Opinion ID: 2423435
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Arbitration Act

Text: At the heart of the parties' disagreement about whether or not the Arbitration Act applies in the present case are differing arguments about the very nature of the Arbitration Act. The District contends that the statutory language of the Arbitration Act limits it solely to written agreement[s] to submit any existing controversy to arbitration.... D.C.Code § 16-4301 (2001) (repealed July 1, 2009); see D.C.Code § 16-4403(e) (2008 Supp.) (On or after July 1, 2009, this chapter governs an agreement to arbitrate whenever made.). Therefore, the District argues, the Arbitration Act must not apply to CMPA awards as CMPA arbitration is not the result of an agreement but the result of a statutory imperativethe CMPA. AFGE responds by noting that, unlike the Federal Arbitration Act, the District of Columbia's Arbitration Act explicitly applies to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives. D.C.Code § 16-4301. AFGE interprets the Arbitration Act's stated application to agreements to arbitrate as solely intended to establish that the arbitrator's authority derives from the consent of the parties.... Such consent necessarily follows from the ongoing relationship between the employer (District of Columbia) and the employees' certified bargaining representative (AFGE Local 1403). For support, AFGE bases its interpretation of § 16-4301 on our opinion in Grad v. Wetherholt Galleries, 660 A.2d 903, 908 (D.C.1995). In Grad, we reversed the trial court's determination that an arbitrator had exclusive authority to decide who was party to the agreement containing the arbitration clause. 660 A.2d at 905. While we did, in dicta, state that, [u]nder the DCUAA, the arbitrator's authority derives from the consent of the parties, AFGE's reliance on Grad here is misplaced. Id. at 908. Grad did not involve CMPA arbitration, but rather arose out of a written arbitration agreement. See id. at 904-05. That distinction is not merely factual. Later in Grad, we wrote that the very existence of the written agreement to arbitrate goes to the heart of whether the dispute between [the parties] is arbitrable under the UAA. Id. at 908 n. 10 As the District notes, there is no such written agreement to arbitrate in the present case. Therefore, as we will explain, the CMPA forecloses applicability of the Arbitration Act to collective bargaining agreements between the District and its municipal employees. The UAA was in effect in the District of Columbia from 1977 until 2008, when it was replaced by the RUAA. [5] The UAA stated that, A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. D.C.Code § 16-4301. The UAA also applied to arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective representatives. Id. Under the UAA, parties in arbitration disputes could file motions in Superior Court in order to have an arbitration award confirmed, modified, corrected, or vacated. See D.C.Code §§ 16-4315, -4313, -4312. The UAA stated that once the court granted an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award, judgment or decree shall be entered in conformity therewith and be enforced as any other judgment or decree. D.C.Code § 16-4313. Unlike the CMPA, which specifically limits its application to labor relations between the District government and its employees, the Arbitration Act does not expressly delineate which types of labor relations are governed by the statute.