Opinion ID: 2365342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: acquiescence as waiver

Text: ¶ 16 Again, according to the officers' testimony, Officer Malone knocked on the apartment door and Schultz answered. Schultz initially denied anyone was there, and then, Robertson appeared from the bedroom, Schultz stepped back, the door opened wider, and the officers walked inside. Schultz testified she stepped to the side because the officers were coming in. Under either version, it is uncontested that neither officer requested permission to enter nor advised Schultz she could refuse a search. The trial court found only acquiescence; it did not find that Schultz consented to the entry. The Court of Appeals' description of the fact states that Schultz did not object to Malone's presence. Schultz, 146 Wash.App. at 1057, 2008 WL 4216255, . ¶ 17 Thus the police, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals seem to be of the view that the protections of article I, section 7 against warrantless intrusions into private affairs and homes are easily waived by silent acquiescence. We disagree. Individuals do not waive this constitutional right by failing to object when the police storm into their homes. [2] Nor do they waive their rights when the police enter their homes without their consent just because they are too afraid or too dumbfounded by the brazenness of the action to speak up. The right not to be disturbed in one's home by the police without authority of law is the bedrock principle upon which our search and seizure jurisprudence is grounded. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d at 112, 960 P.2d 927 (citing Young, 123 Wash.2d at 185, 867 P.2d 593). ¶ 18 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution establishes the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. This constitutional protection was, in part, in response to representatives of the King, writs of assistance, [3] and doubtlessly with muskets in hand, entering homes at will both in England and in the colonies. See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 425-29 (7th ed. 1903); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 n. 5, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886) (citing 3 THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND SINCE THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE THIRD 1760-1860, ch. 11 (1863); HERBERT BROOM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 558 (George L. Denman ed., 2d ed. 1885); HOMERSHAM COX, INSTITUTIONS OF ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 437 (1863)), abrogation recognized by Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976). A century later the framers of the Washington Constitution were presented with a proposed state provision identical to the Fourth Amendment, and they rejected it in favor of the present article I, section 7 prohibiting the invasion of a home without authority of law. See State v. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d 170, 178, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) (citing THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 497 (Beverly Paulik Rosenow ed. 1962)). Article I, section 7 differs from the Fourth Amendment in that it clearly recognizes an individual's right of privacy with no express limitations. Simpson, 95 Wash.2d at 178, 622 P.2d 1199. Article I, section 7, does not use the words `reasonable' or `unreasonable.' Instead, it requires `authority of law' before the State may pry into the private affairs of individuals. Day, 161 Wash.2d at 896, 168 P.3d 1265. These important constitutional protections cannot easily be brushed aside by representatives of the government. As with other constitutional rights, they are not necessarily absolute and may be waived but only by informed and meaningful consent. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d at 115-19, 960 P.2d 927; accord State v. Morse, 156 Wash.2d 1, 4-5, 123 P.3d 832 (2005). ¶ 19 Ferrier is illustrative of limitations of state authority in the face of constitutional protections. There, officers had a tip of illegal activities but not sufficient grounds for a warrant. They decided to use a knock and talk procedure to attempt to obtain Ferrier's consent for a search. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 960 P.2d 927. We concluded the procedure was inherently coercive to some degree. [T]he great majority of home dwellers confronted by police officers on their doorstep or in their home would not question the absence of a search warrant because they either (1) would not know that a warrant is required; (2) would feel inhibited from requesting its production, even if they knew of the warrant requirement; or (3) would simply be too stunned by the circumstances to make a reasoned decision about whether or not to consent to a warrantless search. Id. at 115, 960 P.2d 927. Accordingly, we held that when police officers conduct a knock and talk procedure to obtain consent to search a home, they must, prior to entry, inform the person of the right to refuse or revoke consent. Id. at 118, 960 P.2d 927. Although the police in Ferrier said they had obtained consent, Ferrier, like Schultz, testified that the police just stepped into the house. Id. at 107-08, 960 P.2d 927. We later clarified that the Ferrier requirement was limited to situations where police request entry into a home to conduct a warrantless search. State v. Khounvichai, 149 Wash.2d 557, 563, 69 P.3d 862 (2003) (citing State v. Williams, 142 Wash.2d 17, 28, 11 P.3d 714 (2000)). ¶ 20 But neither Williams nor Khounvichai suggests that mere acquiescence is consent. That was not the question before the court in either case. Further, in Khounvichai police actually obtained consent, albeit without the better practice of the Ferrier warning, before entering the residence, and in Williams the police had an arrest warrant and obtained consent of a tenant before entering the residence. Khounvichai, 149 Wash.2d at 561, 69 P.3d 862; Williams, 142 Wash.2d at 20, 11 P.3d 714.