Opinion ID: 1401176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of Section 17000.51 Upon the Interpretation of Section 17000.5

Text: Even if there were some doubt whether section 17000.5 limited the obligation of counties to provide health care pursuant to section 17000, the Legislature's enactment of section 17000.51 following the Caulk I decision unmistakably establishes that nothing in section 17000.5 affects that obligation. Contrary to the County's contention and the Court of Appeal's decision in Caulk II, the Legislature's clarification of its intent underlying section 17000.5 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) [12] Section 17000.51, subdivision (a), states: Notwithstanding the decision in [ Caulk I ], a county's discretion granted pursuant to Section 17000.5 to include, as part of a general assistance grant, in-kind aid with a monthly actuarial value of up to forty dollars ($40) per month of medical care, was not intended, and shall not be construed, to do any of the following: [¶] (1) Satisfy, in whole or in part, the duty of a county or a city [and] county to provide health care services to indigent and dependent poor persons under Section 17000. [¶] (2) Permit a county or a city and county to cease providing health care services under Section 17000. [¶] (3) Affect the eligibility of indigent and dependent poor persons for health care services under Section 17000. Section 17000.51, subdivision (c), states: Subdivision (a) confirms, and is declarative of, rather than a change in, existing law, as provided for in [the 1996 amendment to section 17000.5], which was intended only to provide a county or city and county with the discretion to reduce its general assistance grant level by up to forty dollars ($40) per month. The Court of Appeal determined that the Legislature's enactment of section 17000.51 was ultra vires because this statute did not amend section 17000.5, but rather presumes to explain what was intended by the 1996 amendment to section 17000.5. According to the Court of Appeal, [s]uch post hoc interpretation by a reconstituted Legislature violates fundamental principles of separation of powers .... The Legislature may not tell the courts how a statute must be interpreted any more than the courts may tell the Legislature what to enact. The Court of Appeal expressed its belief that the interpretation of section 17000.5 set forth in section 17000.51 is wrong and reiterated the construction of section 17000.5 set forth in its decision in Caulk I. We agree that statutory interpretation is an exercise of the judicial power assigned to the courts by the Constitution, and that a subsequent legislative declaration as to the meaning of a preexisting statute is neither binding nor conclusive in construing the statute's application to past events. ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507.) Nevertheless, the Legislature's expressed views on the prior import of its statutes are entitled to due consideration, and we cannot disregard them. [¶] `[A] subsequent expression of the Legislature as to the intent of the prior statute, although not binding on the court, may properly be used in determining the effect of a prior act.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. ) Section 17000.51 was enacted and became effective as an urgency measure less than two months after the Caulk I decision was filed, and less than nine months after the 1996 amendment to section 17000.5 became effective. Unlike the circumstance in which one Legislature declares the intent of an earlier Legislature's enactment when a gulf of decades separates the two bodies ( Western Security Bank v. Superior Court, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 244, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507), there is no incongruity in our considering the prompt legislative response in the present case. ( Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1119-1121, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 471, 969 P.2d 564 [considering prompt legislative amendment of a statute in response to Court of Appeal decisions].) Nor does section 17000.51 represent a legislative attempt to discard the outcome or readjudicate the merits of a particular judicial proceeding. [T]he Legislature ... does not possess the authority to review or to readjudicate final court judgments on a case-by-case basis. The recognition of such legislative authority would completely deprive court judgments of the respect and deference which the Constitution contemplates each branch of government will accord to final actions within the jurisdiction of a coequal branch, and would repose in the Legislature a combination of powers that the constitutional draftsmen specifically intended to forestall. ( Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531, 549, 174 Cal.Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935, fn. omitted, italics added.) As explained previously, however, the only question before the Court of Appeal and this court is whether the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction. Because injunctive relief operates prospectively, a reviewing court must apply the law in effect at the time its opinion is rendered. ( Oberlander v. County of Contra Costa, supra, 11 Cal.App.4th 535, 538, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 182.) The rationale of this rule is that it would be an idle act for [an appellate court] to determine what the county must do in the future under the law as it used to be but no longer is. ( Ibid.; cf. Kuykendall v. State Bd. of Equalization (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1206-1207, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 783 [If a superior court judgment is not yet final because it is on appeal, the separation of powers doctrine does not prevent the Legislature from changing the law to be applied when the appellate court renders its decision.].) The County acknowledges that the Legislature has the power to alter the provisions of existing law by enacting clarifying legislation. The County contends, however, that section 17000.51 was not adopted for the purpose of affirmatively imposing any standard of aid regarding medical care, but rather solely to ascribe a post hoc legislative intent to section 17000.5. According to the County, the Legislature instead should have amended section 17000.5 to provide that counties must provide medical care in addition to [s]ection 17000.5's monetary grant [or] to expressly provide the monetary grant did not abrogate the counties' duty to provide health care services to the medically indigent. The Legislature's decision to add section 17000.51, instead of amending existing statutes, is understandable, however. Section 17000.5, subdivision (a), already stated: This subdivision is not intended to either limit or expand the extent of the duty of counties to provide health care. The additional provisions proposed by the County would have been redundant. In any event, long ago we rejected an argument  similar to the one advanced by the County and adopted by the Court of Appeal  that a separate legislative enactment that explains the meaning of a statute, rather than amends the original statute, cannot affect the judiciary's interpretation of the law. In Matter of Coburn (1913) 165 Cal. 202, 131 P. 352, we considered a new section in the Code of Civil Procedure defining the term incompetent for purposes of guardianship proceedings. In rejecting a constitutional challenge to the statute, we stated: The first point made against the validity of [the statute] is that the act adding the section to the code is an attempted exercise by the legislative branch of the government of a power belonging exclusively to the judiciary; the power, that is to say, of interpreting a pre-existing statute. The appellant quotes, in support of his position, this passage from [a treatise]: `If the legislature would prescribe a different rule for the future from that which the courts enforce, it must be done by statute and cannot be done by a mandate to the courts which leaves the law unchanged, but seeks to compel the courts to construe and apply it, not according to the judicial, but according to the legislative judgment.' [Citation.] ... The weight of authority supports what we think to be the true rule, i.e., that such declaratory or defining statutes are to be upheld, except with regard to past transactions, as an exercise of the legislative power to enact a law for the future. ( Id. at pp. 209-210,131 P. 352.) We recently reiterated this principle in DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 889 P.2d 1019. In DeVita, the plaintiffs contended that a statute enacted in 1987 should not be considered in construing land-use planning laws enacted by earlier Legislatures. They relied upon Del Costello v. State of California (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 887, 893, footnote 8, 185 Cal.Rptr. 582, which states: The Legislature has no authority to interpret a statute. That is a judicial task. In distinguishing Del Costello, we observed that the Court of Appeal in that case had relied on the obvious proposition that a Legislature could not state definitively the meaning of a statute enacted by a previous Legislature so as to give it retroactive application. Del Costello did not suggest that the Legislature was barred from enacting a statute that would prospectively clarify or supplement a previously enacted statute. [Citation.] ( De-Vita v. County of Napa, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 778, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 699, 889 P.2d 1019, first italics added, second italics in original.) Because all relevant events at issue in DeVita had occurred after the 1987 statute was enacted, we determined that we properly could consider that statute in construing the earlier enacted planning laws. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, even if section 17000.5 were susceptible to the interpretation set forth in Caulk I, the Legislature's enactment of section 17000.51, declaring a different intent regarding section 17000.5, is to be upheld as an exercise of the legislative power to enact a law for the future, and governs here because we are concerned with the propriety of injunctive relief, which operates prospectively. The County contends that, even if section 17000.51 is valid, counties still may limit eligibility for medical care to those individuals eligible for general assistance under section 17000.5. According to the County, section 17000.51 simply clarifies that counties may deduct up to $40 per month from general assistance grants, but that they may not cease providing medical care to general assistance recipients. We disagree with this construction of the statute. Section 17000.51, subdivision (c), states that the 1996 amendment to section 17000.5 was intended only to provide a county ... with the discretion to reduce its general assistance grant level by up to forty dollars ($40) per month. (Italics added.) Because this intention was the only purpose of the amendment, eligibility for medical care pursuant to section 17000 remains unaffected by the amendment. Thus, section 17000.51 confirms that the Legislature's reference to medical care in section 17000.5 does not authorize counties to restrict eligibility for medical care to those individuals eligible for general assistance.