Opinion ID: 693376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Voluntariness of Ruotolo's Consent to the Search

Text: 12 In our earlier decision in this case, after reversing the district court's sixth amendment suppression of certain evidence seized by government agents at the time of Ruotolo's arrest, we remanded for a review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the search of Ruotolo's home and for a determination of whether it was voluntary or coerced in light of fourth amendment principles. See Yu-Leung, 910 F.2d at 41. We recounted, at length, the facts regarding Ruotolo's arrest, the agents' treatment of Ruotolo's family and the manner by which the agents obtained Ruotolo's and his wife's written consent to search their home. See id. at 35-36. We need not repeat that discussion here. It is enough to say that Ruotolo continues to maintain that the agents terrorized his family and that their refusal 13 to allow him to contact his attorney, the lateness of the hour, the presence of six DEA agents in his home, and the assurance that they would remain there indefinitely pending the availability of a search warrant combine to require a finding that his consent was not voluntarily given. 14 Id. at 41. 15 On remand, the district court conducted a supplemental suppression hearing. Despite Ruotolo's claims of government coercion, Chief Judge Platt determined that Ruotolo's consent to the search of his home was not coerced. With respect to the agents' alleged abuse of the Ruotolo family, Judge Platt adhered to his prior credibility evaluations and found that most of the family members' testimony was either mistaken, contrary to common sense or persuasively contradicted by other testimony. And noting that Ruotolo was, himself, a retired New York City police officer, Judge Platt further determined that 16 [a]lthough perhaps reluctant, in view of the totality of the circumstances, Ruotolo's consent was voluntary. In essence Ruotolo's consent was a deal struck between a former experienced police officer and the arresting agent, after full Miranda warnings and notice that consent could be refused. The agent's agreement to Ruotolo's conditions that the consent could be withdrawn at any time during the search and that the agents were to be accompanied by both elder Ruotolos as they searched through the house further reveals a bargained for consent. 17 Ruotolo challenges these findings on this appeal. It is well established, though, that [w]e 'will not overturn a district court's finding that a defendant voluntarily consented to a search, unless the finding was clearly erroneous,'  United States v. Hernandez, 5 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir.1987) (per curiam)), and on this record, we cannot say that the district court's voluntariness ruling is erroneous. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of Ruotolo's suppression motion.