Opinion ID: 776953
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: California Court of Appeal Opinion in Brown

Text: 79 The California Court of Appeal's opinion in Brown, like the opinion in Bray, focused primarily on state law and concluded that Brown's sentence was not disproportionate to the petty theft offense within the meaning of the California Constitution. Although the Brown court did refer to the Supreme Court's decision in Harmelin, the court did not apply the controlling Supreme Court test for determining whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather than considering whether Brown's sentence was grossly disproportionate to the crime of petty theft for which he was convicted, as Solem and Harmelin require, the Brown court compared Brown's sentence to his entire criminal history, noting that, if life without parole for one drug offense in Harmelin was not disproportionate, then  a fortiori a term of 25 years to life for a person with [Brown's] record cannot be considered disproportional. See People v. Brown, C023139, at 3 (Cal.Ct.App.1997) (second emphasis added). Because the addition, deletion, or alteration of a factor in a test established by the Supreme Court constitutes a failure to apply controlling Supreme Court law, Brown's habeas petition, like Bray's, is properly resolved under the contrary to clause of AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Packer, 277 F.3d at 1100-01. 80 In any event, because we hold that Brown's case, like Bray's, is materially indistinguishable from Andrade, the Brown court's decision that the statute was constitutional as applied was clearly erroneous and would merit habeas relief under the unreasonable application clause of AEDPA, had the Brown court applied the relevant Supreme Court precedent. See Andrade, 270 F.3d at 766 (holding that the state court's disregard for Harmelin 's distinguishing of the severity of the defendant's crime in that case from the relatively minor nature of the offenses in Solem resulted in an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law). The California Court of Appeal itself characterized Brown's petty theft as a fairly nonserious offense, so the court's application of Harmelin to the facts in Brown was objectively unreasonable. See id. As we explained in our analysis of the state court decision in Bray, the clear error required to satisfy the unreasonable application clause of AEDPA a fortiori satisfies the lesser requirement of error under the contrary to clause. See Packer, 277 F.3d at 1102 & n. 12. Therefore, Brown, like Bray, is entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 21