Opinion ID: 552387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The District Court's Refusal to Give a Special Verdict Form to the Jury

Text: 34 Defendant requested that the District Court provide the jury with a special interrogatory so that the jury, if it found defendant guilty, could designate the quantity of cocaine involved in the conspiracy while defendant was a member. 6 35 The District Court denied this request, concluding that the quantity of cocaine involved in the conspiracy was not an element of the charged offense and therefore not an issue for the jury. 7 Defendant argues that this denial resulted in an ambiguous verdict for sentencing purposes: defendant's guilt could be premised on his involvement with four ounces or two kilograms of cocaine. 36 The use of a special interrogatory is proper when a conspiracy has two objects. See Orozco-Prada, 732 F.2d at 1083. In Orozco-Prada, the court concluded that defendant's sentence was defective because the basis of his guilt could not be determined. The defendant was charged with a conspiracy punishable under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841. The statute established different sentencing ranges for marijuana-related conspiracies and cocaine-related conspiracies. A jury found defendant guilty, and the court sentenced defendant to eight years, a penalty in excess of the statutory maximum established for marijuana-related conspiracies, but within the statutory range for cocaine-related conspiracies. The sentence was held to be unenforceable because, lacking a special interrogatory, the object of the conspiracy--cocaine or marijuana distribution, or both--could not be determined. Similarly, courts have required the use of special interrogatories when defendant's conviction rests on counts charging the violation of multiple statutes, each with different maximum sentences. United States v. Noah, 475 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1095, 94 S.Ct. 728, 38 L.Ed.2d 553 (1973); Brown v. United States, 299 F.2d 438 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thornton v. United States, 370 U.S. 946, 82 S.Ct. 1593, 8 L.Ed.2d 812 (1962). 37 The instant case, however, differs from the above cases. The jury in the instant case determined that defendant was involved in a conspiracy involving cocaine. Thus, the verdict presented no ambiguity. The District Court knew that the conviction was based on a cocaine-related offense and could impose a sentence in accordance with 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b). To be sure, section 841(b) establishes different maximum sentences depending on the amount of cocaine involved. Yet, this Court has concluded that the amount of drug determined pursuant to section 841(b) is not an element of the offense stated in section 841(a). See United States v. Moreno, 899 F.2d 465, 473 (6th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 1382, 1390 (8th Cir.1987) (holding that Sec. 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) was a sentencing consideration and not an element of the offense, and that there is no constitutional right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence turns upon specific findings of fact). Accordingly, the sentencing judge, not the jury, has the prerogative to make a determination of the quantity of drugs involved in the scheme and to sentence accordingly. Moreno, 899 F.2d at 473. 38 We conclude that the District Court did not err in denying defendant's request to submit a special interrogatory to the jury on the issue of the amount of cocaine involved in the conspiracy.