Opinion ID: 4014596
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Error in Excusing Jurors for Cause

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing two prospective jurors based solely on responses in their written questionnaires concerning the death penalty. We conclude that the dismissal of one juror was error, requiring reversal of the penalty judgment. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury that has not been tilted in favor of capital punishment by prosecutorial challenges for cause. (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 9.) To protect that right, a challenge for cause because of a prospective juror‘s views on the death penalty may properly be sustained only when ―the juror‘s views would ‗prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.‘ ‖ (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424.) Thus, a death sentence cannot stand if the jury that imposed or recommended the penalty was selected by excluding prospective jurors for cause ―simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction.‖ (Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522.) Even those who ―firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‖ (Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176.) When the trial court‘s assessment of a prospective juror‘s capacity to serve is based at least in part on the juror‘s tone, demeanor, or other elements that cannot be reflected in the written record, its ruling is owed deference by reviewing courts. (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529.) But no such deference is 19 warranted when a trial court‘s ruling on a for-cause challenge is based solely on the prospective jurors‘ answers to a written questionnaire. (Ibid.) In those circumstances, we review de novo the trial court‘s dismissal of the prospective juror for cause. (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758, 779.)
Prospective Juror No. 129‘s questionnaire responses reflected the extent of her personal opposition to the death penalty. When asked whether she had any religious convictions that would in any way interfere with her ability to sit as a juror in a capital case, Juror No. 129 answered ―Yes‖ and wrote ―Don‘t feel I have the right to decide if a person is to die.‖ A similar question 11 pages later asked whether she had any religious, moral, or personal beliefs that would make it difficult to impose the death penalty. She responded ―Yes‖ and wrote ―Don‘t believe I have the right to make judgement [sic] for another human being to die.‖ The juror provided a very similar answer when asked for her ―general feelings about the death penalty.‖ When asked if there were ―particular reasons‖ for her feelings on the issue, the juror responded ―No[,] other than moral,‖ and referred to her earlier responses. Near the end of the questionnaire, the juror answered ―No‖ when asked whether her ―answers given above‖ were ―based on a religious consideration‖ but then said ―Somewhat‖ when asked in question No. 19 whether she believed ―that any religious beliefs [she] may have would have a substantial impact on [her] decision in this case.‖ What her responses to the same questionnaire also suggested, though, is that Juror No. 129 could nonetheless put aside her views about capital punishment in determining the appropriate penalty in this case. In the section entitled ―Attitudes Regarding The Death Penalty,‖ she stated without qualification that she would not refuse to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder just to prevent 20 the penalty phase from taking place, nor would she refuse to find a special circumstance allegation true just to prevent a penalty phase from taking place. She also conveyed that she would not automatically vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole ―because of any views [she] may have concerning the death penalty,‖ that she would not substitute a different standard of proof in a capital case, and that she would be able to follow the court‘s instructions not to consider the issue of penalty during the guilt phase and not to consider the relative costs of execution and life imprisonment in deciding the penalty. Moreover, when asked in question No. 9d, assuming she was in the penalty phase of the trial, ―Could you set aside your own personal feelings regarding what the law in this case ought to be and follow the law as the court explains it to you?,‖ the juror answered, ―Yes.‖ When the prosecutor then challenged Juror No. 129 for cause based on her religious beliefs, defense counsel objected: ―I don‘t believe she‘s presented an unwillingness to follow the law.‖ The trial court initially expressed some uncertainty about the juror‘s responses, and the adequacy of some of the questions. With respect to question No. 19 in particular, which asked whether the juror believed her religious beliefs would have a substantial impact on her decision, the court admitted, ―I don‘t think it was a very good question. We probably should have elaborated a little bit on this.‖ Nonetheless — and based solely on the written responses in the questionnaire — the trial court excused the juror, citing only in a conclusory fashion ―a substantial impairment to prevent her ability to be neutral‖ and to ―follow the Court‘s instructions.‖ Reviewing that ruling independently, we conclude the trial court erred. The prosecution, as the party making the challenge, had the burden to establish the juror‘s impairment. (People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 445 (Stewart).) In assessing whether the prosecution carried its burden, the question is not whether 21 the record might reasonably have supported a finding that the juror was unwilling to follow instructions pertaining to the death penalty. Rather, a prospective juror may be discharged for cause solely on the basis of written questionnaire responses only if it is ―clear‖ from those responses that the juror is unable or unwilling to temporarily set aside the juror‘s beliefs and follow the law. (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 781, fn. 11; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 531; see also People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 647-648.) Where a prospective juror‘s written responses are ambiguous with respect to the individual‘s willingness or ability to follow the court‘s instructions in a potential penalty phase, the record does not support a challenge for cause. (Stewart, at pp. 448-449.) The for-cause challenge should not have been sustained on this record. A prospective juror‘s conscientious objection to capital punishment is not by itself a sufficient basis for excluding that person from jury service. (Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Although the juror here also stated that her beliefs would make it ―difficult‖ to vote for execution, we have explained that ―[b]ecause the California death penalty sentencing process contemplates that jurors will take into account their own values in determining whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors such that the death penalty is warranted, the circumstance that a juror‘s conscientious opinions or beliefs concerning the death penalty would make it very difficult for the juror ever to impose the death penalty is not equivalent to a determination that such beliefs will ‗substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror‘ . . . .‖ (Id. at p. 447.) That is especially true here, where the juror affirmed that her personal views would not control her approach to various aspects of the case and that she could set aside her personal feelings and follow the law as instructed by the court. As the People point out, the prospective juror‘s responses also raised the possibility that her religious views could have interfered with her ability to sit as a 22 juror. Indeed, she believed ―[s]omewhat‖ that these views could have a substantial impact on her decision in the case. We need not decide whether these responses alone would have sufficiently buttressed a challenge for cause, though, because we conclude that even if these responses could have been disqualifying in the absence of any contrary responses, the prospective juror‘s other responses in this case also mattered. At most, the prospective juror‘s concerns about the death penalty created an ambiguity when considered together with the juror‘s other responses. (See People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 533 [analyzing the prospective juror‘s written responses ―taken together‖].) Not only did the juror‘s responses indicate that she would not always or automatically reject the death penalty, but she also answered ―Yes‖ to the question that ― ‗directly address[ed] the pertinent constitutional issue‘ in Witt — i.e., whether the prospective juror could temporarily set aside his or her personal beliefs and follow the court‘s instructions in determining penalty.‖ (People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 645.) On voir dire, the juror might have demonstrated that her personal beliefs were of such overwhelming weight that they would substantially burden her ability to fulfill her oath at a potential penalty phase. (See People v. Nunez and Satele (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1, 23-24 [deferring to the trial court‘s resolution of the prospective juror‘s equivocal and conflicting responses on the questionnaire and in voir dire]; People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 48 [―Although her written questionnaire responses were somewhat ambiguous, her answers on oral voir dire made it quite clear that because of her beliefs, she was unwilling to vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, even if this were the most ‗horrible crime in history.‘ ‖].) Alternatively, the juror might have reaffirmed in open court her written response to question No. 9d that she would set aside those views and follow the court‘s instructions. But such further probing never took place, and nothing in the record suggests that the trial court had a clear basis on which to 23 resolve the ambiguity. (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 782.). Accordingly, the juror‘s written responses do not clearly establish that she should have been disqualified. (See Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 448-449.) People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 527 underscores this very point. There, a prospective juror‘s questionnaire revealed ―someone profoundly conflicted as to whether she could ever personally vote to impose the death penalty.‖ (Id. at p. 541.) After identifying herself as Catholic, the juror stated that she did not believe she could send someone to his or her death, that she believed only God had the right to take away life, that the conflict between her beliefs and the efficacy of deterrence was one that she has ― ‗not yet been able to resolve,‘ ‖ but that she would ― ‗err on the side of God.‘ ‖ (Id. at pp. 541-542.) On the other hand, the juror also responded that she could give honest consideration to both penalties, that her views would not cause her automatically to vote against the death penalty, and that she ― ‗would follow the law‘ ‖ — even though she was ― ‗not sure [she] could live with it‘ ‖ and recognized that God would hold her ― ‗accountable‘ ‖ for her acts. (Id. at p. 542.) Because the questionnaire left it ―unclear‖ whether the prospective juror was could or would follow the law, we found that the trial court and counsel then ―appropriately‖ used voir dire to resolve the ambiguity. (Ibid.) The People seek to rely on People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th 491. But that reliance is misplaced. Although the questionnaire responses of Prospective Juror O.D. in that case included an acknowledgement at the outset concerning a juror‘s duty to follow the law and an indication that the juror could set aside his feelings and follow the law, O.D. nonetheless went on to respond that he would, in every case and regardless of the evidence presented, ―automatically vote for something other than first degree murder so as not to reach the penalty phase, automatically vote for a verdict of not true as to the special circumstances alleged so as not to reach the penalty phase, and, automatically vote for life imprisonment without the 24 possibility of parole if there were a penalty phase.‖ (Id. at p. 532.) O.D. also wrote, ― ‗I was taught that there should be no reason to kill and I will continue to think this way.‘ ‖ (Ibid.) In contrast to the situation we encountered in Avila, Prospective Juror No. 129‘s written responses did not clearly reveal personal views that would interfere with her ability to judge the penalty based on the evidence presented. Rather –– as in Duff –– her written responses, at worst, left it uncertain whether she had the ability to perform as a juror. Because those responses did not ―clearly reveal‖ an inability to perform her duties, the trial court erred in granting the prosecution‘s challenge for cause without examining the juror in court to ascertain her true state of mind. (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 782.) When a trial court errs in excusing a prospective juror for cause because of that person‘s views concerning the death penalty, we must reverse the penalty. We do so in this case. (Id. at p. 783; accord, Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 659-667.)
Prospective Juror No. 16, was examined in court after completing the questionnaire. Her written and oral responses conveyed inconsistent views about the death penalty. At first, her questionnaire responses indicated that she had no religious, moral, or personal beliefs that would interfere with her ability to impose the death penalty. Yet when asked for her general feelings about the death penalty, she wrote, ―I don‘t feel that I would be able to take a life‖ and added that the death penalty served no purpose. Although she stated that she would automatically refuse to vote for the death penalty without regard to any aggravating or mitigating factors regarding the crime and the defendant‘s background and character, she said she would change her answer and set aside her views and follow the law if so instructed by the court. On the other hand, when 25 asked if she would be able to follow an instruction not to consider the monetary cost of keeping the defendant in prison for life or executing him, she marked ―No.‖ During voir dire, the juror disavowed her questionnaire response and said she would be able to disregard the monetary cost of keeping defendant in prison or executing him. When asked why she had said otherwise on the questionnaire, she replied, ―Well, I really don‘t feel that I should be — should take — or be a part of taking another person‘s life. [¶] But if the law says you — I have never broken the law in my life, and I don‘t intend to do one now.‖ She also said she would be able to follow the law as well as weigh and consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The prosecutor challenged the prospective juror on the basis of her ―contradictory‖ and ―conflicted‖ answers. He also noted that she was not being forthcoming, that she rolled her eyes upon being called into the jury box, that she seemed ―pretty entrenched in her views‖ — and therefore suspected that she had ―an agenda.‖ Defense counsel admitted that ―there‘s some ambivalence‖ in the juror‘s responses, but argued that she did not exhibit ―the inability to follow the law that I think is required.‖ The trial court agreed with counsel that the juror‘s responses could be viewed as ―equivocal.‖ Based on its finding that the juror‘s true views would ―substantially impair‖ her ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court sustained the challenge. The trial court was able to observe and speak with the prospective juror, so we review its ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 378-379 (Scott).) The juror here stated on her questionnaire that she would not be able to follow the court‘s instruction to disregard the monetary cost of imprisonment or execution in selecting the appropriate penalty. In voir dire, she changed course and said she would be able to follow the court‘s instructions on this topic, connecting her prior answer to her reluctance to be involved with the 26 death penalty. We defer to the trial court‘s resolution of these conflicting responses, because that court had the opportunity to assess the juror‘s tone, apparent level of confidence, and demeanor. (People v. Capistrano (2014) 59 Cal.4th 830, 862.) B. Asserted Error in Denying Defendant‘s Batson/Wheeler Motion Defendant, who is Latino, contends that the prosecutor violated his state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection and a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community by peremptorily excusing two Latino prospective jurors, L.R. and R.C. (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.) The claim lacks merit. The familiar Batson/Wheeler inquiry consists of three distinct steps. The opponent of the peremptory strike must first make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. If a prima facie case of discrimination has been established, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to justify it by offering nondiscriminatory reasons. If a valid nondiscriminatory reason has been offered, the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination. (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168; Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 383.) Because the trial court ruled that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, but did so in reliance on ―the since disapproved ‗strong likelihood‘ standard,‖ we independently review the record then before the trial court to determine whether it supports an inference that the prosecutor excused either of these jurors on the basis of race. (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 698.) Defendant‘s claim of discrimination rested solely on the fact that the prosecutor exercised his first two peremptory challenges against Latino 27 prospective jurors and that defendant was Latino. We have previously recognized that removing members of an identifiable group, where the defendant is a member of that group, is a fact that ―may prove particularly relevant‖ to the first-stage inquiry. (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 384.) But a prima facie case of discrimination can be established only if the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. A court, in particular, may also consider nondiscriminatory reasons ―that are apparent from and ‗clearly established‘ in the record [citations] and that necessarily dispel any inference of bias.‖ (Ibid.) The record in this case clearly establishes nondiscriminatory reasons for excusing Prospective Jurors L.R. and R.C. L.R.‘s questionnaire responses revealed that she had been convicted of shoplifting; that her sister had been convicted of a drug charge and had been incarcerated; and that she strongly disagreed with the proposition that the rights of persons charged with crimes are better protected than the rights of crime victims and that harsh punishment is the best solution to the crime problem. She also stated that she would impose a higher burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a capital case and would require proof ―without doubt‖ that ―the defendant was 100% guilty.‖ The record thus contained a compelling nondiscriminatory justification for excusing L.R. (See Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 385.) R.C.‘s questionnaire responses revealed that she did not ―believe‖ in the death penalty, that she doubted it served any purpose, and that her religious convictions on the topic would interfere with her ability to sit as a juror in a murder case or in a case involving the death penalty. Although she marked ―yes‖ when asked whether she could set aside her personal feelings and follow the court‘s instructions, she also wrote, ―I don‘t believe that another life should be taken and although I don‘t believe in it that I could not rule for it.‖ Despite the 28 responses above, she marked ―no‖ when asked at the end of the questionnaire whether her religious beliefs would have a substantial impact on her decision. In voir dire, R.C. said that she ―probably‖ could get to the point of believing that she ―could‖ impose the death penalty. Nonetheless, she reaffirmed in open court her previous responses that her religious beliefs would interfere with her ability to be a juror in a murder or death penalty prosecution and added that her beliefs were ―firmly held.‖ R.C. recalled that when a co-worker was murdered, she had thought that the murderer ―probably‖ deserved to die. On the other hand, she said, ―I don‘t know that I could get to that point if I was actually involved . . . in the decision.‖ R.C. may have offered inconsistent responses as to her ability to consider the death penalty, but a prosecutor could readily have concluded that her true views were consistent with her confession in voir dire that she had ―never been able to say, ‗Well, he should be dead.‘ ‖ This prospect was sufficient to dispel any inference of discrimination. (Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 385.) The trial court therefore did not err in denying the Batson/Wheeler motion.