Opinion ID: 800991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Judgment of the ABCMR Fails for Want of Reasoned Decisionmaking with Respect to the MEB Issue

Text: The findings of the ABCMR afford little help in understanding the MEB issue. Indeed, the Board's decisions lack coherence and, thus, make it impossible for this court to determine whether the judgments of the Board survive arbitrary and capricious review under the APA. Therefore, the ABCMR decisions fail the test of reasoned decisionmaking. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). The ABCMR upheld Coburn's separation, because [t]he scant medical information available does not indicate that the applicant was medically unfit for retention, and because [c]ompetent medical authority determined that his medical condition was such that he could be discharged. 2003 Decision at 6, J.A. 82. The ABCMR never explains, however, how the medical information before it justified Coburn's termination. Nor does it explain how Dr. Caycedo or Dr. Schirner, who were not members of a MEB, could terminate a case that Dr. Caycedo had seemingly referred to a MEB, when no final decision had been issued by a MEB. The Board also fails to clarify whether Coburn's case actually reached a MEB or instead never left the initial MTF examination phase. The Board references the Army's letter to explain that on 2 July 2002 [Coburn] was referred for processing through the MEB. Id. at 3, J.A. 79 (emphasis added). But it also points to notes dated November 14, 2002 from the Inspector General's office indicat[ing] that the applicant worked the system to the point that he was being considered for a MEB; however, the MEB did not override his QMP and he was discharged. Id. at 5, J.A. 81. Later, the Board cites the Inspector General's case summary from January 2003 as explaining that Coburn was undergoing MEB processing and that a MEB had been initiated. Id. These various statements from the ABCMR decision, read together, are incomprehensible. An agency's decision need not be a model of analytic precision to survive a challenge. Dickson, 68 F.3d at 1404. And, certainly, we may uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given. Id. (citation omitted). At the very least, the Board must provide an explanation that will enable the court to evaluate the agency's rationale at the time of decision. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654, 110 S.Ct. 2668, 110 L.Ed.2d 579 (1990); see also PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC v. FERC, 665 F.3d 203, 208 (D.C.Cir.2011) (Among other things, [a]n agency's failure to respond meaningfully to objections raised by a party renders its decision arbitrary and capricious. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It failed to do so in this case. In short, the ABCMR's decision is utterly unreviewable and simply lacks reason[s] that a court can measure . . . against the `arbitrary or capricious' standard of the APA. Kreis, 866 F.2d at 1514-15. Where, as here, an agency's explanation for its determination . . . lacks any coherence, we owe no deference to [the agency's] purported expertise. Tripoli Rocketry Ass'n, Inc., 437 F.3d at 77.