Opinion ID: 1855302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying mr. huphrey's motion for a mistrial because the prosecutor made a send a message type argument

Text: ¶ 7. During closing arguments of the sentencing phase of the trial, the District Attorney made the following statement: So what is the proper punishment? These are your options. If you follow them, follow this road map, you'll get there. And no one, no one, folks, has the right to second guess any decision you make. All we want you to do is what's right. My view of the case, obviously, you know by now. I've seen too much of this for the 20 years that I've served as prosecutor in this District, way too much of it. Somehow, some way, it's just got to stop. It's got to stop. Maybe, just maybe, the sentence of death comes out of that jury room, there's somebody who'll see or read about it who'll have second thoughts about going into someone else's house. ¶ 8. At this point Humphrey's attorney objected, suggesting that the District Attorney was making a send a message type argument of the kind which has been condemned by this Court and moved for a mistrial. The circuit court sustained the objection, advised the District Attorney that he was treading into an area that the Supreme Court has asked us to stay away from, but denied the motion for a mistrial. Humphrey asserts that the trial court was correct in sustaining the objection, but erred in denying the motion for mistrial. Humphrey recognizes that the prosecutor did not literally use send a message terminology, but argues that it could be inferred from the context in which it was used, and that such a statement warrants reversal. The State argues that any alleged improper remarks, if any, made during summation were cured by the trial court's sustaining the objection, and by the instruction submitted to the jury instructing them to disregard any argument, statement or remark made by counsel having no basis in evidence. The State further argues that the danger of a send a message type argument does not exist at the sentencing phase of a trial where sending a message is necessarily entailed in imposing the death penalty in view of the fact that deterrence is one of that penalty's goals. ¶ 9. During the guilt phase of the trial the role of the jury is to weigh the evidence and to apply the law, not to send a message, as this Court has made clear. Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988). The situation is much different during the sentencing phase of the trial. In this case the alleged send a message argument occurred during the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial, after the determination of guilt had been made by the jury, and during consideration of the death penalty. Prosecutors have been allowed the use of send a message type arguments during the sentencing phase of a trial. We have noted that ... the danger inherent in the send a message argument is that jurors will neglect their duty to determine whether the evidence showed the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged. 522 So.2d at 209. This danger does not exist at the sentencing phase, where the defendant has already been found guilty of capital murder. The sole determination to be made at this point is whether the death penalty should be imposed. We choose not to fault the prosecution for arguing that the message conveyed by a death penalty verdict would be different than that urged by the defense. To do so would be disingenuous given the inescapable reality that deterrence is, in fact, an established goal of imposing the death penalty, which goal necessarily entails, to some extent, sending a message. The trial court did not err in permitting this argument by the prosecution. Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 513 (Miss. 1997). ¶ 10. Where the purpose of the statement is to help determine whether the death penalty should be imposed, the prosecution is permitted to argue that the message conveyed by the death penalty verdict would be different than that of a lesser sentence. Id. This is precisely the situation in the present case. Therefore this assignment of error is without merit.