Opinion ID: 176727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: gerardo pineda-soriamotion to suppress

Text: Gerardo Pineda-Soria was a supplier of cocaine to the conspiracy. He pled guilty to possessing with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), subject to a plea agreement in which he retained his ability to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress drugs that had been found during a search of his residence. He was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment. He now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. When considering a motion to suppress, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo, and factual findings and credibility determinations for clear error. United States v. Lewis, 608 F.3d 996, 999 (7th Cir.2010). We are particularly deferential to credibility findings, and unless the trial court has credited testimony that is contrary to the laws of nature or so internally inconsistent or implausible on its fact that no reasonable factfinder would credit it, we defer to the trial court's finding. United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir.2010).
On June 18, 2008, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents obtained a search warrant for Pineda-Soria's residence at 253 South High Street, Apartment A, in Janesville, Wisconsin. The doorway of 253 South High Street opens into a two-story foyer, and the building is divided into two apartments, A and B. The entrance to Apartment A is on the first floor, and an open staircase leads up to the door for Apartment B. Neither door has a letter, however, so it would not necessarily be clear to someone that they were separate apartments. Based on information that the upstairs apartment was empty, agents limited their warrant application only to Apartment A, and the warrant itself was similarly limited. An arrest warrant for Pineda-Soria was issued at the same time. At 6:01 a.m. the next morning, DEA agents and Janesville police officers executed the warrant. None of the DEA agents that were aware of the Apartment A/B distinction were present at the search, and apparently had not informed any of the searching officers that the warrant was limited to the downstairs unit. Unaware of the warrant's limitation or the distinction between the units, the entry team entered both Apartments A and B. In performing a preliminary sweep of Apartment B, agents found three men sleeping: Pineda-Soria, along with Hoguer Pineda and Adrian Lazcano (the co-tenants). The three were taken downstairs and outside. Pineda-Soria was taken to the Janesville police station to be interviewed, while Pineda and Lazcano remained on the premises. Before any contraband was found, a DEA agent became aware that Apartment B was a separate unit after speaking with residents of the downstairs unit. Realizing the error, searching officers immediately ceased the nascent search and withdrew to the front lawn to wait for further instructions. It was decided to ask Pineda-Soria and the co-tenants for consent to search, and DEA agents also contacted an Assistant United States Attorney regarding the possibility of obtaining another search warrant for Apartment B at the same time. At approximately 6:45 a.m., a Spanish-speaking Janesville police officer asked each co-tenant separately whether he would consent to a search of Apartment B. Both men had by this point been allowed to get dressed, and were not handcuffed. The interviewing officer first asked the co-tenants if they lived in the unit and both stated that they did. The officer then told them it was up to them whether or not to allow a search and both individually gave oral consent to search. Police decided it would be advisable to also obtain written consent from each co-tenant, and telephoned another officer to bring a written consent form that he could translate into Spanish for them to read and sign. In the meantime, at the Janesville police station, DEA agents and police advised Pineda-Soria of his rights and asked for his cooperation. He signed a Miranda waiver form, and at 7:08 a.m. he filled out a written consent form consenting to a search of Apartment B. The record is not clear as to whether officers resumed searching the upstairs unit once the co-tenants consented at 6:45 a.m., or whether they also waited for Pineda-Soria's consent that came approximately 25 minutes later. In any event, officers re-entered Apartment B, and found a kilogram of cocaine under Pineda-Soria's bed. [4] By this time, agents had completed an initial interview with Pineda-Soria, who had to that point denied any involvement in the alleged conspiracy. When they brought him back to the apartment building, they learned that cocaine had been found in the search of Apartment B. This update was shared with Pineda-Soria, and he was reminded of his Miranda rights. Pineda-Soria agreed to cooperate, and confronted with the evidence that had been found, admitted to involvement in the conspiracy. Pineda-Soria moved to suppress the physical evidence found in his apartment and the statements that he had made, arguing that the search of Apartment B occurred without a valid warrant and that there had been no valid consent, and on December 8, 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held. On February 11, 2009, a magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation that the district court deny the motion to suppress, finding (1) that the consents to search Apartment B were valid, and (2) that the inevitable discovery doctrine also applied. On March 5, 2009, the district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and denied the motion to suppress. Pineda-Soria then entered into a conditional plea to one count of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.
Pineda-Soria appeals the denial of his motion to suppress on two grounds. First, he argues that none of the consents given to search Apartment B were voluntary. Second, he asserts that the inevitable discovery doctrine should not apply, arguing that the government failed to meet its burden of proof to benefit from that doctrine. No one disputes that the initial search of the upstairs unit was illegal; officers entered Apartment B armed with a warrant that only gave them permission to search Apartment A. Nothing was found in the brief initial sweep, however. It was not until officers re-entered the unit, after receiving consent to do so, that contraband was discovered. The Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply in circumstances where an authorized party voluntarily consents to a search. United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 1074, 1077 (7th Cir.2006); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The relevant question here is whether the consents from Pineda-Soria and his co-tenants to search Apartment B were valid. [5] Whether a defendant voluntarily consented to a search is a question of fact determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. Lewis, 608 F.3d at 999. In making this determination, we consider (1) the defendant's age, intelligence, and education; (2) whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights; (3) how long the defendant was detained prior to giving consent; (4) whether the consent was immediate, or was prompted by repeated requests by authorities; (5) whether any physical coercion was used; and (6) whether the defendant was in police custody when he gave his consent. United States v. Risner, 593 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir.2010); see also United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 704-05 (7th Cir.2007). We review a district court's finding of voluntary consent for clear error. United States v. Santiago, 428 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir.2005). And when consent is given after an illegal search has occurred, we must also be sure that the illegality did not taint any consent that was given. To determine whether the taint from an initial illegal search has been purged, we examine (1) the temporal proximity of the illegal entry and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); see also United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 348 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.2003). Viewing the circumstances in light of these standards, we find that the consents given in this case were valid and were not tainted by the initial warrantless search, and that the district court properly denied Pineda-Soria's motion to suppress.
We first examine the consents given by the co-tenants, Pineda and Lazcano. Approximately 45 minutes transpired between the time that they were rousted out of bed to when they gave their initial oral consent. They were permitted to get dressed, initially sat on a couch in Apartment A, then were relocated to the yard outside of the house. They were not handcuffed, and were in the company of other people that they knew. The record is not clear on their age or education level, but we know that officers communicated with them in their native Spanish. When asked for consent, both co-tenants were informed that they did not have to give permission, both orally and on the written consent forms they signed. See United States v. Valencia, 913 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir.1990) (finding it significant that defendant had been told he did not have to consent to search). The record shows that each man gave his consent immediately, and there is no evidence of repeated prodding or questioning by police. While being awoken by armed officers and made to leave their dwelling certainly must have been an intimidating experience, there is no evidence that any subsequent events took place that were coercive in any way. Nor do we think that the initial illegal entry tainted the co-tenants' consent in any way. Considering the Brown factors, we find that the temporal proximity of the illegal entry and consent, taken together with the intervening circumstances, support the district court's finding that there was no taint. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. Forty-five minutes transpired between the time of the illegal entry and the co-tenants' verbal consents, and an hour and forty minutes passed between the entry and the written consent. See Valencia, 913 F.2d at 382. There is no evidence of any coercion taking place during that time; conversely, both Pineda and Lazcano were told they did not have to consent if they did not want to. Finally, consideration of the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct weighs heavily in favor of finding that any taint was purged. The initial entry into Apartment B was a mistake on the part of the searching officers, none of whom were aware of the limitation on the warrant. Once the mistake was discovered, officers immediately withdrew from the upstairs unit to determine what should be done next. The initial entry does not appear to have been at all flagrant or purposeful, and it did not taint the co-tenants' subsequent consent. The district court's determination that the co-tenants' consents were voluntary is not clearly erroneous. Pineda-Soria contends that even if the consents were voluntary, neither co-tenant had any authority to actually give it. By failing to object to the magistrate judge's recommendation finding that they had authority, Pineda-Soria has waived this issue on appeal. United States v. Moore, 563 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir.2009). And in any event, the co-tenants did have apparent authority to consent to the search. A police officer asked both men, in Spanish, if they lived in the unit, and both answered that they did. Pineda-Soria argues that officers have a duty to inquire further as to a third party's authority, but that is only true when the circumstances make the authority questionable in the first place. See United States v. Goins, 437 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir.2006). An officer can conduct a search when the facts available at the time warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (quotation omitted). Here, the facts clearly warranted such a belief. Pineda and Lazcano had authority to grant consent to search Apartment B.
Having reached this conclusion, we need not address the voluntariness of Pineda-Soria's consent, but do so anyway. We are more concerned with the voluntariness of Pineda-Soria's consent than we are with that of the co-tenants. He was rousted out of bed and whisked away to a police station for interrogation, and was thus in a far more restrictive and potentially coercive setting than the co-tenants were. And unlike the co-tenants, Pineda-Soria was not on the premises and had no knowledge of what was transpiring there. For all Pineda-Soria knew, contraband could already have been found at the location, and he may well have felt pressure to appear cooperative and consent when he otherwise would not have. See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 605 n. 12, 95 S.Ct. 2254. At the same time, he was given Miranda warnings, spoken to in his native Spanish, and chose to sign a written consent form agreeing to the search. While the question of the voluntariness of Pineda-Soria's consent is a closer call than that of his co-tenants, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made by the district court, and we find no clear error in its finding that Pineda-Soria's consent was also voluntary. Lewis, 608 F.3d at 1000 (quotation and citation omitted). Having found that the district court did not err in concluding that the consents from Pineda-Soria and the co-tenants were valid, we need not reach the question of whether the inevitable discovery doctrine would also have justified the warrantless search. See United States v. Patterson, 65 F.3d 68, 72 (7th Cir.1995). We affirm the district court's denial of Pineda-Soria's motion to suppress the contraband found in his apartment and the statements he made in connection therewith.