Opinion ID: 2451184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Mellish's motion for reconsideration valid?

Text: ¶ 21 Frog Mountain makes two additional arguments. The first is that, even if a timely motion for reconsideration would have tolled the time limit on filing a LUPA petition before the enactment of House Bill 2740, Mellish's motion for reconsideration did not do so because it was untimely. If the motion was untimely, the hearing examiner's original decision would have been the final determination, making it the land use decision triggering LUPA's 21-day filing deadline. Frog Mountain also claims that the lack of notice deprived it of due process. ¶ 22 The Court of Appeals considered these issues waived, noting that the JCC does not require a party who moves for reconsideration to notify the opposing party. See JCC 18.40.310. Although the court was concerned that the code may invite due process violations, it did not rule on that issue because Frog Mountain did not appeal on this ground. Mellish, 154 Wash.App. at 399 n. 2, 225 P.3d 439. Similarly, the court observed that [i]t is not clear here whether Mellish's motion for reconsideration was timely under the JCC, but the parties have never litigated this issue. Id. at 403 n. 5, 225 P.3d 439. ¶ 23 Frog Mountain insists, nonetheless, that these issues are properly before this court since they were raised, if briefly, previously, and further that because the enactment of H.B. 2740 has raised new issues raised [sic] for the first time before this Court, Frog Mountain would be substantially prejudiced by such a limitation. Frog Mountain's Suppl. Br. at 6 n. 30. The record shows, however, that Frog Mountain failed to challenge the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration in superior court, focusing instead on the timeliness of the LUPA petition. See CP at 262-69. Thus, the superior court specifically found that the motion was timely. Id. at 204 (The Plaintiff, Mr. Mellish, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that decision within five days pursuant to Jefferson County ordinances.). [3] ¶ 24 Similarly, Frog Mountain waived its due process claim by failing to present it to the superior court or the Court of Appeals. Frog Mountain merely noted in its motion to dismiss that [t]he Elyeas never received notice of this reconsideration, and only learned of it much later. CP at 264 n. 6. [4] In its brief in the Court of Appeals, Frog Mountain contended that [b]ecause they did not receive notice of reconsideration they should be entitled to rely on the permit. Br. of Appellants at 8. The brief contains a few pages of argument about the timeliness of the motion, but no discussion of due process. See id. at 8, 15-17. RAP 2.5(a)(3) allows a party to raise a claim of error for the first time on appeal if it is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wash.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). An error affecting a constitutional right is `manifest' if it caused actual prejudice. Id. at 927, 155 P.3d 125. Here, while Frog Mountain did not receive notice of the motion for reconsideration, the hearing examiner decided the motion in Frog Mountain's favor without ... argument by the party filing the request. JCC 18.40.310. There was no prejudice. In sum, we hold that Frog Mountain's claims concerning the lack of notice and the timeliness of Mellish's motion for reconsideration have been waived.