Opinion ID: 2590193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Offender Score Challenges

Text: Hunter and Legrone assert that the sentencing courts miscalculated their offender scores. We have established that illegal or erroneous sentences may be challenged for the first time on appeal. Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 477, 973 P.2d 452 (citing State v. Moen, 129 Wash.2d 535, 543-48, 919 P.2d 69 (1996); In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 129 Wash.2d 529, 532, 919 P.2d 66 (1996)). In State v. Paine, the Court of Appeals aptly stated that: A justification for the rule is that it tends to bring sentences in conformity and compliance with existing sentencing statutes and avoids permitting widely varying sentences to stand for no reason other than the failure of counsel to register a proper objection in the trial court. 69 Wash.App. 873, 884, 850 P.2d 1369 (1993). If a defendant has been erroneously sentenced, we remand his case to the sentencing court for resentencing. Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 485, 973 P.2d 452. To properly calculate a defendant's offender score, the SRA requires that sentencing courts determine a defendant's criminal history based on his or her prior convictions and the level of seriousness of the current offense. State v. Wiley , 124 Wash.2d 679, 682, 880 P.2d 983 (1994). The SRA also requires that prior out-of-state convictions be classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided by Washington law. [2] RCW 9.94A.525(3). To do so, we have stated that  the sentencing court must compare the elements of the out-of-state offense with the elements of potentially comparable Washington crimes. Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 479, 973 P.2d 452 (citing State v. Morley, 134 Wash.2d 588, 606, 952 P.2d 167 (1998)). Under the SRA, the State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence and comparability of a defendant's prior out-of-state conviction. State v. McCorkle, 137 Wash.2d 490, 495, 973 P.2d 461 (1999) (citing Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 482-83, 973 P.2d 452). Although the State generally bears the burden of proving the existence and comparability of a defendant's prior out-of-state and/or federal convictions, we have stated a defendant's affirmative acknowledgment that his prior out-of-state and/or federal convictions are properly included in his offender score satisfies SRA requirements. Ford, 137 Wash.2d at 483 n. 5, 973 P.2d 452. Here, both Hunter and Legrone affirmatively acknowledged at sentencing that their prior out-of-state and/or federal convictions were comparable to Washington State crimes and thus, were properly included in their offender score. However, Hunter and Legrone argue that our decision in Goodwin abrogated Ford. They posit that the State's failure to prove the comparability of their prior out-of-state and/or federal convictions constitutes legal error and, under Goodwin, they cannot waive challenges to an offender score based in part on legal errors. The Court of Appeals disagreed. It held that pursuant to our decision in Ford, the sentencing court was not required to consider further proof of the existence of Hunter's and Legrone's prior out-of-state and/or federal convictions after they affirmatively acknowledged the comparability of those convictions. Hunter, 116 Wash.App. at 302, 65 P.3d 371; Legrone, 117 Wash.App. 1044, 2003 WL 21500733, at . The court also distinguished Goodwin reasoning that: Nothing in Goodwin, which involved a collateral challenge to a judgment and sentence that was invalid on its face, supports the proposition that the sentencing court must undertake a comparability determination despite the defendant's affirmative agreement with the State's classification. Hunter, 116 Wash.App. at 302, 65 P.3d 371; Legrone, 117 Wash.App. 1044, 2003 WL 21500733, at . Thus, the Court of Appeals denied Hunter and Legrone's appeals. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals. In Goodwin, we considered a defendant's untimely personal restraint petition seeking relief from a miscalculated offender score. 146 Wash.2d at 865, 50 P.3d 618. There, the sentencing court had calculated Goodwin's offender score as a 4 based, in part, on three juvenile convictions that had clearly washed out. Id. at 864-65, 50 P.3d 618. We held that [i]n this case, the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face, and Goodwin's petition is not barred because he filed it over one year after the judgment was final. Id. at 866-67, 50 P.3d 618. Further, in response to the State's argument that Goodwin had waived his challenge to his sentence by stipulating to his offender score in his plea agreement, we stated that in general a defendant cannot waive a challenge to a miscalculated offender score. Id. at 874, 50 P.3d 618. However, we noted that [w]hile waiver does not apply where the alleged sentencing error is a legal error leading to an excessive sentence, waiver can be found where the alleged error involves an agreement to facts, later disputed, or where the alleged error involves a matter of trial court discretion. Id. (emphasis added). Because Goodwin's alleged sentencing error, i.e., inclusion of his three washed out juvenile convictions, was a legal error, we granted his petition and remanded his case for resentencing. Id. at 877-78, 50 P.3d 618. Contrary to Hunter and Legrone's assertion, our decision in Goodwin does not control the inquiry here. Goodwin turned on the fact that that defendant's sentence contained obvious errors. Id. at 875-76, 50 P.3d 618. To invoke the waiver analysis set forth in Goodwin, a defendant must first show on appeal or by way of personal restraint petition that an error of fact or law exists within the four corners of his judgment and sentence. See id. Here, neither Hunter nor Legrone has met this initial threshold requirement since pursuant to our decision in Ford, neither has shown that the sentencing court committed any arguable factual or legal error by including their prior out-of-state and/or federal convictions in their offender score. [3] Therefore, we affirm the Court of Appeals.