Opinion ID: 220580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fifth Amendment Concerns

Text: Finally, with respect to the denial of credit under § 3E1.1, Saani argues the district court erred as a matter of law insofar as it relied upon his unwillingness to discuss matters about which he had a Fifth Amendment privilege not to speak, see U.S. CONST. amend. V (no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself). Specifically, Saani argues the district court refused to give him credit for acceptance of responsibility because he did not cooperate with the Government's bribery investigation by identifying the source of his unreported funds. The Government contests Saani's reading of the record but, like the Supreme Court, express[es] no view on the constitutional issue, see Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999) (holding Fifth Amendment extends to sentencing phase of criminal proceeding but reserving question whether silence bears upon credit for accepting responsibility). Recall that in deciding whether a defendant should receive credit for acceptance of responsibility, it is appropriate for the district court to consider whether the defendant truthfully admitt[ed] the conduct comprising the offense(s) of conviction, and truthfully admitt[ed] or [did] not falsely deny[] any additional relevant conduct for which the defendant is accountable. § 3E1.1 cmt n. 1(A). In order to avoid a potential violation of the defendant's constitutional right against self-incrimination, however, the Commentary further provides: [A] defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under [§ 3E1.1] ... [and] may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction. Id.; see also United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C.Cir.1992) (revision to § 3E1.1 and accompanying application note was intended to prevent tension between the Guideline and the Fifth Amendment). We considered this Commentary in a slightly different context In re Sealed Case. There the defendant had been convicted of, among other things, conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 350 F.3d at 115. The district court denied the defendant credit under § 3E1.1 in part because he refused to disclose the identity of his supplier and co-conspirator. Id. at 122. Because the Guidelines vest a sentencing court with the latitude to consider all reliable, probative indicia tending to demonstrate, or countervail, the genuineness of the defendant's remorse, id., we held a sentencing court may require a defendant seeking credit pursuant to § 3E1.1 to provide a candid and full unraveling of the circumstances of his offense, including the names of his co-conspirators, id. at 123 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a defendant convicted of distributing drugs can be denied credit for failing to reveal the source of his drugs, then does it follow that Saani may be denied credit for failing to reveal the source of his unreported income? We are not certain the analogy holds. The defendant In re Sealed Case stood convicted of conspiracy and naming his supplier would not have subjected him to the possibility of prosecution for an additional crime; one who has conspired necessarily has co-conspirators. Saani, however, asserts that if he were forced to disclose the source of his funds, then he might face prosecution for a crime distinct from tax evasion, viz., bribery. Courts disagree whether the compulsion a defendant faces if he may be denied a reduction of his sentence unless he provides potentially incriminating information is sufficiently forceful to trigger the protection of the Fifth Amendment. Compare United States v. Frazier, 971 F.2d 1076, 1084, 1086 (4th Cir.1992) (conditioning a reduction under § 3E1.1 on the waiver of [a defendant's] Fifth Amendment right is [] analogous to (and constitutionally indistinguishable from) the choice confronting the defendants in [a] plea bargain case[] ... [it] may encourage defendants to provide information that could prove incriminatory, but it does not compel them to do so); with United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 628 (2d Cir.1990) (requiring defendant to accept responsibility for crimes other than those to which he has pled guilty ... in effect forces [him] to choose between incriminating [himself] ... or forfeiting [a] substantial reduction[] in his sentence); United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 779 (2d Cir.2007) (same in dictum); see also United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 805 (3d Cir.1999) (a majority of circuits construe denied 3E1.1 reductions as `denied benefits' rather than `penalties'). We do not now resolve the constitutional issue because we cannot determine from the present record whether the district court did indeed take into account Saani's refusal to disclose specifically the source of his funds when it denied him credit under § 3E1.1. See Tr. of Sentencing Hearing at 4, United States v. Saani, No. 08-147 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2009) (denying Saani credit because of his unwillingness to be forthcoming with Probation over and above his unwillingness to be more forthcoming about his conduct here). Instead, we vacate Saani's sentence so the district court may clarify the basis or bases for, and if necessary reconsider, its conclusion Saani did not accept responsibility for his crimes. See Saro, 24 F.3d at 287 (For most constitutional errors, an appellate court is to reverse if it entertains a `reasonable doubt' about whether the error affected the outcome below). If the district court does not consider Saani's refusal to disclose the source of the funds in deciding whether to grant or deny him credit under § 3E1.1, then there will be no Fifth Amendment issue with respect to that provision. []