Opinion ID: 2338714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Issues In General

Text: Counsel were making two arguments: (1) that another recent, similar crime involving Hungerfordand involving accomplices other than Samuels and Newmangave Hungerford a motive to lie to protect her accomplices, and thus she was a biased witness subject not only to cross-examination about the prior crime but also to impeachment with extrinsic evidence of it; and (2) that extrinsic evidence of this other crime also was admissible as defensive or reverse Drew [6] evidence, meaning that evidence of a recent, similar crime with a distinct modus operandiwhich the defendant could be shown not to have committedwas admissible as tending to prove that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged. See Groves v. United States, 564 A.2d 372, 378 n. 15 (D.C.1989), amended, 574 A.2d 265 (D.C.1990). Akin to defensive or reverse Drew evidenceand sometimes properly characterized as a subset of such evidenceis so-called Winfield [7] (formerly Brown/Beale ) [8] evidence. Winfield evidence tends to show that someone other than the defendant was the real culprit. As elaborated below, Winfield evidence may, but does not necessarily, reflect that someone other than the defendant had committed another crime like the one before the court; but even when a prior crime is not involved, the evidence can be admissible because the proffered motive and opportunity to commit the crime are probative of criminality in the way that Drew or reverse Drew evidence is probative. From the colloquy among court and counsel, it is clear that the prosecutor and the judge recognized that the defense proffer purported to embrace Brown/Beale (now Winfield ) evidence, whereas defense counsel stressed the Drew terminologyperhaps because the proffer concerned a crime, not less culpable behavior as is sometimes proffered in a Winfield situation. We believe it appropriate under the circumstances to analyze the defense proffer not only under the bias and reverse Drew headings but also under Winfield, since the trial judge recognized that such an issue (identified by the prosecutor as Brown /Beale ) was in the case, and further because this court, sitting en banc, for all practical purposes folded Winfield evidence into the reverse Drew category. See Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1, 4, 7 (D.C.1996) (en banc); Morris v. United States, 622 A.2d 1116, 1127 (D.C.1993). We turn first to bias, then to reverse Drew/Winfield.