Opinion ID: 3029594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ward’s Complaint and Merck’s Answer

Text: Ward’s complaint and Merck’s answer set the stage for extensive discovery that preceded the summary judgment stage of the case. The three-count complaint alleged 4 violations by Merck under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). It alleged that Ward was regarded as disabled by Merck and/or had a record of disability and that Merck terminated Ward’s employment as a result of his disability, without any effort at accommodation. Specifically, paragraph 20 of the complaint alleged that, on or about June 26, 2003, Merck demanded that Ward undergo a psychiatric examination unrelated to any legitimate work requirement and demanded that the psychiatric examination be conducted by its in-house medical department.3 Continuing, paragraph 24 of the complaint alleged that Ward was terminated for refusing to submit to the unlawful psychiatric examination that Merck had directed him to undergo.4 3 Merck responded in its answer and asserted the following: As to paragraph 20, Merck states that plaintiff’s peers and supervisors had observed him engage in unusual and disruptive behavior and Merck’s Employee Health Services Medical Director had recommended that plaintiff be medically evaluated in order to determine his health and fitness to perform his job duties. On June 26, 2003, Merck requested plaintiff to make an appointment with its Employee Health Services Director for a “fitness-for-duty” evaluation at his earliest opportunity.... 4 Merck admitted that, on July 7, 2003, plaintiff was suspended from work, with pay, based on his refusal to follow his Senior Director’s directive that he submit to a fitnessfor-duty evaluation by a physician from Merck’s Employee Health Services Group and further alleged in its answer as to paragraph 24: . . . that on about July 24, 2003, Merck sent plaintiff a letter notifying him that his employment with Merck was terminated, effective immediately, for his refusal to comply with the directive that he submit to a medical evaluation. Merck states further that its letter gave plaintiff 48 hours to reconsider his refusal to comply with the directive by contacting his 5 B. The District Court’s Ruling Granting Summary Judgment Before addressing the fitness-for-duty issue, the district court observed that it found no evidence that Ward was subjected to a hostile work environment; no evidence that Ward was compelled by Merck to take a leave of absence; and that Ward had abandoned a portion of his claim in Count III of his complaint alleging that Merck violated the FMLA by compelling him to take leave and requiring him to submit to a fitness-for-duty evaluation. Next, the district court addressed the subject of when an employer may seek a “fitness-for-duty certification” with regard to a particular health condition that caused the employee’s need for FMLA leave and opined: Under certain circumstances, an employer may subsequently request re-certification of an employee’s medical condition, for example where ‘[c]ircumstances described by the previous certification have changed significantly’... ‘No second or third opinion on re-certification may be required.’” (regulatory citations omitted). The district court rejected Ward’s argument that Merck’s request for Ward to undergo a fitness-for-duty evaluation constituted a “second opinion” under the FMLA because there is no second opinion when there has been no re-certification and Ward’s leave of absence had ended months before Merck requested that Ward undergo the challenged examination. business unit’s Human Resources Director and scheduling an appointment with one of the physicians in Employee Health Services no later than Monday, July 28, 2003. Merck states further that plaintiff failed to take any action in response to Merck’s letter.... 6 The district court addressed Ward’s claims of a prohibited medical inquiry and retaliation in violation of the ADA in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(4), which provides in pertinent part: A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity. (emphasis added). The district court, after a review of the testimony placed in the record in support of Merck’s motion for summary judgment, declared that there was “more than sufficient evidence to justify Defendant’s medical inquiry” and indicated that it was compelled to conclude that the medical inquiry requested of Plaintiff was “consistent with business necessity” as required by § 12112(d)(4). Continuing, the district court then ruled that Ward’s retaliation claim must, of necessity, fail as there was no violation of the ADA in requiring the plaintiff to submit to a “fitness-for-duty” evaluation.