Opinion ID: 1187696
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admission of polygraph results as a condition of probation

Text: Does the use of results of a probationer's polygraph examination to monitor the probationer's conduct violate the Fifth Amendment? In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 79 L. Ed.2d 409, 104 S. Ct. 1136, reh. denied 466 U.S. 945 (1984), the United States Supreme Court addressed the federal Constitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the context of a probation. In 1980, Murphy pled guilty to a sex-related charge in a Minnesota court, was given a suspended prison sentence, and was placed on probation. The terms of his probation required him to participate in a treatment program for sexual offenders, to report to his probation officer periodically, and to be truthful with the officer in all matters. During the course of a meeting with his probation officer, who had previously received information from a treatment counselor that Murphy had admitted to a 1974 rape and murder, Murphy, upon questioning, admitted that he had committed the rape and murder. After being indicted for the murder, Murphy sought to suppress the confession made to the probation officer on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The Minnesota trial court found that Murphy was not in custody at the time of the confession and that the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary despite the absence of Miranda warnings. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that, notwithstanding the lack of custody in the usual sense, Murphy's failure to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he was questioned was not fatal to his claim. Due to the nature of his meeting with the probation officer, Murphy was under court order to respond truthfully, and the probation officer had substantial reason to believe that respondent's answers were likely to be incriminating. The United States Supreme Court accepted certiorari. The Murphy Court observed that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments did not prohibit the introduction into evidence of Murphy's admissions to the probation officer in probationer's subsequent murder prosecution. It pointed out that the general obligation to appear before a probation officer and answer questions truthfully did not, in itself, convert Murphy's otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones. It noted that a witness confronted with questions that the government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating evidence ordinarily must assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, rather than answer, if the witness desires not to incriminate himself or herself. If the witness chooses to answer rather than to assert the privilege, his or her choice is considered to be voluntary since the witness was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no penalty as a result of his or her decision to do so. The Murphy Court stated that Murphy could not claim the benefit of the in custody exception to the general rule that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-executing. 465 U.S. at 430. It was clear that Murphy was not in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since there was no formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest. The Court observed that a reasonably perceived threat of revocation of probation does not render the privilege self-executing. The legal compulsion to attend the meeting with the probation officer and to answer truthfully the questions of the officer who anticipated incriminating answers is indistinguishable from that felt by any witness who is required to appear and give testimony, and was insufficient to excuse Murphy's failure to exercise the privilege in a timely manner. The Court stated that whether a subjective or objective test was applied, there was no reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota attempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege. The Court held, however, that a defendant who has been convicted and placed on probation does not lose the protection of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For this reason, the State may not revoke, or threaten to revoke, probation for a valid invocation of the privilege. 465 U.S. at 435. Murphy makes it clear that the State cannot make waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination regarding a separate crime a condition of probation. See State v. Gleason, 154 Vt. 205, 212, 576 A.2d 1246 (1990). However, a probationer may be required to answer questions concerning matters relevant to probation that pose no realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 435 n.7. To the extent the probationer has lost the privilege against self-incrimination on offenses for which he or she has been convicted, the probationer must answer, even if his or her answers may be evidence of probation violations and result in revocation. Arizona v. Eccles, 179 Ariz. 226, 228, 877 P.2d 799 (1994). In this case, there was no violation of Lumley's Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination. The polygraph question and answer which led to Lumley's revocation referred solely to Lumley's condition of probation that he not be alone with children during the term of his probation. Answering the question truthfully would not have exposed Lumley to prosecution for another crime. The courts of other jurisdictions are virtually unanimous in approving the requirement of polygraph examinations as a condition of probation. See generally Annot., Propriety of Conditioning Probation on Defendant's Submission to Polygraph or other Lie Detector Testing, 86 A.L.R.4th 709 (1991). Where the jurisdictions disagree, however, is in whether the polygraph examination results are admissible against the probationer in a probation revocation hearing. Compare People v. Miller, 208 Cal. App.3d 1311, 256 Cal. Rptr. 587 (1989) (holding that an order of probation requiring probationer to submit to polygraph testing was not error where the results were not to be used as evidence of a probation violation but to determine whether changes would be necessary in the administration of the probationer's case plan) with State v. Travis, 125 Idaho 1, 867 P.2d 234 (1994) (holding that evidence of polygraph results was admissible in a probation revocation hearing as a factor that the court could consider in concluding it was appropriate to revoke the probation of a probationer). In Travis, the Idaho court approved the use of polygraph results as one factor in the trial court's determination to revoke Travis' probation. The Travis court noted that the trial court carefully limited its consideration of the polygraph examination. First, the trial court had weighed the evidence and had determined that the results provided an indication that things may not seem as they are. 125 Idaho at 4. Second, the trial court had not relied exclusively on the polygraph results in revoking probation. The trial court also had considered Travis' resistance to supervision and his uncooperativeness. The Travis court also considered the effect of Travis' agreement to submit to a polygraph examination as a condition of probation on the admissibility of the results in the revocation proceeding. The court stated: While Travis's agreement to this condition of his probation might not be sufficient to establish admissibility of the examination results in all circumstances, in the context of a probation revocation proceeding, Travis's agreement is another factor militating in favor of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion in considering the results of the examination. 125 Idaho at 5. In Patton v. State, 580 N.E.2d 693 (Ind. App. 1992), the Indiana court struck down a probation condition which required Patton to stipulate in advance to the admission in any court proceeding of polygraph results obtained from tests ordered as a condition of his probation. The probation condition in Patton was overbroad in that it required Patton to stipulate to the admission of polygraph results in any subsequent court proceeding, not just probation revocation hearings. The court stated: In theroy, a defendant who makes the decision to waive or stipulate to the examination's admissibility does so after weighing the questionable accuracy of the examination against the possible benefit to be gained from the examination's admission. Here, however, that decision was made by the court, not Patton. We hold it is inappropriate for a trial court to coerce a defendant to agree to the admissibility of evidence that otherwise would be inadmissible because it has not been found scientifically reliable. Thus, the rehabilitative benefits of the polygraph examination condition must be obtained without the examination results being admissible in any subsequent court proceeding. We emphasize we are limiting only the unrestricted admissibility of the polygraph examination results in any subsequent court proceeding, including a trial on a pending or subsequent charge. We impose no impediment upon the use of polygraph examinations as a rehabilitative tool much like the probation condition that a probationer be truthful in responding to questions asked by his or her probation supervisor. 580 N.E.2d at 699. Probation revocation hearings are not criminal trials, and there are significant differences as to a defendant's rights and the admission of evidence in a criminal trial and a revocation hearing. We hold that for the offense a probationer was convicted, there is no privilege against self-incrimination available to the probationer, and there is no valid claim of privilege against self-incrimination on the ground that information sought through a polygraph examination might be used in a subsequent probation revocation proceeding. A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no reasonable relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3rd 481, 486, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905, 541 P.2d 545 (1975). Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not required to establish a violation of a condition of probation. Rather, a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient. Rasler, 216 Kan. at 295. Lumley pled guilty to a sex crime committed upon young females. One condition of probation was that he not be alone with young females. As indicated at sentencing, compliance with that condition is difficult to enforce. The polygraph condition helped to monitor compliance and was therefore reasonably related to the defendant's criminal offense. Because this condition was aimed at deterring and discovering criminal conduct most likely to occur during unsupervised contact with young females, the condition was reasonably related to future criminality. The relaxed standard of proof and the fact that a probation revocation decision is a judicial decision rather than a jury decision are additional factors that strongly support a determination that polygraph test results are sufficiently reliable to be considered evidence in probation revocation hearings. Applying the stated rules for probation and revocation of probation to the instant case, we conclude the polygraph condition was valid. Affirmed.