Opinion ID: 1826624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: pip benefits: the van

Text: The defendant argues at length that § 3111 of the no-fault act applies to the current situation because it concerns accidents occurring out of state: Personal protection insurance benefits are payable for accidental bodily injury suffered in an accident occurring out of this state, if the accident occurs within the United States, its territories and possessions or in Canada, and the person whose injury is the basis of the claim was at the time of the accident a named insured under a personal protection insurance policy, his spouse, a relative of either domiciled in the same household or an occupant of a vehicle involved in the accident whose owner or registrant was insured under a personal protection insurance policy or has provided security approved by the secretary of state under subsection (4) of section 3101. [MCL 500.3111; MSA 24.13111. Emphasis added.] Neither the Court of Appeals nor the trial court discussed this section in resolving the present case. The plaintiff's brief, without explanation, simply states: The Court of Appeals was correct in not discussing MCL 500.3111 [MSA 24.13111]. It was not applicable to this lawsuit. We cannot agree. The basic facts of this case are not in dispute, and it is clear the accident occurred in Ohio. Therefore, § 3111 directly applies, placing its interpretation at issue. [5] A careful reading of § 3111 demonstrates that, in order to recover the plaintiff must establish a number of criteria, only two of which are at issue. The plaintiff must show that he is 1) an occupant 2) of a vehicle involved in the accident. [6] A negative answer to either question would dispose of the issue; however, because the definition of occupant has been the source of many disputes and has caused as many courts to agonize over what that definition should be, we are determined to resolve the confusion. [7] In Nickerson, supra, a pre-no-fault case, the plaintiff was a passenger in an insured automobile operated in Davison, Michigan. The car became disabled, and the occupants, while waiting for assistance, were standing outside of the vehicle. An uninsured vehicle struck the disabled vehicle from behind, pushing it into the plaintiff and causing serious injury. Id. at 326. The terms of the disabled vehicle's insurance policy provided the plaintiff with uninsured motorist benefits only if he was occupying the insured automobile. Id. at 328. In interpreting the policy's definition of occupying: in or upon or entering into or alighting from, this Court held that the plaintiff, because he was occupying the insured vehicle immediately before the accident and because his subsequent injury arose out of its use or repair, was entitled to uninsured motorist protection. Id. at 328, 331-332. While Nickerson was based on pre-no-fault law, the occupant issue was raised again in the context of the no-fault act in Royal Globe, supra . In that case, the driver stopped in the driveway while his spouse got out of the vehicle and proceeded to walk through the garage to enter the house. When the driver began backing the vehicle into the garage it accidentally accelerated, striking the driver's spouse. The dispute was between two insurance companies to determine which was responsible for paying no-fault benefits. Resolution of the case turned on whether the injured party was an occupant of the vehicle involved in the accident as that term is used in the no-fault act. Royal Globe at 567-569. In holding that Nickerson did not control the Royal Globe decision, this Court distinguished Nickerson in a number of ways  the most significant of which was the simple fact that Nickerson was a pre-no-fault act case and, thus, only required an interpretation of the insurance policy. [8] Id. at 572-573. We stated: It is a familiar and fundamental rule of construction of a private automobile insurance policy that the court's first duty is to determine, from the language used, the apparent intention of the contracting parties, and then to construe doubtful or ambiguous terms favorably to the insured and against the insurer as the contract drafter. The language of a statute, on the other hand, is required to be construed by assigning to the words used their primary and generally understood meaning consistent with the apparent intention of the Legislature in enacting the law. [ Id. at 573. Citations omitted.] Furthermore, we opined that if this Court had not found Nickerson to be an occupant of the Parvin vehicle, Nickerson would have had no recovery for his injuries under the insurance policy since the vehicle which caused his injuries was uninsured. Id. at 574. In deciding to follow Nickerson in this case, the Court of Appeals failed to acknowledge the significance of the adoption of the no-fault act, which was passed in the time between the Nickerson and Royal Globe decisions. It also overlooked that by the terms of the no-fault act, essentially all accidents are now covered by personal injury protection benefits or the assigned claims plan. Therefore, the repeal of the uninsured motorist statute and passage of the no-fault act largely eliminated the motivating factors underlying the Nickerson decision. [9] See Bradley v Mid-Century Ins Co, 409 Mich 1, 52-54; 294 NW2d 141 (1980) (Justice LEVIN writing for the Court), and Lankford v Citizens Ins Co, 171 Mich App 413, 420; 431 NW2d 59 (1988). Furthermore, we determined in Royal Globe that the purposes of the no-fault act would be better served by the certainty and predictability that a literal construction of the word `occupant' will yield, when it is assigned its primary and generally understood meaning. Id. at 575. Therefore, we reaffirm our decision in Royal Globe that our task is to interpret the statute and not the policy. Where insurance policy coverage is directed by the no-fault act and the language in the policy is intended to be consistent with that act, the language should be interpreted in a consistent fashion, which can only be accomplished by interpreting the statute, rather than individual policies. [10] The question is whether, for purposes of PIP benefits, the plaintiff was an occupant of the van, as that term is used in § 3111, when the accident occurred. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was attempting to right the overturned and disconnected trailer some ten to twenty feet away from the van from which he had departed. As we said in Royal Globe, Whatever her status was after she left the motor vehicle in the street and walked some 60 feet to the rear of the garage where the Pontiac struck her, [she] was `not an occupant' of the vehicle when she was injured. Id. at 576. Although the no-fault act does not define the terms occupant or occupying, other sections of the act provide guidance in determining its meaning. Subsection 3106(1)(c) of the act states in part: Accidental bodily injury does not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance, or use of a parked vehicle as a motor vehicle unless ... the injury was sustained by a person while occupying, entering into, or alighting from the vehicle. [Emphasis added.] The Legislature expressly recognized that entering into and alighting from are acts separate from occupying a vehicle. See Royal Globe, supra at 574, n 5. Section 3111 does not include entering into or alighting from the vehicle as acts that would trigger personal protection benefits for an out-of-state accident. By giving the term occupant its primary and generally understood meaning coupled with the above statutory reference, we conclude that the plaintiff was not an occupant of the van because he was not physically inside the van when the accident occurred. We find this interpretation consistent with our Royal Globe decision and the intent of the no-fault act. [11]