Opinion ID: 2161154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of sec. 62.23 (2), Stats.

Text: Sec. 62.23 (7a), Stats., which provides for extraterritorial zoning by cities and villages, was enacted as ch. 241, Laws of 1963. The extent of extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction conferred by this statute upon fourth-class cities such as Elkhorn is limited to the unincorporated area lying within one and one-half miles of the city's corporate limits. We quote the following material provisions of this statute: (7a) Extraterritorial Zoning. The governing body of any city which has created a city plan commission under sub. (1) and has adopted a zoning ordinance under sub. (7) may exercise extraterritorial zoning power as set forth in this subsection. Insofar as applicable the provisions of sub. (7) (a), (b), (c), (ea) and (h) shall apply to extraterritorial zoning ordinances enacted under this subsection. This subsection shall also apply to the governing body of any village. . . . (b) The governing body may enact, without referring the matter to the plan commission, an interim zoning ordinance to preserve existing zoning or uses in all or part of the extraterritorial zoning jurisdiction while the comprehensive zoning plan is being prepared. Such ordinance may be enacted as is an ordinary ordinance but shall be effective for no longer than 2 years after its enactment, unless extended as provided in this paragraph. The crucial question is whether a city such as Elkhorn can enact a valid interim extraterritorial zoning ordinance freezing existing uses for two years, as authorized by par. (b) of sec. 62.23 (7a), Stats., without obtaining the consent thereto of the county board of supervisors. The answer to  this question is dependent on whether or not the following provision of sec. 62.23 (2) is applicable to such interim zoning ordinances: It shall be the function and duty of the [city plan] commission to make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the municipality, including any areas outside of its boundaries which, in the commission's judgment bear relation to the development of the municipality provided, however, that in any county where a regional planning department has been established, areas outside the boundaries of a municipality may not be included in the master plan without the consent of the county board of supervisors. For the purposes of this appeal we shall assume, without deciding, that Walworth county has a regional planning department. We deem it to be highly significant that ch. 241, Laws of 1963, in creating sec. 62.23 (7a), Stats., specifically enumerated what prior subdivisions of sec. 62.23 appertaining to zoning are to be applicable to this new act. Sub. (2) of sec. 62.23 is not included among these prior-enumerated subdivisions of such statute. Under the canon of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it was not the legislative intent that the aforequoted restrictive provision of sec. 62.23 (2) should be applicable to interim extraterritorial zoning ordinances enacted under sec. 62.23 (7a) (b). There is an additional reason why we conclude that the restriction of sec. 62.23 (2), Stats., is not applicable to the interim extraterritorial zoning ordinances such as that enacted by defendant. By its express terms, sec. 62.23 (2) would appear to be only applicable to master zoning plans initiated by a city plan commission. Viewing the wording of this subsection most favorably from the standpoint of respondent plaintiffs, the subsection's application to action taken by a city council under sec. 62.23 (7a) is ambiguous.  This is a proper case, therefore, in which to look to the statutory history to ascertain the legislative intent. State ex rel. Tilkens v. Board of Trustees (1948), 253 Wis. 371, 374, 34 N. W. (2d) 248. Bill No. 3, A., creating sec. 62.23 (7a), Stats., was introduced in the assembly during the 1963 legislative session by the legislative council and was sponsored by it. In Vol. III, p. 137, of the 1963 report of the legislative council appears the following: Opponents of the bill believed that enactment of LRL 131 [Bill No. 3, A.] would be especially disruptive in those counties where the county zoning ordinance has been approved by all or most of the towns. Those persons favoring the legislation disagreed with this assumption and pointed out that an integral feature of the bill is that the towns affected will have a substantial voice in the preparation of the ordinance. This will put a town in a position to make a solid case for preservation of existing uses, if the town feels that these uses are the most appropriate for that particular town. The proponents of the bill also pointed out that it offers another protection to the counties and towns. That is, the bill provides for a 2-year land use `freeze' pending the development of the ordinance. Whatever land uses the county or town had designated by ordinance, or usage, would be effective for the 2-year period. It was believed that these features of the bill would result in minimal disruption to the towns affected and would still permit the development of a comprehensive zoning ordinance which would be of maximum long-range benefit to the area. This would seem to clearly indicate that it was contemplated by the framers of the bill that a city would be able to exercise extraterritorial zoning under sec. 62.23 (7a), Stats., without the consent of the county. The legislative council probably concluded that the objective of the statute to give cities and villages some control over the haphazard development of adjacent areas might be vitiated if the final decision in the matter were to rest with county boards.  We conclude that the instant interim extraterritorial zoning ordinance enacted by defendant city is not void and ineffective because no consent thereto was obtained from the county board of supervisors.