Opinion ID: 31299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: navarro's motion to reopen the removal proceedings

Text: 11 At the time of his original deportation hearing, Navarro conceded that he was removable under the law that made his DWI conviction an aggravated felony. After the Board issued its removal order, Navarro could have petitioned this court for review of the decision; he failed to do so. Once Navarro was deported, therefore, his removal proceedings were completed and final. See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 398, 115 S.Ct. 1537, 131 L.Ed.2d 465 (1995) (Deportation orders are self-executing orders, not dependent upon judicial enforcement.). 12 Notwithstanding the finality of his proceedings, Navarro argues that the Board should reopen them on its own motion under § 3.2(a) and grant him relief. See 8 C.F.R § 3.2(a) (The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.). Navarro concedes that, because he has already been deported, the BIA lacks jurisdiction to consider any motion filed on his behalf to reopen his removal proceedings. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(d) (2002). However, Navarro argues that the intervening change in the law imposes a duty on the BIA to reopen the case on its own motion and reexamine the removal order in light of Chapa-Garza. 13 The Board considered Navarro's motion to be moot; the execution of the removal order resolved any remaining case or controversy between Navarro and the INS. As a result, the Board interpreted its § 3.2(a) power to reopen on its own motion as being subject to the § 3.2(d) requirement that the alien not have been deported. Because the Board considers § 3.2(d) to be jurisdictional, it concluded that Navarro's deportation deprived the Board of any further jurisdiction over motions brought relating to his removal proceedings. 14 Thus, the Board has concluded that § 3.2(d) trumps the power granted by § 3.2(a) where the alien has been deported; Navarro challenges this interpretation. The question of the interplay between § 3.2(a) and § 3.2(d) has not been considered in any jurisdiction. Courts grant an agency's interpretation of its own regulations considerable legal leeway. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217, 122 S.Ct. 1265, 152 L.Ed.2d 330 (2002). However, [w]hile an agency interpretation of a regulation is entitled to due deference, the interpretation must rationally flow from the language of the regulation. Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. FERC, 878 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir.1989); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) ([J]udicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context.). 15 After examining the regulations closely, we conclude that the BIA's interpretation of the provisions of § 3.2 is reasonable. The BIA may reopen on its own motion in exceptional circumstances. In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 1997 WL 434418 (1997). The BIA has previously taken this step in response to a change in the law concerning the alien's removable offense. See In re Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I. & N. Dec. 207, 2002 WL 110599 (2002) (reopening decision sua sponte where Ninth Circuit subsequently reclassified alien's conviction for possession of a weapon by a felon as an aggravated felony); see also In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 1998 WL 378104 (1998) (reopening sua sponte after enactment of IIRIRA significantly changed applicable asylum law). In neither case, though, had the alien been deported at the time the Board reopened the case; motions to reconsider pursuant to § 3.2(b) ( Vasquez-Muniz ) and § 3.2(c) ( X-G-W- ) were untimely filed, and the Board exercised its § 3.2(a) power to consider the motions. 16 Furthermore, § 3.2(a) is labeled as the General provision of the statute. Section 3.2(d) deals specifically with cases in which the alien has already been deported. As a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, specific provisions trump general provisions. In re Nobleman, 968 F.2d 483, 487 (5th Cir.1992). Thus, the BIA's reasoning that the prohibition on motions to reopen stated in § 3.2(d) overrides its § 3.2(a) power to reopen on its own motion is a reasonable interpretation of the language of these two regulations. 17 The BIA's construction of § 3.2(d) as overriding § 3.2(a) such that the Board lacks jurisdiction to reopen the removal proceedings of a deported alien is a reasonable agency interpretation of the regulations in question. The Board's conclusion that the case is moot is consistent with the well-established principle that a final civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). We therefore deny Navarro's petition for review of his motion to reopen. 18