Opinion ID: 2442743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ordering Referral Of Case To Outside Counsel

Text: Elrich also challenges the validity of the order requiring OPD to panel the case to an outside attorney. He asserts that, in Section 6(f) of Article 27A (Public Defender Act), [11] the General Assembly established only two situations in which a court may appoint counsel. That section provides: (f) Authority of courts to appoint counsel in certain situations. Nothing in this article shall be construed to deprive any court mentioned in § 4(b)(2) of this article of its authority to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent person where there is a conflict in legal representation in a matter involving multiple defendants and one of the defendants is represented by or through the Office of the Public Defender, or where the Office of the Public Defender declines to provide representation to an indigent person entitled to representation under this article. Clearly, Elrich's situation does not fall into either one of the scenarios expressly provided for by Section 6(f). Yet, this does not mean that the Circuit Court lacked the authority to appoint counsel. First, Elrich overlooks the nature of Section 6(f) as a limitation on the other provisions of the Public Defender Act. There is nothing contained in the section to preclude a court from appointing counsel in situations not enumerated in the statute. Rather, we have said that the General Assembly provided in Art. 27 A, § 6(f), a clear oversight and corrective role for the courts in the . . . appointed-counsel process. Office of the Public Defender, et al. v. State, 413 Md. 411, 432, 993 A.2d 55, 68 (2010). Second, Elrich ignores a court's inherent power over the judicial process: We made the point with unmistakable clarity . . . that the power generally to regulate matters regarding the profession and its practitioners, are reposed inherently in the judiciary, that the obligation of the judicial branch of government to monitor and manage its own house are not hollow proclamations of power, for the placement of this responsibility with the judiciary represents a recognition of the special, and to a degree unique relationship that has evolved over the years between the legal profession and the tribunals of justice it serves, and that, although the Legislature may act to aid the courts in the performance of their judicial functions, the judicial branch nonetheless retains the fundamental authority and responsibility to carry out its constitutionally required function, and aspect of which.. . is the supervision of practicing lawyers. Post v. Bregman, 349 Md. 142, 163, 707 A.2d 806, 816 (1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This power cannot be encroached upon by the legislative or executive branch. See Wynn v. State, 388 Md. 423, 433, 879 A.2d 1097, 1103 (2005) (Inherent authority provides courts the means both to employ the power and fulfill the functions granted expressly to the judiciary by the Maryland Constitution as well as to resist encroachments by the legislative and executive branches.). A judge must, of course, have the ability to control his or her courtroom, to assure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly, efficiently, and with dignity and decorum. Liner v. State, 62 Md.App. 381, 391, 489 A.2d 553, 558 (1985). Accordingly, the Circuit Court has the inherent power to appoint counsel to represent a petitioner when the court believes counsel would be necessary to further the interest of justice. [12] Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 509, 929 A.2d 501, 512 (2007). In this case, the juvenile judge had a legitimate interest in determining whether the contents of the Affidavit regarding previous counsel's competency at Elrich's delinquency hearing was improperly influenced by current counsel's status as an attorney within the OPD who, the judge noted, could have a significant impact on her employment, how she is perceived, how she is reviewed, how she is evaluated, her tenure. Furthermore, the juvenile judge was aware that the lines of separation between the JPD and County OPD in connection with post-commitment matters was not consistent or clear: In some instances, JPD staff become involved, enter their appearance, and assume all further representation. In still other instances, JPD have appeared before me in a role more akin to co-counsel in matters relating to placement. There is nothing remotely similar to the separation of function that exists with the Collateral Division in the manner in which the JPD has functioned in delinquency matters in the County. The Circuit Court had the inherent right to ensure that the evidence presented was accurate and not the product of coercion. Thus, to further the interest of justice, it had the discretion to strike the Affidavit and appoint new counsel to resolve the conflict. The court, however, did not have the right to order that OPD panel the case to an attorney entirely independent of the office because its discretion to assign new counsel was limited to ameliorating the existing potential for coercion. We have recently held that the Public Defender Act does not exclude OPD staff from the pool of attorneys a court could appoint as counsel for an indigent. See Office of the Public Defender, et al. v. State, 413 Md. 411, 432-433, 993 A.2d 55, 68 (2010) (Art.27A, § 6(f), contains no language indicating a legislative intent to prohibit the appointment of an attorney from the local OPD by a trial court to represent an individual that the court determines qualifies as indigent....); see also Workman v. State, 413 Md. 475, 490, 993 A.2d 94, 103 (2010) ([T]he Circuit Court should have appointed directly an attorney from the local OPD as [defendant's] counsel[.]). Furthermore, as the juvenile court here recognized, a Chinese Wall existed between the County OPD and the Collateral Review Division of the OPD, where CRD counsel [would] enter their appearances in post-convictions and other occasional post-trial matters, and ... the originally assigned OPD [would then have] no ongoing role in such proceedings.... [13] Cocounsel, DeSimone, [14] also explained to the court that the same clear demarcation existed between the County OPD staff and his Appellate Division. If true, Elrich's hearing could have continued uninterrupted and DeSimone's representation would have resolved the dilemma without the extra costs associated with paneling a case to outside counsel. [15] Yet the court did not attempt to investigate whether the problem extended only to certain divisions within the OPD, leaving other divisions free of any taint. The interests of justice are not furthered by excluding OPD attorneys unnecessarily. Thus, the juvenile judge abused her discretion in summarily precluding all OPD staff from representing Elrich.