Opinion ID: 2975473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hostile or Offensive Environment

Text: The district court paid lip service to the governing standards, but failed to apply them.2 “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). In order to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sexual harassment, Deters must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by creating a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment; and (5) that there is a basis for employer liability. Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999). It is undisputed that the first three elements of this standard are met on the present record. To assess the fourth element, the court must consider “‘all of the circumstances,’ including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 2 One alternative is to vacate the district court’s summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims and remand the matter for the district court to conduct the appropriate analysis in the first instance. On the other hand, because we review the grant of summary judgment de novo, we may affirm the judgment on grounds other than those employed by the lower court, as long as the party opposing summary judgment is not denied the opportunity to respond. Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, the factual record has been adequately developed and both parties have asserted appellate arguments under the governing standards. We therefore proceed to address the question whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on the merits of Deters’ hostile environment claims, or on Rock-Tenn’s affirmative defense, that should forestall summary judgment. - 13 - No. 06-4356 Deters v. Rock-Tenn Co. employee’s performance.’” Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The “conduct in question must be judged by both an objective and a subjective standard: the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as abusive.” Id. at 658 (quoting Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997)). Rock-Tenn feebly attempts to minimize the offensive nature of Wuchter’s comments and behavior. Although there is no evidence that Wuchter was physically intimidating, his undisputed and seemingly constant preoccupation with, and unwelcome communications about, his own sexual prowess, often while alone with the only female employee in the workplace, are, judged by any reasonable standard, degrading, abusive and inexcusable. Rock-Tenn nonetheless questions whether Deters herself subjectively perceived the attention she received from Wuchter as offensive. In support, Rock-Tenn cites her failure to inform anyone about the inappropriate conversations for some three years. She did not register an objection with Wuchter. She did not report any concern even to Webber, the officer manager, with whom she resided day in and day out as the harassment was ongoing. Rock-Tenn also cites Smith’s understanding, gleaned from his interview with Deters, that although “she felt uncomfortable with some of the comments, . . . she was not offended by them;” and that although she “wanted the comments to stop, . . . she didn’t want him to lose his job.” Smith dep. pp. 28-29, JA 730-31. Again, however, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Deters—particularly her deposition testimony, Deters dep. at 138-147, JA 582-91; the e-mail messages from Deters and - 14 - No. 06-4356 Deters v. Rock-Tenn Co. Webber to Smith, JA 788-89; and Webber’s letter to Smith, JA 697-700—it is clear that a triable issue of fact has been presented on the fourth element, the offensiveness of the work environment.