Opinion ID: 1849825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did Connerly Relinquish Her Claim to the Mineral Rights by Accepting a Quitclaim Deed from Pritchard Which Contained a Clause Reserving the Minerals to Pritchard?

Text: Southwest and Burnett contend that Connerly waived her adverse claim to the minerals by accepting Pritchard's quitclaim deed containing a clause reserving the mineral rights to Pritchard. The merit of Southwest's and Burnett's position turns in part on whether the subject clause sets out a reservation or an exception. A reservation constitutes an implied reconveyance from the grantee to the grantor. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Cooper, 190 Miss. 490, 200 So. 729, 730 (1941). An exception, on the other hand, is merely an expression of what the grantor is not conveying. Cook v. Farley, 195 Miss. 638, 15 So.2d 352, 356 (1943); Cooper, 200 So. at 730. Under Mississippi law, an express retention of mineral rights is an exception even if the instrument uses the term reservation. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co. v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560, 50 So.2d 130 (1951); Cooper, 200 So. at 730-31. The clause in Pritchard's quitclaim deed therefore created an exception and not a reservation. Accordingly, Connerly did not implicitly reconvey the mineral interests to Pritchard upon accepting the deed. Rather, the deed merely indicates an interest which Pritchard did not intend to convey. A person who is adversely possessing a tract of land does not relinquish his claim to the whole by accepting a deed from the record title holder which conveys only part. 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 119 states: A person in adverse possession of land generally may fortify the right thereto by acquiring any outstanding interest without weakening the force or effect of the possession... . One claiming adversely may, and usually does, desire, in making the purchase, merely to protect possession and to avoid possible litigation, and the claimant should not be deemed to have intended to abandon a title by conduct the purpose of which was to strengthen title.... [When an adverse possessor acquires an outstanding interest], there is nothing partaking of the nature of an acknowledgement of the superiority of that title, or an abandonment of one's former claim. Viewed in this light, Connerly's acceptance of Pritchard's quitclaim deed was merely an effort to fortify her adverse claim. Even though the deed did not convey the mineral interests, Connerly is not deemed to have abandoned her adverse claim to the minerals by accepting such interest as Pritchard was willing to convey. One could argue, however, that Connerly contractually waived her right to claim a mineral title through adverse possession. In Thomas v. Hinson, 223 Miss. 607, 78 So.2d 611 (1955), this Court held that under certain circumstances, accepting a deed containing a mineral exception can amount to a waiver of the right to claim minerals by adverse possession. In Thomas, one E.T. Amaker was living on land owned by Mrs. Mabel Hinson. L.W. Hinson, Mabel's husband, believing in good faith that the property belonged to him, conveyed the tract to Amaker's daughter, Myrtis Thomas, in 1943. The record suggests that Mr. Hinson stated prior to the conveyance that he would reserve one-half of the minerals. The deed, however, contained no mineral exception clause. Three years later, in 1945, Thomas learned that Mr. Hinson had never held title to the property. Thomas, through counsel, began to negotiate with Mabel Hinson, the legal owner. Mrs. Hinson agreed to convey the property to her husband, Mr. Hinson, but she insisted on excepting one-half of the minerals. Thomas eventually accepted and recorded this deed from Mabel Hinson to her husband. During the ensuing years, Thomas engaged in conduct which implicitly recognized the one-half exception. She arranged with Mr. Hinson and Gulf Oil Refining Company to receive one-half of Gulf's oil-lease rental payments and thereafter accepted a share of the lease payments based on a one-half interest. In a 1950 letter to Mr. Hinson, she wrote: As you know the rental is sixty dollars a year on the whole place, but as I compromised with you, it will be thirty dollars per year. In 1953, Thomas sold part of her mineral rights in three separate conveyances. Each of these three mineral deeds indicated that she owned a one-half interest in the minerals. Thomas later sued to cancel the exception clause in Mrs. Hinson's deed. The chancellor found for Mrs. Hinson. On appeal, this Court held: The chancellor was correct in holding that the 1946 deed from Mrs. Hinson to her husband, in which she reserved one-half of the minerals, was the result of a compromise and settlement with [Thomas], and that it was an accord and satisfaction with her. The deed was obtained with full knowledge by [Thomas] of the exception, and she recognized it as a valid deed for more than seven years before filing this suit... . Her letter to Mr. Hinson of September 1950 expressly recognized the compromise effected by this deed. Thomas, 223 Miss. at 616, 78 So.2d at 614. The Court thus held that since the deed from Mrs. Hinson to Mr. Hinson amounted to a compromise and settlement of Thomas' disputed claim, and since Thomas had expressly acknowledged and acted in accordance with the exception for several years, then Thomas was contractually estopped from asserting an adverse claim to the entire mineral estate. See Thomas, 223 Miss. at 617, 78 So.2d at 614. In the instant case, facts may exist which show that the quitclaim deed from Pritchard to Connerly amounted to an accord and satisfaction with respect to the minerals underlying the surface of the land, or that Connerly subsequently engaged in conduct which would estop her from asserting an adverse claim to minerals. As of yet, however, Southwest and Barnett have made no such showing. It is therefore clear that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether the defense of adverse possession was viable in Ellzey's 1979 confirmation suit. Lastly, Southwest and Burnett argue that even if the 1955 judgment implicitly held that Josie Connerly had adversely possessed both surface and mineral estates, the judgment did not affect Ellzey's legal interest in the minerals because he did not receive legal notice of the 1955 action. See Baker v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 254 (Miss. 1987) (decree in equity cannot adjudicate rights or liabilities of persons not party to proceedings); see also Paepcke-Leicht Lumber Co. v. Savage, 137 Miss. 11, 101 So. 709 (1924) (decree not valid against persons known but not named as defendants). Southwest and Burnett also argue that the 1955 judgment could not have adjudicated mineral rights since the parties to the 1955 suit were concerned only with surface rights necessary to obtain a VA loan. See Gillum v. Gillum, 230 Miss. 246, 255-56, 92 So.2d 665, 669 (1957) (judgment must be construed in sight of issues raised and matters intended to be decided). Southwest's and Burnett's arguments miss the point. The only element of the 1955 judgment essential to the Hursts' defense in the 1979 suit was the chancellor's general finding that Josie Connerly had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. Even if the 1955 ruling did not apply to or was not binding with respect to Ellzey's mineral claim, introduction of the judgment as evidence in the 1979 suit would at least have collaterally estopped Ellzey from attacking Josie Connerly's adverse title to the surface. Josie Connerly and Mr. and Mrs. Hurst could then have established by reference to Beckham and Huddleston that the adverse possession of the surface necessarily entailed the adverse possession of the minerals since the mineral estate had not been previously severed. The Court would then have been presented with a question of fact concerning whether Connerly had waived her claim under Thomas. Based on the record now before us, it appears that Josie Connerly and Mr. and Mrs. Hurst could possibly have prevailed in the 1979 action if their attorney had raised the affirmative defense of adverse possession. Of course, Southwest and Burnett may be able to show otherwise by establishing that Connerly relinquished her adverse claim to the minerals upon or after accepting the quitclaim deed from Pritchard containing an exception clause. As the matter now stands, however, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Burnett negligently breached her duty to her clients, and, if so, whether her negligence caused the appellants' injury. See Hickox v. Holleman, 502 So.2d 626 (Miss. 1987) (in addition to existence of attorney-client relationship, elements in legal negligence action include negligence on part of attorney in handling affairs entrusted to him by client and proximate cause of injury); see also Stewart v. Walls, 534 So.2d 1033 (Miss. 1988); Dean v. Conn, 419 So.2d 148 (Miss. 1982). Since a genuine issue of material fact exists on these points, the lower court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants. See Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990) (party moving for summary judgment bears burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as matter of law); see also American Legion Ladnier Post No. 42, Inc. v. City of Ocean Springs, 562 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss. 1990); Newell v. Hinton, 556 So.2d 1037, 1041 (Miss. 1990). The Hursts were entitled to a trial on their legal negligence claim. B.