Opinion ID: 2813662
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of 2012 Expedited Removal

Text: This court reviews de novo a “denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 when the motion is based on an alleged deprivation of due process in the underlying removal proceedings. The district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Valdavinos-Torres, 704 F.3d 679, 685 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotation omitted).

The government does not contest the assertion that Garcia’s 2012 expedited removal proceeding failed to comply with the applicable regulation. See 8 C.F.R. § 1235.3(b)(2)(i). Thus, like the district court, we assume Garcia has established a due process violation and move on to consider the question of prejudice.
Garcia failed to demonstrate that, absent the assumed due process violation, it was plausible he would have been granted withdrawal of his application for admission in lieu of his 2012 expedited removal. This case is factually and legally indistinguishable from Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1079. As was the case in Barajas-Alvarado, Garcia attempted to enter the United States with false documents of 10 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ citizenship. Barajas-Alvarado concluded such conduct had a “disqualifying effect” given the Field Manual’s focus on “obvious, deliberate fraud on the part of the applicant.” 655 F.3d at 1091 (quoting Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.2). Thus, the first and third factors from the Field Manual weigh strongly against discretionary relief. Id. at 1090–91; see also Raya-Vaca 771 F.3d at 1210 (collecting cases for proposition that deliberate fraud during an attempted entry “renders relief implausible”). The remaining factors also weigh against granting relief. Without regard to whether it would support a § 1326 conviction, Garcia’s removal in 2003 means the second factor from the Field Manual weighs against the availability of discretionary relief. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1090 (noting prior findings of inadmissibility weigh against granting withdrawal of application for admission). The fourth factor—ability to overcome grounds for inadmissability—also weighs against the grant of discretionary relief. Garcia’s California state conviction for possession of cocaine rendered him inadmissible and rendered his father’s petition for adjustment of status irrelevant. Garcia, quite correctly, does not contest this conclusion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (providing that a conviction for violating any state or federal law or regulation “relating to a controlled substance” renders an alien inadmissible); id. § 1255(a)(2) (providing that an alien must be admissible at the time he seeks adjustment of status). The record also reveals Garcia has continued to engage in criminal conduct, including drug-related conduct, while residing illegally in the United States. There is no indication in the record Garcia is old or in poor health and the district court found that Garcia’s alleged provision of care to his disabled daughter was not borne out by the record. Thus, the UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ 11 fifth and sixth factors from the Field Manual also weigh against discretionary relief. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1090–91. None of the factors set out in the Field Manual support the grant of discretionary relief. Garcia nevertheless argues he is entitled to relief because he has identified one similarly situated individual, “Gonzalez,” who was allowed to withdraw his application for admission. This assertion, too, is foreclosed by Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1079. The relevant immigration documents provide no information at all as to why Gonzalez was allowed to withdraw his application for admission. Barajas-Alvarado makes clear such comparisons offer no help to an alien attempting to demonstrate discretionary relief is plausible. 655 F.3d at 1091 n.17. The mere fact that a few other aliens in a position arguably similar to Garcia’s position were allowed (for reasons unknown) to withdraw their applications for admission establishes nothing more than relief in that situation is possible. “[E]stablishing plausibility[, however,] requires more than establishing a mere possibility.” Id. at 1089 (quotations omitted).
Even assuming the existence of a due process violation, Garcia has failed to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice flowing from such violation. In particular, he has failed to demonstrate that absent such violation, relief in the form of withdrawal of application of admission was plausible. Thus, the district court correctly denied Garcia’s motion to dismiss. 12 UNITED STATES V. GARCIA-GONZALEZ