinent question in distinguishing manslaughter from murder is, as was made absolutely clear in Mendoza, whether the defendant acted with malice. If not, then a manslaughter conviction may be proper despite the fact that the death resulted from the commission of an underlying felony. We believe that, in light of the long history of relevant case law and the fact that the homicide in question would never have been an innocent homicide, there is no ex post facto violation in affirming Limmer's conviction of accessory after the fact to involuntary manslaughter and the remaining defendants' involuntary manslaughter convictions. [8]