Opinion ID: 3164768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Limitations on the Presumption of Vindictiveness

Text: Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â As a general matter, trial court judges possess significant discretion in determining an appropriate sentence for a specific defendant and offense, so long as the judgment is not influenced by actual vindictiveness against the defendant. Wasman, 468 U.S. at 563â64; Lopez, 113 P.3d at 720. To protect this trial court discretion during a resentencing on remand, the Court has explained that the presumption of vindictiveness is a narrow one, because reasons other than a judgeâs vindictiveness may justify a modified or increased sentence. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799â800 (â[T]he Pearce Â presumption [of vindictiveness] âmay operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus . . . block a legitimate response to criminal conductâ . . . .â (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373)). Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â To balance a defendantâs right to appeal with a trial courtâs broad discretion in sentencing, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the presumption of vindictiveness should apply only where its objectivesâto deter actual vindictive sentencing and to prevent a chilling effect on defendants exercising their right to appealâare âmost efficaciously served.â Id. at 799 (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986)). Accordingly, the presumption arises only if (1) the new sentence on remand is more severe than the original sentence, and (2) there is a reasonable likelihood that actual vindictiveness played a part in the resentencing. Id. at 799â800; Montgomery, 737 P.2d at 416. Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â With this framework in mind, we now consider the approaches other jurisdictions use when determining whether a new sentence is in fact more severe than an original sentence, and thus whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies in the first place.