Opinion ID: 2974187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Death Sentence

Text: Getsy contends that his sentence of death was imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution because Santine, who initiated, contracted for, and paid for the murder, was acquitted of murder for hire and sentenced to life imprisonment. Relying on Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Getsy claims that the Ohio Supreme Court’s rejection of his Eighth Amendment argument was “contrary to” relevant Supreme Court precedent. We hold that the “arbitrariness” principle firmly established in Furman and its progeny would be offended if the irreconcilable, arbitrary jury verdicts in this case were allowed to stand. We, therefore, conclude that Getsy’s death sentence must be vacated.
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment condemns “the arbitrary infliction” of the death penalty. Furman, 408 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court, in a one paragraph per curiam opinion, held that the death penalty, as then administered under statutes vesting unguided sentencing discretion in juries and trial judges, was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 239-40. The concurring opinions that followed explained that the death penalty was being imposed so discriminatorily, id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring), so wantonly and freakishly, id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), and so infrequently, id. at 310 (White, J., concurring), that any given death sentence was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Justice White concluded that “the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” Id. at 313 (concurring). Indeed, the death sentences examined by the Supreme Court in Furman were “cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of [capital crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death ha[d] in fact been imposed.” Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, Furman established that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this penalty to be arbitrarily and capriciously imposed. See id. at 310; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984) (Furman established that “[i]f a State has determined that death should be an available penalty for certain crimes, then it must administer that penalty in a way that can rationally distinguish between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for whom it is not.”); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (Furman established that “if a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional responsibility to . . . apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.”). As it has evolved since Furman, the Eighth Amendment arbitrariness standard generally prohibits the infliction of a death sentence discriminatorily on the basis of illegitimate and suspect factors, such as the race or socioeconomic status of the defendant and the victim, and its inconsistent or random imposition. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111 (1982) (Beginning with Furman, the Court has emphasized its pursuit of the “goals of measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused.”); David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 7 Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81 Neb. L. Rev. 486, 496 (2002). The second source of arbitrariness, inconsistent and unprincipled outcomes, constituted a major factual foundation of the Furman holding. See Baldus et al., supra, at 496 n.5. The Furman Court invalidated existing death penalty laws because, as the laws were structured and administered at the time, they failed to generate acceptably consistent outcomes. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the existing procedures were not constructed to guard against the totally arbitrary selection of offenders for the punishment of death); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 303 (1990) (noting that the constitutional defect identified in Furman was that “unguided juries were imposing the death penalty in an inconsistent and random manner on defendants”). Each of the concurring opinions in Furman relied upon various forms of statistical evidence that purported to demonstrate patterns of inconsistent or otherwise arbitrary sentencing. Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-52 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 291-95 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); id. at 364-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). Evidence of such inconsistent results, of sentencing decisions that could not be explained on the basis of individual culpability, indicated that the system operated arbitrarily and therefore violated the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has affirmed this conception of the Eighth Amendment in its decisions following Furman. Thus, the Court has insisted that “capital punishment be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112. To satisfy the concerns of Furman, the Supreme Court has thereafter required that the sentencing body’s discretion be “directed and limited” and exercised in an “informed manner” to avoid “wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). Furman was read as holding that “to minimize the risk that the death penalty [will] be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it ha[s] to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority [will] focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.” Id. at 199. The jury should be “given guidance regarding the factors about the crime and the defendant that the State, representing organized society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision.” Id. at 192. “Otherwise, the system cannot function in a consistent and a rational manner.” Id. at 189. It is now well settled that “the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of justice.” Id. at 188. “From the point of view of the defendant, it is different both in its severity and its finality. From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action.” Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977). The qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater need for reliability, consistency, and fairness in capital sentencing decisions. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460 n.7; California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357. Accordingly, the courts must “carefully scrutinize” sentencing decisions “to minimize the risk that the penalty will be imposed in error or in an arbitrary and capricious manner. There must be a valid penological reason for choosing from among the many criminal defendants the few who are sentenced to death.” Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 460 n.7. The death-is-different principle can only be observed here by holding that the inconsistent and disproportionate sentences in the same case violate the clearly established Furman arbitrariness principle and hence the Eighth Amendment.
Proportionality in sentencing is a major, independent element under the Eighth Amendment in assessing a death sentence. The comparative disproportionality between the culpability and sentences of Getsy and Santine demonstrates the arbitrariness of Getsy’s death sentence. Unlike our No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 8 later discussion of inconsistent verdicts, which focuses on the inconsistency of only one codefendant being found guilty of murder for hire, a crime necessarily requiring at least two participants, this disproportionality problem was noted by the Ohio Supreme Court because Getsy had arguably less culpability than Santine, but received a harsher sentence, the death penalty, rather than Santine’s life sentence: It is clear that Getsy would not have committed these crimes if he had never met Santine . . . . Santine was approximately thirty-five years old. Getsy was nineteen when the crimes were committed. Santine paid the rent for the apartment where Hudach and McNulty lived and supplied some of the drugs that they and their friends used. Santine bragged that he had connections with the mob and often spoke of his Mafia connections. When anyone in the group needed money, they asked Santine for it. Santine bragged that he had the police in his pocket . . . . Santine was known to have shot his own brother and apparently had never served time for the incident. Santine was known to routinely carry a duffel bag containing a gun. One time, Hudach and Robert Stoneburner were sitting with Santine when Santine shot a wall for no apparent reason. Santine commented that he wished it had been Chuckie (Serafino) .... It was clear from the videotape of his statement that Getsy feared Santine and was afraid that Santine would execute him. Getsy apparently was afraid to go to the police because Santine made it appear that he had the police in his pocket. This belief was supported by the fact that McNulty told police what Santine was planning and the police did nothing . . . . When the group first went to the Serafino house, they returned to the apartment without completing the act, using the excuse that they could not find a place to park. Santine became furious, eventually driving Getsy, McNulty, and Hudach back to the place himself . . . . It is also troubling that Santine did not receive the death sentence even though he initiated the crime. If not for John Santine, it is unlikely the Serafinos would have been shot. State v. Getsy, 702 N.E.2d 866, 890-92 (Ohio 1998). In evaluating whether a death sentence is arbitrary, the Supreme Court has directed courts to evaluate a defendant’s culpability both individually and in terms of the sentences of codefendants and accomplices in the same case. See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788, 798 (1982). In Enmund, the Supreme Court found the Eighth Amendment violated when defendants with “plainly different” culpability received the same capital sentence. It requires proportionality comparison with others participating in the same crime: Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the State treated them alike and attributed to Enmund the culpability of those who killed the Kerseys. This was impermissible under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 798. No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 9 The instant case presents the reverse situation where defendants with plainly similar culpability received different sentences; and, furthermore, the defendant with arguably the lesser culpability received the harsher sentence -- the death penalty. Numerous state courts have applied the Enmund principal to require reasonable symmetry between culpability and the sentencing of codefendants. See, e.g., People v. Kliner, 705 N.E.2d 850, 897 (Ill. 1998) (“[S]imilarly situated codefendants should not be given arbitrarily or unreasonably disparate sentences.”); Larzelere v. State, 676 So. 2d 394, 406 (Fla. 1996) (“When a codefendant . . . is equally as culpable or more culpable than the defendant, disparate treatment of the codefendant may render the defendant’s punishment disproportionate.”); Hall v. State, 244 S.E.2d 833, 839 (Ga. 1978) (“We find that . . . the death sentence, imposed on Hall for the same crime in which the co-defendant triggerman received a life sentence, is disproportionate.”). Similarly, the Federal Death Penalty Act recognizes that a comparison of the sentences received by equally culpable codefendants improves the likelihood that the death penalty will not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(4) (listing as a mitigating factor the lack of death sentences for equally or more culpable codefendants). The principle requiring proportionate punishment has deep roots in our cultural and biological heritage. Aristotle observed in his Nicomachean Ethics almost 2,500 years ago that basic notions of justice require treating like cases alike: If, then, the unjust is unequal, the just is equal, as all men suppose it to be, even apart from argument . . . . This, then, is what the just is -- the proportional; the unjust is what violates the proportion . . . . [I]t is by proportionate requital that the city holds together. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, in The Works of Aristotle V.3.1131a-1131b, V.5.1132b (W.D. Ross ed. & trans., 1954); see also Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle 129 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., 1946) (“Justice is1 the political good. It involves equality, or the distribution of equal amounts to equal persons.”). Recent studies have reinforced this view. In a recent article, Judge Morris Hoffman and Timothy Goldsmith, a distinguished Yale biologist, make this point: [I]t is not surprising that collectively we struggle to balance the form and amount of punishment that is appropriate, a struggle that lies at the heart of what we mean by “justice.” . . . The two faces of justice - to deal firmly with transgressors, but not too harshly - reflect an intrinsic human sense of fairness and are important to the political ideal of equality. When Aristotle commands that like cases be treated alike, he is touching both on the personal notion that none of us wants to be punished more than anyone else (and therefore on our self-interest) and on the social notion that none of us wants to punish others more than they deserve (and therefore on the equilibrium between our inclination to punish and our intuitions about fairness and sympathy). When sentencing guidelines address the tension between sentencing individual defendants and coordinating the sentences of similarly situated defendants, they are touching on this very same duality. 1 Aristotle’s view that “like cases should be treated alike” has long been a foundational principal in the U.S. legal system. See, e.g., Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900-1949, 49 How. L.J. 99, 101 n.10 (2005); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 Duke L.J. 951, 1000 n.179 (2003); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1299, 1347 n.120 (1988); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 543 n.20 (1982); cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 155 (1961) (deeming the phrase “[t]reat like cases alike” a “leading precept” of justice). No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 10 Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, The Biological Roots of Punishment, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 627, 638-39 (2004). Coordination of sentences for the same crime is not simply a rational, legal principal but a deeply-held concept of justice as well. The dissent argues incorrectly that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), precludes our consideration of the “comparative proportionality” of sentences in this case.2 Pulley simply held that the Eighth Amendment does not require a systematic comparative proportionality review of sentences in other unrelated cases. Id. at 50-51. Pulley concerned whether the Eighth Amendment mandates a systematic comparative proportionality review of a particular sentence to the punishment imposed on others for the same general type of crime but in unrelated cases. Our holding neither contradicts this rule nor implicates systematic comparative proportionality review. Cf. People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 290 (Ill. 1990) (“[I]n reviewing the appropriateness of a death sentence, this court will examine the facts of that particular case and the evidence introduced at the trial and death penalty hearing, and, as a matter of reference, it may consider the sentence imposed on an accomplice or a co-defendant in light of his involvement in the offense.”). Instead, we simply adhere to the clearly established principle of Enmund that, in a capital case with respect to the very same crime stemming from the very same facts, the Eighth Amendment does not permit codefendants with plainly similar culpability to receive different sentences -- especially when the defendant with arguably less culpability receives the harshest of all sentences, the death penalty. Following the dissent’s view would not only conflict with the clear mandate of Enmund but would allow less culpable participants in the same criminal episode to receive the death penalty when the more culpable participant receives a lesser sentence. In sum, sentencing Getsy to death, while the arguably more culpable Santine received a life sentence for the very same crime, violates the Eighth Amendment, as construed by the Supreme Court in Furman and Enmund, and its prohibition of arbitrary and disproportionate death sentences.
The Supreme Court has declared that inconsistent verdicts are both scandalous and inequitable, Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987), and has accordingly indicated that inconsistent verdicts “constitute evidence of arbitrariness that would undermine confidence in the quality of the [jury’s] conclusion,” Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 346 (1981). In concluding that the inconsistent jury verdicts in this case evidences that Getsy’s death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment arbitrariness principle outlined in Furman, we are informed by the common law rule of consistency, which was applied by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), and Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944). The common law rule of consistency prohibited a jury’s acquittal of all but one of multiple defendants charged with jointly committing a crime that requires at least two participants. E.g., Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 782 (1975) (listing conspiracy, adultery, incest, bigamy, and dueling as offenses that require the participation of two people); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 402 (1932) (Butler, J., dissenting) (“Upon the indictment of several for an offense that could not be committed without the 2 The dissent also argues incorrectly that our consideration of the “comparative proportionality” of the sentences in this case is foreclosed by our precedents relying on Pulley v. Harris. See, e.g., Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 96263 (6th Cir. 2004); Wickline v. Mitchell, 319 F.3d 813, 824 (6th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Mitchell, 348 F.3d 177, 214 (6th Cir. 2003); Bowling v. Parker, 344 F.3d 487, 521 (6th Cir. 2003); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 369 (6th Cir. 2001). In each of these cases, we rejected claims regarding inadequate appellate review of the proportionality of death sentences, reasoning that the Constitution does not require the State to provide for a system of proportionality review. Our precedents interpret Pulley as holding that a system of comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally required, and the state therefore has “great latitude” in defining its system of proportionality review. See Buell, 274 F.3d at 369. Getsy’s proportionality argument does not implicate our precedents relying on Pulley because Getsy does not challenge Ohio’s system of proportionality review. Rather, Getsy challenges the imposition of disproportionate sentences for the very same crime stemming from the very same facts. No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 11 participation of two or more of them a verdict of guilty against one and of not guilty for the others, is deemed wholly repugnant and invalid.”). The principle against inconsistent verdicts was well established at common law when we adopted the Eighth Amendment. Harison v. Errington, 79 Eng. Rep. 1292 (K.B. 1627) (riot); Marsh v. Vauhan, 78 Eng. Rep. 937 (Q.B. 1599) (conspiracy).3 The common law crime of riot provides a good example: “Under English law, that crime required three participants. It was legally impossible for fewer than three people to riot. Thus, if three defendants stood trial together for riot, and the jury convicted only one of them, this was a fatally inconsistent verdict, and the conviction could not stand.” Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 771, 779 (1998) (citing Harison, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1293). “The argument was that as in conspiracy, if one only of two is found guilty the verdict is void ‘for one alone cannot conspire.’” Dir. Pub. Prosecutions v. Shannon, [1975] A.C. 717, 723 (discussing Harison). At common law, the rule of consistency was frequently applied to address inconsistent verdicts between two codefendants charged with conspiracy. The crime of conspiracy cannot be committed by an individual acting alone since, by definition, conspiracy requires an agreement between two or more people to commit some unlawful act. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 92. Thus, the rule of consistency invalidates the conviction of one conspirator when all the other alleged conspirators are acquitted of the conspiracy charge.4 See, e.g., United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 564 (6th 3 The origins of the rule of consistency can be traced back more than four centuries to the case of Marsh v. Vauhan, 78 Eng. Rep. 937 (Q.B. 1599), in which two defendants were indicted and tried jointly for conspiracy, with the result that one was convicted and the other acquitted. The court quashed the lone defendant’s conviction, reasoning in a one paragraph opinion that “one cannot conspire alone.” Id. at 937. Subsequent decisions addressing irreconcilable or repugnant jury verdicts in conspiracy and other cases based on a criminal agreement between two parties adhered to the Marsh rule in quashing inconsistent verdicts. See, e.g., R. v. Grimes, 87 Eng. Rep. 142 (K.B. 1688); R. v. Kinnersley, 93 Eng. Rep. 467 (K.B. 1719); R. v. Thompson, 117 Eng. Rep. 1100 (Q.B. 1851). 4 Some courts in non-death penalty cases have refused to apply the rule of consistency to inconsistent verdicts resulting from separate trials. See United States v. Newton, 389 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 280 (2005); United States v. Crayton, 357 F.3d 560, 564 (6th Cir. 2004); Cortis v. Kenney, 995 F.2d 838, 840 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Sachs, 801 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v. Sangmeister, 685 F.2d 1124, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. EspinosaCerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 333 (5th Cir. 1980). These courts reason that “it is not necessarily inconsistent for two juries to reach differing results” because “different juries may hear different evidence.” Sachs, 801 F.2d at 845. These courts also reason that application of the rule of consistency in this context “would be blatantly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Standefer.” See Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d at 333. In Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980), the Supreme Court held that a defendant, who would have been an accessory at common law, may be convicted even though the named principal has been acquitted in a separate trial. The holding in Standefer rested on Congress’s express intent to make those who were accessories at common law principal offenders, thereby permitting their indictment and conviction for the substantive offense. Id. at 19. Contrary to the reasoning of the courts refusing to apply the rule of consistency to inconsistent verdicts resulting from separate trials, neither Standefer nor any subsequent Supreme Court decision has proscribed application of the rule in this context. The cases from the courts of appeals proscribing application of the rule of consistency to inconsistent verdicts resulting from separate trials were not capital cases. In refusing to apply the rule in this context, these cases protect the functions of the jury at the risk of disparate or arbitrary results. Such risk cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant’s life is at stake. As the Supreme Court has often stated: [T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). It would be inconsistent with the heightened need for “reliability” in the capital sentencing decision to refuse to apply the rule of consistency. Although this circuit has held that the rule of consistency does not apply to inconsistent verdicts resulting from separate trials in conspiracy cases, see Newton, 389 F.3d at 636; Crayton, 357 F.3d at 564; Sachs, 801 F.2d at 845, we have not extended this holding either to capital cases or to cases involving substantive crimes, such as adultery, incest, bigamy, dueling, or murder for hire, that necessarily involve at least two participants. The instant indictment charged No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 12 Cir. 2004); United States v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1980); Developments in the Law -- Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 972-73 (1959). The basis for the rule of consistency in conspiracy cases “is the notion that the acquittal of all but one potential conspirator negates the possibility of an agreement between the sole remaining defendant and one of those acquitted of the conspiracy and thereby denies, by definition, the existence of any conspiracy at all.” Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d at 331. Under this reasoning, the conspiracy conviction of a lone defendant is invalid because “the verdict . . . itself den[ies] the existence of the essential facts.” United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 1929). The Supreme Court has on at least two occasions applied the rule of consistency to set aside irreconcilable jury verdicts. In Morrison v. California, the Supreme Court held that the reversal of the conspiracy conviction of the defendant’s sole alleged co-conspirator on constitutional grounds required reversal of the defendant’s state conspiracy conviction. 291 U.S. at 93. In so holding, the Court stated: It is impossible in the nature of things for a man to conspire with himself. In California as elsewhere conspiracy imports a corrupt agreement between not less than two with guilty knowledge on the part of each . . . . The conviction failing as to the one defendant must fail as to the other. Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted); see also Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 123 (1932) (reversing defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to violate the Mann Act because his alleged coconspirator was acquitted, and there was therefore “no proof that the man conspired with anyone else to bring about the transportation”). The Court went on to base its conclusion on the requirements of due process: [T]he conviction of Morrison because he failed to assume the burden of disproving a conspiracy was a denial of due process that vitiates the judgment as to him. Nor is that the only consequence. Doi was not a conspirator, however guilty his own state of mind, unless Morrison had shared in the guilty knowledge and design. . . . The conviction failing as to the one defendant must fail as to the other. Morrison, 291 U.S. at 93 (citing Turinetti v. United States, 2 F.2d 15 (8th Cir. 1924)). In Turinetti v. United States, on which the Court relied, the court of appeals held that the release of one party to the agreement must lead to the acquittal of the second party: Therefore, since Turinetti could not have conspired with himself alone, he could not under the law be convicted of a conspiracy. It follows that there is no lawful way to avoid a reversal also as to Turinetti, although, under the evidence, he violated one or more provisions of the National Prohibition Act. For the latter violations, however, he was neither indicted nor convicted, and so the fact of such other violations will not warrant affirmance of this conviction for conspiracy. 2 F.2d at 17. Getsy with conspiracy to murder, but he was not convicted of this count. He was convicted of murder for hire. This was a substantive offense. Conspiracy is separate from the substantive offense that is the object of the agreement. United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 389-90 (1992). The rule allowing inconsistent verdicts in conspiracy cases has not been applied and should not be applied to inconsistent verdicts on the substantive offense of murder for hire in the same case. The law has excused inconsistent verdicts in run-of-the-mill conspiracy cases, but it has not excused inconsistent verdicts on a substantive offense requiring the participation of two people. We should not start now to permit such arbitrary, inconsistent verdicts -- especially in a capital case. No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 13 Similarly, in Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944), the Supreme Court reversed a conspiracy conviction on the basis of inconsistency. Hartzel and two others were charged with violating and with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917. The trial judge found the evidence insufficient to support the convictions of Hartzel’s two alleged co-conspirators. Id. at 682 n.3. The Supreme Court concluded that the setting aside of Hartzel’s only two co-conspirators’ convictions “makes it impossible to sustain petitioner’s conviction” for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act. Id. Thus, Morrison and Hartzel now stand for the proposition that inconsistent or repugnant jury verdicts in conspiracy and other cases based on a criminal agreement between two parties cannot stand. This rule adds clarity, detail, and content to the more generalized “arbitrariness” language of Furman and mandates that Getsy’s death sentence be vacated. Although several courts of appeals have questioned whether United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), overruled the rule of consistency, see Crayton, 357 F.3d at 564; United States v. Acosta, 17 F.3d 538, 545-46 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d 876, 877-78 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593, 594-97 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 40 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1065-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. Mancari, 875 F.2d 103, 104 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Andrews, 850 F.2d 1557, 1561-62 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Valles-Valencia, 823 F.2d 381, 381-82 (9th Cir. 1987); Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Hoheb, 777 F.2d 138, 142 n.6 (3d Cir. 1985), the Supreme Court has never expressly or even impliedly overruled the rule of consistency previously recognized by the Court in Morrison and Hartzel. As the Tenth Circuit has noted, the argument that the rule of consistency is no longer viable after Powell “is substantially undercut by the fact that the Powell opinion does not discuss Hartzel or expressly overturn the traditionally recognized exception.” United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 475 (10th Cir. 1990). Moreover, Powell did not concern or address inconsistent jury verdicts between two codefendants charged with conspiracy or participation in another similar criminal contract. The defendant in Powell was convicted of using the telephone to commit the crime of “conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine,” but she was acquitted of knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with intent to distribute. Powell, 469 U.S. at 59-60. She argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because proof that she had conspired to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, or had so possessed cocaine, was an element of the telephone facilitation count. Id. at 60. The Court reaffirmed the holding of Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932), that “[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary.” Powell, 469 U.S. at 62-63. In so holding, Powell simply precludes a reversal based on inconsistency between verdicts on separate charges against a single defendant. Powell did nothing, however, to eliminate the rule requiring reversal of irreconcilable verdicts where one defendant is acquitted and the other convicted of a crime that necessarily requires two people to participate in a criminal contract. See Andrews, 850 F.2d at 1570 (Clark, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree that Powell should be expanded to let inconsistent conspiracy verdicts stand where one defendant is acquitted and the other convicted.”). Because nothing in Powell purports to overrule Morrison and Hartzel, we will continue to follow the Supreme Court’s directly applicable precedent and “leave to the Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997). In coming to the foregoing conclusion, we are mindful that the dicta of United States v. Newton and United States v. Crayton states that the rule of consistency “has no continuing validity.” United States v. Newton, 389 F.3d 631, 636 (6th Cir.), vacated in part on other grounds, 126 S. Ct. 280 (2005); Crayton, 357 F.3d at 564. However, both Crayton and Newton more narrowly hold that “an individual’s conviction for conspiracy may stand, despite acquittal of other alleged coconspirators, when the indictment refers to unknown or unnamed conspirators and there is sufficient evidence to show the existence of a conspiracy between the convicted defendant and these other conspirators.” Crayton, 357 F.3d at 567 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 76 F.3d 685, 68889 (6th Cir. 1996)); see Newton, 389 F.3d at 636-37 (citing Anderson, 76 F.3d at 688-89). This No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 14 narrow holding was the only discussion necessary to resolve the case. As the preeminent legal scholar Karl Llewellyn said, there is a “distinction between the ratio decidendi, the Court’s own version of the rule of the case, and the true rule of the case, what it will be made to stand for by another later court”: For one of the vital elements of our doctrine of precedent is this: that any later court can always reexamine a prior case, and under the principle that the court could decide only what was before it, and that the older case must now be read with that in view, can arrive at the conclusion that the dispute before the earlier court was much narrower than that court thought it was, called therefore for the application of a much narrower rule. Indeed, the argument goes further. It goes on to state that no broader rule could have been laid down ex-cathedra, because to do that would transcend the powers of the earlier court. Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 52 (1930). Or, as this Court recently said: “This Court considers as dicta any observation in the opinion of the court unnecessary to the holding in that case.” Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 48 Fed. Appx. 140, 144 (6th Cir. 2002). Because Crayton and Newton were ultimately decided based on the rule of United States v. Anderson, the discussion of whether the rule of consistency is viable after Powell was unnecessary to the holding and therefore not binding on this Court. Since we conclude that the Supreme Court has not overruled Morrison and Hartzel, the rule of consistency is applicable where, as in the instant case, a jury convicts only one of multiple defendants charged with committing the crime of murder for hire. Murder for hire requires at least two participants: the hiring party and the person hired. See Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 343 S.E.2d 465, 470 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that murder for hire “necessarily involve[s] at least two people”). An “essential element” of the crime of murder for hire is an agreement between the hiring party and the person hired that the latter will be compensated for his services. State v. Carpenter, 882 A.2d 604, 653 (Conn. 2005); see Orsini v. State, 665 S.W.2d 245, 253 (Ark. 1984) (To establish murder for hire, the government must prove that there was “an agreement to kill in exchange for something of value.”); State v. McGann, 506 A.2d 109, 116 (Conn. 1986) (To establish a “hiring” relationship, the government must prove “the essential element of an agreement to compensate the [person hired] for his services.”); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 626 A.2d 133, 138 (Pa. 1993) (To establish murder for hire, the government must prove that the hiring party and the person hired “contracted to kill the victim.”). Therefore, the acquittal of all but one defendant “negates the possibility of an agreement” to kill between the sole remaining defendant and one of those acquitted of the murder for hire and “thereby denies, by definition, the existence of” a “hiring” relationship. See Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d at 331. If the jury convicts only one of multiple defendants charged with the crime of murder for hire, this is a fatally inconsistent verdict requiring reversal. Accordingly, the rule of consistency recognized in Morrison and Hartzel requires reversal of Getsy’s murder for hire conviction and the resulting death sentence because the other necessary participant, the hiring party, was acquitted of the same murder for hire specification. The acquittal of Santine of murder for hire based on substantially the same evidence signifies that the jury found no contract to kill the Serafinos, and Getsy cannot have acted alone since murder for hire requires a plurality of actors. Getsy’s murder for hire conviction is therefore irreconcilable with the jury verdict acquitting Santine of the same charge. As the Supreme Court established in Morrison and Hartzel, such an inconsistent verdict cannot stand. Moreover, the opinions in Furman rested upon a perception of just such inconsistency, see Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring), and the arbitrariness principle firmly established in Furman is offended by the irreconcilable jury verdicts in this case. Under these circumstances, the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision affirming Getsy’s death sentence without identifying or applying the No. 03-3200 Getsy v. Mitchell Page 15 governing Eighth Amendment principles was “contrary to” the principles clearly established in Furman, Morrison, and Hartzel.5