Opinion ID: 1467785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Specific Performance of the Plea Agreement.

Text: Prior to defendant's second trial, defense counsel, on April 28, 1982, filed a motion with the Superior Court entitled Defendant's Motion for an Order Requiring the State to Specifically Perform According to the Terms of its Negotiated Plea Agreement, or, in the Alternative for an Order Dismissing this Action. An affidavit stated that on July 9, 1981, the day defendant's first trial ended in a hung jury, defense counsel struck a firm plea bargaining agreement with the assistant district attorney who had prosecuted defendant. The agreement provided that in return for defendant's plea of guilty to a simple assault charge, a Class D offense, the State agreed to dismiss the charge of rape and would recommend a suspended sentence and probation. [3] The affidavit stated further that on March 17, 1982, over nine months after the plea agreement was reached, the district attorney advised defense counsel that the State would not accept a guilty plea to a less severe offense than Gross Sexual Misconduct (Class C) in exchange for a dismissal of the rape charge. [4] Defendant was unwilling to plead to the more serious charge. Although the affidavit states that defense counsel promptly made it known to the district attorney's office that his client wanted to plead to the simple assault as soon as possible after the agreement was reached, defendant never entered a guilty plea with the court. The parties agreed that the motion be decided solely on the basis of defense counsel's affidavit. The motion justice ruled that even if the facts averred in the affidavit were true, defendant was not entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement since he had not pleaded guilty to the reduced charge nor demonstrated that he had relied to his detriment on the assistant district attorney's representations. Defendant argues on appeal that Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), requires specific performance of the unconsummated plea bargain in the instant case. [5] In Santobello, the Supreme Court endorsed plea bargaining as an essential component of the administration of justice which, if properly administered, is to be encouraged. Id. at 260, 92 S.Ct. at 497-98. The Court's approval was based on a supposition of fairness in securing the plea agreement and the recognition that judicial acceptance of a plea agreement must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due under the circumstances. Id. at 261-62, 92 S.Ct. at 498-99. Any notion that Santobello stands as authority for defendant's position, however, was laid to rest in Mabry v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984). In reversing an Eighth Circuit decision [6] that would have effectively precluded prosecutorial withdrawal of a plea proposal once a defendant's acceptance had been communicated to the prosecutor, the Supreme Court in Mabry stated that [a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution. Id. ___ U.S. at ___-___, 104 S.Ct. at 2546. Accepting as true, therefore, the facts stated in the affidavit filed by defendant's attorney in the present case, Mabry teaches that defendant had no enforceable right to plead guilty to simple assault in exchange for dismissal of the rape charge. Although the State made such an offer, defendant never pleaded guilty nor in any other way relied on the offer to his detriment. [7] The Superior Court committed no error when it denied defendant's Motion for Specific Performance.