Opinion ID: 1934689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Statutory Defenses

Text: Begin was charged with gross sexual assault pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(2)(A), [1] which requires that the defendant impair the victim's power to control his sexual acts by administering or employing drugs [or] intoxicants. It is a complete defense to the crime that the victim of the assault voluntarily consumed or allowed administration of the substance with knowledge of its nature. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(3) (Supp.1994). Substantial evidence at trial suggested that A and B voluntarily consumed the marijuana provided by Begin and LaMarche. [2] B testified that he liked the drugs and repeatedly returned to the trailer in order to get more. He admitted to prior marijuana use, testifying that he enjoyed the effects of marijuana. Similarly, A acknowledged using marijuana before meeting Begin and LaMarche. He testified that he enjoyed the effects of marijuana and that he thought it was cool and stuff. Testimony of other witnesses also suggested that the boys consumed the drugs voluntarily. Ward testified that the boys never refused an offer of marijuana. A defense witness, who was also a friend of A's mother and a former baby-sitter, testified that A began smoking marijuana when he was eleven years old. She also testified that she had seen him using marijuana on more than one occasion. Another witness corroborated that testimony. Despite the substantial evidence of voluntary consumption, Begin and LaMarche did not rely explicitly on the voluntary consumption defense. Both denied outright all of the allegations of the victims. Begin and LaMarche did not request a jury instruction on the voluntary consumption defense. Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 101(1) (1983), [3] the State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt any statutory defense in issue as a result of evidence admitted at the trial which is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt on the issue. A defense is in issue within the meaning of section 101 if the evidence is sufficient to make the existence of all the facts constituting the defense a reasonable hypothesis for the factfinder to entertain. State v. Glidden, 487 A.2d 642, 644 (Me.1985). Either the State or the defense may introduce the evidence that generates the State's obligation. Id. As discussed above, the evidence adduced in this case, both by the State and by the defense, is sufficient to generate the question whether the victims consumed marijuana voluntarily. As a result, Begin and LaMarche were entitled to an instruction on the voluntary consumption defense to gross sexual assault. Because Begin and LaMarche failed to request an instruction on the voluntary consumption defense at trial, we review the trial court's failure to give the instruction only for obvious error. State v. True, 438 A.2d 460, 467 (Me.1981). Error is obvious when it results in such serious injustice that we cannot in good conscience let the conviction stand. Id. at 469. It is well-settled that failure to give an instruction on a defense generated by the evidence is obvious error, at least when the defendant embraces the defense in question. See State v. Davis, 528 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Me.1987). The further question presented by the instant case is whether such a failure is obvious error, even when the defense at issue is inconsistent with the defendants' denials of the underlying conduct. In the circumstances of this case, we answer that question in the affirmative. The State's obligation to disprove a defense generated by the evidence is the functional equivalent of the State's burden to prove all of the elements of the offense. State v. Knowles, 495 A.2d 335, 338 (Me. 1985). Just as reliance on a particular defense does not relieve the State of its burden to prove all the elements of an offense, the denial of the criminal act by the defendant should not relieve the prosecution of its burden to negate any defense generated by the evidence. Id. In State v. Earley, 454 A.2d 341 (Me.1983), we reaffirmed the well-settled proposition that it is obvious error to fail to instruct on the elements of an offense. Id. at 343. It follows that it is also obvious error to fail to instruct the jury on the functional equivalent of an element of the offense in the form of a statutory defense generated by the evidence. Such a result is consistent with our rationale in State v. Grover, 460 A.2d 581 (Me. 1983). In that case, we treated the State's burden to disprove the voluntary social companion defense to rape as the equivalent of the State's burden to prove each of the elements of the offense. Id. at 584. The Grover defendant objected to the trial court's decision to give an instruction on the defense even though the evidence generated the issue. [4] We noted that it was not only proper, but necessary for the court to give the instruction. Id. at 583-84. See also State v. Giglio, 441 A.2d 303, 311 (Me.1982). We stated that the nature of the criminal process requires that the State disprove the defense, even though the defendant made a tactical decision not to assert the defense. State v. Grover, 460 A.2d at 584.
A person is guilty of sexual abuse of a minor if having attained the age of 19 years, the person engages in a sexual act with another person ... who has attained the age of 14 years but has not attained the age of 16 years. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 254(1)(A). It is a defense to sexual abuse of a minor that the actor reasonably believed the other person to have attained his 16th birthday. Id. § 254(2) (Supp.1994). Begin and LaMarche contend that it was obvious error for the trial court to fail to offer an instruction on the reasonable belief defense. There is, however, no evidence in the record of either Begin's or LaMarche's belief, reasonable or unreasonable, as to the age of either victim. In the absence of such evidence, the record in this case does not generate the issue of the defendants' reasonable belief as to the age of the victims. Cf. State v. Roberge, 643 A.2d 366, 367 (Me.1994) (ample evidence of defendants' belief).