Opinion ID: 2057978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act

Text: We next examine whether the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act is constitutionally compatible with this Court's policies governing the administration of the probation system. We begin with a brief discussion of probation. Since the inception of the first probation statute in this State more than a century ago, L. 1900, c. 102 (repealed by L. 1906, c. 74), [2] probation officers have played an important role in our court system. See Charles Lionel Chute & Marjorie Bell, Crime, Courts, and Probation 73 (1956). The 1906 Probation Act provided for the appointment of probation officers by the judges of the county-based Court of Quarter Sessions. L. 1906, c. 75, § 1. Probation officers were entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that a criminal defendant complied with a court-ordered probationary sentence. See L. 1906, c. 75, §§ 6-7 (describing duties of probation officers vis-à-vis probationers placed under their care by court). See generally Adamo v. McCorkle, 13 N.J. 561, 564-65, 100 A. 2d 674 (1953) (discussing history of early probation acts), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928, 74 S.Ct. 531, 98 L.Ed. 1080 (1954). The 1929 Probation Act, L. 1929, c. 156, is essentially intact today in our contemporary statutes, and is the foundation for our modern probation system. See N.J.S.A. 2A:168-5 to -13, 2C:45-1 to -4. Those statutes clearly establish that the probation department is under the authority and part of the judiciary. It is [t]he Assignment Judge of the Superior Court in each county who is vested with the power to appoint probation officers, including a chief probation officer, N.J.S.A. 2A:168-5, and to fix their salaries. N.J.S.A. 2A:168-8. Once appointed, the chief probation officer operates  under the direction of the court  and only may make rules and regulations with respect to the management and conduct of the probation officers and other employees as may be authorized by the Assignment Judge of the Superior Court.  N.J.S.A. 2A:168-7 (emphasis added). Our court rules are in accord with those statutes. Rule 1:34 classifies probation officers as Supporting Personnel of the Courts and Rule 1:34-4 provides that the Chief Probation Officer of the county [is] responsible to and under the supervision of the judge designated by the Assignment Judge and must comply with applicable statutes, rules of the Supreme Court, and directives of the Chief Justice, the Administrative Director of the Courts, and the Assignment Judge of the County. The Probation Department in each county operates as an enforcement arm of the state judicial system. Godfrey v. McGann, 37 N.J. 28, 34, 179 A. 2d 6 (1962). As such, probation officers carry out duties that are essential to the proper functioning of our court system. Those duties include preparing presentence investigation reports in criminal cases, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6, 2A:168-11(a); furnishing criminal defendants with a statement of the conditions of their probation and supervising them while on probation, N.J.S.A. 2A:168-11(c), -11(e); conducting investigations and gathering information in matrimonial actions, including those involving the custody of children, N.J.S.A. 2A:168-13, 2A:168-11(a); supervising on request of the court persons ordered to pay support or alimony in a matrimonial action, N.J.S.A. 2A:168-11(b); and collecting payments from persons under their supervision . . . as may be ordered by the court. N.J.S.A. 2A:168-11(d). Thus, it is clear that probation officers play an important and indeed vital role in the administration of justice, both in the criminal and civil courts. Passaic County, supra, 73 N.J. at 253, 374 A. 2d 449. The New Jersey Supreme Court has steadfastly maintained that probation officers must avoid any perception of partisanship in conducting court business. In furtherance of that policy, probation officers have been prohibited from performing traditional police functions or affiliating with law enforcement organizations. In 1974, the AOC advised probation officers that [p]robation work is the guidance and assistance to persons under investigation and supervision, and not law enforcement. Administrative Office of the Courts, Directive No. 10-73 (May 15, 1974), http:// www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/personnel/dir_10_73.pdf.AOC Directive No. 10-73 specifically barred probation officers from carrying weapons in the regular performance of their work. Ibid. The directive recognized the dangers associated with some probationary work and suggested precautions to be taken other than the carrying of firearms. Ibid. Probation officers were told that when undertaking a hazardous assignment, [t]hey should consider traveling in pairs or requesting a police officer to accompany them on those occasions. Ibid. In 1994, the Court was asked to review its long-standing policy prohibiting probation officers from being members of law enforcement organizations, such as the Police Benevolent Association (PBA) and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). In re Proceedings Concerning Probation Officers' Membership in Law Enforcement Organizations and Proposed Affiliation of PANJ with the N.J. State Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. (July 8, 1994) (per curiam) (slip ruling at 1), digested in 137 N.J.L.J. 1124, 1166 (July 18, 1994). We upheld that policy in an administrative ruling, reasoning that any affiliation with law enforcement by probation officers would seriously compromise judicial independence. We explained: Our decision rests on the fundamental difference between probation and police organizations. Probation is an integral part of the judiciary; everything that probation does it does as an arm of the judiciary. Among other things, it is the entity that enforces judicial orders. Given the nature and functions of probation, it must be as impartial as the rest of the judiciary, totally so and scrupulously so. Probation cannot take sides any more than a court may, and cannot be perceived as taking sides any more than a court may. It is not pro-this or anti-that. . . . It has no more right to become allied with a public defender's office than with prosecutors or police. Probation represents no special interest in society and government but one: the courts. Police and police organizations have but one interest and one role: law enforcement. . . . The police stand firmly and properly on one side of the scales of criminal justicethe prosecution's side. Put simply, the functions of police and probationone serving the prosecution the other serving the courtsare not only different, but incompatible. Separation of the two is essential to the impartiality of the probation function and to the integrity of the judiciary. [ Id. (slip ruling at 3-4).] In recognition of the unique role they play as agents of the judiciary, we noted that probation officers would be less likely to win the trust of those they supervise if they were perceived in any way as `law enforcers,' as `police,' or if they acted as such. Id. at 18. At his best, a probation officer serves as a probationer's supporter, counselor, . . . and sometimes even a role model . . . committed to the probationer's rehabilitation under court order, with the help of family, friends, and community, all in the effort to achieve a normal productive life. Ibid. Moreover, [n]either the community groups, the family, nor the probationer would accept, work with, or be inspired by someone thought to have punishment as the main goal. Ibid. We thus concluded that if probation officers were allowed to identify themselves with the police, the impartiality of the judicial branch of government would be cast in doubt both in fact and in appearance. Id. at 42. [3] In rendering our decision, we again acknowledged the inherent dangers connected with some probation work and expressed support for measures that would enhance probation officers' safety. In that regard, we strongly encourage[d] cooperation between probation and police officers. Id. at 6. Following our ruling, the AOC issued Directive No. 6-97, prohibiting probation officers from becoming members of the PBA or FOP and requiring that probation officers who were already members of those organizations resign by June 30, 1997. Administrative Office of the Courts, Directive No. 6-97 (April 28, 1997), 148 N.J.L.J. 445, 535 (May 5, 1997), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/personnel/dir_6_97.pdf. [4] Thus, through its decisions and directives, the Supreme Court has made clear that the special role of the judiciary in our constitutional scheme requires that there be no entangling alliances between law enforcement and judiciary employees.
Against the backdrop of those clearly enunciated judiciary policies, the Legislature passed into law the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act. By authorizing probation officers to be armed and make arrests, the Act is fatally at odds with this Court's administrative rules governing probation. Furthermore, the Act commands both the Supreme Court and the Administrative Director of the Courts to collaborate in a legislative program in contravention of long-standing Court rules and directives. We cannot agree with defendants that allowing probation officers to carry guns and arrest those they supervise will not impair the essential integrity of the Judicial branch. [5] The Act creates a Probation Officer Community Safety Unit within the Administrative Office of the Courts, consisting of no less than 200 probation officers, and requires that at least five probation officers in that unit be assigned to every county. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a), -2(b). As a result of the legislation, probation officers must be transferred from their present assignments into the new armed law enforcement unit. The Legislature requires the Supreme Court not only to reallocate judiciary personnel, but to effectuate an Act that abrogates the Court's own policy directives. See N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a), -3 (providing that Supreme Court adopt rules in compliance with Act). When the Legislature similarly attempted to dictate to the Governor how he should make staffing decisions, we held that the legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine of our State Constitution. Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 463-64, 617 A. 2d 223 (1992). In that case, we declared that legislation countermanding specific executive decisions to reduce personnel amounted to unconstitutional micromanag[ement] and regulat[ion of] the internal administration of a coordinate branch of government. Id. at 461, 463, 617 A. 2d 223. Such a serious intrusion on the Governor's authority and ability to perform his constitutionally-delegated functions had the clear capacity to disrupt[ ] the balance between the two branches. Id. at 461, 463-64, 617 A. 2d 223; see also Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, supra, 90 N.J. at 378, 448 A. 2d 438 (holding that legislative veto provision of Legislative Oversight Act, L. 1981, c. 27, violated separation of powers by excessively interfering with the functions of the executive branch). The Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act interferes with the internal management of the judiciary in a way no less offensive than the unconstitutional legislation in Florio interfered with the executive branch. As previously stated, with few exceptions, we have accepted and complied with legislation touching on court administration. See Passaic County, supra, 73 N.J. at 255, 374 A. 2d 449. Accommodating the Legislature on those many occasions was compatible with the judiciary's core goals and furthered our common mission to give the State good and responsible government. But here, before passage of the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act, the Supreme Court made clear that the important judicial role played by probation officers in the court system could not be reconciled with arming them with guns, allowing them to execute arrest warrants, and permitting them to affiliate with law enforcement organizations. Despite those judicial policy pronouncements, the Legislature enacted a law authorizing probation officers to carry . . . firearm[s] and enforce warrants for the apprehension and arrest of probationers who violate the conditions of their probation sentence. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a). The Legislature also commanded those probation officers acting in a police capacity to undergo law enforcement, firearms, and self-defense training in courses administered by the Police Training Commission. N.J.S.A. 2B:10A-2(a), -2(c), -3. That Commission is part of the executive branch of government. See N.J.S.A. 52:17B-70 (creating Police Training Commission within Division of Criminal Justice in Department of Law and Public Safety). The Legislature, in effect, takes judiciary employees and places them under the sway of the executive branch in violation of the separation of powers and the Supreme Court's constitutional authority to govern its own house. Defendants argue that the Act is a valid exercise of the power of the Legislature to protect the health and safety of probation officers. However, this legislation is not designed to provide greater protection to probation officers in the field from criminal acts, but to convert a certain number of probation officers into armed law enforcement agents whose task it is to track down probation violators who have warrants for their arrest. This new role assignment for judiciary employees is more likely to place them in harm's way than enhance their safety. We are not unmindful that too many probation violators are on the loose. But it is the duty of the many municipal, county, and state law enforcement agencies to execute arrest warrants, including those of probation violators. Those are executive, not judicial, branch functions. It is not our place to pass judgment on the wisdom of legislation, and we do not do so here. It is our responsibility, however, to enforce the dictates of the Constitution and to restrain one branch of government when it oversteps its bounds and threatens the independence of another. We acknowledge that there are statutes, predating the passage of the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act, that confer certain law enforcement powers on probation officers. N.J.S.A. 2A:168-11, which was enacted before the 1947 New Jersey Constitution, provides that [p]robation officers shall have the powers of constables in the execution of their duties. A more recent statute provides that probation officers upon request of the chief probation officer or otherwise having probable cause to believe that the defendant has failed to comply with a requirement imposed as a condition of the order or that he has committed another offense, may arrest him without a warrant. N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3(a)(2). Those statutes like all statutes are subordinate to the fundamental law expressed in the State Constitution. To the extent that those statutes are in conflict with the Supreme Court's exercise of its constitutional supervision of probation officers, they can be given no effect. Whatever constabulary duties probation officers may have had in 1929 when N.J.S.A. 2A:168-11 was enacted, the role of probation officers is now clearly defined as a judicial one. The Act conscripts the Supreme Court to violate its own long-standing policies by directing it to promulgate rules regulating how probation officers are to carry firearms and make arrests, and establishing the law enforcement training of those officers. The Act also requires the Administrative Director of the Courts to collaborate with the Legislature in a program that is contrary to the policy of his constitutional superior, the Chief Justice. The Director is compelled by the Act to report to the Legislature on how effective the probation officers have been in tracking and apprehending probationers. L. 2001, c. 362, § 5. Those legislative commands to the Supreme Court and the Administrative Director of the Courts make an equal and independent branch of government subservient to the Legislature in violation of the separation of powers clause of our State Constitution, N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1. Because every possible presumption favors the validity of an act of the Legislature, N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 8, 292 A. 2d 545, appeal dismissed sub nom. Borough of E. Rutherford v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Auth., 409 U.S. 943, 93 S.Ct. 270, 34 L.Ed. 2d 215 (1972), we will not declare void legislation unless its repugnancy to the Constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt. Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 30 N.J. 381, 388, 153 A. 2d 10 (1959) (citing Gangemi v. Berry, 25 N.J. 1, 10, 134 A. 2d 1 (1957)). Although principles of comity always animate this Court's review of legislation that affects judicial administration, the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act is completely irreconcilable with this Court's exclusive administrative authority over the State's court system under Article VI and the separation of powers under Article III. Our State Constitution, therefore, compels that the Act be declared invalid.