Opinion ID: 2284003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Voir Dire Generally

Text: The English common law has never known or permitted the voir dire examination of jurors as it is practiced in the United States. In England the rule has always been that such examination may be conducted only after a challenge for cause has been interposed, and then in support of the challenge. And it has been said that in selecting the jury in the English courts the challenge of a juror is almost as rare as the challenge of a judge in the United States. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: I. The English Practice, 16 Geo. L.J. 438, 445, 453, n. 53 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Moore ]; Note, Voir Dire Examination  Court or Counsel, 11 St. Louis U.L.J. 234, 235 (1967); Note, The Jury Voir Dire: Useless Delay or Valuable Technique, 11 S. Dak. L. Rev. 306, 308 (1966); Comment, Examination of Jurors Prior to Challenge, 31 Yale L.J. 514 (1922); Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective, 289, 292 (1952). One basic reason was the fundamental confidence in the English juror's fair-mindedness vitalized by his oath. Moore, supra, at p. 453. Originally the English rule was followed in this country. Millar, supra, at p. 292; Note, 11 St. Louis U.L.J., supra, at p. 435; Annotation, 99 A.L.R. 2 d 7, 16 (1965). This was true also in New Jersey. State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 220, 222-223 ( Sup. Ct. 1824); Clifford v. State, 61 N.J.L. 217 ( E. & A. 1897). Efforts to engage in preliminary examination of prospective jurors were rebuffed. For example in Zellers, a murder case, defense counsel endeavored to inquire of a juror about bias toward the prisoner. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick said You cannot ask that question. If you mean to make a challenge you must do it in regular form, and then prove it in regular form: our books know of no other way. 7 N.J.L., at 222. When counsel suggested that such examination had been repeatedly conducted, the Chief Justice replied: It is true we have slipped into the practice, but on looking into it I am satisfied it is not the true way: the only proper way is, to make the challenge, and then prove it upon oath. 7 N.J.L. at 223. Approximately seventy-five years later the Court felt the same way. In Clifford v. State, supra , Chief Justice Magie sharply rejected a similar attempt by counsel to question a juror generally to obtain information on which he could intelligently exercise the right of peremptory challenge   . 61 N.J.L., at 222. The Chief Justice said: I think it would be impossible to exaggerate the evil consequences which would follow the adoption of the contrary practice. If the court is bound to permit counsel to engage in a public conversation with each juror, for the purpose of enabling counsel to determine whether he should interpose a challenge or not, what control has the court over the examination? Where can it draw the line between proper and improper questions, when the purpose of the talk is not to prove a fact or to establish a challenge, but only to furnish counsel information? How is a juror to be protected against improper questions, except by his refusal to answer them? And if he refuses to answer proper questions, what power has the court to compel him to answer? Or, if a juror is anxious to escape service, how can it be discovered whether his answers, not given under the sanctity of an oath, are true or false? Such a practice would introduce into this state, happily so far free from them, the unseemly, vexatious and expensive delays in impaneling juries in criminal cases which have been a reproach to the administration of criminal justice in some other states. 61 L.N.J. at 223. In the course of time, however, through legislative or judicial action, it became the prevailing view in this country that a party could examine prospective jurors without having any previous knowledge concerning them, for the purpose of deciding upon the exercise of peremptory or cause challenges. The reason for the change was perhaps best summarized by Roger D. Moore in this fashion: Cut off politically from the older English tradition and confronted with differences in social conditions growing largely out of heterogeneity of population and extent of territories, it is therefore not surprising that our courts have countenanced such changes in jury trials as to enable parties to procure information about jurors without being put to the expense and inequality of extra-curia investigations. Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: II The Federal Practice, 17 Geo. L.J. 13, 36 (1928). The rule change came about in New Jersey by legislative enactment. Chapter 151, L. 1911, provided that in civil or criminal causes all challenges to jurors for any cause whatever may be made at any time before the juror is sworn. It provided also that in civil cases each party shall be allowed six peremptory challenges, and that either party could question a juror after his name was drawn from the box for the purpose of eliciting information upon which he may determine whether to interpose such a peremptory challenge, and that Within the discretion and under the control of the court, such questions shall be permitted for the purpose of disclosing whether or not the juror is impartial as between the parties to the suit and without interest therein or in the result thereof. L. 1911, c. 151, § 3, p. 220. The quoted portion of the statute was held to apply to civil cases alone. Lamble v. State, 96 N.J.L. 231, 234 ( E. & A. 1921). Oddly enough, the common law prohibition against voir dire examination of jurors in criminal cases [except cases where the death penalty might be imposed ( L. 1931, c. 298, p. 741)] was continued in 1948 by Rule 2:7-2( b ) when the Rules of Criminal Practice were adopted upon revision of the court structure following the 1947 Constitution. The rule provided in the ancient language: All challenges shall be tried under supervision of the court.    Individual jurors may be challenged for principal cause or to the favor, when challenge is to the polls. The challenge is to be made before the swearing of the juror. Except in murder cases, a juror may not be put upon his voir dire and examined as to his competency unless a challenge for cause be first interposed. A few months after adoption of this rule, it was criticized in the New Jersey Law Journal. 72 N.J.L.J. 105 (1949). The article said: In this day of the renaissance of our practice it is doubtful that many members of the bar actually know the technical meaning of `challenge for principal cause or to the favor, where the challenge is to the polls.'