Opinion ID: 215442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The CAFRA fee award should be paid to the claimant

Text: CAFRA does not explicitly identify to whom an award for fees and costs under that statute are to be paid. It simply says that the United States shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A). Prior to CAFRA's enactment in 2000, attorney fees could be sought by successful claimants in forfeiture actions under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). See $60,201.00 U.S. Currency, 291 F.Supp.2d at 1130. EAJA provides that a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses in specified circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The language used in CAFRA and EAJA is somewhat different. EAJA specifically assigns fee awards to the prevailing party, but CAFRA does not, stating only that the United States shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A). UMCC reads this difference to mean that CAFRA fees should go directly to attorneys instead of the prevailing litigant. Following the Supreme Court's recent decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 177 L.Ed.2d 91 (2010), we conclude otherwise. Ratliff resolved a longstanding circuit split on the question of whether fee awards under EAJA were payable to the party or the attorney by holding that EAJA awards are to be paid to the prevailing litigant. Id. at 2525-29. In part, the Court based its decision on the specific language in EAJA, noted above, directing payments to the prevailing party. [P]revailing party is a `term of art' that refers to the prevailing litigant. Id. at 2525. CAFRA does not contain similar language directing fees to the prevailing party. The Court's decision in Ratliff did not stop there, however. It went on to highlight the absence of language in EAJA explicitly directing fees to attorneys. Comparing EAJA with a provision in the Social Security Act making fee awards payable to such attorney, see 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), the Court concluded that given the stark contrast between the SSA's express authorization of direct payments to attorneys and the absence of such language in EAJA, it would not interpret EAJA to contain a direct fee requirement absent clear textual evidence supporting such an interpretation. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. at 2527-28. As the Court noted, Congress knows how to make fees awards payable directly to attorneys where it desires to do so. Id. at 2527. Ratliff counsels that in the absence of explicit instructions from Congress awarding fees to the attorney, direct payment to the attorney should not be presumed. Id. There is no such explicit instruction in CAFRA. Direct payment to the attorney is the exception, not the rule. The Supreme Court has made it clear that, in general, statutes bestow fees on parties, not upon attorneys. United States ex rel. Virani v. Jerry M. Lewis Truck Parts & Equipment, 89 F.3d 574, 577 (9th Cir.1996). For example, attorney fee awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 or under the antitrust laws are payable to parties. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731-33, 106 S.Ct. 1531, 89 L.Ed.2d 747 (1986); Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 875 (9th Cir. 1999) (In the absence of a contractual assignment to counsel, § 1988 requires that attorney fee awards be made directly to the prevailing party); Image Technical Service, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 136 F.3d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir.1998) (Any fee award in an antitrust case goes to the successful plaintiff, not to plaintiffs counsel.). Unless the statute specifies payment to the litigant's attorney, payment to the attorney is not assumed. UMCC argues that by not including EAJA's language mandating fee awards to the prevailing party in CAFRA, Congress signaled its intent to reject EAJA's method of awarding attorney fees. Without further evidence, the use of the passive phrase the United States shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees in CAFRA, rather than shall award to a prevailing party in EAJA, cannot be read as a clear expression of congressional intent to create a direct fee award to counsel. If, as UMCC argues, Congress intended to liberalize fee awards in forfeiture cases with CAFRA, it did so by eliminating EAJA's language exempting the government for payment of fees where the position of the United States was substantially justified, not by providing for fee awards to be paid directly to attorneys. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A). Neither legislative history nor clear textual evidence, Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. at 2528, supports UMCC's contention that direct fee payment to counsel was one of the reforms envisioned by Congress in CAFRA. [1] UMCC attempts to extract a direct fee requirement from two phrases in 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A)that the government is liable for  attorney fees incurred by the claimant (emphasis added). This effort is not persuasive. The word liable, as UMCC agrees, means to be legally obligated. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009). It does not indicate to whom the liability is owed. UMCC is right that under fee-shifting statutes, fees may be considered to be incurred by the client even though the client was represented free of charge. See Nadarajah, 569 F.3d. at 916 (EAJA); Phillips v. General Services Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1991) (Civil Service Reform Act). But a statute that makes the government liable for fees incurred by a party does not necessarily entitle counsel to a direct fee award. UMCC and amicus curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), appearing in support of UMCC's position, offer policy justifications in support of awarding the fees and costs to the claimant's attorney directly rather than to the client. If fee awards are paid to the claimant, they argue, attorneys may not be paid for their work, thus reducing the likelihood of competent representation and defeating congressional intent. It is pointed out that CAFRA fees due to be paid to the client may be offset in part or in full by the client's preexisting debts to the government, leaving nothing to be paid to the attorney. [2] That argument did not persuade the Supreme Court in Ratliff, however. The Court explicitly noted that EAJA fees are subject to offset where a litigant has outstanding federal debts. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. at 2528. The government in that case actually asserted the right to offset a debt owed by the claimant to the federal government against the fee award, producing exactly the result projected by UMCC's argument, but that did not lead the Court to conclude that payment of EAJA fees should be made directly to counsel. There is nothing in the background, text, or purpose of CAFRA that suggests that the same result should not apply to CAFRA fees. UMCC's policy arguments must be made to Congress, which could draft the fee award statute to specify payment to counsel. CAFRA was not written that way. We decline to order direct payment to counsel. The attorney fees and litigation costs awarded in this case are payable to UMCC as the successful claimant. The motion is referred to the Appellate Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this order. REFERRED TO THE APPELLATE COMMISSIONER