Opinion ID: 2058058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bagley v. Raymond School Department

Text: [¶ 21] In Bagley, after reviewing First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence involving public funding of religious schools, we determined that section 2951(2) did not violate those constitutional provisions. 1999 ME 60, ¶ 72, 728 A.2d at 147. We stated that the issue was not whether a particular program in which state funds are used to benefit religious schools violates the constitution, but whether a tuition program that specifically excludes religious schools does so. Id. ¶ 11, 728 A.2d at 132 (emphasis added). The inquiry is the same in the current challenge to section 2951(2). [¶ 22] We undertook our analysis in Bagley in three parts, examining separately whether section 2951(2) violates the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.
[¶ 23] The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . . U.S. CONST. amend. I. [8] Upon a challenge to government action on Free Exercise grounds, the inquiry is whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 16, 728 A.2d at 133 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989)). [¶ 24] The party challenging a statute on free exercise grounds must initially demonstrate that: (1) the activity burdened by the regulation is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; and (2) the challenged regulation restrains the free exercise of that religious belief. Blount v. Dep't of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Me.1988). If the challenger meets that initial burden, the burden shifts, and the State can prevail only by proving that (1) the challenged regulation is motivated by a compelling state interest, and (2) no less restrictive means can adequately achieve that compelling state interest. Id. [¶ 25] The parents in Bagley contended that section 2591(2) violates the Free Exercise Clause by burdening their fundamental right to send their children to religious schools. Because it is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs, Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (quoting Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136), we assumed arguendo that the parents' desire to send their children to religious schools was motivated by a sincerely held religious belief. 1999 ME 60, ¶ 18, 728 A.2d at 134. We determined, however, that no substantial burden had been placed on activity motivated by religious belief, because a statute that merely operates to make the practice of an individual's religious beliefs more expensive does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id. (citing Goodall v. Stafford County Sch. Bd., 60 F.3d 168, 171 (4th Cir.1995)). We further observed that the parents were no more impaired in their efforts to seek a religious education for their [children] than are parents of children in school districts that provide only a free nonreligious education in public schools. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 18, 728 A.2d at 135.
[¶ 26] The Establishment Clause provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. It prevents a state from enacting laws that have the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), or from creating an excessive entanglement between government and religion, [9] Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971). While the Free Exercise Clause addresses the negative by prohibiting the government from interfering with religious practice, the Establishment Clause addresses the affirmative by prohibiting the government from sponsoring or establishing a religion. [10] Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 21, 728 A.2d at 135. [¶ 27] We determined in Bagley that there is no support for the proposition that the Establishment Clause prevents a state from refusing to fund religious schools. Id. ¶ 22, 728 A.2d at 135-36. We reasoned: Distilled to its essence, the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from supporting or advancing religion and from forcing religion, even in subtle ways, on those who choose not to accept it. It has no role in requiring government assistance to make the practice of religion more available or easier. It simply does not speak to governmental actions that fail to support religion. Id. (footnote omitted). Accordingly, we determined that the prohibition against approving religious schools to receive public tuition funds did not violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
[¶ 28] The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any state from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, and requires, generally, that persons similarly situated be treated alike. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Article 1, section 6-A of the Maine Constitution includes similar requirements. [11] [¶ 29] If government action that is challenged on equal protection grounds infringes on a fundamental constitutional right, or involves an inherently suspect classification such as race, it is subject to analysis under the strict scrutiny standard. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ., 659 A.2d 854, 857 (Me.1995). Strict scrutiny requires that the challenged action be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. See Butler v. Supreme Judicial Court, 611 A.2d 987, 992 (Me.1992). If the government action does not implicate either a fundamental right or a suspect class, different treatment accorded to similarly situated persons need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1, 659 A.2d at 857. When a statute is reviewed under the rational basis standard, it bears a strong presumption of validity. See id. Under the rational basis standard, the burden is on the party challenging the government action to demonstrate that there exists no fairly conceivable set of facts that could ground a rational relationship between the challenged classification and the government's legitimate goals. Eulitt, 386 F.3d at 356. [¶ 30] In Bagley, we did not address which level of scrutiny should be applied in analyzing whether section 2951(2) violated the Equal Protection Clause. Because the State proffered only one justification for the statute  compliance with the Establishment Clause  we determined that the Establishment Clause analysis would define the scope of our Equal Protection inquiry. Bagley, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 32, 728 A.2d at 138. We reasoned as follows: If the exclusion of religious schools is not required by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, it must be struck down because the State offers no other reason for its existence. If the exclusion is required in order to comply with the Establishment Clause, the State will have presented a compelling justification for the disparate treatment of religious schools, and the parents' Equal Protection claim will fail. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271... (1981) (agreeing that compliance with constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling.). Id. ¶ 33, 728 A.2d at 138. [¶ 31] Even though the Supreme Court had begun to relax the strict prohibition against channeling public funds, at least indirectly, to religious schools, [12] we concluded that the then-current Establishment Clause jurisprudence required Maine to continue to exclude religious schools from approval for state paid tuition. Id. ¶¶ 60-61, 728 A.2d at 144-45. We therefore upheld section 2951(2) on equal protection grounds. Id. [¶ 32] Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit, presented with a similar constitutional challenge to section 2951(2), came to substantially the same conclusions that we had reached in Bagley. Strout, 178 F.3d at 66.