Opinion ID: 220716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice

Text: Turner's first argument is that the disqualification of his retained attorney violated his Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of his choice. We find no reversible error. Turner forfeited the issue, and the district court did not plainly err by removing attorney Rueckert from the case.
Attorney Rueckert represented Turner until the district court disqualified Rueckert in response to the government's Notice of Potential Conflict of Interest, filed in August 2008. The government had learned that Turner, who had not been gainfully employed for some time, obtained Rueckert's services by paying him $25,000 in cash, delivered by Turner's girlfriend while he was in jail. Intending to make an issue of Turner's unexplained wealth, including the attorney fee paid in cash, the government argued that Rueckert had landed front and center as a witness in this case and therefore could not continue to represent Turner. At a pretrial hearing held on August 13, 2008, the district judge raised the issue with the parties. After the government stated its position for the record, the following exchange occurred: THE COURT: Do I understand correctly you plan to call Mr. Rueckert as a witness? [GOVERNMENT]: Yes. THE COURT: I mean, obviously if you're permitted to do that, then he can't represent Mr. Turner. That's the bottom line. Mr. Rueckert, would you respond to this, please? MR. RUECKERT: Well, Your Honor, I've read the motion and I have spoken to [the prosecutor] about this. I mean, if they're going to call me as a witness, I think the case law is pretty clear. I can't be both. THE COURT: I agree with that. Obviously the question that needs to be asked before that or answered before that is [whether] it is appropriate for them to call you as a witness. So the question to you is based on what you have learned from them orally and based on their written pleadings, do you have a legal argument to make at this point that they cannot appropriately call you as a witness? MR. RUECKERT: Well, obviously I can't talk about how the money was arranged or any of Mr. Turner's involvement in arrangement of the money. I can't do that. But I guess if part of their case is, you know, to prove up how much I got paid, based on the cases they've cited, I see no legal argument why they can't do that. At the conclusion of this exchange, the district court disqualified attorney Rueckert from the case. At Turner's trial, the government did not actually call Rueckert to testify. The defense raised no objection about the choice of counsel issue until appeal.
We generally review a decision to disqualify counsel for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bender, 539 F.3d 449, 454 (7th Cir.2008), citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Where a defendant and his attorney fail to preserve an argument by properly objecting, however, a different standard of review applies. A defendant's state of mind at the time he fails to object determines whether the failure constitutes waiver or forfeiture. A waiver is `the manifestation of an intentional choice not to assert [a] right,' distinguishing it from forfeiture, which is an accidental or negligent omission (or `an apparently inadvertent failure to assert a right in a timely fashion'). United States v. Walton, 255 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir.2001), quoting United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir.2001). While waiver extinguishes all appellate review of an issue, forfeited issues are reviewable for plain error. Id. We need not decide here the defendant's state of mind at the time of his failure to object. The government conceded at oral argument that Turner's failure should not be considered a waiver of the issue. The government argued instead that the issue was forfeited and that we should review for plain error. Turner, on the other hand, makes two arguments against a finding of either waiver or forfeiture. While he acknowledges the absence of any objection in the record, he contends that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is so personal in nature that only the client himself, and not his attorney, could have forfeited it. We are not persuaded. The ethical rules governing the legal profession prohibit lawyers from continuing to represent a client in many conflict of interest situations even if the client would prefer for the representation to continue. See, e.g., Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir.1983) (lawyer may not represent an adversary of his former client if the subject matter of the two representations is substantially related; rule encourages clients to feel comfortable sharing confidences with their attorneys); Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16(a)(2) (1990) (A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal shall withdraw from employment (with permission of the tribunal if such permission is required)... if ... the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such continued employment will result in violation of these Rules) (emphasis added). [1] These rules are inconsistent with an assertion that the right to counsel of choice guarantees any client, including a criminal defendant, the exclusive right to decide when the attorney-client relationship begins and ends. In a similar vein, Turner argues that the district court should have asked him personally whether he would like to waive the conflict in question. Again, we are not persuaded. It is well-settled that, under certain circumstances, a district court may remove defense counsel from the case even in the face of a criminal defendant's proffered waiver. See United States v. Turner, 594 F.3d 946, 952 (7th Cir.2010) (reviewing cases). The district court was under no legal obligation to seek out a waiver it could have overridden, particularly where defense counsel agreed he was required to withdraw. Accordingly, we treat Turner's failure to object as a forfeiture and review for plain error. On review for plain error, a convicted defendant must show that: (1) the error complained of actually occurred; (2) the error was clear or obvious; (3) the error affected his substantial rights ( i.e., he probably would not have been convicted absent the error); and (4) the error seriously impugned the judicial proceeding's fairness, integrity, or public reputation. United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 898 (7th Cir.2010), citing United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2010). The third prong of the plain error test  whether the error affected the defendant's substantial rights  calls for essentially the same inquiry as harmless error analysis. United States v. Wheeler, 540 F.3d 683, 690 (7th Cir.2008), citing United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1540 (7th Cir. 1996). An argument can be made that the third prong should drop out of the plain error analysis where the error is structural. The erroneous deprivation of the right to chosen counsel constitutes a structural error and entitles an aggrieved defendant to reversal without a showing of prejudice. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (We have little trouble concluding that erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as structural error.), quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (quotation marks omitted). It is not a long step to argue that prejudice also should be presumed (or need not be shown independently) under the plain error standard. The Supreme Court, however, has specifically reserved the question of the application of the third plain error prong to structural errors. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1432, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009); see also United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (citing Puckett on this point). We need not resolve that methodological issue definitively here because we find no sufficiently clear error. There is a similar issue regarding the fourth prong of the plain error test when a structural error of the sort alleged here occurs. It seems no easier to determine whether an action with unquantifiable and indeterminate consequences on the course of trial proceedings seriously impugned those proceedings' fairness than it is to inquire whether it effectively prejudiced the defendant's case. Because we find no sufficiently clear error, however, we also do not reach this issue under the fourth prong of the plain error test.
For an error to be plain, it must be of such an obvious nature that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). It cannot be subtle, arcane, debatable, or factually complicated. It must be  plain; but it needn't be blatant. United States v. Caputo, 978 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir.1992). We find no plain error here. The Sixth Amendment gives the accused in criminal cases the right to hire attorneys of their choice. Turner, 594 F.3d at 948, citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692. The right has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee in the Sixth Amendment. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147-48, 126 S.Ct. 2557, citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Even so, a defendant's choice of counsel may be overridden and counsel may be disqualified where an actual conflict of interest or a serious potential for conflict exists. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163-64, 108 S.Ct. 1692 (affirming refusal to accept defendant's waiver of attorney's serious potential for conflict of interest); accord, Turner, 594 F.3d at 952. A conflict that amounts to a breach of the code of professional ethics obviously qualifies as an actual conflict of interest of the sort that allows the trial court to disqualify counsel regardless of a defendant's offer to waive. Turner, 594 F.3d at 952. Rules of professional conduct for attorneys have long recognized that having an attorney testify either for or against his client can put great stress on our system of justice. The specific issue here arose under the Illinois provision then governing when an attorney may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client. The government's notice of potential conflict of interest relied on Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7(b), which stated in 2008: If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer may be called as a witness other than on behalf of the client, the lawyer may accept or continue the representation until the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the lawyer's testimony is or may be prejudicial to the client. The Central District of Illinois has adopted the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Under the applicable version of Rule 3.7(b), attorney Rueckert faced a conflict that could amount to a breach of the code of professional ethics. As soon as he read the government's notice of potential conflict, he knew or reasonably should have known that he could be called as a witness against his client, at least unless there was a persuasive reason to prevent the government from doing so. Rueckert also knew or reasonably should have known that the testimony the government sought  about his client's unexplained wealth  would be prejudicial to his client. If the government planned, and was legally permitted, to call Rueckert as a witness against his client, he could not continue to represent him. Turner argues on appeal that case law actually forbade the government from calling attorney Rueckert to testify under these circumstances, negating any alleged Rule 3.7(b) conflict. Turner relies on United States v. Britton, 289 F.3d 976 (7th Cir.2002), where we said: where evidence is easily available from other sources and absent extraordinary circumstances or compelling reasons, an attorney who participates in the case should not be called as a witness. 289 F.3d at 982, quoting United States v. Dack, 747 F.2d 1172, 1176 n. 5 (7th Cir.1984) (quotation marks omitted). In support of this point, Turner argues that the government could have introduced the same evidence of unexplained wealth  the $25,000 cash payment to attorney Rueckert  through his girlfriend, who delivered the sum on his behalf. Turner also calls the proposed attorney testimony cumulative, insisting that the government could just as easily have brought his wealth to the jury's attention with evidence of his luxury vehicle purchases. Finally, Turner argues that the government's decision not to call attorney Rueckert to testify at trial demonstrates that he was not a necessary witness. We are not persuaded. The fact that Rueckert did not testify at trial does not mean that his testimony did not appear necessary during pretrial proceedings. The issue was presented to the district court for decision long before trial. A district court faced with a potential conflict of interest must act not with the wisdom of hindsight after the trial has taken place, but in the murkier pretrial context when relationships between parties are seen through a glass, darkly. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 162, 108 S.Ct. 1692. Given the facts available during the murky pretrial phase, we find no plain error such that the district court could have been deemed derelict in countenancing Rueckert's disqualification. See Frady, 456 U.S. at 163, 102 S.Ct. 1584. At the time the issue arose, the government was reasonably concerned that Turner's girlfriend would refuse to testify, meaning that the same testimony would not in fact be available from an alternative source. While the government's case against Turner at trial turned out to be very strong, it was based in large part on cooperative testimony from Turner's co-defendants who pled guilty. As of the August 13, 2008 hearing when Rueckert was disqualified, they had not yet pled guilty. At that time, all evidence of unexplained wealth may well have seemed necessary to the government's case. These facts undermine Turner's argument that the government should not have expected to call Rueckert as a witness against Turner, so that he should not have been disqualified. We do not take the disqualification of defense counsel lightly, especially when the same evidence might have been available through alternate sources or had limited probative value. See United States v. Gearhart, 576 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir.2009); Britton, 289 F.3d at 982-83. We are wary of the potential for abuse that comes with allowing the government to disqualify the defendant's chosen attorney. The issue in this case would be closer if we encountered it, for example, on review of a disqualification order entered over a vigorous objection. In this case, however, the district court properly raised the issue with counsel, and the issue was promptly forfeited. We find no plain error in the district court's decision to disqualify attorney Rueckert.