Opinion ID: 814287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: All of the Requested Material Is Protected Work

Text: Product API seems to agree the documents it seeks are, at least in part, work product. The district court’s findings, which are entitled to deference, confirm this. The United States retained Amendola and other firms in preparation for the Fox River and other litigation, and “[t]hese firms have produced draft reports and other documents for the government’s use in litigation.” The documents “consist of the technical reports, drafts, data[,] No. 12-2273 9 and other communications about those reports.” These findings, which are consistent with the record and API’s own assertions, fall under Rule 26(b)(3)(A), making them work product and protected under exemption 5. API’s first and third arguments on appeal assert that any “factual” material is separable from “opinions.” In other words, it believes that factual material underlying the report’s conclusions is not protected work product. This argument ignores Rule 26, which protects all “documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). It does, however, separate “fact” work product and “opinion” work product. “Fact” work product is discoverable in the rare case where party makes the “substantial need” showing discussed above. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii) (permitting discovery if “the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means”); see generally Eagle Compressors, Inc. v. HEC Liquidating Corp., 206 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (This burden is difficult to meet and is satisfied only in “rare situations, such as those involving witness unavailability.”). But even when a litigant makes the substantial need showing, “opinion” work product remains protected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B) (“If the court orders discovery of those materials [for which a party has a substantial need], it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.”). Thus, although there are differing levels of protection for fact 10 No. 12-2273 and opinion work product, the Federal Rules protect both types.2 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Thursday Special Grand Jury Sept. Term, 1991, 33 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 1994). They require a showing beyond relevance before they are discoverable, and as such, they are covered by FOIA exemption 5. See Grolier, 462 U.S. at 26. Indeed, API did not need to look further than Hickman to understand the error in its argument. There, the Court protected the facts the lawyer obtained from interviewing witnesses. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498. API also argues that the district court clearly erred in relying on Rule 26(b)(4)(D), which prohibits parties from discovering the research of a nontestifying expert. This rule is simply an application of the work product rule. The consultant’s work will, by definition, be work product because the party uses the con- sultant “in anticipation of litigation.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(D). The district court did not use the rule as independent authority to reject API’s claim. Rather, the district court used it as an illustration. Because the rule protects “facts known or opinions held by an expert,” the rule shows that facts and opinions alike are protected and therefore not separable. See id. (emphases added). API also cites authority for the proposition that once a party 2 It is possible that all of the documents are “fact” work product comprised of Amendola’s factual studies. This, however, would not alter our conclusion. We make the distinction between fact and opinion work product only to illustrate API’s error. No. 12-2273 11 relies on the research of a nontestifying expert, it falls out of the protection of the Rule and becomes freely discoverable. True, but this is the same litigation-specific argument that API relies on throughout its brief. Parties need only disclose work product in the particular case they use it. This argument echoes the waiver argument we reject below—that the government used a portion of the report in a consent decree does not mean that the Rule requires disclosure in every case going forward.