Opinion ID: 2572600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of an Impartial Jury at the Guilt Phase

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury at the guilt phase (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 16) by excluding for cause from the venire those jurors who would automatically vote against imposing death at the penalty phase. He acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has rejected his claim under the federal Constitution. ( Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 182-183, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137.) Nonetheless, he urges us to reach a different result on independent state grounds under the due process and jury trial protections offered by article I, sections 7, 15, and 16 of the California Constitution. In People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, we considered the social science evidence the defendant there offered to show that death-qualified juries are more prone to convict than those not thus qualified, and we concluded that such evidence does not support a constitutional prohibition of death qualification. ( Id. at pp. 1198-1199, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254; see also People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 112, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 [state constitutional right to impartial jury not violated by exclusion of persons opposed to death penalty].) Defendant here concedes that his claim is essentially the same claim that was before us in Jackson. More recently, we rejected such a claim after concluding the defendant presents no good reason to reconsider our ruling as to the California Constitution. ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1243, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Defendant here has likewise failed to make a compelling case for us to revisit this issue.