Opinion ID: 2016011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compliance with Iowa Code Section 910A.5Aldredge's Victim Impact Statement

Text: Iowa Code section 910A.5 (1997) provides in pertinent part: 1. A victim may present a victim impact statement to the court using one or more of the following methods: .... b. A victim may orally present a victim impact statement at the sentencing hearing in the presence of the defendant. .... 2. A victim impact statement shall include the identification of the victim of the offense, and may include the following: a. Itemization of any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense.... .... e. Any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim. The stated purpose of chapter 910A is as follows: It is the purpose of this Act to assure the fair and compassionate treatment of victims and witnesses of crimes and to increase the effectiveness of the criminal justice system by affording to them certain basic rights and consideration, and by reaffirming the criminal justice system's fundamental responsibility to victims and witnesses to ensure their equitable and fair treatment, protect them from intimidation and further injury, assist them in overcoming emotional and economic hardships resulting from criminal acts, and to keep them informed of the status of their case. 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1178, § 1. Sailer contends that the statute limits the scope of the victim impact statement to a discussion of only the offense of which the defendant has been found guilty or to which he pled guilty. He argues this limitation is implicit in the language of the statute, which allows the victim to provide a statement regarding the impact of the offense. According to Sailer, this means Aldredge's statement should have been limited to the offense to which he pled guilty, third-degree theft. Arguably, however, the word offense as used in section 910A.5 could also mean the offense with which the defendant was originally charged or the offense the victim has reason to believe the defendant committed. The legislature did not define the word offense in chapter 910A. Therefore, we refer to the rules of statutory interpretation to determine the appropriate meaning. Our goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist., 577 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Iowa 1998). That intent is shown by the words used in the statute. Id. The rules of statutory interpretation can be summarized as follows: Absent legislative definition or a particular and appropriate meaning in law, we give words their plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1996); see also Iowa Code § 4.1(38). We also consider the context in which the words are used. Iowa Code § 4.1(38). We apply rules of statutory construction only when the terms of a statute are ambiguous. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996). A statute is ambiguous if reasonable persons could disagree as to its meaning. Id.; American Asbestos Training Ctr., Ltd. v. Eastern Iowa Community College, 463 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1990). Ambiguity may arise in two ways: (1) from the meaning of particular words; or (2) from the general scope and meaning of a statute when all its provisions are examined. Carolan, 553 N.W.2d at 887 (quoting Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995)). William C. Mitchell, Ltd. v. Brown, 576 N.W.2d 342, 347 (Iowa 1998). We have already noted that the legislature did not provide a definition for the word offense. Black's Law Dictionary defines offense as [a] felony or misdemeanor; a breach of the criminal laws; violation of law for which penalty is prescribed. Black's Law Dictionary 1081 (6th ed.1990). Webster's definition of the law-related meaning of offense is similar: an infraction of law: CRIME, MISDEMEANOR. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 1566 (1993). Neither of these definitions, however, provide a contextual meaning, which is necessary to a proper interpretation of the statute. As the word offense is used in section 910A.5, it is not clear whether the legislature intended its use to be limited to a narrow definitionthe offense or offenses to which the defendant pled guilty or of which the defendant was found guiltyor a broader definition which would allow a greater range of testimony by the victim. Because reasonable persons may disagree as to which meaning of offense is more appropriate, we turn to rules of statutory interpretation to aid us in divining the proper meaning. Mitchell, 576 N.W.2d at 348. Iowa Code section 4.6 lists several factors a court should consider, among others, in determining the intention of the legislature when the terms of a statute are ambiguous: 1. The object sought to be attained. 2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted. 3. The legislative history. 4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects. 5. The consequences of a particular construction. 6. The administrative construction of the statute. 7. The preamble or statement of policy. Iowa Code § 4.6 (1995). We have said the following in summarizing our duty when interpreting statutes: The ultimate goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. We cannot, under the guise of construction, enlarge or otherwise change the terms of the statute as the legislature adopted it. We will not construe a statute in a way that would produce impractical or absurd results, and we should not speculate as to the probable legislative intent apart from the wording used in the statute. Carolan v. Hill, 553 N.W.2d 882, 887 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted). Mindful of these rules of statutory interpretation, we now turn to the matter of interpreting the meaning of the word offense as it appears in Iowa Code section 910A.5. Several of the factors listed in section 4.6 as appropriate for consideration are either not applicable or not available. The legislative history which does exist regarding the enactment of section 910A.5 does not discuss the intended meaning of the word offense. There is no common law in this area, as victim impact statements are a creature of statute. Similarly, there are no prior laws on which to base an interpretation and no laws on similar subjects. Also, there is no administrative construction of section 910A.5. The remaining factors all address, to some extent, the purpose of the statute. The legislative purpose of chapter 910A is set forth above. Among the objectives listed are the fair and compassionate treatment of victims ... of crimes, reaffirming the criminal justice system's fundamental responsibility to victims ... to ensure their equitable and fair treatment, and assist[ing] [victims] in overcoming emotional and economic hardships resulting from criminal acts. See 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1178, § 1. Consistent with these stated objectives, it seems a broader interpretation of the word offense would be most appropriate. Allowing a victim to testify fully and completely, without regard for whether particular elements of offenses were proved or admitted would serve the objective of fair and compassionate treatment of victims and would also likely aid victims in overcoming emotional and economic hardships resulting from criminal acts. See id. There are also certain consequences which may arise from either a broad or narrow interpretation of the word offense. Limiting the victim to statements only about offenses admitted or proved would likely frustrate the victim because it would deny the victim the opportunity to state the full impact of the crime. Given the large number of plea agreements utilized in the criminal justice system, many victims would be limited in this manner. The reasons for plea agreements are varied and not all such agreements indicate a weakness in the State's case. Moreover, such a narrow reading of the word offense would involve multiple objections by defense counsel during the statement and undue involvement by the court regarding the content of the victim's statement. Conversely, a broad reading of the word offense would not unduly harm the defendant's rights, while more adequately fulfilling the victim's rights. As we discuss more fully below, a sentencing court may not consider unproven offenses in determining the appropriate sentence for a defendant. We trust the sentencing court with the discretion and responsibility to avoid consideration of any unproven offenses which may arise in the content of the victim impact statement. If a sentencing court should happen to improperly consider such offenses when setting a defendant's sentence, appellate review is available to correct the error. Sailer argues that allowing a victim impact statement to include allegations of unproven offenses denies defendants certain constitutional rights, such as the presumption of innocence and the right of confrontation. Sailer neglects to recognize the distinction between the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding, in which the court is trying to determine an appropriate sentence for an offense for which guilt has already been established, and the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding, during which the above-mentioned constitutional rights of the defendant must be protected vigilantly. In interpreting statutes, [w]e must not forget ... that our primary goal is to give statutes a reasonable construction which will effectuate rather than defeat the purpose of the statute. Mitchell, 576 N.W.2d at 349 (citing Metier v. Cooper Transp. Co., 378 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1985)). We find that a reasonable interpretation of the word offense as it appears in section 910A .5 should not be limited to the offense or offenses for which guilt has been established. To interpret section 910A.5 in the manner defendant urges would further victimize the victim, by forcing his or her impact statement to conform to a rigid legal standard instead of allowing an unabridged expression of the impact of the offense. Rather, the word offense should be more broadly construed to enable the victim to fully detail the impact of the offense, regardless of whether certain elements of a crime have been established. This construction of Iowa Code section 910A.5 furthers the intent of the legislature to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of victims and to aid victims in overcoming the emotional and economic harm caused by the crime. In the case at bar, all of the incidents to which Aldredge testified were part of the same course of conduct from which the theft charge arose. Therefore, the impact of those acts was properly addressed by the victim and the sentencing court did not err in allowing the statement to be admitted in its entirety.