Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial comment.

Text: Appellant contends that the trial judge improperly vouched for the credibility of the two psychiatrists called by the prosecution. As noted above, both had been appointed by the court. While cross-examining Dr. Mills, a defense expert, the prosecutor asked if the witness was aware that the court-appointed psychiatrists had reached a different conclusion as to appellant's sanity, and then referred to those experts as seemingly impartial people that are not hired by the prosecution or the defense. These are people that the Court retained as impartial kinds of people to make an analysis. Dr. Mills objected to the implication that because he had been retained by the defense he was not impartial, to which the prosecutor responded: But understand sir, that Dr. Bittle and Dr. Kaldor have no allegiance to the parties in any sense other than being retained by the court. After the prosecutor also asked why psychiatrists retained by the court which had examined their credentials would have a different opinion, defense counsel objected to the reference to allegiance as inappropriate and to the assertion that the court had examined the credentials as inaccurate. The judge then said, in the presence of the jury, that he disagreed. First of all, I think it's within fair comment the allegiance aspect of it. The doctors explained that he's not for sale, but certainly you know as well as I know that there are certain people this court wouldn't employ, and that Dr. Kaldor and Dr. Bittle are well known to the Court and to counsel, and that through a process of talking and exploring various names we arrived at Bittle and Kaldor. You were part of that process, as was the District Attorney, as was the Court. I know these people's credentials, I've had them testify as experts before, and I think [the prosecutor's] characterization is a correct one. When Dr. Kaldor was later called as a prosecution witness, the prosecutor elicited testimony that Dr. Kaldor became involved in the case when he received a telephone call from the judge asking if he would be a court-appointed doctor. Defense counsel again objected that the testimony was misleading as it suggested that Dr. Kaldor was the personal choice of the judge. The judge declined a defense request that he give a disclaimer that Dr. Kaldor was not his personal choice. He did advise the jury, however, that while the county did not maintain a list of experts, the court had in mind psychiatrists who were available and in whom they had confidence and in this process I think Dr. Kaldor's name was one of five or six we explored.... [T]here were five or six that we thought to be appropriate, and Dr. Kaldor and Dr. Bittle were two names that both sides stipulated would be acceptable. There is a reasonable likelihood that a juror might infer from those exchanges the court had vouched for the witness's credibility and thereby invited the jury to give special credence to Dr. Kaldor's testimony. The fact that an expert witness has been appointed by the court may be revealed to the jury (Evid. Code, § 722), but vouching, which constitutes an attempt to personally vouch for a witness's credibility, is improper. ( People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756.) The judge may have intended only to explain that Dr. Kaldor was appointed pursuant to the regular practice of the court, that the court knows the qualifications of experts considered for appointment pursuant to that practice, and that both sides agreed to this appointment. That would have been proper since the jury understands and expects that the party who retains an expert is familiar with the credentials of the expert. (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 822, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) Like a judicial grant of immunity (see People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 489, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249), court appointment of an expert does not itself constitute vouching and would not be seen as such by a jury. In the context in which the court made these remarks, however, the jury may have understood the explanation to mean that the judge personally vouched for the credibility of Dr. Kaldor and Dr. Bittle. Nonetheless, any error in this regard was not prejudicial. The jurors were instructed that they were the sole judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given to the testimony of witnesses. Nothing in the court's explanation of the appointment of the two court-appointed psychiatrists implied that credibility of defendant's experts was in question, and, as noted before, all of the experts agreed that appellant was mentally ill. Only their assessment of the impact of that illness on his awareness that his conduct was morally wrong differed. To the extent that appellant may be arguing that the questions put to Dr. Mills by the prosecutor regarding his retention by the defense were improper, the claim lacks merit. As we observed in People v. Johnston (1957) 48 Cal.2d 78, 87, 307 P.2d 921, it is inevitable that in the course of direct or cross-examination the jury will learn if an expert witness has been retained by a party. That information is relevant to possible bias and may be considered by the jury in weighing the testimony of the expert.