Opinion ID: 181715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Countrywide's Post-Petition Escrow Recalculation

Text: The issue before us is whether the automatic stay prevents Countrywide from accounting for the pre-petition escrow shortage in its post-petition calculation of the Rodriguezes' future monthly escrow payments. The automatic stay, under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, is triggered upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. That section provides that any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case, outside the course of the bankruptcy proceeding, is stayed during the bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). The automatic stay is applicable only to claims that arise pre-petition, and not to claims that arise post-petition. See In re Grossman's Inc., 607 F.3d 114, 122 (3d Cir.2010) (en banc). Crucial to our determination of whether Countrywide violated the automatic stay is whether it had a claim against the Rodriguezes for the unpaid $1,787.69 prior to the Rodriguezes' bankruptcy filing. If Countrywide had no claim for the unpaid escrow amount until that amount was, in fact, needed to cover taxes, insurance, and other charges that were due, then Countrywide had no right to collect those monies pre-petition and it could not have violated the automatic stay. The Bankruptcy Code defines claim very broadly to mean: (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). In reviewing § 101(5), the Supreme Court observed that the language right to payment in the definition of claim meant nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation[.] Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 (1991). It reiterated that Congress intended by this language to adopt the broadest available definition of `claim.' Id; see also FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc'ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 302, 123 S.Ct. 832, 154 L.Ed.2d 863 (2003). In Grossman's, this Court, sitting en banc, endorsed this broad interpretation of the term claim, overruling the narrow accrual test established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co., which focused on the phrase right to payment in § 101(5) and when the right arose. Grossman's, 607 F.3d at 121, overruling Frenville, 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir.1984). We explained that this focus on the right to payment failed to give sufficient weight to the other words in the statutory definition that modified the term claim, i.e., contingent, unmatured, and unliquidated. 607 F.3d at 121. These modifiers, we concluded, mean that a `claim' can exist under the [Bankruptcy] Code [by virtue of the terms `contingent,' `unmatured,' and `disputed,'] before a right to payment exists under state law. Id. With this definition in mind, we turn to the terms of the mortgage. The mortgage held by Countrywide specified the Rodriguezes' required payments and Countrywide's right to accelerate the payment date and seek foreclosure in case of default: 2. Monthly Payment of Taxes, Insurance, and Other Charges. Borrower shall include in each monthly payment, together with the principal and interest as set forth in the Note and any late charges, a sum for (a) taxes and special assessments levied or to be levied against the Property.... [T]hese items are called Escrow Items and the sums paid to Lender are called Escrow Funds. .... The Escrow Funds are pledged as additional security for all sums secured by this Security Instrument. .... 7. Charges to Borrower and Protection of Lender's Rights in the Property. Borrower shall pay all governmental or municipal charges, fines and impositions that are not included in paragraph 2. .... If Borrower fails to make these payments or the payments or the payments required by paragraph 2, or fails to perform any other covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument... then Lender may do and pay whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property, including payment of taxes, hazard insurance and other items mentioned in paragraph 2. .... 9. Grounds for Acceleration of Debt. (a) Default. Lender may, except as limited by regulations issued by the Secretary in the case of payment defaults, require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument if: (i) Borrower defaults by failing to pay in full any monthly payment required by this Security Instrument prior to or on the due date of the next monthly payment, or (ii) Borrower defaults by failing, for a period of thirty days, to perform any other obligations contained in this Security Instrument. .... 18. Foreclosure Procedure. If Lender requires immediate payment in full under paragraph 9, Lender may foreclose this Security Instrument by judicial proceeding, and any other remedies permitted by applicable law. App. 118-123. The Bankruptcy Court concluded that Countrywide's recalculation of the Rodriguezes' post-petition monthly escrow payments did not violate any provision of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court explained that the pre-petition claim was limited to amounts that Countrywide had a right to retain and not merely a right to collect. Under that reasoning, no debt to Countrywide arose until Countrywide had, in fact, made a corresponding payment for taxes or insurance. The Court was concerned that requiring Countrywide to recover the full past-due escrow amount through the bankruptcy process would have the effect of requiring Countrywide to give the Rodriguezes an interest-free loan for the entire course of the Chapter 13 plan. It explained that RESPA permitted Countrywide to recalculate escrow payments to avoid a shortage and that the Rodriguezes had failed to explain satisfactorily why such rights afforded lenders under RESPA should be abrogated in the context of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. App. at 143. It further explained that Countrywide serves merely as a conduit for tax and insurance payments and should only recover in bankruptcy for such items actually disbursed on behalf of mortgagors. Id. at 145. The District Court agreed with the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that Countrywide was free to include the pre-petition escrow shortage in its post-petition calculation of the Rodriguezes' future monthly escrow payments. On appeal, the Rodriguezes argue that under the broad definition of claim, when they fell behind on their mortgage payments Countrywide had a claim for the pre-petition escrow deficiency, including the $1,787.69 cushion. Accordingly, the argument goes, Countrywide violated the automatic stay by taking into account part of the pre-petition escrow deficiency in calculating their post-petition escrow payments. Countrywide responds that the word claim, as used in Section 101(5), is limited to debt, and that [a]n escrow account is not a debt ... [but rather] is an asset held by the servicer for the borrower that is used to pay the borrower's tax and insurance obligations and to protect the lender's collateral. Appellee's Br. at 16. In support of this narrow definition of claim, Countrywide cites Johnson, in which the Supreme Court stated, in a footnote addressing a different issue (determining which liabilities are extinguished in a bankruptcy case), that debt has a meaning coextensive with that of `claim.' 504 U.S. at 84 n. 5, 112 S.Ct. 1780. Under Countrywide's view, if it foreclosed and sold the property, the Rodriguezes would certainly not be liable for the escrow shortfall related to the cushion because at that point there would be no future payments and thus no need for a cushion. Instead, according to Countrywide, the Rodriguezes would be liable for the escrow shortfall corresponding to payments Countrywide actually made for taxes and insurance. Thus, Countrywide contends, the shortage with respect to the escrow cushion is not a debt, and instead is merely a security interest. [2] The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a substantially similar question in Campbell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 545 F.3d 348 (5th Cir.2008). In Campbell, the security instrument to which the lender and the debtors were parties had terms similar to those here, including a term authorizing the lender (coincidentally, Countrywide) the right to collect regular payments to cover insurance and tax expenses and to retain those funds in an escrow account for payment as the expenses became due. 545 F.3d at 350-51. After the debtors filed for bankruptcy, Countrywide filed a proof of claim that did not include unpaid escrow amounts, but indicated in its proof of claim that it intended to increase the debtors' monthly mortgage payments post-petition to recoup the unpaid pre-petition escrow amounts. Id. at 351. The debtors filed suit, alleging that Countrywide violated the automatic stay, and the bankruptcy court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the debtors, holding that Countrywide had impermissibly attempted to collect a pre-petition debt and that its actions violated the automatic stay. Id. Countrywide argued to the Fifth Circuit that it had no claim to the unpaid escrow amounts because a claim only accrued when Countrywide paid an escrow expense. Id. at 353. The Fifth Circuit rejected Countrywide's imaginative argument, and, relying on the terms of the loan documents, found that Countrywide had a claim against the debtors each time the debtors failed to make an escrow payment. Id. at 353-54. The Fifth Circuit stated that [t]he touchstone of any `claim' is ... an enforceable `right to payment' from the debtor. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the loan documents provided Countrywide with recourse, Countrywide had a claim against the debtors prior to the bankruptcy filing when the debtors failed to pay required escrow amounts. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected Countrywide's arguments that (a) RESPA allowed it to recalculate the post-petition mortgage payments in the manner it used; and (b) under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), [3] the bankruptcy court did not have the power to modify Countrywide's right to recalculate the mortgage payments. The Fifth Circuit stated that its holding did not limit Countrywide's rights under RESPA or the Bankruptcy Code, and that [t]he automatic stay operates to halt collection of pre-petition claims, even those claims held by a creditor protected by the anti-modification provision of Section 1322(b)(2). Id. at 354 (citing 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1322.06[1][a] (15th ed. Rev.2007)). It reached this conclusion because [t]he stay does not determine a creditor's claim but merely suspends an action to collect the claim outside the procedural mechanisms of the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, staying Countrywide's attempt to collect pre-petition escrow amounts does not bar Countrywide from asserting its contractual rights in the bankruptcy court. Id. Finally, although the Fifth Circuit held that Countrywide had a pre-petition claim to the unpaid escrow amounts, it reversed the bankruptcy court's determination that Countrywide had violated the automatic stay because Countrywide did not collect the increased post-petition escrow amount or take any action outside the bankruptcy proceeding to collect it. Id. at 355. Simply asserting in a proof of claim that the debtors owed a higher escrow payment did not violate the automatic stay. Id. The Bankruptcy Court ruled on the Rodriguezes' motion approximately three months before the Fifth Circuit decided Campbell. The District Court noted that decision, but discussed, albeit briefly, only the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that Countrywide had not violated the automatic stay, and concluded that the Fifth Circuit did not actually reach the issue at hand in the instant appeal. App. at 166. That, of course, was incorrect. We find Campbell persuasive. It instructs that the loan documentation is relevant in determining whether there is an obligation to make an escrow payment and whether that obligation is enforceable. 545 F.3d at 354. As in Campbell, the terms of the Rodriguezes' mortgage establish that the obligation to pay into the escrow account was enforceable. Thus, Countrywide had a claim for the unpaid escrow. We recognize that the unpaid escrow amounts may not have constituted debt under the terms of the mortgage until Countrywide actually disbursed its own funds to cover an escrow expense for which there was a shortage. This fact, however, does not undermine our conclusion that the unpaid escrow constitutes a claim. Grossman's instructs that our focus should not be on when the claim accrues (with disbursement of Countrywide's own funds), but whether a claim exists. 607 F.3d at 121. Here, Countrywide's right to successfully collect may be contingent on a disbursement by Countrywide of its own funds to satisfy an escrow item for which there is a deficiency. But the contingent nature of the right to payment does not change the fact that the right to payment exists, even if it is remote, and thereby constitutes a claim for purposes of § 101(5). [4]