Opinion ID: 1430376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The fourth error

Text: Next, the majority opinion reasons that the presumption that the indefinite suspension still existed is too weak to go to the jury because (1) defendant told the officer that she had appeared in court after her initial nonappearance, and (2) the effect of ORS 484.210(2), which the majority terms the controlling substantive statute in this case (opinion 807; see also 806), is that the suspension order must be automatically terminated if the defendant, having failed to appear in court, appears thereafter. Both prongs of this conclusion are wrong. First, the majority refers repeatedly to defendant's statement to the officer that she appeared in court on a citation after her suspension. It is unclear, however, what legal significance the majority attaches to this evidence. No legal effect (as opposed to factual effect) is evident. (a) The statement is not offered for its truth. (b) It does not specify which citation it applies to. (c) The majority seems to say that the evidence weakens the effect of the state's other evidence, but the weight of evidence is a matter for the factfinder, not the appellate court. If the defendant had so testified, the evidence would go to the factfinder to resolve the factual conflict. The majority holds, however, that because the state proved defendant's statement, it was error for the case to have gone to the factfinder. This gives to defendant's unsworn, uncross-examined out-of-court declaration a legal effect greater than her sworn testimony would have had. By the majority's fallacious reasoning, an acquittal would be required by law wherever the state proves that the defendant, upon being caught red-handed, protested his innocence. This convoluted reasoning has no precedent or persuasive logic and, moreover, its statutory basis is erroneous. Contrary to the assertion of the majority, ORS 484.210 is not the controlling statute, for at least the reason that there is another statutory requirement for the reinstatement of a suspended license. The majority fails to mention it, but the requirement appears on the face of the suspension order. ORS 482.505(1) requires, without exception, payment of a license reinstatement fee of $8. [4] There is no suggestion that this statutory requirement has occurred. The majority cites what appears to be loose language in Musgrave et ux. v. Lucas et ux., 193 Or. 401, 414, 238 P.2d 780, 786 (1951), for the proposition that    It cannot be presumed that they knowingly persisted in performing unlawful acts. There is nothing unlawful about not paying $8. Therefore, the Musgrave theory of not presuming continuing illegality (whatever that double negative may mean) has no application to this case. There is no evidence that defendant has paid the fee, no reason to so infer or presume, and certainly no basis for us to conclude as a matter of law that the state's evidence should not have gone to the factfinder.