Opinion ID: 160194
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Day's Sentence Should Have Been Adjusted for Acceptance of Responsibility

Text: 24 Day argues that he was entitled to a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 because he never denied the acts he was charged with committing. He maintains that his challenge throughout has been a legal one, and that he should not be denied the reduction because of that challenge. 25 Determination of acceptance of responsibility is a question of fact reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 805 (10th Cir. 1999). The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, commentary (n.5). 26 To receive a sentence reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the defendant must show 'recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.' United States v. Mitchell, 113 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1994)). The defendant has the burden of making this showing by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. The notes to the acceptance of responsibility provision in the sentencing guidelines state: 27 This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Conviction by trial, however, does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct. 28 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, commentary (n. 2). 29 Because Day put the government to its burden of proof at trial, the question for us is whether this is one of the rare situations in which a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility despite the fact that he went to trial. We hold that it was not. 30 Although Day did not deny that he committed the acts that occurred, he never admitted his culpability for those acts. At sentencing, the district judge stated: 31 I think the defense went to much more than just the constitutionality of the statute and I don't find that the defendant at any time fully accepted -- did or has accepted responsibility for what he was alleged to have done, and for this reason, I just don't think it rises to the level that is necessary for acceptance of responsibility. 32 Day has pointed to nothing to show that this finding was clearly erroneous. 33 Like his co-defendant Saffo, Day cites this court's decision in United States v. Gauvin to support his argument that a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is warranted. Just as Gauvin did not support Saffo on this issue, it does not support Day. See Saffo, __ F.3d at __. In Gauvin, the defendant argued that his drunkenness rendered him incapable of forming the requisite mens rea. See Gauvin, 173 F.3d at 806. Although the jury disagreed with the defendant's argument, the district court found that his defense was made in good faith. It therefore gave the defendant a two-point acceptance of responsibility reduction. We affirmed, stating that [a]lthough we recognize that such adjustments are 'rare,' and might not have reached the same decision, in light of the deference afforded the sentencing judge, we hold the district court did not err in granting a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility. Id. (internal citation omitted). Here, the evidence does not indicate that Day's defense was made in good faith; rather, it shows that the defendant had the requisite mens rea. Here, the district court, unlike the court in Gauvin, found no merit in Day's defense. Just as we gave deference to the district court's determination in Gauvin, we also give deference to the district court's determination here absent any compelling evidence to the contrary. 34 Thus, under the same principles used in Gauvin that looked to the good faith of the defendant's defense and afforded deference to the sentencing judge's determination on that issue, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Saffo a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility.