Opinion ID: 2543466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: disclosure of the child victim's privileged medical records

Text: ¶ 17 Cramer contends that the trial court erred in conducting an in camera review of M.L.'s medical records rather than allowing him direct access to the records. Specifically, Cramer argues that (1) the Utah Constitution entitled him to direct access, and (2) alternatively, the court erred in ruling, based on its in camera review, that none of the records was material. [2] The medical records were not included as part of the appellate record.
¶ 18 Cramer contends that the trial court's in camera review of M.L.'s medical records denied him the ability to scrutinize the records with an advocate's eye for material information. Since the federal constitution does not provide Cramer this right, see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60-61, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987); State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ¶ 30, 982 P.2d 79 (applying Ritchie ), he relies on the Utah Constitution in claiming entitlement to full disclosure of the medical records. ¶ 19 Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees an accused the right to due process of law. Due process includes, among other things, the opportunity to submit evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses. Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 8, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). In addition, Cramer notes that Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees an accused the right to confrontation and compulsory process. ¶ 20 Because Utah appellate courts have not directly addressed the issue of whether the Utah Constitution requires full disclosure of records under the circumstances of his case, Cramer relies on authority from other states. Specifically, he cites as persuasive authority state constitutional holdings in cases from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. ¶ 21 Cases decided by courts in these jurisdictions do not support his interpretation of the Utah Constitution, however. Although Cramer accurately notes that Massachusetts initially rejected in camera review in favor of direct access by the accused's attorney, Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 409 Mass. 867, 570 N.E.2d 992, 1002 (1991), he overlooks the fact that in later cases Massachusetts reinstated in camera review procedures. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 617 N.E.2d 990, 996-99 (1993) (devising in camera procedures to avoid overly inclusive disclosures of privileged information to accused). Prompting this return to in camera review procedures was the Massachusetts Supreme Court's informed judgment that its earlier direct access procedures required disclosure of privileged records that may contain nothing that would aid the defense[.] Id. at 996. In short, Massachusetts's return to in camera review procedures in light of its experience with permitting defense counsel controlled access to privileged records militates against Cramer's argument in favor of full disclosure. ¶ 22 Cramer also cites State v. Hufford, 205 Conn. 386, 533 A.2d 866 (1987), as lending persuasive authority to his interpretation of the Utah Constitution. However, once again, current authority in the cited jurisdiction contradicts Cramer's position. Indeed, applying its substantial experience in balancing the constitutional rights of an accused with a victim's privacy interests in privileged mental health records, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently stated as follows: We reaffirm that the in camera approach represents the most effective and sensitive balance between the interests of the criminal defendant and private citizens who expect and rely on the confidentiality of their psychiatric records and communications.... As we stated in State v. Pratt, 235 Conn. 595, 611, 669 A.2d 562 (1995), in camera judicial review of a victim's privileged records currently represents the most common method of balancing statutory privileges against the defendant's trial rights. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 607 So.2d 333, 335 (Ala.Crim.App.1992); Gunter v. State, 313 Ark. 504, 512-13, 857 S.W.2d 156 (1993); People v. District Court, 743 P.2d 432, 436 (Colo.1987); People v. Foggy, 121 Ill.2d 337, 349-50, 521 N.E.2d 86, 118 Ill.Dec. 18 (1988); Goldsmith v. State, 337 Md. 112, 133-35, 651 A.2d 866 (1995); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 416 Mass. 169, 179-80, 617 N.E.2d 990 (1993); People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 678-79, 521 N.W.2d 557 (1994); State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 413, 628 A.2d 696 (1993); State v. v. Kalakosky, 121 Wash.2d 525, 550, 852 P.2d 1064 (1993). State v. Slimskey, 257 Conn. 842, 779 A.2d 723, 732 n. 9 (2001). ¶ 23 Finally, although Cramer contends that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has construed that state's confrontation clause as affording an accused broader rights than required in Ritchie, the case on which Cramer relies indicates that an accused's rights under that state's confrontation clause are not violated by an in camera review of privileged records. See State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632, 636-38 (R.I.1989) (noting that, had the accused not been granted a new trial on other grounds, the case would have been remanded for the trial court to conduct an in camera review of a witness's juvenile records). ¶ 24 In short, the jurisdictions cited by Cramer do not lend persuasive authority to Cramer's interpretation of the Utah Constitution. Indeed, the case law in these jurisdictions contradicts Cramer's interpretation. Thus, Cramer has cited no persuasive authority for his view of due process under our constitution, nor has he made any persuasive arguments. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's order denying Cramer's request for full disclosure of M.L.'s privileged medical records did not violate Cramer's rights under the Utah Constitution.
¶ 25 Cramer next contends that, given the centrality of M.L.'s credibility to the case, the trial court erred in not disclosing any records. In essence, Cramer argues that some of the records must have been material and that the trial court, in conducting its in camera review, erred in concluding that none of the records was material within the meaning of Ritchie. In other words, Cramer contends that the trial court did not correctly apply the law ( Ritchie's materiality standard) to the facts (the medical records). We are unable to review this ruling regarding materiality, however, because the medical records were not included in the appellate record. ¶ 26 Under rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appellant has the duty to ensure the record is complete with respect to disputed findings or conclusions: If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. Utah R.App. P. 11(e)(2); see also State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah Ct.App. 1990) (Since counsel failed to provide this court with all relevant evidence bearing on the issues raised on appeal, as required by Utah R.App. P. 11(e)(2), we can only presume that the judgment was supported by sufficient evidence. (internal citations omitted)); Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998, 1002-03 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (In essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this court with all evidence relevant to the issues raised on appeal.). ¶ 27 Although the trial court denied Cramer direct access to M.L.'s records, Cramer should have requested that the court seal and retain the records as part of the record as per rule 4-205(4)(A) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, or if the court rejected that request, Cramer should have made a record of his objection and his efforts to include the sealed documents in the record. In addition, after transmission of the record to this Court, Cramer could have attempted to rectify the omission by moving to supplement the record: If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation . . . either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. Utah R.App. P. 11(h). However, Cramer did not move to supplement the record even after this Court pointed out the omission to his attorney during oral argument. Although we have the discretion to supplement an inadequate record, Utah R.App. P. 11(h), we decline to exercise this discretion given that Cramer had an adequate opportunity to ensure a complete record himself. ¶ 28 Because M.L's medical records are not included in the appellate record, we presume that the trial court correctly determined that none of the records was material to Cramer's defense. See State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (applying precedent under which [i]f an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below. (internal quotations omitted)). [3]