Opinion ID: 2709595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones’s assistance to the government

Text: Jones begins by arguing that the district court was wrong to conclude that it was not authorized to reflect his assistance to the government in the sentence without a § 5K1.1 motion from the prosecutor. He is right. Jones was not asking for a sentence below the applicable statutory minimum, so the court was free to consider his assistance, with or without a motion, when applying the § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); United States v. Leiskunas, 656 F.3d 732, 737 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 453 (7th Cir. 2009). The government’s only response is that the district judge may have meant to convey that the absence of a motion kept Jones from being rewarded directly under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for his cooperation. In the abstract, the latter proposition is correct. See id. § 1B1.1(b),(c); United States v. Guyton, 636 F.3d 316, 319 n.2 (7th Cir. 2011). The government also speculates that the judge might have been considering Jones’s assistance when he raised the possibility of credit for acceptance of responsibility. What matters, however, is not speculation but what the transcript reveals. The