Opinion ID: 42576
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinion Evidence Regarding the Truth of a Government Witness

Text: 4 The defense sought to introduce the testimony of Michael Grimes regarding his opinion of Officer Ragsdale's veracity in federal prosecutions, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a). 1 In 1998, Michael Grimes, then an investigator for the United States Department of Justice Inspector General, investigated Officer Ragsdale. The investigation was prompted by Assistant United States Attorney Colleen Murphy expressing concern over her belief that Officer Ragsdale made representations to her that a certain defendant had cooperated when, in fact, he had not done so. 2 During his investigation, Grimes interviewed several witnesses (defense attorneys, police officers, and prosecutors) regarding their impression of Ragsdale. Grimes also had a couple of conversations with Ragsdale, which led Grimes to believe that Ragsdale was not being truthful because of his hand and eye movements, and because Ragsdale was being too nice to Grimes. After the investigation, which lasted about two moths, Grimes formed the opinion that Ragsdale was deceptive. However, Grimes recommended that no prosecution be filed based on insufficient evidence. The district court would not permit Grimes to testify as to his opinion. 5 Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 3 Rule 608 allows witnesses to present their opinion regarding an individual's character for truthfulness and imposes no prerequisite conditioned upon long acquaintance. However, this Court held in United States v. Dotson that Rule 608 does not abandon all limits on the reliability and relevance of opinion evidence. 4 Rather, if the court finds the witness lacks sufficient information to have formed a reliable opinion, the judge can exclude relying on Rules 403 and 602. 5 Further, the Court also stated that the opinion witness' testimony must comply with Rule 701, which provides, If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions of inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witnesses and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of [. . .] the determination of a fact in issue. 6 Therefore, the Dotson Court concluded that [a]n opinion, or indeed any form of testimony, without the underlying facts, may be excluded if it amounts to no more than a conclusory observation. 7 6 In deciding whether to allow Grimes' testimony, the district court carefully considered whether the testimony would satisfy the requirements of Rule 608. The record indicates that the district court repeatedly stated that it would allow such opinion testimony if a proper foundation was laid. In order to adequately decide the issue, the district court allowed Grimes to take the stand and be questioned by both sides out of the hearing of the jury. Following the direct examination, cross-examination, and re-direct of Mr. Grimes, the district court analyzed the present case in light of Dotson. The district court admitted that Grimes had gone further in his investigation than did the agents in Dotson whose testimony was excluded. 8 However, the district court also felt that Grimes' investigation had not gone so far as the investigation of the agent whose testimony was allowed in Dotson. 9 Ultimately, the district court found it to be a close question but concluded that an adequate foundation had not been laid for Mr. Grimes' opinion. 7 The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Grimes' opinion testimony. In coming to its decision, the district court applied the correct legal standard and analyzed the case in light of circuit precedent. As Dotson explains, the determination of whether a sufficient basis for opinion testimony has been demonstrated should be made by the trial court deliberately and in the exercise of considered discretion. 10 Here, the district court exercised sound consideration of Grimes' testimony. Though it was a close call, the fact that the district court may not have been in error in admitting the testimony does not mean that the court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony. In Dotson, this Court explained that it was not holding that a government agent's opinion of a witness's character may never be based exclusively on what the agent learned on an official investigation. 11 However, the Dotson Court also explained that the fact that one has conducted an investigation of the defendant, has known the defendant, or has had minimal contact with the defendant's witness is not a sufficiently reliable basis under Rules 608(a) and 701 for that witness, over objection, to put before the jury that they are liars. 12 Therefore, in the absence of a holding that directly decided whether testimony like Grimes' must be admitted, the district court used analogy to decide whether Grimes' opinion had a basis making it more than bare assertions. It was not an abuse of discretion to come to the considered decision that there was not an adequate foundation for Grimes' opinion.
8 Garza also argues that it was error for the district court to exclude the report containing Grimes' opinion as a party admission. Again, questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 13 According to Garza, the investigation report qualifies as an admissible party admission under Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) and 801(d)(2)(D) because, when he prepared the report, Grimes was employed by the Department of Justice, the entity prosecuting Garza. In pertinent part, Rule 801(d)(2) provides that an admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay if: 9 The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or . . . (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. 10 Garza's argument that the investigation report is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B) fails because the prosecution has never manifested an adoption of belief in the truth of Grimes' report. 11 Though it is not as well-settled in this Circuit's precedent, Garza should also fail in his argument that the investigation report is admissible under 801(d)(2)(D). Garza argues that Grimes prepared his report during the course and scope of his employment while acting as a government agent. Therefore, according to Garza, Grimes' report on Ragsdale is a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). However, other circuits have declined to extend Rule 801(d)(2)(D) to statements made by government agents, especially in criminal trials. 14 12 In United States v. Van Griffin, the Ninth Circuit explained, We do not say that every publication of every branch of government of the United States can be treated as a party admission by the United States under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). 15 In United States v. Prevatte, the Seventh Circuit noted that courts faced with this issue have refused to apply this provision to government employees testifying in criminal trials based on the rationale that no individual can bind the sovereign. 16 In this case, Grimes' investigation related to a different criminal case. The results of his investigation were never adopted by the Department of Justice, and no prosecution was recommended. It hardly seems within the spirit of Rule 801(d)(2)(D) to admit Grimes' opinion regarding Officer Ragsdale's veracity as an admission by the Government. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Grimes' report could not be attributed to the Government.