Opinion ID: 2998624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Teresa’s Confession

Text: The district court held that Teresa was collaterally estopped from bringing a claim based on her confession in this § 1983 action because the Knox County Court had determined, at a suppression hearing in the criminal action, No. 04-3614 23 that her confession was voluntary. The district court held inapplicable the conventional bar on using collateral estoppel when appeal is impossible in the initial proceeding; it reasoned that, because the state court’s decision rested on credibility determinations, the decision had little chance of being reversed on appeal. Principles of issue preclusion, therefore, prevented Teresa from relitigating the voluntariness of her confession in this civil suit. In order to evaluate the correctness of this ruling, we first examine the circumstances surrounding the ruling in the state trial court. At the conclusion of two days of testimony from Teresa and from Officers Riley and Sheppard, the Knox County Circuit Court denied Teresa’s motion to suppress her confession. The court noted, as a preliminary matter, that Teresa’s suppression motion came down to a question of credibility. Over the two days of testimony, Teresa and the officers had presented dramatically different accounts of what had occurred in the interview room at the Galesburg Public Safety Building. The Knox County Court ultimately refused to credit Teresa’s testimony. The court reasoned that, by alleging that her coerced confession was false, Teresa had proved herself untrustworthy, and having lied once, Teresa could not be believed when testifying at the suppression hearing. Having made this threshold credibility finding, the Knox County Court resolved the Miranda issue; it stated simply: “I believe the officers. I do not believe the defendant.” R.111, Ex.15 at 55. The more subtle question of whether Teresa’s confession was voluntary for purposes of due process gave the court greater difficulty. The court found most troubling the consistent testimony that the officers made certain statements to Teresa regarding her children’s future. Nevertheless, the court eventually 24 No. 04-3614 found that the statements made before Teresa’s initial, verbal confession consisted only of permissible appeals to Teresa’s “priorities” and “system of values.” Id. at 60. In the court’s view, the threatening references to Teresa’s children being taken away were not made, if at all, until after she had verbally confessed. On the issue of whether the later threats tainted Teresa’s written confession, the court stated simply, “I am letting in the written statement because the attack is not sufficient.” Id. at 62.
With this background, we now turn to the ruling of the district court. As we noted earlier, the court determined that the decision of the Knox County Court on Teresa’s suppression motion collaterally estopped her from relitigating whether her confession was Miranda-infirm or involuntary. The doctrine of collateral estoppel generally bars relitigation of issues that were litigated fully and decided with finality in a previous proceeding. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Lee v. City of Peoria, 685 F.2d 196, 199-202 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying Illinois law). Illinois law,9 however, provides that collateral estoppel is unavailable when: (1) “additional evidence” is discovered after the prior decision; or (2) the party against whom preclusion is sought was unable to appeal the judgment in the initial action. Teresa argues that both exceptions apply to her case and deprive the suppression ruling of preclusive effect. In this case, we believe that the unavailability of an appeal is determinative. 9 Illinois law determines the preclusive effect, if any, of a judgment rendered by an Illinois court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Rekhi v. Wildwood Indus., 61 F.3d 1313, 1317 (7th Cir. 1995). No. 04-3614 25 Teresa relies on People v. Mordican, 356 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ill. 1976), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that collateral estoppel cannot be asserted against a criminal defendant who “had no opportunity to obtain a review of the correctness of the ruling made in his earlier [proceeding].” In Mordican, a criminal defendant was unable to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence in a prior trial because the trial had ended in an acquittal. When the defendant was subsequently tried on a separate criminal charge stemming from the same events, he again sought to suppress the same evidence. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the issue had been adjudicated during the first criminal proceeding. The defendant ultimately was convicted of the charges brought against him at the second trial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that acquittal of a criminal defendant forecloses the application of collateral estoppel in subsequent proceedings. Id. at 74. The court reasoned that a defendant who is acquitted has no opportunity to obtain appellate review of rulings made by the trial judge during the course of the trial. Id. Because of this “peculiar circumstance,” rulings by the trial judge cannot bind an acquitted defendant in later proceedings through the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Id. Recent Illinois decisions demonstrate the continued vitality of this rule. See, e.g., People v. Weilmuenster, 670 N.E.2d 802, 808-09 (Ill. App. 1996). Whether Mordican applies in the civil context, however, has not yet been decided by Illinois courts. Language in Mordican indicates that its holding may indeed be confined to the criminal context. See id. (“The extent to which the doctrine of collateral estoppel may be used against a defendant in a criminal case is, of course, severely limited.”). Subsequent Illinois cases, however, have hinted in dicta that the Mordican rule applies with equal force in the 26 No. 04-3614 civil context and bars a civil litigant from using collateral estoppel against a party who had no chance to appeal. See, e.g., Morris B. Chapman & Assocs., Ltd. v. Kitzman, 739 N.E.2d 1263 (Ill. 2000) (applying Missouri law); Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 605 N.E.2d 544, 553 (Ill. 1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1), which “recognizes an exception to the application of collateral estoppel where the party against whom preclusion is sought was unable, as a matter of law, to appeal the judgment in the initial action”). Recognizing its duty to predict how Illinois’ highest court would decide this case, the district court held that, “if the Illinois Supreme Court were to consider the facts of this case, they would not find [that] the inability to appeal barred application of collateral estoppel principles.” R.144 at 47. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied heavily on the Northern District of Illinois’ decision in Thompson v. Mueller, 976 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ill. 1997). Thompson held that the absence of appellate review of a state-court decision finding probable cause to arrest a defendant was insufficient to prevent the application of collateral estoppel in the defendant’s subsequent § 1983 action against the arresting officers. In Thompson, the district court cabined Mordican to the criminal context, and relied upon the acknowledgment of the United States Supreme Court that “the availability of appellate review is not always an essential predicate of collateral estoppel.” Id. at 766 (citing Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 23 n.18 (1980)). Mindful that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is concerned primarily with whether “the result achieved in the initial action was substantially correct,” the court in Thompson focused its inquiry on, whether, under the particular facts of the case before it, application of collateral estoppel would be unfair or unjust. Id. The court concluded that Thompson’s No. 04-3614 27 inability to appeal did not bar the use of collateral estoppel “because (1) the issue of probable cause was litigated thoroughly in the state court; (2) the judge’s decision rested on the credibility determinations of several witnesses; and (3) the possibility of the decision being reversed on appeal was, at best, extremely low.” Id. Here, the district court considered that the relevant facts are “practically identical” to the facts in Thompson. R.144 at 51. Reasoning that, because the Knox County Court’s decision on Teresa’s suppression motion rested on credibility determinations that are virtually never overturned on appeal, the result in the initial action was “substantially correct.” Thompson, 976 F. Supp. at 766. Accordingly, the district court held that Teresa’s inability to appeal did not preclude application of collateral estoppel. We respectfully decline to adopt the reasoning of the district court. In our view, the court erred, both in refusing to extend Mordican to the § 1983 context, and in its application of the principles from Thompson. Mordican cited approvingly language from People v. Hopkins, 284 N.E.2d 283, 284 (Ill. 1972), which stressed the limited applicability of collateral estoppel against a criminal defendant. The rationale for this limitation, Hopkins explained, is that a defendant, unlike the prosecution, is not allowed an immediate appeal from an adverse ruling upon a motion to suppress. He cannot review that ruling until after he has been convicted and sentenced. And for a variety of reasons he might not wish to appeal, or as in the case of an acquittal at the first trial, he might not be able to do so. Id. As this language indicates, the concerns that limit application of collateral estoppel in the criminal context 28 No. 04-3614 arise out of problems of appealability for criminal defendants, rather than the nature of subsequent proceedings. The situation in Teresa’s case certainly is no different. She was, at the time of the suppression hearing, a criminal defendant like the defendants in Mordican and Hopkins. Teresa similarly was limited in her ability to test the correctness of the trial court’s ruling through appellate review. Because the problem in Mordican was that the criminal defendant could not appeal the initial ruling, we see no reason why Mordican would not extend to a criminal defendant, similarly unable to appeal, merely because she protests the use of collateral estoppel against her in a subsequent § 1983 action instead of in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Therefore, it appears highly likely that the Supreme Court of Illinois would extend the rule in Mordican to cover situations like Teresa’s.10 Collateral estoppel is an equitable doctrine. Jones v. City of Alton, 757 F.2d 878, 885 (7th Cir. 1985); Talarico v. Dunlap, 685 N.E.2d 325, 328 (Ill. 1997). Even when the technical 10 Such an extension would bring Illinois into conformity with other courts that have addressed this issue. Each applied the approach of the Restatement and refused to allow collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil trial against a criminal defendant who had been unable to appeal the initial ruling. See, e.g., Looney v. City of Wilmington, 723 F. Supp. 1025, 1033 (D. Del. 1989) (applying Delaware law); Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying California law); AKAK, Corp. v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 589, 639-40 (Va. App. 2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1) (allowing relitigation of an issue if “the party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action”). No. 04-3614 29 conditions of the doctrine are met, collateral estoppel must not be applied to preclude an issue “unless it is clear that no unfairness results to the party being estopped.” Talarico, 685 N.E.2d at 328. True, the Knox County Court’s suppression ruling relied in large part on credibility determinations. These credibility findings flow, however, from a line of circular reasoning. The Knox County Court decided that, because Teresa claimed she was coerced into a false confession, she established a record of lying to public officials and therefore could not be trusted to testify truthfully at the suppression hearing. This logic unfairly counts against a defendant an untruth that the defendant now contends was made because of physical or psychological threats. Indeed, the Knox County Court’s reasoning would prohibit, as a practical matter, any involuntary confession from ever being suppressed on the testimony of the defendant, no matter how strong that testimony otherwise might be. If a defendant could not be credited at a suppression hearing due to the admitted falsity of her confession, the officers’ version of the events would invariably carry the day. As the Knox County Court pointed out, suppression motions often turn on whether the court believes the officers’ or the defendant’s account of the events leading to confession. The court, however, set up a credibility analysis that decided the issue before hearing any testimony. In these circumstances, it would be extremely unfair to hold Teresa to the unappealable judgment of a court that used unsound reasoning to resolve credibility. Collateral estoppel therefore cannot bar relitigation of the voluntariness of Teresa’s confession. 30 No. 04-3614
Amendment Claims The facts in the record before us certainly do not establish, as a matter of law, that Teresa’s confession was free of police coercion. Threats to a suspect’s family or children, even if implicit, certainly may render confessions involuntary for purposes of due process. See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 533 (1963) (confession coerced when police told a female suspect that she was in jeopardy of losing welfare benefits and custody of her children); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543 (1961) (confession coerced when police threatened to take suspect’s wife into custody if he did not confess); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (confession coerced when officer, a close friend of defendant, told defendant that officer would get in trouble if defendant did not confess). Moreover, the parties vehemently dispute which threats Officers Sheppard and Riley actually made to Teresa and when the officers made those threats. These issues of fact preclude summary judgment. There are similar issues of fact regarding whether Teresa received Miranda warnings before she confessed. The defendants contend, nevertheless, that we must affirm the district court’s Miranda ruling because of Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003), in which the Supreme Court narrowed the availability of the Fifth Amendment as a basis for civil liability.11 In Chavez, the § 1983 plaintiff Martinez had made 11 Chavez left open the possibility that a plaintiff could pursue a claim for violation of substantive due process in the event of genuine physical or mental coercion surrounding her confession: [A]ny argument for a damages remedy in this case must depend not on its Fifth Amendment feature but upon the (continued...) No. 04-3614 31 incriminating statements while in police custody without receiving Miranda warnings. He never was prosecuted, but filed a § 1983 action against Chavez, the officer who had questioned him. In that action, Martinez alleged that Chavez violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from selfincrimination as well as his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to be free from coercive questioning. The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, held that the police officer’s questioning of Martinez without Miranda warnings did not violate his rights under the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment because his compelled statements had not been used against him in a criminal case. The plurality reasoned that Miranda “created prophylactic rules designed to safeguard the core constitutional right protected by the Self-Incrimination Clause,” id. at 770, namely that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” id. at 766 (citing, with added emphasis, U.S. Const. amend. V). The phrase “criminal case,” as it is employed in the Self-Incrimination Clause, requires, at the very least, the initiation of a legal proceeding, rather than mere police questioning, before a suspect’s self-incrimination rights are implicated. Id. at 767 (“Statements compelled by police interrogations of 11 (...continued) particular charge of outrageous conduct by the police, extending from their initial encounter with Martinez through the questioning by Chavez. That claim, however, if it is to be recognized as a constitutional one that may be raised in an action under § 1983, must sound in substantive due process. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 779-80 (2003) (Souter, J., joined by Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.). Teresa’s claim that her confession was the result of psychological coercion is therefore unaffected by Chavez. 32 No. 04-3614 course may not be used against a defendant at trial, . . . but it is not until their use in a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause occurs.”).12 Martinez never was prosecuted. Consequently, the absence of a criminal case “in which Martinez was compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself” defeated his claim for damages based on the Self-Incrimination Clause. Id. at 773. After Chavez, therefore, violation of the Miranda safeguards cannot provide the basis for § 1983 liability without use of a suspect’s statements against him in a “criminal 12 Two other Justices also rejected the self-incrimination claim, but did so in less absolute terms. They noted a cause of action based on the Miranda protections may be available, but only if the Fifth Amendment’s “core guarantee, or the judicial capacity to protect it, would be placed at some risk in the absence of such complementary protection.” Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 778 (2003) (Souter, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring). They added that the plaintiff had not made the requisite “powerful showing” needed to come within this exception, especially since he “offer[ed] no limiting principle or reason to foresee a stopping place short of liability in all . . . cases” where Miranda was violated. Id. at 779. The remaining members of the Court contended, in dissent, that the Self- Incrimination Clause “provides both assurance that a person will not be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal proceeding and a continuing right against government conduct intended to bring about self-incrimination. . . . The principle extends to forbid policies which exert official compulsion that might induce a person into forfeiting his rights under the Clause. . . .” Id. at 791-92 (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting). According to the dissenters, “[t]he conclusion that the Self-Incrimination Clause is not violated until the government seeks to use a statement in some later criminal proceeding strips the Clause of an essential part of its force and meaning.” Id. at 793. No. 04-3614 33 case.” The plurality in Chavez declined to define “the precise moment when a ‘criminal case’ commences.” Id. at 766 (“[I]t is enough to say that police questioning does not constitute a ‘case.’ ”). At the very least, Chavez requires “the initiation of a legal proceeding.” Id. In the paradigmatic Miranda case, the Fifth Amendment is violated when a criminal defendant’s Miranda-infirm statements are admitted as evidence against him in the prosecution’s case-in-chief at criminal trial. Teresa’s self-incrimination claim falls short of this paradigm; charges were dropped before her case went to trial. Yet, her “criminal case” advanced significantly farther than did that of the Chavez plaintiff, who never had criminal charges filed against him at all. Teresa’s statement, by contrast, allowed police to develop probable cause sufficient to charge her and initiate a criminal prosecution. In this fashion, her allegedly un-warned statements were used against her in a way perhaps contemplated by the SelfIncrimination Clause. Teresa’s situation, thus, raises the intermediate question left unanswered by Chavez: whether a suspect suffers a violation of her right to be free from selfincrimination when her un-warned confession is used to initiate a criminal prosecution against her, but charges are dropped before that confession can ever be introduced at trial.13 This court has not directly addressed this issue, and has given mixed indication on the scope of the Chavez holding. In Allison v. Synder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th Cir. 2003), we held that, under Chavez, inmates who make un- 13 As Justice Souter noted in concurrence, “[t]he question whether the absence of Miranda warnings may be the basis for a § 1983 action under any circumstances is not before the Court.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring). 34 No. 04-3614 warned incriminating statements in the course of sex offender group therapy programs have no damages remedy available without evidence that those statements were used against them in a criminal proceeding. In Allison, we made no attempt to define the manner in which statements must be used for the self-incrimination right to attach. That the prisoners, like the Chavez plaintiff, were never prosecuted based on the un-warned statements was sufficient to deny relief. This court, in another post-Chavez opinion, recently noted in dicta: We also place little weight on earlier court conclusions that a failure to give Miranda warnings cannot support a claim under § 1983. E.g., Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241, 1256 (3d Cir. 1994); Warren v. City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1989). The latter cases were decided before the Supreme Court determined in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000), that the Miranda warnings themselves have constitutional status. Although a plurality of the Court expressed the opinion that civil remedies continue to be unavailable for Miranda violations in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003), the full Court has never taken that step. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 385 (7th Cir. 2005). This leaves us with little guidance from our own circuit on whether Teresa has stated a valid claim for damages based on the Self-Incrimination Clause. There are only two post-Chavez cases from other courts of appeals that are closely, but not directly, on point. See Burrell v. Virginia, 395 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 2005); Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 2003). In Renda, the police failed to warn a suspect of his Miranda rights in the course of custoNo. 04-3614 35 dial interrogation. The resulting statements were then used as a basis for filing criminal charges, which were later dropped. In the ensuing civil rights action, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the officer defendants, holding that Renda’s constitutional right to be free from self-incrimination was not violated. The court recognized that Chavez did not compel this conclusion, as it “leaves open the issue of when a statement is used at a criminal proceeding.” Renda, 347 F.3d at 559. The Third Circuit found itself bound, however, by its pre-Chavez holding in Giuffre v. Bissell, 31 F.3d 1241 (3d Cir. 1994), which, on materially identical facts, held that an alleged Miranda violation is not actionable under § 1983 if the suspect’s statements were never introduced against him at trial. Burrell, from the Fourth Circuit, involved a § 1983 claim by a motorist who, at the scene of a car accident, was asked by police to produce documentation of automobile liability insurance for his vehicle. When Burrell refused, citing his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, the police served him with a summons for obstruction of justice. On appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the action, the Fourth Circuit held that Burrell’s § 1983 suit was precluded by Chavez v. Martinez, “regardless of whether the Fifth Amendment would bar admission in court of insurance information produced under compulsion.” Burrell, 395 F.3d at 512. The court acknowledged that, “[u]nlike in Chavez, criminal charges were ultimately brought against Burrell.” Id. (emphasis in original). This distinction did not change the analysis, however. The court read the Chavez plurality and Justice Souter’s concurrence as limiting the self-incrimination protection to the “courtroom use of a criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony.” Id. (citing, with added emphasis, Chavez, 538 U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring)). Therefore, Burrell holds that a 36 No. 04-3614 § 1983 suit cannot proceed if the compelled testimony was never admitted into evidence in court. On the facts of Teresa’s case, we are satisfied that her unwarned statements were used against her in a “criminal case” and in a manner that implicates the Self-Incrimination Clause. Before charges against Teresa and her husband eventually were dropped, a preliminary hearing was held to determine whether probable cause existed to allow the case against her to go to trial.14 Teresa’s confession was offered by the prosecution to support a determination of probable cause. Her confession was then used to set the amount of bail for Teresa and Scott. See R.122 ¶ 132. At a subsequent arraignment on charges stemming from the First Bank robbery, Teresa’s confession was once again admitted before she was called upon to plead guilty or not guilty. See id. ¶ 134-35; see generally 725 ILCS 5/113-1 (describing procedure at arraignment). Chavez, of course, did not determine whether pre-trial proceedings such as these fall within the scope of a “criminal case” for purposes of the Self-Incrimination Clause. We know only that, under Chavez, a criminal prosecution must at least be initiated to implicate a suspect’s right against self-incrimination. We are also conscious of language in Chavez suggesting that the Fifth Amendment is, at bottom, a trial protection. Yet, where, as here, a suspect’s criminal prosecution was not only initiated, but was 14 Illinois law requires a probable cause determination to be made in every felony case before the accused felon may be brought to trial. That probable cause determination may be made either by a judge conducting a preliminary hearing or by a grand jury. See 725 ILCS 5/109-3 (preliminary hearing); 725 ILCS 5/112-4 (grand jury); see generally People v. Mennenga, 551 N.E.2d 1386, 1390-91 (Ill. App. 1990). No. 04-3614 37 commenced because of her allegedly un-warned confession, the “criminal case” contemplated by the Self-Incrimination Clause has begun. That Teresa’s confession was then introduced as evidence of her guilt at a probable cause hearing, a bail hearing and an arraignment proceeding further persuades us that Teresa was “compelled in [a] criminal case to be a witness against [her]self.” U.S. Const. amend. V.15 This use of Teresa’s confession, if the confession is indeed found to have been elicited without Miranda warnings, allows a suit for damages under § 1983.16 15 Other Supreme Court precedent confirms that the right to be free from self-incrimination may attach at pre-trial stages of the criminal prosecution. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) (“Although the constitutional language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not been so limited.”); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972) (noting that the Fifth Amendment privilege’s “sole concern is to afford protection against being forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of penalties affixed to . . . criminal acts”); see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84 (1973) (stating that the Fifth Amendment privilege allows one “not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings”) (emphasis added). We, therefore, refuse to hold that the right against self-incrimination cannot be violated unless a confession is introduced in the prosecution’s case-inchief at trial before the ultimate finder of fact. 16 Additionally, we note that Teresa’s confession was used against her in a second criminal proceeding after the charges of bank robbery were dropped. On the day that the Sornbergers were released from jail, state’s attorney Mangieri charged Teresa with (continued...) 38 No. 04-3614 We do not see conflict between our holding today and that of our sister circuit in Burrell. There, Burrell claimed that his constitutional rights were violated when the police issued him an obstruction of justice summons for invoking his right to remain silent. The Fourth Circuit held that the issuance of a summons was not a “courtroom use of a criminal defendant’s compelled, self-incriminating testimony,” and therefore Burrell failed to state a claim under § 1983 for violation of his right against selfincrimination. Burrell, 395 F.3d at 513 (emphasis in original). Here, by contrast, Teresa’s confession was used at a preliminary hearing to find probable cause to indict, to arraign and to set her bail. More than the mere issuance of a summons, failure to administer Teresa Miranda warnings led to three distinct “courtroom uses” of her un-warned statements. Assuming the predicate Miranda violation, she has been compelled to bear witness against herself.