Opinion ID: 719748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objectively Reasonable?

Text: 19 Next, we must turn back the judicial clock to 1993 and determine if the Arresting Officers' conduct was nonetheless objectively reasonable at that time. We conclude that it was not. At least since 1987, it has been clear that pretrial detainees, a set that includes arrestees, are entitled to reasonable medical care unless the failure to supply that care is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. 28 A pretrial detainee's specific right to medical attention has evolved over time from his general right to be free from punishment. Pretrial detainees, as distinguished from convicted prisoners, are those individuals who have been charged with a crime but who have yet to be tried on the charge. 29 20 We contrast pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners because the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment accords pretrial detainees rights not enjoyed by convicted inmates under the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 30 Specifically, while a sentenced inmate may be punished in any fashion not cruel and unusual, the due process clause forbids punishment of a person held in custody awaiting trial but not yet adjudged guilty of any crime. 31 This standard, applied to medical attention, entitles pretrial detainees to reasonable medical care unless the failure to supply it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. 32 21 The Arresting Officers have failed to present a legitimate governmental objective for denying Nerren medical attention. Moreover, Nerren has alleged facts presented sufficient summary judgment evidence from which a reasonable juror could find an expressed intent to punish: The Arresting Officers' statements implied that they were refusing medical attention to Nerren because he was not concerned about the other accident victims. From this a reasonable juror could conclude that Nerren was denied medical attention as punishment for fleeing the accident. It is inescapable that such a punishment could not be objectively reasonable conduct by the Arresting Officers because Nerren was not subject to any punishment. His punishment, nevertheless, came in the form of the denial of his constitutional right to medical attention. In sum, whether Nerren's allegations are analyzed under a pretrial detainee's more general right under Bell and Valencia to be free from punishment or his more specific right to medical attention announced in Jones and Hare, Nerren has stated a claim and the Arresting Officers' conduct was objectively unreasonable. We thus conclude that the district court's denial of the Arresting Officers' motion for summary judgment is correct. 22 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 23 AFFIRMED.