Opinion ID: 8704909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants

Text: For jurisdiction over the defendant to be conferred upon this court, “ ‘the most critical inquiry is not whether the nonresident defendant is physically present in the forum[,] but whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum are of such a quality and nature that they manifest a deliberate and voluntary association with the forum.’ ” Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 326 (D.C.2000) (citing Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988 (D.C.1981) (en banc)). The burden belongs to the plaintiff to establish that such personal jurisdiction over the defendant exists. Under International Shoe and Burger King, this inquiry requires asking whether the defendants were transacting business in the District. Because both HHI and HHFI cannot be said to have transacted business in the District, and because all events occurred in a jurisdiction other than the District, personal jurisdiction is lacking in this case. The plaintiff alleges that because HHI advertised in the District, this is sufficient for “doing business” under the statute. But historically, advertisements have not been sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff relies on Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno to claim that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the District forum, but that case fundamentally differs from the present case. In Shoppers Food Warehouse, the court answered the question of whether advertisements placed by a nonresident corporation for a chain of stores, some of which were located in or near the District, established an appropriate nexus for personal jurisdiction. The court found that the supermarket chain “conducted ‘purposeful, affirmative activity’ within the District of Columbia,” by purposefully directing advertisements for its Maryland and Virginia stores at a potential customer base in the District of Columbia. Unlike the supermarket chain in Shoppers Food Warehouse, the defendants here cannot be said to have advertised for the Georgia franchise in the District. The advertisements in question did not encourage District residents to stay at the Island Group Holiday Inn. Certainly, advertisements for any District Holiday Inn franchise are insufficient to create a jurisdictional nexus between Atlanta, Georgia and the District of Columbia, or to refléct purposeful activity in the District relating to the Georgia franchise. Whereas it was reasonable in Shoppers Food Warehouse for the defendants to anticipate that their advertisements would induce customers into shopping there, the defendants here did not engage in such related advertising. It would thus be unreasonable to conclude that a Georgia corporation is similarly situated to the corporation in Shoppers Food Warehouse. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of the District because they “contracted” with the Yellow Pages and other District newspapers. Pl.’s Opp. ¶ 4. It is true that under District law, negotiation, formation, and performance of contracts constitute “doing business” for purposes of personal jurisdiction. Helmer, 393 F.3d at 206. The plaintiff, however, does not conclusively establish that the ads in both the Yellow Pages and the newspapers were directed toward the Georgia hotel. Instead, those ads were directed toward a local Holiday Inn franchise. 5 Where in Ulico Cas. Co. v. Fleet Nat’l Bank such “contracting” was sufficient to meet the contracting business standard, in that case, the defendant’s contract required extensive future contracts with the District such that it was safe to assume the defendant would engage in further substantive contact with the District. 257 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.D.C.2003). Further, the plaintiff also does not establish who placed the ads {e.g., it could have been a local franchisee); without more, the plaintiff does not allege enough facts that allow for the presumption that the defendant transacted business in the District. Even assuming arguendo that the defendant was transacting business in the District, the plaintiff cannot claim that a duty of care arose from the defendant’s advertisements. Bayles v. K-Mart Corp., 636 F.Supp. 852 (D.D.C.1986). The plaintiff had the status of an invitee when she was staying at the Georgia hotel, and this status was not contingent upon the advertisements. Thus, this court cannot find that the plaintiffs claim is related to the defendant’s advertising in the district, even if these advertisements were for the Georgia hotel, because the plaintiff did not choose the hotel herself. Advertising in the District did not constitute “purposeful availment” of the benefits or privileges of this forum such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being haled before a court in the District on a claim related to the allegedly negligent maintenance of a hotel far outside of this jurisdiction. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (holding that a defendant must “purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum”); Shoppers Food Warehouse, 746 A.2d at 326 (conferring personal jurisdiction on the District Court for the District of Columbia where the supermarkets were located in Maryland and Virginia). Any relationship between the defendant’s purported advertising and alleged negligence would be far too tenuous to satisfy the requirements of due process for purposes of personal jurisdiction. For jurisdiction to be conferred upon this court, the plaintiffs claim must also “arise out of’ the transacted business. Some circuits use a liberal “but for” analysis to decide whether a plaintiffs claim rightfully “arose” from transacted business, see Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.1990), but even under that standard, jurisdiction in this case is lacking. Under the standard articulated in Carnival Cruise Lines, which is extremely broad, courts ask whether “but for” a contractual contact the plaintiffs injury would have occurred. Unreasonable assertions of jurisdiction in a “but for” circuit are remedied by the “unreasonableness” prong of the personal jurisdiction standard. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. The standard in the District is much less broad, but the plaintiff does not satisfy even a “but for” analysis. See Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60 (D.C.App.1991) (explaining that “the long arm statute requires that the claim raised have a discernible relationship to the ‘business’ transacted in the District” ... [where] the critical test is whether the nonresident’s conduct is such that he or she could anticipate being “haled into court there”) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559); Everett v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 628 A.2d 106, 107 (D.C.1993) (recognizing the “seminal requirement” that a nonresident defendant undertake “some affirmative act by which the defendant brings itself within the jurisdiction and established minimum contact”) (quoting Cohane v. Arpeja-Califomia, Inc., 385 A.2d 153 (D.C.1978)). Not only were the advertisements for local Holiday Inn franchises, the plaintiff did not make the independent decision to stay at the Georgia hotel based on such advertisements. Def.’s Am. Rep. ¶ 6 (“[T]he plaintiff did not select this Holiday Inn Express, it was selected for her. [T]he Operations Manager at the Tricerion Group made the reservations for the entire party of employees, including the Plaintiffl,] to stay at this [hotel].”) (emphasis added). Thus, the plaintiffs claim did not arise out of the defendant’s alleged business in the District; the two are unrelated. Again, even assuming arguendo that defendant’s alleged contacts constituted “transacting business” under section 13-423(a)(1), due process considerations preclude the assertion of jurisdiction in this case. Under Burger King, where a plaintiffs claim does not arise out of a nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum, the defendant must have minimum contacts with that forum such that personal jurisdiction would not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); Bayles, 636 F.Supp. at 855 (finding that advertising and maintenance of a registered agent for receipt of process were insufficient contacts to satisfy due process). Like in Bayles, “ ‘[t]here is no contention that defendant has corporate agents in the District who solicit sales or negotiate contracts on defendant’s behalf.’ ” 636 F.Supp. at 856 (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 315, 66 S.Ct. 154). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has further classified advertising contacts as merely intermittent rather than substantial and continuous, rendering such contacts insignificant when the cause of action does not relate to the forum. Hughes v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 490 A.2d 1140, 1151 (D.C.1985). The plaintiff here has not alleged facts that demonstrate that defendant’s contacts with the District are substantial and continuous such that subjecting the defendant to litigation here would not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Neither HHI nor HHFI have transacted business with the District or have sufficient minimum contacts with the District to render personal jurisdiction appropriate. Not only does defendant HHI not identify itself as a Holiday Inn company, Def.’s Am. Rep. ¶ 1, the plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to conclude that HHI has a management relationship with Island Group, therefore making Island Group subject to HHI’s advertisements. See PI. Opp. ¶ 2; Def.’s Ex. B. And, again, plaintiff does not establish that HHI placed the advertisements in question. Further, HHFI is merely a licensing company. HHFI has no ownership interest in or financial control over, does not provide funds for operating expenses or managers’ salaries, and does not own, operate, manage, maintain, control policies or management of HHI or Island Group; there is no agency relationship. Defs. Mot. ¶¶ 6, 7. The plaintiff alleges that HHFI plays a critical role in the management and operation of Island Group, PI. Opp. ¶ 3, but not only were these allegations not made in plaintiffs complaint, plaintiffs references to the licensing agreement do not help to advance her claim, id. The standards set forth in the licensing agreement do not reflect a management role over Island Group, and merely set a framework for professional upkeep. Id. (“Maintain the hotel in a clean, safe, and orderly manner and in first class condition, [and] provide efficient, courteous and high-quality service to the public[.]”). It is well established that section 13-423(a)(l) is not satisfied where all of the acts comprising a specific claim occurred in locations other than the District, Appel v. Se. Employers Serv. Corp., 605 F.Supp. 74 (D.D.C.1985), and that the virtual absence of any interest in the forum state in hearing this matter argues for dismissal for want of jurisdiction, Willis v. Willis, 655 F.2d 1333, 1339 (D.C.Cir.1981). Thus, not only may this court not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants HHI and HHFI, it may not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant Island Group either.