Opinion ID: 2319789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Relying on D.C.Code § 16-1006, appellant contends that the government failed to present evidence that the court maintained jurisdiction to enforce the CPO because . . . [t]here is no evidence that, as of April 2009, Ms. Brown was residing, working, or attending school in the District, or was under the legal custody of a District government . . . [or that] the alleged violations occurred in the District. Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, which we review de novo. Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 228 (D.C.2011). D.C.Code § 16-1006 provides: A petitioner may file a petition for protection under this subchapter if: (1) The petitioner resides, lives, works, or attends school in the District of Columbia[;] (2) The petitioner is under the legal custody of a District government agency; or (3) The underlying offense occurred in the District of Columbia. By the terms of the statute, the foregoing requirements apply only to the fil[ing] of a petition for a CPO, not to the enforcement of it, as appellant's jurisdictional argument implies. In addition, the statute places no geographical limitations on where an alleged violation of a CPO issued by the Superior Court under this subchapter [D.C.Code §§ 16-1001 to -1006] must have occurred for the court to have the power to punish contempt of the order. See D.C.Code § 16-1005(f) (providing in pertinent part that [v]iolation of any temporary or final order issued under this subchapter, or violation in the District of Columbia of any valid foreign protection order . . . shall be punishable as contempt), D.C.Code § 16-1005(g) (providing in pertinent part that [a]ny person who violates any protection order issued under this subchapter, or any person who violates in the District of Columbia any valid foreign protection order . . . shall be chargeable with a misdemeanor). Of particular note, both sections require violation in the District of Columbia  before a valid foreign protection order is chargeable and punishable, but omit the phrase that we have italicized in referring to violations of CPOs issued under the statute by the Superior Court. [8] Accordingly, for the court to exercise jurisdiction and to convict appellant of contempt for violation of the December 2008 CPO, the government was not required, as appellant contends, to allege or prove that Brown was residing, working, or attending school in the District, or was under the legal custody of a District government . . . [or] that the alleged violations occurred in the District (although, as the government points out, the evidence did in fact establish that Brown lived in the District at the time of the violations). [9] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.