Opinion ID: 1483018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Ratification, Waiver and Estoppel.

Text: It is asserted that appellants are now barred from asserting their remedies because they acquiesced in the agreement of July 15, 1931, for approximately five years. We are of the opinion that ratification and estoppel may not be invoked as a bar here. The acquiescence, consent or release from liability relied on by the fiduciary must have occurred when the cestui had full knowledge of the facts and of his rights before the cestui will be estopped from asserting his remedy against such fiduciary. 4 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, §§ 941, 942, 943; 1 Restatement of the Law, Trusts, §§ 216, 217, 218; 2 Perry on Trusts and Trustees (7th Ed.) §§ 849, 850, 851; 65 C.J. 663, § 527. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461. Here, the evidence is clear that appellants had no knowledge of their rights, until March 28, 1936, a time subsequent to all the acts relied on as acquiescence and waiver. At no time did Hanson or Bean advise appellants that their dealing with the trust estate was a violation of their duties as fiduciaries, and what their rights were. Under these circumstances we think appellants are not estopped, by acquiescence and waiver, from asserting their rights. Hanson and Bean have pleaded laches as a defense. Appellants make no contention that 1 Ida.Code, Ann., 1932, § 15-742, exclusively controls the time limitation, and we express no opinion in that respect. As stated in 1 Restatement of the Law, Trusts, § 219, many factors are to be considered in determining whether or not the defense of laches should be sustained. This suit was brought about five years after commission of the breach of trust, and about five months after knowledge was acquired by appellants of their rights in that respect. Appellants were aged and had practically no business experience. Since the product of the stock in the Arizona company is to be seized and an accounting of the profits made from the dealings in the product is to be made, the doctrine of change of position has little bearing here. We think it would not be inequitable to permit pursuit of their remedies by appellants. Compare: Diamond v. Connolly, 9 Cir., 251 F. 234; Olympia Mining & Milling Co. v. Kerns, 24 Idaho 481, 135 P. 255.