Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Issues Raised by Defendant Thomas

Text: Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred by failing to grant a motion for a directed verdict and judgment of acquittal following the conclusion of the State's proof and at the end of the trial. The duty of the trial judge and the reviewing court on the determination of a motion for a judgment of acquittal is the same as on a motion for a directed verdict. See State v. Torrey, 880 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). This Court has observed that [t]he standard by which the trial court determines a motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of all the proof is, in essence, the same standard which applies on appeal in determining the sufficiency of the evidence after a conviction. State v. Thompson, 88 S.W.3d 611, 614-15 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000). Moreover, [a] motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the conclusion of the proof by the state is waived when the defendant elects to present evidence on his own behalf. State v. Ball, 973 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tenn.Crim.App.1998). Accordingly, we will address the Defendant's complaints as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State the strongest legitimate view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom. State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn.1982). Questions concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, as well as all factual issues raised by the evidence, are resolved by the trier of fact, not this court. See State v. Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788, 795 (Tenn.2000). Moreover, we note that a guilty verdict can be based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence. See State v. Pendergrass, 13 S.W.3d 389, 392-93 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999). Furthermore, while a guilty verdict may result from purely circumstantial evidence, in order to sustain the conviction the facts and circumstances of the offense must be so strong and cogent as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the defendant, and that beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Crawford, 225 Tenn. 478, 470 S.W.2d 610, 612 (1971). To obtain a conviction for first degree felony murder, the State must prove the killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect or aircraft piracy [.] Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a) (1997). In this case, the proof at trial established that the victim, James Day, was shot in the back of the head during the commission of a robbery. The proof further established that the injuries sustained by the victim as a direct result of the gunshot wound ultimately led to the victim's death. Therefore, the crime of first degree felony murder was established. Defendant Thomas' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is three-fold. He asserts that (1) Angela Jackson's testimony establishing the identity of Defendant Thomas as the perpetrator is not reliable; (2) the discrepancy in the testimony of the State's medical experts as to the source of bacteria which eventually caused the death of the victim creates a reasonable doubt as to the causation of the victim's death; and (3) witness Richard Fisher identified Bond and then Thomas as the passenger in the getaway vehicle. We will address the first and third of these assertions together, and then turn to Defendant Thomas' contention regarding causation.
Identification of a defendant as the person who committed the offense for which he or she is on trial is a question of fact for the jury's determination upon consideration of all competent proof. See State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993). This Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record, as well as all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. See State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn.1992). Because a verdict of guilt against a defendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. See id. Defendant Bond admitted that he and another person took part in the robbery of the Loomis Fargo truck and that James Day was shot during the robbery. It is undisputed that a car, matching the description of a vehicle belonging to Defendant Thomas' ex-wife, Angela Jackson, was seen parked a short distance from the crime scene and that Defendant Thomas and another person were observed getting into the vehicle and driving away. It is undisputed that Defendant Thomas, who was unemployed at the time, purchased a vehicle, jewelry, a shotgun, clothing, and opened a savings account within forty-eight hours of the robbery of the Loomis Fargo carrier. Angela Jackson identified her ex-husband in stills taken from the surveillance tape of the shooting. Ms. Jackson related that, while watching a news report on the robbery, Defendant Thomas remarked that he grabbed the nigger by the throat and shot him. Defendant Thomas points to Ms. Jackson's testimony that he and Defendant Bond returned to her residence between noon and 12:30 p.m. on the day of the robbery. However, the State proved that Mr. Day was robbed and shot between 12:30 and 1:00 p.m. Thus, he argues, the same testimony identifying him as the perpetrator also makes it factually impossible for him to have committed the crime. We are not convinced. Any discrepancy in Ms. Jackson's testimony relating to her report of the time that Defendant Thomas and Defendant Bond arrived at her apartment with the proceeds from the robbery and the actual time of the robbery is not fatal to the identification of Defendant Thomas as the perpetrator. The choice of which witnesses to believe and which to disbelieve is a matter entrusted to the jury. See Bolin v. State, 219 Tenn. 4, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966). Furthermore, the jury is free to believe portions of a witness' testimony and to disbelieve other portions. See Wilson v. State, 574 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tenn.Crim.App.1978). Additionally, Ms. Jackson's testimony as to the events immediately following the robbery were corroborated by other witnesses. Moreover, while it is true that Mr. Fisher initially identified Defendant Bond as the person he observed in the passenger side of the white getaway car, Mr. Fisher, upon request, reexamined both defendants and changed his identification to Defendant Thomas. Defendant Thomas challenged the identification on cross-examination. The jury was present during the identification and then the re-identification. The jury was in the best position to determine the credibility of this witness. Moreover, the identity of the shooter versus the driver is irrelevant, considering the theory of criminal responsibility, for purposes of determining guilt of the offense of felony murder. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402. Irregardless of this identification, there was ample evidence from which any rational trier of fact could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant Thomas was guilty of first degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of a robbery. This issue has no merit.
Defendant Thomas claims that discrepancies between the testimony of Drs. Smith and Gardner mandate a reversal of his conviction for felony murder. Both Drs. Smith and Gardner concluded that the victim died from sepsis due to a rupture of the bladder resulting from a gunshot wound to the head. The alleged discrepancy in their testimony arises in their disparate opinions as to how the bacteria that resulted in sepsis was introduced to the victim's body. Dr. O.C. Smith testified that he had no opinion as to where the bacteria came from and that there were several potential sources for the bacteria. Dr. Smith surmised that the bacteria leading to the infection could have existed prior to the rupture of the bladder, could have been a result of the catheterization, or could have been the result of an infection of the urinary tract near the skin opening. However, Dr. Smith concluded that the neurogenic bladder and ... the fact that he has problems with bladder control ... combined with the requirement for catheterization ... predispose[d] [the victim] ... to have a high risk of colonization and an increased risk of infection. Dr. Cynthia Gardner, Dr. Smith's assistant, testified that [i]t probably was  I would say with ninety-nine percent certainty, the bacteria was introduced into the bladder through catheterization. Defendant Thomas contends that this discrepancy raises sufficient doubt as to the cause of death of the victim. We disagree. Both doctors testified as to the injuries sustained by the victim when he was shot and the impact of the injuries upon the victim during the intervening period until his death. Any alleged conflict as to the source of the bacteria is insignificant. From the testimony of both medical examiners, it appears to this Court that the infection would not have occurred but for the victim's medical condition directly caused by the shooting of the victim on April 21, 1997. That is, the uncontradicted medical testimony established that the victim eventually died as a result of the gunshot wound inflicted during the robbery. Accordingly, the evidence of causation is sufficient to support the verdict of guilt and this issue is without merit.

Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury that it must presume that a life sentence would be served or that the death penalty would be carried out. He argues that absent such an instruction there is a substantial probability that jurors would improperly speculate on the consequences of their verdict. This is not a novel issue. Our supreme court has held that the after-effect of a verdict is not a proper consideration for the jury. See State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tenn.1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The court has ruled that it is not error for a trial court to refuse to charge the jury with the very instruction requested by Defendant Thomas. See, e.g., State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 543 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 979, 114 S.Ct. 475, 126 L.Ed.2d 426 (1993); Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 21. Accordingly, Defendant Thomas is entitled to no relief on this ground.
Defendant Thomas next contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. We disagree. The trial court does not have any discretion to grant a motion for separate juries for the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. See State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458 app. at 478 n. 1 (Tenn.), cert. den. 537 U.S. 1090, 123 S.Ct. 695, 154 L.Ed.2d 635 (2002). Indeed, Tennessee law specifically requires that following a conviction for first degree murder, a sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that determined guilt. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(a). Moreover, our supreme court has previously rejected this argument. See Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d app. at 478-79; State v. Harbison, 704 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct. 2261, 90 L.Ed.2d 705 (1986) (rejecting the argument that a defendant is denied a fair trial by the systematic exclusion of jurors who are against the death penalty); see also State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 app. at 717 (Tenn.1997) (rejecting the argument that the manner of selecting death qualified jurors results in juries that are prone to conviction). Defendant Thomas also contends that a criminal defendant's constitutional rights are violated by excusing prospective jurors for cause when their personal beliefs concerning the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their performance as a juror in accordance with their instructions and their oath. This issue, similarly, has been decided adversely to the Defendant. See Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d app. at 479 n. 2; State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tenn.1994), cert. den. 516 U.S. 846, 116 S.Ct. 137, 133 L.Ed.2d 84 (1995), (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Accordingly, Defendant Thomas is entitled to no relief on these grounds.
Defendant Thomas asserts that Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c), which allows the introduction at sentencing of victim impact evidence, violates the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This identical argument is raised by Defendant Thomas in his general challenge to the constitutionality of the Tennessee death penalty statutes. We reject this claim. See infra Section XVII (J).
Defendant Thomas moved the trial court to dismiss the indictment based upon the common law year-and-a-day rule because the victim's death occurred more than one year and one day after the crime was committed. The common law rule no longer applies in Tennessee. See State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393, 401 (Tenn.1999). This claim is without merit.
Defendant Thomas filed a motion for a jury questionnaire specifically including death penalty questions. The trial court permitted a jury questionnaire to be used but declined to include death penalty questions. Defendant Thomas claims that, in so doing, the trial court erred. The trial court committed no error in denying Defendant Thomas' request. A trial court is vested with great discretion in determining how voir dire examination will be conducted, and the court's decision on how extensive a voir dire examination is required will not be overturned except for an abuse of the discretion. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 247 (Tenn.1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339, 127 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994); State v. Harris, 839 S.W.2d 54, 65 (Tenn.1992), cert. den. 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993). We find no abuse of discretion in the method of voir dire employed in this case.
Defendant Thomas asserts that his trial in state court violates the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article 1 section 10 of the Tennessee Constitution, and Article 14 section 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because the Defendant's federal charges arise from the same criminal event. It is a well-established principle that a federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of the same person for the same acts, and a state prosecution does not bar a federal one ... [P]rosecutions under the laws of separate sovereigns do not, in the language of the Fifth Amendment, `subject [the defendant] for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy.' United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 317, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1082-83, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). Defendant Thomas argues, however, that the dual sovereignty doctrine is violative of the Tennessee constitution and argues for its abrogation. However, our supreme court has specifically upheld and determined to adhere to this doctrine of dual sovereignty, reasoning as follows: There is no question but that such a procedure does not subject the defendant to double jeopardy insofar as the guaranty of due process in the 14th amendment of the federal constitution is concerned. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959). While the rationale of this case  that the state and federal governments are distinct sovereignties, and thus the punishment of a single act by ach is not double jeopardy  has been criticized, a similar approach has provided the basis for a more recent case, which would imply that Bartkus' analysis of the issue is still valid. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). This court is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court concerning the proper interpretation of the federal constitution. Townsend v. Clover Bottom Hospital and School, 560 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn.1978). The double jeopardy provision of the Tennessee constitution, Article I, § 10, affords the defendant no greater protection. In the past, this provision has been interpreted to permit successive state and federal prosecutions on the basis of the same dual sovereignties analysis employed in Bartkus, supra, and, given the need for stability in constitutional interpretation, we see insufficient cause to depart from that precedent now. Lavon v. State, 586 S.W.2d 112, 113-14 (Tenn.1979). The Lavon court further explained that any modification or abandonment of the dual sovereignty doctrine must be accomplished through legislative action. See id. at 115. Such legislative action has yet to take place; thus, the doctrine of dual sovereignty remains in effect. Additionally, Defendant Thomas asserts that the State's prosecution violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which is an international treaty of governing nations. This Court addressed and rejected this identical claim in State v. Carpenter, 69 S.W.3d 568, 578-579 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001), cert. den. 535 U.S. 995, 122 S.Ct. 1557, 152 L.Ed.2d 480 (2002). Defendant Thomas has not convinced this Court to sway from this decision. This claim is without merit.
On September 12, 2001, the trial court continued the trial in this matter until September 17, 2001. Defendant Thomas maintains that the trial court erred by failing to continue the matter for a longer period of time following the events of September 11, 2001. The granting of a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. See State v. Russell, 10 S.W.3d 270, 275 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999). We will reverse the denial of a continuance only if the trial court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced by the denial. See id. An abuse of discretion is demonstrated by showing that the failure to grant a continuance denied defendant a fair trial or that it could be reasonably concluded that a different result would have followed had the continuance been granted. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn.1995). In the present case, the trial court's denial of a continuance was not error. The trial was scheduled to begin on September 10, 2001. On September 10, 2001, eleven jurors were tentatively selected and the matter continued to September 11 for a second day of jury selection. Although not evidenced by the record, September 11, 2001, is the date of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. On September 11, 2001, eighteen jurors were tentatively selected. At some point on that day, defense counsel moved for a continuance. The trial court continued the trial until September 17. While the events of September 11, 2001, were of unquestionable national importance, Defendant Thomas fails to explain how those events affected his trial. Nothing in the record before us indicates that those events had any effect on the proceedings other than to delay them for one week. Thus, Defendant Thomas has failed to show how he was prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance for a longer period of time. We find neither error nor abuse of discretion. This issue is without merit.

Defendant Thomas submits that it was error for the trial court to permit introduction of a photograph of the victim while alive. At trial, defense counsel objected to introduction of the photograph. The photograph was taken after the April 1997 shooting but prior to the victim's death in October 1999. The trial court overruled the objection stating: I think it's, first of all, relevant in that the state, of course, has the burden of proving that an individual  a living, breathing, human being was killed in these events. And the photograph, itself, is again, a very neutral one. It's black and white. It doesn't have family members around. He's not in a choir robe or a scout uniform or military uniform or anything of that sort. This is a very neutral sort of photograph  no wheelchair  nothing that would be designed to elicit sympathy.... I'll allow it to be used. During the guilt phase of the trial, the photograph of the victim was introduced through the testimony of Betty Gay, an employee of Walgreens. On appeal, Defendant Thomas contends that admission of an 8 by 10 black and white photograph of the victim taken during his lifetime was introduced for the sole purpose of invoking the sympathy of the jury and was error. The State responds that the photograph was relevant to rebut Defendant Thomas' defense that it was Mr. Day's physical health, including obesity, that caused his death, rather than the gunshot. The admission of photographs is generally discretionary with the trial court and absent an abuse of that discretion, will not result in the grant of a new trial. See State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn.1978). In State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872 at app. 901-02 & n. 2 (Tenn.1998), cert. den. 526 U.S. 1052, 119 S.Ct. 1359, 143 L.Ed.2d 520 (1999), a capital case involving almost the identical issue, our supreme court adopted this Court's conclusion that, although the requirement of a reasonable creature in being has been removed from the current criminal code, admission of a family portrait of the victim was not error because it was relevant to establish the corpus delicti, including the identity of the person alleged to have been killed. In Bolden v. State, 140 Tenn. 118, 120, 203 S.W. 755 (Tenn.1918), our supreme court held that the evidence necessary to establish the corpus delicti in cases of homicide must show that the life of a human being has been taken, which question involves the subordinate inquiry as to the identity of the person charged to have been killed.... (emphasis added). Thus, the photograph was relevant and we find no reversible error in its admission during the guilt phase of the trial.
During the re-direct examination of Faye Day, the victim's widow, the State introduced two post-mortem photographs depicting the victim's face and back respectively. The State asserted that the photographs were relevant in light of Mrs. Day's testimony describing how her husband blew up shortly before his death and in light of questions by defense counsel regarding the victim's obesity. The trial court, reflecting upon Mrs. Day's testimony, permitted introduction of the photographs, finding: I think in light of her testimony regarding his condition those last couple of days, I think they're relevant at this point  the probative value clearly outweighs whatever prejudicial effect there would be. There's nothing graphic or bloody[.] Defendant Thomas now contends that admission of these photographs was error. Without reference to the specific photographs complained of and without argument to those photographs actually introduced, Defendant Thomas complains that the gruesome photographs of the victim violates the Defendant's rights under the federal and state constitutions.... The State properly argues that Defendant Thomas has waived this issue for failure to offer citation to the record. See Tenn. Ct.Crim.App. R. 10(b). Notwithstanding procedural waiver of this issue for noncompliance with the Rules of this Court, we elect to address the issue on its merits. As previously stated, Tennessee courts have liberally allowed the admission of photographs in both civil and criminal cases. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. Accordingly, the admissibility of photographs lies within the discretion of the trial court whose ruling will not be overturned on appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. See id.; see also State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 602 (Tenn.1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 837, 121 S.Ct. 98, 148 L.Ed.2d 57 (2000). However, a photograph must be relevant to an issue that the jury must decide before it may be admitted into evidence. See State v. Vann, 976 S.W.2d 93, 102 (Tenn.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1071, 119 S.Ct. 1467, 143 L.Ed.2d 551 (1999); State v. Braden, 867 S.W.2d 750, 758 (Tenn.Crim.App.1993); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Photographs of a corpse are admissible in murder prosecutions if they are relevant to the issues at trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and horrifying character. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-51. Notwithstanding this broad interpretation of admissibility, evidence that is not relevant to prove some part of the prosecution's case should not be admitted solely to inflame the jury and prejudice the defendant. See id. Additionally, the probative value of the photograph must outweigh any unfair prejudicial effect that it may have upon the trier of fact. See Vann, 976 S.W.2d at 102-03; see also Tenn. R. Evid. 403 (Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]). In this respect, we note that photographs of a murder victim are prejudicial by their very nature. However, prejudicial evidence is not per se excluded; indeed, if this were true, all evidence of a crime would be excluded at trial. Rather, what is excluded is evidence which is unfairly prejudicial, in other words, evidence which has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, frequently, though not necessarily, an emotional one. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951. The Defendant asserts that post-mortem photographs of the victim should not have been admitted because they were especially gruesome and inflammatory. The purpose for introducing photographs into evidence is to assist the trier of fact. As a general rule, the introduction of photographs helps the trier of fact see for itself what is depicted in the photograph. State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 594 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997). The trial court ultimately determined that the photographs were relevant to support Mrs. Day's testimony regarding the victim's condition during the last days of his life. Dr. Gardner, likewise, used the photographs during her testimony to illustrate that the victim suffered from extensive fluid retention at the time of his death. The photographs further refuted the theory of the defense that the victim's death was the result of his obesity. We conclude that the photographs were relevant to supplement the testimony of the victim's wife and the medical examiner. Although the photographs are not particularly pleasant to view, neither are they particularly gruesome. We find that the probative value of the photographs is not outweighed by their prejudicial effect and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing their admission. See Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this issue.
Defendant Thomas raises several claims of error arising from the admission of evidence that was also used in his prior federal trial. First, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erred in overruling his objection concerning the exhibit stickers placed on exhibits used in Defendant Thomas' prior federal trial and further erred by not providing the jury a curative instruction. Next, he asserts as error that the trial court erred by permitting introduction of the video of the crime even though the prosecution had failed to provide a proper foundation or chain of custody for the admission of the videotape. Third, Defendant Thomas contends that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to read a transcript of Mr. Day's previous testimony as Assistant United States Attorney Tony Arvin read the transcript aloud. Next, Defendant Thomas contends that the date of Defendant Bond's guilty plea and the later date of Mr. Day's testimony provided the inference that the federal proceeding went forward against Defendant Thomas without Defendant Bond. Finally, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erred by overruling his objections to Defendant Bond's counsel asking questions regarding Bond's guilty plea in federal court. As argument on these claims, Defendant Thomas makes the general assertion that this evidence was not relevant. The State asserts that Defendant Thomas has waived these claims for failing to make proper argument. See Tenn. Ct.Crim.App. R. 10(b). Additionally, the State contends that Defendant Thomas has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion with respect to the admission of any of this evidence. The State's position is well-taken. Nonetheless, we elect to review the admission of the contested evidence on its merits. Rulings on the admissibility of evidence based on its relevance are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. DuBose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn.1997). [A]n appellate court should find an abuse of discretion when it appears that a trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, or reached a decision which is against logic or reasoning that caused an injustice to the party complaining. State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tenn.1997).
Initially, we note that Defendant Thomas fails to reference the record regarding objections made to the introduction of exhibits that had been previously used during his federal trial. The State, noting this omission, also fails to cite to the objections, if any, made. Despite the reference made at the motion for new trial hearing that this issue was thoroughly addressed at trial, this Court has been unable to locate any objections to these exhibits, although examples of the trial court's curative measures are found. Irregardless, Defendant Thomas claims that the exhibits were prejudicial because they contained exhibit stickers from the previous trial. Numerous exhibits contain stickers indicating that they had previously been exhibits. No other information is provided on the exhibit tags. Assistant United States Attorney Arvin testified that there were proceedings in federal court. With regard to Defendant Thomas, the jury did not know where or how the exhibits were used previously, the name of any other defendant, or the outcome of any hearing. In short, even if any prejudice resulted from the use of these exhibits, such prejudice was slight and did not substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence. See Tenn. R. Evid. 403.
A videotape of the incident was recorded by Walgreens' security camera and was introduced at trial through the testimony of Charles Young. Defendant Thomas objected, asserting lack of foundation and lack of chain of custody. The trial court found: Well, chain of custody is not relevant. It's just like with a photograph; if the witness can state that he's viewed this film, and it accurately reflects what it purports to show the[n] there is no chain of custody problem like there would be if you had drugs or something that you needed to maintain  preserve the integrity of the item. As far as foundation is concerned, [Charles Young] is the assistant manager of the store. He said he was familiar with the cameras and how they were pointed and how they operated, so I'll note your exception. We agree with the trial court. This issue has no merit.
During the State's case-in-chief, Assistant United States Attorney Tony Arvin read to the jury a transcript of Mr. Day's testimony given on November 9th during the federal proceedings. Simultaneously, the jurors were each provided a copy of the transcript to read. Although Defendant Thomas conceded that the reading of Mr. Day's prior testimony was permissible, he objected to the handing of the transcript to the jury. The trial court responded, this is not Mr. Day testifying; it's a bit harder for jurors, I think, to follow because it's some sort of neutral presentation of what is otherwise testimony; and so I think it will aid  in my opinion, it will aid the jury in following what is being read. Thus, the trial court overruled Defendant Thomas' objection. However, the trial court further determined that the jury was not to have a written copy with them in the jury room because that would give undue weight to a written document which is, in essence, testimony  nothing more nothing less. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling on this matter. This issue is without merit.

Defendant Bond pled guilty in federal court on November 4, 1998, to the robbery of James Day. Mr. Day subsequently testified about the robbery on November 9, 1998. At trial, Defendant Thomas was concerned that the evidence of the two dates would lead to the inference that, as of November 9, 1998, the [federal] proceeding went forward against [Defendant] Thomas without [Defendant] Bond. Following argument by defense counsel, the trial court found, So long as you  as long as [it] is indicated to the jury; that up until November the 4, [Bond] was, indeed, a party to the [federal] proceeding. At that time he entered a guilty plea to these events. And so at the time that Mr. Day testified on November the 9th, in light of the fact that [Bond] entered a guilty plea to these very events five days earlier, he was not, at that time, an actual party to the proceedings. With reference to an objection lodged by Defendant Thomas that this ruling gives the indication that they were together in that proceeding and that [Defendant Bond] was able to plead guilty and that [Defendant Thomas] possibly disputed something, the trial court further found: First of all, the fact that the transcript contains references to the jury and even the court, I can only say that we made an effort ... to avoid referring to the previous proceeding as a trial or what the outcome might have been, who the actual parties were, what the sentence might have been that these men received. The references to jury and court in the transcript ... could have been addressed and could have been deleted. The entry of this testimony comes as no surprise to anyone in this courtroom. You all have had, of course, the transcript for years now, and we addressed the issue of the state's desire to enter Mr. Day's testimony.... So there's been time for you all to review and request that those matters  those references be deleted had you felt ... that it was unduly prejudicial to leave them in. I don't think it's as prejudicial for them to have been in because we're still not referring to precisely what the proceedings [were], what the results were, or anything of that sort.... With regard to what [Defendant Bond] is asking to be allowed to ask, it's already in the record at this point.... Mr. Arvin has already testified to the date on which Mr. Bond entered his guilty plea to these events, not to a specific trial that was about to begin.... He's entered a guilty plea ... on the 4th of November ... and that Mr. Day's testimony ... occurred on the 9th of November. ... And so, ... he's asking to ... re-ask what's already in the record and already before the jury ... and I don't know that there is any real prejudice to your client. The trial court then limited the manner in which Defendant Bond could make inquiry as to Defendant Bond's status in the proceeding at the time of Mr. Day's testimony. Again, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling on this matter. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief as to these claims.
Defendant Thomas complains that it was error for the court to refuse to allow Russell Carpenter and William Upchurch to testify that Angela Jackson had told them that she was going to make sure that Defendant Thomas went to jail. The State responds that this allegation is unsupported by the record. A review of the direct examination of Russell Carpenter reveals that counsel for Defendant Thomas questioned Mr. Carpenter as to the status of the Thomas/Jackson relationship. Specifically, the following questions were posed of Mr. Carpenter: Q: Mr. Carpenter, ... Did [Angela Jackson] threaten ... say she was going to pay Andrew Thomas back? A: Yes, sir. Q: Was she angry about their breakup? A: Yes, sir. Q: Did she make a comment that if she couldn't have him, no one else would? A: Yes, sir. Likewise, a review of the testimony of William Upchurch reveals that counsel for Defendant Thomas questioned Mr. Upchurch as to the status of the Thomas/Jackson relationship. Specifically, the following colloquy occurred: Q: Did you ever hear Ms. Jackson make any statements regarding Andrew Thomas? A: Yes. Q: What statements? A: Saying she were gonna pay him back. The only objection noted in the record is the State's objection to the open-ended questions asked by defense counsel to Russell Carpenter, that is, Did you ... have any occasion to talk to Angela Jackson? and What did she say to you? To the latter objection, the trial court stated, I'm going to let you lead if he's going to say the same thing, basically, that others said; that she said she's going to pay him back. But to just ask an open-ended question, What did she say?  we might be here for three hours listening to all sorts of ... things about a relationship that wouldn't be relevant. But with regard to that one narrow and specific comment that rebuts  or is purported to rebut what she testified to, I'll allow you to lead and get right to that. No question was posed by defense counsel regarding Jackson's alleged threats to send Defendant Thomas to jail and the trial court did not limit the same. Any testimony of this nature was only briefly touched on by defense counsel on recross-examination of Angela Jackson. Called in rebuttal, Angela Jackson denied ever threatening to get Andrew Thomas. On recross-examination, defense counsel specifically asked Ms. Jackson regarding threats by Ms. Jackson that she would see that Defendant Thomas went to jail. The record does not support Defendant Thomas' claim that the trial court improperly restricted his attempt to elicit impeachment evidence against Ms. Jackson. This claim is without merit.
After the jury returned its verdicts but prior to the penalty phase, Defendant Thomas alerted the trial court that one of the jurors worked with defense witness Russell Carpenter. The trial judge responded that he [did not] think that the defense witnesses were mentioned during voir dire in terms of asking the jurors whether they knew potential witnesses. ... And so that certainly can't be held against the juror. I mean she didn't refuse to reveal any knowledge of a relationship to any of your witnesses because those witnesses were never [identified] during voir dire ... [f]or them to respond to. And if it's just a matter of her having worked with this witness, who wasn't actually a fact witness. His role was very minimal. The following colloquy then occurred: MR. SCHOLL: Everybody stop just for a second. Not my client, the juror and one of the witnesses know each other. That came to me through my client  the information. MS. NICHOLS: Have you talked to Mr. Carpenter  how he found out or something that  MR. SCHOLL: Evidently Mr. Bond and Mr. Thomas both talked to Mr. Carpenter, and Mr. Carpenter said that he knew this person. And that's the extent of it. THE COURT: Okay. Just for the record, though, because I clearly misunderstood you when you first  MR. SCHOLL: I'm sorry. THE COURT: I thought your client knew him. I thought your client's relatives knew them, I thought there was an actual relationship there. But none of that's true. The sole statement is that your witness, Russell Carpenter, who was the final witness for the defense ... [w]orked with this juror at one time. MR. SCHOLL: Right, and knows her. THE COURT: And knows her and didn't particularly get along well with her. MR. SCHOLL: Right. ... MS. MCCLUSKEY: Anthony Bond talked to Mr. Carpenter on the phone last night, and Mr. Carpenter said he's apparently seen that woman before because one day when Mr. Carpenter was being dropped off at work or dropped off from work, Mr. Bond was there. And Mr. Carpenter was saying, That woman doesn't like me, and she saw me with you before. THE COURT: Well, that's  there's no mention, there again, of the witnesses during voir dire. There's nothing to suggest that this juror cannot be, has not been totally fair and impartial in this case, and so I'll note your statements for the record, but I don't think it has any bearing or effect, whatsoever, on this case. Defendant Thomas now claims that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a voir dire of this juror. Specifically, Thomas alleges that this juror should have been individually voir dired regarding her knowledge of the defense witness and her ability to be impartial. The State responds: first, the issue is waived because Defendant Thomas never requested that the juror be individually voir dired, see Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a); second, the issue is waived for failing to preserve the issue in the motion for new trial, see Tenn. R.App. P. 3(e); and third, the issue is waived for failing to make an offer of proof through the testimony of Russell Carpenter, see Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a); State v. Powers, 101 S.W.3d 383, 415 n. 5 (Tenn.2003). The State's position regarding waiver is well-taken. Additionally, Defendant Thomas, while stating general propositions of law regarding voir dire, fails to relate to this Court why the trial court's failure to individually voir dire this juror is error. See Tenn. R.App. P. 27(a)(7). Notwithstanding waiver, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the juror withheld information from the court regarding an alleged relationship with witness Carpenter. Moreover, the relationship remains just that, an allegation. Defendant Thomas failed to make an offer of proof supporting his allegation. This issue is without merit.
During its case-in-chief, the State called John Hibbler as a witness. Mr. Hibbler is the owner of the car lot where Defendant Thomas purchased his pink box Chevy immediately following the robbery and shooting of James Day. On cross-examination, Defendant Thomas sought to elicit information regarding problems he and Angela Jackson were having in their marriage. The State objected and Defendant Thomas responded that the testimony was relevant to rebut the anticipated testimony of Angela Jackson. The trial court found that, should Mr. Hibbler recall Defendant Thomas mentioning marital difficulties with Ms. Jackson, that testimony would be hearsay. The following questioning then occurred: Q: Mr. Hibbler, as I was asking before, you had conversations with Mr. Thomas after the sale of this car. Is that right? A: Yes. I had conversations with him. Q: And the conversations with Mr. Thomas, he asked you if he could get a new title for that car because he was having problems with the title. Is that correct? MS. WEIRICH: Object, Your Honor, to hearsay. THE COURT: Sustained. Isn't that what we just discussed? A bench conference ensued, during which the trial court sustained its prior ruling that knowledge of marital difficulties between Defendant Thomas and Angela Jackson obtained during Mr. Hibbler's discussion with Thomas constituted hearsay. On appeal, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erroneously concluded that Mr. Hibbler's testimony about Thomas' marital problems with Ms. Jackson was hearsay. Thomas asserts that such statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but merely to show the subject of the conversation. The State responds that, if the testimony was offered to show the subject of the conversation, such statement was not relevant to any issue regarding the robbery and murder of James Day. Our Rules of Evidence provide that [h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or otherwise by law. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). If an out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, such as a statement offered for impeachment purposes, it is not hearsay. See State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238, 252 (Tenn.1993), cert. den. 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339, 127 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). The determination of whether a statement is hearsay and whether it is admissible through an exception to the hearsay rule is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tenn.2001). Accordingly, this Court will not reverse a trial court's ruling regarding the admission or exclusion of hearsay evidence absent a clear showing that it abused its discretion. See id. Testimony regarding possible bias of a witness is admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 616 which provides that A party may offer evidence by cross-examination, extrinsic evidence, or both, that a witness is biased in favor of or prejudiced against a party or another witness. Tenn. R. Evid. 616. However, although extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove bias or prejudice, Defendant Thomas cites no cases from any jurisdiction, and we have found none, holding that witness bias may be proven by hearsay. If the testimony of Mr. Hibbler was offered to establish Ms. Jackson's prejudice against Defendant Thomas, it was hearsay. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit introduction of hearsay testimony regarding marital difficulties between Defendant Thomas and Angela Jackson.
As his next claim of error, Defendant Thomas asserts that the trial court erred in permitting Officer Sims to testify despite stipulation that the fingerprint found on the stolen getaway car matched Defendant Bond. Thomas asserts that, after the stipulation, any testimony by the fingerprint expert was cumulative. The State responds that Defendant Thomas has waived this issue by failing to enter a contemporaneous objection to Officer Sims' testimony. See Tenn. R.App. P. 36(a). The State further contends that, although Defendant Bond did object to Officer Sims offering any testimony in lieu of the agreed upon stipulation, the objection by a co-defendant fails to preserve the issue on appeal for Defendant Thomas. See State v. Steve Bradford, No. 03C01-9607-CR-00278, 1998 WL 24417, at  (Tenn.Crim.App., Knoxville, Jan. 20, 1998). Although the State's position is well-taken, we elect to review the issue on its merits. The trial court, in response to the expressed objections of Defendant Bond, found: I think that the state has a definite interest in demonstrating to the jury not only the specific facts involved here  that the print does belong to your client, but also the larger fact that  who the police officers were that worked on the case, the fact that the police were working on the case, the fact that all of this was a coordinated effort by police officers, lest some suggestion be made, in final argument, that the police dropped the ball.... I think the state has an interest in putting on proof to satisfy the jury that things were done and done right by the proper personnel. And so to that extent, I think there is an interest ... in at least putting a face with a name. By having Mr. Sims take the stand, the jury can see that Sergeant Hulley was accurate when she stated it was forwarded on to latent prints, and he can state  identify the exhibit as the one he examined. And then the stipulation can kick in, and he doesn't have to go any further than that. After the stipulation was introduced, Officer Sims testified briefly to explain the nature of a latent print and the process by which he receives prints for review. He further related that not all prints that are lifted have value in the sense that they can be matched. As previously indicated, [t]he admissibility of evidence is generally within the broad discretion of the trial court; absent an abuse of that discretion, the trial court's decision will not be reversed. State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn.1999). We review this issue, therefore, under an abuse of discretion standard. Defendant Thomas complains that Officer Sims' testimony was cumulative with regard to the stipulation as to Defendant Bond's fingerprints. To the extent that Sims' testimony was cumulative, if at all, we cannot conclude that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial to Defendant Thomas. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting introduction of the testimony.
Next, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with an instruction concerning accomplice testimony with regard to Angela Jackson. At the close of proof, defense counsel requested that an accomplice instruction be provided with regard to Angela Jackson. The trial court denied the request, finding that Angela Jackson failed to fit the legal definition of an accomplice, in that there was no proof that she united with Defendant Thomas in the commission of the crime. Although the court recognized that Ms. Jackson did participate in the spending of the money after the fact, the court noted that this was not enough to elevate Ms. Jackson to accomplice status. An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent unites with the principal offender in the commission of a crime. State v. Allen, 976 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997). The test generally applied in determining whether a witness is an accomplice is whether the alleged accomplice could be indicted for the same offense charged against the defendant. See id. In this state, if the offense in question was not committed by the person's own conduct, the person may, nonetheless, be criminally responsible as a principal to the offense if the person solicits, directs, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-11-402(2). The proof in this case fails to establish that Angela Jackson solicited, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the Defendant in committing murder and/or aggravated robbery. Her actions in allowing the Defendant into her home after the crimes were committed, going shopping with the stolen money and receiving part of the proceeds for herself, do not make her a principal to the offense of murder or robbery of the victim. Thus, the Defendant's argument that it was error for the trial court not to submit an accomplice instruction to the jury is without merit, because the facts do not demonstrate that Angela Jackson was an accomplice.
Next, Defendant Thomas complains that the trial court declined to instruct the jury as to the following non-statutory mitigating circumstances: (1) residual doubt as to the defendant's guilt; (2) the defendant was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse; (3) the defendant had a history of family instability; (4) the defendant had a fundamental lack of a stable relationship with his parent or step-parent; (5) his parents were divorced; (6) any regret for his past acts; (7) his family could not feed itself on its own; and (8) any positive influence he may have had on others. A review of the charge submitted to the jury reveals that the trial court instructed the jury as to the following mitigating circumstances: (1) Whether he was the product of a dysfunctional family subject to abuse. (2) Any history of family instability. (3) Any proof of abandonment by a significant family member. (4) Any evidence to show that one [of] his parents was an abuser of drugs. (5) Any difficulty with parents' divorce or separation of parents. (6) Any active relationship that he may have with his child although in jail. (7) Any proof that shows that he has family members that will provide him with love and support while in prison. (8) Any proof that, although he is in jail, he provides love and support to other members of his family. (9) Any positive relationship that he had with other adults and children. (10) Any other mitigating factor which is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense at either the guilt or sentencing hearing; that is, you shall consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record, or any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence. The charge reveals that five out of the eight requested instructions were provided to the jury. The factors not specifically included in the charge are: (1) residual doubt, (2) the family's inability to feed itself, and (3) the Defendant's regret for past acts. With respect to the first of these factors, the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not require a lingering or residual doubt instruction. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173-74, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2326-28, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988). In Franklin , the United States Supreme Court stated: Our decisions mandating jury consideration of mitigating circumstances provide no support for petitioner's claim because residual doubt about guilt is not a mitigating circumstance. We have defined mitigating circumstances as facts about the defendant's character or background, or the circumstances of the particular offense, that may call for a penalty less than death. Residual doubt is not a fact about the defendant or the circumstances of the crime. It is instead a lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that exists somewhere between beyond a reasonable doubt and absolute certainty.... Nothing in our cases mandates the imposition of this heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing. Id. at 188, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 813 (Tenn.1994). Accordingly, the trial court did not commit a federal constitutional error in denying Defendant Thomas' request for an instruction on lingering or residual doubt. Defendant Thomas argues that the trial court was required to grant his request for this instruction under state law. Our supreme court has determined that residual doubt is a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. See State v. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d 291, 307 (Tenn.2002); State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44, 55-56 (Tenn.2001). Our criminal code provides, in relevant part, that The trial judge shall also include in the instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(e)(1). [1] Thus, where the issue of residual doubt is raised by the evidence, a jury instruction is appropriate. See State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Tenn.1996). Such evidence may consist of proof... that indicates the defendant did not commit the offense, notwithstanding the jury's verdict following the guilt phase. McKinney, 74 S.W.3d at 307. In this case, Defendant Thomas testified that he did not commit the murder of James Day. Therefore, the trial court should have provided the jury an instruction on residual doubt. Our supreme court has concluded that a convicted defendant's right to have the jury instructed on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances is statutory rather than constitutional in nature and thus, the failure to instruct the jury on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances when raised by the evidence is subject to harmless error analysis. See State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 351-52 (Tenn.), cert. den. 522 U.S. 999, 118 S.Ct. 567, 139 L.Ed.2d 407 (1997). A charge should be considered prejudicially erroneous if it fails to fairly submit the legal issues or if it misleads the jury as to the applicable law. Id. at 352. However, if by their breadth, the instructions on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances encompassed all the evidence presented by the defense, the omission of an instruction on a specific mitigating circumstance is harmless. Id. at 356. Here, the trial court instructed the jury to consider any aspect of the circumstances of the offense favorable to the defendant which is supported by the evidence. This broad instruction encompassed Defendant Thomas' denial of guilt and served to give the jury the opportunity and duty to consider any residual doubts about his culpability. Accordingly, we are confident that the trial court's failure to give a specific instruction on residual doubt had no effect on the jury's verdict, and Defendant Thomas is therefore entitled to no relief on this claim. With regard to Defendant Thomas' regret for past acts and his family members' alleged inability to feed themselves, the trial court found that the testimony did not demonstrate regret for past acts. Rather, Defendant Thomas' mother testified that he had apologized for bringing his family down. Additionally, when asked whether Thomas had ever spoken of bringing down Faye Day's family, Ms. Barber responded, The only thing  he told me that he was charged with this armored driver and that a man died from it. The trial judge concluded, I don't even really remember any  any statements by the mother that he's shown any real regret for any past acts.... I didn't hear any inkling of remorse about any of those [prior aggravated robbery convictions]. Regarding the fact that his family members are unable to feed themselves, the trial court found there was no proof to support this instruction. Accordingly, these circumstances were not raised by the proof and the trial court did not err by failing to so instruct. Even assuming error, any such error was harmless given that the trial court did provide the jury with the catch-all instruction as to mitigating circumstances. It is clear that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury as to Defendant Thomas' alleged regret for past acts and his family members' alleged inability to feed themselves did not result in an instruction that failed to fairly submit the legal issues or misled the jury as to the applicable law. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this claim.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the State sought to cross-examine Defendant Thomas' mother, Luella Barber, regarding a disciplinary write-up he received while in jail. The trial court permitted the questioning, finding, I think that's appropriate because that has a direct bearing on what she's testified to with regard to him being a good person or whatever.... I'll allow you to ask about the jail incident. The State proceeded with the following questioning of Luella Barber: Q: Okay. Are you aware of an incident that occurred in the jail back on June 7th of 2001 of this year? A: An incident  Q: Involving Andrew Thomas? A: No, I'm not. Q: Where he was part of a strip search that they do to the inmates, and they found a six-and-a-half-inch shank on him. A: I don't work here, so I don't know. Q: You didn't know anything about that? A: No one ever notified me about that[.] Mrs. Barber testified that knowledge of this incident would not change her opinion as to her son. Defendant Thomas complains that this line of questioning was error because it was more prejudicial than probative. Our criminal code provides that the rules of evidence do not limit the admissibility of evidence in a capital sentencing proceeding. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c). See also Stout, 46 S.W.3d at 702. The supreme court has interpreted section 39-13-204(c) as permitting trial judges wider discretion than would normally be allowed under the Tennessee Rules of Evidence in ruling on the admissibility of evidence at a capital sentencing hearing. See State v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn.), cert. den. 534 U.S. 956, 122 S.Ct. 357, 151 L.Ed.2d 270 (2001). As the Sims court stated, The Rules of Evidence should not be applied to preclude introduction of otherwise reliable evidence that is relevant to the issue of punishment, as it relates to mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the nature and circumstances of the particular crime, or the character and background of the individual defendant. As our case history reveals, however, the discretion allowed judges and attorneys during sentencing in first degree murder cases is not unfettered. Our constitutional standards require inquiry into the reliability, relevance, value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the defendant and the victim's family. The rules of evidence can in some instances be helpful guides in reaching these determinations of admissibility. Trial judges are not, however, required to adhere strictly to the rules of evidence. These rules are too restrictive and unwieldy in the arena of capital sentencing. 45 S.W.3d at 14. The questioning was relevant to rebut testimony about Defendant Thomas' positive character traits, including allegations by Mrs. Barber that Defendant Thomas attempted to improve himself while incarcerated. Thus, Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Defendant Thomas also argues that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence and the trial court, acting as thirteenth juror, should have overturned the verdicts. Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(f) provides that [t]he trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence. Our supreme court has explained that Rule 33(f) imposes upon a trial court judge the mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case.... State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn.1995). When the trial judge simply overrules a motion for new trial, this Court may presume that the trial judge has served as the thirteenth juror and approved the jury's verdict. See id. In the instant case, the trial court simply overruled the Defendant's motion for new trial without making any comments regarding a dissatisfaction with the weight of the evidence. Thus, this Court presumes that the trial court acted as thirteenth juror and approved the verdicts of the jury. Because the record contains no statements by the trial court expressing dissatisfaction or disagreement with the weight of the evidence or the jury's verdict, or indicating that the trial court misunderstood its role as thirteenth juror, this Court will not grant the defendant a new trial on this basis. See State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 435-36 (Tenn.1995).
Defendant Thomas asserts that, pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the indictment against him did not charge a capital offense and that he cannot, therefore, be sentenced to more than life imprisonment. Defendant's argument is based upon the premise that first degree murder is not a capital offense unless accompanied by aggravating factors. Essentially, Defendant Thomas complains that the indictment returned by the grand jury charges non-capital first degree murder because the grand jury did not find any capital aggravating circumstances. That is, Defendant Thomas alleges that to satisfy the requirements of Apprendi , the indictment must include language of the statutory aggravating circumstances to elevate the offense to capital murder. Because of this omission in the indictment, he argues that the State was then precluded from filing a Rule 12.3 notice of intent to seek the death penalty, which provides that a notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be filed [w]here a capital offense is charged in the indictment or presentment. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 12.3(b). Defendant Thomas asserts that, since a capital offense was not charged in the indictment, the State could not then rely upon aggravating factors to enhance his sentence to death. Our supreme court has recently ruled that the principles of Apprendi do not apply to Tennessee's capital sentencing procedure. Neither the United States Constitution nor the Tennessee Constitution requires that the State charge in the indictment the aggravating factors to be relied upon by the State during sentencing in a first degree murder prosecution. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d at 467. Thus, Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this ground.
Defendant Thomas next asserts that Tennessee's imposition of a death penalty violates United States treaties and hence the federal constitution's Supremacy Clause. [2] Defendant Thomas claims that the Supremacy Clause was violated when his rights under treaties and customary international law to which the United States is bound were disregarded. Specifically, his argument is based upon two primary grounds: (1) customary international law and specific international treaties prohibit capital punishment, and (2) customary international law and specific international treaties prohibit reinstatement of the death penalty by a governmental unit once it has been abolished. This identical argument has recently been rejected by panels of this Court in State v. Richard Odom, No. W2000-02301-CCA-R3-DD, 2002 WL 31322532, at -35 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Oct. 15, 2002), and State v. Robert Faulkner, No. W2001-02614-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 WL 22220341, at  (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Sept. 26, 2003). We see no viable reason to resolve this issue in a different manner in the present case. Defendant Thomas is not entitled to relief on this issue.
The Defendant raises numerous challenges to the constitutionality of Tennessee's death penalty provisions. Included within his claim that the Tennessee death penalty statutes violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Sections 8, 9, 16, and 17, and Article II, Section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, are the following: A. Tennessee's death penalty statutes fail to meaningfully narrow the class of death eligible defendants. Specifically, the statutory aggravating circumstance set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-2-203(i)(2), (i)(5), (i)(6), and (i)(7) have been so broadly interpreted whether viewed singly or collectively, that they fail to provide a meaningful basis for narrowing the population of those convicted of first degree murder to those eligible for the sentence of death. We note that factors (i)(5), (i)(6) and (i)(7) do not pertain to this case as they were not found by the jury. Thus, any individual claim with respect to these factors is without merit. See, e.g., Hall, 958 S.W.2d app. at 715; State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 87 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1020, 115 S.Ct. 585, 130 L.Ed.2d 499 (1994). Also, this argument has been rejected by our supreme court. See Vann, 976 S.W.2d app. at 117-118; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 742 (Tenn.1994). B. The death sentence is imposed capriciously and arbitrarily in that (1) Unlimited discretion is vested in the prosecutor as to whether or not to seek the death penalty. This argument has been rejected. See State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 847, 117 S.Ct. 133, 136 L.Ed.2d 82 (1996). (2) The death penalty is imposed in a discriminatory manner based upon race, geography, and gender. This argument has been rejected. See State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 268 (Tenn.1994), cert. den. 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995). C. There are no uniform standards or procedures for jury selection to insure open inquiry concerning potentially prejudicial subject matter. This argument has been rejected. See Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 269. D. The death qualification process skews the make-up of the jury and results in a relatively prosecution-prone, guilt-prone jury. This argument has been rejected. See State v. Reid , 91 S.W.3d 247 app. at 313 (Tenn.2002), cert. den. 540 U.S. 828, 124 S.Ct. 56, 157 L.Ed.2d 52 (2003), and cases cited therein. E. Defendants are prohibited from addressing misconceptions about matters relevant to sentencing. This argument has been rejected. See id. F. Requiring the jury to agree unanimously to a life verdict violates McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369 (1990) and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988). This argument has been rejected. See Reid , 91 S.W.3d app. at 313. G. There is a reasonable likelihood that jurors believe they must unanimously agree as to the existence of mitigating circumstances because of the failure to instruct the jury on the meaning and function of mitigating circumstances. This argument has been rejected. See id. H. The jury is not required to make the ultimate determination that death is the appropriate penalty. This argument has been rejected. See id. I. The defendant is denied final closing argument in the penalty phase of the trial. This argument has been rejected. See id. J. Mandatory introduction of victim impact evidence and mandatory introduction of other crime evidence upon the prosecutor's request violates separation of powers and injects arbitrariness and capriciousness into capital sentencing. This argument has been rejected by a panel of this Court. See State v. Robert Faulkner, No. W2001-02614-CCA-R3-DD, 2003 WL 22220341, at -37 (Tenn.Crim.App., Jackson, Sept. 26, 2003). K. The appellate review process in death penalty cases, including comparative proportionality review, is constitutionally inadequate. This argument has been rejected. See Reid , 91 S.W.3d app. at 313. Moreover, our supreme court has held that, while important as an additional safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing, comparative proportionality review is not constitutionally required. See State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 663 (Tenn.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1083, 118 S.Ct. 1536, 140 L.Ed.2d 686 (1998).