Opinion ID: 1831361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the defendant enjoy a qualified privilege in televising the film?

Text: Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held the defendant enjoyed a qualified privilege in televising A Bell for Okinawa. The trial court found the film to be a matter of public interest and, so, held that the defendant was not required to determine the truthfulness of it, but merely to believe it to be true and publish it in good faith. The availability of privilege in libel actions is tested by the occasion and is to be determined by the court, but each occasion must be viewed in the light of its own facts. The privilege to disseminate current, topical, immediate news of public interest, or about official or public figures, is one thing. The privilege in connection with past events of possible current interest but which do not have to be transmitted to the public in a matter of hours is quite another. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra . If the privilege is one of a limited or qualified nature, it may be lost through improper conduct. The test for a public figure, as stated by Justice Harlan, is (p 155): A `public figure' who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Newspaper articles appeared in 1953 when the bell was cast and given. The event was described in an article by Bruce Bliven, Jr., in a German Lutheran publication called Christ Und Welt, in April, 1955, and the Reader's Digest story in August of 1955. Consequently, the occasion of the giving of the bell for Okinawa and plaintiff's connection therewith, if any, had entered the area of public interest. Photographs taken and published at the time remain extant. The newspaper and periodical articles describing the event can be procured from libraries or other record depositories. All of this material is in the public domain. To the extent that the film depiction of these matters was merely a reiteration by another medium of communication of what had already been published, it was privileged. Nevertheless, as Justice TALBOT SMITH pointed out in Lawrence v. Fox (1959), 357 Mich 134, 144, qualified privilege raises two questions: In short, at this point 2 questions are presented. The first is whether or not the occasion upon which the words were spoken was a privileged occasion. This determination is for the court and the burden of proof is upon the defendant asserting the privilege. If, however, the privilege is qualified, a further question remains, whether or not the privilege of the occasion was abused. Here the problem is one for the jury, under proper instructions, and with respect to it the plaintiff carries the burden of proof. `The question whether the occasion is such as to rebut the inference of malice if the communication be bona fide is one of law for the court; but whether bona fides exist is one of fact for the jury.' Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich 355, 367, quoting Bacon v. Michigan Central R. Company, 66 Mich 166, 173. Plaintiff established notice to defendant after the first telecast. Plaintiff claims the film deviates falsely from previous accounts. The actor who depicts the Franz Weeren of the film may or may not faithfully and truly depict the character, features and behavior of plaintiff. Consequently, even though the defendant enjoyed a qualified privilege, there were still many questions to be considered by the jury. The fact, then, that it is determined that the occasion is conditionally privileged does not mean that the publisher (whether newspaper or other) has carte blanche to deal recklessly with the most jealously guarded possession of a public official, or, indeed, of any citizen, his good reputation. Yet the conditional privilege does afford the publisher a degree of protection. He is not liable for absolute truth, it being required only, as we held in Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich 297, 305, quoting McAllister v. Detroit Free Press, 76 Mich 338, 356 (15 Am St Rep 318), that the statement made be `honestly believed to be true, and published in good faith.' See, also, Howard v. Dickie, 120 Mich 238, 241; 15 MLP, Libel and Slander, § 21. Lawrence v. Fox, supra, pp 142, 143. Since none of the material was hot news that needed to be reported immediately, and since it is claimed the previously published material had been falsified in the film version so as to be defamatory of the plaintiff, I would apply the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Curtis Publishing Co., supra, and leave the matter for determination by a jury.