Opinion ID: 42566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: of our national institutions is involved

Text: The challenged provisions are similar to The governmental interests sought to be vindiwhat the Court confronted and upheld in cated by the disclosure requirements are of this Buckley. Section 434(e) of FECA required magnitude.” Id. at 66. In reaching that conthat clusion, the Court focused on voters’ need for information about candidates and their sup- [e]very person (other than a political com- porters to evaluate the candidates and expose mittee or candidate) who makes contribu- corruption. Id. at 66-68. tions or expenditures, other than by contri- bution to a political committee or candi- Nevertheless, with regard to § 434(e), the date, in an aggregate amount in excess of Court stated that “the provision raises serious $100 within a calendar year . . . file with problems of vagueness, particularly treacherthe [Federal Election] Commission a state- ous where, as here, the violation of its terms ment containing the information required by carries criminal penalties and fear of incurring this section. these sanctions may deter those who seek to exercise protected First Amendment rights.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 160. In relevant part, Id. at 76-77. The source of vagueness was FECA defined “expenditure” as “a purchase, the “for the purpose of influencing” language payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, within the definition of expenditure, which or gift of money or anything of value, made for gave the provision “potential for encompassing the purpose of influencing the nomination for both issue discussion and advocacy of a politielection, or the election, of any person to cal result.” Id. at 76, 79. Due process “reFederal office, or to the office of presidential quires that a criminal statute provide adequate and vice presidential election.” Id. at 147. notice to a person of ordinary intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal.” Id. at 77. The challengers in Buckley “attack[ed] Without knowing whether the reporting re- § 434(e) as a direct intrusion on privacy of be- quirements of § 434(e) were triggered by lief . . . and as imposing very real, practical political advocacy, issue discussion, or both, burdens . . . certain to deter individuals from an individual (or organization) wishing to making expenditures for their independent po- speak out could not know whether his contemlitical speech . . . .” Id. at 75. In discussing a plated conduct would subject him to criminal similar requirement within the FECA, the sanction if he did not disclose the information Court agreed that disclosure requirements “can required by FECA. seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment” In addition, the Court held that § 434(e) and that such requirements must therefore was rendered potentially overbroad by the fact “survive exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 64. that it could be interpreted to require disclosure when an independent individual or group The Court held, however, that in general, engages only in issue advocacy. The Court disclosure requirements survive exacting scru- reasoned that if § 434(e) did cover that situatiny because “there are governmental interests tion, the connection between the information 7 sought and the governmental interest in pro- cacy and issue advocacy. “Speakers,” the moting clean and well-informed elections “may Court stated, do not “possess an inviolable be too remote.” Id. at 80. First Amendment right to engage in the latter category of speech.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at Rather than striking § 434(e) down as un- 190. The Court further asserted that constitutional, however, the Court imposed a limiting construction on the statute, bringing it a plain reading of Buckley makes clear that within constitutional bounds by drawing a line the express advocacy limitation, in both the between express advocacyand issue advocacy. expenditure and the disclosure contexts, The Court stated that “we construe ‘expendi- was the product of statutory interpretation ture’ for purposes of [§ 434(e)] . . . to reach rather than a constitutional command. In only funds used for communications that narrowly reading the FECA provisions in expressly advocate the election or defeat of a Buckley to avoid problems of vagueness clearly identified candidate.” Id. Words of and overbreadth, we nowhere suggested express advocacy include terms “such as ‘vote that a statute that was neither vague nor for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ overbroad would be required to toe the ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ same express advocacy line. ‘reject.’” Id. at 44 n.52. These are the well- known “magic words.” Id. at 192. Given that the CFDA links the disclosure The Board contends that McConnell elimirequirements for expenditures made by inde- nates completely the express advocacy/issue pendent individuals and groups to the same advocacy delineation and in its place provides “for the purpose of influencing” language that a more holistic, “practical” approach to deterthe Court confronted and upheld in Buckley, mining whether expenditures have been made we can likewise construe the CFDA in a way for the purpose of influencing an election and that saves it from constitutional infirmity. On therefore, consistent with the First Amendthat basis, the Center fails in its facial challenge ment, can be subject to regulation. That readto the constitutionality of the disclosure provi- ing of McConnell is incorrect. McConnell sions of the CFDA. states only that a campaign finance regulation can cover issue advocacy and nevertheless be