Opinion ID: 173013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The NLRB's Authority to Act with Two Members

Text: Before we can reach the merits of the unfair labor practice dispute, we must first determine whether 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) authorizes the NLRB to act with only two members under the present circumstances. We apply the familiar Chevron rule of deference to an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1250 (10th Cir.2004) (The FTC's conclusion that [statutory] language authorized it to enact the national do-not-call registry is entitled to deference under the familiar test outlined in Chevron. ); see also Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Miss. ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381, 108 S.Ct. 2428, 101 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ([I]t is settled law that the [Chevron] rule of deference applies even to an agency's interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) for the proposition that considerable weight must be accorded the CFTC's position regarding its statutory authority to decide state law counterclaims in reparations proceedings). Under Chevron, we begin by examining the statute's plain language, giving words their ordinary and natural meaning, to determine if Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir.2009) (quotations omitted). If congressional intent is clear from the statutory language, the inquiry is over, and both the court and the agency must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Id. (quotations and internal citations omitted). If, however, the statutory language is silent or ambiguous regarding the precise question at issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. (quotations and internal citations omitted). A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses. McGraw v. Barnhart, 450 F.3d 493, 498 (10th Cir.2006).
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides, in relevant part: The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.... A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). In December 2007, the NLRB was comprised of four members: Liebman, Schaumber, Kirsanow, and Walsh. On December 28, 2007, in anticipation of the Board's potential paralysis because of the approaching expiration of Kirsanow's and Walsh's terms, the four members delegated all of the Board's authority to Liebman, Schaumber, and Kirsanow pursuant to the first sentence of § 153(b). On December 31, 2007, Kirsanow's and Walsh's terms expired. Their departures left only two members on the Board, Liebman and Schaumber, both of whom were part of the three-member group to which the Board delegated all of its authority. The Board has continued to act with only these two members since that time. The NLRB's construction of § 153(b) and its belief that it is authorized to act under the present circumstances was derived, in part, from a Memorandum Opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of Justice. In that opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that [t]he provision for a two-member quorum ... is an express exception to the requirement that a quorum of the Board shall be three members. Quorum Requirements, 2003 WL 24166831 (Mar. 4, 2003). We are mindful that we are now the sixth circuit court to examine the NLRB's statutory authority to act with two members under the present circumstances. [2] The First, Second, Fourth and Seventh Circuits have all upheld the NLRB's construction of § 153(b) which authorizes the agency to act with only two members if both members were part of a three-member group to which the Board validly delegated all of its authority. See Northeastern Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir.2009); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir.2009); Narricot Indus., L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654 (4th Cir.2009); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir.2009). Although these courts have not followed identical analytical paths, the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits all based their decisions on the plain language of § 153(b). See Northeastern Land Servs., 560 F.3d at 41 (The Board's delegation of its institutional power ... was lawful under the plain text of [§ 153(b)].); Narricot Indus., 587 F.3d at 658-59 (Under the plain and unambiguous text of § 3(b) ... the designated three-member group was empowered to act with a two-member quorum.); New Process Steel, 564 F.3d at 846 (The plain meaning of [§ 153(b)] thus supports the NLRB's delegation procedure.). On the other hand, the District of Columbia Circuit has concluded that the NLRB does not have the authority to act with only two members under the present circumstances. Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469 (D.C.Cir.2009). Significantly, the D.C. Circuit also based its decision primarily on the plain language of § 153(b), focusing on the phrase at all times in the middle of § 153(b)'s three-member quorum provision. See id. at 473 (The quorum provision clearly requires that a quorum of the Board is, `at all times,' three members.) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)). We are hard-pressed in the wake of this split of opinion in our respected sister circuits to find that the statutory language is clear on its face. Indeed, this very split is evidence of [the statute's] ambiguity. In re So. Star Foods, Inc., 144 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir.1998). Accordingly, we proceed to Chevron's second step, under which we must uphold the NLRB's interpretation of § 153(b) if that interpretation is permissible. Although § 153(b) states that three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, that clause is immediately followed in the same sentence by the words, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to [§ 153(b)'s] first sentence .... § 153(b). We find that the NLRB's construction of § 153(b), which reads the phrase except that as modifying the three member quorum provision, and which is consistent with the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits' constructions, is permissible. Therefore, we uphold the NLRB's authority, under § 153(b), to act with only two members, both of whom were part of a three-member group to which the Board validly delegated all of its authority.