Opinion ID: 1441366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Refusal of Trial Judge to Allow Appellant to Call Corporate Witnesses

Text: Understanding that the CPSC notices could not be offered into evidence, appellant attempted, at trial, to call two employees of the corporate parties as witnesses. One person was a corporate designee of the Robertshaw Company, an individual designated to receive legal process, and to act in other administrative matters. There was also an unsuccessful effort to call a witness employed by the Bradford White Corporation. Objection was sustained on the basis that the witnesses were not listed on the pretrial witness list and were a surprise to appellees, and that the questioning could only produce cumulative evidence. Appellant's counsel responded that although no written order had been issued, he understood that he would be permitted to call the witnesses. The judge did not agree. Thus, appellant asserts that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion to amend her pretrial statement, and in refusing her the right to call the witnesses. This argument has some validity. The general purpose underlying pretrial procedures is to identify legal issues in the event of a trial, and also to identify witnesses and other evidence likely to be offered as proof. In a departure from practices of earlier decades, courts utilize pretrial conferences following discovery to facilitate settlement or, at a minimum, to structure trial on genuine issues. There is a concerted effort to avoid or minimize what was formerly referred to as trial by ambush. Yet experience has shown that this process must be flexible. The pretrial order may be modified at the discretion of the Court for good cause shown and shall be modified if necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 16(g). Rule 16 does not contemplate or require that rigid adherence to the pretrial order must always be extracted. Glorious Food, supra, 648 A.2d at 949 (citing Taylor v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 407 A.2d 585, 592 (D.C.1979)). Whether to allow such a modification in a particular case poses nice questions of balancing `the need for doing justice on the merits between the parties ... against the need for maintaining orderly and efficient procedural arrangement.' Taylor, supra, 407 A.2d at 592 (citing Laguna v. American Export Isbrandtsen, Inc., 439 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir.1971)) (quoting 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 16.20 at 1136 (1978 ed.)). It is apparent, at least in hindsight, that an affirmative response to appellant's pretrial request to call the additional witnesses would have given appellant access to the witnesses, and because of the interval before trial, avoid any serious concern as to surprise. This fact notwithstanding, we observe that appellant's stated purpose in calling the witnesses was to question them concerning the CPSC notices, and to establish that appellees were aware that prolonged exposure to were above a temperature of 125 degrees could cause scalding. Given the earlier ruling by the court, appellant would have been precluded from asking any meaningful questions concerning the CPSC notices. As noted earlier, the parties stipulated that appellees were aware ... that exposure to unmixed tap water for a sufficient period of time at temperatures above 125 degrees would cause injury. Appellant also read portions of depositions from corporate witnesses to the jury. Viewing this assertion in its totality, and even assuming, without deciding, that denial of appellant's request was error, we conclude that appellant had the benefit of the evidence she sought, though not in the form she preferred. We think any error here was harmless. [I]f one can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error ..., Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)), then the error does not rise to the level of reversible error. See also District of Columbia v. Banks, 646 A.2d 972, 982 (D.C.1994); District of Columbia v. Robinson, 644 A.2d 1004, 1007 (D.C.1994). We conclude that is the case here.