Opinion ID: 2806518
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice at the guilt phase

Text: We nevertheless affirm the district court’s denial of Bemore’s guilt-phase IAC claim. Reasonable jurists, we conclude, could disagree whether, as the trial actually went, Bemore has illustrated “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. In a case in which counsel’s error was a failure adequately to investigate, demonstrating Strickland prejudice requires L. Rev. 1557, 1589 (1998) (cited in Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192). BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 33 showing both a reasonable probability that counsel would have made a different decision had he investigated, and a reasonable probability that the different decision would have altered the outcome. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36. On the record before us, fairminded jurists could conclude either that (1) had McKechnie conducted an adequate investigation into the alibi and available alternative defenses, he would likely have presented the alibi defense anyway, or that (2) although a reasonably competent attorney would have chosen to pursue a mental health defense instead of the alibi, the mental health defense was not reasonably likely to succeed. To prevail on a mental health defense, Bemore would have had to prove either that “because of his mental illness or voluntary intoxication, he did not in fact form the intent unlawfully to kill,” Saille, 54 Cal. 3d. at 1117 (emphasis omitted), or that he was not guilty by reason of insanity—i.e., that he “was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the commission of the offense,” Cal. Pen. Code § 25. See Elmore, 59 Cal. 4th at 142–44. Bemore did present some evidence to the state habeas court tending to show that these standards might have been met. But given the evidence suggesting Muck’s murder was deliberate and premeditated, the record does not provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that any reasonable jurist would have concluded that a guilt-phase mental health defense was reasonably likely to have been successful in avoiding a guilty verdict. Perhaps most notably, no expert testimony was presented on habeas indicating that, had follow-up mental health investigation occurred, counsel could have presented evidence sufficient to establish a mental health defense to first-degree murder. Dr. Fineman did not conduct a followup evaluation of Bemore for the habeas petition, despite his 34 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL insistence that a follow-up evaluation was necessary to make any firm diagnosis of Bemore’s mental state. And he did not attest on habeas that Bemore’s mental state at the time of the offense was consistent with any guilt phase defense to the crime. Rather, Dr. Fineman averred only that the facts “gave rise to the guilt-phase defense of whether he was able to form the requisite intent,” and that “it is questionable as to whether he was capable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his act and of distinguishing right from wrong.” (Emphases added). Dr. Rosenthal’s state habeas declaration is more definite. Dr. Rosenthal met with Bemore after trial, and, having reviewed Dr. Fineman’s preliminary report and other materials, declared that Bemore “was not able at the time of the homicide to form the requisite specific intent, premeditate, deliberate, or harbor malice . . . because of his extreme mental disorders and intoxication.” But any testimony negating Bemore’s sanity or intent to kill or to premeditate at the time of the crime would have been countered by the substantial evidence that the crime involved deliberate, premeditated decisions. Witnesses testified that Bemore told them he stabbed Muck because he did not open the safe upon demand. Thus, even had the defense presented a mental health defense, the jury could well have concluded from the evidence that the killing was done in a calculated manner by a perpetrator able to understand and intend the consequences of his actions. Bemore may well have garnered more sympathy with the jury had he presented a mental health defense—or no defense—in lieu of an incongruous alibi BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 35 defense.18 But the prejudice resulting from Bemore’s appearance on the stand is not a basis on which we may grant relief at the guilt phase (although, we later conclude, it is quite pertinent to our penalty phase analysis). See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003); Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). In sum, Bemore has not shown a reasonable likelihood that the result at the guilt phase would have been different but for counsel’s errors. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was therefore not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland.19 18 Even a better investigated and prepared alibi would not have likely have been successful. Numerous state witnesses testified to conversations with Bemore in which he had admitted involvement in the Aztec murder and robbery. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 820–25. Bemore did not contest that his car was at the scene of the crime and that he was involved in opening and disposing of the stolen safe. And knives linked to Bemore were consistent with those used to kill Muck. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 819–20. 19 We need not address Bemore’s additional argument that McKechnie rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at the special circumstances phase by neglecting to challenge the prosecution’s theory that Muck was tortured. Even if McKechnie had persuaded the jury not to vote for the torture special circumstance, Bemore would still have been death-eligible based on the robbery special circumstance. True, any ineffectiveness at the special circumstances phase may have prejudiced Bemore at the penalty phase—facts established regarding the length of time and degree of pain Muck suffered may have made it more likely that the jury would vote for the death penalty rather than life in prison. But because we ultimately reverse as to the penalty phase, based both on counsel’s ineffective representation in investigating mitigating circumstances and also on prejudicial spillover from the guilt phase IAC, it does not matter to our ultimate judgment whether Bemore was additionally prejudiced by counsel’s performance at the special circumstances phase. See United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1029 n.29 (9th Cir. 2014). 36 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL