Opinion ID: 33235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Carmack Amendment

Text: The district court found, as we have now made clear, that the Carmack Amendment and the bill of lading afford New Process its exclusive remedy. Pursuant to the Carmack Amendment, a rail carrier is: [L]iable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this subsection is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by - (1) the receiving rail carrier; (2) the delivering rail carrier; or (3) another rail carrier over whose line or route the property is transported in the United States . . . when transported under a through bill of lading. argument necessarily concedes the exclusive applicability of the Carmack Amendment to its claims. 7 49 U.S.C. § 11706. In Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., we stated the following: Despite the apparent statutory limitation to recovery of damage caused to the property itself transported, the Supreme Court . . . from its earliest interpretation has consistently construed the [Carmack] Amendment as likewise imposing liability upon the carrier for all reasonably foreseeable consequential damages resulting from a breach of the contract of carriage, including those resulting from nondelivery of the shipped goods as provided by the bill of lading. . . . This broad interpretation of a carrier’s liability under its bills of lading was premised upon what the Court conceived to be a paramount object of the legislation - to provide a uniform rule that the carrier issuing the bill of lading would be responsible to the consignee for all loss, damage, or delay arising out of the contract to transport the goods so shipped. 721 F.2d 483, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). The district court held that New Process’s Carmack Amendment claim failed because New Process did not plead that its consequential damages were specifically foreseeable. See Hector Martinez & Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 602 F.2d 106, 108-09 (5th Cir. 1979). Moreover, the district court determined that New Process failed to identify specific deliveries that arrived unreasonably late. New Process argues to this Court that its amended bill of particulars “specifically outlines the many times New Process notified Union Pacific of the damages that were accruing because of Union Pacific’s delays.”3 Thus, New Process argues that it has adequately shown that its damages were foreseeable. Under our Circuit’s precedent, however, a Carmack Amendment plaintiff is not required to show that its consequential damages were specifically foreseeable. Rather, we have stated that under the Carmack Amendment, the measure of damages is determined by common law principles as 3 Union Pacific asserts that New Process waived any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of its Carmack Amendment claim because it failed to appeal from this aspect of the district court’s ruling. We do not agree and we will review the district court’s dismissal of New Process’s federal statutory claim. 8 adopted by federal law. Hector Martinez, 606 F.2d at 108 & n.1. A plaintiff can recover “all reasonably foreseeable damages.” Air Products, 721 F.2d at 485. Moreover, damages for delay in shipment are available when the harm “was not so remote as to make it unforeseeable to a reasonable [person] at the time of contracting.” Hector Martinez, 606 F.2d at 110. New Process’s amended bill of particulars details the following damages caused by Union Pacific’s late deliveries: (1) increased cost for substitute products; (2) increased transportation costs; (3) outside loading charges; and (4) processing and scrap costs related to delays. We find that at the time the bills of lading were issued, each of the above losses should have been reasonably foreseeable consequences of delivery delays. Therefore, the district court’s conclusion as to the foreseeability of New Process’s damages cannot support summary judgment for Union Pacific on New Process’s Carmack claim. Moreover, the district court’s conclusion that New Process failed to put forth evidence of specific late deliveries is not a ground for granting summary judgment in this case because Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment did not point to the absence of such evidence in the record. Opinions from both the Supreme Court and this Circuit establish that “a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); accord, Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 336 F.3d 363, 374 (5th Cir. 2003)(confirming that “[t]he moving party bears the burden of pointing to an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”) None of Union Pacific’s summary judgment material addresses damages. Further, because New Process did not appear to allege a Carmack claim in the district court, Union Pacific did not seek summary judgment 9 on the issue. Instead, Union Pacific’s briefs in support of its motion for summary judgment focus on refuting New Process’s breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and negligence claims under Texas law, and arguing in the alternative that New Process’s claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment. Thus, Union Pacific could not have met its responsibility to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact with respect to a Carmack Amendment claim by New Process. In addition, New Process’s amended bill of particulars indicates that several items of documentary evidence support its damages claims. First, the bill states that New Process has compiled a spreadsheet detailing eighty-two delayed Union Pacific shipments. Second, it claims to possess a chart detailing its increased transportation costs. In the concluding paragraph of its bill of particulars, New Process states that “[a]t the Court’s request, New Process has not attached the documents supporting the assertions contained in this Bill of Particulars.” (emphasis added). The bill confirms that “New Process is prepared, however, to furnish any additional information the Court deems appropriate.” Given that New Process’s damages were uncontested by Union Pacific in its summary judgment motion, we find that summary judgment cannot be based on its failure to produce documents that the district court instructed it not to attach.