Opinion ID: 822667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stole, took and carried, led or drove away;

Text: 5. Property of another of the value of $1,000 or more; 6. With intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor. 9 If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. Jury Instruction No. 7 provided the statutory definition of “deprive”: “Deprive” means: a. To withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value or with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation; or b. To dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover it. [¶37] Over the State’s objection, the Court also instructed the jury as to the lesserincluded misdemeanor of unauthorized use of a vehicle under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-11102 (LexisNexis 2011). The offense of unauthorized use requires only that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the “purpose of temporarily making use of the vehicle,” as opposed to requiring it to prove that the defendant had the intent to “deprive” the owner of the property as it must for felony larceny. See id. Mr. Peña does not dispute that the foregoing instructions were a correct statement of the law applicable to this case. [¶38] Only the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the sixth element of Instruction No. 6, intent to deprive, was disputed at trial or on appeal. Mr. Peña characterizes his actions as “joyriding” or unauthorized use, and argues the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find the required intent to deprive the vehicle’s owner of his property. He concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support a misdemeanor conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle. [¶39] As Instruction No. 7 indicated, the statutory definition of “intent to deprive” includes an intent “[t]o withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value or with intent to restore only upon payment of reward or other compensation.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3- 401(a)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 2011). A jury may properly infer larcenous intent from circumstantial evidence, such as the defendant’s words and conduct. Jones, ¶ 27, 278 10 P.3d at 735–36 (quoting Wentworth v. State, 975 P.2d 22, 26 (Wyo. 1999)). “The wrongful taking of another’s property with no apparent intention of returning it, and in the absence of any explanatory circumstances” can support a finding of intent to deprive. Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201, 204 (Wyo. 1980) (citing State v. Jackson, 420 P.2d 270, 272 (Ariz. 1966)). The State is not required to produce direct evidence of the defendant’s intent to deprive, because that would impose a nearly impossible burden to satisfy in many cases. See Jones, ¶ 27, 278 P.3d at 735–36, (quoting Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133, 135 (Wyo. 1989)). [¶40] Two other Wyoming cases address the issue of sufficiency of evidence to prove intent to deprive. In Wetherelt v. State, 864 P.2d 449 (Wyo. 1993), the defendant broke into the victim’s unoccupied trailer and took a number of items of personal property. She listed some of them in an advertisement for a garage sale, returned some to the victim, and refused to return others. We found this course of conduct sufficient to support a reasonable inference of intent to deprive the victim of his property. Id. at 450–52. [¶41] In Merchant v. State, 4 P.3d 184 (Wyo. 2000), a used car salesman sold a truck to the victim but withheld the truck’s title for more than five months. The victim was unable to use the truck for that period. We held that “in instances of temporary deprivations similar to the ones in this case, the jury can reasonably find intent to deprive.” Id. at 191 (citing Brett v. State, 961 P.2d 385, 391 (Wyo. 1998)). See also Thornton v. State, 689 S.E.2d 361, 367–68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence of larcenous intent where the defendant, a mechanic, kept a customer’s truck and used it as his own for over a year). [¶42] The question the jury had to decide in this case was not whether Mr. Peña succeeded in keeping the vehicle permanently or for long enough to appropriate a major portion of its value, but whether he intended to do so. Whether he was likely to be successful in that effort in a world of instant communications and technological law enforcement capabilities was likewise not the issue that had to be decided. The evidence presented by the State showed that Mr. Peña removed decals connecting the truck to the owner’s business shortly after taking it.3 The record also indicates that he later attempted 3 Other courts have viewed similar acts of concealment as sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference of the requisite intent to deprive. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 575 S.W.2d 677, 681 (Ark. 1979) (“Evidence of concealment of the property may constitute evidence of a felonious intent [to deprive the owner of property], depending upon the surrounding circumstances.” (citing State v. Aten, 457 P.2d 89 (Kan. 1969); Byrd v. State, 173 So. 282 (Miss. 1937); Commonw. v. Dock, 21 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941)); People v. Quisenberry, 311 P.2d 99, 103 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (describing how the concealment of a vehicle’s license plates supported a “reasonable inference that the taker intended to deprive the owner of possession.”) (citation omitted); Maddox v. State, 38 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 1948) (describing how a jury may infer larcenous intent from “an effort to conceal the possession of another’s property” (quoting Long v. State, 11 Fla. 295, 297 (Fla. 1866))). 11 to sell some of the truck’s parts on Craigslist, and may have succeeded in that attempt, as the truck’s grille guard and a toolbox were missing when it was recovered. [¶43] Trial testimony indicated that Mr. Peña told his girlfriend’s mother that the truck belonged to his mother. When he was questioned in Louisiana, he told Corporal Edwards that it belonged to his boss and denied that it was stolen. Shortly thereafter, he told Deputy Hoyt that the truck was stolen but that it belonged to his mother’s fiancé. A reasonable jury could believe that these statements demonstrated an intent to avoid identification of the vehicle’s owner so as to permit Mr. Peña to keep the vehicle as long as possible. That conclusion would be consistent with an intent to deprive. [¶44] There is no dispute that when he was apprehended, Mr. Peña had kept the truck for three months, that he had put approximately 14,000 miles on it, and that he never made any effort to return it to its owner or advise him of its location. By all accounts, he maintained the vehicle well, from which the jury could infer that he intended to keep the vehicle in good condition so that he could continue to use it. When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented was sufficient to permit a jury to reasonably conclude that Mr. Peña intended to deprive the pickup truck’s owner of his property as that term is defined in Wyoming Statute § 6-3-401(a)(ii)(A), and that the deprivation was temporary only because he was caught.