Opinion ID: 176785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural and Substantive Due-Process Claims

Text: Palka's complaint alleges two separate procedural due-process violations: First, he claims he was deprived of due process prior to his suspension; and second, he claims he was deprived of due process prior to his resignation, which he contends was coerced. To plead a procedural due-process claim, Palka must allege a cognizable property interest, a deprivation of that interest, and a denial of due process. Hudson v. City of Chicago, 374 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir.2004). As a threshold matter, the procedural due-process claims against the City and its employees necessarily fail. Because the County, not the City, was Palka's employer, Palka cannot sue the City and its employees for depriving him of due process in connection with the loss of his employment. Nor has Palka stated a cognizable claim against Cook County or any of its employees. A property interest in continued employment can be created in one of two ways, 1) by an independent source such as state law securing certain benefits; or 2) by a clearly implied promise of continued employment. Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Due-process claims in the context of public employment require an entitlement to continued employment; more specifically, the plaintiff must have a legitimate claim of entitlement not to lose a valuable governmental benefit except for cause. Lee v. County of Cook, 862 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir.1988) (quotation marks omitted). A collective-bargaining agreement can create an employment contractand thus a promise of continued employmentin some cases. Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 519-20 (7th Cir.2007); see also Young v. N. Drury Lane Prods., 80 F.3d 203, 206 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that a labor agreement is not an employment contract). When a plaintiff alleges that the due-process entitlement arises from a collective-bargaining agreement, he must identify specific terms of the agreement that contained a promise of continued employment. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 520; see also Minch v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 294, 302 (7th Cir.2007). Palka did plead that he was a member of a collective-bargaining unit but did not identify a provision in the collective-bargaining agreement that could feasibly give rise to a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment. See Krieg, 481 F.3d at 520. The part of his complaint that comes closest is the allegation that he was scheduled to appear before the Merit Board on disciplinary charges; only tenured employees would be entitled to a hearing before this board. We will assume without deciding that this allegation is sufficient and move on to consider whether Palka's allegations state a cognizable claim for violation of his right to procedural due process. As we have noted, Palka has alleged he was deprived of due process prior to both his suspension and resignation. Regarding the former, Palka was suspended with pay, and a suspension with pay does not trigger due-process protections unless the suspension imposes a substantial indirect economic effect on the plaintiff. Townsend v. Vallas, 256 F.3d 661, 676 (7th Cir.2001) (teacher's loss of coaching income after suspension with pay not sufficient to implicate due-process protections). Palka has not claimed that he suffered any indirect economic consequences as a result of his suspension with pay. Accordingly, to the extent that he claims he was deprived of due process prior to his suspension, he has not stated a valid constitutional claim. Palka also alleged that he was deprived of due process prior to his resignation; this claim rests on his contention that his resignation was involuntary. A public employee who voluntarily resigns cannot complain about a lack of due process, but an involuntary resignation may in certain circumstances form the basis of a due-process claim. Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir.1982). Two types of involuntary resignation may qualifyconstructive discharge and coerced resignation. Patterson v. Portch, 853 F.2d 1399, 1405-06 (7th Cir. 1988). Constructive discharge occurs when an employer makes employment so unbearable that an employee resigns; coerced resignation is characterized by the presence of a Hobson's choice in which the employee must resign or suffer severe consequences, such as facing criminal charges. See id. Palka's claim falls in the latter category; he alleges that the defendants forced him to choose between resigning to protect his retirement benefits or clearing himself before the Merit Board. No doubt Palka was confronted with a difficult choice when the disciplinary charges were lodged against him and the Merit Board hearing loomed. He could retire with full benefits or appear before the Board and potentially be vindicated; the latter option, however, obviously risked termination and loss of his benefits if the charges were substantiated. But this is not the kind of choice that makes an otherwise voluntary resignation involuntary. The Merit Board provides adequate procedural protections to Cook County employees facing disciplinary charges, and its formal procedures were underway when Palka chose to resign. The Merit Board's disciplinary process satisfies the County's procedural due-process obligations, and the County and its officials cannot be held liable when an employee chooses not to avail himself of its protections. See Dusanek, 677 F.2d at 543 ([A] state cannot be held to have violated due process requirements when it has made procedural protection[s] available and the plaintiff has simply refused to avail himself of them.). That Palka decided to resign rather than risk an unfavorable Merit Board decision does not make his resignation involuntary. The district court was right to dismiss his procedural due-process claim. The court also properly dismissed Palka's substantive due-process claim. This sort of claim is limited to violations of fundamental rights, see Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 753 (7th Cir.2007), and employment-related rights are not fundamental; an alleged wrongful termination of public employment is not actionable as a violation of substantive due process unless the employee also alleges the defendants violated some other constitutional right or that state remedies were inadequate, Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 939 (7th Cir.2005). Palka has not pleaded an additional constitutional violation or claimed that state-law remedies were inadequate. He therefore has failed to state an actionable substantive due-process claim. Palka's substantive due-process claim also fails to the extent that he bases it on the conduct of the Police Department officials. The Due Process Clause protects citizens from abuses of power by executive officialsincluding law-enforcement officersbut official misconduct will rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it shocks the conscience. Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir.2005); see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). Palka contends that the police officers' investigationtracing the phone call to the school, their use of the Leads System, and the fact that they traveled outside their jurisdiction to track him down at his house at nightsubverted internal Police Department rules and therefore qualifies as conscience-shocking official misconduct. It does not. The threshold for this kind of due-process claim is high; many forms of governmental misconduct are excluded. Tun v. Whitticker, 398 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir.2005) (It is one thing to say that officials acted badly, even tortiously, butand this is the essential pointit is quite another to say that their actions rise to the level of a constitutional violation.); Kernats v. O'Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1994) (Of course, every official abuse of power, even if unreasonable, unjustified, or outrageous, does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional deprivation.). Accepting (as we must) Palka's allegations as true, he has failed to state a cognizable substantive due-process claim.