Opinion ID: 2320518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Brown's Pretrial Identification

Text: Monroe claims that the police procedures in Brown's out-of-court identification were impermissibly suggestive based on (1) Brown's fund of knowledge coupled with police suggestions of Saunders' involvement and Saunders' presence at the police station; (2) Brown's phone discussions with an unknown person; (3) questioning of Brown regarding her knowledge of a link between Monroe and Ferrell; (4) police showing Brown a picture of a white Crown Victoria; and (5) the photo array procedure. In support of that argument, Monroe relies primarily upon the following facts: Before Detective Smith began the recorded interview of Brown, she showed her a photo of Ronise Saunders and confirmed that Saunders was her co-worker. Brown was allowed to keep her cell phone and made numerous phone calls while the officers were not in the room. Ronise Saunders was transported to the police station for questioning and was placed in the adjacent room to Brown. The adjoining wall had a window that was covered over by brown construction paper. During at least one of her phone calls, Brown referred to a white lady who said that the shooter was a person who drove a white Crown Vic. Detective Seth Polk testified that he was assisting in the investigation. He showed Brown a photo of a white Crown Victoria that he said was related to this. Brown stated, I mean, I don't know if it's related to it, it's just the fact of like, how, you know how something just coincidence, like coincidence. She agreed that it was the make and model of car driven by Ronise's boyfriend. Detective Smith asked Brown several times whether Andre Ferrell was acquainted with Monroe. After the last inquiry, Detective Smith asked if Brown were to look at a photo of somebody we think may have been involved, do you think you would be able to recognize them or not? Brown agreed to give a try. Later, Polk showed her a six-pack photo lineup, from which she selected Monroe's photograph, stating, I don'tthat looks like him for some crazyit looks like him. Monroe contends that the pre-identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive. He does not challenge the mix of six photographs that were shown to Brown. Consequently, Monroe's procedural challenge is based upon what happened at the police station before Brown was shown the six photographs. In deciding Monroe's motion to suppress Brown's pretrial identification, the trial judge applied the two-step analysis set forth in Younger. In doing so, the trial judge considered the same arguments that Monroe raises in this appeal. In applying step one of its Younger analysis, the Superior Court began by noting that Monroe is primarily concerned about the pre-identification actions that occurred as part of the exigencies of the immediate ongoing police investigation. One of the first things that Brown said to Officer Paolo when Officer Paolo arrived at the crime scene was that the shooter looked like her co-worker's (Saunders') boyfriend. As the Superior Court noted, it was therefore logical for the chief investigating officer (Detective Smith) to ask Brown if Ferrell knew Saunders' boyfriend and whether there was any animosity between them. The trial judge found it not surprising that Detective Smith asked Brown those questions about Saunders' boyfriend more than once, since Detective Smith wanted to ascertain if there was a reason for what appeared to be an unprovoked shooting. Similarly, in the context of the ongoing investigation, showing Brown a photograph of a white Crown Victoria was part of the police effort to confirm immediately that they were looking for the correct type of car that Brown had seen Saunders and her boyfriend driving that evening. Because Brown told police that the assailant looked like Saunders' boyfriend, the trial judge found it was not unexpected for Saunders to be brought to the police station for investigatory questioning almost immediately. Although Saunders and Brown were in adjoining interrogation rooms that were not soundproof, that appears to have been the result of inadequate space at the police station. Monroe also emphasizes that Brown used her cell phone during the times the police officers were not physically present with her. The trial judge found that it was understandable for the police to allow Brown to use her cell phone. Brown had just witnessed the murder of her boyfriend and she was concerned about her children who had been with her at that time. Monroe argues that Detective Smith should not have told Brown that the photographs would include someone whom the police suspected. However, immediately prior to showing Brown the lineup, Detective Polk told Brown, Ok, That's basically what it is. It's six photographs. The person may or may not be in these photographs. Although Monroe quotes one of Brown's statements during her examination of the six photos, the trial judge noted that when Brown viewed the photographic lineup, she identified Monroe's photograph definitely as the person who killed Ferrell. Only sometime later was Saunders told she had identified the photograph of Saunders' boyfriend, Monroe. [39] The foregoing record reflects that, because she was an eyewitness to Ferrell's murder, Brown was the central focus of urgent efforts by the police to gather information about the perpetrator as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that words and actions that precede a photographic lineup can be impermissibly suggestive. In a recent opinion by the New Jersey Supreme Court, the cause for concern about pre-identification actions and words were thoroughly examined. [40] In a comprehensive analysis, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized the importance, for purposes of review, of having a record of the words and actions that precede a pretrial identification. In Monroe's case, everything that Brown heard and said in the interrogation room was tape recorded, including her cell phone calls, when the police officers were not in the room. The trial judge reviewed the tape recordings of Brown and heard the witnesses' testimony, and concluded that the immediate need to question Brown for investigatory purposes created a pretrial identification situation that was not perfect. [41] After undertaking part one of its Younger analysis, however, the trial judge concluded that the bottom line was that Brown's identification of Monroe in the photo lineup was the product of her own memory and not because of impermissible suggestiveness on the part of the police that gives rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Despite reaching that conclusion under the first part of Younger, the trial judge did not stop his analysis. He assumed arguendo that the pretrial identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive, and proceeded to the second part of a Younger analysis, as an alternative basis for his ruling. The trial judge carefully examined the five Neil v. Biggers ' factors, as follows: One is the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime. Well, here Shameka Brown did have ample opportunity to observe the defendant. It was relativelyhe, the defendant, was relatively close to her. She was able to provide a relatively highly detailed description of the shooter. And while the defense suggests that her vision may have been partially obstructed, there's nothing really in the evidence to support that. I think she did have that opportunity. The witness testified that she had a relatively high degree of attention. She provided a vivid description of the shooting and the defendant. Of course, her focus shifted to her children. That's natural. But I think that she had a high degree of attention paid to the actual incident. I think Shameka Brown's accuracy of her first description of the defendant to both Corporal Paolo and Detective Smith as pretty accurate. She did describe the defendant as shorter than his actual height, but I think, on balance, she relatively accurately made a prior description. I think also that Shameka Brown was relatively certain in her identification to Detective Polk. It was a very short time less than three seconds or so, that it took her to identify the defendant. When she asked if the person she picked out of the lineup looked like the person who shot the victim, she said, quote, yes, definitely, unquote. That's a relatively high standard. Going to the time between the crime and the confrontation was short. It was just a matter of hours. So, I think, looked at under a totality of the circumstances, even finding, which I don't find, that the initial police actions were impermissibly suggestive, I don't find that it was to the extent that would cause a give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. That's a very high standard. Thus, after undertaking part two of the Younger analysis, the trial judge determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, Brown's pretrial identification of Monroe was reliable and, therefore, satisfied due process. The trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusion are supported by the record. We hold that the trial judge properly applied both aspects of the two-part Younger analysis in admitting into evidence Brown's pretrial identification of Monroe on independent alternative grounds under Younger. [42]