Opinion ID: 1745535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Culpability of Jones

Text: Even though Jones met the threshold requirement by setting forth enough evidence that a trial court could have found the existence of a meritorious defense, the trial court's denial of the Rule 55(c) motion was proper in view of the facts of this case, which warrant a finding of intentional conduct evidencing disrespect for the judicial system. See Ex parte Illinois Central Gulf R.R., supra, at 1288. During the proceeding to assess damages, Judge Suttle, expressing his contempt for Jones's conduct, remarked: [T]he Court is completely incredulous as to Mr. Jones's claims as to why he can't be here. It's obvious to this Court that he is just avoiding a trial and playing games with the Court.... Later in the proceeding, speaking to Jones's attorney, Mr. Whitten, Judge Suttle stated: [I]t's just been a pattern of Mr. Jones. He appears, his lawyer withdraws in July of '85, and nothing is done until the day before summary judgment hearing. He hires you the day before the summary judgment hearing, and he mysteriously doesn't get the letters until the same day the trial is set. When he gets those, he's unable to come because of some important meetings with boards or Vice Presidents of the United States, and then when that is not accepted as an excuse, he somehow comes down with an illness. Randy, I trust you and I know you have done everything you can, but I don't believe Mr. Jones's excuse. And in any event, the Court was going to enter a default Monday because of his failure to appear at the call of the docket Monday, and I thought I was doing him a favor by giving him until Thursday, after you came over to me Monday afternoon or Tuesday morning, whenever it was, and told me he had just gotten notice on that Monday. I really said I was going to enter the default on Monday, so when I said I would move it to Thursday, I thought I was doing him a favor. And then he pulls what I consider to be a stunt. That's the reason I'm entering the default. We have stated that reasonable explanations for defaults, such as attorney neglect attributable to innocent inadvertence, militates in favor of a finding of an absence of culpability and provides a basis for setting aside a default judgment. Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., supra . Jones's excuse for his failure to appear on the day of trial required the trial court to determine whether it was reasonable. The trial court concluded that it was not, and we defer to its decision. The trial court afforded Jones two opportunities to defend, and Jones responded by twice failing to appear. The record is clear that Jones had prior knowledge of the second trial setting and that he requested a continuance, stating that he had a meeting with Vice President George Bush. By maintaining his business engagements in Oklahoma in spite of the trial date, Jones evinced the minimal amount of concern that he had regarding the trial. The trial court threatened to dispose of the case by entering a default judgment in the wake of Jones's first failure to appear, but gave him the benefit of the doubt and reset the case. After providing the trial court with a justifiable reason for entering a default judgment on September 22, Jones should have realized that his appearance on September 25 was imperative and that he would be jeopardizing his opportunity to defend by remaining out of state. Although the record clearly shows that Jones became ill on September 24, the gravity of Jones's illness is questionable. The doctor who diagnosed Jones's illness on September 24 stated that Jones suffered from a faint and that he advised him to eat regular meals and if symptoms arise to go to the emergency room. The doctor neither prescribed medication nor admitted Jones into the hospital. There is no evidence suggesting that Jones's illness was so debilitating as to prevent him from traveling to Alabama for the trial on September 25. We can certainly understand how a sudden illness, if serious enough, could excuse a nonappearance on the day of trial. See Ken-Mar Airpark, Inc. v. Toth Aircraft & Accessories Co., 12 F.R.D. 399 (W.D.Mo. 1952). The facts of this case, however, support a finding that Jones's illness did not rise to this level. Not only did the trial court consider Jones's illness to be insufficient as a ground for setting aside the default judgment, but it also construed Jones's nonappearance as an intentional evasion of the court and as a flouting of its authority. The record supports such a finding. After reviewing the facts, we hold that the trial court's finding of culpability was within the bounds of its discretionary authority under Rule 55(c). We recognize that in this opinion and, even more so in Kirtland v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., supra , we have fortified and reemphasized our long-established and compelling policy objective of affording litigants a trial on the merits whenever possible. To accomplish this objective without diminishing the importance of judicial economy, we delineated certain steps that trial courts must follow when considering Rule 55(c) motions. One step requires the trial judge to determine whether the defaulting party has propounded a meritorious defense. We elaborated on the meritorious-defense requirementprimarily by explicitly defining the word meritoriousand, in doing so, we in effect removed much of the broad discretionary authority with which a trial judge was vested under Rule 55(c), Ala.R. Civ.P., at least in regard to ascertaining the existence of a meritorious defense. Insofar as this Court is rightfully predisposed toward giving defendants an opportunity to defend, this result was intended. However, we acknowledge that, due to a trial judge's superior vantage point, the trial court is the more suitable arbiter for determining with accuracy the culpability of the defaulting party's conduct, and, for this reason, we will show great deference toward the trial court's decisions with respect to such culpability. The utility of the default judgment rule depends on its effectiveness in encouraging compliance with procedural rules so that actions may be decided expeditiously. To facilitate an orderly functioning of the judicial system and to preserve the integrity of the court, parties who affront the court by intentionally disregarding trial dates, court orders, or procedural rules, with resulting unnecessary delay, should justifiably incur the ultimate sanction of losing their opportunity to defend. For the default judgment to be a potent sanction, the trial court, when confronting litigants who have manifested willfulness and bad faith in committing defaults, must not be unduly hampered in granting default judgments, and, subsequently, upholding those judgments when deciding Rule 55(c) motions. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jones's Rule 55(c) motion. AFFIRMED. TORBERT, C.J., and JONES, SHORES, BEATTY, ADAMS and STEAGALL, JJ., concur. MADDOX, J., concurs specially.