Opinion ID: 1924747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: order entered february 11, 1983

Text: This cause having been brought to this Court by complaint for quo warranto and due deliberation having been had of the complaint and of the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the Court being equally divided upon the question of the right of defendant to hold the office of Justice of the Supreme Court after January 1, 1983, it is hereby ordered that the complaint is dismissed. Pursuant to GCR 1963, 866.3(c) the Clerk is directed to issue this judgment order forthwith. RILEY, J., not participating. ORDER ENTERED FEBRUARY 15, 1983 Upon reconsideration on the Court's own motion, there now being four justices who vote for ouster, the order of February 11, 1983 in this cause is vacated. This cause having been brought to this Court by complaint for quo warranto and due deliberation having been had of the complaint and of the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that defendant, Dorothy Comstock Riley, has, since the first day of January, 1983, claimed to exercise the office of Justice of the Supreme Court, and whereas, upon full consideration we find that claim from that date to be without authority, it is ordered that the said defendant, Dorothy Comstock Riley is hereby ousted and excluded from the office of Justice of the Supreme Court. Pursuant to GCR 1963, 866.3(c) the Clerk is directed to issue this judgment order forthwith. RILEY, J., not participating. RYAN and BRICKLEY, JJ., state: We dissent from the Court's reconsideration of this matter and dissent from the judgment of ouster for the reasons stated in Justice RYAN'S opinion of February 11, 1983. OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 16, 1983 LEVIN, J. My opinion in the instant case, filed Friday afternoon, February 11, 1983, concluded with the following statement: Because I am of the opinion that no judgment of ouster should be issued at this time, I join in the decision to deny issuance of a judgment of ouster. (Emphasis supplied.) The opinion also states: The quo warranto complaint filed by the Attorney General cannot be decided until four members of this Court vote to grant the relief prayed for therein or to dismiss the complaint.[10] (Emphasis supplied.) [10] No judgment of a trial court is here being affirmed by an equally divided court. Opinions joined in by less than four of the six participating members of this Court do not have finality. Today's disposition cannot, in my opinion, decide or adjudicate this controversy. (Emphasis supplied.) The court rule provides: `Decisions by the Supreme Court. No motion shall be decided nor order entered by the Court unless all required documents have been filed with the Court and requisite fees have been paid and, except for affirmance of action by a lower court or tribunal by even division of the Justices of the Supreme Court voting thereon, decisions of the Supreme Court shall be made by concurrence of a majority of the Justices voting thereon.' GCR 1963, 865.3. The five opinions of the justices filed February 11, 1983, addressed the question whether the former Governor had or the present Governor has the power to make an appointment to fill the MOODY seat for the period beginning January 1, 1983. The five opinions did not consider or address the separate question [1] of the effect on Justice RILEY'S authority to exercise the powers of a justice of this Court of the three different views [2] of the justices on the question whether the former Governor had the power to appoint Justice RILEY for the period beginning January 1, 1983, or of an equal division of the Court on that question. On consideration of the question of the effect of the five opinions of the justices, I am of the opinion that the ultimate question in the instant case is not whether one Governor or another is empowered to make the appointment for the period beginning January 1, 1983, but whether, by virtue of the appointment by the former Governor, Justice RILEY is empowered to exercise the power of the office of justice of the Supreme Court for the period beginning January 1, 1983. However the question arises [3] or whatever the form of action, [4] unless a majority of the six justices (four) participating in the instant case agree that Justice RILEY has been so empowered, her authority to act has not been adjudicated favorably to her claim of authority. [5] Absent an adjudication by four justices favorable to Justice RILEY'S claim of authority, [6] Justice RILEY should not and cannot exercise the power of the office. Her participation in the work of this Court without an adjudication favorable to her claim would leave the question of the authority of her vote and of a decision of this Court in which she were to participate open to continuing dispute. [7] Because less than four votes were garnered for the view that Justice RILEY'S authority from and after January 1, 1983, should be recognized, a judgment of ouster, which could not properly be issued before consideration and determination of the separate question of the effect of the five opinions of the justices filed February 11, 1983, should now be issued. I therefore join in the entry of a judgment of ouster at this time.