Opinion ID: 484640
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Framework Established for Remand by Wakefield I

Text: 21 Wakefield contends that Wakefield I mandated a new trial on his contract claim. The district court rejected this view, stating that it d[id] not understand the Court of Appeals as ruling on whether or not plaintiff had established a prima facie case, March 18 Opinion at 2; the court apparently read our statement that Wakefield could attempt to prove that Paragraph J did not apply or that NTI was motivated by a desire to deny him commissions that were about to become vested as clearly indicat[ing] that plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case, id. Neither view is entirely correct. 22 The action taken by a court of appeals must be analyzed in the context of the issues before it. In Wakefield I, NTI challenged, inter alia, the district court's failure to grant it judgment n.o.v. In pursuing its contention that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, NTI explored at some length the trial evidence with respect to what contract governed Wakefield's right to commissions in 1979. In remanding for a new trial, we plainly rejected NTI's contentions that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Far from clearly indicat[ing] that Wakefield had not established a prima facie case at his first trial, we stated that a properly instructed jury could have awarded damages to Wakefield upon either of [his] theories.... 769 F.2d at 113. Thus, we clearly indicated that Wakefield had presented sufficient evidence at the first trial to withstand a motion for dismissal of his case as a matter of law. This ruling was confirmed thereafter when we denied NTI's petition for rehearing which sought to avoid a new trial on the wrongful motivation theory on the basis that the district court had implicitly ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support that theory at the first trial. 23 We do not mean to suggest that if further discovery proceedings on remand had revealed an undisputed fact conclusively precluding the entry of judgment in Wakefield's favor, judgment could not have been entered against him as a matter of law. But in the absence of such a revelation, our ruling in Wakefield I meant that NTI was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.