Opinion ID: 1614942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Selection

Text: In his second assignment of error in this section, Bjorklund argues that the trial court erred in not conducting a Batson hearing concerning the State's removal of venireperson C.H. from the panel. We do not agree. The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), forbids race-related discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges and has been extended only to gender-related discrimination in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994). In the instant case, Judge Endacott explained to venireperson C.H. that there were two possibilities for first degree murder in regard to sentencing: life imprisonment and the death penalty. Judge Endacott further explained that if the jury convicted Bjorklund, the jury had nothing whatsoever to do with the punishment and must not consider punishment in arriving at a verdict as to whether Bjorklund is guilty. Judge Endacott then asked venireperson C.H. if he had any reservations, feelings, or convictions about the death penalty which would prevent or substantially impair his ability to make an impartial decision as to Bjorklund's guilt, and venireperson C.H. replied [i]t wouldn't be established in that way, but I would feel guilty after the fact if he was sentenced to the death penalty, to myself, I would. It wouldn't make any difference in my decision, but I would feel guilty afterward. The State's challenge for cause was overruled, and the State later used one of its peremptory challenges to remove venireperson C.H. Bjorklund argues that the trial court should have conducted a Batson hearing pursuant to his request at that point, because people opposed to capital punishment represent a segment of society, much like a minority or a male-female; and that striking [venireperson C.H.] is a violation of Batson. Brief for appellant at 114. Both this court and the U.S. Supreme Court have previously stated that death penalty opponents who testify that they can put aside their views and base their decision solely on the evidence are not a distinct or cognizable group whose successful peremptory challenge and removal from the jury is impermissible. State v. Burchett, 224 Neb. 444, 399 N.W.2d 258 (1986) (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986)). We reaffirm our holding in State v. Burchett, supra , and decline to extend the race and gender limitations of Batson v. Kentucky, supra , to include situations such as the one presented here. This assignment of error is also without merit. In his third assignment of error, Bjorklund alleges that the trial court erred in failing to grant Bjorklund's challenges for cause to venirepersons D.F., M.M., C.W., M.H., E.W., and K.L. We disagree. During voir dire, venireperson D.F. testified that he had previously expressed the opinion that Bjorklund should be charged as a murderer. However, after the court and counsel explained to venireperson D.F. that a person is not guilty until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, venireperson D.F. testified that he could be a fair and impartial juror in the case. In the jury questionnaire, venireperson M.M. stated, I assume the defendant... is guilty since he was the one that was arrested. However, venireperson M.M. stated during voir dire that she now understood that Bjorklund was presumed innocent until proven guilty, that she could put aside her own feelings and follow the judge's instructions, and that she could be a fair and impartial juror. Venireperson C.W. stated during voir dire that he believed that, as a general rule, people are not punished severely enough. However, venireperson C.W. later stated that despite this opinion, he could still be a fair and impartial juror. Venireperson M.H. indicated in her jury questionnaire that she thought Bjorklund was guilty because his friend snitched him off. However, venireperson M.H. stated during voir dire that she could be a fair and impartial juror because she now understood that she must base her decision on the evidence and nothing else. Venireperson E.W. stated that she had conversed about the case with her son and his friend, both of whom were Lincoln residents, and that she believed, after these conversations, that Bjorklund was guilty. However, during voir dire, venireperson E.W. stated that she could set aside what her son and his friend had said and that she could be a fair and impartial juror. Venireperson K.L. stated that her husband was the Cheyenne County Attorney and that she had answered the telephone when the Lancaster County Attorney prosecuting Bjorklund had contacted her husband in his official capacity upon arriving in Cheyenne County for jury selection. However, venireperson K.L. also stated that she could decide the case based solely on the evidence and that she could be a fair and impartial juror. The trial court overruled Bjorklund's challenges for cause as to each of these venirepersons. Section 29-2006(2) states that where a juror has expressed or formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the person charged in a case and where the juror upon examination shall say on oath that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence, the court, if satisfied that such juror ... is impartial and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, admit such juror ... to serve in such case. Additionally, the law does not require that a juror be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved; it is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his or her impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on evidence presented in court. State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), modified 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999). A juror who has indicated an inability to fairly and impartially determine guilt by refusing to subordinate his or her own personal views must be excused for cause. State v. McHenry, 247 Neb. 167, 525 N.W.2d 620 (1995). Here, the record clearly demonstrates that each of these jurors could lay aside his or her impressions or opinions and base a verdict solely on the evidence and facts presented at trial. The retention or rejection of a venireperson as a juror is a matter of discretion with the trial court and is subject to reversal only when clearly wrong. State v. Lotter, supra . We conclude that the trial court was not clearly wrong in failing to grant Bjorklund's challenges for cause to each of these venirepersons. This assignment of error is without merit. In his fourth assignment of error, Bjorklund alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the clerk of the Cheyenne County District Court to dismiss venireperson E.B. in violation of ง 25-1601(2). We disagree. Section 25-1601(2) states, The district court or any judge thereof may exercise the power of excusing any grand or petit juror or any person summoned for grand or petit jury service upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, or public necessity for such period as the court deems necessary. Here, the record indicates that the clerk of the Cheyenne County District Court spoke with venireperson E.B. and informed her that she was excused from jury duty due to her recent hospital stay. Bjorklund alleges that this act violated ง 25-1601(2). However, the record demonstrates that the clerk spoke to venireperson E.B. and excused her at the judge's behest. The statute in question does not require that the judge speak personally with a venireperson seeking excusal from service, but only that the trial court officially excuse venireperson E.B. The statute was not violated in this case because the judge did officially excuse venireperson E.B. This assignment of error is without merit.