Opinion ID: 2338257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was a special exception required?

Text: The GRA's main argument is that the plain and unambiguous language of the zoning regulations, specifically 11 DCMR § 205, has only one meaning: that a special exception is a prerequisite for all child development centers in all residential zones, and that the BZA therefore erred when it ruled that the permits could issue without a special exception because the child development center at issue was already a permissible accessory use. [8] We hold, to the contrary, that the BZA's conclusion was correct as a matter of law and fully consistent with the zoning regulations. 11 DCMR § 205.1 provides that child development centers shall be permitted in an [R-3] [9] district if approved by the [BZA] in accordance with the conditions specified in § 3108 of chapter 31 of this title, subject to the provisions of this section. Section 3108, in turn, states that the BZA may grant special exceptions for, among other things, child development centers in residentially zoned districts. Although section 205, when read in isolation, seems to require a special exception for all child development centers, the BZA ruled, in essence, that because the 1990 Campus Plan had already been approved by the grant of a special exception under section 210, [10] and because the child development center was a use consistent with the uses approved in that plan, a second special exception under section 205.1 was not required. Reading the zoning regulations as a whole, [11] we agree with the general proposition advanced by the BZA and the University: that if a specific land use has already been approved by the grant of a special exception under section 210, and no change in that use or construction of additional buildings is proposed, then a second special exception under section 205 for the already approved use is not required. See Levy v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 570 A.2d 739, 748-749 (D.C.1990). We agree with the University that requiring a second special exception in such a case, granted after its own separate hearing, would render the first special exception meaningless. [12] The real issue in this case is whether the proposed child development center was in fact a use consistent with the uses permitted under the 1990 Campus Plan, so that it can correctly be said that such a use was effectively approved in 1990. Under the 1990 Campus Plan, Poulton Hall was approved for use as mixed use main campus education/educational support. The BZA ruled in this case that accessory uses were permitted under that designation and that the child development center was such an accessory use. There are two separate questions here which we must address: first, was the use as a child development center an accessory use within the meaning of the zoning regulations, and second, is such an accessory use permissible under a campus plan designation of mixed use main campus education/educational support without additional BZA approval? We answer both questions in the affirmative. The zoning regulations define an accessory use as a use customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use, and located on the same lot with the principal use. 11 DCMR § 199. Section 321.1(b) of the regulations further defines an accessory use in an R-3 zone as a use incidental to permitted uses. The Acting Zoning Administrator and the BZA both concluded that the child development center was an accessory use to the University. At the hearing before the BZA, the Administrator testified that the center was such an accessory use because it serve[d] ... the University population and supported the University's educational mission. In its order the BZA held that, because the child development center would be used exclusively by University faculty, staff, and students and would support the teaching mission of the University, it was an accessory use. The BZA also pointed out that child development centers on other university campuses in the District have been approved as a matter of right without additional BZA approval. See note 4, supra. We have generally afforded the BZA fairly wide latitude in construing the term accessory use, so long as its interpretation is rational and not inconsistent with the zoning regulations. [13] In Citizens Coalition v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 619 A.2d 940 (D.C. 1993), we upheld the BZA's conclusion that an addition to a power plant located on the Georgetown campus was an accessory use to the University. [14] We endorsed as reasonable the BZA's interpretation of the phrase accessory use to include the power plant because it was clearly subordinate, incidental and related to the principal use of the University, id. at 956, and found the BZA's rationale convincing: Like food sold in a cafeteria to students, the energy generated by the facility, used to heat dormitories, classrooms, a hospital, and other campus buildings, would also be for the benefit of the students, and thus serve as an accessory use to the principal function of the University. Id. at 951. Applying the same reasoning, we conclude that the BZA's acceptance of the child development center in this case as an accessory use was reasonable and consistent with the regulations. The center was proposed for use exclusively by University employees and students, and was thus for the benefit of those persons and clearly subordinate, incidental, and related to the principal use of the University. Id. at 951, 956. Furthermore, substantial evidence supports the proposition that child care centers are customarily incidental to a functioning college or university. [15] The GRA argues nevertheless that this particular child care center is not an accessory use because it fails the same lot test set forth in the zoning regulations. See 11 DCMR § 199 (a use customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use, and located on the same lot with the principal use); Hilton Hotels, supra note 13, 363 A.2d at 671 (facility not on same lot is not an accessory use). Specifically, because Poulton Hall stands on lot 835, in a residential neighborhood and not on Georgetown's main campus, which bears a different lot number in the District of Columbia land records (it is directly across the street), the GRA claims it cannot be deemed an accessory use to the University. This argument is unavailing. Both the Acting Zoning Administrator and the BZA interpreted lot in this context to mean the entire University, not just the record lot, for the purpose of its consideration as an accessory use. We uphold the BZA's ruling on this issue, since it is consistent with both the zoning regulations and our case law. See 11 DCMR § 199 (A lot may or may not be the land so recorded on the records of the Surveyor of the District of Columbia); Citizens Coalition, 619 A.2d at 955 (holding that, because the proposed power plant was on a remote part of the University campus, the same lot requirement for accessory uses was satisfied); see also Georgetown Residents Alliance v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 802 A.2d 359, 366 (D.C.2002) (distinguishing between lot and lot of record). We next consider whether the BZA erred in determining that such a use was permissible under the 1990 Campus Plan designation of Poulton Hall for mixed use education/educational support [16] as a matter of right. We find no error in the BZA's conclusion that the center was covered by this designation and that BZA approval before the permits could issue was therefore unnecessary. At the BZA hearing, the Acting Zoning Administrator testified that the mixed use/educational use category would leave the door open for accessory uses and that, in her opinion and in the opinion of past Zoning Administrators, when a child development center is introduced to an existing building, [it does] not need a special exception. The BZA held that the University did not need to amend its campus plan to establish the child development center at Poulton Hall because it was permitted under the land use category of education/educational support. Nothing in the zoning regulations states explicitly whether any particular accessory use may be allowed under a campus plan without a special exception. [17] Our case law likewise contains no explicit discussion of the issue. In several cases we have considered the validity of BZA grants of special exceptions for accessory uses, see note 13, supra, and we have recognized that a special exception is necessary for accessory uses involving new construction. See National Cathedral, 753 A.2d at 986; Citizens Coalition, 619 A.2d at 947. We have also held that, under the zoning regulations, an addition to a university cannot be located in residential zone as a matter of right. See Duke v. American University, 675 A.2d 26, 27 (D.C.1996). But those cases do not discuss whether certain accessory uses, such as a child development center, are permissible as a matter of right without BZA approval. The BZA has held on prior occasions that child development centers are permitted on university campuses as a matter of right [18] so long as they are restricted to use by employees and students of the university. [19] We find nothing in the regulations that conflicts with that interpretation, at least when no new construction is involved. We have also recognized that some flexibility is warranted in dealing with campus plans. See Duke, 675 A.2d at 28 (university not required to build law school at site previously approved by BZA); Glenbrook Road, 605 A.2d at 34 n. 8 (university could resume past use of a site without BZA approval). Realistically, this must be so, since university officials cannot predict with specificity exactly how the campus must adapt to future needs when developing a ten-year campus plan. Furthermore, the GRA has cited no case in which a college or university was required to go before the BZA for approval when it planned to change only the use of a building and no additional construction was proposed. We therefore hold that the BZA did not err in determining that the child development center was permissible as a matter of right under the zoning regulations.