Opinion ID: 852100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Stop of Renzulli [4]

Text: In the present case, the police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Renzulli's vehicle. We first reiterate that we agree with the State and the Court of Appeals that the caller should be considered an identified informant or concerned citizen, not an anonymous tip. The caller identified himself as Andrew Davies and gave his telephone number to the 911 dispatch officer. He next described the vehicle as a blue Volkswagen Jetta or a Volkswagen Passat. Davies described where the vehicle was located, just pulling into a BP Gas Station. Davies stated he was unable to obtain the license plate of the vehicle because he stayed away from it due to its erratic driving. And he also described the criminal activity observed, he is all over the road he is going to kill somebody, and [h]e run over the cement uh, center of... In looking at the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes. The facts known to Sergeant Schnarr were that a blue Volkswagen of a suspected drunk driver had just pulled into the BP Gas Station before Sergeant Schnarr arrived at 1:00 a.m. Based on the time of the evening, location, and specific vehicle color and make, and the almost immediate response by Sergeant Schnarr, we conclude that reasonable suspicion did exist to detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes. As previously discussed, an investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion, a considerably lesser standard than probable cause. Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). It was Officer Schnarr's conversation with Renzulli and his observations of her that gave him probable cause to then arrest Renzulli. We disagree with the dissent that this case is distinguishable from Kellems. Here, just as in Kellems, there was enough corroboration of the tip by the police to determine they had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. In Kellems, the officer never observed the driver commit any traffic violations. 842 N.E.2d at 354. Rather, the corroboration was solely matching the car description and license plate number given by the caller. Id. In fact, Kellems was not intoxicated and was arrested for operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic offender. Id. Similarly, in the present case, the officer did not observe the driver commit any traffic violations, but did corroborate the tip by observing the Blue Volkswagen at the specifically identified BP Gas Station at 1:00 a.m., within 90 seconds of the call, made by the tipster who gave his name and telephone number. Renzulli argues that the caller was not able to be independently verified to distinguish him from a prankster or an imposter. Renzulli argues that the caller did not identify himself in such a way as to place his credibility at risk or to subject himself to criminal penalties. Renzulli cites State v. Glass, 769 N.E.2d 639 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), as the dispositive case at hand. However, in Glass, the officer received a dispatch at 1:30 p.m. advising him of a suspicious vehicle for reckless driving. Id. at 640. The tipster in Glass was unidentified. Id. at 641. Further, in Glass, the record contained no description of the vehicle. There is no mention of vehicle color or make of the car, location or direction of travel, nor any elapsed time between the 911 dispatch and the stop. Id. at 643-44. The record in Glass was the police officer's testimony that the dispatcher gave a description of the vehicle. Id. at 643. The record contains no information on what that description actually was. Id. We find Glass to be distinguishable as there are more independent indicia of reliability in the present case, including the time, location, make, and color of the vehicle Renzulli was driving. Renzulli also argues that the caller, Davies, did not identify the correct gender of the driver of the blue Volkswagen. Davies used the descriptor he six times when describing the driver of the blue Volkswagen to the 911 operator. Renzulli cites Holly v. State, 918 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. 2009), for the position that once Sergeant Schnarr realized Renzulli was female, Schnarr should have discontinued his investigative stop. In Holly, Officer Jason Ross was conducting a routine patrol in his police car when he ran a license plate of a vehicle traveling in front of him. Id. at 324. His license plate check identified that the vehicle was registered to an African-American female named Terry Sumler, whose driver's license was suspended. Id. at 325. Based on that information, Officer Ross initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. Id. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Ross observed the driver was a male identified as Damen Holly. Id. at 324. Holly held that once Officer Ross observed the driver to be a male, he had no reason for additional inquiry, and no longer had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Id. at 325. We find Holly distinguishable. The descriptor he is a commonly used male pronoun used in unisex form. The time was 1:00 a.m. when Davies called 911. He was traveling at such a distance behind Renzulli to not be able to identify her license plate. We do not believe Davies's use of the word he in this circumstance indicated he had or had not identified the gender of the driver. In Holly, on the other hand, Officer Ross knew he was looking for a female driver based upon an official license check.