Opinion ID: 2545785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Grant Defendant's Motion for Mistrial

Text: The defense called San Bernardino Sheriffs Lieutenant Ross Dvorak to testify regarding defendants demeanor on the night of his arrest. In response to the question, How would you characterize [defendant's] demeanor? Dvorak replied that at the beginning of the investigation defendant was pretty cordial but [a]s time went on, it became more and more of a cat and mouse game to the point where [defendant] shut down the interview by saying, `I want to talk to my attorney.' Defense counsel made no objection to Dvorak's testimony at the time, but soon afterwards, during a bench conference on an unrelated matter that occurred while the prosecutor was still cross-examining Dvorak, counsel asserted that Dvorak's reference to defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) had been improper and should be stricken. The trial court took no action on the matter, and six other witnesses testified that afternoon. Before testimony resumed the next morning, defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming prejudice from Lieutenant Dvorak's testimony that during the investigation defendant had invoked his Miranda rights. The trial court denied the motion, stating: The time to make an objection was at the time the response came out, if it did prejudice the jury in any way. Frankly, it doesn't. Thereafter, at defendant's request, the court told the jury to disregard the testimony in question, which the court ordered stricken from the record. Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for mistrial. He relies on Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, which holds that the prosecution may not penalize a defendant for invoking Miranda rights during interrogation by using the invocation against the defendant at trial. The Attorney General asserts that defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal because his objection to the challenged testimony and his request for a mistrial were untimely, b or the sake of argument, we assume that defendant's motion for a mistrial was timely. Nevertheless, we find no error. `A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. ( People v. Woodberry (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 695, 708, 89 Cal.Rptr. 330.) Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.' ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1038, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Ordinarily, evidence that a suspect has invoked the right to remain silent creates the danger that the jury will draw an impermissible inference of guilt from the testimony. (See generally United States v. Newman (9th Cir.1991) 943 F.2d 1155, 1157.) Here that danger was not present, as defendant's guilt was not in issue in this penalty retrial. Defendant argues that the jury might have inferred from defendant's invocation of his Miranda, rights that he was acting in a cold and callous manner immediately after the killings, and that he therefore should be sentenced to death. But neither the prosecutor nor Lieutenant Dvorak suggested that the jury should draw this inference. As a result, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that any prejudicial effect arising from Lieutenant Dvorak's testimony could be cured by an admonition to the jury to disregard it.