Opinion ID: 737195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defamation of Crane

Text: 12 The question of whether the unprivileged paragraphs were capable of a defamatory meaning with respect to Crane is a question of law subject to de novo review. Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d 1389, 1398 (9th Cir.1986). 13 In order for the issue to go to the jury, the district court need only have determined that by any reasonable interpretation the language is susceptible to a defamatory meaning. Selleck v. Globe Intern., Inc., 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1131 (1985). 14 As we stated supra, the natural implication of the juxtaposition is that either Henderson or Crane lied, and that it is likely, therefore, that they were both guilty of the underlying charges. The implication of the three paragraphs was thus defamatory. 15 Although this court has yet to decide the matter, see Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1152 n. 9 (9th Cir.1995), the D.C.Circuit and the Fourth Circuit have adopted the additional requirement that a plaintiff cannot succeed in a libel claim for a defamatory implication arising from the recitation of true facts without proving that the defendant endorsed the implied defamatory meaning. White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C.Cir.1990); Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir.1993). It is not necessary to decide whether to adopt that test because Seper testified that he intentionally juxtaposed the paragraphs in order to imply that Henderson was lying; in doing so, he admitted that he intended and endorsed that implication.