Opinion ID: 1617265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: When words we make meaningless

Text: The majority opinion's short-sightedness can be easily demonstrated. Two decisions of this Court reaching opposite conclusions on the meaning of household and residence will suffice. In Fleming v. Travelers Ins. Co., 206 Miss. 284, 39 So.2d 885 (1949), one Stewart had a liability policy with Travelers Insurance. Stewart and his wife were separated, but she continued to live in his home in New Orleans, where he had his telephone listed in his name. Stewart lived part-time in Mobile and part-time in New Orleans. Mrs. Stewart also owned a car, but it carried no liability insurance. Stewart had a girl friend, Verla Fleming, and one day while he was driving Mrs. Stewart's car with Verla as a passenger, he had an accident and Verla was injured. Verla sued Stewart and got a judgment. She then sought to collect under Stewart's policy with Travelers. Stewart's policy covered use of a non-owned car so long as it did not belong to someone who was a member of the same household as Stewart. Travelers denied coverage, claiming Mrs. Stewart was a member of Stewart's household. The Fleming Court made some apt observations, but I only quote one paragraph from this well-reasoned opinion: We are dealing with a contract of insurance. We must inquire what the parties thereto meant. Practical considerations must be given play, interpreted in the light of the purpose of the policy provision. This provision has been repeatedly held to reveal an obvious purpose to avoid a multiple coverage of several vehicles owned by members of the same family, who, by their close intimacy, may be expected to use the cars of each other without hindrance and with or without permission, thus increasing the liability of the insurer who has a right to expect each owner to contract for his own coverage. Concession is made to the casual permissive use by the insured of vehicles of other persons, whose permission may be considered episodic or not subject to abuse. 206 Miss. at 293-94, 39 So.2d at 887 (emphasis added). The Court held that Mrs. Stewart was not a member of Stewart's household. Then, in Goens v. Arinder, 248 Miss. 806, 161 So.2d 509 (1964), we had a far stronger case of residence in the same household than today's case. Mr. and Mrs. H.C. Arinder lived in Marion County. They had two daughters, Calva Mae Arinder Stogner and Sylvia Arinder. Calva Mae and her husband, William Earl Stogner, moved in with her parents while the Stogners' house was being constructed 200 yards down the road. Calva Mae was pregnant. William Earl worked offshore on an oil drilling rig. Mr. Arinder (Daddy) had a liability insurance policy with State Farm, and under it Mr. and Mrs. Arinder and their daughter, Sylvia, were the insureds, so long as they drove Mr. Arinder's insured automobile or any other car that did not belong to a relative. The word relative was defined in the policy as follows: a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household. The Stogners also had a car, but it was uninsured. One day Calva Mae asked her sister, Sylvia, to drive the Stogners' car to a local store on an errand. In doing so, Sylvia ran over and killed a little boy, Donald Ray Goens. The parents of Donald Ray sued Sylvia and got a judgment. They then sued to collect under Mr. Arinder's policy. State Farm denied coverage on the ground that the Stogners were residents of the Arinder household. The circuit court agreed with State Farm, and this Court on appeal reversed and rendered. Under the definitions clause, Mrs. Stogner was not a resident of the same household, but only temporarily sojourning or visiting there pending completion of her new home. 248 Miss. at 813, 161 So.2d at 510. This Court then defined resident, as noted on page 1015, infra. [13] Goens went on with a several-page dissertation on the meaning of household, as well, and concluded as a matter of law that the Stogners can not be held to be members of the household of Mr. Arinder, the assured. Goens, 248 Miss. at 815-22, 161 So.2d at 516 (emphasis added). This Court in Fleming and Goens wisely was careful not to expand the meaning of either resident or household beyond their ordinarily-accepted meaning, and, in doing so, extended insurance coverage to protect the public  those third party victims of an uninsured motor vehicle who had no opportunity to protect themselves. A scenario such as happened in Fleming or Goens is far more likely than what actually happened in this case. Let us suppose in this case that we had the following facts on that fateful May 30, 1987: For some reason or another, Williams or his wife, Julia, happened to be driving Junior's car. It could have been parked there at Williams' house, and one of them needed to use it. Or, Williams could have been driving Junior's car from a shop to return it to Junior. And, while one or the other was driving Junior's car, an accident occurred. A child was run over, or there was a wreck and somebody in the other car was terribly injured. Suppose, further, that Aetna declined coverage, because  guess what?  the Aetna policy excludes coverage for use by Williams or Julia of any vehicle owned by any resident of the same household as the named insured. [14] I have no doubt that such a refusal by Aetna, prior to today's decision, would be deemed an unreasonable denial of coverage, subjecting that company to punitive damages. I have no trouble visualizing this Court's observing that any claim that Junior, in fact, was a resident of his father's household May 30, 1987, the time of the accident, was a manifest absurdity. Not only that, the policy excludes liability coverage for injury to anyone related to and living in the household of a person who is responsible for the injury. [15] This means that if Junior had been riding in his father's car as a passenger on May 30, 1987, and was injured or killed, there would have been no coverage. This Court could then have had the fun of declaring this provision void as against public policy. [16] The majority cannot have it both ways. Or perhaps it can. It just has. Janus-like, the majority simply ignores Goens and Fleming, citing neither, and has this Court telling the world that whether or not a person is a member of the same household of the named insured depends on whose ox is being gored, the insurance carrier's or the insured's. [17] What a pretty pass to come to. Depending on the facts of the accident, the majority subjects an insurance carrier to punitive damages for claiming the victim was a resident of the same household in one instance for and denying the same person was a resident of the same household in the other. Just for the heck of it, go a step further. Suppose Junior had been riding as a passenger in Williams' car with stepmother, Julia, driving, and she had a wreck with an uninsured motorist. Both Julia and the uninsured motorist were negligent, and Junior was killed. Under which policy provision would the majority propose Junior's estate collect? I cannot escape the memory of the first line of the chorus of the Air Force hymn. Such uncertainty in the law may very well add to the income of the lawyers who engage in this type litigation, but it is difficult to envision benefit to anyone else. It goes without saying that increased exposure is passed along by increase in premium, and increased uncertain exposure is doubly or trebly passed on to the insurance-paying public. [18] Enjoy.