Opinion ID: 511853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 4 The government argues that the question for decision is whether the district court had any legal basis for its exclusion order, and that therefore review should be de novo, citing United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1985). The defendants argue that the question is whether the imposition of a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gee, 695 F.2d 1165, 1168 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Valencia, 656 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 877, 102 S.Ct. 356, 70 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981); accord, United States v. Euceda-Hernandez, 768 F.2d 1307, 1311-12 (11th Cir.1985) (reviewing exclusion of evidence under Sec. 3731); United States v. Sarcinelli, 667 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 5 These precedents are not inconsistent with each other. In United States v. Aceves-Rosales, 832 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1056, 98 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1988), we harmonized these standards by holding that the applicability of Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 was subject to de novo review, citing Gatto, but that the propriety of any sanction imposed was reviewable for an abuse of discretion, citing Gee. Similarly, in this case we review de novo the question whether a willful violation of the pretrial order must be shown, whereas, if sanction is in order, the district court's choice of sanction will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.