Opinion ID: 186552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The 2001 EA

Text: 20 The Service contends the Fund's claims under the APA, the NEPA, and the MBTA are moot because the Service relied on the 2001 EA for two hunting seasons — 2001-02 and 2002-03 — and has subsequently relied on the 2003 EA. The Fund confirmed at oral argument that the crux of [its] challenge was to the [2001] EA. Although the 2001 EA and the regulations based thereupon are no longer in effect, the Fund argues its present dilemma is one capable of repetition, yet evading review. So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). In particular, the Fund maintains the Service's approach virtually guarantees that their EAs will `systematically evade review,' since at any point in the judicial review process, the agency can simply issue a new EA and declare `moot' any legal challenge. 21 Under the law of this circuit, regardless whether the present situation is capable of repetition, it is not one evading review. As a general rule, two years is enough time for a dispute to be litigated. See LaRouche v. Fowler, 152 F.3d 974, 978 (D.C.Cir.1998); see also So. Pac. Terminal, 219 U.S. at 514-16, 31 S.Ct. 279 (duration of less than two years insufficient to litigate dispute). 22 The 2001 EA was issued in June of that year and remained in effect until August 2003, or somewhat more than two years. The 2003 EA has already been in effect for more than two years and has served as the basis for the relevant provisions of the 2003, 2004, and 2005 regulations; the 2003 EA will therefore be in effect for at least three years. Moreover, the Fund has offered no evidence for its suggestion that the Service is cynically inclined to moot any legal challenge the Fund may mount in the future. Because the 2001 EA has long since been succeeded and the situation of which the Fund complains, should it recur, is not one likely to evade review, we dismiss as moot the Fund's claims under the APA, the NEPA, and the MBTA. 23 Finally, the Service argues we should not vacate the orders under review because this case was mooted as a result of events within the control of ... the Fund. In particular, the Service contends the Fund should have sought expedited review in this court during the six months between the district court's ruling and the issuance of the 2003 EA. Be that as it may, we have repeatedly held that we will not consider the possibility of expedited review in determining mootness. Hinckley v. United States, 163 F.3d 647, 651 n. 8 (1999). 24 The Service also faults the Fund for not severing its claims under the ESA from those under the APA, the NEPA, and the MBTA for purposes of appellate review; the pendency in the district court of the Service's motion for reconsideration of the ESA claim then would not have delayed our consideration of the Fund's other claims. As the Fund points out, however, it did attempt to appeal the MBTA and NEPA claims that were not subject to the [Service's] motion to amend the judgment as to the ESA claims. Rather than separately entertain the non-ESA claims, however, the court held them in abeyance pending resolution of the Service's motion. The Fund therefore did not sit on its hands, as the Service suggests. 25 Because the Service mooted the claims then pending before us, the Fund should not be prejudiced by orders that have not been reviewed on their merits. Indeed, vacatur is commonly utilized in precisely this situation to prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from spawning any legal consequences. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 41, 71 S.Ct. 104.