Opinion ID: 794817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Lin's Asylum Claim

Text: 10 Subject to certain exceptions not relevant here, the INA requires that an asylum-seeker demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that she has filed her application within one year of entering the country. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Lin testified that she entered the United States on October 23, 1998. She also submitted an affidavit from her husband in which he stated that they reunited in the United States in October 1998. Since Lin applied for asylum in June 1999, her application would be timely if her testimony and her husband's affidavit were credited. The IJ held, however, that Lin's testimony, standing alone, was inadequate in light of his adverse credibility finding, and that her husband's affidavit must be given diminished weight because he was not present in the courtroom and available for cross-examination. 11 The INA provides that [n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under [§ 1158(a)(2)]. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). We recently construed this language to deprive our Court of jurisdiction to review discretionary and factual determinations made by an IJ or the BIA pursuant to § 1158(a)(2). Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 154. To the extent that Lin challenges the IJ's credibility determination as it relates to her claimed date of entry, therefore, we are without jurisdiction to review his rejection of her application as untimely. See Secaida-Rosales v. INS, 331 F.3d 297, 307 (2d Cir.2003) (Generally, courts have treated credibility questions in deportation proceedings as questions of fact . . . .). 12 Lin styles her timeliness argument, however, not as a challenge to the IJ's credibility determination, but as a constitutional claim. Lin contends that due process requires that an IJ's determination that an asylum-seeker has not met her burden of proof as to timeliness be based on some evidentiary quantity and not on the IJ's own unsupported and arbitrary opinion. Petr.'s Br. at 16. Lin's argument amounts to a claim that the IJ held her to an impermissibly high burden of proof, and that this violates her constitutional right to due process. 13 Since Lin challenges the constitutionality of the IJ's decisionmaking process, we have jurisdiction to review her claim in light of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (REAL ID Act). See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 154-55 (interpreting REAL ID Act § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), as providing jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals to review constitutional claims or matters of statutory construction, even in the context of one-year bar determinations). We have not had occasion to decide whether an IJ's discretionary determination that an alien failed to proffer credible evidence adequate to her burden of proof may constitute a due process violation. Cf. Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 659 (9th Cir.2003) (finding a due process violation where the BIA made an adverse credibility finding sua sponte on direct review, after the IJ made no such finding, because the BIA had failed to provid[e] [the petitioner] with notice that his credibility was at issue and in what specific respect his credibility was being questioned). But assuming arguendo that an IJ's egregious disregard of applicable standards or procedures in making a credibility determination might acquire constitutional dimension — a determination we need not, and hence do not, make here — we find no such violation in this case. Under the circumstances presented, we cannot say that the IJ's determination that Lin failed to prove her date of entry by clear and convincing evidence was arbitrary or denied [her] a full and fair opportunity to present her claims. Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 155; accord Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1087 (7th Cir.2004) (Due process requires that an applicant receive a full and fair hearing which provides a meaningful opportunity to be heard.). 14 Because we do not disturb the IJ's finding that Lin's asylum application is untimely, our review is limited to Lin's claim for withholding of removal under the INA. 3 See Xiao Ji Chen, 434 F.3d at 155 ([E]ligibility for withholding of removal is not subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B)'s one-year bar and, accordingly, must be considered by the BIA regardless of the timeliness of the initial asylum request.). 15