Opinion ID: 2606360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Jury's Deliberations, Communications, And Verdicts, And The Trial Court's Declaration Of A Mistrial As To Count I

Text: The jury commenced its deliberations at 12:00 p.m. on May 8, 1995. Shortly after 4:10 p.m., the bailiff presented the trial court with a written jury communication, which inquired, How does the law interpret the explanation of Assault in the First Degree regarding bodily injury? Does the `cause' of bodily injury apply to the intent of the assailant or to the outcome of the injury? (Emphasis added.) [15] The communication closed with a page reference to the trial court's instruction regarding the elements of first degree assault. At 4:27 p.m., after conferring with counsel, the trial court returned the communication to the jury with the typed response, Please refer to the jury instructions. The jury was released for the day at 4:30 p.m. On May 9, 1995, the jury resumed its deliberations at 9:00 a.m. The trial day was cut short by a bomb threat, which necessitated an evacuation of the courthouse at 2:10 p.m. The jury was released for the remainder of the day at 3:00 p.m. On May 10, 1995, the jury once again resumed its deliberations at 9:00 a.m. Forty-five minutes later, the trial court received a further written communication from the jury, which advised as follows: Jury instructions provide insufficient definition and explanation of reckless. The jury requests further explanation, definition and/or example regarding reckless in order to distinguish between Assault 1 and Assault 2. The jury is hung without further information or understanding. (Emphasis added.) [16] At 10:05 a.m., after conferring with counsel, the trial court returned the communication to the jury with the typed response, No further definition of Reckless can be provided. [17] If the Court gives the jury additional time to deliberate, can the jury reach a unanimous verdict? At 10:40 a.m., the jury responded to the trial court's inquiry with its last written communication, which stated, No. The jury has reached 2 out of 3 verdicts. The jury is hung. At 11:17 a.m. on May 10, 1995, the jury was returned to the courtroom, at which time the following colloquy transpired: THE COURT: Let the record reflect the presence of the jury, counsel, and the defendant. Will the foreperson please stand and state your name. THE FOREPERSON: [The foreperson stated her name.] THE COURT: And has the jury reached a verdict? THE FOREPERSON: On two of three counts. THE COURT: Which counts? [THE FOREPERSON:] Count II and Count III. THE COURT: And you have not been able to reach a unanimous verdict as to Count I; is that right? THE FOREPERSON: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: If the Court were to give you additional time to deliberate, would you be able to reach a unanimous verdict regarding Count I? THE FOREPERSON: No, Your Honor, we would not. The jury then returned guilty verdicts as to Counts II and III. After polling the jury regarding the unanimity of the two verdicts, the court ruled that, [a]s to Count I, based on the inability to reach a unanimous verdict despite, I believe, two and-a-half days of deliberation, the Court will declare a mistrial as to Count I, finding that there is a manifest necessity. The jury was thereupon discharged, and the trial court referred Quitog to the Adult Probation Division for a presentence diagnosis and report and scheduled a sentencing hearing regarding Counts II and III to take place on August 11, 1995.