Opinion ID: 1806648
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Heading: churchill's breach of implied contract claim

Text: In his motion for leave to amend, Churchill sought to raise the theory of breach of implied contract, alluded to in Strait v. Pat Harrison Waterways District, 523 So.2d 36 (Miss. 1988). He charged that his injuries resulted from a breach of an implied contract to provide a safe place for the activities for which he had paid an admission fee. Although some courts have held that an admission ticket merely grants the holder a license to use the facility for which a fee has been paid, Churchill cites the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in Sims v. Etowah County Board of Education, 337 So.2d 1310 (Ala. 1976), for the proposition that a ticket to a place of public entertainment constitutes a contract between the proprietor and the purchaser of the ticket; whatever contractual duties grow out of that relation, it has been held, must be performed by the proprietor or he must respond in damages for breach of contract. Id. at 1314. See also, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 342 So.2d 321, 322 (Ala. 1977). Thus, in an action brought for injuries sustained when a bleacher collapsed during a high school football game for which Mr. and Mrs. Sims had purchased admission tickets, the Alabama Court found that the trial judge had properly dismissed the negligence counts but erred in dismissing the plaintiff's breach of implied contract claim. Analyzing the contract claim, the Court stated: What we have here is a unilateral contract, with the promisor-board of education as proprietor, upon receiving the admission price, promising admission by ticket and the performance of all other contractual duties arising from the circumstances, including the implied promise that the premises are reasonably safe for the purpose of viewing the athletic contest. Sims, 337 So.2d at 1314. Likewise, in the case sub judice, the appellees had charged Churchill's group an admission fee as well as a fee for renting an inner tube. The receipt of that fee promised not only admission to the water park, but also carried with it the implied promise that the premises were safe for the enjoyment of water sports. Accordingly, we find that there existed an implied contract between the appellees and those who paid an admission fee to use the water park facility. Sovereign immunity does not bar actions against the state or its political subdivisions brought on a breach of contract theory. Miss. State Department of Welfare v. Howie, 449 So.2d 772 (Miss. 1984); Cig Contractors v. Miss. State Bldg. Comm'n, 399 So.2d 1352 (Miss. 1981). As we stated in Cig Contractors: The general rule is that when the legislature authorizes the State's entry into a contract, the State necessarily waives its immunity from suit for a breach of such contract. 81A C.J.S. States § 172 (1977). Where the state has lawfully entered into a business contract with an individual, the obligations and duties of the contract should be mutually binding and reciprocal. There is no mutuality or fairness where a state or county can enter into an advantageous contract and accept its benefits but refuse to perform its obligations. Id. at 1355. The legislature has vested the District with the power to enter into contracts in Miss. Code Ann. § 51-11-11(g) (1972). Likewise, § 51-11-11(b) empowers the District to sue and be sued. Section 51-11-43, which authorizes the District to act jointly with other governmental agencies further states, in relevant part: The several counties, municipalities, districts, political subdivisions, public agencies, commissions and instrumentalities of this state are authorized and empowered to enter into contracts and joint funding agreements with the district in the performance of the purposes and services authorized in this chapter and for the planning, construction, operation and maintenance of projects approved by the district, including but not limited to flood control projects, parks and recreational projects of the district. Although the County is not afforded express statutory power to sue and be sued with regard to any contracts or agreements entered into with the District, a contract claim raised against it should be actionable. Howie, 449 So.2d at 776-777. Accordingly, we find that Churchill had a viable claim in contract against both the District and the County which was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.