Opinion ID: 2515831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Torts for Violations of Public Policy and Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Text: [¶ 18] Generally in Wyoming, in the context of private employment termination litigation, only contract remedies are available to provide relief for wrongful employment terminations, and tort remedies are rarely available. For an at-will employee, a breach of contract action is not available, and the only tort actions available to date are breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which was recognized in Wilder, 868 P.2d at 221; intentional infliction of emotional distress recognized in Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1065-66 (Wyo.1986); and, as recognized in Griess v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 776 P.2d 752, 754 (Wyo.1989), and Allen v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 699 P.2d 277, 284 (Wyo.1985), retaliatory termination which violates the State's public policy when no other remedy is available. Townsend v. Living Centers Rocky Mountain, Inc., 947 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Wyo.1997). [¶ 19] Hoff, a public employee, seeks trial on the torts of retaliatory termination and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Health Department, a governmental entity, seeks affirmance of summary judgment either on grounds of immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act or on the merits of the claims. In reply, Hoff asserts that immunity was not a bar to a remand for trial on this tort issue in Jewell v. North Big Horn Hosp. Dist., 953 P.2d 135, 139-40 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 20] Jewell reversed summary judgment in favor of the employer hospital district and permitted a hospital employee to proceed to trial to determine whether her employment contract was at-will and whether her employer was liable for the tort of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although Jewell's hospital employer was a governmental agency generally entitled to tort immunity unless specifically excepted under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, the parties did not raise the immunity issue on this particular claim, and this Court did not address it. Pickle v. Board of County Comm'rs of County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262, 264 (Wyo.1988) (immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is an affirmative defense and not jurisdictional, and must be raised by answer or it is waived.). Similarly, in Anderson v. South Lincoln Special Cemetery Dist., 972 P.2d 136 (Wyo.1999), and Dubrowski v. State ex rel. Wyoming Liquor Comm'n 1 P.3d 631 (Wyo.2000), we resolved the issue on the merits without addressing the issue of immunity. Although the Health Department did not assert immunity as an affirmative defense in either its answer to Hoff's complaint or its summary judgment motion, it apparently was raised at some point because the issue was addressed in the district court's decision letter. Pickle, 764 P.2d at 264 (finding no prejudice in raising the affirmative defense by summary judgment). We now address the immunity issue. [¶ 21] Hoff asserts that the district court erred on two fronts in granting summary judgment on his two tort claims. On the first front, he contends that the district court erred in its conclusion of law that sovereign immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act bars the claims. On the second front, he contends the district court erred when it ruled that, even if immunity does not bar the claims, no genuine issues of material fact exist about the factual basis for his termination. If we affirm the district court on the first front, we need not address the second. [¶ 22] We have carefully considered the district court's straightforward analysis of and the parties' thoughtful presentations on the sovereign immunity question. For the reasons that follow, we hold that Hoff's tort claims are barred by the pertinent provisions of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-101 through 121 (LexisNexis 2001). We note first that which Hoff does not contend. He does not contend that the Health Department is not a governmental entity covered by the Act; a provision of the Act expressly waives immunity for the subject torts; or the Act is infirm. Instead, he asks this Court to create judicially an exception to the legislature's declaration that [a] governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112.... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) (LexisNexis 2001) (emphasis added). [¶ 23] Hoff relies on Leonard v. Converse County School Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119 (Wyo.1990), but that case is of no help. As we understand that case, Leonard performed counseling duties as an initial contract teacher, as that position is defined by state law. When the school board did not offer her a contract as a continuing contract teacher, as that position is defined by state law, she filed an action against the school district, a governmental entity, in which she sought reinstatement, money damages, and attorney's fees based upon several different legal theories, including the tort theories of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and violation of public policy. On appeal from a summary judgment against her on all legal theories, she asked this Court to adopt and apply the two tort theories to her situation. In that regard, she maintained that the school district's decision not to offer her a contract as a continuing contract teacher was based upon her devoting substantial amounts of time reporting suspected child abuse and neglect incidents and cooperating with law enforcement authorities and child protection agencies in such matters. Id. at 1123. This Court rejected Leonard's invitation to adopt and apply these two tort theories in the initial contract teacher context. Id. at 1122. This Court reasoned: The adoption of these theories would alter the tenure status of initial contract teachers defined in Wyo. Stat. § 21-7-109 (1977).... The power to modify that status belongs to the legislature. Id. [¶ 24] Leonard had also sought relief under federal law, namely, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), alleging that her termination was based upon the constitutionally impermissible grounds of her marital status, her residency, her personal life, and her reporting of incest cases to government agencies. Id. at 1123. This Court upheld summary judgment on the § 1983 theory because Leonard's summary judgment materials were merely speculative and conclusory. Id. [¶ 25] Neither Leonard nor the school district raised governmental immunity, and this Court did not discuss it. More importantly, nothing this Court said in Leonard suggests, let alone stands for the proposition, that a governmental entity's termination of a public employee in breach of the implied good faith covenant or public policy implicates that employee's constitutional rights. Hoff's contention to the contrary is not well-founded. [¶ 26] Hoff also seeks support for his position in VanLente v. University of Wyoming Research Corp., 975 P.2d 594 (Wyo.1999), but it, too, is of no help. Although the employer's name suggests otherwise, VanLente's employer was a private, not governmental, entity; and VanLente was a private employee. An at-will employee, VanLente was terminated from his employment when his employer implemented a reduction-in-force because of budgetary constraints. Id. at 596. After VanLente's efforts at recourse failed before a federal agency and a federal court, he sought relief in state court, asserting both tort and contract claims for breach of the implied good faith covenant. Id. at 596-97. The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and this Court affirmed. Id. at 598-99. Importantly for our purposes here, VanLente specifically disavowed a public policy tort claim. Id. at 597. Obviously, VanLente is inapposite. [¶ 27] The Claims Act creates statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) (LexisNexis 2001) provides: (a) A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 and limited by W.S. 1-39-121 Under the Act, the Health Department is a governmental entity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103 (LexisNexis 2001). Accordingly, sovereign immunity bars recovery unless the tort is one of those enumerated exceptions in the Act or the board members acted outside the scope of their duties. Veile v. Board of County Comm'rs of Washakie County, 860 P.2d 1174, 1177 (Wyo.1993). A tort claim not specifically authorized under the Act is barred. Id. (citing Worden v. Village Homes, 821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo.1991)). The enumerated exceptions to sovereign immunity permit actions premised on negligent operation of certain governmental vehicles, § 1-39-105; negligent operation or maintenance of certain governmental facilities, § 1-39-106; negligent operation of airports, § 1-39-107; negligent operation of public utilities and services, § 1-39-108; negligent operation of public hospitals, § 1-39-109; negligent performance of health care providers employed by governmental entities, § 1-39-110; and tortious acts of peace officers, § 1-39-112. [¶ 28] The torts of retaliatory termination in violation of public policy and breach of the implied good faith covenant are not specifically enumerated in the Act. Insofar as Hoff has alleged that the Health Department terminated his employment in violation of public policy, it is arguable whether he has alleged that the Board members were acting beyond the scope of their duties; however, he does not argue the point. Because he has limited his argument to whether torts arising from a public employment relationship are barred under the Act, we too limit our review to that point. [¶ 29] Of relevance is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-119 (LexisNexis 2001), which states: The provisions of this act shall not affect any provision of law, regulation or agreement governing employer-employee relationships. We have previously interpreted this language and held that it does not serve to except claims which have their genesis in tort even though they arise out of an employment relationship. Instead this section indicates that the provisions of the statute are supplementary to others that may be provided by law, regulation or other agreement relating to employer-employee relationships. If the tort action is brought, and it does arise out of the employment relationship, we conclude that the claims procedure of this statute must be followed. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Wyoming v. Bell, 662 P.2d 410, 414-15 (Wyo.1983). We extended Bell's holding to contract claims in Allen v. Lucero, 925 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo.1996). [¶ 30] Hoff contends that certain language in § 1-39-104(a), following the declaration of immunity from liability for any tort except those expressly enumerated in sections 105 through 112, is sufficiently broad that it can be interpreted to waive immunity for purposes of the implied covenant tort arising from an employment relationship to which a governmental entity is a party. In pertinent part that statutory language reads [a]ny immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract.... Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) (LexisNexis 2001). Conceding that the implied covenant action is treated as a tort action in Wyoming, Hoff observes it is based on an employment contract. Wilder, 868 P.2d at 220-21. The Health Department counters that Hoff provides no support for his conclusion that this statutory language does not bar the implied covenant tort action. Inexplicably, neither party invokes this Court's well-known and frequently applied rules of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Jones v. State of Wyoming Dep't of Health, 2001 WY 28, ¶¶ 12-15, 18 P.3d 1189, ¶¶ 12-15 (Wyo.2001). Be that as it may, this Court is not persuaded by Hoff's abbreviated and perfunctory argument. For one thing, the subject language relied on by Hoff was added in 1980. 1980 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 46, § 1. At that time, this Court had not recognized the implied covenant tort; indeed, it did not until 1994 in Wilder, 868 P.2d at 220. This Court presumes that the legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts. Such legislation should, therefore, be construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing law. Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wyo.1984). Because the implied covenant tort did not exist in Wyoming in 1980, and the legislature is presumed to have known that, we can only conclude that when the legislature added the subject language in 1980, it did not have in mind the implied covenant tort as an action based on a contract. For another thing, the legislature has used plain language in subsection 104(a) to deal with tort actions in the first sentence and contract actions in the next. Those are commonly understood terms, each having distinct elements and remedies. Although the employment relationship is based on contract and provides the setting within which the parties interact with each other, it is that interaction which truly forms the basis of the tort claim on which the employee seeks a remedy. It is more accurate to say that the tort claim arises from the employment contract setting, but it is based on alleged tortious conduct, not on the contract. [¶ 31] We also note one more consideration. At the time the legislature enacted the Act in 1979, neither of the subject torts had been recognized in the private employment relationship context. Allen in 1985 and Griess in 1989 recognized the public policy tort in limited circumstances. Wilder in 1994 recognized the implied covenant tort if certain requirements were satisfied. The legislature has not moved to add these torts to the list of statutorily enumerated exceptions to immunity. It is not as if the legislature is unaware of these kinds of employment-related tort claims. Although neither the district court nor the parties directed our attention to it, from our own research we know that the legislature has enacted the State Government Fraud Reduction Act, effective July 1, 1996, but not after July 1, 2002. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-11-101 through 104 (LexisNexis 2001). This Act expressly authorizes a state employee, as defined in the Act, to bring a civil action and pursue a limited recovery if he or she has been discharged, disciplined, or retaliated against by a state employer, as defined in the Act, because of (1) reporting fraud, waste, or gross management in a state government office; (2) reporting a violation of a state or federal law, regulation, code, or rule; (3) reporting a condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of any individual; (4) participating in any investigation, hearing, or inquiry concerning an issue under this Act; (5) refusing to carry out a directive beyond the terms and scope of his or her employment which would expose any individual to a condition likely to cause serious injury or death, after being unsuccessful in obtaining the employer's correction of the dangerous condition. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-11-101 through 104 (LexisNexis 2001). Given the statutory definitions of employee, State, and political subdivision contained in the Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-11-102(a)(i), (ii), and (iii), this Act does not apply to Hoff and the Health Department. But the important point is, the legislature could have made it applicable to them, but chose not to. [¶ 32] Because these issues relate directly to matters concerning governmental liability and governmental employees as to which the legislature has been particularly active, we must leave the debate about and resolution of the difficult policy issues to the democratic process which is the domain of the people and their representatives in the legislative department. [2] The contract exclusion language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-104(a) is inapplicable as it applies only to a governmental entity's contractual agreement to pay and not to a tort action. Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-119 does not enumerate these two subject torts and cannot serve as an exception to immunity. The legislature has clearly stated in plain language in the Act the public policy that a covered governmental entity is liable for only those torts expressly recognized in that Act. Any invitation to add a particular tort to the statutory list must be addressed to that body. [¶ 33] The district court's summary judgment order is affirmed.