Opinion ID: 299003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the validity of the search and seizure

Text: 16 Shortly after the defendant was taken to the police station and booked on the altered driver's license charge, he revealed to the police and the Secret Service agents that his real name was Charles White. At this point every item of information in the tip had been corroborated, including the most uncertain one as to the suspect's real name, with the exception of course of his possession of counterfeit bills. In addition, the police had uncovered another item of information which tended to cast suspicion on the defendant — that he was using an altered driver's license. This is a much stronger case factually than Draper v. United States, supra, and we think that clearly at this point the police had probable cause to search the defendant's automobile. 17 It may be noted that in assessing the probable cause which existed for the search of this car, while the record clearly shows all the information discussed above, it does not make it entirely clear that each and every officer possessed every item of information which combined to create the probable cause. However, in determining whether probable cause existed we must evaluate the collective information of all the officers. Wood v. Crouse, 436 F.2d 1077, 1078 (10th Cir. 1971); Turk v. United States, 429 F.2d 1327, 1331 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Trabucco, 424 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 399 U.S. 918, 90 S.Ct. 2224, 26 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970); Smith v. United States, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 202, 358 F.2d 833, 835, cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1008, 87 S.Ct. 1350, 18 L.Ed.2d 448 (1966). 18 Nor does the fact that at the time of the search, the officers did not completely and correctly articulate their grounds for the search invalidate it, if in fact from an objective standpoint probable cause existed. The test of probable cause is not the articulation of the policeman's subjective theory but the objective view of the facts. Dodd v. Beto, 435 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1970); Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 396 U.S. 859, 90 S.Ct. 127, 24 L.Ed.2d 110 (1969); Smith v. United States, 402 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1968); Sirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 699, 702 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807, 83 S.Ct. 1696, 10 L.Ed.2d 1032 (1963). 19 While the defendant has attacked the validity of the search warrant in this case, we do not find it necessary to pass on this question, because we believe that the search can be justified as a warrantless search based upon probable cause under the principles of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed.2d 419 (1970). Chambers noted that not in every conceivable circumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made without the extra protection for privacy that a warrant affords. Id. at 50, 90 S.Ct. at 1981. However, the circumstances in the instant case justified an immediate search. The defendant was being held for possessing an altered driver's license, a charge which presumably would not permit him to be detained long. Although there was probable cause to search the car, there was not yet probable cause to arrest him on the counterfeiting charge. The car was in the custody of the police. Were the defendant to be released, he and the car might quickly disappear. 20 The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained.    [F]or the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981 (footnote omitted). 21 We conclude that the warrantless search was valid. 22 The judgment is affirmed.