Opinion ID: 1994788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Long Arm Statute's Requirements

Text: The District of Columbia's long arm statute provides as follows: (a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's  (1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; (2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia; (3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia; (4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia; (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in the District of Columbia; (6) contracting to insure or act as surety for or on any person, property, or risk, contract, obligation, or agreement located, executed, or to be performed within the District of Columbia at the time of contracting, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing; or (7) marital or parent and child relationship in the District of Columbia . . . [under certain conditions; this subsection is not relevant to this case] (b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a claim for relief arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him. D.C.Code § 13-423 (2001). To assert personal jurisdiction under § 13-423, the statute sets out two separate requirements: first, the defendant must have engaged in one of seven enumerated activities, id. at § (a), and, second, [the] claim for relief [must] aris[e] from acts enumerated in the statute. Id. at § (b). In this case, two of the enumerated acts are at issue: whether appellees transact[ed] any business in the District of Columbia, id. at § (a)(1), and whether they caus[ed] tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if [they] . . . engage[] in any other persistent course of conduct. . . in the District of Columbia. Id. at § (a)(4). In a long and detailed order, the trial court considered four contacts by the doctors with the District of Columbia: (1) Ms. Etchebarne-Bourdin's telephone call to appellees from the District on October 29, 1990; (2) the District of Columbia medical licenses held by Drs. Gahres and Radice; (3) the listing for the doctors' Virginia practice in the District of Columbia Yellow Pages, as well as Dr. Radice's listing in a referral list at the IMF Health Center (in the District); and (4) the doctors' periodic attendance at meetings of the Washington Gynecological Society and Grand Rounds at George Washington University Medical Center, all of which took place in the District of Columbia. The trial court determined that, whether viewed individually or in the aggregate, appellees' contacts with the District did not constitute transacting any business under the statute, and that, even assuming they did, appellants' claim did not aris[e] from those business transactions. See D.C.Code § 13-423(b). Similarly, the trial court determined that even though the doctors' attendance at Grand Rounds and Society meetings constituted a persistent course of conduct under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(4), this conduct, also, failed to satisfy the aris[e] from requirement of the statute. Id. at § (b).