Opinion ID: 4569171
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interacting with an Immediate Family Member

Text: Bryant also argues that the communication condition will bar him from speaking to his brother, who is also a convicted felon. He asserts that the district court did not make the required findings in order to justify imposing a condition that prohibits contact with his brother. We agree. In United States v. Myers, then-Judge Sotomayor held that a condition restricting a father from associating with his child was, without a stronger justification in the record, unreasonable: [W]hen a fundamental liberty interest is implicated by a sentencing condition, we must first consider the sentencing goal to which the 39 condition relates, and whether the record establishes its reasonableness. We must then consider whether it represents a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to achieve that goal. Here, however, the record was inadequate on both prongs of the inquiry, allowing us neither to identify the goal to which the condition related nor to determine whether an undue deprivation of liberty occurred. 426 F.3d 117, 126 (2d Cir. 2005). The government argues that Myers is distinguishable because that case involved a parent-child relationship, whereas here the relationship is fraternal. However, we have recognized that sibling relationships are entitled to the same level of due process protection as other familial relationships. See Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 910 F.3d 40, 47 (2d Cir. 2018). Although it would be permissible in certain circumstances to restrict contact on supervised release between a defendant and an immediate family member if a sufficient showing for such a restriction is made, here the district court made no findings and provided little explanation of why this condition was appropriate. When the issue was raised below, the district court responded that “[p]robation officers just generally allow [brothers to talk]” and, if “there’s a particular conflict between members of a family and the probation officer thinks that would create a 40 pretty grave risk if there is contact between the two,” the probation officer should be able to prevent the brothers from communicating. App’x at 172-73. We recognize that a district court need not explain its reasoning when imposing standard conditions, United States v. Truscello, 168 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1999), which the communication condition at issue here is, see App’x at 200. However, because this condition as applied to Bryant implicates a protected familial relationship, see Gorman, 910 F.3d at 47, a more thorough justification is required, see Myers, 426 F.3d at 125-28 (remanding for further development of the record). The district court’s comments, as well as the PSR’s generic justifications for the application of this condition, are not commensurate with the burden imposed, and are thus insufficient to support the restriction of Bryant’s communications and interactions with his brother. Moreover, because a restriction regarding communications and interactions with an immediate family member implicates a liberty interest, that determination is not a minor detail that can be left to the discretion of the Probation Department. See United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that, although a district court “may delegate to a probation officer decisionmaking authority over certain minor details of supervised release,” it “may not delegate to the Probation Department 41 decisionmaking authority which would make a defendant’s liberty itself contingent on a probation officer’s exercise of discretion”); see also Myers, 426 F.3d at 130 (“[T]he district court may not improperly delegate this determination [of whether a special condition is warranted] to the probation office.”). Accordingly, we will remand to allow the district court to provide further justification for this condition as applied to Bryant’s immediate family members or to exempt such communications and interactions from the restriction.