Opinion ID: 186502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Class Counsel Petitions

Text: 9 The district court denied the appellants' motion for relief as to the 92 petitions filed late by class counsel because the appellants failed to demonstrate changed circumstances to warrant modifying the S & O schedule under Rule 60(b)(5), which provides in relevant part: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5) ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application .... The appellants challenge the court's Rule 60(b)(5) decision on two grounds. We address each in turn. 10 First, the appellants assert the district court incorrectly invoked Rule 60(b)(5) because the rule governs only orders that are final. 2 The appellants contend that the S & O was not a final order and that therefore the court should have decided whether to grant relief solely under its inherent equitable authority. See Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1240 (D.C.Cir.1980) (The power of a District Court sitting as a court of equity to modify the terms of a settlement agreement it previously adopted cannot be drawn into question.). As a practical matter, it makes little difference whether the district court resolved the motion under Rule 60 or under its equitable authority as the standard for each is substantially the same. Compare Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992) (under Rule 60(b)(5), a party seeking modification of a consent decree must establish that a significant change in facts or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance), with Envtl. Defense Fund, Inc, 636 F.2d at 1240 ([S]ound exercise of judicial discretion may require that terms of a consent decree be modified when there has been a significant change in the circumstances obtaining at the time the consent decree was entered.). Nonetheless, we conclude that the court correctly invoked Rule 60(b)(5). 11 The appellants do not dispute that the Consent Decree itself is final within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(5). See Appellants' Br. at 19. They contend, however, that because the S & O simply establish[es] procedures for enforcing or implementing the decree, the S & O is not considered `final' within the meaning of Rule 60. Id. (citing United States v. W. Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23 (D.C.Cir.1985); Bogard v. Wright, 159 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir.1998)). The authorities the appellants cite do not support their position. In Western Elec. this court reviewed the district court's denial of a request for waiver from restrictions in a consent decree based on the district court's decision not to consider the merits of such a waiver request until a later time when `there is substantial competition in local tele-communications service.' 777 F.2d at 25 (quoting United States v. W. Elec. Co., 592 F.Supp. 846, 868 (D.D.C.1984)). We explained that the district court's order denying the request was not final because the district court contemplated further proceedings before ruling on the requests. Id. at 26. Similarly in Bogard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that an order that extended the term of a monitor initially appointed for a three-year term unless extended by order of this court was not a final order because it had no termination date and therefore [t]he postjudgment proceeding could drag on for many years and involve a host of far-reaching orders the consequences of which could not be undone when (if ever) the postjudgment proceeding ended with a showing of compliance so complete that the monitor's services could be dispensed with. 159 F.3d at 1062-63. By contrast, the district court's S & O fixed final deadlines for filing petitions with the monitor. See S & O ¶ 5, at 4 (No extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.). As with the Consent Decree, which the S & O supplemented, no further court action was contemplated at the time the S & O issued. That the S & O was in fact subsequently modified by the court in response to the appellants' requests does not make it any less final. Such modification of a final order is precisely what Rule 60(b) contemplates. 3 12 Next, the appellants contend that even if the S & O is a final order subject to Rule 60(b), the district court abused its discretion in failing to modify the S & O for changed circumstances. Again we disagree. 13 In the June 2, 2003 order denying the appellants' motion for relief, the district court rejected their contention that the large volume of claimants requesting assistance with petitions during a short period of time constituted a changed circumstance because it occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court. 265 F.Supp.2d at 46 (emphasis by court). The court explained: The exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order, including its clear provision that `no extensions of these deadlines will be granted for any reason.' Id. at 46 (quoting (S & O ¶ 5, at 4)). The appellants do not quibble with the court's analysis, see Appellants' Br. at 22, but contend the court abused its discretion by failing to grant relief based on four other changed circumstances: (1) the unusually high number of claimants with meritorious grounds for review of their claim denials (caused by an unusually high rate of errors by the adjudicators); (2) the extreme work load borne by the two small class counsel firms because outside of counsels participated only minimally in the review petition filing (particularly after the court's March 8, 2001 ruling that attorney's fees for monitor review work not be available until after readjudication of reviewed claims produced a disincentive to work on the monitor review process, Appellants' Br. at 24); (3) the exhaustion of class counsel's funds and credit by March 2, 2001; and (4) the extra step created by the Register provision. It is no surprise that the district court did not address these four changed circumstances in its initial decision as the appellants raised them for the first time in their motion for reconsideration. Compare Pls.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Relief at 32-34 (filed July 19, 2002) and Pls.' Reply to Def.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Relief at 4-7 (filed Nov. 6, 2002) with Pls.' Mot. for Recons. at 9-16 (filed June 16, 2003). When the court addressed these newly raised circumstances in the reconsideration order, its response was admittedly brief: The Court is well aware of the circumstances surrounding these petitions and further elaboration does not change this Court's opinion that plaintiffs have not demonstrated changed circumstances sufficient to justify modification of the Court's Orders under Rule 60(b)(5). 307 F.Supp.2d at 48. The court's brevity, however, is understandable given what had come before. 14 To the extent the four new circumstances adversely affected the petition filing process, the court had already taken them into account and provided the appellants with relief. In response to class counsel's October 31, 2000 plea of an unexpectedly high volume of meritorious review petitions, the court modified the S & O on November 8 to permit class counsel to satisfy the November 13, 2000 filing deadline through the simple Register listing, a remedy the appellants accepted without complaint. 4 When class counsel sought relief in spring 2001 because of their depleted resources, both financial and human, 5 the court granted a four-month extension until September 15, 2001, by which deadline all of the remaining petitions were filed. Given the district court's repeated accommodation of class counsel's continuing delinquency, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in denying the appellants' motion for further relief. 6 15 The dissent contends the district court erred in two respects. First, it argues the court erred in relying on a finding of fact that the critical changed circumstances occurred before the parties agreed to the deadline in the S & O. Dissent at 24, 27. We perceive no such error. The court was correct when it found as a fact in its June 2, 2003 decision denying relief that [t]he exponential increase in claimants was fully apparent when plaintiffs and defendant negotiated and agreed to the July 14, 2000 Stipulation and Order, 265 F.Supp.2d at 47, as the appellants acknowledge. 7 The district court was also correct when it stated in the June 2, 2003 order that the critical `changed circumstance' on which plaintiffs rely occurred before, not after, the relevant deadlines were agreed to by the parties and endorsed by the Court. 265 F.Supp.2d at 47 (first emphasis added). 8 The appellants had argued at that stage that relief from the deadlines was warranted because of [t]he predominant change in circumstances, since the Consent Decree was approved in 1999, namely, that the number of participants, with or without counsel, has increased 400-500%, overwhelming the system set up by the Consent Decree, Pls.' Reply to Def.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Relief at 4-5, plainly referring to the increased number of claimants. It is not at all surprising if, as the dissent notes, Dissent at 23, the court's June 2, 2003 order ignored the key distinction argued by appellants in the motion for reconsideration of the order, which was filed on June 16, 2003. Further, as we noted supra, the court had already granted relief from the increase in meritorious petitions when it established the simplified Register procedure for meeting the November 13, 2000 filing deadline. 16 Second, the dissent asserts the district court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider whether class counsel's failures to meet the deadlines amounted to an unforeseen obstacle warranting relief. Dissent at 27. The dissent relies on the court's decision in Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918 (D.C.Cir.2002) ( Pigford I ), for the proposition that where class members lack competent counsel, counsel's failure to meet deadlines itself may amount to an `unforeseen obstacle' that makes the decree `unworkable.' Dissent at 25 (quoting Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925). Pigford I, however, presented a different situation in two respects. First, contrary to the dissent's characterization, Pigford I did not present the same issue of modification of deadlines as here, Dissent at 26 (emphasis by dissent), so as to implicate law of the case. In Pigford I the court modified the consent order to permit arbitrators to extend the deadlines for filing evidentiary materials in Track B litigation, set out in paragraph 10 of the Consent Decree, based on class counsel's malpractice in the Track B litigation, namely, its inability to represent all Track B claimants adequately,' Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 925 (quoting 182 F.Supp.2d at 52), as exemplified by one lawyer's failure to timely file a claimant's direct testimony with the arbitrator. Here, the appellants seek to modify the S & O's Track A deadlines for filing review petitions under paragraph 12(b)(iii), relying on their repeated failures to meet the filing deadlines. Second, Pigford I came before us in a different posture. In that decision, we rejected the district court's determination that the consent decree could be interpreted to permit extending deadlines but affirmed the decision to extend deadlines based on the alternative ground, not addressed by the district court, that the decree could be so modified under Rule 60(b)(5) because counsel's failures amounted to changed circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(5). Because we affirmed the district court's decision, we were free to do so, as we did, on a ground not reached by the district court and without reviewing the district court's rationale. EEOC v. Aramark Corp., 208 F.3d 266, 268 (D.C.Cir.2000) (Although the district court never addressed the safe harbor provision, the issue is fully briefed, and because we review the district court's judgment, not its reasoning, we may affirm on any ground properly raised.) (citing Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316, 1321-22 (D.C.Cir.1993)). In this case, however, we review the district court's decision not to grant relief and may overturn such an order only for abuse of discretion. Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1192 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Computer Prof'ls for Soc. Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C.Cir.1996); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C.Cir.1988)). Although the district court might have been warranted in modifying the deadlines based on class counsel's failure to meet deadlines, as we explained supra, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so. For us to decide the question sua sponte or require the district court to do so as a matter of law, as the dissent suggests, would infringe on the district court's discretion and run counter to the presumption of client accountability for attorney conduct which, as we confirmed in Pigford I, applies in class actions. See Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 927.