Opinion ID: 2546228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Manslaughter with Extreme Emotional Disturbance

Text: As his second point for reversal, Appellant contends that the trial court's refusal to give the proffered instruction for manslaughter with extreme emotional disturbance denied Appellant his constitutional right to present a complete defense. Appellant acknowledges that this court has taken the view that the provocation that incites the extreme emotional disturbance necessary for manslaughter is restricted to an event such as a physical fight, threat, or brandished weapon, occurring in the moment prior to the victim's death. Jackson v. State, 375 Ark. 321, 290 S.W.3d 574 (2009). However, Appellant urges this court to extend the time frame of the provocation eliciting the extreme emotional disturbance to include a history of ill treatment leading up to the final provocation. Appellant acknowledges that the trial court allowed him to present evidence of the history of discord in his marriage, but contends the refusal to have the jury instructed on manslaughter with extreme emotional disturbance denied him his constitutional right to present a complete defense. The State first responds that this argument is not preserved for our review because Appellant has changed his argument on appeal from what he argued below. Alternatively, the State responds that there was no evidence to support the giving of the requested instruction because there was no evidence of provocation in the form of a physical fight, a threat, or a brandished weapon. See, e.g., id. At trial, Appellant proffered AMI Crim.2d 1004 and argued as follows: What they've [Arkansas Supreme Court] restricted it to is it has to be immediate after one (1) threat or one (1) emotional disturbance. It's not a continuation. They don't take into account that human beings in life, in real life sometimes are not subjected to one (1) incident, they're subjected to multiple incidents, and that's what leads `em up to it. And we feel that based on that we should be able to submit, and our law is incorrect in light of Holmes versus South Carolina [547 U.S. 319, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006)]. . . . I'm not trying to be disrespectful to the Justices, but we feel that it should be expanded to include something beyond an isolated incident or a single incident. The trial court denied the proffered instruction on manslaughter with extreme emotional disturbance. We agree with the State that Appellant is now arguing for the first time on appeal that the trial court's admission of the testimony of his wife's pattern of abusive or upsetting behavior toward him followed by the refusal to give the instruction on manslaughter with extreme emotional disturbance, deprived him of his constitutional right to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense under Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 124 L.Ed.2d 306 (1993). Despite Appellant's contention to the contrary, his argument below was completely silent with respect to the constitutional right to present a complete defense. Appellant did not raise this particular argument below, and it is therefore not preserved for our review. Davis v. State, 368 Ark. 401, 246 S.W.3d 862 (2007). Our law is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal, even constitutional ones, will not be considered on appeal. London v. State, 354 Ark. 313, 125 S.W.3d 813 (2003); Ferrell v. State, 325 Ark. 455, 929 S.W.2d 697 (1996) (even in a case in which a sentence of life without parole has been imposed, the appellant is bound by the scope of the argument he made at the trial level).