Opinion ID: 6333813
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eighth Amendment Excessive Force

Text: With the relevant facts in hand and the proper constitutional standard identified, we proceed to determine whether Hughes’s testimony that was not “blatantly contradicted,” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, by the bodycam footage creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether his Eighth Amendment right against excessive force was violated. In excessive force cases brought under the Eighth Amendment, the relevant inquiry is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320–21). This Court applies a five-factor test to determine whether the use of force was malicious and HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ 17 sadistic: “(1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response.” Furnace, 705 F.3d at 1028 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). First, we examine the extent of Hughes’s injuries. Although not binding precedent, in Koley v. Williams, No. CV 19-08038-PCT-DWL (JZB), 2021 WL 806935 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2021) (slip copy), the district court concluded that a dog bite with no lasting complications was a minor injury. Here, Hughes testified that he suffered dog bites to his left leg, abrasions to his head and face, and bruising on his upper right thigh. He claims he has scarring and residual soreness in his left leg, but he makes no allegations that these injuries interfere with his work or daily life. We conclude that these injuries are relatively minor, and this factor weighs slightly in favor of the defendant law enforcement officers. Next, we examine factors two through four—the proportionality factors. We note that the use of biting police dogs on hiding suspects has been repeatedly upheld under the more plaintiff-friendly Fourth Amendment excessive force standard. See Hernandez v. Town of Gilbert, 939 F.3d at 739; Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357 (9th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003). If the officer’s conduct does not breach the lower Fourth Amendment standard, it does not breach the higher Eighth Amendment standard. 3 3 The test for a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim is whether the force used was “objectively reasonable under the circumstances.” 18 HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ Indeed, this case bears a striking resemblance to Miller. In that case, the suspect was hiding in woods that were familiar to the suspect, but not to the officers, which afforded him “the opportunity to select a hiding place to maximize [his] strategic advantage.” Id. at 965. The same is true for Hughes, who was hiding within a home familiar to him, but unfamiliar to the officers. Like in Miller, the officers here did not know whether Hughes was armed and, given his prior convictions for weapons possession, had reason to suspect that he was. Just as in Miller, Hughes “remained defiant, having ignored [the officer’s] warning that he was about to release a police dog.” Id. “Under these objectively menacing circumstances,” Officer Michael Rodriguez was “entitled to assume” that Hughes “posed an immediate threat to his and to the other deputy’s safety.” Id. “Given the gravity of the risk to law enforcement,” we conclude that these factors weigh heavily in favor of the officers. Id. We conclude that the initial use of the police dog was proportional to the “threats to the safety of [the officers], as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 31. Finally, we look at efforts made to temper the severity of the law enforcement response. Hughes had three weeks to turn himself in. On the morning of his apprehension, officers used loudspeakers urging Hughes to come out of hiding. Officers knocked on the door of Ward’s home repeatedly. When officers opened the front door to the home, Officer Michael Rodriguez gave Hughes two warnings to come out or face a police dog. Hughes did not avail himself of any opportunity to turn himself in, respond to any of the officer’s Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. The test for an Eighth Amendment violation is whether the force was malicious and sadistic. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ 19 attempts to make their presence known, or heed any warning that force was coming. Thus, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the defendant officers. But Hughes’s Eighth Amendment claim does not rest solely on the initial use of the dog. If that were the case, our analysis could stop here. Instead, Hughes also testified that he was beaten and bitten after he was fully subdued, with his hands cuffed behind his back. Although Officer Michael Rodriguez insists that he threw the punch before Hughes was cuffed, “[a]t the summary judgment stage the trial judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The portion of Hughes’s testimony that was not blatantly contradicted by the bodycam footage creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether Hughes was beaten and bitten after he was handcuffed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 2017) (reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant corrections officers where the inmate plaintiff testified that the officers beat him after he was handcuffed); Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant corrections officers where the inmate plaintiff testified that officers kicked him in the shoulder and hit him in the back with a baton after he was handcuffed). While the initial use of the dog was clearly proportional to the threat posed by Hughes before he was handcuffed, whether the post-handcuff beating and dog-biting occurred, and whether it was proportional to the threat Officer Michael Rodriguez reasonably perceived by a handcuffed Hughes, are questions for the trier of fact. 20 HUGHES V. RODRIGUEZ