Opinion ID: 2526946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: lesser sanctions were appropriate

Text: ¶ 66 Lesser sanctions could protect the right to have a jury decide the case on the merits. We have declared that the court should impose the least severe sanction that will be adequate to serve the purpose of the particular sanction, but not be so minimal that it undermines the purpose of discovery, namely to deter, punish, compensate, and educate. Burnet, 131 Wash.2d at 495-96, 933 P.2d 1036; see also Fisons, 122 Wash.2d at 355-56, 858 P.2d 1054. If necessary, courts may impose more than one type of sanction for a discovery violation. Here, a combination of lesser sanctions would have adequately served the Fisons purposes. The trial court rejected a combination of lesser sanctions and instead imposed the harshest sanction, denying the constitutional right to a jury trial. ¶ 67 The trial court rejected a continuance, stating that this would reward Hyundai, which had sought a trial continuance. The court also noted that a continuance would mean added costs. [5] ¶ 68 However, a continuance would largely remedy the prejudice Magaña argues. More time would allow further investigation of the discovery. Also, Magaña's monetary concerns are clearly addressable by monetary sanctions in the form of litigation costs, as well as an advance against a potential damages award for immediate medical costs, an option suggested or agreed to by Hyundai. ¶ 69 The trial court rejected a monetary sanction, stating that Hyundai is a multibillion dollar corporation and that money would not in any way address the prejudice to the plaintiff or to the judicial system. CP at 5333. Money is the heart of Magaña's case, and substantial fines could affect Hyundai and its litigation strategies. Arriving at the proper monetary sanction is undoubtedly more difficult than ordering a default judgment, but difficulty of determination is not one of the Fisons -enumerated purposes of sanctions. ¶ 70 The trial court also rejected the alternative that accident records produced by Hyundai be treated as admissions of those substantially similar accidents. The court thought that this would equate to a default judgment. However, if a continuance were granted, the parties could properly analyze whether any evidence had gone stale due to Hyundai's discovery violations. Where evidence had gone stale, that evidence could be admitted as proof of any incident substantially similar to that of Magaña's. [6] This course would preserve the jury trial right. ¶ 71 The trial court's error here was in failing to fully consider numerous available lesser sanctions other than default. This was an abuse of discretion. A combination of a continuance, monetary sanctions, and admitting any evidence that had become stale after Hyundai should have produced would not be a reward to Hyundai. The court could have fashioned an appropriate vehicle to deter, punish, compensate, and educate, while still preserving the jury trial.