Opinion ID: 1762045
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interplay of Sections 4-5-223, 4-5-225, and 4-5-322 of the Act

Text: We begin with a review of the pertinent provisions of the Act. Section 4-5-223 of the Act provides that an affected person may petition an agency for a declaratory order as to the validity or applicability of a statute, rule or order within the primary jurisdiction of the agency. Tenn.Code Ann. § 4-5-223(a) (1998). The petitioned agency may then respond in one of two ways: (1) convene a contested case hearing and issue a declaratory order, or (2) refuse to issue a declaratory order. Id. at (a)(1), (a)(2). [2] If the agency elects to convene a contested case hearing, the resulting declaratory order is subject to review in the chancery court of Davidson County, unless otherwise specifically provided by statute, in the manner provided for the review of decisions in contested cases. Id. at (a)(1). Judicial review of decisions in contested cases is governed by section 4-5-322, see id. § 4-5-322(a)(1) (Supp. 2003), and petitions for review must be filed within sixty days after entry of the agency's final order, id. at (b)(1). If, however, the agency declines to issue a declaratory order, the aggrieved petitioner may seek a judicial determination of his concerns by filing a suit for declaratory judgment in the chancery court of Davidson County. Id. § 4-5-225(a) (1998). Section 4-5-225 does not set forth a time period within which the complainant must file his suit for declaratory judgment. In this case, TDOC availed itself of the second option by declining to convene a contested case hearing and to issue the requested declaratory order. Indeed, TDOC stated in its letter to Hughley that it was declining to issue a declaratory order pursuant to section 4-5-223(a)(2), the provision that gives a petitioner whose request for a declaratory order has been denied the right to sue for a declaratory judgment. Accordingly, Hughley filed a suit for declaratory judgment in the chancery court of Davidson County. He did so, however, after more than sixty days had passed following TDOC's letter of refusal. The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that this delay was fatal to Hughley's suit on the basis of section 4-5-322(b)(1) of the Act, which provides that petitions for judicial review of an agency's final decision in a contested case shall be filed within sixty (60) days after the entry of the agency's final order thereon. Id. § 4-5-322(b)(1) (Supp.2003). Because the plain meaning of the statute makes clear that the sixty-day limitation applies to petitions filed following a final decision in a contested case, id. at (a)(1), the State urges us to construe TDOC's letter to Hughley as such a decision.