Opinion ID: 1987135
Heading Depth: 1
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Heading: The Principles Underlying Ineffective-Assistance Claims.

Text: Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are generally based on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution, guaranteeing criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 691 (1984); State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 378 (Iowa 1998). Defendants have a right to effective counsel in postconviction proceedings as well. Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Iowa 1994) (noting that, although it is not a constitutional right, the statutory right to postconviction counsel implies a right to effective counsel). To prevail, Collins must prove that his counsel failed in an essential duty and that prejudice resulted. State v. McPhillips, 580 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Iowa 1998); see also Dunbar, 515 N.W.2d at 15 (competency standards are same for trial counsel and any subsequent counsel) (citing Schertz v. State, 380 N.W.2d 404, 412 (Iowa 1985)). Collins has the burden to show his counsel was ineffective by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Allen, 565 N.W.2d 333, 336 (Iowa 1997). In resolving an ineffective-assistance claim, [t]he ultimate test is whether under the entire record and totality of the circumstances counsel's performance was within the normal range of competency. Meier v. State, 337 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Iowa 1983). Improvident trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, or mistakes in judgment do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. Jones [v. State ], 479 N.W.2d [265,] 272 [(Iowa 1991)]. The petitioner must overcome a strong presumption of counsel's competence, and a postconviction applicant has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694-95 (1984); Jones, 479 N.W.2d at 272. Osborn, 573 N.W.2d at 922. To establish prejudice, Collins must show there is a `reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' [ State v. ] Bugely, 562 N.W.2d [173,] 178 [(Iowa 1997)] (quoting Gering v. State, 382 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Iowa 1986)). A `reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the defendant's trial. Id. (quoting State v. Kraus, 397 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Iowa 1986)). Our ultimate concern is with the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699. Id.