Opinion ID: 2402652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Action of the Commissioner

Text: In his consolidated decision, the Commissioner stated his conclusions: first, that Mr. and Mrs. Nuger had not observed the laws of Maryland in conducting the affairs of the AA Agency; and second, that it is not in the public interest to permit either Mr. or Mrs. Nuger as an officer of that company, or individually, or the AA Company, as a corporation, to be again licensed to engage in the insurance business in Maryland. He then ordered that the qualifications of both Mr. and Mrs. Nuger to engage in the insurance business in Maryland are revoked. A person's qualifications are his character, education and experience. The qualifications of a person may be deemed sufficient or insufficient for the granting or renewal of licenses, but insufficient as the Commissioner obviously deemed the qualifications to be in this case, he could not effectively revoke them anymore than he could effectively revoke the color of a man's hair. What the Commissioner obviously had in mind, in part, in his order, as Judge Henderson inferred in his opinion for the Court, in Nuger v. State Insurance Commissioner, supra, was a declaration for the future, if and when there was a request for a renewal of a license. The law here considered, however, contains no authorization for an administrative order similar to that of a judicial declaratory judgment. While the scope of a delegation of legislative power to administrative officers has been liberally construed, there is no basis in the law for such an implied delegation to the Commissioner in what the Administrative Procedure Act designates a contested case. See Cohen, op. cit., 24 Md. Law Rev. at 3-15 and cases therein cited. The discussion of the specific charges by the Commissioner in his decision of June 1, 1962 makes it apparent that he was convinced there had been a wilful violation of the statute under each of the first three charges. The notices given the appellants clearly show that the proposed action against them for the violations, if proved, was to be taken under Section 111, which provided for the revocation of licenses. The Commissioner acted in excess of his authority in making provision for future applications for licenses but the record as a whole, as well as the specific language of the conclusions, makes it clear that, at the very least, he intended to revoke the appellants' licenses. Both Mr. and Mrs. Nuger had licenses at the time of the hearing but the AA Agency had no license of any kind at the hearing against it and no application by it for a renewal of a license was then pending. Any action against the AA Agency, therefore, as a result of the hearing, was beyond the Commissioner's authority; the evidence adduced could only be considered if and when the AA Agency filed an application for a license, or for a renewal of a license. See State Board v. Ruth, supra . We have found that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the Commissioner's action or the action of the lower court affirming him in respect of the charge against Mrs. Nuger alone in connection with the Utz complaint. We have also found that there was ample evidence before the Commissioner as to the revocation of the license of Mr. Nuger on the Getlan complaint, and the revocation of the licenses of both Mr. and Mrs. Nuger in connection with the failure to pay premiums, and that the lower court's affirmance of these charges was amply supported by competent testimony and the weight of the testimony. The procedural provisions of both the old and new laws provide for judicial modification of the Commissioner's decision on appeal. See also Maryland Rule B12. Because of the incorrect form of the Commissioner's order, affirmed by the lower court; the erroneous conclusion in the Commissioner's decision in reference to matters in the Fourth and Fifth Counts, and the erroneous finding against Mrs. Nuger in connection with the Utz complaint, we are constrained to reverse the decision of the lower court and to remand the case for the entry of such order or orders in connection with Mr. Nuger under the Getlan complaint and in connection with Mr. and Mrs. Nuger under the complaint in respect of failure to pay premiums, as the court may deem proper in accordance with this opinion. Order reversed; case remanded to the Superior Court of Baltimore City for the passage of an order consonant with this opinion; one-half of the cost of this appeal to be paid by Mr. and Mrs. Nuger, and one-half by the State Insurance Commissioner.