Opinion ID: 1060923
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pretextual stops

Text: The Fourth Amendment [5] to the United States Constitution guarantees [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures... . Similarly, Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee provides that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures... . The purpose of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). In this appeal, the defendants urge this Court to hold that the evidence against them should have been suppressed as the fruit of an illegal pretextual stop and search of their automobile. The defendants assert that because the officers initiating the stop were subjectively seeking to discover drugs as the result of an anonymous tip, rather than enforce the traffic laws, the stop was pretextual. They ask the Court to hold that pretextual stops violate Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution even when, based upon the facts and circumstances, the police officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant has violated the law. The defendants concede that the stop in this case does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Their only insistence is that this Court should interpret Article I, Section 7 as providing greater protection than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The State responds that this Court should affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and hold that the Tennessee Constitution provides no greater protection than the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Whren . Though state courts are free to interpret their respective state constitutional provisions as affording greater protections than the base line level of protection guaranteed by the federal constitution, this Court has previously stated that Article I, Section 7 is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1997), quoting Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 13, 423 S.W.2d 857, 860 (1968). Federal case law interpreting the Fourth Amendment is to be regarded as particularly persuasive when the scope and intent of Article I, § 7 is at issue. Id. Indeed, when interpreting the state constitutional provision, this Court has departed from federal precedent only when: (1) adopting federal Fourth Amendment standards would require overruling a settled development of state constitutional law; and (2) when linguistic differences justify distinct interpretations of state and federal constitutional provisions. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 435-36 (Tenn. 1989) (probable cause standard for evaluation of affidavit); State v. Lakin, 588 S.W.2d 544, 549, n. 2 (Tenn. 1979) (open fields doctrine). Without question, the temporary detention of individuals during the stop of a vehicle by police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure which implicates the protection of both the state and federal constitutional provisions. Whren, 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1772; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993). As a general rule, however, the stop of an automobile is constitutionally reasonable, under both the state and federal constitutions, if the police have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Id. Moreover, in Whren , the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected the proposition that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved. Id., 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1774. Instead, the Court held that a stop based upon probable cause to believe that provisions of the traffic code have been violated is constitutionally permissible, despite the subjective motivation of the police officer making the stop. [6] Whren, 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1774. In that case, plainclothes vice-squad officers patrolling a high drug area became suspicious when they observed the occupants of a truck stopped at an intersection. Upon following the truck, the officers observed several traffic violations. When the truck stopped at a traffic light, one officer approached the vehicle, identified himself as a police officer, and directed the driver to put the vehicle in park. As he approached the vehicle, the officer observed Whren holding two large plastic bags of crack cocaine. The occupants of the vehicle, including Whren, were arrested and quantities of illegal drugs were seized. The United States Supreme Court rejected Whren's assertion that suppression of the evidence was required because the stop was pretextual. The Court found the stop valid under the Fourth Amendment because the officers executed the stop only after developing probable cause to believe that the driver of the vehicle had violated the traffic code. The Court held that [s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Whren, 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1774. The existence of probable cause to believe that the petitioners had violated the traffic code ... rendered the stop reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1777. While acknowledging that earlier opinions contained language expressing disapproval of police attempts to use valid bases of action against citizens as pretexts for pursuing other investigatory agendas, the Court emphasized that each of those prior statements appeared in a case addressing potential abuse of a police practice that did not require probable cause for its initiation, for example, an inventory search used as a ruse ... to discover incriminating evidence, Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 1635, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), or a warrantless administrative search undertaken as a `pretext' for obtaining evidence of violation of ... penal laws. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17, n. 27, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2651, n. 27, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987). The Court explained that none of those earlier statements endorsed the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. Whren, 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1772. The danger to individual liberty and privacy posed by police abuses discussed in the earlier decisions is not present when the police action at issue is supported by probable cause. Despite the subjective motivations of police, the essential purpose of the Fourth Amendment, imposition of a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by ... law enforcement agents in order to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions, [7] is entirely fulfilled when a traffic stop is initiated because the officers have probable cause to believe that a violation of the law has been committed. The probable cause requirement constrains the exercise of police discretion and safeguards the citizenry against arbitrary intrusions. Whren, 517 U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1777. The defendants urge us to reject the analysis of the Supreme Court in Whren and in support of their claim, the defendants rely upon prior decisions of this Court which they claim condemn pretextual stops. In Robertson v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947), highway patrol officers, pretending a driver's license inspection, stopped the defendant's vehicle because the passenger looked back through the rear window in a way that made [the officers] suspicious. Id. 198 S.W.2d at 634. The officers had no information that the occupants were involved in any illegal activity, and they observed no violation of the traffic code; consequently, they did not have probable cause. Upon stopping the vehicle, the officers observed illegal liquor in the rear seat of the vehicle. The Court held, This Court will not permit an evasion of the requirements of the law with regard to search warrants through the device, pretext, or subterfuge of a pretended examination of a driver's license, id. at 635, where no impropriety in the driving of the defendants' car is observed. Id. at 636. In Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181 S.W.2d 338 (1944), highway patrol officers followed a vehicle operated by the defendant from Davidson County, where the possession of liquor was legal, into Sumner County, where possession was not legal. The officers believed the vehicle was owned by another person whom they suspected was involved in the illegal transportation of liquor. As in Robertson , they stopped the vehicle and asked to see the defendant's driver's license. And, as in Robertson , the officers observed liquor in the front seat of the vehicle. This Court held the suspicionless stop was a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights against unreasonable seizure and reversed the conviction. Contrary to the defendants' assertions, the decisions in Robertson and Cox did not condemn pretextual stops. Instead, those decisions condemned intrusions that were not supported by probable cause or any level of individualized suspicion. Such intrusions, as the United States Supreme Court recognized in Whren , allow unfettered police discretion and pose the greatest risk of official abuse. Robertson and Cox also do not support the proposition that the state constitution is more protective, in this context, than the federal constitution. Indeed, those cases would have been decided the same under federal law. In Prouse , the United States Supreme Court held that a suspicionless traffic stop initiated by a police officer on a roving patrol aimed at detecting unlicensed drivers is constitutionally impermissible. The Court stated except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion [that a motorist is unlicensed] or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining the driver in order to check his license and the registration of the automobile are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id., 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added). Since the officers initiating the traffic stops in Robertson and Cox did not purport to have reasonable suspicion nor probable cause, those stops were not valid under either the federal or state constitution. Therefore, under this Court's prior decisions, pretext is not the determinative factor in evaluating the constitutionality of a traffic stop. For example in McBride v. State, 200 Tenn. 100, 290 S.W.2d 648 (1956), a highway patrol officer had some general information that the defendant was transporting liquor from [Dyer County, where possession was legal] into Henry County [where possession was not legal] over Highway 54 ... [in] a green Hudson automobile. While traveling on Highway 54 in Henry County, a highway patrol officer met the defendant driving a green Hudson. In response to a radio call from the highway patrol officer, a Paris city police officer undertook to intercept the defendant as he entered the city of Paris. When the defendant failed to stop at a road block, a high speed chase ensued and ended on a dead-end street. The defendant was arrested, and the officers observed liquor in the rear seat. This Court refused to suppress the evidence. The Court found that had the city officer intercepted the defendant's vehicle, an arrest at that point would have been unlawful, but, held that the defendant's violation of the traffic code committed during the chase justified the defendant's arrest and the officer's seizure of illegal liquor in plain view. See also Batchelor v. State, 213 Tenn. 649, 378 S.W.2d 751, 752 (1964). Therefore, despite the police officer's subjective motivations, this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the stop which was based upon probable cause that the defendant had violated the traffic code. Adoption of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Whren would not require overruling a settled development of state constitutional law. Moreover, there are no linguistic differences which, in this context, justify distinct interpretations of the state and federal constitutional provisions. Accordingly, we conclude that probable cause justifies a traffic stop under Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution without regard to the subjective motivations of police officers. Applying that rule to the facts in this case, it is clear that the trial court and Court of Criminal Appeals appropriately denied the defendants' motion to suppress. Although the subjective motivation for the stop may have been the officers' desire to search for illegal drugs, the stop was not accomplished until the detectives had personally observed at least three violations of the traffic laws, which constitutes probable cause justifying the stop. Since the stop was based upon probable cause, its constitutional validity was not impaired by the officers' subjective motivations.