Opinion ID: 776376
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury unanimity as to affirmative defenses

Text: 12 We conclude that the district court's first supplemental instruction concerning jury unanimity in regard to affirmative defenses was correct as a matter of law. 13 Neither party disputes that the jury's ultimate verdict had to be unanimous, or that Allstate would win if the jury unanimously decided that Jazzabi started the fire. The issue is whether the jury could find Allstate liable even if the jury did not unanimously reject Allstate's contention that Jazzabi had started the fire. Allstate's arson argument is an affirmative defense under substantive Oregon law, 6 which controls in this diversity case 7 . Thus, the legal question presented is whether a jury can find for a plaintiff even if the jury has not unanimously rejected a defendant's affirmative defense. 14 Allstate's argument reduces to the contention that the jury cannot find Allstate liable in breach until the jury unanimously disposes of all issues affecting liability, including Allstate's affirmative defense. Jazzabi argues that because it is undisputed that he has established a prima facie case of breach, anything less than unanimous jury agreement that Jazzabi started the fire is a failure of proof on Allstate's part and the jury must return a unanimous verdict for Plaintiff. 15 Relatively few cases have addressed this precise issue, but those we have located have ruled that a defendant cannot be held liable until the jury unanimously rejects an affirmative defense. 8 Thus, the weight of existing authority favors All-state. 16 Most of these cases do not analyze the issue in any depth, however, and there does not seem to be any one rationale underlying the cases' holdings. Still, some of the cases deal with arguments advanced here. Sanchez v. State 9 relied on one of the same arguments Allstate makes: that permitting juries to find a defendant liable even in the absence of a unanimous rejection of an affirmative defense may discourage thorough jury deliberations and promote verdicts based on a simple majority vote. 10 This court has similarly recognized the importance of the unanimity requirement in fostering thorough jury deliberations: 17 A rule which insists on unanimity furthers the deliberative process by requiring the minority view to be examined and, if possible, accepted or rejected by the entire jury. The requirement of jury unanimity thus has a precise effect on the fact-finding process, one which gives particular significance and conclusiveness to the jury's verdict. Both the defendant and society can place special confidence in a unanimous verdict, and we are unwilling to surrender the values of that mode of fact-finding, or to examine the constitutional implications of an attempt to do so, absent a clear mandate in the [Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] or a controlling statute. 11 18 In addition, two cases explicitly rejected the failure of proof theory that Jazzabi makes and upon which the district court relied. One of these, Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Spectramed, Inc., 12 dealt with the argument in a conclusory fashion. 13 The other, State v. Miyashiro, 14 has the most extensive discussion of the affirmative defense unanimity issue of all the cases we have located. 19 In Miyashiro, the jury sent the court a note asking if unanimity was required to establish the defendant's affirmative defense of entrapment. 15 The court sent a response to the jury that could have been read to indicate that lack of unanimity on entrapment disposed of the defense and cleared the way for a finding of guilt. 16 The jury returned a guilty verdict shortly thereafter. 17 The Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals considered the argument that liability is presumptively established before the jury reaches an affirmative defense and that anything less than unanimous juror acceptance of an affirmative defense is therefore a failure of proof, necessarily resulting in a verdict against the defendant. 18 20 The Miyashiro court rejected this argument and instead held that a defendant's guilt is the ultimate finding that a jury must make after determining whether the defendant has committed all the elements of the offense charged and considering any affirmative defenses raised.  19 The court reasoned that because jurors who accept the defendant's affirmative defense must vote to acquit, while those who reject it must vote to convict, a jury split over an affirmative defense necessarily results in a hung jury. 20 This is essentially the same argument that Allstate advances. 21 We find the reasoning of Miyashiro persuasive. Under the Miyashiro rationale, elements and affirmative defenses are co-equal components of the jury's liability determination: Liability cannot be established until after the jurors unanimously agree that the elements are satisfied and they unanimously reject the affirmative defenses. This approach comports well with the constitutional and statutory mandates that federal juries return unanimous verdicts in civil trials. 21 While it is true that these mandates do not mean that civil juries must reach unanimous agreement on all the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict[,] it is nonetheless safe to say that civil juries must render unanimous verdicts on the ultimate issues of a given case[,] not just the final verdict itself. 22 22 Affirmative defenses often present ultimate issues because, as in this case, they frequently determine whether the defendant will be liable. Accordingly, requiring civil juries to come to unanimous agreement regarding affirmative defenses — either unanimous agreement that the defendant has failed to prove the defense, or unanimous agreement that the defendant has proved the defense, but nothing else — is consistent with the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 48. 23 Under the approach that Jazzabi urges, however, a jury can return a unanimous verdict even when the jury is split on a liability-determinative affirmative defense. This rule defeats the intent and rationale underlying the mandate that jury verdicts be unanimous, because liability might attach even though the jury had not unanimously agreed that a basis for liability exists. Such a result would render the requirement of unanimity a hollow one. It would also provide a disincentive for thorough jury deliberations and could undermine confidence in jury verdicts. 23 24 Thus, requiring a civil jury to come to unanimous agreement one way or the other on an affirmative defense is more consistent with the requirement of overall jury unanimity than is Jazzabi's theory. Therefore, the better rule is to require a jury to unanimously reject an affirmative defense before the jury can conclude that the defendant is liable and go on to determine damages. 25 This rule makes particular sense in this case. Allstate relied exclusively on an affirmative defense. The ultimate issue in the case, and the question presented to the jury, was whether Jazzabi had started the fire. Because the overall jury verdict hinged exclusively on whether Jazzabi had started the fire, the jury could not logically be split in regard to the affirmative defense and still unanimously find Allstate liable. Accordingly, the district court's first supplemental instruction was correct. The court's second supplemental instruction was correspondingly incorrect. We therefore reverse the judgment for Jazzabi. 24 26