Opinion ID: 2537041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Out of State Authority

Text: As explained above, the continuing tort doctrine is wholly consistent with the Civil Code and this Court's long held jurisprudence. However, the concept is not unique to Louisiana, and the out of state jurisprudence warrants review as persuasive authority. Perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of chemical contamination as a continuing tort is Hoery v. U.S., 64 P.3d 214 (Colo.2003). A nearby Air Force base negligently released toxic chemicals from 1940 through 1994, and the chemicals migrated under plaintiffs' land. Hoery knew of the contamination in 1995, but did not sue until 1998, after the claim had facially prescribed. Id. at 217. The federal district court held for defendant, finding the only `wrongful act' alleged by Hoery was the actual release of toxic chemicals by the United States. Id. The Tenth Circuit sent a certified question to the Colorado Supreme Court, which was called upon to decide whether the ongoing presence of those toxic chemicals on plaintiff's property constitute continuing trespass and/or nuisance and tolled the statute of limitations. Id. at 215. The Colorado Supreme Court held for plaintiff, as the defendant's tortious conduct is not limited to the initial release of those chemicals. Id. at 216. Instead, an actor's failure to remove a thing tortiously placed on another's land is considered a `continuing trespass' for the entire time during which the thing is wrongfully placed on the land.... Until the thing tortiously placed on the land, or underneath the land, is removed, then liability for trespass remains. Id. at 218, citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161 cmt. B; 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 26. As a result, the migration and presence of toxic chemicals on his property were in themselves wrongful acts for which the United States was responsible. Id. at 217. The Colorado court convincingly distinguished its earlier cases, similar to Crump, involving irrigation ditches and canals. Earlier Colorado courts found prescription began to run when the ditch or canal was complete. [6] The Hoery court distinguished those cases, which were based on the fact the ditch served a useful purpose and defendants, with lawful authority, constructed a socially beneficial structure intended to be permanent. Id. at 220. Of course, there is no socially beneficial use to the chemicals currently contaminating the Hoggs' property. The basic holding of the Hoery case is [t]he failure of the United States to remove the pollution from Hoery's property which it wrongfully placed there constitutes a continuing property invasion for the entire time the contamination remains. Id. at 222. Several other courts have reached the same result. See Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1556-57 (6th Cir.1997)(Although discharge of uranium was years ago, plaintiff may bring claim for resulting contamination to his land. However, plaintiff can only recover for damages suffered within four year prescriptive period); Arcade Water Dist. v. U.S., 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.1991)(Although defendant stopped operating pollution laundromat years before, tort was continuing as long as chemicals leached into plaintiff's water supply); State of Florida v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So.2d 512, 514 (Florida Dist. Ct.App.1997)(In groundwater pollution cases, it is the ongoing contamination, not the initial disposal of wastes, that constitutes a continuing, but abatable, nuisance); Taylor v. Culloden Public Service Dist., 214 W.Va. 639, 591 S.E.2d 197, 204 (2003) (as long as the arsenic remains on the Kermit Lumber business site ... and as long as the arsenic is flowing into the Tug Fork River, the harm or nuisance continues); In re ASARCO/Vashon-Maury Island Litigation, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7154 at -15 (W.D.Wash.2001)(Soil contamination claims are not barred by the statute of limitations so long as the intruding substance remains in the ground.) Notably, the federal Fifth Circuit has not adopted this rule. In the recent decision of Kling Realty Co. v. Chevron USA Inc., 575 F.3d 510 (5th Cir.2009), the Fifth Circuit held chemical contamination from a closed oil well was not a continuing tort. Although the court noted Louisiana law recognizes the doctrine of continuing trespass, it held the contamination of the Kling/Walet property caused by Chevron is the continuing effect of prior conduct; the soil damage is unlike dumping garbage or litter on another's property. Id. at 519. First, it is not clear that Kling is on point. In Kling, plaintiff's primary claim was based on a lease dating from 1970. The lease ended in 1973, and the parties entered into a full release of claims associated with the Well and any pit, tank battery, or other piece of equipment associated with the Well. Id. at 512. The existence of a signed release is highly relevant, as the court held that the three year statute of limitations began to run from the date the release was signed. To the extent that Kling is on point, I believe the Fifth Circuit is in error. This Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the laws of this state. Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 06-0582 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045. Although we carefully consider federal district and appellate court decisions, we are not bound to follow them. Chittenden v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 00-414 (La.5/15/01), 788 So.2d 1140, 1149 n. 21. I would disapprove of Kling in favor of the rule pronounced in Estate of Patout v. City of New Iberia, 01-0151 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/02), 813 So.2d 1248, and Lopez v. House of Faith Non-Denomination Ministries, 09-1147 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/13/10), 29 So.3d 680, and find the continued existence of noxious, unabated chemicals on or beneath a plaintiff's land constitutes a continuing tort, even if the conduct which originally caused the chemical contamination has ceased.