Opinion ID: 77994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mock's Conviction

Text: Mock argues that he was denied a fair trial in violation of his Due Process rights because (1) the prosecution made inflammatory remarks during closing argument, and (2) the district court made a number of small errors, cumulatively denying him a fair trial. Mock takes issue with the following statements made by the prosecution during its closing argument: (1) that Mock is a former police officer. He once took that oath to serve and protect and, unfortunately, he's forgotten about it . . . [he is] an officer fallen from grace; (2) that Mock learned about setting fires from his relatives, who were firefighters; and (3) that Mock set the fires [b]ecause that is what he likes, fires. It's exciting; it gives him a feeling of power and that's why he's doing it. Because Mock did not raise this issue in the district court, he is only entitled to relief if he can show plain error that is so obvious that failure to correct it would jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial. United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1400 (11th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Rodgers, 981 F.2d 497, 499 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam)). A prosecutor's comments [in closing argument] must be viewed in the context of the record as a whole, and will be the basis of reversal only if they result in prejudice affecting the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In closing argument, a prosecutor is not prohibited from making colorful and perhaps flamboyant remarks if they relate to the evidence adduced at trial. United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1541 (11th Cir.1992). Furthermore, because the statements made in closing are not evidence, the district court may rectify improper prosecutorial statements by instructing the jury that only the evidence in the case is to be considered. Id. Each of the above statements, while perhaps colorful, was related to evidence adduced at trial, and did not work to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial. Moreover, the district court instructed the jury that anything the lawyers say is not evidence in the case. It is your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls. What the lawyers say is not binding . . . . Therefore, even if the statements were unfairly prejudicial, the district court rectified any harmful effect. See id. Mock also argues that the following alleged errors, when viewed cumulatively, deprived him of Due Process and that he is therefore entitled to a new trial. Mock claims that the district court erred by (1) excluding Mock's evidence of other fires; (2) admitting testimony that while under surveillance Mock was seen rifling through mailboxes; (3) failing to grant Mock a mistrial when the jury learned that, upon Mock's arrest, police found a syringe and vial on his person; (4) excluding a witness from testifying that she believed someone else set two of the fires; and (5) admitting Mock's post-arrest statements as rebuttal evidence. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in taking the above actions. One, the district court properly excluded Mock's evidence of two unrelated fires, one occurring in a bedroom for which another defendant was arrested, the other occurring in an unoccupied building under construction. Neither of the fires was set in the stairwells of occupied apartment buildings, a common feature of the fires for which Mock was indicted. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence as irrelevant. Two, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a government agent to testify that while under surveillance, at around the time of one of the fires, Mock was observed rifling through other people's mailboxes. We have held that evidence not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and set-up of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime . . . . United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Mock's actions while under surveillance around the time of the fires. Three, the district court did not err in refusing to grant Mock a mistrial when the jury learned that Mock was carrying a syringe and vial at the time of his arrest. Mock himself referred to his illegal use of drugs in his case-in-chief, and therefore evidence that Mock carried drug paraphernalia would not likely have an additional prejudicial effect. In any case, the district court gave the jury a curative instruction to disregard this information. A jury is presumed to follow the instructions given to it by the district judge, United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), and there is nothing to suggest that the jury's knowledge that Mock possessed drug paraphernalia affected its decision to convict him for arson. Four, the district court properly excluded a witness from testifying that she believed someone else committed two of the fires. Under Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the opinion of a lay witness on a matter is admissible only if it is based on first-hand knowledge or observation. . . . United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.1999). Therefore, as this lay witness' opinion testimony was not based on first-hand knowledge, it was properly excluded. Five, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to admit Mock's post-arrest statement as rebuttal evidence. Mock argues that the government offered his statement as rebuttal evidence, rather than in its case-in-chief, as a last minute tactical strategic matter to have the last word on what Mock told the agent. However, Mock's post-arrest statement properly rebutted the claims made by Mock's two prior witnesses, that a different individual may have set one of the fires, by tending to show that it was Mock who set the fire. The purpose of rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adverse party, and the decision to permit rebuttal testimony is one that resides in the sound discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1269 (11th Cir.2004) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, as it could have properly found that the statement's purpose was to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove Mock's evidence that another individual set one of the fires. For the above reasons, we affirm Mock's conviction.