Opinion ID: 1103876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Basic Principles

Text: Due process of law is guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, § 2 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. The central meaning of procedural due process is well settled: Persons whose rights may be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must first be notified. Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864). It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). The Constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of government to follow a fair process of decision making when it acts to deprive a person of his possessions. The purpose of this requirement is to protect a person's use and possession of property from arbitrary encroachmentto minimize substantially unfair or mistaken deprivations of property. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra ; see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972). Fairness can rarely be obtained by a secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights, and no better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170-71, 71 S.Ct. 624, 647-48, 95 L.Ed. 817, 853 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process Clause. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra . Even a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a deprivation within the contemplation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). To one who protests against the taking of his property without due process of law, it is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the same result because he had no adequate defense on the merits. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 35 S.Ct. 625, 59 L.Ed. 1027 (1915). It is enough to invoke the procedural safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment that a significant property interest is at stake, whatever the ultimate outcome of a hearing may be. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra . Due process is not a technical concept with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstance. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961). Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). Accordingly, whether the procedure by which a person is deprived of his property interest is constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 1651, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra . The Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizen against the state itself and all of its creatures. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943).