Opinion ID: 58818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burglary Convictions

Text: We review de novo whether a particular offense constitutes a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. United States v. Wilkerson, 286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). Section 924(e) of the ACCA provides that: (1) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony . . . committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years . . . . ... (2)(B) [T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that - (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . 2 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1), (e)(2)(B). The Supreme Court has defined burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement as “generic burglary,” containing “at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2158, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). In Taylor, the Court specifically rejected using the definition of burglary provided by the State of conviction when deciding if an offense qualified under § 924(e). Id. at 592 (“We think that ‘burglary’ in § 924(e) must have some uniform definition independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.”). While § 924(e)(1) provides that the violent felonies must have been committed on different occasions, we have stated that neither the wording of the ACCA, nor its legislative history, reveals any intent that the predicate offenses must have been separated by some substantial amount of time. United States v. Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 692 (11th. Cir. 1998). Accordingly, “so long as predicate crimes are successive rather than simultaneous, they constitute separate criminal episodes for purposes of the ACCA. A showing that the crimes reflect distinct aggressions, especially if the defendant committed the crimes in different places, is particularly probative of the sequential nature of those crimes.” Id. (emphasis added). Fastnacht has five prior Alabama state court convictions for third-degree 3 burglary, which the Alabama statute defines as “knowingly enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime.” Ala. Code § 13A-7-7 (1977). Therefore, Fastnacht’s convictions meet the elements of generic burglary set out by the Supreme Court in Taylor. The convictions were for burglary of five separate buildings. Even if the burglaries occurred in one night, as Fastnacht alleges, burglary of five different buildings nonetheless represents separate offenses under Pope. Fastnacht’s fifteen year sentence under the ACCA is therefore appropriate. Fastnacht’s claim that the convictions should not be considered because he was a youth when they were committed is unavailing because Fastnacht was tried and sentenced as an adult for the crimes. See United States v. Spears, 443 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006) (petitioner’s claim that his convictions should not count for the ACCA enhancement because he was a juvenile when he committed the crimes found “meritless” because he was tried and sentenced as an adult), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 264 (2006).