Opinion ID: 2551237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Recall Charges

Text: ¶ 11 Assuming the truth of facts alleged in charges one through six, the charges themselves allege no conduct directly on the part of Secretary Reed. Instead, those charges relate entirely to actions by King County elections officials. The appellants merely argue Secretary Reed should have been aware of such conduct after the fact. ¶ 12 Charges in a recall action must be both factually and legally sufficient. In re Recall of Lee, 122 Wash.2d 613, 616, 859 P.2d 1244 (1993). As to factual sufficiency, the court must inquire into whether the charges state, in detail, the acts complained of, as well as whether they demonstrate that the petitioner knows of identifiable facts that support the charge. Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d at 765, 10 P.3d 1034. Factual sufficiency is determined from the face of the statement of charges, In re Recall of Carey, 132 Wash.2d 525, 527, 939 P.2d 1221 (1997), but courts may consider supporting documentation to determine whether the charges are factually sufficient. West, 155 Wash.2d at 663, 121 P.3d at 1193. ¶ 13 The recall statutes do not require the petitioner to have firsthand knowledge, but they do require the petitioner have some form of knowledge more than simply a belief that the charges are true. In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wash.2d 366, 373, 20 P.3d 930 (2001); Lee, 122 Wash.2d at 617, 859 P.2d 1244. Appellants' materials explaining the authorities upon which the charges relyconsisting of newspaper accounts and press releasesare not per se insufficient to show some form of knowledge of the facts underlying the charges. West, 155 Wash.2d at 663, 121 P.3d at 1194. ¶ 14 However, this court has noted that there is no authority for the proposition that a public official may be recalled for the act of a subordinate done without the official's knowledge or direction. In re Recall of Morrisette, 110 Wash.2d 933, 936, 756 P.2d 1318 (1988). This conclusion reflects an underlying premise that an official cannot be held responsible for conduct beyond his knowledge or ability to direct. ¶ 15 In light of the foregoing case, appellants' contention here is unsupportable. In King County, the elected county executive appoints the county election officer. King County Charter 320.10 (election of county executive), 920.20.40 (establishment of election office). There is no authority for the proposition that a public official may be recalled for the past conduct of a wholly separate governmental agency. A conclusion to the contrary would run counter to the reasoning of this court in Morrisette, 110 Wash.2d 933, 756 P.2d 1318.
¶ 16 Charge seven alleges that Secretary Reed accepted final election returns from several counties even though they lacked material required by regulations. As noted above, charges in a recall action must be both factually and legally sufficient. Lee, 122 Wash.2d at 616, 859 P.2d 1244. Legal sufficiency requires the petitioner to allege a prima facie case of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office, without justification. In re Recall of Feetham, 149 Wash.2d 860, 865, 72 P.3d 741 (2003). [2] Further, under the legally sufficiency requirement an elected official cannot be recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion granted him or her by law. Kast, 144 Wash.2d at 815, 31 P.3d 677; Chandler, 103 Wash.2d at 274, 693 P.2d 71. ¶ 17 Here, although appellants alleged that Secretary Reed wrongly accepted final election returns from counties without required materials before the trial court, they do not repeat those allegations on appeal and appear to have abandoned them. See Appellants' Br. at 7. Nonetheless, appellants' petition contends that Secretary Reed failed to receive written narratives from any Washington county reconciling election errors prior to his certification of the governor's election. Id. Appellants quote a public records request citing WAC 434-262-080 through -100 but otherwise offer no further specific factual arguments or any legal arguments in furtherance of this allegation. Id. The cited administrative rules involve errors identified by a canvassing board in reviewing election results submitted to it by the auditor for certification within the context of a particular count. Those rules do not involve discrepancies between an earlier count and a recount. Because appellants do not provide any reason why written narratives were required for inclusion in materials certified to the secretary of state, charge seven is legally insufficient.
¶ 18 Charge eight relies upon a statute that grants the secretary of state administrative rule making authority (former RCW 29A.04.610 (2004)), [3] asserting that Secretary Reed failed to perform many of the duties detailed therein. CP at 14. [4] The charge is ambiguous in that it could be read as either asserting Secretary Reed had a duty to perform certain acts but failed to perform that duty or that Secretary Reed should have adopted appropriate administrative rules but did not. ¶ 19 Former RCW 29A.04.610 conferred rule making authority upon the secretary of state to make reasonable election rules to effectuate election laws and facilitate their operation. Appellants fail to provide any legal analysis supporting any failure of Secretary Reed to act in accordance with the statute. Appellants offer no reason why the allegations contained in the charge show violations of a legal duty. Accordingly, charge eight is legally insufficient.
¶ 20 Charge nine asserts that Secretary Reed failed to withhold certification of the manual recount of votes in the governor's election. ¶ 21 State law requires that the canvassing boards of each county certify the results of the votes cast in their respective counties. RCW 29A.60.190. The county canvassing boards are charged by law with the duty to verify the results from the precincts and the absentee ballots. RCW 29A.60.200. By contrast, the secretary of state's statutory duties are limited to compiling county election returns on a statewide basis. RCW 29A.60.250. See also WAC 434-262-100. ¶ 22 More fundamentally, the state constitution imposes upon the secretary of state a ministerial duty to certify the returns as submitted by the counties. Thus, the secretary of state has a constitutional duty to deliver the counties' respective returns to the speaker of the house. In light of the constitution's mandatory provisions, appellants' charge nine would require Secretary Reed to disregard a constitutional duty. Thus, charge nine is legally insufficient.