Opinion ID: 4508895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nine Years of Litigation on a Motion to Suppress

Text: {¶ 2} Laurence Dibble was a high-school teacher at the Wellington School in Columbus. He is accused of groping one student and secretly videotaping numerous other students in a school locker room while they were undressing. {¶ 3} The police began investigating Dibble after two former students complained about improper sexual behavior. One of the former students told police that Dibble had touched her inappropriately while at school. Subsequently, the police obtained a warrant authorizing the search of Dibble’s home. During the search, police seized videotapes of female students undressing. The recordings appeared to have been filmed by a camera that Dibble had hidden in the school locker room. {¶ 4} In 2010, a grand jury indicted Dibble for one count of sexual imposition and 20 counts of voyeurism. The sexual-imposition charge related to the school-groping incident, while the voyeurism counts were based on the filming of the students while undressing. {¶ 5} Dibble filed a motion to suppress seeking to invalidate the search warrant on the basis that the warrant affidavit contained materially false statements. The affidavit described incidents involving “Victim #1” and “Victim #2.” Victim #1—the subject of the sexual-imposition offense—was the 18-year-old student whom Dibble was alleged to have groped at school. Victim #2 was the other woman who contacted the police. Dibble engaged in sexual contact with and took naked photographs of her. During the motion hearing, the detective acknowledged that the conduct involving Victim #2 did not allege a crime because she was an adult and no longer a student of Dibble’s at the time, and because she said that she had consented to the interaction with Dibble. The detective further conceded that because the allegation of inappropriate physical contact with respect to Victim #1 occurred only at school, it did not by itself provide a basis for searching Dibble’s home. 2 January Term, 2020 {¶ 6} But the detective also testified about other sworn statements that he had made before the judge at the time the warrant was issued. Specifically, he told the judge that the women had discussed occasions during which Dibble had taken photos of them and other underage students at school wearing nearly see-through unitards, purportedly for a theater project. The detective said he expressed his concern to the judge about the nature and location of those photographs. While that information was provided to the judge under oath, it was not recorded or transcribed. The affidavit itself contained no information about the photographs that Dibble took of the children at school. {¶ 7} The trial court initially granted the motion to suppress. It held that by referring to the woman who engaged in sexual conduct with Dibble in his home as a “victim,” despite her own statements that she was a consenting adult at the time, the detective had made false statements in the affidavit with the intent of misleading the judge. On appeal, this court reversed that judgment, concluding that the detective had simply used the identifier “victim” to protect the woman’s identity and not in an attempt to intentionally mislead the judge who issued the warrant. State v. Dibble, 133 Ohio St.3d 451, 2012-Ohio-4630, 979 N.E.2d 247 (“Dibble I”). {¶ 8} On remand, the trial court determined that the affidavit filed in support of the warrant did not establish probable cause to search the home. But the court further found that the detective had acted in good faith in relying on the warrant, and the court therefore denied Dibble’s motion to suppress. After pleading no contest to all the charges, Dibble appealed the denial of the motion to suppress to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. {¶ 9} The arguments on appeal centered on the good-faith exception that was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). We adopted the Leon analysis in State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, 490 N.E.2d 1236 (1986). Under the good-faith 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO exception, evidence obtained during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that is unsupported by probable cause will not be excluded if the officers who obtained the evidence acted reasonably in relying on the warrant. Leon at paragraph one of the syllabus; Wilmoth at paragraph one of the syllabus. The Leon court explained, however, that suppression would still be appropriate in circumstances when (1) the supporting affidavit contained information the affiant knew to be false or would have known to be false but for reckless disregard of the truth, (2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role, (3) the warrant was based on an affidavit “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,’ ” or (4) the warrant is so facially deficient in terms of particularity that the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid. Leon at 923, quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-611, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part); State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 331, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989). {¶ 10} The Tenth District determined that the trial court had failed to consider the third situation discussed in Leon—whether the warrant was based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” State v. Dibble, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP798, 2014-Ohio-5754 (“Dibble II”), ¶ 24. The Tenth District therefore remanded the case to the trial court to consider the third Leon factor. Id. {¶ 11} On the third go-around, the trial court considered the remaining Leon factor and concluded that the affidavit was not so lacking in probable cause as to render the detective’s reliance on the warrant unreasonable. Thus, the court denied the motion to suppress and Dibble appealed again. {¶ 12} This time, the Tenth District concluded that under Crim.R. 41(C)(2), the detective’s testimony regarding his unrecorded conversation with the judge was not admissible at the suppression hearing. State v. Dibble, 2017-Ohio-9321, 92 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (“Dibble III”). Then, considering only the 4 January Term, 2020 information in the affidavit, the Tenth District decided that it was not reasonable for the detective to have relied on the warrant because it was “ ‘based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at ¶ 39, quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. Having determined that the good-faith exception did not apply, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and ordered that judgment be entered in favor of Dibble. Id. at ¶ 40. {¶ 13} The state appealed, and we accepted the cause on the following proposition of law: In deciding whether the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to a search conducted under a search warrant, a court can consider sworn but unrecorded oral information that the police gave to the judge at the time of the approval of the warrant. See 153 Ohio St.3d 1432, 2018-Ohio-2639, 101 N.E.3d 464. We answer that question in the affirmative. II. The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule A. The objective of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct {¶ 14} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution1 provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 1. Curiously, the parties have not presented any arguments under the Ohio Constitution in this court or in the proceedings below. Thus, we have no occasion to consider here the protections afforded under Article I, Section 14 of that document. 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. While the text of the Fourth Amendment says nothing about suppressing evidence obtained in violation of the rights enunciated therein, the United States Supreme Court has created an “exclusionary rule”—“a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 231-232, 131 S.Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011). {¶ 15} Exclusion is not meant to serve as a remedy for the injury caused by an unconstitutional search or seizure but rather as a deterrent against future violations. Id. at 236-237. Thus, the question whether the exclusionary sanction should be imposed is “ ‘an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). {¶ 16} “[T]he deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘vary with the culpability of the law enforcement conduct’ at issue.” Davis at 239, quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 143, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (cleaned up). When a Fourth Amendment violation is occasioned by “deliberate,” “reckless,” or “grossly negligent” police conduct, the deterrent benefits of exclusion are said to outweigh its costs. Id. at 238; see also Herring at 144 (“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system”). But, when police act in an objectively reasonable manner in executing a search believed in good faith to be legal, there is no bad conduct to deter. Leon at 918-920. 6 January Term, 2020 {¶ 17} The United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied in situations in which an officer has relied in good faith on a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate or judicial officer, notwithstanding the fact that the warrant is later found to be invalid. Id. at 913. But “the officer’s reliance on the magistrate’s probable-cause determination and on the technical sufficiency of the warrant he issues must be objectively reasonable.” Id. at 922. {¶ 18} Because the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter unlawful police conduct, evidence should be suppressed “ ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.’ ” Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975). When a detached and neutral magistrate has issued a search warrant and the police have acted within its scope, there is typically nothing more that the police can do to comply with the law. Leon at 920-921. It is ultimately the responsibility of the magistrate to determine whether there is a sufficient legal basis to issue a warrant, and in most instances, police officers are not expected to second-guess the judge. Id. at 921. Suppressing evidence because of an “error by a magistrate can never deter future police misconduct.” Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d at 266, 490 N.E.2d 1236; see also Leon at 921. {¶ 19} The Leon court ultimately summarized the exclusion calculus this way: In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Leon at 926. B. All of the circumstances must be considered {¶ 20} The question we must address in this case is whether a court may look to information outside the four corners of the affidavit when evaluating an officer’s good-faith reliance on a warrant. Viewed in light of the exclusionary rule’s emphasis on deterrence, it becomes apparent that the answer is yes. {¶ 21} The case of United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526 (6th Cir.2005) is instructive. There, the Sixth Circuit considered whether information omitted from the affidavit but provided to the magistrate under oath could be considered in evaluating the officer’s good-faith reliance on the warrant subsequently issued by the magistrate. In holding that the external information could be considered, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that in both Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), the Supreme Court considered information outside the four corners of the affidavit in deciding whether the officers had acted in good faith. The Leon court explained: [O]ur good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances—including whether the warrant application had previously been rejected by a different magistrate—may be considered. 8 January Term, 2020 Leon at 922, fn. 23. By permitting consideration of whether the application had previously been rejected, the Leon court necessarily authorized courts to look beyond the four corners of the affidavit. See Frazier at 534. Likewise, in Sheppard, the court relied upon a conversation between the judge and the detective at the time the warrant was issued in determining that the detective had reasonably relied on the warrant. Sheppard at 989-991. {¶ 22} Because the goal of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, it makes sense to consider information known to the officer and revealed to the judge even when that information is not included in the affidavit. As the Frazier court explained: [W]e are unable to envision any scenario in which a rule excluding from the Leon analysis information known to the officer and revealed to the magistrate would deter police misconduct. Leon only comes into play when an officer has a warrant, albeit a defective one. Because a judge’s initial probable cause determination is limited to the four corners of the affidavit, an officer has no incentive to exclude from the affidavit information that supports a finding of probable cause only to reveal this information to the magistrate by parol. If the affidavit is not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause, the officer is unlikely to get a search warrant, and if the officer does not get a search warrant, he may not rely on Leon. Any deterrent—even the exclusionary rule—is wholly unnecessary in the absence of an incentive to engage in undesirable behavior. (Emphasis sic and citation omitted.) Frazier at 535. Thus, the court held that “a court reviewing an officer’s good faith under Leon may look beyond the four 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO corners of the warrant affidavit to information that was known to the officer and revealed to the issuing magistrate.” Id. at 535-536. {¶ 23} The Fourth Circuit similarly found it “proper to consider any contemporaneous oral statements to the magistrate in conjunction with the supporting affidavit in assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s reliance on a warrant.” United States v. Legg, 18 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir.1994), citing United States v. Edwards, 798 F.2d 686, 691-692 (4th Cir.1986). This is because the goodfaith analysis is based not on the sufficiency of the affidavit, but rather on the officer’s reliance on the warrant, and the latter inquiry must take into account all the information both known to the officer and presented to the magistrate. Legg at 243, fn. 1. {¶ 24} The dissent acknowledges that it is appropriate to consider the totality of the circumstances when conducting a general review of an officer’s good-faith reliance on a warrant. It contends, however, that evidence outside the four corners of an affidavit cannot be probative of the third Leon factor—whether the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the officer could not have reasonably relied upon it, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. {¶ 25} In concluding that a court may not consider an officer’s sworn testimony to the issuing judge in determining whether the officer executed a warrant in good faith, the dissent loses sight of the purpose of the exclusionary rule—to prevent police misconduct. Not surprising in light of the rule’s focus on the officer’s state of mind, the federal circuit courts have reached the opposite conclusion from that reached by the dissent. {¶ 26} In Legg, the Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that an affidavit lacking sufficient indicia of probable cause categorically precluded application of the good-faith exception. 18 F.3d at 243, fn. 1. As that court explained, “even assuming that the affidavit itself lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause to support reasonable reliance on the warrant, the affidavit did not contain all of the 10 January Term, 2020 facts presented to the magistrate.” Id. at 243. Thus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that statements made to the magistrate, considered “in conjunction with” the affidavit, established an officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on the warrant. Id. at 244; see also United States v. Perez, 393 F.3d 457, 463 (4th Cir.2004) (concluding that the affidavit, when considered together with oral statements presented to the magistrate, was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the officer could not have reasonably relied on the warrant). {¶ 27} The Sixth Circuit, in Frazier, also considered information that was provided to the magistrate but was omitted from the affidavit when evaluating an officer’s good-faith reliance on a warrant. The Frazier court determined that in light of the additional extrinsic information given to the magistrate, the insufficient affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it could not be reasonably relied upon. 423 F.3d at 535-536. In so holding, the court explained that evaluating whether an officer’s reliance on a warrant was objectively reasonable requires a “ ‘ “less demanding showing than the ‘substantial basis’ threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause in the first place.” ’ ” Id. at 536, quoting United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir.2004), quoting United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir.2002). {¶ 28} Thus, even though an affidavit presented in support of a warrant might be insufficient, an officer’s reliance on the warrant might nevertheless be reasonable when he has provided information to the magistrate beyond the affidavit. See Legg at 243, fn. 1. Therefore, a court “should examine the totality of the information presented to the magistrate [or judge] in deciding whether an officer’s reliance on the warrant could have been reasonable.” Id. III. Crim.R. 41(C)(2) Does Not Bar Consideration of Extrinsic Evidence for Purposes of the Good-Faith Analysis {¶ 29} Before reaching the constitutional question, the Tenth District determined that the sworn but unrecorded discussion that took place between the 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO detective and the judge was inadmissible under Crim.R. 41(C)(2). Dibble III, 2017Ohio-9321, 92 N.E.3d 893, at ¶ 30. That rule provides: If the judge is satisfied that probable cause exists, the judge shall issue a warrant identifying the property to be seized and naming or describing the person or place to be searched or the person or property to be tracked.    Before ruling on a request for a warrant, the judge may require the affiant to appear personally, and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses the affiant may produce. Such testimony shall be admissible at a hearing on a motion to suppress if taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment, transcribed, and made part of the affidavit. (Emphasis added.) The conversation between the judge and detective regarding the unitard photographs was not recorded, transcribed, or made a part of the affidavit. Nonetheless, that information may be considered in evaluating the detective’s good-faith reliance on the warrant under the totality of the circumstances, subject to any credibility determinations by the trial court. A few points compel this conclusion. {¶ 30} First, the explicit terms of the rule do not bar consideration of such evidence. The recording provision in Crim.R. 41(C)(2) is nestled into a paragraph focused entirely on a judge’s finding of probable cause when issuing a search warrant. Thus, it is not clear that the provision applies beyond the court’s review of the judge’s probable-cause determination. Further, it is a rule of admission, not a rule of exclusion: if the requirements of the rule are met, such “testimony shall be admissible at a hearing on a motion to suppress.” Nothing in the language of the rule directs that unrecorded and untranscribed evidence may not be considered in determining an officer’s good faith. 12 January Term, 2020 {¶ 31} The dissent concludes, based on the history of Crim.R. 41, that the rule should be read as prohibiting a court from considering unrecorded testimony for any purpose—not just a probable-cause determination. The recording requirement was included in Crim.R. 41 from the time of the rule’s adoption in 1973. See Katz, Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure: A Guide to Criminal Procedure in Ohio Under the New Criminal Rules 154-155 (1973). Thus, that requirement predated the United States Supreme Court’s announcement of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in its 1984 decision in Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. Given that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule had not been enunciated at the time that Crim.R. 41 was adopted, it is difficult to conclude that the rule was meant to prohibit the use of unrecorded sworn testimony for the purpose of evaluating good faith. {¶ 32} Rather, as the dissent notes, the recording requirement was made a part of the rule “to insure a later review of the finding of probable cause.” Katz at 157; see also 1 Katz, Giannelli, Lipton, & Crocker, Criminal Law, Section 9:10, 209 (3d Ed.2009) (testimony in support of an affidavit), and at fn. 1, citing Crim.R. 41(C) and Moya v. State, 335 Ark. 193, 202, 981 S.W.2d 521 (1998) (holding pursuant to a state procedural rule that a court may not consider unrecorded oral testimony in determining probable cause, but that such testimony could be used to determine whether an officer relied in good faith on an otherwise invalid warrant). Indeed, when supplemental testimony is recorded, the reviewing court may consider that information in its review of the issuing judge’s finding of probable cause; when the testimony is not recorded or transcribed, the court’s review of probable cause is limited to the four corners of the affidavit. See Katz, Giannelli, Lipton, & Crocker at 209; see also State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St.3d 1, 2015Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 39. {¶ 33} But even if we were to read the rule as requiring that all such statements be recorded, it would not change the result. We have previously held 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO that suppression is warranted for noncompliance with Crim.R. 41 only when the rule violation was of “constitutional magnitude,” Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d at 263, 490 N.E.2d 1236, or, in other words, “ ‘renders the search unconstitutional under traditional fourth amendment standards.’ ” (Emphasis deleted.) Id., quoting United States v. Vasser, 648 F.2d 507, 510 (9th Cir.1980). The Vasser court explained that evidence should be excluded for nonconstitutional rule violations only when “ ‘ “(1) there was ‘prejudice’ in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the Rule.” ’ ” Vasser at 510, quoting United States v. Radlick, 581 F.2d 225, 228 (9th Cir.1978), quoting United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377, 386 (2d Cir.1975). {¶ 34} None of those circumstances apply here. The Fourth Amendment has never been held to require suppression for a failure to record an oral conversation taken under oath as part of a warrant application. Indeed, the Amendment’s explicit terms require only that the probable-cause determination be “supported by oath or affirmation.” And as explained above, the court may consider all the circumstances in deciding whether the detective reasonably relied on the warrant. Nor is there any indication that the search would not have taken place or would have been more limited in scope had the oral conversation been transcribed. Indeed, the additional information provided to the judge about the inappropriate photographs of underage students further supported a finding of probable cause. Finally, there have been no allegations that either the judge or detective acted with deliberate intent to circumvent the rule’s recording requirement. {¶ 35} In addition, whether a court records an applicant officer’s statements has no bearing on the officer’s good-faith reliance on the warrant, because the officer has no control over the court’s recording and transcription procedures. It would seem unduly onerous, once probable cause has been established, to require 14 January Term, 2020 a court to delay issuing a search warrant until a court reporter is able to transcribe additional testimony and attach it to the warrant application. On the contrary, these are requirements that would likely be completed after the warrant has been issued, and the judge’s subsequent failure to ensure fulfillment of those requirements would have no bearing on the officer’s good-faith reliance that the warrant itself was based on probable cause. Indeed, the very fact that the issuing judge would take supplemental testimony from an officer during the application process would reasonably lead the officer to believe that the testimony has legal significance and is being properly considered in assessing probable cause. {¶ 36} For those reasons, we conclude that Crim.R. 41(C)(2) does not bar consideration of unrecorded oral testimony for the purpose of evaluating a detective’s good-faith reliance on the warrant. IV. Considering the Totality of the Information Presented to the Judge, the Detective’s Reliance on the Warrant was Reasonable {¶ 37} Following our remand in Dibble I, the trial court twice determined that the detective relied on the warrant in good faith. The only question that remains is whether the detective’s reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable, notwithstanding the trial court’s later determination that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. As explained above, we may consider “all of the circumstances,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, fn. 23, in evaluating the reasonableness of the detective’s reliance on the warrant. {¶ 38} The detective testified that he told the judge about the allegations regarding photographs taken by Dibble of underage students in “practically seethrough” unitards. And he expressed concern to the judge about where and how those photographs were being used. The judge issued the search warrant after hearing this testimony. Based on all the information known to the detective and provided to the judge at the time the warrant was issued, it was entirely reasonable for the detective to rely on the judge’s probable-cause determination. 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 39} This is not a situation in which the applying officer has intentionally omitted facts that, if included, would tend to undermine a finding of probable cause. Rather, the information pertaining to the unitard photographs further supported a probable-cause determination. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1320 (11th Cir.2002). {¶ 40} When viewing the affidavit in light of the totality of the information provided, the affidavit was not so lacking in indicia of probable cause that the detective’s reliance on it was unreasonable. And the oral testimony given to the judge provides additional support for the allegations in the affidavit. Even if the statement that Dibble took naked photographs of a former student does not itself allege a crime, it was not unreasonable for the detective to connect that conduct with the inappropriate photographs that Dibble had taken at school. And since all that information was provided to the judge as well, it was reasonable for the detective to rely on the judge’s verification that probable cause existed for the search. {¶ 41} The error in this case belongs to the judge, not the detective. Because application of the exclusionary rule would not serve to deter any bad police conduct, suppression is unwarranted. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Tenth District and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment reversed and cause remanded. KENNEDY, TUCKER, FISCHER, and STEWART, JJ., concur. DONNELLY, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’CONNOR, C.J. MICHAEL TUCKER, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for FRENCH, J. _________________ 16 January Term, 2020 DONNELLY, J., dissenting. {¶ 42} After multiple appeals arising from appellee Laurence Dibble’s 2010 motion to suppress, one very specific question remained before the trial court: was Detective Andrew Wuertz’s search-warrant affidavit, alleging an act of gross sexual imposition at the school in which Dibble taught, so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was unreasonable for any official to rely on it when deciding to search all of Dibble’s media and data-storage devices in his home? Appellant, the state, could not prevail on that question within the four corners of Detective Wuertz’s affidavit. Instead, it asserted that Detective Wuertz provided supplemental, unrecorded oral testimony to the issuing judge about an independent crime, which was not even mentioned in the warrant, that provided some indicia of probable cause to search Dibble’s media and data-storage devices in his home. {¶ 43} An even more specific question is now before this court: did Crim.R. 41(C)(2)2 prohibit Detective Wuertz’s alleged unrecorded oral testimony from being considered at Dibble’s suppression hearing? Decidedly, the answer is “yes.” Crim.R. 41(C)(2) unequivocally requires a warrant applicant’s supplemental testimony to be recorded in order for it to be “admissible at a hearing on a motion to suppress.” Because the fundamental purpose of Crim.R. 41(C)(2) is to prevent the state from providing unrecorded oral testimony to create probable cause post hoc and because that is precisely what the state did here, Detective Wuertz’s alleged unrecorded oral testimony should have been excluded from the evidence that the reviewing judge considered when ruling on Dibble’s motion to suppress. By 1. Crim.R. 41(C)(2) provides: Before ruling on a request for a warrant, the judge may require the affiant to appear personally, and may examine under oath the affiant and any witnesses the affiant may produce. Such testimony shall be admissible at a hearing on a motion to suppress if taken down by a court reporter or recording equipment, transcribed, and made part of the affidavit. 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO holding that the state is allowed to present unrecorded testimony to supplement a warrant affidavit at a suppression hearing to establish an officer’s good-faith reliance on a warrant, the majority is providing the state with a complete end run around the very protections intended by the rule. The majority’s holding paves the way for sloppy police work at best and perjury at worst. For these reasons, I dissent.