Opinion ID: 788775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plain Error Affecting Substantial Rights

Text: 41 In the present case, it cannot be disputed that the district court committed plain error that affected a substantial constitutional guarantee contained in the Ex Post Facto Clause — i.e., the unequivocal command that the Government shall not dole out punishment that imposes a harsher sentence than the one permitted by law at the time the crime was committed. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl.3; Frank, 354 F.3d at 926. 10 42 If one compares the sentence Harrison received under the 2003 version of the Guidelines with the sentence he likely would have received under the 2002 version, it appears that he would have received a lesser sentence under the earlier version. It is undisputed that the policy statement contained in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (2003) limits the downward departures for career offenders to one criminal history category. Given Harrison's total offense level of 31 and a criminal history category of V (after application of a single downward departure), the resulting sentencing range was 168-210 months (14-17.5 years). 43 Even the Government concedes that [p]rior to November 5, 2003, no such restriction existed allowing the Court to depart horizontally (criminal history category) and vertically (offense level) from the applicable career offender guideline range. Government's Brief at 8-9 ( citing Greger, 339 F.3d at 668 (8th Cir.2003)). Although the district court did not state definitively what sentence it would have issued to Harrison had it been able to exercise greater discretion, the record reveals that the district court wanted to drop Harrison's offense level to 23, but leave his criminal history category at VI, which would have produced a sentencing range of 92-115 months (roughly 7.6-9.5 years). 11 44 In light of this analysis, it is clear that the application of the 2003 Guideline imposed a harsher sentence than the prior version. Harrison will serve roughly five to ten additional years than he would have served under the prior sentencing scheme. Moreover, this error encroaches upon a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Ex Post Facto Clause. The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997). In both a temporal and substantive sense, this error affects substantial rights. 12 45 Since the district court applied the 2003 version of the Guidelines and imposed a harsher sentence than it would have under the prior version, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 was violated. This type of deviation from a Guideline binding upon courts is plain error within the meaning of Rule 52(b). If a legal rule was violated during the district court proceedings, and if the defendant did not waive the rule, then there has been an `error' within the meaning of Rule 52(b) despite the absence of a timely objection. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34, 113 S.Ct. 1770. 46 In short, the district court committed plain error affecting substantial rights, and Harrison did not waive appeal of this error. This case cries out for reversal. Notes: 5 United States v. Wilson, 184 F.3d 798, 800-01 (8th Cir.1999), appears to state the contrary. I am not confident that Wilson rests on sound reasoning. Wilson states correctly that even a constitutionally guaranteed procedural right to appeal may be waived by a criminal defendant. Id. at 800. Yet, the Wilson court refused to consider Wilson's substantive ex post facto argument on appeal, citing the general rule that a defendant who explicitly and voluntarily exposes himself or herself to a sentence may not challenge that punishment on appeal. Id. at 801. The majority makes an identical mistake. See supra majority opinion at 4-5 ( citing United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 527 (8th Cir.2002); Wilson, 184 F.3d at 800-01; and United States v. Nguyen, 46 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir.1995)). This general rule has no bearing on, and cannot trump, the special review procedure articulated in Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). Second, while the generic, procedural right to appeal can be waived, the substantive right prohibiting ex post facto laws cannot. As Michelsen states, the right to appeal a sentence on grounds of illegality survives a knowing and voluntary waiver of appellate rights. See 141 F.3d at 872. To the extent that Wilson and Michelsen create a conflict within our own circuit, this issue warrants further appeal or rehearing. At any rate, Wilson is factually distinct from the instant case. In Wilson, the defendant's attorney stated at the sentencing hearing that he or she had reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) and believed it [was] correct and accurate in all matters. 184 F.3d at 799-800. Here, Harrison's attorney made no such concession at the sentencing hearings. Indeed, ever since the PSIR in this case was released, Harrison and his attorney have argued that the PSIR's recommendation of career offender status seriously overrepresented Harrison's criminal history. Moreover, Harrison's plea agreement does not contain a provision stating that he waived his appellate rights. 6 Because courts are required to approve plea agreements, the obligation to ensure that plea agreements do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause probably rests with the court, and may be the type of constitutional issue that any court should be allowed to raise sua sponte. 7 See infra Part II.B. at 7-9 (conducting a harshness analysis). 8 If not taken out of context, the record shows that defense counsel lodged conflicting and vague requests regarding the extent of departure and relied upon case law that specifically endorsed the sentencing judge's authority to depart downward more than one offense level See e.g., Def. Brief in Support of Motion for Downward Departure at 6 (requesting that the court reduce his sentence as justice and fairness dictate but requesting no specific offense level); Def. Am. Motion for Downward Departure and Request for Oral Argument at 2 (submitted on February 26, and requesting a departure of one category level from category VI to category V); Tr. at 13 (basing the departure request on the United States v. Greger, 339 F.3d 666, 668, 671 (8th Cir.2003) — which explicitly allows a sentencing judge to depart both vertically and horizontally — yet also requesting only a single criminal history category departure because the ex post facto issue is not yet clear); Tr. at 24 (asking the court on March 1 to impose a sentence at the low end of the guideline range, but omitting a specification of the applicable range). 9 Contrary to the Government's patently incorrect claim in its brief, the transcript from the sentencing hearing contains no concession by defense counsel that, in fact, the new 2003 guideline controlled the extent of departure in this case. Defense counsel merely conceded that the 2003 Guideline amendment came about in November of 2003. Tr. at 20. 10 Normally, a district court's decision to deny a downward departure is not reviewable. An exception to this rule is when the district judge mistakenly believed that he or she lacked the authority to make such a departure, which is the case here Frank, 354 F.3d at 926; see also Tr. at 23 (reflecting the judge's statement that he departed downward to the degree authorized under the current law). 11 See Tr. at 8 (reflecting the judge's belief that if the district court opted to grant Harrison's request for downward departure on the ground that his career offender status overrepresented the severity of his criminal history, the court could sentence within the guideline range that would have applied absent the career offender status in its entirety — i.e., the base offense level minus any adjustments); see also United States v. Senior, 935 F.2d 149, 151 (8th Cir.1991) (affirming sentence based on the guideline range that would have applied absent the career offender status). 12 The Government argues that the 2003 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 did not technically increase the penalty for the crime and therefore did not increase the harshness of Harrison's sentence. Rather, the Government reasons, the amendment merely restricted the sentencing court's discretionary authority to depart more than one criminal history level. This argument is disingenuous. When a judge's discretion to grant downward departures is restricted, the harshness of a sentence necessarily increases. The Supreme Court has already rejected the argument that downward departures or other types of penalty credits bear no relation to the severity of a sentence because they are not `in some technical sense part of the sentence.'  Lynce, 519 U.S. at 445-47, 117 S.Ct. 891. [R]etroactive alteration of parole or early release provisions, like the retroactive application of provisions that govern initial sentencing, implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause because such credits are one determinant of petitioner's prison term... and ... [the petitioner's] effective sentence is altered once this determinant is changed.... [T]he removal of such provisions can constitute an increase in punishment, because a prisoner's eligibility for reduced imprisonment is a significant factor entering into both the defendant's decision to plea bargain and the judge's calculation of the sentence to be imposed. Id. at 445-46, 117 S.Ct. 891 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 33-34, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Cal. Dep't Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) (holding that a revised Florida statute, which reduced the availability of monthly gain-time credits that could operate to reduce a sentence, was retroactively and unconstitutionally applied to defendant in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause). Thus, it is well-settled that, even though a downward departure under § 4A1.3 is a product of judicial discretion to which a defendant is not necessarily entitled, this does not bar the ex post facto claim. In light of Lynce and Weaver, the Government's attempt to recycle this argument is ill-taken.