Opinion ID: 199159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Golenbock's B.B.O. testimony (Golenbock and Stein)

Text: 38 Golenbock and Stein both contend that because Golenbock's B.B.O. testimony was coerced, it should have been suppressed at their criminal trial. 3 In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's findings of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law and rulings on the constitutionality of the government's conduct de novo. See United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 2000). 39 Golenbock argues that she reasonably believed that if she refused to testify before the B.B.O., she could be subject to an adverse inference as to the matters at issue in that proceeding, with the practical outcome being her disbarment. She contends that this impending threat of disbarment rendered her testimony involuntary and thus inadmissible at her criminal trial. We think, however, that the penalty of adverse inference and possible disbarment was too conditional to establish a conclusion that her B.B.O. testimony was compelled in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. 40 The Fifth Amendment secures an individual's privilege to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967) (Douglas, J.) (plurality opinion quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1963)). The Fifth Amendment not only protects against being involuntarily called as a witness against oneself in a criminal prosecution, 41 but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. 42 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 43 The Fifth Amendment has been held to protect individuals from the threat of substantial economic sanction for exercising their rights. See id. at 82-83 (state contractors barred from state business for five years for refusal to testify before grand jury); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (police officer discharged for refusal to testify before grand jury). In Spevack, the Court held that an attorney's refusal, on grounds of self-incrimination, to produce financial records and to testify at a judicial inquiry in a disciplinary proceeding was not a constitutionally permissible basis for his disbarment. Four members of the court described disbarment as a costly sanction within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, and went on to state:The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the [Fifth Amendment] privilege. 44 Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516. 45 On the same day, the Court similarly held that statements elicited as a result of compelling a choice between self-incrimination and the loss of a public job were inadmissible in a later criminal proceeding. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 498 (1967). There, police officers were summoned to appear before a state investigative body examining irregularities in criminal cases. They were informed that anything they said could be used against them in subsequent criminal proceedings, but if they refused to answer they would be subject to removal from office. Id. at 494. The officers answered the questions. Later, they were indicted and tried for crimes relating to the earlier questioning, and their statements were used at trial. Id. at 495. The Supreme Court reversed their convictions on the ground that their testimony was involuntary because it was under threat of job termination. Id. at 497-98. 4 46 Where, however, invocation of the Fifth Amendment does not, by itself, result in forfeiture of the job or license in question, the fact that claiming the Fifth may, as a practical matter, result in damage to one's chances of retaining the privilege at stake does not necessarily establish a constitutional violation. The effect must be capable of forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 806 (1977); see also Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 1974) ([N]ot every undesirable consequence which may follow from the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination can be characterized as a penalty.). 47 Hence the Supreme Court has adhered to the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid allowing adverse inferences to be drawn against parties to civil actions from their refusal to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 317 (1976). In Baxter, the Court held that permitting the drawing of an adverse inference from a prisoner's silence in a prison disciplinary hearing was constitutionally permissible. See id. at 316-20. The Baxter court differentiated the effects of the prisoners' silence from the automatic penalties at issue in other cases: 48 In this respect, this case is very different from the circumstances before the Court in the Garrity-Lefkowitz decisions, where refusal to submit to interrogation and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege, standing alone and without regard to the other evidence, resulted in loss of employment or opportunity to contract with the State. There, failure to respond to interrogation was treated as a final admission of guilt. 49 Id. at 317-18. 5 The Supreme Court later distinguished its holding in Baxter from a case in which, pursuant to a New York statute, an attorney was divested of his state political party offices when he refused to waive his constitutional immunity before a special grand jury: 50 Baxter did no more than permit an inference to be drawn in a civil case from a party's refusal to testify. Respondent's silence in Baxter was only one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty, and was given no more probative value than the facts of the case warranted; here, refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment leads automatically and without more to imposition of sanctions. 51 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977). 52 Relying on Garrity, Golenbock insists that she was forced to choose between her livelihood as an attorney and incriminating herself in the B.B.O. investigation. Unlike the police officers in Garrity, however, Golenbock was not subject to automatic loss of her position if she asserted her right not to testify. While refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment might increase the risk that she would be disbarred, disbarment would not result automatically and without more. Hence, she was not threatened with a penalty within the meaning of Garrity for invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege. 53 Attorney Barshak's affidavit makes this point clear. He stated that the B.B.O. would be allowed to draw from her silence any adverse inferences relating to any area of the investigation she refused to discuss. (Emphasis added). It is true that Barshak went on to opine to his client that those adverse inferences would mean that the B.B.O. would find against her in relation to those areas of investigation and that as a result, she would be disbarred or suspended. His prediction of disbarment, however, rested on his estimate of how the B.B.O. would exercise its ability to draw adverse inferences. Mr. Barshak did not suggest that the B.B.O. was required to disbar her as an automatic sanction for Golenbock's failure to waive her constitutional rights. 54 The B.B.O.'s own rules and practice make it plain that Golenbock was not faced with an automatic sanction. The B.B.O. makes its decisions based on a preponderance of the evidence, with the Bar Counsel bearing the burden of proof. See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, 3.28. Nothing in the record suggests that the B.B.O. has either a formal rule or an unwritten policy or practice to disbar or suspend attorneys simply for invoking Fifth Amendment privileges. Hence, the consequences of Golenbock's assertion of the privilege before the B.B.O. were the same as in any civil proceeding, in that the fact-finder could -- but was not required to -- draw an adverse inference from such an assertion. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317; see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Elio, 39 F.3d 1239, 1248 (1st Cir. 1994). 55 Golenbock contends, nevertheless, that the risk of disbarment arising from her refusal to testify was sufficiently coercive to render her B.B.O. testimony inadmissible. This argument ignores the reasoning of Baxter, on which this court has relied to distinguish between the threat of automatic loss of one's livelihood and the threat of an inference that might lead to such a loss. In United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1980), we held that a state police officer's self-incriminating statements made during a theft investigation were not coerced, where nothing in relevant police department rules mandated dismissal for invoking Fifth Amendment rights. We observed: 56 In all of the cases flowing from Garrity, there are two common features: (1) the person being investigated is explicitly told that failure to waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination will result in his discharge from public employment (or a similarly severe sanction imposed in the case of private citizens); and (2) there is a statute or municipal ordinance mandating such procedure. 57 Id. at 716. In Indorato, we said that absent elements of this nature, fear of punishment as a consequence of claiming one's rights does not protect one from the government's subsequent use of self-incriminating statements in a criminal trial. 6 See id. 58 As said, there is no evidence of any B.B.O. rule mandating that claiming one's constitutional right to remain silent must necessarily result in disbarment. Golenbock could have asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege and later argued to the B.B.O. fact-finder that the evidence against her, as a whole, was inadequate to warrant disbarment. We conclude that [n]either Garrity nor any of its progeny brings defendant within the ambit of the coerced testimony doctrine. Indorato, 628 F.2d at 716. We affirm the district court's denial of Golenbock's motion to suppress. 59