Opinion ID: 852644
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Employers under the Indiana Age Discrimination Act

Text: The IADA prohibits discrimination by employers on the basis of age. A governmental entity which is subject to the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq., is specifically excluded from the definition of employer in Indiana's act. Ind.Code § 22-9-2-1 (2004). The parties agree that Purdue is a governmental entity. Accordingly, if Purdue is subject to the ADEA, the trial court properly concluded that Montgomery had no claim under the IADA. The parties agree that Purdue meets the statutory definition of employer under the ADEA, [1] and is required to comply with the ADEA's substantive provisions. In this sense, Purdue is plainly subject to the ADEA. Montgomery argues, however, that there is no private civil remedy against a state agency under the ADEA and therefore Purdue, admittedly an arm of the State, is not subject to the ADEA as that term is used in the IADA. Specifically, Montgomery argues that Purdue is not subject to the federal ADEA: because (1) the Eleventh Amendment shields state agencies from private actions for monetary damages under the ADEA and (2) enforcement of the ADEA against state agencies through other mechanisms is rarely pursued and meaningless. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that Purdue and other arms of Indiana government are subject to the ADEA and therefore are not employers subject to the IADA.
The ADEA has two primary enforcement mechanisms. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provisions incorporated by reference into the ADEA, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) can bring suit on behalf of an aggrieved individual for injunctive and monetary relief. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The incorporated FLSA provisions, in concert with section 626(c) of the ADEA, also authorize private civil actions for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act. Id. at § 626(b), (c). A private civil action may not be commenced until 60 days after a charge of discrimination has been filed with the EEOC, [2] and if the EEOC exercises its discretion to bring suit, no private suit may be brought unless the aggrieved individual has already filed a private action. Id. at § 626(c)(1), (d). Whether the plaintiff is a private individual or the EEOC, if a trial court finds a violation of the ADEA, the statute authorizes the court to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate including without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of the Act. Id. at § 626(b). Liquidated damages are payable only for willful violations of the Act. Id.
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. This Amendment was adopted in 1798 in response to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), which upheld a common law action for assumpsit brought by two South Carolinians against the State of Georgia to collect a revolutionary war debt. Georgia had refused to appear, claiming that federal courts could not hear suits against a sovereign State, but the Supreme Court affirmed a default judgment for the plaintiffs. Recent Supreme Court precedent has made clear that the Eleventh Amendment has a broader reach than merely stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over claims against one State by citizens of another. Rather, the Amendment reflects the constitutional principle that a State may not be sued in federal court without its consent whether the suit is brought by a foreign citizen, a citizen of another state, or the state's own citizens. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III). This doctrine applies to federal legislation that is grounded in the Commerce Clause or any of Congress' other enumerated Article I powers. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727, 123 S.Ct. 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 953 (2003). Moreover, Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999) established that Congress may not subject unconsenting States to suit in a state court under legislation passed pursuant to Congress' Article I powers. Thus, even though there may be concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction over claims asserting rights under a federal statute, a State may not be sued in either federal or state court without its consent under a federal statute grounded in Article I powers. The Court explained that states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is a convenient shorthand but something of a misnomer, for sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Instead, that immunity stems from the structure of the original Constitution itself which incorporated the traditional understanding that a sovereign was not subject to suit without its consent. Id. at 728, 119 S.Ct. 2240. The Alden majority explained that until Chisholm, the Constitution was understood, in light of its history and structure, to preserve the States' traditional immunity from private suits. As the [Eleventh] Amendment clarified the only provisions of the Constitution that anyone had suggested might support a contrary understanding, there was no reason to draft with a broader brush. Id. at 724, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Thus, though the Eleventh Amendment speaks only of states' immunity from suit in federal court, the original constitutional design which the Amendment acted to restore embraced the fundamental structural principle that unconsenting states are shielded from private suits under federal law in their own courts as well as in the federal courts. Id. at 722, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Congress' Article I powers cannot support a claim against a State because the sovereign immunity reflected in the Eleventh Amendment trumps antecedent provisions of the Constitution. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 66, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) (internal quotations omitted). Congress may, however, abrogate unconsenting States' sovereign immunity by exercising its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which authorizes Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726, 123 S.Ct. 1972. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), however, the Court concluded that the ADEA was not an exercise of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore the provisions of the ADEA authorizing state employees to sue their state employers in federal or state court for monetary damages violated the Eleventh Amendment. Purdue and Montgomery agree that Kimel precludes a claim for monetary damages under the ADEA by state employees against their unconsenting state employers. Indiana has not consented to suit under the ADEA by enacting the IADA. As we explain more fully in Part II of this opinion, the IADA, though prohibiting discrimination in employment in terms similar to the ADEA, does not authorize aggrieved employees to bring private civil actions against their employers. Moreover, even if the IADA authorized private civil actions against state agencies, it would not constitute consent to suit by private individuals under the ADEA. Waiver of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity by the states must be express, unequivocal and voluntary. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). It must be done by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The IADA contains no express and unequivocal language by which Indiana consents to suits for damages brought by aggrieved state employees under the federal ADEA. [3]
Montgomery argues that state employers such as Purdue are not subject to the ADEA because they are shielded from private suits for monetary damages by the Eleventh Amendment and because other enforcement mechanisms are not meaningful. Purdue concedes that absent consent by the State, the Eleventh Amendment bars private litigants from seeking monetary damages from state agencies under the ADEA. Purdue argues that state agencies are nonetheless subject to the ADEA because employees can obtain injunctive relief against state agencies. Moreover, the EEOC, as an arm of the federal government, is not subject to the Eleventh Amendment and can seek both monetary and non-monetary remedies against state agencies. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n. 9, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); State Police for Automatic Ret. Ass'n v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir.2003). In support of his contention that the ADEA provides no meaningful remedy, Montgomery notes that the EEOC's decision to bring a legal action for monetary or injunctive relief on behalf of an aggrieved individual is discretionary. He argues that the EEOC rarely exercises this discretion citing annually published statistics comparing the number of substantiated administrative charges and the number of those charges the EEOC chooses to pursue in court. We find this argument unpersuasive. Whether the enforcement mechanism is vigorous or not, there is no question that the ADEA's substantive requirements apply to Purdue and other state agencies. All taxpayers are subject to the Internal Revenue Code even if less than two percent are subject to audit. Even if we assume lax or nonexistent enforcement, state employers are similarly subject to the ADEA. Moreover, the remedial provisions of the ADEA place the EEOC in a central role. The statutory structure [of the ADEA] plainly gives the EEOC the dominant role in enforcing the ADEA and ADEA private lawsuits therefore are secondary in the statutory scheme to administrative remedies and suits brought by the [EEOC]. EEOC v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc., 897 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir.1990). As a result, state agencies subject to EEOC enforcement are subject to the ADEA as that term is used in the IADA. Montgomery also contends that private lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against state employers do not provide a meaningful remedy for violations of the ADEA and therefore state employers are not subject to the ADEA. Montgomery first argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars not only claims for money damages, but also private civil actions for injunctive relief against the State. This is technically correct, but under the doctrine announced in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not shield state officials from private lawsuits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This has been found by at least some federal courts to allow private injunctive action under the ADEA. See, e.g., DiFava, 317 F.3d at 12 (Neither Kimel, nor the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, prevents individuals . . . from obtaining injunctive relief against a state based upon the ADEA pursuant to Ex Parte Young ). And several post- Kimel cases hold that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar private actions for injunctive relief, including reinstatement, against state officials. [4] Montgomery cites Miranda v. University of Maryland, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944 (S.D.Md. Feb. 9, 2005), where the federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's ADEA claims for injunctive relief. The court noted that although Ex Parte Young allows a suit seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials for prospective equitable relief from ongoing violations of federal law, the only defendant Miranda sued was the University of Maryland, College Park. Consequently, the Ex Parte Young exception is inapplicable. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944, at . Miranda does not exempt the ADEA from the Ex Parte Young doctrine. It merely establishes that aggrieved employees who want to pursue that remedy must identify the correct defendant (state officials as opposed to the State itself) in their pleadings. Finally, Montgomery argues that private action to compel equitable reinstatement by state officials is a meaningless and illusory remedy because the decision whether to grant reinstatement is within the discretion of the trial judge and is based on equitable considerations such as the availability of positions. See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 325-26 (7th Cir.1992). At bottom, this is an argument that state employers are not subject to the ADEA because a court may find other factors to outweigh the requested relief. This is a risk with any enforcement scheme. It does not render the law a nullity to say that it may not accomplish all that some plaintiffs think desireable. In sum, the ADEA's substantive protections for state employees are enforceable through private actions for injunctive relief and direct enforcement by the EEOC. If the law imposes standards of conduct on state employers, they are subject to it. The fact that some remedies may be constitutionally barred does not change this result. Accordingly, we hold that state employers, including Purdue, are government entities subject to the federal ADEA. We therefore also hold that they are not statutory employers under section 1 of Indiana's Age Discrimination Act and affirm the trial court and Court of Appeal's dismissal of Montgomery's IADA wrongful dismissal claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).