Opinion ID: 6335197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Untimely Service of Complaint

Text: We first address the issue of service of the complaint and summons on Mr. Reilley. 4 As stated above, the complaint was filed on September 2, 2010, but the summons was not issued until January 28, 2011, 148 days after the complaint was filed. The 4 We reiterate that Mr. Reilley passed away during the course of the litigation and Petitioners were substituted as parties in his place. 7 summons and complaint were served that day upon Mr. Reilley. Rule 4(k) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure provides: If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effective within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period. W. V. R. C. P. 4. Upon a finding of good cause, an extension of time beyond the 120 days for serving a complaint is mandatory. We have discussed this mandatory application of Rule 4(k) and held: Under Rule 4(k) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure [1998], if a plaintiff fails to serve a summons and complaint upon a defendant within 120 days, then the circuit court should dismiss the action against that defendant without prejudice. However, the circuit court shall extend the time for service if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure. In the absence of a showing of good cause, upon motion or upon its own initiative, the circuit court may in its discretion extend the time for service. Syllabus Point 3, Burkes v. Fas-Chek Food Mart Inc, 217 W. Va. 291, 617 S.E.2d 838 (2005) (brackets in original). In Burkes, we also set forth factors to determine if good cause exists to extend the time for service: In considering whether good cause has been satisfied, circuit courts should consider the “‘(1) length of time to obtain service; (2) activity of plaintiff; (3) plaintiff’s knowledge of defendant’s location; (4) ease with which location could have been known; (5) actual knowledge by defendant of the action; and (6) special circumstances.” Estate of Hough ex rel. Lemaster v. Estate of Hough ex rel. Berkeley County 8 Sheriff, 205 W. Va. 537, 542, 519 S.E.2d 640, 645 (1999) (per curiam). Id., 217 W. Va. at 298, 617 S.E.2d at 845. Additionally, we have previously explained that: Because the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we often refer to interpretations of the Federal Rules when discussing our own rules. See Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 192 n. 6, 451 S.E.2d 755, 758 n. 6 (1994) (“Because the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure are practically identical to the Federal Rules, we give substantial weight to federal cases . . . in determining the meaning and scope of our rules.”). See, e.g., State v. Sutphin, 195 W.Va. 551, 563, 466 S.E.2d 402, 414 (1995) (“The West Virginia Rules of Evidence are patterned upon the Federal Rules of Evidence, . . . and we have repeatedly recognized that when codified procedural rules or rules of evidence of West Virginia are patterned after the corresponding federal rules, federal decisions interpreting those rules are persuasive guides in the interpretation of our rules.” (citations omitted)). Keplinger v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 208 W. Va. 11, 20 n. 13, 537 S.E.2d 632, 641 n. 13 (2000). Thus, under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule after which West Virginia’s Rule 4(k) is patterned, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “[c]omplaints are not to be dismissed if served within 120 days, or within such additional time as the court may allow.” 5 Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 663 (1996). This is because “[t]he liberality of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows minor defects in service to be overlooked, as long as the defendant received actual notice of the lawsuit and has an opportunity to defend the action.” 4B Charles Alan Wright, 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) now requires service within 90 days. 9 Arthur R. Miller & Adam B. Steinman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1137 (2021 Supp.). This is in accord with our previous holding that “the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed liberally to promote justice.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, Harrison v. Davis, 197 W. Va. 651, 478 S.E.2d 104 (1996). Below, the circuit court found that good cause “clearly exists,” pointing to the affidavit of Respondent’s then-counsel Christopher P. Riley, Esquire, which stated: 2. At [Respondent’s] request, Riley did not have the Complaint served on the [then-]defendant, Francis E. Reilley, as [Respondent] wished to provide [Mr.] Reilley with an opportunity to engage in discussions to amicably resolve the recurrent flooding of the John Marshall High School athletic fields and resulting damages therefrom caused by the defendant’s bridge, roadway, and alterations to the watercourse of Little Grave Creek. 3. To this end, [Attorney Riley] wrote to [Petitioners’ then-attorney], William Kolibash, on September 7, 2010, to explore an amicable resolution and request information to aid in resolution of the claim. . . . 4. Other than a brief acknowledgement of receipt and an indication that a response would be forthcoming, the defendant [Mr.] Reilley did not respond. 5. On or about September 1, 2010, [Attorney Riley] began a restructuring of his law firm. . . . 11. The aforesaid firm matters resulted in a delay in effectuating service of process within one hundred twenty (120) days of filing suit. . . . 10 We find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause. Here, Respondent had informed Mr. Reilley’s then-counsel of the suit and was trying to determine if counsel would accept service of process, Respondent knew the location of Mr. Reilley, and Mr. Reilley knew of the lawsuit. We believe that the pre-120 day notice Petitioners enjoyed, coupled with the short period in which the service exceeded 120 days and the complete lack of prejudice to Petitioners substantiate the good cause finding by the circuit court. Indeed, had Respondent’s initial complaint been dismissed, Respondent would simply have refiled the exact same complaint. Of course, at the time the motion to dismiss was denied, nearly seven years had passed since the motion was filed. By that time, according to the docket sheet, significant litigation had already transpired in the matter. The parties and the circuit court had already expended significant resources. At that point, any prejudice to Petitioners had been attenuated by Petitioners’ full participation in almost seven years of litigation. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s finding that Respondent had good cause for the delay in service.