Opinion ID: 1652107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: date and corresponding events

Text: 2/6/95 DeLoach arrested. 7/17/95 DeLoach indicted. 9/18/96 DeLoach filed speedy trial motion while in the Mississippi State Penitentiary on a burglary charge. 2/17/97 DeLoach released from prison concerning the burglary charge. 2/24/97 DeLoach arraigned and trial date set for 3/25/97. 3/6/97 DeLoach's motion to dismiss and motion for continuance filed. 3/24/97 DeLoach's motion for continuance and additional time within which to enter into plea negotiations filed. 3/28/97 Order continuing case entered and motion to dismiss overruled. 5/9/97 Motion for court to reconsider filed. 5/19/97 Order overruling Motion to reconsider entered. 5/25/97 Trial began. (838 days since arrest; 91 days since arraignment) ¶ 14. The right to a speedy trial attaches at the time of the accused's arrest, indictment, or information. Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 408 (Miss.1989). If the Court finds a constitutional speedy trial violation, the sole remedy is to reverse the trial court's decision and dismiss the charges. DeLoach's constitutional right to a speedy trial is considered under the factors established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The balancing test of Barker are as follows: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether defendant was prejudiced by the delay. Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 300 (Miss.1993). In considering this issue, it is important to note what this Court pronounced in State v. Magnusen, 646 So.2d 1275, 1278 (Miss.1994): This Court recognized in Beavers v. State: No mathematical formula exists according to which the Barker weighing and balancing process must be performed. The weight to be given each factor necessarily turns on the quality of evidence available on each and, in the absence of evidence, identification of the party with the risk of nonpersuasion. In the end, no one factor is dispositive. The totality of the circumstances must be considered. 498 So.2d at 790. ¶ 15. In the instant case, the trial court did not require the State to respond and did not articulate its findings and views regarding the Barker factors when it denied DeLoach's motion to dismiss. In similar cases, this Court has acted de novo in performing the Barker analysis. Furthermore, this Court has noted that it would be extremely helpful if the Circuit Courts, in considering these matters, would provide an articulated statement of their findings of evidentiary fact and the reasons for the decision to grant or deny the motion to dismiss. State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252, 1255 (Miss.1991). See also Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243, 1247 (Miss. 1991); and Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 955 (Miss.1985). Under the circumstances, the writer will proceed with a de novo standard of review.