Opinion ID: 2600199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: administrative suspensions

Text: ¶ 13 Sonnenreich argued before the district court that only the Utah Supreme Court, not the Bar, has the authority to suspend attorneys or judges. Sonnenreich also objected to the Bar's issuance of a suspension without prior notice. The district court agreed with Sonnenreich that the Bar has no authority to suspend attorneys and held that actual notice is required in suspension proceedings. The district court based this holding on our decision in In re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989). On appeal, the OPC argues that Utah's Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (RLDD) authorize the Bar to administratively suspend attorneys for failure to pay bar dues. Moreover, the OPC contends that only compliance with the notice requirements contained in the RLDD, rather than actual notice, is required in the context of an administrative suspension. Before determining whether the Bar has the authority to administratively suspend attorneys for failure to pay the Bar's annual licensing fee, we must first identify the differences between administrative and disciplinary actions.
¶ 14 This is not the first time we examine the differences between administrative and disciplinary actions. Almost sixty years ago, in In re Oliver, 97 Utah 1, 89 P.2d 229 (1939), we recognized that the actions taken against an attorney for failure to pay licensing fees differ from other disciplinary actions. In Oliver, the Utah State Bar Board of Commissioners (the Board) refused to recommend that an attorney be reinstated after he was suspended for failing to pay his dues. 97 Utah at 3, 89 P.2d at 230. The Board based its refusal on Section 73, Rule VII of the Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar Governing Professional Conduct and Discipline. [4] At the time, this rule allowed the Board to refuse to reinstate an attorney except upon an affirmative showing to the satisfaction of the [Board] that the petitioner possesse[d] moral qualifications and learning in general education and in law as required at the time for Admission to the Practice of Law in the State of Utah. Oliver, 97 Utah at 4, 89 P.2d at 230. Because Oliver had been discharged from his employment prior to his petition for readmission for obtaining a [railroad travel] pass under false pretenses, and for later allegedly lying that the woman for whom he bought the pass was his wife, the Board felt he did not possess the good moral character necessary for admission to the Bar. Id. ¶ 15 In criticizing the Board's action, we noted that membership in the Bar contemplates two distinct aspects: (1) [t]he status of being a member; and (2) the right to exercise the privileges of membership. Oliver, 97 Utah at 9, 89 P.2d at 232. We noted that `[d]isbarment' is the severance of the status and privileges. `Suspension' is the temporary forced withdrawal from the exercise of office, powers, prerogatives, or privileges as a member. Oliver, 97 Utah at 10, 89 P.2d at 233 (citation omitted). Hence, we reasoned that a suspension for failure to pay dues terminates solely the right to exercise the privileges of the status of a member. The termination of that right for such reasons casts no reflection upon the member's moral qualifications. Id. (emphasis omitted). We went on to state, In Section 73, the reference of the petition for reinstatement to an investigating committee or to the committee of Bar Examiners has ... application to either a disbarment or a suspension for conduct indicative of a lack of moral or a lack of legal qualifications.  Oliver, 97 Utah at 10-11, 89 P.2d at 233 (emphasis added). Thus, there would have been no basis under Section 73 to refuse reinstatement following a suspension for the failure to pay dues, because such a suspension was not indicative of either a lack of moral or legal qualifications. Rather, petitioning for reinstatement from a suspension for failure to pay licensing fees was strictly [a question] of dues and penalties. Oliver, 97 Utah at 8, 89 P.2d at 232. Therefore, in Oliver we recognized that a difference exists between disciplinary actions for lack of the qualifications necessary to practice law, and administrative suspensions for the non-payment of dues. [5]
¶ 16 Utah has an integrated bar, which is an association of attorneys in which membership and dues are required as a condition of practicing law in a[s]tate. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 5, 110 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). See In re Integration and Governance of the Utah State Bar, 632 P.2d 845, 846 (Utah 1981) (adopting the Utah State Bar Rules of Integration and Management). According to the Utah State Bar Rules of Integration and Management (RIM), [6] [a]ll persons licensed in Utah to practice shall be members of the Utah State Bar in accordance with the rules of the Court. RIM A.1. To obtain membership in the Bar, a person must first meet the [q]ualifications and requirements for admission to the practice of law ... as set forth in the Rules of the Utah State Bar for Admission to the Utah State Bar. RIM C.10(a). If a person meets these requirements, with [t]he approval by the [Supreme] Court ... any person ... shall [be entitled] to be enrolled in the Bar upon his taking an oath to support the Constitutions of the United States and of this state and to discharge faithfully the duties of an attorney to the best of his knowledge and ability, and payment of the fee fixed by the Board of the Bar with the approval of the Court, and thereafter to practice law upon payment of the license fees herein provided. Id. (emphasis added); accord Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-10 (1996) (repealed). With regard to the annual fees, the RIM require [e]very person practicing, or holding himself out as practicing law within this state... prior to so doing ... [to] pay to the Bar a license fee. RIM C.16; accord Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-21 (1996) (repealed). The payment of the annual licensing fee is also required by rule 8 of the RLDD, which provides that [e]very lawyer admitted to practice in this state shall pay to the Bar on or before July 1 of each year an annual license fee for each fiscal year. Thus, the rules repeatedly and clearly require Bar members to pay their annual licensing fee as a condition of continuing to practice law. ¶ 17 Notwithstanding this clear requirement, Sonnenreich questions the Bar's authority to administratively suspend attorneys for failing to pay the annual licensing fee. Although the Bar has not been given the express power, via rule, to impose such suspensions, the power to do so is necessarily implied by the rules. At the very outset, RIM A.1 states, Under the power vested to it by the Constitution and laws of the State of Utah[,] the Utah Supreme Court hereby creates and perpetuates under its direction and control an organization known as the Utah State Bar.... The purposes, duties[,] and responsibilities of the Utah State Bar include, but are not limited to, the following:... (d) to regulate and to discipline persons practicing law. (Emphasis added.) Further, RIM C.20 provides that [n]o person ... whose right or license to... practice has terminated either by disbarment, suspension, failure to pay his license fee or otherwise, shall practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public as a person qualified to practice law or to carry on the calling of an attorney within the state. Accord Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-25 (1996) (repealed). Where the RIM and RLDD indicate that attorneys cannot practice law without paying the required dues, and RIM C.20 states that attorneys who fail to pay the fee will be temporarily disqualified from practicing law, the Bar has the implicit authority under RIM A.1 to administratively suspend attorneys who fail to comply with these requirements. ¶ 18 Contrary to the district court's interpretation, we implicitly upheld this authority in In re Crandall, 784 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1989). That case involved a recommendation for an interim suspension, based on an attorney's failure to file required probationary reports after being administratively suspended for failure to pay his bar fees. Id. at 1195. Although we ultimately refused to accept the Bar's recommendation of discipline because the Bar's interpretation of rule XX [7] essentially allowed the Bar, after placing an attorney on administrative suspension for failing to pay bar dues, to continue the suspension for unrelated reasons after the attorney tendered his or her delinquent fee, we never questioned the Bar's ability to administratively suspend Crandall for his initial nonpayment. Id. at 1196-97. Rather, we objected to the Bar's discipline of Crandall for claimed unprofessional behavior caused by his continued suspension after he tendered his dues. Thus, we explained that it is inappropriate that the Bar should be able to refuse reinstatement after the delinquent fee is paid for a reason unrelated to the initial suspension. Id. at 1196. Moreover, our holding relied heavily upon the close nexus between the Bar's ability to continue Crandall's suspension for failure to pay his dues after dues were tendered and the subsequent complaints brought against him for failing to file probationary reports caused by the Bar's refusal. Id. at 1197. Crandall did not purport to prohibit the Bar from administratively suspending those attorneys who fail to pay their annual licensing fees. ¶ 19 In sum, given the distinction between administrative and disciplinary suspensions and the clear requirement that attorneys who fail to pay fees will be suspended, we hold that the Bar has the authority to administratively suspend attorneys for failing to pay appropriate annual licensing fees. [8]
¶ 20 Having determined that the Bar has the authority to administratively suspend attorneys who fail to pay annual licensing fees, we next consider what type of notice is required in connection with administrative suspensions. The RLDD require the Bar to give notice that an attorney has been administratively suspended. Rule 8(b) provides that [t]he Executive Director of the Bar shall give notice of such removal from the rolls [for the failure to pay the annual licensing fee] to such non-complying member at the address on record at the Bar, to the Utah Supreme Court and to the judges of the district courts. Prior to today, we have not determined what kind of notice is necessary to meet this requirement. ¶ 21 In granting summary judgment below, the district court held that actual notice is required before an attorney can be administratively suspended for failing to pay the annual licensing fee. The OPC argues on appeal that actual notice is not required and that its compliance with RLDD 8(b) was sufficient. We agree that RLDD 8(b) does not contemplate actual notice for administrative suspensions. ¶ 22 Actual notice is that notice which is positively proved to have been given to a party directly and personally, or such as he is presumed to have received personally because the evidence within his knowledge was sufficient to put him upon inquiry. [9] Black's Law Dictionary 733 (6th ed.1991). By providing that the Bar need only give notice to non-complying members at the address on record at the Bar, RLDD 8(b) makes clear that actual notice is not required. [10] ¶ 23 Sonnenreich argues that a license is a property right that cannot be taken away without procedural due process and that, therefore, any suspension, even an administrative one, requires actual notice prior to the suspension. Sonnenreich cites In re Worthen, in which we stated that Utah's appellate courts have never hesitated to consider claims alleging due process violations when professionals risk losing their professional license or means of employment through the action of a public disciplinary body. 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 1996) (citing In re Discipline of Schwenke, 849 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah 1993)) (further citations omitted). Sonnenreich is correct in asserting that a lawyer is entitled to procedural due process guarantees in disciplinary actions. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968) (noting attorneys facing disbarment proceedings are entitled to procedural due process, including fair notice and an opportunity to be heard). However, due process is flexible and calls for the procedural protections that the given situation demands. Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876 (quotations and citations omitted). Given the fundamental difference between administrative and disciplinary suspensions, we hold that notice mailed to any non-complying member at the address on record at the Bar is sufficient to satisfy due process in the context of a non-disciplinary, administrative suspension for failing to pay the Bar's annual licensing fee.