Opinion ID: 1058853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Counts II through VI

Text: Greengael asserts that the trial court erred in sustaining the defendants' demurrers and pleas to Counts II through VI. [9] Greengael divides the dismissed counts into two categories: (1) allegations that certain portions of the Culpeper County Subdivision Ordinance were invalid; and (2) allegations that Greengael was entitled to damages for harm it suffered because the County, Board, and Egertson violated principles of due process and equal protection and engaged in willful misconduct. With regard to the validity of the subdivision ordinance, Greengael pled that Sections 425.3.1 and 425.4.1 of the ordinance were invalid because they fail to provide `reasonable' provisions in that, as applied, they do not permit any installed water and sanitary sewer facilities for residential subdivision that the County arbitrarily and capriciously chooses not to approve. Greengael argues the provisions were invalid as applied to it because the Board arbitrarily and capriciously chose not to approve water and sewer facilities. First, we note that nothing in the cited ordinance provisions involves County approval of water and sewer facilities in conjunction with its approval of a preliminary subdivision plat. More importantly, Greengael's arguments fail because, as we have concluded, the Board's denial of the preliminary subdivision plat application based on Greengael's failure to comply with these provisions was not arbitrary or capricious. [10] The second set of allegations Greengael contends the trial court improperly dismissed were the alleged actions of the County, Board, and Egertson that manipulated the subdivision process and constituted fraud and violations of due process and equal protection. According to Greengael, in finding that the County and certain of its officials acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, the trial court found, in sum, that County conduct constituted willful misconduct. As we have held, however, the denial of the preliminary subdivision plat was not arbitrary and capricious and, as Greengael conceded at oral argument, claims based on that conduct are moot. Finally, we address Greengael's allegation in its pleading that the denial of the preliminary subdivision plat was an unconstitutional taking in violation of its rights under the Virginia and United States Constitutions. To establish an unconstitutional taking, a landowner must suffer either a categorical or a regulatory taking. A categorical taking is a deprivation of all economic use of the property. A regulatory taking deprives owners of less than all economic value, but interferes with their investment-backed expectations; in other words, owners bought the property `in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged regulatory regime.' Board of Supervisors of Prince William County v. Omni Homes, Inc., 253 Va. 59, 68, 481 S.E.2d 460, 465 (1997) (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1177 (Fed.Cir. 1994)). Greengael did not allege that it lost all economic use of its Property, and its pleadings show that the Property was zoned R-4 at the time Ashmeade Company, L.L.C., purchased it and when Greengael became the contract purchaser. Thus, the Property was always subject to the utility letter requirement, and Greengael cannot assert it bought the Property relying on a regulatory scheme apart from the one it now challenges.