Opinion ID: 2576436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: governmental immunity act

Text: ¶ 10 In interpreting any statute, rules of statutory construction require the court to first look[ ] to the statute's plain language, and give effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous. Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, ¶ 12, 48 P.3d 949. At the time of the incident in this case, the Governmental Immunity Act read as follows: Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of . . .: (2) assault, battery, [or] false imprisonment.. . . Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(2) (Utah 1997) (repealed 2004). ¶ 11 This court has previously held in governmental immunity cases that the State is immunized against a negligence action if the action arises out of an assault or battery. Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 502-03 (Utah 1996) (holding the State immune from suit for negligence in the shooting deaths of two and the assault and battery upon three others under the assault and battery exception to the immunity waiver); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 241 (Utah 1993) (county immune from suit under the battery exception where a mentally ill patient at a county facility stabbed a child); Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Utah 1993) (school district immune from suit under the battery exception for failing to properly supervise high school students where those students severely beat another student during a physical education class). ¶ 12 Utah courts make three inquiries to determine whether the government is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act. First, courts must ascertain whether the activity was a governmental function and thereby entitled to blanket immunity under the Act. Second, if the activity constituted a governmental function, courts must then look to see whether the State has waived immunity under another section of the Act. Finally, courts must determine whether there is an exception to the waiver of immunity that retains immunity against suit for the cause of action in the particular case. Taylor v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). ¶ 13 Both sides concede that the first two factors do not shield the State from suit. Wagner v. State, No. 20030106-CA, 2004 WL 530728, , 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 282, . The State does argue, however, that the third inquiry requires that the suit against the State be dismissed under the Governmental Immunity Act because Mr. Giese's attack constituted a battery, an exception to the waiver of immunity under former section 63-30-10(2). ¶ 14 The Wagners argue that Mr. Giese's attack could not legally constitute a battery because that intentional tort requires the actor to intend harm or offense through his deliberate contact, an intent Mr. Giese was mentally incompetent to form. The State, on the other hand, argues that the only intent required under the statute is simply the intent to make a contact. The contact must be harmful or offensive by law, but the actor need not intend harm so long as he intended contact. ¶ 15 The outcome of this case, then, turns upon which interpretation of the definition of battery is correct. Accordingly, we turn our attention now to the law of battery as defined in the Restatement.