Opinion ID: 537759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Stop the Train

Text: 8 Puckett argues that the defendants' failure to stop the train before it struck Wanago constitutes negligence. Of course, as a general matter, Illinois law does not require trains to make emergency stops whenever railroad personnel observe an individual near the tracks. Higgins v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 16 Ill.App.2d 227, 231, 147 N.E.2d 714, 716-17 (4th Dist.1958); see Sperry v. Wabash R.R., 55 F.Supp. 825, 826 (E.D.Ill.1944). But Illinois law does require railroad crews to keep a proper lookout for individuals in the vicinity of the tracks, particularly in populated areas and often-travelled crossings. Shine v. Wabash R.R., 8 Ill.App.2d 521, 532, 132 N.E.2d 41, 46 (3d Dist.1956). Had Maves and Gust kept a proper lookout, Puckett contends, they would have seen Wanago near the crossing and stopped the train; their failure to keep a proper lookout, she continues, constitutes negligence. See id., 8 Ill.App.2d at 534, 132 N.E.2d at 47. 9 To support her claim (and, presumably, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact), Puckett argues that the train may have been traveling too fast for the existing weather conditions, making it more difficult for the crew to see Wanago and to stop the train in time. She also intimates that Maves and Gust simply failed to keep a proper lookout of the approaching tracks and crossing. Both these points, however, rely at bottom on the assumption that Wanago was in or adjacent to the crossing--where the locomotive light would have illuminated him--when the train was sufficiently distant from the crossing to be stopped in time. 1 As the district court observed, [t]here is no basis in the evidentiary record for this assumption, however. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 17, 1989 WL 55365 (May 12, 1989). None of the affidavits or depositions submitted by Puckett suggests that Wanago was near the tracks when the train was at a sufficient distance from the crossing to be stopped in time. And Puckett's reliance upon the allegations contained in her complaint to create genuine issues of material fact is wholly misplaced. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Getman v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R., 172 Ill.App.3d 297, 299, 122 Ill.Dec. 298, 300, 526 N.E.2d 557, 559 (1st Dist.1988). As a result, we believe that the district court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to this part of Puckett's case.