Opinion ID: 198981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maine Antitrust Claims

Text: 24 Davric also claims that the defendants violated Maine's antitrust laws. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101 et seq. The Maine statute prohibits [e]very contract, combination..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce, id. § 1101, and provides that [w]hoever shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce of this State shall be guilty of a Class C crime, id. § 1102. 9 25 As described at length above, Davric cannot prevail on its conspiracy-based claims. Davric's flawed arguments concerning the alleged boycott, the defendants' attempts to interfere with Scarborough's mortgage, and their efforts before the Commission, the Maine legislature, and the courts similarly doom any recovery under Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101. Moreover, Davric concedes that the defendants have not actually monopolized its market pursuant to § 1102. In fact, Davric's brief strongly suggests that it remains the dominant player in the appropriate market: 26 Of the $18 million wagered on live racing in Maine in 1993, $10.8 million was wagered at Scarborough Downs. No other facilities offer the racing opportunities and purses available at Scarborough Downs. For decades, Scarborough Downs had been the principal extended racing meet in the State of Maine and since the late 1980s it had been the only such facility in Central or Southern Maine. 27 Further, as Davric notes, a new track would first have to operate for two consecutive years in order to qualify for a share of the off-track betting... revenue. 28 The only remaining question, then, is whether Davric can demonstrate that the defendants attempted to monopolize any particular market. We have noted that the Maine antitrust statutes parallel the Sherman Act, and thus have analyzed claims thereunder according to the doctrines developed in relation to federal law. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 998 F.2d 1073, 1081 (1st Cir. 1993). Those doctrines justify summary judgment in this case. [A] plaintiff charging attempted monopolization must prove a dangerous probability of actual monopolization, which has generally required a definition of the relevant market and examination of market power. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (emphasis added); see also Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ltd., 133 F.3d 103, 107-08 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing requirement that plaintiff who alleges attempted monopolization must demonstrate defendant's market power and dangerous probability of success); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 550 (1st Cir. 1974) ([W]e... think that [an attempted monopolization] case, like a monopolization case, requires a definition of the relevant market.). Davric, however, has failed to set forth any evidence establishing power in any particular geographic or product-based market, and certainly has not produced evidence suggesting a dangerous probability of monopolization. On the contrary, the most Davric can show is that for a period of several days, it was forced to run fewer races than it otherwise would have. Because Davric has provided not even a scintilla of evidence in support of [its] position, Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, summary judgment on its attempted monopolization claim was proper.