Opinion ID: 2747260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Checkpoint

Text: The second question presented by Piper’s appeal is whether all evidence obtained as a result of the July 14, 2012, checkpoint should have been suppressed because the checkpoint was unconstitutional. The county court concluded the checkpoint was constitutional and overruled the motion to suppress on two occasions—before trial and again during trial. On appeal, the district court also concluded that the checkpoint was constitutional and affirmed the county court’s decision not to suppress the evidence. Piper argues that in reviewing the constitutionality of the checkpoint, we should consider only that evidence adduced at the suppression hearing. We disagree. When a motion to suppress is overruled pretrial and again during trial on renewed objection, an appellate court considers all the evidence, both from trial and from the hearing on the motion to suppress. Bromm, supra. Therefore, in reviewing the district court’s conclusion that the county court did not err in determining that the checkpoint was constitutional, we consider the evidence adduced both at the suppression hearing and at the trial.
[16,17] The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Matit, 288 Neb. 163, 846 N.W.2d 232 (2014). “[A] vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000). See, also, Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979). Whether a checkpoint is lawful thus depends Nebraska Advance Sheets 376 289 NEBRASKA REPORTS upon whether it is reasonable. See Sitz, supra. “The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest . . . depends ‘“on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.”’” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979) (citations omitted). The public interest served by a checkpoint is assessed according to the primary purpose of the checkpoint. See Edmond, supra. A court does not look at the subjective intent of individual law enforcement officers administering the checkpoint, but examines purpose “at the programmatic level.” See id., 531 U.S. at 48. The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of checkpoints “designed primarily to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.” Id., 531 U.S. at 41. In Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447, the Court approved the use of “sobriety checkpoints” meant to prevent drunken driving. And in Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004), the Court ruled that law enforcement could legally conduct checkpoints seeking information about a specific, recently committed hit-and-run accident. Conversely, a vehicle checkpoint whose primary purpose was “to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing” violated the Fourth Amendment. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42. In Edmond, the Court explained: We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individ­ ualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime. 531 U.S. at 44. The purpose of a checkpoint must be balanced against the checkpoint’s “intrusion” on motorists’ individual rights. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654. See, also, Brown, supra. The intrusion effectuated by a checkpoint can, depending on the Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PIPER 377 Cite as 289 Neb. 364 circumstances, be “slight” and “minimal.” See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451, 452. However, even where a checkpoint effectuates only a limited intrusion, it cannot subject motorists to “the unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials.” See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. A “central concern in balancing” the public interest and the interference with individual liberty is “to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51. In State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 383 N.W.2d 461 (1986), we adopted the “unfettered discretion” standard of Brown. Several on-duty police officers, none of whom ranked higher than sergeant, had decided to set up unplanned, “transitory” checkpoints during their shift. See Crom, 222 Neb. at 274, 383 N.W.2d 461. The checkpoints were not governed by “any standards, guidelines, or procedures promulgated by the policymakers for the police department or other law enforcement agency.” See id. at 274, 383 N.W.2d at 461-62. Rather, “[t]he officers were free to move the checkpoint from place to place and in fact established a number of such checkpoints at different locations throughout the city of Omaha at various times, as they alone saw fit.” See id. at 274, 383 N.W.2d at 462. We concluded that such checkpoints were unconstitutional. We explained that because “there was no plan formulated at the policymaking level of the Omaha Police Department, or elsewhere,” the officers in the field were “left free to decide when, where, and how to establish and operate the transitory checkpoint in question.” Id. at 277, 383 N.W.2d at 463. As such, motorists stopped at the checkpoints were subjected “to arbitrary invasion solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” See id.
Checkpoint Considering these principles within the context of the instant appeal, we conclude that the July 14, 2012, checkpoint was reasonable. It was established for a permissible Nebraska Advance Sheets 378 289 NEBRASKA REPORTS purpose, involved only minimal intrusion, and was not operated according to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers.
Petersen testified that although the checkpoint was called a “vehicle check,” it was funded by an “alcohol enforcement grant” and was part of an “alcohol-related enforcement project.” He explained that the purpose of the checkpoint was to “target[] alcohol-related violations.” Based on this evidence, the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint was comparable to that of the sobriety checkpoints upheld in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990), and was thus permissible.
The intrusion caused by the checkpoint was minimal. Absent signs of criminal activity, each vehicle was stopped for only a brief period of time—the driver of each vehicle was allowed to proceed after an officer conducted a brief check of the motorist’s condition, driver’s license, vehicle registration, and insurance card, as well as the vehicle’s lights, turn signals, brakes, horn, and windshield wipers. All vehicles were stopped. Thus, the intrusion caused by the checkpoint was no greater than the minimal intrusion caused by the checkpoints in Sitz.
Piper argues that the July 14, 2012, checkpoint subjected motorists to the unfettered discretion of officers in the field, because the plan was “not formulated by a person at the policy making level, but by a person involved in the field.” See brief for appellant at 15. She cites to State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 277, 383 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1986), in which we held that a checkpoint subjected motorists to the “unfettered discretion of officers in the field” and was thus unconstitutional, because “there was no plan formulated at the policymaking level.” Piper acknowledges that the plan for the July 14, 2012, checkpoint was approved by a supervisor within the State Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PIPER 379 Cite as 289 Neb. 364 Patrol. But she argues that this approval was not sufficient to make the checkpoint at which she was stopped constitutional. She alleges that the plan was not “formulated” at the policymaking level, because it was written by a nonsupervisor, and that [m]erely having the formality of rubber stamping a plan at the supervisory level is insufficient. A plan must start at the top and work its way down to officers in the field, not vice-versa. When the officer’s [sic] in the field create the plan and seek approval, it is an unconstitutional checkpoint. See brief for appellant at 15. In effect, Piper argues that as it was used to describe the unconstitutional checkpoint in Crom, the term “formulated” meant “conceived” or “created.” But in the context of Crom, “formulated” refers to acts which would make a plan binding, such as approval and endorsement by an individual at the policymaking level. Crom did not hold, as Piper argues, that the plan for a checkpoint must be conceived at the policymaking level in order for the checkpoint to pass the test for unfettered discretion. Any question as to the meaning of “formulated” in Crom was clarified by State v. One 1987 Toyota Pickup, 233 Neb. 670, 447 N.W.2d 243 (1989), overruled on other grounds, State v. Spotts, 257 Neb. 44, 595 N.W.2d 259 (1999). There, we considered whether a checkpoint that was operated according to a plan created by an officer in a nonsupervisory capacity met the test established in Crom. If “formulated” meant “conceived” or “created,” the fact that the checkpoint plan in One 1987 Toyota Pickup was created by a nonsupervisor would have been the determinative fact in our analysis. But it was not. Instead, in holding the checkpoint unconstitutional, we focused on the fact that the officers conducting the checkpoint had deviated from the plan by changing the date, time, location, and type of checkpoint without obtaining “reapproval.” See id. at 674, 447 N.W.2d at 246. We read “formulated” as meaning “approved.” [18] In addition to clarifying the meaning of “formulated,” One 1987 Toyota Pickup established that a highway checkpoint must be both authorized by an approved plan and Nebraska Advance Sheets 380 289 NEBRASKA REPORTS conducted in a manner that complies with the plan and the policy established by the authority at the policymaking level. As such, to determine whether the discretion of the officers operating a checkpoint was sufficiently constrained, we consider whether the checkpoint was approved and whether it was operated in accordance with the approved plan and State Patrol policy, as well as any other circumstances that may indicate the exercise of unfettered discretion. In the instant case, the checkpoint did not involve the exercise of unfettered discretion. As we explain below, the discretion of the officers conducting the checkpoint was limited by an approved plan that conformed to State Patrol policy. Operation of the checkpoint did not deviate from the plan or the policy. The existence of a valid checkpoint plan limited the discretion of the officers conducting the checkpoint. The plan was valid, because as required by paragraph II(A)(2) of policy No. 07-29-01, the decision to conduct the checkpoint was made by “a neutral source, such as a supervisor who is not involved in conducting the operation in the field.” Korell made the decision to operate the checkpoint by approving and signing the plan. And he was a “neutral source,” because he was a supervisor and did not participate in conducting the checkpoint. The approved plan established the date, time, location, and duration of the checkpoint, as well as the pattern for placement of signs and flares. In operating the checkpoint, the officers did not deviate from the plan. All remaining aspects of the checkpoint were delineated by State Patrol policy No. 07-29-01. The policy specified that “[a]ll vehicles must be stopped and checked” except when there was heavy traffic flow or there were more than three waiting vehicles per officer. It required that each stopped vehicle be checked for 10 specific items, including driver’s license, vehicle registration, proof of insurance, and “driver’s condition.” The policy prohibited officers from asking motorists to get out of their vehicles unless “violations of the law [were] detected or reasonably suspected.” Thus, the policy significantly constrained the exercise of discretion by the officers administering the checkpoint. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PIPER 381 Cite as 289 Neb. 364 Piper argues that the checkpoint violated paragraph II(A)(7) of policy No. 07-29-01, because the officers conducting the checkpoint “made a decision not to stop every car.” See brief for appellant at 16. Piper is referring to the fact that in the case of vehicles that approached the checkpoint on multiple occasions, the officers “did not recheck them after they had already been checked once.” This occurred with either one or two vehicles. They were stopped on their initial approach to the checkpoint. But after the initial stop, the officers waved the repeat vehicles through the checkpoint once they had ascertained that it was the same driver. No evidence was adduced about the reason these vehicles approached the checkpoint on multiple occasions. However, at trial, the parties’ attorneys suggested that the vehicles were driven by designated drivers for a local celebration that was going on at the time. The fact that these vehicles were stopped only on their first approach to the checkpoint did not violate State Patrol policy No. 07-29-01. Paragraph II(A)(7) of the policy required “[a]ll vehicles” to be “stopped and checked.” At the July 14, 2012, checkpoint, all vehicles were stopped and checked. Each vehicle that approached the checkpoint was stopped without exception. Vehicles that were waved through the checkpoint had been stopped and inspected on their first pass through the checkpoint. Thus, no vehicle escaped being stopped and checked at the checkpoint. Piper does not argue that the checkpoint violated any other provisions of the policy, and we find no evidence of any violations. As such, we find that operation of the checkpoint complied with State Patrol policy.
of Checkpoint The July 14, 2012, checkpoint was administered for an appropriate purpose, the intrusion caused by the checkpoint was minimal, and the officers were not allowed to exercise unfettered discretion in the administration of the checkpoint. The district court did not err in affirming the order of the county court which overruled Piper’s motion to suppress the Nebraska Advance Sheets 382 289 NEBRASKA REPORTS evidence obtained as a result of the checkpoint as the fruit of an illegal search and seizure.