Opinion ID: 172534
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Brady v. Maryland Violation

Text: Mr. Williams asserts that his due process rights, as explained by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland , were violated when certain Internal Affairs files pertaining to Officer Henderson were not produced. Specifically, he asserts that the Brady violation was that the Government... failed to produce ... the entirety of the available record about Officer Henderson's ethical lapses. Appellant's Br. (08-5117) at 20. He also asserts that the district judge was required to hold an in camera inspection of Officer Henderson's Internal Affairs files to determine if they contained Brady material. We disagree. The prosecution's suppression of evidence favorable to the accused, including impeachment evidence, violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1162 (10th Cir.2009) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194). We review de novo claims that the prosecution violated Brady, including the determination of whether suppressed evidence was material. United States v. Hughes, 33 F.3d 1248, 1251 (10th Cir.1994). To establish a Brady violation, the defendant must prove that the prosecution suppressed evidence, the evidence was favorable to the defense, and the evidence was material. Erickson, 561 F.3d at 1163. Evidence is material under Brady only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Velarde, 485 F.3d 553, 559 (10th Cir. 2007). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. To make the materiality determination, we view the suppressed evidence's significance in relation to the record as a whole. Hughes, 33 F.3d at 1252. Here, the Government did not commit a Brady violation, nor did the district judge commit reversible error by failing to order an in camera inspection of Officer Henderson's Internal Affairs files. Mr. Williams has not made even a plausible showing that the Internal Affairs files will produce material evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 245 (5th Cir.2002) (holding that a defendant seeking an in camera inspection to determine whether a particular source contains Brady material need only make a plausible showing that the file will produce material evidence); Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 301 (3d Cir.2001) (A defendant seeking an in camera inspection to determine whether files contain Brady material must at least make a `plausible showing' that the inspection will reveal material evidence.). There is no indication that any of the information contained in Officer Henderson's Internal Affairs files relates to Mr. Williams's case. And even if additional documentation regarding Officer Henderson's ethical lapses is included in the absent files, thereby damaging Officer Henderson's credibility in general, overlapping and equally damaging testimony was provided by other witnesses. At trial, Officer Henderson testified to the discovery of the cocaine at Mr. Williams's house on July 27, 2004, and to the discovery of the cocaine in Mr. Williams's car on October 5, 2004. He further testified that Mr. Williams admitted during his July 27, 2004, interview that the drugs found in his house were his and that he sold drugs. Moreover, Officer Henderson testified to the discovery of the firearm at Mr. Williams's house and testified that Mr. Williams admitted to owning the gun found at his house. In addition, trial testimony indicated that when Officer Henderson arrested Mr. Williams on October 5, 2004, he recovered a driver's license reflecting a birth date of February 27, 1975, and helped prepare an arrest and booking sheet that included a social security number and Mr. Williams's fingerprints. Officer MacKenzie testified to the discovery of the cocaine at Mr. Williams's house. Officer Smith testified that Mr. Williams admitted to owning the cocaine found at his house and the cocaine found in his car. Further, Officer Sherman, Officer Smith, and ATF Special Agent McFadden all testified that Mr. Williams admitted to distributing cocaine. Officer Sherman testified that he was present at Officer Henderson's interview of Mr. Williams, and during that interview Mr. Williams indicated that he intended to sell the cocaine found at his residence. Officer Smith testified that Mr. Williams stated that he was fronted the cocaine that was found in his car. ATF Special Agent Brandon McFadden testified that Mr. Williams admitted distributing crack cocaine. In addition, Mr. Williams himself testified that he owned the firearm found at his residence. Moreover, Mr. Williams confirmed that the birth date collected by Officer Henderson and present on the copies of the previous felony convictions the Government sought to prove belonged to Mr. Williams was his correct birthday. He also claimed that his social security number was the same as the social security number collected by Officer Henderson and present on the copies of the previous judgments, except for the last digit. Moreover, Mr. Williams was linked to his penitentiary packet not only by the fingerprints collected by Officer Henderson, but also by photographs contained within that packet that Mr. Williams admitted were of him. We are convinced that even if additional credibility-damaging material had been discovered in Officer Henderson's Internal Affairs files and presented at trial, the result of Mr. Williams's case would have been the same. Therefore, the Government did not violate Brady v. Maryland , nor did the district judge err by not inspecting the withheld materials in camera.