Opinion ID: 2635508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Longwell's Examination of Strand Was Conducted within the Statutory Framework of Chapter 71.09 RCW

Text: ¶ 10 [S]tate statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). The process due to a person subject to an SVP petition is the procedure allocated by the statute which authorizes civil incarceration. Martin, 163 Wash.2d at 511, 182 P.3d 951. Strand claims that his due process rights were violated when the State asked Dr. Longwell to examine him prior to the commencement of SVP proceedings, an examination he believes was unauthorized by the SVP statute. ¶ 11 The SVP statute, however, authorizes a prefiling psychological examination. RCW 71.09.025(1)(b) contains the pertinent statutory language: The agency [with jurisdiction] shall provide the prosecuting agency with all relevant information including but not limited to the following information: . . . (iii) All records relating to the psychological or psychiatric evaluation and/or treatment of the person; . . . (v) A current mental health evaluation or mental health records review. RCW 71.09.025(1)(b). ¶ 12 At issue is whether the legislature intended the term current, in the context of providing [a] current mental health evaluation or mental health records review, to authorize a new evaluation or merely the forwarding of the last available evaluation. The primary objective of any statutory construction inquiry is to ascertain and carry out the intent of the Legislature. Rozner v. City of Bellevue, 116 Wash.2d 342, 347, 804 P.2d 24 (1991). Current has two possibly applicable definitions: occurring in or belonging to the present time and in evidence or in operation at the time actually elapsing. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 557 (2002). Thus, current could mean either occurring in the present time (a new evaluation) or in operation at the time actually elapsing (the last available evaluation). However, a comprehensive reading of chapter 71.09 RCW shows that the plain meaning of current must include a new evaluation. Plain meaning is `discerned from the ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.' Udall v. T.D. Escrow Servs., Inc., 159 Wash.2d 903, 909, 154 P.3d 882 (2007) (quoting Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wash.2d 652, 657, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007)). ¶ 13 Reading current in RCW 71.09.025(1)(b)(v) as authorizing the release of only the last available evaluation does not make sense in the context the word is used. [A] single word in a statute should not be read in isolation, and . . . `the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by those with which they are associated.' State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wash.2d 614, 623, 106 P.3d 196 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wash.2d 712, 729, 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)). In this case, the statute is phrased provide . . . [a] current and uses the indefinite article a as opposed to a definite article, such as the. A is used as a function word before most singular nouns other than proper and mass nouns when the individual in question is undetermined, unidentified, or unspecified. Webster's, supra, at 1. Therefore, by choosing the use of an indefinite article instead of using a definite article, the legislature intended to provide a current mental health evaluation that is undetermined (i.e., yet to be done) rather than the current mental health evaluation, which has already been determined. ¶ 14 Additionally, interpreting RCW 71.09.025(1)(b)(v) to not authorize the agency to perform a mental health evaluation would render that statutory language superfluous. Under rules of statutory construction no part of a statute should be deemed inoperative or superfluous unless it is the result of obvious mistake or error. Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 Wash.2d 1, 13, 810 P.2d 917, 817 P.2d 1359 (1991). RCW 71.09.025(1)(b)(iii) requires the agency to deliver to the prosecutor [a]ll records relating to the psychological or psychiatric evaluation and/or treatment of the person. Because the agency must provide all records under RCW 71.09.025(1)(b)(iii), the language in RCW 71.09.025(1)(b)(v) would be superfluous if it merely specified another existing record that shall be provided. Therefore, RCW 71.09.025(1)(b)(v) must authorize the agency to perform an evaluation. ¶ 15 Strand claims that this cannot be the case because this court has previously stated that RCW 71.09.040 provides the exclusive means for obtaining mental examinations of civil commitment respondents. In re Det. of Audett, 158 Wash.2d 712, 726, 147 P.3d 982 (2006) (citing In re Det. of Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476, 490-91, 55 P.3d 597 (2002)). Strand, however, misapplies Audett. First, the language from Audett that Strand cites simply does not apply to him because he was not a respondent at the time of Dr. Longwell's first mental health evaluation. [3] Second, a full reading of Audett shows that it provides little, if any, support for Strand's position that chapter 71.09 RCW bans prefiling examinations. The issue in Audett was whether or not this court's decision in Williams was to apply retroactively. Id. at 715, 147 P.3d 982. Williams addressed only whether or not a prosecutor could compel an examination under CR 35 during SVP proceedings under chapter 71.09 RCW. Williams, 147 Wash.2d at 486, 55 P.3d 597. It did not address the use of voluntary examinations that took place prior to the commencement of SVP proceedings. Indeed, in Williams this court was presented with multiple instances of prefiling and pre-probable-cause-hearing mental health examinations and did not find any reason to question their validity. See id. at 480-84, 55 P.3d 597. ¶ 16 The SVP statute authorizes a current mental health evaluation to be performed and provided to the prosecutor. Consequently, Strand's claim that Dr. Longwell's evaluation was unauthorized by statute and in violation of due process is rejected.