Opinion ID: 2834302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Res judicata does not apply when the initial tribunal lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. See Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach , 217 S.W.3d 430, 452−53 (Tex. 2007) . Consequently, we must first address whether TWC had subject matter jurisdiction over Igal’s claim. Igal argues that TWC dismissed his claim because it had no jurisdiction pursuant to section 61.051 of the Texas Labor Code. He maintains that the court of appeals erred by expanding TWC’s jurisdiction beyond the Legislature’s intention, as expressed in Section 61.051. Igal argues that because TWC lacked subject matter jurisdiction, TWC’s decision could not preclude his subsequent lawsuit. The Legislature establishes the jurisdiction of administrative agencies. Igal claims Subsection 61.051(c) limits TWC’s jurisdiction. Subsection 61.051(c) of the Texas Labor Code states that “[a] wage claim must be filed not later than the 180th day after the date the wages claimed became due for payment.” Igal performed his last services for BRBA on January 19, 2000. Two days later, Brightstar informed him that his work group had been discontinued, leaving him without a position at the company. Igal was paid through April 2000 but claimed that because Brightstar terminated him without cause, he was entitled to compensation under his contract through January 19, 2001. He filed his wage claim with TWC on July 17, 2001, seeking wages from May 2000 through January 19, 2001. In its decision, TWC stated: The Commissions’ jurisdiction extends back only 180 days from the filing of the wage claim. Any pay owed to the claimant would have been due well before the beginning of the Commission’s jurisdiction in this case. Therefore, the wage claim was not timely filed and is dismissed. Before this Court, Igal argues that he took TWC at its word that it did not have jurisdiction and therefore filed his wage claim in district court. He contends that the court of appeals expanded TWC’s jurisdiction beyond the 180 days the Legislature intended. In support of his argument that the 180-day filing limitations period is a jurisdictional threshold, Igal cites Texas Employment Commission v. Ortiz . 574 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Tex. Civ . App.—Corpus Christi 1978, no writ). In Ortiz , the court of appeals held that the twelve-day limit for the internal appeals to the administrative appeals tribunal of the Commission was jurisdictional. Id. However, the court in Ortiz did not interpret the statute at issue here. This Court has not directly addressed whether the filing limitations period in Subsection 61.051(c) is a jurisdictional threshold. In Mingus v. Wadley , we held that a party suing on a statutory cause of action must comply with all administrative prerequisites, as a matter of jurisdiction. 285 S.W. 1084, 1087 (Tex. 1926), overruled in part by Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi , 12 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. 2000). “The general rule is that where the cause of action and remedy for its enforcement are derived not from the common law but from the statute, the statutory provisions are mandatory and exclusive, and must be complied with in all respects or the action is not maintainable.” Mingus , 285 S.W. at 1087. In Dubai Petroleum Co. , we overruled Mingus “to the extent that it characterized the plaintiff’s failure to establish a statutory prerequisite as jurisdictional.” 12 S.W.3d at 76. Igal urges the Court to apply Mingus , not Dubai , and hold that a plaintiff’s failure to meet a statutory prerequisite for a wage claim is jurisdictional. However, in Dubai , we discussed the evolution of this area of the law, noting that “[a] lthough Mingus represented the dominant approach when it was decided, ‘the modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 11 cmt . e (1982)). [5] Even before Dubai , we explained that “just because a statutory requirement is mandatory does not mean that compliance with it is jurisdictional.” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Sinclair , 984 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. 1999). Later, in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Loutzenhiser , we elaborated on this distinction, looking to legislative intent to determine whether a requirement is jurisdictional or merely mandatory: The failure of a non-jurisdictional requirement mandated by statute may result in the loss of a claim, but that failure must be timely asserted and compliance can be waived. The failure of a jurisdictional requirement deprives the court of the power to act (other than to determine that it has no jurisdiction), and ever to have acted, as a matter of law. Since the Legislature is bound to know the consequences of making a requirement jurisdictional, one must ask, in trying to determine legislative intent, whether the Legislature intended those consequences. 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex. 2004), superseded by statute , Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034. Although the Legislature subsequently provided that the notice requirement at issue in Loutzenhiser was jurisdictional, [6] the Court’s reasoning remains valid. Whether a filing requirement is jurisdictional is a question of statutory interpretation. Hence, we review the words of the statute. Section 61.051, entitled “Filing Wage Claim,” provides the conditions under which a claimant is eligible for relief. Neither the language of the provision nor the statutory scheme indicates Section 61.051 was intended to address TWC’s jurisdiction. See Thomas v. Long , 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006) (analyzing both express language and the statutory scheme to determine jurisdiction). It establishes a procedural bar similar to a statute of limitations and does not prescribe the boundaries of jurisdiction. [7] The Legislature’s bill analysis supports this reading of Section 61.051. It explains that the provision “[e] stablishes a process by which an employee may file a wage claim with the commission, which can investigate the claim and, if necessary and appropriate, hold an administrative hearing and issue administrative penalties” and “[s] tructures the process and sets specific time lines for the involved parties to act.” House Comm. on Gov’t Org., Bill Analysis , Tex. H.B. 863, at 11, 71st Leg., R.S. (1989) (emphasis added). Section 61.051 outlines the filing process for a Payday Law claim and does not speak to TWC’s jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court has also held that filing limitations periods for administrative complaints are not jurisdictional. In Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , the Court held that the filing limitations period of an EEOC discrimination claim operated like a statute of limitations rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that anyone wishing to challenge an employment practice must first file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), within a specified period of time. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). The Supreme Court held that filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, but rather a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel , and equitable tolling. Zipes , 455 U.S. at 393. The relevant statute in that case “contains no reference to the timely-filing requirement. The provision specifying the time for filing charges with the EEOC appears as an entirely separate provision, and it does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the district courts.” Id. at 393−94. The Court explained that the provision granting federal district courts jurisdiction over Title VII claims does not limit jurisdiction to those cases in which there has been a timely EEOC filing. Id. at 393. Thus, the United States Supreme Court held that even with their limited subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts maintain jurisdiction over Title VII claims, even in the event of an untimely EEOC filing. Id. Similarly, the 180-day filing limitations period in this case is a filing requirement. Following Zipes , the United States Supreme Court continued to distinguish between statements of jurisdiction and mere filing requirements. In Kontrick v. Ryan , the Supreme Court observed that there is “a critical difference between a rule governing subject matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule.” 540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004). In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , the Supreme Court held that the numerosity requirement of fifteen or more employees in a Title VII action was not jurisdictional, but rather an element of the cause of action that could not be asserted defensively after the verdict. 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). The dissent argues that because the order of TWC’s wage claim appeals tribunal used the term “dismissed,” TWC held that it did not have jurisdiction over Igal’s claim. Section 61.052 authorizes a TWC hearings officer to make one of two determinations when making a preliminary wage determination: dismiss the claim or order payment of wages. Tex. Lab. Code § 61.052(a) (“[T]he commission shall analyze each wage claim filed under Section 61.051 and, if the claim alleges facts actionable under this chapter, shall investigate the claim and issue a preliminary wage determination order: (1) dismissing the wage claim; or (2) ordering payment of wages determined to be due and unpaid.”). Under the statute, TWC dismisses claims that are unsuccessful, whether based on jurisdiction or the merits. There is no basis in the statutory language for the dissent’s conclusion that TWC’s “dismissal” of Igal’s claim necessarily signals only a non-merits ruling. The order of TWC’s hearings officer “becomes final 14 days after the date the order is mailed,” unless it is timely appealed to the TWC appeals tribunal. I d. § 61.0614. Igal appealed to the appeals tribunal. The TWC wage claim appeals tribunal may modify, affirm, or rescind the preliminary wage determination order. Id. § 61.059. The appeals tribunal’s dismissal of Igal’s wage claim became final when Igal failed to file an appeal or motion for rehearing. Id. § 61.0614. TWC’s order states that its dismissal of the claim was on two grounds: Igal’s claim failed on the facts and the law, and Igal’s complaint was not timely filed. Although a dismissal in the courts often means the court held that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute, TWC’s procedures are not governed by the procedures for courts of law. It has its own procedures, and TWC is not bound in its administrative processes to use judicial terminology. We interpret the words of the Legislature to have created the 180-day filing limitations period as a mandatory condition to pursuing the administrative cause of action and not as a bar to TWC’s exercise of jurisdiction. TWC’s use of the word “dismissed” in its order does not alter its jurisdiction. TWC had jurisdiction over Igal’s claim. We turn to consider whether res judicata should attach to its final decision.