Opinion ID: 605413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Alleged Failure to Exercise Discretion.

Text: 17 As Keith correctly points out, the district court had the right to determine whether Keith's positive urinalysis tests established possession of a controlled substance within the meaning of § 3565(a). U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, Comment Note 5 ([t]he Commission leaves to the court the determination whether evidence of drug usage established solely by laboratory analysis constitutes 'possession of a controlled substance' as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)); Gordon, 961 F.2d at 429. Keith contends the district court erred in finding drug possession here. 18 We are not persuaded. At the probation revocation hearing, the district court considered the evidence before it and made an express factual finding of drug possession. R.Tr. 4, 9; R.Doc. 10 at 2. 2 Moreover, in the analogous context of § 3583(g) (governing revocation of supervised release), we have held that  'use' in this [revocation] context is synonymous with possession. Rockwell, 984 F.2d at 1114. Accordingly, both the record facts and the applicable law support the district court's finding that Keith violated the conditions of her probation by unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 19 C. The District Court's Imposition of a Prison Sentence in Excess of the Guideline Range Applicable to Keith's Original Crime. 20 Having found that Keith violated the terms of her probation by possession of a controlled substance, the district court sentenced Keith to a term of imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release, pursuant to § 3565(a). R.Doc. 10 at 2. The court relied on the last portion of the statute which provides: 21 Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if a defendant is found by the court to be in possession of a controlled substance, thereby violating the condition imposed by § 3563(a)(3), the court shall revoke the sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not less than one-third of the original sentence. 22 (Emphasis added.) The court interpreted the foregoing amendment to require imposition of a prison sentence of at least one-third the length of defendant's probation sentence. Because Keith's term of probation was 5 years, the court sentenced Keith to 20 months' imprisonment. R.Tr. 9; R.Doc. 10 at 2. 23 The defendant argues that the judge misconstrued the statute. We have recently upheld this claim of error. In United States v. Diaz, No. 92-2158, --- F.2d ---- (10th Cir. 3/22/93), we held that the term  'original sentence' in the 1988 Amendment [to § 3565(a) ] refers to the original term of incarceration available at the time of initial sentencing. Id. at 7. 3 Here the guideline range of incarceration applicable to Keith's original conspiracy conviction was 8-14 months. R.Add. to Presentence Rep. at 7. Accordingly, under § 3565(a), the district court should have sentenced Keith to a prison term of no less than four and two-thirds months--one-third of the original 14 month maximum guideline sentence. 24 In light of Diaz we must hold that the imposition of the 20-month sentence, followed by three years of supervised release, was error. 25 D. The District Court's Alleged Failure to Consider Sentencing Commission Policy Statements. 26 As noted by Keith, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) instructs district courts to consider any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission when imposing sentence. Chapter 7 of the guidelines contains policy statements relevant to prison sentences imposed following revocation of probation or supervised release. Specifically, § 7B1.4 indicates a 3-9 month range of imprisonment for a Grade C probation violation such as Keith's drug possession violation. Keith argues that the district court's sentence of 20 months was improper because it exceeds the range indicated in the foregoing guideline policy statements. 27 Here the district court's 20-month sentence was premised on the belief that § 3565(a) mandated the sentence imposed as a minimum. Diaz has now rejected that view. We are vacating the sentence and remanding for resentencing. In resentencing, the district judge should apply Diaz, as outlined above, imposing a sentence of no less than one-third of the original 14-month maximum guideline sentence. In this resentencing, the policy statements, which are advisory, United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d at 772, must also be considered, although they are not binding and cannot override a statute. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7; United States v. Rockwell 984 F.2d at 1114 n. 2; United States v. Brooks, 976 F.2d 1358, 1360 (10th Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 6, 1993) (No. 92-7214). 28 On remand the judge should consider the policy statement as he imposes a new sentence that must not violate § 3565(a).