Opinion ID: 904139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: denial of jmol motion

Text: May next contends that the district court erred in denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law. She argues that, inasmuch as Wilson allegedly directed a racial slur toward her and “falsified” her drug test results, there was 4 Even were we to agree with May that this is an exceptional case subject to the rule announced in Becker, because we agree with the district court that genuine issues of material fact precluded partial summary judgment in May’s favor, reversal still would not be warranted. May’s contention is that MDOC’s drug testing procedures violated Mississippi law. Even if we accept the validity of this assertion, May overlooks that the inconclusive drug test was only part of MDOC’s rationale for not hiring her. MDOC also asserted before trial that May was not hired because she never completed the interview and screening process, including the interview, and the writing, math, and physical agility tests. See Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that a defendant rebuts a presumption of discrimination “by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions”). An applicant’s failure to complete an application process may provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for a defendant’s employment decisions. See Furgess v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 3:05-1206, 2006 WL 3192542, at  (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2006) (unpublished); Hudgens v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., No. W-93-CA-123, 1994 WL 485827, at  (W.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 1994) (unpublished). 7 Case: 12-60868 Document: 00512282270 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/20/2013 No. 12-60868 “undisputed evidence” of racial discrimination. She also claims that MDOC did not show that May would have been denied employment absent this alleged discriminatory animus. In view of these arguments, May asserts that she was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2011). “[O]ur standard of review with respect to a jury verdict is,” however, “especially deferential.” Brown v. Bryan Cnty., Okla., 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000). “The jury verdict must be upheld unless ‘a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.’” Shepherd v. Dall. Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 456 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting McBeth v. Carpenter, 565 F.3d 171, 176 (5th Cir. 2009)). “We consider all of the evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Brown, 219 F.3d at 456.
“When a full trial on the merits has been conducted, as in this case, our focus is on whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of no race . . . discrimination—not on the plaintiff’s prima facie case or the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Stover v. Hattiesburg Pub. Sch. Dist., 549 F.3d 985, 993 (5th Cir. 2008). Here, the record reveals that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict that MDOC did not decline to hire May on the basis of her race. Although May asserts that Wilson “falsified” her drug test as a result of racial animus he held toward her, McDonald testified that Wilson had not seen May when he reviewed May’s results and concluded that she tested positive for cocaine. Indeed, McDonald had to point May out to Wilson, as there were ten other applicants, including two white females, in the screening room. Moreover, only May testified to hearing Wilson “yell” a racial slur at her, despite 8 Case: 12-60868 Document: 00512282270 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/20/2013 No. 12-60868 the presence of other applicants and MDOC personnel in the room. Finally, May left the interview and screening facility on the day of the incident without telling any of the numerous MDOC officers with whom she interacted about the content of Wilson’s alleged statements. Even more, it is undisputed that May never completed the entirety of the interview and screening process. As noted, Weathers testified that it was this failure that led to the withdrawal of May’s conditional employment offer. Weathers’s testimony was substantiated by the letter she sent on October 23, 2007, informing May that her employment offer had been withdrawn due to her “incompletion of the Interview and Screening (I/S) process.” Similarly, MDOC’s response to May’s EEOC charge explained that May was not hired because her drug test was “faulty” and “incomplete,” and she did not complete the interview process. Thus, there was ample evidence for the jury to find that race played no role in MDOC’s decision not to hire May. That the jury declined to conclude otherwise does not constitute judicial error. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of May’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.