Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Criminal Activity Involving Violence or Threats of Violence

Text: The jury was instructed, consistent with CALJIC No. 8.84.1, that: In determining which penalty is to be imposed on defendant, you shall consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial of this case. You shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the following factors, if applicable: [ถ] [(a)] The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true. [ถ] [(b)] The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved use or attempted use of force or violence or the expressed or implied threat to use force or violence. (See also ง 190.3, factors (a), (b).) Additionally, in his argument the prosecutor read the various factors of section 190.3, commenting that many of them did not apply. After reciting factor (b), however, the prosecutor commented: The only other evidence that we have presented in the guilt phase about other acts of violence would be the defendant's plans to kill anyone who got in his way or the testimony we've heard from Mr. Del Frate about the defendant's plan to kill the co-defendant, Mr. Leitch. [28] Defendant contends these instructions and argument virtually required the jury to consider (a) the contention defendant said he would kill someone if necessary to obtain a boat for his Southeast Asia trip, (b) his statement that he would kill refugees rather than transporting them to a new location, (c) his statement that if anyone got in the way of his plan he would kill them, and (d) his alleged discussion with Del Frate about killing Leitch and disposing of Leitch's car and body to make it appear he had fled. He contends these alleged incidents were not properly considered under factor (b), noting that no specific instruction was given requiring the jury to find these incidents of criminal activity true beyond a reasonable doubt. He further notes the jury was not instructed it must find the corpus delicti of any such crime without resort to defendant's admissions or that admissions of the defendant should be viewed with caution. Finally he contends that in addition to any instruction on finding this criminal activity occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury should have been instructed it must unanimously agree such activity had occurred. (22) We have recently confirmed that violent criminal activity or threats of violence offered as aggravating factors under factor (b) require proof of conduct constituting commission of an actual crime. ( Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 65-72.) Furthermore, we held in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], that the jury must be instructed that such crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at pp. 53-55.) We suggested that the prosecution should request an instruction enumerating the specific crimes the jury may consider so that the reasonable-doubt instruction can be directly addressed to the designated crimes. ( Id. at p. 55, fn. 19.) Finally, we have also noted that the trial court should not permit the penalty jury even to consider such a crime as an aggravating factor unless there is sufficient evidence to find its essential elements true under the reasonable doubt standard. ( Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 778; but see Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 99 [unanimity not required].) If there was factor (b) error, it did not arise from failing to instruct the jury on reasonable doubt as defendant contends. The trial court, over the prosecutor's objection, gave instructions requested by the defense which stated: In this penalty phase on certain issues the state has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and all jurors must be so convinced. [ถ] Before you may consider any fact or sets of facts as an aggravating circumstance, all jurors must find that the fact or the set of facts has been established by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. You may not consider any fact or set of facts as an aggravating circumstance unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the fact or set of facts is true. [ถ] If you find any fact or set of facts to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, you are the sole judges of whether that fact or set of facts constitutes an aggravating circumstance as defined in these instructions. [ถ] Further if you find any aggravating factors present, you are the sole judges of what weight, if any, that factor should be given. The court further instructed: Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, the presence of any aggravating factors [ sic ]. [ถ] In determining whether any fact necessary to support any fact in aggravation against the defendant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must not give any effect to suspicion, speculation or mere possibility that such fact is true. Every finding that you are called upon to make must rest on evidence of the type which reasonably inspires confidence and is of solid value. The law does not allow any fact to be found on the basis of suspicion, possibility, speculation or conjecture. (Italics added.) While not specifically directed at the four incidents of threats of violence, these instructions met many of the Robertson concerns ( supra, 33 Cal.3d 21). As for defendant's complaint that the trial court should also have instructed on the corpus delicti rule with respect to any criminal conduct and the need to view a defendant's admissions with caution, the jury did receive such instruction at the guilt phase. Given the tactical considerations that may attend giving such instructions again at the penalty phase, the trial court was under no sua sponte duty to so instruct. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d 739, 773; Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282; Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 72-73, fn. 25.) That is not to say that no possible error under factor (b) occurred in this case. It can be argued that the jury might have considered the asserted plans to kill refugees or kill to obtain a boat for the Southeast Asian venture as threats of violence not amounting to an actual crime. These plans were offered, however for impeachment purposes at the guilt phase, and a limiting instruction had been given. They were not specifically referred to by the prosecutor in his argument to the jury, even in his remark as to what evidence might come within factor (b). It is therefore speculative whether the jury would understand the general direction to consider all evidence received during any part of the case as a mandate both to consider these two incidents as specific aggravating factors and to ignore limiting instructions previously given. (See Roberston, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 60-61, conc. opn. of Broussard, J.) As to the threat to kill anyone who got in his way, we have noted previously this was offered not as other-crimes evidence at the guilt phase but as evidence of motive for the crime of which defendant was convicted. The Attorney General thus argues that while not coming within the terms of factor (b), it was admissible under factor (a) as evidence of the circumstances of the crime. (And see Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d 21.) (23) Even if we accept this as true, there remains the possibility that it was error for the prosecutor to refer to defendant's solicitation of Del Frate to kill Leitch as coming within factor (b). The solicitation was not a circumstance of the crime itself, and hence its admissibility under factor (a) is problematic. It was conduct supporting the commission of an actual crime โ violation of section 653f, solicitation of murder โ but it was apparently not supported by the testimony of two witnesses, resting as it did on the testimony of Del Frate, nor were there reliable corroborating circumstances. (See ง 653f, subd. (e).) Since there was insufficient substantial evidence to establish violation of section 653f as a separate crime, we conclude that whatever the relevance of this evidence at the guilt phase to show defendant's consciousness of guilt, the trial court should not have permitted it to be argued under factor (b) at the penalty phase. (See Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 778.) The prosecutor, however, mentioned it only once and without emphasis. He promptly returned to his virtually exclusive theme, that the circumstances of this crime, the factor (a) consideration, was what justified imposition of the death penalty in this case and that defendant was not entitled to the jury's sympathy. His reference to threats of violence seems more in the nature of argument against defendant's evidence of his good character than affirmative presentation of other violent crimes evidence. (See Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 791-792.) (24) We conclude that any error in permitting reference to solicitation of the killing of Leitch or threat to kill anyone who got in defendant's way was harmless under any standard in light of the brevity of the reference, the focus of both counsels' arguments, and the instructions given.