Opinion ID: 1638451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Florida's Clemency Procedure

Text: Johnston next contends that the clemency proceeding he was provided in 1987 was inadequate because it was held before the postconviction proceedings were concluded and before his mental health issues and life history were fully developed for consideration in the clemency process. He also contends that the clemency process in Florida is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary, lacks standards, is one-sided, and fails to take into account information developed in postconviction proceedings. Johnston argues that clemency in Florida does not provide the fail safe that clemency is envisioned to be by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), did recognize that [e]xecutive clemency has provided the `fail safe' in our criminal justice system. Id. at 415, 113 S.Ct. 853 (quoting Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest 131 (1989)). In Harbison v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 129 S.Ct. 1481, 1490-91, 173 L.Ed.2d 347 (2009), the Supreme Court again recognized clemency proceedings as the fail safe in the criminal justice system. We conclude that the clemency system in Florida performed as intended in providing a fail safe for Johnston. He was given a full clemency hearing in 1987 at which he was represented by counsel. When the death warrant was signed on April 20, 2009, it stated that it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate. Thus, clemency was again considered by the executive branch prior to the signing of the warrant in this case. Moreover, we have considered and rejected this same claim in other cases where a full clemency proceeding had been held and because the clemency process is a matter for the executive branch. See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 940 So.2d 1112, 1122-23 (Fla.2006) (rejecting attack on clemency process where a clemency hearing was held and because it is an executive function); King v. State, 808 So.2d 1237, 1246 (Fla.2002) (holding that clemency claim was meritless in light of precedent); Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 252 (Fla.2001) (rejecting clemency claim where Glock had a clemency hearing and because the matter is an executive function); Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.1986) (clemency is an executive function and it is not the Court's prerogative to second-guess that executive decision). More recently, a challenge to Florida's clemency procedure was rejected in Marek v. State, 8 So.3d 1123 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 40, 174 L.Ed.2d 625 (2009). There, we again addressed challenges to Florida's clemency procedure raised by Marek, who was under an active death warrant at that time, stating: Marek asserts that the clemency process is one-sided, arbitrary, and standardless. Again, his argument is without merit. In Rutherford v. State, 940 So.2d 1112 (Fla.2006), the defendantrelying on the ABA reportargued that Florida's clemency process is arbitrary and capricious. This Court rejected the argument that the ABA Report requires us to reconsider our prior decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to Florida's clemency process. Id. at 1122. Moreover, Marek and the State agree that a full clemency proceeding was conducted in 1988 and that public records demonstrate that in 2008, the Governor corresponded with the Florida Parole Commission about Marek. Marek's death warrant expressly states that it has been determined that Executive Clemency, as authorized by Article IV, Section 8(a), Florida Constitution, is not appropriate. Previously, in Bundy v. State, 497 So.2d 1209, 1211 (Fla.1986), this Court, in rejecting Bundy's contention that he was entitled to time to prepare and present an application for clemency before execution, explained that [i]t is not our prerogative to second-guess the application of this exclusive executive function. First, the principle of separation of powers requires the judiciary to adopt an extremely cautious approach in analyzing questions involving this admitted matter of executive grace. As noted in In re Advisory Opinion of the Governor, 334 So.2d 561, 562-63 (Fla.1976), [t]his Court has always viewed the pardon powers expressed in the Constitution as being peculiarly within the domain of the executive branch of government. Bundy, 497 So.2d at 1211 (some citations omitted); accord Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 253 (Fla.2001); Provenzano v. State, 739 So.2d 1150, 1155 (Fla. 1999). Marek has not presented any reason that this Court should depart from these precedents. Marek, 8 So.3d at 1129-30. Johnston contends that his original clemency hearing was inadequate to protect his rights because it was conducted before his full life history and mental illness history were developed. We rejected a similar argument in Bundy that time must be given to prepare and present a case for clemency in a second clemency proceeding before the death sentence may be carried out. Bundy, 497 So.2d at 1211. We also noted in Marek v. State, 14 So.3d 985 (Fla.2009), after Marek raised a second challenge to the clemency process, that five justices of the United States Supreme Court concluded [in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998)] that some minimal procedural due process requirements should apply to clemency . . . [b]ut none of the opinions in that case required any specific procedures or criteria to guide the executive's signing of warrants for death-sentenced inmates. Marek, 14 So.3d at 998. We again conclude that no specific procedures are mandated in the clemency process and that Johnston has been provided with the clemency proceedings to which he is entitled. Further, we decline to depart from the Court's precedent, based on the doctrine of separation of powers, in which we have held that it is not our prerogative to second-guess the executive on matters of clemency in capital cases. Johnston has not provided any reason for the Court to depart from its precedents or to hold that an additional clemency proceeding is required before a death warrant is signed. Because these same claims have been raised and ruled on in the Court's prior precedents, and Johnston has provided no reason for the Court to depart from those precedents, relief is denied.