Opinion ID: 171206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Job Loss

Text: Separate and apart from her claim based on her loss of the election, Pignanelli also complains of her loss of employment with the school district. Given the Supreme Court's recent holding in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, however, her claim based on a class-of-one equal protection theory must fail. See Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). First, just like the plaintiff in Engquist, Pignanelli sought to bring an equal protection claim against a public employer based on allegations the employer treated her differently than others similarly situated. As the Court made clear in Engquist, this is not a legally cognizable cause of action. Second, Pignanelli has failed to rebut the Defendants' evidentiary showing that she was not qualified for the new position. In Engquist, an Oregon state employee brought an equal protection claim against the state after she was laid off, alleging she lost her job because of arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons directed only at her. 128 S.Ct. at 2149. The plaintiff did not get along with one of her co-workers and repeatedly complained about the co-worker to her supervisor. Id. Based on instructions given by the district court, a jury found the plaintiff had been intentionally treated differently than others similarly situated with respect to the denial of her promotion, termination of her employment, or denial of bumping rights without any rational basis. . . . Id. Although the jury rejected the plaintiff's equal protection claims based on race, sex, and national origin, the jury awarded damages on her class-of-one claim. The court of appeals reversed in relevant part, holding the class-of-one theory of equal protection did not apply in the public employment arena. The court reasoned that allowing such suits to proceed would completely invalidate the practice of public at-will employment. Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 995 (9th Cir.2007) (quoted in Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2150). The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. It too rejected the plaintiff's claim, unequivocally holding that the class-of-one equal protection theory, whatever its contours, does not apply in the public employment context. Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2151. A public employee-turned-plaintiff must be a member of an identifiable class to bring an equal protection claim. Id. The Supreme Court has long recognized a crucial difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the government exercising `the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,' and the government acting `as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.' Id. at 2151 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). The Court has repeatedly sought to reaffirm the common-sense notion government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter. Id. (quotation omitted). Therefore, the Court has held the government as employer . . . has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign. Id. (quotation omitted); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) ([A]bsent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.). The Equal Protection Clause is concerned with governmental classifications that affect some groups of citizens differently than others, especially those in an identifiable group. Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2152 (quotations omitted). To treat employees differently is not to classify them in a way that raises equal protection concerns. Rather, it is simply to exercise the broad discretion that typically characterizes the employer-employee relationship. Id. at 2155. Following the clear commands of Engquist, it is obvious the equal protection theory Pignanelli relies on to challenge the non-renewal of her employment contract must fail. The board's decision to allow her contract to lapse rather than rehire her into a position for which she was unqualified does not raise constitutional concerns. Even if the unequal treatment was not rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, the board's decisionacting in its role as proprietor and employerdoes not constitute a violation of equal protection. See id. at 2157. In fact, the Supreme Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in the specific circumstance where, as here, government employers are alleged to have made an individualized, subjective personnel decision in a seemingly arbitrary or irrational manner. Id. at 2155; see also id. at 2156 (noting recognition of a class-of-one theory of equal protection in the public employment context . . . is simply contrary to the concept of at-will employment). In accordance with the Supreme Court's precedent, we must reject Pignanelli's theory of unequal treatment. It is true, as Pignanelli points out, one of our previous decisions has already analyzed the class-of-one equal protection theory in the public employment context. See Bartell v. Aurora Pub. Schs., 263 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 (10th Cir.2001). [3] In Bartell, a public school teacher facing accusations of sexual harassment sued the school district after being placed on administrative leave. 263 F.3d at 1145-46. The teacher brought an equal protection claim alleging he was the victim of selective, purposeful discrimination by government officials who harbor animosity towards [him]. Id. at 1148. We framed the legal issue as not whether [plaintiff's] equal protection theory is well established, but simply whether it is a viable legal theory. Id. We concluded the plaintiff's class-of-one equal protection theory based on governmental animosity was viable. Id. at 1148-49. To the extent Bartell conflicts with Engquist, it no longer represents the law. In Engquist, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split involving the scope of the class-of-one theoryand Bartell was on the losing side. See Engquist, 478 F.3d at 993 (9th Cir.) (recognizing split and disagreeing with Bartell and other circuit cases applying the class-of-one theory to public employment). Public employees typically have a variety of protections from just the sort of personnel actions about which [Pignanelli] complains, but the Equal Protection Clause is not one of them. Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2157. [4] To the extent Bartell recognized a public employee's class-of-one equal protection theory, Bartell conflicts with Engquist and we overrule it. [5] In laying down this rule, we join several other circuits that have already recognized the implications of Engquist. See, e.g., Appel v. Spiridon, 531 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir.2008) (The Supreme Court recently held that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to a public employee asserting a violation of the Clause based on a `class of one' theory of liability.); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 772, 2008 WL 3287701, at  (D.C.Cir.2008) (Under Engquist . . . the class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. (citation omitted)); see also Skrutski v. Marut, Nos. 07-2828 & 07-2848, 2008 WL 2787434, at  (3d Cir. July 18, 2008) (slip copy). Finally, even assuming she could have pleaded a valid cause of action, Pignanelli has failed to develop disputed material facts sufficient to survive summary judgment. During the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 school years, Pignanelli was employed as a part-time drama teacher in one of the district's middle schools. Responding to changes in federal law, however, the part-time position was eliminated and a new full-time position, covering a wider range of subjects, was created. The Defendants presented evidence in the district court, which Pignanelli failed to rebut, showing Pignanelli was not qualified for the new position. Therefore, quite apart from her school board candidacy playing a role in her not receiving the new job, she did not get the job because she was not qualified for it. Given these undisputed facts, Pignanelli has failed to tie the loss of her job to an equal protection violation.