Opinion ID: 1258767
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Inadmissibility of Prior Remote Unadjudicated Offenses

Text: (3) Defendant observes that one of the other crimes offered by the People as an aggravating circumstance was the 1973 kidnap/assault on Rynetta C., an offense that evidently resulted in no formal criminal charges. Defendant contends that the admission of evidence on unadjudicated offenses, especially one so remote as to be time-barred, violated his confrontation and due process rights under the state and federal Constitutions. He makes similar remoteness claims regarding the 1968 assault on Dawn F. and the 1972 assault on Brian J. We have frequently rejected similar arguments. (See, e.g., People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18, 42-43 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109]; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480].) Defendant offers us no sound basis for reconsidering those holdings. Although the trial courts generally possess discretion to exclude evidence pertaining to remote offenses (see Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 466-467 [143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433]), under section 190.3 the courts lack discretion to exclude the fact of the prior offense entirely. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 531 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) In any event, we find no abuse of discretion here. The murder of Amy occurred in 1978. A continuing pattern of prior assaults and molestations of children commencing in 1968 was certainly relevant to the penalty determination and, from that standpoint, the offenses in 1968, 1972, and 1973 cannot be deemed unduly remote. Defendant complains that although the trial court instructed the jury on the necessity of finding each prior offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the court failed to require jury unanimity on such offenses before it could consider them as aggravating evidence. We have rejected this argument ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 99 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; see People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 774-775 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250]), and we decline to reconsider those decisions here. In addition, the record indicates that defense counsel expressly declined a unanimity instruction, in order to avoid highlighting the nature of the other crimes. Finally, defendant asserts the court erred in allowing the prosecutor to relitigate the facts and circumstances of [defendant's] prior convictions and dismissals, by eliciting the victims' testimony regarding the various offenses. Again, we have rejected similar arguments on several occasions. (See People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 46-47; People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 110 [249 Cal. Rptr. 630, 757 P.2d 569]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1203 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) As stated in Gates, When dealing with violent conduct it is not the fact of conviction which is probative in the penalty phase, but rather the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense. (43 Cal.3d at p. 1203, italics in original.)