Opinion ID: 1844462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Atkins Decision.

Text: ¶ 48. In order to fulfill our obligation to provide guidance to counsel and our trial courts, we now address the Atkins decision, the definition of mental retardation to be used in our courts, and the procedure to be used for Atkins claims. ¶ 49. We are bound by oath to ensure that this Court and our trial courts remain within Constitutional limits. This requires more than a mechanical application of the Atkins decision. Therefore, we begin by carefully evaluating, not only the holding in Atkins, but also the United States Supreme Court's basis and reasoning for that holding. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ¶ 50. At the core of the Atkins decision is the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The deceptively simple wording of that amendment is: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. ¶ 51. This constitutional limit on governmental power to punish has been utilized by the courts on occasion to terminate cruel, brutal practices, and to reverse disproportionate and unjust sentences of incarceration. Some examples include a life sentence under a recidivist statute, where the crimes were shoplifting two cans of sardines, and stealing the money to pay for them; [14] and handcuffing a prisoner who was already subdued to a hitching post for seven hours without water. [15] ¶ 52. Although the Eighth Amendment has been applied to these, and numerous other non-capital prosecutions, its application to capital cases has been the most controversial. National Consensus. ¶ 53. There are few instances where the courts look to public opinion for guidance. However, in order to apply the Eighth Amendment to a given circumstance, a court must necessarily determine that which is cruel and unusual. Thus, the Atkins Court followed the longstanding requirement that the Eighth Amendment draws its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (citing Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (1958)). ¶ 54. This task of discerning evolving standards is not an easy one. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that evolving standards of decency are most reliably learned by looking to legislation enacted in the several states. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). The reason this is so, as explained by the Atkins majority, is that the enactments of the various legislatures are the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (citations omitted). This approach was further justified by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent. The reason we ascribe primacy to legislative enactments follows from the constitutional role legislatures play in expressing policy of a State. [I]n a democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175-176, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)). And because the specifications of punishments are peculiarly questions of legislative policy, Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958), our cases have cautioned against using the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to cut off the normal democratic processes, Gregg, supra, at 176, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion)). Atkins, 536 U.S. at 323, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice further explained that sentences imposed by juries, although not afforded the same weight, are important indicators of contemporary values. Id. [16] ¶ 55. Having thus set forth how contemporary standards of decency are discerned, the Atkins majority analyzed State legislative action regarding the death penalty for retarded persons. The following time line can be drawn from the opinion: a. Prior to 1986, there existed no legislative action regarding the suitability of imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded offenders.... Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313, 122 S.Ct. 2242. b. In 1986, a mentally retarded murderer in Georgia was executed. Id. c. That same year, although not constitutionally required to do so, [17] the Georgia legislature, for the first time, enacted a statute which prohibited execution of mentally retarded prisoners. Id., at 313-14, 122 S.Ct. 2242, citing Ga.Code Ann. 17-7-131(j) (Supp.1988). d. In 1988, Congress excluded mentally retarded persons from its legislation which reinstated the federal death penalty. Id. at 314, 122 S.Ct. 2242. e. In 1989, Maryland enacted a statute similar to Georgia's. Md. Ann.Code, Art. 27, § 412(f)(1) (1989). f. In 1990, Kentucky and Tennessee became the third and fourth States to enact legislation which prohibited execution of mentally retarded persons. g. In 1991, a similar statute was enacted in New Mexico. h. In 1993 and 1994, similar statutes were enacted in Arkansas, Colorado, Washington, Indiana, and Kansas. i. In 1994, Congress expanded its death penalty legislation, and again exempted the mentally retarded. Id. j. In 1995, New York reinstated the death penalty, but exempted the mentally retarded. k. Nebraska followed suit in 1998. Id. l. In 2000 and 2001, similar statutes were enacted in South Dakota, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Missouri, and North Carolina. m. In 2001, similar legislation passed the Texas House and Senate, but was vetoed by Governor Perry, who stated: We do not execute mentally retarded murderers today. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 56. In addition to the above, the Atkins Court pointed out that no State had passed legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions.... Id. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242. ¶ 57. As further evidence of the national consensus, the legislatures of the States cited above voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition, Id., and as a final justification, even in States with no prohibition against executing the mentally retarded, it is rarely carried out. Id. ¶ 58. Accordingly, the Atkins majority held that, since a national consensus exists which disapproves the execution of the mentally retarded, death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Id. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242. The Court further stated, We therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution `places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender. Id. (citation omitted). ¶ 59. In addition to its discussion of the national consensus, the Atkins majority presented a detailed justification and validation of what it perceives to be the national consensus. The Court stated that the two penological purposes served by the death penalty are retribution and deterrence. Id. at 319, 122 S.Ct. 2242. These purposes cannot be met by the execution of mentally retarded persons. Id. Furthermore, the Atkins majority pointed out that mentally retarded persons are particularly vulnerable to the risk of false confessions and poor performance as witnesses presenting mitigating circumstances. Id. The majority further stated that mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their crimes. Id., at 320-21, 122 S.Ct. 2242. ¶ 60. The two dissenting opinions took strong issue with the majority's views concerning both a national consensus, and perceived justification for it. Nevertheless, unpersuaded by the dissents, the majority held that mentally retarded persons are exempt from capital punishment. Atkins, is the law, and we are bound to apply it to cases which come before this Court. The Scope of Atkins. ¶ 61. To fully appreciate and accept that Atkins exempts all mentally retarded personseven those who are minimally mentally retardedfrom execution, a careful reading of the majority opinion, as well as both dissents, is required. This is so because of ambiguous statements in the majority opinion which appear to conflict with other statements in the majority opinion, and with the understanding of the majority holding as expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia in dissent. ¶ 62. After making the case that a national consensus exists to exempt the mentally retarded from execution, the Atkins majority stated: To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), with regard to insanity, we leave to the State(s) the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. Id. at 405, 416-417, 106 S.Ct. 2595. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (footnote omitted) & (emphasis added). If one accepts on its face the emphasized language, then it must follow that the persons to whom this statement applies are, in fact, mentally retarded, but not so retarded as to fall within the national consensus range. Stated differently, the statement implies that mentally retarded persons can constitutionally be executed, so long as they don't fall within the range about whom there is a national consensus. ¶ 63. However, other statements in the decision indicate that the Court found no reason to disagree with the proposition that death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (emphasis added). The Court further states, We are not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty. Id. (emphasis added); [T]he Constitution `places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take the life' of a mentally retarded offender. Id. (emphasis added) & (citation omitted). ¶ 64. Additionally, the statutes enacted by the various States, and cited by the majority, draw no distinction as to degrees of mental retardation and, thus, all mentally retarded persons in those States are exempt. ¶ 65. As a final confirmation that the Atkins majority intended to grant the Eighth Amendment exemption to even the most marginally mentally retarded persons, regardless of degree, the two dissenting opinions clearly assume as much. Justice Scalia lamented what he understood to be the majority's conclusion that no one who is even slightly mentally retarded can have sufficient `moral responsibility' to be subjected to capital punishment for any crime. Id. at 339, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.). Chief Justice Rehnquist, also in dissent, complained that the majority had used faulty data and imprecise methodology in supporting its conclusion that a national consensus has developed against imposing the death penalty on all mentally retarded defendants.... Id. at 328, 122 S.Ct. 2242 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.). ¶ 66. Accordingly, we conclude the Atkins majority granted Eighth Amendment protection from execution to all mentally retarded persons. Who is Mentally Retarded? ¶ 67. The Atkins Court left to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences. Id. at 317, 122 S.Ct. 2242. As previously discussed, numerous States have already done so by legislative enactment. Mississippi, however, has no statute which prohibits the death penalty for the mentally retarded. It is, of course, the prerogative of the Mississippi Legislature to join, or not join, those States which have enacted such legislation, and whose statutes set forth the definition of mental retardation to be applied in their respective States to the statutory prohibition. Absent such legislative enactment, however, it falls upon this Court to set the limits and define the procedure which will safeguard the Eighth Amendment protection of mentally retarded persons, as required by Atkins. ¶ 68. In order to fulfill this requirement, we must provide a definition of mental retardation to be used in our courts. ¶ 69. The Atkins majority cited, with approval, two specific, almost identical, definitions of mental retardation. The first was provided by the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR): Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work, Mental retardation manifests before age 18. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n. 3, 122 S.Ct. 2242, citing Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Support 5 (9th ed.1992). The second was provided by The American Psychiatric Association: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 39 (4th ed.2000). Id. ¶ 70. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, from which the American Psychiatric Association definition is quoted, further states that mild mental retardation is typically used to describe persons with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id. at 42-43. The Manual further provides, however, that mental retardation may, under certain conditions, be present in an individual with an IQ of up to 75. [18] Id. at 40. Additionally, According to the Atkins majority, [i]t is estimated that between 1 and 3 percent of the population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is typically considered the cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function prong of the mental retardation definition. Id. citing 2 Kaplan & Sadock's Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 2952 (B. Sadock & V. Sadock eds 7th ed.2000) (emphasis added). ¶ 71. These definitions were previously adopted and approved by this Court in Foster v. State, 848 So.2d 172 (Miss.2003). This Court further held in Foster that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI-II) is to be administered since its associated validity scales make the test best suited to detect malingering.... Foster must prove that he meets the applicable standard by a preponderance of the evidence.... This issue will be considered and decided by the circuit court without a jury. Id. at 175. ¶ 72. These definitions, approved in Atkins, and adopted in Foster, together with the MMPI-II, [19] provide a clear standard to be used in this State by our trial courts in determining whether, for Eighth Amendment purposes, a criminal defendant is mentally retarded. The trial judge will make such determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, after receiving evidence presented by the defendant and the State. Procedure to be used. ¶ 73. Having established the definition of mental retardation to be used for purposes of Eighth Amendment protection to mentally retarded defendants, we now turn to the procedure to be used in reaching a determination of mental retardation. ¶ 74. We hold that no defendant may be adjudged mentally retarded for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, unless such defendant produces, at a minimum, an expert who expresses an opinion, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that: 1. The defendant is mentally retarded, as that term is defined by the American Association on Mental Retardation and/or The American Psychiatric Association; 2. The defendant has completed the Minnesota Multi phasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI-II) and/or other similar tests, and the defendant is not malingering. ¶ 75. Such expert must be a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist, qualified as an expert in the field of assessing mental retardation, and further qualified as an expert in the administration and interpretation of tests, and in the evaluation of persons, for purposes of determining mental retardation. ¶ 76. Upon meeting this initial requirement to go forward, the defendant may present such other opinions and evidence as the trial court may allow pursuant to the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. ¶ 77. Thereafter, the State may offer evidence, and the matter should proceed as other evidentiary hearings on motions. ¶ 78. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is mentally retarded. The factors to be considered by the trial court are the expert opinions offered by the parties, and other evidence if limitations, or lack thereof, in the adaptive skill areas listed in the definitions of mental retardation approved in Atkins, and discussed above. Upon making such determination, the trial court shall place in the record its finding and the factual basis therefor. Prerequisite to a hearing. ¶ 79. With the sole exception discussed below, no defendant may be granted a hearing on the issue of Eighth Amendment protection from execution, due to alleged mental retardation unless, prior to the expiration of the deadline set by the trial court for filing motions, the defendant shall have filed with the trial court a motion, seeking such hearing. The defendant must attach to the motion an affidavit from at least one expert, qualified as described above, who opines, to a reasonable degree of certainty, that: (1) the defendant has a combined Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of 75 [20] or below, and; (2) in the opinion of the expert, there is a reasonable basis to believe that, upon further testing, the defendant will be found to be mentally retarded, as defined herein. ¶ 80. Upon receiving such motion with attached affidavit, and any response filed by the State, the trial court shall provide a reasonable amount of time for testing the defendant for mental retardation. Thereafter, the trial court shall set a hearing on the motion, and the matter shall proceed. Applications for Post-Conviction relief. ¶ 81. We further hold that, for defendants whose trials were held prior to publication of this opinion, the affidavit as described above shall be attached to the defendant's application for post-conviction relief. Such application shall then be considered pursuant to the provisions of Sections 99-39-1, et seq. The Petition of Ricky Chase. ¶ 82. The State makes numerous valid points concerning the lack of evidence presented by Chase on factors other than IQ. The State also raises troubling questions about the validity of the affidavit and opinions of Dr. Webb. However, such matters should be submitted to the trial court, who will determine their admissibility, and serve as the finder of fact. ¶ 83. Chase has submitted an affidavit from a psychiatrist stating that he suffers from mild mental retardation. Because of Chase's unusual and limited circumstances, including the fact that his conviction occurred prior to Atkins, and the fact that Chase had no notice of the requirements stated herein, we find that Chase has presented the bare minimum necessary under the circumstances, and is entitled to proceed to a hearing in the trial court on this issue.