Opinion ID: 1717980
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Legal Principles to Facts.

Text: The testimony of prosecution witness Grunewald revealed to the trial court that Grunewald was represented by defense counsel Ross-Boon during the pre-trial stages of Ross-Boon's representation of Watson. The testimony established that this period of simultaneous representation included the time frame when Grunewald overheard Watson make an incriminating statement, when Grunewald reported this statement to the police, and when Grunewald was sentenced on the contempt charge. Based on this testimony, the trial court knew of Ross-Boon's dual representation of the defendant and a key prosecution witness. We next consider whether this dual representation gave rise to an actual conflict. Although most conflict of interest cases arise in the context of one attorney representing multiple defendants, a conflict of interest can arise in other factual scenarios. Basically, a conflict exists when an attorney is placed in a situation conducive to divided loyalties. Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1320 (8th Cir. 1991); accord State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 834 (Iowa 1997) (Lavorato, J., dissenting). We think that, under this standard, an actual conflict of interest existed in the present case. Unlike the joint representation of codefendants, where there may be a benefit to presenting a united defense, in the case of dual representation of the defendant and an adverse witness, there is no benefit to common representation. To the contrary, the potential for less zealous representation of the defendant is obvious. In a case of dual representation of the defendant and a prosecution witness, the Pennsylvania Superior Court analyzed the divergence of interests that is the hallmark of a conflict of interest: [The defendant's] interest and [the witness's] interest diverged with respect to [the attorney's] cross-examination of [the witness]. [The attorney] had an obligation to [the defendant] to use all the information at his disposal to impeach [the witness's] credibility. Yet, [the attorney] also had an obligation to [the witness] to maintain the confidentiality of [the witness's] communications with the Defender Association. Given these inconsistent duties, counsel was forced to make a Hobson's choice. One might argue that [the attorney] had a greater responsibility to [the defendant] than to [the witness]. Yet, the importance of maintaining client confidences cannot be lightly disregarded. Any statements made by [the witness] to the Defender Association in connection with his legal representation were covered by the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, a heightened concern for protecting confidences is particularly appropriate where a lawyer is called upon to cross-examine an individual whom his office represents.... We find that counsel had a duty to protect [the witness's] rights as well as a duty to protect [the defendant's] rights. Thus, an actual conflict of interest arose. In re Saladin, 359 Pa.Super. 326, 518 A.2d 1258, 1261-62 (1986) (citations omitted). Other courts have also concluded that an actual conflict of interest exists when an attorney represents the defendant and a prosecution witness. See, e.g., Castillo, 504 F.2d at 1245 (finding actual conflict where the defendant's attorney also represented the victim of the defendant's crime in an unrelated civil matter, noting that the attorney is likely to be restrained in the handling of that client/witness); Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir.1962) (holding, in case where criminal defendant sought to prove entrapment by police officer, that actual conflict would exist if defense attorney also represented the implicated officer in an unrelated matter); United States ex rel. Williamson v. LaVallee, 282 F.Supp. 968, 971 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (finding actual conflict of interest where defense attorney represented important prosecution witness); United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 253 F.Supp. 55, 57 (E.D.Pa.1966) (finding conflict of interest where attorney represented defendant and victim witness); James, 433 S.E.2d at 758 (holding that representation of defendant and witness resulted in an unavoidable conflict as to confidential communications). The State attempts to distinguish these authorities on two bases: (1) Ross-Boon no longer represented Grunewald at the time of trial; and (2) Ross-Boon did not cross-examine Grunewald; Ross-Boon's co-counsel, also an attorney with the Public Defender's Office, did. We do not think these facts insulated the defendant's counsel from the actual conflict of interest shown by the record. We begin our analysis with a review of Ross-Boon's ethical obligations to his clients. Ross-Boon had a duty to Watson to represent him zealously within the bounds of the law. Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 7-1. He also had a duty to Grunewald to maintain the confidences of Grunewald, see id. Canon 4, in other words, not to reveal information protected by the attorney-client privilege, see id. DR 4-101(A). Not only was defense counsel obliged to refrain from revealing the confidences of Grunewald, he was also obligated to preserve the secrets of Grunewald. See id. Canon 4. The term secrets is much broader than confidences. It includes any information gained in the professional relationship. . . the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. Id. DR 4-101(A). Moreover, Ross-Boon's ethical obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of Grunewald exist[ed] without regard to the nature or source of [the] information or the fact that others share[d] the knowledge. Id. EC 4-4. Of equal importance to the present case is the fact that the ethical obligations of defense counsel extended beyond a prohibition of merely revealing Grunewald's confidences and secrets. Counsel was also obligated to refrain from using Grunewald's confidences or secrets to the disadvantage of [Grunewald] or for the advantage. . . of a third party. Id. DR 4-101(B)(2)-(3); see also Williamson, 282 F.Supp. at 971 (noting that one danger in being represented by an attorney who is also representing a prosecution witness is that the scope of examination of the witness by the attorney might be restricted by the fact that the attorney has learned confidential information about his client-witness which cannot be revealed); People v. Coleman, 301 Ill.App.3d 290, 234 Ill.Dec. 525, 703 N.E.2d 137, 144 (1998) (holding that defense counsel's duty of confidentiality owed [client/witness] precluded the use of any helpful information that [client/witness] may have divulged to [defense counsel] in criminal trial of counsel's client/defendant). With this background, we now consider the State's contention that no conflict existed because, by the time of trial, Ross-Boon no longer represented Grunewald. We initially point out that there was simultaneous representation of Watson and Grunewald during some portion of the pre-trial period. [4] Thus, defense counsel's pre-trial investigation was burdened with the conflict between Grunewald's interests and Watson's interests. See Coleman, 234 Ill. Dec. 525, 703 N.E.2d at 144 (noting that defense counsel owed duty to client/witness during trial preparation as well as during trial). Ross-Boon's efforts to ferret out impeachment material based on the relationship between Grunewald and the victim, based on Grunewald's substance abuse problem, or based on any other ground would be dampened by the fact that he also represented Grunewald and had to ensure that he used no information gained in his relationship with Grunewald to Grunewald's disadvantage or to Watson's advantage. In addition, we think defense counsel's divided loyalties survived the termination of the attorney-client relationship between Ross-Boon and Grunewald. The end of this relationship did not lessen Ross-Boon's ethical obligation to Grunewald. He was still bound to maintain Grunewald's confidences and secrets. See Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 4-6 (The obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client continues after the termination of employment.). Simultaneously with his obligation not to use any information gained in [his] professional relationship with Grunewald the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or detrimental to Grunewald, id. DR 4-101(A), Ross-Boon was also obligated to zealously represent Watson by impeaching Grunewald with any information available to Ross-Boon. Clearly the impeachment of Grunewald would be embarrassing to Grunewald and would help Watson. See Okeani v. Superior Ct., 178 Ariz. 180, 871 P.2d 727, 728 (Ct.App.1993) (holding that, in fulfilling duty to client/defendant by impeaching client/witness, counsel causes an adverse effect on client/witness, which is clearly a conflict of interest). In our opinion, Ross-Boon was burdened by an actual conflict of interest at trial despite the fact that he no longer represented Grunewald. See id. at 729 (holding that conflict was not resolved simply because the witness's legal matter had been resolved before trial and she thus had become a former client of the Public Defender); Coleman, 234 Ill.Dec. 525, 703 N.E.2d at 144 (holding that defense counsel's withdrawal as counsel for witness before witness's testimony did not cure the conflict). As for the State's second argument that Ross-Boon did not cross-examine Grunewald we point out that attorneys in the same office are permitted to share confidences. See Iowa Code of Prof'l Responsibility EC 4-2 (Unless the client otherwise directs, a lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client to partners or associates of the lawyer's firm.). Therefore, all members of the Public Defenders Office were bound to protect Grunewald's confidences and secrets. Thus, Ross-Boon's co-counsel labored under the same conflict of interest as did Ross-Boon. Moreover, Ross-Boon's obligation to zealously represent his client, the defendant, was not suspended simply because his co-counsel was the one who asked Grunewald questions on the witness stand. Ross-Boon still had an obligation to Watson to contribute what he could to the defense team's preparation for Grunewald's cross-examination, including pre-trial investigation. We conclude, therefore, that Ross-Boon's decision not to personally examine Grunewald was insufficient to remove the actual conflict of interest that burdened Watson's defense team. See Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979, 984-85 (7th Cir.1980) (finding actual conflict where counsel had access to confidences of witness who was associate's client); Okeani, 871 P.2d at 728 (The conflict of interest is not alleviated by the fact that defendant and the victim were represented by different lawyers with the Public Defender's Office.); In re Saladin, 518 A.2d at 1260 n. 4 (Even the representation of two clients by different attorneys employed by the same Defender Association constitutes dual representation for the purpose of conflict of interest analysis.).