Opinion ID: 710073
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Basis For Determinations

Text: 33 Although I disagree with giving any deference to the BIA's or the INS's conclusions about whether a particular crime is one necessarily involving moral turpitude, I agree with the majority that in determining whether the crime of which the alien has been convicted falls within one of the grounds for deportation under Sec. 241(a)(2)(A), both the court and the BIA look only at the definition of the crime under state law, and not at the underlying facts and circumstances of the alien's particular offense. Ramsey v. INS, 55 F.3d 580, 583 (11th Cir.1995) (interpretation of aggravated felony under Sec. 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)); Rodriguez-Herrera, 52 F.3d at 239-40 (interpretation of moral turpitude under Sec. 241(a)(2)(A)(i) & (ii)); Gonzalez-Alvarado, 39 F.3d at 246 (moral turpitude); United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir.1993) (aggravated felony); Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 647 (moral turpitude); McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1980) (moral turpitude); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022, 1022-23 (2d Cir.1931) (moral turpitude). 6 Thus, in addition to the state-law definition of the crime charged, both the BIA and the reviewing court look only at the record of conviction, which includes the crime as described in the indictment or information, the plea, the verdict or judgment, and the sentence, but not any evidence offered in the case or other facts or circumstances involved. Cabral, 15 F.3d at 196 & n. 6; 7 United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (BIA and reviewing court are limited to the record of conviction and may not look behind the record to the facts of the individual case); Alleyne v. U.S. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1185 (3d Cir.1989) (same); but see Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir.) (court looked at facts of the present case, where petitioner has acknowledged his false statements and the statements made to defraud the United States Government, to find that the convictions may be considered as involving moral turpitude for purposes of denying voluntary departure.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982, 109 S.Ct. 533, 102 L.Ed.2d 564 (1988); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (record of conviction includes the indictment or information, plea, verdict or judgment and sentence); Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (record of conviction includes charge or indictment, the plea, the judgment or verdict, and the sentence, citing United States ex rel. Teper v. Miller, 87 F.Supp. 285, 287 (S.D.N.Y.1949)). Refusal to consider anything but a categorical definition of the crime involved appears to be almost universal in majority decisions. 8 Thus, appellant's arguments based on the facts in her specific case do not persuade me any more than they did the majority. 9 34 Although I find universal agreement that the state law defining the criminal offense of which the alien has been convicted, and not the facts or circumstances involved in the individual alien's case, is the basis for determining whether or not the crime of which the alien has been convicted is one involving moral turpitude, I do not find universal agreement on what, precisely, is meant by state law defining the offense. The state law element is often stated in limited terms as the state statute defining the offense. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Herrera, 52 F.3d at 239 ([W]e must focus on the crime categorically as defined by the [Washington] statute....); Gonzalez-Alvarado, 39 F.3d at 246 n. 2 ([W]e consider the elements or nature of a crime as defined by the relevant statute, not the actual conduct that led to the conviction.); Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 647. 35 However, the state law definition of the crime has also been described as consisting of both the statute and decisions of the state's highest court construing the statute. See, e.g., Grageda v. U.S. INS, 12 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.1993) (Whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude 'is determined by the statutory definition or by the nature of the crime not by the specific conduct that resulted in the conviction,'  quoting McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.1980)); Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 8 F.3d 26 (Table), 1993 WL 394916,  2- 3 (9th Cir.1993) (court looked to decisions of state's highest court to determine proper interpretation of intent element of Alaska statute for purposes of determining whether crime of second degree theft was a crime involving moral turpitude); Holzapfel v. Wyrsch, 259 F.2d 890, 892 (3d Cir.1958) (looking to state case law to interpret a relatively new and novel piece of legislation defining a sex offense by statute). Our own circuit court of appeals has looked to the interpretation of statutorily-defined crimes by the state's highest court in determining whether or not the crime so defined necessarily involves moral turpitude. Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1024 (8th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 1260, 31 L.Ed.2d 466 (1972). Nor has the BIA been reluctant to look to the decisions of the state's highest court when interpreting the elements of the offense of which the alien is convicted to determine whether those elements include the necessary elements for the crime to be one that inherently involves moral turpitude. See, e.g., Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N.Dec. 269, 270 (BIA1975) (looking at decisions of Ohio courts to determine whether the manslaughter statute in question included both voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, because involuntary manslaughter did not involve moral turpitude); Matter of Szegedi, 10 I. & N.Dec. 28, (BIA1962) (looking at decisions of Wisconsin Supreme Court to determine elements distinguishing degrees of murder and manslaughter in order to determine which crimes involved the necessary intent element to be crimes involving moral turpitude). I believe that a focus solely on the statutory language is improper, because it permits a categorical definition of the crime that may, in fact, be out of step with the case law of the state interpreting the statutory elements. 10 This case, as I shall show, vividly demonstrates this problem. 36 Looking at how a state's highest court has construed the elements of a crime defined by a state statute comports with common sense and is the best way to insure that the constitutional requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization, U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 4, is met. Cf. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir.1981) (reference to state statutes to determine whether a crime of moral turpitude had been committed by an alien seeking to prove his good moral character for purposes of naturalization undermined constitutional requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization). 11 It is readily apparent that the highest courts of different states may construe nearly identical statutory language in different ways, and thus mere identity of statutory language does not necessarily indicate identical elements of the offenses, or identical meaning of those elements, as they are defined by comparable statutes. However, where the BIA and the reviewing courts look to the judicial interpretation of a criminal statute by the state's highest court, the BIA and the reviewing court can determine whether the crime necessarily involves moral turpitude, not just whether it appears to define a crime in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres. Goldeshtein, 8 F.3d at 647 (crime must be one in which moral turpitude necessarily inheres); Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 1003 (9th Cir.1991) (same); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir.1964) (same); Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929, 935 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 892, 78 S.Ct. 265, 2 L.Ed.2d 190 (1957). 12 Uniformity would thereby be served, not undermined. 13 The standard would be uniformly applied to the same category of criminal conduct, not just to crimes described in the same or similar language. 37 Nor does looking to state judicial explications of the elements of an offense make the effect of the federal statute depend upon the niceties and nuances of a state procedure. Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir.1965); see also Babouris v. Esperdy, 269 F.2d 621, 623 (2d Cir.1959) (It is not to be supposed that Congress intended an alien's deportability to be determined by the various classifications of misconduct evolved by the states for jurisdictional or other internal application.). The federal standard remains intact; state case law is only relevant to deciding whether the crime does indeed involve the elements of moral turpitude required under the federal standard, as the crime is defined by the courts properly charged with interpreting the criminal statute in question and deciding cases under it. 38 Having examined why I disagree with the majority on the question of what standard of review is applicable to which issues presented in this appeal, and the basis upon which the BIA's and the appellate court's decisions should be made, I will next turn to the opinion of the BIA that is under review here, then to the questions involved in deciding whether or not the BIA's decision in this case should stand.