Opinion ID: 781098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Drebin's Testimony

Text: 7 Sosna first argues that the District Court erred when it limited the scope of her cross-examination of the defendant's expert, Dr. Drebin. The District Court granted Binnington's motion in limine and ruled that Drebin could not be questioned regarding his deposition testimony that he was critical of Binnington's actions because he personally would have administered antibiotics peri-operatively (i.e., during surgery), would have decompressed the bowel, and would not have performed an incidental appendectomy. We think the District Court properly concluded that these were Drebin's personal practices or opinions and therefore were not relevant to the standard of care and that, to the extent that they were relevant, they had a tendency to confuse the jury and to unfairly prejudice the defendant. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. Sosna's theory of liability did not involve any of the practices that Drebin was critical of Binnington for performing (or for not performing). Had Sosna pursued a theory of liability premised on one of these actions, the associated evidence might have been admissible as relevant to the standard of care. However, because Sosna's case was premised on a different theory and chain of events (i.e., the failure to relieve the obstruction or remove the compromised section of the small bowel), we see no abuse of discretion in the District Court's ruling. 8 Even were we to find that the District Court erred when it limited the cross-examination, we would not reverse because Sosna was not prejudiced. In this case, the excluded evidence was not of a critical nature; hence, we have a reasonable assurance that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been admitted. Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 820 F.2d 271, 273 (8th Cir.1987). Notwithstanding his criticisms of Binnington, the whole of Drebin's testimony in his deposition was that the defendant's deviations from Drebin's own surgical practices did not cause the fatal infection and were not a cause of Sosna's death. Thus, in his deposition, Drebin stated that the failure to administer antibiotics peri-operatively did not make a difference to Sosna's outcome. Drebin Dep. at 24. Further, with regard to Binnington's decision not to decompress the small bowel, Drebin stated that he was not critical of that action and that the only reason to decompress a small bowel was to facilitate closure of the wound. Id. at 40. Finally, although he was critical of Binnington's decision to perform an incidental appendectomy, Drebin stated that it was impossible to determine whether this contributed to Sosna's death and that, in any event, Binnington had not deviated from the standard of care in doing so because such procedures are not uncommonly done. Id. at 72-73; Tr. Vol. VI at 32-33. Because Sosna was not prejudiced by the District Court's decision to limit the scope of the plaintiff's cross-examination of Dr. Drebin, any error was harmless. See Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370, 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 871, 121 S.Ct. 172, 148 L.Ed.2d 117 (2000).