Opinion ID: 2156846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the officers violate the Fourth Amendment when they searched Freeman's vehicle and found the drug evidence?

Text: Freeman alleges the district court should have granted his motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment; therefore, our review is de novo. State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 36 (Iowa 2005). Under this review, we `make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record.' State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001) (citation omitted). We give deference to the district court's fact findings due to its opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those findings. Id. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution makes the Fourth Amendment binding on the states. Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 37. Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, unless one of the few carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant requirement exists. State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Iowa 2004). Exceptions recognized by this court are searches based on consent, plain view, probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and those based on the emergency aid exception. Id. The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable. State v. Cadotte, 542 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Iowa 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n. 2. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in a prosecution, no matter how relevant or probative the evidence may be. State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Iowa 1995). We base our assessment of a law enforcement officer's conduct on an objective standard. State v. Hofmann, 537 N.W.2d 767, 770 (Iowa 1995). The legality of the search does not depend on the actual motivations of the law enforcement officers involved in the search. State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 361 (Iowa 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n. 2. Freeman concedes the officers had reasonable suspicion justifying the investigatory stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968) (holding an officer may make an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion). Freeman also concedes the officers were justified in patting him down for weapons. See id. at 24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d at 907-08 (holding an officer may conduct a pat down search of an individual whose suspicious behavior is being investigated to determine if the individual is carrying a weapon). However, Freeman does not concede the search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest. He argues, because it was not illegal for him to carry a knife with a blade less than five inches, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him for violating Iowa Code section 724.4(3)( b ). Iowa Code section 804.7(3) allows a peace officer to make an arrest without a warrant [w]here the peace officer has reasonable ground for believing that an indictable public offense has been committed and has reasonable ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it. The `reasonable ground for belief' standard within section 804.7(3) is tantamount to probable cause. State v. Harris, 490 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1992). Probable cause is present if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it. State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Iowa 1990). If there is probable cause to arrest a person, then a search of the person arrested and the area within the person's immediate control is lawful. See State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 492 (Iowa 1999) (stating [t]he United States Supreme Court has previously recognized there is ample justification for the search of an arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control), abrogated on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n. 2; State v. Morris, 227 N.W.2d 150, 152 (Iowa 1975) (stating that a warrantless search of the person is permissible, within limits, if effected pursuant to a lawful arrest, but that for the arrest to justify a related search it must be based upon probable cause). The Minnesota Supreme Court considered a fact pattern similar to the one presented by this case. State v. Johnson, 314 N.W.2d 229 (Minn.1982). There the officers arrested the defendant for violating a city ordinance making it illegal to carry a knife over four inches long. Id. at 230. Once at the station, the officers measured the knife and determined it was only three inches long. Id. The Minnesota court stated, the officers who arrested [the] defendant had to make their probable cause assessment in the field and on the spot, without the benefit of a ruler. Id. at 231. Based on this proposition, as well as the fact that another officer testified at trial that he actually had to measure the knife to determine for certain that it was not in excess of four inches, the court held the officers acted reasonably. Id. Further, the court noted that although it later turns out that the officers were mistaken in their belief that a crime had been committed, it does not mean that they did not have probable cause at the time they made their assessment. Id. at 230. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we note the officer who removed the knife from Freeman testified that his examination of the knife led him to believe the blade was at least five inches in length. Moreover, at the time the officer examined the knife, he was in the process of investigating a potential armed robbery involving two suspects. The officers did not determine the knife's blade was four-and-a-half inches in length until they returned to the station and measured the blade. Even if the officer had a ruler in his possession at the time of the investigation, he was not required to abandon his investigation to measure the blade of the knife. Rather, the officer was required to use his best judgment to make an on-the-spot determination as to the length of the blade. Our examination of the knife confirms that an officer in the field in the midst of investigating a potential armed robbery could have reasonably believed the blade was at least five inches in length. Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer acted reasonably in believing that the blade of the knife was at least five inches long and that Freeman was committing a crime by having the knife in his possession. Simply because it was later determined the knife Freeman was carrying was less than five inches in length does not mean the arrest was invalid. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.2(d) (4th ed. 2004) (stating [a]n otherwise valid arrest is not rendered illegal by the fact that it turns out the arrestee is innocent). Consequently, the search of Freeman's vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest based upon probable cause. Therefore, we affirm the district court order overruling Freeman's motion to suppress.