Opinion ID: 2160038
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Ms. Orshansky's Wishes

Text: In Ms. Orshansky's absence, Ms. Pollack undertook to convey what her aunt purportedly wished. Sub silentio, however, the court disregarded the relevant testimony entirely. The court's statement that it found Ms. Pollack's testimony inconsistent and troubling in many respects that the court then enumerated is not a finding that would permit us to conclude that the court considered, but chose to disbelieve, Ms. Pollack's testimony about Ms. Orshansky's plans and wishes. The court did not discuss the evidence presented by Ms. Pollack that Ms. Orshansky opposed the appointment of Mr. Jordan, did not wish to be returned to Washington, had made plans in advance for the care of her person and the management of her assets in the event of her incapacitation, and wanted those plans to be honored. This was critical evidence that the court was required to consider in making the discretionary determination of whom to appoint as guardian and conservator; indeed, as we have noted, Ms. Orshansky's preference had priority under D.C.Code §§ 21-2043(b) and -2057(a)(1) and (2). In this regard, we think it important to observe that the health care proxy satisfied on its face the definition in D.C.Code § 21-2081 of a durable power of attorney and the definition in D.C.Code § 21-2202(3) of a durable power of attorney for health care. [19] Moreover, in authorizing Ms. Pollack to make any and all health care decisions for Ms. Orshansky if she became incapacitated, the proxy granted Ms. Pollack one of the core powers that a general guardian of an incapacitated individual may exercise. See D.C.Code § 21-2047(a)(3), (b)(4) and (c)(1)-(4). The health care proxy, if valid (as Ms. Castro concedes it was), therefore triggered the requirement set forth in D.C.Code § 21-2043(b) that unless good cause dictates the contrary, the court shall appoint a guardian in accordance with the incapacitated individual's ... most recent nomination in a durable power of attorney. To comply with this requirement, the court first needs to recognize it explicitly, which the court did not do in this case, and only then determine whether good cause dictates the rejection of the incapacitated individual's own choice. [20] In sum, by making the decision to appoint Mr. Jordan as guardian and conservator without taking into account the contrary plans and wishes of Ms. Orshansky, the probate court disregarded the policy and requirements of the Guardianship Act and failed to give proper weight to a factor that she was required to consider. This was an abuse of discretion that necessitates reversal. We are constrained to say more, for otherwise it might be thought that in determining that Ms. Orshansky's best interests called for returning her to the District of Columbia under the protection of Mr. Jordan, the court found that sufficient grounds existed to justify overriding Ms. Orshansky's apparently contrary arrangements and desires. As we now proceed to discuss, however, the court's determination of Ms. Orshansky's best interests lacked an adequate factual foundation.