Opinion ID: 419184
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentencing of Weston.

Text: 25 After obtaining Weston's conviction the Government sought to enhance his sentence based on the claim that he was a dangerous special offender under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575. A sentencing hearing was conducted during which the Government presented evidence that Weston met the statutory definition of special offender. The Government also contended that the evidence presented at trial established that Weston committed the Stevenson murders and was therefore dangerous within the meaning of section 3575, which requires a finding that a period of confinement longer than that provided for such felony is required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3575(e). 26 The court reviewed the evidence presented at trial, including evidence presented outside the presence of the jury, and found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was implicated in the robbery and murders of Billy F. Stevenson, his wife, son, and brother-in-law. In making this finding the court took into consideration trial testimony that implicated Weston in the robbery. The court also considered a statement given to the FBI by Janice Freeman, which was not introduced into evidence, that Weston was wearing a blood-stained shirt when he returned on the morning of July 6. No additional evidence concerning Weston's involvement in the murders was presented during the hearing. Based on Weston's part in the murders the court found him to be dangerous and sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment. 27 Defendant contends that the court's reliance upon the trial evidence deprived him of his statutory and constitutional right to confront witnesses against him on the issue of dangerousness. The Government contends that a trial court is granted wide discretion in conducting sentencing hearings and that defendant's opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at trial satisfied the demands of due process and the statute. 28 The statute grants a defendant the right to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and cross-examination of such witnesses as appear at the hearing. The statute goes on to state that the court may enhance a defendant's sentence when it appears by a preponderance of the information, including information submitted during the trial of such felony and the sentencing hearing and so much of the presentence report as the court relies upon, that the defendant is a dangerous special offender. Weston's statutory right to cross-examine witnesses extends only to those witnesses who appear at the hearing, and is further limited by the court's statutory perogative to consider trial evidence. Weston was not denied the right to cross-examine any of the witnesses who appeared at the hearing and was not denied any statutory right by the court's consideration of trial testimony. The only remaining issue is whether the statute denied Weston due process in this case. 29 It is clear that before making [a sentencing] determination, a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). Although sentencing under section 3575 may require greater procedural safeguards than sentencing based solely on the commission of an offense, see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967) (sentencing under a statute that requires additional factual determination that defendant poses threat of harm to public invokes due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses); United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 677 (10th Cir.1982) (Specht certainly stands for the proposition that statutes like section 3575 must provide greater procedural protections than normally afforded defendants in sentencing proceedings.), we have held that even under section 3575 a sentencing judge may conduct a broad-based inquiry and consider hearsay testimony. United States v. Inendino, 604 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 932, 100 S.Ct. 276, 62 L.Ed.2d 190. 30 In this case Weston was given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses during the trial. Section 3575 clearly contemplated that this opportunity would satisfy the demands of due process should the Government elect not to present additional witnesses and stand on the trial testimony. To the extent that Weston was unable to cross-examine these witnesses effectively about the murders, rather than the robbery, during trial he was free to take advantage of section 3575's compulsory process provision and call these witnesses for further questioning at the hearing. That the Government chose to rely on the indirect evidence of Weston's involvement in the killings presented at trial rather than call witnesses who could testify without the constraint of the court's pre-trial order barring mention of the murders did not deprive Weston of any constitutional rights. We note, additionally, that the evidence of Weston's involvement in the brutal slaughter of the Stevensons was more than enough to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard and we seriously doubt that a new hearing would produce a different result. 31 For the reasons stated herein, the convictions of defendants are AFFIRMED and defendant Weston's request for a new sentencing hearing is DENIED.