Opinion ID: 415296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Harvey Issues

Text: 23 Harvey also contends that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that it could consider lesser included offenses before it has unanimously decided in favor of the defendant on the manslaughter offense. The district court followed the instruction outlined in 1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Sec. 18.05 (3d Ed.1977), which teaches that a jury should reach a unanimous result in favor of the defendant on the greater charge before moving to lesser ones. We see no error in the district court's instruction. 24 Harvey argues that this court should embrace the rule proposed in United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995, 98 S.Ct. 1647, 56 L.Ed.2d 84 (1978). In Tsanas, the court opined that a defendant has the right to make a seasonable selection between the Devitt and Blackmar instruction and one that allows the jury to move on to lesser offenses if it cannot, after reasonable efforts, decide on the major offense. 572 F.2d at 346. We do not need to decide whether the Tsanas rule should become the law in our circuit. Harvey did not make her request for this instruction until the jury had deliberated for three hours and been dismissed for the weekend. As held in Tsanas, the request for this alternate instruction must be timely. Id. at 347. The Tsanas rule is not of constitutional dimension, and the district court's instruction following Devitt and Blackmar is not error. Id.; Catches v. United States, 582 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir.1978). 25 Harvey also argues that the district court erred because it did not use the exact language of United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir.1979), in its instruction on the knowledge element of involuntary manslaughter. We see no error. While the trial judge's instruction did not mirror the language in Keith, its effect was the same. We fail to see how the instruction as used lowered the level of knowledge required for involuntary manslaughter. 26 Harvey's final contention is that prosecutorial misconduct tainted her conviction. We hold that the misconduct was cured by the trial judge's timely cautionary instruction to the jury, United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S.Ct. 925, 66 L.Ed.2d 843 (1981), but we emphasize that a prosecutor may not expound in closing argument on what a witness would have testified to if questioned. 27