Opinion ID: 2629666
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Statute of Repose, AS 09.10.055, Is Facially Constitutional.

Text: The statute of repose, AS 09.10.055, imposes a ten-year limitations period, in addition to the two-year statute of limitations under AS 09.10.140, for actions for personal injury, death, or property damage. Even if the two-year limitations period of AS 09.10.140 is tolled, the ten-year period of AS 09.10.055 may separately bar an action. Specifically, under AS 09.10.055, actions must be filed within ten years after the earlier of (1) substantial completion of construction that allegedly caused the injury, or (2) the last act alleged to have caused the personal injury. [122] There are exceptions for certain types of injuries, [123] and the limitations period is tolled during a period in which a foreign body upon which a cause of action is based remains undetected in a plaintiff's body. [124] Chapter 26, SLA 1997 altered the statute of repose, which formerly applied only to actions based on injuries in connection with improvements to real property, [125] and shortened the period from fifteen to ten years. [126] The plaintiffs offer two arguments to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of repose: (1) the statute violates equal protection; and (2) the statute violates due process because it overturns the discovery rule. These arguments will be discussed in turn.
The plaintiffs claim that the statute of repose constitutes a violation of equal protection because it treats two classes of minor plaintiffs differently. Minors who are less than eight years old at the time of injury will have their claims barred before they reach the age of majority under the statute of repose, while minors who are more than eight years old at the time of injury will have their claims barred after they reach the age of majority. The plaintiffs claim that this constitutes differential treatment of similarly situated minors because the first group of minors must rely on others to bring suit on their behalf, if suit is to be brought before the claim is lost. However, we need not subject AS 09.10.055 to equal protection analysis because the plaintiffs have failed to make the threshold showing necessary for an equal protection violation claim. As we stated in Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District v. State, [w]here there is no unequal treatment, there can be no violation of the right to equal protection of law, and we need not subject the challenged laws to sliding scale scrutiny. [127] The statute of repose does not treat minors differently: It subjects all minors, as well as all other plaintiffs in actions for personal injury, death, or property damage, to a ten-year limitations period. As the plaintiffs imply, the statute does have an effect on the tolling for minors imposed by AS 09.10.140(a). Under AS 09.10.140(a), discussed earlier in this opinion, the normal two-year limitations period is tolled until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority. Alaska Statute 09.10.055 limits this tolling for plaintiffs injured before the age of eight by barring their actions ten years after the injury when they have not yet reached the age of majority. However, this is not differential treatment since the ten-year statute of repose applies to all plaintiffs. Instead, the legislature simply made a policy decision to create a separate statute of repose in addition to the statute of limitations. [128]
The plaintiffs also claim that the statute of repose violates due process by effectively abolishing our discovery rule, which provides that the statute of limitations does not start running until the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should discover, the existence of all of the elements of his cause of action. [129] In some cases a plaintiff might not discover a cause of action until after the ten-year limitations period in the statute of repose has run, and therefore the claim would be lost before the discovery rule could operate to fully toll the limitations period under AS 09.10.070(a). The plaintiffs argue that this is a violation of due process because it departs from the common law. We reject this argument. The discovery rule is a common law rule created by this court, and is not based on any constitutional principles. [130] As noted earlier in this opinion, the legislature is free to modify or abolish common law rules. [131] Therefore, to the extent that AS 09.10.055 limits the traditional discovery rule, [132] the legislature had the power to do so in enacting the statute.