Opinion ID: 222490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Oral Contract to Lock-in Prices

Text: The second alleged oral contract also involves the prices Dynegy promised to offer Multiut. During a September 2001 meeting with Dynegy employees, Draiman floated the idea of locking-in Multiut's pricing for an extended period of time. He testified that the Dynegy employees said something along th[e] lines of they would work on it or would get it done and requested a list of Multiut's customers and profit margins. Draiman testified that although Dynegy did not explicitly agree to lock-in a price, he walked away from the meeting with the impression and understanding that Multiut would be getting fixed prices for whatever period [its own fixed-price] contracts were. Based on that understanding, Multiut did not seek out other sources of natural gas for its fixed-price customers. On September 17, 2001, Draiman sent a letter to Dynegy in which he provided for Dynegy's review a list of the prices paid by Multiut's fixed-price customers and pointed out that if Multiut could lock-in a price of about 15 cents per therm below what its average customer was paying, it could increase its profits by $2 million. Dynegy's response to the letter did not mention fixed prices, and Draiman took no further steps to ensure that Multiut would actually receive locked-in prices. The district court concluded that this evidence was not enough to show that Dynegy agreed to provide gas at a set price and granted summary judgment. [1] We agree that summary judgment is warranted. The evidence Multiut and Draiman presented does not demonstrate the existence of an agreement between Dynegy and Multiut. Multiut was able to more precisely identify the timeframe in which the alleged agreement was reached, and the actors who allegedly made it, but there is no evidence as to what price the agreement locked in or how long the agreement was in effect. The essential terms of a contract must be definite and certain in order for a contract to be enforceable. Midland Hotel Corp., 113 Ill. Dec. 252, 515 N.E.2d at 65. Both price and duration are unquestionably essential terms, at least in this sort of contract. Even if a jury ignored Dynegy's oral use of prospective preliminary language, cf. Ocean Atl. Dev. Corp. v. Aurora Christian Schs., Inc., 322 F.3d 983, 995-96 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying Illinois law) ([A] letter of intent or a similar preliminary writing that reflects an agreement contingent upon the successful completion of negotiations that are ongoing, does not amount to a contract that binds the parties.), and concluded that an agreement had been reached during or after the September meeting, it would be unable to glean from the evidence presented the parameters or duration of that agreement. [I]f the essential terms are so uncertain that there is no basis for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or broken, there is no contract. Acad. Chi. Publishers v. Cheever, 144 Ill.2d 24, 161 Ill.Dec. 335, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1991).