Opinion ID: 1103876
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Safeguards Required

Text: Under the balancing approach outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge , some administrative procedure for entertaining vehicle owner complaints prior to booting is required to afford reasonable assurance against erroneous or arbitrary deprivation of property which may be a person's sole means of transportation. The vehicle owner's interest is self-evident. A motor vehicle is a necessity of modern life; indeed, the disruption of this essential mode of transportation for even short periods of time may drastically affect one's livelihood and safety. And the risk of an erroneous deprivation, given the necessary reliance on computers, [3] is not insubstantial. [4] Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Croft, supra, 436 U.S. at 18, 98 S.Ct. at 1564. At the very minimum, therefore, a motorist facing immobilization of perhaps his only effective means of transportation and the consequent interference with protected property and liberty interests must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738. The Due Process Clause will not shield the vehicle owner from deprivations properly imposed, but it disserves both his interest and the interest of the city if his deprivation is in fact unwarranted. The risk of error or unfairness caused by human or computer fault in the immobilization process is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or interference. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, supra . In the operation of an efficient parking program with public approval and cooperation, a municipality may be expected to make all reasonable efforts to minimize errors, unfair treatment and the resulting popular dissatisfaction and recalcitrance. Cf. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Croft, 436 U.S. at 19, 98 S.Ct. at 1565. Due Process requires at least rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken classification of persons as scofflaws and against arbitrary deprivation of the use of their vehicles, viz., that the registered owner of a vehicle be given written notice by mail of a proposed order targeting his car for booting, and that he be afforded a brief period before issuance of the order within which to make an informal oral or written statement why the vehicle should not be booted. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental requirement of due process. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985); see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require that the owner be given the opportunity to confront and cross examine witnesses, or to call witnesses. To impose in each case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm administrative facilities. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 583, 95 S.Ct. at 740. On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal discussion permitting the motorist to oppose the targeting of his vehicle will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous or unfair action without being unduly burdensome. Under the city's existing procedure, the registered owner of a vehicle which incurs a parking violation charge is sent two delinquent notices within about sixty days of the ticket issuance if a fine is not paid timely. Requiring at least that there be notification of the proposed boot order in the final mailing and a brief period for informal discussion or other communication prior to issuance of the immobilization order will add little expense or delay to the fact-finding function. In fact, the city's small burden of allowing a private party a chance to respond to a statement or a summary of adverse evidence may be offset substantially by increased fine collections due to more effective notice and the clear, specific threat of vehicular immobilization.