Opinion ID: 848615
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prudential Problems with Sewell

Text: As discussed in the previous section, Sewell contradicted the clear legislative directive that  all questions arising under the WDCA are to be addressed within the worker's compensation system. That is a sufficient basis to overturn the decision. [14] But Sewell's shared jurisdiction paradigm implicates other prudential concerns, quite apart from the absence of judicial authority to negate the legislative scheme. Specifically, it fails to accord the proper deference to agency expertise, and thwarts the goal of consistent and uniform decisions by the WCB.
This Court has acknowledged that administrative agencies possess superior knowledge and expertise in addressing recurring issues within the scope of their authority. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co., 465 Mich. 185, 200, 631 N.W.2d 733 (2001). In Mudel v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 462 Mich. 691, 702 n. 5, 614 N.W.2d 607 (2000), this Court explained that the Legislature created a two-tier reviewing process, which delegates to the WCAC the role of ultimate factfinder, while limiting the judiciary to the role of guardian of procedural fairness. Mudel correctly recognized that administrative agencies possess expertise in particular areas of specialization. Because the judiciary has neither the expertise nor the resources to engage in a fact-intensive review of the entire administrative record, that type of detailed review is generally delegated to the administrative body. In the particular context of worker's compensation cases, a highly technical area of law, the judiciary lacks the expertise necessary to reach well-grounded factual conclusions . . . . The judiciary is not more qualified to reach well-grounded factual conclusions in this arena than the administrative specialists. Therefore, the Legislature has decided that factual determinations are properly made at the administrative level, as opposed to the judicial level. [ Id. ] The rationale underlying this Court's decision in Sewell is that resolving the legal question regarding a plaintiff's employment status is not an issue that requires agency expertise. The instant case, however, belies that understanding. Here, three courts have interpreted the same facts three different ways in deciding plaintiff's employment status. The trial court held that plaintiff was not under a contract of hire at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was under a contract of hire, but that he was an independent contractor. Here, the lead opinion concludes that plaintiff was under a contract of hire and was not acting as an independent contractor. This case itself reflects that the legal question regarding the employment status of an injured party for WDCA purposes can be a complicated and highly fact-driven question. For that reason, employment status is best determined first by the administrative agency legislatively charged with applying the WDCA. Even if the Legislature had not clearly directed that all questions regarding application of the WDCA be answered within the worker's compensation system, the pre- Sewell approach simply works best. Allowing the agency to decide first which tribunal has jurisdiction over a claim in which the WDCA is implicated maximizes the strengths of both tribunals. The WCB may apply its expertise to resolve issues of fact in the employment context, while courts, of course, retain appellate review of WCB decisions and resolve questions of law.
The goal of consistent and uniform administrative decision-making is similarly thwarted where multiple forums may decide the same factual question. As we stated in Travelers, supra at 199, 631 N.W.2d 733: [U]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure. [Citation omitted.] Resort to the WCB in the first instance ensures that employment status issues will be resolved in a consistent manner. Moreover, the shared jurisdiction approach established by Sewell suffers from an unconvincing rationale and lack of clarity in application. As Justice Levin aptly opined, there is little reason to assume that employment status determinations are any more fundamental than other questions involved in determining whether a plaintiff's claim sounds in worker's compensation or tort. Sewell, supra at 70, 347 N.W.2d 447 (Levin, J., concurring). Thus, Sewell 's more fundamental rationale for concurrent jurisdiction appears both unprincipled and groundless.