Opinion ID: 1867526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Blom's Appeal and Petition for Postconviction Relief

Text: Blom filed a direct appeal on November 16, 2000, but later moved to stay the direct appeal proceedings in order to petition for postconviction relief. He sought relief from the postconviction court on the grounds that he was denied his right to effective assistance of trial counsel, to self-representation, to a fair trial on the ground of excessive media coverage, to a change of venue from the City of Virginia, and to present exculpatory evidence. He also claimed he was denied his right against self-incrimination on the ground his statement to the police was not voluntary. A postconviction hearing was held on June 18-19, 2002 for the limited purpose of receiving evidence regarding Blom's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Testimony was received from various witnesses, including Blom and his defense counsel. The issues addressed by the testimony were whether Blom's defense counsel (1) should have testified at the omnibus hearing held to determine whether Blom's September 8 statement should have been suppressed as made in connection with plea negotiations; (2) should have prevented discovery papers from being filed in the court record by both the state and the defense; (3) failed to present a sufficient proffer of proof regarding Donald Christiansen; (4) failed to provide a sufficient proffer of proof regarding its cremation witness; (5) dealt properly with bear bones discovered by two men in Carlton County on August 29, 1999, which bones Blom asserted resembled human bones; [15] (6) should have examined the state's forensic expert on whether the expert believed the factual basis of Blom's September 8 statement about how he cremated Poirier's body; (7) properly dealt with the cremation expert retained by defense counsel; (8) had Blom's permission to make statements to the media that he confessed; and (9) should have moved to suppress Blom's statement based on involuntariness. The testimony also addressed Blom's (1) condition and environment as it related to his statement; (2) behavior in jail and his efforts to contact the media; and (3) frustration with his counsel, including his complaint against them to the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, and counsel's unwillingness to let him testify at the suppression hearing. Blom's defense counsel, who were present when he made his statement, testified that they did not discern any influence of medications on Blom when he made the September 8 statement. Lead defense counsel testified that there was no reason to suspect that the drugs [Blom] was taking were affecting his ability to rationally understand what he was doing. Lead counsel testified further that both he and Blom's other counsel were present when the statement was given and were able to assess whether Blom was affected by medication and would have acted immediately if there was any appearance that Blom was not mentally competent to give a statement. When Blom was first asked at the postconviction hearing whether he recalled September 8, he replied, I recall all of it pretty good. But he changed his position a few moments later and said he did not have a clear recollection of the day. Blom's counsel also addressed the statements made to the news media immediately after Blom gave his statement. Counsel said they gave a statement to the press at Blom's request because Blom wanted counsel to notify the public that he had done the right thing despite his counsels' advice. Blom disputed requesting that counsel make this statement. After reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing, the postconviction court denied Blom's petition. The court found that Blom's counsel faithfully and consistently carried on the defense on behalf of [Blom] throughout the course of representation and that Blom was defended by an experienced and capable criminal defense attorney, who engaged in substantial pretrial preparation. The court noted that Blom's assertions of error were related to decisions made as part of trial strategy. The court concluded that Blom had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel's conduct in its totality amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Blom subsequently appealed the postconviction court's order, and that appeal was joined with his stayed direct appeal. Both appeals are now before us.
We first consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Blom's motions to change venue, continue the trial for one year, and sequester the jury. We review a court's rulings on motions to change venue, continue a trial, and sequester a jury for abuse of discretion. See State v. Kinsky, 348 N.W.2d 319, 323 (Minn.1984) (reviewing a district court's ruling on change of venue and continuance motions for a clear abuse of discretion); State v. Morgan, 310 Minn. 88, 95, 246 N.W.2d 165, 169 (1976) (reviewing a district court's decision on sequestration and continuance motions for abuse of discretion). Here, we consider the various motions together because they are factually interrelated. A district court should grant a motion for change of venue or continuance when the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material creates a reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial. Minn. R.Crim. P. 25.02, subd. 3. A showing of actual prejudice is not required. Id. In an earlier case where a defendant claimed that the court failed to sua sponte change venue, we concluded there was no error when one change of venue motion had already been granted. See Thompson v. State, 289 Minn. 270, 272, 183 N.W.2d 771, 772 (1971) (stating that [i]t is doubtful that more could have been accomplished by another change of venue since the publicity of which he complains extended throughout the state). Similarly, when the issue concerns a motion to sequester, the district court shall order sequestration if it determines that the case is of such notoriety or the issues are of such a nature that    highly prejudicial matters are likely to come to the attention of the jurors. Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 5(2). We have held that the question of whether to grant a continuance or to sequester a jury because of pretrial publicity is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Morgan, 310 Minn. at 94, 246 N.W.2d at 168. Further, whether the trial court abused its discretion    depends on whether [it] properly assessed the likelihood that prejudicial publicity would affect the impartiality of the jurors and thereby prevent a fair trial. Id. at 95, 246 N.W.2d at 169. Here, it is clear that, after changing venue from Carlton County to the City of Virginia in Saint Louis County, the district court gave continuing attention and consideration to Blom's repeated requests to further change venue and to sequester the jurors. The court indicated that it shared Blom's concern that he be given a fair trial by impartial jurors. The court reevaluated the change of venue motions as new information about publicity was raised and as new jurors were seated. In each reevaluation, the court reached the same conclusion that nowhere in the state would Blom face a jury unexposed to publicity about the case. Similarly, the court denied the continuance motion because it concluded that publicity would only die down temporarily and would reoccur once the trial started. When the court rejected these motions, it stated that it had concluded that the voir dire testimony of the jurors ultimately seated demonstrated that those jurors could be fair and unswayed by public prejudice. In Kinsky, the defendant argued that voir dire indicated that prospective jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity and formed opinions about her guilt. Kinsky, 348 N.W.2d at 323. Similarly, Blom states that the change of venue motions were based on negative answers to jury questionnaires; potential jurors' negative statements during voir dire; hostile public sentiment and opinion about Appellant's guilt; pressure and influence from the community on potential and actual jurors; intimidating bumper stickers and signs displayed in the parking lot of the courthouse; an incident where a person slowly drove by in a car as jurors were entering the courthouse yelling, hang the bastard and constant references in the media to things that had been deleted or ruled to be inadmissible. In Kinsky, we concluded that prospective jurors cannot be presumed partial solely on the ground of exposure to pretrial publicity, and [t]he test is whether a prospective juror can set aside his impression or opinion and render an impartial verdict. Kinsky, 348 N.W.2d at 323. The court in Kinsky noted that even if it assumed several prospective jurors stricken with peremptory challenges were biased, this does not establish actual prejudice of the jury. Id. at 324. The facts here are similar to those in Kinsky. As in Kinsky, trial counsel's motions were based on juror answers during voir dire. [16] The 15 jurors selected in this case were individually and extensively questioned by the district court and counsel for both sides. Based on their voir dire testimony, these 15 jurors indicated that they intended to reach their verdict solely on the basis of evidence presented in court. While the jurors indicated that they had been exposed to some pretrial publicity, they agreed to follow the court's instructions and further agreed that they would be fair and impartial. A review of the jurors' answers at voir dire confirms the seriousness with which they undertook this job. In addition to the instructions mentioned above, after each juror was selected, the district court instructed the juror further about not discussing the case with anyone, including family, attorneys, and the media. The court also emphasized that not following these instructions could jeopardize the trial and asked each juror to notify the court if anyone tried to influence or contact the juror regarding the trial. With the exception of three days, the court repeated the same warning in the same detail at the end of each trial day and also on some occasions did so when the court went into recess. The court told the jurors that just because the court was repeating the warnings every day, this did not mean that the jurors should take the warnings less seriously. We conclude that the district court sufficiently verified that the seated jurors would be fair and impartial and did not abuse its discretion in denying Blom's motions. For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that the court did not err when it denied Blom's motions to change the venue of his trial from the City of Virginia, to continue the trial, and to sequester the jury.
Blom next argues that the district court failed to caution all persons with a connection to his case against extra-judicial statements until significant prejudice had already resulted. He asserts that this failure violates Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 7, which states that [w]henever appropriate, the court shall order attorneys, parties, witnesses, jurors, and employees and officers of the court not to make extra-judicial statements relating to the case or the issues in the case for dissemination by any means of public communication during the course of the trial. As a general matter, courts are vested with discretion in managing trials. State v. Erickson, 610 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Minn.2000). Blom acknowledges that the district court issued a gag order on September 16, 1999, but argues that the gag order was issued too lateit came after his counsel had made a statement to the news media on September 8. Blom disputes telling his counsel to give such a statement to the press, but the state correctly points out that the court had no way of knowing that Blom's counsel would be giving such a statement. The court subsequently lifted the gag order and allowed access to transcripts of closed hearings. Blom then points out that actions of the first judge who sat on his case, as well as that judge's subsequent removal from the case, drew considerable media attention. However, the first judge's actions and removal have nothing to do with Rule 26.03. Further, Blom fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the first judge's actions or media attention to the judge's removal. Blom also complains that the court records, which included both parties' discovery and investigative reports, were available to the public. This accessibility has been the standard practice in Carlton County for some time and is not related to extra-judicial statements governed by Rule 26.03, subd. 7. The district court did issue a warning under Rule 26.03, subd. 7, on the first day of trial. Specifically, the court stated in open proceedings, [t]his court does now therefore order, that the attorneys, parties, witnesses, jurors, employees, and officers of the court are not to make any extra-judicial statements relating to the case or the issues in the case for dissemination by any means of public communication during the course of the trial. Further, the federal court overseeing the firearms charges against Blom issued a similar order, prohibiting the parties from making statements regarding the federal and state proceedings. In essence, Blom has given us no basis, factual or otherwise, on which to conclude that Rule 26.03, subd. 7 was violated. Rather, we conclude that the court, on its own initiative, adequately cautioned against extra-judicial statements and therefore hold that the court did not err in its management of Blom's trial with respect to extra-judicial statements.
Blom next argues that the district court failed to adequately control the courtroom and courthouse, in violation of Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 3, and therefore failed to protect jurors from prejudicial publicity. Blom also asserts that the court failed to warn the media about printing prejudicial matters that were not introduced at trial. Rule 26.03, subd. 3 provides: Whenever appropriate in view of the notoriety of the case or the number or conduct of news media representatives present at any judicial proceeding, the court shall ensure the preservation of decorum by instructing those representatives and others as to the permissible use of the courtroom and other facilities of the court, the assignment of seats to news media representatives on an equitable basis, and other matters that may affect the conduct of the proceeding. Here, the court took several actions that are tangentially related to Rule 26.03, subd. 3. When reviewing such actions, we give district courts broad discretion concerning matters of courtroom procedure. State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn.2001). After hearing arguments on behalf of the news media on whether to close certain aspects of the trial under Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 6(4), the district court ordered that matters considered outside the presence of the jury would take place outside the hearing of the public. [17] At the onset of voir dire, the court issued an order which required all those who entered the courtroom to show a picture I.D. and to sign in. The court limited visitors in the courtroom to unreserved seats on a first-come, first-served basis, and denied admittance to the courtroom to additional spectators if there were no more seats available. The court further ordered that those present in the courtroom must be seated at all times while the court was in session and that anyone leaving the courtroom during a session could not re-enter until a subsequent break. The court prohibited all electronic communication and recording devices from the courtroom. Further, on defense counsel's motions, the court instructed the state to instruct its witnesses to refer to Poirier as Miss Poirier instead of Katie, instructed the bailiffs to remove Blom from the courtroom only outside of the jury's presence, and to give Blom discreet handcuffs. The district court continued to address courtroom procedure throughout the trial. When defense counsel complained that one of the witnesses on the state's list was seated in the courtroom during other witnesses' testimony, the court asked the state to have the witness leave and did so without bringing attention to her leaving. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial because of the presence of armed deputies in the courtroom who were watching Blom. Counsel asserted that these matters had been raised before trial precisely to avoid this kind of prejudicial attention. While the court denied the motion, stating that the conduct did not rise to the level of prejudice warranting a mistrial, it instructed the bailiffs to make sure that the armed deputies did not come into the courtroom. We also note that Blom's trial counsel were diligent in bringing to the district court's attention the hostility that their client faced during trial. For example, somebody parked a car across the street from the courthouse with a bumper sticker that said, Blom is guilty. When addressing this incident, the court explained that its options were limited because of freedom of speech, but asked the state to attempt to have the car removed. Blom had a confrontation with the owner of this vehicle a few days later when she was sitting behind him in the courtroom and would not stop staring at him. The court attempted to remedy this situation by reserving the two rows of seats behind Blom for his family only. Our examination of the record gives no indication that the district court was neglectful in managing the trial. Rather, the record suggests just the oppositethe court was actively monitoring courtroom activity and properly addressing problems as they arose. Therefore, we hold that Blom's request for retrial on these grounds lacks merit.
The next issue we must decide is whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting Spreigl evidence about the 1983 incident and the subsequent criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping convictions to show identity and common plan or scheme. We review a district court's decision on whether to admit Spreigl evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn.1998). The defendant must show that the court erred and that the error was prejudicial. Id. Evidence of past crimes cannot be used to show a defendant's character for committing those crimes, but can be used to show motive, intent, absence of mistake, identity, or a common scheme or plan. Id.; see also Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). A court can admit such evidence only if (1) notice is given that the state intends to use the evidence; (2) the state clearly indicates what the evidence is being offered to prove; (3) the evidence is clear and convincing that the defendant participated in the other offense; (4) the Spreigl evidence is relevant and material to the state's case; and (5) the probative value of the Spreigl evidence is not outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d at 389. When it is unclear whether Spreigl evidence should be admitted, the defendant receives the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence should be excluded. Id. The district court should lower the risk of prejudice by withholding its decision on admitting the evidence until the state has presented all of its other evidence and, in a close case, by holding an evidentiary hearing on whether to admit the evidence instead of simply relying on a proffer of proof. State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 504-05 (Minn. 1991). In this case, the court took both suggested procedural precautions by withholding its decision to allow the evidence until the end of the state's case and by holding an evidentiary hearing. Blom asserts that the district court erred in admitting the Spreigl evidence, arguing that the state's proof of identity was not weak because the state produced an eyewitness who placed Blom and his truck near the scene of the crime around the time Poirier was abducted, produced expert evidence that the tooth found on Blom's property belonged to Poirier, and submitted Blom's September 8 statement to the jury. Blom further argues that the Spreigl evidence was lacking a modus operandi connection because the 1983 case was a sexual assault, not a murder, but here the state alleged a murder, but not a sexual assault. Blom also argues that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial impact on the jury. As to relevance and materiality, the district court should consider the issues in the case, the reasons and need for the evidence, and whether there is a time, place, or modus operandi nexus. State v. DeBaere, 356 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Minn.1984). The past crime does not have to be a signature crime, as long as the crime was sufficiently similar to the incident at issue before the jury. State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn.1995); see, e.g., State v. Slowinski, 450 N.W.2d 107, 114-15 (Minn.1990) (finding no abuse of discretion when the incidents all involved the use of a knife, the removal of clothes, and sexual threats). In considering the relevance and materiality of the 1983 incident, we disagree with Blom's contention that the modus operandi was not sufficiently or substantially the same. Both incidents involved the kidnapping of young, petite women to remote, wooded areas. Both incidents also involved subduing the women by applying force at their neck and throat areas. Although the court did not address Blom's concern that the 1983 incident was too remote, we have stated that a close temporal relationship is not required, but is simply a factor in determining relevancy. State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235, 242 n. 3 (Minn. 1993) (observing that passage of time may be insignificant if, for example, the defendant spent a number of those years in prison or if the older offense is part of a `pattern' of similar misconduct occurring over a number of years and noting that we have upheld the admission of offenses going back 19 years). Even considering the time Blom served for the 1983 incident, [18] we view the passage of time between 1983 and 1999 as troubling. However, considering the centrality of the issue of identity in this case and the similarity of the 1983 incident to the abduction of Poirier here, we conclude that the 1983 incident was relevant and material. Even if evidence is relevant, however, `it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.' State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Minn.1999) (quoting Minn. R. Evid. 403). The closer the relationship in time, place, and modus operandi between the past crime and the current charge, the less likely the evidence will be used improperly by the jury. State v. Frisinger, 484 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Minn. 1992) (quoting State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178-79, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967)). When balancing the probative value of Spreigl evidence against the potential for unfair prejudice, the trial court must consider how necessary the Spreigl evidence is to the state's case. When identity is at issue, evidence of other crimes is admissible only if the trial court finds the direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant's identity is otherwise weak or inadequate, and that it is necessary to support the state's burden of proof. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d at 81 (citations omitted). In this case, Blom asserts that the state's proof of identity was not weak, but we note that the testimony of Blom's wife provided an alibi for him, Blom was claiming that he falsely confessed to the abduction of Poirier, there was no direct physical evidence connecting Blom to DJ's Expressway, witnesses other than Hanek were not able to identify Blom at the line-up, and the defense planned to introduce its own expert testimony to establish that the tooth found on Blom's property could not be Poirier's. Further, we have held that where identity is at issue and the defendant offers an alibi, the state may buttress its case with Spreigl evidence. State v. Moorman, 505 N.W.2d 593, 603 (Minn.1993). Evidence about the 1983 incident was not merely cumulative or a subterfuge for impugning defendant's character. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d at 81. While the potential for prejudice was great due to the nature of the 1983 offense and the passage of time, as case law indicates, the similarity in modus operandi lowers the potential for improper use by the jury. While we acknowledge that another district court, in the proper exercise of its discretion, may have excluded this Spreigl evidence, we hold that here the district court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted the admission of the 1983 incident as Spreigl evidence.
Blom next argues that his right to self-representation was violated when the district court denied his request to represent himself. We review the court's denial of Blom's motion for self-representation for clear error. State v. Christian, 657 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 2003). The right to self-representation in state criminal trials is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn.1990) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)). When a criminal defendant asks to represent himself, the court must determine (1) whether the request is clear, unequivocal, and timely, and (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel. Id. (footnote omitted). If a defendant makes a request to represent himself after trial has already begun, the court's decision also becomes a matter of balancing between the defendant's legitimate interests in self-representation and the possibility for disruption and undue delay. Christian, 657 N.W.2d at 191. For purposes of determining whether this balancing test is triggered, trial begins at the onset of jury voir dire. Id. at 193. As to whether the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel is knowing and intelligent, a motion for self-representation is not equivocal simply because it is made as an alternative plan in case the court does not grant a defendant's motion for a different attorney. Richards, 456 N.W.2d at 263-64. If the defendant's right to self-representation is violated, he is entitled to a reversal and new trial. See id. at 263. Because Blom's request for self-representation occurred 40 days into a 48-day trial, we conclude it was untimely when we balance his legitimate interest in self-representation and the likelihood of disruption and undue delay. See Christian, 657 N.W.2d at 193-94. In addition, Blom's request was equivocal as shown by his responses when the district court asked him three times whether he was requesting to represent himself. He did not answer the questions clearly, stating that he did not want to represent himself, but also did not want his existing counsel. Upon further examination of Blom's reasons for his request to represent himself, the court determined that his complaints against his counsel were unfounded. Based on this record, we hold that the court's denial of Blom's request to represent himself did not violate his rights as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
We next address the issues raised by the admission of Blom's September 8 statement. Blom asserts that his statement is inadmissible because it was involuntary or alternatively should be excluded because it falls within the protection of Minn. R. Evid. 410. Blom's challenge to the admission of his statement requires a two-part inquiry. We will initially determine whether Blom gave the statement voluntarily and, if it was, then determine whether the statement is protected by Rule 410. Blom asserts that his September 8 statement was given involuntarily and should have been suppressed on that ground. If Blom's statement was coerced or made involuntarily, it should have been suppressed. A defendant is deprived of constitutional due process of law if he is convicted on the basis of an involuntary confession. State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 169 (Minn.1997) (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)). The state argues that Blom has waived this argument because he failed to properly raise the issue before the district court. We agree. Although Blom asserts a claim of involuntariness in his appeal to our court, in both Blom's initial pretrial omnibus memorandum and his supplemental omnibus memorandum, he argued that his September 8 statement was inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 410. He failed to argue that the statement was inadmissible because it was involuntary. Generally, when a defendant fails to object to a specific error at trial, the defendant forfeits his right to have the error reviewed on appeal. State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 717 (Minn.2003). We do have the discretion to review such an issue on appeal using a plain error analysis. Id. Upon examining this issue, we conclude that the court did not err when it concluded that Blom was not entitled to a new trial on the ground that the statement was given involuntarily. The voluntariness of a statement must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn.1991). To determine whether a defendant's statement was voluntary, we engage in a factual inquiry to examine[ ] the effect that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant and whether the defendant's will was overborne when he confessed. Id. In examining the totality of the circumstances, we will consider such factors as the defendant's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience and ability to comprehend; the lack of or adequacy of warnings; the length and legality of the detention; the nature of the interrogation; and whether the defendant was deprived of physical needs or denied access to friends. Id. Blom argues that his September 8 statement was coerced because he was placed in solitary confinement for 23 hours a day for weeks before he gave the statement; he made the statement to protect his family from the media, the public, and the police; and he was under the influence of medication when he made the statement. He specifically asserts that the lack of access to his family and necessary medication caused him to be under stress at the time he made the statement. He also asserts that Sheriff Seboe promised better jail conditions and other concessions if he made the statement. When considering these assertions, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding Blom's September 8 statement to ascertain whether his assertions provide sufficient support for his claim that he made the statement involuntarily. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 333. The circumstances surrounding Blom's September 8 statement reveal that law enforcement officials did not pressure or coerce him to make the statement. Seboe testified that Blom was not confined in 23-hour lockdown the entire time before he made his statement and when he was, it was the result of jail policy and Blom's violation of jail rules. One such violation involved the discovery of written plans to escape. Blom had access to and used the jail's disciplinary appeals process. Seboe and the BCA denied making any threats involving charges against Blom's family. Moreover, on August 26, Blom thanked Seboe for his straightforward help. Furthermore, it was Blom who approached Seboe to initiate a meeting. Importantly, Blom had three of his attorneys present when he gave the statement. Blom stated on the record that it was his intention to give the statement and that he was making the statement against the advice of counsel. The questioning lasted for about three hours and Blom's handcuffs were removed not long after the questioning began. In addition, Blom was provided with coffee and a restroom break. Once the questioning was completed, Blom volunteered to meet with authorities again to answer more questions and even suggested a day. Blom's argument that he was pressured or coerced into making an involuntary statement is also not supported by his actions leading up to the statement. On September 3, it was Blom who contacted Seboe with the request for a meeting to resolve this matter. On the same day that Blom approached Seboe, he also met with a television news reporter at his own request. Among other things, Blom told the reporter that on the following Monday he would tell the reporter what everybody wants to hear. Moreover, while not dispositive, the district court's finding of fact regarding Blom's subjective expectation when he gave the statement is relevant to the issue of voluntariness. In brief, the court found that Blom approached authorities indicating his intent to give a statement and that his intention to do so was independent of and uninfluenced by any plea negotiations. The record also reveals that, even though Blom was taking prescription medications on September 8, the medications did not render his statement involuntary. Blom's lead state defense counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that there was no reason to suspect that the drugs [Blom] was taking were affecting his ability to rationally understand what he was doing. Law enforcement officers present when the statement was given observed that Blom understood the questions, spoke in a normal tone of voice, freely and voluntarily gave answers to questions, and was alert, lucid, cooperative, and calm. There is also evidence in the record indicating that the medications Blom had taken would not affect his cognitive ability or cause stress. In addition, if Blom had been impaired by the medications, expert testimony at trial indicates that the effects should have been observable in the form of lethargy, drowsiness, slurred speech, difficulty in walking, confusion, and decreased mental alertness. There is nothing in the text of the statement or the testimony of those who observed Blom when he gave the statement to indicate he was suffering from any of the foregoing symptoms. Finally, we note that Blom was 50 years old at the time he gave the statement and had prior experience with law enforcement. For all the reasons stated above, we conclude that, when addressed on its merits, Blom's claim that his statement was made involuntarily lacks substance. Therefore, we hold that Blom's statement was not inadmissible on the ground that it was given involuntarily.
Because we conclude that Blom's statement was given voluntarily, there is no constitutional basis for its suppression. Therefore, we proceed to address Blom's alternative argument that the statement should be excluded under Minn. R. Evid. 410. Blom contends that the statement was made in connection with a plea negotiation and, therefore, Rule 410 prohibits its admission. Rule 410 provides: Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil, criminal, or administrative action, case, or proceeding whether offered for or against the person who made the plea or offer. (Emphasis added.) The rule's plain language gives a district court little discretion to admit a defendant's statement if the statement is made in connection with a plea or plea offer. Whether a statement is made in connection with a plea or plea offer requires an inquiry as to the facts of each case. Our standard of review is responsive to the nature of this inquiry. We give deference to the district court's factual determinations, but still make an independent determination whetheras a matter of lawthe statement was made in connection with a plea or plea offer. Thus, we review the court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, but review de novo the court's legal conclusion that Rule 410 does not protect Blom's statement. Cf. State v. Fields, 679 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn.2004) (Although appellate courts review the presence or absence of historical facts for clear error, the surrounding circumstances relevant to a Sixth Amendment determination are reviewed de novo.); State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 670 (Minn.1998) (stating that an appellate court reviews a district court's findings of fact for clear error, but makes an independent review    of the district court's determination regarding custody and the necessity of a Miranda warning). The district court in this case concluded that Rule 410 did not prohibit the admission of Blom's statement because the statement remained separate and distinct from any plea negotiations and that Blom knowingly and voluntarily waived the rule's protections. We first address whether Blom waived the protections of Rule 410. Then, if necessary, we will address whether Blom's statement was made in connection with a plea or plea offer such that it is encompassed by Rule 410's protections. In general, we recognize that plea bargains are essential to the administration of justice. See State v. Jackson, 325 N.W.2d 819, 822 (Minn.1982); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (encouraging plea bargains in state and federal cases). With proper safeguards, pleas should be a most frequent means for the disposition of criminal cases. Jackson, 325 N.W.2d at 822. The purpose of Rule 410 is to encourage frank discussion in plea bargaining negotiations. See United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 580 F.2d 1137, 1148 (2d Cir.1978); see also Jackson, 325 N.W.2d at 822. In order to further this policy and ensure fruitful negotiations, Rule 410 safeguards the confidentiality of plea negotiations by precluding the evidentiary use of plea-related statements in the event that plea negotiations abort. Jackson, 325 N.W.2d at 822. Meaningful dialogue between the parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence. United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir.1976). The evidentiary safeguards provided for under Rule 410 for statements made in connection with a plea or plea offer nevertheless may be waived. It is a well-established principle of law that a defendant may waive the protections of evidentiary rules. Stevens v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't. Relief Ass'n, 219 Minn. 276, 280, 17 N.W.2d 642, 645 (1945). We have held that a defendant may waive the protections of the hearsay rule by failing to object to inadmissible evidence at trial. State v. Hamilton, 268 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Minn.1978). Indeed, a defendant may even waive fundamental constitutional rights. For example, we have held that a defendant may waive his or her constitutional right under the Confrontation Clause to be present at trial, if his or her conduct is disorderly. State v. Jones, 311 Minn. 176, 182, 247 N.W.2d 427, 431 (1976). A defendant may also waive his or her physician/patient privilege and thereby permit the admission of some of the contents of confidential medical records. State v. Gore, 451 N.W.2d 313, 318-19 (Minn.1990). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant may under certain circumstances waive the federal version of Rule 410 as a condition of a plea agreement. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 210, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995) (holding that a defendant's agreement to allow any statement made during a meeting with a federal prosecutor to be used for impeachment purposes is a valid and enforceable waiver of the exclusionary provisions of the federal rules). Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege, and its validity depends    upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case. State v. Richards, 456 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, a waiver, even of a constitutional right, need not be explicit. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 342-43, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). A court may imply a waiver from a defendant's conduct. See State v. Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 451-52 (Minn.2001). For example, we have held that, when a defendant voluntarily absents himself or herself from a courtroom, that action constitutes a waiver of the Confrontation Clause right to be present at all stages of trial. State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270, 277-78 (Minn.1998). In Worthy, the defendants absented themselves from trial as part of a tactical attempt to delay their trial in order to be the last of multiple defendants tried. Id. at 277. We stated that the [d]efendants cannot take advantage of their own willful choice to defeat the ends of justice and must be held to have waived their right to be present at trial under these facts. Id. at 277-78. It is necessary to examine the highly unusual facts of this case to determine whether Blom's actions constituted a waiver of Rule 410's protections. The record shows that shortly after Blom finished giving his September 8 statement, his state and federal defense counsel met with members of the news media who had assembled outside the jail facility where Blom was being held. His lead state defense counsel began this meeting by announcing: Donald Blom has been down speaking to authorities for several hours. In the course of speaking to the authorities, he has admitted to both the kidnapping and the killing of Katie Poirier.    The matter will now in all likelihood be referred to a grand jury and the matter will proceed from there. Following this statement, Blom's state defense counsel initially refused to give any more details concerning Blom's statement, but did give an opinion, in response to a question, that authorities would not need to start a search for Poirier's body. Also, when a reporter asked if the bone fragments found on Blom's property were Poirier's, Blom's state defense counsel said yes. When asked by a reporter if the tooth found on the property was Poirier's, he responded, I don't think the statement is that specific,    I don't want to go into the details of it any further now. The foregoing statements were made to the media even though the plea agreement did not call for any public disclosure of Blom's statement or its contents. Blom's state defense counsel told reporters that Blom made this statement out of his feelings for the Poirier family and certainly out of feelings for his own family. He wanted to get the matter behind him. After his conviction, Blom petitioned for postconviction relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. One of the reasons Blom argued that state defense counsel was ineffective was because counsel made a statement to the media following Blom's September 8 statement. At the hearing on Blom's postconviction petition, Blom acknowledged that he had requested his counsel to make media appearances and give press conferences quite a few times. Nevertheless, Blom denied giving any general consent for his state defense counsel to make any statements to the media on September 8. Blom also denied giving specific consent to his state defense counsel to tell the media that he killed Poirier and that the bones found in his fire pit were hers. Even though Blom had access to newspapers and television, he asserted that he did not learn of his state defense counsel's statements to the media until approximately 10 days after September 8. Blom's lead state defense counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that he had Blom's permission to talk to the media on September 8. Counsel explained that he told Blom specifically that he would tell the media that Blom gave the statement to bring an end to the case and to ease the minds of his family and the Poirier family. Counsel testified about what happened as follows: There were no limitations placed upon me. Mr. Blom was anxious that we say something concerning the confession and his reasons for giving the confession. I told him very specifically that I was going to say that he gave the statement or confession to bring an end to the case, because to ease the minds of his family and in part to ease the minds of the Poiriers. Now, those were not the exact words I used, but they were very close[ ] to what I used when I gave the statement. Counsel then added that he and Blom went over the fact that we would say that he did this against the wishes of his attorneys. The objective was for Mr. Blom to at least come out looking like he was doing this, that he had regrets, and that even with the advice of his attorneys not to do this,    he went ahead and did it for these noble purposes. And Mr. Blom was very aware that I was going to say that to the press. We went over it before I went out there. Lead state defense counsel also testified that Blom was the only other person present when Blom directed him to go to the media. Supplementing, and not in conflict with the testimony of Blom's lead state defense counsel, Blom's federal defense counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that he was not aware of what conversations, if any, Blom and state defense counsel had regarding authority for state defense counsel to make a statement to the media on September 8. Blom's second chair state defense counsel confirmed under oath that Blom had asked several times for his counsel to contact and make statements to the media and that following Blom's September 8 statement there was definitely a request [from Blom] to go to the media, to make a statement. Counsel testified further that she could not recall a discussion of what was going to be said to the media on September 8. Following the hearing on Blom's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the postconviction court denied Blom's petition. The court found that Blom failed to show by a fair preponderance of the evidence that his state defense counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors, the result of the trial would have been different. It is implicit in these findings that the court found the testimony of lead state defense counsel to be credible. We conclude from the court's findings and from the record that Blom instructed his state defense counsel to talk to the media following the completion of Blom's statement to authorities. Moreover, it is implicit in the court's findings that Blom's lead state defense counsel was credible in testifying that Blom wanted him to make a statement to the media to bring an end to the case, to ease the minds of Blom's family and the Poirier family, and that Blom placed no limitations on what was to be said to the media about his statement in which he admitted to the kidnapping and killing of Poirier. This was tantamount to a public admission that Blom kidnapped and killed Poirier. Blom's conduct in the days leading up to the giving of his statement lends support to what is implicit in the postconviction court's ultimate conclusion. Following a pretrial omnibus hearing, the district court found that on September 3, Blom requested a meeting with Seboe to resolve this matter. Seboe testified that he met with Blom and that Blom said he had his mind made up, and he knew what he was going to do. The court noted that on September 3, Blom met with a television news reporter and disclosed details regarding the abduction and murder of Katie Poirier. In a news report based on this meeting, the reporter stated that Blom had promised he would tell the reporter what everybody wants to hear if the reporter returned in a few days. The court found that Blom's requests to Seboe and his disclosures to the reporter prompted a meeting between Blom, the Sixth Judicial District Chief Public Defender, Blom's federal defense counsel, and law enforcement personnel regarding Blom's desire to resolve the matter. This meeting was held on the evening of September 3. Blom's actions following the September 8 statement are analogous to a defendant waiving the physician/patient privilege by disclosing in open court information covered by that privilege. [19] See Gore, 451 N.W.2d at 318-19. In Gore, the defendant testified, in support of his insanity defense to a charge of murder, that he ingested a potentially lethal amount of medication and slashed his wrists. Id. at 317-18. We held that, by his testimony, the defendant impliedly waived the physician/patient privilege and it was proper for the district court to allow the defendant's treating physician to give limited testimony that the defendant had taken a non-lethal dose of medication and that he had only superficial cuts on his wrists, and thus impeach the defendant's claim that he had tried to commit suicide. Id. at 317-19. This holding was centered on the principle that a privilege ought not to afford a `license to perjury.' Id. at 318. We noted that [it] is a spectacle fit to increase the layman's traditional contempt for the chicanery of the law when a [party] describes at length to the jury and a crowded courtroom the details of his supposed ailment and then is permitted to suppress the available proof of his falsities by asserting that he wishes to keep the matter confidential. Id. (quoting 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence, § 2389 at 859 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). We further stated that by disclosing the privileged information, the privilege holder destroys the information's confidentiality and the information loses its privileged character. Id. at 318-19. Just as the physician/patient privilege safeguards the confidentiality of physician/patient communications in order to foster open and honest communications between physicians and patients, Rule 410 safeguards the confidentiality of plea negotiations in order to foster meaningful dialogue between the parties and to promote the disposition of criminal cases by compromise. See Jackson, 325 N.W.2d at 822. By directing his state defense counsel to talk to the media about his statement to the authorities in which he admitted to kidnapping and killing Poirier, Blom negated the confidentiality of the plea negotiations and thus his September 8 statement lost the protections afforded by the rule. Cf. Gore, 451 N.W.2d at 318-19. It would be a spectacle fit to increase the lay[person]'s traditional contempt for the chicanery of the law to permit Blom to suppress his statement to authorities by asserting that Rule 410 protects the statement's confidentiality after he authorized his counsel to make a public statement to the media about Blom's statement in which he admitted to both the kidnapping and the killing of Poirier. See id. Blom's statement to authorities was part of a larger media event. A few days before his statement, Blom promised details of the crime. Blom then made the statement to authorities. And finally, Blom followed up on his promise to the media by directing his counsel to make a statement to the press. Under these highly unusual facts, Blom cannot take advantage of his willful choice to defeat the ends of justice by utilizing the protections of Rule 410. See Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 277-78. Accordingly, we hold that Blom waived the evidentiary protections of Rule 410 and therefore the district court did not err when it concluded that Blom's confession was admissible. Because we affirm the district court's conclusion that Blom waived the protections of Rule 410, it is unnecessary to address whether Blom's statement was made in connection with a plea or plea offer.
Blom argues that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated because the district court granted the state's motion to exclude his evidence of an alternative perpetratorDonald Christiansen. While the court rejected most of the evidence included in Blom's proffer of proof, it did allow the testimony of five witnesses, including one former sexual assault victim of Christiansen, who identified Christiansen as the person in the surveillance video. The court allowed this testimony for the limited purpose of showing the weakness in the identification of Blom based on the video. The right to present witnesses in one's defense is constitutionally protected. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Where identity is at issue, this includes evidence tending to show that an alternate person committed the crime. See State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158 (Minn.1977). However, with that right comes the obligation to comply with procedural and evidentiary rules. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The defense must establish a proper foundation by providing `evidence having an inherent tendency to connect such other person with the actual commission of the crime.' Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d at 159 (quoting Marrone v. State, 359 P.2d 969, 984 (Alaska 1961)). This requirement avoids the use of bare suspicion and safeguards the third person from indiscriminate use of past differences with the deceased. Id. The purpose of alternative-perpetrator evidence is to create reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime; it is not to prove the guilt of the alternative perpetrator. Id. at 158-59. Once a proper foundation has been laid, the defendant may introduce other evidence tending to show that the alternative perpetrator committed the crime. Id. at 159. The state can offer rebuttal evidence. Id. at 159-60. Blom attempted to establish a proper foundation for his alternative-perpetrator evidence by submitting a proffer of proof based on testimonial evidence that would establish that Christiansen was Poirier's abductor. The district court concluded that Blom's proffer of proof failed to present clear and convincing evidence of Christiansen's connection to the crime. However, Blom's proffer of proof is not subject to the higher clear and convincing evidence standard, given that this is part of his constitutional right to present a defense. He is only required to present evidence having an inherent tendency of linking Christiansen to Poirier's abduction. See State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 16-17 (Minn.2004); State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Minn.2003). The evidence that Blom submitted in his proffer of proof that would sufficiently connect Christiansen to Poirier's abduction was (1) a statement to the police by Christiansen's cellmate that Christiansen confessed that he abducted Poirier, and (2) several witnesses' identifications of Christiansen in the surveillance video. These identifications included one by a sexual assault victim of Christiansen. As to the first item, the cellmate's statement is evidence connecting Christiansen to the crime and therefore Blom should have been allowed to present the cellmate's testimony to the jury. See Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d at 159. We conclude that the district court inappropriately made a credibility assessment in rejecting the cellmate's testimony when all that was required was a determination of whether the inherent tendency connection, beyond a bare suspicion, had been made. See id. It is the jury's role to assess the credibility of the evidence and the state may present rebuttal evidence for the jury to consider in making its decision. As to the witness identifications of Christiansen as the abductor in the surveillance video, these identifications also established a sufficient inherent tendency to connect Christiansen to the abduction. We reach this conclusion after examining the testimony of these witnesses. Two of the witnesses stated that the man in the video resembled Christiansen, but the other three positively identified him as the man in the video. One of the three was a sexual assault victim who testified that she believed she recognized Christiansen in a still photo made from the video, and was permitted by the court to briefly state that she recognized Christiansen because he had sexually assaulted her in the past. The remaining two witnesses were a married couple who had also known Christiansen. Both witnesses pointed out several physical features of the man in the video that led them to positively identify Christiansen. These features were hair length and color, structure of face, overall stance, shape of chin, length of arms and upper torso, height, build, body structure, and the way he was wearing his clothes. We conclude that these identifications, as well as the cellmate's statements to the police, provided sufficient foundation for Blom to present alternative-perpetrator evidence tending to incriminate Christiansen. This alternative-perpetrator evidence included evidence that Christiansen had a New York Yankees Jersey, changed his appearance after the abduction, changed vehicles in early June of 1999, failed to show up for work from May 24 through June 4, 1999, was acting strangely and told friends that he would go to jail for doing something bad, asked a friend to get rid of a knife for him that he claimed was tainted, and fled to Texas. Blom's proffer also included evidence that Christiansen was on property approximately 35 miles away from Moose Lake sometime before May 28 and that female screams were heard from the property on or about the night of May 26. In addition, if the clear and convincing standard for reverse- Spreigl evidence is met, Christiansen's 1995 conviction for sexual assault of the woman who identified Christiansen in the surveillance video also should have been admitted. [20] Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in denying Blom the right to fully present evidence of an alternative perpetrator. The foregoing conclusion, however, does not complete our analysis of this issue. A harmless error analysis applies to the erroneous exclusion of evidence that violates the defendant's right to present evidence. State v. Post, 512 N.W.2d 99, 102 (Minn.1994). In applying the harmless error test, we `must look to the basis on which the jury rested its verdict and determine what effect the error had on the actual verdict. If the verdict actually rendered was surely unattributable to the error, the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' State v. Quick, 659 N.W.2d 701, 716 (Minn.2003) (quoting State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997)). The relevant inquiry in this case is whether a reasonable jury would have reached the same verdict if the evidence had been admitted and the damaging potential of the evidence fully realized. Post, 512 N.W.2d at 102. If, on the other hand, there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if the evidence had been admitted, then the erroneous exclusion of the evidence is prejudicial. Id. Blom has the burden of showing prejudice. See Quick, 659 N.W.2d at 716. After reviewing all the evidence in the record, we conclude that Blom was not prejudiced because there is no reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different if all of the alternative-perpetrator evidence had been admitted. We reach this conclusion for multiple reasons. Hanek, an independent witness totally unknown to Blom except for their brief encounter on the night of Poirier's abduction, positively identified Blom at the police line-up as being the person she saw in and around the property of DJ's Expressway on the night of the abduction. Her identification was confirmed by the fact that Blom owns a pickup truck identical to the truck that Hanek saw the person driving that night. Hanek described a truck that was similar in make, model, and color to Blom's. The license plate of Blom's truck also matched the characters and positioning of the four license plate characters that Hanek was able to provide to the police from her observation of the truck that night. We find this evidence compelling, especially in light of Blom's denial that he was in Moose Lake on May 26. The state also presented evidence of the presence of human female bones and a tooth similar to Poirier's on Blom's property. Blom's failure to report to work after the abduction and his false explanations for the disappearance of his truck further support our conclusion. In addition, the height analysis based on the surveillance video and evidence that Blom owned a New York Yankees jersey also give weight to the evidence against Blom. Finally, in his September 8 statement, Blom admitted that he killed Poirier. All these reasons amply support our conclusion that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict might have been different if all of the alternative-perpetrator evidence had been admitted. Moreover, and importantly, the jury ultimately did hear five witnesses who testified that Blom's purported alternative perpetrator appeared to be, resembled, or was believed to be the person in the surveillance video. Accordingly, we hold that the jury's guilty verdict was surely unattributable to the court's erroneous exclusion of the alternative-perpetrator evidence.
Finally, Blom argues that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. After Blom filed a direct appeal to our court, he filed a motion to stay the proceedings so that he could request a postconviction hearing in order to develop the record for his ineffective assistance claim. A postconviction evidentiary hearing was granted for the limited purpose of determining whether the performance of Blom's trial counsel was deficient. The postconviction court rejected Blom's claim. Blom eventually appealed this order and then filed a motion to merge the postconviction and direct appeals. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to reasonably effective assistance of trial counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. See State v. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn.2003). Our obligation in considering postconviction proceedings is to review both questions of law and of fact. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn.2003). We review legal issues de novo. Id. However, our review of factual matters is limited to whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the postconviction court's findings. Id. Here, as in Rhodes, the appeal from the postconviction order rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was merged with the remaining issues on the direct appeal that had been stayed. See Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 839 n. 6. The test for determining whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of trial counsel is whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether the verdict would have been different but for this deficiency. State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn.1999) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). We need not evaluate both factors if either one is determinative. Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d at 842. The court uses an objective standard of reasonableness in evaluating an attorney's performance. State v. Jones, 392 N.W.2d 224, 236 (Minn.1986). Further, counsel must have the discretion and flexibility to devise a trial strategy that best serves the client. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 43 (Minn. 1998). Blom asserts nine different claims why a new trial is warranted because his trial counsel were ineffective. We have reviewed Blom's claims against his trial counsel one by one and conclude they are without merit. Our analysis of each claim is as follows. Blom first asserts that his lead state defense counsel did not have his consent to admit his guilt at the September 8 press conference. Blom's counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that Blom specifically asked him to talk to the press about Blom's September 8 statement in which Blom admitted to both the kidnapping and the killing of Poirier. Counsel testified as follows: Q. Mr. Brodin, my question to you is, did you personally have any conversation or authorization from the defendant to talk to the press on that date? A. I did. Q. Did you obtain that permission from him prior to going out after the statement and talking to the press? A. Absolutely. Q. What sorts of limitations did the defendant put on you with respect to your release to the press? A. There were no limitations placed upon me. Mr. Blom was anxious that we say something concerning the confession and his reasons for giving the confession. I told him very specifically that I was going to say that he gave the statement or confession to bring an end to the case, because to ease the minds of his family and in part to ease the minds of the Poiriers. Now, those were not the exact words I used, but they were very closed [sic] to what I used when I gave the statement. Q. Mr. Brodin, was that at a time subsequent to the statement, but prior to you leaving the doors of the jail facility? A. It was. And we also went over the fact that we would say that he did this against the wishes of his attorneys. The objective was for Mr. Blom to at least come out looking like he was doing this, that he had regrets, and that even with the advice of his attorneys not to do this, which was true, he went ahead and did it for these noble purposes. And Mr. Blom was very aware that I was going to say that to the press. We went over it before I went out there. Blom denies making this request, but on this claim and others, the postconviction court found that Blom failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel's conduct amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Further, counsel's statements were not prejudicial under Strickland in any event because all the jurors stated during voir dire that they would be able to decide the case solely on what they heard in the courtroom. Finally, Blom's September 8 statement was admitted at trial so the jurors had before them what Blom actually said in the statement. Blom next asserts that his trial counsel should have testified at the omnibus hearing to show that the September 8 statement was part of a plea agreement. Blom's trial defense team, after discussion, decided not to have Blom's lead counsel testify at the omnibus hearing because the team believed that the law was clear that the September 8 statement was part of the plea agreement. We conclude that this decision falls in the realm of trial strategy and therefore does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, Blom asserts that his trial counsel failed to provide evidence regarding the coercive conditions of his incarceration. Here, the postconviction court concluded counsel effectively brought facts before the court relating to conditions of confinement. Moreover, we have already concluded that the evidence shows that Blom's September 8 statement was voluntary. Therefore, we conclude that this assertion lacks merit. The fourth claim raised by Blom is that his trial counsel gave an insufficient proffer of proof regarding the alternative perpetrator. Here again, the postconviction court found counsel effectively brought the facts before the court, and we agree. Moreover, we have already held that the proffer was sufficient and that the district court erred in not admitting the evidence, but the error was harmless. Blom's fifth claim is that his trial counsel gave an insufficient proffer of proof regarding a cremation expert. Blom does not explain how the proffer of proof for his cremation expert was insufficient. The hearing on the state's motion to exclude Blom's cremation expert for surprise and irrelevance indicates that the expert was a substitution for two other experts originally submitted by Blom who withdrew from the case before trial. Blom's trial counsel intended to proffer the testimony of the cremation expert to show that Blom's September 8 statement had to be false because of the way Blom described incinerating Poirier's body without an accelerant. The court granted the state's motion, not on the basis of surprise, but on the ground that the introduction of this witness at that stage of the trial proceedings was untimely and irrelevant. We conclude that trial counsel was not deficient here; rather, the district court exercised its discretion to exclude the testimony after considering the situation. Blom's sixth claim is that his trial counsel were unprepared. After reviewing the trial transcript, the records of the numerous hearings and voir dire, the numerous motions and memoranda filed by defense counsel, the voluminous reports filed by the defense's private investigator, and the trial record, it is evident that Blom's trial counsel were well-prepared despite the huge task they faced. Counsel vigorously defended Blom's right to a fair trial. Blom's counsel were prepared to defend Blom from the time they first represented him and throughout all the subsequent proceedings, including the trial. We conclude that this claim lacks merit and Blom has provided us with no evidence to conclude otherwise. Blom's seventh claim is that his trial counsel failed to sufficiently cross-examine the state's forensic anthropologist. Blom fails to give reasons for his conclusion that his counsel's cross-examination of the forensic anthropologist was deficient. Our reading of the cross-examination reveals no deficiency. Counsel brought out on cross-examination that the anthropologist was not present at the excavation, that the bones were commingled, that there may have been bones from more than one human in the pit, that there were no complete bones, and that the anthropologist could not determine the cause of death. Blom also claims that his trial counsel did not elicit sufficient information regarding the bear bones found in Carlton County on August 29, 1999. However, Blom fails to give an explanation or any basis for this assertion. Our review of the record indicates that Blom has failed to raise a valid issue with respect to these bones. The Carlton County Medical Examiner examined the rib bones recovered from the pit and determined that the bones were not human and likely belonged to a bear. Blom's final ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that his trial counsel failed to prevent discovery and investigation reports from being filed in the court record, which made the reports accessible to the public. At the postconviction hearing, Blom's trial counsel testified that it has been standard practice in Carlton County to file discovery papers and investigative reports in the court record for at least the last 27 years; therefore, we conclude that this claim lacks merit. In sum, for the reasons stated above, we hold that Blom's numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are without merit. In conclusion, we acknowledge that Blom's trial presented many complex and difficult issues. But the district court and counsel for both the state and Blom demonstrated a high degree of skill and competence in dealing with these issues. Moreover, our extensive review of the record leads us to the firm conclusion that while Blom may not have received a perfect trial, he definitely received a fair trial. See State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 505 (Minn.1999) (stating the constitutional right to a fair criminal trial does not guarantee a perfect trial). Therefore, we affirm the jury's verdict, the district court's entry of a conviction for first-degree murder, Blom's sentence to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and the district court's denial of Blom's petition for postconviction relief. Affirmed.