Opinion ID: 2283862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the bar of double jeopardy prevent a trial and conviction for a state offense following a federal conviction of the same or virtually the same offense?

Text: Defendants argue that after conviction of a federal crime, the Fifth Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars a subsequent state indictment and trial for the commission of a crime, arising out of the same act or transaction. Title 18, U.S.C.A. § 2113(d) reads: Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both. N.J.S. 2 A :151-56 reads: Any person who attempts to use unlawfully against another, or who carries or possesses with intent to use unlawfully against another, any instrument or weapon enumerated in section 2A:151-5 of this Title, or any other dangerous or deadly instrument or weapon, is guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or by imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both. It is therefore seen, although not verbatim identical, the two statutes for violation of which defendants were indicted, are most similar. Additionally, the same state of facts here gave rise to both the federal and state indictments and convictions. The converse of the present question, i.e., whether a federal prosecution subsequent to a state prosecution was inhibited by the Fifth Amendment was presented to the Supreme Court in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922). A unanimous court there held: We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory. Each may, without interference by the other, enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the amendment. Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. In Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed. 2 d 729 (1959), the court again had before it a state prosecution followed by a federal prosecution and again sustained the federal constitutionality of such a proceeding. The companion case of Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed. 2 d 684 (1959) held that a factual complex the reverse of Lanza, supra, and Abbate, supra, and identical with the facts sub judice, i.e., a state prosecution following a federal prosecution, did not violate the United States Constitution. A contrary rule could result in an unseemly race between the federal and state authorities to obtain early jurisdiction. We are aware of the problem of ideological differences between the federal government and some of the states in determining the gravity of various criminal offenses. A prohibition against a second trial and indictment could well eventuate in a frustration of either the national or state policy and law enforcement. Nor do we ignore the effect of a second sentence. Realistically, a judge should and undoubtedly would consider the first sentence in imposing a second. We have no doubt that the impact of an additional sentence will be weighted by the court in imposing an additional penalty and that due allowance will be made for the first sentence. We conclude that the state sentences here imposed are not inhibited by the United States Constitution. Defendants argue additionally that the federal-state order or prosecution violates that portion of Art. 1, par. 11 of the N.J. Constitution which reads, No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense. In State v. Cioffe, 128 N.J.L. 342 ( Sup. Ct. 1942), affirmed 130 N.J.L. 160 ( E. & A. 1943). The court held: It is undisputed that the trial in the Federal Court was for the same offense and it is contended that having been acquitted in that tribunal the defendants could not be put to double jeopardy and tried again in a state court. This contention is not sound. The offense in question at once violated the Federal Criminal Code in that the bank whose money was stolen was a National bank; and it also offended against the Crimes Act of this state. Two different sovereignties were offended. The acquittal or conviction in the criminal tribunal of one sovereignty creates no barrier to prosecution by the other for a crime arising out of the same act. Cf. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 47 S.Ct. 103, 71 L.Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314. The peace and dignity of each government, state and national, was offended and each is competent independently to deal with the offenders and punish in case of conviction. See, also, 12 U.S.C.A. § 588d. (at pp. 347-348). We find no reason to supersede or change the above conclusion. Nor are we singular in respect to this conclusion. As stated in Bartkus, supra, Of the twenty-eight States which have considered the validity of successive state and federal prosecutions as against a challenge of violation of either a state constitutional double-jeopardy provision or a common-law evidentiary rule of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, twenty-seven have refused to rule that the second prosecution was or would be barred. 359 U.S. at 134, 79 S.Ct. at 684, 3 L.Ed. 2 d at 693. Defendants have in a pro se brief raised various other grounds for reversal. We find no merit in any such grounds. Affirmed. For affirmance  Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS, FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN  7. For reversal  None.