Opinion ID: 2543498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in sentencing Long as a violent offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83.

Text: ¶ 25. Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83 provides: Every person convicted in this state of a felony who shall have been convicted twice previously of any felony or federal crime upon charges separately brought and arising out of separate incidents at different times and who shall have been sentenced to and served separate terms of one (1) year or more in any state and/or federal penal institution, whether in this state or elsewhere, and where any one (1) of such felonies shall have been a crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, and such sentence shall not be reduced or suspended nor shall such person be eligible for parole or probation. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-83 (Rev.2007). ¶ 26. It is well-settled in this state that sentencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court. Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 537-538 (Miss. 1996) (citing Reynolds v. State, 585 So.2d 753, 756 (Miss.1991)). Further, the general rule in this state is that a sentence cannot be disturbed on appeal so long as it does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute. Id. at 538 (citing Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302 (Miss. 1992)). Pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83, the maximum term of life imprisonment will be imposed if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has previously been convicted of two or more felonies on charges separately brought and arising out of separate indictments at different times, that the defendant was sentenced to and served separate terms of one year or more in any state or federal penal institution, and that at least one such felony was a crime of violence. ( Bradley v. State, 934 So.2d 1018, 1028 (Miss.Ct.App.2005), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 933 So.2d 982 (Miss. 2006)). The most common method of demonstrating prior convictions for enhancement purposes is by introducing original or certified copies of commitment papers. Davis v. State, 995 So.2d 767, 774 (Miss.Ct.App.2008) (quoting Frazier v. State, 907 So.2d 985, 991 (Miss.Ct.App. 2005)). Based on the State's presentation of evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Long as an habitual offender to life imprisonment. ¶ 27. At sentencing, the State presented the trial court with certified copies of Long's commitment papers from the State of Colorado showing that Long had been convicted of three felonies on two separate occasions and had served separate terms of more than one year each in prison. On May 24, 1996, Long was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault on a child, and was sentenced to six years in prison for each conviction, with the sentences to run concurrently. The sentencing court's order stated that Long had committed the offenses charged on January 25, 1991. These same documents also reflect that Long pleaded guilty to aggravated incest with his own child in Adams County, Colorado, on February 25, 1998, with an offense date of September 28, 1989. Long subsequently was sentenced to twelve years in prison for aggravated incest with his own child. ¶ 28. In addition, Long admits to having been convicted of these three felonies. However, Long argues that his Colorado conviction for sexual assault of a child was consensual sex with a seventeen-year-old. He further argues that the alleged victim in his Colorado conviction for aggravated incest with his own child was not his daughter. Thus, Long takes the position that the trial court erred by not fully investigating the nature of his prior convictions, which were the basis of his sentence as an habitual offender. ¶ 29. Citing U.S. v. Vigil, 334 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.2003), the State argued that, according to Colorado state law and federal law, aggravated incest constitutes a crime of violence. In Vigil, the district court determined that Colorado's aggravated incest statute [4] contained as an element the threatened use of physical force.... The district court determined, however, that the requisite threat of force was implied whenever a parent inflicts sexual penetration on his or her child. Vigil, 334 F.3d at 1219. Vigil also noted that psychological brutalization is inherent in an offense like this and incest and rape are in the same category as both being crimes of violence inherently whether or not raw force is used. Id. at 1220 (quoting U.S. v. Passi, 62 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir.1995)). The Vigil court found that even consent by the child-victim would not eliminate the risk of physical harm and that the age of the victim was immaterial. Vigil, 334 F.3d at 1223-1224. Thus, the Vigil court held that aggravated incest constituted a crime of violence. Id. ¶ 30. Therefore, it is the opinion of this Court that the State presented sufficient evidence to make the requisite showing that Long previously had been convicted of two or more felonies on charges separately brought and arising out of separate indictments at different times, that Long was sentenced to and served separate terms of one year or more in Colorado's penal institution, and that at least one conviction was for a crime of violence. Because sentencing is within the complete discretion of the trial court, this Court finds that the trial court did not err in sentencing Long as an habitual offender under Mississippi Code Section 99-19-83.