Opinion ID: 751894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Were appellants selectively prosecuted?

Text: 33 Appellants argue that the prosecutor's decision to try the case in federal court, where the penalties for armed robbery are higher, constitutes selective prosecution. Nelson also claims that other Caucasians who were investigated for purchasing the jewelry stolen in this case were never prosecuted. 34 In order to make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, appellants must show that: 1) others similarly situated were not prosecuted, and 2) the prosecution was based on an impermissible motive. See United States v. Bauer, 84 F.3d 1549, 1560 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 267, 136 L.Ed.2d 191 (1996). 35 The Supreme Court has held that in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official duties. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 1486, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15, 47 S.Ct. 1, 6, 71 L.Ed. 131 (1926)). Appellants have not overcome this presumption. A showing that a prosecutor was influenced by the penalties available upon conviction is insufficient, standing alone, to give rise to a selective prosecution claim. See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204-05, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). In addition, the district court found that the Caucasians involved with Nelson were not prosecuted because the government lacked sufficient evidence for trial. Nelson offers no reason to overturn this finding. Thus, we hold that appellants' selective prosecution claims are without merit. 36 VII. Did the district court properly deny appellants' motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct? 37 Appellants argue that they are entitled to a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct. The alleged misconduct took place during the second round of redirect examination of a government witness, Janet Overstreet. The examination concluded as follows: 38 Prosecutor: In connection with the three felony convictions that have been discussed, did you cooperate in any way in connection with those felony convictions? 39 Overstreet: I was guilty. 40 Prosecutor: Just like you're guilty in connection with the San Diego robberies. 41 Overstreet: Exactly, exactly. 42 Prosecutor: Just like the defendants on trial are guilty. 43 Defense: Objection, your Honor, argumentative. 44 Defense counsel at that time moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor was improperly giving her personal opinion about the defendants' guilt. The district court denied the motion for a mistrial and later denied a motion for a new trial. Instead, the district court instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor's inappropriate question. The district court also polled the individual jurors, each of whom stated that he or she thought the prosecutor's question was inappropriate, that he or she would disregard it, and that he or she did not hear any response. 7 7 The district court then gave another lengthy instruction to the jury. 45 The district court's denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. English, 92 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir.1996) (citation omitted). Under this standard, the reviewing court cannot reverse unless it has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Id. (citation omitted). The district court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial misconduct is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sayetsitty, 107 F.3d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). 46 The government concedes that the prosecutor's final question to Overstreet was improper. The only issue is thus whether the jury was prejudiced by the question. See United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499, 1508 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that prosecutorial misconduct invites reversal if it appears more probable than not that the alleged misconduct affected the jury's verdict) (citation and internal quotation omitted). 47 The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the prosecutor's comment did not affect the jury's verdict. There was ample independent evidence upon which the jury could rely. Moreover, the district judge gave prompt cautionary instructions to the jury. Ordinarily, cautionary instructions or other prompt and effective actions by the trial court are sufficient to cure the effects of improper comments. Id. at 1507-08 (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is because juries are presumed to follow such cautionary instructions. Id. at 1508 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Appellants present nothing to rebut the presumption in this case. 8 48 Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for a mistrial and motion for a new trial. 49