Opinion ID: 1347889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: The parties present a conflict in the standard of review to be applied to our determination of the first issue. Vargas claims de novo review of his constitutional right to counsel is appropriate. The State phrases the issue as one of denial of a motion to substitute counsel, making abuse of discretion the appropriate standard of review. The State cites Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068 (Wyo.1978) as support for its position. In Irvin, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw and for substitute counsel several days prior to trial. That motion was denied. On the morning of trial, Irvin presented a petition to proceed pro se, which was granted. Irvin appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for substitute counsel, and we reviewed that denial for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1071-72. The case before us is distinguishable from Irvin, in that Vargas' request for substitute counsel did not include a request to proceed pro se if substitute counsel was denied. Vargas' refusal to choose between proceeding with appointed counsel or proceeding without counsel presents a different circumstance with different constitutional implications from that before us in Irvin. Recent decisions from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consider factual circumstances similar to those in the instant case under a de novo standard of review. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir.1997) and United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 997, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). See also United States v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746, 748 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 920, 110 S.Ct. 284, 107 L.Ed.2d 264 (1989) and United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955 (10th Cir.1987). Because of the constitutional implications present when a defendant is forced to proceed pro se after he refuses to accept the services of appointed counsel, we will apply the de novo standard of review to Vargas' first issue. [1] As to Vargas' second issue, W.R.Cr.P. 14 provides that the district court may order    separate trials of counts    joined together in a single information. Because the language in this rule is permissive, we review denial of a motion to sever under our `traditional abuse-of-discretion standards.' Black v. State, 869 P.2d 1137, 1139 (Wyo.1994) ( quoting Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 484 (Wyo.1983)). In reviewing judicial discretion, we consider whether the district court could have reasonably decided as it did. Black, 869 P.2d at 1139. When reviewing sufficiency of evidence issues, this court assesses whether all the evidence presented forms an adequate basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the state. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals could have come to the same result as the jury actually did. Martinez v. State, 943 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Wyo.1997) ( quoting Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 823-24 (Wyo.1996)). Finally, Wyoming protects a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial via W.R.Cr.P. 48. This court performs a de novo review of a conviction to ensure that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial have been met. Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo.1995).