Opinion ID: 498211
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: coverdell's claim for damages against langston

Text: 58
59 Coverdell's Amended and Supplemental Complaint purported to allege claims against Langston under the second clause of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(2) (conspiracy for purpose of impeding due course of justice in any state, with intent to deny equal protection of the laws) and under the first clause of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) (conspiracy to deny equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities). Both such clauses require allegation and proof of racial or class-based invidious discrimination. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1028-30 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc). Accordingly, Coverdell alleged that Langston's actions were based on [her] belief that the plaintiff Alice Coverdell was of an inferior intellectual capacity and of an inferior personality and otherwise mentally handicapped. 60 Langston filed a motion pursuant to both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 of the Fed.R.Civ.P., arguing first that Alice Coverdell has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and secondly that if a claim has been stated ... there is no evidence available to support the claim. The district court granted Langston's motion for summary judgment, finding no issue of fact that plaintiff was subjected to class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. No evidentiary facts are presented to show a conspiracy to violate her right to equal protection of the laws because she is mentally retarded. 61 On this appeal, Coverdell contends that the granting of summary judgment in favor of Langston was erroneous because the pleadings show substantial issues of all material facts, no depositions, interrogatories, or admissions are on file, and [Langston] has filed no supporting affidavit. Langston responds that a motion for summary judgment need not be accompanied by affidavits and that summary judgment was properly granted because Coverdell failed to produce any evidence to support her allegation of unlawful conspiracy.
62 As discussed above, a grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. 63
64 Rule 56(b) provides that a defendant may move for summary judgment with or without supporting affidavits. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b). Likewise, Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Langston's failure to provide an affidavit, therefore, is not fatal to her motion for summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, ---, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 65 Coverdell argued below, and argues on this appeal, that Langston's motion for summary judgment is not supported by sufficient sworn factual allegations for her to prevail on her motion. Coverdell's position appears to be that Langston's motion was not properly supported, therefore Coverdell was under no obligation to produce any evidence of her own in response to the motion. 66 In Celotex, the Supreme Court rejected the very position now urged by Coverdell. There, plaintiff alleged the wrongful death of her husband resulting from exposure to asbestos products manufactured by defendant Celotex. Celotex moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had  'failed to produce evidence that any [Celotex] product ... was the proximate cause of the injuries alleged....'  106 S.Ct. at 2551 (quoting Celotex's motion for summary judgment). In response to Celotex's motion, plaintiff produced three documents that she claimed created a genuine factual dispute about whether decedent had ever been exposed to Celotex products. Celotex replied that the three documents were inadmissible hearsay and, thus, could not be considered in opposition to the summary judgment motion. 67 The district court, apparently agreeing that plaintiff's evidence could not be considered, granted summary judgment in favor of Celotex. A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed, ruling that the summary judgment motion had been fatally defective because [i]t advanced only the naked allegation that the plaintiff had not come forward in discovery with evidence to support her allegations.... Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 185 (D.C. Cir.1985), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (emphasis in original). See id. at 185 n. 12 (Celotex came forward literally with nothing save for pointing to perceived short falls in the plaintiff's case.). Therefore, reasoned the majority, Celotex's motion should have been denied for being improperly supported; plaintiff had no obligation to come forward with any evidence, admissible or otherwise, in response to the defective motion. Id. at 185. 68 In dissent, Judge Bork criticized the majority for supposing that a party seeking summary judgment must always make an affirmative evidentiary showing, even in cases where there is not a triable, factual dispute. Id. at 188 (Bork, J., dissenting). The judge further noted that because a district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte whenever it concludes that required evidence cannot be produced, it necessarily follows that a defendant may obtain summary judgment when it brings that situation to the court's attention. Id. at 189 (Bork, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). 69 The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, essentially adopting Judge Bork's dissenting view. The Court held that in cases where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the 'pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.'  Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (emphasis added). Such a motion is properly supported, within the meaning of Rule 56(e). The Court found no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. (emphasis in original); accord Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d 977, 980 (9th Cir.1987). The Court noted that the moving party, of course, bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.... Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. But with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, ... the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'--that is, pointing out to the District Court--that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 2554. Once the moving party shows the absence of evidence, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to designate  'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'  Id. at 2553 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). 70 The nonmoving party may not rely merely on the unsupported or conclusory allegations of her pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, ---, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-90, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) (plaintiff cannot defeat properly supported summary judgment motion of defendant charged with conspiracy without offering any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint). If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of fact with respect to the disputed element of the party's case, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; California Architectural Bldg. Prod., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.1987). 71 Although summary judgment is often questionable in civil rights actions where the defendant's motive and intent are involved, see 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2732.2 at 349-51 (1983), the cases discussed above, and many others, establish that even in a civil rights action, plaintiff may not survive a motion for summary judgment without offering some evidence in support of her claim. See, e.g., Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to resist summary judgment in Title VII case), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir.1985) ([A]lthough summary judgment is usually not proper in a case involving a weighing of conflicting questions of motive and intent, summary judgment is proper where the plaintiff presents no indications of motive and intent supportive of his position.); Mitchel v. General Electric Co., 689 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (dictum) (plaintiff in Title VII action may not rely on unsubstantiated and conclusory allegations to resist defendant's summary judgment motion); Melson v. Kroger Co., 578 F.Supp. 691, 699 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (summary judgment for defendant proper where [p]laintiffs have simply not advanced or referred to any facts in the record which support their Sec. 1981 claims). 72 As the moving party, Langston discharged her burden by pointing out to the district court the absence of any evidence that Langston's actions had been motivated by racial or other class-based animus. The burden then shifted to Coverdell to make a showing that there was a genuine issue of fact concerning the motivation underlying Langston's conduct. To withstand Langston's motion, Coverdell was obliged to show that there were genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. 73 Coverdell failed to come forward with any evidence to raise a genuine issue concerning Langston's motivation. Coverdell filed no affidavit of her own, took no depositions, and propounded no interrogatories or requests for admissions. Consequently, the only evidence before the district court was that provided by DSHS and McLaughlin. That evidence provides no support for Coverdell's allegation that Langston acted from a belief that Coverdell was mentally handicapped and inferior to Langston, or from any other class-based or invidiously discriminatory animus. 74 Because Coverdell failed to bear her burden of showing that the issue of Langston's animus, an essential element of Coverdell's case, could reasonably be resolved in Coverdell's favor, the granting of summary judgment in favor of Langston was proper.