Opinion ID: 517632
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence of the Captain

Text: 77 Avondale also argued at trial that even if the relative movement was caused initially by improper mating of the vessel, the negligence of the crew was an intervening or contributing cause in the damage sustained by the vessel on September 12 and in the sinking of the tug on September 20. The district court held that Avondale failed to carry its burden of proving this affirmative defense with respect to the events of both September 12 and September 20. 36 The court's finding that the Captain acted reasonably in setting sail for the Azores in order to effect repairs is supported by the expert testimony and is not clearly erroneous. 78 The court also found that the Captain had been diligent in his attempts to obtain entry into the harbor at Ponta Delgada and had not acted unreasonably in setting out to sea on September 20. 79 While the harbor officials testified later that they would have permitted the Oxy Producer to enter the harbor if they had known that the vessel was in peril, the district court discounted this testimony as speculative. Given that the ultimate decision was not in the Captain's hands, and considering the range of factors that could affect the Harbor Master's decision whether to grant permission to enter, the district court's assessment of this evidence is certainly permissible. 37 The district court properly concluded that the mere possibility that the Captain might have obtained permission to enter the harbor if he had been more insistent did not establish that he was negligent. 80 Avondale next argues that the district court judge failed to apply the proper legal standard to judge the Captain's conduct on September 20. The district court invoked the doctrine of in extremis which holds that where, without prior negligence, a vessel is put in the very center of destructive natural forces and a hard choice between competing courses must immediately be made, the law requires that there be something more than mere mistake of judgment by the master in that decision in extremis. Boudoin v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 281 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir.1960). 81 Avondale argues that the circumstances confronting the Captain on September 20 were not sufficiently severe to warrant application of the in extremis doctrine and that the Captain's conduct should have been judged according to the ordinary prudent seaman standard. 82 Avondale contends that a predicted storm does not constitute sudden peril because it is the nature of the calling of the shipmaster to know the tempestuous forces of wind and tide and seas. Boudoin, 281 F.2d at 84 (application of in extremis doctrine inappropriate where storm tides from hurricane were predicted several days in advance). 83 The heavy weather predicted for September 20 was not, however, the only difficulty facing Captain Kanellos. His disabled vessel, which carried a hazardous cargo, had been denied entry into the harbor. Moreover, another storm moved into the area early on the 20th, exacerbating the heavy seas created by tropical storm Harvey. 38 While these factors may not have placed the vessel in sudden peril, we think that the district court was justified in finding that the combination of these factors presented a situation of sufficient peril and immediacy to require application of a standard of law different from the standard of ordinary maritime negligence. M.P. Howlett Inc. v. Tug Michael Moran, 425 F.2d 619, 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833, 91 S.Ct. 67, 27 L.Ed.2d 65 (1970). 84 The district court properly evaluated the Captain's conduct in light of the principle that: 85 The master of a vessel caught in an emergency where he is forced to choose between risky alternatives, is entitled to a wide range of discretion in deciding what to do, provided it is a reasonable exercise of current standards of nautical knowledge and skill under the circumstances. It does not become negligence because the decision he makes may later, in the light of subsequent events revealed through hindsight, be shown to have been wrong. 86 Esso Standard Oil S.A. v. S.S. Gasbras Sul, 387 F.2d 573, 580 (2d Cir.1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914, 88 S.Ct. 1808, 20 L.Ed.2d 653 (1968). 87 In arguing that Captain Kanellos was imprudent, Avondale relies on our decision in Boudoin in which we held that a shipmaster's decision to remain docked in the face of an oncoming hurricane, rather than sailing upriver to a more protected harbor, was imprudent. A central factor in our holding in Boudoin, however, was that there was no showing that the tug master evaluated his options critically and made a conscious decision that it would be safer to remain at the dock rather than moving his vessel to another port. 281 F.2d at 86. The experts who testified in Boudoin all agreed that a prudent seaman would not have remained docked in light of the weather forecasts. Furthermore, there was no evidence that taking the vessel upriver would have been dangerous before the onset of the hurricane was imminent. Id. at 87. 88 The instant case is readily distinguishable from Boudoin. First, there is ample evidence that Captain Kanellos carefully considered his options (none of which could be guaranteed to succeed) and made a conscious decision that the risk of dragging anchor, running aground, and spilling the vessel's hazardous cargo outweighed the risk of attempting to maneuver the vessel away from the breakwater. Second, the experts who testified at trial did not agree on one prudent course of action. 39 Finally, at least one expert agreed with Captain Kanellos that remaining at anchor could have been dangerous. 40 89 The district court found that the expert testimony established, at most, that another course of action might have been successful and that this was not enough to establish that the Captain's actions had been unreasonable under the circumstances. We agree. The standard of judging the exercise of prudent seamanship here was tempered by the requirement for decision under very difficult, abnormal circumstances and the error, if there was error, was not negligence. Tug Michael Moran, 425 F.2d at 623 (citations omitted). The district court did not err in holding that Avondale failed to establish that the imprudence of the Captain was an intervening or contributory cause in the loss of the Oxy Producer. The district court must, however, decide whether the events discussed in this section were foreseeable for purposes of determining damages for breach of contract. See supra note 36; Skibs A/S Gylfe v. Nat'l Cargo Bureau Inc., 438 F.2d 803, 805 n.1, 807-08 (6th Cir.1971) (distinguishing superceding and intervening cause as used in tort from forseeability in determining damages for breach of contract). 90