Opinion ID: 2199579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Misconduct and Separation

Text: The defendant alleges several errors involving the jury: (1) two jurors gave false statements on voir dire; (2) the jury conducted unauthorized and impermissible experiments during its deliberations; and (3) the trial court erred in permitting the jury to separate after deliberations had begun. As previously noted, the defendant obtained leave of this Court to suspend the appeal and remand to the trial court for further proceedings to make a more complete factual record. Supp. Record at 86. At the remand hearing the defendant sought to have the trial court address the possibility of whether two jurors had given false statements on their juror questionnaires. The trial court refused, finding that this issue was not part of the defendant's petition to this Court and therefore not proper subject matter at the remand hearing. The defendant then made an offer to prove. As we stated in Section 3, supra, an offer of proof is part of the record only insofar as the defendant challenges the propriety of the trial court's exclusion of evidence. As before, the defendant in this case is not challenging the exclusion, but is instead arguing the merits of his offer of proof. We will not consider the offer for such purposes. The defendant also contends that the jury conducted improper experiments during deliberations which enabled them to consider evidence not presented at trial and therefore violated his right to a fair trial. During the trial, upon motion of the State and without objection by the defense, the jury was taken to the scene of the crime and permitted to view the inside of the house in which the victim's body had been found. Record at 2914. Later, after its deliberations had begun, the jury requested permission to revisit the scene of the fire and to review both the inside and the outside of the house. There were no objections from the State nor the defense, and the trial court granted the jury's request, with some restrictions. The jurors had requested permission to fill an empty gas can with water to determine how fast the gas can could be emptied. The trial judge rejected this request, stating, I cannot allow you to take a gas can and conduct your own experiments. That is not evidence. You cannot conduct your own experiments and make up your own evidence.... Supp. Record at 245. The trial judge granted permission for the jurors to talk to each other about what they were viewing while inside the house, but would not permit such discussion outside the house or in the presence of the bailiff. Following the trial, three jurors signed affidavits for the defense which stated: I recall that the jury conducted experiments by walking through the motions of pouring gasoline out of a can [2] inside the home and timing the amount of time this took as well as the amount of time for an individual to crawl from the front door to the bedroom and back to the front door. Supp. Record at 242; 243; 282. Two different jurors signed affidavits for the State stating that, during their second visit to the crime scene, the jury followed Judge Young's order by not conducting any experiments, testing, or timing simulations that were not in evidence. Supp. Record at 401; 564. In Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1299, 117 L.Ed.2d 521 (1992), during deliberations two jurors of height and build similar to the defendant tried on clothing introduced in evidence. We held that their actions constituted a permissible examination of the evidence and not an improper extrajudicial experiment. We noted the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in In re Beverly Hills Fire Litigation, 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2090, 77 L.Ed.2d 300 (1983) that an experiment by the jury is improper where it amounts to additional evidence supplementary to that introduced during the trial. Kennedy, 578 N.E.2d at 641. The State argues that no outside influence was brought into the jury deliberations and that the jurors were merely examining the crime scene, thus making use of matters submitted to them during the trial for their consideration. At trial, before the jury view of the crime scene, the State introduced evidence relating to whether the defendant had enough time to start the fire. Specifically, Detective Minnis testified that he conducted experiments timing exactly how long it took him to pull into the victim's driveway, walk to the victim's front door (twelve seconds), crawl to the bedroom and back (twelve seconds), walk to the bedroom, pour gasoline in the room making two or three passes around the bed, walk out of the bedroom, light a match and throw it in, and then walk back to the front door (thirty-five seconds). We find that the jury's authorized visit and deliberations at the premises where the crime occurred was not improper. The final argument presented by the defendant is that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to separate overnight after beginning deliberations. The Indiana Code requires the jury to be kept together once deliberations begin. IND.CODE § 35-37-2-6(a)(1) (1993). This Court has taken this requirement very seriously. In Follrad v. State, 428 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind.1981), this Court noted that this requirement serves the obvious and vital purpose of insuring that each juror's individual assessment and verdict are not influenced by matters extraneous to that information presented at trial. Id. at 1202. If the jury is allowed to separate, the State must show that exigent circumstances exist warranting a violation of this rule, id., prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the deliberation of the jurors was not affected by the separation, and show that the verdict clearly appears to be supported by the evidence. Walker v. State, 274 Ind. 224, 228, 410 N.E.2d 1190, 1193 (1980). However, as this Court recently noted in Pruitt v. State, 622 N.E.2d 469 (Ind. 1993), where the court clearly announces to counsel that it intends to permit the jury to go to their homes for the evening and defense counsel poses no objection, appellant is not in a position to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Id. at 472. While there is very little in the trial proceedings dealing with the jury separation, the trial judge did go on record just prior to the jury returning their verdicts and stated, The jurors were then separated and allowed to go home and then come back the next day for deliberations, which is today, the 18th. There was no objection to that procedure from the attorneys or the parties. Record at 4085. Following this statement, the trial judge asked both the State and the defendant if this was their understanding of the record. The State replied, Yes, all those things you mentioned were by agreement of both parties. Record at 4086. The defense replied, That is correct, Your Honor. Record at 4086. At the remand hearing, the defendant acknowledged that defense counsel had made no objections to the jury's separation. When the trial judge learned that the defendant was attempting to have the record show that he expressed his displeasure with this procedure at some point into the deliberations process, Supp. Record at 514, the trial judge quickly interjected stating: [Trial Judge] There was no displeasure on anybody'sas a matter of fact, everybody thought it would be the benefit of their respective clients that the jurors go home. The jurors were exhausted. Both parties were concerned that the jurors might return a verdict just for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.... That's why there was no objection. If there was supposed to be an objection, or if you wanted to lodge an objection, you're both attorneys, you both know the rules of law, an objection could be lodged at that time and we'd make a proper record at that time ... That was not done. Why was that not done? Because no one wanted to do it because everyone agreed with the procedure. I did not hear any displeasure about anything, or anybody having any concern with the Court's order. Everyone thought it was in the benefit of their clients. Is that not correct? ... [Defense Counsel] I have to agree with that your Honor. Supp. Record at 517. Pruitt is clear in its pronouncement that defense counsel cannot raise on appeal the propriety of the jury separation if he did not object to the separation at the time it occurred. With the exception of Pruitt, [3] every case cited by the defendant involved an objection to the separation lodged by the defendant at trial. In the case at bar, not only did defense counsel not raise any objection, but counsel also agreed to the separation and felt it was beneficial to the defendant at the time. Accordingly, we decline to find reversible error. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. SHEPARD, C.J., and SELBY and BOEHM, JJ., concur. SULLIVAN, J., concurs except with respect to the second issue discussed in part 5, in which he concurs in result.