Opinion ID: 4556490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver/Forfeiture

Text: The defendants-appellees first argue that Bard has waived (1) the argument that CO Schadle and/or CO Dunning left Goldson with a collar or strap around his neck, leading him to strangle himself and (2) all of the claims that she originally alleged, except for the claim relating to Goldson’s death. We conclude that Bard has preserved her argument as to how Goldson died.4 Separately, it is my view that Bard has preserved her claims relating to Goldson’s removal from the sheriff’s cruiser and the medical care he failed to receive in his cell. 4The defendants-appellees refer mistakenly to waiver when, in fact, forfeiture is at issue. “Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Waiver is affirmative and intentional,” Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019), and the defendants-appellees nowhere explain how Bard has affirmatively abandoned her claims. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 10 1. Bard has preserved her self-strangulation theory The defendants-appellees assert that Bard waived her specific theory of Goldson’s death by raising it for the first time in the district court at the hearing on their summary-judgment motion, but binding Sixth Circuit caselaw forecloses this argument. As we held in United States v. Huntington National Bank, 574 F.3d 329 (6th Cir. 2009), “litigants may preserve an argument in the district court by ‘rais[ing]’ it for the first time at a hearing, even when they neglected to make the argument in a pre-hearing filing.” Id. at 332 (quoting United States v. Buckingham, 433 F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir. 2006)). For example, in Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Services v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 971 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1992), we addressed the same argument that the defendants-appellees make here and concluded that, despite a plaintiff’s lack of preparedness at summary judgment, [n]onetheless, the plaintiff did appear and argue against the defendant’s motion at the summary judgment hearing. A review of the transcript from that hearing shows that at a very minimum plaintiff’s counsel pointed out the provisions of the insurance contract on which it now bases its argument. Therefore, we find no merit to the defendant’s claim that this argument was waived. Id. at 3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). This “general rule”—that “raising an issue for the first time at a district court hearing,” unlike at an appellate oral argument, preserves the issue— was fleshed out in Huntington, in which we explained that “the litigant not only must identify the issue but also must provide some minimal level of argumentation in support of it.” 574 F.3d at 332. Here, Bard unequivocally identified her theory at the district-court hearing and provided argumentation in support of it. See R. 127 (Summary Judgment Hr’g Tr. at 51–52, 56–57) (Page ID #4813–14, 4818–19). The defendants-appellees do not argue otherwise. Nor do they argue that Bard’s theory of Goldson’s death was “fashioned after a district court’s unfavorable order.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. Healthcare Benefits Plan v. Durden, 448 F.3d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 2006). Because Bard raised this issue to the district court, she has not forfeited it on appeal. 5 5Apart from raising the specific self-strangulation theory at the district-court hearing, Bard’s memorandum in opposition to the defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment stated that “some type of ligature other than the sheet was around [Goldson’s] neck prior to Defendants Schadle, Dunning and McKinzie re-entering Goldson’s cell when they found him in medical distress.” R. 102 (Mem. in Opp. to Mot. for Summary Judgment (“Mem. in Opp.”) at 9) (Page ID #4252); see id. at 18 (Page ID #4261) (“The missing piece of evidence is as to No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 11 Nor did Bard contravene our rule that, “to the extent [a party] seeks to expand its claims to assert new theories, it may not do so in response to summary judgment.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007). Years before summary-judgment briefing, Bard alleged in her Amended Complaint that Goldson did not hang himself, and instead “died as a result of homicidal strangulation.” R. 2 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 48) (Page ID #31, 36). Although Bard did not develop the specific self-strangulation theory until later, she did not “seek[] to expand [her] claims” at the summary-judgment stage—the parameters of her § 1983 claim, which focused on the officers’ actions inside cell 15 that led to Goldson’s death, were the same at summary judgment as they were when she filed her Amended Complaint. Cf. Vonderhaar v. Waymire, 797 F. App’x 981, 990 (6th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the plaintiff could not “expand[]” her claim in opposition to the defendant’s summary-judgment motion “to include theories of recovery that bore no resemblance whatsoever to the . . . theory raised in her complaint”). Bard’s articulation of this theory—which did not expand her original § 1983 claim or raise a new one—at the summary-judgment stage thus did not “subject defendants to unfair surprise.” Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). In sum, Bard raised the specific theory that she raises on appeal at the district-court hearing, and she raised the more general theory of strangulation throughout this litigation. We therefore reject the defendants-appellees’ argument that Bard has waived the self-strangulation theory of Goldson’s death. 2. Bard has forfeited most, but not all, of her claims The defendants-appellees next argue that Bard has abandoned her other claims for excessive force, failure to intervene, deliberate indifference to medical needs, municipal liability, negligence, assault and battery, wrongful death, spoliation, and intentional infliction of what, if anything, was left on Mr. Goldson’s neck at the time Defendants Schadle and Dunning exited the cell. The circumstantial evidence illustrates that the ligature was most likely a Nylon hobble-strap or dog leash.”). It is true that Bard’s memorandum did not explicitly assert that Goldson died from “self-asphyxiation due to the accidental tightening of an unidentified strap around his neck.” Appellee Br. at 29. But her memorandum repeatedly argued that Goldson was “left” with a leash or collar around his neck, see R. 102 (Mem. in Opp. at 18, 20, 30) (Page ID #4261, 4263, 4273), which is the same general theory that Bard asserts on appeal. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 12 emotional distress. See Appellee Br. at 30. Although she “recounts some of the facts she originally alleged,” the defendants-appellees argue, “she develops no legal argument for reversal of the District Court’s Order on those claims.” Id. at 31. In my view, this is largely true. With respect to every issue except (1) the abusive “greeting” that Goldson received upon arrival in the jail garage and (2) the deliberateindifference claim related to medical care for Goldson after the officers apparently discovered his body, Bard “raises the issue in h[er] statement of facts, but does not further develop the issue in the argument section of h[er] brief, nor in h[er] reply brief.” United States v. Smart, 406 F. App’x 14, 17 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010). She presents no arguments in her opening brief in support of her claims of other violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under § 1983 or in support of her state-law claims of negligence, assault and battery, wrongful death, spoliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. “Issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, without some effort to develop an argument, are deemed forfeited.” Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 731 F.3d 608, 621 (6th Cir. 2013).6 Bard’s assertion in her reply brief that her appeal challenges “in toto” the district court’s grant of summary judgment cannot retroactively preserve these claims. Reply Br. at 1. In this brief, Bard briefly references “Wedmore’s verbal assault of Mr. Goldson at the hospital,” id. at 7, but she has dismissed with prejudice her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Wedmore, R. 122 (Stip. Entry of Partial Dismissal) (Page ID #4755). She also attempts, in her reply brief, to develop arguments in support of her claim related to the identity of the sprinkler escutcheon, but “an appellant abandons all issues not raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.”7 United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 845–46 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in 6My colleagues acknowledge that we have never set forth “rigid requirements govern[ing] what constitutes developed argument on appeal,” J. Nalbandian Op. at 39, but, confusingly, proceed to misread our decision in McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1997), as establishing such requirements. McPherson, according to my colleagues, explained that in order to avoid forfeiture, a party’s analysis “must” include “the elements of the claim, evidence that could satisfy those elements for the defendants in the case, and responses to asserted affirmative defenses.” J. Nalbandian Op. at 37. Such mandatory language appears nowhere in McPherson. 7The one reference to this issue in the argument section of Bard’s opening brief makes no “effort to develop an argument.” Williamson, 731 F.3d at 621; see Appellant Br. at 20 (“Other factual issues point to collusion on the part of the Defendants/Appellants regarding statements made between Sheriff personnel to the Brown County Coroner regarding the time line, presentation by the BCI Investigator pertaining to the authenticity and chain of custody of the sprinkler escutcheon from the jail cell where Mr. Goldson was found.”). No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 13 original) (quoting United States v. Still, 102 F.3d 118, 122 n.7 (5th Cir. 1996)); see United States v. Penaloza, 648 F. App’x 508, 521 n.6 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Cabrera raised for the first time in his reply brief the argument on which he focused before the district court . . . . This argument was forfeited when he did not raise it in his opening brief.”). Bard has thus forfeited these claims. By contrast, in support of the excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims related to Goldson’s removal from the cruiser, Bard argues that “[t]he video footage contains direct evidence clearly showing a ‘greeting’ of Mr. Goldson by the corrections officers and deputies who abused him.”8 Appellant Br. at 18. She also argues that the defendants-appellees’ actions “include the ‘welcoming party’ located in the Sally Port of the Brown County Jail that greeted Mr. Goldson when he arrived and then ripped Mr. Goldson out of the car by Officer Huff’s efforts allowing Goldson to ‘free fall’ and to land face first on the concrete while being in hand cuffs and leg shackles.” Reply Br. at 7. As I see it, Bard has thus preserved her excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims related to the manner in which Goldson was removed from the cruiser. Similarly, in my view, Bard has not abandoned her deliberate-indifference claim because she develops arguments in support of this claim in her opening brief. See Appellant Br. at 26 (“[T]estimony and other evidence indicates that no life-saving methods were being executed on Mr. Goldson when the emergency life squad personnel arrived at 03:10 on October 5, 2013.”); id. (“Although Defendants indicated they had started CPR on Mr. Goldson – unverifiable by any other sources – the Defendants colluded with each other to stop these efforts prior to the arrival of the emergency life squad personnel.”).9 8Itis true that Bard makes this argument in the context of attempting to establish that the officers had “motive and opportunity” to leave Goldson in a dangerous environment in his cell, see also Appellant Br. at 21 (“[T]he evidence reveals that the officers involved acted together to give Mr. Goldson a ‘welcoming party’ that entailed leaving him in his cell with leg shackles, hand cuffs, and a collar around his neck.”) (emphasis added), but given that it corresponds to her stand-alone claim that the officers used excessive force and failed to intervene in the cruiser-removal incident, I believe that this statement constitutes developed argumentation. That Bard “focuses” her opening brief on the strangulation claim, J. Nalbandian Op. at 37, does not mean that arguments receiving less focus, like this one, are subject to the severe penalty of forfeiture. We should not ignore Bard’s excessive-force claim, which she has consistently raised since the outset of this lawsuit, see R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 38) (Page ID #9) (“Defendants have, under color of law, deprived Mr. Goldson of . . . the right to be free from excessive force.”), and which the district court comprehensively analyzed as a standalone claim, see Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at , because it overlaps with the broader theory of Goldson’s death. 9Bard also states: “What is disturbing is that none of the officers came to the rescue of Mr. Goldson or admonished each other from refraining from their conduct that created the situation resulting in the death of Mr. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 14 For these reasons, we hold that Bard has preserved her § 1983 claims related to Goldson’s death. I would further hold that she has preserved her claims relating to Goldson’s removal from the sheriff’s cruisier and the inadequate medical care he received in his cell, and that Bard has forfeited all other claims on appeal. C. Excessive-Force Claim for Goldson’s Removal from the Cruiser Because I believe Bard has preserved her claim related to Goldson’s removal from the sheriff’s cruiser, I proceed to assess the merits of this claim. The district court held that the jail officers were entitled to qualified immunity for the manner in which Goldson was removed from the cruiser, explaining that Corporal Huff “moved quickly and with force to secure an inmate who minutes earlier had escaped restraints and attacked an officer” and that because he did not use “objectively unreasonable force,” the surrounding officers could not be held liable for failing to intervene. Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . Additionally, the district court explained that the surrounding officers could not be held liable because Huff “removed Goldson from the cruiser so quickly that the other officers would not have had the opportunity to intervene even if intervention had been required.” Id. The district court was undoubtedly correct as to the surrounding officers. “Generally speaking, a police officer who fails to act to prevent the use of Goldson.” Appellant Br. at 27. Although it appears that the word “rescue” may be unrelated to the medical-care argument, given the context of the sentence and the rest of the surrounding paragraph, which relate to the argument that the officers left Goldson in a situation in which he could strangle himself, I believe that this sentence constitutes another attempt at developing the deliberate-indifference claim more generally. One need only open Bard’s opening brief to pages 26 and 27 to see the error in the my colleagues’ characterization of Bard’s deliberate-indifference argument as merely “support[ing] her self-strangulation claim.” J. Nalbandian Op. at 38. The opinion first states that Bard “explains” that the various statements relating to the officers’ avoidance of Goldson’s medical emergency are connected only to the strangulation claim. Where does Bard “explain” this? All my colleagues point to is a sentence from the prior paragraph—following a discussion of what was left on Goldson’s neck when the officers initially exited his cell—that says, “The circumstantial evidence illustrates that the ligature was most likely a Nylon hobble-strap or dog leash.” Appellant Br. at 26. Bard’s argument that the officers were deliberately indifferent to Goldson’s medical need does not begin until five sentences later, in a new paragraph. See id. (arguing that “no life-saving methods were being executed on Mr. Goldson when the emergency life squad personnel arrived”). The opinion next states that Bard “immediately follows” her statements about medical indifference with a bolded sentence dealing with the self-strangulation claim. J. Nalbandian Op. at 39. Wrong again. The bolded sentence follows only one statement—the one we have acknowledged could be construed as supporting either the strangulation claim or the deliberate-indifference claim, see supra—whereas the rest of Bard’s statements regarding deliberate indifference appear in a different paragraph. Compare Appellant Br. at 26, with id. at 27. To say that these statements are “immediately followed” by the bolded sentence, transforming their meaning, is to mischaracterize the setup of Bard’s brief. The deliberate-indifference claim may not be the “focus” of Bard’s brief, but it is surely not abandoned. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 15 excessive force may be held liable when (1) the officer observed or had reason to know that excessive force would be or was being used, and (2) the officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring.” Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997). The video of this incident confirms that the other officers did not have the opportunity to prevent any possible harm from occurring, given that the use of force lasted approximately three seconds. R. 98-1 (Sally Port Video at 0:09–0:12). Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the surrounding officers on this claim. To determine whether Corporal Huff’s use of force was excessive and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we must consider “whether [his] actions [we]re objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [hi]m, without regard to . . . underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). This analysis considers not only the officer’s actions themselves but also “the effects of [his] actions.” Brown v. Chapman, 814 F.3d 447, 459 (6th Cir. 2016). In the context of a claim against jail officials, “[a] court must also account for the ‘legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in th[e] judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.’” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)). Beyond whether Huff violated Goldson’s constitutional rights, there is the question of whether Huff is entitled to qualified immunity. “We analyze claims of qualified immunity using a three-part test, which requires us to determine (1) whether a constitutional right was violated; (2) whether that right was clearly established and one of which a reasonable person would have known; and (3) whether the official’s action was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.” Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). On the question of whether Corporal Huff’s use of force violated Goldson’s Fourth Amendment rights, none of the various factors that our caselaw mentions in justifying similar uses of force are present here. First, Goldson was not unsecured. It is undisputed that Goldson was handcuffed inside the vehicle, and the defendants-appellees do not argue on appeal that there No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 16 was a question as to whether the handcuffs were secured. “[O]nce someone has been restrained with handcuffs, the need for force is near ‘nonexistent.’” Kalvitz v. City of Cleveland, 763 F. App’x 490, 494 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1307 (6th Cir. 1988)). Cf. Dunn v. Matatall, 549 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A reasonable officer on the scene would have believed that the threat posed by Dunn was not contained until Dunn was out of the car and handcuffed.”). Indeed, the officers had already “neutralize[d] [the] perceived threat,” id., by forcing Goldson to the ground at the hospital; handcuffing him behind his back; securing him in leg shackles and a transport belt; and laying him face-down on the backseat of the sheriff’s cruiser. Cf. Williams v. Ingham, 373 F. App’x 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2010) (use of force not excessive when an officer responded to the plaintiff injuring another officer by “us[ing] a takedown technique to remove [the plaintiff] from the vehicle and put[ting] him face-down on the ground”). Second, Goldson had not “refuse[d] the Officers’ commands to exit the car.” Dunn, 549 F.3d at 354; see Hocker v. Pikeville City Police Dep’t, 738 F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Hocker did not comply with the officers’ commands to exit the vehicle, and as a result they forcibly removed him from the car.”); Graves v. Bowles, 419 F. App’x 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2011) (forcible removal from arrestee’s car was permissible when arrestee refused to comply with officers’ orders); Burdine v. Sandusky County, 524 F. App’x 164, 166 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Upon arriving at the jail, Burdine again refused the officers’ commands to exit the car.”). Third, unlike numerous cases before us in which law-enforcement officers have forcibly removed arrestees from the arrestees’ own vehicles, given the unknown, potentially dangerous contents inside, see, e.g., Blosser v. Gilbert, 422 F. App’x 453, 458 (6th Cir. 2011); Dunn, 549 F.3d at 354; Graves, 419 F. App’x at 644, here an officer physically removed an inmate from a law-enforcement vehicle in which the inmate had already been secured. The district court explained that Huff’s use of force was justified by the fact that Goldson had recently escaped restraints, Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at , but the defendants-appellees do not make this argument on appeal. Even if they had, it would be unconvincing. Goldson was not an unknown criminal suspect who may have, for instance, possessed a weapon. See Hayden v. Green, 640 F.3d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Green could reasonably believe that Hayden was a No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 17 hit-and-run suspect who had refused to stop his vehicle despite a police officer’s obvious indication that he should. So Green escalated his use of force.”). Goldson was a known, secured inmate, and no record evidence indicates that the officers were uncertain whether he had been effectively restrained in the cruiser. Roughly pulling Goldson by the lower part of his body without securing the upper part of his body was certain to—and, as the video reveals, did—result in the upper part of his body crashing to the ground. Although Goldson did not appear to sustain serious head trauma from this maneuver, the video evidence alone is sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Huff violated Goldson’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force. See Ingram v. City of Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 597 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have held that a plaintiff may allege use of excessive force even where the physical contact between the parties did not leave excessive marks or cause extensive physical damage.”) (citing Holmes v. City of Massillon, 78 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1996)). It is clear, in my view, that Huff employed excessive force in removing Goldson from the vehicle, which satisfies both the excessive-force analysis and the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis. The clearly-established prong of the qualified-immunity analysis is straightforwardly satisfied here. As the Supreme Court observed in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), “there is no doubt that Graham v. Connor clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness.” Id. at 201–02. At the time of the alleged unconstitutional conduct, the proscription against the excessive use of force was clearly established. As to the objective reasonableness of the use of force, the fact that both the excessiveforce and qualified-immunity analyses involve assessing whether the force was objectively unreasonable does not render the latter assessment “merely duplicative” of the former. Id. at 203. Indeed, “[t]he qualified immunity inquiry . . . has a further dimension” that “acknowledge[s] that reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Id. at 205. As discussed above, the only theoretical reason for yanking Goldson out of the vehicle by his lower body, guaranteeing that his upper body would immediately fall to the ground, was that Goldson had recently attempted to escape from the officers. But we have repeatedly rejected this argument when the officer “used [such] force well No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 18 after securing [the individual] and defusing the situation.” Vance v. Wade, 546 F.3d 774, 785 (6th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Burden v. Carroll, 108 F. App’x 291, 294 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Because [the plaintiff] alleges that [the officer] [violently shoved him] well after the situation was secured, [the officer] cannot claim that he was reasonably mistaken about the degree of force that was appropriate under those circumstances.”); Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 332 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A]s we have previously held, striking a neutralized suspect who is secured by handcuffs is objectively unreasonable.”). Cf. Dorsey v. Barber, 517 F.3d 389, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[Officer] Begin . . . brandished his firearm to secure compliance only after plaintiffs had disregarded his first two commands. In other words, inasmuch as Begin’s first two lawful commands had gone unheeded, he reasonably perceived that a show of force was necessary to secure compliance.”). “A reasonable officer would understand that, after compliance is secured and a threat is no longer posed, force should not be employed.” Cole v. City of Dearborn, 448 F. App’x 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2011). Because there is no indication in the record that Goldson posed a threat to the officers, I believe that the district court erred in concluding that Huff’s use of force was objectively reasonable and granting him qualified immunity on this basis. D. Excessive-Force Claim for Goldson’s Placement in Cell 15 and Death Next, we address the district court’s conclusion that Deputy Wedmore, Corporal Huff, CO Dunning, CO McKinzie, and CO Schadle were entitled to qualified immunity for the claims against them based on Goldson’s death. Before reaching the issue of how Goldson died, it should be noted that the district court erroneously concluded that “Plaintiff has not put forth admissible evidence establishing who caused Goldson’s death and when if he did not commit suicide.” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . To the contrary, on these two issues, Bard has pointed to direct evidence from the security footage demonstrating that COs Schadle and Dunning were alone with Goldson in his cell from 2:32 to 2:34 a.m., while Corporal Huff and Deputy Wedmore watched from the hallway. R. 98-1 (Hallway Video at 0:20–1:01). The fact that, between COs Schadle and Dunning, Bard does not allege which officer took which action is immaterial at the summary-judgment stage. In Fazica v. Jordan, 926 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2019), we explained: Defendants argue that because Fazica cannot clearly attribute particular uses of force to particular Defendants, she cannot prove that any particular Defendant’s conduct violated her constitutional rights. For example, they argue No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 19 that she cannot prove whether it was Defendant Officer Fletcher, Cordova, Tucker, or Jordan who was the one to twist her arm behind her back, rip her pants off, touch her genitals, etc., and that therefore she must lose at summary judgment. We reject Defendants’ argument and conclude that a reasonable jury could find that each of the named Defendants violated Fazica’s clearly established constitutional rights either by directly using excessive force against her or by observing others doing so and failing to act. Id. at 289–90 (record citation omitted); see also Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 651 (6th Cir. 2010). Even less speculation is necessary here than in Fazica, because only two officers were present in the cell (both of whom are identified by name), and Bard’s excessive-force claim with respect to Goldson’s death rests on only one act—the officers placing a strap or collar around Goldson’s neck. Thus, the question for us to consider is not “who?” or “when?” but “how?”10 On this question—how did Zachary Goldson die?—there is substantial evidence supporting the defendants-appellees’ version of events. The consistent, sworn testimonies of numerous officers present at the jail when Goldson died; the similar conclusions of the Montgomery County Coroner’s office’s forensic pathologists, a grand jury, and a state criminal investigation; and video evidence revealing the on-duty officers apparently reacting with surprise upon discovering Goldson’s body all indicate that Goldson committed suicide by hanging. Furthermore, the defendants-appellees are correct that Investigator Newman’s testimony regarding the possible hobble-strap markings on Goldson’s body was deemed inadmissible by the district court, see R. 114 (Dist. Ct. Order at 12–13) (Page ID #4632–33), and Bard neither appealed that decision nor argued in her appellate brief that it was incorrect, see Appellee Br. at 40–41, so Bard’s citation to Newman’s testimony is improper, see Appellant Br. at 11. 10On this point, the dissent states: “I disagree that defendants Schadle and Dunning’s presence alone with Goldson in cell fifteen is enough to conclude they deliberately caused Goldson’s death.” J. Nalbandian Op. at 40. Yet absent from our analysis, see infra Part II.D.1–4, is any intimation that these officers’ “presence alone” could lead a reasonable jury to hold them liable, J. Nalbandian Op. at 40. Instead, it is discrete, affirmative evidence, discussed below, that could permit such a finding of liability. Accordingly, we make only a limited point in referencing Fazica: If the evidence is sufficient to conclude a victim suffered a constitutional violation caused by a limited universe of actors (as here and in Fazica), the plaintiff’s claim may survive summary judgment without attributing discrete physical acts to discrete actors, so long as each actor necessarily (1) committed the act or (2) failed to stop it from occurring. See Fazica, 926 F.3d at 295 (“A jury could reasonably conclude that when an officer commits such acts, his colleagues are likely to notice.”). In reality, the dissent does not contest our understanding of Fazica, but only our underlying reason for turning to it: There is sufficient evidence in this case, as in Fazica, to conclude that the victim suffered a constitutional violation at the hands of an identifiable group of law-enforcement officers. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 20 In our view, however, the district court erred in concluding that Bard “does not have evidence sufficient to establish that any Defendant used excessive force or failed to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force against Goldson, much less that any specific Defendant caused Goldson’s death.” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . For the following reasons, we conclude that (1) the genuine dispute of fact as to whether Goldson physically could have hanged himself, (2) the testimony of the Brown County Coroner, Dr. Judith Varnau, (3) the dispute over whether Goldson was leg shackled, and (4) Deputy Wedmore’s threatening comments to Goldson shortly before the latter’s death create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how Goldson died.
The existence of a factual dispute over whether Goldson could have physically hanged himself is without question. Indeed, nowhere in the defendants-appellees’ brief do they argue that Bard has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute on this issue, and as the district court concluded, “Plaintiff does establish a question of fact as to whether Goldson physically could have hung himself in holding cell 15 by tying a sheet around the sprinkler assembly.” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . This finding is plainly correct given the forensic analysis of Bard’s expert, which concluded that Goldson could not have hanged himself, the affidavit of Dustin Downing (despite any indication that it lacks trustworthiness, see id. at  n.8), the testimony of Dr. Varnau regarding the implausibility of Goldson hanging himself, see, e.g., R. 74-15 (Varnau Dep. at 224) (Page ID #225), and the evidence of Goldson’s finger impairment, R. 97-3 (Booking Finger Prints at 1–2) (Page ID #3949–50).11 Thus, as all parties seem to agree, a jury could conclude that Goldson was not capable of hanging himself. We need not decide whether this genuine dispute alone would have been sufficient to defeat the defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment, given the other evidence supporting Bard’s opposition to the motion, as follows. 11This dispute is apparent even without considering the evidence that Goldson remained handcuffed and/or leg-shackled in his cell, see infra, which would clearly make it less likely that he could have hanged himself. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 21
At the time of Goldson’s death, Dr. Varnau was responsible for investigating the mode, manner, and cause of his death, R. 74-15 (Varnau Dep. at 27) (Page ID #1460), and she personally responded to the jail upon notice that Goldson had died, id. at 82 (Page ID #1515). Much of her deposition testimony related to her official conclusion that Goldson did not hang himself, and specifically related to the implausibility of a suicide under the circumstances. For example, she said that it “didn’t seem to add up” that the officers had carried out CPR on Goldson while the noose was still tied around his neck. Id. at 219–20 (Page ID #152–63). She also confirmed that her analysis of Goldson’s death was based on her visual inspection of the body, her interviews and conversations with individuals on the death scene, the preliminary findings of the Montgomery County Coroner, the final autopsy of the coroner, the autopsy photographs, her own personal death-scene photographs, and various measurements taken of cell 15. Id. at 233–34 (Page ID #1666–67). Most critical to the issue on appeal are Dr. Varnau’s statements during her deposition that support the theory that Goldson’s death by strangulation involved a hobble strap around his neck. First, she stated that Officer Don Hency commented on the autopsy photographs that he had knowledge of individuals incarcerated in the jail being “led around by hobble straps in the jail. Put the straps around their necks and they lead them like on dog leashes.” Id. at 83–84 (Page ID #1516–17).12 Second, she confirmed that her statement that the marks may have been left from a 12Hency’s out-of-court statements may constitute inadmissible hearsay, but it is well-established that the party opposing summary judgment need not “produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Instead, a party opposing summary judgment who proffers evidence in a form not admissible at trial “must show that she can make good on the promise of the pleadings by laying out enough evidence that will be admissible at trial to demonstrate that a genuine issue on a material fact exists, and that a trial is necessary.” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). It is possible that Hency could testify at trial as to this neck-leashing practice, and if he did not have personal knowledge, another individual could lay this foundation. The dissent argues that introduction of the jail’s practice of placing inmates in neck restraints would constitute inadmissible character evidence, but does not specify how this evidence goes to anyone’s “character,” nor whom it impugns. J. Nalbandian Op. at 43. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Officer Hency’s observation, by contrast, does not pin the neck-leashing practice on any of the named defendants. It is not evidence that a particular named defendant “is the sort of person who would” place an inmate in a neck restraint—“[t]his is precisely the sort of propensity reasoning Rule 404(b) forbids.” Helfrich v. Lakeside Park Police Dep’t, 497 F. App’x 500, 507 (6th Cir. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 22 hobble strap was based on observing photographs of Goldson’s body. Id. at 253 (Page ID #1686).13 Dr. Varnau also testified that, based on her review of the evidence, Goldson’s death was a homicide by strangulation. Id. at 214 (Page ID #1647). In support of this theory, she compared the marks on Goldson’s neck to those of a typical hanging. “When you look at the way that, a person that’s hung, there’s usually a V here on their neck,” Dr. Varnau explained. Id. at 222 (Page ID #1655). As for the marks on Goldson’s neck, she continued, “it seems that something was pulling him back this way. It was not something that was pulling up.” Id. at 223 (Page ID #1656). This testimony resembles that of an examining doctor in Ratcliff v. Daniel, 224 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished), a summary-judgment appeal before the Fifth Circuit dealing with the same question that we consider here—whether an incarcerated decedent had, in fact, committed suicide by hanging. In Ratcliff, the examining doctor “noted that, in a hanging, the ligature mark usually runs in an upward ‘V’ pattern across the neck, whereas the mark on [the decedent]’s neck was horizontal-as if [he] had been strangled from behind.” Id. at . The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that the “[t]he testimony of [this doctor and another doctor] certainly produces an issue of material fact as to whether the Appellees negligently failed to protect Ratcliff from harm by others than himself.” Id. In similar fashion here, Dr. Varnau offered specific testimony in support of the theory that Goldson died by strangulation. Although the district court did not exclude Dr. Varnau’s testimony, at least four aspects of the district court’s evaluation of it were either questionable or erroneous. First, and most 2012) (emphasis added). Instead, evidence that the jail had a practice of leashing inmates by the neck is more akin to background evidence. “Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal or spatial connection with the charged offense.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). “Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” Id. The jail’s general practice of leashing inmates—which does not even identify a “prior” specific “act” for Rule 404(b) purposes—would be directly probative of its employees following this practice in the instant case. We reject the proposition that this constitutes inadmissible character evidence. 13Elsewhere in her deposition testimony, Dr. Varnau stated that Investigator Newman had reviewed autopsy photographs and concluded that the marks on Goldson’s neck “could be like a hobble strap or something like that.” Id. at 78 (Page ID #1511). As we have already clarified, Newman’s testimony was inadmissible, so we do not consider this statement by Varnau as supportive of Bard’s opposition to summary judgment. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 23 important, although it is true that Dr. Varnau did not specifically comment on the theory that Goldson died by accidental self-strangulation after struggling against a hobble strap around his neck, the district court’s conclusion that Dr. Varnau’s testimony “does not reasonably support that theory” is incorrect. Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . Dr. Varnau’s testimony supports the general theory that Goldson was strangled to death with a hobble strap; the specific theory of self-strangulation with the hobble strap, placed by the relevant officers, is consistent with—and supported by—the more general theory. A jury could reasonably infer either that one or both of the officers strangled Goldson with a hobble strap or that one or both of them placed Goldson’s neck in a hobble strap, which led him to strangle himself after struggling against the restraint. Second, the district court improperly weighed the credibility of Dr. Varnau’s testimony, noting that she “offered inconsistent theories of how [Goldson] died.” See id. This was in error. “[P]roof that a party . . . has made prior inconsistent statements is not a rare event in our courts. Juries are regularly called upon to consider evidence of that sort, and we all know that prior inconsistency does not inexorably lead to defeat.” Hanson v. Madison Cty. Det. Ctr., 736 F. App’x 521, 537 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether [s]he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, Inc., 573 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In reviewing a summary judgment motion, credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited.” (citation omitted)). To the extent the district court rejected Dr. Varnau’s testimony because it “offered inconsistent theories” of Goldson’s death, this was erroneous. Third, the district court questioned the significance of Dr. Varnau’s testimony because “she did not testify—nor could she testify since she was not present at the jail—as to which officer purportedly placed the never-seen hobble strap or ligature around Goldson’s neck.” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at  (emphasis added). For the reasons discussed above, it was not necessary for Bard to submit evidence regarding which of the two officers placed the strap around Goldson’s neck. See Fazica, 926 F.3d at 289–90. Nor was Dr. Varnau’s testimony any less significant because she did not name a specific officer responsible for Goldson’s death. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 24 Fourth, the district court stated that Dr. Varnau’s testimony about the hobble strap or leash was “based at least in part on Newman’s inadmissible opinion,” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at , but ignored that Dr. Varnau also stated explicitly that her hobble-strap theory was “base[d] . . . on looking at the photographs,” R. 74-15 (Varnau Dep. at 253) (Page ID #1686). Although the district court did not deem Dr. Varnau’s testimony inadmissible, any discounting by the district court of this testimony because it was based, in part, on Newman’s inadmissible opinion was improper. On a related note, the dissent would have us extend our evidentiary analysis beyond assessing the district court’s rulings—and beyond what any of the parties have argued—and deem Dr. Varnau’s cause-of-death testimony wholly inadmissible because she was not at the scene when Goldson died and because she was not qualified as an expert. See J. Nalbandian Op. 44–45. We reiterate that the district court never concluded that Dr. Varnau’s deposition testimony was inadmissible, nor did the defendants-appellees seek such an evidentiary ruling. At the district court’s hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the district court raised the issue of “the legal or factual significance of Dr. Varnau’s determination that Mr. Goldson’s cause of death was a strangulation or homicide if she was not medically qualified to perform an autopsy,” but did not conclude—or even suggest—that Dr. Varnau’s testimony would be excluded as inadmissible evidence. R. 127 (Summary Judgment Hr’g Tr. at 3) (Page ID #4765). Moreover, the defendants-appellees have never argued—either in the district court, see generally R. 103 (Defs.’ Objections at 1–20) (Page ID #4302–21), or on appeal, see generally Appellee Br.—that Bard cannot rely in part on Dr. Varnau’s deposition testimony to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact. Indeed, the defendants-appellees themselves repeatedly cited her testimony in their motion for summary judgment, see R. 77 (MSJ at 10–11) (Page ID #3139– 40), and they did not ask the district court to exclude Dr. Varnau’s testimony during oral argument on the motion. Bard has consistently revealed to the defendants-appellees her reliance on Dr. Varnau’s testimony, see, e.g., R. 102 (Mem. in Opp. at 25) (Page ID #4266); R. 102-2 (Pl.’s Resp. to Proposed Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 70, 72, 74–75) (Page ID #4283–84); Appellant Br. at 18 (“It is for a jury to weigh the testimonial evidence of Dr. Judy Varnau, Dr. Susan Allen and Dr. Kent Harshbarger as well as their credibility to understand the official manner and cause of death.”), yet the defendants-appellees have never argued that this testimony is inadmissible. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 25 For these reasons, the dissent’s proposed, sua sponte consideration of whether Dr. Varnau’s testimony should have been excluded runs contrary to a fundamental tenet of evidence law: “All evidence is admitted as a matter of course unless a valid ground of objection is interposed.” 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 303; see 88 C.J.S. Trial § 190 (“A party opposing the admission of evidence has the burden to persuade the judge to exclude it.”); United States v. Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Assuming that Mr. Nordfelt’s testimony could properly be cast as that of an expert, Mr. Gomez did not object at trial to the admission of the expert testimony and, therefore, the issue is not properly before this court.”); United States v. Presley, 349 F. App’x 22, 28 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation when “defense counsel likely made a strategic decision not to object to the admission of the hearsay testimony by [the government’s witness]”). In our adversarial system, “the common law made the parties the captains of their own litigious fate.” 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 2d § 5032. It is therefore no surprise that all of the cases cited by the dissent for its argument that Dr. Varnau’s testimony is wholly inadmissible at trial involved one party objecting to or opposing the admission or consideration of such opinion evidence. See Harrison v. New York Life Ins. Co., 78 F.2d 421, 424 (6th Cir. 1935) (“Over strenuous objection, and under interrogation by the court itself, [a physician] was permitted to give an opinion that the causes contributing to the death of the insured were vertigo, nervous exhaustion, and indigestion with eruptions. This evidence was clearly inadmissible.”) (emphasis added); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 227 F. Supp. 3d 452, 457, 463 (D.S.C. 2017) (noting the defendants’ “strenuous objections” to the court reopening expert discovery and other objections to evidentiary rulings); Hall v. Flannery, 840 F.3d 922, 925, 927–28 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that, upon the defendant’s “immediate[]” objection at trial to the testimony of an expert witness, the trial court should have applied the Rule 702/Daubert framework); Appellant Br. at 24 in Hicks v. Scott, 958 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2020) (opposing consideration of the testimony of a witness who was not present when decedent was shot by law enforcement; “[the witness] was not present when [the decedent] went downstairs to confront the officers and was never in a position to confirm or disconfirm the presence of a rifle pointed at [the law-enforcement officer]”). In stark contrast here, the defendants-appellees have never argued that Dr. Varnau’s No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 26 cause-of-death testimony should have been excluded. This is made doubly clear by the fact that the defendants-appellees specifically objected to Bard’s “improper use of certain fact witness deposition testimony as opinion testimony”—but Dr. Varnau was not one of these fact witnesses whose testimony the defendants-appellees challenged. R. 103 (Defs.’ Objections at 1) (Page ID #4302); see id. at 18 (Page ID #4319). We decline to consider an evidentiary objection that no party has made, and that the district court never considered. In sum, the district court erroneously discounted Dr. Varnau’s testimony at the summaryjudgment stage. Her testimony contributes to the genuine dispute of fact over whether Goldson strangled himself after the officers left him in a hobble strap.
Further supporting Bard’s theory of Goldson’s death is the genuine factual dispute over whether Goldson was bound in leg shackles after COs Dunning and Schadle left his cell. This dispute is material because it is undisputed that Goldson was restrained in leg shackles at the time he entered the cell, and Bard argues that the officers left Goldson with “some type of collar around the neck connected to the shackles that tightened as Mr. Goldson struggled thereby causing his asphyxiation. . . . [I]t was by the manner of struggling with the leg shackles and neck collar” that led to his death. Appellant Br. at 19 (emphasis added).14 The district court held that Bard had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to contest the officers’ testimony that the leg shackles were both (1) taken off of Goldson and (2) removed from the cell. Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at . The defendants-appellees agree, and argue on appeal that “[t]he available evidence establishes that the officers removed the leg shackles from Mr. Goldson prior to exiting the cell,” citing COs Dunning’s and Schadle’s deposition testimony. Appellee Br. at 43. The defendants-appellees acknowledge, however, that the “available evidence” on this point is “in the 14Although the dissent initially faults Bard for “present[ing] no evidence that leg shackles cause asphyxiation,” the opinion goes on to acknowledge the potential relevance of leg shackles to this case. J. Nalbandian Op. at 42 (“[I]t’s irrelevant whether Goldson’s legs were bound absent evidence of a restraint around his neck.”) (emphasis added). As the dependent clause of this statement demonstrates, it is the dissent’s belief that Bard lacks evidence of a neck restraint that, in its view, makes the leg-shackling issue irrelevant. But if a neck restraint did exist, the reverse would be true. That is, if Bard has adduced evidence of a neck restraint—which we believe she has, see supra Part II.D.2—then attaching leg shackles to this restraint could make it more likely that a struggling inmate would strangle himself. No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 27 form of sworn deposition testimony”—that is, there is no visual evidence showing the officers removing leg shackles from the cell. Id. at 9. This is a critical flaw in the defendants-appellees’ argument: The available visual evidence, which captures every officer’s entry into and exit out of Goldson’s cell, shows that Goldson was bound in leg shackles upon entering cell 15, and does not clearly show anyone exiting with the leg shackles, supporting the inference that they stayed strapped onto Goldson’s body once the officers left his cell. Hallway Video at 0:56–1:20. In fact, neither CO Dunning’s testimony nor CO Schadle’s testimony specifically identifies any of the items that they removed into the hallway as leg shackles. See Appellee Br. at 43 (citing R. 75-5 (Dunning Dep. at 104–05) (Page ID #2271–72); R. 76-1 (Schadle Dep. at 84–86) (Page ID #3051–53)). The fact that the hallway video does not clearly show the officers removing the leg shackles from the cell supports the conclusion that they remained on Goldson. Furthermore, CO McKinzie twice clarified in her deposition testimony that she collected Goldson’s transport belt and handcuffs—but not his leg shackles—for evidence after Goldson was placed in his cell. See R. 75-8 (McKinzie Dep. at 113, 138) (Page ID #2838, 2863). It is true that, as the district court explained, CO McKinzie “stated clearly to the BCI that she saw the officers remove the leg shackles from holding cell 15 before locking Goldson in the cell,” Bard, 2019 WL 590357, at , but at the summary-judgment stage, her sworn statements still support the inference that she did not collect the leg shackles because they remained on Goldson’s body. The undisputed fact that Goldson entered cell 15 bound in leg shackles, the lack of any dispositive evidence showing that the officers removed these leg shackles from the cell, and CO McKinzie’s testimony that she did not collect the leg shackles from the cell support the inference that Goldson remained bound by this item when the officers left his cell. Based on the foregoing evidence, the district court erred in concluding that Bard had provided insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that Goldson was restrained in leg shackles when he died.
Finally, we note the graphic, threatening nature of Deputy Wedmore’s comments to Goldson, which he made less than an hour before Goldson died. Towering over a prone, handcuffed individual and mocking him with statements such as, “What the fuck is wrong with No. 19-3468 Bard v. Brown Cty., Ohio et al. Page 28 you, you stupid motherfucker,” and “Hope you like prison, bitch,” would itself be cause for concern. But Wedmore went beyond verbal humiliation, stating, “[T]hat motherfucker is getting a welcome party when we get back to the jail” and “I’d like to break your fucking neck right now.” These comments occurred shortly after 2:20 a.m., R. 2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 3) (Page ID #28); R. 74-14 (Prosecutor’s Summary at 3) (Page ID #1406), and by 2:58 a.m., Goldson was dying— or had already died—from a broken neck or a related asphyxiating cause. True, Wedmore was not inside cell 15 with Goldson, but he stood just outside the cell as COs Schadle and Dunning engaged with Goldson outside the view of the security camera. For his part, Wedmore testified, “It was something I said. It wasn’t an action I took.” R. 75-6 (Wedmore Dep. at 77) (Page ID #2474). Yet particularly with respect to the broken-neck comment, this highly specific threat’s temporal proximity to Goldson’s death is simply too glaring to ignore at this juncture.