Opinion ID: 2520026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: proper sanctions

Text: ¶75 The Judicial Conduct Commission has proposed a public reprimand be issued to Judge Anderson for his failure to timely hear and decide the eleven matters cited in the order issued by the Commission. The Judicial Conduct Commission determined that Judge Anderson's failure to hold the nine adjudication hearings in a timely manner, and his holding of the two cases under advisement for a period in excess of two months, constitutes a pattern of disregard and indifference to the law and thereby violated Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2A, which requires judges to `respect and comply with the law,' resulting in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings the judicial office into disrepute. Ordinarily, we would not propose a sanction more drastic than that ordered by the Commission in a case involving specific, discrete failures to conduct court business in keeping with legal requirements. However, Judge Anderson's case does not involve only those discrete events identified by the Judicial Conduct Commission. ¶76 In Worthen, we carefully defined the elements necessary to establish the constitutional ground for discipline based on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute. 926 P.2d at 870-72. In brief, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute is: (1) conduct (2) that is at least negligent if it occurs within the judge's judicial capacity, or willful if outside the judge's judicial capacity, and (3) that reflects a breach of the ethical canons applicable to judges as contained in the Code of Judicial Conduct. Id. Further, this unjudicial conduct must be: (4) prejudicial to the administration of justice, meaning that it is conduct that tends to injure or impair, is hurtful to, damaging to, or detrimental to, the activities that constitute the administration of justice, including the entire range of activities and functions of the judicial system. Id. Finally, the conduct must: (5) bring the judicial office into disrepute, meaning conduct that has the effect of lowering public esteem for a particular judicial office and thus tend[s] to lower public esteem for the entire judiciary so as to reduce its effectiveness. Id. at 871. ¶77 In Judge Anderson's case, the Judicial Conduct Commission found that his failure to abide by the requirements of statutes directing the cases at issue to be decided in a timely manner, within the specified period, constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brought his judicial office into disrepute. We agree. ¶78 In addition, as we have done in nearly every case referred to us by the Judicial Conduct Commission, we have reviewed the current status of Judge Anderson's behavior directly related to the charges brought and adjudicated by the Commission. We have sought additional evidence, as described above, on the question of how Judge Anderson has handled the difficulty that led to the action by the Judicial Conduct Commission. A review of this type is necessary for us to evaluate the suitability and propriety of the sanction recommended by the Judicial Conduct Commission. In cases where the sanctioned behavior has fully ceased, and the judge has evidenced through alternative behavior that the problem is unlikely to recur, we are inclined to see the problem as at least partially resolved, and are unlikely to depart from the recommendation of the Judicial Conduct Commission to direct more severe discipline for the judge. In cases where the sanctioned behavior has continued, or has directly led to more serious breaches of judicial conduct restrictions, we may be forced to consider more serious sanctions. In this case, that sanction is the removal of Judge Anderson from judicial office. ¶79 Because it is the most severe sanction which we may impose, we remove a judge from office only after solemn and deliberate consideration. As holders of judicial office ourselves, we are mindful of the rigors judges endure in the judicial selection, evaluation, and retention processes, rigors which well serve the citizens of Utah by populating our judicial branch with able public servants. We are, therefore, acutely aware of the human and professional distress that accompanies the loss of a position so hard won. Our preeminent duty is, however, to the public which we serve, and that duty demands that we not flinch when convinced that removal of a judge is a necessary sanction for misconduct. ¶80 Upon taking up judicial office, judges surrender no small measure of the rights to political participation and social intercourse enjoyed by citizens generally. They do so in the interests of preserving the integrity of the judicial branch of government, integrity that has as its hallmarks impartiality and uncompromising fidelity to the rule of law. Most judges wear the burden of the limitations on their conduct lightly, although from time to time most also find it necessary to pinch off the impulse to express passionately held views or participate in benign mischief. The demands on judges to elevate the effective administration of justice and preservation of public esteem for judicial office over personal interests can extend to and limit a judge's options to defend against allegations of misconduct. For reasons known only to himself, Judge Anderson has engaged in a course of conduct animated by a single disturbing theme: the denial of blameworthiness for his actions, and a concomitant unwillingness to find a way to do his job. ¶81 Judge Anderson has coupled his steadfast refusal to accept responsibility for his actions with wide-ranging accusations directed at others, both within and outside the courts, for his tardy decisions in child welfare cases. The master found these conclusions to be widely shared by Judge Anderson's colleagues. The master noted that [i]t is the nearly unanimous opinion of the judges of the Third District Juvenile Court that Judge Anderson could have and should have done something long ago to bring to resolution his disqualification from hearing large classes of cases. The master added, [C]entral among these frustrations is the feeling, expressed by several but attributed more widely, that Judge Anderson has not taken ownership of these problems, pointing the blame elsewhere. These frustrations are genuine and have a basis in fact. ¶82 Judge Anderson now recognizes the difficulty he has imposed on his judicial colleagues, the appellate courts, the attorneys of the Office of the Guardian ad Litem and the Attorney General, on the clients of those attorneys, and on the staff and other participants in child welfare cases brought in the Third District Juvenile Court over the past three-plus years. He has now, belatedly at best, attempted to take steps to alleviate at least a portion of the ongoing difficulty he has caused. Obviously, he cannot relieve any of the past difficulty he has created. ¶83 Judge Anderson's retaliation and intemperate statements directed at the attorneys required by law to appear on child welfare cases constitutes conduct that was at least negligent, and runs afoul of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3. First, Canon 3 requires a judge to give precedence to his or her judicial duties over all other activities of the judge. Id. at Canon 3A. Next, in a series of related provisions, Canon 3 requires a judge to perform all judicial duties without bias or prejudice, id. at Canon 3B(5); be patient and courteous to all persons with whom he or she deals in a judicial capacity, including lawyers, id. at Canon 3B(4); and disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including situations in which the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer. Id. at Canon 3E(1); 3E(1)(a). ¶84 In this case, Judge Anderson created a circumstance where he allowed his non-judicial activities, namely his federal action against the Director of the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, to take priority over his judicial duty to hear child welfare cases. He did so by treating the Director, the attorneys in her office, and the attorneys of the Attorney General's office with considerable disrespect, creating a continuing situation where his impartiality might reasonably be, and was, repeatedly questioned. ¶85 This unjudicial conduct was also dramatically prejudicial to the administration of justice, because it created, in the words of the presiding judge of Judge Anderson's district, a horrendous and appalling impact on the ability of the Third District Juvenile Court to meet its statutory obligations to hear cases in that it was administratively impossible for another juvenile court judge to assume Judge Anderson's cases under the circumstances. ¶86 Finally, Judge Anderson's disastrous choices regarding retaliation against lawyers from the Office of the Guardian ad Litem, including its Director, and the office of the Attorney General, has unquestionably brought a judicial office into disrepute. Judge Anderson has promoted the public discussion of his dispute with the attorneys he accuses of attempting to improperly remove him from office. His actions have been widely reported. The activities of this court, as a result of the referral from the Judicial Conduct Commission, have brought more exposure of the dispute. As he has acknowledged before this court, his charges were too broadly made, made as a result of emotional and ill-advised conclusions, and have wrongfully impugned the integrity and competence of a large group of lawyers with whom he had, and has, no reasonable basis for dispute. ¶87 This behavior by Judge Anderson constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute, as we have defined that phrase here and in Worthen. Judge Anderson merits discipline as a result. ¶88 Appropriate discipline in a case such as this is not an easy matter to resolve. The purpose of judicial discipline is three-fold. First, judicial discipline discourages improper behavior by judges, given that they are public officials, sworn to uphold the law, and subject to limited avenues of correction. Second, judicial discipline affords an errant judge both cause and opportunity to correct misbehavior that is correctable. Third, and most importantly, judicial discipline protects the integrity of the judicial system in the interests of the people it serves, the people of Utah. In deciding on the measure of sanction a particular matter requires, the Judicial Conduct Commission must consider these purposes, and the comparative severity of the conduct being sanctioned, among other issues. We, of course, must do the same. ¶89 In the case of Judge Anderson, he has made choices that placed his individual interests in the way of performing the duties for which he was appointed. He has severely impaired his ability, and the ability of the entire Third District Juvenile Court, to do its job for a period of more than three years. In other words, for more than half of his current six-year term of office, he has not done the job he was appointed and retained to do. In the interim, he has continued to enjoy the emoluments of office, and to pursue a course of action that never presented a reasonable likelihood of quick resolution. Even at this late date, he continues to attribute his difficulties to others, and has failed to take any effective action to relieve the impasse he has created at the expense of others. Although he did propose a qualified and self-justifying apology once notified by this court that he was in serious jeopardy of being removed from office, he also admits that he cannot now undo the mess he has made. ¶90 Judge Anderson's past behavior, especially when considered in light of current circumstances, suggests no easy solution. The integrity of the judiciary, the interests of the people of Utah, and the past behavior of Judge Anderson all require a severe sanction, one that will correct the problem if possible. We see no alternative but to remove Judge Anderson from his office as a juvenile court judge. Any sanction short of removal will neither correct the damage done to the judiciary nor restore Judge Anderson to the proper level of function and dignity that his office requires.