Opinion ID: 1202431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: undertaking to protect

Text: Gordon also argues that Boyd had a duty of reasonable care because Boyd undertook to protect him from Geleszinski. If Boyd breached this duty, Alaska Pacific is liable for Gordon's injuries under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Alaska Pacific contends that Boyd did not undertake to protect Gordon. The trial court apparently ruled that Boyd did undertake to break up the fight, but concluded that he exercised reasonable care as a matter of law. Even though one person is otherwise under no duty to another, if he voluntarily undertakes to protect the other he may be liable for his negligence in doing so. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 (1965) imposes liability on a defendant that negligently performs an undertaking to render services: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. We have relied on this principle to establish a duty of care in a variety of factual situations. For example, a city which undertakes to provide police protection to its residents has a duty to exercise reasonable care in providing those services. City of Kotzebue v. McLean, 702 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Alaska 1985). Similarly, a defendant that voluntarily supplies a ladder for access between a tugboat and a dock is under a duty to exercise some degree of care toward those using the ladder. Williams v. Municipality of Anchorage, 633 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1981). Finally, if the state voluntarily conducts building fire safety inspections, it must exercise reasonable care in conducting the inspection and abating known fire hazards. Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 240-41 (Alaska 1976). However, evidence that the undertaking is for the plaintiff's benefit is a prerequisite to liability; a plaintiff who does not produce such evidence is not entitled to a jury instruction on this theory. McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Ass'n, 546 P.2d 1305, 1309 n. 8 (Alaska 1976). Alaskan Village, Inc. v. Smalley, 720 P.2d 945, 947 (Alaska 1986). In Smalley we concluded that a landlord who undertook a duty to control dogs on rented premises is liable to one injured by his negligent failure to do so. Id. at 948. Gordon testified that, after he pulled Geleszinski off Irvine, he would not let Geleszinski go until someone came along, because Geleszinski was mean. When Boyd arrived and asked Gordon to release Geleszinski, Gordon replied, fine, but if I let him go and he hits me, we're going to have a ... problem. Gordon wanted to make sure that Geleszinski would not turn on him when Gordon let go. Gordon assumed that Boyd or other people got a hold of Geleszinski and led him away. He stated: I handed the guy over to Boyd. It was Boyd's trip, I was on Boyd's train, I was at Boyd's party. He was the president. He was told that  he took the responsibility of this guy. I turned him loose to him. I told him that if he turned him loose, we're going to have a problem. Boyd agreed that he took charge of Geleszinski after Gordon let go of him; he walked him ten to fifteen feet up the road, because Boyd did not want the altercation to start all over again. Reading this testimony in the light most favorable to Gordon, we conclude that a jury might find Boyd undertook to prevent Geleszinski from fighting. This undertaking could be found to give rise to a correlative duty to protect those with whom he would foreseeably fight. Gordon was one such person.