Opinion ID: 4468130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Proved Unreasonable Delay

Text: ¶18 Whether a delay is reasonable is case specific; we look at the totality of circumstances. State ex rel. McMillian v. Dickey, 132 Wis. 2d 266, 281, 392 N.W.2d 453 (Ct. App. 1986) (What is reasonable varies from case to case and involves the totality of the circumstances.), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman, 290 Wis. 2d 352; see also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 131 (Whether a party's delay is unreasonable depends on the circumstances of the particular case.). ¶19 In rendering its conclusion, the court of appeals zeroed in on two factual findings. First, Wren was aware no appeal had been filed by 2010 or 2011. And during the intervening time period, he filed four separate pro se motions, none of which raised the issue presented in this habeas petition. The court of appeals held that the six-year delay from the time he knew no appeal had been filed——a full ten years after the deadline to seek postconviction relief——was unreasonably long. Wren concedes the second element, i.e., the State lacked 11 knowledge that he would be asserting the habeas claim. 10 No. 2017AP880-W ¶20 As an initial matter, unreasonable delay in laches is based not on what litigants know, but what they might have known with the exercise of reasonable diligence. This underlying constructive knowledge requirement arises from the general rule that ignorance of one's legal rights is not a reasonable excuse in a laches case. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 138.12 Where the question of laches is in issue, the plaintiff is chargeable with such knowledge as he might have obtained upon inquiry, provided the facts already known by him were such as to put a man of ordinary prudence upon inquiry. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 93 Wis. 153, 174, 66 N.W. 518 (1896) (citations omitted). To be sure, what we expect will vary from case to case and litigant to litigant. But the expectation of reasonable diligence is firm nonetheless.13 ¶21 Thus, the question is when Wren either knew or should have known he had a potential claim. We agree with the court of appeals that the delay clock started running no later than 2010 or 2011 when Wren, by his own admission, learned no appeal had been filed and had long since heard nothing from his attorney. See also Jones v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 531, 533 12 (1984) (Where laches is raised, knowledge of the law is imputed to all plaintiffs. Consequently, professed ignorance of one's legal rights does not justify delay in filing suit.). See also 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 139 (The correct 13 inquiry in determining whether a claimant's conduct resulted in a want of due diligence requires focus not upon what the plaintiff knows, but what he or she might have known, by the use of the means of information within his or her reach, as the law requires a party to discover those facts that were discoverable through the exercise of reasonable diligence.). 11 No. 2017AP880-W After obtaining this knowledge, Wren researched and leveraged his available resources to craft four separate pro se motions relating to his conviction and sentence——none even hinting at the claims raised before us.14 After four attempts to seek various kinds of other postconviction relief, we agree with the court of appeals that a habeas petition coming ten years after his conviction and six years after he knew his attorney didn't file the appeal he was allegedly promised is a delay without good reason. ¶22 Wren raises two principal objections in response. First, he didn't know he could make such a claim and didn't know how to do so; and when he did discover this possible claim, he timely brought it within three to four months. Second, Wren proffers that any delay is actually the State's fault, and that's why he was supposed to have counsel in the first place. ¶23 Wren's first objection, echoed by the dissent, is really an effort to except Wren from the constructive knowledge requirement we apply to all other litigants. The not-so-silent argument being made is that Wren is less capable than others and should be held to a lower standard. However, we regularly 14 His first two motions dealt with the DNA surcharge and restitution award. It was not until his third motion in 2015 that he turned his attention to his sentence, the issue he states he would like to challenge if his direct appeal rights are reinstated. But even his 2016 motion for sentence modification was based on the circuit court's purported reliance on an improper fact——again, nothing suggesting a broader challenge to his conviction or sentence, or to his trial counsel's effectiveness. 12 No. 2017AP880-W require legally untrained litigants to assert their rights in a timely manner.15 Nothing prevented Wren from contacting another attorney. Nothing prevented Wren from researching available options to ensure he took advantage of every possible legal argument he could make. It surely cannot be that 20-year-olds (Wren's approximate age when he found out no appeal was forthcoming) are deemed incompetent. And while the PSI noted Wren had a second grade reading level at the time of sentencing, that detail alone does not mean he cannot research, consult others, and find out what needs to be done. In fact, Wren did just this when he filed four pro se motions regarding other matters prior to filing his habeas petition. This reflects someone who is more than capable of being resourceful.16 ¶24 Wren's paramount objection seems to be that as a pro se litigant whose postconviction attorney abandoned him, any delay is the State's fault, not his. Incorrect. As we explain See infra, ¶25. 15 Courts have long recognized that a violation of constitutional rights——and ineffective assistance of counsel is a violation of the Sixth Amendment——must be timely asserted even in criminal cases. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944) (No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.). For example, Wren noted in his habeas petition that his 16 family discovered Kostich's disciplinary history. Moreover, the circuit court made no findings suggesting that Wren had the kind of severe mental limitations that might call for even broader latitude than we normally give pro se litigants. 13 No. 2017AP880-W below, we have long required pro se litigants, just like those with an attorney, to act reasonably in defense of their rights. ¶25 Pro se litigants are generally granted a degree of leeway in recognition of the fact that they are ordinarily unfamiliar with the procedural rules and substantive law that might govern their appeal. Rutherford v. LIRC, 2008 WI App 66, ¶27, 309 Wis. 2d 498, 752 N.W.2d 897. But by definition, a degree of leeway means the additional leniency will run out at some point. Thus, for example, while we construe pro se petitions, motions, and briefs to make the most intelligible argument we can discern, we do not impute to pro se litigants the best argument they could have, but did not, make.17 And while pro se litigants are given leeway in the style of a motion, we ordinarily hold them to strict deadlines, whether they know about them or not.18 In other words, we generally do not hold pro se litigants only to deadlines or arguments that See State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶69, 360 17 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668 (Although we liberally construe filings by pro se litigants, . . . there is a limit to our lenience. A reviewing court might avert its eyes from the flaws on the peripheries, but it will not ignore obvious insufficiencies at the center of a motion. (internal citation omitted)). See Waushara County v. Graf, 166 Wis. 2d 442, 452, 480 18 N.W.2d 16 (1992) (Pro se appellants must satisfy all procedural requirements, unless those requirements are waived by the court. They are bound by the same rules that apply to attorneys on appeal. The right to self-representation is '[not] a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.' (quoting Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975))). 14 No. 2017AP880-W they know; we hold them to deadlines and arguments we expect them to discover with reasonable diligence. This means that once Wren no longer had a lawyer representing him, he was not free to do nothing to address the claims he raised in his habeas petition. Rather, he had an independent obligation to act——the same standard we apply to all pro se litigants. ¶26 The postconviction relief process is instructive on this point. Following a direct appeal, defendants seeking to attack their criminal convictions may do so through a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (2017-18).19 But this form of relief comes with a significant restriction. Under subsection (4), unless a sufficient reason is given, any legal issues that could have been raised in a prior motion may not be brought in a subsequent § 974.06 motion. § 974.06(4). And in 1994, this court made clear that if the issue could have been raised on direct appeal, the litigant has lost the opportunity to bring it under § 974.06. State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994).20 19All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version. 20This is no outlier; State v. Escalona-Naranjo has been cited thousands of times in Wisconsin courts. 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). 15 No. 2017AP880-W ¶27 The vast majority of motions under Wis. Stat. § 974.06 are filed by pro se litigants.21 The statute's strictures are not ignored or relaxed for pro se litigants; we apply the same rules to everyone. This means that even a potentially meritorious constitutional claim on a petitioner's third § 974.06 motion——a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, for example——is a nonstarter if it could have been brought on direct appeal or in the prior § 974.06 motions.22 These pro se litigants, no less than Wren here, are almost uniformly untrained in the law. Yet we expect them to exercise reasonable diligence to learn all potentially meritorious claims and to raise them in their first § 974.06 motion. If they don't, the claim is procedurally barred, whatever its merits may be.23 21This is in large part because there is no constitutional right to counsel on a collateral attack. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions, . . . and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further. (internal citation omitted)). 22See, e.g., Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 186 ([Escalona-Naranjo] has not alleged a sufficient reason as to why his allegation of ineffective assistance of trial counsel could not have been raised when he filed his [Wis. Stat. §] 974.02 motion for a new trial.); Romero-Georgana, 360 Wis. 2d 522, ¶5 ([T]he defendant has not offered a sufficient reason in his third postconviction motion for failing to raise his [Wis. Stat.] § 974.06 claim [for ineffective assistance of counsel] in his second postconviction motion. . . . Consequently, the defendant's claim is barred.). 23Unless, of course, an exception in Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is triggered. 16 No. 2017AP880-W ¶28 Wren appears to believe——as does the dissent——that ineffective assistance of counsel is an exception to these principles. Yet no authority to this effect is cited, nor are we aware of any. Without question, if Wren told Kostich to file an appeal and Kostich failed to do so, that failure would establish constitutionally deficient performance, and prejudice is presumed. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744 (2019) ([P]rejudice is presumed 'when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.' (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484 (2000))). The law is clear that Wren is not liable for the faults of his constitutionally deficient counsel. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991). ¶29 But Wren and the dissent take this proposition far afield from its more modest foundations. They argue that when a defendant alleges he has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, any subsequent delay must be attributed to the State due to its failure to provide adequate counsel in the first instance. Or said another way, if his counsel failed, Wren is relieved of any further obligation to assert his own rights. Or maybe more charitably, because he didn't know what actions to take, Wren was absolved from taking any action at all.24 There are two problems with this line of argument. Wren also argues he did not know he should file a habeas 24 petition in the court of appeals until our 2014 decision in Kyles, 354 Wis. 2d 626. But this decision only clarified where such a claim should be filed. Nothing in Kyles announced 17 No. 2017AP880-W ¶30 First, it assumes Wren's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was denied. But that is the very claim Wren wishes to maintain if this habeas petition is successful. One cannot assume his ultimate claim will be successful in order to assess whether he delayed in bringing that very claim. ¶31 Second, and more to the point, Wren's argument that laches cannot apply when counsel fails to appeal as promised is without any legal support in Wisconsin. The issue before us is not, did Wren, with counsel, miss the deadline. The question is, knowing counsel did not file an appeal, did Wren himself unreasonably delay in seeking relief. If the dissent is correct that any delay of the sort alleged here is attributable to the State, then Wren could wait ten, twenty, or even thirty years to raise his claim, regardless of any impact on the State's ability to address the merits of an alleged ineffective assistance claim. This cannot be correct. Pro se litigants, including those who claim their trial counsel did not serve them by filing an appeal, still have an independent obligation to timely raise these issues with the court on their own. A pro se litigant has no license to lay in the weeds and wait to raise an issue of anything new related to the substance or timing of a petition to reinstate direct appeal rights because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The issue here is not that Wren timely raised the claim in the wrong court. It is that he untimely raised the claim. This argument is also unpersuasive in light of the fact that, notwithstanding his filing of several postconviction motions in the interim, Wren did not file his habeas petition until three years after Kyles was decided. 18 No. 2017AP880-W potential merit. Washington, 343 Wis. 2d 434, ¶23. After knowing no appeal had been filed, and after knowing his counsel had not responded to him, Wren had an obligation to exercise reasonable diligence and raise the issues in a timely manner. Wren's delay of six to seven years from the time he knew this is not attributable to the State; it is on Wren. Put simply, Wren had some time to figure this out, but not unlimited time. Here, his delay was unreasonable.