Opinion ID: 2074459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cross-Examination of Dr. Walker

Text: The only proper question before this Court on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in preventing the defense from questioning Dr. Walker as to his knowledge of Dockery's purported assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege as expressed in her letters and whether his knowledge of Dockery's purported assertion of the privilege would affect his opinions as to the nature and timing of Nyah's injuries. Managing the scope of cross-examination is a matter that falls within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 193, 695 A.2d 184, 187 (1997). A trial court does not abuse that discretion when it excludes cross-examination that is irrelevant. See Md. Rule 5-402 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Md. Rule 5-401. The Fifth Amendment states in part that No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. amend. V. This prohibition permits a person to refuse to answer official questions at any proceeding where his answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984). To invoke the privilege, the witness need not be guilty of a crime. The privilege extends not only to answers that would in themselves support a criminal conviction but also includes those answers that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the person for a crime. The constitutional protection is confined, however, to those circumstances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer. Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364-65, 37 S.Ct. 621, 622, 61 L.Ed. 1198 (1917). Significantly, it is not for the witness or counsel to determine whether a witness can properly assert the privilege against self-incrimination; the witness's merely saying that he or she would be incriminated does not excuse the witness from answering the questions. It is the duty of the trial judge to determine whether the witness can properly assert the privilege against self-incrimination and whether the witness's silence is justified. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374, 71 S.Ct. 438, 442, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951); Bhagwat v. State, 338 Md. 263, 272, 658 A.2d 244, 248 (1995). To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. See Bhagwat, 338 Md. at 272-73, 658 A.2d at 248. The trial judge in appraising the claim `must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.' Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951) (quoting Ex Parte Irvine, 74 F. 954, 960 (C.C.S.D.Ohio 1896) (Taft, J.)); see also State v. Williams, 200 Conn. 310, 511 A.2d 1000, 1004 (1986) (quoting Ex Parte Irvine, 74 F. at 960). In Bhagwat, we reiterated the test for the witness's entitlement to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege as follows: The test of the witness's entitlement to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination(1) whether there is a reasonable basis for the invocation of the privilege; and (2) whether the privilege is invoked in good faith, was well stated in Choi v. State, 316 Md. 529, 560 A.2d 1108 (1989). It is whether `the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer,' and whether it is `evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.' Bhagwat, 338 Md. at 272-73, 658 A.2d at 248 (internal citations omitted). Applying these well-settled principles, it is clear that Dockery's letters do not amount to a bona fide assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Dockery was never actually called as a witness at trial. Consequently, no questions regarding the events surrounding Nyah's injuries were ever posed to her in an official proceeding, and there was no determination by the trial court that she had reasonable cause to apprehend a danger of self-incrimination by answering such questions. Thus, Dockery did not assert her privilege against self-incrimination, as she was never placed into a position in which the privilege would potentially be assertable. Therefore, her letters are, at best, a statement of her intention to assert her privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify at appellant's trial, not a genuine assertion of the privilege. Despite the fact that Dockery's intention to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not satisfy legal requirements to invoke the privilege, the trial judge seemed to treat them as such. Accordingly, we will consider the correctness vel non of the trial judge's ruling. As explained infra, the trial judge's exclusion of the proposed cross-examination based upon the letters on grounds that the letters were not relevant to challenging the bases of his opinions was proper. Appellant attempted to question Dr. Walker regarding Dockery's intention to assert her privilege against self-incrimination purportedly for two purposes: (1) to challenge the basis of Dr. Walker's opinions concerning the causes of Nyah's injuries; and (2) to challenge the basis of Dr. Walker's opinions concerning the timing of the manifestation of Nyah's symptoms. Dockery's intention to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege is simply not relevant to Dr. Walker's bases for these opinions. Consequently, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by preventing appellant from cross-examining Dr. Walker regarding Dockery's intention to assert the privilege. As appellant's attorney made clear, his actual purpose for his proposed line of cross-examination of Dr. Walker was to challenge Dr. Walker's opinion concerning who caused Nyah's injuries. Appellant's attorney presupposed that Dr. Walker had formed such an opinion, and that this opinion provided a basis for the opinions he had concerning the nature and causes of Nyah's injuries. As he explained to the court, he believed that Dr. Walker, in forming [his] opinion for this jury ... one of the factors is, did someone else do it, and that, for this reason, he was entitled to ask Dr. Walker whether his opinions about the nature, causes, and timing of Nyah's injuries would change if he knew that Dockery had expressed her intention to assert her privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify at trial. Appellant's supposition here concerning the basis for Dr. Walker's opinion about the nature, causes, and timing of Nyah's injuries is simply mistaken. Dr. Walker did not rely on any opinion about who actually caused Nyah's injuries in forming his opinion about the nature, causes, or timing of these injuries. As his testimony, both on direct examination and cross-examination, makes clear, the bases for his opinions about the nature of the injuries Nyah suffered were the medical reports of the other doctors who examined and treated Nyah, his own examination of Nyah, and Nyah's medical history, which he learned in part from Dockery. His opinion that Nyah's injuries were caused by shaking was based on his conclusion that Nyah suffered certain types of injuries, along with his expert opinion that injuries of this sort are almost exclusively caused by shaking. Similarly, Dr. Walker's opinion that Nyah's symptoms would have manifested shortly after the injuries were caused was based on his conclusions about the types of injuries Nyah suffered. As a result, Dr. Walker's opinions concerning the nature, causes, and timing of Nyah's injuries were not based on any opinion concerning who inflicted the injuries. Consequently, evidence of Dockery's intention to assert her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination would not tend to undermine the bases for Dr. Walker's opinions concerning the nature, causes, or timing of Nyah's injuries by undermining his opinion concerning who inflicted Nyah's injuries, as Dr. Walker's opinions about the nature, causes, and timing of Nyah's injuries were not based on any such opinion about who inflicted the injuries. Therefore, it was not relevant for the purpose for which it was offered, and the trial court properly prohibited appellant from asking Dr. Walker about this evidence on cross-examination. Moreover, the trial court correctly observed that Dr. Walker could not testify as to who caused the injuries. JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.