Opinion ID: 42668
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: 42 We agree with the Eighth Circuit that 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) is a valid exercise of the discretion granted by Congress to the Attorney General. For the reasons that follow, we respectfully disagree with both the Succar and Zheng lines of reasoning. In determining the validity of the regulation, we must answer two questions: (1) whether the Attorney General was entitled to implement a rule rather than adjudicate status adjustments on a case-by-case base; and, (2) if so, whether the rule promulgated was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. In sum, we hold that the Attorney General may choose to exercise his discretion favorably or unfavorably by rulemaking rather than adjudication. Moreover, we hold that the categorical exclusion expressed in 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) is a valid exercise of the Attorney General's congressionally-granted discretion. 43
44 Of the courts of appeals to consider this issue, the Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all agree, as do we, that the Attorney General may exercise his discretion by rulemaking rather than case-by-case adjudication. Congress identified classes of aliens that may have their status adjusted at the Attorney General's discretion, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), and Congress also identified various sub-classes of aliens that are ineligible for status adjustments, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c). The First and Ninth Circuits found these tandem congressional mandates sufficient to conclude that Congress unambiguously reserved to itself the determination of who is eligible to apply for adjustment of status relief, and that an additional rule-based limitation on an alien's eligibility to apply was contrary to that clear statement of intent. Succar, 394 F.3d at 24. See also Bona, 425 F.3d at 670. 45 But Congress did not clearly express an intent to withhold the Attorney General's authority to resolve matters of general applicability through rulemaking. Absent such an exclusion, resort to rulemaking is within the discretion afforded the Attorney General. See Am. Hosp. Ass'n v. N.L.R.B., 499 U.S. 606, 612, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991) (noting that resort to rulemaking is proper even where the statute requires the agency to make a determination in each case). Moreover, the fact that Congress chose to exclude certain classes of aliens from eligibility does not mean that, where complete discretion to grant relief is vested in the Attorney General, the Attorney General cannot opt to exercise the discretion and exclude other classes by regulation. Accord Mouelle, 416 F.3d at 928-29; Zheng, 422 F.3d at 116; Geach, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 508101, at ; Scheerer, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at . 46 Indeed, the Supreme Court's holding in Lopez compels this conclusion: 47 We also reject [the] argument ... that the agency must not make categorical exclusions, but may rely only on case-by-case assessments. [E]ven if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, which this scheme does not, the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority. The approach pressed by Lopez—case-by-case decisionmaking in thousands of cases each year—could invite favoritism, disunity, and inconsistency. The [agency] is not required continually to revisit issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding. 48 531 U.S. at 243-44, 121 S.Ct. 714 (internal citations omitted). See also Mourning v. Family Publ'ns. Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973) (rejecting a similar argument and commenting that [t]o accept [the] argument would undermine the flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an administrative agency). 49 In any event, we need not guess at the Attorney General's motivation. The Attorney General's commentary accompanying the rule as promulgated makes clear that the regulation is a categorical exercise of discretion: Adjustment of status is granted in the discretion of the Attorney General .... [T]he Attorney General has determined that she will not favorably exercise her discretion to adjust the status of arriving aliens who are ... placed in removal proceedings. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed.Reg. 444, 452 (Jan. 3, 1997) (proposed rule) (Proposed Rule). See also Interim Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. at 10,327 (In response to the commenters who suggested this policy exceeded the Attorney General's statutory authority, it is noted that section 245 of the Act clearly and unambiguously states that adjustment of status is a discretionary decision, subject to such regulatory limitations as the Attorney General may prescribe.). The Attorney General's approach is entirely consistent with that taken by the agency—and approved of by the Court—in Lopez. We follow Lopez and conclude that, because 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) is silent on the manner in which the Attorney General is to exercise his discretion, the Attorney General can exercise his discretion through rulemaking in matters of general applicability. 531 U.S. at 244, 121 S.Ct. 714. Accord Mouelle, 416 F.3d at 928-29; Zheng, 422 F.3d at 116; Geach, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 508101, at ; Scheerer, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at . 50
51 Having concluded that the Attorney General validly exercised his discretion by rulemaking, we now turn to the substance of the rule. When Congress expressly delegates to an administrative agency the authority to make specific policy determinations, courts must give the agency's decision controlling weight unless it is `arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.' ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 510 U.S. 317, 324, 114 S.Ct. 835, 127 L.Ed.2d 152 (1994) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778). Although one of the discussed cases characterizes the discretion vested in the Attorney General as circumscribed, Succar, 394 F.3d at 26, we find no support for such limiting language in the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (providing that the status of an alien may be adjusted [to LPR] by the Attorney General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe). The Supreme Court has noted that express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed is indicative of an entitlement to deferential treatment by reviewing courts. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001). The statute clearly vests in the Attorney General such authority to promulgate regulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context where officials `exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.' I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999) (quoting I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988)). 52 The courts that deem 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) invalid all share a common trait; they equate the entire class of parolees with the sub-class of parolees who are subject to removal proceedings. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 21, 26 (basing its understanding on an uncontested petitioner's statement); Zheng, 422 F.3d at 117-18 (basing its belief on Succar and the statutory structure); Bona, 425 F.3d at 670 (basing its understanding on Succar and the court's view of the practical effect of the regulation); Scheerer, ___ F.3d at ___-___, 2006 WL 947680, at -8 (basing its belief on Succar and the statutory structure). Because the regulation makes the latter class ineligible for relief and the statute makes the former class eligible for relief (though subject to the Attorney General's discretion), those circuits understand the regulation to be in conflict with the statute and overall statutory design. See Succar, 394 F.3d at 21, 26 ([T]he exclusion of parolees in removal proceedings renders ineligible most of the class that Congress rendered eligible by including parolees.); Zheng, 422 F.3d at 119 (We are thus faced with a statute providing that, in general, aliens paroled into the United States may apply to adjust their status, and a regulation providing that, in general, they may not.); Bona, 425 F.3d at 670 (By entirely excluding a category of aliens from the ability to apply for adjustment, who by statute are eligible to apply for such relief, the regulation [is invalid].); Scheerer, ___ F.3d at ___, 2006 WL 947680, at  (Thus, whereas the statute, § 1255, contemplates that parolees— arriving aliens, virtually all of whom are placed in removal proceedings— should be eligible to apply for an adjustment of status, the regulation, 8 C.F.R. § [245.1(c)(8)], excludes the same class from eligibility.). This estimation as to the practical effect of the regulation and the statutory context forms the core of the rationale for finding the regulation invalid. 53 Like the Eighth Circuit, we have no evidentiary basis to reach the conclusion drawn by these other circuits. Neither party has asserted, much less shown, that the class identified in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), i.e., admitted aliens and parolees, is coterminous with the class identified in 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8), i.e., arriving aliens (including parolees) in removal proceedings. Indeed, the limited facts before us do not bear out this relationship. 8 Momin had been in the United States as a parolee for over two years before he was charged as removable. He obtained advance parole and was charged as removable only when his original application for status adjustment was denied. Without data, it is impossible for this court to opine on the likelihood that the vast majority of (or, for that matter, many) arriving aliens are placed immediately into removal proceedings. It would be wholly inappropriate for a reviewing court to hold a regulation invalid on the basis such an assumption. 54 Nor does our understanding of the statutory structure lead us to believe that the two classes are so similar as to find the regulation to be manifestly contrary to the statute. The INA and its regulations clearly provide that at least some parolees will not be placed into removal proceedings. And nowhere does the INA mandate that parolees must be placed into removal proceedings. Because this court is not satisfied that parolees necessarily are subject to removal proceedings, we cannot conclude that the regulation is manifestly contrary to the statute. 9 Respectfully, we disagree with the reasoning of the Succar and Zheng lines of cases. 55 Absent this assumed-but-not-proved conflict, we have been presented with no reason to hold the regulation invalid. In light of the stated reasons for the regulation, see Mouelle, 416 F.3d at 930 (discussing Proposed Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. at 452, and Interim Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. at 10,326-27), the Attorney General did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or manifestly contrary to the statute in opting to decline to exercise his discretion favorably for parolees that are subject to removal proceedings. Accordingly, 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) is a valid exercise of the Attorney General's discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).