Opinion ID: 1892409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: nebraska's manslaughter statute and due process considerations

Text: Readily apparent in the Nebraska manslaughter statute, § 28-305(1), is the definition of a criminal homicide, expressed in an inclusive disjunction, namely: A person commits manslaughter if he kills another without malice, either upon a sudden quarrel, or causes the death of another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the second of the statutory alternatives in § 28-305(1) prohibits a person's killing another unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act, but the first of the manslaughter statute's alternatives is silent concerning intent to kill as an element of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel. One construction of § 28-305(1) might be that since the situations for manslaughter are expressed in the alternative or inclusive disjunction, the explicit statement of unintentionally killing another, expressed in the second of the alternative situations for manslaughter, means that the first of the statutory alternatives requires the element of an intentional killing as opposed to the unintentional killing in the second of the alternative situations for manslaughter. However, if the first of the alternative situations expressed in § 28-305(1) does not require an intentional killing as an element of manslaughter, absence of criminal intent results in strict responsibility for a killing upon a sudden quarrel. Although Pettit concedes that intent to kill is not required for violation of the second of the alternatives stated in § 28-305(1), he contends that intent to kill is a requisite element for manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel. On the other hand, the State argues, in essence, that intent to kill is not an element of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel, that is, anyone causing another's death upon a sudden quarrel is strictly liable for the offense of manslaughter. Therefore, we must determine whether manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel requires the element of intent to kill or whether strict accountability for another's death upon a sudden quarrel eliminates intent to kill as an element of the felony designated as manslaughter. In determining whether criminal intent is an element of manslaughter upon a sudden quarrel, we bear in mind the general rule that criminal statutes are interpreted as requiring criminal intent, and this is particularly true in situations in which the offense involved is a felony. United States v. O'Brien, 686 F.2d 850, 853 (10th Cir.1982). As the U.S. Supreme Court has observed: The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory But I didn't mean to, and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51, 72 S.Ct. 240, 243-44, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). See, also, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978): Although Blackstone's `vicious will' has been replaced by more sophisticated and less colorful characterizations of the mental state required by support criminality, [citation omitted], intent generally remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense. The fact that a statutory definition of a crime may not include reference to the accused's mental state does not necessarily negate intent (mens rea) as an element for a crime. [T]he holding in Morissette can be fairly read as establishing, at least with regard to crimes having their origin in the common law, an interpretive presumption that mens rea is required. [M]ere omission ... of intent [in the statute] will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced; instead Congress will be presumed to have legislated against the background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a critical factor, and absence of contrary direction [will] be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them. [Citation omitted.] While strict-liability offenses are not unknown to the criminal law and do not invariably offend constitutional requirements [citation omitted], the limited circumstances in which Congress has created and this Court has recognized such offenses [citations omitted] attest to their generally disfavored status. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra at 438 U.S. at 437-38, 98 S.Ct. at 2873-74 (quoting Morissette v. United States, supra . ) See, also, United States v. Anton, 683 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir.1982): mere omission of intent as an element of a felony does not justify dispensing with intent as an element of the crime because  ` [t]he existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. '  (Quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra ); State v. Jennings, 150 Ariz. 90, 94, 722 P.2d 258, 262 (1986): Strict liability offenses are the exception rather than the rule and will only be found where there is a clear legislative intent not to require any degree of mens rea; State v. Jones, 242 Kan. 385, 391, 748 P.2d 839, 845 (1988): When an act is prohibited and made punishable by statute, the statute is to be construed in the light of the common law. The existence of a criminal intent is regarded as essential even though the terms of the statute do not require it, unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended to make the act criminal without regard to the intent with which it was done. Violation of some criminal statutes may occur without a defendant's criminal intent, if such type of statutes omits mention of intent and where it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy, where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto properly expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where the conviction does not gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not taken over from the common law, and where congressional purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring criminal intent. The elimination of this element is then not violative of the due process clause. Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir.1960). We note that the penalty for manslaughter is a maximum sentence of 20 years' imprisonment, a $25,000 fine, or both such imprisonment and fine and that the minimum penalty for manslaughter is 1 year's imprisonment. See § 28-305(2) and Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-105(1) (Reissue 1985). Thus, when the penalty for violation of a statute is severe or conviction for violation of the statute may irreparably damage the defendant's reputation, elimination of criminal intent as an element necessary for violation of a statute may violate due process. See United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir.1985). With that backdrop, we proceed to analyze the crime of manslaughter in Nebraska.