Opinion ID: 1208799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Admissibility of Dr. Todd's Testimony

Text: The appellants next argue that the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of their food safety expert, Dr. Todd, on the basis that his theory was unreliable. Dr. Todd indicated that Mr. San Francisco's rapid illness was consistent with eating preformed verotoxin produced by E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria in the undercooked Wendy's hamburger. The circuit court excluded Dr. Todd's opinion based upon the appellee's argument that there has, to date, been limited publication or peer review on this subject, and that none of the medical tests performed on Mr. San Francisco at Logan General Hospital several days after eating the hamburger found verotoxin or E. coli bacteria. The appellants argue that Dr. Todd's theory is logical and is supported by published literature. Based upon Mr. San Francisco's symptoms, Dr. Todd concluded to a reasonable degree of probability that the cause of Mr. San Francisco's illness was from preformed verotoxin produced by E. coli in ground beef. To support this, Dr. Todd cited to a study in a journal which found that E. coli sitting in uncooked ground beef can produce verotoxin. Furthermore, the appellants point to Dr. Todd's wealth of knowledge on the subject of food safety; the record contains Dr. Todd's curriculum vitae, which extends for some 77 single-spaced pages. [7] The appellees respond that Dr. Todd's conclusions are not reliable under a Daubert/Wilt analysis. The appellees concede that, in Daubert, Wilt and Gentry, trial judges were admonished that the focus of their reliability analysis must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. 2786. See Syllabus Point 2, Wilt (a trial court's inquiry must assess an expert's conclusion by considering its underlying scientific methodology and reasoning.); Gentry, 195 W.Va. at 523, 466 S.E.2d at 182 (The problem is not to decide whether the proffered evidence is right, but whether the science is valid enough to be reliable.). Still, the appellees contend that nothing in the Rules [of Evidence] appears to have been intended to permit experts to speculate in fashions unsupported by . . . the uncontroverted evidence. Gentry, 195 W.Va. at 527, 466 S.E.2d at 186 (citation omitted). The appellees assert that Dr. Todd's opinion is based on assumptions which are speculative and are not supported by the record. For instance, the appellees point out that there are no laboratory results identifying the foodborne organism that caused Mr. San Francisco's illness. Further, while Dr. Todd's opinion is based upon a study indicating that meat containing E. coli bacteria canafter four days at a temperature of 98.6develop verotoxins, the appellee points out that Dr. Todd presumed in forming his opinion that the Wendy's hamburger was handled under abusive manufacturing conditions. In other words, the appellee contends that Dr. Todd speculated that the meat in the Wendy's hamburger was mishandled, [8] and speculated that the meat contained E. coli bacteria, when there is no direct evidence in the record to support that position. The appellants counter the appellee's position by arguing that, in proving a food poisoning lawsuit, positive proof by scientific testing is not required. Instead, the appellants argue that [i]n the absence of direct evidence of the defectiveness of the food, recovery could be supported by circumstantial evidence if every other reasonable hypothesis as to the cause of the plaintiff's illness could be excluded. Castleberry's Food Co. v. Smith, 205 Ga.App. 859, 424 S.E.2d 33 (1992). We agree. To begin, this Court has never required positive proof by scientific testing to establish a factual basis for medical diagnosis and opinion. Bussey v. E.S.C. Restaurants, Inc., 270 Va. 531, 537, 620 S.E.2d 764, 767 (2005). Dr. Gregor testified, in his deposition, that Logan General Hospitala rural hospitalhad limited laboratory facilities to test for foodborne illnesses, and that it was not standard medical practice to retain bodily fluids for later testing. As the Bussey court indicated, food poisoning is a `fairly common illness' for which scientific testing would not be cost effective, and the `emphasis is on the last meal before the event.' Id. The circuit court based its decision to exclude Dr. Todd's testimony, in large part, upon the fact that his conclusion had not been tested, and that his theory had not been subjected to peer review and publication. Syllabus Point 2, Wilt. However, these factors listed in Wilt are by no means a definitive checklist or test of reliability. Our review of the record indicates that Dr. Todd sufficiently connected the proposed testimony with the facts of the case. Because food poisoning is a fairly common illness, we see nothing novel in Dr. Todd's theory that would warrant great interest in its publication. Further, a court may treat an expert's qualifications as circumstantial evidence that he or she has used a scientifically valid methodology or mode of reasoning in drawing his or her conclusions. Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 140 (D.C.Cir.1996). Dr. Todd's extensive background in food safety circumstantially suggests he used a valid methodology in drawing his conclusions. Simply put, we believe that Dr. Todd's opinion is admissible because he explained precisely how the conclusions were reached, and pointed to an objective source to show that his conclusions were based on a scientific method used by at least a minority of scientists in the field. We believe that the conflict between the positions taken by the parties regarding Dr. Todd's conclusions did not render his testimony unreliable, but instead created a jury issue regarding the weight to be given to the testimony. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court erred in excluding Dr. Todd's testimony. D.