Opinion ID: 2622641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Second-degree felony instruction

Text: Barton alleges that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue effectively that NRS 200.070 is unconstitutional. Barton argues that the language of the statute is vague and ambiguous in that it purports to define involuntary manslaughter, but then goes on to define murder in the same paragraph. This, he argues, suggests the existence of a misdemeanor-murder rule. He argues that under that statute, any minor traffic violation which results in the death of a human being would be murder. We disagree. NRS 200.070 provides: [I]nvoluntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being, without any intent to do so, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner, but where the involuntary killing occurs in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense is murder. The jury instruction at trial quoted this statutory language. After defining manslaughter, NRS 200.070 simply distinguishes manslaughter from murder by referring to the factors which indicate malice, a required element of murder. The statute refers to the two types of malice express malice and implied malice, the latter being unlawful acts which naturally tend to destroy the life of a human being. None of the minor traffic violations cited by Barton, like jaywalking or speeding, would naturally tend[ ] to destroy the life of a human being. Thus, the commission of those minor offenses would not automatically render a killing murder (absent proof of malice). Accordingly, appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to argue this issue effectively. NRS 200.070 does not create a misdemeanor-murder offense nor is it unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.