Opinion ID: 2242125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Errors at Post-Conviction Proceeding

Text: Before considering the allegations raised in defendant's post-conviction petition, we first consider defendant's contention that the trial court erred during the post-conviction proceeding when it failed to grant defendant's discovery request, improperly made certain factual and credibility determinations, and ruled that defendant was competent to proceed with the post-conviction process. Defendant maintains that the post-conviction court erred in denying his request for the discovery depositions from four witnesses who wrote out information after the incident at the request of one of the police officers, Sergeant DiMare. Defendant alleges that there exists a conflict between DiMare's trial testimony as to what he told the four witnesses to write down after the incident, an affidavit that DiMare prepared for the post-conviction proceeding, and the witnesses' own testimony. At trial, all four witnesses testified that DiMare gave them pencil and paper and requested that they write out notes about the incident. DiMare testified that he gave all of the witnesses pencils and paper so that they could write out notes about the incident. In an affidavit DiMare prepared for the post-conviction proceeding, he stated that the statements he received contained general information about the crime, which he incorporated into the police report. He further stated that the notes were destroyed once the police report was completed. Defendant argues the trial court should have ordered discovery depositions from the four witnesses in order to ascertain what their statements actually contained. Although neither the civil nor the criminal discovery rules apply to post-conviction proceedings, a circuit court nonetheless has inherent discretionary authority to order discovery in post-conviction proceedings. People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 183, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988); People v. Fair, 193 Ill.2d 256, 264, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500 (2000). A circuit court should allow discovery only if the moving party has demonstrated good cause for the discovery request. Fair, 193 Ill.2d at 264-65, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500. A discovery request will be denied where it amounts to a fishing expedition. People v. Enis, 194 Ill.2d 361, 415, 252 Ill.Dec. 427, 743 N.E.2d 1 (2000). A circuit court's denial of a request for discovery in a post-conviction proceeding will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Fair, 193 Ill.2d at 265, 250 Ill.Dec. 284, 738 N.E.2d 500. Upon review, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's discovery requests. Despite defendant's contention to the contrary, the conflict between DiMare's testimony and his affidavit is not apparent from the record. The witnesses testified that DiMare asked them to write down information about the incident and that he provided pencils and paper for them to do so. Similarly, DiMare testified that he told the witnesses to write down their names and addresses and if they had anything that they want to keep a note of they could. In his affidavit, DiMare stated, I asked the witnesses to write their names, addresses, telephone number, where they were in the store at the time of the shooting, and other such information, on a piece of paper. There is no inconsistency between these two statements, nor has defendant demonstrated that there existed a good cause for the trial court to order discovery depositions of the four witnesses. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request. Defendant next maintains that the circuit court incorrectly made findings of fact and determinations of credibility regarding Brady material and the testimony of LaGrone. We find defendant's argument as to both contentions unpersuasive. In his post-conviction petition, defendant argued that DiMare deliberately withheld statements that were given to him by four witnesses. Defendant argues that in reaching its determination to dismiss defendant's petition, the trial court made improper factual and credibility findings. The record shows, however, that the trial court simply restated the contents of DiMare's affidavit. We note that in restating the contents of the affidavit, the trial court incorrectly used the term res judicata instead of waiver. This error, however, is de minimis. It is clear from the trial court's order that the dismissal rested on the fact that the Brady violation could have been brought up on direct appeal and was, therefore, waived. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court did not make any factual or credibility determinations. Defendant further contends that the trial court made factual findings as to his allegation that LaGrone was instructed by the State to lie about her drug usage on the day of the arrest. The trial court noted that although defendant attached an affidavit from an investigator stating that LaGrone told him she was instructed to lie, defendant did not submit an affidavit from LaGrone herself. The trial court also noted that during the trial LaGrone was extensively cross-examined about her drug use. She denied that she used drugs on the day of her arrest but admitted that she was a drug user and was receiving treatment for her drug addition. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that defendant's allegations lacked legal sufficiency. Defendant's final argument concerns his competency to proceed with the post-conviction proceedings. The record shows that upon the State's request, the trial court made an initial determination of whether a bona fide doubt existed as to defendant's competency. See People v. Owens, 139 Ill.2d 351, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184 (1990). The trial judge decided the issue after hearing arguments from the defendant, defendant's post-conviction counsel and the prosecutor. The trial court concluded, This court listened to the petitioner at length and heard the various legal arguments he advanced as to why a psychiatric examination should not be ordered. This court also listened to petitioner's appointed counsel and arguments advanced by the assistant state's attorney. It is clear to this court that petitioner's condition had not deteriorated and that he is coherent and able to understand the proceedings. A defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, to plead, and to be sentenced. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). A defendant is also presumed to be fit at the time of post-conviction proceedings. Owens, 139 Ill.2d at 362, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184. When a bona fide doubt of a defendant's fitness to proceed with post-conviction proceedings is raised, the court may order a psychological evaluation of the defendant and consider the matter at an evidentiary hearing. Owens, 139 Ill.2d at 365, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184. Because the trial court is in the best position to observe a defendant's conduct, whether a bona fide doubt of fitness to proceed exists is a matter that lies within the discretion of that court. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill.2d 257, 269, 246 Ill.Dec. 642, 730 N.E.2d 1107 (2000). A defendant is considered unfit to proceed with the post-conviction process when, because of a mental condition, he cannot communicate his allegations of constitutional deprivations to counsel, thus frustrating his entitlement, under the Act, to a reasonable level of assistance. Johnson, 191 Ill.2d at 269, 246 Ill.Dec. 642, 730 N.E.2d 1107, citing Owens, 139 Ill.2d at 359-65, 151 Ill.Dec. 522, 564 N.E.2d 1184. If a defendant is competent to communicate allegations of constitutional violations to counsel, that defendant is competent to participate in post-conviction proceedings. Here, the circuit court found that no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness existed. In fact, the trial court noted that the differences between defendant and his post-conviction counsel centered around legal matters and procedures. This conflict about legal strategy does not rise to the level of mental incompetency on defendant's part. The trial court further found that defendant's mental condition had not deteriorated since the last court date and that defendant's post-conviction counsel was able to incorporate some of defendant's pro se arguments into the amended petition. All of these factors together demonstrate that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant was competent to proceed with the post-conviction proceedings.