Opinion ID: 733247
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor's Mention of Burns' Attendance at Trinity College in Summation

Text: 52 Prior to attending Harvard, Burns took courses at Trinity College in Burlington, Vermont. The original indictment against Burns charged him with improperly obtaining funding for that course work. Specifically, Count One alleged that Burns had fraudulently obtained over $5,000 from Northeast, an organization that received federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666. 53 At the conclusion of the government's case, the district court entered a judgment of acquittal as to Count One, holding there was no federal jurisdiction. As the government put it, [t]his decision by the district court meant that Burns' alleged fraud with respect to tuition money paid by Northeast from nonfederal funds was not part of the case that went to the jury. 54 Burns contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when, during his summation, he discussed Burns' attendance at Trinity, and, Burns maintains, [b]y indirect and subtle implication he reminded the jury that the Defendant had probably obtained his Trinity tuition by fraud, deception or theft. 55 Burns and the government agree that prior to summations, there was a discussion in the judge's chambers regarding the scope of the charges after Count One had been dismissed, and specifically, about how the Northeast board's knowledge of Burns' attendance at Trinity was relevant to the remaining counts, if at all. The government insists that the district judge ruled that the Northeast board's knowledge of Burns' attendance at Trinity was relevant to the scheme to defraud charged in Count Two. Burns maintains that the court ruled that the issue of Trinity tuition was specifically excluded. Because the exchange between the judge and counsel on this issue took place off the record, it is impossible for us to determine what the district court ruled. 56 When a district court makes a ruling off the record, Fed. R.App. P. 10(c) provides an appellant with an avenue to get the ruling before an appellate court. The rule states, in pertinent part: 57 If no report of the ... proceedings at a hearing ... was made ... the appellant may prepare a statement of the ... proceedings from the best available means, including the appellant's recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or proposed amendments thereto within 10 days after service. Thereupon the statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district court for settlement and approval and as settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in the record on appeal. 58 Fed. R.App. P. 10(c). Because Burns has failed to comply with this procedure, we cannot rule in his favor. See King v. Unocal Corp., 58 F.3d 586, 587-88 (10th Cir.1995) (court will not consider matters not in the record); Murphy v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 314 F.2d 30, 31-32 (5th Cir.1963) (court would not consider district court's ruling when party failed to comply with a rule which was very similar to Fed. R.App. P. 10(c)). 59 Further, even assuming that the district court ruled as Burns claims it did, a review of the prosecutor's reference to Trinity during summation reveals the reference to be innocuous. The prosecutor stated that it's only when he decides to go to Trinity full time that he decides that he's not going to touch those time sheets anymore [but instead have his sister fill them out.] While the jury conceivably could infer from this statement that Burns had committed fraud with regard to Trinity, it is far from a necessary conclusion. Therefore, we conclude that even if the district court ruled as Burns claims it did, Burns was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's statements. 60 3. The Prosecutor's Statement That He Is Not Permitted to Try [Burns] for Everything He's Done 61 Burns argues that the prosecutor, in his rebuttal summation, improperly insinuated that he was not allowed to attack Burns' character, and then went on to imply that had he been permitted to do so, there would be plenty of evidence to make such a showing. Burns seems to assert that, because he introduced evidence of his good character, the prosecutor was free to introduce evidence impugning his character, but had no such evidence, and so instead, misled the jury into believing that he did. 62 During his closing statement, Burns' counsel emphasized evidence tending to show that Burns was a person of good character, and, in particular that he had performed valuable public service on behalf of the people of Vermont. 4 It was in response to these comments that the prosecutor made the following statement that Burns now challenges: 63 Ladies and gentlemen, you took an oath to decide the case on the evidence. Mr. Burns--[defense counsel] Mr. Rubin is trying to tell you that the defendant is such a good man that you shouldn't convict him. And, ladies and gentlemen, this is not a referendum on a man. Because in spite of what Mr. Rubin suggests to you, I'm not permitted to try the man for everything he's done. This case isn't about what Mr. Burns did before 1990. It isn't about [legislation Mr. Burns worked on when he was in government service]. This case isn't about what Mr. Burns did before 1990. 64 It is clear that, in context, the prosecutor's statements were not misconduct. If anything, these comments served to reenforce for the jury the proper notion that they were to decide only whether Burns had violated the statute, and not sit in judgment of Burns' character.