Opinion ID: 1269966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: personal jurisdiction over whitmire

Text: Whitmire, the Blacks' attorney, argues that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him because there were insufficient minimum contacts between him and Nebraska. He contends that summoning him to court in Nebraska would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Ashby contends that the issue is not properly before us because the district court did not rule on personal jurisdiction and Whitmire did not raise the issue separately through a cross-appeal. But a review of the record shows that Whitmire moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted, and he submitted no evidence at the hearings on the motion. The other defendants all submitted evidence on supporting their motions to dismiss that converted the motions into summary judgments [62] ; Whitmire did not. [63] Nor did he seek any affirmative relief or defend on the merits. [64] And we have previously held that a court should determine whether it has personal jurisdiction before considering whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(6). [65] Only if the court rejects the jurisdictional objections should it address the objection that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which it can grant relief. [66] So we believe that the district court should have determined whether it had personal jurisdiction over Whitmire before addressing the merits of the case. Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to subject and bind a particular person or entity to its decisions. [67] Before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the court must first determine whether the long-arm statute is satisfied. [68] If the long-arm statute is satisfied, the second question is whether minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state for personal jurisdiction over the defendant without offending due process. [69] Our inquiry begins with Nebraska's long-arm statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-536 (Reissue 2008). It extends Nebraska's jurisdiction over nonresidents having any contact with or maintaining any relation to this state as far as the federal Constitution permits. [70] So we look to whether a Nebraska court's exercise of jurisdiction over Whitmire would be consistent with due process. [71] First, we address whether Whitmire had sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska necessary to satisfy due process. [72] Due process requires that a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state be such that `maintenance of the suit does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'' [73] We look at the quality and type of Whitmire's activities. Depending on the facts of a case, a court can exercise two types of jurisdiction: general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. [74] General personal jurisdiction arises from the defendant's ``continuous and systematic general business contacts'' with the forum state. [75] Ashby does not claim that the court had general personal jurisdiction over Whitmire. If the defendant's contacts are neither substantial nor continuous and systematic, but the cause of action arises out of or is related to the defendant's contact with the forum, a court may assert specific jurisdiction over the defendant, depending on the quality and nature of such contact. [76] Ashby contends that allegations of a civil conspiracy involving Whitmire can support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction. In determining conspiracy liability, the actions of one coconspirator are attributable to all coconspirators. [77] So some courts have reasoned that if through one of its members a conspiracy inflicts an actionable wrong in one jurisdiction, the other members should not be allowed to escape being sued there by hiding in another jurisdiction. [78] Under a coconspirator theory of jurisdiction, the actions of one conspirator are attributable to all the coconspirators for assessing jurisdictional contacts. [79] Ashby alleges that the Blacks, Whitmire's clients and alleged coconspirators, came to Nebraska and absconded with Ashby's son, interfering with Ashby's parental relationship. He contends that although Whitmire never entered Nebraska, because his alleged coconspirators committed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy in Nebraska, he is subject to the jurisdiction of a Nebraska court. We have not recognized whether a civil conspiracy can support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Nor are we inclined to do so at this time. Due process for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires that the plaintiff allege specific acts by the defendant which establish that the defendant had the necessary minimum contacts before a Nebraska court can exercise jurisdiction over a person. [80] Without minimum contacts, a Nebraska court cannot exercise jurisdiction over Whitmire without violating his right to due process. The difficulty with establishing personal jurisdiction based on an alleged conspiracy is that it merges the jurisdiction issue with the merits of the case. As noted by the Seventh Circuit: It would be more than awkward to postpone the jurisdictional issue to the merits; it would dissolve the issue. If the plaintiff won on the merits, the jurisdictional issue would be automatically resolved in his favor, while if he lost the defendant would waive the defense of personal jurisdiction and take the judgment for its preclusive value in subsequent suits. But to resolve the jurisdictional issue in advance would require... an evidentiary hearing as extensive as, and in fact duplicative of, the trial on the meritseither that or permit a nonresident to be dragged into court on mere allegations. [81] Ashby's allegations regarding Whitmire's involvement in the alleged conspiracy are insufficient to show minimal contacts. He focuses only on acts that took place in Alabama. Ashby alleges that the Blacks' removal of M.A. from Nebraska is the central act that furthered the conspiracy. But regarding Whitmire's actions, Ashby claims only that Whitmire made false representations to, and withheld information from, the Alabama courts regarding M.A.'s paternity. He makes no allegations regarding Whitmire's involvement with any of the proceedings in Nebraska. And based upon these allegations, we do not believe Whitmire's connection to Nebraska rises to the level that he should have anticipated being haled into court here. To hold otherwise would, we believe, offend notions of fair play and substantial justice, and would violate due process. Although the district court failed to make this determination, we conclude the record is sufficient to show that the court improperly exercised personal jurisdiction over Whitmire.