Opinion ID: 331104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Works of John C. Calhoun 247 (Cralle ed. 1968) (emphasis added).

Text: 41 See E. Sait, supra note 37, at 438 42 Of course the bonus system still has the effect of making delegate apportionment more reflective of party strength than it would be if based on electoral college vote alone. In individual cases it may also make the apportionment more reflective of population. Thus, in our case, the fact that California voted for the 1972 Republican nominee, and Massachusetts did not, suggests that the Party is stronger in California. Because of its 1972 vote California receives a bonus under the challenged formula. The bonus redresses to some extent the overrepresentation Massachusetts would otherwise have (as compared to California) both in terms of population and party strength 43 See P. David, R. Goldman & R. Bain, The Politics of National Party Conventions 165--68 (1960) 44 In Georgia we confined ourselves to considering, and rejecting, 'the precise claim advanced by appellants' that delegate allocation must constitutionally reflect total population only. 447 F.2d at 1280 45 Our opinion in Bode specifically disapproved the ruling of the District Court that the Constitution required a delegate allocation formula 'based on the number of Democratic voters voting in one or more immediately preceding Presidential elections.' 452 F.2d at 1303 46 Electors from large States represent up to 4.4 times as many people as do electors from small States. One of Alaska's three electors represents 100,724 people according to the 1970 census. One of New York's forty-one electors represents 443,677 people. See Exhibits A, F, & P--2, J.A. 74a, 83a, 183a 47 See Republican Rules No. 19, J.A. 151a ('(The National) Committee shall have the general management of the affairs of the Republican Party in the United States and its territories subject to direction from time to time of the National Convention.') The importance of the National Committee in an organization which meets in convention only once every four years is underscored by the fact that it would fall to this body to fashion a new delegate allocation formula should the present one be invalidated. See note 4 supra. 48 See Republican Rule 20. State Party Chairman are also ex officio members of the Republican National Committee. Republican Rule 19(b), J.A. 151a 49 See, e.g., the facts of Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972). Delegates to the 1976 Republican National Convention will also select Resolutions, Credentials, Rules and Order of Business, and Permanent Organization Committees, composed, like the National Committee, of one man and one woman from each State. See Republican Rule 14, J.A. at 150a 50 Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. (1965); Dahl v. Republican State Comm., 319 F.Supp. 682 (W.D.Wash.1970) 51 For an account of the crucial role that administrative decisions (appointments of subcommittees and their chairmen, delegate seating and accommodations, media coverage, etc.) played in the 1968 National Democratic Convention see Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees, The Democratic Choice 40--43 (Hughes Commission Report, 1968) 52 See Bone, supra note 37, at 180--81, 201--04 53 Democratic National Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, Mandate for Reform, reprinted in (and hereinafter cited to) 117 Cong.Rec. 32909, 32915 (1971). The quotas were not mandatory, but, as one member of the Commission which conceived the quota system reports, 'most state delegations chose to play it safe by making sure they had close to the required percentages of each favored group.' Ranney, Changing the Rules of the Nominating Game, Choosing the President 78 n. 1 (Barber ed., 1974). A comparable committee of Republicans was appointed to recommend changes in the rules for selection of delegates to that Party's 1972 convention. One of its recommendations, not accepted, was that 'each State (shall) include in its delegation to the Republican national convention delegates under 25 years of age in numerical equity to their voting strength within the State.' II Report of the Delegates and Organization Committee 5--9 (Republican National Committee publication, 1971). 54 See, e.g., the facts of Maxey v. Wash. State Democratic Comm., 319 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Wash.1970); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minn., 287 F.Supp. 794 (D.Minn.1968). The delegate selection procedures of the states are surveyed in Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1153--54 (1975). Republican Rule 31 permits a selection of national convention delegates by primary election, '(b)y Congressional District or State Conventions,' or '(b)y the Republican State Committee or Governing Committee in any State in which the law specifically authorizes the election of Delegates . . . in such manner.' J.A. 153a--154a 55 See Hughes Commission Report, supra note 51, at 19--27, 24 ('The Commission's study indicates that over 600 delegates to the 1968 Convention were selected by processes which have included no means of voter participation since 1966.'); Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions; 78 Yale L.J. 1228, 1240--52 (1969) 56 The McGovern-Fraser Commission reported that this was the practice of the Democratic Parties of a number of states, one of which selected 12 of its 47 delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention on an ex officio bases. Mandate for Reform, supra note 53, at 32914 Both parties have attempted to eliminate some of the described practices. See generally Mandate for Reform, supra note 53; Report of the Delegates and Organization Committee, supra note 53. However, even the more farreaching reforms of the Democratic Party did not eliminate entirely the practice, found to be prevalent in about one fifth of the States, of selecting delegates by committees of party officials. See Mandate for Reform, supra note 53, at 32914, 32917. 57 It will perhaps add to our perspective to note that the United States is virtually unique among western democracies in the degree to which the selection of party candidates is entrusted even to the party rank and file. Elsewhere this is regarded as a function of the party leadership. See L. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies 201--32 (1967). The British system for selecting candidates for Parliament is judged in the cited study to be far more typical, and is described in the following terms: The types of local leaders dominating the process vary from party to party and from locality to locality. They may, for instance (in the Labour party), be trade-union leaders rather than just political activists. But in any case they are relatively few in number. Candidate selection is not the business of the party rank and file. . . . There is no need--in fact, it is usually regarded as undesirable--for aspirants to campaign before the membership. Candidate selection is meant to be oligarchical. Id. at 220. Canada's major political parties conduct 'national leadership conventions' which resemble ours in the sense that they purport to be representative of the party membership. The representational scheme, however, is one which gives power even more explicitly to the individuals and groups who contribute the most to the party. At the 1968 Conservative Party convention, for example, 35 percent of the delegates were selected on an ex officio basis from among 'the major officers of federal and provincial party association, women's organizations and university clubs, along with members of Parliament, the Senate, and provincial legislatures.' J. Lele, G. C. Perlin & H. G. Thorburn, The National Party Convention Party Politics in Canada 109 (Thorburn ed. 1972). See also U. Parris, The Convention Problem 36--37 (1972). 58 This point is driven home by the difficulty of determining what exactly is the 'constituency' of a national convention. Is it the entire population, much of which may have not the slightest interest in what the convention decides? Is it the registered party membership, a class which does not even exist in some states? Plaintiffs contend that it is the set of voters who voted for the party's candidates in past elections. That is a different set for each election, of course, a fact that only serves to demonstrate that the circumstances of those elections may have been such as to attract to the party's candidates large numbers of voters who retain no continuing interest in its fortunes. If we cannot identify with any confidence the set of people whose preferences are to be given equal and accurate expression at a party convention, then perhaps we must admit that that is not the primary purpose of such a convention at all. The primary purpose is to chart a course for the advancement of the party's ideals, and it is in that light that the requirements of equal protection are to be discerned 59 See also G. Abernathy, The Right of Assembly and Association 171--244 (1961) 60 Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 286, 41 S.Ct. 469, 484, 65 L.Ed. 913 (1921) (Pitney, J., dissenting) 61 The contest in this case of two conflicting constitutional rights suggests an analogy to Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 93 S.Ct. 2080, 36 L.Ed.2d 772 (1973), holding that the First Amendment did not require broadcast licensees to accept editorial advertisements. Broadcasters and political parties are similar in the sense that both, although nominally private entities, are in a position to hinder the exercise of other citizens' constitutional rights, in that case freeedom of speech and in this case the right to vote. Requiring that such entities give the same protection to those constitutional rights that the government must give is a tempting solution, one which had in fact been adopted by the lower court in Columbia Broadcasting, see Business Executives Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 450 F.2d 642 (1971). However, that solution carries with it the price of interference with the First Amendment rights of the entities themselves, and it was in part on this ground that the Supreme Court reversed. 412 U.S. at 120--21, 93 S.Ct. 2080. To the extent the conflict is the same in our case, it must be resolved in the same way 62 Plaintiffs put special emphasis on this point, arguing that the delegates from overrepresented States, like legislators in a malapportioned legislature, can perpetuate their power indefinitely. They omit to mention that an apportionment based on Party vote could have precisely the same effect, if delegates from States where that vote has been high force the nomination of candidates that will keep it so, at the expense of the Parties in other States 63 See C. Rossiter, Parties and Politics in America 12 (1960) (describing the national parties as no more than 'loose confederacies of state parties') 64 Plaintiffs have repeatedly stressed that particular states and regions are favored under the formula. This is only because the uniform and electoral college-based allocations of the formula tend to favor small states, and the victory bonuses tend to favor strongly Republican states. Neither classification is invidious. The first is sanctioned in the Constitution, and all that is required to avoid the effects of the second is success at the polls 65 We may distinguish Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.D.2d 821 (1963), on this basis. It is clearly the Supreme Court case most closely in point. Having first announced the one person, one vote rule, it applied that rule to a primary election held to select candidates for state-wide offices. Georgia's practice of giving unequal weight to votes cast in different districts was invalidated. Justice Douglas reserved the question of whether the same would be true if nominations were made through a convention system. Id. at 378 n. 10, 83 S.Ct. 801. We see no persuasive distinction on that basis (to the extent that convention delegates are bound by primary votes, the systems are identical), or on the basis of Gray's having involved nominations at the state rather than the national level. It was, however, a case dominated by the fact of one party rule in Georgia. The District Court had noted that it was 'known to all that the Democratic candidate has, without exception, at least during the present century, been the choice of the voters at the General election.' Sanders v. Gray, 203 F.Supp. 158, 167 (N.D.Ga.1962). If another distinction is necessary, it is that the use of the weighted-vote primary could hardly be taken as an exercise of First Amendment rights by one of the parties. It was mandated by a state statute, applicable to all parties, and passed some forty-five years earlier. See Neill Primary Act, Georgia Laws 1919 p. 183, repealed by 34 Ga. Code Ann. § 2001 (1970); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F.Supp. at 159 66 The deference we have accorded to the defendant's political decisions should be sufficient to dispel the spectre that Judge Wilkey raises of a flood of further litigation on the eve of the 1976 conventions. No doubt his preferred disposition of a finding of no state action and no justiciability would do the job even more effectively, but by the same token it may go too far. The invidious discrimination and one party rule cases present difficult issues not present in this appeal and not necessary to its decision. We wish to reserve them We are not certain that Judge Wilkey has succeeded in doing so. He makes no reference to one party rule situations. In discussing state action he purports to reserve the case of racial or other invidious classification, which he appears to believe can always be dealt with by the doctrine that a lesser degree of a state involvement will support a finding of state action in such circumstances. As the complainants in Moose Lodge can testify, however, racial discrimination is not enough if the indicia of state action are otherwise lacking, and Judge Wilkey's opinion suggests that they are indeed utterly lacking here. Judge Wilkey makes no reference to the invidious discrimination case in his discussion of justiciability, and his conclusions in that regard are so sweeping as to leave little room for it. Presumably, some way could be found to say that that case is justiciable while this one is not. Whether in doing so we could avoid the appearance of inconsistency of manipulation of the doctrine is another question. We spare ourselves these difficulties, and preserve a greater flexibility, by choosing a disposition on the merits, to which the same underlying considerations of political party autonomy so readily lend themselves. 1 For example, I see no need for us to overrule this court's earlier opinions in Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 447 F.2d 1271, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858, 92 S.Ct. 109, 30 L.D.2d 101 (1971); and in Bode v. National Democratic Party, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 452 F.2d 1302 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019, 92 S.Ct. 684, 30 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972). Different treatment undoubtedly would have been developed if there then had been available the Court's discussion in O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972), Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) and the Memorandum Opinion by Rehnquist, J., in Republican Committee v. Ripon Society, 409 U.S. 1222, 93 S.Ct. 1475 (1972) 2 Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 93 ,.sCt. 2348, 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962), each of which, among many others, demonstrably involved 'state' action. We are not here talking about a 'right to vote' as in election situations, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941), or Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968), after constitutional prerogatives had been denied 3 Mr. Justice Blackmun further particularized in Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 3, 95 S.Ct. 751, 42 L.Ed.2d 766 (1975): This case presents the issue of the constitutionality of a federal-court-ordered reapportionment of the North Dakota Legislature. That State, like many others, has struggled to satisfy constitutional requirements for legislative apportionment delineated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964)    (and other cases.) (Emphasis added.) The Ripon plaintiffs simply fail to distinguish the 'apportionment' problems arising under state law from action by the Republican Party Convention. In Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 378, 83 S.Ct. 801, 807, 9 L.Ed.2d 821, note 10 (1963) the Court expressly specified: We do not reach here the questions that would be presented were the convention system used for nominating candidates in lieu of the primary system. Even in Reynolds v. Sims, text supra, 377 U.S. at 565, 84 S.Ct. at 1383, the Court itself explained that a citizen 'has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies,' and further, that 'full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.' (Emphasis added.) 4 See Powell, J., concurring in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 194, 94 S.Ct. at 2955: '. . . the Court has not broken with the traditional requirement that, in the absence of a specific statutory grant of the right of review, a plaintiff must allege some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street.' (Emphasis added.) See also, id., notes 15 and 16 5 While not controlling here, to be sure, even in an 'apportionment' setting, Mr. Justice Frankfurter undertook his own definition of what he deemed to be an abstract claim. The term applies here in light of our record. Even respecting a state apportionment issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it thus: . . . The claim is hypothetical and the assumptions are abstract because the Court does not vouchsafe the lower courts--state and federal--guidelines for formulating specific, definite, wholly unprecedented remedies for the inevitable litigations that today's umbrageous disposition is bound to stimulate in connection with politically motivated reapportionments in so many States. In such a setting, to promulgate jurisdiction in the abstract is meaningless. It is as devoid of reality as 'a brooding omnipresence in the sky,' for it conveys no intimation what relief, if any, a District Court is capable of affording that would not invite legislatures to play ducks and drakes with the judiciary. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267-268, 82 S.Ct. 691, 738, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). 6 Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 487, 43 S.Ct. 497, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) 7 I will not repetitively cover ground which has been so well treated by my colleagues, Judges Tamm and Wilkey. I find myself in substantial accord with their views. I feel, however, that certain aspects of our problem may further be analyzed 8 Freedom to associate with others for the common advancement of political beliefs and ideas clearly is protected activity. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975). Three concurring justices saw the right of members of a political party to gather in a national political convention to be at the very heart of the freedom of assembly and association, id. at 491, 95 S.Ct. 541. Powell, J., observed, id. at 497, 95 S.Ct. at 552, that '(t)he National Convention of the Party may seat whomever it pleases, . . .' 9 Consider results in the 1972 presidential election when the Republican candidate carried Louisiana where 97 per cent of the registered voters were Democrats$ Disillusionment with a candidate and his announced program can be an intangible factor 10 A convention, after all, may refuse to seat delegates deemed hostile to a party's potential candidate and disruptive of the party's objectives or likely to diffuse support among the voters. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, 419 U.S. at 488, 95 S.Ct. 541, and see Mr. Justice Powell remarking id. at 497, 95 S.Ct. at 552, that '(t)he National Convention of the Party may seat whomever it pleases . . .'; conversely, delegates who deem themselves and their views repelled by an inhospitable convention may even 'take a walk' from their own party as the Republicans found out in 1912 11 Most of us need not even 'look at the record' to recall the two 'disaster' years for the presidential nominees, respectively, the Republican in 1964, and the Democratic in 1972 12 Our record is replete with evidence of the Party's approach. In support of its motion for summary judgment, there appears the Party's 'Statement of Material Facts,' J.A. 187. Additionally, at J.A. 193 is supplied the history of delegate allocations in each presidential year, commencing with the year 1900 through 1972. Various evidentiary materials include the affidavit of Tom Stagg, J.A. 203, with its detailed explanation of the Party's new Rule 30; the affidavit of William C. Cramer at J.A. 210, supplemented by that of Governor Reagan at J.A. 233, that of Senator Tower at J.A. 237 and that of Gerald R. Ford, Minority Leader of the House, at J.A. 251. Exhibits and statistical tables complete the data, culminating with the affidavit of the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Senator Robert Dole, J.A. 274, describing the efforts of the Party to achieve a consensus respecting a system of allocation of delegates 13 Even if the courts were somehow to fashion an allocation of delegates, there can be no control over how those delegates will vote. Many will have come to the convention committed to 'favorite sons' or even to have been hostile to the nomination of the candidate ultimately to be selected. Realignment of delegates' votes may follow after consultations among delegations from the different states. Coalitions can eventuate and turn out to be powerful enough to carry the day. In such circumstances, it may seem difficult to ascertain whose vote is being 'diluted'$ In Convention Decisions and Voting Records, 2d edition 1973, R. Bain and Parris, it is reported that in the 1952 Republican Convention, after a first ballot, 595 votes had been cast in favor of the nomination of General Eisenhower when 604 votes were necessary for decision. The chairman of the Alabama delegation yielded to the State of Minnesota, the chairman of which delegation thereupon cast 19 votes for General Eisenhower. Nomination was thus achieved. 14 But Congress has never done so; and see footnote 3, supra 15 We can readily recognize that 'vital interests.' Consider, e.g., that the Democratic National Committee has adopted its rules for the allocation of delegates to the 1976 Democratic National Convention. The Party's promulgated table shows that there are to be 3,006 delegates authorized for the 1976 convention. The ten largest states including the nation's largest cities have been accorded 1,608 delegates. From those states, clearly enough, and reflecting past experience as to the sources of its voting strength, the Democratic Party has allocated those delegates thus: California 279 Ohio 152 New York 274 Texas 130 Pennsylvania 178 New Jersey 108 Illinois 169 Massachusetts 104 Michigan 133 Florida 81 See The Washington Post, March 13, 1975, 'Delegate Plan Outlined by Democrats.' 16 And see O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4, 5, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) 17 In Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, the Court summarized factors to be considered in a determination of nonjusticiability. Merely to hold that Republican Rule 30 violates no rights of the Ripon plaintiffs would seem not to preclude yet other challenges by other groups, irrespective of which of the major parties may be involved. See note 15, supra, where delegates from ten States will constitute more than a convention majority to the exclusion of the delegate strength of the other forty States A holding of nonjusticiability, on the other hand, would speak to all and make clear that a delegate-allocation plan, rationally evolved, and reflecting valid and constitutionally protected political objectives is beyond judicial modification. Cf., Frankfurter, J., dissenting, Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 289, 82 S.Ct. 691. 1 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927) 2 447 F.2d at 1276 (footnote omitted). While recognizing that the Supreme Court opinions supporting this theory arose in one-party states where nomination was tantamount to election, we did not believe that factor was enough to distinguish those cases 3 In Nixon v. Herndon, the Court struck down on equal protection grounds a Texas state statute explicitly barring blacks from participation in Democratic Party primary elections. 273 U.S. 536, 540--41, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927). After that decision, Texas passed a statute granting every political party in the state 'the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own members . . . to vote or otherwise participate in such political party . . ..' The Democratic Party adopted a 'whites only' primary rule. The Court in Nixon v. Condon found that the power to determine qualifications derived from the statute, and the resolution excluding blacks was therefore state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment, 286 U.S. 75, 85--89, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932) 4 In Allwright, primary eligibility had been determined by the party's convention. However, the Court in finding state action relied heavily on the state's detailed regulation of those primaries for its conclusion that the party was 'an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election.' 321 U.S. 649, 663, 64 S.Ct. 757, 765, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944). In Terry, the Court, though split on the proper analysis, extended its fifteenth amendment holding to the whites-only Jaybird Democratic Association which conducted a straw-vote election prior to each Democratic primary, the winner of which invariably triumphed in the Democratic primary and general election. 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) 5 At last count, nineteen states provided by statute, in one form or another, for presidential primaries. Nineteen other states have statutes providing for state political conventions from which delegates to the National Conventions are chosen, leaving the selection of delegates to state party rules. Twelve states have no statute whatever on the subject. Republican Supp. Br. at 13 n.5. Thus, at best, the degree of state action should vary from state-to-state. Moreover, none of these statutes bear on the issue sub judice, the allocation of delegates and whether that decision constitutes state action 6 Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489--90, 95 S.Ct. 541, 549, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) (footnote omitted), citing Wigoda v. Cousins, 342 F.Supp. 82, 86 (N.D.Ill.1972). The Court also noted recent proposals that the parties use regional or national primaries to choose these nominees. 419 U.S. at 490 n.9, 95 S.Ct. 541 7 Cousins also apparently undercuts the second step in our Georgia analysis--the analogy between delegate-selection processes and candidate-nomination processes. In disposing of the argument that Illinois was protecting its compelling interest in the electoral process, the Court stated: Consideration of the special function of delegates to such a Convention militates persuasively against the conclusion that the asserted interest constitutes a compelling state interest. Delegates perform a task of supreme importance to every citizen of the Nation regardless of their State of residence. The vital business of the Convention is the nomination of the Party's candidates for the offices of President and Vice President of the United States. To that end, the state political parties are 'affiliated with a national party through acceptance of the national call to send state delegates to the national convention.' Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 225, 72 S.Ct. 654, 659, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952). 419 U.S. at 489, 95 S.Ct. at 548. This singling out of convention delegates' 'unique task' dissipates the strength of the analogy we relied upon in Georgia. See also Smith v. State Exec. Comm., 288 F.Supp. 371, 374--76 (N.D.Ga.1968); Note, One Man, One Vote and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U.Chi.L.Rev. 536, 538--45 (1970); Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of Delegates to Presidential Nominating Conventions, 78 Yale L.J. 1228, 1232--35 (1969). Cf. Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 287 F.Supp. 794, 802--03 (D.Minn.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968). But see Maxey v. Washington State Democratic Comm., 319 F.Supp. 673 (W.D.Wash.1970). Cousins also clouds the correctness of the third step in the Georgia analysis. If the states cannot enforce the results of their primaries, there is some question whether the acts of national conventions should be considered those of the states acting in concert. 8 The Court has also recognized that the states cannot constitutionally effectuate their interest in a manner which too rigidly restricts access to the ballot and electoral process. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) 9 It should also be noted that in many states, the national party nominee is placed on the ballot only after certification by the state party. If there is a constitutional violation in these procedures, it is not the certification, but the state's grant of automatic ballot access to the major parties' candidates. The remedy should not be to interfere with the associational activities of the national parties, but to deny their candidate the advantage in securing a place on the state's ballot. See Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Political Parties, 60 Va.L.Rev. 735, 767 (1974) 10 The constitutionality of these provisions was upheld for the most part in Buckley v. Valeo, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 519 F.2d 821 (1975) (en banc), review granted, --- U.S. ---, 96 S.Ct. 32, 46 L.Ed.2d 36, 44 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) 11 Of course, the associational interests identified in Cousins may preclude such regulation, a question explicitly left open by that opinion. 419 U.S. at 483 n.4, 95 S.Ct. 541 12 Black, The Supreme Court--Foreward, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 69, 95 (1967) 13 One important difference is that, unlike an official elected to a governmental body, a delegate selected to attend a national convention apparently cannot force that body to seat him. Compare Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969), with Cousins v. Wigoda, supra note 6 14 A caveat--this case does not concern invidious exclusion, such as race, alienage or national origin. Such a case might change both the previously discussed state action analysis and the appropriateness of judicial interference. However, we intimate no views concerning the ultimate disposition of such a case without the benefit of a concrete factual context before us 15 In Georgia, we also took note of a lesser justiciability test from Baker v. Carr: Judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to the courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action. 447 F.2d at 1277, citing 369 U.S. at 226, 82 S.Ct. 691. If state action were shown, I agree that we could scrutinize even delegate allocation schemes for totally arbitrary action. However, plaintiffs do not, as they clearly cannot, make that claim, but argue that the deviations are not legitimately justifiable. That claim is non-justiciable under Baker. 1 145 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 447 F.2d 1271, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858, 92 S.Ct. 109, 30 L.Ed.2d 101 (1971) 2 146 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 452 F.2d 1302 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019, 92 S.Ct. 684, 30 L.Ed.2d 668 (1972) 3 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972). The Supreme Court has also in the interim decided the cases of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972). In the former case the Court held that the termination of service by a heavily regulated utility with something approaching monopoly power was not state action, absent some actual connection between the state and the termination of service. In the latter case the Court held that the refusal of a private club to serve a black guest at its dining room and bar did not constitute 'state action' despite the fact that the state licensed the club to serve liquor and regulated the club in some particulars unrelated to the discriminatory practices. These two cases are arguably distinguishable on their facts, but their thrust does reinforce our conclusion, developed independently, that the states are not sufficiently involved in the actions of the national political conventions 4 Republican State Central Committee of Arizona v. Ripon Society, Inc., Application for Stay, 409 U.S. 1222, 93 S.Ct. 1475, 34 L.Ed.2d 717 (1972) 5 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 105--06, 447 F.2d at 1274--75 6 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) 7 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) 8 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 107, 447 F.2d at 1276 9 146 U.S.App.D.C. at 375, 452 F.2d at 1304 10 As we indicated earlier in Greenya v. George Washington University, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 379, 383, 512 F.2d 556, 560 (1975), we are in agreement with Judge Friendly that racial and other invidious discrimination is peculiarly offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment, hence a lesser degree of state involvement may constitute 'state action' in that context. Although we are not faced with such a case here, we specifically note that our views on 'state action' might well be different if the issue arose in a case presenting a claim of discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, or sex. Accord, Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397, 405--407 (2nd Cir. 1975) 11 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 106, 447 F.2d at 1275 (emphasis in original) 12 372 U.S. 368, 374, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963), quoting from Chapman v. king, 154 F.2d 460, 464 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800, 66 S.Ct. 905, 90 L.Ed. 1025 (1946) 13 It is, in fact, doubtful that any such scheme of state or federal regulation would be constitutional. In view of the First Amendment associational rights involved, governmental regulation could only be in furtherance of a compelling interest and even then would have to be tailored to be least restrictive of the associational rights involved. Compare Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) 14 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 106, 447 F.2d at 1275 15 See, e.g., D. Broder, The Party's Over (1971) 16 American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974) 17 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968) ('The fact is, however, that the Ohio system does not merely favor a 'two-party system'; it favors two particular parties--the Republicans and the Democrats--and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly.'); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974). Cf. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974) (exclusion of an indigent from the ballot because of an inability to pay a fixed fee) 18 419 U.S. 345, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974) 19 419 U.S. at 357, 95 S.Ct. at 457 20 Ibid 21 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) 22 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93--443, § 406, to be codified as Int.Rev.Code of 1954, § 9008 23 512 F.2d 556 (1975) 24 Id. at 560 25 Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 26 Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 343 F.Supp. 168 (D.D.C.1972) 27 Republican State Central Comm. of Arizona v. Ripon Society, Inc., 409 U.S. 1222, 1225, 93 S.Ct. 1475, 34 L.Ed.2d 717 (1972) 28 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) 29 Id. at 4--5, 92 S.Ct. 2718, quoted in 409 U.S. at 1226--27, 93 S.Ct. at 1478 30 409 U.S. 1222, 93 S.Ct. 1475, 34 L.Ed.2d 717 (1972) 31 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) 32 Id. at 487, 95 S.Ct. 541 33 Nevertheless, this court found in both Georgia and Bode that the judiciary was fully empowered to exercise oversight with regard to the delegate allocation formulas of political party nominating conventions. We did not feel at that time, prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in O'Brien and Cousins v. Wigoda, that nonjusticiability presented a bar to our intervention in such intra-party decisionmaking 34 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) 35 Id. at 217, 82 S.Ct. at 710 36 Ibid 37 145 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 108--09, 447 F.2d 1271, 1277--78 (1971) 38 Id. at 109, 447 F.2d at 1278 39 146 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 376, 452 F.2d 1302, 1305 (1971) 40 Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2718, 34 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) 41 See, e.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S.Ct. 1114, 20 L.Ed.2d 45 (1968); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, 87 S.Ct. 1549, 18 L.Ed.2d 650 (1967) 42 Id 43 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 728--29, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973) 44 See Developments in the Law--Election Law, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1153--54 (1975) 45 See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969) 46 See generally A. Bickel, Reform and Continuity, The Electoral College, the Convention, and the Party System (1973); Note Presidential Nominating Conventions: Party Rules, State Law and the Constitution, 62 Geo.L.J. 1621, 1621--22 n. 5, 1627 nn. 30--31; Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 344 F.Supp. 908, 918, 921 (S.D. Miss.1972) 47 145 U.S.App.D.C. 102, 110, 447 F.2d 1271, 1279 (1971) 48 146 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 377--78, 452 F.2d 1302, 1306--07 (1971) 49 Appellants' Br. at 28 50 Redfearn v. Delaware Republican State Comm., 502 F.2d 1123, 1127--28 (3rd Cir. 1974) 1 Since the division's opinion issued, one additional court has applied the one-person-one-vote principle to political parties, Redfearn v. Delaware Republican State Comm., 393 F.Supp. 372 (D.Del.1975) (reaffirming its earlier decision and rejecting the alternative of invalidating state laws which adopted party decisions). On the other hand, the intervening decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) would compel the denial of attorneys' fees as requested by plaintiff-appellant 2 In their brief on rehearing the Ripon Society has applied the 1976 Republican formula to both the 1972 and 1968--71 election results, and has calculated (1) deviations from the mean Republican vote per delegate, and (2) deviations from the mean population per delegate. For the 1972 election, its figures show the average deviation from the mean in both categories (1) and (2) to be 29.3%. For the 1968--71 elections, the average deviation in category (1) would be 36.7% and in category (2) 32.3%. These figures can usefully be compared to the average deviation from the mean population per Electoral College vote which, based on the 1970 census, is 2i.2% More damningly, the Ripon brief shows that the uniform bonuses disserve both the goal of one Republican one vote, and the goal of one person one vote. Applied to the 1968--71 elections, the 1976 formula without uniform bonuses would produce an average deviation in category (1) of 32.1% (4.6% less than the average deviation with the uniform bonuses) and in category (2) of 25.8% (3.5% less). The Ripon brief does not isolate the effect of the proportional bonuses. 3 E.g. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 84 S.Ct. 1429, 12 L.Ed.2d 595 (1964) 4 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) 5 See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 274, 443 F.2d 689, 693--94 (1971) and cases cited. There are literally hundreds of administrative appeals largely involving communications and environmental policy in which standing for citizens' groups on behalf of their members is accepted as a matter of course. E.g. Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 185, 506 F.2d 246 (1974); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 446, 495 F.2d 1026 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) 6 Generally state law determines how delegates to national conventions are to be selected; when selection must occur; who is eligible to run for delegate; and who is eligible to vote. State law also fixes the obligations of delegates once selected. Delegate selection and Presidential preference primaries are state funded and state-run. And the nominees chosen by the delegates to major party conventions are universally afforded automatic ballot access. See generally Congressional Research Service, Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President of the United States 72--173 (1972); Developments in the Law--Elections, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1121, 1151--1217 (1975) The minority on rehearing makes the startling assertion that it does not follow from the fact that state selection of delegates constitutes state action that the actions of the delegates so selected in the national convention constitute state action. This heroic concept would mean that organizations such as the New York port authority are not state action since they are not an organization of any local government and since the 'mere fact' that they are formed by two constituent state governments is not sufficient to find state action. This absurdity was decisively rejected in Howard University v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 260, 510 F.2d 213 (1975) and authorities cited. 7 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352, 95 S .Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974). The minority offers the suggestion that state action is not present merely because the state somehow 'benefits' a private organization, a comment which is uncontroversial enough. Its relevance to the issue at hand, however, is questionable 8 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) 9 The minority on rehearing attempt to defuse the fairly obvious state action rationale presented by federal financing of most major party activities on the national level by referencing recent decisions holding that 'mere receipt' of state funds does not constitute state action. But here we have more than that--we have complete and exclusive federal financing of the convention and partially exclusive financing of the contested elections of delegates (the matching funds system for presidential elections and a concomitant spending limit). It certainly stretches the imagination to declare that this sort of funding is analogous to federal and state grants to private universities. To return to the example of the New York port authority, the minority would hold that there is no state action 'merely' because the states of New York and New Jersey finance the operation of the entity through fare setting arrangements. Such a potential holding does not commend itself to us 10 See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 90 S.Ct. 791, 25 L.Ed.2d 45 (1970) 11 Majority opinion, supra, 173 U.S.App.D.C. at --- n. 47, 525 F.2d at 583 n. 47, 173 U.S.App.D.C. --- at n. 58, 525 F.2d 585 at n. 58 12 The minority on rehearing fails to distinguish between the two lines of 'right to vote' cases, one line represented by Reynolds v. Sims and the other by Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969). Kramer concerns constitutional limits on the definition of a constituency for a particular governmental entity; Reynolds largely concerns what follows after a definition of constituency is reached, i.e., may the constituency be malapportioned. Salyer v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 93 S.Ct. 1224, 35 L.Ed.2d 659 (1973) was a holding based on the Kramer principles and only very tangentially on the Reynolds principles. Of course, the two principles are closely interwoven and it may be unprofitable to distinguish them in any other context than national conventions of major parties. But the point of the distinction is important: it does not follow from the fact that a constituency of a state organization does not encompass all eligible or registered voters that malapportionment of the constituency that does exist is constitutionally appropriate 13 See the discussion on 173 U.S.App.D.C. ---, --- - ---, 525 F.2d 574, 581--582, the majority opinion of the division. The court in its discussion of the First Amendment interests of the party apparently fails to recall that it is assuming for purposes of decision that the convention is state action. While this fact does not eliminate First Amendment concerns, as the majority opinion of the division clearly holds, it does place consideration of those claims in a vastly different light--instead of the rights of the association being paramount, the rights of the members of the association become paramount and if distinct from the interests of the association, should prevail 14 See 173 U.S.App.D.C. --- - ---, 525 F.2d at 577--580, supra 15 The majority on rehearing asserts that Bode, by accepting the electoral college as a deviation from strict one-person-one-vote standards, is a tacit admission that the one-person-one-vote is either not applicable or applicable in only a meaningless pale version. This assertion is contradicted by the express holding in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) that the constitutional requirement of one representative from each state in the House--creating a malapportionment of sorts--does not justify any further malapportionment 16 See 173 U.S.App.D.C. --- - ---, 525 F.2d at 580--582, supra 17 On this 'balancing' of the party's First Amendment interests and of the one-person-one-vote principle, see note 13 supra 18 Perhaps the ultimate irony of the court's opinion is that it renders largely meaningless much of what we recently said in Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (1975). In Buckley this court, again sitting en banc, upheld the major provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended by the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974. The lynchpin of that decision, in my view, was our recognition of the compelling governmental interest in equalizing the influence of all voters. As we stated: It would be strange indeed if, by extrapolation outward from the basic rights of individuals, the wealthy few could claim a constitutional guarantee to a stronger political voice than the unwealthy many because they are able to give and spend more money, and because the amounts they give and spend cannot be limited. Id. at 841. I find it equally strange that the court now finds that the right to associate freely enables the powerful few to claim a stronger voice than the unpowerful many. I cannot understand why an interest which only yesterday we termed compelling is today afforded so little weight in the scheme of constitutional values.