Opinion ID: 2621895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Awarding attorney fees incurred postjudgment under NRS 108.237(1)

Text: Although the district court failed to identify the basis for its April 28 award of attorney fees, Mt. Rose Heating ostensibly asked for fees under NRS 108.237(1) and now asserts that, under that statute, the court was mandated to award to it, the prevailing lien claimant, reasonable attorney fees incurred postjudgment as part of the costs of the proceedings. Accordingly, it appears that the fees were awarded under NRS 108.237(1). NRS 108.237(1) provides for attorney fees as part of the costs in mechanic's lien actions as follows, with emphasis added: The court shall award to a prevailing lien claimant, whether on its lien or on a surety bond, the lienable amount found due to the lien claimant by the court and the cost of preparing and recording the notice of lien, including, without limitation, attorney's fees, if any, and interest. The court shall also award to the prevailing lien claimant, whether on its lien or on a surety bond, the costs of the proceedings, including, without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, the costs for representation of the lien claimant in the proceedings, and any other amounts as the court may find to be justly due and owing to the lien claimant. Although NRS 108.237(1) does not explicitly provide for attorney fees incurred postjudgment, Mt. Rose Heating points out that the statute does not expressly exclude postjudgment attorney fees from its purview, convincingly arguing that, for policy reasons, NRS 108.237(1) should be liberally interpreted as allowing for postjudgment attorney fees so as to further the lien statutes' purpose to ensure that contractors are paid in whole for their work. [7] When statutory language is not ambiguous, this court will interpret it according to its ordinary meaning. [8] But when a statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is amenable to more than one reasonable interpretation, we must select the construction that will best give effect to the legislative intent. [9] Statutes are to be read in the context of the act and the subject matter as a whole, and policy may be looked to as an interpretive aid. [10] Whenever possible, we will interpret a statute in harmony with other rules and statutes. [11] NRS 108.237(1) gives the district court broad discretion to award, without limitation, reasonable attorney fees and any other amounts justly due and owing as costs of the proceedings. [12] Thus, we must determine to what proceedings the statute refers. [13] To do so, we turn to the statutory scheme and policy. [14] As used in NRS 108.237(1), the term proceedings appears within the statutory lien statutes and clearly refers to steps taken to enforce a mechanic's lien in the courts. [15] The scope of that term, therefore, must be viewed in light of other mechanic's lien statutes and, in particular, NRS 108.239, which generally governs court actions to enforce mechanic's liens. NRS 108.239(10) and (11) contemplate that, after determining the lienable amount, the district court will decree foreclosure, and the property will be sold to satisfy the lien and costs of sale. Once the property has been sold, NRS 108.237(1) costs, including attorney fees, must be paid out of the sale proceeds. [16] Thus, the mechanic's lien enforcement action ends only when the property is sold and the proceeds are distributed, or when the total amounts due under the judgment and NRS 108.237(1) are otherwise paid, and the lien is discharged or released. [17] Costs incurred up until that point are properly awarded under NRS 108.237(1), so long as they are incidental to the lien's enforcement and the foreclosure decree's execution. In this manner, the statute's purpose of making lien claimants whole is effectuated, since lien claimants are protected from owing additional attorney fees incurred to execute on a lien judgment when, for example, protracted litigation takes place after the judgment is entered. [18] Further, interpreting NRS 108.237(1) in this manner is consistent with NRS Chapter 18, which generally provides judgment creditors with certain postjudgment costs, including those costs incurred in connection with any proceeding supplementary to execution, so long as the court has approved those costs as to necessity, propriety and amount, and so long as they are requested before the judgment has been satisfied. [19] Thus, having determined that the district court had authority to award attorney fees incurred postjudgment under NRS 108.237(1), we next turn to Barney's argument that the district court nonetheless abused its discretion in awarding at least some of the requested postjudgment attorney fees to Mt. Rose Heating, given that the court failed to make findings regarding the fees' reasonableness and given that those fees were incurred to contest issues that might not have been necessary and on which Barney ultimately prevailed.