Opinion ID: 414382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review on cross-motions for summary judgment

Text: 51 A preliminary issue raised by the parties involves the proper scope of review by this court when a case has been decided on cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants urge essentially that the lower court proceeding be viewed as a bench trial involving documentary evidence. They assert that the district judge was empowered to decide questions turning on factual inferences, that at least some deference must be accorded the findings of the trial judge, and that no appellate presumptions against the judgment should apply. 52 The tribe, by contrast, asserts that on review all inferences of fact must be viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant and that summary judgment is inappropriate if the judgment requires the resolution of competing factual inferences. 53 There is authority for the general proposition urged by the defendants. In Tripp v. May, 189 F.2d 198 (7th Cir.1951), this court held that  '[i]n a nonjury case if both parties move for summary judgment and the court finds that there are issues of fact but that the facts have been fully developed at the hearing on the motions, the court may proceed to decide the factual issues and give judgment on the merits. This of course amounts to a trial of the case and is not technically a disposition by a summary judgment.'  Id. at 200 (quoting 3 Barron & Holtzoff Sec. 1239); accord, Nielsen v. Western Electric Co., 603 F.2d 741, 743 (8th Cir.1979); Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109, 113 (9th Cir.1975); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2720, at 466 (1973). When the hearing on cross-motions is in fact a trial, the factual findings of the district court will be overturned only if they are clearly erroneous, e.g., Starsky, 512 F.2d at 111. 54 It is important to remember, however, that cross-motions for summary judgment do not automatically empower the court to dispense with the determination whether questions of material fact exist. Starsky, 512 F.2d at 112; accord, Manetas v. International Petroleum Carriers, Inc., 541 F.2d 408, 413 (3d Cir.1976); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Northwest National Bank of Chicago, 228 F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir.1955). The parties in both Nielsen, 603 F.2d at 743, and Tripp, 189 F.2d at 200, had expressly stipulated to an agreed set of facts and in Starsky, the parties had ample notice that the trial judge believed they had in effect so stipulated, 512 F.2d at 113. 55 In the instant case, the record suggests that the tribe did not stipulate to a trial based on the documents before the court. The district judge was well aware that a Rule 56 disposition was precluded if genuine issues of material fact existed and the tribe indicated that if summary judgment were not granted they would call expert witnesses at trial. We are reluctant, therefore, to apply the reasoning in Tripp and Starsky to the instant case. 56 We therefore apply the traditional standard that summary judgment will not lie unless, construing all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is made, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 664 (5th Cir.1980), remanded on reh'g on other grounds, 625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir.1980). As recognized by the Pharo court, however, only inferences that follow reasonably from the evidence need be considered. Id. 57 Relatively few aspects of this case turn on what could be characterized as factual questions. Relevant issues which might be so classified are: (1) the Indians' understanding of the qualifying language in the Treaties of 1837 and 1842, and (2) whether the Indians misbehaved prior to 1850. Rather than considering the appropriateness of summary judgment on these specific questions at this point in our discussion, we consider each issue, infra, applying the standard enunciated above. 58