Opinion ID: 1788325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Post Oral Argument Issues

Text: As noted above, this Court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction in this case for the limited purpose of determining if DNA testing could be performed on certain items of clothing. While those proceedings were pending, Duckett also filed a motion in the circuit court for compliance with Brady and Kyles. Duckett appeals the circuit court's denial of his request for testing of certain items, including two cigarette butts, a flip-flop, two beer bottles, and one beer can, because it would be beyond the scope of this Court's relinquishment order. Duckett also appeals the circuit court's denial of his motion for compliance with Brady and Kyles. Duckett claims that this Court's relinquishment order should be considered the equivalent of a granted motion for DNA testing under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.853. Duckett has never filed any motion under rule 3.853, however, regarding the current items sought to be tested. Rule 3.853 provides formal requirements for a defendant seeking post-conviction DNA testing of evidence. Among other pleading requirements, a defendant must include a statement that the evidence sought to be tested has not previously been tested or that new testing technology exists that may obtain better results than the original test. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.853(b). Rule 3.853 also requires several specific factual allegations as well as a statement about how the new DNA evidence will help exonerate the defendant or mitigate the sentence. See id. Respecting rule 3.853, this Court has stated: Rule 3.853 is not intended to be a fishing expedition. Rather, it is intended to provide a defendant with an opportunity for DNA testing of material not previously tested or of previously tested material when the results of previous DNA testing were inconclusive and subsequent developments in DNA testing techniques would likely provide a definitive result, and when a motion for such testing provides a basis upon which a trial court can make the findings expressly set forth in subdivision (c)(5) of rule 3.853. Hitchcock v. State, 866 So.2d 23, 27-28 (Fla.2004). Duckett did not file a motion under rule 3.853. Therefore, the standards that apply to that rule do not apply to the relinquishment order. In this case, we relinquished jurisdiction on our own motion based on an exchange with counsel during oral argument. Counsel for both sides stated that clothing may exist that might be successfully tested for DNA. The order specifically refers to clothing three times: At oral argument ... both Duckett and the State stipulated that DNA testing may be possible on clothing introduced into evidence. ... [W]e remand this case to the trial court to determine whether clothing exists that can be tested for DNA.... If the trial court determines that DNA testing is possible on any clothing, any such testing shall be completed, and the parties shall report the results to this Court, within 180 days of the date of this Order. The circuit court properly interpreted this order as limiting the scope of DNA testing. We recognize that certain non-clothing items were tested, including a vaginal swab and fingernail scrapings from the victim. However, the record indicates that the testing of at least some of the non-clothing items was done at the request of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) through the State. [16] FDLE made no such request on the other items Duckett sought to have tested. In reaching its decision that those items were outside the scope of the relinquishment order, the court stated that testing of the additional items would amount to nothing more than a fishing expedition. We agree. The relinquishment order was narrowly drafted and intended to be applied narrowly. Duckett also contends that the circuit court erred by ruling that the motion for compliance with Brady and Kyles addressed issues beyond the scope of our relinquishment of jurisdiction. As discussed above, the relinquishment order gave narrow instructions for the circuit court to determine if clothing existed that could be tested for DNA. Duckett had by this time already received a full evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion before the circuit court and oral argument before this Court. By relinquishing jurisdiction, we did not intend to give Duckett the opportunity to assert new claims. Nevertheless, Duckett claims that the State is under a continuing duty throughout all proceedings to comply with Brady. See Strickler, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286; High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1264 n. 8 (11th Cir.2000) (The State's duty to disclose exculpatory material is ongoing.). This duty extends to postconviction proceedings. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 935 n. 12 (9th Cir.1998) (The Brady duty is an ongoing one, and continued to bind the prosecution throughout [defendant's] habeas proceedings.). While this is a correct statement of the law, Duckett fails to explain how he can bring the current claim. He had the opportunity to make these arguments in his postconviction motion, which he amended twicethe second time over two years after the original motion was filed. To assert a new Brady claim at this point, Duckett must file a successive motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851(e)(2) and comply with its requirements. We relinquished jurisdiction for a limited purpose, and the circuit court properly ruled that the motion for compliance with Brady and Kyles goes beyond the scope of our order.