Opinion ID: 2026970
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application: Defendant's Eye Injury

Text: In the present case, absent defendant's black eye, the State would have been required to prove the voluntariness of defendant's inculpatory statement by a preponderance of the evidence. Where the only evidence of coercion would have been Bronaugh's testimony, which was contradicted by the State's witnesses, the circuit court would have been presented solely with an issue of witness credibility, and a reviewing court would have been reluctant to reverse such a determination. However, because it is undisputed that defendant was injured in police custody, the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant's eye injury was not inflicted as a means of producing his inculpatory statement. For example: If the defendant were injured in the lock up, the State could have one of its officers testify to that effect. (Emphasis added.) People v. Smith, 197 Ill. App.3d 226, 231, 143 Ill.Dec. 328, 554 N.E.2d 263 (1989). Unlike Smith, where the State did not produce any evidence of how defendant was injured ( Smith, 197 Ill.App.3d at 231, 143 Ill.Dec. 328, 554 N.E.2d 263), in the present case, this is exactly how defendant was injured and the State proved it by undisputed evidence. At the suppression hearing, Nolan, Zalatoris, and O'Connell did not merely deny defendant's allegations that they assaulted him, or deny any knowledge of how defendant was injured. The State's clear and convincing burden of proof required `more than the mere denial by the State's witnesses that the confession was coerced.' Woods, 184 Ill.2d at 146, 234 Ill.Dec. 423, 703 N.E.2d 35, quoting Wilson, 116 Ill.2d at 40, 106 Ill.Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571; see Smith, 197 Ill.App.3d at 231, 143 Ill.Dec. 328, 554 N.E.2d 263. Rather, the State's witnesses related defendant's accusation that the lockup keeper assaulted him. With only Heil, defendant, and Bronaugh in the interview room, defendant stated that his eye injury occurred in the police station lockup, and that he had been treated fine at Area 1. Defendant told Heil that his statement was the truth and had nothing to do with his eye injury. Bronaugh testified that defendant complained of a uniformed guard injuring him in the police station lockup, rather than Area 1 detectives. Also, at the beginning of his videotaped statement, defendant himself explained that: his eye injury occurred in the police station lockup; no Area 1 detective inflicted the injury; and his statement was unrelated to his eye injury. In concluding that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that defendant's injury was unrelated to his inculpatory statement, the appellate court considered the facts of People v. Woods to be similar to the facts of this case. 376 Ill. App.3d at 543, 314 Ill.Dec. 915, 875 N.E.2d 1202. In Woods, it was undisputed that the defendant sustained injuries to his face while in police custody. Also, during that time, the defendant was either in the presence of police officers or in a single-person holding cell. The defendant moved to suppress his confession contending that it was involuntary. This court concluded that the State should have been able to prove the cause of the defendant's injuries and whether they occurred before or after his confession. This court held that the confession should have been suppressed because the State failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence as to when or how the defendant was injured, or that the defendant's injuries were unrelated to his confession. Woods, 184 Ill.2d at 149-50, 234 Ill.Dec. 423, 703 N.E.2d 35. Woods is distinguishable from this case. The record before us contains clear and convincing evidence, including defendant's own testimony, that establishes that defendant's inculpatory statement was unrelated to his injury. Further, Woods explicitly rejects a per se rule that any unexplained injury suffered by a defendant in police custody renders the defendant's statement inadmissible. Woods, 184 Ill.2d at 147, 234 Ill.Dec. 423, 703 N.E.2d 35. This court has recognized that the taint of earlier coercive circumstances can be attenuated, thereby rendering a subsequent statement voluntary. See People v. Strickland, 129 Ill.2d 550, 557, 136 Ill.Dec. 72, 544 N.E.2d 758 (1989) (collecting cases). In Woods, this court adhered to our past decisions holding that where a defendant establishes that he has been injured while in police custody, the State may present clear and convincing evidence that `the injuries were not inflicted as a means of producing the confession.' Wilson, 116 Ill.2d at 40[, 106 Ill.Dec. 771, 506 N.E.2d 571]. Woods, 184 Ill.2d at 147-48, 234 Ill.Dec. 423, 703 N.E.2d 35. Our admonition in Woods reflects the general understanding that [a] confession is not rendered inadmissible as a matter of law because of an assault upon the defendant which occurred prior to, disconnected with, and apparently unrelated to the subsequent confession. Barton v. State, 605 S.W.2d 605, 607 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); accord Leon v. State, 410 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla.App.1982) (collecting cases). Although physical force is certainly a defining circumstance, and possibly a dispositive one, its incidental use can sometimes be excused where the other circumstances surrounding the interview show a voluntary confession. The relevant inquiry is the totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir.2008). Courts look to factors such as gaps in time between the use of force and the confession, changed interrogators or location, and renewed Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Upton, 512 F.3d at 399; Wilson v. O'Leary, 895 F.2d 378, 384-85 (7th Cir.1990); State v. Gella, 92 Hawai`i 135, 143-45, 988 P.2d 200, 208-10 (1999); People v. Wells, 238 Mich.App. 383, 389, 605 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1999); Burch v. State, 346 Md. 253, 261-68, 696 A.2d 443, 447-51 (1997). In the present case, our review of the entire record supports the circuit court's finding of voluntariness. Defendant arrived at the 2nd District police station at 3:35 p.m. on February 9, 2001. Between 5 and 5:30 p.m., defendant received a black eye in the police station lockup from someone who did not receive defendant's statement. Although Youth Investigator Nolan saw defendant prior to his injury, Nolan did not question defendant regarding the investigation at that time. Further, defendant was already injured when Detectives Zalatoris and O'Connell first met defendant and his mother. Also, defendant was interviewed at Area 1, which was a different location from where he was injured. Nolan, Zalatoris, and O'Connell first interviewed defendant at 9:08 p.m., which was between 3½ and 4 hours after the injury. This interview lasted only between 45 minutes and one hour. At approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 10, defendant repeated his inculpatory statement to Assistant State's Attorney Heil, Nolan, and O'Connell in a session lasting only between 30 and 45 minutes. At approximately 9:27 a.m., defendant made a videotaped statement. Significantly, defendant's statement was taken in the presence of his mother and Youth Investigator Nolan. Further, according to Bronaugh's testimony, she repeatedly told defendant that he did not have to speak to the detectives. At every opportunity to speak, defendant repeatedly: identified his assailant as the lockup keeper, rather than the detectives as alleged in the amended motion to suppress; and asserted that his black eye had nothing to do with his statement. Further, defendant never indicated that he gave his statement because of the fact of being hit, or any fear based on being hit. Defendant repeatedly acknowledged that Area 1 detectives provided him with food and drink, restroom access when needed, and time to sleep. See, e.g., People v. Moats, 89 Ill.App.3d 194, 198-200, 44 Ill. Dec. 451, 411 N.E.2d 573 (1980) (upholding denial of motion to suppress inculpatory statements; observing that defendant's admission that injury was not result of police brutality can be key evidence supporting State's explanation for injury). Indeed, at defendant's first interview, which occurred after the incident in the lockup, defendant initially did not admit culpability. It was only after being confronted with the victim's bruises and bite marks did defendant give his inculpatory statement, which supports the conclusion that the incident in the lockup was unrelated to the inculpatory statement. See People v. Williams, 128 Ill.App.3d 384, 392, 83 Ill.Dec. 720, 470 N.E.2d 1140 (1984) (noting that manner in which a defendant answers questions can also be a factor in the totality of the circumstances test). The circuit court found that defendant and his mother appeared cool, calm, and collected throughout his videotaped statement as defendant detailed the injuries he inflicted on the victim. Further, our own review of defendant's videotaped statement confirms this credibility finding. See Slater, 228 Ill.2d at 160, 319 Ill.Dec. 862, 886 N.E.2d 986 (failing to discern from videotaped statement outward indication that defendant has mental disability). Lastly, at trial, defendant could have recanted the voluntariness of his inculpatory statement, as he recanted a minor factual detail in the statement, but he did not. Indeed, during his trial testimony, defendant expressly conceded that his inculpatory statement was voluntary. See, e.g., King, 109 Ill.2d at 525, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949 (observing that on review of circuit court's suppression ruling reviewing court may consider evidence adduced at trial as well as at suppression hearing). We note that the appellate court, in contrast, concluded that the State failed to meet its burden to show that defendant's injuries were unrelated to his confession.    There simply was no evidence presented by the State at the hearing on the motion that explained how or why defendant was injured in police custody. 376 Ill.App.3d at 543, 314 Ill. Dec. 915, 875 N.E.2d 1202. We disagree, based on the above-discussed uncontradicted evidence in the entire record. Noting that defendant told Nolan, Zalatoris, and O'Connell that a lockup keeper punched him in the face, the appellate court opined: Not one of them attempted to elicit additional information from defendant regarding his injury, nor did any notation of the injury appear in any reports. 376 Ill.App.3d at 543, 314 Ill.Dec. 915, 875 N.E.2d 1202. However, this was not necessary for the State to meet its dual burden of going forward with the evidence and proving the inculpatory statement voluntary. It was necessary only for the prosecution to make a prima facie case before defendant was required to present some evidence. See Patterson, 154 Ill.2d at 445, 182 Ill.Dec. 592, 610 N.E.2d 16; People v. Strayhorn, 35 Ill.2d 41, 46, 219 N.E.2d 517 (1965). That said, we observe that while defendant was being interviewed, the Office of Professional Standards was investigating the lockup incident. The detectives did not document defendant's eye injury because: Professional Standards was doing so; and, by defendant's own accusation, the incident involved 2nd District personnel and not Area 1 personnel. Indeed, early in the suppression hearing, defense counsel received a copy of the Professional Standards file. [6] Further, we note that the appellate court improperly rejected defendant's own testimony that the lockup incident was unrelated to his inculpatory statement: Assuming that defendant was injured while in the lockup, here, we have a somewhat unintelligent, unsophisticated juvenile who has been injured while in police custody after being arrested on suspicion of murder. After being arrested, defendant was not free to leave and was therefore at the mercy of the police personnel involved in this case. We are not convinced that, given the facts of this case, defendant would be able to separate the fear associated with being punched by police personnel from any subsequent interactions with police officers or detectives involved in this case. In addition, it is particularly troubling that personnel from the Office of Professional Standards were prevented from speaking with defendant regarding his injury until after defendant gave the videotaped statement. Consequently, we are not convinced that the injury defendant suffered did not ultimately result in the statement wherein he inculpated himself in the death of his daughter. (Emphasis in original.) 376 Ill. App.3d at 543-44, 314 Ill.Dec. 915, 875 N.E.2d 1202. This reasoning does not accord with the record. First, defendant was not arrested on suspicion of murder. Defendant arrived at the 2nd District police station on February 9, 2001, at 3:35 p.m. He was under arrest for child abuse or aggravated battery of a child. The appellate court itself so recognized. 376 Ill.App.3d at 539 n. 1, 314 Ill.Dec. 915, 875 N.E.2d 1202. When defendant was questioned beginning at 9:08 p.m., the victim was still alive. Heil had already been summoned to receive defendant's inculpatory statement when the victim died at 11:45 p.m. Second, defendant presented no evidence of residual fear resulting from the lockup incident. Further, if defendant did harbor such residual fear, the record shows that it was dispelled by the 9:08 p.m. interview. There, defendant did not behave as if his will was overborne due to residual fear. Rather, defendant initially denied his culpability until he was confronted with the victim's bruises and bite marks. Third, the appellate court vaguely characterized defendant as a somewhat unintelligent, unsophisticated juvenile. Also, before this court, defendant's brief opens with a fleeting reference to defendant as mentally retarded. A defendant's youth and subnormal intelligence do not ipso facto render the defendant's confession involuntary. People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 497-502, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968). While mental deficiency, by itself, does not render an inculpatory statement involuntary, it is a factor that must be considered in the totality of the circumstances under which the defendant waived Miranda rights or made an inculpatory statement. People v. Turner, 56 Ill.2d 201, 206, 306 N.E.2d 27 (1973). In the present case, prior to filing a motion to suppress, the defense retained a private expert to examine defendant as to his ability to waive Miranda and some psychological issues. At the suppression hearing, once the State made its prima facie case of voluntariness, defendant was required to present some evidence on this issue. See, e.g., Lopez, 114 Ill.App.3d at 1024, 70 Ill.Dec. 580, 449 N.E.2d 927; Slaughter, 59 Ill.App.3d at 161, 17 Ill.Dec. 140, 376 N.E.2d 33. However, at the suppression hearing, defendant presented no evidence or argument of any mental deficiency that would render his inculpatory statement involuntary, and the circuit court made no findings relating thereto. [7] Further, the constant presence of defendant's mother and Youth Investigator Nolan cannot be overlooked. The ability to confer with a parent or other concerned adult is a relevant factor to consider in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's statement. G.O., 191 Ill.2d at 55, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003. In the present case, Bronaugh was with defendant from shortly after the lockup incident between 5 and 5:30 p.m. on February 9. Indeed, Bronaugh complained that the detectives did not allow her to telephone her family to inform them where she was. However, the detectives explained to her that she had to stay with defendant because he was a juvenile. Bronaugh did not leave defendant until he gave his inculpatory statement to Heil in the early morning of February 10. See, e.g., Reid, 136 Ill.2d at 59, 143 Ill.Dec. 239, 554 N.E.2d 174 (noting presence of defendant's mother during questioning as circumstance in favor of upholding finding of voluntariness). On this record, we conclude that defendant's youth and mental capacity did not render his inculpatory statement involuntary. Defendant specifically alleged that the detectives physically assaulted him in order to extract his inculpatory statement. However, absent defendant's undisputed eye injury, none of the evidence of record, even testimony presented by the defense, supports this allegation. Just as a court may not ignore a defendant's uncontroverted testimony that a confession was a product of specific acts of physical or mental coercion, so it may not ignore uncontroverted testimony by the State establishing the voluntariness of a confession. Lopez, 114 Ill.App.3d at 1024, 70 Ill.Dec. 580, 449 N.E.2d 927. We conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence the manner of defendant's eye injury, thereby establishing that the injury was not inflicted to obtain his inculpatory statement.