Opinion ID: 2638625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: part ii(a).

Text: ¶ 3 Appellant and appellee were married on or about June 5,1983. At such time, and for about ten (10) years prior thereto, appellant was a firefighter with the City of Oklahoma City. In April 1992 appellant initiated a divorce action. He was then still employed as a firefighter, as he was when the parties were divorced by decree filed on October 22, 1992. As part of the decree's property division, appellee was awarded a portion of appellant's vested interest in the System. The decree expressly found former husband had a vested interest in the System; part of the interest was his separate property (obviously any interest in the System earned while not married to appellee) and part was marital property (just as obviously any interest earned in the System while the parties were married). On page one of his February 18, 2000 brief in chief filed in this appeal former husband admits (1) the divorce decree awarded former wife a share of his retirement income under the System; (2) no appeal was lodged from the decree; and (3) the decree became final. Also, he does not question the trial court's initial authority to award a portion of his future retirement income to appellee as part of the divorce decree's property division. [2] ¶ 4 The decree contained the following concerning the division of the retirement income: [3] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that [former husband] is awarded a portion of his retirement compensation plan with the City of Oklahoma City and [former wife] is awarded a portion of same, as follows: ½ × 115 × Dollars paid to [appellant], [appellant's] total less [appellee's] pro-rata share of any months of employment State and Federal taxes[,] pursuant to the Qualified Domestic[ ] Relations Order which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A[]. In that 115 months was approximately the number of months of the marriage, the above formula appears intended to grant appellee about one-half (½), i.e. fifty percent (50%), of the future anticipated benefit or, in the language of the decree, of the retirement compensation plan, earned during the marriage. [4] In other words, the first part of the formula embodies the multiplication of two fractions. One is one-half (½) or fifty percent (50%). The other fraction has a numerator of one hundred (115) months (the approximate number of months of the parties' marriage) and a denominator representing appellant's total months of employment as a firefighter. The result of the multiplication of these two fractions (which can be expressed in percentage terms) is then multiplied by the total actual dollar benefit eventually to be paid to appellant by the System upon his retirement, which yields the actual share or amount of the System benefit to be paid to appellee. ¶ 5 In that appellant was still employed as a firefighter when the decree was issued and filed, the denominator of the second fraction was not then known. The longer he worked as a firefighter results in the denominator of the second fraction to be continually increasing, which concomitantly results in a decrease in the percentage appellee is entitled to under the divorce decree's formula. However, her share of the eventual retirement income from the System always remains approximately one-half (½)  or fifty percent (50%)  of the benefit earned during the marriage. ¶ 6 Even though the decree states a QDRO is attached to it as Exhibit A, in actuality no QDRO was attached. Not until July 1993 was a QDRO entered in the case. [5] In setting out appellee's share of any System benefit, the 1993 QDRO states in pertinent part: [t]he then current values as of the date of withdrawal of September 28, 1992:[t]wenty-four percent (24%) of the accumulation under Oklahoma Firefighters Pension and Retirement System. Appellant concedes or admits at page three of his February 18, 2000 brief that the meaning of the quoted language is confusing, but asserts the apparent intent was to award appellee some share of what had accumulated in the pension plan during the marriage. We also note, the September 28th date appears to reference the perceived date of the divorce (the 1993 QDRO stating the decree was dated September 28th). [6] Prior to the COCA's decision in this case former husband, in his appellate submissions, relied on the 1993 QDRO as the order dividing the marital interest in the pension plan, although he never takes a firm stance as to its meaning, even though, as noted, he acknowledges its apparent intent is to award appellee a share of what had accumulated in the pension plan during the marriage. The 1993 QDRO was not appealed by either party. ¶ 7 Also in 1993, although appellant became eligible to retire and receive a pension benefit with, at least, twenty (20) years of service as a firefighter, he did not retire, but continued to work as a firefighter. Instead of retiring he elected to participate in a program known as the Oklahoma Firefighters Deferred Option Plan 11 O.S.Supp.1993, § 49-106.1, which allowed him to continue working for an additional five (5) years, while at the same time having what would have been his monthly retirement benefit, had he elected to cease employment and retire, paid into a deferred option account  the account drawing interest and eventually being paid to him in a lump sum or as an annuity upon his actual retirement. § 49-106.1. [7] At page three of his February 18, 2000 brief appellant admits the pension benefits he would have received had he retired in 1993 were the funds paid into the deferred option plan account. [8] ¶ 8 In December 1996 a second QDRO issued at a time former husband still worked as a firefighter  i.e. he was not actually receiving any benefits from the System, although (as noted) the retirement benefit he would have received had he retired in 1993 was being paid into the deferred option account. The 1996 QDRO contained language at odds with both the formula specified in the divorce decree and the 1993 QDRO. It provides former wife is entitled to a monthly benefit from the Plan equal to twenty-four percent (24%) of [former husband's] vested benefit in the Plan, accrued during the period beginning the 5th day of June, 1983, and ending the 28th day of September, 1992, determined as if [former husband] separated from employment on that date with a vested benefit under the Plan. . . . Rather than giving appellee one-half (½) or fifty percent (50%) of the benefit corresponding to the approximate length of the marriage, the 1996 QDRO seems to award her only twenty-four percent (24%) of the benefit earned during the marriage. The 1996 QDRO was not appealed by either party. Neither the 1993 or 1996 QDRO required the System to pay appellee anything, unless and until appellant began receiving a benefit or some payment from the System. ¶ 9 Appellant concedes or admits at page two of his September 5, 2000 answer to petition for certiorari that both the 1993 QDRO and the 1996 QDRO were rejected by the System as inadequate; that the 1996 QDRO used a different formula than reflected in the 1993 QDRO; and, in essence, using the 1996 QDRO would result in appellee receiving a lesser amount of any System benefit than she would have been entitled to under the 1993 QDRO. Further, appellant fails to take a position in any of the materials submitted on appeal as to whether the 1993, 1996 or 1999 QDROs conform to the formula spelled out in the divorce decree, although, as above noted, he admits the formula in the decree was intended to award former wife some share of his retirement income from the System. ¶ 10 In April 1999 appellant moved to modify the 1996 QDRO, essentially arguing appellee was entitled to nothing from the System because, instead of retiring, he recently either had or, was about to be granted, a disability pension which he claimed was solely his separate property. Appellee counter-moved to amend the 1996 QDRO asserting it did not conform to the decree's formula. She asserted that using the divorce decree formula entitled her to nineteen percent (19%) of the benefit appellant was then, apparently, entitled to receive from the System. The nineteen percent (19%) is arrived at as follows: 115 ÷ 305 (appellant's total months of employment) = 0.3770491, which when multiplied by ½ or .50 = 0.1885245, which rounds to 0.19 or nineteen percent (19%). [9] ¶ 11 The trial court denied appellant's motion; granted appellee's counter-motion; and issued a third QDRO (the 1999 QDRO). The trial court's written ruling said the following concerning the System benefit(s): [a]fter consideration of the pleadings and argument of counsel, I find that the Decree of Divorce entered into October 22, 1992, was not appealed and is a final order, the Decree made an equitable division of property, that division cannot later be altered by subsequent motion and the Decree controls the division of marital property. The 1999 QDRO accepts appellee's view that the divorce decree formula entitles her to nineteen percent (19%) of the System benefit. [10] ¶ 12 Appellant appealed and the COCA, Div. I, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Although the COCA ruled appellee was entitled to part of the System benefit, it decided she was not entitled to the amount the trial court determined was due under the 1999 QDRO. [11] Instead, the COCA ruled she was only entitled to a lesser amount as specified in the 1996 QDRO. The COCA's majority characterized the formula contained in the divorce decree as awarding former wife, twenty-four percent of the pension for the months the [parties] were married[,] i.e. what seems called for by the 1996 QDRO. The dissenting COCA judge believed the 1999 QDRO did not modify the divorce decree's formula-driven recitation, but conformed to it. He also, in essence, opined that the 1999 QDRO was a proper exercise of the trial court's authority in aid of attempting to enforce the decree's property division concerning appellee's share of appellant's pension benefit from the System  an aid which would allow the firefighter's pension board the authorization to pay her what had been awarded by the divorce decree. Appellee sought certiorari which we previously granted. [12]