Opinion ID: 1748630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Second Offense) Conviction

Text: Stewart's final allegation of error challenges the validity of his possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense) conviction and, like the preceding arguments, is unpreserved for appellate review. He first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, again asserting that the Commonwealth's verbal explanation of the prior conviction to the jury was inadequate. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the evidence, when taken in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support the conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense). Stewart also attacks the jury instructions with respect to the possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense) conviction. He claims that the jury instructions were infirm in that they did not require the jury to make a specific finding of his intent or of his prior conviction. The guilt phase instruction regarding the possession of drug paraphernalia charge read, in pertinent part: You will find the Defendant, Kelly Stewart, guilty of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia under this Instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in Fayette County on or about October 6, 2006 and within 12 months before the finding of the Indictment herein, he possessed a set of digital scales; AND B. That when he did so, he knew the digital scales would be used to measure or weigh cocaine. There was no error in this instruction. Under the Commonwealth's theory of the case, KRS 218A.500(2) required the jury to believe that Stewart possessed the digital scales with the intent to use them for the purpose of ... processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, [or] storing ... a controlled substance. The phrase, knew that the digital scales would be used to measure or weigh cocaine, sufficiently embodies the possession with intent to use requirement of the statute. We also note that this portion of the instruction is virtually identical to the specimen instruction recommended by Cooper and Cetrulo, Kentucky Instructions to Juries, Criminal § 9.34B (5th ed.2007). See Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Ky.App.2007). Accordingly, there was no error in the guilt phase portion of the instruction. The penalty phase instructions present a different problem. When a prior misdemeanor conviction is used to enhance a subsequent offense to a felony, as purportedly occurred here, the jury must make the finding with respect to the prior conviction during the penalty phase. See Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 920 S.W.2d 526, 528-29 (Ky.1996) (construing DUI statutes). Here, however, the jury was never instructed to make a finding of guilt regarding Stewart's previous conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia. Rather, the penalty phase instructions simply required the jury to fix the Defendant's punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, in your discretion. There was the element of the misdemeanor conviction missing from the instruction. Neither party asserts that a stipulation as to Stewart's prior conviction was agreed upon, and our review of the record reveals none. While any error in jury instructions is presumptively prejudicial, we have likewise acknowledged that such errors are subject to harmless error analysis, though the Commonwealth bears the burden of this assertion. Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky.2008). Here, the Commonwealth argues that the error was harmless because the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Stewart was previously convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia in 2000. An erroneous jury instruction that omits an essential element of the offense is subject to the harmless error analysis. That test is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error ... did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 2, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). However, harmless error analysis is inappropriate in this case because the error is unpreserved. As we explained in Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Ky.2006): [R]eviewing courts should endeavor to avoid mixing the concepts of palpable error and harmless error. One is not the opposite of the other. The proper inquiry, therefore, is whether the erroneous instruction at hand is a palpable error under RCr 10.26. We have recently been beset by numerous cases posing questions concerning erroneous or defective jury instructions. More especially, we have attempted to create the proper standard in applying the harmless and/or palpable error analysis to these errant instructions. In Commonwealth v. McCombs, 304 S.W.3d 676 (Ky.2009), we deemed as harmless instructions wherein the trial court did not submit to the jury the question as to whether a crowbar was a dangerous instrument. In effect, the trial court held as a matter of law that it was a dangerous instrument. However, the elements given were consistent with the crime charged, i.e., that the burglary was committed with threat of, or while armed with, a crowbar. We held differently, however, in the cases of Carver v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.3d 110 (Ky.2010); and Sanders v. Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 497 (Ky.2010). Carver resulted in a conviction for first-degree persistent felony offender when one of the prior convictions in the instructions was, in fact, a misdemeanor. In Sanders , the jury instruction allowed the crime of possession of drug paraphernalia to be enhanced to a first-degree persistent felony conviction when the statute specifically prohibits such use. We held the instructions in those cases constituted palpable error because they allowed the jury to find the defendants guilty under instructions which, on their face, did not constitute the crimes charged. We find this case falls more under the dictates of Carver and Sanders . An essential element of the defendant being convicted of a prior misdemeanor was missing from the instructions. With that missing element, under the penalty phase instructions given, Appellant could have only been found guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia (first offense)a misdemeanor. See Varble v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 246 (Ky.2004); Cobb v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 455 (Ky.2003). Therefore, with the exception herein noted, we affirm the underlying convictions and the judgment and sentence as to the first-degree persistent felony offender count, but vacate and remand the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia (second offense), for further proceedings, if any, consistent with this opinion. MINTON, C.J.; ABRAMSON, NOBLE, SCHRODER and VENTERS, JJ., concur. SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. SCOTT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Although I concur on the other issues, I must respectfully dissent as to the harmfulness of the drug paraphernalia instruction. Because the evidence of Stewart's prior conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia is uncontroverted and uncontrovertable, I believe the Commonwealth has satisfied its burden of establishing that the instructional error was harmless. In a case such as this one, where a defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted element, answering the question whether the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error does not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee. Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). As, I believe the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the element of Stewart's prior conviction was harmless, no manifest injustice requiring reversal occurred. RCr 10.26.