Opinion ID: 2556883
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Police Have Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion to Detain Loper Beyond The Initial Traffic Stop?

Text: Loper claims that the Superior Court erred in denying his suppression motion, because the police did not possess a reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain him beyond the initial traffic stop. Loper concedes the legality of the initial traffic stop, [9] but contends that the follow-up search and seizure exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop and, therefore, was unreasonable. Loper advances three arguments to support that claim. First, he argues that Officer Cancila exceeded the scope of the traffic stop investigation by asking Loper's passenger (Kennedy) to identify himself and then performing a background check. Second, Loper contends that even if the police were entitled to question Kennedy, Loper's detention was unreasonably prolonged by Kennedy's arrest. Third, Loper claims that the evidence seized was the result of a warrantless search and seizure accomplished without reasonable suspicion or consent.
Loper's first claim, that Officer Cancila exceeded the scope of the initial traffic stop by questioning Kennedy, runs as follows: Had Cancila not questioned Loper's passenger, the police would have never discovered the PCP on Loper's person or in his car. Because the police had no right to question Kennedy, the evidence ultimately seized as a result of searching Loper should have been suppressed. Loper's argument fails, because he cannot show that by questioning Kennedy, the police exceeded the scope of the traffic stop or acted unreasonably under the circumstances. The United States Supreme Court has observed that during a routine traffic stop, all passengers are subject to some scrutiny. [10] This Court has also held that during a routine traffic stop, the police may question a passenger about his or her identity, and that those questions are not beyond the scope of a reasonable investigation. [11] Accordingly, the trial judge properly held that Officer Cancila did not exceed the permissible scope of a routine traffic stop by asking Loper's passenger for identification and then running a background check.
Loper next contends that even if the police did not err in questioning Kennedy during the traffic stop, the police unreasonably extended Loper's detention when they arrested Kennedy. This argument lacks merit, because the delay caused by Kennedy's arrest was not unreasonable. Once Kennedy gave the police his name and birth date, Officer Cancila promptly ran a background check. He then immediately called for assistance upon learning that Kennedy had an active outstanding capias on a criminal impersonation charge. Officer Santiago arrived at the scene two or three minutes later. If Loper's detention was delayed by Kennedy's arrest, any delay was de minimis and not unreasonable. [12] The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Loper's suppression motion on this ground.
Loper next claims that the police lacked both a reasonable suspicion and his consent to conduct a warrantless search and seizure of his person and his car. Therefore, he urges, the seized evidence should have been suppressed.
Loper contends that his detention after Kennedy's arrest constituted a second seizure that was not independently supported. Stated differently, Loper argues that a second seizure occurred when Officer Santiago ordered him to exit his car, thereby initiating another investigation beyond the initial traffic stop. Loper claims that because only the facts existing at the time of the seizure are relevant to a reasonable suspicion analysis, the trial court should not have considered the PCP found during the second seizure in determining whether the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct the first search and seizure. Loper relies on Jones v. State , where this Court held that Article 1, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution provided greater protection than its Fourth Amendment counterpart and that a seizure occurs only if, viewing the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to ignore police presence. [13] Loper's reliance on Jones is misplaced. In Jones, the police did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion when they limited the defendant's mobility by ordering him to stop. The police suspicions were triggered by Jones' refusal to obey their order to stop, and his repeated attempts to leave. [14] Here, however, at the time Officer Santiago ordered Loper out of the car, Loper was already lawfully detained as a consequence of the valid traffic stop. Loper's mobility having already been validly limited, he was not subject to a second seizure when the police ordered him to exit his car. As the United States Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Mimms , the police may order the driver or a passenger to exit the car after a valid traffic stop, and that order is not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. [15] Loper has cited no authority, nor made any cogent legal argument, for why this Court should expand the meaning of seizure under Jones and Article 1, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution, to hold that a person already being lawfully detained as a result of a valid traffic stop is seized a second time when ordered to leave his car. [16] The constitutional claim, therefore, fails. Even assuming, arguendo, that a second seizure occurred when the police ordered Loper to leave his car, the seizure was reasonable. Loper relies on Caldwell v. State . [17] In Caldwell, the police approached the defendant, who was illegally parked in a fire lane. They ordered him to exit his car immediately after obtaining his license and registration information. [18] Rather than continue to question the passengers in Caldwell's car, the officer frisked and handcuffed Caldwell and detained him until another officer arrived. [19] In those circumstances, we concluded that a second seizure had occurred, because the officer's actions exceeded the permissible scope of the initial traffic stop, and the police lacked additional facts sufficient to justify the second seizure. [20] Here, in contrast, Officers Santiago and Cancila questioned Loper and Kennedy, and received suspicious responses, before they ordered Loper to exit the car. Loper provides no support for his claim that giving the police a false identify and age does not raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. [21] The Superior Court did not err in holding that, in the totality of the circumstances, there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a search and seizure. [22]
Loper next contests the Superior Court's conclusion that he had voluntarily told the police that he was carrying weed. Alternatively, Loper argues, even if his statement was voluntary it was not a consent to search his car. Whether consent was given to a police search is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. [23] Absent a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Loper was engaged in criminal activity, the consent must be voluntary to justify a warrantless search and seizure. [24] After hearing testimony and weighing the witnesses' credibility, the trial judge concluded that Loper's response-that he had weed on his person, when asked if he had anything illegal on himself,was voluntary. That factual finding is not clearly erroneous.