Opinion ID: 1375110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicable Standards of Care:

Text: According to the Appellant, our existing case law dealing with the applicable standards of care for injuries caused by domestic animals has engendered some confusion. Indeed, the law of torts as it relates to animals has often generated uncertainty, in part, due to `a pot-pourri of specialised rules of mediaeval origin.' P.M. North, The Modern Law of Animals 1 (1972) (commenting on the common law generally and stating additionally that `[t]he law of torts has grown up historically in separate compartments and... beasts have travelled in a compartment of their own.') (quoted sources omitted); see Duren v. Kunkel, 814 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Mo.1991) (en banc) (Rules imposing liability for harm caused by domestic animals find their origin in authority no less ancient than the Pentateuch.) With rare exception, we have applied two separate yet coexisting causes of action in cases involving injuries occasioned by domesticated beasts. [7] The first cause of action is represented by cases such as Johnston v. Mack Manufacturing Co., 65 W.Va. 544, 64 S.E. 841 (1909). In Johnston, a farmer's boar attacked a neighbor. We stated in syllabus point one, in part, as follows: The owner and keeper of a boar is not liable for a personal injury inflicted by him, unless it appear that he was vicious, and that such owner and keeper had previous knowledge of his vicious propensity. ... Id., Syl.Pt. 1, in part, (emphasis added). In other words, Johnston held that in order to impose liability on an owner or keeper of a domestic animal for injuries caused by the animal, it was necessary to prove two elements: (1) that the animal had a dangerous or vicious propensity, and (2) that the owner or keeper had actual or constructive knowledge of the propensity. See also Syl. Pt. 1, Butts v. Houston, 76 W.Va. 604, 86 S.E. 473 (1915). Thus, scienter is a critical component of this first cause of action. [8] A case that is representative of the second cause of action is Dawson v. Woodson, 180 W.Va. 307, 376 S.E.2d 321 (1988). Dawson involved an ordinary negligence action which arose out of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs when the defendant's horse jumped a pasture fence, ran along a public road, and caused a car accident. Id. at 309, 376 S.E.2d at 323. In syllabus point four, we stated, in part, that an injured party may maintain a claim for damages if that party establishes that the animal owner failed to exercise the ordinary care that was necessary to prevent injury to others. Id. at 308-09, 376 S.E .2d at 322-23 (emphasis added). [9] In Dawson, however, we added the following important caveat to this principle: `What ordinary care demands depends always upon the circumstances of the case, and a primary factor among those circumstances is the fact whether the injury could or could not have reasonably have been anticipated from the acts done or left undone by the defendant.' Id. at 311, 376 S.E.2d at 325 n. 2 (quoting Drew v. Gross, 112 Ohio St. 485, 491, 147 N.E. 757, 758 (1925)); see also Drake v. Dean, 15 Cal.App.4th 915, 925, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 325, 331 (1993) (In determining the keeper's liability for negligence for injuries inflicted by a domestic animal, the criterion usually adopted is one of reasonable anticipation of the occurrence, i.e., foreseeability.); Trager v. Thor, 445 Mich. 95, 106, 516 N.W.2d 69, 75-76 (1994) (quoting Arnold v. Laird, 94 Wash.2d 867, 871, 621 P.2d 138, 141 (1980) (en banc) (`The amount of control required is that which would be exercised by a reasonable person based upon the total situation at the time, including the past behavior of the animal and the injuries that could have been reasonably foreseen.'). Based on the Johnston and Dawson lines of cases, our existing authority can be easily reconciled. Where a domestic animal injures one who is lawfully in the place where the injury occurs, the injured party can pursue two causes of action for damages against the owner or keeper of the animal. [10] The first action is one for strict liability, and it may be maintained where the injured party can show that (1) the animal had a dangerous or vicious propensity, and (2) the owner or keeper had actual or constructive knowledge of that propensity. If the injured party cannot prove either of the above elements, he or she may still maintain an ordinary negligence action if it can be shown that the owner or keeper failed to exercise the ordinary care that was necessary to prevent the injury. In the latter case, however, liability will not attach unless the injured party can demonstrate, with particular emphasis on the animal's past behavior and characteristics, that the injury could reasonably and foreseeably have been anticipated by the defendant. One can readily ascertain, at least in the case of attacks by domestic animals, that the knowledge and foreseeability analysis under both causes of action will often overlap to some extent. Our two-pronged approach is similar, if not identical, to that utilized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Restatement (Second) § 509 (1977) provides, in part, as follows: (1) A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent it from doing the harm. Id. By its terms, this section imposes strict liability for injuries caused by a domestic animal resulting from the animal's dangerous propensities of which the possessor knew or had reason to know. In regard to negligence, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 518 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Except for animal trespass, one who possesses or harbors a domestic animal that he does not know or have reason to know to be abnormally dangerous, is subject to liability for harm done by the animal if, but only if, .... (b) he is negligent in failing to prevent the harm. Id. Comment (f) to § 518 states, in part, that [t]he amount of care that the keeper of a domestic animal is required to exercise in its custody is commensurate with the character of the animal. Id. While some courts have recognized only the strict liability cause of action, a number of other jurisdictions and commentators have utilized the two-pronged approach. See, e.g., Drake, 15 Cal.App.4th at 924, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d at 330 (The common law recognizes negligence as a distinct legal theory of recovery for harm caused by domestic animals that are not abnormally dangerous.); Trager, 445 Mich. at 105, 516 N.W.2d at 75 (Negligence actions in domestic animal injury cases have been recognized by the Court of Appeals, usually as an alternative theory of liability to a strict liability claim when scienter cannot be shown.); Duren, 814 S.W.2d at 938 (Defendant's position is that the owner of a domestic animal is immune from liability in the absence of actual or constructive knowledge of the animal's abnormally vicious propensities, even though the owner was in some respect negligent. That is not the law.); DeRobertis v. Randazzo, 94 N.J. 144, 156, 462 A.2d 1260, 1266 (1983) (If either the dog is not vicious or the owner does not know of its vicious propensities, then negligence, not absolute liability, applies.); Dunnings v. Castro, 881 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex.Ct.App.1994) (Dunnings contends that even though the court found the bull was not vicious and did not display any tendency to be vicious, it did not preclude the court from considering whether there was any negligence on the part of the employer. We agree with Dunnings' analysis.); Arnold, 94 Wash.2d at 870, 621 P.2d at 140 ([We have never held that] ... there cannot be both an action based upon negligence and one based upon common law strict liability); 3 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 14.11 at 268-69 (2d ed. 1986) (If there is not notice of the ferocious nature of the animal, the owner may, of course, still be liable for negligent keeping, but the basis of liability in the two cases must be sharply distinguished.); 3 J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl, Modern Tort, Law Liability & Litigation § 37.06 (rev. ed. 1990) (An owner or keeper may be liable for injuries resulting from a failure to exercise reasonable care in keeping an animal.); see also Loder v. State, 200 A.D.2d 925, 927, 607 N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (1994). Having set forth our dual approach as it relates to injuries by domestic animals, we now turn to the question of whether summary judgment was properly granted in the instant case.