Opinion ID: 527543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is Mainstreaming Required?

Text: 37 The threshold question is whether mainstreaming is required by the relevant federal statutes. None of the statutes at issue expressly require local transit authorities to provide mainstreaming for mobility-impaired individuals. While some portions of the legislative history support a mainstreaming requirement, there is also much evidence of congressional opposition to mainstreaming and a preference for local option. The Supreme Court has held that if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Given the breadth of the Secretary's discretion to fashion appropriate minimum criteria for handicapped services, we must accord particular deference to the standards set forth in the challenged regulations. The Secretary struck a balance between preserving local discretion, avoiding the imposition of unduly burdensome costs, and ensuring adequate transportation services for the handicapped. If this balance represents a permissible reading of the statutes, the regulations must be upheld even if we would have struck a different balance in the absence of the regulations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 11.
38 In attempting to discern what is required by the language of section 504, we must view it in light of two countervailing legislative concerns: (1) effectuation of the statute's objectives of assisting the handicapped; and (2) the need to impose reasonable boundaries in accomplishing this purpose. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 299, 105 S.Ct. 712, 719, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). The Supreme Court first considered the balance between these considerations in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). In Davis, a deaf plaintiff, denied entry to a nursing school because she could not participate in the nursing program without full-time supervision, alleged that the school's admission decision violated section 504. On review, the Court determined that section 504 requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to benefits that a federal fund grantee offers. The Court defined the phrase otherwise qualified as one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap. 442 U.S. at 406, 99 S.Ct. at 2367. 39 The Court carefully circumscribed its mandate that otherwise qualified individuals may not be treated differently by holding that section 504 does not compel fundamental alteration to programs receiving federal assistance since such radical adjustments would constitute an unauthorized extension of the obligations imposed by [Sec. 504]. Id. at 410, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Court then concluded that neither the language, purpose, nor history of Sec. 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on all recipients. Id. at 411, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. 40 The Court found that Southeastern's physical qualification requirement for its nursing program was legitimate and that to change it would alter the fundamental nature of the program. Since Davis could not meet this requirement, she was not otherwise qualified under section 504 and Southeastern's decision to exclude Davis was not discriminatory. 41 The Court clarified Davis in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). Challenged in Choate was a state's proposal to impose a limitation on the number of annual in-patient hospital days for which state Medicaid would reimburse hospitals on behalf of Medicaid recipients. A class of disabled Medicaid recipients argued against the 14-day limitation, asserting that the proposal's implementation would have a disproportionately adverse impact on the disabled in violation of section 504. As in Davis, the Court held that the proposal did not preclude meaningful access to or exclude the handicapped from Medicaid services in a way that violated section 504. The Court amplified its Davis holding and stated that federally-funded programs were required to make reasonable modifications to accommodate the disabled. The Court interpreted section 504 as imposing two limitations on the duty to accommodate. 42 It clearly enunciated the first limitation that accommodations necessitating fundamental or substantial changes to the nature of the program were not mandated. The second, concerning the extent of expenditures required to effectuate the alteration, was not as fully delineated. As the Court explained, [t]he balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. Choate, 469 U.S. at 301, 105 S.Ct. at 720; see Davis, 442 U.S. at 405-06, 99 S.Ct. at 2366-67. In both Choate and Davis, the Court recognized that where handicapped persons' needs can be accommodated without imposing undue financial or administrative burdens, the refusal to make necessary modifications might become unreasonable and discriminatory. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 301, 105 S.Ct. at 720; Davis, 442 U.S. at 412-413, 99 S.Ct. at 2370. In both cases, however, the Court refused to mandate the modifications sought because they were substantial. See Choate, 469 U.S. at 308-09, 105 S.Ct. at 724; Davis, 442 U.S. at 413-14, 99 S.Ct. at 2370-71. Choate and Davis therefore contemplate a continuum in which some modest modifications may be necessary to avoid discrimination but other more substantial modifications are not required by section 504. 43 In its final rulemaking, DOT characterized Choate as an elaboration of the undue burden standard announced in Davis. See 51 Fed.Reg. 18,996 (1986). DOT noted that although Choate was decided after the expiration of the comment period on the proposed regulation, DOT would have entertained additional comments on the impact of Choate had it believed it necessary to do so. DOT, however, construed the holding in Choate as consistent with Davis to the extent that if accommodations entail extensive costs and administrative burdens, the refusal to undertake alterations to a program is not discriminatory. See id. 44 The district court disposed of the reasonable accommodation issue by stating that it had reviewed section 504 and concluded that Congress has not yet legislated mainstreaming for the disabled in public transportation. ADAPT, 676 F.Supp. at 639 (Congress has not yet legislated equality for the handicapped regardless of cost). The district court then upheld the validity of Subpart E's local option provision. 45 Neither Supreme Court precedent nor section 504 on its face addresses the extent to which federally-funded transportation programs are required to make physical modifications to accommodate disabled people. However, every federal court that has addressed the question whether mainstreaming in public transit is required has concluded that section 504 does not mandate mainstreaming. See, e.g., Rhode Island Handicapped Action Committee v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 718 F.2d 490, 494-99 (1st Cir.1983); American Public Transportation Association v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (D.C.Cir.1981); Disabled in Action of Baltimore v. Bridwell, 593 F.Supp. 1241, 1250-52 (D.Md.1984), appeal dismissed, 820 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir.1987). 46 The difficulty in determining precisely the extent of accommodation mandated by section 504 is illustrated by the history of the regulations intended to implement section 504. As previously discussed, the regulations were subject to much revision prompted either by executive, legislative or judicial pressures. 47 In the absence of a clear congressional mandate, the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, requires us to defer to an agency's interpretation of the relevant statute in its regulations. The regulations we consider today were enacted pursuant to a broad delegation of discretion under statutory standards that this Court has previously characterized as ambiguous at best. See Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1117 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1293, 99 L.Ed.2d 503 (1988). Applying the Davis/Choate standard, we conclude that section 504 does not mandate mainstreaming.
48 Nothing in the plain language of section 16(a) of UMTA suggests that Congress has mandated mainstreaming. While portions of the pertinent legislative history support ADAPT's position, 7 a thorough reading of the statutory text and the legislative history suggests that Congress gave the Secretary broad discretion to address the transportation problems of the handicapped rather than requiring one particular solution, i.e., mainstreaming. 49 Section 16(a) expresses a clear intent to increase the accessibility of federally assisted mass transportation. It speaks, however, in broad and general terms that cannot fairly be construed as establishing particular standards or mandating a particular federal policy. Section 16(a) requires only that federally assisted programs make special efforts to ensure that the handicapped can effectively utilize transportation services. It requires that the handicapped be able to utilize mass transportation systems, but does not explicitly or implicitly mandate the means by which mass transportation must be made available to the handicapped. Under the common understanding of the phrase, it is surely possible to conclude that a community has made special efforts to ensure that the handicapped may use mass transportation facilities and services even if those efforts do not actually enable the handicapped to fully exploit each of those facilities and services. Because section 16(a) does not unequivocally require the Secretary to implement mainline accessibility, Congress apparently left the Secretary broad discretion to map out the contours of an appropriate federal policy. 50 Every federal court that has squarely addressed the contention that section 16(a) mandates mainstreaming has held that it does not. See, e.g., Rhode Island Handicapped Action Committee, 718 F.2d at 497, 499 (finding that section 16(a) provided no legislative standards to guide a court in this area and concluding that guidance on the appropriate implementation of the statute must come from the Secretary); Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F.Supp. 825, 831 (D.Colo.1978) (In [UMTA and Sec. 504], Congress said do something for the mobility handicapped and left it to the Secretary to determine what that something should be.... [T]he federal statutes ... do not provide a sufficient definition of the duties of the federal [transportation officials] to give direction to them.); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F.Supp. 656, 660 (N.D.Ohio 1977) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that [section 16(a) ] requires that 'all transit rolling stock and facilities [must be able to be] effectively utilized by all mobile disabled and elderly people'  and finding no statutory infirmity in ... the operation of a separate paratransport system parallel to the main bus and rapid systems); see also American Public Transit Association v. Goldschmidt, 485 F.Supp. 811, 823 (D.D.C.1980) (generality of congressional expression in UMTA and Sec. 504 establishes broad delegation of authority; law, the heterogenous character of the handicapped population, the breadth and variety of the states and communities affected, and the uncertain and changing technology available preclude a Congressional prescription of the particular means for carrying out its policy), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. APTA v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272 (D.C.Cir.1981). 51 In light of UMTA's broad language, which clearly does not define the ways in which UMTA was to be effected, we also conclude that section 16(a) of UMTA does not mandate mainstreaming, but rather grants wide latitude to the Secretary to determine how best local governments are to comply with the mandates of UMTA.
52 Although ADAPT raised the issue below, the district court reached its conclusion that Congress has not ordered mainstreaming of the disabled without commenting on section 105(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act. We hold what is implicit in the district court's silence, that the Federal-Aid Highway Act does not speak to whether mainstreaming is required. 53 Section 105(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, amending section 165(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, provided that DOT must require that projects funded pursuant to particular provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act be planned, designed, constructed, and operated to allow effective utilization by ... handicapped persons. 23 U.S.C. Sec. 142 note. The projects included within the purview of section 165(b) include construction of high occupancy vehicle lanes, highway traffic control devices, bus passenger loading areas and facilities ... and fringe and transportation corridor parking facilities, the purchase of buses, and the construction, reconstruction, and improvement of fixed rail facilities including ... rolling stock. 23 U.S.C. Sec. 142(a) (incorporated by reference into 23 U.S.C. Sec. 142 note). DOT acknowledges that this amendment expressed a clear intention of requiring increased accessibility to mass transit. DOT, however, argues persuasively that the amendment did not mandate mainstream accessibility. 54 With regard to this amendment, the Senate Report stated: 55 The bill contains a statement of national policy which is similar to that found in Section 16(a) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended, and which declares that elderly and handicapped persons have the same right to utilize mass transportation systems as other persons. This amendment goes further than the Urban Mass Transportation Act, however, permitting the Secretary to approve only those programs or projects which comply, to the maximum extent feasible, with the provisions of this subsection. 56 S.Rep. No. 1111, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974) (emphasis added). The amendment may have been intended to go[ ] further than [UMTA], id., in the sense that it added the enforcement mechanism of requiring DOT to withhold approval where certain new federally-funded facilities, buses and rolling stock were not made accessible, but it continued to emphasize that efforts of accommodation are to be limited by feasibility, and we understand feasibility to include financial, engineering and physical plant considerations. 57 By its terms, the Federal-Aid Highway Act does not speak to whether a system as a whole must be accessible. The text of the act, see supra at 1194, directs the Secretary to require that projects, including buses, purchased with certain federal funds, be designed and operated to allow effective utilization by the handicapped. It thus arguably requires that certain funds appropriated for projects involving the areas that serve as ingress and egress to transportation be spent on accessible projects and that new buses and rolling stock be accessible. It does not speak to what is required of existing systems. Insofar as a system, whether it is fully accessible, paratransit-oriented, or a combination, gets funds for these new facilities or purchases new buses and rolling stock pursuant to the statutory provisions listed in section 165 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act, that Act may require those new additions to be accessible. 8 However, section 165 does not indicate whether existing systems may incorporate paratransit services or provide transportation to the handicapped solely through paratransit. Section 165 thus does not speak to the issue of mainstreaming, but only to new purchases. It therefore does not undermine the Secretary's interpretation of the transportation acts in Subpart E. 9 See infra at 1197-99. 58
59 Section 317(c) of STAA, 49 U.S.C.A.App. Sec. 1612(d), was enacted to require a more active federal role in the development and enforcement of substantive standards for serving the handicapped in federally-assisted mass transit programs. The statute gives the Secretary extremely broad discretion to adopt appropriate standards for handicapped services. On its face section 317(c) requires only that the Secretary establish minimum criteria for serving the handicapped and does not specify any substantive standard mandating mainline accessibility or otherwise constraining the Secretary's discretion. See 49 U.S.C.A.App. Sec. 1612(d). 60 The legislative history of STAA also demonstrates that Congress did not unambiguously mandate mainstreaming. While this history contains some statements supporting mainstreaming, it also contains contrary statements. Senator Cranston, a co-sponsor of the provision adding section 317(c), stated that we are not imposing an enormously costly burden for transit systems or requiring an immediate return to the controversial, tough [mainline accessibility regulations] in place before July of 1981. 128 Cong.Rec. at 32,643. 61 Congress was apparently unlikely to approve any effort to compel accessible mainline transit. Senator Cranston stated, when he proposed Sec. 317(c), that 62 [u]ltimately and ideally, I believe that transit systems should be fully accessible to handicapped and elderly persons, including those who must use wheelchairs. However, I recognize that it is not now feasible to gain approval of legislation that would provide a full guarantee of eventual accessibility. 63 128 Cong.Rec. at 30,824. Indeed, the Secretary's 1979 regulations had set out precisely such a policy and were met with severe criticism in Congress. In 1980, both houses of Congress passed bills that would have compelled the Secretary to abandon the compulsory mainline accessibility policy of the 1979 regulations and required the Secretary to permit a local option. See, e.g., S. 2720, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Sec. 118; 126 Cong.Rec. 32,197-98 (1980). In the course of considering this legislation, several members of Congress expressed a clear preference for local discretion and paratransit alternatives to mainline accessibility. 64 Senator Exon, for example, stated that [t]he adoption by the Congress of a local option exemption to section 504 would remedy what I consider the very unfortunate rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation regarding the issue of so-called accessible buses versus special transportation services for the handicapped. 126 Cong.Rec. 16,696 (1980). Similarly, Senator McClure noted that paratransit alternatives offered a feasible and, in some cases, more effective means of providing services than accessible bus service. 126 Cong.Rec. 16,698-16,700 (1980). While these local option bills were not enacted into permanent law, the terms of the Senate provisions were incorporated by reference into DOT's 1981 appropriations legislation, thereby barring the Secretary from using any funds to compel bus accessibility in fiscal year 1981. See Pub.L. No. 96-400, Sec. 324, 94 Stat. 1699 (1980). 65 There is nothing in the legislative history that suggests that in enacting section 317(c) of STAA, Congress intended to reverse itself and to foreclose paratransit alternatives to bus accessibility. Indeed, Senator Riegle, a co-sponsor of the provision, suggested that the Secretary could adopt standards governing services that are not in the form of accessible buses or other equipment serving the general public. 128 Cong.Rec. 32,642-43. Similarly, Senator Cranston noted that rather than alter federal policy on accessibility, the measure would still retain[ ] the philosophy of granting broad discretion to local systems in the design and implementation of their programs. Id. at 32,644. We conclude that both the statutory language and the legislative history demonstrate that section 317(c) vests the Secretary with the discretion to permit each community to develop paratransit systems or other alternatives to mainline accessibility. 66 Congress adopted section 317(c) of STAA in 1982 to prod DOT into action following the 1981 remand of the regulations in APTA v. Lewis. Accordingly, DOT was directed to promulgate final regulations establishing minimum criteria for the provision of transportation services to the disabled. DOT, in formulating the regulations before us today, found it reasonable to interpret section 317(c) as not requiring that transportation services for the handicapped be the same as or comparable to that provided the general public. 48 Fed.Reg. 40,685 (1983). The district court, relying on its basic premise that mainstreaming has not been legislated, agreed. So do we.
67 We emphasize that we do not reach the issue whether all new purchases by transit authorities must be of accessible buses. We simply hold that the transportation acts do not mandate mainstreaming, or, in other words, the total revamping of a mass-transit system so that it can accommodate the handicapped in the same facilities and on the same terms as other people. ADAPT at no time requested a declaratory judgment that all new purchases must be accessible. Thus we limit our holding to the validity of Subpart E, which by its terms does not speak to new acquisitions, but rather sets the minimum service criteria by which to judge whether transit systems are fulfilling the mandates of the transportation acts. 68 Subpart C of the DOT's regulations provides in relevant part that 69 Each facility ... constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a recipient [of financial aid from DOT] shall be designed, constructed, and operated in a manner so that the facility or part of the facility is accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, if the construction was commenced after the effective date of this part. 70 49 C.F.R. Sec. 27.67(a). Facility is defined to include all or any portion of buildings, structures, vehicles, equipment, roads, walks, [and] parking lots. 49 C.F.R. Sec. 27.5. 71 We do not think it appropriate at this time to address the relationship between Subparts C and E. First, the issue was not adequately presented in the district court. In its reply brief to this Court, ADAPT suggests that upholding Subpart E of the challenged regulations would in effect vitiate Subpart C of the regulations, which requires transit authorities to make newly purchased facilities accessible to the handicapped, and therefore E must be struck down. See ADAPT Rep.Br. at 16. However, ADAPT did not request declaratory relief with respect to Subpart C in its complaint in the district court or even in its initial brief to this court. It requested only that the provisions of Subpart E be struck down. See ADAPT Br. at 26-27 (This appeal challenges only the validity of subpart E....). Similarly, EPVA has never requested declaratory relief with respect to Subpart C. 72 Moreover, briefing on the relationship between the two subparts has not been significant either in the district court or this Court. And counsel for the Secretary conceded at oral argument that it was a fair interpretation to say that the issue of the relationship between the two subparts was not presented to the district court. Although he subsequently stated that this Court should nonetheless address the issue because the relationship was a question of law that was critical to the outcome of the case, as we discuss below, we disagree with that proposition. While acquisition of buses without lifts may be in violation of the transportation acts and Subpart C, it is not a wrong remediable by attack on Subpart E. Subpart E by its terms does not speak of new acquisitions, but rather sets the minimum service criteria by which to judge whether transit systems are fulfilling the mandates of the transportation acts. 73 Second, the issue was not addressed below. It is the general rule that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below. This rule is one of discretion rather than jurisdiction, and in the past we have heard issues not raised in the district court when prompted by exceptional circumstances. See Selected Risks Insurance Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69 (3d Cir.1983) (citations omitted). We find no exceptional circumstances in this case justifying a departure from the general rule. 74 Third, we do not believe that the issue is ripe for review. Judge Mansmann, in dissent, argues that, in order to give the statutes their full force, Subpart C must be read to require that all new buses are accessible, and concludes that because there is a potential conflict between Subpart C and the part of Subpart E that allows paratransit only, Subpart E must fall. See post at 1214. However, we believe that it is clearly possible to read the two provisions as independent and consistent requirements. If a municipality purchases no new buses, it would be perfectly permissible under both Subparts for none of the city's buses to be accessible and for the city to rely only on paratransit. See ADAPT Br. at 28 (Of course, if a transit system chooses not to purchase any new buses, it need not comply with anything in subpart C, and in that event need only comply with the service requirements of subpart E.). 75 It is also not clear that the Secretary will interpret the regulations so as to cause a conflict since it is not clear that the Secretary will allow municipalities to evade the facial mandate of Subpart C on the grounds that they are in compliance with the paratransit only option of Subpart E. In its brief to this Court, the Secretary does take the position that the regulations taken as a whole did not intend to mandate acquisition of accessible buses. Secretary's Br. at 28. At oral argument on the appeal, the Secretary's counsel, when questioned on the point, contended that compliance with Subpart E excuses compliance with Subpart C. But the fact that the Secretary has taken a litigation position on the matter does not make it ripe for review. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232, 241-42, 101 S.Ct. 488, 493-94, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980) (agency filing of complaint before administrative law judge not final action and not judicially reviewable because it is not a definitive statement of the agency's position); cf. Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 468, 473, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) ( 'Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands.'  (citation omitted)). ADAPT does not contend that the agency has made it clear, either through a rule-making or by approving mass transportation plans that comply with Subpart E but not with Subpart C, that the agency's final position is that Subpart E trumps Subpart C. 10 76 This Court has held that when there is no facial inconsistency between a regulation and a statute there is no need to anticipate that the regulation will be applied inconsistently with the statute. In such a case, the regulation is not ripe for judicial review. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. NRC, 555 F.2d 82, 92 (3d Cir.1977). That is the situation here. We see no reason to anticipate that the Secretary will apply Subpart E in a way that would undermine Subpart C.
77 As the preceding examination of the relevant statutes demonstrates, neither in the express language nor in the legislative history of these statutes has Congress expressly mandated mainstreaming or indicated an intention to do so. Instead, the statutes delegate broad powers to the Secretary to promulgate regulations detailing minimum criteria for handicapped services that balance the goals of preserving local discretion, avoiding the imposition of unduly burdensome costs, and ensuring adequate transportation services for the handicapped. The regulations must be upheld if the balance they strike represents a permissible reading of the statutes, even if the court would have struck a different balance in the absence of the regulations. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 11. To this inquiry we now turn. 78