Opinion ID: 1213767
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Heading: Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Standard

Text: The RCRA citizen suit provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B), provides a cause of action against any person ... including any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). The RCRA defines disposal as the discharge, deposit,... or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be ... discharged into any waters. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). We have indicated that the imminent and substantial endangerment standard is a broad one: Significantly, congress used the word may to preface the standard of liability: present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment[.] This is expansive language, which is intended to confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate any risk posed by toxic wastes. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343, 1355 (2d Cir.1991) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), judgment rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992); see also Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 288 (1st Cir.2006) (noting that at least four of our sister circuits have construed [§ 6972(a)(1)(B) ] expansively and that all four courts have emphasized the preeminence of the word `may' in defining the degree of risk needed to support [§ 6972(a)(1)(B)'s] liability standard). No matter how broadly read, however, the text of 42 U.S.C. § 6972 requires the presence of solid or hazardous waste that may present an endangerment that is imminent and substantial. Each of these terms benefits from evaluation. In Dague, we stated that imminency requires a showing that a risk of threatened harm is present. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356; see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485-86, 116 S.Ct. 1251 (imminency requires a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat may not be felt until later); Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296 (imminency requires a reasonable prospect of future harm ... [that] is near-term); Chem. Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 61 Fed.Appx. 556, 561 (10th Cir.2003) (A vague possibility of future harm cannot satisfy [42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)], which applies to dangers that are both imminent and substantial.(internal quotation marks omitted)); Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1994) (A finding of `imminency' does not require a showing that actual harm will occur immediately so long as the risk of threatened harm is present.). Nonetheless, liability under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) is not limited to emergency-type situations, and [a] finding of `imminency' does not require a showing that actual harm will occur immediately. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. An `imminent hazard' may be declared at any point in a chain of events which may ultimately result in harm to the public. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As for the requirement that the endangerment at issue be substantial  a term for which the RCRA provides no definition or explanation, and that we did not specifically comment on in Dague  we agree with other Circuits that have concluded that an endangerment is substantial if it is serious. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 505 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir.2007) ([A]n endangerment is substantial under RCRA when it is serious. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1015 (11th Cir.2004) (Because the operative word [in 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)] is `may,'... the plaintiffs must show that there is a potential for an imminent threat of a serious harm.); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir.2005) (stating that Parker 's approach ... is most faithful to the statutory language, especially as to the word `substantial'); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 300 (5th Cir.2001) ([A]n endangerment is `substantial' if it is `serious.'); Price, 39 F.3d at 1019 ([The] endangerment must be substantial or serious.). This interpretation comports with the ordinary meaning of substantial, which includes being of moment, or important. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2281 (2002). Although the courts have agreed that the word `substantial' implies serious harm, there has been some reluctance to quantify the needed level of harm more precisely, Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 288, and we decline to do so here. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 505 F.3d at 1021 (stating that a showing of serious endangerment does not necessitate quantification of endangerment). As for endangerment, [c]ourts have consistently held that `endangerment' means a threatened or potential harm and does not require proof of actual harm. Dague, 935 F.2d at 1356. An endangerment that is imminent and substantial requires a reasonable prospect of future harm. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296; see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 505 F.3d at 1021 (stating that an endangerment is substantial where there is reasonable cause for concern that someone or something may be exposed to risk of harm (emphasis added)); Interfaith Cmty. Org., 399 F.3d at 259 (same). As the First Circuit recently summarized: [T]he combination of the word `may' with the word `endanger,' both of which are probabilistic, leads us to conclude that a reasonable prospect of future harm is adequate to engage the gears of [§ 6972(a)(1)(B)] so long as the threat is near-term and involves potentially serious harm. Me. People's Alliance, 471 F.3d at 296.