Opinion ID: 213198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constructive Filing under the MOU

Text: The MOU requires the EEOC to accept charges of discrimination timely filed with the OFCCP. It states, in relevant part: Complaints of employment discrimination filed with OFCCP under Executive Order 11246 will be considered charges simultaneously filed under Title VII whenever the complaints also fall within the jurisdiction of Title VII. For the purpose of determining the timeliness of such a charge, which will be considered dual filed under this paragraph, the date the matter was received by OFCCP shall be deemed to be the date it was received by EEOC. 64 Fed.Reg. 17664-02, 17666 (Apr. 12, 1999). In the present case, the EEOC relied upon the MOU to conclude that Granger and Descant's charges of discrimination were dual-filed with the EEOC as of November 13, 2007. This date satisfies the 300-day requirement. The district court disagreed. It interpreted the MOU as permitting dual-filing only when the complaints filed with the OFCCP also fall within the jurisdiction of Title VII. Id. The court found dual-filing improper because the OFCCP never had jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' complaints. As such, the EEOC did not also have jurisdiction; only the EEOC had jurisdiction. The complaints were not `dual-filed'; they were erroneously filed. We review the district court's legal interpretation de novo. Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 2002). The EEOC has filed an amicus brief urging us to reject the district court's interpretation. It seeks to preserve dual-filing even for complaints where the OFCCP lacks jurisdiction, in order to strengthen enforcement and increase efficiency. It argues that its reading of the MOU is reasonable and entitled to deference, and has been adopted by other courts. Aaron's contends that Granger and Descant waived any challenge to the district court's interpretation of the MOU by failing to appeal or cross-appeal. [I]n the absence of a cross-appeal, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to modify a judgment so as to enlarge the rights of the appellee or diminish the rights of the appellant. Amazing Spaces, Inc. v. Metro Mini Storage, 608 F.3d 225, 250 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citations omitted). We restate the procedures that brought the case here. The district court granted Aaron's motion for certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and we granted leave to appeal. Our jurisdiction thus extends to the order certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the particular question formulated by the district court.... [T]he appellate court may address any issue fairly included within the certified order because it is the order that is appealable.... Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205, 116 S.Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578 (1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We decline to rule on waiver or on the meaning of the MOU. Neither issue is a necessary part of the answer to whether the district court was correct to allow this suit to proceed. Because we affirm on equitable tolling, we need not reach the district court's interpretation of the MOU.