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Text: Rule 23(b)(2) allows class treatment when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” One possible reading of this provision is that it applies only to requests for such injunctive or declaratory relief and does not authorize the class certification of monetary claims at all. We need not reach that broader question in this case, because we think that, at a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy the Rule. The key to the (b)(2) class is “the indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted—the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.” Nagareda, 84 N. Y. U. L. Rev., at 132. In other words, Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certifica tion when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant. Similarly, it does not authorize class certi fication when each class member would be entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages.

That interpretation accords with the history of the Rule. Because Rule 23 “stems from equity practice” that pre dated its codification, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 613 (1997), in determining its meaning we have previously looked to the historical models on which the Rule was based, Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U. S. 815, 841–845 (1999). As we observed in Amchem, “[c]ivil rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class based discrimination are prime examples” of what (b)(2) is meant to capture. 521 U. S., at 614. In particular, the Rule reflects a series of decisions involving challenges to racial segregation—conduct that was remedied by a single classwide order. In none of the cases cited by the Advisory Committee as examples of (b)(2)’s antecedents did the plaintiffs combine any claim for individualized relief with their classwide injunction. See Advisory Committee’s Note, 39 F. R. D. 69, 102 (1966) (citing cases); e.g., Potts v. Flax, 313 F. 2d 284, 289, n. 5 (CA5 1963); Brunson v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of School Dist. No. 1, Clarendon Cty., 311 F. 2d 107, 109 (CA4 1962) (per curiam); Frasier v. Board of Trustees of N.C., 134 F. Supp. 589, 593 (NC 1955) (three-judge court), aff’d, 350 U. S. 979 (1956).

Permitting the combination of individualized and class wide relief in a (b)(2) class is also inconsistent with the structure of Rule 23(b). Classes certified under (b)(1) and (b)(2) share the most traditional justifications for class treatment—that individual adjudications would be impos sible or unworkable, as in a (b)(1) class,11 or that the relief sought must perforce affect the entire class at once, as in a (b)(2) class. For that reason these are also mandatory classes: The Rule provides no opportunity for (b)(1) or (b)(2) class members to opt out, and does not even oblige the District Court to afford them notice of the action. Rule 23(b)(3), by contrast, is an “adventuresome innovation” of the 1966 amendments, Amchem, 521 U. S., at 614 (inter nal quotation marks omitted), framed for situations “in which ‘class-action treatment is not as clearly called for’,” id., at 615 (quoting Advisory Committee’s Notes, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 697 (1994 ed.)). It allows class certifica tion in a much wider set of circumstances but with greater procedural protections. Its only prerequisites are that “the questions of law or fact common to class members pre dominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Rule 23(b)(3). And unlike (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes, the (b)(3) class is not mandatory; class members are entitled to receive “the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances” and to withdraw from the class at their option. See Rule 23(c)(2)(B).

Given that structure, we think it clear that individ ualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3). The procedural protections attending the (b)(3) class— predominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out—are missing from (b)(2) not because the Rule considers them unnecessary, but because it considers them unnecessary to a (b)(2) class. When a class seeks an indivisible injunction benefitting all its members at once, there is no reason to undertake a case-specific inquiry into whether class issues predominate or whether class action is a superior method of adjudicating the dispute. Pre dominance and superiority are self-evident. But with respect to each class member’s individualized claim for money, that is not so—which is precisely why (b)(3) re quires the judge to make findings about predominance and superiority before allowing the class. Similarly, (b)(2) does not require that class members be given notice and optout rights, presumably because it is thought (rightly or wrongly) that notice has no purpose when the class is mandatory, and that depriving people of their right to sue in this manner complies with the Due Process Clause. In the context of a class action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice and opt-out violates due process. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797, 812 (1985). While we have never held that to be so where the monetary claims do not predominate, the serious possibility that it may be so provides an addi tional reason not to read Rule 23(b)(2) to include the monetary claims here.