Opinion ID: 3133341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interrelationship of the MOU and MOA

Text: [¶16] Because we vacate the judgment on other grounds, it is unnecessary for us to reach the parties’ numerous substantive arguments. However, in keeping with our occasional practice to address significant issues that are likely to recur “for the guidance of the court and counsel in the event of a new trial,”3 we discuss one issue emphasized by the parties that we find to be straightforward, namely Flynn’s assertion that the trial court erred in asking the jury to decide whether the 3 State v. Palmer, 624 A.2d 469, 471 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted); see State v. Almurshidy, 1999 ME 97, ¶ 26, 732 A.2d 280. 8 MOA modified the earlier MOU. Because, as a matter of law, the unambiguous language of the MOA did not modify the MOU, it was an abuse of discretion to submit that question to the jury. See Williams v. Inverness Corp., 664 A.2d 1244, 1247 (Me. 1995) (stating that a trial court has “broad discretion in framing the interrogatories submitted to a jury in a special verdict form”); but see Whitehouse v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 461 (1901) (“If there were any warrantable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, tending to support the contention of the claimant, the question should have been submitted to the jury.” (emphasis added)). [¶17] The “[i]nterpretation of an unambiguous [contract] provision is a matter of law, and the provision is given its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning.” Reliance Nat’l Indem. v. Knowles Indus. Servs., Corp., 2005 ME 29, ¶ 24, 868 A.2d 220 (quotation marks omitted). The MOA makes no reference to the MOU whatsoever. It first recites that it is an agreement among Troubh, Flynn, and LLO, and that it is entered into “in contemplation of Flynn’s departure from [Troubh] to work at Lilley.” It then goes on to say, in substantive part: For those clients whose cases are listed on the attached page who choose to have their cases transferred to Lilley with Flynn, it is the parties’ intention that Flynn and Lilley will pay a referral fee to [Troubh] if and when any legal fees are paid to Flynn and/or Lilley. For each such case, the referral fee paid to [Troubh] will be equal to a percentage of the total fees received by Flynn and or Lilley on that case. The percentage referral fee for each case is listed in the right-hand column of the attached page. 9 [¶18] The language of the MOA is simple and unambiguous. Its purpose and effect is to obligate Flynn and LLO to pay Troubh an agreed-upon referral fee in listed cases when either Flynn or LLO receives any legal fees in those cases. It is silent concerning how Flynn and LLO are to divide attorney fees between themselves in those cases after Troubh’s referral fee is paid. Construing the MOA according to its plain language, it does not, and does not purport to, modify the MOU. Accordingly, the court erred in submitting the question of whether it did to the jury. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded with instructions to grant Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A.’s motion to consolidate. On the briefs: Mark V. Franco, Esq., and Jason P. Donovan, Esq., Thompson & Bowie, LLP, Portland, for appellant John P. Flynn III Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Matthew D. Morgan, Esq., McKee Billings, P.A., Augusta, for cross-appellant Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A., et al. 10 At oral argument: Mark V. Franco, Esq., for appellant John P. Flynn III Walter F. McKee, Esq., for cross-appellant Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A., et al. Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2011-403 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY