Opinion ID: 200100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Scope of Immunity

Text: 81 HCQIA immunity only covers liability for damages. It does not shield covered defendants from suit and other forms of relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1) (stating that health care entities shall not be liable in damages for peer review actions under certain conditions); Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir.1993) (concluding, after an exhaustive review of the legislative history, that we are unable to find in HCQIA's grant of statutory protection the kind of explicit guarantee that trial will not occur that is demanded by Supreme Court case law (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)). Therefore, we must determine whether Dr. Singh is seeking relief other than damages in this suit. If so, we must review de novo the district court's summary judgment determination that Dr. Singh could not prevail on the merits of any of his claims. 82 We turn to Dr. Singh's complaint to determine the nature of the relief sought in this lawsuit. At the conclusion of each of the first six counts of the complaint, Dr. Singh demands judgment against the defendant, [Blue Cross], in an amount deemed just by the court, plus actual attorney's fees, interest and costs. (In Count VI, Dr. Singh asks that any judgment resulting from violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A be tripled.) In the last count, entitled Equitable Remedy: Dr. Singh v. [Blue Cross], Dr. Singh requests the following: 83 a. that [Blue Cross] reinstate Dr. Singh as a primary care provider and subscriber, without delay or subject to contingencies; 84 b. that [Blue Cross] pay Dr. Singh reasonable attorney's fees, interest and costs; 85 c. that [Blue Cross] pay Dr. Singh costs and attorney's fees associated with the appeal of the decision to terminate; and 86 d. Such other relief as this court deems just. 87 Dr. Singh has already achieved his first aim; the Fair Hearing Panel reversed the RAC's provisional termination of Dr. Singh and reinstated him as a primary care provider and subscriber. Dr. Singh has not mentioned any delay or contingencies in this reinstatement that a court could now remedy. He therefore cannot be suing for this form of equitable relief. However, Dr. Singh's demand for such other relief as this court deems just is a familiar catchall that signals to the court that other forms of equitable relief may be appropriate. With its close involvement in the case, the district court went beyond the immunity analysis to consider the merits of Dr. Singh's claims, thereby reflecting its view that relief other than damages might still be at issue in this case. Taking our cue from the district court, we go on to consider the merits of Dr. Singh's claims in order to determine whether he can seek any relief other than damages in further proceedings before the trial court.