Opinion ID: 182421
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Agent Dave Lewis

Text: Agent Dave Lewis, a special agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for approximately twenty-two years, testified regarding the characteristics of crack cocaine as well as the methods involved in the distribution of the drug. Defendant argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to assess the relevance and probative value of Agent Lewis's testimony before he was permitted to testify. Defendant did not raise this specific objection during trial; therefore, we review the district court's decision for plain error. We have previously rejected an identical challenge in United States v. Alford, 332 Fed.Appx. 275, 281 (6th Cir.2009), in which the defendant argued that the district court's failure to assess the relevancy and probative value of Agent Lewis's testimony prior to its admission was plain error. Id. We noted that this Court has consistently held that expert testimony by a law enforcement officer about the method of operation of drug dealers is admissible pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 702, id. (citing United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 682 (6th Cir.1996)), and that this Court has deemed Agent Lewis qualified in this area, id. (citing United States v. List, 200 Fed.Appx. 535, 545 (6th Cir.2006)). We found no plain error in the admission of Agent Lewis's testimony, determining that it was highly relevant and helped the jury in resolving the central issue of whether [the defendant] possessed the crack with intent to distribute. Id. at 281-82. There is no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case. The district court properly admitted the expert testimony of Agent Lewis.
Defendant argues that the district court clearly erred by allowing Agent Lewis to testify beyond his area of expertise. Specifically, Defendant contends that Agent Lewis's background and training does not qualify him to testify to the quantities of crack that are consistent with personal use. This argument is without merit. As we stated in Alford, [t]his Court routinely allows qualified law enforcement officials to testify that circumstances are consistent with drug distribution rather than personal use. Alford, 332 Fed.Appx. at 282 (citing United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir.2004) (and cases therein); United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 940 (6th Cir.2004); United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 676, 682 (6th Cir.1996)). There was no plain error.
Defendant also argues that Agent Lewis's testimony concerning throw-away cellular telephones was beyond the scope of his expertise, irrelevant, and unduly prejudicial. Agent Lewis testified, without objection, that drug traffickers often use throw-away phones because they can be set up with a fictitious name, making them untraceable. Defendant argues that this testimony was improper because there was no evidence in the record that Defendant used any of the three phones in the manner described by Agent Lewis. The testimony was within the scope of Agent Lewis's expertise because it concerned a method of operation of drug dealers. Id. at 281. Agent Lewis's testimony explaining why the items seized from the house were consistent with drug dealing was relevant to the issue of whether Defendant intended to distribute the drugs found with him in the bedroom closet. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 682 ([W]ithout expert testimony, the average juror is unlikely to understand the significance of drug paraphernalia....). The fact that there was no direct evidence that Defendant used the cell phones in the way that Agent Lewis testified is of no consequence. Agent Lewis was not offered to provide percipient testimony directly demonstrating Defendant's actions. Instead, he was providing an opinion, based on extensive training and experience, about the items recovered from the residence and the reasons that they were consistent with drug trafficking. Defendant was free to cross-examine Agent Lewis to demonstrate that there were other legitimate uses for these items. In addition, the jury was instructed that they did not have to accept the opinion testimony and that they should consider how the witness reached his conclusion. Accordingly, we find nothing prejudicial in Agent Lewis's testimony concerning throw-away cellular telephones and conclude there was no error in its admission.