Opinion ID: 2613237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reliance on expert opinion

Text: Dwight's argues that, in adopting the figures proposed by Fetzer's experts, the trial court abandoned its responsibility to make an individualized determination of the lodestar figure based on the actual billing records of the attorneys involved. All of the experts testified that, in forming their opinions, they had thoroughly reviewed the attorneys' billing records, as well as this court's decision in Fetzer. The trial court explicitly recognized the thorough review conducted by Fetzer's experts of the discovery, pleadings and attorney billings submitted in this case. CP, at 969. Fetzer's expert, Delay, explained his methodology: I approached it as the amount of lawyering that was reasonably necessary, having prevailed on the jurisdictional issue, and that only, and so I reconstructed from the facts what I thought was the high and low figure. Report of Proceedings (RP), at 184-85. Fetzer's second expert, Shoemaker, followed a similar approach. In contrast, Dwight's' expert Henderson opined that all $203,079.12 of the fees and costs demanded by Dwight's for work at the trial, appellate and remand levels, were reasonable. [9] This figure should be considered in light of the following excerpt from the concurring portion of Justice Brachtenbach's concurrence/dissent in Fetzer I: Dwight's Texas counsel claims in the trial court, $11,125 in fees for taking depositions, $14,375 for briefing and $11,875 in preparation for trial. These figures represent only minimum amounts, limited to those where the affidavit clearly identifies those categories. Incredibly, Texas counsel sought at least another $14,400 for briefing on appeal to the Court of Appeals solely on the issue of jurisdiction. Likewise, I am astonished at a claim of at least an additional $8,650 for briefing on the single-issue petition for review even though no new citations or theories arose from the Court of Appeals decision. These claims are exorbitant. Fetzer I, at 126 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This court has stated before that the actual hours billed by an attorney are only the starting point for a determination of the fee award. Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wn.2d 735, 744, 733 P.2d 208 (1987). See also Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 65, 738 P.2d 665 (1987). As discussed above, in arriving at a determination of reasonable fees, the trial court may be aided by expert opinion. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in agreeing with Delay's analysis. [12] Over a decade ago, the United States Supreme Court exhorted attorneys to exercise billing judgment in fees requests so as to avoid a costly second major litigation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 76 L.Ed.2d 40, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983). Unfortunately, this case demonstrates that the Court's words have not been uniformly heeded. This case began with an uncomplicated dispute over 120 vacuum cleaners worth less than $20,000. The jurisdictional problems with the Washington case were manifest. Out of these simple facts, Dwight's' attorneys have fashioned a claim for over $200,000 in attorneys fees. As discussed above, a claim for over 10 times the amount in contention, in a run-of-the-mill commercial dispute, certainly gives rise to a suspicion of unreasonableness, and demonstrates little, if any, billing judgment. Finally, both Texas and Washington have ethical rules mandating that attorneys charge only a reasonable fee. Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.5; Texas State Bar Rules, art. 10, § 9, rule 1.04. We take this occasion to remind practitioners that such considerations apply whether one's fee is being paid by a client or the opposing party. To summarize, we hold that the 481.89 hours awarded by the trial court for prevailing on the CR 12(b)(2) motion were unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. We reverse the trial court as to that issue and instead grant Dwight's a total of 70 hours for prevailing on the jurisdictional motion. Those hours, and their corresponding fees, are broken down as follows: Mr. McDonald: 60.75 hours or $7,593.75 Mr. Van Camp: 2.75 hours or $343.75 Mr. Taylor: 3.81 hours or $381.00 Mr. Deissner: 2.69 hours or $228.65 Hence, we grant a total of $8,547.15 as fees for prevailing on the jurisdictional motion. Additionally, the trial court granted $7,676.50 for work performed at the Supreme Court, plus costs of $100, and also granted $6,130.63 for work performed on remand. We uphold the remainder of the trial court's decision. Finally, we deny Dwight's' request for attorneys fees for this appeal. ANDERSEN, C.J., and UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, SMITH, JOHNSON, and MADSEN, JJ., concur.