Opinion ID: 195949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Duty-To-Warn Instruction Given

Text: 28 Appellant challenges the duty-to-warn instruction given by the trial court on the negligence claim. The jury was instructed that the defendant had a duty to warn if it knew or should have known that the fireproofing it sold to the plaintiff was dangerous to people or that it would damage property. Appellant argues that this instruction is erroneous because it requires the plaintiff to prove that the product was dangerous. Relying on language in Chellman, the appellant argues that a defendant has a duty to warn if a product may be dangerous. 29 This argument is based more on form than substance. It is difficult to imagine what different meaning would be conveyed by an instruction, instead of that given, that the defendant had a duty to warn if it knew or should have known that the fireproofing it sold to the plaintiff may be dangerous. To the extent that this phrasing conveys the same meaning--for example, that the defendant had a duty to warn if the defendant knew or should have known that the product causes harm in some (but not necessarily all) instances--the instruction given by the court was not in error. 30 To the extent that appellant is urging that its proposed language conveys a different meaning--that the defendant has a duty to warn if it should have known that there was a mere possibility that the product was in the category of dangerous products (i.e., one that causes harm in some instances)--the argument for application of a legal test framed in this particular way has no basis in New Hampshire law. 31 Under New Hampshire law, a manufacturer need not warn of all potential dangers associated with a product. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978) (manufacturer need not warn of known, but very unlikely, risk of danger). Similarly, one may infer from this precedent that there is no duty to warn on the basis of speculation that a product might be dangerous. Thus, the meaning conveyed by the court's instruction is closer to the formulations found in New Hampshire cases than is appellant's proposed alteration, which itself is subject to different interpretations, some of which are inconsistent with the formulations in the New Hampshire cases. Thus, appellant's challenge on this ground fails. 32