Opinion ID: 2077350
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Counsel's Failure to Request an Accomplice Witness Instruction

Text: The Illinois pattern accomplice witness instruction provides: When a witness says he was involved in the commission of a crime with the defendant, the testimony of that witness is subject to suspicion and should be considered by you with caution. It should be carefully examined in light of the other evidence in the case. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.17 (3d ed. 1992). Defendant alleges that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request this instruction with respect to the testimony of James Williams. To establish a violation of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial counsel, a criminal defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from counsel's error. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 525, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698. Defendant notes that the accomplice witness instruction should be given at the defendant's request if the totality of the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom establish probable cause to believe that the witness participated in the crime, either as a principal or under a theory of accountability. People v. Henderson, 142 Ill.2d 258, 314-15, 154 Ill. Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234 (1990). Further, if the probable cause test is satisfied, the accomplice witness instruction must be given, even if the witness himself denies involvement in the crime. Henderson, 142 Ill.2d at 315, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234; People v. Carreon, 162 Ill.App.3d 990, 993-94, 114 Ill.Dec. 217, 516 N.E.2d 372 (1987). Defendant maintains that the totality of the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish probable cause that James Williams participated in the murders of Stanley Williams, Ernestine McCoy and Orlando McCoy either as a principal or under a theory of accountability. Defendant, therefore, contends that he was entitled to the accomplice witness instruction and that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to tender the instruction. Defendant also contends that, because of the nature of the evidence presented at trial, he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to tender the accomplice witness instruction. Defendant maintains that the trial was essentially a credibility contest between himself and James Williams. Defendant contends that if the jurors had been instructed on the suspect nature of James Williams' testimony, they would likely have rejected that testimony. And, according to defendant, if the jurors had rejected James' testimony, they would have either acquitted defendant of all charges, based on a finding that he shot Stanley Williams and Orlando McCoy in self-defense (720 ILCS 5/7-1 (West 1996)), or, at most, convicted him of the second degree murder of Williams and Orlando for the unreasonable use of deadly force in self-defense (720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) (West 1996)). Thus, defendant maintains that trial counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial and, therefore, that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. We disagree. Even if we assume that trial counsel's failure to request the accomplice witness instruction amounted to deficient performance, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the instruction been given. We base this conclusion on the inherent weaknesses of defendant's own testimony, the strength of the evidence offered against defendant apart from James Williams' testimony, and the instructions actually received by the jury. Defendant's testimony regarding the events that took place inside Stanley Williams' trailer on December 11, 1995, was, in many respects, not credible. Defendant admitted, in the first instance, that he entered Williams' trailer with a loaded, sawed-off, .22-caliber rifle concealed within his trench coat. Defendant further admitted that he shot Williams in the head even though Williams was unarmed, was seated, had made no physical attack on defendant, and had not yet opened the kitchen cabinet in which he kept his inoperable gun. To justify this shooting, i.e., to establish that he acted in reasonable or unreasonable self-defense, defendant testified to the existence of two facts, both of which were problematic. First, defendant stated that Williams had previously threatened him with the gun which he kept in the kitchen cabinet. However, that threat occurred, in defendant's words, on one of the very seldom occasions when defendant went to Williams' trailer by himself. Because of this, defendant was unable to offer any evidence at trial to corroborate his self-serving testimony regarding the existence of the prior threat. Second, defendant claimed that, just before he reached for the kitchen cabinet, Williams said he was going to shoot [defendant's] ass. However, this threat was not mentioned in the signed statement that defendant gave to police at the time of his arrest. Thus, significant doubt was cast on the existence of a fact which was critical to establishing that defendant had a reason to fear Williams. Further, defendant stated that he was afraid and panicking when he shot Williams, and that, when he shot Williams, he did not aim for any particular spot on Williams' body. Yet, the forensic evidence showed that, despite his panic, defendant managed to fire a single shot into Williams' temple. As the State pointed out at trial, a murder committed with a single shot to the head is frequently described by law enforcement officers as an execution style murder. Defendant's explanation for the location of the shot was that it was simply a coincidence. Defendant's testimony regarding the shooting of Orlando McCoy also lacked credibility. Defendant stated that, as Orlando attacked, he pulled something out of his pants that was, presumably, a weapon. That Orlando was armed with a weapon was, again, crucial for establishing defendant's contention that he shot Orlando in self-defense. However, the weapon that was discovered under Orlando's body was not a switchblade, or a handgun, or other small weapon that might typically be carried in one's pants, but rather a large, kitchen carving knife. As the State argued to the jury, this fact suggested that defendant found the knife in the kitchen after the murders occurred and placed it under Orlando's body. More importantly, defendant's testimony regarding Orlando's murder was at odds with the physical evidence. Defendant testified that Orlando was moving toward the kitchen when he was shot. Yet, the pool of blood abutting the front door of the trailer, and the drag marks in the blood leading to Orlando's body, established that, after Orlando was shot, his head landed on the floor next to the front door. When asked, defendant agreed that Orlando must therefore have walked the several feet from the kitchen to the front door after being shot in the head. As the State noted at trial, defendant's testimony was incredible, as it is highly unlikely that Orlando could have walked several feet after being shot directly in the temple. Defendant also testified that Orlando was facing him straight on when he attacked. However, the forensic evidence showed that Orlando was shot in the side of the head, not in the front. When defendant was asked how Orlando could have been shot in the side of the head if he was attacking defendant face-forward, defendant said only that he had no idea. As with the shooting of Williams, defendant stated that he was panicking and afraid when Orlando was approaching. Yet, as with Williams, defendant managed to fire a single shot, execution style, into Orlando's head. Again, defendant's explanation for the placement of the shot was that it was a coincidence. Defendant's testimony was also weak with respect to the shooting of Ernestine McCoy. According to the forensic evidence presented at trial, Ernestine was shot once in the back of the neck. The bullet that entered Ernestine's neck traveled forward and downward. This evidence was consistent with defendant's testimony that James, while standing with defendant in the kitchen, grabbed the rifle from defendant and then shot Ernestine from behind as she sat on the couch. However, defendant also testified that Ernestine was screaming when she was shot. Thus, according to defendant's version of events, Ernestine must at least have been aware that shots had been fired, if not the fact that Williams and Orlando had each just been shot in the head. Yet, according to defendant's testimony, Ernestine was not trying to flee the trailer or protect herself when she was shot but, instead, was sitting on the couch with her back to the people doing the shooting. Further, as the State pointed out at trial, if defendant had, in fact, shot Williams and Orlando in self-defense, there would have been no need to shoot Ernestine, who posed no threat to defendant or James. At trial, defendant offered no explanation for why James grabbed the rifle and, without deliberation, shot a woman who posed no threat to them. Equally important, defendant's testimony regarding Ernestine's murder was impeached with the statement he gave the police at the time of his arrest. In that statement, defendant said that Ernestine was not on the couch, but was on the floor of the living room, trying to get under a table, when she was shot by James Williams from about five feet away. Because of this impeachment, doubt was again cast on a critical portion of defendant's testimony. Furthermore, defendant's statement to police describing Ernestine's murder was, itself, not credible. The living room in Williams' trailer contained a coffee table, set in the middle of the room, and a small end table, set against the wall opposite the front door. Pictures taken of the trailer show that none of the numerous items on the tables, including vases with flowers, a purse, a cup, and other miscellaneous items, were disturbed. As the State argued to the jury, if Ernestine had tried to protect herself from her attackers by hiding under one of the tables, she would surely have knocked over, or disturbed in some way, the items on top of the table. Further, there was no blood on either of the tables, a fact at odds with the assertion that Ernestine was shot while hiding under one of them. Moreover, the position of Ernestine's body was inconsistent with defendant's statement. Ernestine's body was not found under one of the tables, but was found directly in front of the living room couch. Defendant's testimony regarding the events that took place inside Williams' trailer may not have been so incredible as to be completely unworthy of belief, but, considered solely on its own terms, it was problematic. As the State argued at length before the jury, the most critical portions of defendant's testimony were uncorroborated, were impeached, or were inconsistent with the physical evidence. Clearly, the outcome of defendant's trial depended as much upon whether the jury believed defendant as it did upon whether they believed James Williams. Equally as clear, in finding defendant guilty of the murders of Stanley Williams, Orlando McCoy and Ernestine McCoy, the jurors, in fact, rejected defendant's testimony. If the accomplice witness instruction had been given, it would have done nothing to cure the inherent weaknesses of defendant's testimony and nothing to increase the likelihood of its acceptance by the jury. If given, the accomplice witness instruction would also have had no effect on the jury's assessment of the witnesses, other than James Williams, presented by the State. Dawn Daubach, Becky Williams and Dana Ganninger testified at trial against defendant. Daubach and Becky both testified that, while waiting outside Williams' trailer, they heard three shots fired in quick succession, followed by a short pause, and then two more shots. This sequence of shots corroborated James Williams' testimony regarding how the shootings took place. In addition, Daubach and Becky both testified that, when James exited the trailer, he was shocked and physically ill. Again, as the State argued to the jury, this tended to corroborate James's testimony that he did not expect the shootings or participate in them. Dana Ganninger's testimony further corroborated James Williams' version of the shootings. Ganninger testified that, in November 1995, defendant told her that Stanley Williams had an attitude problem and was going to get it. She also stated that, on the afternoon of December 11, 1995, defendant confessed to killing the three victims. Defendant notes that the testimony of Becky, Daubach and Ganninger was not entirely credible. Both Daubach and Ganninger had prior felony convictions, and all three witnesses admitted being addicted to, or frequently using, cocaine around the time of the murders. However, the testimony of Becky, Daubach and Ganninger was not discredited to the extent that defendant's testimony was. Moreover, the testimony of each of these witnesses was consistent with the others' in all important respects. As the State noted at trial, this tended to reduce the likelihood that the witnesses had fabricated their testimony. The combined strength of Becky's, Daubach's and Ganninger's testimony was considerable. The accomplice witness instruction, if given, would have had done nothing to diminish the weight of this testimony. Lastly, we note that the jury in the case at bar received the general, pattern instruction on witness credibility. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed. 1992). This instruction tells the jurors that [i]n considering the testimony of any witness, [they] may take into account    any interest, bias, or prejudice he may have. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 1.02 (3d ed. 1992). Thus, while the jury in this case did not receive the accomplice witness instruction with respect to James Williams, it did consider, in general terms, any interest, bias or prejudice that James Williams had in testifying as he did. Defendant argues, however, that the general instruction on witness credibility that was given to the jury did not cure the omission of the accomplice witness instruction. Defendant maintains that the general instruction speaks only in neutral terms while, in contrast, the accomplice witness instruction pointedly tells the jurors to view the testimony of the accomplice with suspicion and caution. According to defendant, the general instruction is distinct from, and cannot function as a substitute for, the accomplice witness instruction. We agree that the general instruction on witness credibility may not, by itself, be enough to cure an errant omission of an accomplice witness instruction. Otherwise, the accomplice witness instruction would be rendered essentially meaningless, since the general instruction on witness credibility is given in most criminal cases. In this case, however, we believe that the fact that the jury was told to consider, in general, the bias, interest or prejudice of the witnesses may be considered as one factor, among others, which establishes that defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's failure to tender the accomplice witness instruction. Defendant also argues that the facts of this case are analogous to those in People v. Campbell, 275 Ill.App.3d 993, 212 Ill. Dec. 392, 657 N.E.2d 87 (1995), in which the appellate court concluded that a defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request an accomplice witness instruction. Defendant urges us to follow the reasoning of the Campbell decision. In Campbell, the defendant was convicted of burglary and criminal damage to property for breaking into a church and spraying the interior with a fire extinguisher. Two other individuals who were charged in the offense testified for the State at trial. The two State witnesses acknowledged at trial that their testimony was given in exchange for receiving a lesser sentence or for the dismissal of charges relating to the damage done to the church. The two witnesses also testified that the defendant had entered the church and sprayed the interior of the church with the fire extinguisher. The two witnesses denied, however, doing any damage to the church themselves. Defendant, in turn, testified that he did not enter the church and that the two State witnesses were the ones who sprayed the church with the fire extinguisher. Neither the defendant's testimony nor the accomplices' testimony was at odds with the physical evidence, or was impeached with prior inconsistent statements. Campbell, 275 Ill.App.3d at 995, 212 Ill.Dec. 392, 657 N.E.2d 87. On these facts, the appellate court concluded that the evidence in defendant's case was closely balanced and that trial counsel's failure to tender the accomplice witness instruction with respect to the two witnesses denied the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. Campbell, 275 Ill. App.3d at 999, 212 Ill.Dec. 392, 657 N.E.2d 87. We find Campbell readily distinguishable from the present case because the facts in Campbell were more closely balanced than those in the case at bar. Unlike the defendant's testimony in Campbell, defendant's testimony in this case was replete with objectively discernable weaknesses, including prior inconsistent statements, critical facts that were uncorroborated, and assertions that were at odds with the physical evidence. In addition, the two State witnesses in Campbell admitted that their testimony was offered in exchange for leniency from the State for the same incident in which the defendant was charged. None of the witnesses in the case at bar testified to a similar situation. Further, in Campbell, the only witnesses who testified that the defendant damaged the church were the two, accomplice witnesses. In the case at bar, three witnesses who were not accomplices, Becky Williams, Dawn Daubach and Dana Ganninger, testified to facts that established defendant shot and robbed the victims. For these reasons, we do not find Campbell persuasive authority in this appeal. The facts in the case at bar are not so closely balanced that we can say our confidence in the outcome ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 698) has been undermined by trial counsel's failure to request the accomplice witness instruction. The inherent weaknesses in defendant's testimony, the evidence aligned against defendant apart from James Williams' testimony, and the fact that the jury did consider James' bias, interest and prejudice in general terms together establish that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the accomplice witness instruction been given. Accordingly, we hold that trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to request the accomplice witness instruction with respect to the testimony of James Williams.