Opinion ID: 1997568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Good Time Before the Truth in Sentencing Act of 1989

Text: Under the system in effect before the enactment of the Truth-in-Sentencing Act, good time operated in two ways to permit an inmate's early release from his term of incarceration. First, an inmate, in most cases, would have become eligible to apply for parole under 11 Del.C. § 4346 after serving one-third of the sentence imposed by the court, after the sentence was reduced by any good time award. [32] Second, even if the inmate failed to obtain a discretionary grant of parole under 11 Del.C. § 4346, the inmate could still achieve early release from his prison term, called conditional release, solely by virtue of his accumulated good time credits. [33] Conditional release is an early release mechanism that operates only if parole is not employed. [34] Unlike parole, conditional release is not discretionary. [35] The Department is required to release an inmate from prison once the inmate has served his term or terms in incarceration less his accumulated good time credits. 11 Del.C. § 4348. Prior to the Act, it was clear that good time credits did not diminish the overall length of a sentence imposed by the court. [36] Any inmate who achieved early release from a prison term imposed before the Act, whether on parole or on conditional release, was required by law to remain on parole or conditional release, under the Board of Parole's supervision, until the maximum expiration date of the prison sentence, unless the Board of Parole discharged him earlier. [37] Thus, early release from incarceration, either on parole or on conditional release, did not mean that an inmate was released from serving the entire sentence imposed by the court. Rather, release on parole or conditional release was merely intended to substitute a separate form of discipline for prison discipline. [38] Furthermore, even after an inmate was released on parole, his good time credits remained subject to forfeiture if he did not comply with the conditions of his early release. In Spurlin v. Department of Corrections, [39] this Court stated that, It is not necessarily true that earned good time prior to parole becomes a right vested in a prisoner which may not be taken from him. We found it necessary that there be some coercive threat of retribution to encourage parolees to abide by the conditions of their early release from incarceration throughout their entire period of parole. [40] The Court further found that the loss of previously earned good time for a parole violation was consistent both with the Board of Parole's legislatively-granted authority to enter orders as it may see fit upon finding a parole violation and with the good time forfeiture statute that authorized the Department to deduct a portion or all of the inmate's previously allowed good time for violating Department rules. [41] In the case of incarcerations prior to Truth-in-Sentencing, it is clear that good time credits accumulated by an inmate while incarcerated did not become a vested right until the inmate completed his entire sentence. The question therefore raised is whether the General Assembly intended to modify this principle when it adopted the Act. Stated another way: Did the General Assembly intend that the good time credited during the serving of a sentence imposed after Truth-in-Sentencing become vested prior to the expiration of the inmate's total sentences?