Opinion ID: 2330570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Application of Reasonable Probability Test

Text: Again, in applying the reasonable probability test we must make a de novo review, giving deference to the trial court's factual findings, of whether there is a reasonable probability that, had Moore's juvenile burglary adjudication been disclosed to the defense before the end of Warrior's trial, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In other words, does the evidence put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict? Although not stating the test in these terms, the trial judge answered the question by stating, I don't believe that it would have had any impact. Our de novo review leads us to the same conclusion. Certainly, as Warrior points out in her appellate brief, Moore was a key witness for the prosecution in that Moore provided first-hand knowledge of Warrior's involvement in Jeremy's murder, detailing the plan and the execution of the plan. Yet, as the State observed, the credibility of Moore on the question of dishonesty was thoroughly attacked at trial. During defense counsel's extensive cross-examination of Moore, Moore admitted to initially naming a person other than Rodgers as the shooter and identifying that person in a photo lineup, changing his versions of events, repeatedly lying to officers, and making up stuff. Moore also admitted to testifying in exchange for a plea agreement with the State. He was significantly impeached on his motive for testifying and his capacity for truthfulnessthe very factors that, according to Warrior, make this juvenile adjudication evidence prejudicial. See State v. Armstrong, 240 Kan. 446, 452, 731 P.2d 249, cert. denied 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3215, 96 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) (impeachment evidence not material where witness had been impeached at trial with his prior inconsistent statements and with alleged concessions made to his son); see also, e.g., Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 549 U.S. 1125, 127 S.Ct. 957, 166 L.Ed.2d 727 (2007) (indicating that if suppressed evidence is merely cumulative, then the failure to disclose is not a violation); United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 525 U.S. 833, 119 S.Ct. 87, 142 L.Ed.2d 69 (1998) (stating undisclosed impeachment evidence is immaterial where it was cumulative of evidence of bias or partiality already presented and thus would have provided only marginal additional support for [the] defense); Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1012, 117 S.Ct. 519, 136 L.Ed.2d 407 (1996) (stating information is not material under Brady if it is merely cumulative of other evidence already before the factfinder). Moreover, the undisclosed adjudication was for an offense committed by Moore as a juvenile and 14 years before the trial. Given that, evidence of the adjudication added little to the impeachment evidence presented to the jury. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that there was a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The confidence of the jury's verdict has not been compromised.