Opinion ID: 1059011
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Order of Firearm Offenses

Text: Winston makes a single argument for assignments of error 56 and 62. [4] He argues that although he was indicted for five counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony ... [n]one was charged as a second [or] subsequent offense. He contends that because Code § 18.2-53.1 establishes an enhanced sentence for a second or subsequent conviction under the statute, it was necessary for the jury to determine the chronological order of the offenses. He also contends that the jury verdict forms should have included some indication of the sequence of the convictions. According to Winston, without an allegation, proof, and a decision concerning the order of the offenses, there can be no second conviction. He also asserts that to administer an enhanced punishment without determining the order of the offenses violates his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, his right to be informed of the charge against him, and the requirement that the trier of fact must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is a second offender. We disagree. In Flythe v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 832, 834-35, 275 S.E.2d 582, 583-84 (1981) (citing Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 763, 250 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1979)), we held that a defendant could be convicted and sentenced for more than one charge under Code § 18.2-53.1 even though the charges arose from a single incident. We held, It is the identity of the offense and not of the act which is dispositive because if two or more persons are injured by a single criminal act, this results in a corresponding number of distinct offenses. Id. If chronology were all important, as Winston claims, Code § 18.2-53.1 would be unenforceable where offenses occurred simultaneously from a single act or where a defendant was first prosecuted for an offense that occurred after another offense. Such a result would unnecessarily impede the statute's goal of deterring violent crimes. See In re Commonwealth, 229 Va. 159, 162, 326 S.E.2d 695, 697 (1985); Ansell, 219 Va. at 763, 250 S.E.2d at 762-63. Neither the purpose nor the effect of the statute impacts Winston's constitutional rights. The trial court did not err in granting these instructions.