Opinion ID: 2315619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the jurors' instruction manual

Text: When the panel from which the jury was drawn reported for service each member was given a blue-covered pamphlet entitled Primary Instructions to Jurors, endorsed Compliments of the Sheriff of Monmouth County. This was not the Manual for Petit Jurors prepared under the direction of this court and now the only manual of this type authorized for distribution in the courts of this State. The challenged pamphlet contains a number of wholly inaccurate or misleading statements of propositions of law among which is that which occasions the controversy here, namely, a completely erroneous definition of reasonable doubt under our law. There is also imprinted on the last page a quotation from Lycurgus as follows: On the head of the criminal lies the crime; but in a miscarriage of justice the jurors delinquent become participants of guilt. The discovery by the trial judge and counsel that the members of the panel were in possession of copies of the pamphlet was first made in the course of the voir dire examination of prospective jurors and at the time only 5 of the 14 jurors ultimately selected had been chosen. The selection of the jury required over two weeks from November 26 to December 10. The trial judge immediately upon the completion of the voir dire examination of the prospective juror during whose interrogation the fact became known promptly dealt with the problem as follows: The Court: May I see that blue book, please? Mr. Juska: Yes, sir. The Court: I don't know by whose authority this book entitled `Primary Instructions to Jurors. Compliments of Morris J. Woodring, Sheriff, Monmouth County,' which booklet is supposed to contain primary instructions to jurors, was permitted to be given to the jurors. I don't know that any judge in this county has authorized the issuance of this book. At least I find nowheres contained therein such authorization. I have not had the opportunity to examine it too carefully, but I can understand where it might be misleading when in the hands of laymen who know nothing about the law, and therefore I am going to instruct the Sheriff to pick up from each and every one of you who are serving on this panel of the jury the books in question, including the five jurors who have already been sworn. It has been the practice in this State since the inception of the new Constitution to give the prospective jurors general instructions upon the opening of the session concerning their responsibilities and their duties in a general way, and then almost each individual judge practically repeats nearly the same instructions to you when you are sworn in a particular case. In view of the fact that the law is given to you by the Court and under the system you must take the law from the Court and not from the Sheriff, I am asking that these booklets be picked up by Sheriff White now. Mrs. Lewis: May they retain the list, your Honor? The Court: Yes, they may retain the list. That's all right as long as he doesn't have it here. One juror in the box has his at home, but he won't be able to go home. So it won't do him any good. Mr. Juska: May I be heard? The Court: Yes. Mr. Juska: The defense, sir, would like the record to show that pursuant to your Honor's instructions the jurors in the box Numbers 2, 3 and 4 returned to Sheriff White the books in question. The Court: 2, 3 and 4. What happened to the other two? Where is yours? Juror Number 1: Mine is home in my other bag. The Court: Where do you have yours? Juror Number 5: Mine is home in another suit. The Court: It may be noted that all the books that are available except the two, Juror Number 1 and Juror Number 5, have been picked up. Mr. Juska: May we now have a copy of the book marked into evidence? The Court: What is the purpose of it? Mr. Juska: Do you want it orally here or at the side bar so that it may not become part of the record? (Counsel confer with the Court at the bench.) Vaszorich argues that it was error not to receive the pamphlet in evidence either at that time or a number of days later on December 17, the last day on which testimony was taken, when his counsel renewed the offer of the pamphlet in evidence as part of my case. We note that the record does not disclose that on either occasion the trial judge was informed of the purpose of the offer. We are told on the brief that it was so that his (Vaszorich's) record might be made for review. It is also argued that it was error for the trial judge not to declare a mistrial, although no motion for a mistrial by any of defense counsel is shown by the record. In the circumstances both this court and the trial judge might well be justified in concluding that counsel did not view the situation as serious enough to call for the break-up of the trial and was content with the trial court's action in taking up the pamphlets and in instructing the jury that they were to take the law from the court. However, we shall deal with the contention made on the brief that Vaszorich is entitled to a reversal of his conviction on the ground that this booklet is incorrect, inflammatory and highly prejudicial to the defendant. Vaszorich relies on Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55 (1951), and Palestroni v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super. 266 ( App. Div. 1950). Those cases lay down the principle that irregular matter having the tendency for improper influence in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge, Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J., at 61, which gets to the jury under circumstances which deprive the party adversely affected by it of the opportunity to rebut or counteract such influence, may be sufficient reason for nullification of the jury's verdict without further inquiry as to the actual effect of the irregular matter upon the jurors' minds. In each of those cases the jury verdict was annulled because the party affected had no such opportunity as the irregular matter reached the jury after the jury had retired and during their deliberations. But the principle of those decisions is not applicable here; the irregular matter came to light at a time when all parties and the trial court had a full and ample opportunity to take steps to avoid any improper influence of the manual upon the minds of the jurors and prospective jurors. The real question is whether in the circumstances of the case, with particular reference to the precautions taken by the trial judge, enough was done to dispel the tendency of the contents of the manual for improper influence. We think the prompt and firm action of the trial judge disclosed by the excerpt from the record above was sufficient in the circumstances. Apart from the fact that no motion for mistrial was made, even if one had been made and denied, it is not generally necessary that a mistrial be declared. It will ordinarily suffice that the trial judge instruct the jury in definite and unexceptionable terms upon the right of the matter, which we think the trial judge did in this case, both at the time and later in his charge, when he instructed them that the jurors were to decide the case upon the evidence alone according to the law as he gave it to them. Cf. State v. Bolles, 13 N.J. Misc. 273 ( Sup. Ct. 1935). Counsel for Brown did not join in either proffer of the pamphlet in evidence made by counsel for Vaszorich, but argues error in the trial judge's refusal to make a requested charge, I charge you that a reasonable doubt is a doubt existing for a reason, but a juror may have reasonable doubt, though unable to give good and sufficient reason for the doubt, or express it in words, informing us on the brief that the charge was requested to make certain that the jurors were not misled by the improper definition of reasonable doubt in the manual and particularly the sentence, obviously erroneous under our law, that a reasonable doubt is one for which, should he be called upon, a juror can give a reason. The trial judge refused to charge the request upon the ground that the charge made upon the subject of reasonable doubt covered the submission. We agree that it did and find no error. The submission was fully embraced within that part of the charge which instructed the jury that reasonable doubt refers to that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. The evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 601 ( E. & A. 1857).