Opinion ID: 2384574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Professional and Clerical Assistants.

Text: In its budget request for the fiscal year 1963-64, the Board asked for seventeen positions for professional and clerical assistants to the county superintendent of schools. The Council denied this request in its appropriation resolution of April 15, 1963. Article 77, Section 159(a) provides that [t]he county superintendent of schools    shall nominate, for appointment by the county board of education, all the professional, clerical, statistical and stenographic assistants of the office   . But    their tenure and compensation, except as may hereinafter be provided, shall be determined by the county board of education. Section 159(n) provides for the creation of other clerical, statistical and stenographic assistants and other professional assistants, assistant superintendents    as the county board of education shall authorize   . Section 159(o) provides that [t]he board of county commissioners [the Council] shall levy sufficient funds to meet the scale of salaries provided for in this section and shall not deny any part of the amount requested for any one school year by the county board of education to be raised by local taxation for the payment of the salaries of the professional and clerical assistants of the county superintendent   . (Italics and brackets supplied). Sections 148, 149 and 150 of the Article deal with the position and duties of the county superintendent of schools. They show the important role the superintendent plays in carrying out the general policies of the State Board of Education. The professional and clerical assistants deemed necessary by the superintendent, subject to the approval of the Board, are a vital part of the over-all educational policy of the State Board. Section 159(a) makes clear the legislative intent that the number of these assistants is to be fixed by the Board and is not subject to curtailment by the Council. The history of Section 159(a) and its predecessor enactments is set forth in 34 Opinions of the Attorney General 147 (1949). That history, as well as the unequivocal wording of the section, leaves no doubt as to the statutory mandate that the Council levy a tax sufficient to pay the requested salaries, even though the forty cent limitation contained in Section 68 is exceeded. See Worcester Co. v. School Comr's, 113 Md. 305, 313, 77 Atl. 605 (1910) and School Commissioners v. Gantt, supra . The Council argues that Section 159(b) and (c) which set up a ratio between teachers and pupils limits the number of professional and clerical assistantships which may be created by the superintendent and the Board to the same ratio which applies between supervisors and teachers. This argument presupposes that professional and clerical assistants are within the class designated as supervisors. We do not agree. Sections 159 (d), (g) and (h) specifically set forth the minimum salaries for supervisors. Section 159(a) empowers the Board to set the compensation for professional and clerical assistants. It is clear that the supervisors referred to in the statute are teacher assistantships, while the professional and clerical assistants enumerated in Section 159(a) are administrative assistantships. The Council further contends that a construction of the statute different from that which it suggests would mean that the Council must appropriate money for any one who in the viewpoint of the superintendent of schools may be a professional assistant, and that to so construe Section 159(a) would strip the Council of its responsibility and duty as the appropriating authority under Section 68. We do not find that there is any conflict between Sections 159 and 68. It was for the Legislature to determine in what respects to give final decision as to financial needs to the educational expertise of the Board and when the general appropriating function of the Council was to govern. See Zantzinger v. Manning, supra ; School Com. of Car. Co. v. Breeding, supra . As to professional and clerical assistants, the Legislature has provided that the Board's determination is binding upon the Council, and that the school levy must raise the necessary funds. The lower court was in error in denying the relief prayed.