Opinion ID: 1391440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: StandardsIneffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: The right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is constitutional in nature. U.S. Const. amend. VI; W.Va.Const. art. III, § 14. Moreover, the right of the accused to be represented by counsel includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. State ex rel. Favors v. Tucker, 143 W.Va. 130, 140, 100 S.E.2d 411, 416 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 908, 78 S.Ct. 1153, 2 L.Ed.2d 1158 (1958); State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W.Va. 473, 482, 63 S.E.2d 845, 850 (1951). In State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 640, 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974), this Court set forth standards for determining the validity of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Syllabus points 19 and 21 of Thomas state: In the determination of a claim that an accused was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel violative of Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, courts should measure and compare the questioned counsel's performance by whether he exhibited the normal and customary degree of skill possessed by attorneys who are reasonably knowledgeable of criminal law, except that proved counsel error which does not affect the outcome of the case, will be regarded as harmless error. Where a counsel's performance, attacked as ineffective, arises from occurrences involving strategy, tactics and arguable courses of action, his conduct will be deemed effectively assistive of his client's interest, unless no reasonably qualified defense attorney would have so acted in the defense of an accused. It should be noted, however, that this Court, in Thomas, indicated that the above standards were to be prospectively applied. 157 W.Va. at 665, 666, 203 S.E.2d at 460-61. The appellant in this action was convicted in 1973, prior to the Thomas decision. The pre- Thomas test concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, applied in various federal courts, was described in the Thomas opinion: counsel's efforts must have been so inadequate as to render the trial a farce and a mockery of justice. 157 W.Va. at 662, 203 S.E.2d at 459. For example, in Gibson v. Boles, 288 F.Supp. 472 (N.D.W.Va.1968), the district court, in rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, stated: The effectiveness of counsel is not determined by whether counsel obtained the `best deal' for his client but whether he has performed his duties to represent his client in a way that does not shock the conscience of the court or produce a mockery of justice. 288 F.Supp. at 476. The accused, in Gibson, entered a plea of guilty in State court to forgery and received a penitentiary sentence of one to ten years. The Gibson opinion states: A petitioner's disappointment in receiving a more severe sentence than he hoped would be imposed is not a basis for finding ineffective assistance of counsel. 288 F.Supp. at 477. Prior to Thomas, however, West Virginia did not simply follow a standard based upon farce and mockery in determining ineffective assistance of counsel. Rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a case where the accused entered a plea to murder of the first degree, this Court in State ex rel. Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W.Va. 557, 573, 103 S.E.2d 777, 787, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 869, 79 S.Ct. 102, 3 L.Ed.2d 101 (1958), stated that counsel must diligently attempt to see that no constitutional or substantial right is denied such a defendant and that he is afforded a fair and impartial trial. It is just as clear, however, that counsel should be fair and honorable in their actions and in their representations to the court. See also State ex rel. Owens v. King, 149 W.Va. 637, 640, 142 S.E.2d 880, 882 (1965); State ex rel. Robison v. Boles, 149 W.Va. 516, 520-21, 142 S.E.2d 55, 58 (1965); State ex rel. Clark v. Adams, 144 W.Va. 771, 777, 111 S.E.2d 336, 340 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 807, 80 S.Ct. 1242, 4 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1960). A recent, important case concerning standards for determining the validity of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, reh'g denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864 (1984). The Supreme Court of the United States in Strickland stated: A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. [10] As indicated in 1 F. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure ch. 1, § E (Michie Co.1985), the farce and mockery test has been criticized as not helpful in resolving the constitutional issues regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases. Thus, the more sophisticated standards of Thomas were adopted by this Court in 1974. Nevertheless, although Thomas is to be applied prospectively, this State's departure from the farce and mockery test was somewhat foreshadowed by the pre- Thomas cases cited above. In any event, for the reasons stated below, we hold that the appellant is entitled to no relief upon the issue of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, even upon the standards articulated in Thomas and Strickland.