Opinion ID: 2709246
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substance of the Jury Instructions

Text: We review jury instructions as a whole, “analyzing them deferentially to determine whether they accurately state the law and do not confuse the jury.” Rapold v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 718 F.3d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2013). To obtain a new trial based on incorrect jury instructions, Johnson must establish that (1) the instructions did not accurately state the law, and (2) the error prejudiced her because the jury was likely to be misled or confused. Id. Johnson challenges the retaliation instruction, the adverse action instruction, and an instruction explaining the relationship between discrimination and retaliation claims. We find no error. The instructions as given stated the law accurately and were not overly confusing. Contrary to Johnson’s contentions, the retaliation instruction did not state that discrimination complaints must be in No. 12-1699 17 writing in order to support an inference of retaliation. The instruction did state that decision-makers would need to have known about Johnson’s discrimination complaints for Johnson to prevail, but that is an accurate statement of the law, absent a “cat’s paw” theory of liability. See, e.g., Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir. 2004) (employer “must have had actual knowledge of the complaints for her decisions to be retaliatory”); Byrd v. Illinois Dep’t of Public Health, 423 F.3d 696, 709–10 (7th Cir. 2005) (cat’s paw theory of retaliation does not require direct knowledge of discrimination complaints by the employer). Johnson did not pursue a cat’s paw theory at trial and did not request a cat’s paw instruction, so the retaliation instruction was accurate. Johnson also claims that the instructions did not explain what constitutes a materially adverse action, but this is incorrect. The adverse action instruction was largely drawn from the Seventh Circuit Pattern Civil Jury Instructions, and accurately stated the law. Johnson challenges next the district court’s decision to provide a curative instruction to the jury. The instruction told the jury that Johnson’s discrimination claims had already been resolved, and told the jury not to consider any alleged discrimination in determining whether the General Board had retaliated against Johnson. The district court found the instruction necessary because it had mistakenly referred to Johnson’s discrimination claims during jury selection, and Johnson had repeatedly referred to those claims during the trial. The relationship between unsuccessful discrimination claims and pending retaliation claims can be confusing to judges and lawyers, let alone jurors. Giving the curative instruction to the 18 No. 12-1699 jury was probably wise and certainly was not an abuse of discretion.