Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor's Reasons

Text: We assume solely for purposes of argument that, for each prospective juror, we must proceed to the third step of the Batson-Wheeler inquiry, i.e., whether substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that the prosecution had articulated a permissible, race-neutral reason for the excusal. (See People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 200-201, 30 Cal. Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717.) In each case, it is plain that there was. As noted, the first Batson-Wheeler motion expressly challenged the excusals of L.W., C.W., and L.T. Prospective Juror L.W. testified that a half-brother had been in and out of jail in Oklahoma since age 15 and was currently in state prison there. L.W. asserted he was once stopped by police on false pretenses. The police cited him for running a red light but he denied having done so. In his view, the police stopped him to see if he might have been driving a stolen car, and the citation was pretextual. He denied that this experience would cause him to tend to disbelieve police testimony. The prosecutor stated that the juror questionnaire and voir dire of L.W. warranted a peremptory challenge. For example, he had the brother in the Oklahoma prison. He indicated that his brother was in and out of jail. . . . Also, L.W. had a difficult time with the questionnaire in terms of understanding some of the legal concepts. And he gave me a bad feeling . . . right from the start, especially when he indicated he was . . . stopped for running a red light, [and] felt that the police simply used an excuse to stop him because they actually thought he was driving a hot car. And it was definitely my feeling that he thought he was being discriminated against because he was Black. [¶] I did not believe him when he said that he would not hold that against us. Everything about his demeanor . . . was very negative. I didn't feel like there was any hope the People had of getting a fair trial from him. On this record, it is apparent that the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that L.W. would be fair to the People. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. C.W. seemed to have trouble hearing two of the trial court's initial questions. Also, voir dire began with C.W.'s admission that he would rather not have been called to the stand. He later explained that he might have to help his disabled daughter-in-law, and that the possibility of having to do so might distract him during trial. In a conflicting response, however, he insisted he could give full attention to the case if on the jury. C.W. and members of his family had been crime victims, and he felt that the police response to crime reports in general is slow when the victims are poorer. Many years before, he had spent a couple of hours in jail after being arrested for drinking in a night spot after legal hours. The charges were dismissed. One son was once charged with burglary but not convicted (C.W. believed his son was innocent), another son had died of a drug overdose, and his daughter was charged with shoplifting and was convicted. The police had beaten one of his sons in a county facility. None of these incidents, he testified, would affect his ability to be fair in a trial of defendants, including his ability to impose the death penalty if warranted. Finally, C.W. was familiar with the Mount Olive Church or at least the surrounding area, though he was not aware of the murders that had occurred there. The prosecutor explained that given C.W.'s testimony, he would be unduly reluctant to convict the defendants. [H]e indicated that he feels the police serve the rich . . . better than the poor. . . . He himself, his son and his daughter have all been busted. . . . He himself, his son was beaten in custody by police officers. [¶] He is familiar with the area of the Mount Olive Church. He has a concern about having to go and take care of his son's wife, who is apparently paralyzed. He also indicated that he visited his son in L.A. County Jail, his son's case was thrown out. He felt that his son was innocent. [¶] This would definitely give somebody a feeling that somebody who is in court might well be innocent as well as in occasions where defendants are poor, it would definitely bias them in their favor given his feeling about law enforcement[,] given the fact he and his son were beaten by the police. [10] Despite C.W.'s contrary assurances, the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that he would be fair to the People. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. L.T. circled an answer on his juror questionnaire that justice was not served in the Rodney King beating case in which police officers were acquitted and declined to explain why. On voir dire, L.T. stated that he felt that police officers could be both good and bad. A friend of his was once wrongfully accused of starting a fire that was large enough to be seen from a freeway. L.T. commented on then recent events involving Rodney King and Reginald Denny, who was beaten by one or more rioters following the police beating of King. He stated that justice had not been served because the King incident had been treated differently from the Denny incident. He felt that the respective incidents showed that the law applied differently to Blacks than to Whites, now and then. The prosecutor explained that she challenged L.T. because he has a very large chip on his shoulder as was evidenced by the fact he felt the King verdict was unjust. . . . [¶] He feels that the death penalty is imposed more often on Blacks than on Whites. He feels that he got bad treatment from the police. And he was probably the most strident [prospective] juror we heard from yet with respect to the King case and the racial issues involved. Here again, the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that a prospective juror would be fair to the People. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. [11] As noted, defendants' second Batson-Wheeler motion expressly challenged the excusals of L.B. and K.B. L.B. began voir dire by explaining that his brother was in confinement for a pending robbery charge, even though the prosecution did not have enough evidence to convict him. He testified that the police told their mother that his brother should turn himself in or they would shoot him. His own experiences with police officers had been mixed: you have some good ones, you [have] some bad ones. In general, he expressed a willingness to be fair in the case against defendants. The prosecutor said that L.B.'s answers about his brother and the police showed a hostility to the state that warranted a peremptory challenge. I could not imagine him possibly being fair in any way in which a defendant who was Black was being tried for a crime. She also said, It's obvious that he feels unhappy about the situation his brother finds himself in. Despite L.B.'s assurances, the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that the prospective juror could be fair to the People. She was entitled to excuse him. In his questionnaire, K.B. said that he would find it difficult to serve on a jury in a capital case and could not be objective. Elsewhere on his questionnaire, he suggested that he would always reject the death penalty and vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. He agree[d] somewhat that anyone who intentionally kills another should never get the death penalty. He would prefer not to serve on the jury out of sympathy. On voir dire, K.B. testified that although he had expressed reservations about the death penalty on his questionnaire, he was more comfortable with it now, evidently from having observed the voir dire proceedings. He, too, expressed a willingness to be fair in the case against defendants. But the record reflects a rote quality to his answers about his open-mindedness, and the prosecutor began her questioning of him by commenting that I feel like sometimes we get to the point where we start programming your responses and people start to try to conform to what everybody else says. . . . She then asked him if he was disavowing a prior statement that his religious scruples would make it difficult to sit in judgment of another in a capital case. K.B. replied that he did not realize then that the trial court would tell the jury what to do regarding the penalty phase, and the prosecutor explained that his first instinct was correct: the court would not tell the jury what sentence to impose. K.B. gave a vague response, and the prosecutor pressed, how does that make it easier? K.B. replied: I'm just more at ease after listening to everything and after she [the court] said everything, explained everything to us and just listening to her. The prosecutor then asked K.B. about two other questionnaire responses: his feelings about the death penalty would interfere with his objectivity at the guilt phase, and he could never see himself voting for death. K.B. essentially disavowed those responses. The prosecutor stated with regard to K.B., I just don't believe a word this man said. His questionnaire is so completely down the line anti-death penalty and every single answer is consistent, anti-death, anti-death, `I can't be fair,' anti-death. Then he when questioned says no, everything is fine, everything has changed. On this record, it is apparent that the prosecutor had reason for her expressed skepticism that K.B. would be fair to the People. His juror questionnaire showed considerable antipathy toward the death penalty and suggested that he would automatically vote for life imprisonment without possibility of parole. His answers on voir dire did not persuasively convey a different impression. On this basis, the prosecutor was entitled to excuse him. As noted, defendants' third Batson-Wheeler motion expressly challenged the excusal of V.H. V.H. had recently served on a jury that acquitted someone else of rape. The jury did not believe the victim. V.H.'s son had had trouble with the law at least since age 15 and was currently incarcerated. Despite this, neither was bitter toward the state, and V.H. had encouraged his son to do his time without complaining. He generally professed an ability to be fair in the case against defendants. The prosecution explained that she found V.H. very acceptable until she learned he had voted to acquit someone on a rape charge. Unfortunately, it is my feeling that once a juror has had the experience of acquitting a defendant, it does create a certain mind set and the readiness to acquit. It certainly shows that he was able to reject the prosecutor's argument, reject the People's proof and reject the word of a woman. [¶] In this trial, we will have women testifying to the history of abuse by one of the defendants. Their believability and credibility will become crucial with this case. The prosecutor noted that the defense had properly exercised a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror for having rendered a verdict of death in another case, and [t]hat's what a peremptory challenge is all about. In light of V.H.'s vote to acquit another criminal defendant of rape, rejecting the testimony of a female victim of violence, the prosecutor had reason to be skeptical about V.H.'s willingness to be fair in this case, in which the testimony of female victims of violence would be crucial. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse him. As noted, defendants' fourth Batson-Wheeler motion challenged the excusal of N.S. This individual had a brother in the custody of what is now called the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. His brother would not reveal the nature of the offense, and N.S. did not know what it was. He believed his brother was fairly incarcerated, and that circumstance would not affect N.S.'s ability to be fair in the case against defendants. N.S. testified that because a prisoner dies in prison whether sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without possibility of parole, he viewed the two penalties as equal. He added that for a Black person a life sentence to prison would be like death, according to what his brother had told him. He thought that because Robert Alton Harris (see People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240) was White, his case had gotten better treatment from the courts than a condemned Black man who had been executed for killing a San Francisco cop. I don't feel he was guilty. They had to drag him away screaming. No one looked into his case after he was convicted. If they did, they probably would have found him innocent. N.S. assured the trial court that despite these views he could be fair to both sides in the trial against defendants. The prosecutor explained that she believed N.S. felt the death penalty and life without would be torture. . . . This is a juror whose beliefs concerning the death penalty are at the very least bizarre, but most likely not fair, I believe, to the People. She also explained that his comments contrasting Robert Alton Harris and the Black condemned prisoner reflected that he did not feel that Blacks receive justice in the justice system. He does have an agenda. He does not like the death penalty, that reason alone. Earlier, in presenting a challenge for cause against N.S., the prosecutor said, the truth of the matter is he could not be fair based on his feelings, his racial bias in terms of what he thinks a Black man goes through in prison, and what he thinks might happen if [giving] the death sentence in terms of the possibility of finding later on he was innocent. [H]e has a clear racial bias in favor of any Black defendant that would prevent him from fairly convicting or sentencing someone to death. The prosecutor had reason to be skeptical about the willingness of N.S. to convict defendants and vote for a verdict of death in this case. On this basis, she was entitled to excuse the prospective juror. Defendants further contend that the prosecution's reasons could hardly be race neutral insofar as the prosecutor commented on the racial attitudes of three prospective jurors: L.W., L.B., and N.S. In particular, defendants insist that it is unconstitutional to exercise peremptory challenges against prospective jurors because they harbor views gleaned from their individual experiences as Black persons or carry attitudes representing viewpoints that predominate or are held more widely in their community than in society at large. Lewis admits that [t]he prosecutor without a doubt identified factors relating to each of the excluded [prospective] jurors that made them less desirable from her perspective, and that her conduct does not appear to be a vendetta against black skin per se. But he argues that when a prosecutor strikes a minority [prospective] juror because [he or she] has in fact had an experience or expresses an opinion reflective of the minority perspective, the prosecutor cannot constitutionally seize upon that experience or opinion as an `individualized' reason for striking [him or her] .... even if [his or her] attitude or experience might be ... suggestive of a less conviction-prone attitude than [that of] other jurors from different backgrounds. Under Batson, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, a party cannot assume in exercising its peremptories that because a prospective juror belongs to a cognizable minority group, that person holds biased views common to that group, and therefore is undesirable as a juror. ( Batson, supra, at pp. 86, 91, 96, 97, 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) But the prosecutor may excuse prospective jurors, including members of cognizable groups, based on personal, individual biases those individuals actually express. ( Wheeler, supra, at p. 277 & fn. 18, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) That is so even if the biased view or attitude may be more widely held inside the cognizable group than outside of it. Batson and Wheeler are intended to limit reliance on stereotypes about certain groups in exercising peremptory challenges. Defendants invoke Batson and Wheeler to preclude the excusal of a member of a cognizable group who expresses personal biases  and thus to foreclose individualized treatment of that prospective juror  if the biases expressed are presumably common to that group. Such an approach stands the law on its head, and promotes the very group stereotyping that Batson and Wheeler forbid. A party does not offend Batson or Wheeler when it excuses prospective jurors who have shown orally or in writing, or through their conduct in court, that they personally harbor biased views.