Opinion ID: 2629666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Comparative Apportionment of Damages Provision, AS 09.17.080, Is Facially Constitutional.

Text: Alaska Statute 09.17.080 is a comparative negligence statute that requires the finder of fact to assign a percentage share of responsibility for damages to each responsible party and non-party, and mandates that liability for damages must be apportioned between the responsible parties in accordance with their percentage of responsibility. Specifically, AS 09.17.080(a) requires the fact-finder to assign fault percentages to all parties to the suit, as well as to non-parties released from liability or responsible for the damages. However, potentially responsible non-parties are not included within the apportionment of fault if the parties had a sufficient opportunity to join them but chose not to do so. [75] Under AS 09.17.080(c) and (d), the court must then determine each party's equitable share of the damages and enter judgment in accordance with that party's percentage of fault. The statute provides: (c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant in accordance with the findings and enter judgment against each party liable. The court also shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages of fault as determined under (a) of this section.... (d) The court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of several liability in accordance with that party's percentage of fault. No judgment is entered against non-parties; the allocation is used only as a measure for accurately determining the percentages of fault of a named party. [76] Chapter 26, SLA 1997 added the requirement that fault be assigned to all non-parties responsible for the damages. [77] The plaintiffs challenge the allocation of fault to non-parties on two grounds: They claim that (1) it is a violation of due process because it is void for vagueness, and (2) it violates the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. These arguments will be considered in turn.
We have recognized that a law is void for vagueness and violates due process when it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. [78] The plaintiffs claim that AS 09.17.080(a) contains ambiguities that render it unconstitutionally vague. Each of these alleged ambiguities will be separately discussed in turn. First, the plaintiffs claim that the statute requires that the fact-finder assign a fault percentage to every person that is alleged to be responsible for the damages. The plaintiffs imply that there is an ambiguity because the language of the statute seems to require that no such person may be assigned a percentage of zero. We reject this argument. The language of AS 09.17.080(a) does not state or imply that a percentage of zero cannot be assigned. [79] The plaintiffs do not provide any legislative history to counter the plain and unambiguous language of AS 09.17.080(a), which does not preclude a percentage of zero from being assigned. [80] The other ambiguities claimed by the plaintiffs arise from the exception in AS 09.17.080(a)(2) that excludes some non-parties from the allocation of fault. As the superior court noted, the general rule, or presumption, established by the statute is that all parties and non-parties responsible for the damages may be assigned a fault percentage. However, there are exceptions to that general rule: fault may not be allocated to any non-party that (1) is identified as potentially responsible, (2) is not protected by the statute of repose, and (3) is a person or entity that the parties had a sufficient opportunity to join, but chose not to. [T]he court ... shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings, indicating... the percentage of the total fault that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, person who has been released from liability, or other person responsible for the damages, unless [1] the person was identified as a potentially responsible person, [2] the person is not a person protected from a civil action under AS 09.10.055, and [3] the parties had a sufficient opportunity to join that person in the action but chose not to. [81] The State, while urging us to affirm this common sense interpretation of the statute, also observes that, under the statute, a non-party can only be included in the allocation of fault if (1) the defendant identifies the non-party as someone who the defendant will argue is at fault, and (2) the defendant shows that the person could not be joined. This is also correct. In order to include a non-party in the fault allocation, a defendant must identify the non-party as someone who the defendant will argue is at fault, because otherwise that non-party cannot be a person responsible for the damages under the general rule of AS 09.17.080(a)(2). And, even if the defendant argues that a non-party was at fault, that non-party cannot be included in the allocation of fault if there was a sufficient opportunity to join that non-party, because a sufficient opportunity to join triggers the exception in AS 09.17.080(a)(2) defining non-parties that cannot be assigned an allocation of fault. [82] The statute states that there is a sufficient opportunity to join when the non-party is (A) within the jurisdiction of the court; (B) not precluded from being joined by law or court rule; and (C) reasonably locatable. [83] Thus, as the State correctly maintains: [A]s finally enacted ... [AS 09.17.080] allows the allocation of fault to a non-party only if certain conditions are met. The defendant first has to identify the person as someone the defendant will argue is at fault. While no method of identification is specified, the procedures in the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure will govern this identification. Next, the defendant will have to show that the person could not be added as a third-party defendant either because that person is outside the jurisdiction of the court or because by law or court rule the person cannot be named as a party. Thus, a defendant who wishes to allocate fault to a person must add the person as a party if the defendant is legally able to do so. [84] (Citations omitted.) The plaintiffs claim that the first and third components of the exception in AS 09.17.080(a)(2) are ambiguous. First, the plaintiffs claim that the statute does not define sufficiently the term potentially responsible person. The plaintiffs claim that this term is ambiguous because it is unclear who is responsible for identifying potentially responsible persons, what the standard of proof is, or what the procedure should be for such an identification. The plaintiffs also claim that the third component of the exception is ambiguous. The plaintiffs impliedly argue that it is possible that a non-party could be identified as a potentially responsible party without the defendant's knowledgeand that therefore this third condition may not apply to that defendant because the defendant did not have the knowledge required to choose not to join the non-party. The plaintiffs also claim that the exception may create an ambiguous duty to try to ascertain potentially responsible persons, and that the phrase sufficient opportunity to join is not clear. There is no unconstitutional ambiguity in the exception contained in AS 09.17.080(a)(2). It is true that AS 09.17.080(a)(2) does not define the term potentially responsible person. However, this does not create an unconstitutional ambiguity. The identification of potentially responsible persons can be made by any party and will be managed by the trial court. Our rule-making process will provide further guidance if such guidance is needed. The third component of the exception, including the phrase sufficient opportunity to join, is also not unconstitutionally ambiguous. The exception does not implicitly or explicitly create any dutiesit simply creates an exception to the general rule that all responsible non-parties will be assigned a fault percentage. Our conclusion that AS 09.17.080(a) does not contain unconstitutional ambiguities is supported by our prior decisions in Lazy Mountain Land Club v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment & Appeals, [85] and Williams v. State, Department of Revenue. [86] In Lazy Mountain, we stated that there are three principal considerations in determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally vague: (1) whether the statute operates to inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights, (2) whether the statute gives adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited, and (3) whether there has been a history or a strong likelihood of uneven application. [87] In Williams, a workers' compensation claimant was denied benefits and claimed that the governing statute defining injury was unconstitutionally vague. [88] We noted in Williams that the three Lazy Mountain factors had little or nothing to do with the situation in Williams: These factors obviously have little or nothing to do with the present case. First Amendment rights are not involved[;] the statutes in question prohibit no conduct; and the statutes give rise to neither prosecutorial action in a criminal context nor a civil enforcement action where a litigant may be at risk of losing an important right because the litigant's conduct did not meet a certain standard. [89] We rejected the vagueness challenge in Williams, because the statute merely set[] a dividing line between instances where compensation is payable and those where it is not. [90] We noted that a lower degree of exactitude is required for civil [as opposed to criminal] statutes, and that a reading of the entire statute clarified the meaning of the challenged terms. [91] Similarly, AS 09.17.080(a) merely sets a dividing line between non-parties who may be assigned a fault percentage and those who may not. Also, first amendment rights are not involved, AS 09.17.080 prohibits no conduct, and the statute does not give rise to criminal liability or possible civil enforcement where a litigant may be at risk of losing an important right because the litigant's conduct did not meet a certain standard. [92] And the language of AS 09.17.080(a) is not so conflicting and confused that it cannot be given meaning in the adjudication process. [93] The ambiguities identified by the plaintiffs do not make AS 09.17.080(a) unconstitutionally vague.
The plaintiffs also argue that AS 09.17.080 violates their substantive due process rights because it forces plaintiffs to defend responsible non-parties who may share in the fault allocation but who by definition will not appear at trial to defend themselves. Plaintiffs would have an interest in defending these non-parties because an allocation of fault to non-parties would reduce the amount of damages recoverable from the defendants. The superior court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that the empty chair problem does not give rise to a constitutional violation, and stated that it is inevitable that someone will be disadvantaged by the presence of empty chairs in multi-party tort cases. The superior court noted that under a system of joint and several liability (the former system in Alaska), the defendants are prejudiced because they face the risk of paying more than their fair share of damages, and must sue other co-defendants for contribution to remedy the situation. Under the AS 09.17.080 comparative negligence scheme, plaintiffs are prejudiced because they risk getting less than their fair share of compensation. The superior court noted that the choice between a system which disadvantages defendants and a system which disadvantages plaintiffs is a pure public policy choice that was made by the legislature and is not one that is vulnerable to constitutional attack. We have held that [s]ubstantive due process is denied when a legislative enactment has no reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. [94] The only relevant authorities cited by the parties are two Montana Supreme Court decisions, Plumb v. Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County [95] and Newville v. State, Department of Family Services, [96] in which the court applied a substantive due process standard identical to our own. [97] The Montana court considered two versions of a Montana comparative negligence statute mandating that fault be allocated to responsible non-parties and that party liability for damages be reduced accordingly. In Newville, the court struck down the first version of the statute because it unreasonably mandate[d] an allocation of percentages of negligence to non-parties without any kind of procedural safeguard. [98] That is, even though the comparative negligence statute was enacted for a valid governmental purpose, the statute was not reasonably related to that purpose because it arbitrarily and unreasonably prejudiced plaintiffs who risked diminished recovery if they did not defend non-party defendants. [99] In the later Plumb decision, the Montana Supreme Court again implied that the allocation of fault to non-parties would be constitutional if there were adequate procedural safeguards. [100] The court considered the next version of the comparative negligence statute passed by the Montana legislature as a response to Newville. [101] In the second statute, the legislature created some procedural safeguards, but the court stated in Plumb that these safeguards were not enough to make the statute constitutional. [102] The second statute included requirements that (1) the defendant had the burden to show non-party liability; (2) the non-party defense had to be affirmatively pled; and (3) the non-party had to be notified that it was being blamed for the injuries. [103] The court held that these procedural safeguards were constitutionally insufficient because they did not provide the non-party with an opportunity to appear and defend itself; without this opportunity, nonparties are likely to be assigned a disproportionate share of liability, and [the plaintiff's] recovery is likely to be reduced. [104] Newville and Plumb are distinguishable from this appeal because AS 09.17.080(a) contains safeguards that adequately address the Montana Supreme Court's concerns. Alaska Statute 09.17.080(a) does not allow allocation of fault to non-parties if the three conditions of its exception are all met: if (1) the non-party is identified as potentially responsible, (2) the non-party is not protected by AS 09.10.055, and (3) the parties had a sufficient opportunity to join the non-party but did not do so. This exception provides the opportunity for the non-party to appear and defend itself that the Montana statute lacked because under AS 09.17.080(a), a defendant must join any potentially responsible non-parties as long as there is a sufficient opportunity to do so, or else no fault will be apportioned to non-parties. Because of these procedural protections, AS 09.17.080(a) is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental purpose and does not violate substantive due process. [105]