Opinion ID: 173724
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timing Claim

Text: Fernández also presents an unconvincing claim that the district court committed reversible error in failing to rule on his motion to suppress before trial. Because Fernández raises this claim for the first time on appeal, we review it for plain error. United States v. Rodriguez-Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir.2009). To satisfy the plain error standard, Fernández must show an error that was plain (i.e., obvious and clear under current law), prejudicial (i.e., affected the outcome of the district court proceedings), and that seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Rivera Calderon, 578 F.3d 78, 95 (1st Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1107, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 524 F.3d 71, 76 (1st Cir. 2008)). Although Fernández points to the fact that Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(d) ordinarily requires a motion to suppress to be resolved before trial, he cites no case law to support his claim that a delayed suppression ruling can give rise to a due process violation. This failure alone has doomed other claims that were subject to plain error review. See, e.g., United States v. Marcano, 525 F.3d 72, 74 (1st Cir.2008); United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 480 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir.2007). Moreover, Fernández has failed to present a persuasive argument that he was prejudiced by the timing of the court's suppression ruling. Without evidence of prejudice, Fernández simply cannot succeed on a claim that is subject to plain error review. See United States v. Perez-Cruz, 558 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 183, 175 L.Ed.2d 115 (2009).