Opinion ID: 2779015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Frankel’s Claims

Text: We now turn to the question whether Mr. Frankel was entitled to more attorney‟s fees than he received. We review the trial court‟s decision to deny fees for an abuse of discretion. Fraternal Order of Police, 52 A.3d at 833. A court “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.” Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 84 (D.C. 2006). 8 This standard is parallel to the federal definition that allows recovery when the plaintiff “obtain[s] relief through . . . a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant‟s claim is not insubstantial.” 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) (2012). 9 Whether the trial court ordered ODMPED to act or not, see footnote 3, supra, it is clear that ODMPED expanded its search as a result of discussions with Mr. Frankel and the judge in the trial court. 10 ODMPED does not argue that Mr. Frankel was not entitled to fees under the Fraternal Order of Police balancing test. See 52 A.3d at 827 (a party must be both “eligible” and “entitled” to fees to receive an award); see also footnote 4, supra. 12
Mr. Frankel argues that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that he was not entitled to attorney‟s fees for the time spent in connection with his Rule 11 motion.11 In general, a party can recover fees for work that is “„both useful and of a type ordinarily necessary to advance the . . . litigation‟ to the point where the party succeeded.” Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 561 (1986) (quoting Webb v. Bd. of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)). The trial court ruled that Mr. Frankel was not entitled to fees for “a motion his attorney never filed,” citing Cooper v. U. S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 24 F.3d 1414, 1417 (D.C. Cir. 1994). To the extent that the trial court understood this as a per se rule, it is inconsistent with the catalyst theory. Cooper involved time spent preparing a pleading for which leave to file was denied and there was no indication that the 11 ODMPED argues that Mr. Frankel waived this issue by failing to discuss it in his reply to ODMPED‟s opposition brief in the trial court or in his motion for reconsideration of the trial court order for attorney‟s fees. ODMPED points to no case law or court rule, however—and we are aware of none—suggesting that a party waives an issue by choosing not to address it in a reply brief or a motion for reconsideration. Mr. Frankel properly raised this issue in his application for attorney‟s fees by specifically requesting fees based on the hours spent preparing and conferring with opposing counsel on his Rule 11 motion. The trial court denied attorney‟s fees for those hours and Mr. Frankel appealed the issue to this court. As this issue was properly presented, we address the merits. 13 pleading had any effect on the proceedings. Id. Fees in that case may have been unwarranted, but when a party drafts a motion or pleading and sends that document to opposing counsel, who alters his behavior because of the document, attorney‟s fees are reasonable even if the document is never filed. See, e.g., Searles v. Van Bebber, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (D. Kan. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001) (awarding attorney‟s fees when party prepared a pleading, contacted opposing counsel, and reached a settlement making it unnecessary to file the pleading). This is especially true in the context of a Rule 11 motion because court rules prohibit a party from filing the motion until conferring with opposing counsel to resolve the situation. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 (c)(1)(A). As Mr. Frankel notes, the Rule 11 process works “as intended” when opposing counsel receives a Rule 11 motion and corrects the challenged document without the motion ever being filed in court. Here, the record shows that ODMPED filed a motion for summary judgment on May 21, 2010, and that, after Mr. Frankel contacted ODMPED by phone and email about a Rule 11 motion “based on misstatements of fact in the Plumridge Affidavit,” ODMPED filed a praecipe clarifying several statements in its motion regarding Ms. Plumridge. Mr. Frankel has produced sufficient evidence that his Rule 11 motion and its presentation to opposing counsel caused ODMPED to file a corrected praecipe, which was useful and necessary to advancing the litigation by 14 aiding the trial court in its consideration of the case. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 561.
Mr. Frankel argues that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that Mr. Frankel was not entitled to attorney‟s fees for the time spent in connection with his motion to strike the Plumridge affidavit. The trial court concluded that Mr. Frankel was not entitled to fees for “unsuccessful” claims. The central question, however, is whether the work was useful and necessary in advancing the litigation to its successful conclusion. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 561. Moreover, “[a] court should compensate the plaintiff for the time his attorney reasonably spent in achieving the favorable outcome, even if „the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention.‟” Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2214 (2011) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983)); Natural Motion by Sandra, Inc. v. District of Columbia Comm’n on Human Rights, 726 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 1999) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). Mr. Frankel objected to the Plumridge affidavit supporting ODMPED‟s motion for summary judgment because it was, among other things, “vague and ambiguous” and contained a “deficient” Vaughn index. In response, ODMPED filed a supplemental affidavit by Mary Margaret Plumridge, a new affidavit by 15 former ODMPED FOIA Officer Sean Madigan, and a new Vaughn index. Although the trial court then denied Mr. Frankel‟s motion to strike, the record establishes that Mr. Frankel‟s motion to strike resulted in ODMPED‟s decision to file these new affidavits and Vaughn index, which cured the problems Mr. Frankel had identified. The Madigan affidavit also contained new information that more accurately informed Mr. Frankel of the extent of ODMPED‟s prior searches, and once the trial court was made aware of this information, ODMPED expanded its search and produced additional records. So even though the motion to strike was denied, the motion was both useful and necessary for Mr. Frankel‟s successful result in this litigation.
Mr. Frankel also challenges the trial court‟s denial of attorney‟s fees for the time he spent responding to ODMPED‟s summary judgment motion and preparing his own cross-motion—a ruling based on the sole ground that the motion was not meritorious. As with the motion to strike, the relevant question is not whether the pleadings were successful but whether they were useful and necessary to advancing the litigation. At the outset, it is indisputable that Mr. Frankel‟s opposition brief was causally connected to the ultimate production of documents. Had Mr. Frankel 16 yielded to ODMPED‟s motion for summary judgment, the case would have closed and he would have been left without the documents he sought and ultimately received. Because Mr. Frankel‟s suit was the catalyst for ODMPED‟s production of documents, Mr. Frankel‟s opposition to ODMPED‟s motion for summary judgment was undoubtedly useful and necessary to advance the litigation to achieve that result, Del. Valley Citizens’ Council, 478 U.S. at 561, which did not occur until nearly a year later. And while we are less confident that Mr. Frankel‟s cross-motion for summary judgment was useful and necessary for his ultimate victory, where “the actual work performed by lawyers to develop the facts [or law] of both claims [is] closely intertwined, . . . [i]t is sometimes virtually impossible to determine how much time was devoted to one category or the other, and the incremental time required to pursue both claims rather than just one is likely to be small.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 448 (Burger, C.J., concurring); cf. Fox, 131 S. Ct. at 2214. We therefore conclude that the trial court should have awarded Mr. Frankel fees for the time spent preparing his opposition brief to ODMPED‟s summary judgment motion as well as his own cross-motion for summary judgment.