Opinion ID: 1719459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Communication to the JuryPresence of Defendant.

Text: We can more readily state the law on the second issue than ascertain the facts from a skimpy record. We know little more than that during jury deliberations the jury sent the trial court a written message reporting unanimity on a lesser offense, a ten-two split on the principal charge, and inquiring what to do. The trial court responded in writing: Please review the instructions. A verdict must be unanimous. The next morning the jury returned a verdict of guilty on the principal charge. The record does not disclose whether the parties or counsel were informed of this communication, waived being present, or were in fact present. The issue was not raised by motion for new trial. Although defendant had the right to be present unless his presence was waived, we conclude that the error was not preserved and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's right to be present is derived from the sixth amendment and implemented by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(5)(g) which provides in pertinent part: After the jury has retired for deliberation,... if it desires to be informed on any point of law, arising in the cause, it must require the officer to conduct it into court, and, upon its being brought in, the information may be given, in discretion of the trial court.... Where the court gives the jury additional instructions, this shall appear of record. Provided, that the procedures described in this section shall take place in the presence of defendant and counsel for the defense and prosecution, unless such presence is waived. See State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Iowa 1981). Our recent cases hold that all communications between court and jury are required to be given in the presence of the defendant and counsel. State v. Folck, 325 N.W.2d 368, 374 (Iowa 1982); State v. Griffin, 323 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1982). Defendant therefore did have the right to be present, if that right was not waived. The error, however, was both inadequately preserved and harmless. The defendant was required to preserve the claimed error both by raising it in the trial court and then by presenting a record adequate for our review. State v. McKee, 312 N.W.2d at 915; State v. Smith, 228 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Iowa 1975). This could have been done by a motion for new trial and the filing of supporting affidavits. See Maier v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 234 N.W.2d 388, 395-96 (Iowa 1975). Since defendant made no such motion and the record before us does not show that defendant was absent when the trial court received and responded to the jury's inquiry, there is no basis for us to conclude that defendant's due process right was violated. Even if defendant was not present, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The communication was not an instruction on the law and had no bearing on the evidence the jurors were to consider. What the court said was not improper; its innocuous response properly told the jurors they should review the instructions and their verdict must be unanimous. In similar cases, we have found no prejudice. See State v. Dreessen, 305 N.W.2d 438, 440-41 (Iowa 1981); State v. Johnston, 221 Iowa 933, 945, 267 N.W. 698, 704 (1936). This contention is without merit.