Opinion ID: 2514034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: proposed jury instruction cc

Text: ¶ 37 Finally, Denver & Rio Grande asserts that the trial court committed prejudicial error by refusing to give its proposed jury instruction CC relating to apportionment of damages. ¶ 38 Whether [a] trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992); see also Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1989). However, [i]t is not error [for a court] to refuse a proposed instruction if the point is properly covered in the other instructions. State v. Sessions, 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982); see also, e.g., State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1231 (Utah 1997); State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1986); State v. Wilcox, 28 Utah 2d 71, 75, 498 P.2d 357, 359 (1972); State v. Martinez, 21 Utah 2d 187, 188, 442 P.2d 943, 944 (1968). Indeed, [w]e review jury instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case. Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231. ¶ 39 The proposed instruction at issue in this case would have instructed the jury to limit any damages awarded Brewer to compensation for injury he suffered as a result of Denver & Rio Grande's negligence. Specifically, the instruction directed the jury to apportion the extent to which plaintiff's injury was caused by defendant's negligence, and award damages, if any, only for its proportionate share of damages. The instruction continued, You cannot award damages against defendant for any injury, or portion thereof, which you find to be due to other causes. The trial court refused this instruction, finding the jury to be otherwise sufficiently instructed that they are only to determine damages . . . that exist as a result of the defendant's negligence. ¶ 40 Viewing the jury instructions offered in this case in their entirety, id., it is clear that the jury was in fact instructed to award only damages resulting from Denver & Rio Grande's negligence. Instruction 29, for instance, provided: If you find the defendant was negligent and that negligence caused injury to the plaintiff, then it is your duty to award the plaintiff such damages, if any, that you find, from a preponderance of the evidence, will fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the injury and damage sustained, as a result of the defendant's negligence. (Emphasis added.) Likewise, instruction 38 specifically directed the jury to limit its award of damages to those injuries caused by the railroad's negligence. In relevant part, that instruction stated: The defendant cannot be held liable for damages arising from symptoms associated with a condition that was not caused by any negligence . . . just because the plaintiff happened to experience those symptoms while performing his duties at work. ¶ 41 Consequently, we conclude that the trial court was correct in finding the jury sufficiently instructed to award damages existing only . . . as a result of the defendant's negligence. Any further instruction in that regard would have been merely duplicative of instructions 29 and 38, which directed the jury, respectively, to award only damages sustained, as a result of the defendant's negligence, and to refrain from awarding damages arising from symptoms associated with a condition that was not caused by any negligence. Accordingly, we hold that because the instruction requested by Denver & Rio Grande was properly covered in the other instructions, the trial court did not err in refusing to give proposed instruction CC. [7] See Sessions, 645 P.2d at 647.