Opinion ID: 1925262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fourth Amendment and Search Incident to Arrest

Text: In support of his challenge to the validity of the search, Paulino relies on the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to Maryland through the Fourteenth Amendment, and prohibits searches that are unreasonable under the circumstances. Nieves, 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68. In Nieves, we noted that it is well established that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent some recognized exception. 383 Md. at 583, 861 A.2d at 68. See also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 156-57 (1990). The Supreme Court of the United States has, however, recognized the authority of the police to search an arrestee incident to a lawful arrest, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26, 94 S.Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427, 434 (1973); as have we, State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496, 516, 723 A.2d 423, 432-33 cert. denied, 528 U.S. 833, 120 S.Ct. 310, 145 L.Ed.2d 77 (1999). In Evans, 352 Md. at 515, 723 A.2d at 432, we held that to execute a lawful arrest a police officer must have probable cause to believe the suspect has committed a felony and must either physically restrain the suspect or otherwise subject the suspect to his or her custody and control. Because Paulino does not challenge the validity of his arrest, the only issue before the Court is the scope of the search under the circumstances. [2] Police are allowed to conduct a search incident to an arrest in order to remove any weapons that the [arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape . . . [or] to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694. In United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973), the Supreme Court explained the scope of a search incident to an arrest in light of its decision in Chimel. The issue before the Court in Robinson was whether after a custodial arrest, a police officer could conduct a full search of the arrestee or, in the alternative, if the scope of a search incident to arrest is limited to a frisk of the outer clothing. The Court held that a search of an arrestee's waist, pants, pockets, as well as the contents of the arrestee's pockets, supports the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as well as the need to preserve the evidence on his person for later use at trial and is therefore permissible under Fourth Amendment law. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234, 94 S.Ct. at 476, 38 L.Ed.2d at 440. The rationale of Chimel and Robinson entitles the police, under the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search incident to arrest, without a warrant, so long as the search does not involve a bodily intrusion. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 919 (1966). In Schmerber, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects an arrestee's privacy interests in his person and prohibits bodily intrusions that are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. 384 U.S. at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d at 918. We note, however, as we did in Nieves, supra, that the Supreme Court has not [specifically] addressed the validity of strip searches incident to an arrest. 383 Md. at 585, 861 A.2d at 69. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's failure to address the validity of strip searches incident to an arrest, we acknowledged in Stackhouse, supra, that the rule developed in Chimel was based on an exigency rationale, that is, the safety of the officer and the preservation of evidence[,] and that [t]he justification, however, remains a narrow one. Stackhouse v. State, 298 Md. at 211-212, 468 A.2d at 338. In addition, we explained that a warrantless search cannot be justified on the basis that the officers had probable cause, because that is the very determination for which the constitution requires a warrant hearing. Stackhouse, 298 Md. at 219, 468 A.2d at 342. Here the police had reason to believe that Paulino carried drugs on his person and under his clothing, but that fact was not the justification for the search. Paulino's arrest served as justification for the search incident and the underlying probable cause for his arrest was never challenged. The actual challenge, however, is to the search of Paulino. He contends that the search constituted a strip search. By definition a strip search involves a more invasive search of the person as opposed to a routine custodial search. Therefore, the necessity for such an invasive search must turn upon the exigency of the circumstances and reasonableness. Without the constitutional safeguards of exigent circumstances and reasonableness, every search incident could result in a strip search. As we have said, [t]he meaning of exigent circumstances is that the police are confronted with an emergency  circumstances so imminent that they present an urgent and compelling need for police action. Stackhouse, 298 Md. at 219-220, 468 A.2d at 342. Therefore, we must determine whether the circumstances of the search in the present case rise to that level. B.