Opinion ID: 1132521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reasonableness of date of discovery

Text: Prescription commences when a plaintiff obtains actual or constructive knowledge of facts indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is the victim of a tort. Percy v. State, E.A. Conway Memorial Hosp., 478 So.2d 570 (La.App. 2 Cir.1985). A prescriptive period will begin to run even if the injured party does not have actual knowledge of facts that would entitle him to bring a suit as long as there is constructive knowledge of same. Constructive knowledge is whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the injured party on guard and call for inquiry. Such notice is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which a reasonable inquiry may lead. Such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the alleged victim on inquiry is sufficient to start running of prescription. Ledet v. Miller, 459 So.2d 202 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984), writ denied, 463 So.2d 603 (La.1985); Bayonne v. Hartford Insurance Co., 353 So.2d 1051 (La.App. 2 Cir.1977); Opelousas General Hospital v. Guillory, 429 So.2d 550 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). Nevertheless, a plaintiff's mere apprehension that something may be wrong is insufficient to commence the running of prescription unless the plaintiff knew or should have known through the exercise of reasonable diligence that his problem may have been caused by acts of malpractice. Gunter v. Plauche, 439 So.2d 437, 439 (La.1983). Even if a malpractice victim is aware that an undesirable condition has developed after the medical treatment, prescription will not run as long as it was reasonable for the plaintiff not to recognize that the condition might be treatment related. Griffin v. Kinberger, 507 So.2d 821 (La.1987). The ultimate issue is the reasonableness of the patient's action or inaction, in light of his education, intelligence, the severity of the symptoms, and the nature of the defendant's conduct. See Griffin, 507 So.2d at 821. In the present case, the trial court heard the peremptory exceptions of prescription filed by the hospital and Dr. Correa, respectively, in separate proceedings and took evidence in the trial of both. [11] In addition to excerpts from the depositions of Campo, Dr. Olson, and Dr. Correa, Campo's wife, Pamela, testified at both proceedings. Because the facts applicable to Dr. Correa and the hospital overlap, we will combine our analysis of the prescription issue that is based upon the date of discovery, an issue that is common to both defendants. With regard to the hospital, our review of the Campos' original and supplemental petitions shows that the allegations against the hospital primarily focus on whether the hospital environment was a causative agent in Campo's post-operative infection and whether it properly exercised control or failed to properly control Dr. Correa and his employees. With regard to Dr. Correa, the Campos' petitions, original and supplemental, basically allege that Dr. Correa's use of the peritoneal shunt was improper, that he failed to properly evaluate and monitor him, that his follow-up care was inappropriate, and that he allowed at least one of his employees, an unlicensed physician, to treat him during his hospitalization. Relying on the same analysis used by the appellate court, the hospital and Dr. Correa contend that Campo knew in May 1991 that he suffered CSF leakage and subsequently developed meningitis, that he complained of constant pain post-surgery, that he had good results from his first cervical surgery Dr. Correa performed, that there was no continuing relationship between Campo and the hospital after his discharge on May 27, 1991, and that Dr. Correa last treated Campo in October 1991. Although the Campos do not deny these facts, plaintiffs urge that their petition was timely filed against the hospital and Dr. Correa because they had no knowledge of malpractice on the part of Dr. Correa until Dr. Billings told Campo on October 26, 1993, that Dr. Correa's utilization of the peritoneal shunt was improper. [12] Simply stated, the Campos assert that in light of the facts of this case, the defendants failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their inaction was unreasonable. Even though the plaintiffs' petition shows that Campo's last professional visit to the hospital was May 27, 1991, and Dr. Correa's last treatment of Campo was in October 1991, it was incumbent upon the hospital and Dr. Correa to show that their alleged misconduct was either apparent or discoverable before October 1993, the date of Dr. Billings' opinion of malpractice relative to Dr. Correa, [13] and the Campos failed to file suit within one year of that knowledge. From the outset, we find no merit in the contention that Campo should have been put on guard because he had previously undergone cervical spine surgery by Dr. Correa which resulted in almost immediate pain relief. The only testimony on this point is that of Campo. In his deposition, Campo stated that he did not think that Dr. Correa had done anything wrong because he (Dr. Correa) kept telling me it's a totally different surgery; it involved a totally different part of the body; so naturally, it's going to take a different amount of time to heal. [14] We likewise find that neither the hospital nor Dr. Correa can find solace in the fact that Dr. Correa immediately informed Campo that he suffered spinal fluid leakage from a fistula at the myelogram site and that he developed meningitis following the May 1991 surgery implanting the shunt. The jurisprudence is well established that the mere fact there is an injury during or following medical care or treatment is not an indication of substandard care that either the physician or hospital provided. See LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:2794(C); [15] Galloway v. Baton Rouge General Hosp., 602 So.2d 1003 (La.1992) (holding that the mere fact an injury occurs or an accident happens in a hospital raises no presumption or inference of negligence on the part of the hospital); Smith v. Lincoln General Hosp., 27,133 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/21/95), 658 So.2d 256, writ denied, 95-1808 (La.10/27/95), 662 So.2d 3 (holding that the mere fact an injury occurred does not raise the presumption that the physician was negligent). Moreover, the simple knowledge that an undesirable condition has developed at some time after medical treatment does not equate to knowledge of everything to which inquiry might lead. Kavanaugh v. Long, 29,380 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/97), 698 So.2d 730, writ denied, 97-2554 (La.5/15/98), 719 So.2d 67. In the present case, the evidence is unrefuted that Dr. Correa specifically advised Campo before the lumbar surgery that both spinal fluid leakage and infection were possible complications which might be expected as a result of lumbar surgery. Likewise, Dr. Correa once again told the Campos post-surgery the infection and the CSF leak were expected complications of the surgery. Although neither of these conditions were definite to occur, they were nonetheless untoward results Dr. Correa prepared Campo to expect as commonly occurring. [16] Accordingly, we do not find it unreasonable for Campo to view these conditions as common risks of this surgery and further that these conditions alone were insufficient to arouse Campo's suspicion that Dr. Correa had committed medical malpractice. The hospital and Dr. Correa also stress that Campo should have known something was amiss because he suffered constant pain after his low back surgery. The jurisprudence is well established that unsuccessful surgery is not per se an indication of medical malpractice. Gunter, 439 So.2d at 439. Campo further testified that it was his belief that Dr. Correa told him he could experience the same symptoms after surgery that he endured prior to surgery. This court in Griffin, a medical malpractice case, stated that prescription does not run as long as it was reasonable for the victim not to recognize that the condition may be related to the treatment. Griffin, 507 So.2d at 823; (emphasis added). In the present case, even though Campo candidly admitted that his pain continued and even worsened at times, there is no indication in the record that his condition may have been related to Dr. Correa's insertion of the shunt until Dr. Billings' examined Campo on October 23, 1993. [17] In accord Guitreau v. Kucharchuk, 99-2570 (La.5/16/00), 763 So.2d 575. In light of the conversations Campo and Dr. Correa had post-surgery, we do not find that Campo acted unreasonably in failing to recognize that his medical condition may have been related to Dr. Correa's treatment and his hospitalization. To find otherwise would place an undue burden on Campo to have self-diagnosed the cause of his injury. The alternative argument that the defendants urge and the lower courts adopted, namely that Campo should have gotten a second opinion earlier than Dr. Billings', is also without merit. Given the facts of the present case, the standard that the lower courts adopted would require a patient, who had belief and trust in his doctor, to nonetheless get a second medical opinion to confirm/refute the treating physician's course of treatment. Such an approach would clearly undermine the doctor-patient relationship. Accordingly, we find that the hospital and Dr. Correa failed to prove that the Campos' medical malpractice claims against them were prescribed.