Opinion ID: 3040568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: False Statement Instruction

Text: The Tatoyans next argue that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that acting “willfully” means acting is technically guilty of bulk cash smuggling but not guilty of a failure to report. Similarly, a person who carries a wad of $20,000 cash in his bare hands (i.e., without “concealing” it), but refuses to report it on Form 4790, is technically guilty of a failure to report but not guilty of bulk cash smuggling. UNITED STATES v. TATOYAN 1137 “deliberately and not out of confusion, mistake or surprise.” Again, on review, “the relevant inquiry is whether the instructions as a whole are misleading or inadequate to guide the jury’s deliberation.” Fernandez, 388 F.3d at 1246. [10] The Tatoyans’ contention is incorrect for two reasons. First, the district court did instruct the jury that “[a]n act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of an act and does not act or fail to act through ignorance, mistake or accident.” Using the words “ignorance, mistake or accident” to modify “knowingly,” rather than the words “confusion, mistake or surprise” to modify the word “willfully,” does not render the chosen instruction inadequate. See United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1364 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[S]o long as the [jury] instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, the judge’s formulation of those instructions or choice of lan- guage is a matter of discretion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). [11] Second, the district court’s instruction—which mirrored Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instruction 8.66—defined “willfully” in a manner that fully comports with Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit holdings. See Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 341 (1941) (willfully means no more than “deliberately and with knowledge”); Notash v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 693, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Heuer, 4 F.3d at 732 (same). Nothing further was required here, as the Tatoyans’ theory that they acted out of “confusion, mistake or surprise” was encompassed by the antonymous term “deliberately” in the jury instructions. See United States v. Ripinsky, 109 F.3d 1436, 1440 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] defendant is not entitled to any particular form of instruction and it is not error . . . to reject a theory-of-the-case instruction if the other instructions in their entirety cover the defense theory.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).11 11 The Tatoyans also contend that the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that, to be found guilty, the defendants must have acted 1138 UNITED STATES v. TATOYAN