Opinion ID: 717461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: indirect emissions

Text: 22 In performing a conformity determination, a federal agency is to consider the emissions that will result from its action both directly and indirectly. 40 C.F.R. § 51.858(a); 58 Fed.Reg. 63,218/2. The EPA has defined direct emissions as those emissions of a criteria pollutant or its precursors that are caused or initiated by the Federal action and occur at the same time and place as the action. 40 C.F.R. § 51.852. Indirect emissions, on the other hand, are those that: 23 (1) Are caused by the Federal action, but may occur later in time and/or may be farther removed in distance from the action itself but are still reasonably foreseeable; and 24 (2) The Federal agency can practicably control and will maintain control over due to a continuing program responsibility of the Federal agency. 25 Id. 26 EDF objects to the second clause of this latter definition on the ground that it creates an exemption for emissions that are the reasonably foreseeable result of federal action but that are not within the agency's continuing program responsibility. This exemption, EDF contends, is inconsistent with the Congress's broad command that [n]o department, agency, or instrumentality of the Federal Government shall engage in ... [or] support in any way an activity that does not conform to the applicable state implementation plan, 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1), and with the statutory definition of conformity set out in 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1): 27 Conformity to an implementation plan means-- 28 (A) conformity to an implementation plan's purpose of eliminating or reducing the severity and number of violations of the national ambient air quality standards and achieving expeditious attainment of such standards; and 29 (B) that such activities will not-- 30 (i) cause or contribute to any new violation of any standard ...; 31 (ii) increase the frequency or severity of any existing violation of any standard ...; or 32 (iii) delay timely attainment of any standard or any required interim emission reductions or other milestones in any area. 33 EDF argues that the support in any way and cause or contribute wording evinces an intent by the Congress to require each federal agency to take into account all reasonably foreseeable emissions, regardless of whether they are within the agency's continuing control. Under this reading, for example, before the Army Corps of Engineers could grant a permit for dredge-and-fill activities as part of a new private shopping center development, the Army Corps would have to examine all reasonably foreseeable emissions--including not only the emissions produced by the equipment involved in the dredge-and-fill operation but also those resulting from the construction and continuing operation of the shopping center. 34 The question before us, then, is whether the statute requires consideration of the emissions that the EPA exempted--that is, emissions that are the reasonably foreseeable result of the federal action, but that are separated in time or place from the federal action itself and are not within the agency's control. In answering this question, we must first look to the statute itself to determine whether the Congress clearly expressed its intent. Because the legislative history of the statute provides little guidance on the general conformity rule, our inquiry begins and ends with the text of the statute. 35 Neither support nor cause are defined in the statute, nor does the statute address whether or to what extent the federal agency must consider emissions that are caused by the federal action only indirectly. Moreover, in enacting this statute the Congress expressly delegated to the EPA the responsibility for promulgating criteria and procedures for determining conformity under the general conformity rule. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(4)(A). We must therefore defer to the EPA's interpretation of the relevant and undefined terms in the statute, as long as that interpretation is reasonable. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). 36 In determining to what extent federal agencies must consider indirect emissions in their conformity analyses, the EPA properly focused upon the provision that forbids the federal government to support in any way an activity that does not conform to the applicable implementation plan. See 58 Fed.Reg. 63,220-22. That is the only proscription that could describe the relationship between a federal action and a subsequent activity that is outside the control or responsibility of the federal agency. (The prohibitions on a federal agency's engaging in, providing financial assistance for, licensing, permitting, or approving a nonconforming activity, see 58 Fed.Reg. 63,221 n. 4, all bar direct federal involvement in a nonconforming activity.) In other words, emissions that result from but are not directly produced by the federal action itself are covered by the statute only if that initial federal action constitutes federal support of the subsequent event or activity that actually produces the emissions in question. 37 As the EPA pointed out in the preamble to the final rule, the word support has a wide range of possible meanings, from mere facilitation to continuing responsibility. 58 Fed.Reg. 63,221/3. Under the broadest definition of support, the EPA noted, the prohibition in section 176(c)(1) might be interpreted to include virtually all Federal activities, since all Federal activities could be argued to support, at least in some remote way, an action that ultimately emits pollution. 58 Fed.Reg. 63,221/2. Concluding that the Congress could not have intended such egregious or absurd applications of section 176(c)(1), id., the EPA settled upon a definition that focuses on the extent to which the Federal agency has continuing program responsibilities, and whether it can practicably control emissions from its own and other party activities, 58 Fed.Reg. 63,221/3. This is certainly a reasonable interpretation, and therefore it is entitled to our deference. 38 Contrary to EDF's contention, the EPA's definition of indirect emissions is not inconsistent with the statutory definition of conformity, which we quoted above. EDF maintains that the broad terms of subsection (B) of that provision require the agency to take into account all reasonably foreseeable emissions, whether produced by the federal action itself or by a subsequent action that is contingent upon the federal action having been taken. By the terms of the statute, however, an agency is required to ask whether an activity will cause or contribute to any new violation or delay timely attainment of an air quality standard only if the activity that produces the emissions will itself be supported in some way by the agency. The broad cause or contribute provision, therefore, pertains only to whether the federally supported activity itself would produce emissions not accounted for in the implementation plan, either at the time and place of the activity (direct emissions) or later or elsewhere (indirect emissions). See 58 Fed.Reg. 63,218/2 (indirect emissions must be included by virtue of support in any way criterion, not cause and contribute criterion). 39 By its terms, therefore, the statute prescribes a two-stage inquiry for federal agencies, and the EPA's regulations appropriately recognize and implement this structure. First, the agency is to determine whether it will be in some way supporting an activity that could potentially produce emissions. Second, the agency is to determine whether that activity conforms to the applicable implementation plan, which involves an inquiry into whether the activity would, inter alia, cause or contribute to a violation of an air quality standard. If the federal action leads to or facilitates a subsequent activity that could potentially produce emissions, the agency must again ask whether the action under consideration will be supporting that subsequent activity; if so, then the reasonably foreseeable emissions produced by the subsequent activity must also be taken into account as the indirect emissions of the agency action. The EPA's definition of indirect emissions--including only those reasonably foreseeable emissions that are within the continuing responsibility of the agency--is thus entirely consistent with the requirement that federally supported activities not cause or contribute to a violation. 40 Neither are we persuaded that the two other Clean Air Act provisions to which EDF refers us are evidence that the Congress intended that the general conformity rule be applied any more broadly than the EPA has applied it. First, EDF points to section 176(c)(2), the provision requiring conformity for transportation plans and projects, in which the Congress specifically required that the emissions from motor vehicles traveling on a new highway be included in the conformity determination for the highway construction project. 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(2)(A). Because the Congress clearly intended that motor vehicle traffic that is outside the continuing program responsibility of the Department of Transportation be included in the conformity determination, EDF argues, the Congress must also have intended the general conformity rule to extend beyond activities within the continuing control of the relevant agency. As we view this provision, however, it suggests the opposite point: the Congress referred explicitly to motor vehicle emissions in section 176(c)(2)(A) precisely because such emissions would not necessarily be included in the conformity determination by virtue of the provisions setting out the conformity requirements. 41 Second, EDF directs our attention to section 316(b) of the Act, which sets out the conformity requirements that apply to EPA grants for construction of sewage treatment plants. See 42 U.S.C. § 7616(b). This section explicitly authorizes the EPA to withhold or attach conditions to federal sewage treatment grants if the new sewage capacity would reasonably be anticipated to cause or contribute to, directly or indirectly, an increase in emissions of any air pollutant in excess of the increase provided for under the provisions of the applicable SIP, or if the new capacity would otherwise not be in conformity with the applicable implementation plan. 42 U.S.C. § 7616(b)(3). The statute also specifies that in nonattainment areas the relevant SIP provisions must account for emissions resulting directly or indirectly from areawide and nonmajor stationary source growth. 42 U.S.C. § 7616(b). According to EDF, the structure of this provision implies that the reasonably anticipated effects of the newly created treatment capacity are among the relevant factors in concluding whether the grant itself is in conformity. As the EPA explained, however, this provision is evidence that the Congress clearly intended a conformity review in this particular area. 58 Fed.Reg. 63,223/3. By specifically requiring the conformity analysis to be performed with respect to the capacity of the new sewage treatment plant, see 42 U.S.C. § 7616(b)(3), the Congress indicated that it was not satisfied in this area to limit conformity review to emissions caused by the construction of the plant, as it was for other types of federal construction permits or grants. Therefore, as with the transportation provision discussed above, we are not persuaded that this provision provides evidence that the Congress intended a broader application of the general conformity rule than the EPA's regulation indicates.