Opinion ID: 2832723
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Racial Discrimination at OSP

Text: 21 For example, Mr. Brewer’s “sensitive emergency grievance” of September 27, 2012 complaining of being placed on restriction was “unanswered due to the issue not being of an emergency or sensitive nature,” and Mr. Brewer “was directed to follow the standard grievance process.” Mr. Brewer’s May 30, 2013 “emergency grievance” relating to the broken water faucet “went unanswered due to the issue not being of an emergency nature,” and because Mr. Brewer had failed “to provide information regarding any informal action taken to resolve the complaint.” Mr. Brewer’s first grievance to Mr. Knutson about alleged racial discrimination, dated September 17, 2013 and marked “sensitive,” was unacceptable under the guidelines because it was not “of a sensitive nature,” and Mr. Brewer “was directed to follow the standard grievance process.” Finally, Mr. Brewer’s second grievance alleging racial discrimination, dated August 23, 2014, suffered from the “procedural error of raising multiple issues in one grievance,” and this was indicated to Mr. Brewer on the response form. (See Dkt. No. 61, Ex. 15, Affidavit of Mark Knutson dated June 11, 2014, at ¶¶ 7-11.) 20 We also agree with the district court that Mr. Brewer has not sufficiently alleged an equal protection violation. “Equal protection ‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike’.” Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 427 F.3d 775, 792 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)), vacated on rehearing on other grounds by 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006). Thus, to establish an equal protection violation, Mr. Brewer must allege facts that show the defendants treated him differently than other similarly situated prisoners. Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1261 (10th Cir. 2006).22 Considering Mr. Brewer’s complaint under this standard, we conclude it fails to state a plausible equal protection claim against any named defendant. Mr. Brewer’s generic allegations of racial discrimination at OSP—ungrounded in specific factual averments that would show that he was treated differently from similarly situated white prisoners—are insufficient to state a plausible equal protection claim. Compare Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1322–23 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff could not show an equal protection violation where he made vague and conclusory allegations but failed to provide specific facts 22 Because Mr. Brewer asserts an equal protection claim based on race, it is unnecessary for him to show that his treatment was not reasonably related to some legitimate penological purpose. See Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813, 820 (10th Cir. 2014); cf. Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367, 371 (10th Cir. 1994) (concluding that because the prisoner failed to allege disparate treatment on the basis of any suspect classification, he was required to show that the distinction between himself and other inmates was not reasonably related to some legitimate penological purpose). 21 showing that white inmates were treated more favorably), with Tennyson v. Carpenter, 558 F. App’x 813, 820 (10th Cir. 2014) (concluding that an equal protection claim was not frivolous where the defendant alleged that he was the only African American in the choir and the only member disciplined for conduct common to all choir members, thereby alleging a suspect classification based on race). For this reason, the district court correctly rejected Mr. Brewer’s claims that defendants Crenshaw, Jones, Knight, Knutson, Parker, Sherwood, Taylor, or Lightle impermissibly discriminated against him on the basis of his race.