Opinion ID: 78296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Regarding Count One

Text: Seher contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his Count One conviction for conspiracy to launder money. He asserts that the evidence established that he had a buyer-seller relationship with his customers at the Depot and did not show that he entered into a conspiratorial agreement to conceal and disguise cocaine proceeds. According to Seher, the district court erred by failing to address this argument as part of his motion for judgment of acquittal. He also asserts that, to the extent that the evidence established an intent to avoid the requirement to file a Form 8300, there was no evidence that such transactions occurred within the relevant statute of limitations period. As such, there would have been insufficient evidence to support his conviction on Count One. We review a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo. See United States v. Evans, 473 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir.2006). When the motion raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in the government's favor. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We will affirm the denial by concluding that a reasonable factfinder could find that the evidence established that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. To support a conviction of conspiracy, the government must prove [1] that an agreement existed between two or more persons to commit a crime and [2] that the defendants knowingly and voluntarily joined or participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1328 (11th Cir.2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The government can show the existence of such an agreement via circumstantial evidence, which would include making inferences based on the conduct of those allegedly involved in the scheme. See id. A defendant is deemed to have knowledge of the illegal agreement if he was aware of the primary purpose of the conspiracy. See id. Federal law sets the statute of limitations for conspiracy charges under § 1956(h) at five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a). The government satisfies the requirements of the statute of limitations for a non-overt act conspiracy if it alleges and proves that the conspiracy continued into the limitations period. United States v. Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 219, 125 S.Ct. 687, 694, 160 L.Ed.2d 611 (2005) (holding that § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act). [A] conspiracy is deemed to continue as long as its purposes have neither been abandoned nor accomplished, and no affirmative showing has been made that it has terminated. Arnold, 117 F.3d at 1313. Count One alleged that Seher conducted a financial transaction with two disjunctive intentsto conceal and/or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership and control of the proceeds of the said unlawful activity and/or to avoid transaction reporting requirements under federal lawwith the unlawful activity in question being the distribution of cocaine. R1-31 at 1-2. The government obtained the initial indictment on 25 July 2006. Accordingly, we need to determine whether there was sufficient evidence that Seher knowingly entered into a conspiracy with either of those purposes and that the conspiracy continued on or beyond 25 July 2001. We find that there was ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Seher acted with both of those intents. Ragland, Johnson, McDowell, and Manning all testified that Seher never requested that they complete a Form 8300 nor asked for information that would have helped him complete one, even though they all made multiple cash purchases in excess of $10,000. Additionally, Seher and many of these witnesses were aware of the requirement to file a Form 8300, and the witnesses testified that they would not have shopped at the Depot if Seher had made them complete such a form. The jury would have been reasonable in inferring from this evidence that the parties had an agreement to avoid reporting requirements and that Seher voluntarily acted with the intent to evade those requirements. There was likewise sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer an intent to disguise drug proceeds. Both Manning and Johnson testified that they purchased jewelry from Seher after that date, though the purchase prices did not exceed $10,000. Furthermore, Manning and Ragland discussed how Seher assisted them in obtaining jewelry that authorities had seized as part of their arrests on drug-related charges, and Johnson testified that Seher agreed to help him sell a watch. In fact, Ragland and Johnson explicitly requested Seher's help, and he agreed to aid them. Furthermore, both Ragland and Manning testified that Seher was aware of their arrests before they ever broached the topic. Though Seher correctly notes that the witnesses all testified that they never told him that they were involved in the drug business or that they were spending drug proceeds, the jury could have reasonably assumed from circumstantial evidence that Seher had such knowledge. Additionally, the witnesses all stated that they made their purchases with cash rolled into thousand-dollar increments, which they typically carried around in plastic bags or shoe boxes, the same manner in which they transported their drug proceeds. Most importantly, Seher continued to help them after they had been charged with drug-related crimes and even expressed a belief to an FBI official that Ragland was involved in the drug trade. The government also put forth sufficient evidence that the conspiracy continued on or beyond 25 July 2001. Manning, Ragland, and Johnson all testified that their interactions with Seher were not limited merely to individual purchases, but extended to his permitting them to return their purchased jewelry later on, which he would then attempt to sell and give them money in return. The jury could have reasonably inferred that the conspiracy encompassed the totality of these dealings, and that these dealings reflected the dual intents of evading reporting requirements and disguising drug proceeds. Given this understanding of the nature of the conspiracy, Johnson's February 2002 request for Seher's assistance in selling the Rolex, along with Seher's subsequent payment of funds to Johnson and his sister, would have constituted part of the conspiracy. Accordingly, although there were no sales in excess of $10,000 after July 2001, it was reasonable to view the conspiracy as continuing into the limitations period. We therefore reject Seher's contention that he had merely a buyer-seller relationship with his customers. [23] We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that Seher entered into a conspiracy to launder drug proceeds with the intent of both avoiding transaction reporting requirements and concealing or disguising drug proceeds. There was also ample proof from which a reasonable juror could find that the conspiracy continued past 25 July 2001. Accordingly, the district court did not err in rejecting Seher's motion for judgment of acquittal on these grounds.
Seher contends that there was a material variance between the crime charged and that proven at trial because the evidence showed that there were multiple conspiracies, rather than a single conspiracy. He believes that the evidence reflected the kind of rimless wheel or hub-and-spoke conspiracy described in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1243, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) and United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir.2004). Both of those courts reversed convictions because that type of conspiracy constituted a material variance from the indictment, and Seher urges us to reach the same result here. A material variance between an indictment and the government's proof at trial occurs if the government proves multiple conspiracies under an indictment alleging only a single conspiracy. Castro, 89 F.3d at 1450. We will uphold the conviction unless the variance (1) was material and (2) substantially prejudiced the defendant. Id. To determine whether a variance was material, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and ask whether a reasonable trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that a single conspiracy existed. See United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033, 1042 (11th Cir.2008). We will not disturb the jury's finding of a single conspiracy if it is supported by substantial evidence. See id. Only after making the finding of material variance do we need to examine whether the variance substantially prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.2008). To determine whether the jury could have found a single conspiracy, we consider: (1) whether a common goal existed; (2) the nature of the underlying scheme; and (3) the overlap of participants. United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1347 (11th Cir.2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The government must establish interdependence amongst the co-conspirators. See id. The existence of separate transactions does not have to imply separate conspiracies if the co-conspirators acted in concert to further a common goal. Chandler, 388 F.3d at 811 (emphasis in original). Courts typically define the common goal element as broadly as possible, with common being defined as `similar' or `substantially the same.' Moore, 525 F.3d at 1042. If a defendant's actions facilitated the endeavors of other coconspirators, or facilitated the venture as a whole, then a single conspiracy is shown. Chandler, 388 F.3d at 811 (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted, emphasis in original). Each co-conspirator thus does not have to be involved in every part of the conspiracy. See Moore, 525 F.3d at 1042. After reviewing the record, we find that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's single conspiracy finding. The evidence indicated that the jewelry transactions between Seher and the drug dealers were all done with the common goals of avoiding filing Form 8300s and disguising drug proceeds. The government showed that Seher deliberately ignored transaction reporting requirements and that the dealers continued to come to him because they also wanted to avoid these requirements. Ragland, Johnson, Manning, and McDowell all expressed a desire to purchase jewelry without leaving a paper trial, with the first three also indicating that they would not have purchased jewelry from Seher if he had made them fill out Form 8300s. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was also substantial proof that Seher sold jewelry to help conceal drug proceeds. Witness testimony demonstrated that Seher had established a scheme whereby drug dealers could purchase jewelry from him using cash from drug sales. As part of this same scheme, he also generally agreed to let the dealers return their jewelry, which he would then attempt to resell and, in effect, convert their purchased jewelry back into cash whenever they were in need of it. Furthermore, the evidence indicated that Seher was aware that he was interacting with drug dealers and that the money being used to purchase the jewelry came from drug sales. There was likewise substantial evidence of a single conspiracy based on the nature of the underlying scheme and the overlap of participants. The set patterns and practices engaged in by Seher and the drug dealers during jewelry purchases at the Depot show the commonality of purpose expected of a single conspiracy. Ragland, Johnson, Manning, and McDowell all testified that Seher required them to complete large transactions in the back room, that he regularly stated coded or incorrect prices for the jewelry, that he never inquired about the source of their cash, and that he failed to request information to complete Form 8300s. These elements all support the notion that there was a scheme, established by Seher, deliberately designed to avoid transaction reporting requirements and conceal the nature of the funds being used to purchase the jewelry. Furthermore, the participants in the scheme had a great deal of overlap. Many of the dealers knew each other, and they often suggested that fellow dealers should come to the Depot to purchase jewelry. For example, McDowell testified that one of his first visits to the Depot was with Johnson. The dealers were thus aware that others they knew were participating in the scheme. We also disagree with Seher's contention that the money laundering involved a rimless wheel conspiracy similar to those described in Chandler and Kotteakos. A rimless wheel conspiracy is a variation of the hub-and-spoke model, in which the individual at the hub of the conspiracy interacts separately with those along the various spokes of the wheel. See Chandler, 388 F.3d at 807. Such a structure would constitute a single conspiracy when the various spokes are aware of each other and of their common aim. See id. at 808. However, where the `spokes' of a conspiracy have no knowledge of or connection with the other spokes and deal[] independently with the hub conspirator, there is not a single conspiracy, but rather as many conspiracies as there are spokes. Id. at 807. This type of multiple conspiracy is akin to a `rimless wheel' because there is no rim to connect the spokes in a single scheme. Id. In Chandler, we found that the evidence reflected the latter kind of arrangement because the central conspirator was the only individual who moved from spoke to spoke or who even knew about the other spokes or the overall scheme. See id. at 808. In contrast, the drug dealers here knew that they could purchase jewelry from Seher without having to follow federal reporting requirements and then exchange it back when needed. They were aware that their fellow drug dealers were purchasing goods from Seher for the same purpose, and they even encouraged others to do likewise. [24] There was thus substantial evidence that the co-conspirators were aware of the nature and scope of Seher's scheme, thereby distinguishing this situation from the rimless wheel discussed in Chandler and Kotteakos. Accordingly, we find that the jury's finding of a single conspiracy was supported by substantial evidence. [25] We therefore conclude that there was no material variance regarding Count One and affirm Seher's conviction on that count. [26]