Opinion ID: 2075889
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The law of spoliation of evidence

Text: The doctrine of what has been termed spoliation of evidence includes two sub-categories of behavior: the deliberate destruction of evidence and the simple failure to preserve evidence. It is well settled that a party's bad faith destruction of a document relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise to a strong inference that production of the document would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 827 F.2d 1119, 1134 (7th Cir.1987); Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 514 F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975); Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 587 F.Supp. 180, 190 (D.D.C.), modified, 593 F.Supp. 388, aff'd, 241 U.S.App.D.C. 83, 746 F.2d 816 (1984). Adverse inferences from the destruction of documents have both an evidentiary and a punitive rationale. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense observation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party in the same position who does not destroy the document. Nation-wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, 692 F.2d 214, 218 (1st Cir. 1982). In essence, the inference is akin to an admission by conduct of the weakness of one's own case. See C. McCORMICK, supra, § 273, at 808. The other rationale for the inference has to do with its prophylactic and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference presumably deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at trial. Nation-wide Check Corp., supra, 692 F.2d at 218. The prevailing rule is that, to justify the inference, the circumstances of the [destruction] must manifest bad faith. Mere negligence is not enough, for it does not sustain the inference of consciousness of a weak case. C. McCORMICK, supra, § 273, at 809. Even courts eschewing a bad faith standard have acknowledged that the destruction must transcend ordinary negligence, and evince at least knowing disregard of the importance of the document to an opposing litigant's claim. See Allen Pen Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 23-24 (1st Cir.1981) (inference ordinarily improper unless documents destroyed in bad faith or from consciousness of a weak case); Nation-wide Check Corp., supra, 692 F.2d at 219. Where proffered evidence demonstrates that documents were concealed or destroyed in bad faitheither deliberately or with reckless disregard for their relevancea trial court may well abuse its discretion by refusing to allow factual inferences adverse to the culpable party to be suggested to the jury through an instruction or argument of counsel. See Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers Org., 687 F.2d 1173, 1205-06 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937, 103 S.Ct. 2108, 77 L.Ed.2d 313 (1983). When the loss or destruction of evidence is not intentional or reckless, by contrast, the issue is not strictly spoliation but rather a failure to preserve evidence. The rule that a fact-finder may draw an inference adverse to a party who fails to preserve relevant evidence within his exclusive control is well established in this jurisdiction. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Smith, supra, 127 A.2d at 559; Hartman v. Lubar, 49 A.2d 553, 556 (D.C.1946); Tendler v. Jaffe, supra, 92 U.S.App.D.C. at 7, 203 F.2d at 19; Washington Gas Light Co. v. Biancaniello, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 164, 167, 183 F.2d 982, 985 (1950); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Helvering, 72 App.D.C. 120, 126, 112 F.2d 205, 211 (1940). Like the spoliation rule, it derives from the common sense notion that if the evidence was favorable to the non-producing party's case, it would have taken pains to preserve and come forward with it. International Union (UAW) v. NLRB, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 305, 311-12, 314, 459 F.2d 1329, 1335-36, 1338 (1972); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Biancaniello, supra, 87 U.S.App.D.C. at 167, 183 F.2d at 985. As the trial judge recognized, in recent years this court has dealt with the issue of failure to preserve evidence almost entirely in the criminal context of evidence the government is required to produce under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, or Super. Ct.Crim.R. 16. The court has made clear that, [a]bsent an abuse of discretion, the decision of what sanctions, if any, to impose [for loss of evidence] is committed to the trial court, Cotton v. United States, 388 A.2d 865, 869 (D.C.1978) (emphasis in original), and that at least where the failure to preserve evidence is merely negligent, nothing in the decisions of this jurisdiction requires that sanctions be automatically imposed. Id. at 870. See also Gibson v. United States, 536 A.2d 78, 84 (D.C. 1987); Bartley v. United States, 530 A.2d 692, 697 (D.C.1987); Wiggins v. United States, 521 A.2d 1146, 1148 (D.C.1987). It is also chiefly in the criminal cases that the court has expressed skepticism about the missing witness/evidence doctrine and underscored the discretion which the trial judge retains to deny the instruction even when its prerequisites have been met. See Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C.1982); see also Stager v. Schneider, supra, 494 A.2d at 1313 (applying same rule to civil cases, and stating that it seldom will constitute error to deny the missing witness instruction or to prohibit argument of the missing witness inference). [4] These principles, in our judgment, compel rejection of a rule that a party's failure in a civil case to preserve evidence regardless of degree of fault requires the court to instruct the jury on the missing evidence inference. Rather, as in criminal cases, the trial judge has discretion to withhold the issue from the jury after considering factors such as the degree of negligence or bad faith involved, the importance of the evidence lost to the issues at hand, and the availability of other proof enabling the party deprived of the evidence to make the same point. Cf. Cotton v. United States, supra, 388 A.2d at 869. We hold that, upon a finding of gross indifference to or reckless disregard for the relevance of the evidence to a possible claim, the trial court must submit the issue of lost evidence to the trier of fact with corresponding instructions allowing an adverse inference. Short of that finding, however, a refusal to instruct on missing evidence is not error unless we can say that the trial court, in all of the circumstances, abused its discretion.