Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Rejection of Defendant's Requested Penalty Phase Instructions

Text: Although the trial court gave the jury the standard CALJIC penalty phase instructions, including CALJIC No. 8.85, defendant argues the court erred by rejecting his proposed 10 nonstandard penalty phase instructions. We disagree. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 1 read: In deciding whether death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence, you may not consider for any reason whatsoever the deterrent or non-deterrent effect of the death penalty or the monetary cost to the State of execution or maintaining a prisoner for life. The court properly rejected the instruction as unnecessary in light of other instructions setting forth proper factors for consideration. Neither cost nor deterrence was raised as an issue at the penalty phase, thus making the instruction unnecessary. ( People v. San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 672.) Defendant argues that the instruction was necessary, and that failure to give it was prejudicial, because Juror No. 6's responses to the jury questionnaire describe her concerns over the death penalty in terms of cost and deterrent effect. But Juror No. 6's response to the questionnaire expressed both a belief that a life sentence was preferable because it was less costly than a death sentence and doubt as to the death penalty's deterrent effect. This response shows that, in Juror No. 6's view, the factors of cost and deterrence weighed against imposing the death penalty. Thus, if the trial court had given defendant's proposed instruction telling the jury not to consider those factors, Juror No. 6 would have been less likely to vote for a life sentence. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 2 read: The mitigating circumstances that I have read for your consideration are given merely as examples of some of the factors that a juror may take into account as reasons for deciding not to impose a death sentence in this case. Any one of the factors may be sufficient, standing alone, to support a decision that death is not the appropriate punishment in this case. But a juror should not limit his or her consideration of mitigating circumstances to these specific factors. [¶] A juror may also consider any other circumstances relating to the case or to the defendant as shown by the evidence as reasons for not imposing the death penalty. [¶] A mitigating circumstance does not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. A juror may find that a mitigating circumstance exists if there is any evidence to support it. [¶] Any mitigating circumstance may outweigh all the aggravating factors. [¶] A juror is permitted to use mercy, sympathy and/or sentiment in deciding what weight to give each mitigating factor. The court properly rejected this instruction as duplicative, as the jury already had been instructed to consider sympathy for the defendant, to consider any fact as a mitigating circumstance, and to weigh mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances. ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 695; People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1070 [71 Cal.Rptr.3d 675, 175 P.3d 632] [proposed instruction to consider `mercy, sympathy and/or sentiment' was duplicative of standard instruction given].) As to the other portions of the refused instruction, we have previously rejected similar claims. ( People v. Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 1068-1070 [the trial court has no duty to instruct the jury that it may find the existence of a mitigating circumstance if there is any evidence to support it and that it need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 163-164 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] [the trial court has no duty to instruct the jury that it may consider sympathy and mercy for the defendant]; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 697 [rejecting as argumentative an instruction that a single mitigating circumstance can be dispositive].) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 3 duplicated parts of his proposed instruction No. 2, and in addition stated: If the mitigating evidence gives rise to compassion or sympathy for the defendant, the jury may, based upon such sympathy or compassion alone, reject death as a penalty. The trial court correctly concluded the instruction was duplicative of the CALJIC No. 8.85 instruction given here. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 911 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981].) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 4 read: The People and the Defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. You must individually decide each question involved in the penalty decision. Defendant, however, later withdrew this proposed instruction, presumably because it was already included in the standard instructions. Defendant, therefore, cannot show error. Defendant's proposed instruction No. 5 read: Only those factors which are applicable on the evidence adduced at trial are to be taken into account in the penalty determination. All factors may not be relevant and a factor which is not relevant to the evidence in a particular case would be disregarded. The absence of a statutory mitigating factor does not constitute an aggravating factor. The trial court correctly refused the portion discussing the relevant factors as duplicative in light of the standard instruction given, and the portion discussing the absence of a mitigating factor was not required because none of the parties improperly suggested that the absence of a mitigating factor itself can be an aggravating factor. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 784 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 6 stated: The factors in the above list which you determine to be aggravating circumstances are the only one [ sic ] which the law permits you to consider. You are not allowed to consider any other facts or circumstances as the basis for deciding that the death penalty would be an appropriate punishment in this case. The trial court correctly rejected this instruction as duplicative of the standard instruction given. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1275 [270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 7 read: Evidence has been introduced for the purpose of showing the specific harm caused by the defendant's crime. Such evidence, if believed, was not received and may not be considered by you to divert your attention from your proper role of deciding the appropriate penalty. You must face this obligation soberly and rationally, as you may not impose the ultimate sanction as a result of an irrational, purely subjective response to emotional evidence and argument. On the other hand, evidence and argument on emotional though relevant subject [ sic ] may provide legitimate reasons to sway you to show mercy. The trial court refused the instruction as unnecessary. We have repeatedly rejected this proposed instruction as both confusing and duplicative of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, which was given in this case. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 368-369 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105]; People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 358-359 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545]; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 455 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78].) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 8 stated: A sentence of life without parole means that under the law the defendant is not eligible for parole. The trial court properly refused to give this instruction. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 172 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980]; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1277.) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 9 stated: You were previously instructed not to consider penalty in the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, and of course, that is your consideration in this phase. That instruction would be totally inapplicable. You will also be instructed at this time that you can consider sympathy for the defendant in deciding this continuing issue, and that was, of course, precluded from the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. This proposed instruction was duplicative of the standard instructions given. Therefore, the trial court's refusal to give this instruction was proper. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1025 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183]; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 102 [241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1209 [240 Cal.Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) (42) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 10 was a lingering doubt instruction as to his guilt of attempting to commit a lewd act on Polly. The trial court was under no duty to give this instruction as it is not required under state or federal law and the lingering doubt concept is sufficiently encompassed in other instructions ordinarily given in capital cases. ( People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 359; see also People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1219 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262]; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1068 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388].) Defendant's proposed instruction No. 11 was a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85, deleting section 190.3, factors (e), (f), (g), and (j), which he deemed inapplicable. The trial court properly refused this instruction, recognizing that the full list of factors may be put before the jury as a framework for the penalty determination. ( People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 302, 319 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235]; People v. Smith, supra, 35 Cal.4th 334, 369; People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 919.)