Opinion ID: 2070962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Stevenson's Statement Properly Admitted Evidence

Text: Manley also contends that a pretrial statement by Stevenson should not have been admissible into evidence at trial. The Superior Court permitted Officer Danese to testify that when Stevenson was apprehended and placed in a police vehicle, Stevenson said: I don't know why you were chasing me from my car. According to Manley, because Stevenson did not testify at trial, the admission into evidence of Stevenson's brief pretrial statement to police violated the right of confrontation guaranteed to Manley by the United States Constitution. Manley argues: Absent this statement, there is no further evidence linking Manley to Stevenson's car on the morning of his arrest, save fingerprints which can easily be explained away due to the prior relationship of the defendants and a jacket which offers at best a tenuous connection between Manley and Stevenson's car. There is no eye witness who can positively place Manley in Stevenson's car at the scene of the murder or at the time of the arrest. Manley is seen, however, running along side of Stevenson briefly, before Manley changes direction, running away from Stevenson. Stevenson's statement then lead the jury to believe that the two defendant's fled from the car together. Hence, the jury must have considered Stevenson's statement against Manley. This conclusion is inescapable. The problem is compounded by the absence of any limiting instruction. The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when a nontestifying co-defendant's confession, incriminating the defendant, is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the co-defendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). For Bruton to apply, however, a co-defendant's statement must be clearly inculpatory standing alone. United States v. Arias, 11th Cir., 984 F.2d 1139, 1142 (1993); Vincent v. Parke, 6th Cir., 942 F.2d 989, 991 (1991). A co-defendant's statement is admissible, however, where the statement is not incriminating on its face but becomes so only when linked to other evidence introduced later at trial. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1707-08, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). Stevenson's statement was not a confession. Stevenson's statement, standing alone, also does not implicate Manley. Stevenson's statement is incriminating as to Manley only when it is linked to other evidence in the State's case. Accordingly, the admission of Stevenson's statement as evidence did not violate Manley's rights under the Confrontation clause of the United States Constitution. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). Alternatively, Manley argues that if Stevenson's statement was admissible as evidence, the Superior Court should have given a limiting instruction. The record reflects that Manley's defense counsel objected to Stevenson's statement on hearsay grounds but did not request a limiting instruction. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the Superior Court did carefully instruct the jury in an effort to eliminate any potential spill-over effect in the evidence resulting from the joint trial of Stevenson and Manley. See Skinner v. State, Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1108, 1120 (1990) (citing Lampkins v. State, Del. Supr., 465 A.2d 785, 795 (1983)). [16] The Superior Court's final instructions specifically directed the jury to segregate and consider the evidence separately as to each defendant. See Robertson v. State, Del.Supr., 630 A.2d 1084, 1094 (1993). See also Skinner, 575 A.2d at 1120 (citing Lampkins v. State, 465 A.2d at 795 and United States v. Cresta, 1st Cir., 825 F.2d 538, 554-55 (1987)). Thus, Manley's alternative argument is not supported by the record.