Opinion ID: 2602482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Bryce C.

Text: In December 1995, this court interpreted Family Code section 7895 in Bryce C, supra, 12 Cal.4th 226, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275. There, a child's stepfather petitioned the superior court under the Family Code for a judgment freeing the child from his father's custody and control. The superior court denied the petition after finding that the father had not abandoned the child. On the stepfather's appeal, the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District refused to appoint counsel to represent the indigent father. We granted the father's petition for review of this order. The issue in this court was whether, on appeal from a judgment refusing to free a child from a parent's custody and control, an appellate court was required under Family Code section 7895 to appoint appellate counsel for an indigent parent who was a respondent on the appeal. ( Bryce C, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 228-229, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275.) This court concluded that Family Code section 7895 requires appellate courts to appoint counsel only for parents appealing a judgment freeing a child from their custody and control, and thus a respondent was not entitled, as of right, to appointed counsel, although an appellate court retained discretion to appoint counsel for a respondent whenever the appearance of counsel may reasonably affect whether parental rights are terminated. ( Bryce C, supra, at p. 229, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275; but see also id. at p. 235, 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275 (cone. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) At the outset, this court acknowledged that proceedings under the Family Code to free a child from parental custody and control are immensely important to the parent because a judgment granting a petition terminates all parental rights in the child. ( Bryce C, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 230, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275.) This court also acknowledged that in Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683, it had construed the statutory scheme as impliedly requiring a `reviewing court to appoint counsel for any indigent parent appealing from an order terminating parental rights....' ( Bryce C, supra, at p. 230, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275.) Noting that the Legislature enacted Civil Code former section 237.7, later reenacted as Family Code section 7895, a few years after our decision in Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d 170, 145 Cal.Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683, this court in Bryce C. reviewed legislative history materials relating to that provision. We then concluded that [t]he legislative language and history both demonstrate an intent to require counsel for appellants, but not necessarily for respondents. ( Bryce C, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 232, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275.) This court added: Substantial reasons explain and justify a statute granting counsel to all appellants whose parental rights have been terminated but not to all respondents whose rights have not been terminated. An appellant whose rights have been terminated has the burden to perfect the appeal, and to identify and argue points of error to try to overturn a presumptively valid judgment. [Citation.] The rationale of Jacqueline H., supra, 21 Cal.3d at page 177, 145 Cal.Rptr. 548, 577 P.2d 683, was that indigent parents should have the `right to an effective appeal,' not just any appeal, which requires an attorney. (Italics in original.) The quoted language was also quoted in the bill analyses of both the Senate and Assembly Committees on the Judiciary. Although counsel is certainly useful, and sometimes vital, to a respondent, this argument has less force when the parent is defending a favorable judgment, and the presumptions favor the respondent. ( Ibid. ) Having concluded that the father was not entitled to appellate counsel as of right because he was the respondent on the appeal, this court in Bryce C. expressly declined to decide whether the child must be a dependent child of the court for counsel to be required. ( Id. at p. 233, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275.) The matter was remanded so the Court of Appeal could exercise its discretion and determine whether to appoint counsel to represent the father under the standards articulated.