Opinion ID: 2711
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Legislative Immunity on Plaintiffs' Claims

Text: A defendant's entitlement to legislative immunity from claims for injunctive relief does not depend solely on whether the defendant's acts giving rise to the alleged violation were taken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (internal quotation marks omitted). We agree with the Third Circuit that, in considering whether the doctrine of legislative immunity is available to foreclose claims for injunctive relief in official-capacity suits, we must also look more specifically to whether granting the particular relief sought would enjoin defendants in their legislative capacities. See Larsen, 152 F.3d at 253 (requiring consideration of the policies underlying legislative immunity and of the extent to which a court could order [the desired] relief). This is so because, unlike a court's award of compensatory damages, which remedies discrete injuries caused by a defendant's prior acts, a court's grant of injunctive relief seeks to shape and direct future acts potentially different in nature and scope from those giving rise to the litigation. Therefore, even where a defendant's prior conduct giving rise to the cause of action consists of legislative acts for which the defendant is immune, the same may not be true of the future acts that would be compelled or prohibited by a grant of injunctive relief. The case of Consumers Union is illustrative. In that case, the Supreme Court applied legislative immunity to bar plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief insofar as the relief sought would compel the defendants to perform a legislative actthe repeal or amendment of the state's bar code to conform with constitutional requirements. See Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733-34, 100 S.Ct. 1967 (holding that court and its members were absolutely immune from suit for failure to amend bar code). The Court concluded, however, that legislative immunity did not bar claims for injunctive relief that would enjoin the defendant justices from committing a distinctly non-legislative actindependent enforcement of the unconstitutional provisions of the bar code against particular individuals. Id. at 734-36, 100 S.Ct. 1967. Other cases have illustrated that even where a defendant commits allegedly unlawful acts in a legislative capacity, the desired injunctive order might act upon the defendant (or another defendant) in a purely non-legislative capacity. In such cases, we see no reason why a defendant should be entitled to legislative immunity simply because the harm alleged originated, in some sense, with a legislative act. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196-205, 26 L.Ed. 377 (1880) (in case involving Speech or Debate Clause, members of House of Representatives were immune for ordering an allegedly false arrest, but the sergeant-at-arms was not immune for carrying out the arrest). Accordingly, before defendants in the instant case can invoke legislative immunity to defeat a claim for injunctive relief, they must show both (1) that the acts giving rise to the harm alleged in the complaint ( i.e., termination of plaintiffs from their positions in retaliation for political affiliations and union activities) were undertaken when defendants were acting in their legislative capacities under the functional test set forth in Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-56, 118 S.Ct. 966; and (2) that the particular relief sought ( e.g., reinstatement of plaintiffs to their previous positions or to other positions) would enjoin defendants in their legislative capacities, and not in some other capacity in which they would not be entitled to legislative immunity.
Defendants argue that, in firing plaintiffs and (allegedly) eliminating their positions, they were engaging in acts that were legislative in nature and thus, entitled to immunity for those acts. We first address the District Court's application of the functional test set forth by the Supreme Court in Bogan for deciding whether a defendant's acts are legislative and therefore protected by the doctrine of absolute legislative immunity. According to that test, two factors are relevant in determining whether a defendant's acts are within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. Id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (internal quotation marks). First, it is relevant whether the defendants' actions were legislative in form, i.e., whether they were integral steps in the legislative process. Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Second, it may also be relevant whether defendants' actions were legislative in substance,  i.e., whether the actions bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation, including whether they reflected . . . discretionary, policymaking decision[s] implicating the budgetary priorities of the [government] and the services the [government] provides to its constituents. Id. at 55-56, 118 S.Ct. 966. Although the Court in Bogan did not state explicitly whether establishing both the procedural and substantive elements of this inquiry was required for legislative immunity to apply, we agree with the District Court that establishing both elements is required in these circumstances. In particular, we think that before high-level executive branch officials in the State of Connecticut can claim the protections of an immunity traditionally accorded to members of the legislative branch, it is important that they show that their activities were legislative both in form and in substance. See Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (Regardless of the level of government, we believe the two-part substance/procedure inquiry is helpful in analyzing whether a non-legislator performing allegedly administrative tasks is entitled to immunity.). Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly framed its broad inquiry as whether defendants' alleged acts were both: (1) substantively legislative, i.e., acts that involve policy making; and (2) procedurally legislative, i.e., passed by means of established legislative procedures. Dist. Ct. Op., 2006 WL 141645, at  (citing Ryan v. Burlington County, 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989)). We turn now to evaluate the District Court's application of this inquiry to facts of the instant case. Defendants argue that the District Court erred in concluding that further factual discovery is necessary to determine whether their alleged acts were procedurally legislative under the first prong of the Bogan test. In particular, defendants contend that the District Court impermissibly focused on defendants' motives, rather than on the nature of their acts, when conducting its analysis. Defendants point specifically to the District Court's conclusion in the April 5 Order that further discovery is necessary so that the Court can determine whether defendants are able to make a good faith [showing] . . . that they ordered the layoffs to achieve budgetary savings under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 4-85(b)(2), and not for other reasons. April 5 Order at 2, J.A. 90. We agree with defendants that the District Court impermissibly focused on defendants' motives when concluding that discovery was warranted. It has been well-settled since the Supreme Court's decision in Bogan that courts may not consider a defendant's motives when assessing the legislative nature vel non of his actions. See Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54-55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Recognizing that the privilege of absolute immunity `would be of little value if [legislators] could be subjected to . . . the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives,' id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783), and that it is not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966 (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377, 71 S.Ct. 783), the Supreme Court in Bogan held that questions concerning the defendants' motives were wholly irrelevant to its determination of whether they were entitled to legislative immunity. See id. The Court concluded that the relevant question was whether, stripped of all considerations of intent and motive, petitioner's acts were legislative. Id. (emphasis added). The District Court thus erred when it determined that before defendants' activities could be cloaked with legislative immunity, defendants would have to make a good faith showing as to their reasons for ordering the alleged terminations. Neither a showing of good faith nor an inquiry into defendants' subjective reasons addresses the relevant issue of whether the nature of the act[s] that gave rise to the alleged harm was legislative or executive. Id. at 54, 118 S.Ct. 966. Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court's ultimate conclusion that further discovery is necessary to determine whether defendants' acts were indeed procedurally legislative under Bogan. We are unable to determine on the current record whether defendants' alleged acts were integral steps in the legislative process. Id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966. Although the District Court concluded that the governor had the legislative authority under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 4-85(b)(2) to make deficit reduction decisions, April 5 Order at 2, J.A. 90, it is unclear whether the alleged terminations were integral steps in the statutory budget process. More specifically, the record does not show whether defendants acted pursuant to their statutory budget authority when they ordered the terminations, or whether the terminations occurred independent of (or in violation of) that authority. [11] Thus, whether defendants' alleged acts were procedurally legislative under the functional test of Bogan remains a disputed question of fact that must be resolved after discovery. Compare Appellants' Br. at 41-42 (contending that when the Governor acted to remedy the State's fiscal condition by revising its budget and reducing its workforce, he . . . was fully authorized to make legislative decisions), with Appellees' Br. at 57 (Plaintiffs are prepared to prove that Governor Rowland never invoked his rescission authority . . . and did not follow the mandatory statutory procedures), and id. at 58 (asserting that the Governor did not act within 30 days of being notified of the deficit, did not submit a report explaining the reasons for the deficit [as] required by § 4-85(b)(2), and did not submit a plan for spending reductions that he could implement to eliminate the budget deficit). We turn next to the District Court's application of the second prong of the Bogan test, inquiring whether the acts undertaken by defendants were substantively legislative. Defendants argue that because the District Court concluded that defendants' actions were substantively legislative, and because the Supreme Court in Bogan did not address whether legislative immunity attaches only to actions that are both substantively and procedurally legislative, we should conclude that legislative immunity bars the instant action. Appellants' Br. at 37. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, as explained above, to establish a legislative immunity defense in the instant case, defendants must show that their acts are procedurally, as well as substantively, legislative. Second, the current record does not reveal whether the District Court properly concluded that defendants' actions were substantively legislative. The District Court based its conclusion on its observation that in this case the governor faced a budget crisis in the fall of 2002, and, as the state's chief executive officer, exercised his discretion to reduce expenditures by demanding collective bargaining agreement concessions and by eliminating some 3,000 union jobs through executive order. Dist. Ct. Op., 2006 WL 141645, at  (emphasis added). The elimination of a position, unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, is a substantively legislative act for legislative immunity purposes. Bogan, 523 U.S. at 56, 118 S.Ct. 966 (noting that termination of an employee's position may have prospective implications that reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office). By contrast, [a] personnel decision is administrative in nature if it is directed at a particular employee or employees, and is not part of a broader legislative policy. Almonte, 478 F.3d at 108; see also Harhay, 323 F.3d at 210 (Discretionary personnel decisions, even if undertaken by public officials who otherwise are entitled to immunity, do not give rise to [legislative] immunity. . . .). However, we do not think it was proper for the District Court to conclude at the pleading stage, and without explanation, that defendants eliminated plaintiffs' positions, rather than terminated the employment of particular employees administratively. Plaintiffs do not allege in their amended complaint that defendants terminat[ed] the budget lines that would have funded their positions, Almonte, 478 F.3d at 108, or that defendants eliminated the positions through other means. Rather, plaintiffs allege only that state union employees were terminat[ed] for illegal reasons. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 42. Moreover, no undisputed record evidence contradicts plaintiffs' allegations. Accepting plaintiffs' allegations as true, as we must in reviewing defendants' motion to dismiss, see Almonte, 478 F.3d at 104 & n. 2, we conclude that the District Court should not have found that the positions were eliminated. Even assuming arguendo that the current record established that some positions were eliminated from the state workforce during the relevant time period, defendants cannot demonstrate at this stage of the litigation that their acts were substantively legislative. The District Court did not consider whether plaintiffs' positions were eliminated, or whether plaintiffs' loss of their state employment was directly attributable to any budget modifications proposed or implemented administratively by defendants. [12] Accordingly, discovery is necessary before the District Court can determine conclusively whether defendants' actions were substantively legislative. After discovery, the dispositive question to be answered by the District Court regarding this aspect of its Bogan inquiry should be whether plaintiffs' positions were eliminated (a substantively legislative act), see Almonte, 478 F.3d at 108, or whether plaintiffs were administratively fired (a substantively non-legislative act), see id. The District Court should include within the realm of substantively legislative activity not only any elimination of positions that occurred, but also any discussions [defendants] may have held, and any agreements they may have made . . . regarding the new budget in the months preceding any decision to eliminate the positions. Id. Although we do not set forth the precise contours of the distinction between legislative position eliminations and administrative firings, we briefly note, for the benefit of the District Court, the possibility that discovery will reveal facts suggesting defendants initially administratively fired plaintiffs and only subsequently eliminated their positions. In Jessen v. Town of Eastchester, 114 F.3d 7 (2d Cir.1997), we held that a plaintiff could sue municipal board members for firing him administratively before they eliminated his position. We rested our conclusion in Jessen on the fact that the earlier termination from a position which then, at least briefly, remained open was an administrative act that legislative immunity does not protect. Id. at 8. But insofar as plaintiffs are seeking reinstatement to positions that have been legislatively eliminated, it would make no difference whether plaintiffs had been administratively fired prior to the legislative position elimination. This is so because, for reasons of legislative immunity, the District Court would lack the power to direct state officials to perform the legislative act of recreating the positions in order to reinstate the plaintiffs to them.
Assuming arguendo that defendants' alleged actions are substantively and procedurally legislative under Bogan, defendants must still show, before they are afforded the protections of legislative immunity as to claims for injunctive relief, that the requested relief would enjoin them in their legislative capacities. Defendants do not address this issue, other than to assert broadly that the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Scott is persuasive and should be adopted by our Court. Plaintiffs address the issue more directly when urging us to find as a matter of law that legislative immunity is inapplicable to the instant claims for injunctive relief. In particular, plaintiffs claim that they do not seek to enjoin defendants from performing any legislative functions, but seek instead merely to prevent defendants from enforcing unconstitutional legislation . . . that they participated in enacting. Appellees' Br. at 66. Consequently, plaintiffs argue that defendants may not invoke legislative immunity against the instant claims for injunctive relief at this stage, or at any future stage, in the litigation. Addressing the merits of this argument, we look first to the nature of the relief sought. Plaintiffs' amended complaint seeks relief in the form of an order that would, inter alia, compel[ ] defendants . . . in their official capacities, to reinstate [plaintiffs] to their former positions with the State of Connecticut or such other position as the Court deems appropriate, with full and appropriate restoration of seniority and benefits. Am. Compl. at 32 ¶ 9. We agree with plaintiffs that legislative immunity does not bar the requested relief insofar as it involves reinstatement to existing positions other than the positions that plaintiffs previously held i.e., reinstatement to other position[s] as the Court deems appropriate. Id.; see also Appellees' Br. at 42 ([E]ven if positions occupied by the unreinstated employees do not currently exist, these employees can be reinstated to equivalent positions . . . in any number of other State agencies); id. at 43 ([E]ven if no such vacancies in the full-time workforce exist, the District Court can order unreinstated workers to be hired as durational employees until openings arise). Because ordering defendants to hire plaintiffs into existing positions in the state workforce would not require either a new allocation of funds or the passage of new legislation, but would instead compel defendants to act only in their administrative capacities as executive branch officials with authority over the state workforce, we conclude that legislative immunity presents no obstacle to the District Court's ordering of any such relief. [13] Nevertheless, we cannot assess, at the pleading stage, the merits of plaintiffs' argument that legislative immunity also presents no obstacle to their claims seeking reinstatement to their previous positions. Whether restoring plaintiffs to those positions would compel defendants to act in their legislative capacities will necessarily hinge on the findings made by the District Court regarding the issues to be resolved under Bogan. If defendants successfully demonstrate that their actions in terminating plaintiffs' positions were legislative in nature under Bogan, plaintiffs' claims for reinstatement to their previous positions would be barred by legislative immunity. This is so because ordering such relief would require no less than a judicial order compelling defendants, in their official capacities, to re-create positions that would have been eliminated through prior legislative action. As the Third Circuit has recognized in similar circumstances, granting such relief contravenes the general policies underlying legislative immunity. See Baraka, 481 F.3d at 203 (claims against the New Jersey Governor and State Assembly seeking reinstatement to position of Poet Laureate were barred because seeking reinstatement would require . . . legislators to rescind their votes repealing the statute and to enact legislation recreating the position). Moreover, unlike the injunction in Consumers Union, which prevented enforcement of unconstitutional provisions of the Virginia Bar Code, plaintiffs' projected relief would not merely enjoin defendants from performing discretionary functions or from exercising their independent enforcement authority. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 734, 100 S.Ct. 1967. Rather, it would compel the rescission of an existing budget agreement and the enactment of new budget legislationprecisely the activity which the legislative immunity privilege seeks to protect. See Baraka, 481 F.3d at 203 (concluding that because [d]ebating, voting on, and passing statutes are role[s] assigned exclusively to the Legislature . . . [defendant's] request for reinstatement was barred by legislative immunity (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because it is unclear whether and how defendants eliminated plaintiffs' positions, their entitlement to immunity from claims seeking reinstatement to their previous positions will depend on facts revealed during discovery. In sum, we dismiss defendants' appeal for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it challenges the District Court's conclusion that defendants' entitlement to legislative immunity from plaintiffs' claims seeking reinstatement to their previously-held positions hinges on findings that can be made only following discovery. See Almonte, 478 F.3d at 105 (appellate jurisdiction does not exist where immunity determination depends on unresolved factual issues). However, because we conclude as a matter of law that legislative immunity presents no bar to plaintiffs' claims insofar as plaintiffs seek placement into other, existing positions in the State workforce, we affirm the District Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss this claim for relief and direct the Court, on remand, to consider this claim without regard to defendants' asserted legislative immunity defense. [14]