Opinion ID: 1926157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District of Columbia Industrial Safety Act

Text: The District of Columbia Industrial Safety Act (the Act), D.C.Code § 36-228(a) (1993) provides that: [e]very employer shall furnish a place of employment which shall be reasonably safe for employees, shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards, and shall adopt and use practices, means, methods, operations, and processes which are reasonably safe and adequate to render such employment and place of employment reasonably safe. D.C.Code § 36-228(a). The Act defines employer to include every person, firm, corporation ... agent, manager, representative... or other persons having control or custody of any place of employment or of any employee. D.C.Code § 36-222(1). Thus, the Act creates a statutory duty when an entity has control or custody over the place of employment or over any employee. This statutory duty of care is broader than its common law counterpart because it is incumbent not only upon employers as defined at common law, but also employers defined by the statute. Martin v. George Hyman Const. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 70 (D.C.1978). The place of employment under the Act is broadly defined as any place where employment is carried on. D.C.Code § 36-222(4). Coverage, in other words, does not depend upon a particular degree of control or supervision exercised by the employer over the wage earner or work performed, if alternatively the employer has control of the worksite. Traudt v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326, 1331 (D.C.1997). By enactment of the instant statutory safety scheme, Congress imposed an affirmative duty upon persons with control over places of employment or employees to provide reasonably safe working conditions. Martin, 395 A.2d at 72. Congress' concern with industrial accidents, as embodied in this legislation, affects not only the interests of individual wage earners but also the interests of society `in the conservation of the lives and of the healthful vigor of its citizens. . . .' Id. (quoting Johnston v. Fargo, 184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388, 390 (1906)). At the same time, [an employer's] duty under the statute is limited to those elements of the workplace over which it has `control or custody.' Traudt, 692 A.2d at 1331. Velásquez and Canales argue that because Essex and Zalco had control or custody over the workplace at which Velásquez was injured, they were employers for purposes of the Act. As employers, they contend, Essex and Zalco owed a statutory duty of care to Velásquez to furnish a reasonably safe place of employment and insure the use of safe work practices and procedures. We agree with the first part of their proposition, that Essex and Zalco are employers under the Act; but disagree that such status made them liable for the accident in the context of the facts of this case. In Traudt, we reviewed a situation similar to the instant case. PEPCO had contracted with Waco, an asbestos abatement company, for the removal of asbestos from PEPCO's electrical cables throughout its manhole system under a contract with provisions like those contained in the contract between Essex and EV-Air-Tight. See id. at 1330. For example, the contract between PEPCO and Waco stated that Waco was solely responsible for the means, methods, techniques, sequences, and procedures of construction, and responsible for initiating, maintaining and supervising all safety precautions in connection with the work. Id. at 1331. PEPCO reserved the right at all reasonable times to inspect and test the Work, and the right to perform itself, or contract for and perform other or additional work on or near the Work covered by th[e] contract, and could direct Waco to cease work at any point temporarily to facilitate work by PEPCO. PEPCO required Waco to comply with PEPCO's own rules concerning safety and security and reserved the right to remove any Waco employee from the worksite. See id. PEPCO required that the asbestos removal work be done on energized cables, but did not furnish Waco with any written rules or guidelines concerning the handling of power lines. PEPCO employees maintained no safety-related presence at the work site. See id. Waco gave Traudt a hammer and a metal screwdriver and after brief instruction on the asbestos removal process, the worker entered a PEPCO manhole. As Traudt, per the instructions given him, used the tip of the screwdriver to pry up the asbestos wrapping, the screwdriver pierced the lead insulation of the wiring and contacted a live wire. An explosion ensued and Traudt was severely burned. See id. at 1330-31. On appeal from the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to PEPCO, we reversed, holding that PEPCO's ownership of the manhole system and the electric cables, together with the authority it reserved in the contract to monitor Waco's work and perform other work simultaneously at the job site, established its control of the `place of employment' sufficient to make it Traudt's employer for purposes of the statute, notwithstanding that PEPCO did not hire or pay Traudt, control the terms of his employment or direct the operative details of Traudt's work. Id. at 1331. We expressly noted that PEPCO asserted its control concretely by dictating that work on the cables was to be done while they were energized. Id. Given the broad remedial purposes of the statute, see Martin, 395 A.2d at 70-71, we hold that Essex's ownership of the building where the work was performed and the authority it reserved in the contract to monitor Ev-Air-Tight's work, to promulgate rules and regulations to which EV-Air-Tight and its employees were bound, and to inspect EV-Air-Tight's equipment, make Essex Velásquez's employer for purposes of the Act, see Traudt, 692 A.2d at 1331. The Act, however, is not a strict liability statute; rather the statute imposes a statutory duty of due care. Martin 395 A.2d at 70. Once a duty is established under the Act, i.e., that an entity is a covered employer, and that the injured party comes within the protection of the statute, see Traudt, 692 A.2d at 1331 n. 4, it is still necessary to determine the scope of the duty of due care under the statute and the reasonableness of defendant's actions. As we have made clear, an employer's duty under the statute is limited to those elements of the workplace over which it has `control or custody.' Id. at 1332 (emphasis added). In other words, where status as an employee under the Act is grounded on ownership of and ability to exercise control or custody over the workplace, an employer's responsibility under the Act for a particular injury is commensurate with the nature and extent of the control it exercises in fact over the workplace. This case is distinguishable from Traudt, in which we remanded for trial because there was a question of material fact regarding the elements of the work-place over which PEPCO had control, particularly because PEPCO had directed that the work be performed on energized wires. See 692 A.2d at 1331-32. In the instant case, as the trial court correctly noted, and undisputed record facts demonstrate, no one from Essex actually worked on the site or supervised any of EV-Air-Tight's work. Neither Essex, nor its agent Zalco, actually instructed, directed or otherwise controlled EV-Air-Tight employees in relation to the renovation project. EV-Air-Tight owned and erected the scaffolding, and no one from Essex or Zalco had access to the scaffolding from which Velásquez fell. Thus, even when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to Velásquez, there is no material question of fact that Essex or Zalco actually asserted any control over the scaffold so as to permit a reasonable jury to find that they breached a statutory duty of due care to Velásquez. See Traudt, 692 A.2d at 1332 (statutory duty limited to those elements of the workplace over which employer has control or custody). [2]