Opinion ID: 162851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Rooker-Feldman Bars Plaintiffs' Federal Claims.

Text: 26
27 In its initial formulation of what is now known as the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court limited the principle to claims actually decided by a state court. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149. In the case before us, the Oklahoma state court did not actually decide (1) whether the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act preempted Union City's application of its municipal fire code to plaintiffs' activities, or (2) whether Union City's actions violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Feldman, however, extended the doctrine articulated in Rooker to claims inextricably intertwined with a state-court judgment. 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303. We must therefore consider whether the plaintiffs' preemption and constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined with the Oklahoma state court's judgment. 28 The Supreme Court has considered the contours of the inextricably intertwined corollary to Rooker in two cases, Feldman and Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987). In Feldman, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied Feldman's application to the D.C. bar, based on a rule limiting bar admission to graduates of ABA-accredited law schools. 460 U.S. at 465, 103 S.Ct. 1303. Feldman brought a subsequent action in federal court, mounting two separate challenges: (1) a general challenge to the constitutionality of the bar-admission rule and (2) a specific challenge to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in his particular case. Id. at 487, 103 S.Ct. 1303. Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the Court held that a federal district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the former, but not the latter challenge. Id. at 476, 482-83, 103 S.Ct. 1303. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules ... which do not require review of a final state court judgment in a particular case; they do not, however, have jurisdiction... over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional. Id. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303. 29 In Pennzoil, five justices concluded in concurring opinions that Rooker-Feldman did not divest a federal court of jurisdiction over Texaco's constitutional challenge to Texas's post-judgment collection procedures. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 18, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 28, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 31 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (Stevens, J., concurring). 5 Justice Brennan characterized Texaco's challenge as `separable from and collateral to' the merits of the state-court judgment. Id. at 21, 107 S.Ct. 1519 (Brennan, J., concurring). 30 Thus, the Supreme Court has identified two categories of cases that fall outside Feldman 's inextricably intertwined umbrella. First, under Feldman, a party may bring a general constitutional challenge to a state law, provided that: (1) the party does not request that the federal court upset 6 a prior state-court judgment applying that law against the party, see Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 494 (8th Cir.2000) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86, 103 S.Ct. 1303), and (2) the prior state-court judgment did not actually decide that the state law at issue was facially constitutional, see Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16, 44 S.Ct. 149. Second, under Pennzoil, a party may challenge state procedures for enforcement of a judgment, where consideration of the underlying state-court decision is not required. See, e.g., Kiowa Indian Tribe, 150 F.3d at 1170-71. 31 These two categories, however, provide little guidance in many cases presenting the inextricably intertwined question. Although it is difficult to formulate a foolproof test, in general we must ask whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment. Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir.1996). Three related concepts — injury, causation, and redressability — inform this analysis. Cf. GASH Assoc. v. Village of Rosemont, Ill., 995 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir.1993) (invoking Rooker-Feldman where the injury of which [the plaintiff] complain[ed] was caused by the [state court] judgment); Facio, 929 F.2d at 544-45 (using standing analysis as an aid in applying Rooker-Feldman ). In other words, we approach the question by asking whether the state-court judgment caused, actually and proximately, 7 the injury for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress. If it did, Rooker-Feldman deprives the federal court of jurisdiction. 32 In conducting this analysis, we must pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff; we cannot simply compare the issues involved in the state-court proceeding to those raised in the federal-court plaintiff's complaint. Rather than prohibiting the relitigation of issues and claims (the province of the preclusion doctrines), Rooker-Feldman protects state-court judgments from impermissible appellate review by lower federal courts. 33 In this case, plaintiffs seek monetary damages attributable to losses they sustained as a result of being forced — by state-court order — to remove magnesium from their Union City storage facility. Plaintiffs do not request any form of prospective declaratory or injunctive relief. 34 Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.1993), involved facts similar to those in this case. In Ritter, a Wisconsin county obtained and executed a foreclosure judgment against the plaintiff's property, in satisfaction of unpaid property taxes. Id. at 751. The plaintiff then brought suit in federal court, alleging that (1) the court commenced the foreclosure action without providing adequate notice to the plaintiff, resulting in a deprivation of property without due process, and (2) the county's actions constituted a taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 752. 35 In his due-process claim, the plaintiff challenged both the county's failure to provide him with adequate notice and its adoption of the procedures in place for enforcing the property-tax lien. Id. The Seventh Circuit first considered the nature of the latter claim. Id. at 754. The plaintiff did not seek a declaratory judgment, effective prospectively, relating to the state-court enforcement procedures for property-tax liens. Rather, the plaintiff conceded that but for the tax lien foreclosure judgment ... [he] would have suffered no injury. Id. at 754. Thus, even if the plaintiff was mounting a general challenge to the county's procedures, cf. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 487, 103 S.Ct. 1303, the only redress he sought was an undoing of the prior state-court judgment — a particularized challenge to an adjudication against him in state court clearly barred under Rooker-Feldman. Ritter, 992 F.2d at 755 (citations and quotations omitted). 36 In this case, plaintiffs' requested relief — monetary damages — would necessarily undo the Oklahoma state court's judgment. Plaintiffs request that this court place them back in the position they occupied prior to the Oklahoma state-court judgment. This we cannot do. As in Ritter, absent the Oklahoma state court's injunction, no forced sale of the magnesium would have occurred and plaintiffs would not be seeking relief in federal court. See Ritter, 992 F.2d at 754. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiffs' constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined with the Oklahoma state-court judgment and barred under Rooker-Feldman. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 103 S.Ct. 1303. 37 Considering plaintiffs' preemption claim, we again focus on the requested relief. Plaintiffs do not seek prospective relief in federal court declaring that the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act preempts Union City's municipal fire code. 8 In other words, the injury for which plaintiffs seek redress is not the possibility of Union City applying its municipal fire code against them in the future. Rather, plaintiffs seek damages for Union City's past application of its municipal fire code — an application sanctioned in a prior state-court judgment. Compare Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422, 1430 (3d Cir.1989) (holding Rooker-Feldman inapplicable to party's prospective challenge to state bar's reinstatement rules), with Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir.1988) (applying Rooker-Feldman to bar disbarred attorney's retrospective challenge to state's disbarment procedures). Under Feldman, we have no jurisdiction to consider this claim. 460 U.S. at 483, 103 S.Ct. 1303. 38 For the reasons stated above, we hold that plaintiffs' preemption and constitutional claims are inextricably intertwined with the Oklahoma state court's injunction. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we therefore lack jurisdiction to consider either claim. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 103 S.Ct. 1303. 39 2. Whether Rooker-Feldman Applies Where Plaintiffs Had No Opportunity to Litigate Their Claims in the Oklahoma State-Court Proceeding. 40 Plaintiffs attempt to avoid this result by arguing that they did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate their claims in the prior state-court proceedings. We find this contention unavailing. 41 In Johnson v. Rodrigues, we considered whether a prior state-court adoption proceeding, to which the federal plaintiff was not a party, barred the federal plaintiff's general constitutional challenge to Utah's adoption laws under Rooker-Feldman. 226 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (10th Cir.2000). We held that Rooker-Feldman did not bar the suit for two reasons. Id. at 1108. First, we noted that the federal plaintiff's suit was a discrete general challenge to the validity of the Utah adoption laws ... thus distinguishing [the] case from one challenging the merits of a particular state court ruling. Id. Second, we noted that the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state-court adoption proceeding. Id. at 1108. In considering the relevance of the federal plaintiff's status as a non-party to the state-court proceeding, we stated: We are convinced that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a federal action when the [non-party] plaintiff, as here, lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate claims in the state court. Id. at 1110. 42 Had we based our decision in Rodrigues solely on the lack of a fair opportunity to litigate the claim, this language would support plaintiffs' contention in the present case. We did not. Indeed, we have previously applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine despite the fact that the federal-court plaintiff had no opportunity to litigate her claims in the state-court proceeding. See Facio, 929 F.2d at 542-44; Anderson, 793 F.2d at 263. Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or undo a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims. Facio, 929 F.2d at 542-44; Anderson, 793 F.2d at 264. 9 43 Injecting the full-and-fair-opportunity-to-litigate inquiry into the Rooker -Feldman analysis tends to blur the distinction between res judicata and Rooker-Feldman. The two are not coextensive. See GASH, 995 F.2d at 728. The Rooker -Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional prohibition, based on 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 598 (3d ed.2000) (recognizing that the jurisdictional nature of Rooker -Feldman distinguishes it from 28 U.S.C. § 1738's rule regarding the preclusive effect of state-court judgments). As Feldman makes clear, section 1257 divests lower federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over appeals from state-court decisions. See 460 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257). Under Rooker-Feldman, a court must ask whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment. Garry, 82 F.3d at 1365. 44 In contrast, res judicata bars a claim or issue that was actually decided or could have been decided in a previous action. See Nat'l Diversified Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Corp. Fin. Opportunities, Inc., 946 P.2d 662, 667 (Okla.1997). 10 Further, res judicata is not a jurisdictional bar; it is an affirmative defense, subject to waiver. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 8(c) (In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... res judicata ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.) (emphasis added); Horwitz v. State Bd. of Med. Examiners of State of Colo., 822 F.2d 1508, 1512 (10th Cir.1987) (Res judicata rules and principles... are waived if not raised as affirmative defenses in the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal unless peculiar facts and the interests of judicial economy dictate otherwise.) (citations omitted). Thus, although Rooker-Feldman and res judicata may often lead to similar results, the two inquiries are distinct. 11 [R]es judicata is largely a matter of common law and involves the impropriety of permitting parties to have `two bites at the apple,' [but] Rooker-Feldman is based squarely on federal law and is concerned with federalism and the proper delineation of the power of the lower federal courts. Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495. The Seventh Circuit in GASH highlighted the interplay: 45 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine asks: is the federal plaintiff seeking to set aside a state judgment, or does he present some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party? If the former, then the district court lacks jurisdiction; if the latter, then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion. 46 GASH, 995 F.2d at 728 (emphasis added). 47 An approach that conflates the two inquiries 12 contradicts Feldman. In Feldman, the Court held that section 1257 did not bar Feldman's general constitutional challenge but expressly refused to reach the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata foreclose[d] litigation on these elements of [the plaintiffs'] complaints. 460 U.S. at 487-88, 103 S.Ct. 1303; accord Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554-55 (7th Cir.1999) (Because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional in nature, its applicability must be determined before considering the defendants' arguments regarding the applicability of res judicata.). 48 Based on the above analysis, we reject plaintiffs' contention that the absence of a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim in the prior state-court proceeding bars application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 49 3. Whether Rooker-Feldman Applies in This Case Despite the Fact That Kenmen Engineering, Mr. Miles, and Mr. Menz Were Not Named Parties in the Oklahoma State-Court Judgment. 50 We have previously held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be applied against non-parties. See Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F.3d 1107, 1116 (10th Cir.2002); Rodrigues, 226 F.3d at 1109-10 (citing cases); see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 594 & n. 59 (3d ed.2000) (citing cases). This general rule follows from Rooker-Feldman 's underlying premise: the doctrine prohibits suits in lower federal court that would be, in substance, appellate review of state-court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Because judgments only decide rights of parties, 13 a person would generally have no basis (or right) to appeal a judgment to which that person was not a party. 51 Kenmen Engineering, Mr. Menz, and Mr. Miles argue that Rooker-Feldman 's prohibition does not apply to their claims because they were not named parties in the Oklahoma state court's judgment. We disagree. 52 As an initial matter, we reject this argument's factual predicate. It is true that Miles Specialty was the only named defendant in the Oklahoma state court's March 22, 1999 order. At the same time, Kenmen Engineering, Mr. Menz, and Mr. Miles were all clearly within the ambit of the Oklahoma state court's injunction. 14 The court directed its March 22, 1999 order to Defendant Miles Specialty Company, Inc [sic], by and through its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, or representatives. March 22, 1999 Dist. Ct. Order at ¶ 2. The record indicates that Miles was an officer of Miles Specialty, and he appeared on behalf of Miles Specialty throughout the Oklahoma state-court proceedings. Further, by virtue of the plaintiffs' joint venture, we have no doubt that Kenmen Engineering 15 and Menz were agents of Miles Specialty. Accord Rollins v. Rayhill, 200 Okla. 192, 191 P.2d 934, 938 (1948) (A joint adventure involves not only joint profits sought through the enterprise but a community of interest in and power over the property involved, wherein each member acts for himself as a principal and as agent for the other member or members. ) (emphasis added). Semantics aside, whatever limitation non-party status might place on Rooker-Feldman 's scope, we cannot accept that Kenmen Engineering, Miles, and Menz were non-parties to the Oklahoma state-court judgment for purposes of Rooker-Feldman 's jurisdictional bar. 53 Focusing on the relief sought by plaintiffs reinforces the necessity of this conclusion. Cf. Rodrigues, 226 F.3d at 1108 (considering the nature of the suit in determining whether to apply Rooker-Feldman to a plaintiff who was not a party to the state-court proceeding at issue); accord Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495 (recognizing that focusing solely on the identity of the parties confuses the Rooker-Feldman doctrine with principles of res judicata). In this case, all plaintiffs join in seeking damages incurred as a result of complying with the Oklahoma state court's injunction. Clearly, plaintiffs would not have standing to bring this suit absent the Oklahoma state-court judgment. Cf. Facio, 929 F.2d at 545 (using standing analysis in considering claims under Rooker-Feldman ); accord Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 495 (asking whether the federal plaintiff's interest in having a state rule set aside is inseparable from his interest in upsetting a particular state court judgment based on that rule) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-86, 103 S.Ct. 1303). Thus, unlike Rodrigues, plaintiffs here  do seek review of a final state court judgment in a particular case. Rodrigues, 226 F.3d at 1108 (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303) (emphasis added). 54 We therefore hold that Rooker-Feldman bars plaintiffs' federal-court claims even though Kenmen Engineering, Miles, and Menz were not named parties in the Oklahoma state court's judgment.