Opinion ID: 1404685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dangerousness

Text: Hubbart contends that the Act violates due process because persons subject to its terms need not pose a serious threat of harm to the community at the time of commitment. According to Hubbart, section 6600, subdivision (a) permits classification and confinement as an SVP based on the mere likelihood that someone who has committed sexually violent offenses in the past might commit similar crimes at some unspecified time in the future. Hubbart suggests that absent language explicitly stating that the requisite danger must exist at the present time, the definition of an SVP is flawed because it can be read broadly to include persons who pose only a remote or speculative threat of harm. While due process precludes the involuntary commitment of mentally impaired persons who are not in any sense dangerous ( O'Connor, supra, 422 U.S. 563, 575, 95 S.Ct. 2486), the United States Supreme Court has never directly defined the term. Assuming dangerousness is measured for constitutional purposes along the lines suggested by Hubbart, no flaw in the relevant statutory language appears. (See Conservatorship of Hofferber, supra, 28 Cal.3d 161, 176-178, 167 Cal.Rptr. 854, 616 P.2d 836 [engrafting a current dangerousness requirement onto LPS statute authorizing conservatorship for incompetent defendants]; People v. Superior Court (Myers ) (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 826, 830, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 32 [recognizing MDO law requires present dangerousness as condition of commitment].) Section 6600, subdivision (a) defines an SVP as a convicted sex offender who  has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (Italics added.) As we have seen, a diagnosed mental disorder is defined, in turn, as a condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity and predispos[ing] the person to commit criminal sex acts in a degree constituting the person a menace to the health and safety of others. ( Id., subd. (c).) Prior qualifying sex crimes are used as evidence in determining whether the person named in the petition is an SVP beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id., subds. (a) & (b); see § 6604.) However, the verdict cannot be based on prior crimes absent evidence of a  currently diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (§ 6600, subd. (a), italics added.) Contrary to what Hubbart suggests, the statute clearly requires the trier of fact to find that an SVP is dangerous at the time of commitment. The statutory criteria are expressed in the present tense, indicating that each must exist at the time the verdict is rendered. In addition, a person cannot be adjudged an SVP unless he currently suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder which prevents him from controlling sexually violent behavior, and which makes him dangerous and likely to reoffend. (§ 6600, subd. (a).) By defining the qualifying mental disorder in this fashion, the statute makes clear that it is the present inability to control sexually violent behavior which gives rise to the likelihood that more crimes will occur, and which makes the SVP dangerous if not confined. The danger and threat of harm posed to community necessarily exist whenever such a mental disorder is found  a finding required for commitment as an SVP. Nothing in the statute permits the trier of fact to conclude that the committed person currently suffers from a diagnosed mental disorder and is a danger, even though he is not likely to commit sexually violent crimes and does not pose a present and substantial threat to public safety. [25] As we have seen, Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072, authorizes involuntary commitment under the foregoing circumstances. There, the statutory criteria for commitment as a sexual predator were substantially similar to section 6600 of the SVPA. The Kansas scheme applied to sex offenders who suffer from a mental disorder which impairs their ability to control sexually violent conduct and which `makes the person likely to engage in sexually violent crimes. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 352, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) The high court approved this statutory formula even though dangerousness was expressed in terms of a qualifying mental disorder giving rise to a likelihood of future criminal conduct. [The statute] requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding to the existence of a [mental disorder] that makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior. ( Id. at p. 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.) [26] Moreover, nothing in Hendricks or the cases on which it relied suggests that a commitment scheme must require the trier of fact to pinpoint the time at which future injury is likely to occur if the person is not confined. Nor is there any authority for Hubbart's suggestion that a person is not dangerous and cannot be involuntarily confined on mental health grounds unless the State proves he would otherwise inflict harm immediately upon release. For reasons we have explained, an SVP constitutes a present and substantial threat to public safety under the definition set forth in section 6600, subdivisions (a) and (c). We decline to invalidate the statutory scheme simply because it is not phrased in the precise manner urged by Hubbart. In a related vein, Hubbart criticizes the Act because it authorizes the use of prior qualifying sex crimes to prove that the alleged predator is mentally disordered and dangerous. Hubbart suggests that this method of establishing the likelihood of future criminal conduct is inherently flawed, and that the statute does little more than establish a presumption of danger based on past crimes. We disagree. Notwithstanding the nuances of psychiatric diagnosis and the difficulties inherent in predicting human behavior, the United States Supreme Court has consistently upheld commitment schemes authorizing the use of prior dangerous behavior to establish both present mental impairment and the likelihood of future harm. ( Hendricks, supra, 521 U.S. 346, 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072; Heller, supra, 509 U.S. 312, 323, 113 S.Ct. 2637; Allen, supra, 478 U.S. 364, 371, 106 S.Ct 2988; Minnesota v. Probate Court, supra, 309 U.S. 270, 274, 60 S.Ct. 523.) Here too, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the evidentiary methods contemplated by the Act are sufficiently reliable and accurate to accomplish its narrow and important purpose  confining and treating mentally disordered individuals who have demonstrated their inability to control specific sexually violent behavior through the commission of similar prior crimes. As noted, the Act precludes commitment based solely on evidence of such prior crimes. (§ 6600, subd. (a).) We find no patent due process violation on this ground.