Opinion ID: 848916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: masters and nabozny

Text: The policy language in this case and in Masters and Nabozny are identical. Each policy provided coverage for an occurrence, which was later defined as an accident. Accident was not further defined.
Masters involved an intentionally set fire that had the unintended result of destroying nearly a block of business establishments. As in this case, the policy in Masters provided coverage for an occurrence, which was later defined in the policy as an accident. 460 Mich. at 113, 595 N.W.2d 832. The insureds claimed that the event was an accident because, although the fire in their business premises was deliberately set, they did not intend to damage the adjoining buildings. The Court of Appeals applied a subjective standard in assessing whether the insured arsonists expected or intended to burn properties other than their own. This Court reversed. We first gave accident its customary, ordinary meaning as an undesigned contingency, a casualty, a happening by chance, something not anticipated,... and not naturally to be expected. Id. at 114, 595 N.W.2d 832. Having defined accident, we nevertheless recognized the difficulty of categorizing cases in which the action giving rise to the harm was intended even though the consequences were not. We unanimously held that an insured's intentional actions precluded coverage even though the insureds claimed not to have intended the consequences of their actions where the insured reasonably should have expected the harm the insured's acts created. We adopted this objective standard from Justice GRIFFIN'S concurrence in Auto Club Group Ins. Co. v. Marzonie, 447 Mich. 624, 648-649, 527 N.W.2d 760 (1994): In such cases, a determination must be made whether the consequences of the insured's intentional act either were intended by the insured or reasonably should have been expected because of the direct risk of harm intentionally created by the insured's actions. When an insured acts intending to cause property damage or personal injury, liability coverage should be denied, irrespective of whether the resulting injury is different from the injury intended. Similarly,... when an insured's intentional actions create a direct risk of harm, there can be no liability coverage for any resulting damage or injury, despite the lack of an actual intent to damage or injure. [ Masters, 460 Mich. at 115-116, 595 N.W.2d 832 (Emphasis added.)] Granting summary disposition to the insurer, this Court held that, because the Masters intended to cause harm, [i]t is irrelevant whether the harm that resulted, damage to the clothing store and surrounding businesses, was different from or exceeded the harm intended, minor damage to the clothing inventory. Id. at 116-117, 595 N.W.2d 832. We later applied this same objective test in Nabozny.
Similarly, in Nabozny, the plaintiff was injured in a fight with the insured. The policy at issue was identical to the one in Masters and this case, and provided coverage for an occurrence, which, in turn, was defined as an accident. 461 Mich. at 474, 606 N.W.2d 639. As in the present case, the insured claimed that the injury he caused was a covered occurrence because he did not intend to break the plaintiff's ankle. We unanimously rejected that argument, holding: In this case, Mr. Burkhardt apparently did not intend to break Mr. Nabozny's ankle. However, it is plain that in tripping someone to the ground in the course of a fight, Mr. Burkhardt reasonably should have expected the consequences of his acts because of the direct risk of harm created. This precludes a finding of liability coverage under the terms of this policy. In other words, the injury did not result from an accident. Moreover, Mr. Burkhardt's testimony that he did not intend to break any bones does not assist him. In our quote from Marzonie, Justice GRIFFIN cited [ Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v.] Piccard [, 440 Mich. 539, 489 N.W.2d 422] which explained: [W]here a direct risk of harm is intentionally created, and property damage or personal injury results, there is no liability coverage even if the specific result was unintended. It is irrelevant that the character of the harm that actually results is different from the character of the harm intended by the insured. It is clear from the facts, as stated by the insured, that injury reasonably should have been expected. Therefore, it is irrelevant that the broken ankle was not the specific harm intended by the insured. [ Id. at 480-481, 606 N.W.2d 639 (citations omitted).] It is worth reemphasizing that in both Masters and Nabozny the policy language we construed was identical to the policy language contained in the present case. Here, like Masters and Nabozny, the insured engaged in a deliberate act but claimed that the resulting unintended consequences rendered the event an accident. In both Masters and Nabozny, this Court rejected this argument and held that there was no covered occurrence because the insured reasonably should have expected the consequences of his intentional actions-even when the insured himself did not anticipate such consequences. Thus, in Masters and Nabozny we declined to view the expectation of the injury from the subjective perspective of the insureds in making the determination whether an accident occurred.
The majority erroneously states that the difference between the present case and Masters and Nabozny is that here, while the act was intended, the result was not. Op. at 27. There is no such difference among these three cases. Rather, in both Masters and Nabozny, the insureds made precisely the same claim as presented herethat they did not intend the result of their deliberate acts. Robert intended to pull the trigger of his shotgun, but he testified that he did not intend to cause any physical injury to his friend. The question for the purpose of coverage is whether the shooting can be considered an accident because Robert should not have reasonably expected the consequences when he intentionally aimed his shotgun at the head of his friend, cocked the hammer, and pulled the trigger. The purported difference between this case and Masters and Nabozny has been created by the majority, which has imposed a different construction of the phrase intentional act. As stated in Masters, this Court unanimously adopted an objective test of intentionality: an intentional act causing injury is not an accident if the insured actually intended the harm or if the harm should reasonably have been expected. [5] Here, the majority fails to apply the objective Masters test of intentionality, instead substituting a subjective one. [6] The majority states that [w]e agree with plaintiff that Robert intended to point the gun at Kevin and pull the trigger.[ [7] ] However, Robert believed that the gun was not loaded. Robert had no intention of firing a loaded weapon. No bodily injury would have been caused by Robert's intended act of pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun. Op. at 27 (emphasis added). What the majority must justify, but cannot, is why we must consider his act of pointing a shotgun at another person and pulling the trigger from Robert's subjective perspective. [8] Under the Masters test, the question is whether the insured reasonably should have expected the consequence because of the direct risk of harm he intentionally created. However, the majority tautologically concludes as a matter of law that Robert should not have reasonably expected the consequences that ensued from his act because his intended act was merely to pull the trigger of an unloaded gun. [9] Op. at 27 (emphasis added). However, what Robert's reasonable expectations should have been, not what his actual subjective beliefs may or may not have been, are the focus of the Masters standard. The majority erroneously maintains that the test we articulated in Masters and Nabozny is a subjective one. However, the majority fails to explain our objective application of the test in both cases. In addition, the term reasonably has consistently been construed as indicating an objective rather than a subjective standard. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 432 Mich. 656, 443 N.W.2d 734 (1989), six justices, including the author of the current majority opinion, agreed that `reasonably be expected' is unambiguous and requires application of an objective standard of expectation. 432 Mich. at 688, 443 N.W.2d 734. In Fire Ins. Exchange v. Diehl, 450 Mich. 678, 685, 545 N.W.2d 602 (1996), the Court held that injury `neither expected nor intended by the insured' required a subjective standard of expectation where the policy language did  not employ the term ` reasonably .' (Emphasis added.) The majority simply refuses to acknowledge that the test adopted in Masters and Nabozny utilizes the same language that has been construed by this Court as requiring an objective standard of inquiry. Without offering any rationale for doing so, the majority makes the insured's subjective belief regarding the status of the gun definitive, as though no contrary conclusion were possible. The issue is whether, in intentionally creating a direct risk of harmpulling the trigger of a shotgun without ascertaining if it was loadedthe insured should have reasonably expected the consequences. Given that the applicable standard is objective, the insured's subjective belief is not controlling. Inexplicably, under the standard adopted by the majority, neither the holding nor the outcome in Masters or Nabozny could be sustained today.