Opinion ID: 1606009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Erred When It Denied Young's Proposed Instructions P-5 and P-6.

Text: ¶ 21. Young requested two jury instructions that set forth the standard of care for medical malpractice and related the standard of care to specific evidentiary facts. Instruction P-5 read: If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that: 1. Given the circumstances of Cherie S. Hancock's medical condition during the time the defendant, Donald C. Guild, saw and treated her, a minimally competent physician and psychiatrist who had available the same general facilities, services, equipment and options as Donald C. Guild had during the time she was his patient would not have discharged Mrs. Hancock on September 17, 1999 from St. Dominic Hospital without performing a comprehensive suicide assessment and preparing an adequate discharge plan that included taking reasonable steps to provide a supportive environment and support system to Mrs. Hancock upon discharge; and 2. The defendant Donald C. Guild failed to comply with this standard of care in his treatment of the plaintiff; and 3. Such failure on the part of Donald C. Guild constituted a proximate cause or contributing proximate cause of the suicide death of Mrs. Hancock, then you must return a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant, Donald C. Guild. ¶ 22. Instruction P-6 read: If you find a preponderance of the evidence in this case that: 1. Cherie S. Hancock was a patient of Dr. Donald C. Guild; and 2. While a patient of Dr. Guild, Cherie S. Hancock was suffering from a mental and physical condition; and 3. Defendant, Donald C. Guild, should have reasonably been aware of Mrs. Hancock's condition and was aware that she had previously attempted to commit suicide in 1996; and 4. That on September 15, 1999, defendant, Donald C. Guild testified in open court under oath in the presence of Cherie S. Hancock in a divorce preceding that in his opinion, if Cherie S. Hancock were not allowed to move back into the marital house that she would take her own life; and 5. That Donald C. Guild, knowing that Cherie S. Hancock, had not been allowed by the Court to return to the marital house, discharged her from St. Dominic Hospital two (2) days later on September 17, 1999 without performing a comprehensive suicide assessment or otherwise preparing an adequate discharge plan that included taking reasonable steps to provide a supportive environment and support system for Mrs. Hancock upon discharge; and 6. That Donald C. Guild failed to provide the care and attention that Cherie S. Hancock's condition reasonable [sic] required and which a reasonable [sic] prudent and minimally competent psychiatrist treating Mrs. Hancock would have provided; and 7. That Donald C. Guild's failure to provide such care and attention was the proximate cause or a proximate contributing cause of Cherie S. Hancock's self-inflicted death by firearms on September 20, 1999, then your verdict should be for plaintiff. The trial court denied instructions P-5 and P-6, finding that they improperly instructed the jury on what the standard of care required, when that decision was for the jury. Instead of P-5 or P-6, the trial court granted the following two medical negligence instructions: [(1)] The Court instructs the jury that the word negligence as used in these instructions with regard to Dr. Guild's actions means the doing of some act which a reasonably prudent, minimally competent psychiatrist treating a patient such as Ms. Hancock would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or the failure to do some act which a reasonably prudent, minimally competent psychiatrist treating a patient such as Ms. Hancock would have done under the same or similar circumstances. Therefore, if you believe that, during his care and treatment of Ms. Hancock, Dr. Guild acted as a reasonably prudent, minimally competent psychiatrist would have acted when faced with the same or similar circumstances, it is your duty to return a verdict for the defendant, Dr. Guild. If you believe that, during his care and treatment of Ms. Hancock, Dr. Guild failed to act as a reasonably prudent, minimally competent psychiatrist would have acted when faced with the same or similar circumstances, it is your duty to return a verdict for the plaintiffs. [(2)] The Court instructs the jury that you may not return a verdict against Dr. Guild simply because Ms. Hancock committed suicide after being released from the hospital. Instead, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that the psychiatrist was guilty of negligence which caused the injury. In this case, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Guild was negligent in his treatment of Ms. Hancock and that such negligence, if any, caused her suicide. Therefore, before the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict in any amount whatsoever against Dr. Guild, she must prove by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that Dr. Guild failed to act as a reasonably prudent, minimally competent psychiatrist would have acted when faced with the same or similar circumstances, and (2) that such failure, if any, proximately caused Ms. Hancock's death. Other jury instructions set out the preponderance of the evidence standard, proximate cause, and the rules for the jury's consideration of expert testimony. ¶ 23. Regarding jury instructions, the trial court possesses considerable discretion. Bickham v. Grant, 861 So.2d 299, 301 (Miss.2003) citing Southland Enters. v. Newton County, 838 So.2d 286, 289 (Miss.2003) (citing Splain v. Hines, 609 So.2d 1234, 1239 (Miss.1992)). A party is entitled to a jury instruction if it concerns a genuine issue of material fact and there is credible evidence to support the instruction. Mariner Health Care, Inc. v. Estate of Edwards, 964 So.2d 1138, 1156 (Miss.2007) (citing DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So.2d 818, 824 (Miss.1992)). While a party is entitled to jury instructions that present his theory of the case, this entitlement is limited; the trial court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Ford v. State, 975 So.2d 859, 863 (Miss.2008) (citing Howell v. State, 860 So.2d 704, 745 (Miss.2003)). On the other hand, it would be error to grant an instruction which is likely to mislead or confuse the jury as to the principles of the law applicable to the facts in evidence. Southland Enters., 838 So.2d at 289 (citing McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866, 869 (Miss.1992)). ¶ 24. On appellate review of the trial court's grant or denial of a proposed jury instruction, our primary concern is that the jury was fairly instructed and that each party's proof-grounded theory of the case was placed before it. Splain, 609 So.2d at 1239 (citing Rester v. Lott, 566 So.2d 1266, 1269 (Miss.1990)). We ask whether the instruction at issue contained a correct statement of law and was warranted by the evidence. Beverly Enters. v. Reed, 961 So.2d 40, 43-44 (Miss.2007) (citing Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986)). This Court will reverse based on the denial of an instruction upon a showing that the granted instructions, taken as a whole, do not fairly present the applicable law. Mariner Health Care, 964 So.2d at 1156 (citing Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 16 (Miss.2000)). Thus, [i]f other instructions granted adequately instruct the jury, a party may not complain of a refused instruction on appeal. Southland Enters., 838 So.2d at 289 (citing Purina Mills, Inc. v. Moak, 575 So.2d 993, 996 (Miss.1990)). In analyzing the aggregate jury instructions, [d]efects in specific instructions will not mandate reversal when all of the instructions, taken as a whole fairlyalthough not perfectlyannounce the applicable primary rules of law. Beverly Enters., 961 So.2d at 43 (citing Burton v. Barnett, 615 So.2d 580, 583 (Miss.1993)). ¶ 25. On appeal, Young argues that the trial court's refusal of instructions P-5 and P-6 constituted reversible error because the jury instructions granted by the trial court omitted Young's fact-based theory of the case and were abstract when read as a whole. This Court has held that [i]nstructions should be tied to the specific facts of the case and when given merely in the abstract, may be grounds for error. McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So.2d 1277, 1287 (Miss.1995) (quoting T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Cason, 614 So.2d 942, 952 (Miss.1992)). The test to determine whether or not an instruction is abstract is to determine whether or not the instruction relates to facts shown by the evidence on the issues involved in the case. If an instruction merely relates a principle of law without relating it to an issue in the case, it is an abstract instruction and should not be given by the Court. Fred's Stores, Inc. v. M & H Drugs, Inc., 725 So.2d 902, 918 (Miss.1998). Abstract instructions on legal principles unrelated to facts and issues set out in the instructions are dangerous, because, although they may be correct in principle, they require legal training to properly interpret. Kellum, 667 So.2d at 1287. This Court has stated that [o]f late where we instruct our juries that all instructions must be considered as a whole, we do not consider abstractness as much of a vice, though we still do not regard it a virtue. Fred's Stores, 725 So.2d at 918. Notably, the granting of an abstract jury instruction will be considered reversible error only if the instruction tends to confuse and mislead the jury. Freeze v. Taylor, 257 So.2d 509, 511 (Miss. 1972). ¶ 26. The aforementioned legal principles establish that Young is not entitled to reversal based upon the trial court's refusal of instructions P-5 and P-6 if the granted jury instructions fairly and adequately instructed the jury on the applicable primary rules of law. Young argues that the granted jury instructions failed to meet this standard because they were abstract. Young contends that the granted instructions were abstract because, while they correctly stated the standard of care, they did not relate the standard of care to any facts alleged to be medical negligence. ¶ 27. We recognize that this Court has indicated that jury instructions on medical negligence should be made applicable to the particular facts of the case. Kellum, 667 So.2d at 1288. [T]he use of an abstract instruction without application of the specific facts of the case under consideration invites reversible error. Id. Nonetheless, our review does not begin and end with the contested instructions. Id. The overarching principle is that this Court will not reverse based upon the denial of a jury instruction if, considering the granted jury instructions as a whole, the jury was fairly and adequately instructed as to the applicable primary rules of law. See Canadian Nat'l/Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Hall, 953 So.2d 1084, 1100-01 (Miss. 2007). ¶ 28. We find that no reversible error occurred in this case because the jury instructions, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately instructed the jury on the applicable primary rules of law. The jury instructions correctly defined the elements of medical negligence, including the standard of care applicable to Dr. Guild in his care and treatment of Hancock. See Flight Line, Inc. v. Tanksley, 608 So.2d 1149, 1157 (Miss.1992) (in reviewing allegations that jury instructions on negligence were too general, this Court stated that we ask only that the instructions, read collectively, fairly inform the jury `on the elements necessary to establish liability.'). Any imperfection inherent in the failure to instruct the jury on the specific acts alleged to be negligent does not require reversal; Young's theory of the case was squarely before the jury. While perhaps the trial court could have provided the jury with more definitive instructions, there is no doubt that in this case the outcome would have been the same. Given the jury instructions that were provided and the clear contrasting theories that were hammered home by the skilled counsel of both litigants, it is clear to this Court that the jury had a firm understanding of the law as it applied to the facts in this case, and it reached a permissible verdict. This issue is without merit.