Opinion ID: 3183090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Motion to Recuse

Text: Albanese next assails the denial of her motion for the trial justice to recuse herself from the case. In support of the motion to recuse, Albanese argued before the Superior Court that the trial justice had failed to take her seriously as a self-represented litigant. In particular, Albanese attributed to her pro se status the denial of her motions to reopen discovery and the court’s refusal, on December 12, 2013, to consider additional motions for extensions in time. Albanese further contended before the Superior Court that the trial justice had encouraged defendants to file a dispositive motion when none had been filed. We afford the trial justice “considerable discretion” in deciding whether to step away from a case. State v. Romano, 456 A.2d 746, 754 (R.I. 1983). A party moving for recusal must show “that the trial justice had personal bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his [or her] impartiality seriously and to sway his [or her] judgment.” In re Jermaine H., 9 A.3d 1227, 1230 (R.I. 2010). The party carries a “substantial burden” to demonstrate that “facts present such that it would be ‘reasonable for members of the public or a litigant or counsel to question the trial justice’s impartiality.’” Id. (quoting In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 653 (R.I. 1992)). We note that, irrespective of her pro se status, Albanese was a recalcitrant litigant whose disruptive behavior ultimately led to her removal from the courtroom by a court deputy. The trial justice tolerated multiple interruptions by Albanese that never would have been allowed from a member of the bar. Contrary to Albanese’s assertion of discriminatory treatment, our review of the transcripts before us reveals that the trial justice exercised commendable courtesy and patience in her interactions with Albanese. The trial justice went to great lengths to make exceptions for Albanese’s behavior, to elucidate the litigation process, and to help Albanese -9- clarify her arguments before the court. In so doing, the trial justice expressed concern about the admitted challenges that pro se litigants face when trying cases that even seasoned attorneys may struggle with and urged Albanese to retain new counsel. We are satisfied that these comments did not evidence discrimination. To the extent that Albanese suggests her pro se status entitles her to anything more than fairness and courtesy, she is mistaken. Albanese has failed to support her allegation that the trial justice ordered defendants to move for summary judgment and that this in turn revealed personal prejudice or bias. Albanese did not submit a copy of the transcript in which the trial justice first broached the issue of summary judgment, and a bare, unsupported allegation is insufficient to meet the heavy burden imposed on a party seeking appellate review on this issue. Moreover, when the trial justice denied the motion to recuse, she set forth on the record that she had not ordered defendants to move for summary judgment but rather had set a timeline for defendants to file dispositive motions in an effort to move forward this long-stagnant civil action. See, e.g., Boucher, 571 A.2d at 37 (The court must “maintain a firm schedule    in order to keep the flow of trials moving in such manner as to    make certain that the cases on the calendar move smoothly toward resolution either by trial or settlement.”). There simply is no evidence to support Albanese’s claims before the Superior Court that the trial justice was anything but patiently appropriate and abundantly fair with the pro se litigant. The motion to recuse is wholly without merit. On appeal before this Court, Albanese further contends that, after submitting her written motion to the Superior Court on January 13, 2014, but before the January 31 hearing, she learned that the trial justice’s husband allegedly works in law enforcement; thus, Albanese concludes he may interact with Sgt. Favreau during the course of his employment. Based on this allegation, - 10 - according to Albanese, the trial justice should have recused herself. Albanese claims that she had not had this purported information available to her before filing, but that she would have raised the issue had the trial justice allowed her to address the court before ruling on the recusal motion. However, because such a decision rests squarely within the Superior Court justice’s discretion, the court is not obliged to permit oral argument. See Ryan v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, 941 A.2d 174, 188 (R.I. 2008). And even if Albanese had the opportunity to address the court on the subject, oral argument is not an appropriate forum for raising new issues not previously briefed. See Zinniel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 883 F.2d 1350, 1356 n.8 (7th Cir. 1989). Nonetheless, Albanese’s claim of a conflict based on the trial justice’s husband’s employment is without merit. Albanese relies on mere conjecture to suggest that Sgt. Favreau may have interacted with the trial justice’s husband, and the asserted connection between Sgt. Favreau and the trial justice is so attenuated that any inference of impartiality is fantastical. We live in an era in which both partners to a marriage frequently pursue separate careers. The notion that, standing alone, a trial justice’s allegiance rests with her husband’s occupation rather than the responsibilities and duties of her position reeks of a bygone age.