Opinion ID: 2399207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Precluding the Use of Deposition Testimony at Trial Obtained from the Opposing Parties' Experts

Text: The plaintiff also argues that the trial justice erred in barring him from using the deposition testimony of defendants' experts in his case-in-chief. [12] He contends that the trial justice based his decision primarily on a `feeling' that it simply would not be fair to permit this practice. The plaintiff alleges that the deposition testimony that he intended to present was from expert witnesses who were unavailable. Therefore, he argued, pursuant to Rule 32(a)(3)(B) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, he should have been permitted to use the deposition testimony of the defendants' expert witnesses. The defendants assert that the trial justice properly precluded plaintiff from using the deposition testimony of their expert witnesses during his case-in-chief. The hospital argued that it did not intend to call the experts in question as witnesses in the case. Therefore, if the trial justice had allowed plaintiff to call such experts as his own witnesses, he would have impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to the defendants. The hospital also argued that plaintiff's attempt to introduce the discovery deposition of one of the hospital's expert witnesses during plaintiff's case-in-chief was not a permissible use of this evidence under Rule 32, which addresses the uses of depositions in court proceedings. The defendants further argue that, in plaintiffs interrogatory answers, plaintiff failed to designate any of defendants' experts as his own trial experts. For this reason alone, they urge us to hold that the trial justice was correct in precluding plaintiff from introducing the deposition testimony of any defense expert as part of his case-in-chief. In excluding the deposition testimony of defendants' expert witnesses, the trial justice reasoned that it would be unfair to permit plaintiff to present one or more of defendants' expert witnesses as his own experts during his case-in-chief. The trial justice also stated that, based upon this Court's holdings in L'Etoile v. Director of Public Works, 89 R.I. 394, 153 A.2d 173 (1959) and Ondis v. Pion, 497 A.2d 13 (R.I.1985), a party may not obtain and may not introduce at trial an opinion of a witness  an expert witness if that party has not retained, in fact, that expert witness and compensated that expert witness for the opinion that is being sought to be introduced. As has been noted previously, evidentiary rulings concerning expert testimony are committed to the trial justice's sound discretion and will not be disturbed. ADP Marshall, Inc., 784 A.2d at 314. Pursuant to Rule 32(a)(3), [t]he deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (A) That the witness is dead; or (B) That the witness is out of state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (C) That the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) That the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) Upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. A deposition of a medical witness or any witness called as an expert, other than a party, which has been recorded by videotape by written stipulation of the parties or pursuant to an order of court may be used at trial for any purpose whether or not the witness is available to testify. Although this rule clearly provides for the use of depositions in a trial, it does not specifically address the use of expert-witness depositions, which in this case the parties scheduled only by agreement because the rules do not provide for such depositions as a matter of right. Here, the reason that defendants' expert witnesses were unavailable to plaintiff was not because they lived and worked out-of-state, but because plaintiff failed to designate them as such in his answers to interrogatories and failed to engage them as testifying expert witnesses for plaintiff in this case. In addition, plaintiff was unable to compel these witnesses to testify under subpoena at trial because he was barred from doing so by the applicable case law. Absent extraordinary circumstances not present in this case, [13] a nonparty expert cannot be compelled to give opinion testimony against his or her will. See Sousa v. Chaset, 519 A.2d 1132, 1136 (R.I.1987); Ondis, 497 A.2d at 18. In Sousa, 519 A.2d at 1135, the plaintiff attempted to subpoena an expert who did not wish to testify. This Court held the trial court properly sustained defendant's objection, stating [a]n expert who has not been engaged, but only subpoenaed, cannot be compelled to give opinion testimony against his or her will. Id. at 1136. In Ondis, 497 A.2d at 18, the plaintiff wished to subpoena a plastic surgeon who had observed the plaintiff's injuries and treatment and to elicit from the witness an expert opinion. This Court held that it is the obligation of a party who desires expert testimony to obtain the services of a qualified person on a voluntary basis. Id. Like the plaintiffs in Sousa and Ondis, Owens attempted to procure expert testimony for his case-in-chief without engaging the services of such experts on a voluntary basis. The, plaintiff obtained the deposition testimony of a defendant's expert through the discovery process, not by securing it voluntarily from the witness. As such, plaintiff could not use this evidence in his case-in-chief. Additionally, plaintiff did not designate the defense expert in question, Dr. Martin, as one of plaintiff's testifying experts in his answers to interrogatories on this subject. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure states [a] party may    require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial. Although the defense decided not to call this witness at trial, that decision did not absolve plaintiff from complying with the rule requiring the pretrial identification of expert witnesses who will testify on his behalf. In addition, Rule 33(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to supplement his answers to interrogatories when he receives information that makes his previous response incomplete. The purpose of Rule 33(c) is to prevent trial by ambush and to allow litigants to prepare for trial free from the elements of surprise and concealment so that judgments can rest upon the merits of the case   . Neri v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 719 A.2d 1150, 1152 (R.I.1998) (quoting Gormley v. Vartian, 121 R.I. 770, 775, 403 A.2d 256, 259 (1979)). In Neri, 719 A.2d at 1152-53, we held that failure to notify the opposing party pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the identity of an expert witness  who in that case was also an opposing party  barred the expert from testifying as such at the trial. We reasoned that, although the defendants had the ability to cross-examine the witness as a party to the case, they still did not have the opportunity to do so in the witness's capacity as an expert. Neri, 719 A.2d at 1152. Given the importance of the proffered testimony, we held that it was improper for the trial justice to allow this witness to testify as an expert at trial. Id. at 1153. Like the plaintiff in Neri, plaintiff here did not identify Dr. Martin as an expert who would testify on his behalf at the trial, as he was bound to do pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(A). Coupled with the fact that Owens failed to engage Dr. Martin as an expert to testify on his behalf, this omission was a sufficient basis to exclude Dr. Martin's testimony during plaintiff's case-in-chief.