Opinion ID: 712236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joint Property--The Home and Unit 10

Text: 34 As to the jointly titled property--the home and Unit 10--we reverse the summary judgment for the government and remand for further proceedings. First, we conclude that both properties are potentially forfeitable and reject Ms. May's contention that Unit 10 is not forfeitable simply because no contraband was found there. However, taking the pleadings and supporting documents as a whole, we conclude that there was a genuine issue of fact, precluding summary judgment, as to Ms. May's innocent owner defense.
35 Ms. May first contends that Unit 10 is not forfeitable at all because it is a lot or tract 6 separate from Unit 9, where the only contraband at the business property was found. She argues further that the district court found Unit 10 forfeitable by using a subjective standard that impermissibly considered how the Mays used the property instead of how it was legally divided. 36 Property is forfeitable under § 881(a)(7) whenever there exists a sufficient nexus between the property and the illegal activity. $149,442.43 in United States Currency, 965 F.2d at 877; cf. United States v. Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 777 (10th Cir.1990) (analyzing an analogous forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2)). In this instance, whether or not the standard used by the district court was subjective, we consider Unit 10 to have a sufficient independent nexus to the illegal activity to support forfeiture. Once the wall between Unit 9 and Unit 10 had been removed, any contraband kept in Unit 9 depended for its continued concealment at least in part on the walls surrounding Unit 10. As the district court noted, [i]t is sufficient that the property serve to facilitate the illegal activity by concealing its presence. Order Regarding Cross Motions for Summary Judgment at 11 (citing United States v. Smith, 966 F.2d 1045, 1055 (6th Cir.1992)). The presence not only of fifty-five grams of cocaine, but also of a scale and cocaine grinder, suggests that the need for concealment at the business property was considerable.
37 We are left with the factual question of Ms. May's innocence in relation to the illegal activity that would otherwise support forfeiture of her interest in the home and Unit 10. Ms. May contends that the government actually conceded Ms. May's innocence, that even if it did not the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government, and that the evidence warranted summary judgment for her, not the government. 7 We agree only that the government should not have received summary judgment as to the joint property. 38 First, it is simply untrue that the government conceded Ms. May's innocence. While the government never presented a substantial case against Ms. May, it did not need to. Ms. May bore the burden of establishing her defense. Despite the statement in the pretrial order, under Claims and Defenses of Frances May, that her innocent ownership of the property was undisputed, Aplt.App. vol. II, at 326, there is no such stipulation by the government in the order. Thus, Ms. May retained a claimant's normal burden of establishing innocent ownership by a preponderance of the evidence. 39 The record does, however, provide evidence from which a finder of fact could infer Ms. May's innocence. First, Ms. May's affidavit plausibly characterizes Mr. May's drug trafficking as an outgrowth of his presumably covert infidelity, although the affidavit stops short of altogether denying knowledge of the presence of drugs. Second, Ms. May's innocence is supported by testimony elicited from Mr. May at the criminal trial and proffered by the government itself in its motion for summary judgment: 40 Q: So you didn't tell [Ms. May] the truth about what you were doing? 41 A: No, ma'am, I certainly did not. 42 Q: Did you tell her you were dealing cocaine? 43 A: No, ma'am. 44 Q: Did you tell her you were having an affair with Lisa? 45 A: No, ma'am, I did not. 46 Q: All right. So at least to your wife, you haven't been truthful? 47 A: I would definitely agree with that, yes, ma'am. During this particular time period, yes. 48 Aplt.App. vol. II, at 252. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we conclude that there was a genuine issue, precluding summary judgment, as to how much Ms. May knew about the illegal activity in her home and business property. Thus, the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the government as to those interests.