Opinion ID: 2279730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of the Right to Counsel

Text: The Fifth Amendment right to counsel attaches during custodial interrogation. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. See id. Instead, an accused, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. See id. While the accused may initiate further contact with the police, the impetus must come from the accused, not the police. See Metcalf v. State, 284 Ark. 223, 681 S.W.2d 344 (1984). Because it is undisputed that Osburn invoked his right to counsel at the conclusion of the 09.28.06 4:45 interview, the question initially presented is whether Osburn initiated further communication with the investigators. With respect to whether Osburn initiated for purposes of Edwards v. Arizona, supra , the circuit court found, in pertinent part: The testimony from the State at the suppression hearing regarding this statement came from Rick Newton and Michael Boshears. Boshears['s] testimony was that after Osburn invoked his right to counsel in the prior interview, Rick Newton turned the tape recorder off and went outside the interview room to arrange for Osburn to be transported to Dumas Jail. Boshears was alone in the room with Osburn 5-10 minutes. Osburn requested of Boshears that he be allowed to see his family before he went to jail. Boshears responded that he would check with Newton to see if his request could be met. Osburn then stated I'm in a mess. Boshears responded that he relies on his faith in such circumstances. Osburn asked Boshears to pray for him. Boshears stated he would, and had already. Osburn became emotional, stating he wanted to see his daughter. Boshears advised him to spend some time in prayer while he was in jail. Osburn explained he did not feel worthy, and had not been doing well in life. Boshears asked if he wanted to keep talking. Osburn said he wanted to do the right thing and talk. Boshears then opened the door and called Newton, telling him Osburn wanted to continue their conversation. Boshears['s] notes regarding this conversation were admitted by the Defendant for impeachment purposes as Defendant's Exhibit A. The Court does not find it to be substantially different from his testimony. Newton's testimony was that about five minutes after the initial interview ended, and he went to arrange transportation for Osburn to the jail, Boshears came out and told him Osburn wanted to speak again and get it off his chest. He then went in and the tape of the interview shows Newton reviewing the Miranda rights form and waiver previously executed by Osburn. Osburn acknowledges the rights. The Court has reviewed the interview in question. Osburn appears calm and relaxed. The only thing which makes him appear uncomfortable at any time during this interview appears to be the video camera. The defendant argues that this statement should be suppressed because of the previous invocation of the right to counsel by the defendant. The states [sic] argues that the defendant initiated this further conversation with the police, thus waiving his fifth amendment right to counsel under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), and Vidos v. State, 367 Ark. 296 [239 S.W.3d 467], 2006 Ark. Lexis 249 (2006). Under Michigan v. Jackson, supra , a defendant initiates further contact with police by evincing willingness, or desire for generalized discussion about the investigation. In the case of Owens v. Bowersox, 290 F.3d 960 (8th Cir.2002), cited by the defendant, the court focused on this element, stating the impetus therein came from the defendant, through his mother, who told the police he wanted to talk to them, and not from suggestion by the police which coached the defendant into prompting the defendant to talk to them. The court finds that the defendant did in this particular statement evince a willingness or desire for generalized discussion about the investigation, when he said to Agent Boshears, I am in a mess. The further conversation between the defendant and Boshears from that point led eventually to the defendant stating he wanted to talk further about the situation and do the right thing. (Emphasis added.) In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), which was a plurality decision, four justices held that the respondent's question, Well, what is going to happen to me now?, `initiated' further conversation in the ordinary dictionary sense of that word. 462 U.S. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the four, further observed that while a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to `initiate' any conversation or dialogue, [7] the respondent's question evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. [8] Id. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830. What is clear from Bradshaw is that in order for an accused to initiate, his inquiry or statement must indicate some desire or willingness to discuss the investigation. Here, the interaction between Osburn and Agent Boshears began with Osburn's inquiry as to whether he could see his family before being taken to jail. Agent Boshears, after telling Osburn that that was not his decision, according to his own testimony, began to describe to Osburn what was about to happen and what Osburn could expect. Again, Osburn asked to see his family, and, again, Agent Boshears told him that he would ask. It was at that point that Osburn simply made the statement that he was in a mess, which the State claims constituted an initiation of contact with the police. However, we think it is clear that such a statement could have a variety of meanings, as evidenced by Agent Boshears's testimony that he too had found himself in a mess: And I explained to [Osburn] that during times that I have, that I would call myself in a mess or tough times, I explained that I rely heavily on my faith and pray a great deal. Here, Osburn's statement simply did not indicate any desire on his part to reengage in a discussion of the investigation, as required by Bradshaw. Indeed, the conversation did not turn to the investigation, but instead, according to Agent Boshears's testimony, it turned to prayer, Osburn became emotional, and he again asked to see his daughter. The two began to speak about faith, to which, according to Boshears, Osburn stated that he did not feel worthy to keep the faith or his relationship with Christ. Then, Agent Boshears, according to the circuit court's findings, asked if [Osburn] wanted to keep talking. [9] It was only at that time that Osburn stated that he wanted to do the right thing and talk, and the statement at issue resulted. After examining the totality of the circumstances, as we must, we simply cannot say that Osburn initiated further contact as contemplated by Bradshaw. Absolutely no inquiry or statement made by Osburn evinced any willingness on his part to reengage or reinitiate a conversation relating to the investigation; to the contrary, his inquiries and statements indicated a desire to see his family and expressed his despair. Nor did Osburn's statement that he was in a mess initiate. As the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, To ascribe such significance to this limited [statement] would render virtually any remark by a defendant, no matter how offhand or superficial, susceptible of interpretation as an invitation to discuss his case in depth. To do so would amount to a perversion of the rule fashioned in Edwards and articulated more fully in Bradshaw. People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382, 390, 207 Ill.Dec. 433, 647 N.E.2d 926, 930 (1995). Indeed, the only statement made by Osburn that indicated any willingness to discuss the investigation after his invocation of the right to counsel came after Agent Boshears asked him if he wanted to keep talking. Here, counsel was not made available to Osburn, nor did he initiate; instead, it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the 09.28.06 7:25 interview was the result of a violation of Edwards. Accordingly, we hold that because Osburn did not initiate, his Fifth Amendment right to counsel was violated by the 09.28.06 7:25 interview, and the circuit court's finding to the contrary was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. We turn then to Osburn's claim that the illegality of the 09.28.06 7:25 interview rendered the 09.28.06 8:55 interview fruit of the poisonous tree. The doctrine requiring courts to suppress evidence as the tainted `fruit' of unlawful governmental conduct had its genesis in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); there, the Court held that the exclusionary rule applies not only to the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also to other incriminating evidence derived from the primary evidence. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), extended the exclusionary rule to evidence that was the indirect product or `fruit' of unlawful police conduct, but there again emphasized that evidence that has been illegally obtained need not always be suppressed. Id. Further, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine has not been limited to cases in which there has been a Fourth Amendment violation, but has also been applied to violations of the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. See id. While some courts have relied upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), to reject the application of the fruit-of-the-poisonoustree doctrine to a Fifth Amendment violation of the right to counsel, [10] we disagree with their interpretation of that decision. In Elstad, the Court examined whether an initial failure of law enforcement officers to administer Miranda warnings, without more, tainted subsequent admissions made after one was fully advised of and had waived his Miranda rights. The Court held that it did not: It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. In so holding, however, the Court drew a distinction between a procedural Miranda violation and a constitutional violation: Respondent's contention that his confession was tainted by the earlier failure of the police to provide Miranda warnings and must be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree assumes the existence of a constitutional violation. .... The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case, Miranda 's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm. .... Justice BRENNAN cannot seriously mean to equate such situations with the case at bar. Likewise inapposite are the cases the dissent cites concerning suspects whose invocation of their rights to remain silent or to have counsel present were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation. Id. at 305, 306-07, 312 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). We have previously recognized that a procedural Miranda violation is not necessarily a violation of the Constitution, and the fruits doctrine may not be applicable. See Childress v. State, 322 Ark. 127, 907 S.W.2d 718 (1995) (rejecting, in accord with Elstad, appellant's claim that his unwarned, initial noncustodial statement tainted two later custodial statements). However, we are of the opinion that there is a critical difference between a mere defect in the administration of Miranda warnings `without more' and police-initiated interrogation conducted after a suspect unambiguously invokes the right to have counsel present during questioning, as [t]he latter is a violation of a constitutional right. State v. Harris, 199 Wis.2d 227, 248, 544 N.W.2d 545, 553 (1996); see also State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 273, 277, 511 A.2d 80, 91, 93 (1986) (Therefore, if after a suspect avails himself of the Constitution's protections the police violate a right that has been invoked, that violation, by definition, is of constitutional magnitude. ... [O]nce it has been determined that there has been a failure to honor the previously-invoked right [to counsel or right to silence], the resultant violation cannot be anything other than a constitutional infringement.). As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed, there is a very clear distinction between the violation of a procedure and the violation of a right: The primary flaw in the State's argument is the failure to distinguish between violation of a procedure (informing an accused of his rights) and violation of a right (the right to have counsel present during interrogation). The procedure required under Miranda is that warnings must be given prior to custodial interrogation, while the procedure required by Edwards is that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, all police-initiated questioning must cease until counsel is present. With the former, it is possible to act in a manner that is violative of the safeguard but not of the rights it seeks to protect; this is not possible with conduct that violates Edwards. A violation of Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 247, 544 N.W.2d at 553. In the instant case, Osburn's Fifth Amendment right was violated; as such, this Fifth Amendment violation triggers the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requiring the suppression of the fruits of that constitutional violation. Id., 544 N.W.2d at 553; see also Smith v. State, 132 Ga.App. 491, 208 S.E.2d 351 (1974) (holding that where appellant's first statement was inadmissible due to the State's failure to show a waiver of his right to counsel, and where the State did not demonstrate that appellant's subsequent confessions were obtained by means sufficient to purge the underlying illegality, appellant's subsequent confessions were tainted by the first, pursuant to Wong Sun ). However, [j]ust as the `fruit' of a Fourth Amendment violation need not, under all circumstances, be suppressed, a confession that follows a Fifth Amendment violation is not, under all circumstances, barred from use as evidence. State v. Vinson, 854 S.W.2d 615, 622 (Mo.Ct.App. 1993). With respect to the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, the pertinent inquiry is whether, granting the establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). The question, then, is whether Osburn's statement from the 09.28.06 8:55 interview was an exploitation of the 09.28.06 7:25 interview or whether it was sufficiently distinguishable such that any taint was purged. Under the facts of this case, we are simply unable to say that Osburn's statement from the 09.28.06 8:55 interview did not come by exploitation of the illegality of the 09.28.06 7:25 interview. As the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v. Bayer : Of course, after an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first. 331 U.S. 532, 540, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947). [11] Certainly, where the illegal statement was made at 7:25 p.m. and concluded at 7:35 p.m., and the subsequent confession was taken at 8:55 p.m., just one hour and twenty minutes later, Osburn was in no way free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having had confessed. In addition, Osburn was in continuous custody between the two statements, and the same two investigators participated in both. While Osburn was taken to a different location between the two statements and was permitted a fifteen-minute visit with his family, he had no consultation with counsel, and, in fact, was ushered into the latter statement by his friend and former employer, the then-sheriff-elect. We have held that when the original confession has been made under illegal influences, such influences will be presumed to continue and color all subsequent confessions, unless the contrary is shown. See Weaver v. State, 305 Ark. 180, 806 S.W.2d 615 (1991). The contrary has not been shown. Accordingly, we hold that the 09.28.06 8:55 interview was a fruit of the earlier 09.28.06 7:25 interview and should have been suppressed.