Opinion ID: 1057758
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tennessee's Scheme for Consecutive Sentencing

Text: Tennessee's Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (the Sentencing Act) provides as follows: (a) If a defendant is convicted of more than one (1) criminal offense, the court shall order sentences to run consecutively or concurrently as provided by the criteria in this section. (b) The court may order sentences to run consecutively if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) The defendant is a professional criminal who has knowingly devoted the defendant's life to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood; (2) The defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive; (3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally abnormal person so declared by a competent psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant's criminal conduct has been characterized by a pattern of repetitive or compulsive behavior with heedless indifference to consequences; (4) The defendant is a dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high; (5) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a minor with consideration of the aggravating circumstances arising from the relationship between the defendant and victim or victims, the time span of defendant's undetected sexual activity, the nature and scope of the sexual acts and the extent of the residual, physical and mental damage to the victim or victims; (6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense committed while on probation; or (7) The defendant is sentenced for criminal contempt. (c) The finding concerning the imposition of consecutive or concurrent sentences is appealable by either party. (d) Sentences shall be ordered to run concurrently, if the criteria noted in subsection (b) are not met, unless consecutive sentences are specifically required by statute or the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115 (2006). [6] Additionally, Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 provides as follows: (c) Concurrent or Consecutive Sentences.  (1) Multiple Sentences from One Trial.  If the defendant pleads guilty or is convicted in one trial of more than one offense, the trial judge shall determine whether the sentences will be served concurrently or consecutively. The order shall specify the reasons for this decision and is reviewable on appeal. Unless it affirmatively appears that the sentences are consecutive, they are deemed to be concurrent. (2) Prior Sentence Not Fully Served.  (A) Prior Tennessee Sentence.  (i) Prior Tennessee Sentence Known.  If the defendant has additional sentences not yet fully served as the result of convictions in the same court or in other courts of Tennessee and if this fact is made known to the court prior to sentencing, the court shall recite this fact in the judgment setting sentence, and the sentence imposed is deemed to be concurrent with the prior sentence or sentences, unless it affirmatively appears that the new sentence being imposed is to be served consecutively to the prior sentence or sentences. The judgment to make the sentences consecutive or concurrent shall explicitly relate the judge's reasons and is reviewable on appeal. (ii) Prior Tennessee Sentence Unknown.  When prior unserved Tennessee sentences are not called to the attention of the trial judge by or on behalf of the defendant at the time of sentencing and are not included in the judgment setting the new sentence, the new sentence is deemed to be consecutive to any such undisclosed prior unserved sentence or sentences. (iii) Parole Revocation.  The new sentence is consecutive when the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor while on parole from an undisclosed prior sentence, and the parole is subsequently revoked. (B) Prior Non-Tennessee Sentence.  If, as the result of conviction in another state or in federal court, the defendant has any additional sentence or portion thereof to serve, the court shall impose a sentence that is consecutive to any such unserved sentence unless the court determines in the exercise of its discretion that good cause exists to run the sentences concurrently and explicitly so orders. (3) Mandatory Consecutive Sentences.  When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses from one trial or when the defendant has additional sentences not yet fully served as the result of convictions in the same or other courts and the law requires consecutive sentences, the sentence shall be consecutive whether the judgment explicitly so orders or not. This rule shall apply: (A) to a sentence for a felony committed while on parole for a felony; (B) to a sentence for escape or for a felony committed while on escape; (C) to a sentence for a felony committed while the defendant was released on bail and the defendant is convicted of both offenses; and (D) for any other ground provided by law. Thus, a defendant in Tennessee is entitled to concurrent sentences on multiple convictions unless the trial court makes specific factual findings by a preponderance of the evidence after conviction, or consecutive sentences are required by statute or a rule of criminal procedure. In Defendant Lumpkin's case, the trial court ordered partial consecutive service after finding Lumpkin to be a dangerous offender. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). In Defendant Allen's case, the trial court ordered partial consecutive service after finding Allen to be an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive and a dangerous offender. Id. § 40-35-115(b)(2), (4). Both Defendants argue that the imposition of consecutive sentences on the basis of these judicially-determined facts violates their federal constitutional rights as explicated in Apprendi and Blakely . The Defendants point to the Supreme Court's statement in Blakely that [w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts `which the law makes essential to the punishment' and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citation omitted). The Defendants contend (1) that their effective terms of service, arrived at by adding together their consecutive sentences for separate offenses, is the punishment on which we must focus and (2) that the cumulative punishment they are facing could not have been imposed absent post-verdict factual findings by the trial court; ergo, in violation of Blakely's holding. As Defendant Lumpkin's counsel puts it, [t]he facts necessary to sustain the imposition of consecutive sentencing in this case are not included within the jury's verdict of guilt of the individual offenses. As set forth below, however, we are persuaded that neither Apprendi nor Blakely apply to a trial court's post-verdict findings and decisions about the manner in which a defendant serves his discrete sentences for multiple offenses.