Opinion ID: 1653372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discovery Dispute

Text: The defendant challenges the trial court's order that counsel for Mack Brown and counsel for Evajean Brown could not share the information obtained from the state by the discovery motion filed by counsel for Evajean Brown pursuant to Rule 16 of Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Further, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting counsel for Mack Brown from viewing the information in the possession of counsel for Evajean Brown after all proceedings concerning her were complete. Mack and Evajean Brown were jointly indicted but were represented by separate counsel. Counsel for Evajean Brown requested discovery from the state pursuant to Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and (D) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. This request triggered the state's right to reciprocal discovery. Id. However, counsel for Mack Brown did not request discovery under this rule. On April 14, 1987, the trial court entered a blanket order prohibiting counsel for Evajean Brown and counsel for Mack Brown from transferring any items between themselves that had been received from the state pursuant to the single Rule 16 discovery request filed on Evajean Brown's behalf. Counsel for Mack Brown filed his objection to the order on April 20, 1987. Mack Brown's motion to sever, which was filed on April 30, 1987, was granted by order filed May 5, 1987. Evajean Brown's trial, which began on September 14, 1987, ended in a mistrial. The Court of Criminal Appeals later held that Evajean Brown could not be retried because of double jeopardy principles. State of Tennessee v. Evajean Brown, (Tenn. Crim. App. Knoxville, Dec. 20, 1988), 1988 WL 136600, perm. app. denied, May 8, 1989. After these events, counsel for Mack Brown moved the trial court to rescind the order of April 14, 1987, but the trial court refused to allow counsel for Mack Brown to receive any information from Evajean Brown's counsel that had originated with the state, unless Mack Brown consented to reciprocal discovery by the state. Counsel for Mack Brown did not request that the information in question be reviewed by the trial court or submitted under seal for appellate review. The state insists that the defendant improperly attempted to gain the benefit of Evajean Brown's full discovery motion while denying the state the reciprocal discovery to which it would have been entitled had he filed for Rule 16 discovery himself. We conclude that the prosecution has overstated the case to some extent. Trial courts, to be sure, have the discretion to enter orders necessary to insure compliance with Rule 16. Cf. State v. Bell, 690 S.W.2d 879 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Vilvarajah, 735 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). However, to do so, reciprocal discovery must have already been triggered. Id. In this case, because the disclosure of items in the possession of counsel for Evajean Brown would not necessarily have triggered reciprocal discovery as to Mack Brown, the trial court's order should have been more selective with regard to disclosure. Reciprocal discovery would only have been triggered if, by the disclosure of the items held by counsel for Evajean Brown, Mack Brown had gained access to information he could have gotten by filing his own request for full Rule 16 discovery. But, Evajean Brown's request would only result in discovery by her of items which were material to the preparation of her own defense, intended for use by the state in its case in chief against her, or obtained from or belonging to her. T.R.Crim.P. Rule 16(a)(1)(C). Hence, items subject to full Rule 16 discovery by Mack Brown would not necessarily have been subject to discovery by Evajean Brown. Obviously, disclosure of Evajean Brown's holdings would not have equated with full Rule 16 discovery by Mack Brown. The importance of unrestricted discovery in preparation for trial is obvious. Indeed, a prosecutor's failure to comply with discovery can contribute to a finding of reversible error. State v. Benson, 645 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). However, the burden rests on the defense to show the degree to which the impediments to discovery hindered trial preparation and defense at trial. Because of the failure of defense counsel to include the materials they sought from counsel for Evajean Brown in the record, we have no way of determining whether access to these materials would have had an impact on the outcome of the trial. Without this determination, we cannot find reversible error.