Opinion ID: 602233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: denial of wilson's motion for new trial

Text: 55 Wilson contends the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial for the following reasons: (a) She presented newly discovered evidence that Jiles committed perjury at trial; (b) the Government withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (c) the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing argument; (d) the jury's verdicts of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a dangerous weapon are legally inconsistent. None of these contentions has merit. A. Perjury 56 Wilson claims that after the trial had concluded, she discovered that Jiles had not told his wife of his sexual encounter with Wilson. She argues that because Jiles indicated at trial that he told his wife of his conduct with Wilson, Jiles committed perjury. 57 We review a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Endicott, 869 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.1989). An appellant carries a  'significant burden'  to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. Id. (quoting United States v. Steel, 759 F.2d 706, 713 (9th Cir.1985)). The district court's findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Id. 58 Wilson points to two portions of the record in support of her contention that Jiles testified he told his wife of his sexual encounter with Wilson. The reporter's transcript reflects the following testimony on cross-examination of Jiles: 59 Mr. Ney: They [the Government] asked you about this [his conduct with Wilson] and you said, Oh, nothing happened? 60 Jiles: Yes, sir. 61 Mr. Ney: They asked you about it again, a second time; you said, Nothing happened? 62 Jiles: Yes, sir. 63 Mr. Ney: They asked you about it a third time; and, again, you told them, Nothing happened. 64 Jiles: That's right, sir. 65 Mr. Ney: I asked you about it, and you said, Nothing happened? 66 Jiles: What you asked me was what did I tell him, and I told you what I told him. 67 Mr. Ney: So you didn't lie to me; you just lied to them three times--is that your testimony today? 68 Jiles: Yes, sir. 69 Mr. Ney. But today, you are not lying; you are telling the truth? 70 Jiles: Yes, I am. 71 Mr. Ney: And the reason is because, oh, you were afraid that you were going to be prosecuted for adultery; is that right? 72 Jiles: No. That might be 25 percent of it. I was worried more about my home than the military. 73 Mr. Ney: And this helps your home life? 74 Jiles: No, it doesn't now, but it's out in the clear, and I can get on with my life. 75 (emphasis added). 76 On redirect examination, Jiles was questioned as follows: 77 Mr. Kubo: You indicated that the immunity was 25 percent of your decision to step forward? 78 Jiles: Yes, Sir. 79 Mr. Kubo: What was the other 75 percent? 80 Jiles: Just--I have a very good home life. What I do is, you know, who's to say, I guess I haven't learned to subdue my own passions yet. But I do have a good home and a good woman. And it bothers me more for Shirley, or for my wife, should I say, to be brought into something that I already did. And that's, basically, that's it. 81 Mr. Kubo: So you want to clear your conscience? 82 Jiles: And I did. And I did when I made that phone call to Officer Sander. 83 At the conclusion of the motion for a new trial proceedings, the district court found that Jiles did not testify at trial that he told his wife that he engaged in sexual intercourse with Wilson. The passages quoted above from the trial transcript do not demonstrate that Jiles testified that he told his wife of his conduct with Wilson. Accordingly, the district court's factual finding on this issue is not clearly erroneous. 84 Wilson also contends that Jiles committed perjury by testifying on cross-examination that he called Officer Sander on his own initiative on December 6, 1991, and admitted that he had sexual intercourse with Wilson. Wilson correctly notes that Jiles testified on direct-examination that he admitted to having engaged in sexual intercourse with Wilson only after the Government granted him immunity from prosecution. Wilson contends that Jiles' testimony on cross-examination that he called Officer Sander to admit his conduct with Wilson before he was granted immunity was perjurious. Wilson refers to the following passages of the trial transcript in support of her claim that Jiles committed perjury on cross-examination: 85 Mr. Ney: They [the Government] didn't ask you to sign a sworn statement when you said, nothing happened--did they? 86 Jiles: No, they didn't. 87 Mr. Ney: Only when you said something happened did they ask you to sign a sworn statement? 88 Jiles: When I called them--I called Mr. Sander up and said, Hey, Mr. Sander, I need to talk to you. They didn't call me; I called them. [I said] I need to talk to you; I need to see you, Captain Payne, and that's when I told them what happened. 89 Mr. Ney: That was your whole initiative? 90 Jiles: It sure was, sir. 91 Mr. Ney: Well, when was that, Sergeant? 92 Jiles: December--correction; Friday prior to this incident taking place--or 93 Mr. Ney: This trial taking place? 94 Jiles: This trial taking place. Thank you. 95 Mr. Ney: Friday, the 6th of December? 96 Jiles: If that was the date, sir, yes. 97 Mr. Ney: The day before the big commemoration at Pearl Harbor? 98 Jiles: December 7th; correct. December 6th. 99 (emphasis added). 100 Inconsistent testimony is not tantamount to perjury absent a showing of knowing falsehood. United States v. Flake, 746 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1225 (1985). In its order denying Wilson's motion for a new trial, the district court concluded that Jiles did not knowingly commit perjury. Both Captain Payne and Officer Sander testified to the following facts at the motion for new trial proceedings: Jiles was given the immunity agreement to review on December 6, 1991. However, at that time, Jiles continued to deny his conduct with Wilson. On December 7, 1991, Jiles called Officer Sander on his own initiative to discuss the immunity agreement. On December 8, 1991, Jiles recanted his previous denials concerning his conduct with Wilson and signed the immunity agreement. The court found that the government witnesses had testified truthfully. The court further found that Jiles' testimony on cross-examination concerning his initiation of contact with Officer Sander on December 6, 1991, was the result of his confusion as to dates, rather than an intentional perjurious statement. Wilson has failed to demonstrate that the district court's factual finding in this regard is clearly erroneous. 101 A prosecutor can never guarantee that a witness will not commit perjury. Her duty is to refrain from knowingly presenting perjured testimony.... United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasis added). The district court also found that the Government had no knowledge of any perjurious statements made by Jiles during the trial. Wilson has failed to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson's motion for a new trial based on her allegations that Jiles committed perjury. B. Brady Violation 102 Wilson further contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial because newly discovered evidence demonstrated that the Government withheld material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 83. Wilson asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion for a new trial, because she discovered new evidence that the Government had promised Jiles that it would not tell his wife about his adulterous behavior with Wilson if Jiles agreed to testify. 103 In its order denying Wilson's motion for a new trial, the district court stated that Wilson had based her motion for a new trial entirely on a bald assertion that an evidentiary hearing would disclose that the Government made such a promise to Jiles. Although Wilson produced no evidence to support this contention, the court held an evidentiary hearing and allowed the defense to question Captain Payne about this alleged promise. 104 Captain Payne testified at the motion for new trial proceedings that he had told Jiles' his sex life was his own concern, and that his wife would not be contacted by government agents regardless of whether he testified. The district court found that the Government's witnesses testified truthfully. It also found that the only promise made to Jiles in exchange for his testimony was immunity from prosecution by the Army. Wilson's unsubstantiated assertion that the Government's witnesses lied is insufficient to demonstrate that the district court's factual finding is clearly erroneous. 105 Wilson's reliance on United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.1986) in support of her argument the Government had a constitutional obligation to disclose its alleged promise to Jiles even in the absence of an express agreement is misplaced. Shaffer involved the prosecution's failure to disclose to the defense its tacit agreement not to proceed in a civil forfeiture action against a witness in exchange for the witness' testimony. Id. at 690. The government had contended that because there was no explicit agreement with the witness, it had no obligation to disclose anything. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that there was an implied-in-fact agreement, and we affirmed. Id. In this case, Wilson has not demonstrated that there was an implied agreement that the Government would refrain from contacting Jiles' wife if he testified. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson's motion for a new trial based on her unsubstantiated allegations that the Government withheld exculpatory evidence. C. Prosecutorial Misconduct 106 Wilson argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial because the prosecutor improperly referred to forensic evidence previously excluded by the trial court. We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 101 (9th Cir.1992). 107 In the presence of the jury, the Government informed the court that Dr. Trant would testify that four superficial wounds were inflicted on Jerome after the fatal wound. Wilson objected to the proffered testimony because a stipulation had already been entered into the record indicating that Jerome was found with one fatal stab wound and four superficial wounds. At a side bar conference, the prosecutor explained that Dr. Trant's testimony would be offered to impeach Wilson's testimony that she did not continue to stab Jerome after inflicting the fatal wound. The court sustained the objection to Dr. Trant's testimony concerning the wounds. The court held that because Dr. Trant's opinion regarding the order of the wounds was not in the autopsy report, his testimony would result in unfair surprise to Wilson. 108 In his closing argument to the jury the next day, the prosecutor commented that the strands of Wilson's hair found on the bed had probably been cut, rather than pulled out. Defense counsel objected to this comment. The record discloses the following exchange: 109 Mr. Ney: Objection. Mr. Kubo knows what the forensic report of that hair was, that it was pulled out and-- 110 Mr. Kubo: Counsel knows the forensic evidence with regard to the stabbing, too. 111 Mr. Ney: Objection.... 112 Court: Just stick to whatever is in that exhibit. 113 (emphasis added). 114 A prosecutor's comments to the jury concerning evidence not in the record will not warrant a new trial unless they are so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant, and any resulting prejudice is not neutralized by the court's instructions. Flake, 746 F.2d at 542 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Wilson has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor's obscure reference to the contents of a forensic report was prejudicial. The prosecutor did not discuss the order that the wounds were inflicted, nor was the jury told what the forensic evidence showed. Moreover, the district court took immediate steps to prevent any prejudice that might have resulted from a continuation of the prosecutor's improper comments concerning matters outside the record--i.e., defense counsel's knowledge of the forensic report--by instructing the parties to restrict their comments to the stipulation. The court intervened before any prejudicial evidence was revealed. The court's admonition also served to remind the jury that the only evidence as to the stab wounds was the stipulation. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prosecutor's remark, while inappropriate, was not so gross as to prejudice the defendant. 115 Wilson further asserts that the prosecutor's closing argument contained improper comments regarding the credibility and character of defense witnesses. Wilson did not make this argument in her motion for a new trial. Nevertheless, because Wilson objected to these comments at trial, we review the comments for harmless error. United States v. McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.1985). We must consider first whether the statements were improper, and, if so, whether it is more probable than not that the prosecutor's conduct materially affected the fairness of the trial. Id. 116 Wilson asserts that the following closing remarks by the prosecutor constituted improper attacks on her credibility: 1) Defendant tried to fool you that she was meek and passive--with her demeanor. 2) She says Jerome drank constantly, two to three times a week. Nobody supported that. She says he beat her all the time. The police didn't support that. His friends didn't--support that. Their neighbors didn't support that.... Defendant is not worthy of belief and her credibility is incredible. (emphasis added). 3) [Wilson] is calling Jiles a liar. She is calling Debra Brooks a liar. She is calling Rhonda Virgil a liar. Remember my phrase to you: How can the defendant be so right and the world so wrong? 4) Throughout the testimony of the defendant, did she at one time look you in the eye? 117 It is well established that the prosecution is given reasonable latitude in fashioning closing arguments. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir.1991). Inherent in this latitude is the freedom to argue reasonable inferences based on the evidence. Id. Where a case essentially reduces to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that one of the two sides is lying. Id. 118 Wilson's trial testimony directly conflicted with that of Jiles and Virgil. Accordingly, the prosecutor's attack on Wilson's credibility as a witness was not improper. Similarly, the prosecutor's reference to Wilson's demeanor on the stand was not misconduct. See United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 n. 3 (9th Cir.1987) (when defendant chooses to testify, his or her demeanor is a relevant consideration for jury in evaluating defendant's credibility). 119 Wilson also alleges that the prosecutor's closing remarks improperly attacked her character by describing her as an unfaithful wife and a bad mother: 120 If she was so concerned for her kid, did she show it when she went to the club and left the kids home with Jerome? If she was so concerned about the child, did she show it by rushing home when the club closed at 1:30 or 2:00 in the morning? If she was so concerned about her children, did she show it by talking story with others afterwards? And if she was so concerned about the welfare of [her son] in Jerome's hand, would she have shown it by then finding--meeting up with somebody and having sex with them? 121 ... Ladies and gentlemen ... this is a case of a defiant wife who went home after--minutes after having been satisfied by another person, who then walked in and got into an argument with her husband. 122 Because Wilson's infidelity was properly before the jury to demonstrate her state of mind at the time of the stabbing, the prosecutor's reference to it was not misconduct. It was also reasonable for the prosecutor to ask the jury to infer that Wilson could not have been afraid to leave her son with Jerome, because she had left him alone with her husband while she entertained herself until 3:30 in the morning. 123 Wilson further contends that the prosecutor's invocation of the Bible in the following manner constituted misconduct: What about, 'Thou shalt not kill?' What about, 'Thou shall not commit adultery'.... And what about, 'Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife or husband?'  While we agree that the comment was improper, the record shows that the court took swift action to offset any possible prejudice by instructing the jury not to consider [biblical law] as the law we are to be judging this defendant by. We are only going to be judging the defendant by the law as the court instructs you in the Counts One and Two. Wilson has failed to demonstrate that the jury disregarded the court's instruction, or that the biblical references materially affected the outcome of the trial. 124 Wilson asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that Jerome didn't have the opportunity to testify ... to you and tell you that her allegations of prior abuse is shibai. 1 Wilson objected to this remark. The district court promptly reminded the jury that Jerome was not present to testify to anything, and admonished the prosecutor to move on. The court further explained to the jury that the arguments made by the lawyers are not evidence. In light of these instructions, we conclude that the prosecutor's improper speculation as to what the deceased might have related to the jury had he lived was not so gross as to materially affect the fairness of the trial. 125 Finally, Wilson argues that the prosecutor improperly attacked the integrity of defense counsel in making the following statement: 126 There is something that every person should know in dealing with the judicial system: If you have got the facts, argue them. If you have got the law, argue it. If you have got the facts and the law, argue it. If you don't have the facts or the law, blow smoke. I couldn't see in this courtroom because the smoke was so thick. Understand, if you will, counsel was merely repeating the position of his client. 127 It is well established that a prosecutor must refrain from launching direct attacks on the integrity of defense counsel. See Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983) (comment that defense counsel had agreed to fabricate a defense for profit was direct attack on integrity of defense counsel and constituted reversible error), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984). However, in this case, the prosecutor's trite argument was not a direct attack on counsel's integrity. It was, instead, a somewhat clumsy comment on the weight of the evidence presented by the defense. In light of the district judge's admonition to the prosecutor to just argue the facts, we conclude that this comment did not materially affect the fairness of the trial. Wilson has also failed to demonstrate that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's comments was prejudicial. D. Inconsistent Verdicts 128 Wilson contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion for a new trial because the jury's verdicts of involuntary manslaughter and assault with a dangerous weapon are legally inconsistent. This argument lacks merit. 129 In United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), the Supreme Court affirmed the long standing principle first articulated by Justice Holmes that  '[c]onsistency in the verdict is not necessary. Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was a separate indictment.'  Id. at 62 (quoting Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)). Because inconsistent verdicts may be a product of lenity or compromise, any review of the inconsistency would be based on pure speculation. Id. at 66. Thus, so long as the guilty verdict is supported by the evidence, appellate courts are foreclosed from disturbing inconsistent verdicts. Id. at 69. 130 Wilson argues that the holding in Powell, precluding appellate review of inconsistent verdicts, applies only where the inconsistency is between a guilty verdict and an acquittal, and is inapplicable where the inconsistency is between two guilty verdicts. In Powell, the Supreme Court stated that [n]othing in this opinion is intended to decide the proper resolution of a situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. Id. at 69 n. 8; see also United States v. Daigle, 149 F.Supp. 409, 414 (D.D.C.) (where a guilty verdict on one count [in the indictment] negatives some fact essential to a finding of guilty on a second count, two guilty verdicts may not stand), aff'd per curiam, 248 F.2d 608 (D.C.Cir.1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 913 (1958). 131 Wilson correctly notes that a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter requires the jury to find that defendant acted with a criminally negligent or reckless mental state, United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 463 (9th Cir.1979), and that a verdict of guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon requires the jury to find that the defendant acted with the specific intent to commit bodily harm. United States v. Washington, 819 F.2d 221, 226 (9th Cir.1987). Wilson argues that because the two crimes require different mental states, a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter logically excludes a verdict of guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon. 132 Wilson has not cited any authority to support her contention that the verdicts of assault with a dangerous weapon and involuntary manslaughter are legally inconsistent. We are persuaded that the verdicts are not inconsistent. Assuming that the jurors found that Wilson intended to stab Jerome with the specific intent to cause him bodily harm, they could also have consistently found that Wilson acted negligently or recklessly in causing Jerome's death. 133 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's reluctance to disturb inconsistent verdicts which may be the product of lenity or compromise is particularly applicable in this case, where the inconsistency is the result of a conviction on a lesser included offense. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 579 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir.1978) (where inconsistent guilty verdicts arise because jury chooses to convict defendant of lesser included offense, verdict may be the result of compromise, and should not be inquired into on appeal). The district did not abuse its discretion in denying Wilson's motion for a new trial.