Opinion ID: 1154815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: CONCLUSION. We conclude that a physician who prescribes a drug which injures a patient does not have a cause of action to recover from the drug company for his or her own emotional pain and suffering [19] under the product liability act (RCW 7.72). The manufacturer's liability section of the product liability act, RCW 7.72.030(1), provides as follows: A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed or not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided. In this case we are faced with the unusual situation of a plaintiff (who is not a relative of the injured party) seeking to recover pain and suffering damages as a result of the physical injury suffered by another. Because the Consumer Protection Act (which is a viable cause of action under these facts) does not allow this type of damages, we must determine whether under the facts presented the Legislature intended to allow such damages under the product liability act (PLA) (RCW 7.72). Although the drug company asks us to disallow a products liability cause of action because the physician is not a proper claimant under the meaning of the PLA, or because these attenuated damages are not the proximate cause of the breach, we choose to resolve this case on narrower grounds. We perceive the most precise inquiry here to be whether these pain and suffering damages are the type of harm contemplated as recoverable by the Legislature under the PLA. The PLA, RCW 7.72.010(6), defines harm as follows: Harm includes any damages recognized by the courts of this state : PROVIDED, That the term harm does not include direct or consequential economic loss ... (Italics ours.) Although most of the definitional section of the Washington PLA was based upon the Model Uniform Product Liability Act, [20] the Senate Report [21] explains that the Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform chose not to use the definition of harm contained in the uniform act and instead adopted a definition allowing for the continued development of the concept through case law. We must, therefore, look to Washington law to define harm for purposes of the PLA. [22] [8] In this case, the product (the drug) harmed the child which in turn caused emotional distress to the prescribing physician for which he seeks to recover mental, and claimed physical, pain and suffering damages. We find no directly applicable product liability case law in this state. In prior Washington cases brought under the PLA, the harm involved has been for injury caused directly by the product to the person or the property of the claimant. [23] In this case, however, we are asked to extend recovery for a kind of harm that we do not perceive as having been contemplated by Washington law, that is, emotional distress suffered by a physician as a result of injury to his patient. We can find guidance in the cases wherein damages for emotional harm are available to a plaintiff based upon injuries to a third person. Generally, in cases where emotional distress is not a consequence of physical injury, or caused by intentional conduct, Washington courts have been cautious about extending a right to recovery, especially when the distress is the consequence of an injury suffered by a third person. [24] If the law were otherwise, liability would potentially be endless. Emotional damages caused by a plaintiff witnessing, or learning of, a third person's physical injuries are only compensable in Washington under very limited circumstances. For example, in Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wn.2d 254, 787 P.2d 553 (1990), which involved a negligent infliction of emotional distress action, mental distress damages were held not to be compensable even to close family members, when they were not present at the scene of a fatal accident. [25] If we were to allow emotional distress damages to be awarded to physicians as a result of injuries sustained by their patients, we would be substantially extending our prior law regarding when a plaintiff could recover emotional distress damages caused by the physical injuries of a third person. We decline to do so. Our cases which involve intentional torts do not provide a basis to award damages for pain and suffering here. In those cases, emotional distress damages can be awarded as a component of total damages. [26] The level of fault involved in a PLA claim, however, may be considerably less than that in an intentional tort claim. In a product liability claim, liability can be predicated on negligence or even on strict liability. [27] Therefore, our intentional tort cases do not provide a state law basis for concluding that the physician's claimed harm here is compensable under the PLA. Two cases in other jurisdictions have allowed professionals to recover their own damages when their patients were injured by a product. However, only pecuniary damages were recovered; emotional pain and suffering were either not sought or were disallowed. In Oksenholt v. Lederle Labs., 294 Or. 213, 656 P.2d 293 (1982), a doctor who prescribed a drug which caused injury to his patient was allowed to recover lost earning capacity and lost income caused by harm to the physician's reputation. In Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 504, 507, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1334, 1336 (1983), a dentist who accidentally killed his patient due to defective equipment was allowed to recover pecuniary damages, but not damages for emotional injury which were a consequential result of the breach. [9] The product liability act was designed to address a liability insurance crisis which the Legislature felt threatened the availability of socially beneficial products and services. [28] We would not be furthering the intent of the Legislature if we extended liability so far that drug manufacturers would be chilled in marketing products and developing new ones. In the present case, a Consumer Protection Act claim was proved and substantial damages were awarded to the physician. We have upheld that. A physician may thus be able to recover pecuniary damages (damages to reputation); however, the physician's emotional pain and suffering are not recoverable under either the Consumer Protection Act or the product liability act. Because we conclude that the facts of this case do not support a cause of action under the PLA for the doctor's pain and suffering damages, we need not address the drug company's other arguments as to why the PLA should not apply.