Opinion ID: 196298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jury instructions on standard of proof

Text: 35 The defendants make various arguments all tending to the same conclusion: that the jurors were misled about what standard of proof to apply. 36
37 James Murray argues that the prosecutors repeatedly urged the jurors to use common sense in evaluating the case and that this effectively lowered the standard of proof below the reasonable doubt standard. James Murray's counsel moved for a mistrial on this ground. Though the district court denied the mistrial motion, it agreed to make clear in [its] charge that the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt, and that's not equivalent of common sense. The court in fact addressed the distinction between common sense and proof beyond a reasonable doubt in its charge. 10 Murray did not object that the court's treatment of the issue was inadequate in any way, but he now contends that the court failed to respond to the improper arguments. Since there was no contemporaneous objection, we review only for plain error affecting substantial rights, and resulting in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. DeMasi, 40 F.3d 1306, 1317-19 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 890 (1995). 38 There is nothing improper about instructing the jury to use its common sense in deliberations. See DeMasi, 40 F.3d at 1317-18; United States v. Ocampo-Guarin, 968 F.2d 1406, 1412 (1st Cir.1992). The district court's instructions drew a distinction between common sense, as methodology, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, as a quantum of proof. The court also told the jury specifically that arguments of counsel were not determinative statements of the law: It is perfectly appropriate now for counsel to have mentioned the law in their closings. That's helpful. But take the law from me. We see no reasonable probability that the jury could have been misled on this record, and we most certainly see nothing that approaches plain error resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 39 There was no error in either respect. 40
41 Leonel Catano argues that the court misled the jurors when it instructed them about the deliberation process as follows: 42 Now about deliberations. Deliberate about the case together. Don't hesitate to reassess or reexamine your views in light of the views of your fellow jurors who have heard and seen exactly the same evidence that you've heard and seen and are under the same oath as you are to do justice. 43 If you have a strong view about any aspect of this case, no one suggests that you surrender it. A unanimous verdict means the verdict of each juror independently agreeing. You're permitted to deliberate together to see whether the views of other jurors do affect your view of the case. 44 So it's probably not a good idea to take a straw vote at the outset of your deliberations lest you feel that under your oath you're somehow committed then to that particular view. That's not so. Jury deliberations are, as I say, just that, deliberations. But you deliberate together to see whether you are affected by the views of your fellow jurors. You're permitted to be, but don't surrender your own views if you have some strongly-held view about any aspect of the case. We see through deliberations whether twelve jurors can come to a unanimous verdict either of not guilty or of guilty. There's no pressure on you, but do understand that you are deliberating together. 45 Leonel Catano contends that by instructing jurors not to surrender strongly-held view[s], the court lowered the standard of proof below the reasonable-doubt standard. He relies on Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam), which the Supreme Court overruled in Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 n. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). He also relies on Victor v. Nebraska, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), which teaches that our inquiry must not be whether an instruction  'could have' been applied in unconstitutional manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury did so apply it. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1243 (emphasis in original). We must consider the phrase Leonel Catano objects to (strongly-held view[s]) in the context of the rest of the charge. See id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1247. 46 The court's instruction about deliberations does not directly relate to the quantum of proof and could only affect the jury's conception of the standard of proof indirectly. The gist of the sentence Leonel complains of is to inform the jurors that they need not surrender their opinions. The remainder of the deliberation instruction reminded jurors that there's no pressure on you. When addressing the subject of burden of proof, the court specifically and repeatedly charged the jury that the government must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. We see no likelihood that the jury would have thought the instructions on standard of proof to have been superseded by some implication in the deliberation instruction. 47 Leonel Catano also argues that the instruction was analogous to an Allen 11 instruction, with its potential for improperly coercing jurors to reach agreement, citing United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir.1973). The instruction Catano complains of was not coercive, as it simply informed the jurors of their right to maintain their opinions and did not pressure them to change. We conclude that the particular instruction not to surrender strongly-held views was not reasonably likely to cause the jurors to apply the instructions as a whole in a way that violated the Constitution. Victor, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1251. 48