Opinion ID: 3063335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Continue Second Sentencing Hearing

Text: Martinez argues that the district court should have granted her request to continue the second sentencing hearing so that her attorney could investigate her cerebral ischemia. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of a request to continue sentencing. United States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 896 (11th Cir. 2005). We consider the denial of a motion for a continuance “in light of the circumstances presented, focusing upon the reasons for the continuance offered to the trial court when the request was denied.” United States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146, 1160-1161 (11th Cir. 1995). A defendant bears the burden of showing that the denial “produced specific substantial prejudice.” United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 1985). 16 Martinez’s counsel requested the continuance to pursue a mental health evaluation to determine whether Martinez’s cerebral ischemia could explain, if not excuse, her offense conduct. Defense counsel explained that he was prepared to focus on Martinez’s physical condition and extreme poverty as mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing, but, based on the newly obtained medical records, wanted to explore whether her mental condition might also be a mitigating factor in sentencing. Contrary to Martinez’s claims on appeal, her counsel did not question Martinez’s mental capacity to understand the plea colloquy or her competency to enter her guilty plea. Nor did defense counsel request time to determine whether to file a motion to withdraw Martinez’s guilty plea. Further, although Martinez’s counsel may not have been aware of the cerebral ischemia diagnosis, he was aware of Martinez’s illnesses, including her multiple hospitalizations for stroke-like symptoms, well before the second sentencing hearing. In fact, defense counsel was aware Martinez was having some memory problems and cognitive difficulties at the time of her March 3, 2009 plea and during her interview with the probation officer prior to preparation of the April 2, 2009 PSI. Yet, during this two-month period, defense counsel did not seek to have Martinez’s mental health evaluated. Indeed, at the plea hearing, defense counsel repeatedly told the magistrate judge that Martinez was able to understand 17 the proceedings.3 Moreover, this was Martinez’s second request to continue the sentencing. The district court already had granted one continuance on May 18, 2008, while Martinez was hospitalized with more stroke-like symptoms and then underwent short-term rehabilitation. This continuance gave Martinez an additional month to gather medical evidence to present in mitigation. In denying Martinez’s requested continuance, the district court noted that the proceedings had gone on too long and that the other defendants connected with Martinez’s case already had been sentenced. Finally, Martinez to date has not presented any evidence that a mental health evaluation would have affected the outcome of her sentencing. The district court concluded that it had seen nothing in Martinez’s medical records that “would have served [as] a defense to this matter.” In other words, the district court did not think 3 Without raising it as a separate ground for reversal, Martinez suggests that her behavior during her plea hearing raises questions as to whether the magistrate judge should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing or whether Martinez’s plea was knowing and voluntary. We disagree. The record does not reflect that a “bona fide doubt” existed regarding Martinez’s competence to enter a guilty plea. See Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir. 1990); see 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). And, the magistrate judge did not abuse her discretion in failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing. As to the voluntariness of Martinez’s plea, our review of the record indicates that the magistrate judge took great care during the plea hearing to ensure that Martinez understood the nature of the charge and the consequences of pleading guilty, that Martinez’s plea was voluntary and that Martinez was in fact guilty of the charged offense. In any event, Martinez did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the plea was knowing and voluntary, thus waiving appellate review of this potential claim. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). 18 additional time to pursue a mental health evaluation as mitigation evidence was warranted. Thus, Martinez has not shown specific, substantial prejudice. In light of the circumstances presented and the reason givens for the requested continuance, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion.