Opinion ID: 795169
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Standard of Culpability

Text: 47 The District Court concluded that the deliberate indifference standard applied, but like many other courts to examine this difficult area of the law, it incorrectly differentiated between a shocks the conscience standard on the one hand and a deliberate indifference standard on the other. For example, the Court suggested that the Lewis standard does not apply in non-urgent situations. We again clarify that in any state-created danger case, the state actor's behavior must always shock the conscience. But what is required to meet the conscience-shocking level will depend upon the circumstances of each case, particularly the extent to which deliberation is possible. In some circumstances, deliberate indifference will be sufficient. In others, it will not. 48 In finding that the deliberate indifference standard applied, the District Court noted that Stiles had an entire week — and another visit from Michael Sanford — to reconsider her [initial] evaluation. We agree that at least some forethought about Michael's condition was possible. Certainly, the intent to harm requirement utilized in Lewis does not apply. We also find this case distinguishable from Miller to the extent that there was probably no need for [Stiles] to act in a matter of hours or minutes. Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 65. But regardless of whether deliberate indifference, or something more, is required to show that Stiles' conduct shocked the conscience, Sanford is unable to meet her burden. Mere negligence is not enough to shock the conscience. See Schieber, 320 F.3d at 419. Thus, the relevant question is not whether Stiles should have contacted the school psychologist or Michael's parent. Instead, the question is whether, under the circumstances, Stiles' decisions shock the conscience. We hold that, applying either the deliberate indifference standard or the heightened standard we articulated above, they do not. 49 First, we examine the apparent gravity of the risk. As the District Court noted, no one, including Michael's mother, Karen, or Michael's uncle, believed that Michael was at risk of harm. Karen indicated several times that she did not believe that Michael would actually commit suicide. For example, she stated: I was shocked by the fact that he said he wanted to go kill himself. But, of course, I didn't think by the context of it that he was serious. (App. 410.) Karen had never heard Michael talk about hurting himself before and she concluded that he was not being serious since it just seem[ed] like one of those things that you would say and because Michael joked in the note. (App.410, 460-61.) 50 We also do not believe that the language in the note itself was a clear cry for help. Karen testified that the expression I want[ ] to kill myself was used all the time by her friends. (App. 461.) Karen was also told by Valladares that the guidance office get[s] notes like this all the time. (App.424.) Significantly, the note also referred to any suicidal thoughts as occurring in the past. 51 Second, Stiles cannot be said to have disregarded any risk that Michael presented. She did not simply ignore the note. To the contrary, she promptly spoke with Michael, at which point she made a conscious judgment that he indicated no suicidal signs. ( See, e.g., App. 421.) This judgment was influenced by the fact that Michael assured Stiles that he was no longer upset about the issue with Karen and that he had future plans. (App.256, 280.) For these reasons, we cannot conclude that Stiles' conduct shocked the conscience. The evidence adduced by Sanford, even when all inferences are drawn in her favor, falls short of both the standard we have borrowed from Ziccardi and the deliberate indifference standard. 52