Opinion ID: 2611900
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quasi-Judicial Immunity Caselaw

Text: In the instant case, the superior court dismissed Lythgoe's suit, finding that her claims fell within the recognized scope of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Indeed, with virtual uniformity, courts have granted absolute immunity to persons who perform functions analogous to those performed by Dr. Guinn in the present case. [1] For example, in S.T.J. v. P.M., 556 So.2d 244 (La. App. 1990), a Louisiana appellate court held that psychologists appointed by the court to aid in resolving custody disputes were absolutely immune from liability for the performance of their delegated functions. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that appointed psychologists are non-judicial persons fulfilling quasi-judicial functions and are classified as officers of the court with functions intimately related to the judicial process. Hence, ... they are entitled to absolute immunity protecting them from having to litigate the manner in which they perform those functions. Id. at 247. An Arizona court reached the same result in Lavit v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 96, 839 P.2d 1141 (App. 1992). In Lavit, the parties to a marriage dissolution sought to employ a psychologist to conduct a child custody evaluation. The court adopted the parties' stipulation asking that Dr. Lavit be named to fill the position. Id. at 1142-43. The court eventually incorporated Dr. Lavit's recommendations into its dissolution decree. Id. at 1143. Subsequently, however, the father sued Dr. Lavit, alleging that his evaluation was improperly biased in favor of the child's mother. Id. The appeals court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Lavit, holding that [j]udicial immunity protects a non-judicial officer performing a function pursuant to a court directive related to the judicial process. Id. at 1144. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that [t]he question becomes not how the psychologist was first chosen but whether his activity is an integral part of the judicial process so that to deny immunity would disserve the broader public interest that non-judicial officers act without fear of liability. Id.; see also LaLonde v. Eissner, 405 Mass. 207, 539 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1989) (common law immunity protects persons appointed by a court to conduct medical or psychiatric evaluation and render an opinion or to provide other expert assistance because of their integral relation to the judicial process). The superior court relied principally on Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App.3d 843, 271 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1990), in finding that Lythgoe's claims were precluded by quasi-judicial immunity. As in the cases discussed above, the Howard court held that a psychologist engaged by the court to evaluate the parties to a custody dispute is entitled to the protection of absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Id., 271 Cal. Rptr. at 894. In Howard, the parties to a child custody dispute agreed to hire a licensed psychologist to conduct an independent custody evaluation. As in Lavit, the parties' stipulation regarding the appointment was approved by the trial court and converted into an order. Id. Following the preparation of the evaluation report, the mother sued the psychologist, alleging professional negligence, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. Id. at 894-95. The trial court dismissed the claims. Id. at 896. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, noting that quasi-judicial immunity applied to people connected with the judicial process ... such as (1) mediators, guardians ad litem, therapists, receivers, bankruptcy trustees and other persons appointed by the courts for their expertise and (2) persons whose work product comes into the judicial process to be used by the court even though they were not court-appointed, such as social workers and probation department employees. Id. at 899. The court further noted that the psychologist performed a function intimately related to the judicial process and which involved impartiality and neutrality. Id. at 901-902. Thus, the court concluded that there should be entitlement to the same immunity given others who function as neutrals in an attempt to resolve disputes, such as judges, commissioners and referees. Id. at 902. Based on this analysis, the court held that quasi-judicial immunity is properly extended to these neutral third-parties for their conduct in performing dispute resolution services which are connected to the judicial process and involve either (1) the making of binding decisions, (2) the making of findings or recommendations to the court or (3) the arbitration, mediation, conciliation, evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes. Id. at 903. In the present case, Dr. Guinn was appointed by the superior court to provide professional advice and expertise regarding the custody of Lythgoe's child. Lythgoe's allegations stem directly from Dr. Guinn's role in the custody proceeding. In acting pursuant to her court-appointment, Dr. Guinn served as an arm of the court and performed a function integral to the judicial process. See Seibel, 631 P.2d at 179. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting Dr. Guinn absolute quasi-judicial immunity.