Opinion ID: 870427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: There Was Sufficient Evidence to Instruct the Jury on the Lesser Included Offense of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree for Counts 1-3, and to Sustain Behrendt's Convictions

Text: Behrendt argues that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury on the offense of sexual assault in the third degree because [t]he only evidence that was presented by the State in regard to sexual assault was evidence of repeated sexual penetrations,  which would constitute first degree sexual assault. Behrendt similarly argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for Counts 1-3 and therefore the circuit court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. HRS § 707-730(1)(c) provides that a person commits the offense of first degree sexual assault when [t]he person knowingly engages in sexual penetration with a person who is at least fourteen years old but less than sixteen years old; provided that: (i) The person is not less than five years older than the minor; and (ii) The person is not legally married to the minor;. ... HRS § 707-732(1)(c) defines the offense of third degree sexual assault the same way as HRS § 707-730(1), except that a person commits the offense of third degree sexual assault by engaging in sexual contact rather than sexual penetration. As noted above, part I.D, the ICA concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support Behrendt's convictions on all counts, but remanded for a new trial on Count 3 because of the circuit court's failure to properly instruct the jury on the amended definition of sexual contact. [25] The State did not appeal the ICA's conclusion with respect to Count 3, nor does Behrendt address it in his application. Therefore, we must determine whether there was a rational basis for the circuit court to instruct the jury on sexual assault in the third degree for Counts 1 and 2, see State v. Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i 46, 49, 897 P.2d 973, 976 (1995) (in the absence of [] a rational basis in the evidence, the trial court should not instruct the jury as to included offenses) (emphasis omitted), and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Behrendt's convictions on all three counts. We conclude that there was, and therefore affirm the ICA. The definition of sexual contact in HRS § 707-700 (both the current definition, effective during the time period covering Count 3, and the definition prior to the 2004 amendments, effective during the time period covering Counts 1 and 2), states that sexual contact includes any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, or of the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor by the person, whether directly or through the clothing or other material intended to cover the sexual or other intimate parts. HRS § 707-700 (1993 & Supp.2004) (emphasis added). SI testified that she and Behrendt repeatedly engaged in sexual intercourse over the time periods covered by Counts 1-3. SI also recounted some of the specific instances in which they had intercourse. For example, at a time when living at the Kamani Trees house (Count 1), SI testified that she was sleeping one night and Behrendt turned me around and he had sexual intercourse with me in the back. When living at the Aloha Kona house (Count 2), SI recounted a time when Behrendt asked her if she wanna do it and [Behrendt] just did sexual intercourse from behind where SI was over the bed, standing up, leaning over. Also while living at the Aloha Kona house, SI testified that Behrendt would take her to a construction site nearby and they would have sexual intercourse in the car, where he would have me sit on top of him, where he's behind me, or he would have me straddle him. SI also recounted a time when Behrendt took her to a nearby construction and had me in the car, in the back seat, and I just ... was ... like bent over the back seat, and he was behind me[,] and then Behrendt inserted his penis into SI's vagina. SI also testified that Behrendt also took her in a rental car to a different construction site in Kaloko where they had sexual intercourse, and then Behrendt asked SI if she wanted to do anal and told her that it wouldn't hurt and other girls do it. The DPA asked SI if Behrendt attempt[ed] it and SI replied [y]es and that he put his penis in my anal, my butt. Although this testimony indicates that there were incidents of sexual penetration between SI and Behrendt, which would support a conviction for sexual assault in the first degree, a rational juror could have inferred that there was sexual contact prior to the penetration, i.e., that there was touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of SI, such as SI's genitalia, buttocks, or other intimate parts, either directly or through clothing, or that SI touched Behrendt's sexual or other intimate parts. HRS § 707-700. This testimony, therefore, provided a rational basis to instruct the jury on sexual assault in the third degree, Kinnane, 79 Hawai`i at 49, 897 P.2d at 976, and, when considered in the strongest light for the prosecution, was also sufficient to sustain Behrendt's convictions. Richie, 88 Hawai`i at 33, 960 P.2d at 1241.