Opinion ID: 2149780
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Heading: Applicability of the Federal Standard to Section 23

Text: Initially, we must determine whether settled Indiana law forecloses consideration of plaintiff's contention that federal Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence does not necessarily apply to a claim brought under Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. During the 143 years since the ratification of Section 23, this Court has assumed various postures with respect to the applicability of federal Fourteenth Amendment standards to Section 23 questions. One such approach suggests that a distinction ought to be drawn between Section 23 and the Fourteenth Amendment. There are striking textual differences between the two provisions. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits laws which abridge privileges or immunities, whereas Section 23 prohibits laws which grant unequal privileges or immunities. Many Indiana cases have considered and applied Section 23 separately from the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in Graffty v. City of Rushville , we noted that Section 23 considerations were to be analyzed independently from the provisions of the National Constitution. Graffty v. City of Rushville (1886), 107 Ind. 502, 509, 8 N.E. 609, 612. In at least one case, a statute was found to comply with the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause but nevertheless to violate the parallel provision in Indiana's Section 23. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 173, 122 N.E. 584. Several decisions of this Court have expressly acknowledged that Section 23 is the antithesis of the 14th amendment to the federal Constitution. Hammer v. State (1909), 173 Ind. 199, 206, 89 N.E. 850, 852. See also Midwestern Petroleum Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs (1933), 206 Ind. 688, 187 N.E. 882, reh'g denied; Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler (1927), 199 Ind. 95, 155 N.E. 465; Cincinnati, H. & D. Ry. Co. v. McCullom (1915), 183 Ind. 556, 109 N.E. 206, aff'd (1917), 245 U.S. 632, 38 S.Ct. 64, 62 L.Ed. 521. Similarly suggesting the distinction between Section 23 and the Fourteenth Amendment, numerous other cases have undertaken the analysis of constitutional claims under first one of the provisions and then the other. Reilly v. Robertson (1977), 266 Ind. 29, 360 N.E.2d 171, cert. denied, (1977), 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 73, 54 L.Ed.2d 83; Phillips v. Officials of Valparaiso (1954), 233 Ind. 414, 120 N.E.2d 398; Shedd v. Automobile Ins. Co. (1935), 208 Ind. 621, 196 N.E. 227; Davis Constr. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs (1921), 192 Ind. 144, 132 N.E. 629; Inland Steel Co. v. Yedinak (1909), 172 Ind. 423, 87 N.E. 229; Levy v. State (1903), 161 Ind. 251, 68 N.E. 172; Street v. Varney Elec. Supply Co. (1903), 160 Ind. 338, 66 N.E. 895; Pennsylvania Co. v. State (1895), 142 Ind. 428, 41 N.E. 937; Warren v. Sohn (1887), 112 Ind. 213, 13 N.E. 863; Cory v. Carter (1874), 48 Ind. 327. A contrasting line of cases has maintained that Section 23 and the Fourteenth Amendment share substantially the same considerations. In Dortch v. Lugar (1971), 255 Ind. 545, 567, 266 N.E.2d 25, 39, our opinion noted that Section 23 and the Fourteenth Amendment concerning the abridging of privileges and immunities of citizens protect substantially identical rights. Id. Other cases have considered the two provisions essentially synonymous. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp. (1980), 273 Ind. 374, 397, 404 N.E.2d 585, 600; Sidle v. Majors (1976), 264 Ind. 206, 210, 341 N.E.2d 763, 767; State ex rel. Miller v. McDonald (1973), 260 Ind. 565, 569, 297 N.E.2d 826, 829, cert. denied, (1974), 414 U.S. 1158, 94 S.Ct. 917, 39 L.Ed.2d 111; Haas v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp. (1972), 259 Ind. 515, 526, 289 N.E.2d 495, 501. Numerous cases have treated the two provisions simultaneously, without any explicit statement as to equivalence or separateness. See, eg., Murphy v. Schilling (1979), 271 Ind. 44, 389 N.E.2d 314; State v. Hi-Jinks, Inc. (1962), 242 Ind. 621, 181 N.E.2d 526; W.A. Barber Grocery Co. v. Fleming (1951), 229 Ind. 140, 96 N.E.2d 108; Vandalia R.R. v. Stillwell (1914), 181 Ind. 267, 104 N.E. 289, aff'd (1916), 239 U.S. 637, 36 S.Ct. 445, 60 L.Ed. 480; Indianapolis Union Ry. Co. v. Houlihan (1901), 157 Ind. 494, 60 N.E. 943; State v. Hogreiver (1899), 152 Ind. 652, 53 N.E. 921. Notwithstanding that the privileges and immunities cases brought under Section 23 have often assimilated federal equal protection analysis, we are under no obligation to follow Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence in resolving a Section 23 issue. An analogous issue was encountered in Miller v. State (1987), Ind., 517 N.E.2d 64, where we observed that Indiana courts had often relied upon federal case law addressing the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in reviewing claims invoking the right of confrontation arising from Article 1, Section 13, of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 68. Nevertheless, we there declared that such precedents do not preclude us from forming an independent standard for analyzing state constitutional claims. Id. at 69. We conclude that there is no settled body of Indiana law that compels application of a federal equal protection analytical methodology to claims alleging special privileges or immunities under Indiana Section 23 and that Section 23 should be given independent interpretation and application. The formulation of a separate Section 23 standard requires consideration of the circumstances of its adoption and its application in subsequent Indiana cases, and we now undertake this task.