Opinion ID: 2831598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Suspension Is the Appropriate Sanction

Text: We also affirm the hearing officer's and unanimous Board's sanctions against Abele. The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 ed. & Supp. 1992) govern lawyer sanctions in Washington. Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 342. Based on these standards, we apply a three-step process to analyze a recommended sanction. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Preszler, 169 Wn.2d 1, 18, 232 P.3d 1118 (201 0). First, we determine the presumptive sanction by analyzing 'the ethical duties violated, ... the lawyer's mental state, and ... the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's conduct.' /d. (quoting Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 342). Second, we determine whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances call for a departure from the presumptive sanction. /d. Third, if raised by the attorney being disciplined, we evaluate the Board's recommended sanction based on '(1) [the] 19 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201,352-0 proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and (2) the extent of agreement among the members of the Disciplinary Board.' /d. (quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Schwimmer, 153 Wn.2d 752, 764, 108 P.3d 761 (2005)). We afford great deference to the Board's recommended sanction but retain the ultimate authority for determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney's misconduct. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Wickersham, 178 Wn.2d 653, 664, 310 P.3d 1237 (2013). We generally adopt the sanction recommended by a unanimous Board unless there is a clear reason for departure. /d. Abele argues (1) that substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding that she acted intentionally or knowingly, (2) that the WSBA failed to prove two of the three aggravating factors found by the hearing officer, (3) that the hearing officer did not apply all applicable mitigating factors, and (4) that Abele's sanction is disproportionate given the circumstances of her case.
Abele argues that substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding that she acted intentionally or with knowledge as required to impose a suspension under Standards 6.22. She asserts that her conduct was negligent rather than knowing. This argument mirrors her argument that she didn't violate the applicable RPCs, as they require more than negligent conduct. As we noted in Part II.A of this opinion, Judge Farris found that Abele's behavior was deliberate, willful, and in bad faith in her unchallenged order of contempt. Additionally, our sufficiency analysis of count I upholds the hearing officer's finding that Abele's conduct was intentional. 20 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201,352-0 Standard 6.22 reads: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows[ 13l that he or she is violating a court order or rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. Standards 6.22 applies to Abele's intentional conduct. We therefore adopt the recommendation and hold that suspension is the presumptive sanction for Abele's conduct under count I.
Abele argues that substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding that she knowingly made a false or misleading report to the SPD in May 2011; she does not argue that suspension is not the appropriate standard for an attorney knowingly making a false or misleading police report, pursuant to Standards 5.12. 14 Because we hold that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's finding that Abele knowingly made a false or misleading report to the SPD in May 2011, we also hold that suspension is the presumptive sanction for Abele's conduct under count II.
Aggravating or mitigating factors can alter the presumptive sanction but only if they are sufficiently compelling to justify a deviation. Cohen, 149 Wn.2d 323, 339. The 13 The ABA Standards articulate a slightly different definition of knowledge than the RPCs. Compare STANDARDS at 17 ('Knowledge' is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.), with RPC 1.0A(f) ('Knowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.). Abele's intentional conduct satisfies the requirements of both definitions. 14 Standards 5.12 reads, Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice. 21 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201,352-0 hearing officer determined that three aggravating factors applied under Standards 9.22: (1) dishonest or selfish motive, (2) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, and (3) substantial experience in the practice of law. The hearing officer found one mitigating factor under Standards 9.32: the absence of a prior disciplinary record. Though potentially applicable, the hearing officer did not apply an aggravating factor for multiple offenses. Abele does not challenge the applicability of the aggravating factor substantial experience in the practice of law; Abele was admitted to the bar and has been practicing since 2002. Abele challenges the first two aggravating factors and argues that the hearing officer erred by failing to recognize the stress of litigation as an additional mitigating factor. Each of her challenges is specific to the presence of aggravating factors for count I, even though the hearing officer did not distinguish aggravating and mitigating factors between count I and count II. We hold that Abele acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and that she refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct. We decline to add the mitigator of personal or emotional problems-stress of litigation, requested by Abele, to her sanction analysis.
As to count I, Abele challenges the application of the aggravating factor dishonest or selfish motive by incorporating her earlier argument that her mental state was merely negligent. The WSBA counters with citations to testimony from Judge Farris that Abele's repeated interruptions throughout the proceedings manifested numerous advantages for her case: 22 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201,352-0 And by doing it, she does gain advantages. It's a form of belligerent bullying by which she does get extra argument. She gets facts in the record that are not subject to cross-examination. She throws her opponents off because they are disrupted. These assertions are supported by testimony from opposing counsel. The hearing officer is permitted to make reasonable inferences of motive. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dornay, 160 Wn.2d 671, 684, 161 P.3d 333 (2007). We have already held that substantial evidence supports the finding that Abele's actions were intentional; substantial evidence also supports the aggravating factor of dishonest or selfish motive. As to count II, the hearing officer found that Abele knowingly gave a false report to law enforcement personnel, motivated by her desire to get either Marshal Copeland or Marshal Webb in trouble by filing a complaint against one or both marshals. Because we hold that this finding is supported by substantial evidence and because Abele does not challenge the presence of any aggravating factor as to count II, we also find that the dishonest or selfish motive aggravating factor applies to count II. 2. Refusal To Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct Abele also challenges the second aggravating factor, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct. STANDARDS 9.22(g). This aggravating factor is appropriate where a lawyer admits that she engaged in the alleged conduct but denies that it was wrongful or where she rationalizes the improper conduct as error. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Ferguson, 170 Wn.2d 916, 943-44, 246 P.3d 1236 (2011) (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Holcomb, 162 Wn.2d 563, 588-89, 173 P.3d 898 (2007)). We have also held that Standards 9.22(g) applies when the 23 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201,352-0 attorney 'did not accept responsibility but sought to justify his conduct with explanations that were insufficient.' In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Lopez, 153 Wn.2d 570, 580, 106 P.3d 221 (2005). The hearing officer reasonably concluded that Standards 9.22(g) applies here. Though Abele presented some evidence that she has acknowledged the wrongful nature of her conduct, her careful selection of statements and assertions ignores substantial evidence that she has not accepted responsibility for her conduct. Abele testified in her deposition, taken only four months before the hearing, that she didn't understand why the WSBA filed a complaint against her, that she didn't understand what she did wrong in front of Judge Farris, and that there was nothing [she] could do to please [Judge Farris]. Her stated belief is that Judge Farris found [her] in contempt because she didn't like [her] .... [T]hat [is the only reason]. Abele's briefing also shifted blame for her misconduct to Judge Farris. The hearing officer specifically found that Abele's assertion that her outbursts were caused by a hearing disability was not credible, and he explicitly rejected her assertions that Judge Farris's behavior provoked her outburst. These factual findings are unchallenged. The hearing officer also found, and Abele does not challenge, that Abele's remaining excuses and explanations were not credible. We therefore reject Abele's contention that the aggravating factor refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct does not apply. 24 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201 ,352-0 3. Stress of Litigation Abele urges this court to apply the stress of litigation as a mitigating factor, citing Dornay, 160 Wn.2d at 687. In Dornay, the attorney lied under oath in order to protect an extramarital affair. /d. at 684. We acknowledged that [t]he Washington Legislature and the courts of this state have recognized the profound impact of intimate partner violence and held that the emotional problems associated with Dornay's relationship constituted a mitigating factor that merits substantial weight. /d. at 687. We reject Abele's argument to apply the stress of litigation as a mitigating factor. Even acknowledging that Abele's misconduct under count I occurred during a contentious, 13-day trial that Judge Farris agreed was stressful, Abele presents no argument that the stress associated with litigation is comparable to the stress of intimate partner violence that was a mitigator in Dornay. Applicable mitigators concerning issues of mental disability and personal or emotional problems (Standards 9.32(c)) are given varying degrees of weight depending on how greatly the factors contributed to the conduct. Wickersham, 178 Wn.2d at 673. However, Abele makes no attempt to show that the stress of trial caused her to misbehave throughout the proceedings, including during pretrial, or that these factors contributed to her misconduct alleged under count II. We decline to add the mitigator of personal/emotional problems-stress of litigation to Abele's sanction analysis.
Finally, Abele argues that suspension for 12 months is not proportionate to her misconduct. A six-month suspension is the accepted minimum term of suspension. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 150 Wn.2d 774, 762, 82 P.3d 224 25 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201,352-0 (2004 ). This minimum term suspension is warranted when there are either no aggravating factors and at least some mitigating factors, or where the mitigating factors clearly outweigh any aggravating factors. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Halverson, 140 Wn.2d 475, 497, 998 P.2d 833 (2000). In considering a proportionality argument, we generally do not depart from the Board's recommendation. However, we will do so if we are persuaded that the sanction is inappropriate in light of the (1) disproportionality of the sanction to the misconduct or (2) the extent of disagreement among the members of the Board. 15 Jackson, 180 Wn.2d at 238 (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kuvara, 149 Wn.2d 237, 259, 66 P.3d 1057 (2003)). Here, there is no disagreement among the members of the Board: the Board was unanimous that Abele should be suspended for one year. We give this unanimous recommendation great deference. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Day, 162 Wn.2d 527, 538, 542, 173 P.3d 915 (2007). Abele's count I contempt violation is clear and egregious. Judges have a responsibility to maintain order in their courtroom; when the judge has to resort to issuing an order of contempt in order to secure compliance with a court order, the attorney's behavior is clearly over the line. Abele does not provide us with a compelling reason to reject the recommended suspension. We therefore adopt the Board's recommendation and hold that a one-year suspension is warranted under these facts. 15We may also depart from the Board's recommendation if we find that our weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors differs from the Board's. See In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Perez-Pena, 161 Wn.2d 820, 837, 168 P.3d 408 (2007). Because that is not the case here, we do not depart from the Board's recommendation. 26 In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Abele, No. 201 ,352-0