Opinion ID: 1215594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: modern status of fixture security law

Text: The statement in the majority's opinion that this court has not discussed the law of fixtures for nearly 48 years is not wholly complete. While the discussion has not been extensive, fixtures did play a part at least tangentially in several cases during this supposed dormant period. See Tri-State Nat. Bank v. Saffren, Wyo., 726 P.2d 1081 (1986); Sannerud v. First Nat. Bank of Sheridan, Wyo., 708 P.2d 1236 (1985); Security Bank and Trust Co. v. Blaze Oil Co., Wyo., 463 P.2d 495 (1970); Hill v. Salmon, 69 Wyo. 1, 236 P.2d 518 (1951); and Rosenblum v. Terry Carpenter, Inc., 62 Wyo. 417, 174 P.2d 142 (1946). The subject of fixtures has been twice addressed by the Wyoming Law Journal: Rudolph, Secured Transactions Under the Commercial Code, 14 Wyo.L.J. 220, 229 (1960) and Note, Some Aspects of the Law of Fixtures in Wyoming, 10 Wyo.L.J. 119 (1956). Excluding the case of Holland Furnace Co. v. Bird, 45 Wyo. 471, 21 P.2d 825 (1933), earlier Wyoming litigation more frequently involved trade fixtures and improvements which come into controversy at the end of a leasehold term. Laramie County, School Dist. No. 11 v. Donahue, 55 Wyo. 220, 97 P.2d 663 (1940); Slane v. Curtis, 41 Wyo. 402, 286 P. 372 (1930); Slane v. Curtis, 39 Wyo. 1, 269 P. 31 (1928). The exceptions being the somewhat similar circumstances to this case resulting from mortgage foreclosure in Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Sells, 40 Wyo. 498, 280 P. 98 (1929) and Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 (1910), where the notice of the improvements included whether the mortgage coverage was persuasively comparable. Moreover, I would today find the majority's reliance on the three-part test of a fixture taken from Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 525 (1853) [1] to be insufficient as too rigid and constraining around which to mold an informed twentieth century analysis of fixtures. The current California approach to the concept of fixtures is found to be more appropriate in today's world of business transactions because it is more expanded and reflective of the precarious nature of fixtures which, at times, lie in the twilight zone between things real and things personal. See Frost v. Schinkel, 121 Neb. 784, 238 N.W. 659, 664 (1931). California utilizes four conjunctive tests to determine whether or not an article is a fixture. The first test is the manner of the article's annexation to the realty. [Citations omitted.] The second test is the article's adaptability to the use and the purpose for which the realty is used. [Citations omitted.] The third test is the intention of the party making the annexation. [Citations omitted.] The fourth test is the relation of the parties to the annexed property. [Citations omitted.] In Re Arlett, 22 B.R. 732, 734 (E.D.Cal. 1982). See also Kruse Metals Mfg. Co. v. Utility Trailer Mfg. Co., 206 Cal. App.2d 176, 23 Cal. Rptr. 514, 518 (1962). We will consider the tests in converse order as a relative demonstration of basic importance. [2] See Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., 132 S.C. 16, 128 S.E. 876, 878 (1925) as an earlier analysis to now be in essential concurrence with the modern rule as it quoted Montague v. Dent, 10 Rich.Law, 135, 67 Am.Dec. 573 in stating: `So various are the considerations which enter into the interpretation of the law fixtures, dictating varying and opposite conclusions as to the same or like articles, which may become the subject of controversy, that an adjudicated case may fail to be of any authority, where the subject-matter of contest may be the same, as the particular case must be considered with reference to the relation of parties.   ' (Emphasis in original.) Planter's Bank v. Lummus Cotton Gin Co., supra, 128 S.E. at 878.