Opinion ID: 475482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonableness of Attorney's Fee.

Text: 11 Congress provided for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to successful civil rights plaintiffs to ensure 'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights grievances. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429, 103 S.Ct. at 1937 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 1 (1976)). While Sec. 1988 does not explain what constitutes a reasonable fee, the legislative history expressly endorses the guidelines developed by the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir.1974). 4 See S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976); H.R.Rep. No. 94-1558, p. 8 (1976) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, pp. 5908, 5913; City of Riverside v. Rivera, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2691-92, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986). 12 The Supreme Court has adopted a hybrid approach to the question of the proper manner by which to determine a reasonable attorneys' fee. See Pennsylvania, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3097-99; Hensley, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933. This approach combines elements of the Johnson 12-factor analysis and the lodestar method of calculation developed by the Third Circuit in Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.1973). 5 The lodestar determination has emerged as the predominate element of the analysis. See Pennsylvania, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3095-99. 13  'The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.'  Pennsylvania, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3097 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939). This product may then be adjusted on the basis of other considerations. Id. (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1940). Hensley viewed the other considerations to include the Johnson factors, but noted that many of these factors usually are subsumed within the lodestar calculation. 6 A strong presumption exists that the lodestar figure represents a reasonable fee, Pennsylvania, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3098, and upward adjustments of the lodestar are proper only in rare and exceptional cases, supported by specific evidence on the record and detailed findings by the district court. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901, 104 S.Ct. at 1548-50. 14 Consequently, a critical inquiry in determining a reasonable attorneys' fee for purposes of Sec. 1988 is the reasonable hourly rate. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547 n. 11. The prevailing market rate in the community at the time services were rendered is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate. 7 Id. at 895, 104 S.Ct. at 1547. The fee applicant has the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, in addition to the affidavits of its counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation. See id. at 895-97 and n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 1547-48 and n. 11. If the applicant satisfies its burden of showing that the claimed rate and number of hours 8 are reasonable, the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee contemplated by Sec. 1988. Id. at 897, 104 S.Ct. at 1548. Pennsylvania, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at 3097-99. 15 Plaintiffs presented the district court with evidence in addition to the affidavits of Mr. LaBarre to show that the claimed rates were in line with those prevailing in the community. 9 Plaintiffs also submitted records sufficient[ly] detail[ed] that a neutral judge [could] make a fair evaluation of the time expended, the nature and need for the service, and the reasonable fees to be allowed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 441, 103 S.Ct. at 1943 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Yet the district judge made no finding on the sufficiency of the evidence. He applied an unsupported range hourly rate to a range of hours to arrive at a fee that he deemed reasonable. 10 While the district court is in the best position to judge the reasonableness of the fee award, see Harmon v. San Diego County, 736 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir.1984) (Harmon II ), judges awarding fees must make certain that attorneys are paid the full value that their efforts would receive on the open market in non-civil-rights cases.... Hensley, 461 U.S. at 447, 103 S.Ct. at 1947 (citations omitted). We therefore reverse the award of attorneys' fees and remand for redetermination of a reasonable fee in accordance with this opinion. 16