Opinion ID: 2317416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Applicable federal law

Text: DeRosa's claim is governed by the standards outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that [a] convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. First, the Court noted, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. Second, the Court noted, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. Unless a defendant makes both showings, the Court held, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Id. Notably, the Supreme Court has declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead ha[s] emphasized that `[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.' Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). There is a strong presumption that an attorney acted in an objectively reasonable manner and that an attorney's challenged conduct might have been part of a sound trial strategy. Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir.2002) (emphasis omitted). And, because [t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case, [e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052.