Opinion ID: 1190934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the superior court's amendment of the verdict.

Text: As indicated at the outset, the jury returned a verdict awarding GAI $1,000. In response to GAI's motion for amendment of judgment or new trial the superior court set aside the jury's verdict as to damages and order[ed] additur in the stipulated amount of $48,948.42. In so doing the superior court held that the jury's verdict was tainted by passion and prejudice and that a new trial was unnecessary because damages were undisputed. [9] Additur is a practice in which a trial court increases an inadequate jury damage award, with the consent of the defendant, as an alternative to granting the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. 6A J. Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 59.08[8], at 59-213 to 59-214 (2d ed. 1987). The practice has been held unconstitutional in the federal courts, when it has been found to deny a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Id.; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935). Many states, however, allow it. See, e.g., Jehl v. Southern Pac. Co., 66 Cal.2d 821, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276, 427 P.2d 988, 992-95 (1967). [10] We need not decide the constitutionality of additur under Alaska's constitution. This is because even in those jurisdictions where additur is otherwise unconstitutional, it does not contravene a party's right to a trial by jury when there is no genuine issue of fact as to damages. It would be a mere formality to order a partial new trial limited to the issue of damages when the court could immediately thereafter grant summary judgment for the undisputed amount. Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 59.08[8], at 59-217 to 59-218. In the instant case there was no dispute about damages at trial. Clark made only two arguments to the jury: (1) that he was not required to name GAI as an additional insured, and (2) that even if he were, GAI waived the requirement by accepting the certificate of insurance as proferred. GAI argued that damages were a simple issue resolved merely by reference to the stipulation in the amount of $48,948.42. Clark did not attempt to rebut this argument or to introduce any evidence to contradict it. Instead, Clark acknowledged in closing arguments, in the context of the waiver issue, that he would be prejudiced to the tune of approximately $50,000 if held to a requirement of listing GAI as an additional insured. Since damages were not in dispute, it was error for the court to give the jury an instruction allowing it to fix damages. The court corrected its error by virtue of its amendment of the jury's verdict. Under these circumstances the court's amendment was not unconstitutional. [11] But this does not end our discussion of the damage issue. For although we have concluded that in the context of this case resolution of the damage issue presented solely questions of law, we further hold that the superior court committed plain error in ruling that $48,948.42 in damages were recoverable by GAI. In our view the damage issues in the case must be remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. First, the superior court must determine whether Clark's policy would have covered GAI's liability in this case. [12] Second, the question of liability between co-insurers, and in turn the amount of damages GAI is entitled to recover, cannot be resolved until the superior court examines the other insurance clauses of both Clark's and GAI's insurance policies. [13] In regard to this latter issue the record fails to disclose that the superior court had both insurance policies before it prior to making its ruling that the jury's damage verdict should be vacated and that a judgment for damages in the amount of $48,948.42 should be entered in favor of GAI. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [14] COMPTON, J., with whom BURKE, J., joins, dissent in part.