Opinion ID: 6498645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutional Right to Parent

Text: ¶67 The constitutional right of parents to direct the raising of their children is at the heart of this lawsuit. It is that constitutional right that the majority opinion intentionally disregards.8 Schools do not have the right to parent our children on gender-identity issues. Yet, a majority of this court greets parents' pleas to temporarily enjoin MMSD with silence, which silence permits schools to make genderidentity decisions for children in a MMSD school without parental knowledge or consent. ¶68 Furthermore, as we consider the constitutional right to parent that is raised in the Petition for Review, it is important to note that a part of the problem we face here is of the circuit court's own making. On February 19, 2020, the parents moved for Temporary Injunction to enjoin MMSD's Policies while this litigation is pending. They sought to prohibit MMSD from: It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 8 department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 12 No. 2020AP1032.pdr (1) enabling children to socially transition to a different gender identity at school by selecting a new affirmed named and pronouns, without parental notice or consent; (2) preventing teachers and other staff from communicating with parents that their child may be dealing with gender dysphoria, or that their child has or wants to change gender identity, without the child's consent; and (3) deceiving parents by using different names and pronouns around parents than at school. The parents asserted in their motion that some of the policies violate parents' constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of their children. They asserted that [w]hether a child with gender dysphoria should socially transition to a different gender identity is a significant and controversial healthcare decision that falls squarely within parental decision-making authority. ¶69 More than two years have passed without a decision by the circuit court on the parents' motion for a Temporary Injunction. If the circuit court had addressed the pending motion, the losing party could have appealed that decision years ago. The litigation could have returned to the circuit court to decide whether the identities of the parents were irrelevant, as the parents contend because they sue on behalf of all parents to raise their children as they see fit, or relevant identities, as MMSD alleges. The administration of justice is affected by the circuit court's non-decision because by not deciding, the circuit court has effectively denied the motion for a temporary injunction and the circuit court also has denied the parents' opportunity to appeal an adverse ruling. ¶70 The Petition for Review, raised the issue of temporary injunction standards, contending that the lower courts' 13 No. 2020AP1032.pdr decisions are directly 'in conflict with' this Court's 'controlling' precedents as to proper application of the temporary injunction standards . . . .9 The Petition for Review did so, recognizing that the circuit court and court of appeals had decided motions for injunction pending appeal, and also recognizing that the standard for whether to grant a temporary injunction, Werner v. A.L. Grootemaat & Sons, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 513, 519, 259 N.W.2d 310 (1977), and a stay pending appeal, State v. Gudenschwager, 191 Wis. 2d 431, 440, 529 N.W.2d 225 (1995), employ similar tests. ¶71 The parents moved for an injunction pending appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2)(a), which the majority opinion denied because its decision ends the appeal and therefore any injunction pending appeal that it would grant would also end with its decision.10 The parents also renewed their request for a temporary injunction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 813.02. ¶72 The majority opinion ignores this part of the Petition for Review, claiming that the parents have not provided a legal theory by which the majority could reach the failure of the circuit court to address the motion for a temporary injunction that has been pending for more than two years.11 By its decision, the majority opinion chooses to duck the significant question of constitutional law that was raised in the Petition 9 Petition for Review, Aug. 13, 2021, 3. 10 Majority op., ¶40. 11 Id., ¶¶38, 39. 14 No. 2020AP1032.pdr for Review, which I address below. The majority opinion also chooses to ignore the circuit court's failure to meet its obligations under SCR 70.36(1)(b),12 which required a decision on the motion for a temporary injunction within 180 days. The majority opinion does so as it also chooses to ignore our obligation to supervise all Wisconsin courts. Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3.13 ¶73 As I begin, I remind the reader that under our constitutional supervisory authority, we have the power to decide whether parts of MMSD's Policies should be enjoined, as was requested in the Petition for Review. This court is vested with superintending and administrative authority over all courts. Koschkee v. Evers, 2018 WI 82, ¶8, 382 Wis. 2d 666, 913 N.W.2d 878 (quoting Wis. Const. art. VII, § 3). This superintending authority is as broad and as flexible as necessary to insure the due administration of justice in the courts of this state. Id. (quoting In re Kading, 70 Wis. 2d 508, 520, 235 N.W.2d 409 (1975)). Further, this power is not Supreme Court Rule 70.36 requires circuit court judges to 12 decide each matter submitted for decision within 90 days of the date on which the matter is submitted to the judge in final form. Judges may file for extensions with the chief judge of the judicial administrative district. However, even this extension, which must be requested and granted within five days of the overrunning the original 90 day timeline, is available for one additional period of 90 days. SCR 70.36(1)(a). Any further extension must be granted by the Supreme Court and will be done only for specific matters as exigent circumstances may require. SCR 70.36(1)(b). Article VII, Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution 13 provides: The supreme court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts. 15 No. 2020AP1032.pdr strictly limited to situations in which it was previously used, continuing supervision is required in response to changing needs and circumstances. Koschkee, 382 Wis. 2d 666, ¶8. ¶74 In Koschkee, we considered our authority over the practice of law, in and out of court as connected with the exercise of judicial power and the administration of justice. Id., ¶9. We employed our supervisory authority because we concluded that the necessities of justice required us to do so. Id., ¶12. We used it to conclude that Evers and DPI are entitled to counsel of their choice and are not required to be represented by DOJ. Id. Here, we should exercise our supervisory authority over a circuit court's failure to decide a motion that has been pending for more than two years contrary to SCR 70.36 and contrary to the administration of justice. ¶75 The pending motion is for a temporary injunction. In Wisconsin, courts may grant a temporary injunction to restrain a party's actions: When it appears from a party's pleading that the party is entitled to judgment and any part thereof consists in restraining some act, the commission or continuance of which during the litigation would injure the party, or when during the litigation it shall appear that a party is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering some act to be done in violation of the rights of another party and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. Wis. Stat. § 813.02(1)(a). The motion for temporary injunction should have been decided years ago. In its present undecided state, there is no decision from which to appeal, and yet the circuit court's failure to decide the pending motion for a temporary injunction stands in the way of the administration of 16 No. 2020AP1032.pdr justice in this litigation. This is so because by failing to decide the pending motion, the circuit court effectively denied it and also denied the parents the opportunity to appeal an unfavorable ruling. ¶76 In order to fully understand this dissent, it is important to appreciate the fundamental constitutional right upon which these proceedings are grounded. Therefore, a review of long-standing protections for the relationship of parent and child will be helpful. ¶77 For hundreds of years, parents' right to direct the upbringing and education of their children has been a fundamental and protected right under Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Michels v. Lyons, 2019 WI 57, ¶15, 387 Wis. 2d 1, 927 N.W.2d 486; Jackson v. Benson, 218 Wis. 2d 835, 879, 578 N.W.2d 602 (1998); Wis. Indus. Sch. for Girls v. Clark Cnty., 103 Wis. 651, 668-70, 79 N.W. 422 (1899). ¶78 As many Supreme Court decisions have shown, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects parents' right to decide the upbringing of their own children. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (concluding that parents possessed the right to direct whether their children would study German in elementary school under the Fourteenth Amendment); Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (concluding that the state requirement that children must attend public schools was contrary to the parents' Fourteenth Amendment 17 No. 2020AP1032.pdr liberty interest of directing the upbringing and education of their children). ¶79 The United States Supreme Court has continually reinforced the primacy of parents when making decisions concerning the upbringing of their children, considering the right as established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.). When it comes to a decision on whether to expose their child[] to certain . . . ideas[,] the parents, not the government, should be the ones to choose. In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 31 (Wash. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). ¶80 Serving as a foundation of this right is the presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). Furthermore, natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. Id. (citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, at .). Of course, this presumption may be rebutted. However, [t]he state's power to displace parental discretion is limited . . . and must be justified on a case-by-case basis. Schleifer by Schleifer v. 18 No. 2020AP1032.pdr City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 861 (4th Cir. 1998) (Michael, J., dissenting). ¶81 In Troxel v. Granville, which involved a Washington statute that permitted visitation rights at any time if visitation was in the best interests of the child[,] the Supreme Court held the statute was an unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right of parents to rear their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-78. The court explained that [t]he liberty interest at issue in this case——the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children——is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. Id. at 65. The court reasoned that there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children and providing grandparents greater access to grandchildren, despite the decision of the parent, is an unconstitutional interference with parental rights. Id. at 68. ¶82 Recently, courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the same subject matter as MMSD's incursion on parental rights in the matter before us. In Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall, No. 2:22cv-184-LCB, 2022 WL 1521889, at  (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2022), the District Court for the Northern Division of Alabama decided that parents, not the state, are the proper decision-makers for medical treatment their child may receive involving genderidentity and transgender treatment. Id. There, the parents of transgender children challenged and sought to enjoin enforcement of a newly-passed Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection 19 No. 2020AP1032.pdr Act (the Act), which banned certain medical procedures used for the treatment of gender dysphoria in minors.14 ¶83 Parent plaintiffs claimed that the Act violated their constitutional right to direct the medical care of their children under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at . In determining whether enforcement of the Act should be enjoined during the lawsuit, the court concluded that parents had a high likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The court reiterated that a parent's right 'to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children' is one of 'the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests' recognized by the Supreme Court. Id. at  (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66). Furthermore, [e]ncompassed within this right is the more specific right to direct a child's medical care. Eknes-Tucker, 2022 WL 1521889, at  (citing Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 470 (11th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the right of parents to generally make decisions concerning the treatment to be given to their children). ¶84 Against this backdrop, the court reasoned that parents likely would succeed on the merits of their claim because the Act prevents Parent Plaintiffs from choosing that course of treatment for their children by criminalizing the use of Gender dysphoria is a clinically diagnosed incongruence 14 between one's gender identity and assigned gender. If untreated, gender dysphoria may cause or lead to anxiety, depression, eating disorders, substance abuse, self-harm, and suicide. Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall, No. 2:22-cv-184-LCB, 2022 WL 1521889, at  (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2022). 20 No. 2020AP1032.pdr transitioning medications to treat gender dysphoria in minors, even at the independent recommendation of a licensed pediatrician. Eknes-Tucker, 2022 WL 1521889, at . ¶85 When a government action directly and substantially implicates a fit parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care and upbringing of his or her child, [governmental action] is subject to strict scrutiny review. Michels, 387 Wis. 2d 1, ¶22. Ordinarily, where a fundamental liberty interest protected by the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment is involved, the government cannot infringe on that right 'unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.' Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 502 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)). The MMSD has identified no compelling state interest upon which MMSD contends the Policies are based. ¶86 The parents renewed their request for a temporary injunction in their Petition for Review, and they ask us to grant them relief. The pending status of the parents' motion before the circuit court is not a deterrent to our superintending authority, which is grounded in our constitutional obligation to supervise all Wisconsin courts. In the exercise of our superintending authority and in order to afford the administration of justice in this litigation, we should grant the temporary injunction under the undisputed facts and the law presented herein. 21 No. 2020AP1032.pdr ¶87 I begin by noting that the granting of a temporary injunction required the parents to show: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a lack of an adequate remedy at law; (3) that the movant will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction; and (4) that a balancing of the equities favors issuing the injunction. Wisconsin Legislature v. Evers, No. 2020AP608-OA, unpublished order (Wis. Apr. 6, 2020) (order granting leave to commence an original action and enjoining Executive Order No. 74); see also Kocken v. Wis. Council 40, 2007 WI 72, ¶22, 301 Wis. 2d 266, 732 N.W.2d 828 (listing requirements for injunctive relief to be a finding a likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable harm, and an inadequate remedy at law.); Spheeris Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Spheeris on Capitol, 157 Wis. 2d 298, 306, 459 N.W.2d 581 (Ct. App. 1990) (explaining a movant must show a reasonable probability of success on the merits, an inadequate remedy at law, and irreparable harm); Grootemaat, 89 Wis. 2d at 520. ¶88 The administration of justice often requires significant judicial effort. But that is what the people of Wisconsin elected us to provide. We are expected not to shirk our responsibilities when hard legal disputes are presented. This case is grounded in the contention that MMSD has usurped fundamental parental rights, some of which relate to healthcare decisions for their children. The administration of justice requires that we not ignore the parents' plea for a judicial decision, as the majority opinion has done. 22 No. 2020AP1032.pdr ¶89 The parents satisfy each factor necessary to success on their motion for a temporary injunction. First, they have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that MMSD's Policies interfere with their constitutional right to raise their children as they think best. The lack of a temporary injunction also keeps MMSD in charge of enabling healthcare choices without parental consent for children who have gender-identity issues. The constitutional presumption is that parents will act in the best interest of their child. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69. Allowing a school to reassign a child's gender, flips this constitutional presumption on its head by assuming that parents will not act in their child's best interest. Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution support the conclusion that MMSD's Policies cannot deprive parents of their constitutional rights without proof that parents are unfit, a hearing, a court order, and without according parents due process. Instead, under MMSD's explicit guidelines, parents are affirmatively excluded from decisionmaking unless their child consents.15 MMSD's Policies affirmatively hide information from 15 parents that relates to their children. For example, School staff shall not disclose any information that may reveal a student's gender identity to others, including parents or guardians and other school staff, unless legally required to do so or unless the student has authorized such disclosure. MMSD Policies, 9. Staff will respect student confidentiality throughout the investigation, be careful not to 'out' students while communicating with family/peers, and involve the targeted student throughout the intervention process. Id., 11. In MMSD with the permission of our students, we will strive to include families along the journey to support their LGBTQ+ youth. Id., 16. Students will be called by their affirmed name and pronouns regardless of parent/guardian permission to 23 No. 2020AP1032.pdr ¶90 Parents have the constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their children. Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides fundamental protection for that parental right. Jackson, 218 Wis. 2d at 879 (explaining that Wisconsin has traditionally accorded parents the primary role in decisions regarding the education and upbringing of their children.). We have interpreted Article I, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution as affording the same protections as are provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2018 WI 78, ¶35, 383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678. The right of parents to decide on the upbringing of their children has been so long established as beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-33. ¶91 What is occurring in Wisconsin schools has been occurring in other schools around the country. Parents are bringing their concerns to court, and courts around the country have confirmed that parental constitutional rights are violated when they are prevented from being involved in gender-identity concerns of their children. Eknes-Tucker, 2022 WL 1521889, at . Accordingly, I conclude that parents have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. ¶92 Second, parents have no remedy at law. Without an injunction to temporarily enjoin MMSD from implementing its policies, MMDS will continue to enforce them. Parents will not be told that their child is socially transitioning to a sex change their name and gender in MMSD systems. Id., 18. 24 No. 2020AP1032.pdr different from that noted at birth without the child's consent, yet social transitioning is a healthcare choice for parents to make. Without an injunction, the parents have no way of becoming involved in such a fundamental decision. ¶93 Third, without an injunction the parents will suffer irreparable harm. The MMSD Policies are on-going and continue to invade parents' constitutional right to parent their children. Many courts consider the on-going infringement of a constitutional right enough and require no further showing of irreparable injury. See e.g., Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1131 (10th Cir. 2012). We should do so as well. ¶94 Fourth, the balance of equities favors the parents, who are ready, willing and able to parent their children. The public interest is served by validation of parental constitutional rights and any harm alleged by MMSD from parental involvement in decision-making for their children runs directly contrary to the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69. Furthermore, because MMSD's Policies are carried out by school officials who are state actors, whose conduct described in the MMSD Policies infringes on the parents' constitutional right to make important choices for their children, the school officials must yield to the constitution. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 307 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that [i]t is not educators, but parents who have primary rights in the upbringing of children. School officials have only a secondary responsibility and must respect these rights.). 25 No. 2020AP1032.pdr ¶95 The parents brought a motion for a temporary injunction to enjoin MMSD from: (1) enabling children to socially transition to a different gender-identity without parental consent; (2) preventing teachers and other staff from telling parents that their child may have gender-identity concerns; and (3) deceiving parents by using different names and pronouns in front of parents than are used at school. The parents have satisfied all the necessary criteria for a temporary injunction.