Opinion ID: 451914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Master-Servant Relationship

Text: 10 The issue of whether employees are borrowed servants is often resolved as an issue of fact. See, e.g., Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 357-58 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913, 98 S.Ct. 2253, 56 L.Ed.2d 414 (1978) and cases cited therein. However, when the material determinative facts are not in dispute and no difference in result would occur based on any remaining disputed fact, summary judgment has been held to be appropriate as a matter of law. Id. at 358. We find that no material determinative facts have been placed in dispute as to whether Kay Lease's workers were the borrowed servants of Rebel and that no other facts would affect the outcome. 11 The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a fellow employee or a corporate officer or agent of a common employer [is] immune from an action at common law. Ramsey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 511 F.Supp. 393, 401 (S.D.Miss.1981), aff'd 671 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir.1982) citing (Brown v. Estess, 374 So.2d 241 (Miss.1979)); McCluskey v. Thompson, 363 So.2d 256 (Miss.1978). Of particular relevance to this case is the Mississippi business enterprise concept as applied to remedies available when an injured worker is covered by the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 71-3-1 et seq. (1972): common law actions by an injured worker covered by the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act can be maintained only against 'strangers to the business enterprise' being served at the time of the accident. Ramsey, 511 F.Supp. at 401. If the allegedly negligent party's employees are loaned servants or borrowed employees of the injured worker's employer, then the injured employee's exclusive remedy is the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation Act. See id. at 402. The district court relied heavily on the foregoing aspects of Mississippi law in formulating the question upon which it based its decision: whether Kay Lease's employees were, at the time the damage to the ears was allegedly caused by them, employees of Rebel, for if they were the relationship of master and servant existed between them and under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act Taylor's exclusive remedy was under the provisions of that Act. Taylor v. Kay Lease Service, Inc., No. W83-0129(B) (S.D.Miss. filed June 14, 1984). 12 In determining whether or not Kay Lease's employees were loaned servants, the district court relied primarily on the factor of control over the employee's work. See, e.g., Hebron v. Union Oil of California, 634 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir.1981) (the central question in borrowed servant cases is whether someone has the power to control and direct another person in the performance of his work); Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310, 312 (5th Cir.1969) (the factor of control is perhaps the most universally accepted standard for establishing an employer-employee relationship ...) 4 Control has been further defined as involving a careful distinction ... 'between authoritative direction and control, and mere suggestion as to details or the necessary cooperation, where the work furnished is part of a larger undertaking.'  Id. at 313 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 222, 29 S.Ct. 252, 254, 53 L.Ed. 480 (1909)). 13 The undisputed facts 5 in the record establish that Kay Lease employees received direction from Rebel's supervisor (tool pusher or driller) in both loading and unloading the rig. The V-door's ear was damaged during the loading the day before the accident according to the undisputed testimony of Bubba Bolyer. Thus, although supervision and control by Rebel may have been limited to loading and unloading and not have extended to the transporting of the disassembled rig, any negligence attributable to Kay Lease employees occurred while they were under the supervision and control of Rebel. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on the basis of Kay Lease's employees being loaned servants of Rebel.