Opinion ID: 1193824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex Post Facto Prohibition

Text: Before deciding whether Frye remains ascendant, we consider, and reject, Coon's argument that the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto legislation apply to judicial decisions thus barring the application of the 1993 Daubert decision to his 1992 trial. [26] We reach this conclusion because there is no support for Coon's proposition in federal or state law. On its face, the federal ex post facto prohibition applies only to legislative acts, not judicial decisions. [27] We construe state prohibition no differently than the federal prohibition. [28] Unforeseeable judicial enlargements of criminal statutes have been struck down as violative of due process when applied retroactively. [29] But that is not the case here. Even if we were to apply the prohibition on ex post facto laws to judicial decisions, changes to rules governing the admissibility of evidence do not violate it. In Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 387, 18 S.Ct. 922, 43 L.Ed. 204 (1898), the United States Supreme Court stated that [W]e cannot perceive any ground upon which to hold a statute to be ex post facto which does nothing more than admit evidence of a particular kind in a criminal case upon an issue of fact which was not admissible under the rules of evidence as enforced by judicial decisions at the time the offense was committed.[ [30] ] The prohibition on ex post facto laws has been construed as applicable only to penal legislation. [31] Coon also asserts that retrospective application of Daubert to his case would deny him substantive and procedural due process of law and violate his right to equal protection. His cursory discussion of these issues is inadequate to preserve them. We consider them waived. [32]