Opinion ID: 2085397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Duration of the Commission of Armed Robbery

Text: Armed robbery is the taking of property from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force while armed with a dangerous weapon. 720 ILCS 5/18-1, 18-2(a) (West 1994). A taking from the person or presence is met when the property is in the possession or control of the victim and the robber uses violence or fear of violence as the means to take it. People v. Smith, 78 Ill.2d 298, 302-03, 35 Ill.Dec. 761, 399 N.E.2d 1289 (1980). Although the required force or threat of force must either precede or be contemporaneous with the taking of the victim's property ( People v. Foster, 198 Ill. App.3d 986, 994, 145 Ill.Dec. 312, 556 N.E.2d 1214 (1990); People v. Cox, 197 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1038-39, 145 Ill.Dec. 518, 557 N.E.2d 288 (1990)), use of a dangerous weapon at any point in a robbery will constitute armed robbery as long as it reasonably can be said to be a part of a single occurrence ( Foster, 198 Ill.App.3d at 994-95, 145 Ill.Dec. 312, 556 N.E.2d 1214). Sufficient force exists where the force used is part of a series of events that constitute a single incident or occurrence. Foster, 198 Ill.App.3d at 995, 145 Ill.Dec. 312, 556 N.E.2d 1214. Generally, where a victim observes a weapon, a sufficient threat of force exists ( People v. Hollingsworth, 120 Ill. App.3d 177, 179-80, 75 Ill.Dec. 620, 457 N.E.2d 1062 (1983)); however, the mere threat of the imminent use will suffice ( People v. Taylor, 129 Ill.2d 80, 84, 133 Ill.Dec. 466, 541 N.E.2d 677 (1989)). In the absence of facts to show that fear was reasonable, a mere subjective feeling of fear will not support a conviction for robbery. Hollingsworth, 120 Ill.App.3d at 179, 75 Ill.Dec. 620, 457 N.E.2d 1062. The offense of robbery is complete when force or threat of force causes the victim to part with possession or custody of property against his will. Smith, 78 Ill.2d at 303, 35 Ill.Dec. 761, 399 N.E.2d 1289; see also People v. Baker, 365 Ill. 328, 6 N.E.2d 665 (1936) (holding that a robbery is complete when property is moved from its customary location with the intent to deprive the owner of the property, even though escape with the property is thwarted); see also People v. Campbell, 234 Ill. 391, 84 N.E. 1035 (1908). Consistent with jurisprudence developed in our appellate court, the State construes force to include not only the force used in the taking, but also the force used to effectuate the defendant's departure. See, e.g., People v. Kennedy, 10 Ill.App.3d 519, 294 N.E.2d 788 (1973); People v. Ditto, 98 Ill.App.3d 36, 53 Ill.Dec. 590, 424 N.E.2d 3 (1981); People v. Ortiz, 156 Ill.App.3d 170, 108 Ill.Dec. 937, 509 N.E.2d 633 (1987). The appellate court in this case clearly disagreed with this line of reasoning, holding that the robbery ended when the Perez brothers gave up their property. The appellate court's position is, however, consistent with Smith, 78 Ill.2d 298, 35 Ill.Dec. 761, 399 N.E.2d 1289. Jones was criminally liable and the offense of robbery was completed, for purposes of a guilt determination, at the moment in time when he forcefully took the radio. His conduct beyond the taking neither enhanced nor diminished his criminal culpability for robbery. Smith would appear to be inconsistent with those appellate court cases which have held, in effect, that the robbery continues for as long as force is being used, either to perfect the taking of property or to effectuate a departure from the scene. However, as the State correctly perceives, Smith may be read to define the minimum conduct required to constitute a completed robbery. In our view, the appellate court's broad construction of the force element is not an unreasonable one and tends to capture that conduct which is the true essence of an armed robbery offense. In many instances, flight or an escape is effectuated by use of force. It is the accompanying force which properly continues the commission of the offense. However, the fact that an escape is made possible by reason of the use of force does not render escape an element of the offense. In a case where an escape is accomplished without force, it cannot reasonably be argued that such escape is a part of the substantive offense. Neither flight from pursuing victims nor escape is included as an element in the statutory definition of robbery. See 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a) (West 1994). Thus, consistent with Smith, the offense of armed robbery is complete when force or threat of force causes the victim to part with possession or custody of property against his will. Although the force which occurs simultaneously with flight or an escape may be viewed as continuing the commission of the offense (see, e.g., Kennedy, 10 Ill.App.3d 519, 294 N.E.2d 788; Ditto, 98 Ill.App.3d 36, 53 Ill.Dec. 590, 424 N.E.2d 3; Ortiz, 156 Ill. App.3d 170, 108 Ill.Dec. 937, 509 N.E.2d 633), it is the force, not escape, which is the essence and constitutes an element of the offense. The commission of an armed robbery ends when force and taking, the elements which constitute the offense, have ceased. In sum, it has long been emphasized that the gist of the offense of robbery is the force or fear of violence directed at the victim in order to deprive him of his property. Taylor, 129 Ill.2d 80, 133 Ill.Dec. 466, 541 N.E.2d 677; Burke v. People, 148 Ill. 70, 35 N.E. 376 (1893). A person who forms the intent to facilitate an escape only after the forceful taking of property has occurred can neither aid nor facilitate the conduct which is an element of robbery. That person is less culpable than the perpetrator and his action serves merely to impede apprehension of the perpetrator. This separate offense is subject to penalization under the current version of our accessory-after-the-fact provision. See 720 ILCS 5/31-5 (West 1994). We acknowledge that, at least in the context of felony murder, we have held that if a killing occurs in the course of an escape from a robbery, the escape is within the operation of the felony-murder rule. That rule had its genesis in People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171, 173, 192 N.E. 856 (1934), citing People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 290 P. 881 (1930). In Bongiorno, this court recognized, as a principle of law, that where two or more persons are engaged in a conspiracy to commit robbery and an officer is murdered while in immediate pursuit of either or both of the offenders who are attempting escape from the scene of the crime with the fruits of the robbery, either in possession of one or both, the crime of robbery is not complete at the time of the murder, inasmuch as the conspirators had not then won their way, even momentarily, to a place of temporary safety, and the possession of the plunder was nothing more than a scrambling possession. Accord People v. Golson, 32 Ill.2d 398, 408, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965); People v. Johnson, 55 Ill.2d 62, 68, 302 N.E.2d 20 (1973); People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.2d 89, 94, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974) (holding that the period of time and activities involved in escaping to place of safety are part of crime itself); People v. Smallwood, 102 Ill.2d 190, 80 Ill.Dec. 66, 464 N.E.2d 1049 (1984) (holding that the act of robbery itself has not necessarily been completed at time victim surrenders the property so that no further consequences will attach to robber's conduct subsequent to surrender of property). The State does not now seek, and we are not inclined, to extend the felony-murder escape rule to apply in accountability cases. Certain policy considerations inform our decision. Felony murder and accountability have theoretically different underpinnings. Felony murder seeks to deter persons from committing forcible felonies by holding them responsible for murder if a death results. People v. Viser, 62 Ill.2d 568, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975). Because of the extremely violent nature of felony murder, we seek the broadest bounds for the attachment of criminal liability. For that reason, in felony murder, a defendant's liability is not limited to his culpability for commission of the underlying felony. A defendant may be found guilty of felony murder regardless of a lack either of intent to commit murder (see People v. Moore, 95 Ill.2d 404, 69 Ill.Dec. 640, 447 N.E.2d 1327 (1983)), or even connivance with a codefendant (see People v. Burke, 85 Ill. App.3d 939, 41 Ill.Dec. 230, 407 N.E.2d 728 (1980)). Our continued adherence to a proximate cause approach is further exemplary of how broadly we seek to extend the reaches of criminal liability in the case of felony murder. See People v. Lowery, 178 Ill.2d 462, 227 Ill.Dec. 491, 687 N.E.2d 973 (1997); see also Hickman, 59 Ill.2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511. Unlike felony murder, accountability focuses on the degree of culpability of the offender and seeks to deter persons from intentionally aiding or encouraging the commission of offenses. Holding a defendant who neither intends to participate in the commission of an offense nor has knowledge that an offense has been committed accountable does not serve the rule's deterrent effect. Further, the attachment of liability in such situations contravenes general concepts of criminal culpability. The felony-murder escape rule contemplates neither knowledge nor intent. Thus, the rule is irreconcilable with our accountability statute and we decline to apply it in that context. See In re D.C., 259 Ill. App.3d 637, 197 Ill.Dec. 661, 631 N.E.2d 883 (1994), overruled in part, People v. Taylor, 287 Ill.App.3d 254, 222 Ill.Dec. 746, 678 N.E.2d 358 (1997) (holding that felony-murder escape rule does not apply for purposes of accountability); accord Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 1158, 811 P.2d 742, 282 Cal.Rptr. 450; but see Trammell, 71 Ill.App.3d 60, 27 Ill.Dec. 315, 389 N.E.2d 1 (applying felony-murder escape rule outside context of felony murder).