Opinion ID: 749590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comment on Assertion of Right to Counsel

Text: 23 Cruz argues that during closing and rebuttal arguments the prosecutor suggested that guilt could be inferred from Cruz's assertion of his right to counsel. Cruz contends that the import of the prosecutor's statements in summation was that Cruz, who, when implicated, asserted his Sixth Amendment right to counsel instead of cooperating with the police, was apparently guilty of the crimes for which he was suspected charged, and ultimately tried. Cruz focuses on several statements made by the prosecution, the most suggestive of which is the following: 24 Even though there's no evidence of that, even though the evidence is uncontroverted, they want you to believe that somebody else did the shooting and Billy was sitting there being questioned by the police knowing that someone else had fired that weapon and yet didn't say a word. That he would sit here and just let them charge him with aggravated murder knowing that someone else did the shooting. He would have been so mad, he would have been jumping around that room, ready to tell the police exactly who it was. He would have been so ticked-off and so mad that those guys were framing him. And yet what did he do? He asked for his father or a lawyer. (RT Vol. XXVI, 6/14/95: 129. ER 35) 25 Although Cruz made no objection following any of the prosecutor's statements, we have held that a prosecutor's improper comment on a defendant's hiring of an attorney is an error of constitutional magnitude. Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 193, 1994 (9th Cir.1983). It follows that we must review under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 26 Cruz's defense at trial was that Conde, Dizon, Siquig, and Tapiceria, all members of the 3E2 gang which Cruz was not, conspired to implicate him as the shooter and that either Conde or Siquig had been the actual shooter. To combat these theories, the prosecutor pointed out to the jury that Cruz's statements and failure to cooperate during the interrogation were inconsistent with the defense's theories at trial The complained of statements, when taken in context, reflect the prosecutor's intent to have the jury question the validity of the defense theories. Here, the prosecution did not argue that the hiring of defense counsel was in some way probative of guilt. A review of the record does not support the contention that the prosecutor attacked Cruz's exercise of his constitutional right to counsel. Even under the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, reversal is not warranted in the circumstances of this case.