Opinion ID: 1058627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: denial of motions to amend and to add new parties

Text: Following the trial court's ruling sustaining the demurrer to Ogunde's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, dismissing his breach of contract claim, and consolidating his negligence claims with his medical malpractice claim, discovery continued and PHS and the Employees filed their pleas of sovereign immunity. In response, Ogunde filed two motions, one to add the Commonwealth as a party defendant and a second to amend his motion for judgment to cure the imperfections in his prior pleading and to add new counts and a claim for punitive damages. Ogunde asserted the amendments resulted from matters arising in discovery and that PHS and the Employees would not be prejudiced by allowing the proposed amendments. A copy of the amended motion for judgment was attached to the motions to amend. PHS and the Employees did not file any written opposition to the proposed amendments. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Ogunde's motions, granted the sovereign immunity plea, and dismissed Ogunde's motion for judgment. Ogunde has assigned error to the trial court's denial of his motions to amend. Ogunde's stated reason for adding the Commonwealth as a party and including a claim under the Virginia Tort Claims Act was in response to PHS's and the Employees' claim of sovereign immunity. In light of our holding that PHS and the Employees are independent contractors and not entitled to sovereign immunity, these amendments are no longer necessary and we need not address Ogunde's arguments directed to that part of the trial court's ruling. PHS and the Employees raise a number of arguments in support of the trial court's exercise of its discretion in denying the remaining amendments. They again assert that Ogunde did not satisfy the pleading requirements of the VPLRA because he did not provide written documentation to support his claim. We have already rejected that construction of Code § 8.01-694 and reject it again here as a basis for refusing the amendments sought. PHS and the Employees also claim that certain counts were barred by the statute of limitations and that venue was improper. These arguments may be defenses to the claims but were not resolved by the trial court, and thus are not appropriate as a basis for denying the amendments. Whether to grant leave to amend pleadings is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kole v. City of Chesapeake, 247 Va. 51, 57, 439 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1994). Leave to amend shall be liberally granted in furtherance of the ends of justice. Rule 1:8. Ogunde had not previously sought to amend his motion for judgment and filed this request in a timely manner, following the relevant rulings of the trial court and the conclusion of discovery. Nothing in the amendments suggests that PHS and the Employees would have been prejudiced by allowing the amendments. Under these circumstances, Ogunde provided good cause to seek to amend his complaint. See Ford Motor Co., v. Benitez, 273 Va. 242, 252, 639 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2007); Mortarino v. Consultant Eng'g Servs., 251 Va. 289, 295-96, 467 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1996). Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to allow Ogunde to file his amended motion for judgment.