Opinion ID: 783810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Villanueva v. United States

Text: 11 Villanueva argues that subjecting his present § 2255 petition to the restrictions AEDPA imposes on second and successive petitions would violate the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution. 2 We disagree. We have held that AEDPA's statute of limitations is not a per se violation of the Suspension Clause. See Lucidore v. New York State Div. of Parole, 209 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir.2000). Thus, the Suspension Clause is not automatically implicated every time a petitioner's first § 2255 petition is denied as time-barred and a second or successive petition does not meet AEDPA's successive requirements, thereby precluding any review of the merits of the petitioner's claims. 12 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rejected a rigid construction of AEDPA under which a habeas petitioner would be entitled to only one decision on the merits, and thereafter would be subject to AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions in all cases regardless of whether the petitioner could have raised his current claims in the first petition. See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 643-44, 118 S.Ct. 1618. Such an interpretation of second or successive, the Court has held, would have far reaching and seemingly perverse implications. Id. at 644, 118 S.Ct. 1618. Rather, a determination of whether a petition is second or successive, even in a case in which a prior § 2255 petition was indisputably decided on the merits, is subject to the equitable principles underlying the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ doctrine. See James, 308 F.3d at 167. Under this doctrine, a subsequent petition is `second or successive' when it raises a claim that was, or could have been, raised in an earlier petition. Id. For example, in Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 643, 118 S.Ct. 1618, the district court ruled on the merits of most of the claims presented in Martinez-Villareal's habeas petition filed in 1994, but found that one claim was premature. Thereafter, the claim became ripe and Martinez-Villareal moved in the district court to reopen the claim. Id. The Supreme Court stated, This may have been the second time that [Martinez-Villareal] had asked the federal courts to provide relief on [the claim that had previously been dismissed as premature], but this does not mean that there were two separate applications, the second of which was necessarily subject to [AEDPA's successive requirements]. Id. 13 Villanueva's claim in his present § 2255 petition seeking resentencing relates to the district court's alleged misapplication of the United States Sentencing Guidelines at the time of sentencing. This claim was available when Villanueva filed his first § 2255 petition in 1998. In fact, Villanueva asserted in his first § 2255 petition that counsel was ineffective because, inter alia, he did not object to the district court's failure to give him federal credit for the nineteen months' imprisonment he had served prior to December 1992. Accordingly, the present petition meets the criteria of a second or successive petition and is subject to the AEDPA gatekeeping provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2244. See James, 308 F.3d at 167. And contrary to Villanueva's arguments, the application of AEDPA's second or successive requirements to his petition does not violate the Suspension Clause because he had some reasonable opportunity to have [his] claims heard on the merits. Lucidore, 209 F.3d at 113. 14 We also reject Villanueva's remaining arguments against a finding that the present § 2255 petition qualifies as a second or successive one as meritless. In particular, we reject Villanueva's assertion that the district court's dismissal of his first § 2255 petition as time-barred was improper. The petition was not filed until February 26, 1998, approximately ten months after the statute of limitations expired, see Mickens v. United States, 148 F.3d 145, 147-48 (2d Cir.1998) (holding that grace period applicable to petitioners whose convictions became final prior to AEDPA's enactment extended deadline for filing a first § 2255 petition to April 24, 1997), and Villanueva does not present any circumstances so rare and exceptional as to warrant equitable tolling, nor has he shown that he acted with reasonable diligence. See Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17-18 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (holding that AEDPA's statute of limitations may be equitably tolled only in rare and exceptional circumstance[s] and only if the party seeking equitable tolling [has] acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll (internal quotation marks omitted)). 15 Having concluded that Villanueva's present § 2255 petition is second or successive, we find that it fails to meet AEDPA's gatekeeping requirements and, therefore, deny him leave to file his successive § 2255 petition in district court. Under AEDPA, this court may certify a successive § 2255 petition only if it is based on: 16 (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or 17 (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. 18 28 U.S.C. § 2255, ¶ 8. 19 Villanueva claims two justifications for filing a second petition. First, he claims that BOP only notified him in July 2000 that it would not give him credit for the time he spent in federal custody prior to sentencing. Second, he contends that the district court should have conducted an evidentiary hearing before determining drug quantity. We conclude that the BOP's 2000 response only confirmed what Villanueva already knew at sentencing and, therefore, that it is not newly discovered evidence. Id. Similarly, Villanueva's request for an evidentiary hearing is not based on a new rule of constitutional law. 20 Finally, to the extent Villanueva's § 2255 petition seeks an order directing the BOP to recalculate his sentence, his motion for leave to file a successive § 2255 petition is denied as unnecessary. Such relief, if available at all, may be obtained only through a petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Chambers, 106 F.3d at 474-75 (observing that § 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for federal prisoners seeking to challenge the execution, rather than the legality, of their sentences). 3