Opinion ID: 1559854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fifth Amendment Implications

Text: ¶ 38. Finally, I must note that I am deeply disturbed by the entire process, and what appears to be a flagrant disregard for fundamental constitutional rights of the accused child. It is basic to our system of justice that no one shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See also Miss. Const. art. 3 § 26 (the accused... shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself). As a suspect in a criminal investigation of E.K. himself, that was so factually intertwined with his own alleged victimization, the court-ordered interview plainly implicated E.K.'s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ¶ 39. Although this issue was not raised by the parties, it was discussed at length during oral arguments before this Court. The prosecutor for the youth court was adamant that the purpose of the interview was to investigate the allegations that E.K. had been sexually abused, and that the interviewer would not question E.K. about the charges against him. However, it appears that this interview was nothing more than a subterfuge that sought to acquire a confession or other incriminating statements from the child that he had abused another child. ¶ 40. It is apparent from the transcript that one of the investigating authorities believed E.K. had been abused. However, the judge, the prosecutor, the social worker, and the guardian ad litem all expressed their belief that the mother had encouraged her son to fabricate the abuse allegations in an attempt to deflect the charges against him. Most telling are the comments made by the guardian ad litem, a person charged with protecting E.K.'s interests, but who proved to be far from an advocate for the child: I find it quite ironic, ma'am, that at 11:23 or 11:24, whatever the time was, there was a call made to DHS saying that your child was an alleged perpetrator, and then seven or eight minutes later there's a call to DHS saying that your child is an alleged victim. I find that quite ironic, don't you? .... I clearly believe that you would bring up this whole story for your own personal benefit.... I'm tired of coming here everyday, six and seven hearings, for sexual abuse. There's no excuse for that, and to have a mother here frustrating this process and pimping this Court. I'm not going to stand for that. ¶ 41. It is also unrealistic to maintain that an interview would not have dealt with both sets of allegations. The two charges are so closely related, temporally and factually, that they would necessarily overlap. Indeed, the mother testified that when she took E.K. to be interviewed, she overheard two social workers and a law enforcement official talking to the therapist who was to conduct the interview. The mother testified that they were telling the therapist ... that E.K. was lying, that E.K. had made up the story. ¶ 42. And, despite assertions to the contrary at oral argument, the prosecutor's brief suggests rather strongly that the interview would go beyond the scope of E.K.'s abuse. The brief repeatedly references the rights of Baby Jane Doe, the child that E.K. was alleged to have abused, and states Baby Jane Doe also has a due process right that DHS follows in its policies and practices, which includes interviewing her alleged perpetrator. [2] ¶ 43. Under the circumstances of this case, I cannot ignore the inherent Fifth Amendment implications associated with compelling E.K., a criminal suspect, to submit to a court-ordered interview, without his mother's consent and without the benefit of counsel. GRAVES, P.J. AND CHANDLER, J., JOIN THIS OPINION. PIERCE, J., JOINS THIS OPINION IN PART.