Opinion ID: 2594239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exception to Teague

Text: The final step in our analysis is to determine whether Blakely falls under the exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure. This exception is reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (quotation marks omitted); Edwards, 129 P.3d at 986. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of this exception, explaining that it is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the Blakely rule does not fall under the exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Summerlin guides our analysis of whether Blakely is a watershed rule. Summerlin addressed the retroactivity of the constitutional rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). As discussed in Part II.A., above, Ring applied Apprendi in holding that a jury, and not a judge, must find the facts that justify a death sentence. The Summerlin Court declined to accord retroactive effect to Ring, holding that Ring announced a new procedural rule that did not qualify for the watershed rule exception. Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 356, 124 S.Ct. 2519. In holding that Ring  which applied the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee to the proceedings that determine whether a convicted person will receive a term of imprisonment or the death penalty  is not to be applied retroactively, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the procedural protections of Blakely are not to be applied retroactively. Indeed, this is exactly the conclusion reached by a number of courts. See Varela v. United States, 400 F.3d 864, 867 (11th Cir.2005) (While neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed the retroactivity of Blakely ... the Supreme Court's recent decision in Schriro v. Summerlin is essentially dispositive.); McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 480 (7th Cir.2005) (concluding that Summerlin is all but conclusive on the point of whether United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), which applied Apprendi and Blakely to the federal Sentencing Guidelines, is to be applied retroactively). Johnson distinguishes Summerlin by noting that the sentencing scheme that the Court addressed in Ring and Summerlin required judges to find the factors that warrant the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, as the Summerlin Court itself noted, the retroactivity of Apprendi's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement was not an issue in Summerlin. See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2519. We agree that the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the retroactivity of Blakely's holding that the jury must find the existence of sentencing facts beyond a reasonable doubt. However, we are persuaded that Blakely's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement is no more watershed than its alteration of the finder of fact. First, the watershed exception applies to rules that are central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt. Beard, 542 U.S. at 417, 124 S.Ct. 2504. Because Blakely alters sentencing procedures, it is difficult to conclude that it is central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt. Second, several federal courts of appeals have held that Apprendi, which altered both the factfinder and the burden of proof, and which was the basis for Blakely, did not announce a watershed rule. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir.2005) (listing cases). Third, although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether Apprendi's burden-of-proof requirement is to be applied retroactively, the Court's post- Apprendi cases suggest that it is not. Since Apprendi, the Court has twice stated that it is unlikely that any . . . watershed rules ha[ve] yet to emerge. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 667 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519 (This class of rules is extremely narrow, and it is unlikely that any . . . ha[s] yet to emerge.) (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that the Court made these statements after Apprendi held that facts that increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, strongly suggests that the Court does not consider Apprendi to be a watershed rule. If Apprendi does not qualify for the watershed exception, it is difficult to understand how Blakely, which applies Apprendi's Sixth Amendment holding, could qualify.