Opinion ID: 41966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mistrial Motions

Text: On appeal, Gomez asserts that the district court erred in denying his mistrial motions and thereby violating his due process rights. Specifically, he contends that (1) when Redus testified that the Yahtzee sheet found in Gomez’s pocket was 25 a drug tally sheet, and the individuals listed on that sheet were known drug traffickers, he improperly implied that Gomez was a drug trafficker; (2) when Redus testified that people do not typically come forward in drug cases to testify because drug trafficking organizations are violent and that people feared being killed, he improperly implied that Gomez was a violent person; (3) when, on cross-examination, the government asked Ponce if it was true that he indicated in his affidavit that he smelled “a strange smell” rather than the smell of marijuana coming from the residence because he was afraid of the guys at the residence, it improperly implied that Ponce was afraid of Gomez and Gomez was a violent person, and (4) when the government stated during closing that Gomez never told the officer that the residence smelled like marijuana, that he was at the residence and saw the marijuana, or otherwise indicate that the detective should investigate the residence for drug activity, it improperly commented on his silence. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial. United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149, 1161 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant is entitled to a grant of a mistrial only upon showing that he was substantially prejudiced. Id. In order for a defendant to prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, he must establish (1) that the prosecutor’s comments were improper, and (2) that 26 those comments prejudicially affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). In order to meet the substantial prejudice prong, the improper comments must have “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction [or sentence] a denial of due process.” Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 838 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). To assess the prosecutor’s statements’ impact, we must evaluate them in the context of the entire trial and assess their probable impact on the jury. See Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1438. The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401. All relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. FED. R. EVID. 402. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 403. Indirect references to a defendant’s silence do not constitute reversible error per se, and we must consider the references’ impact on the jury. United States v. Exarhos, 135 F.3d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 1998). A comment is not an impermissible reference “unless (1) it was the government’s manifest intention to do so, or (2) it 27 was of such a character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the defendant's silence.” Id. (quotations omitted). “When the use of a defendant’s silence results in a constitutional violation, the conviction can stand only if the reviewing court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.” United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th Cir. 1995). In addressing cumulative error claims, we must examine the trial as a whole to determine if the defendant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1333 (11th Cir. 1997). However, we have also stated that if there are no errors on the individual arguments, there can be no cumulative error. United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 208 (2004). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Gomez’s motions for a mistrial. Redus’s testimony that (1) a Yatzee sheet that was found in Gomez’s pocket appeared to be a drug tally sheet, and (2) the names on the tally sheet were those of known drug traffickers, was not improper. Redus explained that he knew that four of the six names were people known to distribute marijuana, and this information was relevant to establish why he believed that the Yatzee sheet was actually a drug tally sheet. See Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1438; FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. 28 Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Gomez’s mistrial motion based on Redus’s testimony that indicated that people do not generally come forward in these types of drug cases to testify because drug trafficking organizations are violent and people feared being killed. The government attempted to explain to the jury that the people on the list may not have come forward to testify against the defendants out of fear, a question that many jurors may have had regarding the people on the drug tally sheet. Further, any problem that may have arisen because of the testimony was cured when Redus specifically testified that he had no knowledge that either of the defendants had committed a crime of violence or had threatened anyone with violent acts. Moreover, later in the trial, the government attempted to impeach Ponce by asking him if it was true that he stated he smelled a “strange smell” at the residence in his affidavit, and did not write that he smelled marijuana, because he told the detectives that he was afraid of the guys at the residence. This question did not form the basis for a mistrial because the defendants had set forth that Ponce had written that he smelled a strange smell because he, in fact, had smelled a strange smell, and not marijuana. However, the detective who interviewed Ponce had indicated in his report that Ponce told him that he did not want to put marijuana down because he was afraid of the people at the residence, and, under 29 the Federal Rules of Evidence, the government was entitled to impeach Ponce with this information. See FED. R. EVID. 607 (“The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party. . . .”). Later, Ponce testified that he did not fear Balderas before, during, or after the events on 1 October 2002, the day Gomez and Balderas were arrested. Therefore, the testimony was proper and relevant to the trial, and the defendants’ substantial rights were not violated because any potential problem was cured when Ponce testified that he never feared Balderas. See Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1438; FED. R. EVID. 401, 402. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Gomez’s mistrial motion during the government’s closing arguments. During its closing arguments, the government commented that, when Gomez was talking to the detective at the auto parts store, he never told them or otherwise indicated that the residence smelled like marijuana, that he was at the residence and saw marijuana, or that the police should go investigate the residence for drug activity. However, Gomez concedes in his brief that the comment referred to a time after Gomez was arrested but before he was given his Miranda rights. Under United States v. Rivera, such comments are appropriate when the defendant’s silence occurred after arrest but before Miranda warnings are given. 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991). 30 Finally, Gomez contends that, even if the district court did not err in denying each of his motions individually, the cumulative effect of the allegedly prejudicial evidence warrants a reversal of his conviction. However, because, as noted above, Gomez cannot demonstrate that the district court erred in denying any of his motions, there can be no cumulative error. See Waldon, 363 F.3d at 1110. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial motions.