Opinion ID: 202136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garcia's Other Arguments

Text: Garcia also argues that he was prejudiced in ways which, in our view, are simply not cognizable on a due process claim in this context. Specifically, he argues that due to the delay, he has suffered anxiety and oppressive incarceration during the pendency of his appeal. He bases this argument on decisions by other courts which have drawn an analogy between the right to a timely appeal and the right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 78 F.3d 348, 350 (8th Cir. 1996); United States -33- v. Mohawk, 20 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 303 (5th Cir. 1980). We reject the argument and differ from these courts. We explain why. A due process claim about delays on appeal is not the same as a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), a case under the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court identified four criteria, of which prejudice is only one, to determine when the right to a speedy trial is violated. Id. at 530. The Court held that it is possible to have a violation of the speedy trial right without a specific showing of prejudice. Id. at 533. By contrast, there is no Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim to be made as to appeals, with the possible exception, not involved here, of interlocutory appeals. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 313-17 (1986); see also United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 206 (6th Cir. 1996) (The speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment applies only to proceedings in the trial court.). The right of appeal is statutory, and the grant is subject to due process requirements. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985). In Barker, three categories of potential prejudice were identified: oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern of the accused, and the possibility that the accused's defense might be impaired. 407 U.S. at 532. Those courts that have accepted the analogy between pretrial delay and appellate delay have adopted this inquiry almost whole cloth and looked for three -34- kinds of potential prejudice from appellate delay: (1) oppressive incarceration pending appeal, (2) anxiety and concern of the convicted party awaiting the outcome of the appeal, and (3) impairment of the convicted person's grounds for appeal or of the viability of his defense in case of retrial. Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 351 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tucker, 8 F.3d at 646); see also Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8. In our view, the due process issues caused by delay on appeal are more limited than those resulting from delay in the trial court. Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (noting, in the context of due process requirements, that there are significant differences between the trial and appellate stages of a criminal proceeding). And so we reject, at least in cases of delayed transcripts on appeal, the direct analogy made to tests involving the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, which underlies the so-often articulated three-factor prejudice test quoted above. Other courts have shared this concern. See, e.g., Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1991) (Certainly, the differences in a defendant's situation before trial and after conviction suggest that at the very least the Barker factors should not be applied uncritically.); see also Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal: A Right Without A Remedy, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 437, 473-81 (1990) (concluding that the concerns of Barker, and the Barker test, do not translate to the appellate delay setting). -35- The first two of the adopted Barker prejudice factors have little rationale in the appellate context. A defendant who has been convicted of a crime no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence, Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993), and so his incarceration pending appeal cannot itself be said to be oppressive. Further, there are other remedies concerning conditions of confinement. The appellant may or may not meet the requirements for bail on appeal.13 If the conditions of incarceration raise Eighth Amendment concerns, habeas corpus is available. Similarly, while any defendant who has been convicted of a crime may experience anxiety during the pendency of the appeal, this consideration is not useful to evaluating prejudice for due process purposes. Because Garcia has not shown prejudice, we do not reach the reasons for the delay. Sometimes the reasons involve inadequate resources in the reporting services available to the district court, or overly busy court reporters; sometimes there are 13 Indeed, delay in the appeals process may itself strengthen an appellant's case for having met those requirements, so long as that delay is not attributable to the appellant. See, e.g., Leigh v. United States, 82 S.Ct. 994, 997 (1962) (Warren, Circuit Justice) (granting bail where th[e] appeal is not frivolous, . . . such delays as have occurred can hardly be attributed to applicant . . . [and] [t]he Government does not contend that there is a likelihood that applicant will flee the jurisdiction.); United States v. Bentvena, 308 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1962) (rejecting bail but noting that [i]f for any reason there are delays in the hearing of these appeals for which the appellants are not responsible these motions may be renewed.). -36- other reasons. The problem of delay in production of transcripts is a very serious one, but one which cannot be used to benefit a defendant absent a showing of prejudice.