Opinion ID: 772328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wire Fraud Conspiracy Conviction

Text: 17 In this second appeal, Ben Zvi challenges the timeliness of the wire fraud conspiracy count. The challenge is styled as both a direct appeal of the conviction and as a collateral attack alleging ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
18 Ben Zvi contends that the district judge committed plain error 1 during both the trial phase, and at resentencing on remand, in not dismissing the wire fraud conspiracy charge as untimely. Because the present appeal represents the first time Ben Zvi has actively pursued this statute of limitations issue either before the district court (Ben Zvi raised but failed to pursue it following the Government's filing of the Second Indictment) or before this court, consideration of the issue as a direct challenge is foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine. 19 The law of the case doctrine has two subsidiary rules, both of which are implicated here. See, e.g., United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000). The first, commonly referred to as the 'mandate rule,' describes the duty of the district court on remand upon receipt of the mandate, which is the appellate court's direction to the trial court, id. at 40; the second governs the obligation of a court of appeals in adhering to its own decision at an earlier stage of the litigation, id. at 39 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 20 The mandate rule compels compliance on remand with the dictates of the superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court. United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added); see also Tenzer, 213 F.3d at 40. Likewise, where an issue was ripe for review at the time of an initial appeal but was nonetheless foregone, the mandate rule generally prohibits the district court from reopening the issue on remand unless the mandate can reasonably be understood as permitting it to do so. See United States v. Stanley, 54 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Bell, 5 F.3d at 66, for proposition that 'the [mandate] rule forecloses litigation of issues decided by the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived'); United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 76 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Webb, 98 F.3d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing circumstances when departure from mandate rule may be warranted). 21 To determine whether an issue remains open for reconsideration on remand, the trial court should look to both the specific dictates of the remand order as well as the broader spirit of the mandate. Kikumura, 947 F.2d at 76. In the context of a remand for resentencing where an appellate court has already fully considered the merits of the conviction, the trial court generally is foreclosed from reconsidering the underlying merits of the conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d 779, 784 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 1993); Webb, 98 F.3d at 588. 22 Our mandate in Ben Zvi I cannot reasonably be construed to authorize consideration by the district judge of issues relating to the underlying merits of the conviction. It is unambiguously limited in scope: the district judge was merely to reconsider sentencing and its order of restitution. Ben Zvi I, 168 F.3d at 61. As a result, the district judge did not err on remand in not considering the timeliness of the wire fraud conspiracy charge, as authority to do so was lacking. 23 With respect to Ben Zvi's contention that the district court erred in not dismissing the wire fraud conspiracy charge as untimely during the trial phase, our consideration of this issue is foreclosed by the second rule of the law of the case doctrine. 24 Under [this rule], a decision made at a previous stage of litigation, which could have been challenged in the ensuing appeal but was not, becomes the law of the case; the parties are deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision, for it would be absurd that a party who has chosen not to argue a point on a first appeal should stand better as regards the law of the case than one who had argued and lost. 25 County of Suffolk v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 106 F.3d 1112, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Bell, 988 F.2d at 250 (same). The proper time for defendant to have challenged the timeliness of the wire fraud conspiracy charge was on the first appeal when the issue was then ripe for review. She did not do so, and as a result, is foreclosed from raising it now.
26 Ben Zvi also challenges the timeliness of the wire fraud conspiracy count indirectly through a Sixth Amendment claim. She contends that the failure of both her trial counsel and her appellate counsel to raise the issue before the district court or on the first appeal amounted to a denial of effective assistance. See also Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 1996) (Generally speaking, the performance of appellate counsel is assessed using the same standards applied to trial counsel....). 27 Ben Zvi never raised her ineffective assistance claim in the district court. As a general matter [i]neffective assistance of counsel claims are best brought [first] before the district court through a motion for a new trial or via collateral relief so as to permit development of a sufficient record for appellate consideration. United States v. Booker, 981 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 35 (2d Cir. 2000) (baseline aversion to resolving ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal (citation omitted)). Nonetheless, the underlying challenge defendant now raises--the timeliness of the wire fraud conspiracy charge--is sufficiently presented to permit our consideration of the ineffective assistance claim, see United States v. Collins, 60 F.3d 4, 7 n.1 (1st Cir. 1995), and we think that judicial efficiency would be served by doing so. See, e.g., United States v. Leone, 215 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing appellate court options for resolving ineffective assistance claims first raised on appeal). 28 Success on an ineffective assistance claim requires two showings. First, counsel's legal representation must have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness judged by prevailing professional norms. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); Jackson v. Leonardo, 162 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Second, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Jackson, 162 F.3d at 85 (citations omitted); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Because we find conclusive defendant's failure to satisfy the second showing, we consider only it. See Marisa Van Dongen & Michelle B. Nadler, Right to Counsel, 86 Geo. L.J. 1593, 1605 n.1637 (1998) (citing cases for proposition that courts generally begin an ineffective assistance analysis by determining if the defendant was prejudiced by the alleged conduct). 29 Ben Zvi contends that her counsel should have sought dismissal of the wire fraud conspiracy based on the following: (1) the conspiracy count in the First Indictment was untimely since all the overt acts charged were outside the statute of limitations; (2) the wire fraud conspiracy counts in the superceding indictments were not independently timely since none asserted an overt act that was both within the statute of limitations and undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) the First Indictment was facially invalid, thus precluding the wire fraud conspiracy count in the superceding indictments from relating back to it for tolling of the statute of limitations. To establish a reasonable probability that her counsels' failure to raise these statute of limitations arguments led to her conviction on the wire fraud conspiracy count, Ben Zvi must succeed on each of these arguments; that is, a conclusion against her on any one of these arguments would alone defeat her untimeliness challenge. If the wire fraud conspiracy was timely, there was no prejudice in counsel's failure to argue untimeliness and her ineffective assistance claim fails. 30 The applicable limitations period for a wire fraud conspiracy charge is five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. For a conspiracy charge that requires proof of overt acts to be within the statute of limitations, the (1) conspiracy must still have been ongoing within the five year period preceding the indictment, and (2) at least one overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement [must have been] performed within that period. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957) ([T]he crucial question in determining whether the statute of limitations has run is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement, for it is that which determines both the duration of the conspiracy, and whether the act relied on as an overt act may properly be regarded as in furtherance of the conspiracy.); see Brown v. Elliott, 225 U.S. 392, 401 (1912) ([In the case of an alleged conspiracy,] the period of limitations must be computed from the date of the last [overt act] of which there is an appropriate allegation and proof. (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 929 (5th Cir. 1976).
31 Ben Zvi argues that the wire fraud conspiracy as charged in the First Indictment was time barred because none of the alleged overt acts occurred within five years of the indictment's return. We agree. 32 The First Indictment was not returned until August 11, 1993, and its latest overt act was on April 12, 1988, well beyond the five year limitations period. 33 The Government argues that the wire fraud conspiracy count is timely because it charged Ben Zvi with caus[ing] an electronic funds transfer to be made on August 15, 1988 from Lloyd's of London to its attorney in New York, Alan J. Martin, and that this is an overt act even if it was not expressly charged as one. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1999). The Government's reliance on the wiring of funds from Lloyd's to Martin fails to cure the untimeliness, however, because the wiring of the funds was not an overt act by Ben Zvi or her co-conspirators. To constitute an overt act for purposes of the statute of limitations the act must involve some affirmative conduct or deliberate omission on the part of Ben Zvi or her coconspirators. See, e.g., Davis, 533 F.2d at 928 (issuance of the contract by [government agency] in reliance on the falsifications [of defendants] was not for purposes of the statute of limitations an overt act [by defendants] in furtherance of the conspiracy). The wiring of funds by Lloyd's to its New York counsel on August 15, 1988, though precipitated by earlier fraudulent acts and omissions of defendant and her coconspirators, did not involve or otherwise turn on any identifiable act or omission of the conspirators as of the time of the wire transfer. And therefore, the wiring of the funds cannot be used as an overt act to satisfy the statute of limitations.
34 Ben Zvi's second statute of limitations challenge centers on whether any of the wire fraud conspiracy counts in the superceding indictments was independently timely. We find that the wire fraud conspiracy count in the Second Indictment was independently timely and, furthermore, that the wire fraud conspiracy charges in the Third and Fourth Indictments related back to the wire fraud conspiracy charge in the Second Indictment, making them timely as well. 35 The Second Indictment properly alleged overt acts by Ben Zvi or her co-conspirators to further the scheme occurring within five years of its filing, which was September 15, 1993. Specifically, it alleged as overt acts the causing of checks to be drawn from [Alan J. Martin's bank] account... in payment of the insurance claim between August, 1988 and December 1989[.] A portion of these payments were made to Josi Jewelry, and thus represented anticipated economic benefits of the conspirators, see United States v. Mennuti, 679 F.2d 1032, 1035 (2d Cir. 1982) (conspiracy continues until the conspirators receive their anticipated economic benefits); see also United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir. 1991), the knowing receipt of which by the defendant and her co-conspirators constituted overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, see United States v. Girard, 744 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1984). 36 Moreover, the wire fraud conspiracy counts in the Third and Fourth Indictments--which were substantially the same as charged in the Second Indictment--relate back to the Second Indictment for determination of timeliness. It is black letter law that [o]nce an indictment is brought, the statute of limitations is tolled as to the charges contained in that indictment. United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir. 1976). When a superceding indictment supplants a pending timely-filed indictment, any charges in the superceding indictment that are neither materially broadened nor substantially amended from the earlier indictment relate back to the date of the filing of the earlier indictment. The superceding indictment continues its predecessor's tolling of the statute of limitations and inherits its predecessor's timeliness. See, e.g., United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1993); Grady, 544 F.2d at 601. 37 Because the wire fraud conspiracy charges in each of the superceding indictments were therefore timely, any challenge Ben Zvi's previous counsel might have made on limitations grounds would have been futile. Thus, Ben Zvi suffered no prejudice from her counsels' omissions and her ineffective assistance claim fails. 2 38