Opinion ID: 787481
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Materiality element of mail fraud.

Text: 70 The district court instructed the jury on the materiality element of mail fraud as follows: [Statements are material if] they would reasonably influence a person to part with money or property. Citing Neder, Defendant argues that this instruction was insufficient because a materiality instruction in a fraud case must make clear that the statement at issue was important to the decision-making process of the victim. Neder quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538 (1977) for the proposition that a matter is material if: 71 (a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or 72 (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it. 73 527 U.S. at 22 n. 5, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (emphasis added). Defendant argues that Neder requires that a jury be instructed in a fraud case that, for a statement to be material, it must be important to a reasonable person. 74 Defendant's argument is contrary to our holding in United States v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 845, 866 (9th Cir.2002), that the Supreme Court in Neder did not intend to supplant the previously existing definition of materiality provided by the Court in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). The Gaudin Court reaffirmed its definition of materiality as a requirement that the statement have a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision making body to which it was addressed. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Johnson, we held that Gaudin's definition survived Neder: 75 At no point in the relevant passage from Neder did the Court indicate that it was abandoning Gaudin or adopting the Restatement's view as the exclusive definition of materiality. Indeed, in an earlier passage in Neder, the Court favorably cited Gaudin as providing the general definition of materiality. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 16, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Therefore, at most, Neder stands for the proposition that alternative meanings of materiality are permissible. Because Gaudin is one such permissible alternative, and because Instruction 8.26.1 is substantially similar to it, the instruction in this case was not plainly erroneous. 76 Johnson, 297 F.3d at 866 n. 21. Although in Johnson we reviewed for plain error, we unequivocally held that Gaudin is a permissible instruction for materiality, even after Neder, and only then held that the instruction was not plainly erroneous. 77 The district court's instruction, which followed Gaudin and Johnson, was not an abuse of discretion. 78