Opinion ID: 540349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the strike

Text: 28 The appellants contend that contract rejection damages should be available for the time the employees were out on strike. As noted above, the purpose of Section 502(g) is to give the same remedy as would be available had the contract not been rejected. Absent constructive dismissal by the employer, 5 employees who strike are not ordinarily entitled to back pay for the period for time they are on strike, even if the strike is in response to an unfair labor practice. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 198 n. 7, 61 S.Ct. 845, 854 n. 7, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (noting that the NLRB does not award backpay for an unfair labor practice strike); J.H. Rutter-Rex Manuf. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir.1968), rev'd on other grounds, 396 U.S. 258, 90 S.Ct. 417, 24 L.Ed.2d 405 (1969) (liability for backpay to unfair labor practice strikers begins with application for reinstatement); Studio 44, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. No. 67 at 13 n. 22 (1987) (It is well settled that unfair labor practice strikers are not entitled to reinstatement and backpay until they have made an unconditional offer to return to work); Comfort, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1090 (1965), enforced, NLRB v. Comfort, Inc., 365 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.1966). As no damages would have been available to Continental employees for the time when they were on strike outside of bankruptcy, none should be given in this instance. 29 The cases relied upon by the appellants do not dictate a different outcome. For example, the appellants cite our decisions in Mungin v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., 416 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir.1969) and United Industrial Workers v. Board of Trustees of Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905, 89 S.Ct. 1747, 23 L.Ed.2d 219 (1969), in support of their contention that a back pay remedy is available for striking employees. In both of these cases the disputed actions of the carriers constituted violations of Sec. 6 of the Railway Labor Act, for which we ruled that back-pay could be awarded as a sanction, calculated from the time of the wrongful discharge until the employees were reinstated pending bargaining. Id. at 328. We noted that the purpose of the sanction was to recreate, so far as possible, the status quo before the wrongful action was taken and to maintain it until the carriers complied with the good faith bargaining required by Sec. 6 of the Act. Id. at 329. 30 The plaintiffs' reliance upon Mungin and Galveston Wharves in the present instance is misplaced. Continental's rejection of the collective bargaining agreement, unenforceable from the time of the bankruptcy filing, involved no statutory violation. 6 In consequence, we have no such concern to preserve the status quo pending statutory compliance as we had in Mungin and Galveston Wharves. We noted the distinction between cases involving statutory violations and those involving breach of contract in both Galveston Wharves and Mungin when we stated:  'But the employees here do not claim backpay for a breach of contract. Their claim arises out of a violation of the federal statute. The contract-dispute cases therefore are not relevant.'  Mungin, 416 F.2d at 1177 (quoting Galveston Wharves, 400 F.2d at 327). Similarly, as the claims here involved are for contract rejection damages, our holdings concerning sanctions for statutory violations are not relevant. 31 Another case relied upon by the appellants, Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v. NLRB, 605 F.2d 60 (2d.Cir.1979), actually supports our ruling here. In Carpenter, an employer's unilateral change in wages and benefits prompted its union employees to strike. An Administrative Law Judge found the employer to have committed an unfair labor practice and ordered the strikers be reinstated with back pay. This order was modified by the NLRB to include a back pay award for the strike replacements as well. On appeal, the court in Carpenter enforced only that portion of the Board's order which awarded back pay to the reinstated strikers. The appellants assume that the back pay was to run from the beginning of the strike. A reading of the Board's order itself, however, reveals that the award was to consist of the difference between the wages and other economic benefits which [the workers] actually received and the economic benefits which they would have received absent Respondent's unlawful conduct. 238 N.L.R.B. 974, 976 (1978). The Board ruled that the employer's liability for back pay shall commence as of the date of the employee's unconditional offer to return to work. Id. (citing Newport News Shipbilding and Dry Dock Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1637 (1978)).