Opinion ID: 1292346
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence submitted

Text: ¶ 117. A petition for supervised release is reviewed according to whether the proof was sufficient under the terms established by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4). [5] It provides: (4) The court, without a jury, shall hear the petition . . . [and] shall grant the petition unless the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person is still a sexually violent person and that it is still substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not continued in institutional care. In making a decision under this subsection, the court may consider, without limitation because of enumeration, the nature and circumstances of the behavior that was the basis of the allegation in the petition under s. 980.02(2)(a), the person's mental history and present mental condition, where the person will live, how the person will support himself or herself and what arrangements are available to ensure that the person has access to and will participate in necessary treatment, including pharmacological treatment using an antiandrogen or the chemical equivalent of an antiandrogen if the person is a serious child sex offender. A decision under this subsection on a petition filed by a person who is a serious child sex offender may not be made based on the fact that the person is a proper subject for pharmacological treatment using an antiandrogen or the chemical equivalent of an antiandrogen or on the fact that the person is willing to participate in pharmacological treatment using an antiandrogen or the chemical equivalent of an antiandrogen. ¶ 118. On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, all evidence that was before the circuit court for its decision is reviewed in the light most favorable to the State. See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). In Curiel, we specifically rejected a de novo standard of review and stated that a determination of whether it was substantially probable that the proposed committee would reoffend is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 418 n.9. We also explained that when testing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must affirm the decision of the circuit court unless no finder of fact, acting reasonably, could find that the defendant was substantially probable to commit future acts of sexual violence. Id. at 418-19. ¶ 119. It is not the volume of testimony in one direction or another that determines whether the evidence was sufficient. See id. at 419-20. Accordingly, when examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the probative value of various pieces of evidence; rather, it is only when the evidence supporting the trier of fact's decision is `inherently or patently incredible' that we will substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Id. at 420 (quoting Gauthier v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 412, 416, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965)). Additionally, we have explained that inherently or patently incredible evidence is that type of evidence which conflicts with nature or fully established or conceded facts. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 418-19 (citing Day v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 392, 400, 284 N.W.2d 666 (1979)). ¶ 120. The majority opinion agrees that Curiel sets the standard, yet it ignores all the directives of Curiel and does a de novo review wherein it reweighs the evidence and comes up with its own finding of fact. Majority op., ¶ 93. For example, nowhere in the record is it stated, or even implied, that Brown's diagnosis of pedophilia has been changed or that his long history of sexual violence has no reliability in predicting his propensity to commit acts of sexual violence in the future. Instead, the majority says that it is troublesome and is accorded weight. Majority op., ¶ 81. The majority opinion ignores Brown's score on the MnSOST-R, the diagnostic test that most accurately predicts future acts of sexual violence by those persons who have used violence in their sexual assaults, as Brown has. Brown's test result showed that there is a 70% probability that Brown would reoffend upon release. Instead, the majority opinion ignores these test results and relies on Brown's scores on two tests that are less reliable for violent sex offenders like Brown. Majority op., ¶ 84. The majority opinion does not concern itself with the testimony of Kotkin, who advised against releasing Brown. Majority op., ¶ 59. It also ignores most of Warner's report, except that portion where he says it is  possible  that Brown could be maintained in supervised release. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 121. And finally, the majority opinion does not conclude that the circuit court relied on inherently or patently incredible evidence. Yet, that is the test we have established for overturning the finding of a circuit court in a ch. 980 proceeding. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d at 418-20. As this court stated in State v. Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, 434-35, 597 N.W.2d 712 (1999), If any possibility exists that the trier of fact could have drawn the appropriate inferences from the evidence adduced at trial to find [that the defendant is a sexually violent person], an appellate court may not overturn a verdict even if it believes the trier of fact should not have found [the defendant to be a sexually violent person] based on the evidence before it. (Quoting Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 507.) This record is chock full of evidence that supports the circuit court's decision. See supra ¶¶ 107-10. In addition, it was Warner's view that Brown's medium-low and medium-high risk scores on the RRASOR and Static-99 do not negate his high risk MnSOST score. Brown is a sexually violent person, and the class of offenders to which he belongs has a 70% probability of reoffending upon release from a secured treatment facility. ¶ 122. The basis for the majority opinion is not found in the law. Rather, the majority opinion simply reflects its view that it is time for Brown to get out. That is not what the legislature decided when it enacted ch. 980 and set specific standards for the courts to apply. It also is not what we decided in Curiel and Kienitz regarding an appellate court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of the circuit court in a ch. 980 proceeding. ¶ 123. Therefore, because I would affirm the court of appeals and the circuit court, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.