Opinion ID: 612140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diane Whited

Text: 39 Whited was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute the drug (21 U.S.C. § 846), as well as on three counts of possession of cocaine, or aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine, with the intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2). The latter convictions were the result of conduct which occurred in September, October, and November of 1988. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining the guilty verdicts returned against her. 40 At trial, Jerry Parks testified that defendant Robert Murr rented a house in the Martha Washington Heights subdivision in Knoxville, Tennessee, for Whited, who was his girlfriend. Murr and Parks would store a large portion of the cocaine they bought in Kentucky there. In September of 1988, they went to the house for such a purpose. According to Parks, he and Murr 41 went upstairs and took the cocaine into a bedroom, and [Murr] told Diane Whited to go into the other room and to get the stash. She was gone a few minutes. I heard her pull out an exit door in the hallway. She climbed up in the step, secured a green duffle bag, which had a padlock on it, and brought it into the bedroom. Mr. Murr had a key on his key ring. He opened up a lock on the duffle bag and pulled out two PVC pipes. We opened it up and put one of the kilos of cocaine in there. He told Ms. Whited to go into the kitchen or wherever she kept her bags and got baggies and roll of aluminum foil and brought back in the bedroom. Mr. Murr had a pair of scales there, digital scales, and we weighed the cocaine. We put [it] in one ounce bags, put green rubber bands around it, wrapped it up, put tinfoil around that, put it back in PVC pipes, secured the lids on it, put [it] back in the green duffle bag, locked that, put it back in the attic. 42 Parks recalled that it was Whited who took the cocaine and hid it in the attic. 43 Parks testified that he and Murr were probably over at the house with Whited 15, 20 times through the fall of 1988. When questioned in greater detail, he confirmed that in September, October, and November of 1988, they brought cocaine to the stash house, Diane Whited's stash house, where it was broken down in pretty much the same manner and later distributed. 44 In order for Parks to remove cocaine from the house to sell, he would have to call Murr and make arrangements to meet him to go out to the house in Martha Washington Heights.... Sometimes Ms. Whited would be at home, sometimes she wouldn't. Parks was not allowed to go there by himself. He and Murr would drive to the area. [Murr] would use his cellular phone. And if [Whited] was there, she would open the door; otherwise, Murr would use his keys to enter the house. This arrangement became unworkable after November of 1988 because Parks needed easier access to the cocaine supply, and it was at this point the drugs were buried in a pipe on property behind Automotive Enterprises. 45 Gene Doss, a long-time resident of the Martha Washington Heights subdivision, testified that Murr and Whited called themselves Don Stallings and Janet Stallings during the time they spent there. Doss described the basement windows of Whited's house as covered with some sort of material, as were the garage door, the entrance door, and a third door. There were fish-eye peepholes in the windows and the doors. He also remembered seeing a large safe being taken out of the residence. 46 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational jury could have concluded that Whited knew of, intended to join and participated in the conspiracy. Pearce, 912 F.2d at 161 (quoting United States v. Stanley, 765 F.2d 1224, 1237 (5th Cir.1985)). She consciously handled and concealed the cocaine stored at her residence, exercising dominion and control over the drugs. In fact, she was entrusted with their safekeeping for a number of months. Doss' testimony concerning Whited's alias and her home security measures further indicated that she was not merely associated with members of the drug distribution ring, but played an active role in the enterprise. Similarly, evidence was educed that she possessed at least a kilogram of cocaine on or about the dates set out in the counts upon which she was convicted. The intent to distribute could be inferred from such a large amount of drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Welebir, 498 F.2d 346 (4th Cir.1974). 47
48 Whited also argues that the district court should have granted defendants' motion for a mistrial following remarks made by Jerry Parks on cross-examination. 49 Parks was questioned by Robert Murr's counsel regarding the $35,000 to $40,000 he estimated he was paid by the government to compensate him for his services and his expenses. In explaining what the money was used for, and why he was uncertain whether his estimate was correct, he told the jury that 50 [a] lot of this money, and I don't know whether it is listed here or not, is for my protection. I have been threatened by these witnesses. I have been threatened by the defendants and their wives. I have been threatened by several people. I actually recorded ... [r]ecorded threats, who has a contract on me. I had to move. I had to get more money from the FBI. I don't know whether this represents all of it or not. I am telling you I spent a lot of their money. This is what they say I spent. I don't know whether this is extra money, whether this represents every single nickel I got from the FBI. I spent a lot of money. 51 After Parks finished his statement, Murr's counsel did not raise an objection but continued his line of questioning. 52 At the close of the day's proceedings, defendant Mary Lawson's attorney moved for a mistrial on the basis of Parks' remarks concerning the threats he allegedly received from defendants and their spouses. The other defendants subsequently joined the motion. The district court replied: 53 Now, in regard to Mr. Parks' response, it was in response to the cross-examination of him being paid all this money. The inference being raised to the jury, well, you know, that's a lot of walking around money, 35, $40,000. That's outrageous. Why would the Government be paying you all kinds of money like that for services and/or expenses? And I allowed him to defend himself. This was in response to cross-examination, direct response as to why it would take 35 or $40,000. And that's what he has to say. That's what he had to say. It may not be true. The jury may not believe it. 54 But, Mr. Hicks, the books are full of cases where threats have been made, glaring, intimidating looks have been made in order to--and witnesses have been murdered, witnesses have been murdered. And that is--if that happens, it is competent, it is relevant, and the circuits have upheld that kind of testimony for as long as I can remember. 55 So your motion for mistrial is overruled. 56 Lawson's counsel went on to express surprise that the district court would allow bald assertion[s] of threats and intimidation into evidence. The court, however, opined that it allowed the testimony to come in for what it's worth.... It goes to the weight of the testimony and not its admissibility. When Lawson's counsel persisted in claiming that Parks' statements were unfounded, the court asked: You want me to have Mr. Parks go into it again tomorrow morning in more detail to see if there is a factual basis in front of this jury? Lawson's counsel answered in the negative; instead, he wanted the jury admonished that Parks' bald assertion that these defendants tried to kill him is not to be used as far as Mary Lawson is considered. The court refused, and also refused similar requests by the other defendants. 57 A defendant may move for a mistrial where there is a legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error, such that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial. United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 220 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1590, 113 L.Ed.2d 654 (1991). The denial of a mistrial is generally within the discretion of the trial court, and our review of the court's ruling is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. 58 Here, the government did not elicit the allegedly prejudicial statements and did not repeat them. See, e.g., United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1413 (D.C.Cir.1988). Significantly, defendants did not make a contemporaneous objection to the remarks on grounds of prejudice, or on any other grounds. As the district court pointed out, the remarks might not have been prejudicial at all. They were surely not what defendants wanted to hear, but they were offered as a legitimate response to a question concerning substantial payments to Parks by the government. The existence of these payments might well have damaged his credibility, if not justified to the jury's satisfaction. Parks' claim of threats was not wholly implausible on its face; such incidents have been known to occur. Defendants had an opportunity to challenge the veracity of the claim; they deliberately chose not to take up the cudgel. While certain statements are so prejudicial that the defense should not be required to rebut them, and the jury should not be left to weigh their value, we are convinced that the instant case did not involve such a situation. 59 We also note that, in the case at bar, the remarks at issue constitute[d] but a small portion of the total testimony at trial. United States v. Bowers, 739 F.2d 1050, 1055 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 861, 105 S.Ct. 195, 83 L.Ed.2d 128 (1984). They were made well before the start of the jury's deliberations, deliberations which produced not guilty verdicts on several of the counts charged in the indictment. For all of these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' mistrial motion.
60 A motion was made by Robert Murr to sever defendant Kenneth Lawson prior to trial, when it appeared that Lawson would not be present for the proceedings. This motion was denied by the district court, and Whited contends that this was in error. 61 A district court's denial for severance is reversible only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 552 (6th Cir.1982). Once defendants have been properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b), a 'strong showing of prejudice' is required to justify severance. United States v. Hessling, 845 F.2d 617, 619 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Reed, 647 F.2d 678, 689 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837, 102 S.Ct. 142, 70 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981)). The jury must be unable to decide fairly and separately the guilt or innocence of each defendant. Moore, 917 F.2d at 220. 62 Whited argues that defendants were harmed because the jury might have inferred that Lawson did not show up for trial because he was guilty, and then concluded that his co-defendants must also be culpable. In addition, Whited asserts that they were prejudiced when the jury was exposed to extensive testimony concerning Lawson's activities, while no one was there to challenge this testimony. 63 As a general rule, persons jointly indicted should be tried together. United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 446 (6th Cir.1984). This is because there is almost always common evidence against the joined defendants that allows for the economy of a single trial. In the instant case, a large portion of the evidence presented, including that related to Lawson, was applicable to each defendant to show the scope of the charged conspiracy. While Lawson was not there to challenge his alleged participation at trial, his co-defendants had the opportunity to convince the jury that they were not associated with him. Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, spillover of evidence from one case to another does not require severance. Moore, 917 F.2d at 221 (relying upon United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1526 (6th Cir.1985)). Defendants have not made such a showing here. 64 The fact that a defendant sought to escape prosecution is usually relevant in establishing culpability, so we understand Whited's anxiety about transferred guilt due to Lawson's flight. However, the district court neutralized any adversity Lawson may have caused his co-defendants by his actions. It gave a cautionary instruction that each defendant's case was to be considered separately and, further, that Lawson's flight could not be used as evidence against anyone but him. The jury appears to have heeded the court's admonition, as defendant William Baird, allegedly a close companion of Lawson's, was acquitted of conspiracy. Other defendants were acquitted on some of the distribution counts brought against them. Thus, the jury was plainly able to view them as distinct individuals in rendering its verdicts. As this was so, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever Lawson. 65
66 Whited next contends that the government elicited, or sought to elicit, a variety of evidence that was prejudicial to defendants, thereby warranting reversal. 67 Specifically, she asserts that the government repeatedly sought to admit testimony related to meetings in Tennessee and Virginia where cocaine allegedly was obtained from Kenneth Lawson and Victor Rojas. As this evidence was never presented to the jury, defendants suffered no harm. 68 Whited also takes issue with the government being permitted to present testimony that cocaine was acquired by Jerry Parks from Robert Murr while Parks was living at a halfway house in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The district court, however, allowed such evidence to establish the beginning of Parks' dealings with Murr. In our view, this was proper. 69 Additionally, Whited argues that the defense was left helpless ... to rebut the inflammatory nature of Jerry Parks' testimony regarding threats allegedly made to him by defendants and their spouses. She seems to claim that the government should have either substantiated the allegations or sought to counteract their effect. We have already determined that reversal is not required as a result of Parks' statements. 70 Whited also complains that she and her co-defendants were harmed by the government's questioning of witness Ernie Nicely regarding loans allegedly extended to Robert Murr and his ex-wife, Judy, and promissory notes memorializing those loans. The district court struck Nicely's testimony on the basis of a pretrial ruling excluding such evidence. The trial judge cautioned the jury to disregard the testimony, and we believe that he cured any harm to defendants in doing so. 71 Finally, Whited contends that defendants were prejudiced both by statements from Nicely that Robert Murr was arrested on the same day he was seen with co-defendant Kenneth Lawson, and from witness Donald Bennett that Murr was incarcerated. However, the district court instructed the jury to disregard these remarks, which abated any prejudice. 72
73 Whited claims that witnesses Jerry Parks and Tommy McKeehan were incompetent to give testimony on grounds of mental incapacity. In the case of Parks, he had previously been found incompetent to stand trial, had a history of auditory delusions, and had spent time in mental health facilities. As for McKeehan, Whited cites an affidavit filed with the district court by his treating psychiatrist that he could not assist his counsel in an upcoming trial because he suffered from confusion, agitation, paranoia and hallucinations. This affidavit was dated four days prior to McKeehan having entered into a plea agreement with the government. Because of such information, Whited contends that, at the very least, it was error for the court not to conduct a preliminary examination of Parks' and McKeehan's competency as witnesses. 74 Under Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (General Rule of Competency), [e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 601 explain that [t]his general ground-clearing eliminates all grounds of incompetency not specifically recognized in the rules of this Article. Accordingly, [n]o mental or moral qualifications for testifying as a witness are specified. Id. This is because [s]tandards of mental capacity have proved elusive in actual application. Id. 75 Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence strongly disfavor barring witnesses on competency grounds due to mental incapacity. As we wrote in United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 841, 110 S.Ct. 127, 107 L.Ed.2d 88 (1989): 76 What must be remembered, and is often confused, is that competency is a matter of status not ability. Thus, the only two groups of persons specifically rendered incompetent as witnesses by the Federal Rules of Evidence are judges (Rule 605) and jurors (Rule 606). The authority of the court to control the admissibility of the testimony of persons so impaired in some manner that they cannot give meaningful testimony is to be found outside of Rule 601. For example, the judge always has the authority under Rule 403 to balance the probative value of testimony against its prejudicial effect. Similarly, under Rule 603, the inability of a witness to take or comprehend an oath or affirmation will allow the judge to exclude that person's testimony. An argument can also be constructed that a person might be impaired to the point that he would not be able to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 602. Again though, it is important to remember that such decisions by a trial judge to either admit or exclude testimony will only be reversed for a clear abuse of discretion. 77 (Footnote omitted.) 78 The district court did not rule on Parks' competency before he took the stand; later, in considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court indicated that Parks and McKeehan were not crazy witnesses. Likewise, it addressed the question of McKeehan's mental capacity during a bench conference held after he had begun to testify. The court stated that it had observed Mr. McKeehan, and he appears to the Court to be sober, cogent. He appears to the Court to know exactly where he is and what he is doing. His testimony has been direct, and his testimony has not been confused. When pressed concerning the psychiatrist's affidavit that McKeehan could not help in his own defense, the court opined that he sure has made a remarkable recovery ... [His condition is] fodder for cross-examination, and it would appear that either the psychiatrist made an inaccurate diagnosis September the 5th or the witness has made a remarkable recovery. And the Court observes that--repeats that he does not appear to be confused today. 79 At a hearing on defendants' post-trial motions, the district court supplemented its findings regarding Parks' and McKeehan's competency, and the need for a special examination of their mental faculties. The court noted that 80 one of the reasons I overlooked stating as to my belief that an independent evaluation at this time would be a waste of time is that--is that such a finding, even if they found that they were incompetent here in April of 1992, would not be dispositive as to their competence or mental state when they testified in September of 1991 at the trial of this case or at the hearings that we held in August. 81 .... 82 Similarly, even if I had such an opinion from a psychiatrist or psychologist or whoever that gave us an independent opinion that these people were--Mr. Parks and McKeehan were total screwballs, I would--I would find those opinions to have little probative value and of little weight, and I would not--I would not accept them as being--as being conclusive on the matter. And I would not let such opinions override my own judgment after having seen--personally witnessed their performance in court. 83 Hence, the district court did not find that Parks and McKeehan were incapable of understanding their oath and obligation to testify truthfully. Nor did the court find, based on its observations, that their mental abilities were so limited that they did not have sufficient capacity to perceive events, to remember them, and to describe them for the benefit of the trier of fact. See Fed.R.Evid. 602. The court was not required, as Whited would have it, to conduct a special examination into their competency. If either Parks' or McKeehan's behavior raised concerns stemming from Rule 602 or 603, it could have excluded their testimony (or portions thereof) without any examination whatsoever. Furthermore, the court had the additional authority, pursuant to Rule 403, to exclude their testimony in light of their past or present mental state. The court chose not to take any of these measures in the circumstances. Instead, it permitted defense counsel to use the psychiatric records of Parks and McKeehan, as well as other indicia of their mental capacity, to vigorously attack their credibility. 84 After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. As long as a witness appreciates his duty to tell the truth, and is minimally capable of observing, recalling, and communicating events, his testimony should come in for whatever it is worth. It is then up to the opposing party to dispute the witness' powers of apprehension, which well may be impaired by mental illness or other factors. As we are persuaded that Parks and McKeehan were at least minimally capable of offering reliable evidence, the possible weaknesses in their testimony went to its credibility, and so were to be assessed by the jury. See United States v. Moreno, 899 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.1990). 85 Whited also argues that defendants should have been allowed to introduce the psychiatric records of Parks and McKeehan as substantive evidence. They were ruled inadmissible hearsay by the district court. Whited alleges, however, that they were not put forward for the truth of the matters asserted within, but to show how manipulative Parks and McKeehan could be if they were not, in fact, mentally unbalanced. Such use of the records during cross-examination to challenge Parks' and McKeehan's credibility was appropriate. However, we believe that they would have constituted hearsay if employed as part of a substantive defense. They would have to have been offered to show that the psychiatrists making the records actually concluded that Parks and McKeehan were mentally ill. Otherwise, Parks' and McKeehan's deception would have no basis in fact. Consequently, the district court did not err in declining to admit the psychiatric records. 86
87 Finally, Whited asserts that the district court improperly limited defendants' cross-examination of a government witness, Special Agent Clyde Merryman of the FBI. Defense counsel sought to question Merryman about an internal disciplinary investigation that had been resolved in his favor. After a sealed hearing outside the presence of the jury, at which the court placed Merryman under oath and interrogated him about the alleged misconduct, it determined that defendants would be restricted from inquiring into the investigation on cross-examination. Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing and the sealed materials contained in the record, we conclude that the district court did not commit an abuse of its discretion in this regard. 88 Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness--Specific instances of conduct) provides in part that 89 Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility ... may ... in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness[.] 90 The first step in a 608(b) analysis is whether the specific conduct is probative of the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. United States v. Hill, 550 F.Supp. 983, 990 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff'd, 716 F.2d 893 (3rd Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1039, 104 S.Ct. 699, 79 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984). Here, Merryman was not disciplined following the investigation into his conduct, so it had little worth as a challenge to his credibility. Whatever probative value might have attached to the FBI's proceedings was substantially outweighed by prejudice to the government. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.