Opinion ID: 2570346
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Heading: Accomplice Liability: Aiding and Abetting

Text: We consider first whether one can be guilty of aiding and abetting absent proof of criminal conduct by some direct perpetrator. We begin with the plain language of Penal Code section 31, which governs aiding and abetting liability. The statute extends criminal liability as principals in a crime to [a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, and all those who aid and abet in its commission. As this language makes plain, the commission of a crime is a prerequisite for criminal liability. If the defendant himself commits the offense, he is guilty as a direct perpetrator. If he assists another, he is guilty as an aider and abettor. It follows, therefore, that for a defendant to be found guilty under an aiding and abetting theory, someone other than the defendant must be proven to have attempted or committed a crime; i.e., absent proof of a predicate offense, conviction on an aiding and abetting theory cannot be sustained. We analyzed aiding and abetting liability in detail in People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210. There, we explained that an aider and abettor's guilt is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator's acts and the aider and abettor's own acts and own mental state. ( Id. at p. 1117, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210, italics omitted.) `[O]nce it is proved that the principal has caused an actus reus, the liability of each of the secondary parties should be assessed according to his own mens rea. ' ( Id. at p. 1118, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210, quoting Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (2d ed.1995) § 30.06[C], p. 450.) Thus, proof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reusa crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens reaknowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reusconduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime. (See McCoy, at p. 1117, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210.) Consistent with these principles, we have explained that [a]ccomplice liability [including aider and abettor liability] is `derivative,' that is, it results from an act by the perpetrator to which the accomplice contributed. ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013, italics added.) This description squares with the historical understanding of the doctrine, recounted by Judge Hand in United States v. Peoni (2d Cir.1938) 100 F.2d 401. As early as the 14th century, English law punished those who `procured, counselled, commanded or abetted' the felony. ( Id. at p. 402, quoting 2 Pollock & Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I (2d ed.1909) p. 509.) But such liability hinged on the commission of a crime; thus, [t]he man who has commanded or counselled a murder has committed no crime until there has been a murder; but when the murder is committed he is guilty of it. (2 Pollock & Maitland, at p. 509.) Though the subsequent development of the law of attempt has amended this principle by allowing liability for substantial steps that fall short of achieving the criminal end, it has not diluted the requirement that there be a second actor engaged in criminal conduct whom the aider and abettor aids and abets. The People argue that aiding and abetting liability does not require proof of a completed crime. They further contend the Court of Appeal erred by relying on People v. Parra (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, which, they assert, misread our decision in People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903. The first half of this argument is correct: proof of an attempt by a direct perpetrator is sufficient for purposes of aiding and abetting liability. If a direct perpetrator is thwarted and guilty only of an attempt, an aider and abettor may still be guilty of aiding and abetting the attempt. (See, e.g., People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 623-624, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176; People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428, 959 P.2d 735.) The second half of the argument is incorrect: nothing in People v. Parra, supra, 70 Cal.App.4th 222, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 541, or in the Court of Appeal's decision below required proof of a completed crime. In Parra, at page 227, footnote 5, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 541, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that a defendant could be convicted of aiding and abetting possession of cocaine with intent to sell where the defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to transfer it to a second person who would sell it. The Court of Appeal reasoned that aiding and abetting liability could not apply because the crime of the alleged recipient/seller was never completed and the liability of aider and abettor attaches only when all substantive elements of the predicate offense are satisfied. (See People v. Montoya [, supra, ] 7 Cal.4th [at pp.] 1040-1041[, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 874 P.2d 903].) This was an entirely correct statement of the law: aiding and abetting liability cannot attach unless the substantive elements of a predicate offense are met. This requirement may be satisfied by proof of an attempt, but contrary to the People's argument, nothing in Parra or in the Court of Appeal's opinion here indicated otherwise. Nor did Parra misread Montoya, a case that examined when in the course of a burglary aiding and abetting liability could attach. Parra correctly recognized what was implicit in Montoya aiding and abetting liability requires the completion of an independent substantive offense. The real issue in this case is not whether proof of an attempted, rather than a completed, crime by the direct perpetrator is sufficient, but whether either is necessary. At trial, the People persuaded the court to give aiding and abetting instructions despite the absence of proof of either a completed crime or an attempt. The People eschewed any attempt theory, arguing instead that by intending to sell the hydriodic acid precursors to Antonio, Perez aided and abetted Antonio's manufacture of methamphetamine. Whether the theory was that Perez intended to aid and abet Antonio's actual manufacture of methamphetamine (§ 11379.6, subd. (a)) or to aid and abet Antonio's possession of hydriodic acid precursors with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (§ 11383(c)(2)), no evidence established that Antonio ever violated, or attempted to violate, either statute. Without proof of a criminal act by Antonio to which Perez contributed, the prosecution could not convict Perez as an aider and abettor. (See People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450, 811 P.2d 742.) Consequently, the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. (See People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45 [It is error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law, has no application to the facts of the case]; People v. Singleton (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 488, 493, 241 Cal.Rptr. 842 [error to instruct on aiding and abetting absent proof of existence of direct perpetrator].) The court also erred in preventing defense counsel from arguing that the law of aiding and abetting, and CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01, require an independent attempted or completed crime. Under the facts of this case, Perez could be convicted as a direct perpetrator or not at all.