Opinion ID: 164283
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of the Original Sentence

Text: In arguing against the revocation of his supervised release, Mr. Turner challenges the legality of his original sentence. He argues that a sentence of zero months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release is illegal because supervised release can only be imposed following a period of initial imprisonment. Both Mr. Turner and the government concede that the first part of the original sentence is legal, as we have explicitly upheld a sentence of zero months’ imprisonment. See United States v. Elliott, 971 F.2d 620, 621 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We conclude that a sentence of zero months does not literally violate the prohibition on probation in 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(1).”). The United States Code and the Sentencing Guidelines suggest that a period of imprisonment must proceed a supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (“The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a felony or a misdemeanor, may include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.”) (emphasis added); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 (“(a) The court shall order a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment when a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed, or when required by statute. (b) The court may order a term of supervised release to follow imprisonment in any other case.”) -6- (emphasis added). Based on this language, the Second Circuit has held that “[i]t is clear that supervised release can never be imposed without an initial period of imprisonment.” United States v. Thomas, 135 F.3d 873, 875 (2d Cir. 1998). However, we need not decide at this time whether § 3583(a) and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1 compel the conclusion that supervised release presupposes a period of imprisonment because we find that Mr. Turner waived his right to challenge the legality of his sentence by failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. “In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 10 days after the later of: (i) the entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed; or (ii) the filing of the government’s notice of appeal.” F ED . R. A PP . P. 4(b)(1)(A). The court originally sentenced Mr. Turner on November 14, 2002; the judgment was entered on November 22, 2002. Mr. Turner did not file an appeal of his sentence within the ten-day period. He asserts that he is now making a direct attack on the legality of the sentence, but such an attack is clearly time-barred under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Mr. Turner relies on the Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Thomas, in which the defendant successfully challenged the legality of her original sentence despite having failed to raise the issue on direct appeal. Thomas is distinguishable from this case, however, because in Thomas the government conceded the permissibility of the challenge. 135 F.3d at 874. Here, the -7- government argues that Mr. Turner’s challenge to the legality of his sentence is barred due to his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal. Alternatively, Mr. Turner’s challenge to his original sentence can be viewed as a collateral attack. Mr. Turner contends that his challenge is not collateral in nature because he is “directly” attacking the revocation of his original sentence. The government posits that “[w]hen the Probation Office sought to revoke the supervised release portion of the sentence, [Mr. Turner] did challenge the sentence collaterally” and that “[i]n doing so, he, in effect, made a motion to the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Aple’s Br. at 18. However, Mr. Turner’s argument cannot succeed even if he did pursue this issue through a collateral challenge, as his failure to challenge the sentence on direct appeal severely limits his ability to raise the issue collaterally. “Generally, a movant is barred from raising an alleged error affecting his conviction or sentence for the first time on collateral review unless he can show both cause for the default and actual prejudice.” 1 United States v. Wiseman, 297 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 153, 1 A defendant can also be excused from failing to raise a challenge on direct appeal by showing that the error has resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 341 (10th Cir. 1996). The miscarriage of justice exception does not apply in this case because Mr. Turner “has not made a colorable showing of factual innocence.” Id.; see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (noting that the miscarriage of justice exception is “explicitly tied” to defendant’s innocence). -8- 167 (1982) (“[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous objection was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he complains.”). A movant can show cause for the procedural default if he can demonstrate that his claim was so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel. Cause can also be established by showing that counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Additionally, the § 2255 movant who challenges his conviction can overcome the procedural bar if he can demonstrate that the constitutional error has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. Wiseman, 297 F.3d at 979 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Mr. Turner has not attempted to show cause for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal or actual prejudice resulting from the error. Notably, he actively sought the sentence he now claims is illegal by filing a sentencing motion asking for “a downward departure of five levels to a level 8, which would permit the Court to impose a sentence of zero-months custody followed by Supervised Release.” Aplt’s Br. at 12 (quoting Defendant’s Sentencing Motion at 23). His zero-month sentence was far below the twelve- to eighteen-month range provided in the Sentencing Guidelines and resulted from the district court’s concern for his health and desire to facilitate rehabilitation. See Rec. vol. 1, doc. 111, at 1 (Order, filed June 11, 2003) (“At sentencing, the Court granted the government’s motion for a downward departure on the basis of Defendant’s serious medical -9- condition.”). Mr. Turner clearly had no intention of challenging the sentence until he found himself back in court for violating the terms of his supervised release. For these reasons, we hold that Mr. Turner’s challenge to the legality of his original sentence is barred by his failure to timely raise the issue on direct appeal.