Opinion ID: 1239288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Racial prejudice argument

Text: The remainder of counsel's argument found inflammatory by the Court of Appeals refers to George being railroaded because he is a black man and Deputy Dial was a white police officer. These comments taken in context refer to George's guilty plea in the related criminal case. [3] George contends these remarks do not compel reversal under Toyota. We agree. In Toyota, we considered an argument during which counsel used posters depicting characters with Oriental features involved in bribery and document shredding. Counsel's argument made an oblique reference to atomic bombs. One of the parties was a regional distributor of Toyota vehicles, a Japanese automotive brand. We found this argument was outrageous and counsel's conduct abhorrent for evoking such racial prejudice. 314 S.C. at 263, 442 S.E.2d at 615. In allowing an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule, Toyota relied on Nasim, supra, a land condemnation case. In that case, during closing argument, counsel referred to the State's land appraiser as a quizzling quivaler and stated: Do you remember the `quizzler' back in World War II? The ones back in Germany and France, the ones that sided up with the enemy? 255 S.C. at 409, 179 S.E.2d at 212. He also referred to the witness as a great highway robber and stated that the witness was tr[ying] to steal my client's property. Id. at 409-10, 179 S.E.2d at 212. Nasim relies on Major v. Alverson, 183 S.C. 123, 190 S.E. 449 (1937), in allowing an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Nasim specifically quotes the conclusion in Major that calling the opposing party a bare-faced liar was not merely improper but amounted to an abuse of the witness.... In short, where counsel applies to a witness or litigant abusive epithets, he will do so at his own peril. 255 S.C. at 411, 179 S.E.2d at 212 (quoting Major, 183 S.C. at 125, 190 S.E. at 450 (emphasis added)). Nasim also cites Edwards v. Union Buffalo Mills Co., 162 S.C. 17, 159 S.E. 818 (1931), where counsel referred to the opposing party's expert witnesses in argument as follows: I am casting no reflections on the doctors, but I think it was one distinguished Chief Justice who said, that there are two classes of liars. One, he said is the plain liars, and the other is the experts. Don't take that literally; I don't mean that, but I do mean that when you have money you can line up doctors on one side and doctors on the other, as many as you want to, and they will try to out-swear each other. 162 S.C. at 26, 159 S.E. at 821. In reversing and remanding for a new trial, Edwards specifically noted that witnesses are entitled to the protection of the Court. Id. at 28, 159 S.E. at 822. Toyota and the line of cases preceding it concern abuse of a witness or litigant. Accordingly, we now clarify that our holding in Toyota excuses the failure to make a contemporaneous objection only where the challenged argument constitutes abuse of a party or witness. Counsel's railroading and racial remarks, while objectionable, [4] do not constitute abuse of a litigant or witness in this case. Counsel's remarks were directed toward the circumstances of George's guilty plea and not the opposing party or witnesses in this civil trial. Further, in Toyota we noted the element of surprise and found prejudice because counsel could not refute such a personal attack. In this case, Dial's counsel chose not to object but responded to the racial reference in his rebuttal argument. We caution that our decision today in no way condones the sort of racial argument employed by counsel in this case. When there is no factual basis for such an argument, the injection of race is clearly objectionable. Had counsel objected, this case would be in a completely different posture. We find no reason, however, to extend the narrow exception of Toyota to cases not involving abuse of a party or witness. REVERSED. Acting Associate Justices GEORGE T. GREGORY, JR. and L. HENRY McKELLAR, concur. TOAL, J., and FINNEY, C.J., dissenting in separate opinion.