Opinion ID: 899881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The need for the application of force,

Text: 3. The relationships between the need and the amount of force used, including the severity and nature of the suspected offense, if any, 4. The immediate threat to the officer or others reasonably perceived by a reasonable law enforcement officer, and 5. Ms. Cavanaugh’s behavior, such as whether she was actively resisting seizure or attempting to evade. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 hindsight. The nature of reasonableness must allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—under circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. An officer can act reasonably without using the least amount of force necessary. This reasonableness inquiry is an objective one. The question is whether Officer Davis’s actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regards to his underlying intent or motivation. Supp. App. 1587–88. -17- As a general matter our cases hold that, where there are disputed issues of material fact, the question of reasonableness underlying a Fourth Amendment violation is for the jury. Thus, for example, we recognize that “[a]lthough on a motion to suppress the ultimate question of the reasonableness of a search or seizure is regarded as a question of law subject to de novo review by the appellate court, in a damages action based on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation the reasonableness of a search or seizure is a question for the jury.” Sherouse v. Ratchner, 573 F.3d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 2009). And “where there is a question of fact or ‘room for a difference of opinion’ about the existence of probable cause, it is a proper question for a jury, even though it is normally determined by a court during the warrant application process.” Bruner v. Baker, 506 F.3d 1021, 1028 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that question whether officer’s shooting of plaintiff was reasonable went to the existence of a constitutional violation in the first place and was “an essentially factual question” for the jury). These principles from probable cause cases are equally applicable to our excessive force cases. Only where there are no disputed questions of historical fact does the court make the excessive force determination on its own, such as on summary judgment. See Keylon v. City of Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that “while probable cause is usually a question for the jury, a court -18- should decide it when there is no genuine issue of material fact”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (concluding that officer’s conduct in ending high-speed chase was objectively reasonable given undisputed video showing recklessness of fleeing driver). In this case, there were disputed issues of material fact relating to Officer Davis’s use of the taser. On summary judgment, Cavanaugh contended that her hands were visible while she was walking toward the house, that she did not run toward the door, and that she received no warning to stop. It was partly on the basis of these facts that we concluded the Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. Cavanaugh, 625 F.3d at 665–67. Yet at trial, Officer Davis testified that Cavanaugh’s hands were stuffed underneath her armpits, that she ran toward the door, and that she rebuffed his verbal and physical efforts to stop her. Given the prior report that Cavanaugh was carrying a knife, her hand placement and behavior outside the house were central to determining whether—from the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer—she posed a threat to herself or others. Due to these disputes of material fact, it was proper for the district court to send the question of whether Officer Davis’s use of force was reasonable to the jury. But Cavanaugh contends the district court should have given the jury special interrogatories tailored to the Graham factors—and then the court should have applied the jury’s findings to make the excessive force determination itself. -19- Yet the cases she relies on for this proposition concern either (1) the court’s evaluation of the excessive force issue at the summary judgment stage, or (2) the issue of qualified immunity, which involves both whether there was a constitutional violation and whether the violation was clearly established. None of the cases support the broad rule she seeks. See Gonzales v. Duran, 590 F.3d 855, 860 (10th Cir. 2009) (qualified immunity generally not for jury); Keylon, 535 F.3d 1210 (no jury question where material fact undisputed). In short, the court may rule on summary judgment that an officer’s conduct was reasonable (or unreasonable) if the undisputed facts support such a conclusion. But the court’s resolution of an excessive force claim as a matter of law, where there is no genuine issue of material fact, does not mean a jury cannot decide the question where there are disputed issues of material fact. This flows from the nature of a § 1983 excessive force claim. It requires two separate inquires: (1) the mixed factual-legal inquiry in deciding whether the force used was reasonable, Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 894–95 (10th Cir. 2009), and (2) the legal inquiry whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, id. at 901. While both concern questions of objective “reasonableness,” they are distinct. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204 (2001) (“The inquires for qualified immunity and excessive force remain distinct, even after Graham.”), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The first is a question -20- whether, under all the circumstances, the officer’s use of force was reasonable. The Supreme Court in Graham channeled that question into an assessment of nonexclusive factors arising from the police-citizen encounter. The second is a question whether, in light of clearly established law, an objectively reasonable officer would believe his or her conduct was permitted. See id. at 205 (“If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.”). This second question is a legal one for the court to decide; it involves a determination of what was clearly established law at the time of the officer’s conduct, which requires an assessment of the state of the law that only the judge is qualified to make. But the first ordinarily goes to the jury where there are disputed facts that bear on the use of force, especially where the second question has disappeared from the case. 5 While our cases allow courts to broadly submit the constitutional violation question to a jury where there are disputed historical facts, that practice is not without limits. In many cases, the better practice is for the district court to use special interrogatories, at least where qualified immunity is at issue. For 5 The allocation of responsibility between judge and jury can raise complex legal and policy concerns given the constitutional stature of § 1983 litigation. Compare Michael Wells, Scott v. Harris and the Role of the Jury in Constitutional Litigation, 29 R EV . L ITIG . 65 (2009) (arguing that Fourth Amendment reasonableness determinations should be left to judges in order to formulate clearer rules for constitutionally permissible behavior), with Catherine Struve, Constitutional Decision Rules for Juries, 37 C OLUM . H UM . R TS . L. R EV . 659, 704–06 (2006) (arguing that applying provisions of the Bill of Rights in civil suits should be left to juries). -21- example, had the jury found for Cavanaugh in this case, the Defendants may have filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity. Even though we previously held that under the version of facts presented by Cavanaugh, Officer Davis would not have been entitled to qualified immunity, there would have been no guarantee, without special interrogatories, that the jury found all the facts supporting such a determination. That is, the jury could have found there was a constitutional violation but nevertheless based that judgment on a set of facts less egregious than the one presented in Cavanaugh’s case in chief—and thus the Defendants may have been entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 206 (noting that even if officer’s conduct was “unreasonable,” officer may be “immun[e] for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions”). This is why, when qualified immunity is at issue, many courts have stated that the relevant disputed issues of fact must be resolved by the jury through special interrogatories, while the court must decide the qualified immunity question. Compare Kelley v. LaForce, 288 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that “factual issues must be decided by the trier of fact” and only then “can the court determine whether the actions were objectively reasonable so as to fall under the qualified immunity umbrella”), and Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 559–60 (4th Cir. 2005) (while “disputed material facts . . . must be submitted to a jury” the “legal question of a defendant’s entitlement to qualified immunity under a particular set of facts should be decided by the court”), with Gonzales, 590 F.3d at 859–60 -22- (allowing either jury or judge to decide the qualified immunity question as long as the judge “define[s] the clearly established law for the jury” and “issues of disputed material fact are dispositive of the qualified immunity inquiry”). We considered this question in some length in Gonzales. In that case, we endorsed two methods of submitting qualified immunity questions to the jury. The first was through special interrogatories, after which the “court could then determine whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law.” 590 F.3d at 859. The second method allows a court “to instruct the jury to determine what the defendant actually did and whether it was reasonable in light of the clearly established law defined by the judge.” Id. But we condemned a third method of “simply allow[ing] the jury to determine what the clearly established law is, what the defendant actually did, and whether the defendant’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the clearly established law found by the jury.” Id. at 860. Even though Gonzales endorsed the second approach, it emphasized the approach should only be used “rarely” in those circumstances “when narrow issues of disputed material fact are dispositive of the qualified immunity inquiry.” Id. “[T]he better approach,” we concluded, “is for the court to submit special interrogatories to the jury to establish the facts.” Id. And we emphasized that “allowing the jury to evaluate the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct” would be done “only because specific key, disputed facts were -23- dispositive of the qualified immunity issue.” Id. at 861 (internal quotation marks omitted). Other courts have noted that some factual disputes may go both to the constitutional violation question and to the qualified immunity question. What happens then? They have given the constitutional violation question to the jury through a general verdict, while also giving it special interrogatories on factual issues that are crucial for determining qualified immunity. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Doe, 332 F.3d 68, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that if the “jury returns a verdict of excessive force,” then the court should make the qualified immunity decision based on the jury’s determination, through special interrogatories, of “what the facts were that the officer faced or perceived”). Or, as we noted in Gonzales, the court can submit only special interrogatories to the jury, and then “[o]nce the jury determines the purely historical facts, the judge then decides the three legal questions of qualified immunity: whether the actions violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, whether those constitutional rights were clearly established, and whether the objectively reasonable defendant ‘would have known that his conduct violated that right.’” 590 F.3d at 860 n.4 (quoting Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003)). Thus, for example, in this case, the court could have given interrogatories to the jury that pinned down whether a knife was visible or whether Officer Davis asked Cavanaugh to stop, both of which would have been relevant to whether a -24- constitutional violation occurred in the first place and, if it did, whether Officer Davis should have known that his conduct violated Cavanaugh’s rights. 6 And then, assuming qualified immunity had been reasserted, the court could have decided the legal questions itself. Regardless of what the better practice may be (and it undoubtedly depends on the case), it is clear the district court here did not abuse its discretion in refusing to submit special interrogatories to the jury. Where qualified immunity is not at issue, a court may submit the excessive force question to the jury. Accordingly, we reject this basis for challenging the district court’s judgment. 7 6 It should be noted that the party raising the qualified immunity defense— the defendant—usually bears the burden of requesting special interrogatories. See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 2007) (“To the extent that a particular finding of fact is essential to a determination by the court that the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, it is the responsibility of the defendant to request that the jury be asked the pertinent question.” (citation omitted)). 7 Cavanaugh also challenges three evidentiary rulings that went to the issue of damages. Even if the district court erred in any of these rulings, Cavanaugh cannot show prejudice. Of the three elements of a § 1983 claim, the jury concluded the second element was not met since Officer Davis did not use excessive force. The jury did not reach the questions of causation and damages. Yet all three evidentiary rulings relate to causation and damages. And Cavanaugh cannot begin to show that this evidence somehow unfairly influenced the jurors’ determination of liability. -25-