Opinion ID: 2507269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overview of the Private Analog Exception (HRS  662-2)

Text: Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, claims against the State are barred unless there has been a clear relinquishment of immunity and the State has consented to be sued. Bush v. Watson, 81 Hawai`i 474, 481, 918 P.2d 1130, 1137 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The State has waived immunity to suit only to the extent specified in HRS chapters 661 and 662. Taylor-Rice v. State, 105 Hawai`i 104, 110, 94 P.3d 659, 665 (2004) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter, Taylor-Rice II ]; Figueroa v. State, 61 Haw. 369, 383, 604 P.2d 1198, 1207 (1979) (The STLA, enacted in 1957, is a specific waiver of tort immunity.). HRS  662-2, upon which DHS relies, expressly waives the State's sovereign immunity in cases where liability arises from the torts of its employees and declares that the State shall be liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances [.] (Emphasis added.) Through its adoption of HRS  662-2, the legislature definitely expressed the intent that, for purposes of determining the liability of the State in tort cases, all the accepted tort law relating to private parties is applicable. However, several exceptions to the general waiver of immunity from tort claims are set forth in HRS  662-15 [(Supp.2007), none of which apply here]. Consequently, [this court] ha[s] held that, if a private party would be liable under the circumstances, then the State would also be liable, except for those claims enumerated in HRS  662-15. Doe Parents No. 1 v. State of Hawai`i, Dep't of Educ., 100 Hawai`i 34, 59, 58 P.3d 545, 570 (2002) (emphases added) (internal quotation marks, original brackets, ellipsis, and citations omitted). Stated differently, the STLA d[oes] not waive governmental immunity in all cases and [it] d[oes] not create any cause of action where none existed before. The effect of the [STLA] is to waive immunity from traditionally recognized common law causes of action in tort, other than those expressly excluded[, see HRS  662-15]. It was not intended to visit the sovereign with novel liabilities. Figueroa, 61 Haw. at 384, 604 P.2d at 1207 (emphases added) (citations omitted). The State, thus, remains immune from liability based upon governmental functions for which no private analog exists and waives its immunity only to the extent a plaintiff's claim for relief is comparable to a recognized claim for relief against a private person. Accordingly, whether the State is entitled to immunity under HRS  662-2 depends on whether a private person would be liable under like circumstances. Although this court has had occasion to review and consider the application of HRS  662-2, it has not explicitly considered the extent to which the State has waived its immunity under like circumstances. We, therefore, turn to federal cases for guidance based upon this court's recognition that federal immunity principles are relevant to our own principles of sovereign immunity. Taylor-Rice II, 105 Hawai`i at 110, 94 P.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), upon which the STLA is modeled, Figueroa, 61 Haw. at 383-84, 604 P.2d at 1206, provides that the United States shall be liable under state tort law only in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.  28 U.S.C.  2674 (2000) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C.  1346(b) (2000) (liability exists under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred). In Reynolds v. United States, 927 F.Supp. 91 (W.D.N.Y.1996), the United States District Court for the Western District of New York explained that the like circumstances language plays an important role in the interpretation of the statute. The like circumstances language . . . means that the liability assumed by the [g]overnment is that created by all the circumstances, not that which a few of the circumstances might create. . . . Thus, notwithstanding any circumstances in which state law would hold a private person liable for his acts, if those circumstances are in any material respect not like those in which the government's act occurred, there has been no FTCA waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 96-97 (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipsis omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit succinctly stated that: The like circumstances inquiry is designed to prevent state legislatures from using the United States' waiver of sovereign immunity under the FTCA as an occasion to enrich their own citizens at the expense of the deepest pocket. Carter v. United States, 982 F.2d 1141, 1143 (7th Cir.1992). This goal is accomplished by requiring the United States' liability to be measured by reference to the liability of private parties. Recognizing that the United States is seldom situated identically to private parties, however, the like circumstances inquiry requires only that the United States be analogized to a similarly situated private party. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64, 76 S.Ct. 122, 124, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1055); . . . [.] Nice pieces of casuistry and hypersensitive legalisms are to be avoided in interpreting this language. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 3 F.3d 1392, 1396 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks, other citations, and original brackets omitted); see also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950) (the FTCA's effect is to waive immunity from recognized causes of action and was not to visit the [g]overnment with novel and unprecedented liabilities); Zabala Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1149 (1st Cir.1978) (even where specific behavior of federal employees is required by federal statute, liability to the beneficiaries of that statute may not be founded on the [FTCA] if state law recognizes no comparable private liability). Hence, the threshold issue is whether the Kaho`ohanohanos' factual allegations satisfy the necessary elements of a cause of action against the State comparable to one that may be maintained against a private person, i.e., whether the alleged tort has a private analog to render the State's immunity waived.