Opinion ID: 39245
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Upward Departures.--

Text: information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted. 18 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(4) provides: (4) Determination of Extent of Upward Departure.-- (A) In General.--Except as provided in subdivision (B), the court shall determine the extent of a departure under this subsection by using, as a reference, the criminal history category applicable to defendants whose criminal history or likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of the defendant’s. -37- applicable to defendants whose likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of the defendant’s.” The court concluded that, for the reasons already discussed, Simkanin’s likelihood to recidivate most closely resembles that of defendants whose criminal history category is VI. This produced a total offense level of Twenty-Two and a criminal history category of VI, resulting in a sentencing range of 84-105 months. The district court then sentenced at the bottom of that range and imposed an eighty-four month sentence. Simkanin argues that the district court erred in imposing an upward departure on the grounds articulated at the sentencing hearing because: (1) it did not include a written statement of reasons in the judgment as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2);19 (2) the district court impermissibly based its departure on grounds involving Simkanin’s associations and beliefs, in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) the district court’s belief that Simkanin posed a danger of recidivism was not supported by evidence. 19 Section 3553(c) provides: (c) Statement of reasons for imposing a sentence.--The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence--
described in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment . . . . -38- We recently discussed the appropriate standard of review to employ when reviewing a district court’s decision to depart upwardly from the sentencing range established by the Guidelines. See United States v. Smith, --- F.3d ----, 2005 WL 1663784, -6 (5th Cir. July 18, 2005). There, we explained that the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), directed us to return essentially to the abuse-ofdiscretion standard employed prior to 2003: Prior to 2003, our review of departure decisions was for abuse of discretion, pursuant to § 3742(e). In April 2003, Congress amended § 3742(e), altering our standard of review with respect to the departure decision to de novo. Under this scheme, while the decision to depart was reviewed de novo, the degree of departure was still reviewed for abuse of discretion. Then, in January 2005, the Supreme Court in Booker excised § 3742(e), leaving the appellate courts to review sentences for reasonableness. The Court explained that it was essentially returning to the standard of review provided by the pre-2003 text, which directs us to determine whether the sentence is unreasonable with regard to § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and its factors guide us in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable. Smith, 2005 WL 1663784 at  (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted);20 see also id. at  n.24; United States v. 20 As the Smith court noted, 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) states: (a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence.--The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-- (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, -39- Harris, 293 F.3d 863, 871 (5th Cir. 2002).21 Applying this standard, we conclude that Simkanin is not entitled to resentencing. to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

established for ... the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines ...; (5) any pertinent [sentencing guidelines] policy statement ... [;] (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 21 In Harris, 293 F.3d at 871, the court stated: We review a district court’s departure from the range established by the Guidelines for abuse of discretion. The district court’s decision is accorded substantial deference because it is a fact intensive assessment and the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. However, the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines is a question of law, reviewed de novo; a district court abuses its discretion by definition when it makes an error of law. Determining whether a factor is permissible to take into account when considering a departure is one of these questions of law. A district court abuses its discretion if it departs on the basis of legally unacceptable reasons or if the degree of the departure is unreasonable. (internal citations omitted). -40- First, Simkanin argues that the district court did not include its written statement of reasons in its judgment of conviction and sentence as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). We disagree. The judgment clearly states that the Statement of Reasons and personal information about the defendant are set forth in an attachment to the judgment. Although Simkanin argued in his principal brief that the district court never drafted a written statement of reasons, he concedes in his reply brief that the court did so and that the written statement is virtually identical to the oral reasons given by the district court at sentencing. He also concedes that, after he filed his initial brief, he received a copy of the written statement, which was in the sealed part of the appellate record, as is the common practice in this circuit, and was available to defense counsel. Thus, Simkanin’s argument that the district court did not author and include in the record a written statement of reasons is wrong. Furthermore, we find no merit in Simkanin’s unsupported argument in his supplemental brief that he is entitled to resentencing simply because the written reasons were attached to the judgment and referenced after the judge’s signature, as opposed to appearing before the judge’s signature. Second, Simkanin argues that the district court erred because it upwardly departed on an impermissible basis--namely, because of his associations and beliefs. Given the particular facts of this case, however, his argument fails. In Dawson v. -41- Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992), the Supreme Court held that it was constitutional error to admit a stipulation of the defendant’s membership in a racist prison gang, The Aryan Brotherhood, as an aggravating factor for consideration in sentencing. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 164-67. The Court reasoned that the defendant’s membership had no relevance whatsoever to the crime in question, which was not racially motivated or otherwise connected to the beliefs of the gang, and it noted that the prosecution had introduced (via a stipulation) evidence establishing only that defendant was a member and that the gang held white supremacist views, not any evidence showing the gang’s violent and unlawful tendencies. Id. The Court explicitly recognized, however, that consideration of a defendant’s beliefs and associations might be appropriate in some instances in making sentencing decisions about the likelihood that the defendant will engage in future criminal activity. Id. at 165-66. The Court stated that “the Constitution does not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one’s beliefs and associations at sentencing simply because those beliefs and associations are protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 165. Moreover, the Court explained that “[i]n many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society[;] [a] defendant’s membership in an organization that endorses the killing of any identifiable group, for example, might be relevant to a jury’s inquiry into whether -42- the defendant will be dangerous in the future.” Id. at 166. Simkanin’s beliefs and associations may be considered if they were “sufficiently related to the issues at sentencing.” Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 183-85 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, Simkanin’s sentence was not increased merely because of his abstract beliefs or associations. Rather, Simkanin’s specific beliefs that the tax laws are invalid and do not require him to withhold taxes or file returns (and his association with an organization that endorses the view that free persons are not required to pay income taxes on their wages) are directly related to the crimes in question and demonstrate a likelihood of recidivism.22 Thus, the district court did not constitutionally err in considering these factors. See id. at 183-85; see also Fuller v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 491, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the defendant’s membership in a racist gang was properly considered in sentencing because it went to future dangerousness in light of the evidence showing the gang’s violent 22 This court reached a similar conclusion in an unpublished opinion, United States v. Tampico, 297 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (unpublished), a child pornography case in which the court upheld an upward departure that was based in part on the defendant’s membership in the North American Man Boy Love Association, which advocates sexual relationships between men and underage boys. The court concluded that the defendant’s membership in the organization was relevant to sentencing because it may indicate the increased likelihood of recidivism. Tampico, 297 F.3d at 402-03. As Simkanin correctly points out, Tampico is not binding precedent. Nonetheless, its reasoning is persuasive in light of Dawson and Boyle. -43- tendencies).23 Simkanin also briefly argues that the district court’s finding that he held “contempt and disrespect for the law” was not a proper basis for upward departure. Relying solely on United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840, 847-48 (5th Cir. 2004), he claims that the appropriate action for the district court to take in response to such contempt is the denial of a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. However, Andrews involved a district court’s upward departure expressly based in part on the defendant’s failure to take responsibility (i.e., his lack of paid restitution, attempts to blame others for his behavior, and insincerity in his proffered words of remorse). The district court in the present case did not base its upward departure on the defendant’s lack of acceptance of responsibility, but rather on the likelihood that he would 23 The other Supreme Court cases cited by Simkanin on the constitutional question are inapposite. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 485 (1993) (upholding a statute that increases punishment for crimes committed with a racially motivated intent); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding that the First Amendment right to petition is no shield against liability for libel); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.705 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a statute prohibiting threats against the President did not constitutionally apply to criminalize the defendant’s conditional and hyperbolic political comment); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98, 299-300 (1961) (addressing a conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act and finding evidence insufficient to show a present advocacy of overthrow); R.A.V. v. Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds a law criminalizing conduct such as placing a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows to arouse anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, religion, etc.). -44- recidivate. Andrews, therefore, is inapposite.24 At oral argument, defense counsel contended that the district court erred because it departed upwardly on the basis of Simkanin’s firmly held beliefs and that this reasoning contradicted the government’s position, and the jury’s finding, that Simkanin did not hold good-faith belief that he was not obligated to file income returns or withhold taxes from the paychecks of Arrow’s employees. However, as the government correctly responded, the district court’s decision to depart upwardly did not contradict the jury’s finding that Simkanin did not have a valid good-faith defense under Cheek. As discussed above, Simkanin’s avowed position was that he would not comply with the tax laws, and the reason for his position was that the tax laws were both inapplicable to him and invalid for a number of reasons beyond the boundaries of a legitimate good-faith defense under Cheek. At sentencing, Simkanin made clear to the district court that he continued to hold these beliefs when he stated that he still “firmly believed” that the Bible, the Constitution, and the Declaration of Independence all agree that 24 Simkanin also challenges the district court’s ability to predict the likelihood of recidivism, stating that even trained scientists cannot accurately make such predictions. The Guidelines, however, clearly permit a district court to depart upwardly if it believes that reliable information suggests that the defendant’s likelihood to recidivate is not adequately represented by the range established. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1). Obviously, nothing in the Guidelines or our case law suggests that the district court must be able to predict recidivism with scientific certainty. -45- “the wages of a laborer are withheld through fraud.” Thus, the district court was convinced that Simkanin’s likelihood to recidivate was not adequately reflected by the Guidelines range, and it did not abuse its discretion in upwardly departing from that range. Finally, Simkanin contends that the extent of the upward departure was unreasonable. The district court upwardly departed from a range of forty-one to fifty-one months imprisonment to impose a sentence of eighty-four months. Simkanin argues that the district court failed to articulate the reasons “why a sentence commensurate with a bypassed criminal history category was not selected.” United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Simkanin is correct that the district court did not specifically state why it rejected each of the preceding criminal history categories. However, as the government correctly notes, this court does “not require the district court to go through a ‘ritualistic exercise’ where . . . it is evident from the stated grounds for departure why the bypassed criminal history categories were inadequate.” United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quoting Lambert, 984 F.2d at 663). Simkanin correctly notes that it was clearer in Ashburn why the district court had decided that defendant’s criminal history category did not adequately reflect his prior history--the district court in Ashburn noted that the defendant had committed a series of robberies for which -46- he was never convicted. Id. However, the district court in the present case explained that it was convinced that Simkanin’s membership in a group with radical views rejecting the laws of the United States and his professed beliefs that he is not required to abide by the tax laws would lead him to commit other tax-related crimes. Moreover, the mere fact that the upward departure nearly doubled the Guidelines range does not render it unreasonable. See United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding departure from Guidelines range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months to a sentence of 240 months); Ashburn, 38 F.3d at 809 (upholding departure from range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months to sentence of 180 months). Therefore, we are persuaded, guided by the factors in § 3553(a), that the sentence imposed was reasonable for the reasons given by the district court.