Opinion ID: 1540750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Failure to Contribute

Text: Section 5-312(b)(4) sets forth three alternative factors, at least one of which must exist before a petition for adoption may be granted. The only factor relevant here is § 5-312(b)(4)(ii)  that the natural parent has repeatedly failed to contribute to the physical care and support of the child although financially able to do so. (Emphasis added). Ernest asserts that the Court of Special Appeals erred in overturning the trial court's factual finding that it had not been proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ernest failed repeatedly to contribute to Baby G.'s care and support. The standard applicable to the intermediate appellate court's review in this regard is whether the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. See Maryland Rule 8-131; Ross v. Hoffman, supra, 280 Md. at 185, 372 A.2d 582. The trial court based its findings on the existence of two checks, one made out to cash, the other to Ernest, and on Ernest's testimony that he gave the checks to his attorney to offer them to the D.'s. The court concluded on that basis that Ernest had offered the money to the D.'s. It also determined that because the D.'s did not request or expect a contribution from Ernest, Ernest's efforts were sufficient to preclude a finding that he had failed to contribute to Baby G.'s support. Ernest does not contend that the D.'s actually received the checks which he produced at trial. Assuming that Ernest's mere offer of the checks to the D.'s would have fulfilled his responsibility to contribute to Baby G.'s support, the evidence must be sufficient to support the court's finding that Ernest actually offered the checks to the D.'s and that the checks were refused by the D.'s. Ernest asserts only that he gave the checks to his attorney and that he believes that the checks were offered to, and refused by, the D.'s. Moreover, it appears from the record that the check amount reflected the cost of Mellisa's medical bills, rather than the cost of Baby G.'s physical care and support; in our view, these are two different things and we think § 5-312(b)(4)(ii) is principally directed to the latter. Based upon the record, it appears that Ernest made no payments, nor offers, of support from his own funds for Baby G.'s physical care and support. Thus, the Court of Special Appeals did not err in holding that the trial court was clearly erroneous in concluding that it could not find by clear and convincing evidence that Ernest had repeatedly failed to contribute to Baby G.'s physical care and support.