Opinion ID: 1988124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: substantive versus procedural legislation

Text: In Kratochvil's first assignment of error, he argues that § 60-509.01 is the statute applicable to his claim and that § 44-6413 is inapplicable because his cause of action accrued before the passage of the UUMICA. See § 44-6401 et seq. In turn, Kratochvil argues that because § 60-509.01 did not contain any reference to a limitation period, the general statute of limitations applying to written contracts, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-205 (Reissue 1995), should control. Under § 25-205, the statute of limitations would be 5 years from accrual of the cause of action and, consequently, Kratochvil's claim would have been timely filed. Kratochvil acknowledges that a change in a statute of limitations which only alters the procedural enforcement of those rights operates on all proceedings instituted after its passage, whether the rights accrued before or after that date. However, Kratochvil attempts to support his argument that § 44-6413(1)(e) should not be applied retrospectively to his claim by asserting that it is substantive legislation. Kratochvil argues that the UUMICA, as a whole, was substantive because it involved the enactment of rights, duties, and obligations never before available with regard to uninsured motorist benefits. Kratochvil reasons that because § 44-4613(1)(e) is merely a small portion of the UUMICA, it cannot be parsed out as separate legislation, and that, therefore, it is also substantive. In response, Motor Club contends that § 44-6413(1)(e) was merely a procedural legislative change and therefore applied to already accrued causes of action. Any claim that Kratochvil would have had against the uninsured motorist would have been a tort claim. Tort claims are governed by § 25-207, which requires that actions for injuries be brought within 4 years of accrual of the cause of action. Section 44-6413(1)(e) would, therefore, bar Kratochvil's claim because his cause of action would have been filed outside the statute of limitations on his tort claim against the uninsured motorist. Motor Club argues that it is common for legislative acts to affect multiple issues and that, accordingly, the only logical manner to judge whether a particular issue is substantive or procedural is to examine the effect of its application. Motor Club contends that § 44-6413 only affects the remedy whereby uninsured motorist coverage is obtained and should therefore be treated as procedural. To determine whether § 44-6413(1)(e) should be applied retrospectively to Kratochvil's claim, we must first determine whether § 44-6413(1)(e) is substantive or procedural. This is necessary because legislative acts affecting substantive matters operate only prospectively unless the legislative intent of retrospective operation is clear. See Proctor v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Cas., 248 Neb. 289, 534 N.W.2d 326 (1995). Contrary to Kratochvil's contention, the UUMICA, however, is not entirely new legislation. While the UUMICA involves some substantive changes in uninsured motorist law, much of the legislation incorporated into the UUMICA is a compilation of previously enacted legislation which has been modified into a more consistent version of the law regarding underinsured and uninsured motorists. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-571 et seq. (Reissue 1993) (Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act); Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 60-509.01 to 60-509.03 (Reissue 1993). Where a statute has been repealed and substantially reenacted with additions or changes, the additions or changes are treated as amendments effective from the time the new statute goes into effect. State v. Sundling, 248 Neb. 732, 538 N.W.2d 749 (1995); Dairyland Power Co-op. v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 696, 472 N.W.2d 363 (1991); Denver Wood Products Co. v. Frye, 202 Neb. 286, 275 N.W.2d 67 (1979). In this instance, § 44-6413(1)(e) is part of a statute that has been repealed and substantially reenacted. See § 60-582. Section 44-6413(1)(e) is therefore treated as an amendment to the uninsured motorist laws. While it is true that § 44-6413(1)(e) was enacted as part of the UUMICA, that in itself does not entitle it to substantive treatment. Kratochvil's assertion that we must look at the UUMICA as a whole and cannot parse its individual statutes for analysis is incorrect. We have often had to deal with new amendments to existing legislation in order to establish whether the amendment applied retroactively to the case in question. See, Behrens v. American Stores Packing Co., 228 Neb. 18, 421 N.W.2d 12 (1988); Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, 218 Neb. 652, 358 N.W.2d 211 (1984); Denver Wood Products Co., supra ; Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hospital, 191 Neb. 224, 214 N.W.2d 490 (1974). The critical question has always turned on whether the amendment was substantive or procedural, not whether the act or new legislation as a whole was substantive or procedural. Procedural amendments to statutes are ordinarily applicable to pending cases, while substantive amendments are not. See, Oviatt, supra; Haiar v. Kessler, 188 Neb. 312, 196 N.W.2d 380 (1972). Accordingly, § 44-6413(1)(e) must be evaluated independently to determine whether it is a substantive or procedural amendment in order to determine whether it is applicable to Kratochvil's claim. In Behrens, supra, we stated that a substantive right is one which creates a right or remedy that did not previously exist and which, but for the creation of the substantive right, would not entitle one to recover.... A procedural right, on the other hand, is considered to simply be the method by which an already existing right is exercised. 228 Neb. at 25, 421 N.W.2d at 17 (quoting Smith v. Fremont Contract Carriers, supra (Krivosha, C.J., concurring)). Moreover, laws prescribing the time within which particular rights may be enforced [generally] relate to remedies only and not substantive rights. Whitten v. Whitten, 250 Neb. 210, 212, 548 N.W.2d 338, 340 (1996). Accord Denver Wood Products Co., supra . Section 44-6413(1)(e) does not serve to create or change the right to a remedy for uninsured motorist benefits. Therefore, § 44-6413(1)(e) should not be considered a substantive right, but, rather, a procedural change that merely relates to the remedy. Section 44-6413(1)(e) limits the insured's remedy by limiting the insurer's liability to the period of time during which the insured still has a viable claim against the uninsured motorist. This in essence limits the insured to a torts limitation period for filing a claim on the policy. Statutes of limitations are defined as such legislative enactments as prescribe the periods within which actions may be brought upon certain claims or within which certain rights may be enforced. (Emphasis supplied.) Black's Law Dictionary 835 (5th ed.1979). Although § 44-4613 does not prescribe a specific time period in which an insured may bring an action on the policy, it does limit the time in which such a right may be enforced. We therefore determine that § 44-4613(1)(e) operates as a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are generally considered procedural, and legislative changes to limitation periods operate on all proceedings instituted after passage, whether the rights accrued before or after that date. See, e.g., Schendt v. Dewey, 246 Neb. 573, 520 N.W.2d 541 (1994); Cedars Corp. v. Swoboda, 210 Neb. 180, 313 N.W.2d 276 (1981); Grand Island School Dist. #2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603 (1979); Denver Wood Products Co., supra ; Educational Service Unit No. 3 v. Mammel, O., S., H. & S., Inc., 192 Neb. 431, 222 N.W.2d 125 (1974). As a legislative change of a procedural limitation period, § 44-6413(1)(e) operates on all proceedings instituted after its passage. Schendt, supra .