Opinion ID: 2515893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Language of Local Licenses Provisions of Title 12, Chapter 4

Text: [¶ 9] Section 12-4-104 is entitled Publication of notice; grant or denial; renewal preference; copy of application and notice to commission; judicial review and provides in relevant part: (a) When an application for a license, permit, renewal or any transfer of location or ownership thereof has been filed with a licensing authority, the clerk shall promptly prepare a notice of application, place the notice conspicuously upon the premises shown by the application as the proposed place of sale and publish the notice in a newspaper of local circulation once a week for four (4) consecutive weeks. The notice shall state that a named applicant has applied for a license, permit, renewal or transfer thereof, and that protests against the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit will be heard at a designated meeting of the licensing authority. Each applicant shall, at the time of filing his application, pay the clerk an amount sufficient to cover the costs of publishing notice. Notices may be substantially in the following form: NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR A.... Notice is hereby given that on the .... day of .... (year) (name of applicant) filed an application for a .... license (permit), in the office of the clerk of the city (or town or county) of .... for the following described place (and room) (insert description) and protests, if any there be, against the issuance (transfer or renewal) of the license (permit) will be heard at the hour of ....M., on the .... day of .... (year), in the (meeting place of the governing body). Dated ........ Signed ............ (b) Any license or permit authorized under this title shall not be issued, renewed or transferred until on or after the date set in the notice for hearing protests. If a renewal or transfer hearing, the hearing shall be held no later than thirty (30) days preceding the expiration date of the license or permit. A license or permit shall not be issued, renewed or transferred if the licensing authority finds from evidence presented at the hearing: (i) The welfare of the people residing in the vicinity of the proposed license or permit premises shall be adversely and seriously affected; (ii) The purpose of this title shall not be carried out by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit; (iii) The number, type and location of existing licenses or permits meet the needs of the vicinity under consideration; (iv) The desires of the residents of the county, city or town will not be met or satisfied by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit; or (v) Any other reasonable restrictions or standards which may be imposed by the licensing authority shall not be carried out by the issuance, renewal or transfer of the license or permit. (c) The owner and holder of an expired liquor license or permit or one due for expiration has a preference right to a new license for the same location. After the required notice and a public hearing, each application claiming renewal preference shall be promptly considered and acted upon by the licensing authority. .... (e) An applicant for a renewal license or permit may appeal to the district court from an adverse decision by the licensing authority. No applicant for a new license shall have a right of appeal from the decision of the licensing authority denying an application. (f) Upon an appeal the person applying for a license and claiming renewal preference shall be named as plaintiff, with the licensing authority named as defendant. During the pendency of an appeal, a renewal license denied by a licensing authority shall not be granted to any other applicant. Upon notice of appeal the clerk shall transmit to the clerk of the district court a certified copy of the application, of each protest if any, and of the minutes recording the decision appealed from. The appeal shall be heard as a trial de novo with evidence taken and other proceedings had as in the trial of civil actions. The court may accept and consider as part of the record certified documents forwarded to the court by the clerk of the licensing authority. The case shall be heard promptly and the procedure shall conform to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure unless other procedures are provided for or required. (Emphasis added.) The express language of § 12-4-104(e) only grants a right of appeal to applicants for renewal licenses or permits, and appeals by new applicants are categorically denied. The appeal procedure set forth in § 12-4-104(f) notably does not refer to appeals in a generic context. On the contrary, the first sentence of the subsection expressly limits the parties to an appeal: Upon an appeal the person applying for a license and claiming renewal preference shall be named as plaintiff, with the licensing authority named as defendant. Section 12-4-104(f). [¶ 10] Neither § 12-4-104(e) nor § 12-4-104(f), which specifically set out appeal rights and procedures, mentions the term transfer or its derivations. This is relevant because the term is referenced at least ten separate times throughout the other subsections of § 12-4-104. Further, all the Local Licenses provisions of Title 12, Chapter 4 (§§ 12-4-101 to 702) taken together mention the term transfer or its derivations over thirty times. The frequent usage of the term throughout the Local Licenses provisions, and § 12-4-104 itself, makes the absence of its use in § 12-4-104(e) and § 12-4-104(f) conspicuous. We conclude the exclusion of the term transfer from the provisions governing appeals is not a mere oversight, but rather it evidences an affirmative legislative choice to limit such appeals. [¶ 11] Also relevant to the interpretation of the language of § 12-4-104 is the express language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-601(a) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides in pertinent part: (a) After public hearing and with the approval of the licensing authority, a license or permit may be transferred to or renewed on different premises on the same basis as the original application. (Emphasis added.) The language chosen for this provision clearly establishes a transfer applicant for a different location is on the same footing as a new applicant. A renewal applicant, on the other hand, has a preference right, pursuant to § 12-4-104(c), which is not provided to a transfer applicant. This statute is consistent with authority holding a transfer license is to be treated in the same manner as an original application. An application to a licensing board by the holder of a liquor license and a proposed transferee thereof for approval of the transfer is in effect an application by the proposed transferees for a license and should be dealt with as if it were an original application .... Whether to approve a transfer is at the discretion of the agency. 45 Am.Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 172 at 701 (1999). [T]he requirements for change of license location are the same as those for obtaining a license, and the duties and authority of the [liquor licensing authority] are the same. It is urged ... that the holder of a license is entitled to more favorable consideration than an applicant for a new license and that the same is true of an applicant for change of location. We cannot so adjudge. We have repeatedly held that it was the intention of the legislature to vest a wide discretion in local licensing authorities. In the case of Board of County Commissioners of Gunnison County v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 108, 213 P.2d 608, 612, involving an application for renewal of a license, we stated: The defendant board was not bound by any prior action of any licensing authority with relation to the facts pertaining to the issuance of any license for former years, but was called upon to exercise its own discretion as of the date of the new application. Conceivably the licensing authority passing upon the new application, in the exercise of its discretion, might with propriety reject an application which a former board, upon the same facts, had approved, and in so doing the board would not, of necessity, be guilty of an abuse of discretion, or an arbitrary and capricious exercise thereof. There is no vested right in a licensee to continue in the liquor business beyond the expiration of the date of the license under which he operates. Equally, there is no vested right in a licensee to move the location of his license, and, upon application so to do, the court may, and should, consider the same as in [the] case of [an] application for a new license. The statute requires it be given like consideration. MacArthur v. Martelli, 127 Colo. 308, 255 P.2d 969, 969-70 (1953) (en banc). [¶ 12] Likewise, in Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520 (1957), this court indicated transfer applications should be considered as original applications. At the time Whitesides was decided, § 53-205, W.C.S.1945, the predecessor of § 12-4-104, did not reference the term transfer. The applicant, who had a liquor license for a number of years at the Frontier Hotel, applied for a new license to be issued for another location. He did so by completing the regular form but marked it Retail Liquor License and renewal thereof at new location. 319 P.2d at 521. Addressing the question of whether this license had the characteristics of a renewal with rights of appeal, Chief Justice Blume stated in relevant part: Unlike the provisions in many other states, the legislature in this state has seen fit not to grant the right of appeal in all cases. Such right is distinctly limited. It is not given when an applicant wants an original license and which is denied. It is limited to those applying for a renewal.... Counsel for applicant contends, if we understand him correctly, that the right of renewal granted by statute means a new license without reference to its terms, that is to say, even though a location different from that mentioned in the license sought to be renewed is asked for, the change of location makes no difference whatever. Of course that cannot be true, particularly in view of the importance attached by various provisions of our statutes to the place for dispensing liquor. We cannot follow counsel's reasoning. When oxygen is combined with hydrogen, the former loses its identity. An entirely different element arises. So when the demand for a new license which is limited to a certain place is combined with a demand for a change of location, an entirely new situation comes into existence.... ... When, accordingly, the statute speaks of the renewal of a license, it speaks of one which contains the same terms and conditions of the old license, namely, one which permits the sale of intoxicating liquor at the same place as permitted in the old license. It is the denial of that kind of license from which an appeal may be taken to the district court and not from the denial of another kind.... .... In this case we should probably consider the application of the applicant as an original application for a license. There are many cases holding that where the statute provides for no appeal to the courts, or forbids it, as our state does except to a limited extent, the action of the governing board is final. Scott v. Township Board of Arcada Tp., 268 Mich. 170, 255 N.W. 752; State ex rel. Renner v. Noel, 346 Mo. 286, 140 S.W.2d 57; Marsh v. Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 54 R.I. 57, 169 A. 747; Duncan v. Superior Court of Pinal County, 65 Ariz. 193, 177 P.2d 374; Minkoff v. Payne, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 123, 210 F.2d 689; Appeal of Zeltner, 174 Pa.Super. 98, 100 A.2d 132; Jones v. Kellogg, Tex.Civ.App., 140 S.W.2d 592; State of Texas v. Lemaster, Tex.Civ.App., 275 S.W.2d 164; Ziebell v. Hall, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 899. 319 P.2d at 523-25. [¶ 13] As we noted in Walker v. Board of County Commissioners, Albany County, 644 P.2d 772, 776 (Wyo.1982), although the Whitesides court questioned the propriety of an appeal from the denial of a transfer request, it nevertheless went on to examine the record and concluded there was no abuse of discretion or arbitrary action on the part of the city council. In the instant appeal, the issue of whether the denial of a transfer request by the governing body of a city can be appealed is now squarely before us for definitive resolution. [¶ 14] The express language of the statutes provides only a right of appeal from a denial of a renewal request. No express right of appeal is made available from a denial of a transfer application. Further, the statutes mandate a transfer request be treated on the same basis as an original application for a liquor license. An appeal from the denial of an original application is specifically precluded. Therefore, through deductive reasoning, no appeal is available from the denial of a transfer application. In this case, Albertson's application was clearly for a transfer and not a renewal. The license in question had been renewed immediately prior to the hearing on the application to transfer the license. B. Structure of the Statutory Scheme and Objectives [¶ 15] It is a fundamental principle that there is no inherent right in a citizen, or any one, to sell intoxicating liquors by retail, and that there is not a vested right in any person to have a liquor license. Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 11 S.Ct. 13, 34 L.Ed. 620; Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42. As it is a business attended with danger to the community, it may ... be entirely prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it may deem proper the power of passing upon applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue licenses for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative will only. Crowley v. Christensen, supra . State ex rel. Noble v. City Council of City of Cheyenne, 7 Wyo. 417, 52 P. 975, 979 (1898); see also Berry v. Arapahoe and Shoshone Tribes, 420 F.Supp. 934, 941 (D.Wyo.1976). [¶ 16] It has been long established that the legislature may control and regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors for the protection of the people. The purpose of the local licensing provisions found in §§ 12-4-101 to -702, W.S.1977, is the exercise of regulatory control by licensing authorities over those who engage in the retail sale of intoxicating liquors in Wyoming. Sterner v. United States, 774 P.2d 639, 643-44 (Wyo.1989). In this regard, the Local Licenses provisions (§§ 12-4-101 to -702) supply the regulatory framework and procedural requirements for issuance of liquor licenses. A part of that [regulatory] control is to limit the period for which a license may be in existence and to periodically require licensees to justify their continuing privilege to engage in the business of retail liquor sales. Thus, a limitation upon the right to transfer, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the particular license ... is consistent with state policy. 774 P.2d at 644. This court has specifically acknowledged the regulatory purpose and nature of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-601 (Lexis-Nexis 2001). The requirement that liquor licenses only be transferred according to W.S. 12-4-601 serves to assure that the regulatory authorities can administer the licensing process in an orderly fashion and that the operator of [a] retail liquor establishment... be exposed to the scrutiny of the licensing process including a public hearing. Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Dev. Co., Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo.1985). Dubray v. Howshar, 884 P.2d 23, 28 (Wyo.1994). [¶ 17] A liquor license is a mere privilege, which is at all times in the control of the legislature. 45 Am.Jur.2d Intoxicating Liquors § 177 (1999). We conclude § 12-4-104(e), which grants the right of appeal only to applicants denied renewal of a license, and § 12-4-601(a), which requires a transfer applicant be considered on the same basis as the original application, are consistent with the legislature's broad authority and the regulatory purpose of the Local Licenses provisions.