Opinion ID: 1943879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency Evidence Supporting Burglary Count

Text: Both at the close of the government's case-in-chief and at the close of trial, appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction of burglary with intent to commit assault. See D.C.Code § 22-1801(a) (1996). Appellant argues that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, no jury could have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because no evidence was presented to show that, before forcing his way into the Knights' house, appellant had the specific intent to assault its occupants upon entry. Appellant contends that, because the assault of Edwin Knight was already in progress when [appellant] entered the house, and because appellant was unaware of whether anyone else was within the house, he could not have intended a new assault upon entering the premises. Appellant concedes that intent to commit assault is `rarely capable of direct proof,' and, unless it is admitted by the accused, it typically must be shown by circumstantial evidence. Lee v. United States, 699 A.2d 373, 383 (D.C.1997) (quoting Bowman, supra, 652 A.2d at 67). To prove burglary, the government must establish `that the defendant entered the premises having already formed an intent to commit a crime therein.' Id. at 383 (quoting Warrick v. United States, 528 A.2d 438, 442 (D.C.1987)). The evidence demonstrated that appellant told Simpson and Wiseman he planned to collect on a debt from Edwin Knight and that he suggested the possibility of violence when he told Simpson that no one would get hurt if [Simpson] just did [what] he asked [her] to do. [Emphasis added.] It also showed that appellant went to Knight's house brandishing a gun. These facts provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion that appellant had the requisite intent to commit an assault when he entered the house. See Lee, supra, 699 A.2d at 384 (fact that appellant entered house with a weapon, stated intention to have a confrontation, and actually committed assault soon after he was inside the house provide strong circumstantial evidence that he intended to commit an assault upon entering) (citing Bowman, supra, 652 A.2d at 68; McKinnon v. United States, 644 A.2d 438, 442 (D.C.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 523, 130 L.Ed.2d 428 (1994)). Therefore, the trial court's denial of appellant's MJOAs was proper.