Opinion ID: 883751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: issue ii tooth repair

Text: Daniel argues that he should not be liable for Michelle's dental expenses associated with her tooth injury because these damages were not plead and he had no notice and opportunity to present evidence on the disputed issue. Michelle asserts that Daniel should pay for the repair of the tooth because he admitted to causing the damage. Moreover, although Michelle states that she did not specifically ask for these damages in her prayer for relief, she did request such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. Finding of Fact no. 43 in the Special Master's findings and conclusions states that [d]uring the marriage, Petitioner [Daniel] inflicted damage to Respondent's tooth. Costs of the repair to that tooth should be borne by the Petitioner. The estimated cost of this repair is approximately Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00). Conclusion of Law no. 23 states that Petitioner shall pay for the repair of Respondent's tooth in the amount not to exceed $3,000.00. We find two problems with awarding Michelle up to $3,000.00 for the repair of the tooth in the instant case. First, although Michelle contends that Daniel admitted during the hearing that he had damaged her tooth, we have no record which we can review to determine whether an admission was indeed made. Moreover, we cannot determine whether, as Daniel insists, Michelle sought to introduce an estimate prepared by Dr. Ming but the exhibit was not received into evidence. Therefore, this Court is hampered by an inability to review the record to determine what evidence was actually presented. We do, however, find support in the record for Daniel's contention that he strenuously objected to the finding of fact and conclusion of law regarding the tooth damage and subsequent repair. Second, and most problematic, is the fact that Daniel received no notice regarding this claim, essentially a personal injury claim, until the dissolution hearing. There is no indication in Michelle's response to the petition for dissolution that the personal injury claim might be an issue during the proceedings. The purpose of a pleading is to provide notice before trial to the opposing party of the specific relief being sought so that both parties have an opportunity to present evidence on the issues in dispute. Matter of Custody of C.J.K. (1993), 258 Mont. 525, 527, 855 P.2d 90, 91. Here, it appears that no such notice was provided and no opportunity to present evidence on the issue was afforded Daniel. C.J.K. states that there are exceptions which provide the court with jurisdiction to grant relief outside of the issues presented in the pleadings; if the parties stipulate that other questions may be considered or if the pleadings are amended to conform to the proof, citing Old Fashion Baptist Church v. Department of Revenue (1983), 206 Mont. 451, 457, 671 P.2d 625, 628. Parties may stipulate either expressly or impliedly. C.J.K., 855 P.2d at 91. (Citation omitted.) There is no evidence here that an expressed stipulation to consider the issue of tooth repair occurred. Moreover, [c]oncerning the issue of implied consent, we have stated that `pleadings will not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence because of `implied consent' where the circumstances were such that the other party was not put on notice that a new issue was being raised.' C.J.K., 855 P.2d at 91. There is no evidence that Daniel received notice before trial that the tooth repair was an issue and therefore, he could not have consented to consider the issue. Further, he objected to the consideration of this issue because he was not provided proper notice, he does not admit to injuring the tooth and the issue of tooth repair is a personal injury issue, not a dissolution issue. Such objection cannot be interpreted to provide implied consent to consider the issue. C.J.K., 855 P.2d at 91. Therefore, there was neither a stipulation nor an amendment of the pleadings to conform to the proof and no exception applies here. Lack of notice may have prejudiced Daniel and prevented him from having adequate opportunity to prepare evidence and testimony regarding the issue. C.J.K., 855 P.2d at 91. We therefore hold that the determination of the issue of the tooth repair was not properly before the District Court and we reverse the District Court's conclusion on this issue.