Opinion ID: 1170652
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of License Ordinance

Text: At the time when petitioners submitted their original renewal application in 1967, section 103.29, subdivision (c), of the Los Angeles Municipal Code empowered the Board, after an investigation, to deny an operating permit if the Board finds that the said operation will not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals,[ [5] ] and general welfare of the public or that facts exist upon which a denial of such permit would be authorized pursuant to this Article. Under section 103.31, a denial of permit is authorized if the business involved is prohibited by local or state law (subd. (a)), if the business is or has become a public nuisance (subd. (b)), or if the applicant is unfit, has a bad moral character, intemperate habits or a bad reputation for truth, honesty or integrity, is under the age of 18, has committed an act which would be ground for discipline under the article, or has been refused a permit or had a permit revoked (subd. (c)). As noted above, the Board and its hearing officer made a specific finding that petitioners' application should be denied, among other reasons, because the granting of the permit would not comport with the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare of the public. Although this general finding was supplemented by further specific findings regarding petitioners' operations, petitioners contend that the broad language of section 103.29 renders the ordinance unconstitutionally vague, furnishing insufficient standards to guide the Board's discretion in exercising its permit powers. (1) A municipality has broad power to enact all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) An ordinance so enacted will ordinarily be upheld if it is reasonably related to promoting the public health, safety, comfort, and welfare, and if the means adopted to accomplish that promotion are reasonably appropriate to the purpose. [Citations.] ( Higgins v. City of Santa Monica, 62 Cal.2d 24, 30 [41 Cal. Rptr. 9, 396 P.2d 41].) (2) The requirement that a license first be obtained before conducting a business or activity has long been recognized as a valid exercise of the police power. ( Burton v. Municipal Court, 68 Cal.2d 684, 690 [68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 441 P.2d 281]; In re Fuller, 15 Cal.2d 425, 431 [102 P.2d 321].) Nevertheless, where First Amendment activities are involved, this court has subjected licensing ordinances to strict scrutiny. (See Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal.3d 656, 661-663 [97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648]; Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal.3d 860, 866 [94 Cal. Rptr. 777, 484 P.2d 945]; Burton v. Municipal Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d 684, 690-697.) In Burton, we were faced with the validity of the same subdivision of section 103.29 (then subd. (b)) involved herein, as applied to an exhibitor of motion picture films to the public. In our analysis of the constitutionality of that subdivision we noted that The crucial factor here is our zealous solicitude for rights falling within the protection of the First Amendment, since in that category of cases, `precision of regulation must be the touchstone' [citations] and the standards set forth [in the ordinance] must be `susceptible of objective measurement' [citations]. (Pp. 690-691.) We concluded that the subdivision in question here contained overly broad standards [which] are fraught with the hazard that an applicant will be denied his rights to free speech and press through exercise of the power of the board, in its discretion, to refuse a permit because of the content of the films which the applicant exhibits in his theater. (P. 692.) It is apparent that the rule announced in Burton applies only to those situations in which the operation of a licensing ordinance impinges upon the exercise of First Amendment activities, rather than ordinary commercial enterprises. ( Saunders v. City of Los Angeles, 273 Cal. App.2d 407, 411 [78 Cal. Rptr. 236].) Thus, in Daniel v. Board of Police Commissioners, 190 Cal. App.2d 566, 573 [12 Cal. Rptr. 226], the court upheld section 103.29 against a claim of vagueness and lack of standards in the context of the denial of a license for premises upon which food and beverages were sold and live entertainment provided. In Burton v. Municipal Court, supra, 68 Cal.2d 684, 693, we noted that the holding in Daniel was not necessarily in conflict with the views we express since the Daniel opinion does not discuss the question of licensing activities within the ambit of the First Amendment.... Nevertheless, presumably because the Daniel case did involve the licensing of live entertainment possibly protected by the First Amendment (see In re Giannini, 69 Cal.2d 563, 568-570 [72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P.2d 535]), we disapproved Daniel, but only insofar as its language may be deemed inconsistent with the results ... announced in Burton. (68 Cal.2d at p. 693.) (3) Therefore, we conclude that insofar as Daniel involved activities not falling within the ambit of the First Amendment, that case correctly held that the language of section 103.29 furnishes adequate standards to guide the Board in licensing matters and is not unconstitutionally vague. (See also Saunders v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 273 Cal. App.2d 407, 411-412; Carolina Lanes, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 253 Cal. App.2d 831, 835-836 [61 Cal. Rptr. 630]; Sultan Turkish Bath v. Board of Police Comrs., 169 Cal. App.2d 188, 199-201 [337 P.2d 203].) It should be kept in mind that there are an infinite variety of activities or conduct which could result in potential or actual danger to the peace, health, safety, convenience, good morals, and general welfare of the public. A municipality cannot reasonably be expected to isolate and specify those precise activities or conduct which are intended to be proscribed. (4) As stated in Daniel, quoting from an earlier case, `to make a statute sufficiently certain to comply with constitutional requirements [of due process of law] it is not necessary that it furnish detailed plans and specifications of the acts or conduct prohibited.' (190 Cal. App.2d 566, 574; see Louis Stores, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 57 Cal.2d 749, 760 [22 Cal. Rptr. 14, 371 P.2d 758]. [6] ) (5) The fact that an ordinance seems to vest unlimited discretion in the licensing agency does not necessarily invalidate the ordinance, for the same might be said of almost any licensing board established under the laws of this state; discretion is not uncontrolled and unguided if it calls for the exercise of judgment of a high order. [Citations.] ( Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind, 67 Cal.2d 536, 548 [63 Cal. Rptr. 21, 432 P.2d 717]; see O'Hagen v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 19 Cal. App.3d 151, 160-161 [96 Cal. Rptr. 484] [good cause standard contemplates that agency will make a factual exposition of a reasonable ground for the sought order]; Iscoff v. Police Commission, 222 Cal. App.2d 395, 405 [35 Cal. Rptr. 189].) Thus, in the absence of an ascertainable effect upon First Amendment activities, section 103.29 provides an adequate standard to guide the Board's discretion, namely, that it must exercise its permit powers in a reasonable, rather than arbitrary, manner to promote the interest of the public. It is significant that petitioners do not contest the foregoing conclusion. Instead, they contend that the operations of a roller skating rink are entitled to First Amendment protection. They claim that such activities include the entertainment or amusement of their patrons, whose rights of free speech and assembly assertedly would be affected by the licensing ordinance. (6) However, no case has ever held or suggested that simple physical activity falls within the ambit of the First Amendment, at least in the absence of some element of communicating or advancing ideas or beliefs. Petitioners rely upon In re Giannini, supra, 69 Cal.2d 563, 567-572, wherein a majority of this court held that the performance of a nonobscene dance for an audience constitutes a method of expression protected by the First Amendment. It is apparent, however, that Giannini's rationale would be inapplicable to the activities conducted by petitioners herein. Giannini sought to express the principle that  all forms of communication, not merely the expression of concrete and definite ideas, potentially receive First Amendment protection. (P. 569, italics in original.) The key element is, of course, communication. We have difficulty finding that essential element to exist in the context of a roller skating rink. True, it is inevitable that some patrons of the rink watch the other skaters and are, perhaps, entertained or amused by their activities. And yet it seems inescapable that petitioners' patrons primarily use the facilities for physical exercise and personal pleasure; Giannini's element of communication between an artist or performer and his audience seems entirely lacking. Petitioners also claim that the joint participation involved in skating (and watching skaters) at a roller skating rink is an assemblage entitled to protection under the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association and assembly.... There is no question that petitioners' patrons are assembled together in one building or rink, and in that sense constitute an assemblage. (7) But again, no case has ever suggested that the constitutional freedom of assembly or association extends to a congregation of persons engaged in mere physical activity or self-amusement. (8) It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inescapable aspect of the `liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. [Citations.] (Italics added; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 [2 L.Ed.2d 1488, 1498, 78 S.Ct. 1163].) In the words of our state Constitution, The people shall have the right to freely assemble together to consult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the Legislature for redress of grievances. (Italics added; art. I, § 10.) (9) Since any First Amendment activities involved in the operation of the Hollywod Rollerbowl would be negligible and wholly incidental to its evident function of providing an outlet for the amusement and exercise of its patrons, the Burton test for determining the validity of licensing statutes is inapplicable, and section 103.29 must be upheld as a reasonable exercise of a municipality's police power to license and regulate ordinary business activities.