Opinion ID: 6316650
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 859, 863 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).

Text: To reiterate, under the current state of Eighth Amendment law as expressed by Jones, “a State’s discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313. A life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile murderer is thus constitutional, and hence no viable Miller claim exists, “so long as the sentence is not mandatory — that is, [ ] so long as the sentencer has discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and impose a lesser punishment.” Id. at 1314 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In Batts II, we interpreted Montgomery as “clarif[ying] that Miller requires far more than mere consideration of an offender’s age prior — must guide the determination of whether rules other than Miller are substantive.” Id. at 1317 n.4. Justice Thomas took this statement to mean the Court was effectively overruling Montgomery “in substance but not in name.” Id. at 1327; see id. (contending Montgomery “gave a good-for-one-ride ticket to a class of juvenile offenders, and its errors will never be repeated”). [J-53-2019] - 17 to imposing a life-without-parole sentence[.]” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 433. This interpretation led us to hold that “for a sentence of life without parole to be proportional as applied to a juvenile murderer, the sentencing court must first find . . . that the offender is entirely unable to change.” Id. at 435; see also id. (expressing belief that “[t]he United States Supreme Court decisions that control in this matter unambiguously permit the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender only if the crime committed is indicative of the offender’s permanent incorrigibility”) (emphasis in original). Our understanding in this regard, however, has been abrogated by the High Court’s decision in Jones.13 Moreover, we are constrained to conclude that without a substantive constitutional mooring, the procedural protections we adopted in Batts II cannot stand in their current, judicially-created form. As we have observed, “the Pennsylvania Constitution clearly and unambiguously bestows upon this Court ‘the power to prescribe general rules governing practice, procedure and the conduct of all courts[,]’” but only if “such rules ‘neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant[.]’” Id. at 449, quoting PA. CONST. art. V, §10(c). The procedural protections we embraced in Batts II — more specifically, a presumption against life-without-parole sentences and a requirement that to overcome this presumption the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the impossibility of rehabilitation beyond a reasonable doubt — were not intended to enlarge any substantive rights of juvenile homicide offenders. Instead, we repeatedly stressed throughout our opinion that we believed those protections were constitutionally necessary “to effectuate the mandate of Miller and Montgomery” by “ensur[ing] that life-without-parole sentences are meted out only to the rarest of juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect permanent 13 The same is true of our decision in Machicote, wherein we held that sentencing courts are “required to make a record of the Miller factors at sentencing.” Machicote, 206 A.3d at 1120. [J-53-2019] - 18 incorrigibility, irreparable corruption and irretrievable depravity.” Id. at 415-16 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see id. at 452 (“a faithful application of the holding in Miller, as clarified in Montgomery, requires the creation of a presumption against sentencing a juvenile offender to life in prison without the possibility of parole”); id. at 455 (“Pursuant to . . . the definitive language used by the Supreme Court, we conclude that to overcome the presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender, the Commonwealth must prove that the juvenile is constitutionally eligible for the sentence beyond a reasonable doubt.”). However, Jones now instructs that, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, “a State’s discretionary sentencing system is . . . constitutionally sufficient.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1313. We are thus forced to conclude the sentencing procedures we adopted in Batts II “do not carry the protections of the Eighth Amendment[.]” Commonwealth v. DeJesus, ___ A.3d ___, 2021 WL 4889071 at  (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc). And absent some constitutional impetus, those procedures are no longer the product of a proper exercise of this Court’s authority over judicial administration, because they enlarge the substantive rights of juvenile homicide offenders beyond what Miller, as cabined by Jones, requires. Cf. PA. CONST. art. V, §10(c). Consequently, we are left with no choice but to dissolve those procedural requirements in Batts II that are not constitutionally required — namely, the presumption against sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to life without parole, and the imposition on the Commonwealth of the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile is permanently incorrigible.14 Moving forward, the authority of a 14 The dissent, apparently believing we granted review to decide the “point at which [a term-of-years] sentence converts into the functional equivalent of a life sentence[,]” Dissenting Opinion at 4, charges us with going “beyond the issues presented for review[.]” Id. at 8. Respectfully, the dissent’s premise is faulty. The question we actually agreed to consider, as phrased by appellant, is whether “a sentence of 50 years to life imposed upon a juvenile constitute[s] a de facto life sentence requiring the sentencing court, as [J-53-2019] - 19 sentencing court to impose a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender is circumscribed only to the extent set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. §9721(b) and 18 Pa.C.S. mandated by this Court in [Batts II, to] first find permanent incorrigibility, irreparable corruption or irretrievable depravity beyond a reasonable doubt.” Felder, 187 A.3d 909 (emphasis added). As appellant’s claim is expressly tethered to our decision in Batts II, the dissent’s argument we have improperly “inject[ed] consideration of [that] case” into our analysis, is untenable. Dissenting Opinion at 8-9. In the alternative, the dissent says we should discontinue this case on the basis that “the analysis is not substantially prompted, or supported, by the parties’ arguments.” Dissenting Opinion at 6. Although the dissent acknowledges we afforded the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs addressing Jones, it implies this was insufficient “because our mandate to the parties for additional briefing did not mention Batts II[.]” Id. at 7. Again, this argument lacks any purchase since it is based on the dissent’s truncated reading of the issue before us. Appellant baked consideration of Batts II directly into the question presented, and our supplemental briefing order instructed the parties to brief Jones’s “impact on the issue presented[.]” Order, 6/22/2021. Thus, the implication we are somehow acting unilaterally or without input from the parties, is not well taken. At bottom, the issue we must decide, as framed by appellant, is whether he is entitled to relief under Batts II. Answering that question necessarily requires us to re-evaluate Batts II under Jones, which, the dissent concedes, “changed everything.” Dissenting Opinion at 5. That the parties have refused to provide us with a fair appraisal of the High Court’s intervening, binding decision is not a proper reason to dismiss the appeal. Cf. generally Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 149 (Pa. 2018) (“[I]f the ‘power’ of a court amounts to nothing more than the power to do exactly what the parties tell it to do, simply because they said so and without any actual merits review, it is not judicial power at all. It is a restriction on power.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted; emphasis in original). Nor does the dissent’s assertion of mootness warrant dismissal. Even if we agreed with that characterization (we do not), this case would almost surely qualify for an exception. See, e.g., Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 600-01 (Pa. 2002) (alluding to the great-public-importance exception to the mootness doctrine, particularly in the face of a material lack of clarity in governing law). We crafted Batts II, so the responsibility naturally falls to us to clarify its viability following new governing federal law — and to do so with haste. Contrary to the dissent’s protestations, we respectfully believe the present case is a proper vehicle for providing that clarification. [J-53-2019] - 20 §1102.1, and by Miller’s command to “consider the mitigating qualities of youth.” Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (internal quotations and citation omitted).15 We turn, finally, to the purported de facto life sentence before us, and we again find that Jones controls. To put it simply, even if a 50-years-to-life sentence amounts to a de facto life sentence, “there is no Miller problem here.” United States v. Grant, 9 F.4th 186, 197 (3rd Cir. 2021) (en banc). This is because Miller’s bar on mandatory life-withoutparole sentencing regimes “is a prophylactic that entitles a juvenile homicide offender to a certain sentencing process, but not a particular sentencing outcome[.]” Id. at 193. Indeed, permanent incorrigibility is “not an eligibility criterion akin to sanity or a lack of intellectual disability[,]” rather it is “a sentencing factor akin to a mitigating circumstance.” Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1315. For that reason, Miller “mandated only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics — before imposing a life-without-parole sentence.” Id. at 1311 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Grant, 9 F.4th at 200 (“What matters for Miller purposes is whether the sentencer considered a juvenile homicide offender’s youth and attendant characteristics before sentencing him or her to [life without parole].”). It logically and necessarily follows that if a discretionary sentencing scheme is constitutionally sufficient to permit the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender, so too can a court impose a sentence that is something less than life without parole. This includes a term-of-years sentence that may amount to a de 15 We recognize again that Section 1102.1 applies only to those juveniles “convicted after June 24, 2012.” 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1(a). In Batts II, we held that “for purposes of uniformity[,]” courts should examine the Section 1102.1(d) factors “regardless of whether the juvenile was convicted pre- or post-Miller.” Batts II, 163 A.3d at 455 n.23. Although this directive did “not result from a review of the constitutionality of the statute[,]” we saw no problem with instructing sentencing courts “to use the new legislative provision as guidance without making it mandatory.” Id. at 458 n.25. We likewise see no problem with reaffirming this non-binding requirement even after Jones. [J-53-2019] - 21 facto life sentence. Stated differently, as long as the sentence was the product of a discretionary sentencing system that included consideration of the juvenile’s youth, the Eighth Amendment is satisfied. Here, the record makes clear that appellant received the constitutionally required procedure guaranteed by Miller and the Eighth Amendment. In resentencing appellant, the court had before it the parties’ presentence memoranda, psychological reports, school records, and victim impact statements. It heard testimony from appellant and his mother and read a letter from his cousin. It considered the parties’ arguments and evidentiary presentations made at the resentencing hearing. It reviewed “lengthy contemporaneous notes taken during both the trial of this case and during the initial sentencing proceeding.” N.T. 10/24/2014 at 51. And it contemplated, “on the record, every one of the twelve factors . . . enumerated in Miller and Batts [I.]” Sentencing Court Op., 2/18/2016, at 5. This process was more than enough to meet the constitutional standard. See Jones, 141 S.Ct. at 1322 (“The resentencing in Jones’s cases complied with [Miller] because the sentence was not mandatory and the trial judge had discretion to impose a lesser punishment in light of Jones’s youth.”). IV. Conclusion Though we might prefer the more expansive view of Miller as seen through the lens of Montgomery, we cannot ignore that Jones’s interpretation is controlling as a matter of Eighth Amendment law. And because that decision abrogates our foundational understanding in Batts II that a juvenile homicide offender cannot constitutionally receive a sentence of life without parole unless he or she is proven to be permanently incorrigible, the procedural protections we adopted in that case to ensure that result are no longer tenable as an exercise of this Court’s power of judicial administration. Therefore, when sentencing juvenile homicide offenders from this point forward, sentencing courts are [J-53-2019] - 22 required to consider only the relevant sentencing statutes, which will guarantee that the sentencer considers the juvenile’s youth and attendant characteristics as required by Miller. So long as the sentence imposed is discretionary and takes into account the offender’s youth, even if it amounts to a de facto life sentence, Miller is not violated. Because the sentencing court in the present case followed this procedure, we affirm.16 Chief Justice Baer and Justices Todd and Mundy join the opinion.