Opinion ID: 2759419
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court Duty to Inquire

Text: A trial judge is required to conduct a “penetrating and comprehensive” inquiry when he or she “reasonably should know” that a conflict of interest exists. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347 (1980). Once this duty to inquire is triggered, “it cannot be discharged by a perfunctory inquiry,” but rather, the duty is only met with “probing and specific questions” about the potential conflict. See Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.9(b)(3d ed.) (quoting Atley v. Ault, 21 F. Supp. 2d 949 (S.D. Iowa 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1999)). This strict requirement imposed upon trial courts to inquire into a potential conflict of interest is consistent with the long recognized principle “that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel contains a correlative right to representation that is unimpaired by conflicts of interest or divided loyalties.” 34 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Lockhart, 923 F.2d at 1320. Generally, “a conflict exists when an attorney is placed in a situation conducive to divided loyalties, and can include situations in which the caliber of an attorney’s services may be substantially diluted.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Our decision in State v. Richie, 88 Hawaiʻi 19, 41, 960 P.2d 1227, 1249 (1998), noted that concurrent representation of a defendant and an adverse witness is a “real conflict of interest” because such a situation is “inherently conducive to divided loyalties.” The Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct (HRPC) Rule 1.7 (1994) provides that a “lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the . . . lawyer’s own interests, unless (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation.”17 17 Our analysis applies the 1994 HRAP Rule 1.7, which was in effect during the circuit court proceedings. A new version of HRPC Rule 1.7 went into effect on January 1, 2014. The revised rule provides that a “concurrent conflict of interest exists if: . . . there is a significant risk that the representation of [a] client[] will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.” “Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest. . . , a lawyer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to [the] client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; . . . and ([3]) [the] client gives consent after consultation, confirmed in writing.” HRAP Rule 1.7 (2014). 35 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Comment 4 to HRPC Rule 1.7, regarding “Loyalty to a Client,” describes how an actual conflict of interest may interfere with client representation: Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest involved. HRPC Rule 1.7 cmt 4 (1994) (emphases added); see also HRPC Rule 1.7 cmt 8 (2014) (“Even where there is no adversity of interest, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s ability to consider, recommend, or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests.”). The possibility of a conflict of interest “does not itself preclude the representation,” and Comment 4 provides that the “critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.” HRPC 36 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Rule 1.7 cmt 4 (1994); see also Fragiao v. State, 95 Hawaiʻi 9, 19, 18 P.3d 871, 881 (2001) (discussing HRPC Rule 1.7). Therefore, a circuit court’s “good cause” inquiry, when there is a potential conflict between the defendant and defense counsel’s personal interests, should address whether the representation would be “conducive to divided loyalties.” In light of the Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct’s guidance on conflicts of interest, the court should consider asking questions regarding the following: - the basis for the conflict of interest; - the potential that the conflict would materially interfere with defense counsel’s independent professional judgment in considering what actions to pursue on behalf of the client; - the possibility that the conflict might foreclose defense counsel from taking courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of a client; and - defense counsel’s opinion on whether his or her representation would be adversely affected.18 If the court finds that there is an actual or potential conflict of interest, the court has an obligation to 18 The questions are based on HRPC Rule 1.7 and comment 4 to Rule 1.7. These same questions are also appropriate under the current version of HRPC Rule 1.7 and comment 8 to Rule 1.7. 37 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER disqualify the attorney or to explain the situation to the defendant and obtain a waiver if the defendant consents to the relationship. See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the court’s “disqualification/waiver” obligation for severe, minor, and potential conflicts); LaFave et al., supra, § 11.9(b). The circuit court in this case was required to conduct an inquiry into the potential conflict of interest that was apparent during the pre-trial hearings on August 13 and 14, 2012. While explaining her reasons in support of her motion to withdraw as counsel on August 13, Ickes emphasized that withdrawal was necessary for her professionally. Ickes noted, “If I feel like perhaps there might be some later allegations of me being ineffective, me neglecting her, I certainly need to protect myself.” She assured the court that her motion was not strategic or intended to waste the court’s time. Nonetheless, in the colloquy that followed between the circuit court and Ickes, the court did not ask any questions probative of whether a conflict of interest did in fact exist between Ickes and Harter, whether such a conflict would adversely affect Ickes’ performance, or whether Harter consented to the relationship. Similarly, the court did not ask Harter any questions related to Ickes’ potential conflict of interest. 38 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Instead, the court determined that Ickes and Harter could “work together” and prepare for trial “in the little time” they had left because Ickes was “one of the better ones” and there were “only a few pages of discovery.” The following morning, the circuit court also did not address the question of whether Ickes had a conflict of interest with Harter, even though Harter explained that she left the courthouse quickly after the prior day’s hearing to go to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. The circuit court did not inquire into the circumstances of the potential conflict. When Harter tried to explain why she did not meet with Ickes, the court responded, “I didn’t ask you why.” Although the circuit court did not inquire into Ickes’ potential conflict of interest, the record indicates that a conflict of interest existed. Ickes explained that her personal interest of protecting herself professionally would jeopardize Harter’s right to the effective assistance of counsel: “[F]or my professional stake in this, and for Ms. Harter’s well-being -- I mean, she is facing these criminal charges, and she is entitled to effective assistance of counsel.” Ickes emphasized that the potential of future allegations of ineffectiveness required her to protect herself, implicitly suggesting it could materially 39 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER affect her representation of Harter.19 The exchange between Ickes and the circuit court thus demonstrates that counsel believed her representation of Harter would be adversely affected by this conflict of interest. Ickes’ opinion regarding her ability to provide effective assistance of counsel should have been afforded significant consideration by the court because she was in the “best position” to determine whether her personal interest would interfere with the representation. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (recognizing that an “attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial”); cf. State v. Scott, 131 Hawaiʻi 333, 345, 319 P.3d 252, 264 (2013) (finding that defense counsel was in the “best position to determine whether transcripts are necessary for an adequate defense”). In Holloway, the United States Supreme Court noted that defense attorneys have an obligation to advise the court of conflicts of interests, and as officers of the court, their declarations as to conflicts of interests are “virtually made 19 Ickes stated, “If I feel like perhaps there might be some later allegations of me being ineffective, me neglecting her, I certainly need to protect myself.” 40 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER under oath.” 435 U.S. at 486. Here, Ickes expressly assured the court that her motion was not strategic or intended to waste the court’s time.20 Thus, Ickes’ concerns, expressed as an officer of the court, regarding her ability to provide effective representation should have been accorded careful consideration by the circuit court in an inquiry to determine whether an actual conflict existed. In Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121 (D.C. 1985), the D.C. Court of Appeals explained how a defense attorney’s personal interest interferes with representation under similar circumstances to this case. The defendant in Douglas filed a complaint against his defense counsel with the Bar Counsel’s Office, which led to the Bar Counsel launching an investigation into the defense attorney’s conduct. Id. at 127-28.21 The D.C. Court of Appeals noted that as soon as the defense counsel learned of the investigation of the defendant’s complaint, “he acquired a personal interest in the way he conducted appellant's 20 Harter stated, “I . . . need to make this motion to withdraw and assure the Court that it’s not any strategy on my part to try and, you know, waste this Court’s time.” 21 The defendant’s complaint did not come to light until the second day of trial, when the defense counsel informed the court that he had just received a letter from the Office of Bar Counsel notifying him of the complaint and that the Bar Counsel was opening an inquiry into his conduct. Douglas v. United States, 488 A.2d 121, 128 (D.C. 1985). Even though the defendant and defense counsel indicated to the court that they wanted to go forward with the trial, the trial court declared a mistrial sua sponte. Id. at 129. 41 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER defense—an interest independent of, and in some respects in conflict with, appellant’s interest in obtaining a judgment of acquittal.” Id. at 137. For example, given a fear that the complaint would be expanded to include claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, the defense attorney “would have an inordinate interest in conducting the defense in a manner calculated to minimize any opportunity for post hoc criticism of his efforts.” Id. at 137. Ickes was in a similar situation as the defense counsel in Douglas, and she even went so far as to tell the circuit court directly that she needed to “protect” herself because of the possibility of a future ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This concern was confirmed the next day when Harter told the court that she went to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel following the pre-trial hearing. Ickes’ personal interest had the potential of seriously interfering with her “professional judgment about the best means of defending” Harter. Id. In light of the absence of a colloquy directed at ascertaining the risks, it cannot be discounted that defense counsel’s personal interest could potentially have also influenced her strategic decisions or encouraged her to use an overly “conservative trial strategy.” Id. Consequently, in the absence of any examination by the circuit court into the 42 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER underlying circumstances, the record in this case indicates there was a conflict of interest between Harter and Ickes. Therefore, “good cause” was demonstrated to grant the motion for withdrawal and substitution of counsel.22