Opinion ID: 4533831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Self-Representation Issue

Text: Sterling first argues the district court “abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Sterling to proceed pro se at the modification hearing.” We disagree. There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a supervised release modification hearing. However, Rule 32.1(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “Before modifying the conditions of probation or supervised release, the court must hold a hearing, at which the person has the right to counsel and an opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation.” We have held that waiver of the right to counsel at a supervised release revocation hearing must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the defendant’s liberty is at issue, as at a criminal trial. See United States v. Owen, 854 F.3d 536, 542 (8th Cir. 2017). We assume without deciding that the same principle applies to a -5- modification hearing, even though an immediate loss of liberty is seldom at risk. But the more elaborate procedures mandated by Rule 32.1(b)(2)(D) for revocation proceedings do not apply unless warranted by the circumstances in a particular case. Judge Wilson granted Sterling’s request to represent himself with the aid of standby counsel at the 2015 trial and sentencing of his underlying conviction. Thus, there was no need for the court to rule on Sterling’s February 2019 notice that he would again represent himself at any supervised release modification or revocation proceeding. The government then petitioned for modifications including a mental health treatment requirement, which raised the possibility that Sterling’s mental health had deteriorated. However, when the parties appeared for the modification hearing in late March, the government changed its request to a mental health assessment. Sterling opposed that request, prepared to conduct the defense, again with standby counsel’s assistance. The mental health issue required prompt attention, as it affected the ongoing supervised release. The court allowed the hearing to proceed with Sterling representing himself, as he had requested. In cross examining Sanders, Sterling demonstrated knowledge of the fact issues and applicable law, the ability to defend his position without disruption or delay, and respect for the court and the proceeding. The hearing gave the court no reason to believe that Sterling’s mental health had changed to the point that his prior knowing and voluntary decision to represent himself was now in doubt. Thus, there was no abuse of the court’s sua sponte discretion. Rather, the court proceeded in a manner well suited to ensuring the prompt and fundamentally fair resolution of the issues. Sterling’s motion to reconsider the court’s unfavorable Order because he had not validly waived his right to counsel was an untimely expression of “buyer’s remorse.” -6-