Opinion ID: 222688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Military Authority Exception to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)

Text: Finally, we turn to the plaintiffs' claim against the United States to recover personal property seized from them by the U.S. military when they were detained. [25] The question is whether the military authority exception in the Administrative Procedure Act, which prohibits judicial review of military authority exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory, 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G), precludes subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claim. We review this question of law de novo. See Thomas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.2002). We conclude that the military authority exception precludes judicial review and reverse the district court's decision on this claim. The military authority exception to the Administrative Procedure Act provides that the right of judicial review for persons aggrieved by government actions does not extend to the exercise of military authority in the field in time of war. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G). The plain language of the statutory exception prevents the court from reviewing military decisions regarding these plaintiffs' personal property. First, there is no question that the seizure of plaintiffs' property was an exercise of military authority by U.S. military personnel stationed in Iraq. Vance and Ertel acknowledge that their property was taken by members of the military in connection with a military investigation. Second, the confiscation of property occurred in time of war. The alleged seizure of the property occurred in 2006 in the midst of a congressionally-authorized war in Iraq. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F.Supp.2d 85, 102 (D.D.C. 2007) (taking judicial notice that the United States is at war in Iraq); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 357 F.Supp.2d 274, 283-84 (D.D.C.2005) (recognizing that the United States was at war in Iraq). Third, the military personnel seized plaintiffs' property in the field. When their property was seized, Vance and Ertel were in Baghdad during an armed conflict. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 64 n. 11 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that the military authority exception would bar relief under the APA because plaintiffs were captured in areas where the United States was engaged in military hostilities pursuant to the Joint Resolution of Congress), aff'd, Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir.2003), rev'd on other grounds, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004); Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1380 (D.C.Cir.1991) (suggesting that the exception applies to military commands made in combat zones or in preparation for, or in the aftermath of, battle). The district court relied on Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.1979), to distinguish between a claim for the return of property and a challenge to the initial seizure of property. We find Jaffee inapposite. There, in a case that did not address recovery of personal property, the plaintiff sued under the APA to challenge the government's failure to take remedial measures to protect soldiers who were exposed to an atomic explosion at a military base in Nevada. The court held that the military authority exception did not apply because the army's failure to act was neither in the field nor in time of war. Id. at 720. The atomic blast occurred during the Korean conflict, but thousands of miles of land and ocean separated the blast site in Nevada from the active combat zone in Korea. These facts are readily distinguishable from those before us, where Vance and Ertel's property was allegedly seized from them in the middle of a war zone. Furthermore, while the Jaffee plaintiffs sought relief for the government's failure to act years after the Korean War had officially ended, Vance and Ertel, by contrast, seek an inquiry into the whereabouts of their property while the conflict in Iraq is ongoing. The district judge denied the motion to dismiss based on the possibility that the plaintiffs' property might no longer be held in the field, and allowed the claim to proceed to permit discovery to inquire into its present location. We do not find this reasoning persuasive. The cases cited by the district court to support this reasoning are all readily distinguishable. See, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld, 297 F.Supp.2d 119, 129 (D.D.C.2003) (finding that the military authority exception did not prevent judicial review of a decision to require American troops stationed within the United States to submit to anthrax vaccinations because claims did not challenge military authority exercised in the field in a time of war or in occupied territory); Rosner v. United States, 231 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1217-18 (S.D.Fla.2002) (allowing, in an abundance of caution, discovery on the application of the military authority exception to the United States Army's seizure of property expropriated by the Hungarian government during World War II). In contrast to these cases, it is clear that Vance and Ertel's personal property was seized by military authority exercised in the field in time of war. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1)(G). Regardless of the current location of the property  whether in Fort Hood, Texas, or in Rock Island, Illinois, as plaintiffs suggest, or in Baghdad  it was seized by and remains in the custody of military engaged in ongoing hostilities in Iraq. While in some cases it may be appropriate for the district court to order discovery to determine whether the military authority exception applies, no additional discovery is necessary on this issue here where the exception clearly applies as the claims have been pled.