Opinion ID: 809864
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acevedo's Evidence of Pretext

Text: Acevedo argues that Ex-Lax's stated reasons for his dismissal betray the element of pretext because they are both internally inconsistent and incompatible with Acevedo's performance record. On this point Acevedo has met the minimally sufficient standard to proceed with his case. We have consistently stated that mere questions regarding the employer's business judgment are insufficient to raise a triable issue as to pretext. See Webber v. Int'l Paper Co., 417 F.3d 229, 238 (1st Cir. 2005) ([A]n employee's opinion of the efficacy of an employment decision, standing alone, cannot supplant the employer's business judgment)). However, Acevedo has presented here more than a simple disagreement with the correctness of Ceinos's decisions; he has proffered evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether Ceinos himself truly believed Acevedo's performance was unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 256 (1st Cir. 1986) (explaining that in assessing pretext . . . [the court's] focus must be on the perception of the decisionmaker, i.e., whether [the decisionmaker] perceived the plaintiff as violating . . . company policies and whether this perception was credible and reasonable). To begin, while it is undisputed that Acevedo's job description encompassed a duty to oversee the general upkeep of the plant's facilities, there are material issues of fact as to whether -24- Acevedo was to blame for four of the incidents involving plant facilities that the company has cited as triggers for his termination. The district court noted as much in its opinion and order, which pinpointed as problematic for Ex-Lax's position the record surrounding: the 2004 microbial incident, for which more than one possible cause was identified in the unplanned deviation report; the 2004 packaging process deviation, which had no negative effect on the quality of Ex-Lax's products; the 2006 TOC incident, during which Acevedo was not on duty; and the 2006 fogging incident, which the investigation report concluded was due to inadequate written procedures for pest control operations.5 See Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 314-15. We must resolve all evidentiary conflicts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Acevedo at this stage. See Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 9. The fact that there is uncertainty regarding whether Acevedo was responsible for the pointed-to incidents indicates that there is a question for a jury to resolve as to whether the employer did in fact rely on these incidents in making its termination decision. 5 We note that there is a question raised by Acevedo whether he was directly responsible for developing the applicable written procedures referenced in the report. While Ceinos testified that the head of each department submits procedures to the Quality Assurance Department for its approval, suggesting that Acevedo was responsible for developing the same for his department during his tenure, both Acevedo and his replacement, Rivera, testified that they were only responsible for administering and implementing such procedures, as determined by Quality Assurance. It is also telling that the job description for the position does not include any mention of SOP development. -25- See Domínguez-Cruz, 202 F.3d at 432-33 (inconsistencies in employer's performance explanation, including doubts whether [plaintiff] was directly responsible for two of the alleged violations, deemed relevant to finding of pretext). Furthermore, [p]roof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is . . . one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination. Williams v. Raytheon Co., 220 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, Acevedo has sufficiently demonstrated potential inconsistencies in Ceinos's testimony as to both the microbial and TOC incidents. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that these inconsistencies call into question Ceinos's reasons for terminating Acevedo, namely, that Acevedo was not complying with the duties and responsibilities of his position. For instance, regarding the 2004 microbial incident, Ceinos stated that it was Acevedo's responsibility to have an SOP in place to ensure that the bathrooms remained adequately cleaned. However, Ceinos also stated that he could not recall whether there was in fact an SOP in place at the time the incident occurred. In addition, with regard to the 2006 TOC incident, Ceinos testified that he held Acevedo accountable despite the fact that he was off duty on that day, because Acevedo was ultimately responsible for mak[ing] sure that [the person he put in charge] [was] qualified -26- to exercise th[at] function. Ceinos nonetheless later acknowledged that Alsina -- the person who was put in charge and actually authorized the change in equipment -- is a very qualified person who still works for Ex-Lax. The employer's contemporaneous beliefs are a vital consideration because [i]n assessing pretext, a court's 'focus must be on the perception of the decisionmaker,' that is, whether the employer believed its stated reason to be credible. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 824 (quoting Gray, 792 F.2d at 256); see Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) ([T]he question is not whether [the plaintiff] was actually performing below expectations, but whether [the employer] believed that [he] was.). Acevedo also argues that pretext may be inferred from Ceinos's reliance on the microbial incident and the packaging process deviation of 2004 because both incidents had been previously addressed through Acevedo's 2005 PIP. According to Rodríguez's deposition testimony, under Ex-Lax's HR policy, if an employee succeeded at a PIP, the factors that led to the PIP could not be used in support of a termination decision. See Kouvchinov v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 537 F.3d 62, 68-69 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that pretext can be demonstrated through a showing that an employer has deviated inexplicably from one of its standard business practices, yet finding the principle inapplicable in the specific case, where plaintiff did not show existence of a standard -27- policy or practice). On the other hand, the PIP itself indicated the possibility of adverse action, including dismissal, against Acevedo if his improvement did not continue. This evidence presents a contested issue of material fact as to Ex-Lax's disciplinary procedures, and it should be for a jury to decide whether Rodríguez's testimony about the PIP procedure is credible. It is undisputed, however, that Acevedo successfully complied with the 2005 PIP, was rated as having fully met expectations in both the mid-year and annual 2005 performance reviews, and -- despite the 2006 incidents that Ceinos points to -- received a bonus of $13,166.00 for his performance in 2006 that was approved by Ceinos himself.6 These seemingly incongruous facts might lead a reasonable juror to disbelieve Ceinos's contention that his decision to terminate Acevedo was based purely on a poor performance record. See Santiago-Ramos, 217 F.3d at 56 (a plaintiff can . . . establish pretext by showing 'weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions 6 Against this proposition, Ex-Lax argues that its bonuses are not based exclusively on each employee's performance; rather, they are based on the performance of Ex-Lax's facility in Puerto Rico, the organization as a whole, and the performance of the division. While we acknowledge that a company is ordinarily in the best position to assess the meaning of its own [policies], Vélez, 585 F.3d at 450, it appears on this record that Ex-Lax has not presented evidence to support its assertions about the bonus policy. Given this lack of evidence, a reasonable trier of fact might infer that [Ex-Lax] would not have sent [Acevedo] even generic commendations if it were truly dissatisfied with [his] job performance. Feliciano de la Cruz, 218 F.3d at 7. -28- in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons' such that a factfinder could 'infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.' (quoting Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 168)). Acevedo raises an additional, correlative argument that his dismissal deviated from Ex-Lax's policy requiring adherence to a progressive disciplinary program. Both Rodríguez and Pabellón testified that Ex-Lax disciplinary actions normally followed successive steps, beginning with an orientation to the employee, followed by a series of verbal and written warnings, a potential suspension, and ultimately ending with dismissal. Pursuant to this policy, all disciplinary actions (including termination) had to be approved by the HR Department, and supervisors had to prepare informative memorandums indicating the reasons for termination prior to an employee's dismissal. None of these steps were taken in Acevedo's case. [E]vidence that standard procedure was not followed is directly relevant to [Acevedo's] burden of demonstrating pretext. Brennan v. GTE Gov't Sys. Corp., 150 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 1998). We acknowledge, as the district court did, see Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 318, that other testimony by Pabellón suggested that Ex-Lax's progressive disciplinary policy did not apply to exempt (or management) employees, who were allegedly routinely chastised through memorandums and/or performance reviews. This was arguably the method employed in -29- Acevedo's case, but it does not answer the question why the decision to dismiss Acevedo did not require submission of the reasons for termination to the HR Department, a step that, in Pabellón's estimation, did apply to all employees. See Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 467 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding, in a case involving allegations that defendant-employer had deviated from its established policies and practices, that evidence of pretext, although thin, disputed and susceptible to varying interpretations, . . . is sufficient to create a jury question). Without much question, Acevedo has offered at least minimally sufficient evidence that the reasons given by Ex-Lax for his discharge were pretextual. Mesnick, 950 F.2d at 825.