Opinion ID: 1102069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Frye v. United States

Text: Murray challenges the admissibility of the DNA evidence introduced by the State on the ground that the procedure used in testing the DNA in this case did not comply with the accepted standards to ensure reliability and, therefore, the evidence should have been excluded. [4] Specifically, he argues that the DNA evidence should have been ruled inadmissible because the laboratory's testing procedures did not meet the standards generally accepted within the scientific community and hence fell below the requirements for admissibility under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). We begin our analysis with the premise that the trial court's ruling on a Frye issue is subject to de novo review on appeal. See Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 274 (Fla.1997). Therefore, we must review the trial court's ruling as a matter of law rather than by an abuse of discretion standard. Id. In Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239 (Fla.1996), we explained the applicable law when reviewing a claim that DNA testing procedures did not meet the necessary standards: In Robinson v. State, 610 So.2d 1288 (Fla.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1170, 114 S.Ct. 1205, 127 L.Ed.2d 553 (1994), we explained: In admitting the results of scientific tests and experiments, the reliability of the testing methods is at issue, and the proper predicate to establish that reliability must be laid. Ramirez v. State, 542 So.2d 352 (Fla.1989). If the reliability of a test's results is recognized and accepted among scientists, admitting those results is within the trial court's discretion. Stevens v. State, 419 So.2d 1058 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1228, 103 S.Ct. 1236, 75 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983). When such reliable evidence is offered, any inquiry into its reliability for purposes of admissibility is only necessary when the opposing party makes a timely request for such an inquiry supported by authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific acceptance of the technique employed. Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 567 (Fla.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871, 109 S.Ct. 183, 102 L.Ed.2d 152 (1988) (emphasis supplied). Id. at 1291. Subsequently, in Hayes v. State, 660 So.2d 257, 264 (Fla.1995), we took judicial notice that DNA test results are generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community, provided that the laboratory has followed accepted testing procedures that meet the Frye test to protect against false readings and contamination.  Id. at 248-49 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Great emphasis was placed on the recommendations of the National Research Council (NRC) concerning the standards and methodology for DNA testing. See Hayes v. State, 660 So.2d 257, 262 (Fla.1995). The NRC explained that when courts apply the Frye test to DNA testing procedures, they should acknowledge that the reliability of DNA testing is based on the assumption that the analytical work comported with the proper procedures. Id. at 263. This is an issue that can be resolved only case by case and is always open to question, even if the general reliability of DNA typing is fully accepted in the scientific community. The DNA evidence should not be admissible if the proper procedures were not followed. Moreover, even if a court finds DNA evidence admissible because proper procedures were followed, the probative force of the evidence will depend on the quality of the laboratory work. More control can be exercised by the court in deciding whether the general practices in the laboratory or the theories that a laboratory uses accord with acceptable scientific standards. Even if the general scientific principles and techniques are accepted by experts in the field, the same experts could testify that the work done in a particular case was so flawed that the court should decide that, under Frye, the jury should not hear the evidence. Id. (quoting Victor A. McKusick, Preface to Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic Sciences, National Academy of Sciences, DNA Technology in Forensic Science at 133-34 (1992)) (emphasis removed). In making the determination as to whether the proper procedures were followed, however, courts are not confined only to the NRC's recommendations. Instead, the NRC recommendations are but one example of the testing procedures that meet the requirements of Frye for admissibility. Henyard, 689 So.2d at 249. [5] In the case at hand, the trial court permitted the DNA test results to be admitted, finding that it was for the jury to determine the weight which should be ascribed to the test results: The Court's function in considering the validity and reliability of the procedures performed by Mr. DeGuglielmo and his laboratory is essentially that of a gatekeeper. There can be no question that expert testimony will generally be of assistance to jurors in assessing DNA evidence. Defendant herein contends, however, that due to mistakes allegedly made during the testing in this case, the flaws in methodology and processes underlying the tests render their results so unreliable as to require exclusion from evidence. Defendant's objections can be divided into two principal categories: (1) allegations amounting to claims of inexact recordkeeping, and (2) challenges as to the potential causes and explanations of dual indications with respect to three of the polymarkers. As to the recording or clerical errors (characterized as scrivener's errors), the Court finds that, although certain errors in recording or memorializing portions of the data clearly occurred, these errors were in large part addressed and explained by the State's witnesses and were neither individually nor collectively significant enough to cast doubt upon the viability of the tests themselves, the reliability of the final results of the testing procedures, or the conclusions derived therefrom. The Court reaches this same conclusion with regard to defendant's objections regarding the DNA amplification, independent review, following of appropriate protocols, and potential for contamination of the evidence. While Defendant is certainly free to argue this point to a jury, the Court does not find that the errors which occurred are significant to the degree that they undermine the viability of the tests, the reliability of the test results, or the expert testimony to a degree requiring exclusion of the evidence. As to the dispute regarding the significance of the fainter allele representations in various polymarkers, the Court finds the testimony of the State's expert to be persuasive. Though defense experts suggested that it was (at least theoretically) possible that the fainter allele was the result of a heterozygous donor or various other factors, both the submitted scientific data and the testimony of the State's experts demonstrate that the result is more likely than not the result of a mixture of DNA on the specimens resulting from the nature of the evidence at the scene; this is particularly true given the vast disparities in the strength of the indicators. In any event, though the experts may draw different conclusions from the test results, the testimony presented does not undermine the viability of the tests or the reliability of the results. Thus, these differing expert opinions pose no bar to the admissibility of the tests or results; the respective credibility of the experts, and the weight ultimately ascribed to their testimony, shall be determined by the jury. Accordingly, the Court is persuaded that the scientific methods and procedures employed by Mr. DeGuglielmo, and the conclusions derived therefrom, are sufficiently reliable so as to meet the threshold requirements for admissibility under both the Frye and Ramirez-Brim-Murray standards. Further, the Court is persuaded that the testimony of Dr. Tracy regarding population statistics and the probability results derived therefrom likewise satisfy these standards. We disagree. Because the State was seeking to introduce the DNA test results, it bore the burden of proving the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand. Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla.1995). Numerous problems occurred, most of which concerned the significance of fainter alleles which appeared during the DNA testing. Even the State's expert, DeGuglielmo, testified that in order for DNA testing to be generally accepted as reliable within the scientific community, there must be an independent review by a second qualified analyst. In this case, Warren, a senior forensic scientist, conducted the tests and performed the initial review; he concluded that the test results were inconclusive because the faint alleles were too faint and ambiguous to be interpreted decisively. His supervisor, DeGuglielmo, reviewed Warren's report and disagreed, submitting a written DNA report which concluded that the tests were conclusive, that the hair sample was consistent with Murray's DNA, and that the faint alleles were consistent with the victim's DNA. [6] DeGuglielmo never discussed with Warren the inconsistencies in the two reports or the possibility of another independent review. The State's argument that the two inconsistent reports meet the requirements of a second independent review is unavailing. If the purpose of the second review is to assure the reliability of the testing, this is hardly accomplished when the analyst conducting the initial testing and his supervisor conducting the independent review reach opposing conclusions. The results from the DNA testing become more uncertain, rather than more conclusive. This defeats the entire purpose of a second independent review and renders the initial review meaningless. Accordingly, as the defense experts explained, one of the elements of a second independent review is to ensure that the results of the initial review were reliable, and should the two analysts disagree, the tests should be deemed inconclusive in the absence of further analysis. Not only did the initial analyst and his supervisor disagree as to the results of the tests, but the analyst failed to properly document the required controls of the testanother step which the experts agree is required within the scientific community. Specifically, the analyst failed to take a picture of one of the control strips which would have shown whether the tests had been contaminated. This is particularly troubling in this case since there was expert testimony that the results normally should not have produced any fainter alleles and that contamination is a possible explanation for the presence of the fainter alleles. DeGuglielmo testified that normally hair follicles would not show fainter alleles of a different DNA because the hair root is the only portion of the hair which contains DNA. He contended, however, that fainter alleles could have occurred because the hair contacted some other substance like blood or semen, thus causing a mixture of DNA to appear. His explanation is troubling, particularly in light of Warren's testimony that when he performed the DNA testing, he washed the strands of hair in xylene and then washed the hair a second time in ethanol to remove the xylene; hence, there should have been no other substance on the hair. In addition, Warren admitted that he did not perform a hair shaft controla control which would have shown whether the hair had any other DNA substance on it. The unreliability of the testing procedures was compounded by the facts that (1) the State's expert used all of the DNA found in the hair, rendering it impossible for the defendant to conduct his own independent analysis; and (2) there was a general sloppiness in documenting the tests which even the analyst admitted was below the standards normally accepted. [7] Because of the clerical errors and the below-standard documentation and paperwork, other experts who were retained by the defense were unable to adequately review the test results since necessary portions of the documentation were missing. Based on the unique combination of errors and problems which occurred in the tests and the lack of documentation, we find that the State did not meet its burden in demonstrating the general acceptance of the testing procedures which were used in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions, vacate the sentences, and remand for a new trial to be conducted in a manner consistent with this opinion. Although this issue is dispositive, we address other grounds raised on review that we deem worthy of comment.