Opinion ID: 3012330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The standard of review is particularly deferential when deciding whether a jury verdict is based on legally sufficient evidence. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). It is not our role to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and sustain the verdict if any rational juror could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The appellant carries a very heavy burden on appeal. Id. Cothran was convicted under 49 U.S.C. S 46507(1), which provides criminal liability if a person: knowing the information to be false, willfully and maliciously or with reckless disregard for the safety of human life, gives . . . under circumstances in which the information reasonably may be believed, false information about an alleged attempt being made or to be made to do an act that would violate section . . . 46505 . . . of this title . . . . 49 U.S.C. S 46507(1). Section 46505 criminalizes carrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft. Thus, the elements here are: (1) Cothran gave false information about an attempt to be made to carry explosives on an aircraft; (2) Cothran 3 knew the information was false; (3) Cothran acted willfully and maliciously; and (4) under the circumstances, the information reasonably may have been believed. There is no argument but that the first three elements are met. Cothran argues that the information he conveyed could not reasonably be believed, or, more precisely, that no rational juror could have found that a reasonable person would have believed that Cothran was threatening to destroy a plane. Although there is no case law on S 46507(1), courts have interpreted analogous statutes as requiring an objective test to determine whether something is a threat. United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994). Moreover, [t]he use of ambiguous language does not preclude a statement from being a threat. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (1st Cir. 1997). A bad joke can fall within the scope of the statute. In United States v. Irving, 509 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1975), the court sustained a conviction under 49 U.S.C. S 1472(m)(1), the statutory precursor to S 46507(1), when a passenger made a comment about hijacking an airplane. Id. at 1328. The Court of Appeals observed that Congress was concerned with the prankster as well as with the individual acting out of malice. Id. at 1329. The question is whether an ordinary, reasonable person would view the language as a threat. Malik, 16 F.3d at 49. Another way of looking at this test is asking whether Cothran should have reasonably foreseen that the airline industry is highly sensitive to bomb threats and that his statement would be taken as a threat by the U.S. Air reservationist. United States v. Freeman, 176 F.3d 575, 578 (1st Cir. 1999). In determining whether something is a threat, proof of the effect of the alleged threat upon the addressee is highly relevant. Malik, 16 F.3d at 49. Cothran attempts to muddy the waters by portraying Blanc’s testimony as inconsistent (e.g., at one time she stated that Cothran said he was very upset with U.S. Air, another time she stated that Cothran said he was alittle upset with U.S. Air). There is no need for this Court to reconcile the inconsistencies, because they relate to witness credibility, an area peculiarly within the jury’s domain. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 321 4 (3d Cir. 1992). We are required solely to look at the trial record to determine if there is evidence sufficient for a rational juror to find Cothran guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, there is more than sufficient evidence. At the time of Cothran’s phone call, Blanc had been a U.S. Air employee for twelve years, and had been in the position of taking phone calls for a decade. She testified that never in those ten years had she found a phone call as threatening as she found Cothran’s. Cothran told Blanc that he was upset with U.S. Air and wanted to take explosives on the flight and blow the plane out of 35,000 feet. Blanc then pressed the emergency button to record the call. Protocol requires U.S. Air reservation sales agents when receiving a threatening call to press an emergency button that allows the call to be recorded. Blanc further testified that in her ten years of taking calls, she never previously felt the need to record a call. Blanc was upset because the situation was serious, something not to be taken lightly. She felt that the passengers on the flight might be threatened by Cothran’s comments. She further described any laughter heard on the recording asnervous laughter, and stated that, despite Cothran’s claim to be joking, she did not take his comments as a joke. Blanc’s testimony is such that a rational juror could certainly have found Cothran guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the District Court committed no error in denying his motion to acquit.