Opinion ID: 2175297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Authority of the City Council to Enact Ordinance 926.

Text: The declaration of emergency in § 1 (a) of the ordinance states: [a] serious public emergency continues to exist in the City of Cambridge with respect to the housing of a substantial number of its citizens, as declared by Chapter 36 of the Acts of 1976, for the reasons stated in the Act. The emergency has worsened since 1976 because of the removal of a substantial number of rental housing units from the market by condominium conversion, demolition, and other causes. The plaintiffs do not contest that the city council could reasonably have made these findings, and they likewise do not contest that the city council could reasonably have concluded that the challenged provisions of the ordinance would alleviate these conditions. In the declaration of emergency in § 1 of c. 36, the Legislature found that unless residential rents and eviction of tenants are regulated and controlled, such emergency and the further inflationary pressures resulting therefrom will produce serious threats to the public health, safety and general welfare of the citizens of Cambridge.... Chapter 36 itself provides restrictions on evictions from controlled rental units, and it expressly states that [r]ecovery of possession in order to convert an apartment unit to a condominium unit shall not be a valid reason to recover possession of a controlled rental unit. § 9 ( a ) (10). The ordinance provides additional restrictions, all consistent with c. 36. [5] The plaintiffs' contention, though, is that the city council lacked authority to enact the ordinance. It is beyond question that c. 36 enables Cambridge to control rents and evictions. In addition to the express powers [6] conferred by c. 36, however, certain powers are implied. When analyzing a grant of power to a municipal government we must keep in mind that a grant of an express power carries with it all unexpressed, incidental powers necessary to carry it into effect. 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 64.02 (4th ed. 1974). This doctrine has been applied, albeit in a slightly narrower fashion, in earlier cases in the Commonwealth. See Higginson v. Treasurer & School House Comm'rs of Boston, 212 Mass. 583, 585 (1912); Cambridge v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 357 Mass. 183, 185 (1970). It appears that this doctrine has been expanded in its recent applications in other jurisdictions. See generally Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake Corp., 609 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1980) (cities have powers expressly set forth and those necessarily implied therefrom which are essential to carrying out duties and purposes of city government); Port of Seattle v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 92 Wash.2d 789 (1979) (in addition to those powers necessary or fairly implied in or incident to express powers, grant of power includes those powers essential to the declared objects and purposes of municipal corporation); Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hinesburg, 135 Vt. 484 (1977) (municipality has those powers and functions specifically authorized by Legislature as well as such additional powers and functions as may be incident, subordinate or necessary to exercise of express powers). In order to determine whether the city council was empowered by c. 36 to enact the ordinance, we must decide whether the city's ability to regulate the removal of rental housing stock from the market is an unexpressed, incidental power necessary to carry [c. 36] into effect. We conclude that it is. If the power to control rents is to be anything more than an interim measure effective for only the short period needed to convert the entire rental housing stock, it must include by implication the power to make reasonable regulations governing removals from the rental housing market. It is no coincidence that many cities facing the most serious conversion problems are rent controlled cities, and as the rent control movement spreads, condominium problems are likely to follow. Comment, The Condominium Conversion Problem: Causes and Solutions, 1980 Duke L.J. 306, 312. In 1979 there were 20,115 controlled rental units in Cambridge. In the seven-year period 1970 to 1976, inclusive, condominium master deeds were filed with respect to a total of 445 residential rental units. The conversion rate escalated, however, from January 1, 1977, to August 13, 1979, the effective date of the ordinance. In this thirty-one month period condominium master deeds were filed with respect to 1,554 residential units: 80.6 per cent of these units were subject to rent control. Thus, immediately prior to the passage of the ordinance, conversion of controlled rental housing was sharply reducing the supply of affordable rental housing in Cambridge, housing which c. 36 was expressly designed to conserve. Even if the conversion rate did no more than level off, the power conferred by c. 36 to control rents would steadily and irreversibly be transformed into the power to control nothing. The power to control rents and evictions is not so illusory that it does not comprehend the right and responsibility of preventing removals from its reach. We conclude that the power to control removals from the rental housing market is essential to the operation of c. 36, and is therefore conferred by implication in the rent control statute.