Opinion ID: 764845
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fourth Amendment Claim against Officer Nicholl for

Text: 63 Initiating and Filing Citation without Probable Cause 64 Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in dismissing Count V of his complaint, which alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages against Officer Nicholl and the City for violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment by issuing a citation under Macedonia Codified Ordinance § 351.12 without probable cause. Under United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. The district court essentially held that, regardless of whether Officer Nicholl had probable cause to ticket plaintiff for a violation of § 351.12, he effected no seizure of plaintiff's person upon issuing the traffic ticket because there was no face-to-face encounter. Plaintiff therefore could not have felt that he was not free to walk away from Nicholl. Mem. Op. and Order of June 19, 1997, at 16-17, J.A. 148-49. 65 Plaintiff submits that the district court erred in dismissing his claim because the issuance of a summons alone, without any face-to-face encounter, may constitute a seizure of the person. Plaintiff relies upon Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 277-79, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), and the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Bacon v. Patera, 772 F.2d 259, 265 (6th Cir.1985) for the proposition that a Fourth Amendment claim for initiating criminal charges without probable cause may be brought in a case where the police use a summons in lieu of an arrest. Both Albright and Bacon are distinguishable from plaintiff's own predicament. Each of the cited cases addressed a situation in which the plaintiff voluntarily responded to a summons or arrest warrant, answered to the charges against him, and was then released on bond in lieu of remaining incarcerated until trial. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 268, 279; Bacon, 772 F.2d at 262. Plaintiff cannot claim issuance of the traffic ticket effected a seizure because upon appearing to answer the charges in the ticket, he would have been afforded a trial. On the date he was issued the parking ticket, he was free to leave. As a result, plaintiff has no § 1983 claim against Officer Nicholl for issuance of the ticket. It was not until he failed to appear for the hearing on the traffic citation that an arrest warrant or summons sufficient to constitute a seizure pursuant to Bacon v. Patera or Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Albright v. Oliver would have been, and was in fact, issued. Officer Nicholl had no role in issuance of the bench warrant, so plaintiff cannot maintain a claim under § 1983 against him for such a seizure. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Count V of plaintiff's complaint. 66