Opinion ID: 77368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Call Atwater to Testify

Text: 50 Atwater also argues that his lawyers' failure to allow him to take the stand at trial violated the right of the accused to testify, as recognized in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533 n. 15, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Atwater claims that only a defendant may waive this right regardless of tactical considerations. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1532 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc). He further notes that the post-conviction court acknowledged the factual dispute over whether Atwater's attorneys ever told him that he had the right to overrule them and testify but decided the issue on the prejudice prong of Strickland only. According to Atwater, the state court's conclusions conflict with the classification of an accused's decision to testify as personal to the defendant. See id. 51 The state first notes that this claim was found to be procedurally barred by the district court due to Atwater's failure to raise the claim in the Florida Supreme Court, a determination reviewed de novo. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1345 (11th Cir.2004), cert. denied sub nom. Kelley v. Crosby, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2962, 162 L.Ed.2d 906 (2005). Pursuant to state procedural rules, abandonment of an issue results from submission of a brief without argument thereon in an appeal of an order denying relief after an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Shere v. State, 742 So.2d 215, 217 n. 6 (Fla.1999) (per curiam). Because Atwater has not shown cause or prejudice to excuse the default, the state argues, he is unable to raise his claim now. Even if Atwater could show valid cause, which the state does not concede, he does not demonstrate actual prejudice in view of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt of first degree murder. The state alternatively contends that the state trial court properly found that Atwater was unable to show prejudice under Strickland. 52 Regarding the issue of procedural default, Atwater states that on appeal of post-conviction relief, the facts about whether counsel interfered with the defendant's right to testify were raised in connection with the claim about counsel's concession of guilt, although the two issues were not formatted as separate grounds for relief. 53 The Florida Supreme Court recognized that an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of whether trial counsel prevented Atwater from testifying on his own behalf. Atwater II, 788 So.2d at 227 n. 2. However, Atwater did not raise the right-to-testify issue in his initial brief on appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion in the Florida Supreme Court. See id. at 227-28. Although Atwater asserted the issue in his reply brief, according to Florida law, it was too late. See, e.g., Shere, 742 So.2d at 217 n. 6 (in Florida, an issue raised in an appellate brief which contains no argument is abandoned); see also Gen. Mortgage Assoc., Inc. v. Campolo Realty & Mortgage Corp., 678 So.2d 431, 431 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1996) (The fact that [an] issue was raised for the first time in the reply brief alone precludes our consideration of the matter.). It is well-settled that if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred...[,] there is a procedural default for purposes of federal habeas .... Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). Because Atwater did not properly exhaust this claim in state court, this issue is defaulted. 54 This being the case, we may only consider the issue on appeal if the defendant shows both cause for noncompliance with the state rule and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation, or if a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533, 537, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2665-66, 2668, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). Here, Atwater has neither alleged nor shown cause and prejudice or actual innocence in order to excuse his default of the issue. He is therefore barred from raising it now. 55 In any event, even if Atwater had properly preserved the issue for review, we cannot say that the state trial court's conclusion that he failed to meet the Strickland standard was unreasonable or contrary to federal law. The state trial court found that Atwater failed to meet his burden to show how he was prejudiced by not testifying at his trial. 1 Order Den. Mot. Post-Conviction Relief, Jan. 5, 1999. It also found that the trial record show[ed] that the defendant's first-person profession of innocence, when weighed against the substantial evidence to the contrary presented by the State, would not have changed the jury's verdict. Id. Considering the overwhelming evidence of Atwater's guilt, see Atwater II, 788 So.2d at 231-32, the state trial court's finding that Atwater is unable to demonstrate prejudice as required by Strickland is neither an unreasonable application of, nor contrary to, federal law. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069 (If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed.). Therefore, this claim lacks merit.