Opinion ID: 20143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: limitation of voir dire on specific mitigating factors

Text: 53 The next issue is whether the trial court's restrictions on the phrasing of certain voir dire questions regarding the consideration of mitigating evidence violated Soria's right to an impartial jury. During voir dire, Soria attempted to pose questions in the following form: No matter what the other evidence would show, could you consider [evidence such as youth or voluntary intoxication] as a mitigating factor in setting punishment. The state objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, concluding that such phrasing of the question constituted an attempt to bind the prospective juror regarding his or her position on the evidence. On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the trial court:We . . . hold the trial court in the instant case did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the form of appellant's questions was improper. Modifying each question by asking, no matter what the other evidence showed could be construed as an attempt to bind the venireperson to say that they would view the specified evidence in mitigation or as a mitigating factor under any circumstances, which would therefore include the circumstances involved in the instant case. 54 Soria, 933 S.W.2d at 65. We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its considerable discretion in finding that the questions posed by Soria constituted an attempt to improperly commit the prospective jurors to a certain view regarding mitigating evidence anticipated to be presented in his case. 55 More important, as the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged, Soria was not prevented from rephrasing the questions. Id. Indeed, the trial court expressly informed Soria that it would allow him to phrase the question to a prospective juror as follows: Can you consider [for example] the age of the Defendant in deciding on punishment? 56 Citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954 (1978), Soria complains that the trial court's question reveals whether a potential sentencer would consider evidence of youth, but not whether the sentencer would consider youth mitigating evidence. Thus, he argues that he was unable to discern whether a potential sentencer should have been excused for cause. Soria's argument rests on a faulty premise. `[T]he fact that a juror might view the evidence of youth as aggravating, as opposed to mitigating, does not mean that the rule of Lockett is violated.' Vuong v. Scott, 62 F.3d 673, 680 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 113 S.Ct. 2658 (1993)) (other citation omitted). 13 Contrary to Soria's argument, he was not entitled to challenge prospective jurors for cause who might view his evidence proffered in mitigation as the oft-cited, double-edged sword. 57 Accordingly, although the trial judge did not allow the particular phrasing Soria sought, we are confident that the form of questioning permitted by the trial court was sufficient to allow an intelligent exercise of his peremptory challenges. See Herman, 98 F.3d at 174 (explaining that no constitutional violation was shown where the trial judge afforded considerable latitude to investigate possible bias in prospective jurors). In other words, the voir dire questioning was sufficient to allow Soria to determine whether a prospective juror would consider the evidence proffered in mitigation by the defense. Soria is entitled to no more. He therefore has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. 58