Opinion ID: 852198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Life Insurance Claim

Text: Kubsch complains his trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object to testimony regarding a settlement reached on the claim Kubsch filed on an insurance policy on Beth Kubsch's life. The record indicates that Kubsch was the sole beneficiary of a $575,000.00 insurance policy on Beth's life which was purchased a few months prior to her death. Tr.2 at 2555. Less than one month after Beth's death, Kubsch attempted to collect on the policy. Tr.2 at 2558. In accordance with insurance company protocol, an investigation took place into Beth's death because it occurred within two years of the issuance of the policy. Tr.2 at 2564-65. At trial, an employee of the insurance company testified that a settlement was reached and money was paid out on the policy. Tr.2 at 2563. The witness further testified that Kubsch did not receive the settlement payout. Tr.2 at 2563. Kubsch offers several theories upon which he argues relief may be granted. Kubsch first argues the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides `[r]elevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. All testimony regarding the insurance policy and Kubsch's claim thereon are probative of the State's theory that Kubsch murdered Beth in order to collect on her life insurance policy. The testimony that a settlement was reached on the policy and that Kubsch was not paid completed the story of the insurance company's involvement. Even if this particular evidence was not relevant, counsel's failure to object was not unduly prejudicial to Kubsch as no evidence was offered regarding who received the settlement or why the settlement was not paid to Kubsch. Furthermore, no evidence was presented as to when the settlement was reached or whether Kubsch's first conviction in this case was relevant to settlement. See, e.g., Young v. State, 746 N.E.2d 920, 927 (Ind. 2001) (finding no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the defendant's trial counsel had performed adequately). Kubsch next argues that the testimony was inadmissible because the witness testified to her opinion concerning Kubsch's guilt. Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) provides in relevant part, [w]itnesses may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case. Kubsch's argument lacks merit because the witness merely replied in the negative when asked the factual question of whether the settlement was paid to Kubsch. Tr.2 at 2563. The witness did not express an opinion as to Kubsch's guilt. Kubsch's final argument is that this testimony is tantamount to evidence that the insurance company completed an investigation and determined that Kubsch was guilty of murdering Beth. Kubsch cites Sailors v. State, 593 N.E.2d 202 (Ind.Ct. App.1992), trans. denied, and contends this testimony invited the jury to believe that another arbiter had determined that Kubsch was responsible for Beth's death. We begin by noting that Kubsch's argument on this point rests on a number of assumptions as to what the testimony offered may mean. We decline to speculate as to the possible meaning behind an insurance company's decision on whether and with whom to settle a claim. In any event Sailors is not determinative. In that case, the prosecutor told the jury that it was the second jury to consider the case after a grand jury had weighed the evidence and indicted the defendant. Id. at 206. Here, the jury was simply informed that a settlement was reached and Kubsch was not awarded any money. No reference was made to any other arbiter determining Kubsch's guilt, and no argument was made that minimized the jury's responsibility to determine the law and facts of the case.