Opinion ID: 391163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Skyride is Used by Consumers

Text: 32 The statutory phrase for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of the consumer poses perhaps the most difficult question of interpretation raised by the congressional definition of consumer product. In the common sense of the word, consumers use the Skyride, in that they enjoy, hold, occupy, or have some manner of benefit from the product. Black's Law Dictionary 1710 (4th ed. 1968) (defining Non-technical Sense). See 2 E. Weekly, An Etymological Dictionary of Modern English 1574 (1967). Taking the term as defined in Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 978 (1965), a common desk-top reference book, the passenger avail(s) oneself of the ride, for use implies availing oneself of as a means to an end. Not only do passengers literally occupy the Skyride, but they also enjoy it for sightseeing and benefit from being transported. 33 Steck & Stapf argues that, because consumers do not exercise control over the particular gondola in which they ride, they do not use the Skyride. Surprisingly, two courts have accepted this argument. See Robert K. Bell Enterprises, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 645 F.2d 26, 29 (10th Cir. 1981); Walt Disney Productions v. United States Consumer Product Safety Commission, No. 79-0170-LEW(Px), slip op. at 6 (C.D.Cal. April 18, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, No. 79-3435 (9th Cir. April 22, 1981). Neither opinion cites any legislative history to support such a narrow and unusual reading of use in contradiction to the common understanding of its meaning. One court has found that no evidence supports their interpretation. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. Chance Manufacturing Co., 441 F.Supp. 228, 233 (D.C.D.C.1977). 34 If we created this requirement sua sponte, we would also ignore that portion of the House Report including as consumer products those products sold to institutions for the use of consumers. The power of consumers to control articles sold to and owned by an institution will usually be limited. 8 Precisely because they cannot control the product, consumers may face even greater risks of injury. It certainly becomes more difficult for them to determine for themselves the risks posed by its use. In the absence of any evidence of a contrary congressional intent, we cannot assume that Congress excluded products falling within the language of the statute and contemplated by the legislative history. 35 We are more troubled by an apparent redundancy in the definition. We find it difficult to imagine a product sold to consumers, but not used by them. 9 Even the restrictive definitions urged by State Fair and Steck & Stapf do not eliminate this redundancy. Ordinarily, we avoid treating statutory language as surplusage. Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. C. D. I. Construction Inc., 640 F.2d 654, 658 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981). In this instance, however, Congress may have tolerated tautology. The Senate version of the Consumer Product Safety Act limited its definition to products sold to consumers. 10 The House bill also used the language now constituting subpart (i), but added the additional language regarding personal use embodied in subpart (ii). 11 In its desire for an assurance of comprehensiveness, ASG Industries, 593 F.2d at 1328, the House employed its more broadly stated definition, H.R.Rep.No.92-1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1972), without considering to what degree it overlapped the Senate definition. See id. The effort to avoid lacunae by seeking embraciveness may easily result in overlapping coverage. Without any evidence that Congress, in passing the House version, intended sold to have independent significance, we decline to fabricate a tortured distinction.