Opinion ID: 1729099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mitigating circumstances pertaining to morton's age and abusive childhood

Text: Under this claim, Morton argues that the trial court erred in assigning little weight to the mitigating circumstances pertaining to Morton's age of nineteen and his abusive childhood. As this Court has stated, the weight assigned to a mitigating circumstance is within the trial court's discretion and subject to the abuse of discretion standard. Elledge v. State, 706 So.2d 1340, 1347 (Fla.1997). In Mahn, we explained that where a defendant is not a minor, in order for age to be accorded any significant weight, the defendant's age must be linked with some other characteristic of the defendant or the crime such as immaturity. 714 So.2d at 400. Thus, in Mahn we found that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider Mahn's age of nineteen given Mahn's unrefuted, long-term substance abuse, chronic mental and emotional instability, and extreme passivity in the face of unremitting physical and mental abuse that provided the essential link between his youthful age and immaturity. Id. On the other hand, in Shellito v. State, 701 So.2d 837, 843 (Fla. 1997), we found no abuse of discretion where the trial court afforded age little weight. We explained that where the defendant is not a minor, no per se rule exists that pinpoints a particular age as an automatic mitigating factor that should be given substantial weight. See id. Instead, the trial judge is to evaluate the defendant's age based on the evidence adduced at trial and at the sentencing hearing. Id. In the present case, we do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in affording little weight to Morton's age as a mitigating circumstance. The evidence presented at resentencing demonstrated that Morton possessed mid-average intelligence with an I.Q. of 96. According to the expert testimony, there was no evidence of an extreme emotional disturbance or any evidence of mental illness, although there was evidence that Morton had an antisocial personality disorder. In addition, there was no evidence of drug or alcohol abuse on the part of Morton. The evidence also established that Morton was the group leader and the driving force behind the double murders. Thus, unlike the facts in Mahn, Morton's age was not linked to some other characteristic of the defendant or the crime that would have compelled the trial judge to afford Morton's age more than little weight as a mitigating factor. Morton also challenges the fact that the trial court gave little weight to Morton's abusive childhood. The weight given to this mitigating circumstance is also within the trial court's discretion. See Shellito, 701 So.2d at 844. In his order, the resentencing judge gave Morton's family background and childhood abuse little weight because: (1) the abuse stopped when Morton was eight years old when his mother divorced her abusive husband and remarried, thereby providing a substitute stable father figure for Morton; (2) there had been no showing that these experiences diminished Morton's ability to know right from wrong or not know the seriousness and grave consequences of his acts; and (3) Morton's sister, Angela, had also been abused, including sexually abused, by the same alcoholic father, yet proceeded to live a normal and productive life. On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in the weight it assigned to the mitigating circumstances. See Shellito, 701 So.2d at 845; Williamson v. State, 681 So.2d 688, 698 (Fla.1996); Jones v. State, 648 So.2d 669, 680 (Fla. 1994).