Opinion ID: 199073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Taylor's Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea

Text: 18 Taylor changed his plea to guilty shortly before his co-defendants went on trial and were found guilty by the jury. About two months thereafter he moved to withdraw the guilty plea. The district court denied the motion and Taylor now asserts that this denial was error. 19 Multiple factors are relevant to whether a defendant has met his burden of establishing a fair and just reason, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e), to withdraw his guilty plea, the most significant of which is whether the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent within the meaning of Rule 11, United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995). Other factors include: (1) the plausibility of the proffered reason for withdrawing the plea; (2) the timing of the motion to withdraw; (3) whether the defendant asserted his innocence; and (4) whether the plea was pursuant to a plea agreement. See United States v. Aker, 181 F.3d 167, 170 (1st Cir. 1999). Before allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea the court must also consider the potential prejudice to the government. See United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 124 F.3d 342, 347 (1st Cir. 1997). 20 Taylor contends that his plea was involuntary because he did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty. A defendant's knowledge of the consequences of his plea is one of Rule 11's core concerns. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 4. Although his argument is difficult to understand, Taylor apparently argues that the district court misled him about the consequences of his plea by telling him that he could face an enhanced sentence under the Guidelines if the substance he possessed was found to be cocaine base, when in fact an increased sentence required an additional finding that the substance was crack, and hence an additional evidentiary burden for the government. This contention misapprehends the nature of Taylor's sentence. He did not receive an increased Guidelines sentence based on a finding that the substance was crack. Instead, he received a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for distributing more than 50 grams of cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), and, as we have explained above, that sentence did not require a finding that the cocaine base was in crack form. 2 21 The transcript of the change of plea hearing reveals that although there was some initial confusion about these matters, the district court made sure that Taylor understood the sentence he was facing before finally accepting the guilty plea: 22 [THE COURT:] But, do you understand that if I find 50 or more grams of cocaine base, that that's the kind of guideline--not the kind. That is the guideline and the statutory provision that's the bottom for the sentence? That's the minimum that you're going to do is 10 years? 23 [TAYLOR:] Yes, sir. 24 [THE COURT:] So you're pleading guilty and leaving it to me to make the determination whether or not we're dealing with 50 grams or more of cocaine base here? 25 [TAYLOR:] Yes, sir. 26 This was a correct statement of the consequences of the guilty plea, and we cannot say that the court erred in finding that Taylor understood those consequences. See Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d at 7 (cocaine conspiracy defendants understood consequences of plea when court advised them that, inter alia, they faced ten-year mandatory minimum); cf. United States v. Gray, 63 F.3d 57, 60 (1st Cir. 1995) (cocaine conspiracy defendant did not understand consequences and should have been allowed to withdraw plea when court erroneously suggested that ten years was maximum, not minimum, sentence). 27 Other factors also weigh in favor of the court's decision to deny Taylor's motion to withdraw his plea. The court supportably found that Taylor's proffered reason for seeking withdrawal was implausible, stemming more from garden-variety second thoughts and unhappiness with the court's finding that the substance was over 50 grams of cocaine base--which led inexorably to the ten-year mandatory minimum--than from any lack of understanding at the time of the plea. 3 Although the court did not consider the timing of the request to be significant, the fact that it was made after the trial of Taylor's co-defendants means that if withdrawal were allowed the government would face the prejudice of an additional trial. There was a plea agreement, but Taylor does not contend that the government breached it in any way. Finally, and significantly, Taylor has never asserted his innocence. The court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Taylor did not establish a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. 28