Opinion ID: 2736728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence (Lopez and Zamora)

Text: Both Lopez and Zamora admit that they failed to move for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the Government had not presented sufficient evidence to convict them. This Court reviews unpreserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for plain error. United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 8 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Under plain error review, the defendant “must show: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, (3) and that affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Garcia–Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 315 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Even if the Defendant–Appellant satisfies those criteria, this Court “will exercise discretion to correct the error only if the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This Court has previously “described the standard of review for unpreserved insufficiency claims in the most exacting language, stating that such a claim ‘will be rejected unless the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or if the evidence is so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.’” Delgado, 672 F.3d at 330–31 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Put simply, to satisfy the second prong of the plain-error test, [the defendant] must demonstrate not just that the government’s evidence of conspiracy was insufficient, but that it was obviously insufficient.” Id. at 331. This Court reviews “the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, including all reasonable inferences and credibility choices.” United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304, 1310–11 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
“To prove conspiracy to possess and distribute a controlled substance, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to violate narcotics laws; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the agreement; and (3) his voluntary participation in the conspiracy.” United State v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 256–57 (5th Cir. 2006) (footnote omitted). The Government cannot prove a conspiracy merely by showing a defendant’s presence at a crime scene or association with conspirators. Id. at 257. But “[a] conspiracy may be inferred from 9 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Villegas–Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1999). The Government is not required to prove “that each defendant knew of every detail of the conspiracy, only that each knew of its essentials.” Id. Importantly for this case, “a defendant may be convicted on the uncorroborated testimony of a coconspirator who has accepted a plea bargain unless the coconspirator’s testimony is incredible.” Id. “Testimony is incredible as a matter of law only if it relates to facts that the witness could not possibly have observed or to events which could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1552 (5th Cir. 1994).
Lopez’s main argument about the sufficiency of the evidence is that it was uncorroborated and unreliable. Specifically, he complains that The only evidence offered by the Government that [Lopez] knowingly permitted the use of Las Carolina Ranch to store and transport marijuana past the Falfurrias border patrol checkpoint was the self-serving testimony of the “low-life” “boss” and selfprofessed “pothead” Jesus Carbajal and his crew of terminally high drug couriers who had each entered a guilty plea and given testimony against [Lopez] in hopes of receiving a more lenient sentence. Lopez argues that the Government only offered “assumptions stacked upon inferences and inferences stacked upon inferences,” and thus failed to prove he knew that Carbajal was actually transporting drugs through his ranch. In response, the Government argues that Lopez ignores the standard of review and fails to make the requisite credibility inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. The Government claims that the record provides “overwhelming evidence of Lopez’s guilt.” We hold that the district court did not plainly err in entering a guilty judgment because our review of the record demonstrates that there was more 10 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 than sufficient evidence of Lopez’s guilt. Carbajal testified that Lopez approached him and offered to allow Carbajal to use his ranch to help transport the drugs past the border-patrol station. Carbajal also testified that Lopez arranged a meeting between the two of them and Garza, and that after that meeting, the smuggling business expanded significantly. The jury also heard testimony from a number of other witnesses describing Lopez’s involvement in the smuggling conspiracy. The coconspirators testified that they told Lopez they were going to drop marijuana off at his ranch, that Lopez was present during the loading and unloading of the marijuana, and that they witnessed Lopez and Carbajal meeting. Witnesses also told the jury that Lopez was present while loads of marijuana were being moved. In addition, the Government presented evidence that Lopez ordered the construction of an outhouse on his ranch so that the smugglers could hide the marijuana they were transporting. Once law enforcement began to dismantle the conspiracy, Lopez then concealed the outhouse. Lopez was also paid for his part of the conspiracy. To counteract the weight of this testimony, Lopez points to his testimony at trial. He testified that he was a legitimate business man, who had been steadily employed his whole life. He also testified that he rented part of his ranch to Carbajal, and he thought Carbajal was moving barrels of hay. He denied ever talking to Carbajal about transporting drugs or being paid for drugs being stored on his ranch. But, it was the jury’s job to make credibility determinations, and on appeal, this Court makes all reasonable credibility choices in favor of the jury verdict. Pierre, 958 F.2d at 1310–11. Considering all of this, the record was not devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, and so we affirm on this issue. 11 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203
Zamora’s primary argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is that the testimony was uncorroborated. He claims that the Government tried to corroborate the witness testimony with the ATV and night-vision goggles that were used to smuggle drugs and were seized from Zamora’s home. But Zamora claims he did not own or control the ATV and that he did not use the night-vision goggles. Further, he argues that coconspirator testimony was incredible as a matter of law because the witnesses gave conflicting dates, ranging from 2005 to 2009, when testifying about when Zamora joined the conspiracy. The Government responds that Zamora’s arguments completely ignore the appropriate standard of review; applying the correct standard of review, the Government argues, the evidence is not plainly insufficient. We agree with the Government that the evidence supporting Zamora’s conviction was not plainly insufficient. First, Zamora’s arguments that the uncorroborated witness testimony is insufficient as a matter of law are unavailing. As discussed above, see supra subpart III(B)(2), this Court has previously held that the Government is entitled to prove its case based on uncorroborated testimony from cooperating witnesses unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law. See Villegas–Rodriguez, 171 F.3d at 228. Zamora does not otherwise attempt to argue that the testimony was incredible. Second, a review of the record shows that there was evidence to support the jury’s conviction. Zamora worked at Baluarte Ranch, and he secured jobs for Carbajal and other coconspirators to further the smuggling operation. Several witnesses testified that Zamora let them into Baluarte Ranch when they arrived with shipments. The jury also heard testimony that Zamora allowed other smugglers to store marijuana on the ranch or at his home. There was also testimony that Zamora was a law enforcement lookout and that Zamora personally transported loads off of Baluarte Ranch. Further, Zamora 12 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 was paid $1,000 per load, earning $30,000 to $40,000 for his work with Carbajal. Considering all of this testimony, we cannot say that the record is devoid of evidence to support the jury’s verdict. See Delgado, 672 F.3d at 330–31. Thus, under plain-error review, the jury had sufficient evidence to find Zamora guilty. C. Variance Between the Indictment and Evidence at Trial (Garza) At the outset, we note that Garza’s brief is somewhat inconsistent in how it frames this issue. Garza labels it a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in the headings of his brief. But, in the body of his brief, he discusses the factors this Court uses to determine whether there has been a variance between the indictment and proof at trial, and he then applies those factors to his case. Thus, despite the headings in his briefing, we will construe this as a variance argument. 1. Standard of Review “The question whether the evidence establishes the existence of one conspiracy (as alleged in the indictment) or multiple conspiracies is a fact question within the jury’s province.” United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th Cir. 2007). This Court affirms the jury’s finding of a single conspiracy “unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences, examined in the light most favorable to the government, would preclude reasonable jurors from finding a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Even when the Court finds a variance, the Court will “reverse only if the variance prejudiced the defendant’s substantial rights.” Id. The defendant’s substantial rights are not affected “as long as the government establishes the defendant’s involvement in at least one of the proved conspiracies.” Id. at 770. 13 Case: 13-40203 Document: 00512780393 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/24/2014 No. 13-40203 2. Analysis “A material variance occurs ‘when the proof at trial depicts a scenario that differs materially from the scenario charged in the indictment but does not modify an essential element of the charged offense.’” Id. at 769 (quoting United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2005)). Determining whether there is a variance between the indictment, which charged a single conspiracy, and the proof at trial, which Garza alleges proved multiple conspiracies, requires counting the conspiracies. “The principal considerations in counting the number of conspiracies are (1) the existence of a common goal; (2) the nature of the scheme; and (3) the overlapping of the participants in the various dealings.” United States v. Morrow, 177 F.3d 272, 291 (5th Cir. 1999)