Opinion ID: 386058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Violation and Seriousness of the Violation of the Housekeeping Regulation

Text: 9 It is undisputed that the dust accumulation existed at the elevator Bunge stipulated at the hearing to the existence of the dust accumulations. Section 1910.22(a)(1) requires all places of employment, passageways, storerooms, and service rooms be kept in a clean, orderly, and sanitary condition. Therefore, there is substantial evidence to support the finding that the housekeeping regulation was violated by the existence of the dust accumulation condition. 10 Bunge's contention, rather, is that the housekeeping regulation has been impermissibly expanded to include fire and explosion hazards instead of, for example, tripping and slipping hazards. 4 The type of hazard, however, is irrelevant to whether some condition or practice constitutes a violation of this regulation. Unless the general standard incorporates a hazard as a violative element, the proscribed condition or practice is all that the Secretary must show; hazard is presumed and is relevant only to whether the violation constitutes a serious one. See, e. g., Central of Georgia R.R. Co. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1978); Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1975). Compare 29 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(1) (recognized hazard causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm) with id. § 666(j) (violation serious if substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition, practice, or process). Condition is what gives rise to a violation here. Therefore, the regulation was not impermissibly extended to cover fire and explosion hazards. The grain dust accumulations were properly cited as an unclean condition in violation of the housekeeping regulation.
11 Whether the violative condition is serious depends on an application of 29 U.S.C.A. § 666(j), which provides that a violation is serious 12 if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use, in such place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation. 13 The first part of the statutory test is thus a calculation of the probable extent of physical injury should the accident occur. See Shaw Construction Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183, 1185 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Usery v. Hermitage Concrete Pipe Co., 584 F.2d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 1978). Therefore, the seriousness of the violation depends on the hazard produced by the condition, subject to the second part of the statutory test the negligence-type limitation of employer lack of actual or constructive knowledge. 14 The ALJ found that the dust accumulations could contribute to an explosion likely to kill or seriously injure employees, and that because the dust piles were in plain sight Bunge knew or should have known of the violation of the housekeeping regulation. There was substantial evidence to justify the ALJ's conclusion. 5
15 Bunge also argues that the Secretary is required to prove that the explosion hazard actually existed and was or should have been a hazard recognized by the employer. This argument proceeds on the assumption that although this is technically a section 5(a)(2) case failure to comply with OSHA standards promulgated under the Act it should be treated instead like a section 5(a) (1) case a violation of the general duty clause requirement to furnish each employee a place of employment free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to the employees. 29 U.S.C.A. § 654(a)(1) & (2). 16 Bunge's argument that this case should be treated as a section 5(a)(1) case rests on its earlier argument that the Secretary extended the housekeeping regulation to situations for which it was never intended. This Court again rejects the theory that the housekeeping regulation can include only tripping and slipping but not fire and explosion hazards. In a section 5(a)(1) case the Secretary must show, among other things, the existence of the hazard, recognition of the hazard by the employer or the industry in general, and worker exposure to the hazard. Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC, 530 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. OSHRC, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974); National Realty Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C.Cir.1973). When the standard incorporates hazard as an element of the violation, then the Secretary must show hazard in addition to condition or practice the standard keys the violation to hazard just like the general duty clause. The existence of a hazard is not always an element, however, of the Secretary's burden of proof for showing violation of an OSHA standard. When the violative element is only a condition, hazard is presumed, and the Secretary need only show the existence of the violative condition and worker exposure to the condition. See, e. g., Central of Georgia R.R. Co. v. OSHRC, 576 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1978); Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1975). 6 17 Bunge further argues that general regulations, because they are general, should, like the general duty clause, be subject to a requirement that the Secretary show the condition generates a recognized hazard. Bunge cites B & B Insulation, Inc. v. OHSRC, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1978), as support for treating this as a section 5(a)(1) case. In B & B Insulation, however, this Court was reviewing a due process vagueness challenge to a general regulation that required the wearing of personal protective equipment when there is an exposure to hazardous conditions (emphasis added). Therefore, that regulation keyed its violative elements to general hazards similar to the general duty clause of section 5(a)(1). See also Cape & Vineyard Division of New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975). In this case, however, the housekeeping regulation goes only to proscribed conditions and does not address hazards. See Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864, 869 (10th Cir. 1975). 18 Finally, Bunge asserts that OSHA may not use general standards to address the problem of grain elevator dust accumulations and dust explosions, but instead may only address those problems by promulgating a specific rulemaking. It again relies on B & B Insulation to support its argument. In that case, however, this Court was concerned with a regulation that attempted to address a specific problem but provided only a general standard. To save the standard from due process infirmities, this Court applied a reasonable person standard to the hazard element, and then noted that a rulemaking is the appropriate route for encouraging a higher standard of safety performance from the industry than customary industry practices exhibit, rather than selective enforcement of general standards. Cf. Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1979) (refusing to limit the reasonable person test to industry custom and practice). OSHA is currently undertaking a rulemaking concerning grain elevator dust explosions and accumulations. While a specific rulemaking may be preferable, OSHA is by no means obligated to countenance dangerous conditions pending the promulgation of a regulation that specifically addresses one of the hazards that the condition generates. 19