Opinion ID: 372907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the necessity for a preliminary decision

Text: 13 Initially a question of procedure is raised concerning the Commission's decision. The rate proceeding was exceptionally drawn out, commencing in June of 1965, 6 postponed 7 and then resumed 8 in 1971, suspended again in 1974, 9 and taken up again for the last time in September of 1974. 10 The 1965 order required that the hearing examiner bypass an initial decision, certifying the record directly to the Commission, but it did provide that the Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau should prepare and issue a recommended decision. (J.A. 124; 38 FCC 1286, 1296). The 1971 resumption order reversed the procedure ordered in 1965: the hearing examiner was to prepare an initial decision but the Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau was not. (J.A. 129-130; 27 FCC2d 930-931). The final order modifying the procedure occurred in 1974. The Commission had interrupted the proceedings earlier that year in the hopes of accommodating a negotiated settlement. (J.A. 135, 45 FCC2d 286). When that did not materialize, it was considered crucial, in order to avoid adding to the already extensive delay, that all intermediate opinions be omitted, and the Commission so ordered. The hearing before the administrative law judge was ordered resumed, and a timetable for finishing imposed: 14 We believe that it is reasonable to require that cross-examination herein be resumed no later than the first week in September, 1974 and that all remaining testimony be completed and the record closed within approximately 3 months thereafter, i. e. no later than December 1, 1974. In this connection, perhaps it is unnecessary to call attention to the powers entrusted to the presiding judge to require, among other things, that testimony be submitted in writing and that cross-examination be limited to that required for a full and true disclosure of facts. 5 U.S.C. 556(d). Upon the closing of the record we shall require the judge to certify the record to the Commission for final decision by it. In our opinion this is required under the circumstances of this case for due and timely execution of our functions. Finally, we believe that all proposed findings and briefs and replies should be submitted by no later than February 1, 1975, thereby permitting the Commission sufficient time to have such oral argument as it may deem necessary or desirable and to render its final decision by April 1, 1975. The Commission requests all parties to cooperate fully in adhering to the schedule we have set forth herein. 15 (J.A. 138-139; 48 FCC2d 86, 87-88). 16 COMSAT challenges this procedure bypassing an initial decision by the administrative law judge. The Communications Act and the Administrative Procedure Act are both cited by COMSAT as requiring that the administrative law judge conducting the hearing is obliged to file an initial, tentative, or recommended decision, unless the Commission finds on the record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably require that the record be certified to the Commission without initial decision. 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)(2) (1970). 17 At the start, it should be noted that COMSAT was afforded a full adversary hearing, with the right of cross-examination as described in the Commission's order quoted above. What COMSAT did not obtain was the right to object to specific recommendations that might have been made by the administrative law judge. Had COMSAT requested a rehearing under 47 U.S.C. § 405 (1970), of the Communications Act, it would have had an opportunity to rebut specific findings, but it made no such request. However, this is not a case like Pacific Gas Transmission Co. v. FPC, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 536 F.2d 393, Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999, 97 S.Ct. 527, 50 L.Ed.2d 610 (1976), where the statute requires the filing of a petition for rehearing as an exhaustion prerequisite to challenging a Commission order. Hence, while there is no adequate reason given to explain why COMSAT did not seek rehearing if it were truly concerned about its inability to respond to specific findings, and there is no proffer by COMSAT of any information that had not been brought out over the long course of the administrative hearing, that situation does not preclude COMSAT from asserting a right to an initial decision. 18 An initial decision by the administrative law judge, however, is not required for all Commission determinations. The Administrative Procedure Act calls for an initial decision when a hearing is required to be conducted in accordance with section 556 of this title. 5 U.S.C. § 557(a) (1970). Section 556, by its own terms, applies to hearings required by section 553 or 554 of this title to be conducted in accordance with this section. 5 U.S.C. § 556(a) (1970). Section 553 specifies When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection. 19 Hence, the requirement for an initial decision is imposed in the present case only if the Commission's action can be termed adjudication, 11 or if the Satellite Act or the Communications Act requires a hearing. 20 The Communications Act of 1934 specifies the following procedure for FCC review of new charges filed with it: 21 Whenever there is filed with the Commission any new charge . . . the Commission may either upon complaint of upon its own initiative without complaint, upon reasonable notice, enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness thereof; . . . and after full hearing the Commission may make such order with reference thereto as would be proper in a proceeding initiated after it had become effective. 22 47 U.S.C. § 204 (1970). This specified procedure does require a decision made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, so an initial decision is necessary unless the exception applies that due and timely execution of (the Commission's) functions imperatively and unavoidably requires proceeding at once to final Commission decision. 47 U.S.C. § 409 (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)(2) (1970). 23 We hold that the exception does apply because the Commission specifically found that under these circumstances due and timely execution of (its) functions Imperatively and unavoidably requires the omission of the Judge's initial decision. (J.A. 142; 49 FCC2d 221, 223) (emphasis in original). The reason cited, the exceptional delay that had already plagued the proceedings, was a thorough justification for avoiding additional delay. Nor does the fact that the Commission omitted the precise words imperatively and unavoidably 12 in its original order undercut the basis for that order as set forth at the time it issued. The Commission's explanation of its concern for delay at the time of the order adequately supports a conclusion that due and Timely Execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably required a streamlined procedure, even if those precise words were not used until later. This is especially true in light of the other procedural shortcuts ordered by the Commission at the same time: taking written testimony, limiting cross-examination, ordering a strict briefing schedule, etc. See quotation at p. --- of 198 U.S.App.D.C., p. 887 of 611 F.2d, Supra. Channel 16 v. FCC, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 229 F.2d 520 (1956), is distinguishable, since there the Commission's insistence on expedition was belied by its contemporaneous procedural orders. (It required an initial decision for five of the six issues in the case, and bypassed that step only for one determination. See 97 U.S.App.D.C. at 182-83, 229 F.2d at 523-24). Here, the Commission's valid concern with completing the delayed rate-making process was consistently demonstrated. 24 In sum, in the circumstances presented by this greatly prolonged case, there was overwhelming justification to implement the procedural shortcut involved in bypassing an initial hearing by the administrative law judge.