Opinion ID: 774990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leventhal's Fourth Amendment Claim

Text: 24
25 Absent specific statutory guidance from Congress, the preclusive effect of prior unreviewed state administrative determinations upon a subsequent suit in federal court is a matter of federal common law. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986) (fashioning common law rules for issue preclusion in suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). When federal common law gives preclusive effect in federal court to a state administrative determination, that prior determination has the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts. Id. at 799. 26 In this case, we need not reach the issue of whether federal common law would give preclusive effect to this state administrative determination because, even if it did, the action by the hearing officer would not have preclusive effect under New York law. 3 Under New York law, a state agency determination is given preclusive effect in a subsequent state court proceedings only when, inter alia, the identical issue, see Allied Chem. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 528 N.E.2d 153, 155 (N.Y. 1988), has been decided in the prior action. Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of the Bronx, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729 (N.Y. 1969). In this case, the hearing officer's conclusion that Leventhal's Fourth Amendment rights were violated does not have preclusive effect because the issue was not decided in the agency proceeding. Leventhal and the DOT settled the disciplinary action before the hearing had concluded and the hearing officer's final recommendations had been forwarded to the DOT Commissioner for review and decision. N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75(2). Even if the hearing officer were to have completed taking the evidence and had offered recommendations, only the DOT Commissioner can make the agency determination. See Simpson v. Wolansky, 343 N.E.2d 274, 276 (N.Y. 1975) ([T]he findings of the hearing officer [in a N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 75 proceeding] are not conclusive and may be overruled by the official upon whom has been imposed the power to remove or mete out the discipline.). Although Leventhal points to one case indicating that a hearing officer receives and rules on evidence, keeps a record of the proceeding, and makes a recommendation to the disciplinary authority, Anderson v. Dolce, 653 F. Supp. 1556, 1563 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (emphasis added), the same case notes that [t]he disciplinary authority is not bound by the hearing officer's recommendation. Id. at 1563. 27
28 [T]he Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Government, even when the Government acts as an employer. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989). The special needs of public employers may, however, allow them to dispense with the probable cause and warrant requirements when conducting workplace searches related to investigations of work- related misconduct. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-26 (1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 732 (Scalia, J. concurring). In these situations, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches is enforced by a careful balancing of governmental and private interests. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (discussing the reasonableness of a search in the absence of a warrant and probable cause). A public employer's search of an area in which an employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy is reasonable when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of its purpose. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 29 We begin by inquiring whether the conduct... at issue... infringed an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable. Id. at 715 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, a workplace search by a public employer will not violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the search's nature and scope. The workplace conditions can be such that an employee's expectation of privacy in a certain area is diminished. See id. at 717-18 (plurality opinion) (recognizing that offices that are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits, can be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable.); id. at 737 (Blackman, J., dissenting) ([I]n certain situations, the `operational realities' of the workplace may remove some expectation of privacy on the part of the employee.). On the facts of O'Connor, the entire Court found a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the office desk and file cabinets in which the plaintiff had maintained his personal correspondence, medical files, correspondence from private patients unconnected with his employment, personal financial records, teaching aids and notes, and personal gifts and mementos. Id. at 718 (plurality opinion); id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In finding that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy, the plurality noted that there was no evidence that the employer had established a[ ] reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees... from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets. Id. at 719 (plurality opinion).
30 We hold, based on the particular facts of this case, that Leventhal had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his office computer. We make this assessment in the context of the employment relation, id. at 717 (plurality opinion), after considering what access other employees or the public had to Leventhal's office. 31 Leventhal occupied a private office with a door. He had exclusive use of the desk, filing cabinet, and computer in his office. Leventhal did not share use of his computer with other employees in the Accounting Bureau nor was there evidence that visitors or the public had access to his computer. 32 We are aware that [p]ublic employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. Id. Construing the evidence in favor of Leventhal, as we must in reviewing this grant of summary judgment against him, we do not find that the DOT either had a general practice of routinely conducting searches of office computers or had placed Leventhal on notice that he should have no expectation of privacy in the contents of his office computer. Cf. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in Internet use when employer's known policy allowed monitoring of all file transfers, all websites visited, and all e-mail messages); Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding no legitimate expectation of privacy in office, desk, and file cabinets in light of the unique relationship between a judge and her law clerk necessitating a distinctive open access to documents). 33 Viewing the DOT anti-theft policy in the light most favorable to Leventhal, we find that it did not prohibit the mere storage of personal materials in his office computer. Rather, the anti-theft policy prohibited using state equipment for personal business without defining further these terms. John Samaniuk, acting director of the DOT's Office of Internal Audits and Investigations, testified at Leventhal's disciplinary hearing that an employee would not violate state policies by keeping a personal checkbook in an office drawer, even though it would take up space there. Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot say that the same anti-theft policy prohibited Leventhal from storing personal items in his office computer. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 719 (plurality opinion) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in [an office] desk and file cabinets). 34 Although the DOT technical support staff had access to all computers in the DOT offices, their maintenance of these computers was normally announced and the one example in the record of an unannounced visit to Leventhal's computer was only to change the name of a server. DOT personnel might also need, at times, to search for a document in an unattended computer, but there was no evidence that these searches were frequent, widespread, or extensive enough to constitute an atmosphere so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. Id. at 718 (plurality opinion). This type of infrequent and selective search for maintenance purposes or to retrieve a needed document, justified by reference to the special needs of employers to pursue legitimate work-related objectives, does not destroy any underlying expectation of privacy that an employee could otherwise possess in the contents of an office computer. The Supreme Court has concluded that `[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer.' Id. at 717-18 (plurality opinion quoting concurring opinion of Scalia, J) (emphasis in original). 4
35 Even though Leventhal had some expectation of privacy in the contents of his office computer, the investigatory searches by the DOT did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. An investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance will be constitutionally reasonable if it is justified at its inception and of appropriate scope. Id. at 726 (plurality opinion); see also T.L.O. 469 U.S. at 342 (finding search permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of... the nature of the [misconduct]). We agree with the district court that both of these requirements are satisfied here. 36 The initial consideration of the search's justification examines whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion). Here, there were reasonable grounds to believe that the searches would uncover evidence of misconduct. The specific allegations against the grade 27 employee, who was reasonably assumed to be Leventhal, were that (1) he was late everyday; (2) he spent [t]he majority of his time... on non-DOT business related phone calls or talking to other personnel about personal computers; and that (3) [h]e is only in the office half the time[; the other half] he is either sick or on vacation. Probable cause is not necessary to conduct a search in this context, a plurality of the Court has explained, because public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. Id. at 724 (plurality opinion). The individualized suspicion of misconduct in this case justified the DOT's decision to instigate some type of search. 5 37 The scope of a search will be appropriate if reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct. Id. at 726 (plurality opinion) (alterations omitted). We conclude that the DOT search to identify whether Leventhal was using non-standard DOT software was reasonably related to the DOT's investigation of the allegations of Leventhal's workplace misconduct. Although the anonymous letter did not allege that the grade 27 employee was misusing DOT office computers, it did allege that the grade 27 employee was not attentive to his duties and spent a significant amount of work time discussing personal computers with other employees. Furthermore, the letter's allegations assumed that the DOT prohibition against misusing office computers was not rigorously enforced in the Accounting Bureau, remarking that a grade 18 employee play[ed] computer games, that a grade 23 employee spent a substantial part of the day playing computer games or in non-work related conversations, and that another grade 23 employee amuses himself by learning about computer software which have nothing to do with work. In view of the allegations of the misuse of DOT computers among other employees in the Accounting Bureau, Leventhal's alleged penchant for discussing personal computers during work hours, and Leventhal's general inattention to his duties which included, we presume, supervision of the computer use of others, we find that the searches of his computer were reasonably related to the DOT investigation of allegations of Leventhal's workplace misconduct. 38 Leventhal argues that a search for non-standard software would be irrelevant to charges of misconduct because the DOT had, de facto, approved of the use of non-standard software needed to conduct DOT business. Even assuming that this were true, the investigation was more broadly aimed at uncovering evidence that Leventhal was using his office computer for non-DOT purposes. The searches accomplished this task by uncovering evidence that Leventhal had loaded a tax preparation program onto his office computer, a program that he later admitted he used to print out personal tax returns in his office. 39 We also find that the scope of the searches was not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct. Id. at 726 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). During the first search, the DOT investigators printed out a list of file names found on Leventhal's office computer. They did not run any program or open any files. The investigators entered Leventhal's office through an open door and found that Leventhal's computer had no power-on password although some menu selections were password protected. The investigators limited their search to viewing and printing file names that were reasonably related to the DOT's need to know whether Leventhal was misusing his office computer. The first search was permissible in scope. 40 Neither were the three subsequent searches excessively intrusive. After the first search had established that files named TAX.FNT and CUSTTAX.DBF were loaded on Leventhal's computer, the investigators reasonably suspected that these files were part of a tax program. When DOT investigators and management met to discuss what they had found in the first search, Assistant Commissioner Knapek expressed a particular interest in confirming whether Leventhal had loaded tax preparation software on his DOT computer, aware that Leventhal had a private tax practice. Investigators reexamined the computer in Leventhal's office once in February 1997 and twice in April 1997. These searches were limited to copying onto a laptop computer the PPU directories that they later identified as referring to Pencil Pushers, a tax preparation program, and the Morph directories, pertaining to a graphics program, to printing out additional copies of the file names, and to opening a few files to examine their contents. There is no evidence that the DOT opened and examined any computer files containing individual tax returns that may have been saved on Leventhal's computer, and, therefore, we need not address the permissibility of searching such materials. Considering that the first search yielded evidence upon which it was reasonable to suspect that a more thorough search would turn up additional proof that Leventhal had misused his DOT office computer, the DOT investigators were justified in returning to confirm the nature of the non-standard DOT programs loaded on Leventhal's computer by copying directories, printing file names, and opening selected files. 6