Opinion ID: 1582584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jurisprudence from other jurisdictions addressing effect of a third party's initiation, on behalf of an accused, of further communication with the police after the accused has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation

Text: Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether a third party, on behalf of the accused, may initiate communication with the police after the accused has requested counsel, other courts have. See, e.g., Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411 (6th Cir.2007)(holding that a suspect who has invoked his right to counsel can indirectly initiate discussions with the police through a third party so long as the impetus for the reinitiation comes from the suspect); Owens v. Bowersox, 290 F.3d 960 (8th Cir.2002)(holding that, although defendant had requested counsel, defendant initiated contact with the police because the impetus for interrogation came from defendant through his mother even though defendant did not contact the police himself and did not ask his mother to have police come to the jail); United States v. Michaud, 268 F.3d 728 (9th Cir.2001)(holding that police had the right to ask if the accused was reinitiating communication after requesting counsel where the accused's cell-mate told a deputy the accused wanted to talk); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.2001)(incriminating statements made by defendant after he was persuaded to talk to police by an acquaintance who had visited defendant in jail after defendant had requested counsel were the not functional equivalent of a police interrogation); Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413 (8th Cir.2000)(holding that defendant initiated contact with the police by asking his stepfather to have a deputy come to the prison to take his confession); United States v. Gonzalez, 183 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Farese, 248 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir.2001)(holding that defendant initiated contact with the police through his wife following his invocation of his right to counsel); United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir.1993)(holding that statements were inadmissible when FBI agent reinterrogated defendant after he requested counsel based on codefendant's vague statement that the other defendants wanted to talk with the police); United States v. Gaddy, 894 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir.1990)(holding that the accused initiated contact with the police through an aunt); and Harvell v. State, 275 Ga. 129, 562 S.E.2d 180 (2002)(holding that police did not improperly reinitiate questioning of defendant where defendant's mother told the police that her son was willing to make a statement and defendant verified that he was). One case in particular warrants a detailed discussion. In Van Hook v. Anderson, supra , Van Hook went to a bar in Ohio patronized by homosexual men. He met the victim, David Self, at the bar, and the two went to Self's apartment. Self made sexual advances to Van Hook, and Van Hook strangled Self to unconsciousness. Van Hook then stabbed Self and killed him. Van Hook also stole items from Self's apartment. Van Hook made his way to Florida, where he was arrested two months later by local police. The police read him his Miranda rights. Although he initially agreed to talk with police, Van Hook later told police, [M]aybe I should have an attorney present. 488 F.3d at 414. The officers understood this to be a request for counsel and ceased questioning him about Self's murder. Later that day, an Ohio police officer came to Florida to facilitate Van Hook's extradition and transportation back to Ohio. Van Hook had not yet been provided with counsel. After talking with Van Hook's mother, the Ohio officer believed that Van Hook might want to talk to police about the murder. At this point, counsel had not yet been appointed for Van Hook. Upon first engaging Van Hook, the officer discussed extradition with Van Hook and confirmed that Van Hook wanted to waive extradition. The officer told Van Hook that he had talked to Van Hook's mother and that she had said that Van Hook wanted to speak with the police. Van Hook stated that he had talked to his mother and that she wanted him to tell the truth and that he wanted to make a statement. Van Hook was again read his Miranda rights, and he waived them, giving a full and graphic confession. Van Hook was charged with murder and aggravated robbery. The Ohio trial court admitted his confession, and Van Hook was convicted. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review. Van Hook filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court and was unsuccessful. A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that the Fifth Amendment does not allow a suspect to initiate communications with the police through a third party. On rehearing en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the panel's holding and in an 8-7 decision affirmed the district court's decision. The eight-member majority opinion in Van Hook ultimately held that a suspect may initiate further discussions with the police through a third party without violating Edwards. Given the realities of the custodial relationship, it is inevitable that the police will sometimes receive information from a suspect or a third party which might evince a willingness and a desire to talk by the suspect.... In this type of situation, the police may `inquire whether [the suspect] was re-initiating communication.' [ United States v.] Michaud , 268 F.3d [728] 735-36 [(9th Cir.2001)]. 488 F.3d at 428. Van Hook had argued that under Edwards the accused himself must initiate discussions with the police. Van Hook, 488 F.3d at 417. The majority rejected Van Hook's argument, stating that [t]here is no sound justification for reading the statement from Edwards that the suspect `himself must initiate a discussion to imply the suspect, and only the suspect, can inform the police he wants to talk. Id. The majority reasoned that the issue of third-party communications was simply not before the United States Supreme Court in Edwards. The majority in Van Hook, in determining how the Edwards rule applied to third-party communications with the police regarding an accused's desire to initiate contact, addressed the standard for determining when an accused initiates discussion with the police. Quoting United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir.1994), the court stated: `[A]n Edwards initiation occurs when, without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to talk generally about his case.' The Van Hook court determined that there is nothing inherent in `show[ing] a willingness and a desire' that restricts it to direct communications only. 488 F.3d at 418. Whether the communication is direct or indirect is immaterialwhat is important is the impetus for discussion come from the suspect himself. Id. The majority in Van Hook acknowledged the protections afforded by Miranda and Edwards and that the purpose behind those cases was to prevent `government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment.' 488 F.3d at 420 (quoting Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 529-30, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987)). The Van Hook court stated: The Constitution clearly forbids officials from using their `power of the sword' to coerce a suspect into making self-incriminating statements; it provides no similar protection against third-party cajoling, pleading, or threatening. 488 F.3d at 421. With third-party communications, the police are still prohibited from reinitiating questioning, and the impetus for reinitiation must still come from the suspect. The virtue of specifically identifying rights and duties is preserved: `police and prosecutors' still know `what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation' under Edwards interrogate a suspect unless and until the suspect asks for a lawyer, and then not interrogate the suspect unless the suspect initiates a discussion (and waives the right to counsel); and `courts' still know `under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible'when the discussions are initiated by police. These players must simply bear in mind what is grasped by common sense and what has been the consistent rule of the post- Edwards case lawinitiation can be communicated directly by the suspect or indirectly by the suspect through a third party. 488 F.3d at 422. Recognizing that whether a suspect has reinitiated a discussion with police can be a difficult question, the Van Hook court explained its evaluation of a third party's reinitiation of discussion on the suspect's behalf: While a suspect's initiation might lead to a valid waiver of the right to counsel, it is not itself sufficient. Before the police can actually begin to interrogate a suspect after he has initiated, they must ensure that the suspect is knowingly and intelligently waiving the right to counsel under the totality of the circumstances.... It is `wrong' to `think [] that an initiation of a conversation or discussion by an accused not only satisfied the Edwards rule, but ex proprio vigore sufficed to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel. The inquiries are separate, and clarity of application is not gained by melding them together.' [ Oregon v. ] Bradshaw , 462 U.S. [1039] 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830 [(1983)] (plurality). Simply put, nothing in our decision today permits the police to begin interrogating a criminal suspect simply by learning from a third party that the suspect is willing to waive the previously invoked right to counsel. Nor do we hold that a third party has the authority to somehow `bring[ ] about the waiver of that right,' ... or otherwise `rescind[ ] th[e] request' for counsel.... When the police receive information that a suspect wants to talk; when there is a sufficient basis for believing its validity; and when the police confirm with the suspect the validity of that information, we conclude that the suspect has adequately evinced a willingness and a desire to talk with them. Whether the suspect knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel is a separate question .... 488 F.3d at 424-25. The Van Hook court held that the facts supported a conclusion that Van Hook did initiate a discussion with the police and that the trial court was correct in denying habeas relief on the claim that Van Hook's statement should have been suppressed. The Constitution protects a suspect from official coercion it does not protect a suspect from himself or his mother. 488 F.3d at 428. In his dissent in Van Hook, Judge Cole wrote that the majority had departed from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on custodial interrogation. [T]he coercive setting of custodial interrogation is ready-made for the infringement, whether intentional or inadvertent, of constitutional protections, such that suspects must be plainly advised of their rights so they may act on them. 488 F.3d at 430. In particular, he noted that throughout the Supreme Court's jurisprudence the Court has insisted that the relationship between a criminal suspect and his official interrogator be governed by `bright-line' rules that precisely spell out the rights and duties of both parties. 488 F.3d at 430. To hold as the majority does today, that a suspect may re-initiate interrogation through a third party, contravenes the reasoning of the Supreme Court's custodial-interrogation jurisprudence by inviting the very uncertainty and complexity into the circumstances surrounding a suspect's waiver of his rights that the Court has sought to banish. This uncertainty and complexity ensnares both the suspect and the law-enforcement officers in charge of his case. 488 F.3d at 432. Judge Cole questioned why a suspect would communicate indirectly with the police through a third party when the suspect could do so directly. He also set out several examples of the problems with third-party communications, including the possibility that the third party misinterpreted the suspect's words or that a third party may be colored by his or her own view of what is in the suspect's best interest. Judge Cole also noted an asymmetry in the majority opinion: a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel through a third party, although the third party may nonetheless play a role in bringing about the waiver of that right. 488 F.3d at 435. Judge Cole also disagreed with the majority's holding that the facts supported the proposition that Van Hook initiated communication with the police through his mother. Although Judge Cole's dissent raises valid points, we agree with the majority opinion in Van Hook that under Edwards an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party. We recognize that Edwards and the Supreme Court decisions both pre- and post- Edwards established a bright-line rule preventing police from reinitiating contact with an accused; however, those cases also recognized that an accused can later decide to reinitiate communication. Edwards was not concerned with the channels or means of communication, but with whether the accused himself reinitiated interrogation. With third-party communications, the police are still prohibited from reinitiating questioning, and the impetus for reinitiation must still come from the accused.