Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: coercion by law enforcement.

Text: ś 33. Evans argues that his confession was involuntary because he was coerced and harassed by law enforcement. During the Motion to Suppress, Evans was questioned about coercion and/or intimidation by law enforcement. Evans described being threatened by Sergeant Steve Barnes of the Gulfport Police Department while he was in custody in Louisiana. Evans testified that Barnes stated that things would go worse on Evans if he did not cooperate. Evans also claims that Sergeant Barnes told him that the major's on his way over here and it's not going to be real nice when he gets here. Evans, however, testified that he remained silent. ś 34. After being booked into the Harrison County Detention Center, Evans testified that he was not given a mattress or hygiene items, was not allowed to bathe, and was kicked by an officer. Evans testified that he was prevented from sleeping due to harassment by jail personnel throughout the night and was denied food. ś 35. In determining the voluntariness of a confession, a trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 841 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123, 115 S.Ct. 2279, 132 L.Ed.2d 282 (1995), reh'g denied, 515 U.S. 1179, 116 S.Ct. 20, 132 L.Ed.2d 903 ( quoting Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797(1990), reh'g denied, 495 U.S. 953, 110 S.Ct. 2221, 109 L.Ed.2d 546 (1990)). In addition, the resolution of conflicting testimony regarding voluntariness is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial judge at the suppression hearing. Id. (quoting Smith v. State, 465 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss.1985)). ś 36. The trial court was presented with conflicting evidence about Evans' harassment allegations. Evans' attorney testified that Evans did not complain about harassment by jail officials during August 7-10, 1991. Lusk also testified that Evans complained that a guard had been obnoxious to him, but clarified that this alleged incident occurred after Evans' statements. ś 37. Lusk testified that although Evans did not like the food he was given, he was not denied food by law enforcement. In fact, Lusk testified that he purchased food for Evans from the snack bar and brought Evans food from home. Lusk also testified that Evans had a steady supply of coffee and snacks. ś 38. Lusk testified that [law enforcement] were doing everything possible to make us asâ to be as helpful and to make us as comfortable as possible so that if there was a problem it was taken care of immediately by the sheriff himself or by Lieutenant Carver. Detective Carvin and Agent Holder testified that Evans was not in any way threatened or coerced into making his statement to law enforcement. ś 39. Despite Evans' allegations of harassment, the testimony at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress reveals that Evans was not coerced into making a statement. While Evans may have had complaints about his accommodations, there is nothing to suggest that he endured treatment which would render his confession involuntary. Moreover, at all times prior to and during his statements, Evans was represented by counsel. The testimony is uncontradicted that prior to each statement Evans was advised of his rights by Agent Holder and his attorney. Evans was so familiar with his rights and the consequences of a waiver that he drafted a document wherein he agreed to make a contingent statement. Evans' familiarity is also evidenced by the fact that he refused to sign the waiver of rights form. ś 40. Somewhat problematic, however, is the presence of Gail Stewart. At Evans' request, Stewart was flown to Gulfport by U.S. Customs. Prior to traveling to Gulfport, Stewart allowed FBI agents to place a telephone recording device in her home in order to track Evans' whereabouts. Stewart was allowed to meet with Evans during the three-day period leading up to the confession during which she counseled Evans about their religious beliefs and encouraged him to confess. Evans' attorney testified that Ms. Stewart was the most important person in Evans' life. ś 41. The presence of Gail Stewart is somewhat similar to the situation in Abram v. State, 606 So.2d 1015, 1033 (Miss.1992), wherein this Court held that the confession was involuntary due to various statements conveyed to Abram [which] proximately caused him to confess.... In Abram, after several unsuccessful attempts to secure a statement from the defendant, the Sheriff solicited the intervention of Reverend Jones on the belief that he would put Abram at ease. Id. at 1022. Reverend Jones had been one of Abram's school teachers and counselors. As instructed by the Sheriff, Reverend Jones encouraged Abram to confess and advised Abram that it might be easier on him if he cooperated with law enforcement. ś 42. Here, however, this Court is faced with a situation which may be distinguished from Abram. Gail Stewart was not acting on behalf of law enforcement. Rather, Evans requested her presence. Specifically, Evans stated that he would consider speaking with law enforcement if he could visit with Stewart. ś 43. Additionally, there is no indication that Stewart advised Evans that cooperation might be of some benefit. Abram, 606 So.2d at 1031. In Abram, the confession was held to be involuntary partially due to the fact that various individuals conveyed to the defendant the impression that his cooperation/confession might have been beneficial. These circumstances are not present in the case sub judice. ś 44. Moreover, there is no indication that Stewart's advice induced Evans to confess. Lusk testified that Evans indicated if the authorities would bring Stewart over then Evans would tell authorities where the body was located. While her presence seems undoubtedly to have contributed to Evans' urge to confess, there is nothing in this record which compels the conclusion that Stewart induced Evans to confess. ś 45. In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L.Ed.2d 238] (1977); Miranda, supra, [384 U.S. at 460, 86 S.Ct. at 1602 [1620], 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 Ohio Misc. 9, 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237, 10 ALR 3d 974]. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285 [1290], 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on free choice in any broader sense of the word. ś 46. In light of the testimony, the trial judge was well within his discretion in holding that Evans' confessions were voluntary. Moreover, here, as in Thorson v. State, 653 So.2d 876, 887 (Miss.1994), [w]e are not confined in this case to a written record, but have the videotaped confession of [Evans]. The videotape does not suggest any coercion, and in it Evans indicated that he understood his rights and wished to make a statement. Based on the totality of the circumstances, there is nothing to suggest that the trial judge's findings were manifestly wrong or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.