Opinion ID: 1372628
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extenuation of the Crimes' Gravity.

Text: (24) As described above, the jury was told it could consider any other circumstance that might extenuate the crimes' gravity, even though the circumstance would not provide a legal excuse for the crimes. Defendant contends the instruction unconstitutionally restricted the jury's consideration of sympathetic aspects of defendant's background and character. The United States Supreme Court has held otherwise, concluding that reasonable jurors would not understand the instruction to restrict consideration of sympathetic background evidence. ( Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 381-382 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329-330, 110 S.Ct. 1190].) Defendant argues that Boyde is distinguishable on its facts because, among other things, the prosecutor in that case acknowledged that the jury could consider defendant's character ( id. at pp. 385-386 [108 L.Ed.2d at pp. 332-333]), whereas in this case the prosecutor told the jury to disregard sympathy. We have already explained that the prosecutor's comment was insignificant in the context of the other instructions and the penalty trial as a whole. (See pt. III.A.1., ante. ) Hence we are unpersuaded that the distinction is material: even in light of the prosecution's comment there is no reasonable likelihood ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663) that the jury misconstrued the instruction to preclude any consideration of sympathy for defendant.