Opinion ID: 1772659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in excluding from evidence a sailboat mast warning.

Text: This issue pertains to a mast warning sticker which, beginning with the 1976 model of the O'Day 25-foot sailboat, Bangor Punta placed upon each boat it manufactured. This sticker contained language warning that contact with overhead power lines was dangerous, and restated the warning found in the operating and rigging instructions furnished with the vessel. This mast warning was not affixed to the 1975 model of the Williams sailboat, but, as stated above, was placed on later models. During the trial, APCo's attempts to introduce evidence of this warning were excluded on objection. The trial court also excluded evidence included in answers to interrogatories by and in the deposition of James H. Hunt, Bangor Punta's president, pertaining to such warnings. APCo acknowledges in brief that the mast warning was first introduced after the 1975 sailboat of the Williamses had been sold by Bangor Punta and left its possession. APCo maintains that this evidence was, nevertheless, relevant on the issue of Bangor Punta's negligence, because the mast warning came into existence some three years before the accident. It is apparent that the trial court's refusal to admit this evidence was based upon its conclusion that it constituted an inadmissible subsequent remedial measure. That rule, of course is designed to protect the important policy of encouraging defendants to repair and improve their products and premises without the fear that such actions will be used later against them in a lawsuit. Werner v. Upjohn Company, 628 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir.1980). To be sure, federal cases, under Federal Rule of Evidence 407, allow the introduction of subsequent remedial measures to prove the feasibility of such remedial measures, but only when feasibility is controverted. Werner at 853. That position is also followed by Alabama case law, which follows Werner. In Standridge v. Alabama Power Co., 418 So.2d 84 (Ala.1982), this Court stated: There are several exceptions to the general rule of inadmissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs or remedial measures. A party may introduce such evidence to show the existence of a condition at the time of an accident; Dixie Electric Co. v. Maggio, 294 Ala. 411, 318 So.2d 274 (1975); to show the feasibility of the use of safeguards or precautionary measures; Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1980); to impeach a witness, Norwood Clinic, Inc. v. Spann, 240 Ala. 427, 199 So. 840 (1941); or to give testimony which is part of the res gestae. Alabama Power acknowledges another exception, that evidence of subsequent repairs may be admitted for the limited purpose of showing a party's control of the alleged defective premises or instrumentality. Norwood Clinic, Inc. v. Spann, 240 Ala. 427, 199 So. 840 (1941); Gulf Railroad Co. v. Havard, 217 Ala. 639, 117 So. 223 (1928). Nevertheless, in order for evidence to be admissible to establish control, control must be a controverted issue in the case. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.1980); Gulf Railroad Co. v. Havard, 217 Ala. 639, 117 So. 223 (1928). Alabama Power's major contention was that it had no duty to Mr. Standridge, not that it had no control over the premises. The estate asserts that the evidence of subsequent remedies is admissible to establish the company's duty to Mr. Standridge. We cannot agree. Duty is an essential element of a cause of action for negligence. The issue of duty does not fall outside the general rule that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible to prove a party's negligence. Thus, the trial judge properly excluded evidence of any subsequent remedies provided by Alabama Power. 418 So.2d at 88-89. The same reasoning applies here. The exception to establish the feasibility of a mast warning was never controverted at trial by Bangor Punta; indeed, feasibility was conceded by it in its motion in limine filed before trial. For aught that appears, APCo's purpose in introducing such evidence was to show Bangor Punta's negligence in the first instance, i.e., in selling the sailboat without that warning, and not to controvert at trial the feasibility of such a warning. APCo, however, argues that the absence of the mast warning was nevertheless admissible because Bangor Punta had knowledge of the danger of electrical shock from possible contact with lower power lines before this accident took place. In other words, APCo would have this evidence admitted against Bangor Punta, even though Bangor Punta's control over the sailboat had long since ceased, so long as Bangor Punta had knowledge of the danger before the accident. Alabama cases have focused on post-accident remedial changes to premises, facilities, or articles under the defendant's control which proximately causes injury. See Standridge, supra ; Dixie Electric Co. v. Maggio, 294 Ala. 411, 318 So.2d 274 (1975). Thus, had Bangor Punta controlled the sailboat in question at the time the mast warnings were placed upon 1976 models, perhaps an issue of negligence would have been made by its failure to incorporate that change in the 1975 model. [3] But, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has commented on the subject of subsequent remedial measures in a products liability case, Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir.1983): Instead, we ought to consider the probative value of such evidence on the point at issue. The real question is whether the product or its design was defective at the time the product was sold. See S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 181 (3d Ed. 1982). The jury's attention should be directed to whether the product was reasonably safe at the time it was manufactured.... The introduction of evidence about subsequent changes in the product or its design threatens to confuse the jury by diverting its attention from whether the product was defective at the relevant time to what was done later. ... Interpreted to require the evidence to focus on the time when the product was sold, Rule 407 would conform to the policy expressed in Rule 403, the exclusion involving information if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of confusion.... (Emphasis added.) See also Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc., 335 So.2d 128 (Ala.1976) (to establish liability in a products liability case, plaintiff must show that he suffered injury by one who sold a product in a defective condition); and First National Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So.2d 966 (Ala. 1978) (the manufacturer's liability arises because he has placed the product on the market and having done so, if he still retains some measure of control, no sale having taken place, he should be liable). A question on the relevancy of testimony is ordinarily a matter within the trial judge's discretion, and his ruling thereon will not be considered error on appeal unless that discretion has been grossly abused. Costarides v. Miller, 374 So.2d 1335 (Ala.1979). See also Burbic Contracting Co. v. Cement Asbestos Products Co., 409 So.2d 1 (Ala.1982) (exclusion of post-manufacture improvement in product line is not abuse of trial court's discretion). In this instance, that discretion was not abused.