Opinion ID: 2639440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Board Had Authority To Sanction Wendte Under AS 08.87.210(2).

Text: Under AS 08.87.210(2), the Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers may exercise its disciplinary powers under AS 08.01.075 [8] if the board finds that an appraiser has been convicted of a crime that involves moral turpitude. [9] On its face, AS 08.87.210(2) only requires the board to find that a real estate appraiser has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude in order to exercise its disciplinary powers. The parties do not dispute that Wendte's felony theft conviction is a crime of moral turpitude. [10] Instead, Wendte argues that AS 08.87.210(2) requires the board to find a nexus between a crime of moral turpitude and his ability to carry out his professional duties before issuing sanctions. He claims that because the board found both that his theft was not directly related to his appraisal activities and that his crime [had] no direct nexus to his professional activity, he should not be sanctioned. Wendte's argument is unconvincing. Nothing in the language of AS 08.87.210(2) suggests that the board may only sanction licensees who commit crimes of moral turpitude while they are performing their professional duties. Wendte's argument fails to recognize that criminal violations may bear on one's fitness to practice a particular profession, regardless of whether the violations are committed while the licensee performs professional duties. In Alaska, it is common for professional licensing statutes to permit a board to impose sanctions for criminal misconduct occurring outside the scope of required professional duties. [11] We have upheld sanctions imposed against professionals who committed crimes of moral turpitude when they were not carrying out professional responsibilities. [12] Other courts have similarly interpreted professional disciplinary statutes authorizing sanctions against licensees who have committed crimes involving moral turpitude to cover crimes not committed while they performed professional activities. [13] Although there are no reported Alaska cases applying AS 08.87.210(2), we have held in two comparable professional licensing cases that a licensing board need not establish that there is a nexus between a crime involving moral turpitude and one's ability to carry out the professional duties to issue sanctions. In Kenai Peninsula Borough Board of Education v. Brown , we upheld a school board's decision to dismiss a tenured teacher convicted of the crime of willfully diverting electricity, which the board held was a theft, and therefore a crime of moral turpitude. [14] We did not require a showing of a nexus between the teacher's criminal conduct and his capacity to perform his job. [15] Instead, we held that a finding that a crime involving moral turpitude has been committed raises at least a presumption that there is a nexus between the teacher's act and the teacher's fitness to teach. [16] We observed that, [t]he legislature, in enacting certain criminal statutes, has established minimum acceptable moral standards for the state as a whole. If a teacher cannot abide by these standards his or her fitness as a teacher is necessarily called into question. [17] In a later case involving the same teacher disciplinary statute, we upheld the dismissal of a teacher who years earlier had engaged in sexual misconduct with a minor. [18] Relying on Brown, we said, it is well established that there need not be a separate showing of a nexus between the act or acts of moral turpitude and the teacher's fitness or capacity to perform his duties. [19] We observed that if the school district had sufficient evidence that Toney had committed an act of moral turpitude, the dismissal was valid. [20] The reasoning of Brown and Toney is persuasive. Alaska Statute 08.87.210(2) contemplates a nexus between a crime involving moral turpitude and the ability to satisfy the requirements of the profession. We hold here that there is a presumed logical nexus between any crime of moral turpitude and the ability to satisfy the ethical standards of the real estate appraisal profession. The superior court correctly noted that when professionals commit crimes involving moral turpitude their fitness to hold a position of trust is necessarily called into question. Alaska Statute 08.87.210(2) contemplates that a crime involving moral turpitude necessarily bears on a real estate appraiser's trustworthiness, regardless of whether a licensee commits such a crime while acting as a real estate appraiser. The real estate appraisal profession requires reliability and honesty of its members. An appraiser who had been the first chairman of the Alaska Board of Certified Real Estate Appraisers, Alfred Ferrara, testified at Wendte's January 2001 hearing. He testified that the purchase of a house is often the largest financial transaction many individuals ever get involved in. He explained that the appraiser is the only objective party, quite often, in that transaction. [21] Wendte argues that he has rebutted any presumption of a nexus between a crime of moral turpitude and fitness to perform duties. He cites the Brown court's observation that during the disciplinary hearing provided under the statute, [o]f course ... the teacher may attempt to demonstrate that the board should retain the teacher despite the finding of a crime involving moral turpitude. [22] Wendte claims that he has overcome the Brown presumption because the board found that his crime did not have a direct connection with his real estate activities. He therefore claims he should not be sanctioned at all. Wendte's argument is without merit. The board found that Wendte's theft conviction is not directly related to his appraisal activities. But that is not evidence that he sufficiently rebutted the presumption that he was unfit to be a real estate appraiser. As discussed above, Brown held that a finding that a crime of moral turpitude has been committed raises at least a presumption that there is a nexus between a professional's act and his fitness to practice his profession. Fitness to practice a regulated profession demands more than the professional's capacity to perfunctorily complete required activities. The board's finding that Wendte's crime was not directly related to his professional activities does not rebut Brown 's presumption that there is a nexus between a crime of moral turpitude and one's fitness to hold a professional license. [23] The plain language of AS 08.87.210(2) suggests that there is a connection between a crime of moral turpitude and general fitness to be a real estate appraiser regardless of whether the crime was committed in the course of carrying out real estate appraising activities. Because the board properly found that Wendte's theft was a crime of moral turpitude, the board had discretion to impose sanctions. [24] We therefore affirm the superior court's decision affirming the board's sanctions.