Opinion ID: 4237873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jean’s appeal

Text: Jean appeals only her sentence. We accordingly limit our discussion to her indictment, presentence report (“PSR”), and sentencing.
The same indictment that charged Presendieu also charged Jean with eleven federal offenses relating to her illegal check-cashing activities. In a written plea agreement accompanied by a detailed factual proffer, Jean agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count 1), and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Count 35). In return, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining nine counts against Jean. After a change of plea hearing held on August 6, 2015, the district court accepted Jean’s plea and adjudicated her guilty of Counts 1 and 35.
A probation officer prepared Jean’s PSR, which outlined, inter alia, Jean’s and codefendant Deronceler’s conduct in the check-cashing conspiracy. Jean’s PSR indicated that she was responsible for an intended loss of $193,132.53. That figure included three components: (1) Jean’s presentation of compilation of information that federal judges have found useful for immediate bench or chambers reference in civil and criminal proceedings.” See Federal Judicial Center, Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges (March 1, 2013), available at https://www.fjc.gov/content/bench book-us-district-court-judges-sixth-edition-0. The Benchbook contains sections on such topics as taking guilty pleas. Id. at 63–73. We encourage judges to take advantage of this resource. 27 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 28 of 50 roughly $73,000 in checks to Habib during October and November 2013; 6 (2) Deronceler’s presentation of checks of roughly $36,000 in checks to Habib from October 2013 to early 2014; and (3) Latasha Pharr’s presentation of around $84,000 in checks to Habib from June to October 2014.7 The checks presented by Jean and Deronceler from October 2013 to early 2014 total $109,000. Pursuant to § 2B1.1 of the 2014 Sentencing Guidelines, the PSR assigned Jean a base offense level of seven for Count 1. The PSR also applied these increases: (1) a ten-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(1)(F) because the loss amount was between $120,000 and $200,000; (2) a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) because her offense involved ten or more victims; (3) a twolevel increase under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) because her offense involved sophisticated means; and (4) a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) because her offense involved the production of unauthorized access devices. Jean also received a three-level decrease for acceptance of responsibility and for timely notifying the 6 The PSR refers to three checks from Jean’s “friend Ashley” that Jean presented to Habib to be cashed on October 28, 2013. The PSR does not state the amount of these checks. It appears, though, that the amount of the checks attributable to Ashley is included in Jean’s personal amount of $73,000. 7 The PSR reported that in 2013, Pharr began cashing fraudulent or stolen checks at Kwik Stop. Pharr ceased contact with Habib for a time, but eventually reconnected with Habib in June 2014. At that time, Pharr told Habib that she no longer dealt with Presendieu because he took her checks and kept the money. Between June and October 2014, Pharr cashed several checks with Habib, which totaled approximately $84,000. Jean did not object to the fact that Pharr cashed these illicit checks. As recounted later, Jean objected on the grounds that she never met or dealt with Pharr and did not undertake any activity with Pharr. 28 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 29 of 50 government of her intention to plead guilty. This resulted in a total offense level of 20. As to Jean’s conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud (Count 1), the PSR used her total offense level of 20 and criminal history category of I, yielding an advisory guidelines range of 33 to 41 months. As to her aggravated-identitytheft conviction (Count 35), Jean was subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence of two years’ imprisonment. On October 13, 2015, Jean filed written objections to the PSR, four of which are relevant to this appeal. Jean objected to (1) the calculation of her loss amount, (2) the two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) for sophisticated means, (3) the two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) for production of unauthorized access devices, and (4) the lack of a minor role reduction under § 3B1.2(b). As part of her objections, Jean argued that the PSR “should be amended to reflect that Ms. Jean never met nor dealt with either Ms. Pharr or Mr. Miles.” Jean also objected to the PSR’s use of the 2014 version of the guidelines and contended the 2015 guidelines should be applied as to the loss amount and sophisticated means increases.8 8 As to loss amount, Jean expressly asked for the 2015 guidelines to be applied. As to sophisticated means, Jean claimed she “did not intentionally engage in or cause any conduct arguably constituting sophisticated means.” 29 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 30 of 50
On October 29, 2015, the district court held Jean’s sentencing hearing, and she raised several objections. First, as to her loss amount objection, Jean contended (1) that she ceased participating in the conspiracy in November 2013; (2) that the Pharr checks totaling $84,000 were cashed from June to October 2014; (3) that Pharr’s check-cashing activity thus occurred over eight months after Jean last cashed a check; and (4) that she was unaware of Pharr’s existence until everyone was arrested. As such, Jean argued her “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3 did not include Pharr’s criminal activity. That is because Pharr’s activities between June and October 2014 were allegedly outside the scope of Jean’s criminal activity, were not reasonably foreseeable to Jean, and were not in furtherance of any criminal activity in which Jean jointly participated. In response, the government argued that it was foreseeable to Jean that Habib would continue cashing illicit checks for other persons after Jean stopped participating in the scheme and, thus, that Jean should be held responsible for the $84,000 in checks cashed by Pharr. The district court overruled Jean’s loss amount objection on the grounds that Pharr’s activities were within the scope of the conspiracy and “certainly” foreseeable to Jean. Specifically, the district court found that Jean had “said she had a few partners that had tax fraud things going on” and had “actually introduced other people into the conspiracy.” The district 30 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 31 of 50 court determined that the loss amount in the PSR “reflects both the actual losses attributable to [Jean] as well as losses that were reasonably foreseeable.” Second, as to her sophisticated means objection, the district court found that the bank fraud conspiracy involved sophisticated means, including the creation of tax service companies for processing fraudulent tax returns to obtain United States Treasury checks, the theft of Treasury checks from the mail, and the generation of false identification documents so that Habib could and would cash those unlawfully obtained checks. The district court overruled this objection. Jean asked the district court to apply the 2015 guidelines, effective November 1, 2015, which included an amendment directing the sentencing court to focus more on the individual’s own conduct to determine whether the offense involved sophisticated means. The district court declined to apply the 2015 guidelines because Jean’s offense “took place over a long period of time, ending more than a year ago” in 2013 and because the 2015 guidelines were not effective until November 1, 2015. Alternatively, the district court found that, even under the 2015 guidelines, Jean’s offense “arguably” still satisfied the definition of sophisticated means. The district court stated that “there was an operation here where they had to get false identification documents to mirror what was in the check” and that “Jean was intimately involved with obtaining identifications tailored towards the [recordkeeping] needs [of] Mr. Habib to cash those checks.” 31 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 32 of 50 Third, the district court overruled Jean’s objection to the increase for the production of unauthorized access devices. The district court found that Jean had directed and paid an associate to create identification matching the payee information on the checks she intended to cash. Fourth, the district court denied Jean’s minor role request. The district court emphasized that Jean was being held accountable for only those losses directly attributable to her ($193,132.53), while codefendant Presendieu was responsible for a greater overall loss amount ($2,594,839.33). Jean maintained that she was substantially less culpable than the other participants in the scheme, such as Presendieu and Pharr, whose participation extended much further than Jean’s because they both ran their own fraudulent tax preparation services. The district court responded that, if Jean were being held accountable for the same overall loss amount as Presendieu, then a minor role reduction would be appropriate. But the district court determined that, because Jean was responsible only for “her own actions as opposed to the broader conspiracy,” this fact alone warranted denial of her request for a minor role reduction. As to this sole factor, the district court emphasized that Jean was not being held responsible for the greater loss amount of $2,594,839.33 from the broader conspiracy. The district court adopted the PSR’s guidelines calculations of a total offense level of twenty and a criminal history category of I, resulting in an 32 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 33 of 50 advisory guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment for Count 1. After hearing mitigating evidence, the district court determined that a slight downward variance was appropriate as to Count 1. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Jean to 27 months as to Count 1 and a consecutive 24 months as to Count 35, for a total sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment. The district court ordered Jean to pay $73,635.95 in restitution.
On appeal, Jean contends that the district court erred in calculating her loss amount as $193,132.53 because that sum included the $84,000 from Pharr’s checkcashing activities in 2014 and because Pharr’s conduct was neither within the scope of Jean’s jointly undertaken criminal activity nor reasonably foreseeable. 9 As noted above, the district court applied the 2014 guidelines because Jean’s conduct occurred in 2013, Jean was sentenced on October 29, 2015, and the 2015 guidelines were not effective until November 1, 2015. As to the loss amount, § 2B1.1 provides that a defendant receives an eight-level increase if she is responsible for a loss amount exceeding $70,000 and a ten-level increase for a loss amount exceeding $120,000. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2014). To determine loss amount, 9 We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 711–12 (11th Cir. 2010). We must accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous and give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1330 (11th Cir. 2015). In particular, we review the district court’s calculation of the loss amount for clear error. United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009). 33 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 34 of 50 we look to the defendant’s “relevant conduct.” See id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2014). The text of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) in the 2014 guidelines provides that the defendant’s relevant conduct includes, in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The commentary to § 1B1.3 requires the district court to determine first “the scope of the criminal activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake” in order to determine the relevant conduct for which a defendant may be held responsible. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2014). “[T]he scope of the criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant . . . is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the same for every participant” in the conspiracy. Id. Under the 2014 guidelines, therefore, it was already clear that, for sentencing purposes, a defendant’s relevant conduct extends only as far as the scope of her jointly undertaken criminal activity. See id. “Once a district court makes ‘individualized findings concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken by a particular participant,’ it [then] can determine foreseeability.” United States v. Pierre, 825 F.3d 1183, 1198 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2003)). In 2015, the Sentencing Commission amended § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) to state that, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, a defendant is responsible for 34 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 35 of 50 “all acts and omissions of others that were—(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, (ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and (iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (2015) (emphasis added). The Sentencing Commission explained that this 2015 amendment was intended to “clarify” § 1B1.3 to delineate more clearly the “jointly undertaken criminal activity” analysis by moving the “scope” portion of that inquiry from the commentary to the main text of § 1B1.3. Id. supp. to app. C, amend. 790 (Reason for Amendment). The Sentencing Commission advised that this amendment was “not intended as a substantive change in policy.” Id. Although substantive changes to the guidelines do not apply retroactively, this Court applies clarifying amendments retroactively on appeal regardless of the sentencing date. United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011). Therefore, this 2015 amendment to § 1B1.3 applies to Jean’s sentence. We must first examine the scope of Jean’s jointly undertaken criminal activity. Based on the record, we conclude there is no evidence that Pharr’s activity from June to October 2014 was within the scope of Jean’s jointly undertaken criminal activity. Although Presendieu initially introduced both Jean and Pharr to Habib, Habib later told Jean that he would not work with her if she was still connected to Presendieu. Furthermore, Jean procured her own false 35 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 36 of 50 identification documents to cash her checks, negotiated her own share of the check proceeds directly with Habib, and addressed on her own any problems Habib had with the false identification she provided. Jean’s check cashing with Habib continued through November 2013. Jean did admit that she brought Deronceler into the conspiracy and that she is responsible for checks cashed by Deronceler and her “friend Ashley.” But Jean has consistently asserted that she never met or dealt with Pharr and was unaware of Pharr’s existence during her own crimes. There is no evidence of any contact at all between Pharr and Jean or that Jean knew anything about Pharr or Pharr’s activity. After Jean’s express objection on this point, the government did not present any evidence of any connection or any contact between Jean and Pharr, and Jean’s factual proffer also did not connect Jean to Pharr. Jean’s mere awareness that she was part of a larger check-cashing scheme is alone insufficient to show that Pharr’s criminal activity was within the scope of Jean’s jointly undertaken criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. Because no evidence supports the determination that Pharr’s activity in June to October 2014 was within the scope of Jean’s jointly undertaken criminal activity, the district court clearly erred in holding Jean responsible for the approximately $84,000 of loss incurred as a result of Pharr’s independent check-cashing activity. 36 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 37 of 50 As such, we vacate Jean’s sentence and remand for resentencing. At sentencing the parties agreed that, without the amount attributable to Pharr, the loss amount was approximately $109,000, which consisted of the amounts of the checks cashed by Jean herself and Deronceler, whom she brought into the conspiracy. 10 Therefore, on remand, the district court shall use this $109,000 as the loss amount, recalculate Jean’s advisory guidelines range, and resentence Jean. E. Increase for Unauthorized or Counterfeit Access Device Jean argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) for the production of counterfeit or unauthorized access devices. We review the relevant guidelines and then Jean’s arguments.11 Under § 2B1.1, a defendant’s offense level is increased by two if the offense involved “the production or trafficking of any . . . unauthorized access device or counterfeit access device.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) (2014). The term “access device” includes “any card, . . . account number, . . . personal identification number, . . . or other means of account access that can be used . . . to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1029(e)(1). The parties 10 As noted earlier, the checks attributable to Jean’s “friend Ashley” were included in Jean’s personal amount of $73,000, whereas Deronceler’s checks were appropriately added to Jean’s total loss amount. 11 We review for clear error the district court’s factual determinations as to whether the defendant induced or willfully caused the production of an unauthorized access device. See United States v. Taylor, 818 F.3d 671, 673, 680 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 387 (2016) (mem.). 37 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 38 of 50 agree that Jean used unauthorized or counterfeit access devices, such as personal identification cards, in the course of her offense conduct of obtaining money. The parties dispute whether Jean was involved in the production of such access devices. When a defendant, such as Jean, is separately convicted of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, the application of the two-level increase for production of such access devices under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) is limited. Pursuant to § 2B1.6 of the guidelines, where the defendant is separately convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, the two-level increase under § 2B1.1 does not apply when the defendant’s conduct is limited to the mere “transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6 cmt. n.2 (2014). As this Court has recognized, “[t]his [§ 2B1.6] limitation is particularly relevant to § 2B1.1 because ‘means of identification’ may include access devices.’” United States v. Taylor, 818 F.3d 671, 675 (11th Cir.), cert denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 387 (2016) (mem.). The § 2B1.6 limitation is intended to prevent a defendant who is separately convicted of aggravated identity theft from being “doubly penalized” for the same conduct. Id. Notwithstanding the § 2B1.6 limitation, a defendant who is separately convicted of aggravated identity theft can still receive the two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i) if her offense conduct involved the production of an unauthorized or counterfeit access device. Id. at 676. As construed by this Court, 38 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 39 of 50 “production” encompasses a broad range of conduct, including where the defendant “willfully causes the ‘manufacture, design, alteration, authentication, duplication, or assembly’ of an unauthorized access device.” Id. at 679 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt n.10(A). It follows that “the production enhancement is applicable to conduct involving third-party production—whether physically performed by a criminal co-conspirator or by an innocent party—that has been willfully induced by the defendant.” Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if Jean’s conduct involved the production of personal identification cards, then the district court correctly applied this two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). As established in her factual proffer, Jean’s conduct did involve the production of false identification cards, and so we conclude that the district court did not err in applying this two-level increase. For certain checks listed in the proffer, Jean provided to Habib counterfeit identification cards matching the named payee. For other checks, Jean assured Habib that she would provide “the right information for the checks and correct identification.” Jean also used social security numbers and assured Habib that the social security numbers she used were accurate. Jean admitted she “pays people for checks and identification.” In the proffer, Jean discussed at least twice “her source for identification documents.” Jean admitted she had “an ID guy who gets ID’s to her so that nothing can be traced.” Jean also admitted her ID guy had returned to Pakistan, 39 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 40 of 50 but stated that she would bring the correct identification for checks. When Habib remarked that the picture on one of the identification cards had been used before, Jean responded that “she [did] not think her ID people” would use a duplicate photo because “it would be dumb.” The evidence amply shows that Jean willfully procured, induced, and caused the manufacture, duplication, or assembly of counterfeit identification cards that matched the payees on her checks. See Taylor, 818 F.3d at 679. We conclude the district court did not err in applying the two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). F. Sophisticated Means Increase Jean also challenges the district court’s application of a two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) for the use of sophisticated means. 12 Under the 2014 guidelines, a defendant receives a two-level increase if, among other things, the offense “involved sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (2014). The guidelines provide that each action by the defendant need not be sophisticated in order to support the two-level increase, so long as the “totality of the scheme was sophisticated.” Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1199. The commentary to § 2B1.1 defines “sophisticated means” as “especially 12 The district court’s finding that sophisticated means were used is a finding of fact that is reviewed for clear error. Barrington, 648 F.3d at 1199. 40 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 41 of 50 complex or especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9(B) (2014). Examples of sophisticated means listed in the commentary include “hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts.” Id. Jean contends that Amendment 792 to § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), which became effective on November 1, 2015, three days after her sentencing hearing, should apply to her sentence. Amendment 792 provides that the two-level increase applies if the offense “involved sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) (2015) (emphasis added). This latter phrase was added to the text of the guideline. However, Amendment 792 does not apply to Jean’s case because it is a substantive amendment. Jerchower, 631 F.3d at 1184 (holding that only clarifying amendments apply retroactively). First, the amendment added a new requirement to the text of the guidelines that was not previously in either the commentary or the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 792. Second, the commentary acknowledges that Amendment 792 “narrow[ed]” the scope of the offense characteristic. U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 792 (Reason for Amendment). Third, the amendment does not appear in the list of amendments made retroactive 41 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 42 of 50 in § 1B1.10(d). Id. § 1B1.10(d) (2015). Fourth, the amendment overturns circuit precedent that “had applied this enhancement on the basis of the sophistication of the overall scheme without a determination of whether the defendant’s own conduct was ‘sophisticated,’” U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 792 (Reason for Amendment), which also suggests a substantive change, see Jerchower, 631 F.3d at 1185. Here, applying the 2014 guidelines, we conclude that the record supports the district court’s finding that Jean’s offense involved sophisticated means. As admitted in the factual proffer, Jean herself employed intricate measures to execute and then conceal her bank fraud. Jean unlawfully procured checks payable to others and acquired false identification cards tailored to each check to satisfy Habib’s documentation requirements. Jean assured Habib that the fraudulent identification she provided was untraceable. Furthermore, Jean procured these illicit checks from tax return companies organized for the purpose of filing fraudulent tax returns. In the factual proffer, Jean admitted telling Habib that she had a few partners engaged in tax fraud, that “she gets mainly government checks and gets cashier’s checks around tax season time,” that she “does $20-30,000 every week” in checks, and that she expected to have “a load of checks to cash” in December and January from a “tax season company.” Jean also indicated to Habib 42 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 43 of 50 that she could ensure that the identification information she provided to accompany her checks was accurate. On the record before it, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Jean’s offense involved sophisticated means and in imposing the two-level increase under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). G. Minor Role Reduction Jean also argues that the district court erred in denying her request for a minor role reduction under § 3B1.2(b). 13 Section 3B1.2 provides for a two-level reduction in the offense level where the defendant was a “minor participant” in the criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) (2014). A minor participant is a one “who is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id. § 3B1.2(b) cmt. n.5 (2014). Whether a defendant is entitled to a minor role reduction is “based on the totality of the circumstances and involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.” Id. § 3B1.2(b) cmt. n.3(C). Two principles guide the determination of whether a defendant played a minor role in the criminal scheme: (1) “the defendant’s role in the relevant 13 As to the extent of the defendant’s role in the offense, we also review for clear error. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). 43 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 44 of 50 conduct for which she has been held accountable at sentencing,” and (2) “her role as compared to that of other participants in her relevant conduct.” United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 940 (11th Cir 1999) (en banc). The en banc Court in De Varon emphasized the fact-intensive nature of this inquiry, stressing the importance of considering a number of factors relevant to the particular criminal scheme at issue. Id. at 943–45. The proponent of the minor role reduction—here, Jean—bears the burden of proving that she played a minor role by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 939. In 2015, the Sentencing Commission amended § 3B1.2’s commentary to provide additional guidance regarding the minor role reduction. See U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 794 (Reason for Amendment). This Court has already held that Amendment 794 is a clarifying amendment, did not substantively change § 3B1.2, and thus can be considered regardless of a defendant’s sentencing date. See United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1194 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1435 (2017) (mem.). Similar to the fact-intensive, multi-faceted approach this Court established in De Varon, Amendment 794 provides a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered when determining whether a defendant qualifies for a minor role reduction: (1) “the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity;” (2) “the degree to which the defendant 44 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 45 of 50 participated in planning or organizing the criminal activity;” (3) “the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-making authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority;” (4) “the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation in the commission of the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant performed and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in performing those acts;” and (5) “the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B.1.2 cmt. n.3(C) (2015). Our recent decision in Cruickshank is instructive here because it explained the legal error in making a minor role decision based solely on one factor. In Cruickshank, the defendant was convicted of transporting a large amount of cocaine aboard a seafaring vessel. 837 F.3d at 1186–87. The district court suggested that the amount of drugs at issue was so large that no participant in the scheme could be eligible for a minor role reduction. Id. at 1194–95. In vacating the defendant’s sentence in Cruickshank, the Court stated that, although neither De Varon nor Amendment 794 precluded the district court from considering the overall amount of drugs to determine the magnitude of the defendant’s role, it was legal error for the district court “to say that this is the only factor to be considered in a case like this one.” Id. at 1195. This Court directed the district court on remand to consider the defendant’s role in the scheme “based 45 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 46 of 50 on the totality of circumstances, taking into account the variety of factors laid out in De Varon and Amendment 794.” Id. Similarly, here the district court indicated that Jean was not entitled to a minor role reduction solely on the ground that she was being held accountable only for “her own actions as opposed to the broader conspiracy.” While that is not an impermissible factor, it is only one of many relevant factors. And, there is conflicting evidence regarding the scope of Jean’s role as compared with the other participants in this criminal scheme. On the one hand, Jean described herself as a boss with independent access to unlawful checks and false identification cards and negotiated her own share of the illicit checks she cashed with Habib. On the other hand, unlike Presendieu and Pharr, who actually formed and operated their own tax return companies, Jean claimed that she paid others for her checks and told Habib that Deronceler was in fact her boss. The evidence is simply conflicting as to Jean’s role, requiring some fact findings. On remand, the district court should examine Jean’s role in the overall scheme in light of the relevant factors and the totality of the circumstances. This Court’s decision is not a determination as to Jean’s ultimate entitlement to a minor role adjustment, but rather only a direction to the district court to make the requisite factual findings in regard to the other relevant factors beyond loss amount. 46 Case: 15-14830 Date Filed: 01/19/2018 Page: 47 of 50