Opinion ID: 1058201
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Limited Scope of Tennessee's Parentage Statutes

Text: Parentage is an area of law governed primarily by statute. Unfortunately, Tennessee's parentage and related statutes do not contemplate many of the scenarios now made possible by recent developments in reproductive technology. We now review Tennessee's statutory scheme. When construing statutes, we must ascertain and carry out the legislature's intent without unduly restricting or expanding a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope. Premium Fin. Corp. of Am. v. Crump Ins. Servs. of Memphis, Inc., 978 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn.1998). In ascertaining the intent of the legislature, this Court may look to `the language of the statute, its subject matter, the object and reach of the statute, the wrong or evil which it seeks to remedy or prevent, and the purpose sought to be accomplished in its enactment.' State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 275 (Tenn.2000) (quoting State v. Lewis, 958 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tenn.1997)). The Tennessee Code provides a single cause of action for establishing parentage. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-301 (2001). A court may enter an order of parentage upon the agreement of the mother and father unless the court on its own motion orders genetic testing. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(a) (2001). Alternatively, a complaint to establish parentage of a child may be brought by the child, the child's mother, a man claiming to be the child's father, or the Tennessee Department of Human Services. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(1). The parentage statutes define mother as the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302(4) (2001) (emphasis added). Similarly, parent is defined as the biological mother or biological father of a child, regardless of the marital status of the mother and father. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-302(5) (emphasis added). The parentage statutes do not define biological mother. Consequently, we adduce definitions provided by Tennessee's adoption statutes. Statutes in pari materia  that is, statutes relating to the same subject or having a common purpose  are to be construed together. Lyons v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn.1994). The adoption statutes define biological parents as the woman and man who physically or genetically conceived the child. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(10) (2001) (emphasis added). Code section 36-1-102(10) focuses solely on conception, making no reference to giving birth. The verb conceived is modified by two disjunctively related adverbs. On the one hand, physically is an adverb meaning in a physical manner and in respect to the body, Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 1707, and which thus means in a manner which relates to or stands in accordance with the laws of nature, id. at 1706 (defining physical). As used in the statute, physically . . . conceived therefore means having caused conception through natural means (coitus) as opposed to artificial means. On the other hand, genetically conceived means having caused conception in a manner pertaining to genetic makeup and phenomena. Id. at 946 (defining genetics). Genetic conception thus entails the contribution of one's genes [5] to a child. By providing for genetic conception in addition to physical or natural conception, Code section 36-1-102(10) implicitly accounts for genetic procreation via technological assistance. If practicable, a statute is to be construed so that its component parts are reasonably consistent. Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968). Every word used is presumed to have meaning and purpose, and should be given full effect if so doing does not violate the obvious intention of the Legislature. Id. We agree with the Court of Appeals that Cindy falls outside the statutory scope of the parentage and adoption statutes, which do not expressly control the circumstances of this case. It is appropriate to construe the parentage and adoption statutes narrowly insofar as this case involves such fundamental constitutional rights as parenthood and the right to procreate. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn.1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600-01 (Tenn.1992). Further, we refrain from speculating about the significance of provisions which are not included in [a] statute, finding it more effective to consider the words actually used. Fletcher v. State, 951 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tenn.1997). First, although the definition of biological parents in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(10) implicitly accounts for assisted conception by distinguishing between physical (natural) and genetic conception, see supra, the adoption and parentage statutes do not further elaborate upon this distinction. Second, even the definition of surrogate birth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(48)(A) (2001) assumes the existence of a marital relationship between the intended parents on whose behalf the surrogate carries a child. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-102(48)(A)(i) (The union of the wife's egg and the husband's sperm which are then placed in another woman who carries the fetus to term and who, pursuant to a contract, then relinquishes all parental rights . . . .) (emphasis added); § 36-1-102(48)(A)(ii) (The gestational surrogate shall relinquish the child to the biological father and the biological father's wife. ) (emphasis added). As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, this definition of surrogate birth is expressly based on the predicate that the surrogate entered into a contract by which she relinquished all parental rights. Moreover, this statutory definition assumes that the intended mother is a woman other than the gestator. However, in this case not only was there no marriage or surrogacy contract, there is also no evidence in the record to suggest that Cindy gave birth on behalf of anyone but Charles and herself. [6] Third, the parentage statutes generally fail to contemplate dispute over maternity. For example, the rebuttable presumptions of parentage provided in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-2-304 (2001) focus exclusively on establishing paternity. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-304(a) (A man is rebuttably presumed to be the father of a child if . . . .) (emphasis added). The statutes also employ the term mother in a way that assumes we already know who the mother is, see, e.g. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-2-303, 36-2-305(b)(1)(B) (2001), whereas references to father include such phrases as a man claiming to be the child's father, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(1)(C), alleged father, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-305(b)(4), and putative father, Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-318 (2001). Similarly, the statute providing for an order of parentage is concerned solely with the establishment of paternity. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-2-311(a) (2001) (Upon establishing parentage, the court shall make an order declaring the father of the child.) (emphasis added). The statutes lack corresponding language concerning the establishment of maternity. The legislative history of the parentage statutes reinforces our conclusion that they fail to contemplate or to control the circumstances of this case. Where the plain language of a statute does not clearly resolve an issue, it is appropriate to consider the history and purpose of legislation in order to ascertain legislative intent. See Lavin v. Jordon, 16 S.W.3d 362, 365-66 (Tenn.2000). In 1997, the Tennessee General Assembly completely overhauled the statutes concerning paternity and legitimation. See 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 477. The primary purpose of this change was to streamline and to simplify the formerly separate causes of action for paternity and legitimation by combining them into a single parentage action. See Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-2-101 to -115 (1996) (paternity) and §§ 36-2-201 to -210 (1996) (legitimation), repealed by 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 477 (codified at Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-2-301 to -322 (2001)); Tape H-C & FA # 1 (Tennessee House of Representatives Children and Family Affairs Committee Mar. 26, 1997) (This bill is an effort to try to revise our statutes and bring us into the twentieth century and develop one system for determining and establishing the parentage of children born out of wedlock.) (statement of Rep. Kim McMillan). The 1997 legislation was also designed to correct a particular constitutional infirmity of the prior statutes. [7] Significantly, the legislative history shows that the current parentage statutes were not designed to control questions of parentage where sperm or egg donation is involved. In response to the observation that the new parentage statutes could potentially allow a sperm donor to file a parentage claim, Mr. Steve Cobb stated as follows: I can tell you that the clear intention, discussed intention, of this [bill] was not to deal with sperm donors at all.... [W]e wanted to put that off for another day.... The intent, and it should be stated by the sponsor in a colloquy on the floor if necessary, is not to affect that issue at all. Tape S-Jud. # 4 (Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee May 13, 1997). Concerning the question of maternity where egg donation is involved, the legislative history contains no indication that this matter was ever contemplated as a potential issue. In sum, we conclude that Tennessee's parentage and related statutes do not provide for or control the circumstances of this case. Contrary to the position taken by the dissent which would restrict the basis for legal maternity to genetic consanguinity alone, we determine that these statutes simply do not apply to all conceivable parentage determinations. In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals.