Opinion ID: 2981099
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Set a Date Certain for Trial

Text: Richardson also complains the continuance granted on November 30, 2009 was open-ended and the court did not balance the relevant factors militating against setting a date certain for trial. The Speedy Trial Act requires that a date certain for trial be set “at the earliest practicable time.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a). However, this Court, along with many other circuits, permits reasonable open-ended continuances. See, e.g., United States v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 1064–65 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e will follow the rule of the First, Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits and hold that open-ended ends-of-justice continuances for reasonable time periods are permissible in cases where it is not possible to . . . set specific ending dates.”) (amended and superceded on other grounds by 307 F.3d 446 (en banc)). Here, a date certain was set at the earliest practicable time. In granting the November 30, 2009 continuance, the district court left the date for trial open as a result of this continuance at Welti’s counsel’s request, a request to which Richardson agreed. At the time of the hearing, Welti’s counsel had just joined the case, and could not inform the court with any certainty of when he could be prepared for trial. Specifically, No. 11-3127 United States v. Richardson Page 11 the court asked Welti’s counsel “[w]ell, you think you can be ready in the spring?” and Welti’s counsel responded “I don’t know . . . I will be filing a motion for a continuance of the trial date when I get a handle—some handle at least on the documents. I would suggest that . . . we have another get-together to discuss where we are, where I am in particular . . . rather than arbitrarily pick a trial date.” (Page ID # 981–82.) Richardson was asked whether he would like to sever his case from Welti’s in order to speed up the process, and Richardson declined, acknowledging that his attorney needed more time to prepare. After some discussion, the court noted that “the next time we meet, we’re gonna make a schedule that is going to be hard and fast” and scheduled a conference for March 24, 2010. (Page ID # 998.) Given this context, particularly the fact that Richardson did not agree to sever his case from Welti’s, the March 24, 2010 conference was the “earliest practicable time” that a date certain could be set. See § 3161(a); see also Zedner, 547 U.S. 498–99 (stating that courts have discretion to “accommodate limited delays for case-specific needs”). Accordingly, this claim of error also fails.