Opinion ID: 1841380
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Revocation of Medical Examiner's Missouri License

Text: Dr. Michael Berkland, a medical examiner, performed the autopsy of Cynthia Campbell. At trial, Berkland testified that Campbell suffered severe blunt force trauma consistent with having been repeatedly bludgeoned with a hammer. Berkland also testified that the victim had been stabbed with a knife no fewer than eleven times and that injuries to the pelvic area indicated an object had been forcibly inserted into her vagina and removed at a sharp angle. Berkland's testimony about the insertion of an object into the victim's vagina formed the basis for the sexual battery charge of which Grim was convicted. The sexual battery charge in turn formed the basis for the felony-murder prong of Grim's first-degree murder indictment. At the time of Grim's trial, Berkland's license to perform autopsies in Missouri had been revoked. [5] The State Attorney's Office had received a twenty-three page facsimile communication dated October 12, 1998, containing various newspaper articles, court papers, and letters documenting the revocation of Berkland's license. These documents were never turned over to the defense. On March 25, 1999, Berkland gave a sworn deposition attended by Assistant State Attorney Ronald Swanson and Assistant Public Defender Antoinette Stitt. Berkland admitted that his Missouri autopsy license had been revoked and explained the circumstances surrounding its revocation. After the Public Defender withdrew from Grim's case due to a conflict, Richard Hill replaced Ms. Stitt as defense counsel. Hill testified that the Public Defender's Office provided him all its files and deposition records and that he reviewed Berkland's March 1999 deposition testimony. However, Hill never impeached Berkland about the revocation of his Missouri license. Grim argues that the State's failure to disclose the faxed documents constitutes a Brady violation. He also argues that Hill's failure to impeach Berkland at trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. The merits of these claims are analyzed below.
As we recently explained, Brady requires the State to disclose material information within its possession or control that is favorable to the defense. To establish a Brady violation, the defendant has the burden to show (1) that favorable evidenceeither exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. To establish prejudice or materiality under Brady, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the suppressed information been used at trial. In other words, the question is whether `the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' Riechmann v. State, 966 So.2d 298, ___ (Fla. 2007) (citations omitted) (quoting Ponticelli v. State, 941 So.2d 1073, 1084-85 (Fla.2006)). The documents the State failed to disclose call into question Berkland's qualifications as a medical examiner. They include a permanent injunction issued in Jackson County, Missouri, which states that Berkland poses a substantial probability of serious danger to the health, safety, and welfare of his patients, clients, and/or the residents of Missouri. A newspaper article, Skill of Medical Examiner Debated, describes the disciplinary charges against Berkland; and a letter from the Missouri Board of the Healing Arts states that we have discovered evidence that one of the former medical examiners from Jackson County, Missouri, a physician currently licensed in the State of Missouri, fabricated autopsy findings while performing his duties. These and other similar documents undoubtedly represent favorable impeachment evidence that could have been utilized by the defense. Therefore, they satisfy the first Brady prong. In addition, the State concedes that it failed to disclose these materials. Therefore, Grim's claim satisfies the second Brady prong. However, because Grim failed to present any evidence challenging the validity of Berkland's autopsy in this case, Grim fails to establish prejudice. Although defense counsel may have been able to attack Berkland's qualifications based on the information contained in the faxed documents, there is no indication that the substance of Berkland's testimony was erroneous. At the evidentiary hearing, Grim failed to present any evidence that Berkland's testimony or autopsy were defective. Grim did not produce any expert testimony contradicting Berkland's conclusion that the victim had been repeatedly attacked with a hammer, stabbed multiple times, and had an object forcefully inserted into her vagina. Therefore, the State's failure to disclose the faxed documents does not undermine confidence in the jury's guilty verdict, and the trial court properly denied Grim's Brady claim.
Grim also argues that Hill's failure to impeach Berkland based on the March 1999 deposition constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish both deficient performance and prejudice. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 928 So.2d 1178, 1183 (Fla.2006). To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's representation `fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.' Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). To prove prejudice, a defendant must establish `that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' A reasonable probability is a `probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Smith, 931 So.2d at 800 (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052). On appeal, we defer to factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but review legal conclusions de novo. Henry v. State, 937 So.2d 563, 569 (Fla.2006). Berkland's deposition testimony contains valuable impeachment evidence. Berkland was an important witness for the State, and it would have been reasonable to impeach him with evidence of the revocation of his Missouri license. Therefore, we agree that counsel's failure to cross-examine Berkland with this evidence constitutes deficient performance. However, Grim failed to establish prejudice. As explained in our Brady analysis above, Grim failed to present any evidence that Berkland's autopsy or trial testimony was erroneous. Therefore, Grim fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance the outcome of his trial would have been different. Counsel's failure to impeach does not undermine confidence in the outcome of Grim's trial. Therefore, the trial court properly denied this claim.