Opinion ID: 844248
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Victim Letters

Text: Near the end of closing argument, the prosecutor referred to defense evidence at the penalty phase showing that defendant had two fathershis stepfather, Rudy Garcia, and his real father, Patrick Grandchamptwith whom he could communicate. Jurors were reminded that defendant had deprived Garrett and Brinlee, as youngsters, of the same benefit by murdering their father, Joseph. The prosecutor asked the jury to consider the emotional pain Garrett felt after his father's murder. Referring to the letters that defendant wrote during trial to Patrick Grandchampt, the prosecutor also asked jurors to imagine how Garrett might describe such pain if he could write a letter to his father. Defense counsel sought a bench conference, and insisted that any reference to a hypothetical letter from Garrett was improper. The court overruled the objection, and prosecutorial argument resumed. [28] The prosecutor then asked jurors to consider what Brinlee might say if she could write a similar letter to Joseph, whom she had never known. [29] On appeal, defendant complains that the prosecutor served only to stir the passions of the jurors by asking them to place themselves in the position of the murder victim's children and to judge defendant harshly. He also suggests that jurors were thereby invited to speculate about irrelevant future events, and to consider matters outside the trial record. (17) In closing argument, prosecutors have wide latitude in asking jurors to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th 970, 1061.) Along these lines, it is proper at the penalty phase for a prosecutor to invite the jurors to put themselves in the place of the [murder] victims and imagine their suffering. ( People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1212 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]; see People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 793 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1] [jurors asked to consider how murder victim felt in having `a hot piece of lead tear through his chest, go through his heart, his lungs, his liver and come out his back'].) The same principle extends to the unique pain experienced by family members who are left to grieve the murder victim's death and to experience the loss of that person in daily life. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 568 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182] [prosecutor encouraged jurors to empathize with both the murder victim, who was a wife and mother, and with the family who survived her].) We do not necessarily condone the particular tactic used by the prosecutor here. But, under relevant law, no constitutional error or prosecutorial misconduct occurred. The prosecutor made clear that the words and thoughts attributed to Garrett and Brinlee had not actually been written or uttered by them. Instead, the letters presented orally in court were obviously being used as a rhetorical device to highlight what the children could write about the capital crime. Moreover, the substantive point being illustrated was permissible under the victim impact principles set forth above. Jurors were simply asked to draw reasonable inferences from evidence of the family's close relationship and favorite activities about the long-term effects of Joseph's murder on his children. Indeed, having threatened Brinlee in her bassinet and peered into Garrett's bedroom, defendant knew about both children when he fatally shot their father and tried to kill their mother. The letters, which were not particularly artful, contained no information that could not otherwise have been properly conveyed to the jury. Hence, we reject the present misconduct claim.