Opinion ID: 781597
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Executive Branch's Official Explanation of Article VII, 2

Text: 37 The negotiators' explanation of ¶ 2 of Article VII, provided in the Technical Analysis, does not support the appellees' reading. The Technical Analysis, included in the ratification history at S. Treaty Doc. 100-14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), was prepared by the United States negotiating team, [and] constitutes the formal executive branch representation as to the meaning of this treaty and the obligations to be assumed by the United States under it. See Technical Analysis at 5. The Analysis states that Article VII(2) provides that the Requested State is to execute the request pursuant to its own laws, practices, and procedures, except that `directions stated in the request' will be honored unless prohibited by domestic law. Technical Analysis at 10. Despite appellees' assertion that law of the Requested State plainly incorporates the substantive law, nowhere in the treaty negotiators' explanation of ¶ 2 of Article VII do the negotiators make any statements that are consistent with or offer any support for the appellees' reading. Rather, the entire paragraph explaining ¶ 2 addresses the methods and procedures by which treaty requests should be executed. The negotiators construe ¶ 2 to address how the Requested State shall handle directions stated [by the Requesting State] in the request concerning the way in which the particular information is to be sought. Unless the Requested State prohibits conformance with the particular directions stated in the request, then the Requested State should execute the request consistent with those directions. Id. The negotiators then give examples of videotaping, notice to persons, and presence of certain persons when evidence is taken, all of which deal with the procedural methods for executing requests. Id. After carefully reading the entire explanation of Article VII, it is clear that the negotiators did not intend ¶ 2 to incorporate and subject all treaty requests to the entire substantive law of the Requested State, but rather they intended Article VII, ¶ 2 to address the procedures and methods to be used by the Requested State in executing the treaty requests. This official interpretation by the executive branch is entitled to great deference by this Court. El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168, 119 S.Ct. 662, 671, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999). 38 (b) Article VII is Intended to Provide Slightly Broader Authority than 28 U.S.C. § 1782 39 In its Technical Analysis, the executive branch states that one purpose of ¶ 1 of Article VII of the MLAT, 6 is to provide[] slightly broader authority than 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for U.S. federal courts to use their power to issue subpoenas and other process when Canada needs evidence for use before an administrative agency.... Technical Analysis at 10. In this statement, the negotiators were apparently concerned with several circuits' restrictive interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 as it then existed. These courts read the statute in a way that limited its scope to pending proceedings in judicial tribunals. The real significance of this executive branch statement in this case is the fact that the negotiators were making clear that ¶ 1 of Article VII allowed assistance that would not otherwise be permitted under section 1782 as it was being construed at that time. According to the actual words used by the negotiators, Article VII of the Treaty provides slightly broader authority than 28 U.S.C. 1782 for U.S. federal courts to use their power to issue subpoenas and other process when Canada needs evidence. This makes clear that the negotiators read the MLAT as not being simply subject to the limits of 28 U.S.C. § 1782. If all MLAT requests were subject to the limits of section 1782, then the MLAT necessarily could not provide slightly broader authority than 28 U.S.C. 1782 for U.S. federal courts to use their power to issue subpoenas ... when Canada needs assistance. This interpretation of ¶ 1 of Article VII cannot be reconciled with a reading of ¶ 2 of that same article to fully incorporate 28 U.S.C. § 1782 as a substantive limitation of Canadian MLAT requests. The Technical Analysis, constituting the executive branch's official interpretation of the Treaty, is entitled to much deference by this Court. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., 525 U.S. at 168, 119 S.Ct. at 671. Moreover, we find this interpretation to be entirely reasonable in light of all the facts and circumstances. 40 (c) Rejection of Dual Criminality 41 Another provision of the Treaty lends additional support to this interpretation. Article II of the MLAT, entitled Scope of Application, contains a provision rejecting the rule of dual criminality. Dual criminality is the rule that the offense for which the foreign state seeks assistance must also constitute a crime in the requested state. Article II, ¶ 3 explicitly provides that [a]ssistance shall be provided without regard to whether the conduct under investigation or prosecution in the Requesting State constitutes an offence or may be prosecuted by the Requested State. The negotiators state in the Technical Analysis that [b]y avoiding a dual criminality provision in this Treaty, the United States expects to receive assistance for such important crimes as, for instance, money laundering, even though Canada has yet to enact similar legislation. Technical Analysis at 5. This provision makes clear an intent that requests for assistance not be routinely impeded or denied by virtue of the Requested State's own laws. If Article VII, as appellees contend, subjects all requests to the limitations of existing Requested State substantive law, then many requests would be impeded by the operation of an indirect dual criminality provision that is explicitly rejected in Article II. Therefore, if Article VII, ¶ 2 is read as the appellees contend, a dual criminality provision will be brought into the Treaty through the back door. On the other hand, construing Article VII, ¶ 2 as we do to refer only to the procedures and methods of executing a request and taking evidence pursuant to such a request is completely consistent with and in no way undermines Article II's rejection of the dual criminality rule.