Opinion ID: 2484763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Compensatory-Damages Award

Text: Dr. O'Rear also argues that the jury's award of compensatory damages in this case was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. This argument was also presented to the trial court in Dr. O'Rear's motion for postjudgment relief, and, in ruling on the motion, that court simply stated: [T]here was more than substantial evidence to indicate that [B.H.] suffered mightily and over a long period of time, and that further, he may continue to suffer for the rest of his life for what the jury could have found to have been visited on him by [Dr. O'Rear]. After conducting a hearing pursuant to the guidelines set out in this Court's decisions in Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), and Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218 (Ala.1989), the trial court denied Dr. O'Rear's motion. The applicable standard for the appellate review of a jury's damages award defers to the discretion of the jury: `This Court has long held that [t]here is no fixed standard for ascertainment of compensatory damages recoverable... for physical pain and mental suffering and that the amount of such [an] award is left to the sound discretion of the jury, subject only to correction by the court for clear abuse or passionate exercise of that discretion. Alabama Power Co. v. Mosley, 294 Ala. 394, 401, 318 So.2d 260, 266 (1975). This Court has consistently held that a trial court cannot interfere with a jury verdict merely because it believes the jury gave too little or too much. Williston v. Ard, 611 So.2d 274 (Ala. 1992); Olympia Spa v. Johnson, 547 So.2d 80 (Ala.1989); and Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 154 So.2d 297 (Ala.1963).' Black v. Comer, 38 So.3d 16, 27 (Ala.2009) (quoting Daniels v. East Alabama Paving, Inc., 740 So.2d 1033, 1044 (Ala.1999)). Dr. O'Rear's argument to this Court relies on the legal standard for the review of compensatory-damages awards set out in Southern Pine Electric Cooperative v. Burch, 878 So.2d 1120, 1127 (Ala.2003): `There is no fixed standard for determining the amount of compensatory damages a jury may award for mental anguish. The amount of the damages award is left to the jury's sound discretion, subject only to review by the court for a clear abuse of that discretion.' Delchamps, Inc. v. Bryant, 738 So.2d 824, 837 (Ala.1999). However, where the plaintiff suffers no physical injury and `offer[s] little or no direct evidence concerning the mental suffering sustained as a result of the defendant's wrongdoing,' we give stricter scrutiny to an award for mental distress. National Ins. Ass'n v. Sockwell, 829 So.2d 111, 133 (Ala.2002). See Kmart Corp. v. Kyles, 723 So.2d 572 (Ala.1998). The plaintiff's testimony is direct evidence of mental anguish. 723 So.2d at 578. Thus, where the plaintiff has suffered no physical injury, we `address the strength of the presumption that a jury's verdict is correct,' Bryant, 738 So.2d at 837, in the context of the plaintiff's testimony regarding the `nature, severity, and duration of the mental anguish.' Alabama Power Co. v. Murray, 751 So.2d 494, 501 (Ala.1999). Cf. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Jeter, 832 So.2d 25 (Ala.2001) (remitting $400,000 compensatory-damages award to $300,000); Oliver v. Towns, 770 So.2d 1059 (Ala.2000) ($500,000 compensatory-damages award remitted to $75,000); Alabama Power Co. v. Murray, supra ($150,000 compensatory-damages award reduced to $84,000); Bryant, supra (reducing $400,000 compensatory-damages award to $100,000); Kyles, supra ($100,000 compensatory-damages award remitted to $15,000). Dr. O'Rear's argument that the compensatory-damages award is excessive rests largely on his contention that the harm suffered by B.H. was solely emotional and mental and that B.H. presented no evidence of any physical injury. Thus, Dr. O'Rear asserts that, although the jury had evidence to support a conclusion that he caused B.H.'s addiction to narcotic drugs that in turn caused B.H. emotional distress, there is also evidence in the record indicating that B.H. sought drugs from other sources so that his emotional distress resulting from Dr. O'Rear's actions should not be sufficient to support a compensatory-damages award of $1,000,000. Dr. O'Rear's argument entirely disregards the emotional trauma and harm that is presumed when an adult sexually assaults a minor. Davis, supra. Dr. O'Rear's argument also disregards the evidence indicating that B.H.'s addiction has resulted in the loss of various educational opportunities during his teenage years, has required him to undergo several attempts at drug-abuse rehabilitation (a costly process that results in extreme physical discomfort), and has resulted in a criminal conviction and incarceration. We recognize that the consequences of a criminal conviction include significant actual harm, such as the loss of opportunity to attend various educational institutions, the loss of the opportunity to pursue various careers, and the loss of various civil rights, possibly including the right to vote in state or federal elections. See, e.g., Ala. Const. 1901, Art. VIII, § 177; Ala.Code 1975, § 12-16-60(a); and Ala.Code 1975, § 36-2-1(a)(3). We conclude that the trial court did not err in holding that in setting the compensatory-damages award the jury did not exceed its discretion. Accordingly, the judgment is due to be affirmed. AFFIRMED. WOODALL, STUART, PARKER, MAIN, and WISE, JJ., concur. BOLIN, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ., concur in the result.