Opinion ID: 2143038
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permit Applications

Text: Under the Act, outdoor advertising signs adjacent to highways are permitted only in business areas. 225 ILCS 440/1, 4.04 (West 2006). A business area means: [A]ny part of an area adjacent to and within 660 feet of the right-of-way which is at any time zoned for business, commercial or industrial activities under the authority of any law of this State; or not so zoned, but which constitutes an unzoned commercial or industrial area as defined in Section 3.11. However, as to signs along Interstate highways, the term `business area' includes only areas which are within incorporated limits of any city, village, or incorporated town, as such limits existed on September 21, 1959, and which are zoned for industrial or commercial use, or both, or to portions of Interstate highways which traverse other areas where the land use, as of September 21, 1959, was established by State law as industrial or commercial, or both.  (Emphasis added.) 225 ILCS 440/3.12 (West 2006). No dispute exists that plaintiff's proposed billboard site was unincorporated and unzoned on September 21, 1959. Thus, the site is a business area only if the land use, as of September 21, 1959, was established by State law as industrial or commercial, or both. 225 ILCS 440/3.12 (West 2006). IDOT's regulations clarify the meaning of business area for previously unzoned parcels, providing as follows: Areas which were unzoned on September 21, 1959 may qualify as business areas along Interstate highways if the applicant can show, based on contemporaneous historical records of State actions (e.g., State sales tax records, required State license fees, etc.) that the land on September 21, 1959 was and has continuously been used as business, commercial or industrial. 92 Ill. Adm. Code § 522.20, amended at 32 Ill. Reg. 17810, eff. October 30, 2008. We note that IDOT's regulations refer to business, commercial or industrial, whereas the Act refers simply to industrial or commercial. We do not view the addition of the word business as an intent by IDOT to expand the statutory definition of the term business area. As IDOT recognizes, `[a]dministrative rules can neither limit nor extend the scope of a statute.' Van's Material Co. v. Department of Revenue, 131 Ill.2d 196, 203, 137 Ill.Dec. 42, 545 N.E.2d 695 (1989), quoting Du-Mont Ventilating Co. v. Department of Revenue, 73 Ill.2d 243, 247-48, 22 Ill. Dec. 721, 383 N.E.2d 197 (1978). Indeed, the Act expressly provides that rules and regulations IDOT establishes may not be inconsistent with the terms of the Act. 225 ILCS 440/14.01 (West 2006). We further note that the word business is commonly used to denote a commercial or industrial enterprise. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 302 (1993). Thus, we read the word business as synonymous with commercial or industrial, and not as an enlargement of the Act's definition of business area. The Act defines [c]ommercial or industrial activities as those activities located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way generally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this State. 225 ILCS 440/3.10 (West 2006). The statutory definition also lists several activities that are not commercial or industrial: (a) Agricultural, forestry, ranging, grazing and farming activities, including wayside fresh produce stands and grain storage bins; (b) Railroad tracks and minor sidings; (c) Transient or temporary activities not involving permanent building or structures; (d) Outdoor advertising structures; (e) Activities not visible from a main-traveled way; (f) Activities conducted in a building principally used as a residence. 225 ILCS 440/3.10 (West 2006). IDOT's definition of [c]ommercial or industrial activities substantially mirrors the language of section 3.10 of the Act, but also includes examples of commercial or industrial activity: land use devoted to commerce, industry, trade, manufacturing, highway service, highway business, warehouses, offices or similar uses   . 92 Ill. Adm.Code § 522.20, amended at 32 Ill. Reg. 17810, eff. October 30, 2008. Under the statutory and regulatory scheme, plaintiff was required to establish that the proposed billboard site on September 21, 1959, was and has continuously been used as commercial or industrial. Plaintiff could satisfy this requirement by establishing that the activity on the site is generally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this State (225 ILCS 440/3.10 (West 2006)), or by pointing to contemporaneous historical records of State actions (e.g., State sales tax records, required State license fees, etc.) establishing the same (92 Ill. Adm. Code § 522.20, amended at 32 Ill. Reg. 17810, eff. October 30, 2008). According to IDOT's denial letter, plaintiff failed to do either, and thus IDOT refused to issue the requested permits. While IDOT did not dispute that the radio tower has occupied the site since before September 21, 1959, IDOT determined that the mere presence of the tower did not establish that the site was used for commercial or industrial activities. IDOT compared the radio tower and attendant trailer to public utilities which do not necessarily define the site on which they are located. IDOT further noted that, prior to annexation, the land use was agricultural, notwithstanding the presence of the radio tower. Based on this record, IDOT maintains that its decision denying the permits is not clearly erroneous and urges us to reverse the courts below. Plaintiff counters that IDOT's decision is based on the faulty conclusion that radio broadcasting is a public utility. Relying on the Illinois Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2006)), and numerous cases from various jurisdictions, plaintiff argues that IDOT's conclusion is simply wrong and its denial of the permits is clearly erroneous. See Mammina v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 110 Misc.2d 534, 442 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1981); WANV, Inc. v. Houff, 219 Va. 57, 244 S.E.2d 760 (1978); Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. WVCH Communications, Inc., 23 Pa. Commw. 292, 351 A.2d 328 (1976); McIntire v. Wm. Penn Broadcasting Co., 151 F.2d 597 (3d Cir.1945); Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 94 F.2d 249 (D.C.Cir.1937). Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that even if radio broadcasting is a public utility, it is nonetheless a business, commercial or industrial activity, and that nothing in the Act indicates a legislative intent to exclude radio broadcasting from qualifying as such an activity for purposes of establishing a business area. We are not persuaded by plaintiff's arguments. IDOT did not declare that radio broadcasting is a public utility. Rather, IDOT concluded that, for purposes of the Act, radio towers are similar to public utilities. That is, radio towers, like public utilities, are necessities and appear in all areasagricultural, residential, commercial and industrialand do not necessarily define the use of the land on which they are located. The authorities cited by plaintiff do not somehow prohibit IDOT from making this comparison and according similar treatment to radio towers as public utilities. Plaintiff's argument assumes that if radio broadcasting is a commercial activity, the site at issue here automatically qualifies as a business area under the Act. We disagree. The issue is not whether radio broadcasting in general is considered a commercial or industrial activity; the issue is whether the mere presence of the radio tower and trailer is an industrial or commercial use of the land, as recognized by local zoning authorities or state action, such that a business area was created. See 225 ILCS 440/3.10 (West 2006); 92 Ill. Adm.Code § 522.20, amended at 32 Ill. Reg. 17810, eff. October 30, 2008. At most, plaintiff established that the site has a nexus to commerce or industry. We agree with IDOT that something more than a nexus is needed to demonstrate that the site is used for commercial or industrial activities and thus constitutes a business area. This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the Act: the regulation of highway advertising in order to protect the public investment in such highways, to promote the recreational value of public travel, [and] to preserve natural beauty. 225 ILCS 440/1 (West 2006). While the Act also recognizes the business and economic value of outdoor advertising, the Act is clearly aimed at limiting highway advertising. Indeed, the general rule is that [s]igns shall not be erected or maintained along highways, unless they fit within one of the Act's express exceptions. (Emphasis added.) 225 ILCS 440/4 (West 2006). Even when an exception applies, the Act regulates the size of the signs, the lighting, the spacing, the placement of the signs at the site, and the number of signs at a given site. 225 ILCS 440/6.01 through 6.03 (West 2006). Thus, we agree with IDOT that the Act embodies an aesthetic choice that favors uninterrupted vistas over billboards. Plaintiff's expansive reading of the business area exception at issue here would defeat the Act's purpose. We recognize, as plaintiff argues, that the list of activities set forth in section 3.10 of the Act, that do not qualify as commercial or industrial, does not include radio towers. 225 ILCS 440/3.10 (West 2006). See also 92 Ill. Adm.Code § 522.20, amended at 32 Ill. Reg. 17810, eff. October 30, 2008 (setting forth the same exclusions). Generally, where a statute lists the things to which it refers or includes, an inference arises that omissions should be understood as excluded. Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill.2d 429, 442, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522 (1992). This inference, however, is not a rule of law and does not trump legislative intent. Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill.2d 548, 555, 169 Ill.Dec. 254, 591 N.E.2d 427 (1992). Nothing in section 3.10 indicates that the list of noncommercial or nonindustrial activities is intended to be exhaustive. Moreover, the inclusion of radio towers, like the one at issue in this case, is entirely consistent with the overriding purpose of the Act: to limit highway advertising. Based on our review of the administrative record, the statute, and regulations, we cannot say that IDOT's decision denying plaintiff's permit applications was clearly erroneous. That is, we are not `left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' AFM Messenger, 198 Ill.2d at 395, 261 Ill.Dec. 302, 763 N.E.2d 272, quoting United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395, 68 S.Ct. at 542, 92 L.Ed. at 766. We therefore reverse the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court and confirm IDOT's decision. Judgments reversed; Department decision confirmed.