Opinion ID: 2423934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Cocaine Conversations

Text: The defendant first argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motion in limine to exclude evidence that she and the informant allegedly traveled to Concord to buy cocaine. The defendant argued to the trial court, and argues on appeal, that this evidence is inadmissible under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b). The record on appeal reveals that the trial court, in fact, granted this motion in part. In its order, the trial court ruled that evidence of the trip to Concord was inadmissible (although we note that this evidence was admitted at trial without objection) but that the conversations in which Detective N. placed an order for an eight ball of cocaine and in which the defendant said that she could not sell him the cocaine yet, but would sell him Oxycontin were admissible. These conversations, the trial court ruled, showed the context of the sale as well as the defendant's motive for selling. The court ruled that they indicate[d] a plan to sell cocaine to the detective. We review the trial court's ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion, and will reverse only if it was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of the defendant's case. State v. Russell, 159 N.H. 475, 482-83, 986 A.2d 515 (2009). Because the trial court ruled upon the admissibility of the challenged evidence before trial, we consider only what was presented at the pretrial hearing. Id. at 483, 986 A.2d 515 (quotation omitted). We so limit our review to avoid the pitfall of justifying the court's pretrial ruling upon the defendant's response at trial to the evidence. State v. Glodgett, 144 N.H. 687, 694, 749 A.2d 283 (2000) (quotation and brackets omitted). Rule 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Other bad acts evidence is admissible when: (1) it is relevant for a purpose other than proving the defendant's character or disposition; (2) there is clear proof that the defendant committed the act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. State v. Beltran, 153 N.H. 643, 647, 904 A.2d 709 (2006). The State bears the burden of demonstrating the admissibility of other bad acts. Id. Although this test must be applied before evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admitted, Rule 404(b) does not apply here. See State v. Kulikowski, 132 N.H. 281, 287, 564 A.2d 439 (1989). The challenged conversations are not other crimes, wrongs or acts, but rather are inextricably intertwined with evidence of the crime charged in the indictment. United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Cir.1995) (quotation omitted); see United States v. LaDue, 561 F.3d 855, 857-58 (8th Cir.2009). The conversations at issue and the crime charged in the indictment are part of a single criminal episode. Barnes, 49 F.3d at 1149 (emphasis added). Therefore, Rule 404(b) does not apply, see id., and the applicable test for admissibility is found in New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 403. Kulikowski, 132 N.H. at 287, 564 A.2d 439. Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if its primary purpose or effect is to appeal to a jury's sympathies, arouse its sense of horror, provoke its instinct to punish, or trigger other mainsprings of human action that may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. State v. Ainsworth, 151 N.H. 691, 696, 867 A.2d 420 (2005). Unfair prejudice is not, of course, mere detriment to a defendant from the tendency of the evidence to prove guilt, in which sense all evidence offered by the prosecution is meant to be prejudicial. State v. Giddens, 155 N.H. 175, 180, 922 A.2d 650 (2007). Rather, the prejudice required to predicate reversible error is an undue tendency to induce a decision against the defendant on some improper basis, commonly one that is emotionally charged. Id. Among the factors we consider in weighing the evidence are: (1) whether the evidence would have a great emotional impact upon a jury; (2) its potential for appealing to a juror's sense of resentment or outrage; and (3) the extent to which the issue upon which it is offered is established by other evidence, stipulation or inference. State v. Howe, 159 N.H. 366, 378, 986 A.2d 631 (2009). The trial court is in the best position to gauge the prejudicial impact of particular testimony, and what steps, if any, are necessary to remedy that prejudice. State v. Sonthikoummane, 145 N.H. 316, 324, 769 A.2d 330 (2000) (quotation and brackets omitted). Thus, we give the trial court broad latitude when ruling on the admissibility of potentially unfairly prejudicial evidence. Id. Accordingly, we will not disturb the trial court's decision absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 252, 921 A.2d 942 (2007). First, we consider the probative value of the evidence. Howe, 159 N.H. at 378, 986 A.2d 631. This entails analyzing how relevant the evidence is. Id. Relevant evidence may have limited probative value. Id. Here, as the trial court aptly found, the challenged conversations were relevant and probative to show the context of the sale as well as the defendant's motive for selling drugs, which was to pay her mortgage. The conversations were also relevant and probative to show that selling Oxycontin to Detective N. was part of the defendant's overall plan, which began with her plan to sell him cocaine. Additionally, the conversations were relevant and probative to show that, despite her claims to the contrary, it was the defendant, and not the informant, who sold the Oxycontin to the detective. While at the motion in limine hearing the defendant's friend, Nicole Moulton, testified that the defendant told her that the informant sold a guy pills and the defendant just drove her there, evidence that the defendant spoke with the detective about selling him cocaine is relevant to show that it was she, and not the informant, who sold him Oxycontin. Next, we consider whether the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant from admission of this evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. In the context of this case, we cannot say that evidence that the detective originally sought to buy cocaine and that the defendant sold him Oxycontin instead to tide [him] over was likely to have any greater emotional impact upon the jury than the charged sale of Oxycontin. See id. Although the evidence of the challenged conversations may have been prejudicial, we cannot conclude that the evidence was so inflammatory as to substantially outweigh its probative value. Id. (quotation omitted). While the trial court applied Rule 404(b), instead of Rule 403, we uphold its determination nonetheless because where the trial court reaches the correct result on mistaken grounds, we will affirm if valid alternative grounds support the decision. State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 591-92, 972 A.2d 1071 (2009) (quotation omitted).