Opinion ID: 1934652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The claimed physical assaults.

Text: Prost's remaining contention, on the other hand, leaves us unable to affirm the custody determination outright. She argues that the trial judge failed to come to grips with the substantial evidence she presented that Greene had repeatedly assaulted her since late 1991. She maintains that the judge was required to take account of this evidence in light of D.C.Code § 16-914(a)(5) (the mental ... health of all individuals involved) and, more importantly, in light of the recent amendment of § 914(a) by the Council of the District of Columbia making evidence of an `intrafamily offense' an express factor to be considered in the custody determination. [23] As Prost concedes, this amendment does not apply directly to this case, see Edwards v. Lateef, 558 A.2d 1144, 1146-47 (D.C.1989) (general nonretroactivity of statutory changes affecting substantive rights), but Prost argues that the legislature's contemporaneous judgment about the critical link between domestic violence and custodial fitness underscores the inadequacy of the judge's treatment of the claimed assaults. Prost presented testimony by herself and others on this point. She testified, in summary, that in late 1991 Greene grabbed her arms, pushed her, and threw dishes at her; in early 1992, he pushed her onto the bed, choked her, and screamed at her; in the late summer of 1992, he stepped on and pressed his weight down on her right foot, threatening to make her left foot, which had been permanently injured in an accident, look good compared to her right foot; in October 1992, in the incident that impelled her to flee the house and seek a CPO, he poked her in the chest and pushed her back against the bed while screaming, I'm going to fuck you.... I'm going to tear ... apart ... every aspect of your existence; and after October 24 he again pushed her. According to Prost, three of these incidents took place in the presence of one or both children. Ann Labelle testified that in July 1992 she saw bruises on Prost's arm, and that in August 1992 she saw bruises on the top and bottom of Prost's foot. Jackie Young testified that in mid-1992 she saw Prost kind of hobbling and that Prost's foot was bruised and swollen. Stephanie Werner confirmed that on one occasion Prost, who apparently was then unaware of Werner's presence, screamed at Greene, Come on. Hit me. Hit me. Are you going to hit me again? The trial judge took note of this evidence, setting forth five instances of the alleged assaults and pointing out that Greene denied each allegation. But the judge's remaining discussion of the issue was as follows: Plaintiff never filed a police report but, after the October 24 incident, on the advice of counsel, she obtained a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) that, inter alia, granted her temporary custody of the children. Thereafter, although defendant steadfastly denied all of plaintiff's allegations, he repeatedly consented to extensions of the TPO while the parties tried to work things out between them. But their efforts were unavailing and, ultimately, they entered into a succession of Consent Orders continuing the TPO and establishing visitation rights for defendant. All of those orders are long expired and no such provisions should any longer be necessary. These two adults will have to learn to be civil to each other, for the sake of their own, as well as their children's, emotional health, and to respect what will now be their separate property rights neither entering the other's residence without permission. This treatment of the issue is unsatisfactory. It leaves unresolved whether all or any of the acts occurred, and thus their relevance to factors that the judge herself considered important to the custody decision. Independently of the Council's recent action, the relevance of violence between spouses to the issue of fitness to assume custody is well-recognized. See, e.g., In re M.D., 602 A.2d 109, 113 (D.C.1992) (in child neglect proceedings, where mother asserted threats and harassment by father but latter disputed these, trial judge failed to reach[] an independent legal conclusion based on factual findings in light of the evidence before him). [24] Evidence of such assaults reflects upon the character and emotional control (the mental ... health) of a spouse, and thus bears directly upon the record support for the judge's finding that Prost was much more emotionally volatile and unstable than [Greene]. It is also relevant to a factor that, as discussed earlier, the judge considered paramount in this case: the basic respect one spouse has for the other, and hence that spouse's anticipated willingness to allow the other spouse generous involvement in the children's lives. In this regard, we recall, the judge attached substantial weight to the character trait[s] Prost had shown in verbally abusing Greene about his unemployment [25] and displaying what Greene aptly terms a proprietary attitude toward the children in resisting Greene's exercise of his recent visitation rights. Greene's own asserted violent conduct would seem self-evidently relevant to this evaluation. In order to consider the bearing of the claimed assaults on the custody determination, the judge must deal with their truth or falsity and with the attendant circumstances more explicitly than she did. Greene argues that the judge implicitly rejected these allegations as unsubstantiated, but we read the judge's cryptic treatment of them instead as essentially laying aside a chapter in the parties' turbulent relationship now closed by their final separation, though still demonstrating a need for them to learn to be civil to each other. The heightened importance of proof of physical abuse, [26] and its relevance to issues central to the decision of who should be entrusted with the primary care of these children, requires more careful consideration of the evidence on this point.