Opinion ID: 597873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Concealment of Charges Against Hughes

Text: 11 At trial, Hughes testified about his prior encounters with law enforcement officials, but failed to mention that he was facing a charge for conspiracy to steal an automobile in juvenile court. This charge stemmed from the events of July 22. Harrington contends his due process rights were violated, but is unclear as to the precise nature of this claim. He does not argue his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to elicit this information; instead, he seems to argue 1) the prosecutor did not reveal this information to his trial counsel, and/or 2) the mere failure of the jury to hear this evidence, regardless of its cause, was fundamental error. 12 We reject Harrington's second contention as lacking any legal basis. With regard to his claim that the prosecution withheld this information from his trial counsel, Harrington relies exclusively upon inferences. Because the trial strategy involved demonstrating Hughes was an accomplice, Harrington's attorney obviously would have wanted to introduce evidence that he had been charged with a crime stemming from the events of July 22. The failure to introduce this evidence could have been caused only by the attorney's failure to have this information. 4 13 These inferences fall well short of demonstrating the prosecution withheld evidence of Hughes' juvenile charges. In the course of state post-conviction hearings, the Iowa state courts found Hughes truthfully answered the questions he was asked; Harrington v. State, No. 88-1216, slip op. at 5 (Iowa Ct.App. Jan. 25, 1990); at trial, Hughes was asked whether he was facing murder charges, but was not asked whether he faced conspiracy charges relating to the planned auto theft. These findings of fact are granted a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988). Furthermore, the district court found that the prosecutor's office maintained an open file policy, and that Hughes' pending juvenile charge was thus available to Harrington's counsel. Harrington v. Nix, No. 4-91-CV-80046, slip op. at 5 (S.D.Iowa Nov. 25, 1991). Finally, there is a plausible explanation for Harrington's attorney's knowing failure to present this evidence to the jury. The charges were filed solely because Hughes fled Iowa after testifying at McGhee's trial, and Iowa officials needed a means of securing Hughes' presence at trial. Harrington's trial counsel may have declined to explore the issue because it would demonstrate to the jury that Hughes was trying to avoid testifying against Harrington. We also note that the importance of this evidence to the outcome is doubtful at best. Even if the fact of this charge proved Hughes was Harrington's accomplice, there was still corroboration sufficient to satisfy Iowa's corroboration requirement. See Harrington, 284 N.W.2d at 248-49. Hughes' testimony already demonstrated that he had a criminal history and that he was at the scene of the crime; the charge represented little, if any, extra impeachment value.