Opinion ID: 677885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: epa liability

Text: 58 In view of our decision on Title VII liability, we find that Hamblin has been fully compensated in damages for any inequality in pay under EPA up to the date of her termination in 1990, with the possible exception of the element of claimed EPA liquidated damages. 59 With respect to liquidated damages, we begin with the finding that in tending to exclude females from managerial jobs and in treating them differently from males, C-B's bias and unfair treatment were subconscious, not willful. The district court did not conclude that Hamblin was more qualified than Hallett; rather, it concluded that C-B did not prove that Hallett was more qualified than Hamblin in 1984 when hired. The district court summarized its EPA findings and conclusions by stating that: [I]n summary, defendant did not violate the Equal Pay Act knowingly or with reckless regard for its provisions.... (emphasis added). 60 This court stated in Delight Wholesale Co. that: [W]e accord great weight to the district court's factual findings and review only for clear error. Id. at 669. Based on the evidence heard and credibility determinations, the district court, as trier of fact, found no knowing pervasive equal pay violation. In Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406 (10th Cir.1993), the court found that even a jury verdict on an EPA claim did not constitute indirect evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. at 410 (emphasis added). 61 The statute provides for the determination of whether the defendant acted willfully to trigger a possible extension of the statute of limitations from two years to three. It also provides a like determination as to whether liquidated damages should be awarded. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 260. The latter is made expressly a matter for the trial court's discretion. The statute does not expressly provide for any other impact of willfulness or for an affirmative finding of nonwillfulness. 62 Tidwell, 989 F.2d at 411. 63 We find no clear error, nor any abuse of discretion, in the district court's conclusion that the two-year statute applied in this EPA claim. If the defendant did not act knowingly with respect to gender-based inequality of pay, this may be the equivalent of not willful or not intentional. Tidwell, 989 F.2d at 411. We deem this also to be a proper concept as to the liquidated damages requirement of EPA. The district court, we believe, had an adequate basis for finding, in substance, that C-B had reasonable grounds for believing that its actions as to equal pay (as distinguished from promotion) were not a violation of EPA. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 260. The district court concluded that C-B did not intend to harm plaintiff ... knowing such treatment would constitute a violation of federal law. We concede some difficulty in interpreting the willful element in EPA just as this court tried to define this element in an age discrimination case where a jury found for the plaintiff-employee. The court found it necessary to look to evidence presented to the jury of the employer's actual motive in the ADEA context. See Neufeld v. Searle Laboratories, 884 F.2d 335, 340 (8th Cir.1989). Neufeld, we believe, may be distinguished in that there was substantial evidence of deliberate and systematic age discrimination presented at trial. Id. at 340. We believe that here, in the EPA context, the district court was not clearly in error in concluding there was no motivated action nor animus involved in the EPA violation. 64 In the Fair Labor Standards context, which we believe comparable to the Equal Pay Act, this court usually gives great deference to the trial court's decision concerning a liquidated damages award. Hultgren v. County of Lancaster, 913 F.2d 498, 509-10 (8th Cir.1990) (finding that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing its position did not violate the FLSA). The fact that the employer was aware of the existence of the EPA and its potential applicability is not enough to show willfulness. McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 1681, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). Negligent conduct which does not show reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited is not sufficient to establish willfulness. Id. at 133, 108 S.Ct. at 1681. 6 65 While the district court did not specifically find that C-B acted in good faith on the equal pay issue, we are of the opinion that in this case its findings that there was no knowing or reckless disregard demonstrated by C-B in its equal pay violation was sufficient and not clearly erroneous so that liquidated damages are not required. 7 66 In light of these EPA decisions, the EPA award is subsumed in the Title VII damages.