Opinion ID: 2450730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Warning Question

Text: In Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., Ky., 532 S.W.2d 197 (1976), we observed that under the strict liability theory of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d the issue is whether a product is unreasonably dangerous to a person who should be expected to use or be exposed to it. We stated that if the danger is unreasonable because it is not obvious and may not be apprehended by such person, then it may be obviated by an adequate warning so provided that in the ordinary course of events it will reach and be understood by that person. In Ulrich we said that a manufacturer was entitled to rely on the owner of a machine to assume the responsibility for keeping it in safe working order. The owner's failure to do so (and to warn the operator accordingly) might constitute superseding negligence if it could be found that the tool was unreasonably dangerous in the first place . . . Ulrich, supra, at p. 201. In this case it appears to us that this is another illustration of the overlap between negligence principles and so-called strict liability theory where defective design or inadequate instructions and warnings of the dangers attending the use of the product are present. [1] Kendall, the injured worker, did not sue his employer Reynolds. This is probably explained by the presence of workmen's compensation payments to him by his employer whom he cannot legally sue in a tort action. As observed in Ulrich, supra, when this case is divorced from the glut of erudition erupting from the scholars, the evidence of the parties makes the real issue simple and renders other issues irrelevant. In this case, after use for a comparatively short interval of time, this crane was discovered to be defectively operating by the manufacturer, the seller, and the buyer. The manufacturer and seller initiated the inquiry into the fitness of the machine and discovered that it lacked bracing which would render it safe. According to the manufacturer and seller, these facts were brought home to a responsible supervisory employee of the buyer. This employee of the buyer agreed to cause the bracing to be applied which under the evidence would have made the machine safe for the buyer's employee who operated the crane. The supervising employee of the buyer admits that he knew the crane was operating defectively because of the breaking of the short hanger rods. He denies that he agreed to effect lateral sway bracing and also represents that he did not realize the extent of the danger nor of the probability of the crane falling if it were not properly braced. The manufacturer and seller admit that they did not discuss the extent of the danger with the buyer's plant engineer because they claim the extent of the danger and the possibility of the crane falling was obvious, at least to a person occupying the role here played by the plant engineer. We are, therefore, of the opinion that this case presents a jury question as to the sufficiency of the warning under the circumstances, taking into account the question of the obviousness of the danger and the possible assumption of responsibility by the buyer. In our view, this resolution makes Kendall's claim that he was entitled to a directed verdict against Cleveland and Bohnert untenable. Hence, we agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals on this phase of the case. Kendall's argument that the trial court committed error in instructing the jury that if the sole cause of the occurrence was the negligence of Reynolds it should find for Cleveland and Bohnert was rejected by the Court of Appeals. That court held Kendall did not preserve the alleged error for appellate consideration because the source of the instruction was traceable to an instruction tendered to the trial court by Kendall. Kendall asserts that the sole-cause instruction violated House v. Kellerman, Ky., 519 S.W.2d 380 (1974). The giving of such an instruction was disapproved in Kellerman . Our resolution of this case so far as this issue is concerned will, in our view, present to the jury the only operative issue for determination. The problem will not arise on a retrial.