Opinion ID: 6226552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Statutes

Text: Tinker and Attorney Defendants also asserted that they were entitled to attorneys’ fees under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Under § 1692k(a)(3), a court may award attorneys’ fees if a FDCPA claim was “brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment.” Under § 1988, a court may, “in its discretion,” award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in civil rights cases. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). And under § 1927, a court may require any attorney “who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously” to pay attorneys’ fees. But awarding fees under § 1927 should be reserved only for “instances evidencing serious and standard disregard for the orderly process of justice.” Miera v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 143 F.3d 1337, 1342 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 11 Appellate Case: 21-6020 Document: 010110646218 Date Filed: 02/16/2022 Page: 12 Tinker and Attorney Defendants argued that Cobb’s claims were meritless because they were barred by the statute of limitations. So, as they see it, Cobb must have sued in bad faith, to harass them, and to multiply the proceedings in this case. The district court rejected that argument. Indeed, it found that Cobb hadn’t brought his claims in bad faith or for harassment purposes. It also concluded that Cobb’s statute-of-limitations arguments were rational and made in good faith. And finally, it determined that Cobb’s attorneys’ actions did not satisfy the demanding standard required to impose fees under § 1927. Once more, we agree with the district court’s reasoning. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorneys’ fees to Tinker or Attorney Defendants.9