Opinion ID: 853063
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defining Characteristics and Justifying Characteristics

Text: We agree with the view that a statute with a population category is a special law if it is designed to operate upon or benefit only particular municipalities and thus is essentially no different than if the statute had identified the particular municipalities by name. City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143, 148 (Fla.2002). Moseley, Hoovler, and Williams clearly implied that those pieces of legislation would have been permissible under Article IV if they had identified the affected counties by name. Indeed, Article IV issues will be simplified if that is done, accompanied by legislative findings as to the facts justifying the legislation's limited territorial application. Legislation applying by its terms to areas with identified characteristics would be equally permissible under Article IV. The statute in Hoovler defined the class of counties to which it applied in terms of population. The opinion justified the classification in terms of the presence vel non of a county's exposure to Superfund liability. Moseley, on the other hand, addressed a statute whose defining characteristics were in part those justifying the classification (bodies of water) and in part population parameters that only Lake County met. Thus its defining characteristics were only partially those that justified the classification, and, like Hoovler, judicial notice of the geography and municipalities in Lake County was necessary to justify the classification. Finally, in Williams, Lake County was identified by name, and its characteristics justifying the legislation were judicially noticed. In some other legislation that has been challenged under Article IV, the characteristics defining the applicable counties are also those that justify the legislation. Thus, in Dortch, a city of the first class in a county was properly thought to justify countywide government. This form of classification is more elegant because it avoids the messiness created by potential entrants (new Superfund sites) or exits (park districts in counties growing out of population parameters) over time. Despite these potential issues, Hoovler made clear that a defining characteristic (a population category) that is theoretically unrelated to the justifying characteristic (Superfund liability) is nevertheless permissible if, under the facts as they are at the time of passage, only justified areas are defined into the class. This is defensible because the perceived evils of special legislation in the absence of special circumstances are largely avoided if the affected area is indeed the only part of the state where the statute has practical effect. In sum, if there are characteristics of the locality that distinguish it for purposes of the legislation, and the legislation identifies the locality, it is special legislation. The identification of the locality may be by name (Tippecanoe County), by the characteristic that justifies special legislation (a unique Superfund liability), or otherwise (population parameters that include only the locality).