Opinion ID: 453004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: determining the scope of permissible prosecutorial

Text: ARGUMENT AT THE SENTENCING PHASE 103 In Georgia, as in other jurisdictions that impose the death penalty, a capital sentence is given only after a special hearing which follows a conviction for a death-eligible crime. Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 17-10-2 (1982). The use of this bifurcated procedure for trial and sentencing in capital cases was first recommended by the drafters of the Model Penal Code as a means of keeping prejudicial evidence relevant only to sentencing, from influencing the jury prior to its adjudication of guilt. ALI, Model Penal Code Sec. 201.6, comment 5, pp. 74-75 (Tentative. Draft No. 9, 1959). While the procedure has been explicitly approved by the Supreme Court, see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2933-34, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the precise nature of the capital sentencing determination has been the source of some controversy. 32 Because the appropriate conception of the penalty phase determines the role of the sentencing jury, it also affects what may be legitimately argued to that jury by a prosecutor as grounds for imposing death. 33 In this section of the opinion, we will discuss the Georgia capital punishment scheme and the areas of argument relevant to it.
104 Because death is qualitatively different from all other punishments, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). The consistent recognition of death as a special punishment has led courts to scrutinize carefully the procedures under which it is imposed. Those procedures must comport with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, which, in the capital sentencing context, requires that sentencing discretion be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). The quest for minimal risk does not, however, require perfection. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). 105 An initial concern in dealing with closing arguments in capital cases is the emotional fashion in which they are frequently delivered, both by prosecution and defense counsel. Indeed, Brooks suggests that the emotional character of the prosecutor's argument here contravenes the mandate of Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), that the decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. See also Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 952-53 (11th Cir.1983) (This dramatic appeal to gut emotion has no place in the courtroom, especially in a case involving the penalty of death). This claim warrants careful attention. 106 Georgia's capital punishment scheme--with its bifurcated trial, its requirement that the jury find at least one of the several statutory aggravating circumstances, its individualized determination of the life or death decision, and its mandatory appellate review--makes it possible to differentiate a particular case in an objective, evenhanded, and substantially rational way from the many Georgia murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 251 (1983). But, while the statute may be an objective one, capital sentencing is still an emotional issue. Necessarily it will always be so. See Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, ----, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 3424, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134, 1144 (1983) (It is entirely fitting for the moral, factual and legal judgment of judges and juries to play a meaningful role in sentencing). Reason alone cannot adequately explain a jury's decision to grant mercy to a person convicted of a serious murder because of that person's youth or troubling personal problems. Nor can reason alone fully explain the reaction of a juror upon hearing the facts of a particular crime described in their specifically tragic detail. Empathy for a defendant's individual circumstance or revulsion at the moral affront of his crime, reactions accepted as bases for capital sentencing decisions, are not susceptible to full explanation without recourse to human emotion. Thus, the fact that an argument by a defense counsel or prosecutor has emotional overtones does not independently indict it as improper. Tucker v. Zant, 724 F.2d 882 (11th Cir.), vacated for reh'g en banc, 724 F.2d 898 (1984); See Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266, 276, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 203, 78 L.Ed.2d 177 (1983); The propriety of argument rests primarily in the relation of its content to issues relevant to the sentencing jury's concern. 34
107 In Zant v. Stephens, 250 Ga. 97, 297 S.E.2d 1 (1982), the Georgia Supreme Court, answering a question certified by the United States Supreme Court, outlined the issue before a Georgia capital sentencing jury. After a conviction of murder, a capital sentencing hearing may be held. The jury hears evidence and argument and is then instructed about statutory aggravating circumstances. The court explained the process beyond this instruction as follows: 108 The purpose of the statutory aggravating circumstances is to limit to a large degree, but not completely, the factfinder's discretion. Unless at least one of the ten statutory aggravating circumstances exist, the death penalty may not be imposed in any event. If there exists at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, the death penalty may be imposed but the factfinder has a discretion to decline to do so without giving any reason. ... [Citations omitted]. In making the decision as to the penalty, the factfinder takes into consideration all circumstances before it from both the guilt-innocence and the sentence phases of the trial. These circumstances relate both to the offense and the defendant. 109 297 S.E.2d at 3-4. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of structuring the sentencing jury's discretion in such a manner. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). 110 This explanation demonstrates that the jury in the sentencing phase has two tasks. It must first determine whether the evidence supports the existence of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. That determination must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 17-10-30(c). If at least one aggravating circumstance is present, the jury must then examine factors relative to the offense and the defendant and exercise its discretion in choosing between death or life imprisonment. 35 111 In carrying out the first task, the issue before the jury is very clear. The statutory circumstances are elaborated such that they require findings of fact similar to those made by the jury in the guilt phase of the trial. Conner v. State, 303 S.E.2d at 274. The second task, exercise of discretion to impose punishment, is more amorphous. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3451, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1185 (1983) (once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively-defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty, ... [it] then is free to consider whether death is the appropriate punishment); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 878, 103 S.Ct. at 2743, 77 L.Ed.2d at 248 (upholding Georgia statute over defendant's contention that jury discretion is unbridled at the sentencing stage). Nevertheless, some description of the jury's discretionary choice of punishment is made possible by reference to case law outlining appropriate sentencing concerns. 112 The subject most relevant to the choice of punishment is the broad class of information about the defendant, his character, and the circumstances of his offense made known to the jury throughout the bifurcated trial. Consideration of these factors is made necessary by the Eighth Amendment's requirement that capital sentencing be individualized. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976). It is unconstitutional for a state to restrict the jury's consideration of any such individualized information that the defendant puts forth to mitigate the severity of his offense. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). The Court's opinion in Zant v. Stephens, supra, made clear that, under the Georgia scheme, the jury can also consider reliable 36 aggravating evidence, even though it is not relevant to any statutory aggravating circumstance. Thus, with very few exceptions, 37 any information about the individual defendant and his offense may be properly considered by the jury. 113 A line of cases has also made clear that the sentencing body may consider the future dangerousness of a particular defendant. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) (approving Texas capital sentencing statute that requires a jury to find, before imposing death, that there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society); 38 see also, California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1002 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3453 n. 16, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1181-83 (1983); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-98, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3396, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1106-07 (1983). 114 A third area of consideration is the accepted penological justifications for the use of death as a punishment. These general justifications are retribution and deterrence. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-87, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2930-31, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). A Georgia jury is charged with implementing the state's capital punishment scheme in a particular case. It is hard to imagine a more reasonable approach to this task than consideration by the jury of whether or not imposition of the death penalty in the particular case will serve the accepted objectives of deterrence and retribution. See Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322 (11th Cir.1984). Translating facts into a penalty is an ethical operation requiring consideration of the accepted justifications of the particular punishment. See Spaziano v. Florida, --- U.S. ----, ----, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3174, 82 L.Ed.2d 340, 366 (1984) (in the final analysis, capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical judgment ...) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 115 Thus, jury consideration of the appropriateness of retribution in the particular case is both proper and inevitable. Similarly, with respect to specific deterrence, the jury may appropriately consider whether a particular defendant is so likely to be dangerous in the future and so unlikely to be rehabilitated that incapacitation is warranted. See Jurek v. Texas, supra. Even general deterrence, while principally a concern for the legislature, Spaziano v. Florida, --- U.S. at ----, 104 S.Ct. at 3172, 82 L.Ed.2d at 354, can be considered in fixing a punishment. In deciding whether to impose the death penalty in a particular case, it is appropriate for a jury to consider whether or not the general deterrence purpose of the statute would be served thereby. Collins v. Francis, 728 F.2d 1322, 1339-40 (11th Cir.1984) (discussing Supreme Court precedent and concluding that the need for general deterrence is a constitutional sentencing consideration). 39 Georgia permits argument about these penological justifications. Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266 (1983). 40 Such arguments are logically relevant to the jury's proper task. Neither reason nor precedent suggests that we should raise a constitutional barrier to such arguments.
116 The previous discussion of issues appropriately considered by the Georgia sentencing jury is necessarily general. However, it provides a guideline for determining the scope of proper prosecutorial argument. With regard to the sentencing jury's first task, it would be improper for a prosecutor to urge the jury to find a statutory aggravating circumstance on any basis other than the relevant facts introduced in evidence and the proper inferences therefrom. 40 Concerning the exercise of discretion after an aggravating circumstance has been found, arguments outside the realm of recognized sentencing concerns--e.g., we noted that the individual circumstances of the crime and defendant, future dangerousness, rehabilitation and penological justifications for the death penalty are within the realm of recognized sentencing concerns--run the risk of being improper because they urge death for possibly irrelevant reasons. Of course, not all improper arguments will rise to the level of fundamental unfairness. Similarly, an argument based on one of these core concerns may, under certain conditions, be improper in its mode of presentation to the jury. 41 The general standards are helpful, however, as a means of focusing counsel on the true task before the sentencing jury. That task is broad enough that much safe ground for argument is available. 117 We now examine Whisnant's argument during Brooks' sentencing in light of these guidelines. 118