Opinion ID: 613272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Helm's Alter-Ego Theory

Text: Helm first argues that the Faragher/Ellerth defense is not available to the State because the harasser, Judge Stewart, was the State's alter ego. We have not squarely addressed whether an employer may rely on the Faragher/Ellerth defense when a victimized employee seeks to impose liability on the employer under the alter-ego theory as opposed to the misuse of delegated authority. We need not decide that issue to resolve this case, however, as we conclude that Helm's argument fails for the reason that Judge Stewart did not operate as the alter ego of the State. The contours of the alter-ego theory are not well defined. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision in Faragher and our decisions in Harrison and Mallinson-Montague provide some guidance. In Faragher, the Supreme Court suggested that presidents, owners, proprietors, partners, corporate officers, and supervisors with a high position in the management hierarchy are the types of officials who can be considered an organization's alter ego. See 524 U.S. at 789-90, 118 S.Ct. 2275. In Harrison, we stated that a supervisory employee can[not] be considered an employer's `alter ego' simply because he or she possesses a high degree of control over a subordinate. 158 F.3d at 1376. Thus, a low-level supervisor does not qualify. Id. at 1376 n. 2. Finally, in Mallinson-Montague, we concluded that a bank's senior vice president of consumer lending held a sufficiently high managerial rank to qualify as the bank's alter ego. 224 F.3d at 1233. We relied on the following factors: the vice president (1) had the authority to hire and fire employees in the consumer lending department; (2) was the ultimate supervisor of all employees in the department; (3) had the ultimate authority to disapprove all consumer loans; (4) answered only to the bank's president; (5) held a senior level title that was regarded as very important; and (6) served on committees exercising policy-making functions. Id. These cases indicate that an official must be high enough in the management hierarchy that his actions speak for the employer before he may be considered the employer's alter ego. Accord Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 384 (5th Cir.2003) ([T]he only factor relevant to the determination of whether [the former president and general manager] was a proxy for [the corporation] is whether he held a `sufficiently high position in the management hierarchy' so as to speak for the corporate employer.) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789, 118 S.Ct. 2275); Johnson v. West, 218 F.3d 725, 730 (7th Cir.2000) (holding that the chief of police at a Veterans Affairs (VA) hospital was not the VA's alter ego because he was not a high-level manager whose actions `spoke' for the VA (citing Harrison, 158 F.3d at 1376)). Only individuals with exceptional authority and control within an organization can meet that standard. Judge Stewart was not such an individual. As an initial matter, we are aware of no cases in which a state district judge (or, for that matter, any state official) was deemed to be the alter ego of the state. Indeed, virtually every case addressing the alter-ego issue has arisen in the corporate context. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that a public official can never qualify as the alter ego of a government entity. But few public officials are vested with the same degree of power over a government entity as, for example, a corporate president has over a corporation. In this case, we need not meticulously define the narrow class of public officials who hold that kind of power, as it is clear that state district judges do not qualify. State district judges do not exercise a sufficient degree of control over the myriad operations of the state. Rather, they operate in a limited sphere (the judicial branch) and perform a limited role (interpreting and applying the law that is enacted by other state officials). Furthermore, their decisions are subject to review and reversal by higher ranking state judges. For these reasons, state district judges, although they have considerable authority, do not occupy positions in the top echelons of the state's management. Nor does any state district judge speak for and represent the state. Indeed, the essential task of all judges is to be independent of the state, even to the extent of occasionally being asked to review the constitutionality or other legality of state actions. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Judge Stewart was not the alter ego of the State of Kansas.