Opinion ID: 787911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Status-of-Forces Agreements and the FSIA

Text: 19 Unlike Randolph , however, this suit was brought against foreign servicemen. Litigation against members of foreign military forces who are within the United States (and against members of the U.S. military abroad) is guided by so-called status-of-forces agreements, or SOFAs. See In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1479 n. 2 (7th Cir.1984); Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sovereign Prerogative, 37 A.F. L. REV. 137 (1994). Litigation in this country against members of the British military is governed by the NATO-SOFA. See Brown v. Ministry of Defense, 683 F.Supp. 1035 (E.D.Va.1988). 20
21 The first issue we must resolve is the relationship between the NATO-SOFA and the FSIA. The central provision of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604, provides: 22 Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter. 23 (emphasis added). 24 Although this language is critical, its meaning is not entirely transparent. Does subject to existing international agreements modify only shall be immune, so that existing international agreements can only permit suits against foreign states where the FSIA would not? Or are the exceptions specified in §§ 1605-1607 also subject to existing international agreements, so that such agreements can preclude suit where the FSIA would otherwise allow it? No court has explicitly resolved this issue. See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719 (9th Cir.1992) (discussing § 1604's language without resolving this question). 25 In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 109 S.Ct. 683, 102 L.Ed.2d 818 (1989), however, the Supreme Court provided some guidance. Amerada Hess held that the treaty exception intended by the subject to existing international agreements phraseology applies when international agreements `expressly conflic[t]' with the immunity provisions of the FSIA. Id. at 442, 109 S.Ct. 683(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6616) (alteration in original). This language suggests that any conflict with the FSIA immunity provisions, whether toward more or less immunity, is within the treaty exception. 26 Although there is no other pertinent judicial precedent, the House Report accompanying the FSIA is clear on this point: 27 Like other provisions in the bill, section 1605 is subject to existing international agreements (see section 1604), including Status of Forces Agreements; if a remedy is available under a Status of Forces Agreement, the foreign state is immune from such tort claims as are encompassed in sections 1605(a)(2) and 1605(a)(5). 28 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6620; 6 see also id. at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6616( All immunity provisions in sections 1604 through 1607 are made subject to `existing' treaties and other international agreements to which the United States is a party. In the event an international agreement expressly conflicts with the [FSIA], the international agreement would control. (emphasis added)). 29 This conflict reading of § 1604 is the only sensible one. Under this interpretation of the FSIA, preexisting international agreements could either expand or contract a foreign nation's amenability to suit as compared to that provided under the FSIA. To read § 1604 otherwise, as permitting pre-existing international agreements only to expand a foreign state's exposure to suit but not to limit it, would allow the FSIA implicitly to trump treaties precluding certain kinds of suits against foreign nations. Given the lack of any specific indication that Congress intended this alternate construction, we follow the canon of statutory interpretation that acts of Congress should not be construed to conflict with international treaty obligations. Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441-42 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 125 L.Ed.2d 128 n. 35 (1993)). We therefore hold that the FSIA in its entirety is subject to such existing international agreements. If there is a conflict between the FSIA and such an agreement regarding the availability of a judicial remedy against a contracting state, the agreement prevails. 30 The NATO-SOFA pre-dated the FSIA, and is therefore one of the existing international agreements covered by the caveat in § 1604. See H.R.Rep. No. 94-1487, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6616 ([T]he[FSIA] would not alter the rights or duties of the United States under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement or similar agreements with other countries....). Because the FSIA is subject to the NATO-SOFA, whether Moore's FSIA claim may go forward turns on two inquiries: Does the NATO-SOFA apply in this case? If so, does it expressly conflic[t], Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442, 109 S.Ct. 683 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), with the FSIA? If the NATO-SOFA applies and conflicts with the FSIA, then the defendants may not be sued under the FSIA.
31 Two provisions of the NATO-SOFA are central to this case. First, Article I, paragraph 1 defines force for purposes of the agreement to mean the personnel belonging to the land, sea, or air armed services of one Contracting Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party in the North Atlantic Treaty area in connexion with their official duties.... NATO-SOFA, art. I, ¶ 1(a), 4 U.S.T. at 1794. The treaty goes on to state that the two Contracting Parties concerned may agree that certain individuals, units, or formations shall not be regarded as constituting or included in a `force' for the purposes of the present Agreement. Id. 32 Under the basic definition, Southall and the other ten Doe defendants were all members of a force at the time of the Tacoma incident: The complaint alleges that they were active members of the British military present within the United States on active duty for the purposes of training exercises. They therefore were here in connexion with their official duties. 33 Moore argues that the district court could not have known whether these defendants fall under the exception to the force definition, i.e., whether Britain and the United States had agreed that any of the individuals named as defendants should not be regarded as constituting or included in a `force' under the NATO-SOFA. Moore, however, points to no such agreement. 7 As he is relying on an exception within the text of the treaty, the burden is on him to show that the exception applies. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223, 1234-35 (9th Cir.1980) (articulating the well-established rule ... that a [party] who relies upon an exception to a statute made by a proviso or distinct clause, whether in the same section of the statute or elsewhere, has the burden of establishing and showing that he comes within the exception.). Because Moore has not alleged any agreement in his complaint, we conclude that the defendants all come under the terms of the NATO-SOFA.
34 The other key provision of the NATO-SOFA appears in Article VIII, paragraph 5: 35 Claims ... arising out of acts or omissions of members of a force or civilian component done in the performance of official duty, or out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which a force or civilian component is legally responsible, and causing damage in the territory of the receiving State to third parties, other than any of the Contracting Parties, shall be dealt with by the receiving State in accordance with the following provisions: — 36 (a) Claims shall be filed, considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of the receiving State with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own armed forces. 37 NATO-SOFA, art. VIII, ¶ 5, 4 U.S.T. at 1806 (emphasis added). 8 We observed some time ago that this provision does suggest ... that the foreign serviceman is `assimilated' into the United States military for this limited consideration. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1978). Daberkow thus assumed that subparagraph (a) does not simply provide that suit can be filed against the foreign nation on the same basis that suit could be filed against the United States were the defendants our armed forces or members thereof. Instead, Daberkow suggested that, as the district court put the matter in this case, under this treaty, foreign servicemen are effectively considered members of the United States military for purposes of claims arising out of acts or omissions of the servicemen. 38 Although we have never squarely so held, the NATO-SOFA's ratification history supports this conclusion. See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 1, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 13-14 (1953) (In the case of torts committed in the performance of duty, the local citizen who is injured proceeds against his own government exactly as he would if the injury had been caused by a member of his own government's armed forces.). 9 So do the decisions of every district court that has looked at this question. See, e.g., Greenpeace, 946 F.Supp. at 788 (Under the framework established by NATO-SOFA, the foreign serviceman is `merged' or `assimilated' into the United States military for the purposes of claims arising out of the acts or omissions of that foreign serviceman.); Lowry v. Commonwealth of Canada, 917 F.Supp. 290, 291 (D.Vt.1996); Aaskov v. Aldridge, 695 F.Supp. 595, 596-99 (D.D.C.1988); Brown, 683 F.Supp. at 1037-40; Shafter v. United States, 273 F.Supp. 152, 153-57 (S.D.N.Y.1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.1968). 39 The decisive support for construing this part of the NATO-SOFA as a merger provision comes from a contemporaneous Act of Congress — the International Agreement Claims Act of 1954, Pub.L. No. 83-734, 68 Stat. 1006(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2734a-2734b). Under the Act, 40 When the United States is a party to an international agreement which provides for the settlement or adjudication by the United States under its laws and regulations, and subject to agreed pro rata reimbursement, of claims against another party to the agreement arising out of the acts or omissions of a member or civilian employee of an armed force of that party done in the performance of official duty, or arising out of any other act, omission, or occurrence for which that armed force is legally responsible under applicable United States law,... claims may be prosecuted against the United States, or settled by the United States, in accordance with the agreement, as if the acts or omissions upon which they are based were the acts or omissions of a member or a civilian employee of an armed force of the United States. 41 10 U.S.C. § 2734b(a). 10 Enacted specifically to codify the cost-sharing reimbursement procedures of the NATO-SOFA, see Eyskens v. United States, 140 F.Supp.2d 553, 557 (E.D.N.C.2000); Niedbala v. United States, 37 Fed. Cl. 43, 46-47 (1996), the Act implements article VIII[of the NATO-SOFA] by authorizing funds for payment of SOFA claims, be they NATO SOFA or other SOFAs. The United States pays a pro rata share of awards as determined by the relevant SOFA. Niedbala, 37 Fed. Cl. at 46. Thus, Congress, in enabling the NATO-SOFA claims procedures by enacting them into federal law, see Aaskov, 695 F.Supp. at 596 n. 2, understood article VIII as a merger provision, an interpretation we follow today. 42 Moore's complaint alleges that Southall and the other ten unnamed defendants were acting within their official capacity. This suit is therefore governed by Article VIII, paragraph 5 of the NATO-SOFA, 11 and Moore must pursue such claims as though he ... were injured by the armed forces of the host nation itself. Greenpeace, 946 F.Supp. at 788. In short, the effect of [NATO-]SOFA is to make the United States the only appropriate defendant in this suit. Lowry, 917 F.Supp. at 291. 43 The FSIA, of course, provides for suits against foreign nations, not against the United States. Further, any suit against the United States for a tort by an employee during the course of employment would have to be filed under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679. The intentional tort exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), bars certain types of claims arising out of intentional, scope-of-duty torts, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights. See Orsay v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 289 F.3d 1125, 1132-36 (9th Cir.2002) (discussing the intentional tort exception to the FTCA). By contrast, the FSIA does not bar assault, or most other intentional torts, 12 when committed within the scope of duty. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B). The NATO-SOFA thus expressly conflicts with the FSIA in both these respects and, therefore, precludes relief under the FSIA. 44 As the NATO-SOFA controls, there is no jurisdiction under the FSIA over Moore's suit against the United Kingdom. 45 As noted, Moore's only remedy based on the allegations in his complaint is a suit against the United States under the FTCA. Such a claim is now (and would have been, as of the date Moore filed this suit in the district court) time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). 13 Additionally, the FTCA does not permit suits against the United States arising out of assault. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Thus, even if his suit were timely, Moore could not have proceeded under the FTCA. There is no basis, consequently, for allowing amendment of the complaint to name the United States as defendant, as any such amendment would be futile. See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 718 n. 20 (9th Cir.2003) (denying leave to amend complaint where such amendment would be futile because the statute of limitations had run at the time suit was filed).