Opinion ID: 2132966
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: County's Contractual Maintenance Obligation

Text: The laws regarding the respective duties of an easement holder and servient estate are well settled. Absent an agreement to the contrary, the general rule is: easement holders have all such rights as are incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of their easement. However, every benefit has a corresponding burden. Accordingly, easement holders not only have the right but an obligation to repair and maintain their easement as necessary. Barry J. Kusinitz, Adverse Possession & Easements, 47 Rhode Island Bar J. 5, 36 (1999); Restatement (Third) of Property § 4.13, at 631-32 (2000). The case before us is not subject to the general rule because the parties have a contract dictating the extent of the County's easement and consequent obligations. As such, the issue of the County's duty to maintain the ditch is entirely one of contract. The contract specifically addressed the right of the County to maintain the ditch stating the County may maintain an open ditch and will take possession of the premises ... for the purposes set forth. The County argues the phrase  may maintain vests discretion in the County to decide if and when to maintain the ditch. Koenigs argue the County is under a mandatory duty to clean the obstructed ditch. The meaning of may as an isolated word is not ambiguous; may is generally understood to be permissive. It is true the word may in a contract can be permissive in one instance and mandatory in another. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434, n. 9, 115 S.Ct. 2227, 2236, n. 9, 132 L.Ed.2d 375, 389, n. 9 (1995). We, however, do not interpret this contractual term apart from the context of the agreement as a whole. 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston On Contracts § 30:10, at 107 (4th ed.1999); Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Fischer, 235 Iowa 506, 514-15, 17 N.W.2d 273, 277 (1945) (discussing use of may in a state statute); D. Mellinkoff, Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage 402-03 (1992) (shall and may are frequently treated as synonyms and their meaning depends on context). The parties' intent as evidenced by all of the terms of the contract controls our conclusion. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Jungling, 654 N.W.2d 530, 536 (Iowa 2002) (citing A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 618 (Iowa 1991)). Given the restricted purpose of this easement, we will not interpret the word may to be mandatory in this situation. By the terms of the contract, it is clear the easement was only for the purpose of building the ditch. That is, the main purpose of the contract between the highway commission and the church was to allow the commission to dredge the ditch in connection with its construction of the road. The contract did not state the County may periodically maintain the ditch for years to come. It likewise did not say in exchange for the right to build the ditch, the highway commission is responsible for its maintenance in perpetuity. There is no language indicating the highway commission shouldered the responsibility for keeping the ditch free from obstructions. The document as a whole does not reflect a permanent easement, but rather a maintenance easement that was restricted to the sole purpose of dredging the ditch during the road construction. Our conclusion that the maintenance easement was limited in scope and duration is supported by the other terms of the contract. The parties' intention was to create an easement on Fishers' property for a limited duration. The contract expressly stated, Should the highway as finally located require none of the real estate described, this contract becomes null and void. Similarly, the parties agreed the highway commission would take possession of the property only for the purposes set forth in the contract, i.e., to build the ditch. Common sense dictates the maintenance easement of the ditch would last only as long as was necessary to complete the road construction and leave the ditch in its final form. After the road was completed, the highway commission did not have any interest in Fishers' property and the easement rights ended. In sum, it is clear from the nature of the contract, the County, by way of the highway commission's initial contract, is under no obligation to maintain the ditch. Surface water is a common enemy, which every proprietor must fight for himself as long as it takes its natural course. 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 790, at 535 (1999); Woods v. Inc. Town of State Centre, 249 Iowa 38, 44, 85 N.W.2d 519, 523 (1957). The County's permissive right to maintain the ditch was limited in scope and duration and does not mean the County has a duty to fight Koenigs' battle.