Opinion ID: 1709776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Introduction of Details of Defendant's Criminal History to the Jury During the Penalty Phase

Text: Finally, Dillbeck argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for introducing evidence of prior crimes and bad acts during the penalty phase which the State may not have been able to introduce under Florida law. On remand, the postconviction trial court made the following findings, which are supported by competent, substantial evidence: Dillbeck testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not consent to trial counsel admitting evidence relating to other crimes. Dillbeck admitted that none of the evidence relating to his past crimes was inaccurate. Dillbeck testified that he thought that it was unreasonable for trial counsel to introduce his past criminal conduct first in an attempt at a preemptive strike because that was the State's job. Dillbeck opined that the State would not have been able to introduce some of the evidence because it was not admissible. He acknowledged that his prior arrest record was a matter of public record. Dillbeck described his prior criminal arrests that did not result in convictions. He noted that trial counsel discussed these arrests in the penalty phase. Trial counsel testified that he thought that the crime in Indiana was admissible because it was the motive for the murder of the deputy sheriff which he was going to put in issue. Dillbeck was fleeing from the stabbing in Indiana when he shot the deputy. The State had already videotaped the stabbing victim prior to the trial to admit during the penalty phase. He thought it was better for us to own up to it and address it than to have it come in as a revelation introduced by the State. He thought this evidence was admissible because he was going to open the door to it by going into the question of why he shot the deputy, which would make the evidence that he was fleeing to Florida from an Indiana crime admissible. Also, trial counsel was attempting to present as mitigating evidence that Dillbeck had a good prison record and had behaved in prison and that he was not a threat to others so long as he was in prison which he knew the State would attempt to rebut. He explained that, by the defense presenting evidence that he was a good inmate, it opened the door to the State presenting prior incidents in prison. The State already had Dillbeck's prison records. What had happened in prison was not a secret. He wanted to address those things before the State revealed them to undercut his argument that Dillbeck was a good prisoner. Trial counsel would not have admitted this information if he did not think that it was admissible by the State. He explained that by introducing mitigating evidence, he had to accept some not so favorable rebuttal evidence by the State. Trial counsel thought that because his mitigation was going to open the door to this rebuttal evidence by the State, it was better to reveal the damaging rebuttal evidence himself than to have the State do it. This Court finds Mr. Murrell's testimony to be credible. This Court finds that counsel's decision to present mitigation, although it necessarily opened the door for the State to attempt to rebut that mitigation, was a reasonable trial strategy and thus counsel was not ineffective. (Record citations omitted.) We agree with the trial court that counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to present this evidence. Counsel knew that introducing the mental mitigation and the model prisoner mitigation would open the door for the State to introduce evidence of a prior stabbing in Indiana, an escape attempt, and the stabbing of another inmate. Yet the only mitigation available was the mental mitigation and model prisoner mitigation, and counsel reasonably believed that the jury would be more likely to recommend death if the defense introduced no mitigation at all. Thus, despite its risk, we cannot say that trial counsel's decision to introduce this evidence was outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986). It was reasonable for trial counsel himself to disclose the prior bad acts to soften or deflect the negative impact of the prejudicial evidence he knew the State would present. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction trial court's conclusion that Dillbeck failed to show deficient performance by counsel for introducing details of his previous criminal activity to the jury during the penalty phase.