Opinion ID: 790924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the cross-appeals: the merits

Text: 82 On the cross-appeals, plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants (cross-appellants) contend that the district court erred in refusing to remand their actions to state court. They contend, inter alia, that the district court's distinction between injuries suffered on or before September 29, 2001, and those suffered after that date bears no relation to anything Congress reasonably intended in enacting ATSSSA (Cross-Appellants' brief on appeal at 59); that ATSSSA was intended to encompass [only] the immediate victims of the terrorist attacks who had a direct connection to the events of September 11, 2001 ( id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases in original)); and that, therefore, the court erred in ruling that their claims were preempted by ATSSSA. For the reasons that follow, we agree that the September 29 line of demarcation was not warranted, but we conclude that claims relating to respiratory injuries suffered in the massive demolition and debris-removal operation required as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11 are preempted and should not be remanded.
83 The question of whether federal law preempts state law is fundamentally a matter of Congress's intent. See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). Since the existence of preemption turns on Congress's intent, we are to begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction[,] with the text of the provision in question, and move on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) ( Travelers ); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). 84 It is well established that state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, in any of several circumstances. 85 First, when acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-empt state law by so stating in express terms. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). In the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress' intent to pre-empt all state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state regulation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 S.Ct. 2396 (1947). Pre-emption of a whole field also will be inferred where the field is one in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Ibid.; see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 86 Even where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, Hines v. Davidowitz, supra, at 67. See generally Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 698-699, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 81 L.Ed.2d 580 (1984). 87 Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371. 88 If the statute contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993) ( Easterwood ). Where the language of the statute plainly indicates that Congress intended preemption, [w]e must give effect to th[e] plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890. If the text of the statute is ambiguous, either as to Congress's intent to preempt at all or as to the extent of an intended preemption, the meaning of the statute may be gleaned from its context and from the statutory scheme as a whole, or by resort to the normal canons of construction and legislative history. See id. at 100, 103 S.Ct. 2890 (finding that federal statute preempted state law based on the statute's plain language ..., [its] structure ..., and its legislative history); see generally K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291, 108 S.Ct. 1811, 100 L.Ed.2d 313 (1988); Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung (Deutschland) AG, 335 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir.2003) ( Canada Life ); Auburn Housing Authority v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 143-44 (2d Cir.2002). 89 When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003); see, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-66, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ( Metropolitan ). Thus, although [f]ederal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiff's suit, and as such does not authorize removal, id. at 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542, complete[ ] preemption warrants removal because claims within the preempted area are necessarily federal in character, id. at 63-64, 107 S.Ct. 1542. See, e.g., Spielman, 332 F.3d at 123 n. 5 (Newman, J., concurring) (Complete preemption permits removal of a lawsuit to federal court based upon the concept that where there is complete preemption, only a federal claim exists.). Where Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action ... removable to federal court, the federal courts must honor that intent. Metropolitan, 481 U.S. at 66, 107 S.Ct. 1542. 90
91 Congress enacted the original version of ATSSSA within days after the September 11 attacks. The principal components of the original enactment were the creation of the Victim Compensation Fund to provide relief, without litigation, to individuals (or relatives of deceased individuals) physically injured or killed as a result of the September 11 aircraft crashes, see ATSSSA §§ 403, 405; the limitation of the airlines' liability for damages sustained as a result of those crashes, see id. § 408(a); the creation of a federal cause of action as the exclusive judicial remedy for damages arising out of those crashes, see id. § 408(b)(1); and the concentration in federal court in the Southern District of New York (or Southern District) of suits on that federal cause of action, see id. § 408(b)(3). Some two months after its initial passage, ATSSSA was amended by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (Nov. 19, 2001), to extend the liability limitation to, inter alios, the City of New York and entities having property interests in the World Trade Center. 92 Section 405 of the Act set out the criteria for individual claimants' recovery from the Fund as follows: 93 (c) ELIGIBILITY.— 94 (1) IN GENERAL.—A claimant shall be determined to be an eligible individual for purposes of this subsection if the Special Master determines that such claimant— 95 (A) is an individual described in paragraph (2); and 96 (B) meets the requirements of paragraph (3). 97 (2) INDIVIDUALS.—A claimant is an individual described in this paragraph if the claimant is— 98 (A) an individual who— 99 (i) was present at the World Trade Center, (New York, New York), the Pentagon (Arlington, Virginia), or the site of the aircraft crash at Shanksville, Pennsylvania at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001; and 100 (ii) suffered physical harm or death as a result of such an air crash; 101 (B) an individual who was a member of the flight crew or a passenger on American Airlines flight 11 or 77 or United Airlines flight 93 or 175, except that an individual identified by the Attorney General to have been a participant or conspirator in the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, or a representative of such individual shall not be eligible to receive compensation under this title; or 102 (C) in the case of a decedent who is an individual described in subparagraph (A) or (B), the personal representative of the decedent who files a claim on behalf of the decedent. 103 (3) REQUIREMENTS.— 104 (A) SINGLE CLAIM.—Not more than one claim may be submitted under this title by an individual or on behalf of a deceased individual. 105 (B) LIMITATION ON CIVIL ACTION.— (i) IN GENERAL.—Upon the submission of a claim under this title, the claimant waives the right to file a civil action (or to be a party to an action) in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001. The preceding sentence does not apply to a civil action to recover collateral source obligations. 106 (ii) PENDING ACTIONS.—In the case of an individual who is a party to a civil action described in clause (i), such individual may not submit a claim under this title unless such individual withdraws from such action by the date that is 90 days after the date on which regulations are promulgated under section 407. 107 ATSSSA § 405(c) (emphases added); see also id. § 402(4) (defining collateral source to mean all collateral sources, including life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal, State, or local governments related to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001). 108 As amended in November 2001, § 408 reads in pertinent part as follows: LIMITATION ON LIABILITY 109 (a) IN GENERAL.— 110 (1) LIABILITY LIMITED TO INSURANCE COVERAGE.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, liability for all claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages or for contribution or indemnity, arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against an air carrier, aircraft manufacturer, airport sponsor, or person with a property interest in the World Trade Center, on September 11, 2001, whether fee simple, leasehold or easement, direct or indirect, or their directors, officers, employees, or agents, shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of liability insurance coverage maintained by that air carrier, aircraft manufacturer, airport sponsor, or person. 111 .... 112 (3) LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY FOR NEW YORK CITY.— Liability for all claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages or for contribution or indemnity arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against the City of New York shall not exceed the greater of the city's insurance coverage or $350,000.000. If a claimant who is eligible to seek compensation under section 405 of this Act, submits a claim under section 405, the claimant waives the right to file a civil action (or to be a party to an action) in any Federal or State court for damages sustained as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, including any such action against the City of New York. The preceding sentence does not apply to a civil action to recover collateral source obligations. 113 (b) FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION.— 114 (1) AVAILABILITY OF ACTION.— There shall exist a Federal cause of action for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of American Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United Airlines flights 93 and 175, on September 11, 2001. Notwithstanding section 40120(c) of title 49, United States Code, this cause of action shall be the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of such flights. 115 (2) SUBSTANTIVE LAW.—The substantive law for decision in any such suit shall be derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law. 116 (3) JURISDICTION.—The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001. 117 ATSSSA § 408 (as amended) (emphases added). 118 Construing the express language of the Act, we think it clear beyond peradventure that some preemption was intended. Viewing the language, considering the statute as a whole and the differences between its relevant parts, and taking into account the statute's purpose and legislative history, we conclude that Congress intended ATSSSA to preempt at least the claims brought by the plaintiffs in the 35 cases dealt with in the district court's opinion. 119 First, it is clear from § 408's provisions that  [t]here shall exist a Federal cause of action for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes and that  this cause of action shall be the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes of such flights, ATSSSA § 408(b)(1) (emphases added), that Congress intended to preempt all state-law claims for damages arising out of the hijackings and the subsequent crashes. Thus, although state law would provide a cause of action in the absence of contrary federal law, the provisions in § 408(b)(1) establishing an exclusive federal remedy undeniably bespeak an intent to displace state-law remedies entirely for such damages claims. 120 Second, it is clear from the additional provision in § 408 that the federal district court in the Southern District shall have ... exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim ... resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, id. § 408(b)(3) (emphases added), that Congress intended that all suits asserting the ATSSSA-created cause of action be litigated only in that federal court. To give effect to that intent where such an action has been commenced in state court, this provision must be interpreted as authorizing the removal of the action to the federal court. 121 Fathoming the extent of the intended preemption, however, requires a focus beyond the precise language of § 408, for the respective reaches of terms such as arising out of, resulting from, and relating to are not self-evident. When § 408 is compared against § 405, which defines eligibility to receive compensation from the Victim Compensation Fund, it is evident that § 408 is broader in two significant respects. First, as detailed above, § 405 sets exacting criteria with respect to the times and places of injury, stating that to be eligible for an award from the Fund, the applicant must, inter alia, be an individual (or represent a deceased individual) who was on one of the four hijacked airplanes, see ATSSSA § 405(c)(2)(B), or who  was present at the World Trade Center, (New York, New York), the Pentagon (Arlington, Virginia), or the site of the aircraft crash at Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, id. § 405(c)(2)(A)(i) (emphases added). Thus, § 405 is specific as to place of injury, i.e., one of the three crash sites, and as to timing, i.e., the time of or the immediate aftermath of the September 11 crashes. Section 408, in creating the federal cause of action, superseding state-law remedies, and giving the federal court exclusive jurisdiction, imposes no such criteria. It makes no mention of any particular timing or situs of an alleged injury; and it contains no language cross-referencing § 405. Thus, although the district court interpreted the Act and its legislative history as showing that the interest of Congress was focused on claims of those immediately involved in the terrorist-related aircraft crashes and the tasks following in their immediate aftermath, 270 F.Supp.2d at 378, that narrower focus appears solely in § 405, which deals only with compensation available from the Victim Compensation Fund, not in § 408. The provisions of § 408 give no indication that Congress intended preemption to be limited to claims with respect to persons who were on the hijacked airplanes or who were present at one of the crash sites at the time of the crashes or immediately thereafter. 122 Second, the phrases used in §§ 405 and 408 are significantly different in describing the required relationship between the September 11 events and the claims that are the subjects of those sections. Section 405, with respect to a person who was present at a crash site at the time of the crash or in its immediate aftermath, allows recovery from the Fund for damages sustained  as a result of  the crash. ATSSSA § 405(c)(2)(A)(ii). Section 408 uses two broader concepts: (1) It creates a federal cause of action for damages arising out of the crashes, id. § 408(b)(1), which encompasses a broader group of claims than does the phrase as a result of the crashes; and (2) while § 405's as a result of concept is repeated—as resulting from—in the § 408 subsection that gives the federal court exclusive jurisdiction, § 408's operative phrase is resulting from or relating to  the crashes, id. § 408(b)(3) (emphasis added), and a phrase such as relat[ing] to is clearly expansive, Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671. Accordingly, we conclude that whereas § 405 relief is limited to injuries suffered as a result of the air crashes, the scope of § 408, dealing with  all actions brought for any claim ... resulting from or relating to  the crashes (emphasis added), is clearly broader. 123 Yet, the fact that ATSSSA's phrase relating to is, both inherently and evidently intentionally, more expansive than merely resulting from does not inform us of the extent of its breadth. With respect to Congress's use of the relat[ing] to concept in its preemption of state laws insofar as they relate to ERISA plans, the Supreme Court has noted that a state law may be said to `relate[] to' an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan, Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890; however, the Court has also stated that, in the cosmological sense, [i]f `relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for `[r]eally, universally, relations stop nowhere,' H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., World's Classics 1980), Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671. Thus, a phrase such as relat[ing] to, though clearly expansive, id., is not a self-evident guide to the precise extent of Congress's preemptive intent. 124 Accordingly, we turn to ATSSSA's purposes and legislative history. The legislative history is understandably sparse, given the swiftness with which Congress acted after the events of September 11; there apparently were no committee reports prior to ATSSSA's initial passage, and only a conference committee report prior to the Act's amendment. Nonetheless, the statements during debate on the legislation made clear that Congress's principal goals were to provide relief without litigation to individuals harmed as a result of the crashes and to limit the liability of entities that were likely to be sued for injuries suffered in connection with the crashes. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. S9594 (Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain). Even Congressmen who decried the speed with which the legislation was passed accepted that those were its principal purposes. See, e.g., 147 Cong. Rec. H5914 (Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 125 Although we are aware of no statements in the legislative history expressly addressing the scope of the provision establishing the ATSSSA federal cause of action as a litigant's exclusive remedy, there is ample evidence that Congress intended all such causes of action to be adjudicated in a single federal forum. For example, Senator Schumer stated: 126 It may be a little unclear to some whether all lawsuits or just lawsuits against the airlines will be situated in the Southern District of New York. The intent here is to put all civil suits arising from the tragic events of September 11 in the Southern District. 127 147 Cong. Rec. S9592 (Sept. 21, 2001) (emphases added). Similarly, Senator McCain stated that the bill attempts to provide some sense to the litigation by consolidating all civil litigation arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11 in one court.  147 Cong. Rec. S9594 (Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added). And Senator Hatch stated: For those who seek to pursue the litigation route, I am pleased that we consolidated the causes of action in one Federal court so that there will be some consistency in the judgments awarded. 147 Cong. Rec. S9595 (Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added). 128 While these statements are addressed most directly to the conferral of exclusive jurisdiction on the federal court, the common theme of references to all lawsuits, all civil litigation, and all civil suits, along with the expansive phrase relating to—all of which contrast with the narrow focus of § 405—strongly suggests that Congress meant the ATSSSA-created cause of action to preempt more than just the claims of persons who were on the hijacked planes or present at or in the immediate aftermath of the crashes, and more than just claims that arose during the formal search for survivors. 129 As it requires no great stretch to view claims of injuries from inhalation of air rendered toxic by the fires, smoke, and pulverized debris caused by the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11 as claims relating to and arising out of those crashes, we conclude that Congress intended ATSSSA's cause of action to be sufficiently expansive to cover claims of respiratory injuries by workers in sifting, removing, transporting, or disposing of that debris. 130 Finally, we note that in the limited legislative history with regard to the November 2001 amendments that extended ATSSSA's liability-limiting provisions to the City and others, Representative Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, repeatedly stated that the purpose of those amendments was to protect ... the city[] and the Port Authority from lawsuits, 147 Cong. Rec. H7658-59 (November 1, 2001); see, e.g., id. at H7649 (to prevent the prospect of unlimited liability damage awards from turning New York from the nation's financial capital into a business graveyard). In giving the City and entities with property interests in the World Trade Center—which include the Port Authority and WTC Properties—protection from debilitating lawsuits, Congress used in the amended § 408(a) the core language it had used in § 408(b)(1) to describe the ATSSSA-created federal cause of action, i.e., claims for damages ... arising from the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001. ATSSSA §§ 408(a)(1) and (3). By adding the City and the property owners to those whose liability for damages arising out of the September 11 attacks was to be limited, and using the same language it had used in the preemptive provisions in § 408(b)—which were not amended—Congress signified its intent that state-law remedies for such claims against the City, the Port Authority, and WTC Properties were to be preempted. 131 Cross-appellants argue that we should find their claims of respiratory injuries not preempted because in Canada Life, 335 F.3d 52, we stated that more than but for causation was needed to bring claims within the scope of ATSSSA's jurisdictional provisions. We are unpersuaded. In Canada Life, we were confronted with the question of whether ATSSSA gave the federal court jurisdiction of a contract dispute between foreign reinsurers with respect to liabilities that resulted from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We noted that [t]he purpose of Section 408(b)(3) ... was to ensure consistency and efficiency in resolving the many expected actions arising from the events of September 11. Id. at 58. 132 Requiring a single forum for all actions brought for any claim ... resulting from or relating to the events of September 11 must have as its goal the avoidance of the undesirable effects that litigation of September 11 claims in the various state and federal courts would inevitably produce. These effects might include: inconsistent or varying adjudications of actions based on the same sets of facts; adjudications having a preclusive effect on non-parties or substantially impairing or impeding non-parties' abilities to protect their rights; victims or their survivors without any possibility of recovery when the limits of liability have been exhausted in other lawsuits; the difficulties in mediation when defendants are sued in multiple state and federal courts, and the waste of private and judicial resources in multiple state and federal courts hearing cases involving the same factual and legal issues. 133 Id. at 59. We observed that, although the dispute between the reinsurers would not have arisen but for the events of September 11, that dispute would not require adjudication of any issue of law or fact that concerns the events of September 11, id. at 57, and we held that there was no reason to infer that Congress had intended that dispute to be encompassed by ATSSSA's jurisdictional provision. 134 In the present cases, in contrast, the relationship between the September 11 crashes and the plaintiffs' claims is considerably more extensive than simple but for causation. Here, the court will be required to explore such common factors as the immediate need to conduct and continue searches for survivors without regard to the availability of respirators; the continuing need to sift for human remains; the unprecedented quantity of the debris; the ever-present need for engineering evaluation of the structural safety of remaining walls and foundations; and the character of the crash site as a crime scene, creating security concerns and affecting the manner in which the demolition and debris-removal operations were conducted and the manner in which the debris was treated both at that site and at marine transfer points and the landfill. The court will confront such individual factors as the degree to which each plaintiff was exposed to toxic substances. Thus, the factors cited in the Canada Life passage quoted above suggest that claims such as those at issue in the present cases are precisely the type of claims that Congress intended to preempt. 135 The district judge, in his ruling that Congress had intended to preempt only some of the present claims but was not clear ... as to the scope of protection that it intended to give to the City, 270 F.Supp.2d at 371, made note of a November 1, 2001 letter sent by then-Mayor Giuliani to members of the New York congressional delegation (Giuliani Letter) urging adoption of amendments that would limit the City's liability. The court observed that the Mayor's letter stated that the proposed amendment would alleviate only `part' of `the City's potential liability exposure,' and that `the City's urgent need for indemnification in removing debris from the World Trade Center site is not part of this legislation.' 270 F.Supp.2d at 371-72 (quoting Giuliani Letter at 1). The pertinent section of that letter stated as follows: 136 I write to offer my support of H.R. 3150 (Secure Transportation for America Act), which is currently being considered before the Congress. The measure that Chairman Young will bring to the floor will contain a managers amendment that would provide New York with much needed relief from potential liability arising out of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. Any substitute would fail to provide the City the fiscal protection it needs from potentially limitless lawsuits. 137 The managers amendment would help New York tremendously by limiting the recovery of damages arising out of the hijackings and subsequent crashes to the amount of insurance that a defendant had prior to September 11th. Passage of Chairman Young's bill would solve one large part of the City's potential liability exposure, and help ensure steady progress toward utilizing our resources to address critical fiscal matters. Although the City's urgent need for indemnification in removing debris from the World Trade Center site is not part of this legislation, H.R. 3150 does grant us tremendously important legal coverage. 138 (Giuliani Letter at 1 (emphases added).) We cannot see that this letter sheds any light on the preemption question at issue here. The letter makes no reference to claims of respiratory injury; its reference to part of the potential liability exposure does not reveal any suggestion of a parsing along temporal or geographical lines; and we see no basis for inferring that the word indemnification was used in any sense other than reimbursement, especially as the sentence in which it appears seems to be contrasting indemnification with legal coverage. Most importantly, we see nothing in the legislative history to create an inference that Congress itself did not intend the provisions in ATSSSA—either the cause-of-action and jurisdictional provisions or the amended provision expanding the entities benefited by the liability cap—to be broad enough to encompass the present claims for respiratory injuries. 139 We agree with the district court that Congress did not intend to displace the entire panoply of state law regulat[ing] the health and safety of the workplace, 270 F.Supp.2d at 378. But we disagree with its conclusion that ATSSSA's encompassing all of the respiratory injury claims in the present cases would have that effect. The ATSSSA-created cause of action has little apparent application to the ordinary workplace—even a workplace concerned with construction and demolition; it supersedes state-law claims only with respect to damages remedies for injuries arising out of or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11. Further, as to those September 11-related claims, ATSSSA requires that [t]he substantive law for decision in any such suit shall be derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in which the crash occurred unless such law is inconsistent with or preempted by Federal law. ATSSSA § 408(b)(2). What ATSSSA itself displaces is not the substantive standards governing liability, but only the state-law damages remedies. And as to such remedies, Congress's intent to preempt is manifest. 140 Finally, we are constrained to note that we see no basis for the district court's ruling that ATSSSA's preemptive effect differs depending on whether the respiratory injuries were suffered at the World Trade Center site or elsewhere, or on whether those injuries were suffered before or after midnight on September 29. Nothing in the language of the statute or the legislative history suggests such lines of demarcation. The district court's geographical line would mean that, as to a given pile of debris that gave off toxic fumes both at the World Trade Center site and at a marine transfer station or the landfill to which it was transported, the claim of a worker who inhaled those fumes at the World Trade Center site would be preempted, while the claim of a worker who inhaled fumes from the same debris at either of the other sites would not. And given that it was December or later before all of the fires caused by the crashes were extinguished, the district court's cutoff date would mean that ATSSSA preempts the claim of a worker who inhaled smoke from a fire on September 29 but not the claim of a worker who inhaled smoke one day later from the same fire. We cannot conclude that Congress intended such differences. 141 In sum, in making the ATSSSA-created federal cause of action the exclusive remedy for damages arising out of the September 11 plane crashes, Congress clearly expressed its intent to preempt state-law remedies for damages claims arising out of those crashes. In conferring on the federal district court in the Southern District of New York original and exclusive jurisdiction of the federal cause of action, Congress clearly evinced its intent that any actions on such claims initiated in state court would be removable to that federal court. 142 No doubt there will be some claims whose relationship to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, is too tenuous, remote, or peripheral, Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661, 115 S.Ct. 1671 (internal quotation marks omitted), to warrant a finding that those claims relat[e] to those crashes; but we make no attempt to draw a definitive line here. We need not take the phrase relating to to any metaphysical extreme in order to conclude that it encompasses the claims brought before the district court here, i.e., that airborne toxins and other contaminants emanating from the debris created by the crashes caused respiratory injuries to plaintiffs employed to sift, remove, transport, or dispose of that debris.