Opinion ID: 809227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mayfield’s Entrapment Defense

Text: Mayfield argues that the district court erred when it granted the Government’s motion in limine to preclude an entrapment defense. We have held that a court may bar a defendant from arguing entrapment at the Nos. 10-3725, 10-3726, 11-2262 & 11-2439 13 pretrial stage if the defendant’s evidence of entrapment is insufficient as a matter of law. See United States v. Johnson, 32 F.3d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1994). We review the district court’s decision in this matter de novo. United States v. Hall, 608 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 2010). To have an entrapment defense, Mayfield needed to show both that the Government induced him to commit a crime and that he was not otherwise predisposed to commit that crime. See United States v. Millet, 510 F.3d 668, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2007). We emphasize that Mayfield had the initial burden of proof on both of these is- sues. Id. at 675. Because we find that he failed to provide adequate evidence that he was not predisposed, we need not address inducement. In determining whether a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime at issue, we consider the following factors: (1) the defendant’s character or reputation; (2) whether the government initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the criminal activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant evidenced a reluctance to commit the offense that was overcome by government persuasion; and (5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion by the government. Id. at 676 (citing United States v. Blassingame, 197 F.3d 271, 281 (7th Cir. 1999)). No one factor is dispositive, but it is the fourth factor that carries the most weight. Millet, 510 at 676. The Government proffered a wealth of evidence that Mayfield had a criminal reputation, including reference to his several prior convictions for crimes such as burglary, armed robbery, and armed vehicle hijacking. 14 Nos. 10-3725, 10-3726, 11-2262 & 11-2439 Mayfield tried to counter this with evidence that he had been working hard, had received several certificates of professional achievement, and had been trying to get his life back on track, but his own words betray his supposed honest intentions. In extensive recorded conversations with Gomez, Mayfield described his past stash-house robberies in detail, and never seemed shy about embarking on a new criminal venture. He also expressed a desire to do a drug deal with Gomez before the robbery had even been fully planned. These conversations certainly do not reveal any sort of reluctance on the part of Mayfield; the first and fourth factors above weigh heavily against a lack of predisposition. Mayfield counters that it was not Gomez but instead the confidential informant for the ATF, Potts, who pressured him into a crime he was not predisposed to commit. Potts worked with Mayfield and was the first person, according to Mayfield, to suggest a stash-house robbery. But how the informant “pressured” Mayfield is not entirely clear; Mayfield claims the informant showed him a gang tattoo, and that this somehow amounted to duress. There is no allegation of a more specific threat. It seems an odd notion that Mayfield could be bullied into something that he did not already want to do. Not only does he have a reputation for committing serious criminal acts, he was able to quickly assemble a team of friends (we refer to the codefendants) who were all prepared to walk into a guarded drug house with him, guns blazing. That is not typically the sort of person who wilts at the suggestion of a gang affiliation. Nos. 10-3725, 10-3726, 11-2262 & 11-2439 15 One thing that weighs in Mayfield’s favor is his claim that Potts approached him first about the stash-house job, and then repeatedly after that. But Government solicitation alone does not entitle a defendant to an entrapment defense. See United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 1985). We cannot find that Mayfield was not predisposed to commit the crimes when approached by the ATF. There was thus no error in the district court’s decision to bar Mayfield from arguing entrapment.4 4 The dissent believes that Mayfield was entitled to an entrapment defense. It argues that a jury could have found the government inducement “extraordinary,” because stashhouse robberies are particularly lucrative compared to other sorts of robberies. The dissent reasons that the inducement would only be extraordinary to a non-veteran stash-house robber, and that it was for the jury to decide if Mayfield had robbed stash houses before. We cannot endorse this analysis. It effectively collapses the inducement and predisposition elements of entrapment and would allow otherwise predisposed criminals to claim entrapment simply because they were entering a new, more lucrative field of crime. Whether a government agent’s offer is extraordinary should be considered in light of the terms on which crimes of this sort are typically committed. See United States v. Pillado, 656 F.3d 754, 765 (7th Cir. 2011). Nothing in the record suggests that this planned stash-house robbery would be any more lucrative than the typical stash-house robbery. And as we stressed previously, the risk-adjusted rewards for this crime were not so great; Mayfield planned to risk his life and to risk prosecution for murder if he lived. 16 Nos. 10-3725, 10-3726, 11-2262 & 11-2439