Opinion ID: 2629208
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Other Suspect Evidence Pertaining to Lynch

Text: Thomas claims that he should have been able to cross-examine the police witnesses on other suspect evidence and been able to present certain results from Daryl Lynch's polygraph test. He contends that his rights to compulsory process and due process have been impinged. The State argues that it was sufficient for the court to have granted Thomas the opportunity to question officers about who they arrested in their investigation. The Sixth Amendment provides, in part: [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.... U.S. Const. amend. VI. The federal right to compulsory process is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Washington, 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920; State v. Smith, 101 Wash.2d 36, 41, 677 P.2d 100 (1984). But both the Supreme Court and this court have noted that [a]lthough guarded jealously, the right [to compulsory process] is not absolute. Smith, 101 Wash.2d at 41, 677 P.2d 100 (noting that Washington limited the right to compel witnesses to those witnesses who are material to the defense). In keeping with the right to establish a defense and its attendant limits, a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have irrelevant evidence admitted in his or her defense. State v. Hudlow, 99 Wash.2d 1, 15, 659 P.2d 514 (1983). When there is no other evidence tending to connect another person with the crime, such as his bad character, his means or opportunity to commit the crime, or even his conviction of the crime, such other evidence is irrelevant to exculpate the accused. See State v. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, 667, 13 P.2d 1 (1932); State v. Maupin, 128 Wash.2d 918, 925, 913 P.2d 808 (1996). Mere opportunity to commit the crime is not enough as such evidence is the most remote kind of speculation. Downs, 168 Wash. at 668, 13 P.2d 1. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make any fact that is of consequence to the case more or less likely than without the evidence. ER 401. Relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is outweighed by prejudice or has a tendency to confuse the issues, mislead the jury, cause undue delay, or is an unnecessary presentation of cumulative evidence. ER 403.
Thomas implies that the State was allowed to present evidence that the police initially suspected Lynch because Walker had identified Lynch in a photomontage, while Thomas was disallowed from cross examining the investigating officers who testified on this matter. Here, Lynch had an alibi for the night of the murder. Walker was certain the man driving the van was not Geist as he testified he saw a light-skinned African American male driving the van as he chased it from Geist's house (Geist was Caucasian). Walker also estimated that the man driving the van was large and taller than Geist. This may have had a bearing on why Walker chose Lynch out of the montage since Lynch was a light-skinned African American, about six feet tall and weighed 190-200 pounds. Thomas has these same characteristics. While he identified Lynch in a photomontage, Walker was uncertain whether Lynch was the man he saw. Walker testified that Lynch looked most like the person driving the van out of any of the other people pictured in the photomontage, however, no photo of Thomas was included. Thomas also neglects to point out that he cross-examined Walker at length on his identification of Lynch in the montage as well as Geist's mention that he may be meeting up with a man named Zaheed (Lynch) sometime in the evening of March 27, 1998. Thus, the record shows that Thomas was able to present evidence of Walker's identification of Lynch by Walker's own testimony. We therefore cannot agree that Thomas's right to present evidence was violated in regard to this issue.
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine to exclude Coleman's out of court identification of Lynch unless she were to testify at trial. The court clarified that Thomas could question officers as to who was arrested but not as to what the officer heard from Coleman. The trial court believed such testimony to be hearsay if not obtained directly from Coleman. On appeal, Thomas argues that he should have been permitted to cross-examine the police witnesses as to Coleman's identification of Lynch as the driver of a van she saw the night of the murder, without having to call Coleman as a witness. Thomas's argument is not persuasive. First, Thomas did not object to the court's hearsay ruling. Second, he could have called Coleman herself, as he did with Walker, to testify as to what she saw the night of the murder, but he declined to do so. Therefore, Thomas has waived his hearsay objection and there was no infringement on his right to present evidence.
Thomas argues that Lynch owed money to Geist's mother, Hall, and that he had previously threatened her. He believes the court erred in denying him the opportunity to cross-examine police officers about Lynch's initial suspected motive for the crime and that the State opened the door to this evidence by discussing the investigation of Lynch. The State moved in limine to exclude any reference to a phone conversation between Lynch and Hall. The State proffered that in January or February 1998, Hall contacted Lynch by phone regarding the final payment he owed her. Over the phone, Lynch allegedly responded with something to the effect of, [d]on't fucking hassle me. I know where you live, and you will get your fucking money when I tell you. RP at 220. The State then stated that, after this phone call, Geist spoke with Lynch who agreed to pay Hall what was owed, less a transfer fee. This apparently resolved the dispute between Hall and Lynch. The trial court excluded testimony as to the phone call between Hall and Lynch. The State's argument to the trial court and on this appeal is persuasive. Any exchange as between Lynch and Hall bears no relevance as to the existence or nonexistence of a disagreement between Lynch and Geist. Thomas has not shown that conversations between Hall and Lynch are relevant to showing Lynch had a motive to murder Geist, especially when any disagreement between Lynch and Hall had been resolved two to three months before the murder. On the day of the murder, Lynch only owed Hall $144. The investigating officers' mere mention of Lynch as an initial suspect at the beginning of the murder investigation does not suffice to open the door to cross-examination as to Lynch's possible motive to kill Geist.
Thomas's argument that he should have been allowed to present evidence that Lynch showed deception in his polygraph is not well taken. Results of polygraph tests are not recognized in Washington as reliable evidence and are, in fact, inadmissible without stipulation from both parties. State v. Renfro, 96 Wash.2d 902, 905, 639 P.2d 737 (1982). Thus, the fact that Lynch showed deception in questions during the test does not, by itself, make the results admissible. Given the dearth of additional evidence inculpating Lynch in the murder, and given the inadmissibility of polygraph results, there is no basis for an exception here. Thus, in regard to whether Thomas's right to present evidence was violated, Thomas only speculates that the testimony from the police officers who initially investigated Lynch would inculpate Lynch as a potential suspect. In reality, there is no evidence suggesting that the dismissal of Lynch as a suspect was anything but rational and supported by the weight of the evidence. Recall the testimony of Ducharme and Azevedo that chronicled Thomas's and Rembert's presence with Geist prior to the murder and their presence after the estimated time of the murder at Geist's house and in his van. There was also Thomas's acquaintance, Horyst, who testified that Thomas solicited him to help Thomas rob his boss two weeks before the murder. During that conversation, as well as others, Thomas expressed that his boss may have to be killed. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the evidence to that which was relevant to the consideration at issue by excluding other suspect evidence and polygraph evidence pertaining to Lynch when each was at once irrelevant and unreliable.