Opinion ID: 2093038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admission of written statement

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a written statement which was given to the police by Audrey DeVone the day after the robberies. [1] The defendant maintains that this statement was inadmissible as hearsay and that its admission was harmful error. During the trial, DeVone's written statement was first mentioned by the state during the direct examination of DeVone. She was asked to identify the statement and verify her signature. The state later attempted to use the statement to refresh DeVone's recollection on a point, but withdrew the question when her memory apparently was not refreshed. A copy of the statement was provided to the defendant at the close of DeVone's direct testimony. DeVone testified during direct examination that she was serving concurrent sentences of two to five years after pleading guilty to robbery charges stemming from the incidents for which the defendant was on trial. During cross-examination, counsel for the defendant also had DeVone identify the statement and had it marked for identification. DeVone was then questioned at some length about the statement, during which questioning defense counsel elicited that DeVone was told by a detective that it will make it lighter on her if she gave a statement as to what happened, and that she was still somewhat high when she gave the statement. DeVone was questioned in some detail concerning her ability to recall specific events which occurred during the day of the robberies. On redirect examination, DeVone denied any interest in trying to convict the defendant and maintained that she gave the statement to the police only because she wanted to take responsibility for what she had done. At the end of the redirect examination, the state offered the statement, to which counsel for the defendant objected on the grounds that the statement was both hearsay and prejudicial. The state claimed the offer on the basis of its relevance to DeVone's credibility. The defendant's objection was overruled and his exception was noted. The statement was admitted into evidence without any limitation by the trial court. We agree with the defendant's claim that the statement was erroneously admitted. The general rule is that a witness' prior consistent statements are inadmissible at trial. Thomas v. Ganezer, [137 Conn. 415, 417, 78 A.2d 539 (1951)]; annot., 75 A.L.R. 2d 909, 918. Such statements clearly are barred by the hearsay rule if sought to be used to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein; see, e.g., 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 500, p. 485 (`its sole purpose is to rehabilitate an impeached witness'); 4 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev.) § 1132, p. 294; also, they generally are prohibited even when offered for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the witness' damaged credibility. See United States v. Quinto, 582 F.2d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 1978) and authority cited therein. The rationale upon which this rule is based is that the witness' story `is not made more probable or more trustworthy by any number of repetitions of it. Such evidence would ordinarily be both irrelevant and cumbersome to the trial; and is rejected in all Courts.' 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d Ed.) § 1124, pp. 194-95; Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., 159 Conn. 307, 315-16, 268 A.2d 639 (1970); see also 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed.) § 500, p. 484.... State v. Dolphin, 178 Conn. 564, 568-69, 424 A.2d 266 (1979); see State v. McCarthy, 179 Conn. 1, 18, 425 A.2d 924 (1979); Mei v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., supra; Thomas v. Ganezer, supra; Fitzgerald v. Savin, 119 Conn. 63, 69, 174 A. 177 (1934); Palmer v. Hartford Dredging Co., 73 Conn. 182, 188, 47 A. 125 (1900); 4 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn Rev.) § 1124; 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence § 500; 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses §§ 641, 642. There are certain exceptions to this general rule. Major exceptions to the general rule include using the prior consistent statement to rehabilitate a witness who has been impeached: by a prior inconsistent statement; State v. McCarthy, supra, 18-21; Thomas v. Ganezer, supra, 418; 4 Wigmore, supra, § 1126; by a suggestion of a bias or interest which was not present at the time of the prior consistent statement; State v. Dolphin, supra, 571, 572; 4 Wigmore, supra, § 1128; or by a suggestion of recent contrivance. State v. Dolphin, supra, 568 n.5; 4 Wigmore, supra, §§ 1129, 1130; see generally 4 Wigmore, supra, §§ 1125-1131; McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 49; annot., 140 A.L.R. 21; annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 909; 81 Am. Jur. 2d, Witnesses §§ 644-655. These exceptions, however, are not applicable to this case because they only apply when the prior consistent statement is admitted solely for the purpose of rehabilitating an impeached witness. [2] See State v. Dolphin, supra, 570; State v. Mitchell, 169 Conn. 161, 168-69, 362 A.2d 808 (1975); Thomas v. Ganezer, supra. Here, even though the state argued that the statement was admissible because it was relevant to DeVone's credibility, the trial court did not, either at the time it admitted the statement or in its charge to the jury, caution the jury that the statement could not be considered by them to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein but could be considered only to evaluate the credibility of the witness. Cf. State v. Dolphin, supra, 567 n.2. [3] As the general rule concerning prior consistent statements was applicable, it was error for the trial court to admit the statement over the defendant's objection. Our inquiry does not end, however, with the conclusion that the admission of DeVone's statement was erroneous. We now consider whether this error was so prejudicial that it constituted harmful error. See State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, 196-97, 435 A.2d 3 (1980). The erroneous admission of the statement was harmful only if the improper admission was likely to have affected the jury's verdict. State v. Cooper, 182 Conn. 207, 212, 438 A.2d 418 (1980); State v. Ruth, supra; State v. McClain, 171 Conn. 293, 300, 370 A.2d 928 (1976); State v. Tropiano, 158 Conn. 412, 427, 262 A.2d 147, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 949, 90 S. Ct. 1866, 26 L. Ed. 2d 288 (1969). Because the erroneous admission of the statement does not involve the violation of a constitutional right, it is the defendant's burden to show that the error was harmful. State v. Gordon, 185 Conn. 402, 419, 441 A.2d 119 (1981); State v. Cooper, supra; State v. Ruth, supra; State v. Dolphin, supra; State v. Pepe, 176 Conn. 75, 81, 405 A.2d 51 (1978); State v. L'Heureux, 166 Conn. 312, 323, 348 A.2d 578 (1974). The defendant contends that the statement was so prejudicial to him that its erroneous admission could not be harmless. The defendant cites in support of this contention various items in the statement which were not before the jury through any other evidence, including assertions that DeVone was shoot[ing] dope and that the defendant had said that they were going to get some money and get high together. We cannot agree, however, that the erroneous admission of the statement was itself likely to have affected the jury's verdict. A review of the record reveals overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. The defendant was positively identified by one victim and was apprehended within a short period after the robberies with the items stolen from both victims. Also, the defendant's accomplice testified fully as to the defendant's involvement in the robberies. In view of this overwhelming evidence of guilt which was entirely separate and distinct from DeVone's statement, we conclude that the erroneous admission of the statement was harmless. See State v. Ruth, supra; State v. Runkles, 174 Conn. 405, 413-14, 389 A.2d 730 (1978); State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 458, 471, 374 A.2d 1107 (1977); State v. Rado, 172 Conn. 74, 86-88, 372 A.2d 159 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918, 97 S. Ct. 1335, 51 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1977).