Opinion ID: 1385357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disqualification of judges

Text: Questions as to who should have adjudged this lawsuit were notably more troubling than Justice Clark's brief discussion of the Rule of Necessity implies ( ante, p. 537). On January 16, 1978, counsel for plaintiffs (Messrs. Levit and Chernick) and defendant (Mr. Falk) stipulated as follows: The parties waive their right to make any motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 170.6 as to judges Harry L. Hupp and Ernest J. Zack if this action is assigned to either of such judges but reserve their right to make any motion permitted by law if the case is assigned to any other judge.... That reference to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 was significant. It is the section that governs the imperative challenge of a trial judge. Its potential impact was documented in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148]; cf. Martini, Legislators Urged to End Affidavit of Trial Judges, The Los Angeles Daily Journal (Dec. 12, 1979) page 1; letter from Maynard Craig, id., (Jan. 10, 1980) page 4. Since January 16, 1978 (the date the stipulation was filed), imperative challenges seem not to have been an issue in this case. On November 22, 1978, Messrs. Levit and Chernick filed plaintiffs' brief in the Court of Appeal. They stated: Respondents offered to stipulate that the case be assigned to a judge pro tem (for example, a retired federal judge, a law school dean or professor, or the like) so that no judge who was affected by the litigation would be required to decide the matter. (C.T. 17-18.) Appellant declined such offer, but in any event (as Appellant concedes (C.T. 303)), under the Rule of Necessity, no California judge is disqualified from hearing this case. That rule has been uniformly recognized to operate to permit and require judges to determine causes in which all judges are financially interested in order to preserve access to the courts. In other words, if all judges are disqualified, none are. (Italics added.) Notwithstanding counsel's contention that it is not susceptible to doubt that ... [the Court of Appeal, 2d District] is qualified, authorized, and required to decide the instant case, [1a] Justices Lillie, Thompson, and Hanson on March 13, 1979, requested that Division One be relieved of any and all further action in the within appeal. (See their letter appended here as Annex A.) On March 20, an order signed by Acting Chief Justice Tobriner transferred the cause from Division One of the Court of Appeal to Division Two. The Lillie-Thompson-Hanson letter (Annex A) is noteworthy because for the first time in this case, apparently, Code of Civil Procedure section 170, subdivision 1 was mentioned. It appears to disqualify a justice or judge from sitting in any action when she or he is a party or is interested. (Because so many lawyers and judges recently seem to have discussed section 170 without evident awareness of its exact words, I append it here as Annex B.) Notwithstanding the absence of any reference to the rule of necessity in the code section, Justices Lillie, Thompson, and Hanson observed that it ... no doubt would permit us to sit and act on this appeal. On June 11, 1979, the opinion of Division Two of the Court of Appeal (Justices Fleming, Roth, and Beach) was issued; and matters pertinent to disqualification were disposed of as follows: Members of this court may adjudicate the cause even though each is financially interested in the outcome of the litigation. Ordinarily, a justice may not pass judgment on any cause in which he has a personal interest, but when all justices in the state are, or may be, financially interested in the outcome, any of them may sit. ( Evans v. Gore (1920) 253 U.S. 245 [64 L.Ed. 887, 40 S.Ct. 550, 11 A.L.R. 519]; Atkins v. United States (Ct.Cl. 1977) 556 F.2d 1028, 1035-1040, cert. den. (1978) 434 U.S. 1009 [54 L.Ed.2d 751, 98 S.Ct. 718]; Caminetti v. Pac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 344, 366 [139 P.2d 908]; Brenkwitz v. City of Santa Cruz (1969) 272 Cal. App.2d 812, 818 [77 Cal. Rptr. 705]; Barkin v. Board of Optometry (1969) 269 Cal. App.2d 714, 719-720 [75 Cal. Rptr. 337]; Gonsalves v. City of Dairy Valley (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 400, 404-405 [71 Cal. Rptr. 255].) In such instances ... disqualification of all judges disqualifies none. The application of this rule has been discussed at length in Atkins v. United States, supra , a class action on behalf of all federal judges to recover additional compensation for their services as judges, and the exhaustive discussion of the issue in Atkins (pp. 1035 to 1040) makes further discussion here unnecessary. Under the rule of necessity this court, to which the cause was transferred by the California Supreme Court, is both qualified and obligated to decide the cause [italics added]. Plaintiffs' counsel then wrote the letter of July 20, 1979, to Chief Justice Bird and Justice Tobriner, that is appended here as Annex C. The next-to-last paragraph reads, It is respectfully submitted that the above circumstances [see paragraphs 3 to 6 of the letter] suggest the appearance of possible bias and prejudice on the part of the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner with respect to the basic issues involved in this case, and that they therefore should disqualify themselves. Annex C first discusses Annex D here, which the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner wrote on June 16, 1978, as Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Judicial Council. Annex C then recites that Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Esq., the principal attorney for the defendant and appellant herein, is acting as co-counsel for the Chief Justice in a matter now pending before the Commission on Judicial Performance. That matter, of course, was the 1979 partly public, partly private investigation of all seven Supreme Court justices. In three letters dated September 24 and 26, 1979 (Annexes E, F, and G here), plaintiffs' counsel suggested that Acting Chief Justice Manuel and Acting Justices Brown and Racanelli withdraw from the case. [2a] Unlike the Chief Justice and Justice Tobriner, they did not recuse and, instead, participated in oral argument and in the calendar conference and have signed the majority opinion. In sum, no trial judges but five appellate judges recused themselves in this case  three of them even though there was no challenge. Three others refused to recuse after challenge. An unfortunately unanswered question is whether the justices who did recuse did so for reasons regarding impartiality that in fact seem more compelling than every judge's conceded interest concerning the amount of her or his monthly salary. By participating in this case the seven justices here have respected the rule of necessity. Yet the majority opinion cites only Atkins, supra, 556 F.2d 1028. The most informative discussion I know of the perplexities and scope of the rule appears in section 12.04 of Professor Davis' Administrative Law Treatise (plus his supplements) (hereafter Davis Treatise). His conclusions are etched by these introductory comments in section 12.03, which deals with Interest: One who stands to gain or lose personally by a decision either way is disqualified by reason of interest to participate in the exercise of judicial functions. Most of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal force to judges and to administrative adjudicators. [Fn. omitted.] The overshadowing and almost overwhelming fact about the law of disqualification for interest is that, as we shall see in the ensuing section, most of that law is largely defeated by the rule of necessity.  (Italics added.) [3a] Is it possible that my colleagues overlooked or ignored a corollary to the rule of necessity that might well have had a significant impact? That corollary is that judges who but for the rule would have been disqualified should exemplify a bend-over-backwards stance; that is to say, they should approach the proffered legal issues with both marked and exceptional care. (See the Davis Treatise at p. 166: Whatever the principles ... for ordinary cases, the extraordinary cases which impel courts to resort to the rule of necessity may often deserve extraordinary scrutiny.... See also pp. 358-359 of Davis, Administrative Law: Cases  Text  Problems (6th ed. 1977): The easy and seemingly automatic application of the rule of necessity is more dangerous than is recognized in typical judicial opinions, for grave injustice may result from allowing disqualified officers to adjudicate cases.... [An] escape route ... is ... to review both more broadly and more intensively when the rule of necessity is invoked than when no bias gives rise to use of the rule of necessity.) Is it perhaps regrettable that the words of the majority opinion disclose no honoring of that approach here?
In California the law governing disqualification includes (1) Code of Civil Procedure sections 170 (Annex B here) and 170a to 170.8, plus a few unrelated statutes (e.g., Prob. Code, § 703; Gov. Code, §§ 11512, subd. (c) and 87101); (2) certain clauses in the state and federal Constitutions; (3) certain canons of judicial conduct and comparable rules; and (4) countless written opinions of courts and other adjudicative bodies. (A brief bibliography is appended here as Annex O; see too Annex K.) Interestingly, counsel in Annexes C, E, F, and G do not stress that law. It is surprising that, in so many California cases where disqualification issues have arisen, lawyers and judges have proceeded to argue and decide the issues without appropriate search and citation. Disqualification law is perhaps less complex than tax law, say, or corporate securities law; but by no means is it accurately portrayed in judges' and law professors' folklore, news commentators' assumptions, or lawyers' untutored assertions. Bias, prejudice, fair and impartial, interest, and related words are like so many words in our state's laws. For enlightenment, legal research is essential. The chances are that reliable guidance only rarely will be found in newspaper and TV editorials, speeches at bar meetings, and common catechisms.
The oath of office requires that each judge well and faithfully discharge the duties of judging. That means, I believe, that none of us should recuse herself or himself merely because a litigant so requests. Nor should a judge recuse merely because she or he thinks there is too much other work to do, or wants to get off the hot seat, or is fearful that participation and relevant rulings might inspire criticism, ridicule, or political attack. Prior to the enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 (the procedure for imperative challenges of a trial judge), this court declared: Under the Constitution of this state a superior judge has certain powers and duties to perform. Upon assuming his office he takes and subscribes to an oath that he will support the state and federal Constitutions and that he will faithfully discharge the duties of his office as a judge of the superior court to the best of his ability.... One of those duties is to hear and determine causes presented to him unless in a particular cause he is disqualified or unable to act. He may not evade or avoid that duty. In proceedings too numerous to need citation of authority a superior judge has been required to discharge that duty when no good cause appeared to justify a refusal to act. Austin v. Lambert (1938) 11 Cal.2d 73, 75 [77 P.2d 849, 115 A.L.R. 849] (italics added). Those words, I submit, still govern every appellate judge and, absent a proper imperative challenge, every trial judge. (See also Swan v. Talbot (1907) 152 Cal. 143, 144 [94 P. 238].) Also pertinent are these widely known comments of Justice Rehnquist in 1972: Every litigant is entitled to have his case heard by a judge mindful of [the federal] oath. But neither the oath, the disqualification statute, nor the practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantees a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing arguments of counsel with his understanding of the Constitution and the law.... (409 U.S. at p. 838 [34 L.Ed.2d at p. 61].) Further, ... I conclude that the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualification in this case. Having so said, I would certainly concede that fair-minded judges might disagree about the matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of disqualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself simply because I do regard the question as a fairly debatable one, even though upon analysis I would resolve it in favor of sitting. [¶] Here again, one's course of action may well depend upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification. THOSE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS THAT HAVE CONSIDERED THE MATTER HAVE UNANIMOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT A FEDERAL JUDGE HAS A DUTY TO SIT WHERE NOT DISQUALIFIED WHICH IS EQUALLY AS STRONG AS THE DUTY TO NOT SIT WHERE DISQUALIFIED. (409 U.S. at p. 836 [34 L.Ed.2d at p. 60]; italics his, capitals mine; see Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum (1973) 73 Colum.L.Rev. 106; cf. Aryeh Neier's review of The Brethren in The Nation (Feb. 2, 1980) pp. 118, 120: At the time Douglas recused himself, my view was that he wanted to avoid casting the deciding vote upholding flag desecration while the effort to impeach him was still smoldering. A controversy over the flag could have ignited it again. I would have been happy to find another view in The Brethren instead of misinformation that could have been easily avoided. [4] )