Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jury Was Misled into Believing It Must Be Unanimous Before It Could Consider a Mitigating Factor

Text: Defendant argues the interplay between the sanity phase instruction that [i]n order to reach a finding all twelve jurors must agree to the decision (italics added), the nearly identical penalty phase instruction requiring unanimity for a penalty verdict, and the penalty phase instruction that all other instructions previously read to you which you find to be applicable to this part of the trial should be considered by you in reaching a decision as to the penalty to be imposed, led the jury reasonably to believe that no juror could consider a mitigating circumstance unless all 12 jurors agreed the factor was established by the evidence. We disagree, finding it was not reasonably likely the jury understood the instructions in this manner. It is settled that a requirement of unanimity improperly limits consideration of mitigating evidence. ( McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433 [110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369]) ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 314, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585, italics omitted; see also Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384.) As in Breaux, however, there is no indication that the jury was misled in any respect. There was nothing in the instructions to limit the consideration of mitigating evidence and nothing to suggest that any particular number of jurors was required to find a mitigating circumstance. The only requirement of unanimity was for the verdict itself. ( People v. Breaux, supra, at p. 315, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585; see also People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 641, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081 [CALJIC No. 8.84.2 . . . was not misleading on this point].) We note the jury was specifically instructed that each juror must decide the question of penalty individually: Both the People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. We conclude it is not reasonably likely the instructions misled the jury into believing it must find the existence of mitigating factors unanimously before such factors could be considered. We also conclude counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the penalty phase instructions on this ground.