Opinion ID: 473674
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Agency Regulations

Text: 61 The agency's suspension and demotion of Mr. Fiorillo was grounded on the asserted violation of certain regulations of the Bureau of Prisons, as set forth in the notice of proposed adverse action. Although several other charges were initially made in the agency's notice of proposed adverse action, only one specification of one charge was upheld by the arbitrator. 1 The charge was conduct which undermines the efficient operation of the institution. The specification on which Mr. Fiorillo was dismissed, reproduced below, does not mention his lawsuit, filed the day before the newspaper articles appeared, but states that Mr. Fiorillo expressed his personal opinions to the press, contrary to agency policy, and continued to raise allegations that had been thoroughly investigated by the agency. The notice states: 62 On April 27, 1983, two local newspapers published articles in which you were quoted expressing your personal opinions about the integrity of staff of this institution and about your own chances for promotion. Your statements reflect negatively on this institution and damage the public's confidence in our ability to carry out our mission. Further, Program Statement 1480.2 and Institution Supplement [TRM] 1480.2[B], both prohibit staff members from releasing information to the news media. I am aware that you have initiated contact with representatives of the press on several occasions and offered your personal opinions about operations and management of this institution. Your actions are a violation of Federal Prison System policies on contacts with the news media and they are also in direct violation of my specific instructions to all staff at a general recall that staff members are not to contact the news media unless specifically designated by me to make such contact. 63 By expressing your personal opinions for publication, you have also refused to conform with Federal Prison System standards of employee conduct [Program Statement 3420.5] which require you to avoid any action which might reflect adversely on the Government. 64 As an employee of this agency, it is certainly your obligation to report to management any possible violation of law or regulation of which you become aware. However, once you have reported the information, you have fulfilled that obligation and it is not your role to investigate further or to dispute the action that management takes as a result of your report. The allegations you have made have all been thoroughly investigated by this and other agencies. Your refusal to accept the results of the investigations and your continuing to raise these issues forms the basis for this charge. 65 The first paragraph of the above notice is not accurate in its description of the cited regulations. Program Statement 1480.2 does not prohibit staff members from releasing information to the news media; it regulates only communications between prisoners and the news media. Institutional Supplement TRM 1480.2B is also mis-described, as it expressly relates only to releases by staff members on behalf of the institution; the agency does not assert that Mr. Fiorillo's statements were on behalf of the Bureau of Prisons, or that the press was misled into such a belief. The agency action purportedly based on these two regulations finds no support at all in the authority relied on. 66 Thus the action taken against Mr. Fiorillo must derive its authority solely from Program Statement 3420.5: 67 6. POLICY : ... In general, the FPS [Federal Prison System] expects its employees to conduct themselves in such a manner that their activities both on and off duty will not discredit either themselves or the agency. 68 ... [E]mployees shall ... 69 b) Avoid any action which might result in, or create the appearance of, affecting adversely the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government. 70 The last paragraph of the notice refers to Mr. Fiorillo's continuing to raise issues that the agency wished to close, and that this persistent whistleblowing forms the basis for this charge. The charge appears to be violation of this policy statement against actions that might reflect adversely on the agency or the government. Although Mr. Fiorillo's lawsuit was not mentioned, it was uncontroverted that this was the reason for the newspaper articles. It is not clear whether the asserted policy violation was attributed to the newspaper articles, the lawsuit, or the whistleblowing itself; but it is clear, as will be discussed in Part II, that these are protected activities. It is equally clear, as will be discussed, that an employee's motive does not convert otherwise protected activities into unprotected activities. 71 Although the arbitrator ruled that this regulation is not so overly broad as to unconstitutionally abridge First Amendment rights, Program Statement 3420.5 is typical of those governmental regulations that have been struck down as exceeding permissible restraints on employee speech. The government's interest cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). The law does not tolerate statutes or regulations patently capable of many unconstitutional applications, threatening those who validly exercise their rights of free expression. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151, 80 S.Ct. 215, 217, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959), reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 399, 4 L.Ed.2d 383 (1960). As was stated in N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 83 S.Ct. 328, 337, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963), a regulation 72 may be invalid if it prohibits privileged exercises of First Amendment rights whether or not the record discloses that the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct.... The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth [depends] upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a [regulation] susceptible of sweeping and improper application. These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society. 73 [citations and footnote omitted]. See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250, 88 S.Ct. 391, 396, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967). 74 The agency's application of Program Statement 3420.5 against Mr. Fiorillo illustrates its potential for sweeping and improper application, in that the regulation was invoked to punish Mr. Fiorillo for talking about, and pursuing, otherwise protected activities. Program Statement 3420.5 expressly prohibits all criticism of the Government regardless of the context, forum, or public interest served. The regulation does not distinguish between public action and private action, as the regulations apply equally to on and off duty actions. It appears to prohibit all public exposure of agency functions which may be conducted inefficiently or corruptly, a matter expressly encouraged in the national interest by the Civil Service Reform Act. See II. C., infra. 75 Similarly broad regulations curtailing police officers have been consistently struck down as unconstitutional. The Seventh Circuit in O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.1984), invalidated rules prohibiting conduct which evince disrespect, discourtesy or criticism of a supervisory or fellow officer. The Seventh Circuit also invalidated a police department rule which barred policemen from engaging in any activity which was derogatory to the department or to any member or policy thereof, and a disciplinary board order requiring that policemen desist from any derogatory comments reflecting on the image or reputation of the Chicago Police Department. Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.1970). In Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F.Supp. 1295 (E.D.La.1971), the court struck down regulations prohibiting, inter alia, criticism concerning the conduct of departmental functions. The court said: 76 The point is that these regulations sweep far broader than necessary to advance the legitimate interests of the police department as an employer. An officer's speech is so subject to the restraints of either prior approval by superiors or subsequent discipline, restraints which are left to the unfettered discretion of enforcing police officials, that we fail to see how an officer can exercise his First Amendment rights rationally and intelligently. As police officers steer far wider of the unlawful zone, [Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1342, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, reh'g denied, 358 U.S. 860, 79 S.Ct. 12, 3 L.Ed.2d 95 (1958) ] the public, for whose benefit the Constitution protects many types of speech, is bound to suffer, and this is impermissible. 77 Id. at 1300-01 (footnote omitted). See also Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 553 F.Supp. 601, 618 (D.Conn.1983) (regulation prohibiting police officers from speaking or writing critically or derogatorily of other members of the Department held impermissibly overbroad). 78 The Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 3420.5 is not only an impermissible restraint on First Amendment rights, but is so vague and indefinite that it can not be objectively enforced. As the Supreme Court stated, a statute or regulation which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926). In order to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement on an ad hoc and subjective basis, a regulation must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). 79 Program Statement 3420.5 proscribes conduct that might adversely affect the confidence of the public in the integrity of the Government. The language of this regulation does not except constitutionally or statutorily protected activity. I an unable to determine how this regulation can be objectively interpreted by those correctional officers who must abide by it, by Bureau of Prisons officials who must enforce it, and by courts that must review any disciplinary proceedings. This vague rule could be applied to deter or punish the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, as in the case of Mr. Fiorillo. 80 The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions. Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity. 81 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33, 83 S.Ct. at 338 (citations omitted). 82 Virtually identical regulations have been overturned by other federal courts as unconstitutionally vague. In O'Brien, the Seventh Circuit granted an employee summary relief when he had been removed on the basis of charges that his conduct had caused serious discredit to the Department and the Town. 748 F.2d at 408. In Flynn, the court invalidated on vagueness grounds a regulation requiring police officers to act in accordance with the highest degree of morality and to act in a manner which would not reflect discredit upon himself or the Department. 321 F.Supp. at 1299-1300. See also Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1284-85 (D.C.Cir.1980) (invalidating for vagueness the words enhance the image of the Police Department or aid in carrying out its obligation to the community); Bence v. Breier, 501 F.2d 1185, 1188, 1190 (7th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1121, 95 S.Ct. 804, 42 L.Ed.2d 821 (1975) (invalidating for vagueness the words conduct unbecoming an officer and detrimental to the service). 83 There is no basis for a different view of Program Statement 3420.5. To the contrary, the agency used this regulation to punish Mr. Fiorillo for an otherwise protected activity. The regulation itself does not survive First Amendment scrutiny.