Opinion ID: 777043
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Act of God Defense Instruction

Text: 11 Appellants first argue that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the act of God defense. Under South Dakota law, an act of God is defined as any accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Henry Carlson Co., 83 S.D. 664, 165 N.W.2d 346, 349 (S.D.1969) (holding that whether damage was proximately caused by act of God is question of fact for jury to resolve, and that trial judge erred in taking issue away from jury). An act of God must be the sole proximate cause of damages without concurrent negligent participation of the defendant before the defendant is entitled to a verdict. Id. 12 Appellants argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish that the wind was so unusual and extraordinary a manifestation of nature as could not under normal conditions have been reasonably anticipated or expected, as is required for an act of God defense. However, because there was conflicting evidence presented at trial with respect to the wind, this argument is actually a challenge to the weight of the evidence presented, and not to its sufficiency as a matter of law. See id. 13 It is axiomatic that [c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (holding that district court was correct to submit case to jury, and court of appeals erred in reversing jury verdict); see also City of Bridgewater v. Morris, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 712, 715 (S.D.1999) (It is the jury's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give to the evidence.). It was within the province of the jury to determine the credibility of the evidence that the unusual wind, and not concurrent negligence on the part of appellees, caused the tree to fall. There was ample evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find that an act of God — that is, the unusually strong winds — caused the tree to fall. See slip op. at 952. Resort guest Bakalars testified that it was very windy the day before the tree fell, and much windier than it had been on previous days. Resort manager Powell testified that it had been very windy the night before the incident. Expert witness Clarke testified that her investigation led to her conclude that wind caused the tree to fall. Apparently, the jury believed this evidence, and found that appellees were not negligent. See id. at 953. 14 Because there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could determine that an act of God caused the tree to fall, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury on the act of God defense.