Opinion ID: 1564079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the trial court err in entering a summary judgment for FedEx on Gracie's claim of negligence per se?

Text: Gracie claims that FedEx was negligent per se because, she says, the FedEx vehicle was parked illegally on the roadway at the time of the accident, in violation of §§ 32-5A-136 and 32-5A-137(a)(1)g., Code of Alabama 1975. (Gracie's brief at 27.) Section 32-5A-136(a), Ala.Code 1975, provides: (a) Outside a business or residence district no person shall stop, park or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway when it is practicable to stop, park or so leave such vehicle off the roadway, but in every event an unobstructed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle shall be available from a distance of 200 feet in each direction upon such highway. Section 32-5A-137(a)(1)g., Ala.Code 1975. provides: (a) Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic, or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall: (1) Stop, stand or park a vehicle: a. On the roadway side of any vehicle stopped or parked at the edge or curb of a street; b. On a sidewalk; c. Within an intersection; d. On a crosswalk; e. Between a safety zone and the adjacent curb or within 30 feet of points on the curb immediately opposite the ends of a safety zone, unless a different length is indicated by signs or markings; f. Alongside or opposite any street excavation or obstruction when stopping, standing or parking would obstruct traffic; g. Upon any bridge or other elevated structure, upon a highway or within a highway tunnel .... Gracie fails to establish the application of these statutes to the location of the accident. Moreover, there was no evidence establishing that the FedEx vehicle was illegally parked. Hyde testified that the FedEx vehicle was off the highway and that she did not have to swerve around it as she entered the intersection where the collision occurred. The police report indicated that the vehicle was off the road. No citations were given to the driver of the FedEx vehicle. Even though Gracie changed her deposition testimony to say that the driver's side front tire of the FedEx vehicle was on the road, she could not estimate how far into the road. Thus, there was no evidence indicating that the FedEx vehicle was obstructing traffic or that its position left no unobstructed width of road. Gracie draws the conclusion that (1) [Gracie is] in the protected class [of the statutes she alleges FedEx violated], (2) the injury caused was the type contemplated by the statute, (3) the FedEx driver violated the statute, and (4) this violation caused the injury to the plaintiffs. (Gracie's brief at 28.) See Fox v. Bartholf, 374 So.2d 294, 295-96 (Ala.1979) (setting out the elements necessary to establish a cause of action for negligence per se). Gracie, however, does not offer any evidence to support these conclusions. This Court ... will not address the merits of either party's argument because Davis, the appellant, has not satisfied the requirements of Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R.App. P., for presenting this issue. Davis's citation to the statute and a general principle of law, along with a conclusory statement that she presented substantial evidence to support her claims do not establish sufficient argument to necessitate reversal. Davis v. Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc., 965 So.2d 1076, 1092-93 (Ala.2007). The trial court did not err in entering the summary judgment on Gracie's negligence per se claim.