Opinion ID: 2192721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: R.Cr.P. 11(g).

Text: Rule 11(g) provides the procedural mechanism for implementing Rules 11(c), 11(d), and 11(f). See Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 11. It leaves no room for doubt that the inquiry into the factual basis for the plea must be recited during the proceedings at which the defendant enters the plea. By failing to do so, the trial court in this case violated both Rule 11(g), the procedural requirement, and Rule 11(f), the substantive requirement that Rule 11(g) seeks to implement. The fact that the court's advice to defendant, the inquiry into voluntariness of the plea, and the inquiry into accuracy are all required to appear in the transcript of the plea proceeding inevitably leads to the conclusion that all three requirements must be met through personal address of the defendant. This is in accord with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal counterpart to Rule 11. McCarthy, the principal case on Rule 11, has been unanimously adopted in Vermont. See State v. Ibey, 134 Vt. 140, 142, 352 A.2d 691, 692 (1976). The Court held in McCarthy that a trial judge must personally address the defendant to determine compliance with Rule 11. See McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166. The reason for this strict requirement is to avoid any confusion or uncertainty as to whether a defendant's plea was voluntary, and thus to reduce the number of post-conviction challenges to pleas. See id. at 466-67, 89 S.Ct. 1166. McCarthy concerned an allegation that the trial court violated the federal version of Rule 11 by failing to establish that the defendant understood the nature of the charge. The Court held that [t]he judge must determine `that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged.' See id. at 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (citing Notes of Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11). This necessarily requires a conversation with defendant regarding whether or not the defendant admits to the alleged conduct. McCarthy makes the purpose of this requirement clear: Requiring this examination of the relation between the law and the acts the defendant admits having committed is designed to protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge. To the extent that the [trial] judge thus exposes the defendant's state of mind on the record through personal interrogation, he not only facilitates his own determination of a guilty plea's voluntariness, but he also facilitates that determination in any subsequent post-conviction proceeding based upon a claim that the plea was involuntary. Id. at 467, 89 S.Ct. 1166 (citing Notes of Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Fed. R.Crim.P. 11). The accuracy of the factual basis goes to the defendant's understanding of the relationship between the law and the facts, [2] which ultimately goes to voluntariness. See Kasper, 145 Vt. at 119, 483 A.2d at 610-11 (where court did not explain law in relation to facts, plea is not entered knowingly and voluntarily); Dunham, 144 Vt. at 449, 479 A.2d at 147 ([A] violation of Rule 11(f) goes directly to the voluntariness of the plea as articulated in Boykin. ). The defendant's understanding cannot be probed except through personal interrogation, which then appears in the record of the proceedings. In this case, an affidavit of the arresting officer contained a description of an altercation between defendant and his then-wife. Although our holding in State v. Whitney, 156 Vt. 301, 303, 591 A.2d 388, 389 (1991), suggested that an affidavit alone might form a sufficient factual basis for a plea of guilty, Rule 11(g) and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in McCarthy make clear that, absent a confirming colloquy with the defendant, a court's own knowledge of certain facts cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 11(f). We therefore clarify that Whitney stands only for the proposition that an affidavit may be a source of facts to support the plea, but that the defendant must subsequently admit to these facts in the plea colloquy to demonstrate that there is a sufficient factual basis. The McCarthy decision states that an additional purpose of Rule 11 is to produce a complete record at the time the plea is entered of the factors relevant to [the] voluntariness determination. Thus, the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least to enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas. McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465, 89 S.Ct. 1166. Had the trial court observed Rules 11(f) and 11(g) in this case, it is possible that this guilty plea could have stood. Absent the required record, doubt as to the plea's voluntariness compels reversal.