Opinion ID: 1687180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: closing argument guilt phase

Text: During closing argument the state opened with the following remarks: BY MR. MAYFIELD: If it please the Court, ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, not much more than twenty-four hours ago we stood up here before you to make our opening statements, during which each side was given the opportunity to tell you what we were gonna prove to you during this trial. I want you to think now about who did what they told you they were gonna do? You'll recall the Defense got up here and told you that during the course of this trial they were gonna prove to you that Otha Lee West didn't commit this crime  and I wrote this down. They said, We're gonna prove to you that he was not there. We're gonna prove this to you by numerous alibi witnesses, who will prove to you that he was somewhere else at that time. BY MR. GORE: Just a minute, please, sir. I object and move for a mistrial. He's commenting on the failure of the Defendant to testify or to put on any proof, which the Court has instructed the Jury he's not required to do. BY THE COURT: Motion denied. [R. 444-445] The state having made the above statement, defense counsel made the following remarks in closing argument: BY MR. GORE: ... Now, we've taken the position that there are so many holes in this case, which I'm gonna discuss a little later, that we decided not to put Otha Lee on the stand or any of his witnesses. And I'm gonna refer you to Instruction No. D-6, which you'll read: The Court instructs the Jury that you must not consider the fact that the Defendant did not testify as being evidence against him and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact that the Defendant did not testify in this case. Now, this, our position is, is trial strategy. We don't think we were put to the necessity of putting him on the stand. [R. 460] Thereafter in the final argument, the district attorney stated as follows: BY MR. PETERS: ... And what do they say? We decided not to put the Defendant on the stand through trial strategy. What was their trial strategy? We [the state] put every witness we could find on the stand. [R. 471] He then proceeded to relate all the witnesses that they had put on the witness stand. Then the prosecution returned to West: BY MR. PETERS: ... Everybody we could find. And what did they say? We decided not to put the Defendant on the stand  BY MR. GORE: If the Court please, we're gonna object. That's improper. He's commenting on his failure to testify or to call witnesses. BY THE COURT: Overruled. BY MR. PETERS: We decided not to put the Defendant on the stand for trial strategy. Could any of you possibly have a doubt? [R. 472] It is the duty of the presiding judge, as well as trial attorneys on both sides, in the conduct of a criminal case to see that the constitutional rights of an accused are not violated. A defendant has a constitutional right not to take the witness stand. See: Mississippi Constitution, Article XXVI; U.S. Constitution, Amendment V; Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). This right becomes meaningless if comment or insinuation can be made reflecting upon his failure to testify. Indeed, for over a century, there has been a statute in effect in this state which provides: § 13-1-9. Competency of an accused. The accused shall be a competent witness for himself in any prosecution for crime against him. The failure of the accused, in any case, to testify shall not however operate to his prejudice or be commented on by counsel. [Emphasis added] As was stated in Brown v. State, 340 So.2d 718, 722 (1976), commenting on a defendant's failure to testify violates an elementary and long established principle of law. See: Clark v. State, 260 So.2d 445 (Miss. 1972); Hines v. State, 339 So.2d 56 (Miss. 1976); Peterson v. State, 357 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1978); and Wilson v. State, 433 So.2d 1142 (Miss. 1983). Our forefathers vouchsafed the right of an accused to remain silent in his trial. Yet there is no way to remove the suspicion the defendant himself casts upon his own defense when he chooses not to take the witness stand. He may very well be the best, if indeed not the only person to answer the proof offered by the state. When he remains silent, no common sense juror can avoid the mental question to himself of why the defendant did not take the stand. In this case the circuit judge was correct in denying West's motion for a mistrial following the remarks of the prosecuting attorney made in opening argument, although the prosecution did come perilously close to the borderline of prejudicial argument. Defense counsel apparently thought he had no choice but to attempt to explain what he viewed as a comment by the state on his client's failure to testify in his own defense. Any attempt to remove this stigma, however, by explanation in closing argument will almost certainly call attention to and enlarge the suspicion, not remove it. And, the so-called explanation West's counsel no doubt met such fate. [2] West's defense, having already received a mortal wound, the prosecution swiftly administered the coup de grace by ridiculing the explanation of defense counsel and concluding with the damning question: Could any of you possibly have a doubt? West received no protection of his constitutional right under the United States' and state constitutions from the trial court or trial counsel. If the only issue confronting us was a conviction of murder, the proof of which was overwhelming in this case, we could more easily find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not prejudice West. In this case, however, the ingredient of the crime which raised the charge to capital murder is extremely close, and the argument of counsel could very well have tipped the scales from murder to capital murder. Likewise, if no constitutional infringement was involved, we could easily follow the temptation of calling this invited error. [3] Yet where a basic constitutional right is at stake, we must require more protection for an accused than afforded West in this case. See: State v. Smith, 101 Ariz. 407, 420 P.2d 278 (1966). The violation was so fundamental we must hold West was denied a fair trial. In Hawkins v. State, 224 Miss. 309, 330, 80 So.2d 1 (1965), we stated that where a constitutional error was violated affecting an accused's right to a fair trial the case will be reversed, regardless of the overwhelming proof of guilt. This is especially true in a case in which the accused has been sentenced to death. It is our duty to examine the record on our own in every death penalty case to see that the accused received a fair trial. See: Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss. 1984); Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1983); Laney v. State, 421 So.2d 1216 (Miss. 1982); Irving v. State, 361 So.2d 1360 (Miss. 1978); Russell v. State, 226 Miss. 885, 85 So.2d 585 (1956). In summary, under our heightened review obligation in this death penalty case, where a constitutional guaranty has been butchered, we are not foreclosed from protecting the accused even though his own attorney may have failed to make all the proper objections. [4]