Opinion ID: 169936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis of the sentence in this case

Text: Mr. Angel-Guzman was granted full opportunity to be heard at sentencing and does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. Applying this Circuit's precedents regarding appellate review of within-Guidelines sentences as summarized in the preceding section and as approved by the Supreme Court in Rita, we conclude that the district court was within its discretion in sentencing the defendant to the low end of the advisory Guidelines range. Because Mr. Angel-Guzman's sentence was properly calculated and within the advisory Guidelines range, it is entitled to the presumption of reasonableness discussed above. Mr. Angel-Guzman argues primarily that the sentence imposed on him was unreasonable because the calculation of his criminal history level failed to take into account the allegedly minor nature of his previous offenses. His argument may be understood as a procedural attack on the district judge's decision not to grant a downward departure from the Guidelines or as a substantive challenge to the resulting sentence of 30 months. Either way, the objection is not well taken.
Under the Guidelines, a district judge may grant a downward departure [i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant's criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. . . . U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b). If Mr. Angel-Guzman's claim is a procedural one, this Court lacks the ability to review it. Even after Booker, `[t]his court has no jurisdiction . . . to review a district court's discretionary decision to deny a motion for downward departure on the ground that a defendant's circumstances do not warrant the departure.' United States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Sierra-Castillo, 405 F.3d 932, 936 (10th Cir.2005)) (emendation and ellipsis in original). [8] Denial of a departure may only be reviewed if the district court unambiguously states it lacks discretion to grant the departure. Id. Mr. Angel-Guzman makes no such allegation here. In any event, our reading of the sentencing transcript indicates that the judge refused the motion to depart because, having considered the nature of Mr. Angel-Guzman's prior crimes, he simply did not believe a departure to be warranted. Our procedural review of Mr. Angel-Guzman's sentence may therefore come to an end.
Mr. Angel-Guzman's appeal may also be interpreted as advancing the position that his sentence, although within a properly calculated Guidelines range, is substantively unreasonable because the true nature of his criminal history is less serious than his criminal history category of V implies. In this regard, his claim hinges on two premises. First, he argues, because his prior convictions are non-violent, they must be non-serious. Second, Mr. Angel-Guzman claims that the state judges in his prior criminal cases sentenced him at the low end of the applicable statutory ranges and thus impliedly made a determination that his offenses were not seriousa determination, he argues now, with which the district court should not have disagreed.
We believe the district court acted within its discretion in treating Mr. Angel-Guzman's prior offenses as sufficiently serious to warrant a criminal history category of V. Driving under the influence of an intoxicant is not without the real possibility of physical injury to others: [T]he risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural or speculative . . . Drunk driving is a reckless act that often results in injury, and the risks of driving while intoxicated are well known. United States v. Farnsworth, 92 F.3d 1001, 1008-09 (10th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964 (10th Cir.2006), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 32, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). And hair-pulling and bottle-throwing, while not the apex of violent crime, are certainly not peaceable activities. As the Guidelines recognize, violence is not the sine qua non of seriousness. In fact, the guideline which contains instructions for computing criminal history, § 4A1.2, explicitly includes convictions for driving under the influence, noting that [s]uch offenses are not minor traffic infractions. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 n. 5. In noting the inherent seriousness of a DWI infraction, the district court did not unduly speculate as to the facts behind Mr. Angel-Guzman's prior convictions, but merely underscored the conclusions of this Court, other Courts of Appeals, and of the Sentencing Commission: that the risk of injury from drunk driving is neither conjectural nor speculative, United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995), and that drunk driving is an irresponsible and often fatal act, United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1208 (10th Cir.2003). Mr. Angel-Guzman points out that we have previously affirmed downward departures tied to criminal history calculations. E.g., United States v. Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir.1997). Even if the defendant's situation here were comparable to that of Mr. Collinswhich it is notsuch a comparison ignores the different procedural postures of the two cases. Collins was a pre- Booker sentencing departure, in which we reviewed the district court's decision to grant a departure deferentially, for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1303. Here, we show similar deference to the district court in its decision not to grant a variance. Thus, even if the two defendants had identical histories and committed identical crimes, a decision by our Court to uphold a district court's departure in one case cannot possibly be read to entitle later defendants in similar cases to a downward variance as a matter of right, or to fetter the sentencing discretion Congress has vested in the district courts. Mr. Angel-Guzman's problems with alcohol are not limited to a single incident: his four alcohol-related convictions and one outstanding arrest warrant show that, despite repeated incarcerations, Mr. Angel-Guzman continues to drive under the influence. Moreover, his sixfold revocation or termination of probation shows that he is not susceptible to softer inducements. Cf. United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir.2006) (affirming an upward variance because the defendant's extensive history of alcohol-related problems and his DUIs, and his demonstrated propensity for returning to the United States, show there is substantial reason to believe that the defendant's future conduct may again involve similar acts.). Moreover, the circumstances of Mr. Angel-Guzman's offense, as recounted in the PSR, support the reasonableness of the sentence. See R. Vol. IV, at 2-3. With the assistance of a co-defendant, he transported eight illegal aliens from Los Angeles to various locations, for a fee. The trip lasted approximately fifteen hours, during which the passengers traveled without food, without seatbelts, and with only one bathroom break. Mr. Angel-Guzman instructed the passengers that, in the event they were apprehended, they should lie about their nation of origin to facilitate a second attempt at illegal entry and should also state, falsely, that they shared in the driving. During the initial traffic stop he reminded the aliens of these instructions. We agree with the government that this conduct suggests an experienced and callous engagement in alien smuggling rather than a casual one-time involvement. U.S. Br. at 20. In light of the facts presented to the district court and the applicable Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months' imprisonment, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in imposing a sentence of 30 months.