Opinion ID: 195068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficient Process and Service of Process.

Text: 8 Jones concedes actual notice of the filing of the section 921(d) enforcement petition with the district court, but pleads insufficient process and insufficient service of process, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(4), (5), based on Williams's admitted failure to serve Jones pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. See Durbin Paper Stock Co. v. Hossain, 97 F.R.D. 639, 639 (S.D.Fla.1982) (Service of process is not effectual on an attorney solely by reason of his capacity as an attorney, [but] [t]he party must have appointed his attorney as his agent for service of process.) (collecting cases); cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b). 4 9 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in section 921(d) enforcement proceedings except to the extent that matters of procedure are provided for in [the LHWCA]. Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(6). As section 921(d) is silent on the procedures for filing, serving, and answering an enforcement petition in the district court, Jones reasons that service of process was required in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 and 81(a)(6); without it, he argues, the district court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over him. 10 The magistrate judge rejected Jones's argument, citing Jourdan v. Equitable Equip. Co., 889 F.2d 637 (5th Cir.1989), a case involving companion LHWCA section 918(a). Section 918(a) enforcement proceedings normally are used to enforce compensation awards which have become effective but are not yet final; that is, during the pendency of an appeal to the BRB from the ALJ's initial award, or from the BRB to the court of appeals. See supra notes 2 and 3. Within one year after an employer's default, the employee may apply to an ALJ for a supplementary order declaring the amount in default. The ALJ may not issue the supplementary order except [a]fter investigation, [and] notice, and hearing. Even then, however, the supplementary order is not self-executing. Rather, the claimant, or the ALJ, must file a certified copy of the supplementary order with the appropriate federal district court, which shall upon filing of the copy enter judgment for the amount declared in default ... if such supplementary order is in accordance with law. 5 11 The Jourdan court held that the obligatory language of section 918(a) evinced a clear congressional intent to dispense with the service of process requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 in a section 918(a) enforcement proceeding brought in the district court. The magistrate judge in the present case, analogizing from Jourdan, reasoned that, 12 [l]ike Section 918(a), Section 921(d) utilizes imperative language; upon certain findings the court shall enforce. The only difference is the lack of specificity regarding the method for filing the application. In either case, the court must make preliminary findings that amount to nothing more than a procedural review of the underlying process. Assuming there were no procedural errors at the administrative level, the court has no choice but to enforce the order. Again, the court has no jurisdiction over the merits of the action. The aggrieved party would have no additional opportunity to be heard even if notice were provided according to the strict requirements of Rule 4. The logical conclusion is that Section 921(d) is a summary proceeding, and that upon filing of appropriate documentation showing that the order is final, that it was properly served, and that the employer has failed to comply, the court should issue the order. 13 Williams v. Jones, No. 92-0156-B, slip op. at 6 (D.Me. Oct. 27, 1992) (recommended decision) (emphasis added). 14 Assuming, arguendo, that Jourdan is correctly decided, section 921(d) is insufficiently analogous to section 918(a) to bear the weight given it in the recommended decision below. Section 918(a)'s bifurcated enforcement mechanism requires administrative notice to the employer, as well as an opportunity to be heard, prior to the entry of any supplementary enforcement order by the ALJ. See supra notes 2 and 5. Long before the employee ever files the ALJ's certified supplementary order with the district court, therefore, the procedural requirements of section 918(a) itself have assured that the employer was placed on notice of the impending judicial enforcement proceeding. The district court is expressly charged with determining whether such supplementary order [was] in accordance with law. 33 U.S.C. Sec. 918(a). Thus, section 918(a) envisions an ancillary district court mechanism for enforcing supplementary enforcement orders entered by the ALJ. Arguably, at least, this is the sort of administrative alternative to service of process which would preempt the Rule 4 service of process requirement under Fed.Rule Civ.P. 81(a)(6). 6 In contrast, however, no notice to the employer is required prior to the commencement of a section 921(d) enforcement action in the district court. See supra p. 251. 15 In addition, we detect no intimation, either in the statutory language or legislative history, that Congress contemplated a section 921(d) proceeding quite so summary as indicated in the recommended decision. Even assuming that a full panoply of equitable defenses is not available to an employer in a section 921(d) enforcement action, see infra pt. II, it is nonetheless clear that the employer may contest factual allegations upon which the section 921(d) enforcement petition necessarily depends, 7 including the main issue whether the employer is in default. Moreover, arguably at least, the employer might be entitled to raise factual challenges relating to (1) the amount in default, 8 (2) whether new evidence indicates that the initial compensation order was procedurally defective, or otherwise not in accordance with law, or (3) employee conduct that might tilt the fundamental balance of equities in favor of judicial restraint. See infra note 18. Moreover, unlike the bifurcated process involved in a section 918(a) enforcement proceeding, which presumes prior notice and hearing at the administrative level, section 921(d) constitutes the district court the employer's first and only forum for a full hearing of such factual disputes prior to the issuance of an injunctive enforcement order, with its attendant exposure to coercive contempt proceedings. 16 The recommended decision observes that even without a formal Rule 4 service of process requirement the district court could notify an employer informally in those cases where the court believed that an employee's petition for enforcement involved controverted factual matters. But of course such an approach could afford adequate safeguards only if the factual conflicts were apparent on the face of the employee's petition for enforcement. Otherwise, there could be no assurance that the respondent-employer would have either notice or opportunity to assert a challenge. Thus, to construe Rule 81(a)(6) as excepting section 921(d) enforcement actions from the service of process requirements of Rule 4, merely because the employer did not interpose opposition to the enforcement petition, could expose employers to ex parte enforcement orders. 17 Finally, Williams suggests that requiring service of process in a section 921(d) enforcement proceeding could subvert the LHWCA goal of ensuring prompt compliance with compensation orders. Granting the premise of Williams's LHWCA policy argument in principle, whatever slight delay might be occasioned by requiring proper service of process in order to enable the court to obtain in personam jurisdiction over employers hardly seems inappropriate, especially in light of the simplicity of the procedure. 9 18 Sections 918(a) and 921(d) serve distinct roles in the LHWCA remedial scheme. Section 918(a) designedly affords injured employees a convenient, inexpensive, and expeditious mechanism for facilitating enforcement of effective compensation awards even before they have become final . Congress anticipated the severe financial hardships that could beset injured employees as a result of lengthy appeals. It therefore settled on the section 918(a) enforcement action as a simple means to compel prompt employer compliance with an enforcement award even though it might later be set aside on review. See, e.g., Tidelands Marine Serv. v. Patterson, 719 F.2d 126, 129 (5th Cir.1983) (Sec. 918(a) implements a theme central to the spirit, intent, and purposes of the LHWCA); Henry, 704 F.2d at 865. 10 For some reason not disclosed in the appellate record, however, Williams failed to invoke the convenient, prompt, and inexpensive enforcement mechanism established under section 918(a) throughout the ten-year period spanned by Jones's numerous appeals. Cf., e.g., Cassell v. Taylor, 243 F.2d 259, 260 (D.C.Cir.1957) (one-year statute of limitations under Sec. 918(a) bars recovery on supplemental order filed sixteen years after default on compensation award payments); supra note 5. Moreover, Williams chose not to cross-appeal from the district court's ruling that section 921(d) could not be used to recover past-due payments. See supra note 8. The avoidable and unexplained delay in Williams's efforts to recover these past-due compensation payments from Jones, however ill advised or unfortunate, does not permit disregard of the service of process requirements applicable to section 921(d) enforcement proceedings, particularly since compliance will entail no significant further delay. 11 But cf. infra pt. II.B. 19 Furthermore, proper service of process is no empty procedural exercise where an employee seeks to obtain a district court enforcement order under section 921(d) which may lead to contempt proceedings against the employer for noncompliance. See Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 103, 108 S.Ct. 404, 409, 98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (Before a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied. '[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.' ) (citing Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45, 66 S.Ct. 242, 245-46, 90 L.Ed. 185 (1946)) (emphasis added); Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21, 23-24 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that actual notice of lawsuit is no substitute for substantial compliance with FRCP 4(d)(1) [requiring service on person of defendant, on suitable resident at defendant's dwelling, or on defendant's agent]; a [ ] judgment entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is void, and may be set aside at any time pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4). Personal jurisdiction is established either by proper service of process or by the defendant's waiver of any defect in the service of process.) (emphasis added); Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1559 (1st Cir.1989) ([I]n the ordinary course, the district court acquires jurisdiction over a defendant only by service of process....) (emphasis added). Accordingly, as we cannot find that Jones waived service of process, see supra note 4, we vacate the district court enforcement order, and remand for service of process pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. 20