Opinion ID: 2982142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: When we sort out the arguments being made here, it is evident that each aspect of the district court’s decision is to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Ale v. TVA, 269 F.3d 680, 692 (6th Cir. 2001) (motion to amend to conform to the evidence under Rule 15(b)); Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 2002) (motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e)); In Re Greektown Holdings, LLC, 728 F.3d 567, 573-74 (6th Cir. 2013) (motion for reconsideration where there is no local rule reviewed under Rule 59(e)). It is an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly apply the law, or use an erroneous legal standard. See Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 619-20 (6th Cir. 2005). Versatile points first to Rule 15(b)(2) as authority for its motion to amend the pleadings after trial. That rule states, in pertinent part: When an issue not raised by the pleadings is tried by the parties’ express or implied consent, it must be treated in all respects as if raised in the pleadings. A party may move—at any time, even after judgment to amend the pleadings to conform them to the evidence and to raise an unpleaded issue. But failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of that issue. Rule 15(b)(2) (emphasis added); see also Ale, 269 F.3d at 693 (noting liberal policy of permitting amendments in order to ensure determination of claims on their merits). The City responded that, by successfully objecting to the motion to amend on the eve of trial, it did not consent to trial of the issue not raised by the pleadings—i.e., damages recoverable for breach of contract in excess of $250,000. Whether or not the issue can be said to have been tried by “consent,” we find it was an abuse of discretion to require amendment of the pleadings as a condition for entry of judgment in the full amount of the verdict under Rule Nos. 12-4239, 12-4475 12 54(c). See, e.g., Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 13 v. United States Gypsum Co., 723 F. Supp. 416, 420 (D.N.D. 1989) (“The pleadings do not limit the amount of the verdict, where the amount is justified by the evidence admitted during trial.”), aff’d 953 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1992).2 Versatile specifically relies on Rule 54(c) in its argument on appeal in support of the claim that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to alter or amend judgment. Rule 54(c) provides that, except in cases of default judgment, “[e]very other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.” The relief need not have been tried by consent, but the only caveat is that the opposing party must have had notice so as not to be prejudiced. Bluegrass Ctr., LLC v. U.S. Intec, Inc., 49 F. App’x 25, 31 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming judgment under Rule 54(c) on new theory of promissory estoppel); see also Powell v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 364 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing cases) (errata corrected 511 F.3d 238). The City’s assertion of prejudice, however, does not rest on an alleged lack of notice as to the extent of the damages Versatile would seek to recover at trial. Nor could it. The record is clear that the Amended Complaint sought the same damages for each of its claims, identified the nature of those damages, and requested damages for costs, expenses, and lost income in the amount of $250,000 plus amounts “in excess” of $25,000. The City conducted 2 Nor did the evidence inject a new and different prayer for relief as in the case cited by the district court. See Born v. Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst., 458 F. App’x 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming the denial of a Rule 15(b) motion at trial to add a demand for punitive damages because it is “‘unfair and substantially prejudicial to permit the injection of a new and different prayer for relief after trial at the very end of the case’”) (citation omitted). Nos. 12-4239, 12-4475 13 discovery with respect to the issue of damages well in advance of trial and does not argue that it was without notice that damages in excess of $250,000 were being sought. Finally, there is no suggestion that the City did not have a full opportunity to challenge the proofs at trial. It was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to alter or amend judgment asking to enter judgment in the full amount of the jury’s verdict in excess of the amount requested on that claim in the prayer for relief. See, e.g., Miller v. Dist. of Columbia, 479 A.2d 329, 331 (D.C. App. 1984) (citing federal decisions for proposition that Rule 54(c) has diminished or eliminated the significance of the prayer for relief); Bail v. Cunningham Bros., Inc., 452 F.2d 182, 188-89 (7th Cir. 1971) (affirming judgment in excess of the demand even though plaintiff’s pretrial motion to amend the ad damnum clause had been denied); Riggs, Ferris & Geer v. Lillibridge, 316 F.2d 60, 62-63 (2d Cir. 1963) (affirming entry of judgment in an amount greater than requested in the ad damnum clause).