Opinion ID: 779903
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Commerce Clause Violation

Text: 26 Invoking United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), Mr. Bayles argues that § 922(g)(8) violates the Commerce Clause. As the government notes, Mr. Bayles's argument is defeated by precedent upholding similar challenges to other subsections of § 922(g). Like § 922(g)(8), these other subsections establish as a jurisdictional element the shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving of firearms or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce. 27 In particular, in United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 586 (10th Cir.2000), we rejected a similar Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1), which applies to convicted felons. We distinguished Lopez and Morrison on the following grounds: 28 [W]hile Lopez and Morrison were questions concerning the power of Congress to regulate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce, § 922(g)(1) regulates the possession of goods moved in interstate commerce. The jurisdictional element in § 922(g)(1) puts it into a different category of analysis than the laws considered in Lopez and Morrison. Section 922(g)(1) by its language only regulates those weapons affecting interstate commerce by being the subject of interstate trade. It addresses items sent in interstate commerce, and the channels of commerce themselves — ordering they be kept clear of firearms. 29 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit has expressly rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the statute at issue here, § 922(g)(8). See United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 723 (4th Cir.1999) (Unlike the statute at issue in Lopez, Section 922(g) expressly requires the government to prove that the firearm was ship[ped] or transport[ed] in interstate or foreign commerce; was possess[ed] in or affect[ed] commerce; or is received after having been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.) (quoting § 922(g)). Other circuits have agreed. See, e.g., Napier, 233 F.3d at 402 (6th Cir.2000) (Section 922(g)(8) ... does contain a jurisdictional element that establishes that it was enacted in pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce in firearms and ammunition.); United States v. Jones, 231 F.3d 508, 514-15 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that every Court of Appeals that has considered this question has concluded that § 922(g)(8) is a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 286 (7th Cir.1998) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) because it contains a jurisdictional element that brings it within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause). 30 The reasoning of these decisions is applicable here. Section 922(g)(8) required the prosecution to prove that the weapons possessed by Mr. Bayles were ship[ped] [or transport[ed]] in interstate or foreign commerce, ... possess[ed] in or affecting commerce ... or receive[d] in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). In his Statement in Advance of a Plea of Guilty, Mr. Bayles stated:  I agree that the government could establish that the firearms had traveled in interstate commerce.  Aplt's App. at 121 (emphasis added). By pleading guilty to the charged offense, Mr. Bayles has thus admitted the required connection to interstate or foreign commerce. 31 Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Bayles's conviction under § 922(g)(8) does not violate the Commerce Clause.