Opinion ID: 3134230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: Defendant argues that the State is not allowed any input when the circuit court determines whether a post-conviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit. Here, the State filed a motion to dismiss before the circuit court determined that the petition was frivolous. Defendant argues that the State's motion to dismiss influenced the circuit court and tainted the circuit court's determination. According to defendant, this cause should be remanded for the appointment of counsel and further consideration of defendant's petition. Section 122--2.1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) provides: (a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition the court shall examine such petition and enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section.  (2) If the petitioner is sentenced to imprisonment and the court determines the petition is frivolous or is patently without merit, it shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision. Such order of dismissal is a final judgment and shall be served upon the petitioner by certified mail within 10 days of its entry. (b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration in accordance with Sections 122--4 through 122--6. (c) In considering a petition pursuant to this Section, the court may examine the court file of the proceeding in which the petitioner was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in such proceeding and any transcripts of such proceeding. (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1992). If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to section 122--2.1, section 122--4 provides for the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants. 725 ILCS 5/122--4 (West 1992). Section 122--5 of the Act provides: Within 30 days after the making of an order pursuant to subsection (b) of Section 122--2.1, or within such further time as the court may set, the State shall answer or move to dismiss. In the event that a motion to dismiss is filed and denied, the State must file an answer within 20 days after such denial. No other or further pleadings shall be filed except as the court may order on its own motion or on that of either party. (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 1992). Section 122--6 allows the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122--6 (West 1992). Pursuant to the Act, a post-conviction proceeding that does not involve the death penalty has three distinct stages. In the first stage, the defendant files a petition and the circuit court determines whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. At this stage, the Act does not permit any further pleadings from the defendant or any motions or responsive pleadings from the State. Instead, the circuit court considers the petition independently, without any input from either side. To survive dismissal at this stage, a petition need only present the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 74 (1988). This is a low threshold and a defendant need only present a limited amount of detail in the petition. At this stage, a defendant need not make legal arguments or cite to legal authority. Porter, 122 Ill. 2d at 74. The Act provides that the petition must be supported by affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or the petition shall state why the same are not attached. 725 ILCS 5/122--2 (West 1992). If the circuit court does not dismiss the petition pursuant to section 122--2.1, it is then docketed for further consideration. The proceeding then advances to the second stage. At the second stage, the circuit court appoints counsel to represent an indigent defendant. 725 ILCS 5/122--4 (West 1992). Counsel may file an amended post-conviction petition. Also, at this second stage, the Act expressly provides that the State may file a motion to dismiss or answer to the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122--5 (West 1992). Section 122--5 specifically contemplates that the State will file a motion to dismiss or answer after the circuit court has evaluated the petition to determine if it is frivolous. If the circuit court does not dismiss or deny the petition, the proceeding advances to the third stage. At this final stage, the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122--6 (West 1992). If the circuit court dismisses the petition or denies post-conviction relief at any stage, the defendant may appeal. Several appellate decisions have considered the situation where the State files a motion before the circuit court has decided whether the petition is frivolous. See, e.g., People v. Merritte, 225 Ill. App. 3d 986 (1992); People v. Mitchell, 218 Ill. App. 3d 401 (1991). These courts have consistently found that the filing of a motion at this stage is premature and improper under the Act. See, e.g., People v. Oury, 259 Ill. App. 3d 663, 668 (1994). The sections of the Act, when considered collectively, do not authorize the filing of a motion to dismiss at the first stage. The mere early filing of a motion or responsive pleading by the State, however, does not per se contaminate the circuit court's determination pursuant to section 122--2.1. See, e.g., Mitchell, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03. The premature filing of a motion to dismiss does not prevent the circuit court from independently evaluating whether a post-conviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit, as required by the Act. Rather, reversal is required where the record shows that the circuit court sought or relied on input from the State when determining whether the petition is frivolous. Compare People v. Barker, 258 Ill. App. 3d 323 (1994) (reversal required where the trial judge requested argument from both parties); Merritte, 225 Ill. App. 3d 986 (reversal required where the State orally argued its motion to dismiss at length to the trial judge and where the judge stated that dismissal was based, in part, on the reasons given by the State at oral argument); People v. Clark, 239 Ill. App. 3d 546 (1992) (reversal required where the State presented oral argument, the State used case law to support its oral argument, and the trial judge said that he had relied on the State's arguments); People v. Rutkowski, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1065 (1992) (reversal required where the trial judge heard argument from the State on its oral motion to strike); People v. Novak, 200 Ill. App. 3d 189 (1990) (reversal required where the trial judge conducted a hearing on the motion to dismiss and expressly indicated that he was granting the State's motion); People v. Magdaleno, 188 Ill. App. 3d 384 (1989) (reversal required where the trial judge addressed the merits of the State's motion to strike); with People v. Woods, 239 Ill. App. 3d 559 (1992) (no reversal where the motion was short and cited only one case, the trial judge did not hear any argument on the motion, and the order showed an independent analysis); Mitchell, 218 Ill. App. 3d 401 (no reversal where the motion was terse, the trial judge did not hear any argument from the State, and the dismissal order showed a detailed analysis). We agree with the approach of these appellate decisions. Section 122--2.1 of the Act authorizes the trial judge to make an initial independent evaluation of a post-conviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1 (West 1992). We ordinarily presume that the trial judge knows and follows the law unless the record indicates otherwise. See People v. Terrell, 132 Ill. 2d 178, 219 (1989). Where the record gives no indication that the trial judge sought input from the State or relied on the motion to dismiss, we presume that the judge acted properly. In this case, defendant acknowledges that reversal is required only if the record shows that the circuit court relied on or was influenced by the motion to dismiss. Defendant argues, however, that the order shows that the circuit court did rely on the motion to dismiss. Defendant emphasizes four purported similarities between the motion to dismiss and the dismissal order to show this reliance. First, defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously relied on the principle of res judicata, which was raised in the State's motion, to bar any attack on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. Defendant contends that she did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in her post-conviction petition. Second, defendant argues that the circuit court erroneously relied on waiver in connection with her ineffective- assistance claim. According to defendant, waiver is inappropriate here because the same counsel represented defendant both at trial and on appeal. Defendant contends that the trial judge would not have mentioned waiver if that argument had not been contained in the motion to dismiss. Third, defendant argues that the circuit court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing, which is what the State sought in its motion. Defendant argues that the circuit court should not consider whether she is entitled to a hearing at this stage of the proceeding. Fourth, defendant argues that the circuit court found that the petition failed to present a substantial showing of violation of Defendant's constitutional rights, which is similar to language used by the State in its motion. Again, defendant argues that this language is used when considering whether a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and that this language would not have been used absent the motion. The purported similarities identified by defendant are too tenuous to show reliance on the motion to dismiss. First, with respect to res judicata, an examination of the post-conviction petition shows that the allegations in the petition do generally attack the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented at trial. Second, with respect to waiver, defendant may be correct that the circuit court overlooked counsel's representation at trial and on appeal. Waiver aside, however, the circuit court specifically found that the ineffective-assistance claim was frivolous because defendant failed to submit affidavits from either Rachel Lauer or Misty Robards, which was not suggested by the State. With respect to defendant's third and fourth arguments, some of the language in the order is similar to the language in the motion, but, as the appellate court noted, the similar language involves general terminology that is common in post-conviction proceedings. The circuit court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing because defendant requested a hearing in her petition. Most significantly, the trial judge specifically identified the materials on which he relied in making his determination. He stated that he had reviewed the post-conviction petition, the affidavits, the trial transcript, and the decision of the appellate court on direct appeal. No mention was made of the State's motion to dismiss. No hearing was held. The analysis in the dismissal order recited the facts of the case and was more detailed than the reasons presented in the motion to dismiss. In the order, the trial judge specifically found that the petition was frivolous and patently without merit, which is the proper statutory standard for dismissal. Accordingly, we reject defendant's argument. Defendant also argues that the circuit court erred in substantively finding the petition frivolous or patently without merit. Defendant argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing the petition based on defendant's failure to include an affidavit from either Rachel Lauer or Misty Robards. Defendant concedes that she failed to raise this argument in the appellate court and in the petition for leave to appeal to this court. We find the issue waived. See People v. Schott, 145 Ill. 2d 188, 201 (1991); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O'Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 154 (1994). Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor made certain improper comments during closing argument. Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to them and that the comments violated due process. Essentially, the prosecutor told the jury that it had to accept certain statements of witnesses as true because they were unrebutted. This argument was not raised in the post-conviction petition. Section 122--3 of the Act provides that [a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122--3 (West 1992). In addition, this issue also was not raised on appeal to the appellate court or in the petition for leave to appeal to this court. Again, we find the issue waived. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed. Affirmed.