Opinion ID: 794258
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bustamante-Barrera's claim to U.S. citizenship

Text: 20 There are `two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization.' 25 As Petitioner was not born in the United States, naturalization is his sole source for a claim of citizenship. Naturalization is available only as provided by Acts of Congress 26 and, even then, only in strict compliance with the terms of such acts. 27 Petitioner has the burden of proving that he qualifies for naturalization, and he must do so in the face of the Supreme Court's mandate that we resolve all doubts in favor of the United States and against those seeking citizenship. 28 21 In his claim to derivative naturalization, Petitioner contends that he automatically became a citizen in 1994 when his mother was naturalized. His argument tracks the version of § 1432(a) that was in effect in 1994. It granted derivative citizenship to 22 child[ren] born outside of the United States [to] alien parents ... upon fulfillment of[, inter alia, ] the following conditions:... 23 (3) The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal separation of the parents ...; and if 24 (4) [s]uch naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of eighteen years; and 25 (5) [s]uch child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence at the time of the custodial parent's naturalization. 29 26 None dispute that Petitioner satisfies all but one of these conditions: (1) He was born outside of the United States to alien parents; (2) his parents' 1991 divorce (which occurred while he was under the age of 18) qualifies as a legal separation; (3) his mother was naturalized while he was under the age of 18; and (4) at the time of his mother's naturalization, Petitioner was residing in the United States as a LPR. Thus, Petitioner's status as a derivatively naturalized citizen turns entirely on § 1432(a)'s fifth condition, viz., whether, before he reached the age of 18, his parents' joint custody regime satisfied § 1432(a)(3)'s requirement that the naturalized parent be the parent having legal custody. 27 This case, then, is one of federal statutory interpretation. We must construe the one of § 1432(a)(3)'s express conditions that requires the parent having legal custody of the child to have been naturalized and determine whether this condition requires that parent to have had sole, as opposed to joint, legal custody. This issue is one of first impression, not only in this Circuit but also, it appears, in all of the federal circuits. 30 In the end, we hold that only sole legal custody satisfies § 1432(a)(3). Two factors lead us to this conclusion: (1) the text of § 1432(a)(3) and its relation to the overall scheme of the INA; and (2) § 1432(a)'s purpose, as demonstrated by its legislative history. As Petitioner cannot meet his burden of proving that he was in the sole legal custody of his naturalized mother prior to his eighteenth birthday, he cannot obtain derivative citizenship. We must, therefore, deny his petition for review. 28