Opinion ID: 2758877
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Improperly Dismissed

Text: the Marriage Action ¶ 25 Ms. Gardiner first argues that the court erred when it dismissed the marriage action without giving her the opportunity to raise defenses. Second, she argues that service was not improper and the district court should not have dismissed the action under rule 4(b)(i) for three reasons: (1) Mr. Francis, in his capacity as special administrator, waived service when he filed a motion to intervene in the marriage case; (2) Mr. Francis stipulated to Ms. Gardiner’s appointment as personal representative and thereby waived any objection to a potential conflict of interest; and (3) in any event, service was proper because the personal representative of the estate (Ms. Gardiner herself) waived service within 120 days of the filing of the marriage petition. We first address the propriety of the district court’s dismissal of the action on its own initiative under rule 4(b)(i) and find that it was improper. We then turn to the issue of service and hold that service was proper because the personal representative of the estate waived service within 120 days of the filing of the marriage petition. violation‖ of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will ―void the grant‖ of the motion unless ―the violation amounts to harmless error‖). 32As explained in Part II.B, infra, the court also erred when it subsequently dismissed the marriage action entirely. 12 Cite as: 2014 UT 56 Opinion of the Court 1. The District Court Erred in Sua Sponte Dismissing the Action Without First Giving Notice to Ms. Gardiner ¶ 26 On April 18, 2012, the district court dismissed the probate case ―upon its own initiative‖ under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(i). It dismissed the case because it found that Ms. Gardiner had ―not served process on anyone since filing her petition for determination of common law marriage‖ and therefore the action had to be ―dismissed, without prejudice.‖33 The court’s actions cannot be squared with the rules of civil procedure taken as a whole. ‖When we interpret a procedural rule, we do so according to our general rules of statutory construction.‖34 Thus we ―read the plain language of the [rule] as a whole, and interpret its provisions in harmony with other [rules].‖35 ¶ 27 There is some tension between Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(b)(i) and 4(e)(3). Rule 4(b)(i) states, ―[i]f the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any party or upon the court’s own initiative.‖ 36 However, rule 4(e)(3) states, ―[f]ailure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service.‖37 At a minimum, before a court dismisses an action for untimely service under rule 4(b)(i), it must first give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond. A plaintiff facing a challenge to the timeliness of service may argue that service was valid despite a failure to provide proof of service or that the opposing party waived service of process under rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Under rule 12(h), a party waives its right to challenge the sufficiency of service of process if it did ―not present[]‖ that claim ―either by motion or by answer or 33 See UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(b)(i). 34 Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossings, LLC, 2010 UT 40, ¶ 18, 238 P.3d 1035. 35 Bd. of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ¶ 9, 94 P.3d 234 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Arbogast Family Trust, 2010 UT 40, ¶ 18. 36 UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(b)(i). 37 Id. 4(e)(3). 13 GARDINER v. VANDERWERFF Opinion of the Court reply.‖ 38 Indeed, these are the very arguments Ms. Gardiner now presents on appeal because she was not given the opportunity to raise them below. We interpret rule 4(b)(i) to allow a court to raise the issue of sufficiency of service of process upon its own initiative, but it may not dismiss an action on that basis without first giving the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to raise defenses.39 Accordingly, we hold that the district court improperly dismissed the action under rule 4(b)(i) without giving Ms. Gardiner an opportunity to respond. We now turn to the merits of the question and determine that service was proper. 2. Ms. Gardiner Waived Service of Process on the Estate of Mr. Vanderwerff in Her Capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate ¶ 28 Rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that in every action, a ―summons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint.‖ A petition for a marriage declaration ordinarily must be served on the putative spouse—in this case, Mr. Vanderwerff. Unfortunately, Mr. Vanderwerff was already deceased when Ms. Gardiner petitioned to have their relationship declared a marriage. Courts cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over individuals who have died.40 Instead, a party must ―obtain appointment of a personal representative to give a trial court personal jurisdiction over the estate‖ and then serve the personal representative.41 38 Id. 12(b)(5) & (h). 39 This interpretation is in line with the federal rule that reads: ―If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time.‖ FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (emphasis added). 40 Berneau v. Martino, 2009 UT 87, ¶ 18, 223 P.3d 1128. 41 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also UTAH CODE § 75-3-602 (―Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the personal representative . . . .‖). 14 Cite as: 2014 UT 56 Opinion of the Court ¶ 29 At the time Ms. Gardiner filed the marriage petition, Mr. Francis had been appointed the special administrator of Mr. Vanderwerff’s estate, and Ms. Gardiner was aware of that appointment. Ms. Gardiner did not serve the petition upon Mr. Francis—though she should have. Nevertheless, Mr. Francis had actual knowledge of the marriage petition, and attempted to intervene both in his individual capacity and in his capacity as the estate’s special administrator. In addition to his motion to intervene, Mr. Francis filed a memorandum objecting to Ms. Gardiner’s marriage petition—and at no point raised a challenge to the sufficiency of service. The court never ruled on Mr. Francis’s motion, however, because it was never submitted for decision. Then one month before the adjudication of the marriage, and within 120 days from the filing of the marriage petition, Mr. Francis stipulated to his own removal as special administrator and Ms. Gardiner’s appointment as personal representative of the estate. ¶ 30 As a result, at that point in the marriage case, Ms. Gardiner, as personal representative of the estate, would have been required to serve herself with her own marriage petition.42 The Cousins argue that this apparent conflict invites fraud and creates a nonadversarial proceeding, and is thus against sound public policy. They also argue that Ms. Gardiner’s conduct violated her fiduciary duties as personal representative. ¶ 31 While we recognize the Cousins’ public policy concerns, we note that being a personal representative and a potential beneficiary of a will does not create a per se conflict of interest that constitutes fraud. 43 Generally, for there to be a serious 42 UTAH CODE § 75-3-602 (―By accepting appointment, a personal representative submits personally to the jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to the personal representative . . . .‖); see also id. § 75-3-608 (indicating that a personal representative whose appointment has not been terminated has the ―authority to represent the estate in any pending or future proceeding‖). 43 Farnsworth v. Hatch, 151 P. 537, 541 (Utah 1915) (―[A] person may not be disqualified merely because he claims property which is also claimed by the estate.‖). 15 GARDINER v. VANDERWERFF Opinion of the Court conflict of interest that would justify removal, the personal representative must commit some negligent act or mismanagement of the estate that leads the heirs to sue. 44 Regardless, whether Ms. Gardiner breached her fiduciary duties as personal representative of Mr. Vanderwerff’s estate is not the issue before us—the Cousins did not directly bring this claim—and therefore we must simply determine whether service was proper.45 ¶ 32 An alleged breach of fiduciary duty does not render otherwise proper service invalid—it is an independent claim.46 The rules required Ms. Gardiner to effectuate service or a waiver of service on the estate of Mr. Vanderwerff by serving the 44 Id. (―But when the claims of the representative are resisted by the estate, and litigation ensues, then the interests between the estate and the representative may become so conflicting and so serious that it is no longer proper for the representative to remain in office.‖); In re Bogert’s Estate, 290 P. 947, 949 (Utah 1930) (explaining that personal representative was properly removed where ―she turned over to her then attorney certain Liberty bonds of the value of $1,500 . . . and that owing to her incompetency, negligence, and carelessness the attorney kept $500 thereof which he has failed to return and . . . . she is incompetent to act as executrix of the estate, and has neglected, mismanaged, and wasted the assets of the estate‖). 45 We note that under the Utah Uniform Probate Code, with some exceptions, ―any transaction which is affected by a substantial conflict of interest on the part of the personal representative, is voidable by any person interested in the estate.‖ UTAH CODE § 75-3-712. However, because the Cousins did not bring a claim under this statute or argue it on appeal, we do not address it, nor will we analyze any related questions, such as whether a petition for a declaration of unsolemnized marriage under Utah Code section 30-1-4.5(1) falls within the definition of a ―transaction‖ for purposes of this provision of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 46 See Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ¶ 35, 57 P.3d 997 (―In Utah, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is an independent tort . . . .‖). 16 Cite as: 2014 UT 56 Opinion of the Court personal representative of the estate.47 Ms. Gardiner, acting in her capacity as personal representative, waived such service within 120 days of the filing of her petition. Therefore, Ms. Gardiner satisfied rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the court erred when it dismissed her petition for insufficient service of process. ¶ 33 The district court erred when it dismissed the action on its own initiative under rule 4(b)(i) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure without notice to Ms. Gardiner and without affording her the opportunity to object—and the court erred because service was in fact proper. Because Mr. Vanderwerff was deceased at the time of the petition, Ms. Gardiner was required to effectuate service of process on—or obtain a waiver of service from—his estate. Ms. Gardiner waived service on the estate in her capacity as personal representative before the expiration of 120 days from the filing of the marriage petition, and therefore service was valid.