Opinion ID: 2093950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Attempted Murder in the First Degree

Text: At all times relevant to this action, the offense of criminal attempt was defined by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-201 (Reissue 1995), which provided in pertinent part: (1) A person shall be guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if he: . . . . (b) Intentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in his commission of the crime. (2) When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, a person shall be guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if, acting with the state of mind required to establish liability with respect to the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, he intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such a result. (3) Conduct shall not be considered a substantial step under this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the defendant's criminal intent. Much of the evidence which supports Sims' conviction for the first degree murder of Coleman is also supportive of his conviction for the attempted first degree murder of Booth. It is undisputed that Winefeldt fired Sims' shotgun at Booth, knowing that the shots could prove fatal. Sims admitted that he provided the loaded shotgun to Winefeldt and ascertained that he understood how to use it shortly before the shooting. Winefeldt testified that Sims instructed him to fire the shotgun at the group of unarmed individuals which included Booth. A finder of fact could reasonably conclude from the evidence, taken as a whole, that, acting with malice and premeditation, Sims intentionally engaged in conduct which was a substantial step in the course of conduct intended to cause Booth's death. Thus, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Sims' conviction of attempt to commit murder in the first degree.