Opinion ID: 1990842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Inform Rhodes of Right to Testify.

Text: In his third assignment of error, Rhodes asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to inform Rhodes of Rhodes' right to testify in his own behalf. Rhodes contends he was not informed of his right to testify at his motion to suppress, nor was he informed he had the right to testify at trial. We turn first to Rhodes' allegation that he was not informed he had the right to testify at trial. The district court's order specifically noted that the record was replete with references to the strategic reasons as to why Rhodes did not testify and that the matter was discussed with Rhodes. Our review of the record indicates that this finding was not clearly erroneous. Counsel testified at his deposition that he did not have any specific recollection of discussing with Rhodes the right to testify, but that as a general practice, he would have discussed it twice: initially, when all other rights were explained to Rhodes and, again, around the time of trial, when making a determination as to whether Rhodes would testify. More importantly, at his deposition, Rhodes testified repeatedly that he was aware he could testify and that he had discussed with counsel whether he should testify. A defendant who has been fully informed of the right to testify may not acquiesce in his or her counsel's advice that he or she not testify, and then later claim that he or she did not voluntarily waive such right. [16] A review of the record shows that Rhodes was informed of his right to testify and acquiesced to counsel's advice that he should not testify. We therefore conclude that Rhodes has not met his burden of showing trial counsel's performance was deficient with respect to Rhodes' allegation regarding his right to testify at trial. We next address Rhodes' allegation that he was not informed he had the right to testify at the hearing on his motion to suppress. Rhodes contends that had he known that he could testify at this hearing, he would have testified that he used arm signals to signal his turn; that the temperature was cold and clothing he wore was not appropriate for that cold weather (undercutting testimony of law enforcement about [his] behavior); the slope of the road where the car was parked and how that would have effected [sic] whether the door was open; and that he ... was not Mirandized. [17] Assuming, but not deciding, that counsel's performance was deficient, we nevertheless conclude Rhodes was not prejudiced by that performance with regard to Rhodes' right to testify at the hearing on his motion to suppress. First, Rhodes asserts he could have testified that he signaled his turn with an arm signal. However, such evidence was presented at the suppression hearing through the testimony of Rhodes' passenger. Rhodes was not prejudiced by his inability to testify to this point where the evidence was nevertheless presented to the district court. Rhodes also contends that he would have testified regarding the temperature and his attire at the time of the stop. Rhodes' proposed testimony is apparently aimed at testimony by the officers that Rhodes was unsteady on his feet; appeared fidgety; and was, in the officers' estimations, under the influence of drugs or alcohol. However, following trial, Rhodes was acquitted of the DUI charge. He could not have been prejudiced by his inability to rebut the officers' testimonies regarding whether he was under the influence when in fact he was found not guilty of such charge. We also note that one officer testified on both direct and cross-examination that the weather at the time of the stop was cold; therefore, this evidence was nevertheless presented to the district court. Next, Rhodes argues he could have testified that the vehicle was parked on an incline during the stop. Apparently, this testimony would have been aimed at rebutting the testimony of one officer that the driver's side door was open at the time that he, the officer, identified the shotgun on the floor behind the front driver and passenger seats. Rhodes apparently contends this was not so, because he had closed the door upon exiting the vehicle and because the slope of the road would have made the door shut automatically. However, Rhodes does not explain, nor can we conceive of, what effect this would have had on the ultimate outcome of the suppression hearing. As such, Rhodes has again failed to establish how he was prejudiced by the fact that he did not testify. Finally, Rhodes argues he would have testified that he was not given any Miranda warnings. But Rhodes' motion to suppress any statements taken in violation of Miranda was sustained, and no such statements were introduced into evidence. Thus, Rhodes suffered no prejudice by the lack of his testimony at the suppression hearing regarding his lack of Miranda warnings. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Rhodes was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged failure to inform Rhodes of his right to testify at his suppression hearing. In addition, we conclude that Rhodes and his counsel discussed Rhodes' right to testify at trial and that Rhodes acquiesced in counsel's opinion that he should not testify. As such, counsel's performance on this point was not deficient. Rhodes' third assignment of error is without merit.