Opinion ID: 706991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Randle's Employment Discrimination Claims19

Text: 47
48 Randle's failure to promote claim involves the questions of whether there is a disputed issue of material fact on: (1) whether Randle was qualified for the Technician III position; and (2) whether the City's proffered reason for not hiring Randle for this position was pretextual. We conclude that there is a disputed issue of fact on each question so as to preclude a grant of summary judgment on Randle's failure to promote claim. 49 The district court concluded that Randle was not qualified for the Technician III position because she has no college credit whatsoever. Randle, slip. op. at 15-16. However, as Randle points out, this fact may not disqualify her for the position if the requirement of college training was not a genuine prerequisite for the position. Randle highlights the fact that the City retained Richards in this position even when it discovered that she did not meet the stated requirement of having an associate's degree; in any event, the City previously posted an announcement of this position with the explanation that other experience could substitute for this qualification and the City certified Randle's application on that ground. Based on these facts, Randle has established a genuine issue of fact as to whether she was qualified to be hired as a Technician III and as to whether the City's claim that she was not qualified was pretextual and untruthful. See Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir.1991) (explaining that plaintiff established a prima facie case even though he did not meet a two year college requirement because the City certified others who also did not meet this requirement). 50 The City also contends that it hired the most qualified applicant. However, Randle's evidence of pretext and the City's failure to fire Richards after it discovered her misrepresentation as to her qualifications enable Randle to withstand summary judgment. At trial, of course, Randle will bear the burden of proving--without the benefit of any presumptions--that the City's decision not to promote her resulted from illegal discrimination. Thus, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on Randle's failure to promote claim. 51
52 It is undisputed that the City did not announce the opening of the Administrator's position even though the City's practice, as reflected in Section 1-2 of its Personnel Manual, was that permanent positions shall be announced internally. Aplt.App. at 308. The City justified its failure to announce the opening of the Administrator position--which precluded Randle from applying for and potentially receiving a promotion to the position--based upon APM 3.4, which states that employees may be reassigned with[in] a department at the discretion of the department directors, Aplt.App. at 150, and Nancy Carney's interpretation of that provision as it applied to the Administrator position. Randle argues that to the extent that permanent reassignments can be made pursuant to this provision, they must be positions of the same skill level because Section 1-4 of the Personnel Manual provides that a change from one position to another position within a Department where there is no change in skill level is at the discretion of the Department Director. Aplt.App. at 310. While that may be the most obvious interpretation of this provision, the district court concluded that Carney's interpretation of APM 3.4 was not so unreasonable as to defy credulity. Randle, slip. op. at 19. 53 The mere fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily suggest that the employer was motivated by illegal discriminatory intent or that the substantive reasons given by the employer for its employment decision were pretextual. Ingels, 42 F.3d at 623 (To the extent there is any inconsistency at all [in following the employer's internal procedures], it only goes to process and not to purpose or motivation, and could not provide a sufficient basis for a jury to find pretext for age discrimination.). Here, the City is not offering its procedures as a reason for its ultimate decision to promote Gilmore, rather than Randle, to the Administrator's position. 20 The City apparently promoted Gilmore because she was the most qualified candidate for the position and Randle has offered no evidence suggesting that this reason was pretextual--i.e., that she was more qualified for the position. Thus, Randle has failed to show how the City discriminated against her by allegedly failing to follow its own posting procedures. 54 In any event, the City offered evidence that it believed that it was following its own internal procedures, and thus, even if the failure to announce this position was a mistake, it was not pretextual. That is, just because the reasoning relied upon for a certain action is mistaken does not mean that the reason is pretextual. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on this claim. 55
56 The district court accepted the City's explanations that Allman's seniority and additional responsibilities explained the 24% pay differential between them and granted the City's motion for summary judgment on Randle's wage discrimination claim. Moreover, the district court ruled further that Randle did not offer any evidence that this reason was pretextual. Randle argues that she set out four such reasons: (1) an expert opined that the seniority differential only accounts for 6% of the differential if one looked just at the inflation factor which was utilized in some labor pay plans; (2) the City and Allman acknowledged that Randle shares 90% of the responsibilities assumed by Allman; (3) Randle and Allman share the identical job title; and (4) other white employees (i.e., the newly hired Richards and the more senior, Gilmore) were not subject to such disparities upon assuming a new position. Moreover, Randle points out that Carney initially explained that the pay differential was due entirely to Allman's seniority (the only reason for pay differential is the fact that Allman was employed for City for a year and a half longer than Randle), and now the City suggests that the differential also results from different job responsibilities--a shifting of explanations which Randle claims adds force to her pretext argument. 57 In addition to asserting its proffered non-discriminatory reasons for the wage differential, the City again argues that the: 58 burden falls on Randle to show that racial discrimination actually motivated the City. Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 839 (10th Cir.) [, cert. denied, [--- U.S. ----] 115 S.Ct. 80 [130 L.Ed.2d 33] (1994) ]. Despite having ample opportunity, Randle has failed to do so. She can point to no comments on her race or her national origin during her employment, nor can she point to any other [direct] evidence.... 59 Br. of Aplee at 23. While it is undeniably true that at trial Randle must prove intentional race discrimination, she can do so with either direct or inferential proof. As we pointed out previously, at the summary judgment stage, Randle can establish a sufficient possible inference of discriminatory intent by demonstrating that there is a genuine dispute as to whether the reasons offered for the challenged employment decision were pretextual--e.g. that they were not the true motivating reasons defendant professed them to be. We conclude that Randle's four arguments and the evidence supporting them cast sufficient doubt on the City's proffered reasons for the wage differential so as to allow a reasonable jury to find that these explanations were pretextual--and thus, a reasonable jury might ultimately infer that these explanations were a pretext for racial discrimination. Thus, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on Randle's wage discrimination claim.