Opinion ID: 1691397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was there a contract between the parties; and, if so, was it breached?

Text: ¶ 14. The Statute of Frauds dealing with the sale of land states, in pertinent part, [a]n action shall not be brought whereby to charge a defendant or other party upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments ... unless, ... the promise or agreement upon which such action may be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-3-1(c) 1972. (emphasis added). Sale contract must describe land with reasonable certainty. Taylor v. Sayle, 163 Miss. 822, 140 So. 3 (1932). The Promissory Note will satisfy the Statute of Frauds as a memorandum or note of any agreement that the parties may have had, and because the Grocery is described both by name and physical address, the land is described with reasonable certainty. ¶ 15. All that is needed to constitute a valid consideration to support an agreement or contract is that there must be either a benefit to the promissor or a detriment to the promisee. If either of these requirements exist, there is a sufficient consideration. American Olean Tile Co. v. Morton, 247 Miss. 886, 893, 157 So.2d 788, 790 (1963). The Theobalds were promisees in the Note, and they gave up possession of the Grocery as well as the opportunity to sell it to other buyers. These actions are sufficient to constitute adequate consideration for the Note. ¶ 16. The Nossers argue that they should not be bound by the Note since they did not sign as makers. Although there appear to be no Mississippi cases addressing this issue, other jurisdictions have found this argument to be unpersuasive. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held, in reference to the signature needed to satisfy a Statute of Frauds, that [it] may take many forms and be located anywhere in the writing, so long as it conveys an intention to authenticate the writing. Vess Beverages, Inc. v. The Paddington Corp., 886 F.2d 208, 213 (8th Cir.1989). Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court held [t]he writing of his name at the top, in the body, or at the bottom of the instrument constitutes a sufficient signing or signature if it is written for the purpose of giving authenticity to the instrument. Borkowski v. Kolodziejski, 332 Mich. 589, 52 N.W.2d 348, 350 (1952) (quoting 49 Am.Jur. 681). These cases state that the intent of the parties, rather than the location of their signatures on an instrument, should be controlling. Because this is the proper inquiry in a situation such as the one at hand, we must now turn to the Note itself and from it, attempt to determine the intent of the Theobalds and Nossers. ¶ 17. Where the intentions of the parties to an instrument appear clear and unambiguous from the instrument itself, the court should look solely to the instrument and give same effect as written. Barnett v. Getty Oil Co., 266 So.2d 581, 586 (Miss.1972). A construction leading to an absurd, harsh or unreasonable result in a contract should be avoided, unless the terms are express and free of doubt. Frazier v. Northeast Miss. Shopping Ctr., Inc., 458 So.2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 1984). Because the Theobalds signed the Note as Makers and the Nossers signed the Note as Guarantors, a literal reading of it would state as follows: We, the Theobalds promise to pay ourselves $175,000 in order to purchase a store which we already own; and if we fail to pay ourselves, then the Nossers guarantee to pay us. Such a literal reading would obviously be absurd. [A]mbiguous words and terms should be construed against the party who has drafted them; and we accept that, in a case where language of an otherwise enforceable contract is subject to more than one fair reading, we will give that language the reading most favorable to the non-drafting party. Leach v. Tingle, 586 So.2d 799, 801-02 (Miss.1991) (emphasis added). ¶ 18. The Nossers argue that construing this agreement against the Theobalds renders the Promissory Note contingent upon the Nossers' obtaining financing. This argument, however, has a significant shortcoming, as the Note in this case says nothing about the purchase being contingent on the securing of financing. Consequently, there is no language regarding financing that is subject to more than one fair reading which could be construed against the Theobalds. ¶ 19. If ... a careful reading of the instrument reveals it to be less than clear, definite, explicit, harmonious in all its provisions, and free from ambiguity throughout, the court is obligated to pursue the intent of the parties, and, to determine the intent, must resort to extrinsic aid. Barnett, 266 So.2d at 586. As the Note is the only written instrument in the record regarding the purposed sale of the Grocery, the only probative extrinsic evidence remaining is the acts of the parties themselves. If, as the Nossers claim, the sale of the Grocery was contingent on their ability to obtain financing, then the Theobalds would have been aware of the possibility of them having to take back the store and immediately re-commencing operations. Assuming such circumstances to be true, then it is hard to believe that they would have closed their business bank account, given up their tax ID number (and their ability to buy food and gas at wholesale prices), and let the Nossers do whatever they wanted to the Grocery without their input or supervision. ¶ 20. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Nossers would have expended over $1,800 on fixtures which they would not have been able to recover had they been forced to vacate the Grocery for failure to complete the sale. Continuing under this same assumption, then it would seem logical to have included language in the Note stating things like the sale was contingent on financing, how much time the Nossers would have to attempt to obtain financing, and what rent would be owed to the Theobalds if the Nossers occupied the grocery for only a brief period of time. As mentioned above, no such language was included in the Note. Since Mr. Nosser thought to insert the description of the property in the Note, then it seems that he would have also thought to insert some contingency upon financing language, if that was truly his arrangement with Mr. Theobald. [I]f a party who contemplates purchasing a piece of property wishes to protect himself against the possibility that he may be unable to secure financing adequate to make the purchase, it is incumbent upon that party to so provide by clear language in the contract. Osborne v. Bullins, 549 So.2d 1337, 1339 (Miss.1989). [I]n the absence of some provision in the contract authorizing termination or cancellation, every contract is presumed irrevocable. Warwick v. Matheney, 603 So.2d 330, 336 (Miss.1992) (quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts, § 397). The only act, or lack thereof, that might suggest that the sale of the Grocery was contingent on financing is that the Theobalds never deeded the Grocery to the Nossers. However, this is but one fact, and all of the parties' actions taken as a whole point to the conclusion that the sale of the Grocery was not contingent on the Nossers' ability to obtain financing. ¶ 21. Therefore, we affirm the Chancellor's holding that a valid, unconditional contract existed between the Theobalds and the Nossers, said contract having been breached by the Nossers when they failed to satisfy the Note on its due date, March 31, 1997. Having determined that a contract did exist and was breached, we must now examine what damages flowed from this breach.