Opinion ID: 1218369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pruitt's Motions

Text: Here, the district court applied the wrongthat is, an incompletelegal standard when reviewing Pruitt's motions for pro bono counsel. None of the three orders denying Pruitt's four motions makes any mention of his competence, either independent of or relative to his claims. Rather, the identical orders state that neither the legal issues raised in the complaint nor the evidence that might support the plaintiff's claims [is] so complex or intricate that a trained attorney is necessary. This boilerplate gives no indication that the district court engaged in the required analysis of Pruitt's competence to litigate his claims; indeed, it flatly implies the court did not. The court's failure to undertake this necessary inquiry is an abuse of discretion. Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 583 (7th Cir.2005) (failure to apply the correct legal standard is an abuse of discretion). The defendants maintain Pruitt was not prejudiced because his case was too weak to succeed even with the assistance of counsel. This argument slightly misconstrues the prejudice inquiry. The question is not whether the case was a sure winner but for the absence of counsel; this is impossible to know. Rather, the question is whether assistance of counsel could have strengthened the preparation and presentation of the case in a manner reasonably likely to alter the outcome. This trial was a swearing contest. As the district court noted in denying the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, Pruitt's testimony, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to sustain a verdict in his favor. But fending for himself before and at trial severely compromised Pruitt's chances of persuading the jury, given his serious educational and forensic shortcomings. Examples of these shortcomings abound, beginning with Pruitt's poor pretrial preparation. With the exception of a single document drafted by a prison law clerk, Pruitt's court filings were disorganized, very poorly written, and at times incoherent; the district court described the complaint as jumbled and very difficult to decipher. Pruitt took no depositions and had significant difficulty explaining his anticipated testimony and exhibits during the pretrial videoconferences. To compound these problems, Pruitt's own deposition testimonygiven without the benefit of preparation and assistance of counsel supplied the principal means of contradicting his testimony at trial. An attorney could have significantly diminished these pretrial difficulties by helping Pruitt identify, locate, and prepare witnesses before trial, and avoid common deposition pitfalls. Even with the substantial assistance he received from the district court, Pruitt's inept trial performance demonstrates the difference counsel could have made. Pruitt did not understand what an opening statement or closing argument entailed, and he proved utterly incapable of summarizing the facts of his case. He was barely able to provide a sequential account of the alleged assault by Mesch or his subsequent complaints to prison authorities, and his testimony became even more confused during cross-examination. Pruitt's direct and cross-examinations elicited little, if any, information from witnesses, and he succeeded in entering only one exhibit into evidence. At the very least, counsel could have helped Pruitt present his story to the jury in a more organized and coherent manner, and deliver a cogent opening statement and closing argument on his behalf. In the end, the defendants' argument about the weakness of Pruitt's case rests on a conclusion that Mesch testified truthfully and Pruitt lied, which presupposes credibility determinations properly left to a finder of fact. The question for us on the issue of prejudice is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Pruitt lost the swearing contest not because of the inherent weakness of his claim, but because of his incompetent preparation and presentation of it to the jury. On this record, we think there is a reasonable likelihood that Pruitt's claims failed on account of poor preparation and presentation. Accordingly, Pruitt was prejudiced by the district court's denial of his requests under § 1915(e)(1), and the case must be returned to the district court for retrial with recruited pro bono counsel. We reach this judgment recognizing that the standard of review is deferential and reversal is justified only on a showing of harm. We appreciate that pro se prisoner cases have proliferated and each one presents special challenges for trial judges. We acknowledge that trial judges are better situated by position and experience to manage those challenges. The lawyers who accept prisoner cases pro bono publico are performing a valuable service for the court as well as the client. Pro se litigants, and the members of the bar who are asked to serve them as volunteers, are entitled to the court's careful consideration of any motion for pro bono counsel under § 1915(e)(1). The principles reiterated here are intended to ensure that requests for pro bono counsel are resolved according to a consistent framework calibrated to the nature of the discretionary judgment called for by § 1915(e)(1). They are not meant to move the exercise of discretion toward recruitment of counsel more often than not, or more often than is now the case; we repeat that the inquiry is individualized to the plaintiff and case before the court. Here, the district judge abused his discretion by applying the incorrect legal standard to Pruitt's requests for pro bono counsel, and the denial of those requests was ultimately prejudicial. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for recruitment of pro bono counsel and retrial.