Opinion ID: 534205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gomez v. United States

Text: 12 It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court last term decided Gomez v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989). The defendants in that case objected to the district court's assignment of voir dire to a federal magistrate, requesting instead the presence of the district judge. These objections were overruled, and the defendants were convicted of the felonies with which they were charged. On appeal, the defendants argued that, at least in cases in which a defendant objects, a federal magistrate has no authority to preside over voir dire. The government disagreed, arguing that jury selection is an additional duty that may be delegated to a magistrate within the meaning of section 636(b)(3) of the Act. 13 In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court held that, absent consent from the defendant, Congress did not contemplate the inclusion of jury selection in felony trials among a magistrate's additional duties. Gomez, 109 S.Ct. at 2247. At the outset, the Court made clear that its decision was impelled primarily by the constitutional implications of forcing a defendant in a felony proceeding to accept a magistrate at voir dire. Given the expansive scope of the additional duties clause, the Court agreed that [t]he only legal constraint on the assignments that may be delegated to a magistrate must be found ... in the Constitution. Gomez, 109 S.Ct. at 2240-41. In this case, the Court reasoned, just such a constitutional problem arose, but because of the settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses no constitutional question, id. at 2241, it was appropriate to reach a result on statutory grounds. 14 Looking to the context of the overall statutory scheme, id., the Court concluded that the additional duties clause did not include voir dire in cases in which the defendant objects. First, the Court reasoned, a trial is thought to commence at the selection of the jury for certain constitutional purposes, including a criminal defendant's right to be present at his trial. Id. at 2246. Second, the Court expressed concerns not only about the absence of any provision establishing the applicable standard of review to be exercised when a magistrate conducts voir dire, but also about the inherent limits in exercising such review over a process that relies so heavily on non-verbal cues. Id. at 2246-47. 15 The Court did not, however, reach the question presented in this case: whether the Federal Magistrates Act permits a magistrate to preside over the selection of a jury when a defendant consents. In Gomez, the Court framed the issue as whether presiding at the selection of a jury in a felony trial without the defendant's consent  is an additional duty within the meaning of the Federal Magistrates Act. Id. at 2239 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2248 (rejecting the government's harmless error analysis on the grounds that it does not apply in a felony case in which, despite the defendant's objection and without any meaningful review by a district judge, an officer exceeds his jurisdiction by selecting a jury). Gomez thus left open the question whether a defendant's consent makes a difference as to whether a district court may assign voir dire to a magistrate. The courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have thus far come to different conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Pena, 890 F.2d 490 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that assignment of jury selection to magistrate did not amount to plain error); United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 1545-46 (2d Cir.1989) (recognizing a consent exception to Gomez ); United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that Gomez provides relief even where the defendant consented to the use of a magistrate).