Opinion ID: 2582516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The denial of appellant's motion to represent himself

Text: Gallego contends that the district court violated his constitutional right to represent himself. A criminal defendant has the right to self-representation under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 8 of the Nevada Constitution. [3] However, an accused who chooses self-representation must satisfy the court that his waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and voluntary. [4] Such a choice can be competent and intelligent even though the accused lacks the skill and experience of a lawyer, but the record should establish that the accused was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. [5] Deprivation of the right to self-representation is reversible, never harmless, error. [6] A court may deny a defendant's request for self-representation when the defendant is incompetent to waive the right to counsel, the request is untimely, the request is equivocal, the request is made solely for the purpose of delay, or the defendant abuses the right to self-representation by disrupting the judicial process. [7] The district court expressed a number of grounds for denying Gallego's motion to represent himself. It found the request to be untimely and equivocal and that Gallego had waived the right to represent himself. It also cited Gallego's uncooperative, obstructive behavior as grounds to deny the motion. Whether the request for self-representation was untimely or waived In Lyons v. State, this court held that if a request for self-representation comes early enough to allow the defendant to prepare for trial without need for a continuance, the request should be deemed timely. [8] We conclude that the district court erred in deeming Gallego's request untimely. None of the cases cited by the court on this issue were apposite since all involved requests for self-representation coming on the first day of trial or later. [9] Here, the district court treated Gallego's request to represent himself as if it came just before the penalty phase in the midst of an ordinary, uninterrupted capital trial. This treatment was not appropriate because the penalty phase followed the original trial by fifteen years and required a new jury to be empaneled. Gallego first made his request in October 1998, almost a year before that empaneling. There is no indication that Gallego was trying to delay the proceedings. Deeming the request untimely under these circumstances improperly placed form over substance and was erroneous. Under Lyons, Gallego's request was timely because it was made well before the penalty phase of the trial and did not necessitate a continuance. The district court also found that Gallego waived the right to represent himself by accepting court-appointed counsel at his original trial. It cited our opinion in Tucker v. State, which holds: Where a defendant requests a court-appointed attorney and thereafter voluntarily acquiesces in representation by that court-appointed attorney, he waives his constitutional right to conduct a pro se defense. [10] In Tucker, a burglary defendant told the district court at a pretrial hearing he would not accept representation by the public defender, but then voluntarily accepted such representation and made no objection once it commenced. [11] Tucker is not on point here, and again the district court placed form over substance and treated Gallego's request as if it came in the midst of an ongoing trial. It concluded that his acceptance of appointed counsel for the trial in 1984 acted to waive his right to proceed without counsel at the second penalty hearing fifteen years later. However, during the proceedings related to the new penalty hearing Gallego never acquiesced to the appointment of his counsel, and the court erred in finding waiver under these circumstances.