Opinion ID: 1214219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mootness of the Class Certification

Text: The Court of Appeals found that the issue of class certification was mooted by the dismissal of Ferguson's claim. We agree. Usually, an order denying class certification is interlocutory and not immediately appealable. See Eldridge v. City of Greenwood, 308 S.C. 125, 126-27, 417 S.E.2d 532, 534 (1992) (Orders under Rule 23, SCRCP are interlocutory and thus, immediately appealable only in certain circumstances.). This Court reviews interlocutory orders when they contain other appealable issues. See Hite v. Thomas & Howard Co., 305 S.C. 358, 360, 409 S.E.2d 340, 341 (1991) ([A]n order that is not directly appealable will nonetheless be considered if there is an appealable issue before the Court and a ruling on appeal will avoid unnecessary litigation.), overruled on other grounds by Huntley v. Young, 319 S.C. 559, 462 S.E.2d 860 (1995). The prerequisites of a class action are set forth in Rule 23, SCRCP: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, and (5) in cases in which the relief primarily sought is not injunctive or declaratory with respect to the class as a whole, the amount in controversy exceeds one hundred dollars for each member of the class. Rule 23(a), SCRCP (emphasis added). We find that the class certification issue is moot because Mr. Ferguson no longer adequately represents the class. Where the named plaintiffs' claims become moot after class certification by death or other means, the class claims become moot unless intervenors can be substituted as named plaintiffs. See Swan v. Stoneman, 635 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.1980) (class action not rendered moot by named plaintiffs death where other plaintiffs had intervened before death of fellow plaintiff); see also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976) (suggesting that, but for the intervention of a third inmate, prisoner class action in which one named plaintiff died and other was paroled before class certification would have been moot). We hold that where a single named plaintiff in a class action suit dies before class certification, the named plaintiff no longer adequately represents the class and the suit becomes moot, unless a suitable plaintiff intervenes and satisfies the requirements of Rule 23, SCRCP. [3]