Opinion ID: 390276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: oglesby's detention

Text: 31 The agents conceded that they lacked probable cause to arrest Oglesby when they first encountered him. The United States maintains that they had founded suspicion for an investigatory stop, 17 which ripened into probable cause for an arrest when the gun was discovered. 32 Oglesby contends that he was under arrest when the agents blocked his car and ordered him out, and that all evidence seized thereafter should be suppressed. He also contends that, even if he was not under arrest, there was no basis for an investigatory stop. 33
34 If the defendant was arrested without probable cause, there is no need to determine whether an investigatory stop would have been justified. United States v. Strickler, 490 F.2d 378, 380 (9th Cir. 1974); see United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, 516 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1975). 35 Whether an arrest has occurred depends on all of the surrounding circumstances, including the extent that freedom of movement is curtailed and the degree and type of force or authority used to effectuate the stop. United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d 1182, 1186 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted). The question is whether, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude he was under arrest. Id. 36 Among the considerations in determining whether an arrest has occurred, duration of detention is critically important. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 206-16, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2253-58, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262 at 1266 (9th Cir. 1980) (detention in police car for 20 minutes following a reasonable stop held improper). If, under the circumstances, an innocent person would reasonably expect to be released after brief questioning, we are less likely to find an arrest. See United States v. Harrington, 636 F.2d at 1186. 37 In United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980), we suggested a different emphasis. We stated that a primary consideration in determining whether an arrest has occurred is whether or not the defendant was free to choose between terminating or continuing the encounter with law enforcement officers. Id. at 755 (citations omitted). We concluded that the defendant was arrested when he answered a knock at the door of his home and confronted agents with guns drawn who took him into custody. Id. at 755-56. 38 In United States v. Strickler, we placed great weight on the fact that the defendant was not free to leave. 490 F.2d at 380. Strickler, like Oglesby, had been observed in an automobile near a home under surveillance in a drug investigation. Id. at 379. We concluded that the defendant was arrested at the outset of his encounter with the police because (t)he restriction of Strickler's 'liberty of movement' was complete when he was encircled by police and confronted with official orders made at gunpoint. Id. at 380. 18 39 Relying on Strickler, we held in United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979), that an arrest occurred when nine agents stopped a taxi carrying three suspects, even though, as in the present case, the agents had not drawn their guns. Id. at 500-01. 40 Oglesby contends that the Strickler line of cases forecloses any complete restriction of liberty, even for a short time, without probable cause. We disagree. Although our treatment of the issue has not been entirely free of ambiguity, Oglesby's position is contrary to our many decisions upholding stops that involve brief but complete restrictions of personal liberty and would defeat the purpose of the investigatory stop. 19 41 In Strickler, we indicated that the force used may have been excessive under the circumstances. See 490 F.2d at 380. In United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa, we again found that an arrest had occurred, but emphasized that the agents had pointed their guns at the suspects under circumstances not suggesting fears for their personal safety. 516 F.2d at 144. 42 Proscription of excessive force is merely the corollary to our holding that an officer attempting to make an investigatory detention may properly display some force when it becomes apparent that an individual will not otherwise comply with his request to stop. United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 1466, 55 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978). Accord, United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 924, 66 L.Ed.2d 842 (1981); United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 1118, 43 L.Ed.2d 393 (1975). 20 In such cases, the person stopped clearly is not free to go. See United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d at 1174. 21 43 In Beck, we acknowledged that a suspicious individual may be briefly stopped and detained for the purposes of limited inquiry and weapons frisk, or 'to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information'  598 F.2d at 500 (emphasis added) (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. at 1923; also citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). 44 We observed that the officers had followed the suspects for several days, essentially on a hunch, and had stopped them despite having failed to find any evidence of wrongdoing. 598 F.2d at 502. The stop was designed not to freeze the status quo, but to yield evidence of wrongdoing, resembling the detention for custodial interrogation held to be an arrest in Dunaway v. New York. See 442 U.S. at 206-16, 99 S.Ct. at 2253-58. Similarly, despite the broad language of United States v. Johnson, the initial detention in that case was clearly a prelude to custodial interrogation. See 626 F.2d at 754-56. 22 45 A valid stop is not transformed into an arrest merely because law enforcement agents momentarily restrict a person's freedom of movement. They may impose such a restriction to maintain the status quo while making an initial inquiry, provided the force displayed is not excessive under the circumstances. See United States v. Gomez, 642 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1981). A contrary result would leave agents powerless to perform their investigative functions without the cooperation of suspects. 23 46 Applying this standard, we have no difficulty characterizing the agents' initial encounter with Oglesby. Had he attempted to drive away after they approached him, they could have pursued him. See United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d at 524. The Constitution does not require them to have given him a head start. He was in the driver's seat with the motor running. Blocking the car was a reasonable precaution to ensure that the inquiry would not be terminated prematurely. 24 47 Ordering Oglesby from the car was also a reasonable precaution. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (officer may order driver out of car stopped for routine traffic violation). It would def(y) logic to permit the policeman to order a minor traffic violator out of the car for the policeman's safety but not allow him to exercise the same precaution when making a valid Terry stop of suspected narcotics traffickers. United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 at --, (D.C.Cir., 1981) (footnote omitted). 48 Although an innocent person in Oglesby's position might reasonably have believed he was not free to go, the force used was not excessive and the innocent person could not reasonably have assumed he was being taken into custody indefinitely. The stop was not an arrest. 49
50 The essential requirement for a valid investigatory stop is that it be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, -- U.S. --, --, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) (footnote and citations omitted). Based on all of the circumstances, the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. Id. (citations omitted). 25 51 Oglesby had dropped off Martinson, who entered a home under surveillance. He was at the wheel with the motor running, looking apprehensive. His brown station wagon matched the general description of an automobile earlier seen leaving another residence under surveillance in the same investigation, and agent Rowe informed agent Fitzgerald of this similarity after driving his car to block Oglesby's. The back of the car contained band instruments in plain view, and Fitzgerald had heard that the suspected source of drugs played in a band. 26 Under these circumstances, Oglesby's presence and appearance justified a brief stop to freeze the status quo while the agents inquired about his possible involvement in the activities being investigated. See United States v. Cortez, -- U.S. at --, 101 S.Ct. at 696. 52 Because Oglesby was properly stopped for investigation and properly arrested when probable cause appeared, his conviction must be affirmed. 27