Opinion ID: 562065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal of Good Character Instruction

Text: 44 Baytank argues that the district court erred in refusing its request for a character evidence instruction. The district court, as Baytank concedes, admitted all the tendered character evidence, and refused to instruct on it only because it did not want to single out a particular kind of evidence; it viewed the requested instruction as permissible but not required. The cases Baytank relies on all involve either the refusal to admit character evidence or an instruction that affirmatively and erroneously restricted the consideration the jury could give to the evidence. See Edgington v. United States, 164 U.S. 361, 17 S.Ct. 72, 41 L.Ed. 467 (1896); United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 273 (5th Cir. Unit A), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107, 102 S.Ct. 3487, 73 L.Ed.2d 1369 (1982); United States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277, 278-79 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1083-86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826, 100 S.Ct. 49, 62 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979); see also United States v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir.1985) (collecting and discussing cases). 45 In Hewitt, this Court stated that [i]n some circumstances, evidence of good character may of itself create a reasonable doubt as to guilt, and the jury must be appropriately instructed. 634 F.2d at 278 (citing Callahan, 588 F.2d at 1083-86; Edgington, supra ). This Court's dictum in Hewitt notwithstanding, Baytank has not cited a single case (and we know of none) where this Court or the Supreme Court has found reversible error in the refusal to give a character instruction, as opposed to the refusal to admit character evidence or the giving of an erroneous character instruction. To the contrary, this Court has found a district court's refusal to give a character instruction, although legally correct and not otherwise substantially covered in the jury charge, not to have been an abuse of discretion. United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1986). In Hunt, we held that an abuse of discretion would occur only if the failure to give the instruction prevented the jury from considering the defense. Id. at 1097. 46 We find no abuse of discretion here. Baytank and its codefendants were able to present their character evidence and argue it to the jury, no instruction restricted the jury's consideration of the evidence, and the jury was instructed to make its determinations from the evidence in the case. Furthermore, it does not appear that character evidence was central or crucial to this case. 26