Opinion ID: 1172230
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pro se status

Text: The Sammises argue that greater leniency from the court is required due to the fact that they participated in this litigation pro se until March 3, 1995. This Court has held, however, that pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration on that ground. Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). Pro se status does not excuse parties from adhering to procedural rules, even though they may be unaware of such requirements. Id., 797 P.2d at 100; Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n. 5, 739 P.2d 385, 388 n. 5 (1987); Scafco Boise, Inc. v. Rigby, 98 Idaho 432, 434, 566 P.2d 381, 383 (1977). In Scafco, the pro se appellant, in filing a motion for a new trial, violated a mandatory procedural rule requiring that he set forth with particularity the factual grounds for his motion. The opposing party sought to strike appellant's motion on that basis. This Court ruled that the trial court erred in not striking appellant's motion, noting that the language of the rule was mandatory and that, the law provides that a man may try his own case if he wants to do so. [Appellant] has chosen to do so, and having so chosen, I suppose he should not complain if he finds himself in difficulty. Scafco, 98 Idaho at 434, 566 P.2d at 383 (quoting trial court's order). Likewise, in the instant case, the lower court considered the mandatory nature of the procedural rules, stating prior to granting the respondents' motions to dismiss, There are rules, and, particularly, `shall' rules I think have to be complied with, and courts themselves are places where rules are followed. Rule 4(a)(2) is couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a showing of good cause. We hold that the Sammises' pro se status cannot excuse their lack of compliance with this mandatory rule. In their briefing before this Court, the Sammises argue that we should consider good cause in Rule 4(a)(2) as synonymous with excusable neglect. Even if this were the applicable standard, we have held that ignorance of procedural requirements goes beyond excusable neglect: [A pro se litigant's f]ailure to be aware of the requirements of procedural rules does not constitute excusable neglect. Golay, 118 Idaho at 392, 797 P.2d at 100 (quoting lower court when discussing excusable neglect for purposes of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1)). Thus, even under this more relaxed standard, the Sammises' pro se status does not excuse their failure to comply with the time limitations in Rule 4(a)(2).