Opinion ID: 707581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Amendment 487

Text: 8 After Mr. Kissick's trial, his direct appeal, and the denial of his motion for reduction of sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35, the Sentencing Commission amended USSG Sec. 2D1.1(c) to resolve an inter-circuit conflict regarding the definition of cocaine base: 9 Section 2D1.1(c) is amended in the notes following the Drug Quantity Table by inserting the following additional paragraph as the third paragraph. 10  'Cocaine base,' for the purposes of this guideline, means 'crack.' 'Crack' is the street name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form.. 11 This amendment provides that, for purposes of the guidelines, cocaine base means crack. The amendment addresses an inter-circuit conflict. Compare, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 936 F.2d 412 (9th Cir.1991) (cocaine base means crack) with United States v. Jackson, 968 F.2d 158 (2d Cir) (cocaine base has a scientific, chemical definition that is more inclusive than crack), cert. denied, [--- U.S. ----] 113 S.Ct. 664 [121 L.Ed.2d 589] (1992). Under this amendment, forms of cocaine base other than crack (e.g., coca paste, an intermediate step in the processing of coca leaves into cocaine hydrochloride, scientifically is a base form of cocaine, but it is not crack) will be treated as cocaine. The effective date of this amendment is November 1, 1993. 12 USSG App. C, Amend. 487 (November 1, 1993). 13 Mr. Kissick argues that this amendment should be applied retroactively to allow his sentence to be recalculated. He maintains that because the substance in his possession when he was arrested was cocaine base (in the broader sense) rather than crack, the substance should be treated as cocaine under Amendment 487 for purposes of making the guidelines calculation. Under Mr. Kissick's theory, the substance found in his possession should be treated as 46.3 grams of cocaine rather than the exponentially greater quantity used by the sentencing court after it employed a multiplier to convert the amount of cocaine base into a corresponding amount of cocaine. The district court rejected Mr. Kissick's argument, characterizing Amendment 487 as a substantive change in the guidelines that should be applied prospectively. 14 As a general rule, it is the guidelines provisions in effect at the time of sentencing that must be applied by the district court. USSG Sec. 1B1.11(a); United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. Camacho, 40 F.3d 349, 354 (11th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1810, 131 L.Ed.2d 735 (1995). 1 However, Congress has granted the Sentencing Commission the authority to determine whether and to what extent guidelines amendments that reduce sentences will be given retroactive effect. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994(a); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 994, the Commission has promulgated USSG Sec. 1B1.10, which lists specific amendments that sentencing courts may apply retroactively to reduce a defendant's sentence. 2 15 Additionally, even if an amendment is not listed in USSG Sec. 1B1.10, sentencing and reviewing courts may still give retroactive effect to amendments that are clarifying (as opposed to substantive). United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th Cir.1995). The distinction between clarifying and substantive amendments is often difficult to draw. Where the line is to be drawn may well reflect not only language and intent but also implicit judgments as to the Sentencing Commission's function and the role of guideline commentary. Isabel v. United States, 980 F.2d 60, 62 (1st Cir.1992). A variety of factors may be considered, including the Commission's characterization of the amendment, whether the amendment changes the text of the guidelines or merely the accompanying commentary, and whether the amendment alters the controlling pre-amendment interpretation of the guideline at issue. See Capers, 61 F.3d at 1109-10; Gerber, 24 F.3d at 96-97. Because Amendment 487 is not listed in USSG Sec. 1B1.10 as having retroactive effect, we must apply these factors to determine whether it is clarifying or substantive, and whether, as a result, it may be applied retroactively. 16 With regard to the third factor, this Circuit has held that an amendment that effectively overrules existing precedent should be classified as substantive rather than clarifying. United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds, Stinson v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993); see also United States v. Mondaine, 956 F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir.1992) (In Saucedo, we refused to accept the Commission's characterization of an amendment as merely clarifying because we were required to overrule precedent construing the guideline in order to interpret it consistently with the amended commentary.). 17 With regard to the issue raised by Mr. Kissick--whether the term cocaine base, as used in USSG Sec. 2D1.1(c), includes substances other than crack--our Circuit had reached a conclusion contrary to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation in Amendment 487. In United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1506, 1511 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1563, 128 L.Ed.2d 209 (1994), we concluded that it is proper to sentence a defendant under the drug quantity table for cocaine base if the record indicates that the defendant intended to transform powdered cocaine into cocaine base. The defendant in Angulo-Lopez was found to have possessed a substance other than crack, but was sentenced under the guidelines provisions for cocaine base. 18 Significantly, we issued Angulo-Lopez on October 26, 1993--only a few days before the effective date of Amendment 487. Amendment 487 defines the term cocaine base more narrowly than Angulo-Lopez, and thereby changes the law of this Circuit. Amendment 487 thus constitutes a substantive amendment to the guidelines. Therefore, the district court properly concluded that Mr. Kissick was not entitled to a retroactive application of Amendment 487.