Opinion ID: 2167211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: first degree burglary and second degree assault

Text: Grundy argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment upon the jury's verdict finding him guilty of both first degree burglary and second degree assault because his convictions for both offenses violate his state and federal protections against double jeopardy. Grundy concedes that he did not preserve this error for our review, and he asks us to review it pursuant to RCr 10.26. We find no error in the trial court's judgment finding Grundy guilty of both offenses, and, therefore, we find no manifest injustice to support Grundy's request for relief as to this unpreserved error. In Commonwealth v. Burge, [24] this Court announced that double jeopardy issues arising out of multiple prosecutions henceforth will be analyzed in accordance with the principles set forth in Blockburger . . . and KRS 505.020. [25] In Blockburger v. United States, [26] the United States Supreme Court indicated that the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, and the Court explained that, in order to determine whether two offenses were the same for double jeopardy purposes: the test to be applied is . . . whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. [27] KRS 505.020 codifies the so-called Blockburger test: (1) When a single course of conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one (1) offense, he may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one (1) offense when: (a) One offense is included in the other, and defined in subsection (2) . . . . . . (2) A defendant may be convicted of an offense that is included in any offense with which he is formally charged. An offense is so included when: (a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (b) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (c) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission; or (d) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest suffices to establish its commission. [28] We have twice addressed the question whether a double jeopardy bar prevents convictions for both first degree burglary and assault crimes. In Polk v. Commonwealth, [29] we found the trial court had properly entered judgment on the appellants' convictions for both first degree burglary and first degree assault because the two offenses met the Blockburger test: The elements, or facts, which constitute [first degree assault] are intentionally causing (1) by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, the (2) serious, (3) physical injury of another. . . . The elements of burglary in the first degree are (1) the burglary of a dwelling and (2) armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (3) causing physical injury to a nonparticipant; or (4) uses or threatens use of a dangerous instrument. In the present case evidence was introduced which met the separate requirements for the crimes of burglary and assault. The appellants unlawfully entered the house of George Cannon and then armed themselves with deadly weapons and threatened him with dangerous instruments, kitchen knives, as well as causing physical injury. These facts satisfied the statutory elements of burglary in the first degree. Evidence also proved that the physical injury caused by the appellants by the use of the dangerous instruments was both intentional and serious. These additional facts satisfied the elements of first degree assault. Since a conviction for each offense required proof of a number of separate facts not required in order to prove the other, the conviction of the appellants for both offenses does not violate either 505.020 or the double jeopardy clauses of the Kentucky or the United States Constitutions. [30] In Butts v. Commonwealth, [31] however, we found that double jeopardy principles prevented the appellant from convictions for both first degree burglary premised on physical injury and fourth degree assault: In Count I the indictment charged appellant with burglary in the first degree and in satisfaction of a necessary element alleged that appellant or another participant in the crime caused physical injury to Tina Hannibal. KRS 511.020(1)(b). In Count III the indictment charged appellant with assault in the fourth degree and in satisfaction of a necessary element alleged that appellant intentionally or wantonly caused physical injury to Tina Hannibal. KRS 508.030. . . . In the course of committing burglary, appellant committed an assault which resulted in physical injury to Tina Hannibal. However, the assault against Tina Hannibal was used as a necessary element to achieve a first degree burglary conviction. . . . [A]ppellant's conviction for fourth degree assault must be vacated. [32] This case gives us our first opportunity to apply the Blockburger analysis to convictions for both first degree burglary and second degree assault. KRS 511.020 defines burglary in the first degree: (1) A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: (a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or (b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (c) Uses or threatens the use of a dangerous instrument against any person who is not a participant in the crime. [33] The trial court's first degree burglary jury instruction included only the KRS 511.020(1)(b) physical injury aggravator: You will find the Defendant guilty of First-Degree Burglary under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in this county on or about September 30, 1997, and before the finding of the Indictment herein, he and/or Marcus Sanders entered or remained unlawfully in a building occupied by Glen Fitch and Johnny Marlow without their permission, or aided, abetted or counseled with one or another [sic] in the commission of said act; B. That in doing so, he knew he did not have such permission; C. That he did so with the intention of committing a crime therein; AND D. That while in the building he caused physical injury to Johnny Marlow who was not a participant in the crime. KRS 508.020 defines assault in the second degree: (1) A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when: (a) He intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person; or (b) He intentionally causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or (c) He wantonly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument. [34] The trial court instructed the jury it could find the defendant guilty of second degree assault under the intentional physical injury with a dangerous instrument theory contained in KRS 508.020(1)(b): You will find the Defendant guilty of Second Degree Assault under this instruction if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that in this county on or about September 30, 1997 and before the finding of the indictment herein, he intentionally caused physical injury to Johnny Marlow by striking him with a dangerous instrument. First degree burglary unquestionably requires proof of an additional fact which the other [second degree assault] does not: [35] a knowing unlawful entry into a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime. Our determination of whether KRS 505.020 and constitutional double jeopardy principles bar conviction for both first degree burglary and second degree assault hinges on whether the jury instructions in this case required proof of a fact or facts for the second degree assault charge which the instructions did not require with respect to the first degree burglary charge. As both instructions contained the element of physical injury, the question then is whether the crime of second degree assault requires proof of an additional element or elements. The first degree burglary instruction required the jury to find that Grundy caused physical injury to Johnny Marlow who was not a participant in the crime. The second degree assault instruction required the jury to find that Grundy intentionally caused physical injury to Johnny Marlow by striking him with a dangerous instrument. Second degree assault, therefore, requires the proof of two additional elements: (1) a culpable mental state (the defendant intentionally caused physical injury), [36] and (2) the defendant caused the physical injury with a dangerous instrument. Accordingly, first degree burglary and second degree assault satisfy the Blockburger additional element test and double jeopardy principles do not bar Grundy's conviction for both offenses. For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the judgment of the Marion Circuit Court. All concur.