Opinion ID: 626397
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Saldana

Text: Saldana was convicted of extortion under the Hobbs Act, which required the government to prove that the defendant obstructed, delayed, or affected commerce by extortion and that the defendant acted knowingly and willfully. See United States v. Driggs, 823 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1951). Saldana contends that there was insufficient evidence of an actual effect on interstate commerce. We review de novo the District Court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. United States v. Brodie, 403 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005). We “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and 5 must sustain a jury’s verdict if a reasonable jury believing the government’s evidence could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government proved all the elements of the offenses.” United States v. Rosario, 118 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). We find, as the District Court did, that federal jurisdiction existed under the Hobbs Act based on the “depletion of assets” theory. See United States v. Marrero, 299 F.3d 653, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2002). There was sufficient evidence introduced at trial from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that interstate commerce was affected, as required for a conviction under the Hobbs Act because the FBI had supplied the $5,000 that was to be paid to defendants. Moreover, although the sham narcotics had already been destroyed, that act was not so far in the past as to be an inappropriate basis for a Hobbs Act violation. We conclude, therefore, that the District Court properly denied Saldana’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Saldana alleges that the government failed to search for possible sources of exculpatory information regarding Sauter, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). For a Brady claim, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 (3d Cir. 1991). To establish a due process violation under Brady, a defendant must show that: 1) evidence was suppressed, 2) the suppressed evidence was favorable to the defense, and 3) the suppressed evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment. United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005). The District Court found, and we agree, that 6 Saldana has failed to point to any evidence that the government withheld from him or to articulate how such evidence would have resulted in his acquittal.
Saldana contends that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial based on exclusion of the public during jury selection. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993). Our review is plenary when the denial was “based on the application of legal precepts.” Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1994). On the basis of testimony introduced at the evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that individuals had been excluded from the courtroom by a Court Security Officer (CSO) during jury roll call at a time when the judge was not present in the courtroom. Moreover, it is not clear whether the closure continued after the judge entered the courtroom. If it did -- and the judge was not aware of any closure – it was for an insignificant period. The District Court concluded that Saldana was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial because the alleged closure was neither ordered nor directed by the District Court and it did not appear to have occurred during a judicial proceeding to which the Sixth Amendment attaches. Greene raised an identical claim, based on testimony introduced at the same evidentiary hearing, in a prior related appeal. On appeal of that conviction we affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Greene did not suffer harm of constitutional dimension when a CSO temporarily prevented his family member from entering the courtroom. United States v. Greene, 431 F. App’x 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2011). We noted there, as we do 7 here, that the partial closure was limited in both duration and scope and occurred unbeknownst to the trial judge. See id. at 196-97. Again, we hold that the District Court properly concluded that Saldana was not denied his right to a public trial.
Saldana argues that the District Court erred in denying his request to give a jury instruction on the public authority defense. Where a party objects to the failure to give a particular jury instruction, we review de novo whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard and review for abuse of discretion the refusal to give a particular instruction. United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008). A defendant is “entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1995). “It is well settled that there is no error to refuse to instruct as counsel wishes if the charge to the jury is correct.” United States v. Blair, 456 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1972). Public authority, either actual public authority or apparent public authority, is an affirmative defense. See United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 755-58 (3d Cir. 1999). Saldana testified at trial and denied committing any illegal acts. Because of this evidence, there was no basis for a defense that he was authorized to commit the acts, nor was there any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in Saldana’s favor on a public authority defense. The District Court therefore correctly charged the jury and did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the requested instruction. 8