Opinion ID: 4156909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Determining Excessive Force

Text: When “the excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 394, 109 S. Ct. at 1871. “[T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily 21 A custodial arrest may be made for misdemeanor offenses and traffic violations. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1557 (2001). “[U]nder Florida law, like under federal law, a full custodial arrest is allowed even when the offense is only a misdemeanor. See Fla. Stat. § 901.15(1) (‘A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when . . . [t]he person has committed a felony or misdemeanor . . . in the presence of an officer.’).” Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1093 (second alteration and ellipses in original). Violating Fla. Stat. § 322.03(1), driving without a valid driver’s license, is a second-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. § 322.39, punishable by up to 60 days in jail, Fla. Stat. § 775.082(4)(b). 29 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 30 of 46 carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872. An officer’s use of force, however, violates the Fourth Amendment when it is objectively unreasonable under the facts and circumstances of a specific case, “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. Determining whether the force used to effect a seizure was objectively reasonable requires case-by-case “balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id., 109 S. Ct. at 1871 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1699 (1985)). “The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be free from the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197 (emphasis added). The Graham objective-reasonableness standard governs judicial determination of claims of official use of excessive force. “[T]o determine whether the amount of force used by a police officer was proper, a court must ask whether a reasonable officer would believe that this level of force is necessary in the situation at hand.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In deciding whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, the question of whether the force used by the officer in the course of an arrest is excessive is a “‘pure question of 30 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 31 of 46 law,’” decided by the court. Myers v. Bowman, 713 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8, 127 S. Ct. at 1776 n.8). To determine “whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable,’” the Graham Court noted three nonexclusive factors for evaluating an officer’s necessity for using force against an arrestee’s Fourth Amendment rights: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2) “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and (3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”22 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1871-72. Regarding the first Graham factor, severity of the crime, the conduct with which Stephens was charged at the scene, obstructing Deputy DeGiovanni’s investigation without violence and driving without a driver’s license, are misdemeanors, the first of which was dismissed by the State.23 The investigation of neither of these misdemeanors rises to the level of criminal conduct that should have required the use of force. 22 In Graham, the Court recognized “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application.” 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S. Ct. at 1872 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alteration omitted); see Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199, 125 S. Ct. at 599 (“Graham and Garner, following the lead of the Fourth Amendment’s text, are cast at a high level of generality.”). 23 We have noted “‘[t]he validity of an arrest does not turn on the offense announced by the officer at the time of the arrest.’” Durruthy, 351 F.3d at 1089 n.6 (quoting Bailey v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Alachua Cty., 956 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.4 (11th Cir. 1992)). 31 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 32 of 46 Accepting Stephens and Greenwood’s affidavits as we must, it also is clear Stephens posed no threat to the safety of Deputy DeGiovanni or the other two deputies, the latter of whom arrived at the scene after Stephens had been arrested and handcuffed. 24 The only threatening language and forceful, physical conduct, which injured Stephens, came from Deputy DeGiovanni. Stephens complied with each investigation request by Deputy DeGiovanni, including producing his identification, which necessitated his standing up from his seated position on the driver’s door frame of the car, where he was checking the engine, to retrieve his Florida identification card from his back pocket. Deputy DeGiovanni did not request specifically a Florida driver’s license from Stephens. There is no evidence Stephens did anything to cause Deputy DeGiovanni to slap the Bluetooth device out of his ear, which prompted Stephens to request Deputy DeGiovanni to call his supervisor to the scene. 25 Using his full body 24 In his affidavit, Stephens averred: “At no time did I raise my voice at Deputy DeGiovanni. At no time did I say anything threatening to Deputy DeGiovanni. At no time did [I] make any[] threatening gestures towards Deputy DeGiovanni.” Stephens’s Aff. at 4 ¶ 11. Similarly, eyewitness Greenwood attested: “At no time did Paul Stephens raise his voice at Deputy DeGiovanni. At no time did Paul Stephens say anything threatening to Deputy DeGiovanni. At no time did Paul Stephens make any[] threatening gestures towards Deputy DeGiovanni.” Greenwood’s Aff. at 3 ¶ 9. 25 “[A] citizen [cannot] be precluded by the threat of arrest from asking to speak to an officer’s superior or from asking for an officer’s badge number. Those inquiries . . . do not constitute obstruction of justice or disorderly conduct.” Davis, 451 F.3d at 767 (emphasis added). In West, an attorney arriving at a county courthouse for a case, was detained by a security officer at the entry screening, because she would not remove her suit jacket, which would have exposed her undergarments; she asked him to call his supervisor. 767 F.3d at 1066. When the supervisor arrived, he told the attorney she did not have to remove her suit jacket; wanding her was 32 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 33 of 46 weight, Deputy DeGiovanni thereafter twice slugged Stephens in his chest, each time slamming him into the car-driver’s seat. Stephens alleges, when he noted White’s children were watching his abusive conduct, Deputy DeGiovanni responded by stepping on Stephens’s foot as he slammed him the third time forcefully back into the car, which resulted in Stephens’s being thrown against the car-door frame, causing severe injuries to his neck, back, and shoulder. 26 As sufficient. Id. On the way out of his clinic, the plaintiff doctor in Galvez “was simply asking [the officer] why [the officer] was arresting him and why [the officer] was humiliating him and informing [the officer] that he knew [his] boss.” 552 F.3d at 1243. Thereupon, the officer “forcefully ‘dragged’ [plaintiff] outside and proceeded to repeatedly ‘slam’ [plaintiff’s] body into the corner of a concrete structure, causing [plaintiff] extreme pain, putting [plaintiff] in fear for his life, and inflicting serious injuries.” Id. 26 In according qualified immunity to Deputy DeGiovanni, the district judge noted Stephens’s standing after Deputy DeGiovanni “pushed him down” into the driver’s seat “could be interpreted as a prelude to resistance,” which may have caused Deputy DeGiovanni to feel “threatened.” Order Granting Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 15, 16. Stephens had been sitting in the driver’s seat with his feet on the ground, while he was checking the car engine with a scanner, when Deputy DeGiovanni encountered him. The first time Stephens stood up was to obtain his identification, which Deputy DeGiovanni had requested. Because his Florida identification card was in his back pocket, Stephens had to stand up to retrieve it, likely from his wallet in his back pocket. After slapping the Bluetooth device from Stephens’s ear, causing him to request a field supervisor, Deputy DeGiovanni, using his full body weight, hit Stephens hard in the chest and slammed him down into the driver’s seat. At that point, likely with the air knocked out of his lungs from being struck so forcefully in his chest, Stephens stood up and asked why Deputy DeGiovanni was doing that to him, causing Deputy DeGiovanni to slug him in his chest again and into the driver’s seat. Stephens got up and said White’s children were watching and asked what sort of example Deputy DeGiovanni was setting for them. Thereupon, Deputy DeGiovanni threw Stephens against the car-door jamb, causing his severe and permanent injuries. This third time, Stephens was too injured to stand up; instead, he had to pull himself up by the car-door frame. Accepting Stephens’s version of the sequence of these events, there was nothing menacing about Stephens’s getting up from the car driver’s seat after Deputy DeGiovanni so roughly and aggressively had slammed him down into the car driver’s seat by socking him in his chest twice rather than his remaining in a slumped or seated position. Deputy DeGiovanni never asked Stephens to stay seated in the driver’s seat. While there is a rational and legitimate reason for Stephens to have stood up after having been knocked down aggressively by Deputy DeGiovanni, there is no logical explanation for Deputy DeGiovanni’s 33 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 34 of 46 Stephens attempted to grasp the car door with his right hand to lift himself up, Deputy DeGiovanni grabbed and twisted his hand, so the palm faced up, then forced the last three fingers on Stephens’s right hand backward toward his forearm, causing Stephens’s full body weight to be supported on those three fingers of his right hand. This maneuver had nothing to do with Deputy DeGiovanni’s placing handcuffs on nonresisting Stephens. There is no evidence Stephens attempted to resist Deputy DeGiovanni’s investigation ending in his arrest or to evade his arrest by fleeing. To the contrary, Stephens answered Deputy DeGiovanni’s questions, despite Deputy DeGiovanni’s harsh, threatening questioning and his forcefully hitting Stephens in his chest multiple times, ultimately causing his head to strike the door jamb, resulting in permanent injury as well as twisting Stephens’s right hand and three fingers backward, supporting his full body weight. Through it all, Stephens was compliant, even when Deputy DeGiovanni arrested and handcuffed him. Stephens slugging Stephens in his chest twice to throw him into the car-driver’s seat. Deputy DeGiovanni’s increased roughness, unprovoked by cooperative, nonaggressive Stephens, escalated to the third slamming of Stephens against the car-door jamb, after Stephens had noted White’s children were watching Deputy DeGiovanni treating him so violently. There is no record evidence why Deputy DeGiovanni used such unwarranted force on compliant Stephens. Whether Stephens lived nearby the Shoppes of St. Croix was irrelevant, when Greenwood had shown and demonstrated to Deputy DeGiovanni they had the key to White’s apartment for Stephens, an automobile mechanic, to check the car engine for her. The key verified Stephens’s explanation to Deputy DeGiovanni regarding why he and Greenwood were at the Shoppes of St. Croix, and revealed they were not committing a burglary. Stephens, who freely had given his time and expertise to check the car engine, was left with debilitating injuries that ended his automobile-mechanic livelihood and sent him to the hospital and jail not to be released until the next morning, when he paid his $100 bond. 34 Case: 15-10206 Date Filed: 03/30/2017 Page: 35 of 46 never attempted to flee the scene of his arrest. Consequently, none of the Graham factors applies to Stephens’s encounter with and seizure by Deputy DeGiovanni as to Stephens’s actions resulting in his seizure and arrest by Deputy DeGiovanni. “[Q]ualified immunity is not appropriate when the Graham analysis yields an answer that is clear beyond all doubt,” as in this case. Lee, 284 F.3d at 1200.