Opinion ID: 2338354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Actual Custody

Text: We begin our analysis by determining whether Boffen was in the actual custody of a place of confinement for purposes of first degree escape. For the following reasons, we conclude that he was not. As we observed in Farris, actual custody exists when an individual is confined to the institution itself ... within the walls of the prison. 351 Md. at 33, 716 A.2d at 242. The institution within which one is actually confined, moreover, must be a legislatively designated place of confinement. There is no question that at the time of Boffen's departure, he was not within the walls of the Detention Center or any of the correctional facilities administered by the DOC. He was, however, within the walls of the Wicomico County courtroom. Whether he was confined within the courtroom during sentencing is an issue we need not reach because, as we shall explain below, a courtroom, in any event, is ordinarily not a place of confinement. A place of confinement, as defined in Article 27, Section 136(c), is: (1) A correctional facility as defined in § 1-101 of the Correctional Services Article; (2) A place identified in a home detention order or agreement; (3) A facility of the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene; (4) A detention center for juveniles or a facility for juveniles listed in Article 83C, § 2-117(a)(2) of the Code; or (5) Any other facility in which a person is confined under color of law. A courtroom is not included within the first four listed places of confinement, and there is no indication in the language of the statute that the legislature intended to include a courtroom as [a]ny other facility in which a person is confined under color of law, at least under the facts presented in this case. [6] Pursuant to the rule of ejusdem generis: [W]here general words in a statute follow the designation of particular things or classes of subjects or persons, the general words will usually be construed to include only those things or persons of the same class or general nature as those specifically mentioned. This rule is based on the supposition that if the Legislature had intended the general words to be considered in an unrestricted sense, it would not have enumerated the particular things. Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 427, 722 A.2d 887, 900 (1999) (citation omitted) The particular places of confinement specified prior to number five in the General Assembly's list are of a different class or general nature than a courtroom. A courtroom, unlike correctional facilities, detention centers, and the like, ordinarily is not intended as a place to hold, treat, or attempt to reintegrate prisoners into society. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that criminal statutes are to be construed narrowly so that `courts will not extend the punishment to cases not plainly within the language used.' Farris, 351 Md. at 36, 716 A.2d at 243 (quoting Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654, 684 A.2d 439, 441 (1996))(internal citation omitted). Moreover, `If the law is to be broadened ... it should be modified by the Legislature, not by this Court.' Id. at 37-38, 716 A.2d at 244 (quoting Briggs v. State, 348 Md. 470, 483, 704 A.2d 904, 911 (1998)). Had the Legislature intended to explicitly include a courtroom within its definition of a place of confinement, it certainly could have attempted to do so.