Opinion ID: 456012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: validity of the injunction

Text: 110 Fairbanks asserts that the injunction prohibiting appellants from using the name Shift Kit in connection with selling valve body parts is overly broad. 111 The district court permanently enjoined Fairbanks from using any name, designation or material ... likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception as to source relative to plaintiff's trademark. In the January 1981 contempt proceedings, the court clarified the injunction after appellants had continued their use of the terms Shift Kit in several combinations. The new order prohibited the use of the name Shift Kit or any other name including the words Shift and Kit. The court specifically enjoined use of the terms Shift Timing Kit, Posi Shift Kit, 2 Stage Shift Kit, Posi Shift 2 Stage Kit, or Posi Shift Single Stage Kit on the basis that such use was likely to cause confusion with Transgo's trademark. 112 The grant or denial of injunctive relief rests with the sound discretion of the trial court and requires a clear abuse of discretion for a modification or reversal. To succeed in its attack on the injunction, Fairbanks must show that there was no reasonable basis for the district court's decision. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir.1979). 113 The scope of the injunction was based on the district court's conclusion that the use of the words shift or kit in any combination would be likely to confuse the public. Unless we find the underlying facts to be clearly erroneous, we must affirm the finding of the district court and conclude that the court acted within its discretion in enjoining the use of names likely to confuse the public. J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, 523 F.2d 187, 191 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913, 96 S.Ct. 1110, 47 L.Ed.2d 317 (1976). 114 Under Rule 65(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an order granting an injunction shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other documents, the act or acts sought to be restrained; ... The basic principle of the federal rule is that those against whom an injunction is issued should receive fair and well-defined notice of what the injunction prohibits. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 444, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1126, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). 115 The injunction in the instant case precisely sets out the forbidden conduct. Fairbanks was on notice that it was prohibited from using any name or designation which was likely to cause confusion. The jury had found that Fairbanks and the other defendants had deliberately copied Transgo's trademark. The court concluded that Fairbanks had deliberately chosen names similar to Transgo's trademark in an attempt to walk as close to the line as they can and had deliberately and willfully ignored the previous injunction. In light of the overwhelming evidence of appellants' deliberate violations of Transgo's interest, the injunction was not overbroad. Rather, it put Fairbanks on notice that future imitations of Transgo's trademark would not be tolerated. [A]n injunction may be framed to bar future violations that are likely to occur. United States v. An Article of Drug, 661 F.2d 742, 747 (9th Cir.1981). Under these circumstances, we do not find an abuse of discretion. 116 Fairbanks also maintains that the injunction violates its first amendment rights. This argument lacks merit. Commercial speech may be regulated when its content is otherwise false or misleading. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-73, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830-31, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976). Substantial evidence was presented at trial to show that Fairbanks' use of the words shift and kit was misleading.