Opinion ID: 778104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Discharge of Community Support Worker Verna Fugere

Text: 40 Upon her departure as weatherization director, Clark, along with a number of other former employees, dissatisfied with the state of affairs at FiveCAP, formed a group called Concerned Citizens for a Better FiveCAP (Concerned Citizens). Notwithstanding FiveCAP's no-solicitation policy, under which employees are prohibited from circulating petitions or any other materials without prior approval from management, Concerned Citizens initiated a petition drive. The drive sought the removal of Trucks and Pomeroy from their respective positions at FiveCAP. Concerned Citizens accused Trucks and Pomeroy of mishandling FiveCAP funds by cutting programs yet according themselves raises; terminating needed employees without replacing them; and using FiveCAP's funds to deter the Union's campaign. The group also began picketing outside of FiveCAP's Scottsville office, garnering attention from the local press. Two articles appeared in the Ludington Daily News on June 1 and 19, 1995, both of which chronicled the activities of Concerned Citizens and the pending unfair labor charges that had been filed by the NRLB against FiveCAP. Trucks was quoted in the article as saying that the activities of Concerned Citizens were mostly a ploy by the Union to elevate its bargaining position. Moreover, she stated that the Union had always intended to remove her from her position at FiveCAP. 41 In late May, 1995, Clark gave a copy of this petition to Fugere, a community support worker in FiveCAP's Mason office. Fugere in turn circulated the petition to several fellow employees, urging them to support the petition because Trucks is anti-union. Once Trucks became aware of the petition, she called Fugere into her office to meet with herself and Pomeroy; Trucks told Fugere that she would be tape-recording their conversation. Trucks told Fugere that she had breached FiveCAP's anti-solicitation policy and advised her to hire an attorney. 42 The next day, when Fugere arrived at work, Pomeroy handed Fugere a typed transcript of her conversation with Trucks and asked Fugere to sign it. Fugere refused to sign the document, stating that she would first like to consult an attorney. Trucks told Fugere that she was fired; when Fugere asked for a reason, Trucks told her to read the transcript of their conversation. A few days later, Fugere received a letter from Trucks, indicating that Fugere had been terminated for gross insubordination, arising out of Fugere's actions regarding the petition. 43 Section 7 of the NLRA grants employees the right to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. An employer violates Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act wherever it hinders or interferes with an employee's participation in activities encompassed by Section 7. As a rule of thumb, protected activity must regard employees' relations with their employer and thus constitute a manifestation of a `labor dispute.' NLRB v. Leslie Metal Arts Co., Inc., 509 F.2d 811, 813 (6th Cir.1975). Where employee activity involves the circulation of a petition, that petition must regard in some way the conditions of employment — otherwise it is not considered protected activity. Id. See also Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749 (4th Cir.1949) (circulation of a petition by an employee for the removal of a foreman for personal reasons is not protected activity). However, where the petition seeks the amelioration of work-related conditions, the circulation of a petition is considered protected activity. See NLRB. v. Pyromatics, Inc., 677 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir.1982) (There is substantial evidence to support a finding that the principal reason or dominant motive for the discharge of Willis was his protected activity of circulating the petition [for increased vacation time].). 44 We find no error in the Board's conclusion that the discharge of Fugere was wholly unlawful. It is readily apparent that the petition was related to the working conditions at FiveCAP. By its very terms, the petition sought the removal of Trucks and Pomeroy for their failure to manage FiveCAP properly. Moreover, local press coverage of the petition drive reflected both Concerned Citizens' and Trucks's understanding that the petition drive was related to the Union and alleged unfair labor practices at FiveCAP. That the petition explicitly and implicitly regarded management-employee relationships, and that Trucks understood it to be so, is representative of substantial evidence that Fugere was engaging in protected activity and thus was unlawfully terminated in violation of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3). 45 C. The Elimination of the Home Start Program and the Failure to Recall Melissa Kukla, Amanda Lange, Karen Sandstedt, and Jane Meyers 46 FiveCAP maintains a federally-funded Head Start program, a child development program that operates in eight centers in FiveCAP's four county area. As part of this program, FiveCAP also maintains a Home Start program, through which home-visit teachers travel to the homes of preschool children and their parents on a weekly basis to provide educational support. The Home Start program runs during the course of a regular school year; at the close of the school year, home-visit teachers are laid off until the beginning of the next school year. 47 Kukla, Lange, Sandstedt, and Myers, active Union supporters, were all Home Start teachers for the 1994-95 school year in Manistee County and Lake County and, as usual, laid off at the end of the school year. That summer, Trucks did not apply for funding for the Home Start programs in Manistee County and Lake County for the 1995-96 school year. As a result, the four teachers were not recalled to their positions as Home Start teachers. 48 Trucks testified that she did not apply for Home Start funding because of changes in Michigan welfare laws that mandated that welfare recipients, including those with small children, work twenty hours per week as a condition of receiving welfare benefits. Because the Home Start program required parents to be home when the home-visit teacher is present, scheduling around work obligations became too tedious and thus the program was canceled. Trucks also testified that she did not apply for funding because the Home Start program was not well received by the parents. 49 The Home Start teachers tell a different story, however. Sandra Rotzein, the Home Start supervisor, testified before the ALJ that parents were pleased with the Home Start programs in Manistee and Lake Counties. Rotzein also testified that while pre-enrollment was down from prior years, there were still a relatively significant number of children enrolled and parents interested in keeping their children in the program. Furthermore, all four teachers testified that the new welfare laws would not be prohibitive of running the Home Start program; the teachers were all willing to work around parents' schedules so as to accommodate their jobs and their need for educational assistance. The General Counsel alleged that Trucks's failure to apply for further Home Start funding thus was a ploy to eliminate avid Union supporters; indeed, Trucks once stated during the union campaign that she was not going to fight for funding for jobs of people that she couldn't trust. 50 Upon finding that they were not to be recalled for the upcoming school year, all four teachers separately inquired about alternative teaching positions that they could fill. Melba White, the supervisor in charge of Head Start, notified each teacher that there were no available jobs for them in any of the Head Start facilities, other than positions for which they were unqualified. However, between August 1995 and January 1996, FiveCAP advertised for a number of teaching and teacher's aide positions through their Head Start program at the various centers. Kukla, Lange, Sandstedt, and Myers each applied for numerous of these positions and were neither interviewed nor hired for any of these positions. 51 We agree with the NLRB's finding that FiveCAP's failure to recall Kukla, Lange, Sandstedt, and Meyers to either the Home Start program or some analogous position was unlawful. FiveCap challenges the Board's conclusion, and in particular, the ALJ's factual finding that the new welfare laws were not a legitimate reason for eliminating the Home Start program. The testimony of the Home Start teachers as to their perceived ability to accommodate families despite the changes in welfare law, argues FiveCAP, is insufficient to support a finding that FiveCAP's reasons were pretextual. However, the Board did not find FiveCAP's actions to be unlawful on the basis of the Home Start teachers' ability to adjust to the welfare law changes. Rather, the Board found two factors to be relevant: first, that Trucks continued to change her testimony as to the reasons for eliminating the program; and second, that Trucks failed to even consider any of the home-visit teachers for other positions after the Home Start program was eliminated. The deference given to the ALJ's credibility findings and other factual findings suggests that substantial evidence exists to support the Board's determination that FiveCAP's failure to recall the home-visit teachers was not the simple result of changed welfare policies, but in fact a deliberate tactic to keep Union supporters from returning to FiveCAP. We thus must enforce the Board's finding as to this claim. D. The Reprimand of Bruce Kent 52 FiveCAP policy provides that bus drivers are to be compensated from the time they pick up their first child of the day. Bus drivers are not paid for their driving time to and from their first pick up and last drop off. As a matter of practice, however, bus drivers who ride the so-called Irons route, which includes a thirty-mile distance to the first pick-up, are permitted to charge for the drive from their homes to the home of the first child. This unwritten exception was enforced under Diane Smolinski, a bus driver supervisor. 53 Kent is employed at FiveCAP as a Head Start bus driver. Kent was an active supporter of the Union and testified at the representation hearing. In September 1995, Kent began driving the Irons route four times a week. After submitting his time sheets, White asked him why he was charging for time prior to when the first child was picked up. Kent explained the unwritten Irons route exception that he had always followed under Smolinski. He invited White to speak to Smolinski, who had since left FiveCAP. White called Smolinski, who confirmed that this was the standard practice. Nonetheless, White issued Kent a written reprimand for overcharging his time. White instructed Kent to charge his time pursuant to the written policy. 54 Substantial evidence supports the NLRB's conclusion that the reprimand of Kent was likely the result of anti-union animus rather than any legitimate employee policy. In doing so, we point to the finding by the ALJ that notwithstanding her discussion with Smolinski, White issued the reprimand to Kent without first issuing a warning or a notice of change in policy. Moreover, we find reasonable the Board's conclusion that FiveCAP did not proffer a credible legitimate reason for the reprimand. Given this set of facts, the Board did not err in determining that FiveCAP had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by issuing the reprimand. 55 E. The Constructive Discharge of Melissa Kukla 56 An employee can bring a claim for constructive discharge based upon anti-union animus under Section 8(a)(3), and, where applicable, 8(a)(4), of the NLRA where she can demonstrate that her employer makes working conditions so unbearable because of the employee's Union activity or demotes an employee because of Union activity and the employee is thus induced or forced to resign. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 452, 459 (6th Cir.1967). In determining whether work conditions are unberable, this Court applies an objective standard, under which the conditions must be so undesirable that a reasonable person in the same situation would choose to resign. See Wilson v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 932 F.2d 510 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 636-37 (6th Cir.1987)). 57 While the labor charges against FiveCAP were pending, Melissa Kukla sought a preliminary injunction ordering FiveCAP to reinstate her to a vacant teaching position. FiveCAP ultimately complied, assigning her to a classroom position at FiveCAP's Fountain Child Development Center (Fountain Center). Once Kukla was reinstated, the General Counsel alleges that she was made subject to several humiliating and harassing incidents as a result of her support for the Union and participation in proceedings brought against FiveCAP. The General Counsel argued, and the Board agreed, that each of these incidents violates Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4), and that the cumulation of these events ultimately caused her constructive discharge. We now consider these incidents, both to the extent that they violate the Act in and of themselves, and to the extent they contribute to a showing of constructive discharge.
58 FiveCAP's leave policy requires that an employee provide a doctor's note after an absence of three consecutive days. Kukla was subpoenaed to testify before the NLRB regarding FiveCAP's labor practices on October 15. The following day, she called in sick due to back pains. When she returned to work, White refused to allow Kukla to work without first producing a copy of the NLRB subpoena as well as a doctor's note, notwithstanding FiveCAP's written policy. When Kukla finally produced these documents, White issued a reprimand to Kukla for her failure to provide them timely. 59 We conclude that the Board did not err in finding that White's treatment of Kukla amounted to a violation of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4). This seemingly arbitrary subpoena rule was not present in any of FiveCAP's employee manuals, and FiveCAP policy regarding doctor's notes did not require Kukla to provide a written doctor's note for being absent for just one day. We also place weight upon the fact that the subpoena in question sought Kukla's testimony regarding FiveCAP's unfair labor practices. Finally, we note that the Board rejected as incredible White's contention that she was acting pursuant to company policy. The Board's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence, and thus must be enforced by this court.
60 On Friday, February 6, the Fountain Center received a donation of 95 carpet samples. On Saturday, while in the Fountain Center preparing for classes, Kukla and her teaching assistant discovered the carpet samples and took several to her classroom to replace the old carpet. They placed the old samples in the basement, along with the remaining new samples. 61 Later that afternoon, April Foley, a Head Start supervisor, arrived at the Fountain Center and found that several of the carpet samples were missing. She also noted that Kukla had been at the Fountain Center that day, and noticed that Kukla had used some of the new carpet samples. Foley phoned White, who told Foley to follow company policy and call the sheriff. The sheriff asked Foley whether she saw any signs of forced entry, and if she knew if anyone else had been in the building that day. Foley replied that it looked like Kukla had been in the building. Foley immediately had the locks changed on the building. 62 The next day, a sheriff's deputy went to Kukla's home to question her about the missing carpet samples. Kukla told the deputy that she had used some of the carpet samples, and that she had placed the remainder in the basement. She offered to show the deputy where she left the samples; however, when they arrived at the Fountain Center, the locks had been changed, and Kukla was unable to enter using her key. On Monday, February 11, the deputy returned to the Fountain Center, concluded that the samples were mostly accounted for, and did not pursue the matter any further. Kukla was not made subject to any formal disciplinary action by FiveCAP. 63 When Kukla returned to work on Monday, Foley notified Kukla that she must leave her door open at all times when children were not present, so that Foley could keep an eye on her. Foley testified that this was because the classroom teachers often congregated in Kukla's classroom to chat and would not get their work done. The General Counsel alleged, however, that this measure was meant to humiliate Kukla for the investigation of the alleged theft. 64 We find that the NLRB correctly concluded that FiveCAP violated the NLRA, both by essentially reporting Kukla to the authorities and by forcing her to leave her classroom open. We agree with the Board that Foley acted with unreasonable haste upon finding the carpet samples missing. Foley testified that she realized that Kukla had been in the Fountain Center earlier that day and had used several of the carpet samples. This fact seems to indicate that Foley could easily surmise the location of the carpet samples by speaking with Kukla, and that she had no reason to believe that they had been stolen. Furthermore, even though Foley did not directly tell the sheriff's office that she thought that Kukla stole the carpet samples, this was certainly the implication of her telling the sheriff that Kukla was the only person to have been in the building that day. Moreover, the NLRB found incredible White's testimony that FiveCAP policy mandated that they contact the police for any theft. These facts cumulatively constitute substantial evidence that FiveCAP acted unlawfully. 65 We find no error in the Board's conclusion that Foley's insistence that Kukla leave her door was motivated by anti-union animus. Assigning the requisite deference to the ALJ's credibility determination that Foley was disingenuous in stating that the open-door measure was simply intended to reduce the amount of employee chatter, and considering that the measure was instituted the Monday after Foley called the sheriff and would likely humiliate Kukla, it appears that the Board acted on the basis of substantial evidence in concluding that FiveCAP unlawfully harassed Kukla because of her support for the Union.
66 The Fountain Center is comprised of three classrooms of students, ranging from ages three to four and a half. The children were divided by age into the three classrooms. Kukla, who had the most teaching experience, taught a class of the oldest children; Pam Jolly taught the next oldest children, and Foley taught the youngest children. 67 Shortly after the theft incident, on February 19, FiveCAP management consolidated the three classrooms at the Fountain Center into two classrooms. As a result, Kukla was relinquished of her duties as a classroom teacher and reassigned as Foley's teaching assistant. Kukla's pay and benefits remained the same. 68 FiveCAP alleged before the Board that the decision to consolidate the classrooms was made because enrollment at the center was particularly low that year: while the center had received funding for 52 students, only 34 were enrolled. This low number of students did not require three classrooms. When asked why the consolidation took place eleven weeks before the close of the school year, Foley stated that she had continually told the Fountain Center staff that if the enrollment did not increase, people would have to be laid off. However, Foley privately told two volunteers that the decision to consolidate was a matter of good business judgment and was not a matter of money. 69 Substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that the decision to consolidate the classrooms at the Fountain Center and relinquish Kukla's teaching duties was not supported by any legitimate purpose and was instead motivated by anti-union animus. We find persuasive the fact that the Board found that FiveCAP failed to proffer a credible reason for consolidating the classrooms eleven weeks prior to the close of the school year. Rejecting Foley's explanation that the layoff was necessary due to low enrollment, the Board pointed to the fact that other Head Start centers were lacking in enrollment, yet only the Fountain Center classrooms were consolidated. Moreover, even if this were true, it is unclear why Kukla, who had the most teaching experience, should have been demoted to teaching assistant. Given Kukla's active Union support, and Foley's prior treatment of Kukla, we find that there existed substantial evidence that Kukla was removed from her position as classroom teacher on the basis of anti-union animus.
70 Shortly after FiveCAP consolidated the classrooms at the Fountain Center, Kukla resigned, stating that she could no longer work under the conditions placed upon her by the Head Start supervisors. The General Counsel alleges that the previously discussed incidents ultimately created unbearable work conditions, thus causing Kukla's constructive discharge. The Board agreed that FiveCAP facilitated a pattern of harassment and humiliation against Kukla, one that would induce any reasonable person to resign. Substantial evidence exists to support this finding. It is clear from the record that Kukla was made subject to a repeated series of incidents intended to harass and humiliate her. Moreover, it is equally clear that these events were a result of Kukla's involvement in the Union, and in particular, her involvement in proceedings regarding pending unfair labor charges against FiveCAP. Finally, we find it self-evident that any reasonable person subjected to similar conditions — reprimands for failing to comply with contrived policies, false accusations of theft, and demotion despite extensive experience — would be compelled to resign. This unquestionably satisfies this court's constructive discharge standard under the NLRA. II. Failure to Bargain 71 Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA requires that employers notify and bargain with the Union over changes in the terms and conditions of its employees. [U]nilateral action with respect to any mandatory subject of bargaining is prohibited, for it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objective of section 8(a)(5) much as does a flat refusal. NLRB v. Plainville Ready Mix Concrete Co., 44 F.3d 1320, 1325 (6th Cir.1995) (quoting NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962)). Failure to bargain with and notify the union regarding such changes minimizes the importance and effectiveness of the employer-union relationship. Id. at 1325 (If an employer changes wages or other terms without affording the Union an opportunity for adequate consultation, it minimizes the influence of organized bargaining and emphasizes to the employees that there is no necessity for a collective bargaining agent. (quoting May Dep't Stores v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 385, 66 S.Ct. 203, 90 L.Ed. 145 (1945))). 72 However, the NLRA mandates that employers are required to bargain only over matters concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). The Supreme Court has held that an employer has no duty to bargain over matters relating to fundamental changes in the business enterprise. First Nat'l. Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676, 101 S.Ct. 2573, 69 L.Ed.2d 318 (1991) ([In enacting 8(a)(5)] Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are employed.). The First National Court held that courts must make a distinction between those changes that relate simply to the employer-employee relationship and those managerial decisions that relate to the fundamental alteration of a profitable business. Employers are only required to bargain over matters pertaining to the former category of changes. Thus, where an employer makes a fundamental business change based solely on economic reasons, that employer is not required to bargain over the terms of these changes. 73 The General Counsel alleges that FiveCAP failed to bargain over three changes in the terms and conditions of employment of three classes of employees: Head Start bus drivers, a data entry position, and Head Start teachers at the Fountain Center. 74 A. The Compensation of Head Start Bus Drivers 75 On October 4, in the midst of uncompleted bargaining negotiations with the Union over the compensation policies for bus drivers, FiveCAP unilaterally notified bus drivers that they would no longer be able to drive their buses to their homes at night; instead, all buses would be parked at a centralized location at which bus drivers would meet every day. Under this new policy, drivers would be compensated from the time they left the centralized location until they returned. On October 9, FiveCAP modified this policy such that drivers could choose between two policies: this new policy and the former policy, under which drivers were compensated from fifteen minutes before their first pick up until fifteen minutes after their last dropoff. FiveCAP did not notify the Union that it was instituting any of these policies, nor did it offer the Union the opportunity to discuss these policies, outside of the uncompleted bargaining negotiations. 76 The Board did not err in concluding that FiveCAP's failure to discuss these policies with the Union constitutes a failure to bargain under Section 8(a)(5). The terms of payment for Head Start bus drivers clearly fall within the scope of 8(a)(5), and FiveCAP's decision to bypass the Union and institute a compensation scheme without completing negotiations constitutes substantial evidence of a failure to bargain. 77 B. Head Start Classroom Consolidation and the Elimination of the Data Entry Position 78 As stated above, in February 1998, FiveCAP, without consulting the Union, decided to consolidate the Head Start classrooms at the Fountain Center, thus eliminating the position of one Head Start teacher. During this same period of time, after purchasing a common computer network for all FiveCAP centers, FiveCAP eliminated the position of data entry clerk. Prior to the installment of the common network, the data entry clerk was responsible for entering information from the various FiveCAP centers onto a centralized computer. 79 The General Counsel alleges that FiveCAP's failure to bargain over the elimination of these two positions clearly amounts to a failure to bargain under Section 8(a)(5). On appeal, FiveCAP vehemently disagrees, stating that these changes were part and parcel to fundamental economic changes at FiveCAP. In the case of the consolidation of the Head Start classrooms, FiveCAP argues that this change was a financial necessity due to low enrollment. As to the elimination of the data entry position, FiveCAP insists that this change was necessary due to a fundamental change in the way in which data was entered into the FiveCAP computers. Under a First Nat'l analysis, argues FiveCAP, it was not required to bargain over the elimination of either of these positions. 80 We find this argument to be without merit and agree with the NLRB that the elimination of these positions constitutes a failure to bargain under Section 8(a)(5). While FiveCAP rightly points out that decisions only peripheral to the terms and conditions of employment are not encompassed by Section 8(a)(5), see, e.g., NLRB v. Plymouth Stamping Div., Eltec Corp., 870 F.2d 1112, 1115 (6th Cir.1989), the line that is to be drawn between conditions of employment and fundamental business changes is a fairly bold one. In general, [a] guideline to follow ... is whether requiring bargaining over this sort of decision will advance the neutral purposes of the Act, namely promotion of labor-management relations and the collective-bargaining process without unduly burdening management's right freely to choose the basic direction of a corporate enterprise. Id. at 1115 (quoting First Nat'l, 452 U.S. at 681, 101 S.Ct. 2573 and Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)). Deferring to the Board's factual finding that the changes made by FiveCAP were not fundamental operational changes, we find that these changes did not alter the direction or scope of FiveCAP's business as required under First Nat'l. Indeed, the decision to purchase a common computer network, while perhaps causing changes to aspects of FiveCAP's infrastructure, cannot be considered to alter the services and capabilities of FiveCAP from a business perspective. Similarly, the decision to consolidate three Head Start classrooms into two likewise does not effect the type of alteration required by First Nat'l. Indeed, nothing in the record suggests that these changes were related to a partial shut down of FiveCAP's operations or some fundamental change in the services that FiveCAP offers. Because these changes are not of the magnitude contemplated in First Nat'l, and instead are wholly related to the terms and conditions of Union employees, the changes are well within the scope of Section 8(a)(5). We thus find no error in the Board's conclusion that FiveCAP has violated this section by failing to bargain with the Union prior to instituting these changes. III. Uncontested Violations 81 FiveCAP does not appeal nor challenge the Board's conclusions regarding a number of violations of Sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(4). Therefore, FiveCAP has essentially admitted the truth of those findings. NLRB v. Gen. Fabrications Corp., 222 F.3d 218, 232 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting NLRB v. Kentucky May Coal Co., 89 F.3d 1235, 1241 (6th Cir.1996)). This court is obliged to summarily enforce the Board's order as to those findings. See Gen. Fabrications Corp., 222 F.3d at 232; NLRB v. Autodie Int'l, Inc., 169 F.3d 378, 381 (6th Cir.1999).