Opinion ID: 2544894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dessaure's habeas claims

Text: Dessaure also filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that his appellate counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to raise on direct appeal that the jury instructions constituted fundamental error by improperly instructing the jury on felony murder and other charges not contained in the grand jury indictment; and (2) failing to raise instances of prosecutorial misconduct. [W]hen evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, this Court must determine: (1) whether the alleged omissions are of such magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance, and (2) whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result. Lowe v. State, 2 So.3d 21, 42 (Fla. 2008) (citing Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798, 800 (Fla.1986)). Because Dessaure has not shown that his appellate counsel was ineffective according to these standards, we hold that he is not entitled to habeas relief.
Dessaure first claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging the jury instruction on first-degree felony murder when the indictment charged first-degree premeditated murder. However, this Court has long held that this type of instruction is proper. See Williams v. State, 967 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2007). In Williams, this Court explained: It is well established that an indictment which charges premeditated murder permits the State to prosecute under both the premeditated and felony murder theories. Parker v. State, 904 So.2d 370, 382-83 (Fla.2005). We have further held that [t]he State need not charge felony murder in an indictment in order to prosecute a defendant under alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder when the indictment charges premeditated murder. Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 682 (Fla.1995). Similarly, this Court has repeatedly rejected claims that it is error for a trial court to allow the State to pursue a felony murder theory when the indictment gave no notice of the theory. Gudinas [v. State], 693 So.2d [953, 964 (Fla.1997)]. Williams, 967 So.2d at 758-59. Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim which `would in all probability' have been without merit or would have been procedurally barred on direct appeal. Mansfield v. State, 911 So.2d 1160, 1178 (Fla.2005) (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla. 1994)). Consequently, appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective here. Dessaure also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on sexual battery when it was not charged in the indictment and when there was insufficient evidence to support it. But this Court has also rejected the claim that the indictment must provide notice of the underlying felonies used to prove felony murder. See id. at 1178-79. Because the State has no obligation to charge felony murder in the indictment, it similarly has no obligation to give notice of the underlying felonies that it will rely upon to prove felony murder. Id. at 1179 (quoting Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 682 (Fla.1995)). And despite Dessaure's assertion to the contrary, there was ample evidence here to support that a sexual battery occurredthe victim was found naked and face down on the floor; Dessaure's semen was found on a towel near the victim's body and on her bed linens; and a witness testified that Dessaure told him he struck the victim and began having sex with her. Therefore, this claim is meritless, and counsel cannot be ineffective for not raising it on appeal.
Dessaure also argues that appellate counsel should have argued that the prosecutor's arguments during closing were improper. He specifically objects to the last comments made after the prosecutor led the jury through all the evidence in the case: And when we started this trial he had a presumption of innocence and he only enjoyed that presumption at the start of the trial. Once the first witness was called, once the evidence began to be presented, the State chipped and chipped away at that cloak, that shield he can hide behind. And as you sit here now, he no longer enjoys that presumption because we have proven our case. We reject this claim for two reasons. First, this claim was not preserved by trial counsel with an objection, and, in the absence of fundamental error, appellate counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims which were not preserved due to trial counsel's failure to object. Brown v. State, 846 So.2d 1114, 1127 (Fla.2003) (quoting Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So.2d 263, 266 (Fla.1996)); see also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1281-82 (Fla.2005) (Appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for appeal. However, an exception is made where appellate counsel fails to raise a claim which, although not preserved at trial, represents fundamental error. (citations omitted)). Second, this claim is meritless. In Easterly v. State, 22 So.3d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the First District Court of Appeal distinguished a prosecutor's comment which states his opinion or belief that the evidence is strong from a prosecutor's comment which projects a statement of the law. In Easterly, the prosecutor stated during closing: The testimonial evidence in this case, the physical evidence in this case, has not only removed the presumption of innocence from this man, it has torn it away and shown him for what he did to [K.D.] on [sic] May of 2004 when he raped her. 22 So.3d at 816. The First District held that the comment did not constitute fundamental error because it was tied directly to the prosecutor's perspective on the strength of the evidence. Id. at 817; see also Dailey v. State, 965 So.2d 38, 44 (Fla. 2007) (Regarding the prosecutor's statements concerning Dailey's presumption of innocence, we agree with the trial court that when read in context, the comments appear to be a statement by the prosecutor of her belief that the State satisfied its burden of proof. Therefore, counsel's failure to object was not deficient.). Likewise here, the prosecutor's comments do not constitute error because the comments were directly tied to the prosecutor's perspective on the strength of the evidence. Specifically, after the prosecutor reviewed all of the evidence presented in the case, she stated that, although Dessaure enjoyed the presumption of innocence at the beginning of the trial, the State chipped and chipped away at that cloak [and] he no longer enjoys that presumption because we have proven our case. These comments clearly reflect the prosecutor's opinion of the evidence and are not projecting a statement of the law. Accordingly, this issue is without merit. And appellate counsel cannot be rendered ineffective for not raising an unpreserved and otherwise meritless claim on appeal. Dessaure also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal that the prosecution knowingly presented the false testimony of two jailhouse informants who testified about statements Dessaure made to them. This claim is meritless because Dessaure has not proven that the informants' testimony was false or that the prosecution knew the testimony was false. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Accordingly, we reject this claim.