Opinion ID: 567448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for New Trial Based Upon Newly Discovered Evidence

Text: 20 All defendants assert that the district court abused its discretion in denying their motions for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence that a court order to sequester witnesses was violated in contravention of Fed.R.Evid. 615. Defendants argue that the violation of the sequestration order meets the following standard for granting a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence: 21 (1) the new evidence was discovered after the trial; 22 (2) the evidence could not have been discovered earlier with due dilignece; 23 (3) the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and 24 (4) the evidence would likely produce an acquittal. 25 United States v. O'Dell, 805 F.2d 637, 640 (6th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 966 (6th Cir.1982)). 26 Defendants argue that they did not learn that the sequestration order had been violated until after trial. Elder was incarcerated in Bullitt County Jail, where he discovered that Hunt, Haskell, and Villacci had discussed their testimony for many hours on February 8, 1990. Defendants claim that they were diligent in obtaining this information once it was revealed to Elder, and, furthermore, that during the trial the assistant United States attorney withheld information from defense counsel as to where the witnesses were located. Defendants argue further that because these witnesses' testimony was material to the issue of the existence of a conspiracy to traffic marijuana in this case, Haskell's differing testimony also would be material to the issue of the existence of a conspiracy among these three defendants, and not merely of an impeaching nature. As to the fourth element, defendants argue that had Haskell testified differently, a jury might not have found defendants guilty. 27 Defendants make an additional argument that since the newly discovered evidence indicates that Haskell committed perjury, the following less stringent standard for granting a new trial should be applied: 28 (1) the court must be reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a material witness is false; 29 (2) that the jury might have reached a different conclusion without such testimony; and 30 (3) that the party seeking a new trial was taken by surprise when the false testimony was given and the defendant was unable to correct the falsity or did not discover it until after trial. 31 Davis v. Jellico Community Hosp., Inc., 912 F.2d 129 (6th Cir.1990); Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928). 32 The government's position is that the O'Dell standard rather than the Jellico standard is appropriate in this matter, and that defendants fail to meet the requirements outlined in that case for the grant of a new trial. 33 The standard of review concerning motions for a new trial is an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Allen, 748 F.2d 335, 337 (6th Cir.1984). As a preliminary matter, we find that the correct legal standard to be used in resolving this issue is the O'Dell test, which was applied by the trial court, and not the less restrictive Jellico test urged by defendants. Historically, the Jellico test has been applied only in perjury cases in which a material witness has later recanted testimony. See Gordon v. United States, 178 F.2d 896 (6th Cir.1949). In the instant case, third parties are claiming that a material witness perjured himself. 34 After careful consideration of the circumstances and application of the O'Dell test, we find that defendants failed to prove the requirements necessary for the grant of a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. First, we note that Hunt's testimony, which in large part was completed on the first day, by itself could have given the jury sufficient grounds to find a single conspiracy and to convict all three defendants. 35 Furthermore, the record indicates that defendants were aware at the time of trial that the governments' witnesses might have had an opportunity to discuss their testimony with each other. At trial, defendant Elder called two witnesses, Rick Subien and Tim Seng, to substantiate his allegations of the witnesses' collusion. Inasmuch as defendant Elder called two witnesses at trial to address the alleged violation of the sequestration order, it is apparent that such evidence was discoverable with due diligence. Additionally, even if the evidence had shown collusion of the witnesses for the purpose of tailoring their testimony, such evidence could only have been used to impeach their testimony, and the testimony of the five new witnesses proffered by defendants would merely have been cumulative. Finally, defendants failed to demonstrate that the testimony of five new persons would likely produce an acquittal. Nothing in the affidavits of the two witnesses employed by the Bullitt County Jail indicates that they had firsthand knowledge of the alleged collusion. 36 While we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, the government's conduct in this matter is disquieting. Although there is no proof that the governments' witnesses tailored their testimony, the government acted improperly by placing all three witnesses in the same cell for an extended period of time after the first day of trial. Such conduct raises the specter of impropriety, and, for that reason alone, should have been avoided. 37