Opinion ID: 609813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement

Text: 12 Fagan contends that the district court erred by failing to enforce the plea agreement that had been placed on the record, and initially had been accepted, by Judge Pfaelzer in Case I. Under the terms of that agreement, Fagan was supposed to enter guilty pleas in both cases. Therefore, Fagan argues, the government breached its promise by failing to offer the plea agreement to Judge Tevrizian in Case II. We agree with Fagan's contention that the government reneged on its promise, but this conclusion does not resolve the issue he presents. We must determine what remedy exists for the government's breach of the plea agreement in light of the unusual procedural posture of this case. 4 13 Whether the district court is required to enforce a plea agreement is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (questions of law reviewed de novo), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). A plea agreement that has not been entered and accepted by the trial court does not bind the parties. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 2546-47, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1133 (3d Cir.1990) (a plea agreement is neither binding nor enforceable until it is accepted in open court), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1107, 111 S.Ct. 1015, 112 L.Ed.2d 1097 and --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1637, 113 L.Ed.2d 733 (1991). In contrast, once the district court accepts a guilty plea, absent fraud or breach of the plea agreement by the defendant, the court has no authority to vacate the guilty plea because of a government motion asserting that a mistake of fact (on [the government's] part) prevented the formation of a binding agreement. Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d at 633. If the government has breached a plea agreement by successfully moving to vacate a guilty plea that the district court had accepted, and the defendant has been convicted after a jury trial, [t]he appropriate remedy is to reinstate the guilty plea and remand for resentencing. Id. at 635 (citations omitted). 14 Here, the fact that a guilty plea had not been entered or accepted by Judge Tevrizian in Case II distinguishes this case from Partida-Parra; we cannot simply reinstate a guilty plea. See id. at 635 n. 7 (noting that the district court's acceptance of Partida-Parra's guilty plea distinguished his case from one in which the plea agreement had not yet been presented to the district court for acceptance and, in that sense, was unconsummated) (citing Government of Virgin Islands v. Scotland, 614 F.2d 360, 365 (3d Cir.1980)); see also Mabry, 467 U.S. at 507-08, 104 S.Ct. at 2546-47; Gonzalez, 918 F.2d at 1133. 15 Nevertheless, as of May 17, 1988, Fagan had entered and the district court had accepted a guilty plea in Case I. During the plea hearing before Judge Pfaelzer, the prosecutor stated: 16 [T]his plea agreement encompasses two cases. This is the first case. The second case is set before Judge Tevrizian ... and the agreement is that Mr. Fagan is going to also plead guilty in that case to the 845(A) [sic] count which I believe is count two and it is commonly known as the schoolyard statute. 17 May 17, 1988, Reporter's Transcript at 33. The government's subsequent discovery that its decision to enter into this plea agreement was based on a mistake of fact did not nullify the agreement or excuse the government from compliance with its terms. See Partida-Parra, 859 F.2d at 633-35. Therefore, the government was obligated to present the plea agreement to the district court in Case II, and the district court erred by failing to hold the government to its obligation under the plea agreement. See id. at 635; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, ... such promise must be fulfilled). 5 18 There exists the possibility that Judge Tevrizian would have rejected the plea agreement even if the government had presented it to him. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(2) & (4) (district court has discretion to reject a plea agreement reached by the parties). Despite this possibility, however, we are convinced that the government's failure to offer the plea agreement to Judge Tevrizian was prejudicial to Fagan; he was convicted of three felony charges instead of the single count contemplated by the plea agreement, and he was effectively precluded from a two-point decrease in his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of responsibility. 19 We conclude that Judge Tevrizian, armed with the knowledge that the government breached its obligation to present the plea agreement to him, should be given an opportunity to determine in the first instance an appropriate remedy. Although this list is not exhaustive and is intended only to provide guidance to the district court, we note that Judge Tevrizian may choose to effectuate the plea agreement, vacate one or more of Fagan's convictions, or modify his sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence imposed by the district court in Case II and remand for reconsideration of the plea agreement and resentencing. 6 20