Opinion ID: 842356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the defense actually tendered at trial

Text: The lead opinion states that the error that occurred in this case was not harmless because defendant may have adopted a different strategy at trial, including objecting to the police officer's testimony regarding his alleged admission of a sexual touching. [19] The lead opinion further states that, but for the error, defense counsel may not have withdrawn his motion to suppress the statement or for a Walker [ [20] ] hearing just before the trial began. [21] Similarly, the concurring opinion opines that the error was outcome determinative because of the critical fact that defense counsel had no incentive to challenge the admission of the confession. . . .  [22] All these claims of prejudice, however, are belied by a review of the trial court record, which reveals the actual defense presented at trial. The theory of defense presented at trial was that no sexual conduct of any type occurred between defendant and the victim, that the victim lied about the alleged incidents, and that the victim had motive to lie because one of her classmates attempted to extort money from defendant. [23] The chosen defense of denying all sexual conduct necessarily encompasses denying sexual penetration as well as denying sexual contact. Defense counsel cross-examined prosecution witnesses, focusing on inconsistencies in their testimony in an effort to attack their credibility. The sole defense witness, a math teacher at the school, testified that his attendance records indicated that both witnesses were in his math class at the time of the events, further attacking their credibility. Because the defense presented was a complete denial of the alleged events, it is unclear how the defense trial strategy might have changed had defense counsel known that the trial court was going to find defendant guilty of CSC II on the basis of sexual conduct that defendant admitted committing. Moreover, the trial court record conclusively establishes that defense counsel in fact challenged the confession by arguing at trial that the inculpatory statement was never made. During closing argument, defense counsel forthrightly argued to the trial court that [t]here were no admissions and no statement made by Mr. Nyx. Therefore, rather than claim that the statement was involuntary or the product of coercion, defense counsel made the strategic decision to claim that it was not given. While the lead opinion claims that the defendant would have sought suppression of the statement in a Walker hearing but for the error, this course of action would unavoidably require acknowledging that an inculpatory statement was given. Such an action would have undermined the actual defense tendered at trial. Thus, I do not share the view of my colleagues that the failure to request a Walker hearing is indicative of anything other than the fact that defendant claimed he made no confession of sexual misconduct. Furthermore, as a Walker hearing is designed to test the voluntariness of a confession, the lead opinion fails to recognize that pursuing a Walker hearing was the weaker avenue of challenge under the facts of this case. Maurice Nyx, a college educated professional, voluntarily arrived at the police station midday to be interviewed, accompanied by his attorney. He was not in custody during the interview, signed a waiver of rights form before giving the statement, and never asked for his attorney at any point during the interview before admitting to the interviewing officer that he volitionally touched the vagina of his 15-year-old student while in a dark, restricted access stairway at the school. In addition to a complete dearth of coercion or involuntariness, the record reveals no factual basis for the majority's conclusion that, but for the error, defense counsel would have sought suppression of the confession. Rather, the record reveals no credible basis upon which defendant could have pursued a successful Walker hearing. Moreover, given that defense counsel actually challenged the confession, it cannot be said that counsel had no incentive to do so. Certainly, given defendant's defense theory of complete denial, the existence of defendant's confession makes his theory of defense less probable, providing defense counsel with more than ample incentive to challenge the existence of the confession. IV. CONCLUSION I agree that MCL 768.32(1) permits a defendant to be found guilty of a necessarily included lesser offense, but not a cognate lesser offense, of the charged offense. However, I disagree with the lead opinion's conclusion that a statutory violation has occurred because I believe that CSC II is a necessarily included lesser offense of CSC I. Therefore, the trial court properly found defendant guilty of CSC II, which was amply supported by the victim's testimony as well as defendant's confession. Moreover, assuming that an error had occurred in this case, the unpreserved nonconstitutional error would be harmless under the plain error rule. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that Court to address defendant's remaining appellate issues. WEAVER, J., concurs. CORRIGAN, J. ( dissenting ). I respectfully dissent. MCL 768.32(1) allows a trier of fact to find a defendant guilty of an inferior degree of an offense that consist[s] of different degrees. . . . That is precisely what occurred in this case. We do not face any constitutional dilemma requiring the lead opinion's novel approach to the statute. Moreover, because second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c, (CSC II) is a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b, (CSC I), the new rule does not govern this case. But if it did, any error would be harmless. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that Court to address defendant's remaining appellate issues. I. INTERPRETATION OF MCL 768.32(1) MCL 768.32(1) is clear and unambiguous. It provides: [U]pon an indictment for an offense, consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the jury, or the judge in a trial without a jury, may find the accused not guilty of the offense in the degree charged in the indictment and may find the accused person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit that offense. This plain language indicates that when a defendant is charged with an offense consisting of different degrees, the factfinder may acquit the defendant of the charged offense and find him guilty of a degree of that offense inferior to that charged in the indictment. . . . Here, criminal sexual conduct is an offense consisting of different degreesthe Legislature has formally divided the offense into degrees and designated them as such. The highest degree of the offense is CSC I, carrying a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The other degrees of CSC carry less severe maximum punishments. Therefore, under the plain language of MCL 768.32(1), the fact-finder may consider and find a defendant guilty of CSC II, III (MCL 750.520d), or IV (MCL 750.520e) when the defendant is charged with CSC I if a rational view of the evidence supports the conviction. Although the statutory language is clear, the lead opinion holds that a defendant may not be convicted of an offense of lesser degree unless the test set forth in People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335, 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002), is satisfied. The lead opinion concludes that Cornell bars consideration of lesser offenses whose elements are not subsumed in the charged offense, even where the Legislature has formally denominated an offense as one of inferior degree. As early as 1869, this Court made clear that the predecessor of MCL 768.32(1) was not restricted to formally degreed offenses, but this Court did not hold that formally degreed offenses were excluded from the scope of the statute. On the contrary, this Court's historical analyses implicitly presumed that formally degreed offenses fell within the statute. In Hanna v. People, 19 Mich. 316, 320 (1869), Justice Christiancy, writing for the Court, stated: I do not think this provision was intended to be restricted in its application to offenses divided by the statutes contained in this title (which contain all the provisions in reference to crimes), into classes expressly designated by the name of degrees. Thus confined, it would apply, so far as I have been able to discover, only to the single case of an indictment for murder in the first degree, and would not even include manslaughter as a lower degree of the offense, but only murder in the second degree; since [at the time Hanna was decided] murder [was] the only offense divided by the statute into classes expressly designated as degrees. [Emphasis added.] Because both the common law and a separate statutory provision already provided for the consideration of second-degree murder, the predecessor of MCL 768.32(1) would have been entirely superfluous if it were limited to that offense. Thus, Justice Christiancy concluded that the predecessor of MCL 768.32(1) must be construed as extending to all cases in which the statute has substantially, or in effect, recognized and provided for the punishment of offenses of different grades, or degrees of enormity, wherever the charge for the higher grade includes a charge for the less. Hanna, supra at 322 (emphasis added). [1] Similarly, this Court in Cornell did not exclude offenses that have been formally divided into degrees from the scope of MCL 768.32(1). Rather, we agreed with the Hanna Court that the provision was not intended to be limited only to those [offenses] expressly divided into degrees, but was intended to extend to all cases in which different grades of offenses or degrees of enormity had been recognized. Moreover the statute removed the common-law misdemeanor restriction. Thus, application of the statute is neither limited to those crimes expressly divided into degrees nor to lesser included felonies. [ Cornell, supra at 353-354, 646 N.W.2d 127 (emphasis added).] In considering offenses that were not formally degreed, we held in Cornell that the word inferior in MCL 768.32(1) refers `to the absence of an element that distinguishes the charged offense from the lesser offense.' Cornell, supra at 354, 646 N.W.2d 127, quoting People v. Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich.App. 411, 420, 564 N.W.2d 149 (1997). Thus, we held that a trier of fact may not consider cognate lesser offenses, which are only `related' or of the same `class or category' as the greater offense and may contain some elements not found in the greater offense. Cornell, supra at 355, 646 N.W.2d 127. Further, we held that a requested instruction on a necessarily included lesser offense is proper if the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the evidence would support it. Id. at 357, 646 N.W.2d 127. It is perfectly clear, then, that both Hanna and Cornell simply presumed that formally degreed offenses were within the scope of the statute. Our decision in Cornell merely explicated a tool of construction for determining whether an offense is inferior where the Legislature has not formally denominated it as such. Where the Legislature has expressly divided an offense into degrees, as it has with criminal sexual conduct, no construction is necessary. By legislative definition, criminal sexual conduct is an offense consisting of different degrees, and application of the Cornell test is thus unnecessary. CSC II is a degree of the offense that the Legislature has expressly designated as inferior to CSC I. The new rulethat a legislatively denominated lesser degree is not an inferior degreereflects a lack of deference to the Legislature's authority to denominate an offense as inferior. Unquestionably, the power to define crimes is wholly a legislative function. People v. Calloway, 469 Mich. 448, 451, 671 N.W.2d 733 (2003). The Legislature thus acted within its proper sphere of constitutional authority when it (1) enacted MCL 768.32(1) permitting the fact-finder to consider an inferior degree of the charged offense and (2) chose to categorize CSC II as a lesser or inferior degree of CSC I. We have no authority to override this legislative classification (in the absence of a constitutional flaw). Having conceded that the Legislature has divided the offense of criminal sexual conduct into degrees, the lead opinion remarkably concludes that CSC II is not an inferior degree of CSC I, even though the degrees of this offense are legislatively numbered in descending order, with second-, third-, and fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct as lesser degrees of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. The lead opinion characterizes our caselaw as precluding a judge or a jury from convicting a defendant of a cognate lesser offense even if the crime is divided into degrees. Ante at 554. The caselaw does not remotely purport to preclude a conviction where the Legislature itself has formally divided the offense into degrees. [2] The lead opinion's claim that it is following 130 years of caselaw, and that my interpretation would require overruling those cases, is therefore wholly unfounded. The lead opinion cites no authority to suggest that the word inferior has some hidden, counterintuitive meaning that would render MCL 768.32(1) inapplicable to the very type of offenses described in the statute, i.e., offenses that the Legislature itself has formally divided into degrees. The new rule also ignores our history of allowing a conviction of a formally inferior degree that is not a subset of the elements of the charged offense. Before People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980), malice was not a necessary element of first-degree felony murder. But second-degree murder does require proof of malice, People v. Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 534, 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003). Thus, before Aaron, second-degree murder contained an element not required for first-degree felony murder. Yet this Court held consistently, even before Aaron, that an instruction for second-degree murder was appropriate where the defendant was charged with first-degree felony murder. See People v. Carter, 395 Mich. 434, 438, 236 N.W.2d 500 (1975); People v. Treichel, 229 Mich. 303, 307-308, 200 N.W. 950 (1924). Thus, this Court historically has allowed conviction of a formally inferior degree that is not subsumed in the charged offense. This Court's decision in People v. McDonald, 9 Mich. 150 (1861), further supports my analysis of our historical treatment of lesser included offenses. In McDonald, this Court held that assault and battery was included in a charge of felonious assault, and thus upheld an assault and battery conviction even though the defendant was charged only with felonious assault. It is possible to commit an assault without committing a battery. See People v. Nickens, 470 Mich. 622, 628, 685 N.W.2d 657 (2004). Thus, as it is possible to commit a felonious assault without first having committed an assault and battery, McDonald confirms that our caselaw has not required a subset of the elements test, contrary to the lead opinion's view. Further, Justice Cavanagh's concurring opinion in Mendoza, supra, supports my historical analysis. In Mendoza, Justice Cavanagh opined that limiting the application of MCL 768.32(1) to necessarily included lesser offenses contravened the accepted meaning of the term inferior. Id. at 551, 664 N.W.2d 685 (opinion by Cavanagh, J.). He argued that the statutory term inferior authorized a range of convictions broader than necessarily included lesser offenses. He contended that [a]lthough, the majority attempts to claim its holding has a historical foundation, it, in fact, usurps this Court's longstanding interpretation, which accords with the statute's plain meaning. Id. at 554, 664 N.W.2d 685. Thus, Justice Cavanagh would permit the fact-finder to consider a cognate offense to the extent that it is inferior to the crime charged and supported by the evidence. Id. at 554-555, 664 N.W.2d 685. I continue to support the holdings in Cornell and Mendoza because they set forth a means of discerning whether a nondegreed offense is inferior to the charged offense. But we simply have no authority to impose a judicial gloss on formally degreed offenses because MCL 768.32(1) expressly permits the fact-finder to consider them. Thus, in the context of formally degreed offenses such as CSC I and II, I agree with Justice Cavanagh's view that there is no historical basis to limit the meaning of the term inferior to necessarily included lesser offenses. II. IS CSC II NECESSARILY INCLUDED IN CSC I? Accepting the new rule of criminal law and procedure that a formally degreed offense must satisfy the Cornell test, the lead opinion does not explain why that rule was satisfied in this case. The lead opinion assumes that CSC II is merely a cognate lesser offense of CSC I, but a serious question exists regarding whether CSC II really is necessarily included in CSC I. We have yet to address this issue in the wake of recent authorities. In the pre- Cornell era, this Court had concluded that CSC II is a cognate lesser offense of CSC I. In People v. Lemons, 454 Mich. 234, 253-254, 562 N.W.2d 447 (1997), this Court stated: CSC I requires the prosecutor to prove sexual penetration. MCL 750.520b(1); MSA 28.788(2)(1). CSC II requires the prosecutor to prove sexual contact. MCL 750.520c(1); MSA 28.788(3)(1). Sexual penetration can be for any purpose. MCL 750.520a(1); MSA 28.788(1)(1). The statute defines sexual contact, however, as touching that can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. MCL 750.520a(k); MSA 28.788(1)(k). Thus, because CSC II requires proof of an intent not required by CSC Ithat defendant intended to seek sexual arousal or gratificationCSC II is a cognate lesser offense of CSC I. In short, it is possible to commit CSC I without first having committed CSC II. The Lemons Court acknowledged that CSC II is, in general, factually included in CSC I, `for sexual penetration is usually for a sexual purpose.' Id. at 254 n. 29, 562 N.W.2d 447 (quoting People v. Garrow, 99 Mich.App. 834, 839-840, 298 N.W.2d 627 [1980]). But the Lemons Court remained convinced that the additional intent requirement for CSC II mandates that it be considered a cognate lesser offense of CSC I. Id. Nonetheless, Lemons was decided before Cornell, when instructions on necessarily included lesser offenses were mandatory in the absence of a genuine evidentiary dispute and instructions on nondegreed, cognate offenses were permitted. See People v. Ora Jones, 395 Mich. 379, 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975). Now, however, in light of Cornell, the trier of fact may consider a necessarily included lesser offense only where a rational view of the evidence supports it, and cognate lesser offenses that are not formally degreed may not be considered at all. These major adjustments in our lesser included offense jurisprudence warrant at least a reexamination of the pre- Cornell analysis in Lemons. In addition, People v. Tombs, 472 Mich. 446, 697 N.W.2d 494 (2005), has obviously modified our understanding of the intent required to prove CSC I. That broader criminal intent requirement plainly includes the narrower intent required for CSC II. In Tombs, this Court explained that we tend to find that the Legislature wanted criminal intent to be an element of a criminal offense, even if it was left unstated.  Id. at 451, 697 N.W.2d 494 (opinion by Kelly, J.) (emphasis added). Thus, absent a clear indication that the Legislature intended to dispense with the requirement of a criminal purpose, we will presume from the Legislature's silence that proof of a criminal intent is required. Id. at 456-457, 697 N.W.2d 494. In light of Tombs, we should reassess the Lemons Court's assertion that [s]exual penetration [under CSC I] can be for any purpose.  Lemons, supra at 253, 562 N.W.2d 447 (emphasis added). A penetration committed without a criminal purpose would likely fail to satisfy the mandates of Tombs. The implications of Tombs should be considered. If proof of a criminal intent is required in a CSC I case, it is then fair to ask whether the intent element of CSC II is included in the criminal intent required for CSC I. The justices signing the lead opinion ought to carefully consider their assertion that CSC II is not an inferior degree of CSC I. [3] In fact, the CSC I statute, MCL 750.520b, only prohibits penetrations that are sexual, and the definitional statute, MCL 750.520a(p), lists types of sexual penetrations, including sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, and anal intercourse. The definitional statute for CSC II does not add a different sexual-purpose component. It merely reiterates that the nature of the contact under the criminal sexual conduct statute must be sexual, just as the penetrations in CSC I cases must be sexual in nature. I therefore question the lead opinion's contention that the statutory definition of sexual contact contains a subjective motivation or specific intent requirement. MCL 750.520a(o) defines sexual contact to include the intentional touching of the victim's or actor's intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner for: ( i ) Revenge. ( ii ) To inflict humiliation. ( iii ) Out of anger. This language does not prescribe a subjective motivation that must be proven to establish CSC II. Rather, it limits the types of intentional touchings that may be considered sexual contact. Specifically, an intentional touching constitutes sexual contact only if it can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification, etc. That is, the statute uses objective language indicating that the intentional touching must be susceptible to being reasonably construed as reflecting the sexual purposes described in the statute. The lead opinion offers a series of hypothetical situations that satisfy the elements of sexual penetration, but allegedly do not constitute sexual contact. But those situations fail to honor the statutory definition. Every listed hypothetical situation involves a touching that, whatever the actor's subjective motivation, could be reasonably construed as being for a sexual purpose identified in MCL 750.520a(o). Thus, these hypothetical situations do not support the lead opinion's holding. On the contrary, they reflect that the lead opinion has replaced the phrase can reasonably be construed as in MCL 750.520a(o) with a subjective motivation element. III. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE The lead opinion applies the canon of constitutional avoidance. It reasons that applying MCL 768.32(1) to formally inferior degrees that are not subsumed in the charged offense would render the statute subject to constitutional challenge. Ante at 556. The lead opinion perceives a due process concern . . . because defendants are entitled to know the charges against them. Ante at 555. The lead opinion thus adopts an interpretation that will save the statute. Ante at 556. In invoking the constitutional avoidance doctrine, the lead opinion has omitted a crucial step by failing to identify any ambiguity in MCL 768.32(1) that would warrant loading the dice in favor of its preferred interpretation. The canon of constitutional avoidance comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one construction ; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between them. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005) (emphasis added; original emphasis omitted). The lead opinion omits an ordinary textual analysis to explain why MCL 768.32(1) is susceptible of more than one construction. The language allowing a defendant charged with an offense, consisting of different degrees, to be found guilty of a degree of that offense inferior to that charged in the indictment . . ., is not unclear. As discussed, the statutory language is not difficult to comprehend, and provides notice to the defendant that he should defend against all degrees. Indeed, the lead opinion has acknowledged that criminal sexual conduct is an offense consisting of different degrees, so it presumably does not find this language ambiguous. And where the Legislature has delineated the degrees of an offense and numbered them in descending order, it has plainly expressed that each subsequent degree is an inferior degree of those that precede it. Thus, the lead opinion's failure to identify an ambiguity renders its dice-loading argument unconvincing. But even if an ambiguity existed, the lead opinion does not justify its application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The doctrine seeks in part to minimize disagreement between the Branches by preserving congressional enactments that might otherwise founder on constitutional objections. It is not designed to aggravate that friction by creating (through the power of precedent) statutes foreign to those Congress intended, simply through fear of a constitutional difficulty that, upon analysis, will evaporate. Thus, those who invoke the doctrine must believe that the alternative is a serious likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional. Only then will the doctrine serve its basic democratic function of maintaining a set of statutes that reflect, rather than distort, the policy choices that elected representatives have made. For similar reasons, the statute must be genuinely susceptible to two constructions after, and not before, its complexities are unraveled. Only then is the statutory construction that avoids the constitutional question a fair one. [ Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (emphasis added).] In my view, there is no serious likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional. Id. The lead opinion does not identify any authority holding that due process concerns preclude consideration of an offense that a legislature has formally denominated as an inferior degree of the charged offense. [4] In truth, compelling authorities do not raise a serious question regarding the constitutionality of MCL 768.32(1). Indeed, the lead opinion cannot possibly demonstrate a serious likelihood that MCL 768.32(1) will be held unconstitutional, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Paterno v. Lyons, 334 U.S. 314, 68 S.Ct. 1044, 92 L.Ed. 1409 (1948). In Paterno, the Supreme Court upheld a guilty plea to a charge of attempted grand larceny where the defendant was charged with receiving stolen property. Under New York law, attempted grand larceny was not necessarily included in the charged offense of receiving stolen property. Id. at 321 n. 10, 68 S.Ct. 1044. Yet the United States Supreme Court upheld the conviction, noting that [t]here is close kinship between the two offenses. Id. at 320, 68 S.Ct. 1044. The Supreme Court further explained: It would be exaltation of technical precision to an unwarranted degree to say that the indictment here did not inform petitioner that he was charged with substantial elements of the crime of larceny thereby enabling him, as a means of cutting his sentence in half, to agree to plead guilty to an attempted larceny. [ Id. at 321, 68 S.Ct. 1044.] Additional authorities undercut the lead opinion's constitutional avoidance argument. In Salinas v. United States, 277 F.2d 914 (C.A.9, 1960), the defendant was charged with first-degree arson in the United States District Court for Alaska. The trial court instructed the jury that the charge of first-degree arson included a charge of second-degree arson. First-degree arson required proof that the defendant had willfully burned `any dwelling house . . . or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable or other outhouse that is parcel thereof, or belonging to or adjoining thereto. . . .' Id. at 916, quoting § 65-5-1, ACLA Supplement. Second-degree arson proscribed burning any building or structure of whatsoever class or character not included in the first-degree arson provision. Id. The defendant had burned down a restaurant containing living quarters on the second floor. The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree arson. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant's conviction of the inferior degree of arson did not violate due process. It explained: Often a particular crime is graded or classified into degrees    in order that the punishment may be adjusted with reference to the presence or absence of circumstances of aggravation. Davis v. Utah Territory, 1893, 151 U.S. 262, 266, 14 S.Ct. 328, 329, 38 L.Ed. 153. Where a substantive crime is so divided, the elements necessary to the commission of the crime itself are the same in each instance, but the degree of culpability differs depending upon the category in which the circumstances place the offense. [ Salinas, supra at 917.] Thus, where the indictment sets out a crime divided into degrees the defendant is put on notice of the particular offense charged against him together with any aggravating circumstances appearing by additional averments. Id. (emphasis added). The Salinas court further explained: The well settled rule, recognized in Alaska by two statutes, is that when an indictment charges a crime in which a lesser offense is necessarily included, or charges a higher degree of a particular offense that is divided into degrees, the accused, although acquitted of the greater offense or of the higher degree of the same offense may, consistent with the requirements of due process, be convicted of a lesser included offense or a lower degree of the offense charged. [ Id. (emphasis added).] Notably, one of the Alaska statutes contained language nearly identical to our provision, MCL 768.32(1). [5] The defendant in Salinas argued that second-degree arson was a separate and distinct offense because it was not necessarily included in the charge of first-degree arson. The defendant contended that first-degree arson could be committed without first having committed second-degree arson, thereby failing a test articulated in Giles v. United States, 144 F.2d 860, 861 (C.A.9, 1944), and House v. State, 186 Ind. 593, 117 N.E. 647 (1917). The Salinas court rejected that argument: This test is of doubtful application in determining whether the elements of a lesser degree of a substantive crime, divided into several degrees, are included in a charge of a higher degree of that crime; it is more appropriate where different crimes are being considered. The elements of a single crime divided into degrees are the same in each instance, and only one crime can be committed. The aggravation of the basic offense may vary in each degree; the substantive crime, with its elements, remains the same. The Giles case did not seek to apply the above test to determine the sufficiency of an indictment that charged one crime divided into degrees, but rather whether one crime was necessarily included in another, different crime. This was also the situation in the House case where the rule originated; there the court was careful to note specifically that it was not dealing with an offense divided into degrees. We are inclined to view the two statutes relating to first and second degree arson as commonly denouncing but one crime-that of arson. As it relates to buildings and structures, this crime is divided into two grades, the one being more aggravated than the other by reason of the particular nature of the building burned, i.e., a dwelling house. Consequently an indictment charging the more aggravated degree necessarily contains all of the elements of the lower degree. [ Salinas, supra at 918.] Similarly, in State v. Foster, 91 Wash.2d 466, 589 P.2d 789 (1979), the defendant was charged with first-degree assault with intent to kill, and the court instructed on second-degree negligent assault. The jury found the defendant guilty of second-degree negligent assault. The defendant claimed that he was deprived of his constitutional right to notice of the accusation against him, and that he could be convicted of second-degree assault only if it were included in first-degree assault. The Washington Supreme Court rejected this argument: The general rule regarding this right is that the crimes of which a person can be convicted, and those on which a jury is properly instructed, are limited to those which are charged in the information. . . . There are two exceptions to this rule: (1) where a defendant is convicted of a lesser included offense of the one charged in the information . . .; and (2) where a defendant is convicted of an offense which is a crime of an inferior degree to the one charged, pursuant to RCW 10.61.003. [ Id. at 471, 589 P.2d 789 (emphasis added).] The Washington statute was worded nearly identically to MCL 768.32(1). [6] The Foster court held that this statute gave appellant sufficient notice that he was subject to a conviction of second-degree negligent assault. Foster, supra at 471, 589 P.2d 789. The Foster Court also found Salinas persuasive: Similarly [to the analysis in Salinas ], we conclude that both the first-degree and second-degree assault statutes proscribe but one offense-that of assault. Since the offense upon which the trial court instructed the jury is a lesser degree crime of the one with which he was charged and the two crimes, namely assault, are not separate and distinct from one another, we conclude that appellant was given sufficient notice to satisfy the requirements of [the state constitution] and the Sixth Amendment. [ Id. at 472, 589 P.2d 789.] Like in Salinas and Foster, our Legislature has formally divided the offense of criminal sexual conduct into degrees and numbered them in descending order. Thus, criminal sexual conduct is but one offense divided into several degrees, and CSC II is, by legislative definition, an inferior offense of CSC I. Defendant received adequate notice of the nature of this charge. Finally, the lead opinion has offered no reason to believe that MCL 768.32(1) is unconstitutional as applied to defendant. [7] MCL 768.32(1) provided notice to defendant because the plain language of the statute permits the trier of fact to consider a lesser degree of CSC. Moreover, defendant certainly had notice that a rational view of the evidence supported a CSC II conviction. It was, after all, defendant's own admission that he had touched the victim's vagina that led the court to find him guilty of CSC II. It is simply untenable to suggest that defendant had no notice of his own confession, or that use of that confession somehow violated due process. [8] In my view, the Legislature is entirely free to correct the lead opinion's rewrite of MCL 768.32(1). The lead opinion has not held that the statute is unconstitutional. Instead, the lead opinion has merely applied a canon of statutory interpretation known as the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. [9] IV. HARMLESS ERROR Even accepting the lead opinion's contention that an error occurred, it would be harmless. [10] As the alleged error here is unpreserved and nonconstitutional, it is reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 764, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999). In considering whether defendant's substantial rights were affected, I would note that under Cornell, the trier of fact may consider an inferior offense only if it is supported by a rational view of the evidence. This aspect of our holding in Cornell must apply to all inferior offenses, both formally degreed offenses and those that are inferior under the Cornell rule of construction. As we explained in Cornell: To permit otherwise would be inconsistent with the truth-seeking function of a trial, as expressed in MCL 768.29. Cornell, supra at 357-358, 646 N.W.2d 127. [11] That rationale applies equally here. In this case, a rational view of the evidence supported the court's decision to convict defendant of CSC II. The victim testified that defendant fondled her vagina. This testimony is consistent with defendant's own admission, given during a police interview. [12] Thus, the court's finding that defendant was guilty of two counts of CSC II was permissible under MCL 768.32(1). The lead opinion incorrectly asserts that the defense at trial was focused on a charge that defendant had sexually penetrated the victim. Ante at 557. Justice Markman's concurrence reflects a similar misunderstanding of the record. He states that defendant likely failed to object to or otherwise refute the introduction of a statement he made to the police admitting sexual contact, because it was not relevant to his defense that no sexual penetration had occurred. Ante at 564 (emphasis in original). Justice Markman further characterizes defendant's defense as claiming that while he may have done something inappropriate, he did not commit CSC I. Ante at 564. In truth, defendant claimed that no sexual touching of any kind occurred, and that he never made the statement to the police. Indeed, defense counsel stated in closing argument that the question that obviously this Court is left to take a look at is whether beyond a reasonable doubt it's been proven that Mr. Nyx had in fact improper contact with this defendant [sic]. (Emphasis added.) Defense counsel then challenged the testimony of prosecution witnesses, noting that there were contradicting stories from the complainant and another witness: It's [sic] contradicting stories as to when it happened, allegedly; what allegedly happened, on what day this allegedly happened. Defense counsel further discussed inconsistencies between the police reports and hospital records regarding the complainant's version of the crime. In short, the defense theory was that no sexual incident occurred, not that defendant engaged in sexual contact short of penetration. Nor did the defense attempt to rely on defendant's confession. The defense strategy at trial was to suggest that defendant did not make a statement. During the cross-examination of police witnesses, defense counsel attempted to challenge their credibility. For example, counsel elicited testimony that the officer who took the statement did not record the interview and did not note certain events that occurred during the making of the statement. In closing argument, counsel discussed a notation in a police document suggesting that no statement was made. [13] Thus, defense counsel plainly did not rely on the confession to suggest that defendant did something inappropriate short of penetration. For these reasons, the defense at trial would not have changed had defendant known that the judge would convict him of CSC II instead of CSC I. Thus, even accepting the lead opinion's view that an error occurred, I would conclude that it did not affect defendant's substantial rights, and that reversal is therefore not required under Carines. V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE MAJORITY'S DECISION The broader consequence of the lead opinion's adoption of its new rule of criminal procedure and new definition of substantive criminal law is that CSC II is no longer an inferior degree of CSC I. Indeed, it seems that any cognate degreed offense cannot qualify as an inferior offense. The Court's decision affects all formally degreed offenses until such time as our appellate courts clarify the status of each degreed offense. Prosecutors will now have the burden of charging each degree of an offense that they wish to have considered, and to present often-confusing alternative arguments and proofs to the trier of fact for each degree of the offense charged. We will face a cottage industry of litigation to decipher whether each formally degreed offense is truly necessarily included or merely cognate. As the lead opinion acknowledges, our Legislature has chosen to classify many crimes as formally degreed offenses. [14] To avoid claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, defense lawyers must now argue that any lesser degreed offense is not truly inferior. Indeed, counsel's failure to object with regard to a lesser degree at a trial or plea hearing, or affirmative acquiescence in the inclusion of the lesser degree, will allow a defendant to argue on appeal that trial counsel was ineffective. We will spend years sorting out the consequences of this new rule. The sensible rule that Cornell restored to Michigan is being upset by this decision. There are clear practical effects that will follow as a result of the lead opinion. Testifying before a jury is a nerve-wracking experience, and witnesses often offer more tentative statements at trial than those they made during the police investigation. Hence, a prosecutor can never know which statements of a CSC victim may be accepted as true by the trier of fact or the weight that will be given to them. In order to assure that an offender does not escape responsibility for his crime, a prosecutor will now be required to charge CSC II as an alternative count whenever bringing a charge of CSC I, or risk the possibility of acquittal where the victim's testimony at trial may not be as strong as anticipated. The same charging requirement would hold true for any other crime for which this Court has not definitively held that the lesser degreed offense is also a necessarily included offense. Thus, this decision heralds a revival of Ora Jones. Now, the decision of which cognate lesser offense will be included will move from the end of the trial when proofs have been adduced to the prosecutor's charging decision before any evidence has been presented. Finally, defendants will also suffer negative consequences with the new rule. Take, for example, a case where the prosecutor has charged a defendant with CSC I involving a 12-year-old girl (and decides not to charge CSC II as an alternative count). If the defendant disputes penetration but not sexual contact, he will face an all-or-nothing verdict instead of offering the jury the reasonable alternative of convicting him of that which he admitted: CSC II. VI. CONCLUSION I would hold that under the plain language of MCL 768.32(1), a fact-finder may convict a defendant of a legislatively denominated inferior degree of the charged offense if a rational view of the evidence supports the conviction. The Cornell rule of construction for determining whether an offense is inferior does not apply where the Legislature itself has formally divided an offense into degrees. In any event, it appears that CSC II is necessarily included in CSC I, notwithstanding this Court's contrary statement in Lemons. Moreover, any error was harmless in light of the fact the defense at trial was that defendant engaged in no sexual touching with the complainant. There is no ambiguity in the text of MCL 768.32(1) to warrant application of the canon of constitutional avoidance, nor is there a serious likelihood that the statute will be held unconstitutional. I would thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that Court to address defendant's remaining appellate issues.