Opinion ID: 2223747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motion to Take Depositions.

Text: Depositions shall be taken hereunder within thirty days after arraignment, unless the period for taking is extended by the court for good cause shown. Our discovery rules are to be liberally construed to effectuate the disclosure of relevant information to the parties, but we properly accord to our trial courts wide discretion in ruling upon discovery requests. State v. Gates, 306 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 1981); Pollock v. Deere & Co., 282 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1979). As we recently said in State v. Gates : This discretion vested in trial courts necessarily includes supervision of the exercise of discovery. Thus, although criminal defendants possess the right to depose witnesses to be called on behalf of the State, this right is subject to reasonable regulation. 306 N.W.2d at 725. Here, because the very belated motion to take depositions would have necessitated a continuance of the jury trial scheduled for the next day, the discretion vested in the trial court is very similar to the discretion accorded when a defendant requests a continuance of any scheduled trial. Our court has long held that in granting or denying continuances the trial court's discretion is very broad. State v. McNeal, 261 Iowa 1387, 1393-94, 158 N.W.2d 129, 133 (1968). A trial court's ruling on a motion for continuance will not be interfered with on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion, and an injustice has resulted therefrom. State v. Elliston, 159 N.W.2d 503, 509 (Iowa 1968) (continuance denied though trial counsel employed the day before trial); see State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 1977) (motions for continuance denied though filed seven days and four days before trial). In such cases the court may properly consider not just the interests of the state and defendant in a speedy and fair trial but also the orderly administration of the court's business. See K. Dunahoo, The Scope of Judicial Discretion in the Iowa Criminal Trial Process, 58 Iowa L.Rev. 1023, 1053-54 (1973). There are sound reasons for according this considerable discretion to the trial court's determination of motions which will delay trial. As this court aptly said in State v. Gartin, 271 N.W.2d 902 (Iowa 1978): Trial court discretion is often accorded where, because of proximity to the trial process, the trial court is in as good or better position than the appellate court to make a determination in accordance with demands of justice. 271 N.W.2d at 910. The defendant had the burden to show affirmatively that the trial court's discretion was abused. Here defendant failed to make such a showing; each reason defendant urges as alleged abuse of discretion is rebutted by support in the record for the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to take depositions. Defendant contends he was unable to meet with the attorney from Dyersville during the 39 days that he was represented by that court-appointed attorney. We note, however, that they did meet in Dubuque on the day of defendant's arraignment, the very day which commenced the running of the usual 30-day period for taking depositions. Thereafter, the Dyersville attorney attempted repeatedly to get in touch with defendant; it was defendant who failed to respond to his attorney's letters, object to his attorney's suggestion that they meet in Dyersville, or promptly request appointment of other counsel. If defendant could not afford to travel to Dyersville he could at least have contacted the attorney by phone, left a phone number where he could be reached, or answered in writing the attorney's several letters requesting a meeting. When defendant appeared late on February 1 for the first scheduled trial, he prepared on his own and filed two handwritten motions which clearly expressed to the court his complaints. He should have so expressed himself to his attorney, by phone or in writing, well before that date. Defendant also contends that the 30-day period for taking depositions had expired by the time his new Dubuque attorney was appointed. His argument suggests that each newly-appointed lawyer is entitled to a period of 30 days to take depositions in a criminal case, with no further showing of good cause necessary for establishing the exception in rule 12(6). We disagree. Rule 12(6) provides that ordinarily a party, not the party's attorney, has 30 days within which to take depositions as a matter of right. That time limit may only be extended upon a showing of good cause. The length of time an attorney has been in the case is just one of the several factors which the trial court should weigh in the balance before determining whether good cause has been shown. Other factors which may properly be considered include the rights of both parties to a fair and speedy trial and the court's legitimate concern for sound judicial administration. In denying defendant's motion to take depositions the trial court expressed sound reasons for its ruling. The court first noted that the case had been pending for some time and had previously been scheduled for trial; the court then said: The Court understands that the defendant's current counsel, Paul Fitzsimmons, has represented the defendant for a short period of time and that the motion to take depositions has been filed promptly from Mr. Fitzsimmons point of view. The Court's ruling, however, is based upon the fact that the motion to take depositions is the defendant's responsibility. The fact that the case has been pending and that the defendant has been represented by counsel throughout the time indicates to the Court that the motion is not made in a timely basis. It is also significant to the Court that granting the motion would require continuation of the present trial setting. The Court feels that this is inappropriate since this is not the first trial setting and the jury has already been called. The court properly emphasized that it was neither excusing nor laying the blame for late filing of the motion on defendant's recently-appointed Dubuque attorney. It properly determined that defendant himself, represented throughout the proceedings by court-appointed counsel, had not shown good cause for the belated request to take depositions. It was also proper for the trial court to emphasize in its ruling its concern for sound judicial administration. Defendant had waited to file the motion to take depositions until the day before trial, when granting of the motion would have required another trial setting, calling off of the jury, and the disruption of the trial court's schedule. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that good cause for the late taking of depositions had not been shown.
Error in the administration of discovery rules is not reversible absent a demonstration that the substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced. 306 N.W.2d at 725. The minutes of testimony disclosed much of what defendant might have learned from depositions. He has not claimed surprise concerning the testimony of any state witness. Moreover, we do not agree with defendant's claim that depositions would have given him important information about discrepancies in the length of time the supervisors meeting was disrupted. The variance in the witnesses' estimates of the length of the actual disturbancewhich ranged in minutes from 1 or 2 to 3 or 4was not of crucial significance to the issues. Defendant has not shown he was denied a fair trial by the denial of his motion to take depositions. Applying our well-established principles of appellate review we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to take depositions, and denial of the motion did not deprive him of his right to a fair trial.