Opinion ID: 1786627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Time Limitations

Text: ¶ 5. Kelly also claims on appeal that the time limitation stated in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (2000) violates not only Article 3, Section 21 and Section 27 of the Mississippi Constitution, but also, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, thereby making the three-year time limitation unconstitutional. Kelly's argument is wholly without merit. The Legislature may impose reasonable restrictions upon the exercise of a constitutional right. Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313, 1318 (Miss.1992). Legislative time restrictions encompass the time period allowed for commencement of an action. Id. at 1319. When the appellant neglects to comply with these regulations, he waives his constitutional privileges. Id. It is a well-settled principle that a state may attach reasonable time limitations to bring an action, even if, it involves federal constitutional rights. Id. (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486, 73 S.Ct. 397, 422, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953)). Time limitations may also be placed on the exercise of a state constitutional right. Id. ¶ 6. Kelly had a three-year window of opportunity to challenge his criminal conviction by filing for post-conviction relief. By Kelly failing to exercise his statutory remedy, he thereby waived his right to challenge his conviction. Id. (citing United States v. Randolph, 262 F.2d 10, 12 (7th Cir.1958)). For the foregoing reasons stated, we find that the three-year limitation contained in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2) (2000), does not result in either a federal or state constitutional violation. Therefore, the trial court's decision to deny Kelly's petition for post-conviction collateral relief did not violate his constitutional rights. This assignment of error is without merit.