Opinion ID: 1910282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prejudice Arising from Wearing Leg Shackles at Penalty Stage

Text: Appellant complains that he suffered reversible error by being forced to wear shackles on his ankles in front of the penalty jury. The history of the trial shows that the guilty verdict was handed down on a Saturday. The penalty jury convened the following day, on a Sunday, when Philadelphia City Hall, wherein are located the criminal courtrooms, was closed and lacked normal staffing by police and sheriffs. The trial judge ordered the Appellant to be brought into the courtroom with leg shackles before the entrance of the jury and justified the order because of the potential for flight based on his past record as a fugitive and grave fears arising from Appellant's prior record for violence in the face of an empty building. (T.T., 3/20/88, pp. 835-838). Appellant was brought into the court room before the jury entered and placed behind the counsel table so that the jury could not see him shackled. The record reveals a controversy between defense counsel and the court as to whether the jurors could see Appellant's shackled feet under the counsel table. We observe at the outset that it is well-settled under common law and constitutionally as incident to a fair trial without prejudice that defendants appear free from shackles or other physical restraints. The sight of shackles and gags, moreover, constitutes an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). While there exists a legal presumption against the necessity of physical restraint of an accused in the courtroom, there are exceptional circumstances when the employment of such techniques are an acceptable practice where such restraint [is] reasonably necessary to maintain order. ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Trial by Jury § 4.1(c) (Approved Draft 1968), as accepted in Commonwealth v. Davis, 466 Pa. 102, 351 A.2d 642 (1976). Exceptional circumstances often have been found in sister jurisdictions as well where the defendant disrupts the proceedings, where there is evident danger of escape, and where the court has reason to believe that an unrestrained defendant might attack others. See, for example, State v. Roberts, 86 N.J.Super.Ct. 159, 206 A.2d 200 (1965); State v. Glick, 73 Or.App. 79, 697 P.2d 1002 (1985); Burleson v. State, (Tex. App.2d Dist.), 646 S.W.2d 646 (1983); People v. Lundquist, 151 App.Div.2d 505, 542 N.Y.S.2d 295, app. den. 74 N.Y.2d 849, 546 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 546 N.E.2d 197 (1989); People v. Sheldon, 48 Cal.3d 935, 258 Cal.Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330 (1989); People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal.3d 72, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23 (1990); and Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). The most recent decision by our Superior Court on this subject approves the above rules but also holds on point that where the trial evidence shows that a violent defendant was incarcerated at the time of trial, no prejudice occurs even when restraints are visible to the jury. Commonwealth v. Chew, 338 Pa. Superior Ct. 472, 487 A.2d 1379 (1985) (appeal not filed in this case). We hold this to be a correct statement of the law. Proper security measures are within the discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 452 Pa. 457, 308 A.2d 90 (1975). The exercise of that discretion under the facts of the instant case was neither abusive nor unwarranted. The trial court undertook an extensive scrutiny of the line of sight between the jury box and the defendant's seat but found no validity to the complaints of defense counsel. The known violent criminal character of the accused, coupled to his record as a past fugitive, lends additional support to the court's decision. In Chew, supra, it was held also that an appellant who already had been convicted as a murderer by the same jury could not have been prejudiced at anytime or circumstances by that jury viewing the very person they had found guilty of a heinous crime then appear before them in restraints. We lastly find that the Appellant waived his claims to error by failing to question the jury on the subject of restraints or to ask for cautionary instructions. Commonwealth v. Evans, 465 Pa. 12, 348 A.2d 92 (1975). The allegation of prejudice is rejected.