Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adeline Rodriguez Testimony.

Text: Defendant raises several issues concerning the testimony of defendant's mother, Adeline Rodriguez, who was called as a prosecution witness. He first urges that the court erred in admitting, over his numerous hearsay objections, the testimony of Detective Stan Reed concerning Reed's earlier interview of Rodriguez. The interview evidence was allowed for its truth as prior inconsistent statements of Rodriguez. (Evid. Code, งง 770, 1235.) (18) Defendant asserts that Rodriguez's police interview was not materially inconsistent with her trial testimony. We agree that the bulk of the interview evidence should not have been admitted, but we find the error harmless. Both Rodriguez's trial testimony and her earlier interview with Reed primarily concerned her conversation with defendant which took place in a park a few days after the Beacon robbery and murder. Rodriguez was obviously a reluctant witness, and her trial testimony was peppered with protestations that she had no clear recall of her conversations with defendant or the police. When the trial court concludes, on substantial evidence, that such professed lapses of memory are false, evasive devices to avoid truthful answers, it may admit, as inconsistent, the witness's prior statements describing the events the witness now claims to have forgotten. ( People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988-989 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998].) However, despite her frequent evasiveness and assertions of memory loss, Rodriguez did ultimately recount her current recollection of her conversation with defendant. In effect, she conceded on the stand that defendant had admitted his participation in the Beacon robbery, had acknowledged stabbing someone who grabbed his shoulder and tried to restrain him, had disclosed the presence of a companion who did nothing but take some beer, was reluctant to turn himself in because he did not want to go to prison, and had discussed becoming a fugitive. Rodriguez also testified she warned defendant against fleeing because the police would be looking for her car, which defendant had used in the Beacon crimes. Rodriguez's prior interview statements, as recounted by Reed, were largely consistent with this testimony and included only one significant difference. Two examples illustrate the typical disparities. On the stand, Rodriguez was asked whether she told the police defendant had said he intended to go to Mexico. Rodriguez responded that while defendant had discussed flight, he never mentioned Mexico specifically, and she only assumed he would go there because he had relatives in that country. Reed later testified Rodriguez had said defendant told her [t]hat he was going to go to Mexico. On the stand, Rodriguez could not recall that defendant had provided information about who was present in the Beacon store. Reed later testified Rodriguez had said defendant told her a lady was present. Thus, in great measure, Rodriguez's trial testimony was not materially inconsistent with her prior statements. To that extent, admission of the prior statements for their truth under Evidence Code section 1235 was erroneous. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1220 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1].) But by the same token, the error was harmless. Insofar as Reed's testimony did not materially differ from Rodriguez's, and thus should not have been admitted, it was merely cumulative. Hence, it is not reasonably probable that such erroneous admission affected the verdict. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1220; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) There was, as previously indicated, one significant divergence between the Reed and Rodriguez accounts. When asked on the stand whether defendant had said he would die in prison or end up killing somebody else  (italics added), Rodriguez responded, I don't remember the exact words. But I know that [defendant] would die in โ in prison, or anybody would die in prison, if they had to spend the rest of their life. (Italics added.) By contrast, Reed testified that Rodriguez previously said defendant had told her he would end up killing someone (italics added) if he was sent to prison. To the extent that Rodriguez, in her sworn testimony, denied or avoided admitting defendant had made this remark, her prior statement to Reed was materially inconsistent, and Reed's disclosure was therefore not subject to a hearsay objection. However, defendant makes a separate argument that evidence he predicted he would kill in prison should have been excluded as irrelevant character or disposition evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, and as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. He concedes he made no objections on these grounds but asks that we consider the merits as a claim of ineffective trial assistance. Addressed in that context, defendant's contentions must nonetheless fail. Even if his kill in prison remark should have been excluded, upon proper objection, for the reasons now asserted, the failure to exclude it does not undermine confidence in the trial outcome. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697-698].) Given the undisputed violence of his crimes against victims Waltrip and Judy N., this brief further reference to his propensity for violence could hardly have prejudiced the jury further. Defendant suggests the jury may improperly have believed that, by showing his future readiness to kill, the remark was probative on the crucial issue of his intent to kill Waltrip. Again, we see no reasonable probability the judgment was affected. As noted above, Reed's testimonial reference to the remark was brief. The prosecutor's argument did not suggest the kill in prison comment was evidence that the murder of Waltrip was intentional; indeed, the prosecutor did not mention the remark at all. Moreover, if the jurors were inclined to reason as defendant fears, his threats to Judy N. that he had killed before and would kill again already provided an ample basis. Those threats were properly in evidence, and any further damage caused by the kill in prison comment was marginal at most. No basis for reversal appears. (19) Defendant next attacks a particular line of questions posed to Rodriguez by the prosecutor. The prosecutor asked Rodriguez whether, while defendant was living at the Lemon Hill house, she warned defendant about carrying knives. Rodriguez said she had warned them all, meaning all [her] boys including defendant, and she had warned him too. The prosecutor then asked, Why did you warn [defendant] not to carry knives? At this point, defense counsel objected. When the court asked the basis of the objection, counsel replied, Irrelevant as to all of them. The court indicated that the objection was overruled as to [defendant]. Counsel said, Well, then, under [Evidence Code section] 352. The court stated, Denied. The prosecutor repeated his question, and Rodriguez answered, Him and all his brothers, because I didn't want them getting into trouble. In his reply brief, defendant renews his claim that the evidence was irrelevant. We disagree. The fact that defendant carried, brandished, and used such a lethal weapon in the Beacon robbery is some evidence that he considered the possibility of homicide from the outset. ( People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626 [205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 685 P.2d 1126]; see also People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d 841, 850.) That he did so despite recent [23] warnings against the carrying of knives heightens the inference of lethal purpose. This, in turn, supports the prosecution's theory that the fatal stabbing of Waltrip was not a spur-of-the-moment reflex, but a purposefully homicidal act. Defendant also urges the court erred in overruling the objection under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree. Any undue prejudice from the inference that defendant carried a knife despite warnings was outweighed by the value of the evidence to prove that, prior to the Beacon robbery murder, he understood and accepted the lethal possibilities of carrying and using a knife. There was no abuse of discretion. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) Defendant urges that the court abrogated its duty to weigh probative value against prejudicial effect on the record. But the court need make no express statements on these issues so long as the record affirmatively shows that weighing occurred, and there is an adequate basis for appellate review. (E.g., People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th 83, 135-136; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 660-661 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 656 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) Those requirements are met here. The court had previously sustained a defense irrelevancy objection when the prosecutor asked Rodriguez if she ever saw defendant carrying a knife. The court admonished the prosecutor that the time frame was unclear and you can't proceed [from] the day he was born to the present. It therefore rejected the prosecutor's question as posed. Moments later, the court overruled defendant's objection that questions about recent knife warnings were irrelevant as to all [Rodriguez's sons]. In doing so, the court made clear that it believed this line of questions was indeed relevant as to [defendant]. As an apparent afterthought, defense counsel then immediately posed an objection under Evidence Code section 352. Though the court overruled this objection without further comment, it appears clear the court continued to believe that the evidence was probative on intent, and also concluded that it was not unduly prejudicial. There was no error. Finally, defendant contends that his counsel's cross-examination of Rodriguez was improperly limited. Counsel asked Rodriguez, Did [defendant] ever tell you that after he left that Beacon Station that night, that he went to the Guadalupe Church and prayed that the young man wouldn't die? The prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds. Counsel responded that the defense was entitled to expose portions of the conversation between defendant and Rodriguez which explained or placed in context the damaging admissions elicited by the prosecution. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection. (20) Defendant contends on appeal that this ruling was erroneous under Evidence Code section 356, which provides that if part of an act, conversation, declaration, or writing is placed in evidence, the adverse party may inquire into the whole on the same subject.  (Italics added.) [24] The purpose of this section is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the subjects addressed. ( People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 235.) Thus, if a party's oral admissions have been introduced in evidence, he may show other portions of the same interview or conversation, even if they are self-serving, which have some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission ... in evidence. ( People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th 281, 302; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1174 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) Defendant argues that because the prosecution introduced selected portions of his conversation with Rodriguez as an admission he killed Waltrip, he was entitled to use other portions, namely his claim of prayer for Waltrip's survival, to present a fair picture of his mental state, and to bolster his assertion to Rodriguez, already in evidence, that he stabbed Waltrip reflexively. However, we need not determine whether error occurred, because exclusion of the prayer evidence was harmless in any event. Defendant's claims of momentary remorse would have seemed hollow, insofar as he thereafter boasted of killing Waltrip, and used that murder as a threat when he later committed numerous violent assaults against another victim, Judy N. Indeed, it is unlikely the jury would have believed defendant went to church that night and prayed for Waltrip's survival, since other evidence indicated that after the Beacon robbery, he spent the rest of the evening obtaining drugs, then learned early the next day that Waltrip had died. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that admission of the prayer evidence would have resulted in a more favorable verdict. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) [25]