Opinion ID: 772210
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Date of Indictment

Text: 37 Defendant first contends that the government impermissibly waited to indict him. Defendant argues that because he was indicted in state court on September 17, 1997, the Speedy Trial clock should have begun to tick on that date rather than April 22, 1998 when he was indicted on federal charges. Defendant therefore argues that he was indicted well outside the thirty-day period mandated by § 3161(b), which requires that a defendant be formally charged within thirty days of his arrest. Defendant's contention has absolutely no basis in law and is without merit. It is well established in this Circuit that the thirty-day time limit is not triggered until there is a federal arrest. See United States v. Blackmon, 874 F.2d 378, 381 (6th Cir. 1989) (A defendant is not 'arrested' for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act until formal federal charges are pending.); United States v. Copley, 774 F.2d 728 (6th Cir.1985). Therefore, we reject Defendant's contention out of hand. 38