Opinion ID: 3064643
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellants’ Requests to Amend the Complaint

Text: We review the district court’s denial of leave to amend the complaint for abuse of discretion. Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 677 (9th Cir. 1993). A district court does not err in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile. Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). “When a proposed amendment would be futile, there is no need to prolong the litigation by permitting further amendment.” Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming trial court’s denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs could not cure a basic flaw — inability to demonstrate standing — in their pleading).
i. Applicability of Anti-SLAPP Statutes in Federal Diversity Cases [10] Appellants argue that the district court erred when it did not permit Appellants to file an amended complaint and argue that Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which requires entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice, directly conflicts with the Federal Rules and Oregon’s civil procedure rules, both of which favor liberal amendment. Appellants rely GARDNER v. MARTINO 4841 on the language in Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150 which states that “[t]he special motion to strike shall be treated as a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21 A.” Appellants read this to mean that the express language in the anti-SLAPP statute that requires dismissal may be ignored and thus urge this Court to apply a liberal amendment standard under Rule 21A of Oregon’s Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants rely on Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad Communications Co., 377 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2004), and Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) for the proposition that the Court should use a liberal amendment policy instead of the harsh penalties under the anti-SLAPP statute.9 [11] Here, Appellants had already filed the first amended complaint as a matter of right and Verizon specifically held that a first amended complaint is subject to anti-SLAPP remedies. See Verizon Del., Inc. 377 F.3d at 1091 (holding that “if the offending claims remain in the first amended complaint, the anti-SLAPP remedies are available to defendants.”). Moreover, in United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 972-973 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit expressly held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute may be applied in federal diversity suits and found that the application of the statute’s special motion to strike does not “directly collide” with the Federal Rules. Thus, this Court holds that Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute, which requires entry of a judgment of dismissal without prejudice, does not directly conflict with the Federal Rules and Oregon’s civil procedure rules. ii. Appellants’ First Request for Leave to Amend Appellants did not file a formal motion for leave to amend 9 Appellants also rely on In re Bah, 321 B.R. 41 (9th Cir. 2005), which holds that anti-SLAPP statutes may not be applied in federal question cases. Id. at 46. However, the instant case is a diversity case, therefore, In re Bah is inapplicable. 4842 GARDNER v. MARTINO the first amended complaint but instead made the request within their objections to the Findings & Recommendation.10 Appellants did not explain how they would cure the deficiencies in the first amended complaint but simply stated, “Given that there has been no activity in this case other than the special motion to strike, none of the defendants have filed an answer, no discovery has been had, and no other activity has occurred in this case, and given the fact that a dismissal under [Or. Rev. Stat.] § 31.150 must be ‘without prejudice,’ it only makes sense to permit plaintiffs to file amended claims.” Moreover, Appellants did not include a proposed copy of the second amended complaint as required by District of Oregon Local Rule 15.1.11 [12] We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ first request to amend the complaint because Appellants did not propose any new facts or legal theories for an amended complaint and therefore gave the Court no basis to allow an amendment. iii. Appellants’ Second Request for Leave to Amend Ten days after the first amended complaint was dismissed without prejudice, Appellants filed a “motion to amend order and judgment and for leave to file [a] second amended complaint” and an “amended motion for an order setting aside the judgment and to amend or correct the complaint.” Appellants brought the motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), 52(b) 10 In the District of Oregon, the Magistrate may issue the Findings & Recommendation for a Special Motion to Strike under Or. Rev. Stat. § 31.150 and the District Court Judge reviews it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 11 Local Rule 15.1 for the District of Oregon requires that any party filing or moving to file an amended pleading must: (1) reproduce the entire pleading; and (2) describe the changes made. Further, a copy of the proposed amended pleading must be attached as an exhibit to any motion for leave to file the amended pleading. GARDNER v. MARTINO 4843 and 60(b). Appellants moved to “reopen the judgment” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), which provides that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for any “reason that justifies relief.” Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) will not be granted unless the moving party is able to show both injury and circumstances beyond its control prevented timely action to protect its interest. At oral argument in front of the District Court, Appellees stipulated to bypass the Rule 60(b)(6) standards so the trial court could reach and resolve the merits of the motion to amend the complaint. The parties do not raise Rule 60(b) on appeal. [13] We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ second request for leave to amend the complaint because the proposed amendment would have been futile. The proposed second amended complaint pled one cause of action for “intentional interference with economic relations and prospective economic advantage.” The Supreme Court of Oregon has held that the elements of such a claim are: (1) the existence of a professional or business relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a prospective economic advantage); (2) intentional interference with that relationship or advantage; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal effect between the interference and the harm to the relationship or prospective advantage; and (6) damages. Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (1999). We have held that when a claim of tortious interference with business relationships is brought as a result of constitutionallyprotected speech, the claim is subject to the same First Amendment requirements that govern actions for defamation. Unelko Corp., 912 F.2d at 1058. [14] Appellants’ claim in the proposed second amended complaint is based on Martino’s statements in segment three of the broadcast where he urged his listeners to not buy Polaris products. We hold that Martino’s statements in segment three of the broadcast are nonactionable opinion pro4844 GARDNER v. MARTINO tected by the First Amendment. Based on the “totality of the circumstances” test, Martino’s reliance on the facts as recited by Feroglia was reasonable and the specific context of the radio broadcast indicates that Martino was expressing his opinion and not a factual assertion. Accordingly, Appellants cannot state a claim for intentional interference with economic relations and prospective economic advantage because protected speech cannot be the basis for such a claim. Unelko Corp., 912 F.2d at 1058. Moreover, Appellants’ allegations regarding Martino’s “improper purpose” fail to state a cognizable claim for intentional interference, as, given the nature of Martino’s consumer advocacy talk radio program, they show that he acted consistently with the “pursuit of [his] own business purposes as [he] saw them, ” Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Or. 1978). As such, Appellants’ proposed amendment to the complaint is futile.