Opinion ID: 2443659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Expert Witness Testimony

Text: [¶ 11] Maine Rule of Evidence 702, which governs the admission of expert witness testimony, provides, [I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Before admitting evidence pursuant to this Rule, the trial court must determine that the testimony (1) is relevant in accordance with M.R. Evid. 401, and (2) will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. Searles v. Fleetwood Homes of Pa., Inc., 2005 ME 94, ¶ 21, 878 A.2d 509, 515-16 (citing State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me.1978)). The testimony must also meet a threshold level of reliability. State v. Bickart, 2009 ME 7, ¶ 14, 963 A.2d 183, 187. [¶ 12] For proffered evidence to meet the threshold level of reliability, the court need not find that the expert's methods are generally accepted. Id. Instead, the court must satisfy itself that the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable to be held relevant by considering indicia such as (1) whether any studies tendered in support of the testimony are based on facts similar to those at issue; (2) whether the hypothesis of the testimony has been subject to peer review; (3) whether an expert's conclusion has been tailored to the facts of the case; (4) whether any other experts attest to the reliability of the testimony; (5) the nature of the expert's qualifications; and (6) if a causal relationship is asserted, whether there is a scientific basis for determining that such a relationship exists. Id. ¶ 15, 963 A.2d at 187-88 (quotation marks omitted). We review a court's refusal to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Id. ¶¶ 15, 27, 963 A.2d at 188, 191. [¶ 13] Ericson argues that the court abused its discretion by excluding Plaud's testimony because there was sufficient evidence that the Abel Assessment produced reliable results. However, we agree with the trial court that there are significant concerns with the reliability of the Abel Assessment, including that (1) it has not been subject to adequate peer review because the formula used to assess test results is proprietary and not subject to review; (2) the test is not assessment has been tested only on admitted sex offenders; and (4) even when taken by admitted sex offenders, the test has a potential error rate of between 21% and 32%. [¶ 14] Because the test was unreliable, it was not relevant. See Tolliver v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 83, ¶ 29, 948 A.2d 1223, 1233 (explaining that an expert opinion that is formulated using an unreliable methodology has no probative value). Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding Plaud's deposition testimony on the basis that it was neither reliable nor relevant.