Opinion ID: 6534115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Frosty's Entry into Mr. Pier's Vehicle

Text: [¶61] The actions of Frosty the drug dog might supply probable cause for the search, and so I will deal with that issue. Although this Court has not had a prior opportunity to address the circumstances in which a drug dog's entry into a vehicle during an exterior sniff is permissible under the Fourth Amendment, several other jurisdictions have weighed in on the question. What has emerged is a generally accepted two-part test. I will begin my analysis with that test and its origin and then address the district court's findings and conclusions under the test.
[¶62] It is well established that an exterior canine sniff of a car during a lawful traffic stop is not a search under the Fourth Amendment. Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 , 409, 125 S.Ct. 834 , 838, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005) ; see also Engdahl v. State , 2014 WY 76 , ¶ 14, 327 P.3d 114 , 118 (Wyo. 2014). If, however, a drug dog enters a vehicle during an exterior sniff, that entry may implicate Fourth Amendment concerns because [p]eople have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the interior of their automobiles. United States v. Lujan , 398 Fed. Appx. 347 , 350 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Stone , 866 F.2d 359 , 363 (10th Cir. 1989) ). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first court to address such a circumstance with its 1989 decision in Stone , and a number of other jurisdictions then followed suit. See, e.g. , United States v. Guidry , 817 F.3d 997 , 1006 (7th Cir. 2016) ; United States v. Sharp , 689 F.3d 616 , 620 (6th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Mostowicz , 471 Fed. Appx. 887 , 890-91 (11th Cir. 2012) ; United States v. Pierce , 622 F.3d 209 , 213-14 (3rd Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Lyons , 486 F.3d 367 , 373 (8th Cir. 2007) ; State v. Miller , 367 N.C. 702 , 766 S.E.2d 289 , 296 (2014) ; United States v. Hutchinson , 471 F.Supp.2d 497 , 506 (M.D. Pa. 2007). [¶63] In Stone , the defendant was stopped for speeding and denied the violation, insisting that he was being careful because he had already been cited that day for speeding. Stone , 866 F.2d at 361 . When the officer asked to see the earlier ticket, the defendant opened his hatchback to retrieve it. Id . While the hatchback was still open, another officer arrived with a drug dog and began an exterior sniff of the vehicle. Id . The dog circled the vehicle, showed interest under the rear of the car and at the passenger door, and then jumped in the open hatchback and keyed on a duffle bag. Id . Upon searching the bag, officers found 33,000 methaqualone tablets. Id . The court acknowledged the expectation of privacy an individual has in his vehicle's interior but nonetheless upheld the search. Id. at 363-64 . It explained: We agree with the district judge that the dog's instinctive actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. There is no evidence, nor does Stone contend, that the police asked Stone to open the hatchback so the dog could jump in. Nor is there any evidence the police handler encouraged the dog to jump in the car.... The judge asked the Officer in charge of the dog: So you didn't encourage him or discourage him from jumping into the back? And the Officer replied: That's correct. I just let his leash go and let him go where his nose would take him. ... In these circumstances, we think the police remained within the range of activities they may permissibly engage in when they have reasonable suspicion to believe an automobile contains narcotics. Stone , 866 F.2d at 364 . [¶64] Since Stone, the Tenth Circuit has further refined the test for determining the legality of a dog's entry into a vehicle during an exterior sniff and has upheld such sniffs when: (1) the dog's leap into the car was instinctual rather than orchestrated and (2) the officers did not ask the driver to open the point of entry, such as a hatchback or window, used by the dog. United States v. Vazquez , 555 F.3d 923 , 930 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Stone , 866 F.2d at 364 and United States v. Winningham , 140 F.3d 1328 , 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1998) ); see also  United States v. Moore , 795 F.3d 1224 , 1232 (10th Cir. 2015) ; Felders v. Malcom , 755 F.3d 870 , 880 (10th Cir. 2014) ; United States v. Lujan , 398 Fed. Appx. 347 , 350 (10th Cir. 2010). [¶65] The two-part test is aimed at determining whether officers acted with an intent to facilitate an interior vehicle search. Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1331 . This focus makes sense because the Fourth Amendment addresses 'misuse of power,'    not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct. Brower v. Cty. of Inyo , 489 U.S. 593 , 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378 , 1381, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989) (quoting Byars v. United States , 273 U.S. 28 , 33, 47 S.Ct. 248 , 250, 71 L.Ed. 520 (1927) ). As the North Carolina Supreme Court explained: If a police dog is acting without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler (in the words of Sharp, acting instinctively), it cannot be said that a State or governmental actor intends to do anything. In such a case, the dog is simply being a dog. If, however, police misconduct is present, or if the dog is acting at the direction or guidance of its handler, then it can be readily inferred from the dog's action that there is an intent to find something or to obtain information. See Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1330-31 (invalidating a search on such grounds). Miller , 766 S.E.2d at 296 .
[¶66] The two-part test required the State to make two showings: (1) that Frosty's vehicle entry was instinctual rather than orchestrated; and (2) that the officers did not create the point of entry. Vazquez , 555 F.3d at 930 . Because the vehicle's entry point was created before Trooper Kirlin and Frosty arrived at the traffic stop, I begin with the district court's ruling on the test's second prong. I will then address the district court's finding that Frosty's entry into the vehicle was instinctual.
[¶67] The district court found that Mr. Pier, not the officers, created the entry point into his truck. 42. ... Trooper Kirlin did not facilitate Frosty's sniff of the interior of Mr. Pier's vehicle by opening the door. The door to Mr. Pier's vehicle was open because Mr. Pier failed to shut it when Deputy Colling asked him to exit the vehicle. [¶68] Mr. Pier claims the district court erred in this finding. First, he likens this case to Winningham , where the Tenth Circuit held that law enforcement's act of leaving a vehicle's door open until the drug dog arrived evidenced their intent to facilitate an interior dog sniff and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1331 . Additionally, he contends that because Deputy Colling would not permit him to return to his vehicle to secure it and Deputy Colling refused to close the vehicle door himself, it was Deputy Colling who was responsible for creating the entry point. I disagree. 9 [¶69] First, Winningham is factually different from this case. In Winningham , New Mexico border agents stopped a van on suspicion of carrying undocumented aliens. Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1329 . One of the agents requested and was given consent to search the van for illegal passengers and opened the van's sliding door to conduct that search. Id . The search revealed no other passengers, and the agent then requested and was given consent to run a drug dog around the van's exterior. Id . When the canine unit arrived five or six minutes later, the handler began the exterior sniff with the dog leashed. Id . As they approached the rear of the van, however, the handler detected a just noticeable change in the dog's behavior and unleashed the dog. Id . at 1329-30. The dog then jumped into the van, methodically sniffed its interior, and eventually alerted on a rear vent where the agents found fifty kilograms of marijuana. Id . at 1330.  [¶70] In holding the interior sniff violated the Fourth Amendment, the court observed: In Mr. Winningham's case, the officers themselves opened the door, allowing the van to sit on the side of the highway with the sliding door wide open for a period of at least six minutes until the drug dog could arrive. The dog handler then unleashed the dog as the dog neared the open door. A desire to facilitate a dog sniff of the van's interior, absent in Stone, seems readily apparent here. Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1331 (footnote omitted). [¶71] In contrast to Winningham , in this case it was Mr. Pier who opened his vehicle door and left it open, not Deputy Colling. See Guidry , 817 F.3d at 1006 (distinguishing Winningham where defendant, not officers, opened door); United States v. Nance , 2010 WL 4004782 , -21 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (same); United States v. Woods , 2008 WL 11396770 ,  (D. Kan. 2008) (upholding search where defendant left door open and rejecting argument that officers created entry point by requiring defendant to exit vehicle). Additionally, Deputy Colling's refusal to allow Mr. Pier to return to his vehicle was a decision made for safety reasons, not to facilitate an interior search. Deputy Colling cited his concern with Mr. Pier's aggressive behavior and the presence of knives in the vehicle, and testified that [b]ased on his actions, and the fact that there were knives in the vehicle, I wasn't going to let him touch his vehicle nor shut his door. That makes this case less like Winningham and more like Mostowicz , an Eleventh Circuit case where the court concluded: Mostowicz contends that the officers facilitated [K-9] Cody's search when they handcuffed him before he had an opportunity to close his door. But nothing evidences that the officers instructed Mostowicz to leave open his door. And, as we have discussed, the officers handcuffed Mostowicz based on their reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, not to facilitate the dog sniff. Mostowicz , 471 Fed. Appx. at 891 . [¶72] Finally, I reject Mr. Pier's argument that Deputy Colling was responsible for creating the entry point because he refused to close the door himself. An officer has no affirmative duty to close vehicle entry points in preparation for an exterior sniff. Sharp , 689 F.3d at 619 ; Lyons , 486 F.3d at 373 . As the Eighth Circuit explained: Appellants do not cite to any authority that holds that the officers had the affirmative duty to close the windows in preparation for the dog sniff, and we find none. Instead, appellants rely on United States v. Winningham , 140 F.3d 1328 , 1329-30 (10th Cir. 1998) [.] .... Winningham does not help appellants here, as both Trooper Brehm and Sgt. Duis, in the words of the district court, took the situation as [they] found it. Lyons , 486 F.3d at 373 . [¶73] For these reasons, I would find no clear error in the district court's conclusion that Mr. Pier, not the officers, created the entry point through which Frosty accessed the interior of Mr. Pier's vehicle.
[¶74] As to the remaining prong of the two-part analysis, the requirement that a dog's vehicle entry during an exterior sniff be instinctual rather than law enforcement-orchestrated, the district court again concluded that the State met its burden of proof. Citing Deputy Colling's testimony, the court found that Frosty entered Mr. Pier's vehicle spontaneously and not at Trooper Kirlin's command or encouragement. Based on my record review, I must disagree. For reasons that are not apparent from the record, the State did not call Trooper Kirlin as a witness in the suppression hearing. For the reasons that follow, I believe this left a gap in the State's evidence that was not filled by Deputy Colling's testimony. 10 I would therefore  conclude that the district court clearly erred in ruling that the State met its burden of proof on this prong of the two-part test. [¶75] A dog's vehicle entry is instinctual if the dog enters the vehicle without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional action by its handler. Pierce , 622 F.3d at 214 . The Sixth Circuit has summarized the required inquiry: [W]hile it is a Fourth Amendment violation for a narcotics canine to be trained to jump into cars, it is not a Fourth Amendment violation for a dog to jump into a car on its own volition and instinct when sniffing for drugs, as long as the dog's behavior has not been facilitated by law enforcement. This inquiry focuses on the police's conduct in training the dog before the search and the officers' conduct during the search. It is a Fourth Amendment violation for a narcotics detection dog to jump into a car because of something the police did, like training the dog to jump into cars as part of the search or facilitating or encouraging the jump. Sharp , 689 F.3d at 620 . [¶76] In addressing whether Frosty's entry into Mr. Pier's vehicle was instinctual as opposed to law enforcement-orchestrated, the district court found: 42. Here, Deputy Colling testified that he did not see Trooper Kirlin command or encourage Frosty to enter into the vehicle but, instead, led him around the vehicle to conduct a standard sniff of the vehicle. After Frosty spontaneously entered the vehicle, he alerted to the presence of a controlled substance. [¶77] The record does not support this finding. First, Deputy Colling did not testify that he did not see Trooper Kirlin command or encourage Frosty to enter the vehicle. Deputy Colling testified: [Trooper Kirlin] led his dog around from the-from the driver's side, so he started at the back, the back driver's side of the truck. He led his dog towards the front of the vehicle. I saw Trooper Kirlin walk past the open door and directed Frosty towards the front quarter panel of the vehicle in front of the open door. Frosty stopped by the driver's side door that was already open. I saw Frosty sniff in the air and then Frosty jumped into the vehicle. I'm not a K9 handler, but it appeared that Frosty stuck his nose right by that black bag and kind of stiffened up. Trooper Kirlin told me later that Frosty had alerted to the odor of a controlled substance. [¶78] Deputy Colling was not asked whether Trooper Kirlin commanded or encouraged Frosty to enter Mr. Pier's vehicle, and he did not volunteer any such testimony. His testimony was simply silent on that question. Moreover, on cross-examination, Deputy Colling was reluctant to commit to Trooper Kirlin's actions. Q.    Now, did Trooper Kirlin, when he was walking the dog around there, he had the dog on the leash, correct? A. Correct. Q. He did try to pull the dog out of the truck when the dog jumped into the truck? A. I don't know. You'd have to ask him. Q. Okay. So you don't know, but he left the dog in there and the dog got all the way into the center of the pickup truck before it alerted, correct? A. I couldn't tell you exactly at what point he alerted. I know that he locked up on the-on the center console of the vehicle.    Q. So how long was the drug sniff dog inside the vehicle? A. A few seconds. I don't know exactly how long. Q. Well, what were you doing when all this was happening? Were you observing Mr.-or Trooper Kirlin when he was running the dog. A. Yes. Q. You observed him, but you don't recall whether    Trooper Kirlin pulled the dog-tried to pull the dog out of the vehicle? A. No. No. And I-to observe very minute body movements from another office[r] or another person in general is very difficult.  Q. You observed all of the body movements from Mr. Pier, and you couldn't observe Officer-or Trooper Kirlin? A. I don't recall him trying to pull the dog out of the vehicle. [¶79] Deputy Colling's reservations are understandable. Courts, including this Court, have recognized that a drug dog's handler is uniquely qualified to interpret that dog's behaviors during a sniff. See Phippen , ¶ 16, 297 P.3d at 109 (recognizing drug dog may exhibit behaviors during sniff that will have meaning to handler but not to officer who lacks the same training and experience with the dog); United States v. Ludwig , 10 F.3d 1523 , 1528 (10th Cir. 1993) (giving greater weight to handler testimony to resolve discrepancy between handler and non-handler testimony). As the Sixth Circuit observed: [T]he primary issue in determining the credibility of a dog's alert is not the capability or ability of a dog to accurately identify particular scents, but is instead the communication between the handler and the dog based on that indisputable ability. This determination in turn rests almost entirely on the credibility of the dog handler's testimony because the handler is the only witness who can speak to the subjective interaction during a particular dog alert. United States v. Howard , 621 F.3d 433 , 449 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied , 562 U.S. 1278 , 131 S.Ct. 1623 , 179 L.Ed.2d 514 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation to district court decision omitted); United States v. Christian , 452 Fed. Appx. 283 , 286 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Howard , 621 F.3d at 449 ). 11 [¶80] This brings me to the deficit I find in the evidence before the district court: Trooper Kirlin did not testify at the suppression hearing. The absence of handler testimony distinguishes this case from other cases addressing a dog's vehicle entry during an exterior sniff. In the great majority of cases I have reviewed, the courts expressly relied on handler testimony to determine whether the dog acted instinctively or was trained, encouraged, or guided to enter a vehicle. See United States v. Almeida , 2012 WL 75751 , , 12 (D. Me. 2012) ; Guidry , 817 F.3d at 1002 , 1006 ; Sharp , 689 F.3d at 620 ; Pierce , 622 F.3d at 210 , 214 ; Lujan , 398 Fed. Appx. at 351 ; Vazquez , 555 F.3d at 930 ; Lyons , 486 F.3d at 373 ; Winningham , 140 F.3d at 1329-30 , 1331 ; Stone , 866 F.2d at 364 ; Nance , 2010 WL 4004782 ,  ; Woods , 2008 WL 11396770 ,  ; Hutchinson , 471 F.Supp.2d at 510 n.10 ; State v. Warsaw , 125 N.M. 8 , 956 P.2d 139 , 142-43 (N.M. App. 1997). In these cases, the courts had sufficient evidence to determine whether the drug dog in question had been trained or encouraged in any manner to enter the vehicle. In this case, that evidence is entirely lacking. 12 [¶81] I reiterate that I do not intend to suggest that the State may only prove the legality of this type of search with handler testimony. It may be that the State can make the required showing that a drug dog acted instinctively with other qualified evidence. In this case, however, Deputy Colling was by his own admission unable to interpret either Frosty's or Trooper Kirlin's actions, and the State offered no other evidence to aid in that  interpretation. Additionally, while this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, this does not give the Court leeway to interpret the actions of Trooper Kirlin and Frosty. The record does not tell us how Frosty was trained to respond to open vehicles, Frosty's past experience with open vehicles, how Trooper Kirlin handled Frosty on the leash, or the cues, if any, Trooper Kirlin may have given Frosty. Without that information, any meaning this Court may attach to the actions of Trooper Kirlin and Frosty would go beyond drawing favorable inferences from the evidence and amount to no more than speculation. [¶82] Based on the lack of evidence explaining or interpreting the actions of Trooper Kirlin and Frosty, I would conclude that the district court clearly erred when it found the State had met its burden of proving the legality of Frosty's vehicle entry. I therefore dissent, and I would suppress the drugs seized during the search.