Opinion ID: 846031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the distinction between control and interference

Text: The lower courts were careful to note the distinction between control of a vehicle and interference with that control. In the majority's decision, that distinction is ignored because the majority uses control interchangeably with influence. I believe that the distinction between exercising control and interfering with that control is relevant here. By ignoring it, the majority has failed to effectuate the Legislature's intent in choosing to use the term control. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the Legislature's intent. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 456 Mich. 511, 515, 573 N.W.2d 611 (1998). Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001) defines interfere as to come into opposition or collision so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct someone or something[.] This is a concept distinct from control. In fact, it can be seen as the opposite. The person exercising control is dominating and commanding the object. A person interfering is hampering, hindering, or obstructing that domination or command. This case demonstrates the salient point. The driver of the car was in command of the vehicle. She was exercising direction over it by regulating the gas pedal, brake pedal, emergency brake, and steering wheel. This command caused the car to function. Defendant, on the other hand, hampered that command by grabbing the steering wheel. This action did not place the vehicle under his command. Rather, it hindered and obstructed the driver's command and ability to direct the vehicle. By seizing the wheel, defendant could not cause the car to stop. He could not increase or decrease its speed. And he could not have activated the headlights or turn signals. All he could do was hamper the driver in steering the vehicle in the direction she chose. Because this ability fits the definition of interference rather than control, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the lower courts' decisions to dismiss the felonious-driving charge. Ignoring this distinction, the majority offers no justification for its failure to effectuate the intent of the Legislature.