Opinion ID: 1157986
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Adherence To The Bail Schedule Was A Manifest Abuse Of Discretion.

Text: Petitioner also contends the trial judge abused her discretion by rigidly following the Bail Schedule. We agree and conclude that the use of the instant Bail Schedule is analogous to the use of the family court sentencing guidelines struck down by this court in State v. Nunes, 72 Haw. 521, 824 P.2d 837 (1992). In Nunes, the trial judge, after the defendant was convicted of abuse of a household member, imposed a sentence of thirty days in accordance with the guidelines set up by Family Court in household abuse cases.... Id., at 522-23, 824 P.2d at 838 (emphasis deleted). The guidelines referred to were promulgated by another family court judge for use by all family court judges. Id., at 523, 824 P.2d at 838. In striking down the sentencing guidelines, we held that where the legislature vested the trial courts with discretion to impose a sentence, rigidly adhering to sentencing guidelines promulgated without legislative authority was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 524, 824 P.2d at 839. If the family court believed that additional sentencing guidelines were necessary, we urged that the family court propose additional guidelines to the legislature for enactment to ensure that such guidelines received the scrutiny of the bar and the public. Like the trial judge in Nunes, the trial judge in the instant case had the discretion to reset bail for Petitioner when he appeared before her. By rigidly following the Bail Schedule, the trial judge substituted the Bail Schedule for the discretion vested in her by statute and, in doing so, abused her discretion. The prosecution contends that the Bail Schedule is distinguishable from the family court sentencing guidelines addressed in Nunes. The prosecution argues that, unlike the trial court in Nunes, the trial court in the instant case did not adhere inflexibly to the Bail Schedule. The prosecution further argues that Nunes did not prohibit the use of guidelines, but merely prohibited the inflexible adherence to such guidelines. Despite the prosecution's arguments, we believe that the family court sentencing guidelines in Nunes and the Bail Schedule are indistinguishable. Both were promulgated without legislative authority and were substituted for the exercise of the trial court's discretion. Although the prosecution argues that the trial court did not adhere inflexibly to the bail schedule, [6] we conclude that the Bail Schedule was utilized as a standard to set bail in lieu of the discretion accorded the bail setting authority by HRS § 804-9. It is clear that the trial court has the authority and discretion to reset bail for individual defendants appearing before it in each case. Thus, in the instant case, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to utilize the Bail Schedule as the standard by which to determine whether to grant Petitioner's request for reduction of bail.