Opinion ID: 180313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Scienter Burden

Text: Enacted as part of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) provides that it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to ... distribute, or ... possess with intent to... distribute ... a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). And § 841(b) of that title prescribes maximum and minimum punishments depending on the type and quantity of the controlled substance involved in the offense. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). In interpreting § 841, we have adhered to the principle that the government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the specific nature and amount of the controlled substance for the enhancement provisions to apply. United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). This result derives from the structure and language of the provision, which clearly indicates that the terms `knowingly or intentionally' in § 841(a) modif[y] the conduct set forth in that sub-section of the statute, and not the penalty provisions in § 841(b). United States v. King, 345 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Put another way, § 841's scienter requirement is not type-specific. To convict on charges of cocaine possession, for example, the government need not prove that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine; rather, it need only prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance that was in fact cocaine. On this point the precedents are consistent and clear. Andino, however, was not convicted of a direct offense; rather, he was convicted under the CSA's conspiracy prohibition, which subjects drug conspirators to the same penalties as those prescribed for the [object] offense. 21 U.S.C. § 846. In particular, the jury found that Andino conspired to violate § 841 i.e., that he conspired to distribute or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substanceand that the conspiracy involved cocaine in the amount of less than 500 grams. As a result, Andino was sentenced pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C), which, through § 846, establishes the penalty range for conspiracy convictions involving the relevant amount and type of controlled substance. The question thus arises whether this statutory framework requires the government to prove that a conspiracy defendant has specific knowledge of the type and quantity of the drugs involved in the conspiracy. On this question the parties suggestincorrectly, we believethat our precedents are in some tension with each other. The government assertsand Andino does not denythat we have sometimes expressed the view that the mens rea requirement for conspiracy is satisfied simply if the government shows that the defendant intended to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute any controlled substance. United States v. Abdulle, 564 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir.2009); see also United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.2010) (The knowledge of the parties is relevant to a conspiracy charge to the same extent as it may be for conviction of the substantive offense. (internal quotation and citation omitted)); United States v. Morgan, 385 F.3d 196, 206 (2d Cir.2004) (Here, the government had to establish to the jury's satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knew that she was engaged in a conspiracy to import into the United States some controlled substance. (internal citations omitted)). But Andino notes that in other cases we have applied a stricter scienter burden, holding in particular that [c]onviction of a Section 841(b)(1)(A) conspiracy.... require[s] proof that ... drug type and quantity were at least reasonably foreseeable to the co-conspirator defendant. Adams, 448 F.3d at 499; see also Santos, 541 F.3d at 70-71 (citing Adams for the proposition that in a conspiracy punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), the government must also prove ... that it was either known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant that the conspiracy involved the drug type and quantity charged); United States v. Martinez, 987 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir.1993) (similar). These seemingly mixed messages, it is said, have created significant confusion regarding the requisite scienter burden in drug conspiracy casesconfusion that assertedly was reflected in the trial proceedings in this case. [2] But whatever the tension some of the language of these cases may seem to suggest, we believe that, in context, there are no inconsistencies in the prior holdings. In fact, all of our cases accord with the rule that the government need not prove scienter as to drug type or quantity when a defendant personally and directly participates in a drug transaction underlying a conspiracy charge. See United States v. Chalarca, 95 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.1996) ([T]he quantity of drugs attributed to a defendant need not be foreseeable to him when he personally participates, in a direct way, in a jointly undertaken drug transaction.); United States v. Oluigbo, 375 Fed. Appx. 61, 64 (2d Cir.2010) (summary order); United States v. Wade, 217 Fed. Appx. 77, 79 (2d Cir.2007) (summary order). We reaffirm this rule today. Under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government need not prove foreseeability of drug type and quantity to the extent that it seeks to hold a defendant accountable for drug transactions in which the defendant directly and personally took part. [3] In cases like the present one, where the defendant personally and directly participated in the drug transaction underlying the conspiracy charge, the government need not prove that the defendant had knowledge of either drug type or quantity. The record in the case before us makes clear that Andino's participation in the drug transaction was anything but peripheral, as indicated by the uncontroverted evidence (a) that the incriminating package bore his name; (b) that he physically possessed the package after it arrived at the listed address; and (c) that he transported the package to a neighboring building, where his co-conspirators later picked it up. These facts alone demonstrate that Andino directly and personally took part in the drug transaction giving rise to his conspiracy charge. Consequently, the government was not subject to the reasonable foreseeability requirement; it did not bear the burden of proving that Andino reasonably believed that the package contained cocaine; and, as to Andino's scienter, it was required to show only that Andino believed that the package contained a controlled substance of one type or another.
Independent of the statutory scienter issue, Andino argues that the government here committed itself to proving cocaine-specific knowledge on Andino's part, by indicting him on cocaine-specific charges and by asserting at trial that it absolutely [did] want to go for the whole enchilada of a cocaine-specific conviction. To support this claim, and citing United States v. Wozniak, 126 F.3d 105, 110-11 (2d Cir.1997), and United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 545 (2d Cir.2004), Andino contends that the government cannot secure a conspiracy conviction based on one type of drug when it alleges a conspiracy involving a different type of drug. Rather, he asserts, the government must prove that the drug in the indictment was the one actually involved in the conspiracy. But, whatever the merits of this contention, and his reliance on Wozniak and Rodriguez to support it, he misreads our case law when he further takes it to mean that the government must show type-specific scienter on the defendant's part, as a result of alleging a conspiracy involving a specific type of drug. Andino also seeks to rely on our decision in United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108 (2d Cir.2008). Hassan arose from a conspiracy prosecution involving cathinone, which is harvested from a plant called khat and quickly decomposes into a different and less potent type of controlled substance known as cathine. The CSA designates cathinone as a Schedule I controlled substance and cathine as a Schedule IV controlled substance. Significantly, it does not designate khat as any type of controlled substance. The relationship between these three substances has given rise to various legal complications, one of which surfaced in Hassan. We reversed Hassan's conviction on the ground that the jury instructions, combined with the testimony offered at trial, did not adequately differentiate between khat, cathine, and cathinone. In doing so, we rejected the government's claim that Hassan could have been lawfully convicted by the jury even if the jury had found that he intended to import an illegal substance with cathine, and not an illegal substance with cathinone.  Id. at 133 (emphasis in original). This argument lacked merit, we explained, because the government conceded at trial that it was not trying an `any' controlled substance charge, but rather, was limiting itself to trying a cathinone-related charge, as listed in the indictment. Id. As a result, [a] conviction based on cathine, rather than cathinone, would have been an impermissible constructive amendment of the indictment and could not stand. Id. (internal citation omitted). Read in isolation, this language might seem to support Andino's claim that the government's indictment and statements at trial gave rise to a cocaine-specific scienter burden. In context, however, Hassan supports no such claim. Indeed, Hassan itself is explicit on this point; the amended opinion takes pains to underscore its adhere[nce] to [the] rule that scienter with respect to the type and quantity of controlled substance is not required to convict a defendant under the CSA. Id. at 113 n. 1 (internal quotation omitted). [4] Accordingly, we need not consider what the government's burden would have been, in the instant case, had the indictment alleged that it was cocaine that Andino intended to distribute, or had the government elsewhere committed itself to making such a showing. Here, neither circumstance is present. Instead, the indictment alleged only that Andino intentionally[ ] and knowingly ... conspire[d] ... to violate the narcotics laws of the United States, and that [i]t was a part and an object of the conspiracy ... that Andino... would and did distribute and possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, to wit, 500 grams and more of ... cocaine. J.A. 9. And at trial, the government repeatedly expressed the view that the jury could convict if it found that Andino directly and personally participated in a transaction that in fact did involve cocaine. J.A. 401. There is, therefore, no reason in the case before us to depart from the statutory scienter rule in drug conspiracy cases, which, given Andino's personal and direct involvement in the drug transaction, required only a showing that Andino intended to distribute a controlled substance.