Opinion ID: 2998114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reed’s Issues

Text: Reed claims that (1) the prosecutor breached a promise to seek a downward departure in his sentence in exchange for his cooperation, which the district court failed to remedy; and (2) his sentence violates Booker. First, Reed contends that the government promised to move for downward departure based on substantial assistance if he helped to identify Coleman. The district court determined that no such promise had been made. Disputes regarding the terms of a cooperation or plea agreement are questions of fact to be determined by the district court and will only be reversed if they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Williams, 198 F.3d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Daniels, 902 F.2d 1238, 1243 (7th Cir. 1990). The district court did not err by finding that the government did not make any enforceable promise to Reed. Reed acknowledged on three separate occasions that the prosecution made no promises to him. He signed a proffer letter which stated that there was no other promise existing between himself and the government, he testified before the grand jury that the prosecution had not made him any promises about seeking a downward departure, and he admitted at his plea colloquy that no oral promises had induced him to plead guilty. Furthermore, the government twice asked the district court to delay Reed’s sentencing so that it could have more time to consider its position on whether to move for a downward departure based on substantial assistance, and Reed did not object. Logic dictates that if there had been a promise made and some sort of enforceable agreement reached, Reed would not have agreed to these continuances. He would have objected, 10 Nos. 04-1176, 04-1177, 04-1231 & 04-2009 claiming that the government did not need additional time as it had already promised to make the substantial assistance motion. Second, Reed takes issue with the trial judge’s decision to impose a sentence based on a total adjusted offense level of 41 under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court determined that his base level was 38, but arrived at an adjusted offense level of 41 after enhancements for being a leader/organizer. Following the Guidelines, the judge sen- tenced Reed to 360 months in prison. As with Hill, the district court erred in treating the Guidelines as mandatory and making findings of fact that enhanced Reed’s sentencing range. We remand in accordance with Paladino.