Opinion ID: 1230089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reduction of interest

Text: Hoovestol contends that the trial court abused its discretion and erred in reducing the interest awarded by the jury verdict. At trial, Hoovestol introduced an exhibit summarizing the damages resulting from nonpayment of the indebtedness by credit life insurance proceeds. The exhibit showed a principal balance of $103,044.87 remaining on the notes after reduction by the payment of $25,000 in credit life insurance proceeds. The exhibit also showed the interest that Darlene Hoovestol paid on the balance to the Bank and to the New Salem Credit Union from July 28, 1988, to September 13, 1990. With the agreement of counsel for both parties, the court advised the jury, in response to a jury question during deliberations, that it could award interest from the date of Glenn Hoovestol's death or later as it determined. The jury returned a verdict awarding Hoovestol damages of $115,191.05, which included interest Darlene paid on the principal balance of the Hoovestols' indebtedness, and interest at the rate of six percent per annum on that amount from the date of Glenn Hoovestol's death on January 6, 1988. In post-trial proceedings, the trial court and counsel recognized that awarding prejudgment interest from the date of Glenn Hoovestol's death was troublesome. Counsel for the Bank said it may not be correct to award prejudgment interest to the date of death. Counsel for Hoovestol said that the Bank is estopped to raise an issue now. The following colloquy occurred between the trial court and Hoovestol's attorney: THE COURT: ... not only did you get [interest] as an item of damages at whatever rate was paid to the bank, you also got six percent from January 6, `88. Now that has to be a duplication; doesn't it?       MR. NORRIS: ... Now, I agree there is a timing problem here, Your Honor, and I fully expected the bank to come in with evidence which would have made an analysis of this interest to present to the jury, but they didn't do so.... But I believe to say that she is receiving double interest, that is not true, Your Honor.... THE COURT: Let's look at the last entry on Exhibit 5, date 9-13-90 she paid $631.90 interest at the Credit Union but under the verdict she is getting interest on that amount from January 6th, 1988, even though she didn't spend it until roughly two years later. MR. NORRIS: I agree, Your Honor. THE COURT: There is something wrong with that. MR. NORRIS: I believe that should have been a modification, but again the bank had the obligation to put that evidence in. The bank didn't.... THE COURT: It is getting interest on money you haven't spent yet before it becomes an item of damages. MR. NORRIS: I agree with the court on that.... But I don't think there is necessarily any error in that, ...       THE COURT: ... There is definitely a duplication, and call it what you will, but since the jury did grant prejudgment interest at the rate of six percent per annum on the verdict form from January 6, 1988, I feel under the law I have to grant a remittur [sic] as to that and provide that interest will only run from 9-13-90, the prejudgment interest at 6 percent. So that reduces it some. I don't suppose it is a big amount. Under remittur [sic], I guess you would have your right to remit that amount or ask for a new trial. I assume it being so insignificant I can assume you are going to take the remittur [sic] and not ask for a new trial? MR. NORRIS: That is correct, Your Honor.  (Emphasis added.) The verdict clearly awarded excessive interest to Hoovestol. Hoovestol agreed to accept a reduction in the interest awarded in lieu of a new trial. Under the circumstances presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reducing the prejudgment interest on the damage award by ordering that it run from September 13, 1990, the last date that an interest payment was shown to have been made to the Credit Union, rather than from January 6, 1988, the date of Glenn Hoovestol's death.