Opinion ID: 2967804
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wiggins' Jackson v. Virginia Claim3

Text: ____________________________________________________________ 3 Although Jackson announced the appropriate standard for sufficiency of the evidence review in habeas corpus cases, the Maryland court of appeals found it applicable to direct appeals in Tichnell v. State, 415 A.2d 830, 842 (Md. 1980), and subsequently applied it on direct appeal of Wiggins' conviction. This is the same method of analysis utilized by the Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984), a case on direct appeal. There the Court equated the substantial evidence standard of Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), also a direct appeal case, with Jackson's rationality test. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984) (Sufficiency-of-the evidence review involves assessment by the courts of whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), and Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)). 9 In Jackson v. Virginia, the Supreme Court stated that the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction . . . [is] whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The question to be answered in applying the standard is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (italics in original). Conflicting inferences presented by the facts in the historical record are presumed to have been resolved in favor of the prosecution even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record, and we must defer to that resolution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 297 (1992). The Maryland Court of Appeals identified these controlling principles of law correctly. Wiggins v. State, 597 A.2d at 1366-67. As stated above, it is our task to decide whether the state court's application of these precepts is unreasonable in this case: to do this we must decide whether the Court of Appeals' decision is minimally consistent with the historical record of facts. Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d at 159. We conclude that it is; indeed, in our opinion, it is not only minimally consistent with, but fully supported by the record. In deciding Wiggins' sufficiency claim on direct appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's findings of fact for clear error pursuant to state law and concluded that no such error was present. The Court stated that the trial judge considered but rejected Wiggins's argument that the circumstances taken together, demonstrated a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Wiggins v. State, 597 A.2d at 1367.4 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge explicitly did not credit any of Wiggins's evidence that the robbery and murder were committed at a time subsequent to his theft of the victim's car and other personal property. 597 A.2d at 1367. Lastly, the Court stated that the conflicting testimony regarding time of death did not render the trial court's ultimate conclusion of guilt clearly erroneous. As such, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to ____________________________________________________________ 4 The Maryland rule which the trial judge considered in this case is more favorable to defendants than the federal rule. Compare Wilson v. State, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (Md. 1990), with Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320. 10 conclude, as Judge Hinkel did, that Wiggins robbed and murdered Mrs. Lacs on September 15. 597 A.2d at 1367. A recitation of the facts found by the trial judge and the inferences that could reasonably be drawn therefrom will demonstrate that the Maryland Court of Appeals applied Jackson reasonably.5 Kevin Wig____________________________________________________________ 5 The district court began its Jackson analysis by stating that only one piece of evidence supported an inference that Wiggins murdered Lacs, namely his possession of Mrs. Lacs' property. 164 F. Supp. 2d at 554. However, the court stated that Wiggins' conviction could not be sustained on that basis, because the trial judge had refused to draw that very inference. Stating that the Maryland Court of Appeals appeared to rely on that inference to affirm, the district court reasoned that it would be a violation of due process for an appellate court, in affirming a conviction, to rely upon an inference that is only permissible and that was expressly rejected by the finder of fact. Accordingly, the district court proceeded to examine the record facts for other evidence of guilt, finding none. The district court, however, misapprehended the finding of the Maryland trial court and also the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals. To repeat, what Judge Hinkel decided with respect to the recently stolen property follows: The defendant of course is in possession of recently stolen property. The defense argues that any presumption that he is the robber is rebutted upon testimony of M. S. Vassar, but my decision is not based on any presumption arising from the recent possession of stolen property, but my belief and fact finding and decision is based upon all the evidence that I have weighed in this case and not by any presumption. [J.A.550] So the district court found that the Maryland trial court did exactly what the Maryland trial court did not do. It laid off the finding of the Maryland trial court solely to possession of Mrs. Lacs' property which had been recently stolen, the very thing that Judge Hinkel did not do, rather basing his decision on all the evidence that I have weighed in this case and not by any presumption. Although we cannot know all the mental processes of Judge Hinkel, it may well be that he was aware of such cases as West v. State, 539 A.2d 231 (Md. 1988), in which the recent possession of a stolen money order after a purse snatching sufficed to support the crime of receiver but not stealing the money order. However that may be, and whatever the presumption may be in Maryland, Judge Hinkel did not rely on it, rather, as noted, he relied on all 11 gins was working in Lacs' building on September 15, 1988. Wiggins was dismissed from work at or about 4:30 p.m. on that day. Wiggins had no legitimate reason to stay at work after the time his supervisor dismissed him, however, he returned to the building sometime after 4:30 p.m. While in the building, Wiggins was seen near Mrs. Lacs' apartment by Chianti Thomas, who also testified that Wiggins and Mrs. Lacs briefly conversed. When Wiggins returned from the building some 30 minutes later, he told his supervisor that he moved some sheetrock in the apartment building. This job, according to Wiggins' supervisor, would only have taken a couple of minutes. Later that same night, Wiggins was found in possession of Mrs. Lacs' credit cards, her ring, and her car. There was evidence that Wiggins' girlfriend, who came with him that evening of September 15th, forged Mrs. Lacs' name to the credit card slips, while accompanied by Wiggins. The trial court could reasonably have drawn several inferences from these facts, that Wiggins was in the vicinity of Ms. Lacs' apartment sometime around 5:00 p.m. on the evening of September 15th, that he had ample time to steal Mrs. Lacs' property, approximately 30 minutes, and that his return to explain his presence on the job site was pre-textual. The time of death was not established to a reasonable medical certainty by medical testimony at trial. In fact, the conclusions of the ____________________________________________________________ the evidence that I have weighed in this case and not by any presumption. Judge Hinkel's trial decision as to consideration of the evidence was consistent with the direction in Jackson as to the review of evidence, that: the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 443 U.S. at 319 (italics in original). And this quotation from Jackson was more recently repeated in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992). The fact that the Maryland trial court did not rely on any presumption, in our opinion, did not prevent that court from its reliance on all of the evidence in the case, which included, among many other items, the fact that Mrs. Lacs' automobile, credit cards, and ring had been stolen at a time contemporaneous with her murder and that Wiggins was present at her house at that time. 12 medical experts were discounted by the trial judge. However, that the time of death was not established to any scientific certainty is of little moment because ample evidence supported the conclusion that Mrs. Lacs was killed on the evening of September 15, thus implicating Wiggins in more than mere theft or robbery. First, there was the testimony of Mrs. Lacs' friends regarding her attire the last time she was seen alive. The testimony established that Mrs. Lacs was wearing a blue skirt, white blouse, and white beads when she was seen at her regular card game on the 15th. This was the same outfit that she was wearing when she was found dead on the 17th.6 Furthermore, there was evidence that Mrs. Lacs had marked certain television programs of apparent interest in her TV Guide, and the last markings in the TV Guide were for September 15. As stated above, other testimony established that Mrs. Lacs was last perceived alive7 on September 15, sometime between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. when Chianti Thomas heard Wiggins thank Mrs. Lacs for watching some sheetrock for him. It was only a few hours later that Wiggins picked up Miss Armstrong in Mrs. Lacs' car and the two began using Mrs. Lacs' credit cards. Adding all the circumstances together, the trial judge concluded that Florence Lacs' robbery and murder occurred on the evening of September 15th and that Wiggins, being there at a relevant time, was the robber and murderer. On this basis, the Maryland Court of Appeals found Jackson v. Virginia satisfied. We are of opinion and decide that the Maryland Court of Appeals' decision was not only at least minimally consistent with the record of facts found by the trial judge and thus was not unreasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d), ____________________________________________________________ 6 This testimony was not without contradiction. Mary Elgert filed a missing persons report indicating that Mrs. Lacs was wearing a white blouse and red skirt when she was last seen on Thursday. The trial judge explicitly resolved the conflicting testimony in favor of the prosecution stating that Mrs. Elgert's recollection was simply wrong. It is the exclusive province of the trier of fact, save only for clear error, to resolve conflicting facts and credibility determinations at trial. The Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed the record evidence for clear error and found none. Nor is there any evidence that we can see that would indicate a result to the contrary. 7 Edith Vassar testified that she received a call from Florence Lacs on the morning of September 16. The trial judge explicitly found that Mrs. Vassar did not correctly remember. 13 it was fully supported by the record. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of Wiggins' petition on this issue.