Opinion ID: 1817017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: would qualified immunity shield these public officials from liability?

Text: The defendants cite Red Enterprises, Inc., supra, for authority that one of the reasons for which a motion for leave to amend should be denied is the futility of the amendment. The defendants take the position that had malicious prosecution been properly alleged, the results would have been no different because the defendants were immune from liability under such a claim as they were acting within their discretion as public law enforcement officials carrying out the duties of their positions. In Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689, 696 (Miss. 1984), this Court said: ... The public officials of this state, elected or appointed, enjoy a qualified immunity to a civil action for damages when acting in the performance of official functions discretionary in nature. They lose that immunity only when they substantially exceed their authority and commit wrongs under color of office. They have no immunity when they commit willful wrongs or malicious acts ... (Emphasis Added). In essence, the defendants say that even if malicious prosecution had been properly pled, that as a matter of law, they are not amenable to judgment because they enjoy qualified immunity. The defendants appear to confuse qualified with absolute immunity. They are blind to the fact that malicious prosecution is by its very nature a malicious act, sufficient to disengage the protective shield of qualified immunity. Had an amendment been allowed, the defendants would not have been entitled to judgment on the qualified immunity issue as a matter of law because the amended pleading would allege a triable issue of fact, being: whether malicious acts were committed by the defendants which would open them to civil liability. There is no merit to this assignment of error. In conclusion, the Parkers' petition was insufficient to inform the defendants that a claim for malicious prosecution was contemplated. The trial judge was correct in sustaining the motion for summary judgment. As to their second assignment, we find no evidence that a motion for leave to amend to assert a malicious prosecution claim was ever made, and this assignment is also without merit. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in result only. PITTMAN, J., not participating.