Opinion ID: 780678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute

Text: 39 Vess also appeals the district court's determination that his suit constitutes a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) suit within the meaning of the California statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 425.16. A SLAPP suit is one in which the plaintiff's alleged injury results from petitioning or free speech activities by a defendant that are protected by the federal or state constitutions. California's anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to allow early dismissal of meritless first amendment cases aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation. Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 839; see also United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970 (9th Cir.1999) (legislature passed anti-SLAPP statute in response to [its] concern about civil actions aimed at private citizens to deter or punish them for exercising their political or legal rights). Specifically, California's anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to strike a plaintiff's complaint if it aris[es] from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(b)(1). The California legislature has instructed that the statute should be construed broadly. Id. § 425.16(a). Motions to strike a state law claim under California's anti-SLAPP statute may be brought in federal court. See Lockheed Missiles, 190 F.3d at 970-73 (holding that there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rules and §§ 425.16(b) and (c), and that adopting California procedural rules serves the purposes of the Erie doctrine). But see Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 846 (because the discovery-limiting aspects of §§ 425.16(f) and (g) collide with the discovery-allowing aspects of Rule 56, these aspects of subsections 425.16(f) and (g) cannot apply in federal court). 40 Vess argues that his suit does not come within the paradigm of the SLAPP statute. He states that he is not a large private company seeking to deter private individuals from engaging in political debate, but rather a little guy seeking to vindicate his rights under California's consumer protection statutes. While Vess may be right that his is not a paradigmatic example of a SLAPP suit, he is wrong that it does not come within the statute. Nothing in the statute itself categorically excludes any particular type of action from its operation.... Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82, 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal.2002). California and federal courts have repeatedly permitted defendants to move to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute despite the fact that they were neither small nor championing individual interests. See, e.g., DuPont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App.4th 562, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 (2000) (permitting defendant DuPont Merck to invoke anti-SLAPP statute against prospective class action plaintiffs seeking relief under the same statutes on which Vess relies); Metabolife, 264 F.3d at 837-38 (defendants included television station); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 63 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1128 (N.D.Cal.1999) (defendant was a software company); see also Wilcox v. Superior Court, 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, 33 Cal. Rptr.2d 446 (Cal.Ct.App.1994) (stating that the defendants in SLAPP suits are not necessarily local organizations with limited resources). In sum, Vess's action fits within the statute, particularly in light of the statutory directive that it be construed broadly. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(a). See also Navellier, 29 Cal.4th at 92, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 530, 52 P.3d 703. 41 A court considering a motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute must engage in a two-part inquiry. First, a defendant must make an initial prima facie showing that the plaintiff's suit arises from an act in furtherance of the defendant's rights of petition or free speech. Globetrotter Software, 63 F.Supp.2d at 1129; see also Wilcox, 27 Cal.App.4th at 819-20, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446. The defendant need not show that the plaintiff's suit was brought with the intention to chill the defendant's speech; the plaintiff's intentions are ultimately beside the point. Equilon Enters., LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 67, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685 (Cal.2002). Similarly, the defendant bringing a motion to strike need not show that any speech was actually chilled. See City of Cotati v. Cashman, 29 Cal.4th 69, 75-76, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 519, 52 P.3d 695 (Cal.2002). 42 Second, once the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the challenged claims. Globetrotter Software, 63 F.Supp.2d at 1129. If the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim, the motion to strike must be denied. Cal Civ. Proc.Code § 425.16(b)(1). 43 The APA and CHADD have made a sufficient showing under the first part of the inquiry. A protected act of free speech includes any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, and any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 425.16(e)(3)-(4). See also Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117-18, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564 (Cal.1999). The APA's protected speech, within the meaning of the statute, consists of the publication of the DSM. CHADD's protected speech consists of its public advocacy activities in connection with the use of Ritalin. 44 As to the APA and CHADD, Vess cannot make a proper showing under the second part of the inquiry. The district court dismissed Vess's complaint against the APA and CHADD with prejudice under Rules 9(b) and 12(b)(6), and we have affirmed that dismissal. Thus, Vess cannot demonstrate a probability that [he] will prevail on [his] claim. Cal Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1). We therefore affirm the district court's grant of the APA and CHADD's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. 45 As to Novartis, however, we reverse. The district court declined to rule on any of the three defendants' motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute before it had ruled on the merits of their motions to dismiss under Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6), deeming such motions premature. Because we reverse the district court's dismissal of Vess's complaint against Novartis insofar as it alleges non-fraudulent conduct, the case is back in the position, as to those allegations, where the district court deemed Novartis's motion to strike premature. We agree with the district court's decision not to rule on the motion with the case in that posture. We therefore reverse, without prejudice, the district court's grant of Novartis's motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. 46 The district court awarded attorneys' fees to all three defendants under the anti-SLAPP statute. We affirm that award as to the APA and CHADD, who prevailed in their motions to strike. See Pfeiffer Venice Props. v. Bernard, 101 Cal. App.4th 211, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 647, 652 (2002) (holding that a trial court has jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant whose SLAPP motion was not heard solely because the matter was dismissed before defendants obtained a ruling on the SLAPP motion). We reverse as to Novartis. 47 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REMAND for further proceedings. The APA and CHADD's share of costs on appeal is to be awarded to them. Novartis's share of costs on appeal is to be divided equally between Vess and Novartis.