Opinion ID: 2331585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Common Law Wife Claim

Text: In addition to challenging the will as the product of fraud, Valentine's motion dated March 17, 1997, also claimed, for the first time, that she was Delaney's common law wife. This claim is not barred under D.C.Code ง 20-305 because it does not contest the validity of the will. [6] Presumably, Valentine asserted that she was decedent's common law wife so that she could claim a spouse's statutory share of the estate, a claim she could make regardless of the validity of the will. D.C.Code ง 19-113(a) provides a six-month period from the time the will is admitted to probate for a surviving spouse to renounce any devise or bequest made... by the last will of my husband and to elect to take in lieu thereof my legal share of the real and personal estate of my deceased spouse. This period does not begin to run until the end of any action to construe the will of the decedent (D.C.Code ง 19-113(c) (2001)), but that is the only tolling provision provided in the statute. In other words, the statute is not tolled for an individual who suddenly discovers that she was the decedent's common law wife three years after a will is admitted to probate. [7] Since appellant Valentine could be attempting to claim common law wife status only for the purpose of electing a statutory share of the estate, and since any election of the statutory share is clearly time-barred, appellant Valentine's assertion of common law wife status is time-barred as well. In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court's order dated June 27, 1997, dismissing both the challenge to the will and the common law wife claim as time-barred.