Opinion ID: 1664552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: For his first point an appeal, Mr. Hale challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this court does not reweigh the evidence but determines instead whether the evidence supporting the verdict is substantial. McFarland v. State, 337 Ark. 386, 989 S.W.2d 899 (1999). Substantial evidence is defined as direct or circumstantial evidence that is forceful enough to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion one way or another and that goes beyond mere speculation or conjecture. Id.; Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 972 S.W.2d 239 (1998). In determining whether there is substantial evidence, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. McFarland v. State, supra . Only evidence supporting the verdict is considered. McFarland v. State, supra . We will affirm if there is any substantial evidence to support the verdict. Harris v. State, 331 Ark. 353, 961 S.W.2d 737 (1998). As a threshold matter, Mr. Hale argues that this court should follow the standard of review set out by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), where the Court, in determining whether habeas corpus relief should be granted to a defendant convicted of murder, stated: the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The State suggests initially that Mr. Hale failed to make this argument below and, therefore, is precluded from raising it on appeal. We note that Mr. Hale's motion for directed verdict incorporated language similar to the above-quoted language in Jackson v. Virginia : no jury could reasonably find that there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the element of intent. Thus, we conclude that Mr. Hale is not barred from arguing on appeal that this court should explicitly adopt Jackson's rational factfinder test as the proper standard of review. In that regard, we considered a similar argument in Jones v. State, 269 Ark. 119, 598 S.W.2d 748 (1980), and concluded that the language in Jackson v. Virginia does not require us to abandon our decisions regarding the test of whether a jury verdict should stand in a criminal case. There must be substantial evidence to support such a decision. Id., 269 Ark. at 120, 598 S.W.2d at 749. Once again, for the reasons stated in Jones v. State , we decline to explicitly adopt Jackson's rational fact-finder test as the appropriate standard of review when there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Accordingly, we will adhere to the substantial-evidence test in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in this case. [2] With regard to the substance of Mr. Hale's first argument on appeal, we now consider whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for violating section 26-60-109, which states: Any person who files any statement, application, form, or other document required to be filed by this code, knowing the statement or information contained in the document to be false or misleading in any material respect, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or by imprisonment in the Department of Correction for not more than three (3) years, or by both fine and imprisonment. Mr. Hale contends that the evidence is insufficient in three respects: (1) the State failed to prove that he filed a document; (2) the State failed to prove that the document was required to be filed by the Insurance Code; and (3) the State failed to prove that he knew the statement to be false or misleading at the time it was filed. We conclude that all of these arguments are without merit. In making the argument that the State failed to prove that he filed a document, Mr. Hale characterizes Mr. Niemann's memory as somewhat fuzzy regarding all the events surrounding this matter. With regard to the events leading up to July 6, 1993, when the letter was written to the Arkansas Insurance Department, Mr. Niemann testified as follows: Well, it came to be written because the $150,000.00 capital contribution to National Savings Life Insurance Companyit solved the deficiency in the company that was mentioned in the Commissioner's letter that he wrote back in March.... Well, I wrote the letter because the deficiency had been impaired [sic]. I don't exactly recall whether I said, We need to write the letter, to David Hale, or whether David Hale said to me, We need to write the letter. We simply talked about the fact that the Insurance Commissioner had to be advised thator should be advised that our deficiency had been solved. Mr. Hale asserts there was no evidence that he instructed Mr. Niemann to write the July 6 letter. That assertion fails to acknowledge Ark.Code Ann. § 5-2-503(a) (Repl.1997), which provides that: A person is criminally liable for any conduct constituting an offense that he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of an organization to the same extent as if that conduct were performed in his own name or behalf. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the issue here is whether there is substantial evidence that Mr. Hale caused the document to be filed with the Arkansas Insurance Department. Mr. Niemann testified unequivocally that Mr. Hale knew about the letter before it was filed. Indeed, Mr. Hale acknowledged during his testimony that he was familiar with the letter. Furthermore, Mr. Hale was the owner of NSLIC and was the only person directing the events that caused $150,000 to be deposited into NSLIC's account, thereby triggering the need to notify the Insurance Department that the deficiency had been cured. According to Commissioner Douglass's testimony, Mr. Hale came to see him to ask for an extension of time to cure NSLIC's capital deficiency and told him that he was going to cure the deficiency by means of a cash infusion. Subsequently, Mr. Hale entered into negotiations with Mr. Rutherford, which resulted in $150,000 being deposited into NSLIC's account on July 2. Once Mr. Hale received the $150,000 check from Mr. Rutherford, Mr. Hale directed Mr. Niemann to put the money into NSLIC's account as a capital contribution. That infusion of cash into NSLIC came about solely as a result of Mr. Hale's dealings with Mr. Rutherford, and, without it, the July 6 letter to the Insurance Commissioner would not have been written and filed with the Arkansas Insurance Department. This evidence directly supports the conclusion that Mr. Hale caused the filing of the July 6 letter and, therefore, was ultimately responsible to the same extent as if he had filed the letter himself. Mr. Hale next contends that the filing of the July 6 letter with the Insurance Department was not required by the Insurance Code. He is clearly mistaken. The meaning of the term this code as used in section 23-60-109 is defined in the note to Ark.Code Ann. § 23-60-101 (Repl. 1994) to include sections 23-69-105XX-XX-XXX. Thus, this code includes Ark. Code Ann. § 23-69-138(c) (Repl.1994), which provides in relevant part: If the deficiency is not made good and proof thereof filed with the commissioner within the thirty-day period, the insurer shall be deemed insolvent and the commissioner shall institute delinquency proceedings against it.... The plain language of section 23-69-138(c) required the filing of the July 6 letter. Moreover, Commissioner Douglass testified that the July 6 letter advising the Insurance Department that the capital deficiency had been cured was a statutory requirement of curing the impairment, and Mr. Hale admitted during his own testimony that he knew of the requirement that the Insurance Department be notified when NLSIC's capital deficiency was cured. Finally, Mr. Hale argues that the State failed to prove that he knew the statements contained in the July 6 letter were false at the time the letter was mailed on July 6, 1993. Mr. Hale fails to recognize that Ark.Code Ann. § 23-60-109 allows the jury to convict if the information contained in a document is either false or misleading in any material respect. The July 6 letter from NSLIC to the Insurance Department noted NSLIC's capital impairment in the amount of $38,575 and then stated that $150,000 had been deposited into the savings account of the company, thereby purportedly indicating that the capital impairment had been cured. However, Mr. Rutherford testified that he gave Mr. Hale the check for $150,000 on July 2 and then called Mr. Hale later that same day and asked him to return the money. According to Mr. Rutherford, Mr. Hale agreed during that phone call on July 2 to return the $150,000 to him during the week after the July 4 holiday. This evidence shows that Mr. Hale knew when the July 6 letter was sent to the Insurance Department that (a) he was going to have to return the $150,000 to Mr. Rutherford sometime during that week, and (b) NSLIC's capital impairment had not been cured. For these reasons, we hold that the evidence supporting Mr. Hale's conviction for violating Ark.Code Ann. § 23-60-109 is substantial.