Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wiretap Evidence Gathered by the State

Text: 60 In August 1989, State agents installed a pen register on the home telephone of Polly Douglas, the mother of Jimenez. The register indicated that the telephone was used to place many calls to telephones where Supreme Team members lived or conducted illegal business, and that several calls were received from state prisons where gang members were incarcerated. Based on this and other information, the State subsequently obtained authorization to install a wiretap which became operational in December 1989 (the Douglas wiretap). The Douglas wiretap intercepted discussions of the Supreme Team's narcotics trafficking between the Douglas home and the home of Miller. With this and other information, the State obtained authorization to tap the telephone in Miller's home (the Miller wiretap); the Miller wiretap became operational in January 1990. The Miller wiretap intercepted the conversations of Miller, Arroyo, Hale, David Robinson, Raymond Robinson, Tucker, Coleman, and other Supreme Team members as they discussed narcotics trafficking. Miller was intercepted discussing drug transactions with William Graham on Graham's home telephone, and the State soon thereafter obtained authorization to wiretap the latter telephone (the Graham wiretap); the Graham wiretap became operational in February 1990. The Graham wiretap also intercepted several incriminating conversations between Graham and other gang members, including Miller, Arroyo, Hale, David Robinson, and Raymond Robinson. All of the wiretaps were renewed at least once, and the Miller and Graham wiretaps remained in place until defendants, and William Graham, were arrested by State officers in March 1990. 61 In the State's case against Graham, who was prosecuted separately from Miller and the other Supreme Team members, the state court suppressed the evidence gathered through the Graham and Miller wiretaps on the grounds that the State officers had not disclosed to the authorizing judge that Hale had been cooperating with the police, and that the officers had recklessly disregarded state-law requirements that the identities of all persons whose conversations are likely to be intercepted be disclosed in the warrant application. On the basis of that decision, Miller successfully moved to suppress the evidence collected through the Graham wiretap on the ground of collateral estoppel. 62 In the present case, defendants challenge the district court's denial of their motion to suppress the evidence gathered through all three wiretaps. They contend principally that their convictions must be reversed and their indictments dismissed with prejudice because the indictments were obtained with the use of evidence suppressed in the state prosecutions of Miller and William Graham; Miller contends in his pro se brief that the state court's suppression ruling was binding in the present case. Defendants also contend, inter alia, that their motion to suppress in the district court should have been granted on its merit because of the officers' failures (a) to comply with the requirements that alternative investigative techniques be exhausted and that the availability of such techniques be disclosed to the issuing judge, and (b) to make proper disclosures in the warrant applications. We find none of defendants' arguments persuasive. 63
64 We reject first the contention that defendants are entitled to dismissal of the indictments by reason of the government's presentation to the federal grand jury of evidence that was suppressed by the state court. A grand jury may make use of information obtained through a wiretap unless it is clear that the wiretap was illegal, such as when there is a government concession that the surveillance was unlawful, or there is patent illegality such as, for example, when no prior court order was obtained, or when the unlawfulness of the Government's surveillance has been established in a prior judicial proceeding. In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir.) (ruling that grand jury witness, who was asked a question based on information gained through wiretaps, had no right under Title III to a suppression hearing as to whether the wiretap was lawful), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 924, 95 S.Ct. 199, 42 L.Ed.2d 158 (1974). Absent such clear or patent illegality, the grand jury is entitled to consider the wiretap evidence. 65 The Persico phrase unlawfulness ... established in a prior judicial proceeding does not refer to orders of suppression in state court prosecutions, for those orders do not establish[ ] unlawfulness for purposes of a proceeding in federal court. [I]t has long been the rule in this Circuit that collateral estoppel never bars the United States from using evidence previously suppressed in a state proceeding in which the United States was not a party. United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir.1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Peterson, 100 F.3d 7, 12 (2d Cir.1996) (discussing narrowness of exceptions). Indeed, when Graham (prosecuted separately in federal court) and Miller themselves appealed to this Court from the district court's denial of their motions for a temporary restraining order to prevent the government from using the very wiretap evidence at issue here, we stated obiter that state court rulings in a criminal trial are not binding on a federal court because the state and national sovereignty are separate and distinct from one another. United States v. Miller, 14 F.3d 761, 763 (2d Cir.1994) (dismissing for mootness and lack of appellate jurisdiction). Thus, the state court's suppression order did not foreclose consideration of the wiretap evidence by the grand jury, and it was not binding on the district court. The latter court properly held an evidentiary hearing on defendants' suppression motion and considered the motion on its merits. 66
67 Both federal law and state law are designed to harmonize the needs of law enforcement officials with the privacy rights of the individual. Title III requires that wiretap applications include 68 a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. 69 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c); see also N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 700.20(2)(d) (McKinney 1995) (containing similar requirement). In United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.1983), we disapproved of the use of wiretap evidence because the affidavit underlying the application for wiretap authorization d[id] not reveal what, if any, investigative techniques were attempted prior to the wiretap request and d[id] not enlighten us as to why this narcotics case presented problems different from any other small-time narcotics case. Id. at 104; see also id. at 102 (discern[ing] no difference between the federal and state case law relating to this requirement); People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12, 412 N.Y.S.2d 801, 807, 385 N.E.2d 541 (1978) (New York statute was designed to harmonize State standards for court authorized eavesdropping warrants with federal standards), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972, 99 S.Ct. 1535, 59 L.Ed.2d 788 (1979). 70 The requirement that there be disclosure as to the use, success, and potential success of other investigative techniques, however, does not mean that any particular investigative procedures [must] be exhausted before a wiretap may be authorized. United States v. Young, 822 F.2d 1234, 1237 (2d Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). 71 [T]he purpose of the statutory requirements is not to preclude resort to electronic surveillance until after all other possible means of investigation have been exhausted by investigative agents; rather they only require that the agents inform the authorizing judicial officer of the nature and progress of the investigation and of the difficulties inherent in the use of normal law enforcement methods. 72 United States v. Vazquez, 605 F.2d 1269, 1282 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 484, 62 L.Ed.2d 408 (1979). In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress wiretap evidence, we accord deference to the district court because [t]he role of an appeals court in reviewing the issuance of a wiretap order ... is not to make a de novo determination of sufficiency as if it were a district judge, but to decide if the facts set forth in the application were minimally adequate to support the determination that was made. United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 231 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990). 73 As to the present case, when the State applied in state court for wiretap authorizations, it explained that it had been investigating the Supreme Team for some years and had nearly exhausted its battery of traditional investigative techniques with little significant success. Using normal techniques, the State had been unable to penetrate the Supreme Team or gain sufficient admissible evidence against any members other than those at the lowest echelons. The Team's leaders had insulated themselves from police contact through extensive use of bodyguards and lookouts, and when the State applied for wiretap authorization it had yet to identify all of the upper and middle level members of the Supreme Team, or to determine where the narcotics and illegal proceeds were kept, or to identify the Team's cocaine suppliers. The State had procured the cooperation of one accomplice, but it hesitated to attempt other undercover infiltration because of the extreme violence in which the Supreme Team engaged against persons it believed were threats to its security. Even by the time the State applied for the Graham wiretap, it was still unable to obtain the physical evidence whose existence could be gleaned from conversations intercepted by wiretap, given both the difficulty of infiltration by undercover officers and the unreliability of cooperating defendants. For example, Hale at one time agreed to cooperate and then at various points refused to cooperate; his history of homicide and drug abuse further decreased his reliability. Thus, the State sought wiretaps in order to identify the Team's leaders and suppliers and to locate their drug storage facilities. We conclude that the district court did not err in ruling that the State met its burden of showing its need for a wiretap. 74 Defendants fare no better in their challenge to the Miller wiretap on the ground that affidavits supporting the application for that tap omitted material information that had been provided by informants who were cooperating with the State. A challenge to the veracity of such an affidavit will succeed only when it establishes intentional or reckless omissions or false statements that are necessary to the finding of probable cause supporting the wiretap authorization. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); see Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 604 (2d Cir.1991). 75 In the present case, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether State officers had sought to mislead the state-court judges to induce them to authorize wiretaps. The court found that 76 [t]he credible testimony of assistant district attorneys Quinn and Ruiz and Detective Ryan at that supplemental hearing establishe[d] beyond any doubt that these state officials did not seek to deceive the state court, nor did they act in a suspiciously careless manner in the preparation of the wire tap application. 77 District Court Memorandum dated March 10, 1993, at 1-2. Although the Miller and Graham wiretaps had been suppressed by the state court, the district court found no reason to grant the relief, applying either state or federal law to the resolution of the issues. Id. at 1. Giving due deference to the district court's assessment of witness credibility, we can see no basis for overturning its refusal to suppress evidence on this ground. 78 Finally, the district court properly rejected defendants' contention that they were entitled to suppression because the State, knowing that Graham was engaged in criminal activity with Miller and that Graham's conversations would likely be intercepted, omitted Graham's name from the application for the Miller wiretap. Although the state court, relying in part on state-court decisions, ruled that the State was obligated to identify ... Graham when the Miller warrant was obtained, People v. Graham, Ind. No. QN13137/90, Memorandum Decision at 21 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 15, 1991), there is no such requirement under federal law. See United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 435, 97 S.Ct. 658, 671, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (where wiretap meets Title III standards, the failure to identify additional persons who are likely to be overheard engaging in incriminating conversations could hardly invalidate an otherwise lawful judicial authorization). 79 We have considered all of defendants' challenges to the wiretap evidence and have found them to be without merit. The district court properly denied the motion to suppress. 80