Opinion ID: 2639418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: legal malpractice/breach of fiduciary duty

Text: ¶ 40 Bennett's second cause of action in the fourth amended complaint is for legal malpractice through breach of fiduciary duty. Similar to its rationale with regard to its dismissal of the first cause of action, the trial court granted the Jones Waldo defendants' motion to dismiss the legal malpractice claim on the ground that the complaint did not adequately plead damages to Bennett from the alleged legal malpractice. Bennett argues on appeal that the cause of action for legal malpractice was adequately pled and that he was in fact damaged by the Jones Waldo defendants' legal malpractice. ¶ 41 In a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must plead and prove (i) an attorney-client relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client arising from their relationship; [6] (iii) a breach of that duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach of duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) actual damages. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (citing Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 889 (Utah 1988)); see also Legal Malpractice § 18.12, at 550-51. ¶ 42 Bennett's claim for legal malpractice suffers from the same deficiency as his breach of contract claim, that is, an inability to show damage from any breach of duty. ¶ 43 As an initial matter, our review of the well pled facts associated with the legal malpractice claim must be confined to those facts and events that fall within the period in which an attorney-client relationship existed. That period is the same one explained previously, that is, the period from the execution of the retainer agreement to the moment when Bennett exercised his right to opt out of the class action settlement. As previously discussed, see supra ¶ 34, Bennett's decision to opt out effectively terminated the Jones Waldo defendants' representation of him. Therefore, only the facts alleged related to the Jones Waldo defendants' representation of Bennett during the Utah and California Gen-Probe litigations are relevant to whether the complaint states a claim for legal malpractice. Any other facts or allegations regarding the Jones Waldo defendants' conduct after the termination of the legal representation of Bennett cannot form the basis of a cause of action for legal malpractice, because the existence of an attorney-client relationship is an indispensable element of a cause of action for legal malpractice. See Harline, 912 P.2d at 439. ¶ 44 The damages claimed by Bennett arising out of the Jones Waldo defendants' alleged breaches of duty owed to Bennett during the Utah and California Gen-Probe litigations are no different than the damages pled in connection with the cause of action for breach of contract. Consequently, the second cause of action for legal malpractice is deficient for the same reason that the first cause of action is deficient. Bennett simply cannot plead and has not pled that he was damaged as a result of the Jones Waldo defendants' alleged breaches of duty because by opting out of the class action settlement, he preserved his legal position and his individual causes of action. Bennett's failure to pursue those individual causes of action in connection with the Gen-Probe transaction is not attributable to any conduct by the Jones Waldo defendants and not related to any prior alleged breach of duty by them. Even if we assume all of the allegations in the fourth amended complaint to be true, Bennett cannot show as a matter of law that he was damaged, that is, placed in a worse position as a result of the Jones Waldo defendants' alleged conduct, because his opting out of the class action settlement placed him in the same position he would have been in prior to the instigation of the original Utah and California Gen-Probe litigations. Lack of any damages and direct causation is fatal to [any] malpractice claim. Kinniburgh v. Garrity, 244 Mont. 350, 798 P.2d 102, 105 (1990). ¶ 45 Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing the second cause of action for legal malpractice for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted.