Opinion ID: 1290303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conspiracy to interfere with business

Text: In its fourth amended petition, appellant alleged that appellees entered into a mutual agreement and engaged in actions that constitute a conspiracy to intentionally harm and injure appellant by disrupting its business operations. Only the six employees were named as defendants, and the corporation itself was not charged with conspiracy. Appellees asserted two affirmative defenses. First, they state that at all times material to appellant's allegations, they were employees of LRA and acted within the scope of their employment. Further, appellees asserted that all of their actions within the scope of their employment were justified actions protected by a privilege afforded design engineers. A conspiracy to unlawfully injure another's business is actionable. Diesel Service, Inc. v. Accessory Sales, Inc., 210 Neb. 797, 317 N.W.2d 719 (1982). A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish by concerted action an unlawful or oppressive object, or a lawful object by unlawful or oppressive means. Treptow Co. v. Duncan Aviation, Inc., 210 Neb. 72, 313 N.W.2d 224 (1981); Dixon v. Reconciliation, Inc., 206 Neb. 45, 291 N.W.2d 230 (1980); Peters v. Woodman Accident & Life Co., 170 Neb. 861, 104 N.W.2d 490 (1960). The necessary elements of tortious interference with a business relationship or expectation are (1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) knowledge by the interferer of the relationship or expectancy, (3) an unjustified intentional act of interference on the part of the interferer, (4) proof that the interference caused the harm sustained, and (5) damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy was disrupted. Matheson v. Stork, 239 Neb. 547, 477 N.W.2d 156 (1991). As more fully discussed below, appellant's argument that the LRA employees conspired to interfere with its business relationships fails for two reasons. First, there is absolutely no evidence that the employees acted outside the scope of their employment with LRA, and therefore, there is no showing of conspiracy. Each appellee has submitted an affidavit describing his duties and responsibilities as an employee or officer of LRA. For example, appellee Ludewig stated that his responsibilities entailed representing the owner during the construction phase of the project and advising and consulting with the owner. Appellee Steenson stated he participated in the preparation of the plat for SID No. 337. All appellees aver that their actions were within the scope of their employment. Despite bare allegations in appellant's pleadings, appellant failed to offer any evidence to indicate that any appellee acted outside the scope of his employment with LRA. Without some evidence that appellees acted outside the scope of their employment for LRA, there can be no conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with an agent when the agent is acting within the scope of his or her authority. Corporations act through their agents, and the acts of an agent are the acts of the corporation. Renner v. Wurdeman, 231 Neb. 8, 434 N.W.2d 536 (1989). See, also, Dixon v. Reconciliation, Inc., supra . It follows that if all of a corporation's agents are acting within the scope of his or her authority, their acts are acts of the corporation and there is only one actor. However, the gist of a civil conspiracy action is not the conspiracy charged, but the damages the plaintiff claims to have suffered due to the wrongful acts of the defendants. Treptow Co. v. Duncan Aviation, Inc., supra ; Trebelhorn v. Bartlett, 154 Neb. 113, 47 N.W.2d 374 (1951). Failure to prove a conspiracy is of no consequence if the plaintiff is able to establish that one or more defendants committed wrongful acts resulting in damages. Treptow Co. v. Duncan Aviation, Inc., supra ; Trebelhorn v. Bartlett, supra . As the design engineer, LRA was required to act as a consultant and advisor to the owners, the SID's, with regard to the construction projects. Appellant argues that by recommending its termination from the two projects, LRA exceeded the scope of its privilege to give advice to the owners and committed wrongful acts. One of the basic elements of tortious interference with a business relationship requires an intentional act which induces or causes a breach or termination of the relationship. Renner v. Wurdeman, supra ; Miller Chemical Co., Inc. v. Tams, 211 Neb. 837, 320 N.W.2d 759 (1982). An intentional, but justified, act of interference will not subject the interferer to liability. Matheson v. Stork, supra (citing and clarifying Miller Chemical Co., Inc., v. Tams, supra ). See, also, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 770 (1979); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 129 at 983 (5th ed. 1984). For example, where a lender gave notice to a debtor's suppliers that it would no longer provide floor-plan financing to the debtor, we held that there was no improper act of interference with the debtor's business. DeLay First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745 (1976). We have not previously addressed whether there is any privilege afforded design professionals; however, other courts have done so. Those courts have held that design professionals acting within the scope of their contractual obligations to the owner cannot be liable for advising the owner to terminate a relationship with the contractor, unless the design professionals act in bad faith or with malice. Dehnert v. Arrow Sprinklers, Inc., 705 P.2d 846 (Wyo.1985); Kecko Piping Co. v. Monroe, 172 Conn. 197, 374 A.2d 179 (1977); Ballou v. Basic Construction Company, 407 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir.1969). We hold that design professionals acting within the scope of their contractual obligations are privileged to give the owner advice which may lead to the termination of a contractor. Absent a showing of bad faith or malice, a design professional's intentional, but justified, act of interference will not subject it to liability for tortious interference with business. Here, appellant argues that by recommending its termination from the two projects, LRA exceeded the scope of its privilege to interfere and to give advice to the owners. LRA is not a defendant. The privilege afforded design engineers inures to LRA, rather than appellees. However, as we stated above, all acts material to this action were within the scope of appellees' employment. If LRA did not exceed the scope of its privilege, neither did appellees. The contract documents for Storm Sewer Section I for SID No. 337 were offered into evidence by appellees. Article 9 defines the engineer's status during construction and provides that the engineer will be the owner's representative during the construction period. Further, the engineer's efforts were to be directed toward providing for OWNER a greater degree of confidence that the completed Work will conform to the Contract Documents. On the basis of ... visits and on-site observations as an experienced and qualified design professional, ENGINEER will keep OWNER informed of the progress of the Work and will endeavor to guard OWNER against defects and deficiencies in the Work. Again, LRA is not a party. Yet while appellant pleads that appellees acted outside the scope of their employment with LRA, appellant argues on the other hand that LRA, through its agents, exceeded its privilege to give advice to SID No. 337 by failing to insist that SID No. 337 follow the requirements of the contract and give appellant notice of the defects and an opportunity to cure. However, at the November 4 meeting, the engineers were asked to determine, from an engineering standpoint, whether the contractor deserved to be terminated. The engineers determined that appellant was not performing, that its work would have to be redone, and that grounds for termination existed. Once that recommendation was made, it was up to the attorney for SID No. 337 to determine the legal and appropriate method of termination. Appellant speculates in its brief regarding possible motives which might show that appellees acted with malice or bad faith and therefore outside the scope of their employment. Assuming, arguendo, that malice and bad faith would be outside the scope of appellees' employment, appellant offers no evidence to support such a finding. LRA, by and through appellees, acted within the scope of its privilege in recommending that SID No. 337 terminate appellant. Since appellees were within the scope of their employment, their actions are also privileged. Similarly, LRA, by and through appellees, acted within its privilege and with justification when it informed SID No. 291 that it would not act as design engineer if appellant was permitted to tunnel under the Union Pacific main line. Appellant had failed to procure required insurance and had indicated that it would do the tunneling itself, rather than use an experienced subcontractor as earlier promised. It appears that LRA was justifiably concerned for its own exposure to liability. LRA's board of directors determined that the company would refuse to act as design engineer, only after consulting with its corporate counsel. LRA communicated its decision to SID No. 291's board of trustees, through its president. Again, appellant offers no evidence that any of LRA's employees or agents acted outside the scope of their employment with LRA. The evidence indicates that appellees acted at all times within the scope of their employment and that LRA acted at all times within the scope of its privilege to give advice to SID No. 337 and SID No. 291. Accordingly, appellees were entitled to summary judgment in their favor as a matter of law.