Opinion ID: 516001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty of Appellee as Moving Party

Text: 14 The Supreme Court made clear in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), that the movant has no burden of introducing evidence negating the nonmovant's claim. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Rather, the moving party's duty to support its motion is discharged by its informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Thus, where the nonmoving party shoulders the burden of proof at trial, the movant's burden is met by a sufficient  'showing' ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. 15 Of course, in the Celotex case, the nonmoving party was to bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, while, in the present case, the moving party (Willoughby) faced the ultimate burden of proof. Nonetheless, we conclude that the Celotex principle applies where a silent nonmoving party is to bear an initial burden of production at trial. Here, the statutory requirement that the Secretary's order be treated as prima-facie evidence of the facts therein stated placed upon Frito-Lay an initial burden of producing sufficient evidence at trial to rebut the Secretary's findings. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 499g(c); see Consolidated Citrus Co. v. Goldstein, 214 F.Supp. 823, 826 n. 5 (E.D.Pa.1963). Under Celotex, a court must enter summary judgment against a nonmovant who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. It follows that a court must enter summary judgment against a nonmovant who will bear an initial burden of production at trial and who fails to make a showing sufficient to meet that burden. Consequently, the movant in such circumstances can meet its own burden by showing that there is an absence of evidence to rebut the prima facie case presented by the Secretary's order. Cf. id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554. This is consistent with Celotex and is entirely logical: A party who bears an initial burden of production should not be permitted to waste the resources of its opponent and of the courts if it cannot show that it could possibly meet that burden. 16 In the present case, appellee faced the burden of proving a violation of section 2 of the Act. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 499b. We hold that he properly discharged his duty as moving party when, armed with the prima facie value of the Secretary's decision, he alerted the Court to the absence of evidence to support appellant's case. In the critical portion of his moving papers, appellee noted that: 17 Frito-Lay has not submitted any affidavits or other evidence to show that there is a factual dispute. The findings of fact of the Judicial Officer of the Secretary of Agriculture are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.... It is clear in those findings of fact that oral modifications had been entered into by the parties.... In the absence of any affidavit or other evidence from Frito-Lay, these findings of fact are not the subject of genuine dispute. 18 Willoughby's Reply Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment at 2 (citations omitted); see also J.A. at K29 (appellee's counsel responding to Court's query regarding the possibility of a triable issue over whether there was an oral agreement: there's been absolutely no evidence submitted, anything, affidavits or anything, which would indicate that there they're [sic] going to be able to rebut the prima facie finding of a modification by the Secretary). Effect of the Secretary's Findings of Fact 19 The District Court was clearly of the opinion that unless rebutted by specific evidence, the Secretary's findings of fact were not to be disturbed. It stated that [i]n general, courts find that the prima facie case established by the Secretary's findings and order prevails, unless it is overcome by evidence submitted by the petitioner. Mem.Op. at 3 (J.A. at M3) (citing Consolidated Citrus Co. v. Goldstein, 214 F.Supp. 823 (E.D.Pa.1963)). In Consolidated Citrus, the Court stated that the Act creates a rebuttable presumption that [the Secretary's findings] are established facts until sufficient evidence is introduced at trial to rebut them. Id. at 826 n. 5 (citing Spano v. Western Fruit Growers, 83 F.2d 150 (10th Cir.1936)); see also Spano, 83 F.2d at 152 (The Act merely creates a rebuttable presumption. It establishes a rule of evidence and does not prevent any defense. It does not interpose an obstacle to the presentation of any contest on the issue nor does it take away the right of either party to introduce any pertinent or relevant evidence.). Appellant asserts, without the benefit of authority, that [t]he Secretary's findings are prima facie evidence but are not dispositive on a motion for summary judgment. Br. for Appellant at 11. While the Secretary's findings could not be conclusive had they been opposed properly, appellee is correct that even for purposes of summary judgment, [t]he Secretary's findings are dispositive when there is no evidence submitted in dispute. Br. for Appellee at 7 (relying on Spano, 83 F.2d 150). This interpretation gives effect to the prima facie clause of the Act, by making the Secretary's findings conclusive unless effectively rebutted. Once rebutted, the Court is then able to reweigh the evidence, thus giving effect to the provision for de novo review. Our interpretation also gives effect to the mandate that the proceeding before the District Court proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages. 7 U.S.C. Sec. 499g(c).