Opinion ID: 2631199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Moore Factors Demonstrates Irreconcilable Conflict

Text: In Moore the Ninth Circuit applied the test for substitution of counsel to an attorney-client dispute and found the conflict to be irreconcilable. Moore, 159 F.3d at 1160. Application of the Moore test, (1) the extent of the conflict; (2) the adequacy of the inquiry; and (3) the timeliness of the motion, demonstrates the irreconcilable conflict in this case warranted substitution of counsel.
The conflict between Stenson and his attorneys started as early as January 1994 when Fred Leatherman called him a liar, causing Stenson to leave the meeting [o]ut of sheer frustration. Personal Restraint Pet., App. C at 1. On two separate occasions during the following months Stenson told his attorneys he no longer wanted their representation, telling Leatherman in May that his decision to not defend me in the guilt phase of the trial would be against my wishes. Id. On July 12, 1994 Stenson petitioned the court to substitute counsel or allow him to proceed pro se because of his concern that Leatherman was not planning to defend me during the guilt phase of the trial. Id. at 2. During the July 13 in camera hearing, Leatherman stated: It is Mr. Neupert's and my opinion ... that the guilt phase is not winable and we do not want to do anything during the course of the guilt phase which ... [would] prejudice Mr. Stenson's defense in the penalty phase. Put another way, from the perspective of the lawyers, the only issue in this case is whether Mr. Stenson lives or dies. From the perspective of Mr. Stenson, the only issue that is important to him is whether he is acquitted or not.  RP (July 13, 1994) at 3118 (emphasis added). The irreconcilable nature of the conflict could not have been clearer yet the trial court denied Stenson's motion to substitute counsel and three subsequent requests to proceed pro se. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 764-65, 940 P.2d 1239 (Sanders, J., dissenting). Two and a half weeks later on August 3 Leatherman himself petitioned the court to be removed as counsel, saying: And I'm very concerned about the nature of the attorney-client relationship. Right now I don't feel like I have an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Stenson. I'm extremely frustrated with him to the point of really not wanting to go on with this case.... Quite frankly, I can't stand the sight of him. .... [T]he nature of my relationship with Mr. Stenson has been getting worse and worse and worse. To the point now where I don't think we are even communicating. I'm certainly not communicating with him and he's not communicating with me and we are heading in different directions on this case. RP (Aug. 3, 1994) at 1501-02 (emphasis added). [5] Somehow the majority distinguishes this case from Brown and Frazer, saying the breakdowns there were tantamount to a total lack of communication. Majority at 13. Since both parties here characterized the relationship as just that, a total lack of communication, it is unclear what more would be needed for this case to have risen to that level in the eyes of the majority. The conflict and lack of communication was so bad it made Stenson afraid to go forward with them and [ ] afraid to go forward without them, too. RP (Aug. 3, 1994) at 1506. This was an irreconcilable conflict under the first Moore factor.
Despite the obvious and irreconcilable conflict, not to mention the express wishes of both attorney and client, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw saying, there is no evidence from which I could even begin to conclude that Mr. Stenson was not receiving very competent and professional counsel.  RP (Aug. 3, 1994) at 1503 (emphasis added). The trial court went on to say that competent representation was required and [t]hat's what's present. Id. at 1504. The majority justifies its decision by saying  whatever the disagreements between Stenson and his counsel ... there is no evidence to suggest that the representation Stenson received was in any way inadequate. Majority at 12 (emphasis added). Both the trial court and the majority err by applying generalized standards of adequacy and competency as the measure of irreconcilable conflict between attorney and client. If mere adequacy were the standard, whatever the disagreements between [a defendant] and his counsel, id., an attorney could, over the client's objection, convince a jury his client is guilty and get him convicted as long as the attorney does an adequate job of it. The Ninth Circuit has found error in cases where the court focused on attorney competency rather than the actual conflict, saying the proper focus of such an inquiry is on the nature and extent of the conflict between defendant and counsel, not on whether counsel is legally competent.  United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 480, 483 (9th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2000). The court also noted that, as in this case, the belief that legal incompetence was the basis of the complaint would only demonstrate the inadequacy of the court's inquiry into the true cause of [defendant's] dissatisfaction. Walker, 915 F.2d at 483. The majority goes so far as to call the effects of the breakdown in communication negligible. Majority at 12. I can scarcely imagine such effects being negligible where (1) two convictions for first degree murder are at stake; (2) the penalty may be death; (3) the attorney and client disagree on whether the only issue in the case is the client's guilt and innocence or life and death; (4) the client asks for substitution of counsel or, in the alternative, to proceed pro se (several times); (5) the attorney doesn't feel like he has an attorney-client relationship, is not communicating with the client, can't stand the sight of him, doesn't want to go on with the case, and asks to be removed; (6) and the client is left in a position where he is afraid to go on with his attorney but also afraid to go on without him. Far from negligible, these circumstances begged for the appointment of new counsel. Both the majority and trial court's focus on competency serves only to demonstrate the inadequacy of the court's inquiry into the true cause of [defendant's] dissatisfaction, and does not satisfy the inquiry into the nature of the conflict itself required under the second factor of the Moore test. Walker, 915 F.2d at 483.
Stenson filed his motion for substitution of counsel and alternative request to proceed pro se on July 12, 1994, two days before the jury was empaneled on July 14. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 730, 733, 940 P.2d 1239. The majority summarily dispenses with the third factor of the Moore analysis by saying the factor of timeliness weighs against finding irreconcilable conflict, Majority at 13, utterly ignoring the settled rule in the Ninth Circuit that a request to proceed pro se is timely if made before the jury is empaneled, unless it is shown to be a tactic to secure delay. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir.1997). [6] The motion was clearly not a tactic to secure delay; Stenson had other attorneys who were immediately willing to take the case if appointed. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d at 733, 940 P.2d 1239. The delay caused by substitution would have been only the time needed for the new attorneys to review the case and prepare for trial. Majority at 13. This would have been a small imposition compared to the specter of facing a death penalty proceeding represented by an attorney with an irreconcilable conflict. Because there is no evidence the motion was made to secure delay and the motion was timely made before the jury was empaneled, the third Moore factor militates for substitution of counsel. Consideration of the three Moore factors reveals (1) an irreconcilable conflict and total breakdown of communication; (2) an inadequate and misdirected inquiry into the competence of the attorneys rather than the nature of the conflict itself; and (3) a timely motion for substitution of counsel that at most would have resulted in relatively minimal delay considering the import of the proceedings.