Opinion ID: 1292234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Did the Borough Assembly's rezoning decision, and the Board of Adjustment's subsequent denial of grandfather rights, constitute an unconstitutional taking of Balough's property?

Text: Article I, section 18 of the Alaska Constitution provides: Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. [78] In recognizing United States Supreme Court precedent, this court has noted that there are two classes of per se takings: (1) cases of physical invasion and (2) cases where a regulation denies a landowner of all economically feasible use of the property. [79] When a case does not fall into either of these categories, courts must engage in a case-specific inquiry to determine whether governmental action effects a taking. [80] Factors that a court should consider in making this determination include: (1) the character of the governmental action; (2) its economic impact; and (3) its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. [81] In addition, we have stated that [t]he legitimacy of the interest advanced by the regulation or land-use decision is also relevant to this inquiry. [82] Balough argues that FNSB's actions have substantially impaired the marketability of [her] property and have otherwise abridged the economic advantages of ownership and the opportunities and rewards [her] ingenious abilities and resources would have produced if the property were to be utilized as [she] reasonably expected and intended when she purchased the property and made subsequent expenditures toward that end. While the BOA's decision to deny Balough grandfather rights would terminate her right to use her property as a junkyard, the decision did leave her with economically feasible use of her property. Presumably, Balough could sell her property to someone who wishes to build a house on it, or use it in any other manner permitted in the RR zoning district. [83] Balough herself does not seem to be claiming that she has no economically feasible use for her land; rather, she argues that the BOA's decision substantially impaired the marketability of her property, though she presented no evidence to support her assertion. Even though the BOA's actions did not constitute a per se taking, Balough could still be entitled to compensation if the BOA's action amounted to a taking based on the three-part analysis articulated above. Balough does not address the three factors used to determine whether a government action constitutes a taking even if there is no per se taking. First, Balough's brief is unclear as to exactly what government action she feels amounted to a taking. Based on the case law she cites, Balough appears to be arguing that the Borough Assembly's decision to rezone, thus eliminating junkyards as a permitted use, constituted a taking. The Assembly's rezoning action was a legitimate government action, consistent with FNSB's comprehensive zoning plan. The Assembly rezoned Nugget Loop to RR in response to neighbors' concerns about safety and aesthetics. Second, any negative economic impact of the rezoning seems solely concentrated in Balough's fence-building efforts. Whether her property was located in a RR zoning district or a GU-1 zoning district, however, Balough would be required to obscure the junkyard from view. The Assembly's rezoning decision, therefore, did not create the costs she incurred when building her fence. Lastly, Balough only asserted that she purchased the property in order to operate a junkyard after she had filed suit against FNSB. [84] Prior to her deposition, however, Balough had never alleged to have bought the property for the purpose of storing junked cars. In fact, her husband told the Borough Assembly that the junkyard was only temporary; that [he] did not intend to turn it into a junkyard. Because the Assembly's action did not amount to a per se taking of Balough's property, and because application of the three factors articulated in Sandberg does not reveal a taking, we conclude that Balough was not a victim of an unconstitutional taking. 4. Was it a violation of Balough's right to due process of law that the Borough Assembly sat as the Board of Adjustment? Due process requirements apply in administrative proceedings. [A] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process. This applies to administrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts. Not only is a biased decision maker constitutionally unacceptable[,] but our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness. [85] In Keiner v. City of Anchorage, we stated that the Anchorage board of adjustment did not deny Keiner due process because The board made its findings only after due notice and full opportunity to be heard; the conduct of the hearing was consistent with the essentials of a fair trial; there is no assertion that the board was anything but impartial; and a complete record of the proceedings was kept so that the reviewing court was able to determine that there was no substantial failure to observe applicable rules of law and procedure, and that in all other respects Keiner was afforded a fair hearing. [86] The most plausible argument that Balough was denied due process is that the BOA members were not impartial. Balough had due notice and a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and those who testified before the BOA were sworn in. If, however, the BOA was not a neutral body, Balough's right to due process was violated. A reading of the Assembly transcripts reveals potential biases of Assembly members, who later sat on the BOA. Balough, however, does not make this argument. Balough's only argument that the BOA was not impartial pertains exclusively to Assembly Member Therrien's alleged conflict of interest, which we discuss in the following subsection. Instead, Balough argues that her due process rights were violated because the Borough Assembly wore three hats when it: (1) passed the grandfather rights ordinance; (2) rezoned the seventy-five-acre parcel of land; and (3) sat as the BOA and rendered the decision revoking Balough's grandfather rights. She states that the broad, unrestrainedessentially politicaldiscretion granted to the Assembly/Board of Adjustment is such so as to itself constitute a violation of due process. Balough also argues that the Assembly should not be involved in rezoning decisions because such decisions are quasi-judicial, and the Assembly is not trained in the law. [87] Balough's argument that the BOA violated her rights to due process, absent an allegation of partiality, is unconvincing. First, the Borough Assembly sat as a legislative body when it enacted both the grandfather rights ordinance and the ordinance that resulted in the rezoning of the seventy-five-acre parcel. [88] In Griswold we stated that [w]e have repeatedly held that it is the role of elected representatives rather than the courts to decide whether a particular statute or ordinance is a wise one. [89] The Borough Assembly, therefore, was acting in its proper legislative capacity when it enacted FNSBCO 18.56.020, and when it rezoned the seventy-five-acre parcel within the FNSB as RR. [90] Second, the Borough Assembly properly sat as the BOA when it revoked Balough's grandfather rights. [91] The BOA gave Balough notice of the hearing and the right to be heard; both she and her attorney spoke at the hearing; and the BOA voted to and did consider a letter and photographs written by her attorney to the BOA. Additionally, while the BOA and the Borough Assembly share the same members, the BOA was not reviewing a decision by the Borough Assembly; rather, the BOA was hearing an appeal from a decision of the Department of Community Planning. The BOA had no input into the Department's decision to grant Balough grandfather rights, and, therefore, no appearance of impropriety existed when the BOA reviewed the Department's decision. The mere fact that the BOA comprised the same members as the Borough Assembly does not amount to a denial of due process. 5. Did Assembly Member Therrien's participation in the rezoning and Board of Adjustment hearing amount to a denial of Balough's due process rights? Balough argues that Assembly Member Therrien had an actual conflict of interest; thus her participation in the rezoning decision and in the subsequent decision to deny Balough grandfather rights amounted to a denial of Balough's right to due process. Balough cites Griswold in support of her assertion. Furthermore, Balough argues that fundamental fairness and professional ethics required Therrien to refrain from participating in the decision making process. During the January 14, 1993, Assembly meeting, Therrien told the Chair, I think I might have to declare a conflict of interest because I represent several of the parties in this area and I feel that I should abstain. Not necessarily with regard to this, but I represent at least three of the people and I think it would be more appropriate [to abstain]. The Chair asked Therrien whether she had ever represented them on issues or matters relating to the rezoning. Upon Therrien's negative reply, the Chair stated that he [did not] find that [Therrien had] a conflict of interest. Neither Balough or her attorney objected to Therrien's participation in the Assembly's rezoning vote, nor did they object to her participating as a member of the BOA in the decision to deny Balough grandfather rights. Balough's failure to object to Therrien's participation in the Assembly meeting or the BOA hearing effectively waives her right to raise such an objection on appeal.