Opinion ID: 77991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Carter's Hearsay Objection

Text: Carter timely objected when the prosecutor asked Michael Carpenter about the events surrounding Johns' death. The following exchange took place: Q. And when you left, what was going on there at the house? A. He was waiting, he said he was waiting on somebody to come with some cocaine, that he had  waiting on some cocaine to come in. Q. And do you know who?    Q. Do you know who he was waiting on? A. Bip, he said.    Q. And when you left, had Bip arrived? A. Yeah. He was just coming in, and they went to the back. Carter maintains the district court erred in allowing the government to elicit information about the source of the cocaine Johns used, and without the objectionable answers containing the words Johns spoke to Carpenter, there would have been no other evidence presented concerning the source of the controlled substances that caused or contributed to Johns' death. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Perez-Oliveros, 479 F.3d 779, 783 (11th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Appellant must demonstrate that `the district court's decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to fact.' United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1295 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir.2005)). The government agrees that Carpenter's statements concerning what Johns told him are hearsay statements admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, presumptively inadmissible under Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R.Evid. 802. Nonetheless, the government suggests several hearsay exceptions apply, most notably the Rule 804(b)(3) exception. Rule 804(b)(3) permits admission of a hearsay statement which [ ] at the time of its making . . . so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3). To be admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), a statement must satisfy three elements: `(1) the declarant [must be] unavailable; (2) the statement so far tends to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) the statement is corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness.' United States v. Costa, 31 F.3d 1073, 1077 (11th Cir.1994) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Harrell, 788 F.2d 1524, 1526 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). While a determination of whether a statement is against the declarant's penal interest is purely a question of law subject to de novo review, see Costa, 31 F.3d at 1077, consideration of a statement's trustworthiness requires a review of findings of fact and a review of the trial court's application of a legal standard to the facts. See United States v. Bagley, 537 F.2d 162, 166 (5th Cir.1976). Because the trial court made no finding regarding the applicability of the statement against penal interest exception, or any other hearsay exception, we `determine whether any reasonable view of the evidence,' United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 907 (11th Cir.1989) (quoting Bagley, 537 F.2d at 167), supports the trustworthiness of Johns' statements. The first element is easily satisfied, as Johns was unavailable to testify at trial. The second element, whether the statements were against Johns' penal interest, we also resolve in the affirmative, although not without some explanation. For a statement to be against penal interest, it must so far tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527. Initially, given Johns' close relationship to Carpenter, it would appear that Johns would not have believed his statements would subject him to criminal liability. However, it is unnecessary that the declarant know he was speaking to a person who could cause his prosecution. Id. Thus, for example, courts have held that the mere fact that the recipient of the information was a confidante of the declarant does not rule out admissibility of a statement as against interest. See Bagley, 537 F.2d at 165 (The fact that the statement was made to a friend and cellmate has no relevance to the determination whether the statement was against the declarant's penal interest.); United States v. Mock, 640 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.1981) (fact that the statement was made to his former wife does not destroy its credibility); Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527 (refusing to engraft onto the second element of the Rule a requirement that appellants must know that they were being recorded and that they must know that they were speaking with persons who could have caused their prosecution); Costa, 31 F.3d at 1078-79 (distinguishing custodial statements implicating self and others from spontaneous declarations made to acquaintances, friends and confederates; the latter being more trustworthy) (citations omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, we do not think a reasonable man would falsely admit to waiting for cocaine at the Clay Street home, a serious crime, knowing there was a chance, albeit slight, that the admission could be used to subject him to severe penalties. See Harrell, 788 F.2d at 1527; United States v. Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir.1978) (fact that statement was made to friend and cellmate not relevant to whether statement was against declarant's penal interest). The last element to consider, then, is whether the statements are corroborated by circumstances clearly indicating their trustworthiness. Prior to the admission of the statements, the government had elicited testimony from Carpenter that he and his cousin Johns used drugs together from about 1998 until Johns' death in 2001, and that they usually obtained their drugs at the Clay Street home. Carpenter had explained he and Johns were injecting methadone in a back room of the Clay Street home before Carpenter left, before Johns stated he would wait on somebody to come with some cocaine, and that the somebody was Bip or Carter. Sufficient corroborating circumstances were presented to satisfy the trustworthiness element, and thus we conclude the statements were admissible as statements against Johns' penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3), Federal Rules of Evidence.