Opinion ID: 709024
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The New Hampshire Long-Arm Statute

Text: 18 It is well established in diversity cases that the district court's personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is governed by the forum's long-arm statute. Goldman, Antonetti, Ferraiuoli, Axtmayer & Hertell v. Medfit Int'l, Inc., 982 F.2d 686, 690 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, C.A., 907 F.2d 1256, 1258 (1st Cir.1990)). In the case at bar, the group of defendants includes two individuals, a professional association and a partnership. Accordingly, we must consider the New Hampshire long-arm statutes applicable to each of these defendants. 19 The New Hampshire long-arm statute applicable to the individual defendants, Olin and Farrell, is N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. (RSA) 510:4, I (Supp.1994), which permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who transacts any business within [the] state or commits a tortious act within [the] state. In Estabrook v. Wetmore, 129 N.H. 520, 523, 529 A.2d 956 (1987), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire interpreted the latter phrase to include situations where a defendant's out-of-state activity results in an injury within New Hampshire. The Sawtelles exhaustively argue that their claims against the individual defendants satisfy each of the possible bases for personal jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, defendants disagree. 20 We need not dwell on this issue. The New Hampshire long-arm statute applicable to individuals has been interpreted to afford jurisdiction over foreign defendants to the full extent that the statutory language and due process will allow. Phelps v. Kingston, 130 N.H. 166, 171, 536 A.2d 740 (1987). As recognized by the court below, when a state's long-arm statute is coextensive with the outer limits of due process, the court's attention properly turns to the issue of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with federal constitutional standards. See Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 777 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015, 107 S.Ct. 1892, 95 L.Ed.2d 499 (1987). 21 We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the professional association defendant. New Hampshire's long-arm statute governing unregistered foreign corporations, such as the Podhurst professional association, is RSA 293-A:15.10 (Supp.1994). That statute includes no restriction upon the scope of jurisdiction available under state law and thus authorizes jurisdiction over such entities to the full extent permitted by the federal Constitution. See McClary v. Erie Engine & Mfg. Co., 856 F.Supp. 52, 55 (D.N.H.1994) (because RSA 293-A:15.10 reaches to the federal limit, the traditional two-part analysis for personal jurisdiction collapses into the single question of whether the constitutional requirements of due process have been met). 22 The appropriate treatment of the Speiser firm is less clear. The New Hampshire long-arm statutes do not, by their terms, apply to partnerships, and the case law does not discuss any long-arm provision applicable to such entities. To address that unresolved issue of state law, the Sawtelles turn for guidance to RSA 305-A:6-8 (Supp.1994), which relates to service of process on a foreign partnership. Observing that service on a foreign partnership is treated nearly identically to service on a foreign corporation under RSA 293-A:15.10, plaintiffs argue that partnerships are to be treated as corporations for determining personal jurisdiction. If that is so, then, as in the individual and corporate contexts discussed above, the scope of jurisdiction over the Speiser firm partnership is commensurate with that permitted under the Constitution. 23 We find it unnecessary to resolve this unsettled issue of state law because a plaintiff seeking to establish jurisdiction over a foreign defendant must satisfy the demands not only of state law but also of the federal Constitution. When confronted with a similar quandary in Ticketmaster, we chose to bypass the statutory phase of the jurisdictional inquiry because the plaintiff's case could not pass constitutional muster. 26 F.3d at 206. We therefore assume, arguendo, that under New Hampshire law the scope of personal jurisdiction over the Speiser firm partnership is, as in the case of the corporate defendant, coextensive with the outer limits of due process.