Opinion ID: 745288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The FCUA

Text: 11 Bruns argues that the applicable statutes to which he refers in paragraphs 9 and 30 of the complaint include 12 U.S.C. §§ 1789(a)(2), 1790b(b), and 1786. Section 1789(a)(2) contains the NCUA's sue and be sued clause. Section 1790b(b) provides protection to whistleblowers. Section 1786 establishes procedures for the NCUA's removal of a credit union officer or employee. Bruns has no claim against the NCUA under any of these provisions. Section 1789(a)(2) The FCUA provides that the NCUA may 12 sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law or equity, State or Federal. All suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which the Board shall be a party shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States, and the United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction thereof, without regard to the amount in controversy. 13 12 U.S.C. § 1789(a)(2). The government removed Bruns' state court action to the district court under this section. 14 However, the FCUA's sue and be sued clause is constrained by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which provides the exclusive remedy for suits against a federal agency based on claims which are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a). Section 1346(b) grants the federal courts jurisdiction over claims 15 against the United States, for money damages, ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 16 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Bruns seeks money damages for wrongful acts by the NCUA and its employees which allegedly resulted in loss of property (his job and benefits) and personal injury (emotional distress); Bruns does not allege that the NCUA or its employees acted outside the scope of their authority. His tort claims therefore are cognizable under section 1346(b), and the FTCA provides Bruns' exclusive avenue for pursuing those claims against the NCUA. 17 Bruns has not exhausted his administrative remedies, a jurisdictional prerequisite to an FTCA suit in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); Meridian Int'l Logistics, Inc. v. United States, 939 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1991). The FTCA therefore does not provide a jurisdictional basis for Bruns' claims against the NCUA. 3 Section 1790b(b) 18 The FCUA protects credit union employees against discrimination or discharge because the employee ... provided information to the [NCUA] Board or the Attorney General regarding any possible violation of any law or regulation by the credit union or any director, officer, or employee of the credit union. 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a). Any employee or former employee who believes he has been discharged ... in violation of subsection (a) ... may file a civil action in the appropriate United States district court. Id. § 1790b(b). Bruns claims he was suspended and terminated in retaliation for pursuing a bond claim against certain HAFCU officers and directors. However, Bruns has styled his claims of retaliation as (a) conspiracy and (b) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. He does not allege that he provided any information to the NCUA or to the Attorney General regarding illegal conduct by HAFCU or its directors, officers, or employees. While we construe Bruns' complaint liberally, we find no a claim under section 1790b. 4 Section 1786 19 Section 1786(g) establishes an administrative process for the NCUA to follow in removing a federal credit union officer. Nowhere in Bruns' complaint does he allege that the NCUA suspended and terminated him without affording him the procedural guarantees of section 1786(g). He claims instead that HAFCU suspended and terminated him pursuant to a conspiracy with the NCUA and others. 20 Even if Bruns' claims do arise under § 1786(g), several courts have concluded that no private right of action exists under that section. E.g., Ridenour v. Andrews Fed. Credit Union, 897 F.2d 715, 720-21 (4th Cir.1990); Heller v. CACL Fed. Credit Union, 775 F.Supp. 839, 842 (E.D.Pa.1991); Montford v. Robins Fed. Credit Union, 691 F.Supp. 347, 351 (M.D.Ga.1988); National Temple Non-Profit Corp. v. National Temple Community Fed. Credit Union, 603 F.Supp. 807, 808-09 (E.D.Pa.1985). We see no reason to hold otherwise. 21 Bruns stated in response to the district court's first OSC that he was not seeking to enforce the FCUA, and that his claim therefore was distinguishable from the above-cited cases. He now claims, however, that he has been deprived of his statutory rights, including notice and direct access to the circuit courts for judicial review. We reject this argument. If Bruns' claim arises as a result of some action taken by the NCUA to terminate him, he must proceed under the FCUA by first exhausting his administrative remedies and then seeking judicial review as provided under section 1786(j). Bruns cannot base his claims on the NCUA's failure to follow the statutory procedures, because no private right of action exists for such a claim. Section 1786 does not support Bruns' claims against the NCUA.