Opinion ID: 716743
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Theories of Liability Only Confuse the Issue

Text: 38 In the process of stating the above described deficient hiring and failure-to-supervise claims, Doe indiscriminately jumbles into the complaint the language and elements of two other § 1983 theories of liability: (1) the state-created danger doctrine and (2) the DeShaney 35 special-relationship doctrine. As both of these doctrines apply only when a third-party inflicts the harm, both of these theories are legal dead ends here. 39
40 Regarding the state-created danger theory, other circuits have held that when a state actor knowingly places a person in danger, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution renders such state actor accountable for the foreseeable injuries that result from his conduct, whether or not the victim was in formal custody. 36 In attempting to apply this doctrine to the instant case, we encounter two flaws: First, although at least once in the past we assumed arguendo that such a claim is recognized in this circuit, we have yet to recognize this theory of liability squarely. 37 Second, Jane's case does not arise under one of the factual situations in which other circuits have applied (and we have assumed) this doctrine. Generally, the state-created danger doctrine applies only when the state actor creates the dangerous situation in which a third-party causes the harm. 38 In the instant case the custodian who caused the harm was himself a state actor, not a third party, so even assuming arguendo that the state-created danger theory were recognized in this circuit, Doe's effort to employ the state-created danger doctrine would fail. 41
42 In like manner, a special-relationship claim under DeShaney 39 is applicable only to harm inflicted by third parties. In Leffall, we stated that [t]he special relationship doctrine is properly invoked in cases involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it is not applicable when it is the conduct of a state actor that has allegedly infringed on a person's constitutional rights. 40 Again, the Custodian was a state actor; consequently, the special relationship doctrine is unavailable to Doe.