Opinion ID: 2510618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Majority's Objective Witness Test

Text: I also disagree with the majority's application of the third of the three formulations of the core class of testimonial statements discussed in Crawford. To apply this formulation correctly, I suggest that it must be understood in the context of Crawford 's Confrontation Clause analysis. The purpose of the Confrontation Clause reflects the purpose of the Bill of Rights generally: to limit the power of the government when an individual's liberty is at stake. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 571, n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the whole point of the procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights is to limit the methods by which the Government can determine facts that the citizen disputes and on which the citizen's liberty depends). To determine what governmental powers the Clause was meant to curtail, Crawford traced the history of the Confrontation Clause from Roman times through sixteenth century England and colonial America to the First Congress of the United States which drafted the proposal that became the Sixth Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-49, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Citing Sir Walter Raleigh's demand at his trial let Cobham be here, let him speak it. Call my accuser before my face, the Court reasoned that the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was ... [the] use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Court concluded that the founding fathers intended the Confrontation Clause to secure the right of cross-examination of witnesses bearing testimonial evidence against the accused. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Confrontation Clause prohibits the government from introducing testimony when the government participates in some way to produce testimony with an eye toward trial where the defendant does not have the opportunity to cross examine the declarant-witness. The majority's interpretation of the third of Crawford's three formulations of testimonial focuses on the characteristics of the witness. This construction conflicts with the fundamental purpose of the Bill of Rights which serves to protect the rights of individuals when infringed upon by governmental action. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation protects the rights of the accused in the context of a criminal trial. Therefore, the nature of the right protected by the Confrontation Clause does not turn on the characteristics of the witness but on the action of the government that orchestrates and produces trial testimony in the absence of cross-examination. As noted, Crawford declined to define explicitly the term testimonial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Testimony, according to Wigmore, is  [a]ny assertion, taken as the basis of an inference to the existence of the matter asserted ... whether made in court or not. 2 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 479 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (emphasis in original). Crawford concerns a subset of this general definition of testimonytestimonial evidence which the Confrontation Clause historically intended to prohibit. The Crawford Court's extensive discussion of the history of the Confrontation Clause led it to recognize certain statements that are always testimonial under its use of the term and others that always are not. For instance, ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing, statements taken during interrogations by law enforcement officers, and prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial are testimonial under any formulation of the term. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Conversely, an off-hand, overheard remark is not a statement that the Framers intended the Confrontation Clause to exclude. Id. at 51, 124 S.Ct. 1354. But the Crawford Court did not limit its definition of the term testimonial to these formal categories of statements. Rather, the Court recognized that the unpardonable vice of the Roberts test ... [was] its demonstrated capacity to admit core testimonial statements that the Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude. Id. at 62, 124 S.Ct. 1354. While it held that the term testimonial applies at a minimum to certain types of formal statements, the Court recognized three formulations of what it called the core class of testimonial statements that broaden this narrow standard to define the Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction. Id. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354. All three formulations possess the common thread that runs through this core class of testimonial statements: a concern with the involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial. Id. at 56 n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The three formulations include: (1)  ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalentthat is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; (2) extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions; and (3)  statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Each of Crawford 's three formulations of the core class of testimonial statements defines testimonial evidence at various levels of abstraction. Id. The second formulation of the core class includes specific categories of formal statements that the Court recognized as testimonial under even a narrow standard. Id. The first and third formulations of the core class go beyond the formal testimonial materials listed in the second formulation. The first formulation broadens the narrow standard by including not only ex parte testimony, but statements that are its functional equivalent, and similar pretrial statements that objectively appear to have a prosecutorial purpose. Id. The third formulation looks to an objective appraisal of the circumstances surrounding the questioning to determine whether a statement is testimonial. Under this formulation, a statement is testimonial if it was taken under circumstances that, when viewed objectively, indicate that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Id. The majority misconstrues the third formulation of the core class of testimonial statements. By referring to the third formulation as the objective witness test, the majority shifts the focus from an objective determination of whether the circumstances surrounding the questioning indicate that the statements will be available for trial. Instead, use of the phrase the objective witness test implies a declarant-centered approach to determine whether a statement is testimonial. Based upon this declarant-centered approach, the majority discusses whether the objective witness must be defined as an objectively reasonable adult observer educated in the law or an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. See Maj. Op. at 925. The majority reads the language reasonable, objective witness out of context to conclude that the term `reasonable, objective witness' refers to an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position. Id. This additional language changes the focus of the third formulation of the core class of testimonial statements from an objective appraisal of the circumstances of the questioning to focus instead upon the expectations and cognitive abilities of the actual witness in the case. This shift from an objective view of the circumstances of the out-of-court questioning to the cognitive abilities and subjective traits of the witness, contravenes the common thread of Crawford 's core class of testimonial statements which are produced with government involvement with an eye toward trial. I find the reasoning of the Maryland Court of Appeals consistent with Crawford 's rationale and instructive. See State v. Snowden, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 314, 329 (2005). That court interpreted the third formulation of the core class of testimonial statements to require an objective evaluation of the circumstances of the questioning and dismissed the objective person the age of the declarant standard, reasoning that the intentions underlying the questioning were relevant to the analysis, not only what a witness the victim's age would reasonably know or expect: The formulations in Crawford outlining what is testimonial not only take into account the intentions of the declarant, but also look to the intentions of the person eliciting the statement... To allow the prosecution to utilize statements by a young child made in an environment and under circumstances in which the investigators clearly contemplated use of the statements at a later trial would create an exception that we are not prepared to recognize. Thus, we are satisfied that an objective test, using an objective person, rather than an objective child of that age, is the appropriate test for determining whether a statement is testimonial in nature. Id. Hence, the Snowden court recognized that the third of the three formulations of the core class of testimonial statements is not meant to inquire about the mental capabilities or understanding of the witness, but instead to evaluate objectively the circumstances surrounding the questioning. The majority's reliance on Dutton illustrates a practical problem with introducing subjective elements into what Crawford envisions as an objective test. See Maj. Op. at 925. The majority concludes that an objectively reasonable person in the declarant's position  in Dutton would not have foreseen the prosecution using the statement in court, while an objectively reasonable observer educated in the law might have foreseen this use. Maj. Op. at 925 nn. 6, 7 (emphasis added). Once subjective qualifying language, such as in the declarant's position, or educated in the law, is introduced to this formulation of testimonial evidence, as with any subjective test, the lines become difficult, if not impossible to draw uniformly. Different courts could emphasize different facts about the witness to reach different conclusions regarding how he might act. For instance, one court may emphasize a child's age and find, as the majority does, that the statements of an objective seven-year-old are not testimonial and another court may emphasize his experience and reach the opposite conclusion. Maj. Op. at 926. In contrast, an objective assessment of the entire circumstances surrounding the questioning is consistent with and supports the objective nature of the third formulation of the core class of testimonial statements recognized in Crawford. This approach promotes uniformity and is not subject to the various interpretive choices available under the majority's objective witness test formulation. Returning to the statements that were made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial formulation of the core class of testimonial statements, I conclude that an objective witness would have reasonably known that statements made during a forensic exam would be available later in a criminal trial. The facts demonstrate that the police brought the child to the doctor in a police car, helped the child's mother sign him in to the hospital, and asked the doctor to perform a forensic exam to build their case against Vigil. An objective witness would reasonably know that the doctor was engaged in gathering evidence for the police and would expect his statements to the doctor to be usedat least in partto prosecute Vigil. The majority misconstrues Crawford by adding a subjective element to what Crawford envisions as a standard requiring an objective assessment of circumstances surrounding the questioning. I would apply the standard announced in Crawford to hold that an objective witness would reasonably believe that the statements he made to the doctor obtained under these circumstances would be used to prosecute Mr. Vigil, and that therefore, these statements were testimonial and could not be admitted unless the accused, Vigil, had the opportunity to cross-examine this witness. Hence, I respectfully dissent.