Opinion ID: 1358458
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Heading: There was a joint venture to sell the ranch.

Text: Defendants contend that there was no express agreement between the parties concerning a commission for a sale of the View Point Ranch and their relationship was not a joint venture. We start with the rule that a joint adventure is never presumed and that the burden of establishing it is upon the party who alleges it. Long v. S.I.A.C., 246 Or. 187, 192, 424 P.2d 236 (1967). It is the rule in Oregon, however, that a contract of joint adventure need not be express, but may be implied in whole or in part from the conduct of the parties. Suitter v. Thompson et ux., 225 Or. 614, 627, 358 P.2d 267 (1961); Lane v. National Ins. Agency, 148 Or. 589, 596, 37 P.2d 365 (1934). Indeed, in Salem-Fairfield Tel. Assn. v. McMahan, 78 Or. 477, 482, 153 P. 788, 789 (1915), this court said that although a joint venture is usually created by express or implied agreement, equity will look through the entire transaction    in order to promote justice and held that under the circumstances of that case a joint venture was created by operation of law. It has also been said that the usual rule of contract law to the effect that the terms of a contract must be definite and certain is enforced less vigorously in contracts of joint venture than in other types of contracts, particularly in cases in which the joint venture is not wholly executory, but has been wholly or partially executed. 2 Rowley on Partnerships (2d ed. 1960) 468, § 52.3, and Mason v. Rose, 176 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.1949). This result would appear to follow from the established rule that a joint venture for a single undertaking may be implied from the conduct of the parties. But see Reed et al. v. Montgomery, 180 Or. 196, 175 P.2d 986 (1947). Thus, even though there has been no express agreement on the subject of dividing the profits of a joint venture, the law may imply an agreement for equal division of any profits. Indeed, when two parties enter into a joint venture the prima facie inference is that they are equally interested and entitled to an equal share of any profits, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See Guis v. Coffinberry, 39 Or. 414, 419, 65 P. 358 (1901), and Campell's Gas Burner Co. v. Hammer, 78 Or. 612, 618, 153 P. 475 (1916). Cf. Walls v. Gribble, 168 Or. 542, 124 P.2d 713 (1942). An agreement between real estate brokers to work together in an effort to sell property and to share the commission on the sale is commonly held to be a joint venture, despite some decisions to the contrary. See Annot., 171 A.L.R. 1012, 1014 (1947). This has also been the rule adopted by this court. Stark et al. v. McKenna et al., 124 Or. 332, 348, 263 P. 391 (1928). In this case the evidence clearly shows that Mr. McNulty and Mr. Casteel agreed to work together in an attempt to sell this ranch and to share equally any commissions resulting from such a sale. We hold that in doing so they were engaged in a joint venture and, as such, were in a fiduciary relationship with each other. Walls v. Gribble, supra, 168 Or. at 546, 124 P.2d 713, and McIver v. Norman, 187 Or. 516, 522, 205 P.2d 137, 213 P.2d 144 (1949). As real estate brokers they also were in a fiduciary relationship with the owner of the ranch. Parker v. Faust, 222 Or. 526, 529-530, 353 P.2d 550 (1960).