Opinion ID: 166159
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rejection of Defendant's Plea

Text: 7 A district court's decision to reject a plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir.1995). 8 Defendant argues that he was prepared to admit his guilt at the change of plea hearing but that the district court, because of its misunderstanding of the applicable statute, mis-characterized Defendant's intended guilty plea either as an Alford plea or as a plea of nolo contendere. 2 In the alternative, Defendant argues that even if the district court properly characterized his plea as an Alford or nolo plea, the court abused its discretion by rejecting that plea pursuant to its policy against such pleas. We address each argument in turn. 9 A. Characterization of Defendant's Plea as an Alford Plea or a Plea of Nolo Contendere 10 Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), it is unlawful knowingly or intentionally to possess[] or distribute[] a listed chemical knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the listed chemical will be used to manufacture a controlled substance.... 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (emphasis added). At the change of plea hearing, the district court asked Defendant only whether he knew that the products he was selling would be used to manufacture methamphetamine and did not ask him whether he had reasonable cause to believe that the products would be used to manufacture methamphetamine. When Defendant denied that he knew that the products would be used to manufacture methamphetamine, the district court immediately rejected his plea, characterizing it as an Alford or nolo plea. 11 Defendant now argues that he was prepared to admit that he had reasonable cause to believe that the products he sold would be used to manufacture methamphetamine but that the district court, by prematurely terminating the plea colloquy, did not allow him to admit his guilt and thus mis-characterized his plea as an Alford or nolo plea. 12 In general, this court will not consider a theory on appeal not raised or ruled on below. See Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (10th Cir.1997). Defendant failed to object to the district court's rejection of his plea on the basis that the court, due to its premature termination of the plea colloquy, mis-characterized Defendant's plea as an Alford or nolo plea. To the contrary, Defendant expressly admitted that he intended to offer an Alford or nolo plea and objected only on the ground that the district court's general policy against such pleas was an abuse of the court's discretion. Specifically, in his written objection following the change of plea hearing Defendant said, Because the Defendant would not `admit' guilt but rather was only willing to accept punishment for the alleged crime, the court required him to try the matter. Accordingly, the district court had no notice of Defendant's current objection and was therefore unable to make a ruling or take corrective action based on that objection. 13 Attempting to avoid a finding of waiver, Defendant points out that at the beginning of the change of plea hearing he put the court on notice that he intended to admit guilt and that this notice should serve as an objection that preserves his argument for appeal. However, at the beginning of the change of plea hearing, the court instructed the parties that it would not accept a plea of nolo contendere, that Defendant would be required to admit guilt. Defense counsel responded that this would not be a problem. Thus Defendant's placing the court on notice that he intended to admit guilt does not remedy Defendant's failure to object to the district court's alleged misunderstanding of the later plea colloquy, which is the basis of Defendant's current objection. 14 Because Defendant failed to raise this issue below, we review the district court's action for plain error only. See United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir.2003). Under the plain error standard of review, we may exercise our discretion to reverse (1) error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). 15 Defendant has not demonstrated that the district court plainly erred in characterizing his plea as an Alford or nolo plea. Defendant acknowledged in his written objection that Defendant would not `admit' guilt but rather was only willing to accept punishment for the alleged crime, and then argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to accept any plea accompanied by a protestation of innocence. Defendant's objection demonstrates that he did not intend to admit his guilt regardless of the questions the district court asked him, but instead planned to offer an Alford or nolo plea. Accordingly, the district court did not plainly err in characterizing Defendant's plea as an Alford or nolo plea. 16 B. Rejection of Defendant's Alford Plea or Plea of Nolo Contendere 17 Defendant argues in the alternative that, even if the district court properly characterized Defendant's plea as an Alford or nolo plea, the district court abused its discretion by rejecting the plea pursuant to the court's general policy against such pleas. 18 The Supreme Court has held that a district court may accept a plea of guilty even if that plea is accompanied by protestations of innocence. In North Carolina v. Alford, the trial court accepted the defendant's guilty plea even though the defendant maintained his innocence as he offered the plea. See 400 U.S. 25, 28-29, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). The defendant then sought post-conviction relief on the basis that his plea was involuntary because he pled guilty only to avoid the death penalty. See id. at 29-30, 91 S.Ct. 160. The Supreme Court equated the plea offered by the defendant to a plea of nolo contendere, see id. at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, and held that when there is a strong factual basis for the plea, it is not unconstitutional for a court to accept a guilty plea despite the defendant's professed belief in his innocence, see id. at 38, 91 S.Ct. 160. 19 The Court noted that [o]ur holding does not mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead. Id. at 38 n. 11, 91 S.Ct. 160. The Court then stated that 20 [a] criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court, although the States may by statute or otherwise confer such a right. Likewise, the States may bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their innocence. 21 Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court further noted that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives federal district judges discretion to refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and stated that [w]e need not now delineate the scope of that discretion. Id. Accordingly, the question left open by Alford is whether the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure limit a district court's discretion to reject Alford or nolo pleas. 22 When a defendant offers an Alford plea (i.e., a guilty plea accompanied by protestations of innocence), the proper procedure is to treat the plea as a plea of nolo contendere. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee's note (1974). Rule 11 provides that a defendant may plead nolo contendere only with the court's consent. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(1). Before accepting a plea of nolo contendere, the court must consider the parties' views and the public interest in the effective administration of justice. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(3). 23 Rule 11 is silent with respect to what, if anything, the court must consider before rejecting a plea of nolo contendere. See id. According to the Advisory Committee: 24 The defendant who asserts his innocence while pleading guilty or nolo contendere is often difficult to deal with in a correctional setting, and it may therefore be preferable to resolve the issue of guilt or innocence at the trial stage rather than leaving that issue unresolved, thus complicating subsequent correctional decisions. The rule is intended to make clear that a judge may reject a plea of nolo contendere and require the defendant either to plead not guilty or to plead guilty under circumstances in which the judge is able to determine that the defendant is in fact guilty of the crime to which he is pleading guilty. 25 Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 advisory committee's note (1974). As this note demonstrates, the Advisory Committee recognized the difficulties inherent in the acceptance of nolo pleas 3 and appears to vest discretion in the district court to adopt a policy requiring a defendant either to admit guilt or to plead not guilty. See id. In short, Rule 11 appears to sanction, and perhaps even encourage, the policy employed by the district court in this case. 26 We have not yet taken a position on the issue presented in this case, but we have recognized the district court's broad discretion in determining whether to accept a plea of nolo contendere. In United States v. Soltow, 444 F.2d 59 (10th Cir.1971), the defendant wished to plead nolo contendere, but the district court said, If Mr. Soltow wants to change his plea, he may do so, but I'll not accept a nolo contendere plea. I see nothing unusual in this case from the hundreds of others that come through the Court all the time. Id. at 60-61 & n. 1 (quotations omitted). We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept that plea and requiring the defendant either to plead guilty or go to trial. See id. at 61. We noted that `[i]t is not necessary to decide whether a refusal to accept a plea of nolo contendere under certain circumstances may constitute an abuse of discretion. All the cases hold that the trial court is vested with a broad discretion in determining whether a plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted.' Id. (quoting Mason v. United States, 250 F.2d 704, 706 (10th Cir.1957)). 27 In United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.1995), we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a guilty plea when the defendant refused to admit the intent element of the crime. See id. at 1413-14. We noted that [a]lthough a defendant may in some circumstances plead guilty without admitting all the elements of the offense, see Alford, those circumstances are not presented here. Id. at 1414. Presumably, the circumstances to which we referred in Young included the existence of a strong factual basis for the plea. Nevertheless, we did not indicate in Young that a district court would abuse its discretion in rejecting an Alford plea even under such circumstances. See id. 28 Other courts of appeals have held that a district court may reject a plea of guilty or nolo contendere solely on the basis that the defendant refused to acknowledge his guilt. See United States v. Gomez-Gomez, 822 F.2d 1008, 1011 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Dorman, 496 F.2d 438, 440 (4th Cir.1974). In addition, although it did not decide the issue, the Seventh Circuit noted that it seems at least arguable that the acceptance of a nolo plea is so broadly a matter of discretion that a judge's adoption of a policy against such a plea is itself within his discretion.... United States v. Gratton, 525 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th Cir.1975). Cf. United States v. Cepeda Penes, 577 F.2d 754, 756 (1st Cir.1978) ([A]cceptance of a nolo plea is solely a matter of grace....). 29 Secondary sources also provide support for the proposition that a district court has discretion to reject Alford or nolo pleas based on a general policy against such pleas. According to Wright and Miller, the court is not required to accept a guilty plea from one who asserts he is innocent. 1A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 174, at 201-02 (3d ed.1999). It is discretionary with the court whether to accept the plea and it is wholly unlikely that refusal to accept the plea would be regarded as error on appeal. Id. § 177, at 294. According to the American Law Reports: 30 One of the most important characteristics of the plea of nolo contendere, which distinguishes it fundamentally from the plea of guilty to which it is so frequently linked by the courts, is that its acceptance by the court is not a matter of right of the defendant but is entirely within the discretion of the court. 31 All the later cases support the proposition that the plea of nolo contendere cannot be entered by the defendant as a matter of right but is pleadable only by leave of court, its acceptance by the court being entirely a matter of grace. 32 89 A.L.R.2d 540, § 14 (emphasis added). 33 Relying on the broad discretion that Rule 11 affords district courts in rejecting Alford and nolo pleas, we hold that a district court's adoption of a general policy against Alford or nolo pleas is permissible. In this case, then, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Defendant's plea pursuant to such a policy.