Opinion ID: 1189686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: challenges to section 76-3-203.1

Text: Defendant levels a barrage of constitutional challenges to section 76-3-203.1 of the Utah Code pursuant to which the trial court imposed a minimum mandatory sentence of twenty years in prison. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp.1993). We conclude, however, that these challenges were not properly preserved for appeal. In his motion to strike defendant's minimum mandatory sentence under section 76-3-203.1, defense counsel merely stated that the section was unconstitutionally vague and consequently denies the defendant due process of law as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel renewed this general objection and added a separation of powers argument: With respect to [section 76-3-203.1].... As the offense is now presently determined, that enhancement is twenty years. I think I need to perfect the record in behalf of Mr. Alvarez in that regard. There are Constitutional arguments that need to be preserved regarding the vagueness in the relegation of legislative function to the Judicial and Executive branches and applying ... Federal and State standards 76-3-203.1 is unconstitutional. A defendant cannot preserve issues for appeal by generally objecting or nominally invoking the state and federal constitutions. As stated above, a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an appellate court will review such a claim on appeal. Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1144-45 (emphasis added). For this reason, we do not address defendant's constitutional arguments. Only one of defendant's challenges regarding section 76-3-203.1 is properly before us. He contends that the trial court clearly erred in finding that defendant acted in concert with two or more persons under section 76-3-203.1. The correct interpretation of a statute is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993). Factual findings, on the other hand, will not be reversed absent clear error. To prove findings of fact clearly erroneous, an appellant must marshal all evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 1991). Section 76-3-203.1, commonly known as the gang enhancement provision, [10] reads in part: (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (3) in concert with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense as provided below. (b) In concert with two or more persons as used in this section means the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1)(a)-(b). Section 76-2-202 reads: Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202. Defendant makes the plausible argument that under section 76-3-203.1, the persons with whom he acted in concert must be parties to the offense of first degree murder and possess the mental state required for that offense  intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another. The statute admits of this interpretation because [i]n concert with two or more persons means that two or more other persons would be criminally liable for the offense as parties. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1(1)(b) (emphasis added). The words the offense in subpart (1)(b) appear to refer to the offense for which defendant is being sentenced under subpart (1)(a). Defendant argues that no other participant in the fight, with the exception perhaps of Tony DeHerrera, had the requisite mental state to make them parties to the offense of first degree murder. Therefore, the argument continues, the factual finding that defendant acted in concert with two or more persons was not supported by the record and clearly erroneous. While defendant's interpretation of section 76-3-203.1 is plausible, it is not correct. For section 76-3-203.1 to apply, a defendant must act in concert with two or more persons who would be criminally liable as parties under section 76-2-202. Party liability under section 76-2-202 does not require that the persons involved in the criminal conduct have the same mental state. We wrote in State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983): A defendant can be criminally responsible for an act committed by another, but the degree of his responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state of the actor. This is clear from the language of § 76-2-202. Id. at 534. Thus, three persons can be parties to the same criminal conduct and each have a different mental state. This rule is consistent with subsection (5)(b) of section 76-3-203.1, which provides: It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense. (Emphasis added.) In the instant case, the trial court found that defendant acted in concert with Martinez, Manuel Alvarez, DeHerrera, and others unknown to commit the criminal assaults that caused the deaths of Don and Shayne Newingham. This finding is supported by the evidence, and we cannot deem it clearly erroneous. The jury determined that defendant knowingly and intentionally caused the death of Don Newingham. The fact that the other participants may have possessed lesser mental states does not mean that they did not act as parties to the criminal assaults and therefore in concert with defendant.