Opinion ID: 1351321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court Discretion in Managing Prisoner Civil Rights Litigation

Text: As the parties seem to agree, there is no specific statutory authority either permitting or forbidding the requested report, although the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have approved the use of such reports. [3] See, e.g., Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir.1997); Martinez, 570 F.2d 317; Hardwick v. Ault, 517 F.2d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1975). Absent statutory mandate or precedent from the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, we cannot conclude that the order is erroneous as a matter of law, as that term is used in mandamus analysis. See Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 660 (9th Cir.1977) (district court order not clearly erroneous where there were no Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit decisions deciding the issue and where there was split of authority in other circuits). We start with first principles. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 vests the district court with early control over cases toward a process of judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase, especially motions and discovery. Fed. R.Civ.P. 16 advisory committee's note, 1983 Amendment; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(a) (In any action, the court may order the attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences....). Rule 16 further recognizes the inherent power of the district court to enforce its pretrial orders through sanctions, Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), and the discretion of the district judge to apply an appropriate level of supervision as dictated by the issues raised by each individual case. See, e.g., Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(c)(2). For example, district courts are to issue a scheduling order within 120 days after service of the complaint on the defendant, setting various deadlines for joinder, amendment of pleadings, motions and discovery, but the order may also include other appropriate matters. Fed. R.Civ.P. 16(b). Failure to comply with the scheduling order exposes a party to any just orders, as determined by the district judge, including dismissal, entry of default or contempt of court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), 37(b)(2). While the scope of the district court's authority over pretrial proceedings is broad, it is tempered in pro se prisoner civil rights cases. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 specifically exempts pro se prisoner lawsuits from the initial disclosure requirements, Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(B)(iv), and from initial conference requirements, Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f). Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.). The district court is not required to conduct a pretrial conference in prisoner cases, though there is no rule forbidding it. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(a). In addition, a district court must determine at the outset of the litigation or suit whether a pro se prisoner has filed a colorable action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). After screening, the district court may order a response to any surviving claims and the case proceeds as any ordinary civil litigation would, with a few exceptions. For example, the parties may take discovery and file dispositive motions. See generally Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, 26. In this case, the district court did not order production of the Martinez report until after petitioners had filed their answer. Since that time, the district court has ruled on petitioners' Rule 12(b) motion, concluding that certain of Tuzon's claims were either exhausted or did not require exhaustion. [4] Thus, this was not a situation where a defendant was called upon to create a record at the outset of the litigation in order to assist the district court to screen the complaint or to determine jurisdiction. However, because the district court has identified defects in the administrative record at this point, an investigation and report seem not only prudent but necessary to determine whether this case involves a legal challenge to an important complicated constitutional issue that may affect more inmates than Tuzon. See Lewis, 1986 WL 12781, -2, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17837, at .