Opinion ID: 686553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Content-Based Censorship

Text: 18 The Regents argue that they simply wanted to make sure that they were not establishing or endorsing religion when they temporarily suspended their approval for showing the film on September 22. The district court found for the Appellees on this ground, stating that when the Defendants [Appellees] sought timely pertinent advice of legal counsel concerning the potential First Amendment conflicts herein they did not 'violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'  Order of Aug. 7, 1992, at 10 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738). The district court said that [a]chieving neutrality while at the same time balancing the tension created by the free speech and establishment tenets of the First Amendment calls for considered judgment which does not lend itself to hasty decision. Timely but purposeful reflection is prudent. Id. at 9. 19 Appellant directs our attention to Widmar as evidence that the law that the Regents allegedly violated was clearly established. In Widmar, a religiously-oriented student group was told that it could not hold its meetings on university property, even though that property was generally available for meetings of other student groups, because the university did not want to run afoul of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the university was in error in excluding the religious group from the use of its meeting rooms. The Supreme Court applied the three-part Lemon test 3 in reaching its conclusion that the Establishment Clause does not preclude a state institution from making its facilities available to private religious groups so long as those facilities were made available to other groups as well, the religious groups did not predominate, and the university did not sponsor or endorse the religious activity. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-77, 102 S.Ct. at 274-78. The Court stated that the mere act of providing an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices. Id. at 274, 102 S.Ct. at 276. 20 However, the Supreme Court went on to set some limits to its holding. It distinguished a prior case where the school may appear to sponsor the views of the speaker. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. at 276 n. 10. It went on to stress that: 21 In light of the large number of groups meeting on campus, however, we doubt students could draw any reasonable inference of University support from the mere fact of a campus meeting place. The University's student handbook already notes that the University's name will not be identified in any way with the aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any organization or its members. 22 Id. at 274 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. at 276 n. 14 (quoting student handbook); see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2148, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (applying Widmar to a situation where the showing of a film on school grounds similarly would not have been sponsored by the school). It is in this area of presenting an appearance of sponsorship that the facts of this case begin to diverge from Widmar. 23 Here, there is evidence that SUAB is not simply a student group totally independent of the university as was the case in Widmar. Widmar left open the possibility that a university's sponsorship of a religious activity may be viewed as excessive entanglement. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n. 12, 274, 102 S.Ct. at 276 n. 12, 276-77. Here, Appellant has not disputed that Tom Keys, the director of the Student Union, is an OSU employee, that SUAB receives student fees from OSU's student fee coffers, or that SUAB scheduled the film and the SUAB name was on the literature advertising the film. These facts, rather than the mere fact that the film was shown on OSU property, distinguishes Widmar. Thus, there is at least an appearance, and perhaps a reality, that SUAB is an agent of or an extension of OSU itself. 24 Appellant's complaint contains the following uncontested assertions: 25 3. ... The Student Union is managed by Defendant TOM KEYS, its Director, and is a part of the overall operation of the University under RON BEER, Vice-President for Student Services, who reports to JOHN CAMPBELL, President of Oklahoma State University. 26 4. The Student Union Activities Board is generally responsible for the ultimate selection of selected programs and on occasion consults with Defendant KEYS. Defendant KEYS generally limits his consultation with the members of the SUAB Board to scheduling and financial consideration ... and occasionally mak[es] suggestions about films to be shown. 27 5. ... The operating expenses of the theatre are paid by admission fees, University funds in the form of student activity fees and donations. 28 Although Appellant presents paragraph 4 as evidence of independence, we think it instead suggests that OSU has not given up control over the programming at its theatre. 29 The record intimates enough connection between SUAB and OSU that SUAB's actions may be seen to be sponsored by or a part of OSU itself. On that basis, we find that Widmar does not clearly establish the law for this case. The Regents' decision whether to allow the film to be shown may be viewed as nothing more than OSU deciding whether it wanted to speak or to sponsor specific speech. We conclude that the law was not clearly established at the time the Regents acted such that a reasonable official would understand that his or her actions in this case would violate Appellant's rights. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to all Appellees on this issue.