Opinion ID: 783822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The TRIA Claim

Text: 22 The district court's first holding is that section 201 of TRIA does not provide a basis for the plaintiffs to attach the Assets. See Smith II, 2003 WL 22103452, at -, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15949, at -. To reiterate, section 201 of the Act states that: 23 [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in subsection (b), in every case in which a person has obtained a judgment against a terrorist party on a claim based upon an act of terrorism, ... the blocked assets of that terrorist party (including the blocked assets of any agency or instrumentality of that terrorist party) shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution in order to satisfy such judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages for which such terrorist party has been adjudged liable. 24 TRIA § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 2337. 25 Plaintiffs' theory of the case is premised upon the idea that section 201 of TRIA represents a Congressional mandate — akin to an appropriation — that the frozen Iraqi Assets be used only to compensate plaintiffs who have judgments against the Iraqi government. According to this theory, the President acted without authority when he confiscated blocked Iraqi assets and directed their use for a purpose other than satisfying victims' judgments. 26 Plaintiffs' interpretation hinges on the statute's use of the imperative shall. Thus, throughout their brief, Plaintiffs write that Congress declared, in section 201 of TRIA, that ... these frozen Iraqi funds ` shall ' be used to satisfy the judgments of victims of State sponsored terror such as the plaintiffs here. Br. for Plaintiff-Appellants at 8; see also id. at 4 (Congress explicitly mandated that the subject funds shall be used to compensate victims of terrorism.); id. at 5 (Congress' specific, express intent was for these plaintiffs to be compensated from frozen Iraqi funds.) These assertions are presented in a conclusory fashion, however, bereft of any explanation of why the language of the statute compels such a reading. 27 Instead of offering a text-based argument, Plaintiffs make much of a passage in the House Conference Report, which states that [i]t is the intent of the Conferees that Section 201 establish that such judgments [against terrorist states] are to be enforced. Section 201 ... make[s] clear that all such judgments are enforceable against any assets or property [covered by the statute]. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-779, at 27 (Nov. 13, 2002). They further rely on remarks by Senator Tom Harkin indicating that Congress intended the blocked assets referenced in TRIA § 201 to include any asset of a terrorist party that has been seized or frozen by the United States in accordance with law. 148 Cong. Rec. S11528 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002). 28 We disagree with Plaintiffs' interpretation of the statute. First, we do not believe that TRIA § 201 is analogous to an appropriation. 3 Although Plaintiffs consistently imply that TRIA is an appropriation — most notably through their repeated reference to the President's confiscation as a reappropriation — nowhere do they argue directly that section 201 operates literally as an appropriation. If they did, they would have to confront the challenge of explaining how these funds constituted appropriations. See 31 U.S.C. § 1301(d) (A law may [only be] an appropriation ... if the law specifically states that an appropriation is made.); see also U.S. Const. art I, § 9, cl.7 (No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law). 4 Second, the language of section 201 cannot reasonably be read to mandate that terrorist assets be blocked in perpetuity. 5 It states simply that blocked assets shall be subject to execution or attachment in aid of execution. 116 Stat. at 2337. We believe that the plain meaning of that language is to give terrorist victims who actually receive favorable judgments a right to execute against assets that would otherwise be blocked. Thus, although the statute applies broadly to every case in which a person has obtained a judgment, it confers no entitlement on victims who have not yet obtained judgments. Neither does it guarantee that any blocked assets will in fact be available when a particular victim seeks to execute on a judgment. 6 Most important, nothing in the statutory language evinces Congressional intent to divest the President of authority to confiscate terrorist assets as provided in IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(C). 29 To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the first clause of section 201 of TRIA, which reads, [n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, operates to abrogate the President's IEEPA confiscation authority as it pertains to blocked terrorist assets, we are unconvinced. As the district court noted, the notwithstanding clause applies only when some other provision of law conflicts with TRIA. Smith II, 2003 WL 22103452, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15949, at ; cf. Hill v. Republic of Iraq, No. Civ.A. 1:99-CV-03346TP, 2003 WL 21057173, at , 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3725, at - (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2003) (holding that notwithstanding language of TRIA superseded conflicting non-attachment provisions of other statutes). We see no conflict here. As we have already explained, section 201 operates to empower a plaintiff with a judgment against a terrorist party to execute against any blocked assets of that party. TRIA § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 2337. It imposes no obligation on the President to maintain such funds for future attachment. Indeed, by defining blocked assets in TRIA § 201(d)(2)(A) by reference to IEEPA § 1702, the very statute that authorizes the President, in his discretion, both to block and to confiscate terrorist assets as circumstances warrant, Congress implicitly acknowledged that not all assets procured by the United States from terrorists would be available for execution pursuant to TRIA § 201. 30 Finally, although we ordinarily will not look to legislative history when the language of a statute is clear, see Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), the history of TRIA § 201 is entirely consonant with the interpretation suggested by the statutory language. The Conference Report excerpt cited by Plaintiffs indicates Congress's commitment to making terrorism judgments enforceable against terrorists' blocked assets, 7 but it cannot reasonably be stretched, as Plaintiffs would have us do, to divest the President of authority to confiscate blocked assets. There is more than a semantic difference between blocking assets and confiscating them. As Senator Harkin, in the remarks quoted by Plaintiffs, noted, the term blocked assets reaches broadly to include any property seized or frozen by the United States. But it does not reach so broadly as to encompass confiscated property. To seize or freeze assets transfers possessory interest in the property. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673-74 & n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 2972. But confiscation, pursuant to IEEPA § 203(a)(1)(C), transfers ownership of terrorist property by vesting right, title, and interest as the President deems appropriate. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 228 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 3026, 82 L.Ed.2d 171 (1984); Propper, 337 U.S. at 482-84, 69 S.Ct. 1333. Indeed, Senator Harkin added an important caveat to his remarks: [A]ny assets as to which the United States claims ownership are not included in the definition of `blocked assets' [in TRIA § 201] and are not subject to execution or attachment under this provision. 148 Cong. Rec. S11528 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002). 31 In sum, we conclude that on March 20, 2003, well before Plaintiffs had obtained a final judgment against the Republic of Iraq from the district court, the President was within his authority conferred by IEEPA § 1702(a)(1)(C) in ordering the confiscation of blocked Iraqi assets. By the time Plaintiffs obtained a final judgment, the President had vested title in the confiscated assets in the United States Department of the Treasury and there simply were no more blocked assets in the Federal Reserve Bank's custody against which Plaintiffs could execute. 8 Because Plaintiffs cannot establish that section 201 of TRIA segregated the Assets specifically for their use or that the President's confiscation of the Assets was unlawful, their claim must fail. We therefore affirm the district court on this basis.