Opinion ID: 887751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying Howard's motions for partial summary judgment and for a directed verdict regarding St. James's liability for alleged violations of the AIDS Prevention Act?

Text: ¶ 18 Howard argues that, as a matter of law, St. James violated the AIDS Prevention Act, § 50-16-1007, MCA, by performing an HIV test when he was unconscious or incompetent, without seeking informed consent from Hunter, whom he argues was his significant other. ¶ 19 The AIDS Prevention Act reads in relevant part: XX-XX-XXXX. Testingcounselinginformed consentpenalty. (1) An HIV-related test may be ordered only by a health care provider and only after receiving the informed consent of: (a) the subject of the test; (b) the subject's legal guardian; (c) the subject's next of kin or significant other if: (i) the subject is unconscious or otherwise mentally incapacitated (ii) there is no legal guardian; (iii) there are medical indications of an HIV-related condition; and (iv) the test is advisable in order to determine the proper course of treatment of the subject; or (d) the subject's next of kin or significant other or the person, if any, designated by the subject in hospital records to act on the subject's behalf if: (i) the subject is in a hospital; and (ii) the circumstances in subsections (1)(c)(i) through (1)(c)(iv) exist. . . . . (9) Subsections (1) through (6) do not apply to: . . . (c) the performance of an HIV-related test when: (i) the subject of the test is unconscious or otherwise mentally incapacitated; (ii) there are medical indications of an HIV-related condition; (iii) the test is advisable in order to determine the proper course of treatment of the subject; and (iv) none of the individuals listed in subsection (1)(b), (1)(c), or (1)(d) exists or is available within a reasonable time after the test is determined to be advisable .... Section 50-16-1007, MCA (emphasis added). ¶ 20 Statutory law defines significant other as an individual living in a current spousal relationship with another individual but who is not legally a spouse of that individual. Section 50-16-1003(18), MCA. Because Hunter was Howard's live-in girlfriend in 1997, he argues that Hunter qualified as his significant other. Consequently, Howard contends that since he was mentally incapacitated  due to suffering two grand mal seizures and being administered large doses of sedative medication  St. James should have sought consent from Hunter, his significant other, before ordering an HIV test. ¶ 21 St. James does not dispute that Howard was unable to provide consent to the HIV testing due to mental incapacity. However, St. James asserts that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Hunter qualified as a significant other given that her relationship with Howard was unclear in the minds of Dr. Thorne and the other medical staff. At trial, Dr. Thorne testified that there was much confusion over the nature of Howard's relationships with Schultz and Hunter given that Schultz brought Howard to the emergency room and identified herself as his girlfriend and roommate, and then Hunter arrived, claiming to live with Howard as his girlfriend. It was a very confusing situation. I had a woman that came in with Mr. Howard [Schultz], who said that she was his roommate and girlfriend. And now I've got somebody else that says she's his girlfriend [Hunter]. I didn't feel like I could get a consent from either one of them at this point. It was confusing. . . . . It was a very abnormal event. I mean, normally you don't have somebody coming in saying they're their roommate, and then you've got somebody else. That was an unusual event.... When asked why he identified Hunter as a friend in his case notes, Dr. Thorne testified: I [was] not trying to cause harm to Mr. Howard. I [didn't] want to put down things in the chart that [could have been] used, you know, against him that [had] no medical basis. ¶ 22 Howard dismisses St. James's defense, arguing that it is irrelevant whether [St. James] had actual knowledge of [Hunter]'s status because the AIDS Prevention Act requires only that there be a `significant other' who `exists' and that he or she be `available within a reasonable time after the test is deemed advisable.' We disagree. If St. James lacked the requisite information that Hunter qualified as Howard's significant other, it cannot be held responsible for failing to seek her consent to the HIV test. Here, Hunter's explanation of her relationship to Howard proved unclear in light of the fact that earlier in the day Schultz presented herself as having the same relationship to Howard as Hunter claimed. Consequently, whether or not St. James understood Hunter to be Howard's statutorily defined significant other provided a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to decide. Additionally, there was enough credible evidence to support a finding that Hunter did not legally qualify as such. ¶ 23 The District Court properly denied Howard's motions for partial summary judgment and a directed verdict.