Opinion ID: 2976133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Version of Sentencing Guidelines

Text: Daulton argues that the district court erred in applying the 2005 Sentencing Guidelines Manual in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Whether a defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause is a legal question that this court reviews de novo. United States v. VanHoose, 437 F.3d 497, 500 (6th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Factual findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Pierce, 17 F.3d 146, 151 (6th Cir. 1994). We review the district court’s sentence based on application of the consulted Guidelines for reasonableness. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 2005). 14 “The court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). This rule generally applies unless it would result in a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 462 (6th Cir. 2006). An ex post facto violation occurs when a law is retrospective and it harms the offender. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981). A law is retrospective if it “changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.” Davis, 397 F.3d at 347. “The application of a particular version of the Guidelines is retrospective if the version went into effect after the last date of the offense of conviction.” United States v. Kilkenny, 493 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2007). While the Ex Post Facto Clause generally applies only to legislatures, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the judiciary from punishing the defendant if the defendant did not have fair notice that such punishment was possible due to ex post facto concerns. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964). Daulton argues that his sentencing violated the Ex Post Facto Clause because the district court retroactively applied the 2005 Guidelines. Considering the district court’s discussion of both the 1998 and the 2005 Guidelines at sentencing, we cannot reach that same conclusion. A district court has discretion to consider updates to the Guidelines Manual in determining an appropriate sentence. United States v. Meyer, 452 F.3d 998, 100102 (8th Cir. 2006) (“While our court cannot retrospectively apply enhancing amendments to the guidelines in order to calculate the defendant’s guidelines range, such amendments are instructive as to whether a sentence outside of the guidelines falls within the range of reasonableness.”); United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that 15 it is permissible to consider the version of the Guidelines in effect at sentencing “as one benchmark to gauge the reasonableness” of the sentence without implication of ex post facto concerns). At the September 12, 2006 sentencing hearing, the government requested that the district court use the 2005 Sentencing Guidelines Manual. Daulton objected and filed a memorandum opposing the use of the 2005 Manual on the basis that to do so would amount to a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The district court addressed the argument at the December 1, 2006 sentencing hearing and stated that it would use the 2005 Guidelines Manual to calculate the advisory guidelines range. Despite the district court’s pronouncement that it would use the 2005 Manual, it is apparent from the court’s further discussion of sentencing that the court considered the sentence under both the 1998 and the 2005 Manuals. The court proceeded at sentencing by stating that it was following the guidelines in general rather than a particular version. As is required, the court considered factors relevant to sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and then imposed the defendant’s sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment. At no point during this discussion of factors did the court mention either the 2005 or the 1998 version of the Sentencing Guidelines. We therefore cannot conclude that the district court relied exclusively on the 2005 Guidelines in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The record indicates that the court considered both guideline ranges and imposed a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary as is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2463 (2007). Because the 16 district court considered the 2005 Guidelines Manual in conjunction with the 1998 Manual, as it is permitted to do, there was no ex post facto violation. Finally, any error in consideration of the 2005 Guidelines Manual was harmless. As discussed above, the district court considered the 1998 and 2005 Guidelines in tandem. There is no indication that the court gave greater weight to the 2005 Guidelines than the 1998 Guidelines. Under the 1998 Guidelines, the appropriate range was 37 to 46 months, while under the 2005 Guidelines, the appropriate range for Daulton’s sentence was 41 to 51 months. Daulton was sentenced to 46 months’ imprisonment, a sentence that falls within both ranges. This court affords a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to sentences that fall within the Guidelines range. United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006). We have adopted this presumption, in large part, because the fact that the Sentencing Commission and a sentencing judge agree on an appropriate sentence “significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.” United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 339 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463). Because the district court imposed Daulton’s sentence only after considering the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and the advisory range under both the 1998 and 2005 Guidelines, we conclude that any error in sentencing was harmless.