Opinion ID: 1863815
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of review. We recently summarized our scope of review as to constitutional issues in In re Morrow:

Text: This court reviews constitutional claims de novo. Statutes are cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality and, thus, a party challenging a statute carries a heavy burden of rebutting this presumption. `A person challenging a statute must negate every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be upheld as constitutional.' 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted). 2. Seventh Amendment. Channon argues that the damages cap violates her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial because the cap effectively vetoes any jury award of compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $300,000. The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. U.S. Const. amend. VII (emphasis added). Among other reasons, the district court rejected Channon's Seventh Amendment claim on the ground that the Seventh Amendment governs proceedings only in federal courts and not in state courts. We agree. Channon goes to great lengths to show how the cap violates the Seventh Amendment. However, she does little to challenge the district court's ruling regarding the applicability of that constitutional provision. Her only argument is that Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996), which the district court relied on, does not squarely answer the question. In Gasperini, the Supreme Court stated: The Seventh Amendment, which governs proceedings in federal court, but not in state court, bears not only on the allocation of trial functions between judge and jury ...; it also controls the allocation of authority to review verdicts, the issue of concern here. 518 U.S. at 432, 116 S.Ct. at 2222, 135 L.Ed.2d at 677 (emphasis added). The language makes clear the Supreme Court's position that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to proceedings in state court. Nevertheless, Channon argues this language is dictum. To whatever extent this may be true, prior Supreme Court precedent, including the precedent relied upon by the Supreme Court in making the above statement, supports the conclusion that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to state court proceedings. See, e.g., Pearson v. Yewdall, 5 Otto 289, 95 U.S. 294, 296, 24 L.Ed. 436, 437 (1877) (We have held over and over again that art. 7 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States relating to trials by jury applies only to the courts of the United States....); Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Wall. (88 U.S.) 532, 557, 22 L.Ed. 487, 492 (1874); see also Elliott v. City of Wheat Ridge, 49 F.3d 1458, 1459 (10th Cir.1995); In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir.1994); Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 99 & n. 1 (4th Cir.1991). Additionally, as UPS points out, there is Supreme Court precedent for the very type of issue before us. In Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad v. Bombolis, the Supreme Court had before it state constitutional and statutory law which provided that after a case has been under submission to a jury for a period of twelve hours without a unanimous verdict, five sixths of the jury are authorized to reach a verdict, which is entitled to the legal effect of a unanimous verdict at common law. 241 U.S. 211, 216, 36 S.Ct. 595, 596, 60 L.Ed. 961, 963 (1916). The issue was whether applying this law to a cause of action under the federal Employers' Liability Act brought in state court violated the Seventh Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment requirement of a unanimous verdict as mandated by prior judicial decision did not control state court enforcement of federal law. See generally id. at 216-23, 36 S.Ct. at 596-99, 60 L.Ed. at 963-65. In reaching this conclusion, the Court again recognized that the Seventh Amendment applies only to federal court proceedings and not to state court proceedings. Id. at 217, 36 S.Ct. at 596, 60 L.Ed. at 963. The importance of this case to the proceeding before us is obvious: not only is the Seventh Amendment inapplicable to state court proceedings brought under state law, but it is also inapplicable to state court proceedings brought under federal lawthe very situation we have here. The Fifth Circuit similarly has held that the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in common-law actions does not apply to a case in state court, even though the claims are based on federal law, i.e. the Jones Act. See Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock, 964 F.2d 1480, 1488-89 n. 16 (5th Cir.1992). In the present case, the district court wisely observed that [p]erhaps the reason for the United States Supreme Court's consistency regarding the application of the Seventh Amendment only to federal courts stems from the clear language of the Seventh Amendment, which states [i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law. Because we hold that the Seventh Amendment does not apply here, we do not reach the question whether the $300,000 damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) violates the Seventh Amendment. 3. Separation of powers. Channon also contends that the damages cap infringes on the doctrine of separation of powers guaranteed by Article III of the Federal Constitution. She concedes that Congress has the power to decide which remedies are available for violations of a statute. However, she argues that while Congress has the power to limit the types of remedies, it has no power to limit the amount awarded. Specifically, she argues, the damages cap violates the separation of powers doctrine by undercutting the power and obligation of the judiciary to reduce an excessive verdict, based on the facts of a specific case. Article III, section 1 of the Federal Constitution begins by stating that [t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. The separation of powers doctrine derives from Article III and requires that each of the three branches of the federal government remain entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others.... Humprey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629, 55 S.Ct. 869, 874, 79 L.Ed. 1611, 1620 (1935); accord Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380, 109 S.Ct. 647, 659, 102 L.Ed.2d 714, 736 (1989). The three branches of government, however, need not be entirely separate and distinct. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380, 109 S.Ct. at 659, 102 L.Ed.2d at 736. Rather, the three branches of government have a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of which `would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.' Id. at 381, 109 S.Ct. at 659, 102 L.Ed.2d at 736 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121, 96 S.Ct. 612, 683, 46 L.Ed.2d 659, 746 (1976)). The separation-of-powers jurisprudence grew out of the concern over the encroachment and aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another. Id. at 382, 109 S.Ct. at 660, 102 L.Ed.2d at 737. For this reason, the Supreme Court has struck down provisions of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch. Id. By the same token, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] upheld statutory provisions that to some degree commingle the functions of the Branches, but that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or encroachment. Id. To that end, separation-of-powers jurisprudence has consistently recognized that when Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in defining that right, to create presumptions, or assign burdens of proof, or prescribe remedies.... Such provisions do, in a sense, affect the exercise of judicial power, but they are also incidental to Congress' power to define the right that it has created. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2878, 73 L.Ed.2d 598, 623 (1982) (plurality opinion). In passing the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress permitted additional remedies in the form of compensatory and punitive damages but then decided to limit the available damages awarded based on the size of the employer. Channon does not dispute the power of Congress to designate the type of remedy, but rather disputes the power of Congress to designate the amount of damages to be awarded. In rejecting a similar argument, the Sixth Circuit said: Plaintiff cross-appeals on the basis that the statutory cap on compensatory damages found at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a is an unconstitutional violation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. Plaintiff argues that by creating the statutory cap, Congress impermissibly encroached upon the judiciary and its traditional responsibility for assuring against excessive verdicts on a case-by-case basis. We do not find this argument persuasive. Congress created Title VII, and Congress may designate the remedies under Title VII. The fact that the judicial branch is limited in the amount of damages which it may award does not mean its ability to decide cases is being impaired by Congress. Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 213 F.3d 933, 945-46 (6th Cir.2000), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. at 1952, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (citation omitted); see also Dobrich v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 106 F.Supp.2d 386, 396 (D.Conn. 2000). We agree with this analysis and conclude that Congress, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D), has not violated the separation of powers doctrine under Article III of the Federal Constitution. Under these circumstances, the damages cap does not threaten encroachment or aggrandizement by Congress at the expense of the judiciary. As the district court determined here, [s]ince the statute does not unduly infringe on the province of the judiciary but instead expresses the will of Congress with respect to available statutory remedies under Title VII, no constitutional infirmity exists. 4. Equal protection. Channon argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a gives women the right to recover compensatory and punitive damages when they suffer intentional discrimination on the job, but limits the amount of recovery. On the other hand, she argues, victims of discrimination on the basis of race or national origin are permitted to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 without any upper limit. For this reason she argues that the damages cap imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) violates her right to equal protection. At the outset, we note Channon does not specify which equal protection provision she meant to invokethe one found in the Fourteenth Amendment or the implied equal protection clause inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Because the statute at issue is a federal one, we assume she meant the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the federal government. See Pollard, 213 F.3d at 946. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that [n]o person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. The equal protection clause requires that similarly-situated persons be treated alike. Morrow, 616 N.W.2d at 548. If people are not similarly situated, their dissimilar treatment does not violate equal protection. Id. In Pollard, the Sixth Circuit rejected the same argument that Channon raises here. 213 F.3d at 946. The court did so concluding that plaintiffs bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a are not similarly situated with 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claimants. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned: Plaintiff also argues that the statutory damages provision also violates the Equal Protection Clause of [the Fifth Amendment] in that it unfairly discriminates among those persons who wish to vindicate their rights with respect to racial discrimination and those who wish to vindicate their rights with respect to gender discrimination.... 42 U.S.C. § 1981a places a $300,000 statutory cap on all intentional discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, sex, religion, or disability (as defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act). The statute is inherently equitable on its face. The difference in the application of this statute in situations of gender or race discrimination occurs due to a provision in the Act which states that nothing in section 1981a is to be construed as in any way limiting the remedies provided in section 1981 itself, which does not limit recovery for intentional discrimination based upon race or national origin. However, section 1981 provides relief for a different type of claim than encompassed by the remedies available to plaintiff in section 1981a. Section 1981 provides for relief from discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, while section 1981a provides for relief purely from intentional discrimination in the employment context. While section 1981 includes contracts for employment, it also includes contracts for admission to organizations, insurance and other business contracts with private persons or corporations, and admission to schools. Plaintiff cannot therefore be said to be similarly situated with section 1981 claimants. Id. (Emphasis added.) Based on the same reasoning, we conclude Channon is not similarly situated with section 1981 claimants. Her equal protection challenge must therefore fail. The district court was correct in rejecting this challenge. 5. Due process. As to her final constitutional challenge, Channon contends that the damages cap violates her guarantees of due process. As with her equal protection challenge, Channon does not specify whether she is making a due process challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. As mentioned, the Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriv[ing] a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. Because Channon challenges a federal statute, her challenge implicates the Fifth rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. Channon relies on one case to support her position: Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 691, 576 N.E.2d 765, 771 (1991). In that case, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a state statutory cap on damages for medical malpractice violated a state constitutional due process provision. The court's rationale was that the statute was unreasonable and arbitrary because it imposed the costs of the intended benefit of the statute to the general public solely upon the class consisting of those most severely injured by medical malpractice. Channon asserts we can use the identical rationale regarding the damages cap here. The district court rejected this argument and so do we. As the district court properly pointed out, the Ohio Supreme Court was interpreting its own constitution. The court had every right to accord Ohio citizens more rights under the Ohio Constitution than such citizens were entitled under the Federal Constitution. Additionally, as the district court noted, Channon cites no authority supporting her contention that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Channon has the burden to establish her due process claim by showing that Congress acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 2636, 57 L.Ed.2d 595, 618 (1978). She has not met that burden. In rejecting the argument that Congress had no rational basis for enacting the damages cap, the Sixth Circuit explained: In a political compromise, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was limited in the remedies which it would provide due to a belief that unlimited damages for all forms of discrimination would force employers to institute hiring quotas for their own economic safety. See 137 Cong. Rec. S15472-01 (discussing the fear of quotas that drove the compromise which was reached in the Civil Rights Act of 1991). The adoption of the provision saving the remedies available under section 1981 was rationally related to the legitimate purpose of creating reasonable damages available to all other victims of intentional discrimination without being forced to limit the damages already available to victims of racial and ethnic discrimination. Pollard, 213 F.3d at 946. What we have here is a classic example of an economic regulationa legislative effort to structure and accommodate `the burdens and benefits of economic life.' Duke, 438 U.S. at 83, 98 S.Ct. at 2635, 57 L.Ed.2d at 618 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752, 766 (1976)). The Supreme Court has previously held similar types of legislation motivated by similar concerns do not violate the due process protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment. See Duke, 438 U.S. at 84-87, 98 S.Ct. at 2636-2637, 57 L.Ed.2d at 618-20 (holding that cap on liability for nuclear accidents did not violate Fifth Amendment due process as arbitrary or irrational). We conclude, as did the district court, that the damages cap found at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) does not violate the Fifth Amendment due process requirements.