Opinion ID: 8704070
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sources and Scope of Res Judicata

Text: Although the principle of res judicata— that “a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action,” Montana, 440 U.S. at 153, 99 S.Ct. 970 — is universally accepted, the law of claim preclusion 3 differs from one jurisdiction to another. This is chiefly because jurisdictions “start from different understandings of the scope of a ‘cause of action.’ ” Stanton, 127 F.3d at 78; see also Migra, 465 U.S. at 86, 104 S.Ct. 892 (“The definition of ‘cause of action’ ... is critical in the present context ...”); Duhaney v. Attorney Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir.2010) (“The challenge in this case, as in many res judicata cases, is defining the relevant ‘cause of action.’ ”). “Various tests for determining the scope of a cause of action have been suggested and used: ‘... Among the most common are that the cause of action is the same if: (a) the same principles of substantive and procedural law are applicable to both questions, (b) the same right is alleged to be infringed by the same wrong in both actions, (c) the judgment sought in the second action would infringe rights established in the first, (d) the same evidence would support both actions, or (e) the operative facts are the same in both actions.’ ” Semler v. Psychiatric Inst. of Wash., D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 930 n. 42 (D.C.Cir.1978) (quoting Developments in the Law: Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L.Rev. 818, 824-25 (1952)); see also Shapiro, Preclusion at 36 (noting the “variation among jurisdictions”); Charles Alan Wright, et al„ Federal Practice & Procedure § 4407 (“Wright & Miller”) (discussing various definitions). To determine the preclusive effect of a judgment, then, one must know what law of preclusion applies. “The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law.” Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891, 128 S.Ct. 2161 (citing Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-08, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001)). “For judgments in federal-question cases ... federal courts participate in developing ‘uniform federal rule[s]’ of res judicata, which [the Supreme] Court has ultimate authority to determine and declare.” Id. (quoting Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508, 121 S.Ct. 1021) (alteration in original). “For judgments in diversity cases, federal law incorporates the rules of preclusion applied by the State in which the rendering court sits.” Id. at 891 n. 4, 128 S.Ct. 2161 (citing Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508, 121 S.Ct. 1021 (explaining that judgments in diversity suits “seem[] to us, a classic case for adopting, as the federally prescribed rule of decision, the law that would be applied by state courts in the State in which the federal diversity court sits”)). The Hegnas’ first suit was erroneously held to be a federal question case. Judge Kennedy ruled that the plaintiffs had “a cause of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 note” against both Iran and its Ministry of Information and Security. Memorandum at 15, Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. OO-ev-716 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2002). As discussed above, the Circuit ruled in Cicippio-Puleo that this widely-held interpretation of the terrorism exception was partially incorrect: plaintiffs bringing suit against a foreign state under the jurisdiction permitted by § 1605(a)(7) were required “to state a cause of action under some other source of law, including state law.” 353 F.3d at 1036. They did not have a federal cause of action against a foreign state by virtue of either § 1605(a)(7) or the Flatow Amendment. The judgment in Hegna I was therefore based upon a misapprehension of the governing law — but that fact has no bearing on its preclusive effect. As the Supreme Court has explained, “the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); accord Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1981) (noting that res judicata applies “whether the initial judgment was erroneous or not”). The “contrary view would result in creating elements of uncertainty and confusion and in undermining the conclusive character of judgments, consequences which it was the very purpose of the doctrine of res judicata to avert.” Moitie, 452 U.S. at 398-99, 101 S.Ct. 2424 (quoting Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 201, 52 S.Ct. 532, 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932)). Perhaps the Hegnas should have sued Iran under a state law cause of action, as many plaintiffs did after Cicippio-Puleo. But they brought their first suit under a purported federal cause of action, and their case went to judgment on that basis. The “ ‘uniform federal rule[s]’ of res judicata” therefore govern that judgment’s preclusive effect. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 891, 128 S.Ct. 2161 (quoting Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508, 121 S.Ct. 1021) (alteration in original). Under federal law, “[a] subsequent lawsuit is barred by claim preclusion ‘if there has been prior litigation (1) involving the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.’ ” Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 513 F.3d 257, 260 (D.C.Cir.2008) (quoting Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C.Cir.2006)). “Whether two cases implicate the same cause of action turns on whether they share the same nucleus of facts.” Apotex, 393 F.3d at 217 (quoting Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C.Cir.2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C.Cir. 1984) (“The judgment bars any further claim based on the same .‘nucleus of facts,’ ” because “ ‘it is the facts surrounding the transaction or occurrence which operate to constitute the cause of action, not the legal theory upon which a litigant relies.’ ”) (quoting Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1234 (2d Cir.1977)). Taken at face value, this test would clearly bar the plaintiffs’ claims. The claims asserted here are based on the same “nucleus of facts” as the Hegnas’ first suit — namely, the murder of Charles Hegna and the suffering of his family that resulted from it. The two cases involved the same plaintiffs and one identical defendant: the state of Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (which has been added as a defendant) is, by the allegations in the complaint and the precedent of this district, an agency of the Iranian state and therefore in privity with it. See, e.g., Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 466 F.Supp.2d 229, 255 (D.D.C.2006) (noting that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is “considered to be a division of [the] state of Iran”); Salazar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 370 F.Supp.2d 105, 117 (D.D.C.2005) (finding that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is “like an ‘armed force’ under the ultimate command of the leadership of the Iranian government”). The judgment in Hegna I was final, valid, and on the merits; the court had jurisdiction to issue it. Absent some reason to conclude otherwise, the claims that the Hegnas assert here would therefore be barred by the earlier judgment in their favor.