Opinion ID: 2690026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judge’s Failure to Recuse

Text: {¶ 58} In his 17th proposition of law, Osie contends that Judge Noah E. Powers II, who presided over the trial, should have recused himself because his pecuniary relationship with the defense mitigation specialist, who was the judge’s former law partner, created an appearance of impropriety. {¶ 59} Some months before trial, the defense requested that attorney Christopher J. Pagan be appointed as the defense mitigation specialist. Judge Powers informed the parties on the record that he had an ongoing financial relationship with Pagan, because they had been law partners, and Pagan “still owes me [the judge] money.” Judge Powers was initially reluctant to appoint Pagan for this reason. However, recognizing that defense counsel had valid reasons for desiring the appointment, Judge Powers recused himself from ruling on the defense motion to appoint Pagan. The matter was referred to Judge Michael J. Sage, the administrative judge of the common pleas court. {¶ 60} Judge Sage held a hearing on the motion to appoint Pagan. At the hearing, defense counsel explained that Judge Powers had recused himself from the motion because “there are still some cases that Mr. Pagan has in his office that Judge Powers was working on at the time, and he is still owed money from those cases if and when they settle or if judgment is obtained.” {¶ 61} The prosecution expressed concerns because, if Osie waived his right to a jury trial and if Pagan was called to testify in the penalty phase, Judge Powers might be compelled to recuse himself. Defense counsel responded that 15 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the defense did not anticipate waiving a jury and in any event did not plan to call Pagan as a witness. Judge Sage granted the motion to appoint Pagan. {¶ 62} Osie never asked that Judge Powers recuse himself, nor did he raise the issue of Judge Powers’s alleged bias before the chief justice pursuant to R.C. 2701.03, which establishes procedures for filing an affidavit of disqualification against a common pleas judge. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(C) provides: “The chief justice of the supreme court or any judge of that court designated by him shall pass upon the disqualification of any judge of the courts of appeals or courts of common pleas or division thereof.” This provision vests exclusive authority to pass on disqualification matters in the chief justice or her designee. See Beer v. Griffith, 54 Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442, 377 N.E.2d 775 (1978). {¶ 63} In Beer, the court of appeals voided a trial court’s judgment on the ground that the trial judge in that case should have recused himself. We reversed, holding: “Since only the Chief Justice or his designee may hear disqualification matters, the Court of Appeals was without authority to pass upon disqualification or to void the judgment of the trial court upon that basis.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 441. {¶ 64} Similarly, in State v. Moore, 93 Ohio St.3d 649, 650, 758 N.E.2d 1130 (2001), we held that an appellant who had failed to file an affidavit of disqualification could not complain on appeal that the judges on the court below were biased. Moore was an appeal to this court from the judgment of a court of appeals that denied an application to reopen an appeal under App.R. 26(B). The appellant argued in this court that the judges of the court of appeals should have recused themselves from ruling on his application. Citing Beer and Article IV, Section 5(C), we held: “Under R.C. 2501.13, when a party believes that a judge of the court of appeals is biased, the proper avenue for redress is filing an affidavit of 16 January Term, 2014 disqualification with this court.    Moore did not file such an affidavit, and therefore is foreclosed from bringing such a complaint.” Id. at 650. {¶ 65} Osie should have brought his bias claim before the chief justice via affidavit for disqualification under R.C. 2701.03. Having failed to do so, he is likewise “foreclosed from bringing such a complaint,” id., on appeal of his conviction.5 {¶ 66} In addition to being waived, Osie’s claim lacks merit. The alleged conflict is based on Osie’s belief that Judge Powers “ha[d] a pecuniary interest in not damaging his former law partner’s reputation.” Osie appears to be arguing that if Pagan was appointed and his performance damaged his reputation, the result might be a reduction in the income of his law firm that could endanger his ability to meet his financial obligations to Judge Powers. Because Judge Powers might suffer “financial loss if Pagan’s reputation was harmed,” he was “invested in Pagan’s long term success.” {¶ 67} Osie’s argument is speculative. Osie does not explain how Pagan’s reputation stood to be harmed by participating in this case. Nor does he explain how an interest in protecting Pagan’s reputation would give rise to a bias against the defense, given that Pagan was affiliated with the defense. {¶ 68} Osie cites Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927), but Tumey is in no way apposite here. Tumey holds that a criminal defendant is denied due process when subjected to trial before a judge with “a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him.” In Tumey, the mayor presiding over the village mayor’s court stood 5 In State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070, 937 N.E.2d 97, we recently overturned an aggravated-murder conviction on appeal, partly on the ground of judicial bias against defense counsel. Dean is distinguishable, however. In Dean, the bias claim was “inextricably entwined” with the defendant’s claim that the trial court had improperly denied his request to represent himself. Dean at ¶ 48. Thus, we could not fully consider the latter claim without considering the bias claim. See id. at ¶ 66-75. Here, Osie’s allegation of bias is not “entwined” with his other claims. 17 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO to receive $12 in “costs” if—and only if—the defendant was convicted. But in this case, Judge Powers’s relationship with Pagan gave him no “direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest,” Tumey, either in convicting Osie or in subjecting him to the death penalty. {¶ 69} Finally, Osie argues that “[a]greeing not to call Pagan before a mitigation investigation had been undertaken violated Osie’s right to effective assistance of counsel.” However, Osie fails to outline any reasoning by which we could reach such a conclusion. {¶ 70} To demonstrate ineffective assistance, Osie would have to show both that trial counsel’s failure to call Pagan as a witness was deficient performance and that it prejudiced him. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). He does not attempt to make either showing here. Defense counsel may have had valid strategic reasons for not wanting Judge Powers to recuse himself. Moreover, the defense could present whatever witnesses and evidence Pagan’s investigation might uncover without having to call Pagan to testify. Osie identifies nothing in the record to show why the defense needed Pagan to testify or how he might have testified. Consequently, Osie fails to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice. {¶ 71} Osie’s 17th proposition of law is overruled.