Opinion ID: 587397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review in the court of appeals

Text: 37
38 When the vaccine compensation program was created by Congress, it was anticipated that a substantial number of cases requiring these fact-specific determinations would have to be made. Claimed injuries from these vaccines were already in litigation on a variety of common law theories, and it was recognized that, because of the nature of these vaccines, future cases were unavoidable. See generally H.Rep. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346-48. 39 Congress recognized that expeditious resolution of a large number of new and heavily fact specific claims would require additional personnel--the cases could not simply be added to the existing workload of an agency or court. Two options were available. One was to assign some sort of initial fact finding/determination role to an administrative agency or extra-judicial body. Another option was to keep the process entirely within the court system. Congress first considered a proposal that claims be resolved by a panel of persons selected from a list, provided by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, of individuals in the region in which the claimant resides who are willing to serve as members of a hearing panel. Participants in the hearing process would have been required to waive their right to trial and the decision of the hearing panel was to be binding and not subject to any administrative or judicial review. H.R. 1780, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2103-08 (1985). This approach ultimately was discarded, and Congress turned instead to a court-based process. 40 After first giving jurisdiction to the district courts, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), 6 Congress reconsidered and gave jurisdiction to the Claims Court. 42 U.S.C. § 300-11(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). Congress created within the Claims Court an Office of Special Masters, and authorized the employment of qualified individuals to perform the fact finding function for the Program. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub.L. No. 101-239, § 6601, 103 Stat. 2106, 2286-88 (1989). 7 The role spelled out in the statute for the special master was to take evidence and propose findings of fact and conclusions of law for consideration by the Claims Court judge. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(2) (Supp. V. 1987). The Claims Court judge was free to undertake a review of the record ... and ... make a de novo determination of any matter and issue its judgment accordingly.... 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(1) (Supp. V. 1987). 41 In turn, this court's review of the Claims Court's determination was authorized by s 300aa-12(e) (Supp. V. 1987), which stated that 42 [t]he findings of fact and conclusions of law of the United States Claims Court on a petition shall be final determinations of the matters involved, except that [the parties] may obtain review of the judgment of the court in the United States court of appeals for the Federal Circuit.... 43 No express standard for our review was stated. 44 In Bunting v. Secretary of the Dep't. of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 867, reh'g denied, this court considered, as a matter of first impression, the nature and scope of our review of cases so appealed. We concluded that we review the Claims Court's decision for correctness of law, and clear error in its factual findings. Id. at 871. This formulation is the standard one applied by courts of appeals to appeals from judgments of trial courts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 45

46 For a number of reasons, Congress found the pre-1989 structure for the resolution of these cases unsatisfactory. See generally 135 Cong.Rec. H9475-77 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). Consequently, in 1989 Congress altered the roles of the special master and the Claims Court judge. Under the amended § 300aa-12(d), the special master no longer makes proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law; the special master now issue[s] a decision ... with respect to whether compensation is to be provided under the Program and the amount of such compensation. 47 The Claims Court, on motion by a party, may sit in review of the decision of the special master, based on the record of the proceedings. § 300aa-12(e). As noted earlier, the Claims Court judge may take one of three actions: (1) the judge may uphold the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master and sustain the special master's decision; (2) the judge may set aside some or all of the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master, and issue different findings of fact and conclusions of law. To do this, however, requires that the judge first find that the disapproved findings and conclusions were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; or (3) the judge may do neither, but instead may remand the petition to the special master with instructions for further proceedings. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2). 48 The effect of this is to give the special master's determinations decisional effect, and to place the Claims Court judge in the role of a reviewing judge. The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the special master may be set aside only if found violative of the standard of review set forth in the statute, a standard of review which is highly deferential to the factual findings of the special master. Absent that, the special master's decision is final, and the clerk of the Claims Court is mandated to enter judgment in accordance with the special master's decision. § 300aa-12(e)(3). 49 The statutory provision for further review by this court remains essentially unchanged. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f) (Supp. I 1989). The section of the statute which, prior to the 1989 amendments, stated this court's authority to review (but did not specify the standard to be applied), simply was renumbered and retained. 8 50 In view of this statutorily mandated review relationship between the Claims Court judge and the special master, and the absence of a specified standard of review for the Court of Appeals, it is necessary that an appropriate role for this court be identified and clearly articulated. It must of course be one that carries out the Congressional purpose and intent in mandating this rather unique decisional structure.
51 The way in which the petitioner and the respondent framed the issues on appeal highlights the need to clarify the appellate role. Petitioner Munn frames the issues on appeal in terms of whether the special master's medical findings were an abuse of discretion. Respondent Secretary states the issues in terms of whether the Claims Court committed clear error ... Previous opinions of this court, both precedential and nonprecedential, have described our review role in various ways, leaving some question as to its exact scope. 9 52 The problem is simplified somewhat, although not entirely resolved, by a close reading of the statutory section, 300aa-12(f), providing for this court's review. When read in the light of the structure just described, the review role of this court is narrowed considerably. The section states: The findings of fact and conclusions of law of the United States Claims Court on a petition shall be final determinations of the matters involved, except that [the parties] may obtain review of the judgment of the court in the United States court of appeals for the Federal Circuit ... (Emphasis added.) 53 Close attention to the statute tells us several important things. First, no appeal is provided to this court from the decision of the special master. It is only the Claims Court that is subject to review here. Second, it is the final judgment of the Claims Court that we review. We know from the previous discussion that the statute contemplates that fact finding will be done by the special master. Only in extraordinary cases will the Claims Court undertake to do any independent fact finding. In arriving at its judgment, the only time the Claims Court can make its own findings of fact is when that court, as a matter of law, has concluded that the special master was 'arbitrary and capricious' (the phrase 'arbitrary and capricious' will be used in this discussion as a shorthand reference to the longer standard described earlier; see § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B)), and that it is necessary for the Claims Court to substitute its own findings of fact. Absent that, there are no separate findings of fact by the Claims Court.
54 This much then is clear. Under the 1989 amendments it is the judgment of the Claims Court that we review directly, and only indirectly the decision of the special master. Issues of law--constitutional imperatives, statutory construction, procedural requirements--come to us for decision with little if any deference owed to or expected by the forums below. With regard to both fact-findings and fact-based conclusions, the key decision maker in the first instance is the special master. The Claims Court owes these findings and conclusions by the special master great deference--no change may be made absent first a determination that the special master was 'arbitrary and capricious.' This is a standard well understood to be the most deferential possible. M. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D.L.Rev. 469, 476 (1988); see generally, 2 Childress and Davis, Standards of Review § 15.7 (1986). 55 When a case comes before us in which the Claims Court has upheld the findings and conclusions of the special master against a charge that they were arbitrary and capricious, and the Claims Court has rendered judgment accordingly, it follows that the Claims Court's judgment is entitled to at least the same deference by us as that accorded the special master by the Claims Court. That is, we may not disturb the judgment of the Claims Court unless we find that judgment to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 10 56 This standard is consistent with and elaborates upon the standard for review of post-1989 vaccine compensation cases first enunciated in Hines v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518 (Fed.Cir.1991). 11 Any other standard would create an anomalous situation, one in which the affirming decision (the Claims Court's judgment) was more readily overturned than the original decision (that of the special master). 57 Establishing that the Claims Court's judgment was, with regard to the facts of the case, arbitrary and capricious is not an easy task for an appellant. When the case comes to us in that posture, the findings of fact of the Claims Court referred to in the statutory section providing for our review are actually the factual findings and fact-based conclusions of the special master. The decision rendered by the Claims Court judge necessarily incorporates a conclusion that these findings were not arbitrary or capricious, and thus stand. Clearly it is not then the role of this court to reweigh the factual evidence, or to assess whether the special master correctly evaluated the evidence. And of course we do not examine the probative value of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. These are all matters within the purview of the fact finder. 12 58 We do not say that this is a burden no petitioner can carry. It is possible to hypothesize a case, for example, in which a special master rendered a decision when no factual basis whatever existed under which the decision could be justified. Presumably such a decision, if a petition for review by the Claims Court was requested, would be returned by the Claims Court to the special master for further proceedings. But one can hypothesize a case in which either that was not done, or if done the error was not corrected, and the Claims Court nevertheless affirmed. This court on appeal could exercise its review authority to find the Claims Court's judgment arbitrary and capricious. However, as we shall shortly explain, this clearly is not such a case. 59 The situation that we have been describing, which is the one before us, can be compared to the situation in which the Claims Court has found some of the fact-based determinations of the special master to be arbitrary and capricious, and has substituted others. In such a situation, there are at least two possibilities for the scope of our review of these new findings. One is that the same standard enunciated above should apply: the judgment of the Claims Court should be affirmed unless it is found to be arbitrary and capricious. An alternative theory, however, might be that the new factual determinations by the Claims Court would not carry with them the deference the statute accords to findings of the special master. It is, after all, the special masters to whom Congress has accorded the status of expert, entitling them to the special statutory deference in fact-finding normally reserved for specialized agencies. 60 The Claims Court, when it independently engages in fact-finding, is not exercising expertise beyond that of a trial court in the usual course. Under this theory we would review the new factual determinations of the Claims Court under the same standard by which we review trial court fact findings in other contexts, and by which we review Claims Court determinations in vaccine compensation cases under the pre-1989 amendments--are they clearly erroneous. 61 How much difference, if any, these different articulations of the standard of review would make in actual practice is a matter for academic debate. Since the case before us does not require us to decide the issues raised by this alternative scenario, we need not address them further.
62 The 1989 amendments apply to: 1) petitions filed after December 19, 1989 and 2) petitions pending as of December 19, 1989 in which the evidentiary record is not closed, with provision for an immediate suspension for 30 days of all pending cases. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 and -12, notes on effective date of 1989 amendments (Supp. I 1989) (emphasis added). Petitions pending as of December 19, 1989 in which the evidentiary record is closed proceed under the law in effect before the date of enactment [of the 1989 amendments]. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10, note on effective dates (Supp. I 1989) (emphasis added). In the present matter, the petition was filed on June 28, 1989. However, as of December 19, 1989, the evidentiary record had not closed. Therefore, the 1989 amendments apply to this case and to the roles of the special master, the Claims Court, and this court. 63 This case was appealed and argued at a time when the Court of Appeals had not yet spoken definitively regarding the standard of review. Under the circumstances, and out of fairness to the litigants, we have examined the factual findings and conclusions that underlay the Claims Court's decision--that is, the special master's findings and conclusions as upheld by the Claims Court--with more care than the standard we here articulate requires in order to ascertain whether they were wrong under any arguably-applicable standard. On the record before us we find no such error. 64