Opinion ID: 2625727
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Penalty Phase Instructional Issues

Text: The prosecutor requested murder instructions in connection with the stabbing of Flemming. Defense counsel requested instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, self-defense, and unreasonable self-defense. After hearing argument, the court decided the evidence would not support a finding that either defendant or Gornick had a belief in the need for self-defense, reasonable or unreasonable. The court also considered whether a heat of passion theory of manslaughter might be sustainable, and concluded it was not. The court did decide to instruct on assault with a deadly weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury. Thus, the jury could consider whether defendant aided and abetted an assault instead of a murder. However, the court rejected defense counsel's argument that defendant may have aided and abetted only a battery, so that Flemming's killing might be deemed a misdemeanor manslaughter. (8) On appeal, defendant contends the court's rulings violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and his state constitutional rights to present a defense, to a fair trial, to due process, and to equal protection. He claims he was entitled to instructions on manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. However, we have not decide[d] whether a trial court is ever obligated to instruct on lesser offenses requested by trial counsel at a penalty phase. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1148 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) Defendant was not charged with Flemming's murder in this case. Evidence of the attack in jail was presented as an aggravating circumstance under section 190.3, factor (b): criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence. Whether the assault amounted to murder or manslaughter was beside the point. The proper focus for consideration of prior violent crimes in the penalty phase is on the facts of the defendant's past actions as they reflect on his character, rather than on the labels to be assigned the past crimes [citation] or the existence of technical defenses to prior bad acts [citation]. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 73 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224].) (9) Nevertheless, counsel may request instruction on the elements of offenses presented under section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1147.) Here, defense counsel proposed instructions on the elements of manslaughter and various related theories. The trial court correctly determined that the evidence was inadequate to support these instructions. Defendant argues that the jury could have found that he acted in reasonable or unreasonable defense of Gornick, who himself acted in self-defense. But both self-defense and defense of others, whether perfect or imperfect, require an actual fear of imminent harm. ( People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 994-997 [28 Cal.Rptr.3d 725, 111 P.3d 987].) Here, Flemming's threats against Gornick's family did not pose an immediate threat. By defendant's own account at trial, the fight was planned in advance, and Flemming was handcuffed throughout the assault. Neither defendant nor the other eyewitness, Deputy Mendoza, saw Flemming with a weapon of any kind. Defendant notes there was testimony that a piece of metal, which could have been used to make a shank, had previously been confiscated from Flemming's cell. This does not indicate that Flemming was armed when he was attacked. Without any evidence to support a finding that Gornick or defendant feared imminent harm, there was no basis to argue self-defense or defense of others. (10) Defendant also claims a voluntary manslaughter instruction was justified under the theory that he and Gornick acted in the heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel. However, the fact that defendant knew Gornick had planned the assault in advance showed that both of them acted deliberately and upon reflection. (See People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583-584 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614].) Defendant suggests he and Gornick were provoked by the sight of the shank. This speculation is not supported by anything in the testimony. In any event, `[t]he provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim.' ( Manriquez, at p. 583.) Here, there was no evidence that Flemming had any role in the production of the shank. Finally, defendant contends involuntary manslaughter instructions were proper because the jury could have found that he intended to participate only in a misdemeanor battery. (See People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 102-103 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099].) This theory is also untenable. Defendant admitted that after he saw Flemming bleeding heavily from the wounds inflicted by Gornick, he continued to block the deputy's view of the fight, kick Flemming, and block him from reaching the row gate. Whatever defendant may have anticipated at the outset, by his own account he knowingly participated in an assault with a deadly weapon. No reasonable jury could have found that this violent and bloody incident was a misdemeanor battery. The court properly declined to instruct on involuntary manslaughter.
Defense counsel requested CALJIC No. 8.71, which informs the jury that a defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt as to whether murder was of the first or second degree. The prosecutor had no objection, and the court agreed. However, the instruction was not given. Defendant contends this omission violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. He is mistaken. As explained in part II.E.1, ante, at pages 867-868, defendant was not charged with murder in the penalty phase. The jury was not required to fix any degree or classification of homicide in its deliberations regarding defendant's role in the killing of Flemming. The court told the jury that there was evidence of defendant's commission of murder and assault with a deadly weapon, and that [b]efore a juror may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in fact, commit such criminal acts. This instruction correctly informed the jury of the applicable standard of proof.
Also in connection with the Flemming killing, the court instructed the jury on aiding and abetting liability, as follows: In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime of murder, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that: One, the crime of murder was committed; two, the defendant aided and abetted such crime; three, a co-principal in such crime committed the crime of assault with a deadly weapon; and four, the crime of murder was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon. At this point, the prosecutor requested and was granted a bench conference. She pointed out that the court had not added or assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury to assault with a deadly weapon, which would be consistent with the other assault instructions. The prosecutor acknowledged that she had prepared the instruction and was responsible for the omission. Defense counsel said, I think it's harmless error if you just write it in there on the instruction and move on. The prosecutor asked the court to provide the phrase verbally, but the court decided to simply write it on the instructions that were provided to the jury. In a supplemental brief, defendant raises a number of claims of error regarding this instruction. Principally, he contends the instruction was misleading because it identified the crime of murder as the target offense and assault with a deadly weapon as the coprincipal's crime, a reversal of the proper designations. (See People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 267 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013]; CALJIC No. 3.02.) Defendant also finds fault with the court for omitting two paragraphs from CALJIC No. 3.02, for failing to provide oral instruction on assault likely to produce great bodily injury, and for not reinstructing the jury with various standard aiding and abetting instructions that were given at the guilt phase. [10] The Attorney General concedes that the court transposed murder and assault with a deadly weapon in the first and third enumerated elements of the instruction, but contends the instruction could not have operated to defendant's prejudice. We agree. The fine points of aiding and abetting liability were not properly before the jury. As discussed above, the jury needed only to weigh defendant's violent criminal activity as an aggravating factor, not to determine precisely which crime his acts constituted. In any event, the instruction as given properly informed the jury that in order to hold defendant liable for murder, it would have to find that the murder was a natural and probable consequence of an assault with a deadly weapon. [11] The transposition of murder and assault in the first and third elements of the instruction had only a subtle effect, and could only have made it more difficult for the prosecution to establish defendant's culpability for murder. Taken literally, the instruction could be read to require a finding that he intended to aid and abet in a murder, rather than an assault. [12] The Attorney General also notes, correctly, that the omitted paragraphs about which defendant complains were added to CALJIC No. 3.02 after defendant's trial, following this court's decision in People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248. (See Prettyman, at pp. 258, fn. 3, 264.) Defense counsel did not request any expansion of the standard instruction, and none was required under these circumstances. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 106-107 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) Finally, there is no merit to defendant's complaint that the court failed to repeat other aiding and abetting instructions given during the guilt phase. These instructions were given to the jury in written form for use during the penalty deliberations, and the jury was told to refer to the applicable guilt phase instructions.
Deputies testified that on three occasions they found blades broken out of plastic razors in defendant's jail cell. The court instructed the jury that a prisoner's possession of a sharp instrument, including a razor blade, is a felony, and that [e]vidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the following criminal acts: . . . possession of a sharp instrument while in custody, which involved the express or implied use of force or violence or the threat of force or violence. Before a juror may consider any of such criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in fact, commit such criminal acts. The court rejected defense counsel's request to amend this standard instruction (CALJIC No. 8.87) to tell the jury that it must determine whether there was an express or implied use of force or violence. The court noted that counsel was free to argue this point to the jury. (11) Defendant contends the instruction was improper, both because razor blades in a jail cell do not rise to the level of an actual or implied threat of force or violence, and because the instruction created a mandatory presumption of violence. [13] We have repeatedly rejected these arguments. In People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1082 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 651], People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1152 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 52 P.3d 572], and People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 588-589 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142], we held that possessing contraband razor blades in custody constitutes an express or implied threat to use force or violence under section 190.3, factor (b). We have also consistently ruled that whether criminal acts pose a threat of violence is a legal question for the trial court, and that CALJIC No. 8.87 does not create an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. (E.g., People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 530 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947]; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 235 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496]; People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 720 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190].) Defendant offers no persuasive reason for us to reconsider these holdings.
The court instructed the jury: You are to be guided by previous instructions given in the first phase of this trial which are applicable and pertinent to the determination of penalty. However, you are to completely disregard any instructions given in the first phase which had prohibited you from considering pity or sympathy for the defendant. In determining penalty, the jury shall take into consideration pity and sympathy for the defendant. (12) Defendant recognizes that the court was not required to reinstruct the jury with guilt phase instructions, as a general rule. However, he contends the court's penalty phase instructions were misleading and incomplete because the court did not specify which guilt phase instructions were applicable, and because it did repeat two guilt phase instructions, one defining possession and one on witness credibility. Thus, defendant argues, the jury may have believed that only the repeated instructions were applicable, and not other critical instructions like the definition of reasonable doubt. Defendant also claims the jury may have been misled by the court's instruction to disregard the prohibition on considering sympathy, because that guilt phase instruction had also informed the jury not to consider the consequences of its verdict. He asserts that the jurors may improperly have continued to ignore the consequences of the penalty verdict. [14] These claims are meritless. The court was not required to specify the applicable guilt phase instructions. ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 903-904 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) Nor was it necessary to reinstruct the jury on reasonable doubt. ( Rogers, at p. 905; People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1191 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) It makes no difference that the court repeated two guilt phase instructions. The jury was provided with all guilt phase instructions in writing and told to consider those that were pertinent to their penalty deliberations. Defendant's suggestion that the court's direction to consider pity and sympathy may have led the jury to disregard the consequences of its decision strains credulity. We presume that jurors are intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the court's instructions. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 390 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34].)
Defendant contends the court erred by giving CALJIC No. 8.88, governing the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and by refusing various proposed defense instructions on related points. [15] His arguments cannot be squared with this court's consistently expressed views on CALJIC No. 8.88. First, defendant challenges the denial of a proposed instruction that would have conditioned a death sentence on jury findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and that death was the appropriate punishment. Defendant recognizes that we have rejected the claim that CALJIC No. 8.88 must include these requirements, but asks us to reconsider our view in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531]. However, [n]othing in Apprendi . . ., Ring . . ., or Blakely . . . casts doubt on these conclusions. [Citations.] ( People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 370 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 269, 187 P.3d 1].) Defendant asserts that, at a minimum, the standard of proof by a preponderance of the evidence is required as a matter of due process. He did not submit such a proposal below. In any event, it is settled that the trial court need not and should not instruct the jury as to any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase. ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 753 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145], italics added.) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proofwhether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidenceas to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1066 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775]; accord, People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 926 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528].) Next, defendant claims the court should have given an instruction telling the jury to render an individualized moral determination about the appropriate penalty. He argues that this instruction is superior to CALJIC No. 8.88, which advises the jury that [t]o return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. We have repeatedly held that the standard instruction is constitutionally sufficient. (E.g., People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 52 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664]; People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 42-43 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591].) CALJIC No. 8.88 properly advised the jury of its responsibility to make an individualized moral assessment of the appropriate penalty: The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. Defendant also contends the court should have given his proposed instruction informing the jury that it could, but was not required to, impose the death penalty if aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, whereas it was required to return a verdict of life without possibility of parole if mitigating circumstances predominated. This instruction was argumentative and misstated the terms of section 190.3, which requires the death penalty if the jury finds that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 599 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347].) It is settled that CALJIC No. 8.88 properly instructs the jury on the balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (E.g., People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 52; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 42-43.) Finally, defendant claims the court erroneously refused this proposed instruction: You need not find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a sentence of life without possibility of parole. A life sentence may be returned regardless of the evidence. Defendant offers no authority for the proposition that a jury may reach its sentencing determination regardless of the evidence. CALJIC No. 8.88 correctly advises the jury on its discretion to reject the death penalty. ( People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 355-356 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846]; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 525-526 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521].)
Defendant also argues that CALJIC No. 8.85, which instructs the jury on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is constitutionally defective, and that the court should instead have given various instructions proposed by the defense. [16] Defendant fails to provide any persuasive reason for us to reconsider our many holdings rejecting such challenges. Specifically, defendant claims the standard instruction is defective because it fails to advise the jury which sentencing factors are aggravating, mitigating, or either, and does not inform the jury that the absence of a mitigating factor cannot be considered an aggravating factor. We have disagreed with these arguments. (E.g., People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1035-1036 [77 Cal.Rptr.3d 163, 183 P.3d 1146]; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1266-1269 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475].) Defendant contends the court erred by rejecting proposed instructions providing guidance on aggravating and mitigating factors, and considerations of compassion and mercy. However, CALJIC No. 8.85 is both correct and adequate. [Citations.] The court need not give pinpoint instructions regarding what mitigating evidence the jury may consider or special instructions regarding mercy and compassion. [Citations.] ( People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309-310 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351].) Defendant also asserts that certain of his proposed instructions would have cured deficiencies in the standard instruction by advising the jury that it need not agree unanimously on mitigating factors, and that no burden of proof applies to the consideration of such factors. These claims are meritless. ( People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 328 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363].)
Defense counsel proposed instructions requiring the jury to unanimously agree that aggravating factors existed beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, and that death was the appropriate punishment. Defendant argues that these instructions were erroneously rejected by the trial court. He also claims it was improper to give CALJIC No. 8.87, which told the jury that it need not unanimously agree on the other-crimes evidence, but that only those jurors who were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt could consider that evidence in aggravation. [17] The court did not err. Defendant's proposed instruction incorrectly imposed the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have rejected defendant's claim that the Apprendi line of cases requires that standard for death penalty determinations. ( People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1142 [81 Cal.Rptr.3d 614]; People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1059 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 82, 162 P.3d 596].) Nor is the standard instruction defective for failing to require juror unanimity. ( Mungia, at p. 1142; Barnwell, at p. 1059.)
CALJIC No. 8.88 includes the following sentence: An aggravating factor is any fact, condition or event attending the commission of a crime which increases its severity or enormity, or adds to its injurious consequences, which is above and beyond the elements of the crime itself. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the court asking: (1) Can you clarify `attending the commission of a crime which . . .' (2) How's `attending' meant? (3) And a little clarification as a whole on the definition of aggravating factor or evidence. The court met with counsel, and decided to give the jury four alternative phrases for attending, but no additional definition of aggravating factor. Both counsel agreed with this approach. The jury was brought in and the court told them that in place of attending, they could substitute connected with, and surrounding circumstances of, accompanying, or associated with. The court added, if you need any further readback or any further clarification, we'll attempt to do that as soon as possible. Just write it out on another note, and we'll be happy to provide that for you. Defendant contends the court's failure to provide further clarification deprived him of his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, due process, and a reliable penalty determination. He notes that before sending this query, the jury had requested a readback of testimony about defendant's drug habit, and then sent a notice of deadlock. Subsequently, it requested readback of the deputies' testimony regarding the Flemming murder, and sent another notice of deadlock. From these circumstances, defendant infers that the jury was confused about aggravating factors and the court failed to dispel the confusion. Defendant waived this claim by agreeing to the court's response below. In no sense were his substantial rights affected so as to obviate the necessity of an objection pursuant to section 1259. Although it was invited to seek further clarification by the court, the jury did not ask any more questions about aggravating factors. Evidently, the court's provision of alternatives for attending resolved the jury's uncertainties. In any event, it is settled that further explanation of the standard instructions on this point is not required. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1018 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248], citing cases.)