Opinion ID: 78159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments on Petitioner's Post-Arrest Silence

Text: The district court found that the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding Petitioner's post-arrest silence, in the State's case in chief, as evidence of his guilt. Prevatte, 459 F.Supp.2d at 1370. And, the district court found that the prosecutor made impermissible statements about that silence, including a statement during closing argument that an innocent man would not have requested a lawyer but instead would have talked to police. Id. at 1375. The district court held that these statements violated Petitioner's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, but that testimony about his silence offered for purposes of impeachment did not violate Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)  holding that a defendant may not be impeached by cross-examination about his failure to talk to police after receiving Miranda warnings  was decided after Petitioner's conviction was final and was not retroactive to his case. Prevatte, 459 F.Supp.2d at 1369-75. Significantly, the district court found that the constitutional violations were harmless because the other evidence of petitioner's guilt was simply overwhelming. Id. at 1378. The district court applied the harmlessness standard announced in Brecht v. Abrahamson, namely, whether the error `had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Brecht, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1714, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). After recapping the evidence of Petitioner's guilt separate and apart from his post-arrest silence, the district court concluded: the evidence of Petitioner's post-arrest silence, insofar as it may have been considered as evidence of guilt, was of little significance and certainly was not the touchstone of the state's case against Petitioner. When this overwhelming evidence of guilt and the relatively minor role the evidence of Petitioner's silence played are considered against the prejudice to Petitioner, the Court concludes that the errors resulting from the prosecutor's references to Petitioner's post-arrest silence did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710. While the Court in no way seeks to minimize the errors that occurred, the Court is confident that those errors did not operate to sway the jury in favor of a verdict of guilty. Prevatte, 459 F.Supp.2d at 1379. Therefore, the district court denied Petitioner relief on this claim. Petitioner argues that the district court erred when it held that Doyle does not apply to Petitioner's trial because Petitioner had not been sentenced at the time Doyle was decided, and therefore his judgment was not final pre- Doyle. Petitioner also argues that the district court should not have performed a harmlessness review as Respondents did not argue that the errors were harmless. And, Petitioner argues that the district court applied the wrong standard in its harmlessness review, as it should have applied cases that took Doyle into account. We hold that the district court was within its powers in performing a sua sponte harmless error review. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637, 113 S.Ct. at 1722 (citing the federal harmless-error rule, 28 U.S.C. § 2111, and stating that habeas petitioners are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.) (internal quotations omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. ) (emphasis added); see also Horsley v. State of Ala., 45 F.3d 1486, 1492 n. 10 (11th Cir.1995) ([W]e have the discretion to overlook a failure to argue harmlessness and to undertake sua sponte the task of considering harmlessness.). And, the court applied the correct standard in determining whether the statements regarding Petitioner's silence were harmless. See Hill v. Turpin, 135 F.3d 1411, 1417-19 (11th Cir.1998) (applying Brecht standard to analyze whether Doyle violation was harmless). We now consider harmlessness  a question of law  de novo. For purposes of our analysis, we assume, without deciding, that Doyle should apply to Petitioner's case. We therefore assume, again without deciding, that all of the statements made at Petitioner's trial regarding his post-arrest silence violated his constitutional rights and ask whether those statements had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623, 113 S.Ct. at 1714. We conclude that they did not. We are, as was the district court, overwhelmed by the evidence of Petitioner's guilt, separate and apart from any evidence of his post-arrest silence. The district court summarized that evidence: Petitioner and Jordan were arrested in North Carolina less than 24 hours after the victim was killed. At the time they were arrested, they were driving the victim's car. During a high-speed police chase leading up to their eventual capture which included an exchange of gunfire with the pursuing officers, a shotgun was tossed from the vehicle. [footnote omitted.] This was the same type of weapon used to kill the victim. The shotgun shells found in their possession were of the exact brand and type as that discovered at the scene of the killing, and the state's expert testified that the shell found at the scene had been fired from the shotgun in Petitioner's possession. Petitioner and Jordan had in their possession the victim's wallet and briefcase, and Jordan was wearing the victim's watch. There were photographs of Petitioner and Jordan standing in front of the victim's car holding various weapons, including a shotgun, which Petitioner and Jordan explained as just clowning around and as a souvenir. Finally, there was testimony from Ms. Hamrick placing Petitioner, Jordan, and the victim at a bar which was in close proximity to where the victim was killed, but a significant distance from the location where Petitioner claimed to have discovered and stolen his vehicle. Prevatte, 459 F.Supp.2d at 1378-79. We are convinced that this is not a case, like Hill, where there were significant weaknesses in the state's case against [the Defendant]. Hill, 135 F.3d at 1417. We hold that any error arising from statements regarding Petitioner's silence  whether those statements were used in the prosecution's case in chief or to impeach Petitioner  was harmless. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.