Opinion ID: 1920879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Defender's Motion to Withdraw

Text: Snelgrove's contention that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's motion to withdraw is without merit. The fact that the State's key witness was, at one time, represented by the same public defender's office as Snelgrove is not grounds for reversal in this case. Of the three cases cited by the defendant, only Ortiz v. State, 844 So.2d 824 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), actually considers whether such a situation creates a conflict of interest, and Ortiz is distinguishable. The other cases hold that the trial court did not adequately consider the issue. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence that a conflict actually manifested itself at trial. Matthews expressly waived his attorney-client privilege, and defense counsel's ability to aggressively cross-examine Matthews was unimpaired. Therefore, we find the defendant's argument to be without merit. Ortiz is the only case cited in which an appellate court disagreed with the trial court's substantive finding that a conflict did not exist. The other cases cited by the defendant, i.e., Lee v. State, 690 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Thomas v. State, 785 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), focus upon the procedural process. They disapprove of a trial court's failure to adequately inquire into whether a conflict existed. In this case, the trial court conducted an in-camera hearing to consider defense counsel's motion to withdraw; [11] therefore, there are no procedural concerns and these two cases do not apply. Moreover, Ortiz is distinguishable. In Ortiz, the Fifth District recognized the potential conflict of interest that may arise when the public defender's office represents both the defendant and the State's key witness. The court stated: To deny a motion for separate representation, where a risk of conflicting interest exists, is reversible error. There exists a risk of conflicting interest in the instant case as the State's key witness against Ortiz, the confidential informant, was also being represented by the Office of the Public Defender. It cannot be said that the apparent conflict created when defense counsel represented both appellant Ortiz and the State's key witness is not prejudicial to Ortiz so as to have denied him his right to effective assistance of counsel. 844 So.2d at 825-26 (internal quote marks and citations omitted). In Snelgrove's case, the public defender's office did not represent Matthews at the time of trial. In fact, Connelly, the assistant public defender who represented Matthews when Snelgrove was first arrested withdrew almost immediately after learning Matthews had information about Snelgrove's case. [12] Furthermore, the record does not support the appellant's assertion that his trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest or was otherwise affected by his office's prior representation of Matthews. While trial counsel stated that he knew Matthews was facing more serious charges than those initially pled to because his office represented him in a prior case, there is no evidence that this knowledge compromised Snelgrove's right to effective assistance of counsel. As previously stated, the simultaneous representation in question lasted for a very short period of time at the outset of the case, and at trial, Matthews waived any attorney-client privilege before testifying. Moreover, defense counsel was not impaired in his ability to aggressively question and impeach Matthews on cross-examination.