Opinion ID: 1145144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cardenas Revisited

Text: A condition precedent to our acceptance of the proposition that an accused has effectively changed his plea from not guilty to guilty, and thus made up an issue upon which judgment could be entered and sentence pronounced, is a showing on the record that Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., has been complied with. The reason for this is that the informing process which furnishes a basis for a change of plea goes to the guarantee of the accused's constitutional rights of due process. Until those rights have been protected by the Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., mandatory ritual, there is nothing which will permit the judge on the record to reach a rational and informed conclusion that the defendant exercised his prerogatives voluntarily and with an understanding of what his decision would bring. Cardenas, supra. For the court to establish the fact that the defendant has pleaded guilty voluntarily, the court must  at the hearing where the plea of guilty is offered and before the judge accepts it  address and advise the defendant in open court on the record and determine if he understands [t]he nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; Rule 15(c)(1). [4] This was not done. The court must advise the defendant [t]hat he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; Rule 15(c)(3). This was not done. The court must inform and advise the defendant [t]hat if he pleads guilty ... there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty... he waives the right to a trial; Rule 15(c)(4). This was not done. Further, the court must advise the defendant [t]hat if he pleads guilty ... the court may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement. Rule 15(c)(5). This was not done. Rule 15(d), W.R.Cr.P., goes on to require the court to address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea was voluntary and did not come about as a result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. This was not done. The court did not address and personally inquire of the defendant whether his willingness to change his plea to guilty came about through prior discussions between the attorney for the state and the defendant or his attorney, as it was required to do under Rule 15(d), supra. Additionally, the plea bargain was not inquired into as we have noted above. This is mandatory according to Rule 15, W.R. Cr.P., and Cardenas, supra. To fail to comply with the strictures of this rule is to deny the defendant his constitutional right of due process of law. This rule is mandatory. Failure to strictly adhere to Rule 15, W.R.Cr.P., will inevitably result in reversal, as it must here. There is no good purpose to be served by further reiterating the reasons for the requirement. They have been thoroughly explained in Cardenas, supra; and also see Britain v. State, Wyo., 497 P.2d 543 (1972). The defendant also complains that the court did not properly and adequately inquire whether or not there was a factual basis for the plea as required by Rule 15. Since we reverse on other grounds, we will not comment, except to say that it is absolutely imperative that the court, before accepting a guilty plea, determine that there are facts which support a plea of guilty and this showing must clearly appear of record. The petition is granted and the matter remanded to the trial court in order that the defendant will be permitted to replead to all charges that were lodged against him prior to the resentencing hearing in which the errors complained of herein occurred, and for such other and further proceedings as are not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.