Opinion ID: 783850
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ellison

Text: 47 Regarding the June 19 interview, on that day officers returned to the Arlington Avenue residence to further question Stewart. Akridge and Ellison initially indicated that Stewart was not at home, but eventually went inside the residence to summon Stewart. Affidavits indicate that a crowd was gathering outside the apartment, so the officers thought it would be safer to conduct the questioning at the police station and requested that Akridge, Ellison, and Stewart all come in for questioning. As recounted by Akridge, Agent Malone invited Akridge and Ellison to meet with officers at the police station to discuss the May 2 search of their apartment and Stewart's arrest. The three cooperated and admitted to selling crack cocaine and marijuana. Appellant's Br. at 10. 48 Per police procedure, Akridge, Stewart, and Ellison were handcuffed during transport to the police station, but were not handcuffed during their interviews. All three parties signed a waiver of rights, admitted to various drug and weapons related incidents, and ultimately were arrested. 49 Akridge emphasizes that it was not until after the June arrest that Ellison made the final decision to plead guilty and turn his life around. However, in the affidavit presented at the second suppression hearing, Ellison states that the reason for his decision was that he was facing exposure to enhanced sentencing as a career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) due to the January 1999 firearms charge and that this charge was a major factor in his decision to enter a plea. Ellison also explained that he knew he had been a poor role model for his son by getting caught up in selling drugs and wanted to serve his time to be a good example for [his] son. Ellison's affidavit further reflects that in deciding to cooperate, Ellison knew that he would have to disclose Akridge's and Stewart's involvement with guns and drugs, but having made the decision to cooperate, he could not do it half way. Based on this decision, Ellison testified favorably for Akridge at the suppression hearing but offered testimony against Akridge at trial. 50 Although Ellison's direct relationship with Akridge may not have been revealed until May 2000, it is undisputed that Ellison was facing prosecution as a career offender. While Ellison appeared for questioning at the Government's behest, he did so voluntarily and without coercion. 13 It was several months thereafter, in October, that Ellison entered into a plea agreement, an agreement that required Ellison's cooperation with future investigations and resulted in Ellison's trial testimony against Akridge. 51 We find that the foregoing supports the conclusion that Ellison's cooperation and trial testimony resulted from an exercise of Ellison's free will, and was the product of detached reflection and a desire to be cooperative. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Admittedly, this is not as clear a case as in Ceccolini, in which the witness was not a putative defendant, and Akridge asserts that due to their impending prosecutions, Ellison and Stewart were faced with a Hobson's choice that cannot fairly be regarded as a product of their free wills. However, Ceccolini instructs: 52 Another factor which not only is relevant in determining the usefulness of the exclusionary rule in a particular context, but also seems to us to differentiate the testimony of all live witnesses even putative defendants from the exclusion of the typical documentary evidence, is that such exclusion would perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and material facts, regardless of how unrelated such testimony might be to the purpose of the originally illegal search or the evidence discovered thereby. Rules which disqualify knowledgeable witnesses from testifying at trial are, in the word of Professor McCormick, serious obstructions to the ascertainment of truth accordingly, [f]or a century the course of legal evolution has been in the direction of sweeping away these obstructions. C. McCormick, Law of Evidence § 71 (1954). [  ] For many of these same reasons, the Court has also held admissible at trial testimony of a witness whose identity was disclosed by the defendant's statement given after inadequate Miranda warnings. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-451, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). 53 Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277-78, 98 S.Ct. 1054. 14 54 Based on the foregoing, and in light of (1) the Government's prior knowledge of Ellison and his criminal background; 15 (2) the six week lapse between the illegal search and the June questioning and arrest; (3) the additional nearly four month lapse between the arrest and Ellison's decision to cooperate; (4) Ellison's stated willingness to testify, particularly his cited reasons for deciding to turn his life around; and (5) the significant impact of Ellison's impending prosecution and eligibility for a career offender enhancement relating to the January 1999 charges, we find that the connection between the illegal search and the testimony is sufficiently attenuated. See United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746 (2d Cir.1980) (finding it likely that the witness' decision to cooperate was based on the strong possibility of substantial jail time in relation to committing a crime separate from that at issue on appeal). In making this determination, we find instructive Wong Sun, in which Wong Sun's arrest was deemed illegal due to lack of probable cause or reasonable grounds. Nonetheless, the Court regarded this antecedent illegality to be of no evidentiary consequence, because Wong Sun had been arraigned, released on his own recognizance, and had returned voluntarily several days later for interrogation, during which he made the contested statement. The Court determined that based on the foregoing, the connection between the arrest and the statement had `become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. 407 (quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341, 60 S.Ct. 266).