Opinion ID: 2097750
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Heading: The Origins of the Confrontation Right

Text: The confrontation right in seventeenth century English common law is said to have evolved from public backlash to the abuses which occurred during Sir Walter Raleigh's trial for treason in 1603. F. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 104 (1959). Raleigh's conviction rested in great part on a written confession given outside his presence by his alleged co-conspirator, who was not present at trial. The knight of muddied cape fame, who was not permitted counsel, implored the court for confrontation: The proof of the Common Law is by witness and jury; let Cobham [his alleged co-conspirator] be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, and I have done. To which Judge Warburton responded: I marvel, Sir Walter, that you being of such experience and wit should stand on this point; for so many horse-stealers may escape, if they may not be condemned without witnesses. K. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim.L.Bull. 99, 100 (1972). The common law right of confrontation was planted firmly in the American colonies. Confrontation clauses were included in most of the first state constitutions adopted at the start of the Revolutionary War; those constitutions served as models for the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights. R. Clinton, The Right to Present A Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind.L.Rev. 711, 728 (1976). As with the common law confrontation right, the general purpose of these clauses was to prevent the trial of criminal cases upon affidavits. See Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825, 79 S.Ct. 42, 3 L.Ed.2d 65. The right of confrontation became part of the United States Constitution through the Sixth Amendment: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him... . The historical record of the congressional debates on the Bill of Rights is meager. R. Clinton, supra, at 732-733. Even less is known of the individual states' deliberations on the amendments during ratification. Id. at 738. Courts and scholars have generally concluded that the essential purpose of the federal confrontation right is to secure to the defendant the opportunity of cross-examination. Pointer v. Texas 380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 926 (1965); F. Heller, supra p. 5, at 105; 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1395, at 150 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The Supreme Court has described the nature of confrontation at trial as: a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-243, 15 S.Ct. 337, 339, 39 L.Ed. 409, 411 (1895). More recently, Justice Blackmun reminded us that: These means of testing accuracy are so important that the absence of proper confrontation at trial `calls into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.' Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 606 (1980) (citations omitted). While Wigmore calls the witness' presence before the tribunal a result accidentally associated with the process of confrontation, 5 J. Wigmore, § 1395, at 154, courts have tended to regard the jury's opportunity to view the demeanor of the witness as a critical component of the confrontation right. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 1322, 20 L.Ed.2d 255, 260 (1968); Sumpter v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 471, 481, 306 N.E.2d 95, 102, cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952, 96 S.Ct. 1727, 48 L.Ed.2d 196. The Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407, 85 S.Ct. at 1069, 13 L.Ed.2d at 928. The right of confrontation is not absolute. It must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243, 15 S.Ct. at 340, 39 L.Ed. at 411. The Supreme Court also noted that technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant. Id. at 243, 15 S.Ct. at 340, 39 L.Ed. at 411.