Opinion ID: 1057985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Facts Developed at the Suppression Hearing

Text: At the suppression hearing on July 22, 2002, FBI Special Agent C.M. Sturgis testified that he interviewed the appellant on December 3, 1999, while the appellant was in custody in Oxford, Mississippi. The appellant was in custody on a warrant relating to the murder of William Bramlett, which murder occurred in Lafayette County, Mississippi. Agent Sturgis went to Oxford to question the appellant about his involvement with or knowledge of a missing college student, Hillary Johnson, from the University of Memphis. At the time of the interview, Agent Sturgis knew that the victim's credit cards had been used out of the state, the victim had been listed as missing by the Memphis Police Department, and the victim's vehicle had been recovered in Tippah County, Mississippi. The appellant had been apprehended approximately four miles from where the victim's car was recovered. The appellant had previously admitted to Memphis police officers that he had carjacked [the victim], that he had driven out Highway 64 somewhere near the county line, meaning Fayette County[, Tennessee]. He had dropped her off at the end of a road and had proceeded on and he had left her there. Agent Sturgis hoped that additional information could be gleaned from the appellant. When Agent Sturgis and Agent Rinehart arrived at the jail, they were met by Sheriff East and the attorney appointed to represent the appellant on the charges pending in Mississippi. The attorney agreed that as long as [the agents] did not discuss [the charges pending in Mississippi]. . . that it would be okay to go in if [the appellant] was willing to speak with [the agents.] At approximately 2:00 p.m., the agents were taken to a holding area outside the appellant's cell. Agent Sturgis testified that the area in which the appellant was confined had three individual cells. He was in the middle cell. All of the doors were unlocked and opened and there was a common area where you could sit that had a stainless steel picnic table. There was a television mounted on the wall, a pay phone, a shower, and rest room area. According to Agent Sturgis, the appellant seemed to be okay. He didn't seem like he was in any kind of health problems or miserable. . . . The agents asked the appellant if he was willing to speak with them and advised him of his rights. The appellant agreed to speak with the agents, advising them that he had just come from court on the Bramlett case and the judge had gone over his rights at length with him. The appellant never indicated that he did not understand his rights or that he had trouble hearing. Thereafter, the agents and the appellant watched television. The appellant periodically went from his cell to the picnic table where he would sit with the agents. They discussed the appellant's carpentry skills and the fact that he had recently lost a thumb. Eventually, Agent Sturgis pulled out an envelope containing childhood photographs of the victim. He removed the photographs from the envelope and placed them on the picnic table. The agents remarked that they would like to find the victim's body and asked the appellant if he would help them. The three men continued their conversation, discussing the appellant's past relationships, his education, and his prior periods of confinement. The appellant had a lengthy criminal history, spanning forty years. The appellant never requested an attorney and never indicated that he was tired or wanted to leave. During the interview, the appellant was served dinner and permitted to smoke a cigarette, although smoking in the jail was prohibited. Thereafter, the appellant returned to his cell. When he returned to the table, he tapped Agent Sturgis on the chest and said, I'm fixing to give you something. He then proceeded to draw a map on the back of the envelope which had contained the photographs of the victim. The agents relayed the information to investigators, but the investigators were unable to find the area described by the appellant. Eventually, the appellant agreed to ride with the agents and direct them to the location of the body. They left the Oxford jail at approximately 10:30 p.m. During the drive, the appellant never indicated that he no longer wanted to help the officers locate the victim's body or that he wanted to return to the jail. Agent Sturgis testified that when they located the body at approximately 1:20 a.m., the appellant broke down and was very upset about what all had happened. Although unable to recall the murder, the appellant stated that if she was laying there dead, that he guessed he did it. He further admitted that he had encountered the victim in midtown Memphis. The next day, Memphis law enforcement officials contacted Agent Sturgis and inquired whether the appellant would be willing to provide a recorded written statement. Agent Sturgis offered to return to Oxford to ask the appellant if he would provide another statement. Memphis Police Sergeant Gerald Blum testified that he and his partner, Sergeant Cox, first interviewed the appellant on November 30, 1999. The officers traveled to the Lafayette County Jail in Oxford, Mississippi, to interview the appellant as a potential suspect in the victim's disappearance. At 1:35 p.m. that afternoon, the officers advised the appellant of his Miranda rights, which were read to him from the Memphis Police Department advice of rights form. The appellant informed Sergeant Blum that he understood his rights, but he could not read or write and, although he was willing to talk with the officers, he refused to sign anything. The appellant then told the officers that he was the person responsible for carjacking the victim. He stated that he drove the victim out off of Highway 64 and let[ ] her out of the car. After interviewing the appellant for more than an hour, Sergeant Blum [t]ook a break. During the break, Agent Sturgis advised Sergeant Blum that the appellant had been positively identified as a robbery suspect in Alabama. Based upon this information, Sergeant Blum decided to question the appellant regarding the course of [his] travels during that time. At 6:48 p.m., Sergeant Blum resumed his questioning of the appellant and again advised the appellant of his rights. During this interview, Sergeant Blum asked, [I]f we find Ms. Johnson's body and it's determined there was foul play involved, who would be responsible and he said only me. The appellant also admitted to taking the victim's vehicle and traveling through several southern states. The second part of the interview concluded at 9:50 p.m. Sergeant Blum recalled that during the interview, the appellant did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. Sergeant Blum also stated that neither he nor anyone in his presence threatened, coerced, or made promises to the appellant. Moreover, the appellant never requested an attorney. However, the appellant informed the officers that he had completed only the third grade and could not read or write. Sergeant Blum testified that on December 4, 1999, he returned to Oxford to question the appellant. Sergeant Blum was taken to an interview room where the appellant's statement was to be tape recorded. The appellant was again advised of his rights and, this time, the appellant signed the advice of rights form. According to Sergeant Blum, the appellant appeared to be in good condition, calm, cooperative, and not under the influence of any drugs or intoxicants. During the interview, the appellant did not indicate that he wanted to terminate the interview or that he wanted counsel. The interview lasted approximately one hour. In his recorded statement, the appellant admitted that while runnin' from the law out of Mississippi, he stole the Bronco and drove through Memphis to Houston, Texas, and back to Memphis. While in Memphis, he visited his niece, who informed him that the police were looking for him. Thereafter, the appellant parked the Bronco on the street near his niece's apartment in midtown and started walkin'. As he walked across the street, a girl in a white, four-door car stopped and asked the appellant a question. The appellant jumped in the passenger side of the vehicle and told the girl that he wasn't gonna hurt her, all [he] needed was a way to get out of Shelby County. The appellant related that when he jumped into the car, he had two guns in his boots, one of which was the nine-millimeter pistol taken from the Bronco. The appellant stated that after driving several blocks, he and the victim switched places, and he drove east `till we got to Airways. When we got to Airways, I knowed where I was at then. We went to Airways around to [Interstate] 240. I went around Memphis to [Interstate] 40 going to Nashville and hit [Highway] 64 while I was going out that way. The appellant stated that he dumped [the victim] off out there in Shelby County and. . . hid her body under some tin. In his statement, the appellant claimed that although he was responsible for the victim's death, he was unable to recall how she died. However, he related that while in the woods, the victim pulled a knife from behind the seat. He grabbed her arm and took the knife from her. The appellant stated, I think she got cut. The appellant then dragged the victim's body to a field and placed her under some tin. After hiding the victim's body, the appellant took her car and drove to Alabama, Florida, and back to Mississippi. He used the victim's credit cards to finance his trip. The fifty-seven-year-old appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he had completed only the first grade. When he was twelve years old, he was placed in a school for boys, but was subsequently forced to leave because his father needed him to work in the fields. The appellant testified that he could not read or write. He related that while in the Lafayette County Jail he was questioned by approximately sixteen or eighteen law enforcement officers within a five-day period. According to the appellant, the officers failed to identify themselves and questioned him [d]ay and night, day and night. The appellant maintained that during the interview process, he was threatened physically by a Memphis police officer and was confined to his cell. When taken to the sally port to smoke a cigarette, the appellant was placed in leg irons, handcuffs, and waist chains and guarded by attack dogs. The appellant conceded that he understood some of the rights that were read to him; however, he was unable to recall signing the advice of rights form. In fact, he maintained that he ain't signed nothing. The appellant claimed that during the interview, he advised the officers that he was finished speaking with them, but the interview continued. The appellant also claimed that when he requested an attorney, Sheriff East brought an attorney to the door and said, [T]his is the attorney we are going to appoint you. The appellant testified that the man left and I ain't ever seen him since, not nary time since then. Regarding his alleged cooperation, the appellant stated, I tried to be as [cooperative as] I could . . . to keep from getting the hell beat out of me. The appellant further averred that he never agreed to physically direct the officers to the location of the victim's body. Rather, he was chained and placed in a patrol car. According to the appellant, the trip to Tennessee and then to Mississippi was without his consent. On cross-examination, the appellant admitted that he had prior convictions of robbery with a deadly weapon, rape, crime against nature, grand larceny, kidnapping, habitual criminal, and manslaughter. Based upon this proof, the trial court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: [T]here is ample proof in my judgment that the FBI Agents Sturgis and Rinehart gave Mr. Young his rights. Even Mr. Young conceded in his testimony, his sworn testimony today that he was advised of his rights orally. He does not remember them actually reading from a document the rights, but he does remember having been advised of his rights and concedes that he understood most of them. We didn't get into or the questioning didn't get into exactly what he claims he did not understand but he concedes that he understood most of them. That's from his testimony. Certainly from the testimony of the agents, he was fully advised of his rights and appeared to fully understand his rights prior to giving the oral statements that they took from him and prior to going with them up to Tennessee and the continuing statements that he provided in helping them locate the body. So I don't have any qualms about determining that he had been fully advised of his rights by the FBI agents prior to cooperating with them, giving them the oral statements that he gave and the statements that he gave in the process of helping to locate the body. In fact, the whole history of the statements that he gave would indicate a pattern of cooperation, a pattern of initially giving self-serving statements that then evolved into more incriminating statements. He first told the police even before the agents went down there that he had kidnapped the victim but had let her out at that intersection on Highway 64. And last time he saw her she was alive. That was his initial statement. So that would indicate a self-serving statement that would certainly indicate a statement freely and voluntarily given. And of course, when trying to view what Mr. Young is now claiming happened against what the officers claim happened, one has to evaluate the credibility of the various witnesses, and I find Mr. Young's credibility not to be very good given his prior record and the motive he would have today to shade things in his favor. With regard to whether he was advised of his rights by Officer Blum and whether he freely and voluntarily gave the statement to the Memphis Police Department, again, he was advised of his rights first on November 30 at 1:35 p.m. That was the time that he was read his rights but refused to sign. That's consistent with all that was presented. And then again on December 4th, when he was read his rights and did sign. Then provided the lengthy taped statement. There are several indications at the beginning  the tape itself has not been introduced into evidence, but the statement indicates that in the heading it was stated that this taped statement is made on Saturday, December 4th, 1999, in the Fayette County jail, Fayette County, Mississippi. I assume that means LaFayette County, 1611 hours to Sergeant Blum and Sergeant Cox. Farther down that first page, Question: Mr. Young, are you aware that we are recording this tape? Answer: Yes. Second page  well, after his rights are read to him again, they ask him: If you don't mind speaking up and saying yes instead of shaking your head. Answer: Yes. Which would again indicate that he knew it was being taped. And then later in the statement where Sergeant Blum indicates that he's turning the tape over to side B and asking Mr. Young to repeat his answer, would further indicate that he knew that the matter was being taped. I don't think it's any question. He knew it was being taped. He was freely and voluntarily giving the statement. In fact some of his answers, some of his responses  all of his responses in here would indicate an individual who was cooperating and freely and voluntarily giving the statement. And as an example, of course I had noticed the portion . . . where he said he wanted to apologize for giving the police a hard time the other day. That would certainly indicate an individual who was not being coerced to say anything but was voluntarily cooperating and giving the statement. And then on Page 17 where he was asked: Why did you decide to take them to that location? Answer: I wanted her to be with her family for Christmas and get this over with. It was eating me up. It was eating me alive. To me that indicates a person that's voluntarily providing this information, has a real, an overwhelming feeling of guilt. It was eating me up. It was eating me alive. He wants to unburden himself and provide this information and does not indicate an individual who is being coerced or beaten or forced in anyway to give this statement. I think everything about the testimony I've heard and the documents that have been introduced suggest that all these statements and all these actions were provided freely and voluntarily after he had been fully advised of his rights on numerous occasions. And I'll deny the motion to suppress in every regard. On appeal, the appellant contests the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that his testimony reflects that his confession was coerced and that his request for counsel was never honored. The State responds that the trial court properly denied the appellant's motion to suppress. A defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination is protected by both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. As our supreme court has explained: In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. The procedural safeguards must include warnings prior to any custodial questioning that an accused has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, and that he has the right to an attorney. State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 207 (Tenn.2000). However, these rights protected by Miranda may be waived by an accused if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id. Whether a waiver has been made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently must be determined by the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d 465, 472-73 (Tenn.1993); State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 431-32 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). The findings of fact made by the trial court at the hearing on a motion to suppress are binding upon this court unless the evidence contained in the record preponderates otherwise. State v. Ross, 49 S.W.3d 833, 839 (Tenn.2001) (citing State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The trial court, as the trier of fact, is able to assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the weight and value to be afforded the evidence, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. On appeal, the prevailing party is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Tenn.2001). The trial court's application of the law to the facts, however, is subject to de novo review. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 423 (Tenn.2000). The defendant has the burden of establishing that the evidence contained in the record preponderates against the findings of fact made by the trial court. State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 610 (Tenn.1984). In the instant case, the trial court accredited the testimony of Memphis Police Sergeant Gerald Blum and the FBI agents and found that the appellant had not been coerced into giving his statements. The trial court noted that Sergeant Blum testified, and the appellant conceded, that he had advised the appellant of his rights prior to questioning on both November 30, 1999, and December 4, 1999. The trial court further noted that although the appellant refused to sign a waiver at the interview on November 30, 1999, he subsequently executed a written waiver on December 4, 1999, and provided a lengthy taped statement. The transcribed statement reflects that the appellant was advised of his rights, claimed that he understood his rights, and acknowledged that he was aware that his statement was being recorded on audiotape. Moreover, contrary to the appellant's testimony, both Sergeant Blum and Agent Sturgis testified that the appellant never requested an attorney. Although the appellant had a limited education, he had a history with the criminal justice system that spanned forty years. Based upon these facts and circumstances, the trial court found that the appellant was cooperative and freely and voluntarily g[ave] the statement[s]. The evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial court. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court committed no error in denying the appellant's motion to suppress.