Opinion ID: 1119431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Proper Approach For New Mexico

Text: 15. Campos urges us to follow the Kansas approach and hold that the collateral-felony requirement mandates that the underlying felonious act must be temporally or spatially distinct from the lethal act. Campos points out that, in this case, the act of criminal sexual penetration with a mop was the very same act that caused Gutierrez's death. He therefore argues that the CSP cannot serve as the predicate felony for applying the felony-murder doctrine. However, we decline to follow the Kansas approach or the other two approaches discussed above. 16. New Mexico has a distinct version of the felony-murder doctrine, which calls for a different formulation of the collateral-felony requirement. The primary distinction between New Mexico's felony-murder doctrine and those of other jurisdictions is that, in State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991), this Court imposed a mens rea requirement for felony murder. Compare Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205 (requiring showing of mens rea for second-degree murder to elevate the murder to first-degree felony murder) with Miniefield, 522 P.2d at 28 (The legislature has deemed... murder committed in the perpetration of certain other felonies so heinous and committed with such a wanton disregard for human life that there is no need to prove the elements usually necessary for a conviction for first degree murder.) and Mattison, 481 P.2d at 198 (noting with respect to second-degree felony murder, The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit. (quotations omitted)) and State v. Branch, 244 Or. 97, 415 P.2d 766, 767 (Or. 1966) (en banc) (The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to relieve the State of the burden of proving premeditation or malice whenever the victim's death is caused by the killer while the killer is committing another felony.). 17. We explained in Ortega that the felony-murder doctrine in New Mexico does not abandon the mens rea requirement for murder, nor does it create a presumption that a defendant had intended to kill whenever a homicide occurs during the course of a felony. Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205. Our felony-murder rule only serves to raise second-degree murder to first-degree murder when the murder is committed in the course of a dangerous felony. Id. 18. Accordingly, unlike other jurisdictions, New Mexico's modernized felony-murder doctrine does not run the risk of circumventing the legislatively determined mens rea for murder. Furthermore, the purpose of the felony-murder rule as explained in Kansas and Californiato deter negligent or accidental killings that may occur in the course of committing a felonyis inapposite in New Mexico, because a negligent or accidental killing would not constitute second-degree murder and would therefore not implicate the felony-murder doctrine. Rather, this Court explained that the purpose of the felony-murder rule in New Mexico is to elevate second-degree murder to first-degree murder when it occurs in circumstances that the legislature has determined are so serious as to merit increased punishment. Id. We noted in Harrison that these serious circumstances include the commission of a first-degree felony or a lesser-degree felony that is itself inherently dangerous or is committed under circumstances that are inherently dangerous. Harrison, 90 N.M. at 442, 564 P.2d at 1324. 19. Therefore, because the killing must already constitute second-degree murder for the felony-murder doctrine to apply, the main concern in applying the felony-murder doctrine in New Mexico is that the prosecution may be able to elevate improperly the vast majority of second-degree murders to first-degree murders by charging the underlying assaultive act as a predicate felony for the felony-murder doctrine. Consequently, the appropriate limitation imposed by the collateral-felony doctrine in New Mexico is simply that the predicate felony cannot be a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. See 1 Robinson, supra, § 103(b), at 498 (An approach [to the collateral-felony doctrine] more consistent with modern offense definitions might be to merge all felonies that are lesser included offenses of the [second-degree] murder statute.); cf. State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228, 403 P.2d 540, 545 (1965) (en banc) (The felony-murder doctrine does not apply where the felony is an offense included in the charge of homicide.).