Opinion ID: 2636537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Effect of Waiver Language in Plea Agreement

Text: We now address the substance of the State's argument that, regardless of the applicability of any of the Ortiz exceptions, Patton waived his right to appeal his sentence when he signed his written plea agreement. A defendant who pleads guilty may still challenge the sentence imposed in some circumstances. State v. Phinney, 280 Kan. 394, 398, 122 P.3d 356 (2005). However, a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant of his statutory right to appeal is generally enforceable. State v. Campbell, 273 Kan. 414, 424-25, 44 P.3d 349 (2002) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 134 F.3d 1435, 1437 [10th Cir.1998]). In Campbell, defendant Kenyon Campbell bargained with the State for a reduced sentence in exchange for his cooperation, testimony against another individual, and a waiver of his right to appeal the verdict against him. 273 Kan. at 425, 44 P.3d 349. In his direct appeal, Campbell challenged both his convictions and sentence. The court entertained Campbell's challenge to his sentence but held that Campbell had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his convictions when he entered into the sentencing agreement with the State. In State v. Boley, 279 Kan. 989, 997, 113 P.3d 248 (2005), defendant Charles Boley had pleaded no contest to manufacture of methamphetamine. He appealed his sentence successfully and was resentenced in accord with McAdam. When the State sought to rescind the plea agreement based upon a mistake of law, this court held that the State was precluded from doing so. Boley did not breach his plea agreement by attacking his sentence. He had not agreed to advocate for any particular sentence; the agreement did not prohibit him from seeking a lesser sentence; and he had not waived his right to appeal or to argue about the severity level of his crime. We wrote: [T]he State bore the risk that Boley would appeal his sentence. The prosecutor could have protected against this risk by including a provision in the plea agreement requiring the defendant to waive his right to appeal or indicating that if the defendant successfully challenged his sentence, such action would be considered a breach of the agreement. State v. Boley, 279 Kan. at 997, 113 P.3d 248. In this case, again, the plea agreement stated that Patton waived his right to appeal and that he had read and understood an attached and incorporated Waiver of Rights form. We do not have the Waiver of Rights form in the record on appeal, so it can add nothing to our understanding of Patton's intent in signing the plea agreement. The waiver language in the agreement is general. Although, given its timing and other content, it must refer to appeal of Patton's two convictions, it need not be understood as specifically addressing his sentence for either offense, neither of which, of course, had yet been handed down. In addition, the record shows that, when sentencing did occur, the district judge told Patton he had a right to appeal any of the judge's rulings or findings. The sentencing transcript demonstrates irrefutably that the judge told Patton his right to appeal remained intact, at least, incorrectly, as to denial of a downward dispositional departure, on which the waiver in the plea agreement had no bearing. The judge said that, if the plea agreement waiver was to concern such issues, it should have stated that it applied to all issues involved at sentencing. Moreover, to the extent the immediately subsequent behavior of the defendant is revealing of his understanding of what he had waived and what he had not waived at the time of his plea and/or sentencing, there is no dispute that Patton attempted to appeal his sentence within 10 days. In other words, it is apparent he believed he would not be prevented from doing so. Counsel was on the same page. He would not have inquired of Patton's mother about her son's desire to appeal if counsel believed no right of appeal existed. See State v. Harmon, 243 S.W.2d 326, 330 (Mo.1951) (appellate court should not hold criminal defendant waived right to appeal unless record, acts of defendant, all circumstances inconsistent with any other interpretation). Furthermore, Patton is correct that the decisions relied upon by the Court of Appeals to dismiss his late appeal here actually support him. Those decisions involved defendants who had explicitly and unambiguously waived the particular appeal right they later sought to exercise. In Ortiz itself, the defendant had signed an explicit written waiver of his right to appeal his sentence, disqualifying himself from application of any of the exceptions permitting late appeals laid out in his case. Ortiz, 230 Kan. at 734, 640 P.2d 1255; see also Campbell, 273 Kan. at 425, 44 P.3d 349 (defendant's plea agreement specifically stated [defendant] waives any right to appeal the verdict against him); State v. Willingham, 266 Kan. 98, 101, 967 P.2d 1079 (1998) (in dicta, the court commented that the defendant may not have been granted the ability to file an out-of-time appeal if he had signed a written waiver of his right to appeal). The Tenth Circuit and sister jurisdictions also have recognized the need to tread carefully when courts are asked to hold that a criminal defendant waived his or her right to appeal a sentence. See United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325-28 (10th Cir.2004) (rejecting suggestion that presentencing waiver of appellate rights can never be enforceable, but noting defendant who waives right to appeal does not subject himself or herself to any sentence handed down by district court; court applies three-part test to determine whether waiver occurred, reading ambiguities in plea agreement in favor of defendant); United States v. Lang, 440 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.2006) (waiver of appeal in plea agreement does not deprive appellate court of jurisdiction over appeal of defendant's sentence); United States v. Story, 439 F.3d 226 (5th Cir.2006) (same); People v. Sherrick, 19 Cal.App.4th 657, 659, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 25 (1993) (defendant's general waiver of right to appeal, part of negotiated plea agreement, does not bar appeal of sentencing errors occurring after plea). As the district court suggested in this case, it is not too onerous a burden to require the State to be explicit about the terms it requires in plea agreements. The State was not explicit about a waiver of appeal of sentence in this case. The agreement's general waiver language is, at best, ambiguous about the availability of any appeal of the sentences yet to come. We have previously stated: Where a statute is ambiguous, we require that it be strictly construed in favor of the accused. [Citation omitted.] We find no compelling reason to adopt a different rule in interpreting ambiguous plea agreements. State v. Wills, 244 Kan. 62, 69, 765 P.2d 1114 (1988); see also United States v. Chavez-Salais, 337 F.3d 1170, 1173 (10th Cir.2003) (court will not enforce waivers of appellate rights beyond scope of plea agreement; [l]ike most waivers, a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal... is to be construed narrowly); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2003) (in determining waiver's scope, any ambiguities in ... agreements will be read against the Government and in favor of a defendant's appellate rights).