Opinion ID: 556487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process of the Administrative Hearing

Text: 37 The USDA's governing statutes require a hearing in withdrawal proceedings, and the APA describes the process that is due in such a hearing. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 554(b)-(e) (1988). Petitioner does not demonstrate how the proceeding fell short of these requirements, other than the complaint that the per se rule tainted the process so badly as to violate due process. We discussed above how the per se rule may run afoul of the limits imposed by due process but how this does not justify reversal in this case. 38 Windy City also claims that the per se rule violates constitutional due process guarantees. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the factors to be balanced in determining the extent of due process protection in administrative matters are: (1) the nature of the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden entailed by additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the risk of error under the challenged process and the value of additional procedural safeguards. 39 The hearing provided Windy City easily met the minimum constitutional requirements. The ALJ provided very broad opportunities for the introduction of evidence. Petitioner has identified no mitigating factor or circumstance which he believes the ALJ and JO should have taken into account but did not. There is no evidence that the per se rule tainted the non-per se analysis. In short, Windy City enjoyed the extent of the process it was due in the USDA's review under the meat safety acts.