Opinion ID: 1257787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Reliance on Presumptive Prejudice

Text: This case presents us with an opportunity to revisit the issue of preindictment delay and, specifically, to consider when due process is implicated by such delay. In reviewing the law in this area, we uncovered authority that expressly undermines this Court's decision to employ a presumption of prejudice where an extensive preindictment delay is involved. See Hey, 269 S.E.2d at 394, syl. pt. 2. Our holding in Hey is called into question by the Fourth Circuit's recognition that [t]he Due Process Clause has never been interpreted so as to impose a presumption of prejudice in the event of a lengthy preindictment delay.... Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900, 906 (4th Cir.1996); accord U.S. v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.1995) (rejecting contention that delay was presumptively prejudicial, holding that a defendant must show actual prejudice to establish a claim of preindictment delay under the due process clause); State v. Collins, 118 Ohio App.3d 73, 691 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (1997) (recognizing speedy trial analysis [14] is genesis of presumptive prejudice rulings and holding that notion of presumptive prejudice ... has no application to preindictment delays). [15] Firmly rejecting an argument to extend the presumptive prejudice approach used for Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims to due process claims in Jones, the Fourth Circuit underscored the unwavering approach taken by the high court on this issue: The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that, in order to establish a due process violation, the defendant must show that the delay `caused him actual prejudice in presenting his defense.' Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 (quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192, 104 S.Ct. 2292). Further recapping, the Fourth Circuit observed that the United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that the `potential prejudice and passage of time' is sufficient to sustain a due process claim. Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 455). Referencing its preference for resolving issues of delay by relying upon statutes of limitations the United States Supreme Court stated: `The law has provided other mechanisms to guard against possible as distinguished from actual prejudice resulting from the passage of time between crime and arrest or charge.' Jones, 94 F.3d at 906 (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 455) (emphasis in original). Critically, as the Fourth Circuit recounted, the courts of appeals have uniformly held that to obtain a dismissal under the Due Process Clause a defendant must establish that a pre-indictment delay actually prejudiced his defense.... Jones, 94 F.3d at 907 (emphasis in original); accord Wilson v. McCaughtry, 994 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that despite sixteen-year delay between crime and indictment, defendant must demonstrate that he suffered actual and substantial prejudice). After reviewing the rulings of the various federal circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit concluded that every court that has specifically considered the application of Doggett [lengthy post-indictment delay is presumptively prejudicial for speedy trial purposes] [16] ... has held that `[t]he concept of presumed prejudice has no place in a due process analysis.' Jones, 94 F.3d at 907 (citations omitted).