Opinion ID: 1377077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Specific Reference to Defendant's Prior Felonies as Relevant Evidence, Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2)

Text: Rule 404(b)(2) requires that the trial court should admit other-acts evidence only upon an affirmative finding that a material issue exists other than conduct conforming with a character trait. In this case, the trial court cited State v. Wingard, 891 S.W.2d 628 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994), for the proposition that where the defendant's prior felony convictions constitute an essential element of the offense of felony escape, Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-605(b)(2), evidence of the name and nature of each conviction is relevant to satisfy a material issue other than character. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed and held instead that the defendant's proffered stipulation rendered irrelevant any reference to the name or nature of his prior convictions. The intermediate court cited to State v. Culp, 891 S.W.2d 232 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994), which concluded that because the felony escape statute only requires proof that the defendant was being held for a felony at the time of his attempted escape, [it is] not necessary for the name of the felony to be alleged, instructed, or proven. Id. at 236. In this case, the State appealed the intermediate court's decision, arguing that Culp stood only for the proposition that the State is not required to name the defendant's prior felonies, but that it is not error for the State to do so. Accordingly, it urges this Court to hold that, regardless of the defendant's willingness to stipulate, evidence of the specific offenses for which the defendant had previously been convicted is relevant to establish the prior-conviction element of the offense of felony escape. This jurisdiction has long held that the name or nature of crimes other than that for which the defendant is on trial is relevant to establish an essential element of the crime for which the defendant is being tried. See, e.g., State v. Wingard, 891 S.W.2d 628, 633-34 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994) (allowing the specific nature of the prior offenses to be admitted into evidence to satisfy an essential element of the offense of felony escape); State v. Blackmon, 701 S.W.2d 228, 232 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985) (stating that in escape prosecutions, it is proper to admit the name or nature of an accused's prior convictions); Lacey v. State, 506 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Tenn.Crim.App.1974) (It is material to the crime of escape to show that the defendant was in the custody of the penal system and, therefore, it is admissible to show his previous conviction which resulted in his confinement.). Culp is not inconsistent with this rule. Instead, it merely states that the name of the felony for which the defendant is incarcerated at the time of his or her escape is not required to be alleged, instructed, or proven. Culp, 891 S.W.2d at 236. Moreover, it is well settled that the prosecution is free to reject the offer of a defendant to stipulate certain facts. See State v. Smith, 644 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982); see also State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d 577, 595 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997) (stating that a stipulation requires the acquiescence of all parties to the litigation). [A]n accused cannot marshal the evidence of the State by simply offering to stipulate to a fact for the purpose of barring the State from introducing admissible, demonstrative evidence the accused does not want the jury to see. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d at 595. In lieu of accepting a stipulation to certain facts, the State may satisfy its burden of proving every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt, see State v. West, 767 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Tenn.1989), by introducing evidence of its own choice in support of those same facts. Smith, 644 S.W.2d at 701. Consequently, a mere offer to stipulate evidence does not render that evidence irrelevant under Rule 404(b)(2). In this case, the felony escape statute requires the State to prove that the accused was being held for a felony at the time of his escape from a penal institution. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-16-605(b)(2). Here, the State introduced into evidence the defendant's previous convictions of especially aggravated robbery, second degree murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping. On this preliminary issue of relevancy, we hold, applying the long-standing law in this jurisdiction, that (1) the State was not required to accept the stipulation, and (2) specific reference to the defendant's prior felonies made his prior-conviction status more probable than it would have been without the evidence, thereby constituting relevant evidence under Rule 404(b). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue.