Opinion ID: 186193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 52 In considering Evergreen's petition for review, we must ask whether the Board's determination that the Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and Port Engineers are employees under the Act has warrant in the record and a reasonable basis in law. Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 761 (D.C.Cir.2002); see also NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 860-61, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944). As the Supreme Court noted in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, we accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and consistent with the Act. 444 U.S. at 691, 100 S.Ct. at 867. Under the Act, it is clear that [t]he findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2000). Substantial evidence means `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' MECO Corp. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1434, 1436 (D.C.Cir.1993) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)). Additionally, the court will uphold the Board's decision upon substantial evidence even if we would reach a different result upon de novo review. See Perdue Farms, Inc., Cookin' Good Div. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 830, 834-35 (D.C.Cir. 1998). In short, this court reverses for lack of substantial evidence only when the record is `so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find' to the contrary. Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 955, 961 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 244 (D.C.Cir.1993)). With this standard of review in mind, we turn to the principal findings supporting the Board's conclusion that the five employees are not managerial. We also address Evergreen's claim that the Board's decision cannot be squared with Yeshiva.
53 The Act only extends its protections and guarantees to those workers who meet the statutory definition of employee. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). In NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974), the Supreme Court held that Congress intended to exclude from the protections of the Act all employees properly classified as managerial. Id. at 275, 94 S.Ct. at 1762. Employees are properly classified as managerial when they formulate and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their employer. Id. at 288, 94 S.Ct. at 1768-69 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n. 4, 1947 WL 8976 (1947)); accord Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 682, 100 S.Ct. at 862; Gen. Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at 857. The Supreme Court has made it clear that employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been assigned are not managers under the Act. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690, 100 S.Ct. at 866. 54 The Board's finding that Port Captains, the Assistant Port Captain, and the Port Engineer do not exercise managerial discretion is clearly supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is consistent with the Act. The record shows that, in all but the most routine tasks, the Port Captains are tethered to the Section Manager. Assistant Port Captain Meng and Port Captain Yang testified, without contradiction, that Port Captains follow strict policies and guidelines in performing their jobs, with constant direction from their manager. 55 Evergreen argues that the Board ignored evidence of Port Captains' discretion and authority over a ship's regional schedule. See Petitioner's Br. at 16. The Employer points to Junior Vice President Chen's testimony that, under certain circumstances, Port Captains may order extra gangs if needed. Hearing Tr. at 101, 178, 195-96. But Assistant Port Captain Meng's testimony established that the Employer's Project Department sets the ship's schedule, and that circumstances requiring a change of schedule should be reported to the manager. Id. at 270. Meng testified that he had never ordered extra gangs, and that he would not do this unless [he had] the approval from the manager. Id. at 386. Meng also explained that, when a ship arrived behind schedule in the late evening and was scheduled to sail early the next morning, he had to consult with his manager about the additional gangs necessary to get the ship out. Id. at 379-92. 56 The Section Manager's close supervision of the Port Captains' purported exercise of discretion in the ordering of extra gangs was confirmed by Port Captain Yang's testimony. Yang testified that if two or more EMC ships unexpectedly berth at the same time, the labor adjustments are made by the manager in consultation with the terminal. Id. at 473-75. Yang also stated that he never ordered extra gangs on his own, and that the manager coordinated such tasks with the terminal supervisor. Id. at 474. 57 The record clearly establishes that Port Captains do not set a ship's schedule —they merely administer it in consultation with their manager. The Board considered the evidence that Port Captains exercise some discretion over a ship's schedule and estimate the number of labor gangs needed. See Representation Decision, slip op. at 14-15, J.A. 554-55. However, the Board reasonably concluded that this discretion is professional, not managerial. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. at 857-58. 58 Evergreen also argues that the Representation Decision failed to recognize the discretionary authority of Port Captains over stowage plans. See Petitioner's Br. at 18. Both Junior Vice President Chia-Lin Chen and Section Manager Johnnie Chen testified that they need not approve the Port Captain's stowage plan before it takes effect, and that they review the plan after the stowage is completed. Hearing Tr. at 172, 490. But Meng's testimony established that, in practice, Port Captains follow specific guidelines in the preparation and execution of stowage plans. Meng reports to the manager after determining the location of reefers, which are considered special cargo. The manager, not the Port Captain, determines whether a reefer mechanic should be hired in such circumstances. Id. at 318. Meng also testified that when a customer requests a major change in the stowage plan, such as the shifting of 30 containers, he must report to his manager, who must approve the change. Id. at 323-24. According to Meng, Port Captains also receive instructions for loading or discharging hazardous cargos. The manager, not the Port Captain, decides when the hazardous cargo can be shipped. Id. at 330. Meng also stated that Port Captains are not authorized to fix any cargo problems without first reporting them to the manager. Id. at 441. 59 The record therefore supports the Board's finding that, [a]s to the Port Captain's function of making arrangements for the ship in port ... these functions are wholly routine and therefore do not characterize a managerial employee. Representation Decision, slip op. at 17, J.A. 557. Similarly, the Board reasonably determined that the Port Engineer does not exercise managerial discretion. Id. at 18. Nothing in the testimony of the Junior Vice President or the Section Manager undermines these conclusions. 60 We also reject the Employer's argument that Yeshiva compels reversal of the Board decision in this case. Yeshiva held that a university's full-time faculty members were managerial employees who were excluded from the protections of the Act. The Employer contends that, pursuant to Yeshiva, `managerial employee' ... encompass[es] not just those who have authority to formulate policies, or to act independently of them, but also those who represent management interests by taking or recommending discretionary action that effectively implement those policies. Petitioner's Br. at 15 (emphasis in the original). Yeshiva says no such thing. The Yeshiva decision acknowledges that the exercise of discretion is among the factors to be weighed in determining management status. However, the Court goes on to say: 61 The controlling consideration in this case is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any other context unquestionably would be managerial. Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They decide what courses will be offered, when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards. They effectively decide which students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On occasion their views have determined the size of the student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of a school. When one considers the function of a university, it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the faculty determines within each school the product to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the customers who will be served. 62 Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 686, 100 S.Ct. at 864. 63 The work of Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and Port Engineers does not come close to satisfying Yeshiva 's description of a manager. The record in this case makes it clear that the Evergreen employees in question do not have absolute authority over anything — not even a ship's schedule. These employees exercise professional discretion in a few matters affecting the ships, but their decisions are closely monitored by and subject to the direction of the Section Manager. This is not analogous to the discretion exercised by the university professors in Yeshiva. 64 Finally, Evergreen argues that if the Union is allowed to represent the Port Captains, Assistant Port Captains, and Port Engineers, there will be a conflict of interest between the contested Evergreen employees and terminal stevedores, because the stevedores are represented by the same union as the employees in this case. Petitioner's Br. at 18. One rationale for excluding managerial employees from the Act's coverage is [t]o ensure that employees who exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer will not divide their loyalty between employer and union. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 687-88, 100 S.Ct. at 864-65. Evergreen claims that Port Captains' discretion over the number of stevedoring gangs used by Evergreen impacts the income of the stevedores, thus creating a conflict of interest. Petitioner's Br. at 18. This contention is meritless. 65 The stevedores work for a different employer, Maher Terminal, and they are in a different bargaining unit. We are aware of no authority, and Evergreen cites to none, supporting the proposition that such a purported cross-unit conflict may be relied upon to defeat the representational rights of employees who are not otherwise managers under the Act. Indeed, in an analogous situation, the Board has held that the potential for divided loyalty between inspectors and contractors working for two different employers did not render the inspectors managerial, even though the inspectors would be represented by the same union which represents the employees whose work they inspect. Bechtel, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 959, 225 N.L.R.B. 197, 198, 1976 WL 7219 (1976). 66 In light of the record as a whole, the Board reasonably rejected Evergreen's claim that its Port Captains, Assistant Port Captain, and Port Engineer are managerial employees. Accordingly, the Acting Regional Director properly directed the representational election leading to the Union's certification. And the Board did not err when it determined that Evergreen violated the Act in refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union and in refusing to provide information sought by the Union.