Opinion ID: 197262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Roadblock Effect an Unreasonable Seizure?

Text: 23 We determine the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment seizure by balancing  'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1699-1700, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985)). The Fourth Amendment reasonableness test requires careful attention to the circumstances in the particular case. McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 540, 546 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 275, 136 L.Ed.2d 198 (1996). Moreover, a viable excessive force claim must demonstrate that the police defendant['s] actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation. Alexis v. McDonald's Restaurants of Massachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 352 (1st Cir.1995). See also Graham, 490 U.S. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. 24 Graham identifies three factors for evaluating whether the force used to effect a seizure was objectively reasonable: (1) the severity of the crime, (2) whether there was an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect was, inter alia, actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. See Alexis, 67 F.3d at 352-53. Under these standards, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that no rational jury could have found this roadblock unreasonable in the circumstances. See Seekamp, 936 F.Supp. at 28. 25 Seekamp contends that the roadblock was set up in a manner likely to kill him. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 599, 109 S.Ct. at 1382-83 (noting that the potential for recovery by Brower arose only because the unreasonableness ... allege[d] consist[ed] precisely of setting up the roadblock in such a manner as to be likely to kill him.). In that event, he argues, the more particularized analysis employed in Garner, 471 U.S. at 11, 105 S.Ct. at 1701, prohibiting deadly force against fleeing suspects who pose no immediate danger to the officers or the public, displaces the Graham analysis. We need only consider the evidence material to the threshold requirement that the roadblock be shown to have been set up in a manner likely to kill Seekamp. 26 Unlike the deadman's roadblock in Brower, 489 U.S. at 594, 109 S.Ct. at 1379-80 (unilluminated roadblock hidden beyond sharp curve), the Seekamp roadblock was brightly illuminated and located at the end of a long straightaway. The undisputed evidence established that it was visible from approximately 1500 feet to the north and that the Monte Carlo could have been brought to a complete stop without contacting the roadblock equipment but for its malfunctioning brakes. An adequate corridor for circumvention, though not readily apparent to vehicles approaching at excessive speed, had enabled many motorists to bypass the roadblock before Seekamp arrived. 7 The Seekamp roadblock thus stands in marked contrast to the deadman's roadblock in Brower and the bullet which stopped the fleeing suspect in Garner. Compare Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 949-50 (7th Cir.1994) (differentiating, based on relative likelihood of death or serious injury, between the nondeadly force employed by ramming a police cruiser into a speeding car and the deadly force employed by driving a cruiser into a speeding motorcycle). 27 At the time Trooper McAfee established the roadblock, there existed probable cause to believe that Seekamp was a fleeing felon who had eluded local law enforcement officers in Scarborough and Saco and continued to elude the pursuing MSP troopers, see Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., tit. 29-A, § 2501-A (1994) (class C crime to elude officer at reckless speeds resulting in chase); see also Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(C) (1964) (class C crime punishable by five years' imprisonment). Seekamp committed lesser crimes as well, which nonetheless endangered the pursuing officers and the traveling public: driving at 97 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone on the Maine Turnpike, see Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 29-A, § 2074(3) (West Supp.1996) (class E crime to exceed posted speed limit by more than 30 m.p.h.), and driving to endanger by maneuvering to evade the rolling roadblock, see Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 29-A, § 2413 (class E crime) (1964); see also Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(E) (1964) (class E crimes punishable by six months' imprisonment). Moreover, Seekamp had been evading apprehension throughout the chase. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72 (evading arrest by flight a factor in determining reasonableness of seizure). Thus, the factors for determining reasonableness under Graham all weighed heavily in favor of employing nondeadly force to contain Seekamp. 28 Finally, even assuming the information transmitted to Trooper Michaud regarding the identity and condition of the driver of the Monte Carlo was neither stale nor unverifiable, the outcome under Graham would not be altered. Relying on firsthand observation and eyewitness reports from other law enforcement officers engaged in the pursuit, Trooper Michaud had probable cause to believe that a fleeing felon, driving at excessive speeds, had resorted to reckless efforts to evade the rolling roadblock and refused to stop. In these circumstances the information regarding the purported identity and condition of the person driving the Monte Carlo could not have affected the Graham analysis because the officers were faced with a situation which fully warranted a nondeadly roadblock based on the available objective information and the serious danger posed, without regard to the particular influences prompting the driver's dangerous actions. See id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-73. 29 The Supreme Court has held, in a closely analogous context, that the constitutionality of a seizure based simply on reasonable suspicion does not depend exclusively on whether the police employed the least intrusive [investigatory] means available. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1587-88, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (The reasonableness of the officer's decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.). See also United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1989) (same). As the Court has explained:A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But [t]he fact that the protection of the public might have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not itself render the search unreasonable. The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue it. 30 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-87, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1575-76, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (citations omitted) (upholding duration of investigatory stop as reasonable). 31 Moreover, Seekamp proffers no reasonable alternative for resolving the safety threat posed by his persistent, irresponsible conduct. True, the defendant officers never resorted to the alternative Seekamp now proposes: abandoning their pursuit. Implicit in this suggestion, of course, is the premise that fleeing felons must be allowed to proceed on their reckless way without answering for their criminal conduct despite the ongoing risk to the traveling public. The defendant officers recognized that inaction on their part was not a responsible option in the circumstances. We do likewise by acknowledging that their actions in setting up the roadblock and effecting the seizure through nondeadly force were reasonable. 8 2. Supervisory Liability 32 Seekamp contends that MSP Chief Skofield failed to provide the defendant MSP troopers with adequate training and supervision. Supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be predicated on a respondeat superior theory, Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1379, but  'only on the basis of [the supervisor's] own acts or omissions[,]'  Sanchez v. Alvarado, 101 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir.1989)) (alteration in original). As we pointed out almost a decade ago, a supervisor: 33 can be held liable ... if (1) the behavior of [his] subordinates results in a constitutional violation, and (2) the [supervisor]'s action or inaction was affirmative[ly] link[ed] to that behavior in that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference. 34 Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (1st Cir.1988) (citations omitted). Moreover, the indifference required to support supervisory liability under section 1983 must be deliberate, reckless or callous. Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.1989). Thus, the affirmative link required between the action or inaction of a supervisor and the behavior of subordinates contemplates proof that the supervisor's conduct led inexorably to the constitutional violation. Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1380. 35 The present claim fails at a primitive level, as it meets neither test under Lipsett. First, because the behavior of the subordinate MSP officers was reasonable in the circumstances, see supra pt. II, B, the required predicate--a constitutional violation by the subordinate--cannot be established. See Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 902. Second, Seekamp adduced no evidence of supervisory indifference to proper police training on the part of defendant Skofield, let alone a level of indifference sufficient to sustain a section 1983 supervisory liability claim. See Sanchez, 101 F.3d at 229 (mere laxity insufficient to establish § 1983 supervisory liability). Quite the contrary, it is undisputed that each subordinate defendant received training on high speed pursuit and roadblocks, including a refresher course on MSP high speed pursuit policy, within the year preceding the incident sub judice which itself reflected no inadequate training whatsoever. III