Opinion ID: 901801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Two Interpreters

Text: [¶ 60.] First, in my view, the nature of Selalla's case for interpretive services has been mischaracterized. Notwithstanding the other writings, the record does not support the special concurrence's characterization that this is the type of case in which the court forced sharing of Selalla's interpreter in order to assist the court. See supra ¶ 58. Nor does the record support the dissent's characterization that this is the type of case in which the trial judge commandeer[ed], borrowed, confiscate[d], seize[d] and appropriated Selalla's interpreter to work for the court. See infra ¶ ¶ 73-74, 76, 80, n. 20. Those types of cases involute a trial court's actual use of a defendant's interpreter to simultaneously interpret for the defendant and the court, jury, or other participant in the trial. See State v. Gonzales-Morales, 91 Wash.App. 420, 422, n. 1, 958 P.2d 339, 340 (1998) (explaining that because the trial court was unable to find a second interpreter, it borrowed defendant's interpreter to simultaneously interpret a Spanish-speaking witness for the prosecutor, jury, and other courtroom participants while also facilitating communication between defendant and his counsel). [9] [¶ 61.] This is a case in which Selalla's public defender arranged for one publicly financed interpreter on his own. In addition, for reasons not explained in the record, the circuit court administrator also arranged to have yet another interpreter present. It appears that Judge Lieberman was not aware of these arrangements because when both interpreters appeared that first morning of trial, he conducted an off-the-record discussion with counsel. Following that discussion, he made a determination on the record expressly finding that the only person in this courtroom who will need an interpreter is the defendant. Thereafter, for the first time, Selalla's trial counsel indicated that he would like both interpreters: an official interpreter for the trial and a personal interpreter in case Selalla had any questions during the trial or during breaks. Because both interpreters were publicly financed, this is a case where defense counsel asked the trial court to appoint a personal interpreter in addition to a trial interpreter. [10] Selalla did not, however, make any factual showing suggesting the need for two such interpreters because of any language difficulty. [¶ 62.] The court determined that because Selalla was the only person in the courtroom in need of an interpreter, there was no need for two interpreters. [11] The court ordered Selalla's interpreter to remain to assist Selalla and his attorney, and the second interpreter was excused. There is no dispute that thereafter, Selalla's interpreter was not actually used by the court (borrowed) to interpret for the court, jury, any witness, or for anyone other than Selalla. [12] Because the record does not reflect that Selalla's interpreter was ever used to simultaneously interpret for the court and for the defendant, and because it appears that Selalla's own interpreter remained continuously available throughout the trial for Selalla and his counsel, this is not a borrowing or commandeering case. [¶ 63.] Furthermore, even if this were a borrowing case, the court utilized the appropriate procedure to ensure that Selalla's constitutional rights were protected. See Gonzales-Morales, 91 Wash.App. at 424-27, 958 P.2d at 341-42 (collecting cases that have approved similar protective procedures). The Gonzales-Morales court noted with approval that although that trial court borrowed the defendant's interpreter to interpret a state witness, it also made the necessary accommodations for the defendant to consult and communicate with his attorney. The trial court in Gonzales-Morales informed the defendant: I am going to allow the interpreter to remain there at the defense table and she can interpret [the prosecutor's] question, which she would, be doing anyway, and can interpret the answer in Spanish for the court. The defendant will be able to understand the answer himself anyway because he speaks the same language as the witness . . . [The interpreter] should stay there at the defense table and if the defendant has any question to ask counsel, then he can just let us know and we'll interrupt the questions and answers being given so that he can communicate freely and thoroughly with his attorney. Id. at 422, 958 P.2d at 340. Gonzales-Morales concluded that there was no constitutional violation in light of the case law and this protective procedure. The court did so even though it was mindful of the serious constitutional dimensions surrounding a non-English speaking criminal defendant's right to have meaningful access to counsel. Id. at 428, 958 P.2d at 343. [¶ 64.] In Selalla's case, the trial court employed the same protective procedure even though this interpreter was not borrowed to simultaneously interpret for the defense and for the court. The court informed Selalla and counsel: [T]here is only one person in the courtroom [Selalla] who needed an interpreter, and if at any point during the trial you feel inhibited, in any way whatsoever, I will work with you and take a recess. . . . We have interpreters so that as the witnesses are testifying, your client will be interpreted to and if you need to visit with your client, just state that to me because you can't listen to the witnesses, and your client can't listen to the witnesses while talking. If you need to visit, just state that to me and I'll be glad to stop the testimony and give you an opportunity to do that. Under the overwhelming weight of authority, this procedure sufficiently protected Selalla's constitutional rights to confrontation, counsel, and due process even if the trial court had borrowed his interpreter. See Gonzales-Morales and its collected authorities, 91 Wash.App. at 428, 958 P.2d at 343 (citing six federal and four state court decisions affirming use of a single interpreter over claims of entitlement to two interpreters as long as an opportunity for recess and consultation were provided). [¶ 65.] Nevertheless, Selalla's trial and appellate counsel have asserted that a non-English speaking defendant is entitled to two interpreters as a matter of law: one to interpret for the defendant and one to facilitate communication between the defendant and counsel. With the possible exception of two cases that are not relevant here, this asserted right to two interpreters is not supported by any case cited by Selalla or the dissent. It is also unsupported generally. See infra ¶ 67. Because Selalla's interpreter was not borrowed or commandeered, and because Selalla made no factual showing of need for two interpreters, it is my view that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Selalla to one publicly financed interpreter. [¶ 66] I also disagree with the dissent's premise that Selalla's level of understanding the English language is irrelevant in the context of this case and should be no part of our analysis. Infra ¶ 74. On the contrary, the right to an interpreter does not simply hinge on a request: it is dependent upon a showing of an actual language disability. United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir.1996). Although many of the federal cases have been decided in the context of the federal statutory right to an interpreter, the point at which the need arises is the same. Yet how high must the language barrier rise before a defendant has a right to an interpreter? It is well settled that there is no right to an interpreter if the foreign-born defendant speaks fluent English and is completely aware of all the proceedings. Cervantes v. Cox, 350 F.2d 855 (10th Cir.1965). The status of the right becomes less certain, however, where, as in the present case, the defendant has some ability to understand and communicate, but clearly has difficulty. Because the determination is likely to hinge upon various factors, including the complexity of the issues and testimony presented during trial and the language ability of the defendant's counsel, considerations of judicial economy would dictate that the trial court, coming into direct contact with the defendant, be granted wide discretion in determining whether an interpreter is necessary. See Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.Ed. 722 (1907); United States v. Barrios, 457 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.1972); United States v. Sosa, 379 F.2d 525, 527 (7th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845, 88 S.Ct. 94, 19 L.Ed.2d 111 (1967). It would be a fruitless and frustrating exercise for the appellate court to have to infer language difficulty from every faltering, repetitious bit of testimony in the record. But precisely because the trial court is entrusted with discretion, it should make unmistakably clear to a defendant who may have a language difficulty that he has a right to a court-appointed interpreter if the court determines that one is needed, and, whenever put on notice that there may be some significant language difficulty, the court should make such a determination of need. United States v. Carrion, 488 F.2d 12, 14-15 (1st Cir.1973) (emphasis added). Ultimately: [b]ecause the determination is likely to hinge upon various factors, including the complexity of the issues and testimony presented during trial and the language ability of the defendant's counsel, considerations of judicial economy would dictate that the trial court, coming into direct contact with the defendant, be granted wide discretion in determining whether an interpreter is necessary. Id. (citing Perovich, 205 U.S. at 91, 27 S.Ct. 456, 51 L.Ed. 722; Barrios, 457 F.2d 680; Sosa, 379 F.2d 525, 527). [¶ 67.] In today's case, there is no dispute that Selalla needed some level of interpretive services, and one publicly financed interpreter was provided. There is also no dispute that trial counsel did not put the court on notice that Selalla was having any language difficulty that required two interpreters. [13] Because Selalla did not make any showing of need, his appellate argument is in essence that interpretation of witnesses and communication with counsel requires two interpreters as a matter of law. As was previously mentioned, however, the overwhelming consensus of authority does not support that claim. See' Gonzales-Morales, 91 Wash.App. at 428, 958 P.2d at 343 (collecting cases). See also Carrion, 488 F.2d at 15 (noting that the court must be put on notice of some significant language difficulty, and that protective procedures are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements). [¶ 68] In summary, Selalla failed to make any showing that his interpreter was borrowed by the court. Even if his interpreter was borrowed at any point in the trial, the court employed the appropriate protective procedure. Moreover, Selalla did not show that the trial court's ruling rendered him unable to understand the proceedings, unable to communicate with counsel, unable to assist in his defense, or unable to cross-examine the witnesses. Finally, Selalla has failed to show that a defendant in his circumstances has a legal right to two interpreters. Therefore, his claim fails both factually and as a matter. of law.