Opinion ID: 2625018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: crank's motion for attorney fees

Text: ¶ 35 Crank asserts that he is entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that [i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[] . . . 1983 . . . of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . . Crank argues the district court erred in holding he was not a prevailing party under this standard and in refusing to award him attorney fees. In response, the Council asserts that Crank's September 1997 motion was not a civil rights action subject to attorney fees under section 1988, but was instead merely an action to enforce a contract. The Council also defends the court's finding that Crank was not a prevailing party. ¶ 36 The Council's attempt to characterize Crank's motion as a common law contract action is misplaced. Crank initially brought his suit as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1988 of the same title provides that a prevailing party may receive attorney fees as an award of costs. Crank's initial action was settled pursuant to the Agreement, which was formulated as a consent decree. Notably, the district court retained jurisdiction. Crank's present motion was an action to enforce the decree according to the court's continuing jurisdiction and not a new action based upon some other ground. ¶ 37 The Council relies primarily on Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 31 F.3d 196, 200-02 (4th Cir.1994). We first note that we are not bound by the holding in that case. Moreover, Arvinger does not support the Council's argument on this issue. Although Arvinger dealt with a somewhat similar scenariowhere the plaintiff asserted the defendant had failed to abide by the terms of a settlement agreementit also specifically acknowledged that when plaintiffs are forced to litigate to preserve the relief originally obtained, and where the issues pertaining to both actions are inextricably intermingled, the plaintiff may be treated as a prevailing party. Id. at 202. Crank's motion facially meets this test. He alleges he has been compelled to litigate due to the Council's failure to abide by its obligations under the settlement agreement and the issues upon which he predicates his claim for attorney fees are the same issues that were litigated and settled in the original action. We thus reject the Council's claim that Crank's motion is not actually predicated upon section 1983. ¶ 38 Whether the motion to enforce the Agreement qualifies Crank for prevailing party status under section 1988 presents a separate question, however, to which we now turn. In Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of the standards applicable to an award of attorney fees under section 1988. The Farrar Court prescribed as follows the standard for determining prevailing party status: To qualify as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim. The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought . . . or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. . . . Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or settlement. . . . In short, a plaintiff prevails when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-12, 113 S.Ct. 566 (citation omitted). [14] ¶ 39 In this case, it is not clear whether the district court considered this standard. In rendering its finding that Crank was not the prevailing party on the substantive issues tried, the court ruled that the Council prevailed on the primary issue: whether the Agreement required a yearly estimate of the adult Native American population in San Juan County. The governing standard, however, does not premise its determination of prevailing party status upon primary issues. Instead, it simply requires some relief on the merits of the party's claim that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties. Id. at 110-11, 113 S.Ct. 566. The United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in Farrar was a prevailing party even though that plaintiff received only nominal damages of one dollar on his seventeen million dollar claim. Id. at 113, 113 S.Ct. 566. ¶ 40 In this case, Crank asserts that the district court's order and the stipulations he obtained from the Council were sufficient to confer prevailing party status. With respect to the stipulations, we disagree. Even assuming the stipulations were analogous to a settlement or can otherwise be considered as comparable relief according to the Farrar standard, those stipulations do not provide a basis for a finding that Crank was a prevailing party. The Council admitted that it had failed in its obligations to the court by neglecting to obtain extensions of time with respect to explicit deadlines within the Agreement. However, it did not admit to any failures in its obligations toward Crank nor to any alteration in its commitment to finalize the protocol with the Navajo Nation and file a plan in conformity with the Agreement. Because the stipulations did not create any legally-enforceable alteration in the Council's behavior toward Crank, the court could not employ them as a predicate for a finding that Crank was a prevailing party. ¶ 41 However, the court's rulings and judgment rendered at the conclusion of trial arguably provided a potential basis under Farrar for a finding that Crank was a prevailing party. Notably, the court directed the Council to implement special measures in the event its practice of employing a random draw from the master jury list did not produce the required minimum percentage of Native Americans on the questionnaire lists. The court also ordered the Council to file its plan forthwith, whether finalized or not, as well as its first report. [15] At present, it is unclear whether these orders created a legally-enforceable modification of the Council's behavior, or whether any direct benefit inured to Crank as a result. ¶ 42 Apparently, the Council was relying upon the establishment of an accurate master list to ensure questionnaire lists that complied with the Agreement's mandates. The court made no findings regarding the Council's pre-litigation intent, willingness, or obligation to implement special measures beyond its traditional practice of randomly drawing names from the master list if that procedure failed to produce questionnaire lists complying with the Agreement. Nor did the court's order specify what special measures should be taken. The court simply held that the Council should take appropriate action, and undertake reasonable efforts in the event a random draw failed to produce the minimum required percentage. [16] ¶ 43 Because we are unable to discern the actual impact of these holdings on the Council's behavior or the precise nature of the benefit Crank may have received as the result of his motion, we remand this issue to the district court for adequate findings and rulings according to the governing federal law. In so doing, we note that prevailing party status under section 1988 does not automatically require an award of fees. Once civil rights litigation materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, `the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness' of a fee award. . . . Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566 (quoting Texas State Teachers Assoc. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 793, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989)); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). The trial court is charged with determining the reasonableness of fees according to the particular circumstances of the case, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430-33, 103 S.Ct. 1933, and the court retains a certain measure of discretion to lawfully award low fees or no fees at all. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114-15, 113 S.Ct. 566. [17] ¶ 44 To summarize, we affirm the court's ruling wherein it refused to hold Judge Anderson in contempt. We remand the issue of Judge Anderson's claim for attorney fees under subparts (2) and (3) of Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b) and the issue of Crank's claim for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for the district court's determination consistent with the directives in this opinion. [18] ¶ 45 Justice DURHAM, Judge JACKSON, Judge BILLINGS and Judge HENRIOD concur in Justice DURRANT'S opinion. ¶ 46 Having disqualified himself, Chief Justice HOWE does not participate herein. Court of Appeals Judge NORMAN H. JACKSON sat. ¶ 47 Having disqualified himself, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON does not participate herein. Court of Appeals Judge JUDITH M. BILLINGS sat. ¶ 48 Having disqualified himself, Justice WILKINS does not participate herein. District Court Judge STEPHEN L. HENRIOD sat.