Opinion ID: 1684614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statements Regarding Penalty Phase Deliberations

Text: In Smith's fourth point on appeal, he argues that the prosecutor misled both the jury and the trial court about the correct rule of law regarding penalty-phase deliberations. Smith alleges that the prosecutor's statements were contrary to Florida law that a jury is neither compelled nor required to recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. Henyard v. State, 689 So.2d 239, 249-50 (Fla.1996). During voir dire, the prosecutor stated to the prospective jurors: Here's the situation. You found the existence of an aggravated circumstance or circumstances proven beyond a reasonable doubt. You found that that aggravating circumstance or circumstances justify the imposition of the death penalty. You go back to the evidence, you look to mitigating circumstances. If you find that there are no mitigating circumstances, your job is over. Your recommendation to the Court is the verdict of death. If, however, after reviewing the evidence, you find the existence of mitigating circumstances, then the weighing process begins. And this is not a numbers game. It's not, Well, there's three aggravators over here, and four mitigators over here. Four versus three, four wins. It's not like that. It's a weighing situation. If you find, based upon this weighing situation that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then your recommendation to the Court is one of death. If you find that the aggravating circumstances are outweighed by the mitigating circumstances, then your recommendation to the Court is one of life. (Emphasis added.) Also, during the penalty-phase closing arguments, the prosecutor stated: If you find no mitigating factors ... then your obligation is to return a verdict to the judge recommending a sentence of death. If [you find mitigation], then your responsibility becomes one of weighing the factors against one another. If your deliberation leads to the conclusion that the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors, your recommendation to the Court should be that Joey Smith live. If you find, to the contrary, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, then your recommendation to the Court will be that Joey Smith die. (Emphasis added.) No contemporaneous objection was made by the defense to these comments. Therefore, we can address this issue as it relates to the jury's verdict only under the fundamental error doctrine, which requires the type of error that `reaches down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error.' Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 418 n. 8 (Fla.1998) (quoting Kilgore v. State, 688 So.2d 895, 898 (Fla.1996)); see also Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 191 n. 5 (Fla. 1997) (describing fundamental error as error which is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial). This Court has held that comments indicating to the jury that they must or are required to recommend the death penalty when aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors are erroneous misstatements of the law. See Cox v. State, 819 So.2d 705, 717-18 (Fla.2002); Franqui v. State, 804 So.2d 1185, 1192-93 (Fla.2001); Brooks v. State, 762 So.2d 879, 902 (Fla.2000); Henyard, 689 So.2d at 249-50. We note that in this case the trial court correctly recited all standard jury instructions, defense counsel informed the jury that the law never requires the death penalty under any circumstances, and the prosecutor himself told the jury that the judge's instructions should be relied upon over any statements of law by the attorneys. We therefore conclude that neither prejudicial nor fundamental error resulted from these statements by the prosecutor to the jury.
In his sentencing order, the trial judge set forth the aggravating and mitigating factors found, the mitigating factors rejected, and the factual basis for those findings. That order concludes with the following paragraphs: In weighing and comparing the aggravating and mitigating factors discussed above, this Court concludes that beyond and to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt Defendant killed Robert Crawford with a firearm in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner while assisting in the kidnapping of Robert Crawford and after having tried to kill Stephen Tuttle with a firearm, and that Defendant was a close friend of Faunce Pearce but not dominated by him, was saddened by the long illness of his father, had a loving, caring family, had a very good childhood, and had a long history of drug abuse. The aggravating factors far outweigh the mitigating factors and as such requires that the appropriate punishment in this case is death. Death is never a pleasant or easy resolution to any criminal conduct, and this Court is deeply saddened that death must even be considered. However, the Legislature of this state has required that death must be imposed when the aggravating factors far outweigh the mitigating factors, and this Court must be guided by this law. Ours is a country of law, not men, and the law of this state requires the result to be rendered hereafter. State v. Smith, No. 99-3110CFAES, order at 31 (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. order filed Aug. 17, 2001) (sentencing order) (emphasis added). We agree with Smith that this language in the sentencing order is an incorrect statement of law. This Court stated in Alvord v. State, 322 So.2d 533 (Fla.1975): [Florida's death penalty] statute contemplates that the trial jury, the trial judge and this Court will exercise reasoned judgment as to what factual situations require the imposition of death and which factual situations can be satisfied by life imprisonment in light of the totality of the circumstances present in the evidence. Certain factual situations may warrant the infliction of capital punishment, but, nevertheless, would not prevent either the trial jury, the trial judge, or this Court from exercising reasoned judgment in reducing the sentence to life imprisonment. Id. at 540. Thus, the trial court's statement that the law required the imposition of the death penalty was erroneous. Because it is not evident to this Court whether the trial court simply misstated the law or would have considered imposing a sentence of life imprisonment if he thought it permitted and thus misapplied the law, we remand this case for resentencing by the trial court. Upon resentencing, the trial court shall again carefully consider the trial record and hold a hearing in accord with Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156, 1160-61 (Fla.2000).