Opinion ID: 1345019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Proximate Cause of Villafranca's Injuries

Text: The district court below found that the DEA agents' negligence, in failing to devise a plan to release the patrons, was not the proximate cause of Villafranca's injury. Specifically, the district court found: 15. Any injuries to Villafranca occurred after [his resistance]. 16. [Villafranca's resistance] was a new and independent cause, an act of separate and independent agency, not reasonably foreseeable, that destroyed the causal connection between the DEA agents' unreasonable search plan and Villafranca's injuries. 17. [Villafranca's resistance] was the sole proximate cause of Villafranca's injuries. 18. The DEA agents' unreasonable search plan did not cause Villafranca's injury. Villafranca, No. 3:06-CV-0806, slip op. at 3 ¶¶ 15-18. Because we hold that the district court's finding that the agents' alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Villafranca's injuries is not clearly erroneous, we need not re-visit the district court's determination that the search plan was unreasonable. Villafranca now argues that a new and independent cause must arise from the conduct of an outside force and not from his actions in the incident. Thus, Villafranca urges that the district court's findings on proximate cause were incorrect since the agents misconstrued his resistance. See Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828, 844 (Tex.App. Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (holding that new and independent cause contemplates that an independent force, rather than the alleged negligent acts of the parties, was responsible for the plaintiff's injuries). The Government does not challenge this specific argument. Instead, it counters that the district court's findings that the negligent planning did not proximately cause Villafranca's harm and that Villafranca's resistance was the sole proximate cause of his harm are sufficient to sustain the district court's judgment. We agree. In Texas, proximate cause is composed of two elements: foreseeability and cause in fact. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004). Foreseeability means the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers his negligent act created for others. Boggs v. Bottomless Pit Cooking Team, 25 S.W.3d 818, 823 (Tex.App. Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Cause in fact is established when the act or omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries, and without it, the harm would not have occurred. IHS, 143 S.W.3d at 799. In view of the record as a whole, the district court did not commit clear error in finding both that Villafranca's resistance was the proximate cause of his injuries and that the agents' alleged negligence did not proximately cause his injuries. While better planning may have reduced the amount of time that Villafranca had to wait in the Salon, better planning would not have made Villafranca obey agents' orders to end his cell phone conversation, remain seated, and submit to a search. As the Government correctly points out, because Villafranca's defiance occurred so soon after the agents entered, even a non-negligent plan would not have allowed patrons to leave before Villafranca disobeyed the agents' commands and resisted arrest. Villafranca also attempts to frame all of the district court's causation findings as relying upon the allegedly erroneous new and independent cause determination. As such, Villafranca contends that the district court's findings on other proximate causation theories were tainted by this error. We find this argument unpersuasive. At trial, the district court had before it all theories of proximate causation. The district court then made separate factual findings on each theory. Because the district court made separate findings, we determine that the district court properly considered each theory of causation. Accordingly, the district court's relevant findings are not clearly erroneous, and we need not determine whether Villafranca's actions actually constitute a new and independent cause. Because the Government's alleged negligence did not proximately cause Villafranca's injuries, his negligence claim fails.