Opinion ID: 758866
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutional limits on legislative prayers

Text: 28 Snyder argues that even if Marsh allows legislative prayers, that case imposes some limits on a legislative body's discretion to appoint or to exclude the persons who will recite its prayers. Snyder points out that when the Court turned to the particular nuances of the Nebraska practice in Marsh, the Court gave only conditional approval to the legislative chaplain system there. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. Snyder argues that in light of those conditions in Marsh, Murray City may not discriminate against his request to give an opening prayer based on the content of his proposed prayer. 29 Although we agree with Snyder that Marsh implicitly acknowledges some constitutional limits on the scope and selection of legislative prayers, those limits are not the ones Snyder would have us adopt. The Establishment Clause and Marsh simply do not require that a legislative body ensure a kind of equal public access to a legislative body's program of invocational prayers. Instead, the constitutional restraints on legislative prayers flow directly from the scope of the religious genre blessed in Marsh. What matters under Marsh is whether the prayer to be offered fits within the genre of legislative invocational prayer that has become part of the fabric of our society and constitutes a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people. See id. at 792, 103 S.Ct. 3330. 30 The point at which an invocational legislative prayer falls outside the traditions of the genre and becomes intolerable occurs when the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief. 10 See id. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330; see also Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 950 F.Supp. 1337, 1347 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (relying on Marsh to uphold a school board's practice of invocational prayer because the record does not support a finding that the board was using prayer as an attempt to convert audience members or to promote any particular belief); Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 11 F.Supp.2d 1192 (C.D.Cal.1998) (denying a request for a preliminary injunction against a school board's practice of invocational prayer in light of Marsh ). As Marsh indicated, the danger is not just an effort to proselytize or disparage an entire religion, but also efforts to proselytize or disparage the particular tenets or beliefs of individual faiths. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. The Court explained six years after Marsh that not even the 'unique history' of legislative prayer can justify contemporary legislative prayers that have the effect of affiliating the government with any one specific faith or belief. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 603, 109 S.Ct. 3086 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 791, 103 S.Ct. 3330). Thus, the kind of legislative prayer that will run afoul of the Constitution is one that proselytizes a particular religious tenet or belief, or that aggressively advocates a specific religious creed, or that derogates another religious faith or doctrine. When a legislative invocation strays across this line of proselytization or disparagement, the Establishment Clause condemns it. 31 As a second constitutional restriction on legislative prayer, the Court in Marsh also warned that the selection of the person who is to recite the legislative body's invocational prayer might itself violate the Establishment Clause if the selection stemmed from an impermissible motive. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793, 103 S.Ct. 3330. The Court implicitly indicated that the particular motive that is impermissible in this context is a motive in selecting the prayer-giver either to proselytize a particular faith or to disparage another faith, or to establish a particular religion as the sanctioned or official religion of the legislative body. See id. at 793-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330. 32 It is clear under Marsh that there is no impermissible motive when a legislative body or its agent chooses to reject a government-sanctioned speaker because the tendered prayer falls outside the long-accepted genre of legislative prayer. The genre approved in Marsh is a kind of ecumenical activity that seeks to bind peoples of varying faiths together in a common purpose. That genre, although often taking the form of invocations that reflect a Judeo-Christian ethic, typically involves nonsectarian requests for wisdom and solemnity, as well as calls for divine blessing on the work of the legislative body. When a legislative body prevents its agents from reciting a prayer that falls outside this genre, the legislators are merely enforcing the principle in Marsh that a legislative prayer is constitutional if it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792, 103 S.Ct. 3330. 11 III. The constitutionality of Murray City's Reverence Period 33 Turning now to the specifics of this case, Snyder's amended complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Murray City's conduct is in violation of ... the establishment protection ... of the United States Constitution. We do not perceive this request as seeking a declaration that Murray City's practice of beginning its council meetings with a prayer is unconstitutional as a whole. Rather, Snyder's request merely seeks a declaration that Murray City's particular denial of his individual request to participate in the city's reverence period at the opening of its meeting is unconstitutional. 34 Snyder's claim must fail as a matter of law because his proposed prayer falls well outside the genre of legislative prayers that the Supreme Court approved in Marsh and the record is devoid of evidence indicating an intent to promote or disparage any religion. Not only does Snyder's prayer explicitly attack the genre itself, it also disparages those who believe that legislative prayer is appropriate. See Opening Prayer, supra note 3 (denouncing politicians who believe in the use of legislative prayer as self-righteous, hypocritical, selfish, mis-guided, weak and stupid, and calling the belief in the use of legislative prayer blasphemous, evil, and cheapen[ing]). Most importantly, Snyder's prayer aggressively proselytizes for his particular religious views and strongly disparages other religious views. See id. (asking for divine assistance to guide civic leaders to the wisdom of separating church and state and to never again perform demeaning religious ceremonies as part of official government functions). 12 Snyder's prayer clearly draws on the tenets of his belief--which is an aspect of many different religious faiths--that prayer should only be conducted in private. Because Snyder's prayer seeks to convert his audience to his belief in the sacrilegious nature of governmental prayer, his prayer is itself proselytizing. As a result, Murray City was well within its rights under Marsh to deny permission for Snyder to recite his proposed prayer. A deliberative body has a right to take steps to avoid the kind of government prayer that would run afoul of Marsh and the Establishment Clause. 35 Having concluded that Murray City did not violate the Establishment Clause in refusing Snyder's prayer, we next address the point raised by the dissent to the original panel decision in this case, to the effect that there is sufficient evidence in the record below to raise a dispute of fact as to whether Murray City relied on an impermissible motive in its denial of Snyder's prayer. See Snyder III, 124 F.3d at 1357-58 (Briscoe, J., dissenting). The record includes circumstantial evidence to suggest that City Attorney Hall's letter of June 1, 1994, in which he outlined Murray City's standards for legislative prayers, was drafted specifically to exclude the kind of prayer that Snyder had proposed. See id. (pointing out that City Attorney Hall was aware of and influenced by newspaper accounts of Snyder's dealings with the city council in Salt Lake City). However, this evidence only establishes that Hall was concerned with the political nature of the proposed prayer and with the fact that it was not consistent with the genre of legislative invocational prayer for which the opening portion of the legislation session had been reserved. 36 This evidence only tends to establish that Murray City acted with a permissible motive in excluding Snyder's proposed prayer. Snyder's proselytizing and disparaging prayer falls well outside the scope of invocational legislative prayers found to be constitutional in Marsh, and thus there was nothing improper about excluding it from the time properly set aside for legislative prayer. It was therefore permissible to exclude Snyder's prayer from the city's reverence period. In drafting guidelines for council prayers that excluded Snyder's prayer, the record demonstrates that Hall was attempting to exclude the prayer because of its proselytizing and disparaging nature. 37 Finally, Snyder attempts to incorporate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment into his argument in this appeal. Because these contentions fall outside the limitation of our order for rehearing--confined as it was to the Establishment Clause issues in this case--we will not address them.