Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Instructions Regarding Mental Disorder and Intoxication

Text: Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective in not requesting an instruction specifically advising the jury that it could consider his mental disorders in combination with his intoxication when assessing his mental state at the time of the offense. The jury was given one instruction permitting it to consider evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder in determining whether defendant actually formed the requisite mental states, and another instruction allowing it to consider evidence of intoxication in determining whether defendant possessed such mental states. [15] Defendant contends that, without an additional instruction harmonizing these two instructions, the jurors were likely to believe they could not consider combined evidence of a mental disorder and intoxication in determining whether defendant harbored the mental states required to convict him. Defendant observes that he presented expert testimony that the combined effect of his mental disorders and intoxication at the time of the crime prevented him from actually forming the mental states required for the charged offenses, and that trial counsel had no reasonable tactical basis for failing to request an additional pinpoint instruction elaborating upon this theory of his defense. (See People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1120, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588 [defendant may seek a pinpoint instruction that relates the evidence of intoxication to an element of a crime, such as premeditation and deliberation].) To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a [d]efendant must show that counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial, i.e., that it is reasonably probable that counsel's unprofessional errors affected the outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 693-694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) We have also said that if the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's performance. ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) ( People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1014-1015, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) We need not inquire into why counsel failed to request an additional pinpoint instruction in the present case, however, because the court fully apprised the jury of the law applicable to defendant's mental state defenses, and no additional instruction was necessary. ( People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1015, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) `[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1016, 68 Cal. Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) The instruction permitting the jury to consider evidence of intoxication was given only three paragraphs after the instruction referring to evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder, and the instructions were read in the context of general instructions regarding the mental state required for all the charged offenses. Immediately following the instruction regarding evidence of intoxication, the court stated: If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant formed such specific intents and/or mental states, you must find that he did not have such specific intents or mental states. (Italics added.) The instructions as a whole adequately informed the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's mental disease or defect, together with the evidence of his intoxication, in deciding whether the prosecution had carried its burden of proving the mental elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. The instructions did not hinder defense counsel from emphasizing to the jury during the closing guilt phase argument that the requisite mental states had not been proven because defendant's mental disease, defect, or disorder had exacerbated the effects of his intoxication. (Cf. People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1249, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475; People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 1017-1018, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197.) There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury was led to believe that it could not consider evidence of the combined effect of defendant's mental disorder and intoxication in determining his mental state. (See People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 833, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to request an additional instruction. Defendant also contends that the instruction regarding mental disorder was incomplete. The instruction permitted the jury to consider evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder in determining whether defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crime charged. Defendant contends that this instruction failed to inform the jury that mental state includes malice, premeditation and deliberation, and intent. [16] Therefore, according to defendant, the jury did not know that evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder could raise a reasonable doubt regarding whether he harbored each of these particular mental states. Defendant claims that the failure to provide such an explanation to the jury raised an impermissible presumption regarding the mental states required to commit each crime with which he was charged. We recently have rejected challenges to similar instructions regarding evidence of mental disorder or intoxication as related to the defendant's mental state. In People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pages 1247-1249, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475, the court refused to give the defendant's requested pinpoint instruction directing the jury to consider evidence of mental disorder in determining whether the defendant engaged in premeditation or deliberation or harbored malice aforethought. Instead, the court gave a more general instruction that the jury could consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether the defendant actually formed the mental state that was an element of murder and attempted murder. Because the jury was instructed that malice, premeditation, and deliberation were the necessary mental states for murder and attempted murder, we held the instructions as a whole adequately informed the jury that it could consider evidence of mental disease or defect in deciding whether the mental elements of first degree murder had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (See also People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1145, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757 [the trial court had no duty to specify each of the mental states to which the evidence of mental disease or defect was relevant].) In People v. Castillo, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pages 1014-1018, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197, the court gave an instruction that the jury could consider evidence of the defendant's intoxication in determining whether he had formed the specific intent or mental state that is a necessary element of the crimes of murder and attempted murder. We rejected the defendant's argument that his counsel was ineffective in not requesting a pinpoint instruction permitting consideration of the intoxication evidence in deciding whether the defendant premeditated the killing. Because the other instructions correctly required the jury to find premeditation and deliberation before it could find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, we concluded that a reasonable jury would have understood deliberation and premeditation to be mental states that could be considered in connection with evidence of intoxication. In the present case, the court instructed the jury that [t]he mental state required is included in the definition of the crime charged. Thus, the definition of murder included an explanation of malice, premeditation, and deliberation. The instructions on attempted rape, robbery, and burglary also included explanations of the specific intent required for these crimes. As in the foregoing decisions, we find that a reasonable jury would have understood that the requisite mental states (as set forth in the definitions of the crimes) were the same mental states that could be considered in connection with the evidence of defendant's mental disease, defect, or disorder. We reject defendant's contention that the court's failure to refer to specific intent as well as mental state in the instruction on mental disorder requires a different conclusion. The court appears to have used the terms interchangeably, and the jury was not reasonably likely to believe that the term mental state did not encompass specific intent. The instruction was not improper and did not create a presumption that defendant acted with the mental states required for the charged crimes.

Defendant contends that the two photographs depicting Cheryl's body as it was discovered after commission of the crimes should have been excluded from the penalty phase of the trial. He contends that the inflammatory nature of the photographs, together with the prosecutor's specific reference to them during the penalty phase argument, precluded a rational and reliable penalty determination as required by the Eighth Amendment. In closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor twice referred to these photographs. In commenting upon the circumstances of the murder, he noted that the photographs depicted the way Cheryl was found, and that she had blood on her hand, indicating that during the assault her hands went to her throat and she had the tremendous horror of realizing the nature of the injury that had been inflicted upon her. The prosecutor further stated defendant knew that the people who would find Cheryl Nesler were her small children, and he knew they would find her in the condition in which he left her, which was the condition you saw in the People's exhibits at the guilt phase of the trial. These comments and the photographs, according to defendant, distorted the evidence and inflamed the passions of the jury to the extent that a life sentence was virtually impossible. We have rejected defendant's contention that these photographs should have been excluded from the guilt phase because they were unduly prejudicial. (Pt. H.A.7., ante. ) To the extent the photographs may have resulted in different or heightened prejudice at the penalty phase, defendant did not renew his objection to the photographs at the penalty phase, nor did he object to the prosecutor's reference to the photographs during argument. Therefore, defendant's argument has been waived on appeal. ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 490, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) Because defendant contends in the alternative that the failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we consider whether he was prejudiced by the jury's consideration of the photographs at the penalty phase. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 366-367, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) We repeatedly have determined that photographs of victims' bodies may be admissible at the penalty phase to demonstrate graphically the circumstances of the crime, a factor relevant to the issues of aggravation and penalty. (E.g., People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 490, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373; People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 63-65, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 775, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 655, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 914, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712; People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 199-200, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781.) The prosecutor's reference to the photographs during closing argument was not improper or unduly prejudicial. The jury was familiar with the facts of the crime, including the circumstance that the victim's young daughter had discovered the body. (Cf. People v. Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 64, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) The jury also was familiar with the photographs, which properly had been admitted at the guilt phase. Thus, even if defendant had renewed his objection to the photographs at the penalty phase of the trial, the court would not have abused its discretion in determining that the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.
Defendant challenges the admissibility of evidence regarding two incidents of unadjudicated criminal activity offered pursuant to section 190.3, factor (b): The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. The court conducted a preliminary inquiry, outside the presence of the jury, regarding the admissibility of evidence of a 1973 robbery. (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72, fn. 25, 222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423 (plur.opn.).) At this hearing, John Cavins testified on direct examination that he was robbed at his tavern by defendant and another man. On cross-examination, Cavins could not positively identify defendant, who was seated in the courtroom, as one of the men who had robbed him in 1973, nor could Cavins recognize defendant from booking and newspaper photographs taken in 1970. Cavins explained that he knew defendant because defendant had come into his tavern approximately five or six times during the 1960's, and defendant's brother had done some work at the tavern. Under further examination by defense counsel, Cavins explained that he had not seen defendant for six or seven years prior to the robbery. In response to a question from the court, however, Cavins stated that he knew defendant's name when defendant came into the tavern on the night of the robbery. Defense counsel then impeached Cavins with a police report indicating Cavins said he thought he knew one of the subjects, but could not think of his name at that time. Cavins responded that the police report was inaccurate. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Cavins's testimony was sufficient to identify defendant as the individual who committed the robbery. At trial, Cavins testified that he knew defendant in 1973 because defendant had been in the tavern a few times before, and defendant's brother had done some work at the tavern. Cavins proceeded to testify concerning the circumstances of the robbery, indicating that defendant was one of the two perpetrators. On cross-examination, Cavins responded affirmatively to defense counsel's questions whether, on the night of the robbery, Cavins knew defendant. Counsel did not impeach Cavins with either the police report or his testimony from the hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury. Defendant contends that evidence of the 1973 robbery should not have been admitted, because Cavins's testimony at the hearing was legally insufficient to show that defendant was one of the men who committed the robbery. Defendant claims that the testimony was unreliable and violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As we have explained, however, the plurality opinion in Phillips did not impose a requirement of a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the prosecution's evidence of prior criminal activity is substantial. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 677-678, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705; see also People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 398-399, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The trial court's decision to admit evidence of prior criminal activity is reviewable for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1167, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 676, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) When testimony regarding the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the prior criminal act is equivocal, that circumstance affects the credibility of the witness, not the admissibility of his or her testimony. The trial court does not abuse its discretion if, [v]iewing the totality of the evidence presented, a rational jury could conclude that defendant was the one who committed the act. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1168, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) In the present case, Cavins had difficulty identifying defendant at the hearing, but he also stated that he knew who defendant was at the time of the robbery. Any inconsistencies in his testimony, or conflict with the police report prepared at the time, were matters affecting Cavins's credibility, not the admissibility of the testimony. At trial, Cavins testified without contradiction that defendant was one of the two perpetrators of the robbery. The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the robbery. Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object to Cavins's testimony at trial or to impeach Cavins with prior inconsistent statements regarding his ability to identify defendant. Because the court already had ruled the testimony admissible following the hearing, however, any objection would have been futile, and counsel therefore was not ineffective in failing to object to the testimony. ( People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 937, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that counsel's failure to impeach Cavins constituted deficient performance, we find no reasonable probability that, but for counsel's omission, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (11 Cal.4th at p. 936, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) Despite counsel's efforts to impeach Cavins at the hearing, Cavins insisted that he knew who defendant was when he came into the tavern on the night of the robbery. Cavins also testified that one of the two perpetrators asked about defendant's brother. Under these circumstances, it is not likely that the jury would have disbelieved Cavins's identification of defendant. Even if the jury had disbelieved his testimony, considering the circumstances of the crimes against Cheryl and the other instances of defendant's prior criminal activity, it is not reasonably probable that the jury's penalty determination would have been different. Defendant also challenges the admission of evidence concerning his arrest for robbery in 1968. At the hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, Paul Neblett testified that in 1968 he was a sheriffs department investigator in Tennessee. Defendant and defendant's brother were suspects in an armed robbery. The brother had been arrested and was in custody, but defendant still had not been apprehended. By posing as an ordinary citizen who wanted to post part of the bail for defendant's brother, Neblett arranged to meet defendant at the bonding company. Neblett asked defendant to step outside into an alley. Defendant kept his right hand in his jacket pocket, and in an attempt to get defendant to remove his hand, Neblett extended his right hand to introduce himself. Defendant hesitated a few moments and extended his left hand instead; Neblett then grabbed defendant's right hand, which was holding a loaded revolver. At that point, defendant just kind of wilted, and Neblett disarmed defendant, placed him under arrest, and handcuffed him. Defendant did not resist arrest. He later tried to escape from Neblett's vehicle but did not assault Neblett. Neblett's testimony at trial was substantially the same as that presented at the hearing. Defendant contends, as he did at trial, that this testimony of prior criminal activity was inadmissible as aggravating evidence because his mere possession of a concealed weapon did not involve the use or attempted use of force or violence or... the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3.) We have found an implied threat of violence, however, when the evidence permits an inference that the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon with the purpose of using it to avoid apprehension and successfully escape the scene of a crime; the circumstance that the defendant chose not to act upon his plan could not negate the implied threat to use the weapon against anyone who might interfere. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 676-677, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.) Similarly, in the present case, the jury could infer an implied threat of violence from defendant's failure to remove his hand from the loaded weapon kept hidden in his jacket while he was attempting to avoid arrest. (Cf. People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1235-1236, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [[A] defendant who arms himself after having escaped from custody can be presumed to be in possession of a gun to assist his continued flight rather than for legitimate self-defense or some other lawful purpose.].) Defendant was free to present any additional evidence regarding the incident that would have suggested he possessed the handgun for a lawful purpose. ( Id. at p. 1236, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) The trial court properly admitted the evidence concerning the circumstances of defendant's 1968 arrest. Finally, defendant challenges the admission of evidence regarding these prior incidents on the ground they were so remote in time that requiring him to defend against the claims violated his constitutional rights to due process of law and a speedy trial, as well as his Eighth Amendment rights. Defendant failed to raise such an objection in the trial court, however, and he acknowledges that we repeatedly have rejected these and other challenges to the use of evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b). (E.g., People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 335, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374; People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 312-313, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890; People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 863, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2; People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 401-402, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 69-70, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224, and cases cited therein.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider these decisions.
At the guilt phase of the trial, defendant moved for the court to appoint a commissioner to depose Deanna Lisa Russell in Tennessee. (See §§ 1349-1362.) Russell had been defendant's parole officer in that state. Defense counseI asserted that Russell was the person who knew the most concerning efforts to obtain mental health treatment for defendant following his release from prison, and that her testimony would be relevant to mitigating factors at the penalty phase. Counsel explained that Russell was caring for a small infant, and that under these circumstances he did not want to subpoena her to testify at the trial. The prosecutor noted that such a deposition may be read into evidence at trial only if the witness is unavailable within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240 (§ 1362), and that Russell was not unavailable under that standard. Nevertheless, reserving the right to object to the admission of the deposition testimony at trial, the prosecutor stated that he had no objection to having the deposition taken, and that he might be willing to stipulate to its admission, depending upon the answers. The court granted defendant's motion but stated it was not ruling on the admissibility of Russell's answers at trial. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were given the opportunity to pose questions to be asked by the commissioner. Russell testified at the deposition that defendant's parole in Tennessee included the special condition that he participate in a mental health program. She assumed the condition was imposed to facilitate readjustment to the community. After she made an initial referral to a mental health program, Russell received a letter from the director of the program. The director requested copies of defendant's latest psychological evaluation, parole board papers, and instructions regarding what information Russell wanted from an evaluation. Russell did not provide this information, because she could not disclose parole records without the written permission of the board of paroles. Therefore, she wrote a memorandum to a supervisor requesting guidance, but did not receive a response. Approximately one month after Russell received the program director's request for information, defendant was given permission to travel to California. When he returned to Tennessee, defendant was granted a transfer of his parole supervision to California. At the penalty phase, defendant's sister-in-law testified that she accompanied defendant to the mental health facility in Tennessee, where defendant was informed he could not receive services until his probation officer provided some kind of paperwork. She and defendant then went to see Russell, who said she did not have the papers and would contact defendant when she received them. Russell never again mentioned the paperwork or mental health treatment to defendant during his subsequent visits with her. Defendant's brother, Enoch, testified that after defendant had wrecked two trucks, Enoch called a physician he knew to seek assistance in getting defendant into the mental health program. In Enoch's opinion, the States of Tennessee and California did nothing to help defendant fulfill his parole condition of receiving mental health care. Defendant subsequently offered a stipulation that Russell's testimony be admitted into evidence and read to the jury. Defense counsel stated that the testimony would help the jury determine exactly why defendant did not receive mental health treatment in Tennessee. Defense counsel conceded that Russell was not unavailable within the meaning of the Evidence Code, that all he could do was offer the stipulation, and that the matter was in the [prosecutor's] hands. The prosecutor refused to join the stipulation, and the trial court declined to admit the testimony. Defendant now contends that Russell's testimony should have been admitted even though it falls within no exception to the hearsay rule. He relies upon his Eighth Amendment right at the penalty phase to have the jury consider all relevant mitigating evidence. ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1.) Defendant also relies upon the principle that a defendant's due process rights are violated when hearsay testimony at the penalty phase of a capital trial is excluded, if both of the following conditions are present: (1) the excluded testimony is `highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the trial,' and (2) there are substantial reasons to assume the reliability of the evidence. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278, quoting Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95, 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 60 L.Ed.2d 738; see also Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 [the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice].) In seeking admission of Russell's testimony at trial, defendant did not contend that the federal Constitution compelled admission of this hearsay testimony, and he may not do so for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1264-1265, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) Defendant claims, however, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to advance this argument in the trial court. Therefore, we consider whether defendant was prejudiced by the alleged deficiency in counsel's performance. (See People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 366-367, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) Although the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments confer a right upon capital defendants to present all relevant mitigating evidence to the jury ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669), the United States Supreme Court never has suggested that this right precludes the state from applying ordinary rules of evidence to determine whether such evidence is admissible. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1176, 1178, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 856, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249.) Furthermore, in the present case the excluded deposition testimony simply corroborated the testimony of defendant's brother and sister-in-law concerning defendant's efforts to participate in the mental health program and the reason these efforts were unsuccessful. The trial court's application of the hearsay rule to exclude Russell's deposition therefore did not deprive defendant of his right to present relevant mitigating evidence. Nor did application of the rules of evidence violate defendant's right to due process of law. In Green v. Georgia, supra, 442 U.S. at page 97, 99 S.Ct. 2150, evidence highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase consisted of hearsay testimony that the defendant's accomplice had confessed to killing the victim after ordering the defendant to run an errand. The state had used the same testimony to obtain a conviction and death sentence in the accomplice's trial. The high court held that [i]n these unique circumstances, application of the hearsay rule denied the defendant a fair trial on the issue of punishment. ( Ibid.; cf. Chambers v. Mississippi supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 289-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038 [the defendant was denied due process when he could not use a witness's signed confession for impeachment after the witness denied any involvement in the murder].) Thus, in these decisions, the high court found due process violations when the excluded evidence was highly probative of the defendant's innocence. By contrast, we have held that if the exculpatory value of the excluded evidence is tangential, or cumulative of other evidence admitted at trial, exclusion of the evidence does not deny the accused due process of law. (E.g., People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1178-1179, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950 [corroborating evidence concerning the defendant's background]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 938, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93 [evidence that unidentified gang members told the defendant's parole officer that they believed the defendant was innocent]; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 55-59, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118 [witness's preliminary hearing testimony of his recollection of police identification procedures]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 838-839, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 [corroborating evidence regarding the defendant's good relationship with children].) As explained above, in the present case Russell's deposition testimony simply corroborated other testimony presented at trial. Although, as defendant observes, Russell's testimony may have been considered more credible than that of defendant's relatives, its exclusion did not prevent defendant from presenting evidence to the jury regarding his attempt to receive mental health treatment in Tennessee. Moreover, the exculpatory value of this evidence was tangential at best. Defendant left Tennessee for California approximately two months after he was released from prison, and approximately one month after the director of the mental health program requested the paperwork from defendant's Tennessee parole officer. Defendant called his California parole officer as a witness, who testified he had no knowledge of any efforts made in California to ensure that defendant fulfilled the mental health condition of his parole. Thus, to the extent defendant offered Russell's testimony as mitigating evidence to show that his lack of mental health treatment was the responsibility of his parole officers, there was ample evidence admitted at trial that showed the same circumstance. Therefore, even assuming Russell's deposition testimony was sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, [17] it was not highly relevant to a critical issue at the penalty phase. Accordingly, exclusion of this evidence did not violate the Eighth Amendment or deprive defendant of due process of law. Defendant suffered no prejudice from his trial counsel's failure to argue that the testimony was admissible under this theory.
Defendant presented evidence that he had adjusted well to prison life when he was incarcerated in Tennessee. He had good relationships with inmates and prison staff, worked hard as a member of the prison maintenance crew, and engaged in hobbies such as building crafts from wood. This evidence was introduced pursuant to section 190.3, factor (k), which permits the jury to consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument by using this evidence as an aggravating factor, thereby violating section 190.3 and defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. In his closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor described as aggravating factors defendant's previous criminal conduct and the circumstances of the present crime. He then stated: And of course, before [defendant] committed this crime, why did he do it? Well, he thought the worst thing that can happen to me, I probably won't get caught. But if I do, the worst thing that can happen to me, they're just going to send me back to prison again. [¶] Well, Cheryl Nesler was not given any chance in this case. And she has left this life forever because of the acts of [defendant]; because of the acts of a man who's led the type of life that you'[ve] heard about, [¶] But he's asking you, ladies and gentlemen, for yet another chance, and he has had many. He's asking you for another chance, where Cheryl had none. [¶] He wants to go back home to prison; prison where he gets along with the inmates, and gets along with the guards, where he gets three meals a day, and a roof over his head. He can make the crafts that he makes. [¶] Is that justice, or does that amount in the case of [defendant] to no punishment at all.... (Italics added.) In his rebuttal argument, after suggesting that defendant might pose a threat of violence in prison, the prosecutor stated: But assuming he could function in prison, and wouldn't hurt anyone in prison, and wouldn't escape, is he a man that deserves this? Would that be punishment for [defendant], or would that be giving him a break that he does not deserve because he's received breaks in the past? It would be sending him home to prison. [¶] What is the reason to vote for the death penalty for [defendant]? The reason is clear. Society is not safe with [defendant] alive. (Italics added.) Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's remarks in the trial court, and his claim therefore has been waived. ( People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 149, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 495, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) In any event, the prosecutor's comments were not improper. We have held that evidence of a defendant's background and character is admissible under section 190.3, factor (k), only to mitigate the gravity of the crime, and that it is improper for the prosecutor to urge that such evidence should be considered in aggravation. ( People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782]....) ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 494, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) Nonetheless, `[a] prosecutor does not mischaracterize [mitigating] evidence by arguing it should not carry any extenuating weight when evaluated in a broader factual context. We have consistently declined to criticize advocacy of this nature. [Citations.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 184, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960, overruled on another point in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) In People v. Lucas , for example, the defendant asserted the prosecutor relied upon nonstatutory aggravating factors in arguing that prison would be an inadequate punishment for defendant, as his brutality was such that he `would not even see the bars.' (12 Cal.4th at p. 496, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) We determined that such argument was not inappropriate, because it was based upon proper aggravating factors (defendant's brutality as demonstrated by the circumstances of the crime and prior violent criminal activity) and was directed to the jury's `` individualized assessment of the crucial issue whether the death penalty is appropriate for the particular defendant on trial. [Citation.] ( Ibid., original italics; see also People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1020-1021, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Millwee, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 151-152, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990.) Similarly, in the present case the prosecutor contended, in light of defendant's prior violent criminal activity and the circumstances of the present crime, that a sentence of life in prison would not be an appropriate punishment for defendant. The prosecutor did not ask the jury to consider defendant's adjustment to prison life as a factor in aggravation, but rather essentially urged the jury not to give this mitigating evidence extenuating weight in light of other aggravating factors. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's argument.
During closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor stated: Something else that I think needs to be discussed at this juncture is the sympathy that you are entitled to consider. [¶] What you have to do in this case is separate sympathy you may feel for the Defendant's family from sympathy you should consider for the Defendant. The sympathy that should be considered by you is sympathy for the Defendant, not for any of the Defendant's family members. [¶] And, of course, you naturally feel sympathy for the brothers and sisters who come in and have one of their loved ones charged and convicted with an offense like this, and facing the possible penalties that he's facing, [¶] It's only normal to consider that sympathy. But that is not the sympathy that plays into your weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, [¶] ... [¶] ... [I]t's very, very hard, I would imagine, for family members to realize that one of their loved ones has been convicted of this. [¶] So you feel sympathy for them, and you feel sympathy, of course, for the family members who have tried to help [defendant,] who have given [him] the opportunity to straighten his life out. [¶] He's turned his back on them as well. You can't help feeling sympathy for them, but it's not that sympathy, but sympathy for the Defendant that could come into play in this case.... The prosecutor then stated that the law requires the jury to consider sympathy for defendant, but that the jurors individually must decide how much weight to give such sympathy. The prosecutor proceeded to discuss various aggravating factors. Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by informing the jury it could not consider sympathy for defendant's family. According to defendant, this misconduct precluded the jury from considering relevant mitigating evidence of defendant's character or record, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and section 190.3, factor (k). (See Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 [the sentencer ... [may] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death (original italics, fns. omitted) ]; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 280-281, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [when instructing on section 190.3, factor (k), the court should inform the jury that it may consider in mitigation any other aspect of the defendant's character or record].) Noting that the jury may consider sympathy for the victim's family as aggravating evidence ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720; People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436), defendant maintains that sympathy for the defendant's family is relevant as well and should be considered as mitigating evidence. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's comments essentially directed the jury to ignore the testimony of defendant's siblings regarding the difficult circumstances of their childhood, which were relevant to defendant's character and record as well. [18] We recently held that sympathy for a defendant's family is not a matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation, but that family members may offer testimony of the impact of an execution on them if by so doing they illuminate some positive quality of the defendant's background or character. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 456, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) We explained in Ochoa that when considering mitigating evidence in determining the penalty, the relevant factor is a defendant's background and character  not the distress of his or her family. A defendant may offer evidence that he or she is loved by family members or others, and that these individuals want him or her to live. But this evidence is relevant because it constitutes indirect evidence of the defendant's character. ( Ibid. ) Thus, we determined that the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's requested instruction that would have invited the jury to consider in mitigation sympathy for the defendant's family. Such an instruction impermissibly would have allowed the jurors to return a verdict of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole solely because they wished to spare the defendant's family the emotional distress of an execution. Therefore, the prosecutor's argument in the present case properly directed the jury not to consider sympathy for defendant's family as mitigating evidence. His comments did not preclude the jury from considering the testimony of defendant's family to the extent it might have been relevant to sympathy for defendant. Indeed, the prosecutor expressly told the jurors that the law required them to weigh sympathy for defendant in making their penalty determination. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecutor's argument did not have the effect of inviting the jury to disregard all the testimony of defendant's family that was related to mitigating evidence of defendant's background. We find no prosecutorial misconduct and no constitutional violation.
Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument at the penalty phase by falsely characterizing defendant's 1973 escape from prison as violent, and by arguing that defendant could pose a threat of violence to others in prison if he were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. According to defendant, the prosecutor's intentional presentation of false and misleading information to the jury introduced improper aggravating factors, depriving him of a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination. [19] A defense witness at the penalty phase testified that defendant escaped from prison when he and approximately 10 other inmates cut through the roof of the cellblock and went over the wall using a rope ladder. The witness stated that no one was harmed during the escape. No evidence suggested that defendant possessed a weapon at the time of the escape, or that the escape itself otherwise involved violence or the threat of violence. The prosecution did present evidence, however, that after defendant escaped and before he was apprehended, defendant committed an armed robbery. (See pt. H.B.2., ante. ) During closing argument, in the course of discussing defendant's prior criminal activity, the prosecutor observed that defendant was sentenced to prison in 1969 for armed robbery, and that in 1973 he escaped. The prosecutor then stated: Now, the fact that he's sentenced, or the fact that he escaped, are not factors in aggravation. They're just part of the history of the choices that he's made. [¶] Then while he was escaped, while he was out of prison, in April of 1973, he robbed Mr. Cavins, who came in and testified as to exactly what happened there. [¶] Again, he uses a firearm.... After referring to testimony regarding defendant's possession of a shank in prison, the prosecutor continued: One of the threads that runs through all these events is that [defendant] always manages to get his hands on a deadly weapon. He has a gun, and he threatens to kill his wife, and fires the shots in the car. [¶] He is convicted of an armed robbery. He's arrested. He has a gun, and he escapes from prison. While he's escaped from prison, he manages to get a gun, and commits another act of violence. (Italics added.) Later in his argument, the prosecutor made the following comments: Would [defendant] be a threat in prison? Possibly. He's escaped in the past, and when he's escaped, he's committed a violent act. [¶] The ... only times he hasn't been in prison since 1969, he's committed violent acts; escape in 1973; robbed Mr. Cavins. And he's out for just barely over a year, after all this time in prison, and he commits the murder that has brought us here today. Contrary to defendant's characterization of the prosecutor's remarks, we find the prosecutor did not suggest that defendant possessed a gun when he escaped from prison. In light of the evidence and previous argument, it is clear the statement, He's arrested. He has a gun, and he escapes from prison, was transcribed with punctuation conveying a meaning different from that intended by the prosecutor. Defendant did have a gun when he was arrested for robbery. On no other occasion did the prosecutor imply that defendant was armed when he escaped, or that the escape involved violence; indeed, the prosecutor explicitly conceded that the escape could not be considered as an aggravating factor  something he would not have done if he could have asserted an implied threat of violence because of defendant's possession of a firearm. (See People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1235-1236, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) In addition, if defendant had possessed a gun when he escaped from prison, it is unlikely the prosecutor would have said that while defendant was at large, he managed to obtain a gun. Similarly, by stating that when defendant was not in prison, he's committed violent acts; escape in 1973; robbed Mr. Cavins, the prosecutor was not suggesting that the escape was a violent act, but rather that defendant committed the violent act of robbery while he was at large after the escape. The prosecutor's argument did not mischaracterize the evidence. Nor did the prosecutor improperly suggest that defendant might pose a threat to others in prison. It is settled that a defendant's knowing possession of a potentially dangerous weapon in custody is admissible under [section 190.3,] factor (b). Such conduct is unlawful and involves an implied threat of violence even where there is no evidence defendant used or displayed it in a provocative or threatening manner. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Defendant offered an innocent explanation for his possession of a shank in prison (self-defense), as he was entitled to do, but the evidence remains admissible under section 190.3, factor (b). (4 Cal.4th at p. 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) As a result of his possession of the weapon, defendant was placed in involuntary segregation due to a threat to the population.... Therefore, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by suggesting that defendant might pose a threat of violence in prison. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1172, 1174, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.)
At the guilt phase of the trial, the court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence regarding defendant's mental disease, defect, or disorder solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crime charged. Defendant contends that the court erred in failing expressly to inform the jury that this limitation upon the use of mental state evidence no longer applied at the penalty phase. The effect of the court's omission, according to defendant, was to bar the jury from considering his strongest mitigating evidence in support of a verdict other than death, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court instructed the jury at the beginning and end of the penalty phase of the trial that it must consider, among other things, whether or not the offense was committed when the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and whether or not at the time of the offense, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct, as a requirement of law, was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect.... Immediately following the enumeration of factors that must be considered in determining the penalty, the court stated: You must disregard any instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with this principle. Defendant claims that the general admonition to disregard conflicting guilt phase instructions was insufficient to inform the jury that the limitation upon its consideration of mental state evidence no longer applied at the penalty phase. We have rejected similar claims of error based upon the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to disregard particular instructions given at the guilt phase. (E.g., People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1025, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 [guilt phase instruction not to be influenced by sympathy]; People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 379-380, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169 [guilt phase instruction to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences]; People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 717-718, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253 [guilt phase instructions to disregard sympathy and the consequences of the verdict].) As in the foregoing decisions, the court in the present case did not repeat the inapplicable guilt phase instruction at the penalty phase, the jury properly was instructed to consider the appropriate sentencing factors and to disregard any conflicting guilt phase instructions, and the parties presented evidence and argument regarding those factors. Accordingly, we find no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the absence of an instruction to disregard the mental disorder instruction given at the guilt phase.
The trial court refused a number of defendant's proposed instructions regarding mitigating factors. Defendant contends that the absence of proper instructions resulted in a failure to guide the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence as relevant to his personal culpability, thereby violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and analogous provisions in the California Constitution. (See Penry v. Lynaugh (1989) 492 U.S. 302, 317-328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256; People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1015, 1022, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) In evaluating defendant's contention, we consider the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instructions in a manner that precluded the consideration of mitigating evidence. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1021, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 472, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) Section 190.3, factor (i) requires the jury to take into account, if relevant, [t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime. One of defendant's proposed instructions stated in relevant part: Chronological age, by itself, is a matter over which the defendant has no control, and which is not relevant to the choice of penalty. [¶] However, the factor relating to `defendant's age,' as set forth in these instructions, refers to any matter concerning defendant's age, maturity, and judgment which common experience or morality might indicate to be relevant to the issue of penalty. [¶] You shall therefore give any age-related factors and argument consideration in arriving at a judgment as to penalty. This instruction paraphrased the discussion of section 190.3, factor (i) in People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 301-302, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052, which rejected the defendant's argument that factor (i) could be considered only in mitigation. The opinion in Lucky states: [T]he word `age' in statutory sentencing factor (i) is used as a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. (45 Cal.3d at p. 302, 247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052.) The trial court gave no reason for its refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction, and it gave no other instruction explaining section 190.3, factor (i). Defendant contends that the court's refusal to give his requested instruction precluded the jury from considering his mental age as evidence in mitigation. Defense experts testified that defendant has an IQ between 67 and 72  within the mildly mentally retarded range  and a mental age equivalent score of 11 years. Without his requested instruction regarding age, defendant contends, no instruction specifically addressed the issues of his mental age or mental retardation, and the jury thus was precluded from giving the proper mitigating effect to this evidence. Defendant relies upon Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. 302, 328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256, which held that the sentencing jury must be instructed that it can consider evidence of a defendant's mental retardation and background of abuse in determining whether to impose the death penalty. According to defendant, this requirement was particularly important in the present case because the prosecutor argued that defendant, who was 48 years of age at the time of the crimes, is much less deserving of mercy than a young inexperienced defendant who has never experienced the consequences of his criminal acts. Penry is distinguishable. In that case, the trial court was required to sentence the defendant to death if the jury answered yes to three questions: whether the defendant acted deliberately, whether there was a probability that he would pose a continuing threat to society, and whether the killing was an unreasonable response to provocation, if any. ( Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, 492 U.S. at p. 310, 109 S.Ct. 2934.) None of these questions permitted consideration of the defendant's retardation or background. In contrast, section 190.3, factors (d), (h), and (k), require consideration of whether the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of an extreme mental disturbance, whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, and any other circumstance that extenuates the gravity of the crime. The trial court's instruction that the jurors must consider these factors informed them that they were to consider evidence of defendant's mental retardation and mental age in deciding the appropriate penalty. (See People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [section 190.3, factor (k) allows consideration of any mental condition]; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1252, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1 [ Penry's requirement of supporting instructions is met by the section 190.3, factor (k) instruction].) Accordingly, there was no instructional error. [20] Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that section 190.3, factor (i) is not impermissibly vague simply because it can be either aggravating or mitigating: Both the prosecution and the defense may present valid arguments as to the significance of the defendant's age in a particular case. Competing arguments by adversary parties bring perspective to a problem, and thus serve to promote a more reasoned decision, providing guidance as to a factor jurors most likely would discuss in any event. We find no constitutional deficiency in factor (i). ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 977, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) In closing argument, defense counsel told the jurors that they should decide whether defendant's mental age falls within section 190.3, factor (i), and defense counsel also mentioned defendant's intelligence and mental retardation in connection with section 190.3, factors (d), (h), and (k). In light of this argument and the court's direction that the jury consider those three factors, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled to believe it could not consider the mitigating evidence regarding defendant's mental age and retardation. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his request to exclude section 190.3 factors for which no evidence was introduced, and that the court should have identified which factors were mitigating and which were aggravating. The court instead instructed the jury, pursuant to defendant's request, that some factors would be inapplicable because they were not shown by the evidence, and that the jury was to disregard any factor not shown by the evidence; in addition, the jury was instructed that the absence of any mitigating factor could not be considered as an aggravating factor. We repeatedly have rejected the claims now made by defendant, and he provides no compelling reason for us to revisit them. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1026-1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1183, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 674-675, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) [21] We also consistently have rejected defendant's claim that a trial court prejudicially errs in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte at the penalty Phase to disregard the no-sympathy instruction given at the guilt phase. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 1024-1026, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously refused his instruction stating that mitigating factors are unlimited. Although we have mentioned such an instruction with approval (e.g., People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 807, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485), we also have stated that the catchall section 190.3, factor (k) instruction allows the jury to consider a virtually unlimited range of mitigating circumstances. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1192, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The absence of defendant's proposed instruction thus was not reasonably likely to have misled the jury into believing that its consideration of mitigating circumstances somehow was limited. Because we find no instructional error affecting the jury's consideration of mitigating factors, defendant's claim of heightened prejudice from cumulative instructional error is without merit.
During its deliberations at the penalty phase, the jury sent a note to the court stating: If the death penalty is overthrown  would [defendant] get life or life without parole. The court had the jurors return to the courtroom, and asked the foreperson to elaborate upon the question. The foreperson responded: What we were concerned with, that in the event that we found the defendant death [ sic ], that if it went to the higher court, if the death penalty was overthrown, would it be life in prison, or would it be just life with possibility of parole? In a conference with the court in chambers, defense counsel requested that the jury be informed that defendant would be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole if a death sentence were overturned on appeal, and that he never would be released from prison. The court refused to give such an instruction, instead telling the jury: I'm not going to answer your question as you put it.... [¶] You are not to speculate or be influenced in making your decision as to what may possibly happen or occur in the future as to any sentence that you impose, [¶] You are ... to determine what you consider to be the proper penalty based upon consideration of all the evidence presented and the instructions given you by the Court. [¶] And it is to be made on the basis that your decision will stand. Approximately 20 minutes later, the jurors sent a note to the court indicating that the jury was unable to arrive at a penalty verdict. The court Rinquired how many jurors would wish to continue deliberations further if the court answered their previous question more fully. One juror responded affirmatively. The court then asked the foreperson whether answering the question more fully would be helpful. The foreperson replied: It's a little more involved than that, your Honor. The people are dictating by their conscience, and it's hard to persuade somebody who is set on the decision. The court excused the jurors for lunch and asked them to consider whether they desired a further answer to their question. Upon resuming their deliberations, the foreperson sent a note to the court that stated: Yes! We would like you to go over our last question[.] Higher court over rules [ sic ] death sentence? The court then read the jurors the following instruction proposed by defense counsel but modified by the court: First of all, you should vote on the assumption that your decision will not be overturned. However, if the Supreme Court should overturn or reverse the death penalty finding, the case would be sent back to the Court for a potential retrial of the penalty phase only. [¶] By the terms of your question, the conviction of guilt would stand. The District Attorney would have the option or decision as to whether to retry the penalty phase, [¶] If the district attorney chose not to retry the penalty phase, the penalty of life imprisonment without parole would stand, [¶] If the District Attorney chooses to retry the penalty phase, the new jury would decide on the penalty only; that is, of the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole. The court then reread to the jury its previous instruction that the jury was not to speculate or be influenced by what may happen in the future regarding any penalty it imposed, and that it should choose the penalty on the basis that its decision would stand. Two minutes after resuming deliberations, the jury informed the court that it had reached a verdict. Defendant contends that the trial court's instruction did not eliminate the jury's confusion regarding the meaning of the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He contends the court should have granted defense counsel's request that the jury be informed that under no circumstances could [defendant] get life with parole, and that defendant would never get out of prison. Defendant relies upon Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 168-171, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133, in which the high court held that when the prosecution urges a capital jury to sentence a defendant to death because of a potential for future dangerousness, the trial court cannot prevent the jury from learning that the defendant is not eligible for parole. Thus, when the jury in Simmons was required to choose between a death sentence and life imprisonment, prohibiting the defendant from informing the jury that life imprisonment meant life in prison without the possibility of parole resulted in a violation of his right to due process of law. Defendant also asserts that the trial court's failure to define the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole precluded a reliable sentencing determination, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prosecutor in the present case urged the jury to return a verdict of death, in part because of the potential that defendant would be dangerous in prison or to society if he escaped. Therefore, under Simmons, defendant was entitled to advise the jury that he was ineligible for parole. On several occasions, however, we have distinguished Simmons on the ground that under California's statutory scheme, the jury expressly is informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole by the instruction that it must choose between death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole; an instruction that such a sentence will inexorably be carried out would be incorrect. ( People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1271, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475 [no error in refusing defense instruction that a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole meant that the defendant never would be paroled]; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 687-689, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 [no sua sponte duty to give such an instruction]; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 189-190, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960 [no error in refusing a similar instruction requested by the defendant]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 715-716, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [same]; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 172-173, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980 [same]; People v. Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th 891, 971-972, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on the meaning of the term].) Defendant contends that our post-Simmons decisions are inapposite because none considered a situation, like the one in the present case, in which the jury expressed confusion regarding the meaning of the term life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. According to defendant, the court had a duty to eliminate the jurors' uncertainty by instructing that such a sentence signified that he never would be released from prison. As explained previously (pt. II.A.11., ante), the court has an obligation to rectify any confusion expressed by the jury regarding instructions, but has discretion to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury's request for information. (§ 1138; People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 522, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) In past cases we have rejected the claim that the term life without the possibility of parole confuses jurors or has a technical meaning that requires a sua sponte definitional instruction. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 457, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 688-689, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 971, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388.) In the event the jury does express misunderstanding or concerns regarding the consequences of its choice of penalty, the court properly may address such confusion by instructing the jury to assume that whatever penalty it selects will be carried out. ( People v. Kipp, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 378-379, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169.) The court did so in the present case Immby instructing the jury it should vote on the assumption that [its] decision will not be overturned, and on the basis that [its] decision will stand. The court also correctly informed the jury regarding the consequences of a reversal of a death sentence on appeal, indicating that the most lenient penalty that could result after such a reversal would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Indeed, the confusion reflected in the jury's note appears to concern the consequences of a reversal of a death sentence on appeal  not the meaning of life without the possibility of parole. In any event, it would have been error for the court to instruct the jury, as requested by defendant, that the penalty of life without the possibility of parole necessarily would be carried out and that defendant never would be released from prison. ( People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 524, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) We conclude that the court's instructions regarding the jury's sentencing alternatives were sufficient and correct, and that the instructions did not violate defendant's due process or Eighth Amendment rights. [22] For similar reasons, we reject defendant's contention that the court erroneously refused his proposed instruction, described below, regarding other convicted murderers who became eligible for parole after their death sentences were reversed. Defendant observes that during voir dire, several jurors expressed concern regarding well-known murderers such as Sirhan Sirhan who now are eligible for parole after the death penalty statute under which they were convicted was held invalid. (See People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 717, 102 Cal.Rptr. 385, 497 P.2d 1121.) According to defendant, the trial court had a duty to instruct the jury that defendant was tried under a statute different from the one previously held unconstitutional, that the jury was to disregard previous cases, and that the jury could not speculate how the outcome of defendant's case might be affected by the subsequent actions of other authorities. As established above, however, the trial court did instruct the jurors not to speculate regarding events following the trial, and to assume that their penalty determination would stand. Any confusion the jurors may have had regarding a potential reversal of the penalty on appeal was addressed adequately by the court's explanation that the most lenient sentence possible after such a reversal would be life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Defendant's requested instruction unnecessarily would have highlighted matters irrelevant to the jury's penalty determination.