Opinion ID: 212425
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The ICCTA completely preempts the Elams' negligence per se claim.

Text: In Friberg v. Kansas City Southern Railway, we held the ICCTA at least defensively preempted a negligence per se claim based on a state antiblocking statute substantially identical to the Mississippi statute at issue in this case. [7] 267 F.3d at 444. We reasoned that the ICCTA does not permit states to directly regulate a railroad's economic decisions such as those pertaining to train length, speed or scheduling. Id. at 444. Sitting en banc, we confirmed this holding in Franks Investment v. Union Pacific Railroad. 593 F.3d at 411. The only issue here is whether Friberg applies to the context of complete preemption. We have already held the ICCTA completely preempts state law tort actions that fall squarely under § 10501(b). PCI Transp. Inc. v. Fort Worth & W. R.R. Co., 418 F.3d 535, 540 (5th Cir.2005); [8] Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331. We have not yet defined what it means to fall squarely under § 10501(b), but our cases provide some guidance. First, as discussed above, § 10501(b) expressly preempts only state laws that manage or govern rail transportation. Franks, 593 F.3d at 411; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-422, at 167 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 850, 853 (stating that exclusivity is limited to remedies with respect to rail regulationnot State and Federal law generally). This suggests a state law does not fall squarely under § 10501(b) unless it attempts to manage or govern rail transportation. Second, we have recognized the core purpose of § 10501(b) is to prevent states from regulating rail transportation in the economic realm. Friberg, 267 F.3d at 443; see also Fayus, 602 F.3d at 451. This recognition is consistent with Congress's intent regarding the completely preemptive effect of § 10501(b). See H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 95-96, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807, 808 (asserting the direct and complete pre-emption of State economic regulation of railroads.). This suggests a state law does not fall squarely under § 10501(b) unless it attempts to manage or govern rail transportation in the economic realm. Lastly, we have specifically determined that a state law tort remedy that would directly regulate a railroad's switching rates and services falls squarely under § 10501(b). PCI, 418 F.3d at 540; see also Port City Props. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 518 F.3d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir.2008) (citing PCI and finding state law tort remedy targeting delivery services on rail spur completely preempted). Implicit in our determination was a recognition that a rail operator's decisions about switching rates and services are economic decisions. See Friberg, 267 F.3d at 444 (finding that a railroad's economic decisions include those pertaining to train length, speed or scheduling). We read these cases together as establishing that § 10501(b) completely preempts state laws (and remedies based on such laws) that directly attempt to manage or govern a railroad's decisions in the economic realm. [9] Put another way, when a plaintiff's tort claim directly attempts to manage or govern a railroad's decisions in the economic realm, that claim is either wholly federal or nothing at all. Barrois, 533 F.3d at 330. The Elams' negligence per se claim fits this mold. Mississippi's antiblocking statute directly attempts to manage KCSR's switching operations, including KCSR's decisions as to train speed, length, and scheduling. The statute thus reach[es] into the area of economic regulation, Friberg, 267 F.3d at 443-44, in a direct way. Franks, 593 F.3d at 411. Because Mississippi's antiblocking statute is a direct attempt to manage KCSR's decisions in the economic realm, the statute is completely preempted by the ICCTA. And because the Elams' negligence per se claim is based solely on Mississippi's antiblocking statute, it too is completely preempted. We note the economic effects of Mississippi's antiblocking statute are not merely incidental to an otherwise valid state law. See Franks, 593 F.3d at 411. Unlike generally applicable state property laws and rules of civil procedure that on their face have nothing to do with railroad crossings, id., Mississippi's antiblocking statute homes in on railroad compan[ies] and rail cross[ings]. MISS.CODE § 77-9-235. Indeed, the statute has no application except with respect to the operation of railroads at rail crossings. The Elams point out that their negligence per se claim, unlike the negligence per se claim at issue in Friberg, involves safety issues. But focusing on the Elams' particular reason for enforcing Mississippi's antiblocking statute misses the point. Regardless of why the Elams brought their negligence per se claim, the effect of the claim is to economically regulate KCSR's switching operations. To be sure, not every state law targeting rail operations is completely preempted by the ICCTA. Under the standards we have discussed, the ICCTA will not completely preempt valid exercises of a state's police powers in most cases. See Fayus, 602 F.3d at 451 (distinguishing economic regulations from public health, safety, and environmental regulations). [10] Indeed, the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) expressly provides that states may enact (and citizens may enforce) rail safety laws in certain circumstances. See 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2), (b)(1); see also Tyrrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 248 F.3d 517, 523 (6th Cir.2001) ([T]he ICCTA and its legislative history contain no evidence that Congress intended for the STB to supplant the FRA's authority over rail safety.). But we have already determined that a state antiblocking statute like the one at issue in this case does not pertain to traditionally state-controlled safety issues. Friberg, 267 F.3d at 444 n. 18. The statute therefore is incompatible with the ICCTA and not saved by the FRSA. [11] We emphasize our holding so far is not broad. We do not anticipate many state law claims will be completely preempted (and thus removable to federal court) under the standards we have discussed. Complete preemption applies only when a plaintiff's claim directly attempts to manage or govern a railroad's decisions in the economic realm. A negligence per se claim based on Mississippi's antiblocking statute happens to be one such claim.