Opinion ID: 45022
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: DeAngelis raises arguments about 50 of his convictions. All fail. We group the counts where DeAngelis raises a common argument about them and discuss each set of counts in turn.
DeAngelis raises two arguments against the conspiracy count. First, he argues that the conspiracy was a “rimless wheel” of multiple conspiracies rather than one single enterprise. “Where the ‘spokes’ of a conspiracy have no knowledge of or connection with any other, dealing independently with the hub conspirator, there is not a single conspiracy, but rather as many conspiracies as there are spokes.” United States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807-08 (11th Cir. 2004). To support a conviction for a single conspiracy, the evidence must prove that the conspirators “knew of the ‘essential nature of the plan’ and agreed to it.” Id. at 806. 6 Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for a single conspiracy. Evidence presented at trial showed that DeAngelis’s coconspirators, Robert Jabbour and Lou Claps, solicited and guaranteed others’ investments with DeAngelis by making false representations of their own successes with him. Jabbour and DeAngelis agreed to use Claps’s name on the corporate papers of the pain clinic. The coconspirators knew of each other and of the essential nature of the plan. Second, DeAngelis argues that he did not agree to engage in conduct plainly proscribed by statute. The legal basis for this argument relies entirely upon language in Chandler that we later rescinded. See Chandler, 376 F.3d 1303, 131214 (11th Cir. 2004), rescinded, 388 F.3d at 798, 804-05. This argument fails.
DeAngelis argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on most of the remaining counts because the government failed to prove the existence of fraud, which is an element of each of the offenses challenged here. Under the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, “[a] scheme to defraud requires proof of material representations, or the omission or concealment of material facts.” Hasson, 333 F.3d at 1270-71. The “scheme or artifice to defraud” language in the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are construed identically. Id. at 1271 n.7. 7 Fraud is also an element of transportation of stolen property, 18 U.S.C. § 2314; and “[m]ail and wire fraud constitute ‘specified unlawful activity’ under the [money laundering] statutes.” Hasson, 333 F.3d at 1274. The evidence supports the charges that DeAngelis defrauded his investors. The investors testified that DeAngelis represented to them that he would use their money to make bridge loans, purchase pain clinics, finance real estate ventures, or buy shares in GIASI when it made its initial public offering. DeAngelis never used the investors’ money for these purposes. The investors’ funds were spent on clothing, automobiles, personal expenses of DeAngelis and his associates, and Ponzi payments to the investors. Only one payment was ever made to a pain clinic, and that check was dishonored. The director of the clinic testified that none of its funds came from GIASI or Velvet Hammer. DeAngelis produced financial statements that misrepresented the financial condition of his companies, and DeAngelis falsely represented himself as Greg Brown, both over the phone and in person. Another investor testified that he received false mortgage notes from DeAngelis as a security for his investment. Several investors testified that DeAngelis did not tell them that he was going to prison, where he could not conduct business, and they would not have invested with him if they had known 8 about his incarceration. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence supports the charges that DeAngelis engaged in a scheme to defraud.
DeAngelis argues that the pretrial services officer to whom he gave false statements was an investigating agent beyond the reach of the obstruction of justice statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1503; United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 2362 (1995). We disagree. We have explained that the critical element, under section 1503, is a nexus “in time, causation, or logic” between the obstructive act and the judicial proceeding. United States v. Vaghela, 169 F.3d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1999). We must consider whether the defendant’s actions “would have ‘the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice’ in a way that is more than merely ‘speculative.’” Id. at 734 (quoting Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601, 115 S. Ct. at 2363). The issue then is whether a bond hearing is a “judicial proceeding” for the purposes of section 1503. Because of its constitutional importance and the degree of judicial involvement, the bail proceeding is part of the “administration of justice” within the meaning of section 1503. Our precedent established long ago that “a bail hearing is a judicial proceeding,” as opposed to an administrative or “housekeeping” proceeding, for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which 9 proscribes making materially false statements to agents of the government except in judicial proceedings. United States v. Abrahams, 604 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1979). “The right to be free of excessive bail appears explicitly in the Bill of Rights. . . . Bail may be set only by a judicial officer. The determination of bail requires a judicial decision of which conditions of release will reasonably assure the appearance of a defendant.” Id. The pretrial services officer testified that false information about one’s income and assets submitted in the course of a bail investigation has a probable effect on the outcome of the bail proceeding, and DeAngelis does not dispute that his statements were false. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for obstruction of justice.
DeAngelis argues that the false statement to the pretrial services officer was not material because it did not affect his bond determination. The perjury statute proscribes “willfully subscrib[ing] as true any material matter . . . not believe[d] to be true” in “any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of perjury.” 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2). A statement is material if it is “capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it.” United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th Cir. 1978). 10 This argument fails. At trial, government witnesses testified that the false report of DeAngelis’s assets could influence the court’s decision on the measure of fine or restitution to impose. The evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the false statement, which DeAngelis subscribed as true and executed under penalty of perjury, was material.
DeAngelis argues that the government failed to prove any of the three elements of tax evasion, 26 U.S.C. § 7201: “(1) wilfullness; (2) existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax.” United States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 1990). We disagree. First, DeAngelis argues that the government failed to prove that he knew he had an obligation to pay the taxes in question, but the evidence at trial established that DeAngelis possessed W-2s, completed tax returns, and a notice from the IRS, all of which provided notice of outstanding tax liabilities. Second, DeAngelis argues that he had no personal interest in the funds for which he evaded taxation, but DeAngelis’s 2001 tax return listed $1.3 million in personal income, nearly the amount he received from GIASI investors that year. None of the companies with which DeAngelis was involved filed income taxes that year, which evidenced that he viewed those funds as his income. Third, DeAngelis argues that 11 he did not conceal anything from the IRS, but the evidence established that DeAngelis used nominees and kept his name off corporate documents and bank accounts, which, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, supports the tax evasion conviction and the conviction for conspiracy to evade taxation.
DeAngelis argues that he did not know Gyonki Berki, he had no access to her identity particulars, and he had no intent to aid or abet any unlawful activity. Identity theft occurs when one “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or aid or abet, or in connection with, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7). DeAngelis’s argument fails. At trial, the government presented circumstantial evidence that DeAngelis had access to Berki’s identity documents through Jabbour, and the existence of the accounts in Berki’s name supports the finding that DeAngelis had access to Berki’s identification to open the accounts. DeAngelis’s unlawful activity was tax evasion, and the use of another’s identity to conceal DeAngelis’s accounts is circumstantial evidence that DeAngelis sought to conceal his ability to make payments to the IRS. 12 Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence supports the conviction for identity theft.