Opinion ID: 1854001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amendment of the trial information.

Text: Defendant initially contends he is entitled to a new trial because the hearing and ruling on the State's motion to reinstate the language in the trial information was held during his trial and in his absence. See Iowa R.Crim.P. 23(2)(b)(1). We note that this assignment of error is predicated solely upon those provisions of our rules of criminal procedure pertaining to an accused's presence during criminal proceedings; defendant asserts no constitutional basis for this challenge. Rule 25 of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the personal presence of defendants in criminal proceedings. In part pertinent here the rule requires: In felony cases the defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. In other cases the defendant may appear by counsel. Iowa R.Crim.P. 25(1). Under defendant's theory of error, the dispositive question thus is whether the State's motion was made and decided at a stage of the trial. We do not accept defendant's contention that a stage of his trial was conducted in his absence. From the record, it appears that shortly after 9 a. m. of the day assigned for defendant's trial, the State's motion was presented to and ruled on by the district judge who had granted the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment and reinstated the plea of not guilty. The judge's action on the motion simply restored to the trial information that part of the original accusation deleted in connection with the earlier agreement relating to defendant's guilty plea. Defendant's trial was scheduled before a different district judge, and that proceeding commenced the same morning following disposition of the State's motion. Apparently defendant was present in the courtroom of the judge who presided at trial at the time the State's motion was being considered. In any event, defendant acknowledges that he was present throughout the impaneling of the jury, during the reading of the accusation from the information as finally amended by the State's motion, see Iowa R.Crim.P. 18(3)(a)(1), and at every subsequent stage of the trial. Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, we are satisfied that his trial did not begin without his presence. Moreover, the entertaining of the State's motion was not a stage of the trial within the meaning of rule 25(1); this event involved only a pretrial amendment of the pleadings. See Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(1) (defining pleadings in criminal proceedings). That is, the trial information was amended by leave of court pursuant to the State's motion. The motion dealt strictly with a legal issue, and no evidence was presented. In addition, defendant's counsel candidly conceded in argument that defendant's presence at the hearing on the State's motion would not have affected the court's ruling. Hence, it is apparent that no benefit would have inured to defendant had he been present, and it is equally clear no prejudice resulted from his absence. See State v. Dreessen, 305 N.W.2d 438,440 (Iowa 1981) (court's communication with jury in absence of defendant and his attorney did not prejudice defendant). Accordingly, this assignment of error, grounded solely upon rule 25(1), is without merit.