Opinion ID: 1354452
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Commit Auto Theft

Text: In light of Williams, 537 F.3d at 972-73, Boaz's prior conviction for conspiring to commit auto theft is not a predicate violent felony. The relevant Arizona conspiracy statute authorized a term of imprisonment in excess of one year. Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-331(B) (1974) (repealed 1978). In addition, the statute defining the underlying criminal offense in Boaz's case, Theft of a motor vehicle or motorcycle, provided: Theft of a motor vehicle or motorcycle; penalty (A) It shall be unlawful for any person to take from another a motor vehicle or motorcycle with the intent to either temporarily [7] or permanently deprive such other person of such motor vehicle or motorcycle. (B) A person found guilty of intent to permanently deprive another of his motor vehicle or motorcycle is guilty of a felony. Id. § 13-672(A)-(B) (1974) (repealed 1978). The § 924(e) analysis of a prior conspiracy conviction is governed by the substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy, such that we must focus our § 924(e) analysis upon Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-672. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 301 F.3d 880, 885 (8th Cir.2002) (analyzing the underlying crime of theft in relation to a conviction for conspiracy to commit theft). This particular prior conviction could qualify as a predicate violent felony only if it satisfies what we have referred to as the otherwise clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Williams, 537 F.3d at 972. In determining whether this crime is a violent felony, we consider the offense generically, that is to say, we examine it in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ____, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 1584, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). When the law defines an offense by proscribing several discrete, alternative sets of elements that might be shown as different manners of committing the offense, we employ the modified categorical approach that permits examination of a limited class of materials to determine which set of elements the defendant was found to have violated. United States v. Livingston, 442 F.3d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir.2006) ([W]e look to the charging papers for the limited purpose of determining the specific elements for which [a defendant] was convicted.). Neither we nor the Supreme Court have approved a methodology that would decouple the limited review of record materials from an element-by-element analysis of the predicate offense. In other words, [i]f the predicate statute reaches a broad range of conduct, this court may expand the inquiry to review the charging papers and jury instructions, but only to determine which part of the statute the defendant violated. United States v. Howell, 531 F.3d 621, 622-23 (8th Cir.2008). When a statute is broadly inclusive, but contains no alternatives in its elements, we must apply the traditional categorical approach, and application of the modified categorical approach is inappropriate. Like the Missouri auto-theft statute we addressed in Williams, 537 F.3d at 973, the Arizona auto-theft statute encompasses a broad range of conduct, some of which may be violent and similar in kind to the enumerated offenses in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and some of which may not. The Arizona statute, however, contains no subdivisions or further delineations setting forth separate elements for proving different types of felony auto theft. In fact, unlike the Missouri statute in Williams, the Arizona statute is devoid of language suggesting different elements. Rather, it merely criminalizes taking ... another['s] ... motor vehicle ... with intent to deprive. Ariz.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 13-672. As such, this statute does not appear amenable to the modified categorical approach. Applying the traditional categorical approach, we believe this statute is analogous to the offense in Williams that we described as auto theft without consent, and which we determined is not a qualifying predicate felony. Williams, 537 F.3d at 973 (interpreting one of the offenses proscribed by Mo.Rev.Stat. § 570.030). Although the Arizona statute does not include lack of consent as an element, it would be nonsensical to interpret the Arizona statute as criminalizing the taking of another's motor vehicle where consent exists, and we may safely infer that the rule of lenity makes lack of consent an implicit element of the Arizona offense. Based on Williams, then, Boaz's conviction for violating this Arizona statute does not qualify as a violent felony. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).