Opinion ID: 3034719
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Rains’s Request to Supplement the

Text: Evidentiary Record Rains contends that the bankruptcy court committed reversible error by “denying [his] verbal request at the preliminary hearing . . . to supplement the evidentiary record to challenge [Flinn’s] lay witness declaration testimony submitted in support of [Flinn’s] [reply].” He further asserts that the bankruptcy court’s “decision to deny Rains’ request to file evidentiary objections” to the reply declarations violated his procedural due process rights. [5] Rains’s arguments are not persuasive for five reasons. First, Rains waived his due process claim by failing to raise it properly before either the bankruptcy court or the district court. In general, this Court does not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004).4 Rains did not raise the issue 4 There are three recognized exceptions pursuant to which we may exercise discretion to hear previously unconsidered claims: “(1) In the ‘exceptional’ case in which review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial process, (2) when a new 15222 IN RE: RAINS at all before the bankruptcy court. He did not raise it before the district court until he filed his reply brief. The district court did not address the due process claim in its subsequent order, undoubtedly relying on the principle that “issues cannot be raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1289 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). [6] Second, Rains never articulated his requests with sufficient clarity to preserve the alleged error for review. For an argument to be considered on appeal, it generally “must be raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on it.” Broad v. Sealaska Corp., 85 F.3d 422, 430 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The closest Rains’s counsel came to asking for expansion of the record was to complain that “[w]e get no chance to take a whack at the reply declarations. I mean, are you going to do that sua sponte, or should I file something or —.” This vague statement did not adequately apprise the bankruptcy court of the nature of Rains’s request such that the court had an opportunity to rule on it. [7] Third, nothing prevented Rains from orally objecting to the reply declarations at the hearing on the motion to approve. However, he failed to so. At one point, Rains’s counsel stated that “several of the declarations are replete with hearsay statements which are completely inadmissible,” but he never articulated any clear objections to specific statements made in the declarations. Absent a contemporaneous objection, we will review for plain error “where the integrity or fundamental fairness of the proceedings . . . is called into serious question.” Bird v. Glacier Elec. Coop., Inc., 255 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). That is not the case here. issues arises while appeal is pending because of a change in the law, (3) or when the issue presented is purely one of law and either does not depend on the factual record developed below, or the pertinent record has been fully developed.” Id. (citation and alterations omitted). None of these exceptions apply. IN RE: RAINS 15223 [8] Fourth, as a substantive matter, the main authority Rains cites in support of his allegation of a due process violation is Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).5 That case simply stands for the proposition that “[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 314 (citation omitted). In that sense, Rains was accorded his full due process rights with respect to the motion. The declarations of the trustee and his attorney (Flinn declarations) were filed well in advance of the hearing. Although the declarations of the creditor and her attorney were filed only one day before the hearing, Rains’s counsel had received and read them by the time the hearing took place, and they were substantially similar in substance to the Flinn declarations. Rains had adequate opportunity to challenge the declarations at the hearing before the bankruptcy court. [9] Fifth and finally, Rains expressly waived his right to a separate evidentiary hearing when he filed his opposition to the motion to approve the settlement.6 [10] For these reasons, the bankruptcy court did not err in declining to allow Rains to supplement the evidentiary record. 5 The only other authority Rains cites in conjunction with his due process claim is inapposite. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985) (holding that due process requires states to provide indigent defendants with psychiatric assistance where sanity is likely to be a significant factor at trial). 6 Rains did so pursuant to E.D. Cal. Bankr. 9014-1(f)(1)(ii), which requires an opposition to a motion to “specify whether the responding party consents to the Court’s resolution of the disputed material factual issues pursuant to FRCivP 43(e) as made applicable by FRBP 9017.” 15224 IN RE: RAINS