Opinion ID: 2512667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immigration Preemption

Text: We consider Jose C.'s alternative argument, that Congress has exclusive power to regulate immigration and state court adjudication of incorporated federal immigration offenses is preempted as an infringement of that power. In the exercise of its powers, Congress may preempt state courts from exercising jurisdiction over immigration matters, or it may preempt state Legislatures from substantively regulating on matters touching upon immigration. We address each possibility in turn.
(8) Federal criminal laws relating to immigration are collected in title 8, chapter 12, subchapter II of the United States Code. Congress has granted federal courts jurisdiction over such matters: The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, brought by the United States that arise under the provisions of this subchapter. (8 U.S.C. § 1329.) We think it clear Congress has not thereby preempted state court jurisdiction. (9) Title 8 United States Code section 1329 vests federal courts with jurisdiction but makes no mention of state courts. The absence of an express exclusion of state court jurisdiction is strong, and arguably sufficient, evidence that Congress had no such intent. ( Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly (1990) 494 U.S. 820, 823 [108 L.Ed.2d 834, 110 S.Ct. 1566].) While in some cases preemption may be found in the absence of an explicit textual directive based on legislative history or demonstrated incompatibility with federal interests, we discern no such history or incompatibility here, and Jose C. identifies none. The consequence of state jurisdiction in the context of a wardship proceeding touching on immigration law is that state and federal courts may engage in parallel interpretation of the same statutes, but this concern has never alone been understood as sufficient to defeat jurisdiction. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at page 464, state interpretation of federal law, even federal criminal law, creates no significant danger of inconsistent application because federal courts are not bound by state interpretations, state courts are to be guided by existing federal interpretations, and any erroneous state court interpretations are subject to direct review in the United States Supreme Court. Jose C. relies on Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee (E.D.Wash. 1987) 662 F.Supp. 821, 824, for the proposition that state courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether a federal immigration law has been broken. While Gutierrez so holds, we are not persuaded. In Gutierrez, an alleged illegal alien facing state incarceration following a probation revocation hearing sought an injunction in federal court. The terms of his probation forbade violation of any laws; at the probation revocation hearing, the state court purported to determine Gutierrez had violated federal immigration law. The federal district court issued a declaratory judgment, holding Gutierrez's immigration status could be decided only in the context of a federal prosecution or federal administrative proceeding. ( Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee, supra, 662 F.Supp. at pp. 822, 825.) (10) Gutierrez rests, first, on the understanding that immigration may be regulated only by the federal governmenta proposition we agree with in part, as discussed below, but which is not determinativeand second, on the understanding that under section 3231, state court adjudications of whether federal criminal laws have been violated impinge on federal sovereignty, even when the adjudication arises in the course of an independent state law proceeding (there, a probation revocation hearing). (See Gutierrez v. City of Wenatchee, supra, 662 F.Supp. at p. 824.) That latter understanding is incorrect, as the United States Supreme Court made clear a few years later in Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. 455; contrary to Gutierrez 's holding, section 3231 does not strip state courts of jurisdictional authority to make[] a factual determination and reach[] a legal conclusion that a federal law has been broken ( Gutierrez, at p. 824). Accordingly, Gutierrez does not persuade us that state court jurisdiction is lacking here. [9]

(11) Finally, we consider whether, though state court jurisdiction exists, Congress has preempted states from substantively regulating immigration matters, and in particular alien smuggling. That is, though Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 is valid insofar as it vests state juvenile courts with jurisdiction to decide whether federal immigration law has been violated, whether a state may condition wardship status, or any other state remedy or sanction, on the violation of a federal criminal immigration law is a separate question. The power to regulate is not necessarily coextensive with the power to adjudicate. The [p]ower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power. ( De Canas v. Bica (1976) 424 U.S. 351, 354 [47 L.Ed.2d 43, 96 S.Ct. 933]; see also Hines v. Davidowitz (1941) 312 U.S. 52, 62 [85 L.Ed. 581, 61 S.Ct. 399]; Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U.S. 33, 42 [60 L.Ed. 131, 36 S.Ct. 7] [The authority to control immigrationto admit or exclude aliensis vested solely in the Federal Government.].) Both the power and its asserted exclusivity are implicit in the structure of the Constitution, inferred as a consequence of various explicit grants of authority, including the powers to regulate commerce, establish rules for naturalization, and conduct foreign affairs. ( Toll v. Moreno (1982) 458 U.S. 1, 10 [73 L.Ed.2d 563, 102 S.Ct. 2977]; see U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 [commerce power]; id., cl. 4 [naturalization power]; id., art. II, § 2, cl. 2 [treaty power].) (12) While the immigration power is exclusive, it does not follow that any and all state regulations touching on aliens are preempted. ( De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 355.) Only if the state statute is in fact a regulation of immigration, i.e., a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain ( ibid. ), is preemption structural and automatic. Otherwise, the usual rules of statutory preemption analysis apply; state law will be displaced only when affirmative congressional action compels the conclusion it must be. ( Id. at pp. 356-357.) As Jose C. does not, and could not, contend Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 as applied here regulates who may enter or remain in the United States, we proceed under the usual preemption rules. (13) We have identified four ways in which Congress may preempt state law: express, conflict, obstacle, and field preemption. ( Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1077, 1087 [72 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 175 P.3d 1170]; Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 936 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569]; see also Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, 350 U.S. at pp. 502-509 [same principles apply to preemption of criminal statutes].) Neither express nor conflict preemption is implicated here. Nothing in title 8 of the United States Code expressly divests states of jurisdiction over all matters touching on immigration generally or alien smuggling in particular. [10] Nor is there any impossibility in complying simultaneously with state and federal law, as the state law here purports to incorporate the federal antismuggling law and thus adopts an identical rule. Rather, the issue is one of field and obstacle preemption. [F]ield preemption, i.e., `Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area,' applies `where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation.' ( Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 936.) In turn, obstacle preemption arises when `under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) Congress has by statute criminalized the smuggling of aliens into the United States (8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)); has it thereby occupied the field of alien smuggling, or would imposition of state juvenile wardships based on violations of section 1324 pose an obstacle to federal immigration policy's goals? Applying the general presumption against preemption ( Viva! Internat. Voice for Animals, at p. 936), a presumption that applies even in the context of immigration law (see De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 356 [requiring evidence that Congress has `unmistakably' mandated preemption or the subject matter `permits no other conclusion']), we conclude not.
We discern no intent by Congress, in either its initial enactment or subsequent amendments of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537), to occupy the field of immigration law generally or alien smuggling in particular. (14) As a general matter, the United States Supreme Court has declined to presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state authority to regulate . . . in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws. ( De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 357.) Rather, after independently reviewing the INA, the De Canas court could not find any specific indication in either the wording or the legislative history of the INA that Congress intended to preclude even harmonious state regulation touching on aliens in general. ( De Canas, at p. 358.) Nor could it infer any such intent from the scope and detail of the INA. ( Id. at p. 359.) Accordingly, it rejected field preemption in the context of California legislation touching on the employment of aliens. We reach the same conclusion in the context of alien smuggling and enforcement of immigration-related criminal law. A series of provisions in the INA demonstrate Congress, far from occupying the field, welcomed state and local assistance in enforcement. Of greatest significance, title 8 United States Code section 1324(c) expressly allows for state and local enforcement of section 1324's alien smuggling provisions. Arrests for violations of section 1324 may be made by various designated immigration officers and by all other officers whose duty it is to enforce criminal laws. (8 U.S.C. § 1324(c).) As the Court of Appeal in People v. Barajas (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 999 [147 Cal.Rptr. 195] explained, the legislative history behind this section shows the quoted language was intended to preserve state and local authority to make arrests for criminal immigration violations. ( Id. at pp. 1005-1006; see also Gonzales v. City of Peoria (9th Cir. 1983) 722 F.2d 468, 475 [concluding based on 8 U.S.C. § 1324 text and legislative history that federal law does not preclude local enforcement of the criminal provisions of the INA], overruled on another ground by Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina (9th Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 1037, 1040, fn. 1.) Three more recent amendments of the INA are to similar effect. Title 8 United States Code section 1357(g), adopted as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (Pub.L. No. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996) 110 Stat. 3009-546), authorizes states and localities to enter into written agreements with the United States Attorney General under which state and local officials will have authority to investigate, apprehend, and detain individuals for suspected violations of immigration law, and further emphasizes that even in the absence of a written agreement, state and local officials are free to cooperate with the United States Attorney General in the enforcement of immigration laws. (8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10).) Title 8 United States Code section 1103(c), amended at the same time, similarly authorizes the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to enter into cooperative agreements with State and local law enforcement agencies for the purpose of assisting in the enforcement of the immigration laws. Finally, title 8 United States Code section 1252c, adopted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub.L. No. 104-132 (Apr. 24, 1996) 110 Stat. 1276), expressly authorizes state and local officials in specified circumstances to make arrests of individuals illegally present in the United States. Both the plain language and legislative history of § 1252c reflect that Congress intended the provision to displace perceived Federal limitations on the authority of state and local officers to arrest `criminal illegal aliens.' ( U.S. v. Vasquez-Alvarez (10th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3d 1294, 1300.) (15) Consistent with these provisions, those federal circuits to have addressed the question (the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth) have unanimously concluded Congress has not occupied the field and preempted state assistance in the enforcement of federal criminal immigration law. The federal criminal regulation of immigration is not so complex or comprehensive that it may be inferred Congress intended to occupy the field. ( Gonzales v. City of Peoria, supra, 722 F.2d at pp. 474-475.) Instead, federal law `evinces a clear invitation from Congress for state and local agencies to participate in the process of enforcing federal immigration laws.' ( U.S. v. Santana-Garcia (10th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3d 1188, 1193; see also Lynch v. Cannatella (5th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2d 1363, 1371 [No statute precludes other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies from taking other action to enforce this nation's immigration laws.].) These courts recognize that Congress has established a regime of cooperative federalism, in which local, state, and federal governments may work together to ensure the achievement of federal criminal immigration policy. This is the antithesis of field preemption. In making his field preemption argument, Jose C. relies entirely on cases drawn from the area of industrial relations, an area in which [i]t is by now a commonplace [understanding] that in passing the [National Labor Relations Act] Congress largely displaced state regulation . . . . ( Wisconsin Dept. of Industry v. Gould Inc. (1986) 475 U.S. 282, 286 [89 L.Ed.2d 223, 106 S.Ct. 1057]; see also San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236, 246 [3 L.Ed.2d 775, 79 S.Ct. 773].) As Congress has instead embraced a role for the states in the area of criminal immigration law, these cases are not persuasive.
(16) There remains the question whether, although the INA contemplates some room for state legislation, [Welfare and Institutions Code section 602] is nevertheless unconstitutional because it `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress' in enacting the INA. ( De Canas v. Bica, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 363, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, 312 U.S. at p. 67.) Put in the affirmative, the States do have some authority to act with respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and furthers a legitimate state goal. ( Plyler v. Doe (1982) 457 U.S. 202, 225 [72 L.Ed.2d 786, 102 S.Ct. 2382].) Does Welfare and Institutions Code section 602's incorporation of federal criminal immigration law mirror[] federal objectives and further a legitimate state interest? We think it manifest that it does. That Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 mirrors federal objectives we infer from two separate grounds. First, it incorporates criminal immigration law and thereby adopts the same standards; that which is a violation of federal criminal immigration law is a violation under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, while that which is not, is not. Where state law mandates compliance with the federal immigration laws and regulations, it cannot be said [state law] stands as an obstacle to accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives embodied in the INA. ( In re Manuel P., supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 64.) Second, as we shall explain, Congress's passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (Delinquency Prevention Act) (42 U.S.C. § 5601 et seq.), and in particular title 18 United States Code section 5032, demonstrates that Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 is wholly consistent with federal objectives. The text and history behind the Delinquency Prevention Act show state juvenile dispositions for offenders who may have violated a federal criminal statute are no obstacle to federal goals; to the contrary, Congress strongly prefers such outcomes. (17) Title 18 United States Code section 5032, with limited exceptions not applicable here, establishes a presumption that juveniles who are alleged to have violated federal criminal law shall be proceeded against in state juvenile court. An alleged juvenile delinquent shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General certifies that one of three conditions has been met: (1) the state court does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) no adequate state juvenile program exists, or (3) the crime is one of a specified list of drug- and violence-related offenses. (18 U.S.C. § 5032.) The text thus establishes a strong preference for juvenile offenders to be channeled into and handled by state juvenile courts whenever jurisdiction exists for the state courts to accept them. The legislative history of the Delinquency Prevention Act is to the same effect. Congress recognized juvenile delinquency as essentially a State and local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local governments. (Sen.Rep. No. 93-1011, 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 5283, 5286.) However, because [f]ederal assistance is very necessary to provide needed financial assistance and resources ( ibid. ), Congress passed the Delinquency Prevention Act to provide[] for Federal leadership and coordination of the resources necessary to develop and implement at the State and local community level effective programs for the prevention and treatment of juvenile delinquency (1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 5283). The measure was intended to afford [a]ssistance in the development of State and local mechanisms designed to channel juveniles, for whom the criminal justice system is inappropriate, away from and out of the system into human problem-solving agencies and professions. ( Id. at p. 5287.) Congress `recognized that the federal court system is at best ill equipped to meet the needs of juvenile offenders. Deference to the state courts should always be observed except in the most severe of cases.' ( U.S. v. Chambers (6th Cir. 1991) 944 F.2d 1253, 1258, quoting United States v. Juvenile (D.Or. 1984) 599 F.Supp. 1126, 1130; see also U.S. v. Juvenile Male (9th Cir. 1988) 864 F.2d 641, 644 [Congress' desire to channel juveniles into state and local treatment programs . . . [is] clearly expressed in the legislative history of [18 U.S.C.] section 5032]; Notes, There's No Place Like Home: The Availability of Judicial Review Over Certification Decisions Invoking Federal Jurisdiction under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (2000) 53 Vand. L.Rev. 1311, 1314-1320, 1340-1341 [reviewing history of long-standing congressional preference for state treatment of juvenile delinquency].) Clearly, then, Welfare and Institutions Code section 602's incorporation of federal criminal law so that juvenile delinquents who violate federal law may be handled through state wardship proceedings is no obstacle to federal goals; instead, it ensures precisely the approach Congress expressly prefers. It is equally evident Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 furthers legitimate state interests. The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat and rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from criminal conduct. ( In re Jerald C. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 1, 8 [201 Cal.Rptr. 342, 678 P.2d 917] (lead opn. of Broussard, J.); In re Calvin S. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 443, 449 [58 Cal.Rptr.3d 559]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202.) The preservation of the safety and welfare of a state's citizenry is foremost among its government's interests, and it is squarely within the police power to seek to rehabilitate those who have committed misdeeds while protecting the populace from further misconduct. As Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 does this in a fashion that mirrors and is wholly consistent with federal aims, it poses no obstacle to federal policy and is not preempted.