Opinion ID: 603521
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pertinent Pennsylvania Caselaw

Text: 22 In the most recent case on this issue decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a trespasser jumped to her death from the roof of an apartment building. See Engel v. Friend's Hospital, 439 Pa. 559, 266 A.2d 685 (1970). The decedent's husband alleged that the landowner maintained a dangerous condition: 1) by not locking the door to the roof; 2) by not limiting access to the roof to tenants; and 3) by not fencing in the roof. Id., 266 A.2d at 686. He also alleged that his wife's trespass was foreseeable because the landowner knew that the roof had been the site of prior suicides and attempted suicides. Id. The court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint after concluding that the complaint failed to aver wilful or wanton negligence. Id., 266 A.2d at 687. It stated: Plaintiff was a trespasser who could recover only if defendant was guilty of willful or wanton negligence or misconduct. Id.; see also Costanza v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 276 Pa. 90, 119 A. 819, 820 (1923) (recognizing in dicta that a landowner would owe an adult trespasser no duty except that of refraining from willfully or wantonly inflicting injury from an electrical transformer maintained by the landowner). 23 We recognize that Engel was decided over twenty years ago. Nevertheless, more recent decisions of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania convince us that Engel's statement of the duty of care is still good law. Over ten years after Engel was decided, the Superior Court considered this issue. See Antonace v. Ferri Contracting Co., 320 Pa.Super. 519, 467 A.2d 833 (1983). In Antonace, a trespasser was killed while riding his dirt bike when he struck a steel cable that a landowner had strung across a roadway. The landowner did not dispute that it knew that dirt bikers frequently rode over its property. Id., 467 A.2d at 836. The court relied on Engel in concluding that the duty the landowner owed the trespasser was only to refrain from wilful or wanton misconduct even though a jury could conclude that [the landowner] knew that dirt bike riders such as the decedent were using the property. Id., 467 A.2d at 837. 24 More recently, the Superior Court expressly rejected the argument that a landowner owes a foreseeable adult trespasser a duty of reasonable care to prevent injuries from artificial conditions. See Graham v. Sky Haven Coal, Inc., 386 Pa.Super. 598, 563 A.2d 891, 896 n. 8 (1989), allocatur granted, 525 Pa. 600, 603, 575 A.2d 566, 568 (1990), appeal discontinued, June 27, 1990. In Graham, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that plaintiff was owed a duty of reasonable care as set forth in Section 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). 3 In rejecting plaintiff's argument, the Superior Court stated: Section 335 [has] not been adopted by [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and] it is contrary to the long recognized rule in this Commonwealth, i.e., that a plaintiff who is a trespasser can recover only if the defendant is guilty of wanton or wilful misconduct. Graham, 563 A.2d at 897 n. 8 (quoting Franc v. Pennsylvania R.R., 424 Pa. 99, 225 A.2d 528, 531 (1967) (Jones, J., dissenting)). 25 Although it might be expected that a court that arguably recognizes a heightened duty to foreseeable trespassers for activities would also recognize a heightened duty for artificial conditions, such is not always the case. Instead, [c]ourts are far readier to invoke the duty of care and the concept of negligence where they find active conduct than where they find a mere condition of the premises. Fowler V. Harper, et al., The Law of Torts § 27.6, at 188 (1986). Accordingly, Pennsylvania courts have traditionally been much more willing to hold a landowner liable to a trespasser for activities than for artificial conditions. See Laurence H. Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 Temp. L.Q. 32, 32 (1937) (discussing Pennsylvania law; [T]he liability of a possessor [of land] for harm caused by his active conduct on the land must be sharply distinguished from the liability arising out of conditions existing upon the land.); Note, Those Weasel Words--Wilful and Wanton, 92 U.Pa.L.Rev. 431, 435-36 (1944) (recognizing that a proper understanding of Pennsylvania law requires that one keep in mind ... the distinction between the liability arising from active conduct on land and that arising out of conditions upon the land). 26 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania expressly recognizes this same distinction between liability for activities as opposed to liability for artificial conditions in the closely analogous situation of gratuitous licensees. See Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515, 519 (1983) ([A]ppellant's injuries at most would seem to have resulted from 'existent conditions upon the premises' ... as opposed to 'any affirmative or active negligence on [the defendant's] part.' In such a case a possessor of land is not liable to a licensee in the absence of willful and wanton injury. (quoting Potter Title & Trust Co. v. Young, 367 Pa. 239, 80 A.2d 76, 79 (1951))).