Opinion ID: 164842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rinchem

Text: Mr. Eden argues the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Rinchem and in deciding Rinchem was entitled to qualified immunity even though Rinchem is a private party. Mr. Eden asserts the district court erred by applying qualified immunity to Rinchem, because Rinchem presented no evidence showing entitlement to qualified immunity and the district court did not address whether qualified immunity would apply under the limited circumstances set forth in Richardson v. McKnight , 521 U.S. 399 (1997). We review a grant of summary judgment de novo , applying the same legal standard as the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Eagon ex rel. Eagon v. City of Elk City , 72 F.3d 1480, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 6 6 Mr. Eden makes two preliminary assertions. We reject his first assertion that he did not receive notice that the district court would treat Rinchem’s motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Rinchem’s motion was pled in the alternative, and Mr. Eden acknowledged this in his district court and appellate court filings. See R. doc. 10; Aplt. Opening Br. at 2. (continued...) -9- In resolving the qualified immunity issue, the district court first considered whether Mr. Eden alleged a deprivation of an actual constitutional right and concluded that Mr. Eden failed to do so. 7 In reaching this conclusion, the court first decided that ample evidence established probable cause to issue the search warrant. The court found that (1) the facts listed in the warrant application were sufficient to enable the state court judge to conclude that a violation of the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Law may be occurring, (2) the application included the sources for this information, (3) Mr. Voss indicated how he and NMED had verified the information received from the Albuquerque Police Department and 6 (...continued) Next, Mr. Eden challenges the district court’s consideration of the complaint in a separate state-court case filed by NMED against Mr. Eden. In that case, NMED sought injunctive relief requiring Mr. Eden to stop disposing of or storing hazardous waste on his property, costs for its activity concerning the hazardous waste, and civil and punitive damages for violating hazardous waste statutes and regulations. In a summary judgment context, it is appropriate for the district court to take judicial notice of pleadings in another case. See, e.g. , St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC , 605 F.2d 1169, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1979). However, no pleadings the district court considered from this separate case appear in the record before us for review. Through our own efforts, we learned that the state case was dismissed on June 6, 2003, for lack of prosecution. This occurred after the district court entered its order granting summary judgment to Rinchem, so it was not error for the district court to consider the separate state-court action at the time it ruled. 7 In resolving qualified immunity cases, courts first consider whether the plaintiff alleged a deprivation of an actual constitutional right and, if so, whether the plaintiff showed the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. See Conn v. Gabbert , 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). Because the district court concluded Mr. Eden did not prove a violation of his constitutional rights, the court found it unnecessary to reach the second inquiry. -10- Rinchem, and (4) the application and warrant specified the scope of the search, the time for the warrant’s execution, and the persons allowed to access the property. See R. doc. 29 at 11-12 (citing Marshall v. Horn Seed Co. , 647 F.2d 96, 102-03 (10th Cir. 1981)). Also, the district court decided that there was no constitutional violation because the administrative warrant was not overbroad and, under the circumstances, described with sufficient particularity the items that could be seized. Additionally, the court determined the warrant was lawful in that the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act authorizes the acts specified in the warrant to be carried out by NMED officers and agents. Because Rinchem acted pursuant to a lawful and constitutional warrant, the district court held that Rinchem did not violate Mr. Eden’s constitutional rights and was therefore entitled to qualified immunity. We agree for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court that Mr. Eden has failed to prove a constitutional violation for which § 1983 provides a remedy with respect to his claims of lack of probable cause and an overbroad warrant. Without a constitutional violation, Rinchem cannot be liable under § 1983 regardless of whether Rinchem, a private company, may assert a qualified immunity defense. See Parratt v. Taylor , 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981) (requiring plaintiff seeking § 1983 relief to prove both that conduct complained of was -11- committed by person acting under color of state law 8 and that conduct deprived person of constitutional right), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327 (1986). With no constitutional violation, we need not address Richardson ’s applicability to these claims. Mr. Eden made other assertions against Rinchem. He also contended that the warrant was not reasonably executed and that he was denied due process during the deprivation of his property. The district court did not address these issues. We remand to the district court to allow that court to consider these claims in the first instance. In remanding, we note that contrary to the district court’s conclusion, not all private contractors acting under color of state law are engaged in governmental functions eligible for qualified immunity. In Richardson v. McKnight , the Supreme Court addressed whether prison guards employed by a private prison management firm were entitled to qualified immunity and held they were not. 521 U.S. at 401. The Court limited its holding in Richardson to “a private firm, systematically organized to assume a major lengthy administrative task . . . with limited direct supervision by the government, [which] undertakes 8 There is no dispute that Rinchem’s conduct constituted state action. See Scott v. Hern , 216 F.3d 897, 906 (10th Cir. 2000); see also R., doc. 1 at 4 (complaint assertion that Rinchem was acting under color of state law). -12- that task for profit and potentially in competition with other firms.” Richardson , 521 U.S. at 413. The Court specifically noted that its holding “d[id] not involve a private individual briefly associated with a government body, serving as an adjunct to government in an essential governmental activity, or acting under close official supervision.” Id. ; see also Bartell v. Lohiser , 215 F.3d 550, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) (recognizing private party closely supervised by state may assert qualified immunity). The record here provides no relevant facts to discern whether Rinchem was closely supervised by NMED and, therefore, entitled to assert qualified immunity. At best, the record indicates that NMED representatives were present when the warrant was executed. Thus, there is a genuine issue of fact whether Rinchem acted autonomously or under the close supervision and control of NMED. If, on remand, the district court concludes that Mr. Eden stated a constitutional violation with respect to his warrant execution and due process claims, the court must consider whether Rinchem is protected by qualified immunity under the test set forth in Richardson . Lastly, Mr. Eden asserts state-law conversion and trespass claims against Rinchem. “Conversion is the unlawful exercise of dominion and control over property belonging to another in defiance of the owner’s rights, or acts constituting an unauthorized and injurious use of another’s property, or a -13- wrongful detention after demand has been made.” Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs. v. Signfilled Corp. , 956 P.2d 837, 842 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998). Trespass is the “unauthorized entry upon the land of another.” North v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. , 608 P.2d 1128, 1129 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). The district court granted summary judgment on these claims because all alleged activities by Rinchem occurred during the execution of a lawful warrant. We agree with the district court that Rinchem acted pursuant to a valid administrative search and seizure warrant. 9 The affidavits supporting the application for the warrant set forth probable cause for issuance of the warrant. And the Hazardous Waste Act permitted seizure of hazardous wastes. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 74-4-4.3. Thus, there was no conversion or trespass by Rinchem. In summary, we affirm the district court’s conclusions that Mr. Eden failed to present a constitutional claim concerning probable cause to issue the search warrant and the lawfulness of the warrant. We also affirm the court’s decision that there was no trespass or conversion. We remand to the district court to consider Mr. Eden’s claims that the warrant was unconstitutionally executed and he was denied due process during the deprivation of his property. 9 Even Mr. Eden suggests the warrant may “possibly” be valid and the validity of the warrant is “irrelevant,” because most items Rinchem seized were not listed in the warrant. Aplt. Reply Br. at 3. -14-