Opinion ID: 2332719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appellant's statements and silence

Text: In my opinion, the majority's conclusion that it need not engage in a lengthy constitutional analysis of whether Appellant was or was not in custody or whether his Miranda rights were, in fact, violated [because] [a]t no point did Appellant state that he did not wish to talk to the officers or that he desired questioning to cease until he could speak with an attorney [35] is inadequate to address Appellant's allegations of error concerning his abbreviated statements to the investigating officers. Although the majority opinion's analysis implicitly assumes that a clear and unequivocal invocation of the right to remain silent is a necessary precondition to each of Appellant's distinct arguments for relief, this analysis completely overlooksor is at least unresponsive to: (1) Appellant's allegation that his admission to stealing jewelry from the victim's home on a prior occasion occurred during a custodial interrogation in which he did not receive Miranda warnings; and (2) a split of authority that currently exists at the United States Circuit Court level as to whether a state violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination whenas was the case here [36] the state, at trial, utilizes a defendant's silence, including refusals to discuss a matter prior to arrest, as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. [37] I nonetheless concur in the majority's conclusion that Appellant's allegations of error in this regard do not justify our reversal of Appellant's conviction. I note that, in the trial court, Appellant objected to none of the evidence that he now targets on appeal, and, because it may reasonably be inferred that appellant intentionally failed to object for reasons of trial strategy, [38] these unpreserved allegations of error are, thus, inappropriate subjects for our review on direct appeal. [39] Fact patterns akin to the one presented herewhere the Commonwealth seeks to present statements obtained from a defendant during what is arguably a custodial interrogation, and there is an issue of whether the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to the questioning would usually alert a criminal defense attorney that a suppression issue might exist. However, based upon indications from the record in this caseincluding: (1) Appellant's defense counsel's opening statement, in which she emphasized that, despite extensive questioning by professionals trained in interrogation, Appellant did not confess to the murder; (2) Appellant's defense counsel's cross-examination of Detective Denham that resulted in the repetition of Appellant's brief protestations of his innocence; and (3) defense's closing argument that emphasized that Appellant told the investigating officers that he didn't kill her, Mrs. Williamson and rationalized Appellant's failure to further confide in the officers as possibly the result of Appellant's distrust or Appellant's belief that the officers would not help himI believe it is a more-than-reasonable assumption that the failure to object constituted reasonable trial strategy. After all, the small amount of inculpatory information that Appellant gave during the interviews was consistent with the overall defense strategy of admitting to the property crime offenses, but focusing the defense upon the relative dearth of evidence as to the death eligible offense. By allowing the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that Appellant had denied any involvement in the murder, the defense was able to have its cake and eat it too by enjoying the benefit of a no adverse inference instruction while simultaneously placing Appellant's words before the jury without subjecting Appellant to cross-examination and impeachment with his prior felony convictions. I also observe that pleadings associated with a motion in limine filed by the Commonwealth that sought to prohibit the defense from introducing evidence that Appellant told family members and friends after he was arrested that he had robbed, but not killed, the victim suggest that the defense team had investigated other bases of making the jury aware of Appellant's out-of-court denials of his involvement in the victim's death, but concluded that the hearsay rule stood in the way. While it is possible that the failure to object was the result of an oversight by counsel rather than trial strategyand, in fact, the ultimate resolution of that issue may require an evidentiary hearing in a future proceedingwe need not resolve that issue conclusively one way or another at this stage. For the purposes of this Court's review of Appellant's unpreserved allegation of error in a capital case, the first prong [40] of our inquiry is whether there is a reasonable justification or explanation for defense counsel's failure to object, e.g., whether the failure might have been a legitimate trial tactic. [41] I believe from the record in this case that Appellant's trial counsel may very well have concluded that evidence of Appellant's terse declaration of his innocence would do more good than harm. For that reason, I would not address the merits of Appellant's allegations of error concerning the interview statements. STUMBO, J., joins. JOHNSTONE, J., joins in part as to Limitations on Voir Dire Examination.