Opinion ID: 1985043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether a dissolution decree which leaves division of personal property to the parties, subject to certain guidelines, is a final judgment.

Text: Before we address the merits of Deborah's contentions on appeal concerning the 1995 decree, we must first consider William's motion to dismiss Deborah's appeal. William asserts that Deborah's appeal was not filed within the 30-day time period required by Iowa rule of appellate procedure 5(a). We must consider the motion first because we do not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal that was not filed within the 30-day time period. See Bellach v. IMT Ins. Co., 573 N.W.2d 903, 905 (Iowa 1998) (noting that appellate deadlines are mandatory and jurisdictional); Madyun v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 544 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1996) (untimely appeal deprives an appellate court of subject matter jurisdiction). A. To determine whether Deborah's appeal was filed in a timely manner, we must first decide whether the 1995 decree was a final judgment. If it was, she should have appealed within thirty days after entry of that decree. Our analysis starts with an examination of our rules of appellate procedure. Through our cases, we have articulated certain principles concerning those rules. First, pursuant to rule 1(a), only final judgments may be appealed. [1] A final judgment is one that `conclusively adjudicates all of the rights of the parties,' In re J.J.A., 580 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 357 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 1984)), and places the case beyond the power of the court to return the parties to their original positions. Ahls v. Sherwood/Division of Harsco Corp., 473 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1991). Second, pursuant to rule 5(a), appeals must be filed with our court within thirty days from entry of the order, judgment or decree. [2] Any appeals not so filed will be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. See id. (noting that remedy is dismissal of appeal when appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider appeal). We believe that our decision in the case of In re Fenchel, 268 N.W.2d 207 (Iowa 1978), clearly shows that the November 16, 1995 decree constitutes a final judgment. Relying on our prior decision in Shipley v. Shipley, 182 N.W.2d 125 (Iowa 1970), we stated in Fenchel that a final decree is the one in which the marriage is terminated. If review of the provisions of that decree is desired, appeal must be taken within 30 days of its entry. 268 N.W.2d at 209. In Fenchel, a dissolution decree was entered in August 1976 deciding all issues and ordering the husband to pay alimony, but it stated that alimony could be modified based on certain contingencies. More than a year after the decree was entered, the court entered a supplementary decree that modified the husband's alimony obligations. The husband appealed from the supplementary decree, challenging alimony payments, and the wife cross-appealed from both the original and supplemental decrees. On appeal, we concluded that the wife's cross appeal, concerning matters in the original decree, was not filed in a timely manner because it was not filed within thirty days from entry of the original decree and thus we had no jurisdiction over the wife's assignments of error concerning provisions of the original decree. Id. We did, however, examine the merits of the supplementary decree because the husband's appeal from entry of that decree was filed in a timely manner. Id. The situation in this case is almost identical to that of the parties in Fenchel. Here, the district court in the 1995 decree determined issues of custody, visitation, child support, spousal support, attorneys fees and costs, and divided the parties' real property, but, subject to certain guidelines, let the parties divide some of the personal property. The decree also stated that personal property items on which the parties could not agree would be sold at public auction with the proceeds to be divided equally between the parties. Thus, the November 1995 decree fully adjudicated the parties' rights that were at issue in the dissolution proceedings and reserved no issues for further determination. The parties, however, did not follow the terms of the decree concerning division of the parties' personal property. As a result, the district court entered a supplemental order in February 1997 in a contempt action, concerning how several items of personal property should be divided. Fenchel clearly provides authority that entry of the final decree on November 16, 1995 constituted a final judgment for purposes of Iowa rule of appellate procedure 1(a) and thus that date was the point at which the 30-day time period began to run concerning Deborah's right to appeal the terms of the 1995 decree. Id. Deborah did not file her notice of appeal until March 3, 1997, well after the thirty-day period expired following the 1995 decree. Deborah's appeal was not filed in a timely manner and we therefore have no jurisdiction to consider the issues raised therein concerning the original decree. B. Additionally, the fact that Deborah appealed the supplemental order within thirty days after it was entered cannot extend the time for appealing provisions of the 1995 decree. The Fenchel case so holds. Id. Accordingly, Deborah's appeal must be dismissed. See Uchtorff v. Dahlin, 363 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Iowa 1985) (noting that court is prohibited from enlarging the time for appeal except when allowed by Iowa rule of appellate procedure 20(b) due to failure by the clerk to notify appellant of entry of final judgment). Deborah's appeal from the February 6, 1997 ruling was filed in a timely manner because it was filed within thirty days after that ruling was entered. In her brief, however, Deborah makes no assignment of error concerning the terms of the February 6, 1997 ruling, which more specifically divided the parties' personal property. We therefore need not examine the terms of that ruling on appeal.