Opinion ID: 1177897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appellant's Proposed Instruction E.

Text: Appellant next contends that his instruction, which comports with NRS 175.201, should have been given and that the trial court's failure to do so constitutes reversible error. [1] NRS 175.201 provides in part: ... and when an offense has been proved against him, and there exists a reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only of the lowest. The reasonable doubt instruction given in this case was taken verbatim from NRS 175.211(1). [2] This court and the legislature have said that no other definition of reasonable doubt shall be given. Cutler v. State, 93 Nev. 329, 336, 566 P.2d 809, 813 (1977); NRS 175.211(2). But appellant's instruction assumed that the jury found proof of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The proffered instruction, informed the jury to find a second degree murder if it entertained a reasonable doubt as to which degree had been proven. In California, an instruction based on a statute similar to our NRS 175.201 is required if other instructions do not adequately cover the law. People v. Morse, 60 Cal.2d 631, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 217, 388 P.2d 33, 49 (1964). See Geary v. State, 91 Nev. at 793, 544 P.2d at 423 (1975); see also Carey v. State, 91 Idaho 706, 429 P.2d 836, 841 (1967); State v. Stationak, 73 Wash.2d 647, 440 P.2d 457, 460 n. 4, 461 (1968). The principle embodied in the rejected instruction represents the weight of authority in this country, as well as our statutory law. See Annot. 20 A.L.R. 1258-59 (1922). The distinguishing feature between first and second degree murder is the presence or absence of premeditation and deliberation. The defense argued that proof of these elements was lacking and that had his instructions been given, he would probably have been convicted only of second degree murder. Here, however, statutory instructions on reasonable doubt were given, as were instructions on the presumption of innocence, intent, and the distinctions between first and second degree murder. Notwithstanding the reading of these instructions, we find that it is error not to give the instruction. In the context of this case, however, the failure does not require reversal since consideration of the entire record indicates neither a miscarriage of justice, nor prejudice to appellant's substantial rights. See State v. Fitch, 65 Nev. 668, 691-93, 200 P.2d 991, 1003-04 (1948); NRS 177.255; 178.598; 47.040(1)(b). Moreover, the evidence can easily be read to exclude a theory of guilt on the lesser offense of second degree murder. State v. Trujillo, 225 Kan. 320, 590 P.2d 1027, 1030-31 (1979). The evidence proving each element of first degree murder is truly overwhelming, Abram v. State, 95 Nev. 352, 594 P.2d 1143 (1979); Coffman v. State, 93 Nev. 32, 559 P.2d 828 (1977), and we conclude that the error in failure to give the statutory instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 20, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). There is substantial evidence from which the jury could have found premeditated homicide. This includes, for example, appellant's careful planning of the robbery and homicide, his carrying of the victim's pistol for a time preceding the killing, the locking of the cottage doors and the execution style of the slaying and deliberateness of the plan. We summarily reject appellant's remaining assignments of error and we affirm the judgment of the lower court. MOWBRAY and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.