Opinion ID: 2633469
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The prosecution's contentions

Text: The prosecution argues that the requirements of the due process clause of article 1, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution are fulfilled when an indictment `contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he or she must be prepared to meet' (quoting State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 379-80, 894 P.2d 70, 76-77 (1995) (brackets omitted)) and that, if the indictment tracks the language of the statute alleged to have been violated, the indictment is sufficient (citing State v. Silva, 67 Haw. 581, 585, 698 P.2d 293, 296 (1985); State v. Treat, 67 Haw. 119, 680 P.2d 250 (1984); State v. Robins, 66 Haw. 312, 660 P.2d 39 (1983)). The prosecution also asserts that the HPC does not require it to allege limitation-tolling facts in the indictment. The prosecution argues that if, pursuant to HRS § 806-29 (1993), [18] it is not required to aver facts as to exceptions or excuses contained within a statute describing an offense, a fortiori it need not aver facts as to non-elements of the offense contained in separate statutes. Rather, the prosecution insists, `limitations are imposed by independent statute.... [T]hey are matters of defense, and avoidance need not be alleged in the indictment.' (Quoting People v. Kohut, 30 N.Y.2d 183, 331 N.Y.S.2d 416, 282 N.E.2d 312, 315 (1972).) Statutes of limitation are not fundamental rights, the prosecution urges, nor are they jurisdictional, but they may be waived by a defendant, reflecting their status as defenses rather than fundamental elements of an offense. (Citing State v. Timoteo, 87 Hawai'i 108, 113-14, 952 P.2d 865, 870-71 (1997).) The prosecution insists that it met the requirements of HRS § 806-34 (1993) [19] simply by setting forth the charge with sufficient detail as to time, place, and circumstances so as to give the accused reasonable notice of the facts.