Opinion ID: 3018897
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voice Identification Evidence.

Text: Anthony Askew argues that the district court erred in allowing the government to introduce trial testimony of a voice identification by Wayne Fischer, who had been present during the July 8, 2003 robbery at the S&T Bank in Murrysville. Fischer testified that he had previously heard Anthony Askew’s voice, and that it matched the voice of one of the armed bank robbers at the S&T Bank who had spoken directly to him during the robbery. Fischer was able to make the comparison because he was present at the suppression hearing and heard Anthony Askew testify.3 Anthony claims that evidence 3 Fischer did not testify that he heard Anthony Askew’s voice during the suppression hearing. At the district court’s direction, he testified that he heard the voice at some undetermined time and recognized it as the voice of one of the robbers. 4 violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and interfered with his right to challenge an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment by using his own testimony against him at trial. Both arguments are meritless. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects a defendant from being compelled to provide testimonial evidence against him/her self. It does not shield a defendant from producing real or physical evidence. See generally Pennsylvania v. Munoz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1986). Moreover, it is a “well-settled rule that the sound of a defendant’s voice, even if heard during privileged communications, is not itself testimonial, and therefore is not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973)). Thus, “a criminal suspect may be compelled to produce a voice exemplar without impinging on Fifth Amendment protections.” Id. (citation omitted). Since a voice exemplar can be compelled under the Fifth Amendment, there is clearly no constitutional violation when a witness compares a defendant’s voice to the voice of someone the witness heard during a bank robbery. See Oriakhi, 57 F.3d at 1299. The second prong of Anthony Askew’s challenge to the voice identification is equally meritless. He relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), to support his claim that the voice identification interfered with his right to challenge an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because it used 5 his own testimony against him at trial. However, Simmons has nothing to do with nontestimonial evidence such as a voice exemplar. Rather, Simmons held that a defendant’s pre-trial testimony at a suppression hearing may not later be used against him at trial without his consent. Id. at 394. The dispute concerned the substance of a defendant’s pre-trial testimony, and the issue was whether the substance of a defendant’s statements during a suppression hearing could later be used against him at trial without violating the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self incrimination. That is not the situation here, and we are not persuaded by Anthony Askew’s attempt to link the holding of Simmons to the facts before us here.