Opinion ID: 10040
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unusually Vulnerable Victim Enhancement

Text: 12 The PSR recommended a two-level increase to Kuban's base offense level because Kuban knew or should have known that Ozen was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that [Ozen] was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1. Specifically, the PSR stated that Kuban verbally and physically threatened to kill sixteen-year-old Ozen with a cocked, loaded pistol. The PSR also noted that Ozen had worked for Kuban at Kuban's business. Finally, the PSR observed that Kuban is a fairly large and imposing individual. 13 The district court adopted the PSR's recommendation. After considering defense counsel's arguments on this point, the district court concluded that Ozen was unusually vulnerable because of his age--unusually vulnerable, because he's being faced by a fellow who is, perhaps, bigger, certainly older, more experienced, more knowledgeable, more mature, supposedly, as to what he might be able to do to him or with him. 14 Kuban challenges this adjustment on two grounds: First, Kuban contends that the offense of conviction, felon in possession of a firearm, is a victimless crime; second, Kuban argues that, even assuming arguendo that there could be a victim of his offense of conviction, Ozen was not unusually vulnerable within the meaning of section 3A1.1. 15 Reviewing Kuban's first contention de novo, we hold that the district court did not err by characterizing Ozen as a victim of Kuban's conduct. In United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989), this Court held that, in the present context, [T]he [Sentencing] Commission has chosen not to require a nexus between the offense of conviction and the victim. Id. at 608. This Court reached this conclusion after observing that the commentary to section 3A1.1 did not require the vulnerable victim to be a victim of the offense of conviction: [W]hen the Commission has wished to require a link between the offense of conviction and a factor the court could consider in sentencing, it has expressly included that requirement in the Guidelines. Id. At the time that this Court decided Roberson, the commentary to section 3A1.1 explained that the vulnerable victim enhancement applie[d] to any offense where the victim's vulnerability played any part in the defendant's decision to commit the offense. Id. Based on this language, this Court held in Roberson that the (deceased) individual whose credit card had been used by the defendant after the card owner's death in order to commit the charged credit card fraud--the offense of conviction--was a victim under section 3A1.1, particularly in that the decedent certainly suffered indignity in having his corpse abused and his good name brought into this whole sordid affair. Id. at 609. 5 Within this analytical framework, Ozen must be viewed as a victim of Kuban's conduct, as well. We are bound by Roberson. 6 16 Next, Kuban contends that, even if Ozen were a victim within the meaning of section 3A1.1, the district court erred in finding that Ozen was an unusually vulnerable victim. The determination of 'vulnerability is a complex fact dependent upon a number of characteristics which a trial court could not possibly articulate completely' ... United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 542 (5th Cir.1995) (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we give the finding of vulnerability due deference. United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 358-59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 309, 133 L.Ed.2d 213 (1995). See also Koon v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 2045-46, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996) (recognizing the statutory requirement that courts of appeals 'give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts' ). 7 Additionally, we accord due deference to the finding of what the defendant knew or should have known in this respect. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 1155, 1160 (5th Cir.1993). Finally, we must determine whether the district court's finding of unusual vulnerab[ility] was plausible in light of the record as a whole. See Scurlock, at 542. 17 In the instant case, the district court concluded that Ozen was unusually vulnerable because of his age--unusually vulnerable, because he's being faced by a fellow who is, perhaps, bigger, certainly older, more experienced, more knowledgeable, more mature, supposedly, as to what he might be able to do to him or with him. Additionally, it was brought to the district court's attention that Ozen had previously been employed by Kuban, adding yet another nuance to the relationship between these two individuals. Although the issue is indeed a close one, and the concept of vulnerability has arguably been taken virtually to its outer limits, nevertheless, in light of all the foregoing circumstances and the deference due the district court, we ultimately conclude that its application of section 3A1.1 must stand. 18