Opinion ID: 2543191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Responses to Jury Questions on Life Sentence

Text: The jury was instructed: It is the law of this state that the penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder of the first degree shall be death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole in any case in which the special circumstances alleged in this case have been found or admitted to be true. During deliberations, the jury asked the following questions: Is it possible for the court to provide the jury with a clear definition of the law of life in prison without the possibility of parole. A. Does `life' have time application [sic ]; B. Does [sic ] any of the verdicts automatically go to appeals? C. Will the individual have the right to go before a parole board even though they have no possibility of parole? The trial court discussed these questions with counsel outside the presence of the jury, and defense counsel suggested that an instruction be given that defendant will never come before a parole board. The trial court eventually gave the jury the following response: The instruction I'm going to read you and will send back with you is this, which I think covers all three subparts of your question: In making your decision in this case, as to the appropriate penalty, you are to assume that if you select death that sentence will be carried out. If you select life without possibility of parole, you are to assume that the defendant will never be released from prison. Defendant claims judicial error from the trial court's response, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. His claims are based on Simmons v. South Carolina (1994) 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 and its progeny. In these cases, the court has held that where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant `to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel.' ( Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) 532 U.S. 36, 39, 121 S.Ct. 1263, 149 L.Ed.2d 178.) This line of cases stemmed from South Carolina's consistent refusal to inform the jury of a capital defendant's parole eligibility status. ( Id. at p. 48, 121 S.Ct. 1263, fn. omitted; see also Ramdass v. Angelone (2000) 530 U.S. 156, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 147 L.Ed.2d 125; Kelly v. South Carolina (2002) 534 U.S. 246, 122 S.Ct. 726, 151 L.Ed.2d 670.) The alternative to a death sentence was described in these cases as life imprisonment. ( Shafer, supra, at p. 48, 121 S.Ct. 1263.) The Supreme Court held it to be error for the trial court under these circumstances to reply to a jury question about a defendant's parole eligibility by saying that the jury was not to consider parole eligibility in reaching its verdict, when the defendant is in fact not legally eligible for parole. Defendant's attempt to draw a parallel between this line of cases and the present one is unavailing. Here, the jury was instructed that life imprisonment was without the possibility of parole. When asked by the jury whether without the possibility of parole was in effect literally true, the trial court appropriately responded: If you select life without possibility of parole, you are to assume that the defendant will never be released from prison. Unlike the South Carolina courts, the trial court was in no way being coy or uninformative about the nature of the life sentence, but rather reaffirmed that the phrase without possibility of parole was to be taken literally. In fact, the answer is very similar to the one given in People v. Turner (2004) 34 Cal.4th 406, 436-438, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505. In response to the jury's question of whether life imprisonment without parole `mean[s] exactly what it implies,' and related questions ( id. at p. 436, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505), the trial court stated: `For the purpose of your deliberations, you are to assume life without the possibility of parole means what it says.' ( Id. at p. 437, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505, italics added.) We held the response was not error. By informing the jury that `life without the possibility of parole' means `what it says,' the court effectively told the jury that defendant would be ineligible for parole if the jury chose that sentence. ( Id. at p. 438, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 182, 99 P.3d 505.) In the present case, we find no error in the trial court's similar response. Defendant also claims error from the trial court's failure to directly address the question of appeals. In the present case, defendant points out that while his death judgment was automatically appealed, a sentence of life imprisonment without parole after having pleaded guilty to first degree murder and special circumstances would likely not have resulted in an appeal. He argues that the jury should have been so informed, so that it would not feel as though the death sentence needed to be imposed in order to prevent defendant from escaping life imprisonment by a successful appeal. But even with a guilty plea, defendant could still appeal his murder conviction after obtaining a certificate of probable cause. (§ 1237.5.) It is inappropriate for the jury to speculate about what may occur on appeal, and the trial court was correct not to address that question directly.