Opinion ID: 1940407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a brief history of peremptory challenges

Text: Peremptory challenges have had a long and storied history. [19] This Court has consistently recognized that these challenges are not of constitutional dimension but are a means to ensure that defendants receive an impartial jury. See Carroll v. State, 139 Fla. 233, 190 So. 437, 438 (1939). In Rollins v. State, 148 So.2d 274, 276 (Fla.1963), this Court refused to reverse a conviction based on an erroneous denial of a cause challenge because a peremptory challenge was used on the objectionable venireperson. As Busby did, Rollins exhausted his peremptory challenges, but this Court held that there was no showing that an objectionable or unqualified juror served on the jury. This Court defined objectionable juror as one that is legally objectionable or unqualified to serve. Id. In Swain, 380 U.S. at 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, the United States Supreme Court stated in dicta that the denial or impairment of the right [to exercise peremptory challenges] is reversible error without a showing of prejudice. This Court applied the Swain dicta in Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (Fla.1985). The trial court in Hill erroneously denied a cause challenge, and Hill used a peremptory on the objectionable venireperson. With little analysis, this Court stated: We find that such error cannot be harmless because it abridged appellant's right to peremptory challenges by reducing the number of those challenges available him. Florida and most other jurisdictions adhere to the general rule that it is reversible error for a court to force a party to use peremptory challenges on persons who should have been excused for cause, provided the party subsequently exhausts all of his or her peremptory challenges and an additional challenge is sought and denied. See Singer[ v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959)]; Leon v. State, 396 So.2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also Wasko v. Frankel, 116 Ariz. 288, 569 P.2d 230 (Ariz.1977); Jones v. Cloud, 119 Ga.App. 697, 168 S.E.2d 598 (1969); State v. Sugar, 408 So.2d 1329 (La.1982); State v. Ternes, 259 N.W.2d 296 (N.D.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944, 98 S.Ct. 1524, 55 L.Ed.2d 540 (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Pa. 164, 383 A.2d 874 (Pa.1978); Martin v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 436, 271 S.E.2d 123 (Va.1980). Hill, 477 So.2d at 556. The majority of the cases cited in Hill cite to Swain as authority. This Court did not provide a state constitutional or statutory law basis for its holding in Hill. Thus, the most reasonable inference is that the decision was based on federal constitutional requirements in light of Swain. Four years later, this Court considered a similar situation in Hamilton v. State, 547 So.2d 630 (Fla.1989). The trial court in Hamilton erroneously denied a cause challenge to a juror. Although Hamilton could have used one of his remaining peremptory challenges to remove the challenged juror, he elected not to do so. At the conclusion of voir dire, after Hamilton had exhausted his peremptory challenges, he requested an additional peremptory challenge so he could backstrike the juror. The request was denied, and the biased juror sat on the panel that issued a verdict in the case. This Court held that the failure to excuse this juror upon motion deprived Hamilton of his constitutional right to a fair trial, requiring us to reverse the conviction and remand this case for a new trial. Hamilton, 547 So.2d at 633. Hamilton differs from Hill in that a legally objectionable juror actually served on the jury in Hamilton. Twenty-three years after Swain was decided (but only three years after Hill ), the United States Supreme Court confronted the question before us in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). The Court addressed Ross's arguments based on federal constitutional rights and then on state law. First, the Court held that peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension and rejected the argument that, without more, the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273. The Court concluded that, because peremptory challenges are only a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury, whether a litigant is forced or required to exercise a peremptory challenge does not violate the Sixth Amendment so long as the jury that sits is impartial. See id. at 88, 108 S.Ct. 2273. Second, the Court considered and rejected Ross's argument that the trial court's failure to remove a juror for cause violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by arbitrarily depriving him of the full complement of nine peremptory challenges allowed under state law. Id. at 89, 108 S.Ct. 2273. The facts in Ross are nearly identical to those in this case, and the Oklahoma law is very similar to Florida law in that a defendant who disagrees with a trial court's ruling on a cause challenge must, in order to preserve the claim that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial, exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. The Court held that such a requirement is consistent with the ultimate goal of empaneling an impartial jury. Id. Thus, the Court concluded that Ross did not lose any state law right when he used one of his challenges to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause. Instead, the Court held that Ross received all that state law allowed him and received the fair trial guaranteed by the federal constitution. Id. at 90-91. And, contrary to the majority's position in this case, the Court in Ross found that this blurring of the distinction between peremptory and cause challenges did not violate Oklahoma law nor did it violate Ross's due process rights. However, the Court did tacitly acknowledge that repeated and deliberate misapplication of the law by the trial court might rise to the level of a due process violation. See id. at 91 n. 5. [20]
In Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691 (Fla.1991), this Court held: Where a defendant seeks reversal based on a claim that he was forced to exhaust his peremptory challenges, he initially must identify a specific juror whom he otherwise would have struck peremptorily. This juror must be an individual who actually sat on the jury and whom the defendant either challenged for cause or attempted to challenge peremptorily or otherwise objected to after his peremptory challenges had been exhausted. Trotter, 576 So.2d at 693. We have interpreted Trotter not to require an actual showing of bias or partiality on the part of the juror. [21] Thus, the mere objection to any juror who actually sits on the jury is sufficient to warrant automatic reversal. Under this standard, a defendant could object to a clearly neutral or even a defense-friendly juror and still be entitled to a new trial. As Judge Harris noted,  Trotter, in effect, grants a reversal of even a fair verdict in order to reward a party for properly following the procedure to preserve the error. Gootee v. Clevinger, 778 So.2d 1005, 1013 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Harris, J., dissenting). Importantly, neither Trotter nor the cases that it cites provide any state law basis for a per se reversal rule.
In 2000, the United States Supreme Court revisited the constitutional importance of peremptory challenges in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 120 S.Ct. 774, 145 L.Ed.2d 792 (2000). The Court in Martinez-Salazar decided the issue left open in Ross of whether, absent the requirement under the federal rules to use a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous refusal by the trial court to excuse jurors for cause, a denial or impairment of the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove jurors who should have been excused for cause. Ross, 487 U.S. at 91 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 2273. The Court determined that Martinez-Salazar's use of a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's error was consistent with the purpose of peremptory challenges, that is, securing trial by an impartial jury, and was not equivalent to the loss of a peremptory challenge. The Court affirmed the conviction. It is clear from Ross and Martinez-Salazar that there is no federal constitutional right to peremptory challenges. [22] So, absent a showing that an objectionable juror served on the jury, the so-called denial of a full complement of peremptory challenges arising from the use of a peremptory challenge to cure an erroneous denial of a cause challenge does not constitute reversible error. In addition to there being no federal constitutional right to peremptory challenges, this Court has never established a state constitutional right to peremptory challenges. And, contrary to the majority, I believe we should not do so in this case. Since the Ross and Martinez-Salazar decisions, many other states have reconsidered their positions on peremptory challenges. The Wisconsin Supreme Court conducted an excellent analysis of peremptory challenge law in State v. Lindell, 245 Wis.2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223 (2001), and reversed that state's long-standing per se error position in light of Ross and Martinez-Salazar. A number of other states have followed suit. [23] In fact, the majority of states currently do not require reversal unless a legally objectionable juror actually served on the jury. In Florida, at least one appellate judge has asked the right question and reached the correct conclusion. In his dissent in Gootee v. Clevinger, 778 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), Judge Harris posed the question that is at issue in this case: [I]s the failure to get one's full complement of peremptory challenges itself so prejudicial that a new trial must always be granted? Gootee, 778 So.2d at 1011 (Harris, J., dissenting). Judge Harris succinctly answered his question and, in so doing, showed why such a procedural error should be subjected to a harmless error analysis, not per se reversal. Judge Harris said: Rollins requires an error which affects the fairness of the verdict; Trotter requires only that there have been an error in ruling on the for cause challenge and that (1) the peremptory challenges are exhausted to cure the error, (2) an additional challenge is requested (and denied), (3) for the purpose of challenging a specified juror who ultimately serves on the jury. I submit that although (1), (2), and (3) are essential in order to preserve the error (for without them there would clearly be no harm associated with the court's error), such preservation factors themselves fail to establish harm. Trotter, in effect, grants a reversal of even a fair verdict in order to reward a party for properly following the procedure to preserve the error. Rollins, Hamilton and Farina[ v. State, 679 So.2d 1151, 1152 (Fla.1996),] go further and ask, Now that you have preserved the error, how have you been harmed? Only by asking this question will we subject this procedural error, as we do even constitutional errors, to a harmless error analysis. Gootee, 778 So.2d at 1013 (Harris, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). I agree with Judge Harris. The Trotter requirements are a necessary  and judicially efficient  means of preserving potentially harmful error. However, this Court's original reliance on Swain to require per se reversal is obviously no longer sustainable. [24] And, because a per se reversal rule no longer has any foundation in the federal constitution, we must look to see what state law demands. To do this, we must first determine the state law source of the right to peremptory challenges and then determine what standard of review to apply when a right from such a source is violated.