Opinion ID: 437447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability Under Section 1985(3)

Text: 43 As a threshold matter, all defendants challenge the applicability of section 1985(3) to this case, although on separate grounds. The D.C. defendants argue that the section does not apply to employees of the District of Columbia or to the municipality. 39 The FBI defendants contend that the class-based animus necessary to a section 1985(3) action was not established. 40 Finally, FBI defendant Jones argues that the section does not apply to federal officials or to acts occurring within the District of Columbia. 41
44 We begin by considering the language of, and case law relevant to, section 1985(3). The provision reads, 45 If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws ... [and] in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 42 46 By its terms, therefore, the statute requires that a plaintiff must allege and prove four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 47 It is by now well-established that the provision encompasses private conspiracies, and not just actions taken under color of state law. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). It is equally clear, in light of Griffin, that the provision does not apply to all conspiratorial tortious interferences with the rights of others, but only to those motivated by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court has added a requirement of class-based animus to the list of elements set out above. 48 In Griffin, the seminal case establishing these principles, the complaint alleged that defendants, private persons, had conspired to carry out an assault to prevent [the] plaintiffs and other Negro-Americans, through ... force, violence and intimidation, from seeking the equal protection of the laws and from enjoying the equal rights, privileges and immunities of citizens. Id. at 103, 91 S.Ct. at 1799. Holding that the complaint stated a cause of action at the core of section 1985(3), the Court found it unnecessary to delineate the periphery of such actions. Consequently, because the alleged conspiracy in Griffin was motivated by racial basis, the Court did not have to consider whether non-racial discriminatory animus stated a cause of action under the statute. 49 Similarly, the Court identified two constitutional sources of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged in the case before it. First, the Court observed that section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment enables Congress to impose liability on private persons for conduct far beyond the actual imposition of slavery or involuntary servitude, id. at 105, 91 S.Ct. at 1800, and concluded that Congress was wholly within its powers under Sec. 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men. Id. 43 Second, the Court noted that the right of interstate travel is constitutionally protected, does not necessarily rest on the Fourteenth Amendment, and is assertable against private as well as governmental interference, id. at 105, 91 S.Ct. at 1800, and that plaintiffs had alleged interference with that right. Congress therefore unquestionably had the particular power to protect the right of interstate travel from private interference. The Court made clear that, in identifying these two sources of power, it did not mean to imply the absence of any others. Id. at 107, 91 S.Ct. at 1801. 50 Quite recently the Supreme Court revisited section 1985(3) and offered some guidance on the outer limits of the provision. In United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners v. Scott, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983), the Court reviewed an action brought by a construction company and two of its employees, principally against a number of unions and their members. The complaint alleged that defendants had conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their legally protected rights, contrary to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981), by planning and executing attacks on persons and property at a construction site known to employ non-union workers. The Court held, first, that an alleged conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights is not a violation of section 1985(3) unless it is proved that the state is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the state. Id. 103 S.Ct. at 3356-57. On this point, the Court observed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the individual against state action, not against wrongs committed by individuals, and it made clear that a section 1985(3) conspiracy to violate either of these constitutional provisions is not made out without some proof of state involvement. At the same time, the Court reaffirmed that the interpretation of the section is not generally limited by the state action constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment; section 1985(3) in fact applies to wholly private conspiracies as long as they are aimed at interfering with rights constitutionally protected against private as well as official encroachment--such as the Thirteenth Amendment and the right to travel. In other words, the rights protected by section 1985(3) exist independently of the section and only to the extent that the Constitution creates them. Thus, when state action is involved, the whole spectrum of rights against state encroachment that the Constitution sets forth comes into play. When no state action is involved, only those constitutional rights that exist against private actors may be challenged under the section. 51 The Court in Scott also considered the kind of class-based animus that is encompassed by the section and rejected the notion that the section forbids conspiracies against workers who refuse to join a union. More generally, the Court held that the provision was not intended to reach conspiracies motivated by bias toward others on account of their economic views, status or activities, id. at 3360, or, put another way, motivated by economic or commercial animus. 52 At the same time, the Court in Scott reaffirmed, on the basis of the applicable legislative history, that section 1985(3) was intended at a minimum to reach animus against Blacks and those who championed their cause, most notably Republicans, id. at 3359 (emphasis added). Whether it also reached wholly non-racial, but politically motivated conspiracies, id. at 3359, was dubbed a difficult question and was not reached. 44 53 It is against this background that we consider defendants' arguments that the District Court erroneously permitted plaintiffs to proceed with their section 1985(3) claims. 54
55 The District of Columbia argues that section 1985(3) does not apply to the District of Columbia or its employees. For this proposition it offers no analytical support, but rather rests on a passing and conclusory remark in an opinion from this Circuit to the effect that section 1985 has never been applicable to District employees. 45 We disagree. Nothing in the statute or in Supreme Court opinions supports the view put forth by defendants. For the following reasons, we hold that the District and its employees may be sued for damages under section 1985(3). 46 56 The District defendants do not offer any rationale for their proposed limitation on the reach of section 1985(3), and we therefore must undertake an independent inquiry into the possible bases for that argument. The proposed limitation has two possible sources: either it is an interpretation of the geographical limit contained in that section--the section by its terms encompasses conspiracies acted upon in any State or Territory--which, arguably, was intended to eliminate from the scope of the statute all conspiracies formed in the District of Columbia; or it might be a confused analogy to section 1983 case law, holding that the District of Columbia is not a State or Territory within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. 47 57 The Supreme Court has twice construed the phrase any [or every] State or Territory as used in the civil statutes of the 1860s and early 1870s. In Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31, 68 S.Ct. 847, 851, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948), the Court ruled that the phrase, as used in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1982 (1976), includes the District of Columbia. That section, which first appeared as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, provides: 58 All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. 48 59 In District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973), the Court reached the opposite conclusion when construing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (current version at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (Supp. V 1981)). At the time, 49 that section provided in pertinent part, Every person who, under color of any statute ... of any State or Territory .... The Court concluded that the District of Columbia was not a State or Territory within the meaning of that language. 60 To determine the meaning of the phrase State or Territory as it is used in section 1985(3), we track the analysis in District of Columbia v. Carter and test for divergence. Initially, however, it is crucial to note that section 1985(3) is facially more akin to section 1982--which has been construed to encompass the District--than to section 1983. Sections 1982 and 1985(3) both use the State or Territory phrase as a geographical limit (unlike section 1983); consequently, to exclude the District of Columbia from their scope is to create an inexplicable safe haven in the District for persons--both private and official--who would be liable elsewhere. In contrast, the color of law requirement in section 1983 (which is not found in either sections 1982 or 1985(3)) implicates federalism issues not relevant to our inquiry; therefore the case law construing section 1983 offers a less compelling analogy. In other words, to draw lines on the basis of source of authority is to recognize a coherent distinction, whereas to draw lines on the basis of place of action is to be impractical, as Hurd v. Hodge made clear. 61 The issue is somewhat complicated, however, by the fact that sections 1982 and 1983 originated in two different acts, each with a different purpose. Section 1985(3) first appeared in the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 50 as did section 1983, whereas section 1982 appeared earlier, in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 51 This difference in origin was central to the Carter Court's analysis of sections 1982 and 1983. Thus, after explaining that section 1982 was enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's nationwide prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude, the Court explained, 62 The situation is wholly different, however, with respect to Sec. 1983. Unlike Sec. 1982, which derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Sec. 1983 has its roots in Sec. 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, Act of Apr. 20, 1871, Sec. 1, 17 Stat. 13. This distinction has great significance, for unlike the 1866 Act, which was passed as a means to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, the primary purpose of the 1871 Act was to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 Stat. 13; ... And it has long been recognized that [d]ifferent problems of statutory meaning are presented by two enactments deriving from different constitutional sources. 63 409 U.S. at 423, 93 S.Ct. at 605. Since section 1985(3) also derives from the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, arguably the same limits apply to its interpretation as to that of section 1983, in particular the limits imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, it might be contended that the District of Columbia would not be within section 1985(3)'s purview, as it was not within that of section 1983, simply because the District is not a State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 694, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); see also Morgan v. District of Columbia, 550 F.Supp. 465, 470 (D.D.C.1982) (reaching this conclusion), aff'd without opinion, 725 F.2d 125 (D.C.Cir.1983). If we were to read into section 1985(3) the limits imposed by Fourteenth Amendment analysis, as the Carter Court read them into section 1983, the result would be to remove from the scope of section 1985(3) all conspiracies acted upon in the District, by whomever planned, not simply or even necessarily conspiracies in which the District or its employees participate. The problem with this analysis is that there is no more reason to read the word state as being limited by the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment than there is to read the nature of the conspiracies described in section 1985(3) as limited by that concept--so that only conspiracies under color of state law would be covered. The two would seem to go pari passu. But the latter interpretation has been conclusively rejected by the Supreme Court. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). 64 By interpreting section 1985(3) to encompass private conspiracies, the Court in Griffin necessarily eschewed an extension of the Fourteenth Amendment's limitations to section 1985(3). The holding in Griffin is wholly inconsistent with the limited commands of the Fourteenth Amendment, which constrain only the States and those acting under color of State authority. Similarly, in Scott the Court explicitly reaffirmed the proposition that section 1985(3) encompasses wholly private conspiracies and unequivocally stated that the section is not limited by the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. 52 Accordingly, while the Carter Court found persuasive section 1983's Fourteenth Amendment origins, and relied on those origins to read into section 1983 limitations on its reach, Supreme Court decisions construing section 1985(3) point in precisely the opposite direction. With express Supreme Court direction not to apply Fourteenth Amendment analysis to the construction of section 1985(3), we can perceive no reason to interpret the provision as the Court interpreted section 1983, where a contrary rule controlled. 65 Nor do we find persuasive for our purposes any other argument put forth in Carter to limit section 1983's reach in the District. In fact, the remaining factors point toward construing section 1985(3) to cover District employees. The Carter Court observed that unlike section 1983, section 1982 was intended to reach private parties, to act as an 'absolute' bar to all such discrimination, private as well as public, federal as well as state. 409 U.S. at 422, 93 S.Ct. at 605. With this in mind, the Court concluded, it would be anomalous indeed if Congress chose to carve out the District of Columbia as the sole exception to an act of otherwise universal application, id., particularly when the dangers of private discrimination ... were, and are, as present in the District of Columbia as in the States. Id. Precisely the same analysis applies to section 1985(3), which applies to all conspiracies, whether public or private, and the Carter argument quite clearly counsels against carving out the District of Columbia. We have no reason to believe private persons in the District are any less capable than persons elsewhere of participating in conspiracies of the kind addressed in section 1985(3). 66 On the basis of the Court's analysis in Carter, we conclude that none of the reasons offered for eliminating the District from the scope of section 1983 applies to section 1985(3) or counsels reaching the same result. In light of the Supreme Court's direction not to read Fourteenth Amendment restraints into section 1985(3), we would be remiss to limit the reach of that section and exempt the District and its employees. In the firm belief that Hurd v. Hodge and the analysis contained therein controls this case, we reject defendants' proposed limitation on section 1985(3). 67
68 We turn next to consider defendant Jones' contention that section 1985(3) does not contemplate actions against federal officers. The apparent source of this argument is an antiquated decision of the Second Circuit, whose holding has repeatedly been read out of context by District Courts, and has now effectively been overruled by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Jones' argument and hold that section 1985(3) encompasses actions against federal officers, subject, of course, to considerations of qualified immunity. 69 Initially, we note that this Circuit has previously permitted actions to be brought under section 1985(3) against federal officers. See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220 (D.C.Cir.1977) (White House official may be liable in section 1985(3) action). As a result, we pause here only to resolve any lingering doubts about the rationale of the law of this Circuit, not to decide what the law should be. Because the law in this area for years was based on conclusory, unsupported statements, and misguided interpretations of an unfortunately cryptic opinion, we want to make absolutely clear the basis of our decision. 70 The source of confusion is Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir.1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949, 70 S.Ct. 803, 94 L.Ed. 1363 (1950), a delphic opinion by Judge Learned Hand, which has repeatedly been cited for the proposition that section 1985(3) does not contemplate suits against federal officers. See, e.g., Lofland v. Meyers, 442 F.Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y.1977); Williams v. Halperin, 360 F.Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y.1973). In Gregoire, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a complaint against Francis Biddle, the Attorney General, and other federal officials, to recover for false arrest as an enemy alien. The complaint was grounded, inter alia, on the Civil Rights Act, including section 47(3), now 1985(3). The court began its analysis by summarizing a decision of that Circuit, affirmed by the Supreme Court, which had held United States Attorneys absolutely immune from a civil action for malicious prosecution. The Supreme Court, in affirming, cited to earlier cases establishing absolute immunity for judges for acts done in the exercise of their judicial function. 53 Judge Hand concluded that the Court's affirmance of the circuit court established absolute immunity for officers of the Department of Justice, when engaged in prosecuting private persons. 177 F.2d at 580. Defendants in Gregoire were officers of the Justice Department engaged in prosecuting a private person. Accordingly, Gregoire held only that the common law grants executive officers engaged in prosecution an absolute privilege from civil actions, not that all federal officers are thus sheltered. It concluded that, absent any indication that Congress intended to remove that immunity, the complaint required dismissal. 71 It was in this context that Gregoire turned to consider the Civil Rights Acts, presumably to determine whether they were meant to waive prosecutorial immunity. Judge Hand rejected plaintiff's argument that then-section 47(3), currently section 1985(3), created a claim against any two people, including federal officers, who conspire to injure another for spite or improper motives, or, in other words, rejected a reading of the section that would transform it into a general federal tort law. He remarked, it is apparent that [the words] could not have had such a scope without destroying their validity constitutionally. Id. at 581. Regardless whether Judge Hand was more concerned with the idea of private conspiracies under the statute or federalization of tort law, it is now clear that neither of these factors necessarily poses any obstacle to the section's constitutionality. In light of Griffin, which both established the constitutionality of the very statutory construction rejected by Judge Hand--that the conspiracy statute applies to wholly private conspiracies--and read into the statute a requirement of class-based discriminatory animus to assure the statute was not a general tort provision, Judge Hand's construction of the statute on these issues no longer merits consideration. 72 It is therefore apparent that cases relying on Gregoire to preclude suits against federal officials under section 1985(3) have no present force. First, these cases always have been in error to the extent they read into Gregoire an absolute privilege for persons other than prosecutors. Second, these cases have in any event been superseded in their analysis of section 1985(3), along with Gregoire itself, by Griffin. We have not found either in case law or in the language of the statute any reason to exclude all federal officers from the meaning of the word persons in section 1985(3). Pre-Griffin cases therefore are of no precedential weight on this point, and post-Griffin cases that rely only on Gregoire, or on other cases citing only Gregoire, without any mention of Griffin, similarly should not be followed. 73 Considerable recent case law rejects the proposed limitation on section 1985(3) and supports our conclusion. See Jafree v. Barber, 689 F.2d 640, 643 (7th Cir.1982) (section 1985(3) action against federal officer states cause of action); Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir.1980) (same); Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931 (10th Cir.1975) (same); Bergman v. United States, 551 F.Supp. 407, 414-15 (W.D.Mich.1982) (same); Peck v. United States, 470 F.Supp. 1003, 1008-12 (S.D.N.Y.1979) (construing section 1985(3) to permit suits against federal officers, rejecting contrary decisions in the district); Founding Church of Scientology v. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 459 F.Supp. 748 (D.D.C.1978) (allowing section 1985(3) action against federal officer). As one Southern District of New York judge explained, in rejecting Gregoire and the cases that followed, 74 Unless there is a rationale, unknown to the past cases, for holding that federal officers are not persons under Sec. 1985(3), there is no longer any reason to exclude from coverage federal officers acting under color of federal law. Since such a rationale is inconceivable, Griffin 's holding that Sec. 1985(3) applies to any person requires that it apply to federal officers. 75 Moriani v. Hunter, 462 F.Supp. 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y.1978). We agree and hold that plaintiffs did not fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted by naming either federal officers as defendants or, for reasons stated in section I(B), for naming as defendants the District of Columbia and its employees.
76 FBI defendants also contend that plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of the racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus 54 requisite to recovery under section 1985(3). Their challenge is not directed at the trial judge's instructions on the matter, which were not challenged below, 55 but at the sufficiency of the evidence on this element of plaintiffs' case. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that the FBI defendants acted with the requisite animus, and that the claim must therefore fail. 77 We note at the outset the existence of some debate over the kinds of class-based discriminatory animus that section 1985(3) requires. Scott sought to break down the potential scope of the provision into three categories of animus--economic and commercial, purely political (meaning wholly non-racial), and racial (including the traditional supporters of civil rights)--and held that the first category was not within the reach of the section. Griffin, on the other hand, had squarely placed the third category (i.e., racial) within the section's reach. Both cases left unanswered whether political activity simpliciter defines a class of people covered by section 1985(3). At the same time, several circuits have ruled that politics and religion define such a class. See, e.g., Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-88 (2d Cir.1983) (discrimination on basis of political affiliation constitutes class-based discriminatory animus); Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 47-48 (4th Cir.1981) (discrimination against members of Unification Church), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1253, 71 L.Ed.2d 445 (1982); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 & n. 22 (7th Cir.1979) (discrimination based on political affiliation with racial overtones), modified on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-40 (8th Cir.1975) (discrimination against supporters of insurgent candidate for tribal council presidency), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1436, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 911-12 (6th Cir.) (discrimination against critics of the President), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 280, 46 L.Ed.2d 258 (1975); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1064-65 (6th Cir.1973) (discrimination against Jews); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir.1971) (en banc) (worshippers at predominantly White parish disrupted by Black civil rights workers); see also Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights, 90 HARV.L.REV. 1721, 1728 (1977) ([T]he legislative history behind section 1985(3) points unmistakably to the conclusion that discrimination [on the basis of political affiliations or beliefs] was intended to be actionable.); cf. Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.1983) (handicapped persons not a class within meaning of section 1985(3)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1601, 80 L.Ed.2d 131 (1984); DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir.1979) (homosexuals not a protected class). 78 Given the facts of this case, it is unnecessary to decide whether purely political or other activity without any racial overtones falls within section 1985(3). The FBI conspiracy allegedly targeted plaintiffs in significant part because of their involvement in and support of civil rights. At a minimum, according to Griffin, section 1985(3) reaches conspiracies motivated by animus against Blacks and those who support them. As the Court in Scott explained, 79 The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the [Ku Klux] Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to political power. The predominate purpose of Sec. 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters. The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards the Negro. 56 80 Thus, in Griffin, the Court found an alleged conspiracy against Blacks (and against a non-party who was mistaken to be a civil rights worker), designed to prevent them from seeking equal rights under the laws, to satisfy the requisite animus requirement. Similarly, we find that the uncontroverted evidence plaintiffs offered to prove the requisite animus discloses that defendants' actions were undoubtedly aimed at plaintiffs at least in part on account of their racial politics --that is, their participation in and support of civil rights protest, so as to take the conspiracy out of the purely political, wholly non-racial category. The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the COINTELPRO conspiracy was impelled by a commingling of racial and political motives, 57 and is far removed from the kind of purely political disputes that seemingly have troubled the Supreme Court in its reading of section 1985(3). 58 The blatant racial overtone of the FBI program, coupled with plaintiffs' various organizational efforts, make clear the entanglement of race and politics that characterized the implementation of the COINTELPRO conspiracy. 81 First, the plaintiffs clearly constitute a class of Black and White civil rights workers and White supporters of their efforts and, thus, fall at the core of section 1985(3)'s concern. Plaintiffs Abbott and Booker were prominent in the Emergency Committee on the Transportation Crisis, a coalition of Black and White neighborhood groups opposed to construction of superhighways through the District's residential areas, because of the consequent displacement of many poor Blacks; plaintiffs Booker and Eaton were involved in organization of the Black United Front, a civil rights group. Plaintiff Hobson, an active member of the peace movement, also worked for and supported the civil rights efforts of her husband, Julius Hobson. Many of these plaintiffs also participated in protests against the Vietnam War, in part to heighten the awareness of the public on particularly the racial miseries of the war ... [meaning] that minority youths were disproportionately being drafted and fighting for the war. 59 At the same time, the plaintiffs who were primarily involved with antiwar groups, such as the Washington Mobilization Committee and the New Mobilization Committee, worked with Black civil rights groups on peace marches 60 and otherwise, both to support civil rights generally and to increase Black awareness of the high casualty figures among Black soldiers and the perceived need, as a result, to participate in antiwar protest. Given the undisputed evidence that the antiwar plaintiffs and civil rights plaintiffs joined together to seek common goals of concern to each, we find they represent, at a minimum, a class of civil rights workers and their supporters at the core of section 1985(3)'s concerns. 82 It is equally clear that the FBI defendants' conspiracy was directed against plaintiffs because of their participation in these very activities. Considerable testimony described efforts by the FBI to drive a wedge into this alliance between civil rights groups and peace groups. 83 The FBI's COINTELPRO program sought not only to neutralize and disrupt Black groups and antiwar groups separately, but also to exploit any dissention between them in an effort to deter formation of an alliance. One of the most shocking examples of this effort is found in an FBI document, written in August 1969, relating to the BUF head tax demand on the New Mobilization Committee. It discloses that an aim of COINTELPRO-New Left, to which it is referenced, was to split the antiwar and civil rights groups: 84 The Washington Field Office has recommended and the Bureau concurs in that recommendation that this is an ideal situation to exploit through the Counterintelligence Program. 85 Recipient offices are to furnish recommendations for such action to the Bureau by 8/29/69 without fail. Consideration is to be given to utilizing informants in both racial and nonracial protest groups in this matter. It is noted that the nonracial protest groups, particularly the NMC, can be accused of racism in refusing to go along with this demand. At the same time, such groups could be split further by some individuals calling the Front's demands extortion while other individuals in the group support the demands. 86 .... 87 The NMC has called for a massive demonstration at Washington, D.C., on 11/15/69. This demonstration may result in confrontation with authorities. The BUF is demanding that it be paid to let this demonstration go on in Washington, D.C. Committee members are upset over these demands and this situation offers an opportunity to divide and to embarrass them. This airtel requests recommendations from the field. 61 88 An October 1969 memorandum from the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in New York to the FBI Director, also referenced to COINTELPRO-New Left, followed: 89 Enclosed are two copies of a suggested leaflet entitled Give Them Bananas!, designed to widen the rift between the New Mobilization Committee To End The War in Vietnam (NMC) and the Black United Front (BUF) over the BUF demand that the NMC pay for their planned March on Washington 11/15/69. 90 Enclosed leaflet has been written in the jargon of the New Left, necessitating the use of a certain amount of profanity. 91 It is realized this material is racial in tone but it is believed this is the one point of vulnerability in the NMC-BUF combination. 92 Bureau authority is requested to prepare and mail anonymously the enclosed leaflet to selected individuals active in the NMC and BUF both in the New York and Washington areas. 62 93 Subsequent documents reveal that Bureau authority was granted, with the caution, Take all necessary steps to protect the identity of the Bureau as the source of these leaflets, 63 and that copies of the leaflet were forwarded to WFO fordistribution. 64 Rev. Moore, purported author of the BUF head tax demand, testified that he in fact received the FBI's leaflet. 65 As distributed, it was titled, Give Them Bananas!, was decorated with a drawing of a monkey, and contained a string of profane, racist and degrading remarks that our senses of propriety and revulsion prevent us from reprinting in full. 66 94 We believe the foregoing amply discloses that the FBI actions were sufficiently related to matters of race to place the FBI conspiracy solidly within even the narrowest reading of section 1985(3). 67 Section 1985(3) was intended, perhaps more than anything else, to provide redress for victims of conspiracies impelled by a commingling of racial and political motives. 68 We would be hard pressed to imagine a case with evidence stronger than we find here of precisely such commingled motives. Accordingly, we reject the FBI defendants' contention that plaintiffs' evidence on this element of their claim did not support the verdict. 95