Opinion ID: 799956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial Commentary and Jury Instructions

Text: The appellant next alleges that at various junctures, the district court inaccurately and prejudicially commented on the evidence, thus skewing the proceedings and depriving him of an impartial trial. Specifically, he contends that, in making several remarks during trial and in issuing instructions, the trial judge (1) bolstered the perceived strength of the government's case, (2) assumed the otherwise contested identification of Valdivia's voice on certain wiretap recordings, and (3) presaged the present appeal, thereby implying the judge's expectation of a conviction. We address these claims in turn.
As part of its case-in-chief, the government presented evidenceincluding the testimony of a Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.) chemist, and a copy of the chemist's forensic laboratory reportto show that the substance possessed by Giovani Castro upon his arrest, and intended for delivery to Valdivia, was in fact heroin. Because the substance itself had been destroyed by the government prior to trial, defense counsel objected that the chain of custody was deficient, leading to the following exchange with the trial judge in front of the jury: Defense Counsel: The case against my client relies on [the drugs seized from Castro on October 9, 2001]. [ ... ] Court: Partially. It does partially, because even if the drugs do not exist ... there is plenty of other evidence here, if the jury believes it, to convict your client. Defense Counsel: [ ... ] What can we do with [destroyed] evidence and ... partial testimony? Court: Sir, if I eliminate the drugs [found on Castro], the case still goes against your client, based on the testimony of all the other witnesses. [ ... ] And then the jury will decide. The court then excused the jury at the government's request, and further explained: [T]o make matters very clear, even if the Court eliminates the [drugs found on Castro] and gives an instruction to the jury to disregard the transaction of [Castro], this case still goes to the jury because there was plenty of evidence provided by the cooperator that he provided heroin to ... and collected from [Valdivia]. Upon its return, the jury was instructed that the chain-of-custody issue raised by defense counsel affected only the weight, and not the admissibility, of the chemist's testimony. At the beginning of the next trial day, the judge prefaced his issuance of a lengthy superseding instruction by noting that, last [trial day], ... there was a discussion between counsel [and with the Court] as to the law ... and I am going to... order you to disregard anything that you may have heard as to that discussion[,] and the instruction [from] that day is ... superseded by this instruction.... To eliminate any created confusion, the court then proceeded to define the elements of criminal conspiracy, explaining in pertinent part: [S]ince overt acts are [no longer a] necessary [element of conspiracy], the ... physical presence of drugs is not required, because that would be an overt act. [In] this case, however, the [government] has chosen to prove overt acts. And there have been many overt acts allegedly testified. And you will provide credible [sic], yes or no, as to those overt acts. And I am ordering that you... are not to decide credibility until the end of the case when you have all of the evidence in. Examples of overt acts are the fact that drugs came in ... tires of bicycles[,] ... whether or not a person went to charge for the drugs, and whether or not a person went to deliver the drugs. All of those are overt acts. [... ] The defense can challenge [the overt acts], and it will be up to you to decide whether or not the [government] has proven [them]. (emphasis added). According to Valdivia, the judge's comments and the highlighted portions of the instructions fostered the impression that the court had prematurely concluded that the evidence was sufficient, effectively usurping the jury's ability to weigh it for proof of guilt. We disagree. A trial judge is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct, and has a perfect right albeit a right that should be exercised with careto participate actively [at trial]. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir.1997) (internal citation omitted). Trial judges in the federal system thus retain the power to analyze, dissect, explain, summarize, and comment on the evidence, so long as their participation is balanced, and does not render unfair advantage to either party. Id. Ultimately, an inquiry into the propriety of a judge's actions in this regard will turn on whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice. See United States v. González-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir.1997). After a painstaking review of the trial record, we conclude that the judge's actions did not amount to reversible error. As a preliminary matter, all of the challenged statements and instructions were provided with a single purpose in mind: to resolve any confusion caused by defense counsel's assertion, in the presence of the jury, that the unavailability of the substance in Castro's possession was somehow dispositive of the government's case. The court was merely attempting to clarify the elements necessary for a finding of guilt. See United States v. Quesada-Bonilla, 952 F.2d 597, 600-01 (1st Cir.1991) (failing to find prejudice in part because defense counsel ... provoked the court's comment). There is little doubt that, in doing so, some of the language employedthere is plenty of other evidence ... to convict your client, and the case still goes against your clientif considered in isolation, could give a reviewing court some pause. But we cannot read such words as singular, insular statements; rather, we must gauge them in light of the overall record. Logue, 103 F.3d at 1046; United States v. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 296 (1st Cir.1979). Properly viewed in that broader context, the contested statements were contemporaneously tempered by qualifying language like if the jury believes it and then the jury will decide, and any lingering untoward effects were almost certainly cured by the court's mandate to disregard the remarks, and its numerous and explicit reminders that the jury alone retains the exclusive function of judging the facts. See United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 36 (1st Cir.1999) (holding that jury instructions are a useful means of allaying potential prejudice). Thus, the court's commentary, though in some instances perhaps inartfully constructed, did not substantially taint the proceedings. We similarly fail to discern any error as to the substance of the court's curative instruction on the elements of conspiracy. The use of evidentiary exemplars from the body of existing trial evidence to illustrate the meaning of overt acts was not improper; we have repeatedly stated that the trial judge is not limited to instructions in the abstract. The judge may explain, comment upon and incorporate the evidence into the instructions in order to assist the jury to understand it in light of the applicable legal principles. United States v. Maguire, 918 F.2d 254, 268 (1st Cir.1990) (internal citation omitted). This is precisely what the court did: incorporate the evidence in order to explicate the governing law. In plumbing any other meaning, the appellant is most assuredly overreaching.
The appellant's second claim of inappropriate conduct fares no better. Faced with the proffer of recordings from the Aruban wiretap investigation, defense counsel objected, questioning the authenticity of the tapes and submitting that there was insufficient foundational proof that the voice was indeed that of the defendant. The court, in addressing the objection at some length, made the following remark before the jury, which the appellant now urges must result in vacating his conviction: Whether [the tapes are] going to be played to the jury, remember what I said, please.... The jury is not going to hear any of this until I'm satisfied that those tapes contain Mr. Valdivia, and whether or not I cansomebody can identify his voice. (emphasis added). Valdivia submits that the court's subsequent admission of the recordings, in conjunction with this statement, left the jury with little choice but to conclude that the voice on the tapes belonged to him. As noted above, in determining the prejudicial effect of such a statement, we review it not independently, but as part and parcel of the record in its entirety. Logue, 103 F.3d at 1046; Richman, 600 F.2d at 296. That record, upon closer inspection, divulges meaningful pieces of the exchange that were omitted from the appellant's brief. For example, almost immediately prior to the contested statement, the court opined: [T]his Court ... will not allow any arguments, relating to any other tape but the tape of Mr. Valdivia if somebody identified the voice of Mr. Valdivia. So whatever happened that may be in that tape... relating to any other person other than Mr. Valdivia, ... I'm not going to allow [it]. [ ... ] [T]he only tapes [to] be played and produced in evidence will be the tapes of the Defendant if somebody ... properly identified the tapes of the Defendant. [ ... ] [T]he only case I have is if somebody identifies the tapes, that this José Valdivia is him. And I don't know if it will be, because it will be the jury that will decide if the voice identification made is reliable to them. It's not going to be me, it's going to be ultimately the jury. (emphasis added). A short time later, the court continued: [T]he Court admits the tape, subject to the weight the jury may provide because... the fact that the Court accepts a document does not mean that you have to provide it weight. The weight will depend on the credibility and the defendant may attack the weight of the [tape]. [... ] The Defendant is not precluded and can challenge the ... tape. These statements, and the court's many admonitions to reserve judgment until all of the evidence had been presented, were enough to ameliorate any perceived impropriety. See Richman, 600 F.2d at 296 (holding that similar instructions to the jury effectively cured whatever error had been made). [9]
The appellant's final charge of prejudicial commentary, which he raises for the first time on appeal, need not detain us. Confronted on several occasions with the need for English translations, the court noted that such translations were required for appeal purposes, and reflected on the importance of making a proper record for appeal. The appellant's brief is devoid of any developed argumentation on the issue, offering only an oblique suggestion that, in conjunction with the other prejudicial remarks, the comments warrant closer consideration. Such sparse elaboration falls far short of the development required for consideration on appeal, and we could reject the claim on this ground alone. See United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (holding that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived). Moreover, the record here reflects a wholly rational explanation for the court's references. As we have said, it is clear, to the point of transparency, that federal court proceedings must be conducted in English.... [And] parties are required to translate all foreign language documents into English. United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1, 5, 7 n. 4 (1st Cir.2002). Normally, the submission of foreign documents unaccompanied by English translations is error, and such documents would not be considered on appeal. See United States v. Contreras Palacios, 492 F.3d 39, 43 n. 7 (1st Cir.2007). The court, in neutrally referencing the preservation of the record, was merely explaining to the jury the significance of the translations in light of these stringent rules. Such comments were not impermissible, let alone prejudicial.