Opinion ID: 2500003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Factual issues remain as to whether subsection 2's one-year discovery period should have been tolled due to Sunrise's alleged concealment of records

Text: Winn argues alternatively that his February 3, 2009, lawsuit is timely as to all respondents because subsection 2's one-year discovery period should have been tolled for concealment pursuant to subsection 3 until February 12, 2008. This is the date when Sunrise ultimately provided Winn with a complete set of records, which, according to Winn, was necessary to procure an expert affidavit. [4] In response, Sunrise acknowledges that Winn did not receive a complete set of records until February 12, 2008. Nonetheless, Sunrise vigorously objects to the notion that it concealed these records from him, which is what section 3 requires for tolling. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Winn, Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005), we conclude that factual issues remain as to whether the one-year discovery period should have been tolled. Resolution of this issue requires us to consider the interplay between subsection 3's tolling provision and subsection 2's standard of reasonable diligence. We begin by considering subsection 3's tolling provision, which provides that [subsection 2's] time limitation is tolled for any period during which the provider of health care has concealed any act, error or omission upon which the action is based. NRS 41A.097(3) (emphasis added). Subsection 3's use of the term concealed carries with it a specific connotation. While different legal authorities define concealment in slightly varying ways, these definitions generally include two specific elements: (1) an intentional act by one party that (2) prevents or hinders another party from learning something. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 327 (9th ed. 2009) (defining concealment as  an act by which one prevents or hinders  another party from realizing something (emphases added)); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 160 (1981) (defining concealment as an affirmative act intended or known to be likely to keep another from learning of a fact (emphases added)). Thus, by using the term concealed in subsection 3, it is evident that the Legislature intended for subsection 3's tolling provision to apply only in situations when these two elements are present. State v. State, Employees Assoc., 102 Nev. 287, 289, 720 P.2d 697, 699 (1986) (When a statute uses words which have a definite and plain meaning, the words will retain that meaning unless it clearly appears that such meaning was not so intended.). In addition to establishing that a defendant concealed information under subsection 3, a plaintiff seeking to toll subsection 2's one-year discovery period must also establish that he or she satisfied subsection 2's standard of reasonable diligence. [5] Thus, regardless of a plaintiffs subjective concern regarding the significance of withheld information, the plaintiff must show that this information would have objectively hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from timely filing suit. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the withheld information was material. Cf. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 240, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988) (equating materiality of undisclosed information with the significance that a reasonable investor would ascribe to the information); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(2)(a) (1977) (indicating that a matter is material if a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action). Accordingly, when subsection 3 and subsection 2 are read in tandem, Winn must satisfy the following two-prong test in order to establish that subsection 2's one-year discovery period should be tolled: (1) that Sunrise intentionally withheld information, and (2) that this withholding would have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit. As to whether Sunrise intentionally withheld information, the record on appeal provides us with no clear guidance. Winn evidently canceled and reinstated the same records request on numerous occasions, which may have left Sunrise without clear direction as to whether it should provide the roughly 3,000 additional pages of records in addition to the 182 pages it had already provided Winn in February 2007. Although the district court's summary judgment order did conclude that subsection 3's tolling provision was inapplicable, it provided no factual findings to support this conclusionfor example, when Winn had a pending request, and what Sunrise's response was to this request. Thus, factual issues remain as to when Sunrise was presented with an unequivocal request for medical records and whether Sunrise, upon receiving this request, intentionally withheld the requested records. As to whether such withholding would have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit, Sunrise and Winn are in disagreement. Sunrise indicates that even once Winn procured his expert affidavit, the expert relied largely upon Dr. Ciccolo's postoperative report, a document that was among the initial 182 pages of records that Sunrise provided in February 2007. Thus, Sunrise contends, even if the delay in providing a complete set of records may have hindered Winn from filing suit, the delay would not have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from doing the same. Winn, on the other hand, indicates that these initial 182 pages did not contain records such as Sedona's post-surgery MRI and CT scansrecords that Winn contends were critical for his expert's review of the case. In other words, Winn contends that even though his expert may not have expressly referenced these particular records in his affidavit, it was nonetheless imperative that his expert review them before opining under oath that respondents were negligent. At its core, the parties' disagreement comes down to a question of materiality. Although Winn's expert may ultimately have referenced the postoperative report in his affidavit, the record on appeal is silent as to whether other records were material to conducting a full review of Sedona's case. See Levinson, 485 U.S. at 240, 108 S.Ct. 978; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538(2)(a) (1977). Thus, based upon the facts before us, we are unable to affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of Sunrise, and we therefore vacate that order. On remand, Winn is to be afforded an opportunity to show that subsection 2's one-year discovery period should have been tolled as to his claim against Sunrise. Winn must satisfy a two-prong test: (1) that Sunrise intentionally withheld records after being presented with an unequivocal request for them, and (2) that this intentional withholding would have hindered a reasonably diligent plaintiff from procuring an expert affidavit.