Opinion ID: 1119388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Requires an Inquiry into Whether a Licensee Was Actually Driving a Vehicle before a Driver's License May Be Suspended.

Text: A driver's license represents an important property interest which is protected under the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution. Haynes v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 865 P.2d 753, 756 (Alaska 1993); Graham v. State, 633 P.2d 211, 216 (Alaska 1981). We have held that licensees are entitled to a meaningful hearing before their driver's licenses may be revoked or suspended. Graham, 633 P.2d at 216. In examining whether a hearing is a meaningful one, we are guided by considerations of fundamental fairness. Thorne v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Whisenhunt v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 746 P.2d 1298, 1300 (Alaska 1987)). For example, the denial of an opportunity at an administrative revocation hearing to challenge the reliability and credibility of the breath test operates as a denial of a meaningful and fundamentally fair hearing. Champion v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 721 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1986) (holding failure to take reasonable steps to preserve breath sample violates due process). We have written that a meaningful hearing would require the presence of the arresting officer, the production of the report of the arresting officer and any tape recordings, videotapes, or transcripts concerning events surrounding the arrest, and the presence of witnesses having evidence to offer on contested points. Graham, 633 P.2d at 216 n. 12. Also, in order for results of a breath test to be admissible at an administrative revocation hearing, the State must preserve the breath test sample or give the driver an opportunity to obtain an independent test, Briggs v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 732 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Alaska 1987), and the driver must be given a reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney before being required to take the test, Whisenhunt v. State, Dep't of Public Safety, 746 P.2d 1298 (Alaska 1987). We emphasized that driving is an important privilege which commands meaningful safeguards in Whisenhunt, where we extended criminal procedural safeguards to the administrative revocation context. 746 P.2d at 1298. We noted that in DWI cases, license revocation is often the most important and long-lasting sanction imposed on the defendant.... Driving is such an important privilege in our society that license revocation alone can reasonably be regarded as a significant sanction. Id. at 1299. We have thus rejected a formal distinction between civil and criminal proceedings when considerations of fundamental fairness are involved. Id. at 1300; Champion, 721 P.2d at 133. Alaska Statute 28.15.165 requires the administrative revocation of driver's licenses by the Department of Public Safety for drivers who fail a chemical sobriety test or who refuse to submit to such a test. Alaska Statute 28.15.166 allows administrative review of such a revocation. Subsection (g) of AS 28.15.166 limits the scope of the hearing officer's inquiry at a revocation proceeding: The hearing for review of action by the department under AS 28.15.165 shall be limited to the issues of whether the law enforcement officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle or commercial motor vehicle that was involved in an accident causing death or serious physical injury to another, or that the person was operating a motor vehicle, commercial motor vehicle, or aircraft while intoxicated in violation of AS 28.33.030 or AS 28.35.030 and whether (1) the person refused to submit to a chemical test authorized under AS 28.33.031(a) or AS 28.35.031(a) or (g) after being advised that refusal would result in disqualification or the suspension, revocation, or denial of the person's license, privilege to drive, or privilege to obtain a license, and that the refusal is a misdemeanor; (2) the chemical test administered under AS 28.33.031(a) or AS 28.35.031(a) or (g) produced a result described in AS 28.35.030(a)(2); or (3) the chemical test administered under AS 28.33.031(a) produced a result described in AS 28.33.030(a)(2). Javed's argument is simple and persuasive: a hearing which is statutorily limited to the reasonableness of the arresting officer's beliefs at the time of arrest is not necessarily meaningful or fundamentally fair. Revocation is not fair if the accused can demonstrate that he was not driving, regardless of the reasonable beliefs of the arresting officer. We noted in Thorne that the accused at a revocation hearing must be granted the opportunity to fully contest issues of `central importance' to the revocation decision. 774 P.2d at 1331 (quoting Champion, 721 P.2d at 133). In Thorne, that meant that the State had the duty to preserve a videotape of the accused performing sobriety tests so that Thorne could contest whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe he had been DWI. 774 P.2d at 1331-32. It is hard to imagine an issue of more central importance to a driver's license revocation hearing than whether the person accused of DWI was driving a vehicle in the first place. Intoxication alone may not justify the revocation of a driver's license. The State concedes that where a licensee takes and fails a breath test, it would be irrational to revoke his license unless he was in fact driving when he was arrested. Yet this is precisely what might happen where the evidence that the arrestee was driving is examined only from the perspective of the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. It is plausible that an officer might have unquestionably reasonable grounds to believe that a person was driving, but evidence presented by the arrestee later demonstrates that the officer was mistaken. Under the terms of AS 28.15.166(g), the later evidence may not be considered, and the license of a person who was not driving will be suspended. Due process requires that an arrestee who fails a breath test must be afforded the opportunity at an administrative revocation hearing to present evidence that he was not driving in order to make that hearing meaningful and fundamentally fair. [2] This court has previously implicitly allowed inquiries outside the literal scope of subsection .166(g) when due process required them. See Champion, 721 P.2d at 133 (allowing driver opportunity to test credibility of breathalyzer); Whisenhunt, 746 P.2d at 1299 (excluding test results where right to consult attorney violated); Graham, 633 P.2d at 216 n. 12 (holding that meaningful hearing requires presence of witnesses having evidence to offer on contested points). These cases generally assume that the inquiries will help to determine that a person who is accused of driving while intoxicated was actually intoxicated. But it is equally important to ensure a meaningful hearing where the person claims not to have been actually driving.