Opinion ID: 1443085
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Coleman Affidavit Excluded

Text: On April 18, 2005, PwC filed a motion for summary judgment, based, inter alia, on the ground that the appellants' auditing and accounting expert had failed to identify admissible evidence of any material misstatement in Lason's 1997 financial statements on which they allegedly relied. The appellants opposed PwC's motion and submitted an affidavit from the appellant, Richard Coleman. In that affidavit, Coleman purported, for the first time, to offer expert testimony, alleging that, [us]ing [his] skills as a trained auditor and accountant, [he] duplicated Mr. Reynolds' analysis and . . . agree[d] with his conclusion. The Superior Court ruled that this affidavit was untimely as purported expert testimony, and inadmissible as lay opinion testimony. The trial judge's rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. [10] The appellants allege abuse of discretion in the trial judge's determination that he would not consider an affidavit of Richard Coleman. The trial judge stated that he would not accept the Coleman affidavit [b]ecause the testimony that Mr. Coleman would provide at trial pertaining to alleged material misstatements in the 1997 financial statements is either expert testimony proffered under Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence (`D.R.E.') 703 or lay testimony proffered under D.R.E. 701 and Mr. Coleman is not qualified under either rule to testify as such. The record reflects that determination was both legally correct and within the trial court's discretion. Coleman asserted in his affidavit that, hav[ing] come to read the deposition of James Reynolds . . . . [that Mr. Reynolds] stated on page 58 of his deposition testimony that, Lason had misstated its 1997 income by $5,583,000. Coleman further asserted that [u]sing my skills as a trained auditor and accountant, I duplicated Mr. Reynolds' analysis and I agree with his conclusion. The trial judge concluded, based on Mr. Coleman's own words, that Coleman was proffering expert testimony. The trial judge then ruled that the appellants had failed to designate Coleman as an expert during pretrial discovery, thereby depriving PwC of an opportunity to cross examine Mr. Coleman on his expert opinion. The appellants do not dispute that they did not designate Coleman as an expert witness during pretrial discovery, or that rules of civil procedure required them to do so. [11] The trial judge also ruled that the appellants failed to satisfy D.R.E. 702's requirements that a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. The trial judge concluded that, despite Coleman's claim that he duplicated Reynolds' analysis, Reynolds himself testified that he relied on memos written by Lason's controller that he was not able to identify further, and to which Coleman presumably . . . did not have access. Reynolds also testified that he relied on the books and records of Lason. Coleman testified, however, that he did not have access to Lason's books or records and was unaware of their contents. Alternatively, the trial judge ruled that Coleman's affidavit did not constitute a proper lay opinion. The trial judge noted that D.R.E. 602 states that [a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. The trial judge further noted that, under D.R.E. 701, [I]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness. The trial judge concluded that the appellants did not satisfy the requirements of Rules 602 and 701 with respect to Coleman's testimony since it was admittedly not based on either `personal knowledge of the matter' or `based on the perception of the witness.' That conclusion was based on Coleman's own admissions that his opinion was based on read[ing] the deposition of James Reynolds, and that he had no familiarity with Lason's books and records. Based on the record before him, the trial judge's rulings regarding the proffered affidavit of Coleman cannot be said to have exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances [or] so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice. [12] Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in applying the requirements of D.R.E. 602, 701 and 702 to the facts of this case.