Opinion ID: 1118827
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Heading: Is the Retraction Statute an Abrogation or a Regulation?

Text: We have consistently held that the constitution prohibits legislative abrogation, but not legislative regulation, of a right of action. Ruth v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. 572, 575, 490 P.2d 828, 831 (1971); Moseley, 38 Ariz. at 420-21, 300 P. at 959. We differentiate between abrogation and regulation by determining whether a purported legislative regulation leaves those claiming injury a reasonable possibility of obtaining legal redress. Ruth, supra ; Kilpatrick, 105 Ariz. at 419-21, 466 P.2d at 24-26. We recently stated that legislative action is regulatory [s]o long as it leaves a claimant reasonable alternatives or choices which will enable him or her to bring the action. [The legislature] may not, under the guise of regulation, so affect the fundamental right to sue for damages as to effectively deprive the claimant of the ability to bring the action. Barrio, 143 Ariz. at 106, 692 P.2d at 285 (citing Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 88, 688 P.2d at 980 (Hays, J., concurring)). Article 18, § 6 thus guarantees that those seeking a remedy are able to enforce [their claims] in court ... without the necessity of overcoming practically insurmountable defenses constructed by legislative act. Barrio, 143 Ariz. at 106, 692 P.2d at 285 ( quoting Industrial Commission v. Crisman, 22 Ariz. 579, 595, 199 P. 390, 395 (1921) (McAlister, J., concurring)). Arizona's retraction statutes prevent many defamed plaintiffs from recovering damages for actual injury to reputation and for emotional suffering. Once a media defendant retracts, the plaintiff can recover only special damage to his or her trade, profession, business, or occupation. A.R.S. § 12-653.02. As the court of appeals pointed out, the recovery scheme creates insurmountable hurdles for large and foreseeable classes of victims. 152 Ariz. at 8, 730 P.2d at 185. Among those effectively deprived of any remedy are the elderly, the retired, homemakers, children, and all others who may have no trade, business, profession, or occupation. Id. Other examples are those [with income] from fixed investment or salary or official emolument, or business not depending upon his repute.... The cases must be very rare in which a libel will destroy business profits in such a way that the loss can be directly traced to the mischief.... The statute does not reach cases where a libel has operated to cut off chances of office or employment in the future, or broken up or prevented relationships not capable of an exact money standard, or produced that intangible but fatal influence which suspicion, helped by ill will, spreads beyond recall or reach by apology or retraction.... Hanson, 68 Kan. at 676-77, 75 P. at 1043 ( quoting Park, 72 Mich. at 565, 40 N.W. at 733). Thus, the retraction statutes go beyond regulating the mode, method, and procedure to be followed in pursuing the cause of action. In addition, the retraction statutes do not merely regulate the type and amount of damage that can be recovered. [22] Instead, they completely deprive many who have sustained real injury of judicial remedy. For many who have been wronged, the effect of the statutes is to substitute retraction  a form of correction, withdrawal, and sometimes of apology  for a judicial remedy. A retraction is insufficient. Article 18, § 6 of the constitution fixes the right to a remedy and where it may be sought. Madison, 180 Mont. at 63, 589 P.2d at 131. The legislature is without power to eliminate a judicial remedy. Of course, nothing prevents the legislature from requiring that retraction be considered in mitigation of damages, a principle already recognized at common law. 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 375, at 899-900. We hold, therefore, that A.R.S. § 12-653.02 offends art. 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution and is void insofar as it eliminates general damages for both loss of reputation and emotional harm, preventing those damaged by defamation from recovering general damages for actual injury. Of course, the first amendment of the United States Constitution limits this holding. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789; Dombey, 150 Ariz. 476, 724 P.2d 562. State remedies for defamatory falsehood must reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Thus, a media defendant may not be held liable without a showing of the requisite degree of fault. Dombey, supra . If the defamation involves a matter of public concern, a jury may not award presumed or punitive damages absent a showing of actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985). Compensation may be awarded to public plaintiffs or private plaintiffs defamed by a statement involving a matter of public concern only for actual injury. We need not define actual injury, as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350-51, 94 S.Ct. at 3012; see also Dun & Bradstreet, supra .