Opinion ID: 1400494
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purposeful Availment Through Trademark Infringement

Text: BBI contends that the Defendants' alleged trademark infringement created personal jurisdiction in California because the Defendants purposefully directed their activities toward that forum. Br. of Appellant 42. Relying on the effects test of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984), BBI says that purposeful availment exists if the defendant (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.2002) (summarizing Calder 's effects test). BBI contends that trademark infringement is treated as an intentional tort for jurisdictional purposes. The first case that BBI cites for this proposition is Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Russolillo, No. 00-03476 CM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21510 (C.D.Cal. Aug. 25, 2000). In Russolillo, the court held that the defendant's trademark infringement through the sale of counterfeit goods was intentional because the plaintiff had written a letter to put the defendant on notice of the infringement. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21510, at . BBI claims that Russolillo is analogous to the instant case, because BBI informed the Defendants of their infringement in 2003, prior to the settlement, and informed them of their continuing infringement on February 1, 2005. The second case that BBI cites is Panavision. In Panavision, the court stated that although the defendant's registration of the plaintiff's trademark as a domain name was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction in the forum state, the defendant's scheme to register [the plaintiff's] trademarks as his domain names for the purpose of extorting money from the plaintiff was an intentional act directed at the forum state. [23] 141 F.3d at 1322. The instant case is distinguishable from both Russolillo and Panavision. In Russolillo, the court indicated that it was the explicit warning about trademark infringement, not the act of counterfeiting itself, that rendered the defendant's trademark infringement intentional. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21510, at . Although BBI also sent a warning to the Defendants, the record suggests that the Defendants acted in good faith to remedy the alleged infringement. If this is true, then any ongoing infringement was not the result of intentional acts on the Defendants' partunless we agree with BBI's claim that surrendering control of the telephone number was absolutely necessary to prevent further infringement. Panavision supports the Defendants, because it makes clear that the mere use of another party's trademark (i.e., registration of domain names and creation of web sites) does not constitute an intentional act aimed at the forum state for jurisdictional purposes. 141 F.3d at 1322. It is possible, however, that the District Court's findings of fact will reveal more about whether White's behavior can be construed as intentional. BBI also contends that the Defendants' behavior was expressly aimed at the forum state. We do not find it immediately obvious why the failure to change New Jersey telephone listings and to surrender a New Jersey telephone number is behavior expressly aimed at California. But BBI relies on language in Bancroft & Masters v. Augusta National, 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.2000), which states that the [`expressly aiming'] requirement is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state. 223 F.3d at 1086. Even though the Defendants' alleged infringement was limited to activities in New Jersey, Bancroft implies that because it was targeted at franchisees of BBI, a known resident of California, it was therefore expressly aimed at California. [24] But Panavision suggests a contrary result. Given the holding in Panavision that the use of a company's trademarks in domain names and web sites is not expressly aimed at the forum in which the company has its principal place of business, 141 F.3d at 1322, we question whether listings in New Jersey telephone directories could be characterized as actions expressly aimed at California. Finally, BBI contends that the brunt of the harm to its reputation and profits is felt in California because California is its principal place of business. [25] BBI argues that just because BBI is a California corporation, a jurisdictionally sufficient amount of economic harm is felt in California. See Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs. v. Bell & Clements, Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.2003) (for a California corporation whose principal place of business is in California, . . . the brunt of the harm [is] felt in California.). We cannot resolve this issue without more evidence. BBI's California complaint suggests that the Defendants' alleged infringement is causing economic harm to BBI as a whole. But White claimed that as of March 9, 2005, her company had not received a single call from anyone confused by the erroneous listing, which would suggest that little economic harm has been inflicted upon the New Jersey franchisees, let alone the national entity. Without further factfinding, it is impossible to decide which party is correct about the economic effects felt by BBI in California.