Opinion ID: 296628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 19 The carriers argue that the courts lack jurisdiction over the claims asserted by BLFE, that what is involved is a mere contract dispute, and that Section 3 adjustment boards have exclusive jurisdiction over such disputes between labor and management in the railroad industry. We agree with the carriers that Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the adjustment boards to consider those minor disputes between carriers and unions that are based on the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. 4 However, the present case involves more than a mere disagreement over contract terms and we find jurisdiction to consider the Brotherhood's claims. 20 The carriers lean on the statement in our Akron opinion, supra, that the work rules resulting from Award 282 are deemed to be incorporated into the prior agreements of the parties [the National Diesel Agreement] that themselves endure by virtue of the Railway Labor Act unless and until changed in accordance with that statute. 128 U.S.App. D.C. at 87, 385 F.2d at 609. 21 While this argument has some appeal in terms of logic, we think it without merit in the light of underlying realities. The basic dispute which brought the parties to this court was not a dispute over the meaning of a contract, but over the impact of Award 282 — whether and to what extent it modified the National Diesel Agreement. Having assumed jurisdiction over that dispute, we retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the decree resulting from our decision in that case. This is so although we resolved the dispute by an analysis that the work rules resulting from Award 282 are deemed to be incorporated into the prior agreements of the parties, here the National Diesel Agreement. In a sense it is true that the carriers may be deemed to have violated the Agreement. It is also true that their violation was in contravention of the definition of their obligation provided by our ruling in Akron. 22 The applicable principle was outlined in Southern Pacific Co. v. BLF & E, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 236, 393 F.2d 345 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 1803, 20 L.Ed.2d 651 (1968). There the District Court had enjoined a strike over a dispute concerning Award 282, but reserved jurisdiction for any of the parties `to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders as may be necessary or appropriate for the    enforcement of this order    or any legal obligation resulting therefrom.' 129 U.S. App.D.C. at 237, 393 F.2d at 346. Thereafter the union filed a motion with the District Court for damages for alleged violations of Award 282 by the carrier. The District Court granted the requested relief, and the carrier appealed, on the ground that these claims of alleged violations of the Award must be processed pursuant to the procedures of Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act. In rejecting this contention we held (129 U.S.App.D.C. at 238, 393 F.2d at 347): 23 Even assuming    that the carriers are right that these claims are minor disputes for which the contract provided a usual procedure within Section 3 of the Railway Labor Act, the district court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a condition that employees injured by misapplication of the award have available a judicial remedy, and do not have to wait years for Adjustment Board vindication. 24 We are aware that in Southern Pacific the Award itself formed the basis of the union's claim, and that the decision did not focus on the legal constructs applicable to the period following the expiration of the Award. 129 U.S.App.D.C. at 239, 393 F.2d at 345. However, the underlying principle, as appears from the language quoted above, is clear that the courts may assume jurisdiction over claims for damages sustained through violation of their decrees, even though the claims might at the same time be characterized as minor disputes subject to the jurisdiction of a Section 3 Board. Where the elements of contract interpretation are obvious or subordinate they cannot fairly be permitted to control the issue of judicial jurisdiction. A similar approach was followed in the first Galveston Wharves case, United Indus. Workers of Seafarers, etc. v. Bd. of Trustees of the Galveston Wharves, 351 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1965), where the court reached a question of contract interpretation in order to decide whether the dispute before it was major or minor. The exclusive jurisdiction of Section 3 boards over contract claims will not be taken as precluding a court's exercise of jurisdiction on bases other than resolution of contract disputes merely because of the possible existence of ancillary or concurrent contract issues. 25 Similarly we reject the carriers' contention that these claims are barred by the union's failure to comply with the grievance procedures set forth in Section 17 of the 1948 Agreement. [T]here is sound equitable basis for omitting the claims-and-grievance procedure established in 1948 and 1949 agreements, even assuming its applicability. Concepts of exhaustion of remedies will not be pursued with remorseless logic, at least in situations not fairly contemplated when the remedies were established, when the consequence would contravene basic expectations of justice by mandating a futile or unduly protracted procedure. Southern Pacific, supra, 129 U.S.App.D.C. at 239, 393 F.2d at 348. 26 The District Court recognized that firemen who had been deprived of employment by the carriers would have a valid claim for damages, but it relegated these individuals to the Section 3 Boards, on the ground that it would be an unreasonable burden for the Court to compute the hundreds of claims that will most likely be made. We regard this as sound. The fact that the district court has jurisdiction over these claims does not mean that the jurisdiction must in all cases be exercised. Where, as here, the claims may be numerous and complex, the court's action in deferring to administrative expertise, and manpower, for their resolution, is a sound exercise of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Damage Claims 27 We now turn to BLFE's claim that it should recover, on behalf of its members, the amount saved by the carriers through their illegal blanking of runs in Washington and Oregon through a negative failure to hire rather than affirmative dismissals and transfers. The mechanics of this negative blanking mean that there will be few or no firemen who could show individual earnings losses as a result of these violations. Therefore, according to BLFE, unless recovery is established for the benefits of firemen generally, the carriers will retain the fruits of their own illegal acts as a windfall. Rather than permit this result, the Brotherhood urges that we avoid this result as against sound policy and instead devote these funds to benefit the class most nearly approximating those harmed — namely, the firemen. 28 This is not a case where the court can say with reasonable confidence that the class of injured persons coincides in substantial part with the membership of the Brotherhood, or firemen as a whole. If such an assumption could be made BLFE's request could be supported as providing an effective means of compensating those who, by hypothesis, were the victims of the carriers' illegal acts. In the present case, however, there is not a sufficient showing of identity between the victims and the intended beneficiaries to justify an award on that basis. 5 29 The law of class recovery is in flux. The courts are ready to apply bases of recovery with reasonable liberality in order to serve the objectives of the law. Thus, in Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 216, 318 F.2d 187, cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 1304 (1963), this court, finding a past transit fare increase to be excessive, ordered Transit to set aside the overcharges as a fund, to be used for the benefit of future transit riders. The theory of the Order was that there was a reasonable continuity and equivalence between the class of persons injured — those riders who had paid the overcharges in the past — and the class of riders who would receive the benefits of the fund in the future, in the form of improvements, lower rates, etc. The two classes would not be identical, of course, since some riders would cease to use the transit, and new riders would replace them. In other contexts the difference in these classes might loom large. But in the context of avoiding carrier retention of fares unlawfully charged and compensating those victimized by the unlawful action there was sufficient relationship and overlap of classes to permit a judgment that the compensation inure in substantial measure to the class of those who had suffered harm. 30 It would extend Bebchick unduly to permit a class recovery in the case at bar on the theory of compensation for damage suffered by a class. The persons who suffered primary damage from the carriers' violations are the men who would have been hired on the blanked runs. 6 Those who would have been hired are a class that is essentially indeterminate and indeterminable. By the Brotherhood's own admission, the additional positions would have been filled from the streets. We have no way of knowing who was harmed by the violations, and whether any, or how many, of these persons are now working as firemen or are Brotherhood members. We cannot determine what relation if any exists between the class of persons harmed by the carriers' actions and those who would benefit from recovery of the savings by the Brotherhood, or its members, or all those who are presently firemen. 31 A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong at the expense of another. Restatement, Restitution (Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts) § 3. But in general the law has not yet come to the point of awarding judgments based on unjust enrichment for the benefit of a suitor who has not established any harm to himself or his class. If there is such harm there are doctrines permitting the recovery to exceed the loss to plaintiff and equal the unjust gain realized by defendant, but even this is normally permitted only when defendant stands condemned of consciously tortious conduct. Restatement, Restitution (Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts) § 151. There is also doctrine requiring an agent or person with fiduciary responsibility to account to his principal or beneficiary for all of the gains, benefit or enrichment he obtained by use of the property of his beneficiary or other breach of his duty as fiduciary. See Restatement, Restitution (Quasi Contracts and Constructive Trusts) § 138. But such fiduciary doctrine is far removed from the underlying legal relationship before us. Nor do we think that the carriers have acted so unreasonably as to warrant assessment of punitive damages, or to justify the recovery sought by BLFE by analogy to an amount of punitive damages. 7 32 Recovery by Brotherhood for loss of dues, assessments, initiation fees 33 This does not mean that the carriers will retain all the fruits of their violation. Recovery will be allowed to take account of the damage sustained by the Brotherhood as a result of these violations in the loss of the dues, assessments, initiation fees, and other payments which would have been made to BLFE if additional firemen had been employed on the illegally blanked runs. The carriers argue that there can be no showing of loss by BLFE because it is not certain that the additional firemen, when hired, would join the BLFE rather than one of the other firemen's unions which would satisfy the union shop clause of the agreement. There may well be an element of uncertainty in the precise amount of damage sustained by the Union. But established principle dictates that the burden of that uncertainty must fairly rest on the wrongdoer. Where the wrongdoing is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise. 8 That principle is applicable with full vigor when, as in the case of these carriers, the wrongdoing resulted in an increase in their profits far in excess of the maximum damages that could be allowed to BLFE. It seems reasonable to limit the setoff for the possibility of nonjoinder of BLFE by reference to the conditions of union membership of other firemen on these carriers, or of those ultimately hired in 1969 to man the Washington-Oregon jobs. 34 The amount of dues and payments for which BLFE must be compensated is to be calculated from the date of the Award's expiration, since the blanking of runs in Washington and Oregon was illegal after that date. The carriers seem to argue their liability should be limited to the period following the Supreme Court's November, 1968, Rock Island decision on the ground that they had a right to litigate the full crew issue through the Federal courts, and to maintain the status quo pending final disposition by the Supreme Court. 35 An award of damages does not constitute a denial of any right of the carriers to litigate. The fact that the carriers presented reasonable arguments was cited above as a reason for not imposing punitive damages. But the right to litigate is not a right to a free ride during the period of litigation 9 that relieves the carriers of their duty to compensate those damaged by their wrongs. The carriers were incorrect in their premise that they could blank runs after the Award expired and they must make compensation for damage sustained as a result of their erroneous premise. 36 The Brotherhood's recovery also entitles it to reimbursement of appropriate expenses of litigation but not, we think, to attorneys' fees. Attorneys' fees are not recoverable as a general rule. There are exceptions. A notable exception applies where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a suit, usually on behalf of a class, that benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392, 90 S.Ct. 616, 625, 24 L.Ed.2d 593 (1970). The allowance may take into account the public interest in preventing or rectifying the wrong. Freeman v. Ryan, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 408 F.2d 1204 (1968). But the provision for attorneys' fees is designed primarily not as an additional recovery against the wrongdoers, but as a means of ordering compensation to counsel from the class benefited. 10 Since we have rejected BLFE's claim for class recovery, this principle is inapplicable. 37 The general rule against allowance of attorneys' fees is also subject to another, and narrow, exception derived from the power of equity courts to tax attorneys' fees in exceptional cases and for dominating reasons of justice, Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167, 59 S.Ct. 777, 780, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386 U.S. 714, 717-719, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967). Outside of litigation involving benefit to a class, the Sprague exception seems to have been invoked for the most part in extraordinary cases involving such elements as fraud, oppression, bad faith in a fiduciary relationship, and also obstructiveness in recognition of rights, and wanton or vexatious litigation. Bell v. School Bd of Powhatan Cy., 321 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1963); Cleveland v. Second Nat'l Bank & Trust, 149 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 775, 66 S.Ct. 231, 90 L.Ed. 468 (1945). This exception would not be considered applicable where litigation was pursued on a matter as to which prior decisions left a lingering doubt. Local 149, UAW v. American Brake Shoe, 298 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 873, 82 S.Ct. 1142, 8 L.Ed.2d 276 (1962). While any doubts of the carriers do not excuse failure to comply with outstanding orders, we cannot say that their pursuit of litigation with the union, which required services of its attorneys, calls for extraordinary measures, and conclude that the interest of justice is served by compensating BLFE on reasonable proof of damages sustained without special provision for attorneys' fees. 11 38 We think sound principles of judicial administration call for the Brotherhood's claim to be determined by the District Court. With the basic principle determined in this opinion we anticipate that procedures for computation can readily be established, hopefully by agreement, and if not, by appropriate order of the District Court. 12 The Northern Pacific Agreement 39 The District Court ruled that the Brotherhood's agreements with the Northern Pacific and with the Spokane, Portland & Seattle roads established new work rules which modified the National Diesel Agreement, and that firemen need be used on those lines only as specified in the agreements. The Brotherhood does not challenge the SP & S ruling. However, it claims that the agreement it entered into with Northern Pacific on January 9, 1968, effective March 16, 1968, was intended only as an interim measure pending judicial resolution of the full crew issues, and that it does not affect the carriers' liability for violating our 1967 decision concerning the use of firemen in Washington and Oregon. 40 If this were the only issue in the case it might more properly be remitted to a Section 3 adjustment board, since it is almost exclusively one of contract interpretation. However, the issue is closely related to those already considered, and hence we think it appropriate to exercise judicial jurisdiction, along principles analogous to pendent jurisdiction, and affirm the ruling of the District Court. 13 41 The case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 42 Remanded.