Opinion ID: 727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Constitutional Injuries

Text: Finally, Petitioner claims that a third trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, his right to a speedy trial, and pose a general due process violation. [8] We acknowledge that, generally, a petitioner must first exhaust the remedies available in state court by fairly presenting his federal claims to the state courts. Smith v. State of Ohio Dep't of Rehab. and Corrections, 463 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2006). We address these issues, however, to insure that our order allowing a subsequent trial does not independently violate Girts' constitutional rights in the fluid factual scenario unfolding in the state court proceeding. We focus only on activities that occurred before the date on which Girts was released from his previous conviction, November 5, 2008. See Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1176 (10th Cir.2009) (holding that barring a new trial may be necessary when the error forming the basis for the relief cannot be corrected in further proceedings and acknowledging that the classic example of such an irredeemable error . . . is . . . when a new trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment) (citations and quotations omitted). Consistent with this approach, Girts' first challenge is that a third trial would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Even Girts concedes that his case is not a typical situation in which double jeopardy applies. (Pet. Reply Br. at 25). Girts argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause should protect him from the anxiety, expense, and delay occasioned by multiple prosecutions Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 32, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977), and that he should enjoy the right. . . to have his trial completed before the first jury impaneled to try him. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673, 102 S.Ct. 2083, 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982). His strongest argument is that the prosecution intentionally committed prosecutorial misconduct in order to get a new trial. The Supreme Court has held that where the governmental conduct in question is intended to `goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial [a defendant may] raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion. Id. at 676, 102 S.Ct. 2083. However, the Court specifically held that conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching, even if sufficient to justify a mistrial on defendant's motion . . . does not bar retrial absent intent on the part of the prosecutor to subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 675-76, 102 S.Ct. 2083. The general rule, however, is that a successful post-conviction appeal is considered differently than a mistrial. [R]eprosecution for the same offense is permitted where the defendant wins a reversal on appeal of a conviction . . . [T]he crucial difference between reprosecution after appeal by the defendant and reprosecution after a sua sponte judicial mistrial declaration is that in the first situation the defendant has not been deprived of his option to go to the first jury and, perhaps, end the dispute then and there with an acquittal. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). We do not foreclose the possibility that egregious prosecutorial misconduct could in an extreme case implicate double jeopardy rights, but this case does not present such a scenario. Girts relies on this panel's previous statement that the prosecutorial misconduct indicated a strong likelihood that the prosecutor strategically made the prejudicial statements. Girts, 501 F.3d at 761. This statement, while accurately describing the prosecution's likely motives, does not rise to the necessary level for a finding by this Court sitting in habeas that Girts' constitutional rights were violated. Based on our consideration of the record, we do not believe that the prosecution's strategy was to get a mistrial declared, but was instead to improperly infect the jury in the prosecution's favor. Girts' attorney did not actually object, and was thus found ineffective, and while Girts claims a mistrial would have been granted if one had been requested, this is pure speculation. The trial court could have offered a limiting instruction rather than declare a mistrial. Girts further argues that a third trial reaches the breaking point and thus should be barred where double jeopardy concerns are implicated. Again, Petitioner cites no authority that this breaking point analysis applies to the habeas context and instead relies solely on direct appeals. See, e.g., Carsey v. United States, 392 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir.1967). We have already implicitly rejected this argument by issuing a conditional writ, and we decline to depart from that previous determination. In addition, Girts asserts that a third trial should be barred based on the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Initially, it is unclear whether this Court can properly consider this argument on appeal. In effect, Girts is challenging the legitimacy of the pending state litigation, a claim that should be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Furthermore, Girts arguably needs a certificate of appealability in order to address this issue, which he does not have. Even if we were to overlook these procedural hurdles, the claims fail on the merits. Petitioner cites no support for his contention that the fifteen-year delay caused by the improperly obtained conviction implicates his speedy trial rights in the habeas context. He bases his argument primarily on the factors for a speedy trial analysis discussed in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Under Barker, a court should consider four factors in analyzing whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated: length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182. Simply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from `presumptively prejudicial' delay. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). This threshold is typically assumed if the delay is longer than one year. Id. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686. In general, a Barker analysis can be done only after the trial, inasmuch as before trial, the Barker prejudice criterion is indeterminate at this point. Atkins v. Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 547 (6th Cir.1981). Furthermore, Girts' argument under Barker would arguably apply to almost every successful federal habeas petitioner when the writ is granted based on prosecutorial misconduct. All have suffered a substantial delay; all are prejudiced because the delay is more than one year; and almost all prosecutorial misconduct might be characterized as deliberate. No court of which we are aware has considered the Barker factors in the setting of a post-habeas trial, and Petitioner does not offer a sufficiently compelling case for this Court to do so. This is particularly true because all of these factors were known when we granted the conditional writ, which specifically allowed for retrial. Finally, Petitioner makes a cursory argument in favor of a due process claim, but nothing about this argument implicates the state's failure to retry him within the 180 day window. For support, Girts relies on a footnote in a Fourth Circuit case that found an aggregate delay could entitle a defendant to relief. United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 271 n. 18 (4th Cir.2009). He cites no case law from the habeas context where a subsequent retrial was barred based on a due process violation. Furthermore, this Court's previous decision to grant a conditional writ forecloses his claim that any third trial in his situation poses a due process violation. The conduct of Respondent subsequent to the granting of the conditional writ and before the granting of the unconditional writ does not reach the level of a due process violation. All told, Girts presents a compelling case on a factual level. While we express no opinion as to his guilt or innocence, it is appalling that Girts has spent fifteen years in prison on the basis of two constitutionally deficient convictions. It is also unfortunate that the state of Ohio did not act with all deliberate speed to retry him, instead allowing the conditional writ's 180-day period to run. Still, the law is clear that a habeas court may bar retrial only in extraordinary circumstances, and at this point, we cannot conclude that the district court erred in finding that the delay following Girts' successful habeas petition, even combined with the previous history of the improper convictions, rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances.