Opinion ID: 211371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Summary Judgment Grant

Text: 13 Exigent argues that we should reverse the district court grant of summary judgment because the district court's claim construction was flawed and because Atrana failed to sufficiently support its summary judgment motion regarding non-infringement. 14 As to the claim construction, Exigent attempts to challenge many of the district court's constructions as too narrow. However, the district court's judgment on non-infringement rested on the failure to meet three specific claim limitations: (1) the inclusion of a control processor, (2) the creation of accounts in response to receipt of a payment authority, and (3) the inclusion of a card assembly with promotional materials thereon. We find no reversible error in the district court's construction of the term payment authority, and thus need not reach the correctness of the district court's claim construction in other respects. 15 The district court construed the term payment authority in the '885 patent as [d]ata that is input by the consumer that represents the monetary value of the transaction and the consumer's authorization for payment that is received by the transaction terminal and is also used to define the value of the user's account. J.A. at 39. On appeal, Exigent argues that this construction is erroneous because the claims contain no reference to the payment authority representing a monetary value and because there is no limitation that the payment must be received by the transaction terminal. Exigent's Brief at 26. However, Exigent failed to make this argument to the district court. In fact, the district court's construction is not at odds with what Exigent proposed below. Exigent construed payment authority as the information inputted by the user of the system as a result of acknowledging payment be it by cash, credit card or independent of the purchase or system. . . . In this context the data entry facility is physically structured to accept information acknowledging payment by cash or credit card, etc.  J.A. at 279 (emphasis added). Exigent also stated in its proposed construction chart: payment authority—a credit card transaction or acknowledgment of cash payment from a consumer. 4 J.A. at 285. Thus Exigent itself suggested that payment authority represented a monetary value. Further, Exigent stated that a data entry facility —which is included in the transaction terminal—is structured to accept the payment authority. Thus, Exigent did not make the argument to the district court that it now asserts on appeal. As a result, we will not disturb the court's construction of payment authority. 5 Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714-16 (Fed.Cir.1998). Because the construction of payment authority is sufficient to support the district court's noninfringement finding, we will not review the remainder of the disputed claim terms. Hoffer v. Microsoft Corp., 405 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2005). 16 Exigent also argues that Atrana did not properly support its motion for summary judgment of non-infringement with evidence sufficient to establish non-infringement. The appropriateness of a grant of summary judgment in these circumstances is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Celotex, the Supreme Court definitively explained how the burden of proof at trial affects summary judgment practice. There, Catrett filed a wrongful-death complaint against Celotex for asbestos exposure. Id. at 319, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Celotex moved for summary judgment, contending that Catrett `failed to produce evidence that any [Celotex] product . . . was the proximate cause of the injuries . . . .' Id. (quoting Motion for Summary Judgment) (brackets and first ellipses in original). Celotex noted that Catrett had failed to identify, in response to interrogatories, any witnesses who could testify about the asbestos exposure. Id. at 320, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The District of Columbia Circuit held that Celotex's motion was fatally defective because it made no effort to adduce any evidence, in the form of affidavits or otherwise, to support its motion. Id. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C.Cir.1985) (emphasis in original)). The Supreme Court reversed, making clear that on issues in which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, in contrast to those in which the movant bears the burden, 6 the movant need not produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in order to properly support its summary judgment motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Instead, the Court explained, the [summary judgment] motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. [T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. 17 Exigent argues that here Atrana's summary judgment motion was not supported by admissible evidence establishing non-infringement because the Boukadoum affidavit was merely conclusory and Boukadoum himself lacked the necessary expert qualifications. However, even assuming that the Boukadoum declaration should be given no weight, it is clear that Atrana did not have to support its motion with evidence of non-infringement. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Exigent nonetheless argues that, even if Atrana was not required to produce evidence of non-infringement, the motion was too cryptic, under regional circuit law, to shift the burden to Exigent to establish evidence of infringement. 18 In United States v. Four Parcels, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit stated: 19 Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Celotex does not explain exactly how the moving party may show the court that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case. In this circuit, [e]ven after Celotex, it is never enough simply to state that the non-moving party cannot meet its burden at trial. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604 (11th Cir.1991); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (White, J., concurring) . . . . Instead, the moving party must point to specific portions of the record in order to demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial. 20 Id. at 1438 n. 19 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 7 While the Supreme Court in Celotex did not articulate, with precision, the minimum that a movant must do in its motion to discharge its burden, the Court did explain that where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Celotex Court also made clear that all that is required is notice [to the party with the burden of proof] that she had to come forward with all of her evidence. 8 Id. at 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In the light of Celotex, we conclude that nothing more is required than the filing of a summary judgment motion stating that the patentee had no evidence of infringement and pointing to the specific ways in which accused systems did not meet the claim limitations. 21 This is precisely what was done here. In pertinent part, Atrana's summary judgment motion stated that: 22 Plaintiff Exigent will not be able to establish that any system of Atrana infringes any claim of the '885 Patent. Most importantly, no Atrana system includes a control processor meeting the requirements of any of the claims of the '885 Patent. More specifically, no Atrana system includes a control processor that as claimed is structured to define a user account and to issue an authorization code associated with said user account at least in response to the payment authority as required by the '885 Patent claims. No Atrana system creates any account in response to receipt of a payment authority. . . . Atrana's systems do not infringe claim 47 for the additional reason that they do not include any control processor that issues [ ] at least one authorization code structured to be provided to a merchant in connection with a purchase [ ] as required by claim 47. . . . Atrana only provides consumers with access codes (also known as PINs) to be provided to a telephone service provider to obtain a telephone connection for making calls. These access codes are not recognized by merchants for the purchase of anything at a point of sale. . . . Atrana [also] asserts that it does not infringe [claim 32] because no Atrana system includes a card assembly with promotional materials thereon. . . . Atrana also lacks a transaction processor that is communicatively associated with such a control processor. 23 J.A. at 550-51. To the extent that the Eleventh Circuit has held that more is required, we do not follow it because it would be inconsistent with Celotex. 9 Microchip Tech. Inc. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 367 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed.Cir.2004) (Where regional circuit authority is contrary to governing Supreme Court precedent we need not, and indeed must not, follow it.). 24 We therefore hold that the district court properly held that Atrana discharged its burden as the summary judgment movant. Exigent failed to set forth any argument or evidence of infringement—either literal or by equivalents—in response to Atrana's motion. In fact, Exigent admits that no evidence of the accused device was ever submitted as part of the summary judgment record. Exigent's Br. at 35. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting Atrana's motion for summary judgment. 10