Opinion ID: 397893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defamation count.

Text: 27 The complaint in this action included a count charging that Olin Corporation had defamed Seymour. Seymour's counsel mentioned this allegation in his opening statement to the jury. The only testimony which Olin points to on this issue was Seymour's testimony that his son had heard on the school playground that Seymour was going to prison because (he) had stole a bunch of stuff and got fired. (Record, vol. IV at 81). At the close of plaintiff's case, the district court granted a directed verdict in Olin's favor with respect to the defamation count. 28 Prior to the closing arguments to the jury, counsel for Olin requested that the court permit him to argue to the jury that counsel for Seymour had promised in his opening statement to prove the defamation count and that he had failed to do so as evidenced by the directed verdict in Olin's favor. (Record, vol. VII at 26-27). 29 On appeal, Olin argues that the refusal of the district court to let counsel for Olin make this argument to the jury deprived him of a valuable trial technique and allowed the jury to consider highly prejudicial testimony. We find no merit in these contentions. 30 Olin argues that its counsel was denied the opportunity to pound Seymour's counsel to pieces about his unfulfilled promises. Brief for Olin at 39. It notes that the jury could infer from the grant of the directed verdict and Seymour's opening statement that Seymour's entire case was suspect. We believe that the district court properly refused to allow Olin to argue to the jury that it should make such an inference. In essence, Olin's argument would have encouraged the jury to give the directed verdict on the defamation count far more effect than it warranted. The district court does not express any view on the merits of other claims in a case when it directs a verdict on one count, and any attempt to persuade the jury to make an inference that it does is impermissible. 31 Counsel for Olin neither moved to strike the evidence that had been introduced to support the defamation count, nor requested an instruction that the jury disregard such evidence, nor in any way mentioned to the district judge any potential prejudicial effect that would ensue from a failure to strike such evidence from the record. Accordingly, Olin has waived any claim of error in this respect. Where no request for a jury instruction is made, a party may not generally assign as error a trial court's refusal to give such an instruction. See Bissett v. Ply-Gem Industries, Inc., 533 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1976); Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. Failure to request an instruction or make a proper objection is excused only where the prejudicial effect of failing to give such an instruction is so clear that the district judge should make the instruction on his own motion. Here, the limited testimony relating to the defamation count is not so clearly prejudicial to justify reversal in this case. 32