Opinion ID: 2619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Challenges to the Restitution Order

Text: The district court, proceeding under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, ordered Douglas to pay $5,031.44 in restitution to Moran's father (Moran Sr.), comprising $1,280 for unreimbursed funeral expenses and $3,751.44 for income lost by Moran Sr. as a result of his use of annual leave in order to participate in the investigation into the death of his son and attend the related court proceedings. The court ordered Douglas to pay $6,050 in restitution to Brink's, comprising $4,150 that Brink's paid for a headstone for Moran, plus $1,900 it paid to Moran Sr. to reimburse him for funeral-home expenses. Douglas contends (1) that the restitution award should be vacated in its entirety because it was entered more than 90 days after he was sentenced, and (2) that the awards to Brink's and the award of lost income to Moran Sr. were not authorized by the statute. There being no challenges to the court's arithmetic calculations or the evidence to support them, Douglas's restitution challenges raise only issues of law, which we review de novo, see, e.g., United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir.2006), and we find them to be without merit. The provisions governing the procedures for the issuance of restitution orders state, inter alia, that if a victim's losses are not ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to sentencing, the court may order restitution by a date not to exceed 90 days after sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5). In the present case, Douglas was sentenced on January 31, 2006; the 90th day thereafter was May 1; the amended judgment imposing the restitution order was not entered until May 5. We have noted, however, that the purpose behind the statutory ninety-day limit on the determination of victims' losses is not to protect defendants from drawn-out sentencing proceedings or to establish finality; rather, it is to protect crime victims from the willful dissipation of defendants' assets. United States v. Zakhary, 357 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir.) ( Zakhary ), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1092, 124 S.Ct. 2833, 159 L.Ed.2d 259 (2004). Accordingly, we have held that an extension of the proceedings beyond the 90-day period provides no basis for vacating the restitution order unless the defendant can show that the extension caused him actual prejudice. See id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 187, 199 (4th Cir.) (the procedural requirements of § 3664 are intended to protect victims, not the victimizers (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 856, 126 S.Ct. 134, 163 L.Ed.2d 133 (2005). Douglas has provided no indication that he was in any way prejudiced by the fact that the restitution order was entered on May 5, 2006, rather than May 1, and his challenge to the order's timeliness is thus rejected. Nor do we find merit in any of Douglas's substantive challenges. The MVRA provides that with respect to a defendant convicted of an offense described in § 3663A(c)which includes any offense. . . in which an identifiable victim . . . has suffered a physical injury, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B)the court shall order. . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense or, if the victim is deceased, to the victim's estate, id. § 3663A(a)(1). For purposes of § 3663A, victim means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered. . . . In the case of a victim who is . . . deceased, the . . . representative of the victim's estate, another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, may assume the victim's rights under this section. . . . Id. § 3663A(a)(2). As to the types of expenses to be compensated, subsection (b) of § 3663A provides, in pertinent part, that the restitution order is to require that the defendant, in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury that results in the death of the victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services; and (4) in any case, reimburse the victim for lost income . . . and other expenses incurred during participation in the investigation or prosecution of the offense or attendance at proceedings related to the offense. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(b)(3) and (4). In addition, [i]f a victim has received compensation from insurance or any other source with respect to a loss, the court shall order that restitution be paid to the person who provided or is obligated to provide the compensation . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(1). In objecting to the restitution award to Brink's, Douglas relies on a statement in Zakhary that `defendants have a due process interest in paying restitution only for losses actually sustained by victims ' (Douglas brief on appeal at 62 (quoting 357 F.3d at 191 n. 4) (emphasis in brief)); and he cites our opinion in United States v. Reifler, 446 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.2006), for the proposition that Brink's cannot properly be awarded restitution because it does not fit within the MVRA's definition of victim ( see Douglas brief on appeal at 61-62). Neither case advances Douglas's cause. Douglas's reliance on Zakhary is misplaced because that case dealt with a lump sum restitution order entered without any identification of victims and their actual losses. 357 F.3d at 190. Thus, the context of the above-quoted language in the Zakhary footnote was the need to determine which of various entities had lost money, and hence were the victims of the defendant's crimes, see, e.g., id. (mandatory restitution can only be imposed to the extent that the victims of a crime are actually identified (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, there is no question that it was Brink's that reimbursed Moran Sr. $1,900 for part of Moran's funeral-home expense and paid $4,150 for Moran's headstone. Douglas's reliance on Reifler is also misplaced, for we had no occasion in that case to interpret §§ 3663A(b)(3) and (4), as the restitution issues there concerned compensation for victims of financial fraud, rather than bodily injury. And the restitution orders in that case were held to be erroneous principally because they (1) ordered payments for losses that were not occasioned by the defendants' criminal conduct, and (2) ordered payments to persons whofar from being victimswere among the defendants' coconspirators, see 446 F.3d at 127. Douglas's offense, in contrast, resulted in the death of Moran, occasioning his documented funeral and related expenses. Restitution with respect to that category of expenses was authorized by § 3663A(b)(3), and the MVRA required that restitution be ordered not only for Moran's estate [or] another family member, who may assume [Moran's] rights under this section, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2), but also for any person who provided Moran's successors with compensation for losses for which restitution was appropriate, see id. § 3664(j)(1). Thus, the court did not err in ordering Douglas to pay restitution to Brink's for its reimbursement of Moran Sr. for funeral-home expenses. Nor did it err in ordering restitution to Brink's for its direct payment for Moran's headstone. Had Moran Sr. purchased the headstone, he plainly would have been entitled to restitution for that funeral-related expense as Moran's father or the representative of Moran's estate under §§ 3663A(a)(2) and (b)(3); and had Brink's then reimbursed Moran Sr. for the headstone, Brink's would have been entitled to restitution for that reimbursement under § 3664(j)(1). The fact that Brink's paid for the headstone directly rather than having Moran Sr. pay for it and reimbursing him does not relieve Douglas of the obligation to make restitution for the cost incurred. See generally United States v. Malpeso, 126 F.3d 92, 95 (2d Cir.1997) (upholding award of restitution to the FBI under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, the precursor to the MVRA, even though FBI had paid the expense directly instead of reimbursing the victim, there being no significant functional or economic difference between the indemnitor's prior payment of the victim's expense and subsequent reimbursement). Finally, Douglas contends that the district court erred in ordering restitution to Moran Sr. to compensate him for lost income, in the form of his expenditure of accrued annual leave to assist in the investigation and attend court proceedings. While conceding that Moran[] Sr. clearly is a `victim' within the meaning of the MVRA, Douglas argued to the district court that Moran Sr.'s use of annual leave actually prevent[ed] lost income. It appears that the annual leave was used exactly as it is intended and cushioned Mr. Moran [Sr.] against incurring lost income. (Letter from Clinton W. Calhoun, III, to Judge McMahon dated April 27, 2006, at 2, 3.) The district court properly rejected this argument. It reasoned that if Moran Sr. had not had to use that annual leave for the days on which he assisted in the investigation and attended court proceedings, he would have had the right to receive payment for those days upon leaving his job. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 796-97 (3d Cir.1999). We see no error in the court's conclusion that Moran Sr.'s expended annual leave in this case qualifies as lost income under § 3663A(b)(4).