Opinion ID: 1198919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is GC's Cable Act Claim Moot?

Text: GVEA argues that GC's Cable Act claim is moot. We have stated that [u]nder ordinary circumstances, we will refrain from deciding questions where events have rendered the legal issue moot. Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass'n v. State, 900 P.2d 1191, 1195 (Alaska 1995) (citations omitted). A claim will be deemed moot if it has lost its character as a present, live controversy. Id. We have further held that `[a] case is moot if the party bringing the action would not be entitled to any relief even if they prevail.' O'Callaghan v. State, 920 P.2d 1387, 1388 (Alaska 1996) (citations omitted). GVEA contends that because GC has already obtained an easement across the Axtell property through eminent domain, there is no relief possible for GC, even if it prevails on appeal. GVEA argues that, according to the terms of GC's stipulation with the Axtells, GC is not entitled to the $500 it paid as just compensation for the taking. The stipulation states that [t]here will be no appeal of the Master's decision to the Supreme Court. GC argues that if we hold GC has the right to use GVEA's easement, GC has no obligation to `take' any portion of the Axtells' property and/or to compensate the Axtells for the use of GVEA's easement. GC contends that relief is possible if it prevails  recovery of the $500 it paid the Axtells for the easement. GC also argues that the stipulation not to appeal the master's decision relates only to the issue of the amount of damages. We conclude that GC's claim is moot. Without deciding whether § 541(a)(2) authorizes access to private easements, we note that such a construction would violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against taking without just compensation unless the Cable Act were also construed to provide for just compensation for any taking. See Cable Holdings of Georgia, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 953 F.2d 600, 604-06 (11th Cir.1992). Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. suggests that GC's unconsented physical use of the Axtells' easement, even if authorized by the Cable Act, would be a taking that requires just compensation. See Loretto, 458 U.S. 419, 421, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (holding that a minor but permanent physical occupation of an owner's property authorized by the government constitutes a `taking' of property for which just compensation is due under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution). The Cable Act seems to require just compensation. Subsection (C) of § 541(a)(2) requires the cable operator to ensure that, the owner of the property be justly compensated by the cable operator for any damages caused by the installation, construction, operation, or removal of such facilities by the cable operator. But see Cable Holdings, 953 F.2d at 604 n. 2. (stating that subsection (C) applies exclusively to damages, and does not provide just compensation for the taking); Cable Invs., Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir.1989) (same). GC obtained its easement through eminent domain. The central objective in eminent domain proceedings is to determine just compensation. See Babinec v. State, 512 P.2d 563, 570 (Alaska 1973). GC has already paid the Axtells $500, the amount the court-appointed master determined to be just compensation for the taking. This amount is equivalent to the amount GC would be required to pay the Axtells as just compensation assuming the Cable Act authorized access. Because GC would not be entitled to recover the $500 it paid the Axtells even if it prevailed on its Cable Act claim, we conclude that this controversy is moot.