Opinion ID: 853387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-examination of Wilhite

Text: The defendant's final contention is that he was denied his constitutional right to fully cross-examine the State's key witness against him, Anthony Wilhite, regarding the penalties Wilhite was avoiding by testifying. At trial, the defendant sought relief from the trial court's pre-trial ruling that prevented both the State and the defendant from eliciting information about the penalties Wilhite would face if charged with the same criminal charges on which the defendant was being tried. The defendant's offer to prove at trial asserted that his cross-examination would establish the amount of time Wilhite was avoiding by cooperating with the State. The trial court denied the defendant's request for relief from the ruling on the motion in limine, stating that the State cannot mention penalties, the defense can't either. You can't do indirectly what you can't do directly. Record at 433. The State argues that there was no evidence of any deal between the State and Wilhite and that his agreement to cooperate with federal authorities did not require him to testify in this case. Br. of Appellee at 8. It also argues that the defense was permitted to elicit and argue that Wilhite had not been prosecuted for his involvement in the murder or conspiracy. The State urges that there was no abuse of discretion, and that, if error is found, it was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. While the constitutional right of confrontation requires that a defendant be afforded an opportunity to conduct a full, adequate, and effective cross-examination, a trial judge may impose reasonable limits which will not warrant reversal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Strong v. State, 538 N.E.2d 924, 928 (Ind.1989). The exposure of a witness's motivations in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Jarrett v. State, 498 N.E.2d 967, 968 (Ind. 1986). Often it is relevant and proper for [the] jury to know the quantity of benefit to accusing witnesses. Id. However, in cases where there has been no plea agreement between the witness and the State or a patent benefit for testifying, we have found no abuse of discretion in limiting the testimony of a witness as long as the jury has been sufficiently apprised of the circumstances surrounding the testimony. See, e.g., Wolfe v. State, 562 N.E.2d 414, 420 (Ind.1990) (declining to find error where witness neither charged in instant case nor testifying pursuant to a plea bargain in another case and motives for testifying elicited); Bergfeld v. State, 531 N.E.2d 486, 492 (Ind.1988) (finding no error where co-defendant witness received no plea bargain or patent benefit for testimony and testimony brought forth about advantages of exculpating himself); Fassoth v. State, 525 N.E.2d 318, 322 (Ind. 1988) (finding no error where witness received no plea bargain, testimony was elicited that he testified under use immunity, and witness was unsure of benefit he would receive for testifying). But see Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. 1999) (finding it error for trial court to exclude evidence identifying pending charges and the witness's perceptions of the arrangement that resulted in his release on his own recognizance). Departing an airplane while carrying two kilos of cocaine, Wilhite voluntarily surrendered to police at a Tennessee airport. He was facing federal charges, but his agreement to cooperate with federal authorities did not require him to testify in the present case. Record at 420. At the time of trial, he had not been charged with any crimes in Marion County that were related to this case or his admissions. The defendant was able to elicit all this information at trial, and the defense argued that the lack of prosecution in Marion County was the motive for Wilhite's testimony. The defendant also brought out the fact that the uncharged crimes were serious and would amount to many years. He was only prevented from inquiring into exact sentences that would attach to each crime. As there was no plea agreement or patent benefit present and the jury was sufficiently apprised of the circumstances surrounding Wilhite's testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded testimony of the penalties the defendant would have received had he been convicted of the crimes in this case.