Opinion ID: 4528343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mootness and Sovereign Immunity

Text: At the outset, Defendants say that there is no need to reach the merits of this appeal, because Plaintiffs sued the wrong people. This is because, in the past several years, Defendants have shifted the administration of Plaintiffs’ schools back to local officials, and so any complaints about the conditions in these schools must instead be addressed to the local school board. Defendants also argue that since they no longer control the day-to-day events at Plaintiffs’ schools, any suit against them would have to be for retroactive monetary relief, and so would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity. The district court found against Defendants on each of these points. Gary B., 329 F. Supp. 3d at 354, 357. While the Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits lawsuits against states in federal court, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908), a plaintiff can sue state officers to enjoin an unconstitutional state policy. When challenging a state policy, the officer sued must “have some connection” with the policy’s enforcement or execution. Id. at 157. Even when a function is administered on a day-to-day level by local officials, a state officer’s supervisory authority can still make her a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. E.g., Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1048–49 (6th Cir. 2015). So long as the named defendants are “actively involved” with the challenged conduct, they can be sued for injunctive relief without implicating the Eleventh Amendment. Id.; accord Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d 842, 848– 49 (6th Cir. 2018). Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 18 By arguing that the day-to-day management of Plaintiffs’ schools has been returned to DPSCD, Defendants misconstrue Plaintiffs’ central claim in this case, which is that the state—as the primary authority for public schools in Michigan—has failed to provide them with a basic minimum education. While their complaint also discusses Defendants’ prior, more extensive interventions into Detroit’s schools, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ argument is that the state, by virtue of its supervisory authority over all public education in Michigan, has a responsibility to ensure that each school it oversees at least provides access to literacy. This Court has previously rejected an argument that is analogous to Defendants’ here: The Secretary [of State] and Governor also maintain that they are not proper parties to this action in that any alleged errors were the fault of local [boards of election] rather than high-level state officials. The district court properly rejected this argument. The Secretary of State of Ohio is the state’s chief election officer ex officio. The Governor of Ohio is the state’s chief executive officer. Both officials have the authority to control the [boards of election] and are proper parties here. League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 475 n.16 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Doe v. DeWine, 910 F.3d at 848–49; Russell, 784 F.3d at 1048–49. This logic applies here too. The state board of education has “[l]eadership and general supervision over all public education.” Mich. Const. art. VIII, § 3. The superintendent executes the board’s policies and is the chief education officer of Michigan. Id. The governor is the chief executive officer. Id. art. V, § 1. And while the state has delegated much of the management of individual school districts and schools to local authorities, these remain “under the ultimate and immediate control of the state and its agents.” Parochiaid, 566 N.W.2d at 216.8 8 Although the changes highlighted by Defendants do not alter this general relationship between the state and its subordinate school districts, they may affect whether certain individual defendants should remain in this case. For example, the SRO appears to have been eliminated in June 2019. While the parties did not raise this issue directly with respect to individual officers, they could do so following remand in the district court. See, e.g., Chisom v. Jindal, 890 F. Supp. 2d 696, 728 (E.D. La. 2012) (approving the voluntary dismissal of an official-capacity defendant after the office in question was eliminated); see also, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.”). Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 19 Furthermore, any remedy that the district court could order would almost certainly implicate Defendants, who have policymaking and financial responsibility for the statewide education system. The rule advocated by Defendants could create a liability catch-22, in which Plaintiffs are forced to instead seek injunctive relief against local officials, only to be told that the resources they need can only come from the state. In Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1055 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam), we rejected a similar argument on these grounds: The [defendants] also argue that only the officer with immediate control over the challenged act or omission is amenable to § 1983. We find this claim ridiculous. Such a rule would allow a state agency to avoid, or defer, liability merely by transferring the defendant in a particular case, or by changing the scope of the defendant official’s authority. The directors of a state agency, no matter how far removed from the actions of agency employees, are proper parties to a suit for an injunction under § 1983. In fact, even if Plaintiffs’ claims were limited to the state’s direct intervention in Detroit’s schools, Defendants’ recent transfer of day-to-day management to DPSCD would still not require dismissal. “A defendant’s ‘voluntary cessation of a challenged practice’ does not moot a case. Rather, voluntary conduct moots a case only in the rare instance where ‘subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’” League of Women Voters, 548 F.3d at 473 (citations omitted) (first quoting Ammex, Inc. v. Cox, 351 F.3d 697, 704 (6th Cir. 2003); and then quoting Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030, 1035 (6th Cir. 2003)). Given Defendants’ repeated interventions in and changes to the governance structure of Detroit’s education system, there is no assurance that Defendants will not again inject themselves into the administration of Plaintiffs’ schools, nor do they attempt to make such a commitment in their brief. Despite the greater consideration afforded to government officials’ cessation of allegedly unlawful conduct, e.g., Ammex, 351 F.3d at 705; Mosley v. Hairston, 920 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1990), there is no basis to believe this change is a permanent one. Finally, Defendants’ argument that this lawsuit is really an attempt to seek payment for past harms, and so is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, misstates both Plaintiffs’ requested remedy and the law. As Defendants themselves repeatedly argue, Plaintiffs are requesting Nos. 18-1855/1871 Gary B., et al. v. Whitmer, et al. Page 20 affirmative injunctive relief to improve the conditions in their schools. Such an injunction “fits squarely within the prospective-compliance exception” to the Eleventh Amendment, even if funds from the state treasury are needed to carry it out. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289 (1977); see also id. at 288–90 (affirming an order requiring Michigan state officers to fund remedial education measures). The cases cited by Defendants all involved cash payments to claimants for previously incurred liabilities, see Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1220 (11th Cir. 2000) (“If the prospective relief sought is ‘measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of a legal duty,’ it is the functional equivalent of money damages and Ex parte Young does not apply.” (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974))), and so are completely inapplicable to this case. In sum, it is evident from the Michigan Constitution and statutes, as well as its prior interventions in the school system, that the state retains significant authority over Detroit’s public schools. Accordingly, its officers are proper defendants in this case under Ex parte Young, and the transfer of some control back to local officials does not render this lawsuit moot.