Opinion ID: 2639482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leo W.

Text: The prosecutor asked a group of jurors that included Leo W, Let's assume for a moment that it was an accidental killing. He dropped the gun. It ricocheted, the bullet ricocheted and killed the person.... Do you think you'd be unable to give him the death penalty because he didn't intend to kill? Leo W. responded, I think I would go with life, especially if it was an accident. Later the prosecutor asked Leo W. why he left his job at the California Rehabilitation Center. Leo W. responded: I'm not a law enforcement type of person. I'm not a real authoritative type of person by nature. ... I'm not a law enforcement person, so I chose not to do it. It didn't sit well with me. He added: You just asked earlier if it was difficult for them [the jurors] to come to a conclusion. If all the evidenceif it was proven that the person is guilty, it would be difficult for me to make a decision. I have to be honest with you. It would be difficult. The prosecutor could reasonably have concluded from these remarks that Leo W. would not be a favorable penalty phase juror. Defendant argues that the prosecutor's question about imposition of the death penalty in a case of an accidental killing was improper, since the case here did not involve an accidental killing. The defense implies that the prosecutor asked the question to develop a ground for challenging Leo W., and to cover up the real basis for his peremptory challenge, Leo W.'s race. (See Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 [disparate questioning of Black venire members to develop grounds for peremptory challenges may show discriminatory intent].) But the prosecutor did not single out Leo W. or other Black prospective jurors to question them about the death penalty in a case of accidental killing. He posed his question to a group of six prospective jurors, including Leo W. and five White jurors. The prosecutor had earlier put similar questions about the felony-murder rule and unintentional or accidental killings to other groups of jurors. The record thus indicates that the prosecutor was trying to explain the felony-murder rule and ferret out any jurors hostile to that rule, not to develop grounds for challenging Leo W. Defendant finally argues that his counsel should have objected when the prosecutor told the group of jurors including Leo W. that he, the prosecutor, had asked almost every juror whether that juror could vote for death in the case of an accidental killing, when in fact he had asked that question on four previous occasions to 17 jurors, but not to all or most of the jurors. We have repeatedly emphasized that a claim of ineffective assistance is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding. ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) The defendant must show that counsel's action or inaction was not a reasonable tactical choice, and in most cases ``the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged ....'' ( People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, at p. 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134; People v. Wilson, supra, at p. 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Pope, supra, at p. 426, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.) ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 526, 122 Cal. Rptr.2d 285, 49 P.3d 1032.) The record does not show whether counsel had a tactical reason for failing to object to the prosecutor's comment.