Opinion ID: 2586006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the district court reasonably imposed an initial $500 limitation on reimbursable investigator expense

Text: ¶ 18 Having determined that the court of appeals erred in creating a per se rule against limitations to reimbursable investigator expenses, we now consider whether the district court nevertheless abused its discretion in setting an initial limitation of $500. Although a court must consider cost when deciding whether to approve an expenditure over $500, the threshold inquiry is still whether investigatory resources are necessary for a complete defense. [31] In essence, regardless of the cost, if the resources are necessary for a complete defense, the court must approve them. Extending this reasoning to the Act, it would be inappropriate to set an absolute cap of reimbursable expenses for investigative purposes. Rather, a defendant should always have the opportunity to request approval for additional expenditures, and the court must approve such requests to the extent necessary for a complete defense. By requiring the court to approve extraordinary expenditures in advance, section 77-32-305.5 not only protects the county or municipality from paying or contesting unnecessary expenses, but also gives the investigator and appointed counsel a measure of security that they will not need to defend the reasonableness of their expenses after the expenses have been incurred. A motion to appoint an investigator for $500 or less, although not required before a defendant incurs the expense, offers similar protections when filed and granted before such time. ¶ 19 Turning to the facts of this case, there is simply no record evidence to support a conclusion that the district court erred in placing the initial $500 limitation on reimbursable investigator expenses. First, as we explain above, the court of appeals erred in concluding that a district court must  exclusively address[] the need for an investigator. [32] Because Carreno failed to include in the record a transcript of the hearing on his motion to appoint an investigator, the court of appeals could only speculate that the district court unduly focus[ed] on the expenses of the investigator. [33] That speculation was unjustified, however, because, in the absence of a record, we must assume the regularity of the proceeding below. [34] In other words, we must assume that the district court gave appropriate weight to the threshold question of whether an investigator was necessary. Indeed, the district court concluded that an investigator was necessary, and, accordingly, allocated funds for that purpose. ¶ 20 Second, there is nothing in the record to support the court of appeals' statement that the $500 limitation acts as a bar rather than a prerequisite. [35] This statement suggests that the $500 limit was absolute. To the contrary, the written order refers to the $500 limitation as merely an initial sum. Thus, upon exhaustion of the initial funds, Carreno was free to request additional funds. But there is nothing in the record to suggest that Carreno either exhausted the $500 provided [36] or requested more at any time. [37] ¶ 21 Under these circumstances, placing an initial limit of $500 on reimbursable investigator expenses is not error. Carreno's motion did not contain a specific request or budget. This put the district court in the difficult position of either coming up with a limit with little-to-no information, or giving Carreno a blank check on behalf of the county. As discussed above, the blank-check option is at odds with the Act. [38] Thus, the district court was left looking for a reasonable limitation. In this circumstance, the court reasonably used the $500 limitation from section 77-32-305.5 as a starting point. Indeed, the use of the word initial in the written order suggests that Carreno was free to request more funds if necessary. ¶ 22 Yet Carreno argues that the district court erred in setting the limitation at $500 because his request merited a larger initial sum. Carreno first argues that because section 77-32-305.5 does not require counsel to move for funds for an investigator unless the expense is anticipated to exceed $500, [39] the mere fact that he moved for an investigator implies that he was requesting more than $500. He next argues that the number of issues on which he requested investigative assistance makes it unlikely that Carreno agreed to the $500 limitation at the hearing. Finally, Carreno claims that because the legal expenses required to petition for an investigator are more than $500, the district court's ruling results in a net loss to the public defender. We address each of these arguments in turn. ¶ 23 First, Carreno argues that his motion to appoint an investigator should have been interpreted as a motion for extraordinary expenses because section 77-32-305.5 does not require a motion for anything less. A motion to appoint an investigator is not necessarily synonymous, however, with a motion for extraordinary expenses. Under section 77-32-305.5, no investigator expense is reimbursed unless it is reasonably incurred. [40] Additionally, for an extraordinary expense, e.g., investigator expenses beyond $500, a defendant must obtain approval from the court before the expense is incurred. [41] Accordingly, the defense need not necessarily seek prior approval from the court to later be reimbursed for investigator expenses of $500 or less. Nevertheless, the defense may seek prior approval of non-extraordinary expenses to avoid the risk that a court might find the expenditure unreasonable and, accordingly, withhold reimbursement. ¶ 24 Defense counsel's motion in this case focuses solely on the necessity of investigating possible exculpatory evidence without any estimate of the expense of such an investigation. In the motion, defense counsel makes no mention of the extraordinary expenses discussed in Utah Code section 77-32-305.5, but only quotes the Act as requiring a municipality to provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense. [42] Additionally, there is no record that Carreno objected when the court set the limit at $500. Thus, the district court could reasonably have concluded that Carreno was only seeking prior approval of a non-extraordinary expense. ¶ 25 Second, Carreno urges us to infer that he objected to the $500 limit because, given the numerous issues he wished to investigate, he certainly would not have agreed to the $500 limitation. Such an inference would directly contradict the rule that, in the absence of an adequate record, we assume the regularity of the proceeding. [43] Consequently, we must conclude that the court was not informed that counsel was dissatisfied with the initial limitation. ¶ 26 Finally, Carreno argues that because the legal fees for preparing a motion to appoint an investigator would exceed $500, it would be inefficient to make a motion for less than that amount. But the fact that a motion is inefficient does not compel our rewriting the motion to make it efficient. Rather, where the motion did not include a proposed budget, the court reasonably imposed an initial limitation on reimbursable investigator expenses. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in placing an initial $500 limitation in its order appointing an investigator.