Opinion ID: 2972268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Faulkner’s Consent to the Search of his Vehicle

Text: Faulkner claims that the evidence from the search of his car should be suppressed because he did not intend to give the police permission to search his vehicle and because, in any event, he did not give his consent voluntarily. The district court found that Faulkner intended to give the police permission to search his vehicle, and that Faulkner gave his consent voluntarily. These determinations were not clearly erroneous. Faulkner first argues that his response to Officer Schafer’s request to search the vehicle—“I mean you search it. I ain’t got nothing in the car”—was not meant to give Officer Schafer consent to search, but rather, only as a statement that, hypothetically, if the officers were to search the car, they would find nothing illegal.4 The magistrate judge, however, found that when making the statement, “I mean you search it. I ain’t got nothing in the car,” Faulkner expected Schafer to perform a search of the vehicle. In so deciding, the magistrate judge noted that after Schafer began searching the car, Faulkner did not protest. Instead, Faulkner “continued to quietly discuss with Robinson whether the gun was in the car and whether the officers would find it.” The finding of the magistrate judge on this matter is in accord with the common-sense interpretation of Faulkner’s words, and was not clearly erroneous. 4 Faulkner claims that the officers began searching his car before asking Faulkner to consent. The magistrate judge, however, found this claim not to be credible, in part because the audiotape contains no protests about, or references to, any illegal search. This factual finding was not clearly erroneous, and the court accordingly is bound to accept it on appeal. -9- No. 04-5589 United States v. Faulkner Faulkner next argues that, even if he gave did give permission for the officers to search his car, such consent was not given voluntarily. “[W]hether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). A lower court’s finding that consent was given voluntarily is a factual finding that can only be overturned if clearly erroneous. Erwin, 155 F.3d at 822. In arguing that the magistrate judge’s finding of voluntary consent was clearly erroneous, Faulkner relies heavily on this court’s decision in United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 1995). Mesa, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In Mesa, the defendant was detained in the back seat of a police car and asked to consent to a search after the initial purpose of the traffic stop was completed. However, in this case, Faulkner was detained and asked for his consent to search the vehicle while the officers were running a records check and, therefore, before the initial purpose for the traffic stop was completed. This court has found that consent given under similar circumstances was voluntary. See Wellman, 185 F.3d at 656 (holding that, although the defendant was detained in a police cruiser, “any consent to search voluntarily given during this time would justify a search”). Thus, the mere fact that Faulkner’s consent was obtained while he was detained in the police cruiser does not render his consent per se involuntary. The magistrate judge found that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, Faulkner’s consent was given voluntarily. In so finding, the magistrate noted that Faulkner’s age and intelligence level, as well as his familiarity with criminal procedure and his constitutional rights - 10 - No. 04-5589 United States v. Faulkner (based upon his prior arrests), indicated that Faulkner had the ability, and was aware of his right, to refuse consent. Furthermore, the court found that there was no evidence of coercion or intimidation by the officers. The conclusion of the magistrate judge that Faulkner’s consent was voluntarily given, based upon the factors listed above, was not clearly erroneous and will not be overturned on appeal.