Opinion ID: 1864317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Defendant's right to remain silent.

Text: A prosecutor's comment on a defendant's silence in the defendant's trial is a violation of an accused's right to remain silent under the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution and under article I, § 12, of the Nebraska Constitution. State v. Donald, 199 Neb. 70, 256 N.W.2d 107 (1977); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). The prohibition against a prosecutor's comment on a defendant's right to remain silent applies throughout a trial, including the opening statement and closing argument during the defendant's trial. State v. Turner, 433 A.2d 397 (Me.1981). In an opening statement for a jury trial, a prosecutor's comment concerning the necessity of the defendant's testimony or an expression concerning the plausibility or credibility of anticipated testimony from a defendant violates an accused's right to remain silent at trial. For example, a prosecutor's comments or expressions in opening statements were improper in the following: Meadows v. State, 291 Ark. 105, 111, 722 S.W.2d 584, 587 (1987) (question, `What's he going to say after all this evidence is presented?'); Smith v. State, 358 So.2d 1137 (Fla.App.1978) (comment that the basic issue was witness credibility whether the jury would believe the State's witnesses or the defendant); Knopp v. State, 233 Ind. 435, 120 N.E.2d 268 (1954) (comment that the defendant was afraid to take the witness stand because the defendant knew what the prosecutor would do to him on cross-examination); State v. Turner, supra at 401 (comment that the `defendant will surely try to raise doubts in your mind' about the perpetrator's identity in the crime charged); Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (in a murder trial and in reference to a firearm with a silencer, the prosecutor turned to the defendant and asked, `[W]here did you get it?'). The fact that Pierce actually testified renders the prosecutor's remark no less objectionable and reprehensible. In Coleman v. The State, 111 Ind. 563, 565, 13 N.E. 100, 101 (1887), during opening statement the prosecutor told the jury: `You should watch the evidence closely. We do not know that the defendant will go upon the stand. He has not been sworn; I noticed that. If he should go upon the stand you should watch' at which point defense counsel objected. Later, the defendant testified on his own behalf. The Indiana Supreme Court stated: The effect of the remarks must have been either to coerce the defendant to testify, as has been said, with a halter about his neck, or to induce him to remain silent, with knowledge that the jury had been challenged in the outset to observe whether or not he would go upon the stand, under the goad of the prosecutor's statement. Id. at 566, 13 N.E. at 101. See, also, State v. Lindsey, 578 S.W.2d 903 (Mo.1979) (prosecutor's statement in opening, `Mr. Lindsey doesn't have to go forward with any evidence if he doesn't wish to. He doesn't have to take the stand if he doesn't want to' (emphasis omitted); held, a defendant's right to remain silent prohibits not only a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify but also a prosecutor's comment which compels a defendant to testify). An accused's right to remain silent at trial, accorded by the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 12, of the Nebraska Constitution, is not limited to a statement concerning a defendant's failure to testify at trial, but includes the prosecutor's use of any language or device which compels a defendant to testify. In Pierce's case, then, at issue is the prosecutor's comment in his opening statement that Pierce will testify but we do not know which version of the facts to which he will testify. Did the prosecutor's statement violate Pierce's constitutional right to remain silent and inject unfair prejudice into Pierce's trial? The prosecutor's remark immediately made Pierce's credibility an issue in the case before introduction of any evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor's remark presented a dilemma: Pierce could remain silent and thereby give credence to, or even substantiate, the invidious innuendo that he had previously given inconsistent versions of the incident on which the criminal charge was based, or Pierce could take the witness stand and recount a version without any inconsistency, thereby responding to the prosecutor's intimation of inconsistency but subjecting himself to cross-examination. If Pierce failed to take the stand, the jury might conclude that his silence buttressed the prosecutor's remark about Pierce's multiple versions of the incident, that is, Pierce did not have a consistent credible account of the incident and remained silent to avoid entanglement in a web of inconsistency as an indication of guilt. On the other hand, if Pierce did take the stand, but failed to provide an absolutely consistent account of the incident, the jury might indulge in the belief that Pierce's guilt or innocence turned on consistency in Pierce's testimony rather than the State's meeting its burden to prove Pierce's guilt by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. In this manner, the State suggested the hypothesis to the jury: If Pierce's testimony involved any inconsistency, his guilt was established. [W]e do not know which version of the facts to which he will testify. In that statement, the prosecutor informed the jury that Pierce had expressed more than one version or account of the incident in question. How did the prosecutor know that Pierce had expressed more than one version? The very insinuation of multiple versions could lead a jury to believe that Pierce, before trial, had admitted his criminality in the charged offense. At that point, in-court evidence would be relegated to irrelevance because Pierce had already admitted his guilt. We conclude that the prosecutor's statement in his opening address to the jury compelled Pierce to testify and was a violation of Pierce's constitutional right to remain silent. We do not decide whether any appropriate cautionary instruction might have eliminated the prejudice from the prosecutor's statement inasmuch as no instruction was given concerning the prosecutor's comment. See State v. Ross, 220 Neb. 843, 846, 374 N.W.2d 228, 230 (1985): `[A]n objection followed by admonition or instruction is typically presumed to be sufficient to dispel prejudice.' (Quoting from United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed. 2d 1 (1985).) See, also, State v. Borchardt, 224 Neb. 47, 395 N.W.2d 551 (1986). Therefore, the prosecutor's misconduct in his opening statement to the jury prevented a fair trial for Pierce, whose motion for mistrial should have been granted under the circumstances. Consequently, we set aside Pierce's conviction for criminal mischief.