Opinion ID: 1390081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: diminished expectation of privacy

Text: Because of the language of our constitution, we must also consider the applicability of a privacy analysis to search incident to arrest questions. Article 1, section 7 protects against unreasonable invasions of private affairs. State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151 (1984). Thus, a person enjoys Const. art. 1, § 7 protection to the extent that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place or an object. One does not expect the same degree of privacy in an automobile as in one's home. State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 149, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980) (discussing warrantless automobile searches based upon probable cause). Automobiles are licensed, heavily regulated, and subject to safety and pollution control inspections. Automobile travel has aspects of being both public and private. A diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile follows from these factors. It is not, however, necessary to find a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile in order to validate automobile searches incident to arrest. As already discussed, the fact of a lawful arrest and the exigencies which surround automobiles authorize a search of a passenger compartment. Application of a privacy analysis to automobiles is appropriate in other contexts. [10] See State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (analyzing privacy interest in vehicle identification number); Houser, at 156 (inventory search). A misapplication of privacy analysis to search incident to arrest questions is vividly illustrated by the majority's arbitrary distinction between locked and unlocked containers. The majority's implication that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked container exempts the container from an automobile search is unsupportable. It suggests a subjective test of a person's privacy expectations as support for drawing the line between locked and unlocked containers. Majority opinion, at 152. A subjective expectation of privacy may legitimately be held in any container, locked or unlocked, which a person takes with him into an automobile. [11] Is a rich criminal's expectation of privacy in a locked briefcase loaded with cash to be accorded greater deference than a poor criminal's expectation of privacy in tightly tied bank bags stuffed under the seat merely because of the type of container? [12] Such an approach could lead courts back to Ringer 's case-by-case adjudication of search and seizure questions. The exigent circumstances which surround an automobile search and militate against exempting containers from the search also refute the majority's argument that the exigencies do not require searching locked containers. Contrary to its assertion, the danger is not simply that the person arrested will destroy evidence or obtain a weapon. Majority opinion, at 152. Rather, what a search aims to prevent is the destruction of evidence by any person and threats to the public safety. The nature of these exigencies mandates such a search. The fact that a container is locked does not make it invulnerable to others, nor immovable. Thus, the majority's line-drawing exercise is contradicted by the very reasons for allowing searches of automobile passenger compartments incident to an arrest. Any distinction in this situation between locked and unlocked containers is logically inconsistent.