Opinion ID: 2610257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The appeals board improperly considered the motion picture evidence and the medical reports based solely on the film.

Text: Labor Code section 5903 provides that any person aggrieved by the decision of a referee may petition the appeals board for reconsideration on the ground that he has discovered new evidence material to him, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the hearing. [6] (1) This provision seeks to achieve the orderly and efficient conduct of workmen's compensation cases and requires that all parties present their evidence in a timely fashion at the referee's hearing. A party cannot withhold crucial evidence in the expectation that the referee will decide in its favor, and then, if the referee does not so rule, invoke a right to reconsideration. (2) A petition for reconsideration on the ground of new evidence should state the nature of the proffered evidence and a full and accurate statement of the reasons why such testimony or exhibits could not reasonably have been discovered or produced before the filing of the decision. (W.C.A.B. rule 10856(e); see Standard Rectifier Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 287, 292 [54 Cal. Rptr. 100, 419 P.2d 164]; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 509, 518 [159 P.2d 625]; Baker v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1959) 24 Cal.Comp. Cases 17, 18.) In the present case the insurance carrier must have known of the motion picture evidence at least from August 6, 1968, when, on the basis of the film, it ceased paying temporary disability compensation. The carrier enjoyed ample opportunity to present the film at the referee's hearing but failed to do so. Thus in its petition the carrier could not, and did not, urge as a basis for offering the film the ground of discovery of new evidence. The carrier merely recited in the statutory language the various other grounds for reconsideration  none of which related to the film  and stated no reason whatsoever for its failure to present the film at the referee's hearing. [7] Since section 5903 declares that an aggrieved party may petition for reconsideration on the five statutory grounds and no other and since the petition failed to state a competent basis for belatedly offering the film into evidence on reconsideration, the appeals board violated section 5903, its own rule 10856(e), and reasonable canons of orderly procedure in granting the petition solely in order to present the film. The appeals board in its return before this court now argues that it retains the inherent authority to grant reconsideration on its own motion under section 5906 of the Labor Code [8] and thus could consider the film whether or not it were offered by one of the parties. It maintains that in granting reconsideration it may disregard the restrictions of section 5903. Although we note that the appeals board granted reconsideration on the basis of the carrier's petition, which would be controlled not by section 5906 but by section 5903, we pass on to the more fundamental analysis of the board's powers under section 5906. (3) We believe the language of the Court of Appeal in Michon v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 15 Cal. App.3d 917, 924-925 [93 Cal. Rptr. 476] (fn. omitted; italics in original) applicable. But the board exceeded its power when, without cause, it granted the employer-carrier's petition which, itself, set forth no sufficient cause. A court does not have power to overturn its judgment and grant new trials capriciously (See 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (1954) p. 2051, citing Diamond v. Superior Court (1922) 189 Cal. 732, 736 [210 P. 36], and other cases; id. 1967 Supp., p. 835, citing Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166 [10 Cal. Rptr. 462, 358 P.2d 918].) We hold arbitrary power is similarly denied the board. Labor Code section 5906 provides that the board may grant reconsideration upon its own motion. We interpret the Legislature in granting that power to have intended that, whether reconsideration is initiated by petition of a party aggrieved or upon the board's own motion, the order granting reconsideration must be based upon one of the grounds specified in section 5903. Otherwise, workmen's compensation hearings could be tried over and over again. (See Lab. Code, §§ 5315, 5900, subd. (b); Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 4; LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 627, 633-635 and fn. 11 [83 Cal. Rptr. 208, 463 P.2d 432]; Evans v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 753, 755 [68 Cal. Rptr. 825, 441 P.2d 633].) [9] Although we do not believe that the board's grant of reconsideration here rested upon sufficient grounds, we recognize that section 5903 provides the appeals board with considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant such reconsideration. Indeed, the breadth of the board's powers in that respect finds further exemplification in Labor Code section 5903, subdivision (c), which permits the board to grant reconsideration if the evidence does not justify the findings of fact. The word justify indicates that the board enjoys broad authority to correct injustices, but at the same time by definition inhibits an arbitrary grant of reconsideration. (See, e.g., Argonaut Ins. Exchange v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 706, 710-711 [321 P.2d 460] [10] (reconsideration granted to consider whether evidence and findings justify attorney's lien and later award of compensation); Rushing v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1971) 15 Cal. App.3d 517, 522 [92 Cal. Rptr. 605] (reconsideration may be granted to direct examination by a physician (Lab. Code, § 5701) and taking of additional evidence).) (4) Under the circumstances of the present case, however, the board abused its discretion in allowing the carrier deliberately to withhold the motion picture evidence until the referee, who is the official fact-finder of the board, had reached a decision. Neither the board nor the carrier has suggested any persuasive reason why the carrier should be permitted to flout the board's reasonable rules as well as its legislative mandate under section 5903. We conclude that the board in ordering reconsideration erroneously relied upon the motion picture evidence. (5) Furthermore, in permitting the attorneys only to make brief comments on the content of the film the board denied applicant his fundamental right to cross-examination and to the presentation of rebuttal evidence. (See Allied Comp. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1961) 57 Cal.2d 115, 121 [17 Cal. Rptr. 817, 367 P.2d 409]; Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1963) 223 Cal. App.2d 350, 351-353 [35 Cal. Rptr. 729]; Massachusetts etc. Ins. Co. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1946) 74 Cal. App.2d 911, 913-915 [170 P.2d 36].) [11] Even if the motion picture evidence had been offered in a timely fashion at the referee's hearing, the referee should have refused to rely upon it because the carrier obtained it by fraudulent inducement. The record contains uncontradicted testimony by applicant that the private investigator induced applicant's intoxication and subsequent horseback ride in order to obtain a film of this activity. The carrier thereafter attempted to profit by this questionable conduct: it sought to introduce the film in evidence at the compensation proceeding. We recognize that motion picture evidence is now quite commonly utilized in personal injury and workmen's compensation litigation. (See, e.g., Ryan v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 654, 660 [72 Cal. Rptr. 140]; Mejia v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1966) 31 Cal.Comp.Cases 330; Transport Indem. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1966) 31 Cal.Comp.Cases 356; 1 Hanna, Cal. Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen's Compensation, supra, § 17.01[5][b]; Herlick, Cal. Workmen's Compensation Law (1970) § 16.66.) (6) Ordinarily, of course, motion pictures are obtained without fraudulent inducement. [12] Under such circumstances the film may constitute competent evidence to be considered in determining the extent of disability. On rare occasions, however, the insurance carrier or its private investigators have deceitfully induced applicants to perform acts for the hidden camera which they would not otherwise have committed. (See Carson v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1966) 31 Cal.Comp.Cases 291.) [13] (7, 8) In the present proceeding, the carrier should not profit from its own deceitful conduct. The investigators feigned friendship and concealed their employer's identity in bringing about applicant's inebriation and effectuating his horseback ride. Nothing in the record so much as suggests that in the absence of the fraudulent inducement applicant would have taken the ride. Indeed, the referee found that the carrier fraudulently obtained the film by means of a violation of applicant's rights; the referee refused to consider the two medical reports to the extent that they described or relied upon the tainted film. The appeals board is not bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence and procedure, but may make inquiry in the manner, through oral testimony and records, which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit and provisions of the workmen's compensation laws. (Italics added.) (Lab. Code, § 5708.) As this court observed in French v. Rishell (1953) 40 Cal.2d 477, 481 [254 P.2d 26], the board from its early days, has been allowed to receive hearsay evidence and to proceed informally.... (See Bland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 324, 330 [90 Cal. Rptr. 431, 475 P.2d 663].) Evidence obtained by fraud and deceit in violation of the rights of the applicant, however, is not best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out justly the spirit and provisions of the workmen's compensation laws. The high purposes of the compensation law should not be perverted by resort to evidence perfidiously procured. We therefore conclude that the board may not rely upon evidence obtained, as in the present case, by deceitful inducement of an applicant to engage in activities which he would not otherwise have undertaken.