Opinion ID: 204163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Right to Counsel Claim

Text: Abrante first claims that the state established agency relationships with inmate informants who then elicited admissions from him without the presence of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Abrante argues that the MAC's finding that no agency relationship existed between the informants and the police before the informants heard his admissions was an unreasonable factual determination. He also characterizes the MAC's finding as a violation of Supreme Court precedent. We disagree. We first address Abrante's argument that the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. In affirming the trial court's denial of Abrante's motion for a new trial, the MAC found that Abrante had provided no evidence of any agreement between the inmate informants and police that existed before the informants heard Abrante's admissions. Commonwealth v. Abrante, No. 06-P-898, 2007 WL 4180256, 876 N.E.2d 1185, at  (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 23, 2007) (table).3 Under AEDPA, we presume these findings to be correct, and Abrante has not 3 The MAC appears to have been referring to all four informants. Respondent argues that Abrante's argument applies only to the two testifying informants, but Abrante contends that because elicitation is the prohibited conduct that violates the Sixth Amendment, the argument is relevant to all four inmates. We assume, without deciding, that the government's contact with all four informants is properly at issue. -6- offered clear and convincing evidence that would lead us to conclude that they are unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to the state court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1).4 Abrante argues that Tolentino's bail reduction from $100,000 to $500 and Tolentino's subsequent disappearance5 show that Tolentino had an agreement with the police to provide information against Abrante. The circumstances Abrante alleges, however, do not show that any agreement existed with the police before Tolentino heard Abrante's admissions about his crimes. Evidence that Tolentino met with Springfield Police Officer Joselito Lozada on January 22, 2002, on matters which Abrante concedes were unrelated to him, is not to the contrary. As to Maldonado, Abrante offers nothing more than the coincidence that Maldonado was moved to Abrante's cell in November 2001, the same month that the United States Attorney declined to prosecute Maldonado after being informed that Maldonado would be 4 The issue that recently concerned the Supreme Court in Wood v. Allen, No. 08-9156, 2010 WL 173369 (Jan. 20, 2010), is not presented by this case. Id. at  (electing not to resolve how and when § 2254(e)(1)'s requirement that a petitioner rebut a state court's presumptively correct factual determinations with clear and convincing evidence applies in challenges to state court findings of fact under § 2254(d)(2)). Abrante concedes in his brief that he is obliged to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the presumptively correct state court findings were unreasonable. 5 The final notation in Tolentino's case docket indicates that he may have been deported. -7- prosecuted by the state. Abrante suggests that the timing of these two events as well as the timing of Perez's trial in that same month and subsequent police requests for information about Abrante from Maldonado suggests a particularly strong relationship of agency between the state and Maldonado. This is mere speculation. Abrante also argues that the government solicited evidence about Abrante from Maldonado, Tolentino, and Melendez, and that the MAC's finding that there was no solicitation was unreasonable. First, we must note that the MAC did not make a finding that there was no solicitation. It made no finding at all on this point. Rather, the court concluded that even if it were to assume, arguendo, that police had told the inmates that they were seeking information about Abrante, Abrante's claim that an agency relationship existed would still fail. Abrante, 2007 WL 4180256, at . Abrante has not offered clear and convincing evidence of any contact between the government and the informants beyond that described by the MAC,6 and he has similarly failed to demonstrate 6 Abrante's only evidence that police did anything other than ask Maldonado and Melendez whether Abrante had already discussed his case with them is the testimony of defense investigator Philip Kass. Kass testified that Maldonado told him that police had told Maldonado that they could help him with his case if he would talk with them about Abrante. But Kass also testified that Maldonado told him this in English, without an interpreter, even though Maldonado indicated that he would be more comfortable with an interpreter. This is not clear and convincing evidence sufficient to rebut the state court's finding that there was no agreement between the government and Maldonado before Maldonado heard Abrante's admissions. -8- that the MAC's legal conclusion was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. A police officer's asking an inmate whether Abrante had already discussed his case with that inmate does not create an agency relationship that could implicate the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that [i]n the absence of any express or implied quid pro quo underlying the relationship between [the informant] and the Government, and in the absence of any instructions or directions by the Government, informant was not a government agent). We also reject Abrante's argument that the state court's decision was a violation or unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Abrante appears to argue that the state court unreasonably applied United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), claiming that the facts of this case are analogous. In Henry, the Supreme Court held that the government violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by soliciting a paid government informant to be alert to any statements made by certain prisoners with whom he was housed, including the defendant. Id. at 266. Abrante argues that [j]ust as in Henry, inmates here, knowing what the government sought to learn, initiated and held conversations As for Tolentino, there is no evidence that police approached him about Abrante's case. The record reflects that after his January 2002 meeting with Officer Lozada, Tolentino learned that the police were looking for people to testify against [Abrante], but it is unclear how he came by that information. -9- with Abrante in violation of the Sixth Amendment. But Abrante neglects the fact that in this case, unlike in Henry, there is no evidence that the government had established an informant relationship with the inmates that pre-dated the inmates' conversations with Abrante. See id. at 270 (informant was acting under instructions as a paid informant for the government); see also Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 163, 176-77 (1985). Here, as discussed above, the state court did not make such a finding, and Abrante has not offered clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.7