Opinion ID: 1058110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Expert Testimony of Haubert and Heninger

Text: Regarding Haubert, the only basis for his opinion testimony that the hose had a manufacturing defect was the failure of the hose itself. That opinion is not based upon an adequate foundation. It is insufficient for Haubert to base his opinion upon the premise that because the hose failed, it was the result of a manufacturing defect. Additionally, Haubert admitted that he failed to perform tests that could have determined whether the hose suffered from the tight carrier defect he alleged. When Haubert made his own examination of the hose with a borescope, he conceded that he saw no evidence of a tight carrier defect in the hose. Haubert's opinion testimony concerning the hose's alleged manufacturing defect was not supported by facts, and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his opinion into evidence. The trial court also abused its discretion in admitting the expert opinion of Heninger. Heninger admitted that he was not an expert in the hydraulic systems of mowers and had no experience in the design or manufacture of mowers or any other agricultural equipment. An expert's qualifications must correlate to the opinions for which the expert is being offered. King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 78, 471 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1996). The fact that a person is a qualified expert in one field does not make him an expert in another field, even if they are closely related. Combs v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 256 Va. 490, 496, 507 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1998); Tazewell Oil Co. v. United Virginia Bank, 243 Va. 94, 110, 413 S.E.2d 611, 620 (1992). Here, Heninger admitted that he lacked specific expertise in the hydraulics of disc mowers and was unfamiliar with the hydraulic system of this mower. In Keesee, we clarified the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony offered to assist a trier of fact in understanding general scientific or technical principles. 259 Va. at 161, 524 S.E.2d at 648 (emphasis added). While a trial court may permit an expert witness to explain the general nature of the principle, testimony that goes further and attempts to relate those general principles to a particular person or event generally is inadmissible because the probative value of that evidence rest[s] on assumptions ... that [have] no factual basis in the record. Id. at 162, 524 S.E.2d at 648. Furthermore, because of Heninger's limited expertise, the trial court ruled that his testimony was to be restricted to hydraulic systems generally and held that he could not testify specifically about the particular mower at issue. However, Heninger's actual testimony went far beyond the court's limitations. He opined that the defect in this particular hose could have caused the hose to get caught in a pinch point in the mower, which caused the hose to burst. Heninger also offered alternative designs for the mower, but he conceded that he did not know whether these alternatives would make the mower unsafe or would even be feasible or effective. His opinions about the design of the mower were based upon assumptions not supported by facts and outside his area of expertise. Additionally, he admitted that he was not qualified to testify about the hose. As such, Heninger's opinion testimony lacked adequate foundation, and the trial court abused its discretion in admitting his opinions into evidence.