Opinion ID: 2279177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Cade's Videotaped Statement

Text: At the first trial, the government introduced in its case-in-chief a redacted version of a videotaped statement Cade had initially made to an officer investigating Semino's murder. In the tape, Cade acknowledged that he was present when the robbery and murder of Semino occurred. Cade referred to the other men involved as Leon, Leon's cousin, [14] and my friend. [15] Because of a potential for prejudice to Downing from Cade's videotaped statement, the trial court sanitized the videotaped evidence by ordering the government to delete any statements that would lead the jury to infer that Downing was one of the individuals with Cade on the night of the offense since as a co-defendant, Downing would not have an opportunity to cross-examine Cade about the testimony. The court further instructed the jury that the videotaped statement could only be used to determine Cade's guilt or innocence because the videotape was admissible only against Cade. After the government rested, however, Cade chose to testify. During his live testimony, Cade placed both himself and Downing at the scene of the robbery and subsequent murder. During Cade's cross-examination, he also testified that the person to whom he referred in the videotape as my friend was Downing. Despite the fact that Cade presented live testimony and was cross-examined by Downing, the court once again instructed the jury in closing that Cade's videotaped statement was admissible only against Cade, and not against Downing. On appeal, Downing alleges that the trial court erred in admitting the redacted videotape statement because it denied him rights secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment under the Bruton line of cases. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). We disagree. Because Cade ultimately testified and was subject to cross-examination by Downing's counsel about his live and videotaped testimony, Downing's Confrontation Clause rights were not violated by the admission of Cade's videotaped statement. As an initial matter, we note that Downing failed to raise this claim of a Confrontation Clause violation at trial. Therefore, our review of this claim is for plain error. Plain error review permits us to grant a remedy where (1) there is error, (2) the error is plain, meaning `clear' or `obvious,' and (3) the error affected substantial rights. Baker v. United States, 867 A.2d 988, 1002 (D.C.2005); see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). Moreover, the error must seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. We reverse only where the error resulted in manifest injustice or a clear miscarriage of justice. York v. United States, 803 A.2d 1009, 1011 (D.C.2002); Perkins v. United States, 760 A.2d 604, 609 (D.C. 2000). In Bruton, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that an out-of-court statement implicating a non-confessing co-defendant is inherently prejudicial. 391 U.S. at 135-137, 88 S.Ct. 1620; see Johnson v. United States, 883 A.2d 135, 141 (D.C.2005). The Court held that a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights were violated where incriminating references were not deleted and the declarant co-defendant did not take the stand such that the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Moreover, the court concluded that a limiting instruction could not alleviate the harm because of the prejudicial impact such a statement could have on a jury. Id. at 132, 88 S.Ct. 1620. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Supreme Court held that a statement is properly admitted with limiting instructions where a defendant's name and any reference to his or her existence are eliminated from the co-defendant's extrajudicial statement. 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987); see Foster v. United States, 548 A.2d 1370, 1378 (D.C.1988) (finding a redacted statement that substituted a neutral reference to a defendant admissible insofar as there existed no substantial risk that the jury will consider the statement). Downing's reliance on the Bruton line of cases to attack the admission of his redacted statement is misplaced, however, because unlike the co-defendants in these cases cited above, Cade testified at their joint trial. Therefore, the Confrontation Clause concern that the Bruton line of cases seeks to address is not present here. Cade was subjected to a full cross-examination by Downing and therefore, cannot complain that he was prejudiced by the trial court's decision. See Lemon v. United States, 564 A.2d 1368, 1372 (D.C.1989) (The Constitution as construed in Bruton . . . is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for `full and effective' cross examination.) (citing Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971)) (emphasis in original); see also Nelson, 402 U.S. at 626, 91 S.Ct. 1723 (the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant's out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.) (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.) (emphasis added). Because Cade testified in this case and there was no limitation on Downing's cross-examination of Cade, the admission of Cade's videotaped statement was not error, let alone plain error, because Downing was not at all prejudiced by its admission.