Opinion ID: 772135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As to Tam and Ng:

Text: 13 Tam and Ng argue that the prosecution improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the defendants by thrice stating that the defendant had the same subpoena powers as the government, thereby implying that the defendants had a duty to call witnesses in their own defense. 14 We review claims of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error when the defendant did not object at trial, and for abuse of discretion when the district court denied an objection to closing argument. United States v. Etsitty, 130 F.3d 420, 424 (9th Cir. 1997). The defendant must show that it is more probable than not that the misconduct materially affected the verdict. United States v. Cooper, 173 F.3d 1192, 1203 (9thCir. 1999). 15 During closing argument, defense counsel for Tam and Ng pointed to particular persons involved in the offense who were not called to testify, as well as to records that the prosecution had not offered into evidence. Arguably, these statements by defense counsel urged the jury to assume that the missing evidence and witness would have been favorable to the defense. The government responded to this strategy during its rebuttal argument. The prosecutor reminded the jury to consider only the evidence in front of it, but then went on to state that the defense had the same power to subpoena witnesses as did the prosecution, suggesting that if the so-called missing evidence were in fact favorable to the defendants, then the defendants would have produced it for the jury. 16 During a recess, defense counsel for both defendants stated to the district court that they believed the government's argument was improper and that if made again during rebuttal that they intended to object. In response to the defense counsel, the district court stated that the government's comments were proper, but that the repetition of them may suggest a burden on the defendant. The judge instructed the government to refrain from further comments on the subpoena power of the defense. Neither of the counsel for defendants requested a curative instruction. 17 We need not decide whether the government's comments were error. Even assuming arguendo that they were, that error was rendered harmless as a result of the district court's response to the defendants' objection, as well as its jury instruction. The district court cured any potential error by telling the jury that the burden of proof was on the government and that the defendant need not call any witnesses or produce any evidence. Thus, even if the prosecution's comments were improper, the defendants suffered no prejudice as a result.
18 Defendants Tam and Ng also assert that the district court erred in finding that the money laundering conspiracy statute does not require the indictment to allege an overt act. This was not error. The language of 18 U.S.C. S 1956(h) is nearly identical to the language of 21 U.S.C. S 846, which the Supreme Court held in United States v. Shabani , 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994), does not require proof of an overt act.
19 Ng and Tam also argue that the district court's jury instruction on mail fraud inadequately defined the required element of materiality so that the element was not adequately presented to the jury. This argument also fails. The instruction given by the district court 2 was taken verbatim from the NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 8.26.1 (1997 edition). Defense counsel made no objection at trial. We note that the instruction is substantially like the definition of materiality given by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995). 3 Arguably Gaudin's definition of materiality, which includes the capable of influencing language, is in fact broader than the instruction given by the district court in this case. The district court did not plainly err in its jury instruction.
20 Tam and Ng also both appeal their sentences, arguing that the district court erred in holding the defendants responsible for the entire scope of the money laundering scheme. In sentencing Tam and Ng on the conspiracy to commit money laundering count, the district court relied upon their respective presentence reports (PSR). Both of their PSRs supplied facts supporting a conclusion that the defendants knew or could have reasonably foreseen the full amount of money wire transferred and brought into the United States by Ken Mak; approximately $2,300,000. This finding resulted in a six level increase over the base offense level of 23 contained in UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2S1.1 (1998). 21 At sentencing, the government bears the burden of proving factors enhancing a sentence by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Romero-Rendon, 220 F.3d 1159, 1160 (9th Cir. 2000). We review de novo a district court's compliance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. United States v. Carter, 219 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2000). The district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines we review de novo. Id. 22 A district court's resolution of disputed evidence related to sentencing is governed by Rule 32(c)(1), which reads as follows: 23 At the sentencing hearing . . . [f]or each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controversial matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. 24 Our precedent requires strict compliance with Rule 32. United States v. Houston, 217 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). We adopted this rule because resolving factual objections to the PSR on the record ensures meaningful appellate review of the sentence. Carter, 219 F.3d at 866-87. We hold that as to both defendants, the district court complied with Rule 32. 25 Prior to sentencing, both Tam and Ng objected to the six level increase recommended by their PSRs. They argued that they were responsible only for the account that they each individually controlled, or in the alternative, for the cumulative amount of the two accounts (totaling approximately $364,000, which would have resulted in a three level increase). They both disputed the facts in the PSR supporting the conclusion that they had knowledge of or could have reasonably foreseen the larger scope of the money laundering scheme. 26 In sentencing both defendants, the district court relied upon the defendants' PSRs and specifically adopted the findings contained therein. In doing so, the district court indicated its awareness of the defendants' challenges to the statements in the PSR and made the specific findings necessitatedby Rule 32. See Houston, 217 F.3d at 1209 (concluding that there was a Rule 32 violation by specifically noting that the district court had not adopted the PSR as its own findings). The facts in the defendants' PSR are sufficient to support the district court's finding that the government met its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendants could have reasonably foreseen the full scope of the money laundering conspiracy.