Opinion ID: 2268037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Denial of Defendant's Motions for Mistrial

Text: The defendant contends that on four occasions during the course of the trial the jury heard improper reference to other criminal activity by him. He points out that after each impropriety counsel for defendant moved to pass the case and each motion was denied. He further argues that each motion for mistrial should have been granted and that together the improper references had the cumulative effect of denying him a fundamentally fair trial. The first instance was McGonigle's testimony that upon his initial encounter with Werner outside Johnny Ray's, defendant asked him for drugs. At this point, counsel for defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that this reference was highly prejudicial. The trial justice denied the motion and commented as follows: [T]his is such an integral part of the testimony of this witness that this was the only way in which the defendant allegedly or the shooter allegedly introduced himself to the witness, I really don't see how a reasonably, truthful sanitized version of that could be made and with the Court's curative instruction, the Court will make every attempt to dispel that motion. The comment of the trial justice in denying the motion was both insightful and correct. For a reference to bad conduct to qualify as a basis for a mistrial, the comment must not only be prejudicial, but also irrelevant. State v. Cline, 122 R.I. 297, 330, 405 A.2d 1192, 1210 (1979). This testimony certainly was not irrelevant. It was necessary for Stoddard to describe his encounter with defendant. The exchange of conversation between them leading up to the shooting was not irrelevant, but an integral part of the witness's testimony, as the trial justice indicated. Since the testimony was not improper, it could not form the basis for a mistrial. In any event, at the request of counsel for defendant, the trial justice gave a long curative instruction to the jury. This reference to drugs, though certainly prejudicial to defendant, did not have the effect of inflaming the jury, in light of the circumstances of this case. State v. Botelho, 753 A.2d 343, 349 (R.I.2000). Moreover, a defendant does not have the right to be insulated from relevant truths even when they are prejudicial. Cline, 122 R.I. at 330, 405 A.2d at 1210. The trial justice did his best to minimize prejudice by the curative instruction. Well, as you know from all of our previous discussions, this case is not about drugs. No drugs were involved in this case. No drugs were found on anyone or given or received by anybody here. That reference is simply by way of introduction, the first contact that this witness is testifying that he had with whomever he is speaking about and if it turns out to be' the alleged shooter in this case, I'm instructing you []now that drugs have no place in this case. It has nothing to do with this case, and you may not in any way, shape or form consider this defendant or a person who is the subject of this testimony as having anything to do with drugs. Do you understand that, ladies and gentlemen? The trial justice did not err in refusing to grant defendant's motion for mistrial based upon McGonigle's testimony. The defendant also argues that he was entitled to a mistrial after Stoddard's reference that he had identified defendant at the hospital from a bunch of mug shots. No objection was made to this comment, but a short time later Stoddard again said that he had identified defendant from a mug shot. At this point, defendant's counsel objected and requested a mistrial because this testimony, combined with the reference to drugs, created significant prejudice to defendant. The trial justice denied the motion for mistrial but cautioned the jury as follows: Mug shot in common parlance simply means an array of photographs shown by the police. I'm sure you have all heard that expression before. It doesn't connote anything with regard to this defendant's guilt or his participation in the crime or any other crime. You will see later in this case, well, I believe you will probably see this photo array which is commonly called mug shots in the singular or plural, so don't read anything into the word mug shot. It has no significance of guilt or any indication of participation by this defendant in any criminal activity here or anyplace else. We agree with the trial justice that this reference did not warrant granting a motion for mistrial. See State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710, 718 (R.I.1994) (holding that the trial justice's refusal to pass the case was not an abuse of discretion because the jury instructions cured the improper questioning). The defendant again moved for a mistrial when Ms. Prefontaine, in the course of her testimony, said that at one point she was living with Werner's sister while defendant was in jail. The trial justice denied the motion and gave a cautionary instruction. All right, ladies and gentlemen, you just heard Ms. Prefontaine make an answer that she opened this particular box when she was living with the defendant's sister and he was in jail. Now, that's an improper reference because it may lead you to believe that because he's in jail he may have done something else untoward or other. I don't know if he was in jail. If he was in jail, it's none of our concern whatsoever. You are to judge this case on its merits or lack of its merits according to the instructions that I give you. So I'm going to instruct you now to disregard any notion that this defendant may or may not have been in jail, what he may have been in there for, just put it out of your mind. It has absolutely no bearing on the guilt or innocence of this defendant in this case. We are of the opinion that this cautionary instruction was sufficient to dispel any potentially inflammatory effect upon the jurors. We cannot assume in the light of the totality of the testimony in this case that a reference to jail would have so inflamed the jurors as to prevent their impartial examination of the evidence in the case. State v. Brown, 522 A.2d 208, 210-11 (R.I.1987). The defendant also argues that he was entitled to the declaration of a mistrial when witness Gammon sought to change his testimony at trial from that given at a voir dire examination in which he said that he saw a gun similar to the shotgun in evidence in Werner's apartment on the day of the shooting. At trial he testified that the gun he saw was not the same as the gun introduced into evidence. Counsel for the state called Gammon's attention to the testimony he previously had given at the voir dire examination. She went on to ask Gammon whether he had received any threats relating to his testimony. He replied that he had not. At this point, defense counsel again moved for a mistrial on the ground of significant prejudice. The trial justice denied the motion and gave the following cautionary instruction: The answer may stand. There's been no evidence of any threats in this case or any coercion by anybody against any witness whether it's a State or defense witness or anything, so I'm going to instruct you to disregard that question. The answer was no anyway. It has nothing to do with this case nor have there been threats or anything like that in this matter. The trial justice commented that the prosecutor's question was imprudent, but he concluded that any prejudice could be cured by the foregoing instruction. This holding was in accordance with the principles enunciated in Brown, wherein we observed that a mistrial should be granted only if the damage caused by a question or prosecutorial statement is inexpiable. Brown, 522 A.2d at 210. In the case at bar, we agree that the prosecutor's question, which elicited a negative answer, did not create incurable prejudice or inflame the jurors to a point where a prompt curative instruction would not be effective. See also United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 902-03 (7th Cir.1988). We also have considered defendant's argument that these four instances considered together created a context of fundamental unfairness and demands reversal. We respectfully disagree with this argument, though we recognize the principles enunciated in State v. Pepper, 103 R.I. 310, 318, 237 A.2d 330, 335 (1968) (holding that the cumulative effect of the improper evidence is of such a character that the defendant was prejudiced thereby to such an extent that only a new trial can cure it). We also recognize that the trial justice's decision to deny a mistrial is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. State v. Aponte, 800 A.2d 420, 427 (R.I.2002). We hold that, in declining to grant the four motions for a mistrial, the trial justice did not commit an abuse of discretion in any of the four instances. We further hold that the cumulative effect of these rulings did not deprive defendant of a fundamentally fair trial. The trial justice did not commit reversible error either in the individual rulings or in the cumulative effect thereof.