Opinion ID: 3033682
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing Standard

Text: Under this standard, “the rigorousness of [a reviewing court’s] inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. “[W]hen those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’ ” Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). But when those rights are subjected only to “ ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory’ ” restrictions, “ ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient.’ ” Id. (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788).
Caruso argues that section 280.070(4)(a) imposed a “severe” burden on his communication with voters by requiring that the ballot title for Measure 36-55 include the “false and misleading” warning that “[t]his measure may cause property taxes to increase more than three percent.” This warning, Caruso maintains, implied that Measure 36-55 by itself might cause property taxes to increase more than three percent when the measure in fact proposed a much lower increase of 0.0003 12158 CARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY percent. Because the material facts are not in dispute, “the character and extent of the statute’s burden involves a question of law,” which we review de novo. Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d 851, 859 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing (WIN) Wash. Initiatives Now v. Rippie, 213 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000)). [10] Mindful of the constitutional backdrop against which section 280.070(4)(a) was enacted, we reject Caruso’s assumption that his is the only reasonable interpretation of the three-percent warning. As discussed above, the Oregon Constitution provides that a “property’s maximum assessed value shall not increase by more than three percent from the previous tax year.” Or. Const. art. XI, § 11(1)(b). But this limitation may be exceeded by local option taxes submitted to and approved by voters in the taxing district. Id. § 11(4)(a)(A). When construed in context, then, the three-percent warning could be read as an accurate reminder that the local option tax proposed by Measure 36-55 would not be subject to the limitation imposed by the Oregon Constitution. In other words, absent approval of Measure 36-55, maximum assessed values and, in turn, property taxes could increase by no more than three percent. Id. § 11(1)(b). If the measure were approved, however, property taxes could increase by more than that amount. Id. § 11(4)(a)(A). Caruso offers several reasons to reject this reading: (a) voters are unlikely to know of the constitutional three-percent limit; (b) the constitutional three-percent limit applies to maximum assessed values, not property taxes; (c) there is only an “infinitesimal possibility” that other property taxes will increase three percent; and (d) even if other property taxes increased three percent, it would not be Measure 36-55 that would “cause” total taxes to increase more than that amount. We address these reasons in turn. [11] As to voters’ knowledge, we note that Measure 50, which imposed the three-percent limit, was adopted by referendum. Flavorland Foods, 54 P.3d at 583-84. Before the elecCARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY 12159 tion on Measure 50, voters would have been presented with summaries of its impact on the ballot and in the voters’ pamphlet. Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 250.035(2)(d), 251.185(1). It is also likely that the ballot issue was the subject of discussion and press coverage leading up to election day. We further note that Measure 50 replaced Measure 47, a “short-lived constitutional amendment” which had been enacted by the voters by ballot initiative the year before the approval of Measure 50, and which included substantially the same property tax limitations. See Flavorland Foods, 54 P.3d at 583 (explaining that “ ‘[c]ertain practical and technical difficulties in the application of Measure 47 led the legislature to propose, and the people to adopt, Measure 50 as its effective replacement’ ” (quoting Shilo Inn, 36 P.3d at 958 n.6)). As such, voters would have been presented with substantially identical summaries before the election on Measure 47 as well. Accordingly, although voters might not have had perfect knowledge of the Oregon property tax system, they were likely aware of the constitutional three-percent limit, which not only was the subject of two separate ballot measures, both of which the voters approved, but which also affected the calculation of property taxes for every year since its adoption. As to the difference between maximum assessed values and property taxes and the likelihood that the latter will increase by three percent, Caruso’s assertions are undermined by other limitations imposed by Measure 50. Taken together, these limitations create more than an “infinitesimal possibility” that property taxes will increase three percent. As described above, in addition to imposing the three-percent limit, Measure 50 “rolled back” properties’ maximum assessed values for the tax year beginning July 1, 1997, and established a “permanent limit on the rate of ad valorem property taxes imposed” by each local taxing district. Or. Const. art. XI, § 11(1)(a)-(3)(b). The State informs us that real market values, meanwhile, have been “generally rising.” The result is that for tax years beginning after July 1, 1997, a property’s assessed value — defined as “the lesser of: (a) The property’s 12160 CARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY maximum assessed value; or (b) The property’s real market value,” Or. Rev. Stat. § 308.146 — is likely to equal its maximum assessed value. And as maximum assessed values increase by three percent per year, property taxes increase by the same amount because they are imposed at the permanent rate established by Measure 50.3 Finally, as to the “cause” of a greater-than-three-percent increase in property taxes, predictable three-percent increases in property taxes suggest that local option taxes may in fact “produce[ ]” an increase of more than that amount. See Black’s Law Dictionary 234 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “cause” as “[s]omething that produces an effect or result”). That is, absent approval of a local option tax, maximum assessed values and, frequently, assessed values and property taxes could increase by no more than three percent. Or. Const. art. XI, § 11(1)(b). If a local option tax is approved, however, it could produce an increase of more than that amount. Id. § 11(4)(a)(A). [12] Certainly, the three-percent warning could also be read to suggest that Measure 36-55 by itself might cause property taxes to increase more than three percent, but we regard its interpretation as an accurate reminder that the measure would not be subject to the constitutional three-percent limit to be at least as plausible. For this reason, we do not characterize the burden imposed by section 280.070(4)(a) as “severe.” Rather, like the Fourth Circuit, we believe that we may not declare a 3 We do not dispute that the real market values for some properties may be decreasing. For these properties, the likelihood that property taxes would increase by three percent in a given year would be much lower, because assessed values would likely equal decreasing real market values rather than incrementally increasing maximum assessed values. But particularly in the absence of evidence that a substantial portion of Oregon properties fit this description, we decline to condition application of section 280.070(4)(a) on the real market values of individual properties. Doing so would effectively “tie the hands” of the State. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. CARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY 12161 State’s ballot language unconstitutionally burdensome “merely because it could conceivably mislead some individuals and could have been crafted more adroitly.” Cf. McLaughlin v. N.C. Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1227 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting constitutional challenges to the allegedly misleading heading printed on voter petitions because the court could not say that the language “permits of only one interpretation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[13] Where, as here, a state election law imposes restrictions on speech that are not severe, “ ‘the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient’ ” to justify it. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788). The State maintains that section 280.070(4)(a) advances its interest in reminding voters that approving a local option tax effectively waives the constitutional three-percent limit. The sufficiency of this interest presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See McClure v. Galvin, 386 F.3d 36, 4145 (1st Cir. 2004). [14] The Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged states’ legitimate interest in “fostering informed and educated expressions of the popular will.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796; see, e.g., Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971). By requiring inclusion of the three-percent warning as a “shorthand designation” of an initiative’s potential tax consequences, section 280.070(4)(a) “plays a role in the process by which voters inform themselves for the exercise of the franchise.” Cf. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986) (observing that “party labels provide a shorthand designation of the views of party candidates on matters of public concern”); compare McIntyre, 514 U.S. 348-49 (noting that “in the case of a handbill written by a private citizen who is not known to the recipient, the name and address of the 12162 CARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY author add little, if anything, to the reader’s ability to evaluate the document’s message”). We are mindful that a state’s asserted interest in informing voters will not necessarily justify the burdens its regulations impose on First Amendment rights. For example, “[a] state’s claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some skepticism.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 798. Skepticism is also warranted if a state goes beyond “merely” providing information about candidates to “handicap[ping]” them. Cook, 531 U.S. at 525 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 280.070(4)(a), however, neither restricts information nor handicaps initiatives. It instead provides additional information, “ ‘open[ing] the channels of communication rather than . . . clos[ing] them,’ ” and applies equally to all initiatives proposing local option taxes, leaving no measure at a “political disadvantage.” Compare Anderson, 460 U.S. at 798 (quoting Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)); Cook, 531 U.S. at 525. We note, too, that the State enacted section 280.070(4)(a) as part of a statutory scheme requiring that ballot titles for local option taxes include not only the three-percent warning, but also the rate, period, amount, and purpose of the proposed option tax. See Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 280.070, 280.075. The State’s directing attention to this variety of considerations is in our view more consistent with an interest in informing voters than with an interest in influencing them. Compare Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402 (“[B]y directing the citizen’s attention to the single consideration of race or color, the State . . . may [d]ecisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines.”). [15] As stated above, the three-percent warning might have been more clearly worded. For example, Article XI-A, section 4 of the Oregon Constitution, which authorizes a separate statewide property tax for the purpose of repaying the principal and interest of bonds, provides that “said tax levy hereby CARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY 12163 authorized shall be in addition to all other taxes which may be levied according to law.” Or. Const. art. XI-A, § 4. But because the three-percent warning, even as presently worded, does not impose a severe burden on Caruso’s First Amendment rights, “the State need not narrowly tailor the means it chooses to promote [its interests].” See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 365. The district court deemed section 280.070(4)(a) insufficiently tailored in a different respect: specifically, in its application to all measures proposing the imposition of a local option tax, even those which by themselves cannot cause property taxes to increase more than three percent. The district court concluded that the general applicability of section 280.070(4)(a) rendered it substantially overbroad and therefore facially invalid. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973). We disagree. If, as the district court ordered, application of section 280.070(4)(a) were limited to measures which themselves could cause property taxes to increase more than three percent, the statute would be rendered largely ineffective in increasing the information available to voters. Under a separate provision of Oregon law, the ballot titles for measures proposing local option taxes must declare the “dollar rate per thousand dollars assessed value.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 280.060(1)(b). Voters can thus readily identify ballot measures that themselves may cause property taxes to increase more than three percent. What voters are less likely to readily identify are those ballot measures that propose lower dollar rates, but which, if approved, will be levied outside the threepercent limit imposed by the Oregon Constitution. See Or. Const. art. XI, § 11(4)(a)(A). In our view, then, the general applicability of section 280.070(4)(a) does not burden substantially more speech than is justified by the State’s important interests. [16] In sum, we conclude that the First Amendment burden imposed by section 280.070(4)(a) is not severe and further 12164 CARUSO v. YAMHILL COUNTY that that burden is justified by the State’s important interest in encouraging informed and educated voting. We accordingly conclude that section 280.070(4)(a) does not violate the First Amendment, either as applied to Measure 36-55 or on its face.