Opinion ID: 402462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of Membership

Text: 117 The wheel has come full circle, and the question still remains the meaning of this term. Plain meaning has its limitations, but it must count for something. To ascertain what Congress meant ... we would do well to begin (with) what Congress said. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 39, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 1395, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). There is no suggestion whatsoever in the legislative history that a worker who pays a fee for services rendered by the union thereby becomes a member of the union. In any other context, such a proposition would be facially absurd. A commuter can be required to pay a toll for crossing a bridge owned by a corporation without therein becoming a member of that corporation. An action for quantum meruit by a contractor does not make the defendant a member of the contracting firm. 118 The majority's interpretation is particularly egregious because it ignores the emphasis on compulsory unionism that surfaced again and again in Congress. Nonunion employees working under a representation-fee contract would not in any way be required to support the union, or fund its institutional, union-oriented activities. They would not sign membership cards or be carried on the union's rolls. See NLRB v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 128 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1942). They would not be required to embrace participation in union activities and maintain good standing. See Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 695, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1426, 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42, 74 S.Ct. 323, 335-36, 98 L.Ed. 455 (1954). They would not fill out applications, take oaths, or attend meetings. See Union Starch and Refining Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir. 1951). They would not be subject to union-imposed disciplinary measures enforceable in state courts. See United Stanford Employees, Local 680 v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 980, 981 (9th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1975). They would not have fulfilled the requirements for membership in such organization. 29 U.S.C. § 402(o) (Supp. III 1979) (Landrum-Griffin Act definition of union member); see In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1980). By no stretch of the imagination could employees paying a representation fee be considered members of the union, full-fledged or otherwise. They would have none of the responsibilities of union membership, none of its stigma, and none of its perquisites. 119 The NLRB has itself concluded that requiring nonunion employees to pay periodic amounts for the support of the bargaining unit does not make those employees members in the union. In Public Service Company of Colorado, 89 NLRB 418 (1950), the contract provision at issue stated: 120 Union membership ... shall not be required as a condition of employment, but all employees in the classifications covered by this Agreement shall, as a condition of employment, within sixty (60) days after hiring, or commencing August 1, 1947, pay to the Union Two ($2.00) Dollars per month for the support of the bargaining unit. 121 The initial decision had concluded that because the support money provision does not require, and is not related to a requirement of 'membership,'  it did not come within the terms of section 8(3) and could not be lawfully enforced. Id. at 420. After searching through the legislative history of the Wagner Act, the Board ruled to the contrary 12 even though it agreed that the provision required as an employment condition something other than actual 'membership.'  Id. See id. at 430 (opinion of General Counsel that requiring nonmembers to pay union money for the support of the bargaining unit is clearly distinguishable from a requirement of 'membership in a labor organization' ). 122 The argument that the support money requirement in the contract is necessarily contingent upon the Union's acceptance of an employee membership application finds no support in either the contract or in the statute. The Wagner Act was not concerned with an employee's right to membership in a labor union and held no guarantee of membership, even where, in a union security contract, membership is made a condition of employment. 123 Id. at 425. The Board reaffirmed this ruling under the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Wagner Act in American Seating Co., 98 NLRB 800 (1952). It now departs from that reasoning with no legal basis for doing so. 124 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1453, 10 L.Ed.2d 670, is not to the contrary, and indeed cuts against the position adopted by the majority. The financial core of membership was defined as the payment of fees and dues. Id. at 742, 83 S.Ct. at 1459. As a matter of the Supreme Court's definition, then, payment of service fees in an amount less than initiation fees and dues cannot constitute membership. At its core, compulsory unionism refers to mandatory payment by employees of union dues and initiation fees. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. National Right to Work Legal Defense and Educ. Foundation, Inc., 590 F.2d 1139, 1143 (D.C.Cir.1978). (S)uch 'membership' includes only the duty to pay dues and initiation fees. United Stanford Employees, Local 680 v. NLRB, 601 F.2d at 982 (emphasis added). Accord, NLRB v. Hershey Foods Corp., 513 F.2d at 1087; Boilermakers Local 749 v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 343, 344-45 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926, 93 S.Ct. 1356, 35 L.Ed.2d 586 (1973). 13 The interpretation of membership adopted by the majority ignores these explicit holdings. See Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 457 F.Supp. 1207, 1217 (D.N.D.1978). 125 The majority therefore extends the scope of section 14(b) to an unprecedented degree. Section 14(b) does not empower states to ban all involuntary relationships between workers and unions. Laborer's International Union, Local 107 v. Kunco, Inc., 472 F.2d 456, 458 (8th Cir. 1973). It is now settled law, for example, that nondiscriminatory union-operated hiring halls may not be prohibited by state right-to-work laws under section 14(b). See, e.g., NLRB v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., 353 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1965); cf. Local 357, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 81 S.Ct. 835, 6 L.Ed.2d 11 (1961) (exclusive hiring hall does not violate closed shop prohibition of section 8(a)(3)). Unions are further permitted to charge nonmembers a special service or referral fee for the use of the hiring hall, if the fee is reasonably related to the expenses of operating the halls. NLRB v. Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers, 385 F.2d 874, 876-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904, 88 S.Ct. 1653, 20 L.Ed.2d 418 (1968); Local 825, International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO, 137 NLRB 1043, 1044 (1962) (non-member must pay his pro rata share of the cost and expense of operating the employment list and referrals therefrom even though union members pay no fee for referrals). 14 126 The majority contends that these cases are clearly distinguishable because use of a hiring hall precedes hiring, and because state regulation of union membership under section 14(b) applies only to post-hiring arrangements. Majority opinion at 10. Both assertions are dubious. The legislative history of section 14(b) shows that Congress was most concerned about the evils of the closed shop, which by definition requires that union membership precede hiring, and that Congress endorsed state right-to-work laws banning closed shops. Hiring halls were specifically discussed in the legislative history. See S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), Leg.Hist. at 412 (In the maritime industry and to a large extent in the construction industry union hiring halls now provide the only method of securing employment.). More important, only a strained conception of hiring halls would suggest that they have no post-hiring consequences. In NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Associated General Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966), the court explained that the purpose of such a hall would be to establish a system of seniority rights and job priority in the otherwise transitory construction trade. Such an arrangement undoubtedly affects the post-hiring relationship between employer and employee. The court added: 127 This is a multi-employer situation where the essence of employee security would rest on job priority standards being established through a common source-the hiring hall.... 128 No doubt union membership will be encouraged under the arrangement, indeed it may be a boon to the union; nevertheless such an arrangement does not constitute compulsory unionism so long as the arrangement is not employed in a discriminatory manner. 129 Id. at 452, 453. The Supreme Court has also suggested that the very existence of the hiring hall encourages union membership. We may assume that it does. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. at 675, 81 S.Ct. at 839. See Mountain Pacific Chapter, 119 NLRB 883, 896 (1957) (early decision holding even nondiscriminatory hiring hall illegal per se because the inference of encouragement of union membership is inescapable.). Despite their clear post-hiring consequences, union hiring halls cannot be prohibited by states under section 14(b) because such halls do not meet the test of compulsory unionism. 15 130 The final blow to the majority's suggestion that section 14(b) governs this case because a post-hiring arrangement is involved comes from SeaPak v. Industrial, Technical and Professional Employees, 300 F.Supp. 1197 (S.D.Ga.1969), aff'd per curiam, 423 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd mem., 400 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 452, 27 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971). The Georgia right-to-work statute provided that authorizations for deduction of union dues were revocable at the will of the employee, but the federal labor statute made such authorizations irrevocable for not more than one year. The court explained: 131 Counsel vigorously maintain that employees who execute authorizations revocable only after one year but who within twelve months revoke same become forced members of the union. The employee's choice is either that of continued, compulsory membership in the union or of termination of employment. So they argue, and the argument has some force.... 132 I am inevitably confronted by the question of whether there is a Federal preemption of check-off authorizations and whether § 14(b) in prohibiting agreements requiring union membership as a condition of employment permits a state to enact check-off provisions contrary to what is provided for in § 302 of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Act. 133 300 F.Supp. at 1199-1200. The court's answer was emphatic. 134 I think the state regulation must yield.... I am confident Congress did not conceive that checkoff of dues for a limited time after an employee's revocation of authorization therefor would amount to compulsory union membership as interdicted by state Right-to-Work laws.... After all, state prohibition of compulsory unionism is a Congressional dispensation of grace, not the imperious right of a state. I do not agree that the one year irrevocability provision in the Act can be varied by a state legislature under the reservation to the states of the power to prohibit agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment. Section 14(b) says that and no more and it reaches no further.... Checkoff authorizations irrevocable for one year after date do not amount to compulsory unionism as to employees who wish to withdraw from membership prior to that time. 135 Id. at 1200-01. It is obvious that a compulsory check-off provision is a post-hiring arrangement. It is also obvious that the critical inquiry in assessing the reach of state right-to-work laws under section 14(b) is not whether they ban post-hiring arrangements, but whether the arrangements are a form of compulsory unionism. 136