Opinion ID: 214311
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: dismissal of kant’s counterclaims

Text: In its March 30, 2009 and September 9, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s counterclaims to Kousoulas’s fee lien petition. We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010). (1) Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage In January 2009, Kant asserted a claim against Kousoulas for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage. He asserted that in January 2001, he received a one-year appointment as a visiting scholar at Columbia University, and that in the spring of 2002, the senior faculty in the Economics Department voted to hire him. In May 2002, Kant told Kousoulas that he was likely to receive a full-time faculty appointment. 6 However, within a week after Kant’s conversation with Kousoulas, Columbia University advised him that he had not been selected for the position. Due to the timing of these two events, Kant believes that Kousoulas prevented him from obtaining the job at Columbia University. On March 30, 2009, the district court dismissed Kant’s counterclaim as timebarred because it was filed beyond either New York’s or New Jersey’s statute of limitations for such claims. The district court’s decision is correct. Because the district court determined that Kant’s claim was time-barred under either New York’s or New Jersey’s statute of limitations, it did not engage in a choice-of-law analysis. The New Jersey statute of limitations for a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is six years. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1. New York has a three-year statute of limitations for such claims. Besicorp Ltd. v. Kahn, 736 N.Y.S.2d 708, 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). Under New Jersey law, “a statute of limitations begins to run when all elements of a cause of action are present, or, more plainly, from the moment of the wrong.” Michaels v. State of N.J., 955 F. Supp. 315, 326 (D.N.J. 1996) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Similarly, in New York, “a tort claim accrues as soon as the claim becomes enforceable, i.e., when all elements of the tort can be truthfully alleged in a complaint.” IDT Corp. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 12 N.Y.3d 132, 140 (N.Y. 2009). Here, Kant’s claim accrued in May 2002, when he was told that he did not receive the position at Columbia University. Kant, did not, however, bring his tortious interference claim until January 27, 2009. The claim was therefore untimely under either New York or New Jersey law. Further, the district court properly determined that Kant did not 7 provide grounds to toll the statute of limitations on equitable grounds or delay it under the discovery rule. (2) Legal Malpractice Kant also claimed that Kousoulas had committed legal malpractice by, among other things, creating an expectation that he would recover $300,000 in damages from Seton Hall and failing to amend the original complaint to include a request for punitive damages. The district court dismissed the claim because Kant failed to produce an Affidavit of Merit, as is required by New Jersey law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27. Under New Jersey law, a plaintiff alleging malpractice by a licensed professional must, “provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices.” Id. New Jersey does, however, provide that “[i]n lieu of an affidavit, the plaintiff may provide a sworn statement that, after written request, the defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with records that have a substantial bearing on the preparation of the affidavit.” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-28). Further, an affidavit is not required when the case turns on common knowledge. “The factual predicate for a common knowledge case is one where the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone of average intelligence and ordinary experience.” Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 579 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). If, however, “the claim’s 8 underlying factual allegations require proof of a deviation from the professional standard of care applicable to that specific profession,” an affidavit of merit is required. Couri v. Gardner, 801 A.2d 1134, 1141 (N.J. 2002). Kant unsuccessfully argues both that he substantially complied with the affidavit of merit requirement and that an affidavit is not required because his claim turns on common knowledge. 4 First, to be relieved of the obligation to file an affidavit of merit, Kant was required to file a sworn statement that Kousoulas had failed to provide the documents that could form the basis of an affidavit of merit. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53-28. He claims that he provided such a statement. However, the document that he relies upon is an unsworn statement that he attached to a motion for default judgment, in which he asserted that Kousoulas had not complied with the district court’s scheduling order regarding discovery and other pretrial matters. Apart from being unsworn, the statement does not assert that Kousoulas’s alleged noncompliance with the scheduling order had any effect on Kant’s ability to obtain an affidavit of merit, much less reference the affidavit of merit statute. Therefore, this document does not constitute a sworn statement under New Jersey law. Kant also argues that because his claim sounded in contract and because its merit was “apparent from a reading of [his] complaint,” no affidavit of merit was required. This argument lacks merit. His claim, which alleged that Kousoulas failed to adequately represent his interests in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, required proof of a deviation from the 4 We have determined that Kousoulas’s remaining arguments regarding the affidavit of merit statute, which include an assertion that the statute is unconstitutional, are meritless. 9 professional standard of care and thus required an affidavit of merit. See Couri, 801 A.2d at 1151. The case did not fall within the “common knowledge” doctrine because the alleged professional failings of Kousoulas (including her legal judgment) were not so apparent that no expert was required to demonstrate a deviation from the accepted standard of care. See Hubbard v. Reed, 774 A.2d 495, 500-01 (N.J. 2001).