Opinion ID: 1947466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Omitted Parties

Text: Applying Mafrige to omitted parties, like those in both Lehmann and Harris, has also troubled the lower courts. Specifically, they have struggled with deciding when finality language operates to render a summary judgment final against omitted parties. This issue often surfaces when both the summary judgment motion and the resulting order omit any specific reference to one or more parties. [3] In this situation, several courts have held that Mafrige applies, reasoning that issues and parties are co-extensive and thus if an order disposes of all issues in a case, then it necessarily disposes of all parties to a case, and vice versa. Kaigler, 961 S.W.2d at 276; see also Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 988 S.W.2d 415, 416-17 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. granted); Harper v. Newton, 910 S.W.2d 9, 12 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Waco), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Dallas County v. Harper, 913 S.W.2d 207 (Tex.1995). In contrast, other courts have interpreted Mafrige more narrowly, reasoning that an order that explicitly grants a summary judgment in favor of less than all the defendants does not clearly evidence an intent to dispose of all claims against all defendants, especially those against whom summary judgment was not sought, regardless of the inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause. Lowe v. Teator, 1 S.W.3d 819, 823-24 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. filed); see also Midkiff v. Hancock E. Tex. Sanitation, Inc., 996 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Vanderwiele v. Llano Trucks, Inc., 885 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex.App.-Austin 1994, no writ). Here the Court summarily dismisses this omitted parties problem: Nothing in the order in Lehmann indicates that it is a final judgment, and it did not dispose of all pending claims and parties. The order in Harris states that plaintiff take nothing as to one of the defendants, but that language does not suggest that all of the plaintiffs' claims were denied. As the order recites and as the record demonstrates, the defendant named in the order was not the only defendant remaining in the case. Thus, we conclude that a final appealable judgment was not rendered in either case. 39 S.W.3d at 206. Despite the presence of a Mother Hubbard clause, the trial court and parties in Lehmann continued treating the order as interlocutory-even in the face of this Court's admonishment that a Mother Hubbard clause indicates finality. [4] 988 S.W.2d at 416. The Court now holds that the order did not purport to be final based solely on its new rule discounting the dispositive effect of Mother Hubbard clauses. However, the Court's resolution merely sidesteps the real problem. What happens in the next case when, on facts identical to Lehmann, a trial court signs an interlocutory summary judgment with the Court's new magic language rather than a Mother Hubbard clause? We are right back where we started. Substituting one magic phrase for another leads nowhere. The reality is simply that omitted parties oftentimes do not believe that a summary judgment order that they have not seen, that does not mention them, and that results from a hearing in which they did not participate will operate to dispose of them or their claims. But, under the Court's standard, if these parties do not perfect a timely appeal from the erroneous judgment, their right to appeal is forever lost. This result elevates form over substance and hinders parties' rights to have the merits of their claims considered. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. NBC Bank, 5 S.W.3d 756, 763 n. 4 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (recognizing this Court's express goal of reaching the merits of a cause of action, instead of dismissing actions on procedural technicalities).