Opinion ID: 201833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 32 Sánchez and Cotto both challenge the district court's denial of their motions for judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R.Crim.P. 29. We ordinarily review the denial of such motions de novo, asking whether the evidence, construed favorably to the government, permitted rational jurors to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty as charged. United States v. Sebaggala, 256 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir.2001). The government can supply a satisfactory answer to this question through either direct or circumstantial evidence, or through any combination thereof. United States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1996). 33 Sánchez claims that the government did not present sufficient evidence to prove the intent necessary for a conspiracy conviction. Without ever using the word entrapment, he employs the essentials of that construct to argue that the district court should have found entrapment as a matter of law. 5 We reject his importunings. 34 To defeat a sufficiency challenge premised on a defense of entrapment, the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, need only support a finding of either predisposition or lack of improper inducement. See Rodriguez, 858 F.2d at 814. The record in this case contains ample evidence on both points. 35 A discussion of lack of any improper inducement would substantially replicate what we already have written in relation to Cotto. ( See supra Part II©). As to predisposition, we note that Sánchez's involvement in the drug escort was recorded and presented to the jury. Among other things, the jurors heard Sánchez being told, over and over again, that he did not have to participate in the venture. The jurors also heard Sánchez state that he was not worried about doing something that he knew was illegal; he was worried only about the possibility of being caught. From this and other evidence, it is abundantly clear that the government provided enough proof for a rational jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Sánchez was predisposed to commit the crime (and, therefore, was not entrapped). 36 Cotto's Rule 29 challenge takes a different tack. He jettisons his entrapment argument at this juncture in favor of an argument that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the weapons count because the government used sham cocaine in the underlying transport operation. Therefore, his thesis runs, his firearm could not have been used in furtherance of any drug-related crime. 37 The first flaw in this line of argument is that Cotto did not pursue it below. Since this particular theory of insufficiency was not preserved, our review is limited to the prevention of clear and gross injustice. 6 Santiago, 83 F.3d at 23. 38 The evidence here is palpably sufficient to support the weapons count. The statute of conviction applies to any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . for which the person may be prosecuted . . ., uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The government brought the charge against Cotto in conjunction with the conspiracy count. A culpable conspiracy may exist even though the conspirators misapprehend certain facts. United States v. Waldron, 590 F.2d 33, 34 (1st Cir.1979). (A conspiracy to traffic in controlled substances, punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 846, is itself a drug-trafficking crime and may serve as a predicate offense for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924©). See United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir.1989). While the substantive crime that is the object of the conspiracy may be impossible to achieve, the conspiracy nonetheless qualifies as an offense for which a person may be prosecuted. See Waldron, 590 F.2d at 34. 39 That conclusion leads to game, set, and match. If the use of sham cocaine has no effect on the underlying conspiracy charge, then a fortiori, it has no effect on the weapons charge in this case. 40 Without a showing that the weapons count failed as a matter of law, Cotto's sufficiency challenge fizzles. Videotaped evidence showed Cotto with his firearm during the drug transport and additional testimony confirmed that he had his firearm with him during the commission of the crime. That evidence is certainly enough to allow a rational jury to conclude — as this jury did — that Cotto was guilty as charged on the weapons count.