Opinion ID: 1351343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues relating to appointment and removal of counsel

Text: On May 17, 1982, defendant was arraigned for the murders, and the court appointed the Riverside County Public Defender to represent him. Defendant requested appointment of Andrew Roth, who had represented him on his appeal from the bank robbery conviction. Defendant said he did not trust the public defender's office, and that Roth was representing him in a federal district court petition for habeas corpus attacking the bank robbery conviction on the ground that he did not receive competent representation from the public defender. Defendant was particularly upset that the deputy public defender who represented him in the bank robbery case did not inform him that the deputy was negotiating for a position with the district attorney. The judge denied defendant's request, and the public defender represented defendant through the preliminary hearing. On October 12, 1982, the judge granted the public defender's ex parte motion to appoint Roth as cocounsel for defendant. The district attorney then moved to rescind Roth's appointment. He said he intended to call Roth as a prosecution witness, and that Roth thus had a conflict of interest which precluded him from representing defendant. Defendant argued that the evidence the prosecution sought to elicit from Roth was barred by the attorney-client privilege. Counsel suggested that if the evidence were held admissible the defense might be willing to stipulate to some matters, and that in any event Roth's testimony would not be prejudicial to his client. The judge, however, granted the motion to vacate Roth's appointment. He did not ask defendant whether he would waive Roth's conflict of interest, and defendant did not volunteer to do so. On December 10, 1982, the public defender moved to reinstate Roth as cocounsel for defendant. Defendant testified, and submitted a declaration, to the effect that he had consulted with independent counsel, was aware of Roth's conflict of interest, and was willing to waive any conflict. The trial court denied the motion. On February 23, 1983, the public defender declared an unspecified conflict, and was removed from the case. Over defendant's objection, the court appointed Carl Jordan as counsel. On April 1 it appointed Attorney Warren Small as cocounsel for defendant. At the commencement of trial defendant moved to relieve Jordan and Small, and to appoint Roth as his attorney. The motion was denied. At the commencement of the penalty trial defendant moved to substitute Roth for Small; the motion was again denied. Finally, after the penalty verdict, the court denied defendant's motion to appoint Roth to argue the motion for new trial. On appeal, defendant raises a number of contentions relating to the trial court's rulings. We review each of these contentions.
(1) Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when, at the arraignment of May 17, 1982, it appointed the public defender to represent defendant on the murder charges. He asserts that the deputy public defender who represented him at the bank robbery prosecution had not afforded him competent representation, and, unknown to defendant, had been negotiating for a position with the district attorney. Defendant had filed a petition for habeas corpus with the federal district court alleging that his bank robbery conviction should be overturned because of incompetence and conflict of interest on the part of the deputy. (The petition was denied two days after the arraignment.) Defendant argues that his counsel in the present case may have wanted to attack the validity of the bank robbery conviction; however, this would have placed the deputy in a position where he had to attack the competence of a former colleague. [2] Also, the deputy public defender appearing at arraignment told the court that defendant had experienced difficulty in past communications with the public defender's staff, and had refused to communicate with them about the present case. A similar issue arose before the Illinois Supreme Court three years ago. ( People v. Banks (1987) 121 Ill.2d 36 [520 N.E.2d 617].) In that case defendant objected to the appointment of an assistant public defender to represent him in postconviction proceedings, because the appointee would have to attack the competence of trial counsel, an assistant public defender from the same office. The court refused to presume that public defenders would allow any office allegiances to interfere with their foremost obligation to their clients. (520 N.E.2d at p. 620.) Rejecting a rule of per se disqualification, the court mandated disqualification only if defendant suggested particular circumstances showing actual conflict of interest. (P. 621.) We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that a rule of automatic disqualification is unnecessary, and would hamper the ability of public defenders' offices to represent indigents in criminal cases. It would be particularly inappropriate in the present case, since the deputy public defender whose competence might have been under attack was no longer with that office. Since defendant has not shown any personal or professional relationship suggestive of a conflict of interest between the deputies actually representing him in this case and the departed deputy who had represented him in the bank robbery trial, we conclude that the trial court was not required to find a conflict of interest barring appointment of the public defender. Defendant's distrust of the public defender, and consequent difficulty in communicating with the deputies, is a matter for the trial court to consider as part of its discretionary decision in appointing counsel. (See Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934-935 [106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007, 66 A.L.R.3d 984], in which we upheld the court's ruling appointing counsel even though Drumgo, like the defendant in the present case, insisted that he distrusted and would not cooperate with the attorney the court appointed.) We do not perceive that difficulties between defendant and the public defender had reached the level of irreconcilable conflict precluding the effective assistance of counsel, as in People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, 94 [184 Cal. Rptr. 611, 648 P.2d 578, 23 A.L.R.4th 476] and Brown v. Craven (9th Cir.1970) 424 F.2d 1166, 1170. [3]
(2) Defendant also claims the court abused its discretion when, at the arraignment hearing of May 17, 1982, it refused to appoint Andrew Roth as defendant's counsel. He relies on our decision in Harris v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 786 [140 Cal. Rptr. 318, 567 P.2d 750]. In that case the superior court judge, after receiving a declaration of conflict from the public defender, appointed Attorneys Ballachey and Mintz to represent defendants, despite the defendants' request for appointment of Attorneys Susan Jordan and Leonard Weinglass. Our opinion noted not only the subjective considerations  defendants' long relationship with counsel Jordan and Weinglass, and their confidence in those attorneys  but also objective considerations. Defendants had been members of an organization known as the Symbionese Liberation Army, and the charged crimes, as well as other alleged crimes, arose from the activities of that organization. Jordan and Weinglass had represented the defendants in related prosecutions arising from these activities and had an extensive background in the factual and legal issues likely to arise in the case in question. We therefore found the judge's refusal to appoint them an abuse of discretion. In response, the Attorney General argues that Harris is relevant only in cases in which the public defender is unavailable, so the court must choose between private counsel. The Attorney General points out that in Charlton v. Superior Court (1979) 93 Cal. App.3d 858 [156 Cal. Rptr. 107], the Court of Appeal interpreted the court's authority to appoint private counsel when the public defender is unavailable (§ 987.2) as precluding appointment of private counsel when the public defender is available. Its decision expressly distinguished Harris, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, limiting that precedent to a case in which the court cannot appoint a public defender. (93 Cal. App.3d at p. 863.) Defendant argues that Charlton goes too far in limiting the trial court's discretion. Section 987.2 says the court may appoint private counsel when a public defender is unavailable; it does not say that this is the only circumstance under which appointment is permissible. If a case arose in which defendant was unable to cooperate with the public defender (see People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 85 [270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23]), or in which appointment of private counsel would save considerable time and expense, defendant maintains that the trial court should have discretion to appoint private counsel. The present case does not require us to decide that question. Unlike Harris v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.3d 786, in which Attorneys Jordan and Weinglass had represented defendants on similar cases arising from the same alleged conspiracy, and thus had extensive experience and knowledge relating to the charged crime, in the present case Roth had represented defendant only on the bank robbery appeal and on minor traffic matters, none of which had much relationship to the murder case at issue. And unlike Stankewitz, supra, 51 Cal.3d 72, there is no showing here that defendant suffered from a mental disorder that prevented him from assisting the public defender in a rational manner. Under these circumstances the trial court was not required to appoint Roth to represent defendant. [4]

Roth assisted the public defender on a pro bono basis until October 15, 1982, when on motion of the public defender he was appointed cocounsel. The motion was filed under seal and heard ex parte, without the prosecutor present. When he learned of the appointment, however, the prosecutor moved to revoke it, asserting that because he intended to call Roth as a witness, there existed a conflict of interest precluding Roth from serving as defendant's counsel. [5] The matter came up for hearing on November 8 and November 12, 1982. At the hearing, the district attorney said he would ask Roth three questions: (1) Did Roth tell defendant his appeal had been lost? (2) Did he tell defendant to appear in court? (3) When defendant did not appear, did he tell defendant a bench warrant had been issued? The district attorney explained that answers to these questions would help to prove that defendant was expecting the police to come and arrest him, and that his killing of the police officers was premeditated. The prosecutor presented testimony that Roth told Wayne Astin, a deputy district attorney, that Roth had notified defendant to appear. He pointed out that Roth's testimony would unquestionably constitute relevant and material evidence, tending to show that defendant had expected the police officers' arrival, and that his actions were not impulsive but premeditated. [6] The defense offered to stipulate to some of the matters sought by the prosecution, but the specifics of the stipulation were never set out. Roth assured the judge that his testimony would not prejudice defendant. [7] The judge, however, replied to Roth that The court made the appointment based on less than complete knowledge, and the Court would not have made the appointment had the Court had complete knowledge, and under the circumstances, I feel it's inappropriate that you continue to represent him. The judge then granted the motion to revoke the appointment. (3a) Defendant contends that the judge erred in removing Roth. He points out that while the trial court enjoys a broad discretion in deciding who to appoint to represent a defendant, its power to remove counsel, appointed or retained, is far more limited. (4) [T]he involuntary removal of any attorney is a severe limitation on a defendant's right to counsel and may be justified, if at all, only in the most flagrant circumstances of attorney misconduct or incompetence when all other judicial controls have failed. ( Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1975) 14 Cal.3d 678, 697 [122 Cal. Rptr. 778, 537 P.2d 898]; see Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606, 615 [180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 639 P.2d 248, 18 A.L.R.4th 333]; Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 561 [68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65].) (3b) We believe, however, that the specific circumstances of this case call for an exception to the rule that a judge enjoys less discretion in removing counsel than in appointing counsel. Specifically, we note that (1) counsel was appointed in an ex parte proceeding, without notice to the prosecutor; (2) the prosecutor promptly informed the court of his objection to the appointment; and (3) at the time of the appointment the court was unaware of the grounds on which the prosecutor objected. [8] Under these circumstances, the court should have the authority to reconsider its appointment free of the strict rules which limit its power to remove counsel. When the court, for the first time, considered the matter in a proceeding in which the prosecutor was present and made known his objection, the court declared that it would not have appointed Roth had it known of the possibility of a conflict of interest. It then vacated that appointment. Its actions in this respect fall within its discretionary power.
(5) On December 10, 1982, the court heard defendant's motion to reinstate Roth. Defendant consulted with independent counsel, Patrick Mulloy, and submitted a declaration waiving any conflict of interest. [9] He offered to stipulate to any facts the prosecution sought to prove through Roth's testimony. Deputy Public Defender Keller testified that Roth had been assisting him on a pro bono basis throughout the case, and that absent such assistance he did not believe defendant would cooperate with him. Judge Garst denied the motion. Ruling from the bench, he confirmed his position that had he known of the conflict, he would not have appointed Roth in the first place. [10] For the reasons previously stated, the court acted within its discretionary power. The court is not required to appoint counsel with a conflict of interest even if the client is willing to make a voluntary and informed waiver.
(6) On September 6, prior to the opening statements at the guilt trial, defendant sent a letter to the judge in which he said he did not trust Attorneys Carl Jordan and Warren Small. He asked the judge to remove them and appoint Roth, and requested appointment of independent counsel to help him present the case for removal. Judge Schulte read the letter and invited comments from defendant and counsel. (See People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44].) Defendant now complains that Judge Schulte ruled without full knowledge, since he was not aware of everything that transpired during the various hearings before Judge Garst. The record before him, however, was sufficient to make it clear that defendant had no particulars to support his general distrust of Jordan and Small, and confirms Judge Schulte's conclusion that they were providing competent representation. We find no error in his refusal to recuse them. Defendant also complains of the court's failure to appoint independent counsel to represent defendant on the Marsden motion. He cites People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 388 [217 Cal. Rptr. 306], which held that when a motion for new trial was based on incompetency of counsel, the court can appoint new, independent counsel to represent defendant in arguing that motion. Assuming Stewart authorizes appointment of independent counsel when a Marsden motion is based on alleged incompetency of present counsel, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appoint independent counsel because defendant offered no grounds, other than his distrust of all counsel except Roth, to suggest that present counsel were incompetent.
(7) After the guilt trial, defendant and Attorney Small requested that Roth be appointed to serve at the penalty trial. (It is not clear whether Roth would be an additional attorney, replace Small, or replace Jordan.) The motion pointed out that the initial reason for not appointing Roth no longer existed, since Roth would not be a witness at the penalty trial. The judge denied the motion as dilatory, since it would have required a continuance of the penalty trial. As in the previous motion, defendant expressed a general distrust of Jordan and Small  indeed of any attorney except Roth  but did not give any basis for his feelings. He hints that he could not disclose what really happened at the time of the killings to Jordan and Small, but did not explain why, nor in what respect the true story would have aided his defense. We see no error in the court's denial of the motion.
(8) Defendant requested appointment of Roth to argue the motion for new trial. As we have noted, People v. Stewart, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d 388, authorizes appointment of new counsel if the motion for new trial is based on incompetency of existing counsel. Defendant's charges of incompetency, however, are not sufficient to show that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the request. Defendant specified four charges: (a) that he did not explain fully to Jordan and Small what happened at the murder scene because he did not trust them; (b) that the court had denied some of their motions for investigative funds; (c) that they lacked experience, neither having tried a capital case before; and (d) that they did not obtain an expert ballistics report. The first ground does not demonstrate counsel's incompetence, only defendant's refusal to cooperate. The other grounds relate to matters which the court, having observed the trial and counsel's conduct of the defense, could reasonably conclude offered no hope of success.