Opinion ID: 786579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: asylum standards

Text: 15 Garcia bears the burden of proof with respect to her claim of eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a). An applicant for asylum must first show that he or she is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A refugee is one who is unable or unwilling to return to ... [his or her native] country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion[.] 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 16 It is the well-settled law of this circuit that eligibility for asylum may be based on past persecution alone, even absent a well-founded fear of future persecution. Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 959 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, if an asylum applicant can show she has in the past suffered under atrocious forms of persecution, she is eligible for asylum even where there is little likelihood of future persecution. Acewicz v. INS, 984 F.2d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1009 (9th Cir.2001) (recognizing that sometimes past persecution is so horrific that the march of time and ebb and flow of political tides cannot efface the fear in the mind of the persecuted). 17 Rape or sexual assault may constitute such persecution. See Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 962 (observing that [r]ape at the hands of government authorities ... can be an atrocious form of punishment indeed). In such a case, the applicant need only demonstrate the severity of [her] past abuse [,] Lal, 255 F.3d at 1002, because even though there may have been a change of regime in [her] country, this may not always produce a complete change in view of [her] past experiences, in the mind of the refugee. Id. at 1006 (citation and alterations omitted). 18 Because it is difficult to conclusively prove motive, [Garcia] need only provide some evidence of motive, direct or circumstantial, and demonstrate the connection between the government's actions and [her] membership in a protected group. Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir.2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted) (emphasis in the original). 3 Garcia contends that she was persecuted based on the pro-guerilla political opinion imputed to her by the Guatemalan military. The motive requirement is satisfied by evidence that political opinion was imputed to the petitioner. Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). Moreover, [p]ersecution on account of imputed political opinion ... satisfies the motive requirement, whether or not that imputation is accurate. Lopez-Galarza, 99 F.3d at 959 (citation and emphasis omitted). 19 We have cautioned that [t]he difficulty of determining motive in situations of general civil unrest should not ... diminish the protections of asylum for persons who have been punished because of their actual or imputed political views ... Arulampalam v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 679, 685 n. 4 (9th Cir.2003). And the plain meaning of the phrase `persecution on account of the victim's political opinion,' does not mean persecution solely on account of the victim's political opinion. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (citation and alteration omitted) (emphasis in the original). In other words, simply because the soldiers might have had more than one motivation for raping [Garcia] does not in itself defeat her asylum claim. Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1075-76 (9th Cir.2000). 20 To demonstrate past persecution, an applicant must show: (1) an incident, or incidents, that rise to the level of persecution; (2) that is on account of one of the statutorily-protected grounds; and (3) is committed by the government or forces the government is either unable or unwilling to control. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a well-founded fear of present persecution, an applicant must show that her fear is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Id. at 656 n. 11 (citation omitted). An applicant satisfies the subjective component by credibly testifying that [she] genuinely fears persecution. Id. (citation omitted). The objective component of this test requires showing, by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, that persecution is a reasonable possibility. Agbuya v. INS, 241 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This showing may be made by the production of specific documentary evidence or by the credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant. Id. (citation omitted). In fact, an alien's testimony, if unrefuted and credible, direct and specific, is sufficient to establish the facts testified [sic] without the need for any corroboration. Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2000). 21 The ability to demonstrate past persecution triggers a rebuttable presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 4 Rios v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). However, [t]he INS can rebut this presumption by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conditions in the applicant's home country have changed such that she no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution. Id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless, a State Department report on country conditions, standing alone, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of future persecution when a petitioner has established past persecution. Molina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). Instead, we have required an individualized analysis of how changed conditions will affect the specific petitioner's situation. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 22 As noted above, the BIA's streamlined decision affirmed, without opinion, the IJ's denial of Garcia's asylum application. Because the BIA affirmed without opinion, the IJ's order constitutes the final agency determination that we review. Halaim v. INS, 358 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). And because the IJ expressly determined that Garcia was a credible witness, we must accept [Garcia's] testimony as true[.] Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, the question ... becomes whether these facts, and their reasonable inferences, satisfy the elements of the claim for relief. Ladha, 215 F.3d at 900. 23 The IJ's determination that Garcia is ineligible for asylum can be reversed only if the evidence presented by [Garcia] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (citation omitted). To reverse the IJ's finding, we must find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it[.] Id. at 481 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 812 (emphasis in the original). To that end, the IJ's decision need only be supported by substantial evidence. Gonzalez-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 995, 998 (9th Cir.2003) (citation omitted).