Opinion ID: 153055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Length of the Delay

Text: The first factor of the balancing test actually serves as a double enquiry. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). First, it serves as a threshold inquiry that the defendant must satisfy in order for us to weigh the remaining three factors. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.). To satisfy this threshold inquiry the defendant `must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay.' Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686). If, and only if, the defendant satisfies this threshold inquiry will we proceed to address the remaining three factors of the Barker balancing test. Id. The second part of our inquiry under this factor examines the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to satisfy the threshold showing of presumptive prejudice. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The longer the pretrial delay extended beyond the bare minimum necessary to show presumptive prejudice, the stronger the presumption that the pretrial delay prejudiced the defendant. See id. at 652, 655-57, 112 S.Ct. 2686. The length of the delay itself weighs against the government, incrementally increasing in weight as the delay becomes increasingly protracted, and a particularly lengthy delay may also affect our analysis of the fourth Barker factor. See id.; see also United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 209 (6th Cir.1996) ([I]f the constitutional inquiry has been triggered, the length of delay is itself balanced with the other factors and may, in extreme circumstances, give rise to a strong presumption of evidentiary prejudice affecting the fourth Barker factor.) (quotations omitted). To resolve these two inquiries, we must first determine the length of the pretrial delay. To do so, we calculate the time that elapsed between when the Sixth Amendment right attached until trial (or, until the pretrial motion to dismiss on this ground is determined). 5 Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.2(b) (3d ed. Thomson/West 2007) (footnotes omitted). Here, Villarreal's speedy trial right attached in July 1998 when a federal grand jury indicted him. The government arrested Villarreal in January 2008, the court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial grounds in May 2008, and Villarreal ultimately pled guilty in September 2008. Thus, Villarreal endured a delay of approximately ten years. The ten-year delay in this case clearly satisfies the threshold inquiry of presumptive prejudice. The government has conceded this point (Aple. Br. at 27), and our cases support that concession. See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336 (Delays exceeding one year are generally found to be presumptively prejudicial.) (quotations omitted). The delay also extended significantly beyond the minimum necessary to show presumptive prejudice. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (explaining that the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time). This factor, therefore, weighs against the government.