Opinion ID: 778749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compliance With the Treaty and the Grant of Extradition

Text: 32 Campbell contends that his convictions on the firearms charges should be reversed, and those counts of the indictment dismissed, because the Extradition Treaty does not list firearms offenses within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as extraditable crimes. He also contends that those charges should be dismissed because it was not made clear to the Costa Rican government that the penalties for § 924(c) convictions would be five years for the first conviction and 20 years for every other conviction, to run consecutively to each other, and thus Costa Rica did not knowingly grant the extradition request with respect to those crimes; and he contends that, in any event, his 155-year sentence violates the conditions of the grant of extradition. We reject all of these contentions.
33 It is well established that, under the international principle of specialty, an extradited defendant may not be tried for a crime not enumerated in the applicable extradition treaty. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 424, 7 S.Ct. 234, 30 L.Ed. 425 (1886); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir.1976). However, the question of whether an extradition treaty allows prosecution for a particular crime that is specified in the extradition request is a matter for the extraditing country to determine. See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309, 316, 27 S.Ct. 539, 51 L.Ed. 816 (1907). In Johnson, in affirming the grant of a writ of habeas corpus for the release of a person who had been extradited by the Dominion of Canada for one offense but was imprisoned for a different offense that Canada had held was not an extraditable crime, the United States Supreme Court stated that [w]hether the crime came within the provision of the treaty was a matter for the decision of the Dominion authorities, and such decision was final by the express terms of the treaty itself. Id. at 316, 27 S.Ct. 539. Whether or not express terms in a treaty make the extraditing country's decision final as to whether an offense is extraditable, deference to that country's decision seems essential to the maintenance of cordial international relations. It could hardly promote harmony to request a grant of extradition and then, after extradition is granted, have the requesting nation take the stance that the extraditing nation was wrong to grant the request. 34 Thus, although courts of the United States have authority to determine whether an offense is an extraditable crime when deciding whether an accused should be extradited from the United States, see, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 905-06 (2d Cir.1973), we interpret Johnson v. Browne to mean that our courts cannot second-guess another country's grant of extradition to the United States. Accord United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424, 429 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 773, 98 L.Ed.2d 859 (1988); McGann v. United States Board of Parole, 488 F.2d 39, 40 (3d Cir.1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 958, 94 S.Ct. 1974, 40 L.Ed.2d 309 (1974); see also Casey v. Department of State, 980 F.2d 1472, 1476-77 (D.C.Cir.1992); id. at 1477 ([A]t a minimum, Johnson means that an American court must give great deference to the determination of the foreign court in an extradition proceeding.). Giving the required deference, we will presume that if the extraditing country does not indicate that an offense specified in the request is excluded from the extradition grant, the extraditing country considers the offense to be a crime for which extradition is permissible. 35 In the present case, Costa Rica rendered its decision to extradite Campbell to face all of the charges set forth in the indictment. See Extradition Decree. The indictment included the charges that Campbell had committed offenses in violation of § 924(c). We must infer, therefore, that Costa Rica found the § 924(c) offenses to be extraditable crimes, and we may not second-guess that decision. 36
37 It is also well established that even if the extradition treaty explicitly lists as extraditable crimes the offenses with which a defendant is charged, prosecution on those charges is barred if the extradition request did not list those charges or if the extraditing state declined to grant extradition for those crimes. See Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. at 316-18, 27 S.Ct. 539; United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 159 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d at 944; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d at 905. This principle is reflected both in the Treaty at issue here, see Extradition Treaty, art. IV, 43 Stat. 1621, 1625 (No person shall be tried for any crime or offense other than that for which he was surrendered.), and in the Costa Rican criminal court's decree granting the extradition request, see Extradition Decree (requiring an assurance from the United States that Campbell would not be tried for crimes different from the ones for which this extradition is granted). 38 Although our courts have authority to determine whether a prosecution in the United States for a given crime is within the scope of the extraditing country's extradition decree, see, e.g., United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d at 944 (United States court may determine whether certain offenses which the government seeks to prosecute fall outside the contemplated scope of the foreign sovereign's extradition decree); Fiocconi v. Attorney General, 462 F.2d 475, 480 (2d Cir.) (essential to determine, as best one can, whether the surrendering state would regard the prosecution at issue as a breach of its agreement to extradite the defendant in question), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1059, 93 S.Ct. 552, 34 L.Ed.2d 511 (1972), Campbell's contention that his prosecution on § 924(c) charges went beyond the Costa Rican government's extradition grant is meritless. 39 The United States government's formal extradition request to the Costa Rican government attached a copy of the indictment, which included 11 counts alleging that Campbell violated § 924(c). The supporting affidavit explicitly addressed the § 924(c) counts, inter alia, stating that they charged Campbell with the use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; namely, the various armed bank and post office robberies charged in the superseding indictment (AUSA's Affidavit ¶ 17), outlining what the government would be required to prove to establish guilt on those counts, explaining what the § 924(c) penalties were, and attaching copies of the applicable statutory and sentencing provisions. For example, the affidavit stated that 40 [i]n order to convict ROLAND LAVAR CAMPBELL of the offense charged in those counts, the United States must prove at trial that he knowingly and wilfully, during an [ sic ] in relation to a crime of violence (the various robberies charged in the superseding indictment), used and carried a firearm. The penalty for a violation of Section 924(c)(1) of Title 18 United States Code is a mandatory minimum term of five years imprisonment consecutive to the sentence imposed for the crime of violence for an individual[']s first conviction, and a mandatory minimum consecutive twenty years (20) imprisonment for each subsequent conviction for violating the statute. 41 (AUSA's Affidavit ¶ 17.) 42 Presented with this affidavit and copies of the indictment and the statutory provisions, the Costa Rican Criminal Court granted extradition, and its decision was affirmed on appeal. We thus reject Campbell's contention that the Costa Rican government did not knowingly consent to his extradition to face § 924(c) charges carrying cumulative penalties.
43 Campbell also contends that his 155-year sentence violated the terms of the Costa Rican government's grant of extradition, which included the condition that the United States would not sentence him to a prison term longer than 50 years. Given the record of the communications between the two nations, and the district court's judgment as a whole, we see no violation. 44 In the initial grant of extradition, as translated, the Costa Rican Criminal Court imposed the condition that the United States must promise that Campbell will not receive a sentence of more than 50 years. Extradition Decree. In response to that condition, the United States Department of State promised that Campbell would not be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment greater than 50 years (State Department Note (emphasis added)), and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York gave the assurance that that court would not impose any sentence pursuant to which the defendant would serve a term of imprisonment of greater than fifty years (1997 Order at 2 (emphasis added)). 45 In light of the possible lack of congruence between the phrases will not receive a sentence and will not be sentenced to serve, the United States, following Campbell's conviction, sought clarification as to whether the judgment could permissibly announce a longer term, so long as Campbell's release was guaranteed after no more than 50 years. The Costa Rican government plainly responded in the affirmative. The Costa Rican Ministry stated that 46 the guilty verdict issued in the United States against a person who was extradited from Costa Rica may make reference to the general amount of jail time to be imposed. However, both the dispositive part and the explanation of purposes must establish in a clear and manifest fashion that the maximum sentence to be served is fifty years, as provided by Article 51 of the Costa Rican Criminal Code. 47 (Costa Rican Ministry Letter (emphasis added).) We think it plain that the Costa Rican government's reference to verdict — given its conception of a document that would not only announce guilt but would also impose sentence — was a reference not to the jury's finding but rather to the judgment of conviction. And plainly the Costa Rican Ministry stated that so long as the dispositive part of the judgment made clear that Campbell could serve[] no more than 50 years, the judgment could permissibly make reference to the amount of jail time that would generally be applicable. Our interpretation of the Costa Rican Ministry Letter is confirmed by the language of the accompanying letter from the Costa Rican Consul General, which stated that 48 [T]he verdict in the United States against an extradited person[] can refer to the total years that the accused can be indicted for. Nevertheless, the sentence must state, in a clear and manifest way, that the maximum time the accused must serve is 50 years. This would be the real serving time. 49 (Costa Rican Consul General's Letter (emphasis added).) 50 In accordance with these clarifications, the district court, after announcing a sentence of 155 years, stated that in order to comply with the terms of the Extradition Decree the judgment would be clarified by an accompanying order making clear that Campbell was to serve no more than 50 years of that sentence. The court then attached to the judgment of conviction an order stating that Campbell shall be released after he serves a period of incarceration not greater than 50 years. Judgment Addendum at 2. That order constitutes an integral part of the judgment, and it clearly and dispositively establishes that the maximum sentence to be served by Campbell — his real serving time — is 50 years. Accordingly, the sentence imposed complies with the terms of the Costa Rican government's grant of extradition. 51 Finally, we note that it was well within the discretion of the district court to impose its sentence in the form of a 155-year sentence with an order that exactly 50 years be served, without any diminution for, e.g., good time credits, in order to ensure that Campbell would be incarcerated for the full 50 years permitted by the Extradition Decree. See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1185 (2d Cir.1989) (extradition decree requiring only that the maximum period of imprisonment may not in any event exceed 30 years not violated by judgment sentenc[ing the defendant] to prison for forty-five years but order[ing] that he be released after thirty years (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1138, 107 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1990). 52