Opinion ID: 1369544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comparing Storey to Ms. Frey

Text: Storey also claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's statement [c]omparing the value of Ms. Frey's life to Tim's life which violated Storey I.  The prosecutor argued in the 1999 trial: I don't want to get into the business of measuring the value of one life against another, but I don't think there is any debate that Jill Lynn Frey was a fine woman. You know most of us in this life go through our lives and don't do a great deal of harm and we don't do a great deal of good either, but this woman was doing a lot of good. And another part of the tragedy is that that's been seized from us and taken from us. When asked why she did not object to the prosecutors 1999 statements, counsel testified: I'm not sure they are objectionable. The motion court held: The state's closing argument did not attempt to weigh or compare the life of the victim against the movant's as occurred in the first trial. The state simply stated that Jill Frey was a fine person  a reasonable and fair comment on the evidence. The prosecutor had argued in Storey's 1995 case: Why do we have a death penalty? The reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighsby huge leaps and bounds, outweighs the right of the guilty not to die. The right of the innocent completely outweighs the right of the guilty not to die, and, so, it comes down to one basic thing. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value? The Defendant's or Jill Lynn Frey's? State v. Storey, 901 S.W.2d 886, 902 (Mo. banc 1995). This Court granted post-conviction relief because of the 1995 statement and responded: [E]ven if the process could be distilled to one thing, it would not be Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value? In truth, There is one principle . . .: The State must ensure that the process is neutral and principled so as to guard against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision. Id. Even a cursory reading of these two arguments illustrates the profound difference between them. In this case, the prosecutor's statement did not mischaracterize the law, and [c]ounsel is not deemed ineffective for declining to make a non-meritorious objection. State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 167 (Mo. banc 1991). Storey has not shown that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by not objecting. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (internal citations omitted). Storey has not overcome the strong presumption . . . that trial counsel was effective. . . . State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. banc 1996). Storey has not overcome the presumption that counsel's alleged omissions were sound trial strategy. Id. at 766. Storey has not shown prejudice because he has not shown a reasonable probability that had counsel objected, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Williams, 529 U.S. at 391, 120 S.Ct. 1495.