Opinion ID: 568368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII and the ADEA

Text: 25 Courts apply the same standard in adjudicating claims of discrimination under both Title VII and the ADEA. Foster v. Arcata Associates, Inc., 772 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). The plaintiff must prove intentional discriminatory conduct by defendant in order to obtain relief. Id. 26 The order of proof and allocation of burdens for Title VII cases was set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 7 If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then negate the defendant's excuse by showing that the proferred reason is a pretext for discrimination. Ultimately it is the burden of the plaintiff to persuade the court that he has been a victim of intentional discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04; Foster, 772 F.2d at 1458-59.
27 Since appellee was prohibited by law from hiring a noncitizen if even a minimally qualified citizen was available for the position, a key issue on appeal is whether the appellant was qualified for the job. Appellant argued that he was qualified, and that appellee went out of its way to disqualify him in order to be able to hire Safak, a noncitizen. 28 Both parties agreed that appellant met the educational and professional experience requirements for the job. However, in making out his prima facie case of discrimination and in trying to show pretext and discriminatory animus, appellant failed to demonstrate that he possessed the specialized knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics described in the job announcement as essential to the job, e.g. the ability to develop analytical techniques for analyzing strong-motion records from instrumented structures, and knowledge of engineering and/or structural dynamics related to earthquakes. Appellant's application and resume demonstrated to those who reviewed it that appellant had construction experience, but no research or earthquake experience. Moreover, appellant presented nothing at trial which indicated that he was qualified to design and conduct sophisticated earthquake engineering research. 29 Appellee, however, presented evidence that Hanks, the head of the Seismic and Engineering Branch; Celebi, the supervisor for the vacant position; and Davidson, the Chief of the Science and Engineering Examining Office of the OPM, each independently concluded that appellant was not qualified for the position. Hanks testified that he based his conclusion on his general knowledge of the engineering field and appellant's lack of any scholarly publications. Celebi's unrebutted testimony was that he was familiar with appellant's listed work experience and concluded that appellant was experienced in run of the mill cookbook engineering which required no research capability. Davidson had never met the other witnesses and testified as an expert on the examination of applications and job announcements. 30 Appellant has clearly failed to show that the Magistrate erroneously concluded that appellant was unqualified for the job. 31 Our conclusion is unaffected by the fact that Hanks erroneously thought that the job required a Ph.D., because Hanks' ultimate conclusion is supported by other deficiencies in appellant's resume and application. Significantly, Davidson, who disagreed with Hanks regarding the Ph.D. requirement, agreed with Hanks that appellant was unqualified and agreed to change the Certificate of Eligibles to delete appellant's name. 32 Appellant places great weight on the fact that OPM initially placed appellant on the Certificate of Eligibles. Appellee, however, in meeting its second-stage burden to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, presented evidence that the initial OPM determination was a mistake committed by Busteed, a relatively inexperienced staffing specialist trainee. Davidson testified that Busteed must have mistakenly overlooked the two selective placement factors at the bottom of the vacancy announcement. Davidson also testified that, based on his twenty years of staffing experience in the Science and Engineering Office at OPM and a comparison between the job requirements and appellant's application, a correct initial determination would have labeled appellant not qualified. 33 The Magistrate's finding that OPM had no basis to ascertain whether appellant had the necessary selective placement factors which are those knowledges, skills, abilities, and other characteristics identified as essential for successful performance in the position, 8 is further supported by the fact that appellant had not supplied any information to OPM which indicated that he possessed the requisite knowledges, skills, abilities and other characteristics for the job. 9 34 At trial, appellant presented no evidence that he had experience developing analytical techniques for analyzing strong-motion records from instrumented structures, or any knowledge of engineering and/or structural dynamics related to earthquakes. The Magistrate concluded that Busteed's determination was unsupported by appellant's application and by facts presented at trial. The appellant has not presented this court with any reasons why the Magistrate's conclusion in this regard was erroneous.
35 The United States Department of the Interior rejected appellant's claim pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1613.215, finding that the complaint was unduly late 10 and that the record did not indicate facts or circumstances requiring a waiver of the time limit. Appellant timely appealed to the EEOC, which affirmed the agency's decision. The EEOC subsequently sent notice to appellant of his right to file a civil action. 36 The right-to-sue letter from the EEOC indicates that Kalra exhausted his administrative remedies and was therefore properly before the district court. See Carter v. Smith Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 923 (9th Cir.1985) (A right-to-sue letter would be a contradiction in terms if it did not mean that the recipient had exhausted his administrative remedies and had met all the statutory prerequisites to the filing of a lawsuit.) There may be an issue as to whether appellant's untimely EEOC filing bars a subsequent suit in federal court despite the right-to-sue letter. 37 Because appellee has failed to give this court any direct authority which supports its contention, 11 and because the case for affirming the judgment on the merits is so strong, we need not address the timeliness issue on this appeal.