Opinion ID: 397909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 16 The general standard of review for motions for directed verdict is well established in this Circuit. 3 17 On motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict the Court should consider all the evidence-not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case-but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and the inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper.... A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury. 18 Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). The Boeing standard is appropriate for unseaworthiness claims. Allen v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 1980); Claborn v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 578 F.2d 983, 987, 1979 A.M.C. 636, 642 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 1281, 59 L.Ed.2d 494 (1979); Robertson v. Douglas S. S. Co., 510 F.2d 829, 833, 1975 A.M.C. 1021, 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Shephard v. S/S NOPAL PROGRESS, 497 F.2d 963, 967 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937, 95 S.Ct. 1147, 43 L.Ed.2d 414 (1975). From the evidence adduced at trial we find that reasonable men could not have arrived at a verdict contrary to the finding of unseaworthiness. The First Accident-Unseaworthiness Claim 19 General maritime law imposes a duty on a ship owner to provide a seaworthy vessel. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549, 80 S.Ct. 926, 932, 4 L.Ed.2d 941, 947-48 (1960); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1980); Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1980); Weeks v. Alonzo Cothron, Inc., 466 F.2d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1972). The warranty of seaworthiness includes a seaworthy crew and the ship owner's duty is breached by providing a defective or inadequate crew. Of course, to be inadequate or improperly manned is a classic case of an unseaworthy vessel. June T., Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404, 407 (5th Cir. 1961), 1961 A.M.C. 1431. See Boudin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336, 75 S.Ct. 382, 99 L.Ed. 354 (1955); Vallot v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1981); Moschi v. Steamship Edgar F. Luckenbach, 424 F.2d 1060, 1061 (5th Cir. 1970); Clevenger v. Star Fish & Oyster Co., 325 F.2d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1963). 20 There is no question in this case that the MISS FRANCES was unseaworthy due to an inadequate crew. Not only was the crew insufficient in number, but the one crew member, Tucker, was totally inexperienced and blind in one eye. 4 It is also undisputed that Comeaux undertook this task with Tucker as his assistant only upon the order of the leverman. There simply is no evidence from which a jury could possibly fail to find the vessel unseaworthy due to defective crew. We can only speculate that the jury somehow viewed the accident as caused by Comeaux's assuming the risk of an unseaworthy crew, which as a matter of law is error. 5 While the seaman does assume the risk of those perils of the sea which are inescapable, no risk that can be reasonably controlled by the ship owner is assumed by the seaman. No matter how glaring the negligence of the seaman that may be said to have contributed to his injury, assumption of risk never rises to the level of even a partial defense. Reyes v. Vantage S. S. Co., 558 F.2d 238, 244 (5th Cir. 1977), modified on rehearing, 609 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1980). 21 Contributory negligence is not ordinarily a defense under a claim of unseaworthiness but relates only to the diminution of damages. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431, 59 S.Ct. 262, 266, 83 L.Ed. 265 (1939); Allen v. Coast Products, Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 362 (5th Cir. 1980); Hlodan v. Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 611 F.2d 71, 74 (5th Cir. 1980). In this case, James presented no evidence directly related to contributory negligence of Comeaux as to the unseaworthiness claim, other than Comeaux's investigatory statement that his injury was caused by an accident. 6 A possible other basis for a finding of negligence on Comeaux's part that would relate to the unseaworthiness claim is the testimony of Trahan as to the safest way to position the MISS FRANCES to change the batteries. However, a seaman has no duty to find the safest way to perform his work. His duty is to do the work assigned, not to find the safest method of work. Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1975), clarified, 546 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1977). In cross-examination, Trahan admitted that under the safety regulations, Comeaux's positioning of the MISS FRANCES with the bow against the pontoon cylinder, instead of the pipeline, was acceptable. 7 22 Given a directed verdict instructing that the MISS FRANCES was unseaworthy and the evidence from Trahan speaking for James that both positions for changing the batteries were acceptable, we cannot assume that the jury's answer would be the same as in the simpler case of negligence. 23 The Second Accident-The Disappearing Witness 24 James' primary defense to the second accident was that the accident itself never occurred. The only direct evidence that no accident occurred was in the form of testimony of Trahan that Comeaux never reported the accident. Comeaux had testified that he reported the incident to Trahan and to Captain Kidder. At the beginning of the trial Kidder was put under oath and sequestered with other witnesses, and most importantly, given positive instructions to remain outside the courtroom ... until you have been excused and discharged by the court. 8 The Captain mysteriously was unavailable when Comeaux attempted to call him as a rebuttal witness without counsel for James ever having moved the court in the presence of Comeaux's counsel to release Kidder as a witness. The record establishes that counsel for James, on his own, without the authority of the court or notice to counsel for Comeaux, excused Captain Kidder. Kidder's departure prior to being released by the court was a violation of the court's instructions by the witness himself, done not only with full acquiescence of counsel for James, but, as the record reveals, on the express permission if not instruction of counsel for James. When Comeaux's counsel attempted to use Kidder's pretrial deposition, the District Court refused since Kidder was within the subpoena power of the court. 9 25 F.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(3) governs the use of depositions in court proceedings. The deposition of a witness, ... may be used ... if the court finds: (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. We find that this section, in the interest of justice, provided sufficient basis for allowing the deposition of Kidder whose live testimony was then made unavailable, in part through the action of counsel for James. Kidder had not been released by the District Court in open court and counsel for James had no authority to release the witness. Kidder's testimony was not merely cumulative corroborative evidence. It was a direct denial of the testimony of Trahan, thus impeaching him (Trahan) and tending to prove the opposite, that is, a report of the second accident. Under these circumstances, coming near the close of trial and resulting both from the violation of the court's instruction by the witness and from the unauthorized instruction of counsel to one of James' employees, the District Court, at the minimum, should have admitted the deposition. If the District Court did not believe that the interest of justice required the use of the deposition, the District Court should have delayed the trial until Kidder could be subpoenaed and his presence secured. The action of counsel for James here is certainly one we do not condone and counsel's response that the plaintiff had had his day in court simply does not justify secretly releasing a witness and then successfully moving to keep his deposition out of the trial. Since Captain Kidder's testimony, either in person or by deposition, was crucial to the one piece of direct evidence presented by James concerning the nonoccurrence of the second accident, the entire issue of the second accident must be retried. Wrapping it Up 26 Because of the confusion created by two separate theories of liability for two separate accidents, we here summarize our holding and directions on remand. As to the first accident, we affirm the finding of negligence under the Jones Act claim (Int. No. 1) and the finding of 75% contributory negligence as to the Jones Act claim (Int. No. 7). We hold that under the unseaworthiness claim in the first accident Comeaux was entitled to a directed verdict. The jury found that Comeaux sustained damages of $150,000 as a result of the first accident (Int. No. 5). In determining the amount of damages sustained in the first accident, the interrogatory, as written did not, and rightly so, ask the jury to separate those damages resulting from negligence as opposed to those resulting from unseaworthiness 10 . Thus, we must sustain the finding of $150,000 damages in the first accident under either theory of liability. While Comeaux was entitled to a directed verdict on unseaworthiness, part of this claim must be remanded, that concerning contributory negligence. Because negligence on the part of Comeaux under a theory of unseaworthiness is not necessarily equivalent to contributory negligence under a Jones Act theory, the jury must determine the percentage of negligence contributed by Comeaux under the unseaworthiness theory, which percentage, if any, would permit the judge to reduce Comeaux's recovery. The District Court on remand should make sure that the affirmed finding of 75% contributory negligence in the Jones Act claim is not determinative of the percentage of negligence of Comeaux under the unseaworthiness claim. 27 As to the second accident, we hold that the exclusion of the deposition of Kidder was a critical error requiring a new trial on all aspects of this incident. 28 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.