Opinion ID: 421210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Tolling the Statute of Limitations

Text: 25 Appellant argues that the statute of limitations should not have begun to run until appellant knew or should have known of the alleged negligence of the United States. Specifically, appellant charges that the FAA unilaterally amended the DC-3's flight plan by changing the estimated time of arrival. Appellant claims that this information was withheld until August, 1980, and therefore the limitations period should not run until that point. 26 The facts do not support appellant's argument. Even assuming that the flight plan information was withheld, appellant had sufficient information to file suit prior to August, 1980. In fact, her administrative claim was filed June 2, 1980, two months prior to the release of the flight plan. Any later-acquired information might have bolstered Williams' original claim, but it did not create a new claim. In any event, from a standpoint of certainty the limitations period should be computed from the date of injury. See McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27, 72 S.Ct. 17, 19, 96 L.Ed. 268 (1951). 27 Nor is this case well-suited for equitable tolling whereby a statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of ongoing administrative procedures. 9 See, e.g., McCormick v. United States, 680 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.1982); Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 616 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831, 101 S.Ct. 99, 66 L.Ed.2d 36 (1980). Under this theory, the running of the limitations period would be suspended during the time that Williams' FTCA claim was pending before the FAA. This is not a situation, though, where the pending administrative proceeding is related to the suit at bar. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., supra, at 395-96 (antitrust statute tolled during pendency of related ICC proceedings). The FTCA and the SAA statutes have no intertwining functions. Further, Williams was not appealing under the erroneous assumption that the FTCA alone was the operable jurisdictional base. See McCormick, supra, at 346. Williams was aware of and pleaded alternative jurisdictional bases. The FTCA requires the submission of an administrative claim prior to bringing suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The SAA does not. It was appellant's responsibility to follow the procedural requirements for both statutes. Waiver of sovereign immunity involves strict compliance with the conditions by which the United States may be sued. McMahon, supra, 342 U.S. at 27, 72 S.Ct. at 19; Mayer v. Wright, 251 F.2d 178, 179 (9th Cir.1958). It is true that, in denying the FTCA claim, the FAA did not apprise appellant that suit might not lie against the FAA under the FTCA. Supplying that information was not the duty of the FAA, however; their role was limited to assessment of the claim. It was appellant's duty to name the proper party and timely serve process under both statutes. Appellant failed in this duty. 28 The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.