Opinion ID: 1133622
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claim of Prosecutorial Misconduct in Examining a Defense Expert

Text: Section 28, subdivision (a), provides that evidence of mental disease, defect, or disorder is not admissible to show or negate the capacity to form any mental state, but is admissible solely on the issue whether the accused actually formed a required specific intent ... when a specific intent crime is charged. (Italics added.) Section 29 also limits the admissibility of evidence of a defendant's mental state: In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant's mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact. Defendant contends that the prosecutor violated the restrictions imposed by these statutes when, during cross-examination of defendant's psychiatric expert, and over repeated defense objections, the prosecutor persistently asked the expert questions concerning whether defendant could form or did form the intent to commit the crimes with which he was charged. These statutory violations, defendant maintains, amounted to prejudicial misconduct that denied him the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. As mentioned previously, the defense elicited testimony that defendant was suffering from organic brain damage, mental retardation, and paranoid psychosis at the time of the homicide. These mental disorders, according to defense expert Robert M. Bittle, M.D., impaired defendant's judgment and memory and prevented him from responding appropriately to surrounding events and understanding what was occurring around him. In Dr. Bittle's opinion, defendant would not have committed the crimes if he had not suffered from these mental disorders. During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked whether Dr. Bittle found it suspicious that the only things defendant had not admitted were the relevant mental states at issue in this case. Dr. Bittle responded in part: I can't testify as to specific mental states at that time, as you well know. The following exchange ensued: [Prosecutor]: So you don't have an opinion, then whether or not he could form the intent to commit the crimes that he is charged with? [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I am going to have to object because this is getting into an area that the law doesn't allow him to give an opinion one way or the other, so he certainly can't comment. If he wants to have the question answered and open the door in this regard, that is fine, but I have to object. [Prosecutor]: I don't mind having the door opened in this regard, Your Honor. [Defense counsel]: Well, it is just improper questioning that Dr. Bittle and I have discussed that the law doesn't allow questioning in this area, so he is not prepared to testify in this area. And I object, it is not allowed by law. [Prosecutor]: Well, Counsel's correct, but I have no objection to opening the door to see whether or not the doctor has an opinion in [sic ] the ultimate issue in the case. After defense counsel indicated that a one-week continuance would be required to prepare for testimony regarding the issue, the prosecutor responded that he did not want to belabor the point and would move on. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked Dr. Bittle whether he had an opinion regarding how defendant would be able to cause that type of injury with a knife if he didn't intend to do it, and how defendant would be able to unfasten Cheryl's pants and pull them down if he didn't intend to do that. Defense counsel again objected on the ground that the law did not allow the witness to testify regarding intent, and the prosecutor asked a different question. The prosecutor later referred to testimony that defendant had told several individuals that he was going to go up the hill and return with some money, and asked Dr. Bittle whether [t]he fact that he did go up the hill, and the fact that it appears as though he did rob the victim, does that indicate that his judgment was impaired? Dr. Bittle responded, He might have some intent to rob, based upon that statement. After Dr. Bittle and the jury were excused, defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor was aware of the proscriptions of sections 28 and 29, but decided to continue to violate them until he finally elicited an answer regarding defendant's intent to rob. Defendant contended that the jury would understand from the prosecutor's questions and the defense objections that the defense did not want Dr. Bittle to answer, because he would have testified that defendant did have the requisite intent to commit the crimes. The court denied the motion and admonished the jury to disregard the questions and answers regarding defendant's intent. The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are well established. `A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct `so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.'' [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves ``the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.'' [Citation.] ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) [W]hen the claim focuses upon comments made by the prosecutor before the jury, the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( Ibid. ) It is, of course, misconduct for a prosecutor to `intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony.' [Citations.] ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689, 250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217, overruled on another point in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Such misconduct is exacerbated if the prosecutor continues to attempt to elicit such evidence after defense counsel has objected. ( People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532, 262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129.) An expert witness may not be cross-examined regarding matters that are not relevant to the expert's opinion or qualifications. ( Ibid.; see Evid.Code, § 721, subd. (a).) As we have seen, an expert may not offer an opinion regarding whether the defendant had the capacity to form the intent required for the crime, or whether the defendant actually did form the requisite intent. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 835-837, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) The prosecutor's question seeking to elicit Dr. Bittle's inadmissible opinion regarding defendant's capacity to form such intent at the time he committed the crimes, and the prosecutor's subsequent remarks that he was willing to open the door on that issue, were improper. Even if an experienced prosecutor legitimately could believe that the parties may waive the prohibitions in section 28 and 29, a showing of bad faith or knowledge of the wrongfulness of his or her conduct is not required to establish prosecutorial misconduct. ( People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800, 822-823 & fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) On the other hand, the prosecutor's questions concerning how defendant could perform certain acts without intending to do them, and whether defendant's actions indicated that he had impaired judgment, were not inappropriate. Defendant concedes that the prosecutor legitimately could attempt to show intent by emphasizing defendant's acts, and that his cross-examination in this regard was not technically objectionable. Dr. Bittie's statement that defendant might have had some intent to rob was not responsive to the prosecutor's question concerning whether defendant's actions indicated that defendant's judgment was impaired, as Dr. Bittle previously had testified. The prosecutor's improper question and remarks regarding capacity did not amount to an egregious pattern of conduct that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in denial of defendant's federal constitutional right to due process of law. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 841, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Assuming the prosecutor's conduct constituted a deceptive or reprehensible method to persuade the jury, in violation of state law, such misconduct was not prejudicial. The prosecutor's improper question constituted an isolated instance in a lengthy and otherwise well-conducted trial.... ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 690, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217.) As described in more detail below, the trial court quickly admonished the jury to disregard questions posed to Dr. Bittle regarding defendant's intent to commit the crime and any answers to such questions, explained that any objections to such questions were proper, and read the text of section 29. Furthermore, at the conclusion of the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury: If an objection was sustained to a question, do not guess what the answer might have been. Do not speculate as to the reason for the objection, [¶] Do not assume to be true any insinuation suggested by a question asked a witness. We presume the jury followed the court's detailed instructions regarding this matter and conclude that, in light of the instructions, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the prosecutor's improper question. ( People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 179, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331.) Accordingly, no prejudice is shown. In a related claim, defendant contends the prosecutor's misconduct violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, because the only way defendant could rebut the inference raised by the prosecutor's improper questions was to ask Dr. Bittle similar improper questions that would elicit inadmissible testimony. Defendant relies upon Douglas v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 415, 416-420, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934, in which the defendant's accomplice was called to testify at the defendant's trial. The prosecutor read portions of the accomplice's alleged confession, pausing periodically to inquire whether the accomplice had made the statements. The accomplice repeatedly invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer. The high court held that the prosecutor's reading of the confession and the accomplice's refusal to answer may have been construed by the jury to be the equivalent of testimony establishing that the accomplice did make the confession and that his statements, some of which were prejudicial to the defendant, were true. Because defense counsel could not question any witness regarding the matters raised during the prosecutor's examination of the accomplice, the high court held that the defendant was denied his right to confront and cross-examine the accomplice. Douglas is distinguishable from the present case. Dr. Bittle was available for cross-examination, and the prosecutor's improper question regarding defendant's intent could not reasonably have been construed by the jury to constitute testimony by Dr. Bittle. (See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643, fn. 15, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 [there is no deprivation of the right to confrontation when the prosecutor does not introduce statements made by persons unavailable for questioning at trial].) The doctor's testimony that defendant might have had the intent to rob, as we have seen, was volunteered and not responsive to the prosecutor's question. In any event, the jury was instructed to disregard all questions regarding defendant's intent and any answers that may have been given. Defendant was not denied his right to confrontation.