Opinion ID: 1224786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: police station interview

Text: Ninci's interview at the police station began at approximately 7 p.m. and ended at approximately 10:30 p.m. The police did not read him his Miranda rights until shortly after 8 p.m. During the first hour of the interview, Ninci admitted visiting Owen at his home but denied knowing Ford or having any involvement in Owen's murder. During the later 2 ½ hours of the interview, Ninci admitted to knowing Ford and to being present when Ford killed Owen, but he denied having any intent or plan to kill Owen with Ford. In this issue, Ninci argues that the first hour of his interview at the police station should not have been admitted into evidence at trial because it was conducted without first having provided him with Miranda warnings. Ninci also argues that his confession in the later 2 ½ hours of the interview, after the Miranda warnings were provided, should not have been admitted into evidence at trial because it was involuntarily extorted by fear and hope of benefit. Since the interview should not have been admitted into evidence, Ninci also contends that all of the evidence obtained as a result of the interview (he signed a consent to search form during the interview) should not have been admitted into evidence either. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that [n]o person ... shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness against himself. Section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights guarantees this same right. In order to protect this right, the United States Supreme Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, reh. denied 385 U.S. 890 (1966), held: [T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Based on Miranda, Ninci filed a motion with the trial court to suppress the first hour of his statement because he had not been read his Miranda rights until an hour into the interview. The trial court denied Ninci's motion, finding that Miranda warnings were not necessary because Ninci was not in custody at the time of the interview; thus, a custodial interrogation did not occur. In so holding, the trial court stated: The police undoubtedly had suspicions about the defendant at the time he was stopped and was asked if he would come to the Leawood police station to be interviewed regarding the homicide of Michael Owen. There is nothing that prohibits the police from asking citizens to cooperate in investigations. The fact that he was allowed to drive his own vehicle there is significant in determining whether or not the defendant was under arrest. The fact that perhaps one police car was in front and one may have been following behind is not determinative. Viewed from the rational or reasonable person's point of view, it is hard for this court to conclude that a reasonable person would have believed himself to be under arrest. When they arrived at the police station he was left alone for five minutes, again not the conduct this court believes a reasonable person would expect the police to display if that person were under arrest. During the interview he was thanked for coming in and he was asked if he had plans for that evening. He responded that he did not. The interview was initiated at 7:08 P.M. and maintained at low key until after the Miranda warning was given shortly after 8:00 P.M. After the Miranda warning was given, statements made by the defendant in the first hour were utilized to accuse the defendant of being dishonest. Detective McClure confronted the defendant with a picture of Ford that he had been shown in the first hour and told the defendant in words to the effect that we know you know this person and that you are being dishonest in telling us that you don't know this person. From there the defendant began to disclose his involvement in the Owen homicide. In applying the case law to the facts of this case, it would appear that the defendant in this case voluntarily drove his vehicle to the police station. The total interview of the defendant began at 7:08 P.M. and ended at approximately 10:30 that evening. The interview of the defendant was low key and for the most part non-confrontive or aggressive until the request for consent to search was presented to the defendant. There is no evidence that the defendant was intoxicated nor any evidence that the defendant was in any way discomforted to the extent that he was coerced into making these statements. During the first few minutes of the interview the defendant began to admit that he had had contact with the decedent during the week of his death and in the first hour when he denied that he recognized an individual with whom he was known to have associated with, undoubtedly the police focused on him as a prime suspect. It was at this time that the defendant was given his Miranda warning. In applying the case law to the facts of this particular case, the Court concludes that the totality of the circumstances would lead a reasonable person to believe under the same or similar circumstances that they were not under arrest and were free to leave at any time up until the time they began to admit their specific involvement in the crime being investigated. Therefore, the Court would decline to suppress any statements made by the defendant.... Ninci appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the first hour of his interview. The admissibility of statements made by a defendant before Miranda warnings are given depends on whether the statements are the result of a custodial interrogation or an investigatory interrogation.... .... [T]he general rule [is] that any statement made by a person during custodial police interrogation cannot, over the person's objection, be admitted in evidence against the person at trial, even though the statement may in fact be wholly voluntary, unless the police, before interrogation, informed the person that he or she has a right to remain silent, that any statement the person makes may be used as evidence against that person, and that the person has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. State v. Lewis, 258 Kan. 24, 35-36, 899 P.2d 1027 (1995). The determinative question here is whether the first hour of the interview, before the Miranda warnings were provided, was an interrogation, and, if so, was it a custodial interrogation or an investigatory interrogation. Interrogation refers not only to express questioning but also to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response from the suspect. Lewis, 258 Kan. at 35. During the first hour of the interview, the officers asked Ninci if he recognized a picture of Ford and why his car was seen at Owen's house the same week as the murder. The officers should have known that these questions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminatory response from Ninci. Thus, it is obvious that Ninci was subjected to interrogation during the first hour that he was at the police station before he had been read his Miranda rights. The next question is whether such interrogation qualified as custodial interrogation or investigatory interrogation. Based on the objective standard of whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave if placed in the same situation, custody is determined by looking to the following factors, in no particular weight or order of importance: `when and where [the interrogation] occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, ... whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or a witness ... how the defendant got to the place of questioningwhether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers ... [and] what happened after the interrogationwhether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested....' State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, 603, 802 P.2d 558 (1990). In ruling on Ninci's motion to suppress, the trial court found that the interrogation at the police station occurred in an noncustodial setting. As such, the court held that the Miranda warnings were not necessary and failure to give them until an hour into the interview did not require the first hour of the interview to be suppressed. If the findings of the trial court on a motion to suppress evidence are based upon substantial evidence, this court on review will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial court. State v. Garcia, 250 Kan. 310, Syl. ¶ 2, 827 P.2d 727 (1992). The findings of the trial court that the interview at the police station, at least the first hour of it, was noncustodial and did not need to be suppressed for failure to provide Miranda warnings were based upon substantial evidence. The interrogation at the police station took place in an interview room. The interview lasted approximately 3 ½ hours, but the un- Mirandized portion of the interview only lasted an hour. Two police officers were present, but each one left the room several times for various reasons. The communication between the officers and Ninci during this first hour of the interview was cordial and friendly. The officers asked Ninci if he had any plans for the rest of the night, which indicated that the interview could have been postponed to a more convenient time for Ninci if necessary. While the officers stated that they were trying to clear Ninci as a suspect and that they would cut [him] loose later in the evening, the officers also thanked Ninci for voluntarily coming in and helping them with the investigation. After finishing a certain line of questioning, the officers provided Ninci with a beverage at his request, and asked him if he wanted some cake. Ninci was not physically restrained in any way. He wore no handcuffs and no guards were stationed at the door. The police obviously wanted to question Ninci as a potential suspect, but the officers testified that they also wanted to talk to Ninci to find out more about Ford. Ninci voluntarily came to the police station in his own car in response to a police request. Ninci claims that being blocked in in the parking lot put pressure on him to go to the police station, but he acquiesced at the interview that he had voluntarily agreed to come to the police station. One officer asked for Ninci's driver's license when the interview began. The officer did not directly give the license back to Ninci. However, a few minutes into the interview, the officer placed Ninci's license on the table between the officer and Ninci, within Ninci's reach. When Ninci asked to have his license back after an hour had passed, the officer readily handed it back to him. When the interview ended, Ninci was arrested because he had admitted to being involved in the murder of Owen. We hold there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the same circumstances, at least up until the time Ninci started confessing to the crime. Thus, Ninci was not in custody during the first hour of the police interrogation, and this first hour of the interview constituted only an investigatory interrogation, not a custodial interrogation. Since Ninci was not in custody at this time, the officers were not required to provide him with Miranda warnings. As such, the failure of the officers to provide Ninci with Miranda warnings during the first hour of the interview does not require the suppression of his statements taken during this first hour of the interview. Substantial competent evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the first hour of the interview was admissible. See State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 897 P.2d 152 (1995); State v. Fritschen, 247 Kan. 592, 802 P.2d 558 (1990); and State v. Jones, 246 Kan. 214, 787 P.2d 726 (1990). Because the first hour of the interrogation at the police station, before Ninci's Miranda rights were read, was not custodial and was admissible at trial, the resulting confession in the last 2 hours of the interrogation, after the Miranda warnings were provided, cannot be considered tainted by the prior un- Mirandized statement. However, Ninci asserts that the later 2 ½ hours of the interview, after the Miranda warnings were provided, are inadmissible, regardless of the admissibility of the first hour of the interview, because Ninci's confession was involuntary extorted by fear and hope of benefit. Ninci contends that the officer who read him the Miranda warnings treated the warnings as an inconvenience and as an interruption in the flow of questioning. The officer told Ninci that the officer's boss asked him to read the warnings to Ninci. In fact, an assistant district attorney who was observing the interview recommended that the warnings be given. The officer told Ninci to read the Miranda waiver aloud to himself, which Ninci did, and told Ninci where to sign the waiver. Ninci signed the waiver, and the officer continued questioning him. In order for the waiver of Miranda rights to be knowing and voluntary, the United States Supreme Court held that two requirements must be met: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 89 L. Ed.2d 410, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986). Also, throughout these last 2 ½ hours of the interview, the officers told Ninci now is the time to come clean and you can do some things to help yourself now. At 9:30 p.m., when Ninci indicated he was very scared of Ford and feared for his life, the officers told Ninci that Ford knows you know too much, we can help you on that, but it has to be a two way street. We are willing to do what we can to keep you safe, but we can't do it unless we know exactly what is going on. Ninci was told that if he did not cooperate, then the officers really did not care what happened to him. According to Ninci, the officers indicated that it would help him if he confessed. `It is well settled that an extrajudicial confession will not be received in evidence unless it has been freely and voluntarily made. If it has been extorted by fear or induced by hope of profit, benefit, or amelioration, it will be excluded as involuntary. However, the advice or admonition to the defendant to speak the truth, which does not import either a threat or benefit, will not make a following confession incompetent.' State v. Newfield, 229 Kan. 347, 359, 623 P.2d 1349 (1981) (quoting State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 227, 61 Pac. 805 [1900]). Ninci contends that, even after having been read the Miranda warnings, his confession in the last 2 ½ hours of the interview was not voluntary because his waiver of the Miranda rights was not voluntary and because his confession was coerced by extortion and hope of benefit. After conducting a hearing on Ninci's motion to suppress his statement, the trial court denied the motion, finding that the statement was freely and voluntarily given. The videotape of the entire interview was admitted at trial. When a trial court conducts a full hearing on the admissibility of an extrajudicial statement by an accused, determines the statement was freely and voluntarily given, and admits the statement into evidence at the trial, an appellate court accepts that determination if it is supported by substantial competent evidence. State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 971, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). The trial court's conclusions that Ninci's statement in the last 2 ½ hours of the interview was freely and voluntarily given and that Ninci freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ninci paid attention while the rights were being read to him and nodded in understanding. From the videotape, Ninci appears to be an articulate and intelligent man. He did not appear to be intoxicated with drugs or alcohol at the time of the interview. After the officer read the Miranda rights to Ninci, he had Ninci read the waiver of Miranda rights out loud. Ninci signed the waiver without coercion or threat. There is no indication that Ninci did not voluntarily and knowingly waive his Miranda rights before he began answering questions. It is also true that officers encouraged Ninci to tell the truth because they thought he would be better off if he did. These comments did not amount to a promise of benefit or to extortion in order to get Ninci to confess. The officers merely advised and admonished Ninci to speak the truth. The officers were questioning him in order to solve a murder. The officers were not required to have the defendant's best interests at heart or even be nice to him during the questioning. The officers were required to follow the law so that Ninci's confession was voluntarily and knowingly made. The police did not violate the voluntary and knowing limits when they questioned Ninci. The discussion was very cordial, up until the officers asked Ninci to sign a consent to search form. The officers gave Ninci something to drink and offered to give him something to eat. The officers did not threaten Ninci or promise a benefit in order to make Ninci confess. There is substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that Ninci knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and knowingly and voluntarily confessed to the murder of Owen. Thus, the last 2 ½ hours of the interview were properly admitted at trial, just as the first hour was. Since the interview was properly admitted into evidence at trial, all the evidence that was discovered as a result of Ninci's agreement to sign a consent to search form during the interview was also properly admitted into evidence at trial.