Opinion ID: 1656213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim of Tortious Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Text: Northrup claims a second ground for recovery. He asserts that the actions of the employer constituted a tortious infliction of emotional harm, a claim recognized by the Restatement and several of our cases. See, e.g., Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District, 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984); Harsha v. State Savings Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 1984); Powell v. Khodari-Intergreen Co., 334 N.W.2d 127, 129 (Iowa 1983); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965). The elements of this tort are: (1) Outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) The defendant's intentional causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) Plaintiff has suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) Actual proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118; Powell, 334 N.W.2d at 129. (Although our cases have referred to this claim as an intentional infliction of emotional distress, neither the Restatement nor our cases actually require proof of an intentional act; a reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress is enough. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46; Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118; Harsha, 346 N.W.2d at 800; Powell, 334 N.W.2d at 129. In view of this, we will simply refer to the claim as a tortious infliction of emotional distress.) Farmland has responded to this claim in two ways: First, it asserts Northrup's pleading is insufficient to raise it and second, as a matter of law, there was no outrageous conduct on the part of Farmland. A. The Pleading Issue. The standard by which the sufficiency of a pleading is measured is whether it provides fair notice of the claim asserted so as to allow the adverse party an opportunity to make an adequate response. Schmidt v. Wilkinson, 340 N.W.2d 282, 283 (Iowa 1982); Gosha v. Woller, 288 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Iowa 1980). See Iowa R.Civ.P. 69(a). With this standard in mind, we look to the contents of Northrup's petition. Count I alleged breach of an employment contract, proximate cause, and damages. Count II incorporated the above allegations of Count I and further alleged that the termination was in bad faith and in violation of defendant's duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect to the plaintiff's contract of employment. Count III incorporated Count II and further alleged the termination was in reckless disregard of causing emotional harm. Count IV alleged malice and demanded punitive damages. The petition asserted three of the four elements of tortious infliction of emotional distress: Reckless disregard of causing emotional harm, proximate cause, and damages. Although he did not expressly allege the fourth element, outrageous conduct, we believe the petition when taken as a whole gave fair notice of the tortious interference claim and was therefore sufficient under rule 69(a). B. The Outrageous Conduct Element. The defendant argues that, even if the claim for tortious infliction of emotional distress was properly pled, there was no outrageous conduct on its part. We have said that the outrageous conduct in this context is so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.... Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118, quoting Harsha, 346 N.W.2d at 801. The Restatement highlights the egregiousness required to elevate (or downgrade) mere bad conduct to the level of outrageousness: It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 comment d. It is for the court to determine in the first instance, as a matter of law, whether the conduct complained about may reasonably be regarded as outrageous. Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 118; Roalson v. Chaney, 334 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Iowa 1983). In making that determination, we take the evidence in the light most favorable to Northrup. He testified that, in his opinion, he had been fired for alcoholism. For summary judgment purposes, we must assume this is true. Northrup's duties included plant operations, buying, production scheduling, maintenance, and, perhaps most significantly, plant safety. Discharge of a plant superintendent for alcoholism, when he has such extensive responsibilities, does not exceed all possible bounds of decency nor could it be expected to cause an average member of the community to exclaim Outrageous! under the Restatement test. Northrup does not seem to rely on any other circumstances to show outrageousness; he continues to point to the fact of his alcoholism, and the public policy implications of a discharge based on it. He did, however, testify about certain acts by his supervisor prior to, and at the time of, his discharge. The supervisor had yelled at him, told him he would not tolerate any more of Northrup's behavior, suggested that he had falsified some documents and accused him of lying. The supervisor also criticized Northrup's feed production scheduling and finally told him he was fed up with him. The general criticism of Northrup by the supervisor does not appear to be anything unusual in an employer-employee relationship. In considering the question whether conduct was outrageous for these purposes, a reasonable level of tolerance is required. We have said that [t]he tort law should encourage a certain level of emotional toughness. The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, comment d, supra. Against a large part of the frictions and irritations and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 1033, 1035 (1936). Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911, 918 (Iowa 1976). Testimony by Northrup that his supervisor accused him of lying and falsifying documents might appear to be more serious than the general allegations of friction. Northrup's brief comments about these matters in his deposition, however, were not developed by him. In fact, when pressed he said he did not know anything about the basis for these statements and that he did not make any inquiry about them. He does not assert the statements were outrageous, or even that they were untrue. In Vinson, we considered an employer-employee relationship with considerably rougher edges than what we find here. In Vinson, we said an allegation of an ongoing intentional campaign of harassment by a supervisor, including an accusation of falsifying time records, was insufficient as a matter of law to constitute outrageousness. We concluded that [e]ven though we believe a jury could find defendants engaged in a deliberate campaign to badger and harass plaintiff, we do not believe their conduct rises to the level of extremity essential to support a finding of outrageousness. The jury could find that defendants' actions were petty and wrong, even malicious, but we do not believe a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the conduct went beyond all possible bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Vinson, 360 N.W.2d at 119. We believe Northrup's discharge for alcoholism, even considering these additional circumstances, could not reasonably be considered to be outrageous conduct under the rule. We find no basis for reversal. AFFIRMED. All Justices concur except REYNOLDSON, C.J., who concurs specially.