Opinion ID: 3039711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unreasonable Sentence Claim

Text: Finally, Edwards argues that his sentence was unreasonable because the District Court “mechanically” applied the Armed Career Criminal Act and did not consider factors such as a lowered risk of recidivism for people in Edwards’ age category. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) calculated that Edwards had an adjusted offense level of 30 after calculating a base offense level of 24 and adding enhancements for the stolen gun, his attempts to evade police, and subsequent allegations of obstruction of justice. Because the District Court found that there was not substantial evidence of obstruction of justice, it recalculated and found an adjusted offense level of 28. However, the District Court agreed with the PSR that Edwards was an armed career criminal under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Because of this, the District Court observed that his offense level automatically became 33 under ACCA and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B), regardless of whether his original adjusted base offense level was 12 calculated as 28 or 30. Combined with his Criminal History Category of VI, the Court found an advisory range of 235 to 293 months. The ACCA also carries with it a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. After considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court imposed a sentence of 235 months, the lowest possible within-Guidelines sentence. In explaining its decision, the Court stated that “there is hope for Mr. Edwards and I don’t think the high end of the guidelines is necessary.” There is no dispute that Edwards is an armed career criminal or that the guideline range resulting from the ACCA application was correctly calculated. And contrary to Edwards’ contention, the District Court did not “mechanically” apply the ACCA to his sentencing determination. As it has been instructed to do, the District Court scrupulously considered and applied the § 3553(a) factors, including § 3553(a)(4), which directs courts to correctly calculate and consider the Guidelines range before imposing a sentence. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264-65 (2005); United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 331 (3d Cir. 2006). Applying the ACCA and precisely calculating the resulting recommended Guidelines range thus constitutes part of the application of § 3553(a), and therefore Edwards’ argument that the ACCA was applied “mechanically” necessarily fails. Edwards further argues that the District Court should have given greater weight to his age and marital status in making its sentencing determination. As discussed above, in 13 evaluating whether the District Court abused its discretion, we look to see whether the Court considered all of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65; Cooper, 437 F.3d at 331. The Court carried out this analysis. It considered Edwards’ criminal history, calling it “probably the worst record” he’d seen in five years; Edwards’ assault on Matthews and his flight from police; the need to protect society from repeat offenders; and Edwards’ need to learn to control his anger. Edwards has been a persistently violent person and has continuously engaged in criminal behavior for the greater part of his life. While it may be true that in general, older, married individuals have lower rates of recidivism, Edwards was only thirty-nine at the time of conviction and has not shown any signs of tempering his conduct. Where the District Court has carefully applied the § 3553(a) factors, it is not obligated to discuss every argument made by the defendant as to why his sentence should be different. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. Defendant has therefore not met his burden of showing that the District Court abused its discretion by not applying a below-Guidelines sentence in light of his age and marital status and that his sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 332; see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 600.