Opinion ID: 4531404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disability Retaliation

Text: We next consider the district court’s grant of summary judgment against Rossley’s disability retaliation claim. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “construing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Wages v. Stuart Mgmt. Corp., 798 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2015). “Even if not discussed by the district court, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record.” Id. The district court granted summary judgement in favor of the University and the Board on Rossley’s claim that they retaliated against him in violation of Title III -8- of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the University and the Board because the district court concluded Rossley failed to provide any evidence showing the defendants’ decisions or actions were pretext for retaliatory animus. On appeal, Rossley argues the district court “did not do justice to [his] retaliation case when it selectively chose to highlight only those actions relied upon by Drake to support its motion for summary judgment,” which resulted in a no pretext finding. For purposes of summary judgment all parties concede that (1) Rossley could state a prima facie case of retaliation, and (2) the University and the Board had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his removal from the Board. Thus, the only question on appeal is whether Rossley could prove the non-discriminatory reason for his removal was actually a pretext for disability retaliation. Moses v. Dassault Falcon Jet Wilmington Corp., 894 F.3d 911, 924 (8th Cir. 2018). Rossley asserts the district court erred by improperly relying on facts highlighted by the University and the Board, and that it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to him. He also argues the district court erroneously relied on Eighth Circuit precedent in Mershon v. St. Louis University, because he believes the facts are distinguishable. 442 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2006). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Rossley, we find that the Board voted to remove Rossley from his position of Trustee due to his “[p]ervasive conflict of interest” with the University, and only after Rossley refused to take a leave of absence from the Board. This decision was bolstered by the emails from Rossley intimating he or his son may sue the University. And while Rossley asserts that other Trustees “were previously personally involved in Title IX proceedings at the University” but were not found to have conflicts of interest, we find this suggestion dubious. Nothing suggests these other allegedly personally-involved Trustees sent emails to the University about possible litigation, asked the Board to consider reversing a University disciplinary decision, or spoke to faculty, alumni, and donors -9- about their children’s situation. The factual dissimilarities between Rossley and the other interested Board members he identifies do not generate an inference that the Board removed Rossley because of disability-related animus. No question of fact exists for a jury. Rossley has not shown any evidence that the proffered reason — a pervasive conflict of interest — was not the motivation behind his removal from the Board. One cannot reasonably infer that either the University or the Board retaliated against Rossley. And although it is true the facts in Mershon are distinguishable from the actions Rossley and the University undertook here, its principles are nonetheless applicable. In Mershon, a former student was prevented from returning to St. Louis University’s (“SLU”) campus shortly after he allegedly complained of SLU’s failure to accommodate his disability. The former student therefore argued that the timing of SLU’s action indicated pretext. We disagreed. SLU had explained it prevented the student’s return because it believed the student had threatened a professor with violence. 442 F.3d at 1073. The former student’s claim that he had complained about his lack of accommodations shortly before his removal did not undercut SLU’s proffered explanation, because the university’s explanation justified the student’s prompt removal. Id. at 1075. The same principle applies here. Rossley’s removal shortly after his threat of litigation does not undercut the Board’s proffered explanation, because the ever-increasing conflict between Rossley’s interests and the University’s justified Rossley’s removal at the time. Therefore the district court did not err in relying on Mershon in its analysis.