Opinion ID: 3012536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: weston's appeal

Text: Weston's counsel has raised three claims of trial error. In addition, we have permitted Weston to file a pro se brief, in which he has raised three claims of sentencing error. Each assignment of error is discussed separately. 1. The District Court Erred by Allowing Testimony Regarding Threats Against a Government Witness. In his counseled brief, Weston argues that the district court improperly allowed the government to cross-examine 7 two defense witnesses regarding Weston's efforts to coerce Farris into providing false exculpatory testimony for Weston. After Weston was indicted, he tried to get Farris to sign an affidavit in which Farris was to swear that he did not know Weston. When Farris returned to prison following his guilty plea, he found a letter in his cell.4 The letter threatened harm to Farris and his family if Farris testified against Weston, and it instructed Farris to recopy a portion of the letter and sign it in his own handwriting. The portion of the letter that was to be recopied stated that Weston had not committed the crimes he was charged with. Farris believed that the letter came from Weston. Farris did copy a portion of the letter as requested, but he added a sentence in which he asked the reader to notify law enforcement if Farris was the victim of foul play. Farris then threw away the original letter. Farris later spoke to Robert Perry, an inmate who worked in the prison library and was helping Weston prepare for trial. Perry told Farris that he should hope for a long prison sentence, because otherwise somebody is going to kill you. Farris responded by telling Perry that he would withdraw his guilty plea and refuse to testify against Weston. Farris hoped that Perry would relay that message to Weston. Shortly thereafter, Farris was summoned to the prison library where he encountered Weston, Boone and Perry. Weston had Farris' letter and directed Farris to rewrite the letter omitting the reference to foul play. About one week later, Farris was again summoned to the prison library where Boone demanded that Farris write a similar letter _________________________________________________________________ 4. According to the government, after Farris received the letter he asked another inmate named Gavin if he had written the letter. Gavin denied having written the letter but warned Farris that he had better not cooperate with the government because Farris' life and Farris' family's lives will be in danger. Government's Br. at 15 n.5. Presumably, Gavin is the same person Weston calls Garrin. According to Weston, Garrin is the only person who Farris actually identified as threatening him, but who the government never directly associated with Weston. Weston's Counseled Br. at 7. 8 exonerating him (Boone). Farris was transferred to another prison after telling law enforcement authorities about the threats. According to the government, Farris was terrified by these threats, and did not want to testify. At trial, Weston denied ever threatening Farris, or ever seeing the letter that purported to exonerate Weston. Weston also testified that when he saw Farris in prison, Farris was surprised that Weston had been charged. According to Weston, Farris had suggested that Jones had implicated Weston, and Farris volunteered to exonerate Weston. To further contradict Farris' testimony about Weston's intimidation, Weston presented several inmates who had been incarcerated with Weston and/or Farris. Johnny Davenport testified on direct examination that at the time of trial he had been an inmate in the same prison as Weston. He had known Weston for 18 years and Farris for 25 years. Davenport claimed that Farris admitted to him that the government wanted Farris to lie on[Weston]. Davenport further testified that Farris told him that Weston was not involved in the drug conspiracy. On cross-examination, Davenport testified, without objection, that he was six feet tall, and weighed about 225 pounds. When the prosecutor asked Davenport whether he made use of this time in jail by keeping in good shape, Weston's counsel objected to personal observations of the prosecutor. The objection was overruled. The prosecutor then inquired, without objection, whether Davenport lifted weights in jail. Davenport claimed that he did not. Then, again without objection, the prosecutor elicited testimony that Davenport had been convicted of drug-trafficking offenses and assault. Weston also called Nard Henderson as a defense witness. Henderson testified on direct examination that he spoke to Farris while the two were in a holding cell at the Federal Courthouse in Trenton, New Jersey. According to Henderson, Farris told him Weston had nothing to do with it. Henderson also claimed that Farris was going to write a letter, clearing [Weston]. On cross-examination, Henderson testified without objection that he was six feet, 9 two and one-half inches tall, weighed 280 pounds, that he had an extensive criminal record that included drugtrafficking and resisting arrest, and that he was acareer offender. Weston argues that the cross-examination of these witnesses was an improper attempt to convey an image in the minds of the jurors that Farris was continually living under the threat of violent physical harm rendered by Weston's prison henchmen. Weston's Counseled Br. at 6-7. In Weston's view, the harm visited upon [him], despite the incriminat[ing] evidence adduced below, mandates reversal by the Honorable Court. Id. at 7. At the outset, we note that Weston's only objection to this line of cross-examination was that it exceeded the scope of direct, and that the questions were based upon improper observations by the prosecutor. Consequently, our scope of review as to these issues is whether the district court committed plain error in allowing the testimony. United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2000). [W]e may reverse only if we find error . . . so serious as to undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 897 (3d Cir. 1994)(citation omitted). A plain error is clear or obvious. In most cases, an error will be deemed to have affected substantial rights where it is prejudicial. Prejudicial error, affecting substantial rights, must have affected the outcome of the District Court proceedings. The inquiry concerning prejudice on plain error review is similar to our inquiry into harmless error with the important difference that the defendant, rather than the government, bears the burden of persuasion in a plain error analysis. Id. at 898 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here Weston never even attempts to show how the disputed testimony constitutes plain error. He merely claims that he was harmed by the improper cross-examination. We do not believe this testimony amounts to plain error, and he has not met his burden of showing that it was plain error.5 _________________________________________________________________ 5. We do not think the court erred in allowing this inquiry. However, even if we assume that the district court did err, the error clearly did not affect the outcome of the trial because Farris, Perry, and Gavin (or Garrin) also testified about Weston's threats. 10 2. The District Court Erred by Allowing the Government to Cross-Examine Witnesses About Weston's Prior Drug-Trafficking Activities. Weston's counsel also argues that the district court improperly allowed the government to cross-examine two witnesses about Weston's prior, uncharged drug-trafficking. Weston called Rayfield James as a character witness, and asked him about Weston's reputation in the community for truthfulness and honesty. James replied that Weston is straightforward, and a man of his word. On crossexamination, James testified, without objection, that with me, . . . [Weston had] a reputation for being law-abiding, and truthful. James also testified on cross-examination that he was unaware that Weston had previously been convicted of dealing crack cocaine, but that, even if he had been aware, it would not have changed his opinion of Weston's character. However, Weston objected when the government asked James if he was aware that the nightclub Weston owned in Asbury Park had been the subject of a search warrant executed by narcotics agents. The objection was overruled and the district court immediately instructed the jury that the question was permissible not for the truth of any such assertion but rather as it may affect the opinion of the witness. James then testified that he was not aware of any search warrant and that even if he had been, it would not have affected his opinion of Weston. Weston's counsel argues that allowing questions about Weston's prior conviction and the search of his night club amounted to fatal error. According to counsel, [t]he inescapable conclusion is that the government knew of other narcotic activity on [Weston's] part that was not part of [his] trial and a juror could only be left with the thought that Weston was a continuing target for narcotics agents. Weston's Counseled Br. at 8. We disagree.6 _________________________________________________________________ 6. We review for plain error those claims that were not preserved in the district court, United States v. Saada, 212 F.3d 210, 224 (3d Cir. 2000), and for abuse of discretion for those claims that were preserved. United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 256 (3d Cir. 1999). 11 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that: In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct. Fed. R. Evid. 405(a)(italics added). Therefore, the government could inquire about James's awareness of Weston's prior conviction and the execution of the search warrant at Weston's night club once Weston put his character in issue. See United States v. Scholl , 166 F.3d 964, 974-75 (9th Cir. 1999)(approving cross-examination of opinion character witness by reference to defendant's specific acts of misconduct). The district court has broad discretion regarding the cross-examination of character witnesses, and the court did not abuse that discretion in allowing the government to challenge the character testimony that Weston offered. United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 578 (3d Cir. 1989). Furthermore, inasmuch as counsel did not object to inquiry into Weston's prior drug-trafficking conviction during James' cross-examination, Weston again has the burden of establishing plain error. The testimony regarding the search of Weston's night club did not amount to plain error. For one thing, Mills testified, without objection, that he had purchased drugs there. Accordingly, we fail to see how inquiring into James' knowledge of a search of that night club could have prejudiced Weston; especially given the district court's prompt limiting instruction. See United States v. Curtis, 644 F.2d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 1981)(no reversible error for improper cross-examination of a reputation witness which elicited only information that had already been introduced into evidence). Similarly, Duval Moore testified on direct examination that he and Farris were lifelong friends, and cell mates in jail. Moore told the jury that Farris told him that Farris had a deal that included falsely implicating Weston in the charged drug offenses. On cross-examination, Moore continued to claim that Farris told him that the FBI 12 instructed Farris to lie about Weston. Moore also claimed that Farris gave him a letter in which Farris stated that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea because he knew he would have to lie for the government. However, according to Moore, law enforcement officials refused to allow Farris to withdraw his plea. The government attacked Moore's credibility by eliciting (without objection) that Moore had several convictions for cocaine trafficking and violent crimes. Moore refused to identify his suppliers during that line of questioning, and the government responded by asking: isn't it a fact that you distributed Thomas Weston's cocaine and you're covering for him here? Moore denied that assertion and Weston's counsel stated he objected unless the prosecutor has some proof of that. At a sidebar, the government then proffered that Farris had informed investigators that he once delivered a package of cocaine from Weston to Moore for subsequent distribution by Moore. Weston's counsel responded with a motion for a mistrial, just for the record, which the court denied. Weston now argues that testimony was highly inflammatory, . . . meant to prejudice, and [constitutes] reversible error. However, at trial Weston did not object to the inquiry because of its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. Rather, counsel argued that the question was not permissible unless the government had proof of the assertion. Accordingly, we once again review for plain error. Given the context of the cross-examination, we conclude that the district court did not commit any error in allowing the inquiry -- let alone, plain error. Evidence that Moore and Weston had been drug dealing partners was relevant to Moore's possible bias in favor of Weston. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)(evidence regarding joint membership of witness and defendant in criminal organization was properly admitted to establish possible bias of witness in favor of defendant). In addition, the jury was properly instructed that answers, not questions, constitute evidence, and Moore denied selling drugs for Weston.7 _________________________________________________________________ 7. In explaining why this evidence did not violate the strictures of Rule 404(b), we again emphasize the danger inherent in this kind of evidence. 13 Moreover, there was significant evidence of Weston's involvement in the drug trade. Mills testified that he saw Weston distribute drugs, that he purchased drugs from Weston, and that Weston solicited him to sell drugs. Farris testified that he purchased drugs with Weston. Weston admitted that he had previously manufactured crack cocaine, and Weston was captured on audiotape discussing the charged conspiracy with Mills. Thus, the district court did not err in allowing the limited inquiry into whether Moore once sold drugs for Weston to establish the relationship between the two. See United States v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 1997)(no plain error for improper question on cross-examination of defense witness about whether defendant was involved in drug-dealing, where cooperating co-conspirators had previously testified extensively that defendant was the leader of a drugtrafficking organization). 3. The District Court Erred by Refusing to Strike All References to Crack Cocaine. At the close of the government's case, Weston moved to strike any illusions to crack cocaine from the jury's consideration. He argued that the government's evidence proved that Weston actually sold Agent Hilton cocaine powder, not crack cocaine. However, the district court denied Weston's motion. Here, Weston's counsel argues that injecting the specter of crack evokes the ire of any jury, and is so inflammatory that the mere unsubstantiated allegation of involvement may be enough to convict. Weston's Counseled Br. at 10. He therefore asserts that the district court committed reversible error in denying his motion. As recited earlier, the superseding indictment charged that Weston, Farris, Boone and Jones conspired to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more _________________________________________________________________ See United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 886 (3d Cir. 1992) (Although the government will hardly admit it, the reasons proffered to admit prior bad act evidence . . . is often mixed between an urge to show some other consequential fact as well as to impugn the defendant's character.). 14 than 5 grams of crack cocaine and more than 200 grams of cocaine. Although the substance that Weston actually delivered was cocaine powder, more than sufficient evidence was introduced at trial to support the conviction for conspiring to manufacture and deliver crack cocaine. The government produced testimony that Weston had, on two occasions, agreed to supply crack cocaine to agent Hilton, and Weston offered to personally convert the powder to crack when Mills (the go-between) reminded Weston that Hilton wanted crack. At trial, Weston denied furnishing the cocaine that was delivered to Hilton. However, the evidence certainly supported the jury's conclusion that Weston was responsible for that delivery. Weston's argument is really bottomed upon an implicit assertion that he cannot be convicted of conspiring to distribute crack without evidence that he actually delivered that substance as opposed to powder cocaine. However, one can certainly conspire to deliver and distribute crack without the actual distribution or delivery if the charge has otherwise been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. DeSimone, 119 F.3d 217, 223 (2d Cir. 1997). Consequently, the district court properly refused counsel's motion to strikeany illusions to crack cocaine from the jury's consideration.8 _________________________________________________________________ 8. The legal basis for counsel's motion is not clear. In the district court, he relied upon Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. However, we do not believe that rule gives the district court the authority to strike evidence from the jury's consideration. Rather, it authorizes the district court to order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses charged in the indictment . . . after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for such offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. On appeal, counsel does not cite to any specific authority. Rather, he characterizes his motion as one to strike crack cocaine from the indictment. Weston's Counseled Br. at 10. However, Weston never mentioned the indictment in his motion to strike in the district court and he never mentioned Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(d), which governs requests to strike allegations from an indictment. In any event, we have ignored the procedural intricacies and reached the merits of the argument. 15 4. The PSR Erroneously Calculated the Amount of Drugs Attributable to Weston. In his pro se brief challenging his sentence, Weston argues that the district court erred at sentencing by attributing 5 kilograms of cocaine powder to him that he purchased in New York City.9 In Weston's view, only the 220 grams of cocaine powder that he caused to be delivered to Agent Hilton during the two controlled buys identified in the indictment can be attributed to him under the Sentencing Guidelines. However, a sentence in a criminal conspiracy is based upon all relevant conduct and not merely offense conduct. See United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 194 F.3d 224, 228 (7th Cir.) (Since defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute controlled substances, she is responsible for all drugs [she] personally handled or anticipated handling, and, under the relevant conduct rubric, for drugs involved in additional acts that were reasonably foreseeable by [her] and were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.)(citation omitted). The evidence here easily established that Weston's relevant conduct included the purchase and sale of approximately 5 kilograms of cocaine powder. Weston and Farris first met in the autumn of 1995 inside Farris' telephone pager store in Asbury Park. Weston had four pagers set to a single telephone number which he used in dispatching his confederates to make cocaine sales. After Weston told Farris that he was unhappy with his cocaine suppliers, Farris drove Weston to New York City to meet a man referred to as Poppy, a Dominican from whom Farris had been buying cocaine in lots of 200 to 700 grams. 10 Farris introduced Weston to Poppy as a steady, and described Weston as a high volume cocaine buyer. Weston _________________________________________________________________ 9. When . . . construction of the Sentencing Guidelines is required on appeal, the standard of review is plenary. United States v. Greene, 212 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 2000). Review of the district court's findings of facts with regard to the sentence is clear error. United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 442, 456 (3d Cir. 1999). 10. Farris diluted the cocaine and then sold the diluted product. 16 and Farris each gave Poppy $4,000 to purchase a total of 400 grams of cocaine. Thereafter, on five or six occasions, Weston gave Farris cash in the average amount of $6,000 to purchase additional cocaine from Poppy. Farris charged Weston 10 grams of cocaine (worth about $300) in return for purchasing $6,000 to $7,000 of cocaine from Poppy. On three or four other occasions, Weston bought cocaine from Poppy for Farris in amounts of up to $8,000, and charged Farris the same ten gram fee for that service. On six or seven other occasions, Weston went to Poppy and made unspecified purchases of his own. In early 1996, Weston and Farris went together to New York City, where each purchased between $6,000 and $8,000 of cocaine from Poppy. The evidence established that Weston and Poppy appeared to be well acquainted with each other. Weston last used Farris to purchase cocaine from Poppy in late 1997 or early 1998. Farris' testimony established that Weston's bulk cocaine purchases from Poppy to Weston and/or Weston and Farris amounted to between 4.8 and 5.7 kilograms of cocaine. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that [t]ypes and quantities of drugs not specified in the count of conviction may be considered in determining the offense level. See S 1B1.3(a)(2)(Relevant Conduct). U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1, Application Note 12. Relevant Conduct for a drug trafficking conviction includes not only all controlled substances involvedduring the commission of the offense of conviction, but also those substances involved as part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.1(a)(2). Consequently, all of Weston's drugtrafficking that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme must be included in the drug quantity, regardless of whether a particular transaction resulted in a conviction. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 3 (application of S 1B1.3(a)(2) does not require the defendant, in fact, to have been convicted of multiple counts.). Weston's multiple drug-trafficking offenses, including the offense of conviction, and his purchases from Poppy, were part of a common scheme or plan, because they were substantially connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as . . . common accomplices, . .. [or 17 a] common purpose. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 9(A). Weston and Farris were clearly accomplices in the offense of conviction and in their joint purchases of cocaine powder from Poppy. Farris introduced Weston to Poppy, identified Weston as a reliable bulk purchaser of cocaine, purchased cocaine from Poppy for Weston, and gave Weston money to purchase cocaine from Poppy. Farris also arranged for Boone and Jones to deliver Weston's cocaine in the charged conspiracy. Therefore, the district court properly held Weston accountable for all the cocaine that he purchased from Poppy; either alone or jointly with Farris. The purchases from Poppy and the offense of conviction also qualifi[ed] as part of the same course of conduct [because] they [were] sufficiently related or connected to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they were part of [an] . . . ongoing series of offenses. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 9(B). The conduct all occurred within the small geographic area in or near Asbury Park, involved cocaine that Weston sold through intermediaries, and it involved the same co-conspirators, i.e., Weston and Farris. Accordingly, we find no merit in Weston's claim that the 5 kilograms of cocaine purchased in New York should not be attributed to him under the Sentencing Guidelines. 5. The District Court Erred by Crediting Farris' Testimony on the Volume of Drugs Weston Distributed. In his pro se brief, Weston relies upon United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1993), in arguing that the district court committed clear error by crediting Farris' testimony regarding the volume of cocaine that he and Weston purchased from Poppy. Weston claims that Farris' testimony was internally inconsistent. In Miele, the district court's estimate of drug quantity rested upon the unsworn hearsay statement of an informant. That informant later contradicted that estimate in sworn testimony he gave during the trial of Miele's codefendants. We found that the vast disparity between [the informant's] estimate in the PSI and the significantly lower 18 estimates he provided at the co-defendants' trial cast [ ] doubt on the reliability of the PSI's estimate. Id. at 664. Since the district court never explained why it accepted the informant's higher estimate in calculating the drug quantity, we remanded for resentencing. Id. Here, however, the district court based the volume of cocaine on Farris' sworn trial testimony, and the court concluded that the testimony was reliable. The testimony remained unshaken after vigorous cross-examination. Moreover, the vast disparity in estimates of drug quantity that we found so troubling in Miele is absent here. Farris' testimony was neither speculative nor contradictory. Weston argues that Farris' testimony was contradictory because Farris first testified on direct that he and Weston first went to New York to buy cocaine from Poppy in 1995, but then, on cross-examination, testified that the first trip was in 1996. Although Farris did initially testify that the first trip was in 1995, he immediately corrected himself and explained that it was in 1996. Moreover, even if he had not done so, the resulting discrepancy would not have been analogous to the discrepancies in Miele. Slight memory lapses hardly compel a sentencing court to completely reject testimony about drug quantity. This is particularly true where, as here, it was immediately corrected, and involves an issue that is not at all relevant to the substance of the testimony about drug quantity. See United States v. Huddleston, 194 F.3d 214, 224 (1st Cir. 1999)(rejecting argument that district court, in calculating the drug amount, should not have relied on testimony of an informant whose testimony regarding dates and times was fuzzy, because such credibility calls are grist for the trial court's mill.). Given Farris' familiarity with drug transactions, his estimate of volume was appropriately considered by the district court. It is not unreasonable . . . to believe that the testimony of a man experienced in drug deals was sufficient to establish an appropriate drug quantity. Id. Weston also alleges that Farris' testimony should not be credited because of an inconsistency regarding the wholesale price of cocaine. Farris said that he paid $20 a gram for cocaine that he purchased from Poppy in New 19 York in bulk. He also said that he and Weston paid Poppy $4,000 each for close to half a key [kilogram]. Finally, Farris testified that he and Weston would charge each other $300 to pick up cocaine from Poppy, and ten grams of cocaine (i.e., $30 a gram) were accepted in payment. However, as the government points out, Farris' accounts are easily reconciled. At $20 a gram when bought in bulk, 400 grams, costing $8,000, ($4,000 from Weston and $4,000 from Farris) is relatively close to half a key, i.e., 500 grams. Farris testimony that smaller quantities (i.e. 10 grams) cost more (i.e. $30 a gram) than bulk purchases simply reflects the economies of scale that apparently operated in this illegal market. Finally, Weston complains that Farris' testimony should not be credited because Farris did not give a dollar amount for each of the quantities of cocaine that either he or Weston purchased from Poppy. Therefore, argues Weston, the district court's estimate of the total volume of drugs was clearly erroneous. We disagree. Farris recited particular dollar amounts for several of the purchases, estimated the average amount of money spent during other transactions, and estimated the total number of transactions. This is sufficient to support the district court's estimate of the total amount of cocaine that Weston and Farris bought from Poppy. See United States v. Grandados, 202 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000)(not clear error for district court to estimate unknown quantities of drugs involved in certain transactions by reference to known quantities involved in other, similar transactions). 6. The District Court Erred by Enhancing Weston's Sentence for Obstruction of Justice. Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two level enhancement if a defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice. Examples of obstruction include: threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing . . . a witness, or attempting to do so; suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury; and other conduct prohibited by the obstruction of justice provisions 20 under Title 18, United States Code. U.S.S.G.S 3C1.1, Application Note 4(a). In the Presentence Report, the Probation Office found that Weston obstructed justice and recommended a two level enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.l. This was based upon the letter that Weston attempted to coerce Farris into signing. PSR P 38. Weston objected, claiming that Farris' account of the circumstances surrounding the purported letter were not credible. However, the district court observed Farris' testimony and concluded otherwise. The court concluded this is one of the most clear and convincing episodes of obstruction of justice that I have seen. The court found that it even rose to a level that exceeded the degree of obstruction encompassed within the heartland of S 3C1. It would have been difficult to conclude otherwise. In his pro se brief, Weston challenges Farris' credibility by pointing to Farris' cross-examination testimony about a gold cadillac Weston purportedly owned. However, Weston's ownership of a gold Cadillac has absolutely nothing to do with his conviction. The district concluded that Farris testified credibly about Weston's obstruction activity, and we afford that finding deference. United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440 (3d Cir. 1997). Given the credible testimony that Weston directly and indirectly attempted to coerce Farris into signing a copy of the aforementioned exculpatory letter, the district court did not err in concluding that a two level enchantment for obstruction of justice was warranted.