Opinion ID: 1027730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of evidence of other bad acts

Text: Hicks next argues that evidence regarding Hicks’s bad character and collateral bad acts should have been excluded 6 under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review the admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Forrest, 429 F.3d 73, 79 (4th Cir. 2005). Rule 404(b), which applies to acts extrinsic to the crime charged, prohibits the admission of evidence of a person’s prior conduct solely to prove a defendant’s bad character, or conduct in conformity with defendant’s bad character. Such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, such as “‘proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’” United States v. Hodge, 354 F.3d 305, 311-12 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). For such evidence to be admissible under Rule 404(b), it must be “(1) relevant to an issue other than the general character of the defendant; (2) necessary to prove an element of the charged offense; and (3) reliable.” Id. at 312 (citing United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997)). Additionally, the probative value of the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 403; Queen, 132 F.3d at 997). After reviewing the record, we find that the challenged evidence falls under the exception to Rule 404(b) and its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effects. 7 IV. Admission of evidence seized during a search of Hicks’s home and computer Hicks next argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his home and computer. He contends that the search should not have been authorized because the application and affidavit did not establish probable cause that child pornography would be found in Hicks’s home or computer. Factual findings underlying a motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error, while the legal determinations are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). When the district court denies a defendant’s suppression motion, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. See United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006). In reviewing the propriety of issuing a search warrant, the relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The facts presented to the issuing judge need only convince a person of reasonable caution that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). We afford great 8 deference to a judge’s findings of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. The lengthy affidavit presented to the magistrate judge in support of the search warrant included statements made by a minor that Hicks had taken nude photographs of her while she was bathing, and that she had later observed these photographs on his home computer. This assertion was independently corroborated by another juvenile, who estimated she had seen thirty photographs of the minor on Hicks’s computer, and had actually seen Hicks take nude photographs of the minor. Finally, Hicks’s wife, from whom he is legally separated, informed the child protective services interviewer that she had seen Hicks download child pornography on his computer. We find this evidence to be more than sufficient to “convince a person of reasonable caution” that child pornography would be found on Hicks’s computer and in Hicks’s apartment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Hicks’s motion to suppress. V. Limitation of the cross-examination of the Government’s child witnesses Next, Hicks contends that the district court erred by refusing to allow defense counsel to cross-examine two child witnesses about past instances of molestation by perpetrators 9 other than Hicks. We review a district court’s decision to limit cross-examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Scheetz, 293 F.3d 175, 184 (4th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees the accused the right to cross-examine witnesses. However, the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee counsel the right to unfettered, unlimited cross-examination, nor does it prevent a trial judge from imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination based upon concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness safety, repetition, or relevance. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). Thus, “the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective crossexamination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)(per curiam)(emphasis in original). Here, it is clear from the record that the district court judge did no more than impose a reasonable limit on the cross-examination based upon legitimate concerns of potential harassment of witnesses, confusion of issues, and relevance. Accordingly, we find that such reasonable limitation did not amount to an abuse of discretion. 10