Opinion ID: 2049440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Derivative Diplomatic Immunity

Text: It is a well-established general principle of law that a diplomatic envoy is immune from the legal process of the Receiving State. [7] The U.S. Supreme Court recognized, from the earliest times of our country as a basis for this principle, that the person of a public minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers any violence to him, not only affronts the Sovereign he represents, but also hurts the common safety and well-being of nations; he is guilty of a crime against the whole world. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111, 116, 1 Dall. 111, 1 L.Ed. 59, 62 (1784). In more modern times, diplomats enjoy immunity under various international treaties, including the UN Convention and the Vienna Convention. According to the U.S. State Department, [t]he purpose of these privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient and effective performance of their official missions on behalf of their governments. United States Department of State, Diplomatic and Consular Immunity: Guidance for Law Enforcement and Judicial Authorities 2 (1998 rev. ed.) [hereinafter Diplomatic and Consular Immunity ]. See also UN Convention, art. V, § 20 (Privileges and immunities are granted to officials in the interests of the United Nations and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.). Generally, the spouse and other members of the household and the diplomat's staff also enjoy the same diplomatic immunities and privileges as the diplomat. Vienna Convention, art. 37(1); UN Convention, art. V, § 19. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254d (2006) provides: Any action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations . . ., or under any other laws extending diplomatic privileges and immunities, shall be dismissed. Thus, if an individual is entitled to immunity, a court must dismiss the matter because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant. See Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F.Supp.2d 509, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that when raised, diplomatic [i]mmunity must be determined at the outset because it implicates the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.). See also Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir.2010) (upholding the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because defendants were entitled to diplomatic immunity). The individual claiming immunity from prosecution bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547, 558 (1991) (stating that where a defendant claims prosecutorial immunity from suit, he or she bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the function in question.); O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 376 (6th Cir.2009) (explaining that the party claiming sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA) bears the initial burden of proof of establishing a prima facie case that it satisfies the FSIA's definition of a foreign state. . . .); Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguense De La Carne, 705 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.1983) (noting that under the FSIA, defendants bear the burden of establishing their immunity). See also Staley v. Staley, 251 Md. 701, 705, 248 A.2d 655, 658 (1968) (The burden of proof in establishing lack of jurisdiction . . . is upon the person alleging it.). Whether a diplomat is entitled to immunity is typically a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 569 (4th Cir.2004). As such, courts review such questions `under a hybrid standard, applying to the factual portion of each inquiry the same standard applied to questions of pure fact and examining de novo the legal conclusions derived from those facts.' Id. (quoting Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 80 F.3d 895, 905 (4th Cir.1996)). Generally an individual must be accredited by the State Department as a diplomatic official in order to be entitled to full diplomatic immunity. Ved P. Nanda & David K. Pansius, Litigation of International Disputes in U.S. Courts § 4:4 (2d ed. 2010). Typically, in the more common situation of a diplomat to a mission of a traditional foreign State (as opposed to an international organization such as the UN), when a person asserts diplomatic immunity from prosecution or suit, the law enforcement officer should verify the party's diplomatic status with the State Department. Diplomatic and Consular Immunity, supra, at 16; Nanda & Pansius, supra at § 4:4. In the situation of a representative of a traditional foreign State, courts generally give the State Department's certification substantial deference in its consideration of diplomatic status. In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 431-32, 10 S.Ct. 854, 862, 34 L.Ed. 222, 231 (1890); Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d at 571; Traore v. State, 290 Md. 585, 589, 431 A.2d 96, 98 (1981); Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 82, 88 A.2d 312, 317 (1952). A principal reason underlying judicial deference to the executive branch of the federal government in certain matters involving foreign governments is the principle that courts should `not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in conducting foreign relations.' Traore, 290 Md. at 591, 431 A.2d at 99 (alteration in original) (quoting Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588, 63 S.Ct. 793, 799, 87 L.Ed. 1014, 1020 (1943)). We, however, do not review the State Department's conclusions of law with regard to the interpretation of a statute on a deferential standard. Id. at 592, 431 A.2d at 99-100. Ascertaining the diplomatic status, vel non, of an individual claiming diplomatic immunity based on his or her involvement with the UN, rather than a traditional foreign State, requires a different and more complex analysis. At least two scholars point out, albeit discussing the immunity of the UN as an entity rather than that of a UN official, that [t]heorists who attempt to explain the international immunities of the United Nations face what has been called a `bewildering array of instruments,' an `inconsistency of practice,' a `multiplicity of applicable instruments,' and a `bizarre drafting of provisions.' Linda S. Frey & Marsha L. Frey, The History of Diplomatic Immunity 559 (1999). In the case of a UN official, the United Nations is essentially the receiving State and, as such, the United States has no say or veto power with respect to such representative of any member state. United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F.Supp. 425, 433 (S.D.N.Y.1963). Thus, when a law enforcement officer encounters a suspect who claims that he or she is a UN official or claims immunity through such a person, the officer should verify the diplomatic status of the UN official with the United States Mission to the UN. Diplomatic and Consular Immunity, supra, at 16. In the context of the present case, the Coffey certification would be inconclusive with regard to the elder Diallo's diplomatic status in 2006 and we shall not consider the certification further in our analysis. Moreover, the State appears to concede that the Coffey certification is incomplete and possibly incorrect in its conclusion and that, by virtue of the United States' adoption of the Vienna Convention, any protection accorded to UN officials was available to the elder Diallo when present in the United States (before he resigned his UN position). Petitioner alleges, and the State concedes, that his father was a senior UN official entitled to diplomatic immunity under certain circumstances. He contends further that, as a member of his father's household, he enjoyed derivative diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention and the UN Convention, to the extent his father enjoyed it at the critical time(s) significant to our analysis. He claims that he is immune from prosecution pursuant to the UN Convention, the Vienna Convention, the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-2881, [8] and the Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254a. The State retorts that he failed to establish before the trial court that his father enjoyed diplomatic immunity on the date(s) in question, and, thus, Diallo enjoyed nothing derivatively. [9] As a then UN Assistant Secretary-General, the principal source of the elder Diallo's immunity was the UN Convention. The UN Convention grants to the Secretary-General and all Assistant Secretaries-General (and their spouses and minor children) the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with international law. UN Convention, art. V, § 19. The scope of that immunity under international law is the immunity described in the Vienna Convention. See Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113; Ahmed v. Hoque, 2002 WL 1858776, at , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14852, at -14 (S.D.N.Y. 14 Aug. 2002) (The scope of immunity extended to diplomatic envoys, and accordingly the scope of immunity to be extended to United Nations representatives, is that set out in the Vienna Convention. . . .). Here, Petitioner argued to the trial court in his motion to dismiss, other papers filed in the Circuit Court, and at the 13 November 2007 hearing that, pursuant to Article IV, § 11 of the UN Convention, he was entitled to full diplomatic immunity and privileges. [10] That section provides, in pertinent part: Representatives of Members to the principal and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and to conferences convened by the United Nations, shall, while exercising their functions and during their journey to and from the place of meeting, enjoy the following privileges and immunities: (a) immunity from personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage, and, in respect of words spoken or written and all acts done by them in their capacity as representatives, immunity from legal process of every kind. UN Convention, art. IV, § 11. That section limits the official's immunity to functional immunity, i.e., immunity for acts exercised in the performance of his or her official duties. Under the Vienna Convention, [a] diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. Art. 31(1). Article 39(1) states that [e]very person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from the moment he enters the territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up his post. . . . When that person's diplomatic functions come to an end in the Receiving State, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country. . . . However, with respect to acts performed by such person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist. Vienna Convention, art. 39(2). Article 37(1) of the Vienna Convention provides that [t]he members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29-36. Accordingly, if the elder Diallo was present in the United States at the time the offense occurred or perhaps when Petitioner was arrested, Diallo may have been entitled to absolute immunity. If the elder Diallo was absent, however, he would be entitled at most only to functional immunity. Vienna Convention, art. 39(2); see also Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113 (former UN officials no longer in the country enjoy only functional immunity); Swarna, 607 F.Supp.2d at 515-16 (former UN official entitled only to functional immunity). In Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 607 F.Supp.2d at 511-12, a former domestic employee brought suit in the U.S. against her former employer, the employer's wife, and the State of Kuwait. The former employer was a diplomat serving in New York City with the Permanent Mission of the State of Kuwait to the United Nations. Id. At the time the former employee brought suit, her former employer lived in Paris, France. Id. at 512. The individual defendants claimed diplomatic immunity under, inter alia, the Vienna Convention and the Diplomatic Relations Act. Id. The court determined that the former diplomat was not entitled to residual diplomatic immunity because his employment of a domestic servant was a private act and bore no official relation to the functions of a diplomatic mission. Id. at 520. With respect to the former diplomat's wife, the court held that, although Article 37 of the Vienna Convention (providing for diplomatic immunity of diplomat's family members) does not provide expressly for residual diplomatic immunity to family members once they have left the country, it need not decide whether, if Mr. Al-Awadi were entitled to residual diplomatic immunity under Art. 39, such immunity would also extend to [his wife]. [She] has no greater entitlement to immunity than does Mr. Al-Awadi. Id. at 522. Because the court held that the husband was not entitled to diplomatic immunity, the court determined that it follows that [the plaintiff's claims] are also not barred with respect to [the wife]. Id. Under the plain language of the Diplomatic Relations Act, § 254d, if Petitioner was entitled to diplomatic immunity under the UN Convention and the Vienna Convention at the time the offense occurred or when he was arrested, the trial court should have dismissed the charges against him. The parties do not dispute that the elder Diallo must have been present in the United States on the date in question in order for Petitioner to enjoy derivative immunity from criminal prosecution. The State argues, however, that Petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to compel the trial court to conclude that the elder Diallo was present in the United States on either potentially relevant date. Petitioner contends that he presented sufficient evidence in his pre- and post-trial motions to show that the elder Diallo had diplomatic status at the time of the subject offenses, namely a letter from the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, appointing the elder Diallo, a June 2006 list of the UN Assistant Secretary-Generals, and the Meek attestation. The only new evidence presented to the trial court at the hearing on Petitioner's motion for a new trial was the letter from Congressman Payne. Diallo, however, merely alleged in his brief that his father was in New York at the critical time(s), meeting with former United States UN Ambassador, Andrew Young. Yet, Diallo did not offer to the trial court any documentary or testimonial proffer of evidence to support the latter assertion. [11] The sum of the evidence actually generated before the Circuit Court showed only that his father was an Assistant Secretary-General at the time of the crimes and Diallo's arrest, not that the elder Diallo was in the United States performing any official UN functions at those times. [12] We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground that Petitioner had not proven he enjoyed immunity under the Vienna Convention because he did not present sufficient evidence that he enjoyed immunity under the UN Convention.