Opinion ID: 530543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Amount of the Attorney's Fees Award

Text: 21 In determining the amount of the award, a lodestar figure is set by multiplying the hours spent on a case by a reasonable hourly rate of compensation for each attorney involved. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 563, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3097, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). The lodestar figure may be adjusted upward or downward, however, there is [a] strong presumption that the lodestar figure ... represents a 'reasonable' fee. Id. at 565, 106 S.Ct. at 3098. 22 The district court found that [s]ome reduction of the gross lodestar amount is undoubtedly proper in this case, given the limited success of the USFL, and its recovery of only nominal damages. United States Football League, 704 F.Supp. at 484. The lodestar, as such, was reduced by twenty percent. The NFL contends that the lodestar figure should have been reduced more. We note that a party advocating the reduction of the lodestar amount bears the burden of establishing that a reduction is justified. Lindy Bros. Builders Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir.1976). The NFL has failed to meet that burden here. In this case, the district court acted within its discretion in considering a number of factors to determine the reasonableness of the amount of the attorney's fees award. 23
24 The NFL challenges the district court's failure to exclude certain elements that the USFL claimed in its fee application. Specifically, the NFL objects to the district court's failure to exclude attorney's fees for time devoted to the (1) television contract claim and consequent damages; (2) allegations dismissed before trial; and (3) unsuccessful collateral matters. 25 In Hensley, the Supreme Court noted that work on an unsuccessful claim that is based on different facts and legal theories than a successful one may not be included in the fee award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-40. However, a plaintiff's diverse claims for relief may involve a common core of facts or ... be based on related legal theories. Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. In that instance, [m]uch of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Id. The Court held that under those circumstances, the district court should focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff. Id. Where a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, full compensation for attorney's fees would not be reasonable. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. The district court may either attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success. Id. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. 26 In the instant case, all of the USFL's claims involve a common core of facts and are based on related legal theories. Id. at 435, 103 S.Ct. at 1940. However, the USFL was successful on only one of its claims. To compensate for this limited success, the district court exercised its discretion by reducing the amount of the award. Because the district court took into account the USFL's lack of success by reducing the overall attorney's fees award by a certain percentage, allowing compensation for time spent on all of the claims was correct. 27 Here, as previously discussed, the television damages claim was related to the general claim of monopolization of the professional football market in the United States. See supra. Therefore, the NFL's objection to the inclusion of time spent in relation to this claim must fail. 28 The NFL also objects to the district court's failure to exclude time spent by the USFL's attorneys on allegations that were dismissed prior to trial--namely, allegations concerning NFL conduct regarding stadium leases, disparagement and game officials. The work done in relation to those allegations was properly included in the fee award because it was related to the same claim upon which the USFL eventually prevailed. That those allegations were dismissed before trial does not necessitate their exclusion from the basis of the fee award. The development of factual allegations and theories to support a claim is part of the normal litigation process and should be compensable. 29 The same reasoning holds true for the NFL's contentions that the USFL should not receive attorney's fees for work related to unsuccessful collateral matters, such as attempts to introduce evidence of prior judgments against the NFL and evidence of congressional testimony by NFL personnel. The district court opined that to the extent that this time was spent on alternative ways to obtain relief for the NFL's illegal monopolization of professional football, it is fully compensable. United States Football League, 704 F.Supp. at 481. We agree. These collateral issues all stem from and are related to a common core of facts--the alleged antitrust violations. We have previously held that the evidence of the prior judgments was at best marginally probative with respect to the issues in this litigation. United States Football League, 842 F.2d at 1372. We also agreed with the Third Circuit's declaration that in this context, legislative process evidence was  'irrelevant.'  Id. at 1375 (quoting Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League, 720 F.2d 772, 784 (3d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215, 104 S.Ct. 2657, 81 L.Ed.2d 364 (1984)). Thus, time spent by USFL attorneys on these issues is not fully compensable. While the district court did not specifically exclude time spent on these issues, it did reduce the lodestar. Because it was within the district court's discretion to do so, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1941, and we see no abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the fee award because of the inclusion of time spent on these matters. 30 In sum, because the USFL was successful in proving an antitrust injury, all that is required under section 4 of the Clayton Act, it is entitled to attorney's fees for all work done in relation to the common core of facts that resulted in that injury. The district court correctly included these amounts in the fee award. 31
32 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Hensley, the district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award. This is appropriate in view of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. The district court's determination should be overturned only upon a finding of an abuse of that discretion. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy Inc., 776 F.2d 646, 650 (7th Cir.1985). 33 In adjusting a lodestar figure, the Fifth Circuit developed a set of factors that may be taken into consideration. Those factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974). As the Supreme Court noted in Hensley, in adjusting a fee upward or downward, a district court ... may consider ... factors identified in Johnson ... though it should note that many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 1939 n. 9. 34 Here, the district court took the Johnson factors into consideration in determining a reasonable fee. United States Football League, 704 F.Supp. at 485 & n. 12. Applying the Johnson factors, the district court found that the only factor indicating a reduction in the lodestar amount was an evaluation of the results obtained. Focusing on the results obtained as a crucial factor, id. at 485, the district court went on to determine what would be a reasonable award given that the USFL did not succeed in proving violations and damages regarding many of its claims. 35 The district court noted that the USFL exercised billing judgment and in recognition of its limited success, the USFL had already reduced the basic lodestar by twenty percent. According to the district court, the adjusted claimed amount was $7,662,702.13. The USFL also pointed out that it had charged historic billing rates, instead of current rates, and that it had understated the time actually spent on the litigation. Because of the USFL's limited success, the district court fe[lt] compelled, id. at 486, to reduce the amount claimed by the USFL by an additional twenty percent over the ten percent reduction that had previously been imposed for vagueness in the documentation of certain time entries. The district court believed that the resulting thirty percent reduction reflect[ed] a 'reasonable' fee under 15 U.S.C. Sec. 15. Id. The NFL now challenges the amount of the reduction, claiming that the reduction should have been greater. We decline to modify the amount of the reduction imposed by the district court. 36 As the amount of an award is within the discretion of the district court, so is the amount of any reduction. The district court considered the relevant factors in determining the amount of the reduction to impose. We find no abuse of discretion and conclude that the amount of the reduction and of the award should stand.