Opinion ID: 777349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victor Matias, Jr. (01-1929)

Text: 47 The plea agreement provided that Victor Matias, Jr. would plead guilty to conspiracy, and under oath he provided testimony regarding the activities of the conspiracy. In exchange, the government would dismiss the remaining two counts of the indictment for distribution. After the parties agreed to the plea, Matias, Jr. testified at the trial of Hector Carrasco, Johnny Alicea, and Victor Alicea. Matias, Jr.'s testimony at trial was directly contradictory to his prior sworn testimony. Matias, Jr. denied that he and the other three defendants on trial engaged in any drug deals, purchases, or conspiracy. 48 Based on the plea agreement the maximum sentence for the remaining conspiracy charge was 240 months (20 years) in prison. The PSR had previously calculated his potential sentence (based on all three counts and applicable enhancements) at 360 months (30 years) to life in prison. At sentencing, the district court reviewed the plea agreement and rejected it, finding it did not adequately reflect the severity of the defendant's conduct and would undermine the sentencing guidelines. Matias, Jr. subsequently withdrew his guilty plea. A superceding indictment alleging five counts was returned and the district court dismissed the prior indictment. A trial commenced and the jury found Matias, Jr. guilty on all five counts. The district court then sentenced Matias, Jr. to 360 months (30 years) and 5 years supervised release, and a concurrent term of 240 months (20 years) and 3 years supervised release. 49 Matias, Jr. does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his plea agreement. Rather, Matias, Jr. asserts that the district court usurped the authority of the prosecutor in violation the principle of separation of powers. In the alternative, Matias, Jr. argues that U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 is unconstitutional. These claims are, by far, the most imaginative arguments raised by any of the defendants in this appeal, albeit equally unsuccessful. 50 At the outset, Matias, Jr. seeks to treat the dismissal of the other counts as separate from the plea agreement. In the context of a plea agreement, the dismissal of specific charges is contingent on the defendant's guilty plea to other charges; in sum the dismissal and guilty plea are two parts of one agreement. Cf. United States v. Peterson, 268 F.3d 533, 534 (7th Cir.2001). A plea agreement is a unified document, and even if the district court wanted to it could not accept part and reject part. See id. (The whole plea agreement stands, or the whole thing falls.). 51 Matias, Jr. cites a number of cases in which a district court refused to grant a prosecutor's motion to dismiss the indictment under FED.R.CRIM.P. 48 and were reversed on appeal. The decision to indict, allege specific charges, or dismiss charges is inherently an exercise of executive power, and the prosecutor has broad discretion in these matters. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480-82 (D.C.Cir.1967) (Burger, J.). The executive can choose not to prosecute one case, yet prosecute vigorously another involving the same issues. See id. (citing cases and stating that [t]wo persons may have committed what is precisely the same legal offense but the prosecutor is not compelled by law, duty or tradition to treat them the same as to charges.). The judiciary cannot compel prosecutions, nor can a judge refuse to grant the prosecution's voluntary motion to dismiss charges absent a specific finding of bad faith. See United States v. Palomares, 119 F.3d 556, 558 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157, 158-59 (4th Cir.1995). Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring leave of court to dismiss an indictment, checks the discretionary power of the prosecutor to seek a nolle prosequi and later reindict on the same charges. Rule 48 allows a court to ensure the fair administration of justice and prevent harassment of a defendant. Smith, 55 F.3d at 158-59. The leave of court requirement does not allow the judiciary to exercise executive powers; rather the condition protects the justice system judges oversee from misuse after proceedings have been initiated by the executive. See United States v. Goodson, 204 F.3d 508, 512-15 (4th Cir.2000) (noting a court may dismiss charges under Rule 48(b) to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.). 52 Since the judicial check on the prosecutorial power is a very limited one, a prosecutor's motion to dismiss must be granted unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest. Smith, 55 F.3d at 158-59; United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628-30 (5th Cir., Unit A, Oct.1981) (en banc); see also Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 30, 98 S.Ct. 81, 54 L.Ed.2d 207 (1977). Judicial discretion becomes extremely limited in circumstances where the prosecutor seeks to dismiss the indictment with prejudice and the defendant joins the motion. 53 The facts of this case are in stark contrast to the Rule 48 cases cited above. The district court, exercising its authority under U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2, rejected a plea agreement, not a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CRIM.P. 48. The United States Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin did not once object to the district court's rejection of the plea agreement, and does not assert that prosecutorial authority has been, in any way, usurped. As this panel suggested at oral argument, the Assistant U.S. Attorney, if he wanted to, could have effectuated the same result the plea agreement sought to by moving to dismiss the other counts with prejudice and having Matias, Jr. plead guilty to the remaining count. If Matias, Jr. joined a motion to dismiss with prejudice, the court would have been required to grant the motion, absent a specific finding that dismissal would be manifestly against the public interest. Cf. Hamm, 659 F.2d at 629-30; Smith, 55 F.3d at 159. However, the U.S. Attorney was not upset by the rejection of the plea agreement because Matias, Jr., after accepting the benefits of the plea agreement, attempted to sabotage the U.S. Attorney's case by taking the witness stand and committing perjury in the trial of three other co-conspirators. 54 As we noted at the outset of this analysis, the court has a role to play in plea bargains and need not accept a plea agreement because there is no absolute right to plead guilty. Greener, 979 F.2d at 519-20. The district court in Greener rejected two plea agreements before finally accepting a third, and we found the rejections to be well within the court's discretion. Id. The agreement here did not bind the court, and it was free to reject the agreement if it found the agreement would undermine the sentencing guidelines or did not adequately take into account the defendant's relevant conduct. See id.; Sandles, 80 F.3d at 1147-49. Taking into consideration Matias, Jr.'s role in the conspiracy and the sentence he would receive, the district court properly rejected the plea on the grounds it would undermine the sentencing guidelines. Greener, 979 F.2d at 519-20. The district court's role in reviewing plea agreements under U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2 is neither improper, nor an exercise of executive authority in violation of the constitution. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the plea agreement in this case.