Opinion ID: 882912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: duty under federal law

Text: The majority briefly reviews State statutory law which imposes a duty to fence highways, but concludes that since those statutes were not applicable to the area where this action occurred, there was no statutory duty imposed on the State to protect motorists on this highway from wandering livestock. However, I do not understand why the majority's review of statutory obligations is limited to state law. What rational distinction is there between state statutes which impose a duty to fence highways and federal statutes which impose the same duty? The State of Montana concedes, in its appellate brief, that the area where this accident occurred was originally fenced and protected by the State Highway Department because the State was required to do so by federal law. In its brief, the State concedes that: While state law is permissive regarding Interstate fencing, the primary if not exclusive reason that these highways are fenced is that fencing is required by the Federal government as a precondition for receiving critical construction funding. A complete discussion of the applicable Federal statutes and regulations would be complicated and lengthy and is unnecessary here. It is sufficient to note that Federal law requires states to comply with Federal standards for design (23 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 109), construction (23 U.S.C. § 114), and maintenance (23 U.S.C. § 116) of Interstate highways, and for inspections and approvals to insure compliance. The statutes referred to in the State's brief are part of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101 through 160 (1958). A more complete explanation of the controlling provisions is found in Daye v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (1972), 344 F. Supp. 1337. That court explained that: Section 106(a) provides for the submission by the state and approval by the United States Secretary of Transportation [Secretary] of surveys, plans, specifications and estimates for each proposed project. Section 109(a) provides that the Secretary shall not approve the plans and specifications unless they are conducive to traffic needs, safety, durability and economy. Section 109(d) provides that the location of highway signs shall be subject to the approval of the State Highway Department with the concurrence of the Secretary. Section 109(e) provides that no funds shall be approved unless proper safety protective devices complying with certain safety standards approved by the Secretary are installed. Section 114(a) provides that highway construction shall be under the supervision of the State Highway Department, subject to the inspection and approval of the Secretary. Section 116(a) provides that it is the duty of the state to maintain the highways, and Section 116(c) provides that if the highway is not being properly maintained, the Secretary may withhold approval of further projects. Daye, 344 F. Supp. at 1347. The State cites Daye for the principle that these federal statutes do not create a duty on the part of the State to construct and maintain its fences and protective devices. However, I do not agree with that interpretation of Daye. The Federal District Court simply found that the statutes in question did not give rise to an independent private cause of action which was in contravention of Pennsylvania's immunity statutes. However, it is clear that the statutes create a duty on the part of the State to comply with federal requirements as a condition to federal funding, and the State concedes that those requirements included constructing and maintaining the fences which are the subject of plaintiffs' complaint. Finally, it appears to me that the majority opinion is based on several false premises. The Court concluded that § 60-7-103, MCA, which requires fencing of the right-of-way constructed through open range areas was not applicable because the location where this accident occurred was within a horse herd district. However, the majority then proceeds to justify its decision based upon its conclusion that Montana has been, and continues to be, an open range state. They hold that [u]nder the open range doctrine, neither the State nor livestock owners have a duty to prevent livestock from wandering onto roadways. Why does the majority rely on the fact that this is a herd district for purposes of rejecting plaintiffs' claim that the State had a statutory duty to fence, and then rely on an inconsistent conclusion that Montana is an open range state when it declines to impose a common law duty to maintain the State's fences? Likewise, the majority concludes that since the Montana Legislature true has not imposed a duty to fence the particular right-of-way where this accident occurred, we should not impose that duty. What about the duties imposed by the federal government and by the Department of Highways itself? To me, this claim involves simple issues. The State, by statute, had a duty to maintain its property, including its fence and cattle guard, in a condition that would have prevented unreasonable risk of harm to others, including motorists on the interstate highway. Plaintiffs alleged that it failed to do so and that Elroy Yager was injured as a result of that negligent omission. The State has offered no evidence to the contrary, therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. If the statutory duty imposed on everyone in Montana to exercise reasonable care in the maintenance of their property is not a clear enough creation of a duty for the majority, then certainly the obligations imposed by the Highway Department's own maintenance manual, or the commitment made by the State, pursuant to federal statute, in order to obtain federal highway funds, create additional duties. I am at a loss to find any justification for the majority opinion. If the State was not negligent, or if the State's negligence was not a cause of injury to Mr. Yager, then our laws should protect the State from liability. However, if the State was negligent, and its negligence caused harm to Mr. Yager, then simple fairness and justice require that the State be accountable for its conduct. It is beyond my comprehension why any court would go to the lengths that this Court has gone to in an effort to allow the State to avoid accountability for its negligent omissions. By its reliance on statutes which are irrelevant, and prior case law which is not on point, the majority has constructed what appears at first glance to be a rational justification for denying recovery in this case. The question that I have a difficult time understanding is to what justifiable purpose is that effort directed? For these reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court.