Opinion ID: 1345677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative and constitutional history

Text: The reporters rely on the legislative history of section 1070 to support their view. Delaney and the prosecutor disagree with the reporters' interpretation of that history. It is, however, beside the point for two reasons. First, as we have explained, article I, section 2(b) and section 1070 are virtually identical. In light of our determination that the language of article I, section 2(b) is unambiguous, simple logic compels the same conclusion as to the statute. Thus, we need not go beyond the words of the statute to extrinsic aids such as legislative history. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) To do so would violate the principle that, When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it.  ( Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198 [137 Cal. Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148], italics added.) This rule is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence. ( Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819) 17 U.S. 122, 202 [4 L.Ed. 529, 550].) [10] (9) (See fn. 11.) Second, in light of the voters' incorporation of the statutory language into the California Constitution, we need construe only article I, section 2(b). [11] The legislative history of section 1070 would be relevant only if it shed some light on the meaning of its constitutional counterpart, article I, section 2(b). The history, however, is of no help in that regard. Article I, section 2(b) is plain on its face, and we need not  indeed, should not  search for external indicia of the voters' intent. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) Moreover, the legislative history of section 1070 could, as a matter of logic, reflect only the Legislature's intent. (10, 11) (See fn. 12.) That history would not provide us with any guidance as to the voters' subsequent intent because none of the indicia of the Legislature's possible intent (committee analysis and digest and letters from the statute's author) were before the voters. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 311-312 [211 Cal. Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]; Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 742.) [12] Delaney also relies on the ballot argument in favor of Proposition 5 in 1980, the measure that created article I, section 2(b). (12) Ballot arguments are accepted sources from which to ascertain the voters' intent. ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 888, fn. 8 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744]; White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775, fn. 11 [120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222].) As with the legislative history of section 1070, however, we need not look beyond the language of the enactment (article I, section 2(b)) when its language is unambiguous. ( Lungren v. Deukmejian, supra, 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) The ballot argument (unlike the legislative history) is, however, at least relevant to determining the voters' intent. (2f) We therefore consider the ballot argument (set forth in full in the margin) to determine if it demonstrates the voters did not mean what they said. [13] The repeated references in the argument to confidentiality and the like permit the inference the proponents of the measure intended to protect only confidential information. The same inference may be drawn from the Legislative Analyst's statement. [14] The inference, however, is far from compelling. The ballot materials emphasized the need for confidentiality but did not state that only confidential matters would be protected. The most reasonable inference is that the proponents chose to emphasize (in the limited space available for ballot arguments) what they perceived as the greatest need. We cannot conclude that, by emphasizing one purpose, perhaps the primary purpose of the measure, the argument misled voters into thinking confidentiality was the only purpose, especially when the measure itself made clear that all unpublished information would be protected. Moreover, a possible inference based on the ballot argument is an insufficient basis on which to ignore the unrestricted and unambiguous language of the measure itself. It would be a strained approach to constitutional analysis if we were to give more weight to a possible inference in an extrinsic source (a ballot argument) than to a clear statement in the Constitution itself. We decline to do so. [15]