Opinion ID: 667818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: estoppel to assert the statutes of limitation

Text: 19 Delta urges that it was lulled into its decision not to file the present action sooner as a result of James' conduct, and that James should therefore be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. As the California Supreme Court has held, [o]ne cannot justly or equitably lull his adversary into a false sense of security, and thereby cause his adversary to subject his claim to the bar of the statute of limitations, and then be permitted to plead the very delay caused by his course of conduct as a defense to the action when brought. Carruth v. Fritch, 36 Cal.2d 426, 433 (1950). 20 Delta urges that whether James' own conduct resulted in an estoppel which tolled the statute of limitations is a question for the factfinder. Delta cites as support for this position Golden v. Faust, 766 F.2d 1339, 1341 (9th Cir.1985), but gravely misinterprets the holding of that case, which clearly states [b]efore estoppel can toll the statute of limitations, certain conditions must be met: 1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; 2) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts, and the party to be estopped must have acted so that the other party had a right to believe that the party intended its conduct to be acted upon; and 3) the other party relied on the conduct to its prejudice. Id. at 1341 (citations omitted). Whether James is estopped by its own conduct is a question of law unless Delta properly pleads all three elements. 21 The key question here is whether Delta was justly or equitably lull[ed] into a false sense of security by James' conduct. In other words, did Delta make out a claim that James led Delta to feel reasonably secure that the parties would settle? 22 Delta points to James' requests for time to study the complaint, its suggestion that the parties await the Ninth Circuit's decision in REV v. Forrest, and the fact that James never refused to settle. James, however, never promised to settle, and Delta was represented by attorneys who should have known that the statute was running. 23 Delta counters that California courts have repeatedly found an estoppel where, as here, the defendant has simply asked the aggrieved party for 'more time' to complete its investigation of the aggrieved party's claim, and cites two workers' compensation cases, Benner v. Industrial Accident Commission, 26 Cal.2d 346 (1945) and United States Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 122 Cal.App.2d 427 (1954) for support. These decisions found, under the specific facts of each, that the plaintiffs had been reasonably led to delay filing by the conduct of the defendants. But what a worker may reasonably infer from such a request is very different from what sophisticated business entities, represented by counsel, may infer. 24 California cases are reluctant to find an estoppel where the parties are represented by counsel and have not entered into an express tolling agreement. Kuntsman v. Mirizzi, 234 Cal.App.2d 753 (1965) Statutes of limitation are favored by the law, and the law does not favor estoppels, particularly where the party attempting to raise the estoppel is represented by an attorney at law. Id. at 757 (Citations omitted). 25 Delta seeks to overcome this disfavor by pointing to two cases, Golden v. Faust, supra, and Sumrall v. City of Cypress, 258 Cal.App.2d 565, which demonstrate that whether a party is or is not represented by counsel is not dispositive of the issue of estoppel to assert the statute of limitation. Id. at 570. However, in each of these cases, the defendant's counsel made affirmative misrepresentations to plaintiff's counsel. As Sumrall states in the same paragraph cited by Delta,  'To permit an insurance carrier to take advantage of the misleading statements and false promises of its agents made to an insured and his counsel in the course of extended settlement negotiations, offends our sense of equity and fair dealing. Id. at 570. James never made any such misrepresentations in this case, and Delta and its attorneys can hardly be considered reasonable in treating James' requests as the equivalent thereof. 26 In 1960, the California Supreme Court held that  '[W]here one acts with full knowledge of plain provisions of law, and their probable effect upon facts within his knowledge, especially where represented by counsel, he can neither claim (1) ignorance of the true facts or [sic] (2) reliance to his detriment upon conduct of the person claimed to be estopped, two of the essential elements of equitable estoppel.'  Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. Los Angeles, 53 Cal.2d 865, 871 (1960) (Citation omitted). 27 Delta was represented by counsel at many, if not all, times during the negotiations with James. This fact renders untenable its claim that it was lulled into delaying this action. No equitable tolling occurred. 28 The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.