Opinion ID: 2329225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Agreement to all material terms

Text: In order for a contract to be enforceable, it must be sufficiently definite as to its material terms (which include, e.g., subject matter, . . . payment terms, quantity, and duration) that the promises and performance to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain. Affordable Elegance Travel, Inc. v. Worldspan, L.P., 774 A.2d 320, 327 (D.C.2001) (quoting Rosenthal v. National Produce Co., 573 A.2d 365, 370 (D.C.1990) and citing Georgetown Entm't Corp., 496 A.2d at 590). Conversely, an agreement is unenforceable if it fails to address material terms. In Stansel v. American Security Bank, 547 A.2d 990, 993 (D.C.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021, 109 S.Ct. 1746, 104 L.Ed.2d 183 (1989), we rejected a claim that an oral agreement concerning a loan was enforceable, because the parties failed to offer[] evidence of any specific terms of the alleged agreement, such as the exact amount of the loans, the interest rates, terms of payment, or manner of performance. We accordingly held that the claim of breach of contract fail[ed] for lack of certainty of the contract's terms. Id. ; see also Owen, 427 A.2d at 938 (noting that, to be final, a contract must include all the terms the parties intend to cover). If all material terms are addressed, however, and the terms of the contract are clear enough for the court to determine whether a breach has occurred and to identify an appropriate remedy, it is enforceable. Affordable Elegance Travel, 774 A.2d at 327 (citing Rosenthal, 573 A.2d at 370). We agree with the trial court that the Letter was both complete and definite with regard to the terms of the parties' dissolution of their marriage. According to the Letter: Brian [appellant] and I [appellee] have agreed upon the basic terms of the divorce settlement, as we understand them in lay terms. The key items are outlined below. We would like your help to create a document that expresses these intentions as well as any other items that need to be included in such a document. It is our intent to then forward the document to Brian's lawyer for review. The language of the Letter therefore shows that the parties understood themselves to have agreed upon the basic terms of the divorce settlement. This understanding is borne out by the terms covered in the Letter, which memorialized the parties' agreement on thirteen separately listed items: joint legal custody of their daughter, with appellee as the custodial parent; vacation and visitation rights and costs; division of proceeds from the sale of their home; ownership of appellant's life insurance policy; transfer of funds from appellant's 401K account; health insurance coverage for their daughter; sharing of costs of their daughter's education and wedding; the absence of any restrictions on the parties' future place of residence; [2] the absence of marital debt; and child support at the rate of $5000 per month. [3] The child support  as to which appellant has expressed primary concern  was clearly articulated in its own clause, and was specific as to amount, manner of payment, and duration. [4] Thus, the parties could be clear about their obligations and expectations, and, in the event of a challenge, a trial court would be able to determine whether there had been a breach of the child support agreement and to fashion an appropriate remedy. See Affordable Elegance Travel, 774 A.2d at 327. In support of his argument that the Letter does not evidence a meeting of minds on all material terms, appellant asserts that it lacked a regular visitation schedule for him to see his daughter, or agreement regarding the division of their personal property (furniture and whatnot). But the Letter did address vacation and visitation with his daughter, [5] and contained a provision specifying the division of the proceeds from the sale of their house. Although the Letter did not provide for the division of personal property, testimony at trial demonstrated that the parties had divided the household furniture and other personal property prior to the signing of the Letter. Viewed in the context of the parties' previous dealings, the Letter therefore disposed of all remaining marital property, real and personal, and arranged for the child's custody, visitation, and support, including monthly child support, ongoing health insurance, college and wedding costs. Since there was no material issue left undisposed and the terms were clear, the Letter was sufficiently complete to be enforceable. See, e.g., Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 186, 190 (D.C. 1999) (holding that agreements between parties settling all property rights and claims are enforceable, as are agreements arranging for child custody and monthly support payments, provided they are in the best interest of the child) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Davis v. Davis, 268 A.2d 515, 517 (D.C.1970) (enforcing a separation agreement that provided for the division of all of the marital property, temporary alimony, child custody and child support). We disagree with appellant's contention that a comparison of the terms of the Letter and the Draft Agreement prepared by appellee's lawyer shows that the Letter was incomplete. The minor differences in language between the Letter and the Draft Agreement do not go to the substance of the agreement, and merely further specify foreseeable details. [6] Appellant does not explain how the expense items listed in the Draft Agreement are materially distinct from the Letter's more general terms, undergraduate college education and wedding, nor does he contend that those more general terms are so vague as to preclude the parties from reasonably knowing how to perform their obligations under the Letter. The Draft Agreement also added provisions for attorney fee shifting in the event of breach or default by either party, and for the payment of their daughter's unreimbursed medical expenses. Terms providing for how parties will allocate attorney's fees incurred in seeking redress for a breach of contract are not necessary for the parties to understand how they are expected to perform the contract itself. See Hackney v. Morelite Constr., D.C. Corp., 418 A.2d 1062, 1068 (D.C.1980) (noting that absence of agreement on incidental factors  who will bear closing costs and transfer taxes  does not render an agreement on material terms to sell property unenforceable). Moreover, given that the parties reached detailed agreement on child support and health insurance, [7] the absence of a provision on unreimbursed medical expenses is unremarkable. [8] The record supports the trial court's finding that the Letter was intended to be the complete and final agreement between the parties, and that it is clear on its face.