Opinion ID: 2614927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interrelationship Between RCW 4.16.170 and RCW 46.64.040

Text: [3] Service of process requires adherence to due process requirements, and in its execution must provide notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. [37] The United States Supreme Court in 1927 found constitutional a nonresident motorist statute similar to RCW 46.64.040. [38] This court has previously ruled that the procedures under RCW 46.64.040 satisfy due process requirements. [39] [4] It is necessary to distinguish between the limitation of actions statute (statute of limitations) and the substituted service statute, both of which impose 3-year time limits to accomplish their specified purposes. [40] RCW 4.16.170 explicitly tolls the statute of limitations when a complaint is filed or a summons is served, whichever occurs first. [41] We must now determine whether RCW 4.16.170 implicitly extends the 3-year limit for substituted service under RCW 46.64.040. We thus look to the legislative history of the two statutes. The Legislature in 1895 created the 90-day rule by enacting a statute permitting commencement of actions by filing a complaint, followed by service within 90 days. [42] This court adopted the rule in 1967 as part of its comprehensive revision of the rules of civil procedure. [43] The current version of the Superior Court Civil Rules continues to defer to the statutory provisions for tolling statutes of limitation. [44] When the new civil rules were adopted in 1967, the foreword noted that they were designed [t]o eliminate many procedural traps now existing in Washington practice. [45] Subsequent opinions of this court have reiterated the objective of the rules to minimize miscarriages of justice based on unnecessarily complex procedures, and have applied the 90-day rule to a variety of statutory time limits. [46] [5] The purpose of the substituted service statute, RCW 46.64.040, is clearly stated in it. Attendant to the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on the public highways in Washington, residents involved in any accident, collision or liability and who thereafter within 3 years depart from the state confer agency on the Secretary of State for acceptance of service of summons and process, the same as provided in that statute for nonresidents. [47] Such statutes are reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all ... who use [state] highways, as well as to provide ... a convenient method by which [claimants] may sue to enforce [their] rights. [48] The substituted service statute is designed to minimize procedural difficulties in bringing actions arising out of `... the use of [the State's] highways ... and the protection of persons and property within the State.' [49] Decisions of this court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted terms of the substituted service statute. A potential defendant's absence from the state does not toll the statute of limitations under RCW 4.16.180 [50] when the plaintiff has a statutory right, pursuant to RCW 46.64.040, to serve that party through the Secretary of State. [51] The language `each resident ... who ... departs from this state' applies to residents who only temporarily leave the state. [52] A defendant need not have actually departed from the state, so long as plaintiff has a good faith belief that the defendant is absent from the state. [53] This case, however, presents a new issue for our consideration: whether substituted service may be accomplished upon a defendant more than 3 years after the accident giving rise to the lawsuit. [6] The time limit provided in RCW 46.64.040 (3 years) is the same as that specified in the statute of limitations (3 years) for bringing an action for injury to person or property. [54] The Legislature in 1957 amended RCW 46.64.040 to include the section applying to absent resident motorists. [55] The Senate Judiciary Committee recommended changing the proposed time limit for service from 1 year to 3 years. That recommendation was incorporated into the statute. [56] `[L]egislative bodies ... are presumed to have full knowledge of existing statutes affecting the matter upon which they are legislating', [57] and it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended to coordinate the absent motorist service statute with the statute of limitations governing lawsuits arising out of motor vehicle accidents. [7, 8] Legislative enactments which relate to the same subject and are not actually in conflict should be interpreted to give meaning and effect to both. [58] Considering the legislative objective of reducing procedural difficulties and the blanket application of the tolling statute to various statutory time limits, we read together the two statutes, RCW 4.16.170 and RCW 46.64.040, and interpret them to give effect to their legislative purpose. We thus conclude that when a plaintiff commences suit by filing a complaint, it is logical to construe RCW 4.16.170 as extending by 90 days the time period for satisfying the provisions of RCW 46.64.040. [59]