Opinion ID: 2643677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Concerted Action Instruction

Text: Petitioner argues that it was error for the circuit court to give the following concerted action instruction to the jury: A person who is the absolute perpetrator of a crime is a principal in the first degree. A person who is actually or constructively present at the scene of a crime at the same time as the criminal act of the absolute perpetrator, who acts with shared criminal intent, contributing to the criminal act of the absolute perpetrator, is an aider and abettor, and a principal in the second degree, and as such may be criminally liable for the criminal act as if he were the absolute perpetrator of the crime. Actual physical presence at the scene of the criminal act is not necessary where the aider and abettor was constructively present at a convenient distance at the time and place of the criminal act, acting in concert with the absolute perpetrator. However, you are cautioned that merely witnessing a crime without intervention therein does not make a person a party to its commission unless his interference was a duty, and his non-interference was designed by him and operated as an encouragement to or for protection of the absolute perpetrator of the criminal act. Petitioner acknowledges that this instruction is consistent with Syllabus Point 11 of State v. Fortner, 182 W.Va. 345, 387 S.E.2d 812 (1989): “[u]nder the concerted action principle, a defendant who is present at the scene of a crime and, by acting with another, contributes to the criminal act, is criminally liable for such offense as if he were the sole perpetrator.” However, petitioner argues that the instruction should have included more language from our discussion in the Fortner opinion. He asserts that the instruction should have required the State to prove that he “knowingly intended to assist, encourage, or facilitate the design of the criminal actor.” Id., 182 W.Va. at 356, 387 S.E.2d at 823. We disagree. The language which petitioner cites from the discussion in Fortner was used to help explain the intent requirement for an aider and abettor. We conclude that the circuit court sufficiently addressed the intent requirement in its instruction. The circuit court covered this issue by instructing that there must be more than mere presence; an aider and abettor must “act[] with shared criminal intent, contributing to the criminal act of the absolute perpetrator[.]” The circuit court’s instruction was a correct statement of the law. 7 Petitioner also suggests that there was no showing of any shared intent between himself and Mr. Cross, therefore a concerted action instruction should not have been given. We easily reject this argument. The State asserted, and based upon their verdict, the jury found, that petitioner and Cross ran toward a vehicle together, attacking and severely stabbing their victims. The only difference is that petitioner’s victim survived his severe stabbing wounds, while Cross’s victim died. Under the facts of this case, there was sufficient evidence for the court to instruct the jury on a concerted action theory.