Opinion ID: 445220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the subsections 501(a) and 101(a) claims

Text: 53 Mallick also argues that the IBEW has a fiduciary duty under subsection 501(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 501(a), to permit him to inspect union records reflecting the Boswell costs. In support of that view, he cites three cases in which courts have relied on subsection 501(a) to require disclosure of information relevant to a scheduled vote of the membership. See Petrazzulo v. Lowen, 534 F.Supp. 173, 177 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Blanchard v. Lowenstein, 388 F.Supp. 208, 215 (N.D.Ohio 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869, 97 S.Ct. 180, 50 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976); Cefalo v. Moffett, 333 F.Supp. 1283, 1283, 1288 (D.D.C.), modified on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1193 (D.C.Cir.1971). The IBEW replies that Gabauer v. Woodcock, 594 F.2d 662 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841, 100 S.Ct. 80, 62 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979), rejected the use of section 501 as a general device for examination of union records. At least where no relevant union election is scheduled and the union member has not alleged an actual breach of fiduciary trust in the handling of union funds, the IBEW argues that to imply a right of examination under subsection 501(a) would defeat the limited right Congress specifically created in subsection 201(c). Cf. Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637, 653 n. 30 (D.C.Cir.1984) (expressing doubt that Sec. 501 forbids unions to violate political rights of members enumerated in Sec. 101, since Sec. 101 directly protects those rights). 54 However, we need not decide under what circumstances section 501 might enable a union member to examine records unavailable under subsection 201(c). 35 We have interpreted subsection 201(c), as applied to the facts of this case, to require consideration of essentially the same principles of fiduciary duty that govern section 501. We therefore hold that in this case, Mallick could have no right under section 501 broader than his right under subsection 201(c). For that reason, we vacate summary judgment on the subsection 501(a) claim and direct the district court to address the subsection 201(c) claim first on remand. If the subsection 201(c) claim succeeds, no further consideration of the subsection 501(a) claim will be necessary. If it fails for lack of just cause, Mallick could have no right to relief under the parallel principles governing subsection 501(a), assuming arguendo that subsection 501(a) applies to this case. 36 55 Finally, Mallick brings two related claims under subsection 101(a) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 411(a). The gist of the claims is that the union has violated his statutory rights to an equal vote and freedom of speech by failing to disclose information essential to informed participation in union politics. Subsection 101(a)(1) is no more than a command that members and classes of members shall not be discriminated against in their right to nominate and vote. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 139, 85 S.Ct. 292, 295, 13 L.Ed.2d 190 (1964). This circuit has refused to take an unreasonably narrow view of the right to an equal vote, see Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union Local 224, 567 F.2d 1117 (D.C.Cir.1977), but Mallick's claim is outside even a very broad view of the statute. Mallick calls attention to Daniels v. National Post Office Mail Handlers, 454 F.Supp. 336 (E.D.Va.1978), in which the court held that when a union deliberately and as a matter of policy keeps its members in ignorance as to even the basic validity of the union's Constitution, id. at 339, the union had violated its members' voting and speech rights under subsection 101(a) by refusing to disclose this essential information. We need not consider whether Daniels was correctly decided, since the connection between the information sought and the union member's statutory rights under subsection 101(a) is far more attenuated in this case than it was in Daniels. 56 Mallick also relies on Lodge 1380 Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, & Steamship Clerks v. Dennis, 625 F.2d 819 (9th Cir.1980), in which a union member sought a list of the membership as essential to communicate his views to them, and so to exercise his right of free speech. The court held his complaint adequate to survive a motion to dismiss. See id. at 827-28. Again, we need not determine whether Dennis was correct to conclude that Mallick's claim is at a much greater remove from the statutory right to freedom of speech. That right simply does not guarantee access to all information a member might want to speak about. Cf. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982) (scope of Sec. 101(a)(2) narrower than that of first amendment). Mallick must be able to ground his claims on a violation of a specific right enumerated in subsection 101(a), see Bunz v. Moving Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union Local 224, 567 F.2d at 1120, and this he has failed to do. Accordingly, we affirm summary judgment against him on the subsection 101(a) claims.