Opinion ID: 575188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's Fourth Amendment Claim

Text: 8 Appellant argues that the police arrested him--as opposed to merely detaining him in an investigatory stop--when they made him pull his car off the road in order to question him. 3 This arrest, he argues, was unlawful as not supported by probable cause and any and all physical and testimonial evidence derived from it should have been suppressed as fruits of a Fourth [293 U.S.App.D.C. 221] Amendment violation. Brief for Appellant at 12-13. We reject appellant's claim.
9 Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny, police officers possessing a reasonable and articulable suspicion of a suspect's involvement in criminal activity may detain [the suspect] briefly in order to 'investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion.'  Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2580, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)). The stop and inquiry, however, must be  'reasonably related in scope' ... to determine [the suspect's] identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling [their] suspicions. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 3150 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884). [U]nless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him, he must then be released. Id. 468 U.S. at 439-40, 104 S.Ct. at 3150. 10 The police did not arrest appellant when they pulled him off the road and approached his car to question him. In United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924, 102 S.Ct. 424, 70 L.Ed.2d 233 (1981), we held that the police had engaged only in an investigatory stop when, in response to an anonymous tip regarding drug activity, they partially blocked defendant's car and approached him with guns drawn. Id. at 31. In United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 1962, 95 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987), the court similarly found it to be an investigatory stop and not an arrest when the police blocked the defendants' car, ordered them to get out, and patted them down for weapons. Id. at 1053. As one court has noted, blocking a vehicle generally is reasonable, and not an excessive intrusion, when the suspect is in a vehicle because of the chance that the suspect may flee upon the approach of police with resulting danger to the public as well as to the officers involved. United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir.1986) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1097, 107 S.Ct. 1318, 94 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987). 11 The police in this case parked their cars in a manner that blocked appellant's car, approached him while he was sitting in his car, asked to see his driver's license and then asked him if he had any drugs. On these facts, we find that the police conducted an investigatory stop  'reasonably related in scope' ... to determine [the suspect's] identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling [their] suspicions that he was in possession of illegal drugs. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 3150 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. at 1884).
12 Appellant was formally placed under arrest, however, immediately after he admitted to Officer Stroud that he was in possession of illegal drugs. Transcript of Motions Hearing (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 1990) (Tr. I) at 5. For that arrest to be valid, the police had to have probable cause to believe that appellant was engaged in criminal activity. The district court found that probable cause for this arrest arose at the moment Officer Stroud confirmed that the name on appellant's license was consistent with the informant's statement as to appellant's nickname. Tr. II at 30. We need not decide whether probable cause arose at that time, however, because probable cause clearly did arise seconds later when appellant admitted that he was engaged in criminal conduct. 4 Appellant's arrest was thus [293 U.S.App.D.C. 222] supported by probable cause and entirely lawful.
13 As Officer Stroud's first question to appellant about possession of illegal drugs was entirely proper, 5 there is no basis for suppressing the drugs that appellant removed from the front seat of his car in response to that question. Thus, the district court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress that physical evidence was correct. 14 Appellant argues, however, that the drugs seized from his person and the trunk of his car were discovered as a result of his second and third statements--both of which the government concedes had not been Mirandized although made as a result of questioning after appellant was arrested and in formal custody. These drug seizures, appellant contends, must be suppressed as fruits of the Miranda violation. Brief for Appellant at 29. The government counters, and the district court reasoned, however, that appellant's arrest established an independent basis for the search and seizure of the drugs, that is, that the drugs would have inevitably been found and seized regardless of any statements made by appellant. Tr. II at 30. 6 15 [W]hen ... evidence ... would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct, there is no nexus sufficient to provide a taint and the evidence is admissible. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The drugs removed from appellant's person and automobile trunk would certainly have been discovered when the police searched his person incident to his arrest, see United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, 94 S.Ct. 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973) (warrantless search of person valid when incident to custodial arrest), and his car pursuant to a post-impoundment inventory search, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (upholding warrantless inventory search of lawfully impounded car); see also United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1507 n. 2 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1069, 110 S.Ct. 1111, 107 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1990) (even if search of vehicle at scene of crime were illegal, evidence seized would inevitably have been discovered in DEA inventory search); United States v. Jenkins, 876 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (2d Cir.1989) (discussing FBI policy of conducting inventory searches of lawfully seized vehicles as basis of inevitable discovery of incriminating evidence). 7 We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that the drugs removed from appellant's person and the trunk of his automobile would have been discovered [293 U.S.App.D.C. 223] without regard to appellant's second and third statements, and the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress them. 16