Opinion ID: 537759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Sound the Whistle or Horn

Text: 10 That the crew may not have seen Wanago in time to stop the train, however, does not necessarily mean that the crew did not see Wanago in time to signal the train's approach. 2 In fact, the record suggests otherwise. When he first saw Wanago in the vicinity of the tracks, Gust said, he did not take any action because Wanago wasn't bothering anything. Gust Dep. at 70. But as he watched, Gust noticed that Wanago never saw the approaching train; Gust also observed that Wanago wore a cap with ear flaps and thought that maybe he didn't hear the train. 3 Id. at 125. 11 There is no question that Illinois law requires train personnel to signal a train's approach in certain situations: It is the general rule of law that a railroad has no duty to keep a lookout for trespassers, but when persons are seen on or near the tracks in a place of danger, there is a duty to give them a signal. Higgins v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 16 Ill.App.2d 227, 230, 147 N.E.2d 714, 716 (4th Dist.1958). In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Puckett contends, the district court failed to consider the defendants' obligation to provide an effective signal that would have alerted Wanago to the approaching train. The defendants counter on appeal that their action--the ringing of the train bell--was sufficient to comply with Illinois law. 4 And they point to one Illinois case stating that train personnel need not activate all the signals on the train to warn approaching pedestrians and motorists. Applegate v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 334 Ill.App. 141, 148, 78 N.E.2d 793, 796 (2d Dist.1948) (crew may signal with bell or whistle). 12 Read in its entirety, however, Applegate is not entirely favorable to the defendants' position. The plaintiffs in Applegate sued the Chicago & North Western Railway Company (the CNW) for its failure to give effective warning signals which, they argued, could have prevented the deaths of the passengers in a car struck by the train. In response, the CNW argued that it discharged its statutory duty by ringing the train bell and therefore could not be found liable for negligence. The court disagreed: 13 Irrespective of the statutory requirements, defendant had a common law duty to give timely warning of its approach. Continental Imp. Co. v. Stead, 1887, 95 U.S. 161, 24 L.Ed. 403, 405. Although the bell was rung some 2,000 feet from the crossing, the engineer knew, or should have known, that this sound would be obscured by the noise from the passing freight train, and the whistle which was sounded at 600 feet from the crossing would not be heard until about four seconds before the train crossed the intersection.... 14 Under these circumstances, it could reasonably be urged that no effective warning signals were given by defendant's engineer, and whether such conduct constituted negligence was properly an issue for the jury to determine. 15 Applegate, 334 Ill.App. at 149, 78 N.E.2d at 797 (emphasis supplied). As a result, the appellate court upheld the circuit court's refusal to grant a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that the sufficiency of CNW's warning signal was properly submitted to the jury. 16 In this respect, Puckett's case is similar to Applegate. Gust, the brakeman, observed that Wanago wore a cap with ear flaps and admitted later that maybe he didn't hear the train. Further, Gust never saw Wanago look at the train or acknowledge its approach. Just as the jury in Applegate apparently concluded that the CNW's bell warning was inadequate because it was obscured by the noise from passing trains, a jury in this case might also consider the Soo Line's bell warning insufficient because Gust--who saw that Wanago's ears were covered and that Wanago did not see the train--did not blast the whistle or horn (both louder than the bell) to alert Wanago of the approaching train. 5 17 In this regard, Illinois courts generally have examined the sufficiency of railroad warnings on a so-called case-by-case basis, especially when presented with special circumstances. For example, in Dunn v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 127 Ill.2d 350, 130 Ill.Dec. 409, 537 N.E.2d 738 (1989) (discussing crew's failure to warn of train stopped at crossing), the Illinois Supreme Court explained that the adequacy of warnings is often dependent upon the circumstances of a particular situation: 18 There is no fixed rule as to what constitutes special circumstances. Circumstances which courts have recognized as special or extraordinary include a blinding snowstorm (Petricek, [v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co.], 21 Ill.App.2d 60, 157 N.E.2d 421) and malfunctioning warning lights which erroneously indicated that the crossing was clear (Langston, [v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co.], 398 Ill. 248, 75 N.E.2d 363). In contrast, it has been held that darkness, heavy fog and poor visibility do not constitute special circumstances. Bachman v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1971), 132 Ill.App.2d 277, 268 N.E.2d 42. 19 Dunn, 127 Ill.2d at 357, 537 N.E.2d at 741. The same case-by-case analysis is appropriate for examining the adequacy of warning devices at crossings. See, e.g., Bassett v. Burlington N.R.R., 131 Ill.App.3d 807, 813, 86 Ill.Dec. 855, 858-59, 476 N.E.2d 31, 34-35 (5th Dist.1985) ([T]he amount of protection required at a crossing is strictly a jury question to be determined from the circumstances of each case.); see also Baker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 120 Ill.App.2d 296, 303, 256 N.E.2d 887, 891 (5th Dist.1970) (Whether a particular crossing is extra hazardous is a jury question.). Cf. Shine v. Wabash R.R., 8 Ill.App.2d 521, 534, 132 N.E.2d 41, 47 (3d Dist.1956) (adequacy of lookout is jury question). 20 These Illinois cases all suggest that railroads must provide an effective signal to warn pedestrians and motorists in the vicinity of approaching trains. The effectiveness of any signal may depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. Here, the district court's grant of summary judgment (without even addressing the signal dispute) deprived Puckett of the opportunity to demonstrate that the ringing bell was inadequate to warn Wanago of the approaching train. In sum, the plaintiff and the defendants' argument regarding the adequacy of the train signal constituted a genuine issue of material fact that should not have been decided as a matter of law.