Opinion ID: 1995457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of Johnsons Duty

Text: The concurrence notes that Johnson gratuitously undertook to provide a large portion of the services that Bjerke's parents were otherwise obligated to provide to Bjerke. From this observation, the concurrence leaps to the conclusion that the preliminary language of section 324A is satisfied without assessing the scope of the duty assumed by Johnson. The proper application of section 324A, however, requires us, as a threshold matter, to determine the scope of the duty assumed by Johnson. An actor's specific undertaking of the services allegedly performed without reasonable care is a threshold requirement to section 324A liability. In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 113 F.3d 1484, 1493 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Patentas v. United States, 687 F.2d 707, 716 (3d Cir.1982) (The foundation of the good [S]amaritan rule [found in sections 323 and 324A] is that the defendant specifically has undertaken to perform the task that he or she is charged with having performed negligently.); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1188-89 (E.D.Pa.1978) (The foundational requirement of the good Samaritan rule is that in order for liability to be imposed upon the actor, he must specifically have undertaken to perform the task that he is charged with having performed negligently   .). Or, as stated by the court of appeals in this case, The extent of the duty owed under section 324A is defined by the extent of the undertaking. Bjerke, 727 N.W.2d at 190; see also Homer v. Pabst Brewing Co., 806 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir.1986) ([T]he scope of the duty is limited by the extent of the undertaking.); McGee ex rel. McGee v. Chalfant, 248 Kan. 434, 806 P.2d 980, 985 (1991) (The extent of the undertaking should define the scope of the duty.). Therefore, in order for a special relationship to have existed between Johnson and Bjerke under section 324A, Johnson must have specifically undertaken to protect Bjerke from third parties at Island Farm. But the record reflects that Bjerke was responsible for herself while at the farm, that her parents never transferred primary control over her to Johnson, and that Bjerke spent little time with Johnson at the farm. In fact, Johnson believed that she had no more authority over Bjerke than did Bohlman or the farm manager. The extent of Johnsons undertaking was to provide Bjerke with room, board, and a very limited degree of supervision. She may have had a duty under section 324A to perform these services with reasonable care, an issue not present in this litigation, but she did not assume the duty of protecting Bjerke from third parties at Island Farm. We have never imposed a duty under section 324A that exceeded the scope of the undertaking. In Erickson, we held that a security firm hired by the owner of a parking ramp owed a duty of reasonable care to a customer of the ramp lessee because the firm undertook to protect the lessee's customers by actively patrolling the ramp. 447 N.W.2d at 167, 170-71. Similarly, in Pagra, we concluded that a city owed a duty to a pilot whose plane was destroyed by fire because the city voluntarily undertook to render fire protection services to airport users. 282 N.W.2d at 570. Johnson, in contrast, did not voluntarily undertake to protect Bjerke from third parties at Island Farm. Because Johnson did not assume the duty to protect Bjerke from third parties at Island Farm, that duty remained with Bjerke's parents. The Minnesota statute governing the termination of parental rights exemplifies the principle that parents have ultimate responsibility for their children: [T]he duties imposed upon [a] parent by the parent and child relationship    includ[e]    providing the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control necessary for the child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development.  Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). Just as we are [r]eluctant    to terminate parental rights in all but the most egregious of cases, In re C.K., 434 N.W.2d 925, 926 (Minn.1989), we should also be reluctant to transfer parental duties to third parties. A parent's abdication of his or her parental duties does not effectuate the transfer of those duties to another. The scope of any duty assumed by Johnson with respect to Bjerke did not encompass the duty to protect Bjerke from third parties at Island Farm; therefore, I would hold that a special relationship did not exist between Johnson and Bjerke under section 324A.