Opinion ID: 1041512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Ineffective

Text: Assistance of Counsel [7] Because different attorneys represented Morgan at trial and on direct appeal, he must now assert any known or apparent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under Nebraska law, in order to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel where appellate counsel is different from trial counsel, a defendant must raise on direct appeal any issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record, or the issue will be procedurally barred on postconviction review.10 Morgan raises four instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, which we discuss below. [8,9] The fact that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal does not necessarily mean that it can be resolved. The determining factor is whether the record is sufficient to adequately review the question.11 An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will not be addressed on direct appeal if it requires an evidentiary hearing.12 As 9 State v. Alarcon-Chavez, 284 Neb. 322, 821 N.W.2d 359 (2012). 10 State v. Watt, supra note 6. 11 Id. 12 Id. Nebraska Advance Sheets 564 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS discussed below, the record is not sufficient to address two of Morgan’s claims. [10-14] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington,13 the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient performance actually prejudiced his or her defense.14 To show deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law in the area.15 To show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.16 The entire ineffectiveness analysis is viewed with a strong presumption that counsel’s actions were reasonable and that even if found unreasonable, the error justifies setting aside the judgment only if there was prejudice.17 Deficient performance and prejudice can be addressed in either order. If it is more appropriate to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim due to the lack of sufficient prejudice, that course should be followed.18 We now address each claim of ineffectiveness raised by Morgan.
Morgan asserts that counsel performed deficiently by failing to retain an expert who could have provided a scientific basis for Morgan’s explanation of events, i.e., the firing of certain shots, where the shots originated, and the sequence of events. He argues that an accident reconstructionist and a ballistics expert could have explained certain matters to support the defense theory. The parties agree—as do we—that the record 13 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 14 State v. Watt, supra note 6. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. MORGAN 565 Cite as 286 Neb. 556 is insufficient to review this claim. We make no comment whether Morgan’s allegations regarding this claim would be sufficient to require an evidentiary hearing in the context of a motion for postconviction relief. We simply decline to reach this claim on direct appeal, because the record is insufficient to do so.
Prior to trial, the district court ordered that Morgan “shall appear at all times in the presence of prospective jurors in civilian clothing and without shackles.” Morgan argues that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the jury’s seeing Morgan brought to court every day in shackles. The record contains no information regarding any circumstances where the jury may have seen Morgan in shackles. Once again, we make no comment on the sufficiency of the allegation in the context of a motion for postconviction relief. We agree with the parties that the record is insufficient to review this claim on direct appeal. Accordingly, we do not reach it.
“Murder” Reference During the State’s cross-examination of Morgan, the prosecutor asked the following question: “And you maintained that relationship from that point until May 13th, the time of the murder?” Defense counsel did not object. Morgan argues, “In such a context it was presumptuous, inflammatory[,] and conclusory and invaded the province of the jury to decide if it was [m]urder, [m]anslaughter, or self defense.”19 [15] Morgan cannot establish prejudice by counsel’s failure to object, because the jury was instructed that statements or questions by the attorneys are not evidence. Instruction No. 1 stated in part that “what the attorneys say is not evidence.” Instruction No. 5 provided a list of things that are not evidence, the first of which was “[s]tatements, arguments, and questions of the lawyers for the parties in this case.” Absent 19 Brief for appellant at 27. Nebraska Advance Sheets 566 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a jury followed the instructions given in arriving at its verdict.20 Because we must presume that the jury followed the instructions and did not treat counsel’s fleeting reference to “murder” as evidence, Morgan cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had objected.
From Being Published With Word “Murder” Displayed Morgan contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion in limine or to object at trial to prevent the evidence envelopes for certain exhibits from being published to the jury with the word “murder” printed on them. Morgan contends that “[i]t amounted to [a] repetitive drum beat by the police of ‘Murder,’ ‘Murder,’ ‘Murder.’ Twenty nine times.”21 Again, Morgan cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had filed a motion in limine or objected. The evidence envelopes were marked with a description of the contents, location where the evidence was found, the investigator or investigators who recovered the evidence, Morgan’s name, Marquez’ name, and the word “murder.” Law enforcement officers used “murder” in a general sense to refer to an unlawful killing that they were investigating rather than in a technical or legal sense. And the jury was instructed in part: “The fact that the state has brought these charges is not evidence of anything. The charges are simply an accusation, nothing more.” Further, the jury was instructed that it could return one of four verdicts: guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, or not guilty. Again, we presume that the jury followed the instructions given by the court.22 Like the charges brought by the State, law enforcement’s placement of the word “murder” on its evidence envelopes during its investigation is 20 State v. Sandoval, 280 Neb. 309, 788 N.W.2d 172 (2010). 21 Brief for appellant at 27. 22 See State v. Sandoval, supra note 20. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. MUHANNAD 567 Cite as 286 Neb. 567 not evidence of anything. We conclude that Morgan has not established prejudice by counsel’s failure to object or to otherwise keep the evidence envelopes from being published to the jury with the word “murder” on them.