Opinion ID: 880569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the court commit error in limiting and excluding testimony of plaintiff's labor relations expert?

Text: The District Court denied plaintiff's offer of proof through the witness Allan D. Brown that the policies of the defendant were deficient in good personnel practices; that the defendant failed to act in good faith, based upon the information made available to Brown from the case; that the policies of the defendant in connection with the termination of personnel in a reduction of force proceedings were not adequate; that the manner of which Mahan was terminated was not conducted fairly through a good personnel policy; and that the actual termination of the plaintiff was unfair under all the circumstances of the case. In denying the offer of proof, the District Court indicated that it would limit the testimony of the expert to the personnel manual then in existence, and that it would not permit the witness to testify as to his opinion that the company may have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The District Court indicated that it was basing its decision upon the cases of Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hospital (1984), 213 Mont. 488, 693 P.2d 487, and Flanigan v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan (Mont. 1986), 720 P.2d 257, 43 St.Rep. 941. In Crenshaw, relying on Rule 702, M.R. Evid., that the testimony of an expert is admissible if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, this Court said: The trier of fact's experience does not extend to Hospital disciplinary guidelines, much less the ability to evaluate the propriety of such guidelines. We find Dr. Vinton's perspective assisted the jury to understand the evidence and ultimately the breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing question at issue. Further, the Hospital's counsel moved in limine to exclude Dr. Vinton's testimony. The argument was presented to the trial judge. The trial court in its broad discretion admitted the expert testimony. The trial court's order will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. [Citing cases.] Crenshaw, 213 Mont. at 405, 693 P.2d at 495. In Crenshaw, this Court also noted: The instant case is not a scenario of simple facts. Fault arising from breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not easily comprehensible to the average person. Dr. Vinton's testimony was based on professional expertise and experience which the individual jury members were unlikely to possess. Her testimony assisted the trier of fact by providing the jury with information and a prospective [sic] beyond the common experience of a lay juror. [Citing authority.] Crenshaw, 213 Mont. at 502, 693 P.2d at 494. In Flanigan, this Court approved the foregoing statements from Crenshaw, and went on to state that the District Court in Flanigan had acted properly in allowing expert testimony interpreting written employment policies of the employer. It appears that the order of the District Court during trial correctly interpreted our holdings in both Crenshaw and Flanigan. In the case at bar, the court did permit experts for both parties to testify as to whether the company complied with or violated its own policies. That ruling, of course, followed Crenshaw and Flanigan. As to whether the District Court erred in disallowing opinion testimony from the expert about the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, we are unable to say. The offer of proof did not include the specifics on which the proper testimony of the expert witness would be based. We only restate that under Flanigan, based on Crenshaw, opinion testimony from expert witnesses considering the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is admissible, provided that foundation testimony is in the record, and the conditions of Rule 702, M.R.Evid., that the specialized knowledge of the expert will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine the fact of issue are met. Though not explicitly stated in the record, it appears that part of the reason for the District Court's refusal of the offer of proof in this case was based upon the expert's background and experience, since he had made no study of nationwide policies and practices relating to terminations in reductions in force.