Opinion ID: 1268251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: improper resentencing on the basis of an erroneous presentence report

Text: Appellant Grier argues that it was improper to resentence him without the aid of a new presentence report. The State contends that any deficiencies in the report were corrected in post-conviction relief proceedings and that the resentence should therefore be affirmed. Trial courts have broad discretion in sentencing convicted defendants. State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. 72, 87, 695 P.2d 1110, 1125 (1985). If a sentence is within statutory limits, it will not be modified or reduced unless, from the circumstances, it clearly appears the sentence was an abuse of discretion. Id., State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 552, 611 P.2d 551, 556 (1980). An abuse of discretion in sentencing is characterized by capriciousness, arbitrariness or by failure to conduct an adequate investigation into facts necessary for an intelligent exercise of the court's sentencing power. State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 87, 695 P.2d at 1125. Convicted defendants have a due process right to a fair sentencing procedure which includes the right to be sentenced on the basis of accurate information. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592, 596 (1972); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690, 1693-94 (1948). A sentence must be set aside where the defendant can demonstrate that false information formed part of the basis for the sentence. The defendant must show: (1) that the information before the sentencing court was false or misleading and, (2) that the court relied on the false information in passing sentence. See United States v. Rone, 743 F.2d 1169, 1171 (7th Cir.1984). Appellant successfully demonstrated to the trial court that the presentence report contained various mistakes relating to the extent of appellant's criminal history. Also, the court found, in granting the hearing, that the first sentencing court had undoubtedly relied on those prior convictions in imposing the first sentence. Appellant now contends that the second sentencing judge also relied on this false information in resentencing him. At the resentencing, the trial judge imposed the aggravated sentence relying on three factors: (1) the appellant's longstanding use and addiction to a variety of drugs, one being substituted for the other; (2) the inability of the defendant to maintain steady employment; and (3) to the psychiatric factors and psychological factors shown by the reports which indicate an anti-social behavior and no prognosis for a change and that society does, indeed, need to be protected. After the sentence was reimposed, the appellant objected to the characterization that he was a drug addict: THE COURT: What is wrong with the Pre-Sentence report, other than the recitations about your prior record? MR. GRIER: You stated I had a drug addiction. Show me one time where I have drugs  a drug addiction. THE COURT: Oh, no, I'm not talking  I didn't say a drug addiction. MR. GRIER: You said addiction. THE COURT: I said a drug addiction, heroin, marijuana, longstanding marijuana problems by your own statements in here, two years, and you go crazy. .... LSD for a period of time. Are those statements all inaccurate? MR. GRIER: When I was 18, 19, I had taken drugs, but I haven't taken no drugs in so long and don't want any. THE COURT: Oh. Well, I quite understand. MR. GRIER: But yet  but, yet, you're still using that against me because I  THE COURT: You bet I am. .... THE COURT: In the past you have substituted one drug for another as a way of life. It has not been the same one and, true, you may not now be addicted. I hope you are not. The court went on to tell the appellant: [B]ased upon what I know about you and your pattern of living in the past, that a maximum sentence would be appropriate. Earlier the judge acknowledged that she had told appellant what she had read, and what she was relying on, ... because it's all I know about you. [1] From this exchange the judge noted that Grier had a history of drug abuse. However, there is no showing that this drug abuse played a role in the charged crime. This factor alone would not support the aggravated sentence imposed by the trial court on resentencing. The second factor that the trial judge characterized as an aggravating circumstance was the inability to maintain a steady employment. At the first sentencing, this factor was specifically excluded by the sentencing judge as an aggravating factor: THE COURT: I also consider the following other factors to be appropriate for the ends of justice: All of those reasons set forth in the pre-sentence report on page nine, except number two, I have considered as aggravating circumstances. Page 9 on the presentence report lists the following factors in making the recommendation that appellant be incarcerated in excess of the presumptive term: 1. The defendant's extensive prior criminal record, which now includes three convictions on sexual assault related charges. 2. The defendant's inability to maintain steady employment. 3. The defendant has established assaultive and violent behavior patterns. 4. The defendant's impaired mental health condition coupled with his violent and assaultive behavior make him a definite threat to the safety and well-being of the community. 5. Prior convictions for sexually assaultive behavior indicate established patterns regarding these types of offenses. 6. Although it appears to this writer that the defendant is in need of mental health therapy, it is the observation of this writer that because the defendant poses an extreme threat to the community, the safety and well-being of the community is the more important consideration in sentencing of this defendant. Item two, which the original sentencing judge explicitly deleted, was a factor in imposing an aggravated sentence. Again, this factor alone or coupled with the first would not support such an aggravated sentence. It is, therefore, the third factor which the resentencing court relied on that figures most significantly in the imposition of the aggravated sentence: [T]he psychiatric factors and psychological factors shown by the reports which indicate an anti-social behavior and no prognosis for a change and that society does, indeed, need to be protected. The trial court recognized that each of the doctors had either read the presentence report or else could have potentially seen the appellant's erroneous rap sheets. However, the trial court did not conduct an investigation into how this information may have influenced their reports. [2] Therefore, because the various medical and psychological reports were tainted with an erroneous prior conviction profile, we find the court's mere attempt to correct the prior convictions in the original report insufficient. Unlike State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 405, 604 P.2d 660, 669 (App. 1979), it is clear here that the resentencing court relied on the reports and was adversely influenced by content which may have been erroneous. The failure of the trial court to conduct an adequate investigation into facts necessary for an intelligent exercise of its sentencing power is an abuse of discretion. State v. Stotts, 144 Ariz. at 87, 695 P.2d at 1125. It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely on the doctors' reports and to speculate as to what impact, if any, the erroneous prior convictions may have had on their conclusions. The very purpose of the presentence report and the doctors' reports is to take the guesswork out of sentencing. These reports enable the sentencing judge to tailor the sentence to the individual. See State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 346, 690 P.2d 54, 65 (1984). In this instance, the trial judge relied on inadequate guesswork and this was an abuse of discretion.