Opinion ID: 1865711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: constitutional attack on jury shield law (assignment number fourteen)

Text: By this assignment, defendant contends that La.R.S. 15:470, our jury privilege statute, is unconstitutional. The Louisiana rule as embodied in La. R.S. 15:470 follows the general rule that a juror's testimony or affidavit is not receivable to impeach his own verdict. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2345 (McNaughton ed. 1961). In recent times, we have come to realize that the absolute language of the statute cannot be applied so as to deprive a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights. For example, in State v. Sinegal, supra , we reasoned that if the defendant presented a substantial claim that his constitutional rights had been infringed, the jury privilege cannot be used to bar testimony by jurors regarding their alleged improprieties. Our application of the jury privilege statute in this manner alligns with the Fifth Circuit's construction of the same statute. See Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891 at 893-94. Moreover, this approach of looking behind an evidentiary privilege has been virtually mandated by the United States Supreme Court. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). As construed in this case and other decisions by this court, the statute is constitutional. Accordingly, this assignment lacks merit. For the reasons assigned, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED.