Opinion ID: 200155
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Reading of the Statute

Text: We turn first to the language of the statute itself. If a statute is unambiguous, we use neither legislative history,4 Dep't 4 At times, though, we use legislative history as a check to confirm the correctness of our interpretation in very complex areas of regulation. Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Improvement Comm'n, 184 F.3d 88, 101 (1st Cir. 1999) ([A] court should go beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the plain purpose of the statute . . . .). Even were we to rely on the legislative history of § 1396n(c)(10), as plaintiffs request, it would not require the conclusion that § 1396n(c)(10) was meant to mandate that waiver plans serve at least 200 individuals. Paragraph 1396n(c)(10), as originally written, stated that [n]o waiver under this subsection shall limit by an amount less than 200 the number of individuals who may receive home and community-based services. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 4118(b), 101 Stat. 1330-1, 1330-155. The paragraph was amended to the current language the next year. See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100360, § 411(k)(10)(A), 102 Stat. 683, 794. The plaintiffs have submitted no legislative history with regard to this change, and there appears to be little discussion in the relevant committee reports. See H.R. Rep. No. 100-105(I) (1987), reprinted in 1988 -11- of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 1234 (2002), nor administrative agency interpretation, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Neither the language nor the structure of § 1396n(c)(10) supports plaintiffs' reading; the statute does not require applications for state waiver programs to serve at least 200 individuals. The language of the paragraph, by its very terms, governs only the Secretary's ability to deny approval of waiver plans. See § 1396n(c)(10) (The Secretary shall not limit . . . .). The statute does not purport to govern the behavior of the states or the contents of the waiver plans themselves. Moreover, the paragraph does not, by its terms, prevent the Secretary from approving plans unless there are a certain number of slots. It only governs the Secretary's actions when she or he is acting to limit the content of waiver plans as to the number of individuals to be served. Comparing the language of § 1396n(c)(10) to the remainder of § 1396n(c), which governs waiver services, makes this reading U.S.C.C.A.N. 803; H.R. Rep. No. 100-105(II) (1987), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-661, at 269 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 923, 1047. The only legislative history the plaintiffs cite, that of the 1987 statute, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-495, at 760 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245, 2313-1506, is inapposite. All we are left with is the simple fact that Congress altered the language of paragraph 10 by striking language that supported the plaintiffs' contentions. Even were we to construe the legislative history, then, we would find that if it has any effect at all, it is to bolster the interpretation that the statute in its current form governs only the actions of the Secretary. -12- even more compelling. Some provisions of subsection (c) directly govern the content of the waiver plans; these clearly state their purpose in limiting the content of the plans directly. See id. § 1396n(c)(2) (A waiver may not be granted under this subsection unless . . . .). By contrast, § 1396n(c)(10) does not contain such language limiting the content of the plans themselves. Other provisions of subsection (c), like (c)(10), operate to prevent the Secretary from unduly restraining the state plans.5 For instance, the Secretary may not restrict the number of hours or days of respite care provided under a waiver plan, id. § 1396n(c)(4), nor may he require that the waiver plan spend no more money than the approved estimates as a condition of waiver approval, id. § 1396n(c)(6). These provisions merely prevent the Secretary from imposing conditions onto the waiver plans. Similarly, § 1396n(c)(10) restricts the Secretary's ability to limit the size and funding of waiver plans. Read together, these provisions, like paragraph 10, ensure that the states will be able to receive funding for waiver plans up to a certain size and free from restrictions on how much care is provided to each individual. They do not dictate to the states the content of their waiver applications. 5 This is also consistent with the language of § 1396n(c), the title of which includes such subjects as imposition of certain regulatory limits prohibited, obviously a reference to paragraph 10. -13- Finally, it is evident that § 1396n(c) contemplates state waiver plans with definite limits on the number of individuals served. Paragraph 9 permits state plans to replace individuals who die or become ineligible with other individuals [i]n the case of any waiver under this subsection which contains a limit on the number of individuals who shall receive home or community-based services. Id. § 1396n(c)(9). State plans, then, certainly have the right to include a limit on the number of waiver slots they request.6 This statute, § 1396n(c)(10), is most plausibly read as limiting only the ability of the Secretary to impose such restrictions, and not the ability of the states to propose or the Secretary to approve waiver plans serving fewer than 200 individuals.