Opinion ID: 2082485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Direct Appeal Counsel

Text: As the final ground for post-conviction relief, appellant alleges that his appellate counsel had rendered ineffective legal assistance, contrary to the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. The burden on this ground was upon appellant in the post-conviction court as petitioner, and in light of the judgment against petitioner, on appeal as well. The gravamen of the ground is two-fold: 1) counsel did not include a transcript of the jury selection proceedings in the record for this Court to review during the direct appeal; and 2) appellate counsel did not present fundamental errors to this Court during the direct appeal. The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is identical to the standard for trial counsel. Thornton, 570 N.E.2d at 37. First, an appellant must make a showing that the performance of his counsel was deficient. Second, the appellant must show adverse prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. Again, this Court will presume that counsel is competent, and appellant must present strong and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption. Clark v. State (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 759, 763. However, when reviewing the denial of post-conviction relief, we will not set aside the post-conviction court's ruling unless the evidence, without conflict, leads to one result, and the post-conviction court reached the opposite result. Smith v. State (1989), Ind., 535 N.E.2d 1155. Deputy State Public Defender David Freund was appellant's appellate counsel. The praecipe included a request that the record should include the entire record ... including transcripts of the jury trial (including voir dire examination of juror [sic], and any hearing held out of the presence of the jury either during or after the trial)... . However, at the post-conviction hearing, Freund testified that the transcript of the jury voir dire examination was not included in the record of proceedings filed with this Court for the appeal. Freund believed that the only possible error in the jury selection procedure was the refusal of the trial court to grant individualized voir dire. However, Freund believed that the arguments concerning the process known as death qualification were not worth pursuing, because individualized jury selection had never been granted. Freund decided not to pursue any claim of error in that area, and did not have any need for the voir dire transcript. Freund, after consulting with State Public Defender Susan Carpenter, decided not to seek the transcript. Freund testified that he had made a strategic decision not to have the transcript of the jury voir dire prepared. Further, Freund concluded that if there was something that, that bad that happened at voir dire, ... it was already waived... . To rebut Freund's testimony, Brent Westerfeld, appellant's post-conviction counsel, introduced an itemized bill of the State Public Defender's Office to the Hendricks County Circuit Court, which detailed the costs of the case. Absent was an entry that specifically denoted review of the record of the proceedings, although the bill contained a plethora of general entries entitled Brief Preparation. Following a long line of questioning, Westerfeld suggested that Freund could not have judged whether appellant's theory of improper voir dire /individualized jury selection was valid, because Freund apparently had not reviewed the transcript of the proceedings or talked with anyone who knew what had happened. It appears from the record that Freund did review the trial record, including the alleged anomaly in the jury selection process. Freund made a strategic decision not to pursue the death qualification issue. Freund also concluded that the issue, if it existed, was unavailable, because appellant's trial attorney had not raised it in appellant's motion to correct errors. The evidence appellant presents conflicts with the evidence supporting Freund's actions. The post-conviction court logically concluded that Freund acted competently and provided effective assistance of counsel. Appellant alleges that the trial court committed many fundamental errors at the guilt and penalty stages of the trial. Appellant believes that many of the issues he raises here on post-conviction appeal are fundamental error. Appellant argues that his appellate counsel should have raised, developed, presented, and preserved these issues, but failed to do so. Due to such failures, appellant now claims that his appellate counsel was deficient and did not meet the Strickland standard for representation. Appellant contends that if the errors would have been presented on appeal, then it would have been reasonably probable that his convictions and death sentences would have been overturned, and the appellate court would have ordered a new trial and a new sentencing hearing. At the post-conviction hearing, Freund testified that no objections were made to these alleged errors at trial, and the incidents appeared so isolated that they did not appear to amount to fundamental error. Freund commented: [I]f I had identified something in the record that I thought was fundamental error, [in] other words, there was both plain error, and I felt that I could make a good case for prejudice, ... I would have raised it. Uh, if it was a marginal thing, you know, maybe I saw something that was error, but I wasn't sure there was prejudice, maybe I wouldn't have under, you know, that standard, knowing that well that can be addressed later on... . [B]asically, .. . my practice has been that if I have identified something and I strongly believe it's fundamental error, I will press forward with it. Freund was hesitant to raise what he considered to be frivolous claims. Freund also noted that, in his assessment, there was some overwhelming evidence that appellant had in fact committed the crimes. We agree with Freund that the actions appellant regards as errors were not errors, were not fundamental in nature, and, if raised, would have been frivolous. We have reviewed the many issues that appellant has presented, and note that appellate counsel acted appropriately. On appeal, appellate counsel did raise the only errors apparent on the record, but the issues were decided against appellant. Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to present meritless claims. Vaughn v. State (1990), Ind., 559 N.E.2d 610, 615. Freund exercised professional judgment and expertise in deciding not to pursue the claims appellant raises in this appeal. On appeal, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is highly deferential. The evidence before the post-conviction court with respect to legal assistance provided by Freund is such that it does not lead unerringly to the conclusion that such assistance was constitutionally deficient. Therefore the finding of the post-conviction court will not be disturbed.