Opinion ID: 835999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Changes Made by Measure 7

Text: We begin by addressing certain of the substantive changes that plaintiffs contend that Measure 7 makes to the Oregon Constitution. As noted above, plaintiffs first contend that, by its express terms, Measure 7 substantively changes Article I, section 18. The state and intervenor agree, as do we. The parties disagree, however, concerning the effect of Measure 7 upon other parts of the Oregon Constitution, including Article I, section 8. Below, we first briefly summarize the effect of Measure 7 upon Article I, section 18, and then turn to the effect that Measure 7 has upon Article I, section 8. [19]
Article I, section 18, provides, in part: Private property shall not be taken for public use    without just compensation; nor except in the case of the state, without such compensation first assessed and tendered; provided, that the use of all roads, ways and waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw products of mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the state and is declared a public use. That provision requires payment of just compensation for a variety of governmental actions that result in the taking of private property for public use, including regulatory takings by way of application or enforcement of regulations with certain economic ramifications. Boise Cascade Corp. v. Board of Forestry, 325 Or. 185, 197-98, 935 P.2d 411 (1997). Measure 7 explicitly amends Article I, section 18, as follows: BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF OREGON: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OREGON IS AMENDED BY ADDING THE FOLLOWING SUBSECTIONS TO SECTION 18 OF ARTICLE I: (a) If the state, a political subdivision of the state, or a local government passes or enforces a regulation that restricts the use of private real property, and the restriction has the effect of reducing the value of a property upon which the restriction is imposed; the property owner shall be paid just compensation equal to the reduction in the fair market value of the property. (b) For purposes of this section, adoption or enforcement of historically and commonly recognized nuisance laws shall not be deemed to have caused a reduction in the value of a property. The phrase `historically and commonly recognized nuisance laws' shall be narrowly construed in favor of a finding that just compensation is required under this section. (c) A regulating entity may impose, to the minimum extent required, a regulation to implement a requirement of federal law without payment of compensation under this section. Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall require compensation due to a government regulation prohibiting the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography, performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic beverages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino or gaming parlor. (d) Compensation shall be due the property owner if the regulation was adopted, first enforced or applied after the current owner of the property became the owner, and continues to apply to the property 90 days after the owner applies for compensation under this section. (e) Definitions: For purposes of this section, `regulation' shall include any law, rule, ordinance, resolution, goal, or other enforceable enactment of government; `real property' shall include any structure built or sited on the property, aggregate and other removable minerals, and any forest product or other crop grown on the property; `reduction in the fair market value' shall mean the difference in the fair market value of the property before and after application of the regulation, and shall include the net cost to the landowner of an affirmative obligation to protect, provide, or preserve wildlife habitat, natural areas, wetlands, ecosystems, scenery, open space, historical, archaeological or cultural resources, or low income housing; and `just compensation' shall include, if a claim for compensation is denied or not fully paid within 90 days of filing, reasonable attorney fees and expenses necessary to collect the compensation. (f) If any phrase, clause, or part of this section is found to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining phrases, clauses and parts shall remain in full force and effect. (Emphasis added.) As its text demonstrates, Measure 7 explicitly changes Article I, section 18, in a number of ways. Most significantly, Article I, section 18, currently requires payment of just compensation only when a property owner demonstrates that a governmental regulation has deprive[d] the owner of all economically viable use of the property.    If the owner has some substantial beneficial use of the property remaining, then the owner fails to meet the test. Boise Cascade Corp., 325 Or. at 197-98, 935 P.2d 411 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Dodd v. Hood River County, 317 Or. 172, 181-82, 855 P.2d 608 (1993) (to same effect). After amendment by Measure 7, Article I, section 18, would require payment of just compensation for any reduction in the value of private real property resulting from the enforcement of a restrictive regulation, even that which falls short of the standard set out in Boise Cascade Corp. and Dodd. Although Measure 7 changes Article I, section 18, in other ways, and although the parties disagree regarding the extent and ramifications of such changes, we need not discuss such changes here. That is so, because we conclude below that Measure 7 also implicitly changes Article I, section 8, in a substantive way and that the explicit, substantive change to Article I, section 18, discussed above, is not closely related to the implicit change that Measure 7 makes to Article I, section 8. Accordingly, the number of other changes that Measure 7 makes to Article I, section 18, has no bearing upon our decision in this case. See Swett, 333 Or. at 607, 43 P.3d 1094 (because court addressed two substantive changes that were not closely related, unnecessary to discuss other changes made by measure at issue). [20] We turn to our analysis of the effect of Measure 7 upon Article I, section 8.
Plaintiffs contend that subsection (c) of Measure 7 changes Article I, section 8. We address that argument by first turning again to the text of Measure 7. As noted above, in subsection (a), Measure 7 requires payment of just compensation for restrictive regulations that reduce the value of private real property. Subsection (c) of Measure 7, however, creates the following exception to the just-compensation requirement set out in subsection (a): Nothing in this 2000 Amendment shall require compensation due to a government regulation prohibiting the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography, performing nude dancing, selling alcoholic beverages or other controlled substances, or operating a casino or gaming parlor. In other words, subsection (c) permits the state and local governments not to pay a claim that otherwise would qualify under subsection (a), if that claim is made in response to a regulation that forbids using the subject property for one of the enumerated purposes. By its terms, then, subsection (c) permits the state and local governments not to pay just compensation for regulations that explicitly prohibit using property for those purposes, even if such regulations reduce property value under subsection (a). Plaintiffs contend that, because subsection (c) permits the state or a local government not to pay just compensation to private real property owners whose property decreases in value because of a regulation prohibiting the use of property for, among other uses, the purpose of selling pornography, Measure 7 changes the right of free expression currently guaranteed by Article I, section 8. The state and intervenor respond that subsection (c) merely creates an exception to the right to just compensation set out in subsection (a) and, viewed in that way, does not change rights currently guaranteed by Article I, section 8. Alternatively, intervenor contends that, if subsection (c) does operate to prevent certain property owners from receiving payment of just compensation, such a scheme never could be enforced, because it would not be permitted under Article I, section 8. Therefore, in intervenor's view, Measure 7 effectively could not change Article I, section 8, because that constitutional provision would prevent subsection (c) from becoming effective in the first instance. As explained below, we agree with plaintiffs. Article I, section 8, in place since statehood, provides, in part: No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever[.] As this court explained in City of Portland v. Tidyman, 306 Or. 174, 179, 759 P.2d 242 (1988), Article I, section 8, forbids the enactment of a law directed in terms against any subject of speech, writing, or printing, unless the communication in question falls within a well-established historical exception that the constitutional guarantees demonstrably were not meant to displace. There is no suggestion in the text of Measure 7 that the term pornography is used in other than its ordinary sense. So understood, it is clear that pornography is one form of speech, writing, or printing. Tidyman, 306 Or. at 179, 759 P.2d 242. Further, this court has determined that restrictions upon sexually explicit and obscene expression involving adultssuch as many forms of pornographydo not fit within any historical exception. State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510, 523, 732 P.2d 9 (1987). Therefore, the term pornography, as used in subsection (c), includes some forms of expression that, no matter how offensive to many people, are protected under Article I, section 8. The state and intervenor do not quarrel with the foregoing statement of Oregon constitutional law. Neither do they disagree that the use of property for the purpose of selling pornography, as described in subsection (c), implicates the right of free expression. Instead, as noted, the state and intervenor argue that subsection (c) does not change that right because it does not take away any benefit that property owners who use their property to sell pornography currently enjoy. That is, such property owners would not be entitled to just compensation for the type of regulation described in subsection (c) today, and they would not be entitled to it under Measure 7. Therefore, according to the state and intervenor, Measure 7 would not change those owners' right of free expression. The state's and intervenor's argument mistakenly focuses upon whether property owners who use their property to sell pornography actually would lose money under Measure 7. That is not the question. The question is whether those owners would experience any change in the constitutional right to free expression to which they currently are entitled under Article I, section 8. We turn to that question now. As we have explained, as it currently operates, Article I, section 8, prohibits the state or a local government from enacting a law that is directed against the content of constitutionally protected expression. Tidyman, 306 Or. at 179, 759 P.2d 242. Thus, the state or a local government may not enact a law that is directed against the selling of pornography because it is pornography. Id. However, the protection afforded by Article I, section 8, does not end with the protection from regulations that explicitly target expression. As this court explained in City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or. 480, 491, 871 P.2d 454 (1994), freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article I, section 8, also means that the state or a local government may not treat those who sell expressive material more restrictively than those who sell other merchandise. Because Miller is crucial to understanding the scope of the freedom of expression that Article I, section 8, guarantees, we briefly discuss that case here. Miller concerned a bookseller's challenge to a city ordinance that prohibited the sale of most forms of merchandise on city sidewalks, except (by license) the sale of food, beverages, flowers or balloons. 318 Or. at 483, 871 P.2d 454. On its face, the ordinance targeted neither expression generally nor any particular type of expression. Stated differently, in the words of Tidyman, 306 Or. at 179, 759 P.2d 242, the ordinance was not explicitly directed in terms against any subject of speech. However, the ordinance operated to restrict the booksellersomeone who sold expressive material protected under Article I, section 8to a greater extent than it did those who sold food, beverages, flowers, and balloons. That restriction, this court held, violated Article I, section 8. The court explained: So long as the city chooses to make its sidewalks available for some general commercial activity   , it may not treat a vendor of expressive material more restrictively than vendors of other merchandise   . 318 Or. at 491, 871 P.2d 454 (emphasis in original). Miller demonstrates that a governmental burden upon free expression is one type of restrain[t] of expression that Article I, section 8, prohibits. It is equally clear under Miller that a governmental enactment that allows some persons to participate in a certain activity, but prohibits others engaged in expression from participating in that same activity, constitutes a prohibited burden upon expression. [21] It follows that a governmental scheme that requires payment to some persons, but not others engaged in protected expression, also constitutes a burden that Article I, section 8, prohibits. For that reason, today, if the state or a local government is required to offer a benefit to some property owners, it may not, under Article I, section 8, choose not to offer that same benefit to another property owner because that latter owner engages in a particular type of expressive activity. [22] Under Measure 7, by contrast, the state and local governments explicitly would be permitted to do just that, i.e., they could decline to pay just compensation under Article I, section 18, to a property owner because that owner engages in a particular type of expressive activity, namely, the sale of some forms of pornography. Stated differently, subsection (c) operates to permit the state and local governments to choose not to pay such a property owner, unless that owner were to change the content of the expressive material sold on the property in question essentially placing a price tag upon the property owner's right of free expression. Consequently, subsection (c) changesindeed, limitsthe scope of the rights currently guaranteed by Article I, section 8. For that reason, we reject the state's and intervenor's argument that subsection (c) does not constitute a constitutional change for purposes of our separate-vote analysis. Intervenor also contends that, because regulations directed toward constitutionally protected expressionsuch as those that, under subsection (c), would prohibit[ ] the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornographyare impermissible under Article I, section 8, the exception to the just-compensation requirement set out in subsection (c) never could be enforced and, consequently, cannot be deemed a constitutional change for purposes of Article XVII, section 1. Again, we disagree. We first note that, in Tidyman, 306 Or. at 185, 188, 190-91, 759 P.2d 242, this court left open the possibility that a regulation ostensibly directed against expression might pass constitutional muster, provided that such a regulation in fact was directed toward negative effects sought to be prevented and also specified the harm that otherwise would arise if the regulation were not adopted. Consequently, although this court has not yet decided a case involving such a regulation, it is possible that a governmental entity, today, could craft a regulation that prohibit[s] the use of a property for the purpose of selling pornography without running afoul of Article I, section 8. That said, we disagree with intervenor's theory that a constitutional change that never might be enforced is not a change for separate-vote purposes. Subsection (c), as of the moment of its passage, carves out an explicit constitutional exception to the protection that Article I, section 8, now provides. Stated differently, subsection (c) sets out a circumstance, effective as of the effective date of Measure 7, in which the state and local governments constitutionally must provide a benefit to some property owners, but may decline to offer it to other property owners who use their property to sell a type of expressive material that is protected under Article I, section 8. Regardless of whether the state or a local government ever chooses to take advantage of the exception set out in subsection (c), that exception nevertheless is a change to the scope of the rights currently guaranteed by Article I, section 8, for purposes of our separate-vote analysis in this case. See generally, Lehman 333 Or. at 243 n. 8, 37 P.3d 989 (fact that one constitutional change made by measure at issue was prohibited by U.S. Constitution did not affect court's separate-vote analysis). In sum, although the text of Measure 7 purports to change only Article I, section 18, its inclusion of the exception set out in subsection (c) nonetheless changes rights currently guaranteed by Article I, section 8. See generally, Coalition for Equit. School Fund. v. State of Oregon, 311 Or. 300, 309, 811 P.2d 116 (1991) (When a party argues that a general constitutional provision forbids the state from doing something, the argument may be answered by a later-adopted constitutional provision that allows the state to do that very thing.). For those reasons, we conclude that, as written, Measure 7 substantively changes two existing constitutional provisions: Article I, section 18 (takings), and Article I, section 8 (freedom of expression).