Opinion ID: 508470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Armed Career Criminal Act

Text: 43 Prior to trial Baker moved to dismiss the armed career criminal charges as unconstitutional on equal protection, due process and disproportionality grounds, and as a violation of the separation of powers. The trial court denied the motion. 44
45 The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 amended 18 U.S.C.App. Sec. 1202(a)(1) to provide mandatory and enhanced penalties for a narrow category of persons, namely those having three previous convictions by any court ... for robbery or burglary, or both .... Baker challenges this classification on equal protection grounds, arguing that it irrationally targets three-time burglars and robbers as opposed to other three time felons who commit dangerous crimes. However, this court recently held that it was within Congress' power to make this distinction. United States v. Clawson, 831 F.2d 909, 915 (9th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 216-17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 69 (1987). 46
47 Baker argues that the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years violates the eighth amendment because it is disproportionate to the underlying crime. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) (mandatory life sentence without parole, for defendant convicted of seven nonviolent felonies held invalid). However, sentence enhancement for dangerous offenders or for firearms offenses has been held not to violate the eighth amendment. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986) (5-year minimum sentence for use of firearm upheld); United States v. Soto, 779 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir.1986) (sentence enhancement for special dangerous offenders upheld), amended, 793 F.2d 217 (1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 110, 98 L.Ed.2d 70 (1987). Moreover, a life sentence imposed upon a person convicted of three nonviolent felonies, has been upheld when that person was eligible for parole in twelve years. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). 48 The mandatory 15-year minimum sentence for dangerous felons in this case is more like the statute in Rummel than the one in Solem. Thus, we hold that the 15-year term does not violate the eighth amendment. 49
50 Finally, Baker argues that the mandatory minimum sentencing requirement is a legislative infringement of the judicial branch in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Baker's argument is based on broad statements about the separations of powers and checks and balances, see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986), and a tenuous analogy between mandatory minimum sentences and death penalty cases. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), quoting Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 61, 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) (observing that in death penalty cases, justice ... requires ... that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the offender). 51 The Supreme Court, however, simply has not applied the strict requirement for death penalty cases that the sentencing body retain discretion, to mandatory minimum prison sentences. Nor has the Court applied the broad principles of checks and balances to invalidate mandatory minimum prison sentences. Baker offers no compelling reasons to extend the reasoning in Bowsher or Eddings to mandatory minimum prison sentences. We decline to do so. 52 AFFIRMED.