Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the philosophy of the dissent

Text: 169 There are a great many assertions in the dissent that are not supported by the record and which are unsound factually, legally and logically. These are set forth in considerable detail in my dissent to the panel opinion in Decoster II, (1976), 199 U.S.App.D.C. ---, 624 F.2d 196. The plurality opinion ignores many of these and only partially deals with others. Lest silence be interpreted as recognizing their validity a few are hereinafter replied to.
170 The principal contention of the dissent is that counsel's investigation was inadequate because certain witnesses or possible witnesses were not interviewed. The supposed witnesses fit into five categories: (1) witnesses at the Golden Gate Bar, (2) witnesses who were in the D.C. Annex, (3) the two policemen, (4) the victim, and (5) the co-defendants. 171 1. Golden Gate Bar. There is no controversy as to what happened in the bar; no proffer as to what witnesses in the bar could have said; and Decoster told his counsel, and so testified, that there was nobody (in the bar) who could testify (he was) there. 58 172 2. D.C. Annex. There is no dispute as to what transpired at the hotel, and there has never been any indication that exculpatory evidence could have been obtained from witnesses in the Annex. 173 3. Policemen. Counsel examined officer Ehler at the preliminary hearing. 59 In addition, the United States Attorney furnished Decoster's lawyer with all Jencks Act material and grand jury testimony in advance of the trial. From this, he knew that the testimony of all three of the Government's witnesses was substantially the same, and very prejudicial to defendant's case. 174 4. Victim. After the incident, Crump moved away from the Washington area. There is no indication that he was available to be interviewed by defense counsel. In addition, a witness need not consent to pre-trial interviews by defense counsel, and there is no assurance that Crump would have done so. Finally, Crump was seriously injured in an automobile accident, and his ability to recollect the incident at the trial was hampered. His only testimony at the trial was as to his identification at the scene of the crime. In light of the limited nature of his testimony, a lengthy interrogation of Crump would have been useless. 175 5. Co-defendants. Decoster's counsel was familiar with their versions of the events because he had represented two of the defendants at the preliminary hearing. Counsel's probing cross-examination of the government's witnesses proves his familiarity with the facts of the case. 176 Even now, the dissent and appellant do not and cannot point to any exculpatory evidence that could have been found if Decoster's lawyer had conducted the unnecessarily thorough investigation that the dissent demands. Judge Bazelon concedes that (m)y colleagues may be correct that no material information could be elicited from such an investigation. 60 His whole argument rests on the assertion that it is . . . possible that exculpatory evidence could have been found. From this he concludes that an enormous investigation should have been conducted so that we would not have to speculate, post hoc, as to what the witnesses would have said. 61 177 On this record, it is clear that it is only my dissenting colleagues who are engaging in speculation. Decoster's counsel knew from the information available to him that his client was guilty. 62 This knowledge was confirmed after the trial when Decoster admitted his guilt. Thus, without speculating at all, it can be said that no investigation, however exhaustive, could have discovered evidence that would have helped Decoster. When as here a defense attorney knows his client is guilty, I wholeheartedly agree with then Judge (now Justice) Stevens' statement that counsel ha(s) no duty to search for witnesses, expert or otherwise, who might falsely testify to the contrary. Matthews v. United States, 518 F.2d 1245, 1246 (7th Cir. 1975). This statement contradicts the dissent's claim that counsel was required to search for alibi witnesses. Dissent nn.107, 110. 178
179 The dissent contends that defense counsel are obligated to investigate contradictory statements by an accused. Dissent n.110. To apply that law here, an accused like Decoster who initially told his attorney that he was present at the scene of the robbery, but later contradicted himself and said that he was not present, would thereby force his counsel to conduct an independent investigation for evidence that might support either statement to determine which version should be presented as a defense. 63 This suggestion is incredible. It grossly overstates the duty to investigate and is symptomatic of the unreasonable duties that the dissent is attempting to foist on defense lawyers. Without any investigation, the defendant's contradictory statements are conclusive proof that one of them is false and defense counsel owes no duty to a prevaricating accused to straighten out an obviously crooked story. See Dissent nn.22, 49, 112, page --- of --- U.S.App.D.C., page 272 of 624 F.2d.
180 The dissent states: (T)he suggestion that a client whose lawyer believes him to be guilty deserves less pretrial investigation is simply wrong. An attorney's duty to investigate is not relieved by his own perception of his client's guilt or innocence. 64 This pronouncement is foreign to a lawyer's basic obligation to the court and his profession. When, as here, defense counsel has reasonable grounds for believing his client guilty, that perception must influence his representation of the client. My dissenting colleagues recognize that a lawyer's obligation is only to make reasonable inquiries (dissent n.112), but then they ignore the reasonableness requirement and dissent because of counsel's failure to investigate in support of a fabricated defense. Dissent pages ---, ---, ---, --- of 199 U.S.App.D.C., pages 285, 286, 292, 294 of 624 F.2d. The dissent would brand as ineffective any conduct falling below the minimum standards of competent lawyering, without regard to the client's guilt or innocence. Dissent n.131. While the quality of counsel's performance may not depend on the guilt or innocence of his client, that does not contradict the principle that in determining whether a counsel has breached a duty, the guilt or innocence of his client may affect what he was required to do to satisfy the requirement of a reasonably competent lawyer. 181 Defense counsel are not required to close their eyes to the obvious and search for alibis for defendants who would like assistance in the fabrication of a defense, for that would be a violation of the ethical standards of the legal profession. As Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court: there is an important limitation on a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel: counsel ethically cannot assist his client in presenting what the attorney has reason to believe is false testimony. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 98 S.Ct. 2610, 57 L.Ed.2d 582, 592 (1978) (emphasis added). Thus, when the dissent states that an attorney cannot be guided by his own perception of his client's guilt or innocence, 65 it contradicts the Supreme Court.
182 The dissent contends that defense counsel's delay in seeking bond review is an example of his ineffectiveness. It is clear, however, that such delay was entirely irrelevant to the outcome of the case, for when the bond review motion was filed it was denied. Even assuming that counsel had unreasonably delayed filing for bond review, Decoster was not prejudiced in any way. 183 In addition, on the facts of this case it is apparent that it was unnecessary for defense counsel to file for bond review at all. Counsel, however, cannot be blamed for filing such a frivolous motion as this court is partially responsible because of the ever increasing list of unreasonable burdens some of our opinions place on defense counsel. On the facts the merit of the decision to deny bond reduction cannot be questioned. When Decoster was arrested on this charge, (1) he was already being sought as a fugitive on a bench warrant issued in another case; (2) he had no fixed address, no community ties, and no employment whatsoever; (3) he was an admitted narcotics user; (4) he had previously been arrested for carrying a dangerous weapon and had jumped bail while under a $600 bond; (5) as a juvenile he had been involved in a robbery and was sent to the Receiving Home from which he escaped; 66 and (6) the Bail Agency did not recommend release, even on conditions. 184 The wisdom of the decision to continue Decoster's incarceration was borne out when his trial was postponed. As a result of this delay, Decoster was released to the Black Man's Development Center. As might have been expected from his history of escapes, appellant promptly became a fugitive from justice. Under these circumstances, all of which were known to Decoster's counsel, it is folly to suggest that a motion for release should have been filed or that any prejudice resulted from trial counsel not immediately moving for Decoster's release. It was a complete waste of judicial effort for the panel, knowing all of this, to remand the case for a hearing on this frivolous point.
185 The dissent comments critically about the seventeen month period between the date of the offense and appellant's trial. It fails to recognize that over eight months of this delay was caused by Decoster jumping bail and remaining a fugitive. The facts are delineated in the Government's Supplemental Brief 3: 186 On January 21 appellant absconded from the Black Man's Development Center and never returned. (The) Bail Agency then reported that appellant had further violated the conditions of his release by reporting only once since being released. When the case was called for trial on February 9, appellant did not appear, and a bench warrant issued. Appellant was not rearrested until September 1971, after his codefendants in this case had pleaded guilty (at their trial) on June 18, 1971. 187 The trial was also delayed because one of the primary prosecution witnesses, Mr. Crump, was seriously injured in an automobile accident. The seventeen month delay, therefore, was not caused by any fault on the part of the Government.
The dissent states: 188 Although the question of prejudice remains part of the court's inquiry, it is distinct from the determination of whether the defendant has received effective assistance. Rather, prejudice is considered only in order to spare defendants, prosecutors and the courts alike a truly futile repetition of the pretrial and trial process. 67 189 Decoster was found guilty on clear, uncontradicted evidence. Prior to trial his letters in effect admitted his participation in the robbery and thereafter, at sentencing, he practically admitted his guilt. If this case is a good example of how my dissenting colleagues would apply their rule, then it is hard to imagine what it would take to convince them that a retrial would be futile. This illustrates part of the problem presented by the issues here. Courts can agree on language for standards for counsel but some judges, as in the dissent, give the standards such an unreasonable construction that the actual standard becomes meaningless. 190
191 There is considerable doubt about what story Decoster was telling when he was first arrested. The dissent states: Decoster claimed that he was not with (his co-defendants). Dissent n.110. Yet in his letter to Judge Waddy filed November 13, 1970, Decoster wrote: I can prove that I am only guilty of assault by self defence. See dissent n.22. And in his letter to his counsel, which Decoster testified he mailed between May and November, 1970, he admitted his participation in the events of the robbery. Dissent page --- of 199 U.S.App.D.C., page 273 of 624 F.2d. These letters obviously contradict the statements of the dissent at n.110 because if Decoster were guilty of assault by self defence he would have had to be in Crump's presence when he assaulted him in self defence. So to the extent that the dissent relies on any claim by Decoster that he was not with the co-defendants it is of questionable validity.
192 The dissent states that the Department of Corrections clarified Decoster's sentence because it was allegedly not properly executed. 68 This confuses the role of trial and appellate counsel and what is referred to as a clarification is nothing more than the routine computation of a legally adjudged sentence. 193 The dissent also implies that counsel's failure to offer any allocution caused the trial judge's decision to sentence Decoster to a prison term of 2-8 years while his co-defendants received only probation. 69 The lesser sentences for the co-defendants, however, were justified by (1) their guilty pleas, and because they did not (2) use narcotics, (3) jump bail, and (4) have a substantial criminal record, as Decoster did. 70