Opinion ID: 2596728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly denied the motion to quash because the constitutional spousal testimonial privilege applies only to compelled, in-court testimony

Text: ¶ 17 Mr. Timmerman argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Mrs. Timmerman's out-of-court statements into evidence even though Mrs. Timmerman invoked her spousal privilege not to testify against her husband. Utah recognizes two different spousal privileges: the spousal testimonial privilege and the spousal communications privilege. The spousal testimonial privilege is defined in article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution: [A] wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife. The Utah Rules of Evidence codifies the privilege in rule 502(a). In contrast, the spousal communications privilege, as codified in Utah Code section 78B-1-137 and Rule 502(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, protects confidential communications between spouses during their marriage. However, the accused spouse cannot invoke the spousal communications privilege if the accused spouse is charged with a crime. Utah R. Evid. 502(b)(4)(C). Mr. Timmerman argues that the privileges were violated, but since Mr. Timmerman is accused of a crime against his spouse, he cannot invoke the spousal communications privilege. See Utah R. Evid. 502(b)(4)(C)(i). Hence, only the spousal testimonial privilege is at issue here. ¶ 18 Mr. Timmerman argues that Mrs. Timmerman's out-of-court statements were improperly admitted after she invoked her spousal testimonial privilege. Mr. Timmerman relies on the following language from this court's decision in State v. Carter: The State is free to interrogate and receive information from a witness spouse on any matter, including confidential communications, so long as the witness spouse's statement is not introduced into evidence at trial over the objections of the accused spouse. 888 P.2d 629, 639 (Utah 1994). But Mr. Timmerman improperly relies on Carter. This court construed the spousal privilege in Carter as it existed in Utah Code section 78-24-8(1). At that time, this court noted that Carter was limited to cases implicating that statute and did not determine the nature or scope of the marital privilege embodied in superseding rules 502 and 507 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because Carter had been charged with the crime before the rules came into effect. 888 P.2d at 638 n.10. Furthermore, the language of the superseded statute prevented spouses only from being examined as to any communication made by one to the other during the marriage. Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(1) (1985) (emphasis added). This superseded statute codified the spousal communications privilege, not the spousal testimonial privilege at issue here. Because Carter is based on an outdated statute and concerns the spousal communications privilege, it is not determinative in this case. ¶ 19 Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides, [A] wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband. In examining the language of the privilege, we recognize that a privilege should be strictly construed in accordance with its object, Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1972), because of its undesirable effect of excluding relevant evidence. Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91, ¶ 14, 173 P.3d 848. Because a privilege withholds relevant information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). ¶ 20 The purpose of the spousal testimonial privilege is to foster the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980). If spouses were forced to testify against each other, then the testifying spouse would be placed in the unenviable position of either committing perjury or testifying to matters that are detrimental to his or her spouse, which could clearly lead to marital strife. State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1227 (Utah 1997), overruled on other grounds by State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, ¶ 25 n.11, 61 P.3d 1000. ¶ 21 Construing the privilege strictly, according to its plain language and in light of its purpose, we interpret the spousal testimonial privilege to apply only to compelled testimony, or in other words, involuntary, in-court testimony. We believe this narrow interpretation of the privilege will not serve to exclude relevant testimony or extend the privilege beyond its narrow purpose. Further, admitting an out-of-court statement into evidence does not force one spouse to testify against the other or tempt the testifying spouse to commit perjury. ¶ 22 Criticism of the spousal testimonial privilege further bolsters this narrow interpretation. The privilege enables abusers to silence their victims and makes the testifying spouse vulnerable to coercion from the defendant-spouse and his lawyer. Amanda H. Frost, Updating the Marital Privileges: A Witness-Centered Rationale, 14 Wis. Women's L.J. 1, 34 (1999). Similarly, the Advisory Committee of the Utah Rules of Evidence is convinced that the justifications for the spousal testimonial privilege are insufficient: [The privilege] does not promote marital felicity, is based on the outmoded concept that the husband and wife are one, and causes suppression of relevant evidence. Utah R. Evid. 502 advisory comm. note. The Advisory Committee recommends that only the spousal communications privilege be preserved and the spousal testimonial privilege be repealed. However, such a change is dependent on a constitutional amendment to article I, section 12 that would remove the spousal testimonial privilege. ¶ 23 In this case, the introduction of Mrs. Timmerman's statements into evidence at the preliminary hearing did not violate her spousal testimonial privilege, which protects a spouse from giving involuntary, in-court statements. Mrs. Timmerman was not forced to testify at the preliminary hearing. She invoked her privilege and was dismissed from the witness stand. In lieu of her in-court testimony, the State introduced Mrs. Timmerman's witness statement and her statements in the SANE report. Mrs. Timmerman made those statements voluntarily. She was not forced to attend a sexual assault examination or write a witness statement. Because the statements were neither compelled nor in-court, the spousal testimonial privilege does not apply. ¶ 24 We also note that barring the statements would not comport with the justifications for the privilege. Whatever degree of marital harmony that previously existed between the Timmermans was most likely absent when Mrs. Timmerman voluntarily gave her statements to the police and to the sexual assault nurse. Blocking her statements from admission into evidence at the preliminary hearing would promote excluding relevant evidence more than it would promote marital harmony. Furthermore, Mrs. Timmerman was not placed in a position where she had to choose either to perjure herself or harm her husband because she was not forced to testify in court. [4] ¶ 25 Because the spousal testimonial privilege does not apply to the voluntary, out-of-court statements given to the police and to the sexual assault nurse, the trial court properly held that the spousal testimonial privilege was not violated and denied the motion to quash the bindover. [5] We therefore affirm. ¶ 26 Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Wilkins, Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion.