Opinion ID: 492351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does The Evidence Support The Existence Of A Contract?

Text: 10 The jury found that Mayo was entitled to recover $154,000 for breach of his employment contract. Defendants, however, do not believe that the evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to justify such an award and contend that the district court should have granted their motion for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, their motion for a new trial. 11 Before considering these arguments, we briefly describe the standards of review to be employed in this case. As to the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the standard of review is the same as for a denial of a motion for directed verdict: we must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and determine whether there are facts and inferences reasonably drawn from those facts which lead to but one conclusion--that there is a total failure of evidence to prove plaintiff's case. Fact Concerts, Inc. v. City of Newport, 626 F.2d 1060, 1064 (1st Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds, 453 U.S. 247, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981). With regard to the court's denial of defendants' new trial motion, we will reverse only if defendants can show that the verdict was 'so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice.'  Jordan v. United States Lines, Inc., 738 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir.1984) (quoting Lakin v. Daniel Marr & Son Co., 732 F.2d 233, 237 (1st Cir.1984)). 12
13 Defendants begin by challenging the district court's denial of their motion for judgment n.o.v. on the ground that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence. They correctly note that the only evidence of the oral contract claimed by Mayo is his own trial testimony. Mayo offered no corroborating witnesses, nor did he introduce any documentary evidence in support of his claim. These facts alone, however, do not require the entry of judgment n.o.v. so long as Mayo's testimony and the inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it support the jury's conclusion. 14 To support their contention that the verdict is unsupported by the evidence, defendants cite glaring discrepancies between Mayo's redrafted complaint and his testimony at trial. Mayo's complaint first alleges that he would be entitled to at least a ten percent equity share in Continental as well as a commission of $20,000 per megawatt capacity on all dams he identified or analyzed which were subsequently acquired by the yet unnamed, unformed company or its assigns within a period of three (3) years. Redrafted Complaint p 9 (emphasis supplied). The very next paragraph of the complaint states the terms of the contract differently, alleging that Mayo would receive a one-third ownership interest in the new corporation or, if he chose to terminate his relationship with the venture after the original three month period, a commission of $20,000 per megawatt. Redrafted Complaint p 10. His testimony at trial was different still from both versions of the contract described in his complaint. Mayo testified that he was entitled to a commission of $20,000 per megawatt of potential installed capacity of all sites he identified that could have been acquired in the exercise of reasonable diligence within three years. (App.299). 15 Defendants contend that Mayo's shifting description of the alleged oral contract renders his trial testimony totally unbelievable. They insist that it is completely inconceivable that a financer [sic] for a power project would request a list of 'the largest possible number' of potential sites and agree to pay $20,000 per megawatt capacity related to those sites, completely regardless of whether those sites were ever acquired or attempted to be acquired. Defendants' Brief at 22. Defendants add, moreover, that Mayo did not terminate his relationship with the venture at the conclusion of his three month consulting contract. Instead, he stayed on, attempted without success to negotiate for a share of the equity in Continental, and eventually settled on the deal making him president, and his wife a major stockholder, in Water Power. Defendants contend that, under the version of the contract alleged in the Redrafted Complaint, Mayo's decision to continue with the venture should have precluded his collection of the $20,000 per megawatt commission. They suggest that Mayo changed his story at trial and abandoned pursuit of an equity share in Continental because the corporation had ceased to enjoy financial success. 16 We acknowledge the power of these arguments, but we believe they are addressed to the wrong audience. Although entirely appropriate in the context of a closing argument to the jury, these contentions do not affect our review of the jury's verdict in plaintiff's favor. The variance between Mayo's complaint and trial testimony may very well support the conclusion that his testimony was the product of a flight of fancy. But the jury is the ultimate finder of fact with regard to such issues of credibility and its determination must be respected. On a motion for judgment n.o.v., a court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and may not substitute its opinion of witnesses' credibility for that of the jury. Fact Concerts, 626 F.2d at 1064. 17 It is obvious, moreover, that the jury did not accept as true everything that Mayo said on the witness stand. In addition to finding against him on a counterclaim that is not before us on this appeal, the jury also rejected Mayo's suggestion that he was owed a commission on several sites he had recommended to Ryan as desirable acquisitions, but which were not ultimately acquired. Instead, it apparently believed that Mayo was entitled to a commission of $20,000 per megawatt of potential installed capacity only for the three hydroelectric sites actually acquired by Continental or its affiliates. At bottom, this boils down to the jury determining that Mayo's identification of 21 sites as acquirable within three years was overly optimistic in light of the other evidence in the case. We are persuaded that the jury acted properly in making this finding based on the available evidence and, hence, see no cause for overturning its verdict. 18
19 While Mayo's credibility is completely irrelevant to the motion for judgment n.o.v., the district court could properly have considered this factor in ruling on the new trial motion advanced by defendants. Defendants asserted in their motion to the district court that a new trial was necessary because the jury's verdict was inconsistent, against the weight of the evidence, and represented a miscarriage of justice. See Borras v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 586 F.2d 881, 886 (1st Cir.1978). On appeal they focus solely on their claim that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence because the proposition that such a contract ever existed between defendants and Mayo is completely unbelievable and because Mayo's own testimony is not creditable, as shown by his shifting allegations concerning the alleged contract, as well as his cavalier misappropriation of corporate assets. Defendants' Brief at 24. Thus, credibility is at the very heart of their demand for a new trial. 20 We recognize, as we have previously stated, the trial court's duty to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial if [it] is of the opinion that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence which is false, or will result in a clear miscarriage of justice. Coffran v. Hitchcock Clinic, Inc., 683 F.2d 5, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 571, 74 L.Ed.2d 933 (1982). Here, however, the district court did not believe that the jury was so derelict in rendering its verdict as to require a new trial and denied defendants' motion. Our review of this decision is necessarily circumscribed, first, by our appreciation of the district court's superior ability to monitor the conduct of the trial and assess the credibility of witnesses, and second, by the jury's constitutionally sanctioned role as finder of fact. Thus, absent a showing that the verdict was so clearly against the weight of the evidence as to constitute a manifest miscarriage of justice, we will refrain from substituting our view of the evidence for that shared by both the jury and the trial court. Jordan, 738 F.2d at 49 (quoting Lakin, 732 F.2d at 233). 21 Given this deferential standard of review and the evidence as described above, we hold that the district court's denial of the new trial motion does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Although the district court admitted that the evidence supporting plaintiff's claim was awful thin (App.255), we believe that it correctly denied defendants' new trial motion because the verdict was not so improper as to constitute a miscarriage of justice and we refuse to overturn this considered judgment. 22