Opinion ID: 1687391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 3 and Section 1(E)

Text: The State first contends that the trial court erred in denying injunctive relief to the State and in granting such relief to the defendants on the grounds that Section 3 and Section 1(E) of Article 527 are unconstitutionally overbroad because they fail to differentiate between public and mere private possession of allegedly obscene materials. The United States Supreme Court held in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), that obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press and may be regulated by the States. This decision was limited in its application in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542, (1969), wherein the Court said: We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today's holding. As we have said, the States have broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home. 394 U.S. 568, 89 S.Ct. 1249-1250. A three-judge court in Texas held the predecessor of Section 3 [2] unconstitutional on the ground that it made mere possession of obscene material a crime and did not protect private possession as required by Stanley . Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F.Supp. 602 (N.D.Tex.1969). The amended Article 527 of the Penal Code, applicable to the case now under consideration, proscribes only the sale, distribution or exhibition of obscene materials or their possession with the intent to sell, distribute or exhibit. The amended Article 527 became effective on June 10, 1969the day after the Stein decision was handed down. Mere private possession of obscene materials is no longer prohibited or punishable under Article 527. Therefore, the holding in Stein is not applicable to Article 527 as amended. Two cases which are relevant are Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.Ga.1969) (Aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 592, 90 S.Ct. 1351, 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970), and Newman v. Conover, 313 F.Supp. 623 (N.D.Tex. 1970) (Three-judge courts). In Gable , a section of the Georgia Statute [3] prohibiting the distribution of obscene literature was challenged on the ground that it was overbroad under the standard put forth in Stanley . The section is very similar to Section 3 of the Texas Statute. A three-judge court upheld the statute as constitutional, stating: Obscenity, it was stated in Roth ,   is not within the protected pale of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, Stanley tempers this broad mandate by the allowance of the private possession of obscene materials. As Justice Marshall stated in his concluding paragraph in Stanley : `as we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home'. These words indicate a conscious desire on the part of that court to keep Stanley limited to its facts and no statements in the body of the opinion could logically be construed to encompass the contention of plaintiff. Plaintiff divines several situations under which the working of 26-201 might be overly broad, viz., a husband showing an obscene book to his wife, or consenting adults being prohibited from gathering in a private home to view an obscene film. However, as was stated in Stanley , `No such dangers are present in this case'. 309 F.Supp. 1000-1001. The United States Supreme Court apparently agrees with this interpretation of Stanley , as it affirmed the Gable decision. 397 U.S. 592, 90 S.Ct. 1351, 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970). Newman v. Conover dealt with the same question before this Court, the constitutionality of Article 527 of the Texas Penal Code. The district court, after considering Roth , Stanley , Stein and Gable , held that:    Section 3 is clearly constitutional. 313 F.Supp. 626. I would hold that the trial court erred in denying the State's request for a temporary injunction because Section 3 and Section 1 (E) fail to differentiate between public and mere private possession or sale, exhibition or distribution. I would interpret the recently amended statute to make that distinction, and hold that the State has a legitimate interest in regulating the public dissemination of obscenity.