Opinion ID: 4678698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of Naidoo’s Sentence

Text: Naidoo raises challenges both to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to exercise its discretion to reject Guidelines enhancements, did not avoid unwarranted disparities as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), and imposed an unreasonable condition of supervised release limiting his Internet-use. We engage in a bifurcated review of a sentence: first examining “whether the district court committed any significant procedural error,” and then considering “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 2017). In reviewing the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, we review the district court’s “interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” Id. Significant procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We then review a sentence’s substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion. See Nguyen, 854 F.3d at 283. “A discretionary sentence imposed within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). That presumption may be rebutted “only upon a showing that the sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, 18 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 19 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 it gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a clear error of judgment in balancing sentencing factors.” United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Nikonova, 480 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2007)).
Naidoo’s first challenge is to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Naidoo argues that the district court improperly treated the Guidelines as mandatory and should have exercised its discretion to reject enhancements provided under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 for child pornography offenses. Naidoo relies on a decision of the Second Circuit, United States v. Dorvee, in which the court found that the enhancements provided under § 2G2.2 were “irrational[]” and directed district courts to “take seriously the broad discretion they possess in fashioning sentences under § 2G2.2” because those Guidelines were not developed using an “empirical approach.” 616 F. 3d 174, 184, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2010). However, as Naidoo concedes, we have already considered Dorvee’s reasoning and refused to “reject a Guidelines provision as ‘unreasonable’ or ‘irrational’ simply because it is not based on empirical data and even if it leads to some disparities in sentencing.” United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 121 (5th Cir. 2011). As we explained, “[t]he Guidelines remain the Guidelines, and district courts must take them into account.” Id. at 123. Moreover, the record does not support that the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory. The district court repeatedly articulated its understanding that the Guidelines are merely advisory. And there is no error in the district court’s statement that it “need[ed] to apply the sentencing guidelines as they have been given to me.” Though the Guidelines are advisory only, district courts “must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 19 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 20 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 (2005); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007) (“A district judge must include the Guidelines range in the array of factors warranting consideration.”); Miller, 665 F.3d at 121 (“Empirically based or not, the Guidelines remain the Guidelines. It is for the Commission to alter or amend them.”). 2. District Court’s Application of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) Naidoo’s next challenge is to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Naidoo argues that the court failed to avoid unwarranted disparities as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Naidoo recites national statistics demonstrating the low percentage of defendants sentenced under § 2G2.2 who received a sentence within the Guidelines range and showing that the average sentence for possessing child pornography without a mandatory minimum sentence is less than half his own. Naidoo further argues that his sentence is “unfairly comparable to defendants who committed far more egregious conduct.” Naidoo has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness that is afforded to his within-Guidelines sentence. First, “avoiding unwarranted general sentencing disparities is not a factor that we grant significant weight where the sentence is within the Guidelines range.” United States v. Diaz, 637 F.3d 592, 604 (5th Cir. 2011). Further, we have held that “[n]ational averages of sentences” with “no details underlying the sentences are unreliable to determine unwarranted disparity.” United States v. Willingham, 497 F.3d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 2007). Indeed, where averages “only reflect a broad grouping of sentences imposed on a broad grouping of criminal defendants,” they are “basically meaningless in considering whether a disparity with respect to a particular defendant is warranted or unwarranted.” Id. at 544–45. Accordingly, Naidoo’s arguments based on broad nationwide statistics are irrelevant. Finally, his attempted comparisons 20 Case: 20-60730 Document: 00515827551 Page: 21 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 No. 20-60730 to defendants convicted of other offenses do not demonstrate a disparity between “similarly situated” defendants. United States v. Cedillo-Narvaez, 761 F.3d 397, 406 (5th Cir. 2014). 3. Condition of Supervised Release Naidoo’s challenge to his condition of supervised release is also a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Becerra, 835 F. App’x 751, 755 (5th Cir. 2021) (reviewing a similar objection as a challenge to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence). Naidoo argues that the condition of supervised release which requires him to seek permission from a Probation Officer prior to using any Internet-capable device should be modified to permit him to use the Internet without seeking permission before every use. We have indeed found similar conditions to be “unreasonably restrictive” to the extent they require the defendant “to request permission every time he needs to use a computer, or every time he needs to access the Internet.” United States v. Sealed Juvenile, 781 F.3d 747, 756 (5th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we affirm the condition of supervised release subject to our interpretation that individual approval is not required every single time Naidoo must use a computer or access the Internet. Id. at 757; see also United States v. Melton, 753 F. App’x 283, 289 (5th Cir. 2018).