Opinion ID: 590329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Caldwell Claim

Text: 50 Hendricks argues that, through his penalty phase summation to the jury, the prosecutor grossly distorted the jury's understanding of its proper role with regard to sentencing, in violation of the eighth amendment. Hendricks claims that the obvious intent and natural effect of the prosecutor's arguments was to remove from the minds of the jury the responsibility for passage of the death sentence. In making this argument, Hendricks relies on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). 51 Under Caldwell, it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death lay elsewhere. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639. To make out a Caldwell claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that the prosecutor misled the jury as to its sentencing role under state law. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989). In this case, the California Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statements to the jury had been in accordance with California law. Hendricks, 44 Cal.3d at 653-55, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836. We have independently examined the prosecutor's comments for possible Caldwell error and find none. The jury could not have been misled as to the gravity of its responsibility. Accordingly, Hendricks' Caldwell claim must fail. 52 In addition, Hendricks argues that the prosecutor's statements, combined with the trial judge's failure to give a curative instruction for these statements and the judge's actual instruction concerning the jury's role, violated his constitutional rights. Because the prosecutor committed no error, no curative instruction was necessary. Moreover, for his actual instruction, the judge merely read from the statute. Hendricks has not challenged the constitutionality of the statute. Accordingly, Hendricks' second argument is without merit. See also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (same jury instruction was constitutional).IX. Consideration of Mitigating Evidence 53 Hendricks claims that the trial judge's jury instructions combined with the prosecutor's arguments to the jury prevented the jury from considering all mitigating evidence. This, Hendricks claims, violated his rights under the eighth amendment. 54 During the penalty phase, the trial judge told the jury that it was permitted to consider as a factor in mitigation whether the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. This language comes directly from California's statutory death penalty scheme. During its summation, the government emphasized that this mitigating factor required extreme disturbance. These actions, Hendricks claims, prevented the jury from considering evidence of mental or emotional disturbance which did not rise to the level of extreme. 55 Hendricks' argument fails because the jury in this case was not prevented from considering relevant mitigating evidence. An argument similar to the one put forward by Hendricks was rejected by the Supreme Court in Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 108 L.Ed.2d 255 (1990). In Blystone, the trial judge had instructed the jury that it could consider as a mitigating factor, evidence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, but also instructed the jury that it was entitled to consider any other mitigating matter. Id. 494 U.S. at 308, 110 S.Ct. at 1084. Petitioner Blystone argued that the trial judge's instructions had prevented the jury from considering mental disturbance not rising to the level of extreme. The Court rejected this argument. 56 In this case, the trial judge gave two jury instructions functionally identical to the ones at issue in Blystone. Hendricks' attempt to distinguish Blystone by pointing to the prosecutor's emphasis of the extreme language is unpersuasive. Any such emphasis only clarified that particular mitigating circumstance. It did not imply that the jurors were barred from considering other relevant mitigating factors including mental or emotional disturbance below an extreme level.