Opinion ID: 865843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether service of process was effected on

Text: FLAGSTAR. ¶13. The critical issue addressed by the Court of Appeals was whether the plaintiffs sufficiently complied with Rule 4(c)(5) so as to effect service of process on the defendant Flagstar.4 The majority of the Court of Appeals answered this question in the negative, adversely to the plaintiffs. The majority based its decision on its finding that the person who signed for the summons was not Gladner, but a mail clerk, whose authority to receive the 4 Rule 4(c)(5) provides: Service by Certified Mail on Person Outside State. In addition to service by any other method provided by this rule, a summons may be served on a person outside this state by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by certified mail, return receipt requested. Where the defendant is a natural person, the envelope containing the summons and complaint shall be marked “restricted delivery.” Service by this method shall be deemed complete as of the date of delivery as evidenced by the return receipt or by the returned envelope marked “Refused.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(5). 8 summons on behalf of Flagstar was not established to be in compliance with the mandate of Rule 4(d)(4). Respectfully, we think otherwise, and find Rule 4(d)(4) to be inapplicable on these facts. ¶14. The comment to Rule 4(c)(5) states: The Rule 4(c)(5) procedure supplants the circuitous procedures available to obtain in personam jurisdiction against nonresidents. E.g. Miss. Code Ann. 13-3-63 (1972). However, the criteria for subjecting nonresidents to the jurisdiction of Mississippi courts are those established by the legislature. ¶15. Because Flagstar is a foreign corporation not doing business in the state, and thus has no registered agent in the state, Mississippi Code Section 13-3-57, Mississippi’s Long-Arm Statute, controls for purposes of jurisdictional intent. Miss. Code. Ann. § 13-3-57 (Rev. 2002). However, the statute is silent with regard to service of process, in that it provides, “Service of summons and process upon the defendant shall be had or made as is provided by the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. ¶16. As the Court of Appeals’ dissent pointed out, Rule 4(c)(5) is silent with regard to whether someone other than the registered agent for service of process for a corporation may sign for a certified letter addressed to the registered agent. So too are the statutes. What is clear, however, from the standpoint of the efficacy of service of process on a foreign corporation by way of certified letter, is that the letter must be properly addressed to the person authorized to receive process on behalf of the corporation and actually delivered to that address. That was done in this case, as it is clear from the record that the letter was properly addressed and that it reached its destination. Cf. Pointer v. Huffman, 509 So. 2d 9 870, 873 (Miss. 1987) (after discussion on issue of whether constable had authority under statute to serve process in name of sheriff, “[t]here being no dispute as to the fact of service and notice to the defendant . . . . , this Court finds no reversible error in the trial judge’s [holding that service of process was valid]”). In today’s case, Robert K. Fleming, the operations coordinator for Flagstar’s legal department, admitted to having received the process. ¶17. Further, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ dissent that the Danoses’ attempted service on Flagstar with “restricted delivery” does not in-and-of-itself render the attempted service invalid. This is a requirement born out of Mississippi Code Section 13-3-63, which governs service of process on nonresident motorists. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-3-63 (Rev. 2002). The Danoses were not required to send the letter restricted delivery; the fact that they went the extra step should not be viewed as noncompliance with Rule 4(c)(5). ¶18. For the reasons stated, based on the facts revealed in today’s record, we find that service of process was proper in this matter. To hold otherwise would work an illogical burden on plaintiffs who have no control over a corporate defendant’s internal operating procedures, such as how mail rooms are run. ¶19. Because the Court of Appeals found that the default judgment must be set aside due to the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to enter the judgment because of defective process, the Court of Appeals, understandably, did not address the three-prong balancing test grounded in our law to determine the propriety of the trial court’s refusal to set aside the default judgment. We thus turn now to this issue. 10