Opinion ID: 1388423
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Imposing liability on the employer to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct

Text: The John R. lead opinion remarked that vicarious liability can be a spur toward accident prevention. (48 Cal.3d at p. 451.) On the other hand, John R. recognized that a public entity must not be presented with such an onerous, impossible, or impractical prevention burden that its proper functions are threatened. ( Ibid. ) This latter principle was a cornerstone of the Tort Claims Act. The California Law Revision Commission emphasized that, The basic problem is to determine how far it is desirable to permit the loss distributing function of tort law to apply to public entities without unduly frustrating or interfering with the desirable purposes for which such entities exist. (Law Revision Com. Recommendations, supra, at p. 810, italics added.) Rape, of course, is no accident. It results from an individual's conscious decision to commit the outrageous act despite all moral and legal sanctions. Hence, it cannot be prevented in the way a city might train its officers in safe driving. Rape is a serious crime punishable by imprisonment (Pen. Code, งง 261, 264), and a compensable civil wrong as well. We assume such considerations informed the John R. lead opinion's observation that prevention and deterrence [play] little role in the allocation of responsibility for the sexual misconduct of employees generally.... (48 Cal.3d at p. 451.) Here there is no suggestion that the City negligently failed to screen Officer Schroyer's background and character, or that it failed to exercise due care in training and supervising him. The majority fails to explain what additional measures the City could or should practically have taken to prevent his intentional sexual misconduct. Nor have we any evidence about the costs or benefits of any such measures. Indeed, as the John R. lead opinion observed, excessive restrictions on contacts between public employees and citizens are likely to undermine the employees' public function. (48 Cal.3d at p. 451.) Common sense suggests that what was true for education in John R. has equal or greater validity in the context of law enforcement. The premise that the City should adopt further regulations for police training and conduct also runs afoul of Government Code section 818.2. Section 818.2 provides that [a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law. The term enactment includes ordinances and regulations. (Gov. Code, ง 810.6.) The majority's inability to suggest how vicarious liability might deter sexual misconduct by public employees demonstrates that we are ill equipped to dictate such matters. As the California Law Revision Commission explained, in many cases decisions made by the legislative and executive branches should not be subject to review in tort suits for damages, for this would take the ultimate decision-making authority from those who are responsible politically for making the decisions. (Law Revision Com. Recommendations, supra, at p. 810.) The remedy for officials who make bad law, who do not adequately enforce existing law, or who do not provide the people with services they desire is to replace them with other officials. ( Id., at p. 817.) Of course, the paradoxical result of the majority's holding is that no matter what the City does, it may be held responsible for a police officer's criminal conduct including offenses such as this rape. The City's police department already has a policy that imposes several reporting requirements on officers who transport members of the opposite sex. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 218, fn. 10.) The City's assistant chief of police in charge of personnel and training testified that department policy requires a male officer transporting a female arrestee to record the time and mileage of his police vehicle so that the arrestee's whereabouts could be monitored and verified. Department policy also prohibited Officer Schroyer from transporting plaintiff to her residence. Obviously, these policies did not prevent the rape in this case. Under the majority's reasoning, one purpose of vicarious liability in this case would be to encourage the City to adopt further, undefined measures. By adopting the rules then in effect, the City, however, may have done all that it could reasonably do without imposing an undue burden on the police's resources and mission โ the same concern expressed in John R. Indeed, if the City did not act reasonably, it could have been found negligent. Plaintiff, however, dismissed her cause of action for negligence, thereby indicating that the City had done all it could reasonably be expected to do. Plaintiff fails to propose any regulation that would be effective without being unreasonably restrictive on effective law enforcement. The majority's treatment of the regulations adopted by the City is self-contradictory. At one point, the majority approvingly notes a rule adopted by the San Francisco Police Department relating to the transport of females by male officers. The majority asserts this rule illustrates the type of measure that a law enforcement agency can take to reduce the incidence of sexual assaults by police officers on duty. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 215, fn. 7.) Only a few paragraphs later, the majority notes that the City has a similar regulation. Thus, the effect of the majority's holding is that the City is liable despite its adoption of measures vicarious liability is designed to encourage. [1] The proper question is whether vicarious liability would deter future misconduct without undue adverse consequences for the police function. If we impose liability, the City has two choices: (1) It can conclude it has already done all that it can reasonably do and accept the fact that errant officers might on occasion rape citizens, thereby subjecting the City to vicarious liability. If this is the result, vicarious liability has no deterrent effect. (2) Alternatively, the City can take measures beyond those already adopted. It requires little common sense to imagine that such measures might lead to the same result disapproved in John R., supra, 48 Cal.3d 438 โ undue interference with the City's ability to perform its mission of providing police protection. In rejecting vicarious liability for a teacher's sexual molestation of a child, the John R. lead opinion explained that, Although it is unquestionably important to encourage both the careful selection of these employees and the close monitoring of their conduct, such concerns are, we think, better addressed by holding school districts to the exercise of due care in such matters and subjecting them to liability only for their own direct negligence in that regard. Applying the doctrine of respondeat superior to impose, in effect, strict liability in this context would be far too likely... to induce districts to impose such rigorous controls on activities of this nature that the educational process would be negatively affected. ( Id., at p. 451.) The same reasoning applies with equal force in this case. Whether vicarious liability will have a deterrent effect without undue impediment to a public function depends on what measures a public entity has already taken, what additional measures it can take, and what the effects of those measures will likely be. The majority's holding will allow liability in future cases regardless of whether it will help attain the goal of deterrence or whether it will unduly restrict an essential public function. At a minimum, the question whether vicarious liability is appropriate should depend on the particular facts of each case. In John R., even Justice Kaufman, who vigorously dissented in favor of vicarious liability, explained that, Respondeat superior is a fact-specific determination; a holding adverse to the district would necessarily be limited to the uniquely compelling facts of this case. (48 Cal.3d at p. 465 (conc. and dis. opn. of Kaufman, J.), italics added.) By contrast, the majority result here is absolute and not tethered to any factual basis.