Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Inadmissible Evidence by the State During the Testimony of Diana Aviv

Text: Defendant challenges the State's evidence during the penalty-phase testimony of Diana Aviv on two grounds. First, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined his expert witness with inadmissible evidence. Second, defendant contends that the trial court erroneously relaxed the rules of evidence and permitted the State to introduce hearsay in rebuttal. During the penalty-phase proceeding, defendant called to the stand Diana Aviv, a psychiatric social worker, as an expert witness. Ms. Aviv based her testimony on interviews she had conducted with defendant and Alice Martini as well as a brief conversation she had had with the couple's youngest daughter. Prior to the commencement of Ms. Aviv's testimony, defense counsel did not establish that such interviews were the type of material reasonably relied on by experts in Ms. Aviv's field of expertise in forming opinions. Instead, her testimony, which consisted primarily of a recitation of the conversations she had had with defendant and his ex-wife, proceeded without any finding regarding its admissibility. Most of Ms. Aviv's testimony concerned the Martinis' early life and the circumstances that drove them apart. Defense counsel asked her no hypothetical questions. Her testimony, largely comprised of hearsay, prompted repeated objections from the prosecutor. The trial court overruled each objection, permitting Ms. Aviv to continue uninterrupted. Eventually, the witness offered the following opinion of defendant: John Martini had led, for the first approximately 50 years of his life, an average life, being in a family that was supportive and protective of his growing up, met a woman who he was attracted to and had a reasonably successful marriage for the first 25 years of their marriage, brought four children into the world who appeared to have grown up in a healthy, positive environment with the economic advantages that his income brought them, living in three houses in Bergen County, New Jersey and then moving to Arizona and living quite well over there. He appeared to be a good father and good husband, and when approximately 50 years old appeared to reach a stage in his life in which he felt that his major responsibilities towards his family were accomplished and became attracted by a woman who was much younger than himself, 20 years old, to his 50 years. And this young woman who had been a prostitute and was a drug addict, appeared to capture his interest to the point where he felt it was necessary to take care of her. He had a desire to take care of her and it involved him in a pattern of drug abuse, and through that pattern of drug abuse he became seriously addicted to cocaine. It seriously impaired his judgment and his behavior. It destroyed his marriage. It ruined his relationships with his children to some degree and it made him paranoid and produced the kind of behavior that resulted in his killing Mr. Flax. One of the statements relied on by Ms. Aviv in reaching her conclusion was defendant's remark that the only person he was ever interested in outside of his wife was Therese [Afdahl], and he wasn't sure that he would describe it as a romantic involvement. Prior to cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Ms. Aviv to review several documents that were not in evidence: a statement of Victor Picardi, defendant's January 30, 1989, statement, and an investigative report of Sergeant Leonard A. Minichino. Defendant's statement referred to Eileen Metzgroff as [a] friend, girlfriend of his from as early as 1977. In addition, the statement contained a different birth date for defendant from the one he related to Ms. Aviv. The report of Sergeant Minichino described a conversation he had with Eileen Metzgroff on January 27, 1989. In that conversation, Ms. Metzgroff told Sergeant Minichino that she loved defendant, had known him since 1976, and had had sexual relations with him on January 14, 1989, nine days before the kidnapping. The report also stated that Ms. Metzgroff had claimed that defendant had wanted to marry her. In the remaining document, Picardi stated that he had seen no signs of drug use by defendant and Afdahl, and that Martini had bragged about getting Afdahl off of drugs. The prosecutor intended to ask Ms. Aviv if a review of those materials changed her opinion. Defendant asked the court to limit the prosecutor's expected cross-examination, arguing that the documents contained extremely prejudicial remarks. However, defendant did not object on hearsay grounds. In State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 577 A. 2d 419 (1990), we upheld the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(b) (Section 3c(2)(b)), which provides: If the defendant produces evidence in mitigation which would not be admissible under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, the State may rebut that evidence without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. We held that because the defense is allowed to introduce mitigating evidence outside of the Rules of Evidence during the penalty phase to ensure that the jury imposes death only when the defendant is deserving of the punishment, the State should also be permitted to rebut that evidence under the same relaxed conditions. Id. at 549, 577 A. 2d 419. To hold otherwise could present a distorted view of defendant to the jury. Ibid. The trial court, relying on our holding in McDougald, permitted the prosecutor to use the materials to ask [Ms. Aviv] to take into consideration this information and to see if it would, in fact, change her opinion at all. The trial court noted that the defendant is permitted to introduce evidence in mitigation that does not conform to the Rules of Evidence    [a]nd where the defense does that, the State is permitted to rebut that evidence, also without regard to the rules governing the admissibility of that evidence. The prosecutor conducted the expected cross-examination, relying heavily on the hearsay statement of Eileen Metzgroff contained in the Minichino report. Picardi's statement was not used. During the penalty-phase rebuttal, Sergeant Minichino testified, over defendant's objection, about his conversation with Ms. Metzgroff. Again, the trial court relied on McDougald and Section 3c(2)(b). Anything in rebuttal, any character testimony such as statements given to Ms. Aviv by Mrs. Martini and John Martini can be rebutted in the same manner in which that evidence was received, which was irregardless [sic] of the Rules of Evidence. So, therefore, I'm going to allow this witness to testify. Subsequently, the prosecutor offered the testimony of Aquilino Rocas, an employee at the Days Inn in Fort Lee. Rocas's testimony dealt entirely with documentary proof that Eileen Metzgroff and another person had stayed at the motel on January 14, 1989. Defendant now contends that the use of hearsay statements by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Ms. Aviv as well as during the State's penalty-phase rebuttal was improper. According to defendant, Ms. Aviv's testimony was based on materials reasonably relied on by experts in her field as permitted by Evidence Rule 56(2). Thus, defendant argues that the expert's direct examination was conducted within the parameters of the rules, thereby negating the State's right to disregard those rules during cross-examination and rebuttal. Defendant asserts that because the rules were not relaxed, the prosecutor should have been required to get the material admitted into evidence or should have been required to establish that they were the type of evidence relied on by psychiatric social workers. We find defendant's arguments to be unpersuasive. The trial court clearly relaxed the Rules of Evidence during Ms. Aviv's direct testimony. Although the witness was properly qualified as an expert pursuant to Evidence Rule 19, the court did not undertake an analysis of the material on which Ms. Aviv relied in reaching her opinion. Rule 56(2) permits experts to rely on otherwise-inadmissible evidence if such material is of the type reasonably relied on by experts in that field. However, as we stated in Ryan v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 121 N.J. 276, 289, 579 A. 2d 1241 (1990), the trial court is required to make an inquiry into and a finding regarding whether experts in the given field reasonably rely on that information in reaching conclusions of the type offered by the witness. The trial court did not make such a finding, the defense counsel did not request such a finding, nor did the State object to the lack of such a finding. Clearly, the court and both counsel recognized that Aviv's testimony was admitted outside of the Rules of Evidence. Additionally, the court allowed Ms. Aviv to give an expert opinion based completely on hearsay. Rule 56(2) permit[s] an expert opinion to be corroborated, confirmed or bolstered by hearsay, but not to rest exclusively or primarily upon it. Dietzeman v. Peterson, 196 N.J. Super. 96, 101, 481 A. 2d 596 (Law Div. 1984). Ms. Aviv's opinion rested primarily, if not exclusively, on hearsay statements and was permitted without interference from the court. The only reasonable conclusion one can draw from the court's inaction is that the Rules of Evidence had been suspended in order to give the defendant additional latitude for the production of mitigating evidence. The cross-examination in question here differs materially from that which we found to be improper in State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 500, 548 A. 2d 1058. In Rose, the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant's penalty-phase expert with materials which were unrelated to [the expert's] opinion. In addition, there was no indication in that case that the trial court had relaxed the rules of evidence during the expert's direct examination. Similar circumstances led to our holding in State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 578, 575 A. 2d 816. The prosecutor's cross-examination of Ms. Aviv related directly to her opinion that defendant had had a successful marriage and was a good husband prior to his introduction to Afdahl. The prosecutor's rebuttal evidence squarely attacked the expert's reliance on defendant's assertion that Afdahl was the only woman, apart from Mrs. Martini, with whom he had been romantically involved. In Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 500, 548 A. 2d 1058, we found that any error that may have occurred in permitting the improper cross-examination was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. We likewise find here that even if the disputed evidence was improperly admitted, any consequent error was harmless given Martini's admitted long-term adulterous relationship with Afdahl, his long-term drug abuse, and his admission of the kidnapping and murder of Flax. [I]t does not seem even remotely possible that the proposed testimony would show [defendant's] character in any worse light than had already been directly demonstrated. State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273, 306, 460 A. 2d 120 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 531, 468 A. 2d 185 (1983).