Opinion ID: 48253
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Indictment was Plainly Erroneous

Text: 9 The sufficiency of an indictment is measured by whether (1) each count contains all essential elements of the offense charged, (2) the elements are charged with particularity, and (3) the charge is specific enough to preclude a subsequent prosecution on the same offense. United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 1999). 10 McGilberry argues, the government concedes, and we find that the language used in the indictment was plainly erroneous. Section 924 refers to someone who either uses or carries a firearm . . . during and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime, or someone who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). When the conduct charged is possession of a firearm, the appropriate standard of participation is in furtherance of a crime. However, if the defendant uses or carries a firearm, the participation standard is during and in relation to a crime. Here, the indictment erroneously combined the possession prong of the statute with the during and in relation to prong, thereby failing to list the essential elements of any criminal conduct. 1 See generally United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 412-15 (5th Cir.2000). 11 This error is not necessarily harmless, as this court has recognized that [t]here are situations where a possession would be `during and in relation to' drug trafficking without `furthering or advancing' that activity. Id. at 413. A brief history of § 924 helps to appreciate the differences between the two types of conduct that are criminalized therein. 12 An earlier version of § 924 criminalized only us[ing] or carry[ing] a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking, without any reference to simple possession. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court grappled with the meaning of this provision as it pertained to two defendants, one who had a firearm in the trunk of a car while drugs were in the passenger compartment, and another who kept a gun locked away in his closet near some illegal drugs. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). The Court found the evidence insufficient to convict either defendant under the uses or carries provision because the firearms were not actively employed. Id. at 150-51, 116 S.Ct. 501. 13 The Court held that use of a firearm requires more than mere possession of an accessible firearm. Id. at 141, 143-44, 116 S.Ct. 501. [N]early every possession of a firearm by a person engaged in drug trafficking would satisfy that standard, `thereby eras[ing] the line that the statutes, and the courts, have tried to draw.' Id. at 144, 116 S.Ct. 501 ( quoting United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 469 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting)). 14 After the Supreme Court's opinion in Bailey, Congress broadened § 924 and added the possession in furtherance of language. See Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 413. In interpreting this new language, this circuit has held that mere possession is only criminalized where it furthers, advances, or helps forward a drug trafficking offense. Id. at 414. The result is that the use or carrying of a firearm is illegal when it is actively employed during a drug crime, and mere possession is criminal only when it furthers or advances the drug trafficking offense. 2 15 With that background in mind, it is apparent that the indictment in this case, referencing only possess[ion] . . . during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime failed to list all the elements of any offensive conduct. It combines the lower conduct standard with the lower standard of participation embodied in § 924, and would allow for a conviction where the firearm is not actively employed and does not advance or further the drug crime. In light of Bailey and Ceballos-Torres, that error is plain. 16 2. The Error Did not Affect the Fairness, Integrity, or Public Reputation of the Proceedings 17 Having found that there was plain error below, the next step in the analysis is typically to consider whether the error affected McGilberry's substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. While this inquiry normally requires a finding that the error was prejudicial, it is unclear what type of showing must be made to prove that a defective indictment affected substantial rights. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770 (We need not decide whether the phrase `affecting substantial rights' is always synonymous with `prejudicial.'). The Supreme Court has repeatedly avoided answering that question, and instead chosen to skip this step in the plain error analysis when defective indictments are at issue. See, e.g., Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33, 122 S.Ct. 1781; Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468-70, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). 18 We follow the Supreme Court's lead in turning directly to the fourth step of the plain error analysis. Even if the defective indictment in this case affected McGilberry's substantial rights, there are two reasons why it cannot be said that it affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of his judicial proceedings. 19 The first is that the evidence that McGilberry used or carried the firearm in question was essentially uncontroverted. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. 1781; Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470, 117 S.Ct. 1544. On the evidence presented, it would have been impossible for a jury to find that McGilberry possessed the firearm but did not use or carry it. According to Payne's unrefuted testimony, McGilberry removed the gun from his jacket and set it on the table after he arrived in Payne's motel room. In addition to Payne, two officers and McGilberry's only witness all testified that the gun was sitting directly in front of Payne during the incident. 20 While this may not be overwhelming evidence in the abstract, the jury's verdict necessarily included a finding that McGilberry used or carried the firearm in question. The jury found that McGilberry possessed the gun that, according to every witness, sat on the table directly in front of him. The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that § 924 certainly includes brandishing [and] displaying a firearm as methods of using it. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501; see also Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 136, 118 S.Ct. 1911, 141 L.Ed.2d 111 (1998). 21 The only theory presented as to how the gun ended up on the table is that McGilberry carried and placed it there. In convicting McGilberry, the jury must have credited the uncontroverted testimony that McGilberry (1) possessed the gun in question, (2) carried the gun to the motel room, and (3) displayed it openly. 3 No other theory of possession was ever offered. Because the jury necessarily found each element contained in § 924, the erroneous indictment did not affect the fairness or integrity of the underlying proceedings. 4 22 The second reason the error did not affect the proceedings' fairness is that the jury was properly instructed on the elements of § 924. While the indictment erroneously charged McGilberry with simple possession, the jury was instructed to convict McGilberry only if it found that he knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to [his] alleged commission of the crime of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. (emphasis added). The instructions continued that the firearm must have some purpose, role, or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime. While the indictment was plainly erroneous, the jury instructions largely mitigated that error by properly conveying the elements of § 924.