Opinion ID: 1768367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: venue and juror issues

Text: Some two months before the trial began, the trial court held a hearing on the appellant's motion for a change of venue. Several witnesses testified for each side, and numerous affidavits were filed regarding whether the defendant could receive a fair trial in Leslie County. At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court denied the motion for a change of venue, but stated that the defense could renew the motion during the subsequent jury selection process. On July 12, 1993, jury selection began, and on the following day a jury of twelve plus two alternates was seated. The appellant did not renew his motion for a change of venue at any time during this process and accordingly he waived any objection as to venue. Epperson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 809 S.W.2d 835 (1991). One of the jurors who sat on the case, Mr. Boggs, informed the court in chambers before the Commonwealth completed its proof, that he felt he could not continue to sit as a juror because of what he considered to be unjustifiable delays in the trial and the fact that the jury was sequestered. After Boggs left the court's chambers, the judge asked counsel for their thoughts. Defense counsel stated that he didn't know what to think since he had never been in a similar situation. The court responded that he was going to require Boggs to continue sitting on the jury and that defense counsel could decide whether they wanted to object to his continuing to serve. Finally, before the case was submitted to the jury, the defense requested that Mr. Boggs be excused as an alternate juror. The court granted the request and finally excused Mr. Boggs. The appellant now argues that the court's initial decision to require Mr. Boggs to continue to sit as a juror was vindictive and erroneous, and that his continued service contaminated the jury. We find no error in the trial court's exercise of his discretion. The record reveals no objection by the defense to the court's initial decision for the juror to continue to serve and consequently any such objection was waived. Upon the defense's later request that the juror be excused, the court granted the request. No further remedy is available on this appeal. Finally, the appellant argues that jurors Agnes Melton and Lillian Hayes were not entirely forthcoming on voir dire and that accordingly he is entitled to a new trial. The appellant, after the trial, obtained an affidavit from his daughter-in-law that she had been a student in teacher Agnes Melton's class at school the previous year and went on a field trip to the courthouse to observe part of a trial. As it turned out, the appellant was the defendant in that trial, which concerned some unrelated matter. During voir dire in the instant trial, the prosecution asked whether any juror had ever been interested in a criminal defense, had a family member who was personally involved, or watched a case or anything like that. Ms. Melton had responded that someone in her husband's family had been murdered and she had been interested in the prosecution of that case. She nevertheless stated that she did not believe this would create any problem as to her serving as a juror. She made no specific allusion to the school field trip the previous year, nor was she asked about it in any other way. The record reveals that throughout the voir dire examination, Ms. Melton showed her apparent willingness to be truthful and to answer all questions asked about her acquaintance with the appellant and the victim and their families, as well as with potential witnesses. The trial judge gave the appellant the opportunity to call Ms. Melton or other witnesses regarding the field trip and her previous answers to questions asked on voir dire, but he chose not to pursue the matter. Following the hearing, the trial court found nothing that established that Mrs. Melton intentionally made any misstatement or withheld any information. As to juror Lillian Hayes, the appellant asserts that when the jury panel was asked how many had previously served on a jury panel, Ms. Hayes did not respond. The appellant states that he learned after the trial that in 1972 a Lillian Hayes sat on the jury during the trial of the appellant and his brother, Randall Johnson, for shooting into an occupied dwelling. Randall Johnson pled guilty but the appellant was not convicted. The trial court observed at the hearing on the motion for a new trial that there was no showing whatever that this was the same person as sat on this case. He added that, even if he knew it was the same person, he could not say that she gave false information about a matter that happened twenty-one years ago. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion for judgment N.O.V. or for a new trial on these grounds. For all the reasons set out above, the judgment and sentence of the Leslie Circuit Court are affirmed. LAMBERT, REYNOLDS and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur in this opinion by SPAIN, J. STUMBO, J., dissents by separate opinion in which STEPHENS, C.J., and LEIBSON, J., join.