Opinion ID: 1869392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burden of Proof for Summary Judgment

Text: For their appeal, the taxpayers contend as their first point that the Board failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment and, accordingly, did not meet its burden of proof. They further assert that the circuit court erred in finding that the taxpayers had the burden of introducing evidence to establish the existence of a material question of fact. The taxpayers note that the circuit court found in its order that the Board had attached a copy of the contract between the School Board and Dr. Brooks to its motion for summary judgment, while in fact the only contracts attached to that motion were between the School Board and previous superintendents. The taxpayers also point out that no affidavits were attached to the motion for summary judgment. They emphasize that, in the absence of reliance by the circuit court on any proof outside of the pleadings in granting summary judgment, it was inconsistent for the circuit court to deny the Board's motion to dismiss but then grant the Board's motion for summary judgment. The taxpayers next claim that, by focusing on the School Board's discretion and by failing to balance that discretion against the constitutional limitations on the expenditure of school district funds, the circuit court, in effect, found that the Board had the discretion to violate the Arkansas Constitution. They note that the Board is a creature of the Arkansas General Assembly and can only exercise what power it is given under the Arkansas Constitution and by statute. In sum, they urge that a material question of fact remains: whether or not the payment of severance pay to a terminated school superintendent is an operations-and-maintenance expenditure and, therefore, allowable under the Arkansas Constitution. The Board counters that whether severance pay is necessary for the operation and maintenance of public schools and is therefore constitutional is not a question of fact that can be established by testimony but rather is a question of law. The circuit court, it argues, made a specific finding that there were no disputed material facts and listed several material facts in its order that were undisputed. Where the facts are not disputed, the Board concludes, it is appropriate to make a legal determination by means of summary judgment. Our standard of review for summary judgment has been often stated: Summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Once a moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. After reviewing undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied if, under the evidence, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions from those undisputed facts. On appeal, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of its motion leave a material question of fact unanswered. This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Our review is not limited to the pleadings, as we also focus on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Sykes v. Williams, 373 Ark. 236, 239-40, 283 S.W.3d 209, 240 (2008). We disagree with the taxpayers that the Board failed to meet its burden of showing there was no genuine issue of material fact and, thus, the issue could not be decided as one of law. In its order of July 30, 2007, which granted summary judgment to the Board, the circuit court first quoted the Termination Clause from the School Board's three-year contract with Dr. Roy Brooks set out under Paragraph 11: E. Unilateral Termination by Board of Education. The BOARD may, at its option, and by a minimum of ninety (90) days notice to SUPERINTENDENT, unilaterally terminate this contract. In the event of such termination, the DISTRICT shall pay to SUPERINTENDENT, as severance pay, all of the aggregate salary allowances and other compensation he would have earned under this employment contract from the actual date of termination to the termination date set forth in this employment contract, unless otherwise agreed to. Though the circuit court misspoke when it said in its order that the employment contract was attached to the Board's summary-judgment motion, the contract was properly before the court as an exhibit to the taxpayers' complaint. The circuit court then concluded in its summary-judgment order: 14. The defendants attached a copy of the contract between the Board and Dr. Brooks to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The signatures of the members of the Board on the contract are evidence of the Board's utilization of its discretion to include the unilateral termination provision in the contract. 15. The plaintiffs' Response to Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment had two attachments, an Affidavit of Teresa Gray and Minutes of the May 24, 2007, Special Meeting of the Board of Directors. 16. The Minutes of the May 24, 2007, Special Meeting provide evidence of the Board's utilization of its discretion to invoke the unilateral termination provision of the contract. 17. After the defendants established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the plaintiffs were required to meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of one or more disputed material issues of fact. The plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence to meet their burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the Board clearly abused its discretion in either including the unilateral termination provision in the contract or in choosing to exercise the unilateral termination provision. With the employment contract and the May 27, 2007 minutes of the School Board before it, which included the motion and vote to terminate Dr. Brooks under Paragraph 11E of the employment contract, the circuit court had the pertinent, undisputed facts necessary to decide the maintenance-and-operation issue under the Arkansas Constitution. Moreover, the taxpayers provided nothing in the way of proof to show that there was any genuine issue of material fact that had to be resolved in order to decide the constitutional issue, which was their obligation under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2). We hold that, absent a showing of a genuine issue of material fact, the question of whether payment of severance pay as part of the termination of Dr. Brooks pursuant to the employment contract falls under the constitutional rubric of maintenance and operation of the public schools can be decided as a matter of law. We discern no valid reason to remand this matter to the circuit court to determine factual issues. There is no reversible error on this point.