Opinion ID: 8414984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Franz

Text: As vessel owner, Franz was subject to suit for negligence under the LHWCA. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). Although the district court correctly noted that Franz was not an employer or bareboat charterer of the Barge and therefore was only responsible for his “turnover duty,” see O’hara, 294 F.3d at 65, the district court did not properly analyze the LHWCA claims. While he could not be responsible for the presence of excess stone, Franz arguably had a duty, as owner, to address the condition of the Barge before turning it over to Buchanan. As the district court itself recognized, Volk’s negligence claim could have been based on the condition of the vessel, not just the presence of excess stone on the margin deck. See Special App’x at 27 (“The alleged negligence which caused W. Volk’s injury could plausibly originate from one of two sources. The first is where the stones reached the margin deck of the B-252 from a barge weeper, which is a drainage hole on the side of a barge. The second is where the stones could have been overloaded by Tilcon and spilled onto the margin deck.” (citation omitted and emphasis added)). On remand, the district court shall consider whether there is a viable claim under § 905(b) of the LHWCA against Franz as owner based on the condition of the vessel. See Gravatt, 226 F.3d at 115 (“[T]he employee may sue negligent third parties in tort.”); see also Pellegrino v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 309 F.Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“The shipowner owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to ... longshoremen properly aboard its vessel to provide a seaworthy ship.”). As that statute is the sole basis under which Volk can recover against Franz, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), the general maritime and state law claims otherwise must be dismissed. See Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 818, 121 S.Ct. 1927, 150 L.Ed.2d 34 (2001) (noting that the LHWCA preempts all other claims against a vessel owner).