Opinion ID: 72032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The statutory language of the LHWCA

Text: In answering any statutory question, we begin with the language of the statute itself. [10] By its express terms, the LHWCA provides workers' compensation benefits to employees who are injured upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing dismantling, or building a vessel). [11] The LHWCA defines an employee as  any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations .... [12] The statute contains several limited exceptions to this definition, but each exception is based on an individual's job description and makes no reference to the individual's immigration status. [13] In reviewing similar federal labor and employment laws, both the Supreme Court and this court have concluded that the subject laws provide coverage to undocumented immigrants. In Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court reviewed the statutory language of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and concluded that, because undocumented aliens are not among the few groups of workers expressly exempted by Congress [in that statute], they plainly come within the broad statutory definition of `employee.' [14] Similarly, in In re Reyes, we reviewed the statutory language of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and concluded that the statute's use of the broad term employees reflected the intent of Congress that it apply to citizens and aliens alike, and whether the alien is documented or undocumented is irrelevant. [15] We also find persuasive the section of the LHWCA entitled Aliens, which states that [c]ompensation under [the LHWCA] to aliens not residents (or about to become nonresidents) of the United States or Canada shall be the same in amount as provided for residents.  [16] Although the statute does not expressly define the term alien and makes no reference to illegal or undocumented immigrants, its coverage of nonresident aliens is significant. Other courts that have interpreted similar workers' compensation statutes have concluded that the unmodified term alien encompasses both documented and undocumented immigrants. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in interpreting that state's workers' compensation statute, explained: The clear language of the Act does not distinguish between authorized and unauthorized aliens. Following our rules of statutory construction, when the words of a law are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of [pursuing] its spirit. Had the legislature intended to exclude unauthorized aliens from coverage under the [statute], it could easily have done so, as it did with certain types of farm workers who are explicitly excluded from the definition of employee, but it did not. Applying the Act as it is written, aliens, whether authorized or unauthorized, are employees and thus are subject to the Act's provisions. [17] As the plain statutory language of the LHWCA broadly defines the term employee and specifies that nonresident aliens are entitled to benefits in the same amount as other claimants, we are convinced beyond cavil that Rodriguez was an employee within the intendment of the statute and is thus eligible for workers' compensation benefits.