Opinion ID: 63492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Habeas Review

Text: We review de novo a district court’s denial of federal habeas review based on a state procedural ground.15 13 Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 14 Bell v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F. App’x at 878. 15 Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1996). 6 No. 07-60154 “Under the procedural default doctrine, a federal court may not consider a state prisoner’s federal habeas claim when the state based its rejection of that claim on an adequate and independent state ground.”16 “In cases where a state court decision ‘fairly appears’ to rest primarily on federal law, the state must make a ‘plain statement’ that the state’s review of the claim is procedurally barred.”17 In other words, “a procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case ‘clearly and expressly’ states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”18 “[I]n order to be ‘adequate,’ a procedural bar must be ‘strictly or regularly’ applied by the state to the ‘vast majority of similar claims.’”19 The burden is on the defendant to establish that the state procedural bar rule was not strictly and regularly followed at the time of his appeal.20 “A state has failed to strictly and regularly apply a procedural rule only when the state ‘clearly and unequivocally excuse[s] the procedural default.”21 “Moreover, the state must fail to apply the rule to claims identical or similar to the petitioner’s claim. De minimis exceptions will not preclude the state from asserting the procedural default doctrine; an occasional act of grace by a state court in excusing or disregarding a state procedural rule does not render the rule inadequate. ”22 16 Id. (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)). 17 Id. (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261 (1989)). 18 Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989) (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)). 19 Martin, 98 F.3d at 847 (citing Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d 333, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995)). 20 Id. 21 Id. (citing Amos, 61 F.3d at 342). 22 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). 7 No. 07-60154 When the state court decision is based on an independent and adequate state ground, a federal habeas court is barred from considering the claim unless the petitioner can show (1) both cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation, or (2) that failure to consider the claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.23 The latter exception is extremely narrow and requires establishing a “colorable claim of factual innocence.”24
This is the second occasion on which we have addressed whether Bell’s habeas petition, in which he asserts his double-jeopardy challenge to his armed robbery conviction and sentence, is procedurally barred. As noted, in 2005, a prior panel of this court reversed the lower court’s decision denying Bell’s petition because that court had erroneously held that the Mississippi Supreme Court in Bell III provided a “clear and express” statement that Bell’s doublejeopardy claim was procedurally barred. The State insists that Bell III need not be the final word on whether Bell’s double-jeopardy claim was held to be procedurally barred by the Mississippi state courts. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decision in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, the State urges us to look through the last “unexplained” opinion of the state court that addressed Bell’s double-jeopardy challenge—Bell III—to the last “reasoned” decision on the issue—Bell I—to determine whether the denial of his claim rested on a state procedural bar.25 In Ylst, the Supreme Court considered whether the California Supreme Court’s unexplained order denying petitioner’s habeas petition on his Miranda 23 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 24 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (citation omitted). 25 501 U.S. 797 (1991). 8 No. 07-60154 claim constituted a “decision on the merits” of that claim sufficient to lift the procedural bar previously imposed by the California Court of Appeal.26 In resolving the question, the Ylst Court applied the following presumption: “When there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.”27 Accordingly, when “the last reasoned opinion on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.”28 Under the precise circumstances of this case, we are persuaded to adopt the State’s position. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Bell III is not the last explained state-court judgment on Bell’s double-jeopardy claim, as the court did not rule on that particular challenge. Although the state supreme court addressed Bell’s IAC claim in Bell III, the court was, as our prior panel held, effectively silent on his double-jeopardy claim, thereby implicitly rejecting it without explanation. Accordingly, we may “look through” that decision to the last reasoned opinion that addressed Bell’s instant challenge. In Bell I, the Mississippi Supreme Court summarily dismissed (1) his petition to clarify his sentence on the basis that it was procedurally barred pursuant to the successive writ bar of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6) and (2) his motion for out-of-time appeal on the basis that it was procedurally barred pursuant to the time bar of Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2).29 Bell’s pleadings to the Mississippi Supreme 26 Id. at 801. 27 Id. at 803. 28 Id. 29 Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s final judgment stated as follows: “Lower Court’s Dismissal of Petition to Clarify Sentence Affirmed as Successive Writ Barred Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-39-23(6) (Supp. 1990); Lower Court’s dismissal of Motion for 9 No. 07-60154 Court in Bell I, construed liberally, alleged violations of, inter alia, his right to effective assistance of counsel and his right to be protected from double jeopardy. Unlike the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Bell III, in which it clearly and expressly held only that Bell’s IAC claim was procedurally barred, its judgment in Bell I unambiguously dismissed as procedurally barred both Bell’s petition and his motion in their entireties, which dismissals necessarily included all claims asserted therein, including Bell’s double-jeopardy challenge. As the Mississippi state courts did not re-visit Bell’s double-jeopardy claim in any proceeding subsequent to Bell I, it remains the last reasoned decision directed at the instant challenge. Furthermore, the Mississippi Supreme Court’s summary dismissal of Bell’s petition and motion in Bell I is sufficiently “reasoned” under these circumstances because it was apparent on the face of the record that Bell’s claims were procedurally barred. Bell’s double-jeopardy challenge was denied on its merits in 1985 by the Mississippi Circuit Court of Forrest County. From this order an appeal was taken to the Mississippi Supreme Court; however, the following year, that court dismissed Bell’s appeal for lack of prosecution, which forever foreclosed his entitlement to raise the claim again. The Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Bell I that his double-jeopardy challenge was plainly subject to procedural bar and expressly provided its reasons for dismissing his petition and motion, albeit in succinct fashion. We hold, therefore, that the Mississippi Supreme Court in Bell I clearly and expressly held that Bell’s double-jeopardy claim was procedurally barred. Moreover, Bell has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-23(6) and 99-39-5(2) are inadequate procedural bars. We have held previously that each of these rules is an independent and adequate Out-of-Time Appeal Affirmed as Time Barred Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. Section 99-39-5(2) (Supp. 1990) . . . .” 10 No. 07-60154 procedural bar to federal habeas review.30 And, here, Bell has not shown that the State of Mississippi failed to apply the bars regularly with respect to the vast majority of similar claims during the applicable period. In only one of the cases to which he refers, Fuselier v. State, did the Mississippi Supreme Court decline to impose a procedural bar in factual circumstances similar to those at issue.31 This case is distinguishable, however, considering that (1) Bell is serving two consecutive life sentences for two separate capital murder offenses, as opposed to only one, (2) he was separately indicted for the crimes of armed robbery as an habitual offender and the murder of D.C. Haden, rather than being charged with both crimes in a single indictment, and (3) the procedural bars at issue here are Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-39-26(6) and 99-39-5(2), whereas the bar apparently excused in Fuselier was Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). Moreover, this court has held that an occasional act of grace in overlooking a state procedural rule does not render the rule inadequate.32 Finally, none of the other cases that Bell cites involved a claim of double jeopardy, and in none of those cases did the defendant obtain a reversal of a sentence he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily assumed to avoid the death penalty.33 30 See, e.g., Moawad v. Anderson, 143 F.3d 942, 947 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying § 99-3923(6) to bar petitioner from raising claim in subsequent state court proceeding for postconviction relief); Lott v. Hargett, 80 F.3d 161, 164-65 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 99-3923(6) bars federal habeas review of substantive claims raised by petitioner in successive motion); Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that § 99-39-5(2) “functions as an independent and adequate procedural bar to review of Sones’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in federal court”). 31 654 So. 2d 519 (Miss. 1995). 32 See Martin v. Maxey, 98 F.3d 844, 847 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 33 See id.; Kennedy v. State, 732 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1999); Stevenson v. State, 674 So. 2d 501 (Miss. 1996); Kennedy v. State, 626 So. 2d 103 (Miss. 1993); Luckett v. State, 582 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1991); Grubb v. State, 582 So. 2d 428 (Miss. 1991); Smith v. State, 477 So. 2d 191 (Miss. 1985). 11 No. 07-60154 As we noted above, federal habeas courts are estopped from reviewing state cases applying an independent and adequate state procedural rule unless the petitioner can demonstrate either (1) cause and actual prejudice or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the case is not reviewed.34 Cause requires “something external to the petitioner, something that cannot be fairly attributed to him.”35 Bell is unable to make such a showing. His error came when he failed to prosecute further the appeal of his first post-conviction petition when it was denied by the Mississippi circuit court in 1985. As Bell had no constitutional right to counsel in pursuing post-conviction relief,36 and as he does not point to any other external factor causing his lapse, his mistake is attributable to him and to him alone. Because Bell has failed to demonstrate cause, we do not consider whether he suffered actual prejudice. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that there will be a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” if Bell’s challenge is not heard on its merits. Bell makes no effort in his brief to argue that there would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice if we hold that his habeas petition is procedurally barred, nor do we believe there would be, considering that his double-jeopardy claim arises from a plea agreement that was of such obvious and immense benefit to him.