Opinion ID: 2246121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: Defendant submits that it is unconstitutional to place the burden of establishing insanity upon him. The submission is dual-pronged: first, that it is a violation of due process to place the burden upon him; and second, that it is a denial of equal protection to place the burden upon him. In the recent case of Price v. State, (1980) Ind., 412 N.E.2d 783, we determined that Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(b) (Burns 1979), which places the burden of establishing insanity upon the defendant, does not constitute a violation of due process. There is no basis for departing from that holding. See Norris v. State, (1981) Ind., 419 N.E.2d 129. With regard to Defendant's contention that the statute denies him the equal protection of the law under both the State and Federal Constitutions, the burden is upon the challenger to overcome the presumption of constitutionality, and all doubts are resolved against a charge of unconstitutionality. Sidle v. Majors, (1976) 264 Ind. 206, 341 N.E.2d 763. Defendant has cited no authority in support of his argument that to require the State to prove his sanity, as an element of the crime, is unarguably a fundamental right, and that, accordingly the distinction between the insanity defense and other defenses can be upheld only if justified by a compelling state interest. Defendant has cited no authority to support his fundamental rights claim, and we are of the opinion that he is in error. Although due process of law does embody the concept of the presumption of innocence, it does not follow that a defendant may never be encumbered with the burden of proving matters of defense. Justice Cardozo, in Morrison v. California, (1934) 291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664, said: The limits are in substance these, that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression. Id. at 88-89, 54 S.Ct. at 284, 78 L.Ed. at 669. Sanity is the norm, insanity the exception. When the mens rea has been logically inferred from the circumstances of the crime, to such an extent that it could be found therefrom beyond a reasonable doubt, but the defendant seeks to avoid responsibility therefor by reason of a lack of or diminished mental capacity, we see no oppression in requiring him to carry the burden of proof. This is particularly true in view of his superior position to present evidence upon the issue. Thus we think that there is a fair and substantial relationship between the distinction complained of and the object of the legislation.