Opinion ID: 4576082
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Factors indicating a lack of coercion

Text: In sum, regarding coercion, we are left with only three arguments preserved for appellate review: the time of day; the number of agents present; and the alleged failure to inform Mr. Lara that he could refuse consent. As for his right to refuse consent, Mr. Lara signed a form containing a clause describing his right to refuse. The number of officers present here and the fact that the search occurred in the middle of the night, however, both tend to make the officers’ request to search more coercive than had it occurred during the day with only a single officer. But these factors do not outweigh the numerous factors indicating that Mr. Lara’s consent was voluntary and not a product of coercion. The agents did not engage in coercive tactics such as “physical mistreatment . . . threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, or an aggressive tone.” Warwick, 928 F.3d at 945. The record also “does not reveal that [Mr. Lara] felt coerced, frightened or otherwise threatened” at the time he gave consent to search. Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557. To the contrary, agents testified that Mr. Lara was joking with them, that he was “[c]alm and friendly,” even offering to make them food, and there is no evidence that he was handcuffed or restrained. ROA, Vol. II at 21, 73–74, 81, 90–91, 94; see Warwick, 928 F.3d at 945 (the fact that the defendant “was friendly and comfortable enough to engage the agents in small talk and jokes” supported finding that he voluntarily consented to a search); Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557 19 (emphasizing that “[t]he conversation between [the officer] and [the third-party] regarding her consent to search the house was cordial and spoken in low volume”). And, as in Iribe, “[n]o promises or threats were made in an attempt to extract [his] consent.” 11 F.3d at 1557. Agent Stemo read the consent-to-search form to Mr. Lara in Spanish, including its statement that he had a right to refuse consent, and he signed it without hesitation. Given the numerous factors indicating Mr. Lara’s consent was not a product of coercion, the time of day and the number of agents present do not render the district court’s finding clearly erroneous. B. Whether the search exceeded the scope of the consent Finally, Mr. Quezada-Lara argues that “the search that took place exceeded the scope of any consent as Mr. Lara was not told agents were searching for drugs and firearms until after his written consent was obtained.” Aplt. Br. at 24 (capitalization omitted). This argument was not made before the district court, and he has not attempted to show good cause. Before the district court, Mr. Quezada-Lara did note, in setting forth the general legal standards, that a search cannot exceed the scope of the consent given. See ROA, Vol. I at 16. But he never argued that the search exceeded the scope of the consent given by Mr. Lara here. See id. at 15–18, 33–40. Thus, the argument has been waived. 20