Opinion ID: 1269651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sanctioning Mendez's Counsel for Failure to Appear

Text: After trial, the district court imposed a $500 sanction personally on one of Mendez's attorneys, Arturo J. Gonzalez, Esq., for failure to appear at an order to show cause hearing. The local rules for the Central District of California expressly reserve the district court's inherent power to maintain control over the proceedings conducted before said judge, and state that [m]isconduct of any attorney in the presence of a court or in any manner in respect to any matter pending in a court may be dealt with directly by the judge in charge of the matter. C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-3.1.12. Although the district court did not specify the authority for its order, we can deduce the source of its power for purposes of our review, and in this case it is clear that the court sanctioned Gonzalez in an exercise of its inherent power to protect[ ] the due and orderly administration of justice and maintain[ ] the authority and dignity of the court. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). We review the district court's entry of sanctions for abuse of discretion. See id. With respect, we must conclude that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction without making an express finding of bad faith, and by sanctioning Gonzalez for failing to appear at a hearing when he did not have notice that his personal appearance was required. We therefore reverse and vacate the sanction order.
The genesis of the sanctions came during trial, when the district court admonished Gonzalez for seeming to repeat a question during his examination of a hostile witness, after the court had ruled the question argumentative. [4] Once the jury was dismissed, the court said it was inclined to cite Gonzalez for contempt for having disobeyed its ruling sustaining the objection. The court asked Gonzalez to respond in papers by the following Monday, but told him that [a]t this point there's an [order to show cause] re sanctions for contempt set for the end of trial. In his declaration, Gonzalez explained that he is a partner at Morrison & Foerster and chair of his firm's Trial Practice Group, with 20 years of litigation experience before federal and state courts. He explained that when a trial objection is sustained, it is his practice to make a quick and good faith judgment call on how to rephrase the question so as to elicit the desired information in a way that is not objectionable. In this case, he believed he had done so by removing the argumentative aspect from the objectionable question, and noted that defense counsel did not object to the reformulated question. The court did not respond to Gonzalez' declaration, but approximately two weeks later, when setting a date for argument on various post-trial motions, advised counsel that the hearing would include argument on OSC's as well. [5] On the date of that hearing, Tony West, Gonzalez's co-counsel and partner from Morrison & Foerster, appeared but Gonzalez did not. In response to the court's question about Gonzalez' absence, West said Gonzalez was available by telephone if the court had any questions that were not adequately addressed by his declaration, but that Gonzalez had a longstanding commitment that he could not easily get out of, teaching a legal practice course. West averred that Gonzalez has every confidence in my ability to represent him, to which the district court replied, technically, the contempt is against him; therefore, I'm not sure you represent him. The district court did not resolve the contempt citation at this hearing, but two days later issued a second order to show cause, this time regarding Gonzalez' failure to appear at the hearing. Gonzalez submitted a further declaration in response to the second order to show cause and also personally appeared at a hearing held three weeks later. The court expressed its view that a contempt citation is addressed not to the party, but to the counsel personally, and that therefore Mr. West could not purport to represent you personally. The court suggested that even Gonzalez' own declarations were not properly filed with the court because he had not entered his own appearance in pro per. Gonzalez told the court that he was surprised to learn, if it indeed is the case, that when a court makes a request, such as the court did, that a lawyer has to actually either obtain counsel or make a formal appearance in pro per. Just never knew that, to be candid with you. Gonzalez explained that he did not appear at the previous hearing because he thought his declaration would satisfy the court and that it would be best for West to represent him. At the end of the hearing, the court decided not to cite Gonzalez for contempt based on his repetition of the question during trial examination. The court did, however, impose a $500 sanction personally on Gonzalez for failure to appear at the order to show cause hearing, stating that the court found it difficult to understand how you could not believe that on a contempt you would be required to be here. Gonzalez paid the sanctions directly to the court and brought this appeal.
The district court's authority to impose sanctions under its inherent powers is broad, but not limitless. Before awarding sanctions under its inherent powers ... the court must make an explicit finding that counsel's conduct `constituted or was tantamount to bad faith.' Primus, 115 F.3d at 648 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 767, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980)). A finding of bad faith may be appropriate when, among other things, a party engages in behavior that has the effect of delaying or disrupting the litigation or hampering enforcement of a court order. Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted). We have emphasized, however, that [t]he bad faith requirement sets a high threshold. Id. Even in a case where the district court described a litigant's arguments as totally frivolous, outrageous and inexcusable and called his behavior appall[ing], we nonetheless refused to equate this characterization of conduct as synonymous with a finding of bad faith. See id. Here the district court said only that it found it difficult to understand that Gonzalez would not have known his personal appearance was required. This does not suffice as a finding of bad faith, nor is this a case where bad faith is so patent that we will infer the necessary finding. Id. We are also troubled by the district court's failure to give Gonzalez notice that his personal appearance was required at the first order to show cause hearing. A district court may not sanction an attorney under its inherent powers if there is nothing in the local rules or norms of professional conduct which would have placed [the attorney] on reasonable notice that his conduct was not in conformance with the court's requirements. See In re Richardson, 793 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir.1986). Although the district court suggested that the contempt proceeding was an entirely separate action such that Gonzalez should have known to enter a formal appearance of counsel on his behalf, courts frequently impose sanctions against clients as well as attorneys for their counsel's misbehavior before the court. See, e.g., Lasar v. Ford Motor Co., 399 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that the district court imposed monetary sanctions against both client and attorney for counsel's bad faith actions). Earlier in the litigation, the court had in fact issued to both sides an order to show cause for sanctions for a possible violation of a court order regarding a settlement conference. See n. 5 supra. That OSC did not purport to run against any of the attorneys personally, although individual attorneys might have been to blame for any error. Accordingly, Gonzalez could reasonably have believed  before being informed otherwise by the court  that the order to show cause was not necessarily a separate action against him personally, such as to require him to obtain his own counsel and to appear himself. With this understanding, it would not have been unreasonable for him to believe he could rely on another member of his trial team who was appearing to argue the other post-trial motions in Mendez's case. To the extent the district court was focused on punishing Gonzalez for his trial misbehavior, it was incumbent on the court to give him fair notice of that personal exposure and obligation to appear in person. See generally F.J. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1137-39 (9th Cir.2001) (discussing levels of due process required in contempt and sanctions proceedings). Although we agree that Gonzalez should have, as a matter of good practice and courtesy, either attended the hearing or informed the court of his unavailability, we cannot find that the court's orders unambiguously communicated to Gonzalez that his presence was necessary and his co-counsel could not represent him. Absent such notice, Gonzalez could not have acted intentionally and in bad faith to circumvent the court by failing to appear at the first OSC hearing. We recognize that district courts enjoy broad power to award sanctions against attorney misconduct and that it is important for courts to have sufficient tools to control the behavior of litigants in their courtrooms. See Primus, 115 F.3d at 649. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that [b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and discretion. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764, 100 S.Ct. 2455. Sanctions not only may have a severe effect on the individual attorney sanctioned, potentially damaging the attorney's career, reputation and livelihood, but they also may deter future parties from pursuing colorable claims. Primus, 115 F.3d at 650. Because the district court did not make a bad faith finding before imposing sanctions, and the record does not support such a finding, we must reverse and vacate the sanction order.