Opinion ID: 2615891
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The duty.

Text: Appellants contend Const. art. 9, § 1 should be given only that substantive meaning accorded it by the early legislatures. They argue that the action of the first legislature is entitled to great weight because several of its members participated in the constitutional convention and must have known what the framers meant when they used the phrase make ample provision for ... education. Const. art. 9, § 1. Thus, it is asserted, the phrase make ample provision for ... education must be interpreted in light of the financing actually provided immediately after statehood. Appellants point to the exceptionally restrictive funding provided at that time. State funding was either negligible or nonexistent. The little state money provided came from school lands. Funding of school construction was dependent upon voter approval. For the most part, operating revenues were dependent upon niggardly allotments made by county commissioners. This resulted in an average school year of between 4 and 5 months. Finally, school districts had virtually no taxing authority which was independent of county commissioners or the voters. This restrictive funding scheme, appellants contend, is an indication of the first legislature's view of its paramount duty ... to make ample provision for the education of the resident children. Had the constitution required a stable school funding base, appellants suggest the early legislatures would have provided it. We do not accept appellants' argument for two reasons. First, we have already said in Sections IV and V that it is a function of the judiciary, not the legislature, to interpret, construe and give substantive meaning to Const. art. 9, § 1. Second, appellants' position stems from the legal nonsequitur considered and rejected in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and fully considered in Section VI. In the final analysis, however, it is not the failure of our early legislatures that troubles us. Rather, our current concern is the failure of subsequent legislatures to make ample provision for ... education ... Accordingly, we must now examine the trial court's interpretation of Const. art. 9, and the obligation it imposes upon the State. The trial court did not and we do not attempt to deal definitively with the words ample, provision or education. Rather these terms are treated as guidelines for giving the Legislature the greatest possible latitude to participate in the full implementation of the constitutional mandate. In this sense, then, we adopt, as guidelines, the trial court's unchallenged conclusions of law and corresponding paragraphs of the judgment, which provide broadly: As used in Const. Art. 9 sec 1 the word ample (amply) means liberal, unrestrained, without parsimony, fully, sufficient. As used in Const. Art. 9, sec. 1, the word provision (provide) means preparation, measures taken beforehand; for the supply of wants; measures taken for a future exigency. As used in Const. art. 9, § 1 education in its total or ultimate sense comprehends all that series of instruction and discipline which is intended to enlighten the understanding, correct the temper, and form the manners and habits of youth, and fit them for usefulness in the future. In its most extended signification it may be defined, in reference to man, to be the act of developing and cultivating the various physical, intellectual, aesthetic and moral faculties. Appellants contend there can be no conclusive, static or exact definition of the phrase make ample provision for the education of all resident children. But, it is not seriously argued that this places the State's duty to make such provision beyond all judicial scrutiny. There are ongoing factors as well as financial and historical considerations that clearly impact the subject as well as provide a commonsense aid for determining what may or may not be ample provision. For example, the phrase make ample provision for ... education has remained unchanged since its enactment. Yet, to suggest that the State fulfills its duty to make such provision by merely providing more acceptable educational facilities than those of 1889 is utter nonsense. We cannot ignore the fact that times have changed and that which may have been ample in 1889 may be wholly unsuited for children confronted with contemporary demands wholly unknown to the constitutional convention. However, to recognize changing times is not to change the constitution. Quite the contrary. We must interpret the constitution in accordance with the demands of modern society or it will be in constant danger of becoming atrophied and, in fact, may even lose its original meaning. It is the judiciary's duty to ensure that the constitution does not become a magnificent structure ... to look at, but totally unfit for use. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). A constitution is intended to endure for the ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). In short, the constitution was not intended to be a static document incapable of coping with changing times. It was meant to be, and is, a living document with current effectiveness. As was so well stated by Mr. Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433, 64 L.Ed. 641, 40 S.Ct. 382, 11 A.L.R. 984 (1920): [W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago. [13] Consequently, the State's constitutional duty goes beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic. It also embraces broad educational opportunities needed in the contemporary setting to equip our children for their role as citizens and as potential competitors in today's market as well as in the marketplace of ideas. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603, 17 L.Ed.2d 629, 87 S.Ct. 675 (1967). Education plays a critical role in a free society. It must prepare our children to participate intelligently and effectively in our open political system to ensure that system's survival. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 92 S.Ct. 1526 (1972). It must prepare them to exercise their First Amendment freedoms both as sources and receivers of information; and, it must prepare them to be able to inquire, to study, to evaluate and to gain maturity and understanding. The constitutional right to have the State make ample provision for the education of all [resident] children would be hollow indeed if the possessor of the right could not compete adequately in our open political system, in the labor market, or in the marketplace of ideas. In short, we agree with the trial court's conclusions of law and judgment as they express these same broad educational concepts in terms of constitutional rights. The trial court did not, nor do we, deal with the above mentioned educational concepts as fully definitive of the State's paramount duty. Rather, we hold that they constitute broad guidelines and that the effective teaching and opportunities for learning these essential skills make up the minimum of the education that is constitutionally required. We hold further that the mandate of Const. art. 9, § 1 is addressed to the State and requires, as a first priority, fully sufficient funds for the general and uniform system of public schools which the Legislature is obligated to establish pursuant to Const. art. 9, § 2. Through this system our children will receive their constitutionally guaranteed education.