Opinion ID: 1254151
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review for Substantive Reasonableness

Text: Because we conclude that Roller's and Young's sentences are procedurally reasonable, we must consider the substantive reasonableness of their sentences. Bolds, 511 F.3d at 581. This court has held that sentences that fall within the Guidelines are presumed to be reasonable. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 389-90. This presumption is rebuttable, but an appellate court should not overturn a sentence just because it believes that another sentence would be appropriate. Id.; see also Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Roller's and Young's sentences fall within the Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months and thus are rebuttably presumed to be substantively reasonable. Roller argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable for three reasons: (1) the district court failed to accord the proper weight to mitigating evidence under § 3553(a), (2) imposed a sentence that was greater than necessary, and (3) failed to avoid unwarranted sentencing similarities [sic] between the defendant and his codefendant's sentences or sentencing disparities with other defendants. Roller Br. at 55. Young joins Roller in the first two arguments, asserting that his sentence is greater than that necessary to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)(2) and does not adequately take account of [Young's] history and characteristics. Young Br. at 36. Because the district court sentenced Roller and Young within the Guidelines, their sentences are presumed reasonable. We conclude that Roller and Young have not rebutted this presumption. Roller and Young did present mitigating evidence in the form of numerous letters from family and community members. Although the district court did not conclude that a sentence reduction was appropriate based on these letters, it specifically considered the letters before imposing Roller's and Young's sentences. The district court also enumerated the specific evidence and the § 3553(a) factors that led it to believe that the sentences it imposed were appropriate. Given the deferential standard of review, we decline to reverse Roller's and Young's sentences. As to Roller's argument that his sentence was disproportionate when compared with Young's, we note that Roller and Young were sentenced within the same Guidelines range because the district court determined that Young's prior convictions did not increase his criminal history level for Guidelines purposes. [16] The district court specifically stated that because of these convictions, Young merited a higher sentence within that Guidelines range, and the district court sentenced Young to two additional years of incarceration and four additional years of supervised release. Given this explanation and the fact that the district court did not ignore the difference in prior criminal convictions, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence on Roller. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the sentences imposed by the district court.