Opinion ID: 1279670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: constitutional issues involving the death penalty

Text: [14] Defendant alleges due process requires that in all capital cases the accused be charged by an indictment by a grand jury. Additionally he alleges that charging an accused by information violates the separation of powers doctrine. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ... Defendant contends that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes this provision binding on the states in capital cases. We disagree. We affirm that defendants in this state may be indicted by information. See State v. Kanistanaux, 68 Wn.2d 652, 414 P.2d 784 (1966). Defendant argues that RCW 10.95.130(2)(b), which directs this court to determine whether the death penalty given in a case is excessive or disproportionate to other similar cases, violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Jeffries contends that the Legislature, in this statute, has encroached upon a judicial function. He asserts that, while it is proper for the Legislature to tell this court to review for proportionality, it is not proper for the Legislature to tell this court how it should perform such a proportionality review. Defendant contends that limiting the review to other death penalty cases reported since January 1, 1965, and those where reports have been filed in this court pursuant to RCW 10.95.120 is an unconstitutional infringement on this court's adjudicatory powers. See Tacoma v. O'Brien, 85 Wn.2d 266, 534 P.2d 114 (1975). [15] A proportionality review is not constitutionally required in a death penalty statute. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871 (1984). Since the Legislature has the authority to set punishments for criminal offenses, State v. Mulcare, 189 Wash. 625, 66 P.2d 360 (1937), it is appropriate for it to have determined that the crime of aggravated first degree murder shall be punished by death only if, inter alia, the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate to similar cases in which the imposition of capital punishment has been considered. Limiting similar cases to cases reported after January 1, 1965, is a valid means of deciding when the death penalty is appropriate. Defendant alleges that the Washington State death penalty statute, which requires a sentence of death if the jury finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, is a mandatory death penalty statute which is unconstitutional. [16] RCW 10.95.030(2) provides: If, pursuant to a special sentencing proceeding held under RCW 10.95.050, the trier of fact finds that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency, the sentence shall be death. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (1976), the Court held that a mandatory death sentence for every person convicted of a specified offense is unconstitutional. See also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 49 L.Ed.2d 974, 96 S.Ct. 3001 (Louisiana death penalty statute which imposed death on all persons convicted of any five categories of premeditated murder unconstitutional), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976). This State's statute is unlike those struck down in Woodson and Roberts. In this state, there is no mandatory death penalty for committing a specified offense. Instead, two things must be proved by the State: at least one aggravating circumstance and the absence of sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. It is only at that point that the death penalty becomes mandatory. One goal, however, of a death penalty statute is to focus jury discretion so that death is not arbitrarily imposed. This State's death penalty statute allows for jury discretion in finding mitigating factors. The jury is not limited in deciding what will be a mitigating factor. The defendant even enters the penalty phase with the presumption of leniency. Once the State, however, proves the absence of any sufficient mitigating factors then the jury's discretion ends. At this point it must return a sentence of death. The result is that the penalty of death is not arbitrarily or capriciously imposed, but instead is imposed in a just manner. Cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, 96 S.Ct. 2960 (White, J., concurring) (Florida death penalty statute upheld where sentencing judge is required to impose the death penalty on all first-degree murderers as to whom the statutory aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976). Defendant asserts that the death penalty statute unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show why he should not receive the death penalty. During the penalty phase, the trial court gave the jury the following instructions: Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? Instruction 3, Clerk's Papers, at 41. During these special proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Instruction 4, Clerk's Papers, at 42. These instructions show that the State bears the burden of proof to prove that there are no mitigating circumstances. We find no error.