Opinion ID: 223395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brady/Strickland Claim

Text: Abdur'Rahman mounts a final attack by banding together the Brady violations with his long-settled Strickland claims. See Abdur'Rahman II, 226 F.3d at 707-09. I agree with Abdur'Rahman that the COA creates no jurisdictional bar to our review of this hybrid claim because the COA allows Abdur'Rahman to make cumulative effect arguments related to his Brady subclaims. ( See Jan. 20, 2010 Order at 5 (Abdur'Rahman is permitted to make cumulative-effect arguments with respect to the subclaims on which we grant him a COA.).) The clause the majority reads to limit the scope of those cumulative claims (even if [bringing cumulative claims] involves referring to factual allegations that underpin prosecutorial misconduct subclaims on which we have denied his COA request) is properly read to provide an example of one kind of cumulative effect claim, not to limit the permutations of permissible Brady hybrids. ( Id. ) Even so, I am constrained to agree with the majority that Abdur'Rahman procedurally defaulted the Strickland/Brady claim by failing to raise it in state court. See Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 679 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 447 (6th Cir.2002)). Were I able to reach this last claim, I would grant it for the reasons detailed above. The Brady violations and Strickland ineffective assistance fed off each other at trial in a perverse symbiosis that infected the verdict with constitutional error. Perhaps if Abdur'Rahman could have pursued his petition in another circuit his life might be spared in this procedural posture. See, e.g., Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1456-57 (5th Cir.1992) (permitting a hybrid cumulative error argument where none was raised below). But I am powerless against our precedent and my colleagues' contrary views.