Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: 2. Disclosure of Agreement

Text: First thing in the morning on May 18, 1995, the day after Nissen testified, defense counsel informed the court that he had asked for a copy of Nissen's sentencing agreement and that the special prosecutor would not provide one. After being ordered by the court to put a copy of the document in Lotter's file, the special prosecutor stated, I'm not gonna file it I guess is my position. Nonetheless, after further discussion, the special prosecutor did agree to place a copy in Nissen's file. Lotter argues that the special prosecutor's failure to disclose the written sentencing agreement until after Nissen's testimony violated the U.S. Constitution and § 29-1912. During his direct testimony, Nissen did not mention that certain felony charges against him would be dismissed in exchange for his testimony. Although we have stated that [a] defendant in a criminal proceeding has no general due process right to discovery, State v. Tuttle, 238 Neb. 827, 834, 472 N.W.2d 712, 717 (1991), that a criminal defendant has a right to certain disclosure is made clear by Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). [F]avorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, `if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Four aspects of materiality under Bagley bear emphasis: Although the constitutional duty is triggered by the potential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence, a showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal (whether based on the presence of reasonable doubt or acceptance of an explanation for the crime that does not inculpate the defendant).... Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result, and the adjective is important.... A reasonable probability of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. ... The second aspect of Bagley materiality bearing emphasis here is that it is not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict.... Third ... once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless-error review.... The fourth and final aspect of Bagley materiality to be stressed here is its definition in terms of suppressed evidence considered collectively, not item by item. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 434-36, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Bagley decision is its holding that evidence that might be used to impeach the prosecution's witnesses is `evidence favorable to the accused' ... so that, if disclosed and used effectively, it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, quoting Brady v. Maryland, supra . See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). See, also, Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 445, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (stating that the effective impeachment of one eyewitness can call for a new trial even though the attack does not extend directly to others); State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 674, 335 N.W.2d 542, 547 (1983) (stating that [m]atters affecting the credibility of a critical or major witness are material to the defense in a criminal case). The testimony of codefendants rendered pursuant to a plea agreement has long been suspect, see NJI2d Crim. 5.6, and a plea or sentencing agreement is clearly relevant to impeachment. Having determined that prosecutorial inducements given to a witness to testify fall within the purview of Brady v. Maryland, supra , the question is whether the document detailing Nissen's sentencing agreement was material. At trial, when asked about the contents of the agreement, Nissen failed to testify to the fact that the agreement also provided that a presentence report would not be compiled, that a three-judge panel would not be convened, that the additional felony charges filed against him would be dismissed, that he sought assurances from the judge that the court would honor the agreement, and that his sentencing would occur after Lotter's. In U.S. v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511 (D.C.Cir. 1996), the court held that the prosecution's failure to disclose certain aspects of a testifying codefendant's plea agreement was a material Brady violation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The prosecution had disclosed via letter to defense counsel that a plea agreement had been struck that dismissed several counts against the codefendant in exchange for his plea of guilty to one count and his testimony against the defendant. The letter did not disclose that the prosecution had dismissed two other felony counts against the codefendant, nor did it disclose certain evidence regarding the codefendant's psychiatric history. On appeal, the government argued that the unrevealed dismissal of the two felony counts amounted merely to cumulative impeachment material and that absent the codefendant's testimony, the result would have been the same. The court rejected the notion that the result would have been the same even if the codefendant had not testified, noting that [t]here is no way to know this. U.S. v. Smith, 77 F.3d at 515. The court pointed out that the materiality test is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test, stating that the relevant inquiry is whether the undisclosed information could have substantially affected the efforts of defense counsel to impeach the witness, thereby calling into question the fairness of the ultimate verdict. Id. In answering this question, the Smith court noted that defense counsel was able to cross-examine the codefendant concerning the dismissal of 10 charges against the codefendant and his guilty plea to 1 charge. However, the Smith court rejected the government's assertion that any further cross-examination on the two additional charges would have been merely cumulative: `[T]he fact that other impeachment evidence was available to defense counsel does not render additional impeachment evidence immaterial.' Id., quoting United States v. O'Conner, 64 F.3d 355 (8th Cir.1995). According to the court, one must look not to the ways defense counsel was able to impeach [the codefendant], but to the ways in which the witness' testimony was allowed to stand unchallenged. Id. In Smith, supra, the unchallenged testimony was the codefendant's assertion that the only inducements he was receiving for his testimony were those contained in the plea letter. According to the court, if defense counsel had full knowledge of the plea, he could have pursued devastating cross-examination... suggesting that the witness might have deliberately concealed the other favors from the Government that were not in the written plea agreement. 77 F.3d at 516. The court concluded that the potential impact of such a cross-examination was sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial and, thus, required reversal. According to the court's analysis in Smith, supra, evidence that Nissen, an accomplice who was receiving the benefit of a dismissal of serious charges in order to testify, failed to testify to the dismissal of those charges is material. If defense counsel had Nissen's sentencing document during Nissen's cross-examination, defense counsel could have pursued a more effective cross-examination. Finally, we note that the prosecution's evident concern about disclosing the document is strong evidence that the document was material, exculpatory evidence. See United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1986). Thus, we conclude that the sentencing document was material. The materiality of Nissen's sentencing agreement is not, however, dispositive. Because Lotter's counsel had access to the agreement prior to the conclusion of the trial, the question is whether the belated nature of the disclosure was sufficient to constitute a constitutional violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that [w]here the prosecution delays disclosure of evidence, but the evidence is nonetheless disclosed during trial, Brady is not violated. U.S. v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir.1996). See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). The First Circuit has held that belated disclosure may violate Brady: [T]he critical question was whether the delay had `prevented [the material's] effective use by the defense' ... and that some showing of prejudice was required beyond mere assertions that the defendant would have conducted cross-examination differently. U.S. v. Walsh, 75 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.1996). To determine whether the belated disclosure of material evidence amounts to a constitutional violation, the 11th Circuit has considered the reasons for the delay in complying with discovery, whether there was any bad faith on the part of the prosecution, whether there was prejudice to the defendant, and the availability of a means to cure the prejudice, including continuances and recesses. U.S. v. Turner, 871 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1989). We find the Eighth Circuit's rule to be the most persuasive. Applying the Eighth Circuit's rule to the instant case, we can conclude only that there was no constitutional violation, because the material evidence was disclosed prior to the close of trial. Nonetheless, in Nebraska, discovery in criminal cases is also governed by statute. [D]iscovery in a criminal case is generally, and in the absence of a constitutional requirement, controlled by either a statute or court rule. State v. Tuttle, 238 Neb. 827, 834, 472 N.W.2d 712, 717 (1991). This court has addressed the discovery rights of a criminal defendant under § 29-1912 and has defined materiality more broadly than the U.S. Constitution, which requires a reasonable probability of a different result. See State v. Brown, 214 Neb. 665, 335 N.W.2d 542 (1983). While Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), impose a constitutional mandate for disclosure in criminal cases, a statutory design for discovery such as § 29-1912 can exact more than the constitutional minimum, so that courts must focus on information potentially useful to the defense.... Under § 29-1912, whether a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence results in prejudice depends on whether the information sought is material to the preparation of the defense, meaning that there is a strong indication that such information will play an important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding preparation of witnesses, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or rebuttal. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Kula, 252 Neb. 471, 486, 562 N.W.2d 717, 727 (1997). Thus, under § 29-1912, evidence is material when there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in, among other things, assisting impeachment or rebuttal. State v. Dyer, 245 Neb. 385, 513 N.W.2d 316 (1994); State v. Brown, 214 Neb. at 674, 335 N.W.2d at 547 (stating that [m]atters affecting the credibility of a critical or major witness are material to the defense in a criminal case). As we have already determined that due to its impeachment value, the sentencing agreement was material under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), it necessarily meets the important role standard of § 29-1912. However, as in the constitutional context, the document's materiality under § 29-1912 is not dispositive. We must still determine whether the prosecution's delay in disclosure violated § 29-1912. In State v. Kula, supra , the trial judge ordered that the prosecutor turn over police reports prepared during an investigation of two suspects other than the defendant. The prosecutor did not release these reports until the first day of trial. This court held that the reports were material because they would have led to the discovery of other witnesses and that it was error not to grant a continuance to the defendant in light of the prosecution's delay in producing the reports. It follows that the holding in Kula was premised on the trial court's failure to grant the requested continuance, not on the discovery violation itself. Thus, although Kula clearly indicates that belated disclosure may violate § 29-1912, see, also, State v. Neujahr, 248 Neb. 965, 540 N.W.2d 566 (1995), it also indicates that in some circumstances, the prejudice caused by such a disclosure may be remedied by a properly granted continuance. If a continuance would not have been a sufficient remedy for the belated disclosure in Kula, this court could not have concluded that the trial court had erred in failing to grant the continuance. Indeed, the issue would never have been reached, because the discovery violation would have required reversal in and of itself. Obviously, a continuance will not cure every instance of belated disclosure (lost or destroyed evidence, missing witnesses, et cetera). Nonetheless, when a continuance will cure the prejudice caused by belated disclosure, a continuance should be requested by counsel and granted by the trial court. See U.S. v. Turner, 871 F.2d 1574 (11th Cir.1989). In the instant case, the prosecution's delay in the disclosure of Nissen's sentencing document, like the prosecution's delay in the disclosure of the police reports in Kula, violated § 29-1912. However, the belated disclosure in the instant case was likewise remediable by continuance, which would have given Lotter's counsel time to analyze the document and recall Nissen, who was still available for further cross-examination. Although defense counsel had earlier sought two continuances regarding Nissen's testimony, defense counsel failed to do so for the purpose of analyzing a copy of the sentencing agreement. Therefore, we conclude that under the circumstances in the instant case, Lotter's failure to seek a continuance and further cross-examine Nissen, who was available, waived any rights he may have had pursuant to § 29-1912.