Opinion ID: 6336933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Alleged Juror Misconduct

Text: Finally, Aiyer contends that the district court abused its discretion in handling allegations of juror misconduct. In particular, he argues that the district court erroneously accepted Juror No. 3’s “self-serving denials” of the allegations during his post-trial interview in court, Aiyer’s Br. at 56, and that, instead, the district court should have also interviewed Juror No. 6, who made the post-trial allegations in a letter to the court. Aiyer additionally asserts that another juror’s 56 mid-trial podcasts, discovered after trial, suggested that further investigation was required. 27 We review a district court’s investigation into alleged juror misconduct for abuse of discretion. United States v. Baker, 899 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2018). When “[f]aced with a credible allegation of juror misconduct during trial, a court has an obligation to investigate and, if necessary, correct the problem.” United States v. Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 2013). We have warned, however, “that district judges should be particularly cautious in conducting investigations into possible jury misconduct after a verdict.” United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 250 (2d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 302 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Posttrial jury scrutiny is disfavored because of its potential to undermine full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors’ willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community’s trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in the post-verdict context, a hearing into allegations of juror misconduct is required only “when reasonable grounds for investigation exist” and “[r]easonable grounds are present when there is clear, 27 Aiyer raises no arguments concerning that juror’s post-trial podcast wherein he discussed his jury service. Accordingly, we consider any such arguments abandoned. See Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 87 n.9 (2d Cir. 2018). 57 strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial of a defendant.”28 United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal citation omitted). Moreover, “in the course of a post-verdict inquiry on this subject, when and if it becomes apparent that . . . reasonable grounds to suspect prejudicial jury impropriety do not exist, the inquiry should end.” Id. As set forth below, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s handling of these post-trial allegations of juror misconduct. After the district court received the letter from Juror No. 6 regarding Juror No. 3’s alleged misconduct, it directed Juror No. 3 to return to court for an interview with lawyers for both sides present. The district court first asked Juror No. 3 whether he had done “any research about the case or any of the parties or the lawyers.” Redacted App’x at 18. Juror No. 3 indicated that he had conducted no such research during the trial and volunteered that, after the trial, he learned 28 We have clarified that “[t]he requirements of ‘strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence’ do not demand that the allegations be irrebuttable; if the allegations were conclusive, there would be no need for a hearing.” United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 543; accord Baker, 899 F.3d at 130–31. For example, in Ianniello, we found that a post-trial hearing was warranted based upon three affidavits from jurors that “contain[ed] concrete allegations of inappropriate conduct [by the trial judge and a federal marshal] that constitute[d] competent and relevant evidence.” 866 F.2d at 543. 58 that his office manager—who had seen a notice related to Juror No. 3’s jury service—had researched this case. Juror No. 3 also denied seeing any pictures of any attorneys involved in the trial and reported only that the jurors had “nicknames for some of the lawyers.” Redacted App’x at 19. With respect to the suggestion that his girlfriend or boss may have given him outside information before the jury reached its verdict, Juror No. 3 explained that they did not provide him with any such information and that they “respected that the United States Code is to leave the juror alone.” Redacted App’x at 20. He also stated, “[i]n one instance, my girlfriend did ask [about the case], but I told her I was not allowed to speak about it.” Redacted App’x at 20. Before Juror No. 3 was dismissed, counsel for both the government and Aiyer informed the district court that they had no additional questions for Juror No. 3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, in light of Juror No. 3’s interview, “there [was] no reason to suggest that there was any prejudicial information improperly brought to the attention of the jury.” Aiyer I, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 476. After interviewing Juror No. 3, the district court found that he “was forthcoming in his answers and explained [them] in matter-of-fact and credible terms.” Id. Moreover, the district court explained: 59 To the extent that there is any conflict between Juror No. 3’s testimony and the allegations contained in Juror No. 6’s letter, Juror No. 3’s direct statements are more credible than the alleged comments that Juror No. 6 claims to have overheard, particularly when the Court instructed the jurors to bring to the Court’s attention during the trial if any juror violated the Court’s instructions not to look at or listen to anything about the case outside the courtroom. Further, Juror No. 6 brought his concerns to the Court only after he became dissatisfied with the unanimous verdict. Id. at 476–77. Given that “the district court is best situated to evaluate jurors’ credibility” in these circumstances, United States v. Cox, 324 F.3d 77, 87 (2d Cir. 2003), we decline to second-guess the district court’s finding that Juror No. 3 was more credible than Juror No. 6. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, even assuming that Juror No. 6’s allegations were true, those allegations failed to demonstrate that Juror No. 3 had, in fact, been exposed to any prejudicial information. In other words, even if Juror No. 3’s girlfriend and boss had looked up this case, and even if he had looked up a member of the defense team and commented on that attorney’s appearance, Juror No. 6 made no allegation that Juror No. 3 received or otherwise heard anything that could have prejudiced Aiyer’s trial. In addition, given the level of detail in Juror No. 6’s letter, as well as the district court’s instruction that jurors immediately bring misconduct concerns 60 to its attention, the court was well within its discretion to doubt that Juror No. 6 had any more details to provide and to conclude that the investigation could end because “reasonable grounds to suspect prejudicial jury impropriety” did not exist. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. To the extent Aiyer relies on United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 1993) in support of his position, we are unpersuaded. There, the district court was informed mid-trial that “members of the jury had been discussing the case during their recesses and while waiting in the jury room.” Id. at 687. After “summon[ing] the jurors en masse” and informing them of the issue, the court gave them a twoquestion questionnaire with the following yes-or-no questions: (1) “Have you participated in discussing the facts of this case with one or more other jurors during the trial?”; and (2) “If your answer to Question No. 1 is ‘Yes,’ have you formed an opinion about the guilt or non-guilt of either defendant as a result of your discussions with other jurors?” Id. at 688. Although “[a]ll twelve jurors answered ‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ to the second question,” the district court denied the defendants motion for a mistrial and resumed the trial. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated the defendants’ convictions, concluding that “the questionnaire raised more questions than it answered” 61 because, among other things, the jurors’ answers indicated that they all “engaged in premature discussions,” but “ there [was] no way [of] know[ing] the nature of those discussions—whether they involved merely brief and inconsequential conversations about minor matters or whether they involved full-blown discussions of the defendants’ guilt or innocence.” Id. at 690–91. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion by “declining to engage in further inquiry—such as individualized voir dire—upon which it could have determined whether the jurors had maintained open minds.” Id. at 691. Here, by contrast, after it received the specific allegations of misconduct by Juror No. 3, the district court promptly recalled Juror No. 3 for an interview, asked him focused questions related to the specific allegations, and received answers denying any impropriety, which the district court found credible. Thus, in light of its knowledge of the specifics of the allegations from Juror No. 6’s letter and its credibility determination as to Juror No. 3 after interviewing him, the district court was able to conclude confidently that it was “apparent that . . . reasonable grounds to suspect prejudicial jury impropriety do not exist,” and thus, “the inquiry should end.” Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. Additionally, it is significant that the allegations in this case, unlike in Resko, arose after the jury reached its verdict, a time when 62 district courts “should be[] hesitant to haul jurors in [to court] . . . in order to probe for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences.” Id. In essence, Aiyer asks us to decide that, where a juror informs a district court—post-trial—about potential juror misconduct in detail in writing, and an accused juror’s subsequent denial of those allegations is deemed credible, the district court is still obligated in every instance to interview, at a minimum, the accusing juror. We decline to adopt such a categorical rule, which would be inconsistent with our precedent. Indeed, we are mindful that “[a] district court’s investigation of juror misconduct or bias is a delicate and complex task.” Cox, 324 F.3d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted). In performing that task, there are a series of discretionary (and often countervailing) factors that could impact a district court’s determination on whether one or more jurors should be interviewed when an allegation of misconduct arises, including, among others, the nature of the allegations, the level of detail in the allegations, the strength of the allegations on their face and in the context of other information and observations already possessed by the court before conducting any investigation, as well as an ongoing assessment of the merits of the allegations based on the results of any investigation that the court decides to conduct (including, here, any credibility 63 determination it makes as to an accused juror if that juror is interviewed first). In short, this type of delicate inquiry should not be subject to any bright-line rule on how a district judge must proceed, but rather should be a fact-specific, discretionary determination that must be carefully assessed on a case-by-case basis. See also United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir. 1985) (“The extent of that investigation and the method of conducting it will, of course, depend on the surrounding circumstances, including the content of the communication and the apparent sensitivity of the juror. The trial judge must be given wide discretion to decide upon the appropriate course to take, in view of his personal observations of the jurors and parties.”), abrogated on other grounds, 116 S. Ct. 1241 (1996). Under the particular facts here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, after interviewing Juror No. 3 and finding the juror’s responses to the allegations credible, that the inquiry could end without interviewing the accusing juror to further assess the credibility of that juror’s allegations or to determine if there were any additional unreported allegations. As to Juror No. 4’s mid-trial podcasts, we similarly conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that, when considered in their entirety, the podcasts “[did] not raise any concerns that necessitate a post-verdict inquiry.” 64 Aiyer I, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 474. Of course, Juror No. 4’s mid-trial, public comments on the podcast that he did not care about the case, was “angry” that he was a juror, and that he “started to not pay attention at all” were cause for concern. Redacted App’x at 5. However, the district court did not rely on snippets of the podcasts provided by Aiyer after the trial; instead, it reviewed all of Juror No. 4’s mid-trial podcasts and found that, notwithstanding his many complaints, he also explained that “he would refrain from discussing the case during the trial”; “he would be unbiased in deliberations[] at the end of the day”; and “he understood the gravity of his role and . . . would render a fair and just decision.” Aiyer I, 433 F. Supp. 3d at 474–75. Based on this record, the district court was well within its discretion in determining that “reasonable grounds to suspect prejudicial jury impropriety [no longer] exist[ed],” and that no further investigation was warranted. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. Accordingly, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in relation to the district court’s post-trial investigation into potential juror misconduct.