Opinion ID: 416888
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Nature of Plaintiff's Activities at the Time the Negligent Act Occurred

Text: 42 The fundamental goal of the Feres doctrine is to safeguard the military disciplinary structure from disruptive civil suits. See supra at 1436. In our view, then, the most relevant line of inquiry is whether or not the service member's activities at the time of injury are of the sort that could harm the disciplinary system if litigated in a civil action. 43 Courts interpreting Feres have identified two distinct ways in which military discipline could be impeded by the possibility of civil suits concerning activities bearing a strong relationship to military affairs. First, military decision-makers subject to civil suit might not be willing to act as quickly and forcefully as is necessary, especially during battlefield conditions, if their actions could be second-guessed in a civilian court. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d at 1232. See also Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. at 673, 97 S.Ct. at 2059. Second, encouraging military personnel to question decisions by their superiors might have some effect on the willingness of such personnel to follow orders. See, e.g., Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d at 1232; Hunt v. United States, 636 F.2d at 599. In light of these concerns, we find that the civil litigation of negligence claims such as Johnson's could not possibly have any effect whatsoever on military discipline. We reach this conclusion for three reasons. 44 First, at the time the government's negligence occurred, Johnson was not subject in any real way to the compulsion of military orders or performing any sort of military mission. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d at 1014 (recovery under FTCA allowed because serviceman was not directly subject to military control; he was not under compulsion of military orders; he was not performing any military mission.); Bryson v. United States, 463 F.Supp. at 914 (recovery permissible because serviceman was not acting under compulsion of orders or duty and he was not on a military mission.); Knecht v. United States, 144 F.Supp. 786, 789 (E.D.Pa.1956) (recovery allowed when serviceman's activities were not controlled by his military status.), aff'd 242 F.2d 929 (3d Cir.1957). On the contrary, Johnson stands in exactly the same position as a civilian employee of a privately owned nightclub. In short, Johnson could just as easily have been injured had [he] never worn a uniform at all. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 114, 75 S.Ct. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting). 45 The fact that Johnson was not under military control easily distinguishes the other cases that have concluded that activities in NCO clubs are incident to military service. In Mariano v. United States, 605 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.1979), for example, the plaintiff was employed during his off-duty hours as night manager of a Club. Plaintiff was injured while attempting to break up a fight between two patrons. In holding that the Feres doctrine barred plaintiff's suit, the court emphasized that official military regulations made the night manager responsible for maintaining order in the Club. Thus, the plaintiff in Mariano was subject to direct military control and was assigned specific duties as night manager by military regulations. Conversely, Johnson was not subject to any such direct control at the time the negligent act occurred. Indeed, Johnson was injured because the NCO Club remained open in clear violation of Air Force regulations and state law. See also Richardson v. United States, 226 F.Supp. 49, 50 (E.D.Va.1964) (NCO Club rules provide that any service member may be called on to enforce the rules of the Club). 46 Second, at the time of the government's negligence, Johnson was subject to military discipline only in the very remotest sense. Because Johnson was off-duty and working at a non-military second job, his activities were purely personal. Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d at 1340. See also Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d at 1013 (even though the accident occurred on-base, a suit by one leaving the base to attend to his personal affairs, while under no military supervision, will not interfere with military discipline.); Knecht v. United States, 144 F.Supp. at 789 (because serviceman was on a pass, his time was his own and his activities were not controlled by his military status.). In fact, Johnson's status at the time of the negligence was quite similar to that of the serviceman in Mills v. Tucker, 499 F.2d 866 (9th Cir.1974). There, a Navy petty officer had a second job during his off-duty hours as a cook at an off-base restaurant. After finishing his day's work as a cook, the serviceman was on his way back to his on-base quarters to attend his son's birthday party when he was involved in a fatal accident. The accident occurred on a road maintained by the military adjacent to the base. Under these circumstances, we held that the serviceman could sue under the FTCA because at the time of the negligence he was only in the remotest sense subject to military discipline. Id. at 867. Because Johnson's activities were no more closely controlled by the military disciplinary structure, a civil suit should also be permitted in this case. 47 Third, Johnson's activities do not involve the sort of close military judgment calls that the Feres doctrine was designed to insulate from judicial review. See supra at 1439. We are not dealing with a case where the government's negligence occurred because of a decision requiring military expertise or judgment. Rather, the government is negligent precisely because it failed to follow established military rules and procedures governing the operation of its NCO Club. 4 A civilian patron of the Club could certainly recover for such negligence. 5 Because there is simply no connection between off-duty work as a bartender and the kind of military interests that the Supreme Court intended to protect in Feres, Johnson too should be allowed to recover. 48 In sum, where there is no relevant relationship between the service member's behavior and the military interests that might be jeopardized by civil suits, the Feres doctrine cannot bar recovery. See, e.g., Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d at 141, 142 (Feres requires that there be some proximate relationship between the service member's activities and the Armed Forces.... [W]here the soldier demonstrates that the activity has no significant link to the Armed Forces and is remote to his military service, suit under the Act has been allowed.); Camassar v. United States, 400 F.Supp. 894, 897 (D.Conn.1975) (the more realistically critical test of whether Feres should apply is the existence or absence of meaningful causal connection between the injury occurrence and the injured person's military service.) aff'd, 531 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir.1976); Schwager v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 262, 263 (E.D.Pa.1968) (application of Feres depends on the relevant links between the military and the service member's activity and requires a measuring of the degree to which the activity is divorced from or related to military service.); Downes v. United States, 249 F.Supp. at 628 (Feres should only be applied when the service member is performing duties of such a character so that a civil suit would undermine the traditional concepts of military discipline.).