Opinion ID: 1918200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Mr. McNair's 1997 Deposition

Text: Despite the existence  and availability  of public land records revealing the facts underlying Mrs. Drake's fraud claims, Mrs. Drake asserts in her brief that Mr. McNair's misleading responses during his 1997 deposition, as well as the undisclosed and unmentioned Thompson Affidavit, which we have already discussed, lulled her into a state of ignorance until July 30, 2004. Specifically, she contends that Mr. McNair affirmatively concealed the alleged fraud by providing three misleading answers to questions posed during that deposition: (1) that Designmark purchased the Q Street property, (2) that he (McNair) played no role in the purchase of the property, and (3) that Mr. Hodin worked only on pre-death matters for Mr. Drake. We conclude that Mrs. Drake could not reasonably have relied on these alleged misrepresentations and, therefore, that she failed to allege facts sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. It is well established that affirmative acts employed by a party to fraudulently conceal either the existence of a claim or facts forming the basis of a cause of action toll the running of limitations periods. Estate of Chappelle v. Sanders, 442 A.2d 157, 158 (D.C.1982) (citations omitted); accord, William J. Davis, Inc. v. Young, 412 A.2d 1187, 1192 (D.C.1980) ([t]he defendant's affirmative efforts to divert or prevent discovery of the original fraud give a continuing character to the original act which deprives it of statute of limitations protection until discovery). A mere failure to disclose pertinent information, however, is not sufficient to toll the statute of limitations unless there has been some affirmative act of concealment. It has consistently been the law in the District of Columbia that fraudulent concealment requires `something of an affirmative nature designed to prevent discovery of [a] cause of action.' Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768, 773-774 (D.C.1998) (quoting Young, 412 A.2d at 1191-1192). These and similar cases, read together, have established a requirement of due diligence and imposed it on a plaintiff who seeks to take advantage of the discovery rule. Thus ... a plaintiff guilty of ordinary negligence in not earlier discovering a cause of action may not avoid the bar of the statute of limitations merely because a fraud or fraudulent concealment is involved.... [T]he presence of a fraudulent misrepresentation does not excuse the injured party from acting reasonably to protect her interests. Diamond, 680 A.2d at 375-376 (citations omitted). However, [i]n evaluating the reasonableness of the plaintiff's diligence, cases from this jurisdiction have long taken into account the confidential or fiducial relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. at 376. [I]n a close, confidential relationship, the degree of reasonable reliance is likely to be much greater  and the reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff much less  than would exist where the parties had been in an adversary relationship. Id. at 378; see also Firestone v. Firestone, 316 U.S.App. D.C. 152, 156, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (1996) (failure to disclose information may be sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment when one party has a fiduciary obligation to the other party). We must therefore examine the record to determine, first, whether Mrs. Drake exercised sufficient diligence to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations and, second, whether she and Mr. McNair were in a fiduciary relationship that would excuse, or at least reduce the significance of, any lack of diligence on her part. According to Mrs. Drake's brief, [a]t no time did McNair disclose his role in the preparation or supervision of Thompson's October 26, 1995 affidavit or that he subsequently became involved in changing the name on the deed to indicate that Designmark had purchased the property at the foreclosure. We conclude that Mr. McNair's responses during his deposition, although they may have been potentially misleading, were not technically incorrect. For example, when asked, Who purchased the [Q Street property] in the foreclosure?, Mr. McNair responded, Designmark Development Corporation. While it is true that Taurus  and not Designmark  purportedly bought the property in July 1995, shortly before Mr. Drake's death, the property was retitled just a few months later to reflect that Designmark was the actual purchaser. [19] In addition, when asked about his role in the foreclosure, Mr. McNair stated, I had some discussions with [Mr. Drake] prior to his death regarding that property, and my advice to him generally was to walk away from it. Although this statement minimized Mr. McNair's role in the retitling of the property, he went on to explain that he was involved in the transfer of the Q Street property proceeds to the Drake Trusts. He testified in his deposition that he frequently consulted with a representative of Mr. Drake's estate to discuss execution of the will and the trust instruments, as well as the transfer of assets. We are not persuaded that these statements, even if they can be regarded as evasive, rise to the level of active concealment, nor do they warrant depriving Mr. McNair and the other appellees of the protection of the statute of limitations. See Cevenini, 707 A.2d at 774 (we are unwilling to hold that a failure to disclose information that has not even been requested constitutes fraudulent concealment); Young, 412 A.2d at 1191 (Generally the defendant must have done something of an affirmative nature designed to prevent discovery of the cause of action). Furthermore, Mrs. Drake cannot be excused from taking steps to protect her own interests, especially when Mr. McNair owed her no fiduciary obligation. Even if representations are false or misleading, it is unreasonable for a party to rely on those representations if the party had an `adequate opportunity to conduct an independent investigation' and the party making the representation `did not have exclusive access to such information.' In re Estate of McKenney, 953 A.2d 336, 343 (D.C.2008) (citing Howard v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 707 (D.C.1981)). [20] We note that Mr. McNair incorrectly stated during his deposition that Mr. Hodin worked on pre-death  and not post-death  matters for Mr. Drake. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that this statement, even assuming that it was intentionally false, did not toll the statute of limitations. As we pointed out earlier, Mr. McNair had no continuing fiduciary duty to Mrs. Drake because he had previously relinquished his appointment as co-personal representative of Mr. Drake's estate. [21] In addition, Mrs. Drake was already on inquiry notice of Mr. Hodin's involvement in the foreclosure sale of the Q Street property because Hodin's name appeared on the Confirmatory Substitute Trustee's Deed as the person to whom the deed should be returned after it was recorded. Thus it would not have been reasonable for Mrs. Drake to rely on any suggestion by Mr. McNair that Mr. Hodin was involved exclusively with pre-death matters. See Diamond, 680 A.2d at 376 (the presence of a fraudulent misrepresentation does not excuse the injured party from acting reasonably to protect her interests).