Opinion ID: 1104480
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the trial court in error in overruling the defendant's motion for a severance?

Text: The first issue raised by this assignment of error is whether a defendant jointly indicted for a capital crime not involving the death penalty has an absolute right to a separate trial or whether the question of severance is discretionary with the trial court. Severance in felony cases is governed by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-47 (1972), which provides as follows: Any of several persons jointly indicted for a felony may be tried separately on making application therefor before the order for a special venire in capital cases and before arraignment in other cases. In Price v. State, 336 So.2d 1311 (Miss. 1976), this Court addressed the question of whether a separate trial is a matter of right where two or more persons are jointly indicted for a felony. This Court noted that the statutory language regarding severance had been changed from shall to may in 1880, held that the word may in section 99-15-47 should be given its ordinary meaning, and concluded that whether a severance should be granted is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. 336 So.2d at 1310. Appellants' argument is based upon Miss. Code Ann. section 1-3-4 and Rule 4.04 Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Miss. Code Ann. § 1-3-4 (Supp. 1983) defines capital cases as follows: The terms capital case, capital cases, capital offense, capital offenses, and capital crime when used in any statute shall denote criminal cases, offenses and crimes punishable by death or imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary. The term capital murder when used in any statute shall denote criminal cases, offenses and crimes punishable by death, or imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary. At the time this case was tried, Rule 4.04 of the Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit Court Practice provided that the granting or refusing of severances of defendants in cases less than capital shall be in the discretion of the trial judge. (Emphasis added). Appellants argue that, since murder falls within the section 1-3-4 definition of capital cases, and Rule 4.04 only provides that severances shall be discretionary in cases less than capital, a defendant jointly charged with a capital crime is entitled as a matter of right to a severance. [1] Appellants further argue that, even if the right to severance is discretionary, the trial court abused its discretion in this case since, though each defendant had a right to call the co-defendant as a witness, each co-defendant had a right to invoke the Fifth Amendment. This argument was previously advanced and rejected under similar facts in Fairley v. State, 349 So.2d 1050 (Miss. 1977). Appellants' constitutional argument is without merit and the denial of severance did not constitute an abuse of discretion.