Opinion ID: 764161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of LIUNA.

Text: 126 We review de novo a district court's conclusions of law, Waxman v. Luna, 881 F.2d 237, 240 (6th Cir.1989) (per curiam), but review its findings of fact only for clear error, Jackson v. RKO Bottlers of Toledo, Inc., 743 F.2d 370, 374 (6th Cir.1984). 127 The National Maintenance Agreement, signed by LIUNA and effective at Perry in March 1985, provided in part: 128 The employer agrees to hire men in any territory where work is being performed or is to be performed in accordance with the hiring procedure existing in the territory where the work is being performed or is performed; however, in the event the Local Union is unable to fill the request of the Employer for Employees within a forty-eight (48) hour period after such request for Employees ..., the Employer may employ workmen from any source. 129 The Agreement also contained a non-discrimination clause, which stated: The Union and the Employer agree to abide by all Executive Orders and subsequent amendments thereto, regarding the Civil Rights Act of 1964, pertaining to non-discrimination in employment, in every respect. 130 The district court found that [a]t all relevant times, the referral system was administered solely by Local 496; no International Union representative or agent has participated in its operation. The court also found that LIUNA was aware of the discriminatory actions being take by the defendant[s] Local 496 and Floyd Conrad since May of 1983, but has continually refused to investigate charges of discrimination or take any action to correct this illegal conduct. It is undisputed, however, that no class member ever contacted LIUNA to register a discrimination complaint or to ask LIUNA to investigate his or her situation. 131 The district court concluded that LIUNA was liable under a principal-agent theory for the discriminatory actions of Local 496 because both before and after March 1985, LIUNA was aware of Local 496's actions regarding its refusal to make referrals to class members or to permit them to become union members, and because LIUNA acquiesced in those actions. The court also held that LIUNA had an affirmative duty under Title VII and § 1981 to oppose Local 496's discriminatory practices because for several years LIUNA had knowledge of the class members' charges of discrimination against Local 496 and of some resulting EEOC reasonable cause findings, and because LIUNA had signed the National Maintenance Agreement, which regulated labor relations at Perry. 132
133 An international union may be liable for the discriminatory practices of an affiliated local if, in carrying out such practices, the local is acting as the international's agent. See Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395, 1426-33 (D.C.Cir.1988). 16 Thus, to be liable under Title VII, an international must participate in or authorize[ ], ratify[ ], or approve[ ] of the particular condition about which the plaintiff complains. See id. at 1428-32. 17 Contrary to the statements of the district court, mere acquiescence is not enough. To be similarly liable under § 1981, the plaintiff must also prove that the relationship between the international and the local is sufficient to impute discriminatory intent. Id. at 1430. 134 In the present case, the district court's findings and the parties' stipulations foreclose a finding that LIUNA participated in the discriminatory referral process. The closer question, of course, is whether, by signing the National Maintenance Agreement, and therein obligating contractors to hire men in any territory where work is being performed or is to be performed in accordance with the hiring procedure existing in the territory where the work is being performed or is to be performed, when LIUNA knew or should have known of Local 496's discriminatory practices, LIUNA authorized, ratified, or approved Local 496's referral practices. 135 In General Building Contractors, like in the present case, the plaintiffs charged that the union had engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination by systematically denying access to union referral lists and by arbitrarily skewing referrals in favor of white workers. The Court held that the mere fact that trade associations and employers had delegated to the union the authority to select workers, and the union, in effectuating that delegation, intentionally discriminated or produced a discriminatory impact, alone was not enough to support an agency relationship. 458 U.S. at 391-94. Likewise, this court cannot find that merely securing in the National Maintenance Agreement a promise that the contractors will follow Local 496's hiring procedures, whatever they may be, without any concurrent control over those procedures, is sufficient to render LIUNA a principal responsible for Local 496's discriminatory actions. This is particularly so because the same agreement that Plaintiffs and the district court would read as reflecting LIUNA's acquiescence in the discriminatory referral procedures also contains an explicit requirement that the union not discriminate. 136 In Berger, the court found an agency relationship because, in addition to the international union's constitutional provisions providing the international with oversight authority over the local's membership practices (which alone would not be enough to find the agency relationship, 843 F.2d at 1431), the international had formally endorsed the establishment of the discriminatory practice in question and was actually involved in its implementation. Id. at 1430-32. In the cases cited by Plaintiffs, the provisions in question were themselves discriminatory and were explicitly negotiated by the international. See, e.g., Myers v. Gilman Paper Corp., 544 F.2d 837, 844, 847-48, 850-51 (5th Cir.1977) (agency liability for line seniority provision in labor agreement either negotiated by the international or advised by international and requiring international's approval). In the present case, LIUNA was not involved in Local 496's 1973 agreement to refer both members and non-members to laborer positions at Perry. Plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence indicating that LIUNA supported or approved of Local 496's decision in fact not to comply with the terms of the PLA, or allegedly to make exceptions in their noncompliance for a number of white relatives/friends. LIUNA knew that charges of discrimination had been levied, but not that discrimination actually had occurred, and knew that Plaintiffs were seeking court intervention to resolve the matter. Therefore, on the record before us, where the district court found and the record reflects nothing more than mere acquiescence, in my view we cannot find that Local 496 was acting as LIUNA's agent when it discriminated against Plaintiffs. 137
138 The district court found that because LIUNA had notice of discrimination complaints against Local 496 and because it was a party to the National Maintenance Agreement, LIUNA had an affirmative duty to oppose Local 496's discriminatory conduct. In so holding, the district court relied upon Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.1975), wherein the Ninth Circuit held that under Title VII, [b]y making and [tacitly] enforcing a collective bargaining agreement that perpetuates past discriminatory effects, an international labor organizations has an affirmative duty to take corrective steps to prevent the perpetuation of such discrimination by their affiliates. Id. at 1360. Central to Kaplan 's holding, however, is that the international union actually negotiated on behalf of the local the agreement containing the discriminatory referral procedure. See id. at 1359-60. In contrast, LIUNA was not involved either in the negotiation of the 1973 PLA, or in Local 496's decision not to comply with the PLA's requirements. Moreover, in Kaplan, the provision perpetuating the discriminatory effects was part of the collective bargaining agreement itself. In the present case, Plaintiffs did not allege and the district court did not find that the PLA itself was discriminatory; it was the failure of Local 496 (by referring only members) and the employers (because of security at Perry) to properly implement the agreement that caused the discrimination. 139 Plaintiffs argue that requiring anything more than an international union's knowledge of discrimination claims against a local affiliate to create an affirmative duty would be in direct conflict with the broad remedial purposes of Title VII and Section 1981, as well as LIUNA's duties under the National Maintenance Agreement. In General Building Contractors Association, however, the Supreme Court explicitly stated 140 [T]he question is not whether the employers and associations are free to delegate their duty to abide by § 1981, for whatever duty the statute imposes, they are bound to adhere to it. The question is what duty does § 1981 impose. More precisely, does § 1981 impose a duty to refrain from intentionally denying blacks the right to contract on the same basis as whites or does it impose an affirmative obligation to ensure that blacks enjoy such a right? The language of the statute does not speak in terms of duties. It merely declares specific rights held by [a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States. We are confident that the Thirty-ninth Congress meant to do no more than prohibit the employers and associations in these cases from intentionally depriving black workers of the rights enumerated in the statute, including the equal right to contract. It did not intend to make them the guarantors of the workers' rights as against third parties who would infringe them. 141 458 U.S. at 396 (second emphasis added). Thus, at least under § 1981, in the absence of an agency relationship, an international union does not have an affirmative duty to ensure that its affiliates do not undertake discriminatory practices. See also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 687-89, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987) (Powell, concurring); 18 cf. Phelan v. Local 305 of United Ass'n of Journeymen, 973 F.2d 1050, 1061 (2d Cir.1992) (in context of union democracy claim, citing Carbon Fuel for the proposition that: An international union has no independent duty to intervene in the affairs of its local chapters, even where the international has knowledge of the local's unlawful acts.). Because of the close relationship between Title VII and § 1981, I conclude that the same standard applies in the Title VII context. See Berger, 843 F.2d at 1429 (noting that an international's liability for the actions of an affiliate must be based on something more than the abstract and unbounded premise that the entities regulated by [Title VII and § 1981] have an 'affirmative duty' to end discrimination.). The non-discrimination clause of the National Maintenance Agreement likewise does not require anything greater. 142 Moreover, as a practical matter, holding LIUNA responsible for Local 496's actions, under the facts of this case, makes little sense. In finding an affirmative duty, the district court relied in part on the fact that in March 1985, LIUNA signed the National Maintenance Agreement. Before 1985, LIUNA was not a party to any Perry agreement. After May 1985, no class member even applied for union membership until 1990. During that period, no class member filed an EEOC grievance claiming additional discrimination. In addition, no class member ever requested that LIUNA investigate the charges of discrimination. As far as LIUNA was aware, the institution of the October 1987 referral policy, which the court acknowledged appeared to be neutral on its face, corrected any discrimination problems that had appeared in the past. 143 For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the district court erred in finding that LIUNA had an affirmative duty to oppose Local 496's discriminatory practices. 19