Opinion ID: 747578
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: How?

Text: 89 Q. How. 90 A. Because I am saying the truth that it was there. 91 Q. And if you didn't tell us it was there, we would never know it. 92 A. That's correct. 93 Q. And there would be no way to collect on it. [An apparent reference to the Rule 35 motion the government would file on Garcia's behalf in return for Garcia's testimony.] 94 A. I don't know. 95 Q. It is your word? 96 A. My truth. 97 Q. And you are telling the truth? 98 A. Yes, sir. 99 Noa's counsel then referred to GX36, a photograph of the Rusty Pelican Marina where the What's Up was docked, after its return with the first load, and the following occurred (R. 10-244-245): 100 Q. And here is the Rusty Pelican Marina? 101 A. Yes sir. 102 Q. The What's Up isn't there now, is it? 103 A. Not now. 104 Q. But it was at one time? 105 A. yes. 106 Q. Because you told the government? 107 A. I did.Q. And I were [sic] telling the truth so it must have been there. 108 A. Correct, sir. 109 On redirect, government counsel inquired about GX78, a photograph of a house in the Bahamas where Garcia stayed with Abella, Noa and another co-defendant, prior to delivery of the third load. Referring to events related to that house, the following occurred (R. 11-111): 110 Q. Now you were asked earlier and you were shown these various photographs, government 78. Tell us again what this is? 111 A. This is the white house where Jose Abella and Oro and I stayed there. 112 Q. This doesn't show you all there in that pretty photograph, does it? 113 A. No. 114 Q. But you were asked are you the only person that can tell us about that incident? Are you? 115 A. Yes, sir. I have been asked that. 116 Q. But is that a true statement? Are you the only person that can tell us about that? 117 A. No. 118 Q. Who else? 119 A. Jose Abella, Oro [Noa], Yvonette Estrada and I Harold Garcia. 120 Noa's counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the witness's answer. The court interpreted the question as one inquiring whether the government agents who accompanied Garcia to the site could testify about the scene depicted in the photographs. The court stated that [i]t is a silly question to ask him. Let me tell the jury obviously the government agent can tell them who was in the pictures. R. 11-112. The prosecutor continued to question Garcia about the events that had occurred at the locations depicted in the photographs. Noa's counsel objected again on the grounds that the question stemmed from the same line of questioning which led to the previous objection. The district court noted that it is unfair to leave in the minds of the jury the implication that their sole source of information about this is this particular witness. That is unfair and he has the right to correct that unfairness. R. 11-116. However, because defense counsel had no intention of arguing that Garcia was the only one present at the places depicted in the photographs, the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the series of questions dealing with photographs. 121 The standard for determining whether a prosecutor has made an impermissible comment on appellants' right not to testify is whether or not the statement was manifestly intended or was of such character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. United States v. Watson, 866 F.2d 381, 386 (11th Cir.1989). A reviewing court will review the trial judge's determination of whether manifest intent was present under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. Moreover, the remark must be examined in the context in which it was made. United States v. LeQuire, 943 F.2d 1554, 1565 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1223, 112 S.Ct. 3037, 120 L.Ed.2d 906 (1992). Because only the trial judge had the opportunity to view the prosecutor's demeanor first hand, we review only for abuse of discretion the trial judge's determination of whether manifest intent was present. Watson, 866 F.2d at 386. 122 After reviewing the context in which the challenged statements were made, we find that the prosecutor's questions were not manifestly intended as a comment on the appellants' exercise of their right not to testify. The government contends that the prosecutor was merely asking who else was involved in the events depicted in the photographs to rebut defense counsel's suggestion that Garcia was not credible. This court has observed that there is no infirmity when the comment is offered to rebut a defense attack on a prosecution witness's credibility. LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1565. The district court viewed the questioning as an attempt to rebut the implication that Garcia was the government's only source of information regarding the events that took place at the places depicted in the photographs. No manifest intent exists where there is another, equally plausible explanation for the remark. Id. We find both the government's invited argument explanation and the district court's interpretation of the prosecutor's intent as plausible as the appellants' claim that the questioning was manifestly intended as a comment on the appellants' decision not to testify. Therefore, we conclude that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in finding no manifest intent. 123 With regard to the second part of the test--whether the comments were of such character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify--the question is not whether the 'jury possibly or even probably would view the challenged remark in this manner but whether the jury necessarily would have done so.'  LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1567 (quoting United States v. Griggs, 735 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.1984)) (emphasis in original). The comments were not a direct comment on appellants' exercise of their right not to testify as was the case in LeQuire, 943 F.2d at 1564 (he doesn't have the guts to tell it about the Colombians and get on that stand). Rather, the questions at issue merely elicited a response that the appellants could provide information about the locations depicted in the photographs. We do not view the prosecutor's questions as sufficiently egregious to find that the jury would necessarily conclude that the questions were comments on the appellants' exercise of their right not to testify.