Opinion ID: 42668
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valid under Chevron

Text: 38 The Eighth Circuit is the only circuit court to deem 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8) valid, and it has done so in a pair of opinions; each opinion drew a dissent arguing in favor of invalidating the regulation. See Mouelle v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 923, 930 (8th Cir.2005); Geach v. Chertoff, 444 F.3d 940, ___-___, No. 05-1405, 2006 WL 508101, at -3 (8th Cir. Mar.3, 2006) (following Mouelle ). The Mouelle court, like both Zheng and Scheerer, followed the Supreme Court's directive in Lopez and recognized that the Attorney General's use of rulemaking was not invalid as contrary to the statute. 416 F.3d at 930. 39 Having satisfied itself with the manner of regulation, the Mouelle court followed Lopez and inquired whether the gap-filling regulation was `reasonable in light of the legislature's revealed design.' Id. (quoting Lopez, 531 U.S. at 242, 121 S.Ct. 714). At this point, the Eighth Circuit referred to the Attorney General's commentary in promulgating the regulation, which indicated that the regulation responded to congressional intent to expedite removal and avoid lengthening removal proceedings. Id. (citing Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed.Reg. 10,312, 10,312-13, 10,326-27 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim rule with request for comments) (Interim Rule)). The Mouelle court noted the broad discretion granted the Attorney General in the statute and determined that the fact that an arriving alien is in a removal proceeding is a characteristic that is a reasonably sound basis for choosing not to grant relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1255[(a)]. Id. To the contention in Succar (and the same contention later in Zheng, Bona, and Scheerer ) that the regulation renders an entire class of aliens— intended by Congress to be eligible for status adjustment—ineligible for status adjustment, the Mouelle court responded: 40 The court in Succar opined that the relevant characteristic—placement in removal proceedings—effectively barred most aliens who had been paroled from adjusting status because most paroled aliens were in removal proceedings. Thus, the court concluded, the regulation was contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) because paroled aliens were among those eligible to adjust status under the statute. As an evidentiary matter, we cannot conclude that the regulation bars most paroled aliens from adjusting status. Unlike the court in Succar, we have not been informed, of that fact. And in this case the Attorney General cites DHS statistics suggesting that only about two to three percent of parolees who entered the United States in 2003 have been placed in removal proceedings. In fact, the INS did not initiate removal proceedings against the Mouelles until April 15, 1998, over ten months after the Mouelles were paroled into the United States. Moreover, even if we assumed that most aliens paroled into the United States were placed in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 does not show a congressional intent to vest a few, most, or all paroled aliens with the right to adjust their status. Relief remains discretionary. 41 Id. at 930 n. 9 (internal citations omitted). Because the regulation was, according to the Eighth Circuit, a valid exercise of expressly-granted discretion, the court upheld 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(c)(8).