Opinion ID: 1354475
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidence of Murders Occurring After the Instant Homicides for Which Gallego Had Been Previously Convicted

Text: Gallego objected to the admission of two murder convictions occurring in Contra Costa County Superior Court of California in 1983 as an aggravating circumstance under NRS 200.033(2). Since the two murders involved in the California judgment were committed subsequent to the murders in the instant case, Gallego contends the former killings do not qualify as an aggravating circumstance under the statute. This issue is one of first impression in the State of Nevada. NRS 200.033(2) provides as follows: The only circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated are: ... . 2. The murder was committed by a person who was previously convicted of another murder or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another. Gallego argues that the statute simply provides that a person who is convicted of murder and thereafter commits another murder will have the second offense aggravated by the first. Thus, Gallego concludes that since the June 1983 California convictions did not precede the 1980 killings of Redican and Twiggs, the admission of the former offenses as a statutory aggravating circumstance was error. Gallego is wrong. Aggravating circumstances, as defined by the statute, provide direction to the sentencing authority as it considers an appropriate punishment for the defendant. The statute was never intended to operate on the vagaries of conviction sequences. Instead, the focal point is the time of sentencing. The sentencing panel is entitled to consider all relevant aspects of the defendant's criminal background prior to rendering sentence. The fact that Gallego murdered two victims after killing the two victims in the instant case is not relevant to the dictates of the statute. The clear language of the statute required only that Gallego stood convicted of the California murders at the time of the introduction of that evidence in the penalty phase of the present proceeding. It would be both absurd and counterproductive for this Court to construe the plain language of the statute so as to exclude convictions of murders or crimes of violence occurring after the primary offense but prior to the penalty phase of a defendant's trial. This we refuse to do. The trial court did not err. E.