Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of evidence of mental illness.

Text: In advance of the guilt phase trial session at which appellant planned to offer psychiatric testimony, the court and counsel discussed the scope of the mental state evidence that would be admitted. Appellant conceded that no evidence of diminished capacity was admissible, but sought a ruling that the expert would be permitted to testify regarding diminished actuality. The court ruled that the defense could offer any relevant evidence on mental defect or disease. However, no questions could be asked of the expert by either appellant or the People about whether or how such defect or disease would affect the defendant's mental state or actuality, or if it would impair his ability to form an intent, deliberate, or premeditate, unless the psychiatrist would testify, out of the presence of the jury, that he believed that appellant did not premeditate and deliberate the killings. The court extended that ruling to preclude any hypothetical questions regarding the effect of mental defect or illness on a person's ability to deliberate or premeditate. Appellant then offered no evidence of mental illness at the guilt phase. He now claims that the court erred. The ruling was an overly restrictive reading of the statutory limitations on admission of evidence of mental illness. Expert opinion on whether a defendant had the capacity to form a mental state that is an element of a charged offense or actually did form such intent is not admissible at the guilt phase of a trial. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960-961, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Sections 28 [21] and 29 [22] permit introduction of evidence of mental illness when relevant to whether a defendant actually formed a mental state that is an element of a charged offense, but do not permit an expert to offer an opinion on whether a defendant had the mental capacity to form a specific mental state or whether the defendant actually harbored such a mental state. An expert's opinion that a form of mental illness can lead to impulsive behavior is relevant to the existence vel non of the mental states of premeditation and deliberation regardless of whether the expert believed appellant actually harbored those mental states at the time of the killing. We reject, however, appellant's claim that exclusion of expert testimony on the ultimate question of fact as to whether appellant did form those mental states denied him the right to present a defense and thereby deprived him of rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. All authority is to the contrary. (See, e.g., People v. Nunn (1996) 50 Cal. App.4th 1357, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 294; People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891, 905, 234 Cal.Rptr. 819; People v. McCowan (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1, 12-15, 227 Cal. Rptr. 23; People v. Whitler (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 337, 214 Cal.Rptr. 610.) Sections 28 and 29 do not preclude offering as a defense the absence of a mental state that is an element of a charged offense or presenting evidence in support of that defense. They preclude only expert opinion that the element was not present. Although we agree that the court erred in ruling that the experts could not testify unless they believed defendant did not premeditate and deliberate the murders, that error is not a basis for reversal of the judgment. The record does not confirm appellant's implied claim that his failure to offer expert testimony regarding mental illness or defect was attributable to the trial court's restriction of expert testimony. At the hearing, defense counsel conceded that section 29 precludes expert opinion on whether a defendant had the capacity to entertain or actually had a particular mental state when the crime was committed and submitted the matter only on the issue of whether hypothetical questions could be asked of the experts. The court ruled that expert opinion on the ultimate issue could not be introduced by means of asking the expert a hypothetical question such as what a person who had a bipolar disorder or was a paranoid schizophrenic could or could not do. The expert could not tie the disease to appellant's conduct in that manner. That discussion and a subsequent discussion of what evidence the prosecution would be permitted to offer to impeach defense evidence of mental illness clearly assumed that the defense would be offering psychiatric testimony. Thus, appellant was free to offer evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect as well as evidence about that disease or defect. Had the evidence he introduced at the sanity phase about his mental illness offered a basis from which the jury could infer that he did not premeditate or deliberate the murders, that evidence could have been introduced at the guilt phase. Inasmuch as he failed to offer any such evidence at the guilt phase and the record does not reflect that this failure was due to the court's ruling, the issue is not properly preserved or presented. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 837, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) Even assuming the court erred in precluding hypothetical questions, however, the error was not prejudicial. None of the experts, either court-appointed or defenseretained, all of whom testified that appellant was mentally ill, suggested that his illness precluded or would affect the ability to premeditate and deliberate. At least to the extent that it was relevant to the plan to seize the girls and their chaperones, the guilt phase evidence demonstrated extensive premeditation and deliberation. There was also sufficient evidence that the murders were premeditated and deliberate.