Opinion ID: 2252960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Dugan's Nicarico Statements as Statements Against Penal Interest

Text: The State initially argues that Dugan's Nicarico statements were not against penal interest, were therefore not admissible, and there is thus no need to consider the admissibility of additional evidence of Dugan's other crimes. As stated previously, the State did not challenge on appeal the admission of Dugan's Nicarico statements on any other basis. Thus, we do not consider the appropriateness of the trial court's finding that Dugan's Nicarico statements were sufficiently corroborated. Given the record before us, we are satisfied the trial court's finding was in full compliance with the standards relied upon in People v. Bowel (1986), 111 Ill.2d 58, 68, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995. An extrajudicial declaration not under oath, by the declarant, that he, and not the defendant on trial, committed the crime is inadmissible as hearsay, though the declaration is against the declarant's penal interest. ( People v. House (1990), 141 Ill.2d 323, 389-90, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259; Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995.) Such declaration may, however, be admitted where justice requires. ( House, 141 Ill.2d at 390, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259; Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995, citing People v. Lettrich (1952), 413 Ill. 172, 179, 108 N.E.2d 488.) Thus, where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness of such extrajudicial statements, a declaration may be admissible under the statements-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule. Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995, citing Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049, 35 L.E.2d 297, 313. The Chambers court referred to four specific objective indicia of trustworthiness: (1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant's interest; and (4) there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. ( Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12.) The presence of all four factors is not a condition of admissibility. They are indicia, not hard and fast requirements. ( House, 141 Ill.2d at 390, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259, citing Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 67, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995.) The question to be considered in deciding the admissibility of such an extrajudicial declaration is whether it was made under circumstances which provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 67, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995, quoting Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12; People v. Tate (1981), 87 Ill.2d 134, 143-44, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470. The State's sole argument on appeal concerning Dugan's Nicarico statements is that they were not against his penal interest and should not have been admitted for that reason. According to the State, Dugan's Nicarico statements were made in plea negotiations and therefore the statements were not admissible against him in any prosecution for the instant crime. (See 134 Ill.2d R. 402(f) (plea discussion, agreement, plea, or judgment is not admissible against defendant in any criminal proceeding).) The State further asserts that Dugan already faced natural life sentencing for the murders of Ackerman and Schnorr and gave the Nicarico statements knowing that he could suffer no additional penalty in making them. Whether Dugan's Nicarico statements were admissible as evidence in a prosecution against him is not alone determinative of whether they were against his penal interest. To say that Dugan's statements were not against his penal interest because he made them so that they could not be used as evidence against him misapprehends the necessary analysis. Actually, the very fact that a defendant under Rule 402(f) is protected from the evidentiary use of his plea-related statements, except as a basis for a guilty plea, reflects that such statements are considered generally to be against a defendant's interest. Cf. United States v. Scopo (2d Cir. 1988), 861 F.2d 339 (third party's allocution in entering guilty pleas admissible as statement against interest); United States v. Gotti (E.D.N.Y.1986), 641 F.Supp. 283 (defendant and third parties' pleas and allocutions are admissible as statements against interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)). While Rule 402(f) might have prohibited the evidentiary use of Dugan's Nicarico statements in a prosecution against him, the information the statements conveyed is not similarly immunized. Dugan could always be prosecuted on the basis of that information, regardless of whether the statements, themselves, were admissible as evidence against him. Moreover, Dugan provided an abundance of information from which independent evidence usable against him might potentially be developed (secretor type, fibers from blindfold towel said to be traceable to mother's boyfriend's car, etc.). Thus, Dugan's statements themselves could not be used against him, but they offered a means for police to acquire evidence which could be. The offer of a plea can always be withdrawn by a defendant and nothing prevents the prosecution from refusing the offer of a plea and independently proceeding against a defendant. Cf. People v. Mack (1984), 105 Ill.2d 103, 116, 85 Ill.Dec. 281, 473 N.E.2d 880 (a prosecutor has the responsibility of evaluating all of the pertinent factors in making his decision whether or not to seek the death penalty and, in doing so, he may properly consider the attitude of the victim's family as one of those factors, thereby rejecting a defendant's proposal to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence). Moreover, it is the qualitative content and circumstances of Dugan's statements, rather than their evidentiary value, which determines whether they were against his penal interest. An understanding of the chronology of Dugan's plea bargaining is helpful. The record shows that Dugan's November 13 statement indicating that he killed Jeanine Nicarico was made through his attorney to Du Page County prosecutors in pursuit of a plea agreement for her murder. At the time, Dugan was not at the focus of the Nicarico murder. Dugan made this statement in an attempt to negotiate a plea agreement for the instant murder and, as such, fully implicated himself, regardless of whether his statements could have been used as evidence against him. In fact, by making the statement in the context of plea discussions, Dugan was seeking to persuade Du Page County prosecutors to agree to subsequently accept a consistent confession in support of a guilty plea. Quite obviously then, by making such statement, Dugan was exposing himself to the prospect of criminal prosecution; indeed, that was the whole point in making the statement. Such statement was thus clearly against his penal interest. Secondly, the record demonstrates that Dugan made this first Nicarico statement, not in furtherance of the proposed plea agreement for life sentences, with respect to the Ackerman and Schnorr murders, but to negotiate a plea agreement for this crime. While Dugan's second Nicarico statement on November 16 might have been made to help negotiate life sentences for both the Ackerman and the Schnorr murders, such statement, nonetheless, continued to expose Dugan to potential prosecution and imposition of the death penalty for the Nicarico murder. When DCI authorities indicated they were prepared to question Dugan about a McHenry County murder, Dugan specifically indicated that the information he possessed pertained to Nicarico. If Dugan had been seeking merely to gain negotiating leverage by displaying knowledge about multiple unsolved murders, he need not have continued to implicate himself in this particular crime. Furthermore, the Ackerman-Schnorr plea agreement simply required that Dugan truthfully answer police questions about the Nicarico murder; it did not require that Dugan implicate himself or offer unrequested details about the crime. Dugan's Nicarico statements made after his convictions and sentencings for the Ackerman and Schnorr murders represented a resumed attempt to negotiate a plea agreement with respect to the Nicarico murder. Because he had already been convicted and sentenced for those crimes, there was no continuing obligation on Dugan's part to continue answering police questions about Nicarico. At this point, even though Dugan had received two life sentences, he still faced, according to his counsel, some exposure because he could still be prosecuted and sentenced to death for the Nicarico murder. These later Nicarico statements of Dugan's were made to negotiate the elimination of that possibility. The information Dugan provided police could and still potentially can result in his prosecution for the Nicarico murder for which he can still receive the death penalty. In this case, it should matter little that the State chose not to pursue Dugan and seek the death penalty, as this potentially was and still is a possibility. It matters little for our purposes here, as well as for Dugan's purposes at the time, that Du Page County officials appeared uninterested; at any time, they could have changed their posture and chosen to prosecute him, even seeking the death penalty. Indeed, the State so much as admits this fact. The argument the State employs on appeal to support a denial of immunity is that it may choose to prosecute Dugan in the future. Accordingly, we find that Dugan's Nicarico statements were clearly against penal interest and met the threshold requirement for admissibility as an exception to the hearsay rule. C.