Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: right to counsel under const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20

Text: We first address defendant's contention that Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20 entitles him to appointed counsel. As amended, art. 1, ง 20 provides, in part: In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right ... to have an appeal as a matter of right, except as provided by law an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court; and as provided by law, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. [Emphasis added.] We emphasize that, after the ratification of Proposal B, indigent defendants who plead guilty or nolo contendere are no longer entitled to appeal their convictions as a matter of right. Rather, they must apply for leave to appeal. Defendant contends that, when applying for leave to appeal, he is entitled to the appointment of counsel as reasonable assistance that is necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. A defendant, however, is entitled to reasonable assistance only when it is provided by law and the trial court so orders. As discussed below, we conclude that defendant has no right to appointed counsel under our state constitution because the appointment of appellate counsel for an indigent defendant applying for leave to appeal from a plea-based conviction was not provided by law at any relevant time in this case. In construing our constitution, this Court's object is to give effect to the intent of the people adopting it. Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 444 Mich. 579, 606, 513 N.W.2d 773 (1994). Hence, the primary source for ascertaining its meaning is to examine its plain meaning as understood by its ratifiers at the time of its adoption. Id. Since the 1972 amendment, art. 1, ง 20 has provided that a defendant is only entitled, as provided by law, and when the trial court so orders, to such reasonable assistance as is necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. Before the passage of Proposal B, however, no reason existed for this Court to construe the as provided by law language. Since guilty plea appeals were as of right, and the United States Constitution requires that the state provide counsel in a first appeal of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), this Court was never called upon to decide whether the appointment of appellate counsel in guilty plea appeals was provided by law. Because the ratification of Proposal B made guilty plea appeals discretionary, we must now consider that question. The drafters of the 1963 Constitution used the phrase provided by law in several provisions. See, e.g., Const. 1963, art. 6, งง 10, 15, 28. This Court has consistently construed the provided by law language as vesting authority to act in the Legislature. For example, Const. 1963, art. 6, ง 15 provides that the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the probate courts shall be provided by law. In Buback v. Governor, 380 Mich. 209, 226, 156 N.W.2d 549 (1968), this Court held that art. 6, ง 15 grants the Legislature the power to define the probate courts' jurisdiction and noted as follows regarding the meaning of the phrase provided by law in our constitution: The committee on style and drafting of the constitutional convention of 1961 made a distinction in the use of the words prescribed by law and the words provided by law. Where provided by law is used, it is intended that the legislature shall do the entire job of implementation. Where only the details were left to the legislature and not the overall planning, the committee used the words prescribed by law. See 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention of 1961, pp. 2673, 2674. [380 Mich. at 226, 156 N.W.2d 549.] See also In re Kasuba Estate, 401 Mich. 560, 566, 258 N.W.2d 731 (1977) ([t]he Constitution provides for statutory definition of the jurisdiction of probate courts and our power to make rules of practice and procedure cannot be used to expand that jurisdiction without legislative consent). The drafters also used the phrase provided by law in art. 6, ง 10: The jurisdiction of the court of appeals shall be provided by law and the practice and procedure therein shall be prescribed by rules of the supreme court. The plain language of this section clearly reveals that the phrase provided by law does not include this Court's rulemaking powers. Accordingly, this Court stated in People v. Cooke, 419 Mich. 420, 430, 355 N.W.2d 88 (1984), that [t]he Legislature, not this Court, has the power under the constitution to prescribe the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. Further, Const. 1963, art. 5, ง 29, provides, in part, that the Civil Rights Commission shall have other powers provided by law to carry out its purposes. In Beech Grove Investment Co. v. Civil Rights Comm., 380 Mich. 405, 419, 157 N.W.2d 213 (1968), Justice Adams, writing for a plurality of the Court, construed art. 5, ง 29 to afford the Legislature the task of granting such other powers to the Civil Rights Commission. Thus, this Court has consistently held that use of the phrase provided by law in our constitution contemplates legislative action. Where action by this Court pursuant to its rulemaking powers is contemplated, the constitution explicitly says so. See, e.g., Const. 1963, art. 6, งง 10, 30. The constitutional provision presently under consideration, art. 1, ง 20, provides that an accused has the right as provided by law, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. (Emphasis added.) Given the use of the phrase as provided by law in this section, our state constitution entitles defendant to the appointment of counsel only to the extent that such assistance is legislatively required. When defendant requested appointment of appellate counsel at state expense, the Legislature had not acted to provide appointed counsel for indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal from plea-based convictions. Since the Legislature had not acted, the appointment of counsel for defendant was not provided by law. Accordingly, Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20, does not afford defendant the right to appointed counsel. Defendant does not contend in this Court that 1999 PA 200 governs his case as his request for counsel occurred before the effective date of the act. Nor does defendant argue that, if the statute applied, he would satisfy any of the conditions for appointing counsel to pursue the application. Defendant's reliance on MCR 6.425(F)(1)(c) is likewise misplaced. When defendant requested counsel, the court rule provided: In a case involving a conviction following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the court should liberally grant the request [for appointed counsel] if it is filed within 42 days after sentencing. Under Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20, however, this Court lacked the authority to adopt MCR 6.425(F)(1)(c). The phrase provided by law permits action by the Legislature only. Accordingly, this Court could not use its rulemaking powers to provide for appointed appellate counsel in the absence of legislative action. [5] The Michigan Constitution does not afford indigent defendants seeking leave to appeal from plea-based convictions the right to appointed counsel absent legislative action.