Opinion ID: 1195594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Penalty Phase Bifurcation

Text: As the plain language of §§ 3593(b)-(e) summarized at the start of Part III makes clear, the FDPA contemplates a single penalty phase hearing at which all relevant evidence is admitted and, if the defendant is found eligible for the death penalty, ultimately weighed by the jury. A number of district courts have nonetheless granted pre-hearing motions to bifurcate the penalty phase (or, as some have phrased it, trifurcate the entire trial) into an eligibility phase, limited to evidence relevant to mental state and to the existence of one or more statutory aggravating factors, and, if the defendant is found eligible, a selection phase, at which evidence relevant to mitigating factors and non-statutory aggravating factors such as victim impact and other crimes is received and weighed by the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Natson, 444 F.Supp.2d 1296, 1309 (M.D.Ga.2006); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F.Supp.2d 936, 955-57 (S.D.Oh.2005); United States v. Johnson, 362 F.Supp.2d 1043, 1099-1111 (N.D.Ia.2005) (tried under 21 U.S.C. § 848, not the FDPA), aff'd (without discussing this issue), 495 F.3d 951 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Jordan, 357 F.Supp.2d 889, 903-04 (E.D.Va. 2005); United States v. Davis, 912 F.Supp. 938, 949 (E.D.La.1996). In this case, Bolden filed a pretrial motion to bifurcate the penalty phase hearing. He argued that the government's evidence of other crimes was relevant only to a non-statutory aggravating factor but would invite the jury to resolve the eligibility issues, his mental state and the alleged statutory aggravating factors, based on his bad character as evidenced by his criminal history. The district court denied the motion, explaining that the jury would follow the court's eligibility instructions. On appeal, Bolden argues this issue very differently, asserting that the government's extensive victim impact evidence enhanced the risk that the jury would find him eligible for death despite the government's weak proof of either statutory aggravating factor. He provides no citation to the voluminous record establishing that he made this argument to the district court, either before or during the sentencing hearing. The government argues that bifurcation is statutorily impermissible. [7] The only circuit to address this issue under the FDPA concluded that the statute contemplates but does not require a single penalty phase proceeding and encouraged district courts ruling on motions to trifurcate to consider carefully the ramifications of presenting . . . evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in the guilt phase . . . to a jury that has not yet made findings concerning death eligibility. United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 240 n. 28 (2d Cir.2008). We agree that is a sound reading of the statute. As no case has held that bifurcation is mandatory, we think it obvious that the ruling on a motion to bifurcate the penalty phase of an FDPA proceeding is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Such a motion should not be routinely granted because it further extends and complicates what is already a long and complicated proceeding. Moreover, as this case illustrates, penalty phase evidence such as prior crimes may be relevant to both statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3592(c)(2)-(4), (10), (12), (15). In such cases, the risk of improper spillover will be negligible if the jury is properly instructed and is in any event outweighed by the risk of unnecessary protraction and confusion. Bolden moved to bifurcate based on the risk that other crimes evidence would prejudice the jury's consideration of eligibility issues. Bolden does not argue that risk on appeal. Instead, he argues that the government's victim impact evidence enhanced the risk, an issue not pursued in the district court. In its final penalty phase instructions, the court carefully instructed the jury: You many not consider the victim impact evidence in deciding the preliminary issues of whether the defendant is at least 18 years old, whether he acted with a mental state listed in Instruction No. 3, or whether any statutory aggravating circumstances in Instruction No. 4 exists beyond a reasonable doubt. If you make the findings on those three preliminary issues which are required before the death penalty can be considered, you many consider the victim impact evidence. . . . You may not, however, permit the victim impact testimony to overwhelm your ability to follow the law. Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions, and there is no indication in the record that they did not do so. Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584-85, 114 S.Ct. 2419, 129 L.Ed.2d 459 (1994). The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to bifurcate.