Opinion ID: 1236812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial court's response to jury inquiry during guilt phase deliberation.

Text: Defendant raises numerous claims of error concerning the trial court's response to an inquiry from the jury shortly before it reached the guilt phase verdict. Before discussing his contentions, some factual background is in order: The guilt phase deliberations began December 4, 1985. On the afternoon of December 16, the bailiff received a note from the jury: What do we do now? After much extra deliberation one member of the jury is not sure whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. At the time, the trial judge, Judge Lew, [9] was at home on vacation. The clerk's minutes contain the only contemporaneous record of what then transpired; they reflect the following: A written question is received from the jury. The Bailiff calls Judge Lew at home and receives instructions which he relays to the jury. The question is filed and placed in the court file. On June 8, 1987, on motion of the defense, Judge Munoz [10] settled the record regarding the jury note as follows: On December 16, 1985, the trial judge was called at home by the bailiff and told that the jury had reported that one member was undecided. The court provided instructions to the bailiff which the bailiff then relayed to the jury. It is impossible to determine, and no one remembers, what instructions were given and relayed to the jury. On June 10, 1988, defendant filed an opening brief in this court raising several issues pertaining to the manner in which the trial court handled the December 16 inquiry. The Attorney General responded on the merits and also moved to augment the record on appeal, relying in part on a declaration from the prosecutor setting forth her recollection of the factual context surrounding the jury question. The declaration stated in essence that, although they failed to do so on the record, the parties had agreed that while Judge Lew was on vacation, jury questions would be relayed to him by telephone; his proposed response would be communicated to the attorneys by telephone and, absent any objection, would then be conveyed to the jury without requiring the presence of defendant or counsel. Relying on this unrecorded stipulation, respondent argued defendant had waived any lack of notice or defect in the proceedings. On November 23, 1988, this court directed augmentation of the record concerning whether the parties had so stipulated and whether the trial court had notified counsel of its response to the jury's question on December 16. The matter returned to the superior court where Judge Reid assumed the task of resolving our concerns. On May 5, 1989, Judge Reid held a settlement hearing at which he considered the declarations of trial counsel and defendant's appellate counsel, [11] transcripts of previous proceedings, and the contents of the case file; counsel also testified. At the close of testimony and argument, Judge Reid stated he would have a decision in printed form on May the 26th. About May 20, Judge Reid contacted Judge Lew and asked him to review the court file to determine whether he might recall any pertinent facts. In a subsequent declaration, Judge Lew stated that an examination of the file had refreshed his recollection: Counsel had stipulated to a procedure for handling jury matters during his vacation. On December 16, 1985, he was contacted at home by his bailiff and told the jury had a question regarding one juror who could not choose between a guilty and a not guilty verdict. Judge Lew believed he instructed the bailiff to advise the jury to continue to deliberate until an answer was returned by the court and to have the clerk contact the attorneys to inform them of the inquiry. Immediately after the first call, he received a second call from the bailiff informing him the jury wished to continue to deliberate without receiving an answer. He thereupon instructed the bailiff to have the question placed in the file and have the jury continue to deliberate. Also at Judge Lew's direction, counsel were never contacted regarding the matter. Neither the People nor the defense learned of the contact between Judge Reid and Judge Lew until so informed on May 26. Although Judge Reid had prepared a settled statement, he invited further input from the parties in light of Judge Lew's declaration. The defense objected to any consideration of the declaration as the product of an improper ex parte communication. The court overruled the objection and continued the matter to allow the parties to examine Judge Lew on the record, which they did. Judge Reid subsequently prepared an engrossed settled statement substantially in conformance with Judge Lew's declaration as reiterated in his testimony. Defendant raises a succession of constitutional and statutory challenges, contending the foregoing facts establish a prejudicial violation of guaranties under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, analogous provisions of the state Constitution, and various statutory protections. (See, e.g., §§ 1127, 1138.) In addressing these claims, we note with some disquiet that both the trial and settled statement procedures reflect a certain inattention to the critical role of a proper and complete record in facilitating meaningful appellate review. We cannot urge too strongly that trial judges assiduously preserve a detailed account of all proceedings regardless of their perceived significance, particularly in capital cases, to minimize the need to reconstruct events. Nevertheless, while this practice was not always diligently observed here, we find that the lapses were neither singly nor cumulatively so substantial as to undermine confidence in the judgment; and any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (5) The fulcrum of defendant's numerous claims is his assertion that Judge Lew, through the medium of the bailiff, improperly instructed the jury ex parte and off the record in response to an indication they were deadlocked in their deliberations. A critical examination of the record fails to substantiate this broad characterization of the proceedings, which is based upon selective portions ostensibly favorable to defendant. A reviewing court must consider the entire record; it may not isolate certain particulars and disregard the totality of the circumstances. The clerk's minutes of December 16 indicate, The Bailiff calls Judge Lew at home and receives instructions which he relays to the jury. The statement settled by Judge Reid, however, establishes much more: that the jury initiated an inquiry as to how to proceed if one member remained undecided; that Judge Lew intended to have them continue deliberating while he informed counsel of their question and formulated a response; that before receiving any reply, the jury determined they could benefit from further deliberations and so informed the bailiff, who relayed that information to the court; that on the court's instruction, the bailiff thereafter directed the jury to continue deliberating. Defendant urges us to reject the settled statement in favor of the more contemporaneous clerk's minutes. In part, he argues that any reconstruction of the record more than three years after the occurrence is inherently unreliable due to the passage of time. Time alone, however, is not the dispositive consideration in evaluating whether a reconstructed record affords meaningful appellate review. The nature of the issue, the amount of the record reconstructed, and the means available to assist the process are all important in determining the reliability of any substitute for a contemporaneous verbatim account. In the cases cited by defendant, court reporters' notes of significant portions of the proceedings were lost or destroyed and none of the original participants could sufficiently reconstruct pertinent events to formulate an accurate and complete settled statement to address the claims presented on appeal. (See, e.g., In re Steven B. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 1, 7 [157 Cal. Rptr. 510, 598 P.2d 480]; People v. Apalatequi (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 970, 973 [147 Cal. Rptr. 473]; see also People v. Serrato (1965) 238 Cal. App.2d 112, 118-119 [47 Cal. Rptr. 543]; Bergerco, U.S.A. v. Shipping Corp. of India, Inc. (9th Cir.1990) 896 F.2d 1210, 1213.) Under such circumstances, the appellant was deprived of `an adequate record to enable the court to pass upon the questions sought to be raised.' [Citation.] ( In re Steven B., supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 7; see People v. Jones (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 298, 301 [178 Cal. Rptr. 44].) This case differs markedly: The issue is extremely narrow. The principal participant, Judge Lew, reviewed a substantial number of contemporaneous documents, which refreshed his recollection of the limited proceedings in question. Because defense counsel were not present during relevant events, their failure to contribute to the settled statement is both understandable and without significance to its reliability. We reject as unsupported speculation any suggestion counsel's inability to participate afforded Judge Lew and the prosecutor the opportunity to contrive the record against defendant. (Cf. People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 721 [280 Cal. Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181] [whether anything took place off the record regarding appointment of counsel and defense investigator is purely a matter of speculation].) All parties were examined under oath and assessed credible in their testimony by an impartial judicial officer unconnected to the trial proceedings. (See, post, fn. 12.) Under these circumstances, we perceive no violation of rights, constitutional or statutory, concerning settlement of the record or use of a settled statement on appeal. Defendant also points to various inconsistencies between the settled statement and the clerk's minutes, in particular with respect to whether the bailiff provided instructions from Judge Lew in response to the jury's inquiry. Initially, we question defendant's premise that a conflict exists. The record contains no evidence the clerk used instructions as a term of art rather than simply as a synonym for directions. (See Webster's New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1988) p. 700.) On the other hand, Judge Lew, who would clearly have understood the distinction, made no reference to giving the bailiff instructions, in any legal sense, to convey to the jury. However, to the extent any material divergence does arise, that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to the greater credence [citation]. ( In re Evans (1945) 70 Cal. App.2d 213, 216 [160 P.2d 551].) This determination rests, in turn, upon a consideration of the circumstances under which the proceedings were had. [Citations.] ( People v. Washington (1949) 95 Cal. App.2d 454, 456 [213 P.2d 70].) After careful review, we find the settled statement more reliable for the following reasons: First, the court clerk was not a percipient witness to any of the relevant facts set forth in the minutes and relied entirely upon the bailiff's summary of events that took place in her absence. At the settled statement hearing, she had virtually no independent recollection and testified her minutes contained the most accurate information available. Judge Lew, whose declaration provided the substance of the settled statement, personally participated and recalled the circumstances from his review of contemporaneous notes and records. Second, the procedures described by Judge Lew are consistent with those he utilized with the approval of the defense in responding to earlier inquiries from the jury. Finally, the settled statement provides a more detailed and complete rendition of events based upon all available facts and circumstances. Having determined the settled statement is more creditworthy, we are bound by its contents, for it has been held that the trial judge has full power over the record, and as long as he does not act arbitrarily, his action is final. [Citations.] [12] ( Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 374, 376, fn. 1 [115 Cal. Rptr. 648, 525 P.2d 88]; see Burns v. Brown (1946) 27 Cal.2d 631, 636 [166 P.2d 1].) (6) In a related argument, defendant contends the absence of a reporter's transcript of the events of December 16 violated his rights under section 190.9, which provides that all proceedings in capital cases shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. Without deciding whether the circumstances at issue constituted a proceeding within the meaning of section 190.9, we reject the implicit proposition that violation of the statute requires reversal of the conviction. (See Draper v. Washington (1963) 372 U.S. 487, 495 [90 L.Ed. 899, 905-806, 83 S.Ct. 774]; March v. Municipal Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 422, 428 [102 Cal. Rptr. 597, 498 P.2d 437, 66 A.L.R.3d 945]; People v. Chessman (1950) 35 Cal.2d 455, 459-462 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084] [no right to new trial if reporter unable to prepare transcript].) [W]here other methods of reconstructing the trial record are available, the defendant must proceed with those alternatives in order to obtain review. [Citations.] ( People v. Jones, supra, 125 Cal. App.3d at pp. 300-301; In re Armstrong (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 565, 571 [178 Cal. Rptr. 902].) We find the record before us adequate to the task at hand: Resolution of defendant's claims does not depend upon a verbatim transcription; hence, the settled statement suffices. (See People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1116 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327]; see also People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 921-922 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571].) On this basis, we also find no violation of defendant's due process right to meaningful appellate review. ( Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 U.S. 114, 120 [78 L.Ed.2d 267, 274, 104 S.Ct. 453].) (7) In a similar vein, defendant argues that in the absence of a reporter's transcript of the bailiff's communications with the jury, we cannot determine whether his directions conveyed a prejudicially coercive connotation. At the outset, we reject defendant's factual predicate. Bailiffs have innumerable contacts with deliberating juries any of which offers the opportunity for an untoward comment. The mere potential for impropriety, however, cannot sustain an inference of misconduct. As officers of the court, bailiffs must be presumed to act in accordance with their sworn duty to keep the jury insulated from all extraneous influences, including their own. (Evid. Code, § 664; see People v. Napolitano (1959) 175 Cal. App.2d 477, 480 [346 P.2d 238]; cf. Rushen v. Spain, supra, 464 U.S. at pp. 118-119 [78 L.Ed.2d at pp. 273-274].) Moreover, in this particular case, the record reasonably supports the conclusion the bailiff told the jury nothing more or less than to continue their deliberations, as they were already doing. We have no evidence the jurors had deadlocked (cf. § 1140 [court may declare mistrial when it satisfactorily appears that there is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree]) or had reached an impasse they would likely resolve other than in accordance with their individual judgment. (See, e.g., People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835 [139 Cal. Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997, 97 A.L.R.3d 73] [disapproving Allen -type instructions as coercive of minority jurors].) Indeed, it is far from clear that any actual disagreement existed, only that one juror had yet to decide whether the prosecution had proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The situation was thus anything but rife with the potential for undue or untoward influence by virtue of ex parte contact. (See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (1978) 438 U.S. 422, 460 [57 L.Ed.2d 854, 883-884, 98 S.Ct. 2864]; Burton v. United States (1905) 196 U.S. 283, 307 [49 L.Ed. 482, 490-491, 25 S.Ct. 243]; People v. Lozano (1987) 192 Cal. App.3d 618, 625 [237 Cal. Rptr. 612].) Given the minimal nature of the message, the possible nuances of language and tone are too limited to raise any constitutional concern. (8a) Turning to defendant's remaining arguments, i.e., that the manner and nature of the trial court's response to the jury's inquiry violated his right to counsel, his right to be present at all trial proceedings, his right to a reliable verdict, his due process right to a fair trial, and related statutory provisions, we find the record sustains none of these claims. [13] At most, the court neglected to memorialize an essentially ministerial exchange in which the bailiff had an incidental contact with the jury to inform them, at the court's behest, to continue deliberating as they had already independently decided to do. Under these circumstances, nothing which assertedly occurred off the record here could possibly have affected the verdict. [14] ( People v. Deere, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 720.) Contrary to defendant's assertions, we do not confront a situation in which the trial court erroneously gave the jury additional substantive instructions. In People v. Weatherford, supra, 27 Cal.2d 401, the trial judge, through the bailiff and in the absence of defendant's attorney, responded to an inquiry `Whether or not it was the duty of the prosecution or the defense to put the defendant on the scene.' ( Id., at p. 417.) The court's reply as well as the bailiff's additional colloquy with the jury was apparently interpreted as meaning that the matter was none of the jury's business. ( Id., at p. 419.) In People v. Lozano, supra, 192 Cal. App.3d 618, the trial judge gave a self-defense instruction without notifying defense counsel or otherwise affording him an opportunity to object to the instruction before it was given. ( Id., at p. 622.) Similarly, in People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 981 [146 Cal. Rptr. 129], the court gave the jury additional instructions on the difference between first and second degree burglary and the definition of accessory and also provided them with a written copy of all instructions without informing counsel or permitting any response. ( Id., at pp. 985-986; see also People v. Jenkins, supra, 223 Cal. App.2d at pp. 539-540.) In each circumstance, counsel could have taken some action on the defendant's behalf to amplify, clarify, or modify the supplemental instruction or procedure. (See also People v. Hogan, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 850; United States v. Dellinger (9th Cir.1972) 472 F.2d 340, 380.) The court's failure to give notice or afford an opportunity to respond thus constituted statutory as well as constitutional error. (9) Penal Code section 1138 requires that any questions posed by the jury regarding the law or the evidence be answered in open court in the presence of the accused and his or her counsel, unless presence is waived. Communication between judge and jury during deliberations without affording defendant and counsel an opportunity to be present impinges on a defendant's constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] ( People v. Chagolla, supra, 144 Cal. App.3d at p. 432; see also § 1127 [All instructions given shall be in writing unless preserved by court reporter].) Ex parte instructions also implicate the defendant's right to personal presence at all trial proceedings. (See U.S. Const., Amend. VI; § 1043, subd. (a).) (8b) Here, however, the court did not direct the jury on any question regarding the law or the evidence; and the circumstances more closely parallel those found nonprejudicial in People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177 [148 P.2d 627]. In that case, the jury sent the court a note inquiring, `May we render a decision of life imprisonment and not eligible for parole ?'.... ( Id., at p. 188.) The court responded, `No'; and the defendant claimed reversible error because of this communication between the judge and jury out of the presence of the defendant and his counsel. ( Id., at p. 189.) We acknowledged that courts are practically unanimous in holding that private communications between court and jury are improper, and that all communications should be made in open court. [Citation.] Ordinary procedure would require that the trial judge afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of any such communication and to have the opportunity to make timely objection to any action by the court or jury which might be deemed irregular. But in this instance the court could not have responded by any other answer than `No' or its equivalent, namely, that the jury was to be guided solely by the instructions already given. The answer of the trial judge could properly have been made over the objection of the defendant or his counsel if the ordinary procedure had been followed. The episode may not be deemed to be prejudicial.... ( Ibid.; People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 384 [279 Cal. Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009].) We apply a similar analysis and reach a similar conclusion in this case. While we strongly reiterate the proscription against private communications between court and jury, we do not infer from either the fact of the communication or the absence of a contemporaneous verbatim record that a prejudicial contact occurred. To the contrary, considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude defendant did not suffer an impairment of rights sufficient to affect the verdict. (See United States v. Di Pietto (7th Cir.1968) 396 F.2d 283, 287.) As an interim measure, the court reasonably directed the bailiff to have the jury maintain the status quo pending notification of counsel and their agreement to any further instructions. (See United States v. Dellinger, supra, 472 F.2d at p. 378 [Messages, conveyed through a [bailiff], that the jury should continue deliberations, have been held harmless error.]; cf. People v. Lee (1974) 38 Cal. App.3d 749, 756 [113 Cal. Rptr. 641] [during a reasonable delay in obtaining evidence which it wishes to consider, the jury may continue its deliberations and reach a valid verdict without the evidence it has previously requested]; People v. Stafford (1973) 29 Cal. App.3d 940, 943-945 [10 Cal. Rptr. 72] [same].) Once the jury expressed a desire and intent to continue deliberations without a reply, the court had only one reasonable response: Keep deliberating. At no point could counsel have objected to or offered any qualification of the court's action. [15] (See People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 384-385 [court correctly replied to informal inquiry regarding procedure if jury deadlocked]; People v. Woods (1950) 35 Cal.2d 504, 512 [218 P.2d 981] [court correctly explained hung jury].) Our recent decision in People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140 [284 Cal. Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290] is also instructive. In that case, the jury sent the court a note shortly after beginning deliberations asking for `a summarized definition of the charges of murder. First Degree, Second Degree.' ( Id., at p. 174.) In the presence of the court clerk and reporter, but without notifying counsel, the court returned a written response: `If you wish to be brought back into court, I will reread the information to you.' The jury never responded to the court's offer. ( Ibid., italics deleted.) Defendant Mickle made similar claims of error, all of which we rejected: While the preferable practice is to notify counsel of all mid-deliberation jury inquiries, the trial court did not err here. A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel. [Citations.] Here, the court simply offered to provide further instructions in open court, presumably after proper notice to counsel. The offer was not accepted, and no murder instructions were actually given after the jury retired to deliberate. ( Ibid. ; see Rushen v. Spain, supra, 464 U.S. at p. 121 [78 L.Ed.2d at pp. 274-275].) In sum, although we conclude the trial court erred in failing to observe the general proscription against ex parte communications with a deliberating jury, we cannot deem such error ground for reversal. [I]t is most undesirable that anything should reach a jury which does not do so in the court room. This is, indeed, too well settled for debate. [Citations.] But, like other rules for the conduct of trials, it is not an end in itself; and, while lapses should be closely scrutinized, when it appears with certainty that no harm has been done, it would be the merest pedantry to insist upon procedural regularity. [Citations.] There cannot be the slightest doubt here that the informality  for, at most, it was no more  did not prejudice the accused. [16] ( United States v. Campagna (2d Cir.1945) 146 F.2d 524, 528; accord, People v. Alcalde, supra, 24 Cal.2d at p. 189; United States v. Di Pietto, supra, 396 F.2d at p. 287; United States v. Grosso (3d Cir.1966) 358 F.2d 154, 157-158, revd. on other grounds sub nom. Grosso v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 62 [19 L.Ed.2d 906, 88 S.Ct. 709].)