Opinion ID: 1128761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inconsistent Decisions in Bifurcated Trials

Text: At the time of this trial in 1994, La.Rev. Stat. 13:5105 provided in part that [n]o suit against a political subdivision of the state shall be tried by jury. [3] Because the RTA was a political subdivision of the state, La. Rev.Stat. 48:1654, a jury trial against the RTA was prohibited. The RTA employee, however, requested trial by jury as to her liability. In Champagne v. American Southern Ins. Co., 295 So.2d 437 (La.1974), this court addressed the issue of whether La.Rev.Stat. 13:5105 (then 5104) prohibits a jury trial of any portion of the case when the state is one of several defendants in the action, either by cumulation in one action or by consolidation of several actions. Reviewing the Code articles pertaining to jury trials, this court noted that La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 1735 (now Article 1736) contemplates that some issues may be tried by the jury while others in the same trial may be decided by the judge. The Champagne decision held that a single trial is permitted with the judge determining the issues relative to the state and the jury determining all the other issues. The court in Champagne noted the possibility of inconsistent decisions, but stated that the judge has the power to set aside a jury decision with which he or she is not in accord [4] and the appellate court has the constitutional right to review findings of fact of both judge and jury. The court did not mention the manifest error standard for such appellate review which had been adopted one year earlier, but review of factual findings under that standard, by granting due deference to the decisions of both the jury and the judge, obviously would not reconcile conflicting decisions if each decision was supported by record evidence and therefore was not manifestly erroneous. The case of Thornton v. Moran, 341 So.2d 1136 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976), involved actions against each other by the drivers in a twovehicle collision. The two actions were consolidated because of the common issues of law and fact, and were tried concurrently, one by the jury (as requested in one of the consolidated cases) and the other by the judge. The two triers-of-fact reached contradictory results, and conflicting judgments were rendered in the two cases. Using the Canter v. Koehring Co . standard, the court of appeal reviewed the cases separately, noting that each decision should not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. Stating that [i]f the results reached in these cases after our review remain contradictory or should they conform one to the other, so be it, the court found a reasonable factual basis to support the conclusion reached by each trier-of-fact and essentially affirmed each judgment. This court peremptorily granted the applications for certiorari, without briefing or oral argument, [5] and rendered the following order: Writ granted. Judgment of court of appeal reversed; case remanded to court of appeal to resolve the differences in the factual findings between the jury and the judge in these consolidated cases and to render a single opinion based upon the record. La. Const. Art. 5, § 10(B); Rights of parties to reapply for writs in accordance with law after court of appeal renders decision in accordance with views herein expressed are reserved. Thornton v. Moran, 343 So.2d 1065 and 1066 (La.1977). On remand, the court of appeal reconciled the judgments, holding that the jury's decision was more reasonable. Thornton v. Moran, 348 So.2d 79 (La.App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 So.2d 897 (La.1977). Since the Thornton decision, the courts of appeal have adopted varying procedures for reconciling conflicting decisions by the jury and the judge in bifurcated trials. We do not reach in this case the questions of whether to overrule Thornton's mandate to reconcile conflicting decisions rather than to give due deference to each, [6] or of how to reconcile the decisions if it is necessary to do so. We address only the threshold question of whether there should be a bifurcated trial at all when there is only one tortfeasor and the other defendant is only vicariously liable for that tortfeasor.
When an action involves only two defendants, an employee of a political subdivision of the state and the political subdivision itself which is not independently negligent and can only be liable vicariously, separate trials of each defendant with separate triers-of-fact serve no useful purpose except to accord the employee of the targeted defendant his or her arguable statutory right to a jury trial. On the other hand, separate trials promote the substantial possibility of inconsistent decisions on the liability of the employee, with the additional possibility of inconsistent quantum awards. We granted certiorari to consider whether we should modify the Champagne decision and mandate that there be only one trier-of-fact in this situation. Such a ruling would eliminate the untenable result (as in the present case) in which the jury may find the employee was not at fault, but the judge may find the employer vicariously liable based on the fault of the alleged tortfeasor whom the jury exonerated. See also Aubert v. Charity Hosp. of La., 363 So.2d 1223 (La.App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 242 (La.1978). During our study of the inherent problems, including the issue of whether the single trier-of-fact should be the judge or the jury, we discovered that the Legislature has already provided the solution, which apparently has been generally overlooked in the trial courts. In 1988, the Legislature amended La.Rev. Stat. 13:5101, which had previously made La. Rev.Stat. 13:5101-5114 (now known as the Louisiana Governmental Claims Act) applicable to any suit ... against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision of the state. The 1988 amendment made La.Rev. Stat. 13:5101-5114 also applicable to any suit ... against an officer or employee of a political subdivision arising out of the discharge of his official duties or within the course and scope of his employment. When Section 5101 after the 1988 amendment is read together with Section 5105, [7] the prohibition of jury trials against a political subdivision in Section 5105 extends to employees of the political subdivision when the suit arose out of the discharge of the officer's or employee's official duties or the officer or employee was in the course and scope of employment at the pertinent time. [8] Thus any actions against both a political subdivision and its employee tried after the 1988 amendment to Section 5101 should have been tried by the judge alone without a jury. The present case involving a 1990 accident was tried in 1994, long after the 1988 amendment to La.Rev.Stat. 13:5101 extended the prohibition against jury trials to employees of a political subdivision. When this case was tried, the RTA was a political subdivision of the state, and Singleton was an employee of a political subdivision in the course and scope of employment at the time of the alleged negligence. [9] The action therefore should have been tried by the judge alone without a jury. Accordingly, the jury trial of Singleton's liability was incorrect, and the verdict of the jury must be disregarded. In the bench trial of the RTA's liability (at which the employee's liability also should have been tried), the judge found the RTA employee negligent and ruled that the RTA was vicariously liable for the tort of its employee. This is the decision that should be subjected to appellate review. Inasmuch as the court of appeal has not reviewed the decision of the trial judge, we remand the case to the court of appeal to review the decision on liability under the manifest error standard and the decision on quantum under the much discretion standard. [10]