Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Requiring Special Verdicts

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly acceded to the prosecutor's request to have the jury return special verdicts. With small exceptions, state law requires a jury in a criminal case to return a general verdict (§ 1150), which is defined as a verdict of either guilty or not guilty, which imports a conviction or acquittal of the offense charged in the accusatory pleading (§ 1151). This rale ensures that juries have a wide latitude to reach a verdict, permitting them to consider all facets of a case before making a decision. (See generally People v. Williams (2001) 25 Cal.4th 441, 450, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 21 P.3d 1209; United States v. Spock (1st Cir.1969) 416 F.2d 165, 182.) In this case, the prosecution proposed to submit to the jury certain verdict forms that would enable the jury to indicate whether it found true any or all of the four proffered theories of first degree murder: premeditated and deliberate murder, murder while lying in wait, felony murder, or murder during the course of a conspiracy. Without stating any grounds, defense counsel objected, but the trial court overruled the objection. The court then instructed the jurors that they need not be unanimous on the theory elevating the homicide to first degree murder so long as they were unanimous that defendant was guilty of that crime. The court further instructed the jurors that [i]f they were unanimous on a particular theory, the foreperson should sign and date the corresponding special verdict form, but [i]f you do not unanimously agree upon any or all of the theories of murder in the first degree, then leave those special findings undated and unsigned. The jury sustained all four special findings. Contrary to defendant's argument, we have approved the use of such hybrid general verdict forms, finding they do not violate the statutory prohibition against special verdicts. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511-512, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119; People v. Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 877, 897-898, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 189, 864 P.2d 460.) Such verdict forms are permissible because they do not ask the jury merely to make factual findings while ced[ing] the ultimate judgment of [the defendant's] culpability to the trial court. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1227, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Defendant's further argument that such hybrid general verdict forms violate his constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial was not preserved for appeal because defense counsel did not make clear their objection was on constitutional grounds. Even assuming for argument that the constitutional issue is properly before us, it is meritless. ( People v. Davis, supra, at p. 512, fn. 9, 309 P.2d 1.)