Opinion ID: 618761
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Allege a Federal Claim

Text: Even in the absence of immunity, however, the District Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. A claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19831 must allege a deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the U.S. Constitution or federal law. See, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 1 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 4 U.S. 500, 513 (2006); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542–43 (1974). To invoke subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 13312 or 1343(a)(3),3 the federal right claimed in a complaint must not be insubstantial, unsubstantiated, or frivolous. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Studies Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1978) (noting that to sustain jurisdiction under § 1331, the alleged deprivation must not be “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); Hagans, 415 U.S. at 536-37 (noting that §§ 1331 and 1343(a) do not vest district courts with jurisdiction to hear claims of federal civil rights deprivations that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, . . . wholly insubstantial, . . . obviously frivolous, . . . plainly unsubstantial, . . . or no longer open to discussion” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has warned that “[j]urisdiction . . . is not defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover.” Hagans, 415 U.S. at 542 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). Rather, “failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 682). Assuming, arguendo, that the District Court was not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3), her complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, and thus the District Court properly granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Giammatteo bases her § 1983 action on an alleged harm to her professional reputation and relationship with patients and employees, which she claims deprived her of due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 3 “(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States; . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3). 5 Notwithstanding conclusory labels and naked assertions that defendants violated her constitutional rights, Giammatteo does not allege facts that, taken as true, would permit the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendants deprived her of any federally-protected right. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 570. As an initial matter, we note that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits,” Giammatteo was required to plead that “each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” McKinnon v. Patterson, 568 F.2d 930, 934 (2d Cir. 1977). Giammatteo fails to plead any specific conduct by defendants Peck or Galvin from which to infer that they were negligent or reckless in managing their subordinates, that they knew or were informed of any unconstitutional conduct and failed to act, or that polices they instituted enabled such conduct. Although Giammatteo points to specific conduct by Newton, her complaint nonetheless fails to state a claim against Newton because the alleged conduct, even if true, did not deprive Giammatteo of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, as is required to state a claim for due process. See, e.g., RRI Realty corp. v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 914–18 (2d Cir. 1989). To the extent the Constitution confers a substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary government action, the right is limited to “arbitrary government action that infringes a protected right.” O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 200 n.6 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). Action that merely harms one’s professional or business interests does not, alone, infringe a federallyprotected right, and thus does not implicate due process.4 See id. at 203; Valez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 87 (2d Cir. 2005). Nor, based on the undisputed facts, does Giammatteo adequately allege a deprivation of procedural due process. She was given adequate notice of the Charges and hearings and was given an opportunity to be heard at the proceedings. See, e.g., Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of procedural due process has always been understood to embody a presumptive requirement of notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the State acts to deprive a person of his property.” (emphasis in original)). The proceedings to which Giammatteo objects were terminated completely—and new proceedings initiated in front of a new panel with a new prosecutor—to remove any semblance of unfairness or bias. Giammatteo does not allege that the panel responsible for the final decision over the proceedings was anything but impartial. Giammatteo also fails to state a cognizable equal protection claim because her complaint fails to show that she was treated differently from any similarly situated person, as would have been necessary to state a so-called “class-of-one” equal protection claim. See, e.g., Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 4 Moreover, the protections of substantive due process are generally limited to “matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity,” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994), none of which relate to Giammatteo’s complaint. 6 468 F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006). The existence of persons in similar circumstances5 who received more favorable treatment than the plaintiff is absolutely essential in a class-of-one case, “to provide an inference that the plaintiff was intentionally singled out for reasons that so lack any reasonable nexus with a legitimate governmental policy that an improper purpose—whether personal or otherwise—is all but certain.” Id. (quoting Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, her claims may be vindicated, if at all, in state court under traditional state law principles. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).