Opinion ID: 1242865
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inability to understand legal rights and unsound mind

Text: ¶ 48 In the present case, the court of appeals limited its focus to whether Plaintiff was able to manage her daily affairs and ignored any relevance of the alternative inquiry into her ability to pursue the action the second part of the Allen test. The separate concurrence today takes a similar view. Facts permitting, however, Plaintiff is entitled to have the jury consider both alternatives. The court of appeals erred to the extent that it read Florez as prohibiting any inquiry into the question of ability to pursue a legal action. In Florez, a majority of this court wrote, [t]he focus of the unsound mind inquiry is on a plaintiff's ability to manage his or her daily affairs. It does not focus on plaintiff's ability to pursue the subject matter of the litigation at issue. 185 Ariz. at 525, 917 P.2d at 254. It appears that difficulty in interpreting this language may have given rise to a split in and between the two divisions of the court of appeals with respect to the proper scope of the Allen inquiry as applied in Florez. In Nolde v. Frankie, Division One interpreted Florez in the same manner as the Doe court. 190 Ariz. 422, 949 P.2d 511 (App.1997). The majority opinion reasoned that the touchstone of whether an unsound mind will toll the statute is whether the plaintiff is able to manage his or her daily affairs. Id. at 423, 949 P.2d at 512. However, in Logerquist v. Danforth, Division Two recognized that Florez held in favor of defendants [b]ecause the evidence, demonstrated that both plaintiffs could function on a day to day basis and understood the nature of their legal rights. 188 Ariz. 16, 19, 932 P.2d 281, 284 (App.1996) (emphasis added). ¶ 49 Florez merely reaffirmed our longstanding two-part test of unsound mind. In our discussion, we cited favorably both divisions of the court of appeals: Allen, 21 Ariz. App. 269, 518 P.2d 588; and Nelson v. Nelson, 137 Ariz. 213, 669 P.2d 990 (App.1983). In Allen, of course, unsound mind was defined as being unable to manage his affairs or to understand his legal rights or liabilities. 21 Ariz.App. at 270, 518 P.2d at 589. In Nelson, the court of appeals not only applied the Allen test but also provided some insight into the longevity of this standard in Arizona jurisprudence. The court cited as analogous a very early decision by this court in which incompetency, for purposes of invalidating a testamentary instrument, required that the grantor be incapable of understanding in a reasonable degree and knowing the consequences of the instrument he executes. 137 Ariz. at 216, 669 P.2d at 993 (citing Pass v. Stephens, 22 Ariz. 461, 470, 198 P. 712, 715 (1921)). After relying on both opinions, we expressly agreed with both divisions of our court of appeals. Florez, 185 Ariz. at 525, 917 P.2d at 254. ¶ 50 Moreover, the authorities cited in Florez for the definition of unsound mind support the proposition that unsound mind is evaluated by both management of daily affairs and ability to comprehend legal rights. See id. In O'Neal, for example, the Utah Supreme Court explained that in determining what sort of lack of ability and capacity to protect one's legal rights qualifies for disability protection, courts generally hold that a person is incompetent for the purposes of a provision tolling the statute of limitations `when the disability is of such a nature to show him [or her] unable to manage his [or her] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend his [or her] legal rights or liabilities.' 821 P.2d at 1142 (quoting 51 AM.JUR.2D Limitation of Actions § 187 (1970) (emphasis added)). [16] ¶ 51 The language in Florez must be read with respect to the facts of that case. In Florez, almost all of the plaintiffs' evidence addressed only the first Allen factor of unsound mindmanagement of daily affairs. Nonetheless, the Florez majority considered the alternative Allen factor of ability to understand legal rights, noting that the only real evidence offered showed that the plaintiffs had discussed their potential causes of action with attorneys more than two years before bringing suit. 185 Ariz. at 526, 917 P.2d at 255. The court emphasized that one of the therapists admitted that Moonshadow understood the nature of her legal rights. Id. Thus the only evidence considered by the majority supported the proposition that the plaintiffs were able to understand their rights. The brevity of attention paid to the second Allen factor was thus merely an incident to the factual case presentednot an abandonment of the factor. Indeed, consideration of the plaintiffs' retention of counsel was perfectly consistent with Allen, in which the only factual evidence bearing on the plaintiff's ability to understand his legal rights was the fact that he retained counsel. The Allen court concluded that the fact that [the plaintiff] hired a lawyer within four months after the accident is strong evidence that the plaintiff was aware of his legal rights. 21 Ariz.App. at 270, 518 P.2d at 589. Thus Florez did not overrule Allen and should not be read as a departure from it. ¶ 52 When the facts require the court to focus on the second part of the Allen test, inability to understand and assert legal rights may provide the basis for concluding that the plaintiff was of unsound mind. In the instant case, there is more than enough evidence to withstand summary judgment on the issue of whether Plaintiff was able to understand her legal rights. Depending on when Plaintiff's causes of action accrued, the following evidence may establish a genuine issue of material fact as to tolling: Plaintiff repressed memories of abuse (one cannot understand legal rights with respect to a wrong of which the person was unaware); she was in denial that any abuse took place, was unable to accept that the events had occurred, and was unable to articulate them; she experienced feelings of complicity with her abuser (evidencing, perhaps, that she did not understand that a wrong had occurred); and she experienced feelings of responsibility and guilt for the abuse (same). When she was able to confront her parents about the prior abuse, she was within the two-year limitations period. Moreover, in the present case consultation with an attorney, the single factor evidencing an ability to understand legal rights in both Allen and Florez, occurred within two years of the filing date. Thus the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial judge's award of summary judgment. The facts here create a genuine issue on the second Allen testability to understand and assert one's legal rights.