Opinion ID: 2635774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relationship between the Penalty and the Offense

Text: In Wheeler, this court examined the text of Article I, section 16, and attempted to articulate what the framers of that provision meant when they required that a penalty should be proportioned to the offense: The term `proportion' indicates a comparative relationship between at least two things. See, e.g., 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 45 (1828) (`proportion' indicates a `comparative relation'). Here, the two things being related are `penalties' and `the offense,' and the provision requires that the penalties for each particular offense be `proportioned'that is, comparatively relatedto that offense. The strong implication of that requirement is that a greater or more severe penalty should be imposed for a greater or more severe offense, and, conversely, that a less severe penalty should be imposed for a less severe offense.  343 Or. at 655-56, 175 P.3d 438 (emphasis added). After an extensive discussion of the history of the proportionality requirement, the court in Wheeler applied it to the sentences at issue there, concluding that [the] defendant's sentences bear a sufficient relationship to the gravity of the crimes of which he was convicted and his prior felony convictions. 343 Or. at 680, 175 P.3d 438. Thus, it is apparent from Wheeler that application of the proportionality provision requires consideration of the relationship between the gravity of the offense and the severity of the penalty. That consideration is similar to the first step in the test used by the United States Supreme Court in determining whether a penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (first part of test is examining the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty). [7] It also was the first step that the Court of Appeals followed in these cases, which that court applied based on its own precedents and Solem. Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. at 360-62, 174 P.3d 1100; Buck, 217 Or.App. at 370 n. 6, 174 P.3d 1106. These cases require us to elaborate on the way in which a court should examine the severity of the penalty, the gravity of the offense, and the relationship between the two. As to the relevant penalty, in contemporary criminal justice systems, including Oregon's, the primary determinant of the severity of a penalty is the amount of time that the wrongdoer must spend in prison or jail, if convicted of that offense. Examining the offense is slightly more involved. The state argues that the offense, for purposes of the proportionality requirement, is limited to the description of the prohibited conduct in the statute. In the state's view, the court is not permitted to consider the specific facts of any individual case when analyzing the gravity of the offense. The state's approach is inconsistent with this court's prior cases and defines offense too narrowly. If the state were correct, and the court could look to only the statutory definition of the offense and compare it to the statutory penalty, a defendant essentially would be limited to challenging the proportionality of a criminal penalty on its face. Of course, this court has rejected facial challenges to the mandatory sentences imposed by Measure 11, State ex rel Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or. 597, 614, 932 P.2d 1145 (1997), and we do not question that decision. However, in rejecting facial challenges to Measure 11 penalties, this court explicitly stated that a defendant could assert an as-applied constitutional challenge, as defendants have here: [I]f a sentencing court rules that a statutorily prescribed sentence (under [Measure 11] or any other statute) would be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual as applied in a given case, the court may refuse to impose the prescribed sentence. Id. (emphasis in original). And an as-applied challenge necessarily involves the consideration of the particular conduct in which the defendant engaged and for which he was convicted, as well as other factors, such as the defendant's criminal history. See, e.g., Wheeler, 343 Or. at 677-80, 175 P.3d 438 (in rejecting facial and as-applied proportionality challenges to sentence for sexual abuse, noting that defendant was charged with 18 separate sex felonies involving three different boys as young as nine years of age and that he had two previous felony sex convictions as well as a robbery conviction). An as-applied proportionality analysis that considers the facts of an individual defendant's specific criminal conduct is particularly significant when the criminal statute at issue covers a broad range of activity, criminalizing a variety of forms and intensity of conduct. In such a case, a harsh penalty might not, on its face, be disproportionate, because of the fact that the statute dealt, inter alia, with some extreme form of that conduct. However, when a defendant is convicted for engaging in only more minor conduct encompassed within the statute, the defendant may plausibly argue that the mandatory sentence, as applied to the particular facts of his or her case, is unconstitutionally disproportionate. To refuse even to consider defendants' as-applied challenge would not only be inconsistent with Huddleston, but would undermine the basic proportionality concept that more serious crimes should receive more severe sentences than less serious crimes and vice versa. In any event, the state offers no cogent reason to read the word offense in Article I, section 16, as limited to only the general (and, therefore, abstract) description of the conduct prohibited in the statute. Certainly, offense, for purposes of the proportionality requirement, includes the statutory definition of the crime, but the ordinary definition of the word offense also includes the specific conduct of the defendant that (because it was within the statutory definition) led to the prosecution and conviction of that defendant. [8] We therefore conclude that a defendant's offense, for purposes of Article I, section 16, is the specific defendant's particular conduct toward the victim that constituted the crime, as well as the general definition of the crime in the statute. In considering a defendant's claim that a penalty is constitutionally disproportionate as applied to that defendant, then, a court may consider, among other things, the specific circumstances and facts of the defendant's conduct that come within the statutory definition of the offense, as well as other case-specific factors, such as characteristics of the defendant and the victim, the harm to the victim, and the relationship between the defendant and the victim. Having identified the penalty and the offense, Article I, section 16, requires a court then to consider whether the former is proportioned to the latter. As discussed above, we observed in Wheeler that the use of the word proportioned strongly implies that a greater or more severe penalty should be imposed for a greater or more severe offense, and conversely, that a less severe penalty should be imposed for a less severe offense. 343 Or. at 656, 175 P.3d 438. The state argues that, by enacting a statute that sets a more severe penalty, the legislature (or the people acting through the initiative process) establishes that the offense to which the penalty is attached is, necessarily, a more severe offense. That is true, to a point. But this court has an independent duty to consider whether the specific sentences imposed pursuant to that statute are consistent with the constitutional proportionality requirement of Article I, section 16. Indeed, in Huddleston, we recognized that a court's authority to hold a Measure 11 sentence unconstitutional if, based on the facts of the particular case, the sentence violated Article I, section 16, was essential if the judicial branch were to retain its appropriate constitutional role. 324 Or. at 614, 932 P.2d 1145. We acknowledge that the task of comparing the penalty to the offense involves judgments that courts find difficult, but it is not impossible. The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the court's role in making such determinations in Solem: Application of these factors assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale. In a broad sense, this assumption is justified, and courts traditionally have made these judgmentsjust as legislatures must make them in the first instance. Comparisons can be made in light of the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender.    [T]here are widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes. For example, as the criminal laws make clear, nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes marked by violence or the threat of violence. There are other accepted principles that courts may apply in measuring the harm caused or threatened to the victim or society. The absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. Stealing a million dollars is viewed as more serious than stealing a hundred dollarsa point recognized in statutes distinguishing petty theft from grand theft. Few would dispute that a lesser included offense should not be punished more severely than the greater offense. Thus a court is justified in viewing assault with intent to murder as more serious than simple assault. 463 U.S. at 292-93, 103 S.Ct. 3001 (citations omitted).