Opinion ID: 1276324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Activity and Adverse Action

Text: We have recognized that a plaintiff may rely on a broad array of evidence to demonstrate a causal link between his protected activity and the adverse action taken against him. Farrell, 206 F.3d at 284. In certain narrow circumstances, an unusually suggestive proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action may be sufficient, on its own, to establish the requisite causal connection. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1302 (3d Cir.1997); see Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir.1989) (discharge of plaintiff two days after filing EEOC complaint found to be sufficient, under the circumstances, to establish causation). Conversely, however, [t]he mere passage of time is not legally conclusive proof against retaliation. Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir.1993) (citation omitted); see also Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir.1997) (It is important to emphasize that it is causation, not temporal proximity itself, that is an element of plaintiff's prima facie case, and temporal proximity merely provides an evidentiary basis from which an inference can be drawn.). Where the time between the protected activity and adverse action is not so close as to be unusually suggestive of a causal connection standing alone, courts may look to the intervening period for demonstrative proof, such as actual antagonistic conduct or animus against the employee, see, e.g., Woodson, 109 F.3d at 921 (finding sufficient causal connection based on pattern of antagonism during intervening two-year period between protected activity and adverse action), or other types of circumstantial evidence, such as inconsistent reasons given by the employer for terminating the employee or the employer's treatment of other employees, that give rise to an inference of causation when considered as a whole. Farrell, 206 F.3d at 280-81. In assessing causation, we are mindful of the procedural posture of the case, see id. at 279 n. 5 (There is . . . a difference between a plaintiff relying upon temporal proximity to satisfy her prima facie case for the purpose of summary judgment, and to reverse a verdict.) (internal citation omitted), and where, as here, the retaliation claim has been tried to a verdict, we give deference to the jury's `unique opportunity to judge the credibility and demeanor' of the witnesses who testified at the trial. . . . Woodson, 109 F.3d at 921 (quoting Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir.1991)).
Although the District Court found that the nine-month time lapse between Marra testifying at the Paladino trial in June 2001 and his eventual termination in March 2002 was not unusually suggestive of a retaliatory motive by PHA, it believed that the evidence presented at trial established an intervening pattern of antagonism against Marra sufficient to support an inference of causation. This pattern included: (1) the vandaliz[ation] of Marra's computer in July 2001, shortly after he testified at the Paladino trial, in response to which PHA took no action; (2) Marra's exclusion from the July 2001 meeting at which the Section 8 project was discussed; (3) the reassignment of DiGravio to the Section 8 Department, over Marra's objections, in July 2001; and (4) the look of disgust that Greene gave Marra upon learning, shortly after the Paladino trial, that Marra had testified against PHA. Marra, 404 F.Supp.2d at 845. The District Court also believed that the involuntary demotion Marra received shortly after giving deposition testimony in Paladino indicated a causal connection between his subsequent trial testimony and termination. Id. PHA's contentions predictably focus on the District Court's finding of an intervening pattern of antagonism against Marra. [14] Before considering PHA's specific arguments, we emphasize that it matters not, of course, whether each piece of evidence of antagonistic conduct is alone sufficient to support an inference of causation, so long as the evidence permits such an inference when considered collectively. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 921. Thus, while we will discuss each piece of evidence, and [PHA's] objections to them, in turn, we must determine whether the evidence is sufficient based on the whole picture. Id. ; cf. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir.1990) (A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario.). PHA first disputes that the computer failure Marra experienced shortly after he testified at the Paladino trial is suggestive of retaliatory animus, emphasizing the absence of any direct proof that his computer had been tampered with by a PHA employee. Given that this incident occurred on the heels of the jury's verdict in Paladino and while Marra was away from the office on vacation, however, we believe the jury here was permitted to infer that the extensive damage to Marra's computer  in his words, the hard drive was totally wiped out  resulted from foul play, a finding that was in no way precluded by the vague representation of a PHA employee that the computer had burned out. Marra's testimony that PHA failed adequately to investigate the origin of his computer problems, which he promptly brought to Panchwagh's attention, also indicates causation because it suggests that PHA condoned such conduct. Further, although the culprit was never identified (or at least never revealed to Marra), the jury could also readily infer from these circumstances that a PHA employee, rather than some workplace intruder, was responsible for the vandalization. While this incident, standing alone, would typically be insufficient to support an inference of causation, we conclude that the jury could properly treat it as a link in the causal chain. See Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 451 (3d Cir.2006) (damage to plaintiff's vehicle by unknown vandals was a component[ ] of an integrated pattern of retaliation by employer). Notwithstanding PHA's arguments to the contrary, we also believe that Panchwagh's decision to reassign DiGravio to the Section 8 Department, over Marra's objections, fortifies the causal link in Marra's case. PHA points out that Marra himself believed that DiGravio's transfer was simply the product of a miscommunication between DiGravio and Panchwagh, whom Marra considered to be an honest and honorable man. App. at 275, 282. There is, however, ample evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that, unbeknownst to Marra, Panchwagh was plotting against him. Although Marra stressed to Panchwagh his pressing need for DiGravio's assistance on a variety of ongoing projects, Panchwagh declined to recall DiGravio from the Section 8 Department (even though he had the authority to do so), and gave Marra the misimpression that DiGravio would only be unavailable for a few weeks. The jury also may have been skeptical of Panchwagh himself making the decision to send DiGravio to the Section 8 Department to work as an inspector, given his candid admission that, in all other instances, Marra decided which Inspections Division employees to reassign because [Marra] was in charge of the Inspection[s] Division, App. at 472, and that [t]ransferring a certain inspector or not transferring a certain inspector was left to [him]. . . . I was not running the day-to-day affairs of th[at] d[ivision]. App. at 586. The jury could have drawn many different inferences from Panchwagh's decision, one of which was that Panchwagh had reassigned DiGravio to the Section 8 Department, and declined to recall him, in the face of Marra's pleas, at least in part to deprive Marra of the much needed services of a key subordinate, which undoubtedly contributes to an intervening pattern of antagonism against Marra. As discussed more fully below in our pretext analysis, another inference the jury could have drawn was that Panchwagh reassigned DiGravio to the Section 8 Department because of his participation in the Paladino trial. Panchwagh's retaliatory antipathy toward DiGravio helps build Marra's causation case because it suggests a hostile atmosphere in which the subsequent decision to terminate Marra was carried out. See Walden, 126 F.3d 506 at 521; Woodson, 109 F.3d at 922-23. While PHA does not appear to challenge specifically the District Court's conclusion that Marra's exclusion from the July 2001 supervisors' meeting suggested a causal link, we observe that this finding is also supported by the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to Marra. Given Panchwagh's concession noted above that Marra was chiefly responsible for the assignment and allocation of labor to the Section 8 project, a reasonable juror could find it suspicious that Panchwagh convened a meeting of the Inspections Division's supervisory personnel, save Marra, to discuss that logistical task. Similarly, although PHA does not appear to take issue with the District Court's reliance on the look of disgust Greene gave Marra upon learning that he had testified at the Paladino trial, this evidence also bears at least some probative value in assessing causation. While Greene had no personal involvement in the decision to terminate Marra, as the jury found, the jury still likely gave careful consideration to the expressive conduct of PHA's highest ranking official, and could have reasonably concluded that Greene's negative reaction upon confirming Marra's involvement in the Paladino trial reflected an atmosphere in which the employment decision about Marra was made. See Walden, 126 F.3d 506 at 521; Woodson, 109 F.3d at 922-23. Viewed in the light most favorable to Marra, the evidence we have discussed to this point shows that, in the months immediately following his participation in the Paladino trial, he had his computer vandalized, resulting in loss of significant work product; although he brought the computer incident to Panchwagh's attention, it was never adequately investigated; Panchwagh subsequently excluded Marra from an important meeting concerning matters within his province and reassigned one of his key subordinates, who had also testified against PHA in Paladino, to another Department, despite Marra's protestations; and PHA's top official gave Marra a look of disgust upon learning that he had testified at the Paladino trial. We have little doubt that this evidence considered as a whole, together with evidence of the involuntary demotion Marra had received after giving deposition testimony in Paladino approximately one year earlier, [15] is sufficient to forge a causal link between Marra testifying at the Paladino trial in June 2001 and his formal termination in March 2002. In our view, however, the jury was permitted to consider this evidence within a more limited time frame than the nine-month gap that separated Marra's participation in the Paladino trial and his official last day as a PHA employee. Although Marra was not formally terminated until March 2002, the evidence shows that Panchwagh and Galbreth discussed eliminating Marra's position as early as fall 2001 and Panchwagh first recommended such action to Leithead in a November 2001 memorandum, and that Leithead approved Panchwagh's initial proposal but had him submit it to the Human Resources Department for review. In a follow-up memorandum to Leithead in early December 2001, Panchwagh attached a lay-off notice for Marra. As plaintiffs' counsel strenuously argued at trial, see App. at 185, 755, 759, 778, consistent with our highly context-specific approach to assessing causation, Kachmar, 109 F.3d at 178, the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that PHA resolved to terminate Marra by no later than November 2001, only five months after he testified at the Paladino trial, rather than several months later when the adverse employment decision was formally carried out. See id. (although employee was not officially terminated until January 1994, [h]er allegation that she was told her position had been offered to a male in November, 1993 . . . would, if proven, show that [defendant] had resolved to discharge her shortly after the latest [protected] activity in mid-1993); see also Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) (considering, as part of temporal proximity analysis in First Amendment retaliation case, fact that discharged employee's pre-termination hearing was initially scheduled for date three months earlier). Considering the pattern of antagonistic behavior against Marra within this more suggestive time frame, we conclude that the evidence as a whole is clearly sufficient to support a causal link between Marra's participation in the Paladino trial and his subsequent termination, particularly when we consider, as we must, that the verdict may have been based in part on the jurors' evaluation of each witness' credibility and demeanor. Woodson, 109 F.3d at 924. [16]
Although the District Court did not specifically address PHA's causation challenge with respect to DiGravio, which is confined to a footnote in both its post-trial and appellate briefs, this issue need only detain us briefly. PHA's sole argument is that DiGravio's offer to work in the Section 8 Department undercuts any causal connection between his participation in the Paladino trial and his subsequent transfer to that Department. This contention is better understood as a pretext challenge and will be fully addressed in that analysis below. Suffice it to say that the jury could have reasonably inferred the requisite causal connection based on the close temporal proximity between DiGravio testifying at the Paladino trial and his transfer to the Section 8 Department approximately six weeks later, coupled with the antagonism experienced by Marra, a fellow witness, in the weeks that immediately followed the trial. See Farrell, 206 F.3d at 281 (noting that employer's conduct toward others is relevant to causation inquiry).
The remaining question is whether sufficient evidence exists from which the jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that PHA's explanations offered for its adverse employment decisions were merely a pretext for unlawful retaliation. Pretext may be shown by exposing such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them `unworthy of credence.' Krouse, 126 F.3d at 504 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). [A] plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully [retaliated]. Fasold, 409 F.3d at 185 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (alteration added)); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1065-72 (3d Cir.1996) (en banc). As the Supreme Court recognized in Reeves : In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as `affirmative evidence of guilt.' Moreover, once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision. 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal citations omitted). There is ample evidence from which the jury could have inferred that PHA's explanation for terminating Marra (his position was eliminated as part of a reorganization) was not credible. First, the jury could have reasonably believed that the sequence of events leading up to, and the timing of, Marra's termination cast doubt on the legitimacy of PHA's asserted justification. After twice recommending the elimination of four inspector positions, in addition to Marra's position, over the course of a three-week period in late 2001, Panchwagh significantly changed course in his final memorandum to Leithead, now targeting Marra's position alone. While his previous recommendations had languished for several months without final action, Panchwagh's scaled-back recommendation was approved and executed within a span of merely three days. Conspicuously absent from Panchwagh's final memorandum was any explanation for why he believed that each position he previously proposed eliminating, save Marra's, should now be spared that fate. Although Galbreth insisted at trial that it became unnecessary to lay off anyone other than Marra because of the retirement or transfer of the inspectors in question, this explanation only covered three of the four inspector positions that had been recommended for elimination. Neither Galbreth nor Panchwagh, nor any other PHA witness, provided an explanation for the decision not to eliminate the fourth inspector position, which may have raised further doubts in the jurors' minds about the true scope and intent of the PHA's purported reorganization plan. Moreover, given that PHA opted not to terminate two of the inspectors who would have been affected by the reorganization because they were planning to retire in the near future, a reasonable juror could easily attach significance to the fact that Panchwagh, himself on the verge of retiring, did not at least ask Marra, who was 68 years old at the time, about his retirement plans before terminating his employment. Second, the jury could have reasonably believed that the rationale underlying Panchwagh's recommendation to eliminate Marra's position as part of the reorganization  lack of available work  was highly suspect. Contrary to Panchwagh's suggestion, Marra testified that he was continuously busy throughout the relevant time period, citing several different projects on which he was actively working. Indeed, Panchwagh's representation that there was insufficient work available for Marra came only a few months after Marra had complained to Panchwagh about DiGravio's transfer to the Section 8 Department, stressing his dire need for DiGravio's continued assistance in handling the crush of work in the Inspections Division. Third, we observe that, in contrast to many employment cases in which an employer successfully defends its actions as being part of a company reorganization or the like, none of Marra's co-workers who were affected by the reorganization at PHA suffered the same fate as he did  loss of employment. See, e.g., Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541, 551 (4th Cir.2006) (finding that terminated employee failed to rebut employer's reorganization explanation, which was supported in part by evidence that several other positions had been eliminated); Davis v. Con-Way Transp. Cent. Express, Inc., 368 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir.2004) ([W]e think it ridiculous to suggest that Con-Way would terminate nine other employees from Davis's facility, not to mention forty others from around the state . . ., on the pretense of economic hardship, just so it could cover its tracks with respect to Davis.). To the contrary, the uncontested evidence shows that remaining employees affected by the reorganization, many of whom held the same position as Marra in different departments and divisions, were simply transferred to new positions within PHA. This disparate treatment, when considered in conjunction with the evidence recited above, further strengthens the inference that PHA's proffered explanation was pretextual. See Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 752 (10th Cir.1999) (finding genuine issue of material fact regarding whether employer's reorganization explanation was pretextual in part because plaintiff's position was only one eliminated). Contrary to PHA's assertion, we do not think that Marra's admission, when questioned on cross-examination, that he did not believe Panchwagh retaliated against him undercuts a finding of pretext here. Marra's testimony was colored by his belief, based on Panchwagh's own representations to him, that Panchwagh was equally in the dark about the reorganization. But in fact, over the course of several months leading up to his termination, Panchwagh had consistently recommended the elimination of Marra's position as part of a reorganization of the Inspections Division. While Panchwagh may have left Marra in the dark, his pivotal role in the plan to eliminate Marra's position was exposed in full light to the jury. There is also no shortage of evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have chosen to disbelieve PHA's reasons offered for reassigning DiGravio to the Section 8 Department to perform inspections work (his volunteering to assist a Department in need of help). PHA makes much of DiGravio's testimony that he elected to go to the Section 8 Department because he figured it would only be another feather in [his] cap. In making this statement, however, DiGravio reasonably believed, based on Panchwagh's representations to him, that he would retain a supervisory role while working in that Department. Instead, Panchwagh reassigned DiGravio with knowledge that he would be stripped of his supervisory status and left to perform the grueling inspections work himself, toiling in conditions that were by all accounts little short of deplorable. Any notion that the transfer resulted from an innocent miscommunication is belied by DiGravio's confrontation of Panchwagh shortly after learning that he would be performing inspections work in Section 8. When pressed by DiGravio to explain his apparent demotion, Panchwagh pleaded ignorance, much as he did with Marra, claiming that he served as nothing more than the messenger for a decision that came from above. In reality, as Panchwagh conceded at trial, he alone made the decision to transfer DiGravio to the Section 8 Department. Panchwagh also admitted that DiGravio was the only supervisory level employee in the Inspections Division ever sent to the Section 8 Department to perform inspections, and that, even though he assured DiGravio that his Section 8 assignment would be quite short (Galbreth herself was under the impression that DiGravio's stint in the Section 8 Department would last no more than one month), Panchwagh never sought to recall DiGravio prior to his (Panchwagh's) retirement nearly eight months later. While Panchwagh insisted that he had no reason to recall DiGravio based on the ongoing needs of the Section 8 Department, the jury was free to reject Panchwagh's testimony and infer a motive less benign based on the evidence. While we think a reasonable factfinder could conclude that PHA intentionally retaliated against Marra and DiGravio based on the causation evidence discussed above, coupled with the evidence exposing the falsity of PHA's asserted justifications for its actions, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147-48, 120 S.Ct. 2097, [17] we need not rest our conclusion on this evidence alone. As noted, plaintiffs bolstered their claims by presenting additional, independent evidence of retaliatory animus- e.g., DiPiero's repeated warnings to DiGravio that there would be repercussions against employees testifying against PHA-from which the jury could reasonably infer that PHA's decisionmakers, principally Panchwagh here, harbored ill-will toward Marra and DiGravio for the protected activity in which they engaged. In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to Marra and DiGravio, the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain the retaliation verdicts returned by the jury in their favor under the PHRA. [18]
PHA also challenges the District Court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative a new trial, on the ground that the jury's finding that PHA retaliated against Marra and DiGravio, in violation of the PHRA, is irreconcilably inconsistent with its finding that Greene did not personally direct or acquiesce in any retaliation against them under § 1983. [19] Immediately after discharging the jury, the District Court entered judgment in favor of both Marra and DiGravio on their PHRA claims. The District Court entered judgment in favor of PHA on the § 1983 claims, however, notwithstanding the jury's findings that PHA retaliated against both Marra and DiGravio in violation of that statute, based on the jury's separate finding that Greene  the only employee whose conduct could, as a matter of law, be imputed to PHA for purposes of § 1983 liability under Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and its progeny  did not personally order or acquiesce in the retaliation. See generally, id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (municipal liability under § 1983 only attaches when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury). Because the PHRA subjects employers to a broader scope of liability under principles of respondeat superior, see generally County of Allegheny v. Wilcox, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 584, 465 A.2d 47 (1983), as neither party disputes, the District Court rejected PHA's contention, first raised in post-trial motions filed several days later, that the jury's PHRA verdicts in favor of Marra and DiGravio were inconsistent with its absolution of Greene. The District Court concluded that, under the theory of respondeat superior, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that a PHA employee other than Greene, the obvious candidate being Panchwagh, retaliated against both Marra and DiGravio in violation of the PHRA. On appeal, PHA does not seriously dispute that the challenged jury findings are facially consistent, nor could it, in light of the materially different standards of liability governing claims under § 1983 and the PHRA, upon which the jury was properly instructed. See Kitchen v. Chippewa Valley Sch., 825 F.2d 1004, 1013-14 (6th Cir. 1987) (By finding that Kitchen was denied equal protection, but not finding the board liable [under § 1983], the jury must have concluded that the causal nexus of board policy or custom was absent. The board's liability under Title VII, however, can be based on the theory of respondeat superior. Therefore, the district court could have found liability against the board under respondeat superior. Such a finding would not have conflicted with the jury's § 1983 finding.) (internal citation omitted); see also Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1547 (10th Cir.1993) (as a general matter, [a] verdict that resolves separate and distinct causes of action in favor of both parties is not inconsistent on its face) (citation omitted). The obvious inference from the jury's findings that PHA retaliated against both Marra and DiGravio, but Greene was not personally involved in either instance, is that the jury believed that one or more of PHA's other agents were responsible for the retaliation, as it was permitted to do in assessing PHRA liability under respondeat superior. As the District Court's analysis implies, any inconsistency between these findings can be exposed only by inquiring into whether there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that one or more PHA employees, other than Greene, retaliated against Marra and DiGravio. At bottom, rather than an inconsistency between the PHRA and § 1983 verdicts, what PHA asserts is an inconsistency between the jury's findings and the evidence, which amounts to nothing more than a recasting of the sufficiency of the evidence challenge that we have already considered and rejected. PHA resists this conclusion by arguing that, regardless whether the evidence may be interpreted in such a manner as to support a finding of PHRA liability based on the conduct of some PHA employee other than Greene, Marra and DiGravio exclusively targeted Greene as the perpetrator of the retaliation at trial, and the jury disagreed. In essence, PHA urges us to construe the jury's PHRA verdicts as being inconsistent with the theory of the case advanced by Marra and DiGravio. Accepting this invitation would require us to conclude that plaintiffs' view of the adverse employment decisions against them as being retaliatory in nature was contingent upon Greene's affirmative involvement in those decisions. No fair reading of the trial record supports PHA's assertion. [20] The essence of plaintiffs' claims is that the particular employment decisions affecting them were, without qualification, the product of retaliation for their involvement in the Paladino trial, rather than honest business considerations. From their perspective, the only question was how far up the chain of command the blame could be put for purposes of imputing liability to PHA, the only named defendant. To the extent that they more forcefully pointed at Greene as the orchestrator of the challenged employment decisions, it was primarily, if not exclusively, because they could not prevail against PHA under § 1983 without doing so. PHA's contrary suggestion on appeal is belied by its own thinking at trial, as reflected in the jury instructions and verdict form upon which the parties agreed. At PHA's request, the District Court instructed the jury that it was required to return a verdict in favor of PHA on the § 1983 claims if it found that Greene had no involvement in the challenged employment decisions. PHA did not, however, request a similar instruction for the PHRA claims. Instead, without any objection by PHA, the District Court instructed the jury that, for purposes of PHRA liability, [i]t is undisputed in this case that all acts done by officers and employees of the [PHA] . . . were within the scope of their employment with the [PHA]. . . . Therefore, you must then decide the other questions [regarding liability], keeping in mind that it is undisputed that the acts were conducted, or . . . were done[,] within the scope of their employment, App. at 810 (emphasis added), authorizing the jury to look beyond Greene to the remaining PHA employees in assessing PHRA liability. Consistent with these instructions, the agreed-upon verdict form authorized the jury to award damages based on the single finding that PHA retaliated against Marra and DiGravio, respectively, in violation of the PHRA, whereas the jury was only permitted to enter a damages verdict on the § 1983 claims if it first found that Greene personally ordered or acquiesced in the retaliation against Marra and DiGravio, respectively. See, e.g., App. at 5 (If you answered `Yes' to Question # 1 [whether PHA retaliated against Marra in violation of the PHRA] or (3 and 4) [whether Marra was retaliated against in violation of Section 1983 and Greene personally ordered or acquiesced in the retaliation], what amount of damages, if any, do you award Edward Marra?) (emphasis added). In rendering PHRA verdicts in favor of both Marra and DiGravio, the jury faithfully applied the instructions given to them. In short, we reject every permutation of PHA's inconsistency challenge and conclude that the jury's findings here are consistent in all respects. [21]
PHA finally contends that the District Court erred in permitting plaintiffs' PHRA claims to be tried before a jury. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed Section 962(c)(3) of the PHRA [22] as not conferring a right to a jury trial for claims under the statute, Wertz v. Chapman Twp., 559 Pa. 630, 741 A.2d 1272 (1999), the District Court concluded that it was not bound by Wertz because the right to a jury trial in federal court is a matter of federal law. The District Court further determined that Marra and DiGravio were entitled to a jury trial on their PHRA claims under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. On appeal, PHA takes issue only with the District Court's predicate determination that federal law, not state law, governs the question of whether a litigant has a right to jury trial on a claim brought in a federal forum, insisting that the District Court was bound to apply Wertz and strike the jury trial demand for the PHRA claims. We disagree. The right to a jury trial in federal court, regardless of whether the claim arises under state law, presents a question of federal law, In re City of Philadelphia Litigation, 158 F.3d 723, 726 (3d Cir.1998) (citing Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222, 83 S.Ct. 609, 9 L.Ed.2d 691 (1963) (per curiam); Cooper Labs., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 802 F.2d 667, 671 (3d Cir.1986)), even when a state statute or state constitution would preclude a jury trial in state court. Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co., 83 F.3d 225, 230 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). This long-recognized precept is dictated by the clear command of the Seventh Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. VII (In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. . . .); Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609 (The federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic and continuing strength. Only through a holding that the jurytrial [sic] right [in federal court] is to be determined according to federal law can the uniformity in its exercise[,] which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment[,] be achieved.) (internal citations and footnote omitted). [23] Our decision in Bereda v. Pickering Creek Indus. Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.1989), relied on here by PHA, is not to the contrary. There, the plaintiff brought suit against her former employer for, among other things, gender discrimination in violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Both parties requested a jury trial and the case was tried to a jury. It found in favor of the plaintiff on both claims. It had not been instructed on the statutory caps on back pay under Title VII and the PHRA, however, and awarded back pay damages in excess of those caps. Reasoning from the premise that neither Title VII nor the PHRA conferred a right to a jury trial on the plaintiff's claims, [24] the district court elected to treat the jury's gender discrimination verdict as merely advisory in nature, even though the case had been submitted to the jury on the parties' understanding that the jury verdict would be binding, and reduced the plaintiff's back pay award to comply with the statutory caps. On appeal, the plaintiff did not challenge the district court's legal premise that she had no right to a jury trial on her claims, but instead principally contended that the court had violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) [25] by announcing that it would treat the jury's verdict as advisory only after the verdict had been returned. At the outset of our analysis of this claim on the merits, we observed that neither Title VII nor PHRA provide for trial by jury as a matter of right, Bereda, 865 F.2d at 52, merely citing § 962(c) of the PHRA for the latter proposition, and did not consider whether the Seventh Amendment independently conferred such a right. We went on to rule in favor of the plaintiff on the merits of her Rule 39(c) argument. Id. at 53. PHA misreads Bereda as eschewing application of a federal constitutional analysis in determining whether there exists a right to a jury trial in federal court on a state law claim. We were not asked in Bereda to determine whether the plaintiff had a federal constitutional right to a jury trial on her PHRA claim, and our cursory observation that there exists no statutory right to a jury trial under the PHRA, an issue that would not be definitively resolved by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court until more than a decade later in Wertz, was intended to serve as nothing more than an acknowledgment of an undisputed point in that case. In any event, long-standing Supreme Court precedent requires the application of federal law in determining the right to a jury trial in federal court, Simler, 372 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. 609, and our decision in Bereda cannot, and should not, be understood to suggest anything to the contrary. We thus conclude that the District Court was correct in looking beyond Wertz to determine, under the Seventh Amendment, whether Marra and DiGravio had a constitutionally guaranteed right to try their PHRA claims before a jury. We need not further decide whether the District Court correctly held that Marra and DiGravio were entitled to a jury trial on their PHRA claims under the Seventh Amendment, see Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18, 107 S.Ct. 1831, 95 L.Ed.2d 365 (1987) (articulating two-part test for determining whether statutory cause of action is a Suit at common law for Seventh Amendment purposes), as PHA has not challenged this aspect of the District Court's ruling. [26]