Opinion ID: 2035676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blood Spatter Expert

Text: Dean Marks, a sergeant with the Indiana State Police, testified during the guilt phase of the trial as an expert witness concerning the interpretation of the pattern of blood spatters found at the scene of the shooting. The trial court denied James' timely requests for funds to hire his own blood spatter expert and overruled James' timely objections to Marks' testimony. James claims that admission of Marks' testimony constituted reversible error because (1) the trial court should have approved funds for James to hire his own blood spatter expert or, alternatively, (2) blood spatter interpretation was not a proper subject for expert testimony. We agree that he was entitled to his own expert. During the guilt phase of the trial, James defended a charge of felony murder; thus, the State was not required to prove that James had any intent to kill the victim, but only that he intended to rob and that the victim was killed during the robbery. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(2) and Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. After he was found guilty of felony murder, the jury was reconvened to consider a recommendation of death. As the lone statutory aggravator used to support the death penalty count, the State was required to prove that James had the intent to kill. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G). Sergeant Marks' testimony, that the victim's head was approximately one foot from the floor at the time she was shot, tended to support the State's theory that the killing occurred as an intentional act on James' part to execute the only witness to his crime. The testimony tended to negate James' assertion in his pre-trial statement to police that the victim was shot accidentally in the midst of a struggle. Thus, the opinion of the blood spatter expert was testimony central to the State's death penalty case. In Indiana, a criminal defendant is not constitutionally entitled, at public expense, to any type or number of expert witnesses he desires to support his case. Kennedy v. State (1991), Ind., 578 N.E.2d 633, 640, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1299, 117 L.Ed.2d 521. A defendant who requests funds for an expert witness has the burden of demonstrating the need for that expert. Id. The appointment of experts is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and only an abuse of that discretion will result in a reversal, but a trial court must provide a defendant access to experts where it is clear that prejudice will otherwise result. Id. Issues which the trial court should consider in determining whether a defendant is entitled to funds for an expert include (1) whether defense counsel already possesses the skills to cross-examine the expert adequately or could prepare to do so by studying published writings, Id.; (2) whether the purpose of the expert is exploratory only, Hough v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 511, 516; and (3) whether the nature of the expert testimony involves precise physical measurements and chemical testing, the results of which were not subject to dispute. Schultz v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 531, 533-34. In cases where a defendant faces the death penalty, we also have held that the failure to allow the defendant appropriate resources to retain an expert who would give an opinion concerning the statutory mitigator, may require reversal of the death penalty. Castor v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 1281, 1288. We find Castor more applicable to this case than those cases relied upon by the State, viz, Hough, Schultz and Jackson. The testimony from the blood spatter expert, which provided evidence of an intentional killing, was central in the penalty phase and was highlighted by the State in final argument. Knowledge concerning cross-examination of blood spatter experts is not the kind of experience that defense counsel would normally be expected to possess. In fact, defense counsel was left to use, as a resource for cross-examination, a book that Sergeant Marks adopted as authoritative on the subject of blood spatter interpretation, but the contents of which Sergeant Marks was unable to explain. In addition, Sergeant Marks acknowledged that other experts interpreting the same evidence in this case might reach different conclusions. Under these facts, and where the defendant faces the ultimate penalty, we conclude that it was error not to provide the defendant with a blood spatter expert. Therefore, we must reverse the death penalty. However, we disagree with James' contention that interpretation of blood spatters was not a proper subject of expert testimony or that Sergeant Marks was not qualified to give that testimony. Expert testimony is appropriate where (1) the subject matter of the opinion is distinctly related to some science, profession, business or occupation beyond the knowledge of the average lay person; and (2) the witness has sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in the field such that the witness' opinion or inference will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth. Fox v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 1090, 1095. No precise amount of knowledge is required; the extent of the witness' knowledge affects the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility. Rowan v. State (1982), Ind., 431 N.E.2d 805, 816. Indiana courts have previously allowed expert testimony on blood spatter interpretation. See King v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 1154, 1157; Fox v. State, 506 N.E.2d at 1095; Hampton v. State (1992), Ind. App., 588 N.E.2d 555, 557-58. We find the discussion in Hampton persuasive on this issue, and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to present expert testimony from a blood spatter interpretation expert. Sergeant Marks' qualifications  he had attended two schools in blood stain interpretation, performed approximately twenty-five blood stain interpretations in the past, and previously testified as an expert  are superior to the qualifications approved by this Court in Fox, 506 N.E.2d at 1095. The trial court acted within its discretion in finding Marks' qualifications acceptable and in recognizing blood spatter interpretation as an appropriate area of expertise.