Opinion ID: 2649461
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The following factual background is taken from the 3  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  record on appeal.
On August 5, 2009, DeLeon was indicted for: Attempted Murder in the First Degree as to Powell and Gamboa (Count I); Murder in the Second Degree as to Powell, in violation of HRS §§ 707-701.5 and 706-656 (Count II)3; Attempted Murder in the Second Degree as to Gamboa, in violation of HRS §§ 705-500, 707701.5, and 706-656 (Count III); Carrying or Use of Firearm in the Commission of a Separate Felony in violation of HRS § 134-21 as to Count II (Count IV); Carrying or Use of Firearm in the Commission of a Separate Felony in violation of HRS § 134-21 as to Count III (Count V); Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver in violation of HRS § 134-25 (Count VI); Reckless Endangering in the First Degree in violation of HRS § 707-713 (Count VII); and Ownership or Possession Prohibited of Any Firearm or Ammunition by a Person Convicted of Certain Crimes in violation of HRS §§ 134-7(b) and (h) (Count VIII). 1. State’s first motion in limine to exclude cocaine evidence Prior to trial, on August 24, 2010, the State filed a 3 HRS § 707-701.5 (1993) provides in relevant part, “a person commits the offense of murder in the second degree if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another person.” HRS § 706-656(2) (Supp. 2010) provides in relevant part: “[P]ersons convicted of second degree murder . . . shall be sentenced to life imprisonment with possibility of parole.” 4  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  motion in limine, seeking, inter alia, to exclude any evidence that Powell’s blood tested positive for .05 mg/L of cocaine on grounds that such evidence is inadmissible under Hawai#i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 404(b)4 and/or irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial under HRE Rule 403.5 DeLeon opposed the State’s motion, arguing, inter alia, that evidence that Powell’s blood tested positive for .05 mg/L of cocaine was “essential and probative to [DeLeon’s] self-defense assertion, and its exclusion would be extremely prejudicial to his claims[.]” Among the exhibits attached to DeLeon’s opposition was a letter from Dr. Clifford G. Wong, the Toxicology 4 HRE Rule 404(b) (Supp. 2010) provides: Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible where such evidence is probative of another fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, modus operandi, or absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the proponent of evidence to be offered under this subsection shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the date, location, and general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial. 5 HRE Rule 403 (1993) provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 5  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Laboratory Director for Clinical Laboratories of Hawaii. The letter indicated that DeLeon’s defense counsel retained Dr. Wong as an expert in “DUI toxicology” and largely discussed Powell’s blood alcohol concentration. With regard to Powell’s cocaine concentration at the time of the shooting, Dr. Wong stated, in relevant part: The retrograde extrapolation of [] Powell’s blood cocaine concentration to the time of the shooting was performed to yield a probable range of 0.06 to 0.08 mg/L. The time of cocaine ingestion is unknown, so the actual cocaine dosage cannot be determined. Information regarding total amount ingested and the time of ingestion would be required to determine more accurately whether [] Powell has [sic] under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting. (Emphasis added). At a hearing on the motion, the circuit court noted that “[t]he issue right away that the Court [saw]” was Dr. Wong’s statement that he would need more information. Defense counsel responded: I have since spoken to Dr. Wong. This is what I expect the proof to be: First, respectfully, if you would, keeping in mind we have a video of Powell going towards the defendant after at least three warning shots were fired and saying some things that will come out that my client heard. There’s loud screaming. We have a witness from the manager of the Seoul Karaoke that heard two men screaming and then a shot or shots. This is what Dr. Wong says -- and we’ve subpoenaed [medical examiner Dr. William] Goodhue, who was -- who did the toxicology and autopsy. He says that the cocaine was of recent use, and all that means is -- I mean, what does “recent” mean? But with the doctors and . . . Dr. Wong, “recent use” means probably within 24 hours because the cocaine was still in the blood, it had not been completely absorbed. Dr. Wong says when . . . there’s a use of cocaine . . . it gives -- and he will testify, if he’s allowed 6  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  to -- someone a sense of euphoria, and he defines euphoria as invincibility, like you think you’re Superman, which is consistent with why anyone would be going after someone who’s firing three shots in the air. My client will testify that when he was grabbed -- and he has seen people, and he will testify, on the west side and when he was in California that he thought were high on something. And when he was grabbed in the bar by the victim, his testimony will be . . . this guy was drunk but there was something wrong with this guy, he looked like he was high on something[.] And then we have the cocaine, the invincibility, the Superman, and then there’s an explanation as to why this guy is doing this. Their witnesses say they thought Powell was crazy that he would be going after someone that just fired a gun in the air and just went right after him. So I don’t mind a [HRE Rule] 104 hearing[6] as well, but it’s the euphoria that the cocaine gives. We have the toxicology report that says recent use. We have the testimony from the defendant who says this guy looked like he was on something. Now, if he says that, then I think he has the right to say that. If it’s not buttressed or corroborated by the medical testimony and the expert testimony, it may look like it’s simply a self-serving statement he wants to make with no basis in fact. The DPA then argued for an HRE Rule 104 hearing: [I]t’s the state’s understanding that cocaine does not have a consistent effect on people like alcohol does. I think that this euphoric state can also be a dysphoric state and I think that the witness would testify to that, that he cannot describe the states that people go through on a consistent basis, . . . even knowing or being able to retro-extrapolate the amount of cocaine that was in the blood at the time of the specific incident. The circuit court ruled that it would conduct an HRE Rule 104 hearing before allowing any testimony regarding Powell’s cocaine level. The circuit court also informed defense counsel of its concerns: 6 HRE Rule 104 governs preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence. 7  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  THE COURT: . . . And just so, you know, counsel, you’re very clear, it’s the Court’s concern that Dr. Wong is not able to render an opinion that the victim was under the influence at the time of the shooting, and . . . doesn’t have enough information and that’s what’s stated on the bottom of page 5 of his opinion, and if that remains his opinion, then it’s not admissible. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m clear with that. Thank you, Your Honor. I’m clear as to the ruling. THE COURT: Questionable relevancy and materiality will just create undue confusion. Shortly before opening statements, the circuit court ruled, over the State’s objection, that defense counsel could mention in his opening statement DeLeon’s perception that Powell may have been “high on something without making any specifications.” The circuit court stated that the substance or the amount could not be mentioned “until we have had subsequent [HRE] Rule 104 hearings.” 2. State’s Case-in-Chief At trial, Jermaine Beaudoin testified that on the night of July 30, 2009, he, along with Gamboa, and Powell went in Gamboa’s Lincoln Navigator to Bar Seven7 next to Ala Moana Center at about 2:15 to 2:30 a.m. Beaudoin estimated that at this point in the evening, he had consumed between nine to eleven alcoholic drinks, and that Powell had also been drinking but was not drunk. At some point, Beaudoin saw Powell talking to DeLeon, whom 7 Other witnesses, as well as defense counsel and the DPA, referred to this establishment as either Club 7 or Bar Seven. For purposes of consistency, this opinion will use the name “Bar Seven.” 8  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Beaudoin did not know at the time. Powell and DeLeon “got into a little tussle.” Beaudoin intervened and DeLeon began yelling at him. In response, Beaudoin slapped DeLeon’s head with his open hand, knocking off DeLeon’s dark glasses. Beaudoin testified that he believed that DeLeon then left Bar Seven. Beaudoin, Powell, and Gamboa then went in Gamboa’s Navigator to Seoul Karaoke at about 3:45 a.m. Powell, Beaudoin, Gamboa and another acquaintance, Lane Akiona, walked in to Seoul Karaoke. The group was in Seoul Karaoke for about two to three minutes, was told that it was closing, and walked out to the car. According to Beaudoin, as the group walked to the car, someone yelled at them. Beaudoin stated that he “couldn’t make out what he was yelling at us, but he was yelling something at us. So we turned around and walked towards the defendant.” When Beaudoin came within about five to ten feet of DeLeon, Beaudoin “noticed that it was the same guy from Bar 7.” At that point, Powell was closest to DeLeon, and Beaudoin told Powell “that’s the guy from Bar 7[,]” and said “we go.” According to Beaudoin, when Powell reached DeLeon, Powell said, “Everything is cool, everything -- no more problem.” Beaudoin described Powell’s body language as “[r]egular, hands down. Everything is cool, misunderstanding or whatevers.” Beaudoin stated that Powell did not look mad and that Powell was trying to calm the situation. Powell was about 9  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  an “[a]rm’s length[]” from DeLeon when DeLeon then “[g]rab[bed] his gun and started shooting.” DeLeon first shot into the ground two or three times, then shot Powell in the chest. At that point, Beaudoin was “turning around, trying to get away[,]” and then DeLeon shot “towards [Beaudoin] in the ground and [shot] at the vehicle.” Beaudoin stated that as DeLeon shot the gun, Beaudoin was on the ground and “felt the pebbles off the ground hitting [his] face.” Beaudoin testified that the shots were “[c]ontinuous[].” On cross-examination, Beaudoin acknowledged that his July 31, 2009 written statement describing the incident reflected that DeLeon’s first shots were in the air and that his written statement and his August 5, 2009 grand jury testimony did not mention that his group approached DeLeon because DeLeon yelled at them. Beaudoin stated that he tried to stop Powell by grabbing his shoulder and that he was able to stop him from walking. Beaudoin acknowledged that when asked before the grand jury how many feet away DeLeon was from Powell when DeLeon shot Powell in the chest, Beaudoin answered, “[n]ot feet” and “[n]ot even feet.” Gamboa testified that at Bar Seven, he noticed Powell talking to a Mexican man in dark glasses and that the conversation between them appeared friendly. At some point there was a commotion in the group, and Gamboa saw another 10  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  acquaintance, Joe Chang, “trying to break it up [and p]ulled kind of [Powell] to the side.” Gamboa did not see anyone being hit but saw “this Mexican guy stumbling.” Gamboa saw the Mexican man walk towards the entrance of the club and did not see him in the club after that. Later, the group left Bar Seven, and Gamboa drove Beaudoin, Powell, and two other men whom Gamboa did not know to Seoul Karaoke. No one talked about the incident from Bar Seven, and Powell “seemed normal[]” and “[n]othing bothered him.” Gamboa further testified that he, Powell, Beaudoin, Lane, and two other men went to Seoul Karaoke but were told it was closed and left. Gamboa walked into the parking lot to his car, with the other men “kind of trailing behind” him. Gamboa opened his car door, and then heard someone yelling aggressively, “You want to mess with me? You want to hit me?” Gamboa then heard someone say, “What, the guy from Sevens.” Gamboa turned around to see who was yelling and walked in the direction of the yelling. Gamboa saw “him coming towards us. Then he shot three rounds into the ground. . . . [T]hen I seen him shoot [Powell].” Gamboa estimated that one to two seconds passed between when he heard the man yelling and when he fired the first three shots into the ground, and stated that it was another one to two seconds between the first three shots and the shot to Powell. 11  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Gamboa stated that Powell and the man had been “kind of talking towards each other,” but that Gamboa could not hear what they were saying. Gamboa stated that he saw the man point the gun towards Powell’s chest and that Powell was raising his hands with his palms facing forward when the man shot Powell. About one to two seconds after shooting Powell, the man shot toward Gamboa. Gamboa heard his car windshield “blowing up[,]” and ran to the building next door. Gamboa stated that Powell was about one to two feet away from the shooter when he was shot. Gamboa identified the shooter in court as DeLeon. On cross-examination, Gamboa acknowledged that he told police that DeLeon’s car pulled up as the group left Seoul Karaoke, and Powell “veered off.” Gamboa stated that he did not drink the night of the incident. Lane Akiona testified that as he was leaving Seoul Karaoke with Powell, Beaudoin and Gamboa, a male Lane did not know approached them. Lane did not know about the incident with DeLeon at Bar Seven. According to Lane, the male said, “What’s up?” When asked how the male was acting, Lane answered: “Like what’s up now, like, then [Powell] raised his hands approaching him and the guy reached behind his back and he just -- it happened so fast. He just started firing shots and I ducked out of the way and tried to get out of the line of fire.” Lane 12  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  estimated it was about 15 to 20 seconds between when the male said, “what’s up” to when he started shooting. Lane stated that before Powell was shot, Powell was “[j]ust standing there[.]” Lane stated that he saw the shooter point directly to Powell’s chest when the shooter was about three feet from Powell. Lane identified the shooter in court as DeLeon. Daekum Kim, who worked at Seoul Karaoke at the time of the incident, stated that at about 4:00 a.m. on July 31, 2009, he told a group of about four to five drunk men who entered that Seoul Karaoke would be closing. The men left, and Kim heard “someone fight” outside. Kim could not see who was outside, but “[t]heir voice was loud and the yelling and they say bad words.” Kim then heard a single gun shot, then “after two, three seconds, two, three times more.” Kim called the police and did not go outside until after the police arrived. Liana Cuarisma, DeLeon’s girlfriend at the time of the incident, testified that on July 31, 2009, at about 3:50 a.m., DeLeon called her and said, “I just got fucking mobbed”8 at Bar Seven. Cuarisma stated that DeLeon sounded upset and was “[h]uffing and puffing” over the phone. Later that day, during lunchtime, DeLeon told Cuarisma over the phone that he had to 8 Cuarisma initially testified that DeLeon told her that he had just gotten “mugged.” 13  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  return to Washington, where he was from, to see his mother in the hospital.9 Later that evening, Cuarisma dropped DeLeon off at the airport. Taro Nakamura, a Honolulu Police Department (HPD) homicide detective, testified that at some point he received an anonymous phone call from a male who said that Powell had gotten into an argument with someone at Bar Seven, and described the person as a tall Mexican male with the name of Jose Lion or Deleon.10 Nakamura ran background checks for “combinations of Jose, Jesus, Lion, Deleon,” found an entry and photograph for DeLeon, and assembled a photographic lineup. Beaudoin and Gamboa picked out DeLeon from the photographic lineup, but Lane was not able to identify a suspect. Nakamura learned that DeLeon had purchased an airplane ticket, and sent officers to the airport.11 HPD criminalist Kaleo Kaluhiokalani testified as an expert in the field of gunshot residue analysis and stated that gunshot residue kit samples taken from Powell’s hands showed particles “highly specific to gunshot residue.” Kaluhiokalani 9 Cuarisma, whom the State treated as a hostile witness, later acknowledged on direct examination that it was possible, although she did not remember, that between 4:08 a.m. and 9:30 p.m. on July 31, 2009 she talked to DeLeon at least 40 times. 10 It appears that the anonymous call occurred on July 31, 2009. 11 Additional witnesses testified about DeLeon’s check-in and arrest at the airport on the evening of July 31, 2009. 14  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  stated that this finding could indicate that Powell discharged a gun, handled the gun or another object contaminated with gunshot residue, or was near a firearm when it was discharged, and that if a person is shot in the chest and touches the wound, gunshot residue can be transferred to the person’s hands. Acting chief medical examiner Dr. William Goodhue, testifying as an expert in the field of forensic pathology, stated that he performed an autopsy on Powell on July 31, 2009 and concluded that Powell’s cause of death was “massive blood loss due to injury to his heart as a result of a gunshot wound to the chest.” On cross-examination, Dr. Goodhue stated that the gunshot to Powell was not a contact wound in which the barrel of the gun was placed against the body. Dr. Goodhue stated that he could not conclude how far away the gun was from Powell at the time it was fired because he did not receive Powell’s shirt to examine. After the State rested,12 DeLeon moved for judgment of acquittal as to all charges. The circuit court denied the motion. 3. HRE Rule 104 hearing regarding cocaine evidence and circuit court ruling On September 22, 2010, the day after resting its case- 12 Additional witnesses testified for the State; however, their testimony is not relevant to the issues before this court. 15  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  in-chief, the State filed Motion in Limine No. 2, seeking to exclude from trial (1) any evidence of any opinion by Dr. Wong regarding the behavioral effects of cocaine and/or alcohol combination, (2) any testimony about how Powell might have reacted to the cocaine and/or alcohol in his system, and (3) Dr. Wong’s opinion in his September 7, 2010 letter13 that: Given[] the co-presence of significant levels of cocaine and alcohol in the decedent, my opinion is that [] Powell was under the influence of those two drugs at the time of the shooting, and accordingly, made a fatal misjudgment in his attempt to accost the defendant, [] Deleon, even after warning shots were fired. The State argued that allowing such evidence would violate HRE Rule 702,14 stating: “Dr. [] Wong cannot testify to [] Powell’s state of mind because he does not have enough information. Additionally, it is an issue of fact for the jury to decide whether there was an ‘attempt to accost the defendant.’ Lastly, the opinion is outside Dr. Wong’s expertise.” The State also argued that Dr. Wong’s “opinion is outweighed by the danger 13 Dr. Wong’s September 7, 2010 letter is not included in the record on appeal. 14 HRE Rule 702 (1993) provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the court may consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of analysis employed by the proffered expert. 16  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury,” warranting its exclusion pursuant to HRE Rule 403. The circuit court held an HRE Rule 104 hearing the same day. At the hearing, Dr. Wong testified that he is a forensic toxicologist and the toxicology lab director at Clinical Laboratories of Hawaii’s toxicology department. Dr. Wong explained that cocaine is a “central nervous system stimulant . . . [that] mimics the activity of adrenaline.” Its effect increases the heart rate and dilates blood vessels, “engorg[ing] the muscles of the body to fight or flight[]” – that is, “when a person is confronted with danger or something that is opposing them, they would develop the ability to fight off that threat or to run away.” Dr. Wong agreed that he could say “to a reasonable scientific probability that based on [his] training and experience, . . . the ingestion of cocaine can affect someone’s behavior[.]” With respect to the instant case, Dr. Wong testified that he reviewed some parts of the police report, the testimony of the witnesses before the grand jury, witness statements to the police officers “investigating right after” the shooting, the medical examiner’s report, and a security camera video recording of the shooting. Dr. Wong noted that Dr. Goodhue’s autopsy report indicated the finding of cocaine and benzoylecgonine, a 17  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  metabolite of cocaine, in Powell’s blood. According to the medical examiner’s laboratory report on Powell, “the alcohol was extremely high.” A toxicology report indicated the presence of .05 milligrams per liter of cocaine and .39 milligrams per liter of benzoylecgonine. Dr. Wong stated that the proportion of benzoylecgonine to cocaine “generally means that the cocaine . . . was perhaps consumed at a . . . much earlier time frame, say beyond four or five hours.” Dr. Wong noted that Dr. Goodhue’s autopsy report stated that the cocaine was taken “in close proximity to the death”; Dr. Wong stated that given the level of cocaine detected, it was taken within the previous 24 hours. Dr. Wong also testified that he called the laboratory that performed the toxicology analysis on Powell’s blood, and learned that the laboratory also found cocaethylene, which “indicates a usage of cocaine while there was still alcohol present in the body.” Defense counsel asked Dr. Wong if he could say to a “reasonable scientific probability” that if cocaine is in the blood, it would have an effect on the user’s behavior, to which Dr. Wong responded: “I would say not knowing his medical history, his experience with cocaine, I would say just if I would assume an average user or a naive user, yes, we would normally see the effects of cocaine.” 18  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Dr. Wong also performed a retrograde extrapolation for alcohol and cocaine, in which he calculated the concentrations of alcohol and cocaine in Powell’s body at the time of the shooting. Dr. Wong stated that Powell’s blood alcohol at the time of the shooting was 0.18.15 Dr. Wong stated that the combined effects of cocaine and alcohol “generally are additive, especially in the effects of judgment.” The following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Dr. Wong: Q. Does it help you at all in the video in assessing as you may look at a police report a field sobriety test, does this video help you at all in being able to give an opinion based on a reasonable scientific probability as to what the effects first of all with the alcohol and then -- strike the alcohol, the effects of the cocaine? A. Just that everyone else there at that party had drinks as well as he. When they saw or appeared to have seen a gun, they all pretty much stayed away from the defendant, whereas the victim did not. Now, what is the commonality of all of them? They had alcohol. What was the -- at least all we know at this time the only difference between [] Powell and the others in his party was that we found cocaine in him, and so by inference perhaps it was that cocaine that gave him that extra shove to confront the individual. Q. Can you say to a reasonable scientific probability the fact that there was cocaine found in his bloodstream, the proximity of the cocaine, that it affected his judgment and his critical judgment or his behavior, just the cocaine alone? A. Well, again, just based on cocaine 15 Although Dr. Wong did not state at the hearing the concentration of cocaine in Powell’s blood at the time of the shooting, Dr. Wong’s August 9, 2010 letter that defense counsel submitted to the circuit court on September 3, 2010 indicated that Powell’s blood cocaine concentration at the time of the shooting was in a “probable range of 0.06 to 0.08 mg/L.” 19  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  concentrations that is something I can’t give you a definite answer but if this individual was approaching staring down the barrel of a gun, where most normal people would shy away or perhaps remove themselves from, I would say that perhaps cocaine, yes, by a probability would have been a factor in having him confront this individual even with a gun being presented towards him. . . . . Q. . . . Are you satisfied that the ingestion of cocaine in the proximity to the death had an impact on Powell’s behavior? A. With reasonable probability I would say yes. Q. To a reasonable medical scientific probability? A. Yes. (Emphases added). On cross-examination, the State questioned Dr. Wong about what he could testify to regarding the effect of cocaine on Powell: Q. You know, you just used words like perhaps the cocaine could or would have been a factor in [] Powell’s judgment; right? A. Yes. Q. And you cannot testify today in court under oath that to a reasonable degree of medical certainty [] Powell was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Excuse me, I don’t mean to interrupt you, . . . I’m not so sure the standard is medical certainty, I think it’s probability but either way. THE WITNESS: Yes. BY [THE STATE]: Q. Dr. Wong, you’re uncomfortable with saying that; isn’t that true? A. Well, normally in court in a criminal case I 20  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  usually would make an opinion based on beyond a reasonable doubt, okay? In this case it’s clearly it’s not beyond a reasonable doubt whether or not he was or not or was not under the influence of cocaine. I can only say with reasonable probability because of the concentration that was found, extrapolated concentration that was found in the blood, as well as his behavior, his apparent behavior in the camera of moving towards the defendant – . . . . Q. Can you testify to a reasonable medical degree of certainty that [] Powell was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting? A. I can only say by probability. Q. Yes or no, Doctor. A. High probability, that’s all I can say. Q. High probability, not to a reasonable degree of medical certainty? A. Not beyond a reasonable -- THE COURT: Scientific certainty. BY [THE STATE]: Q. Scientific certainty. To a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, can you testify that [] Powell was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting? A. No. Q. And the reason why you can’t is because you don’t know the background of [] Powell? A. Yes. . . . . Q. . . . [Y]ou cannot testify to a reasonable degree of scientific study [sic] because you state you need more information? A. Yes, that’s correct. Q. From your August 9 letter to your September 7 letter you say you need more information; correct? A. Yes. 21  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Q. Now, you need to know how the cocaine was ingested, was it smoked, was it snorted, was it intravenous? A. No, that aspect was not important. Primarily the important factors were did the individual show signs of intoxication, and we have no evidence other than any anecdotal evidence from the other witnesses. The camera was too far away to really determine any behaviors of tremors or antsyness of the individual. Of course, you cannot determine the pupil dilation, so I can’t use any other evidence to determine whether or not he was definitely under the influence of cocaine. (Emphases added). Dr. Wong acknowledged that in his September 7, 2010 letter, he cited to two references, including a “McCance-Katz” article – which studied the effects of cocaine and alcohol – but did not read that article. Dr. Wong stated that he relied primarily on an article by Dr. Eisenschmidt, and that he cited the McCance-Katz study because it was noted in the Dr. Eisenschmidt article. Dr. Wong acknowledged that between his August 9, 2010 letter and his September 7, 2010 letter, he never received information regarding the total amount of cocaine Powell ingested and when it was ingested, which would be required to determine more accurately whether Powell was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting. Dr. Wong also stated that he would need to know Powell’s tolerance. When asked whether he received the information he requested, Dr. Wong responded: “Not all the information, no, that I needed. And I did say I could not make 22  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  that statement that with reasonable -- with medical certainty. I said I could not make that determination that he was under the influence of cocaine.” The circuit court also examined Dr. Wong: Q. Dr. Wong, this last paragraph that [defense counsel] was just asking you about [in Dr. Wong’s supplemental report dated September 7, 2010], the highly intoxicated by alcohol and cocaine, does the highly intoxicated modify both? I mean, was he highly intoxicated by cocaine at the time? A. The highly intoxication would refer to the alcohol. Q. Okay. And as the Court understands your first letter, you were not able to determine whether he was under the influence of the cocaine at the -- A. Well, I mention it was hard to make a definitive judgment on his impairment or the influence by cocaine unless there is more information given. Q. And the additional information between August and September was your viewing of the video? A. Yes, and the finding about the cocaethylene as well. Q. And the effect of that was just to indicate that the cocaine and alcohol had been taken at the same time? A. Yes. Q. But did not give any additional information about amount, time of ingestion? A. That, yes, we don’t know but the fact that they were both then coincident in the blood would give a very high probable of circumstance of intoxication by both, okay? [sic] I don’t have any behavioral clues other than perhaps what may be seen in the film of the man approaching the suspect with the -- the defendant with the -- I guess in their confrontation. It’s difficult to see at what point the gun is brandished. You can’t really pick that out in the film. So my point is that if a person points a gun at you it normally would give the person pause. I would not run up to him face-to-face if I see a gun in his hand. 23  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Q. The chart that was attached to your August letter with regard to the level of alcohol intoxication and the behavior, is there a similar chart for cocaine? A. No, for any of the drugs. That’s the reason why the DRE program[16] was established because there is no definitive way you can give a level of drug with a level of impairment. Some drugs exert effects even as the levels are dropping, so they don’t always correlate increase level increase intoxication either drugs as it does in alcohol. [Sic] Following the questioning of Dr. Wong, defense counsel argued that Dr. Wong should be allowed to testify about the behavioral effects of cocaine: . . . I think really it’s a weight issue, if anything, based on whether [the jury] believe[s] that was a factor. It’s . . . impossible for any expert to be present unless it’s a controlled test to watch somebody ingest any drug, cocaine included, and that’s why we have toxicology reports and that’s why we have experts, forensic toxicologists, who testify regarding the accepted effects, behavioral effects, based on studies that are done. And when [the DPA] asked [Dr. Wong] whether or not there’s anything in his references or CV, it is there. He has testified before and been admitted as an expert for the effects. It’s the combined effects. And I think he certainly shouldn’t be precluded and the jury should not be misled as to the condition of [] Powell. I think his testimony is an aid to the trier of fact. I think there’s a sufficient basis based on his credentials, based on the toxicology report, based on his extrapolation, and if it does enhance the effects of alcohol they should know that. And I think it would be properly admitted. I think it would be error to exclude it. . . . (Emphasis added). The circuit court allowed Dr. Wong’s testimony as to 16 Dr. Wong described the DRE program as a certification program that trains officers to recognize impairment due to drugs rather than alcohol. 24  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  the effects of alcohol, but excluded his testimony regarding cocaine: Viewing the evidence that has been presented with respect to this issue, the Court affirms its prior ruling on the motion in limine, is going to preclude the evidence and testimony with respect to the presence of cocaine.[17] The Court, in reviewing Dr. Wong’s initial letter, the subsequent September letter, as well as the testimony presented today, the Court thinks that it does not have sufficient reliability to present the issue before the jury and is going to cause confusion. The Court does note that in the [August] letter he indicated that he was not able to render an opinion with respect to whether [] Powell was under the influence of cocaine at the time of the shooting without additional information. He received some additional information between August and September, not the specific information that he indicated that he would need to do that, and he further indicated today that he could not make the -- render an opinion to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that [] Powell was under the influence of cocaine at the time of his -- at the time of the shooting and therefore to allow him to opine about influence of both substances and the effect on the behavior of the deceased would be speculative. So Court precludes that use. . . . . [Dr. Wong] could not give an opinion in August and then he did render that opinion in the September 7th letter, but the Court is not allowing that opinion based on the testimony presented this morning. And he did indicate this morning that he cannot render that opinion to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. But just to clarify . . . , he will be able to testify as to the blood alcohol level at the time of the shooting and what that level blood alcohol may indicate in terms of an individual’s behavior. The Court does find he’s qualified in that area. (Emphases added). 4. Defense’s Case-in-Chief 17 It is unclear from the record whether the circuit court actually made a prior ruling on this issue. A transcript of the September 3, 2010 hearing indicates that the circuit court’s prior ruling was that an HRE Rule 104 hearing would be held prior to any admission of the cocaine evidence. Minutes of the September 3, 2010 hearing state: “State and Deft’s motions in limine: granted in part, reserved in part, and Rule 104 hearings to be held.” 25  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Chang testified that he met DeLeon through a mutual friend and saw DeLeon about four or five times at various bars before the night of the incident. DeLeon appeared to be at Bar Seven alone and was drinking. At some point, DeLeon wound up talking with Powell. Chang, who considered Powell a friend, testified that Powell had his arm around DeLeon “like how you would hold like a pal or a buddy[,]” but Chang could not hear what Powell was saying to DeLeon. Beaudoin then told Chang he wanted to “false crack the Mexican guy[,]” and Chang told Beaudoin, “The guy is not doing anything wrong. Leave him alone. They’re all right.” Chang turned to talk to someone else, and then heard a slap. DeLeon started yelling at Beaudoin, “[W]hat the hell are you doing?” Chang “stopped the confrontation[,]” picked up DeLeon’s glasses from the floor, returned them, and told DeLeon, “You need to get the hell out of here before something worse happens to you[,]” because “they have all their friends[.]” DeLeon then left the club. About half an hour later, Chang left the club and went to Seoul Karaoke, where he saw Powell and Powell’s group. Chang left Seoul Karaoke before Powell was shot. Dr. Wong was qualified as an expert witness in the field of forensic toxicology, and testified that he reviewed the Sorabol security video, Powell’s autopsy report, and a toxicology 26  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  report of Powell’s blood alcohol content. Dr. Wong stated that Powell was found to have a blood alcohol level of 0.171, which indicates “a high degree of alcohol intoxication.” Dr. Wong further stated that he calculated by retrograde extrapolation that Powell’s blood alcohol level was .181 at the time of the shooting. Dr. Wong then consulted the “Dubowski table”18 in which ranges of blood alcohol concentrations are assigned various stages of alcoholic influence and clinical signs and symptoms. According to the Dubowski table, Powell’s blood alcohol level bordered between the alcoholic influence categories of confusion and excitement. Dr. Wong also testified that the category of euphoria, which included symptoms of being “supremely overconfident[,]” was also applicable. Dr. Wong explained that the category of “excitement” includes symptoms of emotional instability and impairment of the perception of distance, objects, and danger. Dr. Wong explained the category of confusion as not being situationally aware of where you are in a given time. . . . [I]f you have mental confusions you may not be aware of these different options . . . that were available to you and you may take other options that are perhaps more dangerous. It also is a means of interpretation of what the situation is. If a person is in conversation or in actions that may be misinterpreted as something else. . . . . [I]f a person is angry at an individual, alcohol will 18 Dr. Wong testified that the table was constructed by Dr. Kurt Dubowski, a “world expert on alcohol.” 27  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  supplement and will fuel that anger to a higher level, in some cases rage, uncontrollable rage. After the defense rested,19 DeLeon moved for judgment of acquittal, which the circuit court denied. 5. Jury instruction on self-defense The circuit court provided the jury an instruction modeled after HAWJIC 7.01 with regard to self-defense. The instruction provided the following: Justifiable use of force, commonly known as self-defense, is a defense to the charge of Attempted Murder in the First Degree in Count I and Murder in the Second Degree in Count II and the included offense in Count II of Manslaughter. The burden is on the Prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the force used by the defendant was not justifiable. If the Prosecution does not meet its burden, then you must find the defendant not guilty. The use of force upon or toward another person is justified when a person reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary to protect himself on the present occasion against the use of unlawful force by the other person. The reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use of such protective force was immediately necessary shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the circumstances of which the defendant was aware or as the defendant reasonably believed them to be. The use of deadly force upon or toward another person is justified when a person using such force reasonably believes that deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself on the present occasion against death or serious bodily injury. The reasonableness of the defendant’s belief that the use of such protective force was immediately necessary shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant’s position under the circumstances of which the defendant was aware or as 19 DeLeon chose not to testify. Additional witnesses testified for the defense; however, their testimony is not relevant to the issues before this court. 28  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  the defendant reasonably believed them to be. The use of deadly force is not justifiable if the defendant, with the intent of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter or if the defendant knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating. “Force” means any bodily impact, restraint, or confinement or the threat thereof. “Unlawful force” means force which is used without the consent of the person against whom it is directed and the use of which would constitute an unjustifiable use of force or deadly force. “Deadly force” means force which the actor uses with the intent of causing, or which he knows to create a substantial risk of causing, death or serious bodily injury. Intentionally firing a firearm in the direction of another person or in the direction which the person is believed to be constitutes deadly force. A threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the production of a weapon or otherwise, so long as the actor’s intent is limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute deadly force. “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ. If and only if you find that the defendant was reckless in having a belief that he was justified in using self-protective force against another person, or that the defendant was reckless in acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief which was material to the justifiability of his use of force against the other person, then the use of such self-protective force is unavailable as a defense to the offense of Manslaughter. The defense did not object to the court’s self-defense instruction. 6. Closing arguments In its closing argument, the State described DeLeon as a person with various VIP cards to bars and nightclubs and “who thinks he’s somebody, he’s a baller, he’s a VIP.” The DPA stated 29  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  that that image was “crushed” on the night of the incident at Bar Seven, when Beaudoin slapped him, and DeLeon was told to “get the hell out of here[,]” leaving DeLeon to “do the walk of shame in front of all these guys[.]” The DPA stated that DeLeon, humiliated, “waited to see which car they got into, he waited to see where they would go, and he waited for his opportunity.” The DPA stated that DeLeon arrived at Seoul Karaoke two minutes after Powell’s group walked into Seoul Karaoke – “one hour, seven minutes, and 55 seconds after the slap.” The DPA stated that DeLeon waited “in the dark, and watch[ed] as [Powell] and his friends walk from Seoul directly to the Navigator[.]” DeLeon then “shout[ed] out to them, You wanna mess with me? You wanna hit me? What’s up now? He’s trying to, and he does, get the attention of [Powell] and his friends.” The DPA described what occurred next as follows: So at 04:09:07 A.M. you see [Powell] turn and walk towards that shouting. They walk towards him, . . . listening to this shouting and screaming, wondering what’s going on, when they finally realize, when they get closer, Oh, it’s the guy from [Bar Seven]. So [Beaudoin] tells him, Nah, let’s just go. But [Powell] tells him, No, brah, everything’s cool. He has his hands up. Everything’s cool. It doesn’t stop the defendant. First three shots. . . . Meanwhile, [Powell] is still there, hands up, I surrender; It’s okay; Everything’s cool. He doesn’t kick him; he doesn’t punch him; he doesn’t slap him; he doesn’t choke him; he doesn’t lunge at him; he doesn’t threaten him. But it doesn’t matter. Shot four, less than three feet away, Defendant points, aims, and shoots. [Powell] crumbles. And at this point, he doesn’t lower the gun to shoot to his leg; he doesn’t raise the gun to shoot to his shoulder or his foot. Straight to the heart. 30  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  The DPA also argued that self-defense did not apply to DeLeon: You cannot create your own thing, walk up to it, and then claim self-defense. He calls them over. He says, Come over here; Look what I gotta show you. Shawn walks up with his hands. When he realizes who it is, Everything’s cool, brah. You know, nothing. I’m in surrender, palms face up. He doesn’t hit him; he doesn’t punch him; he doesn’t kick him; he doesn’t threaten him. In his closing argument, defense counsel stated that DeLeon did not want to shoot anyone but ended up shooting Powell in self-defense. Defense counsel questioned the State’s theory that DeLeon was seeking revenge, noting that DeLeon did not shoot Beaudoin, who slapped him at Bar Seven, but shot Powell, “the guy that was on him, that walked across and ignored the warning shots, ignored his friend who tried to grab him, and he was on him.” [T]here’s a gun at [DeLeon’s] side, and they start coming. They’re screaming and yelling. And then there’s finally, when he’s five feet away, a gunshot in the air. [Powell’s] friends are trying to pull him off. He’s less than a foot away. His hands, I suggest, are out and he shot once. Was there a reasonable belief that he was going to sustain serious bodily injury? Is there anyone that can possibly imagine some crazy guy, drunk, coming at you and you firing a warning shot? If he wants to shoot somebody, what's he firing warning shots about? Why does he then shoot in the ground to keep the other guys back? He wants to kill somebody? He thought about it? How could anyone right-thinking not believe that he has a reasonable belief he’s going to suffer serious bodily injury when the guy is now on him after he’s fired a warning shot? And you’ll see [DeLeon] steps out of the screen. He steps back. But [Powell is] on him. And he doesn’t listen to Beaudoin, who’s grabbing his shoulder. Defense counsel described Powell as “one mean guy when 31  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  he got drunk,” and called Powell’s group a “mob looking for trouble, going after a guy with a gun, who’s firing a warning shot.” Defense counsel stated that on the night of the shooting, Powell and his friends were “drunk out of their minds” after engaging in “eight hours of drinking alcohol.” Defense counsel noted that Powell’s extrapolated blood alcohol level was 0.181 and that “Dr. Wong said the presumption of intoxication is 0.82, [sic] which is twice the amount, which fits into every category almost of the Dubowski table.” Defense counsel further discussed Dr. Wong’s testimony regarding the effects of alcohol on Powell: [W]e have increased self-confidence, decreased inhibitions, diminished judgment and control, emotional instability, critical judgment, Superman. Bullets don’t hurt you. Critical judgment, impairment of perception. . . . This guy . . . has lost his critical judgment and it increases his rage. To suggest to you folks he just walked across the parking lot -- and you’ll see it -- just to say, Braddah, everything is cool, my hands are up, you see, I surrender -- who are the other two people that were screaming and swearing in that parking lot? Braddah, it’s so cool. How come Beaudoin had to try to grab him by the shoulder and couldn’t do it? G. Verdict, Judgment, and Sentence On October 1, 2010, the jury found DeLeon guilty of Murder in the Second Degree as to Powell (Count II), Carrying or Use of a Firearm While Engaged in the Commission of a Separate Felony (Counts IV and V), Place to Keep a Pistol or Revolver (Count VI), Reckless Endangering in the First Degree (Count VII), and Ownership or Possession Prohibited of Any Firearm or 32  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Ammunition by a Person Convicted of Specified Crimes (Count VIII). The jury found DeLeon not guilty of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree as to Gamboa (Count III), but found him guilty of the included offense of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree. The jury acquitted DeLeon of Attempted Murder in the First Degree regarding Powell and Gamboa (Count I). At sentencing, the circuit court granted the State’s oral motion to dismiss without prejudice Count VI, which merged with Count VIII. DeLeon was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of life with the possibility of parole (Count II), five years (Count III), twenty years (Count IV), twenty years (Count V), five years (Count VII), and ten years (Count VIII). DeLeon was also sentenced to mandatory minimum terms of twenty years for Count II and five years for Count III, and was ordered to pay $4,000 in restitution to the Crime Victim Compensation Commission. DeLeon timely filed a notice of appeal.
In his opening brief, DeLeon raised four points of error. Specifically, DeLeon asserted that (1) defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to establish Powell’s recent cocaine ingestion before the incident, (2) the circuit court’s self-defense instruction failed to properly instruct the jury on the law of self-defense, (3) the 33  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  circuit court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED) manslaughter, and (4) the circuit court wrongly convicted and sentenced him as to Count V (Carrying or Use of Firearm in the Commission of a Separate Felony) because the jury convicted him in Count III of reckless endangerment, an excluded offense.20 In its January 18, 2013 Summary Disposition Order, the ICA agreed that DeLeon’s conviction as to Count V was improper because his reckless endangerment conviction did not constitute a “separate felony,” and accordingly reversed the Count V conviction. The ICA affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all other respects. Relevant to the issues before this court, the ICA rejected DeLeon’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument, and concluded that the circuit court properly instructed the jury on self-defense. The ICA filed its judgment on appeal on February 14, 2013. 20 HRS § 134-21 (Supp. 2009), which governs the offense of Carrying or Use of a Firearm in the Commission of a Separate Felony, provides, in relevant part: (a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly carry on the person or have within the person’s immediate control or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm while engaged in the commission of a separate felony, . . . provided that a person shall not be prosecuted under this subsection when the separate felony is: . . . . (2) The felony offense of reckless endangering in the first degree under [HRS §] 707-713[.] 34  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  DeLeon timely filed his application for a writ of certiorari, in which he raises the following questions:
DeLeon’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to establish [decedent Shawn] Powell’s cocaine ingestion (in addition to his alcohol intoxication) which substantially impaired DeLeon’s defense of self-defense.
DeLeon’s claim that the self-defense instruction based on HAWJIC 7.01, which omitted the language of HRS § 703-304(3), failed to completely and properly instruct the jury on the law of self- defense. The State filed a response on April 22, 2013.21