Opinion ID: 1199986
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gravity of the Offense in Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances Analysis

Text: Both Welsh and Miller require courts to weigh the gravity of the suspected offense in evaluating the validity of a warrantless entry, search, or seizure. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750-53, 104 S.Ct. 2091; Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057. As the majority observes, Welsh involved a warrantless entry at night into the home of a drunken driving suspect. The police officers in that case were concerned that delay associated with obtaining a warrant would allow the level of alcohol in Welsh's blood to dissipate, essentially destroying the evidence of Welsh's offense. The Court in Welsh assumed the reality of this risk for purposes of decision, but nevertheless found that the intrusion on the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy and his person, for the purpose of preserving evidence and taking him into custody, was unreasonable in light of the minor nature of the offense. See 466 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. 2091. Both Welsh and Miller drew upon Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C.Cir.1970) (en banc), for their analysis. [1] The court in Dorman listed a number of factors to be considered in evaluating whether exigent circumstances authorize a warrantless entry. Our totality of the circumstances analysis under Miller follows Dorman in considering gravity of the offense as the first among seven relating to the validity of a warrantless entry, search, or seizure. The six pertinent considerations outlined in Dorman are that (1) a grave offense is involved, particularly a crime of violence; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) there exists a clear showing of probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the crime; (4) there is a strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5) the likelihood exists that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the entry is made peaceably. One additional factor is whether the warrantless entry is made at night. Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057. These factors have garnered a substantial following in both federal and state courts. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 6.1(f), at 266 (3d ed.1996) (collecting cases). In addition, Professor LaFave has observed that, [o]ne factor which did not make the Dorman list but which is often of significance in this context concerns the preservation of evidence.... [I]t makes great sense to recognize that frequently an immediate entry to arrest is necessitated so that the defendant can be disabled from destroying or distributing evidence. See LaFave, supra, § 6.1(f), at 274. Thus, the seven factors we identified in Miller can reasonably be supplemented by an eighth factor, namely whether immediate entry to arrest is necessitated so that the defendant can be disabled from destroying evidence. Under the Miller totality of the circumstances test, [2] which applies when the police urge that there was a need that `could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant,' Miller, 773 P.2d at 1057 (quoting Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392), all of the factors must be weighed. The trial court and we must determine, under the facts of the case, whether the prosecution has sustained its burden of proof that the warrantless entry, search, and seizure of the evidence and the defendant's person was reasonable. Miller 's first factor requires us to decide whether a grave offense is involved. In doing so, we do not look at what the police actually found after entering the room and searching Mendez; rather, we look to what the police officers could have reasonably believed the offense to be. This is an objective test, not one which indulges the suspicion and speculation of the officers. [3]