Opinion ID: 2076369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Credibility Problems and the Sufficiency of the Findings.

Text: In general, credibility findings by a trier of fact who has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their demeanor are accorded considerable deference by reviewing courts. [A]n appellate court lacks the direct feel for the evidence which is available to the [hearing examiner], who sees live bodies and facial expressions rather than a cold transcript which may capture words while the heart and soul of the case elude it. In re T.M., 577 A.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C.1990). Moreover, although articulation of reasons is to be encouraged, Harris v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 562 A.2d 625, 631 (D.C.1989), [13] the hearing examiner is not ordinarily required to explain why he believed one witness over another. Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown, Inc. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 402 A.2d 36, 47 (D.C.1979); see also Harris, supra, 562 A.2d at 631. As this court explained in Citizens Ass'n, supra, 402 A.2d at 47 n. 19, however, [i]t is conceivable ... that the evidence in support of a finding could be so weak, in contrast with evidence to the contrary, that an agencyto avoid a remand would have to give persuasive reasons for its reliance on particular testimony, otherwise, the evidence could not be deemed reliable, probative, and substantial. DCAPA § 1-1509(e). The court added its agreement with the proposition that there may be certain basic findings of fact on contested issues which are so thinly supported by evidence of record that still other findings would be required to demonstrate that there is `reliable, probative, and substantial' evidence to support them. Id. at n. 20. [14] We think that this is a case of the kind envisaged in Citizens Ass'n. We recognize that [a] certain amount of inconsistency in the evidence is almost inevitable in any trial, but it rarely justifies reversal, at least where the degree of inconsistency is not abnormal. In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490, 495 (D.C.1985). The discrepancies in the present case, however, are not of the commonplace variety. Officer Braswell claimed initially to have observed Mr. Eilers drive through a red light; he later acknowledged that the light could not be seen from his (the officer's) vantage point. When this problem emerged with the officer's version of events, he referred for the first time to an alleged assault by the driver on the passenger, and he now described this assault as his real reason for stopping Mr. Eilers' vehicle. The officer claimed to have left his police vehicle unattended in the middle of the street as he moved Mr. Eilers' BMW to the curb. He testified in some detail about events that he described as having occurred at a police station, but he subsequently acknowledged that Mr. Eilers was never taken to the police station at all. [15] The limitations of cold transcripts notwithstanding, reviewing courts are not absolutely bound by the credibility findings of administrative officers or agencies. Although the ALJ generally is upheld on credibility determinations, there are certain times when a court must override such a determination by examining evidence in the record that detracts from the ALJ's finding. First Nat'l Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 687 (5th Cir.1983). As the court stated in Midwest Stock Exch., Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 1255, 1265 (7th Cir.1980), [t]he ALJ has an opportunity to hear the testimony and view the witnesses and, therefore, is best suited to make credibility determinations.... On the other hand, we may also disregard these credibility determinations where we find them to be unreasonable, self-contradictory or based on inadequate reasoning. (Citations omitted). A reviewing court must scrutinize the record as a whole and, although it is not our task to assess the facts of this case de novo, neither [are we] to function as a `judicial echo' or rubber stamp for the conclusions of the [agency]. Id. at 1259, (quoting in part Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491, 71 S.Ct. 456, 466, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)); see also Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1288, 1290 (6th Cir.1984). In light of the unusual problems with Officer Braswell's testimony, we think that this is a case in which the hearing examiner should have offered a specific, cogent reason for crediting it and for rejecting the contrary evidence offered by Mr. Eilers and his witness. Cf. Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir.1988). But the hearing examiner offered no reasons, cogent or otherwise, for his credibility determinations. Indeed, his findings in this case, both oral and written, were altogether conclusory. Although the record is devoid of evidence of reckless driving on the part of Mr. Eilersthe nearest approximation is the testimony of the officer that Mr. Eilers drove through a red light which the officer was unable to seethe examiner found that Mr. Eilers operated his vehicle in such a manner as to show a flagrant disregard for the safety of persons or property. This is a verbatim rendition of a passage from Bungardeanu v. England, 219 A.2d 104, 108 (D.C.1966), in which the charges against the driver included reckless driving, three counts of leaving the scene of an accident, and DUI. [16] The borrowed phraseology from Bungardeanu suggests the rote recitation of language from precedents of dubious relevance rather than a meaningful attempt to come to grips with the difficult factual issues raised by this record. In a case dominated by credibility problems, this simply will not do. With respect to the issue whether Mr. Eilers operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol, one can reasonably deduce that the hearing examiner credited Officer Braswell over Mr. Eilers and Ms. Shelley. He stated that he believed the officer, and there were relatively specific findings regarding the smell of alcohol, Mr. Eilers' bloodshot eyes, his wobbly gait, and the allegedly failed sobriety tests. In essentially paraphrasing the officer's observations, however, [17] the examiner made no mention, of any of the facts which tended to cast doubt on the officer's credibility. Except for his premature pronouncement, before the defense case began, that he was sure that there was a traffic violation at the red light, see page 682, supra, the hearing examiner made no finding as to the red light controversy. He likewise never addressed Officer Braswell's claim that Mr. Eilers had assaulted Ms. Shelley, or the unusual fact that this assault was never mentioned until after the revelation that the officer could not have seen the red light through which he claimed that Mr. Eilers had driven. Although these issues were arguably collateral in a technical sense in that the District was not required to prove either a red light violation or an assault, we think that they were central to a determination as to who was telling the truth about the incident and who had the superior recollection. In a case in which credibility was the critical issue, no reasonable determination as to whether the officer's testimony constituted probative and reliable evidence within the meaning of the DCAPA could be made without these discrepancies being addressed. The findings are even more defective, in our view, in regard to Mr. Eilers' alleged refusal to take the two chemical tests. Aside from issues of credibility, the hearing examiner made no finding as to whether the controversy over the officer's rubbing the RBT occurred. He likewise did not address the question whether Mr. Eilers requested that he be tested on a more reliable machine. Finally, there was no finding as to whether and to what extent the implied consent form had been filled out at the time Mr. Eilers signed it. See pages 679-680, supra. If the officer wrote in portions of it after obtaining Mr. Eilers' signatureand this seems to us a more than plausible possibility in view of the location of the hand-printed words DID NOT FEEL LIKE IT to the immediate right of the signaturethen this would have a significant bearing on the credibility issues. Cf. II J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 278, at 133-34 (Chadbourn ed. 1979). As we stated in Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 293 A.2d 470, 473 (D.C.1972), [t]he function of the court in reviewing administrative action is to assure that the agency has given full and reasoned consideration to all material facts and issues. The court can only perform this function when the agency discloses the basis of its order by an articulation with reasonable clarity of its reasons for the decision. Accord, Communications Workers of America v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 367 A.2d 149, 152 (D.C. 1976). Neither the repetition of the statutory language (or of language from a decided case) nor a summary of the evidence of the witness credited by the agency satisfies the requirements of the Act, Hedgman v. District of Columbia Hackers' License Appeal Bd., 549 A.2d 720, 723 (D.C.1988), especially where, as here, critical questions remain as to how the events occurred and as to whether the officer's testimony was reliable and probative. We simply cannot say, on this record, that the agency has given full and reasoned consideration to all material facts and issues. Dietrich, supra, 293 A.2d at 473. The only role for a court is to insure that the agency has taken a hard look. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 2730 n. 21, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976). In this case, we are not at all confident that the agency has done so.