Opinion ID: 1059140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Pre-trial Motions

Text: On April 25, 2002, Powell filed a motion to have Virginia's statutory scheme for charging a capital crime and imposing a death sentence declared unconstitutional on various grounds. On appeal, Powell reasserts only some of these arguments and does so only in summary fashion. Accordingly, we will not summarize those arguments in detail here, but will address them within the discussion of the relevant assignment of error, infra. On April 26, 2002, Powell filed a motion seeking to have the Commonwealth's Attorney's office disqualified from prosecuting his case. Powell contended that the Commonwealth's Attorney had a conflict of interest because he was a key chain of custody witness with respect to his receipt of Powell's October 21, 2001 letter confession to the attempted rape of Stacey. Powell further contended that the offensive nature of that letter and his other conduct toward the Commonwealth's Attorney had created such a level of animosity that the Commonwealth's Attorney would not be able to objectively pursue justice, but would instead seek to satisfy a personal vendetta against Powell. Powell further contended that this taint of bias extended to every attorney in the Commonwealth's Attorney's office, and further asserted that these attorneys would be potential witnesses called to give testimony concerning the Commonwealth's Attorney's personal animus against Powell. [4] On May 1, 2002, the Commonwealth filed responses to Powell's motions to have Virginia's statutory scheme for charging a capital crime and imposing a death sentence declared unconstitutional and to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney's office. With respect to the former, the Commonwealth asserted that all the issues raised therein had previously been considered and rejected by this Court, and there was no cause for the trial court to revisit them. As to the latter, the Commonwealth asserted that there was no evidence of bias on the part of the Commonwealth's Attorney or other members of his office and denied that there was any such bias, that the manner of establishing the chain of custody of Powell's letter was not the defense's concern, and that the questions of an appearance of impropriety should be raised through a disciplinary complaint proceeding. On May 6, 2002, in the same hearing in which the trial court heard argument of Powell's first motion to dismiss the indictment, the trial court also heard argument on Powell's motions to have Virginia's statutory scheme for charging a capital crime and imposing a death sentence declared unconstitutional and to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney's office from prosecuting the case. Following that hearing, the trial court entered an order overruling these motions without comment. On December 11, 2002, Powell filed a motion to exclude any evidence concerning his abduction, rape, and attempted murder of Kristie Reed from his trial. Powell contended that because he was charged only with the capital murder of Stacey Reed predicated on an attempted rape of her, evidence of his subsequent attack on Kristie was irrelevant or that any probative value it might have would be overborne by its unduly prejudicial effect on the jury. The Commonwealth did not file a response to this motion, but during oral argument in a hearing held December 23, 2002, the Commonwealth asserted that evidence concerning the attack on Kristie was part of a continuing criminal enterprise and was relevant to show Powell's motive and intent in attempting the rape of Stacey. Also on December 11, 2002, Powell, alleging that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) had called into question prior judgments of this Court concerning the issue, filed a motion seeking to have Code § 19.2-264.4(B) declared unconstitutional because it permits a jury to consider evidence relating to the future dangerousness and vileness aggravating factors without full protection of due process to the defendant to confront witnesses. Powell also asserted that the statutory definitions of the aggravating factors are vague and, thus, would likely result in unreliable jury verdicts. The Commonwealth filed a brief in response to this motion, asserting that the issue of the constitutionality of Code § 19.2-264.4(B) is settled law. On December 16, 2002, Powell filed a motion to suppress various statements he made to police during the initial investigation of the crimes. Powell alleged that after giving an initial statement following waiver of his Miranda rights, he advised police that he had nothing more to say. Thereafter, Powell contended, any statement he made to police without a readvisement and waiver of his Miranda rights should be suppressed. The Commonwealth responded that the suppression issue had been decided in Powell's first trial and, thus, the doctrine of res judicata barred consideration of the issue in his second trial. [5] Powell filed a supplemental motion on December 17, 2002 asserting that a statement taken by an investigator on November 2, 2001, while Powell was in prison following his first trial, should be suppressed because his counsel was not present. The Commonwealth responded that Powell had been advised of and waived his Miranda rights prior to giving this statement and that he was not entitled to counsel under the Sixth Amendment at that time because he had not yet been indicted for the offense for which he was then on trial, and the formal proceedings on the prior indictments had concluded. In summarizing its rulings on these motions during the December 23, 2002 hearing, the trial court stated that it found Powell had waived his Miranda rights with respect to the statement made after his first trial but prior to the bringing of the second indictment and, thus, the statement was not barred by either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments. The trial court also indicated that it would deny the motion to suppress the statements from the initial investigation of the crimes, incorporating by reference the finding made during the first trial with respect to those statements. The trial court further found that evidence of Powell's attack on Kristie was admissible as being part of a common scheme and to show consciousness of guilt. The trial court entered an omnibus order denying all these motions as well as the motion challenging the constitutionality of Code § 19.2-264.4(B).