Opinion ID: 19356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The minimum procedural due process

Text: Haggerty argues that he adequately requirements for the final revocation hearing asserted his right to confront and cross- include (1) written notice of the alleged examine Borders, that good cause did not exist violations of parole; (2) the disclosure to the to disallow his confrontation and cross- parolee of evidence against him; (3) the examination of Borders, that Borders’s opportunity to be heard in person and to hearsay statements lacked a sufficient indicia present witnesses and documentary evidence; of reliability, and that Saurage’s account of (4) the qualified right to confront and crosswhat Borders told him contradicted Coleman’s examine adverse witnesses unless the hearing live testimony that Haggerty had nothing to do officer specifically finds good cause for not with the sale or possession of the gun. allowing confrontation; (5) a neutral and Haggerty asserts that it was the state’s detached hearing body; and (6) a written obligation to produce all witnesses it had on statement by the factfinders as to the evidence whose testimony it was going to rely to obtain relied on and reasons for revoking parole. See a revocation, and that the error in denying Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; McBride, confrontation was not harmless error. 118 F.3d at 437. The finding of a parole violation should be based on verified facts and The state argues that Haggerty did not be “informed by an accurate knowledge of the object to the hearsay testimony (obviating the parolee’s behavior.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. need for the hearing officer to determine at 484. A revocation hearing, however, is not a criminal prosecution; “the process should be flexible enough to consider evidence including 1 See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 letters, affidavits, and other material that (1997); Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1120 would not be admissible in an adversary (5th Cir. 1997). 2 3 Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487-88; see McBride Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1845 (1998). v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1997). 4 criminal trial.” Id. at 489. In Farrish, 836 F.2d at 979, this court Despite this lowered standard, hearsay upheld a monetary judgment in favor of a testimony remains problematic, because it parolee against the Mississippi Commissioner “prevents the parolee from confronting and of Corrections for the denial of due process at cross-examining the declarant,” and “unrel iable a revocation hearing. The only evidence that hearsay undermines the accuracy of the fact- he had committed the alleged parole violation finding process.” Farrish v. Mississippi State was an informant’s statement introduced Parole Bd., 836 F.2d 969, 978 (5th Cir. 1988). through a police officer’s testimony. Id. at “[C]ourts considering the admissibility of 978. Farrish had requested the informant’s hearsay in revocation proceedings have presence at the hearing. Id. at 970. We adopted an approach which balances the determined that the statements were inherently parolee’s interest in confronting a particular unreliable because, if believed, they “shifted a witness against the government’s good cause potential conviction for drug dealing from [the for denying it, particularly focusing on the informant] to Farrish.” Id. at 978. We held ‘indicia of reliability’ of a given hearsay that this was “a classic example of when the statement.” Id. Hence, in carving out a good- use of hearsay impermissibly violates a right to cause exception to the general rule that confront and cross-examine the declarant.” Id. hearsay cannot be employed even in a parole hearing, the courts have hewn narrowly, In McBride, 118 F.3d at 439-40, we held finding good cause only when strong “indicia that the petitioner’s right to confront and of reliability” of the hearsay exist SSwhich cross-examine an adverse witness was violated indicia they have found primarily in cases in when his parole was revoked on the sole basis which field tests or other objective measures of hearsay testimony. McBride was charged are being reported by hearsay.4 with committing an aggravated assault while on parole, but ultimately a jury acquitted him. Id. at 433-34. Based on the purported 4 See United States v. Grandlund, 77 F.3d 811, aggravated assault, the parole board charged 811 (5th Cir. 1996), clarifying United States v. that McBride had violated his parole by failing Grandlund (“Grandlund I”), 71 F.3d 507, 510 to obey state law. Id. at 434. The alleged (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Kindred, victim did not testify at the revocation hearing. 918 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 1990) (urinalysis); Id. A police officer testified concerning what United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986) the victim had told him about the assault, and (same); United States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762 (11th parole was revoked based on the officer’s Cir. 1983) (same). In Penn, the court noted that hearsay testimony and over objection. Id. [t]he difficulty and expense of procuring live witnesses would not suffice as an excuse for The facts of these cases virtually mirror admitting hearsay testimony in a criminal those here. The district court did not apply the trial, but the Court tenders this as an precedent to this case, however, because it example of a situation in which hearsay concluded that Haggerty had waived his due could be admissible in a probation process rights by failing to object to Saurage’s revocation proceeding. Likewise, the Court hearsay statements or to assert his right to recommends the conventional substitutes for confront and cross-examine Borders. hearsay: affidavits, depositions and documentary evidence. These conventional VI. substitutes tend to bear the “indicia of A. reliability” upon which the Court has focused in the related context of determining The state argues that the right of whether a given hearsay statement should be admissible in a criminal trial. (...continued) Id. at 765. Of course, this does not assist the state appears not in the affidavit or other testimony of here, because the hearsay on which it depends the witness, but only in the unsubstantiated second- (continued...) hand report of an involved law officer. 5 confrontation and cross-examination is an make a statement to Saurage. These, affirmative right that must be invoked by the collectively, must be understood appropriately parolee, and asserts that there is no to have raised Haggerty’s objection to the “indication” that Haggerty objected to testimony. Saurage’s hearsay testimony about what Borders said or to the violation of his right to confront and cross-examine Borders. The state concedes that Haggerty’s lack of objection regarding Borders’s statements could be explained by Borders’s failure to appear at the hearing, despite a subpoena. The state notes, however, that Haggerty did not request, in his motion to reopen, that Borders be subpoenaed to attend the new hearing, and asserts that Haggerty waived any objection by failing to object to the hearsay nature of Borders’s information that came in through Saurage’s testimony at the reopened hearing. This argument is unavailing. In McBride, 118 F.3d at 438-39, we explained that while that defendant’s “invocation of his Sixth Amendment rights was not as clear as it could have been[,] we do not believe that preserving the Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses requires parolees to invoke their right in only one way.” Haggerty made robust, if somewhat indirect, objections to the use of Saurage’s hearsay testimony. In his motion to reopen filed after the original revocation hearing, Haggerty argued that Borders’s testimony was “very important” to the question of whether he and Borders or just Borders sold the pistol to Coleman. He noted that Borders had been subpoenaed but did not appear and that no explanation for his absence was offered. He argued that Borders’s statement that he and Borders met on the night of the burglary; that he had the gun with him; and that they then sold it to Coleman could not be true, because the record showed that the sale of the pistol did not occur until after the burglary. In his motion to reopen the reopened hearing, Haggerty asserted that Saurage’s testimony about Borders’s statement was false and unsupported by any written statement or affidavit. He noted again that Borders had been subpoenaed but failed to appear, and he asserted that Borders told him that he did not 6 B. cocaine, and that Borders had told Coleman Even assuming, arguendo, that Haggerty that the gun belonged to him. Based on failed to assert his confrontation right or to Saurage’s testimony, the hearing officer object to the admission of Borders’s hearsay, questioned the credibility of Coleman’s the district court’s failure explicitly to find testimony that she had purchased the gun for good cause for not allowing confrontation is $20. reviewable for plain error.5 Under FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), we can correct forfeited errors Coleman testified that Haggerty and when the appellant shows the existence of an Borders came to her apartment and wanted to error, that it was clear or obvious, and that it sell a pistolSSbut also that Borders said the affected his substantial rights, see United gun was his. She testified that she purchased States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-64 (5th the gun from Borders for $20 and that Cir. 1994) (en banc), and when the error Haggerty had nothing to do with the sale. seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, see Haggerty testified that a third man United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735-36 possessed the gun and that he merely (1993). accompanied Borders to Coleman’s apartment during the sale, but had nothing to do with the A parolee’s right to confront an adverse possession or sale of the pistol. Haggerty’s witness may be disallowed on a finding of testimony is consistent with the police report, good cause. Grandlund I, 71 F.3d at 510. In which indicated that a confidential informant determining whether good cause exists, the told Lyons that she had possession of a pistol parole board must weigh the defendant’s she had obtained from Haggerty, Borders, and interest in confronting the witness against the an unidentified white male who waited in a state’s interest in denying confrontation. See vehicle. id. “A critical consideration is the indicia of reliability of the challenged evidence.” Id. The court concluded that there was good The failure to make a specific finding of good cause to allow the hearsay statements of cause “may require reversal in most instances, Borders through Saurage’s and Coleman’s but may be found to be harmless error where testimony, that the hearing officer determined good cause exists, its basis is found in the that the statements were reliable, and that record, and its finding is implicit in the Haggerty was allowed to testify about what [hearing officer’s] rulings.” Id. (internal Borders told him. The court also noted that footnotes and citations omitted). Borders’s statements were “cumulative and repetitive of other evidence, primarily The revocation of Haggerty’s parole was Coleman’s live testimony.” Saurage’s based, in pertinent part, on Saurage’s testimony about what Borders said was not testimony that Borders told him that Haggerty cumulative or repetitive of Coleman’s possessed the gun, that they had decided to testimony, except to the extent that each sell the gun to Coleman in exchange for crack testified that Borders and Haggerty went to Coleman’s apartment and that Borders said the gun was his. 5 See Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., The hearing officer found that there were 131 F.3d 1120, 1123 (5th Cir. 1997); Cf. United sufficient indicia of reliability to support the States v. Alaniz-Alaniz, 38 F.3d 788, 791-92 (5th alleged parole violations based on Saurage’s Cir. 1994) (assuming that the district court’s testimony that Borders said that Haggerty was failure to conduct the good-cause balancing test and use of hearsay testimony, admitted without in possession of the gun, that they went objection at a federal prisoner’s revocation hearing, together to Coleman’s apartment, and that was plain error, but concluding that Alaniz had they sold the gun to Coleman for crack failed to demonstrate that the district court violated cocaine; Coleman’s statement to police that his substantial rights by relying on the testimony). she purchased the gun from Borders and Haggerty; and her testimony that Haggerty 7 was present during the sale of the gun. There why its interest in denying confrontation of is, however, no indication that Borders’s Borders outweighed Haggerty’s right of statement that Haggerty was in possession of confrontation. Borders had been subpoenaed the gun was reliable. to appear at the first revocation hearing but failed to do so, and there was no explanation Although Haggerty was allowed to testify for that failure. There is no indication that as to his version of events and to cross- Borders was subpoenaed to appear at the examine Saurage, he was not allowed to reopened hearing, nor allegation that Haggerty confront BordersSSthe only source of the procured Borders’s absence. evidence that Haggerty possessed the gun. Even the hearing officer’s finding that Saurage In Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803, 813 (8th was more credible than Haggerty or Coleman Cir. 1994), the court rejected as irrelevant the does not satisfy the good-cause balancing test. state’s argument that the parolee had failed to request the presence of adverse witnesses at the revocation hearing. “For the final Saurage’s credibility was not the issue. It revocation hearing . . ., it is incumbent upon may be that Borders told Saurage that the state authorities to produce the witnesses Haggerty had possession of the gun, but upon whose testimony said authorities rely to Haggerty did not have the opportunity to strip a parolee of his liberty. Only when the confront Borders about that statement, which hearing officer specifically finds good cause was the only evidence that Haggerty possessed for disallowing confrontation is the state the pistol and was admitted for the truth of the relieved of its burden.” Id. We agree. matter asserted. The record does not support a finding of Haggerty specifically denied possessing the good cause, nor is such a finding implicit in the pistol. There was no live testimony or hearing officer’s rulings. Accordingly, even admissions that corroborated Borders’s assuming that Haggerty did not properly statement that Haggerty did so. The only object, the hearing officer’s failure to make a element of Borders’s statement that was specific finding of good cause to disallow corroborated was that he and Haggerty went confrontation of Borders and to weigh to Coleman’s apartment, Borders told her the Haggerty’s interests against the state’s interest gun was his, and Borders sold the gun to her. is reversible error. Borders’s statement that he and Haggerty were going to sell the pistol directly Concluding that the state violated contradicts Coleman’s and Haggerty’s live Haggerty’s Sixth Amendment right to confront testimony. and cross-examine Borders during his parole revocation hearing, we REVERSE the denial This uncorroborated hearsaySSwhich, even of habeas relief and REMAND so the district if spoken by Borders, would have been said in court can return this matter to the parole board suspect circumstances, in which it cannot be for a sufficient parole revocation hearing. reliably asserted that Borders would have been speaking truthfullySSstrays rather far from the core situation in which the good-cause exception is appropriateSStestimony about verifiable, objective drug testing, and far too from any suggested usage of affidavit or other testimony given under oath by the witness directly to the court. In essence, the hearsay testimonySSBorders’s statement that Haggerty possessed the pistolSSbears little or no indicia of reliability. Moreover, the state advances no reason 8