Opinion ID: 149112
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overarching Conspiracy

Text: The plaintiffs alleged and the jury found an overarching conspiracy spanning Contracts 20A, 29, and 07. HUK contends that the evidence does not support this finding and that we must therefore reverse both the conspiracy and substantive verdicts against it. We must reverse the conspiracy verdict, HUK urges, because record evidence shows only that Peter Schmidt was involved in three separate and distinct episodes of discussing bid-rigging. Citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 774, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), the defendants also argue that we must reverse the substantive verdict because the overarching conspiracy theory created dangers of transference of guilt from one [defendant] to another. In other words, HUK argues, the jury may well have relied on its conspiracy verdict to hold HUK liable for substantive FCA violations based on the actions of its co-conspirators. See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 481. As we explained in United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1393 (D.C.Cir.1988), a jury must consider three factors to determine whether potentially connected conduct constitutes an overarching conspiracy: (1) whether the conspirators share[d] a common goal; (2) the degree of dependence inherent in the conspiracy; and (3) the overlap of participants between the arguably separate schemes. Pointing out that Tarantino involved a drug conspiracy, HUK argues that this framework is inapplicable, or at least more demanding, where, as here, the conspiracy is of a commercial nature. But we have repeatedly applied this three-part inquiry to non-drug conspiracies without altering its contours. See, e.g., United States v. Hemphill, 514 F.3d 1350, 1363-64 (D.C.Cir.2008) (single conspiracy to steal from Washington Teachers Union); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1520 (D.C.Cir.1996) (single conspiracy to commit bribery in connection with illegal issuance of section 8 housing subsidies); cf. United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319, 1327-28 (11th Cir.2003) (applying this three-part framework and upholding a jury finding of an overarching conspiracy in Anderson's criminal case on the same facts as in the case before us). To apply that test to the overarching conspiracy the jury found in this case, we must consider testimony and evidence regarding the bidding on each contract even though, as explained in Part II.A.2, Contracts 29 and 07, by themselves, cannot give rise to substantive liability against any defendant. Cf. Hemphill, 514 F.3d at 1363-64 (considering evidence relating to multiple schemes as proof of one overarching conspiracy). In assessing the first factor whether defendants involved in allegedly conspiratorial conduct shared a common goala conspiracy's purpose should not be defined in too narrow or specific terms. Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1520. Thus, we have found obtaining money in exchange for [government] subsidies, id., and steal[ing] money from [a] union, Hemphill, 514 F.3d at 1364, to be sufficiently specific common purposes. Reviewing the evidence, the district court determined that the jury could have reasonably found an overarching conspiracy with a common purpose of limiting competition in bidding on projects in Egypt funded by the USAID. Miller, 563 F.Supp.2d at 138-139 & n. 131. We agree. The jury heard testimony revealing just such a common purpose, including for example Anderson's statement that all prequalified contractors working in Egypt were part of a Frankfurt Club that set up the bids on Egyptian contracts. John Ollis, Vice President of Holzmann, inferred from Anderson's comments that the jobs that we were bidding, there had been some kind of arrangements made among the bidders to collaborate on how much would be bid. In the vernacular, bid-rigging. The defendants contend that even if the other participants shared the common goal of limiting competition in Egypt, Schmidt had a separate goalpursing Holzmann's interests in Europe.  In support, they point to testimony that Schmidt offered to make a trade with SUSA, a prequalified bidder on Contract 29, under which SUSA would win that contract in exchange for Harbert-Jones winning a later contract in Europe. During the second Contract 29 meeting, however, Schmidt abandoned this plan, and in any event, Schmidt's fleeting desire to use the conspiracy to accomplish an additional goal is insufficient to undermine the jury's finding of a common purpose across all three contracts. The second factor, interdependence, requires that each defendant's actions facilitate the endeavors of other alleged coconspirators or facilitate the venture as a whole. United States v. Carnagie, 533 F.3d 1231, 1238 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1392-93. We have upheld a jury's finding of interdependence where the assistance one branch of a conspiracy provides to another is fairly minimal and where given the overlap in participation and timing ... accusations relating to one of the schemes could trigger an investigation that would lead to exposure of the others. Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1522. This standard is clearly satisfied here. For one thing, a written bid-rigging agreement between Holzmann and Archirodon (Fuller's parent company) regarding Contract 20A expressly contemplated future collusion on Contract 29. Similarly, a SUSA manager testified that Schmidt offered SUSA a deal in which the loser on Contract 29 would bid high on that contract and the winner would compensate the loser in kind, by bidding high on another contract[] to be bid in Egypt similar to [Contract 29]. The jury could also have reasonably inferred interdependence from financial statements for the Harbert-Jones Egypt Joint Venture, which included Contract 20A, Contract 07, and other projects. The third factoroverlap among participantsis less significant than the others, requiring only that the main conspirators work with all the participants. Hemphill, 514 F.3d at 1363 (citing United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 23-24 (D.C.Cir.2000)). Again, record evidence satisfies this standard. The defendants concede that Schmidt, on behalf of Jones and its parent company, Holzmann, was involved in all three contracts. The jury also heard evidence (1) that another prequalified bidder, Fru-Con (through its parent company, Bilfinger & Berger), received payoffs for cooperating on Contracts 20A and 07; (2) that BIE admitted conspiring to rig bids on Contracts 20A and 29; and (3) that Anderson participated in meetings on Contracts 20A and 07, may well have participated in a meeting on Contract 29, and had authority over all three contracts. Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Schmidt and possibly Anderson worked with all participants and that BIE and HII (through Anderson) were directly involved in rigging bids on multiple contracts. The defendants respond that with the exception of Schmidt and Anderson, each individual met with competitors to discuss but one contract. True enough, but because the conspiracy was between corporations, the identity of the individuals representing those corporations at bid-rigging meetings is irrelevant. In sum, then, sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding of an overarching conspiracy.