Opinion ID: 2251340
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Initial Hearing

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold an initial hearing on the habitual offender count. Consequently, he was not afforded an opportunity to enter a plea. He maintains that he was not provided with sufficient notice of the habitual offender charge and thus was unable to properly and adequately prepare a defense for the habitual offender hearing which was held on February 13, 1984. The State filed the habitual offender count three days before the scheduled trial date of February 6, 1984. On February 6, 1984, appellant responded by filing a motion in limine which sought to prohibit testimony about his prior convictions during the first phase of his bifurcated trial since he was also charged with being an habitual offender. This motion listed the same prior convictions which the State alleged in the habitual offender count. At an arraignment the accused is brought before the court, notified of the charges against him, and then asked for his plea. Bradford v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 250. Notification of the charges is usually achieved by reading the information or indictment to the accused. While arraignment is an appropriate procedure for habitual offender counts, the failure to arraign one charged as an habitual offender does not present grounds for reversal in the absence of prejudice. Edwards v. State (1985), Ind., 479 N.E.2d 541. In this case, Shelton had notice of the habitual offender count prior to trial. He was informed ten days prior to the habitual offender hearing of the prior convictions which the State intended to prove at these proceedings. Had this time period been deemed inadequate, he could have moved for a continuance of the second phase of his bifurcated trial. Shelton has failed to show how he was harmed by the failure to hold an initial hearing.