Opinion ID: 1780236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court improperly denied Moore's motion to suppress evidence.

Text: ¶ 9. In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we must determine whether the trial court's findings, considering the totality of the circumstances, are supported by substantial credible evidence. Price v. State, 752 So.2d 1070(¶ 9) (Miss. Ct.App.1999) ( citing Magee v. State, 542 So.2d 228, 231 (Miss.1989); Nicholson v. State, 523 So.2d 68, 71 (Miss.1988); Ray v. State, 503 So.2d 222, 224 (Miss.1986)). Where supported by substantial credible evidence, this Court shall not disturb those findings. Ray, 503 So.2d at 223-24.
¶ 10. Moore argues that, at the time of the search, he was in custody following an illegal arrest. As such, he argues, any evidence collected during that search was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed. ¶ 11. Officers Reedy and Carter, who claim they had a warrant, arrested Moore on a misdemeanor charge of writing a $4.19 bad check to Wal-Mart in 1996. The officers discovered the outstanding warrant by running Moore's name through the Justice Court database. The officers went to Moore's place of employment and informed him that he was being arrested on a warrant for a bad check. After arresting Moore, the officers transported him to his apartment where the search took place. ¶ 12. On January 10, 2005, Moore filed a Motion to Compel Discovery in which he requested a copy of the misdemeanor warrant. At a January 28, 2005, pre-trial hearing, Moore again requested that the State produce the original misdemeanor arrest warrant. The Justice Court file included an Affidavit, a copy of the $4.19 check to Wal-Mart, a computerized arrest form, and a disposition sheet  but no warrant. Because the State could not produce a copy of the misdemeanor warrant upon request, Moore claims that under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-3-7(1) and (2) (1972), his arrest was illegal. Section 99-3-7 provides: (1) An officer or private person may arrest any person without a warrant, for an indictable offense committed, or a breach of the peace threatened or attempted in his presence; or when a person has committed a felony, though not in his presence; or when a felony has been committed, and he has reasonable grounds to suspect and believe the person proposed to be arrested to have committed it; or on a charge, made upon reasonable cause, of the commission of a felony by the party proposed to be arrested. And in all cases of arrest without warrant, the person making such arrest must inform the accused of the object and cause of the arrest, except when he is in the actual commission of the offense, or is arrested on pursuit. (2) Any law enforcement officer may arrest any person on a misdemeanor charge without having a warrant in his possession when a warrant is in fact outstanding for that person's arrest. In all such cases, the officer making the arrest must inform such person at the time of the arrest the object and cause therefor. If the person arrested so requests, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-3-7(1) and (2) (1972) ( emphasis added ). ¶ 13. The statute clearly requires a warrant for the misdemeanor arrest. Thus, the Circuit Court was presented with a question of fact, that is, whether the officers had a warrant when they arrested Moore. The fact that the warrant could not later be produced is not conclusive proof that no warrant existed, nor does it necessarily mean the officers were not in possession of the warrant when they arrested Moore. See Torrence v. State, 283 So.2d 595, 597 (Miss.1973). ¶ 14. The Circuit Court was required to weigh the evidence that no warrant existed against other evidence that it did. Moore claims he never saw a warrant, and, when requested in discovery, no warrant could be produced. On the other hand, the officers testified they had an arrest warrant in their possession at the time of the arrest. According to Officer Reedy, after running a routine check of the Justice Court database, he located the physical misdemeanor warrant for Moore in the police department's file at the jail. Officers Reedy and Carter claim that, with warrant in hand, they went to Moore's workplace, informed him he was being arrested because of the bad check, and showed him the actual warrant. ¶ 15. Additionally, the Justice Court file included a Justice Affidavit concerning the bad check charge, a copy of the $4.19 check signed by Moore and issued to Wal-Mart, and a computerized arrest form. The arrest form indicated in two places that a warrant had been issued for Moore's arrest on the bad check charge. This evidence, along with the testimony of Officers Reedy and Carter, constitutes substantial credible evidence which supports the Circuit Court's findings. ¶ 16. Poor record keeping does not erase the existence of the warrant. The trial court's denial of Moore's motion to exclude the items seized from his home was supported by substantial credible evidence, and we will not disturb those findings. As such, Moore's arrest was not illegal, and the items seized from his house after his arrest cannot be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree. This portion of Moore's first assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 17. Moore says he did not voluntarily consent to the search of his home. Thus, he argues, the evidence collected pursuant to this non-consensual search  specifically the blood-stained belt  should have been suppressed by the trial court. ¶ 18. The United States Constitution and the Mississippi State Constitution guarantee citizens the right to be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions against unreasonable and warrantless searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. AMEND IV; MISS. CONST. ART. 3, § 23. While the warrant clauses of these provisions express the general rule that law enforcement must procure a warrant based on probable cause before engaging in a search, the rule has several exceptions. The pertinent one to this discussion is the consent exception. Voluntary consent eliminates the warrant requirement. Morris v. State, 777 So.2d 16, 26 (Miss.2000). ¶ 19. With respect to the consent exception to the warrant requirement, this Court has established the following rule: [i]n order for there to be a valid consent to a search not otherwise authorized by law, . . . the person searched [must] be aware he has the legal right to refuse. Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 550 (Miss.1983) ( citing Smith v. State, 133 Miss. 730, 98 So. 344, 345 (1923)). [2] Consent is valid only where a person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right not to be searched. Penick, 440 So.2d at 551. Knowledgeable consent is consent where the defendant, being cognizant of his rights in the property, knows of his right to refuse. Id. at 549-50. ¶ 20. In Jones v. State, 607 So.2d 23, 29 (Miss.1991), this Court clarified its rule in Penick and held that, where consent is given, the State is not required to demonstrate knowledge; rather, the burden [is] on the defendant to show impaired consent or some diminished capacity. Id. Whether a person voluntarily consents to a search is a question of fact to be determined by the total circumstances. Id. at 27. Those considerations include: whether the circumstances were coercive, occurred while in the custody of law enforcement or occurred in the course of a station house investigation. The court must also look to the individual's maturity, impressionability, experience and education. Further, the court should consider whether the person was excited, under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or mentally incompetent. If the consent occurred while the defendant was being generally cooperative, the consent is more likely to be voluntary; however, if the defendant agreed and then changed his mind, the consent should be suspect. Graves v. State, 708 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss. 1997) ( citing Jones, 607 So.2d at 27). Finally, in Graves, this Court interpreted Jones as limiting Penick's knowledgeable waiver requirement to cases where the defendant specifically claims he did not have knowledge of the right to refuse. Graves, 708 So.2d at 864. ¶ 21. Moore argues that his consent to the search of his apartment was not knowledgeable and thus cannot be considered a valid waiver of his right against an unreasonable search and seizure. Under this Court's jurisprudence, Moore has the burden of proving that some impairment or diminished capacity prevented him from knowingly giving his consent. Moore testified he was unaware that the officers could not search his home without a warrant absent a signed consent form. He stated that he thought the officers would go in and get the clothes anyway. According to Moore, he did not know he had a right to refuse to sign the consent form when he signed it. Moore claims that Officer Reedy did not read the consent form to him, and he did not read it for himself. As such, Moore claims he did not know, and no one informed him, that he had a right to refuse to sign the consent form. Moore also points out that he only completed an eighth grade education, and he even failed the eighth grade the first time through. ¶ 22. Moore's testimony starkly contrasts the testimony of Officers Reedy and Carter. Officer Carter testified that after arresting Moore on the misdemeanor warrant, the officers took Moore to his house. No threats or coercive action occurred during the drive over. According to Officer Reedy, he read the consent form to Moore. The consent form stated: I, [Charles Moore] having been informed of my constitutional right not to have a search made of the premises hereinafter mentioned without a search warrant and of my right to refuse to consent to such a search, hereby authorize [Sgt. Scotty Reedy, Truman Carter] to conduct a complete search of my premises located at [507 S. Cumming St. Fulton, MS]. These officers or agents are authorized by me to take from my premises any letters, papers, materials or other property which they may desire. This written permission is being given by me to the above named persons voluntarily and without threats or promises of any kind. Moore signed the form after Officer Reedy read it to him. Officer Carter testified he heard Officer Reedy read the form to Moore, and he witnessed Moore signing the document. In addition, Mike Emmons, the owner or co-resident of Moore's house, signed the consent form at approximately the same time as Moore. According to Officer Reedy, Moore was cooperative and even went with the officers to his bedroom where they retrieved his clothes. ¶ 23. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, Moore has failed to prove that his consent was not voluntary or knowledgeable. Moore alleges that because he was in police custody at the time of the search and has only an eighth grade education, he could not have knowingly consented to the search. However, Moore cites no authority which establishes these factors as indicative of lack of knowledge. Moore was not excited, under the influence of drugs or alcohol, mentally incompetent, or especially impressionable. The circumstances of his consent were not coercive. Moore willingly cooperated with the officers, indicating voluntary consent. ¶ 24. A significant factor in this particular case is the conflicting testimony of Moore and the officers as to whether the consent form was read to Moore. As it was in Jones, the only evidence Moore provides to support his contention [that his consent was not knowledgeable and voluntary] is his own testimony . . . . The trial judge has sole authority in determining witness credibility. Such a determination should not be overturned without a substantial showing that the trial judge was manifestly wrong. Jones, 607 So.2d at 28 ( citing Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 25. The trial court's denial of Moore's motion to suppress the clothes taken during the search was not an abuse of discretion. Moore's only proof that he did not knowingly waive his right to refuse the search was his own testimony, which the trial court was free to give less weight than the officers' testimony. The trial court's findings were certainly supported by substantial credible evidence. Therefore, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed, and Moore's first assignment of error on appeal is without merit.