Opinion ID: 1952548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the mention of parole during voir dire should have required an immediate mistrial?

Text: Wilcher next contends that the possibility of parole was improperly mentioned during the voir dire. He bases this argument on the following interaction with the venire during the defense attorney's voir dire examination, in which a potential juror asked about the possibility of parole: [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do any of you have opinions right now, based on previous things that you have read, previous things that you have heard, or however you might have acquired that opinion that life imprisonment is just a not serious sentence? Does anybody have that opinion? Raise your hand if you do, please... . Q. You are number ... [16]. A. The question  are we talking life without parole or life? Q. Well, sir, the only sentence that can be returned would be life imprisonment or the death penalty. A. Yes, sir. That could mean parole? BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I don't know how to respond to that question. BY THE COURT: I am going to let you draw on your own experiences in interpreting whether life imprisonment means life to serve or life with or without parole. After the voir dire was concluded and the challenges for cause were heard, the defense moved for a mistrial. The motion was denied. Wilcher argues that the motion for a mistrial should have been granted. He contends that the jury pool was tainted because of the mention of parole. Under the sentencing statute in effect at that time, jurors were forbidden to consider the possibility of parole [3]  except in habitual offender cases (where a sentence of life imprisonment would automatically be without parole). Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1195-96 (Miss. 1996); Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 40-41 (Miss. 1990). The seminal case on this issue is Walter Williams, Jr. v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 812-14 (Miss. 1984). In Williams, this Court held that: A jury should have no concern with the quantum of punishment because it subverts a proper determination of the sentencing issue. Reference to the possibility of parole should the defendant not be sentenced to die are wholly out of place at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial for two additional reasons. First, such references inevitably have the effect of inviting the jury to second guess the Legislature. The Legislature has declared that persons sentenced to life imprisonment may under certain circumstances become eligible for parole. It is no more proper for the jury to concern itself with the wisdom of that legislative determination that it is for the jury to consider the Legislature's judgment that death in the gas chamber be an authorized punishment for capital murder. Second, parole is not automatic. No person sentenced to life imprisonment has any right to parole. Allowing argument or testimony regarding the possibility of the defendant some day being paroled is in effect inviting the jury to speculate how ten years in the future the parole board may exercise its legislatively granted discretionary authority. This would introduce into the sentencing proceedings an arbitrary factor proscribed by [Miss. Code Ann.] section 99-19-105(3)(a). Williams, 445 So.2d at 813 (citations omitted). See also Jessie Derrell Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 798 (Miss. 1987); Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 346 (Miss. 1985). Most of the cases dealing with this issue have arisen in the context of closing arguments, jury instructions, or witness's testimony. See, e.g., Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 553 (Miss. 1990); Jessie Derrell Williams v. State, 544 So.2d at 798; Walter Williams, Jr. v. State, 445 So.2d at 812-14. However, the case at hand involves the handling of questions from the venire during voir dire. This Court finds that the case sub judice is factually distinguishable from Williams and its progeny; for this reason, the analysis expressed in those cases will not be extended to apply to this factual situation. See Williams, 445 So.2d at 813; Griffin, 557 So.2d at 553; Jessie Derrell Williams, 544 So.2d at 798; Cabello, 471 So.2d at 346. The trial judge followed this Court's instructions to not speculate on parole. He did not tell the jurors that parole was a possibility. Moreover, at the close of the presentation of evidence, the trial judge properly instructed the jury regarding the options of life and death. The trial judge's actions in this case did not constitute reversible error; therefore, Wilcher's claim on this point is without merit.