Opinion ID: 761781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Erroneous Charge on Money Laundering

Text: 31 During the jury charge, the trial court recited incorrect subsections of the domestic and international money laundering statute. In its charge on domestic money laundering, the district court recited the elements of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) in place of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); instead of stating that the transaction need occur with knowledge that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature of the proceeds, the court instructed the jury on the entirely different element that the transaction need occur with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity. 32 On the international money laundering charge, instead of charging § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), the district court recited the elements of the domestic laundering section, § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). This error was less serious; both sections contained the element that the transaction be designed to conceal the proceeds from a specified unlawful activity, although the charge as given excluded the element that the transmittal of funds need be into or outside of the United States. 33 We review a jury charge in its entirety and not on the basis of excerpts taken out of context. United States v. Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d 1283, 1290 (2d Cir.) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 950, 117 S.Ct. 362, 136 L.Ed.2d 253 (1996). When, as here, the defendants did not object to the charge and the error is trial error and not structural, we review the trial court's charge for plain error. See United States v. Knoll, 116 F.3d 994, 999 (2d Cir.1997). 34 Under United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), a reversal is required where there is (1) unpreserved error, that (2) is plain; (3) affects a substantial right; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. See id. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). In Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 1550, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), the Court held that where there was no showing of a miscarriage of justice, the fourth prong of Olano would not be satisfied. Under the plain error standard, we examine a jury instruction to see if it caused a miscarriage of justice when viewed as a whole and in the context of the entire trial. See United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir.1994). 35 As we stated above, the multiplicitous charging of domestic and international money laundering requires the dismissal of either the domestic or the international counts. Instead of remanding the case so that the district court could dismiss either the domestic or international charges, we dismiss the remaining domestic money laundering counts against Roz Ben Zvi due to the substantial problems with the domestic money laundering instruction. As we have reversed all of the domestic money laundering charges against defendants as either time-barred or multiplicitous, we need not consider further whether the error in the domestic money laundering instruction, in and of itself, amounted to reversible plain error. 36 Turning to the error in the charge on international money laundering, we find that it did not rise to the level of plain error. Viewing the instructions in their entirety, we find that the correct elements of international money laundering were twice read by the court to the jury from the indictment, and the jury took the indictment into their jury room deliberations. See Vebeliunas, 76 F.3d at 1290 (trial court's insertion of erroneous aspects of crime ameliorated by fact that trial court stated the correct law twice). Moreover, after the jury retired to deliberate, it specifically asked the district court to explain the difference between the two money laundering charges. The district court accurately responded that the domestic laundering charge referred to a financial transaction whereas the international laundering charge required that funds be transferred from outside the United States into the United States, and that otherwise the two crimes were the same. Finally, we note that the laundering transactions alleged in the indictment all involved overseas transfers of funds (a fact to which the parties stipulated). Accordingly, having found that the transfers occurred, the jury necessarily found that they were overseas transfers into the United States. 37 Based on the foregoing, we find that the erroneous jury instruction on international money laundering could not have resulted in a miscarriage of justice and, therefore, was not plain error. 38