Opinion ID: 1142390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Case Number 1930853The Beans' Cross Appeal

Text: The Beans contend that the trial court erred in first finding BIC liable for the Beans' property damage and awarding them $70,000, and then off-setting against that award the amount of the Beans' judgment in the fraud action against their mortgagee. BIC argues that the trial court erred in entering a judgment on the propertydamage claim, because, it contends, to do so violated the parties' pre-verdict agreement regarding the disposition of that claim. The agreement was evidenced by the following colloquy: [Counsel for the Beans]. In keeping with our conversation before the noon break, and under the impressions imposed by the court regarding allowing interrogation about the lawsuit against the mortgage companies, we agree that the court determine the entirety of the Beans' claims for personal and real property damage, that is, personal and real property damage as opposed to any other kind of physical and mental injury or the wrongful death claim or claim in behalf of Luke. And, of course, you would be guided by ... the jury's verdict on liability if that ever became a question on what you are doing. [Counsel for BIC]. The only thing I am concerned about is the court's coercion. I want to make it clear it is your choice, no [Counsel for the Beans]. When I make a deal, I make a deal. [Counsel for BIC]. Good enough. That is all I want to know. . . . . [The court]. Okay. [Counsel for the Beans]. So, I guess we can expect not to hear anything about the [The court]. I guess that is a fair statement. [Counsel for the Beans]. All right. [The court]. Okay. With that behind us, are we ready to move forward? [Counsel for the Beans]. Yes, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.) All parties concede that the agreement expressly required the court, in disposing of the Beans' property-damage claims, to enter a judgment consistent with the jury's verdict on the wrongful death and personal injury claims. The Beans, however, contend that the entry of judgment in their favor was not inconsistent with the jury's verdict, because, they argue, the jury's verdict was based on a finding that neither Mr. Bean nor Mrs. Bean had suffered any injuries. They insist that the verdict was not based on a finding that BIC was not liable to Mr. and Mrs. Bean. BIC, of course, draws the opposite conclusion from the jury's verdict. We agree with BIC's construction of the verdict. Verdicts are to be construed so as to effectuate the true intent of the jury. See Cory v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 So.2d 36, 41 (Fla.1971). The jury's intent may be derived from a construction of its verdict in the context of the case as a whole, including its procedural posture, the issues, evidence, pleadings, arguments, and jury instructions. See Reynolds Bros. Lumber Co. v. W.S. Newell Constr. Co., 284 Ala. 352, 356-57, 224 So.2d 899, 902 (1969); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Holman, 373 So.2d 869, 871 (Ala.Civ. App.1979). Both Sam and Leigh Ann Bean claimed compensatory damages for physical injuries they incurred while escaping, and attempting to rescue their two children from, the fire that erupted in the family home. They also sought compensatory damages for mental anguish incurred in connection with their escape and as a result of the loss of their youngest child. Sam Bean was hospitalized immediately after the fire; Dr. Stuart Padove, a physician specializing in pulmonary disease, gave extensive, particularized testimony as to some physical injuries Mr. Bean had incurred in the fire. Also, Leigh Ann Bean's mother testified that Mrs. Bean's doctor prescribed tranquilizers for her the day of the fire, and had continued to prescribe them until the time of the trial. Indeed, whether Sam and Leigh Ann Bean actually sustained physical or emotional injuries was an issue that was never seriously contested. One issue that did play a prominent role in the trial, however, regarded the Beans' supervision of their children. That issue was relevant to at least two elements of the plaintiffs' prima facie case, namely, foreseeability and proximate cause. As to foreseeability, the court charged the jury: The fifth element that the plaintiff[s] must prove to your reasonable satisfaction is that the lighter was being used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner at the time of the fire. The plaintiffs claim that it was reasonably foreseeable, at the time BIC marketed the lighter in question, that children too young to appreciate the dangers of operating the lighter, could obtain and operate the lighter. ... Whether it was reasonably foreseeable that children too young to appreciate the dangers of operating BIC lighters, could obtain and operate such lighters is a fact issue for you to decide based on all the evidence presented. Also, forcefully presented in closing argument was BIC's contention that the Beans had failed to supervise their children and that their failure in that regard was the sole proximate cause of the fire. See Reply Brief of Appellant/Cross-Appellee BIC Corporation, at 21. Nothing in the manner in which this case was tried suggests that a damages question lay at the heart of the jury's query to the trial court. Indeed, to propose that two of four plaintiffs in a personal injury action could not recoverregardless of the extent of their own injuriesunless the other two plaintiffs could also prove some injuries, defies common experience and reasoning. Far more plausible is a construction of the verdict as evidence of the jury's reluctance, because of a finding of a lack of parental supervision, either to (1) hold BIC liable for the parents ' injuries or (2) penalize the small children for what it considered the fault of the parents. Moreover, the verdicts themselves expressly declared a finding of the issues in favor of the defendant, BIC Corporation, and against the [adult plaintiffs]. (Emphasis added.) The jury had at its disposal verdict forms evidencing a finding in favor of the adult plaintiffs and assessing discretionary damages. Had the jury merely intended to express a finding that the parents had shown no injury, it would have used those verdict forms and would have awarded zero or nominal damages. Construing the verdict in the context of the peculiarities of this case, we must conclude that the jury desired to express its view that these plaintiffs, as adult parents, should bear personal responsibility for what the jurors must have seen as the parents' lack of proper parental supervision of their children. The trial court's affirmative response to the jury's query, which response resulted in this legal inconsistency, became, through all parties' acquiescence, the law of the case. [2] Because of the agreement of the parties, the only judgment the trial court could have entered on the parents' property-damage claims that would have been consistent with the jury's verdict would have been a judgment for BIC. The judgment for the Beans on their property damage claim was clearly erroneous; the court should have entered a judgment for BIC on that claim. The judgment on that claim is reversed and a judgment is hereby rendered for BIC on that claim. 1930751AFFIRMED. SHORES, KENNEDY, and INGRAM, JJ., concur. MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur in the result. 1930853REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. MADDOX, SHORES, HOUSTON, KENNEDY, and INGRAM, JJ., concur.