Opinion ID: 2291395
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Multiplicity of Counts.

Text: Finally, Ms. Abdulshakur contends, again for the first time on appeal, that if her conduct was in violation of the law at all, it represented one offense rather than three. Relying primarily on Blackmone, supra, she maintains that, at most, one single crime of a continuing nature was charged and proved. We disagree. Section 3-218.1 provides among other things that any person who, by fraudulent means, attempts to obtain a larger amount of money than that to which he or she is entitled is guilty of a misdemeanor. Construing the words of the statute in their literal sense, and according them their conventional everyday meaning, see Riggs Nat'l Bank v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1235 (D.C.1990), one would surely conclude that the first such attempt is one crime, the second is another crime, and so on. [S]uccessive acts, no matter how close in time, constitute separate offenses. United States v. Hawkins, 794 F.2d 589, 590 (11th Cir.1986). The literal meaning of the statute also comports with reason and with sound public policy. The construction for which Ms. Abdulshakur contends would mean that once a defendant has made a single fraudulent representation (and perhaps secured a single payment to which he or she is not entitled) any future misrepresentations could be made with impunity; they would simply be treated as a part of one criminal scheme. Under Ms. Abdulshakur's theory, as a result, a defendant who made thirty-six separate misrepresentations on the first day of each month for three years, and who received thirty-six checks to which he or she was not entitled, would be subject to the same maximum penalty as a more timorous or less venal counterpart who lied only once and who secured but one forbidden payment. There would be no incentive for the defendant not to do it again (and again and again). This is surely not a result which the legislature intended. [13] Courts avoid interpretations of statutes which lead to implausible results, even where resort to the dictionary would sustain such implausibility (which, in this case, it assuredly does not). See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27, 68 S.Ct. 376, 381, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948); J. Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 46 (D.C.1989). Although the rule of lenity applies where there is any ambiguity in a criminal enactment with regard to the proper unit of prosecution, the statutory language must be read with the saving grace of common sense. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955); Riggs, supra, 581 A.2d at 1262. That saving grace surely inhibits our favorably entertaining Ms. Abdulshakur's proposed construction of our welfare fraud legislation. The courts, including this one, have sustained prosecution for multiple offenses where a defendant has repeated his unlawful conduct, even though the various offenses could be viewed as part of a single scheme. In Baldwin v. District of Columbia, 183 A.2d 566 (D.C.1962), for example, we affirmed the defendant's conviction of two counts of practicing podiatry without a license, where he treated two separate individuals a month apart. In Bruce v. United States, 471 A.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C.1984), we stated, albeit in dictum, that a defendant may be prosecuted for two counts of carrying a pistol without a license where the continuity of the first violation has been interrupted ( e.g. by taking the pistol to his home, where possession is lawful) and a second carrying has followed. In United States v. Williams, 685 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir.1982), the court held that the defendant was properly convicted of seven separate offenses after he had made false statements on seven separate transaction forms with respect to firearms purchased on five separate occasions; see also Hawkins, supra, 794 F.2d at 590 (each firearms transaction form was a proper unit of prosecution). In Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 710, 59 L.Ed. 1151 (1915), the petitioner had, on a single occasion, broken into six separate government mail bags for the purpose of appropriating their contents. He was convicted of six counts of violating a statute providing in pertinent part that [w]hoever shall ... cut, or otherwise injure any mail bag ... with intent to ... steal any such mail ... shall be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both. Id. at 629, 35 S.Ct. at 711. The Supreme Court held that in spite of the fact that the various intrusions into separate mail bags were part of a single scheme, multiple convictions were proper. Analyzing the statutory language, the Court stated: These words plainly indicate that it was the intention of the lawmakers to protect each and every mail bag from felonious injury and mutilation. Whenever any one mail bag is thus torn, cut or injured, the offense is complete. Although the transaction of cutting the mail bags was in a sense continuous, the complete statutory offense was committed every time a mail bag was cut in the manner described, with the intent charged. The offense as to each separate bag was complete when that bag was cut, irrespective of any attack upon, or mutilation of, any other bag. Id. The Court continued: So here, proof of cutting and opening one sack completed the offense, and although defendant continued the operation by cutting into other sacks, proof of cutting one sack would not have supported the counts of the indictment as to cutting the others; nor was there that continuity of offense which made the several acts charged against the defendant only one crime. Id. at 631, 35 S.Ct. at 712. Ebeling may be a marginally easier case for the prosecution, in light of the allusion in the statute to any mail bag in the singular, but we think that its reasoning nevertheless applies here. An offense was complete whenever Ms. Abdulshakur submitted a false statement (and received benefits based on that statement). Indeed, a proscribed attempt was complete even before the benefits were paid. Although her scheme to defraud the District government was in a sense continuousshe made repeated misrepresentations over a period of several monthsa separate statutory offense was committed each time she filed a false application or monthly statement. [14] In Blackmone, the principal authority on which Ms. Abdulshakur relies, the defendant falsely represented to the Department of Public Welfare in March 1955 that her husband had deserted her. From April 1955 to February 1958, she received welfare checks which would not have been issued but for that misrepresentation. She was initially charged with thirty-five separate violations of the predecessor to what is now section 3-218.1. The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of Ms. Blackmone on all but two counts, and the jury convicted her of the remaining two counts. On appeal, this court held that only a single crime of a continuing nature was charged here rather than a series of crimes. 151 A.2d at 195. The court so ruled sua sponte notwithstanding the failure of the defendant to raise the issue either in the trial court or on appeal. In reaching this result, the court relied heavily on Bramblett v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 231 F.2d 489, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1015, 76 S.Ct. 658, 100 L.Ed. 874 (1956). In Bramblett, the defendant (a Congressman) had received several payments to which he was not entitled, all as a result of the same false statement. [15] The United States Court of Appeals held that on these facts the rule of lenity precluded subjecting an offender to multiple convictions by reason of a single unified pattern of behavior even though the behavior continues over a period of time. Bramblett, supra, 97 U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 231 F.2d at 491, quoted in Blackmone, supra, 151 A.2d at 195. [16] The decision in Blackmone was thus predicated on the court's assumption that Mrs. Blackmone, like Congressman Bramblett, had made a single misrepresentation which had resulted in her receiving several payments to which she was not entitled. Indeed, there was only one fact misrepresented, namely, that Mrs. Blackmone's husband had deserted her. Throughout its analysis, the court referred to the defendant's false statement in the singular. The court observed, for example, that [i]t is, of course, conceded that Mrs. Blackmone made the representation in March 1955 that her husband had deserted her, and that as a result of her statement she received various allowances from the Department of Public Welfare. 151 A.2d at 196 (emphasis added). [17] The opinion simply does not address the issue presented here, namely, whether multiple misrepresentations resulting in the receipt of multiple payments for which Ms. Abdulshakur was ineligible constitute multiple offenses or only a single crime. [18] Indeed, in her own Reply Brief, Ms. Abdulshakur synopsizes Blackmone as follows: Blackmone also makes clear that the receipt of several checks following a single false statement or failure to disclose information results in only one violation of the law. (Emphasis added). The present case differs from Blackmone in a decisive respect. Ms. Abdulshakur made misrepresentations on three different forms, each form applying to a different period of time. To put the matter plainly, she told different lies about her finances in completing each form. In December 1985, she misrepresented her assets as of then and failed to disclose payments which she had received in the period preceding the December application. On the January and February forms, she made false statements as to her financial condition during those months, and concealed salary payments which she had received after the December application was filed. Under these circumstances, Blackmone cannot be and is not controlling. Several cases from other jurisdictions have been brought to our attention by amici curiae, three defendants who are facing charges in the Superior Court similar to those of which Ms. Abdulshakur stands convicted. Although two of these decisions provide no enlightenment with respect to the issues here presented, [19] two others merit discussion. In People v. Keehley, 193 Cal.App.3d 1381, 239 Cal.Rptr. 5 (1987), the defendant was charged with a single count of welfare fraud. The court held that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the filing by an applicant for public assistance of false monthly reports with the welfare authorities, in which she did not disclose that she was receiving social security payments, constituted a single continuing offense, rather than a series of individual crimes. Id. at 1385-1386, 239 Cal.Rptr. at 8. Cf. Ebeling, supra, 237 U.S. at 629, 35 S.Ct. at 711. The court also stated, by way of dictum, that the prosecutor was precluded in such circumstances from charging multiple counts. Id. Since the issue before the court was whether a single prosecution was time-barred, rather than whether separate counts were maintainable, the court never had occasion to consider the implications of a rule which would give a defendant who made the first misrepresentation, and who received the first payment, a free ride if he or she then repeated the offense in later months. Keehley is not persuasive authority on a question that was not presented and could not be decided. See Webster, supra, 266 U.S. at 511, 45 S.Ct. at 149. In State v. Martin, 62 Haw. 364, 616 P.2d 193 (1980) (per curiam), the defendant was convicted of a single count of theft in the first degree. In successive applications for public assistance, Ms. Martin had misrepresented facts relevant to her entitlement. Rejecting the defendant's contention that the prosecution could not be brought pursuant to a statute which had become effective after the fraud was initiated, the court held that the State acted within legal bounds in prosecuting defendant under an indictment covering only part of the entire duration of a continuing offense. Id. at 370, 616 P.2d at 197. In reaching this decision, the court stated: We do not view each filing by defendant of a statement of facts supporting continued eligibility as necessarily constituting a new offense, since all statements were identical, representing that defendant was unmarried, unemployed, and not receiving social security benefits. Id. at 369, 616 P.2d at 197 (emphasis added). It cannot be gainsaid that, viewed in isolation, the quoted language is marginally helpful to Ms. Abdulshakur's cause. The court's use of the word necessarily, however, indicates that the question in the present case was not being decided. Moreover, as in Keehley, the court was not dealing with the point in a context in which the defendant's potential free ride for additional wrongdoing was presented, and the decision cannot be viewed as dispositive of an issue not argued or discussed. After deceiving the Department of Human Services in December, Ms. Abdulshakur had the opportunity to put an end to her fraudulent activities. Instead, she returned and completed a mendacious form as to January. Having done that, she proceeded to tell more lies on the form for February. We cannot attribute to the legislature the intention to enact a rule of law which would enable a defendant to commit with impunity the second and third crimes and, by implication, many more.