Opinion ID: 185156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Judicial Review of Tribal Permitting Programs

Text: 81 Under Title V of the Act, states must develop a comprehensive permitting program applicable to major air pollution sources. See 42 U.S.C. S 7661a. Section 7661a enunciates the requirements for administering permitting programs, including elements of judicial review. Pursuant to § 7661a, 82 [t]hese elements shall include ... 83 (6) Adequate, streamlined, and reasonable procedures for ... expeditious review of permit actions, ... including an opportunity for judicial review in State court of the final permit action.... 84 (7) To ensure against unreasonable delay by the permit-ting authority, adequate authority and procedures to provide that a failure of such permitting authority to acton a permit application or permit renewal application ...shall be treated as a final permit action solely for purposes of obtaining judicial review in State court of an action brought by any person referred to in paragraph(6) to require that action be taken by thepermitting authority on such application without additional delay. Id. § 7661a(b)(6), (7). 85 EPA initially proposed that tribes will have to meet the same requirements as states in providing an opportunity for judicial review of a final permit action. Proposed Tribal Authority Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,972. EPA withdrew this proposal in its final rule. Instead, EPA required tribes to meet all the requirements of S 7661a(b)(6) and (7) except that review of a tribe's Title V permitting program need not be judicial or in State court. See Tribal Authority Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7261. Petitioners present two challenges to the final rule on judicial review: (1) that EPA had no authority to exempt tribes from the Act's judicial review requirements; and (2) that interested parties received insufficient notice of the final rule's content. 86 EPA promulgated its final rule in response to comments that expressed concern over waivers of tribal sovereign immunity to judicial review. Id. Some Native American representatives observed that requiring a waiver of sovereign immunity for a tribe to administer a Title V permit program would operate as a disincentive to a tribe's establishing such programs. Industry commenters also sought assurances that nonmembers of tribes would have access to tribal courts for judicial review. 87 EPA identified two alternatives for ensuring that some form of citizen recourse be available for applicants and other persons affected by permits issued under tribal Title V programs. Id. One option was for tribes to voluntarily waive their sovereign immunity in tribal courts. A second possibility was for the Agency to consider alternative options ...that would not require tribes to waive their sovereign immunity to judicial review but, at the same time, would provide for an avenue for appeal of tribal government action or inaction to an independent review body and for injunctive type relief to which the Tribe would agree to be bound. Id. at 7262. EPA interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) to provide[ ] EPA with the discretion to balance the goals of ensuring meaningful opportunities for public participation under the CAA and avoiding undue interference with tribal sovereignty when determining those provisions for which it is appropriate to treat tribes in the same manner as states. Id. 88 Section 7601(d) authorizes EPA to treat Native American nations as states for the purposes of the Act. However, if EPA determines that the treatment of Indian tribes as identical to states is inappropriate or administratively infeasible, the Administrator may provide, by regulation, other means by which the Administrator will directly administer such provisions so as to achieve the appropriate purpose. 42 U.S.C. S 7601(d)(4). EPA relies on this statutory provision to justify the approach taken on judicial review. 89 Petitioners argue that EPA lacks authority to exempt tribes from the judicial review requirements, because S 7601(d) does not affect the operation of CAA provisions that define rights that must be afforded to those affected by a program in order [for either a tribe or a state] to receive EPA approval to administer a federally enforceable program. Br. for Petitioners NAM at 42. We see no merit in this claim. EPA's interpretation is not clearly contradicted by the statute. In fact, S 7601(d)(4) allows the Agency the discretion to determine whether it is inappropriate or administratively infeasible to treat Indian tribes exactly the same as states in administering the Act. Petitioners offer no support for their assertions that the judicial review requirements do not come within the EPA's discretion under this section. It is obvious, then, that the Agency had a choice as to whether to treat Indian tribes identical to states with regard to the judicial review elements of S 7661a(b). The clear meaning of the statutedoes not foreclose the Agency's interpretation. 90 Nor is the Agency's interpretation unreasonable. EPA understandably was concerned that the effect of requiring tribes to submit their permitting disputes to state courts would conflict with policies supporting tribal sovereignty and also discourage the institution of tribal permitting programs. The Agency's decision to allow tribes to submit alternatives to waiving sovereign immunity accomplishes a reasonable balancing of these interests. This is bolstered by EPA's expressed intention to ensure that any alternative to a waiver of sovereign immunity nonetheless provides an impartial forum allowing for injunctive-type relief. Tribal Authority Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7262. 91 Petitioners also argue that, assuming that EPA could exempt tribes from judicial review requirements, S 7601(d)(4) requires that EPA provide an alternative means of ensuring effective judicial review. Petitioners suggest that EPA must at least provide for review by the Regional Administrator of all tribal permit decisions, and resolve all federal or tribal challenges to the tribe's actions. Br. for Petitioners NAM at 44. To the extent that this argument merely reiterates the contention that EPA has no authority to alter tribes' judicial review responsibilities, nothing more need be said. To the extent that this argument challenges the alternative tribal review procedures to be approved by EPA in lieu of judicial review in state court, this issue is not ripe for review. EPA has not yet approved any alternative tribal judicial review procedures. See Tribal Authority Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 7262 (EPA will develop guidance in the future on acceptable alternatives to judicial review.). As such, there is no decision fit for judicial review, nor have petitioners demonstrated any hardship from deferred review. 92 Petitioners advance a separate contention in support of vacating the rule: that interested parties did not receive sufficient notice of the substance of the final rule. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency publish notice of its proposed rulemaking that includes either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved. 5 U.S.C. S 553(b)(3) (1994). An agency satisfies this notice requirement if the final rule is a logical outgrowth of the proposed rule. See Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 928 F.2d 428, 445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In other words, we consider  'whether ... [the party], ex ante, should have anticipated that such a requirement might be imposed'  in determining whether adequate notice was given in a notice of proposed rulemaking. Id. at 446 (quoting Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983)) (alterations in original). 93 In most cases, if the agency ... alters its course in response to the comments it receives, little purpose would be served by a second round of comment. American Water Works Ass'n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1994).Thus, the logical outgrowth test normally is applied to consider whether a new round of notice and comment would provide the first opportunity for interested parties to offer comments that could persuade the agency to modify its rule.Id. (emphasis added). In this case, there was more than enough notice for interested parties to offer comments on EPA's treatment of the judicial review provisions of the Act vis a vis Indian tribes. The parties were not asked to divine the EPA's unspoken thoughts. Shell Oil Co., 950 F.2d at 751. And the final rule was not wholly unrelated or surprisingly distant from what EPA initially suggested. In first proposing that tribes would have to meet the same requirements as states, EPA effectively raised the question as to whether this made sense. EPA's proposal was not a bureaucratic game of hide and seek, MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1995); the proposal raised a highlyvisible and controversial issue and elicited responses from both tribal and industry commenters. Furthermore, any reasonable party should have understood that EPA might reach the opposite conclusion after considering public comments. In short, it is fair to say that the purpose of notice and comment rulemaking has been served, and that the Agency's change of heart on this issue only demonstrates the value of the comments it received.