Opinion ID: 3110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Record in Zhang's Case

Text: 27
28 Applying these principles to Zhang's case, we conclude that the IJ's adverse credibility finding, reiterated by the BIA, is supported by substantial evidence. Certainly, we cannot conclude that no reasonable fact-finder could have failed to credit his persecution claim. See Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d at 287. 29 As Zhang himself acknowledges, in assessing credibility, the IJ apparently excused numerous inconsistencies in the record that might be attributable to typographical or translation errors. 8 Nevertheless, he concluded that Zhang's repeated inconsistent statements at the exclusion hearing regarding the sterilization of his wife seriously undermine[d][his] truthfulness and credibility with respect to his persecution claim. IJ Decision at 8. 9 The BIA concurred that important discrepancies in Zhang's account are indicative of an overall lack of veracity on the part of the applicant. BIA Decision at 1. 10 30 The inconsistencies referenced by the BIA are apparent on the record. In response to questions posed on direct examination, Zhang testified that his wife was sterilized approximately one month after the birth of his second child, which would have dated the sterilization sometime in January 1993. At the same time, he stated that the date of sterilization was much later, on June 5, 1993. 31 Q. Aside from the fine [imposed after the birth of your second child], were there any other problems? 32 A. In addition to the monetary penalty, one month after the kid was — I mean, the baby was born, my wife was taken for sterilization. 33 Q. When was your wife taken for sterilization? 34 A. Around June the 5th, '93. 35 Q. Didn't you earlier state that your child was born December 13, 1992? 36 ... 37 A. Yeah, the second one is December 13th, '92. 38 Q. So your wife was not sterilized then one month afterwards, it was more like six months. Isn't that correct? 39 ... 40 A. No. 41 Q. When did they — when did you first find out that they wanted to sterilize your wife? 42 A. June the — June the 5th. 43 Hearing Tr. at 11-12. 44 Later on direct examination, in recounting the circumstances under which Chinese officials required his wife's sterilization, Zhang again testified in a way that suggested that the forcible procedure occurred relatively soon after the December 1992 birth of his second child. He stated that his wife was confronted by a number of Chinese officials not long after the — giving birth of the baby, but because her health was very weak, she asked for more time, and the officials refused, telling her, No, there's no[ ] choice. You have to go today. Id. at 16. 45 Zhang does not dispute that his wife's purported sterilization was critical to his asylum claim and that it was reasonable to expect him to recall the time and circumstances under which he learned of this event. Instead, he argues that his testimonial discrepancies are less indicative of his lack of credibility than of incompetent interpretation and his attorney's unfamiliarity with the case. This argument, however, is entirely speculative and without support in the record. In any event, Zhang must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony. Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d at 275. 46 In urging such a conclusion, Zhang asserts that the IJ acted too hastily in assuming that the cited inconsistencies evidenced a lack of credibility. The record is to the contrary. After counsel for both sides concluded their examination, the IJ endeavored to clarify the ambiguity created by Zhang's direct testimony regarding when his wife had purportedly been sterilized relative to when he claimed first to have learned of the event. Nevertheless, Zhang continued to provide inconsistent responses. He initially stated quite clearly that he spoke with his wife in February 1993, which would necessarily have placed the alleged sterilization before that date. 47 Q. And when you arrived here in January of '93, did you contact your wife? 48 A. Yes, I did. 49 Q. And when did you talk to her? 50 A. Yeah, around one month after my arrival in the United States. 51 Q. So sometime in February of '93? 52 A. Yes. 53 Q. Is that when she told you about this incident with the five — five or six government people coming to your wife's home? 54 A. Yes. 55 .... 56 Q. .... Now, you stated that you contacted your wife in February of 1993 after you arrived here in the United States. 57 A. Yes, in February. 58 Q. February of 1993, and this was about a month after you arrived in the United States? 59 A. Yes. 60 Hearing Tr. at 37-39. In response to further questioning, however, Zhang stated that his wife had not yet been sterilized at the time of the February conversation. He reiterated that the procedure occurred months later, on June 5, 1993. 61 Q. And you told me that [the February conversation was] when she told you about the sterilization. She had the birth of the child, and then the government took her for sterilization? 62 A. Oh, not yet. At that point, not yet. 63 Q. What happened not yet? 64 A. Oh, at that point when I call my wife, she was not taken for the sterilization yet. 65 Q. I see. When did — when did it happen? 66 A. Yeah, around June the 5th, '93. 67 Q. When did you find out? 68 A. After one month of my arrival in United States, I call back and I learn that the government has notify my family. 69 Q. So when were you notified that your wife was sterilized? When did you learn your wife was sterilized? 70 A. After she was sterilized, that's — when I call back, then I learn. 71 Id. at 39-40. When Zhang's counsel then asked his client to approximate the month and year when his wife initially told him of her sterilization, Zhang stated, for the first time, that their conversation took place sometime in July 1993. See id. at 40. 72 The cited inconsistencies were not the sort of minor and isolated discrepancies so plainly immaterial to a persecution claim that no reasonable fact-finder could use them as a basis for an adverse credibility ruling. Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d at 288. The purported sterilization of his wife was, presumably, an event of major importance to Zhang, not only to his persecution claim but also to his marriage. A fact-finder might reasonably expect him to have had a clear recollection of when and how he learned such distressing information. Thus, the fact that Zhang repeatedly testified that his wife told him of her sterilization in February 1993, while he otherwise dated the procedure months later, in June 1993, rendered his account of key events incoherent, raising legitimate concerns about his veracity. Moreover, without having seen Zhang testify, we cannot conclude that such concerns were necessarily dispelled by Zhang's belated claim that his wife first told him of her sterilization in July 1993. 73 As already noted, it is not our task to see if Zhang's inconsistent statements can somehow be reconciled. Neither do we weigh the inconsistencies for ourselves to see if we would reach the same credibility conclusions as the IJ, who actually observed Zhang testify, or the BIA. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d at 149. We consider only whether, on the evidence adduced, a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude, contrary to the IJ and BIA, that Zhang provided a credible account of persecution. See Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d at 275. We hold that the record does not compel such a conclusion. The cited inconsistencies qualify as specific, cogent reasons, bearing a legitimate nexus to the IJ/BIA findings that Zhang was not credible in recounting the alleged forcible sterilization of his spouse. Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d at 307 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d at 178. Further, because his spouse's sterilization was integral to Zhang's overall persecution claim, see Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d at 182, the adverse credibility findings on this point provided specific, cogent reasons bearing a legitimate nexus to the IJ/BIA's findings that Zhang's credibility was generally suspect. 74 In sum, we conclude that the IJ and BIA findings that Zhang was not credible are substantially supported by the record.
75 Zhang submits that the IJ and BIA erroneously denied him asylum based on his failure to produce certain corroborative documents about his wife and family without adequately assessing whether the materials were reasonably available to him. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d at 153 (observing that to deny asylum for want of sufficient corroboration, the adjudicator must (a) identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant documentation, and (b) show that the documentation at issue was reasonably available to the petitioner); see also Diallo v. INS, 232 F.3d at 285 (holding that an asylum applicant may be required to produce evidence corroborating his story, or an explanation for its absence, ... where it would reasonably be expected). 76 Although the IJ made no specific finding as to availability, the record hardly suggests that this issue presented any real concerns. Zhang testified that in the weeks before his July 1, 1998 hearing, he had requested and received from his wife in China the birth, marriage, household registration, sterilization, and fine certificates that were offered in evidence to support his persecution claim. Thus, Zhang's failure to produce similar documents, which the IJ considered more probative, could reasonably be deemed more a product of Zhang's oversight or neglect than of the documents' unavailability. Such a conclusion would certainly be warranted with respect to the most significant missing document identified by the IJ: an affidavit or statement from Zhang's wife detailing her forcible sterilization. In response to an IJ inquiry about why he had not asked his wife to send such a document, Zhang did not assert unavailability. Rather, he replied, Oh, the time was rather urgent, and I forgot to mention that. Hearing Tr. at 39. In claiming that he was pressed for time, Zhang ignored the fact that he had waited five years to seek reopening of his asylum application. 77 Even if Zhang's ability to secure the identified corroborative documents were in doubt, however, he would not be entitled to the relief sought in this petition. The requirement for corroborative documents'identification and availability articulated in Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft (as derived from Diallo v. INS ) pertains when the IJ or BIA cites inadequate corroboration as a basis for denying asylum to an applicant who is otherwise credible. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d at 153 (noting that Diallo recognized IJ authority to deny asylum in some cases where the applicant has failed to provide certain corroborative documents, even though the applicant testified credibly to facts that, if true, would qualify her for refugee status). That is not this case. If Zhang's failure to produce the identified corroboration were excused, what would remain would be (1) the IJ's finding that Zhang's inconsistent testimony ... seriously undermines the applicant's truthfulness and credibility before the Court, IJ Decision at 7-8, and (2) the BIA's finding that important discrepancies in the evidence are indicative of an overall lack of veracity on the part of the applicant, BIA Decision at 1. Such adverse credibility findings, by themselves, constitute substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Zhang failed to carry his burden of proof on his persecution claim. 11