Opinion ID: 729692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of Evidence Under Fourth Amendment

Text: 9 Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, which the district court denied. The court found that the police had probable cause to stop the car and search the knapsack on the basis of the reliable informant's detailed tip and the officers' corroboration of this tip. Appendix of Appellant (A.A.) 14-18. The court also held that the appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of the knapsack because he had disclaimed ownership of and therefore had no privacy interest in the bag. A.A. 20-21. The court found that the officers could not and need not have obtained a search warrant prior to stopping the car, since they did not have probable cause to search appellant until they had corroborated the details of the tip by observing Mangum. Finally, the court held that the police did not arrest appellant prior to finding the gun, but had only conducted a lawful investigative detention and weapons search pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A.A. 14-16. 3 10 On appeal, Mangum argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop and search of the car in which Mangum was a passenger. Appellant concedes that the police officers' corroboration of the informant's tip provided reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigative Terry stop of the vehicle and pat-down of its occupants. Brief of Appellant, at 12. However, he claims that, because the detention, seizure, and search exceeded the scope of a legitimate investigative stop, the stop crossed the line into a warrantless arrest that was unjustified by probable cause and the evidence thereby seized must be suppressed. Id. at 16, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. Appellant advances four reasons why the stop crossed the line into an arrest: (1) three police cars and seven or eight officers were involved in the stop; (2) appellant was not free to leave or refuse to answer the officers' questions; (3) the officers did not conduct further investigation before they opened the trunk and searched appellant's bag; and (4) the officers had already intended to arrest him when they removed him from the automobile. Id. at 14-15, 88 S.Ct. at 1876-77. 11 The government counters that the trial court did not err when it refused to suppress the evidence. Its response proceeds on a number of theories: (1) seizing the gun and other items from appellant's backpack was not the fruit of his detention under the Fourth Amendment; (2) the investigatory stop never crossed the line to being an arrest; (3) even if appellant was arrested, the arrest was justified by probable cause; and (4) appellant lacked standing to challenge the seizure of the knapsack since he had disclaimed ownership of it. Brief for Appellee, at 7. 12 We agree with the government that the trial judge did not err in refusing to [321 U.S.App.D.C. 353] suppress the evidence obtained during the stop and search of the car in which Mangum was a passenger because the legitimate investigatory stop never turned into an arrest and because Mangum lacked standing to challenge the search of his knapsack. 4 It is true that the [t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment] and therefore is subject to the limitation that it be reasonable under the circumstances. Whren v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). A legitimate investigatory stop may cross the line into an arrest if the duration of the stop or the amount of force used is 'unreasonable' under the circumstances. United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C.Cir.1989). The government carries the burden of showing that the measures employed during the stop were justified. 13 We conclude that the scope and duration of the investigatory stop at issue here were reasonable under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny. Based on their corroboration of the innocent details of the tip, the officers clearly had a reasonable, articulable suspicion sufficient to stop the car in which Mangum was a passenger, to complete a protective weapons search of its occupants, and to conduct reasonable further investigation. In Adams v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that [a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (emphasis added). Moreover, it is well-recognized that officers' orders to the occupants to get out of the car for questioning [are] compatible with an investigatory stop. United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 36-37 (D.C.Cir.). Here, the officers did no more than was permissible under these precedents. After stopping the car and ordering its occupants to step outside, the officers conducted an expeditious pat-down for weapons and then promptly asked the driver to open the trunk. The driver consented to the request. Removing the knapsack, one officer then asked whether it belonged to the driver or to Mangum. When both denied ownership, the officer opened the bag and found the gun, along with appellant's shorts with identification in the pocket. Throughout this process, the officers were diligent in pursuing their investigation. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.). The entire investigatory stop lasted only a few minutes, until the officers found the gun and officially arrested Mangum. Additionally, as the district court properly found, there was no evidence in the record of any threat or use of force that would have converted the stop into an arrest. A.A. 16. 14 Finally, none of appellant's specific objections to the investigatory stop demonstrate that it was not reasonable or that it crossed the line into an illegal arrest. First, we know of no case that has held it unreasonable for seven or eight officers to aid in the stop of a car carrying four passengers when there is no showing of any threat or exertion of unlawful force by those officers. 5 Second, although the government concedes that appellant was not free to leave the scene during the stop, that fact alone does not convert the stop into an arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 456, 98 [321 U.S.App.D.C. 354] L.Ed.2d 396 (1987) (holding that [t]he perception ... that one is not free to leave is insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest and that [a] brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid under Terry). Third, it is not clear what appellant is objecting to in claiming that the police failed to complete further investigation prior to opening the trunk of the car and searching appellant's knapsack. Indeed, the officers were pursuing further investigation by asking the driver if he would open the trunk and by attempting to ascertain the proper ownership of the knapsack. 6 Finally, even if appellant had produced evidence showing that the officers intended to arrest appellant prior to stopping him and finding the gun, 7 such evidence would be irrelevant. In determining whether a stop or search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, courts look to objective evidence, not subjective intentions. Whren v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (rejecting the proposition that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879 (adopting objective standard for determining reasonableness of searches or seizures under the Fourth Amendment). We therefore find that none of appellant's four objections have merit. 15 In addition to finding the Terry stop reasonable, we also conclude that appellant lacks standing to challenge the search of his knapsack. In the course of the investigatory stop, as duly explained above, the officers asked the driver of the car to open the trunk, which he did. 8 Officer Johnson removed the knapsack from the car. When Mangum was asked whether the bag was his, he denied ownership. On these facts, we need not reach the issue of whether the police officers had probable cause to search appellant's knapsack. Because Mangum disclaimed ownership of the bag, he abandoned his property and waived any legitimate privacy interest in it. Courts have long held that, when a person voluntarily denies ownership of property in response to a police officer's question, he forfeits any reasonable expectation of privacy in [the property]; consequently, police may search it without a warrant. United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1302 (D.C.Cir.1990). Accordingly, Mangum has no standing to challenge the search of his bag on Fourth Amendment grounds. 16 We conclude that the officers' investigatory stop of appellant was not an arrest and that appellant lacked standing to contest the officers' search of his knapsack since he disclaimed ownership of it. Thus, we find that the district court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress evidence gleaned from the stop and search.