Opinion ID: 2508531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court Erred When Granting The Scaggs' Second Motion For Attorney Fees.

Text: On October 10, 2002, the district court issued a Decision and Order that confirmed the arbitration award and denied the Scaggs' request for attorney fees. In its Order dated May 2, 2003, the district court viewed the prior Decision and Order as a final judgment; it stated, While not expressly framed as such, it is clear that the motion before the court is to alter the prior judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b) which empowers a court to relieve a party from a judgment which is otherwise final.  (emphasis added). The district court relied upon I.R.C.P. 60(b) when it entered the new ruling granting attorney fees. However, in their briefs and at oral argument, both parties maintain that I.R.C.P. 60(b) is not applicable to this case. Mutual of Enumclaw agrees with the district court's characterization of the October 10, 2002 Decision and Order as a final judgment, but argues it was error to grant the second Motion for Attorney Fees since no appeal was perfected within 42 days as required by I.A.R. 14. The Scaggs dispute the district court's characterization of the October 10, 2002 Decision and Order as a final judgment. They argue their first Motion for Attorney Fees should be treated as a summary judgment motion, and that the October 10, 2002 Decision and Order confirming the arbitration award and denying attorney fees effectively denied in part the Scaggs' summary judgment motion. They assert that the issuance of a Rule 54(b) certificate was required in order for the judgment to be considered final. Therefore, the Scaggs argue that their Second Motion for Attorney Fees was effectively a motion for reconsideration and the October 10, 2002 Decision and Order is subject to revision at any time prior to the issuance of a Rule 54(b) certificate. We hold the October 10, 2002 Decision and Order is a final judgment and the Scaggs' Motion for Attorney Fees is not a summary judgment motion. Even if this Court were to accept the Scaggs' position that their first Motion for Attorney Fees should be considered a motion for summary judgment, the October 10, 2002 Decision and Order is still a final judgment. The general rule is that if an order or judgment ends the suit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties, the instrument constitutes a final judgment. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999). In Davis, the Court held the summary judgment entered was final and appealable because there were no claims left to be resolved. Id. at 640-41, 991 P.2d at 365-66. Similarly, in this case there were no issues left after the district court's ruling. The district judge stated, I think the case is done, because I have ordered that the award be confirmed, and the only thing that's left is the attorney fees issue, so I don't know if it needs a 54(b), if that's all that's left. Therefore, even if treated as a summary judgment motion, the Scaggs' Motion for Attorney Fees is a final judgment without the issuance of a Rule 54(b) certificate. The October 10, 2002 Decision and Order is a final judgment. Both Mutual of Enumclaw and the Scaggs have stated in their briefs and at oral argument that the application of I.R.C.P. 60 is not appropriate here. The Scaggs were required to appeal the final judgment entered on October 10, 2002, within 42 days under I.A.R. 14. Because they failed to do so, the district court did not have jurisdiction to apply the ruling of Martin to change the original decision denying attorney fees.