Opinion ID: 772626
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Good-Faith Compliance

Text: 44 The magistrate judge concluded that Appellants had complied in good faith with past federal desegregation decrees, as required by Dowell and its progeny. 498 U.S. at 249-50, 111 S.Ct. at 638. The magistrate judge's conclusion was based largely on the testimony given during the 7-day evidentiary hearing by a variety of witnesses, including inter alia: Dr. Walter Sickles, the school superintendent from 1989 to 1996; Dr. Earl Lennard, the school superintendent as of 1996; five members of the school board; Doris Reddick, the chair of the school board; Andrew Manning, the lead plaintiff in the case since its inception; and Joanna Tokley, the president and CEO of the Urban League. 45 Dr. Sickles, who had been an employee of the school board since 1969, testified that he believed the school district was unitary in the early 1990's. Dr. Sickles did not seek a declaration of unitary status at that time because he believed Appellees would have opposed and impeded his effort to establish middle schools, which was his top priority. Instead, Dr. Sickles sought Appellees' cooperation in establishing middle schools via the Task Force Report and the 1991 Consent Order. Dr. Lennard, an employee of the school board since 1964, testified that he felt a moral and legal obligation on the school system to continue a desegregated school system. Five school board members expressed no misgivings about ... the intent and ability of the School Board to continue a desegregated school system while receiving input from all members of the community. 46 Some witnesses voice[d] concern about what might happen in the future if [c]ourt supervision ended. For instance, Ms. Reddick, the chair of the school board, testified against a finding of unitary status. Nevertheless, when asked by Appellees' counsel what would happen if the school district were found unitary, Ms. Reddick asserted, [W]e're going to guarantee that students will receive equal education. 47 The magistrate judge found that for more than 25 years Appellants had complied with the court's orders to desegregate and that not once had Appellants been found in violation of any court order. In addition, the magistrate judge noted that Appellants had regularly conferred [with Appellees] ... to ensure that the school system was moving forwards, not backwards, toward compliance with the [c]ourt's orders. Accordingly, the long history of compliance with the [c]ourt's orders outweighed the opinions and the anecdotal evidence offered by [Appellees]. In sum, the magistrate judge concluded, The testimony of ... most School Board members, as well as the current superintendent and those responsible for various facets of school operation[,] demonstrates that [Appellants] have accepted the principle of racial equality and will not revert back to a dual school system. 48 The district judge, however, did not adopt this finding of good faith. Since the district judge did not observe any of the testimony from the evidentiary hearing, naturally she could not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. Instead, the district judge's finding of bad faith centered upon two interrelated areas of concern: Appellants' apathy and the lack of a majority-to-minority (MTM) transfer program. 21 See Manning, 24 F.Supp.2d at 1293, 1312-14. 49 With regard to Appellants' apathy, the district judge faulted Appellants for not utiliz[ing] all available techniques [to desegregate] to the maximum extent practicable and for not demonstrating that they [were] willing to aggressively desegregate the school district to the maximum extent practicable. Id. at 1312, 1335. Additionally, the district judge spoke of missed opportunities and a failure to take affirmative steps ... to be released from the [c]ourt's supervision. Id. at 1312; accord Manning 28 F.Supp.2d at 1359 (citing Lockett v. Bd. of Educ. of Muscogee Sch. Dist., 92 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir.1996) (Lockett I)). Nevertheless, after a request by Appellants to clarify exactly what steps should be taken to desegregate to the maximum extent practicable, see id. at 1355, the district judge declined to give any specifics. 50 Related to the issue of apathy is the inaction demonstrated by Appellants in their MTM program. As previously noted, the July 1971 Order directed the establishment of an MTM program. See supra Part I.B.1. Under this program, a student who attended a school where his race was the majority would be permitted to transfer to a school where his race was the minority. At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. John Miliziano, who was Appellants' in-house desegregation expert, expressed ignorance about the requirement to implement an MTM program: 51 I dealt with the Biracial Committee for many years, and no member of the committee ever brought that up. And to tell you the truth, I thought it was one of those things that was considered by the court and it was never meant to apply. It wasn't until recently that I, a person who has spent many, many years in dealing with the court order, maybe it's stupidity on my part, but I didn't even know that this hidden clause-this clause, not hidden, but this clause in the [July 1971 Order] meant really anything. 52 Manning, 24 F.Supp.2d at 1313. The evidence also showed that, from 1977 to 1996, no student had ever applied for an MTM transfer, and Appellants had not made any effort to publicize or market the MTM program. See id. at 1314; Manning, 28 F.Supp.2d at 1359. 53 While faulting Appellants on the MTM program, the district judge acknowledged that the July 1971 Order did not specifically direct [Appellants] to market the [MTM] program. Manning, 24 F.Supp.2d at 1314. Furthermore, the district judge noted (and did not dispute) that no member of the Bi-Racial Committee and no representative of Appellees had complained, prior to the mid-1990's, about the non-availability of an MTM program. See id. at 1313 (quoting testimony of Dr. Miliziano). The district judge also found that when Appellees did raise the lack of an effective MTM program, Appellants announced the program to the [school] district as a whole and ... took action to publish information about the program. Id. at 1312. 54 Although the district judge stated that an MTM program is an indispensable remedy and a useful part of every desegregation plan, 22 id. at 1314, the district judge did not explain why this particular MTM program was needed to desegregate the Hillsborough County school district. In fact, as previously mentioned, Dr. Stevens-Appellees' expert who was involved in the negotiations that led to the 1991 Consent Order-conceded that an MTM program would not significantly impact the race ratios at the schools Appellees were challenging as racially imbalanced. Furthermore, the Task Force Report and the 1991 Consent Order (both of which were approved by the district judge) failed to even mention the MTM program. Lastly, notwithstanding the criticism of the MTM program, the district judge spoke favorably of Appellants' overall desegregation efforts. See, e.g., id. at 1287 (stating that [u]ndoubtedly, [Appellants'] desegregation efforts demonstrate significant success); id. at 1311 (stating Appellants deserve acknowledgment for their desegregation efforts thus far); id. at 1312 (noting Appellants have been relatively successful in implementing desegregation techniques); id. at 1325 (finding Appellants had acted in good faith with respect to faculty desegregation and commending Appellants for taking recommendations from the Minority Recruitment Task Force).