Opinion ID: 165426
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Second or Successive Petition Issues

Text: As set forth above, on July 12, 2002 -- almost three years after he had filed his first habeas petition and well after the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) had expired -- Buchanan moved for leave to file a third amended habeas petition. See Fed. Ct. R., Doc. 43. Buchanan also submitted a proposed third amended petition as an attachment to his motion for leave, and, for the first time, Buchanan asserted his right to be present claim, his conflict of interest claim, and the related ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court -22- denied the motion for leave based on a failure to exhaust state remedies/mixed petition analysis. Id. , Doc. 46 at 2-4. Because Buchanan’s new claims were filed after the one-year limitations period in § 2244(d)(1)(A) had expired, we conclude that the district court should have determined, as a threshold matter, whether the claims related back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) to the filing of Buchanan’s first habeas petition in 1999. As we have previously recognized, the threshold relation back analysis is critical because, if a district court determines that new habeas claims do not relate back and are therefore time-barred, the court must then treat the new claims as a second or successive habeas petition and transfer the petition to this court for consideration under § 2244(b)(3). Cf. United States v. Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d 501, 503-05 (10th Cir. 2000) (involving motion filed by federal prisoner to supplement habeas claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); see also Woodward v. Williams , 263 F.3d 1135, 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that reasoning of Espinoza-Saenz applies to amended habeas petitions filed by state prisoners under § 2254). Subject to certain restrictions, a habeas petitioner may amend a habeas petition under Rule 15. The claims asserted in an amended habeas petition do not automatically relate back to the date when the initial petition was filed, however. Instead, Rule 15(c)(2) provides that “[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back -23- to the date of the original pleading when . . . the claim . . . asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth . . . in the original pleading.” Rule 15(c)(2) has been the subject of much debate in the context of habeas proceedings brought pursuant to § 2254, but this circuit has taken a firm stance and held that an untimely amendment to a [§ 2254 petition] which, by way of additional facts, clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory in the original [petition] may, in the District Court’s discretion, relate back to the date of the original [petition] if and only if the original [petition] was timely filed and the proposed amendment does not seek to add a new claim or to insert a new theory into the case . Woodward , 263 F.3d at 1142 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d at 505). While Buchanan’s right to be present and conflict of interest claims are related factually to his other competency claims, they are based on entirely separate theories of relief, and we therefore conclude that they are “new” claims for purposes of Rule 15(c)(2). Id. As a result, “the relation back provision of Rule 15(c) cannot be applied to save [Buchanan’s right to be present and conflict of interest claims], and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying . . . permission to amend.” Espinoza-Saenz , 235 F.3d at 505. The district court did not follow the right procedure in this case, however, as the court should have treated Buchanan’s right to be present and conflict of interest claims as a second or successive habeas petition and transferred the -24- petition to this court for consideration under § 2244(b)(3). Id. at 503; see also Coleman v. United States , 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that “when a second or successive petition for habeas corpus relief under § 2254 . . . is filed in the district court without the required authorization by this court [under § 2244(b)(3)(A)], the district court should transfer the petition . . . to this court . . . pursuant to [28 U.S.C.] § 1631”). Indeed, as we have recognized in the analogous context of § 2254 cases involving motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), a district court does not have jurisdiction to address the merits of a second or successive petition until this court has granted the required prior authorization under § 2244(b)(3)(A). See Lopez v. Douglas , 141 F.3d 974, 975-76