Opinion ID: 159592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Andover Defendants

Text: We turn first to the district court’s decision dismissing the Andover defendants on a motion to dismiss. We review de novo the sufficiency of a complaint and the district court’s grant of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. , 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). In doing so, we apply the same standards applied by the district court. See David v. City & County of Denver , 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996). Specifically, we accept as true all the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See GFF , 130 F.3d at 1384. Moreover, “[a] 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we assess the limited question “whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Miller v. Glanz , 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs acknowledge that they failed to raise the issue of indispensable party below in defending against the Andover defendants’ motion to dismiss, but argue that we should consider it nevertheless because we have an independent duty and should exercise our jurisdiction to do so. Essentially, plaintiffs argue that, without the Andover USD, it will be impossible to ascertain which school -8- district is responsible for providing Joshua W. with special education and special services. Plaintiffs argue that, although by their own admission Joshua W. never resided in the Andover USD, the Wichita USD adopted the position that he did. Last, plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly based the dismissal on paragraph three of the complaint (which states that Joshua W. never resided in the Andover school district), and should have, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2), allowed the claims against all the Andover defendants to proceed. Plaintiffs’ attempt to argue joinder of a necessary/indispensable party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 obfuscates the real issue, i.e., whether the district court properly dismissed the Andover USD for plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim in their complaint. Even if we were persuaded of Rule 19’s applicability, and our “duty” to consider the issue of a necessary party on appeal in these circumstances, we would conclude that the Andover USD is neither a necessary nor indispensable party for purposes of that rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 19 (setting out factors to be considered in relevant analyses). Based on our review of the complaint under the standards set forth above, we conclude as did the district court. Plaintiffs’ complaint states that Joshua W. “has resided all his life in the Kansas school district of Wichita U.S.D. 259.” -9- Appellant’s App., Vol. I at 21, para. 3 (complaint); 3 see also id. at 23, para. 18 (“Since 1988, Joshua W. lived in Wichita with various family members, including his father or adult sister but never with his mother.”). Under the applicable Kansas law quoted above, Joshua W.’s residency controls. Plaintiffs have failed to plead any residency in the Andover USD. Neither are we persuaded by plaintiffs’ contentions on appeal of “alternative” claims against the Andover defendants, in which plaintiffs essentially argue that: (1) the Wichita USD took the position that the Andover USD was responsible for Joshua W.’s special education needs; and (2) if Wichita is not responsible for meeting Joshua W.’s special education needs, the Andover USD had to be the responsible district. Although plaintiffs characterize this an alternative pleading permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2)--which condones inconsistent claims and defenses--that rule does not apply to this situation. 3 After the district court entered its order dismissing the Andover defendants, plaintiffs amended their complaint. The amended complaint still contains the same statement. See Appellant’s App., Vol. II at 271, para. 3 (amended complaint). -10-