Opinion ID: 2619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exclusion of Sarin's Affidavit

Text: Douglas also contends that the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a Sarin affidavit that stated that the driver of the SUV might have been white. Evidentiary rulings of the district court are reviewed for abuse of discretion, see, e.g., Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 174 n. 1, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997); United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54-55, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984), and we see no abuse of discretion here. In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, Sarin was questioned about an affidavit she had signed on the afternoon of April 22, in which the driver of the SUV was described as a `heavyset male, possibly white' (Tr. 124). She testified, I was asked if he was possibly, could he have possibly been white. I said, he was possibly white but I was confident that he was a black male. ( Id. ) In the presence of the jury, Sarin testified, as described in Part I.A. above, that the driver of the SUV was a heavyset, black male with dark facial hair, and that she had selected the picture of Douglas from the photographic array as the driver of the SUV. On cross-examination, Douglas's attorney was allowed to have Sarin read from her April 22 affidavit the statement, `I saw a heavyset male, possibly white, with a beard, driving the SUV.' (Tr. 190.) When defense counsel asked whether Sarin had said heavyset male, possibly white? she responded, Possibly white, yes. ( Id. at 191.) On redirect examination, Sarin testified that her April 22 affidavit had been prepared by the police detective interviewing her; that she did not tell the detective what words to use in the affidavit; that she had not read the typed affidavit carefully for the accuracy of its contents before she signed it; and that she did not notice that its only reference to the race of the person she was describing was possibly white. ( Id. at 193-94.) Sarin testified that when she was asked by the detective to describe the SUV's driver, she had said he was a heavyset, black male; that when asked if the driver could have been white, she had said possibly; and that it was not her recollection, either on April 22 or at the time of trial, that the driver of the SUV was white. ( Id. at 194.) On recross-examination, defense counsel brought out that Sarin's statement was taken just hours after the events on April 22; that she had given the detective the information about what she had seen; that she knew her statements were of importance to the police investigation; that she had wanted to be accurate; that the document recites that the driver [Sarin] saw was a heavyset male, possibly white ( id. at 197); and that Sarin had signed the affidavit under penalty of perjury. Plainly, Douglas was allowed at trial to cross- and recross-examine Sarin fully about the affidavit. He was allowed to have her read aloud the portion of the affidavit that said that she had seen a `heavyset male, possibly white, with a beard, driving the SUV.' ( Id. at 190.) And he was allowed to quote the heavyset male, possibly white language to the jury repeatedly ( see, e.g., id. at 190, 191, 197). In light of the latitude given to Douglas to examine Sarin repeatedly with respect to that phrase in the affidavit, we see no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to allow Douglas also to introduce the affidavit itself.