Opinion ID: 796336
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 50 In addition to his Sixth Amendment claim, Nolen asserts that the evidence presented against him was insufficient to support his conviction for tax evasion. As Nolen did not move for a judgment of acquittal on this ground, we review his claim of insufficient evidence only to determine whether the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt. 30
51 Nolen was convicted of violating 26 U.S.C. § 7201, which criminalizes willfully attempting in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof.  31 The Supreme Court has held that § 7201 includes the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the assessment of a tax as well as the offense of willfully attempting to evade or defeat the payment of a tax. 32 The elements of both offenses are the same: (1) willfulness, (2) existence of a tax deficiency; and (3) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax. 33 Nolen contends that, at the government's request, the district court charged the jury solely on the second theory encompassed by § 7201, i.e., evasion of payment of tax. 52 The district court told the jury that Title 26, United States Code, section 7201, makes it a crime for anyone willfully to attempt to evade or defeat the payment of federal income tax. Nolen contends that, by using only the term payment in its summary explanation of § 7201, the district court permanently narrowed the possible basis of conviction, and thus of affirmance to only one of the two kinds of evasion recognized by the Court in Sansone, namely the evasion of payment of income tax. He suggests further that a formal assessment is a necessary element of that offense, and that the absence of such an assessment renders the trial record devoid of evidence pointing to guilt for that offense, requiring in turn that we reverse his convictions, even under our narrow standard of review. This syllogism is clever but flawed and therefore unavailing. 53 We reject Nolen's contention that the district court's instruction narrowed the basis of conviction to only an evasion of payment of taxes. To accept that argument we would have to disregard (1) the indictment, (2) the case as actually tried by the government, and (3) the entire remainder of the jury charge, all of which demonstrate beyond cavil that Nolen was tried for the general offense of tax evasion, which occurs when one evades either the assessment or the payment of taxes owed. 54
55 Nolen was indicted for willfully attempt[ing] to evade and defeat the income tax due and owing by him . . . by failing to make an income tax return . . . by failing to pay to the Internal Revenue Service said income tax, and by concealing his income. We made clear in United States v. Masat, that when, as here, an indictment closely tracks the wording of § 7201, there is one crime charged, the evasion of taxes, and that crime occurs when either the assessment or the payment of taxes owed is evaded. 34 Nolen does not dispute that, as written, the scope of this indictment is not limited to the specific offense of evasion of payment. 56
57 The trial record makes clear that the government offered evidence that Nolen (1) earned taxable income, (2) owed substantial income tax, (3) knew that he was required to file an income tax return, (4) wilfully failed to file an income tax return, (5) failed to pay any income taxes, and (6) willfully attempted to evade the tax he owed. We are satisfied that, at least as far as the government's conduct of the prosecution during trial, this case was not limited to the specific offense of evasion of payment of taxes. Rather, it was prosecuted and tried, as stated in the indictment, as a full-blown tax evasion case, encompassing both the evasion of assessment and the evasion of payment of taxes. The government's presentation of its case at trial also raises serious doubts about Nolen's assertion that the jury instruction suggested to the district court by the prosecution limited its case to only an evasion of payment case, rendering meaningless most of the evidence the government offered at trial. 58
59 The district court began the substantive portion of its jury instruction as follows: 60 Title 26, United States Code, section 7201, makes it a crime for anyone willfully to attempt to evade or defeat payment 35 of federal income taxes. . . . 61 For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 62 First, that the defendant received gross income of $12,200 or more . . . 63 Second, that the defendant failed to file an income-tax return . . . 64 Third, that the defendant knew he was required to file a return; 65 Fourth, that the defendant's failure to file was willful; 66 Fifth, that the defendant owed substantial income tax; 67 Sixth, that the defendant failed to pay the substantial income tax owed to the Internal Revenue Service; and 68 Seventh, that the defendant willfully attempted to evade or defeat such tax. 69 . . . . 70 The word attempt contemplates that the defendant had knowledge and understanding that . . . he had income which was taxable and which he was required by law to report, but he nevertheless attempted to evade the tax . . . on that income by willfully concealing income which he knew he had during that year. 71 Nolen isolates the first sentence of this instruction to support his contention that the district court limited the jury's basis of conviction under § 7201 to only whether the government had proven that Nolen attempted to evade payment of taxes. As discussed above, however, the law is clear that § 7201 criminalizes evasion of either assessment or payment of taxes, 36 and we do not read the district court's use of payment in its explanation of § 7201 to indicate any intent to narrow the scope of the statute's application in this case. Neither do we see the district court's word choice as constructing any such limitation as a matter of law. Moreover, by instructing the jury to consider whether Nolen had failed to file an income tax return or knew that he was required to file a return, and by clarifying that concealing income could amount to evasion, the district court left no doubt that § 7201 extended to any and all efforts Nolen may have made to avoid assessment as well as payment of income tax. 72 Finally, even if we were to characterize Nolen's conviction as a one for evasion of payment of taxes only, we would not be constrained to reverse for lack of a formal administrative tax assessment. Without unnecessarily straying down a road we need not travel, we observe that the entirety of the caselaw on this issue provides less than compelling support for Nolen's position. As the Third Circuit recently recognized in a case argued by Nolen's appellate counsel, the weight of authority favors [the] view that an assessment is not required to prove attempted evasion of payment under § 7201. 37 The converse is indisputably true. In any event, we certainly need not deign to settle the matter for this Circuit on the basis of the facts presented here, and we reiterate our rejection of Nolen's attempt to position his case solely within the rare and factually distinct evasion of payment subset of § 7201 prosecutions.