Opinion ID: 1736847
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Gary Booker's Murder

Text: At the penalty phase in the instant case, the prosecutor argued that the murder of Gary Booker was particularly heinous because the victim suffered approximately 30 seconds after being shot once in the back of his chest before the defendant shot him seven more times. According to the coroner's testimony, the victim could have survived the first bullet wound; however, the other seven bullets went through his heart and lungs causing the victim to go into shock within a few seconds. In the coroner's opinion, the victim probably died within five minutes after the last shot was fired into his body. Thus, the evidence does not support a finding that the defendant inflicted serious physical abuse or pain on the victim before he died. The defendant's actions in standing over the defendant and continuing to shoot him, while cold-hearted, do not reflect an intent to inflict pain pitilessly or to torture; rather, the gunshot wounds were inflicted to kill. Further, the victim died within a relatively brief span of time, and several of the shots were fired after the victim was unconscious or dead. Therefore, the aggravating factor of heinousness is not supported by the evidence concerning the nature and manner of the murder and is accordingly invalid. The defendant incorrectly argues that, because the jury only returned the one invalid aggravating factor in its penalty verdict for the Gary Booker murder, it rejected the other possible aggravating factor presented, that the murder occurred during the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of an armed robbery, and, thus, acquitted him on the death penalty. The defendant contends that double jeopardy principles bar another sentencing hearing on this count. However, this court has held that a jury's finding of a single aggravating factor during the penalty phase of a capital trial does not constitute an acquittal of the other aggravating circumstances presented to the jury. See David, supra . Specifically, the court in David reasoned that, during a penalty hearing, the jury is not required to adjudge the sufficiency of each aggravating circumstance argued by the prosecution, but is only instructed that it may consider the death penalty upon the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance. David, 468 So.2d at 1137; La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 905.3. The court concluded that the jury in that case most likely responded to the legal charge that they needed only to find one statutory aggravating circumstance, and that, upon finding one, they moved on to consider mitigating circumstances and sentence recommendation. David, 468 So.2d at 1137. Thus, the court instructed that under Louisiana's procedure, a jury's finding of one aggravating factor does not indicate that the jury considered and rejected every other possible aggravating circumstance. Id. Subsequent to this court's holding in David, the Supreme Court decided the case of Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), in which its decision confirmed this court's reasoning in David. In Poland, the defendant received the death penalty after the trial court found one of two possible aggravating circumstances applicable. On appeal, however, the trial court's interpretation of the law was deemed erroneous, and the case was remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court held that, as the defendant had not been acquitted of the death penalty in the first trial, there was no double jeopardy bar against the state submitting the same aggravating circumstances and seeking the death penalty in a subsequent trial. Id. at 155-57, 106 S.Ct. 1749. The Court found that double jeopardy principles, which are in place to protect the finality of acquittals are not implicated when a defendant is sentenced to death in the first instance, but receives a new penalty hearing. Id. (distinguishing its earlier opinion in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), where it held that, if a defendant receives a life sentence in the first instance, the defendant is essentially acquitted of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence). The defendant in the instant case attempts to distinguish this case from David by pointing to the verdict sheet for the Gary Booker murder as evidence that the jury considered the felony aggravating circumstance and rejected it. According to the defendant, the verdict sheet reveals that after the jury found the heinousness factor, the jury wrote, then erased, the aggravating factor that the offense occurred during the commission of an armed robbery. While the copy of the verdict sheet contained in the record does show some markings which may indicate erasure, the defendant's claim remains speculative at best. As the jury clearly found at the guilt phase of the trial that the defendant committed the murder during the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an armed robbery, we can only guess that perhaps, it did not feel it needed to make that same finding twice. Regardless, the reasoning of both David and Poland is clearly applicable to the present case. Double jeopardy principles will not preclude the prosecution from resubmitting the aggravating factor that was not initially returned by the jury at a new penalty hearing. Therefore, the case is remanded to the trial court for a new penalty hearing, where the state will be allowed to present and argue all aggravating circumstances supported by the record.