Opinion ID: 3051618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Explanation

Text: We respectfully submit that the question we pose is worthy of decision because it will be dispositive in this appeal, it is not answered by any opinions of the Supreme Court of California or the California Courts of Appeal and it has important public policy ramifications. We invoke the certification process only after careful consideration and do not do so lightly. See Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2003). In this diversity action, California law controls whether the Secretary’s findings on causation (i.e., that there was no connection between Murray’s termination and his whistleblowing activity) have an issue-preclusive effect on Murray’s state-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Jacobs v. CBS Broad., Inc., 291 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002). Murray’s state-law claims include causation as a required element.2 Therefore, the treat- 2 See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 1238, 1258 (1994) (holding that plaintiff’s “claim of whistle-blower harassment fails because he cannot demonstrate the required nexus between his reporting of alleged statutory violations and his allegedly adverse treatment”) (emphasis added); Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 652 (Ct. App. 2000) (“To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she engaged in protected activity, that she was thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by her employer, and there was a causal link between the two.”) (emphasis added and internal quotation marks removed). 3728 MURRAY v. ALASKA AIRLINES ment of the Secretary’s investigative findings under California’s law of collateral estoppel is determinative of Murray’s appeal. If the Secretary’s finding that there was “no connection between [Murray’s] termination and his involvement in protected activity” is entitled to issue-preclusive effect, then the district court’s dismissal of Murray’s state-law claims with prejudice will be affirmed. If, under the circumstances described above, California law would not accord the administrative finding preclusive effect, then the district court’s judgment will be reversed and remanded, and Murray will be permitted to litigate the issue of causation and the remainder of his two termination claims in the district court. Under California law, even when the “traditional” threshold requirements of collateral estoppel are met, preclusive effect will not be given to a previously litigated issue unless the public policies underlying the collateral estoppel doctrine would be furthered by doing so.3 See Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 4th 815, 829, 982 P.2d 229 (1999). In particular, “[w]hether collateral estoppel is fair and consistent with public policy . . . depends in part upon the character of the forum that first decided the issue later sought to be foreclosed.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Imen v. Glassford, 201 Cal. App. 3d 898, 907-08, 247 Cal. Rptr. 514 (Ct. App. 1988). As was stated in People v. Sims, 32 Cal. 3d 468, 651 P.2d 321 (1982), superseded by statute on another point as stated in Gikas v. Zolin, 6 Cal. 4th 841, 851, 863 P.2d 745 (1993), “[c]ollateral estoppel may be applied to decisions made by administrative agencies ‘[w]hen an administrative agency is 3 The Supreme Court of California has summarized the “traditional” requirements as follows: “First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.” Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 335, 341, 795 P.2d 1223 (1990). MURRAY v. ALASKA AIRLINES 3729 acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate.’ ” Id. at 479 (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)) (emphasis added). In Sims itself, that the “County failed to present evidence or otherwise participate” at the agency’s hearing did not prove that the hearing process failed to provide the County with an adequate opportunity to fully litigate the contested issues. Id. at 481; see also Zevnik v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 4th 76, 85, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817 (Ct. App. 2008); Rymer v. Hagler, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1171, 1179, 260 Cal. Rptr. 76 (Ct. App. 1989). In Sims and the other cited cases, unlike in the present appeal, the administrative agency actually conducted an adjudicatory hearing. We are not certain how California law would treat the Secretary’s investigative findings, made at the initial stage of AIR21’s voluntary administrative process, when the complainant has chosen not to seek further review. There do not appear to be squarely controlling California cases addressing whether an “opportunity to litigate” requires that an actual hearing with adequate procedural safeguards take place, or if instead it is enough that the agency’s procedures afford the complainant the right to seek an adjudicatory hearing after the findings are made.4 Our uncertainty is magnified because Cal- 4 An AIR 21 complainant may contest the Secretary’s investigative findings by filing “objections to [those] findings” and “request[ing] a hearing on the record” within 30 days of receiving them. See § 42121(b)(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1979.106(a). If the Secretary’s findings are timely challenged, AIR21 provides for a de novo, on-the-record hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. See 29 C.F.R. § 1979.107(a)-(b); id. at § 1979.109(a) (written findings and conclusions); 29 C.F.R. § 18.13 (discovery procedures); id. at § 18.24 (subpoena power); id. at § 18.34 (right to personal appearance and representation by counsel); id. at § 18.38 (prohibition on ex parte communications); id. at § 18.52 (decision based on record of hearings). After the ALJ issues a ruling, a party has 10 days to file a petition for review with the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board. See 29 C.F.R. § 1979.110(a). At its discretion, the Administrative 3730 MURRAY v. ALASKA AIRLINES ifornia appears to have a comparatively expansive understanding of collateral estoppel when judicial proceedings are involved. In the majority of jurisdictions, collateral estoppel does not apply to default judgments in judicial proceedings, where the judgment necessarily is entered against an absent party without any actual adjudicatory process taking place. See Gottlieb v. Kest, 141 Cal. App. 4th 110, 148, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7 (Ct. App. 2006); Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. e. “California, on the other hand, accords collateral estoppel effect to default judgments, at least where the judgment contains an express finding on the allegations.” Gottlieb, 141 Cal. App. 4th at 149; see also In re Williams’ Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 289, 293, 223 P.2d 248 (1950). Decisions of the Supreme Court of California and the California Courts of Appeal do not yield an answer to whether this permissive approach to collateral estoppel with respect to judicial proceedings applies also in the context of unreviewed administrative agency findings. Considerations of comity and federalism favor resolution of this substantial state-law question by the Supreme Court of California. We respectfully request that the Supreme Court of California accept and decide the certified question.