Opinion ID: 197410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: See Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995)

Text: -15- 15 (holding that a plaintiff may rely on the same evidence to prove both pretext and discrimination). Molloy was suspended without being offered the same rights granted to similarly situated male officers. Moreover, the reasons supplied by the Chief for his refusal to provide Molloy with a hearing were so flimsy as to permit a finding of mendacity: The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination . . . . St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). See also Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260- 61 n.3 (1st Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 843 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018 (1994). The Chief was experienced in matters arising under the Officers' Bill of Rights, yet he refused to grant Plaintiff her rights even after, with the assistance of an attorney and a union representative, she had requested a hearing. The Chief said that he had refused to grant Molloy a hearing because the City Solicitor had told him no hearing was required. Yet the statutory language seems utterly clear that a hearing was required in this case. See R.I. Gen. Laws 42-28.6-13(C) (Any law enforcement officer so suspended -16- 16 shall be entitled to a prompt hearing before a hearing committee upon his or her request.). The Chief's outright refusal was in marked contrast to his regular allowance of these rights to male officers. We hold that the jury had sufficient evidence from which to infer discriminatory intent.