Opinion ID: 1983594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jury charge on credibility

Text: During its charge to the jury on the credibility of witnesses, the trial court, Stoughton, J., stated in part: It is the province of the jury to determine the credibility, if any, to be given the testimony of a witness who has been impeached. Evidence was offered in this case, as I remember it and, of course, this is for you to recall. Your recollection is controlling. I think there was evidence of statements, for example, by Mrs. Stepney which you may believe to have been inconsistent with her testimony. You heard the evidence and you heard her explanation as to some of it, anyway. It is for you to remember the testimony, of course. You may find other examples, and it is for you to determine whether these or any of them are in fact inconsistent and, if they are, the weight you will give them in weighing the credibility of the witness, and that is the sole purpose for which they were admitted. This is the case with any claimed inconsistent statement which was admitted during the trial as to any witness. The defendant claims that by specifically mentioning only Mrs. Stepney as having been impeached, the court in effect said that [her] testimony should be subject to special scrutiny and a special set of rules. Although he assigns error to this portion of the court's charge, the defendant never makes clear the grounds, constitutional or otherwise, upon which error should be found. The defendant was entitled to have the jury correctly and adequately instructed. Mack v. Perzanowski, 172 Conn. 310, 312, 374 A.2d 156 (1977). State v. Hines, 187 Conn. 199, 206, 445 A.2d 314 (1982). `The test to be applied to any part of a charge is whether the charge considered as a whole presents the case to the jury so that no injustice will result.' State v. Mullings, 166 Conn. 268, 275, 348 A.2d 645 [1974]; Siladi v. McNamara, 164 Conn. 510, 515, 325 A.2d 277 [1973]. State v. Roy, 173 Conn. 35, 40, 376 A.2d 391 (1977). `It is a well-established rule that the charge to the jury must be read as a whole and that individual instructions are not to be judged in artificial isolation from the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S. Ct. 396, 38 L. Ed. 2d 368 [1973]; State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 422, 356 A.2d 147 [1974].' State v. Crawford, 172 Conn. 65, 69, 372 A.2d 154 [1976]. State v. Holmquist, 173 Conn. 140, 151, 376 A.2d 1111, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906, 98 S. Ct. 306, 54 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1977). Common sense, and more to the point, fairness, must acknowledge that the use of a proper example in jury instructions serves to make less abstract and more comprehensible the meaning of a complex legal concept or term. The same considerations, however, would indicate that a jury may give undue weight to examples because they are easier to understand and may even simply compare the defendant's actions with the example. `To prevent these adverse effects, the trial judge must clearly indicate that the examples are only examples, and that the jury must determine guilt or innocence by following the jury instructions as a whole.' (Emphasis in original.) People v. Shepherd, 63 Mich. App. 316, 322, 234 N.W.2d 502 (1975) .... `In considering whether an illustration is fair or prejudicial, it is necessary to consider the instructions as a whole and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the trial and shown by the evidence, such as the complexity or simplicity of the issues and the multiplicity of facts.' Luteran v. United States, 93 F.2d 395, 401 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 644, 58 S. Ct. 642, 82 L. Ed. 1103 (1938). State v. Hines, supra, 210-11. On numerous occasions this court has stated that the trial court in a criminal case may, in its discretion, make fair comment on the evidence and particularly on the credibility of witnesses. State v. Cari, 163 Conn. 174, 182, 303 A.2d 7 (1972), quoted in State v. Bennett, 172 Conn. 324, 329, 374 A.2d 247 (1977). The trial court's illustrative comment concerning contradictions in Mrs. Stepney's testimony was certainly fair comment on her testimony. Her cross-examination revealed numerous contradictions between her trial testimony and prior statements at the suppression hearing or to the police concerning the defendant's actions on the day of the murder. A review of the record convinces us that the court's reference to Mrs. Stepney's testimony did not unduly emphasize the extent of the impeachment, but served as an example to the jury to illuminate the credibility instruction. It was both clearly labeled as an example and surrounded by careful qualifying language. The court repeatedly reminded the jury that they were the sole judges of credibility. It emphasized that the jury's recollections of the testimony governed over any comments the court had made. The court's instructions, read as a whole, were scrupulously fair and balanced, [8] and the challenged credibility instruction was well within the court's discretion. There was no error in the instructions to the jury. [9]