Opinion ID: 181603
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural Soundness.

Text: We turn now to the claim of procedural error. The defendant complains that the sentencing court erred by (i) failing to cogitate the Mariano factors and (ii) delving too deeply into the background of the assault charge. We consider these two claims separately. 1. The Mariano Factors. Both the decision to depart downward for substantial assistance and the related decision about the extent of the departure rest within the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156. The so-called Mariano factors inform those decisions; in United States v. Ahlers, we summarized them: [T]he court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance ...; the reliability of any information or testimony given by the defendant; the timeliness, nature, and extent of the assistance; and any danger to which the defendant or members of his family were exposed as a result of the assistance. 305 F.3d 54, 61 n. 6 (1st Cir.2002). A sentencing court's discretion to assay these factors is wide, but not unbounded. Although a sentencing court must at a bare minimum indicate its cognizance of the Mariano factors, Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156, we have prescribed no particular formula for evaluating and explicating these factors. In other words, a sentencing court is not required to use any magic words or chant any special mantra to show that it has considered the five factors. See Vaknin, 112 F.3d at 585. In this instance, the record shows with conspicuous clarity the sentencing court's awareness of the Mariano factors. During the first day of the disposition hearing, the court noted that it would measure the [defendant's] cooperation against the factors and inquired into the role that the defendant's cooperation had played in convicting other persons. The prosecutor confirmed that assistance rendered by the defendant was significant, useful, truthful, complete and reliable, giving specific illustrations. The transcript makes manifest that the court not only recognized the salience of the Mariano factors but also understood the nature, timeliness, veracity, and value of the defendant's aid. Having grasped the situation on the first day of the hearing, the court kept the defendant's assistance at the forefront. On the last day of the hearing, the court gave each side an opportunity to rehearse the case for a departure. This was done, in the court's words, to ensure that it had in mind the nature of the defendant's cooperation. The parties availed themselves of this opportunity in full. Of particular pertinence for present purposes, the defendant walked the court through each of the five Mariano factors and argued for no less than a two-level downward departure referable to each one. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that the Mariano factors were squarely before the court when it excogitated the extent of the departure. To be sure, the court, in pronouncing sentence, could have expounded upon the Mariano factors one by one, welding each to the case at hand. But the law does not require such a level of specificity. Where, as here, the court's reasoning is easily inferred and there is nothing in the record to suggest that it overlooked any pertinent factor, the claim of procedural error is nothing more than hopeful speculation. Consequently, the claim lacks force. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 329 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Torres, 251 F.3d 138, 148-49 (3d Cir.2001); see also Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156. The defendant attempts to blunt the force of this reasoning by noting that the guidelines instruct sentencing courts to give substantial weight to the government's evaluation of the extent of the defendant's assistance, particularly where the extent and value of the assistance are difficult to ascertain. USSG § 5K1.1, cmt. n. 3. The defendant says that the court strayed too far from the government's recommendation here. We think, however, that the defendant overstates the effect of this directive. A substantial assistance departure begins with a government motion. Wade, 504 U.S. at 184, 112 S.Ct. 1840. Once such a motion is filed, the government's assessment of the defendant's assistance deserves serious consideration. Withal, that assessment is neither a proxy for the sentencing court's exercise of discretion nor a basis upon which the court can abdicate its responsibilities. See United States v. Burns, 577 F.3d 887, 893 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (noting that the government's recommendation is not controlling... and it is the district court's responsibility to determine an appropriate reduction) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The directive to give substantial weight to the government's evaluation was never intended to rein in the district court's discretion concerning the need for, and extent of, a downward departure under section 5K1.1. Mariano, 983 F.2d at 1156; see Vaknin, 112 F.3d at 585 (observing that the sentencing judge's role cannot be usurped by agreements between the prosecutor and the defendant). It follows inexorably that a court that chooses not to accept a prosecutor's recommendation in full cannot, for that reason alone, be deemed to have misweighed the Mariano factors. 2. The Assault. Next, the defendant assails the sentencing court's zealous attention to the assault charge. It was error, he asserts, for the court to look behind the face of the state-court record; and in any event, the lengthy evidentiary hearing resulted in a peripheral matter (the assault) overshadowing the central issue in the case (the defendant's substantial assistance). This argument is unavailing. To begin, courts have long been permitted to consider more than charged conduct in fashioning sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 609-10 (7th Cir.2010); United States v. Lombard, 102 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1996). Moreover, a sentencing court is not bound by the face of a record in a different criminal proceeding; indeed, a sentencing court may even consider acquitted conduct, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (per curiam); United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 314 (1st Cir.2006); see also United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C.Cir.2006) (collecting cases). The sentencing guidelines themselves contemplate incorporating allegedly criminal conduct into the sentencing equation prior to any conviction. See, e.g., USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1). Similarly, the case law allows sentencing courts to consider prior criminal conduct that has not ripened into a conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Martínez, 71 F.3d 946, 952 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir.1989). The defendant notes that the assault is not relevant conduct, USSG § 1B1.3, but, rather, conduct unrelated to the offenses of conviction. That is true as far as it goes, but it does not take the defendant very far. The assault occurred while the defendant was free on bail for the offenses of conviction, and cases are legion in which sentencing courts have considered such conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Fadayini, 28 F.3d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir.1994); United States v. Doe, 18 F.3d 41, 47-48 (1st Cir.1994) (Breyer, C.J.). It was, therefore, permissible for the court below to inquire into the conduct underlying the assault charge. The defendant's related claimthat the emphasis on the assault charge overshadowed the merits of his substantial assistanceis unpersuasive. Because the defendant did not object below to the evidentiary hearing, this claim is at best reviewable for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Jiminez, 498 F.3d 82, 85 (1st Cir.2007); United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001). There is no error here, plain or otherwise. The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing at the time of sentencing rests within the sentencing court's discretion. United States v. Robles-Torres, 109 F.3d 83, 85 (1st Cir.1997). Given that the assault charge arose out of acts committed while the defendant was free on bail, there was no abuse of discretion in deciding to inquire into them. In contending otherwise, the defendant misreads our decision in United States v. Mateo, 271 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.2001). There, we held that a district court ordinarily is not required to look beyond the face of the state-court record in deciding how to factor a state charge into the federal sentencing equation. Id. at 16. But not required and not permitted are two very different things. Proceeding to the substance of the defendant's argument, nothing in the record supports a finding that the attention paid to the assault charge drove other issues into obscurity. The information about substantial assistance plainly remained front and center. There is not so much as a hint that the assault charge came to dominate the court's thinking. This lack of dominance is made quite clear by the sentencing court's limited use of the assault charge. The assault played only a minor part in shaping the defendant's sentence. It was not used to elevate the defendant's offense level, enhance his criminal history score, discount his substantial assistance, or circumscribe the extent of the downward departure. Instead, it came into play only after the court effected the departure by shaping a new GSR. Only then did the court use the assaultative conduct for the narrow purpose of fixing a sentencing point within that newly constituted range. This small adjustment was comfortably within the court's discretion.