Opinion ID: 1213794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: there was a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting kinnane of the charged offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree and convicting him of the included offenses of sexual assault in the fourth degree and attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree.

Text: When jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue on appeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 514-15, 849 P.2d 58, 74 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 38, 881 P.2d 504, 525 (1994); State v. Horswill, 75 Haw. 152, 155, 857 P.2d 579, 581 (1993); State v. Lee, 75 Haw. 80, 112, 856 P.2d 1246, 1263 (1993).
[W]hen a defendant in a criminal case timely asks for a lesser included offense instruction to which he [or she] is entitled, it is reversible error not to give it. State v. Williams, 6 Haw.App. 17, 18, 708 P.2d 834, 835 (1985) (citing 2 Wright, Federal Procedure and Practice: Criminal 2d § 498 (1982)). On the other hand, a trial court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. HRS § 701-109(5) (1985). State v. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i 387, 390, 879 P.2d 492, 495 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in the absence of such a rational basis in the evidence, the trial court should not instruct the jury as to included offenses. See generally State v. Sneed, 68 Haw. 463, 718 P.2d 280 (1986). A fortiori, it is not error for a trial court to refuse  and the trial court should refrain from giving  an instruction regarding an uncharged offense that is not included, for purposes of the Hawai`i Penal Code, within the charged offense. See generally State v. Pukahi, 70 Haw. 456, 776 P.2d 392 (1989); State v. Freeman, 70 Haw. 434, 774 P.2d 888 (1989); State v. Burdett, 70 Haw. 85, 762 P.2d 164 (1988); State v. Woicek, 63 Haw. 548, 632 P.2d 654 (1981); State v. Kupau, 63 Haw. 1, 620 P.2d 250 (1980); State v. Rullman, No. 16389, slip op. at 7-8, ___ P.2d ___, ___-___ (Haw. Ct.App. May, 25, 1995); State v. Doi, 6 Haw. App. 115, 711 P.2d 736, cert. denied, 68 Haw. 692 (1985). Where there is such a rational basis in the evidence, however, we have held that it may be plain error [6] for a trial court to fail to give an included offense instruction even when neither the prosecution nor the defendant have requested it; [7] this is because the trial court is the sole source of all definitions and statements of law applicable to an issue to be resolved by the jury. Moreover, it is the duty of the circuit judge to see to it that the case goes to the jury in a clear and intelligent manner, so that they may have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide, and he or she shall state to them fully the law applicable to the facts. And faced with inaccurate or incomplete instructions, the trial court has a duty to, with the aid of counsel, either correct the defective instructions or to otherwise incorporate it into its own instructions. In other words, the ultimate responsibility properly to instruct the jury lies with the circuit court and not with trial counsel. . . . . Thus, in order to reconcile the competing interests of the prosecution and defendants, as well as to ensure that juries are appropriately instructed in criminal cases, we hold as follows: The trial judge must bring all included offense instructions that are supported by the evidence to the attention of the parties. The trial judge must then give each such instruction to the jury unless (1) the prosecution does not request that included instructions be given and (2) the defendant specifically objects to the included offense instructions for tactical reasons. If the prosecution does not make a request and the defendant makes a tactical objection, the trial judge must then exercise his or her discretion as to whether the included offense instructions should be given. The trial judge's discretion should be guided by the nature of the evidence presented during the trial, as well as the extent to which the defendant appears to understand the risks involved. Kupau, 76 Hawai`i at 394-96, 879 P.2d at 499-501 (citations, footnotes, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted) (emphases in original).
In State v. Alston, 75 Haw. 517, 865 P.2d 157 (1994), this court recently summarized the law in Hawai`i applicable to the issue of what constitutes an included offense. We began our analysis by citing Burdett, 70 Haw. at 87, 762 P.2d at 165, for the general proposition that an offense is a lesser included offense of another if it satisfies the requirements set forth in HRS § 701-109(4) which codifies the common law doctrine of lesser included offenses. Alston, 75 Haw. at 532-33, 865 P.2d at 166 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). HRS § 701-109 (1985), which, as indicated, is the statutory basis of the Alston assessment, provides in relevant part: Method of prosecution when conduct establishes an element of more than one offense. (1) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish an element of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each offense of which such conduct is an element. He [or she] may not, however, be convicted of more than one offense if: (a) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (4) of this section[.] . . . . (4) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or the information. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein;[ [8] ] or (c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a different state of mind indicating lesser degree of culpability suffices to establish its commission. In Alston, we construed HRS § 701-109(4) in the following manner: Under subsection (a), an offense is included if it is impossible to commit the greater without also committing the lesser. Burdett, 70 Haw. at 87-88, 762 P.2d at 165-67 (citations omitted). In making this comparison, the degree of culpability, the legislative statutory scheme, and the end result may be considered. Id. at 88, 762 P.2d at 166 (citation omitted). Regarding the degree of culpability, the rule is that the lesser included offense cannot have a mental state greater than or different from that which is required for the charged offense. Id. (citations omitted).... .... ... [A] lesser included offense should produce the same end result as the greater charged offense. Id. ... . . . . ... Under subsection (c), an offense is included if [it] differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person ... or public interest or a different state of mind indicating lesser degree of culpability suffices to establish its commission.[ [9] ] Subsection (c) differs from (a) in that there may be some dissimilarity in the facts necessary to prove the lesser offense, but the end result is the same. State v. Freeman, 70 Haw. 434, 440, 774 P.2d 888, 892 (1989) (citing Commentary to HRS § 701-109). Under subsection (c) analysis, the following factors are considered: (1) the degree of culpability; (2) the degree or risk of injury; and (3) the end result. Burdett, 70 Haw. at 90, 762 P.2d at 167 (citation omitted).... Alston, 75 Haw. at 533-36, 865 P.2d at 166-67 (emphasis omitted).
The ICA's rationale as to why the trial court did not err in refusing Defendant's Supplemental Jury Instruction No. 12 was as follows: The trial court refused [Kinnane's] request to instruct the jury that if they were unable to reach a verdict on the charge of attempted sexual assault in the second degree, they should consider whether [Kinnane] was guilty of the included offense of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree.[ [10] ] [Kinnane] assigns the court's refusal as error. We find no error. HRS § 701-109(5) (1985) provides that, [t]he court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. There was a rational basis in the evidence for acquittal of the charged offense of attempted sexual assault. The jury could have disbelieved [the complainant's] testimony that [Kinnane's] penis was rubbing on her stomach and that his hand was under her panties. In that case, however, there would have been no rational basis for convicting [Kinnane] of the lesser offense, since the only remaining testimony would be [Kinnane's] testimony that he never touched [the complainant] except when he kissed her stomach. ICA's decision at 14-15 (footnote omitted). The ICA's reasoning is faulty on at least three grounds. First, the sexual contact, see supra note 3, of Kinnane's penis with the complainant's stomach was not a material element of the offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree with which Kinnane was charged in Count I, [11] see supra note 2 and the discussion of material elements infra in section II.D.1 of this opinion, and the jury obviously found beyond a reasonable doubt that that particular sexual contact had taken place, inasmuch as it convicted Kinnane of sexual assault in the fourth degree as charged in Count II. [12] See the discussion of the material elements of sexual assault in the fourth degree infra in section II.D.1 of this opinion. Second, the jury could rationally have believed the complainant's testimony in its entirety and nonetheless acquitted Kinnane of attempted sexual assault in the second degree if it had a reasonable doubt as to whether, despite touching the complainant under her panties with his hand, Kinnane intended to penetrate the complainant's vagina with his fingers. [13] And third, the jury could rationally have believed the complainant's testimony in part and nonetheless acquitted the defendant of attempted sexual assault in the second degree if it had a reasonable doubt both as to whether Kinnane succeeded in subjecting the complainant to sexual contact under her panties and as to whether Kinnane intended to penetrate the complainant's vagina with his fingers. We thus reach the central questions presented by this appeal: (1) Had the jury acquitted Kinnane of attempted sexual assault in the second degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-731(1)(a), as charged in Count I, was there a rational basis in the evidence for convicting him of either sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of HRS § 707-733(1)(a) or attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-733(1)(a); and, (2) if so, neither sexual assault in the fourth degree nor attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree having been charged in Count I, would such convictions have been lawful? The answer to the first question turns on the respective elements of the three offenses. The answer to the second question turns on whether sexual assault in the fourth degree and attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree are included in the charged offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree, within the meaning of HRS § 701-109(4). Accordingly, we address each question in turn.
HRS § 701-114(1)(a) and (b) (1985) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense. State v. Pone, 78 Hawai`i 262, 265, 892 P.2d 455, 458 (1995) (quoting Kupau, 76 Hawai`i at 390, 879 P.2d at 495) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, pursuant to HRS § 702-205 (1985), the requisite state of mind applies to such conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct as are specified by the definition of the offense. Id. (quoting Kupau, 76 Hawai`i at 390-91, 879 P.2d at 495-96) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). A person commits the offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500(1)(b) and 707-731(1)(a), if the person intentionally engages in conduct, which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to be practically certain to subject another person to an act of sexual penetration that the person is aware is by compulsion. [14] Accordingly, there were two material elements of the offense of attempted sexual assault in the second degree as charged in Count I against Kinnane, each of which the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These two elements were: (1) that Kinnane intentionally ( i.e., the requisite state of mind establishing attempt liability with respect to the actor's conduct) engaged in conduct; and (2) that the conduct, under the circumstances as Kinnane believed them to be: (a) constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct; (b) intended or known to be practically certain ( i.e., the requisite intentional or knowing state of mind with respect to the result of the actor's conduct); (c) to subject the complainant to an act of sexual penetration ( i.e., the result of the actor's prohibited conduct); (d) that Kinnane was aware ( i.e., the requisite knowing state of mind with respect to attendant circumstances); (e) was by compulsion ( i.e., the attendant circumstance of absence of the complainant's consent, see supra note 2). See supra note 14; HRS §§ 705-500(2), supra note 1, and 707-731(1)(a), supra note 2. On the other hand, a person commits the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS § 707-733(1)(a), if the person knowingly subjects another person to sexual contact by compulsion or causes another person to have sexual contact with the actor by compulsion. Accordingly, had the jury been so instructed in connection with Count I, there were three material elements of the offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree, each of which the prosecution would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These three elements were: (1) that Kinnane subjected the complainant ( i.e., the prohibited conduct) to sexual contact ( i.e., the prohibited result of Kinnane's hand touching the complainant's sexual or other intimate parts under her panties and the attendant circumstance that the complainant was not married to Kinnane, see supra note 3); (2) that Kinnane did so by compulsion ( i.e., the attendant circumstance of absence of the complainant's consent, see supra note 2); and (3) that Kinnane did so knowingly ( i.e., the requisite state of mind). Finally, a person commits the offense of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500 and 707-733(1)(a), if the person intentionally engages in conduct, which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to be practically certain to subject another person to sexual contact that the person is aware is by compulsion. [15] Accordingly, had the jury been so instructed in connection with Count I, there were two material elements of the offense of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree, each of which the prosecution would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish guilt. These two elements were: (1) that Kinnane intentionally ( i.e., the requisite state of mind establishing attempt liability with respect to the actor's conduct) engaged in conduct; and (2) that the conduct, under the circumstances as Kinnane believed them to be: (a) constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct; (b) intended or known to be practically certain ( i.e., the requisite intentional or knowing state of mind with respect to the result of the actor's conduct); (c) to subject the complainant to sexual contact ( i.e., the result of the actor's prohibited conduct and the attendant circumstance that the complainant was not married to Kinnane, see supra note 3); (d) that Kinnane was aware ( i.e., the requisite knowing state of mind with respect to attendant circumstances); (e) was by compulsion ( i.e., the attendant circumstance of absence of the complainant's consent, see supra note 2). See supra note 14; HRS §§ 705-500, supra note 1, and 707-733(1)(a), supra note 3. As we have indicated, even if the jury had believed the complainant's testimony in its entirety, it could have acquitted Kinnane of attempted sexual assault in the second degree, as charged in Count I, on the basis of a reasonable doubt as to whether, despite having touched the complainant under her panties, Kinnane intended to insert his fingers into her vagina. The touching, however, clearly met the definition of sexual contact. See supra note 3. [16] We therefore hold that there was a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Kinnane knowingly subjected the complainant to sexual contact by compulsion and thus to convict him of sexual assault in the fourth degree. Moreover, as we have indicated, the jury could have believed that Kinnane attempted, but failed, to subject the complainant to sexual contact. We therefore hold that there was a rational basis in the evidence for the jury to convict Kinnane of attempted sexual assault in the fourth degree.