Opinion ID: 512568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Sections 8(a)(1) and (3)

Text: 21 Section 7 of the Labor Act assures employees of the rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157 (1982). Section 8(a)(1) of the Act provides that [i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section . Id. at Sec. 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.... Id. at 158(a)(3). As commentators have pointed out, however, it has been universally recognized that any violation of [Section 8(a)(3) ] must also, automatically, constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1). Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 Yale L.J. 1269, 1324 (1968). 22 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has fashioned a single framework for analyzing alleged unfair practice violations in cases such as this one, where the employer is charged with violations of both sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378, 88 S.Ct. 543, 546, 19 L.Ed.2d 614 (1967). 1 23 As a general rule, an employer does not violate either section unless its action is motivated by an antiunion animus. On the other hand, [w]hen specific evidence of a subjective intent to discriminate or to encourage or discourage union membership is shown, and found, [even] otherwise innocent or ambiguous actions which are normally incident to the conduct of a business may, without more, be converted into unfair labor practices. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1145, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963). 24 There are two situations in which antiunion motivation can be inferred, and need not be proved: 25 First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was inherently destructive of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is comparatively slight, an antiunion motivation [need not] be proved to sustain the charge [unless] the employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct. 26 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967) (emphases added). 27 It is clear that the Supreme Court intended the phrases inherently destructive and comparatively slight to encompass the universe of employer actions that have any non-trivial, adverse effect on employee rights. Thus, there is no undistributed middle: comparatively slight simply means less than inherently destructive. Accordingly, if an employer's action is not inherently destructive of employee rights, and if the employer provides a legitimate and substantial business justification for its action, then an affirmative showing of improper motivation must be made to sustain an unfair labor practice charge. 2 Id. at 34, 87 S.Ct. at 1798.