Opinion ID: 78503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Doctrine of Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Text: In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976), the Supreme Court considered whether traditional common-law immunities for prosecutors, which derived from immunities recognized for judges, applied to civil cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court concluded that they did. Id. at 427-28, 96 S. Ct. at 993-94 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.) (In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.)). The Supreme Court has explained that the common law gives absolute immunity in § 1983 actions for activities that are `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 860 (2009) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 930 S. Ct. at 995); accord Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). [5] [A] functional approach has evolved to determine whether executive branch public officials should be granted absolute immunity for taking particular actions, or whether they should enjoy instead only the qualified immunity normally afforded public officials. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1282. This functional approach looks to the nature of the function performed, not to the identity of the person who performed it. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 113 S. Ct. 2606, 2613 (1993). Under this functional analysis, executive branch officials are entitled to absolute immunity for certain functions intimately associated with the judicial process. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 861. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions established outer bounds on what activities qualify for prosecutorial immunity and to which individuals it applies. Prosecutorial immunity applies, for instance, to the prosecutor's actions in initiating a prosecution and presenting the State's case. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S. Ct. at 995. A prosecutor is immune for malicious prosecution. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097 (1986). [6] Prosecutors are immune for appearances before a court and conduct in the courtroom, including examining witnesses and presenting evidence in support of a search warrant during a probable cause hearing. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490-92, 111 S. Ct. 1934, 1942 (1991); Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 126, 118 S. Ct. 502, 507-08 (1997); see also Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 861. Prosecutors are also immune from damages claims alleging failure to institute a system of information-sharing among deputy district attorneys regarding confidential jailhouse informants. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 863-64 (The management tasks at issue, insofar as they are relevant, concern how and when to make impeachment information available at trial. They are thereby directly connected with the prosecutor's basic trial advocacy duties.). Applying these principles, our circuit has emphasized that, [a] prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the prosecutor's function as advocate. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281. Such absolute immunity extends to a prosecutor's acts undertaken in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State. Id. (quotation marks omitted); accord Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002). Although absolutely immune for actions taken as an advocate, the prosecutor has only qualified immunity when performing a function that is not associated with his role as an advocate for the state. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281-82; accord Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1279-80 (prosecutor who proferred perjured testimony and fabricated exhibits at trial is entitled to absolute immunity, but a prosecutor who participated in the search of a suspect's apartment is entitled to only qualified immunity). Prosecutors have absolute immunity when filing an information without investigation, filing charges without jurisdiction, filing a baseless detainer, offering perjured testimony, suppressing exculpatory evidence, refusing to investigate . . . complaints about the prison system, [and] threatening . . . further criminal prosecutions. . . . Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1979); [7] accord Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 789 n.10, 790 (11th Cir. 1988) (concluding that prosecutors have absolute immunity for rendering legal advice to police officers concerning the existence of probable cause to arrest). This immunity may extend to certain post-sentencing conduct of a prosecutor. Bruce v. Wade, 537 F.2d 850, 852 (5th Cir. 1976) (concluding that prosecutor had absolute immunity for presentation of evidence at post-sentencing federal habeas corpus proceedings); Allen, 815 F.2d at 1434 (concluding that prosecutor had absolute immunity for giving information about a defendant to the Parole Commission in regard to whether to grant parole to the defendant serving a federal sentence). In Allen v. Thompson, this Court reasoned that, [p]arole decisions are the continuation of the sentencing process, and the assistant United States Attorney's reports to the Parole Commission are part of that process. 815 F.2d at 1434. We added: [w]hile not undertaken literally at the direction of the court, these activities are so intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process as to cloak the prosecutors with absolute immunity from suits for damages. Id. Prosecutorial immunity is not limited solely to prosecutors. Probation officers are entitled to absolute immunity for the preparation and submission of a presentence report in a criminal case because the report is an integral part of the sentencing process, and in preparing the report the probation officer acts at the direction of the court. Hughes v. Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984) (state probation officer) (quoting Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599 F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979) (federal probation officer)). [T]his narrow function is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process[.] Hughes, 731 F.2d at 1490 (internal quotation marks omitted). Police officers receive absolute immunity for their testimony as witnesses at trial and in grand jury proceedings. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1281. Individual Parole Board members are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a suit for damages. Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005). Parole officers also have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for testimony given during parole revocation hearings when they act within the scope of their duties. Id. On the other hand, prosecutorial immunity does not apply when the prosecutor acts outside the ambit of activities intimately associated with the judicial process. Generally, the Supreme Court has made clear that prosecutorial immunity may not apply when a prosecutor is not acting as an officer of the court but is instead engaged in certain investigative or administrative tasks. Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 861. These activities include conducting investigative work before an arrest, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275-76, 113 S. Ct. at 2617, making statements to the press, id. at 277, 113 S. Ct. at 2617-18, and providing legal advice to police regarding pre-indictment investigation techniques. Burns, 500 U.S. at 496, 111 S. Ct. at 1944-45. Prosecutorial immunity does not apply when a prosecutor knowingly makes false statements of fact in an affidavit supporting an application for an arrest warrant. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 123, 118 S. Ct. at 506. Likewise, police officers do not have absolute immunity for submitting supporting affidavits in their applications for arrest warrants. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1282.
Plaintiff Hart argues Defendant Hodges is not immune from suit for the following acts: (1) conspiring to cause the issuance of the second state warrant; (2) calling upon law enforcement officers in Arkansas to detain Hart upon his release from the federal prison; (3) conspiring with Amideo to issue a notice to surrender to Hart and threatening further prosecution; and (4) issuing statements to the Albany Herald. [8] The district court reasoned that because Hodges was attempt[ing] to achieve completion of the sentence he thought was ordered by the federal and state court judges[,] he was entitled to absolute immunity. D. Ct. Order at 12 (Mar. 30, 2009) (citing Henzel, 608 F.2d 657). As an initial matter, it is clear that Hodges is not absolutely immune for his alleged statements to the press. The Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons categorically forecloses absolute prosecutorial immunity for statements to the media. 509 U.S. at 278, 113 S. Ct. at 2618. The district court thus erred in granting absolute prosecutorial immunity to Defendant Hodges for his statements to the Albany Herald. Our consideration of the remaining conduct concerns whether that conduct was intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S. Ct. at 995. After review, we agree with the district court that Hodges is entitled to absolute immunity for his alleged actions in (1) causing the Georgia DOC to issue the second state warrant instructing federal and Arkansas officials to retake Hart for his return to the Georgia prison to serve his already-imposed state sentence, (2) arranging to have Hart detained at the federal prison after his release in order to return to Georgia, and (3) conspiring to threaten Hart with further prosecution if he did not return to Georgia. [9] Our previous decisions held prosecutors were absolutely immune for filing a baseless detainer and threatening further criminal prosecution, Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657, and for forwarding information about a defendant to the Parole Commission as a continuation of the sentencing process. Allen, 815 F.2d at 1434; see also Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 1992) (state prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity for sending letter during inmate's executive clemency proceedings because, [a] determination of executive clemency, like a parole decision, is an extension of the sentencing process). We see no material distinction between those earlier cases granting immunity for certain post-sentencing conduct and this case. All of Hodges's actions were directly related to and intimately associated with the state trial court's sentence and his role as an advocate regarding the court's sentence. Hodges was working to advocate the judicial sentence he understood (whether correctly or mistakenly) had been imposed by the state trial court. While not undertaken literally at the direction of the court, [Hodges's] activities [we]re so intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process as to cloak [him] with absolute immunity from suits for damages. Allen, 815 F.2d at 1434. Hart's argument on appeal relies heavily on his assertion that a prosecutor should be categorically denied absolute immunity if he disobeys a judge's order (e.g., the second state sentence that Hodges appealed) outside the presence of the judge. This argument, however, misapprehends the functional analysis used in considering absolute immunity. As we repeatedly have stated, the determination of absolute prosecutorial immunity depends on the nature of the function performed, not whether the prosecutor performed that function incorrectly or even with dishonesty, such as presenting perjured testimony in court. Jones, 174 F.3d at 1289. Hart's argument that conduct violating a judge's order, or more broadly, violating a legal obligation, should not be entitled to absolute immunity is not consistent with the fundamental purpose of absolute immunity. Absolute immunity renders certain public officials completely immune from liability, even when their conduct is wrongful or malicious prosecution. Having absolute immunity in civil damages actions would be of little consequence if it could only be asserted when the defendant prosecutor correctly complied with all his legal obligations, in which case there would be no claim. [10] Marx, 855 F.2d at 791 (plaintiff's argument that unlawful conduct bars assertion of absolute prosecutorial immunity was clearly without merit); Webster v. Gerstein, 913 F.2d 510, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming immunity for prosecutor's disregard of a judicial order to file an information or release the defendant). Rather, the absolute doctrine has evolved such that even wrongful or malicious acts by prosecutors are allowed to go unredressed in order to prevent a flood of claims against the remainder of prosecutors performing their duties properly. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 426, 96 S. Ct. at 994. [11] Indeed, as it turns out here, the second state sentencing order, that Hodges allegedly violated through his actions, was later determined to be void under Georgia law, and Hart was remanded for re-sentencing by the state sentencing court. State v. Hart, 263 Ga. App. at 9, 587 S.E.2d at 166. Given the gap between the 27-month state sentence originally imposed and the 24 months Hart actually served in federal prison, the state sentencing court imposed yet a third sentence, of time served, that definitively concluded the imprisonment portion of Hart's state sentence. For all of these reasons, we affirm the district court's order granting immunity to Defendant Hodges, except as to his statements to the press.
Hart next argues that the district court erred in granting immunity to Defendant Amideo, the general counsel of the Georgia DOC, and Warden Head, who was in charge of the Georgia prison. Hart argues Defendant Amideo cannot be absolutely immune for (1) causing the issuance of the second state warrant, and (2) issuing the notice to surrender to Hart and threatening further prosecution. Hart argues Warden Head is not absolutely immune for ignoring the order of the Georgia Court of Appeals and not releasing Hart for approximately 19.5 hours after receiving notice of the order. Absolute immunity generally has not been extended to corrections officials. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-62, 98 S. Ct. 855, 859-60 (1978); Whitethorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1426 (11th Cir. 1985); Bruce, 537 F.2d at 852-53. In Procunier v. Navarette, the Supreme Court declined to extend absolute immunity in a § 1983 action to the director of a state corrections department, a prison warden and assistant warden, and three subordinate prison employees, holding instead that corrections officials are entitled to civil damage immunity, if at all, through qualified immunity. 434 U.S. at 561-62, 98 S. Ct. at 859-60. We applied Procunier in Whitethorn v. Harrelson, when we stated the defendants  employees of the Alabama Department of Corrections  were not entitled to absolute immunity for denying the plaintiff the opportunity to participate in a work release program. 758 F.2d at 1426; see also Bruce, 537 F.2d at 852-53 (not applying absolute immunity to custodial officials accused of abusing plaintiff while he was incarcerated). Defendants Amideo's and Head's actions related to the same subject matter as some of Hodges's conduct  that is, the issuance of the second state warrant, the issuance of the notice to surrender, and disobeying the order of the Georgia Court of Appeals. However, Defendants Amideo's and Head's roles in those matters are materially different from Hodges's role. As a prosecutor, Hodges was directly participating as an advocate for how Hart's sentence should be interpreted. In contrast, Amideo's and Head's roles involved the Georgia DOC's executive function of taking custody of a prisoner. Unlike Hodges, Amideo and Head did not participate in the judicial process, much less have an advocate role in that process. Rather, Defendant Amideo's role as legal advisor to the Georgia DOC, which manages the Georgia prison system, and Warden Head's role as chief jailer of the Georgia prison where Hart was incarcerated, are not roles intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. We therefore agree with Hart that the district court erred in granting absolute immunity to Defendants Amideo and Head for actions taken in their roles as state corrections officials and vacate the district court's order as to Amideo and Head.