Opinion ID: 222924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Infringement on right against self incrimination

Text: Nor do we find plain error in the district court's query to Barrington during sentencing as to whether he maintained that he did nothing wrong. Near the end of the sentencing hearing, after Barrington's allocution, the district court addressed him: Mr. Barrington, I sat through your trial. As you know, I was the trial judge. I heard all of the testimony, including yours. And I have yet to hear you say you did wrong. Do you still maintain that you did nothing wrong? Through counsel, Barrington declined to respond. Counsel explained that if Barrington had not made a showing of remorse, it's because of my advice, not that it's not coming from him, Your Honor. Barrington did not object under the Fifth Amendment to the district court's question. Accordingly, we review for plain error. Aguillard, 217 F.3d at 1320. Barrington contends that the district court's question infringed upon his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Since Barrington cites Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), we construe his contention to be that the district court impermissibly drew an adverse inference from Barrington's refusal to answer the question and considered that inference in determining the appropriate sentence. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 328-330, 119 S.Ct. 1307 (determining, in cocaine conspiracy case where the defendant pled guilty, no negative factual inference may be drawn from a defendant's silence during sentencing with respect to the extent of her participation in the cocaine offense and the amount of cocaine attributable to the defendant). [16] The privilege against self-incrimination applies in a sentencing hearing, and any effort to compel a defendant to testify against his will during sentencing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1873, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). And when a defendant shows some sign of remorse but exercises constitutional or statutory rights to remain silent, the sentencing judge may not balance the exercise of those rights against the defendant's expression of remorse to determine whether the `acceptance' [of responsibility] is adequate. United States v. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d 193, 197 (11th Cir.1992)(per curiam)(determining, in a cocaine conspiracy case, that the district court erred in denying the defendant a reduction in the offense level calculations for acceptance of responsibility based on consideration of defendant's intention to appeal verdict and refusal to admit guilt in open court). Mitchell and Rodriguez, however, are factually different because they involve specific Guidelines calculations and other matters, and did not directly address whether the defendant's silence, after some allocution, can bear generally upon a lack of remorse. [17] We need not address that question because the alleged error did not affect Barrington's substantial rights in any event. While Barrington did not expressly address his involvement in the offense when he allocuted, Barrington certainly attempted to portray himself in a favorable light, alluding to what he had learned from his experience in custody, his attempts to assist other prisoners in attaining their GEDs, and his plan to leave prison a better person. Conspicuously absent from his allocution was any acknowledgment of the offenses for which he had been convicted, or any semblance of remorse. That, coupled with Barrington's trial testimony, apparently prompted the district court to pose the challenged query. We acknowledge that the district court's question (Do you still maintain that you did nothing wrong?) and subsequent observation that Barrington had not accepted responsibility might otherwise suggest that it engaged in an impermissible balancing of Barrington's lack of acceptance of responsibility against his exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights. Considered in the proper context, however, the question and comment, even if error, did not affect Barrington's substantial rights. In allocuting, Barrington offered nothing by way of remorse, apologizing only to his mother. And it was undisputed that Barrington did not qualify for a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines. During his trial testimony, despite overwhelming evidence against him, Barrington maintained that he had done nothing wrong. Barrington's trial testimony impacted his sentence in two ways. First, the district court found that Barrington's trial testimony was materially false and imposed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. [18] Second, contrasting the evidence of good character Barrington presented at sentencing with his lack of acceptance of responsibility during the trial, the district court noted the overwhelming evidence of guilt displayed an arrogance and contempt for the law. It is apparent that the district court's question, considered in light of the overwhelming evidence and Barrington's demeanor at trial, was simply an attempt to determine whether Barrington, having had time to reflect, was the least bit remorseful. He was not. Further, Barrington's failure to accept responsibility was an appropriate consideration in the determination of his sentence. Rodriguez, 959 F.2d at 197 (The sentencing court is justified in considering the defendant's conduct prior to, during, and after the trial to determine if the defendant has shown any remorse through his actions or statements.). His lack of remorse, coupled with his false trial testimony, obstructive conduct during the investigation, and what the district court described as his arrogance and contempt for the law, certainly justified the sentence imposed, which we note was at the low-end of the Guidelines range. Finally, Barrington's contention that the district court drew an adverse inference from his silence is entirely speculative. Nothing in the district court's comments evinced an intent to impose a more severe sentence based on Barrington's failure to respond to the district court's question. [19] Barrington merely assumes that the district court relied on an adverse inference in view of the perceived harshness of his sentence. However, his low-end Guidelines sentence belies any such inference having been drawn by the district court. We find no plain error which affected Barrington's substantial rights.