Opinion ID: 572629
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McDonald's Contentions

Text: 84 McDonald contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction to the jury and in making certain evidentiary rulings, to wit, barring McDonald's character witnesses from testifying with respect to his relationship with his son and allowing other witnesses to be questioned hypothetically with respect to McDonald's commission of crimes. For the reasons below, we find no basis for reversal. 85
86 McDonald asked the trial court to charge the jury that defendants' representations that Environmental Contractors was licensed to deal with infectious medical waste were not fraudulent because defendants relied in good faith on the permits they possessed. Thus, he requested the court to instruct that whether or not Environmental Contractors's licenses were fraudulently or irregularly obtained, advertisements describing the company as being licensed w[ere] not false and that defendants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors as licensed. McDonald contends that the trial court's refusal to give this instruction was error. It was not. 87 The trial judge is not required to give a requested charge if it lacks a foundation in law, see, e.g., United States v. Tillem, 906 F.2d 814, 828 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Ouimette, 798 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 163, 102 L.Ed.2d 134 (1988), or lacks a foundation in the evidence adduced at trial, see United States v. Leonard, 524 F.2d 1076, 1084 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1737, 48 L.Ed.2d 202 (1976). Where the defendant requests a charge as to his defense of good faith, there is no basis for reversal where the court's instructions have properly explained the thrust of that defense. See, e.g., United States v. McElroy, 910 F.2d 1016, 1026 (2d Cir.1990); see also Cheek v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 604, 611, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (in criminal tax case, trial court should not instruct jury that, in order to negate willfulness, defendant's belief that enforcement of tax laws was unconstitutional must be objectively reasonable). 88 Here, the court gave the essence of a proper good-faith defense in its jury charge, stating as follows: 89 Under the antifraud statutes, even false representations or statements or omissions of material fact do not amount to a fraud unless done with fraudulent intent. However misleading or deceptive a plan may be, it is not fraudulent if it was devised or carried out in good faith. An honest belief in the truth of the representations made by a defendant is a good defense, no matter how inaccurate the statements may turn out to be. 90 (Trial Transcript, May 21, 1990, at 7069-70.) This general instruction was sufficient. The record did not warrant a charge, as McDonald requested, that the individual defendants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors as licensed. At the outset, Environmental Contractors represented that it was licensed when it was not. When doctors asked to see its license, defendants simply took another company's license and pasted Environmental Contractors's name on it, and distributed copies of the fabricated document. As a matter of law, defendants could not have had a good faith belief that their bogus document was an Environmental Contractors license. Given this record, for the court to have told the jury that defendants were entitled to describe Environmental Contractors as licensed would have been error. 91
92 McDonald, who did not testify at trial, presented only character evidence in his defense. In addition to producing witnesses to testify to his honesty and integrity, he sought to introduce evidence that his then-teenage son had been born with cerebral palsy and that McDonald had devoted his life to caring for the son, in order to persuade the jury that McDonald would never do anything to risk imprisonment thereby disabling himself from caring for the boy. He contends that the court erroneously excluded this evidence. We find no basis for reversal. 93 The admissibility of character evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir.) (Rarely and only upon a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will appellate courts disturb the rulings of trial courts in the admissibility of character evidence.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 906, 97 S.Ct. 1701, 52 L.Ed.2d 391 (1977). It is within the court's discretion to exclude evidence that is prejudicial, as well as evidence of specific acts intended to demonstrate character traits not at issue. United States v. Wilson, 750 F.2d 7, 9 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839, 107 S.Ct. 143, 93 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986). 94 Here, the court properly allowed McDonald's four character witnesses to testify to their opinions that McDonald was a forthright man of honesty whose integrity was beyond reproach. It was well within the court's discretion to draw the line to exclude testimony that had no bearing on his honesty or integrity and that could well cause the jury to be influenced by sympathies having no bearing on the merits of the case. 95 McDonald's other evidentiary contention is that the court improperly allowed the government to pose questions that assumed his guilt. In United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 539 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1695, 114 L.Ed.2d 89 (1991), decided after the trial of the present case, we held that lay character witnesses should not be asked guilt-assuming hypothetical questions. Here, one of the government's challenged questions was:Are you aware, Ms. Tanella, that on the permit application in the area, in the part of the permit application regarding the New Hanover Incinerator, John McDonald forged the name of another individual and wrote the name of another individual on that application? 96 (Trial Transcript, April 24, 1990, at 3761.) The government concedes that this question, though not in the form of a hypothetical, was improper under the spirit of this Court's ruling in Oshatz. We agree that the question was improper, but we regard this single improper question in the course of the 12-week trial as harmless error.