Opinion ID: 1822394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Victim's Statement During Killing

Text: During the third round of direct examination of state witness Vitale, the trial court admitted testimony that Johnson told Vitale that [w]hen he was choking her she said she wanted her children. The defense objected on grounds that the testimony went beyond the permissible scope of redirect examination, that the statement had little or no probative value and tremendous potential for unfair prejudice, and that it did not meet the criteria for either a dying declaration or an excited utterance. The trial court overruled the objection on the first of these grounds because the State could have excused Vitale and recalled him to the witness stand solely to elicit the statement. The court further concluded that the statement fell within the exception to the hearsay rule for excited utterances, which is contained in section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2006). [2] The court also acknowledged that the statement was extremely damaging, but applying the test of admissibility in section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2006), concluded that its potential for unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value on the issue of premeditation. Johnson reiterates each of his grounds for objection on appeal. We conclude that he has not demonstrated reversible error as to either his first-degree murder conviction or death sentence. This Court reviews evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. A judge's discretion is limited by the rules of evidence, Johnston v. State, 863 So.2d 271, 278 (Fla.2003), and by the principles of stare decisis. Cf. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980) (Judges dealing with cases essentially alike should reach the same result. Different results reached from substantially the same facts comport with neither logic nor reasonableness.). A trial court ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion if it is based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). Initially, we reject Johnson's claim that the question eliciting the remark went beyond the permissible scope of redirect examination. As the trial judge concluded, the State could have recalled Vitale to the stand and elicited the statement in a new direct examination. See § 90.612(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that judge shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of the interrogation of witnesses . . . so as to [a]void needless consumption of time). Because the trial court acted within its discretion to permit the testimony while Vitale was still on the witness stand, we need not decide whether the question exceeded the permissible scope of redirect. Before determining whether the statement falls within the exception to the hearsay rule for excited utterances, we note that the statement is not rendered inadmissible merely because it passed through two declarants. Vitale's testimony contained two levels of hearsayHagin to Johnson and Johnson to Vitale. Hearsay within hearsay is admissible if each part of the statement falls within an exception to the hearsay rule. § 90.805, Fla. Stat. (2006). Johnson's statement to Vitale falls under the party admission exception to the hearsay rule in section 90.803(18)(a), Florida Statutes (2006). The next step is to determine whether Hagin's statement to Johnson was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. [3] The excited utterance exception authorizes admission of hearsay containing [a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. § 90.803(2), Fla. Stat. A statement is an excited utterance under section 90.803(2) if it was made (1) regarding an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement, (2) before there was time to contrive or misrepresent, and (3) while the person was under the stress or excitement caused by the event. Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 251 (Fla.1996). Although Johnson challenges admission of the statement under section 90.803(2), he does not dispute that the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. Indeed, we have observed [i]f the statement occurs while the exciting event is still in progress, courts have little difficulty finding that the excitement prompted the statement. State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla.1988) (quoting Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 297, at 856 (3d ed.1984)). Hagin was clearly under the stress of her strangulation when she spoke of her children. Johnson argues instead that the requirement that the statement relate to the startling event or condition means that it must describe or say something about the event or condition. Johnson further contends that the statement itself demonstrates reflection that cannot be reconciled with the rationale for the exception: that a person affected by the excitement of a startling event lacks the reflective capacity necessary for conscious misrepresentation. Rogers v. State, 660 So.2d 237, 240 (Fla.1995) (citing Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 803.2 (1994 ed.)). We disagree with both contentions. First, a statement need not describe or refer to the exciting event to qualify as an excited utterance. The exception for spontaneous statements in section 90.803(1) is limited to statements  describing or explaining an event or condition, but section 90.803(2) more broadly encompasses statements  relating to a startling event or condition. (Emphases supplied.) Rejecting an argument that confused the spontaneous statement and excited utterance exceptions, the Third District ruled that in a trial for DUI causing injury and property damage, the trial court correctly admitted hearsay statements by a distraught woman at an accident scene that she and the defendant were at a party, and that [h]e was drunk and we told him not to drive. Edwards v. State, 763 So.2d 549, 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). The Third District concluded that the woman's statement sufficiently `relates' to the event causing the excitement, namely, the serious automobile accident. Id. In this case, Hagin's statement as she was being strangled also sufficiently relates to the startling event, her strangulation, to satisfy this criterion of section 90.803(2). We also conclude that Hagin's statement did not show reflection demonstrating a capacity for conscious misrepresentation that precludes admission as an excited utterance. The medical examiner in this case testified that a strangulation victim loses consciousness generally within fifteen to thirty seconds, up to one minute at most. Therefore, according to the evidence, Hagin's statement about her children would have been made within a one-minute window while she remained conscious during the lethal attack. [W]here the time interval between the event and the statement is long enough to permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded in the absence of some proof that the declarant did not in fact engage in a reflective thought process. Rogers, 660 So.2d at 240 (quoting Jano, 524 So.2d at 662). Here, the statement was contemporaneous with the startling event, and neither the statement itself nor the circumstances in which it was made indicate the type of reflective thought that could result in fabrication. [4] In sum, the statement meets each of the criteria for an excited utterance under section 90.803(2). Johnson next asserts that Hagin's statement to Johnson was inadmissible because it did not tend to prove premeditation and that any probative value it carried was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The trial court concluded that the evidence was relevant and admissible to show that Johnson killed out of premeditation. We agree that because the defendant related the statement and said it was made while he was choking the victim, it was relevant in the guilt phase to establish the element of premeditation for first-degree murder. Evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact is admissible except as provided by law. §§ 90.401-90.402, Fla. Stat. (2006). Section 90.403 provides for the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by any of several considerations, including the danger of unfair prejudice. As with evidentiary determinations in general, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's application of the unfair prejudice test of section 90.403. Floyd v. State, 913 So.2d 564, 574 (Fla. 2005). Pertinent considerations include the need for the evidence, the tendency of the evidence to suggest an emotional basis for the verdict, the chain of inference from the evidence necessary to establish the material fact, and the effectiveness of a limiting instruction. Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 22 (Fla.2003) (quoting State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420, 422 (Fla.1988)). Generally, a victim's statement cannot be used to prove the defendant's state of mind. See Stoll v. State, 762 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla.2000); Downs v. State, 574 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla.1991); Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562, 565 (Fla.1988). Each of these cases concerned a statement by a victim to a third person expressing fear of the defendant before a murder, which we ruled inadmissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule contained in section 90.803(3). This case is different in that it was the defendant who heard and related what the victim said while he was strangling her. Although we could locate no precedent directly on point, we have reviewed cases in which a defendant's statement to a third person that the victim begged for his or her life was introduced during the guilt phase and then relied upon by the sentencing judge to demonstrate that the killing was either cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) or HAC. See England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 395, 402 (Fla.2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1916, 167 L.Ed.2d 571 (2007); Anderson v. State, 863 So.2d 169, 177 (Fla. 2003); Kokal v. State, 492 So.2d 1317, 1319 (Fla.1986); Deaton v. State, 480 So.2d 1279, 1282 (Fla.1985). Just as the commission of a killing after a victim has begged to be spared can contribute to the heightened premeditation necessary for CCP, this type of evidence is relevant to the issue of premeditation in the guilt phase of a first-degree murder trial. Premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as the nature of the weapon used, the presence or absence of adequate provocation, previous difficulties between the parties, the manner in which the homicide was committed, and the nature and manner of the wounds inflicted. Sochor v. State, 619 So.2d 285, 288 (Fla.1993) (quoting Larry v. State, 104 So.2d 352, 354 (Fla.1958)). Applying the test of relevance from section 90.401 as the tendency to prove or disprove a material fact, premeditation can also be inferred from evidence that the defendant persisted in strangling a victim who asked for his or her children. The jury could have concluded from the circumstances under which the statement was made that Johnson was aware of the consequences of his actions in strangling Hagin and therefore had the opportunity for reflection that is essential to first-degree, premeditated murder. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2 (stating that the period of time necessary to form a premeditated intent to kill must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant); see also Sochor, 619 So.2d at 288 ([Premeditation] must exist for such time before the homicide as will enable the accused to be conscious of the nature of the deed he is about to commit and the probable result to flow from it in so far as the life of his victim is concerned.). Regarding the need for the evidence, the statement was not merely cumulative of other evidence of premeditated murder. Although the circumstances of the killing and other statements attributed to Johnson were sufficient to prove both premeditated and felony murder, the jury could conceivably have construed this evidence as proof beyond a reasonable doubt of only second-degree murder or manslaughter. For example, the State presented evidence of a heated argument between Johnson and Hagin, both of whom were intoxicated and had engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. In addition, Johnson told his friend Shane Bien that Hagin attempted to stab him with an object and was the most annoying person that he ever met. The jury could have concluded from this evidence that Johnson acted not from premeditation but from a depraved mind regardless of human life or in the heat of passion, which would make the killing second-degree murder or manslaughter. Cf. Douglas v. State, 652 So.2d 887, 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) ([A] jury can find a defendant who has killed in the heat of passion guilty of either second degree murder or manslaughter. . . .) (citing Forehand v. State, 126 Fla. 464, 171 So. 241 (1936)). Having concluded that the evidence was relevant, we next review the trial court's determination under section 90.403 that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. We acknowledge the statement's potential to create an emotional basis for the verdict. However, the prejudicial impact of the evidence could have been ameliorated to some extent by an instruction to consider the evidence solely on the issue of the defendant's intent. Johnson complains on appeal that the trial court did not give a limiting instruction, but he made no request for such an instruction below and does not now claim that a limiting instruction would have been ineffective. Therefore, this aspect of his argument is waived. Further, we note that the State was cautious in its use of the statement. The prosecutor did not mention the statement again until the penalty phase, when he legitimately argued that it supported the HAC aggravator. Accordingly, the potential for unfair prejudice in Hagin's statement that she wanted her children did not substantially outweigh the statement's probative value. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion under the rules of evidence, specifically sections 90.403 and 90.803(2), in allowing the State to introduce the statement over defense objection. [5] Because we find no error, we also reject Johnson's argument that admission of the statement was independently harmful as to the penalty phase.