Opinion ID: 1059631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of the Virginia Capital Punishment Statutes

Text: Bailey's first, second, third, fifth, and sixth assignments of error repeat the challenges to the constitutionality of the Virginia death penalty statute and the statutory scheme under which capital murder trials are conducted and death sentences are reviewed on appeal that the trial court rejected in addressing Bailey's pre-trial motion. We have thoroughly addressed and rejected in numerous prior capital murder cases the arguments raised in these assignments of error, and we find no reason to modify our previously expressed views on these issues. In Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 74, 445 S.E.2d 670, 674-75, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 971, 115 S.Ct. 442, 130 L.Ed.2d 353 (1994), we rejected the assertion that capital punishment statutes do not give meaningful guidance to a jury because they do not require the jury to find that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating ones before fixing the death penalty. In Breard we also rejected the contention that the method of instructing jury on mitigation impermissibly interferes with jury's consideration of evidence offered in mitigation. Id. In Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 552, 364 S.E.2d 483, 488, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988), we rejected the assertion that the vileness aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague. Similarly, we have repeatedly rejected the contentions that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 876, 116 S.Ct. 204, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995), and that the method of review of a death sentence by trial court and by this Court on appeal are unconstitutional, see, e.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 61, 515 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S.Ct. 955, 145 L.Ed.2d 829 (2000). In his seventh assignment of error, Bailey contends, inter alia, that this Court has failed in its statutory duty under Code § 17.1-313(E) to maintain records of all capital felony cases for use in the proportionality review required by Code § 17.1-313(C)(2), and that this constitutes a violation of Bailey's due process and other constitutional rights. We disagree. Code § 17.1-313(A) requires that [a] sentence of death, upon the judgment thereon becoming final in the circuit court, shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court. As part of that mandatory review, subsection (C)(2) of the statute directs this Court to determine [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Code § 17.1-313(E) further provides that: The Supreme Court may accumulate the records of all capital felony cases tried within such period of time as the court may determine. The court shall consider such records as are available as a guide in determining whether the sentence imposed in the case under review is excessive. Such records as are accumulated shall be made available to the circuit courts. (Emphasis added.) This statute uses discretionary language permitting this Court to determine the period of time within which the records of all capital felony cases will be accumulated for purposes of a proportionality review of a death sentence. Thus, in the first capital murder case reviewed by this Court following the enactment of the former version of Code § 17.1-313, the Court exercised that discretion by entering an order directing the Clerk of this Court henceforth to segregate and accumulate the printed records and opinions in all class 1 felony cases, to maintain a current index of those cases, and to make the index, records, and opinions of this Court available for examination upon the request of any court of record in the Commonwealth or in the federal jurisdiction. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 482 n. 8, 248 S.E.2d 135, 151 n. 8 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2419, 60 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1979); see also Jones v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 427, 450, 323 S.E.2d 554, 567 (1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1012, 105 S.Ct. 2713, 86 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985). This archive now maintained by the Clerk pursuant to our order contains the records of all appeals of convictions under Code § 18.2-31, whether the sentence imposed was death or life imprisonment, filed in this Court since Smith and, from 1986, those capital cases resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment first reviewed in the Court of Appeals of Virginia. In addition, these records have been summarized in digest form, and are cross-indexed according to the offense of conviction, the sentence imposed, and whether a jury or the trial court imposed that sentence. [3] Moreover, contrary to Bailey's assertion that the maintenance of complete records is requisite to the preservation of his right to a proportionality review of his death sentence, nothing in the statute, nor in the case law relied upon by Bailey, prescribes the method by which an appellate court conducts a proportionality review of a death sentence. Rather, so long as the methods employed assure that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the penalty generally imposed for comparable crimes, due process will be satisfied and the defendant's constitutional rights protected. Additional challenges to the constitutionality of the capital appellate review process raised within Bailey's seventh assignment of error have been previously addressed, and we find no reason to modify our previously expressed views. See, e.g., Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 473-74, 357 S.E.2d 500, 508-09, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 308, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987) (procedures for appellate review of death penalty cases, including expedited review, provide a meaningful appeal and are constitutional). On a related issue, in his twentieth assignment of error, Bailey contends that the trial court erred in refusing his motion that it obtain from this Court and review the records of prior capital murder cases maintained pursuant to Code 17.1-313(E) before determining whether the death sentences were appropriate, or to set them aside for good cause shown pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.5. [4] This contention is without merit. As noted above, Code § 17.1-313(E) requires that [s]uch records as are accumulated [by this Court] shall be made available to the circuit courts. We have previously supplied our records to a circuit court upon request. See Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 448, 304 S.E.2d 271, 285, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977, 104 S.Ct. 414, 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1983). However, nothing in the statute requires the circuit court to make such a request, the matter being one committed to the trial court's discretion. Here, the trial court indicated that it had reviewed a large number of cases to permit it to fairly determine whether the death sentences were appropriate. Moreover, nothing in the record constitutes good cause shown to set these sentences aside and for the trial court to have imposed life sentences. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Bailey's motion. In his motion to have the Virginia death penalty statute and the statutory scheme under which capital murder trials are conducted and death sentences are reviewed on appeal declared unconstitutional, Bailey contended that the Commonwealth's system of appointing counsel in capital cases results in a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel. The trial court rejected this contention without comment. In addition, in his eighth assignment of error, Bailey asserts that Virginia has no system for appointment of counsel ... [and] expends no public funds on education, assistance, or training of capital defense counsel. Bailey further asserts that appointed counsel in capital cases are disproportionately from small firms with resources inadequate to defend a capital murder charge. Bailey also contends that the Commonwealth fails to provide meaningful review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in habeas corpus petitions. According to Bailey, [t]hese factors, individually and collectively, violate Bailey's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We disagree. Bailey's assertion that Virginia has no system for the appointment of counsel in capital cases is demonstrably in error. Code §§ 19.2-163.7 and 19.2-163.8 provide, in capital cases, for the appointment of counsel who meet qualifications determined by the Public Defender Commission in conjunction with the Virginia State Bar. These statutes provide the criteria to be considered in determining the qualifications for attorneys so appointed, including the requirements that they have current training in death penalty litigation... [and a] demonstrated proficiency and commitment to quality representation. We are of opinion that this statutory scheme for identifying and appointing qualified attorneys to represent indigent defendants in capital murder cases adequately safeguards those defendants' constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. Bailey cites no authority for the proposition that a state is required, as part of its obligation to afford indigent defendants with appointed counsel in capital cases, to further provide for the education, assistance, or training of such counsel. In any case, there is no merit to Bailey's contention that Virginia fails to allocate public funds for these purposes. In addition to establishing and funding the Public Defender Commission, the General Assembly, through the appropriation made for the Virginia State Bar, allocates funds for the Virginia Capital Representation Resource Center. See, e.g., 1998-2000 Executive Budget, 1999 Amendments, page B-17 (1999). Moreover, in 1998, the General Assembly authorized a study of the quality of capital representation of indigent defendants in Virginia. . . [and] the standards for qualification of counsel promulgated pursuant to [Code] § 19.2-163.8. House Joint Resolution 190, Acts 1998, at p. 2649. Although recommending certain improvements in the manner in which counsel are appointed in capital cases, the authors of the study concluded that [t]he overall state of the system for representation of indigent capital defendants is good. Report of the Virginia State Crime Commission, Capital Representation of Indigent Defendants, House Document 60, at 1 (1999). According to a survey conducted as part of the study, the quality of representation by appointed counsel in capital murder trials, as appraised by the trial court judges, met or exceeded the desired level of expertise and performance ninety-eight percent of the time. Id. at 19. This empirical data refutes Bailey's wholly unsupported assertion that appointed counsel in capital murder cases are generally unqualified to provide effective representation. We further reject Bailey's contention, also unsupported by reference to any credible data, that appointed counsel in capital murder trials are disproportionately from small firms with resources inadequate to defend a capital murder charge. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-163, counsel appointed in capital murder cases may receive a fee in an amount deemed reasonable by the court and payment of such reasonable expenses incurred. Accordingly, the ability of an appointed attorney to represent a capital murder defendant is not limited to the independent resources available to that attorney from his or her law firm because the trial court will compensate the attorney for any reasonable expenditure of time and expenses. Moreover, we are unwilling to accept Bailey's unsupported assertion that attorneys in small firms are not in a position to adequately defend a client charged with capital murder. Bailey's contention that Virginia fails to provide meaningful review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in habeas corpus petitions does not state an allegation of a facial or systemic violation of the constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel. Moreover, Bailey has not proffered any evidence in support of this contention. Accordingly, we reject this unsupported contention. For these reasons, we hold that Virginia's statutory scheme for the conduct of capital murder trials and the review of death sentences does not violate the due process rights and other protections afforded by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.