Opinion ID: 596795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency at the Time of the Offense and at Trial

Text: 18 Coleman contends that the district court erred by finding that he was sane at the time of the offense and competent to stand trial. The district court's competency to stand trial finding may not be set aside on appeal unless it is clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. Hall v. United States, 410 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969). 19 A criminal defendant may assert as an affirmative defense that at the time of the offense he was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts due to a severe mental disease or defect. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1988). The defendant bears the burden of proof for this defense by clear and convincing evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1988). The district court's finding on this issue is one of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. See United States v. Freeman, 804 F.2d 1574, 1577 (11th Cir. 1986). 20 There were three evaluations of Coleman's mental condition at the time of the offense. The FCI Milan report concluded that he was insane at the time of the offense, whereas the other two reports concluded that he was sane. In light of the two later reports which contradict the FCI Milan report, the district court's finding that Coleman failed to meet the burden of proof that he was insane at the time of the offense is not clearly erroneous. 21 Similarly, Coleman underwent three separate evaluations to determine his competency to stand trial. The psychologist from FCI Milan concluded that Coleman was not competent to stand trial, but the two later evaluations conducted by two psychiatrists and a psychologist concluded that he was competent. In light of these reports, the district court's finding that Coleman was competent to stand trial was not clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.