Opinion ID: 57923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: McCoy next argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he knowingly possessed the firearm. We review de novo whether there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. United States v. Charles, 313 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence “in the light most favorable to the government, with all inferences and credibility choices drawn in the government’s favor.” United States 9 v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 924 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2096 (2007). We “cannot reverse a conviction for insufficiency of the evidence unless . . . we conclude that no reasonable jury could find proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990). When, however, a defendant fails to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal after all of the evidence has been presented, reversal of the conviction is appropriate only to prevent “a manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002). “To establish a violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 922(g)(1), the government must prove three elements: (i) that the defendant has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, (ii) that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition, and (iii) such firearm or ammunition was in or affected interstate commerce.” United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1998). Because McCoy stipulated to the first and third elements, the only issue is whether McCoy knowingly possessed the firearm. Possession, in the context of § 922(g)(1), “may be proven either by showing that the defendant actually possessed the firearm, or by showing that he constructively possessed the firearm.” United States v. Gonzalez, 71 F.3d 819, 834 10 (11th Cir. 1996). The government may prove constructive possession by showing that the defendant had unrestricted access over the premises where the contraband was located. See United States v. Harris, 20 F.3d 445, 454 (11th Cir. 1994), modified on other grounds, United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423 (11th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, at least where some corroborative evidence of guilt exists for the charged offense, “a statement by a defendant, if disbelieved by the jury, may be considered as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995). In other words, “when a defendant chooses to testify, he runs the risk that if disbelieved the jury might conclude the opposite of his testimony is true.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that McCoy constructively possessed the firearm. McCoy admitted that he was alone in the apartment, and the firearm was within his ready access near the couch on which he was resting. Although McCoy testified that he did not know about the gun, the jury was free to disbelieve him and consider his testimony as substantive evidence of his guilt. The jury could have reasonably inferred that McCoy was more than merely present in the apartment based on (1) the apartment keys found in his pocket; (2) the apartment manager’s testimony that McCoy lived in the apartment; and (3) the 11 letter addressed to McCoy found in the kitchen. Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably inferred from the keys and his unaccompanied presence in the apartment that McCoy had unrestricted access to the apartment. Accordingly, because a reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that McCoy violated § 922(g), no miscarriage of justice occurred.