Opinion ID: 783228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentence Illegality Under Apprendi and the Eighth Amendment

Text: 17 Collins next argues that the district court assessed an excessive and illegal sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) and the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Collins argues that the court violated Apprendi by failing to submit his prior convictions to the jury for enhancement purposes. Additionally, he contends the court's life sentence for these drug offenses constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
18 In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court stated, Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. We have applied this rule in United States v. Carter, 270 F.3d 731 (8th Cir.2001) in response to the same argument that Collins asserts. In Carter, the defendant challenged his 130-month sentence for a drug offense, which was enhanced under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) based on a prior drug felony conviction. We held that evidence of a prior conviction need not be submitted to the jury for the enhancement to apply. Id. As such, the district court did not err in not submitting Collins's prior convictions.
19 Collins also asserts that the imposition of a mandatory life sentence is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He claims that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime and argues that this was a simple drug conspiracy that, when compared with similar crimes, did not warrant a life sentence. 20 The Eighth Amendment forbids only extreme sentences that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)); accord United States v. Frieberger, 28 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir.1994); United States v. Jones, 965 F.2d 1507, 1518 (8th Cir.1992). The Supreme Court concluded in Harmelin that a state sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment, despite the fact that the defendant had no prior felony convictions. 501 U.S. at 994, 111 S.Ct. 2680. 21 We have held that mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. United States v. Mendoza, 876 F.2d 639, 640-41 (8th Cir.1989). It is well settled that a sentence within the range provided by statute is generally not reviewable by an appellate court. United States v. Richard, 872 F.2d 253, 255 (8th Cir.1989). Furthermore, such a sentence that falls within the range prescribed by statute has never been found to be an Eighth Amendment violation. Mendoza, 876 F.2d at 639 (citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982)). 22 In United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir.1997), we did not find a violation of the Eighth Amendment when the district court sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on his conviction of possessing with intent to distribute 1,147.6 grams of methamphetamine and his prior record of three drug felony convictions. We compared Prior's case to the facts of Harmelin and concluded that Prior's sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments, even in light of Prior's argument that his conduct as an addict was not as egregious as that of larger-scale distributors. We stated: 23 Such a proportional analysis is only appropriate after an initial comparison of the crime to the sentence for which it is imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 409 (8th Cir.) (relying on Harmelin ), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1008, 112 S.Ct. 646, 116 L.Ed.2d 663 (1991). We have noted that the possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute is an offense at the root of some of the gravest problems facing our country. The `fruit' of the drug plague is everywhere; it fills our jails, our courts, our streets, and our nurseries. United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 829, 112 S.Ct. 101, 116 L.Ed.2d 71 (1991). Prior's three previous convictions indicate that he has been involved in drug distribution for many years, and his actions have furthered the spread of this plague. 24 Prior, 107 F.3d at 660. 25 Under these facts, Collins's two prior felonies used to enhance this sentence were also drug crimes. 4 As in Prior, the repeated nature of similar crimes particularly lends the matter to the enhancement provision of § 841(b) and does not warrant a finding of disproportionality under the Eighth Amendment. Collins's constitutional claim thus cannot succeed.