Opinion ID: 2106660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Motion for Directed Verdict on the Felony-Murder Count

Text: Defendant insists that the circuit court erroneously denied his motion for directed verdict on the felony-murder count. Because we have found reversible error in the circuit court's instruction to the jury on this count, we need not address this argument. [1]

Defendant criticizes the circuit court's approval of the State's instruction No. 11, regarding felony murder. Although we have reversed defendant's felony-murder conviction, defendant's argument calls into question defendant's convictions on all three murder counts, and therefore warrants our consideration. Instruction No. 11 restates Illinois pattern jury instruction No. 5.03A (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03A (3d ed. Supp.1995)). Defendant maintains that the instruction should be limited to cases charging defendant with only felony murder. Defendant argues too that, having received the State's instruction No. 11, the jury should have been informed that instruction No. 11 applied solely to the felony-murder count and not to the remaining murder counts. Defendant theorizes that the lack of a clarifying instruction misled the jury into believing that defendant could be convicted on any of the murder counts merely on proof that defendant and Williams agreed to [commit] armed robbery    even if [defendant] did not intend to kill Officer Simenson. The State correctly observes that defendant waived this argument by neglecting to object to the instruction at the jury instruction conference. People v. Vargas, 174 Ill.2d 355, 362, 220 Ill.Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037 (1996); People v. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d 195, 209, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990). By operation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615, however, we can review any question not otherwise properly preserved if we believe that plain error affecting a substantial right may have occurred. 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a); Vargas, 174 Ill.2d at 363, 220 Ill.Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037; Herrett, 137 Ill.2d at 209, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1. In criminal cases, the plain error rule may be invoked in two instances: first, where the evidence in the case is closely balanced ( Vargas, 174 Ill.2d at 363, 220 Ill.Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037; Herrett, 137 Ill.2d at 209, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1), and second, where to leave the error uncorrected raises a substantial risk that the accused was denied a fair trial, and remedying the error is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process ( Vargas, 174 Ill.2d at 363, 220 Ill. Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037; Herrett, 137 Ill.2d at 210, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1). The error must be so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process that the trial court could not cure the error by sustaining an objection or instructing the jury to disregard the error. Vargas, 174 Ill.2d at 364, 220 Ill.Dec. 616, 673 N.E.2d 1037. We find that the plain error doctrine cannot be applied here. As discussed subsequently in this opinion, the evidence supporting defendant's convictions for knowing and intentional murder is so convincing as to remove any suggestion that the evidence is closely balanced. As we also explain below, instruction No. 11 contains a correct statement of the law, and was adequately supplemented by other instructions that fairly and completely stated the law applicable to this criminal case. No affront to the judicial process occurred that would substantiate a finding of plain error. Thus, we do not find plain error necessitating review. Nevertheless, waiver merely limits the parties' ability to raise an argument, not this court's right to entertain an argument. People v. Hicks, 181 Ill.2d 541, 545, 230 Ill.Dec. 244, 693 N.E.2d 373 (1998). Consequently, we may, as we choose here, address the merits of this issue. The State's instruction No. 11 reads: To sustain the charge of first degree murder, it is not necessary for the State to show that it was or may have been the original intent of the defendant or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible to kill the deceased, Timothy Simenson. It is sufficient if the jury believes from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant and one for whose conduct he is legally responsible combined to do an unlawful act, such as to commit armed robbery, and that the deceased was killed by one of the parties committing that unlawful act. Initially, we note that defendant does not contend that instruction No. 11 misstates the law of felony murder. By tendering an instruction derived from the Illinois pattern jury instructions, the State followed this court's preference for pattern instructions, provided the instruction accurately states the principle of law for which it is submitted. People v. Novak, 163 Ill.2d 93, 116, 205 Ill. Dec. 471, 643 N.E.2d 762 (1994); 134 Ill.2d R. 451(a). Additionally, this court approved IPI 5.03A as a statement of felony murder in People v. Ramey, 151 Ill.2d 498, 537, 177 Ill.Dec. 449, 603 N.E.2d 519 (1992). Defendant's objection to instruction No. 11 chiefly arises from the committee note for IPI 5.03A, which advises that [b]ecause the supreme court has approved this instruction to date only in the context of a felony murder case involving an alleged accomplice, the Committee believes this instruction should not be used in any other case. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.03A, Committee Note (3d ed. Supp.1995). In this appeal, we discern two reasons to decline the committee's suggestion. First, the phrase any other case in the comment is not entirely clear. The phrase might be construed to mean any case in which murder is charged pursuant to theories other than felony murder. However, it could just as easily refer to those cases in which accountability is inapplicable to the charge of felony murder. In any event, we find that, in the case at bar, the committee's directive limiting use of the instruction to a particular fact pattern conflicts with a fundamental rule of law. As stated in Ramey, [a]n individual instruction should not be judged in artificial isolation; rather, the instruction should be examined in light of the overall charge. Ramey, 151 Ill.2d at 537, 177 Ill.Dec. 449, 603 N.E.2d 519. If all of the instructions, read together, completely and fairly state the law governing disposition of the case, no error occurs in instructing the jury. This is true even when the instruction complained of is, alone, superfluous or misleading. People v. Weaver, 18 Ill.2d 108, 116, 163 N.E.2d 483 (1959); People v. Marsh, 403 Ill. 81, 94, 85 N.E.2d 715 (1949). In the appeal at bar, the jury received complete and thorough instructions concerning first degree (knowing) murder and first degree (intentional) murder, in addition to instructions concerning armed robbery and felony murder. These same instructions clearly stated that the knowing and intentional murder charges were separate and distinct from the felony-murder charge. Similarly, the jury received separate verdict forms for each crime charged against defendant. In addition to armed robbery, the jury received separate verdict forms for: the offense of first degree murder intending to kill Timothy Simenson; the offense of first degree murder knowing the acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Timothy Simenson; the offense of first degree murder while committing the offense of armed robbery. Reading the instructions collectively, as we must ( People v. Housby, 84 Ill.2d 415, 433-34, 50 Ill.Dec. 834, 420 N.E.2d 151 (1981)), we find that no error occurred in the tendering of instruction No. 11. In their entirety, the instructions fully and fairly announced the law applicable to the theories of the State and defendant. People v. Terry, 99 Ill.2d 508, 516, 77 Ill.Dec. 442, 460 N.E.2d 746 (1984); Weaver, 18 Ill.2d at 116, 163 N.E.2d 483; Marsh, 403 Ill. at 94, 85 N.E.2d 715. Through the several instructions and verdict forms, the jury was informed, more than once, that defendant was charged under different theories of first degree murder. We also find the instructions facially clear and comprehensible. Defendant's concern that instruction No. 11 confused the jury is without merit.