Opinion ID: 71998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Good Character

Text: Pierce introduced evidence of his good character before the crime, including that he was kind to his mother, was honest and admitted past wrongs to her, and regularly attended church. Pierce also presented evidence of his good character as it developed after he committed the crime. This evidence included that he had matured emotionally and spiritually while in prison, developing his ability to speak and articulate his thoughts and becoming more open and able to communicate his feelings. Pierce also matured in prison by furthering his education, improving his reading skills, and developing his talent for art and woodworking. In Franklin, five Justices (two concurring, three dissenting) indicated, in dicta, that the special issues would not allow a jury to give meaningful consideration and effect to this type of good character evidence. Justice O'Connor's concurrence stated that although the petitioner's evidence of good behavior in prison lacked relevance to any issue other than future dangerousness, had the petitioner presented [e]vidence of voluntary service, kindness to others, or of religious devotion, an additional instruction would have been required: [i]f [the] petitioner had introduced mitigating evidence about his background or character or the circumstances of the crime that was not relevant to the special verdict questions, or that had relevance to the defendant's moral culpability beyond the scope of the special verdict questions, the jury instructions would have provided the jury with no vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to that evidence. 487 U.S. at 185-86, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens's dissent likewise emphasized that character evidence of this type may suggest that the conduct of which the defendant stands convicted was not in keeping with his or her usual qualities or traits, a fact that has as much relevance to culpability as to future dangerousness. Id. at 190, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Since Franklin, the Court's jurisprudence on California's death penalty statute [7] has repeatedly held that character evidence has relevance to a petitioner's moral culpability. See, e.g., Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 15, 127 S.Ct. 469, 166 L.Ed.2d 334 (2006) (noting that good character evidence may extenuate[ ] the gravity of the crime); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 142-43, 125 S.Ct. 1432, 161 L.Ed.2d 334 (2005) (commenting on the relevance of good character evidence as a means of lessen[ing] or excus[ing] a defendant's culpability); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990) (commenting on relevance of good character evidence as a means of showing character strengths in the face of . . . difficulties and showing that criminal conduct was an aberration from otherwise good character). [8] Evidence of postcrime character transformations is also relevant: [T]o accept the view that such evidence could not [be relevant to moral culpability] because it occurred after the crime, one would have to reach the surprising conclusion that remorse could never serve to lessen or excuse a crime. But remorse, which by definition can only be experienced after a crime's commission, is something commonly thought to lessen or excuse a defendant's culpability. Brown, 544 U.S. at 142-43, 125 S.Ct. 1432; see also Ayers, 549 U.S. at 15-16, 127 S.Ct. 469 (noting that it would be counterintuitive if a defendant's capacity to redeem himself through good works [after the crime] could not extenuate his offense and render him less deserving of a death sentence). Ayers and Brown set out the clearly established law as it existed in 1994. 549 U.S. at 10, 127 S.Ct. 469; 544 U.S. at 139, 125 S.Ct. 1432. Boyde was a direct appeal decided in 1990, well before the denial of Pierce's state habeas application became final in 2001. All of these authorities set out the clearly established law for purposes of this case. The Court has addressed good character evidence in the context of the Texas special issues only once since Franklin, in Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S.Ct. 892. The State urges that Graham stands for the proposition that the special issues allow juries to give meaningful consideration and effect to good character evidence. In Graham, the Court considered the petitioner's mitigating evidence that he had a transient upbringing, was a generous person, and loved the Lord. Id. at 464, 113 S.Ct. 892 (alterations omitted). The Court stated, in dicta, that the special issues allowed the jury to give at least some effect to this character evidence, and indicated that some effect was all that was constitutionally required. Id. at 476-77, 113 S.Ct. 892. Graham 's actual holding, however, was that under the law as it existed in 1984 (the year the petitioner's conviction became final) the relief that the petitioner sought would have constituted a new rule, in violation of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Id. at 477, 113 S.Ct. 892. The Abdul-Kabir majority took pains to distinguish Graham 's some effect language as dicta, 550 U.S. at 258-59, 127 S.Ct. 1654, as did this court in Nelson, in which we rejected the State's contention that Graham altered the requirement that the jury be able to give full consideration and full effect to the capital defendant's mitigating evidence, 472 F.3d at 298 (Because the [ Graham ] Court disposed of the case on Teague grounds, it did not address the substantive merits of the petitioner's Penry claim.). [9] Both Abdul-Kabir and Brewer emphasize the importance of allowing juries to give meaningful effect to any mitigating evidence providing a basis for a sentence of life rather than death. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 260, 127 S.Ct. 1654 (emphases added). The California cases establish that good character evidence has meaningful relevance to moral culpability, which a majority of the Justices in Franklin indicated is not encompassed by the special issues. These authorities establish that an additional instruction was required in order for the jury to consider and give effect to this mitigating evidence.