Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Argument about pardon and appeal

Text: During argument to the jury at the penalty phase, defense counsel made these references to the right of appeal and the possibility of pardon or commutation of sentence: You can vote for an option of death, and you know what that is, it's a termination of life. Will it be carried out immediately? No. It'll be some time before the sentence will be imposed โ pardon me, carried out, not imposed. On the other hand, you have something called life without possibility of parole. In the beginning of this case we talked about it, you were assured by the defense and also by Mr. Ogden [the prosecutor], and by the bench definitely that life without possibility of parole as it's presently understood and defined, it means exactly that period. It leaves open the possibility of perhaps two other things which are somewhat โ if not extraordinary, at least rare events. One may be gubernatorial pardon. That is not given on whimsy. The other may be granting of an appeal which results in some other course. After noting that defendant continued to protest his innocence, defense counsel continued as follows: You have the opportunity to balance the scale, if you wish, impose a sentence of death. Ultimately that sentence may be carried out. You should assume for your purposes that if you do, it will be carried out, whether it is in 1990 or 1998 or 2061. At some point, that sentence will be carried out under the current state of the law, barring the one thing that I indicated earlier and that would be a gubernatorial pardon. Defense counsel then alluded to a television drama, apparently based on fact, in which an individual convicted of murder was shown to be innocent by evidence produced many years after the conviction. Counsel then proceeded with his argument this way: I would hope that you'll reconsider some of the evidence. We would hope that you may go back over the mechanics of this event as the People have sought to prove them to you, and that you'll come back with a determination of life without possibility of parole may be the appropriate sanction in this case. You will have done your job. Mr. Cudjo cannot look forward to early parole or benefit or credit for performing well while in prison, because those are not criteria that would set aside that kind of a result. He can then continue to exhaust what rights he may have, something may be done that brings to light perhaps a way that you folks would not or could not see. (29) Defendant contends that the references to appeal and pardon constituted ineffective assistance. In People v. Ramos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 136, 150-159 [207 Cal. Rptr. 800, 689 P.2d 430], we held that a defendant was denied due process of law under the state Constitution when the court instructed the jury at the penalty phase of a capital case that the governor could commute a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. We concluded that the instruction was misleading because it failed to note that the power of commutation extended to a sentence of death as well as to a sentence of life without parole. In addition, the instruction could cause jurors to speculate on future events or to impose a death verdict on the impermissible basis that the defendant might otherwise eventually be released from custody. In a footnote, we observed that it was a close question whether the subject of commutation should be addressed at all in jury instructions. We stated that if the jury inquired about the subject, or if the defense requested an instruction, the court should make a brief statement explaining that the power of commutation extended to both a sentence of death and a sentence of life without possibility of parole, but emphasizing that it would be a violation of the juror's duty to consider the possibility of such commutation in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d 136, 159, fn. 12.) The defense argument in this case posed little risk of prejudice. Defense counsel referred to the power of pardon as extending to both the sentence of death and the sentence of life without possibility of parole, counsel characterized commutation of sentence and reversal of sentence on appeal as rare events, and counsel noted that a sentence of life without possibility of parole means exactly that period. Nothing in counsel's argument carried the improper suggestion that the jury could take its sentencing responsibility lightly because an erroneous death sentence would be subject to correction by appeal or by commutation. (See People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 245; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1106 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) On the contrary, defense counsel admonished the jury to assume that a sentence of death would eventually be carried out. Finally, we do not agree that the argument lacked a sound tactical purpose. The defense at the penalty phase was lingering doubt. Counsel argued that the prosecution's evidence was not conclusive, that defendant continued to maintain his innocence, and that evidence establishing his innocence might later come to light. In referring to the governor's powers of pardon and commutation, defense counsel's main point appeared to be that these powers, though rarely exercised, exist because innocent men are sometimes convicted and innocence is sometimes demonstrated by evidence produced long after a conviction. The references to the governor's powers thus reinforced the lingering doubt argument.