Opinion ID: 2012481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Weighing the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Text: As a final point, Warlick argues that the trial court failed to properly weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. He concedes that the trial court has discretion in determining what weight to assign to these factors, but nonetheless contends that the trial court gave too much weight to the aggravating circumstance and not enough weight to the mitigating circumstances. His argument regarding the aggravating circumstance relies on Justice DeBruler's concurring opinion in Matheney v. State, 583 N.E.2d 1202, 1210 (Ind.1992): [W]here the intent of the burglary is the intent to kill, the weight of the aggravator is greatly diminished, for the mind had formed but a single felonious intent. The majority opinion did not embrace this view but rather held: The General Assembly could reasonably have determined that a murder committed by breaking and entering a dwelling in the place where a person should be able to feel secure, merited the death penalty. Id. at 1208. Although the aggravating circumstance here, and in Matheney, may not be the weightiest one, the trial court was certainly allowed to give it considerable weight. Warlick also argues that the trial court did not give enough weight to the mitigating circumstances. However, as explained in Part II., supra, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find Warlick's criminal history or acceptance of responsibility as mitigating circumstances. Therefore, what remains is Warlick's remorse after the offense as the sole mitigating circumstance to be weighed against his intentional killing of Annie during the course of a burglary as an aggravating circumstance. The trial court concluded that [t]he aggravating circumstance of the intentional killing by the defendant, Ricky P. Warlick, Sr. of the victim, Annie Warlick, during the commission of a felony burglary, substantially outweighs the mitigating circumstance of the defendant[`]s remorse. Although this Court has the constitutional authority to review and revise sentences, Ind. Const. art. VII, § 4, it will not do so unless the sentence imposed is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B). [4] This Court's review under Rule 17(B) is very deferential to the trial court: [T]he issue is not whether in our judgment the sentence is unreasonable, but whether it is clearly, plainly, and obviously so. Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ind. 1997). The nature of the offense, the premeditated killing of one's estranged wife by shooting her at close range without provocation, is severe and troubling. Weighed against the character of the offender, a man who showed remorse after the fact but had a history of misdemeanor domestic offenses against the victim, does not lead us to conclude that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is manifestly unreasonable.