Opinion ID: 201225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Sayyah's Habeas Corpus Petition Falls within the Exceptions to Section 1252(d)(1)

Text: 36 The exhaustion principle, while strict, admits of appropriate exceptions in extraordinary instances. See Sun, 370 F.3d at 943 n. 16 (citing Theodoropoulos, 358 F.3d at 173; Goonsuwan, 252 F.3d at 389; Sousa, 226 F.3d at 32 8 ) (There is agreement among the circuits that have addressed the issue that exceptions do apply to § 1252(d)(1), although the contours of such exceptions remain to be fully developed.). 37 Sayyah contends his case falls within the exception for cases in which prejudice may result from an unreasonable or indefinite timeline for administrative action. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 146-47, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (noting circumstances in which the interests of the individual weigh heavily against requiring administrative exhaustion, including when requiring resort to the administrative remedy may occasion undue prejudice to subsequent assertion of a court action ... for example, from an unreasonable or indefinite timeframe for administrative action) (citations omitted); Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 867-68 (2d Cir.1990) (six-year delay in state appeal excused exhaustion requirement in federal habeas action); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1218-19 (3d Cir. 1987) (excusing state prisoner's failure to exhaust state-law remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief on ground that he had suffered over five years of delay in attempting to vindicate himself in state court). On this record, however, we are unable to find that pursuing an appeal to the BIA would have resulted in a prejudicial delay. 38 Sayyah's final order of removal was issued on June 19, 2000. Sayyah was understood to have waived his right to appeal from the order, thus eliminating further consideration of his claims for asylum, protection under the Convention Against Torture, and stay of removal. Approximately two years later, Sayyah was given another opportunity to appeal to the BIA, but he did not pursue it. It was expressly made clear in that appeal that he could pursue his assertion of a denial of due process by Judge Ragno. Because Sayyah chose not to proceed with the appeal, there was again no reason for further administrative consideration and no reason to blame the agency for delay. Sayyah maintains, however, that, at that time, he was presented information indicating that appeals to the BIA were backlogged some five to eleven years. Bare speculation of this sort, however, is no substitute for proof that Sayyah suffered or would have suffered prejudicial administrative delay. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Roque, 301 F.3d 39, 48 n. 7 (2d Cir.2002) (holding, in statutory exhaustion context, that mistaken belief, even if true, would not excuse [petitioner] from raising an issue but rather merely reflect[ed] his conscious decision not to do so). Sayyah was not, moreover, under continuous detainment during the two-year period between his initial waiver of appeal and the reopening of his case. He was released on June 12, 2001 and returned to further detention only after, among other things, he engaged in angry confrontations with Social Security and deportation personnel. He was again released in 2002. 39 We hold that section 1252(d)(1) applies, jurisdictionally barring consideration of Sayyah's contested claim for want of exhaustion. As the statutory exhaustion requirement bars review, we need not consider how Sayyah's habeas corpus petition fares under the common-law exhaustion standard. See Sousa, 226 F.3d at 31. We conclude that Sayyah's due process claim was properly dismissed. Affirmed.