Opinion ID: 2589940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: effectiveness of faulkner's disclaimer

Text: ¶ 9 Faulkner and Renee argue that we should reverse the trial court's determination that Faulkner's purported disclaimer was ineffective. This argument rests on the disclaimer statute's provision for partial disclaimer of an interest in property. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801(1) (Supp.2003). However, the trial court correctly concluded that Faulkner failed to properly disclaim his interest in the residuary of Jennie's trust. ¶ 10 The document executed by Faulkner as a disclaimer provides that he renounce[s], relinquish[es], and otherwise forfeit[s] all ... right, title, interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner. (Emphasis added.) The document makes no mention of Faulkner's acceptance of any property from the trust. Although the disclaimer statute allows for the partial disclaimer of an interest in a trust, the plain language of the statute requires that a disclaimer describe the property or interest disclaimed and declare the disclaimer and extent thereof. Id. § 75-2-801(3)(a), (b). ¶ 11 Faulkner's disclaimer is not facially defective; rather, it describes the interest to be disclaimed as Faulkner's interest in Jennie's trust and, through the use of the word all, declares the extent of that purported disclaimer as total. Thus, if the document is taken alone, the disclaimer would be valid. However, elsewhere in the statute is a prohibition that voids Faulkner's attempted disclaimer. ¶ 12 The right to disclaim property or an interest therein is barred by an acceptance of the property or interest or a benefit under it. Id. § 75-2-801(5)(c). Faulkner accepted various items of personal property from the trust. Having accepted property representing a portion of the interest he purported to completely disclaim, Faulkner is legally barred from disclaiming that interest. Had he not accepted any property from the trust, or had he used language of partial disclaimer as he now urges he intended, Faulkner's disclaimer would have been effective. Although Faulkner contends that substantial compliance with the partial disclaimer provisions should be sufficient to shield the residual portion of Jennie's trust from his creditors, the language and policy of the statute do not support this argument. ¶ 13 Far from being a departure from the requirement that we liberally construe statutes with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice, id. § 68-3-2 (2000), our recognition of the ineffectiveness of Faulkner's disclaimer is based on the plain language of the statute and the language of his purported disclaimer. As noted above, the statute requires a description of the disclaimer, a declaration of the extent of the disclaimer, and the acceptance of no benefit from the interest sought to be disclaimed. Faulkner strictly complied with the first two of these requirements by describing the interest to be disclaimed and the extent of the disclaimer. But, by accepting property from the trust, he failed to comply with the third provision. Thus, Faulkner's compliance with the statute does not depend on whether he substantially complied with the partial disclaimer provisions, but whether his purported complete disclaimer will be given effect. Were we to hold that partial disclaimer may be accomplished by using language completely disclaiming an interest in a trust, we would virtually eviscerate the requirement that a disclaimant declare the extent of his or her disclaimer. Statutory provisions are not to be interpreted in a manner rendering them devoid of effect; rather, we seek to give all provisions of a statute some effect. ExxonMobil Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2003 UT 53, ¶ 14, 86 P.3d 706. Here, to give effect to the partial disclaimer provisions requires that the law expect more of disclaimants than Faulkner suggests. Indeed, insisting that disclaimants plainly identify what exactly is to be disclaimed fulfills not only the statutory language, but the policy behind the disclaimer statute. ¶ 14 [T]he usual effect of the disclaimer statute is to avoid the imposition of transfer taxes and to thwart creditors. In re Estate of Kirk, 591 N.W.2d 630, 634 (Iowa 1999) (citing In re Estate of Lamoureux, 412 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Iowa 1987)). While this is a permitted use of the disclaimer statute, one who wishes to take advantage of the statute's provisions to avoid the claims of others must comply with its terms. As noted above, Faulkner's substantial compliance argument simply ignores both the language of the statute and of the document he executed. He did not comply with the statutory requirements for a partial disclaimer, and cannot now avail himself of its protections. The disclaimer was ineffective as a total disclaimer because he accepted property from the trust, and as a partial disclaimer because it did not accurately describe the interest to be disclaimed. Therefore, Whitney is entitled to collect Faulkner's portion of Jennie's trust in partial satisfaction of its judgment.