Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Argument regarding burden of reasonable doubt.

Text: (11a) Though he failed to object at trial, defendant now claims the prosecutor misstated the law during his closing argument by asserting that [t]he defense has to create a reasonable doubt.... The reasonable doubt has to be created by the defense. They have not created any reasonable doubt. Confusion, yes, but reasonable doubt, no. (12) As defendant suggests, the prosecution must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused has no burden of proof or persuasion, even as to his defenses. (§ 1096; see In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375, 90 S.Ct. 1068]; Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684 [44 L.Ed.2d 508, 95 S.Ct. 1881]; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 472-474 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697].) However, once the prosecution has submitted proof that permits a finding beyond reasonable doubt on every element of a charge, the accused may obviously be obliged to respond with evidence that raises or permits a reasonable doubt that he is guilty as charged. (See § 189.5, subd. (a) [formerly § 1105, subd. (a)]; People v. Cornett (1948) 33 Cal.2d 33, 42-43 [198 P.2d 877]; People v. Hyde (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 463, 474-475 [212 Cal. Rptr. 440]; see People v. Loggins (1972) 23 Cal. App.3d 597, 601-602 [100 Cal. Rptr. 528].) (11b) In this context, the prosecutor's remark was ambiguous. The remark was proper if it meant only that the prosecution had proved premeditated murder of a peace officer beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the weakness of the defense response had left the record devoid of any basis for reasonable doubt. The remark was improper if meant to absolve the prosecution from its prima facie obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements. Because timely objection, admonition, and instruction would have cured any prejudicial confusion, defendant's failure to intervene below waives a direct claim of misconduct. ( People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]; People v. Scott (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 301, 306-307 [180 Cal. Rptr. 891].) Nor is the point persuasive when phrased as ineffective assistance of counsel. The prosecutor's remark was brief and mild. The jury received accurate standard instructions that the People bore the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that he was presumed innocent until proven guilty. (CALJIC No. 2.90; see also CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 5.15, 8.71, 8.72, 8.80.) No instruction stated or implied that defendant bore any burden of proof or persuasion. Defense counsel in his closing argument reread CALJIC No. 2.90 and repeatedly emphasized the People's very, very, very high burden. The evidence that defendant was guilty as charged was highly persuasive. Hence, counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's reasonable doubt argument does not undermine confidence in the guilt verdict.