Opinion ID: 1964721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: justification for provision of truthful information

Text: In order to be actionable, interference with a business relationship must be both intentional and unjustified. [7] An intentional, but justified, act of interference will not subject the interferer to liability. [8] We have expressly adopted the seven-factor balancing test of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 for use in determining whether interference is unjustified under Nebraska law. [9] Factors to consider in determining whether interference with a business relationship is improper include: (1) the nature of the actor's conduct, (2) the actor's motive, (3) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, (4) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor, (5) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other, (6) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference, and (7) the relations between the parties. [10] These are the important factors to be weighed against each other and balanced in arriving at a judgment; but they do not exhaust the list of possible factors. The issue in each case is whether or not the interference is improper under the circumstances; whether, upon a consideration of the relative significance of the factors involved, the conduct should be permitted without liability, despite its effect of harm to another. The decision depends upon a judgment and choice of values in each situation. [11] Section 772 of the Restatement contains a special application of the general test stated in § 767. [12] It provides: One who intentionally causes a third person not to perform a contract or not to enter into a prospective contractual relation with another does not interfere improperly with the other's contractual relation, by giving the third person (a) truthful information, or (b) honest advice within the scope of a request for the advice. [13] This is true even if the facts are marshaled in such a way that they speak for themselves and are immediately recognized as a basis for breaching the contract. [14] Simply put, if the information provided is truthful, the interference is not improper. [15] Based on that reasoning, the general rule is that an action for tortious interference with a business relationship will not lie where the substance of the alleged interference is the provision of truthful information. [16] Society has a strong interest in promoting the transmission of truthful information, and the factors enumerated in § 767 weigh in favor of permitting such conduct without liability. When truthful information provides the basis for a termination of a business relationship, the resulting liability, if any, should rest on the party who made an informed choice to terminate the relationshipnot the party who provided the facts upon which that decision was based. Although we have never expressly adopted the principle expressed in § 772(a), we implicitly endorsed it in DeLay First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobson Appliance Co., [17] in which we held that a creditor's communications with a debtor's suppliers did not support a claim for defamation or tortious interference with a business relationship when the communications at issue were truthful. We also implicitly adopted § 772(b), protecting the giving of honest advice, in Wiekhorst Bros. Excav. & Equip. v. Ludewig. [18] And we have expressly adopted other special application[s] of § 767. [19] Simply stated, we have already adopted § 767 and its related sections; the special application of § 767 set forth in § 772(a) is not only well recognized and sensible, but necessary for our law to be consistent. [20] Therefore, we now expressly hold that as stated in § 772(a), a person does not incur liability for interfering with a business relationship by giving truthful information to another. [21] Such interference is not improper, even if the facts are marshaled in such a way that they speak for themselves and the person to whom the information is given immediately recognizes them as a reason for breaking a contract or refusing to deal with another. [22] In this case, Recio's brief sets forth, at length, supposed factual inconsistencies and improper behavior on the part of Evers, other Department faculty, and Creighton administrators. Generally, Recio's brief describes a narrative in which Evers' sexual harassment complaint is only part of a larger campaign of persecution directed at Recio by Creighton and her colleagues in the Department. As noted above, the record reflects a substantial amount of discord in the Department. But it does not support the construction put upon it by Recio. Most pertinently, there is nothing in the record that substantially contradicts the factual basis of Evers' sexual harassment complaint. And despite Recio's attempts to broaden the issues in this case, our analysis is limited by Recio's pleadings to the content and effect of Evers' sexual harassment complaint. The purpose of pleadings is to frame the issues upon which a cause of action is to be tried, and the issues in a given case will be limited to those which are pled. [23] And the only act Evers is alleged to have committed that affected Recio's employment relationship with Creighton was the sexual harassment complaint. To the extent that Recio's pleading can be read to allege that Evers made Recio's performance of her job obligations more difficult, such a claim fails because there is no evidence that Recio suffered a pecuniary loss from her alleged inability to perform any contractual duties. [24] In other words, the only damages alleged in Recio's pleadings that can be attributed to Evers' alleged interference with Recio's employment resulted from the sexual harassment complaint. So, we focus on whether the sexual harassment complaint was justified under the principles of § 772(a). The essence of Recio's argument is the contention that Evers made false, inflated and fabricated claims against Recio. [25] But Recio's brief, and the record as a whole, are notably short on instances in which Evers' complaint was demonstrably false. Most importantly, Recio does not deny sending the e-mails that formed the basis and bulk of the complaint. Recio said that she did not clearly remember the content of the e-mails. She also denied that they had sexual overtones and objected to their lack of context, i.e., Evers' failure to retain or provide other e-mails that Evers and Recio had sent to one another. And Recio complains about the misleading manner of Evers' translations of the e-mails. But these arguments do not establish any genuine issue of material fact about whether Recio sent the e-mails at issue. While Recio claimed not to remember their content clearly, she did not deny sending them and generally accepted them as presented. Recio denied that the e-mails constituted sexual harassment within the meaning of the relevant Creighton sexual harassment policy, but that is in essence a legal conclusion, not a denial of the underlying conduct that was the gravamen of Evers' complaint. And Recio's speculation about Evers' translation of the e-mails is unsupported. Recio's criticisms about various words and phrases are largely semanticRecio's alternative translations, in our view, are not meaningfully different. And Evers' sexual harassment complaint also included the original, untranslated e-mailsthereby defeating the suggestion that Evers intended to mislead the sexual harassment committee about what Recio had actually written. We also are not persuaded by the suggestion in Recio's brief that Evers' e-mails showed that the content of Recio's messages was in essence no different from that of Evers' correspondence perhaps effusive or at times melodramatic to an Anglo reader, but in no way threatening or sexually harassing. [26] Those e-mails have not been reproduced here, because, contrary to Recio's suggestion, we do not find them to be particularly relevant. They are friendly and often conclude with traditional Catalan salutations meaning such things as a big hug or a kiss. But they do not resemble Recio's messages in any relevant respect, and the suggestion that they are similar is an exaggeration. Nor is there evidence that the Timeline of Incidents with ... Recio attached to the sexual harassment complaint was substantially untruthful. Recio testified that she did not recall some of the events, and she interpreted some of the events differently. But she did not materially dispute any of them. Instead, Recio attempts to manufacture falsehoods out of discrepancies in the record on facts such as whether the e-mails were sent before or after Evers accepted Creighton's offer of employment, whether she told anyone at Creighton about the e-mails before February 2004, and whether she communicated with Creighton's affirmative action officer before or after she contacted the chair of the sexual harassment committee. But those inconsistencies are either inconsequential or explained by the record. Creighton did not place Recio on probation because of any of those facts. Creighton placed Recio on probation because of a series of e-mails that Recio did not deny sending and a sequence of events that Recio did not materially dispute. The factual disputes that Recio notes are simply not issues of material fact. At oral argument, Recio also intimated that Evers' testimony to the sexual harassment committee formed some basis for liability. This argument is unavailing, for many of the reasons set forth above. Evers' testimony was neither materially inconsistent with her complaint nor denied in any relevant respectbut most significantly, her committee testimony was not placed at issue by Recio's pleadings, nor was it clearly implicated by Recio's appellate brief. We reject Recio's belated attempt to bring it into contention. In short, we find that Evers' sexual harassment complaint was justified, as providing truthful information to Creighton. The incidents upon which Creighton's disciplinary decision was based were, according to Recio, misunderstood. But they were not denied, and the record evidences no genuine issue of material fact about whether those incidents actually took place. The district court did not err in concluding that Evers' complaint was justified, and therefore, we find no merit to Recio's first assignment of error.