Opinion ID: 2782927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adverse Inference

Text: “A district court’s decision regarding spoliation sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” S.E.C. v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934, 947 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Air Express Int’l USA, Inc., 615 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). “[A]n adverse inference is drawn from a party’s failure to preserve evidence only when the absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith.” Id. 12 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 13 of 19 (quoting Bashir v. Amtrak, 119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997). “Mere negligence” is insufficient. Bashir, 119 F.3d at 931. Plaintiff states that “Maersk provided a twist lock from container [sic] stacked at the ‘five-high’ level for analysis and testing. Unfortunately, the evidence in this action indicates that the twist lock actually fell from the container that was stacked ‘four high.’ These facts alone raise a rebuttable presumption in favor of Appellants that the twist lock was defective.” The district court could make little sense of Plaintiff’s argument. “Plaintiffs appear to assume bad faith simply because the twist-lock provided by Defendant Maersk did not meet Plaintiffs’ expectations.” Plaintiff contends that the district court mistook the argument and restates it on appeal: Appellants have evidence that an incorrect twist lock was provided per the testimonies of those that witnessed the event. Additionally, Appellants provide evidence that some lubrication or other agent was added to the provided twist lock. The lubrication would be irrelevant if the twist lock provided by Appellee Maersk was a twist lock other than the one in dispute in this case. On the other hand, if this twist lock was, as Maersk contends, the twist lock relevant to this lawsuit, then it is clear that the lubricant or agent applied to the twist lock would prevent the twist lock from being presented in an unmodified condition. Plaintiff, however, cites no evidence in support of his position that the twist-lock provided was not the one that struck him. Nor does Plaintiff explain why the 13 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 14 of 19 alleged lubrication means that the twist-lock was tampered with or is not the one involved in the accident. The district court was well within its discretion in refusing Plaintiff’s request for an adverse inference. First, Plaintiff has not provided evidence that should have led the district court to conclude that the twist-lock was either not the twistlock that struck Plaintiff or that it had been modified after the accident. Second, even if the twist-lock was not the one that struck Plaintiff, Plaintiff has not met the burden of showing that there was bad faith, as opposed to mere negligence, in collecting and turning over the correct twist-lock. Plaintiff’s unsupported speculations are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). We thus AFFIRM the district court’s denial of an adverse inference on this issue. Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Maersk because there was a genuine issue of material fact. However, Plaintiff’s alleged genuine issue of material fact is the defective twist-lock. Plaintiff believes this remains a genuine issue of material fact because the district court erred in not granting the adverse inference Plaintiff requested. Plaintiff offers no further argument beyond that. Thus, having resolved the issue of the adverse inference, we find no error in the district court’s grant of summary 14 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 15 of 19 judgment in favor of Maersk. We AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment in favor of Maersk. C. Exclusion of Williams’ and Culwell’s Testimony We review a district court’s ruling on evidentiary matters for abuse of discretion. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 556 (11th Cir. 1998). The district court excluded the testimonies of Williams and Culwell because they failed to meet the standard required for expert testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert testimony: A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. Fed. R. Evid. 702. In applying Rule 702, the district courts consider whether (1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert 15 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 16 of 19 reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific . . . expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). It is the burden of the party seeking to introduce the expert testimony to establish that the requirements have been met. McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002). With regard to Williams, the district court held that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden. The district court found that Williams’ “career repairing corner casing is wholly insufficient to render [him] qualified to offer an opinion as to whether a corner casing was defective and whether that defect caused the twist-lock to become dislodged.” On appeal, Plaintiff argues that Williams’ experience is more extensive than the district court recognized. Plaintiff mentions that Williams “rebuilt entire containers, including casting corners, during his career,” and has held supervisory positions over other welders. In response, Moller argues that Williams “has no experience actually performing the job that Plaintiffs have hired him to opine about in this case: to wit, inspecting and assessing the condition of corner castings.” Moller points out that Williams did not inspect corner castings; rather, marine surveyors did the inspecting, and Williams merely repaired the castings that those marine surveyors sent to him. Williams admitted in his deposition that he 16 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 17 of 19 could not say what amount of rust present on a corner casting would render it in need of repair or replacement, stating that a “[s]urveyor would have a figure for it,” but “I wasn’t a surveyor, I’m a mechanic. My job is to fix it.” Moller further notes that in his sole inspection of the corner casting and the container, Williams only visually inspected the container without taking measurements or performing any tests. Finally, in his deposition, Williams conceded that he could not say that the rust on the corner casting caused the twist-lock to fail. As for Culwell, the district court held that Plaintiff had “fail[ed] to identify any characteristic that would reasonably render Mr. Culwell’s opinion reliable.” This is because Culwell’s expert report does not explain his methodology and “elucidates no standards for determining inappropriate amounts of wear for corner casings, nor is it based on any technique that has been subjected to peer review.” Indeed, the district court stated that “Culwell did little more than look at pictures of the container and arrive at a personal belief that the corner casting may have contributed to the twist-lock becoming dislodged.” On appeal, Plaintiff argues that Culwell’s engineering education and extensive experience in maritime equipment consulting qualify him as an expert. Further, Plaintiff asserts that in reaching his conclusion that the wear on the casting corner most likely caused the accident, Culwell followed Moller’s own guidelines. 17 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 18 of 19 In response, Moller points out first that Culwell did not personally inspect the corner casting in reaching his opinion that it was too worn. More importantly, Moller notes that Culwell admits that there is no industry standard for the amount of wear a corner casting may safely endure and that he has no opinion on what that standard should be. The district court did not err in rejecting the expert testimony of Williams or Culwell. By Williams’ own statements, he has no expertise in identifying a defective corner casting. He meets none of the three requirements we set out in Frazier. There are no grounds for believing that Williams could testify competently about the state of the corner casting, that he employs a reliable methodology, or that he would help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260. Although he presents a stronger case for expertise due to his education and experience, Culwell too was rightly rejected as an expert because he provided no reason to believe that his opinion was rendered on the basis of some standard or pursuant to some methodology. The district court had no way of determining the reliability of Culwell’s opinion because of his failure to explain his methodology. See United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 704 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2013). Without such an explanation, Culwell’s testimony would not help the trier of fact 18 Case: 14-14450 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 19 of 19 in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. We thus AFFIRM the district court’s exclusion of the testimonies of Williams and Culwell.