Opinion ID: 1940064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defenses Available Under Section 376.313(3)

Text: The statute's enumeration of specific and exclusive defenses provides further evidence that the Legislature intended to create a cause of action rather than to modify existing ones. The last sentence of section 376.313(3) states that [t]he only defenses to such cause of action shall be those specified in s. 376.308. The phrase such cause of action obviously refers to the cause of action created in the preceding sentences. The statute then lists the only defenses allowed to the new cause of action  those specifically listed in section 376.308. The defenses available under the statute allow defendants in certain circumstances to avoid liability if they can prove they did not cause or know about the pollution. The innocent purchaser defense, detailed in section 376.308(1)(c), protects a purchaser of contaminated petroleum and drycleaning sites if the purchaser can show: (1) that it acquired title to property contaminated by the activities of a previous owner, operator, or third party; (2) that it did not cause or contribute to the discharge; and (3) that it did not know of the polluting condition at the time it acquired title. Because the innocent purchaser defense is limited to petroleum and drycleaning sites, purchasers of other contaminated sites remain liable unless they fall within one of the other defenses listed in section 376.308. Of these, the third party defense allows defendants to escape liability if they can show that a third party's act or omission caused the contamination. See § 376.308(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2002). The third party must be someone other than an employee or agent of the defendant or other than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship existing, directly or indirectly, with the defendant. Id. [1] The Legislature's creation of the innocent purchaser and third party defenses demonstrates that it intended to place the burden on the owners of polluting property to prove they did not cause the pollution, rather than require innocent victims of pollution to prove they did. Such defenses would be superfluous if a plaintiff had to prove, as part of the cause of action, that the defendant caused the contamination. See Acosta v. Richter, 671 So.2d 149, 153-54 (Fla.1996) (stating that a statute should be interpreted to give effect to all of its provisions). The apparent purpose of section 376.313(3) is to make it easier for victims of pollution to recover for damages resulting from a pollutive discharge or conditions of pollution. To that end, the Legislature placed the burden on the owners of contaminated property to affirmatively prove their lack of involvement with, and knowledge of, the pollution, or to avail themselves of another affirmative defense. As between the owner of contaminated property and a victim of pollution, the current owner is in a superior position to protect itself through pre-purchase due diligence and negotiation of indemnities with the seller. Prospective purchasers of contaminated property also have recourse to an entire industry providing pre-acquisition environmental audits and environmental insurance products that protect against third party damage claims. They are in the best position both to protect against the contingent liability attached to purchasing such property and to discover the cause of the pollution. The Legislature balanced the competing interests of owners of contaminated property and victims of contamination, such as adjacent landowners, by allowing victims to maintain an action against the owners of contaminated property, while allowing such owners to avoid liability if they can prove they did not cause the contamination and did not know about it when they bought the property.