Opinion ID: 211768
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “offers to sell, or sells”

Text: Because we conclude that RIM’s customers could not have infringed the asserted method claims of the ’960, ’172, and ’451 patents under the “use” prong of section 271(a), and thus, could not have provided the necessary predicate for the charges of induced or contributory infringement of those claims, we must consider whether RIM could have directly infringed the method claims under the “sell” or “offer to sell” prongs of section 271(a). The cases cited by RIM are concerned primarily with the “use” and “make” prongs of section 271(a) and do not directly address the issue of whether a method claim may be infringed by selling or offering to sell within the meaning of section 271(a). Because the relevant precedent does not address the issue of whether a sale of a claimed method can occur in the United States, even though the contemplated 14 Claims 32 and 34 of the ’960 patent recite “transmitting … from the interface switch.” 15 Claim 199 of the ’172 patent recites “receiving … at the interface”; claim 309 of the ’451 patent recites “receiving with one of the at least one interface”; and claims 313 and 317 of the ’451 patent recite “receiving the originated electronic mail at the interface.” 03-1615 59 performance of that method would not be wholly within the United States, the issue is one of first impression. We begin with the language of the statute. Section 271(a) does not define “sells” or “offers to sell,” nor does the statute specify which infringing acts apply to which types of claims. Section 271(a) was merely a codification of the common law of infringement that had developed up to the time of passage of the 1952 Patent Act. It was not meant to change the law of infringement. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 530 n.10. A claim directed to a method or process, although somewhat controversial in the Nineteenth Century, is now a well-established form of claiming. See In re TarczyHornoch, 397 F.2d 856, 857-65 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (describing the evolution of Supreme Court precedent concerning process claims). Nevertheless, the precise contours of infringement of a method claim have not been clearly established. In Enercon GmbH v. International Trade Commission, 151 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1998), this court considered the meaning of the phrase “sale for importation” in the International Trade Commission’s governing statute, 19 U.S.C. § 1337. Because the term “sale” was not defined in the statute, we assumed that Congress intended to give the term its ordinary meaning. Id. at 1381. In considering the ordinary meaning, we looked to dictionaries and to the Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 1382. We employ a similar methodology here, looking to the ordinary meaning of the term “sale.” The definition of “sale” is: “1. The transfer of property or title for a price. 2. The agreement by which such a transfer takes place. The four elements are (1) parties competent to contract, (2) mutual assent, (3) a thing capable of being transferred, and (4) a price in money paid or promised.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1337 (7th ed. 1999). Thus, the ordinary meaning of a sale includes the concept of a transfer of title or property. The 03-1615 60 definition also requires as the third element “a thing capable of being transferred.” It is difficult to apply this concept to a method claim consisting of a series of acts. See Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[A] process is a series of acts, and the concept of sale as applied to those acts is ambiguous.”). It is difficult to envision what property is transferred merely by one party performing the steps of a method claim in exchange for payment by another party. Moreover, performance of a method does not necessarily require anything that is capable of being transferred. Congress has consistently expressed the view that it understands infringement of method claims under section 271(a) to be limited to use. The committee reports surrounding the passage of the Process Patents Amendments Act of 1987 indicate that Congress did not understand all of the infringing acts in section 271(a) to apply to method claims. The Senate Report explains, “Under our current patent laws, a patent on a process gives the patentholder the right to exclude others from using that process in the United States without authorization from the patentholder. The other two standard aspects of the patent right—the exclusive right to make or sell the invention— are not directly applicable to a patented process.” S. Rep. No. 100-83, at 30 (1987). The House Report expresses a similar view: “With respect to process patents, courts have reasoned that the only act of infringement is the act of making through the use of a patented process . . . .” H.R. Rep. No. 99-807, at 5 (1986). Although this issue has not been directly addressed, this court expressed a similar view in Joy Technologies, Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 770 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In that case, we said, “A method claim is directly infringed only by one practicing the patented method.” Id. at 775. 03-1615 61 In 1994, Congress passed legislation to implement the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). That legislation modified section 271(a) to include the infringing acts of offering to sell and importing into the United States. Id. § 533, 108 Stat. at 4988. The portion of the Uruguay Round being implemented in the modification of section 271(a) was the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. That agreement clearly spells out the rights to be protected. It states: 1. A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained directly by that process. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 28, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1634 (1994) (footnote omitted). The agreement makes clear that claimed processes are to be directly protected only from “the act of using the process.” The joint committee report from the Senate reflects the same understanding: “The list of exclusive rights granted to patent owners is expanded to preclude others from offering to sell or importing products covered by a U.S. patent or offering to sell the products of patented processes.” S. Rep. 103-412, at 230 (1994). Thus, the legislative history of section 271(a) indicates Congress’s understanding that method claims could only be directly infringed by use. In the context of the on sale bar, we have held that a method claim may be invalid if an offer to perform the method was made prior to the critical date. Scaltech, 03-1615 62 Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, LLC, 269 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The on sale bar rule applies to the sale of an ‘invention,’ and in this case, the invention was a process, as permitted by § 101. As a result, the process involved in this case is subject to § 102(b).”); see also Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng’g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming invalidity of claimed method under on sale bar where device capable of performing claimed method was sold). Nevertheless, we have previously “decline[d] to import the authority construing the ‘on sale’ bar of § 102(b) into the ‘offer to sell’ provision of § 271(a).” 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As the Supreme Court cautioned in Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531: “We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use narrower, than courts had previously thought.” The indication we have from Congress on infringement by selling or offering to sell method claims shows that it believes the beachhead is narrow. In this case, we conclude that the jury could not have found that RIM infringed the asserted method claims under the “sells” or “offers to sell” prongs of section 271(a). We need not and do not hold that method claims may not be infringed under the “sells” and “offers to sell” prongs of section 271(a). Rather, we conclude only that RIM’s performance of at least some of the recited steps of the asserted method claims as a service for its customers cannot be considered to be selling or offering to sell the invention covered by the asserted method claims. The sale or offer to sell handheld devices is not, in and of itself, enough. Thus, we conclude as a matter of law that RIM 03-1615 63 did not sell or offer to sell the invention covered by NTP’s method claims within the United States.