Opinion ID: 4466327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Dady asserts it was reversible error for the district court to give instruction No. 6 and fail to give his proposed instruction. Dady asserts the evidence presented at trial failed to prove that M.J. suffered from a mental impairment and that Dady knew of M.J.’s mental impairment. Dady also asserts that the testimony of M.J.’s mental health diagnoses was inadmissible hearsay. Dady argues that he was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial when the court refused to allow him to elicit testimony of M.J.’s previous hospitalizations and to link the hospitalizations to M.J.’s previous sexual encounters. Lastly, Dady asserts that the trial court did not properly 6 See State v. McCurdy, 301 Neb. 343, 918 N.W.2d 292 (2018). 7 State v. Mora, 298 Neb. 185, 903 N.W.2d 244 (2017). 8 See State v. Briggs, 303 Neb. 352, 929 N.W.2d 65 (2019). 9 Briggs, supra note 8. 10 See State v. Erickson, 281 Neb. 31, 793 N.W.2d 155 (2011). 11 State v. Gibson, 302 Neb. 833, 925 N.W.2d 678 (2019). - 660 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 weigh several factors, including Dady’s social background and desire for rehabilitation, when imposing his sentence. As will be explained below, we find the court erred in including the ambiguous phrase “because of the victim’s age” in instruction No. 6 and in overruling Dady’s hearsay objection to the testimony of M.J.’s mother about M.J.’s mental health diagnoses. However, we find both errors to be harmless. M.J.’s mother’s testimony was cumulative to Kelly’s testimony, and the ambiguity of instruction No. 6 was clarified by a combination of the jury instructions’ being taken as a whole and the manner of the State’s presentation of its case and closing arguments. Jury Instructions Dady asserts that instruction No. 6 misstates the law because age is not a permissible consideration under § 28-319(1)(b) in determining whether a victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct. Alternatively, Dady asserts that if age is a permissible consideration under § 28-319(1)(b), instruction No. 6 was misleading because it indicated that based upon a simple determination that M.J. was 10 years old, the jury could find M.J. mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct. Dady argues that his proposed instruction should have been given instead because it would have properly informed the jury that “mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of . . . her conduct” under § 28-319(1)(b) requires the jury to find that M.J. had a significant abnormality. We disagree with Dady’s argument that by omitting any explicit reference to age in § 28-319(1)(b), while specifying age in the statutory rape provision of subsection (1)(c), the Legislature clearly indicated that age is not a permissible consideration in determining whether subsection (1)(b) was violated. We recognize that other states have statutory rape laws directed at persons near the age of majority who - 661 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 sexually prey on younger children.12 Nebraska does not. The only statute relevant to such scenario is § 28-319(1)(b). The statutory rape provisions of § 28-319(1)(c), and of other jurisdictions addressing older individuals’ preying upon children, are distinguishable from § 28-319(1)(b) insofar as the victim of the specified age is conclusively regarded under such statutes as incapable of giving consent to the sexual act.13 By specifying age in subsection (1)(c) and not in subsection (1)(b) of § 28-319, the Legislature was making a distinction between statutory rape under subsection (1)(c) and a violation of subsection (1)(b) requiring an individualized inquiry into the victim’s capacity. Section 28-319(1)(b) does not create a statutory presumption based on age that the victim is incapable of consent. [8,9] It does not follow, however, that age is irrelevant to determining a victim’s capacity for purposes of § 28-319(1)(b). Under § 28-319(1)(b), whether the victim was incapable of consent depends upon a specific inquiry into the victim’s capacity, i.e., whether the victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct. We have long held that § 28-319(1)(b) applies to a wide array of situations that affect a victim’s capacity, including age.14 Thus, while we would agree with Dady’s contention that in charges brought under § 28-319(1)(b), a jury cannot find inability to consent in a manner similar to such a finding under statutory rape provisions based exclusively on age, we disagree with Dady’s contention that a victim’s age is an irrelevant consideration in determining whether a specific victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct. The jury is permitted to conclude 12 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-402(1)(d) (West Cum. Supp. 2018) (victim less than 15 years old with 4-year age gap between victim and perpetrator). 13 See George v. State, 61 Neb. 669, 85 N.W. 840 (1901). 14 See State v. Collins, 7 Neb. App. 187, 583 N.W.2d 341 (1998). - 662 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 the victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct based upon evidence that a child of the victim’s age ordinarily lacks sufficient brain development to have such capacity and that the victim was developmentally normal for his or her age. But we agree with Dady that instruction No. 6 was potentially misleading as to whether the jury could find inability to consent in a manner similar to such a finding under statutory rape provisions based on age. Instruction No. 6 explained to the jury the respective definitions of the terms “mentally incapable” and “mental impairment.” “Mentally incapable” was correctly defined inasmuch as it described a victim “incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her sexual conduct.” “Mental impairment” was correctly defined as a “victim’s impairment . . . so severe that she lacked the capacity to consent to sexual conduct with the Defendant.” The problem is that the definition of “mentally incapable” was prefaced with the phrase “because of the victim’s age or mental impairment.” We disapprove of this broad “because of the victim’s age” phrasing. The phrase “because of the victim’s age” is ambiguous as to whether age can be the sole basis for a finding that the victim was mentally incapable, without an individualized assessment of the victim’s maturity. The definition of “mentally incapable” could have been excluded from the court’s instructions, as the language of § 28-319(1)(b) is sufficiently clear that a definitional instruction would not normally be necessary. Because instruction No. 6 was ambiguous and capable of misleading the jury, it was erroneous. [10] But this does not end our inquiry. Alleged errors in a jury instruction are examined using a two-step process.15 First, the court reviews the case based on the errors assigned and argued, or it may find plain error. Second, when an error is 15 See, Rodriguez, supra note 3; State v. Botts, 26 Neb. App. 544, 921 N.W.2d 151 (2018). - 663 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 identified, the court considers whether the error was harmless or prejudicial.16 Jury instructions are subject to the harmless error rule, and an erroneous jury instruction requires reversal only if the error adversely affects the substantial rights of the complaining party.17 When examining for harmless error, the court may look at a variety of factors including the jury instructions as a whole, the evidence presented at trial, and the closing arguments.18 We conclude that the potentially misleading ambiguity of the phrase “because of the victim’s age” in instruction No. 6 did not in fact mislead the jury. The jury’s verdict was surely unattributable to this erroneous instruction, because the instructions taken as a whole, combined with the evidence and arguments presented at trial, clarified the ambiguity of “because of the victim’s age” such that the jury understood “age” in this context to be a subjective review of M.J.’s developmental age. Other instructions correctly provided that the jury must apply the law in the instructions and that no one instruction contains all of the law applicable to this case. One correctly provided the specific elements of the charge using the language of § 28-319(1)(b), instructing the jury that it could not find Dady guilty without determining beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew or should have known that M.J. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct. Instruction No. 6 also correctly indicated that the inquiry was victim specific. To the extent that the ambiguity of the “because of the victim’s age” phrasing was not fully clarified by the surrounding 16 See, Rodriguez, supra note 3; Botts, supra note 15. 17 Rodriguez, supra note 3. 18 See, State v. Smith, 302 Neb. 154, 922 N.W.2d 444 (2019); Nguyen v. Rezac, 256 Neb. 458, 590 N.W.2d 375 (1999); Huerta, supra note 4; State v. Beamon, 336 Wis. 2d 438, 804 N.W.2d 706 (Wis. App. 2011); Johnson v. State, 94 So. 3d 1209 (Miss. App. 2011). - 664 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 instructions alone, it was clarified by the State’s theory of the case, the evidence, and the closing arguments. The State presented extensive evidence linking age and normal brain development to M.J.’s specific cognitive abilities. Kelly, the treating emergency room physician, opined that M.J. was incapable of appraising the nature of sexual conduct. Kelly based this opinion on her understanding of normal child cognitive development and on the time she spent with M.J. The State thus presented unrefuted evidence that a normal 10-year-old child’s level of cognitive development renders the child unable to appraise the nature of sexual conduct and that M.J. appeared to be a normal 10-year-old. Furthermore, the jurors were able to see M.J. testify and draw their own conclusions about M.J.’s mental capabilities. The court may consider the facts of the case when determining whether a jury instruction was confusing or misleading.19 Where a potential ambiguity in an instruction exists, the prosecutor may assist the jury in resolving such ambiguity during closing arguments.20 The State went step by step during closing arguments through the elements of the crime charged, explaining what “age” in instruction No. 6 meant. The prosecution asked the jury when determining mental and physical capacity to consider the evidence presented at trial that M.J. appeared to be a normal 10-year-old and that a normally developed 10-year-old brain does not have the capacity to appraise the nature of sexual conduct. The State made it clear that the reference “because of the victim’s age” in instruction No. 6 was a case-specific inquiry based on the evidence presented. Viewing instruction No. 6 in context, the jury had a clear and correct understanding of how age related to the question of M.J.’s mental capability of resisting or appraising the nature 19 See Nguyen, supra note 18. 20 See, Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 124 S. Ct. 1830, 158 L. Ed. 2d 701 (2004); Huerta, supra note 4. - 665 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 of her conduct. When the instructions as a whole are combined with the body of evidence on the record and the clarification provided by the prosecution in the closing arguments, the jury was not misled by the ambiguous phrasing of instruction No. 6. Rather, the jury properly understood that age was a consideration in determining M.J.’s level of mental development or developmental age. When considering the instructions as a whole, the evidence presented, and the clarification provided in closing arguments, we find the erroneous jury instruction to be harmless. Dady also contends that his proposed instruction should have been given instead of instruction No. 6. To establish reversible error from a court’s refusal to give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give the tendered instruction.”21 Dady’s proposed jury instruction provided in relevant part: “Mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct” shall mean a significant abnormality on the part of the victim such as severe intoxication or other substantial mental or physical impairment. In order for a mental impairment to be substantial, it must be severe; a person in this category is treated as equivalent to a severely intoxicated or an unconscious person. Not every mental challenge or impairment is so severe that the person lacks the capacity to resist or appraise the nature of her conduct. Dady’s proposed instruction was based on In re Interest of K.M., where we said: To render an individual incapable to consent to sexual conduct, a mental impairment must be severe. A person in this category is treated as equivalent to a severely 21 Mueller, supra note 5, 301 Neb. at 789, 920 N.W.2d at 434. - 666 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 intoxicated or an unconscious person. Thus, not every mental challenge or impairment is so severe that the person lacks the capacity to consent. We have said lack-ofcapacity sexual assault under § 28-319(1)(b) requires on the part of the victim “a significant abnormality, such as severe intoxication or other substantial mental or physical impairment.”22 This passage from In re Interest of K.M. is one way of explaining the concept of mental incapacity as warranted from the facts in that case, which involved an alleged mental impairment. However, as we have already illustrated, In re Interest of K.M. should not be construed as exhaustively defining every situation to which § 28-319(1)(b) could be applied. A victim can be incapable of consent without suffering from a “mental impairment.”23 Dady’s proposed instruction was not a correct recitation of our holding from In re Interest of K.M., because it incorrectly indicated that “[m]entally or physically incapable” is limited to a “significant abnormality” constituting a “substantial mental or physical impairment.” A child can be incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct without suffering from an “abnormality” or “substantial mental or physical impairment.” The court did not err in denying Dady’s proposed instruction, because, as applied to the facts of this matter, it was not a correct statement of the law. Sufficiency of Evidence In his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Dady argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that M.J. suffered from a “mental impairment.”24 He does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support M.J.’s 22 In re Interest of K.M., supra note 1, 299 Neb. at 645, 910 N.W.2d at 89 (emphasis supplied). 23 See id. 24 Brief for appellant at 22. - 667 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 inability to consent by virtue of being mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct for any other reason. Dady also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the necessary element that he knew or should have known that M.J., for whatever reason, was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct. [11] In reviewing a criminal conviction for a sufficiency of the evidence claim, whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, the standard is the same: An appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact.25 The relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.26 And when there are alternative theories of guilt presented to the jury, we will affirm the verdict if the evidence is sufficient to support any alternative theory presented.27 Because we find the evidence sufficient to support a determination that M.J. was incapable of consent by virtue of her stage of development, we need not consider whether the evidence was sufficient to support the State’s alternative theory that by virtue of M.J.’s diagnoses, she suffered a “mental impairment.”28 As stated, expert testimony explained the brain capacities and reasoning capabilities of a normal 10-year-old. Kelly testified that a normal 10-year-old does not have the capacity to appraise the nature of sexual conduct. Kelly then drew on her understanding of child brain development and 25 State v. Thomas, 303 Neb. 964, 932 N.W.2d 713 (2019). 26 Id. 27 See McCurdy, supra note 6. 28 See In re Interest of K.M., supra note 1, 299 Neb. at 645, 910 N.W.2d at 89. Accord McCurdy, supra note 6. - 668 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 her direct interactions with M.J. when she opined that M.J. could not appraise the nature of sex. The jury was also able to observe M.J. and draw its own conclusions about M.J.’s capabilities, when she testified approximately 9 months after the incident. We also find the evidence sufficient for the jury to conclude that Dady knew M.J. was incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct when she agreed to have sex with someone nearly twice her age in exchange for an “MP3 player.” There was evidence presented that M.J. acted as a normal child when she and Dady spent time together. Prior to the incident, M.J.’s stepfather had a specific conversation with Dady explaining that M.J. was 10 years old. M.J. rode around the neighborhood on a “bike [with] flowers on it.” When Dady wanted M.J. to come to the mall with him, M.J. said she would have to go ask her mother. On another occasion, M.J. had to cut short her visit with Dady in order to go home to eat lunch and to clean her room. Such facts indicate Dady had sufficient time to interact with M.J. and observe M.J.’s level of maturity and understanding. And when Dady was interviewed by law enforcement, he repeatedly emphasized that M.J. claimed to be older, thereby indicating he had some knowledge that M.J.’s age was a factor for whether she had the capacity to appraise the nature of her conduct. By the end of the police interview, Dady admitted M.J. appeared to be around 10 or 11 years old. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.29 A rational jury could conclude that M.J. was incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct and that Dady knew or should have known that. We find no merit to Dady’s arguments that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. 29 McCurdy, supra note 6. - 669 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 Hearsay [12] Dady contends that the testimony by M.J.’s mother and by Kelly concerning M.J.’s diagnoses was hearsay. However, the discussion between M.J., M.J.’s mother, and Kelly concerning M.J.’s past diagnoses falls squarely within Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-803(3) (Reissue 2016) as a statement describing medical history. Evidence is admissible under § 27-803(3) when the party seeking to introduce the evidence demonstrates (1) that the circumstances under which the statements were made were such that the declarant’s purpose in making the statements was to assist in the provision of medical diagnosis or treatment and (2) that the statements were of a nature reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment by a medical professional.”30 Although Kelly did not personally diagnose M.J., she testified that she learned of the diagnoses while doing a patient interview for the purpose of treating M.J. during her visit to the emergency room. She further testified that obtaining a patient history is an important part of her job and that she attempts to get a medical history from every patient she treats. The testimony of Kelly satisfies the requirements for evidence to be admissible under § 27-803(3). [13] Although a Confrontation Clause objection was made during the motion to strike, the objection was not asserted or argued on appeal. To be considered by an appellate court, an alleged error must be both specifically assigned and specifically argued in the brief of the party asserting the error.31 Furthermore, the motion to strike was made only in relation to M.J.’s mother’s testimony, and no Confrontation Clause objection was raised as to Kelly’s testimony. The court did not err in admitting Kelly’s testimony of M.J.’s mental health diagnoses over Dady’s hearsay objection. M.J’s mother’s testimony regarding M.J.’s diagnoses was also hearsay, but did not fall 30 Mora, supra note 7, 298 Neb. at 193-94, 903 N.W.2d at 253. 31 Anderson v. Babbe, ante p. 186, 933 N.W.2d 813 (2019). - 670 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 into a hearsay exception. However, the testimony of M.J.’s mother was cumulative of Kelly’s admissible statements and thus qualifies as harmless error.32 Exclusion of § 27-412 Evidence Dady asserts that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by his being prevented from cross-examining M.J. concerning her other sexual encounters. Dady asserts that M.J.’s previous sexual behavior is relevant to show that she comprehended the nature of her sexual conduct. Evidence under § 27-412 should be admitted if it is of sufficient relevance to establish that the victim had prior knowledge of the same kind of sexual activities of which the defendant is accused.33 Where the Nebraska Evidence Rules commit the evidentiary question at issue to the discretion of the trial court, an appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence.34 In its motion in limine, the State argued that the evidence put forward by Dady was not relevant to the case at hand because the other encounters did not involve sexual intercourse. Furthermore, one of the encounters occurred after the incident with Dady, and the timing of one of the other two encounters was also disputed. The State argued that to the extent the other encounters did not involve intercourse and occurred after the incident with Dady, they were not relevant to show that M.J. could appraise the nature of sexual conduct at the time of the incident. 32 See State v. Hood, 301 Neb. 207, 917 N.W.2d 880 (2018). 33 See State v. Earl, 252 Neb. 127, 560 N.W.2d 491 (1997). 34 See Briggs, supra note 8. - 671 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 We have previously held such differences to be enough to warrant the exclusion of prior encounters.35 In State v. Earl,36 the defendant wanted to enter evidence of the 6-year-old victim’s previous sexual conduct to show that the victim had an alternate source for knowledge about sex acts. The victim had had an encounter with two of his similarly aged ­cousins. During that encounter, the victim and his female cousins played house and lay on each other naked. The encounter between the victim and the defendant in State v. Earl involved a male-on-male assault that included fellatio. In considering the defendant’s request under the previous rape shield statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-321 (Reissue 1995), the court concluded the incident involving the victim and his cousins was too different to be relevant in the defendant’s case.37 In the present case, one of the encounters clearly occurred after the incident with Dady and the second encounter’s timing is undetermined. This supports the ruling that the proffered evidence was irrelevant to showing that M.J. could appraise the nature of sexual intercourse at the time of the incident with Dady. Similarly to the comparison in State v. Earl, the proffered evidence of M.J.’s past encounters is categorically different from the encounter with Dady. M.J.’s previous encounters involved sexual touching of similarly aged children. M.J.’s encounter with Dady was a 10-year-old having sexual intercourse with an 18-year-old. The trial court’s ruling did not prevent Dady from presenting an effective defense; nor did it violate Dady’s constitutional rights. Dady was allowed to cross-examine M.J.’s mother concerning the hospitalization related to the one encounter that occurred before the events of the present case. On these facts, 35 See, State v. Sanchez, 257 Neb. 291, 597 N.W.2d 361 (1999); Earl, supra note 33. 36 Earl, supra note 33. 37 See id. - 672 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 we cannot say that the trial court’s ruling was unreasonable or untenable, nor that it was clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence. The district court’s ruling on the admissibility of M.J.’s other sexual encounters was not an abuse of discretion. Having addressed the propriety of the court’s final ruling regarding the admissibility of M.J.’s other sexual encounters, we address Dady’s assertion that there was an irregularity in the proceedings of the court which prevented him from having a fair trial.38 Dady argues that when the district court reversed its decision and informed defense counsel it would allow some of the § 27-412 evidence initially excluded, the defense adjusted its trial strategy to make use of this evidence. Dady began questioning M.J. about certain events and was stopped during the cross-examination. The district court then declared it was reversing its decision again. Dady contends that the adjustment of trial strategy resulted in defense counsel’s eliciting testimony about the hospitalizations in order to attrib­ ute the hospitalizations to M.J.’s previous sexual encounters rather than the mental-health-related reasons given by M.J.’s mother at trial. The evidence proposed in the offer of proof was intended to provide the jury with an alternate explanation for two hospitalizations. Dady had already been able to offer such an explanation for one of those hospitalizations through the crossexamination of M.J.’s mother. The other sexual encounter that resulted in a hospitalization occurred after the incident with Dady. As explained above, such evidence is not relevant in establishing what M.J. knew about sex at the time of the incident. Nor is it relevant to show the state of M.J.’s mental health at the time of the incident. The initial ruling on the evidence was based on Dady’s pretrial notice under § 27-412 and the State’s corresponding motion in limine. A motion in limine is a procedural step by 38 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2101 (Reissue 2016). - 673 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 which a court makes a preliminary determination; it is not a final order.39 A change in a ruling on admissibility is not de facto unfair, and the alleged change in trial strategy is not supported in the record. Defense counsel began questioning M.J.’s mother about the hospitalizations before any change from the pretrial ruling occurred. Therefore, no irregularity which could be considered unfair is demonstrable on these facts. Having addressed all of the grounds for Dady’s motion for a new trial, we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. Excessive Sentence [14] The sentence ordered is within the statutory guidelines and will not be altered unless there was an abuse of discretion.40 When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the violence involved in the commission of the crime. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life.41 Dady asserts that the district court abused its discretion by not considering all of the required factors. The record shows, however, that the district court weighed the correct factors related to Dady’s age, family background, mentality, criminal history, unsuccessful discharge from probation related to juvenile 39 See Golnick v. Callender, 290 Neb. 395, 860 N.W.2d 180 (2015). 40 See State v. Erickson, supra note 10. 41 State v. Chairez, 302 Neb. 731, 740, 924 N.W.2d 725, 732 (2019). - 674 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 304 Nebraska Reports STATE v. DADY Cite as 304 Neb. 649 charges, lack of effort in pursuing education and treatment while on probation, and potential to reoffend. Such consideration is not an abuse of discretion. Consequently, we affirm the district court’s sentence.