Opinion ID: 2633156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Smith Seized?

Text: A seizure occurs when there is a show of authority which, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, would communicate to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave and the person submits to the show of authority. State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 18-19, 72 P.3d 570 (2003). The law recognizes that a traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Thompson, 284 Kan. at 773, 166 P.3d 1015. The seizure resulting from a traffic stop is analyzed as being more akin to an investigatory detention than an arrest. As a result, courts examine the reasonableness of a traffic stop under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, and codified by the Kansas Legislature in K.S.A. 22-2402(1). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Thompson, 284 Kan. at 773, 166 P.3d 1015. Terry is premised upon the basic Fourth Amendment right of each person to be secure in his or her person and property against unreasonable searches and seizures. 392 U.S. at 8, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979). This principle incorporates two precepts. First, `the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' [Citation omitted.] Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Second, `what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.' [Citation omitted.] Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Indeed, the `touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.' Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 [1991]); see Thompson, 284 Kan. at 792, 166 P.3d 1015. Terry breaks the analysis of the legality of traffic stops into two parts: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Under the first prong of the test, in order to stop and detain a person, a law enforcement officer must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is taking place, has taken place, or is about to take place. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 734, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998). Such activity includes traffic violations. See Thompson, 284 Kan. at 773, 166 P.3d 1015. Here, Officer Carter observed a taillight infraction and then discovered an illegal tag. These violations justified the stop, and Smith does not dispute the reasonableness of the driver's detention. Nor do the parties dispute that this case should be analyzed as a traffic stop even though the driver had parked the car before Officer Carter activated his lights. Nevertheless, the State asserts that the valid investigatory stop of the vehicle triggered only a seizure of the driver, and the district court and Court of Appeals panel erred in ruling otherwise. With regard to Smith, the State contends the encounter was consensual. Pointing out that Smith was neither ordered to remain in the vehicle nor prevented from exiting the car, the State asserts: That Smith chose to remain in the area does not mean she was not free to leaveshe simply chose not to. After the filing of the Court of Appeals' decision and the parties' briefs before this court, the United States Supreme Court decided Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. ____, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007), and held that a passenger in a vehicle is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when a law enforcement officer stops the vehicle through a show of authority and the passenger does not flee. In Brendlin, the Court rejected the same argument as asserted by the State in this case, i.e., that the show of authority in a traffic stop was directed toward the driver and not toward passengers. The Court ruled that in pulling over a particular car, the law enforcement officer acts with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some sort, and, understanding that, a reasonable passenger would expect to be subject to some scrutiny even though it is the driver who has committed a wrong. 551 U.S. at ____, 127 S.Ct. at 2402, 168 L.Ed.2d at 140. The Court noted that a passenger is present at the physical focal point of an investigation, and at that point a reasonable person would not expect an officer to let people move around in ways that could jeopardize his safety. 551 U.S. at ____, 127 S.Ct. at 2404, 168 L.Ed.2d at 140. Consequently, there exists a societal expectation of `unquestioned [police] command' at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free to leave, or to terminate the personal encounter any other way, without advance permission. [Citation omitted.] 551 U.S. at ____, 127 S.Ct. at 2407, 168 L.Ed.2d at 140. A seizure does not occur simply because there has been a show of authority, however. There must be a submission to that authority. In Brendlin, the Court considered whether a passenger, who has no control over the vehicle, submits to the law enforcement officer's authority. Noting that submission can be passive, the Court indicated one sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to run away. 551 U.S. at ____, 127 S.Ct. at 2409, 168 L.Ed.2d at 142. Consequently, even though a passenger had no effective way to signal submission while the car was still moving on the roadway, . . . once it came to a stop he could, and apparently did, submit by staying inside. 551 U.S. at ___ - ___, 127 S.Ct. at 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d at 142-43. This approach is consistent with the test utilized in Kansas for determining if a seizure has occurred. See State v. Morris, 276 Kan. 11, 19, 72 P.3d 570 (2003). In this case, it is not clear that the driver parked in response to the presence of the law enforcement officer and, apparently, there had been no show of authority by the officer at that point. That situation changed when Officer Carter pulled behind the car, blocked it, and activated emergency lights. A reasonable occupant in the car, whether a driver or a passenger, would understand the officer's actions to be a display of authority directed to everyone in the vehicle. In other words, all the occupants were subject to like control by the successful display of authority. 551 U.S. at ____, 127 S.Ct. at 2408, 168 L.Ed.2d at 141. Smith's submission to this authority is not as clear as was Brendlin's. Smith moved from the vehicle to sit on nearby steps rather than remaining in the car. Yet she did not walk away; she remained at or near the physical focal point of the investigation in a passive submission to the show of authority. Under the totality of the circumstances, we affirm the district court's and Court of Appeals' determinations that Smith was seized for purposes of application of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and § 15 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.