Opinion ID: 20143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: trial court's failure to define deliberately

Text: 85 Soria argues that the trial court's failure to decide (when defense counsel first inquired during voir dire) whether the jury would be instructed regarding the definition of deliberately 17 violated his due process rights and the right to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 86 In a pretrial motion, Soria requested permission to question venire members regarding the definition of the word deliberately. In that motion, Soria advanced three definitions of the word deliberately. Prior to the commencement of voir dire, the trial court expressly granted Soria's request with respect to the following definition: 18 87 The term deliberately is not the linguistic equivalent of intentionally as used in the Court's Charge on guilt-innocence; 19 rather, it is the thought process which embraces more than a will to engage in conduct and activates the intentional conduct. 88 (footnote added). 89 After venire member number five was excused during voir dire, defense counsel orally inquired whether the trial court would be submitting the above-quoted definition at the punishment phase. The court stated that it had not yet decided. However, the court did state that in future voir dire, counsel are instructed that if they want to, to advise the jurors that we anticipate or we think that the Court may define deliberately in such terms. Such terms apparently referenced the above-quoted definition. 90 Subsequently, in the context of objecting to the court's questioning of venire member number seventy-three, defense counsel referred to previously filed pretrial motions and . . . numerous requests to include a definition of deliberately in the punishment charge. The trial judge responded that, although he had granted a defense motion to question the venire regarding a specific definition of deliberately, he was unaware that a motion had been filed requesting that deliberately be defined in the charge. 20 Defense counselthen stated that he believed he had requested that deliberately be defined in the charge but could not remember whether such a motion had been filed. After some discussion, the trial court granted the defense's request to include the previously-quoted definition of deliberately in the punishment phase charge. 91 Soria now claims that he was unable to adequately question some sixty-seven venire members concerning an instruction in the punishment charge. As previously stated, after venire member number five was questioned, Soria asked the trial court whether deliberately would be defined in the charge. We understand Soria's argument to be that the trial court's failure to make the final decision at that point rendered counsel unable to adequately question venire members numbered six through seventy-two. 92 Soria asserts that Knox v. Collins, 928 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1991), controls the disposition of this claim. We disagree. In Knox, the state trial court allowed defense counsel to question the venire members regarding their understanding of what constitutes a life sentence in Texas. Id. at 658. During voir dire, the trial court made certain statements indicating that he would instruct the jury on the law regarding parole eligibility. Relying on those statements, defense counsel adopted a different strategy for jury selection and, thus, refrained from using peremptory challenges against two venire members whose views regarding a life sentence appeared unfavorable to the defendant. 93 Although we acknowledged our prior case law holding that the Constitution did not mandate instruction on parole in capital cases, 21 that his jury be instructed with respect to parole. we concluded that the trial judge's unkept promise to instruct the jury--such an instruction would have corrected any misconceptions about parole--deprived Knox of a fair opportunity to intelligently exercise the peremptory challenges he was provided under Texas law. Id. at 662. Thus, we granted habeas relief based on the denial of due process. 94 Knox clearly offers Soria no succor. In the instant case, prior to the commencement of voir dire, the trial court granted Soria permission to question venire members on a definition of deliberately suggested by Soria. 22 Additionally, the trial judge instructed counsel that they could advise prospective jurors that counsel anticipated the court would use that particular definition of deliberately. By all indications, the trial judge intended to use the definition advanced by Soria. These intentions later materialized when the trial court ultimately included in the punishment phase charge the same definition of deliberately Soria advanced in a pretrial motion granted by the court. Unlike Knox, the trial judge in the instant case kept his promise. 95 Moreover, this Court previously rejected a Texas habeas petitioner's claim that his due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and counsel were violated when the state trial court refused to allow him to inquire into the venire members' understanding of the term deliberately. Milton v. Procunier, 744 F.2d 1091, 1095 (5th Cir. 1984). We explained that counsel has no right to ask prospective jurors to articulate their understanding of the language. Id.; see also Herman, 98 F.3d at 174 (rejecting petitioner's claim that trial court's refusal to inform him of the instruction to be given at thepunishment phase on evaluating mitigating evidence deprived him of his right to intelligently exercise his peremptory challenges). If a trial court's refusal to allow questioning during voir dire regarding the definition of deliberately does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, then certainly the trial court's failure in the instant case to make a final decision initially regarding the definition of deliberately is not constitutional error. Accordingly, for all the preceding reasons, we conclude that Soria has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. 96