Opinion ID: 199993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Weathermark Appeal

Text: 13 The district court determined that, if successful, the state-court claim Weathermark brought for reimbursement of its past and future response costs would constitute an expense arising out of a[] ... [r]equest, demand or order that any insured or others ... in any way respond to... the effects of pollutants, Policy ¶ f(2)(a); and, consequently, that any recovery realized by Weathermark in its lawsuit would be excluded from coverage under the CGL policy issued to Hall and Riddell. 14 Weathermark maintains on appeal that the district court erred in failing to infer the meaning of Policy ¶ f(2)(a) through reference to ¶ f(2)(b), which excludes from coverage [a]ny loss, cost or expense arising out of any ... [c]laim or suit by or on behalf of a governmental authority for damages because of testing for, monitoring, cleaning up, removing, containing, treating, detoxifying or neutralizing, or in any responding to, or assessing the effects of pollutants. Adverting to the familiar maxim that general contract language normally must yield to more particular language, Weathermark contends that (i) the undefined phrase [r]equest, demand or order, appearing in ¶ f(2)(a), is too general to denote a lawsuit, and (ii) since ¶ f(2)(b) explicitly addresses the subject of lawsuits, Utica needed to specify in ¶ f(2)(b) that both governmental and private-party lawsuits were to be excluded from coverage. 15 The merits of these contentions need not be addressed, however, since Weathermark failed to raise them below, see Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 73 F.Supp.2d at 87-88, and issues first asserted on appeal must be deemed waived, see VanHaaren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1993). Instead, Weathermark merely invited the district court to compare ¶ f(2)(a) and ¶ f(1), rather than ¶ f(2)(a) and ¶ f(2)(b). Moreover, Weathermark subsequently abandoned the former comparison as a ground for the instant appeal. 2 16 Similarly, since the remaining arguments Weathermark asserts on appeal were never raised below, they are deemed waived. See id. Weathermark now argues, on public policy grounds, that the interpretation given ¶ f(2)(a) by the district court would enable Utica to exclude coverage based on the mere fortuity as to whether the third party seeking reimbursement was served with a request, such as a notice of responsibility issued by an environmental enforcement agency. Weathermark adds that its theory was apparently recognized in the memorandum submitted in support of Utica's motion for partial summary judgment. Be that as it may, Weathermark presented no argumentation on this theory in opposition to Utica's motion for partial summary judgment. Consequently, the district court never reached it. 3 The raise-or-waive rule serves to forfend against sand-bagging, viz., reserving legal theories for initial use on appeal. 17 Finally, Weathermark maintains, were we to declare the pollution exclusion ambiguous, we should consider extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent, see, e.g., 1 Gibson & McLendon, Commercial Liability Insurance, Annotated Policy, at V.D. (1988), even though Weathermark concedes, as it must, that it never raised its extrinsic evidence argument below. Nonetheless, Weathermark urges, since appellate interpretations of insurance contracts are plenary, see Ekco Group, Inc., 273 F.3d at 412, we should allow it to advance any alternative argument on appeal. Of course, controlling authority is to the contrary: although the court of appeals affords de novo review to orders granting summary judgment, it will not reverse such an order on the basis of arguments that were not made in the trial court. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258 (1st Cir.1999).