Opinion ID: 1303664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing access to a redacted transcript of the sdcl 26-11-4 transfer hearing?

Text: Argus claims a transcript should be made available because it can be narrowly tailored to protect confidential information through editing. However, the narrowly tailored language is no longer applicable as it was used in interpreting a statute which has since been repealed. See Associated Press, 410 N.W.2d at 580; SDCL 26-8-32, (repealed in 1991). The trial court correctly denied access to the transfer hearing transcripts because no evidence of compelling reasons was presented. If Argus feels that the underlying purposes of our juvenile laws are outmoded and no longer valid, it should not look to this court, but to the legislature to change the law. In re J.S., 140 Vt. 458, 438 A.2d 1125, 1131 (1981). Only the legislature has the power to relax the limitations imposed by SDCL 26-7A-36 upon the general public and the news media if it believes that objective more desirable than the present law. Id. As of the commencement of the juvenile hearings involving M.C., however, the legislative intent is clear. Id. Juveniles, as a class, are shielded from public exposure of hearings conducted in juvenile court to determine delinquency. Id. Argus' interpretation would put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). Justice Rehnquist has reiterated the Supreme Court's concern for maintaining the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings: It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its proceedings have been conducted outside of the public's full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity. This insistence on confidentiality is born of a tender concern for the welfare of the child, to hide his youthful errors and `bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.' The prohibition of publication of a juvenile's name is designed to protect the young person from the stigma of his misconduct and is rooted in the principle that a court concerned with juvenile affairs serves as a rehabilitative and protective agency of the State. In re J.S., 438 A.2d at 1128 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2673, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citations omitted)). After reviewing the entire record, we find that the trial court's order closing the hearings and denying a transfer hearing transcript was a proper exercise of discretion. [I]t is the law's policy `to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past.' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1442, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). The trial court's order is affirmed. The request by M.C. for appellate attorney's fees is denied. M.C. submitted no authority for awarding attorney's fees. Therefore, under precedent of this court, the issue is waived. City of Sioux Falls v. Kelley, 513 N.W.2d 97, 105-06 (S.D.1994). MILLER, C.J., SABERS, J., and WUEST and HENDERSON, Retired Justices, concur. KONENKAMP, J., not having been a member of the Court at the time this matter was submitted to the Court did not participate.