Opinion ID: 2639006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Statutory Scheme and Legislative Intent.

Text: The relevant statutes and legislative history, most of which the majority disregards, clearly demonstrate the Legislature's intent to make established biological paternity determinative as between competing presumed fathers. Under California's Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (§ 7550 et seq.), [i]n a civil action or proceeding in which paternity is a relevant fact, the court may upon its own initiative or upon suggestion made by or on behalf of any person who is involved, and shall upon motion of any party to the action or proceeding made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly, order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to genetic tests. (§ 7551.) If the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests, are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.  (§ 7554, subd. (a), italics added.) [I]f the court finds that the paternity index, as calculated by the [qualified] experts ..., is 100 or greater, then [t]here is a rebuttable presumption ... of paternity, which affect[s] the burden of proof and may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 7555, subd. (a).) The implications of these provisions for the case now before us are unmistakable. Given the undisputed fact that Heriberto is Jesusa's biological father, genetic tests done pursuant to section 7551 would surely have shown that Paul is not the father of Jesusa (§ 7554, subd. (a)) and that Heriberto is Jesusa's father. Based on such results, section 7554, subdivision (a) would have required that the question of [Paul's] paternity ... be resolved accordingly  (italics added), that is, with a judicial determination that he is not Jesusa's father. Such a judicial determination would necessarily and conclusively have rebutted the presumption under section 7611 that Paul is Jesusa's natural father. [3] At that point, only Heriberto would have still been a presumed father under section 7611. Moreover, based on the test results, Heriberto would also have enjoyed a rebuttable presumption ... of paternity under section 7555, subdivision (a), and there is no evidence in the record to rebut this presumption. The paternity determination should be no different in this case simply because testing was not actually performed. At the very first hearing, Jesusa's mother stated that Heriberto is the biological father, and no one has ever contended otherwise. The juvenile court expressly made a finding that [Heriberto] is the biological father. Where, as here, the parties all agree as to who the biological father is, we should not insist that they go through pointless and invasive test procedures that would involve considerable expense and would significantly delay resolution of dependency actions. As the majority notes, such delays would be contrary to the Legislature's goal that dependency actions be resolved expeditiously. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 234, 85 P.3d at p. 26; see In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368, 384, 272 Cal.Rptr. 787, 795 P.2d 1244 [noting state's interest in resolving child's status without unnecessary delay]; Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 [intent of the Legislature, especially with regard to young children, is that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay].) Moreover, where, as here, one of the presumed fathers is also the biological father, the legislative policy decision these statutes reflect  that biological paternity is determinative  should be of controlling weight in determining which presumption is, on the facts ... founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.... [4] (§ 7612, subd. (b).) Although the UPA does not expressly provide that one presumed father's established biological paternity necessarily rebuts the presumption of another presumed father under subdivision (a) of section 7611, that conclusion is evident from the statutory framework as a whole. In addition to defining specific presumptions in subdivisions (a) through (d), section 7611 of the UPA incorporates by reference the presumptions set forth in sections 7540 and 7576. Section 7540 establishes a presumption that the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband ... is ... a child of the marriage. Although the presumption purports to be conclusive[ ] (§ 7540), it is not; [n]otwithstanding the presumption, if the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as disclosed by the evidence, based on blood tests performed pursuant to [section 7551], are that the husband is not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly.  (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics added.) Parties with standing to request such testing must do so within two years from the child's date of birth. (§ 7541, subds.(b), (c).) Section 7576, subdivision (a), establishes a presumption, with the same force and effect as the presumption under Section 7540, that the child of a man and woman executing a voluntary declaration of paternity before January 1, 1997, is ... the man's child. Although this presumption also purports to be conclusive[ ] (§ 7576, subd. (a)), it is not; any person may rebut it by requesting blood or genetic tests pursuant to section 7551 within three years from the date of the declaration's execution. (§ 7576, subd. (d).) Thus, the Legislature has expressly provided that, as to young children, biological proof necessarily rebuts even the conclusive[ ] presumptions under sections 7540 and section 7576, subdivision (a). Logically, if the Legislature provided that proof of biological paternity necessarily rebuts these so-called conclusive presumptions, both of which are UPA presumptions, then surely the Legislature intended that such proof would rebut the non conclusive UPA presumption under section 7611, subdivision (a). [5] These same provisions alternatively show that, in addition to rebutting paternity presumptions, biological paternity should be given controlling weight in determining which unrebutted presumption is, on the facts ... founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.... (§ 7612, subd. (b).) Section 7576, subdivision (e), provides that if the presumption based on a voluntary paternity declaration is not rebutted, it override[s] all statutory presumptions of paternity except a presumption arising under Section 7540 or [ Section ] 7555.  (Italics added.) By implication, the hierarchy of presumptions established by this section affirmatively demonstrates the Legislature's intent that the presumption under section 7555 based on biological paternity would outweigh the presumptions under subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 7611. Logically, if the presumption based on a voluntary declaration necessarily overrides the 7611 presumptions (except the conclusive presumption under section 7540), but does not necessarily override section 7555's biologically-based presumption, then section 7555's biologically-based presumption must also necessarily override those section 7611 presumptions. Thus, the Legislature has expressed its policy decision that the presumption of a presumed father who is also the biological father is, on the facts ... founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.... [6] (§ 7612, subd. (b).) The legislative history of these provisions clearly supports my conclusion. The legislative command that paternity questions shall be resolved in accordance with tests conclusively showing that the alleged father is not the father of the child (§ 7554, subd. (a)) first appeared in 1953 as part of the Code of Civil Procedure (Stats.1953, ch. 1426, § 1, p. 3013). It derives from the identically-worded section 4 of the 1952 Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (1952 Act). In a prefatory note, the drafters of the 1952 Act explained that where tests conclusively show that a man is not a child's biological father, it seems intolerable for a court to permit an opposite result to be reached.... For a court to permit the establishment of paternity in cases where it is scientifically impossible to arrive at that result would seem to be a great travesty on justice. (9 West's U. Laws Ann. (1957) Miscellaneous Acts, 1952 Act, comrs. note No. 1, p. 103.) Thus, 50 years ago, our Legislature directed courts to give controlling weight to evidence conclusively disproving the biological paternity of a particular man. My conclusion that Heriberto's undisputed biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul's presumption is consistent with the Legislature's command. The majority holding's that Heriberto's biological paternity is simply a factor[ ] that a juvenile court is obliged to consider in weighing the competing presumptions under section 7611 (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 220, 85 P.3d at p. 15) overrides that command. The majority's conclusion also defeats the Legislature's intent in establishing the rebuttable presumption ... of paternity based on biology that is currently found in section 7555, subdivision (a). In 1986, when it first enacted this presumption, the Legislature expressly declared in an uncodified section of the enacting legislation: It is the intent of the Legislature to standardize the process by which paternity is established in order to achieve a greater degree of equity and consistency in paternity determinations. The Legislature finds that the science of genetic testing has advanced to the degree that paternity determinations resulting from such testing are so reliable that the burden of proof can be shifted to the putative father. (Stats.1986, ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-2137 [enacting Evid.Code, former § 895.5].) A legislative analysis explained that the section was necessary because, `under existing law, juries, regardless of the biological facts, tend to arrive at their decisions because of very subjective factors such as the appearance of the natural mother, and the ability of the expert witnesses to explain complex matters. The results of trials on these issues do not always correspond to the biological realities, regardless of how overwhelming such evidence may be. In fact, under [one appellate decision], the court is free to ignore blood test evidence. This bill should standardize paternity determinations and insure that blood test findings are given appropriate consideration.' (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3326 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) May 28, 1986, pp. 2-3.) My conclusion that Heriberto's conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul's presumption is consistent with and implements the Legislature's stated desire to standardize paternity determinations and insure that such determinations correspond to the biological realities. ( Id. at p. 3.) The majority's conclusion that a court need only consider biological paternity as one of several relevant factors in weighing competing presumptions (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 220, 85 P.3d at p. 15) is directly contrary to and defeats the Legislature's clearly stated intent. In rejecting my conclusion, the majority misstates the legislative history. The Legislature's expressly declared purpose in enacting section 7555 was not, as the majority states, to standardize the weight accorded to genetic tests in determining biological paternity (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 21), but was to standardize the process by which paternity is established in order to achieve a greater degree of equity and consistency in paternity determinations.  (Stats.1986, ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-2137, italics added.) The problem the statute addressed was not, as the majority asserts, that jurors were relying on less probative markers of biological paternity (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 21), but that they were making decisions regardless of the biological facts and regardless of how overwhelming evidence of the biological realities ... may be. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3326 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) May 28, 1986, pp. 2-3.) Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion, this legislative history says a great deal about what a court should do when faced with a conflict between a presumption under section 7555 based on biology and a presumption under section 7611 that is not based on biology (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 21); it tells us that, in order to implement the Legislature's expressly stated intent to standardize the process by which paternity is established and to achieve a greater degree of equity and consistency in paternity determinations (Stats.1986, ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-2137), the presumption under section 7555 controls. [7] This conclusion is consistent with a critical fact that the majority's analysis ignores: whereas the section 7611 presumptions, none of which is based on biology, are all subject to the UPA weighing process under section 7612, the presumption based on biology under section 7555 is expressly not subject to that weighing process. By its terms, section 7612 requires the weighing of conflicting presumptions that arise under Section 7611. As explained above, the presumptions that arise under section 7611 are those specified in subdivisions (a) through (e) of that section and those incorporated by reference from Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7540) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2. All of these presumptions are based on factors other than biology: marriage (§§ 7540, 7611, subd. (a)), attempted marriage (§ 7611, subds.(b), (c)), a voluntary declaration of paternity (§§ 7576, 7611, subd. (e)), or conduct towards the child (§ 7611, subd. (d)). The presumption based on biology under section 7555 appears in chapter 2 of part 2, not in chapter 1 or chapter 3. Because the presumption under section 7555 based on biology does not arise under Section 7611, it is not subject to weighing under section 7612, subdivision (b); it may be rebutted only by a preponderance of the evidence disproving the biological facts (§ 7555) and it necessarily rebuts the presumptions that arise under subdivisions (a) through (d) of section 7611. Moreover, the Legislature's exclusion of the presumption based on biology was clearly intentional, not simply an oversight. Until 1994, the only presumption incorporated by reference into the UPA was the presumption in chapter 1 of part 2 based on marriage. (§ 7540; see Stats.1993, ch. 219, § 176, p. 1670.) In 1994, the Legislature amended section 7611 to incorporate the presumption in chapter 3 of part 2 based on a voluntary declaration of paternity. (§ 7576; see Stats.1994, ch. 1269, § 53, p. 8058.) Clearly, the Legislature made a conscious decision to exclude the presumption in chapter 2 based on biology (§ 7554) from the UPA's balancing process under section 7612. This choice reflects the Legislature's intent that biological paternity would control paternity determinations, not that it would be, as the majority asserts, simply a factor that a court must weigh. Nor does the majority explain how, under its analysis, a juvenile court that is obliged to consider biological paternity even can take this factor [ ] into account (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 220, 85 P.3d at p. 15) in cases where biological paternity is not admitted. Under the majority's view, how does the juvenile court determine biological paternity where it is not admitted? If through genetic tests performed pursuant to section 7551, then, as explained above, section 7554 expressly tells us the effect of results showing that the tested man is not the father of the child; we must resolve [ ] the question of [his] paternity ... accordingly. If not through such testing, then how? The majority does not tell us. Also supporting my conclusion is the evolution and legislative history of the conclusive[ ] presumption under section 7540 that the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband ... is ... a child of the marriage. This presumption originally appeared as Evidence Code former section 621. In 1980, when the Legislature first made the presumption rebuttable with tests showing that the husband is not the father of the child, only the husband was given standing to move for testing and only within two years from the date of birth of the child. (Stats.1980, ch. 1310, § 1, p. 4433 [amending Evid.Code, former § 621, now Fam.Code, § 7541, subd. (b)].) In 1981, the Legislature extended standing to the mother of the child, subject to the same time limit and only if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child. (Stats.1981, ch. 1180, § 1, p. 4761 [amending Evid.Code, former § 621, now Fam.Code, § 7541, subd. (c)].) In 1990, the Legislature extended standing to a presumed father under section 7611 and to the child, subject to the same time limit and only for purposes of establishing [the presumed father's] paternity. (Stats.1990, ch. 543, § 2, p. 2855 [amending Evid. Code, former § 621, now Fam.Code, § 7541, subd. (b)].) The legislative history regarding these amendments is revealing. Regarding the 1980 legislation that first made the conclusive presumption rebuttable by the husband, one legislative analysis explained: Under the Uniform Parentage Act [citation], a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he comes within the purview of Evidence Code [former] Section 621 or meets any of the other conditions specified in Civil Code [former] Section 7004 [now, Family Code section 7611]. Except for [Evidence Code former] Section 621, all these presumptions are rebuttable and may be met by clear and convincing evidence. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1981 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) June 11, 1980, p. 2.) Thus, [i]f the conclusive presumption is ... eliminated by proof that the parties did not live together as husband and wife, the disputable presumption [that arises under the UPA] can then be met by any kind of competent evidence. ( Id. at p. 3.) The analysis also explained that an exception to the conclusive presumption ... is needed to prevent in some cases an injustice.... ( Id. at p. 2.) Similar statements appear in the legislative history of the 1981 amendment that extended standing to mothers if the biological father acknowledges paternity by affidavit. After stating that all of the presumptions [u]nder the Uniform Parentage Act ... are rebuttable except the conclusive presumption under Evidence Code former section 621 ( ibid. ), one analysis explained that the 1981 amendment would give the child's mother equal standing with the husband to request testing and to prevent the [husband's] conclusive presumption of paternity from operating especially where the biological father wishes to establish paternity. ... (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 207 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 11, 1981, p. 2, italics added.) These statements demonstrate several important things. First, they show the Legislature's express recognition that the conclusive presumption now found in section 7540 is a UPA presumption and the Legislature's intent to make that UPA presumption necessarily rebutted by proof that the presumed father is not the biological father; the amended statute commands that the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved accordingly,  that is, in accordance with the proof that the husband is not the father of the child. (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics added.) Second, they demonstrate that, in making the conclusive presumption rebuttable by the husband, the Legislature intended to make that presumption more like the other presumptions under the UPA, all of which were already rebuttable. Thus, if a husband's otherwise conclusive UPA presumption of paternity is necessarily rebutted by proof he is not the biological father, then the non conclusive UPA presumptions must also be necessarily rebutted by such proof; in establishing the limited exception to the conclusive presumption, the Legislature did not intend to make that presumption more rebuttable than the already rebuttable UPA presumptions. Finally, as especially relevant here, they demonstrate the Legislature's intent that biological paternity would necessarily rebut even an otherwise conclusive UPA presumption  where the biological father wishes to establish paternity. ... (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 207 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) Feb. 11, 1981, p. 2, italics added.) That is precisely the situation here; Heriberto, the biological father, formally request[ed] that the court enter a judgment of [his] paternity. [8] The legislative history of the 1990 amendment extending standing to presumed fathers is perhaps even more significant. Regarding the [n]eed for this change, one legislative analysis explained: [T]his measure would rectify those situations where unwed biological fathers are foreclosed from establishing paternity and precluded from continuing a supportive relationship with a child who was born while the mother was married and cohabiting with another man. [It] ... allow[s] a father who has demonstrated an interest in raising and providing for his child in a familial relationship the opportunity to establish paternity under the above factual circumstances. [¶] ... With more children born out of wedlock, to women who may be technically married, but no longer living with their husbands, ... legislation must be adopted which addresses the problems of unwed fathers who want to become involved and be responsible for the welfare of their children. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No.2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 27, 1990, p. 3.) Another analysis explained that the amendment specifically targeted those situations wherein a mother, a biological father, and child have lived together as a family, and thereupon, the mother departs to return to a husband or to live elsewhere and the biological father does not have access to the procedures that are otherwise available to a divorced father for determination of' custody or visitation. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No.2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 3.) The amendment was meant to change the fact that, under then-existing law, where a mother's husband qualified for the conclusive presumption under Evidence Code former section 621, a biological father who also qualified as a presumed father [could] be refused visitation rights regardless of his established relationship with the child. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Report on Sen. Bill No. 2015 (Apr. 4, 1990) p. 3.) The Legislature passed the amendment despite the contention of opponents that it would seriously erode[ ] the public policy of promoting the integrity of an intact family unit, and providing certainty to the relationship of a child in such a family. ( Id. at p. 4.) These statements, and the 1990 amendment itself, demonstrate the Legislature's intent that where a man who is a presumed father under section 7611 seeks to establish his paternity within a child's first two years of life, proof of his biological paternity conclusively and necessarily rebuts any other man's UPA presumption, even the otherwise conclusive presumption of the mother's husband. The facts here closely match the factual scenario the Legislature specifically had in mind when it gave presumed fathers standing to rebut the otherwise conclusive UPA presumption of a husband's paternity under section 7540. Jesusa's mother left Paul, whom she said she sees ... as a brother rather than a husband, and moved in with Heriberto three years before the dependency proceeding began on April 4, 2001. She lived with Heriberto when Jesusa was conceived and when she was born (May 1999), and the three of them lived together until the dependency proceeding began, when Jesusa was less than 23 months old. Thus, during the relevant events, although Jesusa's mother was still technically married to Paul, she was living with Heriberto. Moreover, Jesusa's mother reported that Heriberto had always been very loving and gentle to Jesusa. Finally, on April 13, 2001, when Heriberto filed a formal request in the dependency action for a judgment declaring his paternity, Jesusa was still less than two years old. Thus, this is precisely the type of case where the Legislature intended that a UPA presumption  which, by definition, is not based on biology  would necessarily be rebutted by proof that another presumed father is the biological father. The majority's response on this point is erroneous. Isolating a single phrase from the legislative reports  `the opportunity to establish paternity'  the majority asserts that [a] mere opportunity for the unwed biological father to establish paternity hardly supports the conclusion that biology is necessarily determinative. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 21.) However, as I have shown, a review of the entire legislative history, rather than a single phrase taken out of context, demonstrates the Legislature's intent to make biology determinative where a biological father who also is a presumed father under section 7611 seeks to rebut another man's presumption. Moreover, the majority's response ignores the fact that section 7541, subdivision (a), expressly makes biology determinative, by providing that the question of paternity of the tested presumed father shall be resolved according[ ] to results showing that he is not the father. In this regard, and contrary to the majority's assertion, section 7541 is not at all similar to the statute the Colorado Supreme Court construed in N.A.H. v. S.L.S. (Colo.2000) 9 P.3d 354. (See maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 21.) The Colorado statute merely provided that a presumption of legitimacy that is not based on biology is overcome by testing showing that the presumed father is not the parent of the child. ( N.A.H., supra, at pp. 360-361.) Section 7541, subdivision (a), does not provide that such testing merely overcomes a presumption; it provides that paternity ... shall be resolved according [ ] to test results showing that the tested presumed father is not the father of the child. The majority is incorrect that my construction of these statutes renders part of section 7612, subdivision (a), meaningless. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 224, 85 P.3d at p. 18.) As the majority observes, section 7541 specifies that the section 7540 presumption is rebutted by evidence of biological fatherhood, and section 7576, subdivision (e), specifies that a presumption based on a voluntary paternity declaration would not override a presumption of paternity arising under section 7555, the genetic testing provision. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 224-225, 85 P.3d at pp. 18-19.) The majority next correctly observes that subdivision (a) of section 7612 provides: Except as provided in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7540) and Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2 ..., a presumption under Section 7611 is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof and may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence. (See maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 224, 85 P.3d at p. 18.) However, the conclusion the majority reaches based on these provisions is incorrect. That the Legislature expressly except [ ed ] the presumptions under section 7540 and section 7576 from the operation of section 7612, subdivision (a) and [made] separate provision for the legal effect of biology in those circumstances does not, as the majority asserts, show the Legislature's  belie [ f ] that section 7612, subdivision (a) [ does ] not necessarily accord primacy to biology.  (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 224, 85 P.3d at p. 18.) Rather, it shows that the Legislature wanted to impose limits with respect to these presumptions that do not exist with respect to the other section 7611 presumptions. Specifically, as the majority recognizes (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 220, fn. 6, 85 P.3d at p. 14, fn. 6), through the excepting clause of section 7612, subdivision (a), the Legislature imposed time limits for rebutting the presumptions under sections 7540 and 7576 that do not apply to the other section 7611 presumptions. (See § 7541, subds. (c), (d) [two-year time limit]; § 7576, subd. (d) [three year time limit]). That is, the excepting clause takes the section 7540 and 7576 presumptions out of the general rule that otherwise applies. Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion, my construction does not render meaningless the `excepting' clause in subdivision (a) of section 7612. [9] (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 224, 85 P.3d at p. 18.) On the other hand, the majority's construction renders meaningless all of subdivision (b) of section 7612. As I have explained, section 7612 gives rise to two separate questions: (1) under subdivision (a), whether a presumed father's presumption is rebutted; and (2) under subdivision (b), where there are competing unrebutted presumptions, which one on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. Under the majority's construction, these questions are exactly the same, and a court looks to the exact same factors to answer each. The majority holds that courts must consider the child's best interest and public policy in determining under subdivision (a) of section 7612 whether [a] presumption is rebutted. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 226, 85 P.3d at p. 20.) Similarly, the majority holds that a court `must take the best interests of the child into account as part of policy and logic in resolving competing presumptions' under subdivision (b) of section 7612. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219, 85 P.3d at p. 14.) Thus, although the term best interests does not appear in either subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of section 7612, the majority reads that term into both. In affirming the juvenile court's finding that Paul's presumption was not rebutted, the majority weighs Paul's relationship to Jesusa, her half siblings, and her mother against the fact that Heriberto is Jesusa's biological father and he lived with her through her infancy. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219, 85 P.3d at p. 14.) Likewise, in affirming the juvenile court's finding that Paul's presumption is weightier, the majority weighs the exact same factors, restated almost verbatim. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 224, 85 P.3d at p. 18.) Under the majority's analysis and construction, subdivision (b) of section 7612 is entirely useless; it adds nothing that is not already contained in subdivision (a) of the same section. Thus, it is the majority's construction, not mine, that renders part of section 7612 meaningless. My construction gives effect to all parts of the statute. The majority's construction also produces absurd results. As noted, the conclusive presumption under section 7540 is also a section 7611 UPA presumption, and the majority concedes that, under section 7541, subdivision (a), this conclusive presumption ... is rebutted by evidence of biological fatherhood. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 224, 85 P.3d at p. 19.) However, under the majority's view, the non conclusive presumptions under section 7611 are not necessarily rebutted by evidence of biological fatherhood. Thus, according to the majority, evidence of biological fatherhood necessarily rebuts the conclusive[ ] UPA presumption of a husband who is cohabiting with his wife at the time of conception (§ 7540), but not the non conclusive UPA presumption of a husband who is not cohabiting with his wife (§ 7611, subd. (a)), or of a man who marries the mother after the child's birth (§ 7611, subd. (c)), or of a man who incorrectly believed he had validly married the mother (§ 7611, subd. (b)). Moreover, test results showing that a husband is not the father does not merely rebut the presumption under section 7540, it requires that the husband's paternity be resolved accordingly, that is, with a judgment that he is not the father. (§ 7541, subd. (a).) Such a judgment necessarily precludes the husband from establishing his paternity claim under some other provision. Thus, under the majority's view, a husband is actually better off if he is not cohabiting with his wife at the time of conception and therefore does not qualify for the conclusive presumption under section 7540. Under these circumstances, he would qualify for only a non conclusive presumption under section 7611 and, because section 7541 does not apply, he could still be declared the father despite another presumed father's established biological paternity. It is highly doubtful that the Legislature intended these absurd results. [10] The majority's attempt to explain these results simply demonstrates the absurdity of its construction. The majority asserts that it is incorrect to compar[e] the presumption in section 7540 to the other section 7611 presumptions because the former, [u]nlike the latter, is not really a presumption at all but is instead `a rule of substantive law.' (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 225, 85 P.3d at p. 19.) However, the characterization of the section 7540 presumption as a substantive rule of law is ours, not the Legislature's. ( Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 619, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657.) Section 7540 provides that the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband is presumed to be the child of the marriage. Similarly, section 7611 expressly provides that a man is presumed to be a child's natural father if he meets the conditions provided in section 7540 or in subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 7611. Thus, contrary to the majority's assertion, section 7540, like subdivisions (a) through (e) of section 7611, creates a paternity presumption. [11] In any event, even if, as the majority asserts, section 7540 alone states a substantive rule of law, then the presumption it establishes should be harder to rebut than the other section 7611 presumptions, not easier; yet, under the majority's construction, evidence that necessarily rebuts the section 7540 presumption does not necessarily rebut the other section 7611 presumptions. The majority also errs in suggesting that the other section 7611 presumptions are unlike the section 7540 presumption in that they were `established to implement some public policy other than to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which the presumption is applied.' (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 225, 85 P.3d at p. 19.) As we have explained, the section 7540 presumption and the other section 7611 presumptions all serve the same public policy. ( In re Nicholas H. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 56, 65, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932 Nicholas H.; Estate of Cornelious (1984) 35 Cal.3d 461, 465, 198 Cal.Rptr. 543, 674 P.2d 245 ( Cornelious ).) Finally, the majority's analysis is not aided by its observation that, unlike the section 7540 presumption, the other section 7611 presumptions may be rebutted `only by clear and convincing evidence.' (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 225, 85 P.3d at p. 19.) The standard of proof for rebutting the section 7540 presumption is actually higher; that presumption is overcome only if  all the experts agree that the husband is not the father. (§ 7541, subd. (a), italics added.) Thus, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the difference in the applicable standard of proof again demonstrates that the Legislature intended to make the section 7611 presumption harder to rebut than the other section 7611 presumptions, and that proof rebutting the section 7540 presumption therefore necessarily rebuts the other section 7611 presumptions. My conclusion that, under our current statutory scheme, one presumed father's biological paternity necessarily rebuts another man's presumption is consistent with the law as it existed before the Legislature adopted the UPA in 1975. In Kusior, we considered the rebuttable presumption under Civil Code former sections 194 and 195 in favor a mother's husband where the child was born within 10 months of the dissolution of marriage. ( Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 607, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657.) Blood tests taken pursuant to the California Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity  specifically, Code of Civil Procedure former section 1980.3, which was substantively identical to the first sentence of Family Code section 7551 (see Stats.1953, ch. 1426, § 1, p. 3013)  showed that the mother's husband could not have been the father of the child.... ( Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 607, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657.) We held that, in adopting California's Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, the Legislature made a legislative determination ... that blood test evidence is conclusive. ( Kusior, at p. 619, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657.) We relied for this conclusion on Code of Civil Procedure former section 1980.6, which, in language identical to Family Code section 7554, provided that if `the conclusions of all the experts ... are that the alleged father is not the father of the child, the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly.' ( Kusior, supra, 54 Cal.2d at p. 620, 7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657, fn. omitted.) [U]nder th[is] language, we explained, where the tests so taken establish that the mother's husband could not be the father of the child the rebuttable presumptions of paternity are conclusively rebutted.  ( Ibid., italics added.) Indeed, under California law before the UPA's passage, evidence other than tests  including an admission of biological paternity  showing that a presumed father was not the biological father conclusively rebutted a presumption. In Baker v. Baker (1859) 13 Cal. 87, 96, 1859 WL 960 ( Baker ), the evidence showed that a woman had admitted to her brother that her husband was not her child's biological father. We first held that, absent evidence of collusion, the admission was admissible because the public can have no interest in suppressing the truth. ( Id. at p. 94.) We then held that the woman's admission placed her child's paternity upon a stranger beyond a doubt and, thus, necessarily overc[a]me the husband's rebuttable presumption. ( Id. at p. 101.) Here, of course, not only does Jesusa's mother concede Heriberto's biological paternity, both Heriberto and Paul do so as well. Moreover, there is not even a hint of collusion in this case. Thus, under California law before passage of the UPA, Heriberto's conceded biological paternity would have conclusively and necessarily rebutted Paul's presumption. (See also Anderson v. Anderson (1931) 214 Cal. 414, 417, 5 P.2d 881 [because evidence established biological paternity by a stranger ... beyond question, husband's presumption no longer obtains]; Hughes v. Hughes (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 781, 784-787, 271 P.2d 172.) Nothing suggests that, in adopting the UPA, the Legislature intended to alter the determinative effect of biological paternity under California law in cases involving competing paternity claims. The UPA's purpose was not to enact fundamental changes regarding the role of biology in the law of paternity, but was simply to replace the concept of legitimacy with the concept of the parent and child relationship and to specify a procedure for establishing that relationship. (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) 2 Stats.1975, Summary Dig., p. 344; Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 88-89, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) According to one legislative analysis, [a]ll of the presumptions established by [the UPA] correspond[ed] to current law.  (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) May 8, 1975, pp. 15-16, italics added.) For example, the rebuttable presumption at issue in Kusior, which we held was conclusively rebutted by tests showing that the presumed father was not the biological father, was the same rebuttable presumption now contained in section 7611, subdivision (a). The legislative history of the UPA also explained that the UPA presumptions may be rebutted ... by clear and convincing evidence. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 347 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 7, 1975, p. 2.) Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which drafted the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (1973 Act) from which California's UPA was derived ( Adoption of Michael H., supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1050, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 445, 898 P.2d 891), explained that the 1973 Act's presumptions are rebuttable [ i ] n accordance with current law in most states relating to the rebuttal of a presumption of `legitimacy.' (9B West's U. Laws Ann. (2001) U. Parentage Act (1973) com. to § 4, p. 394, italics added.) As explained above, when this comment was written, the law in California provided that rebuttable presumptions were conclusively rebutted by proof  such as lack of intercourse, blood tests, the husband's sterility or impotency, or admissions by the mother  that the presumed father was not the biological father. [12] The law in other states was the same. (See generally, Annot., Proof of Husband's Impotency or Sterility as Rebutting Presumption of Legitimacy (1978) 84 A.L.R.3d 495; Annot., Presumption of Legitimacy, or of Paternity, of Child Conceived or Born Before Marriage (1958) 57 A.L.R.2d 729.) The majority's conclusion that, despite one presumed father's conceded biological paternity, a court may decline to find another man's presumption rebutted based on a weighing of policy considerations, constitutes a revolutionary change in terms of the law as it existed when California's UPA and the 1973 Act were drafted and approved. Nothing in the legislative history of the UPA indicates that our Legislature even considered, much less intended to make, this revolutionary change. On the contrary, as explained, the legislative history shows that the UPA was intended to preserve existing law regarding the determinative effect of biological paternity in cases involving competing paternity claims. [13] Indeed, the very language of the UPA demonstrates that the majority's construction is inconsistent with the Legislature's intent. As noted above, the UPA specifies a procedure for establishing [t]he parent and child relationship (§ 7610), which the UPA defines as the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's natural or adoptive parents.... (§ 7601, italics added.) The particular UPA procedure at issue here is that for establishing [t]he parent and child relationship ... [b]etween a child and the natural father. (§ 7610, subd. (b), italics added.) Under well established principles of statutory construction, in construing these provisions, [w]e look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] ( People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648.) The usual and ordinary meaning of the terms natural parent and natural father is, respectively, the biological parent and the biological father. (See Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 463 U.S. 248, 262, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 [the biological connection ... offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring].) As Black's Law Dictionary explains, the term natural father is [a]lso termed biological father  and means [t]he man who impregnated the child's natural mother. (Black's Law Dict. (7th ed.1999) p. 623, col. 1.) For years, we have construed the term natural parent, both in interpreting the UPA and in other contexts, in accordance with its common and ordinary meaning, that is, as meaning biological parent. [14] Based on the common and ordinary meaning of the terms natural parent (§ 7601) and natural father (§ 7610, subd. (b)), the UPA's purpose is to specify a procedure for identifying a child's biological father and legally establishing his relationship to his child. Thus, under the statute's plain meaning, although Paul's marriage to Jesusa's natural mother initially qualified him under section 7611, subdivision (a), for a presumption that he is Jesusa's natural father, Heriberto's conceded biological paternity constitutes clear and convincing evidence that necessarily rebuts the presumption. (§ 7612, subd. (a); see In re Zacharia D., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 450, fn. 18, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 862 P.2d 751 [UPA presumption of one man was rebutted by blood tests establishing that [another man] was the biological father].) Relevant legislative history confirms that the Legislature understood and used the term natural father in the UPA in accordance with its ordinary meaning, that is, biological father. As explained above, in 1980, the Legislature first made the conclusive[ ] presumption under section 7540 rebuttable by giving the husband standing to obtain testing that would necessarily rebut the presumption. (Stats.1980, ch. 1310, § 1, p. 4433 [amending Evid.Code, former § 621, now § 7541, subd. (b)].) One legislative analysis of this amendment explained that a consequence of the irrebutable presumption [wa]s that the child's natural father, when he is not the husband, [could not] establish paternity. Thus, the presumption prevent[ed] the natural father from establishing a legal father-child relationship which is the basis for familial rights.... (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Assem. Bill No.1981 (1979-1980 Reg. Sess.) June 23, 1980, pp. 3-4, italics added.) In these comments, the term natural father was clearly being used to mean biological father. Legislative analyses of the 1990 amendment that extended standing to presumed father[s] under the UPA (§ 7541, subd. (b)), similarly used the term natural father to mean biological father. Several of those analyses explained that, under then-existing law, standing to rebut the otherwise conclusive presumption under section 7540 was limited to the mother's husband and the mother if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 6, 1990, p. 2, italics added.) The statute these reports described actually provides standing to the mother if the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity.... (§ 7541, subd. (c), italics added.) Another analysis explained that the amendment enables a presumed father under the UPA to obtain blood tests to establish himself to be the biological father. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Republican Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 1990, italics added.) As already explained, the UPA sets forth a procedure for establishing a parent-child relationship [b]etween a child and the natural father.... (§ 7610, subd. (b), italics added.) Still another analysis explained that the amendment addressed problems arising under the high court's decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D. (1989) 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91, where [t]he dissenting opinions argued that a natural father's biological link to his child combined with a substantial parent-child relationship maintained between them, guarantees the natural father a liberty interest in his relationship with child. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 4, italics added.) By interchangeably using the terms biological and natural in discussing one of the presumptions under the UPA (§ 7611), these analyses clearly demonstrate the Legislature's understanding and intent that the term natural father in the UPA (§ 7610, subd. (b)) would be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning, that is, biological father. The logical conclusion based on this ordinary meaning is that a presumed father's conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts the presumption that another man is the natural father of a child. [15] (§ 7611.) This conclusion is consistent with our analysis in Johnson. There, we had to resolve the competing maternity claims of two women: one who gave birth to the child and another who had provided the egg that was implanted into the first. ( Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 87, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) We first reasoned that the UPA, which applies to any parentage determination, governed the issue. ( Id. at p. 89, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) We then reasoned that, because both women had a biological claim to maternity, the [UPA] presumptions contained in [section 7611] do not apply.  ( Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 91, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) These presumptions, we explained, describe situations in which substantial evidence points to a particular man as the natural father of the child. [Citation.] ( Ibid., italics added.) We then held that, because both women had established a biological basis for their claim, there [was] no need to resort to an evidentiary presumption to ascertain the identity of the natural mother. ( Id. at p. 91, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776, italics added.) We next expressly rejected the very approach the majority adopts here: that courts applying the UPA should decide parentage based on the best interests of the child. ( Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 93, fn. 10, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) We explained that under our statutory framework, the determination of parentage must precede, and should not be dictated by, eventual custody decisions. ( Ibid. ) We also explained that concerns about the child's best interests should be addressed, not through parentage determinations, but through our dependency laws, which are designed to protect all children irrespective of the manner of birth or conception. ( Ibid. ) We ultimately held that, in resolving the competing maternity claims under the [UPA], the parties' intentions controlled, rather than the child's best interests. ( Id. at p. 95, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) Our analysis in Johnson confirms that, under the UPA, in resolving competing claims of parentage  as opposed to custody  biological parentage controls over a mere presumption that is not based on biology, notwithstanding the child's best interests. Under that analysis, Paul's UPA presumption does not apply in this case because Heriberto is Jesusa's undisputed biological father; if, as we held in Johnson, the UPA presumptions do not apply when both claimants establish biological parentage, then certainly the undisputed biological paternity of one presumed father necessarily rebuts the presumption of another presumed father. Concerns that Heriberto is not an appropriate father for Jesusa should be addressed, not through this paternity determination, but through our laws on custody and termination of parental rights. (See In re Marriage of Moschetta, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 1226, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 893 [§ 7611 presumptions, which serve the function of settling questions of biological parenthood, are inapplicable where there is no question of biological parenthood because [a]ll parties know ... who is genetically related to whom].) The majority's discussion of Johnson is erroneous. The majority asserts that Johnson is not pertinent here because section 7612 contains a directive that the child's best interests should be considered in making parentage decisions. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 229, 85 P.3d at p. 22.) The majority is incorrect; section 7612 does not even mention the child's best interests. That gloss on section 7612 is solely a creation of the majority's; as explained above, the majority reads the phrase best interests into both subdivision (a) and subdivision (b) of that section. [16] Moreover, contrary to the majority's suggestion, in Johnson, when we held that parentage claims should not be based on the child's best interests, we were not merely selecting a policy; we were, as we are here, giving effect to the UPA. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 22.) The majority's holding repudiate[s] that statutory construction. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 228, 85 P.3d at p. 21.) Finally, the majority's discussion ignores Johnson's conclusion that because the purpose of the UPA's presumptions is to identify a particular man as the natural father of the child, where the biological evidence establishes the identity of the natural [parent], the presumptions do not apply. ( Johnson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 91, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, 851 P.2d 776.) Under that conclusion, because Heriberto is Jesusa's biological father, Paul's presumption does not apply. [17] In rejecting my construction of section 7612, subdivision (a), the majority, contrary to governing principles, expressly declines to construe the [statutory] scheme of which section 7612 is a part. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 227, 85 P.3d at p. 20.) The majority also fails to consider most of the legislative history I have discussed, and offers no legislative history supporting its own construction. Nor does the majority consider the common and ordinary meaning of the term natural father or offer any alternative meaning of that phrase. Finally, the majority disregards Johnson, which specifically construed the UPA in the context of competing parentage claims. Instead, in construing section 7612, subdivision (a), the majority relies principally on a decision that did not involve competing parentage claims: Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th 56, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932. Purportedly [a]pplying Nicholas H., the majority concludes that one presumed father's conceded biological paternity does not necessarily defeat the competing presumption of another man who is not the biological father. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 216, 85 P.3d at p. 11.) For several reasons, the majority's reliance on Nicholas H. is misplaced. First and foremost, Nicholas H. actually supports my conclusion that, in this case of competing paternity claims, Heriberto's conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul's presumption. The question we faced in Nicholas H. was whether a presumption arising under section 7611[ ] is, under section 7612[, subdivision (a),] necessarily rebutted when the presumed father ... admits that he is not the biological father of the child. ( Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 58, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932, italics added.) We held that such an admission does not necessarily rebut a presumption where the presumed father is providing a loving home for the child and the child's biological father ... has shown no interest in establishing his paternity or accepting the privilege and responsibility of fathering the child. ( Id. at pp. 58-59, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932.) Rather, we explained, the kind of action the Legislature had in mind where a section 7611 would be rebutted is one in which another candidate is vying for parental rights and seeks to rebut a section 7611[ ] presumption in order to perfect his claim.... ( Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932.) Of course, the case now before us is precisely the kind of case that, according to Nicholas H., the Legislature had in mind as one in which a section 7611 presumption would be rebutted by another man's biological paternity; Heriberto, who is both the biological father and a presumed father in his own right, is vying for parental rights and seeks to rebut Paul's section 7611 presumption in order to perfect his claim. ( Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932.) Thus, contrary to the majority's analysis, Nicholas H. supports the conclusion that Heriberto's conceded biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul's presumption. [18] Relevant legislative history confirms that the distinction we drew in Nicholas H.  between cases where the biological father seeks to establish his paternity claim and cases where he does not  correctly reflects the Legislature's intent. As explained above, when the Legislature extended standing to contest section 7540's conclusive presumption to a presumed father under section 7611 and to the child, it did so only for purposes of establishing [the presumed father's] paternity. (Stats.1990, ch. 543, § 2, p. 2855 [amending Evid.Code, former § 621, now Fam.Code, § 7541, subd. (b)].) According to the amendment's legislative history, the Legislature specifically included this limitation to clarify that the purpose for giving presumed fathers and the child standing was to establish the paternity of the presumed father and to prevent a presumed father (who may not be the biologic father) or the child [from] fil[ing] a motion to have the husband determined as not the biologic father, with no intent of obtaining a legal determination to establish paternity in someone else. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 6.) At the same time the Legislature added this limitation, it rejected a proposed amendment that would have deleted the restriction barring a mother from contesting the husband's conclusive presumption unless the child's biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging paternity of the child. (§ 7541, subd. (c).) One legislative analysis explained that this proposed amendment could, if the mother establishes her husband's lack of paternity, leave the child  legally without a father, which would be contrary to public policy. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2015 (1989-1990 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1990, p. 6.) This legislative history supports our statement in Nicholas H. that the case now before us  in which a biological father who is also a presumed father seeks to perfect his claim and to rebut the presumption of another man  is precisely the kind of case the Legislature had in mind as an ` appropriate action ' where the presumption would be rebutted. ( Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932.) Nicholas H. supports my conclusion in another important respect. The child in Nicholas H. was more than four years old when the dependency petition was filed ( Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 59-60, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932), and, in reaching our conclusion, we quoted the following statement from Cornelious, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pages 465-466, 198 Cal.Rptr. 543, 674 P.2d 245: `[I]n the case of an older child [over two years of age] the familial relationship between the child and the man purporting to be the child's father is considerably more palpable than the biological relationship of actual paternity.' (See Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 65, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932.) This quotation from Cornelious was taken from a discussion explaining why the Legislature, when it gave mothers and their husbands the right to contest the conclusive presumption under section 7540, required that the right be exercised within two years of the child's birth. ( Cornelious, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 465-466, 198 Cal.Rptr. 543, 674 P.2d 245.) Significantly, that discussion also explained that the Legislature's probable rationale for this limitation was that, `[i]n the case of a young child'  that is, a child under two years of age  `the most palpable relation that anyone has to the child is a biological relationship.' ( Id. at p. 465, 198 Cal.Rptr. 543, 674 P.2d 245.) This discussion supports my conclusion that, at least when the child is less than two years old, the Legislature intended that biological paternity would be controlling. In the case now before us, Jesusa was less than two years old when the dependency petition was filed and when Heriberto formally asked the court to enter a judgment declaring his paternity. Thus, by quoting and relying on the discussion in Cornelious, Nicholas H. supports my conclusion that Heriberto's biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul's presumption. [19] Beyond summarizing Nicholas H., the majority's actual analysis under that decision is as unconvincing and conclusory as it is brief. After repeating Nicholas H.'s observation that section 7612, subdivision (a), provides that a presumption may be rebutted in an appropriate action, the majority asserts: This indicates that the Legislature did not envision an automatic preference for biological fathers, even if the biological father has come forward to assert his rights. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) The majority's logic is faulty; the mere fact that section 7612, subdivision (a), makes the presumptions rebuttable in an appropriate action does not indicate a legislative intent not to make biology determinative where the biological father has come forward to assert his rights. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) On the contrary, as I have explained, in Nicholas H., we stated that this is precisely the factual scenario that the Legislature envisioned as ` an appropriate action ' for rebutting the presumption. ( Nicholas H., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 70, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 146, 46 P.3d 932.) Moreover, as I have also explained, the overall statutory scheme and the relevant legislative history demonstrate the Legislature's intent to make biology controlling in paternity disputes between competing presumed fathers, at least with respect to young children like Jesusa. The majority next asserts that, `if the Legislature had intended that a man who is not a biological father cannot be a presumed father under section 7611, it would not have provided for such weighing, for among two competing claims for presumed father status under section 7611, there can be only one biological father.' [Citation.] (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12, italics added.) Again, the majority's logic is faulty. The majority incorrectly assumes that in every case involving competing presumptions, one of the presumed fathers will be the biological father. However, because biological paternity is not a requirement of any of the UPA presumptions, in some cases, neither of the presumed fathers will be the biological father. In this circumstance, neither presumed father will be able to rebut the other's presumption (assuming the facts underlying the presumptions are otherwise established). The majority's logic also overlooks the fact that, under specified circumstances, two of the UPA presumptions  a husband's presumption under section 7540 and the presumption under section 7576 based on a voluntary paternity declaration  are, by statute, not rebuttable. (§ 7541, subds.(b), (c), (e); § 7576, subd. (d).) Thus, in some cases, a presumed father who is also the biological father may be precluded from rebutting another man's UPA presumption. Finally, the majority's logic overlooks the fact that it is possible  for example, in the case of men who are identical twins  for genetic tests to show that more than one man could be the biological father. In all of these scenarios, weighing will be necessary to determine which unrebutted presumption controls. (§ 7612, subd. (b).) These possibilities demonstrate that a weighing provision is necessary even under my conclusion that one presumed father's biological paternity necessarily rebuts a rebuttable presumption of another man. For the same reason, the majority errs in asserting that if the Legislature had intended to restrict the weighing process under section 7612, subdivision (b) to disputes between competing nonbiological fathers, it could easily have said so. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) As I have just explained, under my conclusion, the weighing process under section 7612, subdivision (b), is not applicable only to disputes between nonbiological fathers. Moreover, even were the weighing process so limited, because, as I have demonstrated, the Legislature understood and intended that one presumed father's proven biological paternity would, under section 7612, subdivision (a), necessarily rebut the rebuttable presumption of another man, the Legislature had no need to specify that the weighing process under subdivision (b) of that section applies only to competing nonbiological fathers; that conclusion logically follows from the statutory scheme the Legislature put in place. Nor is the majority correct that section 7575 supports its conclusion. According to the majority, section 7575, subdivision (b) `permits but does not require' a court to rely on blood test evidence in deciding whether to set aside a voluntary declaration of paternity signed on or before December 31, 1996. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) `It is unlikely,' the majority asserts, that `the Legislature would  without explicitly so stating  adopt a contrary rule that blood test evidence ... must defeat the claim of a person who claims presumed father status under section 7611(d).' [Citation.] (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) The majority's analysis is both unpersuasive and incorrect. It is unpersuasive because it ignores the fact that blood test evidence showing that the tested man is not the father does necessarily rebut the presumption of a husband who is conclusively presumed to be the father under section 7540. (§ 7541, subd. (a).) To paraphrase the majority, `[i]t is unlikely the Legislature would  without explicitly so stating  adopt a contrary rule' that test results do not necessarily rebut the non conclusive UPA presumptions. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) The majority's analysis is incorrect because it does not focus on the correct statute. In determining whether Heriberto's biological paternity necessarily rebuts Paul's presumption under section 7611, we should consider the Legislature's treatment of presumptions based on voluntary paternity declarations. That issue is governed by section 7576, not, as the majority asserts, by section 7575. As explained above, section 7576, subdivision (a), provides that a voluntary declaration of paternity completed before January 1, 1997, raises a presumption that the child of the man executing the voluntary declaration is ... the man's child. As also explained above, section 7576, subdivision (d), provides that any person may rebut the presumption raised by such a declaration by obtaining genetic tests pursuant to section 7551. This provision makes a presumption based on a voluntary declaration expressly subject to California's Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (§ 7550 et seq.), including the direction in section 7554 that the question of paternity shall be resolved in accordance with tests showing that the alleged father is not the father. Thus, a presumption based on a voluntary declaration, like a section 7540 presumption, is necessarily rebutted by test results showing that the presumed father is not the father. That test results necessarily rebut the presumptions under both sections 7540 and 7576 follows not just from subdivision (d) of section 7576, but also from subdivision (a), which expressly declares that the presumption based on a voluntary paternity declaration has the same force and effect as the presumption under Section 7540. (§ 7575, subd. (a).) This fact supports my construction because, again to quote the majority, `[i]t is unlikely the Legislature would' provide that the so-called conclusive UPA presumptions under both sections 7540 and 7576 are necessarily rebutted by such evidence and, without explicitly so stating, `adopt a contrary rule' with respect to the non conclusive UPA presumptions. [20] (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) The majority is also incorrect in asserting that not a single case supports my construction of section 7612, subdivision (a) (maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 225, 85 P.3d at p. 19), whereas its construction of that subdivision is consistent with the weight of authority in our Courts of Appeal. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 217, 85 P.3d at p. 12.) Brian C. v. Ginger K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 294, supports my conclusion. There, in discussing resolution of competing claims of presumed fathers under the UPA, the court observed: (1) under section 7551, a court  may order blood tests at any time; (2) under section 7612, subdivision (a), a section 7611 presumption `may be rebutted ... only by clear and convincing evidence'; and (3) DNA tests ... certainly constitute clear and convincing evidence rebutting any of the presumptions that might favor either of the competing fathers. ( Brian C. v. Ginger K., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 1222, fn. 20, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 294.) The majority offers no persuasive reason for discounting this decision. On the other hand, upon examination, the Court of Appeal decisions on which the majority relies turn out not to be weight[y] at all. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 216, 85 P.3d at p. 11.) In Steven W., the court discussed only subdivision ( b ) of what it is now section 7612 in concluding that one man's presumption was controlling; it did not even consider whether, under subdivision ( a ) of section 7612, one presumed father's biological paternity necessarily rebuts the other man's presumption. ( Steven W., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1115-1117, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 535.) Thus, it provides no support for the majority's construction of the latter subdivision. In In re Kiana A. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1109, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 669, the entire discussion of the significance of biological paternity was dicta; before opining on this issue, the court held that biological paternity had not been established in the juvenile court and that the man asserting his biological paternity could not raise his untimely claim for the first time on appeal. ( Id. at p. 1118, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 669.) Moreover, the court's dicta on this issue contained no analysis other than citing Steven W. and citing the language of section 7612, subdivision (a). ( Kiana, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1118-1119, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 669.) Finally, like Nicholas H. and unlike the case now before us, both Steven W. and Kiana involved a child who was more than two years old when the paternity issue arose. ( Kiana, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 669 [child over 12 years of age]; Steven W., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 535 [almost 3-year-old child].) In both cases, the courts relied heavily on this fact in reaching their conclusion. ( Kiana, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1119-1120, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 669; Steven W., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1117-1118, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 535.) Thus, these cases provide no substantial support for the majority's construction. [21] The majority's analysis is equally faulty with respect to its conclusion that a court need not give determinative weight to biology in determining under subdivision (b) of section 7612 which presumption `on the facts is founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.' (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219, 85 P.3d at p. 14.) The sum total of the majority's statutory analysis under California law is the following: Section 7612, subdivision (b) nowhere states that biology is a conclusive consideration of policy and logic. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219, 85 P.3d at p. 14.) Thus, the majority completely ignores the overall statutory scheme, which, as I have shown, demonstrates the Legislature's intent, at least with respect to children less than two years of age, to make biological paternity the controlling consideration of policy and logic in resolving the competing paternity claims of presumed fathers. In this regard, the majority's analysis again violates the principle that we construe statutes not in isolation, but `with reference to the entire scheme of law of which [they are] part.' ( Pieters, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 899, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420.) Instead of analyzing California's statutory scheme, the majority relies on decisions from other states. Specifically, the majority cites decisions from Colorado, Hawai'i, Minnesota, and Nevada in which courts purportedly declined to make biology determinative under their analog to section 7612 when confronted by competing presumptions of paternity. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 219, 85 P.3d at p. 14.) The non-California decisions on which the majority relies do not support the majority's conclusion because the statutes they construed are significantly different from California's UPA. As explained above, when our Legislature established a presumption based on test results, it excluded that presumption from the UPA's weighing process under section 7612 and specifically declared its intent ... to standardize the process by which paternity is established in order to achieve a greater degree of equity and consistency in paternity determinations. (Stats.1986 ch. 629, § 1, pp. 2136-2137.) It thus provided clear evidence of its intent to make established biological paternity determinative as to which competing UPA presumption is,  on the facts ... founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.... (§ 7612, subd. (b), italics added.) By contrast, in Colorado, Hawai'i, Minnesota, and Nevada, the presumption based on scientific tests is just one of several presumptions stated in their version of section 7611, that is, their version of section 4 of the 1973 Act. (Colo. Rev. Stats. § 19-4-105; Hawaii Rev. Stats. § 584-4(a); Minn.Stat. § 257.55, subd. (1); Nev. Rev. Stats. § 126.051(1).) Notably, in the decisions the majority cites, the courts relied on this fact, and the fact that the same statute provided for the weighing of conflicting presumptions, in concluding that their state's presumption based on biology does not necessarily overcome the presumptions based on other factors. [22] For example, as one of the cited cases explained, the original lodestar of [Minnesota's] parentage act was  biological paternity; thus, [w]hen the parentage act was first adopted in [Minnesota], ... the effort was to find the biological father and then to adjudicate that person the legal father. ( Matter of Welfare of C.M.G. (Minn.Ct.App.1994) 516 N.W.2d 555, 560, fn. 8, italics added.) However, when the [Minnesota] legislature added the presumption established under the genetic test presumption, [citation], it ... treated [that presumption] simply as the sixth presumption [under the parentage act]. ( Ibid. ) This fact demonstrate[s] that, in Minnesota, other considerations ha[ve] since made the search something more than a search for a biological father. ( Ibid. ) This decision, and the others the majority cites, do not support the majority's conclusion precisely because their analyses depended on the fact that, unlike our Legislature, the legislatures in Colorado, Hawai`i, Minnesota, and Nevada expressly made their presumption based on biology subject to weighing by placing it in the weighing provision of their version of the 1973 Act. [23] Indeed, by recognizing that, absent this fact, the lodestar of the parentage act is biological paternity ( C.M.G., supra, 516 N.W.2d at p. 560, fn. 8), these decisions actually support my conclusion that biological paternity is determinative under California's statutory scheme, at least as to children no more than two years of age. [24]