Opinion ID: 2632652
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: weinmuller's statements

Text: ¶ 18 Following trial, the Wests presented an affidavit from juror Stacie Bersie. Bersie testified that juror Weinmuller had stated that she had been the subject of several claims or suits against her for personal injuries, and also that Weinmuller had expressed very strong feelings and opinions against awarding general damages. Bersie also testified that Weinmuller had stated an intention to discuss the case with her husband and daughter and had attempted to discuss the case with fellow jurors during trial recesses. ¶ 19 Because Weinmuller had not disclosed her prior involvement in personal injury cases during voir dire, the trial court invited her in to question her about her past experiences with the judicial system and her alleged discussions with family members. Weinmuller denied having discussed the case with her family before its conclusion. The court then reminded Weinmuller of the voir dire question calling for her to disclose any past experiences with litigation and asked if her silence at that time reflected the truth. At that point, Weinmuller admitted that a salesperson who worked for a business she had run with her husband in California had sued their company. ¶ 20 The court then asked Weinmuller whether this experience had left her with any negative feelings about the courts or the judicial system. Weinmuller responded that she also had been subject to frivolous workers' compensation claims that cost her business money because contesting them in court was generally more expensive than paying them. When the court redirected Weinmuller to the salesman lawsuit and again asked if it had left her with negative feelings about the courts, she said, No. I just thought he was a disgruntled salesman and he was trying to make some easy money. We paid it and that was it. ¶ 21 The court then inquired about the workers' compensation claims, asking whether they had been handled in court or through some other process. The following exchange ensued: [Weinmuller]: Well, it never even got to court because the lawyers in California, they said it would cost more to go to court than to settle out of court. And so we settled out of court and we wound up paying everything. [Trial Court]: Did that leave you with a negative feeling toward the court system? [Weinmuller]: Well, it taught me a good lesson in life. It taught me about people. And it's really not a negative feeling, not a disgruntled feeling about people, just that I'm very leery of people. I can feel when a sham is being presented to me and I can discern. [Trial Court]: Now, the question I would have asked you at the time had you given these answers to me at the time would have been: Having had those experiences and those circumstances in California, can you or would you judge this case based on its own facts, and on the law and circumstances as presented in this case? ¶ 22 Weinmuller's answer revealed that she did not really understand the question. Rather, she seemed to believe that she was being asked whether her past experiences made her more or less qualified to serve as a juror. She responded: I would have qualified myself, definitely, because I've had that happen to me throughout the years. It's happened many times, you know, being an employer. ¶ 23 Having received an answer that was not only unresponsive, but that suggested Weinmuller considered her past experiences relevant in evaluating the Wests' case, the trial court tried again: [Trial Court]: I'm being very careful and circumspect because there are very careful rules of law protecting the discussions and deliberations that have already taken place. And it is not my intent at this point to inquire into what went on in the jury room except in certain areas. Did you consider this case on its own merits? Or did you consider what happened to you in California? [Weinmuller]: No. I looked at this man [Mr. West]. My feelings about him were this was a 16-year-old boy that got injured in the knee, and for 10 years he was bilking the Ralph's grocery company. He comes here and he has a fender bender. And he's accustomed to receiving easy money and he wants to do the same thing again. He had lawsuits here, in Idaho, and he was going back to California with one. And so I looked at him and I thought this is a young man that likes to bilk the system. ¶ 24 This last response, describing Weinmuller's conclusions about Mr. West, belies any suggestion that Weinmuller was capable of serving as a fairminded juror. It demonstrates a lack of understanding as to what it means to decide a case on its own merits and establishes that Weinmuller's judgment of the case was colored by her conclusions regarding matters that were not litigated before the jury, such as the validity of Mr. West's unrelated workers' compensation claims in California and his alleged claims in other jurisdictions. Weinmuller admitted that her evaluation of Mr. West's claim against Holley was driven by her conclusion that Mr. West had previously bilked the system to get easy money. Because the validity of Mr. West's prior workers' compensation claim was not at issue in this case, Weinmuller's assessment as to the validity of that claim could only have been the product of bias stemming from her own negative experiences with workers' compensation claims. ¶ 25 Taken together, Weinmuller's responses constitute more than sufficient evidence of bias to raise a presumption that Weinmuller could not fairly or impartially sit in judgment on the Wests' case. Moreover, there is nothing in any of Weinmuller's answers to suggest that she was capable of judging the case solely on the evidence presented at trial. Her answers gave the trial court no objective reason to believe that she could separate her strong feelings regarding workers' compensation claims from the Wests' claim in this case. ¶ 26 After acknowledging that Weinmuller's strong feelings regarding workers' compensation claims created a presumption of bias, the trial court denied the challenge for cause based only on Weinmuller's own opinion that she was capable of deciding the case on its merits. [3] As a matter of law, Weinmuller's own views of her impartiality were insufficient to overcome the presumption of bias. Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (The juror cannot be the judge of his qualifications; this function is the responsibility of the trial court.). Moreover, we can find nothing else in the record on which the trial court could have relied to overcome the presumption. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the Wests' post-trial motion to remove Weinmuller for cause.