Opinion ID: 2976951
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007

Text: At oral argument, Hanna’s counsel mentioned for the first time a new statute enacted since Hanna filed this appeal. Consequently, this Court granted a request to file supplemental briefing regarding the new statute and its applicability to the instant case. On January 28, 2008, the President signed into law the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007.5 The Act provides that “[r]efugees of special humanitarian concern eligible for Priority 2 processing under the refugee resettlement priority system who may apply directly to the United 5 The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act is found at Subtitle C, sections 1241-49 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, 122 Stat. 3. -8- No. 07-3609 Hanna v. Mukasey States Admission Program shall include . . . Iraqis who are members of a religious or minority community, have been identified by the Secretary of State, or the designee of the Secretary, as a persecuted group, and have close family members . . . in the United States.”6 More importantly, the Act provides a special ground and exception for filing a motion to reopen: An alien who applied for asylum or withholding of removal and whose claim was denied on or after March 1, 2003, by an asylum officer or an immigration judge solely, or in part, on the basis of changed country conditions may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, file a motion to reopen such claim in accordance with subparagraphs (A) and (B) of . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) not later than six months after the date of the enactment of the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act if the alien--
(2) has remained in the United States since the date of such denial. RCIA § 1247.7 There is no dispute between the parties that Hanna satisfies the requirements of subparagraphs (1) and (2). But, ultimately, we need not decide the impact of this legislation in this appeal because, for the reasons stated below, we will remand the case to the BIA. This will give the BIA the opportunity to address to what extent the Act has any effect on Hanna’s case. 6 “Close family members” are statutorily defined, and include the “children . . . of a citizen of the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), and “brothers or sisters of citizens of the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)). Ostensibly, Hanna would satisfy this requirement because both of his parents, as well as his sister, have been granted asylum and naturalized citizenship. 7 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) essentially requires that “[t]he motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” This is the same standard that applied to Hanna’s motion to reopen that is currently before this Court. -9- No. 07-3609 Hanna v. Mukasey C. The record does not permit a determination as to whether the BIA abused its discretion. The BIA’s decision is contained within one page, indeed one paragraph. The relevant conclusions and rationale from the BIA are as follows: [W]e are not persuaded that the documents provided with the motion [to reopen] demonstrate that conditions for Chaldean Christians in Iraq worsened after the statutory and regulatory period provided for the filing of a motion, or since [Hanna’s] hearing before the Immigration Judge. The recency of articles shows that some Chaldean Christians continue to be targeted in Iraq, but this evidence fails to illustrate a material change, it does not show that the respondent faces an individualized risk of persecution, and it does not show a pattern or practice of persecution of Chaldean Christians by the Iraqi government. See generally Margos v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 593, 599 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting a pattern and practice claim because the general turmoil in Iraq makes it an unsafe and unpleasant place for the general population, not just Assyrian Christians, to live). The motion is denied. (JA at 10.) In other words, the BIA’s decision states that the motion is denied for three reasons, either individually or in combination with each other: (1) the evidence that Chaldean Christians presently are being persecuted in Iraq does not rise to the level of a material change since either June 2005 or November 2003; (2) the evidence does not demonstrate that Hanna himself faces a risk of persecution; and (3) the evidence does not demonstrate that the Iraqi government is engaged in persecution of the Chaldean Christians. Hanna’s strongest argument for finding abuse of discretion relates to consistency among three BIA decisions. Hanna cites the BIA’s August 2006 decision In re Pati, in which it granted - 10 - No. 07-3609 Hanna v. Mukasey a motion to reopen a decision denying asylum to the Iraqi Chaldean Christian applicants. (JA at 204.) In that decision granting the motion to reopen, the BIA declared that “[t]he motion is supported by updated evidence that we find is new and relevant to the worsening conditions in Iraq for Chaldean Christians.” (Id.) In addition, Hanna cites another decision, In re Balious, in which the BIA in June 2006 granted a motion to reopen an Iraqi Chaldean Catholic’s application for asylum. (JA at 207.) In that decision, the BIA explained that the “respondent has established through this objective evidence of record a prima facie case of eligibility for [asylum]” based upon “new evidence which indicates that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism since the fall of the prior regime has resulted in growing violence in which Christians are specifically targeted.” (Id.) While the BIA has broad discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen, it does not have the discretion to make such decisions arbitrarily. Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2004) (“The Board’s discretion is broad but it is not unlimited. It may not exercise its discretion in a way that is arbitrary, irrational or contrary to law. Cursory, summary, or conclusory statements are inadequate.”). Here, the BIA denied Hanna’s motion to reopen in April 2007 with little more than a bald statement that it was “not persuaded” that “conditions for Chaldean Christians in Iraq worsened,” (JA at 10), despite the fact that in June 2006 and August 2006, the BIA granted similar motions to reopen based upon evidence that did persuade the BIA that there are “worsening conditions in Iraq for Chaldean Christians,” (JA at 204), and that there has been “growing violence in which Christians are specifically targeted,” (JA at 207). In other words, the BIA has now held that between November 2004 and August 2006, conditions in Iraq for Chaldean Christians sufficiently worsened to merit reopening two cases (In re Pati and In re - 11 - No. 07-3609 Hanna v. Mukasey Balious), but between June 2005 and April 2007, conditions had not sufficiently worsened to merit reopening Hanna’s case. There is an overlap of about fourteen months between the two cases meriting reopening and Hanna’s that did not merit reopening, yet the BIA provides insufficient reasoning for this Court to determine whether the BIA abused its discretion in Hanna’s case. This Court cannot engage in meaningful review of the BIA’s decision if the Board neglects to give an adequate articulation of why it granted a motion to reopen in two cases, but denied it in a third that appears to be indistinguishable from the prior two.8 Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the Government readily acknowledged that “[y]ou certainly never want to have situations or you want to try to avoid situations where there’s government inconsistencies.” But counsel for the Government then explained that inconsistencies are “going to happen sometimes just because of the nature of asylum proceedings where people are in separate proceedings. If it’s a false claim, one person might be more convincing.”9 That might very well be true, but in this situation, we are dealing with Board decisions that draw no distinctions that 8 Regulations governing the BIA recognize a need for the BIA to maintain consistency among decisions of IJs. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(6)(i) provides that the BIA may refer a case to a three-member panel, rather than a single member, in cases that present the “need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of different immigration judges.” 9 At oral argument, counsel for the Government also informed the Court that the Department of Homeland Security is currently removing people from the United States to only northern Iraq, not southern Iraq. That removal policy is based upon some other discretionary criteria independent of the administrative ruling that a person is removable to Iraq. While we applaud the Department’s decision to remove people to the more stable and secure areas of Iraq, this other discretionary criteria only underscores our concern in this case that this case deserves a closer look by the BIA. - 12 - No. 07-3609 Hanna v. Mukasey can be labeled alien-specific. As a result, we have a situation in which the risk to all the individuals involved is exactly the same: Christians in Iraq are persecuted on the basis of their religion. Here, the Board failed to give a reason that removes this case from the shadow of In re Pati and In re Balious. There very well might be reasons relating to Hanna’s case that justify the BIA’s decision. Accordingly, we will remand this case to the BIA to explain its decision in Hanna’s case in light of In re Pati and In re Balious, and any other facts or circumstances that the BIA deems relevant to its decision. We believe that the closeness of this case warrants a careful analysis by the BIA. Furthermore, this will also give the BIA the opportunity to consider the impact, if any, of the new Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007.