Opinion ID: 2828805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jones’s Mitigation Arguments

Text: We review de novo whether the district court committed any procedural error during sentencing. United States v. Spiller, 732 F.3d 767, 769 (7th Cir. 2013). We held in United States v. Cunningham that a sentencing judge must address the defendant’s principal arguments in mitigation unless they have no legal merit. 429 F.3d 673, 67879 (7th Cir. 2005). We have applied the Cunningham standard many times. See No. 14-2787 9 United States v. Castaldi, 743 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). As our cases illustrate, that standard “does not apply mechanically or without regard to context.” United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 2009). “A short explanation will suffice where the context and record make clear the reasoning underlying the district court's conclusion.” United States v. Shroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2008). And we generally require less explanation when the court sentences within the guidelines range. United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2010). So long as the record gives us confidence that the court meaningfully considered the defendant’s mitigation arguments, “even if implicitly and imprecisely,” that is enough. United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Poetz, 582 F.3d at 839). But a “rote statement that the judge considered all relevant factors will not always suffice.” Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679. Some of the court’s comments here, taken in isolation, look fairly rote. The court stated toward the end of both hearings that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors, but did so without much explanation and, at the second hearing, only when prompted by the government. Moreover, when pronouncing the sentence, the court summarized Jones’s mitigation arguments only briefly and without analysis. Looking at the record as a whole, however, we are confident that the court meaningfully considered all three of the mitigation arguments that Jones highlights on appeal: (1) that he had “worked hard to put his life on the right track through education, previous employment, and volunteer work”; (2) that he registered as a sex offender on multiple occasions from 1994 until 2010; and (3) that he committed the underlying sexual assaults 26 years ago. 10 No. 14-2787 The facts about Jones’s work and education, his compliance with the registration requirement, and the dates of his offenses were all laid out in the PSR, which the court reviewed before both hearings and on which it placed substantial weight. Jones further argued these points in his sentencing memorandum, which the court also reviewed. And the parties covered this ground again in considerable detail during the two hearings. The court was well aware of Jones’s arguments. Moreover, it is clear that the court considered those arguments in making its decision. The court questioned Jones and his counsel directly about his work history, though it focused more on how long Jones had been unemployed. The court also expressly acknowledged Jones’s claim that he was “a changed person” who presented no risk. The court asked about Jones’s past registration as a sex offender, though it found his prior failure to register more important than his instances of compliance. And the court engaged in the arguments about the length of time since Jones’s sex offenses, often interrupting with questions. In short, the court considered Jones’s arguments; it simply found them unpersuasive. It is true that the court did not directly explain why it found them unpersuasive. The record would have been clearer and this appeal more straightforward had the court done so. But, all the same, we find no procedural error. We can discern the court’s rationale from its questions, comments, and decisions, and from its responses to both sides’ lengthy arguments. The court considered and discussed the most pertinent § 3553(a) factors—Jones’s history, characteristics, and character, as well as the issue of whether he still posed a danger to society. And it expressly determined that the guidelines No. 14-2787 11 range was reasonable in this case. In doing so, the court meaningfully considered and rejected, even if “implicitly and imprecisely,” the facts and arguments that Jones advanced in support of his sentencing position. Diekemper, 604 F.3d at 355.