Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Investigating Officer's Interview with Defendant

Text: In Oklahoma on June 9, 1979, shortly after defendant's arrest, Detective Norman Crawford of the San Diego County Sheriff's Department interviewed defendant. After defendant twice indicated he was ready to deal with it, Detective Crawford told him, I don't know what it is, but like I say, you know, a person is, uh, is sick they're going to lay it right out and tell me what happened because they were sick.... The person that plays it cool, the cold con, that's going to indicate to me that this thing is premeditated.... Set up and that the person could care less about the person that was killed. [17] At the penalty retrial, counsel sought to have these statements redacted from the tape and transcript of the interview offered into evidence, arguing that Crawford's statements were legal conclusions and opinions that allowed the jury to improperly conclude that a defendant's silence in response to police questioning is evidence of premeditation. The court denied defendant's request under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant now argues the court erred in admitting the statements in full. He first asserts that Crawford's statements constituted the improper opinion of a lay witness, but his failure to object on this ground at trial forfeited the claim for appeal. He also argues Crawford's statements improperly allowed the jury to ascribe greater culpability simply because [defendant] maintained his innocence, thereby violating his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a reliable determination of penalty. We disagree. The state standard of review for error at the penalty phase, which is a more exacting standard than that employed for state law errors at the guilt phase, is set forth in People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447-448 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]: [W]hen faced with penalty phase error not amounting to a federal constitutional violation, we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not occurred. ( Id. at p. 448.) When evidence has been erroneously received at the penalty phase, this court should reverse the death sentence if it is `the sort of evidence that is likely to have a significant impact on the jury's evaluation of whether defendant should live or die.' [Citation.] ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 738 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729].) The federal standard of review for constitutional error is set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824]: [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We recently reiterated that ` Brown 's `reasonable possibility' standard and Chapman's `reasonable doubt' test... are the same in substance and effect.' ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1299 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015].) Error, if any, in allowing the penalty retrial jury to hear Crawford's opinion was not prejudicial. Crawford's statements, suggesting the possibility that the murder was the act of a sick mind rather than that of a cold killer, apparently were made in an effort to create an atmosphere in which defendant could more easily admit complicity in the murder. Defendant's lingering doubt defense centered around his claim that he did not commit the murder, not his state of mind at the time of the killing. Defendant fails, therefore, to show a reasonable possibility that, had Crawford's opinions of how a killer reveals his state of mind during an interview not been presented to the jury, he would have received a more favorable penalty verdict.