Opinion ID: 2514285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Reasonableness of the A ward

Text: [ś 111] The City's final claim is that the district court abused its discretion in awarding certain fees and costs to HCI. HCI responds that the district court properly exercised its discretion in awarding HCI $37,133.83 less than that for which it applied. [ś 112] Wyoming has adopted the two-factor federal lodestar test to determine the reasonableness of attorney fee awards. This test requires a determination of whether: 1) the fee charged represents the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate; and 2) other factors of discretionary application should be considered to adjust the fee upward or downward. Forshee, ś 7, 18 P.3d at 448. The City claims the award was unreasonable in three ways: first, the district court allowed a $15/hour increase in lead counsel's hourly rate after the jury rendered its verdict and the fee-shifting provision of the contract became operative; second, the district court awarded fees for time HCI's counsel spent preparing motions which the court refused to consider because they were untimely and improper; and third, the district court awarded HCI costs for computer assisted legal research. [ś 113] Addressing the issue of the increase in lead counsel's hourly rate, HCI asserts that the increase was not related to the verdict or the fee-shifting provision. HCI contends that the increase occurred when Mr. Hladky learned during the first week of trial that, in contrast to the $165/hour per hour his attorney was charging, the City's attorneys were charging $195/hour. According to lead counsel's affidavit, Mr. Hladky thought it fair that he receive $180.00/hour for his trial work and he agreed to charge that amount beginning June 1, 2007. For his work prior to June 1, 2007, including pre-trial preparation and the first week of trial, Mr. Hladky's lead counsel charged $165/hour. [ś 114] The hourly fee HCI's counsel charged for trial work beginning June 1, 2007, was $15/hour less than the hourly rate the City's counsel charged and $20/hour less than the hourly rate this Court deemed reasonable in Morrison v. Clay, 2006 WY 161, ś 19, 149 P.3d 696, 702 (Wyo.2006). HCI attached to its motion for attorney fees the affidavit of another attorney, who attested to the reasonableness of the fees. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees at the rate of $180/hour beginning the second week of trial. [ś 115] We likewise find no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that fees were appropriate for time incurred in preparing motions that it did not ultimately consider. The district court presided over this matter for several months before trial during which time it heard and decided numerous motions. It then presided over the five week trial when it considered and decided the parties' motions. In awarding attorney fees, the district court specifically considered the City's objection to fees incurred in preparing motions which it ultimately did not consider. The district court concluded these [were] reasonable activities for attorneys to undertake. [ś 116] Finally, we address the City's claim that the district court improperly awarded costs for computer assisted legal research. The City cites Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1092 (Wyo.1999) in which this Court concluded that computer research expenditures are included within attorney fees and are not taxable as costs. We find no reference to computer assisted legal research as a cost in HCI's attorney billing statement. Citing Snyder, the district court concluded that legal research fees are recoverable as attorney fees but not as costs. We affirm the district court's award.