Opinion ID: 2052527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Expert Evidence of Memory Repression

Text: Even when an adult plaintiff bringing an action for childhood sexual abuse or other tortious conduct substantiates his or her fraudulent concealment allegations, he or she must then successfully present an explanation or excuse for his or her delay in bringing the claim beyond the statutory time frame. This is where repressed memory comes into legal play. When asserting recovered repressed memories as justification for the delayed claim, plaintiff must present expert opinion regarding his or her experience of repressed memories, and evidence sufficient for the trial court initially to determine whether the opinion is based on reliable scientific principles. Expert opinion is appropriate when it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.... Ind. Evidence Rule 702(a). As memory repression is a phenomenon beyond the ability of the average juror to understand, expert testimony is needed to explain the phenomenon to the jury. If expert opinion testimony is needed, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Evid. R. 702. Rule 702(b) imposes an additional requirement that, in order for the testimony to be admitted, the court must be satisfied that the expert scientific testimony is based on reliable scientific principles. In Fager, we rejected plaintiff's claim in part because she had submitted no affidavits or depositions of qualified witnesses providing expert opinion to support the scientific validity of repressed memory and to establish that [plaintiff's] normal powers of perception and recollection had been obscured by the phenomenon as a result of her father's sexual acts with her. 610 N.E.2d at 252. However, the Plaintiff in the present case did submit an affidavit by a qualified witness opining that Jane I. had repressed memory of the abuse. This affidavit was submitted by Dr. Elgin Baker. Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Elgin Baker, is a licensed clinical psychologist and an associate professor at the Indiana University School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry. He has treated several hundred survivors of childhood sexual abuse in his practice. His opinion that Jane I. repressed all memory of childhood abuse was based on his interview with Jane I., his experience with other victims of childhood trauma, and his analysis of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory taken by Jane I. The Plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, arguing that the Baker affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact, making summary judgment inappropriate. Shults-Lewis responded that the affidavit could not be considered because it was not based on reliable scientific principles. The Court of Appeals, when they reversed the grant of summary judgment against Jane I., found that any challenge to the reliability of Baker's affidavit had been waived. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals found that, even had the claim of reliability not been waived, the affidavit was sufficiently reliable to raise a material factual dispute regarding whether Jane I. had repressed memories of the tortious conduct. The court concluded that: Shults-Lewis's argument to the contrary notwithstanding, we do not read Fager as requiring, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, that a party asserting the phenomenon must establish the scientific validity of the repressed memory. Indeed the court acknowledged that its existence as well as its validity is in dispute. Rather, we read Fager as requiring only that the party at least provide expert testimony `supporting' the scientific validity of the phenomenon. 681 N.E.2d 1157, 1159-60 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997). We disagree with the Court of Appeals that Defendant waived any argument regarding the reliability of Dr. Elgin Baker's affidavit. In order to object to an affidavit in a summary judgment proceeding, the objecting party must direct the trial court's attention to a defective affidavit. See Paramo v. Edwards, 563 N.E.2d 595, 600 (Ind.1990); Avco Financial Servs. v. Metro Holding Co., 563 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (citations omitted). An affidavit which does not satisfy the requirements of T.R. 56(E) is subject to a motion to strike, and formal defects are waived in the absence of a motion to strike or other objection. Gallatin Group v. Central Life Assurance Co., 650 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (citing Avco, 563 N.E.2d at 1327). However, Shults-Lewis did direct the court's attention to the Baker affidavit, and did object to the affidavit on the grounds that it did not meet the requirements governing expert opinion testimony. Shults-Lewis, in their Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Second Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Shults-Lewis, made the following argument: Even if the affidavit of Dr. Baker is considered by this court, and even if the court does not grant Shults-Lewis any continuance of the trial and the deadline for submitting materials in reply to the affidavit of Dr. Baker, the affidavit of Dr. Baker does not create a question of fact to prevent summary judgment against plaintiff. Fager requires expert testimony to establish the scientific validity of the theory of repressed memory. Fager, at 252. In addition, Indiana Rules of Evidence 702(b) provides that any of Dr. Baker's expert scientific testimony is admissible only if the scientific principles on which it rests are reliable. Dr. Baker does not assert that the theory of repressed memory, or any of his other opinions, rest on reliable scientific principles as required by Fager and by IRE 702(b). (R. at 371.) Having determined that the reliability of the Baker affidavit was properly before the court, we are now squarely faced with the question of whether the record raised a question of fact as to whether Jane I.'s memories were, in fact, repressed. We agree with the Court of Appeals that in order to raise a question of fact regarding whether Jane I. actually repressed memory of the abuse, the plaintiff need only present information supporting the scientific validity of the methodologies and processes used to form his opinion. [6] This result is reached by a careful reading of Indiana Trial Rule 56(E), which governs the use of affidavits in summary judgment proceedings, and Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b), which governs expert opinion testimony. Indiana Trial Rule 56 requires that [s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b) was designed to control the use of expert opinion testimony at trial. On the other hand, the trial court is considered the gatekeeper for expert opinion evidence. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 550 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citation omitted) (petitions for transfer pending); see generally Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 498. The trial court must weed out unreliable junk science from reliable scientific evidence. To fulfill this function, it is entrusted with the discretion to rule on the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. In order to fulfill this function at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the trial court certainly needs something more than a list of admissible facts and a bald conclusion drawn therefrom. Indeed, if a bald conclusion by an expert were enough to defeat a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party would always be able to defeat such a motion by the mere presence of an expert opinion. Therefore, we believe that an expert opinion affidavit submitted in a summary judgment proceeding, in addition to asserting admissible facts upon which the opinion is based, must also state the reasoning or methodologies upon which it is based. The reliability of the scientific principles need not be established, but the trial court must be provided with enough information to proceed with a reasonable amount of confidence that the principles used to form the opinion are reliable. The trial court is in the best position to make such determinations, as it is in the trial court that the issue may be fully explored. This approach both allows the trial court to perform its gatekeeping function at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings and avoids placing an onerous burden upon the nonmoving party. Further, this approach is consistent with the approach taken by several federal appellate courts. Although not bound by a federal court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, this Court has noted the similarity between the Indiana Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Evidence, and recognized that federal case law interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence may be of some utility, particularly with regard to the rules governing expert evidence. See Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d at 498. The Seventh Circuit, in Mid-State Fertilizer v. Exchange Nat. Bank, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir.1989), was asked to consider whether an expert opinion affidavit raised a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment. After considering the federal rules governing both summary judgment proceedings and expert opinion evidence, it found that an expert opinion must do more than supply a bottom line. Id. at 1339. Federal Rule 702(b) requires that scientific expert opinion testimony be based on reliable scientific principles. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175, 143 L.Ed.2d 238, 251 (1999). The expert opinion must contain the underlying methodologies used to form the opinion, because the trial judge must look behind [the expert's] ultimate conclusion... and analyze the adequacy of its foundation. Id. at 1339 (citing Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823, 829-32 (D.C.Cir.1988)). In National Diamond Syndicate, Inc. v. UPS, 897 F.2d 253, 260 (7th Cir.1990), the Seventh Circuit found that if the affiant offers an expert opinion, she must give reasons for the opinion, and not merely state her conclusions. See also Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir.1993); Iacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 24-26 (2d Cir.1994); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 966 F.2d 1464, 1470 (D.C.Cir.1992). We must analyze the Baker affidavit to determine if it provides the court with more than a bald conclusion based on admissible facts, and we find that it does. Dr. Baker based his opinion that Jane I. had repressed memory of the tortious conduct on his interview with her, his personal experience with survivors of childhood sexual abuse, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Through his experience with his patients and his reading on the subject, he developed a list of symptoms or traits commonly shared by those who repress memories of childhood sexual abuse. He applied these factors to Jane I., and found that she had repressed her memories. He analyzed the results of Jane I.'s MMPI and found that she registered high on the repression subindex. The underlying methodologies and reasons informing Baker's opinion were adequately expressed. This affidavit therefore raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the validity of the phenomenon of repressed memory and whether Jane I. actually repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse, and summary judgment was inappropriate on this basis.