Opinion ID: 1180863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Failure to object to closing arguments and asserted misconduct

Text: (63) Defendant faults counsel for failing to object to inflammatory and highly prejudicial remarks made by the prosecutor during guilt and penalty phase closing arguments. We have previously addressed each of these claims ( ante, pp. 1088-1094). The statements complained of did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, and defendant has not established that trial counsel's failure to object prejudiced his case. Defendant also asserts counsel were ineffective because they failed to move for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's improprieties. This is the identical claim that we have rejected under claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object. Our review of the record reveals that any motion for mistrial on the grounds alleged would have been denied. Defendant has therefore not established that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to make the suggested motions for mistrial. [17] G. Asserted Trial Court Errors Defendant next submits a list of numerous asserted trial court errors. Many of these claims simply repeat assertions resolved above, under other headings. The remaining points are discussed below. 1. Separate juries (64) Defendant alleges the court should have granted his motion for separate guilt and penalty phase juries. We rejected an identical claim in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 68 [168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301], and Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 79. 2. Restrictions on voir dire (65a) Defendant asserts his voir dire of prospective jurors was improperly restricted, but he provides no explanation or evidence in support of the allegation. He does cite People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392 [174 Cal. Rptr. 317, 628 P.2d 869], in which we held that counsel may ask during voir dire questions that are reasonably designed to assist in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges whether or not such questions are also likely to uncover grounds sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause. (29 Cal.3d at p. 407.) Williams overruled our holding in People v. Edwards (1912) 163 Cal. 752, 753-756 [127 P. 58], that voir dire could not be used with an eye toward peremptory challenge. Williams, however, was not filed until after the voir dire in defendant's case was completed, and we specifically noted that our holding in Williams was to be given prospective effect only. (29 Cal.3d at p. 412, fn. 15.) Our independent review of the record reveals that the court refused to allow either side to ask any question that would require a prospective juror to prejudge the case. Nor did the court allow either party to discuss the law  such as the meaning of diminished capacity  or ask questions that required the prospective jurors to pretry the facts of the case. The trial court informed counsel that the most important question is whether [the juror] will follow the law as the court reads it.... Early in the voir dire examination, trial counsel informed the court, we are objecting to the limitation on our use of the facts of this case to determine death penalty attitudes. We have observed that there are people that would not automatically impose the death penalty for a murder with the special circumstances, but then when those same people find out that it is not one murder, but four murders, that it is not only four murders, but murders accompanied by sexual misuse, not only that, but even a child involved, that that will substantially increase the number of individuals [who would automatically vote for the death penalty]. The court explained, what I am concerned about is a seesaw battle between defendant and prosecution over what the facts of the case will be. Of course, that provokes endless controversies and endless confusion and is undesirable and I want to avoid that. The prosecutor and defense thereafter agreed on a question that read, If the facts in this case disclose that [defendant] is guilty of four separate murders and multiple rapes, including the murder of an eleven-year-old girl who was sexually abused and was killed by being thrown off a high bridge, would those facts trigger emotional responses in you that would make it hard to consider life imprisonment without possibility of parole, or would you under those circumstances vote for the death penalty? This question fully comports with the law existing at the time the voir dire examination was held. (66) We also note that even under Williams voir dire may not be used to `to educate the jury panel to the particular facts of the case, [or] to compel the jurors to commit themselves to vote a particular way, to prejudice the jury for or against a particular party, to argue the case, to indoctrinate the jury, or to instruct the jury in matters of law.' (29 Cal.3d at p. 408, quoting Rousseau v. West Coast House Movers (1967) 256 Cal. App.2d 878, 882 [64 Cal. Rptr. 655].) (65b) Accordingly, we find nothing in the record to support the claim that defense counsel's questioning during voir dire was improperly limited. 3. Presence at informal proceedings (67) Defendant claims he was denied his right to be present during some of the informal pretrial and trial proceedings. The pretrial proceedings concerned various administrative procedures necessary to transfer the case to another county. Defendant orally waived his presence at those proceedings. Later, defendant signed a waiver of his presence pursuant to section 977, subdivision (b). The trial proceedings concerned alleged violations by the press of defendant's privacy. Apparently, the press discovered and reported that defendant wished to be married. Defendant sought a hearing with the court to discuss the alleged improper invasion. The court declined to hold a hearing off the cuff. Instead, it asked for informal briefing on the matter, and said it would consider holding a hearing with defendant present, after it received such briefing. The record does not disclose whether defendant's counsel submitted briefs on the matter, and apparently no hearing was held. We conclude defendant's absence from the various proceedings was proper. None of the proceedings had a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of [defendant's] opportunity to defend against the charge.' ( People v. Jackson, supra, 28 Cal.3d 264, 309.) 4. Hearsay objection (68) Defendant claims the court should have sustained his hearsay objection to certain testimony by Deputy Scott, who testified to victim Kelly M.'s statement  shortly after the assault  that defendant told her (in graphic terms) that he was going to force her to participate in anal intercourse. The court overruled the objection, finding Kelly M.'s statement admissible under the fresh complaint exception to the hearsay rule. We agree that the statement was admissible, and in any event we cannot imagine that this testimony amounted to prejudicial error in light of the other evidence. 5. Relevance of evidence (69) Defendant challenges the court's ruling that certain evidence was admissible. At trial, a sales clerk testified that he sold Annette Selix two cans of Squirt soft drink the night she disappeared. (The sales clerk also testified that Selix had purchased two tubs of Blue Bonnet margarine; two such tubs were discovered in defendant's refrigerator.) A police officer testified that he found six cans of Squirt in defendant's burn barrel and that two of the cans appeared to have been burned while they were full. Trial counsel objected to the admissibility of this evidence on relevancy grounds, arguing that there was no evidence that the Selix girl had purchased six cans of Squirt. The court observed that the sales clerk might have been mistaken (i.e., that Selix did purchase a six-pack) or that defendant threw four more cans of Squirt in the barrel along with the two that Selix had purchased. Accordingly, the court overruled the objection stating, I think they are material and should be received for whatever value they may have and that will enable counsel to argue the inferences [to be drawn therefrom]. We agree with the trial court's conclusion; defendant's objection went to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility. But even if we were to assume error, any error was clearly harmless. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) Defendant had confessed to picking up Selix, driving her to his house, and later throwing her off a bridge. The medical evidence showed that Selix had been raped, sodomized and forced to perform oral copulation. Further, defendant's claim was that he was insane when he killed Selix, not that he was innocent. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable result would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error. 6. Admissibility of photographs (70) Defendant asserts certain photographs were erroneously admitted in evidence over objection. Trial counsel argued that the prejudicial effect of the photographs outweighed their probative value. The court ruled the prosecution ha[s] a right to prove [its] case and concluded that the photographs ha[d] more probative value than prejudice. Defendant renews his claim here. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the photos. The photographs were ruled admissible because the trial court found them probative on the issue of malice. We have said that photographs disclosing and corroborating the manner in which the crime was committed, [are] clearly relevant to the issue of malice. ( People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 576 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908].) We will not disturb the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of photographs unless the prejudicial effect clearly outweighs the photos' probative value. ( Ibid. ) Defendant does not dispute the relevance of the photographs and therefore provides no evidence that the prejudicial effect clearly outweighed their probative value. (71) Defendant insists, however, that the offer to stipulate precluded introduction of the photographs. He relies on language in Ramos, that `if a defendant offers to admit the existence of an element of a charged offense, the prosecutor must accept that offer and refrain from introducing evidence ... to prove that element to the jury.' (30 Cal.3d at p. 577, quoting People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 152 [167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826].) Trial counsel, however, offered to stipulate only that the wounds Selix sustained proved that she was alive when thrown off the bridge. Counsel did not offer to stipulate to the issue of malice. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs. 7. Testimony about a victim's purse (72) Defendant also challenges the court's ruling on his objection to testimony concerning a purse. As noted above, Patricia Moore's purse was ordered suppressed pretrial. At trial, the prosecutor introduced testimony that Patricia was last seen with a specified purse and that the purse was not found in certain locations. The prosecutor explained to the court that it wished the jury to know that Patricia Moore was last seen with a purse and that it was not found in her motel room following her disappearance. He argued that although this was insufficient evidence to support a felony-murder-robbery instruction it did explain why the investigation of her murder was hampered. The court allowed the testimony, but the jury never learned that the purse had been found. Arguably, the evidence was relevant and admissible. In any event, we do not see how defendant was prejudiced by testimony concerning the fact that Patricia Moore owned a purse that was not found in her motel room. 8. Objection to prosecutor's questions to rebuttal witness (73) Defendant challenges the court's ruling on his objection to testimony by Dr. Kaldor. The prosecutor sought to ask Dr. Kaldor questions on rebuttal pertaining to malice aforethought, deliberation, premeditation, unconscious acts, rape, lewd and lascivious conduct. Defense counsel objected on the ground that the ultimate question (i.e., whether Dr. Kaldor believed defendant suffered from insanity or diminished capacity at the time he committed the crimes) had already been asked and answered. The prosecutor pointed out that the underlying questions he sought to ask had not been previously posed. The court overruled the objection. Our review of the record reveals that the questions had not previously been asked and answered; accordingly we believe the ruling was correct. 9. Testimony about an expert witness's report (74) Defendant claims the court erred in allowing Dr. French to testify regarding Dr. Axelrad's report; this issue has been discussed in the context of a prosecutorial misconduct claim (see ante, p. 1088). We add here only that the evidence was clearly admissible under Evidence Code section 356 and that we do not believe the court's ruling was incorrect.