Opinion ID: 787941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant Williams's Two-Level Sentence Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice

Text: 52 Williams appeals from Judge Larimer's imposition of a two-level sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. A two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate under the following circumstances: 53 If (A) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (B) the obstructive conduct related to (i) the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (ii) a closely related offense.... 54 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Put differently, this adjustment is intended to apply where the defendant consciously act[s] with the purpose of obstruction of justice. United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir.1990). Or, as we stated more recently, it must be based on conduct that willfully interferes with or attempts to interfere with the disposition of the criminal charges against a defendant. United States v. Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir.2004). The use of the word willful in § 3C1.1 implies a mens rea requirement [and thus] we have generally limited the application of [§ 3C1.1] to those cases in which the defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice. United States v. Khedr, 343 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 55 Judge Larimer adopted the Probation Department's recommendation to enhance Williams's sentence based on four letters Williams had sent from jail to Sabrina Peterson, one of his co-defendants. Judge Larimer presented his reasoning as follows: The Probation Department added, and the Government urges, that under [§] 3C1.1 the Court should find two points for obstruction of justice based on Mr. Williams' letters to co-conspirators in jail urging them not to cooperate with the Government, to maintain certain stories and positions, and to repeat certain versions of events that were not true. 56 There was a fair amount of testimony about this at trial in terms of letters that were written, letters that were received. The Court reviewed those letters and I believe, based on the testimony, that the two point enhancement is absolutely applicable here. I think there was an effort to obstruct justice, to delay the investigation, to get witnesses to stick to the party line. 57 In other words, he found that Williams was threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant [or] witness... directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so, one of the enumerated types of conduct the Sentencing Commission deemed worthy of the obstruction of justice adjustment in the application notes to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(a). This application note also applies where the targeted co-defendant or witness is still only a potential co-defendant or witness. See United States v. Feliz, 286 F.3d 118, 120-21 (2d Cir.2002) (citing United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir.2001)). 58 There is no dispute that Williams sent Ms. Peterson the four letters for which Judge Larimer enhanced his sentence and that, at the time, Ms. Peterson was a potential co-defendant or witness against him. The only dispute is whether these letters revealed the required obstructive intent. An obstruction of justice enhancement is subject to a mixed standard of review. United States v. Cassiliano, 137 F.3d 742, 745 (2d Cir.1998). A sentencing court's legal interpretations of the sentencing guidelines is reviewed de novo. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. McSherry, 226 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir.2000). But [t]he sentencing court's findings as to what acts were performed, what was said, and what the speaker meant by [his] words, and how a listener would reasonably interpret those words will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Cassiliano, 137 F.3d at 745; see also United States v. Gaskin, 364 F.3d 438, 466 (2d Cir.2004) (We generally defer to a sentencing court's findings as to what a `speaker meant by his words, and how a listener would reasonably interpret those words.' (quoting United States v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir.1990))). 59 Judge Larimer did not analyze the four letters separately and did not specifically state which of the letters provided the justification for a two-level enhancement. Instead, he concluded generally that the letters as a group provided evidence of an attempt to obstruct justice. Again, he stated: The Court reviewed those letters and I believe, based on the testimony, that the two point enhancement is absolutely justified. I think there was an effort to obstruct justice, to delay the investigation, to get witnesses to stick to the party line. While his overall finding of fact merits deference, we analyze the individual letters to see if any could support the finding. We turn first to a letter Williams sent to Ms. Peterson on December 5, 1999 that had Listen to me close written at the top. 60 In his December 5, 1999 letter, Williams enclosed a letter that he had received from co-defendant Lonzo Harden. He explained to Ms. Peterson: Muffin, in your letter you'll see another envelope in their [sic]. That's a letter I received from Lonzo, telling me the question[s] that the `Feds' ask [ed] him.... Just read the yellow paper letter. Significantly, the yellow paper letter which Williams had received from Mr. Harden — and which he urged Ms. Peterson to read — provided a detailed account of Mr. Harden's interviews with federal investigators. Harden described what questions he was asked and how he had responded. In it, Harden also urged Williams to tell certain things to Ms. Peterson. 61 Harden told Williams that the authorities mostly asked about blackie and cottontail going up north. At trial, Harden explained that this referred to his daughter Katrina Harden (blackie) and Shirley Davenport (cottontail, or rabbit) going to Niagara Falls, Canada, to purchase heroin. In the letter, Lonzo Harden gave precise details of what he told the authorities as to why Katrina Harden and Davenport went to Canada, what they did, and who met with their heroin source. He also wrote, now they want to bring blackie here to talk with her. But I know she's not going to know anything except what I just said. If she come I'm going to talk with her first. He continued, if you get in touch with cotton, tell her that when her and blackie went up north, she didn't do anything, she didn't see anybody, or nothing. She just went with blackie because she want to go alone. Harden similarly told Williams, [i]f you did anything with anybody, I never did meet any of them. 62 Again, Williams enclosed Harden's letter to him in his letter to Ms. Peterson and asked her to read it. He asked her to send $25 to his co-conspirator Diane Johnson and told her, we all need to pull together right here. I don't think they will indict you, but they probably will indict Rabbit. Because Lonzo told them that she went to Canada. Nevertheless, he asked her to [t]ell my cousin, Rabbit, not to get scare[d] because they really don't have anything on her, lately. He continued, I don't believe they [are] going to indict you. But they might. I'm talking about Rabbit. Muffin, you tell them the truth — you just got back with me after my wife Mary die[d]. 63 Williams's December 5, 2001 letter to Sabrina Peterson must be viewed in context. It is not clear from the text that Williams was suggesting that Ms. Peterson lie or otherwise obstruct the investigation. But as Judge Larimer stated, [t]here was a fair amount of testimony about this at trial in terms of letters that were written. He heard from Lonzo Harden, who testified at trial that he wrote Williams, in part, so that if Williams spoke to Shirley Davenport, he could make sure she wouldn't say anything other than what Katrina [Harden] had said. Judge Larimer also heard from Ms. Peterson, who testified at trial that she believed Williams had sent her Harden's letter [f]or us to understand what Lonzo [Harden] had told the DEA and so everybody's story would corroborate, you know, so everybody would be saying the same thing. Essentially, Judge Larimer agreed with Ms. Peterson that the most plausible understanding of Williams's letter is that it reflected an intent to improperly influence her testimony and get witnesses to stick to the party line. 64 As we noted above, [t]he sentencing court's findings as to what acts were performed, what was said, and what the speaker meant by [his] words, and how a listener would reasonably interpret those words will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. Cassiliano, 137 F.3d at 745. Viewed in connection with the testimony Judge Larimer heard during the trial, his conclusion that Williams sought to obstruct justice by sending Lonzo Harden's letter to Sabrina Peterson was not clearly erroneous. Williams could have been unlawfully influencing a co-defendant [or] witness ... directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(a). In his letter, Lonzo Harden had provided a notably detailed account of what he had told authorities. Passing that information to other members of the conspiracy may have been a critical step in impeding the investigation. Because various members of the conspiracy were incarcerated or otherwise unable to communicate, sending them Lonzo Harden's letter may have been the only way for Williams to make sure everybody would be saying the same thing. Williams's subsequent three letters to Ms. Peterson could similarly support Judge Larimer's factual finding. 65 On December 11, 1999, Williams wrote Ms. Peterson a brief letter that began, I don't have very much to say. He continued, I know it's hard but try not to worry so much. Because it's not going to change the outcome. Williams also expressed his anger about someone who had apparently told authorities about Ms. Peterson's criminal involvement. He wondered to Ms. Peterson, what happen[ed] to the code of the game? Williams's letter of May 16, 2001 is similar. He sent Sabrina Peterson copies of various cases so that she will understand they [the federal authorities] can't do anything to us. He then added, [a]s long as you don't tell on yourself, which might be the truth. But they will use whatever you say against [you]. Williams also asked Ms. Peterson to tell co-defendant Onaghnior that she will never lie on him. In Williams's June 3, 2001 letter to Ms. Peterson, Williams speculated, I hope Roland [Onaghinor] don't think you told all them lies on him, that he read in those court papers and get scared and cop-out thinking they going to railroad him. He also cautioned Ms. Peterson about speaking to other inmates for fear that any inmate might be a plant. He even admonished her to not let people know she was broke because [a]s long as people feel like you have money, the [y] will give you everything. When they feel like you don't have nothin' they wont give you nothin'. 66 These three letters also must be understood in context. On their face they were simply advising Ms. Peterson of her right to remain silent and the danger of speaking with other inmates. But when Williams wrote these letters, he was the subject of a criminal investigation and had already been indicted. Thus, here we have something more than `mere' advice. United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111, 1119 (2d Cir.1974). It was self-serving advice. Such behavior comes within the ambit of obstruction of justice as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and, by reference, U.S.S.G. 3C1.1: The correct view ... is: 67 ... [W]hile a witness violates no law by claiming the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a grand jury, one who bribes, threatens, coerces a witness to claim it or advises with corrupt motive a witness to take it, can and does obstruct or influence the administration of justice. 68 The focus is on the intent or motive of the party charged as an inducer. The lawful behavior of the person invoking the Amendment cannot be used to protect the criminal behavior of the inducer. 69 Id. (citation omitted); see also Cole v. United States, 329 F.2d 437, 440 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954, 84 S.Ct. 1630, 12 L.Ed.2d 497 (1964); U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(i). Where the inducer's motive in advising a co-conspirator to remain silent is to impede the investigation against him, rather than to give purely altruistic advice, he is obstructing justice. 70 Here, there was a sufficient basis for Judge Larimer to conclude that Williams's motive in his later letters was to impede the investigation against both him and Sabrina Peterson. He wrote to her about how inappropriate it had been for one of their co-conspirators to cooperate with investigators. And he sent her copies of cases to explain that they [the federal authorities] can't do anything to us. As long as you don't tell on yourself, which might be the truth. But they will use whatever you say against [you]. The natural understanding is that Williams was advising her that Williams and Peterson would be able to thwart the investigation against them as long as she exercised her Fifth Amendment right. Or, as Judge Larimer stated, he was urging [her] not to cooperate with the Government. Because the words and the surrounding context of the letters support the conclusion that Williams specifically intended to obstruct justice in his advice to Peterson, see Khedr, 343 F.3d at 104 (the existence of alternative explanations [do] not matter [when there is] evidence of words... by the defendant from which to draw an inference that he specifically intended to obstruct justice), Judge Larimer's imposition of the two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1 was correct. 71 We add that, although we have analyzed each of Williams's letters in its own right, Judge Larimer was free to look at the letters as a group and for the light each letter shed on the others. [I]ndividual pieces of evidence, insufficient in themselves to prove a point, may in cumulation prove it. The sum of an evidentiary presentation may well be greater than its constituent parts. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 179-80, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)).