Opinion ID: 2156025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Challenge to the Habitual Criminal Sentence

Text: Finally, defendant argues that the trial justice erred in imposing an habitual criminal sentence upon him because the predicate sentences for imposition of this sentence had been imposed on the same day. In the instant case, the two felony offenses underlying the habitual criminal sentence were burglary of a nondwelling and unlawful possession of a firearm, two offenses defendant had committed in Utah. [2] The defendant was sentenced to serve six months to one year in prison, with five years suspended, and eighteen months probation. [3] The defendant argues that because the sentences were imposed together on the same date and because he was ordered to serve those two sentences concurrently, they cannot be considered as separate sentences for purposes of the habitual criminals statute. The habitual criminals statute, G.L.1956 § 12-19-21, provides in pertinent part: (a) If any person who has been previously convicted in this or any other state of two or more felony offenses arising from separate and distinct incidents and sentenced on two or more such occasions to serve a term in prison shall, after the convictions and sentences, be convicted in this state of any offense punished by imprisonment for more than one year, such person shall be deemed an `habitual criminal.' (Emphasis added.) Our canons of statutory construction are well established. Generally when a statute expresses a clear and unambiguous meaning, the task of interpretation is at an end and this [C]ourt will apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the words set forth in the statute. State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996). However, when statutory language is ambiguous, the primary object of the [C]ourt is to ascertain the legislative intention from a consideration of the legislation in its entirety, viewing the language used therein in the light, nature, and purpose of the enactment thereof. Mason v. Bowerman Bros., Inc., 95 R.I. 425, 431, 187 A.2d 772, 776 (1963) (citing Nolan v. Representative Counsel of Newport, 73 R.I. 498, 57 A.2d 730 (1948); State v. Muldoon, 67 R.I. 80, 20 A.2d 687 (1941)). When the meaning of a criminal statute is ambiguous, the policy of lenity in the construction of criminal statutes requires that the less harsh of two possible meanings be adopted. State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 925 (R.I.1980). [P]enal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the party upon whom a penalty is to be imposed. Bryant, 670 A.2d at 779 (quoting State v. Calise, 478 A.2d 198, 200 (R.I. 1984); Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2d 1147, 1148 (R.I.1982)). Here, the statute provides that, in order to come within its purview, a defendant must have been previously convicted of at least two separate felonies and sentenced on two or more such occasions. Section 12-19-21. The habitual criminals statute does not define occasions, nor does Rhode Island case law. Black's Law Dictionary 1078 (6th ed.1990) defines occasion as [t]hat which provides an opportunity for the causal agency to act. Meaning not only particular time but carrying idea of opportunity, necessity, or need, or even cause in a limited sense, while Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1560 (1976) defines occasion as, among other things, a particular time at which something takes place: a time marked by some happening. Thus, the word occasion itself is susceptible to more than one plain and ordinary meaning; it can refer to one specific point in time, as well as simply opportunity or cause. Given the ambiguity of the word occasion, this Court must engage in statutory interpretation to determine how it is used in the habitual criminals statute. Reference to the policy underlying habitual offender statutes reflects the Legislature's determination that a third or subsequent offense is more serious than a first or second offense and accordingly should be punishable as such. State v. Tregaskis, 540 A.2d 1022, 1026 (R.I.1988). Such statutes target those individuals who have failed to avail themselves of multiple opportunities to reform themselves following conviction of criminal offenses: Recidivist statutes are enacted in an effort to deter and punish incorrigible offenders.    They areintended to apply to persistent violators who have not responded to the restraining influence of conviction and punishment. State v. Conley, 222 N.W.2d 501, 503 (Iowa 1974). In light of the policy underlying habitual criminals statutes and in light of the policy that dictates that lenity must be afforded in the construction of criminal statutes when two or more meanings are possible, this Court today follows those courts that have concluded that the convictions used as a basis for enhanced punishment must occur sequentially. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 652 So.2d 1236, 1237 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1995) (sequential convictions are necessary for imposition of habitual offender statute); Miller v. State, 275 Ind. 454, 417 N.E.2d 339, 342 (1981) (same); State v. Tillman, 228 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Iowa 1975) (same); State v. Wilson, 6 Kan.App.2d 302, 627 P.2d 1185, 1185 (1981) (same); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 276 Ky. 802, 125 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1939) (same); Montone v. State, 308 Md. 599, 521 A.2d 720, 724 (1987) (same). However, the state argues that this Court should affirm the trial justice's imposition of the habitual offender sentence because even though the reasons given by the trial court [were] erroneous    there are other valid reasons to support the    judgment appealed from. Gross v. State Division of Taxation, 659 A.2d 670, 672 (R.I.1995) (citing Ambeault v. Burrillville Racing Association, 118 R.I. 310, 315, 373 A.2d 807, 809 (1977)). The state argues that the trial justice should have taken into account defendant's Rhode Island convictions, which were submitted by the state to the trial justice in the form of docket face sheets, when the trial justice determined whether defendant was an habitual offender. The defendant did not contest the factual existence of those convictions; rather, he objected to the form in which they were introduced. Section 12-19-21(b) explicitly provides that  authenticated copies of former judgments and commitments which comprise the two or more prior convictions and imprisonments required under this section shall be prima facie evidence of defendant's formerconvictions and imprisonments. (Emphases added.) The state did not comply with the statutory mandates provided in § 12-19-21(b). The proffered docket face sheets for defendant's Rhode Island convictions clearly were not accompanied by the statutorily required authenticated copies of former judgments and commitments. Accordingly, we find that no prima facie proof was established under the statute. Therefore, we agree with the trial justice that the state's proffer of the docket face sheets of defendant's Rhode Island convictions was insufficient to meet its burden of proof under the statute. We hold that because the state has failed to meet its burden of proof under § 12-19-21(b), the habitual offender sentence must be vacated. The state, however, is not precluded from again seeking a sentence under the habitual criminals statute. See State v. Clark, 754 A.2d 73, 83 (R.I.2000) (noting that principles of double jeopardy do not apply to enhanced sentencing statute because it does not create a separate offense). Therefore, we remand this issue to the Superior Court to determine whether adequate evidence may be presented to establish the fact that the defendant is an habitual offender.