Opinion ID: 2616865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: claimed effect of repeal

Text: In the evening of May 10, 1971, the Governor of the State of Washington signed into law the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971 as chapter 67. Defendants contend, and the trial court held, the grand jury then in session ceased to exist upon the signing of the 1971 act, which contained an emergency clause. This contention is directly opposed to  State ex rel. Duvall v. City Council, 71 Wn.2d 462, 429 P.2d 235 (1967). RCW 1.12.020 provides: The provisions of a statute, so far as they are substantially the same as those of a statute existing at the time of their enactment, must be construed as continuations thereof. Respondents attempted to show greater differences between the 1971 act and the prior statute than existed between the old and new statutes in Duvall. We do not think the differences are sufficient to produce a different result. In Duvall, as here, there was no savings clause in the new act. [1] The principle announced in Duvall is adopted by the overwhelming weight of authority. Numerous cases are cited by the court in Duvall and no useful purpose would be served by repeating those citations. In Northern Pac. R.R. v. Ellison, 3 Wash. 225, 227, 28 P. 333 (1891), we said: We can readily see how a law can be continued in force by reenacting it, but we are unable to perceive how it can be repealed by that means. It may thus be transferred from one statute to another, but it is still the same law, and no rights can be affected merely by the change of position. In Kraus v. Philadelphia, 265 Pa. 425, 109 A. 226 (1919), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said in part: It is true that pending proceedings not fully consummated would normally fall with the repeal of the laws under which they were begun; but this result is not brought to pass where, as here, those laws are substantially reenacted by the repealing act itself. In such cases the proceedings may be continued and concluded under the new law, subject, of course, to such modifications as it provides. People v. Lowell, 250 Mich. 349, 230 N.W. 202 (1930), is an often cited case for the proposition that a prosecution started under an act which is amended during the pendency of the prosecution will fail. That case is not in point  for several reasons. Michigan at that time had no statute similar to RCW 1.12.020. The facts were quite different. Lowell was a prosecution for violation of the liquor laws of Michigan. The act involved was amended by act No. 114 of the Public Acts of 1929 to increase the penalty by doubling it from a fine of $1,000 and 1 year imprisonment to a fine of $2,000 and 2 years imprisonment. The rule of Lowell is not applicable to the facts herein, and further that rule is not followed in the majority of jurisdictions. An even stronger reason not to follow Lowell is that it violates good common sense and works against the interests of society, as was said by Butzel, J. in his masterful dissent from Lowell. [2] The existence and functioning of the grand jury in King County were well known in the state of Washington, and we cannot believe the legislature intended to void those proceedings. On the contrary it is far more likely the enactment of the 1971 law as a model grand jury act was intended by the legislature to aid the effectiveness of the grand jury process. It was intended to assist both pending investigations and all future investigations which might be undertaken anywhere in the state. Truly, indeed, to hold the King County grand jury ceased to exist in the evening hours of May 10, 1971, would be against good common sense and would be against the interests of society. It would be the kind of thing that causes the public at large to lose confidence in law. We do not so hold.