Opinion ID: 2051555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Regulation More Extensive Than Necessary to Serve the Governmental Interest?

Text: Despite its conclusion that the ordinance in question did not meet the third prong of the Central Hudson test, the Court of Appeals also determined that there was not a reasonable fit between the ordinance and the goal of preserving the residential character of neighborhoods because the hazards plaintiff seeks to prevent can be easily remedied by restrictions short of a total ban on home occupation signs. 224 Mich.App. at 331-332, 568 N.W.2d 832. Once again, we are unpersuaded by the Court of Appeals analysis. The last prong of the Central Hudson inquiry requires us to analyze the fit between the ban on home occupation signs in this case and the city's interest in preserving the character of its residential neighborhoods. The United States Supreme Court explained the requirements of this fourth prong as follows: What our decisions require is a `fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends, a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have put it in the other contexts discussed above, a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed. [ Fox, 492 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (citations omitted).] Thus, the ordinance does not have to be the least restrictive means to remedy the asserted governmental interest. The fact that there may be less restrictive means to accomplish the government's goals will not invalidate an ordinance as long as the ordinance still provides the required reasonable fit. The question is whether the city's ban on home occupation signs is a reasonable and narrowly tailored way to preserve the nature and character of residential neighborhoods. Again, we draw guidance from the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Metromedia and Vincent. In Metromedia, the Court concluded that a ban on billboards was narrowly tailored to meet the twin goals of traffic safety and aesthetics. It explained: If the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them. The city has gone no further than necessary in seeking to meet its ends. Indeed, it has stopped short of fully accomplishing its ends: It has not prohibited all billboards, but allows onsite advertising and some other specifically exempted signs. [ Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508,101 S.Ct. 2882.] In Vincent, the Court concluded the same was true for signs posted on public property. Since Vincent involved noncommercial speech on public property, the Court analyzed the ordinance at issue under the strict scrutiny standard. Following the lead of the Court in Metromedia, it upheld the ban on signs on public property: As recognized in Metromedia, if the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them. 453 U.S. at 508, 101 S.Ct. 2882. As is true of billboards, the esthetic interests that are implicated by temporary signs are presumptively at work in all parts of the city, including those where appellees posted their signs, and there is no basis in the record in this case upon which to rebut that presumption. These interests are both psychological and economic. The character of the environment affects the quality of life and the value of property in both residential and commercial areas. We hold that on this record these interests are sufficiently substantial to justify this content-neutral, impartially administered prohibition against the posting of appellees' temporary signs on public property and that such an application of the ordinance does not create an unacceptable threat to the profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, [84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686] (1964). [ [Vincent, 466 U.S. at 817, 104 S.Ct. 2118.] We agree with the United States Supreme Court that, in the present case, one of the most effective ways for the city to protect the character of residential areas may be to prohibit home occupation signs altogether. Stopping short of prohibiting home occupation signs might still allow the blurring of the line between residential and commercial districts, and would not advance the city's interest as fully as a ban. As noted above, the city still must prove the direct link between the ordinance and the harm sought to be prevented on remand. However, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that the possibility of adopting restrictions short of a ban necessarily makes the ordinance unconstitutional.