Opinion ID: 762253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Forensic Expert

Text: 20 At trial, petitioner's counsel sought funds for a forensic expert to rebut the testimony of forensic chemist Joyce Gilchrist, a prosecution witness who presented evidence that hair, fiber, and semen samples found on the victim match those of petitioner. The trial court denied the request, and the district court, on two grounds, rejected petitioner's Ake challenge to the trial court's decision. 21 First, the district court found that defense counsel effectively cross-examined the [forensic] witnesses to fully develop the limitations of the tests performed on the evidence. Johnson v. Reynolds, No. CIV-94-121-C (W.D. Okla. Aug 12, 1996) at 31 (hereinafter Mem. Op.). Second, it concluded that in light of the entire record and the nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution at trial, petitioner has failed to establish the denial of expert assistance in developing affirmative evidence, such as testing by electrophoresis, resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. Mem. Op. at 32 (citing Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir.1993)). These are legal conclusions that we review de novo. See Castro, 71 F.3d at 1510. Without deciding the issue of whether defense cross-examination of an expert witness can be an adequate substitute for the testimony of an expert not beholden to the prosecution, we agree with the district court that the denial of expert assistance ultimately did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. 22 In assessing due process challenges to denial of funds for non-psychiatric experts, we consider three factors: (1) the effect on [the petitioner's] private interest in the accuracy of the trial if the requested service is not provided; (2) the burden on the government's interest if the service is provided; and (3) the probable value of the additional service and the risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is not offered. Moore, 153 F.3d at 1112 (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1473 (10th Cir.1995)). 23 The first and second prongs of this test are easily satisfied because as the Supreme Court has held, [t]he private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost uniquely compelling, and although the State's interest in financial economy may weigh against the provision of experts to indigent defendants, its interest in prevailing at trial--unlike that of a private litigant--is necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Thus, the critical factor in assessing whether a particular expert is a required basic tool of an adequate defense is the third prong of the test that deals with the probable value and risk of error associated with the additional assistance. See Moore, 153 F.3d at 1112. 24 In Kennedy, a federal non-capital defendant argued that by refusing to provide funds for additional paralegals, airfare, and accounting services, the district court violated his due process rights to the 'basic tools' and 'raw materials integral to' the presentation of an adequate defense. 64 F.3d at 1473 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 76, 105 S.Ct. 1087). We found the third factor--the value of the additional service and the risk associated with its absence--dispositive because Kennedy failed to show the value of the requested services or how their denial caused him any substantial prejudice at trial. Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1473. 25 In Moore, which involved a petition for habeas corpus in a state death penalty case, we rejected a due process claim based on the denial of a forensic expert, and held that the petitioner's arguments as to what the requested experts might have said [were] entirely speculative, Moore, 153 F.3d at 1112, because he had offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial. Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 324 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)). 26 Here, petitioner offers evidence--letters from two forensic experts--raising arguments that go beyond the level of bare speculation about whether expert testimony would have rebutted the prosecution's testimony about the hair and fiber evidence. Other than merely undermining certain aspects of the prosecution's forensic evidence, however, petitioner's proffered expert rebuttal evidence does not purport to show that he could not have committed the crime. Therefore, upon review of the record we conclude that petitioner fails to show that denial of his request for expert assistance substantially prejudiced his case at the guilt phase of trial. See Moore, 153 F.3d at 1112; Kennedy, 64 F.3d at 1473.