Opinion ID: 3001537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill App.2d 317 (1963) (same).

Text: 14 No. 07-1945 Moreover, under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 820, such suits are also appropriate, in that one who withdraws naturally necessary subjacent support of another’s land is subject to liability. If subsidence occurs, the action is complete and the party that withdraws the support is strictly liable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 820(1), cmt. g. In this instance, Peabody became liable as soon as it withdrew the natural support for Ambrosia’s land. It is undisputed that Peabody was not sued for its acts or omissions related to construction activities. Instead, Peabody was sued in its capacity as owner of the mineral estate at the time of the withdrawal of support. This garners further support for the inapplicability of § 13214 to the claims against Peabody, because the statute of repose does not apply to suits against a landowner solely as a landowner. See DeMarco v. Ecklund, 341 Ill.App.3d 225, 275 Ill.Dec. 173, 792 N.E.2d 404, 406-07 (2003) (a landowner must face suit for an act or omission in a construction-related activity in order for § 13-214(b) to come into play); Kamp v. Preis, 332 Ill.App.3d 1115, 266 Ill.Dec. 426, 774 N.E.2d 865, 873 (2002) (same); MBA Enterprises, 240 Ill.Dec. 500, 717 N.E.2d at 851 (§ 13-214(b) does not apply to an action against a landowner be- cause action was based on landowner’s ongoing duty of care, and not on construction-related activities); Prochnow v. El Paso Golf Club, Inc., 253 Ill.App.3d 387, 192 Ill.Dec. 614, 625 N.E.2d 769, 773 (1993) (the allegations of the complaint were based on the ownership of the property rather than on any of the enumerated activities in § 13-214(b)); C.S. Johnson Co. v. Champaign Nat’l Bank, 126 Ill.App.3d 508, 81 Ill.Dec. 663, 467 N.E.2d 363, 365 (1984) (§ 13-214 does not apply to defendants for damage to property where action is based on the defendant’s status as a landowner, and not one of the enumerated activities in the statute). No. 07-1945 15 We believe the claims against Peabody have been mischaracterized from the beginning. To the extent the claims are for damages against Peabody for constructionrelated activities enumerated by § 13-214(b), the statute of repose would apply to bar the claim, because a coal mine is an “improvement to real property” within the meaning of the statute and Illinois case law interpreting it. However, to the extent the claim is one for damages against Peabody as a landowner (which we believe is the case) for withdrawal of subjacent support under Illinois law, as well as withdrawal of subjacent support that is “naturally necessary” for the support of surface property in another’s possession under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 820, the statute of repose does not apply, because a claim of this sort is not premised upon one of the acts or omissions enumerated in the statute.3 The district court below focused on whether the coal mine was an “improvement to real property,” in that there was no dispute of fact that the mining affecting the property occurred over forty years prior to the suit. The court, however, failed to address the other requirement for the application of § 13-214—whether Peabody was a party engaged in any of the enumerated activities protected under the statute. Our de novo review is limited to legal issues and conclusions. West Allis Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Bowen, 852 F.2d 251, 258 (7th Cir. 1988). We may decide the merits 3 Reviewing Ambrosia’s complaint, the negligence claim against Peabody may also fall under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821, which applies where the withdrawal of subjacent support that is not “naturally necessary,” but rather, is necessary to support the surface land and its artificial additions. 16 No. 07-1945 of legal issues which were not addressed by the district court only when the facts on which those conclusions are based are not in dispute. Id; see also K and N Engineering, Inc. v. Bulat, 510 F.3d 1079, 1081 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (a court of appeals may exercise its discretion to review issue that had not been raised before district court, where issue involves purely legal question of statutory interpretation and pertinent record has been fully developed); Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 97 (3d Cir. 2008) (a district court’s failure to consider an issue below does not necessarily preclude the Court of Appeals from addressing it; however, it is only appropriate for it to do so when the factual record is developed and the issues present purely legal questions, upon which an appellate court exercises plenary review). Peabody was sued in its capacity as the owner of the Mine, not as a party engaging in construction-related activities. Therefore, we find that, as a matter of law, § 13214(b) does not bar Plaintiffs’s claims against Peabody.