Opinion ID: 1835072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the cross-appeal: oral contingency fee contract

Text: We begin with an analysis of whether a contingency fee contract in this case was unreasonable. David had a $20,000 life insurance policy in effect with Allstate Insurance Company, with Lois the beneficiary. It had an absolute exclusion for: 1. Suicide while sane or self destruction while insane, or any attempt at either. Lois was aware of this exclusion in the policy. It is also clear that Lois indeed believed David had committed suicide. The Oxford police department investigated David's death, and the report recited: Mrs. Smith told officer victim under care of Dr. Cooper for prior heart attack and Alzheimer disease. She said he had been hurting badly and that is why he did it to relieve the pain and suffering. With this claim of doubtful liability, there was nothing at all unusual or unfair for Lois or Lowrey to reach an agreement which was a gamble to Lowrey. If he recovered nothing, he received nothing. And, it would be difficult to conceive of a poorer witness in denying suicide than his client Lois. Indeed, Lois might very well have been unwilling to pursue the claim if she was going to have to spend money in attorney's fees. Lowrey's serious problem arises from not seeing that the contract was reduced to writing. He certainly should have done so. Factors which the chancellor undoubtedly considered, however, were: 1. Lowrey was in Oxford and away from his office when Lois and he reached this agreement. 2. Lois was not only a client but a close personal friend, and he undoubtedly did not expect her to die. It was Lowrey who ran the risk in not reducing the contract to writing. Following some substantial recovery, there can be a temptation to a client to deny the contract. It showed his confidence in Lois in not reducing the contract to writing and seeing that she signed it. 3. Lowrey at the first opportunity informed the heirs of the insurance policy and his agreement with Lois. 4. While it is no doubt correct that at a flat, hourly rate, Lowrey did not put in $6,666 worth of time, he did have to put in time investigating David's death, securing and examining the death certificate, the police reports, conferring with representatives of Allstate, doing legal research, and otherwise pursuing this claim. Rule 1.5(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) states in pertinent part: (c) A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Aside from this Rule, an attorney attempting to claim a fee under an oral contingency fee contract has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he fully disclosed all of the terms of the agreement to his client, that it was fair and reasonable, and above all was made in good faith. Fitzpatrick, et al. v. Kellner, 187 Miss. 843, 193 So. 911 (1940); Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Johnson, 390 So.2d 103 (Fla.App. 1980); Kirby v. Liska, 214 Neb. 356, 334 N.W.2d 179 (1983). The chancellor obviously found Lowrey had met this burden in approving the claim of $6,666 under the contract. We certainly cannot find that he was manifestly in error. While we would ordinarily be inclined to find that even where an attorney met these case law requirements, he was nevertheless obligated under Rule 1.5(c) of RPC to reduce it to writing, under the unusual facts of this case we believe it would be unduly harsh to deny Lowrey recovery under the agreement between Lois and him, and the chancellor was not manifestly wrong in approving it. AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, PITTMAN and BLASS, JJ., concur.