Opinion ID: 1707145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in denying appellant's motion to suppress certain evidence, or to continue the trial, because of the State's failure to comply with discovery on certain evidence and certain witnesses less than one month before trial?

Text: ¶ 10. Lewis first contends that the trial judge erred by admitting the testimony of Joe Andrews, an employee of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory. Andrews compared the bloody footprints found at the scene of the crime with Lewis' shoes. He concluded that one of the bloody prints was made by Lewis' shoe, to the exclusion of every other shoe in the world. ¶ 11. The record reflects that Lewis filed his discovery request May 16, 1994. Assistant District Attorney Bobby DeLaughter sent the shoe to the Mississippi Crime Laboratory for analysis May 25, 1995. Upon issuance of Andrews' report, DeLaughter promptly forwarded it to defense counsel, who received the report June 16, 1995. ¶ 12. A suppression hearing was held July 5, 1995. Lewis alleged that the State had withheld the footprint evidence for two years, and that the evidence should be suppressed at the trial, which was scheduled for July 10, 1995. In the alternative, Lewis argued for a three or four week continuance, so that he could obtain a footprint expert to rebut the State's evidence. However, Lewis did not assert that he had attempted to obtain a footprint expert from the time the evidence was received (June 16, 1995) until the date of the suppression hearing (July 5, 1995). The trial judge denied Lewis' motion to suppress Andrews' report, or in the alternative, to continue the trial. ¶ 13. On appeal, Lewis contends that the trial judge should have suppressed the evidence, or, alternatively, allowed a continuance. In Stewart v. State, [512 So.2d 889, 892 (Miss.1987)], we reversed a conviction because the State withheld discovery until the day before trial and we stated, Discovery, to be sufficient, must be made at a time far enough in advance of trial to give the defense a `meaningful opportunity' to make use of it. Stewart, at 892. See also, Turner v. State, 501 So.2d 350 (Miss. 1987); Gray v. State, 487 So.2d 1304 (Miss. 1986); Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012 (Miss.1986); McKinney v. State, 482 So.2d 1129 (Miss.1986).... We have addressed the issue of belated discovery in Foster v. State, 484 So.2d 1009 (Miss.1986), and held: Where the state is tardy in furnishing discovery which it was obligated to disclose, the defendant is entitled upon request to a continuance postponement of the proceedings reasonable under the circumstances. Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Miss.1986); McKinney v. State, 482 So.2d 1129, 1131 (Miss. 1986); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 343 (Miss.1985); Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 26 (Miss.1983) (Robertson, J. concurring). By no means does this mean invariably that the defendant will be entitled to a continuance until the next term of court. There will no doubt be cases where postponement of a day or two, or in some cases even an hour or two, will suffice.... Foster, 484 So.2d at 1011. See also, Stewart v. State, 512 So.2d 889, 892-93 (Miss. 1987). Having received the untimely discovery furnished by the State, the defense was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to make use of it .... if a continuance was necessary to accomplish this, then the defense was entitled to a continuance. Inman v. State, 515 So.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Miss.1987). ¶ 14. The trial judge held that the defense had reasonable time to make use of Andrews' report. At the suppression hearing, Lewis requested three or four weeks to obtain an expert to rebut the report. However, Lewis had three or four weeks from the date he received the information (June 16, 1995) until the trial (July 10, 1995). Moreover, Lewis had five days from the suppression hearing (July 5, 1995) until the trial (July 10, 1995) to find someone who could rebut the footprint analysis [1] if such a person existed. ¶ 15. The record reflects that Lewis had a meaningful opportunity to make use of Andrews' report, and that no discovery violation occurred. Therefore, the trial judge properly denied Lewis' motion to suppress Andrews' report, or in the alternative, to continue the trial. Id. ¶ 16. Lewis further contends that, during Andrews' trial testimony, the State introduced exhibits comparing Lewis' shoe to the bloody shoe print. Lewis objected to the introduction of one of the exhibits for the same reason as that expressed in the motion to suppress. That reason was the tardy disclosure of Andrews' conclusions. Lewis did not object to the introduction of the other exhibits or ask for a continuance, and he did not mention at trial that he had never seen these exhibits. A trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter which was not presented to him for decision. McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 241 (Miss.1997). ¶ 17. Furthermore, it seems disingenuous for Lewis to claim prejudice or ambush by the actual visual comparisons themselves, when he was clearly aware that Andrews would testify about such comparisons. See Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 289 (Miss. 1996) (no discovery violation where appellant knew that shoe print expert would make general comparison and expert testified regarding specific characteristics of toe of shoe, because it was obvious from looking at the evidence of the bloody shoe prints with a naked layman's eye that attention would focus on the toe area of [appellant's] shoe). Therefore, Lewis' argument on this point is also without merit.