Opinion ID: 813650
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Sufficiency of the Evidence

Text: Although the standard of review incorporates “prosecution-friendly overtones . . . , appellate oversight of sufficiency challenges is not an empty ritual.” United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 711-12 (1st Cir. 1992). This is because the reasonable-doubt standard “is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). As the Court explained in Winship, The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 15 conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue. Id. at 363-64 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The reasoanble-doubt standard not only gives “concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,” id. at 363, but also gives the citizenry confidence in the fairness of its criminal justice system: [U]se of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. Id. at 364. “Despite the importance of the reasonable doubt standard in safeguarding the rights of criminal defendants, the term has eluded clear definition.” United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 645 (1st Cir. 1987). Indeed, we have observed that “[m]ost efforts at clarification result in further obfuscation of the concept.” Id. Nevertheless, “we have attempted to describe the level of 16 certainty necessary to support a criminal conviction.” Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2012). We will “not give credence to ‘evidentiary interpretations and illations that are unreasonable, insupportable, or overly speculative.’” Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 1995)). The existence of some metaphysical doubt, however, does not require a verdict in favor of the accused; “it is enough that all ‘reasonable’ doubts be excluded.” Stewart v. Coalter, 48 F.3d 610, 616 (1st Cir. 1995). A verdict satisfying this standard “may be supported by circumstantial evidence alone,” Morgan, 677 F.3d at 47, but we also have noted the limitations of circumstantial evidence: “[W]e are loath to stack inference upon inference in order to uphold the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Valerio, 48 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir. 1995). In the end, [i]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the conviction. This is so because . . . where an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt. United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 323 (1st Cir. 1995) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
17 In this case, Mr. Burgos was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute marijuana. To affirm his conviction, we must determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime: (1) “a conspiracy existed,” (2) Mr. Burgos “had knowledge of the conspiracy” and (3) Mr. Burgos “knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.” United States v. Dellosantos, 649 F.3d 109, 116 (1st Cir. 2011). With respect to the second element, the Government must establish that the defendant had knowledge of the crime charged. Pérez-Meléndez, 599 F.3d at 43. Showing that the defendant had knowledge of generalized illegality is insufficient, id.; the Government must show that the defendant knew the conspiracy involved a controlled substance, but need not show that the defendant knew the specific controlled substance being distributed, id. at 41. The Government may satisfy its burden in two ways: with evidence of actual knowledge or with evidence of willful blindness. Id. (“Willful blindness serves as an alternate theory on which the government may prove knowledge.”). To establish willful blindness, the Government must prove that Mr. Burgos “was aware of a high probability” of the existence of a conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and that Mr. Burgos “consciously and deliberately avoided learning of that fact.” United States v. Lizardo, 445 F.3d 73, 85 n.7 (1st Cir. 2006). The Government can 18 satisfy its burden with direct or circumstantial evidence, but, as we already have stated, “charges of conspiracy cannot be made out by piling inference upon inference.” United States v. DeLutis, 722 F.2d 902, 907 (1st Cir. 1983) (citing Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711 (1943)). Turning to the third element of the conspiracy charge--whether Mr. Burgos knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy--“the evidence must establish that the defendant both intended to join the conspiracy and intended to effectuate the objects of the conspiracy.” Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 116. A defendant “must in some sense promote [the conspiracy] himself, make it his own, have a stake in its outcome.” United States v. Aponte-Suárez, 905 F.2d 483, 491 (1st Cir. 1990) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although a financial stake in the success of the conspiracy is not “essential” to establish this element, United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1203 (1st Cir. 1991), we have suggested that it is not reasonable to conclude that a defendant who is “indifferent” to the conspiracy was a member of it, see Dellosantos, 649 F.3d at 122-23 & n.15. Mr. Burgos concedes the existence of a conspiracy; he challenges, however, the Government’s proof with respect to the second and third elements of the charged conspiracy. We turn first, therefore, to the element of knowledge. 19