Opinion ID: 1390193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Framework of Second Applications Under the Abuse-of-the-Writ Standard and the AEDPA

Text: Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA in 1996, the doctrine of abuse of the writ define[d] the circumstances in which federal courts decline to entertain a claim presented for the first time in a second or successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 470, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1457, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). When Goldblum filed his first federal habeas petition in 1991, the law encompassed the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, which provided that a petitioner could prosecute another such petition only if he could (1) show cause for, and prejudice from, the omission of his new claim or claims from his earlier petition (i.e., that his proceeding would not constitute an `abuse of the writ'), or (2) demonstrate `actual innocence.' Minarik, 166 F.3d at 600. The Supreme Court in McCleskey discussed the meaning of cause and prejudice prongs, and the narrow exception of actual innocence, as well as the burden-shifting framework when the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine is raised. When a prisoner files a second or subsequent application, the government bears the burden of pleading abuse of the writ. The government satisfies this burden if, with clarity and particularity, it notes petitioner's prior writ history, identifies the claims that appear for the first time, and alleges that petitioner has abused the writ. The burden to disprove abuse then becomes petitioner's. To excuse his failure to raise the claim earlier, he must show cause for failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom as those concepts have been defined in our procedural default decisions. The petitioner's opportunity to meet the burden of cause and prejudice will not include an evidentiary hearing if the district court determines as a matter of law that petitioner cannot satisfy the standard. If petitioner cannot show cause, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95, 111 S.Ct. at 1470 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Cause requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim. Id. at 497, 111 S.Ct. at 1472 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). [T]he question is whether petitioner possessed, or by reasonable means could have obtained, a sufficient basis to allege a claim in the first petition and pursue the matter through the habeas process. Id. at 498, 111 S.Ct. at 1472. Accordingly, [i]f what petitioner knows or could discover upon reasonable investigation supports a claim for relief in a federal habeas petition, what he does not know is irrelevant. Omission of the claim will not be excused merely because evidence discovered later might also have supported or strengthened the claim. Id. Once the petitioner has established cause, he must show actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which he complains. Id. at 494, 111 S.Ct. at 1470 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Actual prejudice means not merely that the errors at [] trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1596, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982). See also Fischetti v. Johnson, 384 F.3d 140, 155 (3d Cir.2004). Even if a petitioner cannot show cause and prejudice, the failure to raise the claim in an earlier petition may nonetheless be excused if he or she can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494-95, 111 S.Ct. at 1470. A court, however, should exercise this authority only in a narrow class of cases, i.e., in extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime. Id. at 494, 111 S.Ct. at 1470. To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). In 1996, when the AEDPA became effective Congress changed the rules governing second petitions. The AEDPA instituted a gatekeeping mechanism which imposed strict procedural requirements and significantly altered the substantive showing an applicant had to make in order to proceed on new claims in a second petition. [8] In Benchoff, 404 F.3d 812, we set forth the new procedural and substantive requirements which govern second or successive habeas petitions under the AEDPA. As a procedural matter, section 2244(b)(3)(A) requires a prospective applicant, before he may file a second or successive application in the district court, to move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application. A three-judge panel of the court of appeals may grant the motion authorizing the district court to consider the application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this subsection. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B), (C). The court of appeals should make its determination no later than 30 days after the filing of the motion, id. at § 2244(b)(3)(D), and the decision shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. Id. at § 2244(b)(3)(E). Section 2244(b)(2) requires that the court of appeals deny a motion to file a second or successive habeas petition unless: (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. Id. at § 2244(b)(2). If the court of appeals determines that the procedural requirements for a second or successive petition have been met, the applicant then is permitted to file the second or successive application with the district court. But section 2244(b)(4) makes it clear that before a district court may consider the merits of the application, the petition must satisfy the substantive requirements for it. As we put it in Minarik, 166 F.3d at 600, [t]hese substantive gatekeeping provisions were intended to reduce the universe of cases in which a habeas petition may go forward on a second or successive petition. In this regard, a district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of [section 2244(b)(2)]. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4). We have made it clear that [u]nless both the procedural and substantive requirements of § 2244 are met, the District Court lacks authority to consider the merits of the petition. Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 816. In Minarik, 166 F.3d at 600, we were asked to determine whether section 2244's gatekeeping provisions have an impermissible retroactive effect in cases in which the applicant filed his first petition prior to the AEDPA's enactment and he filed his second petition after the AEDPA's enactment. Guided by the Supreme Court opinions in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), and Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997), we concluded that, [i]n those cases where a prisoner in state custody had a right to prosecute a second or successive petition prior to AEDPA's passage, but would be deprived of that right by these new gatekeeping provisions, . . . applying the AEDPA standard would have a `genuine retroactive effect' because it would attach a new and adverse consequence to pre-AEDPA conduct-the prosecution of the original proceeding. Minarik, 166 F.3d at 600. We distinguished AEDPA's new procedural requirements from its substantive requirements. We decided that the procedural requirement-that an applicant first must seek authorization from a court of appeals before filing a second petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)-applied retroactively as it was a rule of procedure that did not attach new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Minarik, 166 F.3d at 599-600 (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 320, 117 S.Ct. at 2059). However, with respect to the new substantive requirements, we found that if an applicant, can show that he would have been entitled to pursue his second petition under pre-AEDPA law, then the Landgraf default rule prohibits applying AEDPA's new substantive gatekeeping provisions to bar his claims. In the absence of such a showing, however, applying those standards to [an applicant] results in no genuine retroactive effect, and the AEDPA standard must be applied under the Supreme Court's holding in Lindh that AEDPA's habeas corpus amendments apply generally to cases filed after its effective date. Id. at 602. Therefore we concluded that anyone seeking to file a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after April 24, 1996, must move in the appropriate Court of Appeals for an order authorizing the District Court to consider the application. When such a motion is filed by a petitioner whose previous petition was filed before that date, the Court of Appeals must apply the substantive gatekeeping standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) as amended by AEDPA unless such application would bar a second or successive petition that could have been considered by the District Court under the law existing at the time the previous petition was filed. Id. at 609. Thus, in this case, there is no question that the AEDPA's procedural gatekeeping requirements for a court of appeals' authorization apply and have been satisfied. We apply the substantive gatekeeping standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), unless such application would bar a second or successive petition that could have been considered by the District Court under the law existing at the time the previous petition was filed. Minarik, 166 F.3d at 609. Here, the district court by adopting the Report and Recommendation as the opinion of the court, concluded that both the substantive requirements of the AEDPA and the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine bar Goldblum's claims. But, as we previously discussed, we granted a COA only with respect to the abuse-of-the-writ inquiry. Thus, under Minarik, should we agree with the district court that Goldblum's claims would be barred under the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, the AEDPA would not have a genuine retroactive effect and we would affirm the district court's decision barring his claims under the AEDPA. As we will discuss, we do reach this conclusion.