Opinion ID: 2224708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the circuit court properly permitted a rape crisis center worker to testify as an expert witness

Text: [7, 8] Two questions must be addressed in resolving this issue. The first question is whether the worker from the rape crisis center was properly qualified as an expert witness. The second question is whether the testimony was properly admitted under sec. 907.02, Stats. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The question of an expert witness's qualifications is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the circuit court, and unless it is shown that the circuit court abused its discretion, its ruling will stand. Green v. Rosenow, 63 Wis. 2d 463, 472, 217 N.W.2d 388 (1974). The qualification of an expert has historically been a matter not of licensure, but of experience. Karl v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 78 Wis. 2d 284, 297, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977); Brain v. Mann, 129 Wis. 2d 447, 454, 385 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1986). [9] In regard to the first question, the witness from the rape crisis center testified that she had six years of experience at the center, functioning as an advocate for sexual assault victims by providing emotional support and information. In addition, she testified she had personally dealt with seventy to eighty victims. Given these facts, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in holding that her experience was sufficient to qualify her as an expert. [10] In regard to the second question, concerning the admissibility of the testimony under sec. 907.02, Stats., we have recognized that expert testimony is admissible when it assists the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or a fact in issue. Kerkman v. Hintz, 142 Wis. 2d 404, 422-23, 418 N.W.2d 795 (1988); State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 515-19, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984). The testimony presented by the witness in this case satisfies this requirement. The witness testified only as to her observations of the complainant and her observations of other sexual assault victims. She testified that she observed that many victims of sexual assault were emotionally flat immediately after the assault and that she commonly saw an apparent shift in emotions from relative calmness to agitation in the hours, days, or weeks following the assault. The witness was not asked to draw any inferences or offer any opinions about the complainant in this case based on what she had observed about other victims of sexual assault. In fact, the witness did not offer any opinion evidence at all. In State v. Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d 92, 96, 352 N.W.2d 673 (Ct. App. 1984), the court of appeals precluded a psychiatrist from giving an opinion, based on the victim's behavior patterns, that the victim was an incest victim. The court held, in the context presented, that the psychiatrist's opinion, with its aura of scientific reliability, created too great a possibility that the jury abdicated its fact-finding role to the psychiatrist and did not independently decide the defendant's guilt. Id. The court noted, however, that: Although we reverse Haseltine's convictions, we do not hold that psychiatric or other expert testimony is inadmissible in incest cases. Depending on the case, the testimony of an expert might aid the jury. For example, an incest victim may not immediately report the incest, or may recant accusations of incest. Jurors might reasonably regard such behavior as an indication that the victim was not telling the truth. An expert could explain that such behavior is common among incest victims as a result of guilt, confusion, and a reluctance to accuse a parent. Id. at 96-97. Similarly, in Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987), the Wyoming Supreme Court held that expert testimony which serves to rebut a defendant's assertions that a delay in reporting a sexual assault is inconsistent with its occurrence is admissible. Id. at 1047. The court noted that the expert witness, a police officer, merely testified about her interviews with the complainants involved in the case and about the range of responses to sexual assault that she had encountered. Id. at 1044-47. The witness testified that the victims she had encountered often delayed reporting sexual abuse or assault. Id. at 1044. The witness did not testify about the victims' states of mind, nor did she express an opinion on whether the victims were suffering from rape trauma. Id. at 1047. Consequently, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness's testimony. Id. at 1048. [11] The expert testimony in this case was helpful to the jury because the defendant attempted to rebut the complainant's testimony by noting that she was not crying after the assault and that she was so composed she was able to write out her own statement at the police station. The defense attempted to capitalize on the misconception that all sexual assault victims are emotional following the assault. [7] We conclude, therefore, that the witness's testimony in this case assisted the jury in understanding reactions with which it perhaps was not familiar. Consequently, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony at issue into evidence because where a defendant has suggested to the jury that some conduct of the victim after the incident is inconsistent with her claim of having been sexually assaulted, the use of expert testimony in relating observations of the way other sexual assault victims actually behave serves a particularly useful role by disabusing the jury of some widely held misconceptions about sexual assault victims.