Opinion ID: 1905441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Detective Cornell's Opinion on the Operability of the Firearm

Text: The defendant next argues that the trial justice committed reversible error when he allowed Det. Cornell to testify that the firearm was operable. He contends that because she failed to test fire the weapon, Det. Cornell's expert opinion lacked foundation. [11] Had Det. Cornell's opinion been excluded, defendant contends, the trial justice would have entered a judgment of acquittal on count 11 (using a firearm while committing a crime of violence) and the jury would have been unable to convict him on the counts charging assault with a dangerous weapon. [12] We disagree with these contentions. It is well settled that the admissibility of expert testimony, governed by Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, [13] lies within the sound discretion of the trial justice and will not be disturbed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Gordon, 880 A.2d 825, 836 (R.I.2005); State v. D'Alessio, 848 A.2d 1118, 1123 (R.I.2004). The expert testimony must be relevant, within the witness's expertise, and based on an adequate factual foundation.  Kurczy v. St. Joseph Veterans Association, Inc., 820 A.2d 929, 940 (R.I.2003) (quoting Rodriquez v. Kennedy, 706 A.2d 922, 924 (R.I.1998)). In this case, Det. Cornell determined that the gun was capable of firing after she worked the trigger and observed the hammer move. Although she admitted during cross-examination that to be absolutely certain that the gun was operable she would have had to test fire the weapon, Det. Cornell nonetheless testified that the gun possessed all the mechanisms that would have allowed it to fire: a firing pin, an ejection area, a hammer, and a trigger. We are of the opinion that the factual underpinnings upon which Det. Cornell's opinion was based were more than sufficient. This Court has declared that absolute scientific certainty is not the standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. State v. Morales, 621 A.2d 1247, 1250 (R.I. 1993) (citing State v. Bertram, 591 A.2d 14, 25 (R.I.1991) and State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1254 (R.I.1981)). The deficiencies in Det. Cornell's opinion, if any, affect the weight of her testimony and not its admissibility. Id. Accordingly, the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in permitting Det. Cornell to testify that in her opinion the weapon was operable. Even if it were error to permit Det. Cornell to testify, we are of the opinion that the error was harmless because defendant's convictions are supported by ample incriminating evidence. To convict a person for assault with a dangerous weapon pursuant to G.L.1956 § 11-5-2, the state must prove: [1] any unlawful offer to do corporal injury to another [2] under such circumstances as may create a reasonable apprehension of immediate injury unless the person so threatened takes action or inaction to avoid it, coupled with [3] a present ability to carry the offer into effect. State v. Tillery, 922 A.2d 102, 107 (R.I.2007) (quoting State v. Jeremiah, 546 A.2d 183, 186-87 (R.I.1988)). When the dangerous weapon is a firearm, the third element of this testthe only element Abdullah challengesmay be satisfied by proof that the gun was operable, which may be circumstantially established by defendant's conduct. Id. at 107-08. Here, the testimony with respect to Reyes's chilling and threatening conduct overwhelmingly supports an inference that the gun was operable. See, e.g., State v. Andrade, 657 A.2d 538, 543 (R.I.1995) (the jury could have inferred that the defendant's firearm was operable based on the threats he made to the victims as he pointed his pistol at them). Rivera testified that when she first encountered Reyes he pointed his weapon at her and stated: This is a robbery. Once inside, Reyes pressed the gun against her neck and threatened: If you speak or move I will explode you. Later, Reyes pointed the gun at Analyn's head and threatened to shoot her if there was anything funny going on. Within minutes of gaining entry into the first-floor apartment, Reyes went upstairs, pointed the gun at Quiles, and shouted: This is a hold-up. Don't move. Reyes then continued to warn Quiles that he would kill her and Analyn if she called the police and repeated the threat after the police were alerted. In short, the jury was provided with ample circumstantial proof that the gun was operable. The defendant urges the Court to adopt a new rule: that if the state has possession of the firearm, it must demonstrate that the weapon actually is operable by test firing it. We disagree. Although in the context of this case a test fire would have been preferable and should have been performed, we never have held that circumstantial evidence of actual present ability to do corporal injury is limited to cases in which, as in State v. Clifton, 777 A.2d 1272, 1278 (R.I.2001), and Andrade, 657 A.2d at 543, the weapon itself is not available at trial. Rather, we have held that [a]lthough the prosecution must prove the operability of the gun in question, this fact may be inferred from the actions and statements of the defendant. Tillery, 922 A.2d at 107-08. Given that the prosecution has no obligation to produce the gun at trial, [14] id. at 108, it is illogical to hold the state to a higher standard for establishing the gun's operability if it actually introduces the firearm. Notwithstanding, there is no suggestion in the record before us that the firearm used in this case was not operable. Accordingly, we reject this argument.