Opinion ID: 782580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ongoing Contracts

Text: 42 There is no argument that there was an explicit statutory cap in the appropriations acts for ongoing contracts. However, in various appropriations committee reports, the Senate Appropriations Committee and the House Appropriations Committee recommended particular funding levels for contract support costs for both ongoing and initial and expanded contracts. For example, the House Report on the 1996 appropriations act stated, [t]he Committee recommends $153,040,000 for contract support. H.R.Rep. No. 104-173, at 97 (1995). The amount contemplated for ongoing contracts can be deduced by deducting the amount recommended for initial and expanded contracts in this case, $7,500,000. Id. Thus, the total contemplated by the House Committee for ongoing contracts in 1996, was $145,540,000. As discussed above, the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln, our predecessor court's decision in Blackhawk, and other cases establish that such committee report language as such is not binding on the Secretary. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192, 113 S.Ct. 2024; Blackhawk, 622 F.2d at 547 n. 6; see also Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 499 U.S. at 616, 111 S.Ct. 1539 (holding that statements in committee reports were not binding on the agency and do not ha[ve] the force of law, for the Constitution is quite explicit about the procedure that Congress must follow in legislating). 8 43 The Secretary accepts this principle, but argues that he had discretion to determine the amount of available appropriations for ongoing contracts and that this discretion was appropriately guided by the recommendations in committee reports. The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding: 44 in accordance with the appropriation committee report recommendations, the [Secretary] allocated to area offices for tribal contract [support costs] $153,040,000 in 1996 and $160,660,000 in 1997.... [W]hile the Tribes correctly argue that the earmark recommendations of a committee are not typically legally binding, the [Secretary] is likewise not obligated to completely ignore them. Nothing suggests that the [Secretary] awarded the amount it did for ongoing program [contract support costs] because it felt legally obligated to do so because of the committee report recommendations, as opposed to making that allocation as an exercise of the limited discretion inevitably vested in it. In sum, we agree with the district court that funding for the Tribes' ongoing [contract support costs] was subject to the availability of appropriations from Congress, and there were insufficient appropriations to fully pay those [contract support costs]. 45 Cherokee, 311 F.3d at 1062-63 (first emphasis in original) (second emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 9 46 We cannot agree that the Secretary had discretion to refuse to reprogram to meet his contractual obligations. As we have discussed above, it is well recognized that if the Secretary has the authority to reprogram and there are funds available in a lump-sum appropriation, there are available funds. Our predecessor court in Blackhawk rejected the Secretary's contention to the contrary. 622 F.2d at 547. In Blackhawk, the government refused to reprogram to meet its obligations under a settlement agreement, because members of Congress had expressed their disapproval of the reprogramming procedure in committee reports and during hearings. Id. at 544-46. Our predecessor court held that statements of Congress that were not enacted into legislation, can have no bearing upon the parties' rights and obligations under the settlement agreement. Id. at 552. 47 Indeed, allowing the Secretary such discretion would be directly contrary to the purpose of the 1988 Amendments. The primary purpose of section 205 was to remedy [t]he consistent failure of federal agencies to fully fund tribal indirect costs. S.Rep. No. 100-274, at 8-9. Under the Secretary's approach, section 205 of the 1988 amendments would be rendered a nullity. See Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (rejecting a statutory construction that would exclude from the coverage of the statute most of the conduct that Congress obviously intended to prohibit). 10 48 In short, non-binding recommendations of Congress do not excuse the Secretary from fulfilling his duty under the contracts at issue here to pay full contract support costs. The Secretary did not have the discretion to breach his contracts with the appellee. 11