Opinion ID: 2976097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Harris’s Brady Claim

Text: Harris next claims that Spies violated his right to the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in the government’s possession, under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Specifically, Harris contends that Spies wrongfully and deliberately withheld evidence that Lori Duniver reported to police on the day of Devan’s disappearance that she had seen a car resembling Redmond’s in the neighborhood; a letter from Lori Duniver to a police officer mentioning that alleged report; and records of a public child-protection agency establishing that Redmond had beaten Devan with a belt and that Devan had stated that she was afraid of Redmond. The district court concluded that Harris had forfeited his Brady claim when he failed to “seek to amend the complaint again and asserted this new cause of action for violation of his Brady rights for the first time in response to the [instant] motion for summary judgment.” J.A. at 180-81 (Dist. Ct. Mem. at 18-19). The district court further determined that Harris’s Brady claim was factually unsupported, because Harris “was aware of the essential facts that would enable him to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence” and should have known to check public records for such evidence. Id. at 181 (Dist. Ct. Mem. at 19). We utilize a “‘course of the proceedings’ test to determine whether defendants in a § 1983 action have received notice of the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint is ambiguous.” Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 2005). The complaint in Cummings alleged violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but we held that “statements made by both Cummings’ counsel and Defendants’ counsel during Cummings’ deposition demonstrate[d] that both sides understood Cummings’ suit to encompass Fourth Amendment claims” not explicitly set forth in the complaint, and we therefore addressed those claims on appeal. Id. Judge Griffin suggests in dissent that Harris’s complaint wholly failed to plead a Brady claim and thus did not fall within the range of ambiguity contemplated by Cummings. Harris’s Brady claim implicating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, fell within the scope of the allegation in his complaint that the Defendants-Appellees “engaged in a pattern of activity and course of conduct that was intended to manufacture” Anthony’s conviction “in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” J.A. at 57 (Compl. at ¶ 122); J.A. at 152 (Amend. Compl. at ¶ 129). Accordingly, Harris, whose Brady claim lies within the scope of his pleaded Fourteenth Amendment claim, is in an even stronger position than the plaintiff in 13 See Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 310 (6th Cir. 2005). No. 06-3729 Harris v. Bornhorst et al. Page 11 Cummings, whose Fourth Amendment claim did not lie within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment claim pleaded in his complaint. We thus determine that it is appropriate to follow the analysis established in Cummings.