Opinion ID: 1523828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: first-degree burglary as an aggravating factor

Text: Appellant contends first-degree burglary cannot be used as an aggravating factor upon which the death penalty is based. The argument is two-fold. First, it is contended that to constitute an aggravating factor, an offense must be completed before the murder takes place. Appellant contends here, that the burglary was not complete until the murder was committed because otherwise there was no evidence that appellant unlawfully entered the premises with intent to commit a crime. It is also contended that the intent to commit the crime of murder elevated the charge of burglary to burglary in the first degree, and burglary in the first degree elevated the murder to a capital offense. Appellant thus claims that without the murder there was no burglary in the first degree, and without burglary in the first degree there was no capital murder. These contentions are without merit. The crime of first-degree burglary was complete once appellant unlawfully entered the premises while armed with an intent to commit a crime. A jury could reasonably find that he entered the building with intent to kidnap or unlawfully restrain his wife or that he intended to murder Stutzenberger. Regardless, if he intended to commit any crime, the offense of first-degree burglary was complete upon the unlawful entry. Appellant also claims that the burglary itself did nothing to make the murder more aggravated. We hold that an unlawful entry into a building while armed, with an intent to commit a crime, is a substantially aggravated circumstance to be considered by a jury in determining the appropriate punishment for homicide. The consideration of the aggravated circumstance in this case was in accord with the procedures approved by the United States Supreme Court in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).