Opinion ID: 365635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lynch-Young Conversation

Text: 118 A few weeks before the election took place Young had a conversation with his supervisor, Lynch, at the acid lift station. No one else was present. 119 Young testified that he was asked by Lynch why I felt so strong about the Union. Young responded that he didn't feel Delco's system was being run the way it should. Lynch objected that Delco should be given another chance and (H)e asked me if I would talk to some of the people that I had talked to about signin' a Union card. Young agreed to do so but remarked that he doubted it would do any good. That people already had their minds made up what they were going to do. Finally, according to Young, Lynch warned him of the danger of a union at the Fitzgerald plant: 120 He said that you vote the UAW in, the apprenticeship program would be changed and some of the apprentices would lose their jobs. They'd have to go back on production because the way the UAW had it set up they had to have one apprentice to four journeymen or something like those numbers. The way it was, there wasn't any journeymen. 121 Young replied that if apprentices lost their job, if they voted the Union in, they'd be making more than what the apprentices and maintenance men were. 122 Lynch, on the other hand, testified that Young initiated the conversation about unions. Lynch merely had agreed with Young's statement that he was getting tired of all the union activity and would be glad when it was all over. Young then volunteered that he was goin' vote for the union . . . . Lynch said nothing further about the Union because I didn't see any reason to. Kendall-Phillips Conversation 123 Phillips testified that Kendall, the quality control supervisor, came up to him in July 1976, while Phillips was at work, and asked me what were my feelings about the plant. Phillips responded that we had a good system but it wasn't followed. Asked how he felt about the UAW, Phillips replied that I wasn't familiar with the UAW but felt that maybe United Auto Workers would help. Kendall then warned Phillips that: 124 he'd worked up under one and that United Auto Workers takes away your individuality. You become a number he said. His office was always open and if I wanted to talk to him that he knew, I knew I could come to his office at anytime. That if this Union came in I could not do that. I'd have to go through the stewards. 125 Kendall denied that any such conversation took place. Johnson-Phillips Conversations 126 Phillips further testified that Johnson, a production supervisor, approached him at the tool crib in August 1976. Johnson asked Phillips how did I feel . . . about the union. Phillips told Johnson that he knew how I felt. Johnson then remarked that he needed my help. For me to talk to my brother, about, you know, not voting for the union. Finally Johnson opined that we didn't need the union out there. That he wouldn't let the company misuse us. 3 Phillips responded that he may not need the union but I felt like we did. 127 Johnson testified that he never initiated a conversation concerning the Union with an employee. He further testified that I don't recall, saying nothing about blacks and the Union to an employee during the campaign. 128 Phillips also testified that he had a second conversation with Johnson about the union about three or four days after the election. According to Phillips, (A)fter we was coming into the plant he asked me how did you vote. Phillips responded you know how I voted. Johnson then remarked well, see, it didn't do any good. Johnson then walked off. 129 Johnson, on the other hand, testified that he did not have a conversation with any hourly employee, after the election, concerning how they voted. 130 The ALJ credited, without explanation, the testimony of the two employees. On that basis he concluded that Delco was guilty of coercively interrogating its employees, soliciting anti-union support, and threatening to discontinue jobs and other company benefits in violation of Section 8(a)(1). 131 Such conclusory credibility choices, we have already noted Supra, are not binding on this Court. We also conclude, after a thorough review of the record, that substantial evidence does not support the Administrative Law Judge's credibility determinations. 132 We note that according to the testimony of Young and Phillips other employees were either present when the three conversations took place or else were informed of what had transpired at these conversations. None of these other employees were ever called to verify the testimony concerning the conversations in question. The record contains no explanation of this omission. 133 In addition, the uncorroborated testimony accepted by the Administrative Law Judge must be regarded as somewhat suspect. Phillips had an undeniable economic interest in testifying against Delco. He was seeking reinstatement with back pay. Moreover, Phillips had developed an impressive record of falsehoods both on the job and under oath. Young, although not an interested witness, was vague and evasive when testifying. 4 134 The testimony of both Young and Phillips was self-contradictory in important respects. Young at first denied that he had told any Union official about his conversation with Lynch. The ALJ then observed, in response to an objection of relevancy, that since the existence of a complaint has some bearing on the credibility in a rape case maybe it has some bearing on the credibility in this case. Thus prompted, Young subsequently claimed that he told the UAW representative who, it so happened, was sitting at counsel's table. The UAW representative was never called to confirm Young's self-contradictory testimony. 135 Phillips' testimony also was inconsistent with respect to the dates when the alleged conversations took place and, more importantly, with respect to the contents of these conversations. According to Phillips' initial testimony, Johnson asked him in August 1976 to talk to his brother about not voting for the union. In this respect we note that Phillips was careful to refer to brother in the singular and not in the plural. 5 Phillips stated in his affidavit, however, that he needed my help and wanted me to talk to my brothers (I have two brothers that work at Delco) about the union. Phillips also acknowledged at the hearing that Johnson had wanted you to go to the two brothers that you have working at Delco and talk to them about the Union. The affidavit and Phillips' subsequent testimony could not possibly be correct because only one of Phillips' brothers worked at Delco at the time this alleged conversation occurred. 136 Ordinarily we would not regard these discrepancies as anything other than the product of a faulty memory. Cf. NLRB v. American Art Industries, Inc., 5 Cir. 1969, 415 F.2d 1223, 1227, Cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1122, 25 L.Ed.2d 397 (1970). When considered as part of the total picture, however, the inconsistencies here must be regarded as one of the factors leading us to conclude that the testimony of the two employees was incredible. 137 We also note that, contrary to the picture painted by Young and Phillips that Delco was out to get union supporters, Delco hired one of Phillips' brothers in August, after management was allegedly aware of Phillips' pro-union sympathies, and hired another brother in November, after the election but prior to Phillips' discharge. Moreover Delco management had gone to great lengths to ensure that its supervisors and other salaried employees did not violate the Act during the period in question. 138 Under the circumstances outlined above, we decline to follow the ALJ's credibility determinations. We further conclude that even without the benefit of such credibility resolutions, there is not substantial evidence of a Section 8(a)(1) violation. Section 8(a)(1) violation 139 We must sustain the Board's determinations if they are supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1977, 563 F.2d 1252, 1256. Similarly, we will not overturn its findings based on plausible inferences from the evidence even if we might reach a contrary result in deciding the case de novo. Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 536 F.2d at 1256, and cases cited therein. 140 The ALJ concluded that in conversing with its employees, Delco was guilty of coercive interrogation, requesting employees to campaign against the Union, and threatening to discontinue jobs and existing company benefits. Even if we accept the ALJ's credibility resolutions, we must nonetheless disagree with his and the Board's conclusion that a Section 8(a)(1) violation has been committed.
141 It is well established in this Circuit that interrogation of employees is not illegal Per se. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 5 Cir. 1964, 339 F.2d 498, 500. To fall within the ambit of § 8(a)(1), either the words themselves or the context in which they are used must suggest an element of coercion or interference. Id. and cases cited therein. The test of whether questioning is unlawful is whether such questioning tends to be coercive, not whether the employees are, in fact, coerced. Cagle's, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1979, 588 F.2d 943, 948 n. 3; NLRB v. Pope Maintenance Corp., 5 Cir. 1978,573 F.2d 898, 904. This Circuit has employed widely accepted criteria in determining whether the interrogation in question tends to be coercive: 142 (1) the history of the employer's attitude toward its employees; (2) the type of information sought or related; (3) the company rank of the questioner; (4) the place and manner of the conversation; (5) the truthfulness of the employee's responses; (6) whether the employer had a valid purpose in obtaining the information; (7) if so, whether this purpose was communicated to the employee, and (8) whether the employer assures employees that no reprisals will be taken if they support the union. 143 NLRB v. Aero Corp., 5 Cir. 1978, 581 F.2d 511, 514; Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 563 F.2d at 1256; NLRB v. Camco, Inc., 5 Cir. 1965, 340 F.2d 803, Cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct. 313, 15 L.Ed.2d 339. See NLRB v. Pope Maintenance Corp., supra, 573 F.2d at 904-05; NLRB v. Varo, Inc., 5 Cir. 1970, 425 F.2d 293, 298; Bourne v. NLRB, 2 Cir. 1964, 332 F.2d 47, 48. 144 There is no indication in either the ALJ's or the Board's decision that these criteria were applied here. Rather, the ALJ found, in a conclusory fashion, that Delco coercively interrogated its employees in violation of Section 8(a) (1). 6 The Board summarily affirmed this finding. Remand is unnecessary, however, for the record is sufficiently clear to enable us to apply these criteria. 145 It is undisputed that Delco opposed unionization of its Fitzgerald plant. Such opposition, without more, does not amount to anti-union animus. Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 563 F.2d at 1257. There was no evidence here, contrary to the ALJ's conclusion, of an anti-union animus held by Delco. 7 Rather the record indicates that Delco's opposition to unionization was relatively passive. There is no evidence that Delco management was connected in any manner with the Freedom for Independence anti-union rally. Furthermore, Delco management went to great lengths to ensure that its supervisors and other salaried personnel maintained a hands-off approach toward the union. 146 Second, the information sought why I felt so strong about the Union, what were my feelings about the plant, and how did I feel . . . about the union was general and innocuous. Compare NLRB v. Aero Corporation, supra, 581 F.2d at 1256 (questions regarding specifics of organizational activity and employee involvement therein were asked for purposes that could only seem ominous) And Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 563 F.2d at 1257 (employees questioned about identity of union supporters). 147 Third, two of the interrogators, Lynch and Johnson, are lower-level supervisors. Kendall is the Quality Control Supervisor. 148 Fourth, the conversations took place at the work stations. The exchange between the interrogators and the employees were casual and friendly. The questioning was not extensive nor does it appear to have been systematic. Only 3 out of 285 employees were questioned. 8 NLRB v. Aero Corporation, supra, 581 F.2d at 514 (employee taken from his job, during working hours, and questioned outside building); Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 563 F.2d at 1257 (8 of 46 employees questioned); NLRB v. Birdsall Construction Co., 5 Cir. 1973, 487 F.2d 288, 291 (systematic questioning of employees who were called away from their work); NLRB v. Varo, Inc., supra, 425 F.2d at 298 (high-ranking officer, in his office and with secretary present and taking notes, questioned employees); And NLRB v. Camco, Inc., supra, 340 F.2d at 806-07 (systematic and intensive interrogation) With Mueller Brass Co. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1977, 544 F.2d 815, 821 (isolated interrogation when 2 out of 350 employees questioned). 149 Fifth, the employees questioned responded in a candid and bold manner, raising the inference that they did not fear reprisal. 150 Finally, the record is silent as to what purpose, if any, the interrogator had for asking the questions under discussion. Moreover, there is no testimony that any purpose for the questioning was offered the interrogated employees or that these employees were assured that no reprisals would be taken if they supported the union. Although an express statement of purpose as well as an express assurance of no reprisal may be desirable, See NLRB v. Camco, Inc., supra, 340 F.2d at 804, such warning is not required when it is apparent from the circumstances, such as are present here, that the interrogation is for an innocent purpose and that the questions do not otherwise convey a veiled threat of reprisal. 151 We therefore conclude that there is no substantial evidence that the innocuous and isolated questions asked under the circumstances present here have a tendency to be coercive. Accordingly we deny enforcement of the Board's order insofar as it is based upon a finding of coercive interrogation. 152
153 Employers are entitled to oppose unionization. Sturgis Newport Bus. Forms, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 563 F.2d at 1257. Section 8(c) of the Act similarly provides that the expressing of any views, argument, or opinion . . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. On the other hand, Section 7 of the Act provides that employees have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively . . . and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities . . . . 29 U.S.C. § 157. An employer who shall interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights, are guilty of a § 8(a)(1) violation. 154 According to employee Young, his supervisor, Lynch, had asked him if I would talk to some of the people that I had talked to about signing a Union card. Phillips similarly testified that Supervisor Johnson had asked him to talk to my brother, about, you know, not voting for the union. The ALJ concluded that these two acts of solicitation constituted a violation of Section 8(a) (1). The ALJ did not explain how he reached this conclusion. The Board, in affirming the ALJ's decision, did not attempt to justify the ALJ's conclusion in this respect. 155 Delco argues that under the same analysis we just conducted with respect to interrogation it must be concluded that Delco's solicitation was not proscribed by the Act. The analysis referred to was developed in the context of employer interrogation of employees. See, e. g., NLRB v. Varo, Inc., supra, 425 F.2d at 298; NLRB v. Camco, Inc., supra, 340 F.2d at 804; Bourne v. NLRB, 2 Cir. 1964, 332 F.2d 47, 48; Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 NLRB 591 (1954). Strictly speaking, the remarks immediately under consideration are requests and not interrogatories. This, however, is a distinction without a difference. In NLRB v. Sunnyland Packing Company, 5 Cir. 1966, 369 F.2d 787, we undertook a balancing approach similar to the one presently under consideration, with respect to acts of threats and solicitations as well as to acts of interrogation. 369 F.2d at 789-90, Relying upon Camco, Inc., supra, 340 F.2d at 804-07. Applying this analysis to the facts presented in the case Sub judice we conclude that Delco's acts of solicitation were not violative of Section 8(a)(1). We reach this conclusion on the basis of the reasons previously discussed with respect to our conclusion that Delco did not impermissibly interrogate its employees. See 1309-1311, Ante. 156 Neither Independent, Inc. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1969, 406 F.2d 203 nor Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1953, 321 F.2d 100, upon which the Board and the Union now rely, offers any solace to their position that the isolated instances of solicitation under consideration were impermissible. In Independent, Inc. we observed that there was abundant evidence . . . that the company waged an aggressive campaign both to entice employees to side with the company and to frighten employees away from the blandishments of the Union. 406 F.2d at 205. Similarly in Hendrix Mfg. Co., which was decided prior to Sunnyland Packing Company, we held that the Board could find impermissible the acts of employer solicitation (A)s a part of the whole pattern and practice which included unlawful interrogation, threats of economic reprisals, promises of benefits to influence employee sympathies, and creating an impression of surveillance among the employees. 321 F.2d at 106. We expressly eschewed making a hard and fast ruling and content ourselves merely with saying that in these circumstances it was a permissible element of the cease and desist order. Id. 157 Enforcement therefore is denied with respect to that part of the Board order based upon a finding of unlawful solicitation.
158 In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), the seminal case concerning when an employer's statement concerning the consequences of unionization is proscribed, the Supreme Court formulated a prediction vs. threat test. 159 Thus, an employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. He may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to convey a management decision already arrived at to close the plant in case of unionization. See Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274, n. 20, 85 S.Ct. 994, 13 L.Ed.2d 827 (1965). If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation and coercion, and as such without the protection of the First Amendment. 160 Id. at 618, 89 S.Ct. at 1942. 161 In the first incident involving an alleged threat, employee Young, according to his testimony, was warned by his supervisor, Lynch, that if the UAW won, some of the trainees would lose their jobs because the way the UAW had it set up they had to have one apprentice to four journeymen or something like those numbers. The ALJ found that this remark amounted to a threat to discontinue jobs in the event of a union victory. 162 It is clear from the language of Lynch's statement as well as the context in which it was said that Lynch was warning of possible changes in Delco's training program due to union-imposed conditions beyond Delco's control. As such Lynch's statement constituted a prediction and not a threat. 163 With respect to the second alleged threat, Quality Control Supervisor Kendall warned employee Phillips that if the plant was unionized, he could not come to his office at anytime but rather would have to go through the stewards. The ALJ found that Kendall's remark constituted a threat to discontinue existing Company benefits in the event of a Union victory. 164 In Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 5 Cir. 1978, 566 F.2d 1245, we reviewed a Board order in which a similar statement 9 was found to be a misstatement of the law and a threat by the company to discontinue an existing benefit if the Union won the election. We held that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1255. We observed that an employee's qualified right under Section 9(a) of the Act to take a grievance to his employer was not a company benefit but rather was a benefit conferred by law. 566 F.2d at 1255. Therefore an employer could not discontinue such benefit even if it desired to do so. Id. In addition we noted that the record was devoid of evidence that the employer had ever threatened to cut off any company benefit. 165 Federal-Mogul is controlling. Therefore we must conclude that there is not substantial evidence that Delco, through Kendall, threatened to discontinue an existing company benefit.