Opinion ID: 2309703
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Granting a Partial Mistrial

Text: My initial difference with the majority stems from what I regard as its erroneous conclusion that the mistrial was improvidently granted. The majority seems to imply that simply because testimony is relevant and probative, it must be admitted into evidence. Evidence Rule 4, however, permits a trial judge to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value: The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will ... create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. This rule vests discretion in the trial judge for making such determinations. McCormick, Evidence, § 185 at 439-440 (1971). [3] I do not believe that the trial judge here abused his discretion in this regard. Dempsey's testimony as to defendant's post-arrest comment was both inflammatory in its content and damaging in its implications. Moreover, it was completely unrelated to the substantive offenses with which defendant was charged and thus had only limited bearing on defendant's guilt. Contrary to the cases cited by the majority (ante at 414-415), this case does not involve a violent crime. Nor does it contain testimony of threats by a defendant against a specific witness who is expected to testify against him. As a result, the instant matter is clearly distinguishable from those cases which hold that damaging testimony similar to that of Agent Dempsey is admissible to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt. In the context of the trial, it cannot be said that the trial judge erroneously concluded that the prejudicial effect of Dempsey's testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. However, while I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a mistrial on the charge of possession with intent to distribute, I find no rational basis for its failure to similarly grant a mistrial as to the remaining count. By declaring a mistrial in the first place, the court acknowledged that substantial prejudice might result from Dempsey's testimony. If it is conceded that this testimony could have compromised the jury's ability to reach a fair and dispassionate verdict as to one count, it seems illogical to argue that an intimately related charge, grounded upon the same evidence, would somehow remain immune from such prejudice. This is particularly so where the allegedly prejudicial testimony is equally unrelated to either of the criminal charges. The judge's suggestion that a remark by defense counsel which conceded that Rechtschaffer did have possession of marijuana, somehow insulates the possessory offense from the damaging effects of the agent's testimony is untenable. A comment made by counsel during the course of his opening statement must never be treated as a plea of guilty. Despite limiting instructions to this effect, it is highly unlikely that a jury untrained in the law would be able to differentiate between evidence offered for different purposes and on different charges in the course of the same trial. State v. Boone, 66 N.J. 38, 48 (1974); State v. Miller, 67 N.J. 229, 240 (1975) (Pashman, J., dissenting). The jury will, and in this case probably did, consider the prejudicial and inflammatory testimony in reaching its decision. In this respect, I find the impact of the contested testimony to be similar to the harmful rubbing off effect which I described in my dissent in State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 121, 358 A. 2d 163, 175 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting). There, I criticized the effect of impermissible cross-examination of a testifying defendant on his non-testifying accomplice. In the instant case, I find no real distinction between the prejudicial effect of the agent's testimony on jury deliberations on one possession charge and the identical effect which it might have on consideration of the other jointly-tried possession charge. Consequently, once the trial court had determined that a mistrial was warranted, it should have declared a mistrial as to both counts, not one. I, therefore, find that the conviction resulting from the first trial on the charge of simple possession was both tainted and unduly prejudicial, and I would therefore set it aside. [4] In making these observations, I am of course cognizant that the power to declare a mistrial resides in the sound discretion of the trial judge. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed. 2d 425 (1973); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed. 2d 543 (1971); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed. 2d 901 (1961); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 73 S.Ct. 349, 97 L.Ed. 456 (1953); State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 383 (1969); State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 170 (1966) cert. den. 386 U.S. 991, 87 S.Ct. 1305, 18 L.Ed. 2d 335 (1967); State v. O'Leary, 25 N.J. 104, 116 (1957); State v. Witte, 13 N.J. 598, 611 (1953). This power should be reluctantly invoked and exercised, State v. Locklear, 16 N.J. 232, 239 (1954); State v. Farmer, supra, 48 N.J. at 171; but, when necessary, it should be employed in a manner consistent with a standard, whose classic definition is that of Justice Story in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824): We think, that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. [22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 579, 6 L.Ed. at 165] While this standard has been susceptible to a variety of restatements on both the federal and state levels, Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949) (`imperious' or `urgent necessity'); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed. 2d 100 (1963) (imperious necessity); State v. Locklear, supra (absolute or an overriding necessity), courts which have resorted to this procedural device have endeavored to protect the same basic interest. The role of the trial court in protecting this interest was outlined by this Court in State v. Farmer, supra : A wide range of discretion is recognized in the trial judge, who has his finger on the pulse of the proceedings. If in his judgment emergent conditions come into being which persuade him that the ends of justice for the defendant and the State cannot be achieved without aborting the trial, neither the Federal nor the State Constitution proscribes such an order. [48 N.J. at 171] Thus, appellate courts have eschewed attempts to delineate or utilize mechanistic formulae by which to determine the circumstances which would warrant the declaration of a mistrial. Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 463, 93 S.Ct. at 1070, 35 L.Ed. 2d at 430. [5] This represents a judicial effort to accord sufficient leeway to the judgment of the trial court, whose assessment of the attendant circumstances at trial may be most sensitive to defendant's interests. Within the context of the instant case, where the trial judge had already recognized the danger of undue prejudice with regard to one of the charges and where the potential for prejudice would clearly rub off on a second charge, the failure of the judge to declare a mistrial as to both offenses was clearly error. Accordingly, I would set aside the conviction for simple possession and dismiss this charge with prejudice.