Opinion ID: 187080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brown's Acquitted Conduct

Text: Brown argues that the district court erred in imposing a four-point upward adjustment to his base offense level based on his acquitted conduct. Applying de novo review, we held in Dorcely that a sentencing court may base a sentence on acquitted conduct without offending the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 454 F.3d at 371; see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997) (sentencing court's consideration of acquitted conduct does not violate double jeopardy clause). We concluded that consideration of acquitted conduct violates the Sixth Amendment only if the judge imposes a sentence that exceeds what the jury verdict authorizes. 454 F.3d at 371. Brown's conviction on the felonin-possession count authorized a sentence of imprisonment of not more than 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Because he was sentenced to only 96 months' imprisonment, the district court was authorized to rely on Brown's acquitted conduct.