Opinion ID: 173302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Purposefully directed” element

Text: We draw guidance on the “purposefully directed” aspect of the inquiry from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), which encompasses the following elements: “(a) an intentional action . . . that was (b) expressly aimed at the forum state . . . with (c) knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1072 (“Distilling Calder to its essence [in these three elements].”). Because we assess personal jurisdiction here at the pleading stage, our review is de novo and we require only a prima facie showing of the requisite elements. Id. at 1070. The complaint alleges that BOP Director Lappin refused to approve the medication recommended for Mr. Arocho’s Hepatitis C infection by his treating physician. Whether or not that decision is ultimately found to have violated Mr. Arocho’s Eighth Amendment rights, it is clearly pled as an intentional act. And it was aimed at the forum state: Lappin did not allegedly issue some generalized prohibition on Interferon/Ribavirin treatment in federal prisons; he denied a specific treatment request by a Colorado prison physician, precluding use of the requested medication to an inmate in the federal facility in Florence, -13- Colorado. Finally, under the circumstances, it can hardly be denied that Lappin knew the brunt of the injury would be felt in Colorado. In sum, the actions alleged were “performed for the very purpose of having their consequences felt in the forum state,” and thus “are more than sufficient to support a finding of purposeful direction under Calder.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1078 (internal quotation omitted). Of course, the question of personal jurisdiction can always be revisited at a post-pleading stage of the proceedings, where the evidence may show that the relevant facts are other than they have been pled (by showing, for example, that Lappin actually had nothing to do with the denial of Hepatitis C treatment, or was connected with the denial of treatment only through application of a broad policy issued at the national level and was unaware of any harm that would specifically befall Mr. Arocho in Colorado). See id. at 1069 n.3. And when personal jurisdiction is assessed at an evidentiary hearing or at trial, the plaintiff generally must substantiate his allegations with proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1070 n.4. But for present purposes, the requisite “purposeful direction” is more than adequately pled in the complaint.