Opinion ID: 864344
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tallied Vote Count

Text: 2 One of the regular ballots counted in the election that was cast for Rush was not initialed on the back of the ballot. The trial court granted Ivy's counterclaim that the ballot was not initialed as required by § 23-15-541. Rush does not raise this on appeal. 3 ¶9. While much of Rush's argument on appeal is both convoluted and at times without sufficient information to support his claims, the primary focus of Rush's appeal is (1) how Miss. Code Ann. §§ 2315-14 & 23-15-13 (Rev. 2001) should be interpreted, construed, and applied, and (2) the trial court's ruling in favor of Ivy's motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on this point.3 Miss. Code Ann. §§ 23-15-14 and 23-15-13 will be fully addressed in Issue II, however, the remaining argument raised by Rush in this assignment of error concerns whether the votes were tallied correctly. Specifically, Rush contends that the total number of ballots shown on the June 5, 2001, official recapitulation (tally) sheets was incorrect and the correct vote should have been Rush 77, Ivy 75. ¶10. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ivy, stating in its findings of fact and conclusions of law: The [f]irst [c]ause of [a]ction in the [c]omplaint alleges that the total number of ballots shown on the June 5, 2001, official recapitulation sheets in the [a]lderman [w]ard 3 election in the City of Belzoni is incorrect and that the correct total should be Mr. Rush 77 (sic) and Mrs. Ivy 75 (sic).4 The joint examination of the ballot box under the Court's auspices showed that all of the Tally Sheets signed by the mangers of the election tallied 75 votes for Mrs. Ivy and 74 votes for Mr. Rush. When the four Affidavit Ballots accepted by the Belzoni Election Commission (there were two for Mrs. Ivy, two for Mr. Rush) are added to these totals it equals the certified results of 77 votes for Mrs. Ivy and 76 votes for Mr. Rush. The actual counted ballots copied during the joint examination also total the same as the certified results, including the regular ballots actually counted during the election (63 votes for Mrs. Ivy and 74 votes for Mr. Rush), the 12 absentee ballots counted for Mrs. Ivy; and the four counted affidavit ballots (two Mrs. Ivy and two for Mr. Rush). Mrs. Ivy is entitled to summary judgment that the actual ballots counted and certified as the results of the Ward 3 election by the Belzoni Election Commission total 77 votes for Mrs. Ivy and 76 votes for Mr. Rush. 3 Both briefs at times contain errors, misstatements and incorrect figures which can be unintentionally misleading. However, the record speaks for itself. 4 The record should reflect Rush 76 and Ivy 77. 4 ¶11. Ivy filed a counterclaim that one of the ballots counted for Rush should not have been counted because it was not initialed as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-541 (Rev. 2001). The trial court granted summary judgment for Ivy on her counterclaim determining that the actual results of the alderman ward 3 election held on June 5, 2001, were 77 votes for Ivy, 75 votes for Rush. The trial court entered its final judgment dismissing Rush's complaint with prejudice and finding that the results of the election were 77 votes for Ivy and 75 votes for Rush. ¶12. Summary judgment is an appropriate procedural device capable of being utilized in election disputes. Lewis v. Griffith, 664 So.2d 177, 187-88 (Miss. 1995); Stringer v. Lucas, 608 So.2d 1351, 1358 (Miss. 1992). Furthermore, Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-951 (Rev. 2001) does not mandate that all issues in an election contest must be tried by a jury. Id. This Court applies a de novo standard of review on appeal from a grant of summary judgment by the trial court. Jenkins v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 794 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 2001); Russell v. Orr, 700 So.2d 619, 622 (Miss. 1997); Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So.2d 60, 61 (Miss. 1997); Northern Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So.2d 1278, 1281 (Miss. 1995). Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted by a court if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is not genuine issues as to any material fact.... M.R.C.P. 56(c). ¶13. The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact in existence, while the non-moving party should be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss. 1990). See also Heigle v. Heigle, 771 So.2d 341, 345 (Miss. 2000). If, in this view, there is no genuine issues of material fact and, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should forthwith be entered in his favor. Otherwise, 5 the motion should be denied. Williamson v. Keith, 786 So.2d 390, 393 (Miss. 2001). Issues of fact sufficient to require denial of a motion for summary judgment obviously are present where one party swears to one version of the matter in issue and another says the opposite. Tucker, 558 So.2d at 872. Of importance here is the language of the rule authorizing summary judgment 'where there is no genuine issue of material fact.' The presence of fact issues in the record does not per se entitle a party to avoid summary judgment. The court must be convinced that the factual issue is a material one, one that matters in an outcome determinative sense...the existence of a hundred contested issues of fact will not thwart summary judgment where there is not genuine dispute regarding the material issues of fact. Simmons v. Thompson Mach. of Miss., Inc., 631 So.2d 798, 801 (Miss. 1994) (citing Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 252 (Miss. 1985)). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Russell, 700 So.2d at 622; Richmond, 692 So.2d at 61; Northern Elec. Co., 660 So.2d at 1281; Simmons, 631 So.2d at 802; Tucker, 558 So.2d at 872. ¶14. To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party must establish a genuine issue of material fact within the means allowable under the Rule. Richmond, 692 So.2d at 61 (citing Lyle v. Mladinich, 584 So.2d 397, 398 (Miss. 1991)). If any triable issues of fact exist, the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed. Otherwise, the decision is affirmed. Richmond, 692 So.2d at 61. ¶15. The trial court granted summary judgment reasoning that the actual ballots counted and certified by the BEC for ward 3 were 77 votes for Ivy and 76 votes for Rush. However, the trial court, in its finding of facts and conclusions of law, subsequently granted Ivy summary judgment upholding her counterclaim. Based on the counterclaim that one of the ballots cast for Rush was not initialed as required by Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-541, the trial court determined the results to be 77 votes for Ivy and 75 votes for Rush. This Court finds that the trial court's finding of summary judgment concerning how the votes were tallied is without merit. 6