Opinion ID: 3014597
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 786 (Pa. 1998) (hereinafter “Rompilla-2”).

Text: Rompilla then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Rompilla’s petition raised 11 claims. Rompilla v. Horn, No. Civ.A.99737, 2000 WL 964750 (E.D. Pa. July 11, 2000).2 The 1. While the case was pending on direct appeal, Rompilla filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court dismissed the petition without prejudice for lack of exhaustion. Rompilla v. Love, No. 94-cv-4196 (E.D. Pa.). 2. The claims as identified by the District Court were as follows: (1) Trial counsel were ineffective at the capital sentencing phase for failing to investigate, develop and present significant mitigating evidence related to petitioner’s traumatic childhood, alcoholism, mental retardation, cognitive impairment and organic brain damage; (2) Petitioner is entitled to relief from his conviction and death sentence because of the trial court’s improper instruction on accomplice liability; (3) The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that “life imprisonment” means life without possibility of parole, even after the jury repeatedly asked about parole eligibility; and the trial court’s provision, instead, of inaccurate and misleading information, violated petitioner’s Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (4) Petitioner is entitled to relief from his death sentence because the (d)(8) aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally obtained; (5) Petitioner is entitled to relief from his death sentence because the (d)(9) “significant history” of felony convictions aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague; the jury instructions did not cure this vagueness; and the jury instructions, to the extent they provided guidance at all, directed a finding of this aggravating circumstance; 8 District Court denied relief as to the guilt phase but granted relief as to the penalty phase based on its conclusion that counsel had been ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence. Id. at . The District Court thus ordered that a writ of habeas corpus would be granted unless the Commonwealth conducted a new sentencing hearing or resentenced Rompilla to life imprisonment. Id. at . The Commonwealth appealed, and Rompilla cross-appealed. Three questions are presented on appeal: (1) whether Rompilla’s trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective during the penalty phase; (2) whether the trial court committed constitutional error in giving an accomplice liability instruction; and (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that “life (6) Petitioner is entitled to relief from his death sentence because of improper prosecutorial argument at the penalty phase; (7) Petitioner is entitled to relief from his death sentence because the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to read to the jury the inflammatory and prejudicial testimony of the victim of a prior rape and counsel were ineffective for failing to cite controlling authority that would have prevented the introduction of the inflammatory and prejudicial evidence; (8) The seating of the juror who visited the scene of the crime ten times, including, during the trial proceedings, who knew the victim of the offense and the victim’s son, who knew an employee of the prosecutor’s office and who expressed substantial doubts regarding the presumption of innocence; and trial counsel’s failure to challenge this juror for cause, violated petitioner’s sixth, eighth and fourteenth amendment rights; (9) Petitioner’s death sentence should be vacated because the arbitrary “proportionality review” performed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (10) Petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the prosecution violated his due process by introducing false and misleading evidence; and (11) Petitioner is entitled to relief because of cumulative prejudicial effects of errors in this case. Rompilla, 2000 WL 964750. 9 imprisonment” under Pennsylvania law meant life without the possibility of parole.3