Opinion ID: 2460291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: B. 6, section 18 is contrary to Article 4, Section 21 because a general law could apply to address the State's budget shortfall

Text: Even if this court were to credit the State's argument that A.B. 6, section 18 involves only fees, not a tax, taking it outside Article 4, Section 20, the measure still fails because it violates Article 4, Section 21, which mandates general laws in all cases where they can be made applicable. While A.B. 6, section 18 declares that a general law could not apply because of special circumstances, and the Legislature's decision on whether a general law can be made applicable in a given case is presumed correct, Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871), a law's compliance with Article 4, Section 21 nevertheless is subject to judicial review. City of Reno v. County of Washoe, 94 Nev. 327, 332-33, 580 P.2d 460, 463-64 (1978); State of Nevada v. Irwin, 5 Nev. Ill, 120 (1869) (noting that the power of determining whether a given law is repugnant to the principles of a constitution with which it is alleged to conflict, belongs to the judiciary, and the court in that regard is conclusive); Heckler v. Conter, 206 Ind. 376, 187 N.E. 878, 879 (1933) (rejecting earlier authority that allowed the legislature complete discretion in determining whether a general law could have applied, reasoning that if the Legislature may arbitrarily decide that a general law cannot be made applicable, and its decision is final and cannot be questioned, it is not restrained or restricted in any sense, and the constitutional provision [proscribing local or special laws in cases where a general law could have applied] is, if not a nullity, at least a mere admonition). When determining whether a local or special law is permissible because a general law could not be made applicable for purposes of Nevada Constitution Article 4, Section 21, we look to whether the challenged law best subserve[s] the interests of the people of the state, or such class or portion as the particular legislation is intended to affect. Irwin, 5 Nev. at 122. In upholding local or special legislation in the past, this court has focused on whether the general legislation existing was insufficient to meet the peculiar needs of a particular situation, or whether a particular emergency situation existed, requiring more speedy action and relief than could be had by proceeding under the existing general law. Cauble v. Beemer, 64 Nev. 77, 96, 177 P.2d 677, 686 (1947). With those precepts in mind, local or special laws have been upheld in situations where an emergency situation existed within a certain county or locality and a general law could not apply to address the situation because only that county or locality was affected. Id. (upholding local law that removed the Lyon County seat from Dayton to Yerington after the Lyon County courthouse burned down); see also Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, 115 P. 177 (1911) (upholding local law that authorized Washoe County to issue bonds to fund rebuilding a Washoe general hospital and to levy taxes to pay for the bonds, based on the unsanitary and inadequate conditions of the existing hospital); Conservation District v. Beemer, 56 Nev. 104, 45 P.2d 779 (1935) (upholding law that authorized Washoe County to issue bonds to help fund the construction of reservoirs to store and regulate Truckee River floodwaters). In all of those cases, the challenged local or special laws addressed immediate concerns within a locality and directly burdened and benefited those who were subject to the laws. This court has also upheld local or special laws on the basis that the general legislation existing was insufficient to meet the peculiar needs of a particular local or special situation and a general law could not be made applicable. See State ex rel. List v. County of Douglas, 90 Nev. 272, 278, 524 P.2d 1271, 1275 (1974) (upholding legislation that created the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency and allowed it to regulate activity in order to preserve a common natural resource); Dotta v. Hesson, 38 Nev. 1, 143 P. 305 (1914) (upholding law that permitted the issuance of county bonds to construct a high school in a rural location of the county); State v. Lytton, 31 Nev. 67, 99 P. 855 (1909) (upholding law that permitted the issuance of county bonds to construct a county jail and courthouse); Hess v. Pegg, 7 Nev. 23 (1871) (upholding law that designated Reno as Washoe County's seat); State of Nevada v. Irwin, 5 Nev. Ill (1869) (upholding legislation that appointed a person to serve as county sheriff from the time when the county was created until the county's first election); see also Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, 566 P.2d 415 (1977) (concluding that a revitalization and redevelopment law that applied to only two cities was invalid under Article 4, Section 21 because a general law could have been made applicable to all cities, as deterioration of downtown areas and need for improvement was not unique to Reno and Sparks). Although we agree with the State that the statewide budget crisis presents exigent circumstances that must be addressed, those circumstances are of statewide concern and cannot be addressed through legislation that does not comport with Article 4, Section 21's local and special law proscription. Political differences that might make it difficult to agree on a generally applicable law to address the State's budget crisis do not create special circumstances that would permit a local or special law to address a concern that affects the entire state. The State's position in this appeal fails to recognize that the common thread in this court's jurisprudence from the beginning of Nevada's statehood is that permissible local or special laws address particular concerns that pertain only to the locality or to the part of the class affected by the laws, and not to statewide concerns. No Nevada case has upheld a challenged local or special law that addressed a statewide concern, and the State points to no other jurisdiction that has permitted such a law. Indeed, just shortly after the Nevada Constitution was forged, this court explained that in determining the validity of any local or special law, a general law should always be construed . . . to be applicable in all cases where the subject is one in which from its very nature the entire people of the State have an interest. Evans v. Job, 8 Nev. 322, 336 (1873). The Indiana Supreme Court's analysis of statutes under its constitutional proscriptions against local and special laws has been parallel to Nevada's in determining whether a general law could have applied. It has pointed out that when examining local or special legislation, the court looks at whether the legislation is reasonably related to `inherent characteristics' of the affected locale, and whether it applies wherever the justifying characteristics are found. Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683, 692 (Ind.2003). Stating the converse, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that if the conditions the law addresses are found in at least a variety of places throughout the state, a general law can be made applicable and is required by Article IV, and special legislation is not permitted. Id. at 692-93. A.B. 6, section 18 requires one political subdivision to turn over money collected in a local area to the State's general fund coffers for statewide benefit. It affects the people of the entire state of Nevada, and the State's budget crisis is, by its very nature, a subject of interest to all people of the state. For that reason, it cannot be addressed by a local or special law that applies to burden only one entity of the state that operates in one locality of the state. The State offers special circumstances but does not indicate why a general law, uniformly applied to all political subdivisions or based on some other qualifying criteria was not used to address the budget shortfall. From early in this court's jurisprudence, such laws have been rejected. In 1903, this court held unconstitutional a statute that, among other things, required money collected from Reno city licenses to be allocated in portions to the state, Washoe County, and the city. State v. Boyd, 27 Nev. 249, 74 P. 654 (1903). In concluding that the statute was invalid, the court stated: The purpose of an exaction from the public in the form of a tax or license, either for revenue or in the exercise of the police power, is for the benefit of the locality from which the money is collected. Any exaction laid upon a district or community in which it has no interest, or imposed for the benefit of others, to which it is not justly bound to contribute, is invalid. Id. at 255, 74 P. at 654. The court explained that it is not only just, but it is essential that a state purpose must be accomplished by state taxation. Id. at 256, 74 P. at 654. It further explained that the city cannot be compelled to pay in order to relieve others in the county and the state of a public burden properly resting upon them. Id. In holding unconstitutional the statute's requirement that the city turn over portions of city licensing fees to the county and state, the court explained that it was beyond the Legislature's taxing power to `compel one town, city, or locality to contribute to the payment of the debts of another.' Id. at 257, 74 P. at 655 (quoting Matter of Lands in the Town of Flatbush, 60 N.Y. 398 (1875)). The State argues that Boyd is inapposite because it involved a tax statute and the application of a well-established rule limiting the use of money derived through local taxation, and it argues that money obtained through local government utilities is not subject to such limitations. Boyd, without limiting its decision to taxes, states that [a]ny exaction laid upon a district or community. . . imposed for the benefit of others, to which it is not justly bound to contribute, is invalid. 27 Nev. at 255, 74 P. at 654; see Goodwin v. City of Sparks, 93 Nev. 400, 566 P.2d 415 (1977) (rejecting local law where a general law could have been made applicable); County of Clark v. City of Las Vegas, 92 Nev. 323, 550 P.2d 779 (1976) (rejecting a local and special law that applied only to certain areas in and around Las Vegas, concluding that a general law could be made applicable throughout the state). Other courts with local and special law proscriptions have likewise rejected laws that burden only one class or locality because a general law could address the situation. See, e.g., Municipal City of South Bend v. Kimsey, 781 N.E.2d 683 (Ind.2003) (determining that an annexation statute that applied to only one county based on the statute's population criteria was invalid, despite the legislature's declaration that an emergency existed, because no facts existed to explain why the special legislation should apply only to one county); Carson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 162 Kan. 455, 177 P.2d 212 (1947) (invalidating special street paving law that applied to only one city); Lee v. Com., 565 S.W.2d 634 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (invalidating special law prohibiting donations to the election campaigns of candidates for a Property Valuation Administrator office from persons whose property he or she may assess). Accordingly, since A.B. 6, section 18 is a local and special law that addresses a statewide concern to which a general law could have applied, it is not permissible under Article 4, Section 21. [10] We thus conclude that the district court erred by declaring it constitutional.