Opinion ID: 1444222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Waiver of a Jury Trial

Text: Prior to trial, Perry requested that his case be tried to the court without a jury. The State objected, and the court denied Perry's request. K.S.A. 22-3403(1) provides: The defendant and prosecuting attorney, with the consent of the court, may submit the trial of any felony to the court. All other trials of felony cases shall be by jury. See State v. Siver, 237 Kan. 569, 701 P.2d 699 (1985). Perry challenges the constitutionality of the district judge's refusal to allow his case to be tried to the court. Perry claims he was denied a fair trial because of jury bias. In support of this argument, Perry asserts that during selection of the jury panel, numerous potential jurors from the small community stated strong opinions regarding his guilt and the legal defense of insanity. Perry argues that under these circumstances the district court's refusal to permit his waiver of a jury trial resulted in a constitutionally unfair trial. Noting United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1218 (2d Cir. 1983), the State asserts that Perry must show actual prejudice to warrant a new trial. The State argues Perry has provided no evidence of prejudice or that the prosecutor's refusal to waive a jury trial was improperly motivated. The State points out that defense counsel failed to question the venire after the State's voir dire. The State argues that under these circumstances, we can assume defense counsel was satisfied with the impartiality of the jury pool, and Perry cannot now complain of prejudice. Perry contends that the United States Supreme Court recognized the right to waive a jury trial in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 74 L. Ed. 854, 50 S. Ct. 253 (1930). To support this contention, Perry quotes language from Patton that suggests the power to waive a jury trial is a right of the accused. 281 U.S. at 298. We disagree. Patton does not control the issue in this case. Patton concerned the accused's right to waive a jury of 12 members and proceed with a jury of 11 members where the court and the prosecutor have no objection to the waiver. Clearly, the issue in Patton was significantly different than the issue in this case. The Patton Court's holding was narrowly tailored to the specific question on appeal. In addition, Patton has been extensively abrogated and called into doubt by subsequent Supreme Court cases. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 26 L. Ed.2d 446, 90 S. Ct. 1893 (1970); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 33-37, 13 L. Ed.2d 630, 85 S. Ct. 783 (1965). A defendant's only constitutional right concerning the method of trial is to an impartial trial by jury. Singer, 380 U.S. at 36. Despite the fundamental nature of the right to a jury trial, it is agreed the constitutional and statutory provisions guaranteeing the right extend a privilege to the accused which may be waived. State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588, 589, 533 P.2d 1225 (1975). Although the right to waive a jury trial exists, trial by jury has been established by the Constitution as the normal and ... preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases. Patton, 281 U.S. at 312. The ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right. Singer, 380 U.S. at 34-35. The public has a great interest in jury trials in criminal cases; therefore, a defendant cannot waive a jury trial without the consent of the State and the judge. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 73 L. Ed.2d 74, 102 S. Ct. 2485 (1982). There is no constitutional right to a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone. Singer, 380 U.S. at 34. There is no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of the right to a trial by jury on the consent of the State and the trial judge, when, if either refuses to consent, the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by a jury the very thing that the Constitution guarantees the defendant. Singer, 380 U.S. at 36. The jury trial has been surrounded with safeguards to make it as fair as possible. For example, venue can be changed when there is a well-grounded fear of jury prejudice, and prospective jurors are subject to voir dire examination, to challenges for cause, and to peremptory challenges. K.S.A. 22-2616(1); K.S.A. 22-3408; K.S.A. 22-3410; K.S.A. 22-3411a; K.S.A. 22-3412. Perry failed to take advantage of the safeguards provided. In addition, without supporting evidence, his argument that prejudice in the community denied him a fair trial is not persuasive. Therefore, we find no error.