Opinion ID: 2276545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Coverdell Act is a Permissible Exercise of Congress' Spending Power

Text: Mr. Dydell argues that Congress had no authority to enact the Coverdell Act because it attempts to coerce states into recognizing immunity of certain teachers, which he contends is beyond the enumerated powers of Congress and, therefore, is a nullity. [2] Congress is a legislative body of discrete enumerated powers. [3] See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (entrusting Congress only with the legislative Powers herein granted). Congress' limited authority to enact laws reflects our country's deep solicitude for federalism and is calculated to lessen the potential for tyranny and abuse. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ([T]he principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power). Among Congress' enumerated powers is the power to spend. U.S. Const art I., § 8, cl. 1 (Congress shall have Power ... to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the Unites States). Incident to its spending power, and integral to resolution of this case, Congress is authorized to fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal money to the States. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981). Legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. Id. Such a quid pro quo is constitutionally permissible so long as it is not unduly coercive and certain other standards are met. As discussed below, the parties disagree as to whether the Coverdell Act is improperly coercive as applied to Missouri and as to whether the other standards for its constitutional application are met because it requires Missouri to recognize federally imposed immunity for school officials in return for the receipt of federal school funds. Resolution of this issue requires review of the provisions of the Act. Congress enacted the Coverdell Act the full title of which is the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6731-6738 (2006) as part of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (2006). The Coverdell Act specifically states that it shall only apply to States that receive funds under this chapter, and shall apply to such a State as a condition of receiving such funds. 20 U.S.C. § 6734. The chapter the Act references is chapter 70 of title 20 of the United States Code, also known as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The Coverdell Act also provides, This subpart preempts the laws of any State to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this subpart, except that this subpart shall not preempt any State law that provides additional protection from liability relating to teachers. Id. § 6735(a). Moreover, a state may elect not to be governed by the teacher protection provisions: This subpart shall not apply to any civil action in a State court against a teacher with respect to claims arising within that State if such State enacts a statute in accordance with State requirements for enacting legislation (1) citing the authority of this subsection; (2) declaring the election of such State that this subpart shall not apply, as of a date certain, to such civil action in the State; and (3) containing no other provisions. Id. § 6735(b). It is undisputed that Missouri has not enacted legislation rejecting the Coverdell Act and that Missouri is a recipient of some of the funding provided via the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary Education promulgated regulations and standards for the receipt and distribution of these federal funds, including federal funds received under titles I, II and IV of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 5 C.S.R. 50-321.010. All such funds are received by the state pursuant to chapter 70 of title 20 of the United States Code. Among other types of federal funding, the state and the Kansas City school district receive federal funds under title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. [4] It also is undisputed that in 1963, the Missouri legislature elected to receive all funds appropriated by the federal government for public schools as of that date and through any other subsequent acts of congress which provide federal funds for public schools. § 178.430.1, RSMo 1969. The legislature deemed that the benefits of all funds appropriated under the provisions of such acts are accepted as provided in the acts. § 178.430.2, RSMo 1969. The Coverdell Act, therefore, applies in Missouri if the state accepts federal education funds under chapter 70, unless its application violates the constitution because, as Mr. Dydell alleges, it was beyond congressional authority to enact due to the nature of the teacher immunity provisions it requires Missouri courts to recognize. In particular, Mr. Dydell argues that the Act improperly attempts to control state courts by providing that (if certain other requirements are met) no teacher in a school shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the teacher on behalf of the school. 20 U.S.C. § 6736. Under the Act, teacher is defined to include a teacher, instructor, principal, or administrator. Id. § 6733(6). As an administrator, Superintendent Taylor is a teacher and is covered by the act's immunity provision. The Coverdell Act's requirement that Missouri provide such immunity to teachers in return for federal education funds is hardly novel. It is an example of Congress' traditional use of its spending power to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held on many occasions that it is constitutional for Congress to so use the spending power. Dole, the seminal case in this area, explains the Supreme Court's reasoning. South Dakota challenged the validity of a federal law imposing a condition that a portion of federal highway funds would be withheld from any state government that failed to impose a 21-year-old drinking age. 483 U.S. at 205, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Dole recognized that objectives not thought to be within Article I's `enumerated legislative fields' ... may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds. Id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793. After reviewing its precedents establishing general spending power requirements, the Supreme Court held that the law was a permissible exercise of Congress' spending power. Id. at 212, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Mr. Dydell acknowledges the Supreme Court's holding in Dole and implicitly concedes that Congress could require a state, as a condition of receiving federal education funds, to enact legislation that provides exactly the same immunity as does the Coverdell Act. Mr. Dydell argues, however, that Dole is inapposite here because in this case, instead of requiring that states that want certain federal monies must enact legislation agreeing to the terms under which it will be provided, the Coverdell Act inverts the process. It requires a state that chooses to accept chapter 70 education funds to enact a statute that rejects the Coverdell Act's immunity provisions, rather than requiring it to enact a statute stating that it accepts them. Mr. Dydell contends that this distinction is what makes Coverdell an unconstitutional exercise of the otherwise broad spending power of Congress. Mr. Dydell fails to adequately explain why this distinction should require a different result, however. Dole does set out certain requirements that must be met for Congress' imposition of conditions on receipt of funds to come within its spending clause powers. Id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Requiring a state to affirmatively adopt as opposed to affirmatively reject the federal legislation is not one of those requirements, however. Instead, Dole instructs only that the spending power is subject to the following general restrictions: (1) the spending clause legislation must be in pursuit of the general welfare; (2) Congress must state the conditions on the receipt of federal funds clearly and unambiguously; (3) conditions might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the purpose of the grant program; and (4) other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. Id. at 207-08, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Here, the four spending power requirements are satisfied. With respect to the first requirement, in considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress. Id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 2793. The Act's stated purpose is to provide teachers, principals, and other school professionals the tools they need to undertake reasonable actions to maintain order, discipline, and an appropriate educational environment. 20 U.S.C. § 6732. Given the deference accorded Congress, this is sufficient to show that the Coverdell Act was enacted in pursuit of the general welfare. [5] The second requirement is met. As noted, the Coverdell Act plainly states that it shall only apply to States that receive funds under this chapter, and shall apply to such a State as a condition of receiving such funds. Id. § 6734. This language is ample to place a state on notice that accepting funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act binds it to the operation of the immunity provision. The third requirement is that the condition imposed must bear some relation to the purpose of the grant program. In conducting this analysis, a court need not define the outer bounds of the `germaneness' or `relatedness' limitation on the imposition of conditions under the spending power. Dole, 483 U.S. at 209 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 2793. The germaneness of the Coverdell Act's immunity provision to Congress' purpose in making grants for elementary and secondary education is evident. Chapter 70 of title 20 of the United States Code is titled Strengthening and Improvement of Elementary and Secondary Schools. Again, Congress has determined that establishing Coverdell immunity will provide teachers, principals, and other school professionals the tools they need to undertake reasonable actions to maintain order, discipline, and an appropriate educational environment. 20 U.S.C. § 6732. This purpose is rationally related to Congress' stated goal of strengthening and improving elementary and secondary education. The fourth spending power requirement also is met. No independent constitutional provision bars providing immunity for school administrators in undertaking the functions of their job. Indeed, statutes limiting liability are relatively commonplace and have consistently been enforced by the courts. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 88 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978). Mr. Dydell nonetheless argues that the Coverdell Act violates the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states, The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. He argues that the imposition of federal immunity law interferes with the Missouri courts' sovereignty because the grant of immunity traditionally is a state matter on which the federal government should not intrude. This claim is baseless. Most basically, the Supreme Court has concluded that when a federal law is supported by affirmative grants of power to Congress such as the spending power, the law is not inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 173, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). That analysis is directly applicable here. Equally importantly, Mr. Dydell's Tenth Amendment argument fails to take into account that by accepting federal funds and choosing not to pass a law rejecting the Coverdell Act, Missouri has chosen to allow the Coverdell Act's immunity provisions to become part of Missouri law. This Court applies that lawwhen properly invoked and applicable to the caseas it does other validly enacted Missouri statutes governing immunities. See, e.g., § 632.440, RSMo 2000 (no liability for healthcare professionals in detaining, transporting or releasing civil detainees); § 192.740, RSMo 2000 (no liability for divulging confidential information for individuals or organizations providing information to the department of health and senior services in accordance with the statutes requiring the establishment of a head and spinal cord information registry). Although not specifically set out as a requirement, Dole also states that a condition imposed incident to the spending power may be impermissible if the financial inducement offered by Congress [is] so coercive as to pass the point at which `pressure turns into compulsion.' Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 2793, quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937). As is evident from the provisions of the Coverdell Act set out above, however, the Act is devoid of any coercion whatsoever. While it provides that it applies to states that receive education funds and preempts contrary state laws that might reduce teacher protections, it also provides that it will not preempt state law or even apply to actions against teachers in any state that enacts a statute specifically rejecting it, stating: This Subpart shall not apply to any civil action in a State court against a teacher with respect to claims arising within that State if such a State enacts a statute in accordance with State requirements for enacting legislation (1) citing the authority of this subsection; (2) declaring the election of such State that this subpart shall not apply, as of a date certain, to such civil action in the State; and (3) containing no other provisions. 20 U.S.C. § 6735(b). As such, the Act specifically provides that Missouri can nullify the application of the Act to it merely by enacting legislation that says as much and that it can do so without any loss of federal funds. This means that even were Missouri to reject the Act, there would be no loss of funding or other consequencewhether to make the provisions of the Coverdell Act apply in Missouri is completely up to Missouri. There is no stick at all, only carrots. There is no coercion. While, as noted earlier, Mr. Dydell says that it is unconstitutional to require Missouri to enact legislation to reject the Act rather than to consider the Act rejected unless specifically adopted, he cites no authority supporting this argument. Moreover, in adopting section 178.430.1 in 1963, Missouri specifically and affirmatively did agree to accept all funds appropriated by the federal government for public schools as of that date and through any other subsequent acts of congress which provide federal funds for public schools. § 178.430.1, RSMo 1969. This statute still is in effect. The Coverdell Act is a permissible exercise of Congress' spending power.