Opinion ID: 2219142
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chambers Analysis:

Text: ś 185. As stated earlier, when the focus of a circuit court's ruling is on a defendant's asserted due process right to introduce evidence, the issue is often-times characterized as one of constitutional fact, and is, therefore, subject to de novo review. See Stutesman, 221 Wis.2d at 182 ([W]hether a trial court's ruling excluding evidence deprived a defendant of the constitutional right to present evidence is a question of `constitutional fact,' which we review de novo.). [41] ś 186. The right of due process to an accused in a criminal trial is, in essence, the right to the opportunity to defend oneself from the accusations initiated by the State. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294. [31] The right to present a defense originates from the confrontation and compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and applies to the citizens of this state through Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 645. [42, 43] ś 187. A defendant's right to present a defense may in some cases require the admission of testimony that would otherwise be excluded under applicable evidentiary rules. Id. See Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d at 663. The right to present a defense is not absolute, but rather is limited to the presentation of relevant evidence whose probative value is not substantially out-weighed by its prejudicial effect. See Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 646. ś 188. This court is presented with the question of whether the hearsay evidence presented in this case, which may be excluded by traditional Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, is nonetheless admissible under the protections afforded to citizens through the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. ś 189. Chambers states that: The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every State, is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are traditionally excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually not made under oath or other circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the jury. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)). ś 190. However, the Court in Chambers went on to say that exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of [hearsay] evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302. The Court held that the evidence in question: (1) qualified for the exception to the hearsay rule as a trustworthy statement against interest; and (2) was critical to Chambers' defense. Id. As a result, its exclusion implicated constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt and the hearsay rule thus could not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Id. ś 191. In the present case we have already held that the evidence in question qualifies for admission under the statutory exception to the hearsay rule of Wis. Stat. § 908.045(2) because it is sufficiently clear, given the passage of time, to be trustworthy. We now hold that the evidence is also critical to Knapp's defense. [44] ś 192. We hold the evidence is critical because it satisfies the third prong of the Denny test for admission of third-party evidence. Denny, 120 Wis. 2d at 624. Without it, much of the evidence Knapp offers as to the likelihood of Brunner's involvement in Resa's death may be inadmissible under Denny, because the direct link, in time and proximity, between Brunner and Resa's murder will be absent. ś 193. Because the evidence in question here qualifies for admission under an exception to the hearsay rule, and is critical to the defense, it implicates constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt and should be admitted under Chambers. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.