Opinion ID: 540010
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Court's Refusal To Charge Stake In The Venture.

Text: 267 Arcelay contends that the district court's refusal to charge a stake in the venture, as Arcelay requested, deprived him of a fair trial. We reject this contention. Arcelay requested an instruction that: 268 In order to convict a defendant of conspiracy you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she participated in it with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and with the specific intention of furthering its business or objective. 269 In that regard, it has been said that in order for a defendant to be deemed a participant in a conspiracy, he or she must have a stake in the venture or its outcome. You are instructed that while proof of a financial interest in the outcome of a scheme is not essential, if you find that the defendant had such an interest, that is a factor which you may properly consider in determining whether or not the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. Of course, you may also consider the lack of evidence that a particular defendant had any stake in the outcome of the scheme charged in reaching your determination whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the membership of any defendant in the conspiracy charged. 270 Emphasis added. 271 The district court declined to give this instruction, instead charging: 272 To find that a defendant was a member of a conspiracy, you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally participated in it. If a defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, intentionally engages, advises, or assists, for the purpose of furthering the illegal undertaking, he thereby becomes a knowing and wilful participant, a conspirator. 273 .... 274 I instruct you that it is not necessary that a defendant receive any monetary benefit from his participation in the conspiracy or have a financial stake in the outcome as long as he in fact participated in it in the way I have just explained. 275 Finally, you may not find that a defendant is a member in a conspiracy merely because of friendship or family relationship or association, or even sexual association, or business association with alleged co-conspirators. Of course, mere presence at the scene of an alleged transaction or mere similarity of conduct among various persons, or mere association, or even mere approval does not establish proof of the membership in a conspiracy. Also a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy but who happens to act in a way that advances some object or purpose of a conspiracy does not thereby become a conspirator. So too, mere knowledge by a defendant of a conspiracy to commit an illegal act on the part of another does not of itself make the defendant a member. Rather, before you conclude a defendant was a member of the conspiracy, you must be satisfied that he knowingly associated himself with the conspiracy with the intent to aid in the accomplishment of at least one of its unlawful purposes. 276 Emphasis added. 277 Once again, the district court's instruction was balanced and comprehensive. The last quoted paragraph included substantial elements specifically requested by Arcelay, but our precedents counselled against the specific instruction concerning stake in the venture requested by Arcelay and rejected by the district court. We have held that: 278 It is not necessary to charge the jury that each conspirator must be found to have a stake in the success of the conspiracy for the use of such an expression would be misleading as it might infer that there must be a showing of some personal financial interest in the outcome of the conspiracy. It is sufficient that the defendant was not indifferent to the outcome of the venture. United States v. Tramaglino, [197 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 864, 73 S.Ct. 105, 97 L.Ed. 670 (1952). The district court's] charge properly and adequately covered the subject by saying that the individual becomes a part of a conspiracy by his intentional participation in it. United States v. McKnight, 253 F.2d 817, 819 (2d Cir.1958); accord, United States v. DeBiasi, 712 F.2d 785, 792 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 962, 104 S.Ct. 397, 78 L.Ed.2d 339 (1983); United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.1981). 279 In view of these rulings, it was obviously not error for the district court to decline to give the stake in the venture instruction proposed by Arcelay. 280
281 Cruz claims that several statements by the prosecution during its rebuttal summation were improper. He contends that in the following passage, the prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of certain of its witnesses: 282 [U]nless you believe that the agents were lying or unless there were mistakes, there is no room for reasonable doubt because the evidence is clear that the participation of each has been shown. 283 Cruz also asserts that in the following passage, the prosecution misstated the record by mischaracterizing the theory of the defense: 284 For Pedro Cruz, his counsel suggested to you, as an initial matter, that the fatal weakness in the government's case against him was an absence of a confession and your own common sense will tell you that is not much of an argument, that if every case depended on a confession there would be few trials, indeed no trials. If there was a confession, there would be no trial. 285 Finally, 7 Cruz contends that he was prejudiced by the following statement: 286 In analyzing those arguments you can certainly bear in mind that Craig Moruzzi was on the stand. He was the one who made the voice identification of Pedro Cruz and not a single question was asked to him on cross examination about that voice identification. So you ask yourselves how serious is the challenge to that when [no?] cross examination was made. 287 Cruz asserts that the cumulative effect of these allegedly improper statements was to deny him a fair trial. His claims of prosecutorial misconduct are, however, without substance. As to the first challenged passage, it becomes transparently clear that the government was not improperly vouching for the credibility of its witnesses when this statement is placed in the context of the full sentence from which it was taken, which reads as follows: 288 The next 3 defendants that you heard about, Dennis Rivera, Pedro Cruz and Jesus Santiago, essentially suggested to you in their summations that the cases against them are either built on lies or multiple mistakes of agents and that should be recognized by you as an argument that itself recognizes that unless you believe that the agents were lying or unless there were mistakes, there is no room for reasonable doubt because the evidence is clear that the participation of each has been shown. 289 The second challenged statement was obvious, and permissible, sarcasm in response to a defense contention. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 133, 134, 78 L.Ed. 128 (1983). As to the third, [a]n observation that evidence adduced by the Government was not confronted on cross-examination is entirely proper. United States v. Walker, 835 F.2d 983, 989 (2d Cir.1987). 290 J. Sentences. 291 Several appellants claim that the sentences imposed were improper. Before turning to their specific claims, we note that this is a pre-Sentencing Guidelines case in which the sentencing court has wide discretion in imposing sentence, and, ... if a sentence is within the permissible statutory limits and it does not appear that the court took into account any improper factor, the sentence may not be reviewed on appeal. United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 210 (2d Cir.) (citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1284, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958)), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 466, 98 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987). 292 1. The Torres Brothers. 293 The Torres brothers claim that the mandatory life sentence without parole imposed by 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(b) (Supp. V 1987) is unconstitutional. Since we have vacated their convictions under section 848(b) on another ground, see supra section B of this Discussion, we do not reach this contention. As previously indicated, the Torres brothers must be resentenced under section 848(a) in view of the vacation of their convictions under section 848(b). 294 The Torres brothers also assert, however, that they should be resentenced with respect to the other counts on which they were convicted, as to which they were each sentenced to a total of one hundred years imprisonment. They claim that the district court sentenced them with a fixed and mechanical approach that disregarded favorable personal factors, including their youth, expressions of community support and their lack of any prior criminal record, and took into account only the harm caused by their massive heroin distribution in the south Bronx. In this regard, the district court stated at sentencing: 295 The defendants distributed massive quantities of heroin into that neighborhood [the south Bronx] in blatant disregard of the law in order to make a fortune. It was irrelevant to them that they were capitalizing on the despair and lack of hope that lead an individual to a life of dependency on drugs. 296 They were unconcerned that the effect of their product was to ravage the bodies and minds of their customers. Instead, with pride and a sense of accomplishment, these defendants spread the blight of drugs throughout their neighborhood. 297 The Torres brothers further assert that the case should be assigned to a different judge for resentencing. They contend that because the district court imposed heavy, consecutive sentences upon them with respect to the other counts of which they were convicted, expressed no hesitation in imposing the life sentences without parole mandated by section 848(b), and concentrated his sentencing comments upon the harm done by their massive heroin operation in the south Bronx, rather than sentencing on an individualized basis, the applicable precedents call for resentencing by a different judge. 298 We reject both contentions. As to the allegedly mechanistic sentencing, we do not regard the focus of the district court's sentencing comments as inappropriate, or even approaching an abuse of discretion. Rather, given the policies underlying the pertinent federal legislation, the court's concern with, and focus upon, the massive damage inflicted by this intensive, lengthy and highly remunerative narcotics operation was thoroughly justified. Especially given the evidence of the conspiracy's scope and duration, and the lack of any expression of remorse by the Torres brothers, the weight to be given the exonerating contentions pressed by these appellants was a matter for the trial judge's informed discretion. See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 542-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3192, 105 L.Ed.2d 700 (1989); United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 62-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3214, 96 L.Ed.2d 701 (1987). 299 We turn to the claim that resentencing should be assigned to a different judge. United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam), collects most of the precedents in this circuit where we have followed that course. None are comparable on their facts to the situation presented here. As we have just made clear, there was no impropriety in the sentencing procedures originally followed. Rather, resentencing is required because an instruction that failed adequately to relate these appellants' conduct to the effective date of section 848(b) vitiates their conviction under that section, and the resulting mandatory life sentence without parole. We note in this regard that the challenged instruction concerned a matter of first impression, and that appellants' objection to that instruction at trial did not focus upon the flaw in that instruction which is the basis for our ruling on appeal. Further, as we said in Robin, [a] judge who has presided over a lengthy trial often gains an intimate insight into the circumstances of the defendants' crime, which may prove uniquely useful in determining the sentence to be imposed.... 553 F.2d at 11. 300 In sum, no showing has been made which begins to warrant the reassignment urged by these appellants. See United States v. Trzaska, 859 F.2d 1118, 1121 (2d Cir.1988) (no reassignment where trial judge had sufficient legitimate reasons to impose the sentence that he did), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 123, 107 L.Ed.2d 84 (1989); United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 n. 9 (2d Cir.) (even when sentencing judge shown to have held erroneous views or made incorrect findings, reassignment required only in rare instances in which judge's fairness or appearance of judge's fairness seriously in doubt, citing Robin, 553 F.2d at 10), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 832, 108 S.Ct. 107, 98 L.Ed.2d 67 (1987). 301 2. Flores. 302 Flores makes the same arguments as the Torres brothers concerning the constitutionality of section 848(b), sentencing in a mechanistic manner on the other counts (on which Flores was sentenced to a total of seventy-five years imprisonment), and reassignment to a different judge for resentencing. He also contends that the $2,000,000 fine levied against him was unconstitutionally excessive and imposed in violation of statutory requirements, since he is indigent as a result of the forfeiture effected in this litigation, and the fine thus illegally disregarded his ability to pay. 303 We disagree. The fine was the maximum then allowed under section 848(a), but Flores was liable to additional fines for his multiple felony convictions on other counts. Further, a heavy fine was consistent with the pertinent factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3622 (Supp. V 1987), 8 including the nature and circumstances of the offense; ... the history and characteristics of the defendant; [and] ... the need to deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from the offense. Id. Sec. 3622(a)(1), (2) and (7). As to Flores' asserted indigence: 304 The rule in this circuit ... is that [f]inancial obligations may be imposed upon a defendant who is indigent at the time of sentencing but subsequently acquires the means to discharge his obligations. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir.) (citing Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974)), cert. denied, [469 U.S. 1089,] 105 S.Ct. 599, 83 L.Ed.2d 708 (1984). [Such a defendant] may assert a constitutional objection on the ground of his indigency only if the government seeks to enforce the court's order ... at a time when the defendant [is] unable, through no fault of his own, to comply. Id. (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983)). 305 United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 14-15 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 3511, 87 L.Ed.2d 640 (1985); see also United States v. Atkinson, 788 F.2d 900, 904 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Pagan, 785 F.2d 378, 381-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 667, 93 L.Ed.2d 719 (1986). 306 3. Raymond E. Coffie. 307 Coffie was sentenced to ten years imprisonment and a $200,000 fine. He contends that this sentence is so disproportionate as to violate the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. He also asserts that his presentence report (1) failed to include vital information pertaining to available alternative sentencing programs not involving incarceration (Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(2)(E)), and (2) improperly included Sentencing Guidelines information, in view of the inapplicability of those guidelines to Coffie. 308 None of these contentions has merit. While proportionality in criminal sentences is required, see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983),  'successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences' should be 'exceedingly rare.'  Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, 102 S.Ct. 703, 705, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1138, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). This case, where Coffie was convicted of knowing participation in a massive heroin conspiracy and was subject to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and a four million dollar fine, see 21 U.S.C. Secs. 846 and 841(b)(1)(A) (1988), does not arguably approach a constitutional violation. 309 Rule 32(c)(2)(E) calls for the provision of information concerning alternatives to prison unless the court orders otherwise. The failure to provide this information was called to the attention of the trial judge at the sentencing hearing, and he made it clear that he was not interested in such alternatives for Coffie. Similarly, even assuming some prejudice could result from the provision of advisory Sentencing Guidelines calculations in Coffie's presentence report, the district court specifically disavowed any reliance upon those calculations. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D).