Opinion ID: 1194191
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination of Stewart order related to religious worship.

Text: The Stewart order requires that inmates in administrative segregation be allowed one of the following opportunities for religious worship: attending regularly scheduled religious services once a week, making short individual visits to the chapel once each week, or meeting with a bona fide religious adviser upon request of the inmate or adviser. The order also provides for the curtailment or elimination of the right if, in the course of exercising it, the inmate is disruptive or violent. Under the Constitution, reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (addressing the rights of convicted prisoners). However, as with other First Amendment rights in the inmate context, detainees' rights may be limited or retracted if required to maintain[ ] institutional security and preserv[e] internal order and discipline. Bell, 441 U.S. at 549, 99 S.Ct. 1861; see, e.g., Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir.1997). Restrictions on access to religious opportunities  whether group services, chapel visits, or meetings with religious advisers  must be found reasonable in light of four factors: (1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and a legitimate government interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) whether accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have a significant impact on guards and other inmates; and (4) whether ready alternatives are absent (bearing on the reasonableness of the regulation). Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006); Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1058-59 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc). Further, because we are dealing with pretrial detainees, to satisfy substantive due process requirements the restriction or regulation cannot be intended to serve a punitive interest. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861. [19] As the district court observed, under this standard some courts have allowed restrictions on worship for security purposes. Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317, 320(5th Cir.1990) (restriction on type of service inmate may attend permissible where inmate still provided with reasonable opportunities to worship). Denying inmates access to all outlets for religious worship, however, offers no alternative means of exercising the right, as called for by the second prong of Turner. Cf. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (concluding that prison rules which prohibited Muslim inmates from engaging in Friday afternoon prayer services were reasonable, and relying in part on the fact that the inmates were allowed to participate in other weekly religious services and to have free access to the prison's imam). Accordingly, a detainee's placement in administrative segregation does not, standing alone, justify a complete denial of opportunities to practice religion. See Alston v. DeBruyn, 13 F.3d 1036, 1040 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that it was improper for the district court to assume that limits on an inmate's access to religious services were justified based on the inmate's placement in administrative segregation); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that inmates in punitive segregation and keeplock could not be denied participation in chapel services simply on the basis of their classification; individualized determinations of the necessity of their exclusion were required). The district court's final order in Stewart states that there was no indication of punishment or any ongoing violation of detainees' rights with respect to access to religious services. Although the court's final order in Pierce acknowledges evidence of at least [o]ccasional instances of impediments to participation, the court characterized these denials as merely sporadic. But the record evidences consistent denial of access to the chapel (whether for group services or individual visits) and to religious advisers to those in administrative segregation. Both of the plaintiffs' witnesses that were housed in administrative segregation, Fermin Valenzuela and Keith Hawkins, testified that they were routinely denied access to any kind of religious worship. Valenzuela testified that none of his requests to meet with his chaplain were granted, and testified that the verbal explanation he received for the denial was that inmates in administrative segregation . . . don't have it coming. Likewise, Hawkins testified that when he was classified in administrative segregation between March 2003 and June 2003, he was never allowed to attend chapel. Even the County's own witness, Deputy Brian Nissen, testified that he had never seen one of our Ad Seg inmates in chapel. The County's evidence was not to the contrary. Although the County argues on appeal that testimony from three detainee plaintiffs (detainees Conn, Palmitessa and Robledo) supported its contention that it provided regular access to religious services and clergy at every opportunity, the record does not bear out the County's characterization. Connwho was not an administrative segregation inmatemerely testified that he was permitted to attend chapel and that no Deputy ever told him that administrative segregation inmates had limited access to religious services. We are not persuaded that an inmate's failure to obtain a voluntary admission of non-compliance from his jailer somehow constitutes proof of compliance. Similarly, Palmitessaalso not an administrative segregation detaineetestified that he went to chapel whenever it was offered, but that it had not, in fact, been offered to him for several weeks. Finally, Robledo another non-administrative segregation witnesstestified on cross-examination that she was allowed access to religious services, but as she made clear on re-direct, she had difficulties getting access to chapel. [20] Nor did the County's affirmative evidence support the district court's factual finding that the County provides opportunities for inmates to participate in religious services and counseling, at least not as to administrative segregation detainees. The County relied primarily on the testimony of two jail personnel  Sergeant Dubsky and Deputy McCulloch  to support its contention that inmates were provided regular access to religious services and clergy at every opportunity. Sergeant Dubsky testified that administrative segregation detainees must fill out a message slip to obtain access to a chaplain, and that there is no limitation on the number of visits available. But Sergeant Dubsky did not testify that administrative segregation detainees were actually given such access. Likewise, Deputy McCulloch merely testified as to the manner in which chapel is called for non-administrative segregation detainees. He did not establish that chapel was called weekly, bi-weekly or with any other pattern of regularity. A custom can be shown or a policy can be inferred from widespread practices or evidence of repeated constitutional violations for which the errant municipal officers were not discharged or reprimanded. Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir.1992); see also Nadell v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 268 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.2001). Plaintiffs' counsel asked the Sheriffs' department officials who testified whether deputies were ever disciplined or reprimanded for Stewart violations. No witness was able to identify any instance in which disciplinary steps were taken or a reprimand was issued. Moreover, the County's witnesses did not contend, and its brief on appeal does not suggest, that detainees in administrative segregation are denied worship opportunities because of security concerns, or for other legitimate non-punitive reasons. The district court should not have blindly deferred to the County's bare invocation of security concerns, when the County has failed to even establish that there is regular access to religious services for administrative segregation detainees, much less that interruptions in such access are on account of security. Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir.1990) (Without requiring some evidence that prison policies are based on legitimate penological justifications . . . `judicial review of prison policies would not be meaningful.') (citation omitted). In sum, the district court erred in denying declaratory or injunctive relief under § 1983. Similarly, the Stewart order remains necessary to ensure that detainees in administrative segregation are not denied access based on their classification alone. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court with regard to this component of the Stewart injunction, as the record demonstrates that its enforcement remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of [a] Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). We also conclude that the Stewart order, as presently constituted, extends no further than is necessary and is the least intrusive means to correct the violation. Id. The terms of the Stewart injunction require that detainees in administrative segregation be afforded opportunities for worship, provided the detainees have not become disruptive or violent, implicating legitimate security concerns, even though the injunction does not require that detainees be afforded access to group religious services. The jail may instead satisfy the order by allowing individual chapel visits or meetings with religious advisers. In sum, the orderwith its provision for the curtailment or elimination of detainees' rights based on security concernsprovides for no more than a minimum level of ongoing participation in religious activities. Accordingly, we conclude that the injunction is narrowly drawn and extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of a Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).