Opinion ID: 1926802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ice-pick Statement

Text: James Ramosca, a former co-worker of defendant's, testified at trial about statements that defendant had made to him. In 1990 or 1991, Ramosca testified, defendant had said he would not hesitate to take someone out if necessary and that he would take the ice pick, stick it through someone's brain. This was the full extent of the ice-pick comment. The State did not mention Ramosca or his testimony in its closing argument. As with the hit-man letter, the statement at issue is not an act introduced to show the character of defendant in violation of Rule 404; it is simply a statement that defendant made. The statement does not reveal any prior misconduct; it merely reflects defendant's state of mind. Therefore, Rule 404 does not apply and the trial court erred in analyzing the ice-pick comment under the stringent requirements of whether the prior comment provided identity evidence or demonstrated a signature crime. The test for admissibility is whether the evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. See V.R.E. 402 & 403. The State's theory of the case was that defendant was desperate to reconcile with Sandra and jealous of Kenworthy, who had been spending time with her. The State put on evidence that showed the numerous stab wounds inflicted on Kenworthy could have been caused by a slender, sharp, rounded weapon, like an ice-pick or an awl, such as was found in defendant's truck. The evidence may have shown that the murder was first attempted with the quick method of a sharp, pointed object into the brain, consistent with the small stab wounds to the skull. This method plainly did not succeed, and the evidence was consistent with an interpretation that the murderer had become enraged and vindictive, explaining the multiple stab wounds and blunt-object trauma to the head. Ramosca's testimony that defendant would not hesitate to take someone out with an ice-pick to the brain was relevant as tending to show a familiarity with a tool possibly used in the murder, although the style of the murder was not identical to that defendant described to Ramosca. The fact that the murder was not accomplished exactly as defendant suggested does not make irrelevant defendant's professed willingness to use a tool such as an ice-pick to kill someone. As this evidence was relevant, it was properly admitted unless it was unduly prejudicial. We have held that evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose is to appeal to the jury's sympathies, arouse a sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or cause the jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case. See State v. Little, 167 Vt. 577, 579, 705 A.2d 177, 180 (1997) (mem.). This evidence was not explicit or graphic; it could not be more disturbing than the photographs of wounds caused by an instrument like an ice-pick, which were shown to the jury in the autopsy photos. This evidence does not rise to the level of provoking a jury to return a verdict based on its emotional reaction. Id. Thus, the trial court's admission of the statement was not an abuse of discretion. Ramosca also testified that defendant had bragged to him about being a hit man. Although this testimony was immediately struck and the court gave a curative instruction, defendant claims in his pro se brief that this statement requires a new trial. This court has long upheld the efficacy of curative instructions. See State v. LaBounty, 168 Vt. 129, 140, 716 A.2d 1, 8 (1998). In LaBounty, as in this case, the objectionable comment was brief and the court's response was immediate and unequivocal. See id. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that defendant was not unduly prejudiced by the stricken evidence.