Opinion ID: 853754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Resolution of this Case Under Indiana Statutes and Common Law

Text: I believe Richardson correctly complains of his dual conviction, but not on constitutional grounds. As Justice Sullivan observes, we have held that conviction and punishment for a crime that is a lesser included offense of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and punished is prohibited. [28] 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring). We also have a statute that prohibits conviction for an included offense. See IND.CODE § 35-38-1-6 (1998); see also IND.CODE § 35-41-1-16 (1998) (defining included offense). Because we typically do not resort to a constitutional resolution where a statutory one will do, I would decide this case under the statute. See Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 402 (Ind.1991) (it is the duty of the court not to enter upon the consideration of a constitutional questions where the court can perceive another ground upon which it may properly rest its decision) (citing Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Scott, 497 N.E.2d 557, 559 (Ind.1986)). As a preliminary matter, we must be clear about the nature of the inquiry. In evaluating a claim that the statute does not permit convictions for both battery and robbery, we need to look at whether the included offense is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged. See IND.CODE § 35-41-1-16(1) (1998). This necessarily involves more than an examination of the statutory elements and requires inspection of both the evidence produced at trial and the charging instrument. To be sure, the definition of included offense in Indiana Code § 35-41-1-16(1) looks to the elements of the offense, unlike § 35-34-1-2(d), which requires a charging instrument to identify the facts of the offense. However, the definition also specifically states that the court must look to the proof of the elements, necessarily requiring a look at both the charging instrument and the evidence at trial. The conclusion, it seems to me, is that an offense under both sections embraces the statutory prohibition, the charging instrument and the acts of the accused that violate the statute. This conclusion seems inescapable when one considers the implications of a contrary view. Surely one robbery is not the same offense as another robbery of a different victim on another day merely because the same statute is breached. The example of a felony murder based on a killing incident to a robbery also illustrates this point. A defendant charged with a felony murder cannot be convicted of both the felony murder and the underlying felony. Many cases so hold. See, e.g., Swafford v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1188, 1191-92 (Ind.1986). But in order to reach that conclusion one needs to do more than examine the statutes. The felony murder statute does not identify a robbery as the only underlying felony. The statute can be triggered by any of several felonies (arson, robbery, rape, etc.). IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1(2) & (3) (1998). And even if robbery were the only felony in the list, one would still need to examine the charging instrument or the evidence to know whether the robbery supporting the felony murder is the same robbery resulting in the robbery conviction. The resolution of Richardson's case is controlled by the lesser included offense statute. Richardson was charged with a battery that resulted in bodily injury in that the defendant beat a certain Jeffrey W. Koenig with his fist to the extent that [Koenig] suffered bodily injury. He can be convicted in this proceeding only of that battery, not just any old battery at some other time or place. Evidence at trial demonstrated that the use of force in the robbery was Richardson's beating Koenig with his fist. As a result, we know that the battery constituting the force in the robbery is the same as the battery of which Richardson was convicted, and not the tossing of Koenig off the bridge. [29] The fact that the evidence at trial supported this other uncharged battery does not permit the jury to convict on that uncharged battery, or any other crime, for that matter, that was not charged. Hobson v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 n. 2 (Ind. 1996) (A defendant may not be found guilty of a crime that is not charged against him, and if so convicted, the verdict is contrary to law.). Accordingly, the battery constituting an element of the robbery cannot also support an independent conviction for battery because it is established by less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the elevated robbery. I conclude, consistent with the discussion above, that the definition of included offense under Indiana Code § 35-41-1-16(1) necessarily involves a look at the charging instrument and the proof at trial. When we do that, we see that Richardson's convictions for both robbery and battery are not permitted under the Indiana Code, irrespective of constitutional double jeopardy considerations. The dual convictions also fall under the rule, often invoked without reference to the statute, that one crime cannot both enhance another and also support a separate conviction. See, e.g., Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 495-496 (Ind. 1995). SELBY, J., concurs.