Opinion ID: 2607900
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Personal Access to the Courts

Text: (16a, 17a) Petitioner Harrell contends that his right of access to the courts has been unreasonably restricted by the application to him of certain regulations governing the use of the prison library. Thus, he points out that at various times he has been limited to one visit per week to the prison libarary, that he has been disciplined for talking with other inmates while in the legal section of the library, and that he has experienced difficulty in obtaining books which he has ordered from the state library. [15] Prison records attached as exhibits to the return to the order to show cause reveal that petitioner has indeed been disciplined on numerous occasions for persistent infractions of rules relating to use of the prison library. Among the activities for which such discipline has been imposed are: use of the library more frequently than regulations permit; [16] loud, boisterous, and defiant conduct while in the library causing disturbance and agitation of other inmates; [17] failure to return overdue books; [18] and an attempt to check out books when his privilege card had been suspended because of prior infractions. [19] (18) In In re Allison, supra, 66 Cal.2d 282 and In re Schoengarth, supra, 66 Cal.2d 295, we held that prison rules promulgated pursuant to constitutional and statutory authority (see Cal. Const., art. X, § 1; Pen. Code, §§ 5054, 5058) may properly regulate the use of prison legal facilities by inmates in a manner which does not unreasonably impede access to the courts by such inmates. (17b) The rules involved in this case whose application has allegedly impaired petitioner Harrell's access to the courts are manifestly reasonable. Moreover, they are responsive to the practical limitations of space, materials, and staff available, and to the necessity of maintaining control over a large number of prisoners confined within narrow bounds. ( In re Allison, supra, 66 Cal.2d 282, 291.) (16b) It does not appear that such rules have been applied to petitioner Harrell in a discriminatory manner or with a view to silencing his voice in the courts; rather, it appears that sanctions and limitations have been visited upon petitioner Harrell only because of his apparently adamant refusal to abide by reasonable regulations for the library applicable to the entire prison population. His access to the courts has not been unreasonably impeded. (19) Petitioners McKinney and Harrell contend that their right of access to the courts has been unreasonably restricted because the legal materials contained in the prison libraries at their respective institutions (Folsom and San Quentin) are inadequate to permit effective research. Several decisions of this court, as well as one frequently cited decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have indicated in positive terms that inmates in the state prison system have no legally enforceable rights to engage in legal research except insofar as such research is necessary to insure access to the courts. ( In re Schoengarth, supra, 66 Cal.2d 295, 305; In re Allison, supra, 66 Cal.2d 282, 289-290; In re Ferguson (1961) 55 Cal.2d 663, 677, fn. 1 [12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417]; In re Chessman (1955) 44 Cal.2d 1, 10 [279 P.2d 24]; Hatfield v. Bailleaux, supra, 290 F.2d 632, 640-641.) That standard, which conceptually begs the question asked of it, has nevertheless been applied to sustain former Director's Rule D 2602 forbidding mutual prisoner assistance ( Schoengarth ) and has operated to repel constitutional attack against various regulations effectively limiting prisoner access to legal materials ( Allison; Hatfield ). We cannot fail to recognize, however, that the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Avery heralds the advent of new principles governing the question of prisoner access to legal materials. Our recognition of this fact is concretized in preceding pages of this opinion wherein we have attempted to develop a flexible standard governing restrictions upon the right of mutual prisoner assistance. Moreover, we are cognizant that the principles of Johnson may, in a proper case, require a judicial assessment of the adequacy of prison libraries to permit legal research of a certain minimum degree of effectiveness. This court has itself recognized that some kind of access to legal materials is necessary to the preparation of any effective application for relief. [A]lthough [an application] should ordinarily be predicated on a full and honest statement of the facts which the inmate believes give rise to a remedy ( In re Chessman (1955) 44 Cal.2d 1, 10 [279 P.2d 24]; In re Swain (1949) 34 Cal.2d 300, 302, 304 [209 P.2d 793]), the relevance of certain facts may not be apparent to him until he has done some legal research on the point. ( In re Schoengarth, supra, 66 Cal.2d 295, 305.) We do not believe, however, that the records in the proceedings before us raise and expose the issue to the extent necessary for us to reach it. Petitioners are content to allege that the libraries at their institutions are insufficient to their needs; they make no effort to indicate the deficiencies which are the basis of their claim of constitutional insufficiency. Nothing has been presented as to the actual contents of the libraries in question. In these circumstances we think it wise to defer decision on the issue sought to be raised until a fuller record is before us. [20]