Opinion ID: 287676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pre-strike negotiations and conduct3

Text: 9 Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act defines the duty to bargain as the mutual obligation   to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement,    29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d) (1964). This statutory standard contemplates a willingness to enter into discussions with an open mind and a sincere intention to reach an agreement consistent with the respective rights of the parties. N.L.R.B. v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 365 F.2d 321, 322 (C.A. 5, 1966). However, the collective bargaining obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d) (1964); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 147, 363 F.2d 272, 276, cert. den. 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 90, 17 L.Ed.2d 80 (1966). Thus, while a party may not come to the bargaining table with a closed mind, neither is he bound to yield any position fairly maintained; firmness of a bargaining position does not constitute bad faith. Dallas General Drivers, etc., Local 745 v. N.L.R.B., 122 U.S.App.D.C. 417, 419, 355 F.2d 842, 844 (1966). In each instance the degree of cooperation which a party must show is largely a matter for the Board's expertise. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen Local 760 v. N.L. R.B., 114 U.S.App.D.C. 388, 389-390, 316 F.2d 389, 390-391 (1963). Where, as here, the Board finds that an employer has fulfilled his obligation, its determination will be upheld unless it is irrational or unsupported by substantial evidence. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Intern. Union, Local 4-243 AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 116, 362 F.2d 943, 946 (1966). See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 160(f) (1964); Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 487-491, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). The responsibility for determining the existence of substantial evidence in the record to support the findings and orders of the Board thus rests with the Court of Appeals, but the findings of the Board and the Trial Examiner, especially when, as in the instant case, they concur, are not lightly to be disregarded. 4 International Union, etc., UAW v. N.L.R.B., 129 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 200, 392 F.2d 801, 805 (1967), cert. den., Preston Products Co. v. N.L.R.B., 392 U.S. 906, 88 S.Ct. 2058, 20 L.Ed.2d 1364 (1968). 10 Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that the Company's pre-strike conduct contained none of the elements customarily connected with bad faith bargaining. For eighteen years, the Company and the Union had negotiated collective bargaining agreements covering the Company's painters. When the Union was certified in June 1966 as the representative of a broader unit containing both painters and crewmen the Company met with the Union on six occasions in a two-month period and expressed its readiness to reestablish a bargaining relationship. It adopted a number of the proposals made by the Union, including union access to the plant and job sites, superseniority for the steward, a joint union-management safety investigation, and a multi-step grievance procedure coupled with binding arbitration. During negotiations, the Company explored the Union's demands and presented serious counterproposals, explaining the reasons underlying its positions and in some instances succeeding in narrowing the area of disagreement. Such conduct constituted a good faith effort to succeed at collective bargaining. 11 The Union argues that the Company's lack of good faith prior to the strike is demonstrated by its position on the wage issue. When bargaining began, painters and helpers were receiving wages of $3.80 and $2.70 an hour, respectively; crewmen's rates ranged from $1.35 an hour to $2.70 an hour. The Union proposed classification of crewmen as journeymen sign erectors or journeymen sign builders at wage rates of $3.75 and $4.45 an hour, respectively; premium pay of forty cents an hour for boom operators, sixty cents an hour for leadmen and fifty cents an hour for work at heights of forty feet or more; and an increased wage rate of $4.75 an hour for journeymen sign painters. The Company countered with a four cent an hour wage increase to the crewmen only, a position which it adamantly maintained throughout the negotiations. It also agreed to two hours of reporting pay and made concessions on such non-monetary, but income-related items, as hours of work, restrictions on subcontracting and discharge for cause. 12 The Union contends that the offer of four cents an hour to crewmen was made in bad faith, for the Company undoubtedly was fully cognizant of the untenable position the Union would be in if it were to accept an offer resulting in a wage increase to only about half the employees. Accordingly, it could make the offer with reasonable assurance that it could not and would not be accepted. Southwest Porcelain Steel Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1733, 1744 (1961), enf'd, N.L.R.B. v. Southwestern Porcelain Steel Corp., 317 F.2d 527 (C.A. 10, 1963). See also N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 139 (C.A. 1), cert. den., 346 U.S. 887, 74 S.Ct. 139, 98 L.Ed. 391 (1953). However, the facts do not support the Union's contention. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the contrary conclusion that the Company's offer was made in good faith. The crewmen were the lowest paid segment of the work force, there was an obvious disparity between their wages and those of the painters and helpers, and the Union itself had sought larger increases for crewmen than for the others. The Company's refusal to grant any increase to the painters and helpers was based on the reasonable ground that it was already paying more to this group of employees than were any of its competitors. The firmness of the Company's position can be attributed at least in part, to the Union's high demands and its refusal to agree to a no-strike clause. In sum, the Company was not obligated to offer a general wage increase or to acquiesce in any of the union's demands in order to demonstrate its good faith. N.L.R.B. v. American National Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404, 72 S.Ct. 824, 96 L.Ed. 1027 (1952); United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L. R.B., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 147, 363 F.2d 272, 276, cert. den., H. K. Porter, Inc., Disston Division-Danville Works v. N.L.R.B., 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 90, 17 L.Ed.2d 80 (1966). In the circumstances the Board not unreasonably declined to infer bad faith from the fact that the Company's wage offer was insubstantial or that it was limited to one group of employees. 13 We also find substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusions of the trial examiner and the Board that the Company bargained in good faith before the strike on the issues of health and welfare benefits, apprenticeship training, and check-off. So far as the check-off issue is concerned, the case before us differs significantly from the situation which existed in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. N.L.R.B., 124 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 363 F.2d 272, cert. den. H. K. Porter, Inc., Disston Division-Danville Works v. N.L.R.B., 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 90, 17 L.Ed.2d 80 (1966), relied upon by petitioner. There was substantial evidence that the Company's refusal to accept a check-off provision was not motivated by a desire to frustrate collective bargaining, but was based upon the fact that a check-off would impose too great a burden on the Company's small clerical staff. Similarly, the Company rejected the Union's health and welfare demands upon the ground that the Company already provided health benefits for its employees; and the apprenticeship program was rejected because the Company believed it was not well-established and would not be successful.