Opinion ID: 2205346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Agreement Made?

Text: The State argues that either there was no agreement or if there was an agreement, it was a plea agreement. We disagree. First, we determine that there was an agreement. In its brief, the State characterizes the tape as including only the following: Downing told Wacker that he was going to call the county attorney and tell her that he had finally been honest, and had admitted that he was driving, and that Downing couldn't say what she would do, because she was in charge of this thing. Brief for appellee at 19. The State then contends that [a]t no time was there ever a promise made to Wacker that he would only be charged with motor vehicle homicide. Id. The State argues that Wacker's argument has no basis in reality as reflected by [the taped confession]. Id. The State also indicates that Downing's statements referred to things said by the previous county attorney over a year in the past. The State's description of the tape ignores the events leading up to Wacker's confession and mischaracterizes the taped confession. After discussing the differences between manslaughter and motor vehicle homicide, Downing told Wacker that according to the county attorney, right now she's told me the ball's in your court. He told Wacker that she's willing to charge you with motor vehicle homicide, but you haven't been honest with us. He then repeated that it's up to you, the ball's in your court [as to] what you're charged with. The only reasonable construction of these statements is that Wacker controlled whether he would be charged with manslaughter or motor vehicle homicide. If he confessed, the charge would be motor vehicle homicide; if not, then the charge would be manslaughter. Furthermore, the discussion was not about a plea. Although the record indicates that the county attorney intended Downing to offer a plea agreement; a plea is not what Downing offered. The words plea or plead are not mentioned in the tape. At no time did Downing tell Wacker that he would be required to plead guilty in exchange for his information. Instead, Downing stated that Wacker would be charged with motor vehicle homicide and talked about how the State could go about proving the crime at trial. Having spoken with the county attorney, Downing had authority to enter into an agreement with Wacker. See Butler v. State, 55 Md. App. 409, 462 A.2d 1230 (1983). Further, courts have enforced cooperation agreements of nonprosecution or other concessions made by investigative agents without evidence that a U.S. Attorney or the Attorney General had delegated to them the authority to make such a promise. State v. Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. 629, 469 S.E.2d 557 (1996), citing United States v. Carillo, 709 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1975). See, also, People v Gallego, 143 Mich. App. 639, 372 N.W.2d 640 (1985). The preeminent consideration is not whether the police have the authority to make the promise, but whether the promise was in fact made. State v. Sturgill, supra . We conclude that Downing entered into a cooperation agreement with Wacker and that Wacker performed by confessing that he had been driving the vehicle and by providing information about the accident, including information confirming that he had been drinking.