Opinion ID: 4315143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanctions against Plaintiffs’ counsel

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the district court was not required to impose sanctions. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s only justification for his failure to respond to the discovery request was that he was busy with professional and personal obligations. These circumstances do not “substantially justif[y]” Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the discovery deadlines or respond to Defendants. 72 The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting Defendants’ motion for sanctions. 73 Plaintiffs also contend that the amount of the sanctions was unreasonable. The total sanctions award in this case was $3,086.00, which the district court found represented reasonable costs for filing two motions to compel. The court noted that this case involved “heightened media scrutiny,” which necessarily demanded careful research and attention to factual details when drafting the discovery motions. There is no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in awarding $3,086.00 in sanctions. 74 70 Topalian v. Ehrman, 3 F.3d 931, 936 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 883 (5th Cir. 1988)). 71 City of Jackson, 359 F.3d at 732–33. 72 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 37(a)(5). 73 See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 37(a); Smith & Fuller, 685 F.3d at 488; City of Jackson, 359 F.3d at 732. Plaintiffs argue the district court abused its discretion in awarding fees and costs related to Defendants’ second motion to compel, as that court did not grant that motion in its entirety. This argument is without merit. Under Rule 37, when a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the district court has discretion to “apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” The magistrate judge explained that “it would be unconscionable to apportion expenses” because “[o]f the five interrogatories placed in issue, the court denied only a fraction of one interrogatory, rendering the apportionable expenses, if any, too trivial to qualify.” This explanation demonstrates that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs and fees in relation to the second motion to compel. 74 See Positive Software Sols., Inc., 619 F.3d at 460. Furthermore, the low amount of the sanction award in this case does not require particularly rigorous review. See Topalian, 3 F.3d at 936. 19 Case: 17-60774 Document: 00514655230 Page: 20 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 No. 17-60774 3. Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions against Defendants Plaintiffs also contend that the district court abused its discretion in failing to sanction Defendants for violating the case management order. That order states that if a discovery dispute arises, the parties must first communicate among themselves to resolve the dispute. If those communications fail, the parties must conduct a telephone conference with the magistrate judge. “Only if the telephonic conference with the judge is unsuccessful in resolving the issue may the party file a discovery motion.” It is undisputed that Defendants did not conduct a telephone conference with the magistrate judge before filing the motions to compel. But Defendants contend that it was impossible to arrange a telephone conference because Plaintiffs’ counsel would not even respond to their written communications. In their view, Plaintiffs’ refusal to communicate exempted Defendants from the telephone conference requirement. In denying Plaintiffs’ motion for sanctions, the magistrate judge explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)(2) states that a party should not be sanctioned for violating a case management order if the noncompliance “was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” 75 Because Defendants had twice attempted to communicate with Plaintiffs’ counsel but received no response, the magistrate judge determined that “an award of sanctions [against Defendants] would be wholly unjust.” 76 These facts do not amount to “unusual circumstances showing a clear abuse.” 77 The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to sanction Defendants. 75 FED. R. CIV. PROC. 16. 76 The district court also noted that Defendants had previously agreed to an extension of discovery deadlines, at Plaintiffs’ request. 77 See Moore, 735 F.3d at 315 (quoting Kelly, 213 F.3d at 855). 20 Case: 17-60774 Document: 00514655230 Page: 21 Date Filed: 09/25/2018 No. 17-60774