Opinion ID: 665566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession of Cocaine and Cocaine Base with Intent to Distribute Convictions--Falconer

Text: 67 Falconer argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts Two and Three of the Indictment, possession of cocaine base and cocaine with intent to distribute. There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if,  'reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 829 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)). 68 The essential elements of a possession charge depend on the theory of possession employed. In the Ninth Circuit, 69 A conviction for possession with intent to distribute narcotics may be based on one of three legal theories: (1) co-conspirator liability, United States v. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. 640, 645-47 [ ] (1946), (2) aiding and abetting, United States v. Savinovich, 845 F.2d 834, 838 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 [ ] (1988), and (3) exercising dominion and control over the contraband. United States v. Behanna, 814 F.2d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir.1987). 70 United States v. Sanchez-Mata, 925 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir.1991). In Falconer's case, the government relied primarily on co-conspirator liability. Under that theory, 71 A party to an unlawful conspiracy may be held responsible for substantive offenses committed by his co-conspirators in furtherance of the unlawful project, even if the party himself did not participate directly in the commission of the substantive offense. 72 United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1019 (9th Cir.1987). However, the substantive offense committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy must have been reasonably foreseeable to defendant. United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Garcia, 909 F.2d 1346, 1350 n. 1 (9th Cir.1990). 73 The government also argued that Falconer had constructive dominion and control (hence possession) over the cocaine and cocaine base. See United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 705, 709 (9th Cir.1991). 74 Constructive possession may be shown by proof that the defendant had an ability to produce the drug through the use of agents.... [or] that the defendant participated in a joint venture, and thus shared dominion and control over the contraband. 75 Id. at 709-710 (citations omitted). 76 Regarding the cocaine found on August 5 in the apartment at 209 East 62nd Street, Falconer argues that he had not been in the apartment since July 29. He contends that the government has failed to prove that the cocaine found in the apartment on August 5 was the same batch from which Falconer sold CI Martin $100 worth. He concludes that there is no evidence that he had dominion and control over the cocaine seized on August 5. 77 However, the government proved at trial that Falconer took part in a cocaine distribution conspiracy with Ross and Thigpen, and Falconer does not appeal his conspiracy conviction. One undisputed element of the conspiracy was to cook, bag, and sell cocaine from the apartment--that much can be gleaned from Falconer's signed statement alone. The cocaine recovered in the apartment consisted of (1) a flower pot bowl containing packages wrapped for sale, (2) a dish of rock cocaine (with a razor blade) on the kitchen table, and (3) a vial of crack cocaine also on the kitchen table. CI Martin specifically reported that Falconer had sold her a $100 bag of cocaine from the flower pot bowl. Falconer's statement mentions that the conspirators kept cut up cocaine on the table for sale in small amounts. 78 The government's failure to prove Falconer had been in the apartment since July 29 is thus irrelevant. There is no question that Falconer knew or should have known that his co-conspirators would continue selling cocaine there in his absence--that was the purpose of the conspiracy. His possession with intent to distribute conviction for the cocaine found at the apartment (Count 2) must therefore be affirmed. 79 A similar result obtains with respect to Falconer's possession of the 1,971 grams of cocaine found in a locked closet at Ross's house (Count 3). The relevant inquiry is whether a co-conspirator's possession of a large amount of cocaine at a stash house was reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances. We think it was. Indeed, Falconer's own statement indicates that Cass regularly purchased much more cocaine than was found at the apartment; it is a reasonable inference that the excess was being cached somewhere nearby. Moreover, because the inquiry goes to foreseeability rather than actual knowledge, Ross' statements that he was keeping the cocaine for Juan, and that nobody else knew about it, are not dispositive here. Finally, the cases Falconer cites in support of his position are not on point because the defendants there were not convicted on conspiracy charges. See United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Ramirez, 880 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.1989). We find that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury finding that Falconer knew or reasonably should have known that Ross was keeping the cocaine in his house. We therefore affirm Falconer's conviction.