Opinion ID: 3153967
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Parties’ Sentencing Recommendations

Text: In its presentence submission to the district court, the prosecution honored its plea agreement obligation by making an advisory recommendation pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(B) that Messina be sentenced to 10 years’ incarceration.1 It submitted that such a sentence “appropriately balances the defendant’s criminal history and the seriousness of the defendant’s conduct against the significant prosecutorial risks and burdens avoided through a negotiated resolution, and permits careful allocation of prosecutorial and other governmental resources that would otherwise be devoted to trial litigation.” Prosecution Letter, Nov. 7, 2013, at 1. The prosecution observed that, but for the 1 Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(B), a plea agreement may specify that the government will “recommend . . . that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate,” but “such a recommendation or request does not bind the court.” By contrast, Rule 11(c)(1)(C) states that a plea agreement may specify that the government will “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition,” in which case “such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” 5 plea agreement, “the government would have been faced with the risk of trial, which in all cases includes the possibility of adverse verdicts on one or more counts of the indictment.” Id. It represented that the plea agreement (including the recommended 10‐year sentence) avoided that risk, provided the district court with “the opportunity to impose a reasonable sentence in light of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility,” and permitted the prosecution “to focus its resources on additional offenders and additional threats.” Id. at 1−2. Meanwhile, Messina’s counsel urged an even lower prison sentence of between five and seven years. See Messina Sentencing Mem. at 38. 2. The District Court’s Initial Rejection of the Recommended 10‐ Year Sentence On November 8, 2013, the district court formally accepted Messina’s guilty plea, but rejected the recommended 10‐year sentence. While acknowledging the government’s November 7, 2013 letter, the district court concluded that there was no “justifiable reason” for the recommended sentence, which, it noted, represented a “dramatic downward departure” of 10 years, or 50%, from the effective 20‐year Guideline. Tr., Nov. 8, 2013, at 9−10. The district court explained that Messina’s significant role in many serious crimes, committed 6 under the auspices of organized crime, warranted a sentence significantly above 10 years. It further observed that the urged departure rested on the fact of Messina’s guilty plea, a matter for which the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(b)(2) did not anticipate a reduction beyond the three‐level acceptance‐of‐ responsibility consideration of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.2 The district court did not then sentence Messina. Rather, it adjourned the proceedings to afford him a hearing on certain disputed facts. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978). 2 Guideline § 6B1.2, entitled “Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements,” is a policy statement, which states, among other things, that courts “may accept” non‐binding sentencing recommendations outside the applicable Guidelines range “for justifiable reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(b)(2)(A). Accompanying commentary explains that, consistent with U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, a court “may not depart below the applicable guideline range merely because of the defendant’s decision to plead guilty to the offense or to enter a plea agreement with respect to the offense.” Id. § 6B1.2 cmt.; see id. § 5K2.0(d)(4) (stating that “departure may not be based merely on the fact that the defendant decided to plead guilty or to enter into a plea agreement,” but “may be based on justifiable, non‐prohibited reasons as part of a sentence that is recommended, or agreed to, in the plea agreement and accepted by the court”). 7 3. Imposition of a Below‐Guidelines 18‐Year Sentence On April 4, 2014, with the benefit of evidence adduced at the Fatico hearing, the district court made preponderance findings that Messina was responsible for Pistone’s murder as a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the admitted armed robbery predicate. It further found Messina responsible for the attempted murder of Michele Maniscalco, who was shot in the back of the head (and thereby rendered a quadriplegic for the remaining two years of his life) by a hitman recruited and armed by Messina.3 The court found Messina to have possessed firearms in furtherance of the admitted racketeering conspiracy as recently as 2010. It also found that on court‐authorized wiretaps Messina’s girlfriend described 39 months of severe physical abuse at his hands, which the defendant did not deny in the recorded conversations.4 3 The Maniscalco attempted murder was one of the charged predicates to which Messina did not allocute in pleading guilty to racketeering conspiracy. 4 Although the abuse conduct ultimately did not affect Messina’s Guidelines calculation, the district court was careful to direct that the PSR be amended to note the girlfriend’s subsequent denials of abuse. Such attention is evident throughout the sentencing record. 8 Having thus resolved all factual disputes, the district court calculated Messina’s “advisory guideline total adjusted offense level at 41” and his criminal history category at III—one level and one category higher than anticipated in the plea agreement. This yielded a correspondingly higher advisory Guidelines range of 360‐months‐to‐life imprisonment, which, like the 324‐to‐405‐month range referenced in the parties’ plea agreement, was superseded by the 20‐year statutory maximum. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). The district court noted as additional “aggravating” factors (1) Messina’s “long‐time association with the Bonanno organized crime family . . . an especially dangerous criminal enterprise that depends on the willingness of individuals like Mr. Messina to use violence or the threat of violence to rob, enrich themselves or use extor[t]ion . . . to collect the proceeds of loans and engage in illegal gambling ventures,” Tr., Apr. 4, 2014, at 40−41; (2) Messina’s effort “to use Joseph Savarese, a soldier in the Colombo organized crime family with a reputation for violence, to convince workers at the New York Post to engage Mr. Messina’s company,” id. at 41; and (3) Messina’s enlistment of Ralph 9 Scopo, then charged with “extorting a union” to get it to use Messina’s company, id. The district court then reiterated its rejection of the government’s recommended 10‐year sentence, explaining that nothing in the record supported such a significant departure from the 20‐year Guideline “other than the fact that Mr. Messina has ple[aded] guilty and the parties wish to avoid the risks of a trial.” Id. at 47. Accordingly, it sentenced Messina to 18 years’ incarceration, a term “above the ten years recommended by the government, but below Mr. Messina’s effective guideline range of 20 years.” Id. at 56. In imposing this sentence, the district court provided a detailed explanation for its decision, spanning eight pages of transcript, which we summarize below. To begin, the court specifically acknowledged that the Guidelines were not mandatory; rather, it gave them “respectful consideration,” as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4). Id. at 51; see Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007). The court then generally confirmed its consideration of all § 3553(a) sentencing factors, particularly noting that the “nature” of Messina’s crime of conviction—conspiracy to commit racketeering with members and associates of 10 the Bonanno organized crime family—was “a very serious offense.” Id. “Most troubling” to the court was Messina’s solicitation of the Maniscalco murder and his role in the foreseeable felony murder of Pistone. Id. at 52. While the court recognized that these crimes had occurred many years earlier, it found that “[t]he pain suffered by the families of these victims continues to this day” and that Messina had never answered for his actions. Id. The court further observed that Messina’s association with organized crime was not only lengthy but continuing, having become “more active in recent years, including sports betting, loansharking,” using mob connections “to obtain business for his insurance company,” and continued illegal trafficking in firearms, including one gun “equipped with a handmade silencer.” Id. at 52−53. At the same time, the district court noted positive aspects of Messina’s family history, his various health problems, his enrollment in treatment programs for alcohol and drug abuse, his successful educational and employment history, and the court’s receipt of dozens of supportive letters “vividly depict[ing] the good and compassion that Mr. Messina is capable of showing others.” Id. at 55. 11 Upon consideration of the totality of these circumstances, the district court determined that “a substantial sentence”—specifically, 18 years’ incarceration— was necessary in light of Messina’s criminal history, particularly his association and criminal activities with the Bonanno organized crime family, the nature of Messina’s crime of conviction, and the loss of life and devastation resulting from Messina’s offense. 4. The Challenged Restitution Order At the April 4 sentencing, the district court directed the government to ascertain if Pistone’s family sought restitution. On May 1, the government responded in the affirmative and provided documentation to support an award for income lost by Pistone from the time of his death until judgment, funeral and burial expenses, and court costs. Messina did not challenge the government’s calculations. Instead, he argued that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, did not contemplate an award of lost future income to a deceased victim. The district court concluded otherwise and awarded Pistone’s family $112,324.30 for income lost between 1992 and 2013 as a result of the felony murder that took his life. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (stating 12 that in case of deceased victim, “representative of the victim’s estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the victim’s rights under this section”). The amount was based on tax records indicating that Pistone’s average declared annual income for the three years prior to his murder was $5,105.65. The court further awarded $5,225 in funeral expenses, $2,990 in burial expenses, and $72 in court transcript costs, for a total restitution award of $120,611.30. This timely appeal followed.