Opinion ID: 2976627
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: tipton was engaged in protected activity

Text: The first issue for review, then, is whether Tipton was engaged in protected activity when he raised concerns about his excessive work hours and sought to confirm management’s authorization for working those hours. The Court reviews the DOL’s legal decision that the ERA protected Tipton’s activity de novo; however, the question of whether Tipton actually engaged in such activity is fact-based, and thus governed by the substantial evidence standard. To constitute protected activity under the ERA, “an employee’s acts must implicate safety definitively and specifically.” American Nuclear Resources., Inc. v. U.S. Department of Labor, 134 F.3d 1292, 1295 (6th Cir. 1998). I&M argues that Tipton never raised any question about his ability to safely perform his job, but rather only complained about I&M’s failure to complete ministerial paperwork. 9 However, the NRC’s Generic Letter ties excessive work hours to the potential for fatigue, which directly impacts the safety of the nuclear reactor. The express purpose of the work hour limitations contained in Generic Letter 82-12 is “to prevent situations where fatigue could reduce the ability of operating personnel to keep the reactor in a safe condition.” Generic Letter 82-12 specifically provides that normally operating personnel should work an 8-hour day and a 40-hour week while the plant is operating. It permits overtime only when “unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance or major plant modifications, on a temporary basis. . . .” Any deviation from the work hour limitations should be permitted only for “very unusual circumstances,” and any “deviation shall be authorized by the plant manager or his deputy, or higher levels of management.” Deviations must then be documented and available for NRC review to enable the NRC to monitor whether plants are abusing the work hour limitations. The burden of addressing fitness for duty at nuclear plants rests on the NRC licensees, not the employees. See 10 C.F.R. § 26. Moreover, the Generic Letter 82-12 places the burden of compliance on the plant, not the employee, by stating that “[a]n individual should not be permitted to work more . . . than 72 hours in any seven day period. . . .” Because the work hour limitations are in place specifically to prevent fatigued workers from impacting the safety of the nuclear reactor, an employee’s complaints that his work hours exceed the work hour limitations and his requests for the written authorization for deviation from the work hour limitations certainly impact nuclear safety and thus constitute activity protected by the ERA. In this case, Tipton notified Brouwer over the telephone on the morning of September 26 that he was over his work hours; nevertheless, Brouwer indicated to Tipton that he was required to report 10 to work that day. Tipton reasonably assumed that the appropriate authorization for deviation from the work hour limitations would be completed by plant management. Once at the plant, Tipton again expressed concern about his hours to Brouwer, who passed these concerns along to Stark. Although Stark’s hearing testimony and deposition testimony were inconsistent as to when he learned that Tipton was over on his hours, the ALJ concluded that Stark was aware that Tipton had exceeded the work hour limitations at the 9:00 a.m. meeting. Nevertheless, Stark refused to sign the authorization presented to him by Brouwer, and discouraged Brouwer from pursuing the issue up the chain of command. Stark was, however, aware that Tipton had been assigned additional job duties on that day. Tipton again complained to Stark and other management at the plant before leaving late in the day on September 26 that he had worked excessive hours and that a written authorization was required. Based on Tipton’s repeated efforts to notify plant management that he was over his hours and his multiple requests to obtain written authorization for exceeding the work hours limitations, substantial evidence supports the DOL’s conclusion that Tipton was engaged in protected activity. D. TIPTON’S PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITY PROTECTED BY THE ERA WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN I&M’S TERMINATION OF HIS EMPLOYMENT Once Tipton establishes that he was engaged in protected activity, he must also prove that I&M knew he engaged in protected activity, and that the protected activity was a contributing factor to the “unfavorable personnel action.” 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(C); Bartlik v. U.S. Department of Labor, 73 F.3d 100, 103, n.6. (6th Cir. 1996). There is no dispute that I&M was aware of Tipton’s expressed concerns relating to exceeding the work hour limitations or that Tipton’s suspension and termination amounted to an “unfavorable personnel action.” While there is no direct evidence of 11 retaliatory intent on behalf of I&M, the DOL may rely on circumstantial evidence to infer improper motive. Blalock v. Metals Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 707 (6th Cir. 1985). A review of the record reveals substantial circumstantial evidence to support a finding that I&M was motivated in part by Tipton’s protected activity to suspend and terminate his employment. First, the ALJ relied on I&M’s hostility for the NRC work hour limitations as revealed by management’s economic decision to work until the ESW Flow Balance Test was complete in order to restart the plant as soon as possible without regard to the excessive hours worked by the test engineers. Stark’s refusal to sign the work hours deviation form and the fact that he discouraged Brouwer from pursuing the issue up the chain of command further reveals this hostility, as does the fact that I&M falsified a Condition Report filed on September 28, 2001, indicating that Tipton had been sent home early on September 25, 2001 in an effort to feign compliance with the work hour limitations when in fact he was at work on September 25 and 26, 2001. Second, the ALJ relied on the mindset of the Cook plant management, notably the pressure to get the plant running as expeditiously as possible notwithstanding the work hour limitations, as further circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent. Third, the ALJ inferred a retaliatory intent on the part of I&M based on the fact that Tipton’s suspension and termination so closely followed his protected activity. Fourth, the ALJ inferred circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent based on his determination that I&M’s proffered reasons for Tipton’s termination were false. Although I&M asserts that it fired Tipton for lying during the fact finding investigation and for his past performance problems, the ALJ considered the testimony of Turcotte, Brouwer, and Chacon and determined that there was no evidence that Tipton lied during the investigation or failed to adhere to the direction 12 of management with regard to the TDB. Moreover, the ALJ found that although Tipton has received four written warnings, two suspensions, and a substandard performance appraisal during his twentythree month employment at I&M, there was no evidence that he exhibited any unfavorable conduct that would warrant his termination during the period since his last unfavorable action. Thus, the ALJ determined that I&M failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Tipton’s past performance problems led to the decision to terminate him in spite of his protected activities. Based on I&M’s contrived reasons for terminating Tipton, the ALJ determined that this circumstantial evidence supports an inference of discriminatory intent. Fifth, the ALJ considered the disparate treatment afforded Turcotte, Brouwer, Chacon and Tipton regarding the events of September 26, 2001. Specifically, the ALJ determined that although Turcotte engaged in the same alleged instances of misconduct as Tipton, Tucotte was not disciplined. Also, even though Brouwer played a larger role in regard to the TBD than Tipton, Brouwer was not suspended during the fact finding investigation. Nor was Chacon disciplined, sanctioned, or even suspended despite the fact that his TDB draft contained errors and resulted in the delay. Instead, from the beginning of the fact finding investigation, the ALJ found that the investigation centered only on Tipton despite the fact that the TDB listed Turcotte as the initiator and Brouwer as the approver. Lastly, in inferring discriminatory intent on the part of I&M, the ALJ considered the fact that I&M failed to follow its own progressive disciplinary policy as indicative of an unlawful motive. The ARB concurred with the ALJ’s conclusion that I&M violated the ERA by suspending and terminating Tipton, relying specifically on the fact that I&M’s adverse action closely followed Tipton’s protected activity and the fact that I&M’s proffered reasons for firing Tipton were unsubstantiated. Thus, the ARB concluded that Tipton’s protected activity was a contributing factor 13 to the unfavorable personnel action, and that I&M failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of such protected activity. The record certainly contains more than substantial evidence to support the DOL’s finding that I&M violated the whistleblower provisions of the ERA by suspending and terminating Tipton. E. THE DOL DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO MITIGATE I&M’S DAMAGES BASED ON THE ASSERTION THAT TIPTON’S EMPLOYMENT WOULD HAVE BEEN TERMINATED BASED UPON THE DISCOVERY OF “AFTER-ACQUIRED” EVIDENCE In an effort to mitigate its damages, I&M argues that Tipton would have been terminated in March 2002 after discovery of personal or objectionable e-mails in his mailbox. Based on the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 513 U.S. 352 (1995), this post hoc evidence of alternative grounds for termination is irrelevant to the determination of whether I&M legitimately terminated Tipton; however, it may be relevant to the issue of damages. The burden is on I&M to “establish that the wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had know of it at the time of the discharge.” Id. at 362-63. In light of the fact that the evidence revealed that other employees at the Cook plant received and/or forwarded the same or similar e-mails, yet were not sanctioned or disciplined, I&M’s assertion is tantamount to an acknowledgment that Tipton would have been treated differently than other employees. Thus, I&M cannot establish that it would have terminated Tipton’s employment upon the discovery of the prohibited emails. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the DOL’s refusal to use this alleged post hoc evidence to mitigate I&M’s damages. F. THE DOL ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT USED THE “TOTAL OFFSET” METHOD TO CALCULATE THE AMOUNT OF FRONT 14 PAY DUE TO TIPTON In his RD & O, the ALJ initially awarded Tipton front pay in the amount of $81,967 plus the 3% [projected salary] increase “in accordance with Complainant’s Exhibit 15 outlining his damages. However, Tipton’s Exhibit 15 calculates front pay to be $91,038, based on a projected 3% increase in salary for a period of 2 years. Thereafter, on July 2, 2004, the ALJ issued an Erratum and Recommended Order (“E&RO”), effective immediately, which awarded front pay to Tipton in the amount of $91,038, consistent with Tipton’s Exhibit 15. On September 29, 2006, the ARB issued its FD& O affirming all of the ALJ’s RD&O and E&RO, with the exception of the replacement insurance expenses which the ARB determined amounted to a double recovery. I&M subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the ARB should have discounted the ALJ’s front pay award to present value. On reconsideration, however, the ARB noted that “neither party offered any evidence or testimony before the ALJ in support of an appropriate discount rate to be applied in this case. I&M never raised the issue of discounting the front pay award before the ALJ, and Tipton only alluded to it in his post-hearing brief.” Furthermore, with respect to the parties’ briefs to the ARB, the ARB noted that “the parties have offered the Board very little guidance for calculating an appropriate front pay award.” As a result, the ARB adopted the total offset approach, whereby courts refrain from calculating future salary increases into the front pay award, thereby obviating the need to discount the award to present value. See Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the use of the total offset approach in Jackson v. City of Cookeville, 31 F.3d 1354, 1361 (6th Cir. 1994), where “the rule resulted in a reasonable damage calculation.” Applying the total offset approach in this matter, the ARB multiplied Tipton’s I&M salary 15 of $95,000, before the addition of annual increases and bonuses, by three to yield a three year projected salary of $285,000. Then the ARB added fringe benefits of $94,050 (33% of salary) and bonus pay of $28,500 (10% of base pay), to determine that Tipton’s total earnings at I&M would have been $407,550. The ARB then applied the total offset approach to Tipton’s earnings at his subsequent employment for three years, resulting in total earnings of $343,200. The difference in what Tipton would have earned at the Cook plant ($407,550) and what Tipton actually earned ($343,200) - $64,350 - equals the amount of front pay the ARB awarded to Tipton. This Court reviews the DOL’s calculation of damages under the abuse of discretion standard. Killian v. Yorozu Automotive Tennessee, Inc., 454 F.3d 549, 557 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. City of Warren, Mich., 138 F.3d 1083, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998). While the Sixth Circuit has not mandated application of the total offset approach with respect to front pay, it did find that this approach is appropriate when it provides a “reasonable approximation” of front pay. See Jackson, 31 F.3d at 1361. In this case, where the parties disagreed over the proper discount rate and provided very little guidance to the ALJ and ARB on this issue, the DOL acted within its discretion in applying the total offset approach to Tipton’s front pay.