Opinion ID: 2804429
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the claim and relief sought

Text: The nature of the claim and the type of relief requested are strong indicators of primary purpose. We look to statements made in the pleadings and proceedings about the rationale for the lawsuit,35 to whether the relief requested was equitable or legal,36 and 34 (...continued) Dep’t of Law); see also Minutes, House Fin. Comm. Hearing on C.S.H.B. 145 (FIN), 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (May 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Therriault, bill’s sponsor, quotation from minutes) (explaining that constitutional claimants were “a class of litigants recognized by the court as receiving special provisions that provide for the possibility of having attorney fees covered if the case is successful . . . [and] that the bill proposed to restrict those criteria to constitutional issues”). 35 See, e.g., Leisnoi, Inc. v. Stratman, Mem. Op. & J. No. 1369, 2010 WL 3719166, at  (Alaska Sept. 22, 2010) (citing statements made in previous administrative hearings and evidence of the claimant’s prior behavior to conclude claimant had an economic incentive); Musser v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., Mem. Op. & J. No. 1307, 2008 WL 1914375, at  (Alaska Apr. 30, 2008) (examining “main action” in complaint); Puddicombe v. Fitzgerald, Mem. Op. & J. No. 930, 1999 WL 33958803, at  (Alaska Aug. 25, 1999) (examining affirmative defenses to conclude “motivation in this case was in good measure due to [economic incentives]”). 36 Compare City of Kotzebue v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 166 P.3d 37, 47 (Alaska (continued...) -19- 7012 to the amount of money in controversy,37 to determine whether the litigant had sufficient economic incentive to bring the claim. But the type of relief sought is not always conclusive: “Economic interest need not take the form of damages,”38 and requesting injunctive relief does not guarantee a lack of economic motivation.39 We also have stated 36 (...continued) 2007) (determining that party seeking reimbursement for costs had sufficient economic incentive), with Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass’n v. State, 900 P.2d 1191, 1199 (Alaska 1995) (“The fact that [claimants] sought only equitable relief, rather than damages, also indicates that economic motivation was not a significant factor in bringing this case.”); see also Patterson v. State, Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, Mem. Op. & J. No. 989, 2000 WL 34545820, at  (Alaska Aug. 30, 2000) (noting complaint was amended to add a request for damages and finding an economic incentive); Ninilchik Traditional Council v. Noah, 928 P.2d 1206, 1219 (Alaska 1996) (“[T]he parties here have made no claim for monetary damages, indicating that economic motivation was not a significant factor in bringing the claim.”). 37 See Bruner v. Petersen, 944 P.2d 43, 50 (Alaska 1997) (“[T]he economic incentive of $10,000 in wages, coupled with the request for punitive damages for an additional $10,000, demonstrates a sufficient economic incentive to bring the suit regardless of the possible public interest elements of his claim . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Murphy v. City of Wrangell, 763 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1988) (finding sufficient economic incentive after considering possible award of punitive damages and the fact the case was filed in superior court seeking more than $25,000 in total damages). 38 Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. State, 931 P.2d 391, 403 (Alaska 1997). 39 See, e.g., Kachemak Bay Watch, Inc. v. Noah, 935 P.2d 816, 827-28 (Alaska 1997). In Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass’n we suggested that a request only for injunctive relief indicated a lack of economic incentive. 900 P.2d at 1199. But we later clarified that the type of relief by itself is not dispositive — in Fairbanks North Star Borough v. Interior Cabaret, Hotel, Restaurant & Retailer’s Ass’n, we stressed that “the lack of potential for a monetary recovery, while relevant, is not conclusive.” 137 P.3d 289, 292 (Alaska 2006) (footnote omitted) (citing Eyak Traditional Elders Council v. Sherstone, Inc., 904 P.2d 420, 426 (Alaska 1995); Kodiak Seafood Processors Ass’n, (continued...) -20- 7012 that courts must “ ‘look to the facts of the case to determine the litigant’s primary motivation for filing the suit.’ ”40 The facts of the case, including the pleadings, relief requested, standing declarations, and types of arguments made during the proceedings inform the determination of primary purpose.41 In Gwich’in Steering Committee v. State, Office of the Governor we examined the type of relief requested and determined that the claimant did not have sufficient economic incentive to bring its claim.42 In that case a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting caribou filed suit seeking public records about state lobbying activities for drilling operations in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.43 After the organization lost its suit, the superior court ordered it to pay attorney’s fees to the State.44 We reversed that order, concluding that the organization did not have sufficient economic incentive to litigate because the relief requested — disclosure of records under the Public Records Act — “sought access to information, not money or other economic advantage,”and because the organization’s economic interest in protecting caribou for 39 (...continued) 900 P.2d at 1199). 40 O’Callaghan v. State, 920 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Eyak Traditional Elders Council, 904 P.2d at 426). 41 Standing declarations can be indicative of the claimant’s motivations, but standing based on economic harm is “not synonymous with economic incentive.” Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1030 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Oceanview Homeowners Ass’n v. Quadrant Constr. & Eng’g, 680 P.2d 793, 799 n.3 (Alaska 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted. 42 10 P.3d 572, 584-85 (Alaska 2000). 43 Id. at 576-77. 44 Id. at 584. -21- 7012 subsistence uses was not substantial.45 In McCormick v. Smith we similarly relied on the type of relief requested to conclude that a claimant lacked sufficient economic incentive to bring a claim.46 In McCormick an individual prevailed in the superior court on her challenge to a recall petition to remove her from a school board, requesting an injunction against the recall election.47 We reversed and ordered the individual to pay the prevailing appellant’s attorney’s fees on appeal.48 We vacated that order on rehearing, concluding that the individual was entitled to public interest litigant status because she did not have a sufficient economic incentive to bring her claim: [The individual] sought only to enjoin the recall election, not to recover money damages. Moreover, according to [the individual], she serves on the school board “without compensation.” Thus, prevention of her recall election was not intended to protect a paycheck. Accordingly, [the individual] appears to meet the fourth prong of the [public interest litigant] test.[49]