Opinion ID: 894945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deadlines for Appeal: From Judgment or Remittitur?

Text: In its original judgment, the trial court reduced the jury's damages verdict for the 1988-B partnership to $2,090,000 and for Lazare to $930,000, a matter they never appealed. But they did challenge by cross-appeal the trial court's remittitur reducing damages further to $1,302,302 for 1988-B and $579,492.76 for Lazare. The court of appeals reversed the remittitur and reinstated the former amounts. [35] Arkoma asserts the court had no jurisdiction to reinstate anything because the partnerships' cross-appeal was two days late. The trial court's original judgment was signed January 29, 2002. Arkoma's motion for new trial extended the time for appeal to April 29th, 90 days after judgment. [36] When Arkoma filed its notice of appeal on the last possible day, the deadline for a cross-appeal was further extended an additional 14 days to May 13th. [37] The partnerships filed two days later, May 15th. But the partnerships argue their cross-appeal was timely because the original judgment was modified by remittitur. If a judgment is modified in any respect, appellate deadlines do not run from the original judgment but from the date when the modified judgment is signed. [38] According to the partnerships, the trial court's order granting remittitur on April 15, 2002 restarted the appellate timetables, rendering their cross-appeal filed 30 days later timely. [39] Technically, neither trial nor appellate courts can order remittitur; they can only suggest a remittitur on condition that a new trial will be granted if it is refused. [40] We have held that if a court directly orders a reduction in damages, that order necessarily modifies the judgment even if it is incorrectly called a remittitur. [41] By contrast, we have also held that if a party files a purely voluntary remittitur (without any order or suggestion from the court), the judgment has not been modified. [42] If the latter rule were otherwise, a party could extend appellate deadlines indefinitely by remitting a dollar at a time. We have never addressed whether an order that properly suggests remittitur modifies a judgment in any respect, and thus restarts appellate deadlines. But we have explained that the deadlines are restarted by  any change, whether or not material or substantial. [43] Thus, appellate deadlines are restarted by an order that does nothing more than change the docket number or deny all relief not expressly granted. [44] By this standard, we think a signed order suggesting remittitur must restart the appellate deadlines as well. By its very nature, such an order allows only two options: a smaller judgment or a new trial. While it may not be clear when the order is signed which option a claimant will select, it is immediately clear that the original judgment will change. In many cases, the order itself will immediately change which party, if any, should begin preparing for an appeal. Given the relative impacts of an order adding a docket number and an order suggesting remittitur, it would be anomalous if the former restarted appellate deadlines but the latter did not. It is conceivable, of course, that a judgment might be reinstated after a suggestion of remittitur because the trial judge withdraws the latter. But that does not mean the judgment was not modified in any respect in the interim; a trial judge who modifies a judgment and then withdraws the modification has modified the judgment twice rather than never. Because appellate timetables restarted when the trial court signed its remittitur order, the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the remittitur. Because Arkoma asserts no other objection to it, it is affirmed.