Opinion ID: 789575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's property interest claim

Text: 27 Velez asserts that she was deprived, without due process of law, of a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her elected community school board position. The district court concluded that she possessed no such property interest, and therefore cannot state a claim to this effect. We agree, although for different reasons than those given by the district court. 8 28 In order to establish a due process violation of this sort, plaintiff must show that state action deprived her of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1062 (2d Cir.1993). While property interests are constitutionally protected, they are not generally constitutionally established; rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, only where a plaintiff can demonstrate that state law confers a legitimate claim of entitlement to a particular position will a property interest in that position arise. Id. 29 Velez asserts a property interest in her community school board position based on the state legislation that created it. On her view, she enjoyed a real, non abstract objective expectation that she would continue to function in her elected position for her full term ... absent some established cause and appropriate process, and submits that this amounts to a legitimate claim of entitlement. 9 Her assertions are supported by the statutory scheme creating the community school board system. Under New York's statutory framework, elected school board officials are entitled to serve during their elected terms, and can only be removed by the Chancellor for cause. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2590- l (1). And New York courts enforced these statutory restrictions on removal, thereby demonstrating that the limits on the Chancellor's removal powers were not simply precatory. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Crew, 236 A.D.2d 314, 653 N.Y.S.2d 596 (N.Y.App.Div.1997) (affirming order enjoining the Chancellor from suspending community board members without cause). It might seem, then, that Velez's allegations would be adequate to support a property interest claim. See DeMichele v. Greenburgh Cent. School Dist., 167 F.3d 784, 789 (2d Cir.1999) (It is well settled that [the plaintiff], as a public employee who can be discharged only for cause, had a constitutionally protected property interest.). 30 Nevertheless, in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 20 S.Ct. 890, 44 L.Ed. 1187 (1900) and Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed. 497 (1944), we conclude that Velez lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her elected office. In Taylor, the governor of Kentucky claimed to have been deprived of property — namely, his political position — without due process of law, since, he averred, the recount election ousting him from office was marred by voter fraud. The Court rejected his claim in short order: 31 The decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as such .... [G] enerally speaking, the nature of the relation of a public officer to the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract right. 32 Id. at 577, 20 S.Ct. 890 (emphasis added). The Court therefore concluded that the official had been denied no right secured by the 14th Amendment. Id. at 578, 20 S.Ct. 890. 33 In Snowden, the Court, reaffirming Taylor, again asserted that elected offices cannot constitute property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment: 34 More than forty years ago this Court determined that an unlawful denial by state action of a right to state political office is not a denial of a right of property ... secured by the due process clause. Taylor and Marshall v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 20 S.Ct. 1009 [44 L.Ed. 1187]. Only once since has this Court had occasion to consider the question and it then reaffirmed that conclusion, Cave v. State of Missouri ex rel. Newell, 246 U.S. 650, 38 S.Ct. 334, 62 L.Ed. 921, as we reaffirm it now. 35 Snowden, 321 U.S. at 7, 64 S.Ct. 397 (emphasis added). 36 The Court's pronouncements in Taylor and Snowden have since been echoed in numerous decisions. See, e.g., Burks v. Perk, 470 F.2d 163, 165 (6th Cir.1972) (per curiam) (Public office is not property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.) (citing Taylor ); Rabkin v. Dean, 856 F.Supp. 543, 549 (N.D.Cal.1994) (asserting that elected officials are not employees in the traditional sense, and hence do not hold a property interest in their positions); Sweeney v. Tucker, 473 Pa. 493, 524, 375 A.2d 698 (1977) (rejecting legislator's property interest claim, and noting that, because an elected official holds office for the benefit of his constituents and cannot justifiably rely on a private need or expectation in holding office, an elected office is a public trust, not the private domain of the officeholder.). See also Guzman Flores v. College of Optometrists, 106 F.Supp.2d 212, 214 (D.Puerto Rico 2000) (relying on Taylor and Snowden to dismiss a property interest claim put forth by a candidate for public office, and stating, the Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue now before the Court and held that there was no due process right to seek election to public office.... Therefore, Guzman does not have a valid due process claim in the instant case.). 37 We are mindful that, since Taylor and Snowden were decided, the Court has adopted a more expansive approach to identifying property within the meaning of the 14th Amendment. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. But while intervening cases may cast a shadow over Taylor and Snowden, it is [the Supreme] Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997). Accordingly, we follow the Court's pronouncements on this issue, and are bound to conclude that Velez lacks a constitutionally cognizable property interest in her employment as an elected official. And finding, as the district court did, that the plaintiff lacks a constitutionally protected property interest in her elected position sufficient to support a due process claim, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this cause of action. 10