Opinion ID: 400072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Elements of a Reprisal Case.

Text: 68 As noted above, p. 157 supra, the Board decided that, in order to demonstrate the existence of prohibited personnel practices, the Special Counsel must prove that the official accused of taking the retaliatory action against the whistleblower had knowledge that the protected disclosure had been made and by whom. Petitioners agree with the Board that official knowledge of protected activities constitutes an essential element of a reprisal finding. They read the Board's opinion, however, as requiring a showing of direct, personal knowledge by the final agency decisionmaker. Such a requirement, petitioners argue, conflicts with the purpose of the whistleblower provisions of the CSRA by permitting prohibited retaliations to be insulated by layers of bureaucratic ignorance. Moreover, petitioners claim, the Board's imposition of an actual knowledge requirement with respect to the disclosures is inconsistent with the Board's treatment of the EEO-related claims. 56 69 There can be no doubt that a rule limiting retaliation findings to situations in which the top agency official has actual knowledge of the protected activities would seriously undercut the CSRA's goal of strengthening management accountability. Section 2302(c), for instance, provides: 70 The head of each agency shall be responsible for the prevention of prohibited personnel practices, for the compliance with and enforcement of applicable civil service laws, rules, and regulations, and other aspects of personnel management. Any individual to whom the head of an agency delegates authority for personnel management, or for any aspect thereof, shall be similarly responsible within the limits of the delegation. 71 In elaborating on this provision, the Senate Report explained, to the extent that managerial or supervisory authority is delegated, this section means that responsibility for insuring compliance with the merit system, and potential disciplinary liability for failing to ensure compliance, will follow such a delegation. 57 The report continued: 72 The delegation will not, however, relieve the head of the executive agency or other top officials for ultimate responsibility for personnel actions and policies within the agency, to the extent that such officials have knowledge or should have knowledge of the actions taken or policies implemented. (Emphasis added.) 58 73 Thus, the statute imposes on agency heads an affirmative obligation to prevent prohibited practices of which they are or should be aware. We agree with petitioners, therefore, that constructive knowledge of protected activities on the part of one with ultimate responsibility for a personnel action may support an inference of retaliatory intent. Moreover, while delegation of authority does not relieve an agency head of responsibility, subordinates with power to effect a personnel action may also be called to account. Thus, section 2302(b) expressly prohibits (a)ny employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action from taking such an action for prohibited reasons. 74 While the Board's opinion could have been clearer, we believe it adequately conformed to these principles. With respect to the agency head, the Board was explicit:We are compelled by the record here to conclude that Director Hall did not have actual or constructive knowledge that these deputies had engaged in protected activities. Rather, he acted in full reliance upon the recommendation of the management review team which ... was for the most part based upon sound management considerations. 59 75 In support of these conclusions, the Board detailed the evidence showing Hall's lack of actual knowledge and noted the absence of evidence to the contrary. 60 The Board then considered the Special Counsel's argument that knowledge of the disclosures by the management review team should be attributed to Hall. 61 On review of the evidence, the Board rejected the factual predicate of the argument, crediting the uniform testimony of the team's members that they did not know that the four deputies whose transfers they recommended had made disclosures to the congressmen. 62 Finally, the Board found no basis for application of the small plant doctrine, a labor law rule attributing knowledge of protected activities to employers of relatively small labor forces. 63 Although the Board occasionally employed the phrase actual knowledge in its treatment of these points, its analysis implicitly acknowledged the possibility that a finding of retaliation could be based on constructive knowledge as well. 76 The Board also recognized that retaliatory intent on the part of Hall's subordinates, even if not attributable to the Director, could form the basis of a prohibited practice to the extent that they contributed to the decision to take the personnel actions. The only individuals whose views might have lead to the transfer orders and who knew about the whistleblowing were three officials of the Marshals Service: Angel, Lora, and Vandergrift. See p. 157 supra. The evidence did not indicate that either Vandergrift or Lora had played any role in the decision to transfer the deputies. 64 While Angel did seek the reassignment of three of the petitioners, the Board determined that his suggestion played no part in the ultimate decision: 77 (A)ssuming that Marshal Angel had the requisite knowledge and acted with retaliatory intent in recommending the transfers of Deputies Frazier, Reilly, Morris, and Jordan, that recommendation was a nullity since Hall did not act on it. Instead, Hall ordered the transfers of Chief Deputy Bowler and Deputies Love, Reilly, Morris, and Frazier, acting in reliance upon the recommendations of the management review team. 65 78 In sum, the Special Counsel alleged that officials of the Marshals Service recommended or ordered personnel actions in retaliation for protected activities. The Board properly assumed that such a claim presupposes that individuals with actual or constructive knowledge of the activities helped cause the personnel actions. Fairly read, the Board's opinion determined that, in this case, those who effected the transfers had no knowledge and those with knowledge had no effect. 79