Opinion ID: 200829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Vacate and Motion to Reconsider

Text: 16 Rule 55(c) applies different standards for setting aside an entry of default under Rule 55(a) and a judgment by default under Rule 55(b). A court may set aside an entry of default for good cause. This standard is a liberal one, Coon v. Grenier, 867 F.2d 73, 76 (1st Cir. 1989); the relevant factors are whether (1) the default was willful, (2) a set-aside would prejudice plaintiff, and (3) the alleged defense was meritorious. Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373 (D.C.Cir.1980). By contrast, the court can set aside a final judgment by default only in accordance with Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)(1), the provision relevant here, requires a showing of excusable neglect to win relief from a final judgment. 6 This is a demanding standard. See Coon, 867 F.2d at 76. It allows the court, where appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control. Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 123 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993). 7 However, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute `excusable' neglect.... Id. at 392. We have said that, while other factors play an important role in the excusable neglect analysis, the reason-for-delay factor will always be critical to the inquiry.... Hospital del Maestro v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 263 F.3d 173, 175 (1st Cir.2001)(quoting Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir. 2000)). We have also recognized that 17 a trial judge has wide discretion in dealing with a litigant whose predicament results from blatant ignorance of clear or easily ascertainable rules, and, if the trial judge decides that such neglect is not excusable in the particular case, we will not meddle unless we are persuaded that some exceptional justification exists. Quebecor Printing, 270 F.3d at 6-7. 8 18 In this case, Rodríguez filed two motions after the judgment by default: the motion to vacate and the motion to reconsider. Although the motion to vacate did not invoke Rule 60(b), and the district court did not explicitly rely on Rule 60(b) in its decision, the motion was nonetheless a Rule 60(b) motion because it sought to vacate a final judgment by default that, by the explicit terms of Rule 55(c), may be set ... aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). Rodríguez's second motion — the motion to reconsider — essentially restated his claims from the motion to vacate, but this time the court explicitly analyzed the motion under Rule 60(b). In essence, the court allowed Rodríguez a second chance to argue his prior motion to vacate. For the purposes of this appeal, we accept the district court's analytical framework and will treat the motion to reconsider as a Rule 60(b) motion. 9 We review the district court's denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 277 (1st Cir.1993)(District courts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding motions brought under Civil Rule 60(b). We review such rulings only for abuse of that wide discretion.).