Opinion ID: 4535207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial review under Act 111

Text: Act 111 was enacted in the wake of Erie Firefighters Local No. 293 v. Gardner, 178 A.2d 691 (Pa. 1962) (per curiam), which held that its predecessor was not binding on municipalities on constitutional non-delegation grounds. Id. at 695 (citing Pa. Const. art. 3, § 20 (repealed)). That former law “prohibited strikes and attempted to provide for the Commission to force a victim to work with Hobart. (R.R. at 699a.) Although the parties agree that this finding is unsupported by record evidence, we determine that it played no significant part in the trial court's conclusion that reinstating Hobart would compel the Commission to commit an illegal act. Id. at 726. As the parties agreed that this finding was unsupported, and the Commission has not made any factual representations along these lines in its brief to this Court, we likewise disregard it. Relatedly, while Hobart masturbated to photographs in the Department’s bathroom, the arbitrator’s opinion simply referred to photographs in general. It is therefore unclear whether the arbitrator intended to refer to the pornographic pictures Hobart downloaded from the internet or the photographs obtained from JNET. [J-111-2019] - 16 adjustment of grievances through negotiations” but did not allow for collective bargaining. Moon Twp. v. Police Officers of Moon Twp., 498 A.2d 1305, 1308 (Pa. 1985). “This double denial of rights to police and fire personnel fueled the growing tension between labor and management, tension which culminated in ‘illegal strikes and a general breakdown in communication between public employers and their employees.’” PSP v. PSTA, 741 A.2d 1248, 1251 (Pa. 1999) (Smith) (quoting Betancourt, 656 A.2d at 89). Following Erie Firefighters, the electorate authorized an amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. 3, § 31, which allowed “the adjustment or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public employers.” That amendment cleared the way for new legislation. Act 111 was passed two years later. It continued to withhold the right to strike from police and firefighters but conferred “the right to bargain collectively with their public employers concerning the terms and conditions of their employment[.]” 43 P.S. § 217.1. This process, deemed interest arbitration, is “in essence, the process by which the parties, through a neutral arbitrator or panel, create a collective bargaining agreement.” Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, of FOP v. City of Philadelphia, 129 A.3d 1221, 1226 (Pa. 2015). Interest arbitration is distinct from grievance arbitration, which involves disputes over how the governing bargaining agreement should be interpreted and/or applied. The instant case is in the nature of grievance arbitration, as it involves whether the employer had just cause for terminating Hobart’s employment under the bargaining agreement. Grievance arbitration is not specifically mentioned in Act 111 as its language speaks only to the resolution of disputes arising from “the collective bargaining process,” i.e. interest arbitration, which must be settled before a board of arbitration composed of [J-111-2019] - 17 three persons. 43 P.S. § 217.4(b). However, Section 1 of Act 111 states that police and firefighters “shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act,” 43 P.S. § 217.1, and in Chirico v. Bd. of Sup'rs for Newton Twp., 470 A.2d 470, 474–75 (Pa. 1983), we held that the General Assembly intended for Act 111 and the concomitant body of case law regarding the appellate scope of review to apply to grievance disputes. Therefore, an arbitrator’s decision in an Act 111 case, whether grievance or interest, “shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer . . . . No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” 43 P.S. § 217.7(a).8 Despite Act 111’s preclusion of appeals, we adopted the narrow certiorari mechanism for a combination of pragmatic, historical, and constitutional reasons. In particular, this Court announced the adoption of the narrow certiorari standard in Washington Arbitration, 259 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. 1969), to address due process and other 8 The statute reads: (a) The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court. Such determination shall constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivision or of the Commonwealth with respect to matters which require legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry out the determination of the board of arbitration. 43 P.S. § 217.7 (emphasis added). [J-111-2019] - 18 constitutional concerns. The city of Washington challenged an interest arbitration award by filing suit in the court of common pleas, claiming that it required an illegal act. The city argued that its appeal was permitted under Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides in relevant part that [t]here shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record.” We rejected this challenge: “This provision is inapplicable to the case at hand. An arbitration panel is neither a court nor an administrative agency. The inherent differences between an arbitration panel on the one hand, and courts and administrative agencies on the other, well explain the logic behind the distinction.” Id. at 440 (footnotes omitted). Washington thus concluded “that the city did not have the right to appeal,” id., with the trial court lacking jurisdiction to address the claim. This Court recognized, however, that arbitrators could not be totally insulated from oversight. Id. at 441 n.5 (“No one would argue, for instance, that a public employer could set up different wage scales for its black and its white employees just because the arbitrator so ordered.”). To guard “the city’s rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, and specifically its right to due process,” id. at 440, we invoked then-existing Supreme Court Rule 68½9 as “a perfectly adequate mechanism for 9Rule 68½ was applied in circumstances where there was no right of appeal. Rule 68½ was promulgated in 1964 and stated: Where the subject matter does not fall within the statutory jurisdiction of the Superior Court, an appeal to the Supreme Court in the nature of a certiorari from a judgment order or decree will lie only if specially allowed by the Court or by a Judge thereof, where a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from the decision or order or judgment or decree of a Court, or that the decision or order or judgment or [J-111-2019] - 19 the protection of constitutional rights.” Id. In Washington, we set forth the four prongs of the narrow certiorari scope of review: We have decided to grant the city's petition under Rule 68 1/2. The parameters of the review permissible under that rule are as follows: ‘If an appeal is prohibited by an Act, or the decision of the Agency is stated to be final or conclusive, the law is well settled that an appeal will lie to the Courts in the nature of a narrow certiorari and this Court will review only (1) the question of jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings before the Agency; (3) questions of excess in exercise of powers; and (4) constitutional questions. Cf. Devito v. Civil Service Commission, 404 Pa. 354, 172 A.2d 161 (and cases cited therein); Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. Myers, 401 Pa. 230, 164 A.2d 86.’ Id. at 441 (quoting Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm’n., 173
Rule 68½ no longer exists but we have carried forward the narrow certiorari standard articulated in Washington. Moon Twp, 498 A.2d at 1307 n.4 (“Although Rule 68 ½ has since been repealed, we will retain the stated scope of review.”). III. Whether the Commonwealth Court Erred in Vacating and Remanding the Trial Court's Decision Despite the Fact There Was no Finding of Error in the Trial Court's Opinion and the Commonwealth Court Relied decree of a Court shall be final or conclusive, or shall not be subject to review, or where the relevant statute is silent on the question of appellate review. City of Philadelphia v. Chase & Walker Corp., 240 A.2d 65, 66–67 (Pa. 1968) (quoting Rule). As quoted, Washington elected to treat the appeal as a petition for allowance of appeal. [J-111-2019] - 20 Upon Hypothetical Actions That Could Occur in the Future, Rather Than on the Record Before It A. The Arguments of the Parties The Commission first argues that the trial court correctly applied the narrow certiorari scope of review by finding that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in ordering it to commit an illegal act. In turn, “the Commonwealth Court erroneously exceeded its scope of review and relied upon certain portions of deposition testimony that it believes supports the conclusion that JNET had not yet received an appeal of its decision to bar Mr. Hobart permanently from access to JNET.” Commission’s Brief at 15. It further faults the Commonwealth Court for taking notice of Hobart’s due process challenges in ongoing proceedings because those facts were “not offered into evidence at the fact-finding level.” Id. at 16. The Commission characterizes the panel as deciding the case based on hypothetical facts, rendering its opinion advisory. In any case, the Commission points to the testimony of Mr. Webb, who testified that there was virtually no possibility of overturning the JNET suspension. Finally, to the extent that the Commonwealth Court could actually order the Commission to take affirmative action by asking JNET to consider and process Hobart’s appeal, a proposition with which it strenuously disagrees, the Commission states that the trial court had already rendered conclusive determinations on those points as a matter of credibility and fact-finding. See N.T., 10/26/17, at 90 (testimony of Chief Horner, “I sent over Hobart’s appeal letter to JNET, PennDOT, and CLEAN for them to process”). The Commission states that the Commonwealth Court’s independent examination of the testimony “replaces the trial court as fact-finder” and constitutes “an impermissible broadening of the scope of review.” Commission’s Brief at [J-111-2019] - 21 20. See also id. at 26 n.4 (arguing that “the arbitration award should be vacated even under the current narrow certiorari scope of review”). Conversely, the FOP argues that the Commonwealth Court’s majority did not find error in the trial court’s order. In sharp contrast to the Commission’s view, the FOP argues that the panel majority found that the Commission was not required to commit any illegal act, as evidenced by its characterization of the legal issue as “a dispute over the implementation of an arbitrator’s award, not the facial illegality of the award itself.” FOP’s Brief at 43 (quoting Northern Berks, 196 A.3d at 723). In its view, “all three judges agreed the issue before the court did not involve an illegal arbitration order.” Id. The FOP submits that the courts below went further than the narrow certiorari standard permits. “A fair treatment of this case requires a fair treatment of the entirety of the issues in dispute before the arbitrator.” Id. at 15. The FOP emphasizes that the issue decided by the arbitrator was limited to whether “the Commission had just cause to discharge Officer Hobart[.]” Id. at 16 (quoting arbitrator’s opinion). The FOP characterizes that discrete issue as one involving fact-finding regarding the comparative discipline imposed against Officer DeBlasi, which binds reviewing courts even if the court disagrees with those findings. Id. at 18-19. The FOP also notes that the arbitrator considered Hobart’s reputation within the Department and determined that fellow officers, while disheartened by his conduct, would not have been impacted by his employment. Id. at 23.
The Commission contends that the Commonwealth Court erred in vacating the trial court’s order. “The Commission maintains that the trial court property vacated the [J-111-2019] - 22 arbitrator’s award under the narrow certiorari standard of review applicable to Act 111 matters, as the award “causes the Commission to take an unlawful action or do something it cannot voluntarily do.” Reply Brief at 1. We disagree. In determining whether an arbitrator requires the employer to commit an illegal act, this Court has consistently focused on whether the award forces the employer to do an act “not within the authority of the employer or that was prohibited by law.” Appeal of Upper Providence Police Delaware Cty. Lodge No. 27 FOP, 526 A.2d 315, 321 (Pa. 1987). As we stressed in Washington, “an arbitration award may only require a public employer to do that which it could do voluntarily”. Washington, 259 A.2d at 442 (emphasis added). As such, if an employer may take the ordered action lawfully, then the arbitrator has not exceeded his or her powers under the “excess of powers” prong of the narrow certiorari standard and the arbitration award may not be overturned on that basis. As a result, the question in each instance is whether an employer has the discretion to undertake the ordered act in accordance with existing law. In Chirico, 470 A.2d 470 (Pa. 1983), for example, we held that an arbitration award was properly overturned where it required the provision of pension disability payments for non-service related disabilities, where the governing statute explicitly limited disability pensions to service-related disabilities. 470 A.2d at 472. Similarly, in Conley v. Joyce, 393 A.2d 654 (Pa. 1978), we approved of the modification of an award to the extent that it required a city to compensate police officers for overtime in circumstances where it was prohibited from doing so by statute. Id. at 657. In these instances, the employer lacked any discretion under the law to undertake the actions required by the arbitration award. [J-111-2019] - 23 In the present circumstances, in significant contrast, no statutory or other restriction prohibits the Commission from reinstating Hobart as a police officer despite his lack of access to JNET. If Hobart were to apply for a job today, the Commission would have the discretion to hire him even though he cannot access JNET databases. MPOETC regulations supply the exclusive statutory requirements for employment as a police officer and Hobart is MPOETC certified. Given the Department’s small territory, two-man shifts and dearth of administrative “desk duty” work, it may well be a terrible, if not farcical, exercise of discretion, but it would nevertheless be an act of discretion. The record here well-documents the importance of JNET access to a police officer’s ability to perform all of the functions typically expected of police officers in the Department. But Hobart’s employment as a police officer by the Department does not violate state law, and in fact given MPOETC’s exclusive statutory requirements, Hobart’s employment as a police officer is expressly permitted under Pennsylvania law. Perhaps MPOETC should be amended to require JNET access as a condition of enforcing the laws of our Commonwealth, but that is a matter for the General Assembly’s consideration rather than that of this Court.10 The trial court and Commonwealth Court erred in their analyses of the “excess of powers” prong of narrow certiorari by improperly considering whether the Commission had the discretion to employ Hobart based not only in accordance with Pennsylvania law 10In Smith, wherein this Court rejected the PSP’s attempt to expand Betancourt to include a public policy exception, we observed that municipal officers are disqualified from MPOETC certification once convicted of a felony or serious misdemeanor. Smith, 741 A.2d at 1252 n.6. We indicated that “[t]he decision to add such a similar provision applicable to members of the State Police is one for the legislature, and not this Court, to make.” Id. [J-111-2019] - 24 but also upon Departmental practices. While agreeing that MPOETC certification “is all that is needed in order for an officer to perform his or her duties as a police officer,” Chief Horner testified that officers within the Department “have to have [JNET] access ... If any of the officers would not have [JNET], they would not be working for our police department.” Id. at 98. Again, the question here is whether the Commission may legally hire Hobart as a police officer, not whether it would do so. In Washington, this Court emphasized that in assessing whether the public employer could voluntarily undertake an action ordered by an arbitrator, said public employer may not “hide behind self-imposed legal restrictions.” Washington, 259 A.2d at 442. As a result, while departmental policies may well play an important role in the exercise of discretion as to whether to undertake various actions (like whether to hire Hobart), they play no role in the determination as to whether it would be illegal to do so. That the Commission would not hire Hobart under its own self-imposed constraints, regardless of how logical those restrictions might be, is irrelevant to its ability to do so lawfully. Our extensive review of the certified record reflects that both the trial court and the Commonwealth Court failed to limit themselves to the issue actually decided by the arbitrator. As the FOP correctly indicated, “[n]one of the lower court opinions gave any weight to what was a critical issue to the arbitrator’s decision, i.e. comparative discipline” and the Commission’s own policy of requiring that discipline in prior similar cases be a factor in meting out current discipline. FOP’s Brief at 22-23. At the outset of the arbitration, the arbitrator framed the issue presented by the FOP as “whether the Commission had just cause to discharge [Hobart] and, if not, what shall be the remedy?” Arbitrator’s Opinion, 5/30/17, at 4. The Commission relied on Hobart’s “misuse of JNET [J-111-2019] - 25 and the resulting abuse of the public trust extended to every sworn officer who utilizes these police informational services.” Id. at 5. The FOP, while not contesting that discipline was appropriate, stated that the Commission “did not apply its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination,” and that termination was “disproportional when compared to the discipline issued to Officer DeBlasi,” who had committed thousands of JNET violations yet had received only a four-day suspension. Id. at 6. The arbitrator clearly agreed with the FOP and indicated in the award that “the punishment assessed to [Hobart] is glaringly disproportionate to the offense.” Id. at 14. The arbitrator found that Hobart’s conduct warranted serious discipline in consideration of the nature of some of the pornographic material downloaded from the internet using department equipment and the use of JNET to search and then print photographs of women. He issued an award that granted reinstatement with the time off converted into a disciplinary suspension without pay. Id. at 15. Nevertheless, the arbitrator’s decision to reinstate Hobart was strictly limited to the issue presented in the FOP’s grievance, namely the allegation of disproportionality between the Commission’s termination of Hobart and its short suspension of DeBlasi for more extensive JNET violations. We cannot agree with the Commission’s contention that the arbitrator ordered Hobart back to work “despite the fact that he was barred from using [JNET].” Commission’s Brief at 34 n.5 (emphasis added). The arbitrator instead limited his decision to an analysis as to whether the Commission had just cause to terminate Hobart at the time of his termination on September 27, 2016. While the trial court correctly notes that Hobart’s loss of JNET access privileges was known by the time of the arbitration (on March 22, 2017), for purposes of the issue before the arbitrator, it was irrelevant to [J-111-2019] - 26 whether he was fired for just cause on September 27, 2016 or what was the appropriate remedy for said termination without just cause. We take no issue with the arbitrator’s decision to limit his inquiry to the issue presented in the grievance and the facts known to the Commission at the moment it decided to discharge Hobart. In so doing, the arbitrator did not in any respect exceed his powers so as to create a basis for the vacation of the award under the narrow certiorari standard of review. Quite to the contrary, the arbitrator’s exacting focus on the issues presented in the FOP’s grievance petition was entirely proper and clearly in accordance with the limits of his powers as an arbitrator. This Court has held that an arbitrator’s ruling on an issue not before it constitutes an excess of his or her powers. In Dep't of Corr. v. Pennsylvania State Corr. Officers Ass'n, 12 A.3d 346, 356 (Pa. 2011), for example, we ruled that “[a]n award pertaining to an issue that was not placed in dispute before the board also reflects an excess of the arbitrators’ powers.” Id. at 356 n.15. Similarly, in Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, 129 A.3d at 1222, this Court held that the authority of arbitrators “is limited to addressing issues properly submitted to the panel, or those questions reasonably subsumed within those issues.” In this case, the issue submitted for arbitration was whether the Commission had just cause to terminate Hobart’s employment given the alleged lack of disproportionality of the lesser discipline issued to Officer DeBlasi. The arbitrator properly limited his scope to this issue. In this regard, the arbitrator’s actions were in keeping with a decision of the United States Supreme Court in a case involving analogous facts, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). In that case, Isiah Cooper’s job with Misco entailed operating a machine that used sharp blades to cut rolling coils of paper. Id. at [J-111-2019] - 27 32. The arbitrator found that the machine was hazardous and caused numerous injuries, and Cooper had previously received two safety reprimands. Because of the danger posed by such machinery, company policy permitted discharge for bringing controlled substances on plant property, consuming them on site, and/or for operating machinery while under the influence of controlled substances. Id. An officer happened to be surveilling Cooper, as his home was the target of a search warrant that evening. The officer observed Cooper enter, with two other men, an Oldsmobile Cutlass vehicle, which was not Cooper’s vehicle. Cooper remained in the vehicle after the others returned to the plant. Id. The officer apprehended Cooper in the backseat, observing marijuana smoke and a marijuana cigarette in the front ashtray. Police searched the Cutlass and found additional marijuana. Id. The police also searched Cooper’s own vehicle, which was on company premises, and discovered marijuana gleanings. Meanwhile, the search of Cooper’s residence ultimately recovered a substantial amount of marijuana. Id. at 33. Cooper informed Misco of his arrest for having marijuana at home. During its investigation, the company later independently learned of the marijuana cigarette in the Cutlass. Misco terminated Cooper, asserting that “his presence in the Cutlass violated the rule against having drugs on the plant premises.” Id. The matter proceeded to arbitration, where the issue presented was “whether the Company had ‘just cause to discharge [Cooper]’ and, ‘[i]f not, what if any should be the remedy.’” Id. at 33-34 (citation omitted). Relevant for present purposes, five days before the arbitration hearing, Misco learned that marijuana was found in Cooper’s own vehicle. The arbitrator refused to [J-111-2019] - 28 consider that fact and ordered Misco to reinstate Cooper, finding that Misco had failed to prove that Cooper possessed marijuana on company property. At the arbitration, Misco proved only that Cooper was present in the Cutlass with marijuana; it did not also prove that the marijuana belonged to Cooper. With respect to the evidence that Cooper’s vehicle contained marijuana, thereby definitively establishing Cooper possessed marijuana on company grounds in violation of company policy, the arbitrator “refused to accept into evidence th[at] fact ... because the Company did not know of this fact when Cooper was discharged and therefore did not rely on it as a basis for the discharge.” Id. at 34 (emphasis added). For this reason, the arbitrator reinstated Cooper’s employment. Misco filed suit in the federal district court, arguing that reinstating Cooper for possessing marijuana on plant premises was contrary to public policy. The district court agreed and vacated the award, which was affirmed on appeal. Misco, Inc. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985). The court of appeals criticized the arbitrator for ignoring what “the arbitrator knew was in fact true: that Cooper did bring marijuana onto his employer's premises.” Id. at 743. The Supreme Court reversed for three reasons. The first reason, and the one relevant point for present purposes, was that the arbitrator was free to confine the decision of whether just cause existed to the facts known to the employer at the time of the termination: Here the arbitrator ruled that in determining whether Cooper had violated Rule II.1, he should not consider evidence not relied on by the employer in ordering the discharge, particularly in a case like this where there was no notice to the employee or the Union prior to the hearing that the Company would attempt to rely on after-discovered evidence. This, in effect, was a construction of what the contract required when deciding discharge cases: an arbitrator was to look only at [J-111-2019] - 29 the evidence before the employer at the time of discharge. Misco, 484 U.S. at 39–40 (emphasis added). In so ruling, the Supreme Court emphasized that the employer was not without recourse: “Finally, it is worth noting that putting aside the evidence about the marijuana found in Cooper's car during this arbitration did not forever foreclose the Company from using that evidence as the basis for a discharge.” Id. at 40–41. As in Misco, the Commission here was not without recourse in light of the arbitrator’s award. Specifically, the Commission could have complied with the award by reinstating Hobart’s employment and then terminating his employment based upon his lack of JNET access and resulting inability to perform the functions demanded of a police officer in the Department. His loss of JNET access by the issuing authority occurred after his original termination, was not a reason for that termination, and had not been considered by the arbitrator in his decision to reinstate Hobart. Once Hobart had been reinstated, the loss of JNET access could have served as a new and independent basis for the Commission to terminate his employment. Rather than availing itself of this readily available recourse, the Commission instead decided to superimpose post-termination circumstances into the proceedings in an effort to create an illegality. The Commission’s petition to vacate the arbitrator’s award filed with the trial court was based entirely upon factual developments post-dating Hobart’s termination, namely his loss of JNET access and the alleged illegally of employing him without it. Because the arbitrator limited his inquiry to the issue actually presented in the FOP’s grievance petition and fashioned an award strictly in accordance with his factual finding of disproportionality, he did not expand or exceed the scope of his [J-111-2019] - 30 powers and the award should not have been vacated under the narrow certiorari standard of review on that basis. While the Pennsylvania State Corr. Officers Ass'n, Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5 and Misco cases all speak to the limitations on the scope of proceedings before an arbitrator, it follows a fortiori that any reviewing court is likewise limited to consideration of the issues actually presented to, and decided by, the arbitrator. It would be nonsensical to suggest that an arbitrator is required to limit his or her decision to the issues submitted by the parties, but then permit a reviewing court to vacate the award based upon facts and issues that were not decided by the arbitrator. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in vacating the award of the arbitrator. While the Commonwealth Court reversed the decision of the trial court, it did so only pending upon the results of Hobart’s attempts to regain his access to JNET. The Commonwealth Court should have reversed the decision of the trial court and reinstated the arbitrator’s award. IV. Whether the Narrow Certiorari Scope of Review Used in Act 111 Matters Should Encompass a Public Policy Exception, as Part of the Review of Whether an Arbitrator Exceeded His Powers, or, in the Alternative, Whether the Narrow Certiorari Scope of Review Set Forth in Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers' Association (Betancourt), 656 A.2d 83 (1995) Should Be Replaced by the Essence Test or JNOV/error of Law Test The Commission requests that this Court generally modify Act 111’s scope of review to include either a public policy exception to the “excess of powers” prong of the narrow certiorari standard of review or, alternatively, to replace the narrow certiorari standard of review with either the essence test (currently applied in the PERA context) or a JNOV/error test. The FOP argues that the Commission raises this issue for the first [J-111-2019] - 31 time in this Court and thus has failed to preserve the issue for review by this Court.11 FOP Brief at 6 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)). Accordingly, the FOP contends that the issue has been waived. The Commission forthrightly admits that it did not raise this issue before either the trial court or the Commonwealth Court. Commission’s Reply Brief at 1. Instead, the Commission raises three arguments in opposition to the application of Rule 302(a). None is convincing. First, the Commission posits that asking the trial court to expand the narrow certiorari standard of review would have been futile, as that court was obviously bound by this Court’s decision in Betancourt. Id. This Court has not, however, ever adopted a futility doctrine that would relieve litigants of the requirement to advance objections and challenges at the earliest opportunity to do so. See Commonwealth v. Hays, 218 A.3d 1260, 1268 (Pa. 2019) (Saylor, C.J., concurring) (citing Schmidt v. Boardman Co., 11 A.3d 924, 941 (Pa. 2011)). Second, the Commission argues that in the Commonwealth Court, it was the FOP that filed the appeal, and thus it had no obligation (or opportunity) to raise issues before that tribunal. Commission’s Reply Brief at 1-2. The Commission insists that the standard of review issue arose at that level of the proceedings, when it was discussed in the dissenting opinion of Judge Pellegrini. N. Berks, 196 A.3d at 729-34 (Pellegrini, J., 11 The FOP raises the issue of waiver for the first time in its brief filed with this Court. It did not do so in its Answer to Petition for Allocatur, instead addressing only the merits of the issue. Answer to Petition for Allocatur, 12/13/2018, at 9-15. In connection with this author’s concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Bishop, 217 A.3d 833, 844 (Pa. 2019) (Donohue, J., concurring), the Court has requested that our appellate rules committee consider a new rule of appellate procedure addressing the consequences of a respondent’s failure to raise the issue of waiver at the allocatur petition stage. As no such rule has been promulgated to date, however, we will proceed to consider the FOP’s waiver argument on its merits. [J-111-2019] - 32 dissenting). Because the issue had already been waived as a result of the Commission’s failure to raise it at the trial court level, however, events in the Commonwealth Court do not alter the conclusion that the Commission waived the issue. Finally, the Commission argues that there is an exception to the waiver rule for cases involving questions of jurisdiction or public policy, citing to Haagen v. Patton, 164 A.2d 33 (Pa. Super. 1960). The Superior Court’s decision in Haagen was never adopted or otherwise cited with approval by this Court, however, and it would appear that it was only applied with respect to the public policy of the appropriation of public funds. See, e.g., Murphy v. Bradley, 537 A.2d 917, 919 (Pa. Commw. 1988). More importantly, to the extent that Haagen created a general “public policy” exception to issue preservation requirements, it was effectively overruled by subsequent decisions of this Court. In Reilly by Reilly v. SEPTA, 489 A.2d 1291 (Pa. 1985), this Court held that “[t]he failure to preserve an issue on appeal will be excused only when a strong, public interest outweighs the need to protect the judicial system from improperly preserved issues.” Id. at 1301. With respect to what constitutes a “strong, public interest,” we cited to Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1978), in which an unpreserved appeal was allowed to proceed to ensure that capital punishment in Pennsylvania comported with the United States Constitution. Id. at 181. We subsequently confirmed the extremely limited nature of the “public interest” exception (specifically, to capital criminal appeals) in McMillen v. 84 Lumber, Inc., 649 A.2d 932 (Pa. 1994), where we indicated that “[a]side from capital cases in the domain of criminal law – where a human life is at stake, no fact situations have been presented to us, and none readily comes to mind, where this narrow public interest exception would justify departure from the waiver rule.” Id. at 934. [J-111-2019] - 33 Because the Commission did not raise the issue of modification of the narrow certiorari standard of review in Act 111 matters in the lower courts, application of basic issue preservation principles require that we find that this issue is waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); see e.g., Valentino v. Philadelphia Triathlon, LLC, 209 A.3d 941, 942 (Pa. 2019) (holding that issues not raised in the lower tribunals are waived).