Opinion ID: 887282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the prosecutor breach the plea agreement?

Text: ¶ 16 Rardon argues that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement in two ways. First, Rardon argues that a breach occurred when the prosecutor elicited improper testimony from D.N., J.T., and his ex-wife. The specific portions of testimony which Rardon designates as improper include accounts of the physical and sexual abuses which Rardon subjected his family to over a period of years, general testimony regarding Rardon's violent nature, and J.T.'s stated opinion that he should be put away for a very, very long time. Rardon claims that the conduct referred to in this testimony had nothing to do with the charge of sexual assault to which he plead guilty. Further, Rardon asserts, this testimony was improper because it was elicited for the purpose of inducing Judge Christopher to reject the State's recommended sentence and impose an increased sentence. ¶ 17 In determining a proper sentence, the sentencing judge may consider any relevant evidence relating to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character of the defendant, the defendant's background and history, mental and physical condition, and any evidence the court considers to have probative force. State v. Mason, 2003 MT 371, ¶ 23, 319 Mont. 117, ¶ 23, 82 P.3d 903, ¶ 23. This includes evidence of other acts, even those resulting in acquittal or which are dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. Mason, ¶ 23. As well, it is entirely appropriate for a prosecutor to elicit testimony from the victims at a sentencing hearing, and for the victims to express their fears and feelings. Rardon II, ¶ 22. Moreover, we observe that nothing in the plea agreement between the State and Rardon limited the State's ability to present the testimony at issue. Thus, the fact that Rardon's abusive history and violent tendencies came out during the proceeding does not establish a breach of the plea agreement. Nor is a breach established by virtue of the fact that Rardon's daughter stated her opinion that he should receive a lengthy sentence. The portions of testimony which Rardon complains of fit squarely within the parameters of acceptable evidence. As such, we conclude that the sentencing judge was entitled to consider this evidence in determining an appropriate sentence. Thus, we hold that the plea agreement was not breached by the mere introduction of this evidence. ¶ 18 A plea agreement is a contract between the State and a defendant which is subject to contract law standards. Rardon II, ¶ 18. The State may not retain the benefit of such an agreement while avoiding its obligation thereunder. Rardon II, ¶ 18. Indeed, prosecutors must meet strict and meticulous standards of both promise and performance in fulfilling such agreements. Rardon II, ¶ 18. As such, a prosecutorial violation of a plea agreement is unacceptable, even if made inadvertently in the good faith pursuit of a just result. Rardon II, ¶ 18. ¶ 19 Thus, although a prosecutor enjoys wide latitude in submitting evidence to a sentencing judge, the presentation of the State's case must be tempered by any obligations or restrictions created by way of a plea agreement. In Rardon's case, the plea agreement required the prosecutor to recommend a sentence in conformity with the recommendation resulting from the SOTA Evaluation and the PSI Report. This component of the agreement obligated the prosecutor to present the State's case in a way that would not undermine the recommendation he ultimately made to the sentencing judge. Rardon II, ¶ 22. A failure in this regard would constitute a breach of the plea agreement. Rardon II, ¶ 22. As we have previously noted, although a sentencing judge has the statutory authority to reject a plea bargained sentencing recommendation, such a decision should be made pursuant to a good faith and fair presentation of the State's case. Rardon II, ¶ 25. ¶ 20 We hold that the prosecutor's presentation of the State's case did not undermine the plea bargained sentence recommendation. In doing so, we note that there are no hard and fast criteria to apply in making such a determination. Rardon II, ¶ 21. Rather, each case must be decided on its own unique facts. Rardon II, ¶ 21. Here, the testimony at issue was particularly relevant because it described conduct that was part of Rardon's pattern of abusive and violent behavior which was directly related to his crime of sexual assault, and was in fact facilitative of that offense. Further, this conduct occurred during the same time period in which Rardon committed the crime for which he was convicted. The prosecutor appropriately encouraged the witnesses to testify about their experiences so that the sentencing judge was properly informed in determining an appropriate sentence. ¶ 21 More importantly, however, the prosecutor did not use this testimony to undermine the State's sentence recommendation. In Rardon II, we held that the prosecutor had effectively undercut the plea agreement by repeatedly eliciting inflammatory testimony which was clearly intended to convince the sentencing judge that the plea bargained sentence recommendation should not be accepted. Rardon II, ¶¶ 19-22. For example, the prosecutor explained to a witness that if the State's recommended sentence were accepted, Rardon could be eligible for parole within just a few years. Rardon II, ¶ 19. Then the prosecutor asked the witness what she thought of the State's recommended sentence. Rardon II, ¶ 19. The witness, not surprisingly, opposed the recommendation. Rardon II, ¶ 19. ¶ 22 Here, however, nothing of that sort occurred, and Rardon's bare assertions to the contrary are unpersuasive. The fact that some testimony elicited in the third hearing was similar to that of the first and second hearings does not establish a breach of the plea agreement. Our review of the record leads us to conclude that none of the prosecutorial improprieties identified in the previous proceedings were present in the third sentencing hearing. Further, Rardon has not demonstrated that any other form of prosecutorial impropriety occurred. We hold that the prosecutor did not elicit improper testimony or undermine the State's recommended sentence. Thus, we hold that the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement when he questioned Rardon's family members at the sentencing hearing. ¶ 23 Additionally, Rardon argues that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by subpoenaing D.N. to testify at the continuation of the sentencing hearing after she had declined to attend the hearing two weeks earlier. This action, Rardon argues, constitutes a breach because the District Court already had her statements from the PSI Report as well as her testimony from the prior hearings, and thus the prosecutor's purpose could only have been to send the message to the court that the recommended sentence in the plea agreement is insufficient. Rardon cites no authority for the proposition that this Court could or should draw such an inference. This Court simply can not infer that the prosecutor intended to undermine the plea agreement by the mere fact that he subpoenaed D.N. to testify. Nor do we infer an improper intent from any other evidence in the record. Further, setting aside any speculation as to the prosecutor's intent, we observe that the subpoena had no actual impact with regard to the hearing because D.N. testified that she had decided to appear and testify before the subpoena was issued. Indeed, she expressed gratitude for the opportunity to testify, explaining that her prior failure to appear was simply due to her apprehension about the proceeding. In short, Rardon's argument is utterly without merit. We hold that the prosecutor did not breach the plea agreement by subpoenaing D.N. to testify.