Opinion ID: 350872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Internal Memoranda

Text: 24 The district court decided that the remaining documents, documents 2, 3, 6, and 7, 32 fit squarely within exemption five since each document reflects ongoing developments in a Government negotiating process as documents wherein (a)dvice, obstacles, alternatives, and recommendations are weighed and balanced. 25 It generally has been accepted that exemption five incorporates the governmental privilege, developed in discovery cases, 33 to protect documents containing advisory opinions and recommendations or reflecting deliberations comprising the process by which government policy is formulated. 34 Under this facet of exemption five, the courts have required disclosure of essentially factual material but allowed agencies to withhold documents which reveal their deliberative or policy-making processes. 35 The Supreme Court approved this approach in EPA v. Mink 36 and found it consistent with the discussion of a factual deliberative distinction in the legislative history of exemption five. 37 26 Congress adopted exemption five in recognition of the merits of arguments from the executive branch that the quality of administrative decision-making would be seriously undermined if agencies were forced to  operate in a fishbowl because the full and frank exchange of ideas on legal or policy matters would be impossible. 38 A decision that certain information falls within exemption five should therefore rest fundamentally on the conclusion that, unless protected from public disclosure, information of that type would not flow freely within the agency. 39 27 Many exemption five disputes may be able to be decided by application of the simple test that factual material must be disclosed but advisory material, containing opinions and recommendations, may be withheld. The test offers a quick, clear, and predictable rule of decision, but courts must be careful not to become victims of their own semantics. Exemption five is intended to protect the deliberative process of government and not just deliberative material. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 270, 275-278, 491 F.2d 63, 68-71 (1974). Perhaps in the great majority of cases that purpose is well served by focusing on the nature of the information sought. In some circumstances, however, the disclosure of even purely factual material may so expose the deliberative process within an agency that it must be deemed exempted by section 552(b)(5). 40 See Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1194 (8th Cir. 1975); Montrose Chemical Corp., supra; Amway Corp. v. FTC, 1976-1 Trade Cas. P 60,798, at 68,445 (D.D.C.1976); Mobil Oil Corp. v. FTC, 406 F.Supp. 305, 315 (S.D.N.Y.1976). See also Kent Corp. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 612, 620 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 316, 50 L.Ed.2d 287 (1976). 28 Mead Data argues that documents 6 and 7 are reportorial and factual in nature rather than policy deliberative, Brief for Appellant at 21, because they only provide summaries of discussions among Air Force staff relating to the negotiating positions of the Department and West Publishing Co. and do not affirmatively make recommendations or offer opinions. Discussions among agency personnel about the relative merits of various positions which might be adopted in contract negotiations are as much a part of the deliberative process as the actual recommendations and advice which are agreed upon. As such they are equally protected from disclosure by exemption five. See Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 285, 286, 519 F.2d 934, 935 (1975). It would exalt form over substance to exempt documents in which staff recommend certain action or offer their opinions on given issues but require disclosure of documents which only report what those recommendations and opinions are. The evaluations, opinions, and recommendations reported in documents 6 and 7 are the raw materials which went into the decision of the Air Force to contract with West Publishing Co. on certain terms. This is not a case like Schwartz v. IRS 41 or Sterling Drug Inc. v. FTC 42 where an agency is attempting to invoke exemption five to protect the private transmittal of binding agency opinions and interpretations. The policy of promoting the free flow of ideas within an agency by guaranteeing protection from disclosure is therefore fully applicable to this information, and we hold that to the extent documents 6 and 7 reflect the views and opinions of Air Force staff on the state of negotiations between the Air Force and West Publishing the potential problems and available alternatives they are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA by section 552(b)(5). 43 29 Document 3 consists entirely of a running summary of the offers and counter-offers made by each side in the Air Force's negotiations with West Publishing Co. The Air Force insists that this information is exempt simply because it reflects negotiating positions of the parties which predate the final agreement on the contract terms. The district court apparently accepted this proposition, for in holding that documents 2, 3, 6, and 7 fit squarely within exemption five, it reasoned that (e)ach document reflects ongoing developments in a Government negotiating process. J. A. at 40. We find this to be an entirely too broad reading of exemption five. Predecisional materials are not exempt merely because they are predecisional; they must also be a part of the deliberative process within a government agency. Vaughn v. Rosen (Vaughn II), 173 U.S.App.D.C. 187, 195, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (1975). The documents in this case which would reveal the Air Force's internal self-evaluation of its contract negotiations, including discussion of the merits of past efforts, alternatives currently available, and recommendations as to future strategy, fall clearly within this test. Information about the  deliberative or negotiating process outside an agency, between itself and an outside party, does not. Moreover, neither of the policy objectives which exemption five is designed to serve avoiding premature disclosure of agency decisions and encouraging the free exchange of ideas among administrative personnel is relevant to a claim of secrecy for a proceeding between an agency and an outside party. All of the information as to what the Air Force offered West Publishing, initially and in response to West's counter-offers, has already been fully disclosed to at least one party outside the Department West itself and the Department has no control over further disclosure. 30 Perhaps it could be shown that the threat of disclosure of negotiation proceedings would so inhibit private parties from dealing with the Government that agencies must be permitted to withhold such information in order to preserve their ability to effectively arrange for contractual agreements. Cf. Brockway, supra, 518 F.2d at 1193; Machin v. Zuckert, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 316 F.2d 336, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896, 84 S.Ct. 172, 11 L.Ed.2d 124 (1963). Arguments that the disclosure mandated by the FOIA would seriously hamper the performance of an agency's other duties have not fared well in the courts, however. 44 An agency cannot meet its statutory burden of justification by conclusory allegations of possible harm. It must show by specific and detailed proof that disclosure would defeat, rather than further, the purposes of the FOIA. See Brockway, supra, 518 F.2d at 1194. 31 Whatever might be shown with respect to the harm caused by disclosure of the offers and counter-offers made during negotiation of a government contract, the justification claimed by the Air Force in this case is far from sufficient. Unless far more compelling reasons are brought forth on remand and supported by adequately detailed proof, the district court will have no option but to compel disclosure of document 3.