Opinion ID: 759248
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: McKinley's Sentence

Text: 70 Following trial, a presentence report was prepared for McKinley setting forth the various transactions for which there was evidence that McKinley was involved, either by directly selling the cocaine or crack himself, or by having it sold from his house by his codefendants. Those amounts totaled 87.4 grams of crack. In addition, the PSR noted a March 1993 incident in which $75,695 was seized in Pennsylvania from a hidden compartment in a car linked to McKinley. And the PSR stated, somewhat conclusorily, that information supplied by informants and information from other investigations resulted in an estimate that the conspirators distributed over 150 kilograms of cocaine in the Youngstown area, from 1989 to 1993. The PSR then set forth a base offense level of 34 pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1, 1B1.3, based on an estimate that [t]he total quantity of drugs possessed and distributed during the course of this conspiracy is 173.8 grams of cocaine base and 25.2 grams of cocaine, which is equivalent to a marijuana weight of 3481.04 kilograms. Four levels were added because [a]ccording to investigative information provided by the Government, the defendant's role is viewed as that of a leader, considering his degree of participation; no specific factual underpinnings for this conclusion were provided. 71 The defendant filed objections to the quantity of drugs and the four-point enhancement for a leadership role. The district court ordered the parties to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on sentencing issues; the defendant, however, failed to do so. 72 Following the sentencing hearing, the district court issued detailed findings and conclusions. First, it concluded, that 173.8 grams of cocaine base was attributable to McKinley based on his own actions or the actions of his coconspirators. McKinley was further responsible for 7 ounces and 6 kilograms of cocaine listed in transactional ledgers found in his house, as well as 3.5 kilograms of cocaine represented by the currency seized in Pennsylvania, based on a price of $22,000 per kilogram. The court next held McKinley responsible for 10.6 grams of cocaine sold on August 24, 1993, as well as for 64.7 grams of lidocaine that McKinley sold under the belief that it was cocaine. The court concluded its amount computations with the following: McKinley distributed his cocaine with the knowledge and understanding that it would be converted into crack cocaine before being distributed to the consumer. 73 The court then addressed the role-in-the-offense enhancement: 74 The Court further finds that McKinley was a supplier of cocaine to others, including, but not limited to, the coconspirators in this indictment. The Court find [sic] that William A. McKinley was a leader or organizer of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants and was otherwise extensive as set forth in § 3B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Specifically, McKinley was a leader and organizer of a group which included Andre Rodriguez, Curtis Shepherd, Richard Edwards, Tariton Callier, Darnell Walker, Aaron Rogers, and others. 75 The resulting total offense level was 38, with a recommended sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. The court issued a judgment sentencing McKinley to 260 months' imprisonment.
76 On appeal, McKinley argues that the district court erroneously attributed to him amounts of cocaine that were not reasonably foreseeable to him, and with which he was not involved. He contends that he was not a member of this conspiracy, because he was not a member of the Ready Rock Boys. 77 The government bears a  'burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of drugs for which a defendant is accountable.'  United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 267 (6th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). A coconspirator is responsible, for sentencing purposes, for the amount of drugs that the government proves by a preponderance were the result of  'reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the' conspiracy. United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo, 148 F.3d 577, 593 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)). We review for clear error the district court's finding as to the quantity of drugs attributed to a defendant. See Charles, 138 F.3d at 267. As a general rule, a court's determination is not clearly erroneous if it is supported by competent evidence in the record. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 78 McKinley has presented absolutely no basis for reversal on this point. His argument regarding his membership in the Ready Rock Boys is one that we have already discussed and rejected as being factually spurious, as well as legally inconsequential. He offers no other coherent, factually supported argument. For example, he contends that the members of the conspiracy kept their buys secret from one another, but he points to no evidence in the record supporting the assertion. Because we view the district court's findings as reasonable, well-articulated, and supported by citations to evidence in the record, we conclude that McKinley's challenge fails.
79 McKinley next argues that the district court erred in finding him responsible for any amount of cocaine base, or crack, as opposed to cocaine. He bases this argument on the alleged failure of the government expert to positively identify the existence of either baking soda or sodium bicarbonate, as required by the guidelines' definition of crack, in the samples provided by law enforcement officers. Therefore, he concludes, the cocaine under consideration was not crack. See generally United States v. Valenzuela, 150 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir.1998). The government disagrees with McKinley's characterization of the evidence, and points to testimony of the expert that supports the determination that the substance in question was crack. 80 The government also points out that McKinley did not raise this argument in the district court. It is well-established that sentencing arguments not raised in the district court are forfeited and, as a general rule, not considered by this court on appeal: 81 Since the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, the sentencing of a criminal defendant has become a relatively complex procedure involving the consideration of a number of factors. In practice, however, the guidelines give the defendant an advance look at the sentence likely to be imposed and the factors justifying the sentence. Defendant then has an opportunity before sentencing to file objections and to be heard at sentencing on any issues that impact upon the sentence. 82 If the system is to work and if appellate review is to be meaningful, it is absolutely essential that a defendant raise all objections to the sentence before the sentencing judge in the first instance. For this reason, the law has developed that a failure to object results in a waiver. 83 United States v. Cullens, 67 F.3d 123, 124 (6th Cir.1995). 84 We decline to address this argument because McKinley failed to alert the sentencing court that he had any concerns on this score. The question whether the substance in question met the criteria set forth in the guidelines for crack is a fact-intensive one. If the existence of any dispute on the subject had been called to the lower court's attention, it could have been definitively resolved through the presentation of evidence at the sentencing hearing. McKinley did not do so, though, and it is too late to do so now.
85 McKinley's final sentencing challenge is that the district court clearly erred in finding that McKinley was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the conspiracy, and therefore increasing his offense level by two, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).  'A district court's determination regarding a defendant's role in the offense is reversible only if clearly erroneous.'  United States v. Washington, 127 F.3d 510, 515 (6th Cir.1997) (citation omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 2348, 141 L.Ed.2d 2718 (1998). 86 The government points to various items of evidence that it contends support the district court's determination. Our careful review of the evidence, however, makes clear that the government has greatly exaggerated the state of the record, as well as the significance of the testimony it cites. Further, the government implicitly exaggerates the extent of the case-law support for its position. None of the four cases it has relied on give it any aid; either the cases are inapposite, addressing the sentencing court's findings regarding the number of people involved in the conspiracy, Elder, 90 F.3d at 1110; United States v. Ghazaleh, 58 F.3d 240 (6th Cir.1995), or they involve leadership activity by defendants that is far in excess of what even the government believes the evidence showed here, see United States v. Schultz,, 14 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir.1994); United States v. Perkins, 994 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir.1993). 87 Our own perusal of the record reveals nothing that suggests McKinley was a leader. Not a single witness, at trial or at sentencing, discussed any organizational role for McKinley, either administratively (by setting up deals or keeping track of people's salaries, as it were), or by actually directing the action. No one mentioned ever hearing McKinley directing anyone to do anything. The inference we draw from reading the testimony is that McKinley answered to Edwards, and we find nothing to suggest that anyone answered to McKinley. In our view, the government has produced far below what it needs in order to sustain this enhancement, and we conclude that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous.