Opinion ID: 777951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of the Holding in St. Cyr

Text: 8 In St. Cyr, Enrico St. Cyr, a citizen of Haiti who was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident but subsequently found removable for criminal conduct, sought habeas review of a final order of removal entered against him. 533 U.S. at 293, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The INS argued, however, that certain amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., had stripped the federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction, viz., § 401 of AEDPA 2 and three sections of the IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(1), 3 1252(a)(2)(C), 4 and 1252(b)(9). 5 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271. 9 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. It began with the proposition that [f]or the INS to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (footnote omitted). While the principal dissent suggested that IIRIRA had unambiguously repealed habeas jurisdiction [i]n categorical terms that admit of no exception, id. at 327, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the majority based its conclusion to the contrary in part on case law holding that [i]n the immigration context, `judicial review' and `habeas corpus' have historically distinct meanings, id. at 311, 121 S.Ct. 2271; and on the observation that the IIRIRA amendments refer to judicial review, not habeas corpus, id. at 312-14, 121 S.Ct. 2271; see also id. at 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Implications from statutory text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal.) (citing Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105, 19 L.Ed. 332 (1869)). The majority also emphasized that contrary to Justice Scalia's contention, see id. at 329, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (Scalia, J., dissenting), § 401 of AEDPA repealed only the specific habeas provision — i.e., 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1994)—that Congress enacted in 1961 as one of a number of amendments to the INA, see id. at 309-10, 121 S.Ct. 2271; and its repeal cannot be sufficient to eliminate what it did not originally grant — namely, habeas jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, id. at 310, 121 S.Ct. 2271. 10 The Court then observed that [i]n this case, the plain statement rule draws additional reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction, id. at 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271, in particular, the rule against constructions that raise constitutional doubts, see id. at 305, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Because Congress's 1996 amendments to the INA foreclose all other avenues of review for criminal aliens, a serious Suspension Clause issue would be presented if [the Court] were to accept the INS's submission that the 1996 statutes have withdrawn [habeas jurisdiction] from federal judges and provided no adequate substitute for its exercise. Id. Emphasizing the historical use of habeas corpus jurisdiction as a means for aliens to challenge adverse executive action, the Court concluded that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. Id. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271. 11 In St. Cyr, the Court construed the relevant provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA in the context of a habeas corpus petition filed by a criminal alien. Because collateral review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 offered St. Cyr his sole avenue of review, implied repeal of § 2241 would have raised constitutional doubts under the Suspension Clause. But Suspension Clause concerns, the Court wrote, simply reinforce[d] [its] reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement from Congress when Congress intends to repeal habeas jurisdiction. Id. at 305, 121 S.Ct. 2271. 12 Nothing in St. Cyr suggests that its holding — in substance, an extended exercise in statutory construction — applies only to criminal aliens. Indeed, as the Third Circuit, faced with the precise issue before us, aptly observed: 13 The INS argues ... that although the relevant provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA do not evince a congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction for criminal deportees, they do evince such an intent for non-criminal aliens. That argument borders on the nonsensical. The Supreme Court has held that those provisions have a particular meaning, and that meaning does not indicate a congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. It simply cannot be that the meaning will change depending on the background or pedigree of the petitioner. 14 Chmakov, 266 F.3d at 215. We agree. The Court's decision in St. Cyr does not suggest, expressly or implicitly, that its holding that Congress did not repeal § 2241 by any provision of AEDPA or IIRIRA applies only to criminal aliens. 15 We cannot accept the grounds for distinguishing St. Cyr urged by Judge Roth in her dissent in Chmakov. To be sure, the Supreme Court considered in some detail the potential Suspension Clause concerns that would arise from construing AEDPA and IIRIRA to effect an implied repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, thereby leaving criminal aliens without any avenue of judicial review. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299-305, 121 S.Ct. 2271. Unlike criminal aliens, non-criminal aliens can appeal an adverse decision of the BIA directly to the federal courts of appeals, mitigating the Suspension Clause concerns present in St. Cyr. See Chmakov, 266 F.3d at 214. The dissent in Chmakov seized upon this distinction to argue that in St. Cyr, the clear statement requirement [wa]s a consideration at most secondary to the forum availability requirement, i.e., the desirability of avoiding the constitutional question that would be raised were no alternative forum available to a criminal alien. Chmakov, 266 F.3d at 217 (Roth, J., dissenting). But the St. Cyr Court referred repeatedly to the forum availability requirement as reinforcing the plain statement rule. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (observing that the plain statement rule draws additional reinforcement from other canons of statutory construction) (emphasis added); id. at 305, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (The necessity of resolving such a serious and difficult constitutional issue — and the desirability of avoiding that necessity — simply reinforce the reasons for requiring a clear and unambiguous statement of congressional intent.) (emphasis added). In any event, whatever the proper weight to be assigned to the various arguments marshaled in support of the Court's decision, St. Cyr held as a matter of statutory construction that habeas jurisdiction under § 2241 was not repealed by AEDPA and IIRIRA. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271. The Court's construction of those statutes, which does not distinguish, expressly or implicitly, between criminal and non-criminal aliens, compels our conclusion. 16 We therefore join the Third Circuit in holding that Congress has preserved the right to habeas review for both criminal and non-criminal aliens. Chmakov, 266 F.3d at 215. 6