Opinion ID: 1705602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Stay

Text: There are several important factors that operate together to produce a compelling case for staying the appellant's execution pending the United States Supreme Court's resolution of the constitutionality of lethal injection and the manner in which it is administered. The first is fundamental and obvious: the consequences of failing to enter a stay will be irremediable. That is, once the appellant is put to death any decision by the United States Supreme Court impacting the use of lethal injection cannot possibly be applied here no matter the merits of the constitutional claims; on the other hand, the grant of a stay will result in no detriment to the State because immediately following any United States Supreme Court's decision denying relief to Baze the State will be free to execute the appellant in accord with that decision. Two other factors, however, in favor of granting a stay are, perhaps; the most compelling: First, Florida's Constitution expressly mandates that this Court apply the United States Supreme Court's decisions on the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the United States Constitution to any decision we render on the meaning of Florida's cruel and unusual punishment constitutional provision. In other words, in this case there is an explicit command in Florida's Constitution that this Court must follow the United States Supreme Court's decisions on whether death by lethal injection as it is currently being administered constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, the very issue before us. However, as the majority opinion in Lightbourne makes abundantly clear, there is presently no United States Supreme Court decision on this issue. If that was the end of the story, this dissent would not be written. But, that is not the end of story, since we know as an absolute fact that the United States Supreme Court has this very issue pending before it and will be rendering a decision that, pursuant to the mandate in Florida's Constitution, will control the outcome of this case. See Baze v. Rees, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 34, 168 L.Ed.2d 809 (2007). In other words, there is no controlling Supreme Court decision on point at this precise instance, but such a decision is pending. Under these circumstances it is pure sophistry to suggest this Court can ignore the mandate in Florida's Constitution that we apply Supreme Court law to the constitutional issue before us in this case. Why would we rely on speculating on Supreme Court law, as the majority opinion in Lightbourne does, when we know a Supreme Court decision on this very issue is forthcoming? While the majority may be confident in the correctness of its analysis and decision, this Court is constitutionally bound to look to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the pending case. And, while the risk of some contrary decision by that Court may seem small, there is absolutely no risk of adverse consequences to the State in entering a stay. As the majority opinion in Lightbourne acknowledges, other courts around the country have applied a variety of standards and some have invalidated similar lethal injection procedures. Similarly, stays of execution have been entered in other jurisdictions. Finally, as noted above, the last execution in Florida obviously did not proceed as contemplated, and, despite our approval of the revised protocols of the Department of Corrections, we cannot know what may happen with the next execution. This is especially true because one of the primary claims of those contesting lethal injection, the necessity of professional medical supervision, remains absent in Florida's protocol. Schwab's plea for a stay is particularly compelling, because unlike Lightbourne, he has not been afforded an evidentiary hearing on any of his claims, including his claim that the three-drug protocol presents a substantially greater risk of inflicting pain than would the administration of a single lethal dosage of sodium pentothal. As noted in Justice Pariente's concurring opinion, this specific issue is before the United States Supreme Court in Baze. Of course, Schwab's right to a hearing on this issue will be mooted by his execution. Further, the defendant is not going anywhere, and, under Florida's law keeping death warrants alive indefinitely, the setting of a prompt date for execution following a United States Supreme Court decision favorable to the State will be a simple task. For all these reasons I would grant a stay pending the United States Supreme Court's resolution of the constitutional issues involved herein. QUINCE, J., concurs. ORDER DENYING REHEARING Appellant's Motion for Rehearing is hereby denied. ANSTEAD, J., dissenting. I would grant rehearing, especially on the issue of whether Schwab was denied the right to an individualized evidentiary hearing in which he would be given an opportunity to present his own evidence and contentions in addition to those presented in the Lightbourne case. Unlike Lightbourne, who was granted this opportunity, Schwab has been denied this fundamental right to articulate and prosecute his own claim. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.