Opinion ID: 2733039
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Investigation Under Waters

Text: Next, the Defendants argue that reasonable officials in their positions would not have known that, under the circumstances, their investigation was an unreasonable one. We hold that the law of this circuit clearly established what a reasonable investigation was such that a reasonable official would have known that the Defendants’ investigation was unreasonable under the circumstances. The district court found that there was a material fact issue as to whether the investigation was reasonable. The district court found that Cutler had presented evidence that the Defendants ignored Cutler’s explanations of the incident and focused inordinately on the University’s relationship with Rep. Gohmert. The court cited evidence that Berry had directed Himes to fire Cutler before Cutler had even spoken to Berry, that Himes admitted that he “could see where [Cutler] would feel that [he was being railroaded]” and Himes’s admission that though “some sort of investigation” would normally occur after such an incident, “there wasn’t any investigation [here] per se.” Taking these facts as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Cutler’s favor, the Defendants could not have thought that their informal decisionmaking over the course of three days was a reasonable investigation to which our court would accord deference. What constitutes a reasonable investigation prior to terminating a public employee for speech that is likely protected is beyond debate in our circuit. In Salge v. Edna Independent School District, 411 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 2005), our 15 Case: 13-40685 Document: 00512769309 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/15/2014 No. 13-40685 court examined what a minimally adequate investigation had to include. The court surveyed our precedent applying Waters and concluded that the employer’s “de minimis” investigation “fell far short of any investigation that we have ever held to be reasonable.” Id. at 193. The court compared the circumstances of that case to the investigation in Johnson v. Louisiana, 369 F.3d 826 (5th Cir. 2004), in which our court found that the employers had conducted a reasonable investigation. Id. (citing Johnson, 369 F.3d at 832– 33). In Johnson, the court relied on the fact that “(1) [the employer] received statements from three employees, (2) . . . obtained a supervisor’s report stating that the supervisor believed that the plaintiff was lying, and (3) the plaintiff ‘fail[ed] to present any evidence in his own support even when explicitly invited to do so.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 369 F.3d at 832). The court also summarized the investigation in Waters: [T]he investigation approved by the Supreme Court comprised the employer (1) thrice interviewing the employee who originally complained about Churchill’s speech, (2) questioning another employee who had witnessed the conversation for corroboration, and (3) most significantly, conversing with the employee whose speech was at issue. Although the Court noted that the employer had not interviewed the plaintiff before telling her that she was fired, it relied on the fact that, after her discharge, the plaintiff filed an internal grievance and was afforded a meeting with the hospital president to tell her side of the story. And, even then, before making the plaintiff’s employment termination final, the hospital conducted yet another interview with the employee who had originally complained about the plaintiff’s speech and sought assurances of all employees’ credibility from supervisors. Id. (citing Waters, 511 U.S. at 666, 680). At the very least, the court suggested, “without at least asking an employee what she said, an employer’s indispensable investigation into whether an employee’s speech was protected will not be reasonable.” Id. 16 Case: 13-40685 Document: 00512769309 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/15/2014 No. 13-40685 Moreover, in each prior case, the pre-termination investigation the court has found reasonable was the product of written reports and involved routine procedural channels for investigation. In Waters, the Court noted that the plaintiff availed herself of internal grievance procedures, in the course of which decisionmakers had the opportunity to review “written reports” and conduct follow-up interviews. 511 U.S. at 666–67. In Johnson, the decisionmaker acted on an “investigative report” submitted to him by a subordinate, and the decisionmaker invited the plaintiff to “submit evidence” and other statements in support of his claims. 369 F.3d at 829. In Salge, by contrast, the decisionmaker made no report and compiled no evidence, and we held the investigation was unreasonable. 411 F.3d at 183, 194–95. In sum, our court has made clear that reasonableness depends in part on an investigation’s thoroughness and typically results from some formal process for reviewing evidence and weighing disputed claims. This is true even though Waters clearly stated that an investigation “need not be [conducted with] the care with which trials, with their rules of evidence and procedure, are conducted.” 511 U.S. at 677–78; cf. Gonzales v. Dall. Cnty., 249 F.3d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 2001) (granting qualified immunity because “the fact that [defendants] may have relied on hearsay or made credibility determinations . . . does not necessarily suggest that the decision to terminate . . . was unreasonable”). Still, the investigation has to be made according to “the care that a reasonable manager would use before making an employment decision— discharge, suspension, reprimand, or whatever else—of the sort involved in the particular case.” Waters, 511 U.S. at 678. The Defendants are incorrect that all that was required of them was to “talk to the employee and talk to the direct witness to the speech at issue.” Our circuit has made clear that more than just talking is required to conduct an investigation. 17 Case: 13-40685 Document: 00512769309 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/15/2014 No. 13-40685 By this standard, taking the facts as Cutler has established, the Defendants here should have known that their investigation was woefully inadequate. Most importantly, unlike every other case, the Defendants prepared no report and operated according to an ad hoc process. The only written record before the court is Robinson’s vague and incomplete notes of his conversation with Cutler. Based on Himes’s statements, one could reasonably infer that the Defendants had regular investigative procedures available to them but chose not to use them. The Defendants conducted only two interviews, far fewer than in any case we have previously found reasonable. Based on our review of similar cases, we conclude that every reasonable official in the Defendants’ positions would have known based on these cases that an informal, hastily concluded investigation would be unreasonable. In addition, the Defendants’ investigation was not conducted in good faith as is required by Waters. As the Waters Court stated, “It is necessary that the decisionmaker reach its conclusion about what was said in good faith, rather than as a pretext.” 511 U.S. at 677. The district court found facts that suggest the Defendants’ investigation was pretextual. The Defendants could not be said to be acting in good faith on the investigation, if, as the district court found, Berry had already concluded that the University should fire Cutler, before Berry had even spoken with Cutler. Evidence also suggests that Berry formed his termination decision based on past reports of Cutler’s interactions with staff unrelated to his communications to Rep. Gohmert’s office. Any reasonable official would know on the basis of Waters that an investigation that was pretextual could not be reasonable. To be clear, this holding does not foreclose the Defendants from later proving that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Trial may resolve the central credibility determination: whose account of the content of Cutler’s 18 Case: 13-40685 Document: 00512769309 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/15/2014 No. 13-40685 conversations is correct. We only reach the conclusion that the law was clearly established based on the undisputed facts and accepting plaintiff’s version of the facts that the district court found disputed. We lack jurisdiction to secondguess the district court’s factual determinations at this early juncture. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that the law was “clearly established.”