Opinion ID: 1484139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Avoidable Consequences

Text: Finally, the webbing company argues that its opponent could have avoided the imposition of penalties and having failed to do so it cannot recover them as damages in this suit. The webbing company did not itself manufacture the webbing it sold, but had ordered it from a mill. The cause of its inability to deliver, it says, was a breakdown of the weaving machinery at that mill and the inability of the mill to replace immediately the parts needed. This was communicated to the overall company. It is urged that under Article 17 of the government contract, the overall company could have procured an extension of time for its performance had it applied to the Government, and stated these facts. Article 17 of that contract provides: That the contractor shall not be charged with liquidated damages or any excess cost when the delay in delivery is due to unforeseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor, including, but not restricted to, acts of God or the public enemy, acts of the Government, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, unusually severe weather, and delays of a subcontractor due to such causes   , if the contractor shall notify the contracting officer in writing of the cause of any such delay, within 10 days from the beginning thereof,   . The contracting officer shall then ascertain the facts and extent of the delay and extend the time for making delivery when in his judgment the findings of fact justify such an extension, and his findings of fact thereon shall be final and conclusive on the parties hereto, subject only to appeal, within 30 days, by the contractor to the head of the department   , whose decision on such appeal as to the facts of delay and the extension of time for making delivery shall be final and conclusive on the parties hereto. Admittedly defendants failed to ask for an extension of time in writing. At the trial one of them testified that an application for an extension of time due to the foregoing circumstances would have been denied. The trial judge held that as a matter of law the cause of delay was not such as to entitle the overall company to an extension of time under Article 17 and that therefore the failure to request an extension of time was of no consequence. We think that this was a proper construction of the clause. The Pennsylvania decisions support the general rule that a party to a contract cannot recover for damages which he could have avoided by reasonable means. Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Titusville & Pithole Plank Road Company, 1872, 71 Pa. 350; Henry Shenk Company v. Erie County, 1935, 319 Pa. 100, 178 A. 662. But one is not required to go through the motions of attempting to avoid damages when it is certain that they will prove of no avail. That was the case here. Both federal court decisions and recent administrative rulings show what is required to bring one who has contracted with the Government within such a saving clause in a contract. In construing the applicability of a clause in a government contract similar to the one here, the Supreme Court has said that the very essence of the promise of a contract to deliver articles is ability to procure or make them.    It would have no sense or incentive, no assurance of fulfillment, otherwise; and a delay resulting from the absence of such ability is not of the same kind enumerated in the contract  is not a cause extraneous to it and independent of the engagements and exertions of the parties. Carnegie Steel Company v. United States, 1916, 240 U.S. 156, 164-166, 36 S.Ct. 342, 60 L.Ed. 576. Accordingly it has been held that unexpected delays in performance of government contracts due to inexperience, [6] difficulty in securing materials, [7] inability to get priority ratings, [8] labor shortage, [9] and tire rationing [10] were not such causes under the standard excuse for delay clause as would excuse delay. [11] It seems clear in the light of these decisions that if a government contractor asked for an extension of time due to a breakdown of his machinery, not attributable to the causes specified or anything similar thereto, he could not obtain it because part of the ability to perform, which is the contractor's undertaking, is to have available machinery and replacement parts so that performance will not be delayed due to machinery breakdown. That is the very thing he undertakes to do when he agrees to perform within a given time. A fortiori he cannot be excused by way of an extension of time when the delay for such reasons is that of a subcontractor's vendor. The trial judge's instruction to the jury to this effect was correct. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.