Opinion ID: 813437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of the claim against Herbick

Text: Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, prison officials are required to provide basic medical treatment to inmates. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). In order to establish a constitutional violation, a prisoner must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). A finding of deliberate indifference requires proof of subjective knowledge, not objective knowledge, “meaning that the official must actually be aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware.” BeersCapitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001). Deference is given to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which) remains a question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 4 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). We have found deliberate indifference where a prison official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (citing Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, we have found that “no claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990). The District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s claim for failure to allege facts establishing that Herbick knew of and ignored a risk to Johnson’s health. Although Johnson alleged a serious medical condition, he did not allege that Herbick denied or delayed necessary medical treatments. Instead, Johnson received treatment for his condition in accordance with Herbick’s treatment plan, which Herbick apparently developed via videoconference consultation with a vascular surgeon. It thus appears that Johnson’s claim is fundamentally about his concern that Herbick’s treatment plan differed from the treatment Johnson received prior to his incarceration at SCI-Fayette. Because Johnson’s complaint alleged only a disagreement with the course of treatment he received, we agree with the District Court that Johnson failed to state a claim that Herbick was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. B. Dismissal of the claim against Tretinik and Coleman The District Court properly dismissed Johnson’s claims against Tretinik and Coleman for their roles as administrators. “If a prisoner is under the care of medical 5 experts . . . a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). Thus, “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Id. Because Tretinik’s only alleged role was responding to Johnson’s administrative complaint, we conclude that the District Court properly applied Spruill when it dismissed Johnson’s claim against Tretinik. The District Court also properly dismissed Johnson’s claim against Coleman. “An individual government defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing; liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Here, because Johnson did not allege that Coleman had any personal involvement in the alleged underlying wrongdoing, he failed to state a claim against Coleman. Accordingly, this appeal presents us with no substantial question, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 6