Opinion ID: 2672407
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witness Rhodes’s testimony

Text: The district court excluded Eugene Rhodes’s proffered testimony on the basis that it was not relevant and that its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We review a challenge to an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. Brumley v. Albert E. Brumley & Sons, Inc., 727 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2013). We reverse when the district court “applies the incorrect legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies upon clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 326 (6th Cir. 2005)). As noted above, the district judge stated from the bench that Rhodes’s proffered testimony was more prejudicial than probative. Looking to the relevant legal standards, we agree. Schrack asserts that the excluded testimony was relevant to his case because it was evidence of a discriminatory environment, which would aid in proving his claim that the RIF was a 5 pretext for his illegal discharge. Schrack contends that allowing the jury to hear Rhodes’s testimony would enable it to conclude that he was fired in retaliation for using FMLA leave, or in the alternative that he was fired because he is disabled (i.e., narcoleptic) within the meaning of the ADA. Schrack cites several cases in support of his contention. See, e.g., Risch v. Royal Oak Police Dept., 581 F.3d 383, 393 (6th Cir. 2009) (evidence that supervising officers were generally hostile to promoting women relevant to establish discriminatory environment); Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1998) (discriminatory remark of non-supervisor who nonetheless “may have influenced” employment decisions relevant in age discrimination case); Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 1998) (evidence of a fake employment application containing demeaning racial stereotypes was admissible to demonstrate racially hostile atmosphere); Polanco v. City of Austin, Tex., 78 F3d 968, 980 (5th Cir. 1996) (circumstantial evidence can show discriminatory motive); Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1103 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Circumstantial proof of discrimination typically includes unflattering testimony about the employer’s history and work practicesCevidence which in other kinds of cases may well unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. In discrimination cases, however, such background evidence may be critical for the jury=s assessment of whether a given employer was more likely than not to have acted from an unlawful motive.@); Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[E]vidence of a corporate state-of-mind or a discriminatory atmosphere is not rendered irrelevant by its failure to coincide precisely with the particular actors or timeframe involved in the specific events that generated a claim of discriminatory treatment.”). 6 R+L counters that any evidence of other “bad acts” is inadmissible as character evidence used to prove conduct in conformity with the character. See Fed. R. Evid. 404. It cites several cases in support of this proposition, the most relevant of which is Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1988). In Schrand, the plaintiff alleged he had been wrongfully discharged because of his age. Id. at 154. At trial, the district judge admitted testimonyCover defense counsel’s objectionCof two former employees of defendant, who testified they were told they had been discharged in part due to their advanced ages. Id. at 155. This Court reversed. Id. We held that the testimony was not relevant partly because different supervisors allegedly told the witnesses they were too old and not the supervisor who discharged the plaintiff. Id. at 156. We also held that introducing evidence of discriminatory behavior directed toward others was too abstract and could serve to confuse the jury. Id. Further guidance comes from Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2012). In Griffin, we noted that Schrand, while still the law of the circuit, had been distinguished within the circuit, as its applicability is limited to cases where the discriminatory conduct occurs in closer proximity to the plaintiff. Id. at 598 n.9. In Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008), the Supreme Court made it clear that the evaluation of “other acts” testimony in employment discrimination cases must be done on a case-by-case basis, and that no per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility applies. We have explained that a number of factors are relevant to this determination: (1) whether the evidence is logically or reasonably tied to the decision made with respect to the plaintiff; (2) whether the same Abad actors@ were involved in the “other” conduct and in the challenged conduct; (3) whether the other acts and the challenged conduct were in close temporal and geographic proximity; (4) whether decision makers within the organization 7 knew of the decisions of others; (5) whether the other affected employees and the plaintiff were similarly situated; and (6) the nature of the employees= allegations. Griffin, 689 F.3d at 599. In the present case, Schrack’s surviving claims at trial were for retaliatory discharge in violation of the FMLA and discriminatory discharge in violation of the ADA. The jury found in R+L=s favor on both claims. At the outset, we note that under any admissibility test, Rhodes’s testimony regarding alleged age and gender discrimination is irrelevant because those issues do not relate to Schrack’s surviving claims. Rhodes’s testimony regarding R+L’s alleged history of FMLA violations presents a closer question. Rhodes testified he was instructed by Jeff Copsey, his supervisor in the Human Resources department, not to report his own health issues because “the owners” did not want sick people on the payroll. Rhodes also testified that Copsey told him that he had been instructed by “the owners” to fire anyone who exhausted his or her FMLA benefits. Rhodes further testified that “staff” routinely complained to him that Copsey would deny or delay their return to work after being cleared for work after an FMLA leave of absence. At trial, Dale Ellenbarger, the head of Schrack’s department, testified that while Schrack was on leave, he was instructed to eliminate one member of his staff as part of the RIF. Ellenbarger chose Schrack for discharge because he was the least senior member of the team. However, because Schrack was on leave at the time, he convinced management not to move forward with the discharge. Only after Scott Armour approved Schrack to return to work did Ellenbarger terminate him. Application of the factors identified in Griffin favors excluding Rhodes’s proffered testimony. Rhodes’s proffered testimony is so vague as to make any logical connection between 8 his allegations and Schrack’s firing very attenuated. The only bad actors identified by Rhodes are Jeff Copsey and “the owners,” while the only people Schrack has identified as taking adverse action against him were Scott Armour and Dale Ellenbarger. Schrack has in no way connected the actions of Copsey and “the owners” to Armour or Ellenbarger. Schrack has pointed to no evidence that Armour or Ellenbarger knew of or were involved in the relevant alleged bad acts. Schrack has pointed to Rhodes’s own fear of losing his position because of his health conditions and complaints of “staff” that Copsey kept them from returning to work after using leave. Rhodes is not similarly situated to Schrack, and the allegation that “staff” complained of being unable to return to work is too vague for this Court to make a determination as to whether such “staff” were similarly situated to Schrack. Overall, Rhodes’s allegations are too vague and conclusory to determine if the nature of the claims is similar. The only factor favoring inclusion is the fact that the alleged bad acts occurred at the same time and place as Schrack’s discharge. Because the district judge did not rely on a clearly erroneous finding of fact, improperly apply the law, or use an erroneous legal standard, we cannot conclude a mistake has been made. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in excluding Rhodes’s testimony.