Opinion ID: 887356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of Fear on a Guilty Plea

Text: ¶ 24 Lone Elk argues that he pleaded guilty unknowingly and involuntarily because he was unduly influenced by hope and fear. Lone Elk cites State ex rel. Gladue v. Eighth Judicial Dist. (1978), 175 Mont. 509, 575 P.2d 65, for the proposition that a showing that a guilty plea was induced by fear of losing at trial was sufficient to require the district court to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. Specifically, he argues that he pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary because he feared that, if he went to trial and was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, the court would require him to complete sex offender treatment. ¶ 25 In Gladue, we allowed Gladue to withdraw his guilty plea when the evidence showed that [he] had always maintained his innocence and plead guilty only after being induced to do so by his attorney of record. Petitioner feared he had no chance of proving his innocence in a jury trial. This raises serious questions about his guilty plea and whether that plea was voluntarily given. Gladue, 175 Mont. at 512, 575 P.2d at 67. Gladue's only fear was losing at trial. Despite our holding in Gladue, a defendant's belief in his innocence or his fear of going to trial do not preclude him from making a voluntary and intelligent choice between possible alternative courses of action. North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162; accord State v. Allen (1994), 265 Mont. 293, 294, 296, 876 P.2d 639, 639, 641. Fear of the legal consequences of one's actions lies central to the criminal law purpose of deterrence. If an individual did not fear the legal consequences of his action, he may have no reservations about engaging in criminal conduct. This is not improperly-induced fear. To the extent that Gladue allows a defendant to withdraw his Alford plea merely because he fears the consequences of going to trial, we implictly overruled it by implication in Allen. ¶ 26 The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757, 90 S.Ct. at 1473, 25 L.Ed.2d at 761. If Lone Elk was truly afraid of the sexual offender treatment, he could have pleaded not guilty and taken the case to trial. If he was acquitted, he, of course, would not be subject to any punishment or sex offender treatment programs. If he was convicted, he would likely have to undergo sexual offender treatment and his sentence could be a maximum punishment of 100 years in prison. Section 45-5-503(2), MCA (2001). ¶ 27 Pleading guilty to the burglary charge limited his risk to a maximum penalty of twenty years, but it involved a risk of sex offender treatment. Section 45-6-204(3), MCA (2001). The District Court specifically told Lone Elk that his sentence for burglary could require sexual offender treatment. As Lone Elk admitted in court, he understood the repercussions of his decision, and he understood the risks. Simply because the results failed to turn out as he expected or desired, the District Court need not allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.