Opinion ID: 6221174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Step 1: Eligibility

Text: The district judge is first tasked with determining a de- fendant’s sentence-reduction eligibility under § 404. Hudson, 967 F.3d at 610. In this case, the district court stated: “Because defendant is eligible for relief under the First Step Act as to at least part of his conviction, the court will analyze his motion for relief with discretion to potentially resentence him as if he had been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act.” However, the district court went on to hold that the “defendant [was] not legally eligible for relief under the First Step Act.” The district court determined that McSwain did not “actually qualify for relief because he was specifically found guilty of a quantity of heroin that qualified him for a mandatory minimum sentence,” and “heroin is not part of the relief now available under the Fair Sentencing Act[].” In sum, the district court—despite including language more appropriately situated in the second discretionary step of this analysis—disqualified McSwain as ineligible. Both parties now agree that this ineligibility determination (whether as an inadvertent use of a legally significant term or as an actual conclusion as to Step 1) was in error. Whether a conviction amounts to a “covered offense” is a statutory interpretation determination we review de novo. No. 20-2732 7 Hudson, 967 F.3d at 609. The rule governing interplay between the First Step Act and multi-drug conspiracies in our Circuit has not been firmly established, but caselaw from our sister circuits is instructive. In our Circuit, Hudson establishes that when a defendant has been sentenced for two crimes, only one of which is covered by the First Step Act, “a district judge has discretion to revise the entire sentencing package.” United States v. Hible, 13 F.4th 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Hudson, 967 F.3d at 610). Beyond our Circuit, the emerging caselaw supports the conclusion that defendants in McSwain’s situation are eligible, at least at Step 1’s threshold inquiry, for discretionary sentence reduction. See United States v. Reed, 7 F.4th 105, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2021) (“In light of the statutory language in Section 404, we hold that [defendant’s] multi-object conspiracy conviction, with a crack cocaine object that included a drug-quantity element triggering the statutory penalties set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), qualifies as a ‘covered offense’ eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act.”); United States v. Spencer, 998 F.3d 843, 845–47 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The First Step Act does not require [a showing] that the Fair Sentencing Act reduced [defendant’s] penalties.”); United States v. Winters, 986 F.3d 942, 948–50 (5th Cir. 2021) (“In the case of a multi-object offense, the argument that eligibility requires that there be a change in the statutory range resulting from considering all objects of the conspiracy is adding language to what Congress stated in simple terms.”); United States v. Taylor, 982 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he ‘statutory penalties for’ an offense involving one of the crack-cocaine drug-quantity elements previously specified in the federal drug-trafficking statute ‘were modified by’ § 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act, even if the movant ultimately would be subject to the same statutory sentencing 8 No. 20-2732 range as a consequence of another drug-quantity element of the offense.”); United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2020) (explaining the First Step Act still applies to convictions involving other substances so long as the conspiracy included cocaine base); United States v. Barrio, 849 F. App’x 762, 764 (10th Cir. 2021) (affirming that a conspiracy conviction involving both crack cocaine and powder cocaine was a “covered offense” within the meaning of § 404(a) of the First Step Act). In this Circuit, “[w]e do not create conflicts among the circuits without strong cause.” Mayer v. Spanel Int’l Ltd., 51 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 1995). The government initially argued that McSwain was not convicted of a covered offense and therefore was not eligible for relief under § 404. The government has since reexamined its position, as noted in supplemental briefing. Pointing to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1862–63 (2021), and the growing number of circuit courts ruling against the government’s previous position, the government now advances the position that conspiracy to traffic crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) is a covered offense, “even if another object of the conspiracy triggered the same statutory penalty range.” We accept the government’s concession that McSwain has satisfied Step 1 and move to Step 2. See Krieger v. United States, 842 F.3d 490, 499 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that the Court of Appeals is “not bound to accept the government’s concession when the point at issue is a question of law” but may do so when “that concession seems apt”). No. 20-2732 9