Opinion ID: 2403031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the first conviction

Text: It is initially asserted the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove the essential elements of a violation of R.S. 39:4-50. A prosecution for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor falls into the somewhat amorphous category of a quasi -criminal proceeding. State v. McCarthy, 30 N.J. Super. 6 ( App. Div. 1954); State v. Rowe, 116 N.J.L. 48 ( Sup. Ct. 1935), affirmed p.c. 122 N.J.L. 466 ( E. & A. 1939). An infraction of the statute must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Batz, 34 N.J. Super. 172 ( App. Div. ), certification denied 18 N.J. 279 (1955); State v. Matchok, 14 N.J. Super. 359 ( App. Div. 1951). It is not our function in reviewing the conviction in question to weigh the evidence anew and to make independent findings of fact as if we were sitting in first judgment on the case. Rather, our obligation is to determine whether there is adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered below. State v. Dantonio, 18 N.J. 570 (1955); State v. Meyers, 136 N.J.L. 288 ( Sup. Ct. 1947); State v. Rowe, supra . Defendant maintains that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver of the automobile involved. It is significant, however, that this contention is not actually predicated upon any alleged deficiencies in the State's case but, instead, upon the fact that at the trial Edward, John and Eugene all testified on behalf of the defense that John had been driving. They stated that, pursuant to an agreement made during the few hectic moments following the accident, they had originally lied in order to protect John, who did not have a license and had previously been in difficulty with the authorities for driving without one. There was, however, ample evidence to support the magistrate's finding, subsequently confirmed by the County Court, that Edward was the driver and not John. The police officers who had gone to the scene of the accident related Edward's admissions to them that he had been driving, and the State introduced Edward's signed statement to the same effect. The prior inconsistent statements of John and Eugene that Edward was the driver were also the subject of testimony. Additionally, two of the officers described Edward's reactions when he received the news at police headquarters that one of the pedestrians had died. They stated Edward jumped from his chair, exclaiming, Oh, my God, I killed a man, and, when they tried to calm him, You can tell me to take it easy, I killed a man. He said further: It's bad enough I don't have the money to pay for the drunken driving. If I go to jail my wife will have to go on relief and who is going to take care of my baby. In light of their prior statements and demeanor, the magistrate was certainly not compelled to accept the story given by Edward, John and Eugene at the trial as true. It is as plausible to suppose the trial testimony was fabricated in order to protect Edward as it is to conclude the earlier statements were contrived to shelter John. Edward was an adult with a family to support and an indictment for causing death by reckless driving pending against him, while John had no such responsibilities and could only be proceeded against as a juvenile delinquent. Especially influential as bearing upon the true identity of the driver of the car are Edward's agitated remarks in response to the information that a man had been killed. Defendant asserts, however, that there is other evidence, aside from the testimony of the three boys, which conclusively vindicates his contention that John was the driver rather than himself. According to their testimony at the trial, all three occupants of the automobile were sitting in the front seat when the accident occurred. Wolf, who was farthest away from the driver, pitched forward and shattered the windshield with his arms. He was cut rather badly and required hospitalization. The right side of Edward Emery's face was also lacerated. John did not sustain any injuries. If the unimpeachable evidence of the physical results of the accident entirely refuted the State's contention that Edward was the driver, we should, of course, be obligated to order a reversal. But does the injury to Edward's right cheek, regarded in the light of John's lack of injuries, incontrovertibly demonstrate that Edward was sitting next to Wolf when the accident occurred? Certainly, it is not scientifically incredible that when a windshield is fractured on the side away from the wheel, the driver should be struck by flying glass while a passenger in the middle of the front seat escapes uninjured. The fragments naturally pursue an aberrant course, and it is entirely possible that John was thrown beneath the dashboard while Edward remained upright, pressed against the steering wheel. The existence, or lack, of cuts and their location bears upon the issue of who was driving, but it is by no means conclusive. On the entire record, we conclude the magistrate was entitled to find that it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Edward was driving the car at the time of the accident and, a fortiori, the County Court's affirmatory conviction was justified. Defendant, urges, however, that the State's case failed upon the crucial issue of intoxication. R.S. 39:4-50 penalizes a person who drives while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Although prosecutions pursuant to its provisions are commonly and colloquially termed drunken driving cases, it is settled that the statute does not require as a prerequisite to conviction that the accused be absolutely drunk, in the sense of being sodden with alcohol. It is sufficient if the presumed offender has imbibed to the extent that his physical coordination or mental faculties are deleteriously affected. State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212 ( E. & A. 1917); State v. Ash, 21 N.J. Super. 469 ( App. Div. 1952); State v. Glynn, 20 N.J. Super. 20 ( App. Div. 1952). Keeping this criterion in mind, it is apparent there was more than an adequate factual basis for a finding that Edward had contravened the statute on the occasion in question. The record is replete with direct and circumstantial evidence justifying the result reached. We find no merit in defendant's contentions that his first conviction was clearly against the weight of the evidence. R.R. 3:10-10( a ) provides that appeals to the County Court shall take the form of a trial de novo on the record where, as here, a transcript has been taken of the proceedings in the municipal court. Prior to the hearing of the County Court appeal, defendant served notice that he would seek to introduce into evidence the conspiracy indictment, which had not yet been tried, and the results of certain lie detector tests which had been conducted by the State Police, subsequent to defendant's conviction by the magistrate, at the request of the Morris County prosecutor. These tests were administered on June 5, 7 and 11, 1956 to Edward, John and Eugene, and from the polygrams of John and Eugene the examiner concluded that John Emery had been the driver of the automobile. Edward's polygram was distorted and the examiner reached no opinion respecting it. The County Court judge refused to admit the results of the tests into evidence, and defendant apparently did not offer the conspiracy indictment. Passing the issue of whether the County Court judge had power to admit evidence dehors the record, his discretion to make the rulings in question was clearly not abused. The testimony of the state trooper who had given the polygraph examinations to Edward, John and Eugene was offered upon the ground that it constituted newly discovered evidence. In fact, the results of the lie detector tests were not newly discovered. Polygraph examinations are not infallible tests of truth or deception. They must be interpreted in order to have any meaning. It is conceded that their probative value hinges upon the competence of the expert who administers and reads them. McCormick, Evidence, § 174 (1954). Therefore, the trooper's testimony would not have been conclusive upon the issue of who was driving the car, but merely one factor to have been considered in arriving at a finding as to the identity of the driver. Regarded in this light, the results of the tests were cumulative of the testimony given at the trial that John was the driver. Newly discovered evidence is not admissible if merely cumulative in nature. State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, certification denied 346 U.S. 900, 74 S.Ct. 219, 98 L.Ed. 400 (1953); Foster v. Medela, 9 N.J. Super. 195 ( App. Div. 1950); State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super. 531 ( App. Div. 1949); State v. Weleck, 34 N.J. Super. 267 ( Cty. Ct. 1955) Furthermore, these tests could have been procured before or during the trial in the magistrate's court instead of one month thereafter. Defendant insists he was foreclosed from obtaining the tests at an earlier date by the prosecutor's initial refusal to consent to their administration. This did not prevent him, however, from enlisting the aid of a private expert. Since, by the exercise of due diligence, the evidence in question could have been discovered before the trial in the municipal court, it is not newly discovered evidence within the legal definition thereof. State v. Vaszorich, supra ; State v. Hunter, supra . Even when they are the subject of proper and timely offer, many jurisdictions have excluded the results of lie detector tests on the ground that they have but a low degree of scientific accuracy and reliability. See McCormick, supra. By our disposition of defendant's contentions regarding the tests sub judice, we do not intend to intimate any opinion as to the general admissibility of the results of polygraph examinations. Turning to the question of the conspiracy indictment as bearing upon defendant's innocence of the drunken driving charge, it is sufficient to say that no attempt was made at the County Court level to introduce such indictment into evidence. Furthermore, aside from its not being part of the record compiled in the municipal court, it was absolutely devoid of probative value. Defendant's remaining challenges to the validity of the first conviction have no merit, and we will not discuss them specifically. We conclude that the conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor must be affirmed.