Opinion ID: 3065109
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Nash’s Claims Could Benefit from the

Text: Ability to Communicate Rationally We next examine the claims that Nash seeks to raise on appeal, and whether those claims could potentially benefit from the right to competence set forth in Rohan. We conclude that they could so benefit. Among the thirteen claims raised in Nash’s habeas petition and decided by the district court were allegations that Nash received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. These claims included allegations that trial counsel failed to investigate and prepare Nash’s defenses, improperly induced Nash to try the case before the trial judge, and failed to investigate and present at the penalty phase available mitigation evidence, including evidence concerning Nash’s mental illness, character, background, and family history. Indeed, the district court granted a certificate of appealability on Claim 1, which alleged that Nash was denied effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his NASH v. RYAN 13199 trial, and on Claim 2, which alleged that Nash was denied effective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial. There is no suggestion that counsel may not pursue these claims on appeal. See Reply to Response to Motion at 2 (“Two of Mr. Nash’s certified claims deal with the ineffectiveness of his counsel at guilt and sentencing . . . . Because Mr. Nash was never provided any hearing on this claim at either the State or federal level, one of Mr. Nash’s arguments on appeal would be that there should be a remand for evidentiary development [on this claim.]”). Although we do not yet know all of the arguments Nash’s counsel will present in prosecuting this appeal, we are satisfied that, like in Rohan—which also involved claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including allegations that trial counsel failed to present adequate mitigating evidence at the penalty phase—”[a]t least some of the [appellate issues that counsel have identified] could potentially benefit from [Nash’s] assistance.” Rohan, 334 F.3d at 818. Again, like the petitioner in Rohan, “if [Nash] were competent, he could support [these claims]. He is better positioned than anyone to identify aspects of his personal history that should have been, but were not, elicited.” Id. The need for rational communication here is particularly important because Nash has been assisted by several attorneys over the years, including his trial attorney Arthur G. Hazelton, state appellate counsel George Sterling and John Antieau, the attorneys who assisted him in filing his 1987 habeas petition in federal court, and current habeas counsel Thomas Phalen, Jon Sands and Paula Harms, who also represented Nash in the district court. Attempts by Nash’s current counsel to contact his trial counsel have been unsuccessful. The information that Nash possesses would provide first-hand insight into the earlier proceedings, insight that might be helpful in ways that Nash’s current attorneys cannot currently identify because of his alleged incompetence. See Rohan, 334 F.3d at 818 (“Perhaps there are cases where an incompetent petitioner’s 13200 NASH v. RYAN counsel knows exactly what he needs to know and can’t find out. Surely, however, those are the exception rather than the rule.”) As the preceding discussion makes clear, Nash’s claims may benefit from his ability to communicate rationally with his counsel even though he is prosecuting a habeas appeal, whereas the petitioner in Rohan was litigating his habeas petition in the district court. As noted above, neither Rohan nor post-Rohan cases interpreting or applying Rohan draw a distinction among the various procedural stages of a habeas proceeding, but instead focus on the types of claims at issue. For example, as the Northern District of California recently observed in applying Rohan, “claims of innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel in presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of . . . trial” are claims that “could benefit from the ability to communicate rationally.” Hill v. Ayers, No. 4-94-cv-641-CW, 2008 WL 683422, at  (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2008). Similarly, as the District of Arizona noted in a recent exhaustive opinion examining the contours of Rohan, claims that are resolvable as a pure matter of law may not require the petitioner’s assistance. See Gonzalez v. Schriro, 617 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854-55 (D. Ariz. 2008). The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Holmes is also in accord, describing—in a case involving an appeal from the denial of habeas relief—ineffective assistance of trial counsel as one of the issues that may require a layperson’s contribution to counsel’s strategy. 506 F.3d at 579-80. In sum, the success of the two ineffective assistance claims on which the district court granted a certificate of appealability may depend on Nash’s ability to rationally communicate with counsel. Accordingly, we turn next to whether the evidence of Nash’s incompetence is sufficient to warrant a competency determination.