Opinion ID: 2366079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In New Jersey,

Text: [t]he traditional common law approach to landowner or occupier tort liability ... is predicated on the status of the person on the property at the time of the injury. Historically, the duty of the owner or occupier to such a person is gauged by the right of that person to be on the land. That status is determined by which of three classifications applies to the entrant, namely, that of a business invitee, licensee, or trespasser. [ Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 433, 625 A. 2d 1110 (1993).] As in other tort contexts, however, the overriding principle governing the determination of a duty is the general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others. See, e.g., id. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110; Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 277, 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982); Wytupeck v. City of Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 460-64, 136 A. 2d 887 (1957); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 45, 86 A. 2d 777 (1952). Thus, in a landowner-liability case decided nearly a half-century ago, we said that [t]he basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk. Strang, supra, 9 N.J. at 45, 86 A. 2d 777. Just last term we noted the settled principle that the common-law classifications of persons on land should be applied flexibly in assessing the landowner's general tort obligation to avoid foreseeable harm to others. Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 144 N.J. 479, 508, 677 A. 2d 705 (1996) (citing Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 438-39, 625 A. 2d 1110; Butler, supra, 89 N.J. at 275-77, 445 A. 2d 1141). Determining the scope of that obligation is the responsibility of the courts. Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 N.J. 2, 15, 592 A. 2d 527 (1991); Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552, 476 A. 2d 1219 (1984). The actual imposition of a duty of care and the formulation of standards defining such a duty derive from considerations of public policy and fairness. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A. 2d 1110; accord Snyder v. American Assoc. of Blood Banks, 144 N.J. 269, 292, 676 A. 2d 1036 (1996); Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 572, 675 A. 2d 209 (1996); Crawn v. Campo, 136 N.J. 494, 503, 643 A. 2d 600 (1994); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 110, 642 A. 2d 372 (1994). A fundamental purpose of tort law is to deter conduct that creates an unreasonable risk of injury to others. E.g., Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 448, 625 A. 2d 1110; People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 255, 495 A. 2d 107 (1985). [F]orcing tortfeasors to pay for the harm they have wrought provides a proper incentive for reasonable conduct. Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 487, 524 A. 2d 366 (1987). Ability to foresee injury to a potential plaintiff does not in itself establish the existence of a duty, see [ Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A. 2d 291 (1962)], but it is a crucial element in determining whether imposition of a duty on an alleged tortfeasor is appropriate. See Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 143-44 [380 A. 2d 1107] (1977) (discussing foreseeability as a `duty' determinant). Subsumed in the concept of foreseeability are many of the concerns we acknowledge as relevant to the imposition of a duty: the relationship between the plaintiff and the tortfeasor, the nature of the risk, and the ability and opportunity to exercise care. [ Carter Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. EMAR Group, Inc., 135 N.J. 182, 194, 638 A. 2d 1288 (1994).] Once the foreseeability of an injured party is established, we must decide whether considerations of fairness and policy warrant the imposition of a duty. Id. at 194-95, 638 A. 2d 1288. Thus, [a]lthough a foreseeable risk is the indispensable cornerstone of any formulation of a duty of care, not all foreseeable risks give rise to duties. Dunphy, supra, 136 N.J. at 108, 642 A. 2d 372; see Weinberg, supra, 106 N.J. at 485, 524 A. 2d 366; Kelly, supra, 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A. 2d 1219. The inquiry involves identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors  the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439, 625 A. 2d 1110 (citing Goldberg, supra, 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A. 2d 291); see Snyder, supra, 144 N.J. at 292, 676 A. 2d 1036; Carvalho, supra, 143 N.J. at 573, 675 A. 2d 209; Crawn, supra, 136 N.J. at 503, 643 A. 2d 600; Dunphy, supra, 136 N.J. at 108, 642 A. 2d 372. The court must determine whether, `in light of the actual relationship between the parties under all of the surrounding circumstances,' the imposition of a duty on the landowner is `fair and just.' Brett, supra, 144 N.J. at 509, 677 A. 2d 705 (quoting Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 438, 625 A. 2d 1110). Twenty years ago we recognized that under certain conditions a duty properly could be imposed on residential landlords to safeguard tenants' premises against criminal acts by third persons. See Braitman, supra, 68 N.J. at 380, 346 A. 2d 76 (`[N]egligence may consist in the creation of a situation [that] involves unreasonable risk because of the expectable action of another.' (quoting Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201, 156 A. 2d 1 (1959))). We revisited the issue of landlord liability for the criminal acts of others in Trentacost, supra, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A. 2d 436. There, the tenant sued her landlord to recover for injuries the tenant sustained when she was assaulted and robbed in a hallway of her apartment building. We affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and based our holding, in part, on traditional principles of negligence law. Id. at 222, 412 A. 2d 436. We stated: We reiterate that our holding in Braitman lies well within traditional principles of negligence law. Negligence is tested by whether the reasonably prudent person at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk or likelihood of harm or danger to others. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 201 [156 A. 2d 1] (1959). If the reasonably prudent person would foresee danger resulting from another's voluntary, criminal acts, the fact that another's actions are beyond defendant's control does not preclude liability. Foreseeability of harm, not the fact of another's intervention, is the crucial factor in determining whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against [criminal activity]. Goldberg, 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A. 2d 291. [ Trentacost, supra, 82 N.J. at 222-23, 412 A. 2d 436 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).] In Butler v. Acme Markets, Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 276, 445 A. 2d 1141 (1982), we held that the principles established in Braitman and Trentacost were applicable to a case involving a criminal attack in a supermarket parking lot. The evidence at trial established a history of muggings in the parking lot prior to the attack on the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff had shopped at the store regularly for a number of years, she was unaware of the prior attacks on shoppers. The defendant employed off-duty police officers to patrol inside and outside the store, but only one officer was on duty at a time. No signs were posted warning patrons about the possibility of criminal attack. The plaintiff claimed that the supermarket had been negligent in failing to warn her of the risk of criminal activity and in failing to provide a safe place in which to shop and park. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff. On the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed and we affirmed. We stated: While [ Braitman and Trentacost ] involved the relationship of landlord and tenant, their principles are equally applicable to the responsibility of commercial shopkeepers.... Owners and occupiers of land make up the largest single group upon whom the duty of affirmative conduct has been imposed. The historical classifications of the degrees of care owing to visitors upon land are undergoing gradual change in the law in favor of a broadening application of a general tort obligation to exercise reasonable care against foreseeable harm to others. [ Id. at 276-77, 445 A. 2d 1141 (citation omitted).] We concluded that a shopkeeper's liability under these circumstances is properly based upon familiar negligence concepts.... Foreseeability of the risk that criminal acts of others would cause harm is the crucial factor. Id. at 275-76, 445 A. 2d 1141. We held that it was fair to impose a duty on the shopkeeper under the circumstances, because the shopkeeper was in the best position to provide either warnings or adequate protection for its patrons ... and because the public interest lies in providing a reasonably safe place for a patron to shop. Id. at 284, 445 A. 2d 1141. We have also imposed a duty on landowners in respect of injuries that occur outside the premises. We have held that where a landowner's activity invites the use of adjoining property to its commercial advantage or for its special benefit, fairness justifies the imposition of liability for injuries occurring beyond the boundaries of the owner's premises. See Stewart v. 104 Wallace St., Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 157, 432 A. 2d 881 (1981) (imposing duty on commercial landowners to maintain abutting public sidewalks in reasonably good condition to prevent injuries to pedestrians); Davis v. Pecorino, 69 N.J. 1, 4-5, 350 A. 2d 51 (1975) (An abutting landowner is responsible for dangerous conditions created as a result of his special use of the public sidewalk for his particular benefit.). Relying on our decision in Stewart, supra, the Appellate Division determined that a commercial proprietor could be found liable for injuries to its patrons struck by a car on an adjacent roadway that provided access to the premises. Warrington v. Bird, 204 N.J. Super. 611, 499 A. 2d 1026 (1985), certif. denied, 103 N.J. 473, 511 A. 2d 653 (1986). The defendant in that case, a restaurant operator, owned property on both sides of a poorly-lit public road; the restaurant was situated on one side and the parking lot on the other. The plaintiffs were injured while crossing the road to return to their cars after dining. The court held that the landowner was obligated to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its patrons and had a duty not to subject them to an unreasonable risk of harm in traversing the expected route between the two locations. Id. at 617, 499 A. 2d 1026. [T]he critical element should not be the question of the proprietor's control over the area to be traversed but rather the expectation of the invitee that safe passage will be afforded from the parking facility to the establishment to which they are invited. Commercial entrepreneurs know in providing the parking facility that their customers will travel a definite route to reach their premises. The benefiting proprietor should not be permitted to cause or ignore an unsafe condition in that route which it might reasonably remedy, whether the path leads along a sidewalk or across a roadway. ... [T]he question of control of the roadway has little bearing.... [I]f the dangers reasonably required, a sign or flashing signal might have been erected on defendant's premises to alert both motorists and patrons of the dangers. [ Ibid. ] The decisive factor in the determination of the duty in Warrington was that the landowner had invited the use of the unsafe crossing in disregard of the foreseeable risk to its invitees. More significant than the defendant's lack of ownership of the adjacent property was its ability to prevent the harm that occurred there. Other cases are in accord. See, e.g., Gunlock v. Gill Hotels Co., 622 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that hotel owner owed a duty to exercise reasonable care for the safety of its invitees in passing over the highway to and from ... hotel facilities); Lutheran Hosp. of Indiana, Inc. v. Blaser, 634 N.E. 2d 864, 870-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that hospital owed duty to guard against foreseeable injuries caused by car striking pedestrian in public right-of-way adjacent to hospital's parking lot where evidence indicated that hospital permitted pedestrians and vehicles to enter lot in unsafe manner); Tryon v. City of Lowell, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 720, 565 N.E. 2d 456, 457-58 (1991) (holding that city's duty to protect school children from injury could extend to dangers on adjacent railroad property where record indicated that city employees knew that children regularly crossed railroad tracks to enter city's school property by climbing through hole in city's defective fence); see also Dumas v. Pike County, 642 F. Supp. 131, 136 (S.D.Miss. 1986) (The duty of an occupier or owner of a premises to an invitee can extend to the entrance of the property [and] to a safe exit after the purpose of the visit is concluded.... If the landowner treats the neighbor's property as an integral part of his, the lack of formal title is immaterial [to the imposition of the duty].); Ollar v. Spakes, 269 Ark. 488, 601 S.W. 2d 868, 870-71 (1980) ([B]efore extraterritorial liability attaches, it must be shown that the owner or operator had actual or constructive knowledge of the danger of injury to his invitees. When an owner or operator learns or should have learned of a dangerous condition existing adjacent to his property and fails to attempt to correct the condition or warn the invitees of such danger, he is guilty of negligence.); Southland Corp. v. Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57, 60 (1988) (holding that store owner was not entitled to summary judgment on ground that it did not own adjacent land where patron was harmed in criminal assault because triable issues of fact existed concerning foreseeability of criminal attack and store owner's exercise of actual or apparent control of adjacent land); Gayden v. City of Rochester, 148 A.D. 2d 975, 539 N.Y.S. 2d 211, 212 (1989) (holding that landowner owes duty to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of its property to prevent foreseeable injury that might occur on the adjoining property and therefore owner of property adjacent to concrete waterway could be liable for drowning death of child where owner failed to repair hole in fence on its property through which children climbed to get to adjacent waterway property); Andrick v. Town of Buckhannon, 187 W. Va. 706, 421 S.E. 2d 247, 251-52 (1992) (discussing cases in which courts have recognized that landowner's duty to business invitees may extend beyond premises where landowner knows that invitees regularly use adjacent property in connection with business invitation and also knows that such use exposes invitees to risk of injury). In sum, the scope of a landlord's duty to exercise due care to prevent foreseeable harm to tenants is defined not only by the precise boundaries of its premises but also by what is reasonable and fair, under the totality of the circumstances. A landlord acts negligently if it fails to take reasonable measures to protect its tenants from foreseeable, preventable harm. To act non-negligently is to take reasonable precautions to prevent the occurrence of foreseeable harm to others. What precautions are `reasonable' depends upon the risk of harm involved and the practicability of preventing it. Weinberg, supra, 106 N.J. at 484, 524 A. 2d 366; see People Express, supra, 100 N.J. at 267, 495 A. 2d 107; Wytupeck, supra, 25 N.J. at 461, 136 A. 2d 887.