Opinion ID: 2802574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Dr. Weingrad argues that there is nothing in the Third District’s onesentence affirmance that provides this Court with jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution. We disagree. Under article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida Constitution, this Court has jurisdiction to review a decision of a district court of appeal that “expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of [this Court] on the same question of law.” Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The decision -4- on review is not merely an unelaborated affirmance, but specifically relies on, and cites to, the decision in Miles I. Miles II, 103 So. 3d at 260 (“Finding no conflict between our prior opinion in [Miles I], and the Supreme Court’s opinion in [Spiewak], we affirm.”). In Miles I, the Third District held that: Although the injury in the present case occurred in 2003, prior to the effective date of the amendment of section 766.118, because Appellees did not file their notice of intent to initiate litigation, file their complaint, or obtain a judgment prior to the enactment of the statute, they had at most a “mere expectation” or a prospect that they might recover damages of an indeterminate amount at an unspecified date in the future. The Appellees had no vested right to a particular damage award and thus suffer no due process violation with the application of the caps statute to their cause of action. Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 416. Thus, Miles I and Miles II require that, in order to establish that a right vested before the statute became effective, a claimant bringing a personal injury action must have previously noticed his or her intent to bring such an action. Contrarily, in Raphael, the Fourth District held that a “cause of action in a medical malpractice case accrues at the time the malpractice incident occurs.” Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1157. Because a plaintiff has a vested right to this cause of action, and retroactive application of the noneconomic damages cap would impair this vested right, the Fourth District held that retroactive application was -5- impermissible. Id. at 1158. This conflict was recognized by the Third District. See Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 415. Because the Third and Fourth Districts have reached different conclusions on the same question of law, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve this important legal conflict regarding the requirements for bringing personal injury actions stemming from medical malpractice under Florida’s negligence law. Merits To resolve the issue before us, we necessarily address the conflict that exists between the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeal on this issue. In Raphael, the Fourth District concluded that the Legislature enacted section 766.118 with a clear intent to allow “the retroactive application of a new statute for ‘bad faith actions against insurers.’ ” Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1156.2 Relying on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, 61 (Fla. 1995), the district court posited that whether section 766.118(4) is “substantive or procedural in nature is [the] issue that [was] determinative of [the] case.” Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1156. Citing to Clausell v. Hobart Corp., 515 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1987), the Raphael court stated that when a cause of action has not accrued “no one has a vested right in the common law, which the Legislature may substantively change 2. The medical malpractice at issue in Raphael occurred on April 10, 2003. -6- prospectively.” Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1157. However, the Raphael court noted that the cause before it was reminiscent of the circumstances in Alamo Rent-A-Car v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994), in which this Court held that it is presumed that substantive statutes will not retrospectively apply to “impair or destroy existing rights.” Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1156. Thus, the Raphael court concluded that section 766.118(4) may not be “retroactively enforced to impair the appellant’s vested rights.” Id. at 1157. The court further concluded that “[t]he cause of action in a medical malpractice case accrues at the time the malpractice incident occurs.” Id. at 1157-58 (citing § 95.111(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002); Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Scherer, 558 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla. 1990)). Accordingly, the Fourth District reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its holding that the retroactive application of section 766.118(4) was an impairment of the appellant’s substantive rights which accrued and vested on a date prior to the effective date of the statute. Id. at 1158. After the Fourth District issued its decision in Raphael, the Third District reached the opposite conclusion. In Miles I, the Third District determined that because the statutory provision was substantive in nature, its analysis would turn on the questions of legislative intent and constitutionality. Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 410. Indeed, the Third District determined that the Legislature’s intent to apply -7- section 766.118 retroactively was clear and unambiguous. Id. Furthermore, the Third District specifically rejected Miles’ reliance on Raphael, which rejected retroactive application of a statute that lacked legislative language that provided for retroactive application. Id. at 410-11. The Third District acknowledged that precedent from this Court “has refused to apply the statute retroactively if it impairs vested rights, creates new obligations or imposes new penalties.” Id. at 411 (citing Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 61). The Third District concluded, however, that our decision in Clausell is controlling on the subject of whether retroactive application of a statute is constitutional. Id. Consequently, the Third District criticized the Raphael court for ignoring our holding in Clausell. Id. at 415. Accordingly, the Third District held: Although the injury in the present case occurred in 2003, prior to the effective date of the amendment of section 766.118, because Appellees did not file their notice of intent to initiate litigation, file their complaint, or obtain a judgment prior to the enactment of the statute, they had at most a “mere expectation” or a prospect that they might recover damages of an indeterminate amount at an unspecified date in the future. The Appellees had no vested right to a particular damage award and thus suffer no due process violation with the application of the caps statute to their cause of action. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying Dr. Weingrad’s motion to apply the statutory cap to the Appellees’ noneconomic damages. Id. at 416. Both the Third District and the Fourth District cited our decisions in Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condominium Association One, Inc., -8- 986 So. 2d 1279 (Fla. 2008), and Metropolitan Dade County v. Chase Federal Housing Corporation, 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999), as establishing the analysis necessary when courts must determine if a given statute may be retroactively applied. See Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 409 (“Determining whether a statute may be retroactively applied requires consideration of whether the statute expresses the intent for retrospective application and if so, whether the retroactive application is constitutional.”); Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1155 (same proposition). However, the Third District determined that our holding in Clausell is controlling on the subject of a litigant’s vested rights. Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 411. We find that the Third District misunderstood our holding in Clausell by stating that “the retroactive application of a statute did not violate due process because the plaintiff had no vested right.” Id. at 409. Instead, we determined that Clausell “had no vested right in his cause of action,” because the statute that predated his cause of action was temporarily invalidated by our decision in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980); however, the statute was subsequently reinstated when we receded from Battilla in Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985). Clausell, 515 So. 2d at 1276. Therefore, in Clausell, we were not addressing the retroactive application of a substantive statute that affected the litigant’s vested right in a cause of action. See Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 417 (Cope, J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion relies on -9- [Clausell], but that case is inapplicable. Clausell involved the retroactive application of a judicial decision, not the retroactive application of a statute.”). Thus, we necessarily agree with the conclusion drawn in Raphael that was premised on our precedent in Scherer, stating that “[t]he cause of action in a medical malpractice case accrues at the time the malpractice incident occurs.” Raphael, 18 So. 3d at 1157-58; cf. Spiewak, 73 So. 3d at 128. Therefore, we approve Raphael and disapprove the rationale in Miles I and quash the decision in Miles II. The facts in the present case show that Miles underwent the unnecessary surgical procedure in January 2003, which has been undisputedly adjudged as malpractice by Dr. Weingrad. Notably, section 766.118 became effective on September 15, 2003. Therefore, Miles’ cause of action accrued more than seven months before the “legislation capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions went into effect.” Miles I, 29 So. 3d at 408. Our precedent establishes that, generally, a litigant’s substantive and vested rights may not be infringed upon by the retroactive application of a substantive statute. Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 61 (“The general rule is that a substantive statute will not operate retrospectively absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, but that a procedural or remedial statute is to operate retrospectively. . . . Even when the Legislature does expressly state that a statute is to have retroactive application, this Court has - 10 - refused to apply a statute retroactively if the statute impairs vested rights, creates new obligations, or imposes new penalties.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, we quash the decision entered below.