Opinion ID: 757588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bargaining

Text: 83 The majority and I basically agree on the standards under which good or bad-faith bargaining should be judged. We differ primarily on the question of whether there is substantial evidence on the record to support a conclusion that Horsehead engaged in dilatory, bad-faith bargaining. I continue to believe the evidence is substantial and sufficient to support the Board's decision. 84 Although I generally agree with the majority's framing of the question of how to judge bargaining, I would like to emphasize a few points. The majority notes that [a] company's good faith is judged by whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the company 'desired to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collective bargaining contract. '  See supra at 339 (quoting Pease Co. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 1044, 1049 (6th Cir.1981) (quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960))). I would like to emphasize the totality of the circumstances element of the majority's equation. Although I believe that a desire to enter a contract can be indicative of good-faith bargaining, I do not believe it is or should be dispositive. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 761-62 (2d Cir.1969) ( '[D]esire to reach agreement' may mean different things to different people, but in the context of a meaningful and purposeful reading of section 8(a)(5) it must mean more than a willingness to sign a piece of paper. The statute does not say that any 'agreement' reached will validate whatever tactics have been employed to exact it.). Were desire to enter a contract--any contract no matter how onerous to the employees--the only criterion for judging bargaining, an employer would seldom, if ever, be found to have acted in bad faith. What employer, for instance, would not desire to enter a contract that guaranteed employees minimum wage, no medical or life insurance, and no vacation days? To continue a conceit introduced by the majority, it would be fair to describe such an agreement as a Dickensian Contract. I find it difficult to believe that simply evincing a desire to enter a Dickensian Contract would satisfy an employer's duty to bargain in good faith. 85 There must be something more to the determination of whether an employer has acted in bad faith. The Court in Pease appears to have considered more than merely a desire to enter a contract. As the Court noted: Our examination of the specific indicia relied on by the ALJ and the Board leads us to conclude that neither the proposals nor the tactics of the Company, nor the sum of its conduct, amounts to substantial evidence of bad faith. See Pease, 666 F.2d at 1049. As noted by the majority, undue delay can constitute bad faith. See supra at 338-39. See also Calex Corp. v. NLRB, 144 F.3d 904, 909 (6th Cir.1998) (Dilatory and delaying tactics that undermine the process of collective bargaining are indicative of bad faith bargaining.); Kobell v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 965 F.2d 1401, 1408 (6th Cir.1992) (Dilatory or evasive tactics have been considered by the Board as indicative of bad faith.). 86 According to the majority, [t]his case does not involve anything close to the pattern of delay found in Calex .... See supra at 339. The majority is correct in this analysis--Calex involves an extreme example of dilatory bargaining tactics. The majority's analysis, however, is also misleading. The comparison between the facts of the case at hand and those of Calex is true as far as it goes, but it does not answer the question of whether Horsehead has engaged in dilatory bargaining. Just because Horsehead has not acted as egregiously as Calex Corporation does not mean that Horsehead has bargained in good faith. Calex does not provide a baseline level for judging dilatory tactics. I see Calex rather as an extreme example and believe that a company can run afoul of the labor laws, as Horsehead has here, without reaching the level of obstructionism exhibited in Calex. 87 The majority contends that the Board erred in refusing to consider Horsehead's proffered evidence of post-lockout negotiations and contract resolution. I believe the Board acted correctly. Horsehead attempted to introduce affidavits in which the company's chief negotiator testified regarding the ongoing negotiations and their ultimate resolution in a completed contract. The majority argues that these affidavits would have been instructive on Horsehead's desire to reach an agreement and therefore show that the company did not negotiate in bad faith. No one doubts that Horsehead intended to reach an agreement--on its terms. The Board questioned the tactics Horsehead used prior to the lockout, and this pre-lockout bargaining bears no relation to post-lockout negotiations. Evidence of post-lockout negotiations is therefore not relevant to accusations of pre-lockout bad faith. Cf. NLRB v. Ramona's Mexican Food Prods., 531 F.2d 390, 393 (9th Cir.1975) (The ultimate terms of the post strike agreement reached after a long unsuccessful unfair labor practices strike infers more to the success of the Company officials' evasive, stalling, and unlawful tactics than it does to the presence of good faith bargaining.). Under the majority's reasoning, a company could engage in the most nefarious negotiating tactics possible, force a lockout to put pressure on the employees, and then attempt to clean up the mess with good-faith, post-lockout bargaining. Horsehead cannot retroactively cure its prior negotiating tactics with post-lockout bargaining, and evidence regarding these activities has no relevance to pre-lockout activities.