Opinion ID: 778482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reloaders' Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: 61 Reloaders claim that the evidence on each count was insufficient to convict them at the close of the government's case, and thus that the trial court erred by denying their motions for acquittal. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29. We will reverse a district court's finding of sufficient evidence, and thereby its denial of a Rule 29 motion for acquittal, only if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and granting to the government all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, no rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. See United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1490 (9th Cir.1995). Because, applying this standard, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence at the close of the government's case to sustain Reloaders' convictions, we affirm the district court's denial of the Rule 29 motions. 25
62 As noted at the beginning of this opinion, Reloaders were convicted of both conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering 26 and conspiracy to commit wire/mail fraud. Generally, to justify a conviction for conspiracy the government must establish (1) an agreement to engage in criminal activity, (2) one or more overt acts taken to implement the agreement, and (3) the requisite intent to commit the substantive crime. See United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir.1995). However, if the existence of a conspiracy is shown, evidence establishing beyond a reasonable doubt a knowing connection of the defendant with the conspiracy, even though the connection is slight, is sufficient to support a conviction. See United States v. Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1413 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Messer, 197 F.3d 330, 341 (9th Cir.1999). 63 The evidence against Reloaders, though not overwhelming, was sufficient to support their convictions on the two conspiracy counts. The government established, with evidence fully admissible against Reloaders, that Rashada and Rudisill were engaged in conspiracies to commit fraud and promotional money laundering. 27 The testimony of Rashada, Simone, and the various testifying victims showed that Rashada and Rudisill agreed to telemarket ad specialty products to elderly consumers made up to look like businesses. They expressly agreed to use the proceeds of their sales to fund the operation. To identify the individuals to which they could sell their products, Rashada and Rudisill created a qualifying pitch full of lies. 28 In order to convince qualified individuals to buy AEA's products, Rashada and Rudisill also created a front pitch and a reload pitch replete with misrepresentations. 29 They hired employees, trained them on how to use these pitches, and put them to work on calling individuals. All funds taken in from this scheme were in the form of checks. These checks were directed to Phoenix, where Rudisill and Rashada intended they be cashed and used to pay the bills for the Atlanta operation — including Atlanta's payroll. Collectively, this evidence established that Rashada and Rudisill were engaged in both a conspiracy to fraudulently induce people to mail in money, and a conspiracy to engage in financial transactions (check cashing) with the proceeds of the fraud to fund additional fraud. 64 The government also sufficiently established that Reloaders had a knowing connection to both conspiracies. Rashada testified that Reloaders made qualifying, front, and reload calls during their tenure at AEA. These calls connected Reloaders to both conspiracies because they were the means by which AEA fraudulently induced individuals to mail in money, and the source of the illicit monies used to finance the on-going operation. 65 Moreover, circumstantial evidence showed that Reloaders possessed knowledge of the conspiracies. Part of this circumstantial evidence was provided by Rashada's and Simone's testimony on the day-to-day operations of AEA. All the telemarketers at AEA used aliases during their calls. They were taught to convince customers to adopt business names before each sale, and every customer was given the same reward claim number. In filling out sales orders, they were told to record the customer's phone number in code, and to list as the sale price an amount equal to ten percent of the actual sale price. There was no filing system on site for the storage of records. There were no computers in the office (other than Rudisill's personal laptop), and, with the exception of a receptionist, there was no support staff. Every night, before closing, the sales staff was required to load all pitch books, sales orders, and other evidence of the office's daily activities into a box, which Rudisill took home with him. Each employee was paid strictly in cash on every Friday. Virtually every customer contacted by the Atlanta office was an elderly individual. Finally, the very nature of the work at AEA was suspect. Some of the customers were reloaded over ten times. At some point, Reloaders must have wondered why customers had to keep sending in money to receive the prizes promised in the initial sales call. Even the most obtuse observer could not help but be suspicious in such an environment. 66 Additional evidence at trial strengthened the inference that Reloaders knew about AEA's illegal activities. Under the supervision of Rashada and Rudisill, Reloaders made hundreds of calls while employed at AEA. Some of the representations made in these calls would have been obviously false to the person making the call — for example, as to qualifying calls, the claim that the person had been selected pursuant to their entry in a national sweepstakes (the names were taken directly off a leads sheet), and the claim that the caller would be submitting the customer's name to an executive committee (no such committee existed). Other representations, if not facially dishonest, would become patently false after a certain number of calls. After all, only so many people can be one of the lucky few entitled to a share in $500,000 of gold coins. In light of these obvious misrepresentations, taken from sales materials provided by Rashada and Rudisill, a jury could have found that Reloaders knew that they were perpetuating a fraudulent scheme. Moreover, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence that Reloaders knew other employees at AEA were a part of this scheme. Both Rashada and Simone testified that Reloaders engaged in daily sales meetings with Rudisill, could overhear each other's calls, and regularly worked together on getting reloaded customers to send in additional checks. 67 Given the suspicious nature of the operation at AEA, the fact that Reloaders knowingly made false statements to individuals to get them to send in money, and the fact that fraud permeated the Atlanta office, we conclude that a rational juror could have found Reloaders guilty of conspiracy to commit fraud beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the fact that Reloaders knew that all checks garnered by their fraudulent calls went to Phoenix, that these checks were cashed, and that funds from Phoenix were used to cover expenses and payroll for the Atlanta office, 30 we also hold that there was enough evidence for a rational juror to have found Reloaders guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering. Therefore, we affirm the district court's decision on Reloaders' Rule 29 motion as to these two counts.
68 Generally, to obtain a conviction for wire or mail fraud, the government must prove that the defendant (1) participated in a scheme with intent to defraud, and (2) the scheme used or caused the use of the mails or wire in furtherance of the scheme. See United States v. Ciccone, 219 F.3d 1078, 1083-84 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Lothian, 976 F.2d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir.1992). The defendant need not personally have mailed the letter or made the telephone call; the offense may be established where one acts with the knowledge that the prohibited actions will follow in the ordinary course of business or where the prohibited acts can reasonably be foreseen. Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1262. 69 Reviewing the record, we conclude that the government presented enough evidence to convict each reloader for each substantive count. The evidence discussed in the preceding section showed that all four reloaders participated in a scheme with intent to defraud. They regularly made representations over the telephone in order to get individuals to mail checks to the company, all the while knowing that the representations were fraudulent. They also knew they were acting as part of a group, given the joint training sessions, daily sales meetings, the fact that they shared customers, and the fact that they could overhear each other's calls. Finally, circumstantial evidence established that Reloaders were willing participants in the scheme. Each worked for the company for a significant amount of time, and each accepted the financial benefits of AEA's success. 70 Moreover, for each count, the government presented sufficient evidence of the use of wire or mail in furtherance of the fraud scheme. For example, as to count 2, victim Drusilla Aden testified that she sent AEA $16,000 via United Parcel Service (UPS) after receiving a phone call from a H.P. Wills (an alias used by Davis). In support of count 8, Juanita Easson stated that she sent $2,500 to AEA via the postal service after receiving a call from John Logan (one of Burce's aliases). For count 12, Mary Jane Karpel testified that she sent AEA $50,000 via UPS following a phone conversation with John Foley (another one of Burce's aliases). For the various wire fraud counts, the government presented testimony from a phone company representative showing that AEA made calls to various victims immediately prior to the victim's transmittal of a check to AEA. 71 It is immaterial that the government did not prove that each reloader engaged in conduct directly relevant to each fraud count. Much like co-conspirators, knowing participants in a mail or wire fraud scheme are liable for their co-schemers' use of the mails or wires. See Lothian, 976 F.2d at 1263. Thus, for each count, it was sufficient for the government to show that Reloaders participated in the scheme, and that some co-participant used or caused to be used mail or wire in furtherance of the scheme. 31 72 Because the government presented sufficient evidence to convict at least one reloader as to each substantive offense, and because each substantive act of telemarketing fraud was foreseeable and in furtherance of AEA's telemarketing scheme, we hold that a rational juror could find Reloaders guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the various fraud counts. Therefore, the district court's denial of Reloaders' motion for acquittal on these counts is affirmed. 32