Opinion ID: 2582726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Victim Buttons

Text: [¶24] The facts relevant to this issue are undisputed. Just prior to beginning the second day of the appellant's trial, the district court, sua sponte, consulted counsel for both parties about the propriety of continuing to allow the victim's family to wear certain buttons in the courtroom during the trial. It appears, based on what we can discern from the record, that the buttons at issue said, We will never forget and contained a picture of the victim. The district court noted the following while discussing the issue with counsel: 1) the buttons were small enough that it could not see the content of the buttons from the bench (the buttons were not of such size that [they] could be read); 2) the jury was positioned so that it faced away from the courtroom spectators, including the victim's family, with ten to fifteen feet separating the two; 3) when the victim's family entered the courtroom wearing the buttons, the jury had already been seated (facing away from the spectators) for the afternoon trial session; and 4) the district court did not see any jurors actually look at the buttons. The prosecutor stated that the victim's family had been instructed not to wear the buttons during jury selection and the record does not indicate that the family disobeyed that instruction. [13] The appellant's trial counsel asked the district court to prohibit the buttons from the courtroom, and the district court ruled that buttons reflecting either defense or victim should only be displayed outside the courtroom and outside the presence of the jury. [¶25] On appeal, the appellant claims that the buttons at issue injected an impermissible factor into the appellant's trial and that the buttons therefore inherently prejudiced his right to a fair trial. See generally Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986) ; and Asch v. State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003). The appellant contends that his trial counsel were ineffective, despite the fact that the district court ruled in their favor and excluded the buttons, because counsel did not ask the district court also to make any inquiries of the jury [or] admonish the jury regarding the buttons. [¶26] While the appellant focuses his appellate argument on whether we should presume that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced under the circumstances, it remains his burden to prove that his counsel's performance was deficient. We, of course, indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. When this issue was raised in the district court, the appellant's trial counsel promptly asked the district court to exclude the buttons, and the district court granted that request. Trial counsel's failure to take any additional action, then, must be viewed in light of the following circumstances: 1) The size of the buttons was not such that their content was apparent from any meaningful distance. 2) It is not clear from the record how many buttons were actually present in the courtroom during the trial. [14] 3) The jury had virtually no opportunity to view the buttons in the courtroom. The only such opportunity was during the afternoon session on the first day of the appellant's trial. The district court convened that session at 2:51 p.m. When the victim's family entered the courtroom wearing the buttons, the jury had already been seated facing the opposite direction. The trial resumed continuously (with no breaks for the jury) until the district court recessed at 5:06 p.m. It is reasonable to infer from descriptions of the courtroom layout that the jury then exited the courtroom without facing the courtroom spectators. 4) Though it is certainly not conclusive as to whether any jurors saw the buttons, the district court, which had noticed the buttons and observed the jury during the afternoon trial session, informed counsel that it did not see any jurors actually look at the buttons. 5) If the appellant's trial counsel had asked the district court to take any further action, such action would necessarily have focused additional attention on the very buttons that the appellant claims were inherently prejudicial. We cannot say that, considering these circumstances, the appellant's trial counsel were ineffective.