Opinion ID: 1427790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Funeral Protest Provision is Reasonable as a Content-Neutral Regulation of the Time, Place, and Manner of Speech

Text: Phelps-Roper contends that the Funeral Protest Provision violates the First Amendment as an overbroad regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech. The First Amendment is implicated because picketing, included in the list of protest activities restricted by § 3767.30, is inherently expressive activit[y] involving `speech' protected by the First Amendment. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983). The statute also regulates speech in public fora, as both streets and sidewalks, upon which Phelps-Roper desires to protest, are generally considered traditional public fora. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) ([A]ll public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered traditional public fora.). The overbreadth doctrine provides that the government may not proscribe a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118-19, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 156 L.Ed.2d 148 (2003). Facial overbreadth claims have [] been entertained where statutes, by their terms, purport to regulate the time, place, and manner of expressive or communicative conduct.... Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-13, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973) (listing cases); cf. Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 967, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 n. 13 (1984) (`Overbreadth' has also been used to describe a challenge to a statute that in all its applications directly restricts protected First Amendment activity and does not employ means narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.) The Supreme Court has stated that [i]nvalidation for overbreadth is strong medicine that is not to be casually employed. United States v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1838, 170 L.Ed.2d 650 (2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court recently observed that facial challenges are disfavored for three reasons. First, [c]laims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they raise the risk of premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1184, 1191, 170 L.Ed.2d 151 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Second, facial challenges run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). Third, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Id. The district court held, based on the parties' stipulations, that § 3767.30 is content-neutral. Phelps-Roper, 523 F.Supp.2d at 618. We agree that the statute is content-neutral. Cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000) (noting that it is appropriate to comment on the `content neutrality' of the statute because the lower courts concluded that it was a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation). The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (citation omitted). Section 3767.30 is content-neutral first because the statute is not a regulation of speech, but rather a regulation of the places where some speech may occur. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 719, 120 S.Ct. 2480 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, § 3767.30 was not adopted because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys, because the restrictions of § 3767.30 apply equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no reference to the content of the speech. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). And third, the State of Ohio's asserted purpose for the statute, the protection of its citizens from disruption during events associated with a funeral or burial service, is unrelated to the content of [a funeral protestor's] speech. See id. at 719-20, 120 S.Ct. 2480. Because § 3767.30 is content-neutral, the appropriate test is intermediate scrutiny. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Grider v. Abramson, 180 F.3d 739, 748-49 (6th Cir.1999). Under this test, the government may impose reasonable content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions: (1) serve a significant governmental interest; (2) are narrowly tailored; and (3) leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (quotation marks and citation omitted). For the following reasons, we hold that the Funeral Protest Provision satisfies the three-part inquiry in Ward, and is therefore constitutional.