Opinion ID: 4543042
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders

Text: In 2005, Albert Florence was stopped by a New Jersey state trooper. Florence, 566 U.S. at 323. During the stop, the trooper learned of an outstanding 2003 bench warrant. Unknown to the trooper, the warrant had mistakenly remained active in a law-enforcement database despite Florence’s having paid the underlying fine. Id. The trooper arrested Florence and took him to the Burlington County Detention Center, where “every arrestee” was required “to shower with a delousing agent.” Id. Per the jail’s policy, as arrestees showered, officers checked their bodies “for scars, marks, gang tattoos, and contraband[.]” Id. After being subjected to this procedure, Florence was “instructed to open his mouth, lift his tongue, hold out his arms, turn around, and lift his genitals.” Id. At Burlington, Florence “shared a cell with at least one other person and interacted with other inmates following his admission to the jail.” Id. After six days in the Burlington County jail, Florence was transferred to the Essex County Correctional Facility, where “all arriving detainees passed through a metal detector and waited in a group holding cell for a more thorough search.” Id. at 324. During that second search, detention officers examined each detainee’s “ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, fingers, hands, arms, armpits, and other body openings.” Id. To search “other body openings,” the detention officers required Florence “to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough in a squatting position as part of the process.” Id. 45 The detention officers searched Florence’s clothes while he showered. Id. After all this was done, the detention officers placed Florence in the prison’s general population. See id. A day later, the charges against him were dismissed. Id. at 324. Florence sued under § 1983, claiming that “persons arrested for a minor offense could not be required to remove their clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the intake process.” Id. Rather, Florence argued, corrections officials needed reasonable suspicion that a detainee was smuggling contraband. Id. The Third Circuit rejected any need for a reasonable-suspicion showing, ruling that the procedure reasonably balanced inmate privacy and the two jails’ security requirements. Id. at 325 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010)). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the question whether officers need at least reasonable suspicion to strip search detainees. Id. at 325–36 (citation omitted) (noting that seven circuit courts of appeals required reasonable suspicion, while three did not).22 The Supreme Court began its analysis by reciting the overarching principle that “[c]orrectional officials have a significant interest in conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake process.” Id. at 330. The Court derived this interest from at least four concerns: (1) the possibility that new detainees will bring 22 The Tenth Circuit was one of the seven circuits that required reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008); Warner v. Grand Cty., 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984). 46 lice or diseases into the facility, (2) the possibility that new detainees will have wounds that need medical attention, (3) the growing number of gang members who are entering detention facilities and the need to identify who they may be, and (4) the need to detect contraband. Id. at 330–33. And the Court noted that these concerns are not just limited to large prisons: “Jails can be even more dangerous than prisons because officials there know so little about the people they admit at the outset.” Id. at 336 (citation omitted). In view of these concerns, the Court declared that “courts must defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security.” Id. at 332–33. In other words, because prison officials have certain expertise that judges lack, the Court stressed that the judiciary must give prison officials considerable discretion before disturbing their policies. Id. at 326. This means that “a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Only when plaintiffs show “substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to [legitimate security interests]” should courts refuse to defer to prisons. Id. at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584–85 (1984); then quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979)). 47 Citing a need for “readily administrable rules,” the Court concluded that regardless of a detainee’s “suspected offense, criminal history, [or] other factors,” policies requiring strip searches of all incoming detainees who will be admitted into the general population pass constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 338–39 (citation omitted). Requiring that prison officials consider the individual characteristics of each detainee would be too onerous, the Court reasoned, because “[officials] would be required, in a few minutes, to determine whether any of [their] underlying offenses were serious enough to authorize the more invasive search protocol.” Id. at 337.23 This would negatively affect “[t]he laborious administration of prisons.” Id. Thus, the Court ruled against Florence and concluded that he had suffered no constitutional deprivation. Id. at 339–40. By sanctioning the policies at the Burlington County Detention Center and the Essex County Correctional Facility, the Court followed the course it set in Bell, 441 U.S. 520. In Bell, the Court upheld indiscriminate strip-search practices requiring all Metropolitan Correctional Center inmates to undergo body-cavity searches after their contact visits with outsiders, 23 The Court rejected Florence’s reasonable-suspicion argument on this ground, concluding that “[t]he laborious administration of prisons would become less effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded, were the practical problems inevitable from the rules suggested by petitioner to be imposed as a constitutional mandate.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 337. If Florence does apply, Hinkle accepts that the reasonable-suspicion standard plays no role here. 48 despite the record reflecting only “one instance where an MCC inmate was discovered attempting to smuggle contraband into the institution.” Id. at 558–60.24 In applying Florence, we must remember (1) that Florence was arrested on a bench warrant, and (2) that the Court recognized that judicial deference to strip searches might well lessen in other circumstances.25 In light of these factors, the Court recognized that Florence extends only so far. For instance, in Part IV of the opinion (joined by three other Justices), Justice Kennedy identified possible future exceptions from the Court’s ruling. 566 U.S. at 338–39.26 First, he acknowledged that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be 24 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to Florence’s underlying principles in Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). There, the Court ruled “that DNA identification [through cheek swabs] of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure.” Id. at 465. Relying on Florence, the King Court noted that routine prison procedures are needed to identify a detainee “when processing him for detention” and for protecting staff, other detainees, and the “new detainee.” Id. at 450, 452 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Florence, 566 U.S. at 330). 25 We review the Court’s discussion of these exceptions and the concurring opinions’ elaborations on the exceptions only to provide a complete overview of Florence; we do not contend that these exceptions to Florence’s general rule apply here. Rather, because jail officials never decided that Hinkle would be housed in the BCDC’s general population, Florence’s general rule itself does not apply here— meaning Hinkle has no need of an exception to it. See discussion infra Section VI.B. 26 Justice Thomas did not join Part IV of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Florence, 566 U.S. at 321 n.1. Because Justice Thomas did not write separately, it is unclear whether he objected to Justice Kennedy’s discussion of a possible exception from Florence under facts that were not before the Court, or whether he objected to the notion that Florence should have any exception whatsoever. 49 reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees.”27 Id. at 338–39. After doing so, he identified a possible two-part exception from Florence’s general rule concerning “whether an arrestee whose detention has not yet been reviewed by a magistrate or other judicial officer, and who can be held in available facilities removed from the general population, may be subjected to the types of searches at issue here.” See id at 339. Second, he noted that “there also may be legitimate concerns about the invasiveness of searches that involve the touching of detainees,” but he explained that Florence had raised no such issues. Id. at 325, 339.28 27 Justice Kennedy described this situation as the one arising in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 338–39 (2001), which was not itself a strip-search case. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 338–39. In Atwater, a Texas police officer arrested a mother for operating a vehicle without having fastened her children’s seatbelts. 532 U.S. at 323–24. Taken from her children, Ms. Atwater was booked and housed alone at the jail “for about one hour, after which she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond.” Id. at 324. The Court deemed her warrantless arrest reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 354. But in Florence, Justice Kennedy raised Atwater three separate times, noting that Ms. Atwater had been segregated and taken to a magistrate. See 566 U.S. at 329–30, 337–39 (citing Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324). He noted that “[t]he accommodations provided in these situations [referencing Atwater] may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of the searches at issue.” Id. at 339. 28 Hinkle bases his beard-touching claim on this exception, and the district court dismissed the claim after concluding that Hinkle had not met this exception. But we liken Officer Atwood’s touching of Hinkle’s beard to check for contraband to a continuation of the initial pat-down frisk. Importantly, this frisk differs from the far-more-invasive touching of a detainee’s unclothed body as part of a strip search, especially as part of an inspection of body-cavities. Because Hinkle bases his beardtouching claim on an unconstitutional strip search—not an unconstitutional pat50 Two of the majority’s five Justices filed concurring opinions addressing the reach of the Court’s holding. First, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “it is important for me that the Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announces.” Id. at 340 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). He limited Florence to its circumstances—“the facts that Florence was detained not for a minor traffic offense but instead pursuant to a warrant for his arrest, and that there was apparently no alternative, if Florence were to be detained, to holding him in the general jail population.” Id. To avoid “embarrass[ing] the future,” Chief Justice Roberts noted that the Court was “wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions.” Id. Second, Justice Alito considered it important “that the Court does not hold that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial officer and who could be held in available facilities apart from the general population.” Id. at 341 (Alito, J., concurring). He then emphasized that “[t]he Court does not address whether it is always reasonable, without regard to the offense or the reason for detention, to strip search an arrestee before the arrestee’s detention has been reviewed by a judicial officer.” Id. at 342.29 down—we conclude that the district court properly dismissed this claim. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We have long said that we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on arguments not reached by the district court or even presented to us on appeal.” (citations omitted)). 29 Joined by three other Justices, Justice Breyer dissented, reasoning that a body-cavity strip search “of an individual arrested for a minor offense that does not involve drugs or violence . . . is an ‘unreasonable searc[h]’ forbidden by the Fourth 51 He singled out arrestees who are likely to be released by a magistrate on their own recognizance or on minimal bail, and declared that it might not be reasonable to admit them “to the general jail population, with the concomitant humiliation of a strip search,” “particularly if an alternative procedure is feasible.” Id. at 341–42. B. Florence Does Not Sanction the County’s Policy of Body-Cavity Strip Searching All Detainees Before Deciding Whether Particular Detainees “Will Be” Housed in the Jail’s General Population. Sheriff Jay testified that he was “the final policy maker for the sheriff’s department” and that the County’s policy was to body-cavity strip search every detainee arriving at its jail. Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 218–19; id. at 284 (“By policy, everyone that’s booked into the Beckham County Jail is strip searched.”).30 Sheriff Jay had authority to implement this policy because, as he explained, “everybody in Beckham County Sheriff’s Department answers to [him]” and “the buck stops with [him].” Id. at 218. And the record demonstrates that the jailers enforced the County’s policy. Amendment, unless prison authorities have reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual possesses drugs or other contraband.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 343–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). Because four Justices criticized the absence of reasonable suspicion from Florence’s general rule, it seems a fair surmise that these Justices would, at the very least, support robust exceptions in future cases. 30 Even though Sheriff Jay explained that the jailers strip searched pre-trial detainees under the County’s “policy,” we conclude that his and the other witnesses’ testimony (as we discuss next) also suffice to establish that the County had a custom of performing indiscriminate strip searches. See Murphy, 950 F.3d at 644 (explaining that a custom is “a ‘widespread practice that, although not authorized by a written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well-settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law’” (quoting Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010))). 52 For instance, Detention Officer Atwood testified that the “standard [intake] process” at the BCDC involved strip searching a detainee before booking. Id. at 339. He explained that “every inmate [who] comes into the jail gets [strip] searched” and that, after the strip search, detainees would be brought into the booking room to acquire “their basic information.” Id. at 332–34, 336. From his year’s employment as a jailer at the BCDC, Officer Atwood could never recall “a time where the strip search happened after the booking process had begun.” Id. at 320, 340. In fact, Officer Atwood stated that jailers strip searched detainees before receiving from the arresting officer a custody-authorization form, which describes the detainee’s “personal information and his charges.” Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 908–09. And because jailers strip searched detainees before knowing their personal information or charges, Officer Atwood confirmed that jailers postponed making housing decisions until the booking process after the strip search: when asked what he would know about “an inmate’s eventual cell placement at the time that [he was] strip searching an inmate,” Officer Atwood testified that he “wouldn’t know where that inmate’s going to be housed.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 341. In other words, until he had received “a chance to look at [the detainee’s] charges” and personal information during the booking process, Officer Atwood testified he “wouldn’t know exactly 53 where [the detainee is] going.” Id.31 Officer Atwood explained that this “standardized intake process” did not “vary according to inmates[.]” Id. at 340.32 Further, Captain Diana Bilbo, “the captain in charge of the jail,” testified that she never had occasion to “discipline Jason Atwood for the way that he conducted a strip search[.]” Id. at 361, 370. When asked whether “the standard operating procedure was to strip search everybody [who] came in,” Captain Bilbo said, “Yes.” Id. at 365.33 Corroborating Officer Atwood’s testimony that jailers would not know a detainee’s charges or personal information before the strip search (and by extension, would be unable to determine a detainee’s housing designation), Captain Bilbo noted that it was “consistent with [her] experience” that arresting officers would not provide to jailers a completed custody-authorization form until after the strip search. Appellant’s App. vol. 4 at 912. 31 In addition, Officer Atwood testified that he would “would not have begun to type in the information into the booking information category until after Hinkle had been strip searched.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 341. The “booking information category” is a heading on Hinkle’s booking-sheet form. Under that heading, the jailers typed in the word “SEGREGATION” after the strip search. Id. at 316. 32 Officer Atwood did say that “if there’s another detention deputy in there,” one deputy “start[s] th[e] book-in process while the other one’s conducting the strip search.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 340. 33 Deputy Brett Moore, who stopped Hinkle’s automobile before the arrest, testified that he was “aware that all the prisoners [he] brought in were strip searched,” agreeing that “[e]ven the ones that were going to be put in segregation” were strip searched. Appellant’s App. vol. 1 at 172–73. 54 In its briefing, the County acknowledges that by its policy “[j]ailers strip searched incoming inmates at the very beginning of the booking process, before sitting down at the desk to begin the booking paperwork and before knowing where the inmate would be housed in the facility.”34 Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. Br. 4–5. And it acknowledges that its policy was “to strip search all detainees.” Id. at 10 (emphasis and capitalization removed). In strip searching Hinkle, the BCDC’s jailers enforced this policy. Hinkle testified that on self-reporting to the jail, he was immediately strip searched, was booked, and was handcuffed to a bench in the booking area for about an hour until being transported to the Elk City jail. When questioned about why Hinkle was handcuffed to the bench and “what may have been taking place,” Captain Bilbo explained that as arising from their not yet having “made a decision on where he was going to be housed.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 367.35 The County confirms that “at the time [Hinkle] was strip searched, there had been no determination made regarding how [Hinkle] was going to be classified or where he would be housed.” Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. Br. 4. 34 The record contains a four-page 2006 strip-search policy, but the County neither discusses this policy, nor recites its requirements, nor mentions its relevancy. And the policy had succumbed to later legal developments and was not the same policy in force when Deputy Atwood body-cavity strip searched Hinkle. 35 As discussed, Officer Atwood testified that Captain Bilbo made the decision to transfer Hinkle and that she may have known “ahead of time that he was coming in.” Appellant’s App. vol. 2 at 327. But Captain Bilbo was then “on medical leave.” Id. at 366. 55 Under Florence, the jail could (1) decide that Hinkle “will be” housed in the jail’s general population, and (2) then strip search him before placing him in the general population. See 566 U.S. at 322. Here, the County did not decide that Hinkle “will be” placed in the jail’s general population, in fact just the opposite. By acting as it did, the County set the cart before the horse—it strip searched Hinkle before committing itself to admit him into its jail’s general population. In Florence, the Court repeatedly stressed that the strip search comes after the facility determines that the detainee “will be” placed in general population. Id. (explaining that “the controversy [in Florence] concern[ed] whether every detainee who will be admitted to the general population may be required to undergo a close visual inspection while undressed”); id. at 325–26 (explaining again that “[the] Court granted certiorari to address” “whether the Fourth Amendment requires correctional officials to exempt some detainees who will be admitted to a jail’s general population from the searches here at issue”); id. at 335 (“Reasonable correctional officials could conclude these uncertainties [about whether a particular detainee is dangerous] mean they must conduct the same thorough search of everyone who will be admitted to their facilities.”); id. at 338 (accepting the jail officials’ argument that “the Constitution must not prevent [detention officials] from conducting [strip searches] on any suspected offender who will be admitted to the general population in their facilities”); id. at 338–39 (explaining the limits of Florence’s ruling and commenting that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without 56 assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees”).36 In other words, the “will be” condition precedes the strip search, which itself precedes placing the detainee in the jail’s general population.37 And the Court’s “will be” condition to strip searches makes perfect sense—absent admitting the detainee to the jail’s general population, the jail would have no need to protect the new detainee, the existing detainee population, and the detention staff from infectious diseases, rival gang members, weapons, or contraband. Id. at 330–33. These stripsearch justifications were absent here: when the jailers referenced a housing decision on the form, they notated segregation. We would reject any argument that the County—for administrative convenience—could treat all its incoming detainees as bound for its jail’s general population, thus allowing universal strip searches.38 Body-cavity strip searches are not so trivial. And had the County tried to claim that before the strip search it had 36 One of the five majority Justices, Justice Alito, states the “will be” condition in slightly different language: “The Court holds that jail administrators may require all arrestees who are committed to the general population of a jail to undergo visual strip searches not involving physical contact by corrections officers.” Florence, 566 U.S. at 340 (Alito, J., concurring). 37 During the strip search, detention officers may learn things requiring the detainee be segregated and not placed in the facility’s general population—for instance, the presence of an infectious disease or tattoos with gang insignia. See Florence, 566 U.S. at 330–33. 38 In Hill, we “agree[d]” that “[a]n indiscriminate strip search policy routinely applied to detainees . . . cannot be constitutionally justified simply on the basis of administrative ease.” 735 F.2d at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981)). 57 strayed from its policy and determined that Hinkle “will be” housed with its jail’s general population—which to its credit it does not claim—that would have won it nothing. After all, jail officials segregated Hinkle from the jail’s general population after the strip search, because it declined to house a former local law-enforcement officer in its jail. That led the County to transport Hinkle to Elk City.39 If we were to accept the County’s argument and conclude that Florence permits jail policies by which detainees are first strip searched and later sorted out for jail-housing placement, we would render Florence’s general-population condition meaningless. Florence does not sanction such a policy—strip searching detainees not destined for the jail’s general population, or even as here, for the jail itself. See Fonder v. Sheriff of Kankakee Cty., 823 F.3d 1144, 1146 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding that under Florence, two class-action plaintiffs “ha[d] good claims that their rights have been violated” if they had been “arrested, strip searched, and then immediately released”). We therefore conclude that Florence does not protect the County’s policy.40 39 Assuming that segregation truly was unavailable at the BCDC, we presume that this must mean that detainees were always transported to Elk City whenever they required segregation. 40 Under Florence, the County could properly maintain a strip-search policy allowing strip searches after jailers have decided that a detainee “will be” admitted to general population. A facility’s safe course is to strip search the detainee as the last step before admitting him or her into the facility’s general population. 58 C. Hinkle’s Body-Cavity Strip Search Was Unreasonable Under the Fourth Amendment, and the County, by Its Policy, Is Responsible.
Having concluded that Florence does not authorize the County’s strip-search policy, we must still decide whether Hinkle suffered an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The district court did not reach that issue, concluding that this case “fits within Florence.” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1425. The County follows suit, largely resting its case on Florence. With Florence not sanctioning his bodycavity strip search, we must determine what legal standard governs Hinkle’s strip search. Hinkle argues that we should use our circuit’s pre-Florence strip-search cases to determine the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of his strip search. He contends that those cases bar “indiscriminate strip searches of pre-trial detainees.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 22. Indeed, those cases required reasonable suspicion of contraband, including weapons, before permitting a strip search. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hether a strip search is permissible is a separate inquiry based on whether a detainee will be placed in the general prison population and whether the officer has reasonable suspicion that a detainee has hidden drugs, contraband, or weapons.” (citations omitted)); Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995) (“On [January 24, 1991], it was clearly established in this circuit that a brief intermingling with the general jail population does not justify a strip search absent reasonable suspicion of drugs or contraband.” (citation omitted)); Cottrell v. Kaysville City, 994 F.2d 730, 732, 734–36 (10th Cir. 59 1993) (per curiam) (concluding that a body-cavity search of a detainee who was not “held with any other prisoners” was unreasonable when the arresting officer testified that “he did not suspect Ms. Cottrell of having drugs on her person” and “saw no indication she was carrying any weapons”); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a strip search of a traffic offender who “was briefly intermingled with the prison population” was unconstitutional because “[t]here were no circumstances . . . indicating that [he] might possess either a weapon or drugs”).41 But because the jail officials never decided that Hinkle “will be” housed at the county jail, no one had any reason to fear that Hinkle might have secreted contraband that he could take into the jail’s general population. In this circumstance, even our pre-Florence cases do not apply—they too concerned the problem of detainees taking contraband into the general population. But for detainees like Hinkle who will not be housed in the jail’s general population, the County needs far more to justify a bodycavity strip search—probable cause that detainee is secreting evidence of a crime. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1447–49 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that outside of the “jail context,” detainees “may only be subjected to [body-cavity searches] if 41 Archuleta, Warner, and Hill were not body-cavity strip search cases. Archuleta, 523 F.3d at 1282; Warner, 57 F.3d at 963; Hill, 735 F.2d at 393–94. Thus, Hinkle’s search was more invasive. We view Hinkle’s search as comparable to the body-cavity search in Cottrell, during which the plaintiff was “required to take off all her clothes and bend over while the deputies inspected her.” 994 F.2d at 732. We have characterized such body-cavity searches as “demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, [and] repulsive[.]” Levoy v. Mills, 788 F.2d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556, 564 (1st Cir. 1985)). 60 there is probable cause to believe that [they] ha[ve] secreted the item sought in a body cavity”). The County has not argued that it ever had such probable cause.42 Thus, we conclude that Hinkle was subjected to an unlawful strip search.
Before the County can be held liable for Hinkle’s unlawful strip search, Hinkle must show that by enforcing the County’s policy an employee caused the Fourth Amendment violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (noting that the policy or custom must be the “moving force [behind] the constitutional violation” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Specifically, Hinkle “must prove ‘(1) official policy or custom[,] (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.’” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 998 (10th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 769 (10th Cir. 2013)). We have recognized as policies meeting this standard those arising from “a formal regulation or policy statement, an informal custom that amounts to a widespread practice, decisions of municipal employees with final policymaking authority, ratification by final policymakers of the decisions of subordinates to whom authority was delegated, and the deliberately indifferent failure to adequately train or supervise employees.” Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257, 1266 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing 42 Nor has the County argued that Officer Atwood had reasonable suspicion that Hinkle—whose alleged wrong was possessing a stolen trailer—was secreting contraband. So even if our pre-Florence cases applied, the County could not prevail under them. 61 Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010)). Here, the testimony from Sheriff Jay, Captain Bilbo, and Detention Officer Atwood, together with the County’s own description of its policy, demonstrate that the County had a policy of strip searching all detainees before making housing decisions. With this, Hinkle has sufficiently shown the County’s policy and, thus, has satisfied the first element.43 For the causation and state-of-mind elements, Hinkle can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that the County’s policy is facially unlawful. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen an official municipal policy itself violates federal law, issues of culpability and causation are straightforward; simply proving the existence of the unlawful policy puts an end to the question.” (citation omitted)). The Court has explained that “[w]here a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). A county’s sanctioning of a facially unlawful policy establishes that it “was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains.” Id. at 405; see also Burge v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Where an official policy or practice is unconstitutional on its face, it necessarily follows that a policymaker was not only aware of the specific policy, but was also aware that a constitutional violation will most likely occur.”). Further, 43 The County does not protest that Sheriff Jay had final policymaking authority to formulate the BCDC’s strip-search procedures. 62 “proof that a municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. Thus, the next issue is whether the County’s policy is facially unconstitutional. “A facial challenge is really just a claim that the law or policy at issue is unconstitutional in all its applications.” Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1127 (2019).44 Apart from its failed Florence argument, the County advances no argument denying that the policy is unconstitutional in all its applications. Under Florence, jail officials must decide that a detainee “will be” housed in the general population before strip searching him or her. And here, the County’s strip-search policy permits strip searches before the key moment in which the jail official with authority decides that the detainee “will be” housed in the general population. So in enforcing the County’s strip-search policy, jail officials strip search all detainees before reaching the operative decision of whether the detainee will be housed in the general population. For these reasons, we conclude that the County’s strip-search policy is 44 The “official policy” at issue in Monell is an example of a facially unlawful policy. The complaint there alleged that the policy “compelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before such leaves were required for medical reasons.” 436 U.S. at 660–61; see also Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“Monell involved an express municipal policy alleged to violate due process and equal protection limitations—a requirement that pregnant employees take unpaid leave from their city jobs while still willing and able to work.”). An “official policy of sexually harassing, assaulting, or discriminating against women prisoners” would be a second example of a facially unlawful policy. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307. 63 unconstitutional on its face. And with this, Hinkle has satisfied the causation and state-of-mind elements. Moreover, even if the County’s policy were facially constitutional, Hinkle would still satisfy the causation and state-of-mind elements. For causation, we have explained that “the challenged policy or practice must be ‘closely related to the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected right.’” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 770 (quoting Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation Claims & Defenses, § 7.12[B] (2013)). This requires “a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. When a policy is facially constitutional, the burden of establishing causation (and culpability) is heavy. Id. at 405 (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” (citations omitted)). Hinkle meets that heavy burden. By the terms of the County’s policy, “[j]ailers strip searched incoming inmates at the very beginning of the booking process, before sitting down at the desk to begin the booking paperwork and before knowing where the inmate would be housed.” Appellee Beckham Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs Resp. Br. 4–5. Thus, the County’s policy directs jailers to immediately strip search the detainees. By enforcing the policy, Officer Atwood caused Hinkle’s unlawful strip search. Because the jail transported Hinkle to Elk City for detention, Hinkle obviously could not have smuggled contraband into the BCDC’s general population. 64 Thus, but for the County’s policy—specifically, the sequence of performing strip searches before making final housing decisions—Hinkle would never have been unlawfully strip searched. Finally, “a plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 407 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). We have explained that “[t]he deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Waller v. City & Cty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1284 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307). While typically notice is “established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct,” it can also be established “in a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307– 08). For instance, in Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 845 (10th Cir. 1997), this court concluded that a plaintiff’s claim came “within the ‘narrow range of circumstances’ recognized by Canton and left intact by Brown, under which a single violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence [of a 65 municipality’s action or inaction].” There, the summary-judgment record “support[ed] an inference that the City trained its officers to leave cover and approach armed suicidal, emotionally disturbed persons and to try to disarm them[.]” Id. at 843. After participating in this training, police officers approached Terry Allen’s vehicle—where a suicidal and armed Allen sat with a leg out the window— and attempted to wrestle his gun from him. Id. at 839. In the end, “shots were exchanged,” and Allen was hit four times and killed. Id. Because “officers will frequently have to deal with armed emotionally upset persons” and the City’s training amplified the possibility “of a violent response,” we concluded that “the City’s failure to properly train its officers reflected deliberate indifference to the obvious consequence of the City’s choice.” Id. at 845. Likewise, the County’s policy here reflects a deliberate indifference to the obvious consequences of its decision to strip search all detainees before making final housing assignments. Proceeding as if all inmates will be housed in the general population of the jail overlooks the reality that some detainees will not be placed in the jail’s general population—for example, former local police chiefs. Yet the County strip searches all detainees, ignoring that any number of reasons might necessitate that a particular detainee be segregated. Accordingly, even though Hinkle has not pointed out a pattern of tortious conduct, we conclude that this case falls within the “narrow range of circumstances” in which it was “plainly obvious” that the County’s policy of strip searching all detainees would result in a detainee being needlessly body-cavity strip searched. 66 In sum, we conclude that Hinkle was unlawfully strip searched because Florence does not authorize the County’s policy and the search was otherwise unsupported by probable cause. Moreover, we conclude that the County’s stripsearch policy is facially unconstitutional because it directs jail officials to strip search all detainees immediately upon arrival at the jail, before determining they “will be” housed in its jail, and in the absence of probable cause that the detainees are secreting evidence of a crime. And even if the County’s policy were facially constitutional, Hinkle could satisfy the causation and state-of-mind elements because the County’s policy directly caused Hinkle’s unlawful strip search and the County was deliberately indifferent as to the obvious effects of the policy. Before subjecting a detainee to the abject abasement of a body-cavity strip search, jail officials should first conclusively decide whether that detainee will be housed in their jail’s general population.