Opinion ID: 6970661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority to Impose Conditions

Text: The conditions of a prisoner’s confinement are normally determined by the Attorney General through the Bureau of Prisons. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (1994) (describing the Bureau of Prison’s role with respect to the imprisonment of a convicted person); 18 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (1994) (vesting control and management of federal prisons to the Attorney General); 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1994) (authorizing Bureau of Prisons, under direction of the Attorney General, to manage and regulate federal prisons and the inmates within). Yet, we have also ruled that where there is specific statutory authority, a sentencing court may impose conditions on a prisoner’s confinement. See United States v. Huss, 520 F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir.1975). In the case at hand, authority derives from 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d), which allows district courts to limit the associational rights of defendants convicted of racketeering offenses. Section 3582(d) provides that a court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment upon a defendant convicted of a felony set forth in chapter 95 (racketeering) or 96, (racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations) of this title, . ■.. may include as a part of the sentence an order that requires that the defendant not associate or communicate with a specified person, other than his attorney, upon a showing of probable cause to believe that association or communication with such person is for the purpose of enabling the defendant to 'control, manage, direct, finance, or otherwise participate in an illegal enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d) (1994); cf. United States v. Sotelo, 94 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir.1996) (holding that while no federal statute authorizes a court to restrict the communications of an inmate convicted of mailing threatening communications, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(d) does authorize a district court to restrict the communications of an inmate convicted of racketeering offenses). Here, Felipe was convietéd of participating in racketeering activities as the leader of the Latin Kings while incarcerated at Attica. There was also the requisite showing of probable cause, in that the record evidenced Felipe’s skill at circumventing prison regulations and using secret codes to control the Latin Kings organization and 'orchestrate numerr ous murders. Judge Martin properly concluded that Felipe could again use his powers of association and communication to direct other members to carry out violent crimes in the name of the organization. Hence, he had authority to impose relevant conditions of confinement. Appellant’s stronger argument points out that the district court’s order fails to identify “a specified person” with whom Felipe may not communicate, as required by § 3582(d), but rather forbids communication with everyone but close family members. While we acknowledge that the language of the statute is not broad, the trial court’s order, in our view, does not fall outside it. We do not believe Congress expected sentencing courts to list every individual of a racketeering organization in eases where sufficient reason exists to believe that association with any member is for the purpose of participating in an illegal enterprise. Racketeering groups are often large and boast a constantly changing membership. It would be difficult, if not virtually impossible, to identify each and every active member of such an organization. The purpose of § 3582(d) “is to prevent the defendant from continuing his illegal activities from his place of confinement.” S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 121 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3304. The conditions imposed upon Felipe were reasonably formulated to accomplish that objective.