Opinion ID: 1447783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Cohen's Out-of-Court Statements

Text: The Estate argues that the district court abused its discretion by permitting the introduction of two statements allegedly made by Nick Cohen, Biegas's passenger, at the accident scene: (1) Cohen's statements to Dailey and Paul Bourlier telling them to keep Biegas's money which they had picked up at the scene; and (2) Cohen's statement to Dailey that Cohen had told Biegas prior to the accident to get out of the road, he was going to get hit. Trial Tr. 7/16/07 at 85. The district court admitted the statements, ruling that they fell within the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. We review evidentiary rulings by the district court, including determinations of whether testimony is inadmissible hearsay, for abuse of discretion. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 565 (6th Cir.2008). Whether a statement is hearsay is a question of law, which we review de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir.2009). The first question is whether the statements at issue are hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED.R.EVID. 801(c). As to Cohen's utterances to Dailey and Bourlier telling them to keep Biegas's money, it is clear that Quickway offered these statements for the fact that Cohen had made them, not to prove the truth of any proposition. Rodriguez-Lopez, 565 F.3d at 314 (A statement offered as evidence of the bare fact that it was said, rather than for its truth, is not hearsay.). Because these utterances were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, they are not hearsay, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dailey's testimony concerning these statements. Turning to Cohen's statement to Dailey that he had told Biegas before the accident to get out of the road, he was going to get hit, this consists of two statements: (1) the out-of-court statement by Cohen to Biegas and (2) the out-of-court statement by Cohen to Dailey recounting his earlier statement to Biegas. We consider each layer in turn. The first layerCohen's statement to Biegas to get out of the roadis not hearsay because it was not offered for its truth content. This statement was not offered to prove that Biegas was in fact standing in the travel lane at the time of the accident, but rather to show that Biegas had been put on notice that he was in imminent danger and should have been aware of the risk he faced. A statement that is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show its effect on the listener is not hearsay. United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 324 (6th Cir.1988). Cohen's statement was offered for its probable effect on Biegas in the moments before the accident. Under Quickway's theory of the case, Biegas was so upset at the time that he ignored Cohen's warning and continued to walk in the travel lane where he was struck by Dailey's tractor-trailer. The second layerCohen's statement to Dailey recounting his earlier statementis hearsay. This statement was offered for its truth contentto prove that Cohen had in fact told Biegas earlier to get out of the road. Accordingly, we consider whether the district court correctly ruled that the excited-utterance exception applies to this statement. An excited utterance is [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. FED.R.EVID. 803(2). The premise behind this exception to the hearsay rule is that a person under the sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling event will be bereft of the reflective capacity essential for fabrication and that, consequently, any utterance he makes will be spontaneous and trustworthy. Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 980, 79 L.Ed.2d 217 (1984). The excited-utterance exception applies when 1) there [is] an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement; 2) the statement [is] made before there is an opportunity to contrive or misrepresent; and 3) the statement [is] made while the person [is] under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. United States v. Beverly, 369 F.3d 516, 539-40 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 910 (2004). This court previously has explained that the ultimate question is whether the statement was the result of reflective thought or whether it was a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event. Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1058 (internal quotation marks omitted). The first element is satisfied because Cohen witnessed a terrible accident that dismembered and killed his friend and employer. Although Cohen did not see the tractor-trailer strike Biegas, he saw Biegas's torso fall to the ground and saw what he thought were pieces of Biegas's head, arm, and other body parts scattered across the travel lanes. The record makes clear, therefore, that Cohen witnessed an accident startling enough to cause nervous excitement. The second element asks whether the statement was made before there was an opportunity to fabricate or misrepresent. Beverly, 369 F.3d at 539-40. Although the record does not indicate precisely when Cohen made this statement to Dailey, it appears that it was made within a few minutes of the accident, before the arrival of police and paramedics. At his deposition, Cohen testified that immediately after Biegas was struck, he ran into the traffic lane to try to prevent cars from hitting Biegas's scattered body parts. Next, Cohen began running eastbound along the right shoulder and called 911. At that point he came upon Dailey and Bourlier, who were walking from the other direction toward Biegas's truck. Dailey testified at trial that he had been approached by Bourlier immediately after he pulled onto the shoulder. After Bourlier told Dailey that he thought Dailey had run over a person, the two men began walking back westbound along the right shoulder towards Biegas's truck. They came upon Cohen between the two trucks after walking around one-hundred feet. According to Dailey, only a few minutes elapsed between the time of the accident and their encounter with Cohen, at which time Cohen made the out-of-court statement at issue. In light of the short time frame and Cohen's conduct following the accident, we do not believe that Cohen had an opportunity to fabricate. Cohen had witnessed the accident and its horrific aftermath just minutes earlier. In the moments that followed the accident, Cohen ran into the traffic lanes, began running up the shoulder, called 911, and then came upon Dailey and Bourlier. There is no evidence that Cohen had a spare moment, much less an opportunity to recover from the experience, reflect upon the events, and fabricate a statement concerning what he had said to Biegas minutes earlier. The third element asks whether the statement was made while the declarant was still under the stress of excitement caused by the event. Beverly, 369 F.3d at 539-40. Relevant factors in determining whether a speaker remains under the stress of the excitement include (1) the lapse of time between the event and the declarations; (2) the age of the declarant; (3) the physical and mental state of the declarant; (4) the characteristics of the event; and (5) the subject matter of the statements. Maggard v. Ford Motor Co., 320 Fed.Appx. 367, 374 (6th Cir.2009) (unpublished) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although there is contradictory evidence concerning Cohen's mental state, the record as a whole suggests that Cohen remained under the stress of excitement caused by the accident at the time he made the statement. Minutes earlier, Cohen had witnessed a gruesome scene in which Biegas's body had been dismembered and body parts had been strewn across the highway. Cohen testified at his deposition that as he ran into the traffic lane to try to prevent drivers from running over Biegas's body parts, he was screaming and crying. ROA at 620 (Cohen Dep. Tr. at 63). Cohen then began running eastbound along the shoulder. I don't know why, Cohen testified, I just started running. Id. at 64. When Cohen met Dailey on the shoulder, the two men began consoling each other and holding each other. ROA at 621 (Cohen Dep. Tr. at 66). Cohen testified at trial that the accident had been a shocking event and that he had been in a state of shock afterwards. Although Cohen also testified that he never talked to Dailey, Cohen acknowledged that it was possible that he did not recall doing so because he was in a state of shock at the time. In sharp contrast to Cohen's testimony about his own mental state, Dailey testified at trial that when he met Cohen along the shoulder, Cohen seemed happy and was not agitated. Trial Tr. 7/16/07 at 82. When pressed on the point, Dailey acknowledged that Cohen could have been in shock. I don't know, but Dailey said that Cohen did not appear to be in shock. Id. at 83. Despite this contradictory testimony concerning Cohen's mental state, the weight of the evidence indicates that Cohen remained under the stress of excitement from the accident. Only a few minutes had elapsed following an unusually horrific accident, and Cohen's own testimony was that he was in a state of shock at the time. Moreover, Cohen's statement to Dailey related to the subject matter of the accident. When the subject matter of the statement involves the startling event itself, the subject matter supports a finding that the declarant was still under the stress of the accident. Maggard, 320 Fed.Appx. 367, 375. In sum, the record in this case indicates that Cohen's statement to Dailey was not the product of reflective thought but rather a spontaneous reaction to the stress of the accident he had just witnessed. Because Cohen's earlier statement to Biegas is not hearsay and Cohen's statement to Dailey falls within the excited-utterance exception, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dailey's testimony concerning Cohen's statement.