Opinion ID: 1942386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: June, 1922, to Present

Text: Brown did not build on his property but held the same until March 9, 1927, when he sold it to Scruggs Investment Company, Inc. On June 28, 1944, Scruggs conveyed it to Susie M. Milner, the predecessor in title to appellants. Two years later Milner purchased the Brasfield property from the grantee of the Brasfield heirs. In 1966, Milner's estate sold the Brasfield property to Mr. and Mrs. James Martin who in 1972 conveyed to Mr. and Mrs. Nelson. Also, in 1972, the Bank, as trustee of the Milner estate, contracted to sell to Kennedy for residential purposes the Brown property (the subject 125-foot lot), contingent on a determination that a house could be constructed thereon. The Henleys gained title to their property from the heirs of Connors in 1966, and the deed is made subject to the August, 1917, Orr-Connors deed and the 1922 Connors-Brown agreement. We observe initially that it is without dispute that because the evidence before the trial Court was by stipulation of the parties, and testimony was not taken orally, the ore tenus rule of review does not apply. Donald v. Donald, 270 Ala. 483, 119 So.2d 909 (1960); Skinner v. Ellis, 245 Ala. 397, 17 So.2d 416 (1944). Our de novo consideration and resolution of the issues here presented are governed by the following legal propositions: 1. Where the language in a deed is plain and certain, acts and declarations of the parties cannot be resorted to to aid a construction. Lietz v. Pfuehler, 283 Ala. 282, 215 So.2d 723 (1968); Hall v. Long, 199 Ala. 97, 74 So. 56 (1917); Dunn & Wife v. The Bank of Mobile, 2 Ala. 152 (1841). 2. Where an ambiguity exists in the provisions of a deed, subsequent acts of the parties showing the construction they put on the instrument, are entitled to great weight in determining what the parties intended. Slaten v. Loyd, 282 Ala. 485, 213 So.2d 219 (1968); Irwin v. Baggett, 231 Ala. 324, 164 So. 745 (1935). 3. Restrictive covenants are to be construed according to the intent of the parties in the light of the terms of the restriction and surrounding circumstances known to the parties. Virgin v. Garrett, 233 Ala. 34, 169 So. 711 (1936); Chattahoochie & Gulf Railway Co. v. Pilcher, 163 Ala. 401, 51 So. 11 (1909). 4. Restrictions against the free use and enjoyment of property are not favored in law and such restrictions are to be strictly construed. Springdale Gayfer's Store Co., Inc. v. D. H. Holmes Co., 281 Ala. 267, 201 So.2d 855 (1967); Bear v. Bernstein, 251 Ala. 230, 36 So.2d 483 (1948); Virgin v. Garrett, supra. The crucial language of the subject covenant in the Orr-Connors deed is: The grantor herein agrees ... that not more than one dwelling house... shall be built and exist at any one time on the remaining portion of Lots 24 and 25. The question, then, is: Does the use of the words not more than one dwelling house ... include that portion of the Johnston house built on the E ¼ of Lot 25 so as to render the remainder of Lots 24 and 25 (150 feet) useless? The Henleys contend that the language of this covenant is clear, unambiguous, and bears no interpretation. When Orr later sold Johnston 25 feet off the east side of Lot 25 and Johnston built a portion of his house thereon, say the Henleys, and construction of a residence on the remaining portions of Lots 24 and 25 would constitute more than one dwelling. We cannot agree that, within the factual context of this covenant, the language lends itself to but one interpretation. The original subdivision covenant restricted each dwelling to a minimum of 100-foot frontage. Prior to August, 1917, Orr owned two 100-foot lots on which she was entitled to build two houses. One neighbor to the east (Connors) owned 1 and ¾ lots (175 feet) and one neighbor to the west (Johnston) owned 1 lot (100 feet). It is evident that each neighbor desired 25 feet of additional frontage for the purpose of constructing his residence. At the time Orr conveyed 25 feet to Connors in August, 1917, it is entirely reasonable to assume that Connors wished to make clear that this reduction in the size of Lot 24 would reduce Orr to one rather than two dwellings on the remaining 175 feet. Also, it is reasonable to assume that Connors was interested in extending the original subdivision restriction beyond the January 1, 1930, deadline. To assume, as appellees contend, that Orr's subsequent conveyance to Johnston of 25 feet to accommodate a portion of Johnston's dwelling rendered the balance of Orr's property (150 feet) useless is unreasonable, and infers an intention of the parties that is nonsensical. Why would Orr deliberately destroy the utility of the remaining portions of two lots equal in size to 1½ of the original lots in order to sell her neighbors 25 feet each? The absurdity of the supposition upon which this question is based is compounded by the factual certainty that in each instance it was the neighbor who sought the purchase and not Orr who sought the sale. Indeed, Orr made her answer to this question perfectly clear in her deed to Johnston in which she reserved the right to build on the remaining 150 feet. To be sure, Connors was not a party to the Orr-Johnston deed; but Connors executed the Brown agreement, which spelled out Brown's intention to build on the Orr property, subsequent to Johnston's construction on his 25 feet. Surely, it is beyond the realm of speculation that at the time of the Brown-Connors agreement, Connors knew two crucial facts: (1) He knew the exact location of the Johnston dwelling which occupied a portion of Orr's original Lot 25. This fact is inescapable since for at least four years Johnston and Connors were next door neighbors and the space which separated the west side of Johnston's house from the east side of Connors' house was essentially the area purchased by Brown from Orr as a building site at the same time as the Brown-Connors agreement. (2) He knew further that, in order to build a house on Lot 24 (under the subdivision restrictions), Brown necessarily had to utilize the remainder of Lot 25, which after the sale of an additional 25 feet to Brasfield (who now owned the Johnston property), consisted of 50 feet, or a total of 125 feet for the remaining portions of Lots 24 and 25. It is thus that, from all these circumstances, we are drawn to the conclusion that Connors' execution of the agreement with Brown evinced an intention on his part entirely consistent with that of Orr at the time of the Orr-Connors covenant, i. e., that the subsequent sale by Orr of 25 feet to Johnston and Johnston's construction of a portion of his house thereon did not render the balance of Orr's two lots useless under the terms of the Orr-Connors convenant. The court must put itself in the position of the parties. It must know what they knew, in order to ascertain, not what they intended to put in writing, but what meaning they attached to the words used. Chattahoochie & Gulf Railway Co. v. Pilcher, supra. As this Court stated in White v. Harrison, 202 Ala. 623, 81 So. 565 (1919): Covenants will, in general, be most strongly construed against the covenantor; still the paramount rule is to so expound them as to give effect to the actual intent of the parties [citation omitted]; We believe it is clear that the parties to the covenant in questionOrr and Connors intended that not more than one house would exist at any one time on a frontage lot of less than 100 feet. The present frontage of Lots 24 and 25, as reconstituted, is 125 feet. The rule of strict construction of restrictive covenants and the rule to give effect to the intention of the parties accommodate, here, to the same result, i. e., that the covenant in question is not enforceable so as to prohibit the use of this property for the erection of a residence thereon. This Court holds that the reconstituted lots, now consisting of a single building site of 125 foot frontage, are not prohibited from use for residential construction under the terms of the covenant in question. Reversed and remanded. HEFLIN, C. J., and HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, MADDOX and FAULKNER, JJ., concur. COLEMAN, J., dissents. MERRILL and McCALL, JJ., concur.