Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Ban on Contributions by Lobbyists and Their Families

Text: The CFRA's ban on contributions by lobbyists presents markedly different considerations than the CFRA's ban on contributions by contractors. The distinction centers on the fact that the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut in no way involved lobbyists. See, e.g., Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 321 ([L]obbyists ha[ve] not been directly linked to the pay-to-play scandals, which primarily involved state contractors offering bribes in exchange for preferential treatment .... (emphasis added)). As a restriction on campaign contributions, not campaign expenditures, we review the CFRA's ban on lobbyists contributions under the closely drawn standard. See Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200; subsection I.A, ante. We will uphold the ban against plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge only if it is closely drawn to achieve sufficiently important government interests. Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200. Defendants seek to justify the ban on lobbyist contributions as necessary to combat both actual corruption and the appearance of corruption. We decline to decide whether those interests are sufficiently important in this context, see id., for [e]ven assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, 124 S.Ct. 619, the CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions is not closely drawn to the asserted interests. As set forth above, see subsection I.B.2.e, ante, an outright ban on contributions is a drastic measure that substantially infringes one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. Randall, 548 U.S. at 246, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25, 96 S.Ct. 612). As opposed to a contribution limit, which merely restricts those First Amendment freedoms, see id., a contribution ban utterly eliminates an individual's right to express his or her support for a candidate by contributing money to the candidate's cause. Indeed, a contribution ban cuts off even the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a small contribution. Id. at 247, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21, 96 S.Ct. 612). Thus, if the state's interests in this case can be achieved by means of a limit on lobbyist contributions, rather than a ban, the ban should be struck down for failing to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 96 S.Ct. 612. [14] We have upheld the CFRA's ban on contractor contributions because the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut have created an appearance of corruption with respect to all exchanges of money between state contractors and candidates for state office. We have held that an outright ban on contractor contributions was justified ( i.e., closely drawn to meet the state's anticorruption interest) because even a severe limit on contractor contributions would allow a small flow of contributions between contractors and candidates and would, as a result, likely give rise to an appearance of corruption. The situation is different with lobbyists. The recent corruption scandals had nothing to do with lobbyists, see Green Party I, 590 F.Supp.2d at 321, and thus there is insufficient evidence to infer that all contributions made by state lobbyists give rise to an appearance of corruption. Plaintiffs have submitted some evidence suggesting that many members of the public generally distrust lobbyists and the special attention they are believed to receive from elected officials. See, e.g., Meadow Decl. ¶¶ 13-14, 26. But as the Supreme Court has recently clarified, the anticorruption interest recognized by Buckley and other cases is limited to quid pro quo corruption and does not encompass efforts to limit [f]avoritism and influence or the appearance of influence or access. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 909-10 (quotation marks omitted). The fact that speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt, and favoritism and influence are [un]avoidable in representative politics. Id. at 910 (quotation marks omitted). Influence and access, moreover, are not sinister in nature. Some influence, such as wise counsel from a trusted advisoreven if that advisor is a lobbyistcan enhance the effectiveness of our representative government. Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that all lobbyist contributions give rise to an appearance of corruption, and the evidence demonstrating that lobbyist contributions give rise to an appearance of influence, see, e.g., Meadow Decl. ¶ 26, has no bearing on whether the CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions is closely drawn to the state's anticorruption interest. We conclude, as a result, that on this record, a limit on lobbyist contributions would adequately address the state's interest in combating corruption and the appearance of corruption on the part of lobbyists. [15] The CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions, therefore, is not closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. Thus, we hold that the CFRA's ban on lobbyist contributions, Conn. Gen.Stat. § 9-610(g), violates the First Amendment. [16]