Opinion ID: 1865898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Ralph Brown.

Text: Defendants contend that Dr. Brown's testimony concerning Stormo's future economic loss due to unemployability was inadmissible. Dr. Brown's testimony relied for its foundation on conclusions of rehabilitative therapist Mr. Ostrander regarding future annual loss of employment assuming either a high school education or, alternatively assuming a college education. Defendants argue that although Ostrander did testify at trial, he testified as to his findings in terms of the percentage reduction of employability suffered by Stormo, not in terms of weeks of annual loss of employment and, therefore, Dr. Brown's testimony which was based on weeks of annual employment lost, lacked foundation. The trial court's evidentiary rulings are presumed correct and will not be reversed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Zepp v. Hofmann, 444 N.W.2d 28, 31 (S.D.1989). Trial courts have broad discretion concerning the admission of expert testimony. Id. Also, while there must be some factual data to support the opinion of an expert, these facts need not be admissible in evidence to support the expert testimony. Id.; State v. Gallegos, 316 N.W.2d 634, 636-37 (S.D.1982). Indeed, as SDCL 19-15-3 states: The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him [or her] at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. In fact, SDCL 19-15-4 permits expert opinions lacking in foundation[.] Zepp, 444 N.W.2d at 31. SDCL 19-15-4 also provides, in part, that [a]n expert witness may be required, on direct or cross-examination, to specify the data on which his [or her] opinions or inferences are based[,] revealing the rule's purpose to speed[ ] up the trial and permit[ ] the opposing party to attack a weak foundation on cross-examination. Id., at 31, n. 3. Defendants challenge the factual basis for Dr. Brown's testimony. Such challenges go to the weight of the evidence, not the admissibility of the evidence. State v. Esslinger, 357 N.W.2d 525, 528 (S.D.1984); Martino v. Park Jefferson Racing Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 309, 313 (S.D.1982). In fact, we have previously considered the admissibility of expert testimony regarding loss of earning capacity. See Klug v. Keller Indus., Inc., 328 N.W.2d 847 (S.D.1982); Martino, supra . In Martino, we recognized the factors to be considered by the jury in determining the measure of damages for loss of earning capacity and held that as long as the expert's testimony disclosed the basis on which his or her opinion of loss of future earnings relied, it is for the jury to determine the weight to be accorded such testimony. 315 N.W.2d at 312-13. In Martino, Dr. Brown (the same economist whose expert testimony is at issue here) was provided with the plaintiff's medical records which included a permanent partial disability rating of six percent. We concluded that the permanent partial disability rating provided a sufficient basis for the trial court to receive evidence from an economist regarding the loss of future earning capacity. 315 N.W.2d at 311. Once it has been established that there is an adequate basis for an expert's testimony, it is then up to the trier of fact to determine the weight to be given to the expert's opinion and whether to award damages for loss of future earning capacity. Id. at 312. In this case, Stormo amply established a factual basis for Dr. Brown's testimony. In addition to the testimony of Dr. Johnson establishing a twenty-six percent (26%) permanent partial disability rating, testimony by Mr. Ostrander indicated the reduction, due to her injuries, in the number of jobs which Stormo could perform in the current labor market. Mr. Ostrander provided two alternative evaluations of the reduced employability suffered by Stormo based on a high school education or advanced education attained by her. In fact, counsel cross-examined Mr. Ostrander on the differences in employability resulting from her differing educational level. The mere fact that Mr. Ostrander did not convert Stormo's reduced employment opportunities to future weeks of annual unemployment during his testimony does not change our analysis. Martino makes it obvious that Dr. Brown's testimony had sufficient support even without Mr. Ostrander's testimony. Also, we observe that the jury was given the standard instruction regarding expert testimony. [1] They were instructed that they could determine the weight to be given Dr. Brown's testimony and that they could also disregard his opinion if they felt it was unsound. Absent evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the jury followed this instruction and properly applied it to their deliberations. Hy-Vee Food Stores v. Scrivner, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 275, 282 (S.D.1986); State v. Thomas, 381 N.W.2d 232, 237 (S.D.1986). Dr. Brown's testimony presented a factual question properly resolved by the jury. Thus, the trial court's decision to permit Dr. Brown's testimony was within the bounds of SDCL 19-15-3 and 19-15-4, and squarely within its discretion.