Opinion ID: 1510269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Implemental Legislation

Text: The Legislature was faced with a two-fold problem. First, it had to provide the specifics of the new basic structure for county government in Tennessee. Secondly, it had to provide an orderly method of transition. After recognizing the complexity of county government in Tennessee, the necessity for its continuity, the constitutional considerations involved, and the myriad problems posed by the provisions of general and private acts establishing the duties and responsibilities of such officeholders, the Legislature declared that these considerations: dictate a transition in county government in which the smaller counties continue the incumbent county judge for the remainder of his term as the chief executive officer of such counties to exercise the authority and duties for which they were elected. (Emphasis supplied) 1978 Public Acts, Ch. 934, § 42. Further, the Legislature declared: It is the intention of the General Assembly by this act to create a uniform system of county government by the establishment of the county legislative body and the office of county executive as the basic units of government, while providing a reasonable period of transition for certain counties to avoid the disruptive effects of rapid change in their government. (Emphasis supplied) Id. Thus, the stated intention of the Legislature and the declared public policy is that the county judges of the smaller counties, for the remainder of their terms, perform the duties of county executives and that there be a uniform system of county government with an orderly period of transition. It must be borne in mind that there is no constitutional requirement that all Tennessee counties be dealt with in precisely the same manner. Our Constitution is satisfied when all counties similarly situated are treated uniformly. When a county is exempted from the general law the exemption must have a rational basis. Section III, infra. Our Constitution specifically permits the General Assembly to provide alternative forms of County Government. From the beginning of Tennessee time our courts have recognized this right. This provision adds nothing to existing law; it merely constitutionalizes formally and explicitly that which formerly rested on decisional law. This is not the question. The Legislature, by this Act, has established the same form of government in all counties of Tennessee except those having a metropolitan government. Sections 5-501 and 5-601, T.C.A. It contains transitional provisions for McMinn (County Manager), Knox (Commissioners), and Polk [] (County Council) counties. Section 5-551, T.C.A. The nature of a metropolitan government and its similarity to the form of government created by Chapter 934 of the Public Acts of 1978 make the exceptions reasonable and the reasons therefor apparent. The transitional provisions for McMinn, Knox, and Hamilton counties show facially that they are in harmony with the stated purposes of the Act and are rationally based. It is important to remember that Chapter 934 does not exempt Wayne County from the form of government created by the Act; it is exempted solely from Section 5-602 governing the date of the election of the County Executive and the commencement of his term, and from Section 5-502 relating to the designation on the ballot of candidates for the legislative body in multi-member districts. The majority opinion is premised to a substantial extent upon the proposition that the Act does not adopt a general mandatory statewide scheme. This is precisely what the Act does; but the majority wholly fails to recognize the critical distinction between the form of government on the one hand, and the mechanics of its inauguration on the other. With this prelude we examine the Act. Three sections of the statute present troublesome issues which are critical to this controversy. Section 8, codified as a portion of Sec. 5-502, T.C.A., relates to the county legislative body. It governs composition, the number of districts, the qualification of members, their terms of office, the date of their election, and officially designates the legislative body as the Board of County Commissioners. The body is clothed with the discretion to determine whether each office in multi-member districts will be separately designated on the ballot with candidates required to run and to be elected on the basis of such separately designated offices within the district. But, there is a proviso, which forms a substantial part of this lawsuit: Provided, however, that in any county having a population of not less than 12,350 nor more than 12,400 according to the 1970 federal census or any subsequent federal census, each office in multi-member districts shall be separately designated on the ballot, and candidates shall run and be elected on the basis of such separately designated offices within the district. [1] This exception applies only to Wayne County, which had a population of 12,365 persons under the census of 1970, and is the only county within the stated population bracket. The situation would be precisely the same had Wayne County appeared by name. This proviso was incorporated in the bill as a result of an amendment presented by Representative Davidson of Wayne County. (Amendment 23, 1978 House Journal at 3515-3516). The Senate concurred. (Amendment 23, 1978 Senate Journal at 2919-2920). Section 16 of the Public Act, codified as Sec. 5-601 through Sec. 5-603, relates to the county executive. It is provided that in Class I counties, [2] Class 2 counties having a county coucil form of county government, [3] counties having a population of not less than 12,350 nor more than 12,375 or not less than 38,800 nor more than 38,900 by the federal census of 1970 or any subsequent federal census, [4] and those having a chairman of the county court, [5] the county executive shall be elected in the regular August election in 1978 and every four (4) years thereafter. Sec. 5-602(1), T.C.A. Again, the emphasized language identifies Wayne County. This language came by amendment proposed in the House, (Amendment 8, 1978 House Journal at 3508) and concurred in by the Senate. (Amendment 8, 1978 Senate Journal at 2915). Except for these counties, Section 16(b)(2) provides that: in counties having an incumbent county judge elected in 1974 for a term of eight (8) years, the incumbent county judge shall serve as county executive until the regular August Election in 1982, at which time, and every four years thereafter, a county executive shall be elected. Sec. 5-602(2), T.C.A. The final subsection of 5-602 is a catchall provision covering county judges with a four year term of office and counties with administrators or managers: In all other counties, the county executive shall be elected in the regular August election in 1978 and every four (4) years thereafter. Sec. 5-602(3), T.C.A. It is stipulated, and is a verified fact, that there are 69 counties which now have County Judges, exercising Judicial and Administrative functions, and as in Wayne County, they were elected in 1974 and their terms do not expire until 1982. Therefore, the result of this Act is that Wayne County, one of the smaller counties of the State [6] and Roane County [7] are the only two counties in the State having county judges that are required to have both a county judge and a county executive for the four year period beginning September 1, 1978 and ending August 31, 1982. And this by virtue of a population bracket exception to a general law designed to be uniform and in the face of legislatively declared public policy that in smaller counties the county judge serve out the remainder of his term before a county executive is elected. Wayne County is also excepted by population bracket from Section 17 of the Act, (Sec. 5-606, T.C.A.) which vests the county executive with all the judicial authority formerly exercised by the county judge, or an official exercising similar powers. Although this portion of the Act was declared to be unconstitutional by this Court in Waters v. State of Tennessee, ex rel. Schmutzer, 583 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1979), it has no effect on the issues involved in this controversy. The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion by the citation of various county compilations. All are based upon the erroneous premise that we are presented with a question as to the constitutionality of a legislative enactment creating a form of county government. We are not; Wayne County is not exempted from the form of government established by the Act. At first blush these compilations are persuasive; upon analysis they are not pertinent. The first compilation lists six (6) counties in which county executives were elected in August 1978, where there formerly had been county judges. This statement is true, as far as it goes. We look to the enumerated counties. 1. Giles County. By Chapter 158, Private Acts of 1973, the judicial duties of the county judge were transferred to the General Sessions Court, and his term of office was reduced to four years. As a result of Chapter 934, Giles County elected a county executive in 1978 when the county judge's term of office expired. 2. Hamilton County . Chapter 934 converted its county council to the county legislative body. Transitional provisions are properly contained in the Act for this metropolitan (not one of the smaller counties) county. The Act had no immediate effect on this county. 3. Overton County. By Chapter 228, Private Acts of 1974, the office of county judge was abolished and the judicial functions transferred to the General Sessions Court. The county judge was replaced by a county manager with a four (4) year term. Subsequently, Chapter 16 of the Private Acts of 1975 changed the title of the office to county judge. When his term of office expired in 1978, a county executive was elected pursuant to Chapter 934. 4. Rutherford County. As in Giles and Overton Counties, the judicial functions of the county judge were vested in the General Sessions Court by Chapter 187 of the Private Acts of 1974. The county judge's term of office was reduced to four (4) years, and upon expiration of the office in 1978, a county executive was elected under Chapter 934. 5. Sevier County. Upon the death of the county judge in 1978, the office was filled by a temporary appointment. Pursuant to Section 16(c) of Chapter 934, the vacancy was filled by the election of a county executive in the 1978 election. 6. Van Buren County. The incumbent county judge of Van Buren County resigned in 1977. A temporary appointment was made to fill the office until 1978, at which time a county executive was elected under the provisions of Chapter 934. None of these counties was required to elect a county executive under Chapter 934 and continue in office a county judge. None was excepted from its application, except to the extent of the transitional provisions of the Act. Hence, this compilation is meaningless; there is no analogy to Wayne County. It is next asserted by the majority that in seventeen (17) listed counties, [8] county chairmen, administrators, or managers were replaced by county executives. The inclusion of these smaller counties with those required to elect in 1978 rests upon a rational basis, because in each case the term of the chief executive officer expired that year. Thus, a rational basis exists for the four metropolitan counties and for those counties having a county chairman or other officer whose term expired in 1978. The majority opinion, in reference to Roane and Wayne counties, asserts: these two counties were classed with twenty-three other counties having a county chairman, a similar chief officer or outgoing county judge. This simply is not an accurate statement. Wayne County did not have a county chairman, a similar chief officer, or an outgoing judge. It had a county judge whose term of office did not expire until 1982 as in 69 other counties. In the absence of a stated or discernible rational basis for distinguishing Wayne County from the other 69 similarly situated counties, the classification is unconstitutional. The rational  and uniform  scheme of the Act is that in those counties where the chief executive officer's term expires in 1978, an election is conducted in 1978. In all other counties, where the incumbent judge's office does not expire until 1982, an election is conducted that year. This comports with the mandate of Art. 7, Sec. 1, of the State Constitution that [n]o officeholder's current term shall be diminished as a result of this article. [9] Moreover the Act so provides. Chapter 934, Section 37. This is the theme and theory of the Act. It is the Legislature's way of abiding the Constitution. Providing for the election of a county executive in Wayne County in 1978, prior to the expiration of the incumbent county judge's term of office, is a clear departure from the pattern of transition and the stated intention of the Act. The practical effect of the Act is to require Wayne County to continue to have a county judge exercising judicial functions, and simultaneously to have a county executive performing the non-judicial duties imposed by the Act. The fortuitous circumstance that Waters, supra , operates to make this scheme of practical utility is of no consequence to the determination of the issue at hand.