Opinion ID: 772878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA, Rehabilitation Act and FEHA Claims

Text: 10 Although alcoholism is a protected disability under the ADA, see Collings, 63 F.3d at 832 n.4, Brown has not presented any evidence that she was terminated because of her status as an alcoholic, as is required to prove her ADA claim. 1 Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1999). Rather, the evidence shows that Lucky Stores terminated her pursuant to its general policy under which three consecutive unexcused absences from work warrant termination. 2 The ADA clearly states that an employer: 11 may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic to the samequalification standards for employment or jobperformance and behavior that such entity holds otheremployees, even if any unsatisfactory performance orbehavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism ofsuch employee. 12 42 U.S.C. 12114(c)(4); see also Collings, 63 F.3d at 832. Thus, Lucky Stores' termination of Brown did not violate the ADA. 13 Brown argues that her absence from work on November 16 was protected by 42 U.S.C. 12114(b)(2). Section 12114(a) of the statute specifies that an employee or applicant currently engaging in the use of illegal drugs is not covered by the ADA, while section 12114(b) clarifies that section (a) does not apply to an individual who has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or has otherwise been rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use, 42 U.S.C. 12114(b)(1), nor to one who is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such use, id. 12114(b)(2). Mere participation in a rehabilitation program is not enough to trigger the protections of 12114(b); refraining from illegal use of drugs also is essential. Employers are entitled to seek reasonable assurances that no illegal use of drugs is occurring or has occurred recently enough so that continuing use is a real and ongoing problem. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-596, at 64 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 573; see also Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 857-58 (5th Cir. 1999); Shafer v. Preston Mem'l Hosp. Corp., 107 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1997). Brown's continuing use of drugs and alcohol was clearly an ongoing problem at least until November 10, as demonstrated by her incarceration for driving while intoxicated and possession of methamphetamine. Because she had not refrained from the use of drugs and alcohol for a sufficient length of time, she was not entitled to the protections of the ADA's safe-harbor provision. 14 Brown also claims that Lucky Stores had a duty to provide a reasonable accommodation for her disability by excusing her absence from her November 16 shift in order to attend the rehabilitation program. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. at 371 (An employer . . . may, in appropriate circumstances, have to consider the provision of leave to an employee with a disability as a reasonable accommodation unless the provision of leave would impose an undue hardship.). Neither Brown nor her sister-in-law asked for an accommodation, however. Brown testified that she never believed she needed rehabilitation while working for Lucky Stores. That, coupled with the absence of evidence that she ever requested an accommodation, leads us to conclude Lucky Stores was under no affirmative obligation to provide an accommodation for her. 15 Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000), does not alter our conclusion. In Barnett, we held that the interactive process for finding a reasonable accommodation may be triggered by the employer's recognition of the need for such an accommodation, even if the employee does not specifically make the request. Id. at 1112. The exception to the general rule that an employee must make an initial request applies, however, only when the employer (1) knows that the employee has a disability, (2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is experiencing workplace problems because of the disability, and (3) knows, or has reason to know, that the disability prevents the employee from requesting a reasonable accommodation. Id. (citation omitted). Barnett went on to explain that the employer is required to initiate the interactive process only when an employee is unable to make such a request and the company knows of the existence of the employee's disability. Id. at 1114. The record does not show that Brown was unable to request a reasonable accommodation, or that Lucky Stores knew or had reason to know that Brown had a disability preventing her from making such a request. 3 16 In sum, we conclude that Lucky Stores did not terminate Brown in violation of the ADA, she was not entitled to the protections of the ADA's safe harbor provision and Lucky Stores had no duty to provide an accommodation for her, given that she never requested one.
17 The Rehabilitation Act is restricted in application to any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 29 U.S.C. 794(a); Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d 1408, 1414-15 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has made no showing that Lucky Stores receives federal funds or is otherwise under executive agency control. Accordingly, her Rehabilitation Act claim fails.