Opinion ID: 20073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay (State-of-Mind Exception)

Text: 3 Although the district court found that Spring failed to show that Ms. Reilly suffered actual damages, this finding is not dispositive to our holding since a showing of actual damages is not required to sustain an intentional tort action for assault and battery under Mississippi law. See Bumgart v. Bailey, 247 Miss. 604, 156 So.2d 823 (Miss. 1963). 4 Because we find that the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite intent for an assault and battery, we need not address whether vicarious liability is applicable. 4 Spring claims that the district court improperly precluded him from testifying that Ms. Reilly had told him that the incident had “scared” her and made her afraid. Although the statement is hearsay, Springs argues that the testimony was admissible because it related to Ms. Reilly’s state of mind. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. Woods, 163 F.3d 935, 936 (5th Cir.1999); Caparotta v. Entergy Corp., 168 F.3d 754, 755-56 (5th Cir.1999). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence 808(3), a statement as to the declarant’s then existing state of mind is admissible, and thus is an exception to the general prohibition against hearsay testimony under Federal Rules of Evidence 802. Although a witness may testify to what the declarant stated as to the declarant’s then existing state of mind, the “state-of-mind exception does not permit the witness to relate any of the declarant’s statements as to why he held the parti cular state of mind, or what he might have believed that would have induced the state of mind.” United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449, 452 (5th Cir. 1992)(quoting United States v. Cohen, 621 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1990) reh’g denied, 636 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). In the instant case, the district court granted a mistrial in the first trial because the plaintiff improperly attempted to introduce that Ms. Reilly was scared because of the alleged incident. At the second trial, Spring proffered testimony to the court that Ms. Reilly told him that the alleged incident scared her and made her afraid. Thus, we find that the district court properly excluded the testimony because Spring’s proffer related to the reason why Ms. Reilly was scared and afraid, which is not permissible under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay prohibition. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion.