Opinion ID: 1095043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was there deficient performance?

Text: In response to the State's argument in support of trial counsel's advice, we simply refer to the opinion in Leatherwood II where this Court originally addressed Leatherwood's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and ultimately remanded the case for the evidentiary hearing which is the subject of this appeal. In pertinent part this Court said: According to Leatherwood, counsel advised him that if he pled guilty the state would be limited in the evidence it could present concerning the details of the murder during the sentencing phase. This, of course, is not the law. A plea of guilty does not restrict the state from offering evidence of the details of the commission of the crime that would have otherwise been admissible during the guilt phase. (Emphasis added). 473 So.2d at 968. It is axiomatic that a decision on a question of law decided on a former appeal becomes the law of the case, whether the case be civil or criminal, and will be adhered to on subsequent trials and appeals of the same case involving the same issues and facts. Holcomb v. McClure, 217 Miss. 617, 620-21, 64 So.2d 689, 691 (1953); Carraway v. State, 170 Miss. 685, 687, 154 So. 306, 307 (1934). Our decision, therefore, foreclosed any subsequent argument over the correctness vel non of counsel's interpretation of the law as it stood at the time the plea was entered. [5] As to the first prong of Strickland, the only remaining question on remand was whether Leatherwood's contention was correct, i.e., whether counsel's erroneous interpretation of the law was the primary reason for advising a plea of guilty. The trial judge found that it was, and as previously stated, this finding is not manifestly wrong. Applying the law of the case to the facts, counsel's performance in this regard was deficient, and the trial court was correct in so holding. At the least, counsel should have obtained a ruling on the law pertaining to limitation of evidence following the entry of a guilty plea in a capital case, especially since an investigation of other capital murder cases previously tried before Judge Coleman would have revealed that Judge Coleman had ruled contrary to counsel's opinion and would probably do so in Leatherwood's trial. Even ignoring the law of the case, counsel's reliance on Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979), does not render his performance any less deficient. At the least, Coleman unmistakably favored admissibility of evidence concerning the details of Leatherwood's crime. In Coleman, this Court held in clear and unambiguous language that, during sentencing, the State is limited only to presenting evidence relevant to one or more of the eight enumerated aggravating circumstances in Miss. Code Ann., § 99-19-101(5) (Supp. 1988). In Coleman, the State was allowed to present two color pictures showing where the shotgun pellets hit the victim on the right side of his head, his lower arm, and on the left side of his chest on the basis that the pictures were relevant to show that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Id. at 648-49. Similarly then, the horrible facts of the murder in the present case would most assuredly have been admissible under Coleman since the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance was used against Leatherwood. See Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 648 (Miss. 1983). Further, Coleman instructed that what is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies  the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.  378 So.2d at 648, quoting Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 611 (5th Cir.1978) (Emphasis in original). By definition then, the horrible facts and details which counsel interpreted Coleman to exclude were clearly admissible per Coleman. [6] Furthermore, Coleman says nothing about the possible limiting effects of a guilty plea. Finally other aggravating circumstances were used against Leatherwood. [7] Thus the sentencing hearing door, per Coleman, stood plainly open for the reception of evidence concerning the details of this bizarre robbery-murder scenario, only to the limit of the trial judge's broad discretion. It escapes us, therefore, how counsel for Leatherwood could have read Coleman to prohibit evidence concerning details of the crime. Beyond this, we cannot excuse his failure to seek some guidance from the trial judge via a pre-sentencing ruling, especially in light of his knowledge that Judge Coleman had ruled unfavorably to his position just prior to Leatherwood's trial. There is no error in the judge's holding that counsel's performance was deficient. Clearly, counsel's advice to plead guilty fell short of the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. The State relies on Evans v. State, 485 So.2d 276 (Miss. 1986), where a similar scenario developed. The defendant in Evans was advised to plead guilty, in part because counsel interpreted Coleman v. State to require the exclusion at sentencing of all evidence of the crime and premeditation. 485 So.2d at 278. In addressing this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, among others, this Court refused to address the merits, holding instead that the claims were barred per § 99-39-21(4) of the Post-Conviction Relief Act. Id. at 281. In pure dicta, the court stated that trial counsel's interpretation of existing law when the guilty plea was entered was not contrary to the law at the time of its entry. Id. at 282. [8] As this passage is dicta, it holds no precedential value, lacks the form of an adjudication, and therefore, does not guide our decision sub judice. In any event, Evans v. State is clearly distinguishable. While in the present case we know that counsel's erroneous interpretation of Coleman was the primary, if not the only reason for Leatherwood's having pled guilty, we do not know the extent of Evans' reliance on that interpretation in deciding to plead guilty. Also, in Evans, the defendant's request for a hearing was denied even though the defendant argued that an evidentiary hearing was required because in  Leatherwood II  this Court had sustained an identical claim and remanded to the circuit court for a hearing. Evans v. State, supra ; Brief in Support of [Evans'] Motion to Consolidate Misc. No. 1931 and No. 53,754 and in Reply to the State's Responses to Petitioner's Application and Prior Motion to Vacate, at page 8. Obviously then, this Court recognized a significant distinction between the underlying factual claims in Evans and in Leatherwood; otherwise, the evidentiary hearing requested by Evans on the basis of  Leatherwood II  would have been granted the same as it was in  Leatherwood II.  [9]