Opinion ID: 2806764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim

Text: The questions here are: (1) whether the trial was “so infected . . . with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); see also Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2153, 2155 (2012) (per curiam) (confirming that this is the standard used on habeas review); and (2) whether the state court’s ruling that “the prosecutor’s conduct was not so egregious that [Jerry] was denied a fair trial” was contrary to that standard. Bales, 2007 WL 1203536, at . Jerry asserts two general sets of prosecutorial misconduct: attacks against Jerry himself and attacks against defense counsel. Jerry identifies a number of prosecutorial “attacks” against Jerry that he believes warrant habeas relief. Jerry maintains that the prosecutor attacked Jerry on cross-examination by suggesting Jerry was changing his testimony. After a round of back and forth between Jerry and the prosecutor at trial, the prosecutor asked, “So what is your testimony today at 10:01 about that —” to which defense counsel objected at trial. The objection was sustained. Jerry also argues that the prosecutor solicited evidence that Jerry told rude and dirty jokes in front of No. 13-2404 Bales v. Bell Page 11 children. Jerry was apparently upset after viewing photos at trial, and on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Jerry, “When you cry, do you normally cry tears?” Defense counsel made no objection. Jerry also complains that the “prosecutor was allowed, over objection of defense counsel, to ask [Jerry] on cross examination if he ever went to married women’s houses by himself.” However, a review of that question in the record reveals that the prosecutor asked Jerry whether he had ever been to Andrea’s mother’s house by himself, and Jerry responded that he would not go to a married woman’s house without her husband there. As an initial matter, the trial court found that many of these statements were relevant to the trial, and a “prosecutor may rely in good faith on evidentiary rulings made by the state trial judge and make arguments in reliance on those rulings.” Cristini v. McKee, 526 F.3d 888, 900 (6th Cir. 2008). Further, “[w]hen a defendant assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses––rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trial––are generally applicable to him as well.” Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 69 (2000) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, whether Jerry was changing his testimony, whether he was really crying at trial, whether he told dirty jokes, and whether he had some sort of relationship with Andrea’s mother were all relevant, truth-seeking questions asked to Jerry as a witness. Accordingly, although inappropriate, they were not improper. On another occasion during cross-examination, Jerry testified that Whitney came to his home one day without wearing underwear, and the prosecution began a line of questioning about how Jerry knew Whitney was not wearing underwear. Jerry argues the following exchange was improper so as to deny him due process: Q: How were you able to see that [Whitney was not wearing underwear]? A: Because she had a dress on, a short dress on. Q: Well, wouldn’t you agree with me even if I had a short dress on here, you wouldn’t be able to see whether or not I have underwear on, would you? [Defense Counsel]: Please, that’s also argumentative and we’re not going to get into the prosecutor’s underwear, I hope. The Court: Overruled Q: Answer the question. A: Repeat the question. No. 13-2404 Bales v. Bell Page 12 Q: If I had a short dress on right now, you wouldn’t be able to see whether or not I have underwear on, would you? A: I wouldn’t be looking at you. Q: I would hope not. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. Improper comment. The Court: Sustained. The prosecutor also engaged in conduct during closing arguments that Jerry argues constitutes prosecutorial misconduct worthy of habeas relief. The prosecutor referred to Jerry as “atrocious,” and claimed he had molested “yet another girl.” She also stated, “My parents used to tell me, don’t be afraid of the boogey man. There’s no boogey man. The boogey man can’t hurt you. But I think we need to realize, there is a boogey man, and he’s sitting right there.” Defense counsel objected to the boogey man diatribe, and his objection was sustained. The prosecutor also referred back to the underwear line of questioning and stated, Jerry “said he didn’t want to look at me. Well, of course not. I’m a woman. I’m an adult, he only wants to look at little girls.” The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection as to that statement. Because we are reviewing the state court’s opinion solely to determine whether it is contrary to clearly established federal law, as established by Supreme Court precedent, we cannot consider Sixth Circuit precedent for evaluating prosecutorial misconduct that Jerry advances. Parker, 132 S. Ct. at 2155. The Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that we may only consider whether the prosecutor’s improper comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Id. at 2153–55 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that this circuit has erred by applying its own precedent in prosecutorial misconduct habeas cases). Indeed, “the appropriate standard of review for such a claim on writ of habeas corpus is the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise of supervisory power.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). With this narrow standard of review in mind, the prosecutor’s underwear and “boogey man” statements “undoubtedly were improper” but that is not enough. See id. at 180–81. It is also “not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned.” Id. at 181. As the state court reasoned, and the federal district court reiterated, “the evidence [at trial] supported the prosecutor’s comments, which, although harsh, did not No. 13-2404 Bales v. Bell Page 13 constitute misconduct requiring reversal.” Bales, 2007 WL 1203536, at ; see Bales II, 2013 WL 5539592, at . The trial court also repeatedly instructed the jury that what the attorneys said was not evidence and sustained many of defense counsel’s objections. Furthermore, the “evidence against [the] petitioner was heavy . . . [and] reduced the likelihood that the jury’s decision was influenced by [the prosecutor’s] argument.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 182. Whitney and Andrea both testified in detail about how Jerry had molested them as young girls, and the circumstantial evidence indicated that Jerry had ample opportunity alone with both girls. Considering the evidence against Jerry, coupled with the trial court’s repeated cautionary instructions, and the trial court’s sustaining of some of defense counsel’s objections, Jerry’s trial “was not perfect—few are—but neither was it fundamentally unfair.” See id. at 183. Finally, the “boogey man” and underwear comments were “unnecessary and unprofessional-but . . . go[] no further than similar comments which have not required setting aside a state conviction.” Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225, 234 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that calling defendant “demon,” though unprofessional, does not warrant habeas relief); see also Olson v. McFaul, 843 F.2d 918, 930 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the prosecutor’s repeated references to a defendant as a “deadbeat,” a “thief,” a “creep,” and a “liar” did not violate due process). Jerry next argues that the prosecutor’s statements toward defense counsel warrant habeas relief. We disagree. The Michigan Court of Appeals considered and rejected Jerry’s argument that the prosecutor’s statements toward defense counsel warrant relief, and its decision was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent, nor an improper determination of the facts. Jerry’s trial was contentious to say the least. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel often stepped over the line of professionalism and propriety. The trial court played referee and admonished both parties. As the district court noted, however, “[c]onsidered in this context, it cannot be said that every stray comment or heated remark made by the prosecutor was so improper as to affect the overall fairness of Petitioner’s trial.” Bales II, 2013 WL 5539592, at . Again, the standard is a high one. Our challenge is not to supervise the state court but to ensure that the state court has not contradicted federal law so as to deny a petitioner due process. See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Jerry cites the prosecutor’s running commentary and argues that the prosecutor “attack[ed] . . . defense counsel throughout defense counsel’s closing argument.” No. 13-2404 Bales v. Bell Page 14 The prosecutor indicated, “That’s improper . . . and counsel knows that.” What defense counsel omits in his brief is the context of the prosecutor’s statements. During his closing argument, defense counsel stated “Now let me talk about [Jerry’s] hearing problem. I always think it’s a low blow when the prosecutor goes after somebody about a handicap, which is what this is . . . . He went out and got a second hearing aid because he couldn’t hear well in the first trial. And that’s the first things she wants to go after. In context, defense counsel’s statements were themselves improper. While defense counsel’s improper statements do not excuse any improper response by the prosecutor, the defense counsel’s statements “invited [a] response” that put the prosecutor’s comments into perspective for purposes of evaluating the statements’ overall effect on the trial. Id. at 182. The prosecutor’s statements likening Jerry’s defense to “the O.J. Simpson trial” and asking the court to hold defense counsel in contempt of court in front of the jury, while certainly improper, do not rise to the level of infecting the trial so as to deny Jerry due process, particularly considering the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s O.J. Simpson comment. After the prosecutor’s request that defense counsel be held in contempt, the trial court again reminded the jury that “what the attorneys say is not evidence . . . . So, anything that the attorneys say that looks to be like testimony, do not regard it as such.” The trial court’s instructions are generally presumed to have been followed. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001) (“We generally presume that jurors follow their instructions.”). In sum, with regard to the prosecutor’s statements toward Jerry, as well as toward defense counsel, Jerry “has not demonstrated that the state court’s resolution of his prosecutorial misconduct claims was an unreasonable application of federal law. . . . Moreover, this Court has recognized the effectiveness of curative instructions in mitigating prejudice under similar circumstances.” Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 751 (6th Cir. 2002). Jerry is not entitled to habeas relief. AFFIRMED.