Opinion ID: 3027744
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BIA’s review

Text: Fadiga filed a timely appeal with the BIA, and the BIA also took jurisdiction over Fadiga’s motion to reopen. See supra Part I.A. Fadiga was represented on appeal by new counsel, Ryan Osborne, and raised a single claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of his claim, Fadiga offered affidavits from himself, from several potential corroborating witnesses, and from his former counsel, Daniel Pell.
In addition to seven witness affidavits supporting his substantive claims for asylum, withholding and CAT protection,15 Fadiga submitted affidavits from himself and former counsel Daniel Pell as evidence of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at the Immigration Court hearing. Pell, according to his affidavit, had, as of 2004, been practicing law for twenty-nine years and had never been the subject 15 The statements of the seven witnesses were identical and corroborated Fadiga’s account of his background in Guinea and his political affiliations. See A.R. at 38–51. 14 of discipline or censure. Pell attested that Fadiga met with Pell’s assistant, a law student, on one occasion, in late 2002 or early 2003, for the purpose of preparing the Form I-589; that he (Pell) was not present at this meeting; and that he later relied on the student’s work, “erroneously” assuming the application to be complete and accurate. E.R. at 40 (Pell Aff.) ¶ 7. Because of this erroneous assumption, Pell failed to review the Form I-589 with Fadiga when they met in Philadelphia prior to a master calendar hearing on February 5, 2003—nor did he advise Fadiga to review the Form I-589 before signing it. At that meeting, Pell simply collected money orders from Fadiga for the filing fees and presented Fadiga with the typewritten form to sign. Pell later met with Fadiga in March 2004 to review his case and wrote to Fadiga on March 31, 2004 advising him of the date of the merits hearing and of the need for him to bring to my office “any additional written evidence that you have and we can review the country conditions in your case. If you have any letters, video tapes, or any evidence of any nature that you want to submit, you must bring it along, with two (2) copies of each document or tape, video tape or other document with you to the office.” Id. at 41 (Pell. Aff.) ¶ 9. Fadiga did deliver documents (i.e., the exhibits submitted to the IJ) to Pell, but Pell is “certain” that they did not “review the contents of [Fadiga’s application], or discuss in detail any issues of testimony or proof.” Id. ¶ 10. On May 6, 2004—the day before the merits hearing—Pell, according to his affidavit, met with Fadiga for forty-five minutes, “reviewing the ‘country conditions’ and the general nature of his claims,” but “for some unknown reason [Pell] did not ask [Fadiga] to review his [application].” Id. ¶¶ 11–12. “Further, [Pell] did not advise Mr. Fadiga to produce witnesses or declarations regarding his familial ties to former President . . . Sekou Toure, his membership in the R.P.G., . . . the treatment of R.P.G. members by the government, or . . . treatment of [Touré’s] family members . . . by the government.” Id. ¶ 13. Pell, therefore, was “completely surprised and taken aback by the factual contradictions between [the application] and [Fadiga’s] testimony at the merits hearing.” 15 Id. ¶ 12. Pell stated in his affidavit that—had he in fact reviewed the application for asylum with Fadiga—“the problems with the factual inconsistencies . . . would have been cured prior to the merits hearing.” Id. ¶ 14. Specifically, the “fact[s] that [Fadiga] never left Guinea before 1991” and that his party was called RPG and not RPR, as well as “the correct names and dates of the educational institutions he attended[,] would have been established of record without contradiction.” Id. Furthermore, Pell was “quite certain . . . that Mr. Fadiga could and would have produced witnesses or affidavits or declarations to prove his familial relationship to Sekou Toure”; the treatment of Touré family members by “the government of Lasana Conte, the President for Life of Guinea”; Fadiga’s membership in the RPG; and the treatment of “members and/or officials of the R.P.G. by the government.” Id. ¶ 15. Pell based the latter statement on the fact that “at least 5 or 6 members of the [Philadelphia] Guinean community appeared in the Courtroom to support” Fadiga at an earlier hearing in York, Pennsylvania. Id. Pell concluded his affidavit by “sincerely apologiz[ing]” for “not having been more thorough,” noting that “I know better,” and offering “[n]ot by way of excuse, but only by way of explanation” his belief at the time that the documents from the RPG officials and the arrest warrant “should have sufficed to establish the necessary evidentiary nexus between Mr. Fadiga and the R.P.G.” Id. at 42 (Pell Aff.) ¶¶ 16–17. However, he noted that this belief was “of no avail” due to the “shadow . . . cast over [Fadiga’s] credibility, when he testified contrary to many important items contained [in the application].” Id. ¶ 17. While Fadiga’s affidavit largely conformed to the facts stated by Pell in his affidavit, it also added several new facts. In particular, Fadiga attested that on May 6, 2004—the day before the hearing—Pell raised with him the possibility of having a particular witness testify on his behalf, and that Fadiga told Pell that this would not be possible on short notice. Fadiga also reiterated that “[a]t no time prior to the merits hearing did Attorney Pell advise me to review my written applications for relief, or the importance of such a review,” E.R. at 44 (Fadiga Aff.) ¶ 13; that “Attorney Pell never advised me to . . . [submit witnesses or affidavits] concerning my familial relationship to Sekou Toure or my membership in the 16 R.P.G.,” id.; and that Pell “led me to believe that submitting documents to the Court [i.e., the three documents discussed above, supra text accompanying note 7] would be sufficient to establish my membership in the R.P.G., and the fact that I am wanted by the Government of Guinea for arrest.” Id. ¶ 14. Finally, Fadiga stated in his affidavit that “[h]ad I been advised by my attorney” to bring witnesses or obtain “letters, affidavits or declarations” concerning the various elements of his claims for relief, “I could and would have produced many such witnesses, declarations, or affidavits,” id. at 44–45 (Fadiga Aff.) ¶ 15, and that “had I been advised by my attorney, Daniel Pell, to carefully review the [application for asylum], I would have done so, and would have corrected the written application to reflect” the account presented at the hearing. Id. at 45 (Fadiga Aff.) ¶ 16.
The BIA, in a decision and order dated October 6, 2005, found that, regardless of whether Fadiga had met the procedural requirements for advancing an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim or whether he had demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was deficient, his motion had to be denied because he had not been prejudiced by any such deficient performance. As to the asylum claim, the BIA found that there was no prejudice because that claim was time-barred. As to withholding of removal under the INA, the Board found that, even assuming the inadequacy of Fadiga’s legal representation, “the record fails to establish that it is ‘more likely than not’ that he would be in danger of future persecution as either” a relative of Sékou Touré or an RPG member. E.R. at 5. This finding was based on the Board’s view that (1) Fadiga was not a victim of past persecution (and so did not receive a presumption of future persecution), and (2) although there were State Department reports of “isolated incidents of harassment of RPG members in 2003,” without corroboration of the purported arrest warrant, “the record fails to demonstrate a clear probability that [Fadiga] would be targeted for future persecution.” Id. As to the application for withholding under the CAT, the Board similarly found that the record was “devoid of any evidence that [Fadiga] has ever been tortured in the past,” and that “there is also is [sic] insufficient evidence to demonstrate a clear probability that he would be subject to future torture in Guinea.” Id. Concluding 17 that Fadiga had therefore “failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility” for withholding under either section 241(b)(3) of INA or Article III of the CAT, and that he thus could not establish “that he has been prejudiced by the actions of his former attorney,” the BIA dismissed Fadiga’s appeal and denied his motion to reopen. Id. Fadiga filed a timely petition for review in this court, and he now challenges the final order of removal on the ground that the BIA erroneously denied his motion to reopen as to withholding of removal under the INA and protection under the CAT.