Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: do compacts constitute legislation?

Text: The first question presented on review requires that we consider whether the tribal-state compacts at issue constitute legislation. The Michigan Constitution requires that [a]ll legislation shall be by bill.... Const. 1963, art. 4, § 22. In addition, [n]o bill shall become a law without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to and serving in each house. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 26. Plaintiffs contend that the compacts constitute legislation and, therefore, the Legislature was required to approve them by bill-by a majority vote of the members elected to and serving in each house. Defendants contend that the compacts do not constitute legislation and instead are contracts of a unique nature that the state may validly enter into pursuant to federal law as provided in IGRA and, therefore, the compacts are not subject to Const. 1963, art. 4, §§ 22 and 26. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed) defines legislation as [t]he process of making or enacting a positive law in written form, according to some type of formal procedure, by a branch of government constituted to perform this process-Also termed lawmaking .... Michigan's Constitution provides that [t]he legislative power of the State of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives. Const. 1963, art. 4, § 1. Thus, the branch of government constituted to perform [the lawmaking] process is the Legislature, and the formal procedure by which this process is to occur is constitutionally defined  lawmaking is to be by bill and is subject to a majority vote of those elected to each house of the Legislature. Const. 1963, art. 4, §§ 22 and 26. Accordingly, the definition of legislation in Black's Law Dictionary requires that we consider whether the compacts amount to positive lawmaking. In Blank v. Dep't of Corrections, 462 Mich. 103, 611 N.W.2d 530 (2000), this Court considered whether a provision in the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201 et seq., that required administrative agencies to obtain the approval of a joint committee of the Legislature or the Legislature itself before enacting new administrative rules violated the enactment and presentment requirements of Michigan's Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 4, §§ 26 and 33. [37] In analyzing the question presented in Blank, we addressed whether the challenged action  a vote of the joint committee or the Legislature itself on an administrative rule  was legislative in nature, so that it was subject, under the enactment and presentment requirements of Michigan's Constitution, to a majority vote of the full Legislature and gubernatorial approval. [38] In resolving that question, we employed the analytical framework laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). As we noted in Blank, the United States Supreme Court in Chadha made four observations in determining that the action challenged in that case was inherently legislative and was subject to the enactment and presentment requirements of the United States Constitution: First, the action had the purpose and effect of altering... legal rights, duties and relations of persons ... outside the legislative branch. Second, the action supplanted legislative action. The only way the House could have obtained the same result would have been by enacting legislation. Third, the House's action involved determinations of policy. Fourth, the constitution explicitly authorizes only four instances where one house of Congress can act alone. It does not include the authority for one house to exercise a legislative veto over duly authorized actions of the executive branch. [ Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530, quoting Chadha, supra at 952-956, 103 S.Ct. 2764 (citations omitted).] Applying Chadha's framework in Blank, this Court held that the challenged action was legislative in nature and, therefore, it was subject to the enactment and presentment requirements of Michigan's Constitution. Because the Chadha/Blank framework provides necessary guidance in determining whether a challenged action constitutes legislation subject to the constitutional enactment requirements, I employ it in the context of this case. [39] Accordingly, in my judgment, we must consider: (1) whether the compacts at issue `had the purpose and effect of altering... legal rights, duties and relations of persons ... outside the legislative branch,' Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530; (2) whether the Governor's action in negotiating the compacts and the Legislature's resolution vote on the compacts supplanted legislative action; (3) whether the compacts involved determinations of policy; and (4) whether Michigan's Constitution explicitly authorizes the Legislature to approve these compacts by a resolution vote even if they otherwise constitute legislation.
The first factor, whether the compacts had the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch, i.e., whether they have a general effect upon the citizens of Michigan, addresses essentially the same question as does the definition of legislation in Black's Law Dictionary. That is, Black's primarily defines legislation as the making of positive law, and when an action has the purpose and effect of altering legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch, that action is typically an exercise in positive lawmaking. What is important to understand is that, in the absence of the challenged tribal-state compacts, gambling on the subject Indian land was unlawful. Gambling in the absence of a compact was unlawful pursuant to 18 USC 1166, which, as noted above, provides that, in the absence of a tribal-state compact, state laws regulating or prohibiting gambling  shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State,  albeit, at least for criminal laws, through federal enforcement. 18 USC 1166(a). Casino gambling in Michigan is generally unlawful. MCL 750.301. The only casino gambling that is authorized in Michigan is that gambling conducted in accordance with the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act (MGCRA), MCL 432.201 et seq. However, by its express terms, the MGCRA does not apply to gambling on Native American land. MCL 432.203(2)(d), (5). Thus, casino gambling on Indian land cannot be authorized and conducted pursuant to the MGCRA, which leads to the inescapable conclusion that casino gambling on Indian lands located in Michigan is, pursuant to § 1166, subject to Michigan's general prohibition against such gambling. [40] Accordingly, under § 1166, in the absence of a tribal-state compact, casino gambling on Indian land within Michigan's borders is unlawful, and that general unlawfulness is to be enforced by the federal government. [41] Moreover, gambling on the subject Indian lands absent the challenged compacts was unlawful pursuant to 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C). This is because, as noted, § 2710(d) provides that [c]lass III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such activities are ... conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.... Therefore, before these challenged compacts existed, gambling on the subject Indian lands was unlawful. Thus, it becomes clear that, before the challenged compacts existed, the tribes would have been engaging in an unlawful activity had they endeavored to operate their respective casinos. It necessarily follows that the compacts had the intended purpose, and the effect, of altering legal rights and relations of Michigan citizens generally. The compacts purport to allow Indian tribes to lawfully engage in activities that would otherwise be unlawful. Moreover, the compacts impose specific duties upon both the members of the tribes and upon non-Indian peoples and entities. By way of example, the compacts impose a duty on the tribes to administer and enforce on the casinos the regulatory requirements embodied in the compacts. Further, the compacts impose a duty on local units of government to create a local revenue sharing board to receive and distribute a percentage of casino profits that the tribes are required under the compacts to disburse. Alternately, if the local units of government do not create a local revenue sharing board, it may be said that the compacts impose a duty on local units of government to expend their own government funds to cover the inevitable costs for public services, police, etc., that they will incur as a result of having a casino in their area. Under either scenario, the compacts impose duties on local units of government. [42] Accordingly, it is clear that the compacts had the intended purpose and the effect of altering the legal duties generally of Michigan citizens. Further, the tribal-state compacts alter legal relationships because the compacts remove from the federal government the jurisdiction to enforce the applicable state gambling laws and regulations that apply, pursuant to § 1166, on Indian land in the absence of a tribal-state compact and place that jurisdiction in the hands of the tribes themselves. This change in jurisdiction affects Michigan citizens generally because citizens engaging in gambling in tribal casinos were formerly subject to federal jurisdiction, but are now subject to tribal jurisdiction. Additionally, the compacts alter the legal relationships of Michigan citizens generally because they may allow anyone over the age of eighteen to gamble in tribal casinos, whereas the legal gambling age that applies to Michigan casinos subject to the MCGRA is twenty-one. Thus, the first factor of the Chadha/Blank framework leads to the conclusion that the compacts constitute legislation. That is, the compacts had the [intended] purpose and effect of altering ... legal rights, duties and relations of persons... outside the legislative branch. Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530.
The second Chadha/Blank factor requires that we consider whether the Governor's action in negotiating the compacts and the Legislature's resolution vote on the compacts supplanted legislative action. In Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530, we further elaborated on this point, as did the United States Supreme Court in Chadha, by considering whether [t]he only way the House could have [properly] obtained the same result would have been by enacting legislation. Thus, we must consider how, in the absence of the challenged compacts, the Legislature could alternatively have achieved the same result, i.e., how the Legislature could alternatively have made gambling on Indian land lawful. If no IGRA tribal-state compact exists, general state laws pertaining to the regulation or prohibition of gambling apply on any particular Indian land as they apply elsewhere in the state. 18 USC 1166. Therefore, in the absence of a compact, if the Legislature wanted to make gambling on Indian land lawful, the only way it could do that would be by either changing the gambling laws that are generally applicable within the state or by changing the reach of the MGCRA. Changing those laws would, it cannot seriously be disputed, require legislation. Thus, it becomes clear that the compacts effectively supplanted legislative action and, therefore, they themselves constitute legislation. [43]
The third Chadha/Blank factor requires that we consider whether the compacts involved determinations of policy. Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530. The compact negotiation process required the Governor to undertake and resolve multiple policy-making decisions of great consequence to this state, the most significant of which was the initial decision to make lawful what was otherwise unlawful  casino gambling on the subject Indian lands. The fact that casino gambling engenders considerable controversy and passion throughout our society at large, as evidenced by the very existence of this lawsuit, underscores the significance of the policy decision that these compacts represent. Moreover, the compacts represent a host of additional policy decisions that sprang from the initial decision to make gambling lawful on the subject Indian lands. These include, but certainly are not limited to, decisions regarding the number of compacts to sign and the number of casinos to allow, the minimum gambling age that would be enforced in the relevant casinos, the percentage of profits that the tribes would be required to submit to the state and the subsequent use of those funds by the state, the decision to incorporate into the compacts the protections of the Michigan Employment Security Act, MCL 421.1 et seq., and the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.101 et seq., and the decision to leave enforcement of the compact rules and regulations to the tribes themselves rather than delegating that duty to the relevant state agencies as the state clearly could have done pursuant to 25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C). [44] In my judgment, these policy decisions are exactly the sorts of decisions that properly belong within the province of the Legislature. [45] This point was well made by the highest court for the state of New York, the Court of Appeals of New York, in a decision in which that Court held that IGRA tribal-state compacts represent legislation. In Saratoga Co. Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 822-823, 798 N.E.2d 1047, 766 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2003), the Court stated: IGRA itself contemplates that states will confront several policy choices when negotiating gaming compacts. Congress provided that potential conflicts may be resolved in the compact itself, explicitly noting the many policies affected by tribal gaming compacts. Indeed, gaming compacts are laden with policy choices, as Congress well recognized. Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A) may include provisions relating to  (i) the application of the criminal and civil laws and regulations of the Indian tribe or the State that are directly related to, and necessary for, the licensing and regulation of such activity; (ii) the allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of such laws and regulations; (iii) the assessment by the State of such activities in such amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity; (iv) taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities; (v) remedies for breach of contract; (vi) standards for the operation of such activity and maintenance of the gaming facility, including licensing; and (vii) any other subjects that are directly related to the operation of gaming activities. [25 USC 2710(d)(3)(C).] Compacts addressing these issues necessarily make fundamental policy choices that epitomize legislative power. Decisions involving licensing, taxation and criminal and civil jurisdiction require a balancing of differing interests, a task the multi-member, representative Legislature is entrusted to perform under our constitutional structure. [Emphasis added.] I agree with the court's decision on this issue in Saratoga Co and with the other state supreme courts that have considered this issue and reached a similar conclusion. See State ex rel Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 904 P.2d 11 (1995) ; State ex rel Stephan v. Finney, 251 Kan. 559, 836 P.2d 1169 (1992) ; Panzer v. Doyle, 271 Wis.2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 (2004); Narragansett Indian Tribe of Rhode Island v. Rhode Island, 667 A.2d 280 (RI, 1995). [46] It is evident that the compacts involved determinations of policy, Blank, supra at 114, 611 N.W.2d 530, such that they themselves constitute legislation.
The fourth Chadha/Blank factor requires that we consider whether Michigan's Constitution explicitly authorizes the Legislature to approve these compacts by resolution even if the compacts otherwise constitute legislation. Before 1908, the Michigan Constitution allowed the Legislature to make laws by the resolution process. See Const. 1850, art. 4, § 19. However, the constitutions of 1908 and 1963 leave out that earlier proviso, and our Constitution now makes it entirely clear, as already explained, that lawmaking is subject to the enactment requirement. See Const. 1963, art. 4, §§ 1, 22, and 26. In Becker v. Detroit Savings Bank, 269 Mich. 432, 434-436, 257 N.W. 853 (1934), this Court considered whether a legislative resolution can create binding law. In accordance with our Constitution, the Becker Court held that it could not, stating: The language of the constitution is in itself a complete answer to the proposition. It provides in express terms that there shall be but one mode of enacting a law thereunder, and that mode is the exclusive measure of the power of the legislature in that regard. A mere resolution, therefore, is not a competent method of expressing the legislative will, where that expression is to have the force of law, and bind others than the members of the house or houses adopting it.... The requirements of the Constitution are not met by that method of legislation. Nothing becomes law simply and solely because men who possess the legislative power will that it shall be, unless they express their determination to that effect in the mode pointed out by the instrument which invests them with the power, and under all the forms which that instrument has rendered essential. Cooley, [Const. Lim. at 155, ch. 6.] ...    [W]hile the resolution of the Legislature is entitled to respectful consideration, it is not law and courts are bound by the law. [ Id. at 434-436, 257 N.W. 853 (emphasis added).] Moreover, Michigan's Constitution provides a number of specific instances in which the Legislature is explicitly authorized to act by way of resolution. See Const. 1963, art. 4, §§ 12, 13, 37; art 5, § 2; art. 6, § 25. However, none of these provisions is applicable to this issue and none provides a basis for concluding that our Constitution explicitly grants the Legislature the authority to approve the instant compacts by way of resolution even though they otherwise constitute legislation. [47] Therefore, the Legislature's approval of the challenged compacts is not constitutionally exempted from the general lawmaking procedures embodied in our Constitution. Thus, the fourth Chadha/Blank factor likewise leads to a finding that the Legislature was required to adopt the compacts consistently with the enactment requirements of Michigan's Constitution. Accordingly, in my judgment, the tribal-state compacts at issue constitute legislation. The compacts had the purpose and effect of generally altering legal rights, duties, and relations of Michigan citizens; they supplanted legislative action; they represent determinations of policy issues of fundamental importance to the social and economic environment of the state of Michigan; and our Constitution does not authorize the Legislature to approve the compacts by a resolution vote.