Opinion ID: 1404383
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subject Matter Jurisdiction over NRDC's Challenge to CEQ's Action

Text: The Navy argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the validity of CEQ's action because that action allegedly moots the plaintiffs' original claims. Specifically, the Navy contends that the adoption of CEQ's alternative arrangements in a superseding Decision Memorandum constitutes a new administrative action, which can only be challenged by a new claim on the merits. See Rattlesnake Coalition v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1103-04 (holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over new final agency action). [39] The district court implicitly rejected this argument by continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' NEPA claim. Its decision to do so is firmly grounded in the familiar principle that only a valid subsequent action can render a legal claim moot. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222-23, 120 S.Ct. 722, 145 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000); United States v. Larson, 302 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.2002) (The stipulation moots [plaintiff's] challenge to the suppression ruling only if it is valid.). Accordingly, the district court did not rely on an erroneous legal premise or abuse its discretion in concluding that it had jurisdiction to assess the validity of the new action in order to determine whether plaintiffs' original claims could survive. See Adarand, 528 U.S. at 222-23, 120 S.Ct. 722. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by leaving in place the preliminary injunction after determining that CEQ's action did not require its vacatur. The Navy's contention that the district court issued an entirely new injunction . . . based on new, ancillary claims mischaracterizes the posture of this case. The Navy challenged the injunction based on CEQ's action; NRDC argued only that CEQ's action did not change the merits of its NEPA claims. Thus, the district court here did not [g]rant[ ] a preliminary injunction based on a showing that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing a violation of an ancillary court order, rather than a showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of any of their claims. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117, 1135 (11th Cir. 2005).