Opinion ID: 2567349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Asserted unconstitutionality of death penalty law

Text: Defendant contends that many features of this state's capital sentencing law, alone or in combination with each other, violate the federal Constitution. He acknowledges we have rejected these contentions in other cases. Thus, we have held the inclusion in the list of mitigating factors of such adjectives as extreme (see section 190.3, factor (d); CALJIC No. 8.85) does not act as a barrier to the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 796, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956), nor does it render such factors unconstitutionally vague, arbitrary, capricious or incapable of principled application ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 165, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166; People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th 764, 842, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481). California's death penalty law does not fail to perform the constitutionally required narrowing function by virtue of the number of special circumstances or the manner in which they have been construed. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568.) The law does not deprive defendant of meaningful appellate review and federal due process and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to require written or other specific findings by the jury on the aggravating factors it applies. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 641-642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) The death penalty law does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause by failing to require that all aggravating factors be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that aggravation must outweigh mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, and that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Indeed, the sentencing law is not unconstitutional, and does not violate Evidence Code section 520, in requiring no burden of proof as to penalty because the capital sentencing function is not susceptible to a burden of proof quantification. ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1136, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498.) We find no merit in defendant's alternative contention that CALJIC No. 8.84 was deficient because it did not expressly inform the jury that no party bore the burden of proof; taken as a whole, the instructions accurately advised the jury concerning the process of penalty determination, and more was not required. The jury's unanimous agreement on aggravating factors is not required. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) That the death penalty law permits consideration of unadjudicated criminal activity does not render it unconstitutional. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) The existence of prosecutorial discretion whether to seek the death penalty in a given case does not render the law unconstitutional. ( People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1078, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) California's death penalty law is not unconstitutional because the use of the death penalty as a regular form of punishment falls short of international norms of human decency. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 403-404, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244.) The terms aggravating and mitigating are commonly understood words that we have held need not be further defined for the jury ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 965, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 999 P.2d 666); it follows they are not unconstitutionally vague. The trial court was not required to instruct the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole means that a defendant will never be paroled. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 172, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) The trial court also was not required to instruct the jury on a `presumption of life.' ( People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 868, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required. ( People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 913, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305, 102 P.3d 228.) Nor does equal protection require that capital defendants be afforded the same sentence review afforded other felons under the determinate sentencing law. ( People v. Morrison, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568.) The death penalty does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, nor does the existence of procedural barriers to state or federal postconviction remedies violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 462, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968; People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1255, 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 784, 947 P.2d 1321.) The administration of the death penalty in this state is not unconstitutionally arbitrary. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Defendant offers no persuasive reason to depart from these precedents.