Opinion ID: 854097
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unreasonableness of Sentence

Text: Young's final allegation of error is that his 195 year sentence was manifestly unreasonable because the trial court failed to consider his mental disabilities as a mitigating factor. Determination of sentences are a matter of discretion for the trial court. Sims v. State, 585 N.E.2d 271, 272 (Ind.1992). When deciding to enhance a sentence, however, the court must state all significant aggravating and mitigating factors, and articulate the balancing process by which it determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating ones. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1 (1998); Harris v. State, 659 N.E.2d 522, 527 (Ind.1995). Although weight need not be give to every mitigating factor, the court cannot ignore mitigating factors that are clearly supported by the record. Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 534 (Ind.1995). The Indiana Constitution confers upon this Court the power to review and revise sentences. Ind.Const. art. VII, § 4. But, we will not revise a sentence unless it is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B); Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 67 (Ind.1995). Finding numerous aggravating factors and no mitigating factors, the trial court sentenced Young to twenty years for robbery, fifty years for each attempted murder, and sixty-five years for murder. (R. at 864-67). The murder and two attempted murder sentences were to be served consecutively and the robbery sentence was to run concurrent with the other terms. The court then enhanced the sentence by thirty years based on the habitual finding for a total of 195 years executed. We find this sentence to be manifestly unreasonable. Although the court recorded no mitigating factors, the record clearly indicates that Young functions with the mental capacity of a child. (R. at 856, 861-62). In fact, during a pre-trial conference, the court found Young to be mentally retarded under Indiana Code § 35-36-9-2 (1998). Therefore, it determined that he could not be sentenced to life without parole under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9 (1998). (R. at 279-82). By sentencing Young to 195 years, however, the court virtually imposed life without parole anyway. We believe that the trial court should have given this mitigator some weight in the sentence.