Opinion ID: 2332619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Warranty Disclaimer

Text: Ruzzo contends that the trial justice erred when he entered summary judgment for Taylor on the implied warranty claims. To be effective, disclaimers of implied warranties must meet certain statutory requirements in accordance with G.L. 1956 § 6A-2.1-214. A disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must be in writing, be conspicuous, and the language must mention merchantability. Section 6A-2.1-214(2). A disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must also be in writing, be conspicuous, and contain language to the effect that [t]here is no warranty that the goods will be fit for a particular purpose. Id. Ruzzo does not dispute that the warranty disclaimer met all of these statutory requirements. Rather, Ruzzo contends that the disclaimer was unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable. Section 6A-2.1-108(1) provides that, [i]f the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. Although the disclaimer of warranties provision is in full compliance with the UCC provisions in terms of its conspicuousness and language, we conclude that in Rhode Island, a disclaimer for personal injuries arising from the use of a consumer product introduced into the stream of commerce is unconscionable. Moreover, the UCC by its own terms purports to exclude a disclaimer for consequential damages for personal injuries in connection with consumer leases and declares such disclaimers to be prima facie unconscionable. [7] Because our holding today with respect to warranty disclaimers is consistent with § 6A-2.1-503(3) as it relates to disclaimers for personal injuries arising out of consumer transactions, we need not address other aspects of the UCC, except to state that the responsibility of a manufacturer, supplier or lessor of consumer goods to refrain from negligence or from introducing a defective product into the stream of commerce is not overcome by the UCC. Accordingly, because this was a consumer lease, we conclude that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment on this basis.