Opinion ID: 2807870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State law cause of action

Text: As my colleagues appreciate, and as I explained at the outset, the impetus for this litigation, and ultimately this new “rule,” was the concurring opinion in Spotz that accused the Federal Community Defender in the PCRA litigation of being “abusive,” “obstructionist,” and “contemptuous.” 18 A.3d at 330–33 (Castille, C.J., concurring). It also referred to the alleged use of federal funds for that purpose as “perverse.” Id. 10 at 331.8 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then promulgated what amounts to a new “rule” in cases where the Federal Community Defender was representing a PCRA petitioner: that the lower courts should consider disqualifying counsel if they conclude that the Federal Community Defender is misusing federal funds. See, e.g., Sepulveda, 55 A.3d at 1151. However, because this rule bears no resemblance to the procedural rules that the state Supreme Court has historically promulgated or enforced pursuant to § 10(c), the proposition that § 10(c) actually provides authority for the disqualification rule is tenuous at best. 8 The Commonwealth cites to the Spotz line of reasoning in its brief to this Court, arguing that the Federal Community Defender has “pursued a strategy to overwhelm the state courts with volumes of claims and pleadings, many simply frivolous, a strategy which burdens prosecutors and can shut down a trial court for weeks.” Com. First Step Br. 48 (internal quotation marks omitted). The criticism leveled at the Federal Community Defender in Spotz, and repeated by the Commonwealth in its briefing, goes beyond accusations of zealousness or merely over-trying a case. The Chief Justice and the concurring Justices accuse the Federal Community Defender of engaging in tactics that are intended to obstruct the state’s judicial process and thereby halt the state’s attempt to enforce the death penalty. See Spotz, 18 A.3d at 331 (Castille, C.J., concurring). Later, in response to a motion asking him to withdraw that concurring opinion, Chief Justice Castille issued a Single Justice Opinion on Post-Decisional Motions, which reaffirmed the importance of “principled representation of indigent capital defendants” as being “lawyering in the best tradition of the bar.” Commonwealth v Spotz, 99 A.3d 866, 867 (2014) (Castille, C.J.). However, the opinion again described representation of the Federal Community Defender as advancing “an agenda beyond mere zealous representation, one which routinely pushes, and in frequent instances, as here, far exceeds ethical boundaries” in pursuit of its “global agenda.” Id. at 867. The opinion then sets forth examples to support its accusation that the Federal Community Defenders “are at bottom gaming a system and erecting roadblocks in aid of a singular goal—keeping [their client] from being put to death.” Id. at 868 (emphasis in original). 11 The Pennsylvania Constitution states, in relevant part, that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts . . . if such rules are consistent with this Constitution and neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. . . .” PA. CONST., art. V § 10(c). Though § 10 gives the state Supreme Court authority to “exercise general supervisory . . . authority” over the courts and to prescribe “general rules” regulating the courts, nothing about the rules announced in these cases is the least bit “general.” PA. CONST., art. V § 10(a), (c). Instead, as my colleagues note, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decreed that “if the Federal Community Defender fails to show that its actions representing its clients are entirely ‘privately financed’ with non-federal funds, the state PCRA court is to disqualify the Federal Community Defender as counsel.” Maj. Op. 31. Rather than being a general rule, the Order that energizes this dispute is aimed squarely and solely at the Federal Community Defender. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exercised its § 10 power in a number of different ways, but it has not previously promulgated a targeted rule like the one that is purportedly present here. Moreover, its previous exercises of § 10 authority are so dissimilar from this case that they provide little support for the Commonwealth’s current theory. For example, the Court has promulgated and enforced general rules of civil and appellate procedure.9 It has exercised its § 10(c) power to regulate judges, attorneys, and the practice of law by creating and enforcing the Code of Judicial Conduct, which regulates the activity of judges,10 and by defining and 9 See Commonwealth v. Rose, 82 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2013); Laudenberger v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 436 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 1981) (referring to the state Supreme Court’s “constitutional rule-making authority”). 10 See Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). 12 regulating the practice of law in Pennsylvania.11 It has also maintained its exclusive authority over the regulation of attorneys in the state by invalidating legislation that attempted to regulate this area.12 In a more unique use of this power, the state court established procedures to implement a new constitutional rule announced by the United States Supreme Court.13 Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that the state court, ethics board, or other appropriate entity can make and enforce clearly-established, generally applicable rules of conduct to govern the conduct of judges and lawyers in state courts. In re Merlo, the main case cited by the Commonwealth in support of its actions here, is an illustrative example of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s § 10 power. 17 A.3d 869 (2011). Though the Commonwealth asserts that Merlo supports its claim, the run-of-the-mill attorney discipline case is so dissimilar from the instant case that it actually undercuts the Commonwealth’s positon. In Merlo, a local judge who had been suspended for absenteeism and for being abusive towards parties petitioned to set aside her suspension on the ground that the Supreme Court did not have the power to suspend her. Id. at 871. The state Supreme Court had suspended the judge after concluding that the Judicial Conduct Board had probable cause to file a formal charge against her. That charge asserted various violations of the Rules Governing Standards of Conduct of Magisterial District Judges. In its decision, Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that an earlier amendment to the state constitution 11 See Lenau v. Co-eXprise, Inc., 102 A.3d 423, 432–33 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). 12 See Wajert v. State Ethics Comm’n, 420 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. 1980). 13 See Commonwealth v. Hackett, 99 A.3d 11, 26 (Pa. 2014) (interpreting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that intellectually disabled people could not be executed, but which initially gave states the ability to establish procedures to assess whether capital defendants were intellectual disabled). 13 had not stripped it of its general and broad power to supervise attorneys and enforce the state ethics rules. Id. Merlo thus demonstrates how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regulates attorney discipline: by applying general rules of conduct equally to all lawyers. The additional cases cited by the Commonwealth also generally support the position that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has retained the power to regulate the conduct of lawyers through enforcement of the state’s ethical and conduct rules. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Jepsen, 787 A.2d 420, 424– 25 (Pa. 2002) (holding that the Court of Judicial Discipline does not have exclusive authority over regulating lawyers’ conduct).14 It is clear that Pennsylvania courts and the state 14 The cases relied on by the Commonwealth also explain that courts themselves, not merely the state disciplinary board, have the power to enforce the state ethical rules against lawyers who appear before them. Slater v. Rimar, Inc., 338 A.2d 584, 587 (1975) (explaining that a judge may disqualify an attorney appearing before him who is conflicted out of representing his client); Am. Dredging Co. v. City of Phila., 389 A.2d 568, 571–72 (1978) (noting that a trial court has the power and duty to ensure that lawyers appearing before it comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility, and considering the merits of whether an attorney betrayed the confidence of a client). Finally, the authority cited by the Commonwealth makes clear that a state’s ability to regulate lawyers is undoubtedly one of its important roles—though that power is not without limits. See, e.g., Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 442–43 (1979) (holding that out-of-state attorneys did not have a federal constitutional right to appear pro hac vice in Ohio court); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2694 (1977) (holding that a state rule barring lawyers from advertising their services was not challengeable under the Sherman Act but also that the state rule, as applied, violated the attorneys’ First Amendment free speech rights). The Commonwealth also referred to Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984), and Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), which involved challenges under the Sherman Act to the grading of the Arizona bar exam and a fee schedule published by a Virginia county bar, respectively. Neither supports the Commonwealth’s argument that its state 14 disciplinary board have the authority to discipline any attorney whose conduct so transcends the bounds of propriety as to be sanctionable. However, none of the generally applicable rules that regulate the conduct of Pennsylvania lawyers were even cited in the disqualification orders before us.15 To the extent that the Federal Community Defender’s zealousness violates generally-applicable codes of conduct, the appropriate remedy would appear to be enforcing those codes of conduct in specific instances against specific attorneys rather than systematically depriving condemned prisoners of their counsel of choice as a matter of policy. The issue here is not whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court can enforce Pennsylvania’s ethical rules; it surely can, but the Disqualification Orders in these cases were not issued pursuant to a charge that the Federal Community Defender violated a specific rule of conduct. Rather, the question here is what rule or law is actually being enforced. The Federal Community Defender argues that the Commonwealth is impermissibly trying to enforce federal law. The Commonwealth now relies upon a state law cause of action. However, the Commonwealth has not directed us to a previous instance where § 10 has been used to support what it attempts in this case: enforcement of a specific rule that is aimed directly at a single legal office or attorney based on conduct which has not been found to violate any of constitution is a proper basis of authority for the disqualification motions in to this case. 15 The Commonwealth argued at a hearing in the district court in the Mitchell litigation that Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3(a) was the true basis of the disqualification motion. That rule “instructs attorneys to inform ‘the appropriate professional authority’ if he or she ‘knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.’” Mitchell, 2013 WL 4193960, at  (citing 204 Pa. Code § 8.3(a)). This is the only mention of an existing Rule of Professional Conduct of which I am aware. The Commonwealth appears to have abandoned this argument on appeal. 15 Pennsylvania’s general rules governing the conduct of lawyers. The absence of any such citation is understandable, as I have not been able to find any such case. Therefore, even if it were not preempted, the purported disqualification rule here would not be authorized under state law.16