Opinion ID: 3001591
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellate Jurisdiction Over TSI’s Appeal

Text: We questioned appellate jurisdiction by order issued before briefing commenced in this case; our appellate analysis always begins with the jurisdictional inquiry regardless of whether it is raised by one of the parties. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1986); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1055 (7th Cir. 1986). The parties filed memoranda in response to our jurisdictional order and reiterated their jurisdictional arguments in their merits briefs. UGS2 contends we lack jurisdiction over TSI’s claims. No doubt we possess jurisdiction over appeals from final orders in diversity suits, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1332, but our focus here is on the particular requirements of Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure concerning the time for filing a notice of appeal and what it must contain. The district court entered its decision and order granting UGS’s motion to dismiss on August 4, 2006, and three days later, on August 7, 2006, entered a minute order terminating the case. Nocula filed his pro se notice of appeal on September 5, 2006, within the 30-day 2 For simplicity’s sake, we will refer to UGS and UGS Poland as “UGS.” Nos. 06-3386 & 06-3447 7 time limit prescribed by Rule 4(a)(1)(A).3 This notice listed Nocula and TSI in the caption but did not specifically mention TSI in the body of the notice. The notice also misidentified the order appealed from and the appellate court to which the appeal was taken. The body of the notice read: NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that MITCH NOCULA, et al, Petitioner above-named, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from a final order of the Honorable Robert W. Gettleman, Judge of the Northern District Court of Illinois, Eastern Division, denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, declaratory and injunctive relief, entered in this action on the 4th day of August 2006. (Emphasis added.) The notice was signed “Mitch Nocula, Pro Se.” On September 12, 2006, counsel for Nocula and TSI filed what was denominated a “Corrected Notice of Appeal.” This notice remedied several errors contained in the September 5 notice. The second notice was directed to the correct circuit—the Seventh instead of the originally named Eighth—and the language suggesting that claims for habeas, declaratory, and injunctive relief were being appealed was removed (those types of relief had never been sought). Additionally, whereas Nocula had signed the original notice for himself “pro se,” the September 12 notice was signed by an attorney “for Mitch Nocula and Tooling Systems Int’l Corp.” 3 Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal rules of Appellate Procedure states: “In a civil case, . . . the notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.” 8 Nos. 06-3386 & 06-3447 Regardless of the corrections it contained, the second notice was untimely. Absent a motion to extend under Rule 4(a)(5)—which was not filed in this appeal—amendments to a notice must be made within the time set forth by Rule 4(a)(1). See Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 974 F.2d 873, 886 (7th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Leonard v. O’Leary, 788 F.2d 1238, 1239 (7th Cir. 1986). The September 12 notice was filed outside the 30-day appeal period, whether the clock started on August 4, when the district court entered its order dismissing the case, or on August 7, when the court entered its minute order terminating the case; we have previously recognized the latter type of order as a sufficient separate judgment for purposes of Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Props. Unlimited, Inc. Realtors v. Cendant Mobility Servs., 384 F.3d 917, 920 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding a similar minute order entered on the docket to be a final judgment for purposes of Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 30-day appeal time limit of Rule 4(a)). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is not merely a procedural hoop for parties to jump through; it is a jurisdictional requirement. See Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2363 (2007); Leonard, 788 F.2d at 1239. Thus, our examination is limited to the September 5 notice. A notice of appeal must (1) “specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming each one in the caption or body of the notice”; (2) designate the judgment from which the appeal originates; and (3) “name the court to which the appeal is taken.” FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1). The purpose of Rule 3 “is to ensure that the filing provides sufficient notice to other parties and courts.” Nichols v. United States, 75 F.3d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992)). We have said Nos. 06-3386 & 06-3447 9 that “punctilious, literal, and exact compliance” with Rule 3(c)’s requirements is required. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). Notice will be deemed insufficient where the notice of appeal, read as a whole, is ambiguous. See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 913 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1990). The September 5 notice did not mention TSI as an appealing party, either in the body of the notice or as an appealing party under Nocula’s signature—recall that Nocula signed the notice above the typed designation “Mitch Nocula, Pro Se.” TSI was listed in the caption of the notice, and the body of the notice refers to “Mitch Nocula, et al.” But immediately following this is a reference to “Petitioner”—singular—and the notice states that this “petitioner” appeals from “a final order . . . denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, declaratory and injunctive relief.” The use of the singular “Petitioner” and “his,” together with the signature line that read “Mitch Nocula, Pro Se,” without any reference to TSI, gave proper notice only that Nocula was appealing.4 As to TSI, however, the notice was ambiguous. Corporations cannot appear pro se, see Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1985); Strong Delivery Ministry Ass’n v. Bd. of Appeals of Cook County, 543 F.2d 32, 4 References to the wrong circuit court and nonexistent claims were obvious errors that could not have led to confusion or ambiguity in the notice. See United States v. Musa, 946 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir. 1991) (notice of appeal’s misidentification of court being appealed to did not deprive the appellee of notice); accord McLemore v. Landry, 898 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1990). 10 Nos. 06-3386 & 06-3447 33-34 (7th Cir. 1976), and one pro se litigant cannot represent another, see 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Nocula did not sign the notice in any representative capacity on behalf of TSI. The caption lists TSI as “an Illinois Corporation” and Nocula as “an individual”; the latter designation does not provide any indication Nocula was asserting claims in a representative capacity on behalf of TSI. Nocula and TSI cite a Ninth Circuit case, Bigelow v. Brady (In re Bigelow), 179 F.3d 1164, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that an officer of a corporation can sign a notice of appeal for the corporation provided a lawyer subsequently makes a formal appearance. In Bigelow, however, the corporate officer signed the notice of appeal on behalf of the corporation. Bigelow has since been distinguished by D-Beam Ltd. Partnership v. Roller Derby Skates, Inc., 366 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2004), which addressed whether a notice sufficiently indicated both a corporate president’s and the corporation’s intent to appeal. In D-Beam, the Ninth Circuit held that because the corporate president did not sign the notice “on behalf of” the corporation and the notice only referred to a singular “plaintiff,” it failed to provide sufficient notice of the corporation’s appeal, as distinct from the president’s. Id. We are not bound by either Bigelow or D-Beam, but we think this case is closer to D-Beam than Bigelow. Nocula and TSI asserted separate and distinct claims in this case, and the body of the notice of appeal used the singular “Petitioner” to refer to the appealing party. As in D-Beam, Nocula signed the notice for himself, not “for” or “on behalf of” TSI. Accordingly, because the September 5 notice of appeal was ambiguous as to TSI, we lack jurisdiction to hear TSI’s appeal. Nos. 06-3386 & 06-3447 11