Opinion ID: 987039
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the First Amendment to the

Text: Church’s Conduct Because the Church’s constitutional claim fails at the state action stage, we need not decide directly whether the First Amendment’s protections actually do reach the assertedly religious expression at issue in the Japanese suit. As three judges noted in Yahoo! II, “[t]he extent of First Amendment protection of speech accessible solely by those outside the United States is a difficult and, to some degree, unresolved issue” and “the extent—indeed the very existence—of such an extraterritorial right under the First Amendment [to publish speech in violation of foreign law] is uncertain.” 433 F.3d at 1217, 1221 (plurality opinion). Nor has any court yet decided whether the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause applies to religious expression initiated domestically but directed to a foreign audience. Ohno was in Japan at all relevant times, and the Church communicated with her there.18 Absent demonstrated impact 18 The Japanese court’s findings indicate that the Church intentionally directed its allegedly religious speech to Ohno in Japan. The court found, for example, that “[o]n January 2, 2002, . . . Yasuma took several hours to talk to Ohno [on January 2, 2002], . . . pressuring her to tithe,” (emphasis added) and that this talk ultimately led Ohno to make the OHNO V . YASUMA 33 of the Japanese judgment on conduct in the United States, the only constitutional question we face would “involve a determination whether the First Amendment has extraterritorial application”—a determination this Court declined to make in Yahoo! II, 433 F.3d at 1217–18, 1222 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1234–35, 1244–45 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and which we likewise decline to make here.19 Having concluded that the enforcement of the judgment does not amount to state action, we reserve for another day the task of tracing the First Amendment’s reach beyond our borders. Our analysis does not, however, foreclose other, nonconstitutional bars to enforcement of a foreign-country money judgment, such as repugnancy to public policy. As we discuss next, there can be sound policy justifications for refusing to recognize foreign-country money judgments that the Constitution would forbid a domestic court from rendering in the first instance. contested transfers to Saints of Glory. The findings also show that as a general matter, the Church sent recordings of each of Yasuma’s sermons to Japan, to be played to its members there. The Church does not dispute that the events at issue “occurred chiefly in Japan.” Although it is not clear whether Yasuma came to Japan or whether, instead, the Church sent a copy of her speech to Japan, we do not see why it matters which is the case. 19 That the judgment at issue here is an award of monetary damages rather than an injunction, as in Yahoo!, could bear on our analysis of the substantive constitutional issue as well as on the state action inquiry. W hile the imposition of liability in the form of damages can have the effect of chilling protected conduct, that effect is much less direct than is the effect of using the coercive power of a domestic court to ensure that a defendant complies with the terms of an injunction, compelling or forbidding particular conduct. 34 OHNO V . YASUMA B. Statutory Challenge: Repugnancy to Public Policy In addition to its constitutional argument, the Church contends that the Japanese judgment is not entitled to recognition and enforcement under California’s Uniform Act because it is “repugnant to the public policy” embodied in the Religion Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions. A foreign judgment that would be unconstitutional if rendered in this country necessarily qualifies as repugnant, the Church maintains, making its recognition an abuse of discretion under California’s Uniform Act. The Act permits—but does not require—courts to deny recognition to foreign monetary awards if either “[t]he judgment or the cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of California or of the United States.” § 1716(c)(3) (emphases added). Accordingly, we examine whether either the Japanese law on which the judgment rests or the judgment issued meets the stringent standard for repugnancy under California law. i. The Standard of Review We first address the proper standard for reviewing a district court’s decision whether to refuse recognition of a foreign-country money judgment under California’s Uniform Act or similar state statutes on grounds of repugnancy to public policy. The only case of this court addressing a somewhat similar issue is Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim (In re Hashim), 213 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000). Hashim treated a bankruptcy court’s determination that an English award of costs and fees was “repugnant to American jurisprudence” and thus unenforceable under Arizona common law OHNO V . YASUMA 35 principles of comity, as a legal conclusion, subject to de novo review. Id. at 1172.20 Absent a demonstrated ground for non-recognition, enforcement of a qualifying foreign-country money judgment is mandatory under California’s Uniform Act. § 1716(a). Here, the district court’s decision to recognize and enforce the Japanese court’s judgment, over the Church’s objections, hinged on a preliminary determination that neither the judgment nor the underlying cause of action was fundamentally incompatible with, and therefore repugnant to, the Religion Clauses. Because that determination was a conclusion of law, we, as in Hashim, examine de novo the district court’s legal evaluation. Given that the Church has asserted no other ground for non-recognition on appeal, if the district court correctly determined that neither the Japanese judgment nor the underlying cause of action is repugnant to 20 Other circuits reviewing recognition of foreign judgments under state statutes similar to California’s have applied an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000, 1004–06 (5th Cir. 1990) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a district court decision whether to apply a non-mandatory ground of nonrecognition under Texas’s Uniform Act); Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1987) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the district court’s refusal to deny recognition on public policy grounds under Illinois’s Uniform Act, but evaluating the defendant’s principal legal arguments de novo “for the sake of completeness”); cf. Remington Rand Corp.-Del. v. Bus. Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d 1260, 1266 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing IIT Corp. v. Lam (In re Colo. Corp.), 531 F.2d 463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the extension or denial of comity)). Even if we were to apply a deferential standard of review, a district court “abuses its discretion when it commits an error of law.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012). So the analysis would be the same as the one we conduct. 36 OHNO V . YASUMA public policy, then recognition of the damages award was statutorily required. ii. The Standard for Repugnance California courts have set a high bar for repugnancy under the Uniform Act. The standard, rooted in the public policy exception to the comity doctrine at common law, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205–06, 227–28 (1895), measures not simply whether the foreign judgment or cause of action is contrary to our public policy, but whether either is “so offensive to our public policy as to be ‘prejudicial to recognized standards of morality and to the general interests of the citizens.’” Java Oil Ltd. v. Sullivan, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1178, 1189–92 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 39 Cal. 3d 126, 135–36 (1985)). Thus, “even where it is agreed that a foreign law offends public policy, it may still be applied in a limited context where the potential harm is minimal.” Wong, 39 Cal. 3d at 136. Put another way, the public policy exception codified at § 1716(c)(3) does not apply unless a foreign-country judgment or the law on which it is based is “so antagonistic to California [or federal] public policy interests as to preclude the extension of comity.” Crockford’s Club Ltd. v. Si–Ahmed, 203 Cal. App. 3d 1402, 1406 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).21 21 The revised Uniform Foreign-Country M oney Judgment Act of 2005, on which the California statute is based, retained “the stringent test for finding a public policy violation applied by courts interpreting the [previous version of the] Act.” Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 13 U.L.A. pt. II, § 4, cmt. 8, at 28 (Supp. 2011). According to that test, the commentary to the model Uniform Act explains, “[p]ublic policy is violated only if recognition or enforcement of the foreign country judgment would tend clearly to injure public health, the public morals, or the public confidence in the administration of law, OHNO V . YASUMA 37 In the context of an Arizona enforcement action, construing common law principles of international comity similar to those on which California’s Uniform Act is based, see Manco Contracting Co., 45 Cal. 4th at 198, we observed that “few judgments fall in the category of judgments that need not be recognized because they violate the public policy of the forum,” In re Hashim, 213 F.3d at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted). “It has long been the law that unless a foreign country’s judgments are the result of outrageous departures from our own motions of ‘civilized jurisprudence,’ comity should not be refused.” British or would undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property, which any citizen ought to feel.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482 cmt. f (1987); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 117 (1971). Our sister circuits have applied a similarly strict standard to the repugnancy exception of other states’ foreign judgment enforcement statutes. See Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 479–80 (“The public policy inquiry rarely results in refusal to enforce a judgment unless it is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing the repugnancy standard as “high, and infrequently met,” applying only in “clear-cut” cases where the judgment or cause of action on which it is based is contrary to “‘fundamental notions of what is decent and just’” (quoting Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1981))); Sw. Livestock & Trucking Co. v. Ramon, 169 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the “level of contravention of Texas law” has to be “high” for the court to deny recognition on public policy grounds); cf. Andes v. Versant Corp., 878 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding, without expressly discussing repugnancy to public policy, that a court applying Maryland’s Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments Act would not give effect to an English rule of preclusion that is “so much at odds with normal American notions of litigation that no American jurisdiction would readily embrace it”). 38 OHNO V . YASUMA Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int’l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Hilton, 159 U.S. at 205). Simple inconsistency between American state or federal law and foreign law, then, does not render a foreign judgment unenforceable by reason of repugnancy. See Yahoo! II, 433 F.3d at 1215 (plurality opinion). Foreign judgments are not to be “tried afresh” in U.S. courts, applying domestic concepts. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202–03. “We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.” Loucks ex rel. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of N.Y., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918) (Cardozo, J.). Applying these principles, courts in other jurisdictions have declined to enforce foreign-country money judgments on grounds of repugnance to the public policy embodied in the First Amendment, but only where there were stark differences between foreign and domestic law. In Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561 (1997), for example, Maryland’s high court declined to enforce an English libel judgment under principles of comity because English defamation law “is totally different” from Maryland defamation law “in virtually every significant respect” and “so contrary . . . to the policy of freedom of the press underlying Maryland law.” Id. at 598–99. A New York trial court similarly refused recognition of an English libel judgment on the ground that English libel standards are “antithetical to the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution,” explaining that the presumptions and burdens of proof under English libel law are the reverse of those under American law, requiring media defendants to prove the truth of speech of public concern, rather obliging plaintiffs to demonstrate falsity. OHNO V . YASUMA 39 Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (1992) (emphasis added).22 In Yahoo! I, the Northern District of California, in an opinion reversed on jurisdictional grounds, see Yahoo! II, 433 F.3d 1199, applied similar logic to that in Telnikoff and Bachchan and barred enforcement of a French injunction requiring the Internet company Yahoo! to block French users’ access to Nazi-related website content. See Yahoo! I, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184–85. The “content and viewpoint-based regulation” of Internet speech, the district court held, “clearly would be inconsistent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the United States.” Id. at 1192–93. 22 Federal law now controls domestic actions seeking recognition of foreign defamation judgments. In August 2010, Congress adopted the SPEECH Act (“Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act.”), Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010), 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4105, effectively codifying the approach adopted in Telnikoff. The Act was prompted by a perceived increase in the frequency of foreign libel judgments inconsistent with the First Amendment, Pub. L. No. 111-223, § 2(5), and concern that these suits were “significantly chilling American free speech and restricting both domestic and worldwide access to important information.” S. Rep. No. 111-224, at 2 (2010); see also Pub. L. No. 111-223, § 2(3). The new law makes foreign defamation judgments unenforceable in the United States unless it can be shown that such judgments satisfy the protections of freedom of speech and press guaranteed by both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the constitution of the state in which the domestic court is located. See 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1). Notably, the SPEECH Act does not pertain to all foreign judgments allegedly inconsistent with any part of the First Amendment but focuses uniquely on defamation actions and the “First Amendment rights of American authors and publishers.” H.R. Rep. No. 111-154, at 5 (2009), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 812, 816. California’s Uniform Act contains a similar special exception for foreign judgments rendered in defamation actions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1717(c). 40 OHNO V . YASUMA These cases do not suggest that a looser standard applies when the asserted repugnancy arises from an inconsistency with U.S. constitutional as opposed to statutory or common law principles. There is no California case so holding and no basis in the statutory language for such a conclusion. Rather, the cases underscore that only judgments presenting a direct and definite conflict with fundamental American constitutional principles will be denied recognition because repugnant. Such direct conflict is more apt to arise where the foreigncountry judgment—or the law underlying it—does not incidentally or indirectly affect conduct that may be protected in the United States, but expressly targets such conduct. Telnikoff, Bachchan, and Yahoo! (I & II), all concerned challenges to enforcement of foreign-country judgments issued on the basis of foreign laws specific to speech or expression—such as libel, defamation and hate speech laws—not laws of general application, such as the Japanese tort laws underlying the judgment at issue here.23 The state courts in Telnikoff and Bachchan, and the district court in Yahoo! I, found repugnancy not based on the way that a particular foreign law was applied to the specific facts of the 23 The same distinction may be drawn between the present case and another circuit court opinion, involving enforcement of a French intellectual property and copyright judgment, targeting the publication of photographs. See Viewfinder, 489 F.3d 474. The district court had held the French judgment repugnant to public policy on the grounds that it was fundamentally at odds with principles of free expression protected by the U.S. and New York Constitutions. Sarl Louis Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The Second Circuit vacated and remanded for a more thorough comparison of French and U.S. copyright law and the “fair use” exception for First Amendment-protected activity. 489 F.3d at 484. OHNO V . YASUMA 41 case, but because of fundamental differences in the guiding legal doctrine applied or the procedures used in the foreigncountry court as compared to domestic legal principles. The courts concluded that the foreign judgments in question were repugnant to public policy because they would unquestionably violate the Constitution were they issued here with respect to domestic activity; those conclusions were not fact-dependent. In other words, it was not debatable whether the orders, if domestically issued and applied, could have survived constitutional scrutiny. The situation with which we are faced here is quite otherwise. As will appear, it is highly debatable, at least, whether tort liability could be imposed on the Church for inducing Ohno’s Transfers, and the ultimate determination of that question would be highly fact-dependent. As the Japanese cause of action and judgment in this case are not antithetical to the Religion Clauses, they are not repugnant to California or U.S. public policy in the sense required by the exception in California’s Uniform Act. iii. Repugnancy of the Japanese Cause of Action and Claims In evaluating the repugnancy of a foreign cause of action, we compare the legal basis for liability and the plaintiff’s claims for relief in the foreign court with comparable grounds for suit in the United States. If American law recognizes generally parallel causes of action, the foreign cause of action cannot be said to be repugnant to American public policy.24 24 T his condition is sufficient but not necessary for non-repugnancy. There could be foreign causes of action that have no parallel in domestic law but are not repugnant to any aspect of domestic law either. 42 OHNO V . YASUMA This assessment does not depend on whether the standards for evaluating a cause of action or the elements required to state a claim are identical under domestic and foreign law. Instead, we necessarily focus on the fundamentals of the cause of action underlying the foreign judgment and defenses thereto, “not the differences in the bodies of law” or in the way in which remedies are afforded. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 995 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Turner, 303 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). That a particular cause of action does not exist, or that a particular claim would not be cognizable, in California does not obligate us to refuse enforcement of a judgment, as long as the existence of the cause of action is not itself repugnant to California public policy. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 482 cmt. f (1987); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 117 (1971). Here, the Church was held liable under article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code, which provides that “[a] person who has intentionally or negligently infringe[d] any right of others, or legally protected interest of others, shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in consequence.” Minpô [Civ. C.] art. 709 (Japan). There is nothing repugnant to California public policy about providing a damages remedy for intentional or negligent injury to others’ rights or protected interests. California tort law—and American tort law generally—does exactly that. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1714. And, while a party’s status as a religious entity or believer may bear on certain relevant inquiries, such as whether the party may assert a Religion Clause defense, that does not render the party immune from liability under tort law. Cf. Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 480–81 (explaining that an entity’s status as a news publication may bear on its assertion OHNO V . YASUMA 43 of a “fair use” defense but does not entitle it to immunity from liability under intellectual property laws). Accordingly, the general availability of a tort remedy in Japan for a suit against a church is not, on its face, repugnant to California public policy. We look next at the particular claims on which the tort cause of action was based. Ohno’s claims are analogous to actions for undue influence, fraud, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unjust enrichment under California law. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1572 (fraud), 1575 (undue influence); 1714 (liability for willful or negligent injury to others).25 The Church maintains that claims of undue influence, fraud, negligent or intentional infliction of emotion distress, or unjust enrichment are not cognizable in California if the defendants’ actions giving rise to liability were facially religiously motivated. At the level of generality at which this assertion is made, it is false. American courts can recognize tort liability for acts assertedly motivated by religion. The Religion Clauses do not bar tort claims against a religious entity or its members, so long as adjudicating the cause of action does not require a 25 The Supreme Court of California and California Courts of Appeal have recognized actions for relief under the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment. See Ghirardo v. Antonioli, 14 Cal. 4th 39 (1996) (recognizing a cause of action for unjust enrichment upon a showing that the defendant received benefit through another’s known mistake, fraud, coercion or other tortious conduct); see also Hernandez v. Lopez, 180 Cal. App. 4th 932, 938 (2009) (“The doctrine applies where plaintiffs, while having no enforceable contract, nonetheless have conferred a benefit on defendant which defendant has knowingly accepted under circumstances that make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for its value.”). 44 OHNO V . YASUMA court to judge the validity of religious beliefs or interfere with ecclesiastical decisionmaking regarding self-governance or employment. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n for Unification of World Christianity, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1115–16 (1988); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 956, 959–62 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bollard v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945–47 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Religion Clause protections “embrace[] two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); see also Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1128 (9th Cir. 2009); Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1112. Conduct, including speech-based conduct such as solicitation, “remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.” Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304. So recognizing, California courts have entertained claims of fraud, undue influence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress brought against religious entities by former members seeking recovery of donations and damages for harm. See, e.g., Molko, 46 Cal. 3d 1092; Wollersheim v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 212 Cal. App. 3d 872 (1989) (“Wollersheim I”), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 499 U.S. 914 (1991), amended by 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532 (Ct. App. 1992) (“Wollersheim II”).26 Religiously 26 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded Wollersheim I for reconsideration of the punitive damages award in light of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). See Wollersheim, 499 U.S. 914 (1991). On remand, Wollersheim II “incorporated intact and unaltered” the portion of Wollersheim I that “dealt exhaustively with the tort [and] freedom of religion” issues. Wollersheim II, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534 n.1. The California Supreme Court subsequently granted review of Wollersheim II, see 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 182 (1992), but, “following the OHNO V . YASUMA 45 motivated gifts have been set aside on a strong showing of undue influence by religious advisors over the testamentary act. See Sunland Home Found., Inc. v. Bourquin (In re Estate of Bourquin), 161 Cal. App. 2d 289, 299–300 (1958). With respect to speech related to solicitation for a religious cause, there is no categorical bar under domestic law to a claim in tort. The state is “free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort or convenience.” Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 306–07. The preservation of this state regulatory authority is important, given that speech may be the vehicle through which undue influence is exerted, depending on the context and manner in which it is conveyed. See, e.g., Dovydenas v. The Bible Speaks (In re The Bible Speaks), 869 F.2d 628, 645–46 (1st Cir. 1989) (rejecting a church’s First Amendment defense against claims that it exerted undue influence to obtain gifts because the court’s findings rested on the church’s secular statements and actions). There are, to be sure, definite limitations on what constitutes under California law a cognizable tort claim arising from facially religious conduct: No cause of action will be recognized where a plaintiff challenges the verity of religious statements or beliefs. “It is settled that inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs is foreclosed by constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), the California Supreme Court dismissed its prior grant of review.” Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim, 42 Cal. App. 4th 628, 637 (1996). Accordingly, Wollersheim II and Wollersheim I— to the extent the earlier opinion was incorporated into the later one—remain good law. 46 OHNO V . YASUMA courts may ask only whether the proponent of a particular religion holds his beliefs honestly and in good faith.” Hallinan v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F. (In re Estate of Supple), 247 Cal. App. 2d 410, 414 (1966) (refusing to pass on the truth of religious statements alleged to have unduly influenced a testator’s actions). And the California Court of Appeal has refused to entertain actions that require the court to determine whether the actions of an individual not party to the lawsuit were induced by faith or coercive persuasion. Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952 (1977) (overturning conservatorship orders granted to parents of members of the Unification Church who claimed their children were brainwashed). Similarly, under the Religion Clauses, claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against churches or other religious entities “based merely on threats of divine retribution” will not be allowed to proceed, Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1120, because such threats, like “‘hell fire and damnation’” preaching, are protected religious speech and cannot form the basis of a claim for emotional distress, Wollersheim I, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 892–93. Under California law, suits alleging purely emotional injury due to such religious expression are not permitted, given that “[i]t is one of the functions of many religions to ‘afflict the comfortable.’” Id. at 892. And California courts have declined to recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of religiously motivated conduct because “religious organizations owe no duty to members or former members with respect to these forms of [emotional] injury.” Id. at 901. As noted above, the Japanese law under which the Church was sued permits liability for the infringement of another’s rights based either on an intentional or negligent state of OHNO V . YASUMA 47 mind. See Minpô [Civ. C.] art. 709 (Japan). To the extent that Ohno’s claim amounted to one for merely negligent infliction of emotional distress as a result of facially religious conduct, it may not have been cognizable under California law. But California courts have pronounced no bar to claims for negligent infliction of economic injury, and Ohno clearly asserted pecuniary losses as well as pain and suffering. Moreover, the reason the California Court of Appeal has given for barring recovery from religious entities for the negligent infliction of emotional distress is not that such liability necessarily offends the Religion Clauses, but rather that religious organizations have no duty of care to avoid causing their members emotional injury. See Wollersheim I, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 900–01. If such a duty of care exists under Japanese law, this difference from California law does not denote repugnance to a public policy embodied in the Religion Clauses. Ohno’s claims, which relate to economic as well as emotional injury, do not directly impugn the Church’s religious beliefs or teachings. The Japanese trial court rejected the Church’s argument that the lawsuit was a purely religious dispute and explicitly disavowed the notion that it was scrutinizing the Church’s beliefs, stating that there was no “need to make a judgment about the religious teaching itself, in order to make a determination about the validity of [Ohno’s] claim.” The court further recognized that solicitation of donations by religious entities is legal and protected from liability in Japan, so long as the methods used are within the scope of what is “socially appropriate.” Where inducement of donations incite anxiety, confusion, or terror, however, such that the donation cannot be considered to be based on the individual’s free will, then a tort can be established. It was within these parameters that the Japanese 48 OHNO V . YASUMA court adjudicated Ohno’s claims. Far from being so divergent from domestic legal principles as to be repugnant to public policy, the causes of action underlying the Japanese judgment were generally similar to, although possibly broader than, those that would be cognizable under California law. In other words, had Ohno alleged that she had been tortiously induced to donate hundreds of thousands of dollars to a church in California, she could have sued the religious entity or its officers here, too. Whether she would prevail on the particular facts of her case or whether the defendants could successfully raise constitutional defenses to any of her claims is a separate question, which we address next. We are not persuaded that the cause of action underlying the Japanese judgment is antithetical to California public policy regarding religious freedom. iv. Repugnancy of the Japanese Judgment We turn next to the repugnancy of the judgment itself. The Church contends that the judgment is repugnant to public policy because it is incompatible with the Religion Clauses of the California and Federal Constitutions in two respects: First, the judgment necessarily involved an assessment by the court of the validity of the Church’s religious teachings; and, second, the imposition of tort liability placed a burden on the Church’s exercise of its religion without a compelling state interest in doing so. As will appear, the first contention is unsupported in the record. And the second cannot be grounds for declaring the judgment repugnant to public policy precisely because it presents a close question under California and federal law. In this context, where a repugnancy determination hinges on a definitive finding of conflict OHNO V . YASUMA 49 between foreign and domestic law, the debatability of the validity of the Church’s legal position is its downfall.
Ohno’s tort suit rests largely on fact-bound determinations regarding the nature of the actions that gave rise to her asserted injuries. Ohno contends that “the actual [Japanese] judgment was manifestly and explicitly concerned with conduct—the coercion, the overpowering of [her] own will, the deprivation of medications, the destruction of family relations, and the targeted fleecing of [her] assets.” The Church, however, characterizes the Japanese judgment as imposing liability for Ohno’s reactions to its “protected religious speech about the consequences of disobedience to God’s commandments.” By its plain language, the Japanese judgment does appear to attach liability to the speech of a religious entity: The illegal act is described as “inducement” or “solicitation,” based on “fraudulent and intimidating statements.” But the Japanese trial court neither limited its focus to speech that was religious in nature nor rested its ruling on findings regarding the content of any religious speech at issue. The court made findings related to the Church’s communications with Ohno regarding her living situation, contact with her family, and medical care, as well as pressure exerted on her to transfer funds to the Church, any or all of which may have been secular in nature. And while the judgment recounts the substance of some of the Church’s teachings, the court’s language suggests that it attributed the harms Ohno suffered not to the content of the Church’s threats, but to the context in which they were made—that Ohno was isolated from her family, not taking medication for her depression, and 50 OHNO V . YASUMA suffering from general ataxia. The judgment states that the Church’s conduct in soliciting money from Ohno, who was “under such a psychological condition,” “incite[d] anxiety” and “cause[d] terror,” such that the Transfers cannot be said to have been made of Ohno’s free will. The record does not support an inference that the Japanese court imposed liability because of the “specific motivating ideology,” opinion, or perspective behind the Church’s communication with Ohno, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995), or a finding regarding the truth or falsity of the Church’s religious beliefs, see Ballard, 322 U.S. at 87–88. While the facts of Ohno’s case may not be as egregious as those in Wollersheim and Molko, where the plaintiffs alleged they were physically coerced and deceived as to the identity of the church they were joining, the difference is a matter of degree, not kind. To be sure, California tort law would require proof of elements not found in the Japanese judgment. The tort of fraud under California law, for example, requires intent to defraud. See Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1108; Collins v. eMachines, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 4th 249, 259 (2011). Similarly, to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in California, a plaintiff must show intent to cause, or reckless disregard for, emotional injury. Wollersheim I, 212 Cal. App. 3d at 881. And under California law, “undue influence” consists in “the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him” or “taking an unfair advantage of another’s weakness of mind.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1575(1), (2) (emphasis added). OHNO V . YASUMA 51 The Japanese trial court’s judgment does not clearly establish either knowledge or intent on the part of Yasuma or Saints of Glory to “incite anxiety” or “cause terror.” Facts in the record such as Yasuma’s discouragement of the use of medication, Ohno’s regular attendance at Church services, and the Church’s oversight of her living situation permit an inference that Defendants were aware of Ohno’s vulnerable mental and physical condition, and knew or should have known of the likelihood of causing her emotional harm or exerting undue influence. But the record reflects no discrete findings regarding the Church’s knowledge of Ohno’s depression and ataxia, whether Yasuma held a position of confidence and authority over Ohno, and whether the Church intended to take advantage of her. For reasons we have surveyed, however, that the Japanese court did not find all the requisite elements of the causes of action for undue influence, fraud, or infliction of emotional distress under California law does not make the judgment antithetical to the basic precepts of tort law in this country, or to constitutional principles. Enforcing a defamation or libel judgment absent a finding of malice stands in direct tension with constitutional principles, because it punishes speech on the basis of content. In contrast, imposing tort liability absent a finding of intent, for actions that may or may not constitute protected religious conduct, does not give rise to the same stark clash of legal principles.
Even if a court in the United States could find the requisite elements of Ohno’s tort claims, the Church maintains, the Religion Clauses would bar recovery. But the record does not show that the Church has so clearly made out 52 OHNO V . YASUMA a viable Free Exercise defense as to render the Japanese judgment antithetical to the fundamental principles underlying American protection of freedom of religion. To invoke the protection of the Religion Clauses against a judgment in tort, the Church would have to demonstrate that imposing liability in damages substantially burdened its sincerely held religious beliefs or practices and that the state’s justifications for that burden did not outweigh any infringement on the Church’s religious freedom, under the applicable standard of scrutiny.27 See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the 27 A “valid and neutral [state] law of general applicability,” such as a domestic tort judgment similar to the Japanese judgment at issue here, that has the incidental effect of burdening the free exercise of religion no longer must withstand the “compelling interest” test articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), to survive constitutional scrutiny. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 885 (1990); accord Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993). “[A] religious objector has no federal constitutional right to an exemption from a neutral and valid [state] law of general applicability on the ground that compliance with that law is contrary to the objector’s religious beliefs.” N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 4th 1145, 1155 (2008) (emphasis omitted). As we explain below, however, we presume for purposes of our analysis that the tort judgment at issue here, had it been rendered by a domestic court, would have to survive strict scrutiny. “Under strict scrutiny, ‘a law could not be applied in a manner that substantially burden[s] a religious belief or practice unless the state show[s] that the law represent[s] the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest.’” Id. at 1158 (alterations in original) (quoting Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 527, 562 (2004)). OHNO V . YASUMA 53 burden.”); Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 1166–67 (1996). The threshold requirement for a defense based on the Religion Clauses is to show that one sincerely holds beliefs as religious views. Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). Courts typically give credence to assertions of sincerely held religious beliefs in absence of any challenge to their sincerity or religious motives, and so long as they are not “so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.” Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking the plaintiff’s assertion that his dietary needs were religiously motivated as prima facie evidence of sincere religious beliefs); Malik, 16 F.3d at 333 (giving credence to the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the reasons for his adoption of a Muslim name in absence of anything in the record challenging the sincerity of his religious beliefs). Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Church, as we must on review of summary judgment, we presume that their actions were based on sincerely held religious beliefs. Next, the Church would have to show that the order to pay damages to Ohno imposed a “substantial or, in other words, legally significant,” Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 12 Cal. 4th at 1166–67, burden on its exercise of religion. “[A] substantial burden must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise”; it must have a “tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs” or “exert[] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 54 OHNO V . YASUMA F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, “the burden of tort damages is direct.” Paul, 819 F.2d at 881. While a tort damages judgment does not criminalize the conduct for which liability is imposed, it effectively makes the challenged actions “unlawful.” Id. Here, however, it is questionable whether the Church could demonstrate that the burden imposed infringes on protected religious beliefs, not merely on conduct accompanied by such beliefs. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), rejected the notion that “when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation.” Id. at 882. Accordingly, that the Church’s conduct may have been motivated by religious convictions does not shield it from tort liability for injuries engendered by its actions. Even if we presume that the Church could show the imposition of tort liability to be a substantial burden on its religious exercise, it would still have to surmount a final hurdle: proving that its burden outweighed the governmental interest in the regulation of tortious activity. Again, construing the facts in favor of the Church, we presume that strict scrutiny would apply and the judgment could be upheld only upon demonstration that enforcement of tort law serves a compelling state interest. Paul, 819 F.2d at 882–83 & n.6 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)). This presumption is appropriate, as a law of general application that implicates “‘the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press’” remains subject to strict scrutiny. San Jose OHNO V . YASUMA 55 Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881). Because the Church contends that the imposition of tort liability here burdens its religious speech, this case might qualify as a “‘hybrid’” one in an American court, triggering strict scrutiny under federal constitutional law. See id. at 1031 (quoting Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1999)).28 But we are not persuaded that a California court could not conclude that “the state’s interest in allowing tort liability” as a means of protecting vulnerable individuals against undue influence, abuse of confidence for pecuniary gain, and fraud is compelling enough “to outweigh any burden” imposed on the Church’s action. See Molko, 46 Cal. 3d at 1117 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972)). Nor are we persuaded that a California court would not deem tort law the least restrictive means of pursuing the state’s compelling interests. This result is particularly likely given that the religious expression at issue here was targeted at Ohno specifically, rather than a more general audience. Holding the Church liable in this case may discourage it from 28 The California Supreme Court has expressed skepticism about the notion that a “hybrid claim” implicating more than one constitutional right is entitled to heightened scrutiny under the Federal Constitution. See N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc., 44 Cal. 4th at 1156–57. Regardless, federal law does not control California’s interpretation of the State Constitution. The California Supreme Court has not yet determined what standard should apply under the California Constitution to a valid, neutral state law of general applicability that burdens religious exercise. See id. at 1158. W hatever the California standard might be, it would not be stricter than strict scrutiny. Id. at 1159–60 (citing Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., 32 Cal. 4th at 559, 562). For our purposes, we assume that a tort judgment imposing liability for facially religious conduct would need to survive strict scrutiny under either the California or the Federal Constitution, or both. 56 OHNO V . YASUMA soliciting funds in the manner pursued here, from individuals in a comparable psychological or medical state, or from otherwise exerting undue influence to obtain donations in the future. It does not, however, substantially inhibit Yasuma and Saints of Glory from practicing their religion or disseminating their teachings. Construing the facts in the Church’s favor, Ohno may well have failed to prevail in a California court on all her claims. But it is far from “clear-cut,” Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986), and so certainly debatable, whether the Religion Clauses would bar an American court from issuing the same judgment had the suit been brought here. Moreover, as we cannot say, on the record before us, that a court in this country could not have rendered the judgment for Ohno had the events occurred entirely within the United States, then we certainly cannot conclude that a domestic court could not have issued the judgment where, as here, the challenged conduct was directed at an individual in Japan. In sum, the Japanese award cannot be said to fall into the narrow class of judgments that must be refused enforcement because repugnant to public policy. Neither the law applied nor the particular judgment issued is “so antagonistic” to the public policy embodied in the Religion Clauses, Crockford’s Club Ltd., 203 Cal. App. 3d at 1406, or so “inherently vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense,” Viewfinder, 489 F.3d at 479–80, as to preclude recognition.29 29 W e likewise reject the Church’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in denying the Church’s motion for a continuance for the purpose of developing evidence. The Church’s motion under former OHNO V . YASUMA 57