Opinion ID: 795275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Size of the Attorneys' Fee Award Was Reasonable

Text: 195 Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the size of the district court's award of fees was unreasonable. MTA submitted monthly invoices with hourly accountings accompanied by attorney hourly rate charges. MTA's total amount requested was approximately $166,000. The district court found these charges reasonable. Lafayette, however, submitted only a total amount and an accompanying affidavit attesting to the amount's reasonableness. Lafayette requested a total amount of about $75,000. The district court likewise found this amount reasonable. Concluding that Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel unnecessarily expanded the scope and complexity of the ERISA action by approximately 50 percent, the district court ordered Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel held jointly and severally liable for 50 percent of both MTA's and Lafayette's submitted fees. 196 Plaintiff points to no portion of the bill submitted by MTA which Plaintiff avers represents an unreasonable charge. Rather, Plaintiff argues only that the district court failed to give the matter careful analysis and make discrete findings as required for a § 1927 sanction. We disagree. The district court held counsel jointly responsible for the same conduct which underpinned the court's award of attorneys' fees against Plaintiff, conduct which the district court referenced in the memorandum of opinion accompanying the order awarding fees. 6 We therefore find the district court's award of 50 percent of Lafayette and MTA's attorneys' fees a reasonable award, pursuant to the district court's factual findings that Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel unreasonably multiplied the litigation by the same amount. We believe the district court's findings satisfied this Court's instructions that trial courts provide clear and concise explanation[s] of [their] reasons for awarding attorneys' fees. Gettings v. Bldg. Laborers Local 310, 349 F.3d 300, 310 (6th Cir.2003). 197 Plaintiff further argues, in a perfunctory way, that the district court erred in awarding fees to Lafayette when Lafayette had yet to submit detailed hourly charges constituting a breakdown of its fees. 7 Plaintiff argues only that such documentation would be a logical prerequisite to establishing `reasonableness' under § 1927. (Pl.Br.67.) Plaintiff fails to support this statement with any case law, and further fails to cite to any relevant legal authority which requires this Court to overturn a district court's award of attorneys' fees in the absence of an hourly bill. Plaintiff's one sentence argument to this effect is therefore insufficient to preserve this argument on appeal. [The courts of appeals] are not self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties. See Cruz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 356 F.3d 320, 333-34 (D.C.Cir.2004); Indeck Energy Servs., Inc. v. Consumers Energy Co., 250 F.3d 972, 979 (6th Cir.2000) ([I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. (internal quotation and citation omitted)); see also Re/Max North Central, Inc. v. Cook, 64 Fed.Appx. 562, 565 (7th Cir.2003) (finding party's arguments as to attorneys' fees waived for lack of development on appeal); cf. Taubenfeld v. AON Corp., 415 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir.2005) (applying waiver analysis to party's allegations of lower court error in the award of attorneys' fees); Griggs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 454 (4th Cir.2004) (same). Plaintiff's perfunctory argument and failure to elucidate relevant case law therefore amounts to a waiver of this argument on appeal. 198 6. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in the Amount of Fees Awarded to Lafayette 199 Lafayette cross-appeals the district court's award of its attorneys' fees as too low. Inasmuch as the amount awarded by the district court was premised on the amount submitted by Lafayette, and the fact the Plaintiff's claim for benefits was at least colorable as against Lafayette, we find that this cross-appeal is without merit. III.