Opinion ID: 767341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sua Sponte Summary Judgment Against the Moving Party

Text: 11 Bridgeway argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against it sua sponte without prior notice. In so acting, Bridgeway alleges, the district court deprived Bridgeway of an adequate opportunity to develop and present its case. 12 While it is not necessarily reversible error in our circuit for a district court to grant summary judgment against the moving party without notice or opportunity to defend, Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991) ([The] court need not give notice of its intention to enter summary judgment against the moving party.), we have firmly discouraged the practice. In Coach, we made clear that grants of summary judgment without notice will be tolerated only in the absence of some indication that the moving party might otherwise bring forward evidence that would affect the . . . determination, id., when the facts before the district court were fully developed so that the moving party suffered no procedural prejudice. (Now Chief) Judge Winter stressed in his concurrence that such grants of summary judgment are rare and should be employed only when a court is absolutely sure that no issue of material fact exists. Id. at 172 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Ramsey v. Coughlin, 94 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (Before granting summary judgment sua sponte [without notice], the district court must assure itself that following the procedures set out in Rule 56 [for notice and opportunity to defend] would not alter the outcome.). District courts are well advised to give clear and express notice before granting summary judgment sua sponte, even against parties who have themselves moved for summary judgment. The provision of such notice requires relatively little time or effort, and it permits appellate courts much more readily to determine -- as they are required to do -- whether the absence of a cross motion affected the result. Coach Leatherware Co., 933 F.2d at 167; see also Snider v. Melindez, 1999 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1999)([P]roviding the adversely affected party with notice and an opportunity to be heard plays an important role in establishing the fairness and reliability of the order.). 13 If the district court fails to give notice before sua sponte granting summary judgment and the moving party was, as a result, procedurally prejudiced, we must reverse. Id. A party is procedurally prejudiced if it is surprised by the district court's action and that surprise results in the party's failure to present evidence in support of its position. See id. If, however, the party either cannot claim to have been surprised by the district court's action or if, notwithstanding its surprise, the party had no additional evidence to bring, it cannot plausibly argue that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice. 14 [T]he threat of procedural prejudice is greatly diminished if the court's sua sponte determination is based on issues identical to those raised by the moving party. Id. In addition, the likelihood of prejudice is greatly reduced, even when summary judgment is based upon issues raised by the nonmoving party, if the moving party speaks to those issues in the course of the district court proceedings. 15 Moreover, regardless of the basis for summary judgment, [w]here it appears clearly upon the record that all of the evidentiary materials that a party might submit in response to a motion for summary judgment are before the court, a sua sponte grant of summary judgment against that party may be appropriate if those materials show that no material dispute of fact exists and that the other party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ramsey, 94 F.3d at 74. In other words, when the moving party cannot plausibly claim that, had it been given notice of the district court's consideration of summary judgment against it, it would have brought forth additional evidence, the district court's failure to give notice is harmless and a remand is futile. See First Financial Ins. Co. v. Allstate Interior Demolition Corp., 193 F.3d 109, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1999); Ramsey, 94 F.3d at 74 (The record must, therefore, reflect the losing party's inability to enhance the evidence supporting its position and the winning party's entitlement to judgment.); Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at 167 (Absent some indication that the moving party might otherwise bring forward evidence that would affect the court's summary judgment determination, failure to provide an opportunity to respond is not reversible error.). 16 In this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Bridgeway was procedurally prejudiced by the district court's failure to give notice that it was considering a sua sponte grant of summary judgment in favor of Citibank. First, the district court's decision was based upon an issue clearly raised by the defendant below in its memorandum of law in opposition to Bridgeway's motion for summary judgment. Second, Bridgeway argued in its reply to the defendant's memorandum that the evidence it submitted was sufficient to establish that Liberian courts constituted a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice. Suppl. App. at 576. That is, the issue on which the district court based its grant of summary judgment did not arise out of the blue but was clearly put into play by the defendants in response to Bridgeway's motion. Moreover, Bridgeway repeatedly claimed to the district court that it had introduced sufficient evidence concerning that very issue. Under these circumstances, the likelihood that it was surprised by the district court's reliance on that issue -- and therefore prejudiced by the court's failure to provide notice before granting summary judgement sua sponte to Citibank -- was virtually nil. 17 Bridgeway did not, before the district court, raise any objections based on lack of notice. Nor did it subsequently seek to introduce additional evidence that might have convinced the district court to change its position. Contrast First Financial, 193 F.3d at 116 ([T]he lack of opportunity for [the appellant] to present evidence . . . before judgment was entered against it was highly prejudicial. Considerable evidence supporting [the appellant's] position had come to light during the [time] between submission of [the] motion to dismiss and the district court's decision. Much of that evidence was eventually placed before the Court when the motions for reconsideration were made.). Indeed, at no point since the district court's decision has Bridgeway identified any piece of evidence respecting the Liberian judicial system that it would have introduced had it been given notice. We therefore conclude that Bridgeway was not procedurally prejudiced by the district court's decision to grant summary judgment sua sponte to Citibank, albeit without prior notice to Bridgeway, though we reemphasize that giving such notice is certainly the preferable practice.