Opinion ID: 729753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to use inconsistent identification testimony.

Text: 54 Berryman's conviction rested solely on the victim's uncorroborated out-of-court identification, and her in-court identification two years later. As noted above, this case resulted in a total of four trials. Bludson was tried twice (and was ultimately acquitted), and Berryman and Bunch were jointly tried twice. In each trial, Campos testified that the defendants played the following roles: 55 Bunch -- the first man with the knife who forced his way into her car at the traffic light. 56 Bludson -- the second man to get into her car at the traffic light. 57 Berryman -- the third man who waited in the blue car at the supermarket parking lot. 58 The height of the three defendants is critical. Bunch, at 6'4 is the tallest. Berryman is next and is of average height at 5'10. Bludson is the shortest at 5'5. Thus Berryman is nearly half a foot taller than Bludson, and half a foot shorter than Bunch. Bunch, in turn, towers over Bludson, as he is nearly a full foot taller. 59 In the first Bludson trial, Campos testified that Bunch, the man with the knife, was approximately 5'11. At that same trial, Campos testified that Bludson, the short man, was 5'10 and was the same size as Bunch. She described Berryman as being the shortest. 60 In the second Bludson trial, apparently realizing the problems with her identification testimony, Campos retreated from that testimony and was effectively cross-examined on that issue. Because it goes to the heart of our analysis, we review that testimony at some length. 61 Q: Well, how tall was the man with the knife? [Bunch] 62 A: I can't tell you how tall he was. I know he was the tallest. He wasn't that tall but he was taller than both of them, than him and the other one. 63 Q: The second man who got in the car, how tall was he? 64 A: The second man? 65 Q: Yes. 66 A: That's him. 67 Q: How tall was he? 68 A: I don't know. I don't know. I can't tell how tall he was. 69 Q: Before today you have been asked how tall he was, haven't you? 70 A: Right. 71 Q: And haven't you said about 5'10? 72 A: Yes, I told you that, 5'8, 5'10, I am not sure if he's that height. 73 Q: And didn't you say that the first man was about 5'11? 74 A: About that. 75 Q: And the third man -- 76 [interruption by the Court] 77 Q: And the third man, you said was about 5'4? 78 A: The third? 79 Q: Yes, the third man. 80 A: The third man. I don't know what I said how tall he was because I told him before and I'm telling you right now I don't know. 81 Q: Weren't the first and second men about the same size, about 5'10, 5'11? 82 A: The first man -- 83 [lengthy objection by the State which is overruled by the Court] 84 Q: Were not the first man with the knife and the second man who got in the car, weren't they about the same height, about 5'10, 5'11? 85 A: The both of them that got in the car first? 86 Q: Yes. The two men that got in the car first. 87 A: No. The other one was a little bit taller than him. Not much but he was the tallest, like I said. 88 Q: Well, do you recall we had a hearing back on July 17 and you were in a courtroom like this and we had a hearing? 89 A: Yes. 90 Q: Do you recall being asked 'Was he taller or shorter than the man with the knife?' Do you remember being asked that question? 91 A: Yes. 92 Q: And do you remember answering, 'I think the same size.' 93 A: No, I never said that -- I said he was the tallest, the other one maybe I said the same size but I never said he was -- I remember what I said. 94 Q: And the third man was much shorter than those two, is that right? 95 A: The third guy? 96 Q: Yes. 97 A: Yes. 98 Q: And do you remember at that hearing you testified when you said how tall he was? 99 A: Yes. 100 Q: And I think you said 6 feet. 101 A: I told you about 6 feet. I don't know. 102 Q: And stand up, Mr. Bludson. How tall did you say -- I asked you how tall Mr. Bludson was? 103 THE COURT: You mean as she views him standing now? 104 DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes. 105 A: I told you I don't know but I said -- I remember I said about 5'9, 5'10. 106 Q: Well, looking at him now, how tall do you think he is? 107 A: 5'7. I don't know. I don't know. 108 (A16-18). 109 The district court noted that the descriptions of the three men given by Campos in the second Bludson trial differed radically from the actual height of each man, and differed from the identification testimony she gave at the first Bludson trial. Dist. Ct. Op. at 18. The court further noted that despite the inconsistencies in Campos' descriptions, petitioner's counsel never attempted to use the prior testimony to impeach Campos' identification of Berryman at the second trial. Id. at 19. 110 Incredibly, when trial counsel explained his failure to use the inconsistent testimony to impeach Campos' identification of Berryman he said that it as a minor one because [t]here were a lot of major and substantial discrepancies in her story. Id. As the district court correctly noted, that explanation simply does not wash. 111 Petitioner's counsel had in his hands material for a devastating cross-examination of Campos on the critical issue in the case. Because of his failure to confront her with her prior sworn testimony, the jury did not learn that she had previously described the height of her attackers under oath, that she had previously recanted prior testimony given under oath and that her prior descriptions were very different from her testimony at the Bunch/Berryman trial. 112 Id. 113 We agree. The district court correctly ruled that the state appellate court erred in minimizing the importance of this discrepancy. The Appellate Division held [w]e conclude [that the lower court's] ruling has a reasonable basis in the record and that the failure to emphasize the victim's discrepancies regarding the height of her assailant. . . was neither fatally deficient nor prejudicial. (slip op. at 23). The district court concluded [t]here is no way in which the failure to confront Campos with her prior inconsistent identification testimony can be justified as sound trial strategy or a reasonable strategic choice. It was an error of law for the state courts to have so held. Dist. Ct. Op. at 22. Indeed, it borders on the inconceivable that a trial attorney would fail to inform a jury of Ms. Campos' prior problems with this identification whether or not he or she was also arguing that the rape had been fabricated. The reliability of this victim's uncorroborated identification of Berryman cuts directly to the heart of the only evidence against Berryman. Mr. DePalma failed to use it. That failure simply can not be condoned as reasonable trial strategy. The district court correctly concluded that it was wholly unreasonable. 114