Opinion ID: 734241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deprivation of a Property Interest without Due Process

Text: 12 Cabrol contends that his due process rights were violated by the mayor's termination of him, rather than such occurring following a vote of the town council. Cabrol argues that even though no written contract vested him with a property interest, the town council practice of voting when hiring issues are presented to the council created an understanding that a town council vote would precede any dismissal. He contends that this understanding functioned as an implicit contract regarding termination procedure that acted to secure a property interest. 13 The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not create a property interest in government employment. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir.1995). Rather, property interests stem from independent sources. Id. A government employee may possess such an interest by operation of contract or state law, see Board of Regents of State Colleges, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709; Cleveland Board of Ed. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), or perhaps a policy, see Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir.1987) (policy that just cause required for dismissal). Accordingly, in order to advance a due process claim in connection with his termination, Cabrol must point to some state or local law, contract or understanding that creates a property interest in his continued employment. Absent a property interest, there is nothing subject to due process protections and our inquiry ends. 14 To determine if Cabrol had a property interest in his employment we look to Louisiana state and local law. Schaper, 813 F.2d at 713. Absent a contractual agreement for employment for a specified term or a legislative or regulatory restraint on a public entity's termination authority, Louisiana law does not establish a right to continued employment. See La.Civ.Code art. 2747; Guillory v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 802 F.2d 822, 825-26 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3190, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987); Overman v. Fluor Constructors, Inc., 797 F.2d 217, 218 (5th Cir.1986); Cowart v. Lee, 626 So.2d 93 (La.Ct.App.1993); Jackson v. East Baton Rouge Parish Indigent Defender's Board, 353 So.2d 344, 345 (La.Ct.App.1977) ([T]here is no case holding that a specific employment position is a property right of that employee, absent a showing of any contractual agreement or legislative act or rule.). Cabrol did not have an employment contract and no state law or regulation assists him. 15 Rather than creating a property interest, Louisiana law delegates to mayors the authority to fire an employee holding a position such as Cabrol's as long as he is not a civil servant and ordinances do not provide otherwise. Louisiana's Lawrason Act delegates the following powers to mayors: 16 Subject to applicable state law, ordinance, and civil service rules and regulations, to appoint and remove municipal employees, other than employees of a police department with an elected chief of police. However, appointment or removal of a nonelected chief of police, the municipal clerk, the municipal attorney, or any department head, shall be subject to approval by the board of aldermen, except that in the case of a tie vote, the recommendation of the mayor shall prevail. 17 La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 33:404(A)(3). Cabrol was not a civil servant and no ordinances are alleged. Thus, state law is of no assistance to Cabrol in the establishment of a property interest. 18 Lacking either an employment contract or a statutory provision creating a property interest in his position, Cabrol relies on the local practice of the town council voting when presented with hiring questions. He does not allege that Youngsville has any ordinance or charter provision regarding the town council's involvement in the hiring or firing of town employees. The sole custom alleged by Cabrol is not that the council always votes on firings, but that the council regularly uses Robert's Rules of Order when hiring issues are introduced at council meetings. Cabrol argues that the town council's practice of voting when presented with hiring issues constitutes a policy encompassing employment termination that stands as an implicit contract, and that such an implicit contract provides him with a property interest. 19 Robert's Rules of Order is a leading source of parliamentary law in the United States, first published in this country in 1876. Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir.1994). Unless adopted by some type of legislative enactment, we view Robert's Rules of Order as purely parliamentary procedure governing the operation of the town council upon convening, see Mapp v. Lawaetz, 882 F.2d 49, 52 n. 1 (3rd Cir.1989), which we examine only in the context of the council's conduct's compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements, see Brown v. Hansen, 973 F.2d 1118, 1122 (3rd Cir.1992); George v. Local Union No. 639, 825 F.Supp. 328, 333 (D.D.C.1993). There is no allegation or evidence in the record that the council adopted by enactment any part of Robert's Rules of Order either generally for purposes of council business, or specifically in relation to any personnel procedures. Even if they had, the council's parliamentary rules would not operate to create a property interest. See Henderson v. Sotelo, 761 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (5th Cir.1985) (violation of city charter's procedure requiring advice and consent of city commissioners prior to termination does not create a property interest that otherwise did not exist). 20 Even viewing the use of Robert's Rules of Order by the town council in addressing hiring issues presented to the council as an understanding of some sort as to termination procedures, Cabrol's argument similarly fails since  'property' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105 S.Ct. at 1493, irrespective of the source of that procedure, be it city charter, ordinance, or policy. 21 Since Cabrol cannot establish a property interest even with the most indulgent reading of his evidence, his argument on this issue fails. 22