Opinion ID: 1452513
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues arising under article v of the constitution of the united states

Text: Article V of the federal constitution provides the process by which that document may be amended. It sets forth alternative methods of proposing constitutional amendments, by vote of Congress or on application of two-thirds of state Legislatures calling for a constitutional convention. It states: The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. To date, all the amendments have been proposed by Congress and no effort to call a constitutional convention has been successful. Protestant contends that this proposal would allow the people to do indirectly what they cannot do directlypropose amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We agree. To the extent that the initiative applies for a constitutional convention or requires the Legislature to do so, it is facially violative of Article V. The law is plain that the application for a convention must come from the Legislature acting freely without restriction or limitation, not from the people through exercise of their initiative power. The legislative power in the amendment process of Article V includes only that power which has been delegated to the representative bodies of the several states, it does not include the reserved legislative power of the people. In Hawke v. Smith, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221, 40 S.Ct. 495, 64 L.Ed. 871 (1920), the United States Supreme Court held that a provision in the Ohio Constitution which would have extended the referendum to the action of the General Assembly ratifying the proposed prohibition amendment to the Constitution of the United States conflicts with Article V. Answering the question, What did the framers of the Constitution mean in requiring ratification by `legislatures'?, the Court determined that under Article V [b]oth methods of ratification by Legislatures or conventions call for action by deliberative assemblages representative of the people, which it was assumed would voice the will of the people. Id. at 226-27, 40 S.Ct. at 497. See also Hawke v. Smith, No. 2, 253 U.S. 231, 40 S.Ct. 498, 64 L.Ed. 877 (1920), concerning the same question but involving the Nineteenth Amendment extending the right of suffrage to women. The Oklahoma Supreme Court had almost immediate occasion to follow the authority of Hawke in State, ex rel. Gill v. Morris, 79 Okl. 89, 191 P. 364 (1920) where it refused to allow the prohibition amendment to be submitted to a vote of the people after it had been ratified by the Oklahoma Legislature. The Court held that the referendum provision of the State Constitution could not be applied in the ratification process of an amendment to the United States Constitution without violating Article V of that document. Our Court upheld the position of respondent in that action, that Article V excluded the people of the several states from voting directly on amendments to the Constitution and gave that right only to the Legislature, which word was found to refer to a representative legislative body and did not refer to or comprehend the Legislative authority of a state. The people may not place limitations on the deliberative process of the Legislature. In Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 42 S.Ct. 217, 66 L.Ed. 505 (1922) the United States Supreme Court turned away a challenge to the validity of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment on the ground that Article V prohibited the limitations placed on Legislatures by their state constitutions in an effort to impair their power to ratify the Amendment. Striking the limitations, the Court stated: [T]he function of a state Legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a federal function derived from the federal Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a state. At 137, 42 S.Ct. at 217-218. Recent similar attempts at directing state legislatures to call a federal constitutional convention have been held to violate Article V. Amer. Fed. of Labor-Congress v. March Fong Eu, 36 Cal.3d 687, 206 Cal.Rptr. 89, 686 P.2d 609 (1984), and State of Montana ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 213 Mont. 425, 691 P.2d 826 (1984), addressed the issue in the context of initiatives which proposed balanced budget amendments. Both decisions held that a state may not, by initiative or otherwise, compel its legislators to apply for a constitutional convention, or to refrain from such action. Eu, 206 Cal.Rptr. at 102, 686 P.2d at 622; Waltermire, 691 P.2d at 831. Legislators must be free to deliberate and vote their own considered judgment, being responsible to their constituents through the electoral process. A rubber stamp legislature could not fulfill its function under Article V of the Constitution. Eu, 206 Cal.Rptr. at 102, 686 P.2d at 622. No court has reached the conclusion that the people of a state may compel their legislators to call for a federal constitutional convention and direct them to vote for a specified amendment. Proponents argue that the challenged initiative measure merely requests the Oklahoma Legislators to use their lawful delegated power toward a lawful end in following Article V amendment procedure. They assert that nothing in the proposal could actually force a legislator to make the convention call and they contend that to sustain protestant's position is to deny citizens their most basic rights of free political expression and communication with their elected representatives. They rely on Kimble v. Swackhamer, 439 U.S. 1385, 99 S.Ct. 51, 58 L.Ed.2d 225 (1978), for support of their argued right to communicate freely with their legislators by way of initiative referendum. That case is inapposite, however. There the Legislature of the State of Nevada submitted a nonbinding advisory question to the voters of Nevada to obtain their views regarding the proposed equal rights amendment. The measure was challenged as violative of Article V but the Nevada Supreme Court in Kimble v. Swackhamer, 94 Nev. 600, 584 P.2d 161 (1978), found that the question did not violate Art. V. because it was purely advisory; the Legislature was able to vote for or against ratification or refrain from voting at all, without regard to the advisory vote. The Supreme Court of Nevada distinguished Hawke and Leser because this purely advisory question was not a limitation on legislative power. Still challenging only the issue of conflict with Article V, the protestants sought a stay from the United States Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist, sitting as Circuit Judge, refused all requested interim relief. He did not believe a federal question was presented and found protestant's reliance on Hawke and Leser misplaced. He observed that he saw no federal constitutional obstacle to the Nevada Legislature submitting a nonbinding advisory referendum to the people which provided by its terms that the result of voting on this question does not place any legal requirement on the legislature or any of its members. The matter was dismissed for want of a federal question at 439 U.S. 1041, 99 S.Ct. 713, 58 L.Ed.2d 700 (1978). Proponents of today's challenged measure argue that the Oklahoma Legislature would still have the power to disregard its direction concerning the convention call. That assertion is not correct. This measure, if adopted, would be neither nonbinding nor purely advisory in its federal aspects. Its very words distinguish it from the measure at issue in Kimble. The initiative states [t]he People . . . instruct each member of the Oklahoma Legislature . . . to make the specific application under Article V[to] Congress calling for an Article V Convention for the purpose of proposing the following Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is an express mandate from the people to the Legislature to take a specific action. Also, if a Legislator failed to follow the directive, his or her failure would be noted on the ballot. Under these constraints, the application made by the Legislature would violate Article V as interpreted in Hawke and Leser. Legislative deliberation cannot exist where the outcome is a predetermined specific action. Our conclusion that these provisions of the measure which apply for a constitutional convention or seek to compel the Legislature to do so are facially violative of Article V of the United States Constitution, necessarily raises questions of severability and the validity of the remaining provisions under State constitutional challenges.