Opinion ID: 210050
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extensions of the Stay of the Permanent Injunction

Text: The district court's original order staying the permanent injunction stated that the injunction would go into effect [s]even days after the resolution or abandonment of any appeal. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 8:03-CV-242, slip op. at 28 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 2, 2005). Following remand from this court in Amado I, Amado moved to enforce the injunction as having become effective on August 30, 2006  seven days after the mandate issued. The district court denied Amado's motion, interpreting its order staying the injunction through any pending appeal to include a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. 8:03-CV-242, slip op. at 2 (C.D.Cal. Sept. 15, 2006). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 27, 2006. On November 30, Microsoft moved to extend the stay of the injunction. On December 1, the district court granted the request, and on December 5, clarified its ruling as follows: [A]s to the stay, the Court has reconsidered the August 5, 2005 order lifting the stay seven days after the resolution or abandonment of any appeal. The Court believes that the more prudent course is to leave the stay in place, pending resolution of the motions that will be heard on February 5, 2006[, regarding the stay-related escrow, the injunction, or any remaining issues]. Therefore, the stay of the permanent injunction will remain in place until 7 days after the Court rules on the February 5, 2006 motions. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. 8:03-CV-242, slip op. at 2 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 5, 2006); see also Amado v. Microsoft Corp., No. 8:03-CV-242 (C.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2006). Amado contends that the district court abused its discretion by staying the injunction more than seven days following the mandate in Amado I because the district court did not possess authority to deviate from the original order staying the injunction once it was incorporated into the Amado I mandate. Microsoft counters that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the propriety of the stay was not appealed and therefore was not within the scope of the mandate in Amado I. Amado's first assignment of error relates to the district court's interpretation of appeal in its order staying the injunction as including a petition for certiorari. A district court's interpretation of its order is entitled to deference unless the interpretation is unreasonable or is otherwise an abuse of discretion. See Cave v. Singletary, 84 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1996) (The district court's interpretation of its own order is properly accorded deference on appeal when its interpretation is reasonable.); In re Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 865 F.2d 807, 810 (7th Cir.1988) (We shall not reverse a district court's interpretation of its own order `unless the record clearly shows an abuse of discretion.' The district court is in the best position to interpret its own orders.) (citations omitted). We have little difficulty concluding that the district court's interpretation of appeal as including a petition for certiorari was reasonable, and thus worthy of deference. Consequently, we move to Amado's central argument  that the district court was without authority to extend the stay following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. District courts manage hundreds of civil and criminal cases at any given time. For this reason, they are afforded broad discretion to control and manage their dockets, including the authority to decide the order in which they hear and decide issues pending before them. E.g., Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trustees v. Vanvoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed.Cir.2002) (This court defers to the judgment of the trial court on matters closely associated with the standard functions of the adjudicative process, as long as that judgment is not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir.1990) (A trial court has broad discretionary authority in managing the litigation before it. . . . ). As reflected in the December 5, 2006 order, the district court extended the stay of the permanent injunction so that it could address the various pending motions related to the injunction and the escrow account. Amado contends that the district court abused its discretion by so doing because once the order was incorporated into the Amado I mandate, the district court was powerless to modify the terms of the injunction or the stay, no matter how extreme the circumstances. We disagree. As we discuss in more detail below, infra Section II.B.2, district courts possess broad equitable authority to modify injunctions. This broad authority, coupled with the wide discretion to manage the order in which they address issues pending before them, necessarily vests district courts with the authority to extend the stay of an injunction, particularly under these circumstances where it is done to preserve the status quo while motions affecting that injunction are under advisement. Cf. Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1341 (Fed.Cir.1983) ([B]ecause district courts have broad discretionary powers to control their dockets, stays will not be vacated unless they are `immoderate or of an indefinite duration.') (stay of proceedings pending patent reexamination). This principle holds true regardless of whether the order that originally set the terms of the stay is incorporated into an appellate mandate. Cf. Barrow v. Falck, 11 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir.1993) (An appellate mandate does not turn a district judge into a robot, mechanically carrying out orders that become inappropriate in light of subsequent factual discoveries or changes in the law.). Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by extending the stay of the injunction in order to address pending motions, including motions related to whether that very injunction should be dissolved.