Opinion ID: 145521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: The District Court Correctly Applied the Sentencing Guidelines

Text: We review the district court's interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Rivera-Rivera, 555 F.3d 277, 292 (1st Cir.2009). Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) are sentenced under § 2K1.4. That section specifically instructs that [i]f death resulted, or the offense was intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, apply the most analogous guideline from Chapter Two, Part A. U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(c)(1). Guzman argues that the district court erred in finding that the analogous provision from Chapter Two was the provision for first degree murder, § 2A1.1, because Guzman did not premeditate or intend to kill the two victims, and so he should have been sentenced under the provision for second degree murder, § 2A1.2. In the alternative, he argues that the cross reference in § 2K1.4(c) is ambiguous and, under the rule of lenity, he should be sentenced under the second degree murder provision. There was no error. The analogous provision, as required by § 2K1.4(c), is clearly § 2A1.1, under both the text of the Guideline and our precedent. Section 2A1.1 covers sentencing for first-degree murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. That provision includes deaths caused by arson in its definition of first degree murder. Moreover, the commentary for § 2A1.1 explains that it applies not only in cases of premeditated killing, but also when death results from the commission of certain felonies. U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, cmt. n. 1; see also United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 674 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Serrano-Osorio, 191 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir.1999). Other circuits agree that § 2A1.1 is the appropriate provision when arson results in death. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 130-31 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. El-Zoubi, 993 F.2d 442, 449 (5th Cir.1993). Guzman also argues that even if he was properly sentenced under § 2A1.1, the district court should have considered a downward departure because the deaths were not caused knowingly or intentionally. See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1, cmt. n. 2(b). We adhere to a general rule that a sentencing court's discretionary refusal to depart is unreviewable. United States v. Sanchez, 354 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir.2004). Guzman claims to be within an exception to this rule, arguing that the district court erroneously believed it lacked authority to downwardly depart, see id., as shown by its statement that Guzman was chargeable with having intended the predictable consequences of his actions. This was not a statement the court believed it lacked authority. Further, sentencing courts are under no obligation to make specific findings when denying departure requests. Id. (emphasis in original). We reject Guzman's contention that the district court's factfinding to determine § 2A1.1 to be the proper guideline violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). A sentencing court may make factual findings that result in an increase to a defendant's sentence as long as the sentence imposed is within the default statutory maximum. United States v. Vasco, 564 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir.2009). Here, the jury convicted Guzman of arson resulting in death, and 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) states that the maximum sentence under such circumstances may be life imprisonment or the death penalty. This claim clearly fails.