Opinion ID: 2518342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Proper Sentencing Guidelines

Text: For his final claim of error, Overton asserts that the sentencing court applied the wrong sentencing guidelines. On July 1, 1996, the Kansas Legislature increased the sentences for severity 1 and 2 offenses. K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4704; L. 1996, ch. 258, sec. 10. However, on July 1, 1999, the Legislature reduced the sentences for some severity level 1 and 2 offenses. K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4704; L. 1999, ch. 164, sec. 17. The trial court sentenced Overton to a controlling term of 184 months for his rape conviction using the 1996 amendments. See K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4704. Overton argues that because he was convicted after July 1999, he should be sentenced to a controlling term of 147 months under the sentencing guidelines enacted in July 1999. The issue of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which this court has de novo review. State v. Jones, 272 Kan. 674, 677, 35 P.3d 887 (2001). Resolution of this issue requires the interpretation of K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4704. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a statute operates prospectively unless its language clearly indicates that the legislature intended it to operate retroactively. State v. Ford, 262 Kan. 206, 208, 936 P.2d 255 (1997). Therefore, the fundamental rule for sentencing is that the person convicted of a crime is sentenced in accordance with the sentencing provisions in effect at the time the crime was committed. State v. Anthony, 273 Kan. 726, 730, 45 P.3d 852 (2002); State v. Reason, 263 Kan. 405, 951 P.2d 538 (1997); State v. Roseborough, 263 Kan. 378, 382-83, 386, 951 P.2d 532 (1997); Ford, 262 Kan. at 208-09; State v. Riley, 259 Kan. 774, 776, 915 P.2d 774 (1996); State v. Fierro, 257 Kan. 639, 649, 895 P.2d 186 (1995); State v. Downey, 27 Kan. App. 2d 350, 365-66, 2 P.3d 191, rev. denied 269 Kan. 936 (2000). This court has previously determined that the amendments to the sentencing guidelines statutes are substantive and are not applied retroactively unless the statute's language clearly indicates the legislature's intent otherwise. Ford, 262 Kan. at 208. To support his argument, Overton attempts to distinguish Anthony and Downey by noting that the defendants in those cases would have received a longer sentence if the court had not applied the guidelines in effect at the time the crime was committed, thereby avoiding an ex post facto violation. However, Overton fails to argue why the court should not interpret K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4704 in accordance with established precedent and fundamental rules of statutory interpretation simply because the amendment benefits rather than burdens him. In Reason and Ford, this court specifically addressed the retrospective application of amendments to the sentencing guidelines that would benefit criminal defendants. In both cases, the defendants claimed that they should be sentenced under the 1996 amendments to K.S.A. 21-4705 (drug grid) even though their crimes were committed before the effective date of the 1996 amendments. The amendment to K.S.A. 21-4705 changed the applicable box on the grid from presumptive prison to a border box, which would have given both Reason and Ford an opportunity to avoid prison sentences. Reason, 263 Kan. at 416; Ford, 262 Kan. at 207. The Reason court relied on Ford, which concluded that K.S.A. 21-4705 was substantive and the legislature did not specifically make the amendments retroactive. Reason, 263 Kan. at 416-17; Ford, 262 Kan. at 208. For her argument that the 1996 amendments applied to her, Ford relied on K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4705(a), which provided that `[f]or the purpose of sentencing, the following sentencing guidelines grid for drug crimes shall be applied in felony cases under the uniform controlled substances act for crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993.' Ford, 262 Kan. at 208. The Ford court interpreted K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4705(a), stating: [T]hat language establishes which event in the series of events from perpetration through prosecution of a crime determines whether a defendant will be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines or pursuant to previous law. It establishes commission of the crime as the controlling event, and it establishes that crimes committed on or after July 1, 1993, will be punished according to the sentencing guidelines. Hence, if the legislature had changed the date in the language prefacing the drug grid to coincide with the effective date of the 1996 amendment, the resulting provision might have been construed to restrict application of the sentencing guidelines to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996. By not changing the date in K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4705(a), the legislature maintained July 1, 1993, as the date on or after which a crime had to be committed in order for the sentencing guidelines to govern punishment. 262 Kan. at 209. The only distinction between 21-4704(a) and 21-4705(a) is whether the crime is a drug crime or a nondrug crime. Thus, the Ford court's interpretation of K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4705(a) applies to K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4704(a) and directly contradicts Overton's argument that the similar language in K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 21-4704(a) should be interpreted to require retroactive application of the 1999 amendment to him. Accordingly, Overton's claim that he should be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of his sentencing is without merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. LOCKETT, J., Retired, assigned. [1]