Opinion ID: 395131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reason for Dismissal

Text: 5 Although we affirm the district court's determination on grounds derived from the Elrod and Branti cases, see infra pp. 519-520, some discussion of the court's alternative ground for granting summary judgment is merited. 6 Reviewing the affidavits and depositions on file, the court found that Mayor Marshall lacked confidence in the assistants she had inherited from the Kraut administration, that she had a firsthand opportunity to observe them during her tenure as President of the City Council, that she desired to reorganize the City Solicitor's Office to make it, in her mind, more effective and that these were the motivations behind her decision not to continue them in their respective positions. Memorandum, Nov. 14, 1980, Appellants' Appendix, p. 87a. These contentions of the mayor are indeed substantiated in the record. Appendix, pp. 54a-66a (Supplemental Affidavit of Elizabeth N. Marshall), pp. 518a-524a (Deposition of Marshall). 7 The court also made reference to an account offered by plaintiff Roberts of a phone conversation between Marshall and himself. 8 It is true that plaintiff Roberts recalls Mayor Marshall as noting in their telephone conversation that Mayor Kraut had fired the prior Solicitors because they were Democrats and couldn't understand why Roberts was taking issue with her decision to do the same thing. The impact of her statement is not clear as she was also making reference to her right to have her own team as Mayor Kraut had done. 9 Memorandum, pp. 87a-88a, quoting from Deposition of Roberts, p. 741a. 10 Not mentioned by the court was that Roberts had allegedly told Marshall in this same conversation that he had learned from Mrs. Marshall's confidents (sic) that he was being replaced for reasons of his political affiliation and that Marshall admitted to Roberts that his services as assistant solicitor had been quite acceptable. She also allegedly admitted being advised of the Elrod case and that she had the right to fire Roberts even for political purposes, if I want to, because you are a lawyer.... Memorandum, pp. 739a-743a. (In her deposition Marshall denied substantial familiarity with the Branti decision. Appendix, pp. 484a-485a.) 11 The district court concluded that the reference to Roberts' political affiliation in the phone call was 12 overwhelmed by the unchallenged affidavits and testimony which reveal a totally different motivation for Mayor Marshall's action.... This isolated reference under all the circumstances of the record does not support an inference of political discrimination and would be an insufficient base upon which to uphold a verdict for plaintiff. Consequently, I conclude that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the record demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiffs were not discharged because of their political belief or affiliations. 13 Memorandum, p. 88a. 14 Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted by the court pursuant to Rule 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. Written in response to a series of Third Circuit decisions allowing parties opposing such motions to rely mainly on facts alleged in their pleadings, 56(e) requires that an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. See Advisory Committee's Note on 1963 Amendment to Rule 56(e); Adickes v. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1609-10, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Robin Construction Co. v. United States, 345 F.2d 610, 614-15 (3d Cir. 1965). 15 Interpreting the mandate of Rule 56(e), this court has made clear that a party resisting the motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions. See Tilden Finance Corp. v. Palo Alto Service, Inc., 596 F.2d 604, 607 (3d Cir. 1979); Tunnell v. Wiley, 514 F.2d 971, 976 (3d Cir. 1975); Olympic Junior, Inc. v. David Crystal, Inc., 463 F.2d 1141, 1146 (3d Cir. 1972); Robin Construction Co., 345 F.2d at 614. 16 It is also the case, however, that summary judgment has been characterized as a drastic remedy, Tomalewski v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1974), and that courts are to resolve any doubts as to the existence of genuine issues of fact against the moving parties, United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147, 150 (3d Cir. 1971). Furthermore, even if the preponderance of the evidence should appear to lie on the moving party's side, the court's function is not to decide issues of fact, but only to determine whether any issue of fact exists to be tried. Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Lansdale Finishers, Inc., 484 F.2d 1037, 1039 (3d Cir. 1973); Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 941, 90 S.Ct. 378, 24 L.Ed.2d 244 (1969). Finally, where intent is a substantive element of the course of action generally to be inferred from the facts and conduct of the parties the principle is particularly apt that courts should not draw factual inferences in favor of the moving party and should not resolve any genuine issues of credibility. Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114, 121 (3d Cir. 1966). 17 On the record of this case, there is no question that a trier of fact could find that Mayor Marshall's dismissal of the plaintiffs was not motivated by party differences, but that she simply lacked confidence in their abilities to do the required job. It is not quite so obvious to us as it appeared to the district court, however, that the circumstances of the dismissals together with what was alleged as to the phone conversation between Roberts and Mayor Marshall (including the possibility of summoning the alleged confidants of the Mayor) could not support an inference by a trier of fact that the Mayor was motivated by party differences. We need not, though, resolve our doubts about this issue, since we concur in the district court's alternative ground for granting summary judgment for the defendants. 18