Opinion ID: 2362153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial counsel's trial preparation time of sixteen days

Text: Jackson argues that he was denied adequate representation because his trial counsel did not have sufficient time to prepare for a capital murder trial. This argument does not involve any specific allegations of ineffectiveness, rather Jackson argues that because one of two trial counsel was appointed sixteen days before jury selection began, this amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel, per se, citing United States v. Cronic. [8] Cronic outlines a five-factor test to assess the impact of the tardy appointment of counsel. [9] Jackson argues that the facts surrounding tardy appointment of counsel in his case fulfills the first requirement for meeting ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, [10] namely that trial counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. After Jackson's initial private attorney withdrew on October 5, 1992 and the Office of the Public Defender determined that it had a conflict of interest, the Superior Court appointed Jerome M. Capone and Kevin J. O'Connell as Jackson's trial counsel on November 16, 1992. Capone later withdrew after learning that another one of his court-appointed clients, Johnson, would be a key State's witness in the Jackson case. Remarkably, Capone had been appointed Jackson's counsel before his appointment to represent Johnson. Upon recognizing that he had been appointed to represent both Jackson and Johnson, Capone withdrew from representing Jackson. [11] On February 22, 1993, the Superior Court appointed Laurence I. Levinson as co-counsel, sixteen days before jury selection. Jackson refers to the events leading to trial to support his argument that trial counsel had inadequate time to prepare a defense, thereby establishing that trial counsel's actions could not have met an objective standard of reasonableness. For example, as of January 5, 1993, trial counsel had not received a transcript of the proof positive hearing. Two days later (almost two months after assignment), O'Connell met Jackson for the first time. O'Connell filed his first written request for discovery on February 4, 1993. O'Connell filed a motion to compel on February 16, 1999 specifically asking for any FBI or forensic reports. The Court had set trial for March 10, 1993. There is no presumption that trial counsel was ineffective simply because the court appointed Levinson as co-counsel sixteen days before jury selection. Jackson's trial counsel never requested a continuance, and Jackson did not raise this issue until he filed his motion for postconviction relief. In fact, the Superior Court cites statements made by O'Connell, with Levinson agreeing, that he had ample time to prepare a defense strategy, hire forensic experts, review the evidence, investigate critical factual/legal parts of the case, and to, in general, be prepared for this trial. [12] Moreover, even though Jackson claims that an assessment of the five factors in Cronic [13] results in a conclusion that trial counsel's actions could not have met an objective standard of reasonableness, he fails to show how the appointment of counsel sixteen days before trial meets the second requirement of Strickland, that trial counsel's deficiencies were so prejudicial that they deprived him of a fair trial. Jackson argues that because the Superior Court appointed trial counsel so close to the trial date that trial counsel could not conduct independent forensic testing to determine if the test results were favorable to Jackson. Jackson concedes trial counsel did not request a continuance for that or any other purpose, explaining that his trial counsel, as contract attorneys, [14] were reluctant to seek continuances. This may well explain why trial counsel did not ask for a continuance. It fails, nonetheless, to show how that omission so prejudiced. Jackson that he was denied a fair trial.