Opinion ID: 2995143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ill App. 400 (Ill. App. Ct. 1930) (money paid

Text: under duress when plaintiff had contracted for the resale of property, the defendant was obli- gated to furnish the deed, and the defendant demanded that the plaintiff pay for the deed, knowing that the plaintiff had contracted for the sale of the property). Illinois law also provides for the recoupment of payments made under duress for items deemed to be necessities. Specifically, to determine whether duress motivated the payment of a demanded sum, attention must be given to the nature of the asset involved and the consequences of nonpay- ment. See Arra v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 621 N.E.2d 128, 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). If the asset is a necessity and the consequences of nonpayment would adversely affect the asset, a case might be made for duress as a motivating factor in payment. See id. at 132 (enough evi- dence of duress to overturn grant of summary judgment in case involving the plaintiffs’ home, which was certainly a necessity); see also Geary v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 544 N.E.2d 344, 348-53 (Ill. 1989) (because tampons and sanitary napkins were necessities that could not be purchased without paying the tax imposed, the plaintiffs sufficiently pled duress); Getto v. City of Chicago, 426 N.E.2d 844, 850 (Ill. 1981) (payment under duress when made to avoid real threat of loss of telephone service; telephone a necessity such that implicit and real threat that phone service would be terminated amounted to duress); Ross, 357 N.E.2d at 836 (payment under duress where termination of electrical services was threatened, there was evidence that it was the defendant’s policy to terminate ser- vices for nonpayment, and no formal protest mechanism existed that would precede the termination). But see Smith v. Prime Cable of Chicago, 658 N.E.2d 1325, 1332-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (payment for cable service not under duress; plaintiffs’ allegations of threatened loss were wholly speculative and cable service not a necessity such that the loss or threatened loss thereof could furnish a motive for payment); Dreyfus v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (same for cellular telephones); Lusinski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 483 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (plaintiff’s inability to use a dis- count coupon did not rise to the level of du- ress); Isberian v. Vill. of Gurnee, 452 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (potential disap- pointment of the plaintiff’s child if prohibited from attending an amusement park insufficient to warrant a finding that the plaintiff purchased the ticket under duress). /2 Because we are deciding this case under the voluntary payment doctrine, we need not address Harris’ remaining defense that Mr. Randazzo breached the loan agreement. /3 Mr. Randazzo also claims that Harris violated the Consumer Fraud Act by subjecting him to threats and economic coercion. Specifically, he contends that Harris forced him to sell his stock by threatening to sell the stock, and charge higher commissions, if he did not sell it himself. Harris’ reliance upon its perception of its legal rights under the contract is insufficient to form the basis of a violation of the Act.