Opinion ID: 63769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Porter's proffered instruction was a correct statement of the law.

Text: In United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916 (5th Cir.1998), this court held that a note is counterfeit if it bears such a likeness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care dealing with a person who is supposed to be upright and honest. Scott, 159 F.3d at 920-21. Porter's proffered instruction mirrored this court's definition of counterfeit obligation in Scott. See id. As the Government points out on appeal, Scott defined counterfeit for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 473 (2001), which criminalizes the transfer of counterfeit obligations or securities. The Government gives no reason for defining the word counterfeit differently in section 473 than in the almost identical sections at issue heresections 471 and 472. The majority, however, does attempt to explain why Scott 's definition of counterfeit is exclusively applicable to section 473: The difference between the intent required to violate § 473 and that required to violate §§ 471 and 472 is mirrored in the difference between the required level of similarity of the bogus bills to the genuine ones for the different object crimes. . . . [T]o pass, publish, or use false obligations with the level of intent required under § 473, viz., the specific intent that they be perceived by the recipient as true and genuine, requires that the phony bills have a substantially greater level or degree of similitude to the genuine article. Thus, the majority suggests that the three sections' different intent requirements justify the district court's use of a counterfeit definition other than the one articulated by this court in Scott. The majority's distinction is problematic in two respects. First, section 473 requires an intent to pass false obligations as true and genuine, whereas sections 471 and 472 require an intent to defraud. This slight difference in the intent requirement might necessitate a different instruction on intent, [2] but it does not change the meaning of the word counterfeit. [3] Second, the majority cites no opinion, in this circuit or any other, which states that the definition of counterfeit is different among sections 471, 472, and 473. This court in Scott, when defining counterfeit for purposes of section 473, cited a case which in turn relied on a Fourth Circuit case defining counterfeit for purposes of section 472, one of the very sections at issue here. Scott, 159 F.3d at 920-21 (citing United States v. Turner, 586 F.2d 395, 397 (5th Cir.1978) (citing United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir.1963))). Not even the Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, upon which the majority relies to find that the district judge did not abuse his discretion, purport to limit Scott 's definition of counterfeit to jury instructions only pertaining to section 473. Instead, they explicitly suggest using Scott 's definition for jury instructions pertaining to either section 471 or 472. [4] Indeed, the majority's distinction puts our circuit at odds with our sister circuits that have defined counterfeit for purposes of sections 471 and 472 just as our court defined the term in Scott. [5] In sum, to the extent that the majority contends Scott 's definition of counterfeit exclusively applies to section 473, I respectfully disagree.