Opinion ID: 1877768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional QuestionsFirst Amendment

Text: ¶ 19. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, [9] provides: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . . The first clause is referred to as the Establishment Clause, and the second as the Free Exercise Clause. [10] See 4 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance & Procedure § 21.1, at 446 (2d ed. 1992). The entanglement doctrine, which prohibits excessive governmental entanglement with religion, springs from the Establishment Clause. [11] See Holy Trinity Community School, Inc. v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 150, 262 N.W.2d 210, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 823 (1978); 4 Rotunda & Nowak, supra § 21.3, at 457. [6] ¶ 20. It is well-settled that excessive governmental entanglement with religion will occur if a court is required to interpret church law, policies, or practices; therefore, the First Amendment prohibits such an inquiry. See Isely, 880 F. Supp. at 1150 (collecting cases); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 320 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1137 (1994); Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 327-29. However, it is equally well-settled that a court may hear an action if it will involve the consideration of neutral principles of law. See Isely, 880 F. Supp. at 1150; Moses, 863 P.2d at 320. ¶ 21. We therefore must consider whether the determination of L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision would allow a court to apply neutral principles of law. We considered a substantially similar issue in Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 302, 533 N.W.2d 780 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 920 (1996). Judith M. Pritzlaff alleged that Father John Donovan used his relationship and his position as a priest to coerce her to have a sexual relationship with him. Id. at 308. Pritzlaff brought claims against the Archdiocese for negligently hiring, retaining, training, and supervising the priest. Id. at 309-10. Pritzlaff further claimed that the Archdiocese knew or should have known that the priest had a sexual problem. Id. at 310. Subsequently, the Archdiocese brought a motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds. Id. ¶ 22. This court first determined that the First Amendment prohibits claims against a religious entity for negligent hiring or retention, because such claims would require a court to develop a reasonable cleric standard of care, which would involve the interpretation of church canons and internal church policies. Id. at 326-28. Second, this court concluded: Although state inquiry into the training and supervision of clergy is a closer issue than inquiry into hiring and retention practices because under some limited circumstances such questions might be able to be decided without determining questions of church law and policies, it is nonetheless prohibited by the First Amendment under most if not all circumstances. Id. at 328 (emphasis added). The court further explained: [A]ny inquiry into the policies and practices of the church Defendants in hiring or supervising their clergy raises the same kinds of First Amendment problems of entanglement discussed above, which might involve the court in making sensitive judgments about the propriety of the church Defendants' supervision in light of their religious beliefs. . . . The traditional denominations each have their own intricate principles of governance, as to which the state has no right of visitation. Church governance is founded in scripture, modified by reformers over almost two millennia. . . . It would therefore also be inappropriate and unconstitutional for this Court to determine after the fact that the ecclesiastical authorities negligently supervised or retained the defendant Bishop. Any award of damages would have a chilling effect leading indirectly to state control over the future conduct of affairs of a religious denomination, a result violative of the text and history of the establishment clause. Id. at 329 (quoting Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Applying these principles, this court held that Pritzlaff's claim for negligent supervision was precluded by the First Amendment because it would require an inquiry into church laws, practices, and policies. Id. at 330. ¶ 23. In Clergy Sexual Misconduct: Confronting the Difficult Constitutional & Institutional Liability Issues, 7 St. Thomas L. Rev. 31 (1994), an article cited several times by the Pritzlaff court, [12] James T. O'Reilly and Joan M. Strasser further elaborate on the reasons why the measurement of duty and reasonableness needed to find negligence will inevitably entangle the civil court in the nuances of religious discipline practices. Id. at 39. For example, O'Reilly and Strasser state that the Roman Catholic Church has internal disciplinary procedures that are influenced by a religious belief in reconciliation and mercy. Id. at 36. They explain: The reconciliation and counseling of the errant clergy person involves more than a civil employer's file reprimand or three day suspension without pay for misconduct. Mercy and forgiveness of sin may be concepts familiar to bankers but they have no place in the discipline of bank tellers. For clergy, they are interwoven in the institution's norms and practices. Id. at 45-46. Therefore, due to this strong belief in redemption, a bishop may determine that a wayward priest can be sufficiently reprimanded through counseling and prayer. If a court was asked to review such conduct to determine whether the bishop should have taken some other action, the court would directly entangle itself in the religious doctrines of faith, responsibility, and obedience. Id. at 31, 43-46; see also Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 329 (quoting Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 332). ¶ 24. Likewise, O'Reilly and Strasser explain that negligent supervision claims would require a court to formulate a reasonable cleric standard, which would vary depending on the cleric involved, i.e., reasonable Presbyterian pastor standard, reasonable Catholic archbishop standard, and so on. See Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 328; Roppolo v. Moore, 644 So. 2d 206, 208 (La. Ct. App. 1994), writ denied, 650 So. 2d 253 (1995); [13] O'Reilly & Strasser, supra, at 43-46. Such individualized standards would be required because, as previously mentioned, church doctrines and practices are intertwined with the supervision and discipline of clergy. O'Reilly & Strasser, supra, at 43-46. However, as O'Reilly and Strasser state: Our pluralistic society dislikes having its neutral jurists place themselves in the role of a `reasonable chief rabbi,' `reasonable bishop,' etc., because of the degree of involvement that must accompany such decisional framework for the civil tort judge. Id. at 46. This further explains why this court held that negligent supervision claims are prohibited by the First Amendment under most if not all circumstances. See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 328. ¶ 25. Turning to the present case, L.L.N. argues that this case is distinguishable from Pritzlaff because Clauder was a hospital chaplain whom L.L.N. viewed as her pastoral counselor, whereas Pritzlaff involved a sexual relationship between a priest and a parishioner. On the other hand, the Diocese argues that this case is indistinguishable from Pritzlaff, because priests and hospital chaplains essentially perform the same functions. ¶ 26. A chaplain takes care of the spiritual needs of hospital patients and their families. (R.13 at 2; R.15 at 105; R.30 at 58, 145.) According to Clauder, a Roman Catholic chaplain accomplishes this task by saying daily mass, visiting patients, administering the sacraments, satisfying prayer requests, and counseling individuals or groups. (R.30 at 145.) Clauder testified in his deposition that the duties of a chaplain are different from a parish priest in that they are more focused on the spiritual and possibly emotional needs of hospital patients. (R.30 at 58-59.) ¶ 27. Therefore, a chaplain's duties appear similar to the duties of a parish priest, albeit more focused in a hospital setting. [14] In particular, although a chaplain may provide counseling to patients, this function is not unique to chaplains. Parish priests also counsel members of their congregations. See Schmidt, 779 F. Supp. at 327 (stating that clergy of most denominations provide counseling to members of their congregations); Moses, 863 P.2d at 328 (indicating that the priest counseled parishioners at the church). Accordingly, the fact that Donovan was a parish priest and Clauder was a chaplain does not constitute a reason to distinguish Pritzlaff from this case. ¶ 28. Furthermore, in Pritzlaff, Pritzlaff alleged that the priest involved used his position as a priest to develop a friend like relationship with her while she was a student, and then abused that relationship by coercing her to have sex when she was an adult. [15] See Pritzlaff's Complaint, contained in Petitioner's Appendix in Pritzlaff, at 34; see also Respondent's Brief in Pritzlaff, at 2. Similarly, in this case, L.L.N. stated in her letter to Bishop O'Donnell: [Clauder] met me in the hospital at a very low point in my life and befriended me. He became a significant part of my personal life and used me to meet his own needs. [16] (R.15 at 141.) Allegedly, both Clauder and Donovan used their position as priests to induce their victims to trust and rely on them, and then abused that trust and reliance to coerce their victims into having sex; therefore, it appears that Clauder's alleged relationship with L.L.N. was similar to Donovan's alleged relationship with Pritzlaff. Thus, we do not agree with L.L.N. that this case is factually distinguishable from Pritzlaff on this ground. ¶ 29. We do recognize, however, that this case differs from Pritzlaff in that it involves a very specific allegation of notice to the Diocese. [17] In particular, L.L.N. argues that Hebl was obligated to inquire into Clauder's relationship with T.E. after witnessing the incident in the rectory. L.L.N. claims that if Hebl had investigated further, he would have discovered Clauder's sexual involvement with T.E. Therefore, L.L.N. contends that, through Hebl, the Diocese had constructive knowledge of the T.E. incident and Clauder's sexual relationship with T.E. Based on such constructive knowledge, L.L.N. claims that the Diocese should have known of Clauder's propensity to abuse his position as chaplain to become sexually intimate with patients. ¶ 30. However, these specific allegations of notice only further establish that a court would be required to interpret ecclesiastical law in order to decide L.L.N.'s negligent supervision claim. First, under agency law, a principal only has imputed knowledge of information which an agent gains while acting within his or her authority to bind the principal, or of information which an agent has a duty to give the principal. See Ivers v. Pond Piano Co. v. Peckham, 29 Wis. 2d 364, 369, 139 N.W.2d 57 (1966); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 272 (1957). In this case, in order to determine that Hebl was acting within his authority to bind the Diocese when he witnessed the T.E. incident, or had a duty to give the Diocese information about Clauder, a court would be required to consider church law, policies, or practices. This is because the undisputed record indicates that the Diocese did not assign Hebl to a position of authority over Clauder, such as an employer or supervisor. Hebl stated in an affidavit: I had no authority over Gibbs Clauder in my capacity as pastor of St. Bernard Church or otherwise. (R.33 at 2.) Therefore, Hebl had no responsibility to report Clauder's behavior to the Diocese, other than any responsibility he may have had under church law, policies, or practices. Thus, a court would not be able to apply solely neutral principles of law to determine whether the Diocese had constructive knowledge of the T.E. incident, contrary to the First Amendment. [18] ¶ 31. Second, even if we assume that the Diocese had constructive knowledge of Clauder's relationship with T.E., we further conclude that a court would be required to consider and interpret the vow of celibacy in order to determine whether the Diocese negligently supervised Clauder. The deposition transcripts submitted by the Diocese demonstrate that T.E. was not a patient whom Clauder counseled, but instead was a family friend and adult parishioner at the church where Clauder was a priest. The deposition transcripts also establish that Clauder's relationship with T.E. was an extensive one that involved numerous meals, social activities, and even a trip to Japan. Since these deposition transcripts are unopposed, we must accept them as true. See Leszczynski, 30 Wis. 2d at 539. ¶ 32. These undisputed facts demonstrate that Clauder, a single man, engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with an adult, single, female non-patient. L.L.N. argues that because of the Diocese's constructive knowledge of this, the Diocese should have taken some other action in supervising Clauder, such as removing him as chaplain. However, in order to hold the Diocese liable for breach of a duty of care to L.L.N., a court would be required to determine that constructive knowledge of Clauder's involvement with T.E. should have triggered a different response by the Diocese, because such involvement exposed a bad attribute of Clauder's character. See Moses, 863 P.2d at 327-29; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1957). Yet, in order to make this determination, a court would be required to consider the vow of celibacy, since sexual acts committed by single consenting adults are not legally wrong, [19] but instead become wrong only under church doctrine. See Roppolo, 644 So. 2d at 208. Accordingly, L.L.N. is essentially arguing that the Diocese owes a heavier duty to her than a non-secular employer would because of a religious doctrine. However, as one court has stated: The vow of celibacy by clergy is a religious decision based upon religious belief; it does not create a civil duty. Under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, the state may not compel affirmation of a religious belief nor impose requirements based on belief in any religion. [Citation omitted.] Thus the church had no greater civil duty based upon its religious tenets. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, another court has indicated: What may be viewed as sexual misconduct by one religion may be permitted or even encouraged by another. To do as plaintiff requests would require this Court to apply different standards to different litigants depending on their religious affiliations. This is a secular court. If sexual or other conduct of a priest violates secular standards, e.g., child molestation, this Court will impose whatever civil or criminal secular sanctions may be appropriate. But this Court has no authority to determine or enforce standards of religious conduct and duty. Roppolo, 644 So. 2d at 208. ¶ 33. Moreover, to determine whether Clauder violated his vow of celibacy, a court would be required to consider the parameters of the vow. For this court to examine the vow of celibacy, and the church's action or inaction when faced with an alleged violation, would excessively entangle the court in religious affairs, contrary to the First Amendment. [20] See Pritzlaff, 194 Wis. 2d at 328-30. [7] ¶ 34. Thus, the Diocese has made a prima facie case for summary judgment by establishing that, in order to decide L.L.N.'s claim, a court would be required to examine the vow of celibacy. In addition, the Diocese has established that, in order to determine that Hebl was acting within his authority to bind the Diocese when he witnessed the T.E. incident, or had a duty to give the Diocese information about Clauder, a court would be required to consider church law, policies, or practices. L.L.N. has not shown, by affidavit or other proof, the existence of disputed material facts or undisputed material facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn that are sufficient to entitle her to a trial. Accordingly, the Diocese has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because a court would not be able to apply neutral principles of law; therefore, the First Amendment precludes L.L.N.'s claim for negligent supervision.