Opinion ID: 1711814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: intentional sexual torts

Text: After carefully evaluating the policies behind the parental immunity doctrine, the national trends, and our own prior case law, we conclude that the district court was correct in holding that the policies relied upon to support the doctrine are insufficient to continue application of the doctrine to bar intentional sexual tort claims by a child against a parent. We agree with the district court that the fear of disrupting the fabric and nucleus of families by allowing actions based upon intentional sexual abuse simply appears to be without merit. If indeed the principal reason for the parental immunity doctrine is to preserve family harmony, then it appears that the immunity can have no justification in such cases of intentional and malicious sexual abuse, for in those cases the inescapable conclusion is that the family fabric has already been tragically disrupted by the serious misconduct alleged. We agree that the mere additional stress of a lawsuit in such circumstances is an insufficient reason by itself to bar a claim for that misconduct. Further, while we have genuine concerns that some may abuse the judicial system through false claims in domestic relations cases as well as tort cases, we believe the protections available in the judicial process are adequate to address the issue of false or fraudulent claims in this context as well as others. We find the depletion of family resources argument unpersuasive as well. As was noted by the court below, it is apparent that the depletion of family resources by itself cannot justify the parental immunity theory, since any time a person is sued for actions not covered by liability insurance, his or her family's resources are threatened. Herzfeld, 732 So.2d at 1106. [16] The petitioner-father asserts that the Legislature rather than the judiciary is the only branch of government with the authority to make such a change to the application of the doctrine. We disagree. As was noted by Justice Harding in his concurrence in Waite, because the doctrine of interspousal immunity is rooted in the common law and is not a statutory creation[,] ... it is appropriate for this Court to abrogate the doctrine rather than defer to legislative action. Waite, 618 So.2d at 1362; see also Hurst v. Capitell, 539 So.2d 264, 266 (Ala.1989) (Because the [parental immunity] doctrine was judicially created, it is not exclusively a legislative issue and it may be judicially qualified.); Goller v. White, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963). In Waite, this Court recognized that the common law will not be altered or expanded by this Court unless demanded by public policy necessity or to vindicate fundamental rights. Waite, 618 So.2d at 1361. As in Waite, however, we conclude that public policy, as well as the vindication of fundamental rights, requires our action here. Therefore, because the parental immunity doctrine was judicially created, we have not only the authority to abrogate it, but an affirmative duty to review the wisdom of continuing to maintain it in the challenged circumstances. [17]