Opinion ID: 885764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Strickland standard is an inappropriate threshold

Text: ¶ 33 Although in numerous respects the procedural due process rights of an involuntary commitment patient-respondent are identical to those afforded an accused criminal defendant, we disagree with K.G.F. and the Carmody court that the application of the Strickland standard is appropriate in involuntary civil commitment proceedings. We conclude that the standard under Strickland simply does not go far enough to protect the liberty interests of individuals such as K.G.F., who may or may not have broken any law, but who, upon the expiration of a 90-day commitment, must indefinitely bear the badge of inferiority of a once involuntarily committed person with a proven mental disorder. [5] ¶ 34 The Strickland decision, for example, provides that a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (citation and internal quotations omitted). See also State v. Hanson (1997), 283 Mont. 316, 327, 940 P.2d 1166, 1173 (quoting from Strickland, and observing U.S. Supreme Court's warning that courts should be highly deferential when second guessing counsel's assistance). ¶ 35 Even a cursory review of legal commentary reveals the flawed reasoning of applying the foregoing Strickland standard to involuntary civil commitment proceedings. Namely, reasonable professional assistance cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely acceptsand even requiresan unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 39, 53-54 (1992) (identifying Strickland standard as sterile and perfunctory where reasonably effective assistance is objectively measured by the prevailing professional norms) (hereinafter Perlin ). ¶ 36 Further, we disagree with the Carmody court's Strickland analysis indicating that in involuntary commitment proceedings no issues are likely to arise regarding respondent's counsel's failure to adequately investigate or prepare for trial, or counsel's failure to pursue defenses or witnesses as suggested by his client. See Carmody, 210 Ill.Dec. 782, 653 N.E.2d at 984-85. To the contrary, the conduct of counsel during those few available hours prior to an involuntary commitment hearing or trial should be a key focal point of the inquiry as to whether the counsel's representation was effective. ¶ 37 To this extent we disagree with K.G.F. that the most startling evidence that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced [K.G.F.] was counsel's failure to object to hearsay testimony. The weight of one missed objection to questionable testimony at a hearing is minuscule in comparison to the failure to fully investigate and comprehend a patient's circumstances prior to an involuntary civil commitment hearing or trial, which may, in turn, lead to critical decision-making between counsel and client as to how best to proceed. Such pre-hearing matters, which shall be discussed infra, clearly involve effective preparation prior to a hearing or trial. ¶ 38 We also agree with Amicus that the Strickland burden of proving that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deny the defendant a fair trial, is contrary to our prior case law that mandates that unless civil commitment laws are strictly followed, a commitment order must be reversed. See, e.g., In re Morlock (1993), 261 Mont. 499, 501, 862 P.2d 415, 416 (citations omitted). This argument is also raised by K.G.F., in alternatively arguing that a non- Strickland due process analysis would find counsel ineffective here as well. ¶ 39 Finally, we agree with the State and Amicus that the 6th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article II, Section 24, pertain to criminal proceedings alone, and that although affording an individual with certain criminal due process rights, the involuntary commitment process does not invoke those constitutional provisions. See § 53-21-115(6), MCA (person has the right to remain silent) and compare with § 53-21-115(7), MCA (hearing governed by rules of evidence applicable to civil matters); § 53-21-126(3), MCA (proceedings governed by Montana Rules of Civil Procedure). See also § 53-21-126(2), MCA (providing hybrid standards of proof at civil commitment trials or hearings: beyond a reasonable doubt and clear and convincing evidence). ¶ 40 Thus, we turn as suggested by the State and Amicus, to the due process clause of the Montana Constitution.