Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dismissal of the Fourth Claim for Relief

Text: The fulcrum of the en banc majority's analysis is its conclusion that this appeal requires us to decide whether to devise a new Bivens damages action under Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 2597, 168 L.Ed.2d 389 (2007). See infra at 599. But the majority can characterize Arar's action as new only by isolating and eliminating the domestic aspects of the case. It does so in part by affirming the district court's dismissal of Arar's Fourth Claim for Relief, (Fifth Amendment: Substantive Due ProcessDomestic Detention) on the ground that the claim was insufficiently pleaded. See supra at 569. We think that ruling to be incorrect. With respect to the conditions of confinement aspect of this claim, the district court concluded that Arar was entitled to Fifth Amendment substantive due process protection and that his rights in that respect could have been violated by the deprivations Arar alleges with respect to his treatment while in U.S. custody. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 286. We agree, and the majority does not decide otherwise. Supra at 569. With respect to the access to counsel and the courts aspect of the claim, the district court concluded that Arar would be able to state a claim for interference with his access to courts in part by [government officials] lying to his counsel, if he could identify `a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong.' Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 285 (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002)). We agree here, too, and the majority does not decide otherwise. But the district court nonetheless dismissed the Fourth Claim for Relief without prejudice. On pain of forfeiture of the claims, it required Arar (1) with respect to the mistreatment claim, to name those defendants that were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional treatment, and, (2) with respect to the denial of access claim, to replead without regard to any [underlying] rendition claim, in light of the court's conclusion that no Bivens action was available with respect to such a claim, and, because it was unclear to what underlying relief Arar was denied access, identify[ing] the specific injury he was prevented from grieving. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 287-88. Arar declined to replead, [13] rendering the dismissal final.
The majority affirms the dismissal of the Fourth Claim for Relief on the ground that Arar's complaint does not specify any culpable action taken by any single defendant and fails to allege a conspiracy. Supra at 569. We disagree with each of these rationales. Arar should not have been required to name those defendants [who] were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional treatment. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 287. In actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are analog[s] of the less-common Bivens action, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted), we allow plaintiffs to maintain[] supervisory personnel as defendants ... until [they have] been afforded an opportunity through at least brief discovery to identify the subordinate officials who have personal liability. Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Second Circuit authority). Similarly, courts have rejected the dismissal of suits against unnamed defendants described by roles ... until the plaintiff has had some opportunity for discovery to learn the identities of responsible officials. Once the supervisory officer has inquired within the institution and identified the actual decision-makers of the challenged action, those officials may then submit affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the circumstances. Id. (citations omitted). It should not be forgotten that the full name of the Bivens case itself is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (emphasis added). [14] To be sure, the Supreme Court has recently set a strict pleading standard for supervisory liability claims under Bivens against a former Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI. See Iqbal, supra . We do not think, however, that the Court has thereby permitted governmental actors who are unnamed in a complaint automatically to escape personal civil rights liability. A plaintiff must, after all, have some way to identify a defendant who anonymously violates his civil rights. We doubt that Iqbal requires a plaintiff to obtain his abusers' business cards in order to state a civil rights claim. Put conversely, we do not think that Iqbal implies that federal government miscreants may avoid Bivens liability altogether through the simple expedient of wearing hoods while inflicting injury. Some manner of proceeding must be made available for the reasons we recognized in Davis. Whether or not there is a mechanism available to identify the Doe defendants, moreover, Arar's complaint does sufficiently name some individual defendants who personally took part in the alleged violation of his civil rights. The role of defendant J. Scott Blackman, formerly Director of the Regional Office of INS, for example, is, as reflected in the district court's explication of the facts, see Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 252-54, set forth in reasonable detail in the complaint. [15] So are at least some of the acts of the defendant Edward J. McElroy, District Director of the INS. [16] The majority also asserts that Arar does no more than allege[] (in passive voice) that his requests to make phone calls `were ignored,' and that `he was told' that he was not entitled to a lawyer. Supra at 569. But as indicated above, such an identification of the unnamed defendants by their roles should be sufficient to enable a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, and subsequently to use discovery to identify them. And while the majority is correct that the complaint does not utter the talismanic words meeting of the minds to invoke an agreement among the defendants, see supra at 569, it is plain that the logistically complex concerted action allegedly taken to detain Arar and then transport him abroad implies an alleged agreement by government actors within the United States to act in concert.
With respect to the dismissal of Arar's claim for interfere[nce] with his access to lawyers and the courts while he was incarcerated by United States officials, Compl. ¶ 93, we think the district court erred here, too. An access to courts claim requires the pleading of (1) a nonfrivolous, arguable underlying claim that has been frustrated by the defendants' actions, and (2) a continued inability to obtain the relief sought by the underlying claim. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415-16, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court decided that Arar failed to plead with sufficient precis[ion] the existence of a sought-for underlying claim for relief, Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 286, which means it decided that, for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, [17] the defendants were not put on notice of the existence of such a claim. See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations... sufficient to give fair notice to a defendant.). But taking the allegations in the complaint as true, as we must, the complaint clearly implies the existence of an underlying claim for relief under CAT. The defendants can hardly argue that under Arar's assertions, which we take to be true, they lacked notice of such a claim, since the complaint says that it was they who first notified Arar about it: Arar alleges that on October 8, 2002, two INS officials told him that ... Defendant Blackman ... had decided to remove [him] to Syria, and Defendant Blackman also stipulated that [such action] would be consistent with Article 3 of CAT. Compl. ¶ 47. Indeed, the complaint alleges that Arar asked defendants for reconsideration of that decision i.e., relief from itin light of the prospect of torture in Syria, but the officials said that the INS is not governed by the `Geneva Conventions.' Id. Insofar as the district court's requirement that Arar articulate more precisely the judicial relief he was denied, Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 286, related to its holding that  Bivens did not extend a remedy to Arar for his deportation to Syria, id., we disagree for the reasons set forth below. Insofar as the district court thought Arar's underlying CAT claim would have been frivolous, it was mistaken. Cf. Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir.2004) (pursuant to the CAT, the United States may not remove an alien to a country if `it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to [that country]' (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2))). Nor was CAT the only relief Arar was denied. As the government pointed out at oral argument, th[e] decision [in Michael v. INS, 48 F.3d 657 (2d Cir.1995),] shows that in extraordinary cases, and no one can dispute that this is an extraordinary case, the plaintiff could have filed a habeas [petition] and sought a stay pursuant to the All Writs Act. Tr. at 82 (Cohn). [18] Contrary to the district court's ruling, then, Arar's complaint put the defendants on notice of claims seeking relief to bar his removal that were frustrated by the defendants' actions. Whatever the ultimate merits of those claims, they would not have been frivolous. And absent a remedy for the rendition and torture themselves the district court, and the majority, of course, conclude there is noneno contemporaneous legal relief is now possible except through the access to courts and counsel claim. See generally Br. of Amici Norman Dorsen et al. at 12-14. The Fourth Claim for Relief therefore states a sufficient due process access claim.
More generally, we think the district court's extended recitation of the allegations in the complaint makes clear that the facts of Arar's mistreatment while within the United Statesincluding the alleged denial of his access to courts and counsel and his alleged mistreatment while in federal detention in the United Stateswere pleaded meticulously and in copious detail. The assertion of relevant places, times, and eventsand names when knownis lengthy and specific. Even measured in light of Supreme Court case law post-dating the district court's dismissal of the fourth claim, which instituted a more stringent standard of review for pleadings, the complaint here passes muster. It does not offer[] `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Nor does it tender[] `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Its allegations of a constitutional violation are `plausible on [their] face.' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). And, as we have explained, Arar has pled factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s][are] liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). We would therefore vacate the district court's dismissal of the Fourth Claim for Relief.