Opinion ID: 3033043
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Implausibilities

Text: 1. First, the IJ considered Kumar’s description of his first arrest and subsequent release to be implausible. The IJ stated: “The Court finds it implausible to believe that if the police really found weapons at his home, that soon 6 after an attack on parliament, they would have released the respondent merely for giving a bribe, believing him to actually be supporting militants.” Rather, the IJ found more plausible “that the police released the respondent and his father because they were not suspected of having any connection with the attack on parliament or the weapons that were presumably found at their house.” However, Kumar testified several times, and stated in his declaration, that the police never showed Kumar what was inside the bag seized from his home, but rather police claimed that the bag contained weapons. Thus, the IJ’s determination that Kumar’s testimony was implausible hinges on an “assumption” that contradicts substantial evidence in the record. See Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting Board’s implausibility finding that was based on an “assumption” refuted by record evidence). In addition, “the IJ’s assumptions about what the motives of the police should have been . . . are the sort of conjecture and speculation that cannot be used to support an adverse credibility determination.” Id. On the other hand, the story that the IJ found to be plausible is entirely consistent with Kumar’s testimony. Thus, substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s determination. 2. Next, the IJ found the details surrounding Kumar’s second arrest to be implausible. Rather than addressing Kumar’s explanation that it was customary 7 practice for shopkeepers to behave just as Kumar had, the IJ stated only that “the Court does not believe this a plausible explanation under the respondent’s own circumstances.” The IJ did not give any specific or cogent reasons as to why Kumar’s explanation was implausible. However, “[a]n adverse credibility finding is improper when an IJ fails to address a petitioner’s explanation for a discrepancy or inconsistency.” Kaur v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 876, 887 (9th Cir. 2004). “To ignore a petitioner’s explanation . . . and relevant record evidence would be to make a credibility determination on less than the total circumstances in contravention of the REAL ID Act’s text.” Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044. Accordingly, the IJ’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. 3. Finally, the IJ found implausible Kumar’s explanation for not presenting his Canadian asylum application along with the Canadian decision denying his claim. While the IJ noted that the Canadian decision “is not required because it is not being reviewed by this Court,” she considered the application to be “highly relevant” as a check on Kumar’s credibility. “The REAL ID Act changed the standard governing when a trier of fact may require corroborating evidence from where the evidence is ‘easily available’ to where the evidence is ‘reasonably obtainable[.]’” Id. at 1047. However, in enacting the REAL ID Act’s new corroboration standard, Congress meant to 8 incorporate the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-M-J, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722 (BIA 1997). See H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 166. In S-M-J, the BIA held: [W]here it is reasonable to expect corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant’s claim, such evidence should be provided. That is, an asylum applicant should provide documentary support for material facts which are central to his or her claim and easily subject to verification, such as evidence of his or her place of birth, media accounts of large demonstrations, evidence of a publicly held office, or documentation of medical treatment. . . . The absence of such corroborating evidence can lead to a finding that an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof. 21 I. & N. Dec. at 725-26 (emphases added). This is consistent with our case law interpreting the post-REAL ID Act standard. See Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1043-47 (9th Cir. 2009) (IJ properly required corroboration of facts that were central to the applicant’s claim). The type of corroborating evidence discussed in S-M-J and Aden and contemplated by Congress in enacting the REAL ID Act is entirely different from that which Kumar failed to provide. To the contrary, Kumar submitted extensive corroborating evidence into the record that detailed general country conditions against which to judge Kumar’s claim and focused on Kumar’s particular circumstances. Indeed, throughout the IJ’s decision, it indicated several times that Kumar’s claim that corrupt police officials would plant weapons on Kumar and that the militant connection was merely an excuse for the police to extort money 9 was well-supported by the background documents. Kumar’s “particular circumstances” are also supported by other corroborating evidence, in the form of a letter from a doctor in India, and affidavits from local officials and family members. Finally, we note that the IJ never asked Kumar for the Canadian asylum application, which it considered to be “highly relevant.” Contra Aden, 589 F.3d at 1043.2 Therefore, the IJ’s adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. We express no opinion on the merits of Kumar’s claim, which the Board did not reach. Accordingly, we GRANT the petition for review, and REMAND for further proceedings to determine whether the petitioner is eligible for relief. 2 Moreover, even assuming the Canadian application was relevant as a check on Kumar’s credibility, he provided the IJ with a copy of the declaration he filed in Canada, which was consistent with his U.S. declaration in all material respects. 10