Opinion ID: 1356075
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm

Text: We observed in State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i 27, 904 P.2d 912 (1995), that: HRS § 701-114(1)(a) and (b) [(1993)] requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense, as well as `the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense.' State v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 282, 300, 859 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1993) [hereinafter Pinero II ]. . . . Moreover, HRS § 702-204 [(1993)] provides in relevant part that a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies with respect to each element of the offense. Finally, HRS § 702-207 [(1993)] provides that [when] the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. [ State v. Chung, 75 Haw. 398, 411, 862 P.2d 1063, 1070 (1993).] . . . In addition, [pursuant] to HRS § 702-205 [(1993)], the requisite state of mind applies to such conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct as are specified by the definition of the offense. Chung, 75 Haw. at 411-12[ & ] n. 8, 862 P.2d at 1071[ & ] n. 8. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 39, 904 P.2d at 924 (some citations omitted) (some brackets added and some in original) (emphasis omitted). Pursuant to HRS § 702-204, [w]hen the state of mind required to establish an element of the an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. HRS § 134-7(b), see supra note 2, does not specify a state of mind; thus, pursuant to HRS § 702-204, the requisite state of mind necessary to convict a person of the offense proscribed by HRS § 134-7(b) is established if the accused owns, possesses, or controls a firearm intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. See State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 526, 778 P.2d 704, 715 (1989) ( Pinero I ); State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i 87, 109-112, 997 P.2d 13, 35-38 (2000). On the other hand, the requisite state of mind necessary to convict a person of the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm is statutorily specified. HRS § 705-500(1)(b) provides in relevant part that [a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if the person[] . . . [i]ntentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as the person believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the person's commission of the crime. We noted in Holbron, that the commentary on HRS § 705-500 sets forth the conceptual underpinnings of the nature of intent in attempt cases in relevant part as follows:[] The nature of intent in attempt cases. Subsection (1) recognizes penal liability where the defendant's conduct is intentional and consummation of the crime is prevented . . . by some intervening factor following a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the crime. It is easy to recognize penal liability in such cases, notwithstanding the absence of a substantive offense, because the defendant's intent  his conscious object  is commission of the crime. [ ] His disposition toward criminal activity thus established, attempt liability is imposed,. . . under subsection (1)(b), if his conduct has advanced so far toward the criminal objective as to constitute a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to reach the objective.[] . . . . . . . Viewing the plain language of HRS § 705-500 commonsensically and in the light of its commentary, we distill the following propositions: (1) being unconditional in its prefatory language, HRS § 705-500(1) addresses the universe of criminal attempts; . . . (3) HRS § 705-500(1)(b), in substance, imposes criminal attempt liability on a defendant who, by virtue of his or her intentional conduct, has purposely and substantially undertaken to commit a criminal offense, but, because of factors not of his or her choosing, has failed to consummate it . . . . Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 40-41, 904 P.2d at 925-26 (some emphasis added and some in original) (footnotes omitted). As applied in the context of the present matter, the requisite state of mind necessary to convict Valentine of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm, pursuant to HRS §§ 134-7(b) and 702-204, would have been satisfied if the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly possessed a firearm, see infra section III.D. However, the requisite state of mind necessary to convict a person of the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, pursuant to HRS §§ 705-500, 134-7(b), and 702-204, is only established if the accused has intentionally engaged in conduct that constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in the commission of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. Cf. Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 40-41, 904 P.2d at 925-26. Moreover, pursuant to HRS § 705-500(3), conduct, such as reaching for a holstered firearm, shall not be considered a substantial step ... unless it is strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal intent, see supra note 1. In other words, if ambiguity or uncertainty clouds the inference, sought to be derived from a particular act, that the defendant intended to possess or control the firearm, then the act cannot legally satisfy the substantial step requirement of criminal attempt. As a general matter, we further observe that HRS § 705-500(2), see supra note 1, does not apply to the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm. Indeed, HRS § 705-500(2) applies only if causing a particular result is an element of the crime attempted. See Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 41, 904 P.2d at 926 (HRS § 705-500(2) superimposes a gloss on the general attempt liability described in HRS § 705-500(1) in instances `when causing a particular result is an element of the crime' . . .). Pursuant to HRS § 702-205 (1993), [t]he elements of an offense are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct[] as. . . [a]re specified by the [statutory] definition of the offense. For purposes of HRS § 702-205, the offense defined by HRS § 134-7(b), as it pertains to the present matter, is comprised of the following elements: (1) that a person convicted of a felony (attendant circumstance); (2) possesses or controls an object (conduct); (3) exhibiting the attributes of a firearm (attendant circumstances). Insofar as HRS § 134-7(b) does not contain a result-of-conduct element, HRS § 705-500(2) is inapplicable to the present matter and, therefore, does not superimpose a gloss on the general principles of attempt liability set forth in HRS §§ 705-500(1) and (3). Accordingly, a person commits the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, pursuant to HRS §§ 705-500(1)(b), 705-500(3), and 134-7(b), if he or she intentionally engages in conduct that, under the circumstances as he or she believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his or her commission of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. There are two material elements of the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These two elements are: (1) that the defendant engaged in conduct that, under the circumstances as he or she believed them to be, constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct intended by him or her to culminate in the commission of the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm; and (2) that the defendant engaged in such conduct intentionally. Moreover, conduct shall not be considered a substantial step unless it is strongly corroborative of the defendant's intent to commit the offense of prohibited possession of a firearm. With the foregoing analysis in mind, we turn to the jury instruction given by the circuit court regarding the offense of attempted prohibited possession of a firearm.