Opinion ID: 1091695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: As to Defendant Godwin:

Text: Although § 5-5A-41 exempts the Bank from liability, it does not empower the bank to determine ownership of a joint account in its depository. Jones v. Jones, 423 So.2d 205 (Ala.1982). Title is determined in accordance with the intentions of the parties stated in the instrument creating such tenancy, pursuant to Code 1975, § 35-4-7. The only word used in the checking account agreement in the instant case from which one might infer the creation of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship is or. Therefore, at first glimpse, it appears that this Court's holding in Farmer v. Farmer, 455 So.2d 1 (Ala.1984), should be controlling; however, that case may be distinguished on its facts. The primary issue in Farmer was the determination of the rightful payees of a promissory note. Appellant argued that, because the note was payable on its face to Clyde E. Farmer, or Grace Farmer, or Charles Edgar Farmer (emphasis added), there was evidence of intent that the note be held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship. This Court refused to accept the argument and quoted its holding in Ex parte Lovett, 450 So.2d 116, 117 (Ala.1984): As between the claimants to the proceeds, here, the administratrix of the estate of Mrs. Spruell, Mrs. Uptain on the one hand, and Mrs. Lovett on the other, § 35-4-7, Code [1975], is the controlling statute with regard to Mrs. Lovett's claim to the proceeds as a joint tenant with right of survivorship. Title to personalty by that act is determined in accordance with the intention of the parties `stated in the instrument creating such tenancy.' Nothing in the evidence suggests that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship was intended. That being so, Mrs. Lovett is not entitled to the entire fund, because the certificate of deposit did not create a survivorship estate in her. Both Farmer and Lovett can be distinguished from this case, because in each of those cases the instrument at issue was complete on its face. Therefore, there existed no reason for the admission of parol evidence. To the contrary, here, we have an instrument that is not complete on its face. No one designated the proper kind of account on the front of the instrument. Thus, the instrument is incomplete and therefore ambiguous. We have two alternatives in this case. We may discard the contract as void for its incompleteness, or we may accept the contract as incomplete and allow parol evidence to clarify the ambiguity. Because of the obvious intent on the part of the decedent to execute the contract as a completed document, we hold that the ambiguity created by the incompleteness is subject to clarification and being made certain by parol evidence. In our consideration of the issue of admission of parol evidence to explain the incomplete instrument, the case of Port City Construction Co. v. Henderson, 266 So.2d 896, 48 Ala.App. 639 (1972), is persuasive. There, the Court of Civil Appeals found no error in the trial court's allowing parol evidence of consistent additional terms and of facts and circumstances surrounding the formation of a contract, where the contract was ambiguous, lacked clarity, and did not include all the terms necessary for construction. The fundamental determination in the legal construction of contracts is the real intention of the parties. 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 49 (1963). The primary rule of construction is that the court must, if possible, ascertain and give effect to the common intention of the parties, so far as that may be done without contravention of legal principles, statutes, or public policy. C.J.S., Id., at 48. In Lovett, supra, the evidence reflected a certificate of deposit carried on the bank's records in the names of Cora Spruell or Betty Lovett. This Court found nothing in the evidence to suggest that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship was intended. Contrary to the evidence in Lovett, here, we have evidence of an inter vivos gift. See, for example, Dempsey v. First National Bank of Scranton, 359 Pa. 177, 58 A.2d 14 (1948), involving a joint account where the Court held that the proof of the decedent's signature and the offering of the signature card into evidence was prima facie evidence of a gift. [1] In the case at bar, the evidence suggests that decedent's executed signature card, when clarified by parol evidence, expresses an intent to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.