Opinion ID: 2248048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense Counsel's Trial Tactics

Text: Alternately, the State maintains that defense counsel's own trial tactics precluded introduction of the polygraph evidence, even for a limited purpose. The State argues that defendant should not be permitted to use trial tactics to force a court into allowing the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. According to the State, defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude all references to the polygraph examination. The trial court granted defendant's motion and ordered the State to make no reference to either polygraph evidence or the fact that the test had been given. Subsequently, the State moved the court to order that all orders in limine be applied to both parties. According to the State, its motion for reciprocity was allowed. The State asserts that, despite the clear intent of the court's rulings on the motions in limine, defense counsel, in opening statement, violated the orders in limine by referring to the polygraph test and the results. The State maintains, therefore, that the trial court properly barred defendant from presenting any further evidence concerning the polygraph, and urges us to find no error. We have examined the record to determine the scope of the trial court's orders in limine concerning the polygraph evidence. The record reveals that defense counsel moved the court in limine to bar the testimony of the polygraph examiners for fear that the jury would infer from identification of the examiners' agency that defendant took a polygraph examination. The trial court denied the motion in part, allowing the examiners to testify, but ordering that the examiners be characterized as investigative consultants. Defense counsel argued that the court's order limited the scope of defendant's cross-examination, and defendant would be denied the right to confront witnesses as to what events transpired at the polygraph interrogation. Defense counsel further argued that unless testimony of the polygraph examiners was totally barred, defense counsel would need to confront the examiners with the full facts of the interrogation. In response, the trial court stated that defense counsel might want to make [the motion] all or nothing, but that the State would be barred from including any evidence or reference to polygraph examination and from using the name of the polygraphy agency. The court further stated that if defense chooses, in their theory of the case, to raise the issue [of lie detector testing], to bring it out, that's the defense acting at their peril. In response to the State's request for prior notice of defense counsel's intent to present the polygraph evidence, the court stated, What difference is it going to make if you're going to know in advance? I'm not going to let you bring it out unless they open it up. Even if they say they're going to open it up. The State then inquired of the court concerning what would happen if defense counsel brought up the issue of the polygraph examination in opening statement. The court responded that it was not aware that defense counsel so intended. Further, the court stated that if defense counsel did bring up the examination, then, we'll deal with it with the witnesses. The court again stated that it did not consider [the motion] an all or nothing, [the court] considers the defense has to make options at some times which allow things in, or where they put things in where the state couldn't. Defense counsel made no comment during this exchange. The State further argued that the law was clear that polygraph evidence was inadmissible from either side. The court responded that defense counsel asked that the State be barred from introducing the evidence and the court allowed defense counsel's motion. The court stated that if defense counsel opened the door, then we'll have some discussion. It is apparent from the record that the trial court's order in limine did not bar defense counsel from offering the polygraph evidence. It is also apparent that defense counsel was aware of the State's concern that mention of the polygraph evidence would be made in defense counsel's opening statement. Yet, in the face of the State's expressed concerns and the trial court's statements, defense counsel stood mute. Defense counsel was certainly not required to reveal the contents of his opening statement. However, given the expressed concerns, the general rule concerning the inadmissibility of polygraph evidence, and the potential prejudicial effect of this evidence, defense counsel, in deciding to comment on this evidence, should have been guided by principles of fairness. That notwithstanding, we cannot conclude that defense counsel's tactics violated the court's order in limine on the introduction of the polygraph evidence. Additionally, we note that in June 1989, several months prior to the hearing on defendant's motion in limine on the polygraph evidence, the State moved the court for reciprocal application of all orders in limine. Our review of the record, however, has not revealed a responsive order on the State's June motion. At any rate, at the hearing on defendant's motion in limine, both the trial court and the State proceeded as though there had been no prior motion or order for reciprocal application. In fact, in response to the trial court's emphatic identification of the motion in limine on the polygraph evidence as defendant's, the State responded that it would file a motion seeking reciprocal application. Subsequent to the court's order in limine on defendant's motion, the State did file a motion. However, the State sought only reconsideration of the court's order disallowing the use of the name of the polygraph agency. Resolution of whether defense counsel's conduct was violative of the court's order in limine leaves, yet, unanswered the question of what effect this conduct had on defendant's trial. Generally, it is prejudicial error to relate inadmissible evidence in an opening statement with apparent disregard of its subsequent inadmissibility. (See Gillson v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 193, 200, 246 N.E.2d 269.) However, while we believe that any error here was harmless, since, as we discuss later, defendant's convictions must be reversed, we need not give the matter further consideration.