Opinion ID: 669097
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Supplemental Jurisdiction Based on the COBRA Claim of the Georgia Plaintiffs Against Patterson

Text: 28 We must resolve two issues in determining the power of the district court to exercise jurisdiction over Bates based on the COBRA claim of the Georgia Plaintiffs against Patterson--the state-law claims by the Georgia Plaintiffs and those by the Alabama Plaintiffs. First, we look to the claims by the Georgia Plaintiffs. This analysis is virtually identical to the exercise of jurisdiction over the claims of the Alabama Plaintiffs against Patterson; that is, it is traditional pendent party jurisdiction. Once again, section 1367(a) permits such jurisdiction to the full breadth allowed by Article III of the Constitution. As discussed above, the Georgia Plaintiffs have properly invoked supplemental claim jurisdiction to present their state-law claims against Patterson in federal court. These are identical to the claims the Georgia Plaintiffs have raised against Bates. They include precisely the same facts, occurrences, witnesses, and evidence. Such claims are properly considered to be the joinder of an additional party to claims that form part of the same case or controversy under Article III. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a); see Urban v. King, 783 F.Supp. 560, 563 (D.Kan.1992). Therefore, this direct application of supplemental or pendent party jurisdiction is within the power of the district court. 29 Finally, we reach the most difficult inquiry: the power of the district court to exercise jurisdiction over the state-law claims of the Alabama Plaintiffs against Bates. Since we have found no case approving the exercise of such supplemental jurisdiction, this appears to be an issue of first impression. This inquiry involves a direct application of neither supplemental claim nor supplemental party jurisdiction. Rather, this is, in some respects, the linking of the two together. Neither the Alabama Plaintiffs nor Bates is present in federal court under an independent basis of original federal jurisdiction. Rather, both are within the reach of the court pursuant to its supplemental jurisdiction. In this situation, therefore, we are applying supplemental jurisdiction to claims and parties that are before the court themselves solely on a supplemental jurisdictional basis. As a general proposition, we do not favor this type of layering supplemental jurisdiction upon supplemental jurisdiction. The precise facts of this case, however, place such a jurisdictional pirouette within the power of the court under section 1367(a). There are no new claims or parties affirmatively being brought before the court by this exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. The Alabama Plaintiffs are legitimately before the court on claims against Patterson. Bates is within the court's jurisdictional reach, subject to its discretion, on the state-law claims of the Georgia Plaintiffs. Finally, the claims asserted by the Alabama Plaintiffs against Bates are nearly identical to those asserted by the Georgia Plaintiff against Bates. This situation, therefore, merely represents an application of jurisdiction to parties and claims that are already before the court. Were the district court, in its discretion, to agree to exercise jurisdiction over all other claims previously discussed, there would be no additional judicial action required to allow these claims to go forward. Once again, the same facts, occurrences, witnesses, and evidence are present in these claims as in those previously discussed. Hence, they are within the court's power, as form[ing] part of the same case or controversy under Article III. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(a). 30 The suggested analysis must be pursued methodically. As noted above, each state-law claim and each party is linked, finally, to a single COBRA claim, the only surviving basis of original federal jurisdiction. It is undisputed that the federal court has jurisdiction over the Georgia Plaintiffs' COBRA claim against Patterson. Once that is accepted, the logic and rationale behind supplemental jurisdiction allow the court to entertain the related state-law claims under section 1367(a) and the Constitution. We emphasize, however, that the foregoing discussion addresses only the power of the federal court to exercise jurisdiction in this case. The application of the court's discretion, pursuant to section 1367(c), may result in its determination that, despite its power to do so, it will not exercise jurisdiction in this case.