Opinion ID: 1374541
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions to Disregard Pity; Failure to Instruct Jury to Consider All Mitigating Character Evidence

Text: (25) Appellant contends he is entitled to reversal of the penalty verdict on the ground that the jury was instructed to ignore sympathy at the penalty phase of the trial. He also urges that he was prejudiced by a failure to instruct the jury that it should consider all evidence he offered in mitigation of penalty, even if unrelated to the capital crime. The penalty phase instructions as such did not refer to sympathy or pity. But those instructions included the following statements at the outset: The instructions previously given on witness credibility and on assessing the evidence will not be repeated at this time. However, you are to apply the same considerations in assessing the evidence and the credibility of witnesses who testified in the penalty phase as you applied to the witnesses who testified and the evidence in the guilt phase. At the guilt phase, the trial court had given most of CALJIC No. 1.00, including the paragraph that begins, As jurors you must not be influenced by pity for a defendant or by prejudice against him, and goes on to warn against bias against a defendant because of his arrest or trial. The court did not, however, give the final paragraph of CALJIC No. 1.00, which begins, You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Under this court's decisions, an instruction at the penalty phase not to be influenced by pity or sympathy is erroneous and is generally ground for reversal of a verdict imposing the death penalty. ( Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 537-538; People v. Lanphear (1984) 36 Cal.3d 163, 168-169 [203 Cal. Rptr. 122, 680 P.2d 1081]; Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 875.) This is particularly so where defendant has introduced at the penalty phase sympathetic character and background evidence which is constitutionally relevant to the sentence determination. While the obvious purpose of such evidence is to evoke sympathy and compassion, and thus to mitigate the penalty, the jury has expressly been told not to consider it on that basis. In such a case, we cannot say with confidence that the jury properly resolved the ambiguity; there is a substantial likelihood that the jury felt compelled to reject an important element of the penalty defense. Thus, the error is a substantial one requiring reversal. ( Lanphear, supra ; see also Robertson, supra . ) [20] The situation is otherwise when, as here, the no-sympathy instruction occurs only at the guilt phase. The potential for confusion, while it exists theoretically, is more attenuated. We must therefore examine the record as a whole to determine whether an abstract possibility of prejudice may actually have been realized. (Cf., Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 542-545, fn. 17.) In this case, we are persuaded that the evidence heard by the jury at the penalty phase, coupled with the prosecutor's ensuing argument, sufficiently conveyed to them the propriety of considering the sympathy factor in deciding on the penalty. The prosecution presented no new evidence at the penalty phase. The defense evidence at that phase consisted principally of testimony by members of defendant's family and close associates describing constructive aspects of his background, expressing regard for him, and asking that his life be spared. In the argument that followed, the prosecutor discussed seriatim the factors to be considered in fixing the penalty, set out in section 190.3. When he reached factor (k) ([a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime), he called that factor the catch-all which allowed the evidence that was presented to you by the defense in mitigation. He went on: Anything else that suggests that the lesser of the two penalties is appropriate, it is here that you have a duty to consider ... the tragic pleas of [appellant's] family to spare his life.... [To the] list of [appellant's] victims must be added his mother, his sister, his cousins, his whole family.... Our sympathy goes out to that family. [21] We conclude that under these circumstances, there is no reasonable possibility that the penalty phase instruction to apply the same considerations by which evidence and credibility were assessed at the guilt phase, coupled with the prior guilt phase admonition not to be influenced by pity, affected the penalty verdict. Accordingly, these instructions are not grounds for reversal. Nor was appellant prejudiced by the failure to instruct the jury that it should consider, under factor (k), all evidence appellant offered in mitigation of penalty, whether or not related to the capital crime itself. (See Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604-605 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) In Easley, supra, we announced a prospective requirement that such an expanded factor (k) instruction be given. (34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10.) In People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861], we ruled that omission of such an instruction in a pre- Easley trial was grounds for reversal if prejudicial. (Pp. 282-286.) Under Davenport, the assessment of prejudice encompasses the totality of the penalty instructions given and the nature of the arguments made to the jury, in order to determine whether there is a reasonable possibility the penalty verdict was affected by the instructional deficiency. (Pp. 286, 287; see also Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 545, fn. 17.) Here, as in Davenport, no other instructions given the jury either aggravated or mitigated the misleading effect of the factor (k) instruction. In contrast with Davenport, however, the prosecutor in this case took pains to advise the jury of its true responsibility. He declared in no uncertain terms that factor (k) was a catch-all which imposed a duty on the jury to consider [a]nything else that suggests ... the lesser of the two penalties, including the pleas by appellant's family for his life. We see no reasonable possibility that the jury was misled about the factors relevant to its penalty determination.