Opinion ID: 2823822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Supports the Water Courtâs Finding of Abandonment

Text: Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The common law has long defined abandonment as nonuse coupled with the ownerâs intent to relinquish his appropriation. See, e.g., Arnold v. Roup, 157 P. 206, 209 (Colo. 1916). The 1969 Act defines â[a]bandonment of a water rightâ as âthe termination of a water right in whole or in part as the result of the intent of the owner thereof to discontinue permanently the use of all or part of the water available thereunder.â Â§ 37-92-103(2), C.R.S. (2014). Intent is therefore the crux of an abandonment case. See E. Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 921â22; Haystack Ranch, 997 P.2d at 552. A rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon arises from the failure to apply a water right to beneficial use for ten years. Â§ 37-92-402(11); E. Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 921. The burden of proof then shifts to the owner to rebut the presumption of abandonment. E. Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 921. Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The ownerâs self-serving declarations of intent are insufficient to overcome this presumption. Id. at 921â22; see also Beaver Park Water, Inc. v. City of Victor, 649 P.2d 300, 302 (Colo. 1982); Knapp v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 279 P.2d 420, 426 (Colo. 1955). Rather, successful rebuttal requires proof of some affirmative act that negates the ownerâs intent to relinquish his water right, such as repairs to the diversion structure, Haystack Ranch, 997 P.2d at 554, or diligent efforts to sell the water right, City & Cnty. of Denver v. Snake River Water Dist., 788 P.2d 772, 778 (Colo. 1990). Accord E.Â Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 922 (listing factors that may refute the intent to abandon a water right). If such evidence is insufficient or non-existent, however, failure to put water to beneficial use is enough to sustain a finding of abandonment. E. Twin Lakes, 76 P.3d at 922. Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In the instant case, the State presented substantial evidence that the Sanchez Ditch water rights had not been applied to beneficial use for decades. From 1982 onward, diversion records for the Sanchez Ditch described its neglected condition with comments like âstructure not usableâ and âwater available, none taken.â The local water commissioner testified that he visited the Sanchez Ditch area at least once a week and never saw water in the ditch or evidence of irrigation around it. An assistant division engineer who testified as an expert in water resource engineering and water rights administration concluded that water was consistently available to the Sanchez Ditch for two months during the irrigation season but was never used. His field inspection in November 2011 revealed a dilapidated ditch with no usable diversionÂ structure. The water court found this evidence sufficient to establish the statutory presumption of abandonment. Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â McKenna attempted to rebut the presumption with proof that he regularly used the Sanchez Ditch to irrigate his property. He introduced evidence that he dammed the Cucharas with a tire and flooded a portion of the ditch in 2003. Davis testified, however, that the purpose of this venture was to generate pictures of water in the ditch to send to McKennaâs attorney; no irrigation occurred that day. In fact, no other witnesses could corroborate any irrigation through the Sanchez Ditch, and the water court refused to give McKennaâs evidence much weight. Ultimately, the water court found that McKenna, an experienced rancher with access to legal and engineering advice with respect to his water rights, declined to make the repairs necessary to apply water to beneficial use because he opted instead to invest in wells on his property. He then attempted to inveigle the water court with evidence of a staged diversion. Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â While this evidence shows that McKenna did not want to lose his Sanchez Ditch water rights, it fails to establish that he intended to apply them to beneficial use. The premise of prior appropriation law is that ââ[b]eneficial use is the measure and the limit of an appropriative right.ââ Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Assân v. Simpson, 990 P.2d 46, 53 n.7 (Colo. 1999) (quoting Joseph L. Sax, Robert H. Abrams & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Legal Control of Water Resources, Cases and Materials 164 (2d ed. 1991)). The law of abandonment recognizes this principle by retiring an appropriation to the stream when its owner no longer intends to apply it to beneficial use. Gardner, 614 P.2d at 360; People ex rel. Danielson v. City of Thornton, 775 P.2d 11, 24 (Colo. 1989)Â (Quinn, C.J., dissenting). In this case, McKennaâs desire to keep his water rights, divorced from any intent to apply the water to beneficial use, is insufficient to overcome the inference of abandonment that arose from decades of nonuse. Cf. CF & I Steel Corp. v. Purgatoire River Water Conservancy Dist., 515 P.2d 456, 458 (Colo. 1973) (â[A] gleam-in-the-eye philosophy is not consistent with the protection and preservation of existing water rights.â). The water court therefore correctly dismissed McKennaâs âchoreographed photosâ because they did not show the application of water to a decreed, beneficial use. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â It is the province of the water court to weigh the evidence and measure the credibility of witnesses, and we will not disturb its resolution of factual issues on appeal. Danielson, 775 P.2d at 19. In this case, the record supports the trial courtâs finding that McKenna abandoned his Sanchez Ditch water rights. He never made a legitimate effort to apply the water to beneficial use and could not prove that he ever intended to do so. Consequently, we must sustain the water courtâs finding of abandonment.