Opinion ID: 1795314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Abuse of Process Claim

Text: To establish a claim of abuse of process, Parker must prove: (1) the existence of an ulterior purpose; 2) a wrongful use of process, and 3) malice. C.C. & J., Inc. v. Hagood, 711 So.2d 947, 950 (Ala.1998). `[T]he [ulterior motive] must culminate in an actual abuse of the process by perverting it to a use to obtain a result which the process was not intended by law to effect ....' Dempsey v. Denman, 442 So.2d 63, 65 (Ala.1983) (quoting 72 C.J.S. Process § 120, pp. 1190-91 (1951))(emphasis added). ` If the action is confined to its regular and legitimate function in relation to the cause of action stated in the complaint there is no abuse ....' Dempsey, 442 So.2d at 65 (quoting 1 Am.Jur.2d Abuse of Process § 13 (1962)) (emphasis added). [The defendant] is not liable for abuse of process simply because it prosecuted [the plaintiff] with an ulterior purpose. [The plaintiff] was required to further show that [the defendant] wrongfully used the criminal process against [the plaintiff]. At the outset of this analysis, it would be helpful to note the difference between an abuse of process claim .... and a malicious prosecution claim. Malicious prosecution concerns the wrongful issuance of process; abuse of process concerns the wrongful use of process after it has been issued. . . . . ... Merely proceeding with a ... complaint and later agreeing to dismiss the charge cannot constitute a wrongful use because: `[ T]here is no liability where the defendant has done nothing other than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions .... [I]t is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal use of process itself, which constitutes the tort.' ... [The defendant] cannot be liable for an abuse of process claim unless [he] somehow acted outside the boundaries of legitimate procedure after the charge had been filed.  Hagood, 711 So.2d at 950-52 (citations omitted; some emphasis in original; and some emphasis added). When attempting to determine whether a plaintiff has proven malice in an abuse of process case, the focus is `not [on whether the defendant holds] ill will [against the plaintiff], or [is acting out of] spite, but rather, [whether] the [defendant] employed the process ... for an end not germane thereto, for achievement of a benefit totally extraneous to or of a result not within its legitimate scope[.]' Stuart M. Speiser et al., The American Law of Torts, § 28:34, at 218 (1991). Once the plaintiff establishes an ulterior purpose and a wrongful use of process, `malice is made to appear in the eyes of the law.' Clikos v. Long, 231 Ala. 424, 428, 165 So. 394, 397 (1936). ... [ M]alice in an abuse of process case involves not ill will or meanness, but the goal of achieving some result not properly achieved by the process undertaken. See Speiser, supra, § 28:34, at 218; see also Clikos, 231 Ala. at 428, 165 So. at 397. Shoney's, Inc. v. Barnett, 773 So.2d 1015, 1025 (Ala.Civ.App.1999) (emphasis added). We assume, for the purpose of analysis, that the evidence supports a finding of the first essential element of abuse of process, the existence of an ulterior purposethe purpose of driving Parker out of business. Even so, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of either of the two remaining essential elementsa wrongful use of the eviction process and the existence of malice. First, the record lacks proof of a wrongful use of the eviction process. Parker has not proved that Willis pursued the eviction action to obtain a result which the [eviction] process was not intended by law to effect. Dempsey, supra . The direct result Willis sought to achieve by filing the eviction action was the eviction of the month-to-month tenant who remained in possession of Willis's property in spite of Willis's demand for return of the property. Willis had an absolute right to evict his month-to-month tenant, and he confined [his eviction action] to its regular and legitimate function, even though he may have pursued the action with a bad motive. Dempsey, supra . Willis's choice of Parker as the defendant for the eviction action does not constitute wrongful use of process because, as already explained, when Willis filed his eviction action, he correctly regarded Parker as the tenant, and he promptly dismissed the suit against Parker upon Parker's showing him the assignment document naming Super Sav, Inc., as the assignee-lessee. Willis's merely proceeding [with the initial eviction action] and later agreeing to dismiss the charge cannot constitute wrongful use of process because [t]here is no liability where the defendant has done nothing other than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion. Hagood, supra . Second, Parker has not proven the essential element of malice. The record lacks substantial evidence that Willis pursued the eviction action against Parker for an end not germane to the eviction process. Shoney's, supra . The direct result Willis sought to achieve from the eviction actionthe eviction of his month-to-month tenantis germane to the eviction process and is a result properly achieved by the process undertaken. Shoney's, supra . Likewise, Willis did not pursue the eviction process to achieve an end the eviction process was not meant to achieve. Shoney's, supra . Malice cannot be inferred from Willis's ill will or bad intentions for pursuing the eviction action against Parker because the direct result Willis sought to achieve by his eviction action was eviction of his month-to-month tenanta result authorized and intended by the eviction law. Dempsey, supra . Finally, for two of the reasons explained in our discussion of the malicious prosecution claim, malice cannot be inferred from Willis's choice of Parker as the defendant. First, the choice was correct; and, second, any mistake in the choice was de minimis.