Opinion ID: 166965
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert Witness Craddock.

Text: King Soopers also contends that the district court erred in admitting Craddock’s expert testimony because he was not qualified as an expert. In response, Hussmann asserts that King Soopers failed to object to Craddock’s qualifications at trial, and that King Soopers waived appellate review because it cannot show plain error. In this case, King Soopers did not challenge Craddock’s qualifications as an expert witness during his testimony or before trial. Nor did it file a motion in limine to exclude Craddock’s testimony. King Soopers asserts that it objected at least five times during Craddock’s testimony. But none of these objections pertained to Craddock’s qualifications as an expert. “The specific ground for reversal of an evidentiary ruling on appeal must be the same as that raised at trial.” Fortier v. Dona Anna Plaza Partners, 747 F.2d 1324, 1331 (10th Cir. 1984). King Soopers’ objections on other grounds did not preserve an objection to Craddock’s qualifications for appellate review. See McKenzie v. Benton, 388 F.3d 1342, 1350 (10th Cir. 2004) (refusing to treat an objection for relevance as one for qualification), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2294 (2005). King Soopers claims that it challenged Craddock’s qualifications in its -12- motion to strike Hussmann’s comparative negligence defense. In its motion to strike, King Soopers maintained that the only basis for the comparative negligence claim was Craddock’s testimony and he was not qualified. 1 To the extent that King Soopers’ motion to strike the comparative negligence claim challenged Craddock’s qualifications, this was not timely. See Macsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2001) (requiring objection at the time of witness’ testimony and applying plain error, even though the defendant raised his argument in a motion to strike at the close of evidence). As a result of King Soopers’ failure to challenge Craddock’s qualifications before trial or when he testified, we review this issue for plain error. See Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1088 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000). “To constitute plain error, the district court’s mistake must have been both obvious and substantial.” Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1050 (10th Cir. 1995). “The plain error exception in civil cases has been limited to errors which seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 1 The district court denied King Soopers’ motion to strike because “this isn’t the type of comparative fault where you have to have an expert, like medical negligence cases, to support it.” Aplee. App. at 156. Because King Soopers never objected to Craddock’s qualifications during his testimony, the district court did not make any findings regarding his qualifications. However, we “assume that the district court performs such an analysis sub silentio throughout the trial with respect to all expert testimony.” Macsenti v. Becker, 237 F.3d 1223, 1232 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). -13- proceedings.” McEwen v. City of Norman, Okla., 926 F.2d 1539, 1545 (10th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). King Soopers complains that Craddock is not qualified because his educational background is in civil engineering, and he is not an architect, structural engineer, fire protection engineer, or certified fire investigator. A person may be qualified “as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed. R. Evid. R. 702; Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399, 1408 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that an expert is qualified when he possesses “such skill, experience or knowledge in that particular field as to make it appear that his opinion would rest on substantial foundation and would tend to aid the trier of fact in his search for the truth”) (internal quotation marks omitted). King Soopers cites no authority for its argument that only architects, structural engineers, fire protection engineers, or certified fire investigators can provide expert testimony regarding the origin of a fire. Our ruling in Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2004), which affirmed the admissibility of expert testimony from a fire investigator, a chemical engineer, and an accident investigator, is support for the district court’s ruling in the present case. See id. at 1235. Further, Craddock was qualified as an expert under Rule 702. Craddock is a consulting engineer for Engineering Systems, Inc., which investigates accidents and fires. Craddock described his speciality as “the evaluation of very large -14- fires.” Aplee. App. at 121. For three years, Craddock investigated a fire at the MGM casino that spread rapidly from a restaurant where the sprinklers had been removed. In this case, Craddock’s primary role was to determine why “this particular fire had got out of hand and spread so rapidly and ended up basically destroying this particular structure.” Id. at 128. Craddock has an undergraduate degree in civil engineering, and he has taken additional courses in construction materials. Craddock has performed tests on construction materials, including fire testing involving different types of insulation, and evaluating the sufficiency of sprinkler and fire alarm systems. Craddock has experience in designing and evaluating sprinkler systems and interpreting building codes. He has testified as an expert in Colorado state and federal courts. King Soopers has not established that the admission of Craddock’s expert testimony constituted plain error. King Soopers also maintains that Craddock was not qualified to render expert opinion in this matter because he did not have an engineering license in Colorado. King Soopers submits that Craddock is required to be licensed as an engineer in Colorado, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-25-101, presumably because he worked as a consultant and testified as an expert in this case. However, King Soopers has not cited any authority requiring engineers who are consultants or expert witnesses to obtain an engineering license in Colorado. Nor has King Soopers cited any cases concluding that an expert with an engineering background -15- was not qualified to testify because he was not licensed in the state where the trial occurred. While Craddock was not a licensed engineer in Colorado, he was licensed in numerous other states. Craddock was qualified to testify as an expert. Moreover, the district court afforded King Soopers ample opportunity to cross-examine Craddock about his expert opinion. See McKenzie, 388 F.3d at 1351 (affirming admission of expert testimony and noting that plaintiff had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness); Black v. M & W Gear Co., 269 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that no plain error occurred in admitting expert testimony and observing that the defendants cross-examined the expert). Any deficiencies in Craddock’s method or theories were proper fodder for cross examination. King Soopers cross-examined Craddock extensively. Finally, King Soopers argues that the district court erred in admitting Craddock’s testimony because Craddock relied on the work of certified fire investigators in his office. But King Soopers’ argument that Craddock relied on opinions of another goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. See Ferrara & DiMercurio v. St. Paul Mercury, Ins. Co., 240 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001). King Soopers has failed to establish that the district court’s admission of Craddock’s expert testimony was plain error. Leasehold Improvements Next, King Soopers appeals the district court’s exclusion of improvements -16- in determining damages. King Soopers advances three arguments: (1) that the lease agreement expressly vests ownership in the improvements in the lessee; (2) that even in the absence of the lease agreement, it owned the improvements under Colorado law; and (3) that Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) demonstrate that it was the owner of the improvements. On appeal, King Soopers asserts that the improvements were worth $967,469.62. We review the district court’s exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 2000). Also, this court reviews the failure to give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. Allison, 289 F.3d at 1241. At trial, former CFO Ronald Warren testified that King Soopers owned the improvements that King Soopers made to the store. The portion of the lease included in the record states that upon termination of the lease, the title in the improvements “shall become” property of the lessor. Aplt. App. at 28. Warren testified that the lease had not terminated or expired as of the date of the fire. But King Soopers did not introduce the lease as an exhibit at trial, and it did not introduce evidence of the date of termination. On appeal, Hussmann argues that King Soopers failed to object to the district court’s exclusion of improvements. Our review of the record confirms that King Soopers did object on two grounds: (1) that it owned the improvements -17- under Colorado law; and (2) that the improvements would have zero net book value under GAAP upon termination. It does appear, however, that King Soopers is arguing for the first time on appeal that the lease explicitly provided that it owned the leasehold improvements and that the lease entitles King Soopers to recover damages for the value of the improvements. King Soopers’ reliance on the lease is made difficult because we have only a portion of the lease in the record. 2 Although King Soopers did not introduce the lease as an exhibit at trial, Hussmann appended part of the lease agreement to its trial brief submitted to the district court. See Fed. R. App. P. 10 (defining the “record on appeal” to include “the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court”); Echo Acceptance Corp. v. Household Retail Servs., Inc., 267 F.3d 1068, 1081 n.7 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that summary judgment exhibits and exhibits at trial were part of the record on appeal). This court will not consider a new theory on appeal, even one that “falls under the same general category as an argument presented at trial or presents a theory that was discussed in a vague and ambiguous way” at trial. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel of Kan., Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 798-99 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), op. am. on other grounds, 103 F.3d 80 2 Therefore, any reference to “the lease” which appears in the analysis that follows must by necessity refer only to that portion of the lease that is contained in the record. -18- (10th Cir. 1996). “[A] party must present the legal basis of the claim to the district court clearly and explicitly. . . . [V]ague, arguable references to [a] point in the district court proceeding do not . . . preserve the issue on appeal.” Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1302 (2005). In this case, King Soopers argued before the district court that it was entitled to recover damages for the value of the improvements because it owned those improvements, but it provided no authority for its argument. It did not attribute its ownership rights to the lease, although it now contends that the lease expressly confers such ownership rights. Instead, King Soopers’ argument at trial was that it was entitled to recover for the improvements (presumably under the common law) and that the improvements would have zero net book value under GAAP upon termination of the lease. King Soopers did not introduce the lease as an exhibit at trial, nor draw the district court’s attention to it in its arguments at sidebar. At best, King Soopers made vague references to its ownership rights, which are insufficient to preserve the argument that the lease demonstrated ownership of the improvements. This court has “discretion to make exceptions in extraordinary circumstances.” Shoels, 375 F.3d at 1062. We may reverse “a judgment on the basis of issues not raised below when . . . the issues involved are questions of -19- law, the proper resolution of which are beyond reasonable doubt, and the failure to address the issues would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Petrini v. Howard, 918 F.2d 1482, 1483 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). Although this case involves a question of law in interpreting the lease agreement, this case does not constitute extraordinary circumstances. The resolution of the underlying issue is a matter of Colorado landlord-tenant law. Furthermore, its resolution is not beyond reasonable doubt because the lease is silent about the ownership rights of the improvements during the lease, despite King Soopers’ contentions to the contrary. Finally, King Soopers cannot show a miscarriage of justice where the district court entered judgment in its favor for more than $3.2 million. Next, King Soopers contends that, even in the absence of the express lease agreement, that it would still be deemed the owner of the leasehold improvements. Because King Soopers made this argument below, this court reviews the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. King Soopers cites three cases in support of its argument, but none of these cases establish that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the evidence of the improvements. It is undisputed that the lessor owned the improvements upon the termination of the lease. However, because the lease does not clearly confer ownership rights upon King Soopers, the common law of fixtures applies. -20- Under the common law, “[t]he general tests for determining whether a particular object has become a fixture are usually said to comprise annexation to the realty, adaptation to the use to which the realty is devoted, and intention that the object became a permanent accession to the freehold.” Ferganchick v. Johnson, 473 P.2d 990, 992 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970) (internal quotation marks omitted) (affirming trial court’s decision to award damages for value of fixtures in its condition at the time of removal or destruction); Puzzle Mining & Reduction Co. v. Morse Bros. Mach. & Supply Co., 131 P. 791, 792-93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1913) (determining that improvements were fixtures that became part of realty). In this case, King Soopers retained explicit ownership of equipment, fixtures, and furniture, but the lease was silent about ownership of the improvements. Under the common law, the improvements were annexed to realty, and the parties did not express clear intent that the improvements would not become a permanent accession to the freehold. King Soopers has not established that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of improvements and refusing to instruct the jury. Finally, King Soopers advances a policy argument that the lessor could not claim any value in the improvements under GAAP. Because King Soopers raised this argument below, this court reviews the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. In an offer of proof, former CFO Warren testified that GAAP required -21- the improvements to be depreciated over the life of the lease, and that improvements have zero net book value at the termination of the lease. While King Soopers may be correct as a matter of accounting methods, it has cited no authority to support its contention that a lessee is permitted to recover damages for improvements because of GAAP. Rather, courts apply the common law of fixtures in the absence of express agreement in the lease. King Soopers has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of leasehold improvements and refusing to instruct the jury on damages for improvements. AFFIRMED. Entered for the Court Mary Beck Briscoe