Opinion ID: 1439515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Court Err in Expanding the Easement and Rounding Off the Corners?

Text: Lutz and Garrett, in their cross-appeal, argue that the trial court erred by reforming the easement. They claim that the court exceeded its authority by increasing the size of the easement when it decided to round off its corners, and cites us to Brooks v. Tanner, 101 N.M. 203, 207, 680 P.2d 343, 347 (1984), and Posey v. Dove, 57 N.M. 200, 212, 257 P.2d 541, 548 (1953), for the proposition that an easement cannot be altered and a servient estate further burdened except by the consent of the owner. Lutz and Garrett maintain that the easement agreement clearly and unambiguously recites the dimensions of the easement. Although the agreement, which reads: The use of the easement shall be as a roadway for normal residential building construction purposes, and shall include the right to make such installations and improvements as may be reasonably necessary to such use[,] may be read as creating an ambiguity, it refers only to a use restriction on the easement. It is not to be read as a mandate to enlarge its scope. According to Lutz and Garrett, the agreement unambiguously indicates that the easement's corners are square, and therefore, by the rule articulated in Northrip v. Conner, 107 N.M. 139, 142-43, 754 P.2d 516, 519-20 (1988), a court is restricted to the four corners of the deed and may not go beyond it to determine the parties' intentions. They contend that Sanders had notice of the dimensions of the easement as specified in the agreement, and therefore is bound by those limitations. See Germany v. Murdock, 99 N.M. 679, 681, 662 P.2d 1346, 1348 (1983). Sanders contends that, by rounding off the corners of the easement, the court only effectuated a de minimis encroachment on the servient estate, and that the trial court possessed the authority to revise the easement, citing Dyer v. Compere, 41 N.M. 716, 73 P.2d 1356 (1937). [1] In construing an agreement creating an easement, a court must determine and give effect to the intent of the parties. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 26 (1941). In determining the intent of the parties, the court may examine the surrounding circumstances that shed light on the parties' intent. Dyer, 41 N.M. at 720, 73 P.2d at 1358. However, [b]arring any ambiguity [in the granting instrument], ... the trial court may not go outside the deed itself to interpret the parties' intentions. Northrip v. Conner, 107 N.M. at 143, 754 P.2d at 520. We find that the agreement granting the easement is ambiguous, and the trial court properly resorted to an examination of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the easement to determine the parties' intention. The easement agreement states the dimensions of the grant, and it is expressly laid out with square corners. However, the same instrument states that the easement is to be used as a roadway. The trial court determined that, as laid out with square corners, the easement could not be used for this purpose. This created an ambiguity  although the sentence in the instrument was intended as a use limitation, it also evinced the parties' intent that the area should be fit for use as a road. A court has equitable power to interpret an easement, and, under the circumstances, we hold that it properly exercised this authority by rounding off the corners. See Sedillo Title Guaranty, Inc. v. Wagner, 80 N.M. 429, 432, 457 P.2d 361, 364 (1969). A comparison of the facts presented for this appeal with those in Northrip and Germany demonstrate the propriety of this holding. In Northrip, the deed was silent as to any easements; the court refused to go beyond the instrument to find that the parties intended an easement, despite the experience of the parties. In Germany, a case presenting an issue similar to that first addressed by this opinion, the court determined that the location of the easement was unambiguously referred to in the instrument, and refused to modify the agreement to conform to the practice of the parties. In the present case, however, the instrument is ambiguous  if we were to accept Lutz' argument, Sanders would be left with a right of access unfit for its intended purpose. We, therefore, hold that the trial court properly acted within the scope of its authority by determining the intent of the parties and revising the written instrument accordingly.