Opinion ID: 2365387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Miscellaneous Prosecutorial Comments

Text: Defendant contends that, apart from the comments discussed in Section III, supra, other portions of the prosecutor's summation deprived her of a fair penalty trial and constituted reversible error. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor made statements that (1) undercut the value of defendant's guilty plea and parole waiver; (2) improperly characterized the action by the police as courageous and heroic; (3) suggested that the jury must sentence defendant to death; and (4) purported to represent the legislative intent behind the capital sentencing statute. Although generally limited to commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences from the proofs presented, prosecutors are permitted considerable leeway to make forceful, vigorous arguments in summation. State v. Chew, 150 N.J. 30, 84, 695 A. 2d 1301 (1997). On review, a court must assess the prosecutor's comments in the context of the entire trial record. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 419-20, 715 A. 2d 228 (1998). Even where a prosecutor's statements amount to misconduct, that misconduct will not be grounds for reversal unless it was so egregious as to work a deprivation of a defendant's right to a fair trial. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 566, 575 A. 2d 816. We first address the prosecutor's statements in respect of defendant's guilty plea. Specifically, the prosecutor stated that defendant had an absolute right to make any reasonable defense she chooses to make on her behalf. But there's no issue, ladies and gentlemen, I suggest to you as to what happened, how it happened or who did it and no issue as it turns out regarding her responsibility. It's clear, it was pointed out to you at the beginning of the case. You heard from the doctors. Nobody has suggested to you that there's any psychiatric or psychological defense to the actions of [defendant]. No one suggested that at all. So what is noble about the plea? Is it something you can infer that [defendant] did because it's the right thing to do? Is it something you can infer she did because the options were few and she thought it was in her best interest to do so? The above statements were made in response to defense counsel's summation during which counsel argued that defendant's plea was an acceptance of responsibility. Thus, the prosecutor's statements must be considered in that context. Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 457, 715 A. 2d 228 (stating that court must assess prosecutor's allegedly prejudicial comments in context of entire trial record and holding that it was permissible for prosecutor to refer to defendant as cold-blooded killer in response to defense summation that defendant's stoic demeanor indicated that cohort committed the murder). The prosecution is allowed to consider other interpretations of defendant's plea and show less reverence to it than the defense. A prosecutor may respond to defense claims, even if the response tends to undermine the defense case. Morton, supra, 155 N.J. at 457, 715 A. 2d 228. It is not improper for the prosecution to suggest that the defense's presentation was imbalanced and incomplete. Timmendequas, supra, 161 N.J. at 593, 737 A. 2d 55. In fact, it is entirely proper for the prosecutor to ask the jury to infer that defendant had his or her own reasons for pleading guilty. Here, the prosecutor's statements regarding defendant's plea agreement were permissible. Further, the prosecutor's statements characterizing defendant's waiver of parole as no major concession did not result in prejudicial error in view of defense counsel's statement in his summation that defendant was obviously looking at 65 years without parole anyway. In any event, no harm resulted because the jury found the mitigating factor of acceptance of responsibility. Defendant also objects to the prosecutor's characterization of the police officers as courageous and heroic. However, defendant put the conduct of the officers squarely in issue in her mitigation case. The thrust of her defense was that the police were inept and foolhardy and that their inadequate training contributed to or triggered defendant's actions. For example, on direct-examination, Dr. Gelles testified that the police had not assessed properly the threat communicated verbally and behaviorally by defendant. According to Dr. Gelles, the officers failed to appreciate the significance of defendant's prior arrest and failed to interpret the larger danger embodied in defendant's suicide threat. The prosecutor's statements were merely an alternate characterization in rebuttal of defendant's argument that the police were inadequately trained. Defendant further asserts that the prosecutor implied that the jurors must sentence defendant to death or they would otherwise betray their oaths. Contrary to defendant's contentions, however, at no point in the summation did the prosecutor urge the jury to deliver a death sentence. Rather, he asked the jurors to deliberate to reach their verdict because it was important, and whatever the outcome, it would be the ultimate justice. Defendant's arguments in respect of the prosecutor's comments about the murder within the course of murder aggravating factor and the murder of the police officer aggravating factor are similarly meritless. The prosecutor is entitled to argue the weight to be accorded an aggravating factor. In any event, the jury did not approve unanimously the murder within the course of murder aggravating factor. We also reject defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly invoked the intent of the Legislature. Defendant assumes wrongly that the prosecutor had no right to argue that a death sentence was appropriate. Indeed, because a prosecutor may argue that a death sentence is appropriate, he clearly may insinuate as much. Finally, it was not error for the prosecutor to inform the jury that public servants are granted additional protections, because this information merely reiterates the murder of a police officer aggravating factor.