Opinion ID: 1920586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tenancy-at-will

Text: Davis contends that even if the Court were to reject all of Davis's arguments that a long-term lease exists, it would be compelled to apply Section 47-16-05 and rule that Davis has a one-year lease from July 18, 1988 to July 18, 1989. Stonewood argues that [s]ince there is no lease, Section 47-16-05, N.D.C.C., cannot apply. Section 47-16-05, N.D.C.C., provides: A lease of real property, other than lodgings, in places where there is no usage on the subject, is presumed to be for one year from its commencement, unless otherwise expressed in the lease. Stonewood placed Davis in possession of the premises as a tenant while the parties negotiated the final terms of a contemplated long-term lease. Davis partially performed its duties. Stonewood did not present evidence overcoming the statutory presumption of a one-year lease provided in § 47-16-05, N.D. C.C. Thus, even if on remand, the trial court determines that the parties did not agree to a long-term lease, Davis had a one-year lease under § 47-16-05, N.D.C.C., unless Stonewood presents further evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of a one-year lease. The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and GIERKE, J., concur.