Opinion ID: 1712849
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admission of tony carr's testimony concerning the camry

Text: Prior to trial, the State filed a written notice of its intent to introduce evidence that Brooks and Brown had unlawfully used the Camry owned by Tony Carr. Shortly before jury selection commenced, Brown's counsel objected to the admission of such evidence, and the trial court ordered that the prosecutor not mention such factors during jury selection. Following jury selection, the trial court considered Carr's expected testimony that Brooks and Brown paid $50 for the use of the Camry on the day before Jenkins was shot and that the vehicle was not returned that night as agreed, but was found abandoned approximately one week later. After entertaining argument from all counsel, the court determined that Carr's expected testimony was relevant to placing the defendants with the Camry and to Carr's credibility, and, after weighing such testimony under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (1995), the court determined that such testimony would be admissible. The State presented Carr in its case and he testified that Brooks and Brown paid $50 for the use of his Camry on the day before Jenkins was shot. Thereafter, the vehicle was not returned that night as agreed but was found abandoned approximately one week later. See supra note 3. Neither counsel for Brooks or Brown renewed the prior objections to Carr's testimony, either before he took the stand or during his testimony, and both counsel proceeded to cross-examine him. Brooks now asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Carr to testify that the Camry was not returned as agreed but was found abandoned approximately one week later. The State argues that this claim was not preserved for appellate review and, even if properly preserved, such claim is without merit. We agree with the State. First, by not contemporaneously objecting to Carr's testimony when it was elicited during the State's case, the challenge regarding such testimony has been waived for appellate review. See, e.g., Pomeranz v. State, 703 So.2d 465, 470 (Fla.1997) (Failure to object to collateral crime evidence at the time it is introduced violates the contemporaneous objection rule and waives the issue for appellate review.); Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 566 (Fla.1988) (Even when a prior motion in limine has been denied, the failure to object at the time collateral crime evidence is introduced waives the issue for appellate review.). [15] Moreover, even if this challenge had been properly preserved for appellate review, we would find it to be without substantive merit. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 639 So.2d 966, 968-69 (Fla.1994). Therefore, we reject this claim as presented by Brooks.