Opinion ID: 2240772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Employment Analysis

Text: While what constitutes reasonable employment is often a question of fact, at the outer perimeters, the question is one of law. Board of Trustees of the Public Employees' Retirement Fund v. Miller, 519 N.E.2d at 733. In this case, there is no serious factual dispute. [20] The parties stipulated to the fact that, on September 3, 1991, plaintiff injured her lower back in an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment at the Center. Moreover, there is no dispute in the record on the following points: that she underwent surgery and suffered a significant permanent partial impairment of her back as a result; that she is unable to return to work in her previous position; that she is unable to do manual labor that requires lifting more than ten pounds; that her previous positions have all involved manual labor; that she is uneducated; that, because of her chronic pain, she cannot sit or stand for significant periods of time and must lie down off and on throughout the day to relieve the pain; that she is capable of neither full-time nor half-time work; that the seamstress position offered to plaintiff under the State's partial disability program is for four hours per day three days per week and is a position highly accommodated to her needs; that the position is temporary and would not be available for more than approximately four years; and that it would be extremely difficult for someone with plaintiff's limitations to find similar work in the general competitive labor market. In light of these undisputed facts, the question before the Court is one of law, and we conclude, as a matter of law, that plaintiff has met her burden of establishing that, in light of her impairment, her age, her prior experience, and her lack of education, there are no general kinds of employment that would be suitable for her, and that it likely would be futile for her to seek employment in the general competitive labor market. Although the State did put forth evidence that it had offered her a position as a seamstress, that position cannot constitute reasonable employment for at least two reasons, either of which, standing alone, is sufficient to demonstrate that the offered employment is not reasonable employment as a matter of law. First, the temporary nature of the employment is in itself sufficient reason to conclude that it cannot constitute reasonable employment such that it defeats a claim of total permanent disability. If the post-injury employment lacks permanence and if it can fairly be said that, should the claimant lose that job, the claimant would have a hard time getting new work of a regular and continuous nature, a finding of total permanent disability is in order. See generally Larson, § 57.35, at 10-247 to -251, § 57.51(c), at 10-331 to -336. [21] Here, it is not disputed that the work offered plaintiff was temporary, and, in fact, because it was offered under the State's partial disability program, its duration is limited by regulation. See Ind.Admin.Code tit. 31, 3-1-12(a) (1996) (stating that long term disability benefit payments are limited to a maximum of four (4) years). Second, work that is highly accommodated [22] to suit the needs and disabilities of a particular claimant cannot defeat a claim of total permanent disability where it is clear that the claimant could not find similar work under normally prevailing market conditions. Wages paid an injured employee out of sympathy, or in consideration of his long service with the employer do not reflect his actual earning capacity under normal market conditions and are to be discounted for the purposes of determining permanent disability. See Larson, § 57.34, at 10-239. The same is true if the injured man's friends help him to hold his job by doing much of his work for him, or if he manages to continue only by delegating his more onerous tasks to a helper, or if the work for which claimant is paid is `made work' or `sheltered work.' Id. § 57.34, at 10-239 to -245. Similarly, an employer cannot avoid deliberately its duty to pay worker's compensation benefits simply by offering the employee work that is so highly accommodated to the employee's needs that it would not ordinarily be available under normally prevailing market conditions. See Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 342 S.E.2d 798, 806 (1986). Here, there is no question that the offered position was highly accommodated. Ralph Hunter, the State's personnel officer, essentially testified that he would design the position around plaintiff's special needs, that they would permit her to work four hours a day three days per week, and that they would even provide her with a cot to lie down on as needed, and Thomas Roundtree, the State's vocational expert, agreed that the offered position was highly accommodated to plaintiff's needs. (R. at 437.) Moreover, plaintiff's vocational expert Archie Sanders testified that there were no categories of employment that plaintiff could perform on a full-time or half-time basis, and that there was no kind of job in the economy that he would recommend that she try. The State did not present contrary evidence. In fact, the functional capacity evaluation which it introduced stated in essence that, while in theory she could perform some sedentary work, in reality, locating gainful employment with the limitations she demonstrated... would be very difficult. (R. at 275-76.) Thus, if we accept the Board's conclusion that plaintiff could perform the offered seamstress position four hours per day three days per week, as we do in this opinion, it is clear that, once the position ended as it certainly would given that it was temporary by design, it would be very difficult if not impossible for plaintiff to find other suitable work in the general competitive labor market. Even putting aside Sanders' testimony and the State's functional evaluation report, it is hard to imagine another position where a person with significant back problems, limited education, and experienced only in manual labor, would be hired to work only four hours per day three days per week and then be permitted to take breaks and lie down on a couch whenever her back bothered her and to meet no performance standards. [23] Thus, because the offered employment was temporary and so highly accommodated to plaintiff's needs that, once the position would end, plaintiff would not likely be able to find other suitable employment in the general competitive labor market, the offered position is not reasonable employment and cannot defeat her claim for total permanent disability benefits. We are constrained to make one final observation. While we applaud the State's effort to accommodate the disabled and to place those capable of working in accommodated positions under the State's partial disability program, the State cannot use this program to defeat an otherwise valid claim for total permanent disability under the worker's compensation laws. The worker's compensation scheme reflects a compromise struck by employers and injured workers. An employer is obligated to provide limited compensation to workers whose injuries and illnesses arise out of and in the course of their employment, regardless of fault, see Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427, and workers who were previously precluded from recovery under common law theories are thus guaranteed compensation. In exchange, an injured worker relinquishes the right to sue his employer for negligence, and an employer's liability is thereby reduced. Id. Stated another way, the worker's compensation scheme becomes the worker's exclusive remedy. Ind.Code § 22-3-2-6 (1993). The scheme is designed to shift the economic burden for employment related injuries from the employee to the employer and consumers of its products. Collins v. Day, 604 N.E.2d 647, 648 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind.1994). See also Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427. [24] In light of the exclusive nature of the worker's compensation remedy and the humanitarian purpose of the statutory scheme, it is particularly important that, as stated above, we construe the statute liberally in favor of the employee to effectuate its humanitarian purposes. Id. The State does not assert that its partial disability program is a substitute for the worker's compensation scheme, and certainly nothing in Ind.Code § 5-10-8-7 (1993 & Supp.1997), the asserted statutory basis for the State's program, see supra note 7, can be read to limit an employee's entitlement to worker's compensation benefits if the statutory prerequisites have been met. In fact, the only mention of the worker's compensation benefits in § 5-10-8-7 is the subsection which provides that an employee's state disability benefits may be reduced, dollar for dollar if the employee derives income from one of several enumerated sources, including social security and worker's compensation. See Ind.Code § 5-10-8-7(d)(6)(A), (E); Ind.Admin.Code tit. 31, 3-1-22(a)(1), (6) (1996). Thus, while the State may, under the terms of the statute, reduce its award of disability benefits should an employee participate in its program while receiving worker's compensation benefits, it may not, by offering an injured employee under its partial disability program a temporary and highly accommodated position of the sort that would be difficult if not impossible to find in the general competitive labor market, preclude that employee from receiving total permanent disability benefits to which the employee would otherwise be entitled under the worker's compensation scheme.