Opinion ID: 1695556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: claim 5. the trial court erred in overruling lockett's request for a lesser included instruction of manslaughter in violation of the constitutions of the united states and mississippi.

Text: Lockett assails as constitutional error the denial, during the guilt-finding phase, of his request for D-4, a manslaughter instruction based upon a theory the Defendant's conduct exhibited or manifest[ed] a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of human life. The refusal of the manslaughter charge was not one of the ten (10) issues raised on direct appeal by Lockett's second set of lawyers nor was it among the thirteen (13) individual grounds for relief requested by Lockett's third set of lawyers in his first application for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, this claim, like each of the claims preceding it, is barred by the time bar found in § 99-39-5(2) and the second or successive writ bar found in § 99-39-27(9). The four (4) statutory exceptions to the second or successive writ bar are: (1) allegations of supervening insanity, (2) intervening decisions which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of Lockett's conviction or sentence, (3) newly discovered evidence, and (4) allegations that a prisoner's sentence has expired or his probation or parole has been unlawfully revoked. The latter three exceptions are also statutory exceptions to the time bar found in § 99-39-5(2) which has been previously discussed. Supervening insanity has no applicability in this case. Moreover, Lockett has neither alleged nor demonstrated that he has newly discovered evidence, not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial, which is of such nature that it would be practically conclusive that had such been introduced at trial it would have caused a different result in the conviction or sentence. Lockett has never claimed his sentence has expired or his probation or parole has been unlawfully revoked. Finally, Lockett has neither demonstrated fundamental constitutional error nor cited any intervening decision which would defeat the bars. Lockett, however, argues that Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (Miss. 1992), is an intervening decision within the meaning and purview of § 99-39-5(2) and § 99-39-27(9) because it would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence. We disagree. Butler was decided August 26, 1992, several weeks prior to our decision on October 1, 1992, denying Lockett's first application for post-conviction relief. If Butler is an intervening decision, it intervened 6 years 8 months after the murders of Geraldine and John Calhoun, 6 years 4 months after Lockett's conviction for the murder of Geraldine, 5 years after this Court affirmed Lockett's conviction on direct appeal, and 3 years 8 months after the filing of Lockett's first application for post-conviction relief. The full text of the D-4 instruction is quoted as follows: If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that: A. The deceased, Geraldine Calhoun, was a living person; and B. That she died as a result of the Defendant's actions; and C. That the Defendant's conduct exhibited or manifest a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of human life, then you shall find the Defendant guilty of manslaughter. If the State has failed to prove any one or more of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find the Defendant not guilty. While discussing with the trial judge the propriety of granting this instruction, defense counsel stated to the court that by virtue of some of the evidence presented, the shooting of Geraldine could have been out of the heat of passion, and we think that would substantiate a manslaughter instruction. Heat of passion, however, was not the basis for D-4. Rather, the basis for D-4 was conduct by Lockett that exhibited a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of human life, i.e., an act of culpable negligence. The State received instruction number 3, a capital murder instruction, and number 4, an instruction authorizing the jury to find Lockett guilty of murder less than capital. Instruction 3 required the jury to find Lockett guilty of capital murder if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockett, with malice aforethought, shot and killed Geraldine, not by accident or misfortune or in necessary self-defense, and if, at the time of the killing, Lockett was engaged in the crimes(s) of burglary, robbery, and/or kidnapping. Instruction 4, on the other hand, required the jury to find Lockett guilty of murder less than capital if it failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time of the killing Lockett was engaged in the commission of the crime(s) of burglary, robbery, and/or kidnapping but it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockett, with malice aforethought, shot and killed Geraldine, not by accident or misfortune or in necessary self-defense. The jury, in finding Lockett guilty of capital murder, necessarily found that Lockett killed Geraldine with malice aforethought or deliberate design to effect her death while he was engaged in the commission of the crime(s) of burglary, robbery, and/or kidnapping. In Butler, a prosecution for capital murder based upon the killing of a nine month old infant while the defendant was engaged in the crime of felonious child abuse, this Court held the defendant was entitled to a manslaughter instruction by virtue of Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-27 (1972) which reads as follows: § 97-3-27. Homicide; killing while committing felony. The killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any felony, except rape, burglary, arson, or robbery, or while such other is attempting to commit any felony besides such as are above enumerated and excepted, shall be manslaughter. This statute would authorize a conviction of manslaughter for a killing occurring in the course of the commission of kidnapping, even though there was no malice aforethought (deliberate design) and no intent to kill. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) authorizes a conviction of capital murder for a killing done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such felonies. [emphasis supplied] Lockett's fourth crew of lawyers argues that Lockett was sentenced to death under the capital murder statute  Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e)  when there existed in our criminal jurisprudence another criminal statute for the same offense with the maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. § 97-3-27 has been around for many years and certainly existed in its present form at the time of Lockett's trial in 1986 for capital murder. The argument advanced belatedly by Lockett's fourth set of lawyers was not presented on direct appeal by his second group of lawyers nor was it presented by Lockett's third team of attorneys in his first application for post-conviction relief. An intervening decision within the meaning and purview of § 99-39-5(2) and § 99-39-27(9) is one which would have actually adversely affected the outcome of [the defendant's] conviction or sentence. [emphasis supplied] Lockett has failed to demonstrate through his fourth set of lawyers that the Butler case would have, as opposed to could have, actually  or as a matter of fact  adversely affected the outcome of the trial. The jury convicted Lockett of capital murder when it had the option of convicting him of murder less than capital. Under the facts of this case which point to a brutal double murder, it cannot reasonably be argued that the jury would have actually opted for manslaughter. Prior to our decision on October 1, Lockett was allowed to amend his first post-conviction application in order to add additional claims based upon new decisions. The decision in Butler was available to Lockett for a period of thirty-five (35) days prior to our decision denying Lockett's first application for post-conviction relief. This observation detracts from Lockett's suggestion that Butler is an intervening decision. In the final analysis, we do not consider the Butler case to be an intervening decision because (1) Butler was decided prior to this Court's decision in Lockett's first application for post-conviction relief and thus was not wholly intervening and (2) Lockett has failed to demonstrate that Butler would have actually adversely affected the outcome of Lockett's conviction or sentence. Once again, Lockett has failed to demonstrate any fundamental constitutional error or intervening decisions which would exempt his claim from the time bar or the successive writ bar. Finally, the D-4 instruction tendered by Lockett failed to negate the existence of burglary or robbery as underlying offenses. Even if the killing of Geraldine occurred without malice by culpable negligence but while Lockett was engaged in the commission of either burglary or robbery, or both, as authorized by jury instruction 3, he could not have been found guilty of manslaughter under § 97-3-27 which excepts both burglary and robbery. For this reason, if for no other, D-4 was improper, and Butler inapplicable.