Opinion ID: 1205096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Claims of Caldwell and Brown Error

Text: (46) Defendant contends that the prosecutor gave the jury a misleading and erroneous view of its sentencing responsibilities during his penalty phase closing argument. He cites the following remarks: You do have guidance. You do have experience to draw upon. You heard it for the first time this afternoon. It's called the law and it has evolved over time and in its evolution it has given you something. It has given you factors. It has given you guidelines to show you the direction you should take in determining whether or not the death penalty is appropriate under the circumstances of this case and it is no place other than the law I submit to you, that any of you, any of us are going to be able to find the answer to the question, is the death penalty the only appropriate sentence in this case? He also cites the following statement, with which the prosecutor ended his argument: I do know this, actions speak louder than words. I do know that you have a command decision, and it's time to take action, and I, in summation, can only submit to you, because that's what the law does, that there is but one appropriate sentence in the facts and circumstances of this case, and that is the imposition of the death penalty. Defendant contends the cited remarks constitute error under Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633] ( Caldwell ) because they urged the jury to rely on the law in reaching a sentencing decision. The argument is without merit. The prosecutor did no more than urge the jury to follow the law, as they were bound to do. Unlike Caldwell, supra, 472 U.S. at page 325 [86 L.Ed.2d at page 237], the prosecutor never suggested that the jury's decision was not final and that its decision would be reviewed. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 167 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561].) Consequently, no Caldwell error is shown. (47) Defendant also appears to contend that the cited portions of the prosecutor's argument ran afoul of the rule in People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]. He fails to specify how the argument, standing alone, violates Brown. Nonetheless, he argues that the Brown error contained in the argument was exacerbated by erroneous instructions. The trial court read the following modified version of CALJIC former No. 8.84.2 to the jury: It is now your duty to determine which of the two penalties, death or confinement in state prison for life without possibility of parole shall be imposed on the defendant. After having heard all the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account, and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed. The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale, or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider.... [ถ] In weighing the various circumstances you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you may, but need not, impose a sentence of death unless you are persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without possibility of parole. If you conclude that the mitigating factors are equal to or outweigh the aggravating you must return a verdict of confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole. The trial court adapted the foregoing instruction from the standard CALJIC instruction, after discussing with counsel the effect of our decision in Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512. Defendant rightly notes that the italicized portion of this instruction is confusing. To make logical sense of the instruction, the jury had to draw certain inferences about the extent of its discretion. Defendant contends that a reasonable juror would most likely have understood the instruction to mean that if the juror (a) concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and (b) was persuaded that the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that death rather than life without possibility of parole was warranted, then the juror was required to return a death verdict. If, however, the juror concluded that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, but was not persuaded that the aggravating circumstances were so substantial that death rather than life without possibility of parole was warranted, the juror might, but was not required to, impose a sentence of death. This interpretation, defendant contends, does not accurately state applicable law and violates the rule of People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512. The instruction was erroneous, defendant reasons, because it authorized the jury to return a verdict of death whenever aggravation was deemed to outweigh mitigation, even when the jury was not persuaded that death was the appropriate punishment. He contends the jury likely would have concluded that the weighing process was supposed to be an objective one, not the normative, moral, individualized one required by Brown. Theoretically, it is possible to read the italicized sentence, in isolation, to imply such a proposition. However, we review an assertedly erroneous instruction not in isolation, but in the context of the entire charge. ( People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 235 [276 Cal. Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323].) Keeping in mind this principle of construction, we have considered the instructions as a whole. We conclude that the instructions adequately conveyed that the weighing process is merely a metaphor for the juror's personal determination that death is the appropriate penalty under all of the circumstances. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 642 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].) First, it must be noted that the challenged portion of the instruction emphasized the discretionary nature of the jury's penalty determination. The jury was told that if it found that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances, it may, but need not, impose a sentence of death. True, the instruction may have been understood to imply that the jury possessed less discretion in the event it found that aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that death, rather than life without possibility of parole, was warranted. But in that sense the instruction was merely tautological: it directed the jury to return a verdict of death if it found death to be warranted. It did not thereby compel a death verdict in contravention of Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d 512, or the statute. We cannot accept defendant's complementary contention that the instruction invited the jury to return a verdict of death even though it did not believe death was warranted, merely because aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. There is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have thought it could return a verdict of death if it did not believe that penalty was appropriate. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663.) Other instructions ensured that the jury understood the normative, discretionary nature of its decision. The jury was instructed that the weighing process is not a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale. The jury was also instructed that it was free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value [it] deem[ed] appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. Thus, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury was misled by the semantically flawed instruction. Moreover, any ambiguity was not exploited by the prosecutor in argument. Both defense counsel and the district attorney emphasized the serious, discretionary nature of the determination and the necessity that the jurors be persuaded that death was the only appropriate penalty before they returned the corresponding verdict. Defendant also contends that the instruction was unconstitutionally vague, especially in its use of the term substantial. We recently rejected a similar claim in People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585], and defendant does not persuade us that we erred.