Opinion ID: 218262
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: De Minimis Issue

Text: We now consider Mountaire's claim that the time expended by the employees in donning and doffing at the beginning and the end of their work shifts is de minimis and therefore noncompensable, notwithstanding our holding that these activities are part of the continuous workday as acts integral and indispensable to Mountaire's principal activity. As the Supreme Court has explained, the de minimis rule precludes employees from recovering for compensable work [w]hen the matter in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond the scheduled working hours. Anderson, 328 U.S. at 692, 66 S.Ct. 1187. According to the Court, compensation for [s]plit-second absurdities is not justified by the policy of the FLSA. Id. In applying the de minimis rule, we consider the aggregate amount of time for which the employees are otherwise legally entitled to compensation. See DOL Wage & Adv. Mem. No.2006-2 n.1 (May 31, 2006). We do not, as Mountaire suggests, evaluate each task or group of tasks separately to determine if the time period is de minimis. Adopting Mountaire's approach would undermine the purpose of the FLSA by allowing employers to parcel work into small groups of tasks that, when viewed separately, always would be considered de minimis. Therefore, we reject Mountaire's approach and consider whether the aggregate amount of time spent donning and doffing each day at the beginning and the end of the work shifts, a total of 10.204 minutes, is de minimis. Mountaire argues, however, that 10.204 minutes is de minimis as a matter of law. In support of its argument, Mountaire relies on this Court's holding in Green v. Planters Nut & Chocolate Co., 177 F.2d 187 (4th Cir.1949). According to Mountaire, this Court adopted a ten-minute rule in Green establishing that otherwise compensable activities are rendered non-compensable when those activities do not exceed a total of ten minutes per day. We disagree that this Court has established such a ten-minute rule. In Green, the employees argued that they were required to be present at their work station ten minutes before the start of their work shifts and, therefore, were entitled to compensation for that ten-minute period each day. 177 F.3d at 188. This Court summarily rejected the employees' claim on the basis that the employees were not actually required to be present for ten minutes before starting work, but merely were admonished by the employer to arrive at their work stations soon enough to be able to start work on time. Id. Therefore, this Court concluded that the employees could not be compensated additionally under the FLSA for any extra time they spent at the work site to ensure that they would be able to start their work shifts on time. Id. After stating this holding, this Court observed that the ten-minute interval at issue was de minimis. Id. This additional observation was not necessary to the Court's resolution of the factual issue that was the basis of its holding, and we therefore conclude that the observation is merely dicta. Because the decision in Green does not control the present issue, we must address whether the donning and doffing time period of 10.204 minutes per day is de minimis and, therefore, non-compensable under the holding of Anderson. 328 U.S. at 692, 66 S.Ct. 1187. To date, we have not articulated factors to be considered in determining whether a particular time period is de minimis. However, the Ninth Circuit, in Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1062-63 (9th Cir.1984), in a holding adopted by three of our sister circuits, articulated three factors to consider when conducting a de minimis analysis: (1) the practical difficulty the employer would encounter in recording the additional time; (2) the total amount of compensable time; and (3) the regularity of the additional work. See also De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 374 (3d Cir.2007); Brock v. City of Cincinnati, 236 F.3d 793, 804-05 (6th Cir.2001); Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 719 (2d Cir.2001). We conclude that these factors set forth in Lindow provide a useful and practical basis on which to conduct this type of analysis. By applying these factors, we adopt a de minimis analysis that necessarily requires a factual inquiry that will change on a case-by-case basis. [14] See Lindow, 738 F.2d at 1062. With regard to the first factor, we observe that both experts in the present case were able to measure the amount of time required by employees to don and doff protective gear before and after their work shifts. Thus, the time expended in these activities is not so miniscule that it would be difficult to measure as a practical matter. See id. at 1062-63; see also 29 C.F.R. § 785.47. Second, we consider the aggregate amount of compensable time involved. There are 280 employees who opted into the Millsboro action. Each of these employees was being paid at a rate of ten dollars per hour, and each would be entitled to compensation for 10.204 minutes of work per day. Applying these figures to an annual work schedule of fifty weeks, the amount of compensable time per employee is about 42.5 hours per year, which amounts to compensation of about $425 per employee per year. We conclude that this annual amount per employee is significant for an employee earning ten dollars per hour, because that annual amount represents a full week's wages. Additionally, the employees currently seek compensation for a period of more than six years, due in part to the passage of time since the filing of their complaint. [15] Therefore, over the six year period at issue here, each employee is entitled to additional compensation of about $2,550. We conclude that this aggregate amount per employee also is significant. With regard to the third factor, the regularity of the additional work, it is undisputed that these activities of donning and doffing at the beginning and the end of the employees' work shifts occur regularly each workday. Therefore, based on the three factors that we have adopted from Lindow, we conclude that the compensable time at the beginning and the end of the employees' work shifts is not de minimis and, thus, is compensable under the FLSA. Mountaire argues, nevertheless, that it should not be required to compensate the employees for the time spent donning and doffing their protective gear at the beginning and the end of the work shifts, because any calculation of such time would impose unreasonable and substantial administrative difficulties on Mountaire. In that regard, Mountaire asserts that such a calculation of time would be cost-prohibitive, cumbersome, and inefficient. Mountaire asks that we also consider the practical consequences of this type of requirement, including that employers will be compelled to micro-manage the amount of time employees spend donning and doffing to ensure that the employees are not wasting time during these activities. In our opinion, Mountaire overstates the extent of administrative difficulties involved in the calculation of the time required for donning and doffing at the beginning and the end of employees' work shifts. Mountaire already has a time-keeping system that could be modified to include the time that the employees spend performing these activities. We further observe that Mountaire is free to set policies restricting the employees' nonessential conduct during the donning and doffing process. Thus, we conclude that Mountaire's arguments are unpersuasive, and we hold that the employees are entitled to compensation for 10.204 minutes per work shift for the time that they spend donning and doffing their protective gear at the beginning and the end of their work shifts.