Opinion ID: 2029119
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Heading: Ownership of the Sewer Lines

Text: Under the common law, [w]hoever owns the soil owns everything up to the sky and down to the depths. Black's Law Dictionary 1712 (8th ed.2004) (defining the legal maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos ). However, Iowa Code section § 557.3 provides: Every conveyance of real estate passes all the interest of the grantor therein, unless a contrary intent can be reasonably inferred from the terms used. Iowa Code 557.3 (2003) (emphasis added). This provision mirrors the principle, expressed by this court many times, that [i]n interpreting a deed the intent of the grantor is the polestar. Skoog v. Fredell, 332 N.W.2d 333, 334 (Iowa 1983) (citing Schenck v. Schenck, 242 Iowa 1289, 1291, 50 N.W.2d 33, 34-35 (1951); 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 159, at 205-08 (1965); 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 82, at 807-09 (1956)); accord Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1982) (The grantor's intent is controlling, and it is ascertained by applying general contract principles.) (citing Flynn v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 161 N.W.2d 56, 64-65 (Iowa 1968)); In re Fleck's Estate, 261 Iowa 434, 154 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Iowa 1967) (`The primary rule of construction is that the real intention of the parties, particularly that of the grantor, is to be sought and carried out whenever possible .... (Citation omitted.)). The record clearly shows, as the district court found, that the City never intended to deed its sewer mains to the Nichols and the Nichols never intended to accept the sewer mains and assume responsibility for maintaining them. The mayor of Evansdale, John Mardis, testified that the City claims ownership of the sewer lines on the Gilbert Drive Property. In addition, Mr. Nichols testified that he had no knowledge of the sewer lines prior to the land-swap, thus demonstrating that he could not have intended to accept them. Further, he testified that when the Waste Water Superintendent first mentioned the location of the sewer lines, I didn't believe that ittruthfully believe that there was a line under there `cause I didn't figure the City would sell me the sewer system. Accordingly, we conclude the parties did not intend the sewer lines to pass to the Nichols as part of the land-swap. See Opperman v. M.I. Dehy, Inc., 644 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2002) (Although we are not bound by the district court's factual findings, we give weight to those findings, especially when witness credibility is in issue.) (citing Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(6)(g); Norwest Bank v. Philips Realty Co., 594 N.W.2d 3, 6 (Iowa 1999)). Having established that the parties did not intend the sewer lines to pass, we look to general contract principles to determine their ownership: Since a sale is a consensual transaction, the subject matter which passes is to be determined by the intent of the parties, as revealed by the terms of their agreement in light of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, in determining whether an article secreted in the ostensible subject matter also passes by the sale the courts have looked to the terms of the contract and the situation of the parties. Where both buyer and seller were ignorant of the existence or presence of the concealed valuable, and the contract was not broad enough to indicate an intent to convey all the contents, known or unknown, the courts have generally held that as between the owner and the purchaser, title to the hidden article did not pass by the sale. W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Title to Unknown Valuables Secreted in Articles Sold, 4 A.L.R.2d 318, 319 (1949). Here, neither the City nor the Nichols were aware of the presence of sewer lines on the Gilbert Drive Property, and the quitclaim deed from the City to the Nichols did not pass all the contents, known or unknown. Id. Accordingly, title to the sewer lines did not pass by the land-swap, and the City retains ownership. Nevertheless, the Nichols claim that the presence of the sewer lines on the Gilbert Drive Property constitutes a continuing trespass. A person is liable for trespass to land if he or she fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158(c) (1982). If the City had an easement over the Nichols' property, it had no duty to remove the sewer lines and is not liable for trespass. Accordingly, we must first address whether the city had such an easement. There are four ways to create an easement: (1) by express grant or reservation, (2) by prescription, (3) by necessity, and (4) by implication. Kahl v. Clear Lake Methodist Camp Ass'n, 265 N.W.2d 622, 624 (Iowa 1978) (citing Phillips v. Griffin, 250 Iowa 1350, 1354, 98 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1959)). An express easement is an interest in land, which is within the statute of frauds and must be in writing. 25 Am. Jur.2d Easements § 15 (2004). It is undisputed that the Nichols did not expressly grant an easement to the City and that the City did not expressly reserve an easement in its quitclaim deed to the Nichols. Thus, no express easement was created. An easement by prescription is akin to adverse possession. Yet, instead of acquiring title to the property, the putative easement-holder acquires the right to legally use the property. Johnson v. Kaster, 637 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Iowa 2001) (citing Collins Trust v. Allamakee County Bd. of Supervisors, 599 N.W.2d 460, 463-64 (Iowa 1999)). Under Iowa law, an easement by prescription is created when a person uses another's land under a claim of right or color of title, openly, notoriously, continuously, and hostilely for ten years or more. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 564.1 (1999); Collins Trust, 599 N.W.2d at 463). Clearly, the City never acquired an easement by prescription in this case because the Nichols did not own the Gilbert Drive Property for the requisite ten years. It is unnecessary to consider the other elements. An easement by necessity is a form of implied easement, 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements § 30, but it is separate, and we have always recognized it as such. Schwob v. Green, 215 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa 1974) (citations omitted). One significant difference is that an easement by implication requires a showing the parties intended such a right to exist. An easement by necessity involves no such intent. Id. In order to establish an easement by necessity, the putative easement-holder must establish: (1) unity of title to the dominant and servient estates at some point prior to severance, (2) severance of title, and (3) necessity of the easement. Kennedy v. Bedenbaugh, 352 S.C. 56, 572 S.E.2d 452, 454 (2002) (citation omitted); 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements §§ 33, 35. The doctrine of easement by necessity is most commonly applied when a landowner parcels out a landlocked portion of his or her land and conveys it to another. 1 Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.15 cmt. b (2000). Under these circumstances, courts may imply an easement by necessity across the dominant tenement to provide the purchaser of the landlocked parcel with access to a public road. See id. illus. 1-2. The City did not claim an easement by necessity in this case, so we will not address its applicability to the facts on appeal. See DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 61-62 (Iowa 2002) (stating that the supreme court can affirm a district court ruling on a ground other than the one upon which the district court relied provided the ground was urged in that court (citations omitted)). Consequently, we turn to consider the existence of an easement by implication.