Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preclusion of defense evidence.

Text: Defendant claims a combination of incompetence of counsel, judicial error and prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of crucial defense evidence in violation of his right to due process, a fair trial and a reliable verdict under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the California Constitution. Specifically, he claims that defense witnesses Croffoot and Sandoval would have testified and presented evidence of his intoxication and unconsciousness at the time of the crimes had not incompetence of counsel and prosecutorial intimidation caused them to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. Once the witnesses invoked the privilege, he claims, the court should have extended judicial immunity to assure defendant a fair trial. Finally, defense counsel should have offered the witnesses' out-of-court statements to a defense investigator, statements defendant claims were admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. Defendant also claims that as a matter of due process, the evidence should have been admitted even if it was hearsay. He alleges his defense was severely compromised by the loss of independent evidence of his intoxication, evidence he claims was needed to show he lacked the specific intent necessary to establish first degree murder and burglary felony murder. We review the factual background of the claim. The record indicates during the defense case, counsel called witness Sandoval, who began to testify that he had met defendant on the day of the crime. When counsel asked Sandoval whether he had been in possession of a controlled substance, namely cocaine, at the time, the court interrupted and asked whether the witness should be advised of his privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecutor noted that he had some additional information that should be discussed outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel offered to ask the witness whether he had counsel with whom he had discussed his testimony. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated the witness had been advised by the public defender, and the court asked that the public defender be present. The prosecutor added, Your honor, it's also my information, hearsay but my information nonetheless that Mr. Sandoval was convicted on January the 20th of this year of sale of PCP and sentenced to four years in state prison. [¶] I don't know if that's true or not. I notice he came in the public door rather than the private door. I don't know if that case is back  Defense counsel interjected: You know those early parole problems. The prosecutor continued: I also have a copy of the police report [in] which he is one of the named suspects in a conspiracy to defraud by means of bad checks. At one point it was our belief there was a warrant for his arrest on that and I don't know if there is a warrant in the system now or not. The court noted that the witness's counsel was unavailable until the following week. The prosecutor suggested: Why don't we excuse ourselves, you and Mr. Sandoval have a little chat. It may be that Mr. Sandoval voluntarily can convince you there's no danger of him implicating himself.... The court accepted the suggestion and spoke with the witness in an in camera session the transcript of which was sealed. After this discussion, the court ordered the witness to consult with an attorney in the public defender's office and return the following day. Sandoval failed to appear the following day and therefore the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. The prosecutor asked for a copy of the warrant to enable local police to try to secure Sandoval's appearance in court. Defense counsel accepted the prosecutor's offer of police assistance. Apparently Sandoval failed to appear because he was arrested on an outstanding warrant (not the bench warrant) the day he was to appear. Next, defense counsel proposed to call Croffoot to testify about being with defendant for part of the evening of the crime and either using narcotics or seeing them being used. The court had expressed some concern that this witness, too, should have independent counsel, and secured counsel for the witness. At an in camera hearing, the court announced that counsel had been procured for Croffoot, noting that he was speaking euphemistically in stating that Counsel Ayers had volunteered to advise Croffoot. Defendant claims the attorney was dragooned from those waiting in the courtroom, but the record sheds no further light on the subject. The following colloquy ensued: The Court: [Mr. Ayers has volunteered to advise Mr. Croffoot] regarding his constitutional rights as he is the next intended witness and he was going to testify as I kind of surmise that he was with Mr. Lucas part of the evening in question and was either using narcotics or saw narcotics being used or something to that nature, without going into it in detail. [¶] Have you had a chance to interview him? Mr. Ayers: Yes. Mr. Watson [the prosecutor]: Can I interrupt the court and counsel, and I apologize. I think the record should further reflect I had a chance to talk to Mr. Ayers in the presence of both defense attorneys to impart to him some information about the status of our case, where we are, what's going on. I told him a little about [Sandoval] and then the defense attorneys had a chance to consult with him without me being present, and I didn't tell them one thing that I should tell him, and he may already know it, I don't know. The prosecutor then informed Croffoot's counsel that evidence received at trial indicated Croffoot may have been with defendant up to half an hour before the crimes. He added: [T]here is no evidence more than one person did it, but, you know, that's obviously open to speculation. The court asked Ayers whether he had consulted with Croffoot, and Ayers responded: I have talked to Mr. [Croffoot]. From things he has told me about his personal situation I have advised him to invoke [the privilege against self-incrimination]. Croffoot was called to the stand, and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel asked him whether he had seen Sandoval and defendant on the date of the crime. He refused to answer. He also invoked the privilege as to questions about what he did all that day, and about the use of controlled substances on that day with defendant and Sandoval. He also invoked the privilege as to questions regarding his activities with Sandoval and defendant up to 10 or 11 o'clock on the night of the crime. The court sustained the exercise of the privilege. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Counsel noted that the court had an interview with Sandoval out of counsel's presence, assigned him a new public defender, and that Sandoval had disappeared. Croffoot was on probation for a misdemeanor. Defense counsel argued that these witnesses were critical to the defense, that if a mistrial were declared, Sandoval could be apprehended and Croffoot could finish his probationary period. Counsel also pointed out the prosecutor could grant immunity, and claimed the witnesses were unlikely actually to be prosecuted for material in their testimony. The prosecutor responded that the witnesses might incriminate themselves, not for drug charges, but for being accomplices, since an independent witness saw them with defendant near the time of the crime. The court found both witnesses had exercised their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Sandoval partly by footwork. The court denied the motion for mistrial, saying defendant would not benefit from any delay because no competent attorney would advise these witnesses to testify, as they apparently were with defendant up until moments before the crime. Then Sandoval appeared, and outside the presence of the jury, responded to defense counsel's question whether he could answer a series of questions relating to his activities on October 15, 1986, in the company of Croffoot and defendant, and about the use of drugs and various other activities that day. Sandoval announced that he would refuse to answer on the ground the answers would tend to incriminate him.
(11a) Defendant claims his counsel were incompetent because they failed to secure the admission of the testimony of witnesses Sandoval and Croffoot regarding defendant's drug use in the hours before the crime. As noted above, these defense witnesses asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant faults counsel for failing to demonstrate to the trial court that the defense could propound specific questions regarding the witnesses' observation of defendant's drug and alcohol use on the day of the crimes that would not have focused on the witness's activities and hence would not have implicated the witnesses' Fifth Amendment rights. Through such a course, he claims, counsel could have secured essential evidence in support of defendant's claim of intoxication and unconsciousness. Defendant's claim depends on the assumption the court would have required the witnesses to answer questions regarding their observation of defendant's activities. His claim is speculative. He does not state what questions should have been asked, nor can he, on the appellate record, establish what the answers would have been to more specific questions. Moreover, he cannot demonstrate the court would have or should have required the witnesses to answer questions directed to their observations of defendant, as opposed to those directed to the witnesses' own activities. As we explain, the court could reasonably conclude the proposed testimony might tend to incriminate the witnesses. Defendant's claim depends upon an unduly restrictive view of the privilege against self-incrimination. (12) Witnesses may refuse to answer questions calling for a potential link in a chain of evidence of guilt, as well as questions calling for clear admissions against penal interest. ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 616 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635]; People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441 [247 Cal. Rptr. 121, 754 P.2d 168].) Although the court should make a particularized inquiry as to whether or not a claim of privilege is well founded ( Blackburn v. Superior Court (1993) 21 Cal. App.4th 414, 428 [27 Cal. Rptr.2d 204]), in order to approve invocation of the privilege `it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.' ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 617, quoting Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [95 L.Ed. 1118, 1123-1124, 71 S.Ct. 814].) Innocent persons, as well as the guilty, are entitled to invoke the privilege. As the high court has declared, `[t]he privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.' ( Grunewald v. United States (1957) 353 U.S. 391, 421 [1 L.Ed.2d 931, 953, 77 S.Ct. 963]; see also Ratner, Consequences of Exercising the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1957) 24 U. Chi. L.Rev. 472, 472-473.) Further, as we have noted, our Evidence Code provides that when a witness grounds refusal to testify on the privilege against self-incrimination, a trial court may compel the witness to answer only if it `clearly appears to the court' that the proposed testimony `cannot possibly have a tendency to incriminate the person claiming the privilege.' (Evid. Code, § 404.) ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 617.) (11b) Here, defendant proposed to ask the witnesses a series of questions regarding their activities with him on the date of the crime, including their use of controlled substances, their observations regarding his use of controlled substances, and their other activities together with defendant that day. Even if counsel had limited the questions to the witnesses' observations of defendant, we cannot say on this record the court would or should have refused to permit the witnesses to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. Naturally, any testimony regarding the witnesses' observation of defendant's condition would call for cross-examination directed at the witnesses' opportunity and ability to observe. Such questions would subject the witnesses to the same danger of self-incrimination as would the questions of defense counsel of which defendant now complains. Moreover, the prosecutor made it clear that independent witnesses placed Sandoval and Croffoot with defendant at a time close to the time of the crimes, and placed Croffoot with defendant as little as half an hour before the murders. The prosecutor also explained that the physical evidence did not rule out the possibility that more than one person perpetrated the murders. Thus, not only could any question about the witnesses' observations regarding defendant's drug ingestion provide a link in the chain of evidence establishing their own illegal use of drugs, but, as the prosecutor chillingly pointed out, any testimony useful to establish defendant's state of intoxication near the time of the crime could provide a link in the chain of evidence tending to incriminate the witnesses as accomplices or accessories in a double murder. (See People v. Ford, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 442, fn. 7 [if no alibi defense, witness may invoke privilege regarding association with defendant prior to crime because of risk of inference of aiding and abetting the defendant].) The possibility is at best remote that had defense counsel framed their questions differently, the court would have required the witnesses to answer questions regarding their activities with defendant on the night of the crimes. Nor can we evaluate whether any alleged incompetence was prejudicial, without a record that establishes the answers to such questions. Defendant's reliance on Brown v. United States (1958) 356 U.S. 148 [2 L.Ed.2d 589, 78 S.Ct. 622, 72 A.L.R.2d 818] for the proposition that a witness may testify as to certain matters, but may invoke the privilege on cross-examination before the reliability of his testimony has been tested fully, is misplaced. In Brown, the court held that a defendant who took the stand in her own defense could not refuse, on the ground of the privilege against self-incrimination, to answer questions on cross-examination relevant to her testimony on direct examination. The court reasoned that such a witness voluntarily waives the privilege when she volunteers to testify. The high court distinguished a case in which a witness compelled by subpoena to testify in a bankruptcy proceeding was permitted to invoke the privilege for the first time in cross-examination. The court pointed out that in such a case, the witness had no occasion to invoke the privilege until testimony was sought that would tend to incriminate. At that point, the invocation had to be respected, though it would permit the witness to withdraw from the cross-fire of interrogation before the reliability of his testimony has been fully tested. ( Id. at p. 155 [2 L.Ed.2d at p. 597].) This observation is inapposite here, where our review of the record indicates that in fact, any question relevant to defendant's defense would present a clear danger of incriminating the witnesses. The People argue defense counsel had no obligation to ask specific questions and require the witnesses to invoke the privilege as to each, citing People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 637, 658-659 [155 Cal. Rptr. 238].) In that case, the Court of Appeal determined the court had no obligation to require the meaningless ritual of asking a litany of specific questions of a witness who had made it clear he would answer no questions and would invoke the privilege as to any relevant question. In Cornejo, the court had information before it making it plain that the witness's federal parole prohibited him from acting as an informant, but that [a]ll relevant questions which would have been posed to [the witness] could only have related to his activities as an informant. ( Id. at p. 658; see also People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 991 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984] [no need to conduct meaningless ritual of requiring witness to invoke privilege before jury].) The Cornejo case is of limited relevance, however, because there was no claim, as here, that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a certain line of questioning that would not present a danger of incriminating the witness. To the extent it was clear to counsel in this case, however, that the witnesses intended to invoke the privilege as to any question regarding their activities with defendant on the night of the crimes, such a circumstance does undermine defendant's claim that counsel should have put other questions to the witnesses.
(13) The state and federal Constitutions guarantee the defendant a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. ( Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 [90 L.Ed.2d 636, 644-645, 106 S.Ct. 2142]; In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 30 [241 Cal. Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374].) As we have observed, A defendant's constitutional rights to compel the attendance of witnesses, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and to due process, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, are violated when the prosecution interferes with the defendant's right to present witnesses. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 460 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; see also Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 690 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 644-645]; U.S. v. Lopez-Alvarez (9th Cir.1992) 970 F.2d 583, 588, fn. 4 [noting confusion as to whether right to present defense derives from right of confrontation or right of due process].) Defendant alleges such interference took place in this case. To prevail in such a claim, as we have explained, he must establish three elements. First, he must demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., conduct that was `entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor's duties and was of such a nature as to transform a defense witness willing to testify into one unwilling to testify.' ( In re Williams (1994) 7 Cal.4th 572, 603 [29 Cal. Rptr.2d 64, 870 P.2d 1072].) Second, he must establish the prosecutor's misconduct was a substantial cause in depriving the defendant of the witness's testimony. ( Ibid. ) The defendant, however, is not required to prove that the conduct under challenge was the `direct or exclusive' cause. [Citations.] Rather, he need only show that the conduct was a substantial cause. [Citations.] The misconduct in question may be deemed a substantial cause when, for example, it carries significant coercive force [citation] and is soon followed by the witness's refusal to testify. ( In re Martin, supra , 44 Cal.3d at p. 31.) Finally, the defendant must show the testimony he was unable to present was material to his defense. ( Id. at p. 32.) (14) Defendant claims that through intimidation and threats, the prosecutor transformed Sandoval from a willing witness into one who refused to testify. He points out that when the court first raised the question whether Sandoval should be represented by independent counsel, the prosecutor interjected the assertedly irrelevant information, in Sandoval's presence, that Sandoval had a recent conviction for narcotics violations and was a suspect in another matter involving bad checks and might be subject to an arrest warrant. Defendant claims this amounted to a threat that if the witness should testify for the defense, the full force of the People's prosecutorial mechanism would be used against him. Defendant also refers to Sandoval's arrest by the Whittier police, without, however, pointing to anything in the record suggesting that the prosecutor had anything to do with the arrest. The People counter that defendant waived the issue when he failed to object on the same basis below. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 794 [claim of misconduct waived if no objection, unless harm could not have been cured].) Defendant argues that any failure to object establishes ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, the claim involves a question of fundamental fairness, and any misconduct, had it existed, could not readily have been cured by the trial court's intervention, in contrast to other instances of prosecutorial misconduct in the course of trial. Accordingly, we may reach the merits of the claim. (See, e.g., People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948-949 [42 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574]; People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 270-271; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1013 [22 Cal. Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099].) Defendant is unable to carry the first part of his burden, that is, to show that the prosecutor acted improperly. Contrary to defendant's argument, it is clear that the court, not the prosecutor, was the moving force in raising the issue of Sandoval's possible self-incrimination. The court was concerned that Sandoval might incriminate himself by discussing his drug use with defendant; the prosecutor merely offered information relevant to this concern when he said the witness might have a recent narcotics conviction. Any evidence of illegal drug use, of course, could subject such a witness to parole or probation violations. Further, the prosecutor's comments were not threats directed to the witness. (Cf. People v. Warren (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 961, 971-976 [207 Cal. Rptr. 912] [threat that witness would be prosecuted for any crimes revealed in testimony]; People v. Robinson (1983) 144 Cal. App.3d 962, 970 [193 Cal. Rptr. 92] [threat that charges will be filed]; United States v. Hammond (5th Cir.1979) 598 F.2d 1008, 1012-1013 [threat of untoward consequences if witnesses testified].) Nor is there any evidence the witness was arrested in connection with this case or that his arrest on an unrelated warrant was engineered by the prosecutor, or indeed, that the prosecutor even knew about it. Thus the case is not like In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1, in which we said the prosecutor acted improperly in causing a defense witness to be arrested as he left the stand, in an evident effort to intimidate him and prevent further testimony. ( Id. at p. 35.) In sum, as the prosecutor's comments evidently responded to a concern of the court's, we see no indication on this record the prosecutor engaged in conduct wholly unnecessary to the proper performance of [his] duties and of such a character as `to transform [the witness] from a willing witness into one who would refuse to testify.' ( Id. at p. 31.) Similarly, with respect to witness Croffoot, it was the court that initiated inquiry into his exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination and insisted that he consult independent counsel on the point. The prosecutor did not address the witness or threaten prosecution, but merely pointed out to the witness's counsel the rather obvious point that although there was no evidence that more than one person was involved in the crime, a witness who testified he was with the defendant up to half an hour before the crime could not be ruled out absolutely as an accomplice. As the court later said, no competent attorney would have advised either witness to testify. Again, we see no evidence the prosecutor acted improperly. In any event, whether or not it was proper for the prosecutor to point out in front of the witness that the latter could not be ruled out as an accomplice under the facts of the case, it is clear that the prosecutor's comment was not a substantial cause of the witness's decision to refuse to testify. Rather, the record demonstrates that before the prosecutor made the allegedly coercive statement, Croffoot's counsel had already advised Croffoot to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination because of information Croffoot related about his personal situation. Defendant also claims the prosecutor committed misconduct in willfully mischaracterizing the evidence, causing Croffoot and Sandoval to refuse to testify. Specifically, defendant claims the prosecutor argued to the court that an unidentified fingerprint at the scene of the murders might belong to Sandoval or Croffoot, whereas in his opening statement he had already told the jury there was no evidence that anyone besides defendant was present during the crimes. The statement occurred in the prosecutor's argument to the court against the defendant's alternative motions for a grant of immunity to Croffoot and Sandoval for possible drug offenses or a mistrial. The court had already determined the witnesses would be permitted to invoke their privilege against self-incrimination when the prosecutor made the statement defendant complains of, so it is difficult to see how the statement can have caused the witnesses to become unavailable. Further, the prosecutor's point to the court was that immunity for drug offenses would not suffice to secure the witnesses' testimony because they might face liability as accomplices to the murder. He correctly argued that although there was no evidence of their participation, they could not be ruled out as participants. We see no mischaracterization of the evidence. Further, the court had heard the prosecution evidence and was quite capable of evaluating it. [6] Defendant may be understood to argue the prosecutor's refusal to grant Sandoval or Croffoot immunity for murder charges was also misconduct, as it was allegedly unconscionable and interfered with defendant's right to present a defense. As we have observed, the defendant has no power to force the prosecution to grant immunity to defense witnesses. ( In re Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 609.) In any event, defendant did not request such immunity below, but only requested that the prosecutor offer immunity for any drug charges arising from the witnesses' testimony. The issue is not preserved for review. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 585, 619 [barring issue and noting lack of authority requiring prosecutor to offer immunity to defense witnesses].) No claim of ineffective assistance of counsel appears in this connection.
(15a) Defendant argues the trial court should have extended judicial immunity to Croffoot and Sandoval for any potential drug offenses in order to vindicate defendant's right to present a defense. He argues the issue was preserved below because defendant requested that the prosecutor immunize Sandoval and Croffoot for any liability for drug offenses in order to secure their testimony. Here, defendant did not request judicial immunity in the trial court. He failed to direct the court's attention to any authority in support of such immunity, and he did not attempt to meet the standards expressed in the one federal case recognizing such judicial power. ( Government of Virgin Islands v. Smith (3d Cir.1980) 615 F.2d 964, 972 ( Smith ).) We conclude he waived the claim. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619 [failure to request immunity from either prosecutor or court waives issue on appeal].) (16) Further, even if the issue were preserved for appeal, we have pointed out that the vast majority of cases, in this state and in other jurisdictions, reject the notion that a trial court has `inherent power' to confer immunity on a witness called by the defense. ( In re Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 610.) The one jurisdiction that recognizes such a power, we have observed, also recognizes that `the opportunities for judicial use of this immunity power must be clearly limited; ... the proffered testimony must be clearly exculpatory; the testimony must be essential; and there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity.... [¶] [T]he defendant must make a convincing showing sufficient to satisfy the court that the testimony which will be forthcoming is both clearly exculpatory and essential to the defendant's case. Immunity will be denied if the proffered testimony is found to be ambiguous, not clearly exculpatory, cumulative or it is found to relate only to the credibility of the government's witnesses.' ( People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 974 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608], quoting Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 972.) (15b) In several recent cases in which this claim has been raised, we have found the defendant failed to meet the stringent offer of proof requirements of the Smith case, even assuming arguendo the doubtful proposition that the trial court has inherent authority to grant immunity. (See, e.g., In re Williams, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 610; People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 619; People v. Hunter, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 974.) Again, we conclude defendant did not meet the stringent standards of Smith, supra, 615 F.2d 964. Although he asserted that the witnesses would provide crucial exculpatory evidence and made an offer of proof regarding their testimony, it seems evident that immunity for drug offenses would not have sufficed to procure the testimony of Sandoval and Croffoot, who faced a danger their testimony might lead to charges of accomplice liability for the murders of which defendant stood accused. As the prosecutor declared in arguing that a grant of immunity for drug offenses would not procure the witnesses' testimony: It's not the theory of our case they were involved but I cannot exclude that. I might grant one of these people immunity [for murder] or both and they might say, `I did it, thanks for the immunity, Mr. Watson, I appreciate it, I wanted to get off these charges and you've done it for me,' so that's never going to happen. The final judgment would not be mine, but even with the people that run my office I can't believe them making a decision that stupid.... Further, defendant cannot meet another element of the Smith standard, that is, there must be no strong governmental interests which countervail against a grant of immunity. ( Smith, supra, 615 F.2d at p. 972, fn. omitted.) Obviously, as the prosecutor stated, it was contrary to the People's interest to grant immunity to one potentially involved in a double murder. Defendant failed below, and fails now, to show that immunity for any drug offenses would have been effective in procuring the testimony of the witnesses, or that any broader grant of immunity would not have countervailed a strong governmental interest in the prosecution of serious crimes such as murder. Accordingly, assuming arguendo that the issue was preserved and that there is any judicial authority to grant immunity, we reject the claim. [7]
(17a) Defense counsel asked to call Lupori, the defense investigator, to testify as to what Sandoval and Croffoot told Lupori about their activities with defendant on the day of the crimes, claiming the constitutional guarantee of due process required the application of an exception to the hearsay rule. Defendant's offer of proof was that the investigator would testify that Croffoot and Sandoval stated they were continuously with defendant on the day of the crimes, ingesting drugs. The court sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objection to Lupori's testimony, also rejecting defendant's claim that the evidence was admissible despite the hearsay rule as a matter of due process. After trial, defendant moved for a new trial in part on the ground that Lupori's testimony was admissible because Croffoot and Sandoval's statements to Lupori were admissible as statements against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. On appeal, defendant argues Lupori's testimony was admissible because Croffoot and Sandoval's statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1230. He also argues the testimony should have been admitted as a matter of due process, citing Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038]. He claims that trial counsel's argument that the testimony was admissible as a matter of due process preserved the claim the testimony was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. (Evid. Code § 1230.) Alternatively, he argues counsel's failure to offer the proper hearsay exception violated his right to the effective assistance of counsel. (18) Evidence Code section 1230 provides that the out-of-court declaration of an unavailable witness may be admitted for its truth if the statement, when made, was against the declarant's penal interest. The proponent of such evidence must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant's penal interest, and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character. ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th 585, 607.) A trial court determining whether the proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable `may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship to the defendant.' ( Ibid. ) (17b) We conclude the claim of error under Evidence Code section 1230 was waived. Defense counsel's failure to proffer the evidence under that section deprived the trial court of the opportunity to perform this determination. The claim that the evidence must be admitted as a matter of due process is distinct, and did not serve to preserve the issue. (Cf. People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 854 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249] [counsel's offer of evidence for impeachment did not preserve claim evidence was admissible to show state of mind].) Counsel's argument on the motion for new trial that the court had erred under Evidence Code section 1230 in excluding the evidence came too late; in any event, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial on this ground. The court could reasonably conclude that any error in excluding the evidence was not prejudicial, as we shall explain below in connection with the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 667-668 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705] [trial court ruling on motion for new trial subject to review for abuse of discretion; court may grant motion when prejudicial error in admission of evidence has occurred]; see also 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Judgment and Attack in Trial Court, § 3055, pp. 3779-3780.) With respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we cannot say on the appellate record that defendant would or should have prevailed had he offered the testimony as a statement against penal interest, as nothing on the record indicates the trustworthiness or reliability of the witnesses' statements to Lupori. Second, assuming the evidence was admissible as a statement against penal interest, defendant fails to demonstrate the loss of that evidence was prejudicial at the guilt trial. [8] Defendant's offer of proof merely stated the two witnesses would testify they had been with defendant for much of the day of the crimes, using illicit drugs. Another defense witness, however, namely defendant's employer, testified that he saw defendant within an hour of the crimes, and he appeared very much under the influence of drugs. The circumstances of defendant's arrest for possession of cocaine were introduced, and tended to show through the characteristic scarring of his arms that defendant was an habitual drug abuser. Thus Croffoot and Sandoval's statements to the investigator were cumulative to, the extent they would have shown that defendant had used drugs before the crimes and was under the influence of drugs shortly before the crimes. Defendant's claim that they would have provided crucial support for his unconsciousness defense is unfounded; the offer of proof did not suggest either prospective witness would testify that defendant was unconscious or near to unconsciousness close to the time of the crimes. [9] Defendant now claims Croffoot and Sandoval's statements to Lupori would have shown the vast amount of drugs defendant absorbed in the day before the crime, and would also have shown how extremely impaired defendant was by this overindulgence. Defendant did not include in his offer of proof to the court, either when the evidence was offered or when the motion for new trial was made, the material he cites now. This material, consisting of an unsworn memorandum by defense counsel, apparently addressed to the prosecutor, and relating what the defense investigator told counsel that Sandoval and Croffoot had told the investigator, was presented to the court during an unrelated hearing after the end of the guilt phase, after this issue was litigated. We cannot rely on unverified double hearsay as an appropriate or reliable basis for evaluating on direct appeal whether any error on the part of counsel in failing to secure the admission of Lupori's testimony was prejudicial. In any event, this material does not suggest that either Sandoval or Croffoot stated that defendant was nearing unconsciousness; on the contrary, it demonstrates a great deal of purposeful activity on defendant's part and could even show motive for the felony murders, as it indicates defendant obtained his drugs on credit upon an agreement to pay for them the next day. We also reject defendant's argument that the trial court erred in refusing to permit Lupori's testimony regarding statements made to him by Croffoot and Sandoval under the authority of Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284. In that case the trial court excluded defense evidence relating to a witness's out-of-court confessions because Mississippi law excluded hearsay without any exception for statements against penal interest. State law also precluded cross-examination of non-adverse witnesses, so defendant was unable to cross-examine the witness regarding his prior confession when the witness denied complicity on the stand. The high court explained that evidence of the out-of-court confessions was critical to the defense but was excluded despite overwhelming indicia of reliability. ( Id. at pp. 302-303 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 312-314].) It declared that the exclusion of this evidence, along with limitations on the defendant's ability to cross-examine the witness, were a denial of due process in that they deprived defendant of the right to present a defense. ( Id. at pp. 294, 297-298, 302 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 308, 310-311, 312-313]; see also People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 56 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118] [interpreting Chambers as holding, in particular circumstances of case, that combined effect of state rules of evidence violated defendant's right to present defense by exclud[ing] potentially exculpatory evidence crucial to the defense].) (19) Defendant asks us to hold that the application of the general rule excluding hearsay evidence amounted to a denial of due process in his case. We have observed that: `[a]s a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense.' ( People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 58.) Defendant does not point to a rule of evidence peculiar to California jurisprudence, nor one that is considered archaic or otherwise subject to scholarly criticism. (Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 296, fn. 8, 300 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 309, 311-312]; People v. Hawthorne, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 57, and cases cited.) (17c) Moreover, defendant did not demonstrate at trial that application of the general rule excluding hearsay would deprive him of crucial evidence bearing persuasive assurances of trustworthiness. As we have noted, other evidence was available to defendant to show that he was under the influence of drugs on the day of the murder. Moreover, he did not allege that Sandoval or Croffoot was with him at the time of the crimes, so their ability to describe his state of intoxication or possible unconsciousness at the relevant period was limited. Nor was there evidence before the court establishing the trustworthiness of the declarants' statements to Lupori  in fact nothing in defendant's offer of proof described the circumstances under which they had made their statements. Accordingly, we see no violation of defendant's due process rights as established by Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284.