Opinion ID: 2812638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Adherence to Regulatory Criteria

Text: The remainder of AEWC’s arguments challenge the EPA’s consideration of the record evidence in light of the regulatory requirements for the issuance of NPDES permits, ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM’N V. EPA 11 40 C.F.R. § 125.123, and the “unreasonable degradation” criteria set out in the implementing regulations, 40 C.F.R. § 125.122.
The EPA issued the Permit under paragraph (a) of 40 C.F.R. § 125.123, which provides in pertinent part:
information . . . determines prior to permit issuance that the discharge will not cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment after application of any necessary conditions specified in § 125.123(d), he may issue an NPDES permit containing such conditions. The EPA did not purport to act under paragraph (c), which provides in pertinent part: (c) If the director has insufficient information to determine prior to permit issuance that there will be no unreasonable degradation of the marine environment . . . there shall be no discharge of pollutants into the marine environment unless the director on the basis of available information . . . determines that:
irreparable harm to the marine environment during the period in which monitoring is undertaken, and 12 ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM’N V. EPA
the on-site disposal of these materials, and
with all permit conditions established pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section. Paragraph (d) then provides certain conditions that are mandatory for permits issued pursuant to paragraph (c), including a monitoring program to assess the impact of the discharge on aquatic life, and a clause providing for revocation of the permit if the director determines at any time that continued discharges may cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment. Proceeding under paragraph (a), the director determined on the basis of available information that the discharge would not cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment after the monitoring condition and cancellation clause of paragraph (d) were added to the Permit. EPA accordingly issued the Permit. AEWC argues that, because the EPA applied two conditions specified in paragraph (d), the EPA somehow became subject to paragraph (c) and its requirement that the director determine that there were no reasonable alternatives to on-site disposal of materials. This contention, however, simply is not what the regulations provide. The director was free to impose two conditions specified in paragraph (d), as paragraph (a) authorized. Nothing in the regulations provides that proceeding in such a manner somehow converts a paragraph (a) proceeding to a paragraph (c) proceeding. ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM’N V. EPA 13 Accordingly, should the EPA determine on remand that available information still supports its determination that discharges will not cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment, there is no error in its decision to proceed under subsection (a). If, however, the EPA determines on remand that the record does not contain sufficient “available information” to support its determination that “the discharge[s] will not cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment after application of any necessary conditions specified in § 125.123(d),” 40 C.F.R. § 125.123(a), its issuance of the Permit pursuant to subsection (a) cannot stand, and it will be obliged to proceed under subsection (c) and conduct the alternatives analysis and meet the other requirements for permit determinations under that subsection.
The main thrust of AEWC’s remaining arguments is that the EPA’s decision regarding discharges other than noncontact cooling water was not adequately supported by the evidence. AEWC also argues that the EPA did not provide a rational explanation of how the monitoring program will prevent conflicts with subsistence uses and that the EPA’s reliance on the monitoring program is arbitrary and irrational. These arguments stress the EPA’s acknowledgment of record evidence indicating the discharges may conflict with subsistence uses. The Clean Water Act’s implementing regulations set out ten criteria the EPA must consider in making its determination of “whether a discharge will cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.122(a)(1)-(10). AEWC’s challenge to the 14 ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM’N V. EPA sufficiency of the EPA’s analysis of the record evidence in light of the regulatory criteria focuses on the sixth and ninth criteria: “[t]he potential impacts on human health through direct and indirect pathways,” and “[s]uch other factors relating to the effects of the discharge as may be appropriate.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.122(a)(6), (9). The record is, however, replete with evidence that the EPA heard and considered the concerns raised by AEWC. The record evidence also reflects the EPA’s consideration of the ocean discharge criteria in making its determination that the authorized discharges would not cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment, 40 C.F.R. § 125.122(a). To the extent that AEWC takes issue with the EPA’s factual findings other than those specifically related to the effect of the discharge of non-contact cooling water on the bowhead whale migration, those findings are supported by the administrative record and are entitled to our deference. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 113 (1992) (explaining that, when reviewing an agency’s adjudicative action, the reviewing court “should not supplant the agency’s findings merely by identifying alternative findings that could be supported by substantial evidence”). EPA’s issuance of the permit on the basis of those findings was not arbitrary or capricious.
AEWC also argues that the EPA did not provide a rational explanation of how the monitoring program will prevent conflicts with subsistence uses and that the EPA’s reliance on the monitoring program is arbitrary and irrational. ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM’N V. EPA 15 The record contains a detailed description of the monitoring program, including requirements for monthly reports of effluent monitoring and testing, reports after drilling is complete, and ongoing monitoring and reporting of marine mammal deflections during discharges of drilling fluids and cooling water. The EPA’s determination that the reporting requirements under the monitoring program are adequate was not unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern Cnty. Farm Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The arbitrary and capricious standard is ‘highly deferential, presuming the agency action to be valid and [requires] affirming the agency action if a reasonable basis exists for its decision.’” (quoting Indep. Acceptance Co. v. California, 204 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted)). There is accordingly no basis for concluding that the EPA’s design and implementation of the monitoring program was arbitrary or capricious. This conclusion, however, does not preclude the EPA from reassessing or adjusting its monitoring program as necessary or appropriate in light of its reconsidered decision of degradation of the marine environment on remand.
AEWC contends that the EPA should bring its mitigation measures in line with those that the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) adopted in an authorization it issued under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and that are, in fact, the same measures that AEWC and intervenors Shell Gulf of Mexico and Shell Offshore Inc. agreed to in their 2012 Conflict Avoidance Agreement. AEWC identifies no legal authority, and we find none, for the proposition that either the NMFS determination under a 16 ALASKA ESKIMO WHALING COMM’N V. EPA different statute for a different purpose (prevention of noise disruption of marine mammals) or the private Conflict Avoidance Agreement between oil companies and the AEWC, must or should be incorporated into the Permit provisions. The NMFS concurred in EPA’s determination that EPA’s planned action in issuing the Permit “may affect, but is not likely to adversely affect” bowhead whales in the Beaufort Sea. The EPA considered the Conflict Avoidance Agreement, but it was not required to write the terms of that private agreement into the Permit.