Opinion ID: 1896204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Death Qualified Jury Voir Dire

Text: The first issue arises from Chamberlain's waiver of the penalty-phase jury. Unlike Thibault v. State, 850 So.2d 485 (Fla.2003), in which we reversed the death sentence of Chamberlain's codefendant because of the absence of an affirmative waiver of a penalty-phase jury, see id. at 487, Chamberlain does not contest the validity of the waiver itself. Rather, Chamberlain argues that because he waived his right to a penalty-phase jury before the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to question the potential jurors regarding their feelings on the death penalty. During jury selection, the jurors were informed over defense objection that although the judge alone would decide on the sentence, death was an option. The questioning permitted by the trial court was more limited than if the voir dire had been conducted to death qualify the jury to participate in both the guilt and penalty phases. The trial court then granted nine challenges for cause against jurors who stated that they would have difficulty finding a defendant guilty of first-degree murder if their verdict might lead to the death penalty. [5] This Court has repeatedly held that [t]he scope of voir dire questioning rests in the sound discretion of the court and will not be interfered with unless that discretion is clearly abused. Darling v. State, 808 So.2d 145, 160 (Fla.2002) (quoting Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1312, 1322 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 848, 123 S.Ct. 190, 154 L.Ed.2d 78 (2002)). In Darling, a capital case, this Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding questioning of jurors concerning the death penalty. The trial court did not allow the defense to ask potential jurors whether they had seen stories of prisoners released from death row, and whether their drive to impose death would be lessened by the availability of an alternative of life without parole. However, the court permitted defense counsel to explore jurors' concerns over the length of capital proceedings and their understanding of alternative penalties that applied. This Court found no error. See 808 So.2d at 160. On the other hand, in Lavado v. State, 492 So.2d 1322, 1323 (Fla.1986), this Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding defense counsel from questioning potential jurors about their willingness to accept the defense of voluntary intoxication. The Court adopted the dissenting opinion below, in which Judge Pearson stated that where a juror's attitude about a particular legal doctrine (in the words of the trial court, `the law') is essential to a determination of whether challenges for cause or peremptory challenges are to be made, it is well settled that the scope of the voir dire properly includes questions about and references to that legal doctrine. Lavado v. State, 469 So.2d 917, 919-20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (Pearson, J., dissenting). Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) provides in pertinent part that [ e]xcept in capital cases, the judge shall not instruct the jury on the sentence that may be imposed for the offense for which the accused is on trial. (Emphasis supplied.) The United States Supreme Court has held that in capital cases, if a juror's views of the death penalty will prevent or substantially impair the performance of the juror's duties at the sentencing phase, the juror may be excused for cause. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). This Court has similarly recognized that there is no constitutional infirmity in the death qualification of a jury in a capital case. See San Martin v. State, 705 So.2d 1337, 1343 (Fla.1997). Thus, the question is whether, in a first-degree murder case in which the State is seeking the death penalty and the defendant has waived a penalty-phase jury, the jury should be told that a conviction may result in imposition of the death penalty. On this issue as on many others, death is different. The transcript of voir dire in this case illustrates that at least some potential jurors were aware before voir dire that death was a potential penalty for first-degree murder. [6] For example, when defense counsel asked potential juror Williams whether she could serve in a criminal case if she did not know the potential penalties, she stated she would know the death penalty was possible once she was told it was a first-degree murder case. Juror Williams' response demonstrates that some persons called for jury duty are generally aware that their decision in a first-degree murder case may result in a sentence of death. In contrast to the available penalties of either life imprisonment or death for first-degree murder, the array of sentencing laws for noncapital crimes in Florida Statutes, including several different recidivist schemes, makes general awareness of the potential penalty for another particular crime far less likely. In recognition of the fact that at least some potential jurors know that a verdict of guilty in a first-degree murder case may lead to the defendant's execution, we decline to impose a per se rule preventing any questioning of jurors on the death penalty when death remains a potential sentence. To conclude otherwise would create an unacceptable risk that jurors who cannot fulfill their oaths will serve in the guilt phase of capital proceedings. An additional concern is that in this case, it is Chamberlain's position that he could have withdrawn his waiver after the return of the guilty verdict. Had this happened, the jurors would not have been death qualified and the trial court would have been placed in a position of either refusing to allow Chamberlain to withdraw his waiver or having to impanel a different death-qualified jury to hear the penalty phase. Nevertheless, we urge the cautious exercise of judicial discretion in allowing questioning on this sensitive subject in cases in which jurors will not actually render an advisory sentence. Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court struck a proper balance between the rights of the accused and the State. In light of the limited nature of the questioning, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the voir dire concerning the death penalty. Chamberlain is not entitled to reversal on this issue.