Opinion ID: 1142705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: scope of review with a twist

Text: Where, as here, a trial court sits without a jury and makes findings of fact, these ordinarily are safe on appeal where the record includes substantial supporting evidence. Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 814 (Miss. 1986), Gilchrist Machinery Co., Inc. v. Ross, 493 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 1986), Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So.2d 683, 685 (Miss. 1983), Culbreath v. Johnson, 427 So.2d 705, 707-709 (Miss. 1983). This is true whether the findings relate to matters of evidentiary fact or ultimate fact. Dudley v. Light, 586 So.2d 155, 159 (Miss. 1991); Norris, 498 So.2d at 814; Gilchrist, 493 So.2d at 1292, Spain v. Holland, 483 So.2d 318, 320 (Miss. 1986). This Court on review examines the entire record and must accept: that evidence which supports or reasonably tends to support the findings of fact made below, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom... . Cotton, 435 So.2d at 685. Ordinarily, this Court must affirm a finding of fact unless upon review of the record we be left with the firm and definite view that a mistake has been made. UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hospital, 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987); Harkins v. Fletcher, 499 So.2d 773, 775 (Miss. 1986); Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 329 (Miss. 1986). Not infrequently a trial court fails to make all of the findings reasonably prerequisite to its judgment. Where this is so precedent and prudence counsel we interpolate from the findings made and assume the trial court resolved the remaining issues consistent with the judgment. PMZ Oil Company v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201, 205 (Miss. 1984); Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So.2d at 685; Harris v. Bailey Avenue Park, 202 Miss. 776, 791, 32 So.2d 689, 694 (1947). These implied findings are protected by the substantial evidence rule the same as express findings. Spain v. Holland, 483 So.2d at 320; Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So.2d 174, 179 (Miss. 1985). Of course, none of this should be taken to say we will make up findings simply to support a judgment. Riddle v. State, 580 So.2d 1195, 1200 (Miss. 1991); Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 516 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss. 1987); Pace v. Owens, 511 So.2d 489, 492 (Miss. 1987). Today's are not ordinary findings. The Chancery Court literally signed off on USB's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Not one word has been changed. [5] We have confronted this form of findings before. Without doubt, the Chancery Court in gross ruled for USB and against Gray and BOM. Our concern is we have been handed a twenty-three page document detailing numerous findings of evidentiary and ultimate fact with the law thereafter declared and applied, and nothing before us suggests any of this except in broad outline is the product of the Court's adjudicatory prowess. The practical premise underlying our limited review of matters of fact is that the trial court heard the testimony and observed the demeanor of witnesses and from this made the tough and necessary credibility choices. That predicate premise does not obtain today, and so we have no choice but to engage in much more careful analysis of adopting findings than in cases where the findings and conclusions have been authorized by the trial judge himself. Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So.2d 1259, 1265 (Miss. 1987). We must keep a keen eye for gratuitous slants. Common sense suggests our duty of deference to such findings is necessarily lessened. Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So.2d 1259, 1266 (Miss. 1987). At the very least, we may assume such findings have given the party drafting them the benefit of the favorable inferences that may be found in the facts. Findings that tend against the drafting party would seem as solid as can be. We do not wish to appear insensitive to the burdens the trial court carries. The course chosen here increases the burden on this Court as an appellate court, and we must view the challenged findings of fact and the appellate record as a whole with a more critical eye to insure that the trial court has adequately performed its function. Rice Researchers, 512 So.2d at 1265; see also, Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 516 So.2d 236, 239 (Miss. 1987). Some of the issues tendered for review are not of fact but of law. We approach these matters with an altogether different attitude. Our review is de novo. Watts v. Pennington, 598 So.2d 1308, 1311 (Miss. 1992); Rose v. State, 586 So.2d 746, 751 (Miss. 1991); State of Mississippi v. Aseme, 583 So.2d 955 (Miss. 1991); Harrison County v. City of Gulfport, 557 So.2d 780, 784 (Miss. 1990); Cole v. National Life Insurance Co., 549 So.2d 1301, 1303 (Miss. 1989); UHS-Qualicare v. Gulf Coast Community Hospital, 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss. 1987); Boggs v. Eaton, 379 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss. 1980); see also Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1789, 72 L.Ed.2d 66, 79 (1982). This Court, as a matter of institutional necessity and constitutional imperative, is the ultimate expositor of the law of this state. Notwithstanding our respect for and deference to the trial judge, on matters of law it is our job to get it right. That the trial judge may have come close is not good enough. UHS-Qualicare, 525 So.2d at 754. Each of these principles, each of these attitudes, aids our approach to the appeals we must adjudge.