Opinion ID: 483611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allen's Protected Expression as the Predicate for His Alleged Harm

Text: 29 The district court concluded that Allen's exercise of his [f]irst [a]mendment rights played no part in the acts complained of and that the same transfer decisions would have been made even if [he] had not exercised those rights. In Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 576, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that it is the public employee's burden to show that his constitutionally protected expression was a substantial or motivating factor in the employer's adverse decision or conduct. Once the employee satisfies his burden, the employer must show that it would have reached the same decision or that it would have engaged in the same conduct even in the absence of the protected expression. The Court reasoned that [a] rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected [expression] played a part, 'substantial' or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire, could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing. Id. at 285, 97 S.Ct. at 575. 15 30 Viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the evidence indicates that Allen's protected expression was a substantial factor in both his transfer 16 and his harassment. 17 The affidavits of two co-workers bear directly on the issue of Allen's transfer, and suggest that his expressive activity motivated the transfer. In his affidavit of February 18, 1983, Michael Arciero stated: 31 In November 1980, a number of ... USDA [P]roject officials made comments to me that ... Allen should be removed from the ... [P]roject because of the way in which he expressed his opinions concerning the degree of ... infestation. These officials disagreed with him on his opinions, and felt that he should be removed. They called [Allen] a troublemaker. 32 And in her July 20, 1982 affidavit, Cynthia Watts swore to the following: 33 Gordon Tween told me that he had been instructed by several [s]tate and/or [f]ederal officials to remove Allen from his duties of fruit collecting. Tween told me that these officials wanted to have Allen removed from the Project and were looking for an excuse to remove ... Allen ... from the Project entirely, so they ... told ... Tween ... to remove Allen from his duties on the basis of a disagreement on the use of maps. 18 34 Whether Allen would have been transferred notwithstanding his first amendment expression is a genuine issue of material fact, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and is therefore inappropriate for summary judgment. The evidence put forth by the defendants is definitive only in establishing that Allen could have been transferred off the collection unit and back to Sacramento because of his non-protected activity (i.e., his refusal to obey orders), and not that he would have been transferred. In Mt. Healthy, as noted above, the Court opined that the government's burden is to show that it would have reached the same decision as to [the plaintiffs'] employment even in the absence of the protected [expression]. 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 576 (emphasis added). That Allen's insubordinate conduct might have justified an adverse employment decision, including a transfer, does not suffice. The employee in Mt. Healthy was a nontenured high school teacher who could have been discharged for no reason whatever. Id. at 283, 97 S.Ct. at 574 (emphasis added). Yet the case was remanded so that the district court might determine whether the teacher would have been discharged. 35 With respect to the alleged harassment, the defendants do not attempt to argue that they would have accorded Allen the same treatment even if he had not engaged in protected expression. Much of the harassment was allegedly meted out in the context of, or by disparaging remarks about, Allen's statements to the media. 36