Opinion ID: 2053552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: alleged attorney misconduct

Text: Defendants claim that repeated and extensive misconduct by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument diverted the jury from the primary issues of the case and denied defendants a fair trial. We disagree. This Court stated in Reetz v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co., 416 Mich. 97, 102-103, 330 N.W.2d 638 (1982): When reviewing an appeal asserting improper conduct of an attorney, the appellate court should first determine whether or not the claimed error was in fact error and, if so, whether it was harmless. If the claimed error was not harmless, the court must then ask if the error was properly preserved by objection and request for instruction or motion for mistrial. If the error is so preserved, then there is a right to appellate review; if not, the court must still make one further inquiry. It must decide whether a new trial should nevertheless be ordered because what occurred may have caused the result or played too large a part and may have denied a party a fair trial. If the court cannot say that the result was not affected, then a new trial may be granted. Tainted verdicts need not be allowed to stand simply because a lawyer or judge or both failed to protect the interests of the prejudiced party by timely action. The first asserted improper conduct by plaintiff's counsel is his characterization of defense counsel to the jury as slick, a slick talker, smooth, and smoothtalking. Plaintiff responds that all these comments were responses to argument by defendants. Plaintiff's counsel may have been attempting to persuade the jury that defense counsel was not being truthful in some of his arguments. However, we disagree that this constituted trial misconduct. Moreover, defendants did not object to the comments. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the verdict was not changed by plaintiff's counsel's references to defense counsel. Plaintiff's case was very strong. Counsel presented convincing evidence that the two police officers undertook a police chase that was improper and negligent. The jury believed plaintiff's counsel and, we conclude, would have ruled for plaintiff as it did, irrespective of counsel's disparaging remarks. At the same time, we discourage any attorney from denigrating another before a jury. Such behavior jeopardizes the integrity of a trial and reflects adversely on the legal profession. Language unbecoming a court officer imperils the decorum that courts must maintain. The second challenged error is plaintiff's counsel's reference to facts not in evidence. During rebuttal argument, plaintiff's counsel read from a portion of Mr. Montgomery's deposition not in evidence to rebut the claim that Montgomery had changed his testimony. Although it was improper for counsel to read the testimony, defendants again failed to object. If defense counsel had objected, then the trial court could have immediately instructed the jury. On the basis of defendants' failure to object and a lack of manifest injustice, we decline to reverse the trial court's decision not to set aside the jury verdict. Defendants object also to plaintiff's counsel's placement on one of plaintiff's exhibits of the letter B. It appeared on a large street chart showing the area traversed by the police chase. During closing argument, defense counsel questioned the meaning of the B. During rebuttal, plaintiff's counsel responded that he had placed the letter on the diagram to designate the point at which the police could have stopped their chase. Defendants objected. The assertion that the B stood for the point at which the police should have discontinued their chase was first raised during closing argument. Plaintiff asserts that, because plaintiff's counsel prepared the exhibit, he was entitled to explain the placement of the letter. We agree. Defense counsel made the marking on the chart a prominent theme of his closing argument. Thus, plaintiff's counsel's explanation of it should not be viewed as evidence. Moreover, the judge instructed the jury that the attorneys' arguments were not to be considered evidence. Therefore, we find no error. Next, defendants assert that plaintiff's counsel made comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments that inappropriately appealed to the sympathy of the jury. Whereas an appeal to the jury's sympathy may constitute grounds for reversal, the resultant prejudice can be cured by an instruction. The jury can be advised that its verdict must not be influenced by sympathy. Jakubiec v. Hasty, 337 Mich. 205, 59 N.W.2d 385 (1953). In Rogers, defendants neither objected to plaintiff's counsel's remarks nor requested aninstruction. Moreover, the trial judge instructed the jury that [s]ympathy must not influence your decision. Thus, we decline to reverse on this ground. The conduct of plaintiff's counsel that defendant complains of in Rogers does not warrant a new trial. We find that it was the proofs, not the challenged argument, that led the jury to find the city liable.