Opinion ID: 2229929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of the DNA Evidence

Text: Prior to trial, defendant requested a hearing pursuant to Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), to contest the admissibility of the DNA evidence offered by the State. See People v. Thomas, 137 Ill.2d 500, 517, 148 Ill.Dec. 751, 561 N.E.2d 57 (1990). Under Frye, novel scientific evidence must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community before it may be admitted in court. Thomas, 137 Ill.2d at 517, 148 Ill.Dec. 751, 561 N.E.2d 57. In his motion requesting a Frye hearing, defendant asserted that the RFLP method of DNA profiling in general, and the protocol which Metzger followed in performing the RFLP analysis in this case, were not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. Defendant also alleged that the product rule was not a generally accepted means of calculating the frequency with which a DNA profile occurs in a population. Accordingly, in his motion, defendant argued that the DNA evidence should not be admitted at trial. After hearing arguments, the trial court declined to hold a Frye hearing and ruled that the DNA evidence was admissible. The trial court based its holding upon the fact that in another, unspecified circuit court case, it had conducted a Frye hearing and had found the RFLP method of DNA analysis, and the product rule, generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. In his opening brief before this court, defendant repeats the assertions which he made in his pretrial motion for a Frye hearing. Defendant argues that there is significant controversy in the scientific community regarding the forensic use of the RFLP technique and the use of the product rule. Defendant asserts that because these scientific procedures are not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community, the trial court's refusal to hold a Frye hearing, and its subsequent admission of the DNA evidence, constitute reversible error. Shortly after defendant's initial brief was filed, this court addressed the challenges raised by defendant with respect to the admissibility of RFLP profiling in another case. In People v. Miller, 173 Ill.2d 167, 219 Ill. Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721 (1996), we concluded that the forensic use of RFLP analysis is generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. We also concluded that the product rule is a generally accepted method of calculating DNA profile frequencies. Miller, 173 Ill.2d at 188-89, 219 Ill.Dec. 43, 670 N.E.2d 721. Nothing has occurred in the short time since our decision in Miller was issued which would cast doubt upon the results reached in that case. To the contrary, recent developments in the scientific community indicate continued support for the use of RFLP profiling and for the use of the product rule. In the latter part of 1996, the NRC released an update to the 1992 report referred to by defense witnesses Randell Libby and Lawrence Mueller in their testimony at trial. The 1996 report concludes that [t]he state of the profiling technology and the methods for estimating frequencies and related statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt. National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence, Committee of DNA Forensic Science: An Update 36 (National Academy Press 1996) (hereafter NRC Update). The update also specifically concludes that sufficient data have been gathered to establish that the interim ceiling principle is not needed and further recommends that, in general, the calculation of a profile frequency should be made with the product rule. NRC Update at 5, 35. See also State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 261-68, 922 P.2d 1304, 1315-19 (1996) (finding the product rule generally accepted in the relevant scientific community); State v. Johnson, 186 Ariz. 329, 335, 922 P.2d 294, 300 (1996) (discussing a prepublication version of the NRC Update); Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 273 (Fla.1997) (noting that the NRC disavowed the interim ceiling principle in its 1996 update). In light of our decision in Miller, and the 1996 NRC report, we conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to hold a Frye hearing. Furthermore, we note that the issues which defendant has raised with respect to the caliber of the work performed by Metzger in this case, including laboratory protocol and the manner in which it was followed, the various quality control and quality assurance measures which Metzger employed, and the possible contamination or degradation of the DNA samples, are not properly subject to a Frye analysis. Instead, these issues go to the weight of the evidence, and not its admissibility under Frye. See Copeland, 130 Wash.2d at 268-76, 922 P.2d at 1319-23; People v. Dalcollo, 282 Ill.App.3d 944, 957, 218 Ill.Dec. 435, 669 N.E.2d 378 (1996); see also Thomas, 137 Ill.2d at 518, 148 Ill.Dec. 751, 561 N.E.2d 57. Defendant was afforded ample opportunity, through the granting of extensive discovery and the services of two expert witnesses, to present to the jury his criticisms regarding the quality of the work which Metzger performed in this case. The State's experts were also able to present their opinions on the caliber of Metzger's work. We find no error in the admission of the DNA evidence.