Opinion ID: 180769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Before turning to the merits of the appeal, we address the government's contention that we lack jurisdiction. Circuit courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review final decisions of the district courts. The government asserts that when Ms. Constien filed her notice of appeal, the district court's dismissal was not a final, appealable decision because the dismissal had not yet been set forth on a separate document, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a). We disagree. As we proceed to explain, the district court's dismissal was a final decision. The separate-document requirement does not affect the finality of a court order; failure to comply with the requirement merely extends the time for a losing party to file a notice of appeal. A final decision within the meaning of the term in § 1291 is one that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988). [I]n this circuit, whether an order of dismissal is appealable generally depends on whether the district court dismissed the complaint or the action. ... [D]ismissal of the entire action is ordinarily final. Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 448-49 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). A dismissal without prejudice can be a final decision. See id. at 448. In particular, dismissal without prejudice for failure of service is a dismissal of the action and not just the complaint because no amendment of the complaint could cure the defect. See id. at 450-51; cf. Jones v. Frank, 973 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.1992) (reviewing dismissal without prejudice because of failure to serve government). The government's jurisdictional argument is not founded on § 1291 but rather on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which governs the time for appeal in a civil case. Timeliness can have jurisdictional consequences. Most notably, a tardy notice of appeal in a civil case deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 206-07, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). We may also lack jurisdiction, however, when the notice of appeal is filed prematurely. Indeed, a premature notice of appeal may be a legal nullity in some circumstances. Appellate Rule 4(a)(2) might appear to eliminate this problem. It states: A notice of appeal filed after the court announces a decision or order but before the entry of judgment or orderis treated as filed on the date of and after the entry. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2). But in FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991), the Supreme Court limited the application of Rule 4(a)(2), holding that it does not cover a clearly interlocutory decision; it covers only those decisions that would be appealable if immediately followed by entry of judgment, id. ; see Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 158-59, 163 (D.C.Cir.2005) (Roberts, J.) (applying FirsTier and Rule 4(a)(2)). When prematurity of a notice of appeal cannot be cured by Rule 4(a)(2), the aggrieved party must await a final judgment before filing a notice of appeal to challenge the allegedly erroneous ruling. Nevertheless, on this appeal we do not confront prematurity caused by appeal from a clearly interlocutory decision. The government does not dispute that the district court's dismissal in this case would be appealable if immediately followed by entry of judgment. Accordingly, under Appellate Rule 4(a)(2), Ms. Constien's notice of appeal was not a legal nullity but would be considered filed immediately after entry of judgment. Application of that rule does not, however, resolve all the government's concerns. The prematurity claimed by the government in this case arises from the absence of a separate document setting forth the dismissal, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a). [1] Under that rule the judgment and the opinion on which it is based must be kept separate. See Mondragón v. Thompson, 519 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (10th Cir.2008). Apparent prematurity can arise from the absence of a separate document because the time for appeal is measured from entry of the judgment, and the absence of a separate document delays that entry. When the United States or its agency or officer is a party, the notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.  Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). And under Appellate Rule 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), entry of judgment does not occur when the judgment or order is entered in the civil docket but only after: the earlier of these events occurs:  the judgment or order is set forth on a separate document, or  150 days have run from entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a). Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). [2] Thus, if a party files a notice of appeal less than 150 days after the decision is filed but before the decision is set forth on a separate document, the notice is filed before the time period for filing a notice has begun to run. See Warren v. Am. Bankers Ins., 507 F.3d 1239, 1245 (10th Cir.2007) (describing as premature a notice of appeal filed before entry of judgment under Appellate Rule 4(a)(7)). That is what happened here. The dismissal order was filed on June 24, 2010, but the district court did not comply with the separate-document rule. It dismissed Ms. Constien's claim in a four-page order that included facts and legal reasoning; there was not a separate document setting forth the judgment. Therefore, under Appellate Rule 4(a)(7)(A)(ii), entry of judgment did not occur until 150 days later, on November 21, 2010. Ms. Constien filed her notice of appeal on July 1, 2010, well before that date. The type of prematurity caused solely by the absence of a separate document, however, is specifically addressed, and cured, by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(B). It states: A failure to set forth a judgment or order on a separate document when required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a)(1)[ [3] ] does not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or order. If the only reason that the notice of appeal is premature is that the judgment, although filed in the civil docket in accordance with Civil Rule 79(a), has not been set forth on a separate document, then the notice is as effective as if the judgment had been so set forth. Appellate Rule 4(a)(7)(B) was added in 2002 to codify the Supreme Court ruling in Bankers Trust Co. v. Mallis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (per curiam). The rationale for the rule is explained in that decision. The Court said that the sole purpose of the separate-document requirement ... was to clarify when the time for appeal ... begins to run. Id. at 384, 98 S.Ct. 1117. It noted that nothing but delay would flow from requiring the court of appeals to dismiss [because of the absence of a separate document]. Upon dismissal, the district court would simply file and enter the separate judgment, from which a timely appeal would then be taken. Wheels would spin for no practical purpose. Id. at 385, 98 S.Ct. 1117. [4] In short, under Appellate Rule 4(a)(7)(b), the appellant can always decide to waive[] the separate document requirement and choose[] to appeal prior to the running of the 150-day cap. Utah v. Norton, 396 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir.2005). Accordingly, Ms. Constien's notice of appeal was effective, and this court has had jurisdiction over this appeal since that notice was filed. We can now turn to the merits of the appeal. [5]