Opinion ID: 1394991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 30

Heading: Reference to Victim Impact

Text: (39) Relying on the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529], defendant argues that the prosecutor's reference to the effect that defendant's crime would have upon the family of the victim constituted misconduct and a denial of due process by injecting into the deliberation process irrelevant factors which could have been viewed by the jury as aggravating circumstances. Booth, supra, 482 U.S. 496, involving introduction at the sentencing phase of an extensive victim impact statement, is patently distinguishable. In the instant case the prosecutor in closing argument merely observed that Gary Black's family will never be the same. Kelly Chandler will never be the same. Anyone touched by this process will never be the same. Even [codefendant] Arnie and Arnie's family will never be the same because Mr. Miranda, when his robbery failed, couldn't resist the temptation to blow away human beings. Unlike Booth, where the evidence specifically detailed the impact of the crime on the victim's family, these remarks did no more than refer to the obvious and nonspecific fact that Gary Black's murder would affect his family as well as Chandler and Gonzalez. Although prosecutors in the future should refrain from commenting on the impact of the murder on the victims, the prosecutor's comments here were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 771-772.) 6. Spectator Misconduct (40a) Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in denying his request for a mistrial after a spectator made comments to the jury. During the reading of the guilt verdict, one of the members of the audience told the jury that it had convicted an innocent man. Several days later, at the beginning of the penalty trial, the same spectator made a similar remark to the effect that you convicted the wrong man. Outside the presence of the jury, the court determined the spectator was codefendant Gonzales's brother. The prosecutor expressed his concern that this man was intimidating the jury. Defense counsel stated that defendant was not involved in the spectator's comments, and he requested the jury be admonished. The court agreed it would speak to the jury the next day. At the beginning of the next day's proceedings, defendant made a motion for mistrial based on the spectator's comments to the jury. The prosecutor opposed the motion, stating, if the jury is intimidated at all it was intimidated in a negative sense in ... that [it is] ... afraid of ... voting guilty ... because of what might happen later. The court denied defendant's motion. The jury was then brought into the courtroom and it was admonished by the court as follows: I will inform you that the person who had that outburst and the person who made the remark to you yesterday was the brother of the codefendant. As far as we have been able to ascertain, Mr. Miranda had nothing to do with it and we will see that he is not around these premises any further. I think we have taken care, as I say, of seeing that you are escorted to the courtroom so you don't have any contact with anybody in the halls that might make some remarks. I assume I am correct in assuming that anything that has happened either last Friday or yesterday will in no way affect your verdict as far as this case is concerned. You can put that out of your mind and proceed with your duties as jurors in this case. (41) A spectator's misconduct constitutes ground for mistrial only if the misconduct is of such a character as to prejudice or influence the jury. ( People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 867, 883 [125 Cal. Rptr. 442].) [T]he mere fact that a spectator is guilty of some misconduct ... does not mandate the declaration of a mistrial, ... especially where the judge takes immediate action to avert possible juror prejudice. ( Ibid. ) Moreover, the trial court has wide discretion in determining whether the spectator's conduct is prejudicial and the court's determination will not be overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. ( Id. at p. 884; cf. People v. Guillebeau (1980) 107 Cal. App.3d 531, 548 [166 Cal. Rptr. 45].) (40b) The spectator misconduct here consisted of two isolated comments by codefendant's brother expressing his dissatisfaction with the guilt verdict. The jury was promptly admonished by the court. There is absolutely no indication in the record that the remarks could have possibly affected the penalty verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for mistrial. 7. Presence of Security Personnel (42) Defendant contends that the presence of security personnel in the courtroom denied him a fair and impartial penalty trial. We do not agree. At trial defendant objected to the presence of three security personnel who accompanied Saucedo when he entered the courtroom, claiming the security procedures implied defendant had threatened Saucedo. The court found the use of security officers was justified under the circumstances. Defendant later moved for a mistrial due to the presence of the security officers. The court denied the motion. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom during a criminal trial is not inherently prejudicial. ( Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560 [89 L.Ed.2d 525, 106 S.Ct. 1340].) The court explained that a jury may interpret the presence of armed guards in many different ways. [T]he presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything at all from the presence of the guards.... Our society has become inured to the presence of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for granted so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm. ( Holbrook, supra, at p. 569 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 534-535, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1346].) The Holbrook court concluded that whether a defendant has been prejudiced by the presence of security officers must be determined on a case-by-case basis. (475 U.S. at p. 569 [89 L.Ed.2d at p. 535, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1346].) We find absolutely no prejudice in the instant case. The record reflects that a large contingent of defendant's fellow gang members were present in the courtroom, particularly during the testimony of Saucedo and Torres. During this time, several jurors expressed concerns about their own safety. The court responded to these concerns by making special arrangements for the jury to enter and exit the courtroom through a private entrance. The jury may have viewed the uniformed officers as an additional security precaution to control the possible threat of violence in the courtroom. Further, the jury may have believed the added security was a routine procedure when a person in custody, such as Saucedo, takes the witness stand. It is additionally significant that Saucedo did in fact testify that he had received threats from defendant. Based on the record before us, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Saucedo to be accompanied by security officers. In fact, given the atmosphere in the courtroom, we think the court would have been derelict in its duty had it not provided such security arrangements. 8. Juror Misconduct (43a) After the jury had rendered its penalty verdict, Ramona Escareno informed defense counsel that during the trial she had several conversations with Juror Steven Cunningham. Upon receipt of this information, defendant moved for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. [34] The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion consisted of the testimony of Escareno and Juror Cunningham. Escareno testified as follows: She was a spectator throughout the nine-week trial because she was a friend of the defendants. During the trial, Cunningham approached her while they were walking down a stairway in the courthouse. She indicated she did not want to talk at the courthouse, but would meet him later at a hat shop downtown. When they subsequently met at the shop, Escareno gave Cunningham her phone number. During the trial Cunningham called Escareno five or six times. The first time he called, Cunningham asked her whether she was a friend of the defendants. He told her it did not look too good for them because it was all on film. Cunningham then asked her to go out on a date but she said no, because defendant was her boyfriend. Cunningham then called her another day, after defendant had testified. He wanted to know what the initials FRT on defendant's neck meant. Escareno told him they were the initials of a girl. Cunningham said he did not believe it, because some juror had told him it stood for Frogtown. [35] He said defendant should not have testified because he hung himself. Throughout the trial he would look at her and wink. When they first started talking, Cunningham told her he did not think it would turn out as bad as everyone thought. He also told her, prior to sentencing, there would be no death sentence. The day after the death sentence was rendered, Cunningham called her and said he was sorry to vote for the death penalty, but he did not want to delay things. He said he would call back but never did. Cunningham, aged 19, testified that Escareno first approached him and handed him a note which said he could call her. [36] He knew she was a friend of the defendants because he had seen her conversing with them during the trial. Cunningham admitted that he called Escareno several times, but denied that they ever discussed the case. He stated that they only talked about going out. Escareno told him she could not go out until the case was over. After the death penalty verdict Cunningham called Escareno, expecting to set up the date. She refused, and he never spoke with her again. Before giving his courtroom testimony, Cunningham had denied that he had any conversations with Escareno. He said he lied because he did not want to be called to court and have it get as big as it did. He was also concerned that his pregnant girlfriend would find out about it. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, stating as follows: ... I don't feel there has been any prejudice to the defendants in this case. I don't entirely believe the young lady's testimony. I don't believe her testimony with respect to the various places she met this young man. There is no question that there were telephone conversations. And the young man has admitted that. I can understand why he was reluctant to admit it earlier. But he came to court and under oath he admitted that he had telephone conversations with her, two very long ones.... And it does appear to the court to be some kind of a romantic attachment. And I'm more inclined to believe that they did not discuss the case. Defendant maintains that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. We disagree. (44) Jury misconduct raises a presumption of prejudice, and `unless the prosecution rebuts that presumption ..., the defendant is entitled to a new trial.' ( In re Stankewitz (1985) 40 Cal.3d 391, 402 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260]; People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 207 [155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91]; People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050].) The presumption of prejudice may be rebutted by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court's examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party.... ( Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 417 [185 Cal. Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171].) Whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a juror's outside communications depends upon whether the jury's impartiality has been adversely affected, whether the prosecution's burden of proof has been lightened and whether any asserted defense has been contradicted. ( People v. Martinez (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 1, 22 [147 Cal. Rptr. 208]; see, e.g., People v. Pierce, supra, at pp. 207-209; People v. Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d at pp. 157-158.) (43b) In the instant case, the trial court was in the best position to evaluate the conflicting testimony and determine the prejudicial effect of Cunningham's conduct. The court found that Escareno's testimony was not credible; that Escareno and Cunningham did not discuss defendant's case in their telephone conversations; and that Cunningham's telephone calls reflected a romantic attachment. Upon a review of the record, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusions. It appears that Cunningham's conduct involved nothing more than a 19-year-old youth flattered to receive attention from a young woman. In his testimony, he appeared to separate his responsibilities as a juror from his desire to go out with Escareno after the case was finished. The juror misconduct here substantially differs from that in Honeycutt and Pierce. In those cases, a juror had contacted an outside individual and had received information on matters pending in the case. Here, by contrast, defendant fails to point to any disclosure by Escareno which could have possibly harmed defendant's case. (45) `However strictly the decisions may lay down the rule as to the effect of misconduct of the jury that may well have prejudiced the parties, it is settled in this state that a new trial will not be granted on that ground where the misconduct was of such a trifling nature that it could not in the nature of things have been prejudicial to the moving party, and that where it appears that the fairness of the trial has been in no way affected by such impropriety, the verdict will not be disturbed. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal. App.3d 806, 821 [184 Cal. Rptr. 829].) (43c) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 9. Disproportionate Penalty (46) Relying on People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], defendant argues that the death penalty in the instant case constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) He maintains that the sentence is disproportionate to his culpability because the circumstances of the crime (its nature, the method of death, the victim's race) make it likely that he is the subject of institutional and gang attitudes and mental illness and not a cold, calculated, premeditated murderer. He further asserts that the sentence is disproportionate in view of codefendant Gonzales's sentence of life without possibility of parole. Defendant's reliance on Dillon is wholly misplaced. The facts of this case bear no similarity to the circumstances in Dillon, where an immature 17-year-old defendant, who shot and killed his victim out of fear and panic, was sentenced to life in prison despite the view of the judge and jury that the sentence was excessive in relation to his true culpability. (34 Cal.3d at p. 487.) Moreover, nothing in the record points to defendant's asserted mental illness or institutional attitudes. Nor is it disproportionate that defendant, the actual killer, was sentenced to death while his codefendant aider and abettor received a sentence of life without possibility of parole.