Opinion ID: 2051647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence: Compensatory Damages

Text: [¶ 19] We now address the jury's award of compensatory damages. The jury was presented with evidence and argument regarding two torts: tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage and nuisance. We have determined that insufficient facts exist to find liability for one, tortious interference, but that the jury's finding regarding the other tort, nuisance, is supported by the evidence. Because the award of compensatory damages did not differentiate between the counts of tortious interference and nuisance, however, and because we conclude that insufficient evidence exists to support the tortious interference claim, we must vacate the damages in whole and remand for trial on the issue of permissible components of compensatory damages for the claim of nuisance. See Withers v. Hackett, 1999 ME 117, ¶ 8, 734 A.2d 189, 191. [¶ 20] We address the legal issues regarding the compensatory damages award because these issues are likely to reappear on remand. See Irish v. Gimbel, 1997 ME 50, ¶ 1, 691 A.2d 664, 667. Our standard of review is highly deferential because [t]he assessment of damages is within the sole province of the factfinder. James, 1998 ME 148, ¶ 11, 712 A.2d at 1058. Therefore, we will disturb a jury's award of damages only when it is plain that there is no rational basis upon which the amount of the award may be supported, that is, when there is no competent evidence in the record to support the award. Id. at 1058-59.
[¶ 21] At trial, Rutland testified that he planned to subdivide his property into thirty lots and sell five lots per year at $20,000 per lot yielding a profit of $10,500 per lot. He also testified that his research with real estate agents confirmed that $20,000 was a reasonable price for his lots. On that basis, he claimed to have lost $108,750 in prospective profits. Rutland's asserted qualifications for making such a determination include his engineering background, his career at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and with Delta Airlines, his experience in renovating a farm, his development of airplane hangars, his development of land in Alabama, his careful research of his right of access, the City's positive responses to his development plans, his understanding that Belfast needs affordable housing, a soil analyst's determination that the soil is suitable for septic systems, and his acquisition of heavy equipment and a gravel pit to complete the development project. [¶ 22] Prospective profits are allowable only if they can be estimated with reasonable certainty. Ginn v. Penobscot Co., 334 A.2d 874, 887 (Me.1975). Although opinion evidence regarding lost profits is admissible, it must be an informed opinion based on facts that the fact-finder can evaluate. Id. Thus, we have held insufficient a business owner's unsupported assertion that his injury led to $20,000 in lost profits. Id. Similarly, we held that a golf professional's testimony regarding the amount of profits he lost in one year was insufficient even though it was supported by the previous year's tax return because it did not address the volume of business during the actual year in dispute. Eckenrode v. Heritage Mgmt. Corp., 480 A.2d 759, 765-66 (Me.1984). [¶ 23] Although Rutland's past experience is varied, he has never engaged in subdivision or real estate development, nor did he present evidence of profit data from similar projects or the testimony of any witness who would be qualified to render such an opinion. Thus, the jury's award of lost profits was supported only by general information Rutland received from real estate agents indicating that $20,000 was a reasonable price for the lots, as well as Rutland's speculation regarding his development costs. The evidence regarding Rutland's likely development profits is insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's award of compensatory damages for lost profits. Therefore, the court erred in permitting the jury to consider damages for lost profits.
[¶ 24] Rutland maintains that he lost $61,800 in direct costs as a result of the Mullens' actions, including $16,000 for mortgage interest paid for the four-year delay caused by the Mullens and $42,400 for interest and depreciation costs incurred on the heavy equipment Rutland purchased for the development project. [9] Rutland estimated an interest rate of ten percent on the mortgage and equipment financing, and claims that, based on his experience in determining heavy equipment depreciation, a rate of ten percent is conservative. [¶ 25] Although a correct measure of damages may not be based on conjecture or speculation, an informed estimate based on actual market rates may form a sufficient basis for an award of damages. Wendward Corp. v. Group Design, Inc., 428 A.2d 57, 61-62 (Me.1981). We reject the Mullens' contention that damages may not be based on estimated interest and depreciation rates, and conclude that the court did not err in permitting the jury to consider such evidence. Rutland's claim for direct costs damages is therefore supported by the evidence. Because the jury's award of damages did not differentiate between the tortious interference and nuisance claims, however, nor between direct costs and lost profits, we vacate the entire award of compensatory damages and remand for retrial of the issue of compensatory damages on the nuisance claim only with respect to the direct costs component of compensatory damages. [10]