Opinion ID: 1207992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retaliation Under USERRA

Text: We turn to Crews's claim that the defendants retaliated against him for voicing his opposition to the rescission of the work scheduling policy. In addition to protecting against discrimination on the basis of service membership, § 4311 prohibits an employer from taking any adverse employment action against any person because such person ... has taken an action to enforce a protection provided by USERRA. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b)(1). Although we have not previously discussed the statute's adverse employment action requirement in the specific context of a USERRA retaliation claim, our case law on other civil rights statutes describes those employment actions that are sufficiently adverse to be actionable retaliation. An adverse employment action must be materially adverse, not merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities. Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir.2004). An adverse employment action is one that significantly alters the terms and conditions of the employee's job. Id. Materially adverse actions include termination, demotion accompanied by a decrease in pay, or a material loss of benefits or responsibilities, but do not include everything that makes an employee unhappy. Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 986 (7th Cir.2008) (quotation omitted). There is no reason to understand adverse employment action differently in the USERRA context. Echoing an argument made in support of his denial-of-benefit claim, Crews argues that applying the materially adverse standard from other civil rights statutes to his USERRA retaliation claim fails to appreciate the different purposes of USERRA and conventional civil rights laws. However, we have previously stated in a USERRA case that actionable discrimination must involve a materially adverse employment action, which is something more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Nichols v. S. Ill. Univ.Edwardsville, 510 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir.2007)). Although Maher involved a claim of discrimination, we see no reason to dispense with the materiality requirement in retaliation cases. Requiring material adversity for both types of claims is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006), in which the Court established the standard for retaliation claims under Title VII. The Court concluded that, although the retaliatory actions prohibited by Title VII are not limited to harms that are employment-related or that occur in the workplace, the action must nonetheless be materially adverse, such that it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Id. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quotation omitted). Requiring  material adversity is important, the Court continued, to discourage civil rights litigation over trivial harms. Id. In line with Burlington, we do not think that the protections of USERRA are so sweeping as to provide a remedy for mere trivial harms. That is especially true since textual differences between the anti-retaliation provisions of Title VII and USERRA suggest that the latter has a more limited scope. In concluding that the retaliatory actions prohibited by Title VII are not confined to employment-related harms, the Court in Burlington compared the language of Title VII's antidiscrimination provision with the language of the anti-retaliation provision. Id. at 62, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Unlike the conduct prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision, which must affect an employee's conditions of employment, the conduct reached by the anti-retaliation provision is not qualified in terms of employment. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), e-3(a)). No comparable textual distinction exists between USERRA's anti-discrimination provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a), and the anti-retaliation provision, id. § 4311(b), both of which address only actions affecting employment. Applying the materially adverse standard to Crews's claim, it is clear that Crews suffered no actionable retaliation. Crews first points to disparaging comments that Chief Mendenall made to the press about Crews's USERRA law-suit. However, negative employer comments will support a retaliation claim only if they are severe and pervasive. Griffin, 356 F.3d at 829. The plaintiff must show more than petty slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees experience. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Here, the purportedly disparaging comments cited by Crews are nothing more than Mendenall's statements to the media that Crews's USERRA lawsuit had no merit and that his allegations were simply untrue. These isolated comments, which occurred outside the work-place and had no impact on Crews's conditions of employment, are not severe enough to be actionable retaliation. See Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 981-82 (7th Cir.2008) (concluding that a supervisor's comments that expressed frustration with employees' taking medical leave, but that resulted in no loss of job benefits, were not materially adverse); Griffin, 356 F.3d at 829-30 (finding that a supervisor's comments at staff meetings that the plaintiff was a bad influence and know-it-all were not actionable retaliation); cf. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir.1996) (concluding that negative employer evaluations, even if undeserved, were not alone sufficient to show an adverse employment action). Crews also contends that the defendants engaged in retaliation by refusing to allow him to attend FTO classes following his promotion to corporal, thereby denying him advancement opportunities. However, the record establishes that the Department did not approve FTO classes for corporals and higher-ranking officers. Deichman testified that the job of a corporal, which involves much time in the office handling administrative matters and little time in the actual field, does not lend itself to providing field training to new recruits. Crews also acknowledged that he was unaware of Deichman ever approving FTO training for corporals. The undisputed evidence also indicates that Crews received alternative, non-FTO training commensurate with his corporal rank. Crews testified that he attended classes in first line leader management and critical incident management, instruction geared toward officers who fulfill a more supervisory role. A log prepared by Deichman also indicated that Crews had completed the third-highest amount of command staff training hours for the period between May 2005 and December 2006a significant accomplishment, since Crews, having been promoted to corporal in May 2006, was only a command officer for about a third of that period. The Department did not deny Crews training opportunities, and we do not see how changing the specific classes offered based on the officer's rank would dissuade a reasonable employee from asserting his USERRA rights. Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Accordingly, Crews has failed to establish a materially adverse employment action, and the district court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants on Crews's retaliation claim.