Opinion ID: 64191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Discrimination Claims

Text: We also conclude that the district court properly dismissed Malik’s federal claims for racial and religious discrimination. Malik asserts claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 2000d et seq., and 49 U.S.C. § 40127. Each of these statutes requires a litigant to plead facts in support of intentional discrimination. 49 U.S.C. § 40127 (mandating air carrier not subject person in air travel to discrimination on basis of race, color or national origin); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (Title VI prohibits intentional 4 We also note that Malik waived this argument by failing to raise it in her original brief. United States v. Jackson, 426 F.3d 301, 304 n.2 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief . . . are waived.”). 7 No. 08-50373 discrimination); Green v. State Bar of Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that plaintiff must allege facts showing intent to discriminate to state a claim under § 1981); Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A cause of action based upon section 1982 . . . requires an intentional act of racial discrimination.”). To state claims for intentional discrimination, Malik’s complaint must allege “more than labels and conclusions;” rather her “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965. Malik’s complaint falls well short of these standards. She simply alleges that, to her knowledge, she was the only Indian-secular Muslim on a flight where her luggage was removed from an overhead compartment; opened so she could be identified; sent to the plane’s under-cabin compartment; and ultimately lost. She alleges that Continental never compensated her. Based on this “outrageous conduct,” Malik concludes that “she was singled out, subjected to different standards, deprived of her property, and denied compensation because she was a member of a racial, ethnic, and religious group.” As the district court explained, Malik has failed to allege any facts establishing a connection between Continental’s actions and her racial and religious background. Rather, Malik’s complaint is rife with speculation that she feels “she [has] cause to wonder what the source of this disparate treatment could be.” Such unsupported speculation is insufficient to support a claim for intentional discrimination. Finally, Malik’s complaint alleges that Continental failed to compensate her for the loss of her luggage. Although the district court dismissed Malik’s complaint with prejudice, it failed to address her ability to recover for lost luggage under federal law.5 On appeal, Malik continues to press this claim by 5 Continental acknowledged that Malik’s complaint pleaded a cause of action for lost luggage under federal law by moving for summary judgment that the liability limitations in 8 No. 08-50373 arguing that the liability limitations for loss of luggage contained in Continental’s contract of carriage are unenforceable. We have recognized that the federal common law provides airline passenger’s with a cause of action for lost luggage. Casas, 304 F.3d at 521. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Malik’s federal claim for lost luggage and remand the cause for the limited purpose of adjudicating that claim. Because the district court did not address the enforceability of the liability limitations for loss of luggage contained in Continental’s contract of carriage or the scope of same, we decline to do so for the first time on appeal.