Opinion ID: 1450048
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mutual Understanding

Text: Applying these standards, the question emerges whether the prosecution made assurances or representations to Abood suggesting the existence of a mutual understanding or tacit agreementevidence favorable to Akrawi because of its impeachment value. The district court, after considering the evidence presented at trial and the later evidentiary hearing, answered this question in the affirmative. It concluded that while there was no formal agreement between Abood and Macomb County officials, there was an informal agreement to reduce the charges against him in return for his testimony. The court concluded that the Michigan appellate court's contrary conclusion was based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Indeed, the Michigan appellate court's analysis seems to have been based on two fundamental errors of law. First, the appellate court recognized a duty to disclose only formal plea agreements approved by the prosecutor. Yet, as Bell recognizes, even unspoken, tacit agreements or mutual understandings may constitute evidence favorable to the accused that must be disclosed. Second, the Brady disclosure requirement applies to relevant evidence in the hands of the police, whether the prosecutors knew about it or not, whether they suppressed it intentionally or not, ... and whether the accused asked for it or not. Harris, 553 F.3d at 1033. The notion, relied on by the Michigan appellate court, that communications by police officers need not be disclosed unless approved by the prosecutor flies in the face of the prosecutor's duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf ... including the police. Id. (quoting Strickler, 527 U.S. at 280-81, 119 S.Ct. 1936). Moreover, the district court's determination that communications between Pappas, Fresard and Suhy, on behalf of the prosecution, and Abood and his attorney Halpern gave rise to an informal agreement, or mutual understanding, is well supported by the record. Even though Pappas, Fresard and Suhy consistently maintained that no promises or express agreements were made, and even if this testimony were accepted on its face as true, the fact remains that all three acknowledged understanding that Abood's cooperation could result in reduction of the charges against him ... an understanding consistent with Abood's and Halpern's manifest understandingi.e., a tacit but mutual understanding. The prosecution team's knowledge of this mutual understanding, stemming from communications between the prosecution and Abood and his counsel, represents knowledge of communications that could have been used by Akrawi in impeaching Abood and therefore constitutes  Brady material that should have been disclosed. See Harris, 553 F.3d at 1033 (holding that statements by police to witness that his girlfriend would be released if they were satisfied with his cooperation, that he would be released if he testified consistently at a preliminary examination, and that he should not tell anyone about the police promises constituted Brady material the nondisclosure of which resulted in cognizable prejudice requiring habeas relief). Accordingly, we hold that the Michigan appellate court's ruling that the prosecution did not breach its duty under Brady represents an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. [6]