Opinion ID: 202809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: description of federal law

Text: Federal regulation of maritime commerce has existed since the founding of the country. See Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 55. Federal regulation specifically geared toward the transport of dangerous cargoes started with the Tank Vessel Act of 1936, Pub.L. No. 74-765, 49 Stat. 1889. See K. Brooks, California Oil Spill Laws in the Wake of United States v. Locke, 12 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 227, 230 (1999-2000). Regulatory involvement increased after 1967, the year of a massive oil spill involving a supertanker off the coast of England. Indeed, Congress has since enacted more stringent legislation for oil tankers and more comprehensive remedies for oil spills. The PWSA is a key component of this congressional response. It has two titles, both or which are at issue here, which we describe in greater detail later. Title I authorizes the Coast Guard to issue regulations on subjects within that title, although it does not so mandate. 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a). Title II works differently; it requires the Coast Guard to issue federal regulations governing subjects covered by that title. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). Several states have enacted statutes and regulations designed to give still greater protection against oil spills. The Supreme Court's 1978 decision in Ray concerned such state laws. Ray held that certain provisions of a Washington statute (concerning tanker design, tanker size, and pilotage requirements for enrolled vessels [6] ) were preempted by federal law. 435 U.S. at 159-60, 168, 178, 98 S.Ct. 988. Ray did uphold Washington's limited tug escort requirement for Puget Sound against a preemption challenge. Id. at 173, 98 S.Ct. 988. Despite the protections of the PWSA, in 1989 the supertanker Exxon Valdez ran aground in Alaska, causing the largest oil spill in United States history. The key congressional response was the 1990 enactment of OPA. OPA has nine titles, including provisions imposing liability on parties responsible for damages and other costs stemming from oil spills. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702. Two savings clauses in OPA's Title I expressly preserve and recognize state authority to impose additional liability requirements and penalties. Id. § 2718(a)(1), (c). The scope of these savings clauses was at issue in Locke. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the United States argued that several provisions of the Washington Administrative Code were preempted; the federal government stressed the foreign relations [7] and international commerce aspects of the case. Locke, 529 U.S. at 102-03, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke governs this case. The distinctions that Locke drew are the subject of dispute among the parties here. Locke held that several provisions of Washington's regulations were preempted by federal law. Id. at 112-17, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The Locke Court held that PWSA's Title II preempted three state regulations (requiring training for tanker crews, mandating English language proficiency, and imposing a general statewide navigation-watch requirement). Id. at 112-14, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The Court also held that a fourth regulation (governing the reporting of marine casualties) was preempted by a different federal statute, 46 U.S.C. § 6101. Id. at 114-16, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke did not definitively rule on all of the regulations before it. Instead, the Court remanded the issue of whether certain regulations, such as the state's watch requirement in times of restricted visibility, were of limited extraterritorial effect and were necessary to address the peculiarities of Puget Soundfactors that would weigh in favor of a Title I conflict preemption analysis rather than a Title II field preemption analysis. Id. at 116-17, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The Court stated that the resolution of these matters would benefit from a full development of the record, noting that the United States did not enter the case until appeal. Id. For our purposes, Locke established a number of significant rules. Locke held that OPA's savings clauses preserved only state laws of a scope similar to the matters contained in Title I of OPA, id. at 105, 120 S.Ct. 1135, and did not constitute a reversal of Ray 's preemption rules as to Title I and Title II of the PWSA, id. at 105-07, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Rather, OPA only preserved state authority in the limited area of establishing liability rules and imposing financial requirements regarding oil spills. [8] Id. at 105, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke also rejected the use of general presumptions, either for or against preemption, and instead called for close analysis of the federal statutory structure. Locke expressly repudiated any notion, which might have survived Ray, that there is any presumption of non-preemption of state rules. Id. at 107-08, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke pointed out that the federal interest in national and international maritime commerce was one of the reasons cited in the Federalist Papers for adopting the Constitution, and the Court detailed the numerous federal statutes and treaties in the area. Id. at 99-103, 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135. At the same time, however, Locke did not put in place the opposite presumption, a presumption favoring preemption. Rather, the validity of state regulation must be judged against the federal statutory structure. Id. at 108, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Indeed, [n]o artificial presumption aids us in determining the scope of appropriate local regulation under the PWSA. Id.; see also P. Gudridge, Comment, United States v. Locke, 120 S.Ct. 1135, Am. J. Int'l L. 745, 748 (2000). Locke reinforced Ray 's two-category approach to preemption: either field preemption or conflict preemption is to be used. Locke, 529 U.S. at 109-11, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Locke also went further, recognizing that it would not always be clear which of the two models would apply. It added a new overlap analysis to resolve that question. See id. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Field preemption applies to state law on subjects which are within the province of Title II of the PWSA. Id. at 110-11, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Other sources of federal maritime regulation may also preempt state law, even if the state law is consistent with federal law. Id. at 114-16, 120 S.Ct. 1135. By contrast, Locke held that conflict preemption applies to state regulations within the scope of Title I. Title I of the PWSA does not expressly preserve state power (unlike OPA). But Title I also does not preempt with the same force as Title II. Rather, state law in areas within the province of Title I are subject to standard conflict preemption analysis, primarily the model which the Court has utilized in Commerce Clause cases. Id. at 109-10, 120 S.Ct. 1135; see also Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 773-74, 67 S.Ct. 1026, 91 L.Ed. 1234 (1947) (discussing federal preemption of state regulation in the Commerce Clause context). Locke 's conflict preemption analysis involves an initial inquiry into whether federal authority has been exercised through a regulation intended to displace state law, or by a federal decision of the Coast Guard that there should be no regulation of the subject in question. 529 U.S. at 109-10, 120 S.Ct. 1135. A conflict arises when compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress. Id. at 109, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-101, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this context, Coast Guard regulations are to be given pre-emptive effect over conflicting state laws. [9] Id. at 109-10, 120 S.Ct. 1135. Overlap analysis applies when a state law falls within the overlapping coverage of Title I and Title II. We describe that overlap analysis below.
The respective scopes of Title I and Title II play a crucial role in any preemption analysis under the PWSA. This necessitates a more detailed discussion of these provisions. Congress has, by statute, occupied the field with respect to subject matters addressed in Title II of the PWSA. [10] The subject matter of Title II, Vessels Carrying Certain Cargoes in Bulk, is generally defined at 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a): The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for the design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance, operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning of vessels to which this chapter applies, that may be necessary for increased protection against hazards to life and property, for navigation and vessel safety, and for enhanced protection of the marine environment. Congress has required the Coast Guard to issue regulations under Title II, which shall include requirements about . . . (3) equipment and appliances for . . . prevention and mitigation of damage to the marine environment; [and] (4) the manning of vessels and the duties, qualifications, and training of the officers and crew. 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a). By contrast, conflict preemption is applied to state statutes and regulations concerning subject matters within Title I of the PWSA. See Locke, 529 U.S. at 109, 120 S.Ct. 1135. The subject matter of Title I is defined by statute: Subject to the requirements of section 1224 of this title, the Secretary (1) in any port or place under the jurisdiction of the United States, in the navigable waters of the United States, or in any area covered by an international agreement negotiated pursuant to section 1230 of this title, may construct, operate, maintain, improve, or expand vessel traffic services, consisting of measures for controlling or supervising vessel traffic or for protecting navigation and the marine environment and may include, but need not be limited to one or more of the following: reporting and operating requirements, surveillance and communications systems, routing systems, and fairways. . . . 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a). As the United States has stated, the subject matter of Title I is characterized generally by matters of local concern, and, absent issuance of federal regulations or a decision not to allow state regulation under Title I, state regulation is not preempted in areas subject to that title. Title I and Title II overlap in some instances. For example, both titles cover, in different contexts, operating requirements. See id. § 1223(a)(1) (Secretary may impose measures including, inter alia, operating requirements); id. § 1223(a)(4)(D) (Secretary may restrict[] operation, in any hazardous area or under hazardous conditions, to vessels which have particular operating characteristics or capabilities which he considers necessary for safe operation under the circumstances); 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (requiring Secretary to prescribe regulations for the . . . operation . . . and manning of vessels to which this chapter applies); see also Locke, 529 U.S. at 116, 120 S.Ct. 1135 (remanding for consideration of whether a state navigation-watch requirement should be analyzed under Title I conflict preemption or Title II field preemption). Further, each title purports to have as one of its purposes the protection of the environment. See 33 U.S.C. § 1223(a)(1) (authorizing regulations on covered subjects for protecting navigation and the marine environment); 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (requiring regulations on covered subjects that may be necessary . . . for enhanced protection of the marine environment). As a result, Locke recognized that [t]he existence of some overlapping coverage between the two titles of the PWSA may make it difficult to determine whether a pre-emption question is controlled by conflict pre-emption principles, applicable generally to Title I, or by field pre-emption rules, applicable generally to Title II. 529 U.S. at 111, 120 S.Ct. 1135. In such instances of overlap, not every question will be resolved by the greater pre-emptive force of Title II. Id. Rather, conflict pre-emption under Title I will be applicable in some, although not all, cases. Id. at 111-12, 120 S.Ct. 1135. In resolving preemption questions in cases of overlapping coverage, Locke instructs courts to consider these factors [11] : (1) the type of regulations the Secretary has actually promulgated under [Title II]; (2) whether the regulation falls within the specific type listed in § 3703(a) as required to be promulgated; (3) whether the federal rule is justified by conditions unique to a particular port or waterway (e.g., a Title I regulation based on water depth in Puget Sound or other local peculiarities); (4) whether the state regulation is of limited extraterritorial effect, not requiring the tanker to modify its primary conduct outside the specific body of water purported to justify the local rule; and (5) whether the state regulation is one that pose[s] a minimal risk of innocent noncompliance, do[es] not affect vessel operations outside the jurisdiction, do[es] not require adjustment of systemic aspects of the vessel, and do[es] not impose a substantial burden on the vessel's operation within the local jurisdiction itself. Id. at 112, 120 S.Ct. 1135. In the same vein, Ray instructed federal courts addressing such maritime environmental cases to look to the respective purposes of the federal and state laws. 435 U.S. at 164-65, 98 S.Ct. 988. This purpose rule emerged from earlier Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases such as Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 80 S.Ct. 813, 4 L.Ed.2d 852 (1960), and Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 87, 82 L.Ed. 3 (1937). [12] Overlap analysis thus involves some identification of the relative purposes and domains of Title I and Title II. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (stressing the need to identify the domain of the statutory clause said to preempt state law). Ray appeared to consider Title II to be concerned with matters that are properly subject to national rules, see 435 U.S. at 165-66 & n. 15, 98 S.Ct. 988, while Title I is more concerned with rules arising from the peculiarities of local waters that call for special precautionary measures, [13] id. at 171, 98 S.Ct. 988. Against this background, we turn to the preemption analysis of the specific MOSPA sections.