Opinion ID: 2999140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Subjective Complaints

Text: Sutton next argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting her testimony about her pain and functional limitations. She points to the medical records showing that she had a herniated cervical disk and that she continued to complain of pain as proof that his skepticism of her pain was unreasonable. But as we read the ALJ’s opinion, he did not dispute that she suffered residual pain and discomfort in her injured neck and shoulder; he simply did not believe that it limited her effective functioning to the extent she claimed. We see nothing unreasonable about this. While an ALJ may not disregard subjective complaints simply because they are “not fully supported by objective medical evidence,” a discrepancy between an applicant’s complaints and the medical record is still “probative of exaggeration.” Sienkiewicz v. Barnhart, 409 F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (emphasis added). Sutton also contends that the ALJ erred in discrediting her complaints merely because she could perform a variety of daily activities and had sought employment up through the date of the hearing. We have warned against a “casual equating of household work to work in the labor market,” see Gentle v. Barnhart, 430 F.3d 865, 867 (7th Cir. 2005), but this does not mean that Sutton’s daily activities are irrelevant. In fact, the ALJ is required to consider them under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. See also SSR 96-7p. In this case, we think the variousness of the activities, and particularly the fact that she can drive and get out of the house every day support the ALJ’s finding that she is capable of light work. Similarly, though we have recognized that an applicant may be disabled even if she is currently working—because she might have an unusually accommodating employer or be working beyond her capacity out of a desperate need—we have held that it is appropriate for the ALJ to consider any representations she has made to state authorities and prospective employers that she can work. Schmidt, 395 F.3d at 746. Sutton has not argued that she sought work out of desperation. And given the consistent expectations of Drs. Zelby and Pena that she would be able to work, it is less likely that her search for work was born of an unrealistic optimism. Moreover, she told the ALJ at her hearing that the reason she had not tried to work was that she had been unsuccessful in finding a job. In this context, the ALJ’s inference that she may have been motivated to apply for disability benefits because she could not find work rather than because she could not perform it is not unreasonable. Finally, Sutton argues that the ALJ gave too little weight to the side effects of her many medications and to the impact of her obesity. (To put the obesity in perspective, at the time of her application for disability insurance benefits, she was 5'7 and weighed 239 pounds.) But she presented no evidence that side effects played any significant role in her alleged inability to work. And obesity is not itself an impairment; it is rather a cause of impairment. See Gentle, 430 F.3d at 868. So No. 05-2803 Page 8 the fact that the ALJ failed to mention her obesity matters little. In Skarbek, we held that the ALJ did not err in omitting to mention the applicant’s obesity where it was presumably factored into the doctors’ reports and the applicant did not explain how it “further impaired his ability to work.” Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 504. Here, because Sutton has been obese throughout the history of her medical treatment, and because her obesity has been remarked upon by her doctors, we have no reason to doubt that it was properly taken into account. We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ, see Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 503, even if another position is also supported by substantial evidence, see Scheck, 357 F.3d at 699. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.