Opinion ID: 184305
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Causation

Text: The standard of proof for causation in Jones Act cases has been recited many times in this circuit’s precedent. Our most definitive statement of the law is found in Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, where the en banc court articulated the standard as follows: 1 In its brief, KBR asserted a fourth error—that the district court erred in concluding that it was liable to the Clark Estate under the Jones Act—but makes no arguments in support of this contention other than the three asserted underlying errors described in this paragraph. We therefore need not and do not address this argument separately. 4 Case: 09-41190 Document: 00511372672 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/04/2011 No. 09-41190 A seaman is entitled to recovery under the Jones Act . . . if his employer’s negligence is the cause, in whole or in part, of his injury. In their earlier articulations of [this standard of] liability, courts had replaced the phrase “in whole or in part” with the adjective “slightest.” In Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957), the Supreme Court used the term “slightest” to describe the reduced standard of causation between the employer’s negligence and the employee’s injury in [Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”)] cases. In Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957), the Court applied the same standard to a Jones Act case, writing, “‘Under this statute the test of a jury case is simply whether the proofs justify with reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.’” (quoting Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506). 107 F.3d 331, 335 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc). We have explained that the standard is one of “producing cause” rather than “proximate cause” and that the burden of proof is “featherweight.” Chisholm v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1982). Thus, two concepts come into play here – the type of causation that must be shown (producing) and the plaintiff’s burden to show that cause (featherweight). KBR argues that the court’s precedents reflect a misapprehension of the statute and contends that Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Norfolk Southern Railway v. Sorrell rejects the producing cause standard in favor of the usual proximate cause requirement. See 549 U.S. 158, 173 & n. (2007) (Souter, J., concurring). The concurrence, while suggestive of the direction that the Court might head in the future, is not the law we must follow; the opinion of the Court in Sorrell declined to reach the standard-of-causation issue, see id. at 163–65 (noting that the Court had not granted certiorari on the question of the standard for causation), 171–72 (“The question presented in this case is a narrow one, and we see no need to do more than answer that question in today’s 5 Case: 09-41190 Document: 00511372672 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/04/2011 No. 09-41190 decision.”),2 and we are bound to follow our circuit’s clear precedent on this question absent a contrary holding from the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc.3 We are therefore obliged to hold that the district court committed no error of law in identifying the standard and burden of proof of causation applicable to this case.4