Opinion ID: 2424378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Vandiver

Text: After Vandiver, through his counsel, entered an  Alford plea to the charge of robbery, he took the stand and was extensively questioned by his counsel. Vandiver acknowledged during his testimony that he had discussed the elements of robbery with his counsel and understood what he had been told. He said that he understood the nature of his Alford plea and that even though he claimed that he was not guilty, he recognized, in entering the guilty plea, that the State had overwhelming evidence to convict him, and that his guilty plea was in exchange for a favorable plea agreement. He personally acknowledged that his guilty plea was to the offense of robbery. Vandiver agreed with the State's proffered statement of the facts which demonstrated a course of conduct constituting robbery, namely, that the State's evidence would establish that Vandiver accosted the victim on the street, threw her to the ground and seized the valuable contents of her purse. Priet, 289 Md. at 292, 424 A.2d at 362. Although, in our view, the presumption language in Henderson is dicta, the significance and import of similar language replicated in Priet is less clear because Priet involved three cases. To begin, it seems clear that the presumption in the Vandiver case was dicta, as Vandiver acknowledged during his testimony that he had discussed the elements of robbery with his counsel and understood what he had been told. Priet, 289 Md. at 292, 424 A.2d at 362. We did not need to employ a presumption that defense counsel, in representing his/her client contemplating a plea arrangement, routinely explains the nature of the offense to his or her client, considering there was an on-the-record finding that Vandiver's counsel had informed him so. Further, we conclude that mention of the presumption was dicta in the Pincus case. There, the record disclose[d] that Pincus said he knew the difference between first and second degree murder. . . . Priet, 289 Md. at 291-92, 424 A.2d at 361. We think it reasonable to infer that a defendant who claims to comprehend the subtle differences between first- and second-degree murder comprehends also the elements that both degrees share, making such a defendant aware of the nature of the offense. See Willey v. State, 328 Md. 126, 138, 613 A.2d 956, 961 (1992) (noting the fine and often difficult distinction between first degree murder and . . . second degree murder). [9] Arguably, the only case of the three that, but for the application of the presumption, might have been decided differently ( i.e., was not dicta in the case), is the eponymous Priet case. See Lovell v. State, 347 Md. 623, 635, 702 A.2d 261, 267 (1997) (stating that the Court in Priet  held  that [i]t may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense). There, as in the present case, Priet acknowledged that he had discussed his plea . . . with his attorney. Further, and also as in the present case, [t]he factual basis for the plea . . . disclosed a course of criminal conduct clearly constituting the offense of armed robbery. In this sense, then, the Priet case is similar to the case at present: the State may prevail in arguing that the defendant understood the nature of the charges only if the presumption is applied. [10] Pursuant to a Rules Revision effective 1 July 1984, Title 4 of the Maryland Rules replaced Chapter 700 of the former Rules (and the former home of Rule 731(c)). Rule 731(c) was re-numbered Rule 4-242(c) and, at all times pertinent to the present case, [11] provided: The court may accept a plea of guilty only after it determines, upon an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that (1) the defendant is pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. . . . D. Bradshaw In Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005), the Supreme Court again had the opportunity to rule, in a habeas corpus context, whether a defendant's plea was entered with the requisite knowledge of the nature and elements of the crime. Relevant to the present case, [12] in Bradshaw, a defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated murder and was sentenced ultimately to death. See Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 180, 125 S.Ct. at 2403, 162 L.Ed.2d at 151. Later, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that [he] had pleaded guilty to aggravated murder without understanding that specific intent to cause death was a necessary element of the charge under [state] law. Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182, 125 S.Ct. at 2404-05, 162 L.Ed.2d at 152. Having exhausted state postconviction remedies, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 181, 125 S.Ct. at 2404, 162 L.Ed.2d at 152. The federal district court denied relief. Id. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because he was manifestly not aware that specific intent was an element of the crime to which he plead guilty. . . . Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir.2004). The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated murder was invalid because he was not aware of the specific intent element of the charge. . . . Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182, 125 S.Ct. at 2405, 162 L.Ed.2d at 153. First, the Court reaffirmed the notion that [a] guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, `with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.' Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 748 (1970)). Then, reversing the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that defendant's plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly, the Court explained: But the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Stumpf had not been properly informed before pleading guilty. In Stumpf's plea hearing, his attorneys represented on the record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated murder charge; Stumpf himself then confirmed that this representation was true. See App. 135, 137-138. While the court taking a defendant's plea is responsible for ensuring a record adequate for any review that may be later sought, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), we have never held that the judge must himself explain the elements of each charge to the defendant on the record. Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the record accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. Cf. Henderson, supra, at 647, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (granting relief to a defendant unaware of the elements of his crime, but distinguishing that case from others where the record contains either an explanation of the charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused). Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty. Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 183, 125 S.Ct. at 2405-06, 162 L.Ed.2d at 153-54. Regarding Bradshaw, Petitioner here argues that the Supreme Court did not signal an intent to eliminate the Henderson presumption that ordinarily `defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense [to] the accused' in `sufficient detail' to satisfy the requirement that a defendant's plea be knowing and voluntary. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that [i]n Bradshaw v. Stumpf . . . the United States Supreme Court used language which understandably caused the Maryland Court of Special Appeals to question the viability of the [presumption] language from Henderson  explaining that [t]he [presumption] language used in Henderson v. Morgan . . . was glaringly absent from the Court's opinion in Bradshaw. . . . [i]nstead, the Bradshaw v. Stumpf Court stated, `[w]here a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel's assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge. . . .' E. Post-Bradshaw Court of Special Appeals's Cases We are aware of three [13] reported post- Bradshaw opinions decided by our intermediate appellate court colleagues concerning the Henderson/Priet presumption, discussed supra. Because each presents a slightly different factual scenario, it is only prudent to consider each in turn.