Opinion ID: 2507854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Give Other Special Instructions

Text: The trial court refused to give defendant's Special Instruction No. 3, which would have informed the jury that it was free to select a sentence of life without the possibility of parole even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors. No such instruction is required. ( People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1135, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498.) Moreover, the instruction was duplicative; other instructions stated that, in order to impose a sentence of death, the jurors must find not only that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, but also that you personally believe death is the appropriate sentence under all the circumstances. The trial court also refused two defense instructions focused on sympathy. Defendant's Special Instruction No. 5 provided in relevant part that [i]f a mitigating circumstance or an aspect of the defendant's background or his character called to the attention of the jury by the evidence or its observation of the defendant arouses sympathy or compassion such as to persuade the jury that death is not the appropriate penalty, the jury may act in response thereto and opt instead for life without the possibility of parole. Defendant's Special Instruction No. 6 provided in relevant part that [i]t is not only appropriate but necessary that the jury weigh the sympathetic elements of defendant's background against those that may offend the conscience. To the extent these instructions directed the jury to consider sympathy, they were properly refused as duplicative of instructions that were given. ( People v. Hines, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1068-1069, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) As stated above, the jury was directed to consider, take into account, and be guided by any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character or record. In addition, the jury was told to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. To the extent defendant's special instructions directed the jury to consider all evidence in mitigation from whatever source, they were again duplicative of other instructions that were given. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1097-1098, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 155 & fn. 12, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) In addition to the instructions listed above, the jury was told that a mitigating circumstance is any fact condition or event which ... may be considered as an extenuating circumstance[] in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. To the extent Special Instruction No. 5 would have directed the jury to consider defendant's demeanor in the courtroom, it too was properly denied as duplicative. The section 190.3, factor (k) instruction, combined with the other instructions above, was broad enough to encompass jurors' observations of defendant in the courtroom. ( People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 808, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; see also Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 1097-1098, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) We therefore reject defendant's claims of error.