Opinion ID: 201055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McCormack's Sentence

Text: 26 McCormack also challenges the 188-month sentence he received, which he says violates the Sentencing Commission's statutory mandate to provid [e] certainty and fairness in sentencing and reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities. 28 U.S.C. § 994(f). McCormack admits that he did not raise this issue in front of the district court, and so our review is only for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-36, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Under the plain error test, McCormack bears the burden of demonstrating (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights ( i.e., the error was not harmless), and (4) that seriously undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Fazal-Ur-Raheman-Fazal, 355 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir.2004); see United States v. Geronimo, 330 F.3d 67, 74-75 (1st Cir.2003) (burden is on the defendant). 27 McCormack's argument is that his sentence is longer than it would have been if the jury had convicted, rather than acquitted, him of the firearm charge. The reason, claims McCormack, is that the district court increased his base offense level by seven for his Hobbs Act offenses because a firearm was discharged in the course of the kidnapping. 3 U.S.S.G. § 2B3.2(b)(3). As a result of this seven-level enhancement (which McCormack admits was applicable on its face), McCormack's total offense level increased from 28 to 35, 4 which, given his Criminal History Category of II, raised the applicable sentencing range from 87-108 months to 188-235 months, see id. ch. 5 pt. A. The judge sentenced McCormack at the low end of this range, imposing a 188-month sentence. 28 But if the jury had convicted him of the firearm charge pursuant to § 924(c), McCormack argues, then the Sentencing Guidelines would have directed the judge not to apply the firearm enhancement. See id. § 2K2.4 cmt. 4. Although the § 924(c) conviction would have added 60 months to his sentence, 5 see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), this would have resulted in a sentencing range of only 147-168 months, which, even if the judge imposed the maximum, is still 20 months shorter than the 188-month sentence he received. 29 As McCormack admits, the Sentencing Guidelines anticipate this anomaly. To avoid the possibility of inconsistent sentences, the application notes to the provision dealing with violations of § 924(c), provide, in relevant part, that: 30 In a few cases in which the defendant is determined not to be a career offender, the offense level for the underlying offense ... may result in a guideline range that, when combined with the mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C .... § 924(c) ..., produces a total maximum penalty that is less than the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under 18 U.S.C .... § 924(c) ... (i.e., the guideline range that would have resulted if the enhancements for possession, use, or discharge of a firearm had been applied). In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted so that [a] conviction under ... § 924(c) ... does not result in a decrease in the total punishment. An upward departure under this paragraph shall not exceed the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction under 18 U.S.C .... § 924(c).... 31 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. 4 (emphasis added). See generally United States v. Hickey, 280 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir.2002). Several courts have affirmed such upward departures. See, e.g., United States v. Banks-Giombetti, 245 F.3d 949, 953-54 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 465-66 (6th Cir.2000); United States v. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d 1295, 1310-11 (7th Cir.1995). The government reasons that because of this provision it is not likely that McCormack would have received a lesser sentence had he been convicted of the § 924(c) charge. 32 McCormack contends that this solution is insufficient to meet the statutory mandate of avoiding unwarranted disparities in sentences because the district court retains discretion not to depart upward when a § 924(c) conviction has the effect of reducing a defendant's sentence. McCormack says that the result of this discretion is that it is preferable in certain circumstances, from the defendant's point of view, to be convicted under § 924(c). The sentencing range in such cases can be no higher than if the defendant were acquitted, see § 2K2.4 cmt. 4, and there is at least the possibility of convincing a sympathetic judge not to depart upward. Because of this potential, McCormack argues that the Guidelines are inconsistent with the statutory command in 28 U.S.C. § 994(f). 33 We are doubtful that the mere potential for a disparity in sentences is enough to put the Guidelines and statute into conflict, especially given the application note. The existence of a potential disparity is nonetheless a very good reason for defense counsel to present the issue to the sentencing judge. That was not done here. We cannot say that there was plain error because McCormack cannot show that his substantial rights were affected. Fazal-Ur-Raheman-Fazal, 355 F.3d at 48. There is no reason to assume that if McCormack had been convicted of the firearm offense in § 924(c) then he would have been sentenced according to the 147-168 month range that he calculates. The district court may well have departed upward, as encouraged by the Guidelines. In fact, the district court could have departed upward beyond the 188-month sentence that McCormack received, up to 235 months, the maximum of the Guidelines range that McCormack faced. See § 2K2.4 cmt. 4. McCormack's acquittal on the § 924(c) count may well have been what influenced the judge to sentence at the low end of the available range. We add that the use of firearms during the kidnapping was a very serious matter, and the judge was well within his authority in giving the sentence that he did.