Opinion ID: 1758792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Damages Present Special Challenges to Factfinder

Text: Similarly unpersuasive is the Court's contention that we must reject filial consortium claims because the damage assessment is difficult. Loss of consortium is a common-law doctrine that we have consistently modified to adapt to changes in societal norms and values. Unlike other intangible values compensated by tort, consortium does not focus directly on a plaintiff's internal feelings. See, e.g., Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467. Instead, recovery for consortium attaches value to a plaintiff's lost opportunity to derive benefit from another person. Id. Stated another way, consortium damages reflect the intangible, non-economic benefits inherent in the interaction associated with certain relationship, i.e., spouses and parents and children. See Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 666. This Court, and almost every court in the nation, recognizes that consortium damages are neither too intangible [n]or conjectural to be measured in pecuniary terms by a jury. Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667; Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253 (dismissing argument that consortium damages are too speculative to be given a monetary value); see also cases cited supra note 1 and infra note 4. The Court speculates that [t]he jury apparently concluded that while the child's intangible losses would grow with time, her continuing impairment would have no substantial effect on the parent-child relationship in the future. 111 S.W.3d at 119. The Court also notes that [a]nother jury after hearing the same evidence might well have reached a very different conclusion. Id. But is that not true in every jury case? And is that not an issue of factual or legal sufficiencyan inquiry wholly distinct from whether we should recognize the cause of action in the first instance? It is true that consortium damages are difficult to assess. See, e.g., Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253; Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667. They are intangible and therefore resist mathematical computation. Because the damages are ethereal, different juries may well award different (and sometimes excessive) amounts based on similar facts. But we have not, until today, let those difficulties overcome our larger interest in the fair adjudication of a valid claim, nor our confidence in our judiciary to fulfill their duty to review awards: The fear of excessive verdicts is not a sufficient justification for denying recovery for loss of companionship. The judicial system has adequate safeguards to prevent recovery of damages based on sympathy or prejudice rather than fair and just compensation for the plaintiff's injuries. Sanchez, 651 S.W.2d at 253; see also Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 667. Thus, I do not understand how the Court can now, in good faith, contend that the difficulties of calculating damages in filial consortium cases warrant denying such claims altogether.