Opinion ID: 1919200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's ethical obligations

Text: Petitioner warns that adopting a rule allowing sanctions against appellees will require the extreme, indeed unprofessional, act of `throwing in the towel' when there is any chance that an order may be reversed on appeal. This argument overlooks counsel's professional responsibilities as officers of the court. We do not hold that appellate counsel should concede error in all or even many cases. And whether counsel should concede error does not depend on the statistical chances for reversal. In (we hope) rare cases, however, the trial court, whether because of its own misconceptions or counsel's misrepresentations, may incorrectly assume the relevant facts or apply the wrong law. In such circumstances, appellate counsel has a duty to recognize and apprise the appellate court of that fact. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, allowing sanctions against appellees or their counsel for defending indefensible orders requires the quintessentially professional act of admitting defeat when there is no chance of victory, or when victory will have been obtained at the price of integrity and truth. While counsel does have an obligation to be faithful to [his] [client's] lawful objectives, that obligation cannot be used to justify unprofessional conduct by elevating the perceived duty to zealously represent over all other duties. Lingle v. Dion, 776 So.2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting Visoly v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So.2d 482, 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)). Section 57.105, as well as the Florida Bar rules of professional conduct and even the oath of admission to the Florida Bar, all warnif any warning were neededthat counsel must be governed by considerations other than mere zealous advocacy for the client. See § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2002) (allowing a court to sanction the losing party and the losing party's attorney if the court finds the losing party's attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense was not supported by the application of then-existing law); R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1) (A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal.); Oath of Admission, Fla. Bar J., Sept. 2004, at 2 (I will employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law.). Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar specifically prohibits an attorney from knowingly fail[ing] to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel. Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the rules already require counsel to concede error on appeal when appropriate. This is not a new concept. Appellees regularly concede error. Cases in which the State has conceded error on appeal are legion. [5] Confessions of error in civil cases also occur frequently. [6] The sheer number of such cases demonstrates that not only do the rules require counsel to concede error in appropriate cases; counsel can and do adhere to these rules in practice. Lawyers recognize every day when the defense of a trial court's order is untenable. The petitioner's protestations that such concessions would be throwing in the towel reflect an attitude that Chief Judge Schwartz has lamented: Too many members of the Bar practice with complete ignorance of or disdain for the basic principle that a lawyer's duty to his calling and to the administration of justice far outweighsand must outweigheven his obligation to his client, and, surely what we suspect really motivates many such inappropriate actions, his interest in his personal aggrandizement. Rapid Credit Corp., 566 So.2d at 812 n. 1 (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring). Finally, the district court's opinion aptly responds to the petitioner's proposition that conceding error on appeal is unprofessional: The heart of all legal ethics is in the lawyer's duty of candor to a tribunal. It is an exacting duty with an imposing burden. Unlike many provisions of the disciplinary rules, which rely on the court or an opposing lawyer for their invocation, the duty of candor depends on self-regulation; every lawyer must spontaneously disclose contrary authority to a tribunal. It is counter-intuitive, cutting against the lawyer's principal role as an advocate. It also operates most inconvenientlythat is, when victory seems within grasp. But it is precisely because of these things that the duty is so necessary. Although we have an adversary system of justice, it is one founded on the rule of law. Simply because our system is adversarial does not make it unconcerned with outcomes. Might does not make right, at least in the courtroom. We do not accept the notion that outcomes should depend on who is the most powerful, most eloquent, best dressed, most devious and most persistent with the last wordor, for that matter, who is able to misdirect a judge. American civil justice is so designed that established rules of law will be applied and enforced to insure that justice be rightly done. Such a system is surely defective, however, if it is acceptable for lawyers to suggest a trial judge into applying a rule or a discretion that they knowor should knowis contrary to existing law. Even if it hurts the strategy and tactics of a party's counsel, even if it prepares the way for an adverse ruling, even though the adversary has himself failed to cite the correct law, the lawyer is required to disclose law favoring his adversary when the court is obviously under an erroneous impression as to the law's requirements. Forum, 788 So.2d at 1062 (footnote omitted).