Opinion ID: 185275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The So-called Bolstering Evidence

Text: 13 Smith argues that the District Court improperly admitted bolstering testimony that Perry, himself a witness at trial, had provided truthful information to the task force in the past. Smith points to the following exchange on re-direct examination between the prosecutor and government witness Agent Haera: 14 Q: Mr. Miles asked you some questions about Mr. Perry's cooperation and the information he's given you. Do you remember those questions? 15 A: Yes. 16 Q: Is it true that Perry had given you information that has led to the capture of other criminals? 17 Mr. Miles: Objection, Your Honor. 18 The Court: Sustained. By Ms. Covell: 19 Q: As a result of Mr. Perry's cooperation, have you been able to arrest other criminals? 20 Mr. Miles: Objection. 21 The Court: Sustained. It's leading. By Ms. Covell: 22 Q: What happened--well, let me rephrase this. With the information that Mr. Perry gave you, what did you do? 23 Mr. Miles: Objection to relevance. 24 The Court: I'll overrule that objection. 25 The Witness: Repeat your question. 26 Ms. Covell: Sure. By Ms. Covell: 27 Q: Mr. Perry gave you certain information about indi-viduals in the Park Morton complex; is that right? 28 A: That's true. 29 Q: And what did you do with that information? 30 A: The information that Mr. Perry gave me personally, I did a lot of different things with it. Some of the information was used to obtain search warrants. Some of the information was used to begin investigations on other people in that area that were committing crimes such as drug dealing and firearms possession. And some of the information was used to inform the attorneys of how he could help us in these investigations by way of testimony in the grand jury and at trials. 31 Q: In any of those search warrants that were based on information given you by Perry, did you uncover contra-band? 32 A: Yes. 33 Q: And any of those investigations of other individuals that you started as a result of Mr. Perry's information, did any of those investigations lead to arrest? A: Yes 34 Q: And were the arrests of those individuals corroborated by any tangible evidence? 35 Mr. Miles: Objection, Your Honor. 36 The Court: Sustained. By Ms. Covell: 37 Q: Agent Haera, based on what you know about the information Mr. Perry gave you, and the search warrants you've gotten and the arrests, do you believe that the information Mr. Perry gave you is truthful? 38 Mr. Miles: Objection, Your Honor. 39 The Court: Sustained. 40 Ms. Covell: That's all I have, Your Honor. 41 Tr. at 52-55 (emphasis added). This exchange came on the heels of a cross-examination, during which defense counsel elicited from Agent Haera information regarding Perry's possible bias, including his plea agreement and money paid Perry by the ATF. Tr. at 42-48. Smith here renews his relevance objection and also raises for the first time the inadmissibility of the testimony under Federal Rule of Evi- dence 608(b). 42 Because defense counsel lodged an objection on the basis of relevance in a timely fashion, we review admission of the cited testimony for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980, 983 n.3 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 223 (1999). Evidence is relevant if it has any tenden- cy to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less proba- ble than it would be without the evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 401. 43 That Perry has informed and testified truthfully in the past under his plea agreement certainly bears on his response to similar pressures and temptations in the present. Further- more, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which prohibits the admission of evidence regarding past acts to prove the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith, would be largely superfluous if the rules on relevance were construed to proscribe propensity testimony. Similarly, were we to agree with Smith, Rule 608(b)'s prohibition on the use of extrinsic evidence of specific instances of a witness' truthful or untruthful conduct for the purposes of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility would itself be redun- dant. The concerns giving rise to Rules 404(b) and 608(b) are not relevance concerns. To the contrary, both propensity rules and the rule restricting the admission of extrinsic credibility evidence embody specific concerns that, although relevant, evidence of prior acts will either unduly prejudice and overpersuade the jury, see Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63 (1st Cir. 1982)), or waste time by sanctioning countless distinct credibility mini-trials within the trial prop- er, see Fed. R. Evid. 405 advisory committee's note; Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) advisory committee's note. In short, we reject Smith's claim that the disputed testimony was irrelevant and turn to his 608(b) challenge. 44 It should first be noted that certain of the alleged bolster- ing testimony--concerning whether the information that Perry had given to law enforcement officers in the past had been corroborated and whether Perry had been truthful in past dealings--was objected to on unspecified grounds and the objections were sustained. Nonetheless, Agent Haera was allowed to testify that he had received and used informa- tion from Perry to facilitate investigations, uncover contra- band, and secure arrests. It is this latter testimony that Smith claims was bolstering and erroneously admitted un- der Rule 608(b). In light of our ruling in this case, we need not address the accuracy of appellant's characterization of the disputed testimony as bolstering. 45 Because Smith failed to raise a timely Rule 608(b) objec- tion, we review admission of the testimony for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); see also United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The term plain as used in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) is synony- mous with 'clear' or, equivalently, 'obvious.'  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). At a minimum, a court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law. Id. 46 As noted above, this circuit has not yet addressed whether, and to what extent, Rule 608(b) prohibits admission of extrin- sic evidence of specific instances of past truthful coopera- tion offered by the government to rebut allegations of an informant's bias. Although this fact, alone, is not dispositive of the plain error issue, it is important when we consider that Rule 608(b) itself admits of no simple answer to the question at hand and, in addition, our sister circuits have been unable to agree on the point at which impermissible bolstering ends and permissible use of past cooperation to rebut bias begins. Compare United States v. Taylor, 900 F.2d 779, 781 (4th Cir. 1990) ([I]t was error for the district court to admit extrinsic evidence that the informer, Phillips, had provided reliable information and testimony that resulted in several convictions, in order to bolster Philips' credibility.), and United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 321-22 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing Taylor), with United States v. Lochmondy, 890 F.2d 817, 821 (6th Cir. 1989) (Several circuits have held that evidence of cooperation on other matters is admissible to justify a cooperation agreement and to rebut allegations of bias. (citing United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fusco, 748 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Martinez, 775 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985))), and United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Lochmondy). 47 Rule 608(b) states that, 48 [s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of 49 truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness 50 being cross-examined has testified. 51 Fed. R. Evid. 608(b) (emphasis added). As both the plain language of the rule and the cases cited above suggest, the threshold question under Rule 608(b) is: For what purpose has the prosecution offered the extrinsic evidence? If offered solely in order to bolster [the informant's] credibility, Tay- lor, 900 F.2d at 781, then Rule 608(b) bars admission lest one of the exceptions applies. But, if offered for a different and legitimate reason, such as to justify a cooperation agreement [or] rebut allegations of bias, Lochmondy, 890 F.2d at 821, the evidence falls outside Rule 608(b)'s narrow confines. 52 Government informants present a uniquely difficult case for courts determining whether the prosecution has offered the so-called bolstering evidence for a permissible or an imper- missible purpose. Routinely, defense counsel cross-examines government witnesses about an informant's bias--whether it be a plea agreement, a financial arrangement, or both. On re-direct, the prosecution may want to introduce specific instances of fruitful cooperation under the plea agreement to show that the informant has already cooperated substantially with the police, thereby reducing the marginal temptation to lie in the present circumstance. The line between this per- missible use and impermissible bolstering is indeed a hazy one. In Fusco, the Fifth Circuit held extrinsic evidence of past cooperation admissible to rebut implications that the informant had received $45,000 from the DEA solely for his help in that case: Because the government was trying to convince the jury that [the informant] was not biased, it was not 'bolstering' [the informant] in a prohibited way, and [the informant's] prior cooperation was not 'extrinsic,' as those terms are used in Federal Rule of Evidence 608. Bias, as opposed to general veracity, is not a collateral issue. 748 F.2d at 998. Likewise, in United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232 (7th Cir. 1996), the Seventh Circuit found admissi- ble similar evidence offered in response to suggestions that the informant would not have gotten a plea deal if he hadn't come up with the name of a 'big fish' like Lindemann. Id. at 1242. The court held that 53 [t]he evidence specifically rebutted the allegation that [the informant] was biased out of self-interest in Lindemann's case: Burns' successful participation in numerous other cases meant that at the time he was negotiating over his plea deal, he had lots of information to use as bargaining chips. That fact was relevant under the standards of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 402 because it made less probable the assertion that Burns was lying in Lindemann's case out of self-interest. 54 Id. at 1243. 55 Because defense counsel in the instant case failed to raise the 608(b) objection below, the prosecution never had an opportunity to explain why it offered the alleged bolstering evidence. Defense counsel had used its cross-examination of Agent Haera to expose the terms of Perry's plea agreement, Tr. at 45-46, to suggest that Perry need only accuse suspects to benefit under that agreement, Tr. 44-45, and to show the tremendous financial incentives on Perry to provide even false information, Tr. at 46-48. Perhaps, as in Linde- mann, the prosecution offered the testimony to demonstrate the diminished marginal value to Perry of his participation in the instant case; perhaps as in Fusco, it was offered to undermine any insinuation that Perry had received funds for his participation in this case alone; or finally, perhaps the prosecution wanted to counter defense counsel's specific insin- uation that Perry would benefit merely by accusing people. We simply do not know. Given these possibilities, the ambi- guity in the case law, and the context of the present testimo- ny, we cannot say that admission of the evidence constituted plain error. 56 We conclude by emphasizing that, to satisfy the plain error standard, Smith must show that the alleged error affect[ed] substantial rights, that is, affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (holding that the substantial rights inquiry of Federal Rule of Crimi- nal Procedure 52(b) mirrors Rule 52(a)'s harmless error inquiry, except that the burden in the former falls on the defendant to show prejudice). Moreover,  '[t]he plain error exception to the contemporaneous objection requirement should be used sparingly, only for particularly egregious errors that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '  Spriggs, 102 F.3d at 1257 (quoting United States v. Copelin, 996 F.2d 379, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Here, the minimal damage arguably wrought by the contested testimony stands in stark contrast to the overwhelming weight of evidence against Smith. Fur- thermore, as noted above, it appears that the most damaging of the alleged bolstering testimony was excluded pursuant to objections that were raised by Smith's attorney. There was no plain error.