Opinion ID: 1598165
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the doctrine of unclean hands

Text: The doctrine of unclean hands, while applicable to a defendant seeking affirmative relief (Malone v. State ex rel. Gallion, 285 Ala. 493, 234 So.2d 32 (1970)), had no field of operation under the pleadings and proof here presented for two reasons: First, it is the Chamberlain group who seek to invoke the maxim and it is they who seek the relief of equity to cancel the contract with Sterling and reap its full benefits. Sterling's pleading, styled a Cross Bill, is but an answer, praying for a finding of validity of the agreementthe same relief to which it would have been entitled, if any, under an answer to the original bill and Chamberlain's cross bill. Second, the doctrine of unclean hands cannot be applied in the context of nebulous speculation or vague generalities; but rather it finds expression in specific acts of willful misconduct which is morally reprehensible as to known facts. Weaver v. Pool, 249 Ala. 644, 32 So.2d 765 (1947). This is not to say that it was incumbent upon the trial court to specify the particular conduct, but its finding must be based upon competent evidence of specific acts or course of conduct reproved by the doctrine. The only claim of unclean hands, which finds any competent evidentiary support, is contained in the context of appellees' contention of fraud in the form of economic duress. As we have already observed, the economic duress principle is at best of doubtful application; but, again, assuming the strongest possible presumptions in favor of appellees' contention, we, nevertheless, are committed to the proposition that the unclean hands doctrine will not be applied contrary to the rules of equity jurisprudence. Weaver v. Pool, supra. In other words, the operative legal incidents of the principle of economic duress, including ratification and acquiescence, cannot be curtainedand thereby rendered inoperativesimply by calling such species of fraud by another nameunclean hands. When these rules are applied to the case at bar, to hold otherwise would be to effectively eliminate the principle of ratification in the name of unclean hands, where the facts disclose that the contract cannot be invalidated on the ground of fraud due to its ratification as a matter of law.