Opinion ID: 2809229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: administrative review claim

Text: Lalowski’s challenge to the district court’s ruling on his administrative review claim requires some discussion of the proceedings below. The deadline for dispositive motions in the district court was March 26, 2012. On that day, Prandini and the City filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the claims against them, and Lalowski filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim. However, neither the Board nor Lalowski moved for summary judgment on his administrative review claim. Indeed, Lalowski argued that his administrative review claim should not be decided until after his constitutional claims were resolved. In contrast, Prandini and the City took the position (rejected above) that Lalowski’s administrative review claim should be decided first because a ruling adverse to Lalowski on that claim would preclude his constitutional claims. 16 No. 12-3604 Although the Board did not move for summary judg- ment, it agreed with Prandini and the City that Lalowski’s administrative review claim should be resolved first, and on April 12, it moved to compel Lalowski to file a brief in support of that claim. The district court held a hearing on that motion on April 17, during which the court indicated that it would “review the file and issue an order.” However, as of June 19, no order was forthcoming, so the Board filed another motion asking the district court to establish a briefing schedule on the administrative review claim. At a hearing on June 26, the court denied both of the Board’s motions and stated that the administrative review issues would be “taken in context with the pending motions for summary judgment.” By this time, Lalowski, Prandini, and the City had already filed their responses to the pending motions for summary judgment. On October 17, after summary judgment briefing was complete, the district court held a hearing on the pending motions. The next day, the court issued a written order granting Prandini and the City’s motion for summary judgment, denying Lalowski’s motion for summary judgment, and sua sponte granting summary judgment in favor of the Board on Lalowski’s administrative review claim. On appeal, Lalowski contends that this latter ruling was improper because he was never given an opportunity to brief his administrative review claim. We agree. First, we note that summary judgment was the correct procedural mechanism to resolve Lalowski’s administrative review claim. That claim is governed by Illinois’s Administrative Review Law, which limits judicial review of a state administrative agency’s decision to the administrative recNo. 12-3604 17 ord. See 735 I.L.C.S. § 5/3-110 (“No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court.”). When a party seeks judicial review of administrative action in a federal district court, and the case is to be decided on the administrative record without further evidence, “the district court resolves the issue [through] summary judgment.” Johnson by Johnson v. Duneland Sch. Corp., 92 F.3d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Hunger v. Leininger, 15 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 1994)). The problem here is not that summary judgment was used to resolve Lalowski’s administrative review claim, but rather that the district court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of summary judgment. Because no party moved for it, the district court could grant summary judgment on Lalowski’s administrative review claim only “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). Yet, the court did not notify the parties of its intent to resolve the administrative review claim until after their summary judgment response briefs had been filed. Nor did it allow the parties an opportunity to separately brief that claim before entering summary judgment. Indeed, by denying both of the Board’s motions for briefing on the administrative review claim, the court made clear that it would not welcome such briefing. Consequently, the court failed to comply with Rule 56(f), and we must vacate its entry of summary judgment on Lalowski’s administrative review claim and remand for further proceedings. As discussed above, the district court properly entered summary judgment against Lalowski on his First Amend18 No. 12-3604 ment claim. As a result, all of Lalowski’s federal claims have been resolved, and on remand, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state administrative review claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In general, “when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent statelaw claims rather than resolving them on the merits.” Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos. Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (1994). “There are, however, unusual cases in which the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine— judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity—will point to federal decision of the state-law claims on the merits.” Id. We leave the decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lalowski’s administrative review claim to the sound discretion of the district court on remand.