Opinion ID: 2972188
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: White’s Speedy Trial Argument.

Text: In determining whether the district court erred in denying White’s motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his speedy trial rights, this Court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2003). The Speedy Trial Act requires the court to bring a defendant to trial within 70 days of the defendant’s indictment or appearance in court, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act specifically excludes certain periods of delay from the total number of days counted for purposes of the 70-day limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). A defendant can establish a prima facie case of a Speedy Trial Act violation by showing that more than 70 days passed between his indictment or appearance in court and his trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); United States v. Jenkins, 92 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1996). The government must then show that the number of properly excludable days is sufficient to bring the time period between indictment or appearance and trial, within the 70-day limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2); Jenkins, 92 F.3d at 438. In this case, arraignment occurred on September 30, 2002. Trial commenced on August 11, 2003. Three-hundred and sixteen days elapsed between those two dates. White’s appeal, however, -5- No. 03-4488 United States v. White is limited to the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss for denial of his right to speedy trial, not whether this right was actually violated. At the time of White’s motion to dismiss, trial was set for May 5, 2003. As a result, we analyze White’s claim as it was before the district court. Both parties agree that the district court properly excluded the following time periods: 1. September 30, 2002;