Opinion ID: 2096712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mortgage Financing As Condition Precedent

Text: Lastly, the appellants contend that the trial court erroneously failed to grant their proffered instruction that if the jury found that the Traylors were unable to obtain a 20-year, $25,000 mortgage at an interest rate of six percent, and further found that its obtention was an essential condition of the contract, that the verdict must be for the Traylors. When a contractual duty is subject to a condition precedent there is no duty of performance until the condition is satisfied or is excused. Hollander v. Friedman, 360 Pa. 20, 59 A.2d 892 (1948); Chittenholm v. Giffin, 357 Pa. 616, 55 A.2d 324 (1947). In accord, Goldberg v. Anastasi, 272 Md. 61, 321 A.2d 155 (1974); Griffith v. Scheungrab, 219 Md. 27, 146 A.2d 864 (1958). In Robert F. Felte, Inc. v. White, 451 Pa. 137, 302 A.2d 347 (1973), it was recognized that the requirement of obtaining mortgage financing as a condition in a contract for the sale of land must be given effect unless the condition has been altered by the parties or waived by the one for whose benefit the condition was made. In accord, are our holdings in Barnes v. Euster, 240 Md. 603, 214 A.2d 807 (1965); Griffith v. Scheungrab, supra . See also Kahn v. Schleisner, 165 Md. 106, 166 A. 435 (1933). Although the contract of purchase may have here been subject to the obtention of the specified mortgage financing by the Traylors, from the testimony by Eppley that on several occasions within the period prior to the first scheduled settlement Mrs. Traylor had informed him that the Traylors could obtain the financing and there was no problem about financing, there was evidence from which a waiver of the condition precedent, for the benefit of the Traylors, could be found. Even though there was evidence that Mrs. Traylor inquired at the Delta Bank about financing, there was no evidence that any application for such a mortgage was made there  or attempted at any other lending institution. The testimony by the Traylors that Eilers would finance the whole deal by arrangements made through Deshner and had agreed to take a mortgage from them was no evidentiary substitute for a showing by them that they had taken bona fide, reasonable and prompt action to obtain the financing specified and had failed in their efforts. See Robert F. Felte, Inc. v. White, supra ; Hollander v. Friedman, supra . Finding, upon this state of the record, no evidence that the Traylors even attempted to obtain the financing provided, we hold that the condition, created for their benefit, was waived by them and the trial court did not err in refusing the requested instruction. Since we have concluded that the trial court was in error in directing the entry of a verdict and judgment against the Traylors alone under Count I, we shall reverse that judgment and in accordance with the provisions of Maryland Rule 875 enter a judgment as ought to have been entered in the lower court, against both of the Traylors and Deshner jointly under Count II. See Webster v. Larmore, 268 Md. 153, 169, 299 A.2d 814, 822 (1973). Judgment in favor of the appellees against the appellants under Count I reversed and vacated; judgment entered under Count II in favor of the appellees against the appellants and Deshner jointly in the amount of $4000.00, with interest from July 13, 1973; one-half the costs to be paid by the appellants and one-half to be paid by appellees.