Opinion ID: 1346296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Trial Management Orders Improperly Encroached on Plaintiff's Ability to Present its Expert Medical Evidence.

Text: The trial began on April 18, 1994. At the close of the first week's testimony, the trial court entered an amended trial management order, which provided as follows: Plaintiff shall call Dr. Kevin Smith and Dr. Gary Cromer on Monday, April 25, 1994. Plaintiff shall call one of these witnesses at 9 a.m. and the other no later than 1:30 p.m. Failure to comply with this order will result in sanctions which may include exclusion of the witnesses' testimony. Plaintiff contends that this order unduly restricted her ability to effectively present her medical evidence to the jury. A trial court has considerable discretion in directing the course of the trial. Nichols v. Kirchner, 241 Iowa 99, 106, 40 N.W.2d 13, 17 (1949); Fournier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 368 N.W.2d 849 (Iowa App. 1985). Discretionary rulings of the trial court are presumptively correct and will be disturbed on appeal only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Sheer Constr., Inc. v. W. Hodgman & Sons, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 1982). In applying these principles, we must consider the circumstances under which the challenged order was entered. At a pretrial hearing on March 28, 1994, both the court and defense counsel expressed concerns regarding the length of the trial and the need for organization, particularly with regard to the scheduling of defendants' expert medical testimony. Plaintiff's trial counsel represented that he would probably be able to present his case within six days. It became apparent before the trial had even begun that it would run longer than had been anticipated. In response to the scheduling problems this would produce, it was agreed that the expert witnesses for the defense could testify on the seventh, eighth, and ninth days of the trial, and would be taken out of order if necessary. On April 19, 1994, counsel for Iowa Methodist Medical Center informed the court that subpoenas had been served on several of its personnel, including its chief executive officer, a radiologist, and several nurses, most of whom had no involvement with the case. The hospital's counsel moved to quash the subpoenas. The district court overruled the motion to quash, reasoning that granting the motion would cause even more delay. However, the court at this time warned plaintiff's trial counsel that he must be ready to call the witnesses at the time stated in the subpoenas. Despite repeated warnings and admonishments from the court, delays continued. This produced the amended trial management order of which plaintiff now complains. The court indicated that its motivation for issuing this order was its belief that defendants' medical experts should have the benefit of the testimony given by plaintiff's medical experts prior to the time that they testified. Plaintiff's trial counsel immediately disregarded the amended trial management order by putting plaintiff's mother back on the stand at the time designated for the beginning of the testimony of his first medical expert, Dr. Smith. Notwithstanding the effect of this omission in shortening up the time allowed for Dr. Smith's testimony, that testimony was concluded before noon on April 25, 1994. At the conclusion of cross-examination by defendants' counsel, plaintiff's counsel was granted an opportunity for redirect examination of the witness and declined to make such examination. After Dr. Cromer had testified in the afternoon of April 25, the district court inquired of plaintiff's counsel if he wished to make any further record with respect to Dr. Cromer's testimony, and counsel advised that he did not. Plaintiff made no offer of proof concerning any testimony that would have been given by Dr. Smith or Dr. Cromer had plaintiff not been subject to the restrictions of the trial management order. Based on our review of these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in its issuance and enforcement of the amended scheduling order. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed. AFFIRMED.