Opinion ID: 2998787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mark Hague

Text: Finally, Thompson Distribution fired Mark Hague. In his deposition, Thompson explained several reasons for Mark Hague’s firing: Mark Hague (along with Brown) allowed a boiler that Thompson believed belonged to him to be returned to a vendor; he sold products to customers at a margin below that set by Thompson Distribution; and he believed that Hague had informed several suppliers that Thompson Distribution would pay for goods and services that they had supplied to Mutual. In response, Mark Hague, like the other plaintiffs, focuses not on whether Thompson honestly fired him for the proffered reasons, but rather on whether Thompson was right to fire him for those reasons. For instance, like Brown, Hague claims that the vendor owned the boilers, not Thompson Distribution. However, that does not address the question of whether Thompson honestly believed that he owned the boilers. Similarly, Mark Hague admits that he sold products below the margin Thompson set, but claims that was necessary because he would not be able to obtain any sales at a higher level. However, that was Thompson Distribution’s decision and not Hague’s call, and Hague cannot avoid summary judgment by challenging the wisdom of that choice. Hague finally claims that he did not tell suppliers that Thompson would pay for products Mutual had ordered. The record, however, shows that Thompson believed that to be the case, so at most, Hague has shown that Thompson was mistaken—not that he lied. Because Hague has not presented any evidence of pretext, Thompson Distribution is entitled to summary judgment on Mark Hague’s race discrimination claim. To this point, we have focused on the individual plaintiffs and their specific responses to Thompson Distribution’s proffered reasons for their firings. As detailed above, the 18 No. 05-1654 plaintiffs admit to their personal performance problems and rather than present any evidence showing that Thompson Distribution did not honestly believe the reasons asserted, they merely rationalize their deficiencies. In addition to minimizing their personal performance problems, the plaintiffs argue that without documentation confirming the reasons Thompson proffered in his deposition testimony, a jury trial is required because a jury could disbelieve Thompson. In support of their position, the plaintiffs cite Dunn v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 778, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2001), asserting that in Dunn, this court observed that an employer’s “inability to produce any documentary—rather than testimonial—evidence . . . is troubling.” The plaintiffs, however, misrepresent the holding in Dunn by taking this quotation out of context and by slicing off the end of the quote. In Dunn, the employer claimed that it had changed the plaintiff’s job title, not in retaliation for complaining about discrimination, but because it had changed the job titles of all of its midwest employees. In response to that assertion, this court noted: “Nordstrom’s apparent inability to produce any documentary—rather than testimo- nial—evidence relating to the alleged across-the-board demotion of midwest region internal loss prevention leads is troubling because one would expect a large corporation to document the decision to demote so many employees.” Id. (emphasis added) Conversely, with small businesses, one would not expect the owner to spend the time, or incur the 7 expense, to document individual employment decisions. 7 The added expense of defending employment decisions in court has an obvious impact on small business owners. In this (continued...) No. 05-1654 19 Moreover, in arguing that a lack of documentation supports a finding of pretext, the plaintiffs confuse Thompson Distribution’s burden with their own burden. An employer’s burden is a burden of production (not the burden of proof). Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 845 (7th Cir. 1996). This “burden is not difficult to satisfy.” Id. An employer need only “articulate[ ] lawful reasons for the action; that is, to satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. Tex. Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 257 (1981). Here, Thompson Distribution produced admissible evidence in the form of Thompson’s deposition testimony, and in that testimony, Thompson explained several lawful reasons justifying the firing of the five plaintiffs. This satisfied Thompson Distribution’s burden of production. See, e.g., Rand, 42 F.3d at 1145 (mere production of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason rebuts the presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie showing). At this point, the burden remains with the plaintiffs to present evidence of specific facts that call into question the veracity of Thompson Distribution’s proffered reasons. Rand, 42 F.3d at 1146. Merely asserting that a jury could disbelieve an employer’s reason is insufficient. Id. Likewise, complaining that Thompson Distribution did not document the performance problems does not create an inference of pretext. See Rand, 42 F.3d at 1145 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that his employer’s proffered reasons for his 7 (...continued) case, for instance, Thompson stated that as of June 2003, he had already incurred legal fees associated with this lawsuit which total nearly half of the profits he earned in 2002. 20 No. 05-1654 termination were pretextual because the employer never documented or communicated his performance problems). This is because in complaining about the lack of documentation, the plaintiffs are not really challenging the veracity of Thompson Distribution’s proffered reason, but are rather attempting to impermissibly increase Thompson Distribution’s burden from a burden of production to a burden of proof. This is impermissible. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256-57 (holding that “the employer’s burden is satisfied if he simply explains what he has done or produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons[,]” and reversing the appellate court’s decision which “required much more: it placed on the defendant the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above the plaintiff”) (internal citations omitted). Similarly, the plaintiffs’ complaints that Thompson Distribution failed to provide any written job descriptions and failed to conduct performance reviews, or provide them with information about their performance problems, also does not constitute evidence of pretext. Id. Again, as a small company, it is not surprising that Thompson Distribution did not conduct any formal performance reviews or provide written job descriptions. Such formalities are time-consuming and costly. In fact, Anna Perrey testified that she never received a performance review while working for Mutual. The record also indicates that Mutual lacked detailed job descriptions as well, as in taking over Mutual, Thompson Distribution asked the employees to fill out desk procedures for their jobs. Moreover, although Thompson Distribution did not conduct formal job reviews, the record shows that Thompson spoke to the plaintiffs on numerous occasions about their performance problems. Regardless, as noted above, the failure to communicate performance problems No. 05-1654 21 does not constitute evidence of pretext. Rand, 42 F.3d at 1145. The plaintiffs all also complain that at the time of their firing, Thompson did not tell them why they were being fired. That is not quite true. In firing the plaintiffs, Thompson told the plaintiffs either that they did not fit in the company or that the company would be moving forward 8 without their services. Although Thompson did not tell the plaintiffs the specific reasons they did not “fit,” the fact that Thompson did not elaborate does not constitute evidence of 9 pretext. The plaintiffs further attempt to avoid summary judgment by arguing that because Thompson Distribution did not follow the progressive disciplinary structure set forth in the 8 On appeal, Perrey also asserts that in firing her Thompson told her she had not done anything wrong and that that constitutes evidence that Thompson Distribution’s proffered reasons were pretextual. That is not quite the exchange that took place, at least according to Perrey’s deposition testimony. Perrey stated in her deposition that after Thompson fired her she asked “[d]id I do something wrong?” Perrey testified that Thompson responded, “No,” but that when she pressed him further, he explained: “No. You just don’t fit in with the future of Thompson Distribution.” That explanation is entirely consistent with the rationale Thompson provides for firing Perrey—that she was insubordinate and unwilling to recognize Thompson as the new leader. 9 Plaintiffs cite Wilson v. AM General Corp., 167 F.3d 1114, 1116, 1121 (7th Cir. 1999), for the proposition that failing to provide a reason for a termination constitutes evidence of pretext. Wilson, however, involved an employee fired after thirteen years of service, as opposed to a probationary employee. Moreover, unlike the plaintiffs in this case, Wilson had past exemplary performance evaluations. Thus, Wilson is distinguishable. 22 No. 05-1654 company handbook, Thompson Distribution’s reasons for firing them were pretextual. The handbook, while establishing a progressive disciplinary structure, also reserved for Thompson Distribution the right to fire employees (including those who were not probationary) immediately, providing: “The company may decide, in its discretion, that a first offense in a specific situation will result in discharge.” Because Thompson Distribution did not violate its own policies, this does not constitute evidence of pretext. Rand, 42 F.3d at 1145 (holding that since the employer’s policy did not obligate the employer to communicate problems, the failure to do so does not constitute evidence of pretext). Compare with Pryor v. Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, 212 F.3d 976, 980 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that where an employer’s progressive disciplinary policy precluded the plaintiff’s firing, that constituted evidence of pretext) 10 (emphasis added). As detailed above, the plaintiffs did not present any evidence that Thompson Distribution’s proffered reasons for their firing were pretextual. At oral argument, the 10 Thompson testified in his deposition that the progressive disciplinary mechanism did not apply to employees during the ninety-day trial period. The plaintiffs argue in response that the Handbook did not exclude probationary employees from the progressive disciplinary structure. However, the Handbook expressly provided that: “A 90-day trial period is provided for new employees to evaluate the opportunities of continued service with the company and, likewise, for the company to evaluate the new employee for continued service with the company.” It would not make sense to apply a progressive disciplinary structure during a 90-day trial period, but since the Handbook expressly provided for discharge for the first offense, whether the progressive disciplinary mechanism applied to probationary employees is immaterial. No. 05-1654 23 plaintiffs’ attorney made a last-ditch effort to avoid summary judgment by repeatedly stressing the racial composition of Thompson Distribution’s workforce. In fact, after “may it please the court,” the plaintiffs’ attorney’s next sentence was: “By admission of even the defendant this is a case of the only five caucasians working and employed at Thompson Distribution being fired simultaneously by an African-American business owner . . . .” We then asked: “You said they were the only five. There were fourteen employees, right.” The plaintiffs’ attorney responded, “exactly,” and this court continued: “And all the rest were black?” The plaintiffs’ attorney then stated: “That is my knowledge. And that has not been disputed in the record.” Later, in the oral argument, when the plaintiffs’ attorney continued to argue for a jury trial, this court again returned to the issue of the racial composition of the workforce, by asking whether the plaintiffs’ attorney’s position was that without documentation of a performance problem, a jury trial is required because of “[t]he fact that all of the white people were fired and replaced by black people.” The plaintiffs’ attorney responded: “Yes, that’s the fundamental 11 point.” However, this fundamental point is flawed both factually and legally. First, contrary to the plaintiffs’ attorney’s representation, the record, or at least those portions provided to this court, establishes that when Thompson Distribution began operations, in addition to the five white plaintiffs, Thompson Distribution also hired Mary Coleman and Bob McClellan, both of whom were white, as part of the 11 In concluding his argument, the appellants’ attorney once again stressed the need for a jury trial, where “you have five whites, the only whites employed at the time at Thompson Distribution, all replaced by African-Amercians, except one. . . .” 24 No. 05-1654 12 initial fourteen-person workforce. The record also shows that although Thompson never replaced Dubois with a salesperson dedicated to handling hydraulic sales, after firing Dubois, Thompson Distribution hired David Shank, who is white, to handle sales. The plaintiffs also ignore evidence showing that Thompson Distribution, which at the time of summary judgment only employed nine employees, had during its time of operations terminated at least six black employees. Thus, contrary to the plaintiffs’ portrayal, we do not have here a case of a black business owner firing only white employees and hiring only black replacements. Moreover, even if we had that case, legally that is insufficient to establish pretext. The plaintiffs must do more than merely point to race and proclaim: “Aha! Discrimination.” We stressed this point in Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 2002), wherein the plaintiffs attempted to create an inference of discrimination by pointing to “the fact that no blacks were hired during a two-year time frame . . . .” We held in Millbrook that, at best, such evidence was anecdotal, and that we “cannot find discrimination on such a thin basis.” Id. at 1177 (quoting Kuhn v. Ball State Univ., 78 F.3d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1996)). As we explained, if the plaintiffs rely on the racial composition of a workforce as evidence of discrimination it must “subject all of the employer’s decisions to statistical analysis to find out whether [race] makes a difference.” Id. (quoting Kuhn, 78 F.3d at 332.) Thus, like Millbrook, without knowing how many positions became available during the relevant time frame, the number and race of the candidates applying for those positions, and the candidates’ relative qualifications, “[s]uch a list is next to worthless.” Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1177. See 12 The record also shows that Thompson Distribution did not fire the plaintiffs simultaneously, but rather fired the Hagues on February 15, 2001, and the remaining plaintiffs one week later. No. 05-1654 25 also Odom v. Frank, 3 F.3d 839, 849 (5th Cir. 1993) (raw data of age, race, and location of persons promoted from 1980-1983, “without more, is not competent to prove anything”). Lacking such evidence here, the plaintiffs’ focus on the racial composition of the workforce is misplaced, both factually and legally.