Opinion ID: 461631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion for acquittal or severance

Text: 40 Defendant Liefer contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for acquittal. Liefer correctly points out that the only prosecution witness to connect him to the conspiracy was Jeffrey Cox, whose credibility Liefer challenged at trial. Even if we were to accept Liefer's argument that the case against him was weak, his challenge is essentially a credibility challenge, and thus within the province of the jury. 9 If the jury believed Cox's testimony linking Liefer to the Schair/Bayles conspiracy, then that evidence suffices to support a conviction. We thus uphold the trial court's denial of Liefer's motion for acquittal. 41 An appellate court reviewing a motion for acquittal applies the same standard as the trial court, United States v. Weed, 689 F.2d 752, 756 (7th Cir.1982), i.e., whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government could support a conviction, United States v. Redwine, 715 F.2d 315, 319 (7th Cir.1983). We do not substitute our own determination of the credibility of witnesses, of the weight of the evidence, or of the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, for those of the jury. United States v. Mariani, 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir.1984). The jury evidently chose to accept the testimony of Cox concerning Liefer's involvement in the conspiracy, and Cox's testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, supports the trial court's decision to deny the motion for acquittal.
42 Defendant Liefer also challenges the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for severance. Liefer contends that he was prejudiced in that the jury heard massive amounts of evidence about the illegal activities of other participants in the conspiracy, most of which did not directly concern Liefer. 10 We find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Liefer's motion for severance. 43 The decision whether to grant a severance involves a balance between important interests. On one hand, we have recognized a strong public interest in having persons jointly indicted for conspiracy tried together. United States v. Gironda, 758 F.2d 1201, 1220 (7th Cir.1985); United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 610 (7th Cir.1985). On the other hand, a joint trial may prejudice one or more of the defendants by confusing the jury as to what evidence is offered against each defendant. United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 267 (7th Cir.1983). The district court ordinarily is in the best position to balance this public policy preference for joint trials against the possibility that a joint trial may prejudice one of the defendants. Gironda, 758 F.2d at 1220. See also Percival, 756 F.2d at 610; Shively, 715 F.2d at 267. 44 Therefore, the decision whether to grant a motion for severance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Gironda, 758 F.2d at 1220; Percival, 756 F.2d at 610. The judge correctly instructed the jury to give separate consideration as to what the evidence showed with respect to each defendant, not to consider against any defendant evidence admitted solely against some other defendant or defendants, and to decide each defendant's case on the evidence and law applicable to that particular defendant. We affirm the conviction of defendant Liefer.