Opinion ID: 1957199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc.

Text: At the core of Polakoff and Chases's argument is the question of notice and whether we correctly decided Brooks. If we reaffirm Brooks, which we do, then the only remaining question is whether it applies to the case at bar. We therefore begin with a review of the Brooks opinion. In Brooks we stated that, under the common law and in the absence of a statute, a landlord ordinarily has no duty to keep rental premises in repair, or to inspect the rental premises either at the inception of the lease or during the lease term. There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Moreover, where there is an applicable statutory scheme designed to protect a class of persons which includes the plaintiff, another well-settled Maryland common law rule has long been applied by this Court in negligence actions. That rule states that the defendant's duty ordinarily is prescribed by the statute or ordinance and that the violation of the statute or ordinance is itself evidence of negligence. Brooks, 378 Md. at 78, 835 A.2d at 620. We then cited an extensive list of cases that apply the statute or ordinance rule. See Brooks, 378 Md. at 78-9, 835 A.2d at 621 for cases cited therein. We explained: Under this principle, in order to make out a prima facie case in a negligence action, all that a plaintiff must show is: (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of. Proximate cause is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent. It is the existence of this cause and effect relationship that makes the violation of a statute prima facie evidence of negligence. [5] Where there is evidence that the violation of the statute proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, evidence of such violation is sufficient evidence to warrant the court in submitting the case to the jury on the question of the [defendant's] negligence. The trier of fact must then evaluate whether the actions taken by the defendant were reasonable under all the circumstances.       Nevertheless, once it is established that there was a statutory violation, the tort defendant's knowledge that he or she violated the statute is not part of the tort plaintiff's burden of proof. It is the violation of the statute or ordinance alone which is evidence of negligence. Brooks, 378 Md. at 79-80, 835 A.2d at 621-22 (internal citations omitted). Having determined the applicable rule, we turned to the Code itself. We began by noting that the Code contains a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at `establish[ing] minimum standards governing the condition, use, operation, occupancy, and maintenance of dwellings ... in order to make dwellings safe, sanitary, and fit for human habitation.' Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622 (quoting Baltimore City Code (2000 Repl.Vol.), Art. 13, § 103(a)(2)). It imposes numerous duties and obligations upon landlords who rent residential property. Brooks, 378 Md. at 81, 835 A.2d at 622. Section 702 of the Code imposes a duty on property owners to keep a dwelling in good repair and safe condition. Section 702(a) provides that [e]very building and all parts thereof used or occupied as a dwelling shall, while in use or at any time when the lack of maintenance affects neighboring property, be kept in good repair, in safe condition, and fit for human habitation. Section 703(b)(3) provides that good repair and safe condition includes a requirement that [a]ll walls, ceilings, woodwork, doors, and windows shall be kept clean and free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint and paper. The Code places the duty on the owner or operator of the property to keep it in compliance with all provisions of the Code. § 310(a)(1). It further provides the owner with access to the property during a tenancy for the purpose of making such inspection and such repairs or alterations as are necessary to effect compliance with the provisions of this Code.... § 909. Based on the language of the Code, we concluded that the landlord's duty to keep the property in compliance is continuous. The landlord must take whatever measures are necessary during the pendency of the lease to ensure the dwelling's continued compliance with the Code. Brooks, 378 Md. at 84, 835 A.2d at 624. Consequently, because the Code prescribes the property owner's duty to keep the property continuously free of any flaking, loose, or peeling paint, the failure to keep the property in such a condition is itself evidence of negligence. Brooks does not hold that a landlord will be held strictly liable for violations of the Code; rather it reaffirmed the long-standing common law rule that a violation of a statute or ordinance is evidence of negligence. As we repeatedly stated in Brooks, proof of a statutory violation, plaintiff's membership in the class of people designed to be protected by the statute, and causation, amount to prima facie evidence of negligence, not negligence per se. See Brooks, 378 Md. at 78-81, 84-5, 85 n. 5, 89, 835 A.2d at 620-25, 625 n. 5, 627; see also, Absolon v. Dollahite, 376 Md. 547, 831 A.2d 6 (2003) (stating that it is a long established general rule in Maryland that the violation of a statutory duty is only evidence of negligence, but does not establish negligence per se  (internal citations omitted)); [6] Bentley v. Carroll, 355 Md. 312, 325, 734 A.2d 697, 704-05 (1999) (Not long ago we reaffirmed that [t]his Court has consistently held that the violation of a statutory duty may furnish evidence of negligence. The positive evidentiary value of the statutory violation, however, is subject to the condition that `the person alleging the negligence is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent.') (quoting Bd. of County Commissioners v. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., 346 Md. 160, 179, 695 A.2d 171, 181 (1997)). [7] Contrary to the view expressed in Polakoff and Chase's brief, evidence of negligence does not ipso facto equate to liability. Before a landlord can be found liable, the trier of fact must determine whether the defendant acted reasonably given the circumstances. As we stated in Brooks, our holding in the instant case does not impose a strict liability regime upon landlords. Whether [the landlord] is held liable for any injury to a child, based on leadpaint poisoning, will depend on the jury's evaluation of the reasonableness of the [landlord's] actions under all the circumstances. Brooks, 378 Md. at 84-5, 835 A.2d at 624. Thus, liability will depend on the fact-finder's determination regarding whether the landlord acted reasonably under all the circumstances. Brooks, 378 Md. at 85 n. 5, 835 A.2d at 624 n. 5. The issue of what qualifies as reasonable will, as it does in all negligence cases, depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. As we noted in Brooks, the fact-finder's determination of reasonableness is the essence of a negligence action. Brooks, 378 Md. at 85 n. 5, 835 A.2d at 625 n. 5 (negligence is a failure to do what the reasonable [person] would do `under the same or similar circumstances' (internal citation omitted)). [I]t will be the duty of the trier of fact to determine whether the steps taken by the landlord to ensure continued compliance with the Code, i.e. the frequency and thoroughness of inspections, and the maintenance of the interior surfaces of the dwelling, were reasonable under all the circumstances. The test is what a reasonable and prudent landlord would have done under the same circumstances. Brooks, 378 Md. at 86, 835 A.2d at 625. See also, Juarez v. Wavecrest Management Team Ltd., 88 N.Y.2d 628, 649 N.Y.S.2d 115, 672 N.E.2d 135, 141 (1996) (interpreting a New York City Code similar to the Baltimore City Code and concluding that [w]here, however, a landlord establishes that it exercised due care, it will not be held liable. To avoid liability, a landlord must prove that, even though it violated [the local lead-paint statute], it was acting reasonably under the circumstances.). Liability will depend on the reasonableness of the landlord's efforts to remain in compliance with the statute; therefore, it is incumbent upon the landlord to take such reasonable steps as may be necessary. One surefire way of avoiding lead-paint poisoning liability is to remove lead paint from the rental property. We recognize, however, that the current law does not require this action. Less extreme options may include: notifying the tenant in writing and orally of the possible presence of lead paint in the property and its potential danger; asking the tenant to notify the landlord or property manager immediately if flaking, loose, or peeling paint occurs; and inspecting the property at the inception and at regular intervals throughout the tenancy to ensure that there is no flaking, loose, or peeling paint. This list is by no means exhaustive nor is it a guarantee that a jury will find the landlord's actions reasonable. Our point is simply to show that there are reasonable ways of attempting to satisfy one's duty pursuant to the Code. See also, Md.Code (1996 Repl.Vol.), § 6-801 et seq. of the Environment Article (entitled Reduction of Lead Risk in Housing). [8] We expressly recognized in Brooks that our holding was in conflict with parts of our opinion in Richwind, 335 Md. 661, 645 A.2d 1147. Brooks, 378 Md. at 86, 835 A.2d at 625. Richwind held that a landlord is not liable for a defective condition on the property unless the landlord knows or has reason to know of the condition and had a reasonable opportunity to correct it. Richwind, 335 Md. at 673, 645 A.2d at 1153. Richwind argued to the Court that, despite the numerous statutory enactments that impact upon the relationship between the landlord and tenant, the statute does not supercede the common law requirement that a landlord's liability for negligence depends upon notice of a particular defect and a reasonable opportunity to correct it. Richwind, 335 Md. at 670, 645 A.2d at 1151. We recognized that certain statutory enactments may alter the common law. We concluded, however, that based on §§ 301 through 303, the Code and the common law notice requirement were consistent with each other and therefore the Code did not do away with the notice requirement. Richwind, 335 Md. at 672-674, 645 A.2d at 1152-53. In Brooks, we specifically disapproved of this reasoning. Brooks, 378 Md. at 87, 835 A.2d at 626. We noted that [t]he flaw in the Richwind opinion's analysis is its extension of §§ 301 and 303's notice requirement to occupants. [9] Id. We concluded that [t]he Housing Code provisions relied on in the Richwind opinion do not alter the requirements set forth by this Court for a plaintiff to make out a prima facie case based on [statutory] negligence. The Housing Code does not make the landlord's notice of a defective condition a factor with regard to the landlord's duty to the tenant. Brooks, 378 Md. at 88-89, 835 A.2d at 627. [10] We remain committed to the analysis in Brooks. The law in this State regarding the breach of a statutory duty remains the same today as it has for over ninety years. To make out a prima facie case in a negligence action based on the breach of a statutory duty, a plaintiff must show (a) the violation of a statute or ordinance designed to protect a specific class of persons which includes the plaintiff, and (b) that the violation proximately caused the injury complained of. Brooks, 378 Md. at 79, 835 A.2d at 621. Proximate cause is established by determining whether the plaintiff is within the class of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of a kind which the drafters intended the statute to prevent. Id. We conclude, as we did in Brooks, that the Code places a continuous duty on landlords to maintain their properties in good repair and safe condition, including keeping the premises free of flaking, loose, or peeling paint. If a landlord of property located in Baltimore City fails to maintain the premises in a safe condition and someone whom the Code was designed to protect, i.e., a resident child, is injured as a result of the landlord's failure to maintain the premises, the plaintiff will have successfully established a prima facie case of negligence. It will then be incumbent upon the finder of fact to determine whether the landlord's actions were reasonable under all of the circumstances. Pursuant to the established principles of Maryland tort law cited in Brooks, if Jasmine could establish a violation of the Code which proximately caused her injuries, she would be entitled to have the negligence count of her complaint submitted to the trier of fact for a determination of whether Polakoff and Chase acted reasonably under all of the circumstances. As previously discussed, the Code requires that occupied dwellings continuously be kept in good repair and safe condition, which includes keeping windows free of flaking, loose, or peeling paint. §§ 702(a) and 703(b)(3). Jasmine produced testimony that flaking, loose, or peeling paint existed as early as 1½ years into the tenancy and that the paint on the windowsills was bumpy from the inception of the tenancy as a result of new paint being applied on top of old chipping paint. There was testimony that prior to Jasmine's birth, a workman repainted the windowsills in the living room but, again, the new paint was applied on top of the old chipping paint. There was also testimony that Jasmine spent much of her time at the bumpy windowsills looking out the window. Based on this testimony, Jasmine met her burden of production regarding the presence of flaking, loose, or peeling paint in violation of the Code. She established proximate cause by presenting evidence that she is a member of the class of people sought to be protected by the Code, and that her injury, lead-paint poisoning, is the type of injury the drafters of the Code sought to prevent. These two things taken together, a violation of the Code and proximate cause, establish a prima facie case of negligence. Consequently, Jasmine was entitled to have her case presented to the trier of fact for a determination of whether Polakoff and Chase acted reasonably given the circumstances. With regard to the issue of reasonableness, the jury heard testimony that Polakoff was aware of the following at the inception of the lease: that most housing in Baltimore City built before 1950 would probably contain some sort of lead-based paint; that deteriorating lead paint can be a potential danger to young children; that it was a violation of the Code for a property to have peeling, chipping, or flaking paint; and that the Code requires that flaking and chipping paint to be made smooth before repainting the surface. Polakoff testified that he did not inspect the premises at the inception of the lease but instead relied on the experience of a painter with whom he had worked for many years. He further testified that at no time during the nine-year tenancy did he or anyone working for him inspect the interior of the house to ensure its compliance with the Code. Polakoff instead relied on tenants to notify him of needed maintenance. He further testified that he did not inform Ms. Whittington of the dangers of lead paint prior to her moving into the property. Based on this information, a jury could reasonably conclude that, despite being aware of the danger and likely presence of lead paint in the house, as well as the Code's requirement that the house be kept free of flaking, chipping, or peeling paint, Polakoff did not inspect the inside of the residence at any point during the nine-year tenancy. The jury could reasonably conclude that Polakoff did not act as a reasonable landlord would have acted, given the circumstances.