Opinion ID: 900517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Post-conviction DNA Analysis

Text: [¶ 19.] Punishment of the innocent may be the worst of all injustices. To avoid such a grievous outcome courts should solemnly consider reopening a case if a truly persuasive showing of actual innocence lies close at hand. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 113 S.Ct. 853, 869, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), reh'g denied, 507 U.S. 1001, 113 S.Ct. 1628, 123 L.Ed.2d 186 (1993); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995), superseded by statute in Lambert v. Blackwell, 962 F.Supp. 1521 (E.D.Pa.1997). Debra contends that the latest DNA testing technology can prove that the hair found on Abby's body was not Debra's. When newly developed scientific procedures can establish innocence in a conviction laden with doubt, then elementary fairness may compel the new testing. See Mebane v. State, 21 Kan.App.2d 533, 902 P.2d 494, 497 (1995); see also Dabbs v. Vergari, 149 Misc.2d 844, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767-68 (N.Y.Sup.1990) (discovery of exculpatory evidence through post-conviction DNA testing). See generally United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-75, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3379-80, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (due process mandates that courts work to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.); State v. Steele, 510 N.W.2d 661, 665 (S.D.1994); Ashker; 457 N.W.2d at 477. Yet, not every convict who cries innocence will be able to reopen a case to analyze old evidence. Our system of justice will hold little respect if its judgments are never final. Only in extraordinary circumstances should a court allow post-conviction scientific testing. [¶ 20.] After careful consideration, we have formulated the following guidelines for when post-conviction scientific analysis may be authorized: First, the evidence and test results must meet the Daubert standard for scientific reliability. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), on remand, 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 869, 116 S.Ct. 189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1995). A showing must be made that if the matter were presently tried the defendant would be entitled to the testing and the results would be admissible. Second, because convicted defendants may not obtain reconsideration of their cases whenever some new technology promises to reveal another angle on the evidence against them, it must be shown that a favorable result using the latest scientific procedures would most likely produce an acquittal in a new trial. See Dumond v. Lockhart, 911 F.2d 104, 107 (8th Cir.1990) (stating that even if projected DNA test result of semen would comport with petitioner's best scenario, it must still be shown this evidence would probably produce an acquittal); Zeigler v. State, 654 So.2d 1162, 1164 (Fla.1995). But see Dabbs, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 767, 768 (evidence of high exculpatory potential should be discoverable after conviction). Third, testing should not be allowed if it imposes an unreasonable burden on the State. See generally State v. Fowler, 1996 SD 78, ¶ 21, 552 N.W.2d 92, 96. An exorbitant cost may be grounds for denial, for example, especially if anticipated test results promise to be less than definite. If testing is allowed, the court should impose reasonable safeguards to ensure the preservation and integrity of the evidence. With biological evidence, courts have generally found post-conviction testing most suitable when (a) identity of a single perpetrator is at issue; (b) evidence against the defendant is so weak as to suggest real doubt of guilt; (c) the scientific evidence, if any, used to obtain the conviction has been impugned; and, (d) the nature of the biological evidence makes testing results on the issue of identity virtually dispositive. [¶ 21.] Applying these guidelines, post-conviction scientific analysis is unsuitable here. We discern no likelihood that a favorable DNA test result of the hair and blood evidence would produce an acquittal were Debra granted a new trial. The evidence against her was highly persuasive. Proof that the hair found in her dead child's hand was not hers, but Abby's, would only create another circumstance on which to argue reasonable doubt. It would not be conclusive on the question of innocence, especially in light of all the other evidence against her, including her oblique but damaging admissions. Expert criminalist, Rex Riis, eliminated the father as the originator of the hair found on Abby's body and the credibility of his examination has not been challenged in this respect. Anticipated proof that the hair originated from some unknown aggressor is highly improbable. Investigators found no trace of any trespasser in the home. Because the intruder theory was so implausible and the facts to support it so remote, the trial court precluded Debra's effort at trial to offer third party perpetrator evidence and we affirmed that ruling. Simply because a new technology is available to test the evidence does not make this theory any more relevant now than it was before. In sum, DNA testing is not appropriate in this case because it appears to revive a legally and factually insupportable defense. See Jenner, 451 N.W.2d at 722-23. [¶ 22.] Affirmed. [¶ 23.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and SABERS, AMUNDSON, and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.