Opinion ID: 2768598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: rfra claim for injunctive relief

Text: We first address Mr. Davila’s claim for injunctive relief under RFRA, on which the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. “Congress enacted RFRA . . . in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.” Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760 (2014). Under the statute, the “Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a). If the Government takes action that substantially burdens a person’s exercise of religion, it must “demonstrate[] that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” § 2000bb-1(b). We address each part of the 6 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 7 of 31 test in turn. After careful review of the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Davila, we conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on Mr. Davila’s RFRA claim for injunctive relief. A. Substantial Burden on Mr. Davila’s Religious Exercise Under RFRA, a plaintiff must first show that the Government has substantially burdened his exercise of religion. In evaluating these claims, a district court must determine whether an inmate’s (1) religious exercise is (2) substantially burdened by prison policy. § 2000bb-1(a). No one has seriously disputed that Mr. Davila’s beliefs about his religious exercise were sincerely held. However, the Magistrate Judge who first considered this case found that the “Defendants’ application of Program Statement 5360.09 [did] not impose a substantial burden on [the] Plaintiff’s exercise of his religion.” The District Court adopted that finding in full. Because we remand on this RFRA claim, we begin with the standard under RFRA’s first prong. First turning to religious exercise, the Supreme Court recently explained that “it is not for us to say that [a plaintiff’s] religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our ‘narrow function . . . in this context is to determine’ whether the line drawn [between conduct that is and is not permitted under one’s religion] reflects an honest conviction.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 7 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 8 of 31 450 U.S. 707, 716, 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1431 (1981)). This rule minds the Supreme Court’s warning that judges “must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.” Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (1990); see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716, 101 S. Ct. at 1431 (insisting that judges not become “arbiters of scriptural interpretation”). A secular, civil court is a poor forum to litigate the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs, particularly given that faith is, by definition, impossible to justify through reason. See Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S. Ct. 2136, 2148 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”); Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007) (“It is difficult to gauge the objective reasonableness of a belief that need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others.”). As our sister circuit noted in the related context of RLUIPA, “Congress made plain that we . . . lack any license to decide the relative value of a particular exercise to a religion.” Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 54 (10th Cir. 2014). That being the case, we look only to see whether “the claimant is (in essence) seeking to perpetrate a fraud on the court—whether he actually holds the beliefs he claims to hold.” Id. 8 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 9 of 31 At this stage of the litigation, these Defendants have not argued that Mr. Davila’s religious beliefs were not sincerely held. Neither did the Magistrate Judge or the District Court grant summary judgment on the basis of the sincerity of Mr. Davila’s religious beliefs. Although the Defendants may contest the issue at trial, the record at summary judgment contains no evidence that Mr. Davila has fabricated his stated need for beads and shells infused with Ache. Summary judgment would therefore not be appropriate on this ground. Second, the question of whether Mr. Davila’s religious exercise was substantially burdened is also straightforward on this summary judgment record. We have “made clear that, in order to constitute a ‘substantial burden’ on religious practice, the government’s action must be ‘more than . . . incidental’ and ‘must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.’ That is, to constitute a substantial burden [], the governmental action must significantly hamper one’s religious practice.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1277 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (quoting Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004)), abrogated on other grounds by Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1651 (2011). The Supreme Court has observed that the test for whether a person’s religious exercise is substantially burdened is not “whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2778. Instead, we look to “whether the [government’s 9 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 10 of 31 rule] imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting part[y] to conduct [himself] in accordance with [his] religious beliefs.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Yellowbear, 741 F.3d at 55 (noting that a burden is substantial when it “prevents the plaintiff from participating in an activity motivated by a sincerely held religious belief”). The record before us reflects only that Mr. Davila’s religious beliefs require him to wear beads and shells infused with Ache. The Defendants presented no evidence or argument to support a finding that Mr. Davila’s exercise of his religious practices would not be burdened if he is continued to be denied these things. Mr. Davila has therefore shown, at least at this stage of the litigation, that the Defendants substantially burdened his religious exercise by flatly preventing him from having his beads and shells. On this record, the District Court erred in its finding that Mr. Davila’s sincerely held religious beliefs were not substantially burdened. B. In Furtherance of a Compelling Governmental Interest Once a plaintiff shows that his exercise of religion is substantially burdened, the Government must demonstrate that its challenged actions are in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest. To make this showing, the Defendants tell us that the compelling governmental interest of security and order justifies keeping inmates from getting religious items from unauthorized sources. Mr. Davila 10 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 11 of 31 concedes that prison order and security are compelling governmental interests. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823, 94 S. Ct. 2800, 2804 (1974) (“[C]entral to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.”). However, he argues that the Defendants did not show, for purposes of summary judgment, that the prison policy here actually furthers these interests. See Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 533 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding that “[w]hile safety and cost can be compelling governmental interests, the Defendants have not carried their burden to show that [the] policy in fact furthered these two interests” for summary judgment purposes). We agree. In evaluating whether particular policies are in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, courts should “look[] beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 431, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1220 (2006). As we recently observed, “[w]hile we are mindful of our obligation to give due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators, policies grounded on mere speculation, exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the act’s requirements.” Rich, 716 F.3d at 533 (citations and quotation marks omitted). For instance, in Rich, we 11 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 12 of 31 overturned a district court’s grant of summary judgment rejecting a prisoner’s RLUIPA claim, because the prison’s evidence of security concerns was “speculative” and the prison’s cost projections made assumptions that were not supported by the record. 716 F.3d at 533–34. There are genuine disputes of material fact in the record before us about whether prohibiting Mr. Davila from having his personal beads and shells furthers a compelling governmental interest. The Defendants argue generally that the BOP has a broad, compelling governmental interest in security and order that justifies preventing inmates from getting religious items from unauthorized outsiders. The Defendants rely on the prison warden’s affidavit, which reads: “permitting inmates to obtain personal religious items from unauthorized outsiders such as family and friends would have a major impact on prison staff and inmates, as allowing such would drastically increase an inmate’s ability to smuggle contraband and/or weapons into the prison.” The Defendants also point to the cost of screening items. For this, they again cite to the warden’s affidavit, which states: “allowing prisoners to obtain religious items from unauthorized sources would also have a major impact on prison resources, as prison staff would then be required to spend more time and money screening and examining those items before an inmate would be allowed to take possession of such items.” 12 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 13 of 31 However, the Defendants’ generalized statement of interests, unsupported by specific and reliable evidence, is not sufficient to show that the prison restriction furthered a compelling governmental interest. The Defendants offer little more than a conclusory assertion that if they grant Mr. Davila’s request, there will be a significant impact on security interests and cost concerns. On this record, we are left to wonder about the number of prisoners who may similarly request religious objects; any processes the prison currently has for screening objects from outside sources; past incidents of mailed contraband that justify the warden’s security fears; and the actual costs and time the prison would need to spend on screening. The only source of information about these crucial questions is the prison warden’s terse affidavit. But prison officials cannot simply utter the magic words “security and costs” and as a result receive unlimited deference from those of us charged with resolving these disputes. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 438, 126 S. Ct. at 1225 (“[U]nder RFRA invocation of such general interests, standing alone, is not enough.”). Doing so would ignore RFRA’s plain meaning and intent. We are quite mindful that for prisons, we must afford “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005) (citation omitted). But here, 13 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 14 of 31 where the prison has offered no evidence to justify its cost and safety concerns, the requirements of RFRA have not been met. The Defendants have failed, as a matter of law, to meet their burden of demonstrating that their policy furthers a compelling governmental interest. Because there are genuine disputes of material fact about whether prohibiting Mr. Davila from having his personal beads and shells furthers a compelling governmental interest, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the Defendants on this ground. C. Least Restrictive Alternative Even if the Defendants had shown a compelling governmental interest justifying the burden on Mr. Davila’s religious exercise as a matter of law, they have not shown that their wholesale ban on religious items outside the catalog is the least restrictive means for furthering that interest. The Supreme Court recently reminded us that “[t]he least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2780. Although “cost may be an important factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis, . . . RFRA . . . may in some circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs.” Id. at 2781. In his response to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Mr. Davila argued that the least restrictive means would have been for Dr. Cox to contact a qualified Santeria priest or priestess, such as his goddaughter, and 14 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 15 of 31 designate that person as an approved vendor for Ache-infused items. Mr. Davila says this process could be done at a de minimis cost to the prison. The Defendants presented no evidence refuting this assertion other than to say that BOP policy prohibits obtaining a religious item from a source other than an approved vendor’s catalog. In rebuttal, Mr. Davila responds that, while the Program Statement generally requires prisoners to get religious items through a specified catalog, it also includes a directive that prisons create “[p]rocedures for acquiring authorized religious items when no catalog vendor is available.” 3 That the prison’s own policy contemplates exemptions from the catalog requirement undercuts the Defendants’ argument that a categorical prohibition on non-catalog religious objects is the least restrictive means of achieving their objectives. Beyond that, the record also reflects that the prison allowed Mr. Davila to receive prescription eyeglasses by mail from a family member. This evidence at least raises important questions about what procedures the prison already has in place to screen items brought in from outside the prison; how effective those existing procedures are; and how burdensome it would be to simply screen 3 The Defendants argue that this portion of the Program Statement is not contained in the record, and that we therefore should not address it. But we may take judicial notice of a federal prison manual that is readily available to the public. See, e.g., United States v. Thornton, 511 F.3d 1221, 1229 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (taking judicial notice of a BOP Program Statement regarding organ transplants for prisoners); Antonelli v. Ralston, 609 F.2d 340, 341 n.1 (8th Cir. 1979) (taking judicial notice of a Program Statement issued by the BOP relating to prisoners’ mail). 15 Case: 13-10739 Date Filed: 01/09/2015 Page: 16 of 31 religious items through that same established procedure. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at ___, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (holding that the government had not shown that the contraceptive mandate at issue was the least restrictive alternative to providing contraceptive coverage to women because “HHS ha[d] not provided any estimate of the average cost per employee of providing access to . . . contraceptives.”). There are therefore genuine disputes of material fact about whether the BOP’s policy decision in this case constituted the least restrictive means to further security and cost management. On this record, the District Court erred in granting the Defendants’ summary judgment motion on Mr. Davila’s RFRA claim for injunctive relief.4