Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to define unconsciousness.

Text: Defendant contends that, when instructing on unconsciousness by voluntary intoxication (CALJIC No. 8.47), the court erred by failing, sua sponte, also to instruct on the legal definition of unconsciousness. [43] Thus, defendant urges, the jury was deprived of learning that, for legal purposes, unconsciousness extends to those who are not conscious of acting but who perform acts while asleep or while suffering from a delirium of fever,  and (of particular importance, in defendant's view) does not require that a person be incapable of movement. (CALJIC No. 4.30, italics added; see People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1121, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) [44] We are not persuaded. Even [a]ssuming . . . that `unconscious' has a sufficiently legal, technical meaning to require a sua sponte instruction [citation], the instructions as given adequately conveyed the concepts defendant here stresses. ( Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1020, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.) Thus, CALJIC No. 8.47 itself advised that one who,  while unconscious as a result of voluntary intoxication, killed another human being without an intent to kill and without malice aforethought is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and that one who becomes voluntarily intoxicated  to the point of unconsciousness . . . assumes the risk that while unconscious [he][she] will commit acts dangerous to human life or safety. (Italics added.) No reasonable juror could fail to understand from this instruction that one can perform acts while unconscious. ( Clark, supra, at p. 1020, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099; see also People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 343-344, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 ( Hughes ).) [45] Nor, in the context of this case, was it necessary to advise the jury specially that one could be unconscious while acting in a delirium. That defendant killed while hallucinating he was in the movie Halloween II was the essence of his defense. Under these circumstances, jurors receiving an instruction on unconsciousness would necessarily understand that it related to defendant's hallucination claim. No rational jury, having heard the trial evidence and an instruction permitting it to find that defendant killed while unconscious, would require further instructions to realize that it could accept defendant's hallucination claim as one of unconsciousness. No instructional error occurred. [46]