Opinion ID: 1965580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Discovery of Harm Done

Text: The plaintiffs also assert that § 9-1-51, another statutory tolling provision, is applicable to the case at hand. [17] We disagree. They assert that the statute of limitations should be tolled from the June 7, 1982 assault until December 1993, when she learned that Dunn had been involved in other relationships and thus was a fraud who did not possess the power of God. We have previously held, however, that § 9-1-51 has no application to claims made against nonperpetrAtor-defendants. Kelly, 678 A.2d at 877. Indeed, as this Court explicitly stated in that case: We perceive no persuasive policy considerations that the General Assembly failed to consider when enacting § 9-1-51 that would support judicial application of a discovery rule to claims made against nonperpetrator-defendants. If a plaintiff seeks to toll the running of § 9-1-14(b) in a sexual molestation action asserted against a nonperpetrator, he or she must do so pursuant to § 9-1-19   . [18] Kelly, 678 A.2d at 878. Moreover, the discovery rule that is set forth in § 9-1-51 does not retroactively apply to revive claims previously barred under the three-year statute of limitations as of July 25, 1993, the effective date of the legislation. See Kelly, 678 A.2d at 882-83; see also Kelly, 187 F.3d at 196. As stated above, the Ryans' claims were already time-barred as of June 7, 1985; thus, even if § 9-1-51 were applicable to their claims against the nonperpetrators, that statutory provision cannot act to revive their otherwise barred civil claims. Accordingly, we conclude that § 9-1-51 provides no relief for the instant plaintiffs. Even if § 9-1-51 were somehow applicable to the Ryaris' case, their claim would still be barred by the statute of limitations because we conclude that their stated reason for the delay in filing suit was not objectively reasonable. Generally, a statute of limitations begins to run at the time the injury occurs. See Kelly, 678 A.2d at 877. Pursuant to the statutory discovery rule, however, the applicable statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovers the injury or the injury-causing wrongful conduct. See Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I.2003). The reasonable diligence standard is based upon the perception of a reasonable person placed in circumstances similar to the plaintiffs, and also upon an objective assessment of whether such a person should have discovered that the defendants wrongful conduct had caused him or her to be injured. Martin v. Howard, 784 A.2d 291, 300 (R.I.2001); see also Kelly, 187 F.3d at 201. We are in full accord with the assessment of the motion justice in the instant case when he stated: [F]rom any objective vantage point, a reasonable person of twenty-one years of age would surely have known that Dunn's forced sexual actions constituted actionable, wrongful conduct. At the time of the June 7, 1982 assault Ms. Ryan was twenty-one years old. She testified that at the time of the assault she was afraid and that Dunn was hurting her. She further testified that she tried to prevent Dunn's actions by closing her legs and pushing against his chest. We conclude that the evidence establishes overwhelmingly that Ms. Ryan should have known prior to June 7, 1985 that she was sexually assaulted by Dunn. See, e.g., Doe v. Creighton, 439 Mass. 281, 786 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 (2003) (stating that the plaintiffs failure to grasp the connection between her symptoms and the defendants conduct was not objectively reasonable); K.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, 538 N.W.2d 152, 157 (Minn.Ct. App.1995) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of her status as the victim of sexual abuse or of the causal connection between abuse and injury); ABC v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 513 N.W.2d 482, 487 (Minn.Ct. App.1994) (rejecting the contention that the plaintiffs subjective inability to, comprehend the abusive situation tolled the statute of limitations); see also Roe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul and Minneapolis, 518 N.W.2d 629, 631-32 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994); E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 424 Pa.Super. 449, 622 A.2d 1388, 1394 (1993). C