Opinion ID: 546977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unauthorized Interception of Oral Communications.

Text: 28 Plaintiff invokes the private right of action contained in Sec. 2520 of the anti-wiretapping statute, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2510 et seq. Section 2520 provides in pertinent part: 29 [A]ny person whose wire, oral or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate. 30 In order to recover under Sec. 2520, plaintiff must show that defendants violated Sec. 2511, which prohibits the interception, disclosure, or use of any wire or electronic communication. 3 Walker alleges only interception of communications. He does not allege disclosure or use of any communications. 4 As defined by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(4),  'intercept' means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device. Walker alleges only the interception of his oral communications; he does not allege a violation with respect to wire or electronic communications. As defined by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510(2),  'oral communication' means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.... 31 Thus, in order for Walker's claim to survive summary judgment, the district court would have had to find that a question of material fact remained with respect to the following three elements: 1) whether Walker's communications were indeed intercepted by Darby, Day, and Robinson through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device; 2) whether Walker had an expectation that his oral communications were not subject to interception; and 3) whether, if Walker had such an expectation, the expectation was justified under the circumstances. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2510. 32 The district court believed that in order to raise a question of material fact regarding the first element--the actual interception of conversations--Walker would need to allege the specific contents of conversations. The district court came to this conclusion by way of interpretation of a phrase in Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.1976). The Broadway court, in holding that the plaintiff had failed to make out a claim under Sec. 2520, wrote, appellants must show that the oral communications were in fact intercepted, disclosed, or used by defendants. 530 F.2d at 659 (emphasis added). The plaintiff had failed to do this, the court found, where he had failed to present any evidence whatsoever linking either of the two defendants to the recording device discovered in his home. While the district court here read the use of in fact to require proof of contents, the Broadway court did not require the plaintiff to prove the specific contents of the intercepted conversations. 33 Indeed, a Georgia district court case later cited favorably in Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785 (11th Cir.1987), rejected the argument that the phrase in fact as used in Broadway required proof of the specific contents of intercepted conversations. 5 In Awbrey v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 505 F.Supp. 604 (N.D.Ga.1980), defendants relied on Broadway 's use of in fact to argue that no action should lie under Sec. 2520 where plaintiff was unable to allege interception of specific conversations by offering proof of the conversations' dates and contents. In rejecting that argument, the Awbrey court wrote: 34 [D]efendant's argument flies in the face of the statute and the nature of the tort.... the fact that most of the plaintiffs have no personal, first-hand knowledge that any particular phone call was tapped is not remarkable.... The intentional tort of wiretapping created by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520 is obviously one which by its very nature is unknown to the plaintiff. 505 F.Supp. at 606-607. 35 This circuit adopted the Awbrey reasoning in Scutieri, when it held that plaintiffs could establish a wiretapping claim with circumstantial evidence. Citing Awbrey, the Scutieri court held that Direct evidence may not have been available based on the stealthiness of the invasion. The success of the wiretap ultimately depends on secrecy and concealment. 808 F.2d at 790. See also Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 584 (11th Cir.1983) (criminal violation of anti-wiretap statute requires only interception, not interception of particular material). 36 Thus, we find that appellant can raise a question of fact regarding appellees' actual interception of his conversations without proving the contents of specific conversations allegedly intercepted. Having resolved this, we find that the district court erred in finding that no question of fact remained for trial regarding the interception of oral communications in violation of Sec. 2511. Given the facts detailed above, there was clearly evidence sufficient to raise a question of material fact regarding whether Darby, Day and Robinson had participated in installing an intercom or other listening device and whether they had in fact intercepted Walker's communications. 6 37 The other two elements required to make out a Sec. 2520 claim can be treated together. In order to survive summary judgment, Walker would have had to raise a question of fact for trial regarding whether he expected his conversations to be free from interception, and whether, if he had this expectation, it was justified by the circumstances. These two elements may be viewed as subjective and objective prongs of the same inquiry. 38 We note as an initial matter that we do not need to determine whether Walker had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his case area in the Florence Post Office. 7 The statute requires us to determine whether he had a subjective expectation that his conversations were free from interception, and whether that expectation was objectively reasonable. 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2510(2), 2520. 39 Other courts have found that an action for violation of the anti-wiretap statute may be maintained even in the absence of an expectation of privacy as generally understood in the Fourth Amendment search and seizure context. Boddie v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 731 F.2d 333, 338-39 and n. 5 (6th Cir.1984); Bianco v. American Broadcasting Companies, 470 F.Supp. 182, 185 (N.D.Ill.1979) (... there may be some circumstances where a person does not have an expectation of total privacy, but still would be protected by the statute because he was not aware of the specific nature of another's invasion of his privacy.) These courts distinguish between an expectation of privacy and the expectation of noninterception that is discussed in Sec. 2510(2). We agree that there is a difference between a public employee having a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal conversations taking place in the workplace 8 and having a reasonable expectation that those conversations will not be intercepted by a device which allows them to be overheard inside an office in another area of the building. 40 Therefore, the issue is whether a question of fact remained for trial regarding whether Jessie Walker had a subjective expectation that conversations taking place near his case were free from interception. The only evidence in the record on this point is an affidavit submitted to the district court by Walker in opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment. In the affidavit, Walker states: 41 I never gave permission to Kenneth Day, Thomas Darby or Hugh Robinson to intercept or monitor any of my conversations that took place while I was at my work station in the post office. That during the time of the events alleged in my lawsuit, I had numerous private and personal conversations with various other employees.... R1-42. 42 The district court had no other evidence before it contradicting this statement by Walker. Therefore, there was a question of fact for trial concerning the subjective prong of the inquiry. 43 The district court did not discuss whether any subjective expectation that Walker's oral communications would be free from interception was objectively justified under the circumstances. Again, we must distinguish this inquiry from the question of whether Walker had an objectively reasonable expectation that conversations taking place near his case would be overheard. The case was located in an area shared with other workers. But while Walker might have expected conversations uttered in a normal tone of voice to be overheard by those standing nearby, it is highly unlikely that he would have expected his conversations to be electronically intercepted and monitored in an office in another part of the building. Given that we must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, we find that a question of fact remained for trial on this point. 44 The record shows that questions of fact remained for trial on the three elements required to make out a claim of violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2520. We therefore REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.