Opinion ID: 392678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicable Law Unravelling the Tangled Constitutional Skein

Text: As Justice Rehnquist once observed, the law governing warrantless searches and seizures, especially those involving vehicles, is something less than a seamless web. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Eight years later the courts are still trying to extricate themselves from that tangle. As a general rule, a search of private property must, under the Fourth Amendment, be both reasonable and performed pursuant to a properly issued search warrant. However, a so-called automobile exception to the warrant requirement has been recognized. Relying on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), the Supreme Court held that it was constitutionally permissible for law-enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile stopped on a public highway where the officers had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. The Supreme Court subsequently explained the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in terms of a vehicle's inherent mobility rather than its actual mobility and in terms of the diminished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2484, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). In Chadwick, the Supreme Court stated that it had recognized significant differences between motor vehicles and other property which permit warrantless searches of automobiles in circumstances in which warrantless searches would not be reasonable in other contexts. Id., 433 U.S. at 12, 97 S.Ct. at 2484. There, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the warrantless search of a locked footlocker that had been removed by federal agents from the trunk of a parked automobile and taken downtown to the federal building before it was searched. Although the footlocker had been lawfully seized at the time of the arrest of its owners and although the agents had probable cause to search it, the agents' failure to obtain a search warrant rendered the search invalid. The Court rejected the government's invitation to fashion, by analogy to the automobile-search cases, an exception to the warrant requirement for personal luggage. Chadwick indicated that an individual had a legitimate expectation of privacy that the contents of his luggage would remain free from public examination. Id., 433 U.S. at 11, 97 S.Ct. at 2483. The Court found that, unlike the situation with an automobile, an immediate search of luggage constituted a far greater interference with the rights of the owner than its seizure and indefinite immobilization. Id., 433 U.S. at 13-14 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. at 2484-2485 n. 8. Absent exigent circumstances or some other exception to the warrant requirement, then, a warrant had to be obtained prior to the search of an arrestee's luggage once it came under the exclusive control of the arresting officer. The strands of confusion spun by the Chadwick opinion spawned Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). Sanders dealt with the warrantless search of a suitcase immediately after it had been seized from a moving taxicab under circumstances where law-enforcement officers had probable cause to believe that the suitcase contained contraband. Unlike the car in Chadwick, the taxicab was actually moving before the seizure, and not parked, 5 so that the suitcase was taken directly from the vehicle. The Supreme Court characterized the question before it as whether the warrantless search of respondent's suitcase falls on the Chadwick or the Chambers/Carroll side of the Fourth Amendment line. Id., 442 U.S. at 757, 99 S.Ct. at 2589. The Court found that a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on a highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. The Court therefore found no justification for the extension of the automobile exception to the warrantless search of personal luggage merely because it was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police. Accordingly, the Court held that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applied to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree that it applied to such luggage in other locations. Thus, insofar as the police were entitled to search such luggage without a warrant, their actions had to be justified under some exception to the warrant requirement other than that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway. The applicability of Chadwick to containers other than luggage was the constitutional thread left hanging by Sanders. As to containers other than luggage, the Court stated: Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, some containers (for example a kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the contents of a package will be open to plain view, thereby obviating the need for a warrant. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (88 S.Ct. 992, 993, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067) (1968) (per curiam ). There will be difficulties in determining which parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and which do not. Our decision in this case means only that a warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched and that the extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from an automobile. Id., 442 U.S. at 764-65 n. 13, 99 S.Ct. at 2593-2594 n. 13. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, speculated on the constitutional tangle to be generated by Sanders: The Court today ... while purporting to clarify the confusion occasioned by Chadwick, creates in my mind, only greater difficulties ... Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be litigated are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind of container. Id., 442 U.S. at 768, 99 S.Ct. at 2595. Justice Blackmun's prediction concerning Sanders' loose ends has proved to be all too accurate. 6 The Supreme Court's most recent attempt to untangle this constitutional snarl is Robbins v. California, U.S. ----, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981). 7 Robbins involved the warrantless search of a recessed luggage compartment in the rear of a station wagon. After stopping the erratically driven vehicle, smelling marijuana smoke, and finding marijuana in the passenger compartment, the policemen searched the luggage compartment and found a tote bag and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic. The policemen unwrapped the packages and found additional marijuana. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court found that the warrantless opening of the packages was constitutionally impermissible. However, the decision generates further confusion in the area of searches, as only 4 justices joined the plurality opinion Justices Stewart, Brennan, White, and Marshall. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment without giving his reasons, and Justice Powell filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, rejected the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects only containers commonly used to transport personal effects. He rejected the distinction made in numerous decisions between pieces of sturdy luggage, like suitcases, and flimsier containers, like cardboard boxes. Id., --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 2844. Referring to footnote 13 of the Sanders opinion, the plurality held that, unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view, those contents are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id., --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 2846. 8 Justice Powell summarized the plurality's holding as follows: 1 The plurality's bright-line rule would extend the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment to every closed, opaque container, without regard to size, shape or whether common experience would suggest that the owner was asserting a privacy interest in its contents. The plurality would exempt from the broad reach of its rule only those closed, opaque containers where, because of shape or some other characteristic, the contents may be said to be in plain view. In accordance with the plurality's usage I use the term container to include any and all packages, bags, boxes, tins, bottles and the like. 2 Id., --- U.S. at ---- n. 1, 101 S.Ct. at 2847 n. 1. However, Justice Powell stated that he could not join the plurality opinion because (i)t would require officers to obtain warrants in order to examine the contents of insubstantial containers in which no one had a reasonable expectation of privacy. Id., --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 2847. 3 Justice Powell read Chadwick and Sanders as requiring the police to obtain a warrant to search the contents of a container only when the container is one that generally serves as a repository for personal effects or that has been sealed in a manner manifesting a reasonable expectation that the contents will not be open to public scrutiny. Id., --- U.S. at ----, 101 S.Ct. at 2849. In determining whether a defendant had manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a container, the court should consider 4 the size, shape, material, and condition of the exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the container, that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple mischance. A prudent officer will err on the side of respecting ambiguous assertions of privacy, ... and a realistic court seldom should second-guess the good faith judgment of the officer in the field when the public consequently must suffer from the suppression of probative evidence.... 5 Id., --- U.S. at ---- n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 2850 n. 3. Nevertheless, Justice Powell concurred in the judgment because Robbins, by securely wrapping and sealing his package, had manifested a desire that the public not casually observe the contents and because (o)ur society's traditional respect for the privacy of locked or sealed containers confirms the reasonableness of this expectation. Id., --- U.S. at ---- n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 2850 n. 3.