Opinion ID: 2325769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Time Limitation on Closing Argument

Text: In Appellant's sixth issue, he contends that the trial court improperly limited the time for trial counsel's closing argument, and that trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing, respectively, to object and to raise this claim. Appellant's Brief at 62. Appellant alleges that the trial court limited the guilt phase closing arguments to 20 to 30 minutes per side, a limitation that Appellant contends was completely unreasonable and violated [his] rights to due process and a fair trial. Id. We must first note that the only claim cognizable under the PCRA in this issue is appellate counsel ineffectiveness for failing to raise on direct appeal a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to object to the trial judge's limitation on closing argument. Because Appellant's derivative claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness cannot succeed if trial counsel was not ineffective, we begin by considering Appellant's allegations against trial counsel. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 544 Pa. 406, 676 A.2d 1178, 1185 (1996), this Court considered the issue of time limitation on closing argument and summarized the prevailing law on the matter as follows: A defendant has a right to summation. The length of closing arguments is left to the discretion of the trial court. Unless there is such an unreasonable limitation of time that [it] effectively denies a defendant the right to summation[,] a criminal conviction should not be disturbed. Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The trial judge in Brown had interrupted defense counsel's closing argument to announce at a side-bar conference that the court was limiting argument to forty-five minutes per side, and accordingly defense counsel only had fifteen minutes remaining for her closing argument. On direct appeal, the Brown appellant challenged the trial court's action, arguing that the time limitation prevented his counsel from presenting an argument that would enable the jury to concentrate on the issues. Id. Although we disapproved of the trial court's imposition of time limits after the closing arguments had begun, we declined to grant the appellant relief because our review of defense counsel's argument indicate[d] that ample time was allowed to summarize the issues before the jury. Id. Turning to the instant case, we note first that the trial judge here made clear to counsel before the start of testimony that she generally limited the time for closing arguments to thirty minutes. See N.T., 11/30/99, at 201. Furthermore, it is abundantly clear from the court's words that this was not an absolute rule, that it would not cut off an attorney who had something important to say, and that her general limitation was based on her experience as to a jury's attention span. Specifically, the trial judge's comment concerning closing argument, made to the prosecutor and defense counsel the day before testimony commenced, was the following: Closings, I generally limit to about a half hour. So just think about that now in terms of your closings. I mean I have never stopped someone who had something important to say, but I tell you to hone in on what's important because the jury doesn't have an attention span that is longer than 15, 20 minutes. So I tell you now with the proviso if there is something you have to deal with, I very rarely have ever cut off an attorney, okay. Id. During defense counsel's closing argument, after counsel had spoken for thirty minutes, the court did interrupt him as follows: Court: [Counsel], are you going to be wrapping up shortly? Defense Counsel: That is a half hour already? Court: Yes. Defense Counsel: I will try to do it, your honor. N.T., 12/8/99, at 88. Defense counsel continued his argument for a short time and then ended. [21] Based on these excerpts from the notes of testimony, we conclude that Appellant's contention that the trial court limited the guilt phase closing arguments to 20 to 30 minutes per side does not truly reflect the trial judge's position, actions, or words. Notably, the trial judge did not cut short defense counsel's closing argument, but rather, after counsel had addressed the jury for thirty minutes, asked if counsel was going to be ending shortly. If counsel still had something important to say, there is no indication from the record that he could not have continued, relying on the court's instructions issued before any testimony started. We fail to see on what basis trial counsel could or should have objected to the court's actions. Nonetheless, Appellant insists that defense counsel was unable to include a number of matters in his closing argument because of time limitations imposed by the trial judge, and that counsel was ineffective when he did not seek more time to include these matters. Appellant's Brief at 64-66. We have considered each of these matters in light of the entire record, and conclude that there is no arguable merit to Appellant's claims. First, Appellant contends that defense counsel was unable to argue that the testimony of the victim's children had been improperly influenced by Mr. Epps, their father, and by the prosecutor. Appellant's contention disregards or ignores many of the arguments that defense counsel did make during closing argument. Specifically, defense counsel argued that the children truly believed that Appellant had killed their mother and thus were not really lying; that the children knew all the answers to the prosecutor's questions, but could not answer most of defense counsel's questions; that there were many inconsistencies in the children's testimony; that, for a very short time after the murder, Mr. Epps was a suspect in the victim's murder, and Mr. Epps gained the most from the victim's death because of the ongoing divorce and custody actions; that somebody else may have influenced one of Philip's statements, made in the context of comments centered around his father; that Desiree's testimony may have been tainted; and that there was a program as to Philip's testimony. See N.T., 12/8/99, at 75-76, 80, 83, 85-87. The clear implication from defense counsel's comments was that the prosecutor had improperly coached the children prior to their testimony, and that Mr. Epps had a strong interest in deflecting blame for the victim's death from himself to Appellant and did so by influencing his children's testimony. Defense counsel's theory that Mr. Epps had influenced the children's identification of Appellant as the man who shot their mother was weakened by testimony of the victim's sister. She testified that the children called her immediately after the murder and told her that Appellant had shot their mother; a 911 tape, played for the jury, was consistent with the aunt's testimony. See N.T., 12/2/99, at 50-51; N.T., 12/3/99, at 122-24. The children's call took place prior to the reuniting of the children with Mr. Epps. Defense counsel sought during his closing argument to cast doubt on the significance of the aunt's testimony, as it was incompatible with his theory as to the genesis of the children's testimony. See N.T., 12/8/99, at 76-77. Given all of defense counsel's statements and arguments summarized above, there is absolutely no merit to Appellant's contention that counsel needed yet more time to make yet more argument concerning the influence of Mr. Epps and the prosecutor on the children. Second, Appellant contends that defense counsel was unable to argue certain details about the Commonwealth's alleged inadequate investigation and presentation of physical evidence. In particular, Appellant claims he had to omit argument concerning the following: a partial footprint from the crime scene; testimony that five shell casings were found at the crime scene; and testimony that only three of the four bullets recovered from the crime scene were conclusively determined to have been fired from the same firearm. [22] In closing argument, defense counsel repeatedly stated that the instant case had been marked by a rush to judgment and failure to investigate on the part of the Commonwealth. N.T., 12/8/99, at 70, 71, 77, 81, 86, 88. Counsel mentioned the five shell casings twice and mentioned the ballistics evidence of the bullets once, as alleged examples of the failure to investigate. See N.T., 12/8/99, at 82-83. Appellant does not suggest what more points needed to be argued, but were not because of time limitations, with regard to the shell casings, the ballistics evidence, or the partial footprint. There is no merit to Appellant's allegations that counsel needed more time. Third and finally, Appellant contends that defense counsel lacked the time to include in his closing argument the issue of specific intent. More specifically, Appellant relies on testimony of the medical examiner who found no stippling of the victim's gun-shot wounds, indicating that she was not shot at close range. [23] N.T., 12/6/99, at 83-84. Appellant insists that counsel had inadequate time to develop the significance of this finding for the issue of specific intent of the shooter. See Appellant's Brief at 66. Appellant's argument is frivolous. Defense counsel's closing argument reflectedappropriatelyhis theory of the case, as developed throughout trial, i.e., that Appellant could not have killed the victim because he was in another state, but the victim's estranged husband, who had ample motive for the murder, sought to place the blame on Appellant. Consistent with this theory, defense counsel proffered an alibi witness; strongly challenged the credibility of the testimony of the victim's children and sister; and questioned the investigation of the police officers at the scene, including their motivation for going to Mr. Epp's home after the murder. All of this evidence was summarized in defense counsel's closing argument. Counsel's individual arguments and his overall strategy would have been undermined and the jury confused had counsel appended to his closing an aside that the shooter must not have acted with intent to kill, because the shots were not fired at close range. There is no merit to Appellant's allegation that time limitations prevented trial counsel from arguing the significance of the medical examiner's testimony as to the issue of specific intent. Certainly, counsel did not argue specific intentbut the reasons for not doing so had nothing to do with time limitations. In sum, our review of the record, as discussed above, reveals that there is no merit to Appellant's contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's time limitation on closing argument. Because trial counsel was not ineffective, the derivative claim of appellate counsel ineffectiveness for not raising the issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness on direct appeal also is meritless. Appellant's sixth claim fails.