Opinion ID: 2718751
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Forehand next contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2009). “[T]he standard applied is the same whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.” United States v. Utter, 97 5 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 6 of 13 F.3d 509, 512 (11th Cir. 1996). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and decide whether a reasonable fact finder could have reached a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Herrera, 931 F.2d 761, 762 (11th Cir. 1991). “Proof may be established through circumstantial evidence or from inferences drawn from the conduct of an individual.” Utter, 97 F.3d at 512. “[C]redibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury.” United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Statements by the defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, can be considered substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir 1995). Forehand argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the intent element of each of the offenses. Because the government presented sufficient evidence of Forehand’s intent, we affirm his convictions.
Counts One through Five of the indictment charged Forehand with committing wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Mail and wire fraud are analytically identical save for the method of execution. Both offenses require that a person (1) intentionally participates in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property, and (2) uses or causes the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice. The first element, a scheme or artifice to defraud, requires proof of a material 6 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 7 of 13 misrepresentation, or the omission or concealment of a material fact calculated to deceive another out of money or property. A misrepresentation is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision maker to whom it is addressed. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2011) (footnotes, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). “Proof of intent to defraud is necessary to support convictions for mail and wire fraud.” Id. at 1239. “An intent may be found when the defendant believed that he could deceive the person to whom he made the material misrepresentation out of money or property of some value.” Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1301 (internal quotation marks omitted). “A jury may infer an intent to defraud from the defendant’s conduct.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Evidence that a defendant personally profited from a fraud may provide circumstantial evidence of an intent to participate in that fraud.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Forehand had the requisite intent required for wire fraud. At trial, the circumstantial evidence presented by the government demonstrated that Forehand personally and repeatedly misrepresented or omitted material facts in an attempt to influence investors to invest in his scheme. For example, the victim-investors testified at trial that had they known that Forehand’s business partner was a convicted fraudster, they would not have invested with Forehand. Likewise, the victim-investors testified that had 7 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 8 of 13 they known that Forehand’s business partner had bounced hundreds of thousands of dollars in checks to him and other investors, they would not have invested with him. These material misrepresentations to the victim-investors demonstrate Forehand’s intent to defraud those investors. See id. (“A jury may infer an intent to defraud from the defendant’s conduct.”). Furthermore, Forehand profited significantly from the fraud scheme. This is further circumstantial evidence of his intent to participate in the fraud. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the wire fraud convictions.
Forehand was also convicted of two counts of mail fraud (Counts Six and Seven). A third count of mail fraud, Count Eight, was dismissed after the jury verdict on motion from the government. As noted above, “[m]ail and wire fraud are analytically identical save for the method of execution.” Id. at 1238. As discussed with respect to wire fraud, the evidence at trial established that Forehand had the necessary intent to deceive the victim-investors because he lied to them about material facts in order to obtain their money. See id. The government demonstrated that Forehand had the necessary intent required to sustain his mail fraud convictions. See id. Additionally, Forehand takes issue with the dates listed for Count Six only. Forehand argues that there was a material difference between the charges as listed 8 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 9 of 13 in the indictment from the evidence presented at trial; specifically the dates proved for those crimes were different from the dates alleged. “[T]ime is not an essential element of the offense, so long as the government establishes that the conduct occurred reasonably near the date that the indictment mentions.” United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 688–89 (11th Cir. 1998). “Ordinarily, we will not disturb a conviction due to a variance between the date the indictment alleges the offense occurred and the date the proof shows that it occurred if the date shown at trial falls within the statute of limitations and before the return of the indictment.” United States v. Roberts, 308 F.3d 1147, 1156 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “Two purposes are served by the requirement that the allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial correspond: (1) the defendant is properly notified of the charges so that he may present a defense; and (2) the defendant is protected against the possibility of another prosecution for the same offense.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. McIntosh, we concluded that because the date of the offense was not an essential element of the offense, the error was of form, not substance, and was not fatally defective. 580 F.3d 1222, 1228 (11th Cir. 2009). With respect to Count Six, there is only an eight-day difference between the date alleged in the indictment and the date testified to at trial. The indictment alleged that the mail fraud took place on October 20, 2008. The testifying witness 9 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 10 of 13 said that he received the fraudulent document on October 28, 2008. The mail fraud occurred reasonably near when the indictment alleged, and it occurred within the statute of limitations and prior to the return of the indictment. See Pope, 132 F.3d at 688–89; Roberts, 308 F.3d at 1156. The indictment charged that on or about October 20, 2008, Forehand mailed an IRA to “KT” in Dothan, Alabama. The evidence at trial established that on October 28, 2008, Kevin Tillman received in the mail an IRA from Forehand. Forehand admitted at trial there was only one KT on the list of victims provided to him, and that victim was Kevin Tillman. He admitted at trial that he had adequate notice of this charge. Forehand’s argument as to this issue fails.
Forehand was charged in counts nine and ten of his indictment with securities fraud in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2) and 77x. To show a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2), the government must prove: “(1) a material misrepresentation or materially misleading omission, (2) in the offer or sale of a security, (3) made with negligence.” S.E.C. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 678 F.3d 1233, 1244 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). Section 77x provides that “[a]ny person who willfully violates any of the provisions of [§ 77x]” or “makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact required to be 10 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 11 of 13 stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading” commits a criminal offense. 15 U.S.C. § 77x. On appeal, Forehand does not present any argument to support his contention that there was insufficient evidence to uphold his convictions for securities fraud. The government established all the elements of securities fraud by presenting evidence that Forehand sold securities to investors by either intentionally or negligently making both material misrepresentations to investors, and by omitting material information relevant to the investment decision. And he did so by using facilities in interstate commerce: the mail, telephones, and the internet. Forehand made intentionally false assertions to investors that their money would be used to purchase pots and pans when he knew that he was using the money to pay off earlier investors and to pay himself. The investors relied on Forehand’s material misrepresentations to invest in securities offered by Forehand for sale. Forehand’s convictions for securities fraud are affirmed. 4. Counts Eleven through Fourteen: Money Laundering To convict a defendant of money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957, the government must prove that: (1) the defendant “knowingly engage[d] or attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000,” and (2) the property “is derived from specified 11 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 12 of 13 unlawful activity.” See United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of fraud is necessary to support a conviction for engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity. United States v. Naranjo, 634 F.3d 1198, 1207 (11th Cir. 2011). “A scheme to defraud requires proof of a material misrepresentation, or the omission or concealment of a material fact calculated to deceive another out of money or property.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A jury may infer an intent to defraud from the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Evidence that a defendant personally profited from a fraud may provide circumstantial evidence of an intent to participate in that fraud.” Bradley, 644 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). At trial, the government presented sufficient evidence to establish that Forehand knowingly engaged in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, when, on the dates alleged in the indictment, he used funds derived from his fraud in amounts greater than $10,000, for his own personal use or for the benefit of a relative. He made material misrepresentations and omitted material facts when he pitched his scheme to investors, and he personally benefited significantly from this scheme to defraud. Accordingly, his convictions for money laundering are affirmed. AFFIRMED. 12 Case: 13-14089 Date Filed: 08/19/2014 Page: 13 of 13 13