Opinion ID: 2635293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legality of the Investigatory Stop

Text: Hartman first argues that the investigatory stop of the tan Ford Taurus was unconstitutional because it was not justified by reasonable suspicion. [8] As a result, he claims, this evidence should have been suppressed. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure is inadmissible and must be excluded. [9] Although this rule generally does not apply to license revocation proceedings, [10] we have held that an exception applies in certain contexts, such as police misconduct which shocks the conscience, or is of a nature that calls for the judiciary, as a matter of judicial integrity, to disassociate itself from benefits derivable therefrom. [11] In addition, where a Fourth Amendment violation stems from a lack of probable cause for a DUI arrest, exclusion may well be mandated because probable cause is an affirmative statutory element of the offense of refusal and is an affirmative element for proof in the license revocation proceeding. [12] But we need not reach the applicability of exceptions to the general rule in this case because the investigative stop was not an unreasonable search or seizure. In Alaska, a police officer may make an investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred. [13] Reasonable suspicion exists where the totality of the circumstances indicates that there is a substantial possibility that conduct [giving rise to a public danger] has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. [14] Thus, where a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver is operating a vehicle while intoxicated, [15] the officer may conduct an investigatory stop. [16] While we have held that a person who is driving while under the influence poses an imminent public danger, warranting an investigatory stop, [17] we have not considered whether a person who has recently been behind the wheel while intoxicated but is no longer driving continues to pose an imminent public danger. In a series of three cases, [18] the court of appeals has addressed this specific issue. In Larson v. State , a police officer observed a car stopped in the middle of the road, and then watched as the driver of the car, Larson, drove on the wrong side of the road, tried to pick up pedestrians, and almost hit a group of pedestrians. [19] The officer then witnessed Larson pick up two pedestrians, one of whom took over driving. [20] The officer stopped the car, immediately approached Larson, now a passenger, observed that he appeared intoxicated, and arrested him for DUI. [21] The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not clearly err when it found that it was likely that Larson would have resumed driving at some later point, and that [the officer] was not unreasonable in believing that the change of drivers did not eliminate the need to make an investigatory stop. [22] In Romo v. Municipality of Anchorage , a police officer began following the defendant after observing a known prostitute in the cab of the truck that the defendant was driving. [23] The defendant, who was not driving erratically, pulled into a parking lot, exited the truck, and voluntarily approached the police officer. [24] When the police officer noticed that Romo had an odor of alcoholic beverage about his . . . person, he asked Romo to perform a field sobriety test. [25] The court of appeals concluded the test was justified by reasonable suspicion. [26] The court explained that [t]he fact that Romo was driving just prior to his encounter with [the officer] demonstrated Romo's willingness to drive in his current [intoxicated] condition. [27] The court of appeals went on to reason that because Romo retained possession of his car and it remained immediately accessible for him to drive, [28] there was a sufficient risk of imminent public danger to warrant an investigatory stop. [29] In Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage , a police officer noticed a jeep being driven erratically on the Glenn Highway and followed the vehicle until its owner pulled the jeep into his driveway. [30] The officer contacted the driver, Shearer, as he was heading into his house, and, noticing that Shearer smelled of alcohol, asked him to perform field sobriety tests. [31] As in Romo, the court of appeals pointed to Shearer's continuing possession of the vehicle as a factor increasing the likelihood that he would resume driving, but did not state that possession was, in all cases, a necessary condition for finding an imminent public danger: [L]ike the defendant in Romo, Shearer still had access to his car at the time of the encounter with [the police officer]. Further, Shearer had just demonstrated his willingness to drive while intoxicated. Thus, [the officer] could reasonably believe that there was a sufficient risk of imminent public danger to justify an investigatory stop. [32] In this case, although Hartman was no longer driving his car, the investigatory stop was still proper. Somerlot reported that the Honda whip[ped] into his yard and crashed into a ditch in front of his house. Somerlot then saw the juveniles exit the Honda and get into a tan Ford Taurus[-]type vehicle. There was no license plate on the Honda, but the vehicle identification number indicated that it belonged to John Hartman, whose teenage son Tuckwood knew. Tuckwood noted that the Honda smelled strongly of alcohol. While waiting for the tow truck to arrive, Tuckwood saw a tan Ford Taurus-like vehicle with juveniles in it drive by the abandoned Honda. Tuckwood therefore had a reasonable suspicion that someone had been driving the Honda while under the influence and that the intoxicated driver of the Honda was likely in the Ford Taurus when Tuckwood stopped it. Although Hartman was now a passenger in the Ford Taurus, this is not enough to show that he no longer posed an imminent public danger. Passenger status did not automatically establish a non-driving intention on Hartman's part. [33] Nor was Hartman's non-ownership of the Ford Taurus determinative absent evidence that the owner of the vehicle was unwilling to give him a chance to drive. In view of Hartman's continuing access to the Taurus, Tuckwood's belief that Hartman posed an imminent public danger was reasonable. Therefore, under these circumstances, the investigatory stop was legal.