Opinion ID: 1613303
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the issuance of an arrest warrant for an alleged parole violation suspended the running of williams' parole supervision time.

Text: Williams argues that the Board had no authority to revoke his parole because he maintains his sentence had already been fully served. The Board contends that their February 2, 1988 warrant suspended the running of his parole supervision time. They rely on SDCL 24-15-21 which currently provides: If the executive director of the board is satisfied that any provision of § 24-15-20 has been violated, the executive director may issue a warrant to the department of corrections, any law enforcement officer, or any parole agent, directing that the parolee named be arrested. Pursuant to the provisions of § 24-15-23 the parolee may be returned to the state penitentiary. Upon the issuance of the warrant, the running of the parole supervision time shall be suspended until the board has entered its final order on the revocation. The board shall credit the inmate with time spent in custody as a direct result of the parole violation. (emphasis added). Thus, the statute currently in effect clearly specifies that the issuance of a warrant suspends the running of parole supervision time. Williams' case presents a special problem because that provision in the current version of SDCL 24-15-21 was not enacted until 1986, five years after Williams was convicted and two years after he was paroled. The version of the statute in effect when Williams was convicted and paroled did not contain the sentence which suspends the running of parole supervision time upon the issuance of a parole violation arrest warrant. Williams argues that the application of that 1986 version of the statute to him is a violation of the ex post facto prohibitions in the United States Constitution. Two elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be considered ex post facto. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 964, 67 L.Ed.2d 17, 23 (1981) [I]t must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Id. (footnotes omitted). In this case SDCL 24-15-21 was not being applied retrospectively. Williams argues that the 1986 statute was being applied to his 1981 conviction or his 1984 parole. In reality, the 1986 statute was applied to his 1987 parole violation. SDCL 24-15-21, including the provision regarding the suspension of parole supervision time, was enacted and in effect before Williams was convicted of passing fraudulent checks in South Carolina. Thus the 1986 statute was not being applied to conduct which occurred before its enactment. There was no retrospective application and accordingly there is no valid ex post facto objection. The issuance of the warrant in 1988 suspended the running of Williams' parole supervision time. The Board had authority to revoke Williams' parole.