Opinion ID: 1130071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The presumption of compensability applies to Meek's claim.

Text: AS 23.30.120(a)(1) [4] establishes a presumption of compensability which places the burden of producing evidence on the employer. Sokolowski v. Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P.2d 286, 292 (Alaska 1991). Unocal argues that AS 23.30.120(a)(1) only creates a presumption that an injury is work-related, and does not apply to an employee's claim that his or her disability fits within a particular category, such as PTD. However, [i]t is well established that the presumption [of compensability] goes far beyond the issue of whether an injury is work-related. Cluff v. Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d 164, 170 n. 5 (Alaska 1995). We have held that the text of AS 23.30.120(a)(1) indicates that the presumption of compensability is applicable to any claim for compensation under the workers' compensation statute. Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 818 P.2d 661, 665 (Alaska 1991) (emphasis added). In Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471, 474 (Alaska 1991), we applied the presumption of compensability to a temporary total disability claim. We now hold that the pro-worker presumption in AS 23.30.120(a)(1), Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d at 170, also applies to PTD claims. [5] On remand, the Board should apply the presumption of compensability to Meek's claim. Unocal may rebut the presumption with substantial evidence that Meek is not permanently totally disabled. [6] See Olson, 818 P.2d at 672. If Unocal produces such substantial evidence, the presumption will drop out, and Meek will then have the burden of proving all elements of his PTD claim. [7] Burgess Const. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312, 316 (Alaska 1981).