Opinion ID: 4537094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Evidence was Sufficient on Count One

Text: To convict Johnson under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally distributed a Schedule I or II drug that caused the death of another. 6 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). To satisfy the second element, that the drug caused the death of another, the government had to prove that the use of the drug was the but-for cause of the victim’s death. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218–19 (2014). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Johnson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). Based on our 6 Fentanyl is a Schedule II substance. See 21 U.S.C. 812(c) Schedule II (b)(6). As a relatively new drug, methoxyacetyl fentanyl was temporarily classified as a Schedule I substance from October 26, 2017, until October 28, 2019. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11 Schedule I (h)(21). 9 Case: 19-10340 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 10 of 15 review of the evidence presented at trial, it was reasonable for a jury to infer that: (1) the victim abused the substances fentanyl and methoxyacetyl fentanyl thinking they were heroin; (2) the victim bought fentanyl and methoxyacetyl fentanyl from Johnson, which Johnson knew to be “powerful”; and (3) the combination of fentanyl and methoxyacetyl fentanyl killed the victim. Johnson argues that the evidence was “only” circumstantial that he sold drugs to the victim on the days leading up to her death. But in deciding whether the evidence was sufficient to meet a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, we do not distinguish between circumstantial and direct evidence.7 United States v. Tate, 586 F.3d 936, 945 (11th Cir. 2009). Text messages and cell site information showed three separate meetings between Johnson and the victim in the two days prior to her work on September 16, after which she was found deceased. The cell site information showed that Johnson also made a trip to the vicinity of the nightclub where the victim worked in the hours leading up to her death. It was reasonable for the jury to believe that at least some of these meetings involved Johnson distributing drugs to the victim, as her text messages contained numerous drug references, and because Johnson admitted to Detective Boree that he dealt 7 “[C]ircumstantial evidence is not testimony to the specific fact being asserted, but testimony to other facts and circumstances from which the jury may infer that the fact being asserted does or does not exist.” United States v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1031 (11th Cir. 1982). 10 Case: 19-10340 Date Filed: 05/28/2020 Page: 11 of 15 drugs to the victim. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that these transactions were for fentanyl and/or methoxyacetyl fentanyl because Johnson distributed methoxyacetyl fentanyl to Detective Boree shortly after the victim’s death, methoxyacetyl fentanyl is a derivative of fentanyl, and both drugs look identical to heroin. Johnson himself seemed to think that his drugs caused the victim’s death, and certainly believed they were powerful, that users should be careful with them, and users could “cut” the drug and it would still be “the best out here.” Johnson also argues that evidence indicating the victim may have previously used a different drug dealer stretches the reasonable inferences into mere speculation. But the government was not required to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1334–35. The jury was free to choose among reasonable interpretations of the evidence, and one such interpretation was that Johnson sold the victim the drugs that were the “but for” cause of her death. See id. at 1334; Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211–12. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Count One.