Opinion ID: 186449
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Subsequent Congressional Legislation

Text: 80 We think that, for the reasons discussed above, the FCC never has possessed ancillary jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934 to regulate consumer electronic devices that can be used for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission. Indeed, in the more than 70 years of the Act's existence, the Commission has neither claimed such authority nor purported to exercise its ancillary jurisdiction in such a far-reaching way. See Flag Order, 18 F.C.C.R. at 23,566 (We recognize that the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over manufacturers of equipment in the past has typically been tied to specific statutory provisions and that this is the first time the Commission has exercised ancillary jurisdiction over consumer equipment manufacturers in this manner.). 81 The Commission weakly attempts to dismiss this history by suggesting that Congressional admonitions and past Commission assurances of a narrow exercise of authority over manufacturers (such as those reflected in the [All Channel Receiver Act] and its legislative history) are properly limited to the context of those explicit authorizations. The regulations here do not fall within the subject matter of those explicit authorizations. Id. (footnote omitted). This cryptic statement surely cannot justify the FCC's overreaching for regulatory authority that Congress has never granted. As we held in Aid Ass'n for Lutherans: 82 In this case, the [agency]'s position seems to be that the disputed regulations are permissible because the statute does not expressly foreclose the construction advanced by the agency. We reject this position as entirely untenable under well-established case law. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc) (Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of such power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite likely with the Constitution as well.) (emphasis in original); see also Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 187 (D.C.Cir.1997) (quoting Ry. Labor Executives, 29 F.3d at 671); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C.Cir.1995) (same); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C.Cir.1995) (We refuse . . . to presume a delegation of power merely because Congress has not expressly withheld such power.); Natural Res. Def. Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 266 (D.C.Cir.1993) (`[I]t is only legislative intent to delegate such authority that entitles an agency to advance its own statutory construction for review under the deferential second prong of Chevron. ') (alteration in original) (quoting Kansas City v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 191-92 (D.C.Cir.1991)). 83 321 F.3d at 1174-75. 84 It is enough here for us to find that the Communications Act of 1934 does not indicate a legislative intent to delegate authority to the Commission to regulate consumer electronic devices that can be used for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission. That is the end of the matter. It turns out, however, that subsequent legislation enacted by Congress confirms the limited scope of the agency's ancillary jurisdiction and makes it clear that the broadcast flag regulations exceed the agency's delegated authority under the statute. 85 The first such congressional enactment of note is the All Channel Receiver Act (ACRA), Pub.L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(s), 330(a)). Enacted in 1962, the ACRA granted the Commission authority to require that televisions sold in interstate commerce are capable of adequately receiving all frequencies allocated by the Commission to television broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 303(s). See Elec. Indus. Ass'n Consumer Elecs. Groups v. FCC, 636 F.2d 689 (D.C.Cir.1980) ( EIA ) (offering an extensive review of the legislative history of the ACRA). The original version of the All Channel Receiver Act would have given the Commission the authority to set `minimum performance standards' for all television receivers shipped in interstate commerce. Id. at 694 (quoting S. REP. NO. 87-1526, at 7 (1962)). However, in response to criticism about giving the FCC such broad authority over television receiver design, the minimum performance standards language was deleted before the bill passed the House. The version that passed the House would have instead given the Commission the authority to require that television sets be capable of receiving all frequencies allocated by the Commission to television broadcasting. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 87-1559, at 1 (1962)). FCC Chairman Newton Minow then wrote the chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications expressing his concern that under the House version, `we may be powerless to prevent the shipment . . . of all-channel sets having only the barest capability for receiving UHF signals, and which therefore would not permit satisfactory and usable reception of such signals in a great many instances.' Id. at 695 (alteration in original) (quoting the letter). The Senate amended the bill, and the version that was ultimately enacted allowed the FCC to require television receivers sold in interstate commerce to be capable of adequately receiving all frequencies allocated by the Commission to television broadcasting. 47 U.S.C. § 303(s) (emphasis added). 86 It is clear, however, that, in enacting the ACRA, Congress did not give the Commission unbridled authority to regulate receiving apparatus. EIA, 636 F.2d at 696. This was confirmed when the Commission attempted to set a standard requiring television manufacturers to take steps to improve the quality of UHF reception beyond what could be attained with then-existing technology. On review, this court ruled that the Commission overstepped its delegated authority and vacated the Commission's action. See id. at 698. The court held that, while the ACRA granted the Commission limited . . . authority to ensur[e] that all sets `be capable of adequately receiving' all television frequencies, Congress had intentionally restricted this jurisdictional grant to preclude wide-ranging FCC receiver design regulation. Id. at 695, 696. 87 The All Channel Receiver Act's limited and explicit grant of authority to the Commission over receiver equipment clearly indicates that neither Congress nor the Commission assumed that the agency could find this authority in its ancillary jurisdiction. It also confirms the Commission's absence of authority to regulate receiver apparatus as proposed by the broadcast flag regulations in the Flag Order. If the Commission had no ancillary jurisdiction to regulate the quality of UHF reception, it cannot be doubted that the agency has no ancillary authority to regulate consumer electronic devices that can be used for receipt of wire or radio communication when those devices are not engaged in the process of radio or wire transmission. 88 A second congressional enactment that confirms the limited scope of the agency's ancillary jurisdiction is the Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-259, § 108, 96 Stat. 1087, 1091-92. As part of the Communications Amendments Act of 1982, Congress authorized the Commission to impose performance standards on household consumer electronics to ensure that they can withstand radio interference. See 47 U.S.C. § 302a(a). The legislative history of 47 U.S.C. § 302a demonstrates that this enactment was intended by Congress to give the Commission authority it did not previously possess over receiver equipment. Specifically, the Conference Report stated that, because industry attempts to solve the interference problem voluntarily had not always been successful, the Conferees believe that Commission authority to impose appropriate regulations on home electronic equipment and systems is now necessary to insure that consumers' home electronic equipment and systems will not be subject to malfunction due to [radio frequency interference]. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 97-765, at 32 (1982) (emphasis added). 89 The Commission argues that the legislative history of § 302a indicates that the legislation's purpose was to preclude state and local regulation of radio interference. However, it is not until several paragraphs after the portion of the Conference Report quoted above that the Report noted that the legislation was  further intended to clarify the reservation of exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Communications Commission over matters involving [radio frequency interference]. Id. at 33 (emphasis added). Congress's principal purpose in enacting 47 U.S.C. § 302a was clearly to expand the Commission's authority beyond the scope of its then-existing jurisdiction, which is inconsistent with the FCC's current view that it always has had sweeping jurisdiction over receiver apparatus under Title I of the Communications Act.