Opinion ID: 75478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Board's Application of IIRIRA Violates Equal Protection

Text: 46 In affirming the immigration judge's order of removal, the BIA concluded that the statutory definition of conviction in IIRIRA § 1101(a)(48)(A) supersedes the INS policy which accords first offender treatment under the FFOA to aliens whose offenses were expunged under state law if they establish that they would have been eligible for such treatment had they been prosecuted under federal law. In support of that conclusion, the Board relied heavily on its prior decision in Roldan-Santoyo, in which it explained: 47 [S]tate action that purports to abrogate what would otherwise be considered a conviction, as the result of the application of a state rehabilitative statute, rather than as the result of a procedure that vacates a conviction on the merits or on grounds relating to a statutory or constitutional violation, has no effect in determining whether an alien has been convicted for immigration purposes. ... Congress has stated what a conviction is [in § 1101(a)(48)(A)]..., and it has not provided any exception for aliens who have been accorded rehabilitative treatment under state law. ... [T]o continue to apply a policy exception providing federal first offender treatment to certain drug offenders who have received state rehabilitative treatment, in the face of the definition provided by Congress, would be tantamount to creating a new form of relief that is not provided for in the Act. This we cannot do. 48 Roldan-Santoyo. 11 In accordance with that reasoning, the Board found that Fernandez-Bernal's first-time conviction for simple possession of cocaine could serve as a predicate for removal even though it had been expunged under California law, and affirmed the immigration judge's order of removal. 49 On appeal, Fernandez-Bernal contends that the BIA's application of IIRIRA violates his right to equal protection. He argues that the FFOA serves as a specific exception to § 1101(a)(48)(A) because IIRIRA did not repeal the FFOA in whole or in part. Accordingly, he claims, a dismissal of a first-time simple possession offense under the FFOA is still not ... considered a conviction ... for any other purpose, see 18 U.S.C. § 3607(b), including the purposes of immigration law. That being the case, Fernandez-Bernal maintains, his conviction for first-time simple possession of cocaine, which was expunged under a state rehabilitative statute, must also be viewed as an exception to § 1101(a)(48)(A). See Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 749. Otherwise, he argues, the Board's finding of removability was predicated on the fortuitous circumstance of his conviction having been expunged under state law instead of under the FFOA. Removal on that basis, Fernandez-Bernal claims, violates equal protection because it has no logical relation to the fair administration of the immigration laws, or to the war on drugs. See Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1191; see also Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 742 n.24, 749. 50 We disagree. Even if we assume that a dismissal of a drug offense under the FFOA operates as an exception to the definition of conviction in IIRIRA § 1101(a)(48)(A) and, assume further, that equal protection mandates we hold the same exception applies to certain aliens whose drug offenses were expunged under state law, Fernandez-Bernal's constitutional claim nevertheless fails. By its terms, the FFOA permits a court to place an eligible drug offender, as defined by § 3607(a)(1)-(2), see supra n.9, on probation for a term of not more than one year .... 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a). The court may thereafter dismiss the proceedings before the expiration of the probationary period without entering a judgment of conviction if the offender has not violated the terms of probation. Id. At the expiration of probation, the court shall dismiss the proceedings if the offender has not violated the terms of probation. Id. In either case, the offense is not considered a conviction ... for any other purpose. Id. § 3607(b). 51 Fernandez-Bernal could not have received FFOA expungement relief, because he was actually sentenced to two years of probation, as well as a term in jail. Relief under FFOA § 3607(b) is not available to an individual sentenced to a term of probation that exceeds one year; nor is it available to anyone sentenced to jail time. See Manrique (in order for an alien accorded rehabilitative treatment under a state statute to establish eligibility for relief under the FFOA, the state court must have entered an order ... under which the alien's criminal proceedings have been deferred pending successful completion of probation or the proceedings have been or will be dismissed after probation); see also Nwandu, 248 F.3d 1135 (alien would not have be eligible to have his conviction expunged under the FFOA because it was for smuggling drugs, not possessing drugs) (unpublished disposition) (dicta); Sanchez-Morfin v INS, 85 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 1996) (relief under the policy exception of Manrique not available because alien violated the terms of his probation, and [t]he federal statute does not seem to help probation violators) (unpublished disposition); Parades-Urrestarazu, 36 F.3d at 812 (alien who met the eligibility requirements of FFOA § 3607(a)(1)-(2) could not receive the relief specified in § 3607(c) because that provision only applies to persons under twenty one years of age at the time of the offense, and alien was twenty-eight at the time in question). 52 The decisions relied on by Fernandez-Bernal hold only that it is irrational and violative of due process to treat aliens differently based on the breadth of the state rehabilitative statute used to expunge their offenses. See Garberding, 30 F.3d at 1190-91; Manrique; see also Carr v. INS, 86 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) ([Garberding] concluded only that treating aliens differently on the basis of their state expungement statute is irrational ....). 12 Those decisions do not hold that treating aliens differently based on the nature of the sentences they received violates equal protection. Cf. Carr, 86 F.3d at 952. And, of course, it does not. 53 We conclude that Fernandez-Bernal's drug offense could not have been expunged under the FFOA had he received his sentence under federal law and, therefore, the BIA did not violate equal protection in ordering him removed from the United States. 13