Opinion ID: 2294067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Contractual Ambiguity

Text: The essence of this controversy arises from a disagreement between the parties about the standard of review to be applied to Haviland's reappointment. [W]hether a contract is clear and unambiguous is a question of law. Beacon Mutual Insurance Co. v. Spino Brothers, Inc., 11 A.3d 645, 648 (R.I.2011) (citing Irene Realty Corp. v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America, 973 A.2d 1118, 1122 (R.I.2009)). This Court reviews a trial justice's conclusions on questions of law de novo. Id. at 649 (citing International Brotherhood of Police Officers v. City of East Providence, 989 A.2d 106, 108 (R.I. 2010)). In determining whether or not a particular contract is ambiguous, the court should read the contract `in its entirety, giving words their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning.' Young v. Warwick Rollermagic Skating Center, Inc., 973 A.2d 553, 558 (R.I.2009) (quoting Mallane v. Holyoke Mutual Insurance Co. in Salem, 658 A.2d 18, 20 (R.I.1995)). Contract ambiguity arises only when [a contract] is reasonably and clearly susceptible of more than one interpretation. Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.1996) (citing W.P. Associates v. Forcier, Inc., 637 A.2d 353, 356 (R.I.1994)); see also Andrukiewicz v. Andrukiewicz, 860 A.2d 235, 238 (R.I.2004) (noting that a contract is ambiguous if it is `reasonably susceptible of different constructions'). Where an ambiguity exists in a provision of a contractual document, the construction of that provision is a question of fact. Fryzel v. Domestic Credit Corp., 120 R.I. 92, 98, 385 A.2d 663, 666 (1978) (citing Geary v. Hoffman, 98 R.I. 413, 417, 204 A.2d 302, 305 (1964); Russolino v. A. F. Rotelli & Sons, 85 R.I. 160, 163, 128 A.2d 337, 340 (1957)). We are of the opinion that, although an express agreement was entered into, based on our review of the contract in its entirety, an ambiguity exists concerning the terms of the agreement relative to the standard under which Haviland's reappointment is to be evaluated. Brown contends that the operative document is the November 8, 2000 formal offer letter and that the standard for evaluating Haviland's job performance is sustained excellence in teaching. The November 8, 2000 letter, however, is silent with respect to the standard of review for Haviland's reappointment, and Haviland signed the formal offer letter only after receiving assurances in the letter of November 17, 2000 that the October 18 letter  setting forth the terms for renewal  was relevant, that it was not null and void, and that the two letters work together. Notably, although the November 17, 2000 letter provides that neither position for which Haviland was approved carries with it tenure, the record is clear that Haviland was neither seeking nor expecting a tenured position; she merely sought an assurance about job security as one of the three criteria she and Armstrong deemed necessary to accept employment with Brown. [9] Moreover, the November 17 letter also provided that, with respect to her appointment as a visiting professor, exceptions in extraordinary circumstances can be made in accordance with faculty appointment policies and that Haviland's situation probably would be consider[ed] as one of those exceptions. The October 18, 2000 letter included express promises that Haviland's appointment as Visiting Associate Professor and Senior Lecturer at Brown would be governed by all the rules and regulations pertaining to term faculty appointments    and listed in The Faculty Rules and Regulations   . However, the letter also assured her that her appointment would be renewed unless Brown presented her with adequate cause for non-renewal, which was defined in the letter as being substantially equivalent to adequate cause for dismissal of a tenured faculty member from the University    [and was described as] demonstrated incompetence, dishonesty in teaching or research, substantial and manifest neglect of duty, or personal conduct which substantially impairs fulfillment of institutional responsibility. As the trial justice noted, the standard of review set forth within the October 18 letter was atypical for non-tenured faculty, but was nonetheless clear and unambiguous. The trial justice declared that [a]mbiguities arose only when subsequent letters made reference to different lengths of time as to her appointments and listed the usual University rules and regulations as to the standards by which she would be judged for renewal and reappointment. This Court has stated that when an ambiguity exists such that a contract term is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation, such [a]mbiguities in a contract must be construed against the drafter of the document. Fryzel, 120 R.I. at 98, 385 A.2d at 666-67. We are of the opinion that with respect to the standard of review to be applied to Haviland's reappointment at Brown  based on the various communications between the parties, particularly the letter of November 17, 2000  an ambiguity arose such that this contract term may be subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. In light of this ambiguity, the language in the contract must be construed against Brown, and Haviland's contentions must prevail. Her reappointment is governed by the express terms set forth in the letter of October 18, 2000  demonstrated incompetence, dishonesty in teaching or research, substantial and manifest neglect of duty, or personal conduct which substantially impairs fulfillment of institutional responsibility. Because we are satisfied that an express, enforceable contract arose between the parties, we need not reach plaintiff's contention that she is entitled to relief based on a theory of promissory estoppel.