Opinion ID: 2222745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Compliance with Location and Design Requirements under Section 478.18, The Code.

Text: The objectors complain that the franchise approved by the commission, because of its location and design, would unreasonably encroach upon their land. They rely upon section 478.18, which provides that the transmission line shall be constructed near and parallel to the right of way of the railways of the state or along the division lines of the lands, according to the government survey thereof, wherever the same is practicable and reasonable, and so as not to interfere with the use by the public of the highways or streams of the state, nor unnecessarily interfere with the use of the lands by the occupant thereof. (Emphasis added.) The objectors contend that the commission failed to abide by its duty under this section to make certain the line did not unnecessarily interfere with the use of the land. They argue that it failed to do this in several particulars: its allowance of a 125-foot clearance from structures rather than the 100-foot statutorily required clearance constitutes a wholesale departure from land division line routing; that a 345 KV line is more intrusive than is required under these circumstances and that a 230 KV line would suffice; that the use of double-pole construction is more intrusive on land use and the commission should require a single-pole construction; that the commission's consideration in rejecting a proposed alternative route was the increased cost of construction and that this was improper under our cases; that the width of right-of-way granted is too great and could be reduced by a requirement of single-pole construction; that this route is improper because it had 27 or 28 digressions from railroad and division line routing, which was more than would be required by other alternative routes; and that it failed to give the required preference for an existing railroad right-of-way for the line's location. The objectors contend that we should not give deference here to the judgment of the commerce commission, despite their presumed expertise in the area, because the interpretation and application of a statute is involved, and that is solely the duty of the courts. Our interpretation of section 478.18 must begin with a consideration of Hanson v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 227 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 1975). In Hanson, the commerce commission had approved the utility's application for a franchise for a route which in part crossed sections diagonally. It said this route was more feasible, practical and reasonable than the other alternatives. The commission found the other routes would require construction on more farmland and involve a greater number of farm owners. The alternative routes, following railroads, would create much disruption of farming operations and create a greater cost of construction, according to the commission ruling. Upon appeal to this court, we said: [i]f we had only a dispute here between experts as to whether a transmission line following railroad or division lines is practicable and reasonable at certain points, we would have a different problem. But we have an entirely different case, one involving interpretation of § 489.18 of The Code. Statutory interpretation is a legal function and therefore within the province of the judicial department. The court held that additional burdens which had been enumerated by the commission did not make the alternative which would have followed railroad and division lines impracticable and unreasonable so as to permit construction along other alternative routes as provided by section 478.18. As we pointed out in that case, this was a matter of statutory constructionnot the exercise of expert judgment on the issue of what digressions from rail and section lines could be permitted. We said that [i]n this case we do not affirmatively define the words `practicable and reasonable' but rather, we hold what they do not mean. Hanson, 227 N.W.2d at 162. The instant case clearly presents that different problem which Hanson indicates is a province of the expertsnot the judiciary. In Hanson, the reasons given were insufficient as a matter of law. The utility, and the commission, erred in the application of section 478.18 because they had measured the burdens of the diagonal line against the railroad and land division routes, and to the surprise of no one, found the diagonal lines less burdensome. But [these burdens] . . . were only those which normally attend such routes. Applying section 478.18 in this case, in the light of Hanson we conclude that the deviations section lines were based upon engineering considerations of practicability and reasonableness. The plan began with division line locations and adhered to them except when, in the judgment of engineers, it was not practicable or reasonable to do so. It was not the sort of wholesale departure from railroad and section lines found in the diagonal line disapproved in the Hanson case. The engineering reasons given for the deviations in this case need not be set out in detail; neither section 478.18 nor Hanson requires us to determine as a matter of law that the alternative with the fewest deviations should be approved, as objectors suggest Nor are we required, or permitted, to exercise our independent judgment as to whether the reasons of practicability and reasonableness are correct. The commission, after hearing the evidence in support of and opposition to the line as proposed, ruled against the objectors on all of the matters of location and design raised by them. The commission found, for example, that the additional 25-foot clearance was required in order to insure in practice the statutory clearance of 100 feet; that a 230-KV line would be insufficient to meet consumer needs; that single-pole construction would actually result in greater land-use disruption, less safety and less reliability (The decrease in land-use disruption by double-pole construction results from the fact that they can be spaced in quarter-mile intervals; in most instances they can be placed along cross fences.); that the proposed route would result in less total land-use disruption than any of the alternatives; that increased cost in the reconstruction of the existing Avoca line and considerations of reliability rendered that alternative nonviable; that the Rock Island right-of-way route was not a viable alternative because of aesthetic, land-use disruption and safety considerations; and that the number of digressions is not paramount in importance over the amount of land-use disruption. We cannot find that any of these findings are unreasonable. While increased cost is not a proper consideration as between a direct route and routing along railroads or division lines, there is no reason to conclude that it is an improper consideration as between two conforming routes. Similarly, emphasizing total land-use disruption over the number of route digressions would seem to more completely effectuate the legislative mandate of section 478.18. Nor are the digressions along the proposed route unreasonable. Many of the digressions from land division routings were in response to landowners' requests, some digressions were necessary to change from one section line to another and one was to leave a division line to parallel a railroad. Approximately eleven days of hearings were conducted by the Commission, and a great amount of engineering testimony was received on the issues of design and location of the proposed line. In Merchant v. SMB Stage Lines, 172 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Iowa 1969), this court said, in a review of an industrial commissioner's order, that [t]he commissioner's findings of fact have the effect of a jury verdict and, where the evidence is in dispute or where reasonable minds may differ on inferences fairly to be drawn from the disclosed facts, the commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal. We have examined the record and find that substantial evidence supports the commission in its conclusion that the deviations approved were based upon engineering considerations of practicability and reasonableness which pass muster under Hanson and section 478.18. Substantial evidence also supports its conclusions with regard to the other details of design and construction in issue here. The evidence was obviously conflicting, but under section 17A.19(8)(f) we need only to determine whether there was substantial evidence in the record made before the commission when that record is viewed as a whole. We conclude that there was. We need not attempt to decide whether their decision was right; that is an engineering issue, not a legal one.