Opinion ID: 1058533
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restraint of Liberty

Text: Hickman argues that the lower courts erred in concluding that he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he is neither imprisoned nor restrained of liberty by his 1986 conviction. Hickman asserts that the use of his 1986 conviction to enhance his federal sentence restrains his liberty. We disagree. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-101 (2003), provides that [a]ny person imprisoned or restrained of liberty, under any pretense whatsoever, ... may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment and restraint (emphasis added.) The statute does not define the terms imprisoned and restrained of liberty. When construing statutes, this Court ascertains and effectuates legislative intent. Dixon, 70 S.W.3d at 37. Legislative intent is derived from the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Id. When the meaning of the language is unclear, the entire statutory scheme must be examined to determine legislative intent and purpose. Id. The ordinary meaning of the term imprisoned is clear. To imprison is to confine (a person) in prison. Black's Law Dictionary 760 (7th ed.1999). Plainly, then, imprisoned in this statute refers to actual physical confinement or detention. Unlike imprisonment, the meaning of restrained of liberty is not limited to physical confinement or detention. The United States Supreme Court has stated: History, usage, and precedent can leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a [person's] liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas corpus. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963). This Court has also recognized that a person may be restrained of liberty and entitled to seek habeas corpus relief even when not physically confined. State ex rel Dillehay v. White, 217 Tenn. 524, 398 S.W.2d 737 (1966). Dillehay challenged the legality of her restraint under a judgment committing her to the Maury County jail to work off the fine and costs imposed in her criminal case. Id. at 738. The trial judge dismissed the petition but released Dillehay on her own recognizance pending appeal; however, the bond prohibited Dillehay from leaving Maury County. Id. Dillehay appealed, and the State argued that, because Dillehay was no longer physically confined in jail, her appeal was moot. Id. This Court disagreed, stating: Although she is not being held in jail, she is, nevertheless, restricted in her liberty to Maury County pending this appeal and is subject to immediate confinement should her appeal be dismissed. By grace of the trial judge she is now at liberty, but upon her violation of her confinement to Maury County she could be placed in jail again. Habeas corpus, if otherwise proper, can reach this constructive confinement. Id. (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963)). Thus, Dillehay stands for the proposition that, when the challenged judgment itself imposes a restraint upon the petitioner's freedom of action or movement, the petitioner is entitled to seek habeas corpus relief, even though the petitioner is not physically confined or detained. See also Jones, 371 U.S. at 243, 83 S.Ct. 373 (While petitioner's parole releases him from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom....); Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 572, 5 S.Ct. 1050, 29 L.Ed. 277 (1885) (There must be [either] actual confinement or the present means of enforcing it.); 39 Am.Jur.2d Habeas Corpus, § 17 (1999) (Any restraint that precludes freedom of action ... is sufficient, notwithstanding lack of confinement in a jail or prison, as, for example, a restraint that consists in forbidding a man to leave the city and keeping him under the surveillance of an officer, or the restraint that exists by virtue of the conditions of parole or probation.) However, when the restraint on a petitioner's liberty is merely a collateral consequence of the challenged judgment, habeas corpus is not an appropriate avenue for seeking relief. In Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989), the United States Supreme explained this distinction. The question presented by this case is whether a habeas petitioner remains in custody under a conviction after the sentence imposed for it has fully expired, merely because of the possibility that the prior conviction will be used to enhance the sentences imposed for any subsequent crimes of which he is convicted. We hold that he does not. While we have very liberally construed the in custody requirement for purposes of federal habeas, we have never extended it to the situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint from a conviction. Since almost all states have habitual offender statutes, ... a contrary ruling would mean that a petitioner whose sentence has completely expired could nonetheless challenge the conviction for which it was imposed at any time on federal habeas. This would read the in custody requirement out of the statute.... Id. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 1923. Even though the language of the federal habeas corpus statute differs somewhat from the language of the Tennessee statute, we agree with Maleng 's analysis on this issue. Indeed, this analysis is consistent with the history and usage of the writ of habeas corpus, prior decisions of this court, and the overall statutory scheme governing the writ of habeas corpus in Tennessee. Accordingly, we hold that a person is not restrained of liberty for purposes of the habeas corpus statute unless the challenged judgment itself imposes a restraint upon the petitioner's freedom of action or movement. Use of the challenged judgment to enhance the sentence imposed on a separate conviction is not a restraint of liberty sufficient to permit a habeas corpus challenge to the original conviction long after the sentence on the original conviction has expired. [4] Hickman has not alleged that he presently is serving the ten-day suspended sentence imposed for his 1986 conviction in the Knox County General Sessions Court. Thus, Hickman clearly is not imprisoned under the challenged judgment. Furthermore, Hickman is not restrained of liberty as a direct consequence of the 1986 judgment. Indeed, the ten-day sentence has long ago expired, and the General Sessions judgment does not impose any further restraint upon his physical movement or action. Although this 1986 conviction may have been used to enhance a federal sentence Hickman is serving, enhancement is merely a collateral consequence of the 1986 judgment. [5] Thus, Hickman is not restrained of liberty for purposes of the habeas corpus statute. Furthermore, as explained below, the trial court correctly held that Hickman's 1986 judgment is not void on its face.