Opinion ID: 2508188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: failure to object to improper introduction of prejudicial facts during penalty phase

Text: ISSUE (14). Whether defense counsel was ineffective by not objecting to admission of certified copies of judgments and sentences, verdict forms, and municipal court dockets to establish Petitioner's prior criminal history. Petitioner claims his defense counsel was ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial because counsel did not object to facts concerning Petitioner's prior criminal history. He also claims he was denied effective assistance by appellate counsel because the trial exhibits offered during the penalty phase were not designated as part of the record on appeal and no issue was raised concerning admissibility of the exhibits. In the penalty phase of Petitioner's case, the State introduced evidence of Petitioner's nine prior convictions. These included second degree robbery, second degree perjury, second and fourth degree assault, first degree criminal trespass, driving without a valid operator's license on two separate occasions, third degree theft, and violation of a domestic violence pretrial no-contact order. Defense counsel did not object to admission of the certified copies of judgments and sentences, and in some cases certified copies of the corresponding jury verdict forms. Petitioner now argues that the information went beyond the scope of what was admissible and unfairly prejudiced him. Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not objecting to (1) a certified copy of a judgment and sentence documenting Petitioner's robbery conviction, including the fact that he received an exceptional sentence because the force used by the defendant was beyond and in excess of the force necessary to establish the elements of Second Degree Robbery, [309] (2) certified copies of verdict forms which reflect that Petitioner had been convicted of lesser offenses than the actual charged offenses, [310] and (3) certified copies of the Tacoma Municipal Court docket indicating Petitioner's misdemeanor convictions and outstanding traffic fines. [311] During the penalty phase of a capital murder proceeding, RCW 10.95.060(3) requires a trial court to admit any relevant evidence having probative value, including ... evidence of the defendant's previous criminal activity [312] and RCW 10.95.070(1) requires a jury to consider any relevant factors in deciding whether leniency is merited, including but not limited to ... [w]hether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity .... [313] This broad language, however, is subject to constitutional limitations. [314] Hence, the statutory mandates under RCW 10.95.060(3) to admit `any relevant evidence' during the special sentencing proceeding, and under RCW 10.95.070 for the jury to consider `any relevant factors' applies to mitigating factors only. [315] The court's admission and the jury's consideration of aggravating factors, though, `must be restricted to meet the evidentiary, and state and federal constitutional standards we have articulated. Specifically, evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors must be limited to defendant's criminal record, evidence that would have been admissible at the guilt phase, and evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant.' [316] Criminal record means only the defendant's record of convictions. [317] To establish a defendant's criminal history, `adjudications of guilt' may be admitted, while `mere allegations or charges not resulting in convictions' are inadmissible. [318] The dispositive inquiry is whether the prior adjudication is `sufficiently reliable to warrant admission.' [319] In State v. Gentry, [320] we approved admission of a certified copy of a prior conviction and sentence, even though the sentence and judgment indicated the defendant had received an exceptional sentence. The defendant in that case argued he was prejudiced because the jury was informed that he was sentenced to a longer sentence than statutorily required for his prior conviction. In rejecting this argument, we noted that [e]vidence is not excluded because it is `prejudicial' but because it is unfairly prejudicial. [321] The fact that the judgment and sentence for a prior offense indicated an exceptional sentence did not render admission of the judgment and sentence unfairly prejudicial and thus inadmissible as an aggravating factor during the penalty phase of a capital murder proceeding. We concluded that [a] certified copy of a judgment and sentence is highly reliable and the imposition of a prior exceptional sentence is relevant to the penalty phase issue. [322] In Pirtle we allowed, as evidence of a prior conviction for felony assault, admission of a certified copy of the information which alleged the assault was accomplished by use of `a weapon, namely, a glass, by hitting [the victim] in the face with the glass causing severe lacerations to his face.' [323] Admission of additional facts in the information did not cause the defendant undue prejudice. Petitioner has not demonstrated that his defense counsel's decision not to object to admitted evidence concerning Petitioner's prior convictions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because he cannot show that any objection would have been granted by the trial court. Imposition of an exceptional sentence in Petitioner's robbery conviction is relevant and admissible during the penalty phase of the trial. [324] The facts stated in the judgment and sentence only apprised the jury that Petitioner received an exceptional sentence for using excessive force during commission of a prior robbery. A certified copy of a jury verdict form is an acceptable method for proving a prior conviction. [325] Certified copies of municipal court docket entries were admissible to prove Petitioner's prior criminal convictions for driving without a valid operator's license. [326] Trial counsel's decision not to object to admission of certified copies of a judgment and sentence, verdict forms, and municipal court docket entries did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.