Opinion ID: 1296990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: statement to magistrate altman

Text: Von Dohlen next asserts his statement to Magistrate Altman was obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona [9] and Michigan v. Jackson. [10] He contends Altman was a state actor and therefore, the statement was the result of illegal custodial interrogation. We disagree. The night after Von Dohlen confessed, Magistrate Altman went to the detention center to see him. Altman testified he went as Von Dohlen's employer and friend because Von Dohlen had worked for him at the pawn shop for over a year. He insisted that his duty as part-time magistrate had nothing to do with his going to see Von Dohlen. He was let in after hours because police knew him. According to Altman, he asked Von Dohlen why he did something like that, and Von Dohlen told him he had gone over and asked for change and she just didn't have change and ... said, you know, my brother's dead and you don't deserve to live and she acted like a bitch. After an in camera hearing, the trial judge ruled Altman was acting in his capacity as Von Dohlen's employer, such that the statement was admissible. [11] Once an accused requests counsel, police interrogation must cease unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981). Interrogation is defined as express questioning, or its functional equivalent which includes words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. State v. Sims, 304 S.C. 409, 417, 405 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1991) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308 (1980)). (Emphasis supplied). We have previously upheld the voluntariness of a defendant's statements to his cellmate and uncle, notwithstanding the cellmate was acting at the behest of the police and the uncle was brought to the penitentiary by the Sheriff. State v. Bell, 250 S.C. 37, 156 S.E.2d 313 (1967) overruled on other grounds, State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). Contrary to Von Dohlen's contention, his statement to Magistrate Altman did not occur during custodial interrogation by police or police agents. Rather, the statement was a voluntary response made to an employer. As with Von Dohlen's statement to police, it was for the trial judge to determine, in the first instance, whether Altman was acting as a state agent in going to see him. State v. Howard, supra (province of the trial court to determine factual issues by the preponderance of the evidence). Here, there is ample evidence to support the trial court's ruling Altman went to the jail to see Von Dohlen as his employer, rather than as a magistrate. Accordingly, we find no error in submission of this statement to the jury. In any event, even were we to find Von Dohlen's statement to Altman inadmissible, it was cumulative to his statement to police. Contrary to Von Dohlen's contention, the statement to Altman does not necessarily indicate that the shooting was intentional. The statement to Altman is entirely consistent with Von Dohlen's previous statement to police and does not negate his previous claim of accident. Accordingly, since this confession was cumulative to his statement to police, any error in its admission was harmless. State v. Rochester, supra .