Opinion ID: 2510544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleging with specificity the facts supporting an aggravating circumstance

Text: On its face the State's notice of intent to seek the death penalty did not satisfy the requirements of SCR 250. SCR 250(4)(c) provides that the notice must allege all aggravating circumstances which the state intends to prove and allege with specificity the facts on which the state will rely to prove each aggravating circumstance. The notice in this case did not allege with specificity any facts to show that Redeker was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another, the second alleged aggravator. The notice alleged in pertinent part: On October 2, 2001, Defendant entered a guilty plea pursuant to the Alford decision to Second Degree Arson in Case C178281. The case arose out of an incident on June 9, 2001, in which Defendant set fire to the residence of Defendant and Skawduan Lannan at 9749 Manheim Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada. The State will rely on the police reports, witness statements, charging documents, Judgment of Conviction, Guilty Plea Agreement and PreSentence Investigation Report associated with case C178281 to establish this aggravator. The State maintains that this notice alleges specific facts of the date, guilty plea, title of the criminal offense, case number, victim's name, location of crime and certain supporting documentation. Some facts are specific: the crime is clearly identified by title, date, location, case number, and victim. This would be sufficient if the aggravating circumstance in question was that Redeker had been convicted of second-degree arson. However, the aggravator is that he had been convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another. None of the alleged facts indicate how the second-degree arson was a crime of violence or threatened violence to the person of another. A year after filing the notice, the State explained, in its opposition to Redeker's motion to strike the aggravating circumstances, that it considered the crime to be violent because Redeker had made threats against Lannan's life before burning the house. Later, the State also argued that the crime involved the threat of violence because the fire endangered neighboring homes. These specific facts are not alleged in the notice. Instead, to explain and provide factual support for the alleged aggravator, the State has relied on the documents, such as police reports, named in its notice. But a defendant cannot be forced to gather facts and deduce the State's theory for an aggravating circumstance from sources outside the notice of intent to seek death. Under SCR 250, the specific supporting facts are to be stated directly in the notice itself. Nevertheless, the State contends that any failure on its part to comply with SCR 250 is not of constitutional moment because Redeker had full knowledge and understanding of the specific facts that the State will rely on to prove this aggravating circumstance. Therefore, the State argues that it should be allowed to amend the notice in the same manner as it is permitted to amend an information or indictment. The State makes this argument at the same time that it flatly rejects Redeker's contention that aggravators should be charged in an indictment or information after a grand jury or justice court has determined probable cause. [6] Thus, the State proposes that we allow it to evade the charging requirements of SCR 250 but enjoy the benefits, while avoiding the burdens, of the indictment/information process. We reject this proposal.