Opinion ID: 414333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Use of the Prisoner's Dock in this Case

Text: 23 Unlike in Bumpus or in Moore, there is no evidence here that the trial court was concerned over security. Defense counsel's affidavit, making reference to appellant's behavior during two years of incarceration and at his first trial, alleged that allowing [appellant] to sit at counsel table will not present any hazards to the orderly judicial process or to the security of its personnel. The trial court made no further inquiry into the matter and nothing in the record contradicts counsel's affidavit. Unlike the defendant in Moore, appellant here made a clear constitutional objection after having raised the constitutional issue in a pre-trial motion. 24 In once again evaluating for constitutional error the confinement of an accused to the prisoner's box, 4 we reiterate, see Walker v. Butterworth, supra, 599 F.2d at 1080, that such confinement, like appearance in prison attire, is a constant reminder of the accused's condition which may affect a juror's judgment, eroding the presumption of innocence which the accused is due. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1693-94, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). In finding unconstitutional the compelled appearance in prison garb of the accused, the Court in Estelle noted that the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice disapproved the practice. Id. at 504, 96 S.Ct. at 1693. Those standards read as follows with respect to the custody and restraint of defendants and witnesses: 25 (a) During trial the defendant should be seated where he can effectively consult with his counsel and can see and hear the proceedings. 26 (b) An incarcerated defendant or witness should not be required to appear in court in the distinctive attire of a prisoner or convict. 27 (c) Defendants and witnesses should not be subjected to physical restraint while in court unless the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order. If the trial judge orders such restraint, he should enter into the record of the case the reasons therefor. Whenever physical restraint of a defendant or witness occurs in the presence of jurors trying the case, the judge should instruct those jurors that such restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury Sec. 4.1, pp. 91-92 (App.Draft 1968) [hereinafter ABA Standards]. 28 See also ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Sec. 15-3.1 (1980) (custody and restraint of defendants and witnesses) (substantially unchanged except to reflect the holding in Estelle--the trial judge should not permit a defendant or witness to appear at trial in the distinctive attire of a prisoner, unless specifically waived by the defendant). 29 We note that in the discussion of these Standards, already a decade and a half old, there were exceedingly few jurisdictions in which the dock survived. 5 We suspect that there are even fewer today. 6 This evidence from contemporary custom is not without some constitutional significance. 30 Confinement in a prisoner's dock, if less so than appearance in prison attire, is nonetheless a brand of incarceration which is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence. See ABA Standards, commentary on Sec. 4.1(b). Such confinement also implicates both of the other fair trial concerns embodied in the ABA Standards. 31 Even if the court makes allowance for consultation with the confined defendant, access to counsel and thus the right to effective assistance to counsel is inevitably burdened by defendant's confinement to a prisoner's dock. See People v. Zammora, 66 Cal.App.2d 166, 152 P.2d 180, 214-16 (1944) (Cal.Dist.Ct.App.) (denial of defendants' opportunity to sit at counsel table, or consult with counsel during course of trial except when counsel left counsel table and went over to where defendants were seated, violated due process). Here, defense counsel's affidavit in support of appellant's pre-trial motion to sit at counsel table specifically averred that because there would be extensive testimony concerning appellant's conduct over a period of several days, consultation with defendant during the course of testimony was necessary to his conduct of appellant's defense. 32 The only significant state interest in the continued use of the prisoner's dock is as a minimum security measure. 33 Ordinarily, a criminal defendant should be permitted to sit at counsel table. But the dock has served and may continue to serve a valid function in those cases where some form of restraint is necessary to prevent escape or to protect others in the court room. Although the restraint imposed is minor, it has sometimes proved a sufficient obstacle so that court officers could reach the defendant in time to prevent escape or harm to others. Where some form of security is essential, the dock seems far superior to surrounding the defendant with security personnel. Commonwealth v. Moore, supra, 379 Mass. at 110, 393 N.E.2d 904; see also Bumpus v. Gunter, 635 F.2d at 914. But cf. Walker v. Butterworth, supra, at 1080-81 (evaluating state interests). 34 The prisoner's dock, like other physical restraints, should thus be employed only when the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order and when cured by an instruction to the jurors that such restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt. ABA Standards Sec. 4.1(c). The trial judge in this case made no findings that indicated restraint was necessary for security and gave no curative instructions to the jury. 35 We hold that under all the circumstances of this case--particularly in the light of appellant's previously decorous behavior during incarceration and a prior trial, as well as the prospect of a trial involving much testimony concerning conduct of appellant over a substantial period--it was constitutional error for the trial court, without any finding that restraint was necessary, over appellant's constitutional objection, to deny appellant's motion to allow him to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock. Nor can we say that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. at 506-08, 96 S.Ct. at 1694-95; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The first jury was unable to agree upon a verdict, and the second jury, after deliberating for a day and a half, returned second degree murder verdicts despite the fact that, based on the prosecutor's theory of the case, the murders for which appellant was tried could only have been the result of cold-blooded planning and premeditation. As argued persuasively by counsel on appeal, 36 Any suggestion that [appellant] was a dangerous person, implanted in the minds of the jurors through observation of [appellant] confined in the dock day after day, may have tipped the scales of justice.... [A]ny implication that [appellant] was the type of person whom it was necessary to segregate from jurors, spectators, court personnel, and even his own counsel ... cannot fail to impact upon juror deliberation. 37 Appellant may have been additionally prejudiced by the burden which placement in the prisoner's dock put upon effective consultation with counsel during the course of the trial. 38 Our holding is a narrow one. We do not announce a per se rule. We do find that in all the circumstances of this case appellant's confinement to the prisoner's dock unconstitutionally impaired his right to a fair trial. 39 Reversed and remanded with instructions that a writ of habeas corpus shall issue unless the Commonwealth makes arrangements for a new trial within ninety days.