Opinion ID: 163683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Colorado’s Dead Man’s Statute

Text: After Mr. Salazar’s death, the Board also moved the district court under Colorado’s dead man’s statute to exclude testimony by Mrs. Salazar about Mr. Salazar’s emotional distress. The district court denied the motion. Mrs. Salazar thereafter testified at trial on behalf of Mr. Salazar’s estate about Mr. Salazar’s emotional distress. The Board argues on appeal Colorado’s dead man’s statute prohibits her testimony. We review this question of law de novo. See Dang, 175 F.3d at 1189. Under Colorado law, there is a general presumption that “[a]ll persons” are competent to testify, including those “who have an interest in the event of an action or proceeding.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-101 (1997). See also Breeden v. Stone, 992 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Colo. 2000). Of course, this general presumption is subject to some exceptions, including the dead man’s statute. The dead man’s statute prohibits, in relevant part, the testimony of a “person directly interested in individual from bringing a contract action; it only prevents an individual from bringing a tort action for economic loss arising from a breach of contract. Accordingly, the rule does not apply to the estate’s willful and wanton breach of contract claim. -20- the event [of a civil action, suit, or proceeding] when any adverse party sues or defends ... as the executor or administrator, heir, legatee, or devisee of any deceased person.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-102(1) (1997) (repealed and reenacted 2002). In other words, a person directly interested in an action is incompetent to testify if “his testimony is being offered against an heir, legatee, devisee, or other person listed in the statute.” Breeden, 992 P.2d at 1175 (Colo. 2000). As mentioned above, Mrs. Salazar testified on behalf of the estate about Mr. Salazar’s emotional distress. Even though she had a direct interest in the outcome of the litigation as the sole heir to her husband’s estate, the dead man’s statute did not prohibit her testimony because she did not testify “against” the estate. Breeden, 992 P.2d at 1175 (emphasis added). The estate was not an “adverse party” in relation to Mrs. Salazar. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-90-102(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err in allowing her testimony. 8 8 The Board argues Mrs. Salazar’s testimony was “extremely prejudicial to the Board because the Court based its award for emotional distress damages on her testimony.” The Board believes such “testimony is precisely the type the Dead Man’s Statute was intended to prohibit.” While Mrs. Salazar’s testimony may have been unfavorable to the Board, we nevertheless disagree with the Board, as discussed above, that the dead man’s statute prohibits her testimony. -21-