Opinion ID: 1927032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Proper Role of the Reviewing Court.

Text: We have already referred to the provision of our statute which spells out the standard which a trial judge must apply in testing the sufficiency of a jury finding of obscenity: The finding must not be contrary to law or to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. This is the standard normally applied by this court in reviewing, upon appeal, a finding made by a judge as the trier of fact, in the absence of a jury. In Roth, the court's quotation, with apparent approval, of the trial court's instruction that the jurors were the exclusive judges of the conscience of the community, [20] and the reference to the average person, applying contemporary community standards [21] suggest that the supreme court of the United States might, within some limits, consider a jury finding of obscenity final, although the court did not spell out the formula it might apply to determine whether a jury finding would be adequately supported by the record. In Chobot we followed the finding-not-against-the-evidence approach. [22] There is a view that when the constitutional protection is claimed, the judge or appellate court must make an independent review of the material to determine whether it is obscene, and the concept that obscenity is a fact issue has been criticized. [23] That a judgment of obscenity is not a fact issue of the ordinary type is obvious. Issues of legal and constitutional interpretation dominate the process of determination. Upon the one hand is the desirability of according as much finality as is reasonable to decisions of the tribunal of first instance, and on the other the undesirability of a formula which puts the decision of one jury or one judge upon a difficult constitutional issue beyond the reach of reconsideration. The supreme judicial court of Massachusetts has resolved this dilemma by reliance upon the rule that where the evidence is documentary, the appellate court is not bound by the inferences drawn therefrom by the trial court. [24] We have recognized a similar rule. [25] Although there was more conflict in the expert testimony in this case than there appears to have been in the Massachusetts case, we deem the reading of the book to constitute the most weighty factor in the determination, and do not consider ourselves bound by the decision of the trial court, based on his reading of it. We have great respect for the opinion of the learned trial court, as we have for the opinions of our brethren who agree with him. Nonetheless, it is our opinion that he gave too much weight to the author's use of vulgar language, hereinbefore referred to, and to the fact that the incidents related violate our standards of acceptable conduct, and insufficient consideration to the fact that the book has commanded serious attention as a literary work of some importance.