Opinion ID: 1122767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues before the Court

Text: There are five issues to be resolved in this appeal: (1) was Detective Bailey authorized to make a promise that is binding on the government? (2) did Bailey, in his conversations with Manning, make a promise or commitment of some kind? (3) if so, what was the nature and scope of the promise, and did Manning reasonably and detrimentally rely on the promise? (4) is the emergency or rescue doctrine applicable to this case, thus excusing any promise that was made? (5) what remedy, if any, should the trial court have fashioned for Manning? Before dealing with each of these issues, we should identify three questions that are not a part of this appeal. First, neither the defendant, in her analysis of the alleged promise, nor the prosecution, in its claim that any promise was unauthorized, argue that the Colorado witness-immunity statute, section 13-90-118, C.R.S.1973, is directly applicable to this case. Consequently, any discussion of witness or transactional immunity or promises not to prosecute will focus on the scope and effect of Bailey's promise and not on the specific provisions of section 13-90-118. Second, the fact that Bailey spoke to Manning as a witness, while Arevalo remained a suspect in the investigation, does not, in our opinion, lessen the effect of any commitment that was made. The prosecution suggests that questioning someone as a witness does not imply a promise to continue to treat that person as a witness. While this assertion may be correct, we prefer again to focus on the effect of any promise and not on the intricacies of the witness-suspect distinction. Third, the question of whether Manning's confession was voluntary or involuntary is not before this court. We recognize that a confession must be voluntary in order to be admitted into evidence. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); Gimmy v. People, 645 P.2d 262 (Colo.1982); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935 (Colo.1982). In this opinion, however, our resolution of whether Manning's confession should be admitted or excluded will be on the basis of the bargain struck by the government and not the voluntary or involuntary nature of her statements.
The prosecution argues that the trial court's broad suppression order is, in substance and effect, a grant of witness immunity to Manning. Under the terms of section 13-90-118, C.R.S.1973, however, a police officer is not authorized to apply to the court for a grant of immunity or to promise transactional immunity [7] to a witness. According to the prosecution, the trial court should not have extended the immunity power beyond the express terms of the statute. See State v. Ward, 571 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Utah 1977); State v. Hargis, 328 So.2d 479, 481 (Fla.App.1976). Without proper authority, therefore, Bailey's alleged promise should not bind the government in this case. United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1110 (D.C.Cir.1975); Ward, 571 P.2d at 1346. The prosecution concludes by arguing that Fisher, 657 P.2d 922 (Colo.1983), is distinguishable since the promise in that case was not subject to the restrictions of an immunity statute. What the prosecution overlooks is that the alleged promise in this case was not subject to the restrictions of section 13-90-118 either. If the suppression of Manning's statements was incorrect, the reason will be either that Bailey's comments did not rise to the level of a promise, or that the promise he made was excusable. Under these circumstances, we hold that Bailey was an agent of the government when he talked to Manning. In January, he was expressly authorized to promise Manning that she would not be prosecuted if she revealed the location of her son and if he was alive and healthy. In April, Bailey made statements on his own initiative; nevertheless, he possessed the necessary apparent authority [8] to bind his principal, the government. See Gilmore v. Constitution Life Insurance Co., 502 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir.1974); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Green, 384 F.2d 298 (10th Cir.1967); Bowser v. Union Bag Co., 112 Colo. 373, 149 P.2d 800 (1944); White v. Brock, 41 Colo.App. 156, 584 P.2d 1224 (1978); Russell v. First American Mortgage Co., 39 Colo.App. 360, 565 P.2d 972 (1977). As an agent, Bailey was capable of implicating Manning's constitutional rights by any promise or commitment that he made. Fisher, 657 P.2d at 930 n. 11. Any result to the contrary would be unsound from both a legal and a practical standpoint. If police officers were free to make promises to actual or potential defendants, knowing that the government could, without consequence, deny or disaffirm those commitments, the temptation would be great to use unauthorized promises as a device for extracting confessions. See People v. Bookman, 646 P.2d 924 (Colo.1982) (confessions should not be obtained by promises of special consequences); People v. Scott, 198 Colo. 371, 600 P.2d 68 (1979) (confessions obtained by direct or indirect promises, however slight, will be considered involuntary).
We must initially resolve whether Bailey in fact made a promise to the defendant. If he did, we must then determine the scope of the promise and address whether Manning reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the promise.
The People argue that Bailey's comments on April 9 did not constitute a promise. They present this argument in summary fashion, however, relying on assertions that Manning could not reasonably have interpreted Bailey's words as a promise or that the trial court was unreasonable in its conclusion that a promise was made. The defendant, on the other hand, adopts the same approach but positions herself at the opposite end of the spectrum. She simply assumes that a promise was made by Bailey and that the promise was evidenced by his statements of April 8 and 9. In order to determine if a promise was made, we must analyze the form and content of Bailey's words and the circumstances under which they were spoken. In our view, Bailey's statements to Manning on April 9 do not represent an express promise. On that occasion, Bailey stated to the defendant: I am going to interview you as a witness in this thing. Because I am not going to advise you of your rights, they cannot prosecute you for this. These statements were not structured in promissory terms and, at least when considered on their face and independently of the circumstances, might possibly be interpreted as an expression of Bailey's opinion as to the effect of his interview of Manning as a witness. Nevertheless, even though Bailey used no promissory language in speaking to Manning on April 9, his words spoken, when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances, did constitute an implied promise. Previously, in January, Bailey had expressly offered Manning custody of both children and immunity from all criminal prosecution upon the safe return of Michael. Later, on April 8, Bailey ended his interview with Manning by saying: Betsy, you can either be a witness in a murder case or be a suspect in a murder case, it's up to you. On April 9, after Manning initiated the conversation and bargained unsuccessfully for her friends, Bailey then made the statement in issue here. Considering the initial custody and immunity offer in January, plus Bailey's continuing efforts to bargain with Manning over the return of the child, we are satisfied that the only reasonable construction to be placed upon his April 9 statements is that he was obligating himself to take certain actions in exchange for any statements from Manning regarding the reason for the child's disappearance and his present whereabouts. [9]
The exact scope of Bailey's implied promise is a separate matter. The prosecution contends that if Bailey's words constitute a promise, the scope of the promise was limited. It argues that the phrase cannot prosecute you for this, when coupled with the obvious reference to Miranda, meant that Manning would not be prosecuted for the statement she was about to give. [10] In its view, the trial court unreasonably interpreted for this as referring to any crime Manning may have committed, and by granting her de facto enforcement of a promise not to prosecute, the trial court read a broader meaning into Bailey's words than either he or Manning realized. In response, the defendant argues that the combined effect of Bailey's statements on April 8 and 9 was a promise that Manning would be treated as a witness and not as a suspect in any crime involving Michael. She claims that the comment on April 8 was an offer of witness-status, that this offer was never withdrawn, and that she accepted the offer, which remained vividly in [her] mind, on April 9. She criticizes the prosecution's discussion of the phrase cannot prosecute you for this as overly technical and divorced from the actual context in which the statements were presented. We believe there are at least three possible interpretations of Bailey's statements to the defendant on April 9: (1) an implied promise of full transactional immunity of the type offered the defendant in January; (2) an implied promise of limited immunity not to prosecute the defendant for any crime that she might admit during her ensuing statement; and (3) an implied promise not to use the defendant's statements in any prosecution against her. We are satisfied that under the particular circumstances of this case, the April 9 statements of Bailey can most reasonably and plausibly be interpreted as a promise not to prosecute Manning for any crimes that she might admit in the course of her interview. A review of the circumstances immediately preceding Bailey's statements on April 9 supports this interpretation. Bailey's statement to Manning on April 8 disclosed that the police considered her either a potential witness against Arevalo or a potential suspect in the as-yet-undetermined crime. Manning understood what Bailey meant and apparently discussed her next move with other persons in the jail. She told them on April 9 that [s]omething heavy is going to be coming down and that she would probably remain in jail even though the court of appeals had authorized her release. There is nothing in the record to indicate the nature of Manning's intentions on April 9. Since she initiated the crucial conversation with Bailey, we can only speculate that she intended to talk to someone before posting bond. When Bailey arrived unannounced at the jail, Manning asked to talk to him and then attempted to bargain for her friends. Presumably, if Bailey had agreed to the release of her friends, Manning would have provided incriminating information about Arevalo. The deal did not materialize, however, and Manning withdrew into the familiar fetal position. At this point, Bailey realized that Manning was not going to talk after all. After surveying his options, he then decided to interview Manning as a witness and thus dispense with any Miranda warning. Having made this decision, Bailey attempted to communicate to Manning the effect of his decision with these words: Because I am not going to advise you of your rights, they cannot prosecute you for this. The pronoun they in Bailey's last statement refers to the government, and the pronoun this refers to the information in the statement Manning was about to give. What Bailey was doing was obtaining a statement from the defendant in exchange for his implicit promise not to prosecute her for what she told him.
Having determined the scope of the promise, we turn to the question of whether Manning reasonably and detrimentally relied upon the promise. The trial court found and we agree that Manning clearly relied to her detriment on the promise by making a statement which could possibly implicate her in the child's death. What Manning told Bailey was not that she had abused or killed Michael, but that Arevalo had beaten the child for several hours with a belt on December 17, 1982, that she had unsuccessfully tried to intervene, and that she later assisted Arevalo in disposing of the child's body. In view of Bailey's apparent authority to act for the government, which we discussed above, Manning's reliance on Bailey's statements to her was reasonable.
Even though Bailey made a promise to Manning, the People argue that they should be excused from any commitment under the emergency or rescue doctrine. In their view, an urgent situation developed on April 7, when Bailey learned for the first time that Michael had been severely beaten by Arevalo. Although he had begun to consider the possibility that Michael was dead, Bailey still had reason to believe the boy might be alive and in need of assistance. In addition, the detective's primary motivation for interviewing Manning at the county jail was not to obtain incriminating statements, but rather, if at all possible, to locate and rescue Michael. The defendant argues in response that no actual emergency existed on April 8 and 9. Fourteen weeks had passed since Manning appeared in court without Michael. The accumulation of evidence suggested that the child was probably dead and that the expressed concern for rescuing Michael had long since ceased to be realistic. As a result, Bailey was less interested in rescuing Michael than simply in finding out what happened to him. Unless life hangs in the balance, or unless time is of the essence, the rescue doctrine, she claims, should not permit the government to obtain and use a confession in violation of Miranda. We have analyzed the cases which recognize the rescue doctrine, and, without doubting Bailey's sincerity in wanting to locate Michael we are of the opinion that the defendant's interpretation of this issue is more accurate than the argument of the People. The fifth amendment rescue doctrine originated in California in 1965. In effect, it holds that where the interrogation of a suspect is undertaken by the police for the paramount reason that information is being sought to save a life, the interrogating officers are justified in not impeding their rescue efforts by informing the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel, as would otherwise be required under [ Miranda ]. The rationale behind the doctrine is that the interest in saving a human life is considered to be outside of the parameters of the constitutional protection afforded against self-incrimination. Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 595, 596 (1981). The rescue idea is similar to the fourth amendment exigent circumstances doctrine, see Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.Cir.1963); People v. Clements, 661 P.2d 267 (Colo.1983); McCall v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo.1981), in that an overriding concern for the life of a victim excuses police conduct that, apart from the emergency, would be improper or illegal. To date, California appears to be the only jurisdiction which has explicitly embraced the rescue doctrine as an exception to fifth amendment violations. See Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 133 n. 5, 411 A.2d 415, 421 n. 5 (1980). In People v. Modesto, 62 Cal.2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal.Rptr. 417 (1965), later appeal, 66 Cal.2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal.Rptr. 124 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009, 88 S.Ct. 574, 19 L.Ed.2d 608 (1967), the California Supreme Court held that incriminating statements made by a murder suspect were admissible even though the questioning occurred in the absence of defendant's counsel. The parents of two young girls had returned home to find one daughter dead and the other missing. Police officers arrested the defendant thirty minutes later and questioned him several times during the next eighteen hours about the missing girl. They suggested that she might still be alive and that, if the defendant cooperated, they might be able to save her. The defendant finally confessed that the girl was dead. In a pre- Miranda opinion, [11] the California Supreme Court determined that the conduct of the police was excusable, since the incriminating statements were freely and voluntarily made at a time when the officers were concerned primarily with the possibility of saving [the missing girl's] life. The paramount interest in saving her life, if possible, clearly justified the officers in not impeding their rescue efforts by informing defendant of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel.... In the present case the officers' investigatory and rescue operations were necessarily inextricably interwoven until [the missing girl's] body was found, and it would be needlessly restrictive to exclude any evidence lawfully obtained during the rescue operations. Id. at 446-47, 398 P.2d at 759, 42 Cal.Rptr. at 423. [12] Recently, the California Court of Appeal devised a list of criteria for application of the rescue doctrine. In People v. Riddle, 83 Cal.App.3d 563, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 1283, 59 L.Ed.2d 496 (1979), a husband reported to police that someone had ransacked his house and abducted his pregnant wife. Police officers arrested the defendant six hours later and questioned him repeatedly during the next thirty-six hours. At one of the interviews, a police officer failed to Mirandize the defendant because he felt that urgency of time required immediate discovery of [the missing victim]. Id. at 569, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 172. He asked but two questions before the defendant confessed that the victim was dead. In its opinion, the court of appeal invoked the Modesto analysis. It concluded that emergency circumstanceswhen time is of the essencerepresent an exception to Miranda, applicable only in instances of overriding need to save human life or to rescue persons whose lives are in danger. Id. at 575, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 176. It listed three elements which, in its view, must be present before an emergency situation exists: Urgency of need in that no other course of action promises relief; The possibility of saving human life by rescuing a person whose life is in danger; Rescue as the primary purpose and motive of the interrogators. Id. at 577, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 177. Each of these elements was present in Riddle, and, as a result, the court of appeal held that the defendant's statements were admissible in spite of the failure to give a Miranda advisement. The court emphasized that the police had no information to suggest that the victim was not alive. The critical interview took place eleven hours after the reported disappearance, at a time when the possibility of rescue still seemed realistic. Under the circumstances, it was still reasonable to hope [the victim] might be alive. [13] In addition, the primary motive of the police was to locate and rescue the victim. This rescue motive, according to the court, controls the secondary motive of criminal investigation until such time as the primary motive has ceased to be realistic. [Consequently], under circumstances of extreme emergency where the possibility of saving the life of a missing victim exists, non-coercive questions may be asked of a material witness in custody, even though answers to the questions may incriminate the witness. Id. at 579, 148 Cal.Rptr. at 179. After reviewing these cases [14] and the arguments presented by the parties in this appeal, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the rescue doctrine should be adopted as the law of this state. The reason we need not decide the issue here is because the record before us does not establish the factual underpinnings of the doctrine. More than three months had passed since Michael Manning's disappearance. While the police were rightfully concerned about his well-being, their long-standing concern was simply not the same as the sense of urgency that permeated police activities in Modesto and Riddle. In those cases, time was of the essence, as it perhaps would have been here if the evidence of severe child abuse had surfaced within hours or even days after Michael's disappearance. Instead, the investigation dragged on with no solid clues until early April. At that point, it stalled completely, and the decision was made to close the case within one or two weeks. When Bailey learned of Tricia Manning's testimony, he began actively to search for Michael's body. Hoping for the best, he nevertheless had to realize that the passage of time, the investigative dead-end, and the accumulation of evidence and rumor pointed to the conclusion that Michael was already dead. Furthermore, the source of Bailey's fear and frustration when he interviewed Manning on April 8 and 9 appears different than the source of the urgency in Modesto and Riddle. Bailey knew that Manning was about to be released on bond. He sensed that unless Manning decided to talk about Michael then, the truth about her son might never be revealed. While Bailey wanted to rescue Michael if possible, the sudden urgency that gripped him stemmed primarily from his intuitive realization that, just as he was about to break open the investigation, Manning was about to go free. To complicate matters, Manning initiated the crucial conversation of April 9 by attempting unsuccessfully to trade information for the release of her friends. When her attempt failed, she withdrew into the fetal position that Bailey had seen before. As the final opportunity to learn about Michael seemingly slipped away, Bailey decided to promise Manning that she would not be prosecuted for any crimes she might admit during the course of the interview. The promise did not amount to spontaneous and noncoercive questioning of a suspect during a life-threatening emergency. It was part of a desperate but calculated bargain offered by Bailey and accepted by Manning. We conclude that Bailey's promise, which was subsequently renewed and which elicited the incriminating statements on April 9 and 10, 1983, cannot be excused under the fifth amendment rescue doctrine. See Riddle, 83 Cal.App.3d 563, 148 Cal.Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S.Ct. 1283, 59 L.Ed.2d 496 (1979); People v. Dean, 39 Cal.App.3d 875, 114 Cal.Rptr. 555 (1974).
In cases such as this involving reasonable and detrimental reliance upon a governmental promise, the question of remedy turns ultimately on what type of relief will accord the defendant substantial justice. We recognized as much in Fisher when we held that the defendant was entitled to specific performance of the governmental promise, upon which he reasonably and detrimentally relied in furnishing incriminating information to the police, because there was no other remedy available to the court that could approximate substantial justice under the circumstances of the case. When, however, in contrast to Fisher, other remedies are available, then the court should exercise a reasonable discretion in fashioning a form of relief that can secure substantial justice to the defendant and at the same time accommodate the legitimate interests of the government. Fashioning an appropriate remedy to the necessities of a particular case has been the essence of equity jurisdiction, where flexibility rather than rigidity has been the hallmark. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 1803, 72 L.Ed.2d 91 (1982); Dlug v. Wooldridge, 189 Colo. 164, 167, 538 P.2d 883, 885 (1975). The issue of remedy becomes pertinent only after the defendant has established a due process entitlement to some form of judicial relief by reason of certain actions taken in reasonable and detrimental reliance on a governmental promise. Because Manning furnished information to the police after a promise was made, a remedy that accords substantial justice to her is to treat her statements as if they had been obtained pursuant to a grant of use-immunity. Use immunity ... is a grant with limitations. Rather than barring a subsequent related prosecution, it acts only to suppress, in any such prosecution, the witness' testimony and evidence derived directly or indirectly from that testimony. Steinberger v. District Court, 198 Colo. 59, 62, 596 P.2d 755, 757 (1979) (quoting Wheeler v. District Court, 184 Colo. 193, 199, 519 P.2d 327, 331 (1974)). Use-immunity is coextensive with the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and, when granted, leaves an accused in substantially the same position as if she had not relinquished her constitutional rights at all. Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 608, 74 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). Given the scope of Bailey's implied promise and Manning's reasonable and detrimental reliance on his promise, use-immunity adequately protects Manning's interest in vindicating any constitutional rights which she relinquished in her statements to Bailey. The trial court's suppression order, however, went far beyond use-immunity by suppressing all evidence gathered in the police investigation prior to the time Bailey made his promise on April 9, 1983. This evidence was legitimately and independently acquired by the police prior to any governmental promise and, as such, should not have been suppressed. Manning's statements to the police between April 9 and April 22, 1983, however, must be suppressed under the use-immunity principle, as well as any evidence derived directly or indirectly from Manning's statements. See Pillsbury Co., ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 608, 74 L.Ed.2d 430 (1983); United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 100 S.Ct. 948, 63 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979). The Ruling and Order of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. NEIGHBORS, J., does not participate.