Opinion ID: 1136438
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: breach of the lease by kate's refusal to arbitrate

Text: The district judge found as follows: XI. That the subject lease between plaintiffs and defendants COWGILL and PORTER contained arbitration covenants relating to the settling and adjusting of any disputes regarding plaintiff's duty to make major and structural repairs, which covenants defendants COWGILL and PORTER had a right to invoke. XII. That said defendants gave proper notice to plaintiff and performed all steps required under said lease to invoke said arbitration provision, but plaintiff wilfully refused and failed to adhere to the said arbitration covenants of the lease, which constituted a breach thereof on January 4, 1966. And he concluded therefrom as follows: 3. The failure on the part of the plaintiff to make the required repairs or submit the matter to arbitration constituted a breach of the covenants of the lease on the part of plaintiff Lessor. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the district judge's ruling. The lease, which was drawn by McDougall, provided for arbitration. The respondents had nominated an arbitrator and were prepared to go forward with arbitration until Kate's attorney filed suit on the ground that the lease agreement, which that very attorney had drawn, was vague and required court interpretation before arbitration would be possible. If such in fact were the case, Kate could have sought relief under NRS 38.140, which provides: The arbitrators may, on their own motion, and shall by request of a party to the arbitration: 1. At any stage of the proceedings submit any question of law arising in the course of the hearing for the opinion of the court, stating the facts upon which the question arises, and such opinion when given shall bind the arbitrators in the making of their award. 2. State their final award in the form of a conclusion of fact for the opinion of the court on the questions of law arising on the hearing. Instead, she breached the provision for arbitration, upon which respondents were entitled to rely. NRS 38.030. [11] See United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Stine, 76 Nev. 189, 351 P.2d 965 (1960). There is substantial evidence to support the district judge's finding that Kate's refusal to arbitrate constituted a breach of the master lease.