Opinion ID: 1802099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions on Standard of Care.

Text: A. Standard of review. We review for correction of errors of law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Beyond the Garden Gate, Inc. v. Northstar Freeze-Dry Mfg., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 305, 308 (Iowa 1995). Parties to lawsuits are entitled to have their legal theories submitted to a jury if they are supported by the pleadings and substantial evidence in the record. Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994). When weighing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a requested instruction, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party seeking the instruction. Id. B. Instructions based on Duncan's status as a passenger. Common carriers have a duty to protect passengers as far as human care and foresight will go. Burton v. Des Moines Metro. Transit Auth., 530 N.W.2d 696, 699 (Iowa 1995). The carrier must protect passengers from dangers which may reasonably and naturally be anticipated. Id. We have characterized these obligations as a high duty. Moss v. Mason City & Clear Lake R.R., 217 Iowa 354, 357, 251 N.W. 627, 628 (1933). The estate requested instructions on a common carrier's duty, claiming Duncan was a passenger when he was injured. The trial court refused to give the requested instructions. On appeal, the estate argues the court erred because substantial evidence exists in the record that Duncan intended to board the bus and that Klima knew of that intent. Therefore, the estate concludes, Duncan was a passenger and instructions defining the duty of care owed to a passenger should have been submitted to the jury. The City responds that mere intent to board a public conveyance is not sufficient to confer passenger status. We think our prior case law shows the City is correct. In Moss, a woman was struck by a car while she was crossing the street to meet a waiting streetcar. 217 Iowa at 355, 251 N.W. at 627. There was no dispute the woman intended to board the bus and no dispute that the bus had stopped to allow her to board. Id. at 355, 251 N.W. at 627-28. We held the woman was not a passenger under these circumstances; [s]he was only a traveler upon the public highway to whom [the city] owed only such ordinary care as it owed to every other traveler upon such highway. Id. at 357-58, 251 N.W. at 629. We reasoned, Some point must be reached when this [passenger-common carrier] relationship ends, and it must be such a point that is free from all speculation and uncertainty. Id. at 358, 251 N.W. at 628-29. We recently applied the same principles to the opposite situation, where the plaintiff had exited a bus. In Burton, a child had alighted from the bus and was struck by a car as he attempted to cross the street. 530 N.W.2d at 698. We held [t]he responsibility of the street car operator or bus driver terminates when the passenger is no longer on the vehicle. Id. at 702. The rule to be gleaned from these cases is that until one has actually begun to board the public conveyance, one is not a passenger. Similarly, once one has safely alighted from the conveyance, one is no longer a passenger. One's intent does not alter these rules. Nor do the rules vary simply because one is struck by the public conveyance, as was the case here, rather than by a private vehicle. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing the estate's requested instructions; the evidence cannot support a jury finding that Duncan was a passenger. He was not on the bus nor was he boarding or exiting the bus. Duncan's mere intent to become a passenger, even when recognized by the driver of the bus, cannot support a finding that Duncan was a passenger. C. Instruction based on city bus manuals and timetables. The City published training manuals for its bus drivers and timetables for the public. Duncan submitted an instruction that violation of certain requirements contained in those documents is negligence: (1) that drivers observe passengers' behaviors, including nonverbal communication, (2) that a bus driver never pass a passenger up, (3) that a driver stop at all intersections, if required by a passenger or a would be passenger, along his or her route, (4) that a driver give extra and additional attention to the handicapped, and (5) that a driver prevent, in all ways possible, accidents with pedestrians. When the court refused to give this instruction, Duncan took exception, requesting that the last sentence of his original instruction be amended to state Violation of any of these requirements is evidence of negligence. Duncan claims he was entitled to this instruction because evidence of applicable safety codes and customs is relevant to whether the bus driver exercised reasonable care. See generally 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 187, at 239 (1989). The first barrier to Duncan's request is the fact the manual and timetable, in large part, do not set forth the standards contained in his requested instruction. The requested instruction states a driver is require[d] [to] stop at all intersections, if required by a passenger or would be passenger, along his or her route. (Emphasis added.) In contrast, the timetable merely states [b]uses will stop at any intersection along their routes. The requested instruction also states a driver is required to give extra and additional attention to the handicapped and prevent in all ways possible accidents with pedestrians. These directives are not contained in the timetable or manual. To the extent this instruction lacked evidentiary support, the trial court correctly refused to submit it to the jury. See Coker v. Abell-Howe Co., 491 N.W.2d 143, 150 (Iowa 1992) (There must be substantial evidence in the record to support the instruction submitted.). Although the manual did contain statements supporting Duncan's remaining claims that drivers were required to observe passengers' behaviors and never pass a passenger up, we have already determined there was insufficient evidence to support Duncan's claim that he was a passenger. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give this instruction. See Morgan v. Perlowski, 508 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 1993) (holding instruction based on premises liability properly refused where theory of premises liability was not applicable under evidence produced); Porter v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 217 N.W.2d 221, 234-35 (Iowa 1974) (since we have found such duty did not exist under the evidence in this case, the court did not err in refusing the [requested instruction].). We have considered all of the estate's arguments, even if not specifically discussed, and finding no error requiring reversal, we affirm. AFFIRMED. All justices concur except CARTER, J., who takes no part.