Opinion ID: 118407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Eleventh Amendment provides:

Text: The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. Although by its terms the Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 72-73 (2000); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 669-670 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U. S. 44, 54 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 15 (1890). The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court. See Kimel, supra, at 73. We have recognized, however, that Congress may abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both unequivocally intends to do so and act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. 528 U. S., at 73. The first of these requirements is not in dispute here. See 42 U. S. C. § 12202 (A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter). The question, then, is whether Congress acted within its constitutional authority by subjecting the States to suits in federal court for money damages under the ADA. Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I. See Kimel, supra, at 79 (Under our firmly established precedent then, if the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967] rests solely on Congress' Article I commerce power, the private petitioners in today's cases cannot maintain their suits against their state employers); Seminole Tribe, supra, at 72-73 (The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction); College Savings Bank, supra, at 672; Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U. S. 627, 636 (1999); Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 730-733 (1999). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976), however, we held that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 456 (citation omitted). As a result, we concluded, Congress may subject nonconsenting States to suit in federal court when it does so pursuant to a valid exercise of its § 5 power. See ibid. Our cases have adhered to this proposition. See, e. g., Kimel, supra, at 80. Accordingly, the ADA can apply to the States only to the extent that the statute is appropriate § 5 legislation. [3] Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce the substantive guarantees contained in § 1 by enacting appropriate legislation. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 536 (1997). Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, Congress' power `to enforce' the Amendment includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text. Kimel, supra, at 81; City of Boerne, supra, at 536. City of Boerne also confirmed, however, the long-settled principle that it is the responsibility of this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. 521 U. S., at 519-524. Accordingly, § 5 legislation reaching beyond the scope of § 1's actual guarantees must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Id., at 520.