Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilt-Phase Voir Dire Inadequacy

Text: Finally, we note that defendant argues that the jury voir dire for the guilt-phase proceedings was inadequate in several respects. Specifically, defendant maintains that the trial court erred by failing to ask prospective jurors whether they would accept the principles of presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that such inquiries are essential to determine whether the prospective jurors would hold the State to its burden of proof during deliberations. Jury fairness and impartiality takes on added significance in capital cases. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39, 61, 459 A. 2d 641 (1983) ( Williams I ). We have emphasized the importance of the voir dire examination of prospective jurors to reveal potential and latent biases. State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 409-10, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988) ( Williams II ). However, trial courts are allowed broad discretion to assess the qualification of jurors, the exercise of which will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 160, 203 A. 2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 690, 13 L.Ed. 2d 572 (1965); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256-57, 524 A. 2d 188 (Of necessity, a sound measure of discretion must be reposed in our trial courts to determine whether a given juror can well and truly discharge the grave responsibility entrusted.). Two of defendant's proposed questions were rejected by the trial court. The first pertained to the prospective juror's ability to presume defendant's innocence despite the fact that defendant had been charged with three murders. The second question focused on the juror's ability to hold the prosecution to its burden of proof even if the juror personally believed that defendant was guilty. The trial court declined to present those questions because presumption of innocence and burden of proof would be adequately addressed in the court's jury instructions and in the court's general voir dire question: whether the jurors could follow the law as charged. Nevertheless, the trial court did agree to ask the jurors whether they could set aside any personal feelings in a case involving three murders. The trial court instructed the assembled prospective jurors and the jury selected on the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof. The court also probed each juror concerning whether he or she would have difficulty setting aside personal feelings in a case involving three murders. When one prospective juror indicated that he would hold it against defendant if he elected not to testify, the court asked whether he could not set aside that bias in light of the court's instructions on the defendant's right not to testify and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When the juror responded that he would hold defendant's failure not to testify against defendant if it was close, the court promptly excused the juror. Based on a examination of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rejection of defendant's request to question individually prospective guilt-phase jurors on their willingness to accept the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Although we encourage trial courts to be sensitive to permitting attorneys to conduct some voir dire,  State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 30, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987), we note here that the trial court adopted the majority of the voir dire questions submitted by defendant. The decision to omit two of eight questions was well within the trial court's discretion. Further, the instructions to the prospective jurors and the deliberating jurors were sufficient to ensure that the jury was impartial and could follow the law as charged.