Opinion ID: 1541730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Quasi-Bailment.

Text: The towing companies became bailees of appellants' vehicles when they took possession of them in expectation of compensation. See First Am. Bank, supra, 583 A.2d at 996. This is so even absent an explicit agreement: [a]ll that is required is the existence of a mutual benefit. Id. This court has termed such a relationship a quasi -bailment. See id. Because of this relationship, the towing companies, as bailees, owed the appellants a duty to exercise ordinary care in the towing and impoundment of the appellants' vehicles. See id. at 997. Relying on First American Bank, appellants argue that a towing company's duty to exercise ordinary care necessarily includes a duty to notify a vehicle owner of impoundment. But First American Bank did not involve a lack of notice. Rather, there, the appellant witnessed the towing and attempted to stop it. See id. at 995. And the issue in First American Bank was whether the defendants were liable for the disappearance of a money bag that had been inside the vehicle. Although First American Bank holds that companies must exercise ordinary care to safeguard vehicles in their possession, it is silent on the issue of notice. Nor do appellants fare better by citing Wisconsin Ave. Sunoco v. Boone, a case from the District of Columbia Small Claims Court. See 126 D.W.L.R. 1729 (D.C.Super.Ct.Sm.Cl., Sept. 14, 1998) [ Boone ]. Similar to this case, in Boone, the vehicle owner's car was stolen, he reported the theft to the police, and MPD recovered the vehicle and requested impoundment. Neither MPD nor the towing company notified Boone of the recovery or impoundment for seven months, and the towing company billed Boone $3,254.64 for towing and storage. 126 D.W.L.R. at 1729, 1731. Yet, unlike this case, the District and the towing company had entered into an express contract, imposing certain duties on the towing company, such as, [p]rior to providing any service[,] each tow truck operat[or] shall inform the owner or operator of the vehicle of all charges associated with the desired service(s). . . . Id. at 1729. Based on this contract, the court concluded that the towing company shared MPD's responsibility to notify. Id. at 1732. Here, there is no express contract between the towing companies and the District and thus no expression of a shared responsibility. [15] Appellants dispute this distinction, arguing that the towing companies have an implied contractual relationship with the District. Because the companies and the District mutually benefit from their relationship  the companies gain business almost exclusively through the District, while the District benefits by not having to impound vehicles  appellants' argument is not without merit. But the critical distinction between this case and Boone is not that Boone involved an express contract, it is that the contract in Boone contained express provisions that required the towing company to apprise the vehicle owner of all charges before providing any service. Absent such an express provision here, appellants bore the burden of adducing evidence showing that the towing companies were obligated to provide notice of impoundment. Appellants attempted to present such testimony through the expert testimony of Brian Albrite, a Virginia towing company owner. In deposition, Mr. Albrite opined that towing operators have a duty to notify owners that their vehicles are being held. He could not, however, base his opinion on any D.C. statute or regulation. And he conceded that he was unfamiliar with D.C. laws and regulations regarding towing. For these reasons, the trial court rejected his expert testimony. Whether a witness possesses the requisite qualifications to express an opinion on a particular subject is within the trial court's discretion, and its decision in that regard will only be reversed for an abuse. Jung v. George Washington Univ., 875 A.2d 95, 105 (D.C.2005) (internal quotation omitted). Given Mr. Albrite's conceded unfamiliarity with D.C. towing laws or regulations, we see no abuse of discretion in rejecting his testimony. Without Mr. Albrite's testimony, appellants could not prove the applicable standard of care or its breach. Accordingly, the trial court appropriately granted summary judgment on appellants' breach of bailment claims. Yet as noted above, the trial court failed to decide appellants' remaining common law theories. We must therefore remand this case so that the trial court can consider these arguments.