Opinion ID: 2318562
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Huntington's Elaborated Argument

Text: Huntington avers that the relevant statutory scheme installed by the General Assembly bestowed the MIA with primary jurisdiction over Carter's money had and received/statutory violation claim. In Zappone v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 349 Md. 45, 706 A.2d 1060 (1998), we held that, where the Legislature provides [(1)] an administrative and judicial review remedy ... and [(2)] a possible alternative judicial remedy for a particular matter or matters, we must determine whether it intended the agency to have exclusive, primary, or concurrent jurisdiction. Zappone, 349 Md. at 60, 706 A.2d at 1067. [T]he administrative remedy may be exclusive, thus precluding any resort to an alternative remedy. Under this scenario, there simply is no alternative cause of action for matters covered by the statutory administrative remedy.    [T]he administrative remedy may be primary but not exclusive. In this situation, a claimant must invoke and exhaust the administrative remedy, and seek judicial review of an adverse administrative decision, before a court can properly adjudicate the merits of the alternative judicial remedy.    [T]he administrative remedy and the alternative judicial remedy may be fully concurrent, with neither remedy being primary, and the plaintiff at his or her option may pursue the judicial remedy without the necessity of invoking and exhausting the administrative remedy. Zappone, 349 Md. at 60-61, 706 A.2d at 1067-68 (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted). [I]n the absence of specific statutory language indicating otherwise, there is a rebuttable presumption that... an administrative remedy was intended to be primary. Bell Atlantic of Md., Inc. v. Intercom Sys. Corp., 366 Md. 1, 12, 782 A.2d 791, 797 (2001). In deciding whether this presumption prevails in a particular context, we weigh at least four germane factors, including: the comprehensiveness of the administrative remedy, the agency's view of its own jurisdiction, the claim's depeden[ce] upon the statutory scheme which also contains the administrative remedy, and the claim's dependen[ce] upon the agency's expertise. Zappone, 349 Md. at 64-66, 706 A.2d at 1070. Huntington asserts that [a]ll of the[se]... factors are met in this case. The Insurance Article prescribes a comprehensive administrative remedy, or so Huntington concludes §§ 4-113(b), (d)(1), and (d)(2) authoriz[e] the suspension of the certificate of authority, [the] imposi[tion of] penalties and [the] requir[ement of] restitution to any person who has suffered financial injury as a result of any violation[]. Moreover, the MIA views its jurisdiction as concurrent only where the plaintiff has a common law claim purely, which is not the case here. Huntington argues also that Carter's cause of action is wholly dependent on ... the Maryland Insurance [Article], a fact made explicit by Carter's repeated invocations of the Article in his complaint. But for the insurance statute, Huntington asseverates, Carter's claim would not exist. Lastly, Huntington declares that the proper analysis of the merits of Carter's cause of action would benefit from the application of the MIA's expertise. Huntington posits that such expertise is important in deciding whether there was a statutory violation[,] whether Carter is correctly interpreting the rate structure that was filed with the MIA[,] whether there was any [willful] intent to commit a statutory violation, as per § 27-216, and what should be the proper remedy if there was a statutory violation. At oral argument, we questioned whether the agency's expertise was an important factor in parsing Carter's claim because the Stewart Manual of Charges outlines straightforwardly, or so it seems, the criteria that dictate (1) whether a consumer qualifies for the reissue rate, and (2) consequently, whether Huntington violated the statute by charging the higher original rate. Huntington cautioned us at oral argument as follows: [Huntington]: There are numerous factors, starting with the language itself in the statute, that expertise [must] be applied to, [that] determine whether someone gets the discount rate. It is not automatic. It is not just a situation where if you had an original title insurance policy and you refinance in ten years, [you] automatically get the discount rate.... [The Court]: Can you show us the filing [with the Insurance Commissioner] where it makes it clear that it's not automatic.... [Huntington]: Well, the language of the statute ... talks about willfullness number one. That goes to intent.... [The Court]: Well, we're really not concerned with willfullness in a money had and received claim. [Huntington]: Well, let me continue.... There [are] multiple situations ... where one would not get the discount rate depending on intervening events. [The Court]: What I'm asking you is while you're arguing, it's nice if we could have before us what your basis is for saying that it's not cut and dry because it sure seems cut and dry.... [Huntington]: Well.... The good news is we won on a motion to dismiss. The bad news is there was no discovery, no record in this case that I could invite your Honor's attention to that has that data in it. For example, if someone where deposed in the case, they would say ... that if a husband and wife get married and they have a title insurance policy and they get divorced later on within five years and a new wife gets on the policy, that does not mean you get the automatic rate because the risk has changed.    [The Court]: But all that stuff is set up when you file your rates, is it not? [Huntington]: No. There is a Manual [of Charges], part of which is in the record, which talks about the various factors about whether you qualify. If one starts with the statute, it says if you qualify for this reduced rate, then you get it. The word qualification is a matter that is within the ken of the Maryland Insurance Administration because whether you qualify or not depends on whether there was a change in title during the ten years.    [Huntington]: [Y]ou have to have people that are identical owners, policy number one, and then ten years later, the same persons. In support of all of its contentions, Huntington relies heavily upon the reasoning of the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion in Arthur v. Ticor Title Insurance Co. of Florida, 569 F.3d 154 (4th Cir.2009). Considering nearly identical alleged facts and legal issues as those in the present case, the Arthur Court determined that a consumer's money had and received/statutory violation claim: (1) could access the same remed[ies] before the [Maryland Insurance] Commissioner that they seek [in federal court], (2) explicitly depends on the statute that also [contains] administrative remedies, and (3) implicates the expertise of the Maryland Insurance Commissioner.... Arthur, 569 F.3d at 161-62. Huntington concludes, therefore, that Carter is obliged to engage first the agency adjudicatory apparatus.