Opinion ID: 4544014
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mootness principles

Text: 1. Standing and mootness allocate different jurisdictional burdens. Article III gives federal courts jurisdiction over “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Thus, federal courts can entertain actions only if they present live disputes, ones in which both sides have a personal stake. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009). At the start of litigation, the burden rests on the plaintiff, “as the party invoking federal jurisdiction,” to show its standing to sue. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). That 6 requires showing injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Id. But once the plaintiff shows standing at the outset, she need not keep doing so throughout the lawsuit. Instead, the burden shifts. If the defendant (or any party) claims that some development has mooted the case, it bears “[t]he ‘heavy burden of persua[ding]’ the court” that there is no longer a live controversy. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). In other words, mootness is not just “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame.” Id. at 189–90 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). Standing and mootness are “two distinct justiciability doctrines.” Freedom from Religion Found., 832 F.3d at 475–76. So sometimes a suit filed on Monday will be able to proceed even if, because of a development on Tuesday, the suit would have been dismissed for lack of standing if it had been filed on Wednesday. The Tuesday development does not necessarily moot the suit. 2. Voluntary cessation does not always trigger mootness. One scenario in which we are reluctant to declare a case moot is when the defendant argues mootness because of some action it took unilaterally after the litigation began. This situation is often called “[v]oluntary cessation,” and it “will moot a case only if it is ‘absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.’ ” Fields v. Speaker of the Pa. House of Representatives, 936 F.3d 142, 161 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 719 (2007)). When a 7 plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, a defendant arguing mootness must show that there is no reasonable likelihood that a declaratory judgment would affect the parties’ future conduct. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (per curiam); United States v. Gov’t of the V.I., 363 F.3d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 2004). Voluntary cessation cases highlight the important difference between standing (at the start of a suit) and mootness (mid-suit). The shift in the burden of proof from plaintiff to defendant matters. It means that sometimes, “the prospect that a defendant will engage in (or resume) harmful conduct may be too speculative to support standing, but not too speculative to overcome mootness.” Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190. While the case law speaks largely of voluntary cessation, these principles apply even when the defendant’s cessation is not entirely voluntary. Take Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). The City of Albuquerque had forbidden sex offenders to use public libraries. Id. at 1116. An affected sex offender sued and won an injunction, so the City started letting sex offenders use its libraries. Id. at 1117 & n.5. But that did not moot the case. Though the City had complied for the time being, it “forcefully maintained the constitutionality of the enjoined [policy]” and planned to reinstate it in the future. Id. at 1117 n.5; see also DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). Yet if the City’s attitude had been different, the answer to the mootness question could well have differed too. See DeJohn, 537 F.3d at 310. What was important was whether the City could reasonably be expected to engage in the challenged behavior again. Friends of the Earth, 528 8 U.S. at 189. That is always the key question, no matter why the defendant ceased its behavior. To be sure, the defendant’s reason for changing its behavior is often probative of whether it is likely to change its behavior again. We will understandably be skeptical of a claim of mootness when a defendant yields in the face of a court order and assures us that the case is moot because the injury will not recur, yet maintains that its conduct was lawful all along. See Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012); see also 13C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.5, at 248 (3d ed. 2008). On the other hand, if the defendant ceases because of a new statute or a ruling in a completely different case, its argument for mootness is much stronger. See, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 2007); Khodara Envtl., Inc. ex rel. Eagle Envtl., L.P. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.). In short, the touchstone of the voluntary-cessation doctrine is not how willingly the defendant changed course. Rather, the focus is on whether the defendant made that change unilaterally and so may “return to [its] old ways” later on. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (quoting City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 n.10 (1982)). Perhaps it would be more accurate to call it the volitional-cessation doctrine. Though voluntary or volitional cessation is often described as an exception to mootness, that is not quite right. The burden always lies on the party claiming mootness, whether the case involves voluntary cessation or not. See Friends of the Earth, 9 528 U.S. at 189. Voluntary cessation is just a recurring situation in which courts are particularly skeptical of mootness arguments. That is why, in voluntary-cessation cases, defendants’ burden of showing mootness is heavy. Id.