Opinion ID: 1967394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: instruction regarding credibility of john eddy

Text: Both defendants assert that the trial justice erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury regarding the assessment of John Eddy's credibility. We disagree. The trial justice instructed the jury with respect to witness Eddy's testimony as follows: Now, with regard to state's witness, Mr. Eddy. You have heard testimony here concerning considerations that were given to him in return for his agreement to testify for the state. You have heard all of that evidence and I will not rehash it or review it with you because your recollection is all, I am certain, fresh enough. You have the right, as you consider the testimony, all evidence [ sic ] to take into account the plea bargaining agreement or agreements entered into between Mr. Eddy and the state of Rhode Island. You may take into account the promise he received or the recommendations offered to him in return for his cooperation with the state in the prosecution of these two defendants. And you have a right to take into account whether or not those promises affected or influenced the credibility or the noncredibility of Mr. Eddy's in-Court testimony given here during the course of the trial. The mere fact that promises or considerations have been extended to a witness does not automatically mean that that witness's testimony is not to be believed by the jury. You are the judges of the facts. You have to decide whether or not Mr. Eddy came here and testified falsely in whole or in part because of the promises made to him or whether or not he came here and testified truthfully as to the facts that he testified to. That is your obligation and that is your responsibility as the judges of the facts. Additionally, the trial justice instructed the jury generally as to credibility: You have to judge the credibility of each and every one of those witnesses who came here. You have to judge whether or not you are going to accept or reject their testimony in whole or in part. You are the judges of the credibility of the evidence that came from the witness stand. Now, in determining the weight and in determining the degree of credibility that you will give to a witness's testimony, you have the right to take into account as you assess and evaluate the testimony of all evidence here, the appearance of the witness, his or her manner of testifying, his or her apparent candor and fairness or lack of same. His or her bias or prejudice. His or her interest, if any, in the final outcome of this case and his or her apparent intelligence or lack of intelligence about the matters that are in controversy. You should always keep in mind that in considering the credibility and the weight that you will give to a witness's testimony you are not required to believe something to be a fact only because a witness or witnesses have stated that to be a fact. If in the light of all the evidence before you, you believe that a witness or witnesses are mistaken or that they have testified falsely to a fact, then you have absolutely the right to disregard that witness's testimony in whole or in part. The defendants claim as error the trial justice's refusal to instruct the jury in accordance with the following requested instructions: If the jury believes from the evidence that any person was induced to testify in this case by any promise from further punishment, or that any hope was held out or entertained by him that he would be rewarded or in any wise benefit if he implicated the defendant in the crimes charges herein, the jury must take such fact into consideration in determining what weight should be given to the testimony, closely scrutinize it and unless they can reconcile it with the truth, completely reject it. In weighing the testimony of a witness who testified under any promise of reward, the jury must consider that such promise of reward itself is a strong impelling reason for the witness to color and fabricate his testimony, and that such testimony must be weighed with a great deal of care and circumspection. (Emphasis added.) In State v. Fenner , this court rejected an argument identical to the one we are presented with today. The instruction requested by defendants in this case is exactly the same as the one we considered in Fenner and proclaimed to be tantamount to a peremptory instruction that [the witness's] testimony be disregarded in the event that it be found that he was induced to testify by promises of leniency. 503 A.2d at 525. In Fenner, this court noted that it is probably better practice for a trial justice to avoid giving [specific] instructions    and to rely instead upon general instructions concerning credibility, motivation, bias, and the like. Id. Indeed we emphasized that [c]ounsel rather than the court are the appropriate agents to argue to the jury concerning the specific credibility or lack thereof of a particular witness. Id.; see State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575 (R.I. 1987). It is our determination, therefore, that the trial justice correctly instructed the jury with respect to the assessment of John Eddy's credibility.