Opinion ID: 844212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Lorraine Ripple's Psychiatric Records

Text: During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ripple if she had any history of mental health treatment. She replied she had recently received treatment for trouble sleeping due to isolation. She also spoke of a long-term personal and professional relationship with a psychologist who was writing a book on prolonged isolation. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion to appoint a psychologist to examine Ripple for mental illness and requested access to Ripple's psychiatric, disciplinary, and drug treatment records. In support of the motion and request, defense counsel referred to Ripple's statements about her mental health treatment and her angry response to defense questions. He further asserted, on information and belief, that Ripple had displayed bizarre behavior while incarcerated, had at one time slashed her own throat, and had been placed on a suicide watch. He claimed that inmates reported Ripple fantasized about defendant. Defense counsel explained: All of the above combination of facts and circumstances are such that there is a grave concern by defendant that the mental health of the witness is significantly impaired. Her state of depression may well contribute to her flights of fantasy regarding the defendant. She may no longer have an ability to distinguish fantasy from reality. The trial court did not order the examination, but it ordered California's Department of Corrections to release Ripple's psychiatric records to the court. After reviewing the records in camera, the court explained it had balanced defendant's need for the records against Ripple's privacy rights and had determined the records contained nothing of particular value to the defense. The court read to the jury the only portion of the records it found relevant to defendant's argument that Ripple's credibility was affected by her mental health problems: `Ripple, Lorraine. Since inmate Ripple, W27065, is not suffering from a serious mental disorder, and since more than six months has elapsed since her previous self-destructive behavior, it is recommended that the Sharps restriction described in my chrono dated 5/28/96 be lifted. [¶] Although Ripple is perhaps a no greater than average risk of dangerousness to herself at this time, this does not mean that her dangerousness to others has declined.' Defendant does not dispute that the trial court properly reviewed the psychiatric records in camera. (See generally Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 58 [94 L.Ed.2d 40, 107 S.Ct. 989]; Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 320 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 94 S.Ct. 1105]; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 591-595 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224]; People v. Hammon (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1124 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 938 P.2d 986]; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 518 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779].) He claims, however, that the court erred by failing to disclose material he could have used to impeach Ripple, thereby violating his constitutional right to confrontation (U.S. Const., 6th & 14th Amends.). [7] (13) As an initial matter, whether defendant's arguments are properly directed at the right of confrontation is far from certain. `The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.' ( Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at pp. 315-316, italics omitted.) The high court has not decided if the right of confrontation embraces a right to discover information necessary to make cross-examination effective. That question arose in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. 39, but the justices did not reach a consensus. As we have since explained, after [ Ritchie ], `it is not at all clear whether or to what extent the confrontation or compulsory process clauses of the Sixth Amendment grant pretrial discovery rights to the accused.' ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 592.) Although defendant in this case did not seek discovery of the records until after trial had commenced, the uncertainty attending application of the confrontation right to discovery logically extends to his complaint that the trial court's failure to disclose Ripple's psychiatric records at trial deprived him of information he could use to cross-examine her. (14) We need not resolve the question here. Claims such as defendant's implicate the fundamental fairness of trials and are therefore subject to analysis under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 56; People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 451-453 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 732, 213 P.3d 77]; People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 592-593; People v. Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-1128; People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 517-518.) We have recognized that [w]hen a defendant proposes to impeach a critical prosecution witness with questions that call for privileged information, the trial court may be called upon ... to balance the defendant's need for cross-examination and the state policies the privilege is intended to serve. ( Hammon, at p. 1127.) In this context, the records should be disclosed if they are material. ( Martinez, at p. 453.) `[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A `reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ( Ibid. ) We also consider any adverse effect nondisclosure might have had on counsel's investigations and trial strategy. ( In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873, 887 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, 952 P.2d 715].) Nothing in Ripple's psychiatric records rises to this standard or implicates the preparation or presentation of defendant's case. Defendant could not have used the records to argue Ripple suffered from a mental health problem affecting her credibility. The records do not suggest Ripple suffered from delusions or hallucinations, nor do they contain any reports of cognitive difficulties or other problems that could have affected Ripple's ability to perceive, recall, or describe events, or her ability or willingness to tell the truth. Defendant cites references in the records to antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, but the terms are not defined and, even if in some contexts they might be used to describe traits relevant to credibility, the contexts in which they are used here generally refer to the difficulties Ripple was experiencing adjusting to prison life. [8] That Ripple was unhappy, difficult, and antisocial was clear from her trial testimony; an awareness that a prison psychiatrist had described her as antisocial and psychopathic could not have affected the jury's view of her credibility. Nor do the records show or suggest Ripple was in any way obsessed with defendant so as to support that defense theory. Defendant's chief argument has nothing to do with Ripple's mental health. He contends disclosure of the records would have allowed him to impeach Ripple by showing she was promised a significant benefit for testifying against him and was threatened with harsh consequences should she decline to testify. Defendant claims he could also have shown that both Ripple and Detective Tarpley were untruthful because each testified Ripple had received no benefit for her testimony, with the result the jury would have concluded Tarpley was either untruthful or incompetent, thus fatally undermining the prosecution's case. In support of this argument, defendant cites a paragraph in a May 1996 psychologist's evaluation. The evaluation includes the psychologist's report of Ripple's explanation of her reasons for an aggressive outburst at a meeting with the institutional classification committee. It recites that Ripple told him they had told her she could do what they wanted or she could rot in the secured housing unit, and they wanted her to testify against her `ex-old man' `[b]ecause I ran a lot with the Aryan Brotherhood gang members over the years and saw and know about a lot of killings. My ex-old man was an enforcer for the Chicago Crime Family, John Able [ sic ]. If they think I'm gonna tell them something that's gonna endanger my sons in prison they're nuts'.... `I got upset, I'll grant you that. They told me if I testified they'd transfer me south. What a deal huh? I can give them information that'll get my sons killed and trade that for being able to go to a prison down south where I can see my grandchildren.' Defendant also cites the handwritten notes of a psychologist on a master mental health treatment plan dated February 13, 1996: testify pressing to go to CIW, and under pressure from Orange County to testify against high rank leaders .... Defendant's argument presumes the trial court's responsibility to examine the records extended beyond determining if they supported his stated reasons for requesting them: that Ripple might have been diagnosed with a mental disorder affecting her credibility, or that the records might show she was obsessed with defendant. Thus, he now claims he is entitled to relief because the trial court did not also comb through the records searching for anything defendant might possibly use to impeach Ripple, or any other prosecution witness, on some other, unmentioned theory. Defendant cites no authority for that proposition, but even were he correct, the uncertain, speculative nature of his claims falls far short of establishing the records contain matter that, if disclosed, would have been material to his defense. Defendant's argument assumes Ripple was referring to pressure to testify against him in this trial, but if anything, the record suggests Ripple was not talking about this case. There is no evidence defendant was a high rank leader of any organization or that Ripple's asserted experience with the Aryan Brotherhood had anything to do with her testimony in this case. Ripple spoke at trial of her knowledge of many murders, some involving defendant and some involving other persons. She also spoke of providing information about other murders to Detective Mike Proctor, who was not involved in the investigation of this case, and she mentioned she had been approached by a number of other agencies which presumably were interested in obtaining information from her. Defendant's argument also assumes Ripple's response to the psychologist concerning her outburst accurately reported what others told her at the meeting, but there is no compelling reason why that should be true. Defendant assumes, without supporting evidence, that Ripple's decision to testify against him was motivated by the promises and threats she claimed to have received. But Ripple expressed disdain for the promised benefit and further told the psychologist: Well I stopped doing what men on the street wanted me to do before my arrest and I'm not going to do what those men want either. Defendant also assumes Ripple's reference to being transferred down south meant an offer of a permanent transfer to a preferred facility as opposed, for example, to a temporary transfer to put her in proximity to the court where she would testify. Finally, defendant assumes Ripple was indeed transferred down south as a result of her willingness to testify. But at most the record discloses Ripple was housed at CIW when called upon to testify in defendant's case. That Ripple had been offered a permanent transfer down south in return for her testimony in this case, or had been threatened with anything for failing to testify, is mere conjecture. Just as the records do not show Ripple received a benefit for testifying, they also do not show defendant could have used them to establish Ripple and Tarpley were untruthful. Even had the records provided evidence persons attending the institutional classification committee meeting had made threats and promises connected to this caseand they do notthe records are not inconsistent with anything Ripple or Tarpley testified to at trial. Both witnesses explained that Ripple had been offered housing at CIW if she testified. Ripple testified a district attorney investigator had told her that, if she agreed to testify, he'd ... put in a good word to have me transferred to [CIW for] the trial. Later she said the investigator had told her he thought he could have her moved to CIW for one year. The jury was also aware of Ripple's views of that offer; defense counsel read to the jury Ripple's written response: `You're offering me one year at C.I.W. and the rest of my life in the hole.' Detective Tarpley testified he told Ripple she would in all likelihood be called as a witness and might be housed at CIW, and an investigator told her that if she had concerns about her safety, that we could possibly house her at CIW, so [she] would not be in the same facility as Mr. Abel. The psychiatric records do not show either witness was lying. Nor did nondisclosure of the psychiatric records prevent defendant from learning that some kind of offer to transfer Ripple to CIW had been made, so as to foreclose defendant from investigating the matter further. Defendant argues he could have used the records to show Ripple had lied about her mental health because she did not report she had been diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder or psychopathy. But the records do not suggest Ripple was aware of the diagnosis or had any reason to know what the terms meant. Further, Ripple was not asked about her mental health; she was asked if she had been treated for mental health issues. The records do not show Ripple had received or was receiving any significant treatment related to her mental health or any treatment she might reasonably believe had any impact on her trial testimony. The records, therefore, did not provide a basis for impeaching Ripple's testimony about her treatment. Defendant also argues the records showed Ripple lied about her criminal history, because when recounting that history to the jury she did not mention all the criminal acts and acts of violence she had reported to mental health personnel. But Ripple's testimony reflects she was not in the least unwilling to talk about her criminal history, her use of weapons, or her violent lifestyle. That she did not mention every crime or violent act could not have affected the jury's view of her character or credibility. For similar reasons, defendant is not entitled to relief on the theory the records would have enabled him to show Ripple was manipulative and had little conscience. Both points were clearly established by Ripple's trial testimony. (15) In sum, defendant's arguments that the records were material are premised on speculation and conjecture, not actual information contained in the records. Neither his right of confrontation nor his right to due process was violated by their nondisclosure.