Opinion ID: 1131517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court committed error in allowing into evidence the crack cocaine sold by lewis and whether the trial court committed error in permitting maxwell to explain the meaning of the phrase two for twenty two.

Text: ¶ 41. Lewis complains of three matters in his fifth assignment of error. First, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing admission into evidence the crack cocaine he sold to Maxwell; secondly, he argues that the trial court erred in allowing Maxwell to explain the meaning of the phrase two for twenty two; and thirdly, he argues that the trial court erred in permitting Maxwell to testify that Lewis had arranged one of the transactions. ¶ 42. The admission of evidence is largely within the discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse only where there has been an abuse of discretion. The discretion of the trial court must be exercised within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. McIlwain v. State, 700 So.2d 586, 590 (Miss.1997). ¶ 43. Regarding the first contention, Lewis specifically asserts that the State failed to lay the proper predicate for admitting into the evidence the crack cocaine because the State failed to show the method of testing the substances alleged to contain the cocaine was reliable and accurate since the devices used to determine whether the substances contained cocaine were not shown to have been functioning and calibrated properly at the time of the testing. Contrary to Lewis' assertion, the record reveals that the forensic scientists performed a control test on the mass spectrometer for each sample of cocaine tested, performed an auto tune which automatically calibrated that instrument, and performed a controlled test on the ultraviolet spectrophotometry instrument. Both instruments indicated the presence of cocaine in each substance tested. Given the auto tune and control tests performed, any question as to whether the instruments were calibrated and functioning goes only to the weight and credibility of the test results. ¶ 44. Regarding Lewis' second contention that the trial court erred in permitting Maxwell to explain to the jury the meaning of the phrase two for twenty two, we find his argument to be without merit. Maxwell was permitted to explain to the jury that this phrase meant two ounces of crack cocaine for $2,200. Citing McDavid v. State, 594 So.2d 12 (Miss. 1992), Lewis specifically contends that Maxwell's explanation was an impermissible characterization of Lewis and Maxwell's conversation. Lewis' reliance on McDavid is misplaced. There, we deemed it improper for the trial court to have allowed a witness to characterize a certain conversation. The testimony should have been limited to a relation of the actual conversation, rather than a characterization of the conversation. Here, Maxwell was not characterizing a conversation; rather, he was explaining the meaning of a street phrase used in conversing with Lewis. While it may be the general rule that a witness is not to testify to the meaning of words or statements, an exception exists where the words or statements have an unusual or technical meaning peculiar to a certain trade, operation or business. Clark v. State, 409 So.2d 1325, 1328 (Miss.1982). Maxwell's explanation of the phrase was well within this exception. ¶ 45. Finally, Lewis argues that the trial court erred in permitting Maxwell to testify that Lewis had arranged the transaction that occurred on November 10, 1996. While it is unclear to us exactly what Lewis' objection is, we take note that Maxwell made this comment only after he gave his personal knowledge for the statement. We also take note that this statement was subject to cross-examination. Further, we find harmless any error in allowing that statement into evidence as the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that Lewis did in fact arrange for the November 10, 1996, transaction. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 46. In his eighth assignment of error, Lewis complains that Jury Instruction S-1A failed to require the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt one of the elements of § 41-29-139(f). Lewis argues that the instruction failed to mention any mixture containing cocaine as described by Section 41-29-105(s). He admits, however, that the instruction complained of did require the jury to determine whether he sold or transferred two or more ounces of cocaine or of any mixture containing cocaine. More specifically, his complaint is that the instruction did not require the statutory language as described in Section 41-29-105(s) after the language or of any mixture containing cocaine. ¶ 47. As stated above, neither § 41-29-139(f) nor § 41-29-105(s) requires the State to identify the substance into which the cocaine or other substances listed in § 41-29-105(s) was mixed. Section 41-29-139(f) does not say that the mixture prohibited by it means a mixture of cocaine into one of the other substances listed in § 41-29-105(s). The correct reading of §§ 41-29-105(s) and 41-29-139(f) is that a sale or transfer of any substance into which any of the substances listed in § 41-29-105(s) have been mixed is a violation. Cocaine is certainly one of the substances listed in § 41-29-105(s). It is true that a trial court should follow the safe course by instructing a jury in the words of the statute upon which the instruction is based. Sanders v. State, 586 So.2d 792 (Miss.1991). However, given the facts and evidence presented in this case, we find harmless any error in omitting the phrase at issue.
¶ 48. In his sixth assignment of error, Lewis asserts that the trial court violated Rule 10.04(B) of the Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice in that the trial judge sentenced Lewis to life imprisonment without providing a sentencing hearing before the jury on that determination. Contrary to Lewis' argument, Rule 10.04(B) does not mandate that he be given a sentencing hearing before a jury. The rule states, in pertinent part, If the defendant is found guilty of an offense for which life imprisonment may be imposed, a sentencing trial shall be held before the same jury, if possible, or before the court if jury waiver is allowed by the court. (Emphasis added.) This rule requires a sentencing hearing only where a life imprisonment sentence is optional. Here, however, a conviction under § 41-29-139(f) requires a life imprisonment sentence. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.