Opinion ID: 2621377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: abuse of process requires an ulterior purpose in the use of process and a corroborating act

Text: ¶33 Finally, we take up the question of whether Mr. Davis adequately alleged that Mr. Hatch committed a wilful act in furtherance of an abuse of process. The court of appeals concluded that Mr. Davis's pleading was insufficient, and we agree. ¶34 The misuse of legal process becomes actionable when it is used 'primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed.' Hatch, 2004 UT App 378, ¶ 33 (quoting Gilbert v. Ince, 1999 UT 65, ¶ 17, 981 P.2d 841). We have characterized the essence of the tort of abuse of process to be a perversion of the process to accomplish some improper purpose. Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 30 Utah 2d 451, 455, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (1974). ¶35 In this case, there is no question that Mr. Davis alleged that Mr. Hatch had instigated lawsuits against him for the improper purpose of engag[ing] in a campaign of hate and terror towards the residents of Boulder, most specifically toward Larry and Judy Davis, and us[ing] the legal system in an attempt to intimidate those with whom he deals. ¶36 While these allegations satisfy the essence of the tort, they are not enough to fully make out a claim. The elements of abuse of process reach beyond its essence. To state a claim for abuse of process, a party must allege both an ulterior purpose and 'a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding.' Hatch, 2004 UT App 378, ¶ 34 (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts § 121 at 857 (4th ed. 1971)). ¶37 The focus of the essence of abuse of process is on the tortfeasor's motive. But motive is not enough. The tortfeasor must also have undertaken a wilful act. It is easy to slip into the conceptual trap of simply defining the wilful act as the legal process that the tortfeasor pursues according to his ulterior motive. Such a definition would, however, render the wilful act requirement superfluous. Under it, a party would only be required to link a bad motive to an event having the hallmarks of legal process to state a claim. ¶38 This is what Mr. Davis has done in his pleadings. He has yoked Mr. Hatch's courthouse misadventures to his ill-intentioned crusade to intimidate the inhabitants of Boulder. There is nothing in his allegations that distinguish Mr. Hatch's conduct from process that is merely accompanied by spite, ill-will, or any of the other less agreeable human emotions that frequently attach themselves to court papers. ¶39 To satisfy the wilful act requirement, a party must point to conduct independent of legal process itself that corroborates the alleged improper purpose. Id. ¶ 35 (citing Vallance v. Brewbaker, 411 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)). Use of legal process with a bad motive alone does not defeat that right; a corroborating act of a nature other than legal process is also necessary. Young v. Motor City Apartments Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass'n, 350 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). It is this corroborating act that permits true legal process to be branded a perversion of the process. Id. For example, the plaintiff's abuse of process claim in Early Detection Center, PC v. New York Life Insurance Co. was dismissed because the acts alleged as the irregular acts were no more than the filing of a 'groundless' suit. 403 N.W.2d 830, 835 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). In Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston Purina Co., however, the court affirmed an abuse of process judgment where the defendant used legal process to seize turkeys at the height of the Thanksgiving season in order to force. payment of a debt. The payment demands communicated by the defendant immediately after the seizure of the turkeys served as the wilful act. The payment demands were not integral to the proceeding that resulted in the seizure of the turkeys, but they collaborated the perverse character of those proceedings. 446 P.2d 152, 155 (Cal. 1968). ¶40 The wilful act requirement is consistent with the notion that an improper act may not be inferred from the motive. The wilful act element can be understood as an obligation imposed on the complaining party to allege that the tortfeasor has confirmed through his conduct his improper ulterior motive for employing legal process against the plaintiff. In this respect, the wilful act element exists to be in the service of the ulterior purpose core that makes up the essence of abuse of process. It signifies that in the eyes of the law sufficient grounds exist to believe that the complaining party may be exposed to injury that may not reasonably be redressed through the imposition of sanctions or like measures within the litigation forum itself. Mr. Davis alleged the existence of no act that met this standard. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.