Opinion ID: 536265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Failure to Charge the Jury on Entrapment.

Text: 22 Appellant Alston claims that the district court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the defense of entrapment. We disagree. 23 A valid entrapment defense rests upon two interrelated elements: the defendant's lack of predisposition to commit the crime charged, and government inducement of the defendant to engage in criminal conduct. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976). 24 Before an entrapment defense may be presented to the jury, an evidentiary foundation for a valid entrapment defense must be present. In essence, this means that the trial court must determine whether a juror could entertain a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was entrapped. See United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d 1491, 1499 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.1979). This court, and its predecessor the Fifth Circuit, have articulated the standard as some evidence must be shown, but more than a scintilla must be presented. United States v. Lee, 694 F.2d 649, 653 (11th Cir.1983), citing United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285 (5th Cir.1981). In giving concrete meaning to this standard, this court stated in United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d at 1499. 25 A defendant who seeks to raise a defense of entrapment must first come forward with evidence sufficient to raise a jury issue that the government's conduct created a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it. United States v. Dickens, 524 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir.1975). A defendant will be considered to have met this burden if he produces any evidence that governmental conduct created such a risk, Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 435, 24 L.Ed.2d 425 (1969), but evidence that the government agent sought out or initiated conduct with the defendant, or was the first to propose the illicit transaction, has been held to be insufficient to meet the defendant's burden. United States v. Humphrey, 670 F.2d 153 (11th Cir.1982); United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir.1980). The defendant must demonstrate not merely inducement or suggestion on the part of the government, but an element of persuasion or mild coercion. United States v. Hill, supra. The defendant may make such a showing by demonstrating that he had not favorably received the government plan, and the government had to push it on him, United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.1979), or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had failed and on at least one occasion he had directly refused to participate, United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.1977). When the defendant makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense charged. United States v. Dickens, supra. In demonstrating predisposition, the government is not restricted to using past offenses or reputation evidence. Id. at 445. Evidence of predisposition may also include the readiness or eagerness of the defendant to deal in the proposed transaction, id.; United States v. Jones, 473 F.2d 293 (5th Cir.1973), or post-crime statements such as if you need more, I'll be here, United States v. Dickens, supra; United States v. Jenkins, 480 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.1973). 26 The determination of whether a sufficient evidentiary foundation exists in the record which could support a jury's acceptance of an entrapment defense is properly a question for the trial judge, the standard of review being abuse of discretion. United States v. Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir.1983), quoting United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir.1982). 6 27
28 With regard to the Hobbs Act charges, we are satisfied from our review of the record that Mr. Alston failed to come forward with more than a scintilla of evidence that the Government's conduct created a risk that the offense was committed by a person other than one ready to commit it. Mr. Alston agreed to accept money (1) in exchange for his influence with the McIntosh County Commission in securing approval for Agent Carter's proposed club, and (2) suggested, without request by Agent Carter, that he could keep Carter informed of local and federal law enforcement operations in McIntosh County so that Carter could transact drug deals at the club without fear of detection and/or prosecution. As was stated in Andrews, Evidence of predisposition may also include the readiness or eagerness of the defendant to deal in the proposed transaction [citation omitted] ... or post-crime statements ... Andrews, 765 F.2d at 1499. Likewise, with regard to inducement, we agree with the district court's statement that the level of deceitfulness in this case is almost rather mild. The tape-recorded conversation between Alston and Carter at their initial meeting revealed that Carter did not refuse or discourage Carter, but instead took an active role in setting the price at which his help could be purchased. 29
30 Nor do we find any merit to appellant's argument that the district court erred in not charging the jury on entrapment with regard to the cocaine offenses. The decision to introduce Agent Carter to Brennon for the purpose of their doing business together was Alston's. Appellant Alston conveyed messages concerning proposed cocaine transactions, arranged for meetings between Carter and Brennon at his (Alston's) home to discuss cocaine transactions, and advised Brennon on how they might bypass Brennon's regular cocaine supplier and obtain kilogram quantities of cocaine from Florida themselves. Alston never once expressed even a distaste for the cocaine-related activity; he only sought to confine his involvement to that of a lookout and facilitator. The record also reflects that Carter did not pressure Alston into engaging in cocaine-related activities in order to continue receiving the bi-weekly payments for helping Carter to gain county approval for the club. 31