Opinion ID: 1793795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Four Corners Doctrine and Leon Good Faith Exception

Text: First, if we are limited to considering the four corners of the affidavit supporting the issuance of the February 4, 1998, search warrant, our analysis would be limited to the February 4 affidavit. As we have already determined, the February 4 affidavit did not contain any information concerning the reliability of the informant. We have previously held that a search warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit which lacks any evidence as to the reliability of the informant upon whose information it relies is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. State v. Reeder, 249 Neb. 207, 543 N.W.2d 429 (1996), citing with approval State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999). See, also, U.S. v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116 (4th Cir.1996). Therefore, if we are to adhere to Parmar, we would be forced to conclude that the police did not act with good faith in this case. Such a conclusion would not, however, be consistent with the rationale in Leon. A review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and eventual execution of the warrant indicates that the Fourth Amendment violation in this case was the result of judicial error, not police error. Had the judge issued a new warrant on February 7, 1998, when presented with additional information by the police (assuming that the informant's tip was not stale by tat time, an issue that was not raised and that we do not address), no Fourth Amendment violation would have occurred. Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Thus, courts have held that when assessing the objective reasonableness of officers' executing a warrant, an appellate court must look to the totality of the circumstances, including information that was not presented to the issuing judge. U.S. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1258 (8th Cir.1996). See, also, U.S. v. Taxacher, 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied 499 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 1307, 113 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991); U.S. v. Martin, 833 F.2d 752 (8th Cir.1987). Evaluation of the totality of the circumstances when conducting a Leon good faith analysis is consistent with the purposes underlying the exclusionary rule and the good faith exception. U.S. v. Taxacher, supra . The purpose of the Leon good faith exception is to limit the application of the exclusionary rule to those instances when it will most effectively serve to deter police misconduct. Because this purpose is best served by viewing all of the circumstances surrounding the issuance and execution of the warrant, we conclude that in assessing the good faith of an officer's conducting a search pursuant to a warrant, an appellate court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the warrant, including information not contained within the four corners of the affidavit. We emphasize that this conclusion in no way conflicts with the limitations placed upon an appellate court's evaluation of probable cause. Whether the police acted in objectively reasonable good faith is `an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.' United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Thus, when evaluating probable cause, we continue to adhere to the rule restricting appellate courts to the consideration of the information and circumstances contained within the four corners of the affidavit. State v. Johnson, 256 Neb. 133, 589 N.W.2d 108 (1999).