Opinion ID: 852462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiving Direct Appellate Review of a Sentencing Decision

Text: Though the weight of Creech's brief is to urge that his agreement to waive appeal was not voluntary and intelligent, he also presents a question of first impression: whether such waivers should be enforceable at all. The opportunity for appeal is the prevailing rule. If a defendant's sentence is not fixed by a plea agreement, for example, a defendant who pleads guilty is entitled to contest on direct appeal the merits of a trial court's sentencing decision. Collins v. State, 817 N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind.2004). The same is true even when the defendant agrees to a sentencing cap or range. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind.2006). The issue here is whether, through a plea agreement, a defendant can waive altogether this right to appellate review of his sentence. Of course, defendants who bargain to plead guilty in return for favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights. Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind.2001). For instance, when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives the right to appeal his conviction. Collins, 817 N.E.2d at 231. And, there are circumstances in which we already recognize a defendant's decision to forego appeal. When a defendant pleads guilty and agrees to a specific sentence, he waives his right to challenge the propriety of his sentence. Hole v. State, 851 N.E.2d 302, 304 (Ind.2006). The Seventh Circuit has declared, aligning itself with virtually every other federal court of appeals, that defendants may waive their right to appeal as part of a written plea agreement . . . as long as the record clearly demonstrates that it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Williams, 184 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir.1999). [1] The Seventh Circuit has consistently upheld valid appeal waivers and dismissed appeals taken in contravention. Id. As aptly described by the Seventh Circuit, a defendant's waiver of appellate rights can be of substantial benefit to both the defendant and society: [D]efendants are free to waive their rights, to exchange them for other things that they value more highly. They exchange jury trials for lower sentencesand there is no reason why defendants cannot do the same with rights to appeal. An appeal requires the prosecutor's office to spend time researching the record, writing a brief, and attending oral argument. All of this time could be devoted to other prosecutions; and a promise that frees up time may induce a prosecutor to offer concessions. A defendant who values these concessions will waive his rights in order to obtain them. The process makes both society and the defendant better off. To make a given right ineligible for waiver would stifle this process and imprison the defendant in his privileges. United States v. Hare, 269 F.3d 859, 861 (7th Cir.2001). While the matter is not free from doubt, we find this reasoning persuasive. Accordingly, we hold that a defendant may waive the right to appellate review of his sentence as part of a written plea agreement. This holding does not affect our very long-standing policy that a defendant who can establish in a post-conviction proceeding that his plea was coerced or unintelligent is entitled to have his conviction set aside. So it has been since the days of coram nobis. Myers v. State, 115 Ind. 554, 18 N.E. 42 (1888) (plea induced by false promises rendered to a defendant acting without legal representation should be set aside); Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318 (1882) (prisoner whose plea was induced by fear of a lynch mob entitled to withdraw his plea and have a trial). Moreover, we do not mean to alter our case law invalidating provisions that waive post-conviction rights. Provisions in plea agreements that waive a defendant's right to seek post-conviction relief remain void and unenforceable. See Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind.Ct.App.1991).