Opinion ID: 6112077
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plainly Superior Candidate

Text: Plaintiff can survive summary judgment if he proves he “was [the] plainly superior candidate, such that no reasonable employer would have chosen” Somogyi or Zito over him. Id. To prove that he was the plainly superior candidate, Plaintiff “must objectively demonstrate his -10- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. superior qualifications.” Artis v. Finishing Brands Holdings, Inc., 639 F. App’x 313, 320 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Provenzano, 663 F.3d at 806). “If two reasonable decisionmakers could consider the candidates’ qualifications and arrive at opposite conclusions as to who is more qualified, then clearly one candidate’s qualifications are not significantly better than the others.” Bender, 455 F.3d at 628 (citations omitted). In determining whether Plaintiff was the plainly superior candidate, the Court must avoid “acting as a ‘super personnel department,’ overseeing and secondguessing employers’ business decisions.” Id. The Sixth Circuit has created an exceptionally high standard for satisfying the burden of proving a plaintiff is the plainly superior candidate. For example, in Bartlett v. Gates, 421 F. App’x 485, 488–91. (6th Cir. 2010), plaintiff-Bartlett challenged his employer’s hiring of another candidate, Lucas, claiming he was the plainly superior candidate. The Court found that Plaintiff had 24 years of experience as a contract administrator, compared to Lucas’s eight years of experience. In addition, Plaintiff possessed superior educational credentials, including a bachelor’s degree and advanced course work in areas relevant to the job, whereas Lucas had not graduated from college. Record evidence also suggests that Plaintiff’s communication skills. . . were satisfactory if not superior to Lucas’s own. . . . Plaintiff also had substantially more experience and familiarity in the area of contract negotiations, which was said to be a “critical function” of the position. Id. at 491. Despite these disparities, the Court “[found] that while Plaintiff may not have been a ‘plainly superior candidate’ . . . , Plaintiff was as qualified if not more qualified than Lucas.” Id. Thus, to survive a motion for summary judgment based on the plainly-superior prong of the relative qualifications test, a plaintiff must proffer a significant amount of evidence demonstrating his superior qualifications. Simply being “more qualified” is not sufficient to prove Plaintiff is the plainly superior candidate. Id. -11- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. With this backdrop in mind, Plaintiff raises three arguments that he believes demonstrate he is the plainly superior candidate. First, he argues his technical experience was superior. Second, he argues he had superior leadership experience. And finally, he argues he was uniquely qualified for the position “in the Western states.” 2 Plaintiff first argues that he was the plainly superior candidate because Somogyi and Zito did not have the same level of technical experience. Defendants respond that technical experience was not an important criterion for the Unit Leader position and even if it were, Somogyi and Zito had “at least equivalent experience handling the same type of claims as Aday.” (Appellees’ Br. 23.) The job description for the Unit Leader position supports Plaintiff’s argument that technical experience was important to the role. Under the “Job Summary” section of the Unit Leader job posting, Defendants stated the successful applicant “[p]rovides leadership for casualty claim professionals and is responsible for operational success of assigned casualty claims unit. Responsible for technical guidance, quality and customer service related to casualty claims.” 2 Plaintiff also makes a passing argument that he had the best interview among the three applicants and therefore he is the plainly superior candidate. To support this argument, he points to comments made by Lilly and other interviewers, such as he “came prepared to the interview,” was “loaded for the bear,” was the “one to beat,” that he “hit it out of the park,” (Lilly Dep., R. 49, Page ID ## 879, 892, 895, 906), and that he was the “most plug [and] play – ready to go” of the candidates, (Draft Room Notes, R. 49-3, Page ID # 942). This argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, despite these positive remarks, the record indicates Plaintiff’s interview was not as perfect as he claims. Lilly admitted to having reservations about his plan to travel to visit his direct reports. The fact she believed he had given a great presentation, and told him so, does not invalidate her concerns about his travel plans. Second, even if the Court draws all inferences favorable to Plaintiff, the result only leads to the conclusion that he had a better interview. While being a good interviewee is a boon for any job applicant, it does not “objectively demonstrate his superior qualifications” for the Unit Leaders positions. Artis, 639 F. App’x at 320. -12- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. (Job Description, R. 41-8, Page ID # 358.) The job description goes on to list the “Desired Qualifications / Experience / Certification / Education (in order of importance)” as: 1. 5 or more years of casualty claims handling experience of accurately evaluating, negotiating, and settling commercial casualty claims. 2. Previous casualty claims handling experience with exposure up to $150,000. 3. 3 or more years of successful leadership experience with increased responsibility. . . . (Id., Page ID # 359.) Notably, Defendants listed technical experience (i.e, casualty claims handling experience) as the two most important qualifications. Defendants argue these are merely “desired qualifications” and that “casualty claims” are not necessarily the same as “technical experience.” (Appellees’ Br. 22.) While this may be true, Plaintiff has proffered enough evidence to at least suggest that technical experience was a relevant criterion for the Unit Leader position. Nevertheless, even assuming technical experience was relevant, Plaintiff has not proffered enough evidence to convince a reasonable juror his technical experience was so superior to Somogyi’s and Zito’s experience that he was the plainly superior candidate. Plaintiff certainly had broad exposure to Defendants’ business and handled many types of claims in his career. According to Plaintiff, he handled claims including slip-and-falls, construction defects, discrimination, motor vehicle accidents, and construction bonding. In fact, his breadth of experience was confirmed in the draft room notes, which specifically mention his prior experience as a “pro.” Lilly even admitted that Plaintiff had experience handling a “very diverse” set of claims during his 12-year career. (Lilly Dep., R. 49, Page ID # 915.) On the other hand, Zito stated that during his time with Westfield, he had worked primarily on slip-and-fall claims and motor vehicle accidents, and Somogyi had experience working on structured settlements in workers’ compensation cases, motor vehicle accidents, and slip-and-fall claims. -13- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. Plaintiff also points to the fact that Somogyi and Zito underwent online training to prove they lacked his level of technical experience. However, both Somogyi and Zito stated these courses were taken as part of maintaining their licensure. The fact that Somogyi and Zito chose to take their required courses on topics related to their new positions hardly suggests they were significantly less qualified for the position than Plaintiff. Nevertheless, at the summary judgment stage, the Court is not to weigh the credibility of the parties’ evidence and instead should infer in Plaintiff’s favor that Somogyi and Zito took the courses to learn their new fields. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). After construing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff and looking at the facts in the light most favorable to him, a jury could conclude that he had slightly better technical experience than Somogyi or Zito. However, even if Plaintiff were considered the candidate with marginally better technical experience, no reasonable juror could conclude he was the plainly superior candidate under the Sixth Circuit’s exacting standard, especially considering technical experience is only one facet of the job. Plaintiff next argues that he was the plainly superior candidate because he had more leadership experience than Somogyi and Zito. Plaintiff has again failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Regarding Somogyi, Plaintiff merely claims Lilly did not mention her leadership experience when explaining why she chose Somogyi over him. Regarding Zito, he argues the district court improperly relied on Zito’s pre-Westfield leadership roles because the court did not consider Plaintiff’s own pre-Westfield career. Moreover, Plaintiff claims any pre-Westfield work experience is of less significance to Defendants’ hiring decision than experience gained at Westfield. -14- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. Considering Plaintiff’s leadership experience first, the evidence paints a mixed picture. Before joining Westfield, Plaintiff gained approximately 12 years of leadership experience in other insurance-related employment. After that, Plaintiff worked for Defendants for 12 years, six years of which were as the Auto Unit Leader. He points out that he always received positive performance evaluations from his direct reports and had a positive reputation throughout the company. Lilly, however, remembers Plaintiff’s performance differently. She remembers him seeming overworked and stressed in that role. Further, Lilly cited Plaintiff’s decision to leave the Auto Unit Leader position to instead work as a litigation claims specialist as evidence he lacked the desire to be in a leadership role. Somogyi, on the other hand, had 23 years of experience working at Westfield, 11 of which were in a leadership position. The draft room notes indicate Somogyi’s leadership was “incredible.” (Draft Room Notes, R. 49-3, Page ID # 943.) As the district court put it, compared to Somogyi, “Plaintiff was the inferior candidate.” (Order Denying Mot. Alter J., R. 81, Page ID #1949.) In terms of leadership experience, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was the plainly superior candidate. Whether Plaintiff or Zito had better leadership experience is a close call, but certainly neither was the plainly superior candidate. Unlike Plaintiff, who had been with Westfield for 12 years, Zito had only been with Westfield for two years. Prior to joining Westfield, Zito gained 17 years of leadership experience. As mentioned above, the Court is not to “act[] as a ‘super personnel department,’ overseeing and second-guessing employers’ business decisions.” Bender, 455 F.3d at 628. Whether Plaintiff’s six years at Westfield and 12 years elsewhere is more or less valuable than Zito’s two years at Westfield and 17 years elsewhere is a decision for Defendants to make—not the Court. Instead, the question is simply whether Plaintiff has proffered enough -15- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude he was the plainly superior candidate. He has not. Plaintiff’s final argument is that his relocation to Seattle made him the plainly superior candidate because the position was advertised as being “in the Western states.” (Job Description, R. 41-7, Page ID # 357.) In the job posting for the Unit Leader positions, Lilly forecast one would be “in the Western states and one will be more Mid-west and east.” (Id.) In her personal draft room notes, Lilly expected hiring one Unit Leader “in or around SE states” and the other position “geographically to the West, at least Central time zone.” (Draft Room Notes, R. 49-3, Page ID # 941.) The Unit Leader in the West would have direct reports based in Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, and Illinois. Plaintiff places great emphasis on the fact that Zito was based in Toledo, Ohio and not in “at least [the] Central time zone.” (Draft Room Notes, R. 49-3, Page ID # 941.) However, Plaintiff would be further away from all the direct reports except the one in Arizona, he would be the only employee based in Washington, and anything requiring in-person attendance would incur a greater expense. In fact, from the very beginning, Defendants raised concerns about Plaintiff working offsite. Specifically, Lilly encouraged Plaintiff to apply for the Unit Leader position but qualified her statement by adding, “leadership is talking about how we need leaders in an office more often.” (Lilly Email, July 17, 2017, R. 41-9, Page ID # 361.) Thus, while Zito did not meet all the stated requirements for the position, Plaintiff’s candidacy was far from perfect. Just as Defendants wanted a Unit Leader in the Central time zone or further west, they also wanted a Unit Leader in an office. Plaintiff has certainly exposed a factual dispute—whether he or Zito was better located for the “in-the-Western-states” position—but he has not produced enough evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude he was the plainly superior candidate. -16- No. 21-3115, Aday v. Westfield Ins. Co., et al. Finally, even if the Court considers all these arguments collectively, they still fail to establish that Plaintiff was the plainly superior candidate. In his best-case scenario, a reasonable juror could conclude that Plaintiff had marginally better technical training, had better leadership experience than Zito3, and was in a marginally better geographic location. This is not enough. As the district court correctly held, Plaintiff has not satisfied “the Sixth Circuit’s demonstrably high standard.” (Order Granting Summ. J., R. 75, Page ID # 1713.)