Opinion ID: 2154496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Value

Text: UDC also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of damages for the value of the lost property. It argues that Dr. Vossoughi failed to account for the depreciation of the items he purchased from commercial sources, and that his estimates of replacement cost for the other classes of property were speculative and unreliable. As part of his damages for the conversion and total destruction of his personal possessions, Dr. Vossoughi was entitled to recover the value of that property. Measuring that value was no easy undertaking, particularly because of the specialized and unique nature of Dr. Vossoughi's course materials, research and fabricated instruments (which the trial court aptly described as rather esoteric). Moreover, because the property was lost, it could not be examined. Nonetheless, personal property is not valueless because its value may be difficult to establish or proof of the exact amount of loss is unavailable. [13] An injured party will not be precluded from recovering damages because he cannot prove his exact damages so long as there is a reasonable basis for approximation. [14] Dr. Vossoughi was not required to prove the value of his lost property with mathematical precision, [15] but only with a fair degree of probability, [16] or what we have termed reasonable certainty. [17] Thus, while an award of damages may not be based on speculation or guesswork, it may be a just and reasonable estimate based on relevant data. Probable and inferential considerations as well as direct and positive proof may provide the basis for an award. [18] And the courts quite reasonably have been very liberal in permitting the jury to award damages where the uncertainty as to their extent arises from the nature of the wrong itself, for which the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is responsible. [19] The usual and traditional measure of damages for conversion of property is the fair market value of the property at the time of the conversion. [20] In determining the fair market value of a used item, neither its original cost nor its current price new is definitive, for its condition may have changed, and depreciation must be considered. [21] But fair market value is not always the test. Sometimes fair market value cannot be determined, or would be inadequate, as when, for example, the article destroyed was unique or possessed qualities the special nature of which could only be appreciated by the owner. [22] Accordingly, for purposes of awarding adequate compensation for the destruction of property, value means exchange value or the value to the owner if this is greater than the exchange value.  [23] In general, therefore, [a] person tortiously deprived of property is entitled to damages based upon its special value to him if that is greater than its market value. [24] Where the lost property in such cases is replaceable, it is appropriate to measure damages for its loss by the cost of replacement. [25] UDC does not dispute that replacement cost was an appropriate measure of damages for the destruction of Dr. Vossoughi's course materials, unpublished research and fabricated instruments. As the evidence showed, this property had great use value to Dr. Vossoughi but no comparable (if any) market value. We think the jury could have reached the same conclusion with respect to some of the equipment and materials Dr. Vossoughi had purchased from commercial sources. The fair market value of those used items, like that of second-hand clothing or furniture, may have been so much less than their use value to Dr. Vossoughi that it would be unjust to limit the damages for destroying . . . the articles to the exchange value. [26] As to at least some of the purchased items, however, we agree with UDC that fair market value was the appropriate measure of damages. The trial court correctly charged the jury in accordance with the foregoing principles, and we are satisfied there was sufficient competent evidence to permit the jury to apply them appropriately to each class of property in issue. As to the purchased articles, UDC argues that Dr. Vossoughi merely presented evidence of their original cost without factoring in depreciation. But Dr. Vossoughi testified (at considerable length) to the age, usage and condition of the property, and the court instructed the jury to take those factors into account in addition to the purchase price. We do not think Dr. Vossoughi was obliged to estimate the depreciated value of his purchased items, even if it would have been feasible to do so (which we doubt). The jury had enough information to apply a meaningful discount to the original purchase price, and (unlike in Mahallati [27] ) we cannot find that it failed to do so. As to Dr. Vossoughi's other property (which accounted for the bulk of his claimed damages), UDC does not persuade us that the evidence of its replacement cost was so speculative, flawed, and unreliable that it should never have been submitted to the jury. [28] In essence, Dr. Vossoughi based his estimates of the value of the property on the time it would take him to replicate it. This was a conceptually reasonable approach, not  pace UDC  a mysterious one. [29] UDC complains of the vagueness of Dr. Vossoughi's testimony: for example, his estimates were rough approximations, and he did not specify exactly how he valued his or others' time (he was not asked to do so). But our cases have held that an owner is qualified to estimate the value of his property based on his familiarity with its quality and condition, even if he lacks valuation expertise or hard evidence to support his opinion. [30] In this case, Dr. Vossoughi certainly had the requisite familiarity, and given his experience as a fabricator of instruments, a teacher, a researcher, and a grant recipient, he also had considerable expertise to draw on. His opinions clearly were informed ones. There is nothing to show that his estimates were unrealistic; on the contrary, they were corroborated by Dr. Conway and Dr. Saha. It is true those experts testified without having seen all of the property in question (though they had seen some of it), but such familiarity is not required so long as they had other reasonable grounds for their evaluations. [31] UDC further argues that Dr. Vossoughi's valuation of his course materials was flawed in three respects. First, Dr. Vossoughi admitted his course materials were not salable (Nobody would buy somebody else's [teaching] notes. It's useless [sic] only for that particular class.). But as we have explained, the absence of an exchange value does not mean the course materials had no compensable use value to Dr. Vossoughi. Second, Dr. Vossoughi acknowledged having been compensated by Catholic University or UDC from his teaching salary to prepare the course materials and teach the courses. But this fact does not diminish the value of his course materials to Dr. Vossoughi; if anything, it confirms their value. Third, Dr. Vossoughi used the $100,000 salary of an average tenured professor to value the time he would have to spend to recreate the course materials even though he earned much less than $100,000 when he created the courses and, UDC argues, there was no evidence he could secure a tenured position. But UDC's demonstration that Dr. Vossoughi had earned less than a tenured professor did not eliminate the evidentiary basis for an award of damages for the lost course materials; it merely allowed the jury to place a lower value on Dr. Vossoughi's time and award him less than he sought. (In any event, there was some evidentiary support for Dr. Vossoughi's claimed earning capacity: both Dr. Conway and Dr. Saha lauded his accomplishments as a teacher and researcher, and Dr. Conway testified that the University of Central Florida had considered hiring Dr. Vossoughi at a salary of $130,000.) Finally, UDC argues that Dr. Vossoughi's evidence could not support an award of damages for the destruction of his unpublished research results because he could not describe the research or recall how much time he had devoted to each project over the years. There is force to this argument. Nevertheless, Dr. Vossoughi's testimony about the existence and scope of his lost research projects was corroborated by Dr. Saha and, particularly, Dr. Conway (who was personally involved in some of the lost research). Ultimately, it was for the jury to decide whether to credit Dr. Vossoughi's factual claims. The estimate of $50,000 per lost project was not without evidentiary support. If plaintiffs were obliged to prove the amount of their damages with certainty and exactitude, Dr. Vossoughi's evidence would not pass muster. But definitive and precise proof of damages is rarely possible and not required. Rough justice in the ascertainment of damages is often the most that can be achieved, and it is better than nothing. The evidence need only furnish a reasonable basis for approximation. We conclude that Dr. Vossoughi's evidence met this relatively lenient test and allowed the jury to determine a fair amount of compensation for UDC's destruction of his property.