Opinion ID: 2326863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Denial of Speedy Trial Claim

Text: Page first contends that the State infringed upon his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. He rests his argument on the trial judge's failure to appoint substitute counsel sua sponte after being informed of his court-appointed attorneys' scheduling conflicts. He also argues that the State's budgetary limitations led to another six month delay of his trial. Page claims that these are structural errors that warrant a reversal of his Superior Court convictions. This Court reviews claims alleging an infringement of a constitutionally protected right de novo. [12] However, if a defendant fails to object at trial to an alleged constitutional infringement, we review for plain error. [13] As the United States Supreme Court observed in Barker v. Wingo , [t]he right to a speedy trial is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused. [14] Consequently, the determination of the precise moment when the right has been denied is impossible to determine. [15] Because the right is necessarily relative, federal and Delaware courts apply a four-part test to determine whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. [16] Under this test, courts are to evaluate the following factors: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. [17] These factors are related and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. [18] The threshold consideration, however, is the length of the delay. [19] Unless it is presumptively prejudicial, the court will not examine the remaining three factors. [20] In this case, our review is for plain error because Page did not object or otherwise preserve his speedy trial argument before the Superior Court. [21] The first factor, the length of delay, weighs in Page's favor because the right to a speedy trial attached when he was arrested on November 3, 2000. [22] Although the reasons for the delay offered by the State on this factor are appropriately considered next, the lapse of two years, six months, and seventeen days from Page's arrest to the start of his trial raises a presumption of prejudice. [23] Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of Page. The second factor, the reason for the delay, also weighs in Page's favor, but only slightly. In discussing this factor, the Supreme Court in Barker recognized that [t]he inability of courts to provide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of cases in urban courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. [24] At the same time, delay may work toward a defendant's advantage because [a]s the time between the commission of the crime and trial lengthens, witnesses may become unavailable or their memories may fade. [25] Thus, [d]ifferent weights are assigned to different potential reasons for the delay. [26] For example, a deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the State, while a more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily against the State. [27] In other words, benign reasons for trial delays weigh less heavily against the State. [28] The record shows that none of the reasons for delay were deliberate attempts by the State to delay Page's trial. Almost a year and a half of the delay was due to a stay of all capital cases pending the outcome of a decision on certified questions to this Court. Although Page's counsel specifically requested the remainder of the delay, further analysis is necessary under the circumstances of this case. The initial delay was requested by Page's counsel due to scheduling conflicts with other court-appointed homicide cases. Although Administrative Directive 88 required capital cases to be tried or disposed of within one year, the directive also provided flexibility and allowed departure from the guideline, when the interests of justice require. More importantly, our analysis is under the Sixth Amendment and the factors identified in Barker v. Wingo . There is no evidence in the record that the assignment of defense counsel and the trial scheduling was intended to hamper Page's defense. On balance this factor weighs only slightly in Page's favor, and less than it would had State's actions been deliberate. [29] The third factor is the defendant's assertion of a speedy trial. This factor clearly weighs against Page. This factor is of considerable significance in determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation. [30] Likewise, the lack of protest or the failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. [31] This factor also implicitly puts on the defendant some responsibility to call attention to what he views as an unfair postponement. [32] The record shows that at no point prior to this appeal did Page or his counsel assert his Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial. While the failure to demand a speedy trial does not bar a defendant from raising the issue, [33] Page's apparent acquiescence to the delays and his silence until this appeal are significant. The fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant from the delay, also weighs against Page. We analyze this prong with consideration of the interests of a defendant that the speedy trial right was designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [34] Page was incarcerated before trial for slightly more than two and half years. Over half of this time can be attributed to a stay of all capital cases. Page's counsel was also counsel for Miles Brice in the certified questions appeal that addressed issues common to all capital cases, including Page's. Page's own silence suggests that he did not suffer oppressive pretrial incarceration or any undue anxiety related to the delay. [35] The answers to the certified questions applied to all capital defendants awaiting trial. The practical effect of the temporary stay was that Page and all capital defendants were included in a class with common questions of law to be decided through the certified questions in Brice. Additionally, the record shows that Page's defense was not impaired. Given the totality of the circumstances, we find no plain error and no denial of Page's right to a speedy trial.