Opinion ID: 6321625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Traditional Core Criteria

Text: Starting with the simplest and least contentious of the traditional core criteria, the seventeen districts in the Carter Plan, like every map submitted, are all contiguous.
Turning to compactness, we find that all of the submitted plans are on a higher plane of compactness than the unconstitutional 2011 Plan with its “oddly shaped, sprawling districts which wander seemingly arbitrarily across Pennsylvania.” LWV II, 178 A.3d at 819. Moreover, utilizing the various accepted metrics, the submitted maps are all [J-20-2022] - 27 within a relatively narrow range comparable to the 2018 Plan, which this Court deemed constitutionally sufficient.23 While well within the range of the submitted plans, we acknowledge that the Carter Plan is slightly less compact than some of the other maps. We discount, however, the Special Master’s suggestion that any reduction in compactness resulted from adherence to the 2018 Plan lines. Instead, minor reductions resulted from a trade-off acknowledged by numerous experts between two of the traditional core criteria: compactness and minimization of political subdivision splits. It is easily comprehended that adherence to county and city lines will decrease compactness because many of the boundaries follow geographic features such as rivers, which meander across our Commonwealth. A mapmaker must, therefore, balance more compact districts with respect for the integrity of political subdivisions. In our view, Dr. Rodden’s Report sufficiently justifies the slightly less-compact aspect of the Carter Plan by explaining various decision points where he sacrificed compactness in favor of unifying counties or other political subdivisions. Rodden Report at 8-9, 12-20, 22-23, Tr. at 105-06. Additionally, we recognize that the Carter Plan is less compact in part due to the decision to keep Pittsburgh within a single district. Rather than utilizing a relatively smooth dividing line, the Carter Plan traces Pittsburgh’s jagged city 23 Several metrics are used to evaluate compactness, each testing a slightly different aspect of that concept. We need not delve into the details of the computations of these accepted metrics, which are not contested, but rather look broadly to the results across the metrics. Specifically, using the Mean Polsby-Popper metric in which larger scores indicate greater compactness, the submitted maps range from 0.27 to 0.38, with the Carter Plan scoring 0.31 and the 2018 Plan scoring 0.32. On the Mean Reock score, under which higher scores again indicate greater compactness, the submitted maps range from 0.38 to 0.44, with the Carter Plan at 0.41 and the 2018 Plan at 0.43. The Carter Plan again is within the midrange of the Mean Convex Hull metric where larger scores indicate more compact districts, with the maps ranging from 0.75 to 0.81, the Carter Plan at 0.78 and the 2018 Plan at 0.79. Finally, addressing the Cut Edges metric, for which a lower score demonstrates more compact districts, the Carter Plan at 5896 falls within the range of maps from 5,061 to 6821, where the 2018 Plan is at 5,789. [J-20-2022] - 28 line. Given the thorough explanation for the choices made and the realities of existing but irregular county and municipality boundaries, we deem the Carter Plan to be sufficiently compact in comparison to the other submitted plans.
The Carter Plan included four districts with a population of 764,865, four districts with one additional person at 764,866, and nine districts with one less person at 764,864. Rodden Report at 21. As stated supra, the Special Master found that each proposed plan satisfied the constitutional requirement that congressional districts be as nearly equal in population as practicable. Report at 138, CL 1. Nevertheless, she gave less weight to the Carter Plan because districts in the plan had a maximum deviation of two persons, whereas some plans achieved a maximum deviation of only one person. As noted above, we respectfully rejected the Special Master’s discounting based upon its maximum population deviation, without considering whether the slight difference between the oneand two-person population deviation was justified.24 Although a challenge under the equal population requirement is not presently before this Court, the case law is nonetheless instructive in reviewing whether the Carter Plan sufficiently met the traditional core criterion of equal population. While the criterion of equal population is exacting and enforced strictly, the United States Supreme Court has conceded that “precise mathematical equality … may be impossible to achieve in an imperfect world,” and consequently, the United States Constitution’s equal population standard requires only that districts be apportioned to achieve population equality “as nearly as is practicable.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983). 24While the Special Master merely gave the Carter Plan less weight, some parties and amici argued that the Carter Plan failed to meet the equal population requirement because nine plans achieved a deviation of one person. [J-20-2022] - 29 Under the relevant caselaw, a challenge to population equality requires the parties challenging the proposed plan to show that the population deviation “could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population.” Id. at 730. This burden may be satisfied by the presentation of a plan with a lower population deviation, particularly where the party being challenged presents an alternative plan that achieves a lower population deviation. See Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675–76 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (where defendants themselves presented a plan with a lower population deviation). We will assume arguendo that this step is met as the Carter Petitioners appended to their exceptions filed in this Court a slightly revised plan containing only a one-person deviation. The reduced deviation was achieved at the expense of an additional split in a Vote Tabulation District.25 Notably, however, the ability to achieve a lower maximum population deviation, by itself, does not establish the unconstitutionality of a plan with a larger deviation. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740. Rather, the burden merely shifts to the proponent of the plan to prove “with some specificity” that the deviations in its proposed plan were necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective. Id. at 740-41. The specificity required for demonstrating that the deviation was necessary is flexible and requires a case-by-case consideration of the following factors: the size of the deviation, the importance of the legitimate state interest necessitating the deviation, the consistency with which the plan reflects those interests, and whether alternatives might substantially vindicate those interests yet achieve a smaller deviation. Id. at 741. 25 Dr. Rodden explained that a “vote tabulation district” is the term for the level at which ballots differ between local races. He attempted to minimize these splits because district divisions at this level create difficulties and potential errors for local election officials as they determine which ballot a voter should complete. Tr. at 95-96. He observed that these errors relating to vote tabulation districts can result in voters being provided incorrect ballots, which can have significant consequences in close elections. Tr. at 97. [J-20-2022] - 30 Accordingly, “the greater the deviation, the more compelling the government's justification must be.” Vieth, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 677. While “there are no de minimis population variations,” Karcher, 462 U.S. at 734, the size of the deviation between a one-person and two-person deviation is as small a population deviation as is possible and thus results in a low burden of justification. The Karcher court provided a non-exhaustive list of legislative policies that might justify a slight population variance, including respecting municipal boundaries and preserving prior districts. Id. at 740. Since Karcher, federal courts have also recognized a legitimate state interest in avoiding splitting of election precincts and not unduly departing from “the useful familiarity of existing districts.” Mellow, 607 A.2d at 206 (Pa. 1992) (collecting cases). In the brief filed in support of their exceptions in this Court, the Carter Petitioners explained that their attempts to reach zero deviation required not only the manipulation of several census blocks, but also the additional split of a Vote Tabulation District at the intersection of Districts 3 and 5 in South Philadelphia, which the original plan was able to keep intact. Carter Exceptions Brief at Exhibit A, 2–3. We addressed a similar justification in Mellow, where the proposed plan fell below others regarding population deviation precisely because the cost of maximum mathematical equality “require[d] manipulation of the smallest census unit, the census block.” Mellow, 607 A.2d at 218. In Mellow, we found that the election administration problems arising from requiring voters in a single precinct to look to two different sets of congressional candidates “is not a minor one.” Id. In doing so, we accepted the justification and ultimately adopted a proposed plan with a larger, but still slight, population deviation than other plans submitted.26 Id. 26In Mellow, the Court adopted a plan with a 63-person maximum population deviation, despite the submission of a plan with only a one-person deviation. In the adopted plan, the smallest district included 565,754 persons, while the largest district had 565,817 persons. Mellow, 607 A.2d at 226 (Appendix A to Opinion of President Judge Craig). [J-20-2022] - 31 In the present case, the Carter Petitioners have satisfied their burden by stating, with specificity, that the two-person deviation was required to prevent the additional split of a Vote Tabulation District. This is a recognized legitimate state interest, and there has been no evidence nor allegations of bad faith on the part of the Carter Petitioners. The Carter Plan represents a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population, and the two-person deviation was the byproduct of legitimate efforts to limit the number of splits. Accordingly, the Carter Plan satisfies the equal population requirement and is comparable, given the very minimal deviation, to the other submitted plans.
While the traditional core criterion of contiguity is very straight forward, it is less clear how to assess whether a plan has satisfied the requirement that it “not divide any county, city, incorporated town, borough, township, or ward, except where necessary to ensure equality of population.” LWV III, 181 A.3d at 1085. In practical terms, there are only a few political subdivisions which are necessary to split to comply with the maximum population of a district. Following the 2022 Census, the ideal population for Pennsylvania’s congressional districts is 764,865. Thus, only Philadelphia, Allegheny, and Montgomery Counties exceed this population, and the only city with an excess population is Philadelphia. Beyond these required divisions, mapmakers must divide the Commonwealth by grouping together whole political subdivisions with parts of others to achieve the necessary equal population. Inevitably, there are tradeoffs inherent in this process. A plan that prioritizes minimizing the number of county splits may well incur more municipality and ward splits to achieve the critical equal population of the district as a whole. To complicate matters further, some boroughs span a county line, requiring a mapmaker to choose potentially between splitting the county or the borough. Additionally, reasonable minds can differ as [J-20-2022] - 32 to whether it is preferable to split fewer total political subdivisions but to split some in multiple pieces. For example, Philadelphia’s population requires it to be split in at least three pieces, but some proposed plans split it into four pieces. Neither our constitution nor our caselaw provides guidance as to whether the unity of one type of political subdivision should be prioritized over that of another. Instead, we observe that these determinations are best left to the political branches, and thus, we do not rank the order of the importance of the splits. Instead, for the purpose of choosing a plan, we look wholistically across the plans for a minimization of the splits and for a justification for the splits to ensure that the decisions were based on valid redistricting criteria and not for vote dilution purposes. Turning back to the submitted plans, we emphasize that all of the plans are a far cry from the unconstitutional 2011 Plan which splintered the Commonwealth, including the division of twenty-eight counties. LWV II, 178 A.3d at 819. In contrast, the Carter Plan splits half as many counties. Indeed, Dr. Rodden testified that he prioritized maintaining the counties as whole entities and, when counties are split, avoiding splitting them multiple times. While we do not opine as to which division is preferable, we merely observe that the Carter Plan is one of the best in terms of keeping counties whole and falls within all other ranges of the plans submitted.27 Accordingly, we conclude that the Carter Plan is superior or comparable to all the other submitted plans on this criterion. 27 As discussed supra, experts disagree as to how to count the separation of a noncontiguous portion of Chester County from the rest of the county when a plan uses the border between Chester and Delaware Counties as a district boundary. Dr. DeFord’s comparison of the plans’ splits indicates that this split was included in the Carter Plan’s total of 14 divided counties, such that an argument could be made that the Carter Plan should actually be attributed with 13 splits, which would tie for the least split counties. In comparison, the other maps range from 13-17 counties, while the 2018 Plan divided 14. In terms of city splits, the Carter Plan splits Philadelphia into three pieces as is required by its population but does not fragment it into 4 pieces as do some maps. While [J-20-2022] - 33