Opinion ID: 1868629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Increased Penalty for Habitual Criminality

Text: ¶ 13 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62 allows increased penalties to be imposed on repeat criminals at the time of sentencing. Section 939.62 states in pertinent part: (1) If the actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in sub. (2), and the present conviction is for any crime for which imprisonment may be imposed, except for an escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to report under s. 946.425, the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law for that crime may be increased as follows: (a) A maximum term of imprisonment of one year or less may be increased to not more than 2 years. ... (2) The actor is a repeater if the actor was convicted of a felony during the 5-year period immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which the actor presently is being sentenced, or if the actor was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions during that same period, which convictions remain of record and unreversed.... In computing the preceding 5-year period, time which the actor spent in actual confinement serving a criminal sentence shall be excluded. ¶ 14 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.12 sets forth the statutory requirements for alleging and applying the repeater enhancer. It states, in pertinent part: (1) Whenever a person charged with a crime will be a repeater or a persistent repeater under s. 939.62 if convicted, any applicable prior convictions may be alleged in the complaint, indictment or information or amendments so alleging at any time before or at arraignment, and before acceptance of any plea. The court may, upon motion of the district attorney, grant a reasonable time to investigate possible prior convictions before accepting a plea. If the prior convictions are admitted by the defendant or proved by the state, he or she shall be subject to sentence under s. 939.62 unless he or she establishes that he or she was pardoned on grounds of innocence for any crime necessary to constitute him or her a repeater or a persistent repeater. An official report of the F.B.I. or any governmental agency of the United States or of this or any other state shall be prima facie evidence of any conviction or sentence therein reported. Any sentence so reported shall be deemed prima facie to have been fully served in actual confinement or to have been served for such period of time as is shown or is consistent with the report. The proper application of § 973.12 is at the center of Bonds's challenge to his sentence as a repeater.
¶ 15 Bonds contends that the State improperly amended the complaint when it changed the factual basis of the repeater allegation from three misdemeanors to a felony forgery conviction. Bonds supports this position with the following arguments: (1) Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) unambiguously requires that prior convictions be alleged at or before the acceptance of any plea; (2) State v. Martin, 162 Wis.2d 883, 907, 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991), held that a repeater allegation cannot be added after a plea; and (3) even if the State was able to amend the complaint regarding the basis for the repeater allegation after a plea, Bonds was prejudiced and therefore, the State may not amend here. ¶ 16 The State, on the other hand, argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.12 does not bar all post-plea amendments of allegations of habitual criminality. The State supports its position with the following arguments: (1) modifications are permissible if the complaint gives the defendant notice of the potential maximum penalty to which the defendant could be subjected when pleading, such that the defendant would not be prejudiced in deciding how to plead; (2) the complaint gave Bonds adequate notice of the maximum penalty he faced at the time of his plea; and (3) Bonds was not prejudiced by the State's change in the factual basis for the repeater allegation.
¶ 17 Although no amended complaint was actually filed in the circuit court, Bonds characterized the State's request to change the basis for proving habitual criminality as an untimely amendment of the complaint. Therefore, in order to examine the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and how an amendment of the basis for habitual criminality set out in the complaint may affect the statute's requirements, we begin with Whitaker v. State, 83 Wis.2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978), which discussed amendments to charging documents in general. Id. at 374, 265 N.W.2d 575. Whitaker did not concern a repeater enhancer, but rather it addressed an initial charge of party to the crime of theft that the State amended to robbery, after Whitaker's arraignment and plea of not guilty. Subsequent to the amendment, Whitaker was again arraigned, this time on the amended information, and a new plea was taken. Id. at 370-71, 265 N.W.2d 575. We interpreted Wis. Stat. § 971.29 [5] in reaching our conclusion that there was no statutory bar to amending an information with leave of the court after arraignment so long as there was no prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 374, 265 N.W.2d 575. We reasoned that the purpose of an information is to inform the defendant of the charges against him, and that [n]otice is the key factor. Id. at 373, 265 N.W.2d 575 (citing La Fond v. State, 37 Wis.2d 137, 144, 154 N.W.2d 304 (1967) (Heffernan, J., dissenting) and the Wisconsin Constitution, Art. I, sec. 7: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him.). We explained that an amendment of an information before trial would not be prejudicial if a defendant's right to notice, right to a speedy trial, and right to prepare and present a defense to the criminal charges were not affected. Whitaker, 83 Wis.2d at 374, 265 N.W.2d 575. ¶ 18 In recent years, we have had occasion to determine the validity of various post-plea amendments relating to habitual criminality. Those cases guide our analysis of whether the State's amendment in this case was permissible under Wis. Stat. § 973.12 and constitutional due process requirements. ¶ 19 In Martin, we consolidated two cases that raised the same issue. Each defendant challenged the State's assertion of habitual criminality after a plea of not guilty to the charges at arraignment. We interpreted Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) as prohibiting an amendment that alleged that the defendant was an habitual criminal where a defendant has been arraigned and has pled not guilty to an information that made no allegation that the defendant was a repeater. Martin, 162 Wis.2d at 900, 470 N.W.2d 900. We reviewed the legislative history [6] and concluded that the language of the statute, coupled with that history, made clear that: [T]he legislature has established the time of arraignment and of any plea acceptance as the cut-off point after which time a defendant can no longer face exposure to repeater enhancement for the crime set forth in the charging document and pleaded to by the defendant at arraignment. Id. (emphasis in original). ¶ 20 In weighing the meaning of the statute against the facts of the consolidated cases, we relied in part on the reasoning of a prior decision, Block v. State, 41 Wis.2d 205, 210, 163 N.W.2d 196 (1968), in which we analyzed the 1965 amendment to the repeater statute: Being a repeater is not a crime but may enhance the punishment of the crime for which the repeater is convicted. The allegation of recidivism is put in the information in order to meet the due-process requirements of a fair trial. When the defendant is asked to plead, he is entitled to know the extent of his punishment of the alleged crime, which he cannot know if he is not then informed that his prior convictions may be used to enhance the punishment. Martin, 162 Wis.2d at 900-01, 470 N.W.2d 900 (quoting Block, 41 Wis.2d at 210, 163 N.W.2d 196 (emphasis in Block )). ¶ 21 Martin addressed when the initial allegation of habitual criminality must be made. Here, there is no dispute that Bonds was alleged to be a repeater in the initial criminal complaint, in compliance with Martin. The question we must decide is when can an amendment of the initial basis for proving habitual criminality that was alleged in the complaint be made. Subsequent to Martin, we have allowed some post-plea amendments of initial repeater allegations. See State v. Gerard, 189 Wis.2d 505, 517-19, 525 N.W.2d 718 (1995); see also Stynes, 262 Wis.2d 335, ¶¶ 32, 34, 665 N.W.2d 115; State v. Campbell, 201 Wis.2d 783, 792, 549 N.W.2d 501 (Ct.App.1996). ¶ 22 In Gerard, we held that a criminal information that alleged habitual criminality could be amended, after the defendant had pled not guilty to the charges, but prior to the start of trial, to correct the number of years by which the defendant's sentence could be enhanced due to his status as a repeater. Gerard, 189 Wis.2d at 507-09, 525 N.W.2d 718. We distinguished the facts of that case from those of Martin, noting that the complaint and information relating to Gerard's charges correctly alleged his repeater status and that a mere scrivener's error misstating the potential length of enhancement due to the penalty enhancer did not affect the sufficiency of the notice given to Gerard. Id. at 512, 517-19, 525 N.W.2d 718. We rejected Gerard's argument that he was prejudiced because at the time of arraignment, due to a clerical error, he thought that he was subject to three, rather than six, additional years in prison if convicted on one of the underlying counts. Id. at 516-18, 525 N.W.2d 718. ¶ 23 We were persuaded by three factual aspects of the case that caused us to conclude Gerard suffered no prejudice: (1) Gerard discovered the error in the information and the complaint and brought it to the court's attention, so that he was fully aware of the actual sentence enhancement he faced, yet he failed to move to withdraw his plea; (2) Gerard did not assert that he was prejudiced by the court's decision to grant the State's motion to amend; (3) Gerard discovered the clerical error at the very early stages of the criminal proceedings, nine months before his trial. Id. at 518-19, 525 N.W.2d 718. ¶ 24 In Stynes, we held that a complaint that misstated by one day the date of one of the defendant's convictions provided adequate notice of convictions on which his repeater status was based, as it included descriptions of the offenses, stated the correct county in which the convictions occurred, and cited the case numbers for the convictions. Stynes, 262 Wis.2d 335, ¶ 32, 665 N.W.2d 115. We determined that the error in the date did not meaningfully change the basis for Stynes's plea of not guilty. Id., ¶ 34. Accordingly, we held that Stynes was not prejudiced because the amendment gave him notice of the prior convictions on which the repeater allegations were based, and therefore, we permitted an amendment of the date of conviction after Stynes pled. Id. ¶ 25 In Stynes, we also reviewed the court of appeals decision in State v. Wilks, 165 Wis.2d 102, 477 N.W.2d 632 (Ct.App. 1991). Wilks held that where the misstatement of a date of a prior conviction was significant enough to call into question whether the State was relying on a prior conviction that actually existed, the error could not be corrected without prejudice to a defendant who had pled no contest. [7] See Stynes, 262 Wis.2d 335, ¶¶ 22-27, 665 N.W.2d 115. We distinguished Wilks in Stynes because the information in Stynes misstated the date of one of the prior convictions by one day and there was no confusion about whether the alleged convictions actually existed. Id., ¶ 28. ¶ 26 Further, in Stynes we relied on Gerard's reasoning that a statement of the number of years by which the sentence could be enhanced was not essential to a repeater allegation because there was no statutory requirement that the number of years by which the sentence could be enhanced be specified in the charging document. Id., ¶ 30. We summarized the impact of Wilks and Gerard as follows: Wilks identified that the underlying policy of the notice required by Wis. Stat. § 973.12(1) is to satisfy due process by assuring that the defendant knows the extent of the potential punishment at the time of the plea. Gerard reiterated that [d]ue process requires the defendant to be informed of his or her repeater status before pleading to the charges. Id., ¶ 31, 525 N.W.2d 718 (citations omitted); see also State v. Fields, 2001 WI App 297, ¶¶ 7-14, 249 Wis.2d 292, 638 N.W.2d 897 (analyzing Martin and Gerard to conclude that the State's pre-plea submission of a certified copy of defendant's prior convictions constituted an amendment to the information, thereby curing the information's defects, because the defendant had adequate notice that he was being charged as a repeater). ¶ 27 In Campbell, the court of appeals held that a post-arraignment amendment to an information, to add a fourth misdemeanor to three initially alleged as the basis for the repeater enhancer, did not violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12. Campbell, 201 Wis.2d at 792, 549 N.W.2d 501. Campbell argued that he was prejudiced by the amendment because there was a possibility that one of his prior misdemeanors would be reversed on appeal. Id. at 792-93, 549 N.W.2d 501. Therefore, he argued, in the event of such a reversal, the amendment to add a fourth misdemeanor affected his potential punishment because without it, there would be only two valid misdemeanors and the State could not prove repeater status. Id. Consequently, he argued, the amendment meaningfully changed the basis of his not guilty plea and should not have been permitted. Id. at 793, 549 N.W.2d 501. ¶ 28 The court of appeals responded to this theory by concluding that even if the court were to assume that a reversed prior conviction would change Campbell's status as a repeater under the three original misdemeanor charges, the amendment did not prejudice his ability to assess the potential maximum punishment he faced. Id. The court of appeals explained that the prejudice Campbell described is what he perceived to be the potential adverse effect of the amendment on his chances of defending against the penalty enhancer, but that did not affect his ability to evaluate the potential maximum punishment to which he could be subjected, either at arraignment or at the plea hearing. [8] Id. ¶ 29 Campbell relied on the reasoning of Martin and Gerard that the sufficiency of notice to a defendant of the potential maximum punishment he or she faces as a result of a repeater enhancer is the keystone to the permissibility of post-arraignment amendments regarding repeater allegations. Id. at 791-92, 549 N.W.2d 501. Since Campbell had notice of his potential maximum punishment for the crime and the penalty enhancer at the time of his plea, the amendment did not affect the sufficiency of the notice he had been given or violate Wis. Stat. § 973.12. Id. at 792, 549 N.W.2d 501. ¶ 30 When considered together, this precedent establishes the following principles: (1) The purpose of the allegations of repeater status in a charging document is to provide the defendant with sufficient notice of the potential maximum penalty he faces in order that the defendant may make an informed plea. Gerard, 189 Wis.2d at 512 n. 6, 525 N.W.2d 718.; Martin, 162 Wis.2d at 900-01, 470 N.W.2d 900; Whitaker, 83 Wis.2d at 373, 265 N.W.2d 575. (2) If there has been no repeater allegation made prior to the court's acceptance of a plea, and the defendant does not re-plead after the charging document has been amended, sentence enhancement is not permissible upon conviction. Gerard, 189 Wis.2d at 513-14, 525 N.W.2d 718; Martin, 162 Wis.2d at 902-03, 470 N.W.2d 900; Campbell, 201 Wis.2d at 791-92, 549 N.W.2d 501. (3) With leave of court, and after a plea has been accepted, charging documents that were sufficient before the plea was accepted may be amended with regard to the initial allegations concerning a defendant's repeater status so long as the defendant is not prejudiced by the amendment. [9] Stynes, 262 Wis.2d 335, ¶¶ 31, 34, 665 N.W.2d 115; Gerard, 189 Wis.2d at 509, 525 N.W.2d 718; Campbell, 201 Wis.2d at 793, 549 N.W.2d 501. (4) When a post-plea amendment to allegations earlier made concerning a defendant's repeater status does not compromise the sufficiency of notice of the potential maximum sentence a defendant faces, no prejudice occurs. Stynes, 262 Wis.2d 335, ¶¶ 31-32, 665 N.W.2d 115; Gerard, 189 Wis.2d at 516, 525 N.W.2d 718; Campbell, 201 Wis.2d at 793, 549 N.W.2d 501; Wilks, 165 Wis.2d at 110, 477 N.W.2d 632.