Opinion ID: 2826316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: clarence broussard.

Text: The prosecutor offered a litany of reasons for striking Broussard from the jury pool—from Broussard’s view on the death penalty to his brother’s prior run-in with the law. 4 At the 11th hour in this appeal, Cummings argued in his reply brief that the prosecutor racially profiled another black juror who was dismissed for cause. The racial profiling argument was forfeited, because Cummings never made that argument to the California Supreme Court, the district court, or in his opening brief here. United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2012) (deeming an argument forfeited for failure to raise it). 24 CUMMINGS V. MARTEL On questioning, Broussard admitted that he had voted against the death penalty in a 1976 California referendum and said he would do so again because he did not believe it deterred crime. Striking a juror who opposes the death penalty, even one who promises to apply the law impartially, is a valid and non-pretextual reason for using a peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 952 (noting that, in death penalty case, prosecutor exercised most of 26 peremptory strikes against jurors “disinclined from a philosophical standpoint to impose capital punishment”). The record also revealed that Broussard’s brother was tried and convicted of robbery in Los Angeles County five years earlier—by the same District Attorney’s Office that prosecuted Cummings. The California Supreme Court surely was not unreasonable to view this reason as non-pretextual. The coincidence of having the same prosecutor’s office at the helm goes beyond having a relative who was convicted of a crime, a circumstance that in itself has justified the use of a peremptory strike. See Murray v. Groose, 106 F.3d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1997) (upholding strike of potential jurors whose “relatives . . . had been charged with or convicted of crimes,” which led prosecutor to believe “that they would be ‘defendant’s jurors’”). Cummings claims that the coincidence rationale is pretextual because the prosecutor failed to strike another white juror, even though that juror’s brother similarly was arrested for felony marijuana possession. But that juror supported the death penalty, which distinguished him from Broussard. Any comparison between the two jurors is unilluminating. CUMMINGS V. MARTEL 25 Finally, the prosecutor said Broussard gave him “dirty looks” in the courtroom. This is also a valid reason for dismissing a potential juror. Burks v. Borg, 27 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that prosecutors may “take into account tone, demeanor, facial expression” in exercising peremptories). Taken together, these race-neutral reasons justified the prosecutor’s decision to strike Broussard. Cummings also argues that two other reasons cited by the prosecutor were racially tinged and revealed the prosecutor’s true, discriminatory intent. The prosecutor made passing reference to a potential friendship among three black jurors and to Broussard’s own statements on race. During voir dire, Broussard said, “I would be less than honest if I said I was not aware that we are trying two black individuals, therefore I was going to make sure that we are fair in terms of the evidence as presented against those individuals.” Broussard also revealed that he had been “victimized by racial prejudice being born and raised in this town” and added: “It has had an impact on me in terms of the criminal justice system.” Although these reasons touch on race, the record does not show that the strike was “based on” race or stereotyping. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“No matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.”). Broussard made affirmative statements indicating potential bias, which is a far cry from when a prosecutor assumes a black juror will be partial to a black defendant. Tolbert v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding peremptory of juror who believed the criminal 26 CUMMINGS V. MARTEL justice system discriminates against minorities and noting that “[c]hallenging a prospective juror on the basis of his expressed opinions about the judicial system does not violate Batson.”). Viewed in totality, we have little difficulty holding that the California Supreme Court did not unreasonably uphold the prosecutor’s strike of Broussard.