Opinion ID: 2326858
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Choice to Use Standard Equipment's Proposed Verdict Sheet.

Text: Rule 2-522(c) provides that [t]he court may require a jury to return a verdict in the form of written findings upon specific issues. For that purpose, the court may use any method of submitting the issues and requiring written findings as it deems appropriate. The Rule imbues a trial court with, in the words of Owens-Corning, 343 Md. at 525, 682 A.2d at 1155, the authority to design submissions to the jury as well as format the jury's findings. [I]n cases with multiple parties or issues, these special verdicts are often useful.... Id. (citations omitted). Consolidated Waste, in its specific arguments offered here, fails to demonstrate how the trial court abused its discretion in utilizing Standard Equipment's proposed verdict sheet. Question 5 of the verdict sheet was neither redundant nor confusing to the jury, in light of Question 4. Question 4 of the verdict sheet asked whether Consolidated Waste proved that Standard Equipment was negligent, while Question 5 asked whether Consolidated Waste proved that any negligence found by the jury in its response to Question 4 caused damages. Consolidated Waste argues that Question 4 included all the elements of negligence, which the jury was instructed on properly, including causation and damages. By asking, in Question 5, if damages were caused by the negligence, the verdict sheet implied that Standard Equipment could have been negligent, but yet not caused any damages. Consolidated Waste claims that this separation of the elements of negligence was confusing, redundant, and unnecessary. The word negligence is used frequently in popular parlance to describe generally the breach of a duty, separate from the other legal elements that make the breach actionablecausation and damageseven on verdict sheets. As we explained in Collins v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 417 Md. 217, 251-52, 9 A.3d 56, 76-77 (2010), cert. dismissed, A prima facie case of negligence under [the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)] is based on the common law elements in accordance with federal law: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation. Szekeres v. CSX Transp., Inc., 617 F.3d 424 (6th Cir.2010) (citing Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc., 899 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir.1990) (holding that a FELA plaintiff asserting a cause of negligence against his or her employer must prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation)). Ordinarily the general concept of negligence and the instruction on causation, distinct elements in a negligence claim, are explained and represented in separate questions on the verdict sheet. Vol.Ch. 9, Modern Federal Jury InstructionsCivil, ¶ 6.2-6.4 (Matthew Bender 2010) (illustrating a model verdict sheet in which the elements of negligence and causation are addressed separately and in that order); see also 9-49 BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE FORMS Form No. 49:34 (2010) (providing a sample verdict sheet in which the question of negligence preceded the question of causation); see MARYLAND CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 19-1, 19-10 (Maryland Bar Association, 4th ed. 2009 Supp.) (defining the general concept of negligence and causation elements respectively). The trial court's decision seemed to be animated also by a practical concernensuring that the jury addressed all of the elements of Consolidated Waste's negligence claim. In sum, we conclude that a reasonable trial judge could deem[] appropriate the use of this special verdict. Rule 2-522(c). Standard Equipment points out that the jury's negative answer to both Questions 4 and 5 supports the conclusion that the jury was not confused by the alleged separate treatment in these two questions of the elements of actionable negligence. The jury answering no to Question 4 demonstrated that it found at least one element (perhaps more) of negligence was not satisfied, in its judgment. The negative response to Question 5 makes crystal clear that specifically the jury concluded that at least the damages element of negligence was not fulfilled by Consolidated Waste's evidence. We are not persuaded that the jury's understanding of Question 5 had any prejudicial or harmful effect on the jury's response to Question 4. Consolidated Waste quarrels also with Question 6, the part of the verdict sheet that asked the jury to consider potentially the defense of contributory negligence. Consolidated Waste argues that the previously-issued jury instructions were sufficient in and of themselves to present such a defense. As the argument goes, including the question on the verdict sheet influenced improperly the jury to find in favor of Standard Equipment. In particular, as Consolidated Waste argues, the presence of Question 6 on the verdict sheet forced the jury to consider the issue of contributory negligence, in the context of determining the elements of negligence. Consolidated Waste relies upon Fry v. Carter, 375 Md. 341, 825 A.2d 1042 (2003), to bolster its argument that the trial judge instructed the jury improperly on the defense of contributory negligence. In Fry, a roadside worker was killed by a passing tractor-trailer. See Fry, 375 Md. at 344, 825 A.2d at 1043. The family of the worker filed a wrongful death and survival action against the driver and the driver's employer. See id. At the end of trial, the court instructed the jury on the theory of unavoidable accident, which is viewed not so much a defense as a mere denial of negligence. Fry, 375 Md. at 357, 825 A.2d at 1050-51. We held the instruction inappropriate. In light of the evidence of the defendant's negligence, the unavoidable accident instruction diverted juror attention from the pivotal issue in the casenegligence. Fry, 375 Md. at 356, 825 A.2d at 1050. Unlike Fry, the present case involves an actual legal defense, contributory negligence. Standard Equipment was entitled to have the jury instructed on any theory of the defense that is fairly supported by the evidence. General v. State, 367 Md. 475, 485, 789 A.2d 102, 108 (2002); see also Sims v. State, 319 Md. 540, 573 A.2d 1317 (1990). Here, there was at least some dispute over the impact on the machine's operational problems and the root cause of those problems, i.e., the daily maintenance (or not) on the Waste Hauler performed by Consolidated Waste. In any event, Consolidated Waste concedes that the oral instruction on contributory negligence was appropriate. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 17 (There is no question that ... [Standard Equipment] was entitled to such an instruction [on contributory negligence]. (Emphasis omitted)). Moreover, the instruction did not divert juror attention from the pivotal issue, which was whether Standard Equipment was negligent, for Question 6 was only to be answered if the jury answered Questions 4 and 5 in the affirmative. Indeed, Question 6 served actually a practical purpose allowing the jury to separate the triable issues of negligence and contributory negligence. Such a practice is useful in cases with multiple parties or issues. Owens-Corning, 343 Md. at 525, 682 A.2d at 1155. We are unwilling to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting a question about contributory negligence on the verdict sheet. Even were we to determine that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard, Consolidated Waste failed to show how it was prejudiced by Question 6. The verdict sheet instructs clearly the jury to skip Question 6 if the answer to either Question 4 or Question 5 was No. The jury answered both of the earlier questions in the negative and left Question 6 unanswered. It is not unreasonable to expect a jury to follow instructions presented clearly to them. Thus, there is no evidence that Question 6 tainted or affected in any way the verdict of the jury. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.