Opinion ID: 2306236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Grants of Summary Judgment

Text: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no material facts in issue and it is clear that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Our review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. [6] Preliminarily, Carter argues that Judge Alprin violated the law of the case doctrine by reconsidering Judge Terrell's denial of summary judgment with respect to the Human Rights Act and contract claims. On appeal, however, absent a showing of procedural unfairness causing prejudice, the proper inquiry is whether the second trial judge's ultimate disposition was correct, and not whether that ruling was consistent with the first trial judge's holding. [7] The same holds true with respect to Carter's contention that Judge Alprin disregarded the deadlines for dispositive motions set forth in the court's initial scheduling order and the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure when he considered the District's summary judgment motions. We perceive no unfair prejudice to Carter from the irregularities of which she complains and no abuse of discretion on the judge's part.
We first address Judge Alprin's award of summary judgment on Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims, the first two counts of her complaint. Carter filed her two Human Rights Act claims in Superior Court two-and-a-half years after the termination of her employment with DHS, well beyond the one-year period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations. [8] Carter argues that the running of the statute of limitations was tolled by her timely filing of a complaint with OHR, as the statute itself provides. [9] The District argues that this tolling provision is inapplicable because Carter's OHR complaint omitted specific claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Alternatively, the District contends, Carter's assertion of her Human Rights Act claims in Superior Court is barred by her election to pursue the administrative remedy. Whether Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims should have been considered by OHR is an issue in her pending appeal from the agency's decision, and we need not decide the question here. If her OHR complaint did not encompass those claims, Carter was time-barred from asserting them in her Superior Court action. It would make no sense for the OHR complaint to toll the running of the statute with respect to claims not asserted in that complaint. If, however, Carter did pursue her age discrimination and retaliation claims via her OHR complaint, as she contends she did, then she received no benefit from the statutory tolling provision because she never rescinded her election of the administrative remedy. [10] The D.C. Human Rights Act requires complainants to choose between an administrative or a judicial forum in which to pursue their claims. It provides that [a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by an unlawful discriminatory practice shall have a cause of action in any court of competent jurisdiction ... unless such person has filed a complaint hereunder[.] [11] As we have explained, [t]he jurisdiction of the court and OHR are mutually exclusive in the first instance. Thus, where one opts to file with OHR, he or she generally may not also file a complaint in court. [12] The statute recognizes two exceptions: the complainant may bring a lawsuit in court as if no [OHR] complaint had been filed if (1) OHR dismisses the complaint for administrative convenience or (2) the complainant withdraws her OHR complaint before OHR has decided it. [13] Relying on the latter exception, Carter argues that she withdrew her administrative complaint when she filed suit in Superior Court. But to preserve her right to pursue her claims in court, Carter was obliged to withdraw her administrative complaint prior to the agency's disposition. [14] That she did not do; she never withdrew her OHR complaint or even notified OHR of her civil lawsuit. [15] Instead, she allowed OHR to proceed to dispose of her complaint on the merits. We hold that to withdraw a complaint from OHR, a complainant must notify OHR that she wishes to do so. Furthermore, OHR did not dismiss Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims on grounds of administrative convenience. The key element of a dismissal for administrative convenience is the agency's exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to commit resources to the claim, [16] for example because the EEOC will handle it, [17] or because OHR concludes that the complainant can be made whole without the need for formal proceedings. [18] In the present case, OHR reached a final decision on the merits of Carter's complaint; it did not purport to exercise prosecutorial discretion to limit its consideration of her claims. Accordingly, we hold that the District was entitled to summary judgment on Carter's age discrimination and retaliation claims under the D.C. Human Rights Act, because those claims were barred either by the statute of limitations or by Carter's election of an administrative remedy.
We turn to Judge Alprin's award of summary judgment to the District on the third count of Carter's complaint, which alleged breach of contract. Preliminarily, Carter argues that she was given insufficient time to respond to the District's motion, inasmuch as it was filed on June 23, 2007 (the eve of trial), and heard and decided just three days later. We agree that the judge erred by not allowing Carter ten days to respond. [19] When reviewing the trial court's judgment, however, we disregard errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. [20] The error in this instance did not affect Carter's substantial rights because, as we shall explain, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate as a matter of law. Thus, the error was harmless. In her third count, Carter asserted her entitlement to severance pay in connection with the termination of her employment. [21] For the sake of clarity (though it makes no difference to our analysis), we note that Carter's claim is actually statutory, not contractual. MSS employees are at-will and so do not have employment contracts. [22] The statute on which Carter relies, D.C.Code § 1-609.54(b), provides that [e]mployees appointed to the Management Supervisory Service shall be given severance pay in accordance with subchapter XI of this chapter upon separation for non-disciplinary reasons. Subchapter XI required the Mayor to develop a compensation system, with provisions for severance pay, for MSS and other District Government employees. Consequently, in considering Carter's severance pay claim, Judge Alprin looked to the applicable regulations promulgated by the Mayor and set forth in the District Personnel Manual. The judge concluded that those regulations precluded Carter from receiving severance pay because she had opted to retire and receive a retirement annuity. We agree. When Carter was terminated, the Manual expressly stated that the following employees [including MSS employees] are not entitled to severance pay: ... an employee who, at the time of separation from service, has fulfilled the requirements for an immediate annuity or is receiving an annuity under any District of Columbia... retirement system[.] [23] Carter does not dispute that she fulfilled the requirements for an immediate [retirement] annuity. She merely argues that her retirement was not voluntary. That is not a distinction the District Personnel Manual draws. There is no genuine issue of material fact whether Carter was entitled to severance pay under the Personnel Manual; she was not. The District was entitled to summary judgment on this issue.
The fourth count of Carter's complaint was for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. In some circumstances, we have recognized a common law tort of wrongful discharge as an exception to the traditional at-will doctrine governing termination of employment, where the discharge violates `a clear mandate of public policy.' [24] Carter argues that she comes within this exception because she allegedly was fired for reporting violations of municipal personnel regulations governing hiring and promotion in her June 2001 letter to IMA Director Colvin. Judge Terrell rejected this argument and granted summary judgment to the District on count four on the ground that Carter failed to cite a specific public policy contravened by her discharge. We affirm on a different ground. Carter's conduct in reporting violations fell squarely under the aegis of the District's Whistleblower Protection Act. [25] That Act prohibits a supervisory government employee from taking or threatening to take a prohibited personnel action (which includes termination) in retaliation for a protected disclosure (which includes disclosure of information to a supervisor that the employee reasonably believes evidences a violation of any D.C. law, rule, or regulation). [26] The Act further provides that an employee aggrieved by a prohibited personnel action may bring a civil action for monetary and equitable relief. [27] Thus, this is not a case where we have any need to create a new exception to the at-will employment doctrine in order to vindicate an important public policy. The Council squarely addressed the issue itself, articulating an express public policy in favor of government employee whistleblowing and creating a specific, statutory cause of action to enforce it. In this situation, our cases require us to defer to the legislature's prerogatives and to decline to recognize a novel, competing cause of action for wrongful discharge at common law. [28] We therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to the District on Carter's wrongful discharge claim.