Opinion ID: 4015692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plea Withdrawal Issue.

Text: Before sentencing, a defendant who has pleaded guilty may withdraw the plea if he “can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cruz, 643 F.3d 639, 641 (8th Cir. 2011). “The ‘fair and just’ standard is a liberal standard, but it does not create an automatic right to 1 The Honorable Matt J. Whitworth, United States Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 2 The Honorable Beth Phillips, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. -2- withdraw a plea.” United States v. Wicker, 80 F.3d 263, 266 (8th Cir. 1996) (alterations and quotation omitted). The July 2014 PSR made adverse findings that Trevino was responsible for possessing 667.42 kilograms of marijuana, the marijuana equivalent quantity for his relevant conduct; operated a stash house in St. Louis; and was an organizer or leader of the drug conspiracy, based upon information provided by a confidential source, cooperating witnesses, and conspirators who had pleaded guilty. On February 8, 2015, with objections to those findings pending, attorney Hernandez filed a Motion To Withdraw the plea on Trevino’s behalf, stating in support: 1. Mr. Trevino’s plea of guilty was made and entered without meaningful advice of counsel because Mr. Trevino claims that current counsel failed to explain the consequences of pleading guilty without a plea agreement. Thus, defendant made the decision to waive his rights to trial and to defend himself from false allegations of his co-defendants and witnesses. 2. His plea of guilty was made without full understanding of the nature of the offense charged and the punishment that might be imposed, in that these matters were not made known to him clearly by the court. 3. Defendant claims that he was convinced to plead guilty by his appointed counsel and that he would be allowed to make arguments as [to] the range of punishment. He claims that his sentencing calculations have been based on false information provided by witnesses that he has not been allowed to cross-examine and that his attempt to dispute their allegations has jeopardized him further. Trevino submitted no further supporting evidence or argument prior to the March 3, 2015, motion and sentencing hearing. -3- As the district court noted in denying the Motion To Withdraw at the March 2015 hearing, the first two reasons stated in support of the Motion To Withdraw were plainly contradicted by the Rule 11 colloquy at Trevino’s change-of-plea hearing. At that April 2014 hearing, the district court explained that the statutory sentencing range was 0 to 20 years; the sentencing guidelines would apply; the PSR might vary somewhat from defense counsel’s preliminary estimate of the guidelines range; Trevino could object to the PSR and the court would rule on his objections; the court could vary upward or downward from the guidelines range; and Trevino could appeal the sentence but not withdraw his plea. Trevino stated that no one threatened him to get him to plead guilty, no one told him what the district court would do at sentencing, and he was pleading guilty of his own free will. The court then inquired: THE COURT: [A]re you satisfied with Mr. Hernandez’s representation of you? MR. TREVINO: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Has he done everything that you’ve asked him to do? MR. TREVINO: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Is there anything that Mr. Hernandez did that you did not want him to do? MR. TREVINO: No, sir. THE COURT: All right. So, you’re satisfied with his -- the way he’s defended you in this case? MR. TREVINO: Yes, sir, I am. We have repeatedly upheld the denial of motions to withdraw a plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel where the “claim directly contradicts statements -4- [defendant] made under oath at his guilty plea hearing . . . that he was totally satisfied with his attorney’s legal assistance.” United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2003). The failure to assert objections to counsel’s performance at the change-ofplea hearing refutes any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for withdrawing the plea. See United States v. Norvell, 729 F.3d 788, 796 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1342 (2014); United States v. Murphy, 572 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1057 (2009); United States v. Goodson, 569 F.3d 379, 382-83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1098 (2009). “In these circumstances, the ineffective assistance claim is untimely because it was first raised in a motion to withdraw the plea.” United States v. Payton, 260 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1170 (2002). The third reason stated in Trevino’s Motion To Withdraw was addressed at the ex parte portion of the March 2015 hearing. The court asked Trevino, “What are your concerns with your attorney?” He responded: My concern was from the very beginning, as I wrote Magistrate Judge Whitworth about a year and a half ago, a [question] that my attorney failed to answer was [whether I may] take my case to court and challenge the offense level, not my innocence or guilt of the matter, but . . . the amounts of drugs I’m being charged with . . . . That would be my best option because . . . I’m charged with what I believe is amounts of drugs that are not verifiable. They were not able to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law, which would be to my advantage. Now at my sentencing, I have the burden of . . . proving that the allegations are false. The court replied: Well, No. 1, that’s incorrect. The government still has the burden of proof at the sentencing hearing. The burden of proof has changed, but it remains with the government. You have absolutely no burden of -5- proof. And I will tell you that your attorney has preserved your right to challenge pretty much all aspects of the [PSR]. The above-quoted colloquies at the change-of-plea and the March 2015 hearings establish that Trevino presented no fair and just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. Trevino argues the court committed an error of law when it stated at the March 2015 hearing, “any ineffective assistance of counsel claims need to be brought up in [an 18 U.S.C.§] 2255 motion. This is not the appropriate time to raise those issues, and it is not a basis for Mr. Trevino to withdraw his guilty plea.” We agree that ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea process “can serve as the requisite ‘fair and just reason’ for withdrawal [but] only if [defendant] demonstrates both that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by it.” United States v. McMullen, 86 F.3d 135, 137 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, the court spoke too categorically, but in the absence of an objection, we conclude there was no error of law. When a defendant develops no factual record to support his assertions of ineffective assistance, as in this case, “such claims ordinarily are best reviewed in collateral proceedings.” United States v. Mugan, 441 F.3d 622, 631 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 890 (2006); see United States v. Payton, 168 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (8th Cir. 1999). Trevino further argues that, instead of denying his Motion To Withdraw, the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing. However, a district court “need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the allegations in the motion are inherently unreliable, are not supported by specific facts or are not grounds for withdrawal even if true.” United States v. Morrison, 967 F.2d 264, 267-68 (8th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). Here, Trevino’s motion failed to put forth a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea, provided no specific facts supporting a claim of ineffective assistance, and was directly contradicted by his statements under oath at the change-of-plea hearing. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Motion To Withdraw. -6-