Opinion ID: 1885918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: discussion as to goeringer

Text: By the Act of August 24, 1963, P.L. 1175, § 1, adding § 205 to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 72, the Legislature abrogated the common-law liability of one employee to another for negligence: If disability or death is compensable under this act, a person shall not be liable to anyone at common law or otherwise on account of such disability or death for any act or omission occurring while such person was in the same employ as the person disabled or killed, except for intentional wrong. Appellant first contends that Goeringer, as vice president and general manager of Bertels, is not protected by the immunity extended to co-employees by Section 205 by virtue of his superior status. However, the Act of February 28, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1120, § 1, 77 P.S. § 22, includes, inter alia, the following statement: Every executive officer of a corporation elected or appointed . . . shall be an employe of the corporation. Thus, the statute specifically rejects the appellant's  position. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 45 Pa. D. & C. 2d 675 (1968). Appellant contends that if this is the proper interpretation of the statute, then the statute is unconstitutional because the statute insulates a co-worker from liability without any corresponding financial responsibility being placed on him. Appellant emphasizes Article III, § 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, formerly Article III, § 21, which reads as follows: The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or employers and employes jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employes arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of employes, whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of employer or employe, and fixing the basis of ascertainment of such compensation and the maximum and minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general remedies for the collection thereof; but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. . . . We do not see how the above provision precludes the Legislature from immunizing fellow employees from suit. As we recently explained in DeJesus v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 439 Pa. 180, 184, 268 A. 2d 924 (1970): . . . [T]he purpose of Section 18, as amended, was to permit the General Assembly to enact a workmen's compensation program, but to preclude the enactment of general legislation covering injuries other than those arising in the course of employment [citing cases]. . . . In our opinion, a provision immunizing fellow employees from liability for negligent acts or omissions  in the course of their employment is consistent with the constitutional provision permitting the enactment of a comprehensive scheme of workmen's compensation. The employee receives economic insurance that his employment-related injuries will be compensated. He surrenders the right to sue employers or fellow employees for negligence, but he no longer need prove negligence, his own contributory negligence is no longer a bar, and he, too, can no longer be sued for negligence by a fellow employee. Such a comprehensive program is not unconstitutional. See Lowman v. Stafford, 226 Cal. App. 2d 31, 37 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1964), where the California Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in interpreting the California statute.