Opinion ID: 2230054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Court Improperly Fail to Consider Johnson's Alleged Limited Role?

Text: Johnson bases several claims on his allegation that he was only an accomplice. Johnson first says that Roche v. State, 596 N.E.2d 896, 899 (Ind.1992), requires the trial court to consider that an alleged principal's actions, and not Johnson's, were the source of many of the aggravating factors the court used to enhance Johnson's sentence. At the heart of this claim is the proposition that consecutive, enhanced sentences are manifestly unreasonable when only one of two perpetrators is prosecuted for the crime. Second, Johnson offers several claims of sentencing error which arise from his assertion that an unconvicted accomplice's actions exceeded the scope of his plan to rob Cleotha Smith. These claims rest on the existence of Mahone. Both parties state in their briefs that Johnson acted in concert with an accomplice, but the record viewed in a manner most favorable to the verdict does not appear to require the trial court to find that Johnson acted with anybody at all. In other words, it appears that the jury and the sentencing judge could have found Johnson guilty of felony murder without using the aiding and abetting statute, Ind.Code § 35-41-2-4, as a mechanism for broadening the base of Johnson's criminal liability. Several facts in the record would allow a finding that Johnson acted alone. Johnson stated in both his two confessions that he had planned to leave the door to the Smith's home open so that Craig Mahone could enter and rob Cleotha Smith. (R. at 664.) In Johnson's second confession, however, he acknowledged that he was present when Mahone was allegedly beating the Smiths with a lead pipe or another similar instrument. (R. at 666.) This altering admission seems like Johnson's attempt to explain away evidence that put him in close proximity to the actual deaths of Anne and Cleotha Smith. Johnson also stated that the reason he returned to the house after leaving the door unlocked was because he was worried about the safety of his daughter who was in the home. (Id.) However, Johnson's daughter was later discovered still inside the house by the first witness on the scene, Willie Mayfield, and by Officer Clarence R. Anderson, the first policeman to arrive. (R. at 138, 161.) Finally, Johnson changed his story about how he came to have the Smiths' blood on his jeans. He first said the blood was a result of his touching Anne when he found her dead and then wiping his hands on his jeans. (R. at 664.) The next day Johnson stood by this explanation but added that he might also have Cleotha's blood on his clothing since he actually was present when Mahone struck Cleotha. (R. at 666.) The blood of both Cleotha and Anne was found by DNA analysis to be present on Johnson's jeans. (R. at 546.) Given these facts, a jury might well find Johnson guilty of felony murder even if it thought no accomplice existed as a matter of fact. The trial judge did not make any explicit finding regarding the existence of an accomplice. And, the court did instruct on aiding and abetting. We will thus turn to Johnson's claim. Johnson urges that because he was a mere accomplice our laws provide him with legal protections which might not be available to others who stand alone in their criminal liability. Johnson's claim that our case law regarding accomplice sentencing should cause us to reduce his sentence is unconvincing. Under the common law, two general classes of criminals, neither of which relate directly to the meaning of the term accomplice, were used to determine the nature and measure of an individual's culpability. A principal was one who either actually perpetrated the crime or who aided or abetted and was actively or constructively present at the time of the crime. An accessory was one who procured, counseled, commanded or abetted the principal, and who was absent when the latter committed the crime, or who received, relieved, comforted, or assisted the perpetrator after the crime had been committed. A principal could not be convicted as an accessory. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 128 (1989). The common law of criminal liability has been superseded by statute in Indiana, however, and the legal distinction between a principal and an accessory has ceased to exist. The language of Ind.Code § 35-41-2-4 which states, [A] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ..., has been interpreted by this Court to mean that an actor who would have been considered an accessory under the common law now vicariously commits the actual offense. Fisher v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1365, 1369, (Ind.1984) (emphasis added); Kappos v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (Ind.1984). These cases show that individuals convicted of felonies in Indiana are considered to have been convicted on the weight of their own actions even if the accomplice liability statute is utilized by the court or jury to determine guilt. The general standard for reviewing the sentence imposed on an accomplice is thus the same as it is for principals: whether the sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender. (App.R. (17)(B)). The standard provides no categorical benefit to an actor by virtue of his having been charged as an accomplice. Each actor is assessed on the facts available. Johnson cites Roche v. State, 596 N.E.2d 896, 899 (Ind.1992), for the proposition that consecutive sentences upon one perpetrator may be manifestly unreasonable where the actual crime exceeds the scope of his original plan due to the actions of an uncharged accomplice. The holding and application in Roche, however, is actually detrimental to Johnson's argument. In Roche, the Court agreed that imposition of the same penalty upon a principal and accomplice may not be appropriate but then found that the jury was in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess the degree of culpability of the co-defendants Johnson also claims his sentence is manifestly unreasonable because the trial court did not consider that the scope of his original plan was exceeded by the acts of an accomplice. Reading the facts of the case most favorably to the verdict and even assuming the trial judge believed that an accomplice committed the actual killing, we are still unable to find Johnson could not have reasonably foreseen the violence that eventually occurred. The criminal liability of an accomplice is not negated by the principal's commission of an offense greater in severity than the offense originally planned if the resulting offense is a probable and natural consequence of the planned offense. Tynes v. State, 650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind.1995). Johnson admitted that he was the instigator of the planned robbery and that he left the door to the Smiths' home unlocked with the intent that his accomplice would enter and rob the Smiths. (R. at 664.) Additionally, a day after Johnson's first confession in which he claimed to have not been present at the time the Smiths were killed, he admitted that he was present at the time of the murders and that he did nothing to help the Smiths as they were being beaten to death. (R. at 666.) The police also identified the Smiths' blood on Johnson's pants and shoes. (R. at 545.) Given this evidence, the trial judge was not compelled to find that Johnson was merely an accomplice who unwittingly became involved in actions beyond his control. Planning a robbery of a person in that person's own home is bound to create a risk that violence may ensue when the homeowner predictably attempts to protect himself and his family. Johnson claims the fact that his alleged accomplice remains uncharged renders the imposition of consecutive sentences erroneous. Our law is otherwise. An accomplice may be tried and convicted when the proof of the underlying crime is sufficient despite the fact that the other actor is not prosecuted, not convicted, or even acquitted. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-4 (West 1986). It is not error for the State to try an accessory before trying the party who actually committed the crime. Schmidt v. State, 265 N.E.2d 219, 226, 255 Ind. 443, 455 (1970). Johnson asserts that the recent case of Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. 1996) stands for the proposition that an aggravated felony murder sentence is inappropriate where the appellant did not anticipate or encourage her accomplice to exceed the scope of the original plan. This misstates Edgecomb. The Edgecomb analysis was not categorical, i.e., all enhanced sentences ordered upon unwitting accomplices convicted of felony murder are presumed to be manifestly unreasonable. Rather, we performed the normal manifestly unreasonable balancing test required by Appellate Rule (17)(B) and found the trial court's sentence was manifestly unreasonable given the specific facts of Edgecomb, 673 N.E.2d at 1199.