Opinion ID: 1743543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reasonable Inferences

Text: Deana argues that all the Lozanos were involved in Junior's abduction scheme and that their involvement may reasonably be inferred from their respective conduct, such as refusing to share information with Deana, providing financial assistance to Junior, delaying discovery, asserting their Fifth Amendment privileges to resist her requests for discovery, and undermining her efforts to locate Bianca by removing posters and slandering her. She urges that we consider the totality of the known circumstances in determining the legal sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Felker v. Petrolon, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 460, 464 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (In reviewing circumstantial evidence, we must look at the totality of the known circumstances rather than reviewing each piece of evidence in isolation.). Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish any material fact, but it must transcend mere suspicion. Browning-Ferris, 865 S.W.2d at 928. The material fact must be reasonably inferred from the known circumstances. Joske v. Irvine, 91 Tex. 574, 44 S.W. 1059, 1064 (1898)(inference is merely a deduction from proven facts). By its very nature, circumstantial evidence often involves linking what may be apparently insignificant and unrelated events to establish a pattern. Browning-Ferris, 865 S.W.2d at 927. Thus, each piece of circumstantial evidence must be viewed not in isolation, but in light of all the known circumstances. Brinegar v. Porterfield, 705 S.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986), aff'd, 719 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.1986); State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Vandiver, 970 S.W.2d 731, 736 (Tex.App.-Waco 1998, no writ). With these principles in mind, I next examine whether the evidence provides legal support for the jury's verdict against each defendant.
Sandra gave Junior a $1000 check three weeks before the abduction. Deana asserts that Sandra's check was intended to help fund Junior's abduction plans, and Junior no doubt used the money for this purpose. At the time of the abduction, Junior did not own a car, did not have a steady job and was behind in his temporary child support payments. Junior had never been able to support himself without some assistance from his parents, and thus Deana suspected that Junior could not have successfully abducted Bianca without some financial assistance from his family. In light of the charge submitted to the jury, I must look for some evidence that Sandra knew that her check would aid or assist Junior's abduction plans. Even in the absence of direct evidence, we could affirm the judgment if there were any circumstantial evidence of such knowledge. For example, evidence that Sandra had never before given a relative such a large gift might be some evidence that would support the verdict. But the only evidence in this record is that the check was given and that Junior needed money to accomplish his plan. Without more, this is no probative evidence of Sandra's intent to aid or assist Junior. Deana also urges that Sandra's conduct during discovery is some evidence that she knowingly aided Junior in abducting or concealing Bianca. Sandra, like the other members of her family, asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege rather than answer certain questions posed by Deana during discovery. Acting pro se, Sandra initially declined to give the names and addresses of relatives and friends in Mexico, [1] refused to identify any person assisting her in answering the questions, [2] and also invoked the Fifth Amendment to protect the identity of her employer. [3] Some months later, after retaining an attorney, she amended her answers to the interrogatories, withdrawing her assertions of privilege and answering Deana's questions. Deana nevertheless argues that because Sandra initially invoked the privilege, the jury could infer that she either knew where Junior and Bianca were hiding or had conspired with others to conceal their whereabouts so that to provide certain information would be incriminating. In a civil case, a fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from a party's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety Officers Ass'n v. Denton, 897 S.W.2d 757, 763 (Tex.1995); Tex.R. Evid. 513(c). But the negative inferences that Deana suggests are not reasonable under the circumstances disclosed in this record. While Sandra's earlier assertion of the privilege may have influenced the jury's view of her credibility, that assertion is not enough to prove the opposite of what Sandra testified the facts to be. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 761, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983) (claim of privilege is not a substitute for relevant evidence); Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551 (judgment based only on invocation of privilege and without regard to the other evidence exceeds constitutional bounds); see also Tweeddale v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 841 F.2d 643, 645 (5th Cir.1988) (taxpayer cannot use privilege to meet his burden of proof in proceeding he instituted); Custody of Two Minors, 396 Mass. 610, 487 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (1986) (adverse inference is not sufficient, by itself, to meet an opponent's burden of proof). Sandra's assertion of the Fifth Amendment does not show her culpability either by itself or in conjunction with her giving Junior the $1000 check. Deana also complains, however, that Sandra's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege and other objections to discovery aided Junior in delaying Deana's search for Bianca. Deana further submits that even after Sandra waived the Fifth Amendment and supplemented her answers to interrogatories, much of the information she provided was incomplete or wrong. But our record does not disclose that Deana complained about incomplete discovery before trial. Had she presented this complaint to the trial court, she might have obtained the information more quickly with the court's help. Instead, Deana proceeded to trial on the proof she had. Because she failed to present any specific discovery complaint to the trial court, I would not now permit Deana to transmogrify these assertions into some evidence of a statutory violation. Nor is there any evidence that Sandra's delay in responding fully to Deana's interrogatories in any way aided or assisted Junior in concealing Bianca. Deana shared her suspicions with the investigating authorities. The police questioned family members, kept the Lozanos' house under surveillance, subpoenaed the Lozanos' phone records, and followed up on leads in Mexico. Deana offered no evidence that the police or any other government body found anything to confirm that Junior and Bianca were living in Mexico or that Junior was in contact with relatives or friends there. Finally, Deana argues that Sandra's intent to aid Junior may be inferred from Sandra's remarks following the abduction. Deana asserts that Sandra accused her of abusing Bianca while trying to convince two employees in a doctor's office to remove one of the posters identifying Junior and Bianca. The two employees testified that after they refused, either Sandra or Blanca asked them to reconsider because Deana had abused the child. Although Sandra is never identified as the party making the accusation, the court of appeals deduced that Sandra, rather than Blanca, must have uttered the slanderous remark because one witness only remembered Blanca specifically mentioning her attempt to file child abuse charges with the District Attorney. Contrary to the court of appeals, I do not believe that this is enough to affirm the jury's award of damages for slander against Sandra while reversing a similar award against Blanca. 983 S.W.2d at 792-94. Deana concedes that neither witness specified who made the remark, but she urges us to attribute the remark to both defendants. I would not do so. This is not a case in which both parties clearly committed a wrong contributing to plaintiff's injury. Cf. Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731, 734 (1952) (when individual liability cannot be apportioned with reasonable certainty between two wrongdoers each contributing to the injury, plaintiff may hold wrongdoers jointly and severally liable). Nor is it a case in which one defendant was authorized to speak on behalf of the other. See, e.g., 4 J. Hadley Edgar, Jr. & James B. Sales, Texas Torts and Remedies § 52.06[3] (2000) (agency law binds principal for agent's slanderous communications if made in course and scope). Nor is there a finding that Blanca and Sandra conspired to defame Deana. See, e.g., Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.1996) (quoting Triplex Communications, Inc. v. Riley, 900 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.1995) (`civil conspiracy requires specific intent' to agree `to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means.')). Although Deana pled civil conspiracy as a part of her claim against the Lozanos, she did not submit the elements of a conspiracy to the jury, but instead asked the jury to consider each defendant individually. In light of this submission, we may only consider the evidence which pertains to Sandra specifically. Justice Baker assumes in his dissent, however, that Sandra was part of a Lozano family conspiracy to abduct Bianca. He speculates that Sandra herself removed posters because other family members did. He surmises that Sandra asked the doctor's employees to remove a poster and accused Deana of child abuse when they refused because she accompanied her mother to the doctor's office, and at least one of the two made such statements. Justice Baker also infers that Sandra intended to assist Junior financially in his crime because she gave him a check that he did not cash until after the abduction. Finally, he suggests that Sandra used her Fifth Amendment privilege to aid or assist Junior in some manner. To support his conclusion, Justice Baker seems to rely on suspicion and conjecture rather than on known facts. But suspicion and conjecture are not evidence. Browning-Ferris, 865 S.W.2d at 928; Kindred, 650 S.W.2d at 63. Legally sufficient circumstantial evidence requires a logical bridge between the proffered evidence and the necessary fact. See Joske, 44 S.W. at 1064 (inference is merely a deduction from proven facts). Although Justice Baker argues that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to make this bridge, he never pieces these circumstances together to make the requisite connection, and in lieu of such analysis, he substitutes only his own suspicion. Our law, however, does not permit the citizen to be deprived of his property, his liberty, or his life upon mere surmise or suspicion, and places upon a trained judiciary the grave responsibility of determining as a question of law whether the testimony establishes more. Id. at 1062. Because there is no evidence that Sandra knowingly aided or assisted Junior in the abduction or concealment of Bianca, I concur in the Court's decision to affirm the judgment of the court of appeals that plaintiff take nothing from Sandra Lozano Warner.
Deana argues that Blanca aided and assisted Junior in concealing Bianca by asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege, delaying discovery, taking down posters, and accusing Deana of child abuse. Deana further contends that Blanca aided Junior in the abduction by misrepresenting Junior's intentions and concealing other significant information from her. Blanca and Juan were the last family members to see Junior and Bianca before they disappeared. Although they both maintained that Junior and Bianca slept in Junior's room Friday and Saturday night, they never actually saw either father or child after Friday evening. When Junior finally called Sunday afternoon, Blanca apparently was neither curious about where he had gone nor what he had been doing. Further, when Deana called, concerned as to why Junior was late returning Bianca, Blanca misrepresented that Junior and the child were on their way to Deana's. Although she had not seen Junior in two days and knew there were no visible signs that the child had spent any appreciable time in their home that weekend, Blanca did not provide this information to Deana in any of their several conversations Sunday evening. Far from sharing Deana's concern, Blanca soon simply quit taking her calls. Blanca testified that she did not see Bianca after Friday and conceded that there were no signs that Junior had fed [Bianca] or [done] anything in [the Lozanos'] house that weekend. Blanca exhibited no apparent misgivings at not having shared more time with Bianca during visitation that weekend, testifying that it was not uncommon for Junior to take the baby away from home to the park, to the mall, and even to Galveston during visitation. In contrast to Blanca's attitude that weekend, Deana testified that Blanca was ordinarily so intent on spending time with her granddaughter that her visits to Bianca's daycare became disruptive and had to be curtailed. The record further reveals that Blanca attempted to remove some of the posters seeking information about the abduction, and succeeded in doing so on at least two occasions. An employee at a Conoco station testified that Blanca removed one poster and later returned to ask that others be taken down. The owner of an automobile inspection station testified that Blanca removed a poster on his property, justifying her actions when challenged by vaguely alluding to problems of child abuse. Blanca also tried unsuccessfully to remove posters displayed at the doctor's office she visited with Sandra. As I have already discussed, the doctor's employees rebuffed this attempt. The police detective investigating Bianca's abduction testified to the importance of informing the public about the abduction, agreeing with Deana's attorney that destroying posters would interfere with his efforts to apprehend Junior. Blanca explained, however, that she removed these posters because they were embarrassing and harassing to her family. The court of appeals found her explanation to be equally as plausible as Deana's theory that Blanca removed the posters to inhibit the search for Bianca. 983 S.W.2d at 792. The court further concluded that Blanca's reluctance to share information with Deana was just as likely a product of animosity over Deana's divorce and custody dispute with Junior as it was her desire to aid Junior in concealing Bianca. Id. at 791-92. This may all be true. But as I have discussed, the mere fact that more than one reasonable inference may be drawn from this evidence does not mean that no evidence supports the jury's verdict. If more than one reasonable inference may be drawn, a question of fact is ordinarily presented for the jury to decide. Benoit, 239 S.W.2d at 796-97. Considering all the circumstantial evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Blanca's conduct violated the statute. They could have believed that Blanca intended to delay Deana's search and thereby aid Junior, first by misrepresenting that Junior was on his way to her house and later by refusing to provide information to Deana when she called. Blanca's apparent disinterest in her granddaughter's unexplained disappearance also supports the inference that she knew that Bianca, although not in her mother's care, was nevertheless safe with Junior. Further, the jury might have reasonably believed that Blanca's vague allusions to child abuse aided or assisted Junior by discouraging others from helping Deana find her child. These conclusions are reasonable and fair inferences drawn from the evidence and are legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that Blanca Lozano knowingly aided or assisted Junior. Because there is some evidence that Blanca aided or assisted Junior, I concur in the Court's decision to reverse the court of appeals' judgment as to her and remand to that court for a factual sufficiency review of the evidence.
Juan was privy to much of the same information as Blanca during the weekend which ended in Bianca's abduction. While he claimed that he was somewhat concerned about not seeing his son or granddaughter after Friday evening, he apparently was not sufficiently concerned to take any action. Nevertheless, Juan was not involved in conversations with Deana or her requests for additional information on April 9. Nor did he remove any posters or participate in spreading rumors of Deana's child abuse after the abduction. And while it may seem peculiar that Juan was not more active in the search for his missing son and granddaughter, he did cooperate with the authorities. Without more, no reasonable inference may be drawn from his apparent inactivity. Deana maintains, however, that there is more. She argues that Juan's assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege and other delay in responding to discovery is some evidence that he knowingly aided or assisted Junior. Like Sandra and the other family members, Juan initially declined to give the names and addresses of relatives and friends in Mexico. He also asserted the privilege on advice of counsel during his deposition, but months later he answered Deana's deposition questions and written interrogatories. Deana again argues that because Juan initially invoked the privilege, the jury could reasonably infer that he either knew where Junior and Bianca were hiding or had conspired with others to conceal their whereabouts so that to provide certain information would be incriminating. I have already rejected a similar argument against Sandra. As with her, I note as to Juan that any adverse inference from using the privilege is not sufficient, by itself, to meet an opponent's burden of proof. Custody of Two Minors, 487 N.E.2d at 1363. Finally, Deana submits that Juan's lack of candor during discovery is probative of his intent to aid Junior in concealing Bianca. For example, rather than disclose his plans to visit Mexico, Juan objected that an interrogatory inquiring about plans to travel outside the country was too speculative because it did not include any time frame. Two days after filing his objection, Juan and the family left for their time-share condominium in Cancun, Mexico. [4] In July and November, Juan also traveled to Monterrey with Blanca and Alex. Although the stated purpose of the trips to Monterrey was to visit Blanca's ailing mother, Deana suspects that all these trips were really to see Junior and Bianca. When Deana shared her discovery and suspicions with the authorities, as previously discussed, the police found nothing to confirm that Junior and Bianca were living in Mexico or that Junior was in contact with relatives or friends there. While lack of candor during discovery may reasonably affect a jury's view of credibility, it is not a substitute for evidence. Deana's unconfirmed suspicion is not evidence that Juan aided or assisted Junior. Browning-Ferris, 865 S.W.2d at 927 (some suspicion linked to other suspicion produces only more suspicion, which is not the same as some evidence). Because there is no evidence that Juan knowingly aided or assisted Junior in abducting or concealing Bianca, I believe the court of appeals correctly rendered judgment that plaintiff take nothing from Juan Lozano.
Deana asserts that Monica, like the other Lozanos, aided or assisted Junior by asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege and delaying discovery. Additionally, Deana maintains that Monica aided Junior's concealment of the child by tearing down posters she had placed around town. The police detective investigating the abduction testified that these posters were an important investigative tool and that their removal would interfere with his efforts to locate the child. Monica admitted that she removed one poster at a sports bar. Monica explained that she removed this poster because it disclosed her home street address and was embarrassing to her. The court of appeals considered Monica's explanation, concluding that it was equally as plausible as the inference that she removed the poster to help Junior by limiting public information about his crime. But the known factMonica's removal of a posterdoes not in my view implicate the equal inference rule. Given the purpose of these posters, it may reasonably be inferred that by removing one Monica intended to aid or assist Junior in concealing the child. An equal but opposite inference is not suggested by the bare fact of its removal. Monica's testimony may have put her intent in issue, but it did not negate the reasonable inference that she intended something else when she removed the poster. Intent alone, however, is not enough under the statute. The Family Code premises liability on aiding or assisting the perpetrator, providing a cause of action against (a) person who takes or retains possession of a child or who conceals the whereabouts of a child in violation of a possessory right of another person and against (a) person who aids or assists in (such) conduct. Tex. Fam.Code §§ 42.002(a), 42.003(a). Thus, I must examine the record for any evidence that Monica's removal of the poster aided or assisted Junior in concealing the child from the authorities. These posters were put up to collect information on Junior's whereabouts, and the police detective in charge of the investigation testified generally to their effectiveness in other cases. He further testified that thousands of posters were put up around townthat posters were literally everywhere you looked.... Deana agreed with this assessment, testifying that she put up around a thousand or more posters herself. The detective also testified about the efforts of others to publicize the disappearance, including Crime Stoppers, Advo, Inc., the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, as well as the local newspapers. Unfortunately, none of these efforts succeeded in locating Junior or the child. The inquiry, however, is not about what was done to locate Junior and the child, but rather about what Monica did to hinder those efforts. The issue is whether the removal of one poster is some evidence, more than a scintilla, of aid and assistance to Junior. [5] As we have said, more than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Burroughs Wellcome Co., v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex.1995). On the other hand, less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. Kindred, 650 S.W.2d at 63. The detective testified generally to the importance of publicizing the abduction, but he did not testify that the removal of a particular poster had any effect on his efforts to locate Junior. I have not found any additional evidence or circumstances in this record to indicate that Monica's removal of a poster aided or assisted Junior's concealment of the child. Without some logical connection between the removal of the poster from the sports bar and the authorities inability to find Junior, I believe it unreasonable to infer that Junior could have been aided or assisted by Monica's actions. Because there is no evidence that Monica knowingly aided or assisted Junior in abducting or concealing Bianca, I would affirm the court of appeals' judgment that plaintiff take nothing from Monica Lozano.
Deana asserts that Alex aided or assisted Junior in concealing Bianca by asserting the Fifth Amendment, delaying discovery, removing posters and providing financial assistance. Alex admitted that he removed one poster from a Conoco station. Alex also testified that he borrowed about $3000 on his credit card within five months after Junior disappeared, a sum which totaled more than half of his earned income for that year. As with Sandra, however, Deana offers nothing beyond suspicion that this money was funneled to Junior. And as with Monica, Alex's removal of a single poster is no evidence of aid or assistance to Junior in concealing the child. Because there is no evidence that Alex knowingly aided or assisted Junior in abducting or concealing Bianca, I would affirm the court of appeals' judgment that plaintiff take nothing from Alex Lozano.