Opinion ID: 8487230
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Issues Arising During Trial

Text: A, Prosecutor’s Statements During Opening and Closing Appellant Williams (joined by all other appellants on appeal) argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial based upon alleged improper statements made by the prosecution during its opening statement and initial closing argument. 1. Opening Statement In its opening statement, the prosecution referred to the inscription on the Supreme Court building, “Equal Justice Under Law,” and emphasized to the jurors their role in enforcing the laws. While the prosecution was discussing this theme, the trial court sua 'sponte instructed the prosecution, “I [ ] want you to focus on what the evidence is going to show; this is not a closing argument” and gave the same instruction again in response to an objection by the defense. The prosecution obliged, but at times continued with its theme of asking the jurors to enforce the rule of law and emphasized that “vigilante justice” occurs “when individuals take the law into their own hands.” During a break in the prosecutor’s opening statement, the trial court responded to all objections .raised by the defense. Williams’s counsel went a step further by moving for a mistrial, arguing to the court that the prosecution’s “public policy” theme was improper. The trial court denied Williams’s motion, but acknowledged the merits of the objections and reminded the prosecutor twice that the court had to interject and ask him not to make arguments. The trial court clarified that the references to the inscription on the Supreme Court were improper and cautioned the prosecutor not to make further references. - During a second break in the opening statement, the trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection to the prosecution’s statement that its role was to “fairly enforc[e] the criminal laws,” and thus, the government would not ignore the retaliatory shooting against Orlando. The trial court stated that it would allow the prosecution; “a little bit of leeway” in describing its role in that way,’ since the prosecution would later be calling Jordan Howe’s god-brother, Morgan, as a government witness. ' Once the prosecution completed its opening statemént, Williams’s’ counsel requested a curative instruction from the court to address the “emotional nature” of some of the prosecution’s opening statement. The prosecution did not object to the instruction, but stated that it did not believe the instruction-was necessary and that if the court would give one, it requested’that the instruction be given after all of counsels’ opening statements. The trial court agreed that the instruction would be appropriate due to some emotional reactions in the courtroom during the prosecution’s opening statement’ and the court stated that it would give the instruction after all of the opening statements. The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury after opening statements: “Ladies and gentlemen, this case may evoke emotions from witnesses and others. I want to remind you that you are to base the verdicts in this case on the evidence and the law as I instruct you[,] not ... on emotions.” 2. Closing Argument Additionally, Williams takes issue with several statements made by the prosecution during its initial closing argument, as well as the prosecution’s use of a photograph. While there were several objections raised by the defense, none of the defense counsel moved for a mistrial during the prosecution’s closing argument. Williams argues that the trial court should have sua sponte declared a mistrial due to improper comments made by the prosecution. Williams claims the following comments by the prosecution during its closing argument were improper. First, Williams argues that the prosecution’s characterization of certain government witnesses as “heroes” was improper. During its closing, the prosecution stated that the actions of government witness Michael White, who testified that, he came forward to police officers with information about the South Capitol Street shooting because he was tired of the violence, was “heartening.” Williams’s counsel objected to this characterization, but the trial court did not respond. The prosecution also stated- that Antonio Alston, Williams’s cousin, who came forward and exonerated a juvenile that MPD officers had initially mistakenly identified as the driver of the minivan in the South Capitol Street shooting was a “hero” and to “bless him for that.” The prosecutor stated further, “[i]f we’re not about truth and we’re not about justice, then we’re not about anything.” Later the prosecution told the jury that Alston was doing “God’s work” upon which defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Second, Williams argues the prosecution’s statements that the jury should be “proud” of how MPD conducted its investigation, were improper. The prosecution also asked the jury if they would have had the police stop the investigation after Orlando and Simms had been chased down. The defense objected, and the trial court called all defense counsel to the bench to address their objections simultaneously. The trial court ruled that because there were attacks by the defense on the police’s investigation of the case, the government could “comment on the quality -of the investigation,” but also acknowledged that the prosecution should not suggest that the jurors should show their appreciation for the police department though their verdicts. The court gave a curative instruction, recommended by the defense, that the jury should “determine' the facts in [the] case without prejudice, fear, sympathy or favoritism,” but the court also balanced this instruction with a statement that it is proper for the attorneys to comment on the quality of the police investigation. Third, Williams challenges the prosecution’s use of the photograph of .one of the victims, William Jones, lying dead at;the scene of the South Capitol Street shooting, during its closing argument. For context, prior to trial,-Williams’s counsel objected particularly to the government’s use of this photograph of Jones. The government responded that the photograph was appropriate to support an inference of intent to kill by the appellants who used high power weapons, like the AK-47. The court ultimately found the photograph admissible to meet the government’s burden of proof, but noted it would reconsider “if suddenly there [was] a whole mass of these same photographs over and over and over again.” Defense counsel challenged the prosecution’s use of the photograph as an exhibit in its closing argument, asserting that the photograph was blown up and was provoking an emotional reaction from the audience. The trial court overruled the objection, finding that although someone in the audience left the courtroom because of an emotional response to the photograph, the prosecution had used the photograph, not .to evoke emotion, but for a “legitimate purpose” of showing the power of the AK-47. Williams now essentially makes the same argument on appeal: that the prosecution’s use of the photograph of Jones prejudiced the defense because the prosecution, “intentionally showed that graphic [photograph] ... when other more appropriate ones were available ... simply for its ... emotional impact upon the jury.” Finally, Williams states that the prosecution’s final statement to the jury during its closing that “[t]he families here are not asking you for vengeance. They’re only asking you for justice,” was improper. 3. Legal Principles “The purpose of an opening statement is to give the broad outlines of the case to enable the jury to comprehend it.” Bailey v. United States, 831 A.2d 973, 981 (D.C. 2003) (emphasis added) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Therefore, “an opening statement should not be argumentative, nor should it appeal to the passions and sympathies of the jury.” Id. at 981 (internal citation omitted). However, in closing argument, counsel is permitted to make arguments and commentary “as long as it is in the general nature of argument, and not an outright expression of opinion.” Burgess v. United States, 786 A.2d 561, 571 (D.C. 2001) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Both “the scope and extent of [an] opening statement,” as well as “[t]he regulation of closing argument” are left to the discretion of the trial judge. Jennings v. United States, 431 A.2d 552, 560 (D.C. 1981); Anthony v. United States, 935 A.2d 275, 283 (D.C. 2007). Therefore, regarding the issue of an improper statement by counsel during an opening statement or closing argument, “[t]he question of what, if any, remedial action is appropriate is committed to the trial judge’s discretion ... ‘and we do not lightly overturn [its] discretionary rulings.’” Simmons v. United States, 940 A.2d 1014, 1024-25 (D.C. 2008) (footnote omitted). When evaluating claims of prosecutorial error, we must first determine whether the challenged statements from the prosecutor, viewed in context, were, in fact, improper. Bailey, supra, 831 A.2d at 981. If the statements were improper and the claim was properly preserved at trial, a reversal is only warranted if the statements caused “substantial prejudice.” Freeman v. United States, 689 A.2d 575, 584 (D.C. 1997). “The applicable test for prejudice is whether we can say, ‘with fair assurance ... that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’” Anthony, supra, 935 A.2d at 284 (citations omitted); see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (announcing the harmless error standard). The four factors to be considered when determining prejudice are “ T) the gravity of the impropriety, 2) its relationship to the issue of guilt, 3) the effect of any corrective action by the trial judge, and 4) the strength of the government’s case.’ ” Fearwell v. United States, 886 A.2d 95, 102 (D.C. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Bailey, supra, 831 A.2d at 981. 4. Analysis The statements made by the prosecution during its opening statement and closing argument can be addressed in tandem. Williams argues that this court must consider the cumulative effects of the prosecutor’s statements, instead of reviewing the statements in isolation. The government argues that the prosecution’s references to the inscription at the Supreme Court were merely a statement of the government’s theory of the case, and thus were not improper. The government also argues that the prosecution’s statements during closing argument were all permissible forms of argument. a. Statements in Opening Statement To begin, the prosecution’s thematic discussion of “Equal Justice Under Law,” and its comments that the defendants had taken the law into their own hands, did not appear to cross the line of permissible opening statements, as the comments were not argumentative. See Bailey, supra, 831 A.2d at 981. However, even if the comments were improper, in the context of this case, the prosecution’s elaboration on this theme was not so grave as to warrant a mistrial. The statements came at the beginning of a long line of opening statements by counsel, in a three-month long trial, and were only statements enunciating a theory of the case, not statements specifically “related to the evidence in the cape.” Id. at 985, Williams makes no specific argument on appeal as to how the statements may have affected the outcome of the trial. See id. (“Appellant has not persuaded us that [the prosecutor’s improper statements] made any real difference in the outcome of the proceedings.”). Moreover, the trial judge was attentive to defense counsel’s concerns and objections, and even interjected sua sponte to instruct the prosecution “to focus on what the evidence is going to show” and not to give a closing argument. See id. at 986; see also Wright v. United States, 508 A.2d 915, 921 (D.C. 1986) (“[T]he court may curtail an opening statement that becomes argumen-' tative or inflammatory.”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court’s decision not to grant Williams’s motion for a mistrial due to the government’s opening statement was proper, especially because “a mistrial is a severe remedy ... one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor.” Trotter v. United States, 121 A.3d 40, 53 (D.C. 2015) (brackets, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted). It was well within the trial court’s discretion to decide, alternatively, to give a curative instruction to the jury to “base [their] verdicts ... on the evidence and ... not ... on emotions” and defense counsel all agreed to this instruction. See id. at 54 (“The trial court was in a position to evaluate the impact of the prosecutor’s [] comments and the likely efficacy of a curative instruction.”) (footnote and internal quotations omitted). b. Statements and Use of a Photograph in Closing Argument Similarly, the statements made by the prosecution during its closing argument did not warrant a mistrial. First, the prosecution’s references to the quality of the police investigation and its statements that the jury should be “proud” of MPD officers were not improper when considered in context. The prosecutor is allowed to respond to defense counsel’s attacks regarding the quality of the police investigation during trial because “it is in the general nature of argument, and not' an outright expression of opinion.” See Burgess, supra, 786 A.2d at 571 (quoting Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 36 (D.C. 1989)). For example, in Bailey, a prosecutor glorified a police, investigation and his “heroism” in its opening statement and this court held that, while the statements “came close” to the limits of permissible comment, they “did not cross the line, nor ... warrant a mistrial.” Bailey, supra, 831 A.2d at 983. The prosecutor’s references in this case to government witness Alston as a “hero”- and to government witness White’s actions as -“heartening” are similar. Especially in light of the latitude afforded to counsel during closing argument, such statements were not impermissible characterizations in response to defense counsel’s cross-examinations of those witnesses. Additionally, the statements did not- urge the jurors to place themselves “in the position of the victim,” nor did the statements rise to the level of an appeal “to the jury’s emotions.” See Tyree v. United States, 942 A.2d 629, 643 (D.C. 2008) (“This court has repeatedly cautioned that it is improper for the prosecutor to seek to place the jurors in the position of the victim.”). Next, while the prosecutor’s final comment during closing argument that “the families here are not asking you for vengeance. They’re only asking you for justice,” may have appealed' to the sympathy of the jurors, the prosecution did not cross the line by asking the jurors to “send a message to the defendant^]” or to the community with their verdicts, which is “something we have repeatedly condemned.” Bailey, supra, 831 A.2d at 984 (internal quotation marks omitted). Again, Williams has not alleged any specific prejudice that flowed from this final statement in the context of a three-month long trial and lengthy closing arguments by all counsel. See id. at 985 (finding that the prosecutor’s improper comments were not severely prejudicial, as they were made, in a “long closing, argument, after a . long trial, and they were not related to the evidence in the case”). . , . Finally, Williams’s challenge to the prosecutor’s-use of the photograph of William Jones during its closing argument is unavailing. The photograph was admitted into evidence, and as the trial court noted, the photograph was used by the prosecutor to show the high power of the AK-47 to infer appellants’ intent to kill. See Jones v. United States, 27 A.3d 1130, 1142 (D.C. 2011) (“The admission of photographs is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leasure v. United States, 458 A.2d 726, 728 n.2 (D.C. 1983) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photographs of the murder victim, as they had probative value, in confirming the identity of the victim, the location of the offense, the cause of death, and appellants’ malice and premeditation”) (internal citations omitted), B. Technical Issues With Husher Orlando, claims that he is entitled to a new. trial because, throughout trial, the courtroom “husher” failed to work properly and exposed the jury to prejudicial and extra-judicial information. He acknowledges, however, that his defense counsel did not raise the husher issue during trial, and that his counsel never made any assertions before the trial court that certain statements may have been 'overheard by the jurors during-bench conferences. Nevertheless, Orlando requests that this court' presume prejudice (1) due to the husher not working properly on at least two occasions within a two-week period of the trial, and (2) because the'judge did not conduct a hearing to determine if the jurors overheard any statements during bench conferences. 1. Additional Factual Background On February 16, 2012,, five days prior to the start of trial, the trial court explained to the jurors, “[t]he [purpose] of the bench conferences is so you won’t hear what we’re talking about. So please don’t try to read lips whenever we’re using them.” On the first day of trial on February 21, during a bench conference, the trial court indicated to one of the courtroom technicians, “Everybody’s able to hear me when I’m talking with the hushers.” Afterwards, the court called all counsel to the bench .and stated, “I think we have the hushers amped up now, so maybe it’ll work,” and then asked for those in the courtroom to let her know if they could hear the court when the husher was on. No one notified the court that they could hear the bench conferences that day. However, approximately two weeks , later, on March 1, during a bench conference, a juror notified the court that the juror could “almost hear [the bench] conversations sometimes ...(emphasis added). The court responded, “Thank you for letting me know” and told someone in the courtroom “the jurors are able to hear when the husher’s on, so we need to get that adjusted at our break, if we could.” The juror clarified ■ that, “It’s just some tones to the conversations. We’re trying not to [hear],” and the court responded, “Right. But I appreciate you telling me that. So thank you. It’s important to have private conversations here.” On March 7, the trial court stated, presumably to a courtroom technician, “Apparently the husher is still a bit of a problem. It is not being loud enough. If you could, during a break, adjust it, I would appreciate that.” The court advised counsel that they “need[ed] to talk very quietly if [they] are doing something at the bench because of it.” During bench conferences that day, no party suggested any further problems with the husher. On March 14, the court asked jurors if the husher was now effective and a juror responded that, “There just needs to be one more speaker.” The trial court then stated, “Okay. We’ll try to talk more quietly. If you can just raise your hand if . you’re hearing us. Thank you. But do make an effort not to listen.” The record does not show that any juror thereafter .raised a hand to indicate a further problem. During a bench conference later that day,.counsel and the court repeatedly reminded each other to keep their voices down. No counsel ever objected or made any requests to the court about the husher. On appeal, Orlando argues for the first time that the jurors were likely able to hear two bench conferences in particular. First is a. bench conference in which the trial court admonished Orlando’s trial counsel for “showboating?’ before the jury. Second is a bench conference during which Orlando’s counsel sought assurance from the prosecution that it would not elicit any testimony from government witness Ronald Ray that Orlando may have shot at Ray or-may have been involved with other persons Shooting at Ray; The first bench conference occurred on March 1, the'same day that the juror first alerted the court to a problem with the husher. During this conference, the trial court admonished Orlando’s counsel for doing “a big raising eyebrow thing in front of the jury” after the court’s rulings, and told counsel, “I don’t want you to be showboating in front of this jury by raising your eyebrows[.]” The judge pointed out to Orlando’s counsel, “there’s been twice in this trial now where after I ruled, you made a big show” and that she was “only using [the] opportunity to say [that] at the bench because [she didn’t] want to, repeat it.” The second bench conference occurred later that same day, immediately prior to government witness Ray’s testimony, where Orlando’s counsel stated to the court and the prosecutor, “I know that there’s some reference in some of the documents that ... Ray was of the thought that .,. Orlando .,. had something to do with someone shooting at him. I just wanted to make sure that [the prosecution was not] seeking to elicit any of those things.” The prosecutor responded, “I am not going to try to elicit those” and further stated that he did not intend “to get into anything [regarding Ray’s]. thoughts, as [Ray] said in the grand jury, that perhaps Orlando ... might have shot at [him].” 2. Legal Principles The trial court “has an obligation to investigate a plausible claim that the jury has been exposed to extrinsic evidence.” Garrett v. United States, 20 A.3d 745, 748 (D.C. 2011). Accordingly, “when it is alleged that a jury has been exposed to extrinsic evidence, the trial court should inquire as to the nature of the evidence and how the jury came to be exposed to. it.” Id. In circumstances in which “the impartiality of a juror has been plausibly called into question, it is the responsibility of the trial judge to hold a hearing to determine whether the allegation of bias has merit.” Medrano-Quiroz v. United States, 705 A.2d 642, 649 (D.C. 1997). However, “[a] trial judge [ ] does not need to engage in an inquiry when an allegation of [] reliance on extrinsic evidence is speculative.” Garrett, supra, 20 A.3d at 749. Orlando cites to Garrett and (Donald) Young for support. Garrett involved a juror note in which the jury asked the court if it could consider a statement a witness had muttered while on the stand, which was not in response to questioning by counsel. Id. at 747. Over the defense’s objection, the trial court sent back a note stating “yes,” without any inquiry into details of what the jury was referring to by “muttered utterance” because the court did not want to violate the jury’s deliberation process. Id. at 747. This court held that the trial court had abused its discretion because after receiving the jury note, the court had “an obligation to investigate” and to “inquire as to the nature of the [extrinsic] evidence and how the jury came to be exposed to it.” Id. at 748-49. In (Donald) Young, the trial court repeatedly criticized Young’s defense attorney throughout trial, often during the defense counsel’s cross-examination of government witnesses. (Donald) Young v. United States, 346 F.2d 793, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Following the trial court’s “severe criticism” of the defense attorney at bench conferences, the defense attorney notified the court the following day that a “number of bystanders” had informed him that they overheard “all of [those] bench conferences,” and the defense moved for a mistrial. Id. The court did not grant the defense’s request for a mistrial and simply stated in response, “[tjhere will be no more bench conferences,” Id. at 796. The D.C. Circuit held that the “court’s continual intervention” during the defense’s cross-examinations may have precluded the defense counsel from “devotfing] his best talents to the defense of his client.” Id. at 794-95 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The court further held that the trial court should have held a hearing to determine “whether counsel could produce witnesses to substantiate his allegations,” and that it was not confident that the jury did not hear the court’s remarks. Id. at 796. 3. Analysis This case is distinguishable from both Garrett and (Donald) Young because, here, neither Orlando’s trial counsel nor other defense counsel ever asserted to the trial court that the jury overheard certain statements made during bench conferences. Still, Orlando asserts on appeal that “jurors could overhear extremely prejudicial comments.” This claim is speculative without any record support that the jury actually overheard statements from either of the bench conferences that Orlando discusses. In fact, the record indicates that the trial court was very attentive to the husher issue, and repeatedly sought to ensure that the husher was working properly and to mitigate any concern. Specifically, the court instructed the jury not to try to overhear the bench conferences, informed the courtroom technician at least twice that the husher needed to be fixed, reminded counsel to speak quietly at bench conferences, and asked the jurors to notify the court if they could hear the bench conferences. Thus, the trial court carefully ensured that the jury was not exposed to “extrinsic evidence” from the bench, and there was no evidence that the jury, in fact, was exposed to or overheard any of the comments made during the bench conferences. Furthermore, the defense counsel never made any allegations or raised any concerns to the trial court that the jury may have overheard certain conversations at the bench. In such an instance where the trial court acted carefully in light of the issue with the husher, and given the lack of evidence that the jury actually overheard anything, the trial court did not have a duty to sua sponte inquire as to whether the jurors overheard the bench conferences that Orlando references here on appeal. Accordingly, we reject Orlando’s claim that the issue with the hush-er requires reversal of his convictions and a new trial. C. Statements Against Penal Interest Best argues that his video confession to his mother and his verbal confession to Salazar were both improperly admitted at trial as statements against his penal interest. Best claims that in admitting the statements, the trial court improperly applied prongs one and three under the Laumer standard, which governs the admission of statements against penal interest. See Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1979) (en banc). 31 Specifically, with regard to Best’s video confession to his mother, Best argues that the trial court improperly applied prong one of the Laumer standard because the' court failed to identify a particular statement made by Best, and instead only based its ruling on non-verbal responses from Best to Ms. Best, which did not rise to the level of “unambiguous assent” to Ms. Best’s statements. He also contends that it is unclear whether his non-verbal and verbal communications amounted to a confession, as opposed to a variety of other “plausible explanations” for his conduct. Best also argues that his gestures to his mother were untrustworthy as statements against his penal interest under prong three of Lau-mer because the gestures were subject to a non-incriminating interpretation — i.e., that he had dropped his head and cried to his mother, not out of an admission of guilt, but instead because he was upset that his mother had taken the side of the police. With respect to Best’s verbal confession to Salazar, Best argues that under the first prong of the Laumer standard, the trial court improperly concluded that Best made the reported statements to Salazar. Best also argues that his alleged statements to Salazar were untrustworthy under prong three of the Laumer standard because the statements were contradicted by evidence at trial. 1. Additional Factual Background a. Admission of Video Prior to trial, the court considered whether the video of Best’s non-verbal interactions with his mother should be admitted as a confession. The trial court ultimately concluded that Best made a statement against penal interest to his mother, stating that Best was not “simply silen[t]” in the video, but instead he and his mother were communicating with one another non-verbally. The court further stated, “There are nods[,] .... [Best’s] weeping, his asking to be hugged, the whole set of communications!;.]” The court also noted that the video shows Ms. Best’s own assessment of her son’s communication to her, which she understood as Best saying that he had been involved in the shootings. The court considered the defense’s assertions that Ms. Best had been misled by leading questions when she testified to the grand jury that her son had admitted his involvement to her. However, the court found that Ms. Best’s statements to the. grand jury corroborated the videotape. The trial court also stressed that by allowing admission of the video, the jury would not be “required to find that [Best] made a statement against interest,” but nonetheless the jury could reasonably make that finding if it chose to do so. The court stated to both the government and defense, “I too have watched this video many, many, many times. And there is this ... very tiny — and, again, it can be debated — but it is a tiny, what looks like a nod in agreement. And it’s part of the communication that went on there.” b. Admission of Salazar’s. Statements Prior to trial and after hearing arguments from the prosecution and from Best’s defense counsel regarding the admissibility of Best’s verbal. confession to Salazar, the trial court determined that Best’s statements .to Salazar were admissible as statements against penal interest. The court acknowledged that there were inconsistencies between Salazar’s testimony and other evidence in the case, 32 but found that those inconsistencies were “comparable to many inconsistent .statements we’ve seen throughout this trial of people who are fearful of getting involved ... and’who say-one thing and then later say something else.” The court noted that Salazar’s account was reliable because Best, and Salazar were close friends, so Salazar’s motive to fabricate his confession was not strong. The court also noted that Salazar’s account was .corroborated by other .evidence, including the video surveillance showing Best with the bag that Salazar stated that he had retrieved from her apartment and specific ■ details that Best told Salazar regarding the shooting, such as the fact that a girl had. been shot in the head, 2. Legal Principles The rationale behind the statement against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is that “reasonable people usually do not make statements against them penal interest unless the statements are true, [and thus,] the statements are reliable ... insofar as they genuinely increase the declarant’s exposure to criminal sanction.” Thomas v. United States, 978 A.2d 1211, 1227 (D.C. 2009) (footnote omitted). “[T]o ascertain whether a proffered statement is admissible under the penal interest exception, the trial court must undertake a'three-step factual analysis.” Id. at 1227-28. The court must determine: “(1) whether the declarant, in fact, made the reported statement; (2) whether the de-clarant is unavailable to testify; and (3) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.” Id. at 1228 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). . Best argues that the trial court erred in finding that prongs one and three were met with regard to his video confession to Ms. Best and his alleged confession to Salazar. In determining the first factor, whether the declarant in fact made the reported statement, the court looks to “the veracity of the witness who repeats the declaration.” Laumer, supra, 409 A.2d at 199. In determining the. third factor, the court must ascertain whether there are “corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement,” by looking at factors such as “(1) the time of the declaration and the party to whom the declaration was made; (2) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; [and] (3) the extent to which the declaration is really against the declarant’s penal interest.” Id. at 200 (citations omitted). The trial court’s conclusions that the video of Best’s confession to his mother and Salazar’s statements regarding Best’s confession were admissible as statements against penal interest are legal questions, which this court reviews de novo. Thomas, supra, 978 A.2d at 1225 (quoting Laumer, supra, 409 A.2d at 203). “However; [this court] will not disturb the factual findings supporting the [trial] court’s conclusion unless they are clearly erroneous.” Id. (footnote omitted). 3. Analysis a.. Best’s Video Confession With regard to Best’s video confession to his mother, after reviewing the videotape, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the video under the statement against penal interest hearsay exception. Whether Best nodded and thereby, in fact, made a statement is “essentially [a] factual determination” to which we give deference to the trial court, unless clearly erroneous. Walker v. United States, 167 A.3d 1191, 1209 (D.C. 2017) (“The clearly erroneous .standard precludes the- appellate court from setting aside a trial court’s finding of fact-unless the judgment' is plainly wrong-or without evidence to support it.”) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).. In making this factual determination, “the trial court’s focus is not on the' -truth of the declaration, but on the veracity of the witness who repeats the declaration.” McCorkle v. United States, 100 A.3d 116, 120 (D.C. 2014)' (citation omitted). In finding that Best’s non-verbal responses to his mother qualified as statements against his penal interest, the trial court made sufficient findings that prong one of the Lau-mer standard was satisfied because the court noted that Best. appeared to give a “tiny” nod. in response to his mother’s question about whether he had hurt anyone. The court also concluded that Ms. Best understood Best to be confessing to her, which was supported by her response to Best in the video, asking him, “What for? Cause he shot Orlando?” The court further noted that Best’s responses such as crying, lowering his head again, and asking his mother for a hug were further non-verbal and verbal communications that qualified as statements against penal interest. Best’s argument on appeal that his non-verbal responses to his mother could not constitute statements fails because Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (a), which this court has. adopted, clearly defines “statement” as an “oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.” Fed. R. Evid. 801 (a) (emphasis added); see also Little v. United States, 613 A.2d 880, 882 (D.C. 1992) (adopting Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (a)’s definition of “statement”). The trial court also made sufficient findings that prong three, whether Best’s statement bore indicia of trustworthiness, was met. In determining whether there are sufficient corroborating circumstances that indicate the reliability of the statement, “relevant considerations include: (1) the timing of the declaration; (2) to whom the statement was made; (3) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; and (4) the extent to which the declaration is really against the declarant’s interest.” Walker, supra, 167 A.3d at 1209 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). This does not require “that the information within the statement be clearly corroborated” but “only that there be corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement itself.” Ingram v. United States, 885 A.2d 257, 266 (D.C. 2005) (emphasis and citation omitted). “The corroboration requirement of this rule is a preliminary determination as to the statement’s admissibility, not an ultimate determination about the statement’s truth.” Id. (citation omitted). In making its findings as to prong three, the trial court noted that Best’s statements were corroborated both by Ms. Best’s contemporaneous understanding that Best was confessing to her, and by Ms. Best’s testimony to the grand jury that Best had admitted involvement to her while they were in the interrogation room. On this record, those findings are not clearly erroneous. We have previously noted that “the existence of a close relationship between the declarant and the witness also may provide indications of trustworthiness.” Laumer, supra, 409 A.2d at 201. The statements here were made to Best’s mother who Best presumably trusted — shortly after his arrest. See Anthony v. DeWitt, 295 F.3d 554, 564 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[Statements made to a family member or perceived ally, in confidence, have previously been deemed sufficiently trustworthy.”). Moreover, Best’s involvement in the shooting was significantly corroborated by both eyewitness testimony and DNA evidence implicating him. See, e.g., Walker, supra, 167 A.3d at 1210-11 (corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the statement where the statement was made two months after the shooting, to his then-girlfriend whom he presumably trusted, in private, and where the testimony of eyewitnesses and surveillance video supported his presence at the scene); Terry v. United States, 114 A.3d 608, 628-29 (D.C. 2015) (determining that sufficient corroborating circumstances justified admission of the defendant’s statements under the Laumer test because the statements were made to a neighbor, whom he had a close relationship with, the statements were made days after the shooting, and eyewitness testimony and DNA evidence clearly inculpated the defendant). Best asserts, however, that “as a matter of law,” the statements were not truly against his penal interest as his actions in the video could be construed in a way other than admitting guilt — such as remorse that his mother had “turned her back” on him and sided with the police— and therefore, one of the factors weighs against a finding of trustworthiness. Relying on Andrews v. United States, he avers that “if there are two possible interpretations of [a] statement ..., one of which would subject [the declarant] to criminal liability while the other would not, the necessary indicia of trustworthiness [as per Laumer's third prong] are absent.” 981 A.2d 571, 576 (D.C. 2009). There, we agreed with the trial court’s decision to exclude a proposed statement-against-interest because there were two possible meanings of the statement: one of which was incriminating and the other innocuous. In reaching that conclusion, we noted that there was “no evidence in the record to corroborate the statement that [appellants] tried to ‘set up’ all three (or any officers).” Id. (emphasis added). We encounter no such hurdle in this case. Upon review of the videotape, it would not be clearly erroneous to conclude that Best was non-verbally communicating with his mother, and thereby confessing his involvement in the shooting. Such an interpretation is sufficiently corroborated by other compelling, evidence detailing Best’s involvement, as well as Best’s own mother’s contemporaneous understanding of him to be confessing to her. Throughout their interaction, Ms. Best responded to Best’s non-verbal communication with additional questions tailored to what she believed the initial response had been. When asked whether he had hurt anyone, Ms. Best inquired “What for? Cause he shot Orlando?” after understanding Best’s-“tiny” nod to be confirmatory. She further solidified this understanding through her testimony to the grand jury in which she attested that Best had admitted involvement in the shooting to her while they were in the interrogation room. What is more, the entire exchange was captured on video. Thus, it was not clearly erroneous for the trial court to find there was sufficient evidence to corroborate Best’s statements to his mother. Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s findings that Best’s statements to his mother were admissible under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. 33 b. Salazar’s Testimony of Best’s Confession Similarly, there was no error in the trial court’s finding that Best’s confession .to Salazar was admissible. With regard to prong one of the Laumer standard, the court found that Salazar’s statement was reliable because, she and Best were close friends, • and thus, • it was not likely that she would fabricate-his confession to her. Furthermore, even if Salazar was motivated to protect Simms, as the trial court noted, Salazar’s testimony on Best’s confession actually implicated Simms, because she testified that Best told her that Simms shot the AK-47. In addition, Best’s confession to Salazar occurred on the same night of the shooting or very soon thereafter, making the statements more reliable. Although Salazar first indicated to police that Best did not make any statements to her about the shooting, as the trial court noted, Salazar’s inconsistencies were comparable to many inconsistencies from other witnesses at trial who were fearful of getting involved in the case. Under prong three of the Laumer standard, the trial court properly acknowledged that Salazar’s account of Best’s confession to her was corroborated by details surrounding the shooting, such as evidence that Orlando drove, that Simms shot the AK-47, and that a girl had been shot in the head. Best’s main challenges to admission of her statement under prong three are his assertions that he could not have told Salazar that the juvenile was falsely arrested because that information was not public at the time, and in addition, he could not have confessed to Salazar on the night of the shooting because surveillance video from his girlfriend Proctor’s apartment showed that he entered Proctor’s apartment that night and never left to visit Salazar. However, both of these challenges to the video were' successfully presented during cross-examination by Best’s defense counsel. In light of the trial court’s findings that Best’s statements were corroborated 'by many other details of the shooting, this inconsistent evidence was not a basis for the trial court to exclude Salazar’s testimony regarding Best’s statements to her. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that prongs one and three' of the Laumer standard were met for-Best’s verbal confession to Salazar. 34 D. Withdrawal From Conspiracy Jury Instruction Appellant Williams argues that the trial court erred when it refused to give the withdrawal from conspiracy jury instruction. He claims that his action in leaving the van right before the others committed the South Capitol Street shooting constituted withdrawal from that conspiracy, 1, Additional Factual Background Immediately prior to the South Capitol Street shooting, Williams was in the car with Orlando, Simms, Best, and Bost as they prepared to shoot Howe’s associates. Simms testified at trial that Williams told the men, “Y’all about to go commence. Y’all can let me out right here[,]” before éxiting the car. Due to Simms’s testimony regarding this statement by Williams, at the end of trial, Williams’s counsel requested that the judge give the jury an instruction on the withdrawal from a conspiracy defense. Williams’s counsel requested that the following instruction be read to the jury: A person who may have entered into an agreement to commit a crime — a conspiracy — may subsequently withdraw from that agreement. If he does that, he may no longer be held responsible for actions subsequently taken by his former coeonspirators. To withdraw from such an agreement a person must unequivocally indicate to his co-conspirators that he no longer will participate in the agreed activity. The trial court declined to give that instruction, finding that no “reasonable juror, based on Nathaniel Simms’s testimony about what Lamar Williams said in the minivan ... could find that there was a withdrawal by [] Williams from the conspiracy.” 2. Legal Principles “[A] defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” McCrae v. United States, 980 A.2d 1082, 1086 (D.C. 2009) (citation omitted). “Thus, the proper inquiry is whether there is evidence from either the prosecution or defense that fairly raises the defense.” Id. (citation omitted). “However, where there is no factual or legal basis for a requested instruction, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct .the jury on that defense.” Id. (citation omitted). “[T]o withdraw from a conspiracy one must take affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose, or definite, decisive and positive steps'which indicate a full and complete disassociation.” (Mary) Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34, 38 (D.C. 1977). “Passive nonparticipation in the continuing scheme is not enough to sever the meeting of minds that constitutes the conspiracy.” Smith, supra, 568 U.S. at 112-13, 133 S.Ct. 714. Our decision in (Mary) Harris v. United States, which discusses withdrawal from a conspiracy, is instructive on this issue. 377 A.2d at 38. In (Mary) Harris, after her daughter was raped, Harris agreed, along with her daughter, her daughter’s son, and other persons, to “find and deal forcibly” with the rapist. Id. at 36. In planning the retaliation, Harris . .helped to identify the suspected rapist and provided a firearm to her daughter’s son, who told her he would “pistpl-whip” the assailant. Id. When a group gathered at the suspected rapist’s home, Harris left and went to a porch, and when a person answered the door at the suspected assailant’s home, he was shot several times with a pistol. Id. Harris was convicted, amongst other charges, of conspiracy to commit an assault with a dangerous weapon for her role in the incidents as an aider and abettor. Id. at 36. On appeal, she argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that she was an aider and abettor, in part because she had withdrawn from the conspiracy before the shooting occurred. Id. at 38. We emphasized that in order to withdraw from a conspiracy, “one must take affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose, or definite, decisive and positive steps which indicate a full and complete disassociation.” Id. We further stated that “[w]hile there was testimony indicating that [Harris] left the scene before the shooting occurred, [that testimony] was in conflict with other evidence” and that furthermore, the evidence was “insufficient to establish withdrawal as a matter of law.” Id. 3. Analysis In this case, Williams’s request to be let out of the car did not constitute an “affirmative action to disavow or defeat the purpose” of the conspiracy. Like the appellant in (Mary) Harris, Williams played a key role in the conspiracy; he helped provide the weapons for the South Capitol Street shooting. Williams’s actions in providing weapons for the shooting demonstrated that he was willing to assist with the commission of • the conspiracy. Furthermore, Williams failed to “disavow” or “defeat the purpose” of the conspiracy, or completely “disassociate” himself from the conspiracy by leaving the car. Leaving the scene before a crime occurs is insufficient to demonstrate withdrawal from a conspiracy. See (Mary) Harris, supra, 377 A.2d at 38 (concluding that the fact that appellant merely left the scene before the shooting occurred was “insufficient to establish withdrawal as a matter of law E. Other Issues Appellants raise several additional arguments that arose during trial that we address summarily. First, Williams argues that the trial court should have granted his mistrial motions due to the government’s presentation of “emotional testimony” .regarding the South Capitol -.Street shooting, which Williams claims was only presented in order to appeal to the jurors’ emotions. Williams points to the’following testimony that he believes was especially inflammatory: (1) the testimony of Officer Neftia Turner, one of the first , responding officers to the South Capitol Street shooting, who gave a detailed account of the crime scene and later cried while testifying; (2) the testimony of Tierra Brown, who was the girlfriend of one of the victims, Jones, and who was also present and shot in the leg during the South Capitol Street shooting; and (3) the testimony of four mothers of victims at the South Capitol Street shooting. Williams also refers to the testimony of Ra’Shauna Brown and the government’s decision to play recordings of a 911 call that included her screams. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams’s mistrial motions. Certain cases, “particularly those involving tragic death or injury, have an' inherent emotional impact,” Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 76 (D.C. 1989), and in such cases, the government is “not required to deliver a dispassionate presentation of sterile facts.” Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92, 100 (D.C. 2002). However, in the event of an improper comment that is potentially prejudicial, “an effectively worded curative instruction rendered in a timely manner may serve to rectify the error.” Hazel v. United States, 319 A.2d 136, 138 (D.C. 1974). While we question whether the government needed to present testimony from four mothers of the victims, it is evident that throughout trial, the trial court was attentive to the defense’s concerns about the emotional nature of the case and repeatedly instructed the jury to decide the case based on the evidence and the law, and not to be swayed by emotion. There is no reason to believe that the jurors did not follow these instructions. See Metts v. United States, 877 A.2d 113, 118 (D.C. 2005) (stating' that the court would not presume that the jury did not follow the trial court’s curative instruction). Second, Williams argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right by unduly restricting his ability to cross-examine Simms in regards to his jealous behavior towards the women that he had dated. Specifically, Williams sought to demonstrate at trial that Simms was motivated to falsely implicate Williams in the two conspiracies because Simms was jealous that Williams previously had relations with one of Simms’s girlfriends, Salazar. Williams further sought to elicit testimony from Simms that Simms was jealous that his other girlfriend, Young, might be dating other men during Simms’s incarceration. The trial court restricted Williams’s cross-examination regarding Simms’s jealousy toward Young, and we discern no error in the trial court’s limitations. While “[b]ias or testimonial motivation is always a proper subject of cross-examination,” Rose v. United States, 879 A.2d 986, 995 (D.C. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), the trial court still retains “wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the- issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant,” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Here, the trial court’s limitation of Williams’s cross-examination did not preclude Williams from eliciting testimony of Simms’s potential bias against him. Williams was permitted to elicit: (1) evidence that Williams had relations with Salazar prior to Simms’s relationship with her, (2) testimony from Simms and Salazar regarding a prior occasion in which Simms confronted Williams for inappropriately touching .Salazar, and (3) testimony from Simms and Young that Simms was jealous of Young dating other men. It was within the trial court’s discretion to conclude that any further extrinsic evidence regarding the relationship between Simms and Young, and specific instances in which Simms had shown jealousy toward Young, were cumulative with regard to the relationship and level of jealousy that Simms had with Salazar. See Delaware, supra, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Third, Best argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it precluded him from calling a witness to impeach Simms regarding his testimony that he never fired a TEC-9, a semi-automatic pistol, in 2007. Best argues that the -witness’s testimony was material and would have contradicted Simms’s earlier testimony that he was “not familiar with guns,” and would have provided support for Best’s argument that it was actually Simms who fired the AK-47 during the Alabama Avenue shooting, while Best remained in the car. The trial court did not err in excluding extrinsic evidence that Simms had allegedly fired a TEC-9 in 2007. As the trial court noted, the 2007 incident “was not material” to Best’s trial; it occurred three years prior to the Alabama Avenue shooting and involved a different weapon. Furthermore, there was no testimony or evidence adduced at trial to support Best’s assertion that it was actually Simms who had fired the AK-47 on Alabama Avenue. See Washington v. United States, 499 A.2d 95, 101 (D.C. Í985) (“It is well settled that a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on collateral issues.”).