Opinion ID: 1846642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the florida civil rights act

Text: The issue that we resolve is whether the notice received by Woodham precluded Woodham's right to file a complaint of discrimination in circuit court. We begin with the stated purpose of the FCRA, which is to secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. § 760.01(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). The Legislature has specifically declared that the FCRA shall be liberally construed to further the general purposes stated in this section. § 760.01(3). In Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432 (Fla.2000), we recently explained: The statute's stated purpose and statutory construction directive are modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Like Title VII, chapter 760 is remedial and requires a liberal construction to preserve and promote access to the remedy intended by the Legislature. Section 760.01(2) outlines the general purposes of the Act which include securing freedom from discrimination for all individuals and preserving the general welfare of all. Id. at 435 (citations omitted). As a prerequisite to bringing a civil action based upon an alleged violation of the FCRA, the claimant is required to file a complaint with the FCHR within 365 days of the alleged violation. See § 760.11(1). Under section 760.11(3), the FCHR is then required to determine within 180 days whether or not reasonable cause exists. Subsection (3) provides in full: Except as provided in subsection (2), the commission shall investigate the allegations in the complaint. Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. When the commission determines whether or not there is reasonable cause, the commission by registered mail shall promptly notify the aggrieved person and the respondent of the reasonable cause determination, the date of such determination, and the options available under this section. § 760.11(3), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). If the FCHR makes a reasonable cause determination, section 760.11(4) provides the claimant with two options: he or she may (1) bring a civil action or (2) request an administrative hearing. Subsection (4) provides in full: In the event that the commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: (a) Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or (b) Request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing a civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. § 760.11(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). On the other hand, under section 760.11(7), if the FCHR makes a determination that there is not reasonable cause (no cause), the claimant may request an administrative hearing, but must do so within 35 days of the date of the no cause determination. If the request is not made within 35 days, the claim is barred. Subsection (7) provides in full: If the commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under ss. 120.569 and 120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause and any such hearing shall be heard by an administrative law judge and not by the commission or a commissioner. If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. If the administrative law judge finds that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, he or she shall issue an appropriate recommended order to the commission prohibiting the practice and recommending affirmative relief from the effects of the practice, including back pay. Within 90 days of the date the recommended order is rendered, the commission shall issue a final order by adopting, rejecting, or modifying the recommended order as provided under ss. 120.569 and 120.57. The 90-day period may be extended with the consent of all the parties. In any action or proceeding under this subsection, the commission, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. It is the intent of the Legislature that this provision for attorney's fees be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal case law involving a Title VII action. In the event the final order issued by the commission determines that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the aggrieved person may bring, within 1 year of the date of the final order, a civil action under subsection (5) as if there has been a reasonable cause determination or accept the affirmative relief offered by the commission, but not both. § 760.11(7), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). Finally, if the FCHR fails within 180 days to make a determination either way regarding whether reasonable cause exists, section 760.11(8) states that the claimant may proceed under subsection (4) as if the FCHR made a reasonable cause determination. Subsection (8) provides in full: In the event that the commission fails to conciliate or determine whether there is reasonable cause on any complaint under this section within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, an aggrieved person may proceed under subsection (4), as if the commission determined that there was reasonable cause. § 760.11(8), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis supplied). We also point out that, although in many respects the FCRA is patterned on Title VII, which is the federal statutory scheme, Title VII does not bar a federal lawsuit even if the EEOC issues a no cause determination. Moreover, as recognized in the Third District's opinion, [t]he only conditions precedent to filing a lawsuit in federal court are filing a charge with the EEOC and receipt of the EEOC disposition of the charge. Woodham, 793 So.2d at 45 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(2000), which states that within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved). Thus, the FCRA differs from Title VII, its federal counterpart, in that a no cause determination precludes a civil suit under the FCRA but not under Title VII. Further, Title VII requires receipt of the EEOC disposition of a claimant's charge, whereas the FCRA allows the claimant, under subsection (8), to file suit without a disposition if the FCHR fails to timely render a reasonable cause determination.