Opinion ID: 1593692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First-Degree Burglary Instruction

Text: Cooper's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court plainly erred in submitting Instruction No. 5, the verdict director for first-degree burglary, because it did not contain all of the essential elements of the offense charged and the missing element, that Cooper knowingly entered Victim's house unlawfully, was disputed at trial. Cooper argues this omission resulted in manifest injustice and a miscarriage of justice because the improper burglary instruction very likely affected the jury's verdict. Instruction No. 5 provided: As to Count I [Burglary], if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that on or about October 26, 2003, in [St. Louis, Missouri], the defendant knowingly entered in an inhabitable structure at [Busby's address] and possessed by [Busby], and Second, that defendant did so for the purpose of committing the crime of assault therein, and Third, that while the defendant was in the inhabitable structure he was armed with a deadly weapon, then you will find the defendant guilty under Count I of burglary in the first degree. However, unless you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of these propositions, you must find the defendant not guilty of that offense. As used in this instruction, assault means purposely or knowingly placing or attempting to place another in fear of physical harm. This instruction is identical to MAI-CR 323.25, the burglary in the first-degree instruction, except that it omits the word unlawfully from the phrase defendant knowingly entered unlawfully. A verdict-directing instruction must contain each element of the offense charged and must require the jury to find every fact necessary to constitute essential elements of [the] offense charged. State v. Doolittle, 896 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Mo. banc 1995); State v. Krause, 682 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo.App.1985) (reversing defendant's conviction for first-degree burglary because verdict director omitted the word knowingly). A violation of due process arises when an instruction relieves the State of its burden of proving each and every element of the crime and allows the State to obtain a conviction without the jury deliberating on and determining any contested elements of that crime. State v. Ferguson, 887 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Mo. banc 1994). A verdict directing instruction that omits an essential element rises to the level of plain error if the evidence establishing the omitted element was seriously disputed. State v. White, 92 S.W.3d 183, 192 (Mo.App. 2003). On the other hand, if the evidence establishing the omitted element was not in dispute, the jury's verdict would not have been affected and no plain error relief need be given. See, e.g., State v. Nolan, 872 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Mo. banc 1994); State v. Busch, 920 S.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Mo.App.1996). Under section 569.160, a person commits the crime of burglary in the first degree if he knowingly enters unlawfully or knowingly remains unlawfully in a building or inhabitable structure for the purpose of committing a crime therein. (emphasis added). Thus, the State had the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Cooper not only knowingly entered Busby's house for the purpose of committing assault therein, but also that his entry into Busby's house was unlawful. Therefore, there is no doubt that the omission of unlawfully in Instruction No. 5 was erroneous under Rule 28.02(c). The only question, then, is whether the evidence establishing Cooper's entry to the house was seriously disputed. In that regard, a person 'enters unlawfully or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so. Sec. 569.010(8). When a person has the consent of a resident to enter the home, he is not guilty of burglary, regardless of what other crimes he may have committed therein. State v. Chandler, 635 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. banc 1982). Whether Cooper entered Busby's house unlawfully was indeed in serious dispute during trial. While Busby testified that Cooper forced his way into the house, Cooper testified that he talked with Busby at his front door and that Busby gestured for him to go inside, and further, that just as he was in Busby's doorway, he turned, saw that Busby had a gun drawn, reached for the gun, and the struggle ensued. While this Court acknowledges that there are facts in the record that could persuade a jury that Cooper entered Busby's home forcefully and without Busby's consent, and thus unlawfully, the jury was not asked to make that determination. It may well be that the jury would have determined that despite the fact that Cooper entered Busby's house with the purpose of committing an assault, the entry itself was made with Busby's consent, and thus lawfully. There is simply no way to know. Moreover, the concern is even greater given the fact that the jury failed to convict Cooper on the other two offenses charged, which is indicative that the jury disbelieved or found insufficient at least some of the evidence presented by the State. Nonetheless, the State argues that the jury, by finding that [Cooper] entered for the purpose of assaulting [Busby], necessarily rejected [Cooper's] story that he was innocently visiting just to talk with [Busby.] As the state explains, [e]ven if the jury did not believe [Busby's] entire account, since they found that [Cooper] went into [Busby's] home for the purpose of committing assault, it is very unlikely that they would have found that the entry was lawful. The State concludes that it is improbable that the omission of the word unlawfully from the verdict director affected the verdict. Based on this reasoning, however, the State would be impermissibly relieved of its burden of proving all of the essential elements of an offense. The State's argument would also render an essential element of the offense superfluous, as a conviction for burglary requires distinct findings of both unlawful entry and intent to commit a crime therein. The State also cites State v. Busch, 920 S.W.2d at 565, and State v. Nolan, 872 S.W.2d at 99, in support of the argument that the omission of an essential element in this case did not affect the jury's verdict. These cases are inapposite. In both Busch and Nolan , the omission did not affect the jury's verdict because, unlike the case at hand, the evidence establishing the missing element was not in dispute. Busch was a first-degree murder case in which the verdict director failed to include the element of deliberation, and the court held there was no plain error because [d]efendant did not dispute the issue of deliberation, rather, he implied he did not participate in the murder at all. 920 S.W.2d at 570. In Nolan , another burglary case, the verdict director did not specify the crime that the defendant intended to commit in entering a premises unlawfully, but stated only that defendant intended to commit a crime. 872 S.W.2d at 102. This Court held that there was no plain error because the defense, in pertinent part, was that defendant did not intend to commit any crime at all, thus obviating the need to specify the crime. Id. at 103. Thus, in neither Busch nor Nolan would the mistake in omitting an element have affected the jury's verdict. For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds that the omission of the essential element unlawfully in Instruction No. 5 was plainly erroneous, resulting in manifest injustice. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. All concur.