Opinion ID: 2253153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disqualification of the Circuit Court Judge

Text: O'Malley first argues that the circuit court violated Supreme Court Rule 63(C)(1)(c). At the time of trial, this Rule provided: C. Disqualification. (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where       (c) he was, within the preceding three years, associated in the private practice of law with any law firm or lawyer currently representing any party in the controversy    or, for a period of seven years following the last date on which he represented such a party, he represented any party to the controversy while he was an attorney engaged in the private practice of law. (113 Ill.2d R. 63(C)(1)(c).) If a judge is disqualified under Rule 63(C)(1)(c), the judge may still participate in the proceedings. At the time of trial, Supreme Court Rule 63(D) provided: D. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of Canon 3(C)(1)(c)    may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of his disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participation, all agree in writing that the judge's relationship or interest is immaterial, the judge is no longer disqualified and may participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding. 113 Ill.2d R. 63(D). O'Malley contends that the circuit court judge represented the FDIC within seven years of the commencement of trial. O'Malley argues that the judge participated in the case even though the parties did not complete a written remittal of disqualification. O'Malley argues that disqualification can only be waived by a written remittal. Thus, according to O'Malley, there was no effective waiver of disqualification and a new trial is required. We disagree. The record reveals the following pertinent facts. On March 13, 1989, before trial, the circuit court judge disclosed his previous representation of the FDIC and his involvement in the liquidation of Gateway National Bank. The judge did not disclose how recent his representation of the FDIC was. Both sides indicated orally that they had no objection to the judge continuing in the case. The case then went to trial. O'Malley did not raise the issue of disqualification during trial, and the judge entered judgment in favor of the FDIC. On January 16, 1990, ten months after the judge disclosed his representation of the FDIC, O'Malley filed a post-trial motion, asking the judge to grant a new trial because the judge had failed to disqualify himself and obtain a written remittal. After the post-trial motion was filed, the judge investigated further and discovered that he had worked on three FDIC cases as an attorney about six years before trial. These cases all involved the liquidation of Gateway National Bank. The judge stated that he had been unaware his representation of the FDIC occurred within seven years of trial. The judge then disclosed the following additional information to the attorneys: THE COURT: Yes, I personally represented the FDIC in all three of those cases. I can also indicate to you that there was no personal representation by me within the seven-year period, although I must indicateand I am doing this from handwriting on the orders of the proceedings that are within these filesI should also indicate to you that I was a named partner of that firm and everything that had to do with that firm's representation of the FDIC at all times was under my direct supervision. There was no other partner of that law firm that was charged with the responsibility of supervising the FDIC case assigned to that firm at any time. MR. CHALFEN [counsel for FDIC]: You did not personally appear in court? THE COURT: Within the seven-year period, to the best of my knowledge, no, but I want to make it clear. Every lawyer who did appear in that court for that law firm within that seven-period would have done so under my direct supervision. MR. CHALFEN: May I also clarify what your Honor indicated, I believe at the commencement of the trial that you never personally represented the FDIC in its corporate capacity? THE COURT: No. I represented it only in its capacity as liquidator or receiver of the Gateway National Bank of Chicago   . After a hearing on the post-trial motion, the circuit court held that Rule 63(C)(1)(c) was not violated. The judge concluded that the FDIC in its corporate capacity is a different party, within the meaning of Rule 63(C)(1)(c), than the FDIC acting in its receivership capacity. Because the judge had not represented the FDIC in its corporate capacity, Rule 63(C)(1)(c) was not violated. On appeal, the appellate court questioned the circuit court's reasoning. A majority of the appellate court, however, affirmed the circuit court on a different ground. Because the circuit court judge had only exercised a limited supervisory role in the three previous FDIC cases, the majority concluded that the judge had not represented the FDIC within the meaning of Rule 63(C)(1)(c). We do not reach the issues decided by the lower courts. We can affirm the decision below on any ground supported by the record. Under the facts of this case, we find that the circuit court judge disclosed the basis for disqualification before trial and that O'Malley had an opportunity to inquire further. By failing to do so, O'Malley has forfeited his right to raise the issue at this time. In this case, the circuit court judge disclosed his representation of the FDIC at an early stage. He also stated that his representation of the FDIC was in connection with the liquidation of Gateway National Bank. O'Malley, however, did not pursue the matter further until an unfavorable judgment was entered against him. In this appeal, O'Malley argues that disqualification can only be waived by written remittal. We disagree. The purpose of Rule 63(C)(1)(c) is to disqualify a judge from further proceedings where that judge may be biased because of his earlier representation of a party. The rule contemplates that the basis for disqualification will be disclosed at an early stage. It is then possible to obtain a substitute judge. Alternatively, the parties and attorneys may sign a remittal, free from the judge's coercion, and agree to let the judge proceed. In this case, O'Malley seeks to use the rule differently. O'Malley does not seek prospective recusal of the judge; he seeks nullification of the trial. Before O'Malley can seek a new trial, he must show that he did not know the reason for disqualification or have a reason to know. Other courts have adopted similar reasoning. (See, e.g., United States v. Murphy (7th Cir.1985), 768 F.2d 1518; Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage District v. Jarvis (1959), 51 Cal.2d 799, 336 P.2d 530; Haire v. Cook (1976), 237 Ga. 639, 229 S.E.2d 436; Renforth v. Fayette Memorial Hospital Association, Inc. (1979), 178 Ind.App. 475, 383 N.E.2d 368; Citizens First National Bank v. Hoyt (Iowa 1980), 297 N.W.2d 329.) To hold otherwise would permit a party to await the outcome of a trial and object only when the outcome is unfavorable. O'Malley suggests that Woods v. Durkin (1989), 183 Ill.App.3d 870, 132 Ill.Dec. 357, 539 N.E.2d 920, requires a different result. In Woods, before trial, the circuit court judge told the parties that his daughter-in-law was an associate in the law firm representing the defendant. The judge told the attorneys that, under the rules, the parties and attorneys would have to execute a signed waiver before he could proceed. The judge, however, obtained an oral waiver of disqualification from the attorneys and then entered an order relating to discovery. The plaintiffs brought a motion to vacate the order because the parties and attorneys had not completed a written remittal. The judge vacated the discovery order and said that he would hear no more motions until a written remittal was completed. On appeal, the appellate court held that the circuit court judge had no discretion to obtain an oral waiver rather than a written remittal. Thus, the attorneys' oral waiver of the disqualification was not sufficient and the discovery order was invalid. We find no conflict between our reasoning in this case and the appellate court's reasoning in Woods. In Woods, the plaintiffs knew the reason for disqualification and promptly raised the issue of a written remittal before trial. Here, before trial, O'Malley knew the judge had represented the FDIC previously although O'Malley did not know how recent the representation was. O'Malley waited until after trial before determining when the representation occurred. He then argued that the judge should have obtained a written remittal. We emphasize that judges may not ignore the written remittal requirement and obtain an oral waiver instead of a written one. Where a judge has disclosed his disqualification, he must obtain a written remittal before continuing. Parties, however, must exercise due diligence before they can use the written remittal requirement as the basis for a new trial. We note that the result could be different in this case if actual prejudice were shown. O'Malley, however, has not shown actual prejudice from the judge's prior involvement with the FDIC, and we find no indication of prejudice from the record. Prejudice is not shown from the mere fact that O'Malley lost at trial. Thus, we will not excuse O'Malley's failure to raise the written remittal requirement earlier.