Opinion ID: 764146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Commissioner's Assignment of Beneficiaries to Anker

Text: 60 In reviewing the Commissioner's decision to assign beneficiaries to Anker, we decide whether her action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The Commissioner rejected Anker's arguments that Consol was the entity responsible for providing the miners' benefits. Anker had argued to the Social Security Administration 61 that assignments made [because of Anker's affiliation with King Knob] should be reassigned to Consolidation Coal Co. because King Knob operated as an independent contractor mining lands owned or leased by Consol with no ownership rights in the minerals; that amounts paid by Consol to the UMWA plans were not deducted or credited against the amounts paid to King Knob for the mined coal; that upon termination of the agreement in 1982 Consol accepted responsibility for current and subsequent payments to the UMWA Welfare and Retirement Fund or any successor fund based on hours worked prior to the summer of 1982; [and] that for miners employed by King Knob after 1982, responsibility should be pro-rated.... 62 App. at 33. The Commissioner instead determined that 63 Under the Coal Act, ownership of a mine is immaterial to assignment decisions. Assignments are made solely on the basis of the signatory employer who employed the eligible retiree. In the case involving King Knob, an affiliate of Anker Energy, the signatory that employed the retirees was King Knob, not Consol. Also, for Coal Act purposes, SSA is not bound by any private agreements made between companies, nor does the Coal Act allow for pro-ration of premium payments between companies. In light of the foregoing, no assignments that were made to Anker on the basis of its relationship to King Knob Coal can be reassigned to Consol. 64 App. at 33. We will affirm the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings on Count One upholding the Commissioner's assignment of beneficiaries to Anker, because we find that her decision was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 65 Anker contends that King Knob was merely the nominal employer of the miners, while Consol was a signatory operator in its own right under the Act that had received the entire economic benefit which those miners created, and was the entity which had responsibility for all payments required to be made to the UMWA Benefit Funds. Appellants' Brief at 26. We find these contentions to be without merit. 66 The Coal Act directs the Commissioner to assign each eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator who employed the beneficiary. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a). Section 9706(a) also attempts to ensure that the specific assignment of a beneficiary is to the most recent and significant employer still in business. The Act defines a signatory operator as a person which is or was a signatory to a coal wage agreement. 26 U.S.C. § 9701(c)(1). The term coal wage agreement includes the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, as well as any other agreement entered into between an employer in the coal industry and the United Mine Workers of America that required ... the provision of health benefits to retirees of such employer ... or contributions to the 1950 UMWA Benefit Plan or the 1974 UMWA Benefit Plan, or any predecessor thereof. 26 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(1). Finally, the Act provides that employment of a coal industry retiree in the coal industry by a signatory operator shall be treated as employment by any related persons to such operator. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(b)(1)(A). 67 Applying these terms here, we uphold the Commissioner's conclusion that Anker is a related person to King Knob who was responsible for the provision of health benefits to the 1950 or 1974 Plans. First, King Knob was clearly a signatory operator under the Act. Anker admits that King Knob was a me too signatory to the 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984 NBCWAs. App. at 8. Although it did not negotiate these agreements, as a me too signatory King Knob agreed to each of these NBCWAs, and agreed to contribute to the benefit funds. As such, King Knob falls under the Act. 26 U.S.C. § 9701. 68 Moreover, Anker does not contest the Commissioner's determination that it is a related person to King Knob under the Act, and we find that King Knob was without question the miners' employer. See Appellants' Brief at 26. Anker's pleadings and the record reveal as much. As an independent contractor, King Knob agreed in its contracts with Consol that 69 all parties working for it in connection with the undertaking covered by this Agreement shall be its employees subject only to its orders and supervision.... Neither Consol nor any of its agents, servants or employees shall have the right to direct, supervise or control the manner or method in which the work is to be performed. 70 App. at 66. Anker confuses the matter by stating that King Knob was only the miners' nominal employer, and that Consol had received the entire economic benefit from the miners' efforts. The Act does not mention the term nominal employer, nor does the term have any independent meaning in the context here. Likewise, the Act does not assess premiums based upon who received the economic benefit of the miners' work. Moreover, we do not accept the accuracy of Anker's denial that King Knob benefitted economically from its employees' mining efforts. After all, Consol was paying King Knob for its services. 71 Furthermore, we find Anker's argument unpersuasive that King Knob was not the correct signatory employer because it never had made contributions to the benefit fund inasmuch as Consol always paid King Knob's premiums according to their mining agreements. As a me too signatory to the 1974, 1978, 1981 and 1984 NBCWAs, King Knob was responsible for making payments for its employees to the benefit funds. Even though Consol apparently relieved King Knob of this responsibility by making all of its payments to the funds, such a contractual agreement does not lead us to conclude that King Knob was not a signatory operator responsible for making payments to the funds. Thus, we cannot say that the Commissioner's assignment of beneficiaries to Anker is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).