Opinion ID: 151938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The United States Had Territorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Defendants

Text: Riley, joined by Gonzalez, makes an argument that by any objective measure could not have been advanced in good faith nor advanced consistently with the obligations of counsel to the court. See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) ([A]n attorney is under an ethical obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal. (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Pimentel v. Jacobsen Fishing Co., Inc., 102 F.3d 638, 640 (1st Cir.1996) (An appeal is frivolous if the ... arguments are wholly without merit. (internal quotation marks omitted)). They primarily argue that only New Hampshire, and not the United States, has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes occurring in Plainfield, New Hampshire. They also argue that there is no venue in a federal courthouse in Concord, New Hampshire. Their theory is that either the United States must buy the land on which the offense occurred or the land must have been ceded by New Hampshire to the federal government for federal criminal laws to attach. Defendants' murky and confused argument seems to posit that this federal prosecution entails a violation of the sovereignty of the state of New Hampshire and that these defendants may assert whatever sovereign rights New Hampshire has. The claim is utterly frivolous and has been rejected before by this court and others. [9] See, e.g., United States v. Lussier, 929 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1991). The argument ignores the fact that New Hampshire chose to enter into a national union governed by the Constitution. In United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 1 L.Ed. 426 (1798), the Supreme Court affirmed that the enumerated powers granted to Congress in Article I, § 8, included the general power to create, define, and punish, crimes and offenses, whenever they shall deem it necessary and proper by law to do so, for effectuating the objects of the [federal] government. Id. at 394; see also United States v. Comstock, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1957-58, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010) (noting that the Constitution grants Congress broad authority to create federal crimes, which Congress routinely exercises, and collecting examples). There is no offense to state sovereignty by this federal prosecution, nor has New Hampshire claimed that there is. In fact, New Hampshire deployed its own law enforcement to help federal authorities arrest the Browns. It is black-letter law that an act defined as a crime by both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922). This dual-sovereignty doctrine allows for a federal prosecution even after a prior state prosecution for the same conduct. E.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195-96, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959). Congress has chosen to vest jurisdiction and venue over federal crimes in the federal courts. Congress has given the U.S. district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses against the laws of the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3231. That jurisdiction is not limited to crimes which occur on federally owned property, nor is a state's permission needed for federal prosecution. See United States v. Hamilton, 263 F.3d 645, 655 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 953 (9th Cir.1992), abrogated on other grounds by Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996); see also Cantrell v. Reno, 36 Fed. Appx. 651, 652 (1st Cir.2002). Defendants' argument depends upon severely misreading the text of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants point to clause 17 of Article I, § 8, the Exclusive Legislation Clause, which vests Congress with the power [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases .... and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings. Id. The argument misses the point that the United States has not claimed it has the exclusive right to promulgate laws over the lands where the crimes were committed; New Hampshire also has jurisdiction. So the clause is not at issue. The Exclusive Legislation Clause has been used to limit a state's authority to regulate activities on U.S. military bases and similarly exclusive federal areas/buildings absent permission from Congress. See, e.g., United States v. State Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 372-73, 93 S.Ct. 2183, 37 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973); Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 527-30, 58 S.Ct. 1009, 82 L.Ed. 1502 (1938); see also S. Lipsky, The Citizen's Constitution 81 (2009) (In 43 Federalist, Madison offers a straightforward explanation for this clause: `The public money expended on such places, and the public property deposited in them, require that they should be exempt from the authority of the particular State.'). Finally, there is no basis for a venue objection when the trial took place in Concord, New Hampshire, and a judge from the District of Maine sat because the New Hampshire judges were recused. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir.2001).