Opinion ID: 76395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Apprendi to MDLEA Sentencing

Text: 28 Rendon alleges that, because the MDLEA incorporates the penalties framework of 21 U.S.C. § 960, it violates Apprendi by increasing his sentence by facts determined by the trial judge by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Tinoco appellants also contended that the MDLEA was unconstitutional because it incorporates the penalties of 21 U.S.C. § 960(b), which they argued violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and thereby violated Apprendi. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1098. As recognized in Tinoco, Apprendi held that `[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63) (alteration in original). In Tinoco, this Court further explained that  Apprendi does not apply when the defendant's sentence falls into that statutory penalty range, meaning that there is no need to have drug quantity charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury, or proven beyond a reasonable doubt in that context. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1100. 29 There is constitutional error under Apprendi ... in the 21 U.S.C. § 960 context only if the sentencing judge's factual finding actually increased the defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum found in § 960(b)(3), and only if the fact that led to the enhanced sentence was not charged in the federal indictment or submitted to the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 30 Id. at 1101. Because Rendon's sentence was exactly the statutory mandatory minimum and not above the statutory maximum, Apprendi is irrelevant. Id. at 1101. Therefore, Rendon's Apprendi argument relating to his sentencing was resolved by Tinoco and is unavailing. 31