Opinion ID: 1279824
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Assist the Trier of Fact.

Text: If an expert's testimony lacks probative value, see Neb.Evid.R. 401, the testimony is irrelevant and is inadmissible. See Neb.Evid.R. 402. It appears axiomatic that irrelevant evidence will not assist the trier of fact. Thus, relevance of an opinion is among the initial questions for a trial court in determining admissibility of an expert's opinion under Neb.Evid.R. 702. See, United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C.Cir.1987); State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984). If a witness is qualified as an expert pursuant to Neb.Evid.R. 702, a court considering admissibility of the expert's testimony, which may include an opinion, must decide whether the testimony is likely to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a factual issue. See, Getzschman v. Miller Chemical Co., 232 Neb. 885, 443 N.W.2d 260 (1989); Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 202 Neb. 300, 275 N.W.2d 77 (1979); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.1985); State v. Petrich, 101 Wash.2d 566, 683 P.2d 173 (1984). Must a court exclude an expert's testimony or opinion about a subject which is within the comprehension of an average juror? An answer in the negative is suggested in 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 702[02] at 702-15 to 702-16 (1988): Must a court exclude expert testimony if the subject is within the comprehension of the average juror? Such a test is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness expressed in Rule 702. First, it assumes wrongly that there is a bright line separating issues within the comprehension of jurors from those that are not. Secondly, even when jurors are well equipped to make judgments on the basis of their common knowledge and experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to bring to bear on the same issue which would be helpful. Consistent with the preceding excerpt from Weinstein and Berger, this court has stated: Expert testimony is permitted even in areas where laymen have competence to determine the facts testified to by the expert where a trial court may feel the opinion would assist them. Christensen v. City of Tekamah, 201 Neb. 344, 351, 268 N.W.2d 93, 98 (1978); Hegarty v. Campbell Soup Co., 214 Neb. 716, 335 N.W.2d 758 (1983). As observed by McCormick, an expert's contribution in litigation is the power to draw inferences from the facts which a jury would not be competent to draw.... In fact, Rule 702 should permit expert opinion even if the matter is within the competence of the jurors if specialized knowledge will be helpful.... McCormick on Evidence § 13 at 33 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). The helpfulness standard expressed in Neb.Evid.R. 702, that is, the expert's testimony or opinion will assist the trier of fact, has been characterized by Weinstein and Berger: The helpfulness test subsumes a relevancy analysis. In making its determination, the court must proceed on a case-by-case basis. Its conclusions will depend on (1) the court's evaluation of the state of knowledge presently existing about the subject of the proposed testimony and (2) on the court's appraisal of the facts of the case. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, ¶ 702[02] at 702-18. See, also, U.S. v. DeSoto, 885 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.1989). Under Neb.Evid.R. 704, the test is not whether the expert's opinion or inference invades the province of the jury, but whether the opinion or inference is otherwise admissible and, in accordance with Neb.Evid.R. 702, will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. See, Bauman v. Centex Corp., 611 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1980); Little Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 852 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.1988) (the test for admissibility under Rule 704 is whether the jury will receive appreciable help from the expert's testimony or opinion). According to Weinstein and Berger, [m]ost exclusive rulings are explicable as findings by the court that the issue is inappropriate for expert resolution, either because the expert is not needed or because [the expert] is incapable of rendering assistance. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, ¶ 704[03] at 704-17. As one court has expressed, the helpfulness test or criterion requires that the expert's testimony must add precision or depth to the jury's ability to reach conclusions about the subject before the jury. State v. Helterbridle, 301 N.W.2d 545, 547 (Minn.1980). An expert's testimony, although relevant, may be excluded if the probative value of the testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See Neb.Evid.R. 403. See, also, Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir.1988); State v. Hall, 406 N.W.2d 503 (Minn.1987); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1986); State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984). The determination whether an expert's testimony or opinion will be helpful to a jury or assist the trier of fact in accordance with Neb.Evid.R. 702 involves the discretion of a trial court, whose ruling on admissibility of an expert's testimony or opinion will be upheld on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion. See, Little v. Gillette, 225 Neb. 70, 402 N.W.2d 852 (1987); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir.1985); Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1979). A reason for the aforementioned standard of review in relation to admission or exclusion of an expert's opinion was expressed in U.S. v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir.1987): The trial judge has a hands-on familiarity with the nuances of the casenuances which may not survive transplantation into a cold appellate record. Thus, the [trial] court's assessment of what will or will not assist the jury is entitled to considerable deference in the Rule 702 milieu. Cf. State v. Juhl, 234 Neb. 33, 449 N.W.2d 202 (1989) (relevance of offered evidence, otherwise admissible, involves the discretion of a trial court, whose ruling on relevance will be upheld on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion). Therefore, in Reynolds' case the question becomes: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the psychiatric opinions would not assist the jury in Reynolds' trial and, therefore, in excluding the psychiatrists' testimony that Reynolds did not act with deliberateness and premeditation in shooting Craig Dodge? This court has stated that evidence of an accused's mental condition at the time the offense was committed is always admissible to prove absence of intent.... State v. Vosler, 216 Neb. 461, 468, 345 N.W.2d 806, 811 (1984). In Washington v. State, 165 Neb. 275, 281, 85 N.W.2d 509, 513 (1957), which antedates the Nebraska Evidence Rules, this court stated: `[E]vidence of the condition of the mind of the accused at the time of the crime ... may be introduced ... to show absence of any deliberate or premeditated design.' In State v. Shank, 322 N.C. 243, 367 S.E.2d 639 (1988), the trial court, in a first degree murder prosecution, would not allow a defense psychiatrist to testify that the defendant's diminished mental capacity affected his ability to make and carry out plans. [The trial court] also did not allow [the expert] to testify whether he determined that defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense. 322 N.C. at 246, 367 S.E.2d at 641. In finding that the trial court erred in excluding the psychiatrist's testimony, the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated that, pursuant to N.C.Evid.R. 702, which is substantially the same as Neb.Evid.R. 702, [t]estimony that a defendant was incapable of planning his activities or carrying out plans, and that he was under mental or emotional disturbance, could assist the jury in determining whether a defendant in fact premeditated and deliberated. 322 N.C. at 248, 367 S.E.2d at 643. The Shank court also noted that although the opinion testimony tended to show that the defendant lacked the capacity to deliberate and premeditate, the testimony was admissible on an ultimate issue under N.C.Evid.R. 704 (which is substantially the same as Neb.Evid.R. 704). The Supreme Court of North Carolina, on the same day it issued State v. Shank, supra , also issued State v. Weeks, 322 N.C. 152, 367 S.E.2d 895 (1988). In Weeks, the defendant was charged with the first degree murders of his father and stepmother. Defense psychiatrists testified about Weeks' mental condition at the time of the homicides; for example, chronic emotional disturbance characterized by an inability to deal with stress, an adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct, vulnerability to stress, living in a fantasy world, and a proclivity to rage when rebuffed. However, in Weeks, the trial court precluded defense experts from testifying that Weeks did not act with deliberation and premeditation when he committed the homicides in question. The Weeks court held that the opinion testimony about deliberation and premeditation was properly excluded and stated: [I]t is not error for a trial court to refuse to admit expert testimony embracing a legal conclusion that the expert is not qualified to make. [Citations omitted.] .... Such testimony [about deliberation and premeditation] embraces precise legal terms, definitions of which are not readily apparent to medical experts. What defendant sought to accomplish with this testimony was to have the experts tell the jury that certain legal standards had not been met. [Citation omitted.] We are not convinced that either the psychologist or the psychiatrists were in any better position than the jury to make those determinations. Having the experts testify as requested by defendant would tend to confuse, that than help, the jury in understanding the evidence and determining the facts in issue. 322 N.C. at 164, 166-67, 367 S.E.2d at 903-04. See, also, State v. Rose, 323 N.C. 455, 373 S.E.2d 426 (1988). The difference between Shank, supra, and Weeks, supra, appears to be that in Shank the court was faced with an expert's opinion regarding the defendant's mental ability to effectuate subjective or mental elements of a crime, whereas in Weeks, the excluded psychiatric testimony related to the accomplished fact of deliberation and premeditation which, therefore, involved the opinion that the defendant was not guilty of murder in the first degree. In Weeks, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that a psychiatrist, obviously an expert in the field of psychiatry, was not an expert, for the purpose of N.C.Evid.R. 702, in determining whether the crime of first degree murder had been committed. In Gurganus v. State, 451 So.2d 817 (Fla.1984), which involved two convictions for first degree murder, the trial court excluded an expert's testimony that Gurganus' actions were from a `depraved mind' rather than a `premeditated plan.' 451 So.2d at 821. However, holding that exclusion of the expert's testimony was proper, the Florida Supreme Court stated: We recognize that: The trial court has broad discretion in determining the range of subjects on which an expert witness may be allowed to testify, and, unless there is a clear showing of error, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal.... This discretion, however, is not boundless and expert testimony should be excluded where the facts testified to are of such a nature as not to require any special knowledge or experience in order for the jury to form conclusions from the facts. Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 364, 70 L.Ed.2d 191 (1981). We find that the opinions the psychologists were asked to give in this case were not the proper subject of expert testimony. The defense was attempting to elicit a bottom-line opinion as to whether the actions of Gurganus were those of a depraved mind or a premeditated plan. Both of these terms are legal terms with specific legal definitions. Essentially, the defense was attempting to elicit the psychologists' opinions as to whether Gurganus committed second-degree or first-degree murder. Such a conclusion was a legal conclusion no better suited to expert opinion than to lay opinion and, as such, was an issue to be determined solely within the province of the jury. 451 So.2d at 821. Consequently, we conclude that under the standard of helpfulness required by Neb.Evid.R. 702, a court may exclude an expert's opinion which is nothing more than an expression of how the trier of fact should decide a case or what result should be reached on any issue to be resolved by the trier of fact. See, Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir.1987) (an expert's opinion telling the jury what result to reach is not helpful in deciding a case); Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir.1983) (an opinion which contains an expert's view of how the verdict should read and tells the jury what result to reach is properly excluded); United States v. Ness, 665 F.2d 248 (8th Cir.1981) (proper exclusion of an opinion that the defendant did not intend to defraud a bank by misapplication of funds; the opinion was not helpful to the trier of fact); United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d 908 (10th Cir.1979) (forensic psychiatrist's opinion that a defendant's personality prevented the defendant from operating a motor vehicle in a reckless or wanton manner was properly excluded as the expert's substitution of his judgment as to defendant's state of mind); Stoler v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 583 F.2d 896 (6th Cir.1978) (opinion that a railroad crossing was extrahazardous was properly excluded). Wigmore, explaining the theory of the opinion rule, states: The true theory, then, of the opinion rule ... is simply that of the exclusion of supererogatory evidence. It is not that there is any fault to find with the witness himself or the sufficiency of his sources of knowledge or the positiveness of his impression; but simply that his testimony, otherwise unobjectionable, is not needed, is superfluous. .... ... We are dealing merely with a broad principle that, whenever the point is reached at which the tribunal is being told that which it is itself entirely equipped to determine without the witness' aid on this point, his testimony is superfluous and is to be dispensed with. (Emphasis in original.) 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1918 at 11-12 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978). Thus, when an expert's opinion on a disputed issue is a conclusion which may be deduced equally as well by the trier of fact with sufficient evidence on the issue, the expert's opinion is superfluous and does not assist the trier in understanding the evidence or determining a factual issue. See, U.S. v. Felak, 831 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1987) (exclusion of an expert's opinion is proper when there is no basis for the conclusion that the subject was beyond the common understanding of the jurors or that the expert could offer information ordinarily unavailable to the jury); State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Minn.1982) ([i]f the jury is in as good a position to reach a decision as the expert, expert testimony would be of little assistance to the jury and should not be admitted); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.1977) (an expert's testimony may be excluded when the tribunal does not need the witness' judgment, since the judge, or the jury properly instructed by the court, can determine equally well that which the witness would express in an opinion). In Reynolds' case, we affirm the trial court's exclusion of the psychiatrists' opinions that Reynolds acted without deliberation and premeditation in shooting Craig Dodge. The reasons for upholding the exclusionary ruling are twofold. First, the psychiatric opinions did not relate to Reynolds' ability to effectuate subjective or mental elements for the crime of first degree murder, but, rather, related to factual existence of deliberation and premeditation as elements of first degree murder. In that posture, the psychiatric opinions were expressions that Reynolds was not guilty of the crime charged, murder in the first degree, and, therefore, were unlikely to assist the jury in determining whether Reynolds acted with deliberation and premeditation in shooting Craig Dodge. Second, the psychiatrists had thoroughly supplied the jury with information concerning Reynolds' personality disorders and the personality problems of one who is impulsive, especially the inability to deliberate and premeditate an act by weighing the consequences of the act. After the psychiatrists had evidentially provided the major and minor premises in the syllogism previously mentioned in Exclusion of the Opinions on `Deliberate' and `Premeditate' of this opinion, the jury was as qualified as the psychiatrists to draw the factual conclusion that Terry Reynolds, as an impulsive person, did not deliberate and premeditate the act of shooting Craig Dodge. Also, equipped with extensive information supplied by the psychiatrists and other witnesses, the jury was obviously in a position better overall than that of the psychiatrists to determine whether Reynolds actually deliberated and premeditated the act of shooting Dodge. Under the circumstances, we are unable to conclude that the psychiatrists' opinions would have assisted the jury in determining whether Reynolds deliberated and premeditated the act of shooting Craig Dodge. Cf. Getzschman v. Miller Chemical Co., 232 Neb. 885, 443 N.W.2d 260 (1989) (an expert's opinion that a construction bid of $698,000 substantially exceeded the construction project's budget of $350,000 was properly excluded, since the opinion would not assist the jury in determining whether an architect had breached his duty to remain within the project's budget). For the foregoing reasons, the psychiatric opinions about Reynolds' deliberation and premeditation were not information which would have assisted the jury in determining the factual issue of deliberation and premeditation in reference to the Dodge fatality. As we expressed in State v. Juhl, 234 Neb. 33, 43, 449 N.W.2d 202, 209 (1989): [A] judicial abuse of discretion exists when a judge, within the effective limits of authorized judicial power, elects to act or refrain from action, but the selected option results in a decision which is untenable and unfairly deprives a litigant of a substantial right or a just result in matters submitted for disposition through a judicial system. Hence, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's exclusion of the psychiatric opinion evidence on deliberation and premeditation in the fatal shooting. While Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967), supports the general proposition that the sixth amendment prohibits a state from applying an evidential rule which prevents a defendant from presenting a defense based on relevant evidence, the sixth amendment does not make irrelevant evidence admissible and does not render admissible an expert's opinion which does not assist the trier of fact under Neb.Evid.R. 702. See, Stano v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 900 (11th Cir.1989) (the sixth amendment right to present evidence does not extend to irrelevant evidence); United States v. Davis, 772 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir.1985) (the sixth amendment does not make irrelevant evidence admissible). Consequently, we find no reversible error in the trial court's exclusion of the psychiatrists' testimony regarding deliberateness and premeditation in Reynolds' act of shooting Craig Dodge.