Opinion ID: 1886376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Proving Gross Misconduct

Text: As we noted above, the District of Columbia regulations require the employer to prove each element of gross misconduct. 7 DCMR § 312.2; The Washington Times, 724 A.2d at 1218. Evidence by the employer of repeated absence or tardiness following repeated warnings may establish a prima facie case of gross misconduct. But when the employee proffers evidence suggesting that such actions were sufficiently excusable to negate wilfulness or deliberateness, the burden shifts back to the employer to disprove such evidence. The ultimate burden of showing misconduct is always on the employer. Larry, 973 A.2d at 183 n. 4. The EPA made a prima facie showing that Ms. Morris engaged in gross misconduct by being repeatedly absent without authorization. At this point, Ms. Morris was required to produce evidence tending to establish that her absences were caused by genuine illness. She did so by introducing her own testimony, as well as doctors' notes and hospital records. This showing shifted the burden of production back onto the EPA to show that Ms. Morris's absences were not caused by illness. The employer may carry its ultimate burden of proof by, for example, proving that the illness was feigned or that the illness was not severe enough to have caused her to stay home from work. Although, given the circumstances of this case, it certainly was relevant to inquire whether something in the workplace was causing Ms. Morris to be ill, she was not absolutely required to produce evidence of such a link. [8] To meet its burden of proof, the EPA was required to demonstrate that her absenteeism was willful and deliberate, and illness unconnected to the workplace may in some circumstances preclude such a finding. We render no opinion as to whether the EPA presented enough evidence to satisfy its ultimate burden of proof because the ALJ did not determine whether Ms. Morris was actually ill, or would become ill if she returned to the workplace, and whether that illness prevented her from working from January 3 through February 2. [9] This is a question that the ALJ must determine in the first instance. The parties presented contradictory evidence on the matter. To support her claim of illness, Ms. Morris presented letters from her doctors describing her severe allergies, which she claimed were triggered by the EPA work site. Ms. Morris also testified that she became seriously ill and required medical assistance when she entered the EPA buildings. On the other hand, the employer presented evidence that the EPA had conducted extensive testing on Ms. Morris's work environment and found that the air quality was superior to that of the outside air. Additionally, the employer questioned the reliability of Ms. Morris's doctors, and impeached the credibility of Ms. Morris herself. [10] It is clear that the EPA came to believe that Ms. Morris was feigning or grossly exaggerating her symptoms. [11] In Larry and in this case, we have addressed for the first time issues concerning the relationship between employee illness and proof of gross misconduct. Consequently, the ALJ may wish to take additional evidence from the parties to clarify whether Ms. Morris suffered from a serious illness. If he determines (1) that she did, and that the illness prevented her from coming to work, or (2) that she would have become seriously ill upon arriving at work, Ms. Morris will not be guilty of gross misconduct. See Larry, 973 A.2d at 183 (it stretches any reasonable definition of [the word `deliberately'] as used in the regulation to think that a seriously ill person would be expected to show up for [ ] duty). [12]