Opinion ID: 2384508
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Case Against White.

Text: What we have said above comes close to disposing of White's contentions; however there are several aspects of the case, from his point of view, that should be considered. He claims that the stop sign on the south side of E. Church Street is to control traffic which enters E. Main Street at the intersection of the two streets at the point of the painted triangle some 100 to 110 feet east of the stop sign, where a painted yellow line (visible in spots) is the signal (he says) at which he was required to stop. We were referred to no statute, and we have found none, defining the significance of the faint yellow line; nor was the manual of Traffic Control Devices authorized by Code (1957), Article 66 1/2, Section 189 offered in evidence or was the court requested to take judicial notice thereof. Belle Isle Cab v. Trammell, 227 Md. 438. We have examined the Manual of Traffic Control Devices (1955) issued by the State Roads Commission, and we have found nothing to sustain White's version of the meaning of the traffic control devices involved in the case at bar. Compare pp. 26, 41, 124 and 155. We have the positive injunction of Sections 233 (b) and 242 with reference to stop signs and drivers at stop intersections. Section 242 (b), in part, provides: Every stop sign shall be located as near as practical at the property line of the highway [which means as near as practical to the edge of the highway] at the entrance to which the full stop must be made, or at the nearest line of the crosswalk thereat, or, if none, at the nearest line of the [intersecting] roadway. (Italics added.) And Section 242 (c) requires every driver approaching a stop sign to come to a full stop at the sign or at a clearly marked stop line before entering [the] intersection and to yield the right of way to vehicles approaching on the intersecting highway, except when controlled by peace officers or traffic-control signals. In Belle Isle Cab v. Trammell, supra , we stated that the specifications of the Manual of Traffic Control Devices required a stop sign to be erected not closer than six nor more than fifty feet from where the driver had to stop, and held that a stop sign erected some 102 feet from an intersection was too far away to control the intersection. Without repeating the physical layout of the scene of the accident, as it is disclosed by the exhibit, we are impelled to conclude that White was mistaken in his belief that the stop sign controlled the intersection of E. Church and E. Main Streets, but did not control the intersection of the passageway with E. Church Street. And, as stated above, it was his failure to stop and yield the right of way to Savage that was the proximate cause of the collision. White also makes a contention that there was testimony to the effect that an arrow was painted on the passageway at its entrance from E. Church Street indicating that the passageway was for use by traffic turning to the right off E. Church Street only. There are several answers to the contention, but the quick and short one is that Chief Chatham, who testified concerning the arrow (more than two years after the accident), said that he did not know whether it was there at the time of the accident or not, but the passageway was regularly used by traffic in both directions. White makes a further claim that the court erred in excluding an admission by appellee's decedent. The admission was made to the appellee in which the decedent evidenced the opinion that the accident was not the fault of White. We shall assume, without deciding, that the objection to the admission should have been overruled. McCormick, Evidence § 241. However, this did not constitute reversible error, for the above admission of the decedent, if admitted into evidence, would not have been sufficient to require the question of White's primary negligence to have been submitted to the jury in view of White's own testimony to the effect that he did not stop at the stop sign and he failed to yield the right of way. Finally, White complains about several portions of the court's charge to the jury; none of them, however, related to the question of damages. The question of his primary negligence was submitted to the jury and it found him guilty of negligence. Surely he has no cause for complaining of the court's charge (other than on the question of damages), for, as shown above, he was clearly guilty of negligence as a matter of law by his own testimony (as well as all of the other evidence). Judgment against Savage reversed without a new trial; judgment against White affirmed; costs to be paid 1/2 by White and 1/2 by appellee.