Opinion ID: 2277075
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion To Dismiss Multiple Counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree

Text: Feddiman was charged with eight separate counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree (Counts 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12). The Superior Court granted Feddiman's defense attorneys motion for a bill of particulars with respect to those offenses. After receiving the State's response to the motion for a bill of particulars, Feddiman's attorneys filed a pretrial motion to dismiss all but one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, on the grounds of multiplicity. [25] The motion to dismiss was denied by the Superior Court. Multiplicity is defined as the charging of a single offense in more than one count of an indictment. Harrell v. State, 88 Wis.2d 546, 277 N.W.2d 462, 464-65 (1979). The division of a single offense into multiple counts of an indictment violates the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitutions of the State of Delaware and of the United States. Del. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S. Const. amend. V. Feddiman's argument in the Superior Court and in this appeal, is that the State's allegations in eight of the counts in the indictment, if true, only prove one continuous act of sexual intercourse. The State contends that each of the eight counts in the indictment, represents an independent, intentional sexual assault upon the victim by Feddiman. The State's response to Feddiman's request for a bill of particulars related each of the eight counts of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree to a specific location and to a particular sexual act. [26] Restated in chronological order, the State's response to Feddiman's request for a bill of particulars represents that the State would prove that Feddiman 1) forced the victim to commit fellatio while riding in the car to the beach (Count 4); 2) forced the victim to engage in vaginal sexual intercourse in the car at the beach (Count 7); 3) thereafter, forced the victim to commit fellatio again, in the car, at the beach (Count 5); 4) forced the victim to commit fellatio on the sand, near the water, at the beach (Count 6); 5) forced the victim to engage in vaginal sexual intercourse again, in the car, at the beach (Count 9); 6) forced the victim to engage in vaginal intercourse from the rear, in the car, at the dump site (Count 10); 7) forced the victim to commit fellatio, in the car, at the dump site (Count 11); and 8) forced the victim to engage in vaginal intercourse from the rear, outside of the car, at the dump site (Count 12). [27] This Court has previously held that a continuum of criminal activity can constitute a violation of several distinct criminal statutes if each statorney provision requires proof of a fact the other does not. Weber v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 948, 962 (1988). Similarly, [a] person who commits multiple sexual assaults upon the same victim may be held responsible for, and punished for, each separate and distinct act, albeit a violation of the same statute. Harrell v. State, 277 N.W.2d at 471. One is not allowed to take advantage of the fact that he has already committed one sexual assault on the victim and thereby be permitted to commit further assaults on the same person with no risk of further punishment for each assault committed. Each act is a further denigration of the victim's integrity and a further danger to the victim. Id. at 469. [28] This Court has held that [w]hether a course of conduct involving multiple sexual assaults permits prosecution for more than one statutory offense, of rape, ultimately turns on the facts, particularly the timing between the sexual acts and the physical movement of the victim between the acts. Wyant v. State, Del.Supr., 519 A.2d 649, 661 (1986). The State's allegations in the record of the variations in the sexual acts, the physical movement of the victim between the acts, and the timing between the sexual acts, was sufficient to support Feddiman's prosecution for eight separate offenses of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree. Id. Feddiman's argument to the contrary is without merit. We find that the Superior Court properly denied the motion by Feddiman to dismiss all but one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, on the grounds of multiplicity.