Opinion ID: 1799288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Excluded From Ex Post Facto Doctrine

Text: The United States Supreme Court has interpreted Article I, § 9, of the United States Constitution to forbid the enactment of any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time the act was committed... . Puckett v. Abels, 684 So.2d 671, 673 (Miss. 1996) ( citing Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). The Supreme Court, keeping with its original understanding, held the Ex Post Facto Clause was aimed at laws that `retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.' California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 504, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995) ( quoting Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990)). The extension of the limitations period in no way altered the definition of the crime with which Christmas was charged. The jury found Christmas had committed acts which were against the law at the time of their commission. The new limitations period had no effect on the punishment imposed for the crime. Lastly, because Christmas could not raise the expiration of the statute of limitations at the time he committed the crime as a defense or excuse to his crime, he cannot be deprived of that defense by the extension of the limitations period. `[A]n ex post facto law is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was not so at the time the action was performed; or which increases the punishment, or, in short, which, in relation to the offence or its consequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage.' Collins, 497 U.S. at 48, 110 S.Ct. at 2722; quoting Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) (emphasis added). However, in Collins the Court determined that this did not keep with the original meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The holding in Kring can only be justified if the Ex Post Facto Clause is thought to include not merely the Calder categories, but any change which alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage. We think such a reading of the Clause departs from the meaning of the Clause as it was understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and is not supported by later cases. We accordingly overrule Kring. Collins, 497 U.S. at 50, 110 S.Ct. at 2723. In Puckett, this Court adopted the new rationale of the United States Supreme Court where it quoted from the Morales decision stating the Clause is aimed at laws that retroactively alter the definition of the crimes or increase the punishment of criminal acts. Puckett, 684 So.2d at 673 ( quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 504-06, 115 S.Ct. at 1601). The Fifth Circuit has answered this specific question in United States v. Brechtel, 997 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (5th Cir.1993). In that case bank officers were convicted of improper participation in bank transactions. They were prosecuted under an amended statute of limitations that applied to offenses committed before the original limitations period had not expired. Brechtel asserted that his prosecution under the amended statute of limitations was violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 9, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution. Id. The Fifth Circuit answered the question of whether this violated the Ex Post Facto Clause in the negative. This argument misperceives the law. Recent Supreme Court teachings reject the proposition that retroactive legislation violates the ex post facto clause merely because it adversely affects the position of criminal defendants. Rather, that clause prohibits only enactment of statutes which: (1) punish as a crime an act previously committed which was innocent when done; (2) make more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or (3) deprive one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed. Only statutes withdrawing defenses related to the definition of the crime, or to the matters which a defendant might plead as justification or excuse fall within the latter group. Plainly, extension of the limitations period neither criminalizes previously innocent conduct, nor enhances punishment for an existing crime. Brechtel, 997 F.2d at 1113. This Court in Merritt v. State, 517 So.2d 517, 521 (Miss. 1987), expressed its concerns of retroactive application of laws. Justice Robertson wrote: [W]e have said all too often there is a built in presumption of retroactivity in our judicial lawmaking efforts. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 876 (Miss. 1985). We worry most about that presumption in cases where a party may in good faith have relied upon a preexisting state of the law. It goes without saying that we have no obligation to honor the claim of a murderer that he planned and executed the killing of his child in reliance upon the then rule that his wife would not be competent as a witness against him. Id. Christmas cannot come before this Court and argue in good faith that he, in deciding to fondle the victim, relied upon the two-year statute of limitations in effect in June of 1989 as an excuse or justification for his criminal actions. Because we are bound to follow the rule in Merritt, this Court has no obligation to honor the claims of Christmas. Buford Christmas was not prosecuted under a new law that made his acts of June 1989 criminal. They were criminal at the time of their commission. Also, Christmas was not subjected to a longer punishment by the prosecution under the lengthier limitations period than he would have been had he been prosecuted under the original statute of limitations. Therefore, we conclude the prosecution of Buford Christmas did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. His argument is without merit, and the decision by the trial judge to allow the prosecution to take place under the amended statute of limitations is affirmed. Christmas asserts that the prosecution was required to show an offense within the period of limitations. The prosecution also has the burden of proving that the offense was committed after the passage of the statute or ordinance providing for its punishment, and that it was committed within the statutory period of limitations, and if this is not done a conviction will be reversed. Hatton v. State, 92 Miss. 651, 46 So. 708, 709 (1908). Christmas then cites Strong v. State, 199 Miss. 17, 23 So.2d 750, 751 (1945), for the proposition: where evidence is in dispute as to whether the prosecution was begun timely, that factual dispute must be decided by the jury as part of its general verdict. Christmas misinterprets the holdings of the two cases. In Strong there was a dispute as to when the actual crime took place. The prosecution contended the crime took place during December, 1942, which would have been within the limitations period. The defendants argued the acts occurred in July of 1942, which was outside of the limitations period. We are of the opinion that Strong stands for the proposition that where there is dispute as to when a criminal act occurs, the prosecution must prove it took place within the limitations period. In the case sub judice, there is no dispute that the criminal act took place in June of 1989. It was not a question for the jury to decide as to when the crime occurred. Whether a criminal act that, without question, occurred in June of 1989 was prosecutable under the applicable limitations period was a question of law for the judge to determine. The judge made this determination by stating: The two year [sic] was extended to five years before the two year [sic] had expired, two-year statute of limitation had expired, and I think that still puts him in the situation of being able to be prosecuted by the State based on the authority that has been submitted to me. This Court holds that the application of the extended limitations period was a question for law for the judge to determine. He correctly ruled that the prosecution could go forward, and his decision is affirmed.