Opinion ID: 152718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attempted Kidnapping

Text: Sanchez also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted kidnapping. To obtain a conviction for an attempt crime, the government must prove that the defendant intend[ed] the completed crime and t[ook] a `substantial step' toward its completion. United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). Sanchez claims the evidence is insufficient on both elements, but we have already explained why the evidence was sufficient to establish that Sanchez intended to kidnap Vega and Jimenez. The remaining question is whether the government proved that Sanchez took a substantial step toward completing this crime. A substantial step is `some overt act adapted to, approximating, and which in the ordinary and likely course of things will result in, the commission of the particular crime.' Id. (quoting United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 988 (2d Cir. 1980)); see also United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir.1985) (noting that a substantial step is an overt act strongly corroborative of the firmness of the defendant's criminal intent (quotation marks omitted)). It is something more than mere preparation, but less than the last act necessary before the actual commission of the substantive crime. United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.2000). The line between mere preparation and a substantial step is inherently fact specific; conduct that would appear to be mere preparation in one case might qualify as a substantial step in another. See United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1199 (7th Cir.1997). Although there is no easy way to separate mere preparation from a substantial step, we are guided by two general principles. First, a substantial step must be something that makes it reasonably clear that had [the defendant] not been interrupted or made a mistake ... [he] would have completed the crime. Gladish, 536 F.3d at 648; see also United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir.2003) (To determine whether conduct is preparation or an attempt, a court must assess how probable it would have been that the crime would have been committedat least as perceived by the defendanthad intervening circumstances not occurred.); Barnes, 230 F.3d at 315 (noting that a substantial step occurs where events ha[ve] moved beyond the preparation stage and would have resulted in the completed crime but for the government's intervention). Second, we have said that the focus is on the actions already taken to complete the underlying crime, not on the acts that remain uncompleted at the time of the arrest. See Barnes, 230 F.3d at 315. The evidence of Sanchez's conspiratorial conduct in this case was strongly corroborative of his firmness to carry out the kidnapping plot. He explained in recorded conversations that he had secured a safehouse in Joliet and arranged for the cooperation of the Mexican drug cartel indeed, he had traveled to Mexico and back in furtherance of this aspect of the plot. In Sanchez's final meeting with Francisco Jimenez, he approved the van as meeting his specifications for use in the kidnapping and offered a detailed description of additional logistics of the scheme. This is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the kidnapping plot had progressed well beyond the planning stage. To be sure, the kidnapping was not imminent at the moment Sanchez was arrested; he said he would need a week to secure license plates for the van. But it is clear that Sanchez was fully committed and well along the way to putting the kidnapping in motion. Sanchez insists nonetheless that he has been convicted of a thought crimethat the taped conversations reveal only mental preparations from which the jury could infer at most that he was all talk and no more. We have said that [t]reating speech ... as the `substantial step' would abolish any requirement of a substantial step. Gladish, 536 F.3d at 650. The Fourth Circuit has also expressed a similar view: [W]ords and discussions would usually be considered preparations for most crimes. Pratt, 351 F.3d at 136. But the government's case here went well beyond words and discussions and included evidence of concrete actions Sanchez took toward the completion of the kidnappingincluding securing the safehouse and traveling to Mexico to enlist the assistance of the drug cartel. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to sustain Sanchez's conviction for attempted kidnapping.