Opinion ID: 2569804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: KRPC 8.4 (Misconduct)

Text: The panel found respondent in violation of KRPC 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 399) for not attempting to make restitution here. Respondent argues she made an offer to repay Froggatte in installments. The offer was allegedly made in a telephone message. Respondent asked Froggatte on cross-examination, [I]s it possible that there was a telephone message from me left for you at the bank regarding trying to pay you back? Froggatte responded, That would have been possible. Froggatte's response suggests Respondent may have attempted to contact him concerning restitution. Respondent's claim that she attempted to make restitution is corroborated by the testimony of John Moran, who testified for respondent. Moran helped respondent in dealing with her creditors. Moran stated respondent felt bad about owing the money but had received no response when she offered to make payments. The record does not reflect clear and convincing evidence supporting a violation of KRPC 8.4(d). The panel also found respondent in violation of KRPC 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law) for failing to return Froggatte's $692 after the representation ended. Respondent's arguments that the panel erred in this finding are not persuasive. Respondent took and spent her retainer within a matter of days and without performing any legal services for her client. Froggatte was promised prompt actionhe received none. Froggatte lost precious time from respondent's dilatory response. At the time of the panel hearing, Froggatte explained that the expectant mother had left Kansas shortly after giving birth. He has pursued the mother of his child from Tennessee to North Carolina to South Carolina to Mississippi without success. There is no doubt that respondent's conduct adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law. Respondent next argues that she did not violate the cooperation provisions of Supreme Court Rule 207 (1999 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 223). Respondent admits she did not respond to letters from the Disciplinary Administrator and investigator. She argues, however, that her conduct was not intentional. According to respondent, she was unable to respond due to her clinical depression. Again, her argument fails. Respondent repeatedly failed to respond to Froggatte's complaint. The Disciplinary Administrator's office sent three letters and the investigator sent two letters. All went unanswered. The investigator also repeatedly attempted to reach respondent by telephone. Respondent returned only one of these phone calls, in which she left a message promising to fax some documents. No documents were received by the investigator. Clearly respondent's clinical depression was serious; however, there is nothing to suggest she was physically incapacitated. Respondent could have telephoned the Disciplinary Administrator to inform his office of her situation. She failed to do so. Respondent also objects to the panel's paragraph 19 findings relating to her candor in reporting the history of her depression to her mental health professional. Her objection has merit. Respondent's medical records reflect that she reported that her depression problems commenced as far back as high school and have continued to the present.