Opinion ID: 1925695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Adequacy of Nebraska's Remedies

Text: Because we have concluded that Nebraska courts cannot entertain a § 1983 claim challenging a state or local tax unless the state fails to provide an adequate legal remedy, the question becomes whether state law offers the appellants such a remedy. Courts measure the adequacy of a state remedy by procedural, not substantive criteria. Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 101 S.Ct. 1221, 67 L.Ed.2d 464 (1981). Thus, the state remedy need not be identical to section 1983 remedies.... It need not be the best remedy available ... the most convenient remedy... or equal to or comparable with federal remedies. (Citations omitted.) General Motors Corp., 143 N.J. at 348, 671 A.2d at 566. Rather, a state remedy is adequate if it provides the taxpayer with the opportunity for a `full hearing and judicial determination' at which [he or] she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax. Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 515 n. 19, 101 S.Ct. 1221. See, also, Kerr, supra; General Motors Corp., supra . Nebraska provides a taxpayer of a city of the first class at least two adequate methods for challenging a special tax assessment for street improvements. First, under § 16-637, a taxpayer can recover any part of a special tax that it believes to be illegal, inequitable, or unjust if it (1) pays the tax under protest before it becomes delinquent; (2) provides notice to the city treasurer that it intends to sue to recover the tax, giving enough detail to advise the city of the exact nature of the grievance; and (3) brings suit within 60 days of paying the tax and providing notice. A special tax assessment which violates the federal Constitution is illegal, and thus a claim that a special tax assessment violates the federal Constitution can be raised and adjudicated in § 16-637 claims. Further, that § 16-637 allows for only a refund and not injunctive or declaratory relief does not render it inadequate. National Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 587, 115 S.Ct. 2351, 132 L.Ed.2d 509 (1995) ([a]s long as state law provides a `clear and certain remedy,' ... the States may determine whether to provide predeprivation process (e.g., an injunction) or instead to afford postdeprivation relief (e.g., a refund)).  Nor does the relatively short timeframe within which the taxpayer has to determine whether to protest the tax and file suit render § 16-637 inadequate. This is so because individuals who wish to challenge the assessment of a state tax are immediately aware of the precise nature and amount of their injury on the date the assessment is rendered. Jade Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Crystal, 236 Conn. 701, 709-10, 674 A.2d 834, 838 (1996). In addition to the remedy provided by § 16-637, a taxpayer can challenge a special assessment for municipal improvements under Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 19-2422, 19-2423, and 19-2425 (Reissue 1997). See Reiser v. Hartzler, 213 Neb. 802, 331 N.W.2d 523 (1983). Under these sections, an owner of real property who feels aggrieved by the levy of a special assessment made by any city of the first or second class or village may appeal to district court the special assessment as to both validity and amount. See § 19-2422. The owner appealing the special assessment must (1) file a written notice of appeal with the city clerk within 10 days of the levy, (2) post a bond of $200, and (3) file a petition on appeal and transcript with the district court within 30 days of the levy of the special assessment. See §§ 19-2423 and 19-2425. Like with § 16-637, these statutes provide a taxpayer with a means by which his or her constitutional challenges to a special tax assessment can be fairly and fully adjudicated. Thus, Nebraska offers at least two adequate remedies for raising federal constitutional challenges to a special tax assessment for street improvements in cities of the first class. As a result, the district court could not entertain the appellants' § 1983 claims. In addition, because an adequate state remedy exists, no attorney fees were available to the appellants under § 1988(b). See, Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. City of Los Angeles, 79 Cal.App.4th 383, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 81 (2000); New England Legal Foundation v. Boston, 423 Mass. 602, 670 N.E.2d 152 (1996).