Opinion ID: 6491035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proceedings Before the ICA and Supreme Court

Text: On appeal, Abastillas again argued, inter alia, that (1) the Family Court orders of April 22, 1997 were void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the Family Court’s rulings in FC-AA-96-0003 had no preclusive effect because they were not actually litigated. Abastillas and Smith also argued that: (1) the Probate Court’s denial of their creditors’ petition for the untimeliness of their reply brief was improper under HRS § 560:3-804 (1993) 11 and Hawai'i Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 63; 12 and (2) the Probate Court erred in not assigning the creditors’ petition, as a contested matter pursuant to HPR Rules 19 and 20, 13 to the civil trial calendar or retaining it for a deferred hearing. On August 8, 2005 the ICA issued a seventy-three page memorandum opinion vacating all three of the Probate Court’s judgments and remanding to the Probate Court for further proceedings. ICA’s Opinion at 72-73. In its opinion, the ICA concluded that: (1) the Family Court’s April 22, 1997 orders were null and void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction with the result that the 1996 will was never voided and the Probate Court erred both in denying Abastillas’ petition to vacate and in granting Cedric’s petition for instructions; and (2) the Family Court’s rulings in FC-AA-96-0003 had preclusive effect. As to subject matter jurisdiction, the ICA concluded: Regarding the family court’s jurisdiction to enter, in FC-G No. 96-0299 (Guardianship Proceedings), the April 22, 1997 “Order Granting Motion to Void Estate Planning Documents, Filed February 25,1997,” Abastillas argues that the family court is of “limited jurisdiction,” does not have the power to probate or void a will, and, therefore, Abastillas was “free to, and did, ignore the motion before [the Family Court] because [the Family Court’s] order was a ‘complete nullity1; its defectiveness is not subject to waiver; and it may be attacked, directly or collaterally, at any time in any court.” This argument has merit. On October 8, 1996, based on the provisions of Hawaii’s Uniform Probate Code, HRS §§ 560:5-101 and -102, the family court appointed ... co-guardians of Mrs. Kam’s person. On February 10, 1997, allegedly based on the provisions of Hawaii’s Uniform Probate Code, [the co-guardians] filed a “Petition for Appointment of Co-Guardians of the Property.” On April 22, 1997, [the Family Court] entered ... an “Order Granting Petition for Appointment of Co-Guardians of the Property, Filed February 10,1997.” This order stated that the family court had “jurisdiction pursuant to H.R.S. § 560:5-102” and appointed ... “Co-Guardians of the Property of [Mrs.] Kam ... without bond[.]” [Thé Family Court also entered] an “Order Granting Motion to Void Estate Planning Documents, Filed February 25,1997.” In the Guardianship Proceedings, we conclude that: (1) the family court had jurisdiction over the “guardian of the person”; (2) no later than January 1,1997, the family court did not have jurisdiction over the “guardian of the property”; and (3) HRS Chapter 560, Hawaii’s Uniform Probate Code, did not authorize the family court to enter its two April 22,1997 orders, and, therefore, those orders are void ab initio. HRS §§ 560:5-101 and -102 [(1993)] state as follows: 560:5-101 Definitions and use of terms. Unless otherwise apparent from the context, in this chapter: (1) “Guardianship proceeding” is a proceeding to appoint a guardian of the person for an incapacitated person or a minor; [[Image here]] (3) A “protective proceeding” is a proceeding under the provisions of section 560:5-401 to determine that a person cannot effectively manage or apply the person’s estate to necessary ends, either because the person lacks the ability or is otherwise inconvenienced, or because the person is a minor, and to secure administration of the person’s estate by a guardian of the property or other appropriate relief; (4) A “protected person” is a minor or other person for whom a guardian of the property has been appointed or other protective order has been made; (5) A “ward” is a person for whom a guardian of the person has been appointed. A “minor ward” is a minor for whom a guardian of the person has been appointed solely because of minority. 560:5-102 Jurisdiction of subject matter; consolidation of proceedings. The court has jurisdiction over protective proceedings and the family court has jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings. Where protective and guardianship proceedings relating to the same person have been initiated, they may be consolidated in the court or in the family court as the court and the family court in the exercise of their discretion shall determine. Prior to January 1, 1997, in HRS § 560:1-201(5) [ (1993) ], Hawaii’s Uniform Probate Code stated that “ ‘Court’ means the circuit court having jurisdiction in matters relating to trusts and the estates of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, minors and incapacitated persons.” This definition of “Court” includes both the probate court and the family eourt.[ 14 ] It allowed the following interpretation of HRS § 560:5-102: “The [probate court and the family court have] jurisdiction over protective proceedings and the family court has jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings.” Commencing January 1, 1997, Hawaii’s Uniform Probate Code states, in HRS § 560:1-201, that “ ‘Court’ means the circuit court in this State having jurisdiction in matters relating to the affairs of decedents” and, in HRS § 560:1—302(c), that “[t]he court has jurisdiction over protective proceedings [HRS § 560:5-401] and the family court has jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings.” These changes require the following interpretation of HRS § 560:5-102: “The [probate] court has jurisdiction over protective proceedings [including all proceedings involving a guardian of the property] and the family court has jurisdiction over guardianship [of the person] proceedings.” [[Image here]] [Thus], no later than January 1, 1997, the family court did not have jurisdiction over the “guardian of the property,” and HRS Chapter 560, Hawaii’s Uniform Probate Code, as amended effective January 1, 1997, did not authorize the family court to enter the two April 22, 1997 orders in the Guardianship Proceedings. ICA’s Opinion at 57-63 (some brackets in original and some brackets added). Because the Family Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the April 1997 orders, the ICA concluded that the Probate Court’s grant of the petition for instructions and denial of the petition to vacate were wrong. 15 ICA’s Opinion at 62. As to Abastillas’ argument that the Family Court’s rulings in FC-AA-96-0003 had no preclusive effect because the issues were never actually adjudicated but instead were settled, the ICA disagreed, concluding: Regarding adjudication, on September 9, 1996, [the Family Court] entered an “Order Appointing Temporary Co-Guardians of the Property and Continuing Existing Orders” stating that the “[t]rial set for September 23 and 24, 1996 is taken off the calendar,” and ordering that the “[p]arties shall submit proposed findings within seven days[.]” Smith, as “Party Pro Se” and “Counsel for Paz Abastillas” “refused” to approve this order. However, on October 3, 1996, the court entered a finding that “[a]t the Pretrial Conference held September 9, 1996, the Court was informed that the parties had reached an agreement to settle this case by the entry [of] the Order Appointing Temporary Co-Guardians of the Property and Continuing Existing Orders ... on the understanding that, while parties [Mrs.] Kam, ... Smith, and ... Abastillas would not sign approval as to form or substance, neither would they oppose the entry of the order or protest it once entered.” Therefore, Abastillas did not disagree with the settlement. In effect, her non-disagreement is the stipulation referred to in HRS § 346—240(c) [ (1993) ],[ 16 ] and the acceptance referred to in HRS § 346-241(e) [ (1993) ].[ 17 ] Consequently, in light of the following rule of law and subject to one exception to be discussed in the next part,[ 18 ] we conclude that Abastillas is bound by [the Family Court’s] decisions. In Doe v. Doe, 99 Hawai'i 1, 52 P.3d 255 (2002), the child’s mother filed a petition for paternity against the alleged father. The Hawai'i Supreme Court decided that the doctrine of issue preclusion barred the child’s mother from bringing the paternity action because the divorce decree between the mother and her former husband had declared that the child was the son of the mother and her former husband, and the issue of paternity was essential to the portion of the final judgment of divorce that ordered the former husband to make support payments and provided for custody and visitation. The opinion of a majority of the court states, in relevant part, as follows: Issue preclusion, or collateral estop-pel, bars relitigation of an issue where: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one presented in the action in question; (2) there is a final judgment on the merits; (3) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. Issue preclusion can be raised defensively by one who was not a party in the prior adjudication. Pratt v. Pratt, 104 Hawai'i 37, 40, 84 P.3d 545, 547 (Hawai’i App.2004). ICA’s Opinion at 56-57. With respect to the denial of the Smith and Abastillas’ creditors’ petition, the ICA found: At [the time the petition and papers in connection therewith were filed], HPR Rule 10(c) stated, in relevant part, as follows: 19 (c) Time to File Pleadings or Reports. A party objecting or responding to a petition must file the objection or response with the court and serve[ ] it on interested persons within 30 days of service of the petition and notice of hearing[ ].... Unless otherwise ordered by the court, pleadings in response to a response or objection[ ] ... shall be filed with the court and served on counsel for parties who have appeared in the proceeding no less than 72 hours prior to the time set for the hearing as originally set[.] [[Image here]] In light of the record prior to the September 11, 2000 petition, especially given the actions by the family court and the probate court, we conclude that (1) [Smith and Abastillas] knew or should have known the various burdens they would face when they asserted their claims for costs, fees, and state excise taxes, and should have confronted and satisfied those burdens in their September 11, 2000 petition; (2) when the October 20, 2000 hearing was scheduled, [Smith and Abastillas] knew or should have known that if Cedric used all of the 30 days permitted for him to file his objection, [Smith and Abastillas] would not have much time to timely file a reply to Cedric’s objection which was no less than 72 hours before the hearing; (3) the court did not consider [Smith and Abastillas’] reply because it was not timely filed; (4) the court’s decision that much of what the reply said should have been said in the original petition was only one of the reasons why the court did not excuse the untimely filing; (5) the applicable standard of review is the abuse of discretion standard; (6) an abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court has “clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant[,]” Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 114, 889 P.2d 10, 26 (1992) (citation omitted); and (7) the court did not abuse its discretion. ICA’s Opinion at 66-68. The ICA also rejected Abastillas’ argument that the Probate Court should have deferred hearing on the creditors’ petition or reassigned it for civil trial as a contested matter under HPR Rules 19 and 20. Instead, the ICA concluded that it was within the Probate Court’s discretion whether to retain the matter or assign it to the civil trials calendar, and that the Probate Court did not abuse its discretion in retaining and dismissing it. ICA’s Opinion at 68-72. Despite the foregoing, however, the ICA vacated the Probate Court’s denial of creditors’ petition “in light of [its] decision vacating the final judgments pertaining to the probate of the will and the petition for instructions[.]” ICA’s Opinion at 72. After the ICA denied Abastillas’ motion for reconsideration on August 25, 2005, Cedric filed an application for a writ of certiora-ri on September 6, 2005, which was granted by this court on September 14, 2005 over the opposition of Abastillas. Cedric’s application assigned two points of error with respect to the ICA’s jurisdictional conclusion: 1) the ICA’s reliance on the amended version of the HUPC was in error because that version was not in effect when the Family Court entered its orders on April 22, 1997; and 2) in the alternative, the Family Court had jurisdiction under HRS chapter 346. On September 23, 2005, Abastillas filed a cross-application for a writ of certiorari, which was granted by this court on September 29, 2005. Abastillas assigned one point of error—namely, the ICA gravely erred in giving the October 3, 1996 Family Court findings preclusive effect because the issues were not “actually litigated” or “finally decided.” With leave of this court, Cedric and Abastillas filed supplemental briefs on the issue of whether the Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter its April 22, 1997 orders.