Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Rulings on Excusal of Jurors Waldon and McCoy.

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his midtrial motion to excuse Juror Waldon and in granting, over his objection, the prosecutor's similar motion to excuse Juror McCoy. He characterizes the two motions as identical except for the movant's identity, and argues these asserted errors, singly and in combination, prejudiced the defense. (16) Section 1089 provides in relevant part that [i]f at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found unable to perform his duty ... the court may order him to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate.... We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's determination to discharge a juror and order an alternate to serve. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 987 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) If there is any substantial evidence supporting the trial court's ruling, we will uphold it. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 21 [23 Cal. Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673].) We have also stated, however, that a juror's inability to perform as a juror must `appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.' ( Ibid. ) As a preliminary matter, we note that, as subjects of the respective parties' motions, Juror Waldon and Juror McCoy presented factually distinct problems. The only identical aspect of the two motions is that both jurors professed the ability to be fair to both parties. To belabor the obvious, Waldon and McCoy displayed different demeanors, attitudes, and nonverbal behavior in their respective voir dires, and the trial court in this case necessarily made individual assessments of their credibility. The court's two rulings are therefore incommensurable, and we cannot review them in combination. Rather, we must separately examine the trial court's ruling as to each juror under the abuse of discretion standard.
(17) Several days into the trial, Juror Waldon asked the bailiff, `Do you think we are in any danger of getting shot if the jury should decide that the defendant was guilty?' The bailiff advised the trial judge of her remark. After initially speaking to Waldon outside the presence of defendant and counsel, the judge conducted a further hearing before defendant and counsel, outside the presence of the jury. Waldon stated that, returning home one night after the proceedings, she told her husband what she had said to the bailiff. Her husband had responded, `Just do the best you can in the trial and don't worry about it. The man isn't a member of the Mafia or something like that.' Juror Waldon said, in essence, her remark to the bailiff was made in jest, and she denied any apprehension about her ability to function as a juror. She also said she had not mentioned the remark to the other members of the jury. She denied having formed an opinion concerning defendant's guilt and maintained she could be an unbiased juror. Defendant moved to discharge Juror Waldon on the grounds that she was apprehensive about retaliation by defendant, she had improperly discussed the case with her husband, and she might have formed an opinion about defendant's guilt. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion to discharge Juror Waldon. The judge found credible her explanation that she had made the statement to the bailiff in jest. He noted Waldon had worked for the California Highway Patrol with uniformed officers for many years and probably was accustomed to trading banter with peace officers, of which the bailiff was one. The judge noted further that if Waldon were truly apprehensive about her safety, she would have welcomed the opportunity to escape jury service. The judge also accepted Waldon's assurance she had not yet formed an opinion on the case. Finally, he opined that Waldon's repeating the comment to her husband did not constitute a violation of the admonition, because the statement was merely a general comment having nothing to do with the facts of the case. We conclude the record supports the trial court's ruling, and we decline to overturn its determination as to Waldon's credibility. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the defense motion to excuse Juror Waldon. (18) In a related claim, defendant argues he was denied his right to be present when the trial court initially spoke with Juror Waldon, outside the presence of defendant and counsel, concerning her remark to the bailiff. A capital defendant has a waivable right to be present at all critical stages of trial. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 810 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) The record indicates counsel had agreed the court should question Juror Waldon, on the record and outside counsel's and defendant's presence, to determine whether it would be necessary to conduct a hearing on the matter; the trial court furnished counsel with a transcript of that questioning to enable them to make that determination. Furthermore, not only defense counsel, but defendant himself was subsequently afforded the opportunity to question Juror Waldon. Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate he was denied the right to be present at any critical stage of his trial.
(19) On the 43d day of trial, the trial judge interviewed Juror McCoy outside the presence of the other jurors. The judge indicated he had learned McCoy had appeared before a municipal court judge concerning a speeding ticket McCoy had received from the California Highway Patrol. A hearing on the ticket was scheduled for the following Monday, approximately the time the jury would be deliberating defendant's capital case. The municipal court judge had referred McCoy to the district attorney's office to see about having or soliciting the District Attorney's assistance in having a traffic ticket disposed of. McCoy explained that under his employer's rules, if the ticket were upheld he would lose his job. Previously he had received four other tickets, on two of which he claimed he had been railroaded. The trial judge asked McCoy whether the situation with the ticket would affect his ability to serve as a juror. McCoy acknowledged it would be a problem, because it means my job. The judge asked: Okay. Because the District Attorney's office has refused to intercede in your behalf here, does that mean, though, that you feel you would be influenced as a juror in this particular case, possibly, by that fact? McCoy replied, Well, I wonder where the justice is. You're talking about my life, you know, my income. Later, in the course of the voir dire, McCoy commented: So, I don't know. I mean, it would change my view on justice, on the system, yes. McCoy denied any resentment toward the prosecutor, or any particular person, but also said if his ticket were not dismissed he would set here and wonder where justice was at. McCoy said, I don't think it would have any effect on the decision that I would make here except I wouldn't have my mind on what I am doing here. Over defense opposition, the prosecutor moved to excuse McCoy from further jury service. After additional voir dire of McCoy and argument of counsel, the judge granted the prosecutor's motion. He reasoned: If it were not for the fact that the man's livelihood is bound up in all of this and if it were not for the fact that he feels so strongly that the system owes him this dismissal, notwithstanding his guilt of the citation, and that ultimately the District Attorney's Office is going to be at least in part responsible, if the worst happens, I agree with [the prosecutor], I really don't think that even though the man basically is honest, even though he has made the decision in his own mind he isn't going to let it bother him, I don't think that there is any way he can avoid it at least unconscientiously [ sic : unconsciously] affecting any judgment that he might render. Here, too, the record supports the trial court's ruling. Juror McCoy adhered to the belief justice required dismissal of his ticket, and admitted he would be unable to focus on the trial if he were left in doubt as to his employment status. Although he professed no resentment toward the prosecutor, he clearly felt some animosity toward the district attorney's office. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in excusing Juror McCoy under these circumstances.