Opinion ID: 1980853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Potential Conflict

Text: We agree with the trial court that any attorney-client privilege Murphy might have with Grimm concerning the underlying crime was waived by Murphy's plea. Moreover, Murphy himself had disclosed to the prosecutor that he was mad at McCrimmon for snitching and angry that his representation had not come through as he expected. [17] See Bundy v. United States, 422 A.2d 765, 767 (D.C.1980). The ethical rules, however, would nonetheless preclude Grimm from cross-examining Murphy based on their conversation, even if he were not revealing privileged information. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 prohibits an attorney from using either a confidence or a secret against a client. A confidence is defined as information protected by the attorney-client privilege, whereas a secret is  other information gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate, or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing, or would be likely to be detrimental, to the client.  D.C. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(b) (emphasis added). [18] If Grimm were to cross-examine Murphy about their private conversation, it would seem to be at least embarrassing to Murphy, and perhaps could even be seriously detrimental to him, if the examination succeeded in showing that Murphy perjured himself in his testimony against McCrimmon or that Murphy had been willing to help McCrimmon in his criminal prosecution in exchange for assistance in retaining the counsel he wanted. [19] See Herbin v. Hoeffel, 806 A.2d 186, 197 (D.C.2002); see also In re Gonzalez, 773 A.2d 1026, 1029-30 (D.C.2001) (stating that public allegations that the client deliberatively lied to his attorney is a secret within the meaning of a comparable Virginia rule of professional conduct because it could be embarrassing and detrimental to the client). In addition, Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from representing a client in a matter in which the lawyer's judgment may be affected by duties to other parties without the client's consent. [20] It is axiomatic that the validity of McCrimmon's consent to Grimm's representation is necessarily dependent on his understanding of Grimm's remaining ethical obligations to Murphy. That a lawyer has violated a rule of professional conduct designed to preserve client confidences and avoid conflicts of interest does not necessarily equate to a disqualifying conflict requiring reversal for infringement of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172-73, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (holding that reversal for conflict requires showing of effect on counsel's performance). The rules do provide guidance, however, and can shed light on counsel's perceived constraints. We have noted that the subjective belief of an attorney that a conflict is present, while not conclusive, is strong evidence of an actual conflict: The fact that [the attorney] believed that there was a conflict of interest, and acted as though there was a conflict, constitutes strong, if not conclusive, evidence that an actual conflict existed. This court has recognized that, in determining whether a trial judge properly denied a defense request for a continuance based on a possible conflict of interest, it is significant whether counsel believed the potential for conflict was so real as to oblige him to seek leave to withdraw from the case. Derrington, 681 A.2d at 1134-35 (quoting Gibson v. United States, 632 A.2d 1155, 1159 n. 14 (D.C.1993)). Counsel is in the best position to determine when a conflict exists. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 167, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). What McCrimmon and Murphy knew and what Grimm thought his ethical obligations were, are therefore essential to a determination of whether there was an actual conflict under Cuyler.