Opinion ID: 2974024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exhaustion/Fair Presentment

Text: The state first argues that Satterlee did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless the petitioner has exhausted available state-court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). In order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, “a petitioner’s claim must be ‘fairly presented’ to the state courts before seeking relief in the federal courts.” Whiting v. Burt, 395 F.3d 602, 612 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). “It is sufficient if ‘the substance of a federal habeas corpus claim’ be presented to the state courts, and there are instances in which ‘the ultimate question for disposition’ will be the same despite variations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged in its support.” Id. at 612-13 (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78). Whether a habeas petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement is a question of law that we review de novo. E.g., Morris v. Dretke, 413 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2005); Stevens v. Delaware Corr. Ctr., 295 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002); Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 44 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1018 (2002). The state concedes that Satterlee’s legal theory — that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel under Strickland and Hill when his trial attorney failed to relay a favorable plea offer — was fairly presented to the state courts. Appellant Br. (05-2013) at 20. Its exhaustion argument is instead premised on the contention that Satterlee did not fairly present to the state courts the factual allegations underlying his legal theory. According to the state, although the district court granted the writ based on Dodge’s failure to relay a six-to-twenty-year offer made the morning of trial (“morning offer”), before the state courts Satterlee relied on Dodge’s failure to relay a different offer — one that Dodge allegedly sent via letter to Satterlee a week before trial (“letter offer”). Thus, the state argues, Satterlee did not fairly present his IAC claim to the state courts. The state’s argument is without merit, as it is wrong on the facts. Although his IAC argument in the state postconviction proceedings focused on the letter offer, Satterlee also notified the state courts of the morning offer: There will be some factual disputes to be resolved at a hearing. The letter of David Dodge of November 30, 1998, which Defendant received only after being convicted and sentenced, refers to a plea offer of 3 to 7 years. Yet, present counsel spoke by telephone with prosecutor John Cipriani, and Mr. Cipriani states that there was never a plea offer of 3 to 7 years, but that there was a plea offer of 6 to 20 years. (See affidavit of James Lawrence). Something peculiar is going on here, where attorney Dodge after sentence comes up with letters never before seen by Defendant, allegedly advising him of an offer, yet the prosecutor says that offer was never made. At this point, Defendant and his counsel are unsure of who to believe, prosecutor Cipriani or attorney Dodge, who directly contradict each other. An evidentiary hearing is clearly needed. J.A. at 104 (Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Relief from J. at 2 n.1) (emphases added), 155 (Br. in Supp. of Application for Leave to Appeal at 5 n.1) (emphases added). Therefore, Satterlee informed the state courts of Dodge’s failure to relay both plea offers, and the relief eventually granted by the district Nos. 05-2013/2513 Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger Page 4 court was based on one of them. Accordingly, Satterlee fairly presented both the legal and factual bases of his IAC claim to the state courts.2