Opinion ID: 4580297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absentee Ballot Receipt Deadline

Text: [¶13] By statute, “[i]n order to be valid, an absentee ballot must be delivered to the municipal clerk at any time before the polls are closed.” 21-A M.R.S. § 755. With one exception for very small municipalities, “[t]he polls must be closed at 8 p.m. on election day.” 21-A M.R.S. § 626(2). 9 [¶14] ARA contends that the statutory deadline unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote absentee in this particular election cycle5 because (1) the ongoing pandemic will greatly increase absentee voting, (2) many voters will exercise the option to return their absentee ballot by mail in lieu of returning their ballot to their municipal clerk in person, and (3) problems experienced by the United States Postal Service (USPS) will prevent some of those ballots from being received before the deadline if the voter requests and then mails an absentee ballot close to election day.6 Although ARA in its complaint asked the Superior Court to enjoin the rejection of absentee ballots that are postmarked by election day and then “arrive at the election office within a minimum of ten days after Election Day,” and later changed its request to a seven-day waiting period, it now suggests that a two-day extension would suffice, and would “fit[] neatly” within the two-day deadline for municipal clerks to deliver election returns to the Secretary. See 21-A M.R.S. § 711(3).7 5 ARA concedes that “[i]n a normal, non-pandemic year, this deadline might not necessarily impose as significant a burden on the right to vote.” 6By statute, a voter may request an absentee ballot without giving a reason until “the 3rd business day before election day.” 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(2)(D) (2020). 7Title 21-A M.R.S. § 711(3) was recently amended to include the provisions of former 21-A M.R.S. § 712, which was repealed. P.L. 2019, ch. 636, §§ 14-15 (effective June 16, 2020). 10 [¶15] Although recognizing that under the federal constitution voting is of “fundamental significance,” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, the United States Supreme Court has said that “[a] State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process,” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (quotation marks omitted), and so as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted comprehensive and sometimes complex election codes. Each provision of these schemes, whether it governs the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, inevitably affects—at least to some degree—the individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends. Nevertheless, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (quotation marks omitted); see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (recognizing that, pursuant to the Constitution, “States retain the power to regulate their own elections” and that “[c]ommon sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must play an active role in structuring elections”); Perez-Guzman v. Gracia, 346 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Fair, honest, and orderly elections do not just happen. Substantial state regulation is a prophylactic that keeps the democratic process from disintegrating into chaos. Consequently, there is a strong state interest 11 in regulating all phases of the electoral process . . . .”); Jones, 2020 ME 113, ¶ 20, --- A.3d ---. [¶16] Furthermore, we find it instructive that in a recent case where a United States District Court issued a preliminary injunction affecting an absentee ballot deadline five days before an election, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction, noting that “[t]his Court has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 589 U.S. ---, 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1207 (2020). The Court emphasized “the wisdom of the Purcell principle, which seeks to avoid . . . judicially created confusion,” id., referring to its prior holding that, when considering a request for injunctive relief from a statutory election procedure “just weeks before an election,” a court is required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases . . . . Court orders affecting elections . . . can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase. Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5. The Purcell Court applied its principle of judicial restraint in saying, “Given the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow the 12 election to proceed without an injunction suspending [the challenged statutory election procedure].” Id. at 5-6; see Respect Maine PAC, 622 F.3d at 16 (noting “the harm to the public interest from the chaos that will ensue if the Maine election laws . . . are invalidated by a court order in the crucial final weeks before an election”). [¶17] With these principles in mind, the test for whether a particular ballot regulation, such as Maine’s absentee ballot deadline, passes constitutional muster is not necessarily strict scrutiny, rather a more flexible standard applies. A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. . . . [W]hen those rights are subjected to severe restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance. But when a state election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restrictions. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see Jones, 2020 ME 113, ¶¶ 20-21, 23-24, --- A.3d ---; Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2012 ME 57, ¶ 26 n.11, 41 A.3d 551. “No bright line rule separates permissible 13 election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5 (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (“Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws . . . cannot be resolved by any litmus-paper test that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.” (quotation marks omitted)). [¶18] “Election laws will invariably impose some burden upon individual voters.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. Here, the Superior Court found that the absentee ballot deadline prescribed by the Legislature in 21-A M.R.S. § 755 “even in 2020, imposes only a modest burden on the right to vote,” and we agree. The court accepted ARA’s premise that, due to the pandemic, many Maine voters will vote absentee in the November election, and “with the increased use of absentee voting . . . comes the increased risk that some voters will fail to have their absentee ballots delivered on time [by the USPS] so as to be counted.” Nevertheless, the court correctly observed that allowing voters to obtain an absentee ballot as close to election day as the previous Thursday [pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 753-B(2)(D) (2020)] is not necessarily tied to the use of the mail. Rather, it permits a voter to obtain an absentee ballot that can be delivered in person or to a secure lockbox or delivered by a third party. The fact that Maine allows voters to request and obtain an absentee ballot on the Thursday before election day does not somehow render [section 755] unconstitutional because the Postal Service cannot guarantee delivery through the mail by November 3, 2020. 14 See 21-A M.R.S. §§ 753-B(8), 754-A(2) (2020). Beyond the several available options for returning an absentee ballot apart from mailing, the court also found that the State has taken substantial steps to make voting, including absentee voting, safer and more effective. Those changes include designing polling places so as to mitigate exposure to the coronavirus, limiting the number of voters allowed at any one time, and mandating social distancing and face coverings. Further, the Attorney General has joined in successful litigation to prevent operational changes by the USPS that could exacerbate any delay in the return of absentee ballots. See Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, No. 20-4096, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177334, at -6, -31 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2020), clarified by Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, No. 20-4096, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187732, at -8 (E.D. Pa. Oct 9, 2020). [¶19] The effect on voters of the restriction imposed by the election day deadline is weighed against the State’s interest in enforcing the statute, which in this case is significant.8 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. The Secretary highlights, as an essential part of his responsibility “to facilitate an equitable and orderly election,” the need for sufficient time to count ballots, entertain challenges, 8 Intervenors assert in their brief that one of those interests lies in “decreas[ing] the risk of fraud that is inherent in mail voting.” We find nothing in the record to justify a fear of voter fraud based on Maine’s voting procedures, including the option to return absentee ballots by mail. 15 initiate any necessary ranked-choice voting tabulations, and certify results before other statutory deadlines arrive. [¶20] Furthermore, as the Superior Court found, the deadline serves an important state interest in maintaining voter confidence in the integrity of the election by establishing a date certain—established by the people’s representatives in the Legislature—on which votes are cast, a date not subject to a court’s determination that “the statutory deadline is not really a deadline at all.” As the court aptly stated, For this court to unilaterally discard the statutory deadline and impose a deadline of its own choosing, would amount to a judicial re-writing of the election laws. Moreover, any deadline has aspects of arbitrariness to it, including one crafted by the court. Such a judicial modification of the deadline risks severe disruption of Maine’s electoral process, under circumstances where the burden on the right to vote as a result of the Delivery Deadline is slight.[9] [¶21] Applying the “flexible” test prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Purcell principle disfavoring court interference in a looming election, we agree. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434; Republican Nat’l Comm., 140 S. Ct. at 453-54. The Burdick Court stated a principle that is applicable here—Reasonable 9 See Me. Const. art. III, § 2 (providing that the Judicial Branch “shall [not] exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the other[] [branches], except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted”). We do not opine on the question of whether the Governor has the authority to grant the requested relief under her emergency powers, see supra n.4. 16 regulation of elections . . . does require [voters] to act in a timely fashion if they wish to express their views in the voting booth.” 504 U.S. at 438. Because “we conclude that the government’s interest is sufficient to justify the restriction that the [deadline] requirement places on [the plaintiffs’ voting] rights,” Jones, 2020 ME 113, ¶ 34, --- A.3d ---, ARA has not demonstrated a “clear likelihood of success” on its complaint for declaratory relief from the statutory deadline. Emerson, 563 A.2d at 768, 771. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying ARA’s motion for injunctive relief on this ground. [¶22] In reaching this conclusion, we recognize, as emphasized by amici, that the Maine Constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, guarantees citizens of this state the general right to “pursu[e] and obtain[] safety.” Me. Const. art. I, § 1. As amici recognize, we have not had occasion to construe the contours of that right, which amici assert must include the right to vote safely with greater protections than those required by the federal Constitution. [¶23] This Court has the authority and important responsibility to construe the Maine Constitution. See Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 97, 83 A.2d 556, 561 (1951). In doing so, “we are not bound by any of the interpretations which other courts may have made of their own Constitutions. Nor do we follow such interpretations except to the extent that the reasoning upon which they rest is 17 convincing to us when applied to our Constitution.” Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that Maine is “free, pursuant to [its] own law, to adopt a higher standard” than that required by the federal Constitution. State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶ 5, 748 A.2d 976 (quotation marks omitted). [¶24] Assuming, without deciding, that there is a particularized constitutional right to vote safely that is protected by the Maine Constitution, the Secretary’s proposed implementation of the applicable statutory procedure is sufficient to guard against any infringement of a Maine citizen’s unquestioned constitutionally-protected right to vote absentee, Me. Const. art. II, § 4. The statute imposes a deadline by which a voter must return his or her absentee ballot. 21-A M.R.S. § 755. The Secretary’s initiatives provide several “no contact” ways to cure a defective ballot so long as the voter is diligent, see Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438, including phone verification, requesting a new ballot to be delivered in the way that the voter selects, or having the ballot challenged (and therefore counted, see infra n.12) rather than rejected. As the Superior Court found, and we have discussed, there are many ways for a voter to exercise the franchise in the upcoming election, and an individual voter may “pursu[e] . . . safety,” Me. Const. art. I, § 1, in the way that that person sees fit. 18 [¶25] For these reasons, declaring the statute to be unconstitutional rather than deferring to both the Legislature’s judgment in enacting the statute and the Secretary’s thorough cure procedures is not the appropriate remedy. We are not legislators nor do we exercise the executive branch’s power to implement legislation.10 See Me. Const. art. III (establishing three branches of government in Maine and providing that no branch “shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others”). D. Absentee Ballot Verification and Rejection Procedures [¶26] Maine law gives considerable latitude and assistance to voters who wish to vote by absentee ballot. See, e.g., 21-A M.R.S. §§ 753-A(3)-(6) (2020) (allowing the designation of a family member or other third person to return the ballot; allowing application for an absentee ballot by phone or electronic 10We also agree with the dissent’s statement that “[w]e should be uncomfortable extending a legislatively imposed deadline and we should do so reluctantly.” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 51. The Maine Constitution commands that we defer to the Legislature’s “proper enactment” of the statutory deadline “for reasons [it] deemed sufficient,” “except in the cases . . . expressly directed or permitted” by the Constitution. Me. Const. art. II, § 4; art. III, § 2. We diverge from the dissent’s statement only in our conclusion that this is not an appropriate case in which to take that extraordinary step. Moreover, the dissent agrees with the plaintiffs that the statutory deadline is only unconstitutional “during a once-in-a-lifetime deadly pandemic,” Dissenting Opinion ¶ 51, but it does not address how and by whose authority the statutory deadline would once again be constitutionally applied after this election cycle. I.e., would the preliminary injunction the dissent would compel the Superior Court to issue expire once the court, or this Court, or the Governor, or the Legislature determined that the ongoing emergency, which will extend well beyond election day, had passed? That unanswered question illustrates the danger of this Court exercising executive or legislative powers. 19 means; providing for assistance to certain voters), 753-B(4)-(5), (8) (2020) (providing for the issuance of a duplicate ballot in certain circumstances; for clerk assistance in voting on-site at nursing homes and certain other licensed facilities; and for absentee voting without application in the presence of the clerk with immediate acceptance of the ballot), 753-C (2020) (special procedures to facilitate absentee voting by participants in the Address Confidentiality Program), 754-A(3) (2020) (allowing an aide to assist voters who have concerns related to “physical disability, illiteracy or religious faith”). [¶27] Nevertheless, there are some restrictions in addition to the statutory deadline discussed supra. See 21-A M.R.S. § 759(3)(E). By statute, election officials must reject an absentee ballot if, inter alia, the signature on the envelope in which it was returned does not match the signature on the ballot application, or if the affidavit on the envelope is not properly completed. 21-A M.R.S. § 759(3)(A)-(B). [¶28] For this election cycle, the Secretary has issued extensive written guidance to municipal election officials that was admitted in evidence at the hearing on ARA’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In cases of a missing or mismatched signature or improper affidavit, that guidance requires a clerk, upon receipt of an absentee ballot, to 20 make a good faith effort to notify the voter as quickly as possible (within one business day at a minimum) that the ballot may be rejected or challenged unless the defect is cured. If the ballot is received on election day or less than 24 hours before election day, the clerk should make a good faith effort to notify the voter as quickly as possible. Notification is to be made by “email, using the email address provided on the application; or telephone, using the phone number provided on the application.” Detailed, specific procedures for notifying the voter of a potential problem are set out in the guidance. Moreover, the Superior Court found “significant” that the Secretary has established an online absentee ballot tracking system that allows a voter “to follow the journey of their ballot from the time of their request for an absentee ballot to its delivery and receipt by the clerk, including whether it has been rejected.”11 [¶29] Notwithstanding its recognition of “the commendable strides the Secretary has made . . . to implement cure procedures for rejected ballots,” ARA contends that “the procedures still fall short.” ARA asks us to “giv[e] voters an opportunity to cure their ballots for two days after Election Day”—five days in the case of a challenged ballot—and permit voters to cure a ballot by completing an affidavit rather than complying with the Secretary’s procedures. See Maine Secretary of State Absentee Ballot Request page, https://apps.web.maine.gov/cgi11 bin/online/AbsenteeBallot/index.pl (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 21 Depending on the defect involved, those procedures may include a simple phone call, coming to the town office to cure the defect, requesting a duplicate ballot to be delivered in the manner requested by the voter, or having the ballot challenged (as opposed to rejected) in accordance with 21-A M.R.S. § 673 (2020).12 [¶30] ARA asserts that the Secretary’s procedures “impose a severe, or at least significant, burden on the right to vote,” and, absent injunctive relief, violate an absentee voter’s right to procedural due process.13 We disagree, and conclude that the record supports the court’s finding that “[t]he Secretary’s procedures for notification and an opportunity to cure have greatly reduced the risk of an erroneous deprivation.”14 We have said that [p]rocedural due process requires fundamental fairness, which involves consideration of three factors to assess whether the State has violated an individual’s right to due process: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 12 Pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 696(1) (2020), “A challenged ballot must be counted the same as a regular ballot. The validity of a challenged ballot need not be determined unless it affects the results of an election.” 13 ARA’s complaint also stated an equal protection claim. Although that claim remains viable in the underlying declaratory judgment action, ARA has not briefed or otherwise pursued the claim on appeal and we do not discuss it further. See Mehlhorn v. Derby, 2006 ME 110, ¶ 11, 905 A.2d 290. 14 We share the court’s “confiden[ce] that the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, both constitutional officers, will implement the Secretary’s procedure.” 22 interest, including the function involved and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. In re Child of Lacy H., 2019 ME 110, ¶ 14 n.3, 212 A.3d 320 (quotation marks omitted). [¶31] Applying those factors here, it is beyond dispute that a citizen’s right to vote is fundamental. Opinion of the Justices, 2017 ME 100, ¶ 49, 162 A.3d 188. As we have explained, however, the risk that an absentee voter will be erroneously deprived of that right has been substantially reduced through the procedures instituted by the Secretary, even if the statutory deadline for returning such ballots is adhered to. Finally, as we have discussed, the State’s interest in following statutory directives governing the election is substantial. See supra ¶¶ 19-20. [¶32] In sum, we conclude that absentee voters will be afforded “fundamental fairness” in the November 2020 election. In re Child of Lacy H., 2019 ME 110, ¶ 14 n.3, 212 A.3d 320 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, ARA has not shown a “clear likelihood of success” on its complaint for declaratory relief, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying ARA injunctive relief on this ground. See Bangor Historic Track, Inc., 2003 ME 140, ¶ 11, 837 A.2d 129; Emerson, 563 A.2d at 768. 23 The entry is: Decision denying motion for preliminary injunction affirmed. ____________________________ JABAR, J., dissenting. [¶33] I respectfully dissent because I believe that we should be looking to the Maine Constitution and not the Federal Constitution to protect the constitutional rights of Maine citizens. The right to vote by absentee ballot is enshrined in the Maine Constitution—in Article II, section 4—but no such comparable right appears in the Federal Constitution.15 Normally we should not be interfering with a legislative deadline, but we are not living in normal times. We are confronted today with a crisis in our electoral process because the Legislature, understandably, did not anticipate a once-in-100-years deadly pandemic compounded by the United States Postal Service’s problems delivering the mail on time. 15 The Maine constitution provides for the right to vote absentee, Me. Const. art. II, § 4, and Maine statute provides the right to vote absentee by mail. 21-A M.R.S. § 754-A (2020). 24