Opinion ID: 2103885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of Marchand Opinion

Text: This case was resolved below by judgment on the evidence. In reviewing a trial court's grant of judgment on the evidence, an appellate court considers only the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence that are most favorable to the non-moving party. Clark v. Wiegand (1993), Ind., 617 N.E.2d 916, 918. Judgment on the evidence is proper if there is insufficient proof on at least one essential element of a plaintiff's case. Ind.Trial Rule 50(A); Palace Bar, Inc. v. Fearnot (1978), 269 Ind. 405, 409, 381 N.E.2d 858, 861. Judgment on the evidence is improper, however, when the evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, would allow reasonable people to come to differing conclusions. Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 918. In a medical malpractice action alleging negligence, the plaintiff must establish (1) a duty on the part of the defendant in relation to the plaintiff; (2) failure on the part of defendant to conform its conduct to the requisite standard of care required by the relationship; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff resulting from that failure. Burke v. Capello (1988), Ind., 520 N.E.2d 439, 441 (quoting Miller v. Griesel (1974), 261 Ind. 604, 611, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706, reh'g denied ). [1] At issue in this appeal is the second of these factors: whether defendant breached his duty to the plaintiff by failing to conform his conduct to the standard of care required by the relationship. Specifically, plaintiffs ask us to conclude that the opinion of one member of the medical review panel that the defendant failed to comply with the standard of care was sufficient to satisfy their burden of proof with respect to the issue of breach of duty in the context of a motion for judgment on the evidence. If the Marchand Opinion was probative evidence that would allow reasonable minds to differ about whether defendant failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, judgment on the evidence was improper. Clark, 617 N.E.2d at 918. We conclude that the Marchand Opinion was evidence sufficiently probative of breach of duty to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence. Each party to this action selected a physician to serve on the medical review panel, and these two physicians chose the third physician panelist. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-9.5-9-3 (West 1992) (currently codified as Ind. Code § 27-12-10-12 (1993)). All physician panelists must be licensed to practice in this state. Id. The parties submit to the panel all evidence and authorities they wish to have reviewed. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-9.5-9-4 (West 1992) (currently codified as Ind. Code § 27-12-10-17 (1993)). The panel had a duty to request all necessary information, to consult with medical authorities, and to examine reports of other health care providers so as to fully inform itself regarding the issue to be decided. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-9.5-9-6 (West 1992) (currently codified as Ind. Code § 27-12-10-21 (1993)). The purpose of the medical review panel is to conduct a rational inquiry into the extent and source of the patient's injuries for the purpose of forming its expert opinion on the issues to be decided. Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Medical Corp. (1981), Ind. App., 419 N.E.2d 1024, 1033, reh'g denied, 424 N.E.2d 1064, trans. denied, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 802, 103 S.Ct. 23, 74 L.Ed.2d 39 (1982). Although not conclusive, the expert opinion or opinions of the medical review panel are admissible as evidence. Ind. Code Ann. § 16-9.5-9-9 (West 1992) (currently codified as Ind. Code § 27-12-10-23 (1993)); Winbush v. Memorial Health System, Inc. (1991), Ind., 581 N.E.2d 1239, 1243. Because of the nature of the review process described in the preceding paragraph, we think the opinions of individual members of a medical review panel are imbued with sufficient probative value to permit the party favored by such an opinion to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence. Indeed, in Oelling v. Rao (1992), Ind., 593 N.E.2d 189, a majority of this Court decided that a medical review panel opinion alone was sufficient to satisfy defendants' burden of showing no breach of duty for the purpose of obtaining summary judgment. Similarly, we hold today that the Marchand Opinion alone is sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs' burden of showing breach of duty for the purpose of avoiding judgment on the evidence. The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the majority opinion in Oelling is that although the medical review panel opinions only express whether the evidence supports the conclusion that a medical care provider did or did not comply with the required standard of care, Ind. Code § 16-9.5-9-7, it is to be assumed that each member of the panel both correctly identified the appropriate standard of care and then applied the facts to that standard of care. We see no reason not to make the same assumption when the procedural context is a motion for judgment on the evidence. Therefore, with the Marchand Opinion in evidence, judgment on the evidence in this case was improper. The issue of breach of duty should have been presented to the jury.