Opinion ID: 2814288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Williams and Ms. Bryson

Text: On October 28, 2008, Mr. Kuhne met with nurses Olivia Williams and Paula Bryson so that he could “remove certain lifting and walking restrictions that had been placed on him.” 35 During that meeting, he signed a form which stated that he was refusing an “[e]ye [c]onsult,” however, as our court has already found, the evidence in the summary judgment record could support the conclusion that “Mr. Kuhne did not refuse the consultation with the ophthalmologist on October 28, 2008, and that either Nurse Williams or Nurse Bryson (or someone else) wrote in 33 Harper v. Lawrence Cnty., Ala., 592 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1259-60). Alternatively, this element can be phrased as a causation requirement. See Mann v. Taser Int’l., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff must prove “causation between that indifference [by defendant] and the plaintiff’s injury”). 34 Kuhne, 745 F.3d at 1096. 35 Id. at 1094. 11 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 12 of 22 the words “eye consult” after Mr. Kuhne signed a blank refusal form he believed would only remove his lifting and walking restrictions.” 36 Because it is undisputed that a delay in medical treatment in October would have made a difference for Mr. Kuhne’s eventual prognosis, and it is disputed whether Mr. Kuhne declined such treatment when he met with Ms. Williams and Ms. Bryson, summary judgment is inappropriate. In response, the Defendants make two arguments. Neither succeeds. First, they argue that a reasonable jury could not believe “the assertion that [Mr. Kuhne] had to be coerced or threatened into signing a document that he wanted to sign.”37 This argument, however, fails on both the law and the facts. On the law, the relevant test is whether “it is apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the medical problem,” a separate issue altogether from the question of coercion.38 And on the facts, there is evidence of pressure in the summary judgment record, at least as to whether Mr. Kuhne wanted to decline eye care (as opposed to lifting and walking restrictions, which he admits he wanted to decline): 36 Id. at 1097. 37 Appellees’ Br. 29. 38 Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). Mr. Kuhne would also have to show that “the delay does seriously exacerbate the medical problem” and that “the delay is medically unjustified,” id. at 1259-60, neither of which are disputed in this appeal. 12 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 13 of 22 Mr. Kuhne stated in his affidavit that his encounter with Nurses Williams and Bryson lasted no more than two minutes, that no one at Jackson discussed the risks and benefits of refusing the consultation with the ophthalmologist, that he was “not given time to ask questions about his condition or his alleged decision to refuse the treatment regarding [his] eyes,” and that he was not told he was refusing treatment for his eyes. Nurse Bryson, said Mr. Kuhne, told him to sign the refusal form and get out of the office, and he did as she demanded, because a “prisoner does what he is told or else he goes to solitary confinement.”39 Second, the Defendants posit that there is no evidence that Mr. Kuhne requested medical care in November or December 2008.40 Our court has flatly rejected this proposition, concluding that there is a material dispute over the existence and content of such requests.41 The Defendants put forward no further evidence in favor of summary judgment, and consequently, they have not met their burden, with respect to Ms. Williams or Ms. Bryson, of “demonstrate[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 42 39 Kuhne, 745 F.3d at 1094-95 (quoting ECF No. 63-11, at ¶¶ 7-9). 40 Appellees’ Br. at 30-31. 41 See Kuhne, 745 F.3d at 1097 (“[T]here are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Mr. Kuhne renewed his request for medical treatment on multiple occasions thereafter. According to the affidavit he submitted, Mr. Kuhne complained in November and December of 2008 that he was going blind in his left eye but had not been to see another doctor.”). 42 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In Celotex, the Supreme Court made clear that “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. Here, with the exception of the evidence discussed above, which is either not relevant or disputed, the Defendants have not done so. 13 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 14 of 22