Opinion ID: 1728402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Level of Constitutional Scrutiny

Text: If a constitutional challenge involves neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, we review the challenge using a rational basis standard under both the state and federal constitutions. Id. Minnesota Statutes § 176.101, subd. 5, the statute that Gluba asserts is unconstitutional, states that permanent total disability means only: (1) the total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both arms at the shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no effective artificial members can be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total and permanent loss of mental faculties; or (2) any other injury which totally and permanently incapacitates the employee from working at an occupation which brings the employee an income, provided that the employee must also meet the criteria of one of the following clauses: (a) the employee has at least a 17 percent permanent partial disability rating of the whole body; (b) the employee has a permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at least 15 percent and the employee is at least 50 years old at the time of injury; or (c) the employee has a permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at least 13 percent and the employee is at least 55 years old at the time of the injury, and has not completed grade 12 or obtained a GED certificate. For purposes of this clause, totally and permanently incapacitated means that the employee's physical disability in combination with any one of clause (a), (b), or (c) causes the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment resulting in an insubstantial income. Other factors not specified in clause (a), (b), or (c), including the employee's age, education, training and experience, may only be considered in determining whether an employee is totally and permanently incapacitated after the employee meets the threshold criteria of clause (a), (b), or (c). The employee's age, level of physical disability, or education may not be considered to the extent the factor is inconsistent with the disability, age, and education factors specified in clause (a), (b), or (c). Gluba asserts that the PTD thresholds set forth in subdivision 5(2)(a)-(c) above implicate two suspect classifications: age and disability. He also asserts that the thresholds violate the fundamental right to live where one chooses. With respect to Gluba's first assertion, we have stated that [i]t is well settled that legislative classifications based upon age are not suspect classifications for equal protection purposes. In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767, 769 (Minn.1986). Similarly, courts have not subjected classifications based on disability to heightened scrutiny. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 158 L.Ed.2d 820 (2004) ([C]lassifications based on disability violate [equal protection] if they lack a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.); see also Kolton, 645 N.W.2d at 411 (applying rational basis review to a classification based on disability when neither party argued for heightened scrutiny). [6] Further, we do not find persuasive Gluba's additional assertion that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), violates the fundamental right to live where one chooses. Gluba appears to contend that by denying PTD benefits to injured workers who are unemployable in the communities where they live, the thresholds of section 176.101, subd. 5(2) may force such workers to leave their hometowns in order to seek work in healthier job markets. The U.S. Constitution prohibits the legislature from burdening a fundamental right absent a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974). But in this case, we conclude that any burden section 176.101, subd. 5(2), may place on a worker's right to live where he choosesto the extent this right is recognized as fundamentalis too attenuated to trigger the heightened scrutiny that Gluba seeks. The foregoing conclusion finds support in United States Supreme Court case law. In Bowen v. Gilliard, the Court declined to apply heightened scrutiny to an Aid to Families with Dependent Children amendment that allegedly burdened the fundamental right of families to determine their own living arrangements. 483 U.S. 587, 601-03, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1987). In support of its decision to apply rational basis review, the Court reasoned that legislation that could indirectly affect families' choices with respect to living arrangements is distinguishable from legislation that would directly and substantially interfere with such choices. Id. (quoting Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986)). Here, Gluba has not established that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), directly and substantially interferes with a fundamental right. Absent such a showing  and because neither age nor disability is a suspect classification  we conclude that section 176.101, subd. 5(2), is subject to rational basis review.