Opinion ID: 2444731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Award of Costs

Text: Appellants object that the trial court should not have awarded any [] costs whatsoever based on the dismissal of Count I. They do not contend that Mr. Queen failed to show that the particular costs the court awarded were necessary or reasonable. Instead, appellants argue that the court either abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law because appellants voluntarily dismissed that count with prejudice. We disagree. [9] The very case appellants cite to support their argument undermines it. Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 130-31 (5th Cir.1985), makes clear that [b]ecause a dismissal with prejudice is tantamount to a judgment on the merits, the defendant [] is clearly the prevailing party and should ordinarily be entitled to costs. Id. at 130. Because appellants have cited no contrary authority, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to allow court filing fees and copying costs to the prevailing party here, Mr. Queen. See Panos v. Nefflen, 205 A.2d 600, 601-02 (D.C.1964) (filing fees ordinarily allowed as a matter of course); Robinson v. Howard Univ., 455 A.2d 1363, 1368 (D.C.1983) (same); Talley, 689 A.2d at 555 ([T]he prevailing party may recover the cost of obtaining and copying records and other material necessary for case preparation and presentation.).