Opinion ID: 2787080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impermissible Speculation

Text: Sherpa first argues that the IJ engaged in impermissible speculation because he found her “explanation of why the Maoists did not pursue or punish her after she ignored their 2004 and 2005 requests for a donation and training” to be implausible. (Appellant Br. at 41). We disagree that the IJ made this finding of implausibility based on 4 “IJ” refers to the July 24, 2012 decision of the Immigration Judge in this matter. This decision begins at page 8 of the Appendix to the Appellant’s Brief. 8 speculation alone. Rather, the IJ made that finding after conducting a careful review of Sherpa’s testimony and documentary evidence. (IJ at 21–22). The IJ then compared her account of the events to information from Nepal’s 2005 country report,5 noting the inconsistencies that led to his conclusion that her story was implausible. (Id. at 22). For example, Sherpa testified that the Maoists did not take any action against her after she ignored their requests for money and training in 2004 and 2005. (Id.). However, the 2005 country report on Nepal indicated that the “Maoists responded particularly violently to those who ignored extortive demands in 2005.” (Id.). Accordingly, we find that the IJ did not make this determination on speculation alone. B. Failure to Allow Sherpa to Explain Discrepancies Sherpa next argues that the IJ erred in not allowing her to explain certain inconsistencies in her testimony. (Appellant Br. at 38). However, as the BIA noted, the IJ questioned Sherpa regarding the inconsistencies in her testimony. (BIA6 at 2–3). However, even in response to this questioning, Sherpa was unable to sufficiently explain all of the inconsistencies in her testimony. (Id.). Further, even where Sherpa did proffer explanations for the testimony, the IJ is not required to accept those explanations. See Matter of D-R-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 455 (BIA 2011) (“An Immigration Judge is not required to accept a respondent’s assertions, even if plausible, where there are other 5 The Department of State prepares annual reports detailing the political situation in other countries. The IJ reviewed the Department of State’s 2005 Country Report on Nepal in connection with Sherpa’s appeal. 6 “BIA” refers to the May 28, 2014 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in this matter. This decision begins at page 3 of the Appendix to the Appellant’s Brief. 9 permissible views of the evidence based on the record.” (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985))). We therefore reject this argument. C. Identified Inconsistencies Were Minor Sherpa next argues that “the factors identified by the IJ and the Board to support the adverse credibility determination were minor and not central to the claim.” (Appellant Br. at 39). Again, we disagree. The INA provides that the IJ should assess inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012). Therefore, Sherpa’s argument is unsupported by the statute governing her claim. Further, the inconsistencies identified by the IJ did go to the heart of Sherpa’s claim for asylum. For example, a requisite element of whether an applicant qualifies as a refugee is whether she has a subjective, well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To establish that element, Sherpa relied upon a letter from the NCP Chairman that stated that the Maoists posed a threat to Sherpa. (IJ at 22). However, her testimony as to how she acquired that letter was inconsistent. (Id.). Further, her ultimate admission that she traveled to a Maoist-controlled village to acquire the letter undercuts her position that she feared the Maoists. (Id.). Accordingly, we also reject this argument. D. Lack of Corroboration Finally, Sherpa argues that the IJ erred in finding that she lacked certain necessary corroborating evidence. (Appellant Br. at 39–40). “[W]here it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be provided.” In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 10 725 (BIA 1997). To determine whether an applicant has provided sufficient corroboration, an IJ conducts a three-step inquiry: (1) identify the facts that the applicant can reasonably be expected to corroborate, (2) inquire whether the applicant has provided necessary corroborating information, and (3) analyze whether the applicant has adequately explained any failure to corroborate. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001). “The [BIA] has also stated that it is generally reasonable to expect applicants to produce letters from family members remaining in the applicant’s home country.” Id. at 554–55 (citing In re M-D-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1180 (BIA 1998)). On appeal, Sherpa argues that the IJ inadequately performed this inquiry. Specifically, she argues that (1) the IJ failed to explain why the corroborating evidence he sought would have been readily available and (2) the IJ failed to give her an opportunity to explain why she did not produce this evidence. (Appellant Br. at 52). We find Sherpa’s first argument unpersuasive, as the IJ did explain why the evidence would have been readily available. (IJ at 26). The IJ noted that the documentation he sought primarily consisted of statements from Sherpa’s family, friends, and former employees. (Id.). The IJ explained that this information should have been accessible, as Sherpa “ought to have been able to request these documents by phone or mail, as Nepal explicitly prohibits interference with the mail system.” (Id.). We find her second argument similarly unpersuasive, as a review of the record does not show that Sherpa ever attempted to explain why she could not produce these documents. Nor does Sherpa cite a reason for not providing them in her briefs to this Court. Further, the BIA 11 has held that production of the type of documents sought by the IJ in Sherpa’s case is reasonable. Abdulai, 239 F.3d at 554. We accordingly reject Sherpa’s final argument. We therefore find that the adverse credibility findings by the IJ was supported by substantial evidence. Sherpa has failed to persuade us that “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Gao, 299 F.3d at 272 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)). We also find that these adverse credibility determinations are fatal to Sherpa’s claim. Dia, 353 F.3d at 247. We therefore do not reach the IJ’s alternate holding that Sherpa’s claims failed on the merits. 2. Withholding of Removal and CAT Sherpa also appeals the decision to deny her request for withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3) and relief under CAT. This Circuit has held that “[s]ince the threshold for asylum is lower than for protection under the withholding of removal or CAT provisions, rejection of the petitioners’ asylum claims necessarily requires that their CAT and withholding claims be rejected as well.” Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2008); see also In re A-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 1106, 1112 (BIA 1998) (“Inasmuch as the respondent has failed to satisfy the lower burden of proof required for asylum, it follows that he also has failed to satisfy the clear probability standard of eligibility required for withholding of deportation.”). We accordingly affirm the decisions of the IJ and BIA to deny Sherpa’s request for withholding of removal pursuant to INA § 241(b)(3) and relief under CAT.