Opinion ID: 765858
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restraint on Speech. Section 2384 provides:

Text: 120 If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow, put down, or destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. 121 18 U.S.C. § 2384. 122 As Section 2384 proscribes speech only when it constitutes an agreement to use force against the United States, Rahman's generalized First Amendment challenge to the statute is without merit. Our court has previously considered and rejected a First Amendment challenge to Section 2384. See United States v. Lebron, 222 F.2d 531, 536 (2d Cir. 1955). Although Lebron's analysis of the First Amendment issues posed by Section 2384 was brief, the panel found the question was squarely controlled by the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). In Dennis, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Smith Act, which made it a crime to advocate, or to conspire to advocate, the overthrow of the United States government by force or violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385; Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494. The Dennis Court concluded that, while the element of speech inherent in Smith Act convictions required that the Act be given close First Amendment scrutiny, the Act did not impermissibly burden the expression of protected speech, as it was properly directed at advocacy [of overthrow of the government by force], not discussion. See id. at 502. 123 After Dennis, the Court broadened the scope of First Amendment restrictions on laws that criminalize subversive advocacy. It remains fundamental that while the state may not criminalize the expression of views--even including the view that violent overthrow of the government is desirable--it may nonetheless outlaw encouragement, inducement, or conspiracy to take violent action. Thus, in Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957), overruled in part on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 7 (1978), the Court interpreted the Smith Act to prohibit only the advocacy of concrete violent action, but not advocacy and teaching of forcible overthrow as an abstract principle, divorced from any effort to instigate action to that end. And in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam), the Court held that a state may proscribe subversive advocacy only when such advocacy is directed towards, and is likely to result in, imminent lawless action. 124 The prohibitions of the seditious conspiracy statute are much further removed from the realm of constitutionally protected speech than those at issue in Dennis and its progeny. To be convicted under Section 2384, one must conspire to use force, not just to advocate the use of force. We have no doubt that this passes the test of constitutionality. 125 Our view of Section 2384's constitutionality also finds support in a number of the Supreme Court's more recent First Amendment decisions. These cases make clear that a line exists between expressions of belief, which are protected by the First Amendment, and threatened or actual uses of force, which are not. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993) (A physical assault is not . . . expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) ([T]hreats of violence are outside the First Amendment); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (The First Amendment does not protect violence); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (Congress may outlaw threats against President, provided that [w]hat is a threat [is] distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.); see also Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 588 (4th Cir. 1997) (upholding constitutionality of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, as Act prohibits only use of force, physical obstruction, or threats of force); Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418-20 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1995) (same). 126 b. Vagueness and Overbreadth. Rahman also contends that Section 2384 is overbroad and void for vagueness. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95 (1982). 127 (i) Overbreadth. A law is overbroad, and hence void, if it does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of State control, but, on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities that . . . constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). Particularly when conduct and not speech is involved, to void the statute the overbreadth must be real [and] substantial . . . judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613,93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830(1973); see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799-800 & 800 n.19 (1984). 128 We recognize that laws targeting sedition must be scrutinized with care to assure that the threat of prosecution will not deter expression of unpopular viewpoints by persons ideologically opposed to the government. But Section 2384 is drawn sufficiently narrowly that we perceive no unacceptable risk of such abuse. 129 Rahman argues that Section 2384 is overbroad because Congress could have achieved its public safety aims without chilling First Amendment rights by punishing only substantive acts involving bombs, weapons, or other violent acts. Rahman Br. at 67. One of the beneficial purposes of the conspiracy law is to permit arrest and prosecution before the substantive crime has been accomplished. The Government, possessed of evidence of conspiratorial planning, need not wait until buildings and tunnels have been bombed and people killed before arresting the conspirators. Accordingly, it is well established that the Government may criminalize certain preparatory steps towards criminal action, even when the crime consists of the use of conspiratorial or exhortatory words. See, e.g., United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 678 (2d Cir. 1985). Because Section 2384 prohibits only conspiratorial agreement, we are satisfied that the statute is not constitutionally overbroad. 130 (ii) Vagueness. Rahman also challenges the statute for vagueness. A criminal statute, particularly one regulating speech, must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); see also Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499. Rahman argues that Section 2384 does not provide fair warning about what acts are unlawful, leaving constitutionally protected speech vulnerable to criminal prosecution. 131 There is indeed authority suggesting that the word seditious does not sufficiently convey what conduct it forbids to serve as an essential element of a crime. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598 (1967) (noting that dangers fatal to First Amendment freedoms inhere in the word 'seditious,' and invalidating law that provided, inter alia, that state employees who utter seditious words may be discharged). But the word seditious does not appear in the prohibitory text of the statute; it appears only in the caption. The terms of the statute are far more precise. The portions charged against Rahman and his co-defendants--conspiracy to levy war against the United States and to oppose by force the authority thereof--do not involve terms of such vague meaning. Furthermore, they unquestionably specify that agreement to use force is an essential element of the crime. Rahman therefore cannot prevail on the claim that the portions of Section 2384 charged against him criminalize mere expressions of opinion, or are unduly vague. 132