Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Speculation as to future release from prison

Text: Defense counsel's psychiatric expert, Dr. Richard King, testified that defendant had revealed a dream in which he was taken from prison to the White House and was pardoned by then-President Ronald Reagan. During closing argument, the prosecutor first referred to this dream as evidence of defendant's inflated sense of self-importance, [This] just shows you how important he feels he is, the real big shot, the real big shot. Defendant did not object and does not now ascribe any error to this limited reference to the dream. (26) The problem arose when the prosecutor began arguing as to the future effect of the jury's choice between the death penalty and life in prison without the opportunity for parole. [I] just want to remind you that the defendant has hopes and dreams of getting a pardon in this case right from President Reagan. Now, I'm asking you to foreclose any hopes that he has of ever getting out. I mean he has hopes . (Italics added.) Defense counsel promptly objected on the ground, L-WOP [life without parole] means L-WOP, but that the prosecutor was seeking to persuade the jury that defendant might be released from prison unless the death penalty were imposed. The court admonished the prosecutor not to refer to the powers of any authority whatsoever, but otherwise overruled the defense objection. The prosecutor resumed his argument, As I was indicating, he has these hopes and dreams of someday getting out. I mean who knows what miracles can happen in the future. Earthquakes do occur. Social revolutions do occur. Even wars occur. He has hopes of getting out. How many of you ever saw the movie the Dirty Dozen [in] which [actor] Lee Marvin took 12 condemned men during the time of war, went off and fought in Germany, 12 condemned men, some got field commissions and went out and fought. Defense: I object. This is going beyond the scope of the discussion. The Court: Overruled. Prosecutor: Who's to say that can't happen in modern times due to the chaos in the Middle East today? Who's to say that can't happen? A death penalty verdict gives him the same hope that he gave to the Brices and that's none at all. Even though the prosecutor did not explicitly state that defendant might in fact receive a presidential pardon, the obvious implication of the prosecutor's argument was that the jury had to impose the death penalty to foreclose the possibility, albeit remote, that defendant might somehow be released from prison by a pardon or other means. No other purpose is apparent from the face of the argument, in particular the references to President Reagan and the motion picture in which military convicts accepted a combat mission in the hope of obtaining pardons. The trial court itself apparently understood this to be the point of the prosecutor's remarks, admonishing him to desist from referring to the powers of any authority whatsoever. In several respects this portion of the argument was error under People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430] ( Ramos ), in which we condemned as invalid under the California Constitution the use of a jury instruction that a sentence of life without the opportunity for parole might be commuted by the Governor (the Briggs Instruction). ( Id., at pp. 153-155.) Although the error in Ramos was instructional, we see no reason why a similar prosecutorial argument should be treated any differently when, as in this case, the trial court overrules a defense objection to the argument. The court's very act of overruling the objection put the court's imprimatur on the argument and thus tended to mislead the jury. Respondent does not contend otherwise.  Ramos and its rationale would indeed preclude either court or counsel from advising the jury regarding the Governor's commutation power, and the prosecutor should have avoided any argument which might have diverted the jury's attention to the question whether defendant might some day be paroled. ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 581 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776].) The same reasoning applies with equal force to references to a presidential pardon. The first prong of our analysis in Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, was that the Briggs Instruction was a misleading half-truth because it failed to inform the jury that the Governor could commute a death sentence as well as a sentence of life without opportunity for parole. ( Id., at pp. 153-155.) The implied suggestion of a presidential pardon was even more misleading because it was untrue. The President shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.... (U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 1.) The President does not have the power to pardon those persons, like defendant, who are convicted only of crimes under state law. ( Young v. United States (1877) 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 39, 66 [24 L.Ed. 992, 999-1000]; In re Bocchiaro (W.D.N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 37, 38; Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 4.12, p. 256, fn. 10.) Defendant's dream to the contrary is perhaps understandable in light of his plight and his status as a layman with little education. The prosecutor, however, had no excuse for misrepresenting the Constitution, whether his doing so was a matter of oversight or opportunism. The prosecutor's argument was misleading and therefore error under Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, 153-155. The argument was also error because it invited ... the jury to consider matters that are both totally speculative and that should not, in any event, influence the jury's determination. ( Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, 155.) The prosecutor's argument was preposterous. The prosecutor asked the jury to consider the possibility of miracles, earthquakes, social revolutions, wars, and fantastical motion picture plots. Because the argument was speculative, it was error under Ramos. Moreover, to the extent the argument suggested future presidential intervention on defendant's behalf, it further violated Ramos by tending to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its action. ( Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 157.) Respondent asserts three reasons why the argument was not error. None are persuasive. Respondent first contends there was no error because the prosecutor did not refer to the Governor's commutation power. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, cannot be parsed so finely as to prohibit references to gubernatorial power but to allow references to presidential power. Second, respondent asserts that the defense invited the argument by introducing the psychiatrist's testimony as to defendant's dream of a pardon. We disagree. That testimony dealt only with defendant's mental state. To that extent, it was proper for the prosecution to address the issue. Indeed, the prosecution did so, and the defense did not object. The prosecution, however, later went far beyond that limited issue, implicitly suggesting there was a possibility defendant's dream might become a reality. Respondent's third contention is that the argument was proper because it was couched in terms of defendant's future dangerousness. This is not supported by the record. Moreover, such argument, if accepted in this context, would eviscerate Ramos because a prosecutor could easily speculate that future events, e.g., a pardon, might result in the defendant's release and that he would then be dangerous. One of the premises of Ramos is that One principal difficulty, of course, lies in attempting to predict what a particular defendant is likely to be like some 10, 15, 20 or more years in the future when commutation may be considered. ( Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 156.) In short, respondent fails to persuade us that the argument was not error. Defendant correctly notes that  Ramos error is generally reversible. ( People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 794 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419], italics added; People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1101-1102 [255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619].) Being generally reversible, however, is not the same as being per se reversible. In those cases in which we have reversed for Ramos error, the trial court has typically given an affirmative instruction as to the Governor's commutation power, and prejudice was plain. ( Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, 155; People v. Montiel (1985) 39 Cal.3d 910, 928 [218 Cal. Rptr. 572, 705 P.2d 1248].) In such cases, no extended discussion of prejudice was required. It is nonetheless clear that Ramos error is not reversible per se. We must determine whether the error was prejudicial, more specifically, whether there is a reasonable possibility the error affected the jury's penalty determination. ( People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 780-782; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 918-919 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571].) Respondent's entire prejudice argument is that [T]here was very little credible mitigating evidence, if any, whereas the evidence in aggravation was simply overwhelming. Although this naked assertion is singularly unpersuasive, our independent review of the record convinces us that the error was not prejudicial. We have first considered those factors that weigh in defendant's favor on the prejudice question. They are slight. Before the penalty phase arguments and instructions, an unidentified juror submitted the following handwritten note to the court: Does life in prison without chance of parole mean exactly what it says? Is there any chance of parole? This is important to know in order to make the decision. The court informed all counsel of the note and its contents and subsequently advised the jury, I did receive a note from one of the jurors asking a question primarily legal in nature and it is something that we'll  I don't know who wrote it but whoever wrote the note here, that will be addressed in my instructions and I'm sure by both counsel. We may assume, only for the purpose of discussion, that the prosecutor's subsequent argument as to a presidential pardon and other miracles may have exacerbated the concern of the juror who submitted the note. Any nascent concern, however, was eliminated. After the prosecutor's improper argument, defense counsel correctly argued to the jury: Let me remind you just what life in prison without the possibility of parole means. Frankly, it means just that. You've been instructed as to that. You'll be instructed again.... The defendant, Michael Hill, will be imprisoned for the rest of his life period. The court thereafter, at defendant's request, instructed the jury accordingly: Life without the possibility of parole means exactly what it says, the defendant will be imprisoned for the rest of his life.... For you to conclude otherwise would be to rely on conjecture and speculation and would be a violation of your oath as trial jurors. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 208 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781]; People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d 749, 782.) This pinpoint instruction made clear to the jury that it must reject the prosecutor's suggestion to the contrary. We also find that the nature of the prosecutor's argument by itself assuaged any possible concern a juror might have had. Put bluntly, the argument was patently hyperbolic and incredible. His primary support was a fictionalized motion picture account of convicts fighting in World War II. It seems unlikely that any reasonable juror would have been persuaded by the prosecutor's hyperbole. The farfetched tenor of the argument likely had the unintended effect of demonstrating to the jury that there was no realistic possibility defendant would ever be released from prison if he were sentenced to life without opportunity for parole. The error under Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, was not prejudicial.