Opinion ID: 2604299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary Disputes

Text: The architect contends that its trial presentation suffered substantial prejudice on the basis of a series of challenged evidentiary rulings. The standard for appellate review of the trial court's evidentiary decisions states: [T]he rule is that the admissibility of evidence rests within the exercise of discretion by the trial court. The rulings of trial courts on these matters are given considerable deference and will not be reversed as long as some legitimate basis for the ruling is found. The burden is assigned to [the party who originally offered the evidence] on appeal to demonstrate an abuse of discretion with respect to the refusal to admit evidence that it offered. For these purposes, we apply our definition of an abuse of discretion as an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. We also invoke our definition of an abuse of discretion as a situation in which a court acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. Stauffer Chemical Company v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1101 (Wyo.1989) (citations omitted). The architect challenges the trial court's refusal to admit two exhibits into evidence. Exhibit A was a letter directed to the architect by a Corps of Engineers contracting officer. Exhibit L(1) was a compilation of documents, including Exhibit A, which was prepared in conjunction with the architect's appeal to the Board of Contract Appeals. The architect argues that both documents were admissible as public records. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: .... (8) Public records and reports.  Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth ... (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the state in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness[.] W.R.E. 803(8)(C). The trial court, upon the engineer's objection, determined that both exhibits were untrustworthy since they contained hearsay statements alleging a design defect in the system. The architect argued that the evidence was needed to establish that the Corps of Engineers asserted a claim against the architect. However, the court noted that ample evidence was present in the record of the claim and that the existence of the claim was undisputed by the engineer. The trustworthiness evaluation may be conducted by considering a nonexclusive list of four factors: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the investigator's skill or experience; (3) whether a hearing was held; and (4) possible bias when reports are prepared with a view to possible litigation. Beech Aircraft Corporation v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 109 S.Ct. 439, 102 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988), on remand, 868 F.2d 1531 (11th Cir.1989). While the documents appear to be timely, we shall consider each one individually. Exhibit A was prepared by a deputy chief of the Contracting Division of the Department of the Army. It was a letter, addressed to the architect, purporting to restate Findings of Fact of the preparer's investigation of the system. The exhibit contained numerous statements attributed to nongovernmental officials. Many statements were attributed to various contractors and engineers and quoted from the Contractor Daily Reports. In addition, the exhibit concluded with a statement that the architect, as the AE on the project, was negligent in preparing the design for the HVAC System and it is liable. The architect placed no evidence before the court supporting the trustworthiness of the exhibit by demonstrating the investigator's skill or experience or that any hearings were held. Exhibit A contained numerous hearsay-within-hearsay statements which each required individual exceptions for admission. Seaton v. State of Wyoming Highway Commission, District No. 1, 784 P.2d 197, 200 (Wyo.1989). See also John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 563 F.2d 632, 635-36 (3d Cir.1977). Under W.R.E. 803(8)(C), it remains improper to introduce out-of-court statements not made by the investigating government official when the purpose is to establish the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 455 (1980 & Supp.1992). While the architect argues that Exhibit A stated findings admissible under W.R.E. 803(8)(C), we find reason to disagree. A finding states investigative conclusions or opinions; however, the statement of legal conclusions, assessing negligence and liability for damages, exceeds the limits of a public record admissible under W.R.E. 803(8)(C). Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 886 F.2d 299, 302 (11th Cir.1989), on remand, 754 F.Supp. 199 (M.D.Ga.), aff'd, 948 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1587, 118 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Beech Aircraft Corporation, 488 U.S. at 169-70, 109 S.Ct. at 450. Exhibit L(1) was a compilation of documents, including the letter separately presented as Exhibit A. Other documents included portions of various contracts, air conditioning specifications, the Contractor Daily Reports previously mentioned, and various letters from the architect, the engineer, and the Corps of Engineers. Exhibit L(1) stated no additional factual findings of the Corps of Engineers. Certainly, Exhibit L(1)'s trustworthiness was questionable since it was prepared with a view toward possible litigation, initially in the form of an administrative appeal. The previously noted deficiencies of Exhibit A apply since that exhibit was contained within Exhibit L(1). The other documents contained in the compilation included numerous hearsay-within-hearsay statements and statements by nongovernmental officials, many advancing their own views regarding the system problems. The trial court properly excluded Exhibit L(1). The exhibit, taken as a whole, failed to state any factual findings resulting from an investigation by the agency. Under W.R.E. 803(8)(C)'s provisions, only findings formally approved and adopted by the agency are admissible. 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra. The inclusion of Exhibit A, the contract officer's letter, did not meet this standard since no evidence was offered that the letter represented a finding formally approved and adopted by the agency. In substance, Exhibit L(1) represented a compilation of staff reports, including Exhibit A, and other preliminary materials. The materials, as a compilation, may be considered as being prejudicial, irrelevant, cumulative, or of no probative value and, therefore, be excluded. O'Dell v. Hercules Incorporated, 904 F.2d 1194 (8th Cir.1990). The architect failed to meet its burden to support the trustworthiness of Exhibit A and Exhibit L(1). We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the exhibits. Next, the architect challenges the trial court's decision to redact legal conclusions contained in two exhibits offered as public records under W.R.E. 803(8)(C). Exhibit L(2), offered by the architect, was the stipulated settlement for $37,000 between the architect and the Corps of Engineers. The trial court admitted the exhibit but ordered that a reference to deficient design work performed by the mechanical engineering firm, McFall, Konkel & Kimball, through Kemper its principal be redacted. The architect's Exhibit M, styled a Satisfaction of Judgment, stated that the architect paid the settlement amount and that the Corps of Engineers released any claims against the engineer, the mechanical subcontractor, arising from its negligence in causing the design defect which resulted in the claim against Kemper Architects, the architect. The quoted language was redacted. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's action. As previously noted, legal conclusions contained in public records are not admissible under W.R.E. 803(8)(C). Additionally, the trustworthiness of these two statements may be questioned. Without evidence to the contrary, it is quite conceivable, for example, that both documents were drafted by one of the parties to the administrative action with an interest in including a gratuitous legal conclusion for possible future litigation. The architect contends, however, that these statements were opinions on ultimate issues which are admissible under W.R.E. 704. The record contains no indication that the architect presented this argument during trial, and the Supreme Court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Squaw Mountain Cattle Company v. Bowen, 804 P.2d 1292, 1296 (Wyo. 1991); McCue v. McCue, 776 P.2d 742, 745 (Wyo.1989). Finally, the architect argues that the trial court erred in refusing to qualify an expert witness and, subsequently, in refusing to admit the witness' lay opinion testimony. Laurence E. Seeba, Jr. was a mechanical engineer with the Corps of Engineers at the time of the trial. He conducted reviews of construction projects to determine if, using normal construction procedures, a project was feasible. When problems developed with the system, Seeba reviewed the project's plans and visited the construction site. He testified extensively regarding his firsthand factual knowledge. The engineer objected, however, when Seeba offered his opinion that the system is not designed as required. The trial court ruled that, if he were qualified as an expert, Seeba could offer his opinion. During questioning, the engineer's counsel and the architect's counsel asked Seeba about his experience with similar system designs: Q. [BY THE ENGINEER'S COUNSEL] Have you ever designed a system that is comparable to the system that was designed by McFall, Konkel, Kimball for the training and instructional facility at F.E. Warren Air Force Base? A. No, sir. .... Q. [BY THE ARCHITECT'S COUNSEL] Without regard to whether you have designed a system of this complexity, have you seen, in your experience with the Corps, the design of that complexity on a regular basis? A. No, sir. Q. And is this a unique design in that regard? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is it a design that is difficult, more difficult and more complex than any design that you have seen? A. Yes, sir. Q. And under those circumstances, would anybody be considered to be an expert on this particular design? A. I could not answer that, I don't know. There may be some people qualified. Expert testimony is permitted: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. W.R.E. 702. The trial court's determination of whether a testifying witness is qualified as an expert is a matter of discretion which will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is `clearly and prejudicially erroneous, and then only in extreme cases.' Caterpillar Tractor Company v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1286 (Wyo.1983) (quoting Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513, 517 (Wyo.1983)). For a witness to qualify as an expert, a determination must be made that the witness has adequate knowledge, whether acquired by formal education or otherwise, and the appropriate experience in any area in which he proposes to state an opinion. Stauffer Chemical Company, 778 P.2d at 1099. See also W.R.E. 702. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Seeba to testify as an expert witness. Seeba's admitted lack of experience with similar systems limited his testimony to information he acquired by personal knowledge. W.R.E. 602. After Seeba failed to qualify as an expert, the architect contended that the trial court improperly denied it the opportunity to offer Seeba's testimony as opinion testimony by a lay witness. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses is allowed under Wyoming law. If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. W.R.E. 701. This Court has cautioned that conclusory testimony on hotly contested trial issues may be excluded as not being helpful to a determination of the facts in issue. McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 705 (Wyo. 1983). W.R.E. 701 cannot be read to allow a witness who fails to qualify as an expert to offer opinion testimony where the subject in question lies outside the realm of common experience and requires special skill or knowledge. 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 376 at 419 (Supp.1992). Topics demanding special experience, such as the appropriate mechanical design for an atypical heating and air conditioning system, require that only the testimony of a person possessing that special experience be received. Randolph v. Collectramatic, Inc., 590 F.2d 844, 848 (10th Cir.1979). Seeba's testimony indicated that the complex designs utilized by the engineer were beyond his individual competence and knowledge. Any opinions Seeba may have offered regarding possible defects in such designs would have been inappropriate under even the most liberal view of lay-opinion testimony. United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 157 (1st Cir.1989). We would defeat the helpful purpose of expert witnesses, W.R.E. 702, if we were to permit those who fail to qualify to simply restate their opinions as lay witnesses, W.R.E. 701. We agree with the trial court that permitting Seeba to testify about design deficiencies would not have been proper.