Opinion ID: 1624645
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether hearsay testimony denied neal his right to confrontation.

Text: ¶ 31. Neal asserts that the State elicited impermissible hearsay testimony twice during its case-in-chief. First, Neal's neighbor, Loerker, testified that when Cleveland's son, C.D., came back to her house, he complained to her that his bedroom window was locked and he could hear his baby brother crying inside but nobody would answer the door or let him in and he said, `that seems odd. My window is never locked.' Second, Detective Hodges testified that he believed the eight-month-old had been in his crib since around three o'clock p.m. because C.D. had been to the home, had heard the baby crying, and had returned to Loerker's home. ¶ 32. Neal claims that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of these two statements in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). As Neal did not contemporaneously object to the admission of either of these statements, he failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Boyd v. State, 977 So.2d 329, 337 (Miss.2008). However, [u]nder the plain-error doctrine, we can recognize obvious error which was not properly raised by the defendant on appeal, and which affects a defendant's `fundamental, substantive right.' Smith v. State, 986 So.2d 290, 294 (Miss.2008). This Court has held that a violation of the Confrontation Clause is a violation of a fundamental, substantive right. Id. To show plain error, Neal must prove that the inclusion of the statements seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, 518 (1993). To determine if plain error has occurred, we must determine `if the trial court has deviated from a legal rule, whether that error is plain, clear or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the outcome of the trial.' McGee v. State, 953 So.2d 211, 215 (Miss.2007). ¶ 33. Hearsay is defined as a statement... offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Miss. R. Evid. 801(c). Loerker's testimony about what C.D. said was indeed hearsay because it was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, which was that at the time C.D. arrived home, he could not get inside because no one answered the door, and his window, although ordinarily open, was locked. Miss. R. Evid. 801(c). These facts supported the prosecution's theory that Neal killed Cleveland and then altered the crime scene and locked the windows before he went to work; the prosecutor referenced these facts in closing argument in support of this theory. ¶ 34. However, Loerker's hearsay testimony did not violate Neal's Sixth Amendment right, because only testimonial hearsay is capable of violating the Sixth Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. While the Court in Crawford declined to provide a comprehensive definition of `testimonial,' it stated that [w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations,... the modern practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was directed. Id. In the Court's analysis, it articulated that `[t]estimony,'... is typically `a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citation omitted). The Court further stated that: Various formulations of this core class of testimonial statements exist: ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,... statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (citations omitted). ¶ 35. Applying Crawford, this Court has held that a statement is testimonial when it is given to the police or individuals working in connection with the police for the purpose of prosecuting the accused. Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847, 852 (Miss. 2006). C.D.'s statements to Loerker were not made for any prosecutorial purpose; in fact, neither C.D. nor Loerker even knew of Cleveland's death at the time the statement was made. Loerker's testimony about C.D.'s comments bore no resemblance to the core class of testimonial hearsay identified in Crawford. Therefore, we find that it was nontestimonial, and it did not implicate Neal's Sixth Amendment right or the plain-error doctrine. ¶ 36. Nor was the plain-error doctrine implicated by Investigator Hodges's testimony. That testimony was not hearsay, and thus a hearsay objection to the testimony properly would have been overruled. Investigator Hodges's testimony was responsive to questions from the State as to why he contacted the Department of Human Services to pick up the children from the scene. Investigator Hodges responded that he did so because the mother was dead, the father was with police, and the baby had been left in the crib for an extended period of time. He explained that he had concluded that the baby had been in his crib since the afternoon based on the information provided to him by Loerker that C.D. had heard the baby crying that afternoon. Investigator Hodges's testimony was not elicited to prove that the baby in fact had been crying that afternoon, but only to explain Investigator Hodges's decision to proceed as he did regarding the children. Thus, this testimony was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and it is not considered hearsay. Rubenstein, 941 So.2d at 764; Neal v. State, 805 So.2d 520, 523 (Miss.2002).