Opinion ID: 733387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kozak's Claims

Text: 13
14 Kozak claims that postal inspectors improperly detained the April 12, 1994, Express Mail package because they did not have a reasonable suspicion contraband was in the package. She further alleges the search warrant is invalid because the affidavit in support thereof did not establish probable cause. 15 In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The ultimate question of whether a search and seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir.1994). 16 In this Circuit, it is clear that [a] temporary detention of mail for investigative purposes is not an unreasonable seizure when authorities have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1382 (10th Cir.1990). Thus, the issue is whether the postal inspectors had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time they detained the package. A review of the magistrate's findings leads us to conclude that they did. 17 On April 12, 1994, Inspector Wilson learned that an Express Mail package addressed to Kozak had arrived in Salt Lake City. The package smelled strongly of coffee. Wilson testified and the district court found that the decision to detain the package was based on the following: 18 (1) his conversations with other postal inspectors and law enforcement agencies in Brigham City and Box Elder County concerning the express mail packages going to Kozak's post office box and Kozak's daughter's potential involvement in drug trafficking; (2) the fact that this package and most of the prior packages smelled like coffee; and (3) his research concerning the return addresses on the prior packages had revealed either fictitious names or addresses. 19 In light of the minimal intrusion occasioned by the detention, these considerations were sufficient to justify Wilson's decision to briefly detain the package for further investigation. 2 See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 1032-33, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). 20 Once Wilson returned to the office, inspectors noted several additional facts which led Schouten to conclude they should seek a search warrant. For instance, the package was relatively light and the cost to ship the package was $9.95. Based on his experience, Schouten believed that it would be unusual to mail such a small amount of coffee for such a large fee. He also learned that the designated sender of the package did not live at the listed return address and that the residents of the listed return address had not mailed an Express Mail package to Utah. Postal inspectors then submitted the receipts for the packages shipped to Kozak over the previous several months to Detective Jim Vaughn, a handwriting expert. Vaughn determined that several of the labels were written by the same person, even though different names and addresses were utilized. 21 Based on all of the information in the hands of the postal inspectors, we hold they were entitled to continue detaining the package until they could present an affidavit in support of a search warrant to a magistrate. See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253, 90 S.Ct. at 1032-33. Because there is no indication the postal inspectors did not act expeditiously in applying for a warrant, we find the investigatory detention of this package was in conformity with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See Lux, 905 F.2d at 1382; see also United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129, 114 S.Ct. 1097, 127 L.Ed.2d 410 (1994); Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.1984). 22 Kozak argues that in validating the detention of the package, the district court improperly relied on a cumulative theory of reasonable suspicion. In deciding whether to detain the April 12th package, Kozak asserts that postal inspectors were obligated to exorcize from their minds any and all information not readily apparent from the surface of that particular package. Because the postal inspectors here relied on information that they developed during the course of an ongoing investigation in deciding to detain the package, Kozak asserts that the detention was improper. Kozak's view of reasonable suspicion is, at best, illogical. Law enforcement officers are not required to make decisions in a vacuum, without reference to any information other than that on the surface of the package. In fact, the exact opposite is true. See, e.g., United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 228-29 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207, 111 S.Ct. 2802, 115 L.Ed.2d 975 (1991); United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 695-96 (9th Cir.1984). 23 In addition to her arguments on cumulative reasonable suspicion, Kozak argues that the postal inspectors were obligated to immediately submit the package to a drug-detecting dog and to return the package to the mail stream if the dog did not detect the presence of drugs. Kozak relies on a line of cases holding that probable cause is established once a drug dog alerts on a package for the mistaken proposition that absent such an alert, officers are not entitled to detain the package any further. Contrary to Kozak's assertion, drug-detecting dogs have not supplanted the neutral and detached magistrate as the arbiter of probable cause. See United States v. Claps, 818 F.Supp. 1417, 1419 (D.Colo.1993). 3 24 Kozak next claims the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained little more than a recitation of Express Mail profile characteristics and that these characteristics are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The determination of whether there was a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed must be based on the totality-of-the-circumstances. United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 215 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S.Ct. 1164, 107 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1990). This court has recognized that a magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'  United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d 744, 746 (10th Cir.1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Accordingly, a reviewing court must not conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but should instead determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2086, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984); See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. Applying these principles, the totality of the evidence contained in Schouten's affidavit substantially supports the conclusion that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found in the package. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 25 Schouten, the affiant, began the affidavit with a recitation of his extensive experience in drug detection and interdiction. After setting out his experience and training, Schouten proceeded to compare the package at issue with the profile common to packages containing drugs, concluding that it was very likely drugs were in the package. This court has held that [a] magistrate is entitled to rely on the expert opinions of officers when supporting factual information is supplied in the affidavit. United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 292-93 (10th Cir.1991). Accordingly, the magistrate was entitled to rely on Schouten's expert opinion as to the characteristics associated with packages that contain illegal drugs. 26 After laying out the profile characteristics of the April 12, 1994, Express Mail package, Schouten informed the magistrate of his continuing investigation of the packages arriving at Kozak's post office box. For instance, Schouten averred that although a number of the packages sent to Kozak listed different senders, a police hand-writing expert believed several of the mailing certificates had been written by the same person. Furthermore, Schouten indicated officers of the Box Elder Sheriff's Office told him that confidential informants had told them that Kozak's daughters might be involved in the use of drugs. Finally, Schouten informed the magistrate that drug-detecting dogs had failed to alert on two prior packages. He indicated, however, that dogs could be fooled by the use of masking agents such as coffee and that as an experienced police officer, Kozak would be familiar with methods used to conceal controlled substances. 27 On appeal, Kozak asks us to review each piece of information contained in the affidavit to determine whether it, standing alone, supports a finding of probable cause. This court has specifically rejected the analytical method advocated by Kozak. See United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir.1985); see also Upton, 466 U.S. at 733, 104 S.Ct. at 2088. Instead, the determination must be based on the totality of the information contained in the affidavit. Bishop, 890 F.2d at 215. Reviewing the affidavit as a whole, as we are obliged to do, we conclude that the information in the affidavit provided substantial grounds for believing that contraband could be found in the Express Mail package. Upton, 466 U.S. at 728, 104 S.Ct. at 2086; Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. Accordingly, the search of the package pursuant to the search warrant was proper.
28 Kozak first claims the interview conducted by officers Schouten and Summerhill was custodial in nature and her Fifth Amendment rights were violated because she was not advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), either prior to or during the interview. The government acknowledges that Kozak was never Mirandized. Thus, the issue is whether Kozak was in custody at the time of the interview. 29 To determine whether Kozak was in custody for Miranda purposes, we examine all facts relevant to the following inquiry: how would a reasonable person in Kozak's position have understood her situation? If, from an objective viewpoint, someone in [Kozak's] position would reasonably believe her freedom of action had been curtailed to a 'degree associated with a formal arrest,' then she would be held in custody during the interrogation. United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir.1993) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984)) (citation and footnote omitted). Because the determination of custody is based on the totality-of-the-circumstances, it is necessarily fact intensive. Id. Therefore, a district court's determination that a defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda is reviewed for clear error. Cordoba v. Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691, 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1014, 111 S.Ct. 585, 112 L.Ed.2d 590 (1990). 30 Based upon a thorough review of the record and consideration of the totality-of-the-circumstances surrounding the interview, we conclude the district court's finding that Kozak was not in custody is not clearly erroneous. A district court finding is clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or if [this court], after reviewing all the evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Cowles v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 511 (10th Cir.1985) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 74, 93 L.Ed.2d 30 (1986). The district court's conclusion that a reasonable person in Kozak's position would not believe she was in custody finds more than adequate support in the record. 31 The sequence of events leading up to Kozak's confession is as follows. When Schouten and Summerhill arrived at Kozak's house, they asked if she would be willing to talk with them and specifically informed her that she was not under arrest. Kozak was never handcuffed and neither officer exhibited any sign of force or intimidation. 32 Once Schouten, Summerhill, and Kozak arrived at the sheriff's office, they went directly into Summerhill's office. 4 Kozak was again informed that she was not under arrest. The conversation that followed took place in Summerhill's office rather than in an interrogation room. Kozak indicated that she was willing to talk to Schouten and Summerhill, but insisted that the conversation not be taped. After Schouten agreed not to tape the conversation, Kozak admitted that she knew the package contained methamphetamine and that she had received similar packages in the past. The conversation lasted no more than twenty minutes. Kozak never indicated at any time during the conversation that she wanted to stop and never asked for an attorney. In light of this sequence of events and the facts as found by the district court, the district court's conclusion that Kozak was not in custody at the time of the interview is not clearly erroneous and is, therefore, affirmed. 5 33 In addition to her Miranda claim, Kozak asserts that the district court should have excluded her confession because it was not voluntarily given. Incriminating statements obtained by government acts, threats, or promises that permit the defendant's will to be overborne run afoul of the Fifth Amendment and are inadmissible at trial as evidence of guilt. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). In determining whether a particular confession is coerced, we consider the following factors: (1) the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; (2) the length of the detention; (3) the length and nature of the questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of her constitutional rights; and (5) whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The determination of voluntariness is based on the totality-of-the-circumstances; none of the single factors listed above is determinative. Id. Accordingly, this court must be mindful of all of the circumstances surrounding a defendant's interrogation, including the particular defendant's characteristics. See id. 34 When a defendant challenges the use of her statements on the ground that they were involuntary, it is the duty of this court to examine the entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 1764, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966). Nevertheless, the district court's rulings regarding subsidiary factual questions, such as whether the police intimidated or threatened a suspect or whether a suspect was particularly susceptible to police coercion, are subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307-08 (10th Cir.1987). 35 We conclude, based upon an independent evaluation of the record and with appropriate deference to the district court's findings of fact, that Kozak's confession was voluntary. Several key facts mandate this conclusion. First, although Kozak was not specifically informed that she did not have to answer any questions, she was informed at least twice that she was not under arrest. Furthermore, Kozak testified that based on her experience as a police officer, she was aware of her Miranda rights and knew that they applied to her. Second, the conversation was not excessively long, lasting no more than twenty minutes. Third, in light of Kozak's experience, the environment in which the conversation took place was not unduly coercive. The conversation took place in Summerhill's office at the Box Elder Sheriff's Office, rather than in an interrogation room. Furthermore, Kozak was extremely familiar with the sheriff's office due to her position with the Brigham City Police Department. Fourth, Kozak had been employed with the Brigham City Police Department as a detective for eleven years and was well versed in law enforcement procedures. Fifth, there is absolutely no evidence in the record tending to show that Kozak was unusually susceptible to coercion because of age, lack of education, or intelligence. Finally, and of particular importance, Kozak testified at the suppression hearing that she made a conscious decision to cooperate with Schouten and Summerhill because she wanted to help Glover and to be allowed to see him. These types of personal psychological pressures do not amount to official coercion rendering a confession involuntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 523, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Furthermore, although Kozak argues on appeal that her confession was coerced by promises of leniency (i.e., a release on her own recognizance), she testified at the suppression hearing that those discussions did not occur until after the interview. In light of these facts, it is clear that Kozak's will was not overborne and that her confession was the product of her own free will.