Opinion ID: 4536265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

Text: CONVICTIONS Next, both Wilson and Moore challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that the bank branches were federally insured. Moore makes two additional arguments: He challenges the evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy and the robberies. He also challenges the evidence that the gun used in the robberies was real. Our review is highly deferential. We cannot disturb the jury’s factual findings if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 20 reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). On this record, all three challenges fail. A. The stipulation established the jurisdictional element Appellants’ first challenge is groundless. The Government introduced a certificate evidencing the federal insurance of “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,” the national parent company covering all the branches. Wilson App. 1651. And both defendants’ counsel stipulated that both branches were federally insured. A stipulation can establish an element of a crime. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A)). Appellants fall back on objecting that the stipulation was not in writing, that they were never advised on it by counsel or the District Court, and that they did not understand what was going on. But these objections say nothing about whether there was enough evidence. There was. The most we can make of this argument is a rehash of the Sixth Amendment claim. And as we explained above, whether to stipulate to a jurisdictional element is a tactical decision left to counsel’s professional judgment. B. There was sufficient evidence that Moore was involved in the crimes Moore next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he took part in the robberies. He highlights the lack of physical evidence and the Government’s reliance on cooperators’ testimony. And he notes evidence that all three robbers were about the same height, while Wilson and Foster are six to nine inches 21 taller than he is. He also claims that there was too little evidence that he was involved in planning the robberies to support the conspiracy charge. But there was plenty of evidence that Moore was involved in all the crimes: Kane testified that Moore took part in planning discussions before the robberies. Kane and Foster both testified that Moore went into the banks carrying a gun. And both testified that Moore had helped pick the target of the second robbery. Moore argued to the jury that Kane and Foster were lying about his role in the robberies. But the jury could and did reject that argument. And if the jury believed Kane and Foster, it was justified in finding that Moore was part of the conspiracy. We likewise reject Moore’s argument about the height of the robbers. While some evidence suggested that the robbers’ heights were similar, other witnesses reported that one robber was “short and stocky” and that the one who held the gun was “[m]edium-size[d].” Wilson App. 540–41, 672–73. It is not our job to reconcile that conflicting evidence when reviewing a cold trial record. That was for the jury. C. There was sufficient evidence of a real gun Moore also challenges his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a gun during the bank robberies. He claims that the Government never proved that the gun was real, as opposed to a BB gun he owned and used as a prop in music videos. We disagree. Several eyewitnesses in the banks testified about the gun, including one who had lifelong experience with guns. The two 22 cooperating witnesses corroborated this: Kane testified that Wilson and Moore called the gun “the .40.” Wilson App. 895– 96. And Foster testified that before the robberies, Wilson showed him a loaded “standard-issue Glock.” Wilson App. 1231–32. Based on a video of the robbery, one agent concurred that the gun was a Glock .40 caliber, the same gun that he carried on duty. Another agent agreed. This testimony was more than enough evidence for a rational jury to find that the gun was real. See United States v. Beverly, 99 F.3d 570, 572–73 (3d Cir. 1996).