Opinion ID: 1892335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Respondent's Confession

Text: As the Court was careful to point out in Michigan v. Tucker, supra , it does not necessarily follow that the inapplicability of the poisoned tree doctrine makes a confession admissible. That doctrine springs from the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure, but a confession must also be judged under the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination other than voluntary. A careful review of the transcript in this matter convinces us that the confession used on trial was voluntarily given. Since the matter here involved is the admissibility of evidence rather than proof of an essential element of the crime, the measure of proof required is not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but proof by a preponderence of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L. Ed.2d 618. Although the trial judge made no specific findings, which would have been a preferable procedure, it is clear from the evidence that the required standard was amply met. Apart from the considerations taken up in the preceding section of this opinion, we are also of the opinion that the lapse of time here involved, some eight hours, before the giving of the confession to an entirely different set of officers, from another state, plus the giving of additional warnings, would be sufficient to attenuate the taint of the poisoned tree, even were this doctrine otherwise applicable. Wong Sun v. United States, supra . Respondent further urges, however, that his confession should have been excluded because the warning requirements of Miranda were not literally complied with. This, too, is a subject carefully discussed in Michigan v. Tucker, supra . That opinion, as we read it, reaches the commonsense result that the warning standards spelled out in Miranda are `prophylactic standards not intended to be a constitutional straitjacket, and that where there is substantial, but not literal, compliance with the prescribed wording, statements otherwise voluntarily given under former case law standards are not rendered inadmissible. Accord: United States v. Lamie, 429 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1970); Green v. State, 45 Ala.App. 549, 233 So.2d 343 (1970); People v. Landgham, 122 Ill.App.2d 9, 257 N.E.2d 484 (1970). We hold, in light of the foregoing decisions, that the warning given by the Brattleboro police, including the advice that respondent had the right to refuse to answer any questions asked of him while in custody and to talk to an attorney before answering, coupled with the respondent's own admission that he had received the Miranda warnings, and waived his rights thereunder, at least twice shortly before these proceedings, constitute substantial compliance with Miranda as to warning, and a showing of knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his rights which is prerequisite to admission of his oral confession in evidence. The right to remain silent was substantially conveyed. United States v. Lamie, supra ; People v. Landgham, supra . The right to stop answering at any time need not be included in the original warning, so long as it is observed upon specific request. Green v. State, supra; Katzensky v. State, 228 Ga. 6, 183 S.E.2d 749 (1971). We do not read Miranda, as respondent would have us, as requiring notice of a right to talk to an attorney before any questions are asked, rather than answered.