Opinion ID: 1957611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the UCCJL

Text: Although a court's general subject matter jurisdiction is established by the Louisiana constitution or by legislation, the UCCJL functions to graft a second tier of inquiry onto the question of jurisdiction in custody cases. Amin v. Bakhaty, 01-1967 (La.10/16/01), 798 So.2d 75, 80. The UCCJL imposes jurisdictional limitations that require a court that has general subject matter jurisdiction to decline to exercise it. Id. These limitations further the UCCJL's stated purposes, including avoiding jurisdictional competition, assuring that custody litigation takes place in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where relevant evidence is located, promoting a stable home environment, deterring abductions, and encouraging cooperation among the courts of different states. La.Rev. Stat. 13:1700(A); Revere v. Revere, 389 So.2d 1277, 1279 (La.1980) (discussing the UCCJL's purposes). Consistent with these stated goals, the UCCJL provides four grounds for exercising jurisdiction in a custody case, two of which are relevant here: (1) the forum's status as the child's home state, and (2) jurisdiction based on the existence of a significant connection between the forum, the child, and at least one parent. La.Rev.Stat. 13:1702(A)(1)-(2). For a court to exercise jurisdiction on the basis of either of the above grounds, the child need not be present in the forum state. Id. 13:1702(C). And, although the child's presence in the forum state is desirable, that presence alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. 13:1702(B). Thus, although the UCCJL analysis is technically relevant to a court's subject matter jurisdiction, the choice of the optimum jurisdiction to resolve custody battles under the UCCJL focuses on the strength of connections between the child and the competing states, more akin to a personal jurisdiction analysis. Amin, 798 So.2d at 80-81. Because of this focus, this court has rejected the notion that the UCCJL requires deference to the home state in every case. Id. at 82 (citing Revere, 389 So.2d at 1279-80). Rather, jurisdiction may exist concurrently in two different states under the home state and significant connection standards. Where two states possess concurrent jurisdiction, this court has directed that the forum conduct a comparative determination regarding which jurisdiction will serve the best interests of the child. Id. at 83. This determination of the child's best interest is well within the exclusive province of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Anderson, 01-53 (La.3/29/05), 788 So.2d 676. In addition, where concurrent jurisdiction exists, the forum court may consider priority of filing. Revere, 389 So.2d at 1280. Louisiana cannot exercise jurisdiction as Anna's home state in this case, because California is her statutory home state. The UCCJL generally defines home state as the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months. La.Rev.Stat. 13:1701(5). Where the child is less than six months old, as Anna was at the time of filing, home state is defined as the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Id. In this case, Anna lived from birth in California with both of her parents for the first five weeks of her life. Thus, California was Anna's home state for purposes of the UCCJL, and Anna's residence in Louisiana for one week with her mother before filing did not change this. Although Louisiana does not qualify to exercise home state jurisdiction, Louisiana nevertheless may possess jurisdiction to determine Anna's custody under the UCCJL on the basis of a significant connection. To exercise jurisdiction on this basis, the UCCJL requires proof that [i]t is in the best interest of the child that a [Louisiana court] assume jurisdiction because (1) Anna and at least one of her parents have a significant connection with Louisiana, and (2) there is available in [Louisiana] substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Id. 13:1702(A)(2). Whether there is a significant connection should be determined based on the available evidence at the time of filing. See, e.g., Lopez, 661 So.2d at 668 (considering evidence of significant connection existing at the time of filing of the custody action). And, the goal of the significant connection inquiry is to determine which state has superior access to relevant evidence. Revere, 389 So.2d at 1279-80. We find that it is in Anna's best interest in this case for Louisiana to exercise jurisdiction to determine custody on the basis of a significant connection. The first statutory requirement is satisfied, because Anna and her mother have a significant connection to Louisiana. Ms. Stelluto is a New Orleans native, who left Louisiana for California only to marry Mr. Stelluto, a California domiciliary, and who returned to New Orleans a mere 13 months later. While she was in California, Ms. Stelluto maintained her Louisiana driver's license and her Louisiana nursing license. And, Ms. Stelluto was only employed in California briefly, as her difficult pregnancy required her to remain in her home. Anna likewise had a significant connection to Louisiana for purposes of the UCCJL. As the district court judge and the dissenting judge in the court of appeal emphasized, Anna was only weeks old before this custody suit was filed. Although she lived in California longer than she lived in Louisiana (five weeks in California compared to one week in Louisiana), her capacity to form any independent connection to any jurisdiction was limited. Anna's entire experience of the world at such a young age was filtered through her primary caregiver, her mother. Moreover, Anna's connection to her mother, a Louisiana native, was quite literal, as Anna was still breast-feeding at the time Ms. Stelluto brought her to Louisiana. Thus, Anna was connected, by virtue of her relationship with her mother, to Louisiana. This relationship, combined with Anna's one-week residence in the state, and the presence of her maternal grandmother (who also provided care for Anna for two of the five weeks she lived in California), suffices to establish a significant connection to Louisiana. This case is distinguishable from other decisions involving older children in which residence in Louisiana for periods ranging from one day to just over a month did not suffice to establish significant connection jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amin, 798 So.2d at 81 (finding that six-year-old child's residence in Louisiana for one month before filing did not establish a significant connection to Louisiana); Young, 670 So.2d at 690 (finding that an infant's residence in Louisiana for one day with her father was not sufficient to confer significant connection jurisdiction); Lopez, 661 So.2d at 668 (finding that two-year-old child's residence in Louisiana for 37 days before filing was not sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction). Here, Anna's infancy and the primacy of her relationship to her primary caregiver, her mother, render Anna's connection to Louisiana based on living here one week more significant than it would have been in the case of an older child. See Gray, 572 So.2d at 343 (holding that the trial court did not manifestly err in determining that Louisiana could exercise significant connection jurisdiction over custody of a one-year-old child who had lived in Louisiana with her primary caretaker for 41 days at the time of filing). Moreover, roughly equivalent evidence relating to Anna's future care, protection, training, and personal relationships was available in Louisiana as in California. As Anna was not of school age, and school records were not available, the most significant evidence relevant to determining her custody concerned her family relationships of longstanding. Revere, 389 So.2d at 1281. Anna's mother and maternal grandmother, her primary caregivers up to the time of filing, both lived in Louisiana. Although Anna's father and paternal relatives lived in California, we find that fact does not demonstrate that California possessed superior access to evidence. And, we note also that the Louisiana custody action was filed first, which tends to bolster the Louisiana court's jurisdiction. Thus, we reverse the court of appeal and hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Louisiana could exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJL to determine custody of Anna on the basis of significant connections. [6] We note that this decision is not substantive, and does not bear on the question of which parent should be ultimately awarded custody of Anna. Rather, we merely decide that the Orleans Parish district court is the appropriate forum to determine Anna's custody.