Opinion ID: 2604077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: award of fees after dismissal

Text: The Legislature adopted section 1021.5 as a codification of the private attorney general doctrine of attorney fees developed in prior judicial decisions. ( Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 933 [154 Cal. Rptr. 503, 593 P.2d 200].) Under this section, the court may award attorney fees to a successful party in any action that has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. (1) As we explained in Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council, supra, 23 Cal.3d at page 933, the private attorney general doctrine rests upon the recognition that privately initiated lawsuits are often essential to the effectuation of the fundamental public policies embodied in constitutional or statutory provisions, and that, without some mechanism authorizing the award of attorney fees, private actions to enforce such important public policies will as a practical matter frequently be infeasible. Thus, the fundamental objective of the doctrine is to encourage suits enforcing important public policies by providing substantial attorney fees to successful litigants in such cases. ( Ibid. ) (2) A statutory fee motion under section 1021.5 does not create a new cause of action. Instead, the motion is a collateral matter, ancillary to the main cause. ( Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 637.) Before a trial court may award fees, section 1021.5 requires that an action result in the enforcement of an important right and confer a substantial benefit on the public. Given these statutory requirements, we have stated that section 1021.5 motions may not be heard until the benefit is secure, in some cases after judgment is final. ( Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments (1982) 32 Cal.3d 668, 679 [186 Cal. Rptr. 589, 652 P.2d 437]; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley (1986) 181 Cal. App.3d 213, 226-227 [226 Cal. Rptr. 265].) Thus, the trial court retains jurisdiction under section 1021.5 to hear an application for fees after the judgment in the underlying action has become final. ( Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 679; Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, supra, 181 Cal. App.3d at pp. 226-227; Marini v. Municipal Court (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 829, 834-835 [160 Cal. Rptr. 465]; see also White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Empl. Sec. (1982) 455 U.S. 445, 451-452 [71 L.Ed.2d 325, 331, 102 S.Ct. 1162] [court's decision on attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 requires inquiry separate from decision on the merits, which inquiry cannot even commence until one party has `prevailed'].) (3a) Defendants acknowledge these general principles but argue that they are not applicable here. Defendants point out that dismissal of an action not brought to trial within five years is mandatory under section 583, subdivision (b). Thus, they argue, the statute is jurisdictional and divests the court of authority to issue further orders. (See, e.g., White v. Renck (1980) 108 Cal. App.3d 835, 840-841 [71 L.Ed.2d 325, 102 S.Ct. 1162]; McDonough Power Equipment Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 527, 530-531 [105 Cal. Rptr. 330, 503 P.2d 1338]; Weeks v. Roberts (1968) 68 Cal.2d 802, 805 [69 Cal. Rptr. 305, 442 P.2d 361], revd. on other grounds (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342 [228 Cal. Rptr. 504, 721 P.2d 590].) Moreover, they claim that upon dismissal, there is no judgment, settlement, or consent decree in plaintiffs' favor to which an attorney fees application could be deemed collateral or ancillary. Simply labeling a section 583 dismissal as jurisdictional does not end our inquiry about statutory attorney fees. (4) Under the federal Constitution, a dismissal for mootness deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear the underlying cause. (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.) Nevertheless, the federal court still retains jurisdiction to address the issue of attorney fees for a prevailing party under 42 United States Code section 1988. ( Martin v. Heckler (11th Cir.1985) 773 F.2d 1145, 1148-1149 (en banc); Williams v. Alioto (9th Cir.1980) 625 F.2d 845, 847-848, cert. den. (1981) 450 U.S. 1012 [68 L.Ed.2d 213, 101 S.Ct. 1723]; Bagby v. Beal (3d Cir.1979) 606 F.2d 411, 413-415.) Since both this court and the Legislature have relied on federal cases in framing the private attorney general theory, we regard the federal precedent in this area as persuasive. ( Serrano IV, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 634; Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc., supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 934.) (3b) Contrary to defendants' claim, a dismissal for lack of prosecution under section 583 does result in a judgment. (§ 581d.) Moreover, a section 583 dismissal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to consider matters ancillary to the underlying action such as an application for attorney fees under section 1021.5. ( No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 998, 1006 [200 Cal. Rptr. 768]; cf. Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, supra, 32 Cal.3d at pp. 677-679 [court retains jurisdiction after the filing of compromise agreement to consider costs bill and § 1021.5 attorney fee motion].) We conclude that dismissal under section 583, subdivision (b) does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to award attorney fees under section 1021.5.