Opinion ID: 1351343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions on premeditation.

Text: (32) The court refused to give an instruction, based on People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 [73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], which would have told the jurors that [t]he type of evidence which the courts have found proper to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation falls into three basic categories: (1) evidence of planning activity, (2) evidence of motive, and (3) inferences based on the nature of the killing. A finding of premeditation and deliberation may occur where there is evidence of all ... types ... and otherwise requires at least strong evidence of type one or evidence of [type] two in conjunction with either type one or three. [23] The court's ruling was correct. As we explained in People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1020-1021 [245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342], the Anderson analysis ( supra, 70 Cal.2d 15) is intended as a framework to aid in appellate review when a defendant claims that a finding of premeditation and deliberation is not supported by substantial evidence. It was not intended to form the basis for a jury instruction; to the contrary, as Lucero affirms (44 Cal.3d at p. 1021.), the standard jury instruction (CALJIC No. 8.20) given to define premeditation and deliberation is sufficient. (33) Defendant also requested an instruction telling the jury that in deciding the issue of premeditation and deliberation, the jury may consider eight listed factors, including knowledge of the issuance of a warrant, motive, flight, and physical inability. [24] Defendant based his instruction on People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847], which held that on request a defendant is entitled to an instruction relating particular facts to any legal issue. In People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137 [248 Cal. Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049], however, we explained that the language quoted by defendant refers only to a defendant's right to an instruction that `pinpoint[s] the theory of the defense.' [Citing People v. Granados (1957) 49 Cal.2d 490, 496 [319 P.2d 346].] In a proper instruction, `[w]hat is pinpointed is not specific evidence as such, but the theory of the defendant's case.' ( People v. Adrian (1982) 135 Cal. App.3d 335, 338 [185 Cal. Rptr. 506], original italics.) Tested by this standard, defendant's requested instruction C is faulty. Its references to the presence or absence of knowledge that a warrant ... could be served on May 13, 1982, or to the presence or absence of evasive conduct by defendant shortly prior to May 13, 1982  to take two examples  do not pinpoint a theory of the defense, but instead ask the jury to consider the impact of specific evidence. Although neutrally phrased, such an instruction may nevertheless be rejected as argumentative under People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1126. Defendant points to People v. Wright, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1126, where we approved the giving of an instruction which listed the factors the jury should consider in evaluating eyewitness identification testimony. (P. 1143.) He contends that the factors listed in the instruction we there approved do not pinpoint a theory of defense, but instead relate to evidentiary considerations similar to those in his proposed instruction C. Wright 's approval of detailed jury instructions on factors bearing upon eyewitness identification, however, does not signal our approval of equally detailed instructions on every issue to come before a criminal jury. It rested on our analysis in People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351 [208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709, 46 A.L.R.4th 1011], where we concluded, based on expert testimony and the professional literature, that some of the relevant factors bearing upon eyewitness identification may be imperfectly known to jurors, and contrary to the intuitive beliefs of many. (P. 368.) We are aware of no similar concerns with regard to whatever factors might bear upon the issues of premeditation and deliberation, and believe such matters can be addressed in argument without aid of a specific instruction such as the one defendant proposed. We conclude that the court did not err in refusing the instruction.