Opinion ID: 2541918
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sovereign Immunity and the Board of Claims Act

Text: Sovereign immunity is a concept that arose from the common law of England and was embraced by our courts at an early stage in our nation's history. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517 (Ky.2001); Reyes v. Hardin Memorial Hospital, 55 S.W.3d 337 (Ky.2001). Sovereign immunity is an inherent attribute of a sovereign state that precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given its consent or otherwise waived its immunity. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 746, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). The principle of sovereign immunity was recognized as applicable to the Commonwealth of Kentucky as early as 1828. Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 517-18 (citing Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7 T.B.Mon.) 439, 441 (1828)). The absolute immunity afforded to the state also extends to public officials sued in their representative (official) capacities, when the state is the real party against which relief is sought. Id. at 518 (citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), and other authorities). The rationale for absolute immunity for the performance of legislative, judicial and prosecutorial functions is not to protect those individuals from liability for their own unjustifiable conduct, but to protect their offices against the deterrent effect of a threat of suit alleging improper motives where there has been no more than a mistake or a disagreement on the part of the complaining party with the decision made. Id. The Kentucky Constitution, section 231, provides, however, that [t]he General Assembly may, by law, direct in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the Commonwealth. The General Assembly, acting pursuant to section 231 of the Constitution, enacted the Board of Claims Act, KRS 44.070 et seq. (the Act). KRS 44.070(1) established the Board of Claims and vested the Board with authority to hear claims and award damages, subject to certain limitations, incurred as the proximate result of negligence on the part of the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any of its officers, agents, or employees while acting within the scope of their employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies. KRS 44.070(1) further provides that the Board of Claims shall be independent of all agencies, cabinets, and departments of the Commonwealth except as provided in KRS 44.070 to 44.160. In 1986, the General Assembly passed amendments to the Act which clarified the law with regard to what types of conduct may form the basis for recovery under the Act. Collins v. Commonwealth Nat. Resources and Env. Prot. Cabinet, 10 S.W.3d 122, 125 (Ky.1999). Among the amendments, KRS 44.073(2) stated: The board of claims shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all negligence claims for the negligent performance of ministerial acts against the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies, or any officers, agents, or employees thereof while acting within the scope of their employment by the Commonwealth, or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies. (Emphasis added.) The Court in Collins stated, in regard to KRS 44.073(2): This provision clearly establishes that any negligence claims against the Commonwealth or its subdivisions must be for the negligent performance of ministerial acts. By implication, the negligent performance of non-ministerial, i.e., discretionary acts, cannot be a basis for recovery under the Act. 10 S.W.3d at 125. In Yanero v. Davis , the Court's opinion included certain statements which provide guidance in the case presently before the Court. [3] The Court, in addressing governmental immunity, stated `[governmental immunity' is the public policy, derived from the traditional doctrine of sovereign immunity, that limits imposition of tort liability on a government agency. Id. at 519. In its analysis, the Court included a footnote that is important to the present case. The footnote states: The principle discussed here should not be confused with the discretionary/ministerial function analysis that is applied in determining when a claimant can recover damages in the Board of Claims against the Commonwealth or one of its agencies for the negligent performance of a governmental function. KRS 44.073(2); Collins v. Commonwealth Nat. Resources and Env. Prot. Cabinet, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 122 (1999). Id. at 531. The Court in Yanero, in addressing official immunity, stated: `Official immunity' is immunity from tort liability afforded to public officers and employees for acts performed in the exercise of their discretionary functions. It rests not on the status or title of the officer or employee, but on the function performed. Id. at 521. The Court continued: Official immunity can be absolute, as when an officer or employee of the state is sued in his/her representative capacity, in which event his/her actions are included under the umbrella of sovereign immunity. . . . Id. at 521-22. This is the category into which Judge Winchester fits. He is a state officer and would have absolute judicial immunity for his judicial acts in a suit in civil court. However, in the instant case, Appellants' claims were filed in the Board of Claims. [4] The Court, in proceeding to analyze the Board of Claims Act, stated in Yanero that to the extent that KRS 44.073(2) purports to waive immunity for the performance of ministerial acts, it is a nullity; for public agents and employees are not vested with immunity for the negligent performance of their ministerial functions. Id. at 524. [5] The Court further stated that to the extent the Act would transfer jurisdiction of non-immune agencies, officers, and employees from the circuit court to the Board of Claims, it would be unconstitutional for a number of reasons. Id. at 525. [6] The Court concluded that to abide by the principle that statutes should be construed as constitutional if possible, it would construe the 1986 amendments to the Act as applying only to otherwise immune persons and entities and not to governmental agencies, officers, and employees who were not immune from tort liability (and could be sued in court). Id. Finally, the Court made the statement, important to the present action, that, in a civil case, an immune entity cannot be held vicariously liable for any alleged negligence of its employees. Id. at 527. The Court's interpretation and application of the Board of Claims Act continued to evolve in Williams v. Kentucky Department of Education, 113 S.W.3d 145 (Ky. 2003). Therein, the plaintiff brought claims against the Commonwealth of Kentucky's Department of Education (DOE) in the Board of Claims. The claims were premised on negligent supervision by the faculty and staff of Betsy Layne High School, a school operating under the Floyd County Board of Education. The alleged negligent supervision resulted in the death of a student. The Court stated: Appellants could have sued the DOE and/or the Floyd County Board of Education alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of the faculty and staff of Betsy Layne High School in the Floyd Circuit Court except for the fact that both are shielded from liability by governmental immunity. The no vicarious liability principle recognizes that an otherwise immune entity does not lose that status merely because its agents or servants can be held liable for the negligent performance of their ministerial duties. Otherwise, there could be no governmental immunity because state agencies perform their governmental functions by and through their agents, servants and employees. Id. at 154 (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 519, 527). The Court noted in Williams, however, that the action before it was not brought in a judicial court, but in the Board of Claims. Id. The Court noted the language of KRS 44.072, which states in part: It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide the means to enable a person negligently injured by the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies, or any of its officers, agents or employees while acting within the scope of their employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies to be able to assert their just claims as herein provided. Id. (quoting KRS 44.072). The Court then posed the rhetorical question Does that include vicarious liability claims? Id. at 155. The Court next quoted KRS 44.073(2) and (15) as follows: (2) The Board of Claims shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction over all negligence claims for the negligent performance of ministerial acts against the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any officers, agents, or employees thereof while acting within the scope of their employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies. (15) Neither the Commonwealth nor any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies or any officers, agents, or employees thereof shall be liable under a respondeat superior theory or any other similar theory for the acts of independent contractors, contractors, or subcontractors thereof or anyone else doing work or providing services for the state on a volunteer basis or pursuant to a contract therewith. Id. at 155 (quoting KRS 44.073(2), (15)) (emphasis added in Williams). The Court stated that the term ministerial acts in KRS 44.073(2) only applied to the negligence of public officers and employees who enjoyed official immunity from the good faith, but negligent, performance of discretionary acts, but not for the negligent performance of ministerial acts. Id. [7] In other words, KRS 44.073(2) vested primary and exclusive jurisdiction of claims based upon the ministerial acts of otherwise immune state actors in the Board of Claims. The Court stated that KRS 44.073(2) could not pertain to the negligent acts of anyone, other than a state official or employee. Id. The Court continued: And subsection (2) cannot be interpreted as waiving the immunity of public officers and employees for their own ministerial acts because no such immunity exists. Id. (citing Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 522) (emphasis added). The Court next stated: Thus, the only possible meaning ascribable to subsection (2) is that it constitutes a waiver of the immunity of the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or managerial officials and employees from vicarious liability for the negligent performance of ministerial acts by other officers, agents, or employees while in the course and scope of their employment. Id. The Court stated that its conclusion was reinforced by subsection (15), which expressly states that immunity based upon vicarious liability is not waived for the negligent acts of anyone else. Id. Finally, the Court explained: Appellants could have brought an action in the Floyd Circuit Court against appropriate members of the faculty and staff of Betsy Lane High School for the negligent performance of their ministerial duties. In addition, they could have brought an action in the Board of Claims against either the Floyd County Board of Education and/or the DOE (or the Commonwealth) on a theory of vicarious liability. They chose to bring an action only against the DOE. Their failure to file a circuit court action against any or all of the responsible teachers or to file a Board of Claims action against the Floyd County Board is immaterial to their right to recover against the DOE. Id. at 155-56 (citations and footnote omitted). Thus, if Judge Winchester's duties regarding the appointment and bonding of a master commissioner were ministerial, not discretionary, the Commonwealth would have vicarious liability if, in the Board of Claims, Judge Winchester were found to have been negligent in his performance of those duties. The Court's construction of the Act in Williams resolved the Court's previous reservations regarding the Act's constitutionality that it voiced in Yanero. As noted above, in Yanero, the Court indicated concern that if the Act were construed to transfer exclusive jurisdiction of non-immune persons (i.e., state officers or employees performing ministerial functions) to the Board of Claims, such purported transfer may be unconstitutional on a number of grounds. However, Williams makes it sufficiently clear that the Act does not do so. The Board of Claims is a statutory exception to sovereign immunity, but is limited to the negligent performance of ministerial acts. Therefore, the Act does not affect the rights of an injured party to pursue claims against state officers or employees for the officer's or employee's own negligence in the performance of ministerial acts in circuit court. However, the Act does create vicarious liability on the part of the Commonwealth for the negligent performance of ministerial acts by officers and employees of the state. In that sense, it is a waiver of sovereign immunity, as it waives the Commonwealth's immunity from suit based upon negligence in the performance of ministerial functions by its officers and employees. See also Grayson County Bd. of Edu. v. Casey, 157 S.W.3d 201, 202-03 (Ky.2005). Two cases decided after Yanero and Williams confirm that only claims based upon alleged negligence in the performance of ministerial acts may be brought in the Board of Claims. In Stratton v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 516 (Ky.2006), plaintiff brought an action against the Cabinet for Families and Children in the Board of Claims which was dismissed by the Board on the grounds that the Cabinet was protected from the suit by governmental immunity, unless such immunity had been waived. Id. at 519. The Court held that the Cabinet was immune because the duties of the Cabinet's employee in question were discretionary, not ministerial (i.e., there was no waiver). The Court stated: The Board of Claims Act offers a limited waiver of governmental immunity with regard to negligence claims filed with the Board. The waiver extends only to negligence claims involving the performance of ministerial acts. KRS 44.073(2). A ministerial act is one in which the agency has no discretion; non-ministerial, or discretionary acts cannot be a basis for recovery under the Board of Claims Act. Id. The Court found that the Cabinet employee's acts were discretionary and affirmed the Board of Claims' dismissal of the claim. A plaintiff filed suit against the Transportation Cabinet in the Board of Claims in Commonwealth v. Sexton, 256 S.W.3d 29 (Ky.2008). The Court stated that [t]he Board of Claims Act (KRS 44.070 et seq. ) provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity for negligence in the performance of ministerial acts only. Id. at 32. The Court found that the acts of the Cabinet's employees were discretionary, not ministerial, and, accordingly, remanded the matter to the Board of Claims with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the Cabinet. Id. at 36. The parties in the case now before the Court debate whether the plaintiffs sufficiently named the Commonwealth as a party or merely named state officers (e.g. Judge Winchester) who cannot be personally liable in a Board of Claims proceeding. This debate can be put to rest by the statement in Commonwealth v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896 (Ky.2001), in which the Court stated: Official capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. Id. at 899 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985)). There is no question in the present case regarding notice or opportunity to respond.