Opinion ID: 2565957
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count IV RPC 8.4(c) and (d)[18]

Text: RPC 8.4(c) states that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. RPC 8.4(d) provides that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. The Board correctly determined that Dynan's knowing misrepresentation of his actual hourly rate violated these provisions. To determine an RPC 8.4(c) violation, the court must decide whether the attorney lied. No ethical duty could be plainer. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Dann, 136 Wash.2d 67, 77, 960 P.2d 416 (1998). Various explanations as to why lying occurred may mitigate the charge, but does not change the truth of the underlying charge. Id. Dynan has tried to explain why he altered bills and submitted them to the court, but his motivation is inapposite. Reading each declaration as a whole, with the attached billings, proves Dynan misrepresented the billings as true and correct and misled the court, violating RPC 8.4(c). Under RPC 8.4(d), an attorney may prejudice the administration of justice if he engages in conduct in his official capacity or advocatory role that violates practice norms or engages in conduct that physically obstructs justice. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Curran, 115 Wash.2d 747, 764, 801 P.2d 962 (1990); Kuvara, 149 Wash.2d at 255-56, 66 P.3d 1057. Dynan argues that he did not prejudice the administration of justice because the court plays an active role in determining attorney fees and if the $150 hourly rate was not reasonable the court could reject it. He bases his arguments on the lodestar method of calculation and documentation required under that method. Where a fee shifting statute does not specify how fees are to be calculated the lodestar method may be used. Brand v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 139 Wash.2d 659, 666, 989 P.2d 1111 (1999); see also Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wash.2d 398, 432-33, 957 P.2d 632, 966 P.2d 305 (1998) (suggesting use of lodestar method to calculate fee award pursuant to MAR 7.3). Under the lodestar method the court multiplies the number of hours expended by a reasonable rate to determine a reasonable fee. Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash.2d 581, 597, 675 P.2d 193 (1983). The attorney must inform the court of the number of hours worked, the type of work performed, and the category of the attorney performing the work. Id. Although Bowers does not specifically state that the attorney must provide the court with his actual billing rate, several witnesses testified that during a fee award determination, it is the normal practice for an attorney to present his actual rate and then argue for a higher rate if the actual rate is not reasonable. RP (Dec. 4, 2001) at 56-57, 114-15, 119-20, 168. This practice allows the court to reach a reasonable attorney fee based on actual and true evidence, adjusting the rate for other variables. See Bowers, 100 Wash.2d at 597, 675 P.2d 193 (noting that the actual rate of billing may not be reasonable and may be adjusted based on several factors). Dynan, in his official capacity, violated practice norms by not providing the court with his actual rate. Further, even if the submitted rate was reasonable, Dynan's misrepresentations prejudiced the administration of justice by preventing the court from determining an attorney fee award based on true evidence.