Opinion ID: 165009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactivity of Crawford v. Washington

Text: 15 Because the Wyoming Supreme Court's reasoning was contrary to clearly established law, AEDPA deference does not apply. See Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1248 (10th Cir.2003). That, however, is not the end of our inquiry. We must determine de novo if a violation of the Confrontation Clause occurred. Id. 16 Before we proceed to the examination of whether any Confrontation Clause violation occurred, however, we determine if the Supreme Court's recent decision in Crawford v. Washington should be given retroactive effect in this case. Because we are faced with an initial habeas petition, we determine retroactivity by applying the framework set forth in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.2002). In Crawford, the Supreme Court ruled that the admission at trial of testimonial hearsay, like the statements given by Vena in this case, is a violation of the Confrontation Clause. ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1374, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Under Teague, new rules of constitutional law are not made retroactive to habeas petitions unless they place[ ] certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, or set forth watershed rules of criminal procedure. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (quotation omitted). Accordingly, our first inquiry must be whether Crawford created a new rule of constitutional law. 17 A decision by the Supreme Court announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time defendant's conviction became final. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 347 (1990) (quotation omitted). As we explained above, prior to the decision in Crawford, Roberts provided the appropriate framework for determining whether the admission of hearsay statements violated the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court itself noted that the logic of Roberts was inconsistent with the Court's conclusion in Crawford that the Confrontation Clause requires an opportunity to cross-examine before testimonial hearsay may be admitted against the defendant. Crawford, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1369. Thus, Roberts and its progeny did not dictate the result in Crawford and we conclude that it announces a new rule of constitutional law. See Crawford, at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1374 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's holding as a new interpretation of the Confrontation Clause). 18 Whether the rule of Crawford should be retroactively applied, therefore, depends on whether it meets one of the two exceptions articulated by the Court in Teague. Clearly, the first exception does not apply because Crawford does not place private conduct beyond the power of law-making authority to proscribe. We must examine then whether Crawford set forth a watershed rule of criminal procedure. As we have noted before, this exception is narrowly defined. Johnson v. McKune, 288 F.3d 1187, 1197-98 (10th Cir.2002). To qualify as a `watershed' rule of criminal procedure, the rule must not only improve the accuracy with which defendants are convicted or acquitted, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Mora, 293 F.3d at 1218-19 (quotation omitted). We conclude that the rule in Crawford does not meet this definition. 19 It is true that in Crawford the Court referred to the protections of the Confrontation Clause as a bedrock procedural guarantee, Crawford, ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 1359, but that comment does not necessarily suggest that the rule set forth in Crawford is on the magnitude of the rule announced in Gideon v. Wainwright  5 as it must be to fit within the Teague exception. See Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219. Unlike Gideon, Crawford does not alter[ ] our understanding of what constitutes basic due process, Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219, but merely sets out new standards for the admission of certain kinds of hearsay. Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis and thus may be excused depending on the state of the evidence at trial. Crespin v. New Mexico, 144 F.3d 641, 649 (1998). It would, therefore, be difficult to conclude that the rule in Crawford alters rights fundamental to due process. See Mora, 293 F.3d at 1219 (holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey did not alter fundamental due process rights, in part because Apprendi errors could be excused given overwhelming evidence). Accordingly, we conclude that Crawford is not a watershed decision and is, therefore, not retroactively applicable to Brown's initial habeas petition.