Opinion ID: 4298207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Cell Phone Location Data

Text: Thomas argues next that the government’s collection of his cell phones’ location information without a search warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C), a defendant who believes the government obtained evidence by violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures must move before trial to suppress that evidence. Under Rule 12(c)(3), a court may consider untimely motions if the defendant can show good cause. In this case, Thomas never moved to suppress the evidence, never attempted to show good cause for this failure in the district court, and did not object to admission of the evidence at trial. He argues on appeal, however, that the district court still erred in admitting the evidence. Under our precedents, this argument calls for us to answer the somewhat roundabout question: whether the district court would have abused its discretion if it had concluded that Thomas lacked good cause. See United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2010). The cell-site location information pinned Thomas and his accomplice at specific locations during the kidnapping. The government obtained this information pursuant to the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., but without a search warrant. Thomas argues that the government’s collection of his cell phone location information without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. As good cause for his failure to follow the required procedure, he cites “the legal ambiguity surrounding” the use of “historical cell-site location information.” At the time of his trial, a circuit split existed on this precise issue, one we acknowledged in United States v. Daniels, 803 F.3d 335, 351 (7th Cir. 2015). Shortly before Thomas’s trial, 14 No. 17-1002 the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016), finding no constitutional violation in obtaining cell-site data without a warrant. The rule stated in Carpenter remained uncertain throughout Thomas’s trial and appeal as the Supreme Court granted certiorari and later reversed Carpenter. See Carpenter v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (granting certiorari); 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (reversing on merits because search warrant was required). While Thomas certainly is correct that this legal issue remained uncertain before his trial, that uncertainty did not qualify as good cause under Rule 12 for failing to raise the issue. We have trouble seeing how a circuit split on such a high-profile issue can provide good cause for failing to raise the issue in the district court. In Daniels, we rejected a similar challenge to the use of cell data because the defendant failed to file the required pretrial motion. The defendant in that case could not show good cause because the “defendants knew all they needed to know in order to make the Fourth Amendment argument” before this court. Daniels, 803 F.3d at 352. Following Daniels, we find that the district court would not have abused its discretion if it had found no good cause for failing to file a timely motion. In other words, though the Supreme Court’s Carpenter decision indicates a potential Fourth Amendment problem with the cell-site data used here, Thomas cannot raise this argument now, after failing to raise it in the district court.2 2In Carpenter, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the collection of cell-site location information can be, and was in that case, “a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018). We need not and do not address here the scope of the Court’s decision in Carpenter. See id. at 2217 n.3 No. 17-1002 15 C. Sentencing Guideline Issues: Vulnerable Victims and Restraint of Victims Thomas next argues that the district court made two errors in calculating his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court found that Thomas was in criminal history category V and that his total offense level was 52, which was literally off the chart. In rare cases like this one, the offense level will exceed the maximum offense level of 43 listed on the guideline sentencing chart. When that happens, the “offense level of more than 43 is to be treated as an offense level of 43,” which recommends a life sentence for all criminal history categories. U.S.S.G. § 5A cmt. 2. The district court grouped Thomas’s convictions into two groups, one for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap Blackwell’s brother, and the other for kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap her sister. The district court’s offense calculation began with a base offense level of 32 for kidnapping under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1 for the kidnapping of Blackwell’s brother. The court added a total of eighteen points under offense level adjustments because the crime involved a demand for a ransom, use of a dangerous weapon, physical restraint of a victim, a vulnerable victim, and obstruction of justice, and because Thomas was the leader of the criminal activity. An additional two points were added to account for the separate group of counts for kidnapping Blackwell’s sister. Taking the greater of the two groups and adding the multiple-count adjustment, Thomas’s total offense level hit 52. (disclaiming any decision on scope of Fourth Amendment protections for less than seven days' worth of information). 16 No. 17-1002 Thomas challenges on appeal the two-level enhancements for vulnerable victims under § 3A1.1 and for restraint of a victim under § 3A1.3. He did not raise either issue in the district court, so we review for plain error. Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1904 (2018); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. at 1343; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733–34, 736 (1993). Starting with the vulnerable-victim enhancement in § 3A1.1, Thomas argues it amounted to double-counting because he was convicted of kidnapping two minors, who are deemed vulnerable victims. We do not see any error in this enhancement, let alone a plain one. The kidnapping guideline, § 2A4.1, applies generally to all kidnappings. No other offense characteristic that was applied under the Guidelines accounted for the victims’ ages or vulnerability. The restraint-of-victim enhancement of § 3A1.3 is more of a problem. Application Note 2 to § 3A1.3 instructs that this enhancement simply does not apply to offenses covered by § 2A4.1, including kidnapping. The reason is that restraint of a victim is an element of the offense and is already accounted for in the base offense level. We agree with Thomas that this was an error, but we find no plain error requiring a remand.3 3 If this issue had been raised with the district court, there might well have been grounds for a departure or a variance on this issue based on the use of the zip-ties to restrain the man who was in the house during the kidnapping of Blackwell’s younger brother and sister. The court might reasonably have considered that additional restraint of a bystander as beyond the intended scope of Application Note 2. Perhaps that was the probation officer’s view. The PSR applied the enhancement because the “victim was physically restrained with zip ties,” but the government has not pursued this possibility on appeal. No. 17-1002 17 In Molina-Martinez, the Supreme Court addressed plain errors in guideline calculations. The Court made clear that most guideline errors, even if not raised in the district court, will satisfy the criteria for a plain error because there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. 136 S. Ct. at 1346. The Court there rejected a categorical rule (applied by one circuit) that a guideline error was not plain if the actual sentence imposed was within the correct range. See id. at 1345. More recently, in Rosales-Mireles, the Court applied the fourth element of the plain-error standard in a way that shows most guideline errors will require a remand. 138 S. Ct. at 1908. Both Molina-Martinez and Rosales-Mireles frame their holdings in terms of “most” cases, and both decisions recognize that there may be circumstances where a guideline error will not affect the ultimate sentence. Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1346; Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1909–10. In one category of those cases, the sentencing judge makes clear that the defend- ant’s sentence simply does not depend on the resolution of a guideline issue. See, e.g., United States v. Marks, 864 F.3d 575, 576 (7th Cir. 2017) (“when an arcane and arbitrary issue arises under the Sentencing Guidelines, the sentencing judge should ask, ‘Why should I care?’”); United States v. Minhas, 850 F.3d 873, 879–880 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Procedural errors do not warrant remand when we are convinced that returning the case to the district court would result in the same sentence.”), citing United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2009). The government’s contention on appeal that the victim-restraint enhancement was available here because it applied to the conspiracy charge is not persuasive. The presentence investigation report used kidnapping as the base offense under § 2A4.1(a). 18 No. 17-1002 Second, a guideline error that does not actually affect the final guideline range calculated by the court falls outside the general rule of Molina-Martinez and Rosales-Mireles. Both opinions are framed in terms of whether the final “range” is correct or not, and not on whether there might be errors that do not affect the final range. See Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1345–46, 1348–49; Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1903. In this case, a two-level error in the offense level would not have changed the final recommended guideline range. The range still would have been life in prison. The error on the restraintof-victim adjustment therefore did not affect Thomas’s substantial rights or undermine confidence in the proceedings and their final result. See United States v. Fletcher, 763 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (error in guideline calculation was harmless; statutory maximum would have governed under both correct and incorrect calculations, so correct guideline range would have been exactly the same); United States v. Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 965−66 (7th Cir. 2008) (guideline error harmless where correct guideline range on remand would be exactly the same as range that district court calculated). In addition, Judge Young made clear at sentencing that the life sentence he imposed was driven by his overall assessment of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He considered Thomas’s personal characteristics, noting that Thomas engaged in illegal activity “all his life and admits that. He has no other employment history.” The judge noted in particular the terrible nature of the crime, saying, “These young children, I’m sure, were terrified. They had to be … taken in the middle of the night by strangers, armed, threatening, to a place where they didn’t have any idea where they were going or whether they would remain alive.” He also noted the importance of protecting the public from Thomas’s future No. 17-1002 19 crimes, stating that if he were released, “these young victims will still be alive. And will they have to be constantly looking over their shoulder if the defendant is released?” There is no need to remand for resentencing on a slightly different guideline calculation that would still result in a recommended range of life in prison. D. The Alleyne Error on Ages of Victims In Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum” sentence under a criminal statute is an element of the crime “that must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 103. The federal kidnapping statute mandates that if the victim “has not attained the age of eighteen years,” the sentence “shall include imprisonment for not less than 20 years” if the offender is over eighteen and not a close relative or person with custody rights. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1). To apply the mandatory minimum, therefore, the defendant must admit or the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the victims of the offense was younger than 18. Thomas argues on appeal that the district court made an Alleyne error by not submitting the age issue to the jury. He is correct, but his counsel did not object to the verdict form or otherwise raise this issue in the district court. Because Thomas forfeited this argument, we will reverse the district court only if, again, he can establish plain error. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002); United States v. Long, 748 F.3d 322, 330 (7th Cir. 2014) (plain error review for forfeited Alleyne error); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To succeed on plain error review, again, Thomas must show (1) an error that he has not intentionally waived; (2) that 20 No. 17-1002 the error was “plain—that is to say, clear or obvious;” (3) that the error affected his substantial rights; and (4) that the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Molina-Martinez, 136 S. Ct. at 1343; Olano, 507 U.S. at 733–34, 736. In this case, the Alleyne error was not waived, and it was plain. Counsel on both sides just missed it at trial and sentencing. But this error also fails to satisfy the third and fourth elements of the plain-error standard. We are confident the error did not affect Thomas’s substantial rights and did not undermine the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 737 (error did not affect substantial rights because it was not prejudicial). The only place the ages of the kidnapping victims affected the guideline range was in the two-level enhancement for vulnerable victims, which was not erroneous and did not affect the ultimate sentence. And in the face of the off-the-charts guideline recommendation for life sentence and the district judge’s explanation at sentencing, we are confident that the 20-year mandatory minimum sentence was so far below the guideline recommendation of life and the actual sentence of life that it had no effect on the sentence. In addition, Alleyne and Apprendi errors do not amount to plain error where the evidence on the issue at trial was “‘overwhelming’ and ‘essentially uncontroverted.’” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470 (1997); Long, 748 F.3d at 329; United States v. Kirklin, 727 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 2013). In this case, the government presented overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that the kidnapping victims were minors. Blackwell’s brother and sister both testified at trial. During their testimony, her brother and sister No. 17-1002 21 gave their ages, which were 17 and 15 on the day of testimony. Not surprisingly, the defense made no effort to contradict or undermine this testimony. No other witness gave contradictory testimony about their ages. The evidence at trial would have compelled the finding that the victims were minors, so the Alleyne error was not a “plain error” requiring a remand. See Long, 748 F.3d at 330–32 (Alleyne errors did not satisfy plain-error standard where there was “no real possibility” that a jury would have failed to make required findings). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.