Opinion ID: 157801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determination of Refugee Status

Text: Appealing from a BIA decision, petitioners face a heavy burden. We must uphold the BIA's decision unless petitioner's evidence was “so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias , 502 U.S. 478, 484 (1992). “Even if we disagree with the Board’s conclusions, we will not reverse if they are supported by substantial evidence and are substantially reasonable.” Kapcia v. INS , 944 F.2d 702, 707 (10th Cir. 1991). Here, petitioners argue the BIA erred by finding they had not proved a well-founded fear of persecution based on the evidence they presented. They point to their testimony as to their prior involvement in the literacy movement and with the Christian Democratic Party, their belief that they had been threatened in Izabal by the military group G2 and that they had been placed on a government “blacklist,” subsequent threats against them in Chiquimula, their mother's letter confirming injuries to other family members, and various articles they submitted on similar human rights violations in Guatemala. Yet, in order to establish the requisite persecution, petitioners must show that persecution emanated either (1) from the government or (2) from a nongovernmental agency that the government is unwilling or unable to control. See 5 Bartesaghi-Lay v. INS , 9 F.3d 819, 921 (10th Cir. 1993). If petitioners claim persecution by a non-governmental agency, they must make an additional showing that the threat against them is country-wide. See Matter of Acosta , 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) (“an alien seeking to meet the definition of a refugee must do more than show a well-founded fear of persecution in a particular place or abode within a country -- he must show that the threat of persecution exists for him country-wide”), modified on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi , 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987) . Here, the BIA first found that the petitioners had not presented sufficient evidence that the source of threats was the government. We cannot say that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence when (1) the sisters testified only that they “pretty much knew,” C.A.R. at 85, and “assumed,” C.A.R. at 105, that the group threatening them was the military group G2 (because of its similar tactics), and (2) in light of the sisters' own expert's affidavit, on which the BIA relied, suggesting that threats to literacy workers were not governmental but were from “local landlords or factory owners” and threats to Christian Democratic Party workers were from “local level operatives” of a rival political party in electoral decline. See C.A.R. at 161. Petitioners' argument that their credibility must be presumed is both unavailing, when we “may not . . . determine the credibility of witnesses in this review of factual findings,” Refahiyat v. INS , 29 6 F.3d 553, 556 (10th Cir.1994), and superfluous, when the BIA in fact “assum[ed] the respondents were threatened” as they claimed for purposes of making its evaluation. C.A.R. at 2. The BIA then considered, contrary to petitioners' assertions, the second possibility that they faced persecution from a non-governmental group. It found that they had not made the requisite additional showing that they faced a countrywide threat. Again, we cannot say this finding was not supported by substantial evidence when (1) the Board relied on a March, 1995, United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor profile of Guatemala stating that “most low-profile victims of localized harassment can avail themselves of relocation away from the area where they had problems,” and (2) the record does not otherwise show that the petitioners could not have escaped persecution elsewhere in Guatemala. Petitioners challenge this decision on several grounds. First, they argue the BIA improperly applied an elevated standard in its determination of whether they qualified as refugees. In its decision, however, the Board referred to the correct “reasonable possibility” of persecution standard articulated in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca , 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987), and petitioners do not cite any specific language or other evidence indicating that the Board applied any other improper standard. Their argument essentially amounts to a suggestion that we 7 reweigh the evidence, which we are prohibited from doing. See Refahiyat , 29 F.3d at 556. Second, petitioners argue that their move to Chiquimula shows they did try to relocate to escape persecution. This argument fails because evidence of persecution in two localized areas -- without more -- is insufficient to show they faced country-wide persecution, as required. Third, they argue the Board improperly required them to show that they had a high public profile. This argument is similarly unavailing when the BIA considered their profile only in terms of determining whether they had demonstrated they faced the required country-wide threat. Finally, petitioners contend that they need not show they would be singled out for persecution because they meet the alternative “pattern or practice” requirement. An alien need not show “he or she would be singled out individually for persecution if: (I) [she] establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country . . . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant . . .; and (ii) [she] establishes his or her own inclusion in and identification with such group. . . .” 8 C.F.R. 208.13(b)(2)(I)-(ii). However, as the INS points out, petitioners did not argue this before the IJ or the BIA, and they are thus foreclosed from raising it now for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Rivera-Zurita v. INS , 946 F.2d 118, 120 n. 2 (10th Cir.1991). 8 Thus, we conclude that the BIA's finding that petitioners did not show that they qualified as refugees was supported by substantial evidence.