Opinion ID: 44407
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Title VII Framework

Text: The district court assumed--and New Palace concedes for the -16- purposes of summary judgment--that Staten established a prima facie case for each of her claims of race discrimination and retaliation. The district court determined that New Palace presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for terminating and refusing to rehire Staten, and Staten does not contest this determination on summary judgment. Therefore, the only issue presented for our review is whether Staten has produced sufficient evidence to indicate that New Palace’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons were pretext for discrimination and retaliation. 1. Discrimination and Retaliation Based on Staten’s November 2001 Termination Staten points out that New Palace offered inconsistent explanations throughout the litigation as to why it terminated her, initially taking the position before the EEOC and in Conwill’s 30(b)(6) deposition that all Buffet employees had been furloughed, and later explaining in Conwill’s affidavit that the four lead employees who were retained had more seniority than Staten and worked different shifts. Staten maintains that New Palace’s inconsistent explanations are enough to withstand summary judgment and that the district court misapplied Reeves in concluding otherwise. Staten alternatively contends that she should be allowed to prove her termination claims under the mixed-motive framework, as set forth by this court in Rachid v. -17- Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004). New Palace counters that it made a “mistake” in offering inconsistent justifications for its decision to terminate Staten and that when it realized its mistake, it corrected the record and provided all relevant documentation to Staten. New Palace argues that Reeves requires something more than a mistake or an inconsistent explanation for an issue of discrimination or retaliation to reach a jury and that the district court properly granted summary judgment on Staten’s termination claims. We disagree. When an employer offers inconsistent explanations for its employment decision at different times, as here, the jury may infer that the employer’s proffered reasons are pretextual. See Gee, 289 F.3d at 347-48 (determining summary judgment was improper where the plaintiff produced evidence that the employer’s explanation for her non-selection had been inconsistent and there were discrepancies between the decisionmaker’s affidavit and testimony); see also EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fact that Sears has offered different justifications at different times for its failure to hire Santana is, in and of itself, probative of pretext.”) (citing, inter alia, Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[W]hen a company, at different times, gives different and arguably inconsistent explanations, a jury may infer that the articulated -18- reasons are pretextual.”), and EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a reasonable juror could infer that the shifting and inconsistent explanations given by the employer at trial were pretextual, developed over time to counter the evidence suggesting discrimination)); Zaccagnini v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 338 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he consistency of the explanation provided by an employer at the time of an employment decision and in an administrative proceeding is evidence of the veracity of the employer’s explanation at summary judgment.”). The timing of an employer’s changing rationale is also probative of pretext. See Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The timing of the change [in the employer’s explanation for its decision] has been found to support the inference of pretext when it occurs after significant legal proceedings have occurred.”); Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d at 853 (“[A] factfinder could infer from the late appearance of Sears’s current justification that it is a post-hoc rationale, not a legitimate explanation for [its employment decision].”). Given New Palace’s inconsistent explanations for Staten’s termination and the timing of its changing rationale, a factfinder could conclude that, in the words of the Supreme Court, New Palace’s “asserted justification is false” or “unworthy of credence.” 530 U.S. at 148, 147; see also Russell, 235 F.3d at 225 (reiterating that it is the province of the jury -19- to choose among conflicting versions and make credibility determinations). Contrary to the district court’s determination, Staten was not required to produce additional independent evidence of discrimination or retaliation for New Palace’s decision to terminate her. See Gee, 289 F.3d at 348 (stating that under Reeves “a plaintiff may withstand a motion for summary judgment without adducing additional, independent evidence” of discrimination or retaliation). Rather, as this court previously has explained, “evidence of the prima facie case plus pretext may, and usually does, establish sufficient evidence for a jury to find discrimination.” Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 2000).11 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the issues of race discrimination and retaliation for Staten’s termination. Having reached this conclusion, we need not address Staten’s alternative arguments under Rachid and the mixed-motive framework. 11 Under Reeves, there are two instances in which a showing of pretext is insufficient to get the plaintiff past summary judgment: (1) when the record conclusively reveals some other, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for the employer’s decision; or (2) when the plaintiff creates only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and there is abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination or retaliation occurred. 530 U.S. at 148; see Russell, 235 F.3d at 223 (describing the use of these instances as “rare”). The parties have not argued--and we do not conclude --that this is one of those “rare” exceptions to Reeves: the record does not conclusively reveal some other reason for the termination (other than the two inconsistent explanations), and Staten’s showing of pretext is not weak. See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 585. -20- 2. Discrimination and Retaliation Based on New Palace’s May 2002 Refusal to Rehire Staten Staten contends that she can rebut the nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons articulated by New Palace for its refusal to rehire her for a lead position and that the district court erred in not properly evaluating her challenges of pretext.12 First, Staten argues that New Palace’s explanation that it was not hiring lead personnel is a pretext for discrimination and retaliation because the record conclusively shows that New Palace was hiring lead employees in March and April of 2002. Second, Staten claims that New Palace’s justification that Trettle did not know about her January EEOC charge is a pretext for retaliation because Trettle’s testimony is not credible. Staten alternatively contends that she should be allowed to prove her refusal to rehire claims under the mixed-motive framework as set forth in Rachid. New Palace maintains that Trettle was not hiring lead personnel when Staten’s application was under consideration and therefore this justification is not a pretext for discrimination or retaliation.13 Responding to Staten’s argument that New 12 Staten does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that she failed to produce sufficient evidence to support her contention that she was more qualified than Mary Kostmayer for the sous chef position. 13 New Palace has represented in its memoranda and briefs before the district court and this court that it was not hiring lead personnel. See, e.g., R. at 80, 232 (stating that “the unrefuted evidence demonstrates that Mr. Trettle was not hiring -21- Palace retaliated against her by refusing to rehire her, New Palace asserts that the uncontroverted evidence shows that Trettle did not know Staten had filed an EEOC charge against New Palace at the time he interviewed her and made his decision not to hire her. Our review of the record supports Staten’s claim of pretext regarding New Palace’s explanation that it was not hiring lead personnel. The record indicates that New Palace hired one lead baker and three lead cooks in March and April of 2002: April Joyner as a lead baker on March 26, 2002, and Rodney Bryant, Tyree Valentine, and Sommai Boudreaux, as lead cooks on March 7, 2002, March 19, 2002, and April 17, 2002, respectively.14 This unrefuted evidence directly contradicts New Palace’s explanation that it was not hiring any lead personnel in March and April of 2002, when Staten submitted her application for consideration. additional ‘Lead’ personnel for the Buffet”); id. at 239 (noting at the time Trettle was interviewing candidates, he was not hiring any additional lead positions). At oral argument, New Palace’s attorney reiterated the company’s position that it was not hiring lead personnel during March and April of 2002. 14 The record also shows that New Palace hired Sheryl Hughey (“Hughey”) as a lead baker on April 25, 2002. New Palace explained before the district court that Hughey was not hired as a lead baker in April 2002, but instead was hired as a cook in April and transferred to the lead baker position on June 24, 2002. It is not clear why New Palace did not attempt to refute the evidence concerning its hiring of Joyner, Bryant, Valentine, and Boudreaux, as lead employees in March and April of 2002, before the district court or this court. This evidence was included as one of the exhibits that Staten submitted to the district court with her response to New Palace’s motion for summary judgment. -22- Considering all the facts and drawing all inferences in favor of Staten, a factfinder is simply not required to believe New Palace’s proffered justification and could “reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147; see also Evans, 238 F.3d at 592 (“[E]vidence of the prima facie case plus pretext may, and usually does, establish sufficient evidence for a jury to find discrimination.”).15 Because this is the only explanation given by New Palace on Staten’s race discrimination claim and because Staten has submitted sufficient evidence to show that this explanation is false, we reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the issue of race discrimination for the refusal to rehire claim. Although Staten has successfully rebutted New Palace’s explanation that it was not hiring lead personnel, she must rebut each nonretaliatory reason articulated by New Palace to prevail on her claim of pretext for her retaliation claim. See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 578. In addition to its explanation that it was not hiring lead personnel, New Palace offered Trettle’s deposition, in which he testified that he did not know that Staten had filed an EEOC charge against New Palace at the time he interviewed her and made the decision not to hire her. Staten has produced no 15 Again, the parties have not argued--and we do not conclude--that this is one of those “rare” exceptions to Reeves. See Laxton, 333 F.3d at 585; cf. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. -23- evidence to contradict New Palace’s asserted explanation; instead, she attempts to show pretext by challenging the veracity of Trettle’s testimony. Specifically, Staten points to the fact that Trettle could remember only her name after interviewing over 200 applicants, Trettle had her application for two months before interviewing her, and Trettle’s testimony that she answered his interview questions incorrectly is refuted by her testimony and affidavits filed by two other applicants. “To raise an inference of pretext in the face of the employer’s legitimate, non[retaliatory] explanation, the plaintiff must undermine the employer’s credibility to the point that a reasonable jury could not find in its favor.” Jaramillo, 427 F.3d at 1310 (citing Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 70 (7th Cir. 1995)). In other words, the plaintiff must present evidence so “that a jury could find that the employer (or its decisionmaker) lacks all credibility.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Staten’s attempts to undermine Trettle’s testimony are unpersuasive. Her alleged irregularities in the interview process are simply not strong enough so that a jury could find that Trettle “lacks all credibility.” See id. Because we conclude that Staten’s attempted showing of pretext is insufficient, we must address Staten’s alternative argument that in light of Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), and Rachid, 376 F.3d 305, she should be allowed to -24- assert a mixed-motive alternative to the “but for” standard required for retaliation claims.16 Under this lower standard, Staten would only have to prove sufficient evidence that her EEOC charge against New Palace was a “motivating factor” in New Palace’s decision not to rehire her. This circuit has not extended the holdings of Desert Palace or Rachid, both of which concern discrimination claims, to Title VII retaliation claims. See Septimus, 399 F.3d at 607 n.7 (refusing to decide whether Desert Palace or Rachid affect the legal standard for Title VII retaliation claims). Without deciding whether the mixed-motive framework modifies the McDonnell Douglas framework for Title VII retaliation claims, we conclude that Staten has provided no evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that her EEOC charge was a motivating factor in New Palace’s refusal to rehire her. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment on Staten’s retaliation claim for New Palace’s refusal to rehire 16 In Rachid, this court held that Desert Palace modifies the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Age Discrimination and Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, cases such that a plaintiff can proceed on a mixed-motives theory even without direct evidence. In other words, the plaintiff can offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact “either (1) that the defendant’s reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff’s protected characteristic (mixed-motives alternative).” 376 F.3d at 312 (internal quotations marks, citation, and alteration omitted). -25- her.