Opinion ID: 848572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Batson to the Facts in this Case

Text: In Michigan, the right to exercise a per-emptory challenge is provided by court rule and statute. According to MCR 6.412(E)(1), a defendant is entitled to five peremptory challenges unless an offense charged is punishable by life imprisonment, in which case a defendant being tried alone is entitled to twelve peremptory challenges. Further, under M.C.L. § 768.13, [a]ny person who is put on trial for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for life, shall be allowed to challenge peremptorily twenty of the persons drawn to serve as jurors, and no more. . . . [5] The trial court followed the court rule, which entitled defendant to twelve peremptory challenges because he was on trial for an offense punishable by life imprisonment. Defendant claims that the trial court violated his right to two of the peremptory challenges by failing to follow the three-step procedure mandated in Batson in disallowing the challenges. Applying the above rules to the facts in this case, we conclude that no such error occurred. [6]
Here, defense counsel had already exercised several peremptory challenges and was attempting to challenge juror ten when the trial court interrupted and requested that counsel for both parties proceed to chambers. While in chambers, the trial court stated that it was going to disallow the challenge because defense counsel had based his challenges on the race of the juror. The trial court reached this conclusion because defense counsel had established a pattern of excusing Caucasian males. [7] After defense counsel's peremptory challenge of juror five, the prosecution objected, reasoning that juror five was Caucasian and the two previous challenges by defense counsel were of Caucasian males. The trial court agreed and disallowed the challenge. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by raising Batson sua sponte to question defense counsel's reasons for peremptorily challenging juror number ten. Defendant further maintained that neither the trial court nor the prosecution established a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race for either challenge. The Court of Appeals held that a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte, noting that virtually all state courts have concluded that a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that because the record did not reveal the racial identities of the prospective jurors, it could not determine whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been established. We have not previously addressed the question whether a trial court may raise a Batson issue sua sponte. The rationale underlying Batson and its progeny, however, supports the Court of Appeals position that the trial court may make an inquiry sua sponte after observing a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges. Batson and its progeny [8] make clear that a trial court has the authority to raise sua sponte such an issue to ensure the equal protection rights of individual jurors. See Batson, supra at 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (In view of the heterogeneous population of our Nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49-50, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), quoting State v. Alvarado, 221 N.J.Super. 324, 328, 534 A.2d 440 (1987) (`Be it at the hands of the State or the defense,' if a court allows jurors to be excluded because of group bias, `[it] is [a] willing participant in a scheme that could only undermine the very foundation of our system of justiceour citizens' confidence in it.'). The United States Supreme Court, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), held that a criminal defendant has standing to object to a prosecutor's peremptory challenges. It reasoned: The barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting. Potential jurors are not parties to the jury selection process and have no opportunity to be heard at the time of their exclusion. Nor can excluded jurors easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief when discrimination occurs through an individual prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. Unlike a challenge to systematic practices of the jury clerk and commissioners such as we considered in Carter [ v Jury Comm. of Greene Co., 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970)], it would be difficult for an individual juror to show a likelihood that discrimination against him at the voir dire stage will recur. And, there exist considerable practical barriers to suit by the excluded juror because of the small financial stake involved and the economic burdens of litigation. The reality is that a juror dismissed because of race probably will leave the courtroom possessing little incentive to set in motion the arduous process needed to vindicate his own rights. [ Id. at 414-415, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citations omitted).] The Powers Court further stated: The statutory prohibition on discrimination in the selection of jurors, enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's Enabling Clause, makes race neutrality in jury selection a visible, and inevitable, measure of the judicial system's own commitment to the commands of the Constitution. The courts are under an affirmative duty to enforce the strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in that prohibition. [ Id. at 416, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (citation omitted).] The Supreme Court's rationale for allowing a defendant to raise a Batson issue supports our conclusion that a trial court may sua sponte raise a Batson issue. Trial courts are in the best position to enforce the statutory and constitutional policies prohibiting racial discrimination. Further, wrongly excluded jurors have little incentive to vindicate their own rights. We thus conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that a trial court may sua sponte raise a Batson issue. We reject the Court of Appeals assertion that it could not establish whether a prima facie case of discrimination had been made regarding the challenges because of the inadequacy of the record. It is undisputed that defendant is an African-American male. While the challenged jurors were not of defendant's racial group, it is equally harmful to challenge only members outside a defendant's racial group. Powers, supra at 415-416, 111 S.Ct. 1364. The trial court specifically stated that it was disallowing the challenges because defense counsel, for the better part of the day, had only excused Caucasian male jurors. [9] Defense counsel did not dispute that he had only excused Caucasian males. Instead, he pointed to the racial make-up of the remaining jurors to justify his challenges. The trial court rejected defense counsel's challenge of juror ten because defense counsel had exercised seven of nine peremptory challenges against Caucasian males. The prosecution objected to defense counsel's challenge of juror five because defense counsel consecutively excused three Caucasian male jurors. In both instances, defense counsel's challenges created a pattern of strikes against Caucasian males. This pattern was sufficient to raise an inference that defense counsel was indeed excluding potential jurors on the basis of their race. See Batson, supra at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (a pattern of strikes against jurors of a specific race may give rise to an inference of discrimination). We thus conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to find a prima facie showing of discrimination based on race.
Once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the challenger to provide a neutral explanation for the challenge. Upon the trial court's finding that defense counsel's challenge of juror ten was based on race, defense counsel requested an opportunity to make a record. The trial court initially denied defense counsel's request, but reconsidered upon defense counsel's objection. Defense counsel stated: I would bring to the Court's attention that the number of white males on that panel still exceeds the number of the minorities on that panel. Why don't you talk about the whole racial composition of that panel? There's still a vast majority of white members on that panel than it is [sic] black members on that panel. The trial court responded by stating that defense counsel's reason supported its prima facie finding that counsel had exercised the challenge on the basis of race and upheld its disallowance of the challenge. After the prosecutor objected to defense counsel's peremptory challenge of juror five, the trial court disallowed the challenge for the same reasons as asserted before. Defense counsel objected and attempted to make a record, but the trial court interrupted him. The trial court then allowed defense counsel to make a record, but only after the prosecutor asked to approach the bench. The prosecutor stated that defense counsel's three previous peremptory challenges, including juror five, were of Caucasian males. Defense counsel responded by giving race-neutral reasons for two of the challenges. The trial court noted that it was only concerned with defense counsel's reasons for challenging juror five. Defense counsel replied: Judge, again, if there were no other white males on that jury, or white males were a minority on that jury, then there may be some persuasive force to [the assistant prosecutor's] argument about a Battson [sic] challenge. That simply is not the case. The demographics of that jury do not hold up to that kind of a challenge. And I think I don't have to have a reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Defense counsel gave no other reason for his challenge. The trial court stated that peremptory challenges could not be based on race and found that defense counsel's peremptory challenge of juror five had been based on gender and race. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if a prima facie case had been established, the trial court failed to comply with steps two and three of the Batson process. It found that the trial court erred by denying defense counsel the opportunity to make a record before disallowing the per-emptory challenge of juror ten. It further found that the trial court failed to inquire whether defense counsel had a race-neutral reason for striking juror five. We agree that the trial court initially erred in denying defense counsel the opportunity to provide race-neutral reasons for his challenges. We conclude, however, that these errors were cured when the trial court, almost immediately after each challenge, permitted defense counsel to make a record. It then based its ultimate conclusion to disallow the challenges on defendant's race-conscious reasons. Because the trial court did perform the steps required by Batson, albeit somewhat belatedly, it did not improperly deny defendant the right to exercise two of his statutorily prescribed peremptory challenges. We reject the claim that the trial court failed to inquire whether defense counsel had a race-neutral reason for striking juror five because the record shows otherwise. Defense counsel provided only one reason for his challenges, which was not race-neutral and did not refute the prima facie showing that his challenges were based on race. Just as a challenger may not exclude a prospective juror on the basis of race, it is equally improper for a challenger to engineer the composition of a jury to reflect the race of the defendant. Finally, defendant claims on appeal that his responses were not given as race-neutral reasons for his challenges, but, rather, as attempts to disprove the trial court's and the prosecution's prima facie showings of racial discrimination. We are not persuaded by this argument. Defense counsel never contended that the trial court and the prosecution had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination. If he was merely attempting to disprove the prima facie showings, defense counsel would not have stopped there, but would have also provided race-neutral reasons for the challenges in the event that the trial court refused to accept his argument. Additionally, the record indicates that defense counsel understood that he was to provide race-neutral reasons. The prosecution objected to the challenge of juror five because defense counsel's three previous peremptory challenges, including juror five, were of Caucasian males. Defense counsel then furnished race-neutral reasons for two of the challenges. But with respect to juror five, defense counsel merely stated that the prosecution's argument failed because Caucasian males still remained on the jury. Defendant clearly demonstrated his understanding and ability to provide race-neutral reasons when needed. In juror five's case, he failed to do so. [10] While defense counsel may not have effectively used his opportunity to provide race-neutral reasons for his challenges, he had the opportunity. Defendant cannot complain now that the opportunity was insufficient.
Finally, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the challenge has carried the burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. This decision may hinge on the credibility of the challenger's race-neutral explanations, but only if the challenger provided race-neutral explanations. Here, defense counsel provided race-conscious, rather than race-neutral, reasons for his challenges. This reinforces the prima facie showings that the challenges were based on race. Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err in finding purposeful discrimination.