Opinion ID: 460117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Award of attorneys' fees in a habeas corpus proceeding.

Text: 11 Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107, reh'g denied, 737 F.2d 261 (2nd Cir.1984), the Government claims that the EAJA has no application to the instant request for attorneys' fees. Both provisions of the EAJA upon which appellants base their request for attorneys' fees apply to civil actions brought by or against the United States. 1 Although the EAJA does not define the term civil action, the Boudin court determined that the structure and purpose of that legislation indicate that Congress did not contemplate an award of attorneys' fees in habeas corpus proceedings. Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d at 1112. 12 In Boudin, a prisoner filed suit challenging the conditions of her confinement. Her complaint was styled as a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The prisoner was eventually transferred to another institution before fully litigating her complaint. The prisoner sought attorneys' fees under the EAJA. Although the court spoke broadly of habeas corpus proceedings, it is apparent that the court was concerned with habeas corpus proceedings in the criminal context. 13 The denial of attorneys' fees in Boudin was premised on the court's understanding of the dual purposes of the EAJA: to remove the financial disincentive for individuals and small businesses challenging or defending against government regulatory conduct where the cost of attorneys may be prohibitive, and to encourage challenges to improper government action as a means of helping to formulate better public policy. The Boudin court held that those interests were not served in the prisoner's habeas corpus proceedings in that case. The court stated: 14 By contrast, habeas petitions are dedicated to vindicating individual rights based on the Constitution rather than refining rules and policy. They are no more public policy oriented than is a criminal trial [for which EAJA fees are clearly unavailable]. Moreover, we doubt that Congress felt a need to encourage the filing of habeas petitions; they flourished long before the [EAJA] was proposed. 15 Id. at 1114. 16 As the Boudin court noted, we must look to the substance of the remedy sought, not the labels attached to the claim, in determining whether a proceeding falls within the term any civil action of the EAJA. In contrast to the challenge of unlawful criminal custody in Boudin, Hill sought to gain admission into this country and, in essence, sought to secure a declaratory judgment that the Government's policy of excluding homosexual aliens without a medical certificate was improper. Hill's claim was not merely a vindication of his own personal rights, but a challenge to a regulatory policy that had a sweeping effect on homosexual aliens seeking to enter the United States. 17 Moreover, the dual purposes underpinning the EAJA are served by characterizing this particular proceeding as a civil action. Hill, a nonresident alien, was not eligible for government-provided counsel, see 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1362 (1982) and, as an alien seeking to visit, had little economic incentive to challenge such action. And, unlike the inmate in Boudin, a nonresident alien who is a homosexual has no custodial incentive to reverse the Government's action. Application of the EAJA to Hill's petition is appropriate.