Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay in Hiring Mental Health Expert

Text: First, counsel hired Dr. Reynolds only three weeks prior to trial and met with him only two days before he testified, despite the fact that counsel was assigned to this case two years in advance of trial. Under the American Bar Association Guidelines, preparation for the sentencing phase, in the form of investigation, should begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case. ABA Guidelines 11.8.3 (1989). The reason for the ABA's direction is obvious  there must be sufficient time for interviews, research, and adequate testing before strategic planning can even begin. Additionally, if counsel waits until immediately before trial, it is too late to correct any invalid tests or to pursue leads discovered during the testing process, a requirement for counsel to be effective. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 392, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (effective counsel would have conducted further investigation after discovering red flags in initial investigation). The rush to prepare will invariably lead to unnoticed and untapped resources. Mr. Wilson's case exemplifies the problems with delaying the investigation. Dr. Reynolds did not have time to conduct additional testing to confirm a diagnosis of schizophrenia, nor could the defense team gather collateral evidence that might provide insight into Mr. Wilson's psychology. In his affidavit, Dr. Reynolds states flatly that I needed additional testing, and further collateral data to support [a schizophrenia] diagnosis but [u]nfortunately, there wasn't enough time. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 4. He further stated that, with the additional family information provided by appellate counsel after conviction and the additional testing he could then perform, he was able to reach a more accurate diagnosis, id. at ¶ 7, and that this would have improved his testimony enormously and helped the jury better understand Micheal's [sic] emotional illness and how he could have participated in the crime. Id. at ¶ 15. He stated his opinion that among the most important and significant data to tell the jury was Mr. Wilson's diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder, or schizophrenia. Id. at ¶ 14; see also id. at ¶ 8 (Mr. Wilson meets the criterion for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, paranoid type....). Time constraints due to counsel's tardy preparation precluded this more accurate and helpful diagnosis and testimony. Id. at ¶ 4. In Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir.2007), we concluded that trial counsel in a capital case was constitutionally ineffective, partly on the ground that the investigator assigned to investigate the case in mitigation did not begin his work until the month before trial. Id. at 1143. Citing the 2003 version of the ABA Guidelines 10.7 Commentary, the Court regarded this delay as indicative of ineffectiveness, even without specific evidence regarding the consequences of delay. Id. (The mitigation investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may affect the investigation of first phase defenses..., decisions about the need for expert evaluations ..., motion practice, and plea negotiations.). We regard the timeliness of engagement of expert evaluators as no less important. The Ninth Circuit reversed a denial of habeas corpus on grounds of ineffective assistance in a case with similar facts. In Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.1997), defense counsel contacted a psychiatric expert twenty days before trial  a period almost identical to the three weeks in this case. Because counsel did not acquire the services of this key witness until days before trial, a hurried and inaccurate report resulted. Id. at 1277. The court roundly rejected the claim that delay of this sort could be regarded as strategic, commenting that this would `strip[ ] that term of all substance.' Id. (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994)). The court concluded: The complete lack of effort by Bloom's trial counsel to obtain a psychiatric expert until days before trial, combined with counsel's failure to adequately prepare his expert and then present him as a trial witness, was constitutionally deficient performance. Id. Below, we explain why this case, like Bloom, involved inadequate preparation and presentation of the expert witness, as well as delay in engagement. We are, therefore, driven to the same conclusion. Judge Tymkovich argues, in dissent, that the decision not to readminister the MMPI-2 test or collect collateral data was attributable not to the lack of time, but to Dr. Reynolds' failure to recommend further testing to counsel: Wilson's counsel appropriately relied on Dr. Reynolds to decide how many rounds of mental health testing should be conducted. The record does not reveal that Dr. Reynolds ever advised counsel further testing beyond the initial round was necessary or advisable. Diss. Op. 1133-34; see also id. at 1144 (counsel did not consider additional tests and interviews necessary). We do not read the record that way. According to his affidavit, Dr. Reynolds administered the MMPI-2 test during the first battery of testing, but (for an unexplained reason) the results were invalid. [B]ecause his first MMPI-2 was invalid, Dr. Reynolds explains, I needed additional testing, and further collateral data to support this diagnosis. Unfortunately, there wasn't enough time to obtain this information before trial. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 4. The failure to retest had nothing to do with whether Dr. Reynolds advised counsel further testing beyond the initial round was necessary or advisable. Dr. Reynolds did not need authorization from counsel to redo the invalid test. According to his affidavit, his inability to administer the MMPI-2 a second time was due to the lack of time. That was counsel's fault for not engaging Dr. Reynolds until just before trial. The dissent also suggests that no negative consequences flowed from the late hiring because [i]f counsel had considered further investigation necessary, he could have sought a continuance or conducted what further investigation was possible in the time remaining. Diss. Op. 1144 (emphasis omitted). Perhaps so, but that does not make his performance any less ineffective. It might well be regarded as exacerbating counsel's ineffective performance that he did not take any steps to repair the damage of his late start even when the consequences became apparent. Dr. Reynolds, in his affidavit, stated as follows: Evaluations were performed on 1-22-97, 1-29-97, and 2-06-97. Results were made available to defense counsel shortly after February 7th, 1997. Pet. Addendum 2, at ¶ 13. The MMPI-2 test provided some evidence for a diagnosis of schizophrenia, id. at ¶ 4, but was invalid and had to be administered again. If counsel did not grasp the importance of obtaining an accurate diagnosis and deliberately chose to do nothing, as the dissent seems to suggest, this is but confirmation of his lack of understanding of the role of mental health evidence in the mitigation phase of a capital trial. In any event, it is far from clear that if counsel had requested a continuance, the judge would have granted the motion. The trial court might well have been reluctant to keep the jury sitting additional days so late into an already lengthy trial on account of a problem caused by counsel's own dilatoriness.