Opinion ID: 1318712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Maliciously:

Text: Malice has been held by this court and by many other courts to be a general-intent element. In Dean v. State, supra, appellant argued that willfully and maliciously are specific intents. This court held that:    Obviously, such is not so. These words describe the act to be committed and not an intention to produce a desired specific result. Any intent to be derived from them is a general intent. 668 P.2d at 642. In discussing the word maliciously, Justice Thomas said in his concurring opinion in Fuller v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 900 (1977), a case of aggravated assault with intent to commit second-degree murder:    We have noted that the term `maliciously' embraces, amongst other things, the element of unlawful intent. Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412 (1976); Elliott v. State, 47 Wyo. 36, 30 P.2d 791 (1934). I conclude that when the legislature incorporated the term `maliciously' in the statute the word connoted nothing more than unlawful intent or general intent. If the legislature intended to encompass a specific intent within the statute, it would have done so specifically. 568 P.2d at 904. We have also held that malice may be inferred from the facts and circumstances. Leitel v. State, Wyo., 579 P.2d 421 (1978); Doe v. State, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1276, 1279 (1977); Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215, 225 (1942). North Carolina's definition of second-degree murder is somewhat similar to ours. Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice but without premeditation and deliberation. State v. Huggins, 71 N.C. App. 63, 321 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1984), review denied 313 N.C. 333, 327 S.E.2d 895 (1985). See also State v. Wrenn, 279 N.C. 676, 185 S.E.2d 129 (1971). In North Carolina, malice is a general-intent element which may be either express or implied: While an intent to kill is not a necessary element of second degree murder, the crime does not exist in the absence of some intentional act sufficient to show malice and which proximately causes death. State v. Wrenn, supra, 275 N.C. 676, 185 S.E.2d 129 (Sharp, J., now C.J., dissenting); State v. Benton, supra, 276 N.C. 641, 174 S.E.2d 793; State v. Phillips, supra, 264 N.C. 508, 142 S.E.2d 337; State v. Williams, supra, 235 N.C. 752, 71 S.E.2d 138. We question the universal applicability of the statements in Williams, quoted in Phillips, that `an intent to inflict a wound which produces a homicide is an essential element of murder in the second degree,' and in Benton that `second-degree murder . .. imports a specific intent to do an unlawful act.' It is more fundamentally sound to say, as did Justice, now Chief Justice Sharp, in her dissent in Wrenn, that any act evidencing `wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty and deliberately bent on mischief, though there may be no intention to injure a particular person' is sufficient to supply the malice necessary for second degree murder. Such an act will always be accompanied by a general intent to do the act itself but it need not be accompanied by a specific intent to accomplish any particular purpose or do any particular thing. State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905, 917, 98 A.L.R.3d 285 (1978). See also State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 308 S.E.2d 317 (1983). In North Carolina, intoxication may negate the specific intents of premeditation and deliberation necessary to prove first-degree murder, but it is not a defense to second-degree murder. State v. King, 49 N.C. App. 499, 272 S.E.2d 26 (1980), review denied 302 N.C. 220, 276 S.E.2d 917 (1981); State v. Couch, 35 N.C. App. 202, 241 S.E.2d 105 (1978). The same is also true in Michigan, where:    Voluntary intoxication does not negate the malice element of second-degree murder because it is a crime of general intent. People v. Vasquez, 129 Mich. App. 691, 341 N.W.2d 873, 875 (1983). See also People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982).