Opinion ID: 2483089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Prosecutorial Error During Rebuttal Argument

Text: The defendant's second point for review is that he should be granted a new trial because the State mocked defendant during closing argument, compared the strength of its case against defendant to other cases, and claimed that the jury had to believe all of the State's witnesses were lying to acquit defendant. Defendant alleges the mocking occurred when the prosecutor began his rebuttal argument by stating, Bravo. Bravo for Mr. Wonderful over here. Bravo that he didn't fight with Officer Cardo. Bravo that he didn't struggle with Officer Cardo. Bravo. Let's give him a hand. He's Mr. Wonderful. Defendant's objections to the theatrics and that this is not proper argument prompted the court to remark, Stick to the facts, Mr. [Prosecutor]. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's performance was calculated to inflame the passions of the jury and cause the jury to despise defendant, citing People v. Johnson, 119 Ill.2d 119, 139, 115 Ill.Dec. 575, 518 N.E.2d 100 (1987) (it is improper to refer to the defendant as an animal), and People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 53, 80, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003) (it is improper to refer to defendant as evil). Defendant concluded by arguing the jury should not have been goaded into despising him. The State argues that this was proper rebuttal argument because it was made in direct response to the argument made by defense counsel. In her closing statement, defense counsel said: So, let's look at the other evidence. The arresting officer, Officer Cardo, who handle[d] the chase. He took [defendant] into custody at 5:56 p.m. on March 24th. After a short foot chase, [defendant] did not resist arrest. He did not try to strike or shoot at any of the officers. He did not grab the gun from the vehicle. He did not try to toss the gun. The officer told you, after a short foot chase, [defendant] did not resist arrest. We agree with the State that the prosecutor was not attempting, as defendant claims, to cause the jury to despise the defendant, but rather was responding to defense counsel's argument. The wide latitude extended to prosecutors during their closing remarks has been held to include some degree of both sarcasm and invective to express their points. See People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill.2d 502, 549, 252 Ill.Dec. 520, 743 N.E.2d 94 (2000); People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill.2d 130, 146, 233 Ill.Dec. 252, 700 N.E.2d 960 (1998); People v. Burton, 338 Ill.App.3d 406, 418, 272 Ill.Dec. 916, 788 N.E.2d 220 (2003). Defendant next contends that the prosecutor improperly compared the strength of the case against defendant to other cases when he argued, The evidence in this case is overwhelming. Most cases have eyewitness testimony, and that's it. Some cases don't have DNA, or fingerprints, or gunshot residue, or ballistics. Other than fingerprints, you've got it all. This case has it all. An objection to this argument was overruled. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor may not argue assumptions or facts not based upon the evidence in the record, citing People v. Johnson, 208 Ill.2d 53, 115, 281 Ill.Dec. 1, 803 N.E.2d 405 (2003). He contends this argument was prejudicial because it implied that guilt depends upon the quantity and variety of evidence presented, rather than upon the quality of the evidence. The State argues that it is well established that comments by a prosecutor on the strength of the State's evidence are permitted. See, e.g., People v. Emerson, 122 Ill.2d 411, 434, 119 Ill.Dec. 250, 522 N.E.2d 1109 (1987). The clear focus of the prosecutor's argument was the overwhelming strength of the evidence presented in this case. The State also argues that the remarks here bear out that there was eyewitness testimony, DNA analysis, gunshot residue evidence, and ballistics evidence, and that was all the prosecutor was pointing out with his remarks. We do not agree with defendant's contention that the prosecutor's argument was prejudicial because it implied that guilt depends upon the quantity and variety of evidence presented, rather than upon the quality of the evidence. With regard to defendant's claim that the State improperly argued the jury would have to believe all the State's witnesses were lying in order to acquit defendant, he points to the prosecutor's argument that [t]hey would have you believe that each of those witnesses that testified from the jury box, from the witness stand, got in here and lied to put a case on [defendant]. Defendant argues that he did not testify, and because the prosecutor referred to the defense's story, the argument told the jury that it could not acquit defendant unless it believed each of the State's witnesses was lying. The State argues that defendant misstates the proper application of the law, citing People v. Coleman, 158 Ill.2d 319, 198 Ill.Dec. 813, 633 N.E.2d 654 (1994), wherein this court examined a similar complaint by a defendant. In examining the issue, this court drew a distinction between situations where a prosecutor permissibly argues that a jury would have to believe the State's witnesses were lying in order to believe the defendant's version of events and where a prosecutor improperly argues that a jury would have to believe the State's witnesses were lying in order to acquit defendant. Coleman, 158 Ill.2d at 346, 198 Ill.Dec. 813, 633 N.E.2d 654. Since in Coleman the argument represented the former, and was a direct response to a defense attack on the credibility of the State's witnesses, the argument was not a misstatement of the law or an attempt to distort the burden of proof. The same is true here. See People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill.2d 1, 16, 161 Ill.Dec. 296, 578 N.E.2d 942 (1991); People v. Williams, 147 Ill.2d 173, 232, 167 Ill.Dec. 853, 588 N.E.2d 983 (1991). Defendant cites several other cases in support of his argument, but they are distinguishable. In People v. Crossno, 93 Ill.App.3d 808, 822, 49 Ill.Dec. 137, 417 N.E.2d 827 (1981), and People v. Miller, 302 Ill.App.3d 487, 497, 236 Ill.Dec. 73, 706 N.E.2d 947 (1998), the prosecutors improperly distorted the burden of proof by incorrectly intertwining the burden with the jury's credibility determinations. That did not happen in this case. Rather, the prosecutor was simply responding to defendant's attack on the credibility of the State's witnesses. We find that the three complained-of arguments by the prosecutor during rebuttal argument were not improper.