Opinion ID: 1843980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: orders of march 30, 1989, september 22, 1989, and january 5, 1990

Text: As stated above, CNCA brought an earlier appeal in this case (the first appeal) challenging the director's order of September 22, 1989. (Although Central Platte became a party of record in early 1988, it was not an appellant in the earlier appeal.) The first appeal was summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was not timely filed. See In re Appropriations A-14137 et al., 235 Neb. xxviii (case No. 90-126, Mar. 29, 1990). In light of that ruling, the appellees contend that CNCA and Central Platte are precluded from raising issues related to that order in this appeal. The appellants now contend that CNCA's first appeal was premature and that the director's order of September 22, 1989, did not constitute a final order when the first appeal was filed; therefore, they now argue that the validity of the September 22, 1989, order is properly before the court in this appeal. This court does not have jurisdiction to consider appeals from nonfinal orders. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. 405, 470 N.W.2d 780 (1991). Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 1989), defining the term final order, provides: An order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment, [2] and an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding, [3] or upon a summary application in an action after judgment, is a final order which may be vacated, modified or reversed, as provided in this chapter. As we said in In re Interest of R.G., the three types of final orders described in § 25-1902 share the requirement that a substantial right be affected. In addition, the first category requires that the order arise in an action and that it in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment. The second type requires only that the order affect a substantial right in a special proceeding; unlike the first type, there is no corresponding requirement that the order effectually determine the action and prevent a judgment. In re Interest of R.G., 238 Neb. at 411, 470 N.W.2d at 786. The appellants argue that the first appeal did not involve a final order because the case at bar was not completely disposed of by the September 22 order and the Department of Water Resources retained jurisdiction over the original applications. Upper Big Blue claims the orders were final because they affected a substantial right in a special proceeding. In In re Interest of R.G., we recognized that this court has, for over 100 years, construed the phrase special proceeding to mean every civil statutory remedy which is not encompassed in what is now chapter 25 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes. See, e.g., In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. 198, 443 N.W.2d 894 (1989) (effort to remove personal representative was a special proceeding); Grantham v. General Telephone Co., 187 Neb. 647, 193 N.W.2d 449 (1972) (summary judgment); Ropken v. Ropken, 169 Neb. 352, 99 N.W.2d 480 (1959) (divorce action); Sullivan v. Storz, 156 Neb. 177, 55 N.W.2d 499 (1952) (suit for breach of promise of marriage and seduction); Egan v. Bunner, 155 Neb. 611, 52 N.W.2d 820 (1952) (accounting by personal representative); Turpin v. Coates, 12 Neb. 321, 11 N.W. 300 (1882) (order discharging garnishees). We conclude that proceedings before the Department of Water Resources brought pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-209 (Reissue 1988) also are special proceedings for purposes of § 25-1902. Since the order of September 22, 1989, arose in a special proceeding, the issue is whether that order affected a substantial right of CNCA. See In re Interest of R.G., supra . A substantial right is `an essential legal right as distinguished from a mere technical one.' In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb. at 202, 443 N.W.2d at 898 (quoting Sullivan v. Storz, supra . ) Three of the orders referred to in the appellants' assignments of error pertained to the subject matter of the July 7, 1989, hearing on CNCA's proposed amendments and relocation petitions. As set forth above, the March 30, 1989, order provided that CNCA would bear the burden of proving its amendments (1) would not cause harm, (2) were for the same use as the use in the original applications, (3) were in the public interest, and (4) were permitted by statutes or department rules. The dispositive order of September 22, 1989, denied CNCA's proposed amendments and relocation petitions and set aside the department's May 15, 1979, approvals of applications A-14137, A-14138A, A-14138B, and A-14139. CNCA's petition for rehearing was denied on January 5, 1990. The effect of the September 22 order was to deny CNCA the right to go forward with its project as amended. The fact that the director retained jurisdiction over the original applications was only incidental to the findings in the September 22 order, since the only issue remaining was whether CNCA's original applications should be dismissed. Under the circumstances, we hold that the September 22, 1989, order affected CNCA's substantial rights. The September 22 order which was the subject of CNCA's first appeal was final and appealable when it was entered; however, this court did not acquire jurisdiction over the first appeal because it was not timely filed. Thus, CNCA is in the same position in which it would have been if it had not previously attempted to appeal the September 22 order. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 46-238(1) (Reissue 1988), provides, in part, A failure to carry on the construction of either an irrigation or water power project as outlined in this section shall work a forfeiture of the appropriation and all rights thereunder, and the department shall cancel such appropriation. The director had the authority to set aside the department's prior approvals, pursuant to § 46-238, and that order is not void. Also, CNCA has, in essence, acquiesced, as further demonstrated in its showing of cause filed with the department on August 31, 1990. In that document, CNCA informed the director that [d]ue to the recent information developed concerning augmentation flows, CNCA's Applications are not in need of the amendments sought in June of 1988 and as currently filed such original Applications constitute a project which is economically and environmentally feasible and which has an adequate and reliable water supply. If this court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the September 22 order when the first appeal was filed, we certainly did not acquire jurisdiction over the matter by the passage of another 18 months. The appellants' assertions to the contrary are without merit, and the only issues properly raised in this appeal pertain to subsequent hearings and the director's final order of March 4, 1991.