Opinion ID: 151938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The Jury Was Properly Instructed in the Disjunctive on Count 2

Text: Gonzalez makes a related claim, urging that Count 2 must be vacated because the indictment charged defendants with violating both Counts 2A and 2B and the jury was instructed that it could find defendants guilty on the basis of either object of the conspiracy. We review Gonzalez's preserved argument de novo, United States v. Gonzalez-Velez, 466 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir.2006), and reject it. We have routinely affirmed the use of the conjunctive in indictments followed by the use of the disjunctive in jury instructions. See Capozzi, 486 F.3d at 717 (The indictment followed the usual practice of using the conjunction `and' in reference to the planned offenses, but guilt can be established by adequate proof on any one of the ... charged grounds.) (citing Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59-60, 112 S.Ct. 466); see also United States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 810-11 (1st Cir.1996). Gonzalez attempts to distinguish our precedents, which address general verdicts, by urging that what the jury rendered was a special verdict on Count 2. Not so. Neither defendants nor the government requested a special verdict, and a straightforward reading of the verdict form and jury instructions confirms that the jury reached a general verdict. [13] See United States v. Riccio, 529 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir.2008); see also Black v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ & n. 11, 130 S.Ct. 2963, 2968-69 & n. 11, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ & n. 11 (2010) (noting that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only provide for general verdicts and cautioning against using special verdicts in most criminal trials).
Gerhard and Gonzalez argue that the evidence was insufficient to convict them on Count 2B, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 3 (conspiracy to be an accessory after the fact), and Count 3, id. § 3 (being an accessory after the fact). Defendants argue that because there was no evidence they were aware of the specific elements of the crimes the Browns were convicted of committing, the government could not satisfy the knowledge component of the accessory statute. Our review is de novo. We have already rejected the legal premise for the argument; [14] in any event, the evidence on this point was ample. Both Gerhard and Gonzalez were aware the Browns had been convicted of federal tax crimes and acted with that knowledge. Evidence at trial included two newspaper articles, written by Gerhard in February or March of 2007, in which he reported that the Browns had been convicted in January 2007 of conspiring to commit tax fraud, conspiring to disguise large financial transactions and disguising large financial transactions, and that Elaine Brown was also convicted of evading income taxes and failing to withhold taxes from her employees. Gonzalez acknowledged discussing the Browns' tax-related convictions with Edward and Elaine Brown shortly after his April 2007 arrival in New Hampshire. That suffices.
Each defendant argues his sentence was too harsh and based on error. Gerhard received an above-guidelines sentence of 240 months' imprisonment, consisting of 72 months on Count 1; 60 months on Counts 2 and 3, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to Count 1; and 108 months on Count 4, to be served consecutively to the terms imposed on the other counts. Gerhard's guidelines sentencing range was 57 to 71 months' imprisonment. Gonzalez received an above-guidelines sentence of 96 months' imprisonment, consisting of 60 months on Count 2 and 36 months on Count 3, to be served consecutively. Gonzalez's guidelines sentencing range was 41 to 51 months' imprisonment. Riley received a sentence of 432 months' imprisonment, consisting of 72 months on Count 1, 25 months on Counts 2 and 3 to run concurrently with each other and with Count 1, and 360 months on Count 6 to be served consecutively to the terms imposed on Counts 1 through 3. Riley's guidelines sentencing range was 78 to 97 months' imprisonment, and his conviction on Count 6 carried a minimum sentence of 360 months, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). Defendants' sentencing claims fall into three groups: (1) Gerhard and Riley's argument that the district court was unable to calculate their accessory sentences on Count 3 because the sentences for the crimes to which they were accessories were not determined, (2) an unpreserved argument from all three defendants that they were improperly sentenced on Count 2, and (3) additional challenges by Gerhard and Gonzalez. Each of defendants' claims fails. We review [preserved] claims of sentencing error in the application of the guidelines on a sliding scale. Pure issues of law, such as interpretations of the guidelines, are reviewed de novo; findings of fact are reviewed for clear error; and there is a continuum between those two poles. United States v. Stella, 591 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir.2009); United States v. Sicher, 576 F.3d 64, 70-71 (1st Cir.2009).