Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Public Defender's Representation of Prosecution Witnesses

Text: When Massini relinquished the position of Mendocino County Public Defender, Ronald Brown (Brown) assumed that position and became cocounsel with Allen in this case. During the course of trial, several alleged conflicts involving Brown arose. Brown, in his capacity as Mendocino County Public Defender, previously had represented prosecution witnesses Robyn Boyd (Boyd), Smith, Stevens and Matt Williams. Brown also had personally represented Williams.
(22) Defendant correctly contends that in some circumstances a conflict of interest can result from an attorney's duty of loyalty to a client and the professional fiduciary obligations arising from the attorney's present or former representation of an opposing witness in a different proceeding. (See Leversen v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 530, 538 [194 Cal. Rptr. 448, 668 P.2d 755].) The record reveals, however, that no actual or potential conflict resulted from the representation of Boyd, Smith and Stevens by the public defender's office. Brown, as an officer of the court, was in the best position to assess whether a conflict of interest existed or was likely to arise. (E.g., People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 776 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) Brown represented to the court that he possessed no confidential information relating to any of the three witnesses in question. (See ibid. [no actual or potential conflict found in similar circumstances arising in the context of firm under contract to county to be conflict public defender].) Both Brown and Allen represented to the court that the cross-examination of these witnesses would not be affected by any prior representation by the public defender's office. Furthermore, neither Brown nor his office represented any of the witnesses at the time of his or her cross-examination. Therefore, he did not have any interest in attempting to shield these witnesses from impeachment or to otherwise ensure that their testimony was well-received. (Cf. In re Darr (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 500 [191 Cal. Rptr. 882].) We reviewed the instances where defendant claims that the cross-examination of these witnesses was prejudicially deficient. After doing so, we find no reason to conclude that the alleged conflicts adversely affected defendant's representation.
(23) The purported conflict arising from prior representation of Matt Williams is more troubling. The public defender's office had represented Williams on several juvenile charges during time periods when neither Allen nor Brown was associated with the office. Brown also had personally represented Williams in connection with a charge of receiving stolen property. This representation began in February of 1986, prior to the time that Brown became the public defender and commenced work on defendant's case. Upon learning that Williams would likely be a witness in defendant's case, Brown sought guidance regarding how to proceed with representation of his clients from the Mendocino County Superior Court. He was advised to terminate his representation of Williams, to refrain from disclosing to Allen any confidential information about Williams, and to arrange for Allen to conduct Williams's cross-examination. Unlike the other prosecution witnesses discussed above, Brown did personally represent Williams and was in possession of attorney-client information. Therefore, although Brown had withdrawn from his representation of this witness, he likely would have been in a situation of divided professional duties if he had cross-examined Williams or assisted in that cross-examination. (See Leversen v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 538.) Brown, however, did not cross-examine this witness; Allen did. Allen was not in a position of conflict with respect to this witness. Both attorneys as officers of the court represented that Brown did not provide Allen with any confidential information obtained from or relating to Williams. [23] Sworn representations have been held to be effective in assuring the court that insulation of prior confidential communications from present representation has occurred and will continue to occur. (See also People v. Lopez, supra, 155 Cal. App.3d at p. 827; People v. Hernandez, supra, 235 Cal. App.3d at p. 680.) Allen also represented to the court that Brown's conflict would not affect his cross-examination of the witness. Allen was in the best position to make this determination. ( People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 776.) Upon reviewing the record, we have no difficulty crediting Allen's representation. We cannot find or hypothesize any failing on Allen's part that could be attributable to any information that Brown may have received from Williams or from any solicitude Brown may have felt for his former client. There was simply no adverse effect on defendant's representation resulting from Brown's potential conflict of interest. [24]
Defendant contends that the trial court committed Wood error in connection with the above mentioned alleged conflicts of interest. ( Wood v. Georgia, supra, 450 U.S. 261.) Again, we need not determine whether the trial court's inquiry into or the defendant's waiver of the alleged conflicts was sufficient. Assuming error in this regard, defendant fails to demonstrate with respect to any one of the purported conflicts of interest both the existence of an actual conflict and an adverse effect on his representation. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to reversal on this ground. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 837-838.)