Opinion ID: 6315833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 29 d.b. 79.

Text: Respondent represented [A] in a landlord tenant dispute in which a default judgment for $300 and for possession was entered against [A] (Petition for Discipline, ¶3, hereinafter “Pet.”). That judgment was entered on December 20, 1977 and the 20 day appeal period elapsed on January 9, 1978. On January 10, 1978, respondent filed a notice of appeal and the adverse party petitioned to strike the appeal as untimely (Pet., 1f3(a) and (b)). At the argument on that petition, respondent represented to Judge [B] that he had attempted to file the notice of appeal on January 9, 1978 but was precluded from doing so because the prothonotary’s office was closed on that day due to inclement weather (Pet., ¶5). On April 21, 1978 Judge [B] entered a rule to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. At a further hearing on the matter on June 2, 1978, Judge [B] suggested to respondent that he adduce some evidence to support his contention that the prothonotary’s office was closed (Petitioner’s Exhibit 2, hereinafter PE). On June 6, 1978, respondent sent a letter on the merits of the case to Judge [B] without sending a copy to opposing counsel (Pet., ¶9). Enclosed with the June 6, 1978 letter were a letter from the prothonotary’s office and an affidavit taken by respondent. Respondent’s letter repeated his contention that “the clerk’s desk was not open for me to file this appeal.” (Pet. ¶10). Similarly, his enclosed affidavit stated that “the facilities to file the appeal was not open [sic].” (Pet., ¶10). The enclosed letter from the prothonotary did not state that the office was closed on January 9, 1978 (Pet., ¶10). Nonetheless, on the basis of respondent’s affidavit, Judge [B] denied the petition to dismiss the appeal (Pet., ¶11). Opposing counsel immediately requested reconsideration of the order. A hearing was held at which further evidence was presented which showed, inter alia, that the prothonotary’s office was open during regular business hours from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on January 9, 1978 (Pet., ¶13) and that respondent arrived there between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. and found the office closed (Pet ¶14). Respondent could not be more specific about the time of his arrival. On the basis of this evidence, Judge [B] set aside his earlier order and dismissed the appeal (Pet., ¶16).