Opinion ID: 390354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interpretation of Excessive Bail Clause.

Text: 34 We first turn to the constitutional text. The eighth amendment reads, in pertinent part: Excessive bail shall not be required  The language of the clause has its origin in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. II, § I(10). 12 See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545, 72 S.Ct. 525, 536, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952). 35 The state argues that since the express terms of the eighth amendment do not create a right to bail, but merely forbid excessive bail, the state may refuse to grant bail without violating the eighth amendment. We recognize that there is logical support and some authority for this argument. 13 Nonetheless, the history of the right to bail, judicial precedent, the fundamental purpose of bail and the language of the clause itself require us to make further inquiry. 36 We first consider the logic of interpreting the clause to mean that bail may not be excessive, but may be denied altogether. We find ourselves in agreement with the Second Circuit's cogent observation: we perceive no constitutional distinction between requiring excessive bail and denying bail altogether in the absence of legitimate reasons. United States ex rel. Goodman v. Kehl, 456 F.2d 863, 868 (2d Cir. 1972) (emphasis added). Similarly, Mr. Justice Burton, writing in dissent in Carlson v. Landon, observed: 37 (The) Amendment clearly prohibits federal bail that is excessive in amount when seen in the light of all traditionally relevant circumstances. Likewise, it must prohibit unreasonable denial of bail. The Amendment cannot well mean that, on the one hand, it prohibits the requirement of bail so excessive in amount as to be unattainable, yet, on the other hand, under like circumstances, it does not prohibit the denial of bail, which comes to the same thing. The same circumstances are relevant to both procedures. 38 342 U.S. at 569, 72 S.Ct. at 548 (emphasis added). 14 39 If the eighth amendment has any meaning beyond sheer rhetoric, the constitutional prohibition against excessive bail necessarily implies that unreasonable denial of bail is likewise prohibited. Logic defies any other resolution of the question. 40 This does not necessarily mean that a court cannot refuse to set bail in some cases. Pretrial release is a recognition of the individual's interest in obtaining freedom prior to any finding of guilt. Society also has certain interests that are balanced against the individual's desire for release. Foremost among these interests is society's desire to obtain assurances that the accused will appear for trial and submit to sentencing. As the Court wrote in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. at 4-5, 72 S.Ct. at 3-4:The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused's giving adequate assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty. Ex parte Milburn, 9 Pet. 704, 710, (9 L.Ed. 280) (1835). Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused. Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is excessive under the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657 (1926, opinion by Mr. Justice Butler as Circuit Justice of the Seventh Circuit). 41 Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. 15 42 We ordinarily determine whether bail in a particular case is excessive by considering whether the amount corresponds to the state's interests under the particular circumstances of the case. If the bail is higher than is necessary to meet the state's legitimate objectives, it is excessive. We recognize that there may be instances where no amount of bail can sufficiently protect the state's interests. In such a case, a court may consider the relevant factors and deny bail. See, e. g., United States v. Abrahams, 575 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.), app'l for bail denied, 436 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 2229, 56 L.Ed.2d 399, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 85, 58 L.Ed.2d 112 (1978) (denying bail where accused had forfeited a $100,000 bond in the past and lived a life of subterfuge, deceit and cunning.). However, it is quite another thing to say that the eighth amendment would permit outright denial of bail without consideration of the factors relevant to an individual's suitability for pretrial release; at least in the eyes of the accused, an unreasonable and arbitrary denial of bail is surely the equivalent to an unobtainably high amount of bail that is set unreasonably and arbitrarily. 43 The State argues, however, that nothing within the eighth amendment prohibits a legislative (as opposed to a judicial) denial of bail in a certain class of cases. The Supreme Court of Nebraska accepted this argument: 44 Once a recognition that legislative bodies had the right to exclude murder, treason, or capital offenses from bail is made, one is left with the inescapable conclusion that the Eighth Amendment simply prohibited excessive bail where allowed and did not guarantee the right to bail in every instance. 45 Parker v. Roth, 278 N.W.2d at 111. 46 In considering this view, we observe first that it suffers from the same logical flaw as the argument just discussed. If legislative bodies are free to define any and all offenses as nonbailable, they may deprive the amendment of any force and accused persons of any protection. We agree with Justice Black that to conclude that the Amendment does no more than protect a right to bail which Congress can take away reduce(s) (it) below the level of a pious admonition. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. at 556, 72 S.Ct. at 542 (dissenting opinion). This indeed is a devitalizing interpretation. Id. 47 The state urges that English history supports the concept of legislative denial of bail, since Parliament recognized certain offenses were nonbailable and others were subject to reasonable bail. See Duker and Meyer, supra note 12. 48 In construing the Constitution, an analysis of English common law and its adaptation in the colonies can be relevant in determining the intent of the framers. 16 However, the overall history of the bail clause does not necessarily support the conclusion advanced by the state. The fact that Parliament classified certain offenses as nonbailable is not an absolute indication that Congress was to enjoy the same power to define bailable and nonbailable offenses. Our Congress operates under the limits imposed by the Constitution. England, of course, had no constitution. 17 The Constitution was our assurance that many of the abuses suffered under English rule would not be passed on to our people. As the Supreme Court recognized 30 years ago, quoting Stansbury's trial of James H. Peck: 49 At the Revolution we separated ourselves from the mother country, and we have established a republican form of government, securing to the citizens of this country other and greater personal rights, than those enjoyed under the British monarchy. 50 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 n.7, 62 S.Ct. 190, 194, 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941). 51 See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. at 557, 72 S.Ct. at 542 (Black, J., dissenting). 52 Furthermore, there is strong evidence in colonial laws that the American concept of bail differed significantly from English law. Most significant is the early recognition within the colonies that bail was deemed a right of every person except those charged with capital crimes. As early as 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties guaranteed bail in noncapital crimes. 18 This trend in colonial law toward a guarantee of bail in noncapital cases culminated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which stated: 53 (A)ll persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offences, where the proof shall be evident, or the presumption great. All fines shall be moderate, and no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted. 54 An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-west of the River Ohio, Art. II, 22 Journals of the Continental Congress 334 (1787), reprinted in 1 Stat. 50 n. (a). 55 Similar clauses now appear in most state constitutions. See Petition of Humphrey, 601 P.2d 103, 108-11 (Okl.Cr.1979) (compiling state constitutional provisions). 19 56 The state, however, places strong reliance on Mr. Justice Reed's observations in Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. at 545-46, 72 S.Ct. at 537. 57 The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country. Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. 58 The state emphasizes that throughout Anglo-American legal history there have been legislative acts denying bail in capital cases. In fact, when the eighth amendment itself was adopted, Congress contemporaneously passed section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, guaranteeing bail to every accused person except those charged with capital crimes. Thus, it is argued that the framers of the Bill of Rights were well aware that the right to bail could be legislatively denied. 59 Although we are not confronted with the question, we acknowledge that Congress, and the state legislatures, seemingly possess the power to deny the right to bail to persons charged with capital crimes. It is argued that from this premise we must conclude that a legislative body may also deny the right to bail in any or all noncapital cases. However, the syllogism is not complete. First, as discussed, there is a historical basis for the capital crimes exception; there is no similar historical basis for a legislative denial in noncapital cases. In fact, colonial practice suggests to the contrary. Second, the concept of denial of bail in capital cases is at least arguably consistent with one of the purposes of bail. As previously set forth, traditionally the fundamental and sole purpose of bail before conviction was to provide reasonable assurance the accused would appear for trial and sentencing if convicted. The Ninth Circuit recently observed that state courts have found that statutes denying bail to defendants charged with capital offenses were enacted because it had been thought that most defendants facing a possible death penalty would likely flee regardless of what bail was set, but that those facing only a possible prison sentence would not if bail were sufficiently high. United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d 557, 559 (9th Cir. 1980). 60 Blackstone's Commentaries observed in 1770: 61 (the accused) must either be committed to prison, or give bail; that is, put in securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against him. This commitment therefore being only for safe custody, wherever bail will answer the same intention, it ought to be taken; as in most of the inferior crimes: but in felonies, and other offences of a capital nature, no bail can be a security equivalent to the actual custody of the person. For what is there that a man may not be induced to forfeit, to save his own life? and what satisfaction or indemnity is it to the public, to seize the effects of them who have bailed a murderer, if the murderer himself be suffered to escape with impunity? 62 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 293-94 (4th Ed. 1770). 63 In dealing with noncapital offenses there exists no similar rational and relevant concern. In noncapital crimes without balancing at least the individual factors of the particular case there exists no equally strong compulsion to conclude that an accused will not appear for trial. 64 Certainly the eighth amendment would prohibit Congress from arbitrarily decreeing that all persons arrested for possession of an illegal weapon or a proscribed drug must give security by a $1,000,000 bond. We think few courts would have difficulty finding that such a law would not pass muster under the excessive bail clause. If a $1,000,000 bond set arbitrarily by legislative fiat is excessive there is little logic to support the proposition that Congress could arbitrarily deny bail for any or all criminal charges whatsoever. The point is, we agree, Congress and the states may reasonably legislate as to the right to bail for certain offenses provided the power is exercised rationally, reasonably, and without discrimination. 20 65 Lastly, we turn to judicial precedent. 66 It is urged that Carlson v. Landon, relied upon by the Nebraska Supreme Court, has settled the issue favorably to the state. We disagree; Carlson, in our judgment, provides at least implicit support for striking down the Nebraska amendment. 21 67 Carlson involved the discretionary denial of bail by the Attorney General for alien communists facing deportation. On its face, Carlson may not be controlling here since it did not involve persons accused of crime, the traditional concern of the bail clause. Nevertheless, we deem it significant that the Supreme Court upheld the denial of bail under the Internal Security Act, solely on the grounds that Congress had provided the Attorney General with discretion to grant or deny bail. Significantly, with respect to aliens facing deportation proceedings, his discretion was subject to judicial review. The Supreme Court observed: 68 A wide range of discretion in the Attorney General as to bail is required to meet the varying situations arising from the many aliens in this country. 69 The policy and standards as to what aliens are subject to deportation are, in general, clear and definite. 8 U.S.C. §§ 137 and 155. Specifically when dealing with alien Communists, as in these cases, the legislative standard for deportation is definite. See notes 3 and 4, supra. In carrying out that policy the Attorney General is not left with untrammeled discretion as to bail. Courts review his determination. Hearings are had, and he must justify his refusal of bail by reference to the legislative scheme to eradicate the evils of Communist activity. 70 342 U.S. at 543, 72 S.Ct. at 536 (emphasis added). 71 In Carlson the court of appeals in fact earlier had remanded to the district court one of the individual cases since the government had not based the Attorney General's denial on relevant factors relating to the necessity of pretrial detention. 22 Significantly, the Supreme Court stated: 72 In fact, a report filed with this Court by the 73 Department of Justice in this case at our request shows allowance of bail in the large majority of cases. The refusal of bail in these cases is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of power. 74 Id. at 542, 72 S.Ct. at 535 (emphasis added). 75 Thus Carlson recognized that where the Attorney General exercised judgmental discretion, denial of bail could not be based on arbitrary standards. In concluding the eighth amendment did not prevent denial of bail, the Court carefully stated: 76 We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases. 77 Id. at 546, 72 S.Ct. at 537 (emphasis added). 78