Opinion ID: 526161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: appeal on cross claims

Text: 125 Mr. Melton appeals the trial court's actions in (a) directing a verdict on his RICO claim, (b) instructing the jury concerning the section 1985 claim, and (c) striking the punitive damage awards. 126
127 We find no merit in Mr. Melton's claim that the trial court erred in its handling of the RICO claim. It is true that the trial court improperly intimated that RICO was inappropriate because the actions of the Oklahoma City Police Department could not be likened to a gangster situation. In United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2529, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. However, we hold that in this case the trial court's misstatement constitutes harmless error. The plaintiff failed to establish the elements required for a RICO violation with respect to each defendant. Consequently, the district court properly refused to allow the RICO claim to go to the jury. 128 Mr. Melton alleged that defendants violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, which prohibits actions in obstruction of justice. However, to establish this offense plaintiff must prove that each defendant had a specific intent to impede the administration of justice. United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850, 99 S.Ct. 153, 58 L.Ed.2d 152 (1978). We find no evidence in the record to support such an intent. In our view, neither the Internal Affairs investigation of Mr. Melton nor the convening of the Disciplinary Review Board was undertaken with the intent to obstruct justice. Although we have held that Mr. Melton's dismissal and the circumstances attending it constituted a violation of his First Amendment and Due Process rights, that is a significantly different proposition from intentional interference with the administration of justice. We hold that the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict on the RICO claim. 129
130 The essence of plaintiff's objection is that the trial court refused to adopt the wording in plaintiff's proposed instruction. It is well established that although  'a party is, upon proper request, entitled to an instruction upon his theory of the case if there is evidence to support it, a party is not entitled to have the jury instructed in the particular language of its choice.'  United States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir.1987) (quoting Wegerer v. First Commodity Corp., 744 F.2d 719, 723 (10th Cir.1984) (citations omitted)). 131 We have reviewed the instruction at issue and conclude that it was not erroneous as a matter of law. While the instruction may not have been as specific in its application of the law to the facts as plaintiff desired, the instruction correctly stated the law. We do not believe the instruction, as given, mislead or confused the jury. We also find no merit in plaintiff's contention that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict for plaintiff on the section 1985(2) claim. 132
133 We have already held that, with some exceptions, the individual defendants are entitled to the qualified immunity protection provided by Harlow. 41 Since good faith immunity precludes liability for actual damages, we find no basis for a punitive damage award on the First Amendment claim. Cf. Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 477 (10th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed.2d 917 (1986) (no punitive damage award where issue should not have been submitted to jury in the first place). 134 With respect to the property interest claim (retired officer status), we have held that only the City and Chief Gramling must face a new trial on this issue. Because the other individual defendants were not parties to the deprivation of plaintiff's property interest in his status as a retired officer, they, of course, cannot be liable for punitive damages. 135 Liability for punitive damages can only be found, if at all, against Chief Gramling for the deprivation of plaintiff's property interest and against the individual defendants who contributed to the deprivation of Mr. Melton's liberty interest. Just because public officials make mistakes in judgment in the performance of their duties sufficient to subject them to liability for actual damages does not automatically create a basis for a punitive award. The standard for the award of punitive damages is whether defendants acted with ill will, desire to injure, reckless indifference, or malice. Lavicky, 758 F.2d at 477. Our review of the record does not show such malice, ill will, or reckless disregard for Mr. Melton's rights as to meet this standard. For example, it is clear that when Mr. Melton's reputation was stigmatized by dissemination of the perjury charges, defendants should have afforded him a name-clearing hearing. However, we do not discern any malice in the Review Board's refusal to address the perjury charge. If anything, it was probably an effort to not base disciplinary action on the unproven allegations of a third party. 136 Therefore, at most, the impairment of Mr. Melton's liberty interest arose from the officials' lack of familiarity with due process requirements. However, [o]fficials cannot be held for punitive damages simply because they did not know the rules of conduct they should follow. Simple ignorance of the applicable legal rules, even arrogant ignorance, does not by itself indicate reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights. Lavicky, 758 F.2d at 477. In light of the governing standard and the facts of this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting judgment n.o.v. on the issue of punitive damages.