Opinion ID: 2633564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: determining the validity of a waiver

Text: ¶ 40 While we have urged that trial courts engage in an on-the-record colloquy with defendants to ensure that they are aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, we have not imposed an absolute requirement that they do so. Rather, we have recognized that the validity of a defendant's waiver turns upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case. ¶ 41 Relying on admittedly confusing language from some of our prior cases, the court of appeals stated that, in the absence of a colloquy, appellate courts are required to conduct a de novo review of the record to determine the validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel only in extraordinary circumstances. It then concluded that it need not evaluate Pedockie's case for such extraordinary circumstances because there is simply nothing in the record to persuade us that [Pedockie's] waiver was knowing and intelligent. [41] ¶ 42 We take this opportunity to clarify our prior case law regarding appellate review in cases involving waiver of the right to counsel. As previously stated, before we will accept a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel, we have required that he be aware of the dangers and disadvantages[ ] of self-representation, [42] and we continue to strongly recommend a colloquy on the record as the preferred method of determining whether a defendant is aware of these risks. Indeed, a trial court generally cannot determine a defendant's understanding without engaging in the penetrating questioning found in a colloquy. [43] The sixteen-point colloquy found in State v. Frampton [44] establishes a sound framework for efficient and complete questioning. Moreover, on appeal, such a colloquy provides the reviewing court with `an objective basis for review' upon the almost inevitable challenge to the waiver by the defendant who proceeds pro se and is subsequently convicted. [45] ¶ 43 In declining to review the record de novo, the court of appeals relied on State v. Heaton , where we held that a reviewing court could engage in de novo review only in extraordinary circumstances. [46] But in two cases following Heaton, we found that de novo review was appropriate in the absence of a colloquy and never indicated that such a review was dependent on the existence of extraordinary circumstances. [47] We now clarify that it is not. ¶ 44 When this court stated in Heaton that a de novo review was appropriate only in extraordinary circumstances, we cited the Ninth Circuit case of Harding v. Lewis. [48] But the Harding court actually allowed for de novo review absent a colloquy; it only explained that a valid waiver absent a colloquy should rarely be found. [49] Our mistaken interpretation of Harding, combined with the fact that Heaton is inconsistent with this court's more recent decisions, suggests the need for us to rearticulate the procedure to be followed by reviewing courts when evaluating the validity of a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel in the absence of a colloquy. [50] ¶ 45 Absent a colloquy on the record, a reviewing court should review the record de novo to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. De novo review is appropriate because the validity of a waiver does not turn upon whether the trial judge actually conducted the colloquy, [51] but upon whether the defendant understood the consequences of waiver. [52] A de novo review allows a reviewing court to analyze the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case to make that determination. [53] But we pause to note that, considering the strong presumption against waiver and the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, any doubts must be resolved in favor of the defendant. We therefore anticipate that reviewing courts will rarely find a valid waiver of the right to counsel absent a colloquy.