Opinion ID: 779761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretion in Making the Initial Finding

Text: 39 We review a decision to grant or deny summary judgment de novo. Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir.2001). The Service interprets the time limit for making initial listing determinations under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) independently of the one-year limitation imposed in subsection (b)(3)(B). Under the Service's interpretation, it has ninety days [t]o the maximum extent practicable to make the initial listing determination under (b)(3)(A); but if it is not practicable to complete the determination within ninety days, the finding may be delayed indefinitely. We disagree with the Service's interpretation. 40 Although we give deference to an agency's construction of a statutory provision it is charged with administering, Amer. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 204 F.3d 1272, 1274-75 (9th Cir.2000), we must reject those constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent or that frustrate the policy Congress sought to implement. Eisinger v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 218 F.3d 1097, 1100-01 (9th Cir.2000). 41 It is an elementary canon of construction that an interpretation which gives effect to all sections of a statute is preferred. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596, (1979) (limited by Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989)). The Service's interpretation would render subsection (b)(3)(B) inoperative. The only way to give effect to both deadline provisions is to apply the twelve-month deadline to both the initial and final determinations. 42 Additionally, Congress from the outset recognized that timeliness in the listing process is essential. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 254 F.3d 833, 839 (9th Cir.2001). During subsequent revisions of the ESA, Congress expressed particular concern for species that had languished for years in status reviews. Id. at 839-40 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the Service asks us to embrace an interpretation of the ESA in which listings could admittedly take years, it is apparent that Congress passed the 1982 amendments for the very purpose of curtailing the process. 43 Subsection (b)(3)(B) imposes a firm twelve-month deadline for making final determinations. Kantor, 99 F.3d at 338-39. If the final determination must be made within twelve months, the only logical conclusion is that the initial one must be made within that time as well. Our conclusion is not inconsistent with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.1998). In that case, Biodiversity Legal Foundation (Biodiversity), one of the parties to this action, asserted that the phrase maximum extent practicable places a limit on the Service's discretion. Id. at 1253. Specifically, Biodiversity argued that the LPG could not be used to extend initial listing determinations beyond ninety days. Id. It asserted that the Service could exceed the ninety-day limitation only if making a listing determination within ninety days was impracticable. Id. 44 The Tenth Circuit ruled that [t]he 1997 LPG's prioritization ... is consistent with the language and legislative history of section 4(b)(3)(A). Id. at 1255. However, the court expressly limited its review to assessing whether the 1997 LPG is a reasonable interpretation of section 4(b)(3)(A) in light of the entire statutory scheme. Id. at 1255-56. The Tenth Circuit never addressed the issue whether the Service's discretion under subsection (b)(3)(A) was limited by subsection (b)(3)(B). That is the issue we now decide. We rule that Congress intended to limit the flexible deadline governing the initial listing determination by enacting the firm deadline for making the final determination. Both determinations must be made within one year. See Norton, 254 F.3d at 838-40.