Opinion ID: 1940200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Judge's Override of the Jury's Life Recommendation

Text: The jury recommended life imprisonment. The trial court overrode that recommendation and sentenced Weaver to death. We reverse on this issue and remand for the imposition of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Long ago we stated the standard the trial court must use in determining whether to override a jury's recommendation of a life sentence. In Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975), we held that [i]n order to sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. This inquiry and the built-in deference to the jury's recommendation honors the underlying principle that this jury's advisory sentence reflect[s] the `conscience of the community' at the time of [the] trial. Keen v. State, 775 So.2d 263, 283 (Fla.2000). As we recently emphasized, [t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation. Id. (quoting San Martin v. State, 717 So.2d 462, 471 (Fla.1998)); see also Cheshire v. State, 568 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1990) (reiterating that under Tedder, the trial court's role is solely to determine whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to form a basis upon which reasonable jurors could rely in recommending life imprisonment). We explained in Keen that the jury's life recommendation changes the analytical dynamic and magnifies the ultimate effect of mitigation on the defendant's sentence. Id. at 285. Before reviewing the trial court's override analysis, we must discuss the validity of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found in this case. The trial court found four aggravating factors, which Weaver does not challenge: (1) contemporaneous violent felony convictions; (2) the victim was a law enforcement officer engaged in his official duties; (3) avoiding lawful arrest; and (4) disrupting or hindering a law enforcement officer. Aggravators two through four, however, were merged into one. The court found one statutory mitigator of no significant history of prior criminal activity (given little weight) and three nonstatutory mitigators: good employment record (moderate weight), cooperation with police (moderate weight), and adaptation to a life of incarceration/future value to society (little weight). Despite Weaver's arguments, the court properly rejected the following mitigation as not established by the greater weight of the evidence: (1) contribution to society/charitable, humanitarian deeds; [14] (2) being a good parent; [15] (3) religious devotion; [16] (4) circumstances of the offense; [17] (5) potential for rehabilitation; [18] (6) sorrow over the victim's injury and death; [19] (7) pretrial and trial conduct; [20] and (8) any other mitigating circumstance within the knowledge of the court. Competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's rejection of these mitigating circumstances. See Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 420 (Fla.1990) (stating that whether a mitigating circumstance has been established by the evidence in a given case is a question of fact and subject to the competent substantial evidence standard). Similarly, the weight given to the mitigation does not constitute an abuse of discretion. The sentencing order articulates the court's rationale regarding the weight determinations for the statutory and nonstatutory mitigators. See id. (stating that the weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the trial court's discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard). Because the central focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life, we must examine what was presented during Weaver's penalty phase. At the penalty phase, the State called two witnesses: Officer Peney's mother and the former captain of the Ft. Lauderdale police department, Paul Urschalitz. Mr. Urschalitz testified about Officer Peney's effectiveness in carrying out the department's community policing initiative. The State also introduced evidence of prior criminal convictions in order to rebut the mitigating circumstance of lack of prior significant criminal history. Weaver's penalty phase counsel called various witnesses. The mother of Weaver's son testified that Weaver helped her raise her other two children as if they were his own. She also testified that Weaver provided financially for them and that he cashed out his retirement plan so that he could pay off their debts. Weaver's mother testified about how Weaver respected his family and took care of his sister and her children when her abusive husband left them. Weaver's sisters also testified. Weaver's older sister testified about how Weaver assisted her when she had problems and how much he meant to her. Another sister testified about how he helped her after her husband kicked her out of the house and about Weaver's ability to help resolve family disputes even though he was in prison. Weaver's youngest sister testified about their close bond and how he still gives her good advice when he calls her from prison. Mr. Decker, a former co-worker, testified that Weaver was a responsible, hard worker and characterized him as a generous, honest person who would send most of his paycheck to his family. Brian Putnam, Weaver's co-worker when he worked at a cotton mill, testified that Weaver was a very smart and hardworking individual. He also testified about how Weaver cared for his girlfriend's two children as if they were his own. Mr. Mykitka, Weaver's former boss for six months, testified that Weaver was a good and diligent worker who was reliable. William Lehman Eaton, a long-time friend of Weaver, testified about how Weaver convinced his father to take Eaton into his home after Eaton's stepmother kicked him out of the house. He also testified that Weaver was nonviolent and that he was always helping everybody out and about Weaver's involvement in a prayer group during high school. Timothy Madison Denton, Weaver's friend from high school, also testified that Weaver was very passionate about religion and the Bible and how he headed a Bible study group in high school. Mr. Madison testified that the time he spent with Weaver had a very positive impact on him throughout his entire life. Betty Rabon Scott, another friend of Weaver's from high school, testified that he was an honest individual. Counsel introduced Weaver's high school diploma, which he earned while at the Broward County Jail. Finally, Weaver's counsel pointed out that the five convictions on Weaver's record were misdemeanor offenses, none of which involved violence. As stated above, [t]he singular focus of a Tedder inquiry is whether there is `a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation of life,' rather than the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation. Keen, 775 So.2d at 283-84 (quoting San Martin, 717 So.2d at 471). The reasonable basis analysis must focus on finding support for the jury's recommendation and does not demand that the judge agree with the jury's conclusion. See id. at 283 (noting that [r]easonable arguments [could] certainly be presented to support [the trial judge's] order but overturning trial judge's decision to override jury's life recommendation). The sentencing order does not follow a Tedder analysis. It does not focus on whether there was a reasonable basis to support the jury's life recommendation. Instead, it appears to engage in the weighing process which a judge conducts after a death recommendation. Id. at 283. For example, the sentencing order states: In summary, this Court has established, considered, and weighed the mitigating factors against the aggravating factors. Despite the existence of the four mitigating factors and the weight assigned to each by this Court, their nature and quality pale when compared to the severity and enormity of the circumstances of this case. Although no two cases are ever completely alike, this Court has reviewed the mitigating factors which the Supreme Court of Florida has unequivocally identified and determined to be significant and commonly present in cases where they have reversed a trial court's override of a jury's recommendation of a sentence of life incarceration. None are present in this case. The recommendation by the jury in this case of a life sentence was based on minor mitigating circumstances when compared to the outrageousness of the crimes committed. . . . . . . . . . . The weighing process within this case and the proportionality review with other cases require the imposition of the ultimate penalty. There is a reasonable basis to override the jury's recommendation. (Citations omitted.) While the sentencing order is thoughtful and well-written, the order's override analysis appears to violate Tedder and its progeny to the extent that it engages in the weighing process that a judge conducts when he receives a death recommendation. The order essentially cites and discusses other judicial override cases and seeks to distinguish them on the basis of the aggravating and mitigating factors in those cases. The sentencing order's override analysis approximates a weighing analysis, which is not the standard that should be employed when contemplating a judicial override. See Keen, 775 So.2d at 283 (overturning a trial court's judicial override of a life recommendation based on the trial court's reasoning that [t]he mitigating evidence is wholly insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances in support of a life sentence). As we recently emphasized, a fundamental distinction exists between a defendant who receives an advisory sentence of death from a jury as opposed to one who receives an advisory sentence of life. Keen, 775 So.2d at 284 n. 19. In the latter context, it must be assumed that at least six members of the twelve-member jury concluded that based on the record before them, the mitigation evidence compelled a life recommendation. From that starting point, the mitigation evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant. Cf. Marshall v. State, 604 So.2d 799, 806 (Fla.1992) (viewing the mitigation in the light most favorable to the defendant but affirming the override in light of four statutory aggravating circumstances). The trial court must then consider whether the mitigation evidence could serve as a reasonable basis for a life recommendation. See Keen, 775 So.2d at 284 n. 19 (applying this analysis to mitigation evidence regarding disparate treatment of an accomplice). In this case, there can be no dispute that the jury found the aggravators  the aggravators flow from the fact that the jury convicted Weaver of the charged crimes and that he murdered a law enforcement officer. The judge found one statutory mitigator (no significant history of prior criminal activity) and three nonstatutory mitigators (good employment record, cooperation with police and adaptation to a life of incarceration/future value to society). He assigned this mitigation moderate to little weight. For purposes of an override analysis, however, the judge's determinations on the weight attributable to mitigating factors should not be seen as the jury's determinations, nor do they mandate unflinching deference. Cf. Holsworth v. State, 522 So.2d 348, 354 (Fla.1988) (agreeing with the defendant that in overriding the jury's recommendation, the trial judge could not substitute his view of the evidence and the weight to be given it for that of the jury); Parker v. State, 643 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Fla.1994) (rejecting the State's argument that in the context of a Tedder analysis this Court should defer to a trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the weight of mitigation evidence regardless of the jury's recommendation and noting that [w]hile some persons may disagree with the weight [of the mitigation evidence presented] . . . clearly other reasonable persons would be convinced by it). In Weaver's case, the trial judge conducted a typical weighing analysis, noting that despite the existence of the four mitigating factors and the weight assigned to each by this Court, their nature and quality pale when compared to the severity and enormity of the circumstances of this case and that the jury based its life recommendation on  minor mitigating circumstances. (Emphasis added.) Instead, the trial judge's override analysis should have proceeded from the premise that the jury assigned great weight to the mitigating factors and, if so, whether such weighty mitigation could have justified a life recommendation. Here, the jury heard testimony from Weaver's family about his caring behavior towards them and how, even from prison, they believe that he could serve a purpose in their lives. The jury also heard testimony about Weaver's work habits and the fact that this was essentially his first violent offense, though not necessarily his first encounter with the legal system. The trial court found that there was no significant history of prior criminal activity, but assigned that factor little weight. The jury certainly could have assigned great weight to the mitigating factors. Weaver's criminal record consisted of five misdemeanor offenses between 1979 and 1982. These crimes were not violent and were remote in time to the murder. We find it possible that the jury could have placed great weight on the fact that this was Weaver's first violent offense. This, in combination with the nonstatutory mitigation presented, provide support for the jury's life recommendation. [21] Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that, as a matter of law, the trial court conducted an improper override analysis and that there was a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's life recommendation.