Opinion ID: 1989998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: We must first decide whether the Pine Ridge police officers had the authority to stop and detain or arrest Cuny. The power of a police officer at common law to make an arrest without a warrant is limited to the boundaries of the governmental unit by which he or she was appointed, unless the police officer is acting in fresh and continued pursuit of a suspected felon who has committed an offense in the officer's presence and within his or her territorial jurisdiction. State v. Masat, 239 Neb. 849, 479 N.W.2d 131 (1992). It is clear that the common-law exception of fresh pursuit does not apply to Cuny's case. Common-law fresh pursuit is limited to felonies, and Cuny was charged with a violation of § 60-6,196, a Class W misdemeanor. There being no authority under common law for the Pine Ridge police officers to arrest a misdemeanant suspect outside the officers' geographical jurisdiction, the State must rely upon statutory authorization to prove that the actions of the Pine Ridge police officers were lawful. See, State v. Tingle, 239 Neb. 558, 477 N.W.2d 544 (1991), citing Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990). Once the Pine Ridge police officers left the reservation and entered Nebraska, they were outside the territorial limits of their jurisdiction. Therefore, the question becomes whether there is statutory authority that gives the Pine Ridge police officers the power to apprehend a suspected misdemeanor offender in Nebraska. The district court found that Neb.Rev. Stat. § 29-215(2)(b) (Reissue 1995) is such a statute. Section 29-215(2)(b) states as follows: Any such law enforcement officer who is within this state, but beyond the territorial limits of his or her primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state or any legal ordinance of any city or incorporated village or otherwise perform the functions of his or her office, including the authority to arrest and detain suspects, as if enforcing the laws or performing the functions within the territorial limits of his or her primary jurisdiction in the following cases: .... ... Any such law enforcement officer, if in a fresh attempt to apprehend a person suspected of committing a misdemeanor or a traffic infraction, may follow such person anywhere in an area within twenty-five miles of the boundaries of the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction and there arrest and detain such person and return such person to the law enforcement officer's primary jurisdiction. Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. State v. Torres, 256 Neb. 380, 590 N.W.2d 184 (1999); State v. Woods, 255 Neb. 755, 587 N.W.2d 122 (1998). It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the language; neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. State v. Woods, supra . Section 29-215 does give certain extrajurisdictional arrest powers to certain law enforcement officers. However, we conclude that § 29-215 only applies to Nebraska law enforcement officers and does not apply to law enforcement officers who cross state lines. This conclusion is supported by the language of § 29-215(1): Every sheriff, deputy sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, police officer, or peace officer as defined in subdivision (15) of section 49-801 shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state and of the political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his or her primary jurisdiction. Primary jurisdiction shall mean the geographic area within territorial limits of the state or political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer. (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, we hold that § 29-215 does not authorize an out-of-state police officer to arrest a suspect for a misdemeanor DUI inside Nebraska. The Pine Ridge police officers did not have the authority to pursue and arrest Cuny for a misdemeanor offense in Nebraska. As such, their stop and detainment, or arrest, of Cuny was unlawful. Having concluded that the actions of the Pine Ridge police officers were unlawful, we find the evidence obtained by Robbins was the fruit of an illegal search or seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, is inadmissible in a state prosecution, and must be excluded. See State v. Tingle, 239 Neb. 558, 477 N.W.2d 544 (1991), citing State v. O'Kelly, 175 Neb. 798, 124 N.W.2d 211 (1963), cert. denied 376 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 978, 11 L.Ed.2d 975 (1964). After concluding that the Pine Ridge police officers were without authority to make the stop and arrest, we hold that Cuny's arrest was unlawful and that the trial court was clearly wrong in not suppressing all evidence obtained pursuant to the illegal actions.