Opinion ID: 467627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 27 Williams' appeal was filed November 20, 1984 in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On July 22, 1985 Navy moved to transfer to the Federal Circuit under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1631. Williams opposed that motion. On August 14, 1985, the Fourth Circuit transferred the appeal, citing Wronke v. Marsh, 767 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.1985), and Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065 (D.C.Cir.1985). 28 In his opposition to Navy's motion, Williams said it was inaccurate to view his complaint as based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2) (the Little Tucker Act). Noting that he had waived all damages in excess of $10,000, Williams said [b]ecause the action is of an equitable nature, it was not brought pursuant to the Tucker Act, but under [28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1361] as the Court of Claims [sic] has no equitable jurisdiction. 6 As Williams' own assertions make clear, however, transfer in this case was proper. 29 The federal courts have the power, and the duty, to determine their own jurisdiction. Dubost v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 777 F.2d 1561, 1564, 227 USPQ 977, 979 (Fed.Cir.1985). Mere recitation of a basis for jurisdiction, by either a party or a court, cannot be controlling: federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, and may not alter the scope of either their own or another courts' statutory mandate. Chemical Engineering Corp. v. Marlo, Inc., 754 F.2d 331, 333 (Fed.Cir.1984). Substance, not form, is controlling: we look to the true nature of the action in the district court in determining jurisdiction of an appeal. Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d 973, 982 (Fed.Cir.1985); In Re Snap on Tools Corp., 720 F.2d 654 (Fed.Cir.1983). 30 As did the plaintiff in Maier v. Orr, supra, Williams: (1) alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1361; (2) added claims for money damages; and (3) waived recovery of damages in excess of $10,000 (originally in excess of $23,000) when challenged by the government, saying he did so to preserve jurisdiction in the district court. It is well-settled that a plaintiff ... should not be allowed to avoid the jurisdictional (and hence remedial) restrictions of the Tucker Act by casting its pleadings in terms that would enable a district court to exercise jurisdiction under a separate statute. Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967 (D.C.Cir.1982). And yet, that is precisely what Williams has attempted to do by labeling his suit as filed exclusively under 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1331 and 1361. 31 Because the substance of the pleadings define a suit for money damages and restitution under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2), Maier v. Orr, 754 F.2d at 982, we recharacterize the pleadings accordingly. See also Bockoven v. Marsh, 727 F.2d 1558 (Fed.Cir.1984). 32 As the Fourth Circuit's order correctly noted, the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction of any appeal from a judgment of a district court based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(a)(2). Presence of additional allegations, e.g. those of constitutional deprivation here, does not divest this court of its constitutionally granted jurisdiction of the entire case. To hold to the contrary would defeat the purposes of Congress in its enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub.L. No. 97-312, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). See Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Markey, Chief Judge, dissenting); Bray v. United States, 785 F.2d 989, No. 85-2614 (Fed.Cir.1986) (Order). Exclusive jurisdiction of this appeal therefore rests, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1295(a)(2) (1982), in this court. See Wronke v. Marsh, supra, 767 F.2d 354; Van Drasek v. Lehman, supra, 762 F.2d 1065; Professional Managers' Ass'n v. United States, 761 F.2d 740 (D.C.Cir.1985); Hahn v. United States, 757 F.2d 581, 587 n. 3 (3d Cir.1985); Wilson v. Turnage, 755 F.2d 967 (D.C.Cir.1985); Oliveira v. United States, 734 F.2d 760, 762 (11th Cir.1984).