Opinion ID: 77629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the performance prong

Text: 31 To satisfy the deficient performance prong of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Dingle has the burden of proving that Sakin made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Additionally, Dingle must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065 (explaining that we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy') (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 164, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). In short, considering all the circumstances, we give great deference to choices dictated by reasonable strategy. Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir.1994); Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 958 (11th Cir.1992) (stating we must, in a highly deferential manner, examine `whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances') (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065). The question is whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted as defense counsel acted in the trial at issue and not what most good lawyers would have done. Conklin v. Schofield, 366 F.3d 1191, 1204 (11th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). Even if counsel's decision appears to have been unwise in retrospect, the decision will be held to have been ineffective assistance only if it was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it. Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir.1983). 32 The state court held that Sakin made a tactical decision not to present expert testimony. This finding is a finding of fact, and a state court's decision as to this issue is therefore presumed to be correct, absent convincing evidence to the contrary. Jackson v. Herring, 42 F.3d 1350, 1367 (11th Cir.1995). Sakin's statements during the state court trial and his testimony at the evidentiary hearing before the magistrate judge support the finding that Sakin's decision was a strategic one. Sakin had secured experts and these experts were available to testify on Dingle's behalf. Accordingly, it is clear that Sakin chose not to call these expert witnesses. Thus, the state court's finding that Sakin's approach in the second trial was the result of a tactical decision has support in the record and must be considered correct. 33 Whether Sakin's tactical decision was reasonable, and therefore within the wide range of competent professional assistance, is an issue of law. Jackson, 42 F.3d at 1367. Under the deferential standard of AEDPA, our review is limited to whether the state court's decision that Sakin was not ineffective is contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. A jury found Dingle guilty of both charges at his first trial, even with the benefit of expert testimony on Dingle's behalf. Given that the jury at the second trial would have heard substantially the same testimony that led to a guilty verdict in the first trial, it was not unreasonable for Sakin to attempt to shift the focus at trial from causation to Dingle's intent, an issue on which expert testimony was not available. Sakin employed a different trial strategy than he had in the first trial in the hopes of obtaining a more favorable verdict for his client. The change in focus allowed Sakin to shift attention from the brutal nature of the baby's injuries. On the other hand, had Sakin called expert witnesses, the jury might have heard Dr. Kessler, one of Dingle's own witnesses, express the opinion that the child was forcibly thrown or slammed down on a hard surface, or was drop-kicked like a football. Sakin wanted to keep the jury from hearing such testimony and, instead, keep the jury focused on intent. Although this new strategy resulted in a guilty verdict, we are not permitted to use the benefit of hindsight to conclude that Sakin should have known his new strategy would be unsuccessful. 34 It is simply not the case, as Dingle argues, that Sakin had nothing to gain by not calling expert witnesses. Instead, by not calling any witnesses to the stand, Sakin not only could focus more on intent than on causation, but he also retained the distinct advantage of presenting both the initial and concluding closing argument to the jury. 2 Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.250. Additionally, Sakin's choice allowed him to focus on the non-intentional nature of Dingle's conduct as opposed to the cause and brutality of the baby's injuries. As to Dingle's claim that Sakin failed to consult about the advantages and disadvantages of not presenting expert testimony and, instead, concede guilt, Dingle points to no evidence in the record to support a finding that Sakin failed to consult. Additionally, Sakin did not concede that Dingle killed the child, only that if the jury determined that Dingle caused the baby's death, he should be found guilty of the lesser offense of child abuse or manslaughter, not murder. It is true that Sakin could have presented expert testimony and still pursued this line of argument, but he retained the advantages we have discussed by not doing so. 35 We conclude that the state court's decision that Sakin's performance at Dingle's second trial was not so deficient that no competent attorney would have chosen to proceed as he did was neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.