Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Court of Appeal's Role

Text: Lastly, Congress tasked the courts of appeals with policing the system by creating substantive grounds for appeal. In addition to the right to appeal an illegal sentence, which had existed under the medical model, Congress created three new grounds for appeal, see 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to assure that the district court correctly applied the Guidelines. The first of these grounds was that the sentence was the result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines. Id. § 3742(a)(2), (b)(2). [26] The second was that the sentence was greater or less than the Guidelines sentencing range. Id. § 3742(a)(3), (b)(3). [27] The third was that the sentence was imposed for an offense for which no guideline existed and was plainly unreasonable. Id. § 3742(a)(4), (b)(4). [28]    In sum, the SRA structurally divided responsibility for sentencing among three entities: the Commission, the district courts, and the courts of appeals. The Commission promulgated the mandatory Guidelines, which were the lynchpin of the SRA. The Guidelines created sentences by considering offense and offender characteristics. In addition to a base offense level reflecting the charged offense conduct, the offense characteristics incorporated specific offense characteristics and more general adjustments, meaning that offenders were sentenced partly on the basis of uncharged conduct. The offender characteristic was based entirely on the offender's criminal history. The district courts were statutorily charged with sentencing offenders consistent with the traditional purposes of sentencing and the parsimony principle. In nearly all cases, though, the district courts were required to impose a Guidelines sentence. Therefore, the district court rarely had to conduct an independent analysis of the four purposes driving sentencingthe Sentencing Commission had already done this work for them in devising the mandatory Guidelines. Likewise, the courts rarely had to grapple with the parsimony principle. In all, the district courts exercised very little discretion other than determining where within the applicable Guidelines range to sentence the offender. The courts of appeals' role was to ensure that the Guidelines were followed. II. The Post-SRA Model
In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), a fractured Supreme Court radically reformed and rearranged the roles the SRA had assigned the district courts, the Commission, and the courts of appeals. At issue in Booker was whether the SRA's mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court held they did and reaffirmed that [a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. [29] Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. at 756. Because the Guidelines sentencing range was often determined by facts established by the district court by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 232-34, 244, 125 S.Ct. at 749-50, 756. To solve this Sixth Amendment problem, the Court discussed two possible remedies: (1) transform the Guidelines from mandatory to advisory, [30] or (2) require that every fact that would determine the Guidelines range be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Citing administrative concerns, the Booker remedial majority [31] opted for the first choice. Accordingly, the Supreme Court severed and excised two provisions of the SRA. First, the Court struck 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which had mandated the imposition of a Guidelines sentence. 543 U.S. at 259, 125 S.Ct. at 764. Second, the Court struck 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which set out standards of appellate review, because it contained critical cross-references to § 3553(b). Id. at 260-61, 125 S.Ct. at 765. To fill the gap, the Court held that the statute impli[ed] that sentences should be review[ed] for `unreasonable[ness]'. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)) (final alteration in original). [32] The Court later clarified that review for unreasonableness meant review for abuse of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 128 S.Ct. at 594. Aside from these changes, the Court left the remainder of the SRA intact, concluding that it functioned independently. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259, 125 S.Ct. at 764. Booker redistributed the roles in sentencing offenders between the Commission, the district courts, and the courts of appeals. The Commission no longer framed the district courts' sentencing discretion with mandatory guidelines; instead, it would inform the district courts' sentencing discretion with advisory guidelines. [33] The district courts once again bore the responsibility of independently crafting sentences. See United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1287-89 (11th Cir.2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). Thus, § 3553(a), which embodies the parsimony principle and the four traditional purposes of sentencing, moved to the forefront, providing the bases for the construction of a sentence. The courts of appeals bore the responsibility of reviewing the district courts' sentences, but under the abuse of discretion standard of review. Such review, it was thought, would preserve some of the uniformity in sentencing the SRA sought to achieve. Because the primary responsibility for sentencing post- Booker lies with the district courts, I explain what fashioning a sentence in accordance with § 3553(a) involves, how the sentencing hearing should be conducted, and the explanation the district courts must give for the sentences they impose. Only then can the abuse of discretion standard of appellate review be meaningfully discussed.
Section 3553(a) sets out seven factors that a district court must consider before imposing a sentence. [34] At the end of the day, however, the statute requires the district court to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, although all of the sentencing factors identified in § 3553(a) must be considered, the heart of the inquiry is the district court's assessment of the four traditional purposes of sentencing § 3553(a)(2) has codified. The first purpose, § 3553(a)(2)(A), requires the sentence be sufficient, but not greater than necessary to satisfy the need for punishment. Section 3553(a)(2)(A) actually involves three inquiries that exist in a dynamic relationship: the sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offense, []promote respect for the law, and [ ] provide just punishment for the offense. [35] Section 3553(a)(2)(B) focuses on the need for general deterrencethe need for the sentence imposed ... to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. The need for general deterrence involves an assessment of the seriousness of the offense and its relative incidence in the community. Section 3553(a)(2)(C) asks what sentence is needed to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. The basic task is to predict the likelihood that the offender will commit further offenses, assess the potential seriousness of those offenses, and determine the need to incapacitate the offender as a prophylactic measure. Finally, § 3553(a)(2)(D) focuses on the need for the sentence to rehabilitate the offenderto provide ... needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. Ordinarily, rehabilitation will play no role in determining the sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). [36] At first blush, it seems odd that Congress required consideration of seven factors but ultimately directed the district courts to impose sentences sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with just one: § 3553(a)(2). On further examination, however, it is apparent that all of the other factors inform the analysis of the four purposes of sentencing. Section 3553(a)(1) requires consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant. These considerations are directly relevant to all four purposes. Section 3553(a)(3) requires consideration of the kinds of sentences available, which is crucial to any determination of what sentence would be no harsher than necessary to punish or deter. Sections 3553(a)(4), (5) and (6) require consideration of the Guidelines sentencing range, the Commission's policy statements, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparity, respectively. Unwarranted sentencing disparity breeds disrespect for the rule of law in contravention of § 3553(a)(2)(A) (whose purpose is, in part, to promote respect for the law), and a correctly calculated Guidelines sentencing range (which is calculated in part by considering the Commission's policy statements) is one tool for avoiding such disparity. Finally, § 3553(a)(7)'s command that the court consider the need to provide restitution to victims is directly relevant to just punishment. My take on what transpires after the district court considers the seven § 3553(a) factors is that the district court should impose a sentence that satisfies the four traditional sentencing purposes of § 3553(a)(2). In most, if not all cases, one of the purposes will drive the sentence. If, for example, the punishment that should be meted out is more than sufficient to meet the needs of general and specific deterrence, then the need for punishment will drive the sentence. If the need for general deterrence is at the forefront (say in a tax evasion case) and the defendant is a first-time offender, the sentence will be imposed to satisfy the need for general deterrencethat is, the term of imprisonment for that purpose is greater than the period of incarceration required for punishment or specific deterrence. Alternatively, consider the case of a repeat offender with a string of convictions that harmed scores of victims. The period of incarceration required to protect the public from his future criminal behavior may exceed the term of imprisonment needed for punishment and general deterrence, and specific deterrence will drive the sentence. [37]
As I explain in part I.B, supra, a district judge might not find the answer to what would constitute a parsimonious sentence by consulting the Guidelines because the Commission was not instructed to take the parsimony principle into account when fashioning the Guidelines. When the parties disagree about what would be a parsimonious sentence, the PSI is of limited use to the district court. As the Supreme Court anticipated in Gall, the PSI does not answer the question of which of the four § 3553(a)(2) purposes the Guidelines sentencing range primarily accommodates; nor does it recommend a sentence that would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary to achieve those purposes. [38] 552 U.S. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. at 596. The PSI simply informs the district court of the range of sentences that, in the Commission's view, should be considered in cases with offense and offender characteristics similar to the case before the court. The district court needs the parties' input to fashion a parsimonious sentence. The sentencing hearing is an adversary proceeding [39] in which the parties frame the controversy by requesting sentences that they believe will meet § 3553(a)'s parsimony requirement. [40] After the court has entertained the parties' evidence and arguments in support of their requests, the district court determines whether either sentence request is supported by the § 3553(a) factors. Id. The obligations Gall has placed on the prosecutor and defense counsel to present sentence requests to the district court is consistent with their adversarial roles in the case. [41] The prosecutor must urge the court to impose a sentence that is appropriate... under all the circumstances of the case. U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, § 9-27.320 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/ fusao/eousa/ffoia_reading_room/usam/ index.html. To this end, the prosecutor must endeavor to ensure that the relevant facts are brought to the court's attention fully and accurately. Id. § 9-27.710 (Participation in SentencingGenerally). This includes mak[ing] a factual presentation to the court when ... [i]t is necessary to supplement or correct the [PSI]; [i]t is necessary in light of the defense presentation to the court; or [i]t is requested by the court. Id. § 9-27.720 (Establishing Factual Basis for Sentence). Finally, the prosecutor must [b]e prepared to substantiate significant factual allegations disputed by the defense. Id. Defense counsel also has an obligation to prepare for the sentencing hearing; in fact, the Sixth Amendment requires that defense counsel provide the defendant with effective assistance in all phases of the case. This would include providing the district court with evidence favorable to the defendant as the court considers § 3553(a)(2)'s sentencing objectives. The parties should present their sentence requests to the district court after the PSI, and any addendums to the PSI, are in final form and ready for submission to the court. Ideally, the requests should be presented well in advance of the sentencing hearing in sentencing memoranda akin to the pretrial briefs parties routinely present to the district court in advance of a civil bench trial. In their sentencing memoranda, the parties should consider presenting the district court with findings of fact and conclusions of law similar to the findings of fact and conclusions of law parties in a civil case present the court prior to or following a bench trial. The memoranda would indicate the Guidelines sentencing range, [42] the sentence the party requests, the primary § 3553(a)(2) purpose the sentence is to serve, and why the sentence would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with the § 3553(a)(2) purposes. [43] In formulating their sentence requests, the parties should first evaluate how well the guidelines listed in the PSI serve as proxies for § 3553(a)(2)'s purposes. As explained, the Guidelines offense level for the offense of conviction is made up of the base offense level, specific offense characteristics, and adjustments. Some of the specific offense characteristics and adjustments may describe acts committed by the defendant in perpetrating the offense of conviction; the Commission treats such acts as part of the real offense conduct and properly includes them in the offense level as proxies for the § 3553(a)(2)(A)(B) needs for punishment and general deterrence. Other specific offense characteristics and adjustments, however, may not fairly be said to have any bearing on the defendant's commission of the offense of conviction and thus on the (A) and (B) needs. Therefore, although the Commission treats them as proxies for (A) and (B) purposes, they may be irrelevant to whether the sentence a party proposes is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to satisfy the (A) and (B) needs in the case. [44] Accordingly, in determining the proxies for (A) and (B), the defendant may urge the court to remove from the PSI's offense level the specific offense characteristics and adjustments that reflect conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction. [45] The offense level may not fit the circumstances of the case even after irrelevant considerations are removed. As indicated, the Guidelines offense level applies to all cases involving the offense of conviction; that is, it does not speak to the unique circumstances of a particular case. Consequently, in its sentencing memorandum, a party may urge the court to deviate from the prescribed offense level to take into account one or more of the offense characteristics listed in 28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (which the Commission considered in determining the categories of offenses) [46] that render the instant case atypical. In doing so, the party would be positing a substitute offense level and using it to support the sentence it will be asking the court to impose. The parties' sentencing memoranda will also address the prescribed criminal history category, which, coupled with the offense level, would inform the district court's sentencing discretion. If the criminal history category is I, and the government does not contend that the category should be increased on the ground that it substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1), the defendant's sentence will be driven solely by the offense level for the offense of convictionthat is, the sentence necessary to satisfy the need for punishment or general deterrence will be more than enough to satisfy any need for specific deterrence. If the defendant's criminal history category is greater than I, the parties may dispute whether the defendant's punishment for the offense of conviction should be greater on account of his past criminal behavior, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), or, if not, whether such behavior predicts future criminality and thus warrants an additional period of incarceration to protect the public, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C). Regarding the latter, the parties may point to factors that bear on the defendant's likelihood to recidivate but that the Commission did not take into account for policy reasons, such as age and drug abuse. [47] In the end, each party will arrive at a criminal history category, which, coupled with the offense level it proposes, will presumably support the sentence it is requesting the district court to impose.
The sentencing hearing is framed by the competing positions of the parties, as expressed in their sentencing memoranda. The government seeks the most severe sentence the facts and circumstances of the case will allow. The defendant seeks leniency. The manner in which the district court conducts the sentencing hearing is relevant to the parties' and the public's perception of whether the sentence imposed is fair or not. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597. To ensure that it is fair, and thus perceived as such, the sentence must be subjected to the thorough adversarial testing contemplated by the federal sentencing procedure, Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 352, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), and the reasons for its imposition must be explained, id. at 356, 127 S.Ct. at 2468 (Confidence in a judge's use of reason underlies the public's trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of [the judges's] reasons [for the particular sentence imposed] helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust.). Moreover, the judge's statement of reasons allow[s] for meaningful appellate review. Gall, 552 U.S. at 39, 128 S.Ct. at 590. The adversarial process the Supreme Court mandates involves five steps. After listing them in order, I address them in some detail to indicate what might take place in a typical case in which the parties cannot agree that the Guidelines sentencing range correctly approximates the § 3553(a)(2) purposes. First, the district court determines the Guidelines sentencing range. Id. at 49, 128 S.Ct. at 597; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32. [48] Second, turning to the prosecutor then to defense counsel, the court asks the parties for their sentence requests and affords them an opportunity to present evidence relevant to each of the four § 3553(a)(2) purposes. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49-50, 128 S.Ct. at 596-97. [49] Third, the court entertains the parties' arguments in support of their sentence requests. Id. Fourth, the court determines whether the sentence either party proposes satisfies each of § 3553(a)(2)'s purposes and the parsimony principle. Id. Fifth, the court fashions a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to meet those purposes, explains how the sentence does this, and if the sentence deviates from the Guidelines range or the parties' requests, gives the reasons for the deviation. Id. The first step of the sentencing hearing is to determine whether the Guidelines sentencing range fixed by the PSI is correctly calculated. [50] By correctly calculated, I mean calculated per the instructions in the Guidelines manual. At this stage, the court will resolve any disputes regarding whether the manual's instructions were properly followed. In the second step, the district court will entertain the parties' sentencing requests. The government and then the defense will present evidence to support their requested sentences, and this evidence will often show why the Guidelines recommendation is or is not appropriate in the given case. [51] A party might challenge the offense level the court has set by contending that the Commission's generalized treatment of the offensefor example, the weights accorded to characteristics in the base offense level or specific offense characteristicsis inappropriate in the present case. [52] Aside from relying on the circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the seriousness of the offense, the party might proffer evidence concerning the community view of the gravity of the offense, or the current incidence of the offense in the community. This evidence, the party would contend, is relevant to the § 3553(a)(2)(A)(B) inquiry regarding the needs for punishment and general deterrence. Or, a party might challenge the criminal history category the court has set by proffering evidence on characteristics such as gender, race and ethnicity, employment status, educational attainment, and marital status that the Commission did not consider in establishing the categories of offenders. [53] In the third step, the court entertains the parties' arguments in support of their sentence requests. The court then turns to the fourth step of determining whether either party's proposal meets the four sentencing purposes of § 3553(a)(2) and is the sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to comply with those purposes. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, 128 S.Ct. at 597 ([T]he district judge should ... consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.). Finally, the court moves to the fifth step and fashions a sentence which, depending on its fourth-step determination, may mirror a party's request. If neither side prevailed in the fourth step, the sentence the court imposes may be less than the government requested or more than the defendant requested. [54] The court supports the sentence by making factfindings regarding the (a)(2) purposes [55] and explaining how the sentence is parsimonious to the driving § 3553(a)(2) purpose. [56] In the process, the court must also explain the reasons for any deviation from a party's request or the PSI sentencing range as established in step one. After pronouncing a sentence, the court elicits the parties' objections in accordance with United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.1990). The objections are important for appellate review. They also give the court an opportunity to correct any errors it may have made, which if corrected to the objecting party's satisfaction will render an appeal unlikely.

It is axiomatic that the appellate review of a sentence is conducted under the abuse of discretion standard. Rita, 551 U.S. at 351, 127 S.Ct. at 2465 (`[R]easonableness' review merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.); Gall, 552 U.S. at 46, 128 S.Ct. at 594 (Our explanation of `reasonableness' review in the Booker opinion made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions.). Under this familiar standard, Gall, 552 U.S. at 26, 128 S.Ct. at 594, a district court abuses its discretion when it follows improper procedures, bases its decision on an incorrect interpretation of law or clearly erroneous factfindings, or when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that the court committed a clear error of judgment in making the ultimate decision entitled to deference. Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1251 (11th Cir.2004). When conducting this review, the court of appeals may only consider evidence, arguments, and objections presented to the district court. See United States v. Weir, 51 F.3d 1031, 1032 (11th Cir.1995). The abuse of discretion standard governs a broad array of appellate inquiries; although the same basic framework applies to all these inquiries, how that framework works in practice depends very much on the nature of the decision being reviewed. [57] See Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Products, Inc., 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ([T]his phrase [abuse of discretion] covers a family of review standards rather than a single standard, and a family whose members differ greatly in the actual stringency of review.). The Supreme Court has said that [w]hether discretion has been abused depends, of course, on the bounds of that discretion and the principles that guide its exercise. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336, 108 S.Ct. 2413, 2419, 101 L.Ed.2d 297 (1988). In other words, examining what the district court inquiry looks like reveals how and to what the court of appeals defers. As I explained in part II, the sentencing inquiry is primarily a factual inquirythe district court derives the ultimate sentence from a series of factfindings based on circumstantial evidence, credibility determinations, and sometimes conflicting evidence. In light of the nature of the district court's sentencing inquiry, I deconstruct the abuse of discretion standard and identify how its component parts apply to the district court's sentencing determination. Once simplified this way, the appellate court's task in reviewing sentences for abuse of discretion becomes clear. I begin with the statement that a district court can abuse its discretion by making a clearly erroneous factfinding. It is well established that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.... Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (quotation omitted). The sentencing inquiry is driven in large part by factfindings: the underlying facts regarding the § 3553(a)(2) factors, [58] the weight given to each piece of evidence, the district court's determinations regarding each § 3553(a)(2) purpose, [59] and the sentence necessary to satisfy each § 3353(a)(2) purpose are all factfindings. As such, the appellate court accepts these findings unless they are clearly erroneous. A district court can also abuse its discretion by misinterpreting the law, although the fact-intensive nature of sentencing means that there will be fewer instances in which the district court abuses its discretion in this way. Nonetheless, the district court might misinterpret the law in two key ways. [60] First, it would be a misinterpretation of the law for the district court to fail to follow the adversarial procedure required by Gall, which in part requires the court to elicit and consider sentencing requests from the parties and to explain the reasons for its sentence in a way that allows for the parties to object to any perceived errors and for the court of appeals to meaningfully review the sentence. Second, the district court would misinterpret the law if it follows the correct procedural steps but its explanation reveals that it misunderstood the nature of the sentencing inquiry. This would occur, for example, if the district court weighs the § 3553(a)(2) purposes against each other instead of determining the sentence parsimonious to the driving purpose or if the district court erroneously believes that it cannot consider relevant evidence. [61] Lastly, the court of appeals will reverse the sentence if the district court committed a clear error of judgment. This term must be applied carefully when reviewing a sentence, which necessarily turns very heavily on the district court's assessment of the facts. It seems that when courts use the phrase clear error of judgment in this context, they are frequently saying that the court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. See, e.g., United States v. Westry, 524 F.3d 1198, 1222 (11th Cir. 2008) (A remand for resentencing due to the unreasonableness of a sentence occurs only `if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.'). As I have explained, however, the § 3553(a) factors fold into the (a)(2) purposes, and the (a)(2) purposes should not be weighed against each other; rather, the court should identify the (a)(2) purpose that drives the sentence and fashion a sentence parsimonious to that purpose. Moreover, the need to satisfy each (a)(2) purpose and which purpose will drive the sentence are both factfindings, the review of which I have already described. Therefore, for clear error of judgment to do any work in appellate review of a sentence, it must refer to the situation in which the court has imposed a sentence that is more or less than necessary to satisfy the driving purpose. But importantly, the appellate court is not to substitute its own judgment for that of the district court; rather, it must determine whether the district court committed a clear error of judgment by imposing a sentence that cannot be reconciled with its correctly interpreted law and not-clearly-erroneous facts. In some regards, this inquiry is akin to the inquiry an appellate court performs when determining whether the evidence submitted to a jury is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Cf. United States v. Wright, 392 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir.2004) (noting that we will not overturn a conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence unless no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). In the sentencing context, though, the appellate court is limited to the facts set forth in the district court's sentencing explanation, which shows what evidence the court deemed relevant and probative and how that evidence informed the court's decision. [62] Thus, focusing on the district court's sentencing explanation, the appellate court asks whetherin light of the district court's factfindings, its explanation for the sentence, and any deviation from the Guidelines sentencing range and the parties' requestsany rational judge could have concluded that the sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the § 3553(a)(2) purposes. If the sentence imposed cannot be reconciled with the § 3553(a)(2) factfindings, the sentence must be vacated. Deconstructing the abuse of discretion standard shows that appellate review of a sentence should be a clearly delineated, straightforward process. If the district court followed the proper procedures, the court of appeals will have a sentencing explanation that clearly explains the facts found by the district court, how they relate to the (a)(2) purposes, the driving (a)(2) purpose, and how the sentence is parsimonious to that purpose. From the record (which will include the parties' objections and the court's responses), the court will be able to determine whether any factfindings were clearly erroneous in light of the evidence presented. It will also be readily evident whether the district court properly understood the nature of the sentencing inquiry. From there, the court asks whether there are sufficient facts in the record to support the sentencethat is, it must determine whether any reasonable judge could find, based on the facts clearly found in the record, that the sentence imposed is parsimonious to the driving purpose. [63] With this framework in mind, I now explain how the court of appeals should review each step of the sentencing hearing I set out in the previous section.
Having carefully examined the abuse of discretion standard in the sentencing context, I now show how appellate review under that standard identifies abuses of discretion at each step of the sentencing hearing. [64] I posit a case in which a party contends that the district court failed to follow the five-step process. [65] The party also contends, alternatively, that, if the court followed that process, its rulings in at least one of the steps were erroneous. [66] The court of appeals considers each challenge seriatim, under the abuse of discretion standard; that is, it examines for clear error the facts on which the district court based its ruling and the district court's application of the law de novo. If the district court abused its discretion at any step, the inquiry ends there. The sentence must be vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing. [67] If there is no abuse of discretion in a step, the court proceeds to the next. Step one required the district court to determine the Guidelines sentencing range for the case. This determination is vulnerable to attack on two fronts: the district court's factual findings and its application of the Guidelines to the facts. If the factfindings are clearly erroneous, the district court abused its discretion. If the factfindings survive clear error review, the question becomes whether the court erred in applying the Guidelines to the facts. If in doing so the court made an identifiable legal mistake in interpreting the Guidelines or if it clear[ly] err[ed] in applying them, the court abused its discretion and the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded. See United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1317-19 (11th Cir.2003). At step two, the district court was required to give the government, and then defendant, the opportunity to present their sentence requests and to provide a factual basis in support of their proposals. [68] If the court failed to afford the parties the opportunity to present their case, it abused its discretion (by misinterpreting the law requiring it to provide such an opportunity) and the defendant's sentence must be vacated. At step three, the court must have given the parties the opportunity to arguein light of all of the evidence presented at step twothat the sentences they have requested are supported by the § 3553(a) factors and are sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve § 3553(a)(2)'s purposes. If the court failed to do this, it abused its discretion (by misinterpreting the law), and the sentence must be vacated. Step four asked the district court to determine whether either party's sentence proposal fulfilled § 3553(a)(2)'s sentencing purposes, was not inconsistent with the remaining § 3553(a) factors, and satisfied the statute's parsimony requirement. If the court failed to engage in this process, it abused its discretion (by misinterpreting the law) and the sentence must be vacated. Step five required the district court to select and explain a sentence supported by § 3553(a)'s factors and, moreover, a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary to meet § 3553(a)(2)'s objectives. If the sentence deviated from the Guidelines sentencing range for the case, the court had to set forth the reasons for the deviation. The first question the court of appeals must answer is whether the district court's explanation for the sentence is sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. Rita, 551 U.S. at 357, 127 S.Ct. at 2469. If not, the sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings on the ground that the district court misinterpreted the law requiring it to provide such an explanation. The court of appeals also determines whether any facts relied on in the sentencing explanation were clearly erroneous. If the explanation is sufficient and the facts not clearly erroneous, the question becomes whether the record reasonably supports the district court's explanation and therefore the sentence. If it does, the district court did not commit a clear error of judgment and did not abuse its discretion. In sum, appellate scrutiny of a sentence is performed through the classic abuse of discretion lens. This is consistent with Gall 's command that a district court's sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion whether inside or outside the Guidelines sentencing range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. It is also consistent with the district court's sentencing expertise. The district court is unquestionably the best judicial actor to apply the fact-heavy and open-ended inquiry demanded by § 3553(a) and to fashion a sentence in accordance with the parsimony principle. See id. (The sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case.) (quotation omitted). III. Applying the Sentencing Model Irey's sentence must be vacated and the case remanded because the court failed to explain its deviation from the Guidelines sentencing range and its denial of the Government's request and because it failed to make intelligible findings on two of the four § 3553(a)(2) purposes.