Opinion ID: 2980118
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relevant Disability Law

Text: 13 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. Under the ADA, “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).8 In order to “recover on a claim of discrimination under the [ADA], a plaintiff must show that: 1) he is an individual with a disability; 2) he is ‘otherwise qualified’ to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and 3) he was discharged solely by reason of his handicap.” Macy v. Hopkins Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 363 (6th Cir. 2007). The first step is determining whether the plaintiff has a disability. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1185 (6th Cir. 1996). In this regard, the ADA provides: (2) Disability “The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual-- (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 8 The TDA provides, “There shall be no discrimination in the hiring, firing, and other terms and conditions of employment of . . . any private employer . . . based solely upon any physical, mental or visual disability of the applicant, . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103(b). The elements of the TDA and the ADA are “very similar,” thus, a claim brought under the TDA is analyzed “under the same principles as those utilized for the [ADA].” See Bennett v. Nissan North America, Inc., 2009 WL 837726 at  (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished); Sasser v. Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp., 159 S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). 14 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. 42 U.S.C.§ 12102 (2008) (emphasis added).9 In this case, Jones claims he falls under§ 12102(2)(C) – that is, he claims not that he actually was disabled, but that he was so regarded by Nissan.10 “It is not enough that the employer regarded that individual as somehow disabled; rather, the plaintiff must show that the employer regarded the individual as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). Combining the requirements of subsections (A) and (C) of § 12102, Jones must show that Nissan regarded him as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities. As the Supreme Court explained, There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual – it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999), superseded by statute on other grounds, see n.9. Jones argues that he falls in the second category, that he had a physical impairment that did not substantially limit him in a major life activity. 9 In 2008, the ADA was modified by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The ADAAA broadened the definition of disability in § 12102. However, this court has determined that the ADAAA does not apply to pre-amendment conduct, making it inapplicable to this case. See Milholland v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d 562, 567 (6th Cir. 2009). 10 Tennessee has an equivalent “regarded as” provision. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21102(3)(A)(iii). 15 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc. The relevant major life activities in this case are lifting and “performing manual tasks,” a category that this court has found includes the use of hand tools, vibrating power tools, etc. See Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (lifting a major life activity); Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2001) (ability to perform manual tasks (including using “hand power tools” and “air vibrating power tools”) a major life activity). In order for Jones to be “substantially limited,” he would have to be: (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. Wysong, 503 F.3d at 450 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)).11 With respect to “regarded as” discrimination, this court explained in Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2000), that an employer is required to conduct an “individualized inquiry” into the plaintiff’s actual medical condition: The ADA mandates an individualized inquiry in determining whether an employee’s disability or other condition disqualifies him from a particular position. In order to properly evaluate a job applicant on the basis of his personal characteristics, the employer must conduct an individualized inquiry into the individual’s actual medical condition, and the impact, if any, the condition might have on that individual’s ability to perform the job in question. Id. at 643. 11 Alternatively, the major life activity of “working” may be at issue here. The definition for “substantially limits” specific to working is: “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” Wysong, 503 F.3d at 451 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). 16 No. 09-5786 Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc.