Opinion ID: 2708540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Facial Sufficiency

Text: First, the probable cause determination in this case was undermined by the withholding of credibility information, but the affidavit was not otherwise lacking in factual detail to the point that reliance was unreasonable. A defendant establishes unreasonable reliance if “courts have clearly held that a materially similar affidavit previously failed to establish probable cause” or the affidavit is “plainly deficient.” United States v. Woolsey, 535 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2008) (applying good faith exception), quoting Koerth, 312 F.3d at 869. In Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2004), we examined a residential search warrant supported by an affidavit that alleged only that an unknown quantity of cocaine had been sold at the residence one time some three months before, with no indication of the amount sold or the reliability of the informant. Id. at 608. We held that the affidavit was “so inadequate” that the good faith exception did not apply. Id. (granting habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel on a failed motion to suppress). While a complete lack of information on the informant’s reliability is also an issue in this case, the remainder of the affidavit here is not as deficient as the affidavit in Owens. And given the close similarity of the affidavit here to the affidavit held sufficient in Dismuke, see 593 F.3d 12 No. 13-2475 at 587, a reasonable officer acting in the wake of that decision could not be expected to know that the warrant here was not supported by probable cause. Glover argues that the officer’s affidavit here is comparable to the deficient affidavits in United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1993). In Wilhelm, the affidavit resulted from an anonymous tip and provided no detail beyond stating that the informant had provided various descriptions of marijuana “consistent with the applicant[’s] knowledge.” 80 F.3d at 118. Here, the officer’s affidavit provided some factual detail rather than merely asserting conduct supposedly in conformity with criminal activity, and it resulted from an inperson informant who appeared before the issuing judge. The Leake decision is less relevant—the good faith exception did not apply because the officer failed to corroborate an anonymous tip in a meaningful way, but the court rejected Leake’s argument that the affidavit was “bare bones.” 998 F.2d at 1367.