Opinion ID: 1236325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: S00A1048 Charles Jackson v. The State.

Text: Charles Jackson was arrested in October 1997. In February 1998 and again in May 1998 he filed pro se Sixth Amendment demands for a speedy trial. In June 1998 he was released on bond and simultaneously, through counsel, withdrew his demands for speedy trial. He was reindicted in March 1999. At that same time Jackson filed a motion adopting all motions of his other co-defendants. While the nearly two-year period between arrest and date of trial is presumptively prejudicial, having withdrawn his earlier Sixth Amendment assertions of his right to a speedy trial, Jackson did not purport to demand a speedy trial until approximately 18 months after arrest when he joined in the motion pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170. This delay is weighted against him. The reasons for delay are the same as those raised in his co-defendant's case and to the extent that they involve the continuance to indict, then sever, Nolton and Mosely are weighted against the state. However, Jackson offers no evidence to support his claim that the eight months he spent incarcerated constitute actual prejudice, or to support his assertion that there is possible prejudice arising from his inability to assist his counsel in investigating the case and locating witnesses. Jackson's release from jail 15 months prior to the scheduled trial date provided ample opportunity to assist his counsel in this regard if he so desired. Thus the trial court did not err in denying Jackson's motion to dismiss the indictment against him. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except CARLEY, J., who concurs in judgment only.