Opinion ID: 2035627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability and New Trial Issues.

Text: We first discuss the defendants' assertions that judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.) should have entered in their favor or, at the very least, that they are entitled to a new trial. 1. The defendants argue that their motion for judgment n.o.v. should have been allowed because the evidence was insufficient, as matter of law, to warrant a finding by the jury that they had discharged the plaintiff in violation of age discrimination laws. At the time of his discharge, the plaintiff was fifty-one, and, consequently, within the class of persons (over forty years of age) protected by the age discrimination laws. G.L.c. 151B, § 1 (8) (1990 ed.). The plaintiff presented evidence which made out a prima facie case that his discharge was discriminatory. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 229 (1978); Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 135 n. 5 (1976). The defendants presented evidence which would have warranted a finding that the plaintiff was discharged for unsatisfactory job performance. See McKenzie v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 405 Mass. 432, 435 (1989); Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, supra at 138. See also Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 565-566 (1981). On the judgment n.o.v. point, therefore, the issue on appeal comes down to whether the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with all reasonable inferences drawn in his favor, see Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 414 Mass. 468, 470 (1993), warranted the jury's finding that the plaintiff's allegedly poor job performance was merely a pretext for a discharge actually based on concerns about his age. [6] Under the applicable n.o.v. standard, the jury could have found the following. In August, 1980, the plaintiff joined Ebtec, located in Agawam, as manager of the company's electron beam welding and laser job shop. The company was at that time a closely held corporation, which was owned by two individuals. Under the plaintiff's management, the shop acquired new customers and sales and profits rose substantially. At the end of 1986, Ebtec was sold to Thermal Scientific, a British conglomerate. Thomas Liebermann was appointed to oversee Ebtec (and six other American operations owned by Thermal Scientific). Liebermann reported to Robert Huddie, who was responsible for all of Thermal Scientific's American operations. In July, 1987, Liebermann promoted the plaintiff to executive vice president and general manager of Ebtec and gave the plaintiff specific goals in terms of pretax sales and profits. The plaintiff generally met those goals until the stock market crash of October, 1987, which had an adverse impact on many of the companies for which Ebtec performed services. In December, 1987, Liebermann evaluated the plaintiff. The evaluation was designed to identify for the plaintiff significant weaknesses in his management skills that would have to be addressed before the plaintiff's promotion to president of Ebtec could be considered. Liebermann disclaimed any intent of terminating the plaintiff's employment with Ebtec. According to Liebermann, the question was whether the plaintiff would work for Ebtec as a production manager or whether he would be promoted to president of Ebtec. Also in December, 1987, Liebermann decided that, because of changes in the company's business goals caused largely by the October stock market crash, he would leave Thermal Scientific. He had conveyed this fact to Huddie by December, 1987, and had begun to disengage himself from the company's operations. Huddie, not Liebermann, made the decision to terminate the plaintiff. On or about January 15, 1988, the plaintiff attended a meeting at which executives from Thermal Scientific's American companies presented their budgets. Huddie presided over the meeting. The plaintiff testified that Huddie, reflecting on the reports that had been presented to him, commented that there was a real problem in [Ebtec and another company] because both managers were old. One was in his fifties and the other was in his sixties, and it was absolutely necessary to get young management into these companies as soon as possible. [7] The plaintiff became concerned for his job at this meeting. He was terminated ten days later. His replacement, a thirty year old Thermal Scientific executive to whom the plaintiff had given basic courses in the technology that constituted Ebtec's business, was given the title of president of Ebtec. There was additional evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that Huddie desired to replace older managers with younger ones. Liebermann testified that Huddie considered American age discrimination laws to be an unnecessary fuss and complained to him (Liebermann) about the age of certain managers in American Thermal Scientific companies. Liebermann also testified that he felt compelled to call the age discrimination laws to Huddie's attention, and to insist that he, Liebermann, would not participate in any adverse employment decision based on an employee's age. From this evidence, the jury reasonably could have inferred that Huddie had raised with Liebermann the possibility of an age-related discharge at a Thermal Scientific company under Liebermann's supervision. In addition to this evidence of discriminatory intent, there was evidence from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that Huddie's stated reason for terminating the plaintiff (unsatisfactory job performance in the sense of a failure to perform in relation to budgets and forecasts) was a pretext. The jury could have concluded that Ebtec's declining profitability in November and December of 1987 was caused by the stock market crash, an event beyond the plaintiff's control. There was evidence that the plaintiff's superiors were fully aware of the effect of the stock market collapse on Ebtec's business. The plaintiff indicated that he was discouraged from attempting to adjust his forecasts to reflect changed circumstances. The jury also could have concluded that other evidence concerning the plaintiff's alleged poor performance was of little or no relevance, in light of Huddie's reason for the discharge. [8] The jury's verdict finding liability for discrimination under State and Federal law was supported by the evidence. 2. In February, 1991, the defendants moved for a firm trial date of either February 26, 1991, or on the first trial day in April, 1991, giving as a reason the conflicting travel schedules of their principal witnesses, Liebermann and Huddie. The motion judge scheduled the matter as first trial out in the March, 1991, inventory session. Because Huddie would be unavailable on this date, the defendants moved for reconsideration, seeking an April date, or, in the alternative, permission to videotape Huddie's testimony. Permission was given to videotape Huddie's deposition, and the videotape was shown to the jury as part of the defendants' case. The defendants nonetheless maintain that the absence of live testimony by Huddie so prejudiced their defense that a new trial is required. The scheduling of a trial is a matter within the sound discretion of a motion or trial judge. See Noble v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 237 Mass. 5, 16 (1921); Beninati v. Beninati, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 529, 534 (1984); Mass. R. Civ. P. 40 (a), 365 Mass. 802 (1974). When [a] trial is ... imminent as it was in this case, a judge may give weight to the public interest in the efficient operation of the trial list and to the interests of other parties who are ready for trial. Castellucci v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 372 Mass. 288, 292 (1977). Rule 40 (c) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, 365 Mass. 802 (1974), which addresses requests for a trial continuance based on the absence of a material witness, plainly contemplates testimony in the form of a deposition as a substitute for live testimony. Huddie's videotaped deposition, which permitted the jury to observe his demeanor and tone, represented a reasonable accommodation between the defendants' need for Huddie's testimony, the plaintiff's interest in a prompt trial, and the efficient administration of the Superior Court trial list. It was not error to deny the defendants' motion for a new trial on this basis. 3. The defendants claim that the plaintiff's attorney's closing argument contained an improper appeal to regional bias. The defendants failed to object at trial to what constituted a relatively minor portion of the argument, despite the well-established rule that a closing argument which is considered to be improper should be called to the attention of the trial judge at once. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 374 Mass. 453, 458 (1978), and cases cited. The content of the criticized argument is not of significance. See Pryor v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 401 Mass. 506, 509 (1988). We decline to exercise our discretion to consider the claim of error now argued. Id. Rice v. James Hanrahan & Sons, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 701, 712 (1985).