Opinion ID: 2629200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the fire suppression charge

Text: Article XIII D provides: No fee or charge may be imposed for general governmental services including, but not limited to, police, fire, ambulance or library services, where the service is available to the public at large in substantially the same manner as it is to property owners. (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (b)(5), italics added.) At the trial below, the evidence showed that the District uses the proceeds of the fire suppression component of the connection fee to purchase equipment for its volunteer fire department, including both firefighting equipment and emergency medical equipment. [5] The fire department provides firefighting and emergency medical services to the public at large. Accordingly, the District's fire suppression charge is imposed for general governmental services within the meaning of section 6, subdivision (b)(5), of article XIII D, and it is prohibited by that provision if it satisfies article XIII D's definition of a fee or charge. Article XIII D defines a fee or charge as any levy other than an ad valorem tax, a special tax, or an assessment, imposed by an agency upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership, including a user fee or charge for a property-related service. ( Id., § 2, subd. (e).) It defines property-related service as a public service having a direct relationship to property ownership. ( Id., § 2, subd. (h).) The District argues that the connection fee, including its fire suppression component, does not fall within article XIII D's definition of a fee or charge because it is not imposed upon a parcel or upon a person as an incident of property ownership. (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).) The District does not impose the fee on parcels of real property but on persons who apply for a water service connection. The District does not impose the fee on such persons as an incident of property ownership but instead as an incident of their voluntary decisions to request water service. If a person fails to pay the connection fee, the District does not collect it by levying upon the person's property. Rather, because the person applying for service has not satisfied a condition for extending service, the District does not make the water connection and does not provide water service. We agree that a connection charge, because it is not imposed as an incident of property ownership (art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e)), is not a fee or charge under article XIII D. A connection fee is not imposed simply by virtue of property ownership, but instead it is imposed as an incident of the voluntary act of the property owner in applying for a service connection. Urging a different construction, plaintiffs rely on article XIII D's definition of a fee or charge as including a user fee or charge for a property-related service. ( Id., § 2, subd. (e).) They argue that supplying water is a property-related service, and, therefore, all charges for water service must be deemed to be imposed upon a person as an incident of property ownership. We agree that supplying water is a property-related service within the meaning of article XIII D's definition of a fee or charge. In the ballot pamphlet for the election at which article XIII D was adopted, the Legislative Analyst stated that [f]ees for water, sewer, and refuse collection service probably meet the measure's definition of property-related fee. (Ballot Pamp., Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 1996), analysis of Prop. 218 by Legis. Analyst, p. 73.) The Legislative Analyst apparently concluded that water service has a direct relationship to property ownership, and thus is a property-related service within the meaning of article XIII D because water is indispensable to most uses of real property; because water is provided through pipes that are physically connected to the property; and because a water provider may, by recording a certificate, obtain a lien on the property for the amount of any delinquent service charges (see Gov.Code, §§ 61621, 61621.3). But the Legislative Analyst was apparently referring to fees imposed on existing water service customers, not fees imposed as a condition of initiating water service in the first instance. Several provisions of article XIII D tend to confirm the Legislative Analyst's conclusion that charges for utility services such as electricity and water should be understood as charges imposed as an incident of property ownership. For example, subdivision (b) of section 3 provides that fees for the provision of electrical or gas service shall not be deemed charges or fees imposed as an incident of property ownership under article XIII D. Under the rule of construction that the expression of some things in a statute implies the exclusion of other things not expressed ( In re Bryce C. (1995) 12 Cal.4th 226, 231, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 120, 906 P.2d 1275), the expression that electrical and gas service charges are not within the category of property-related fees implies that similar charges for other utility services, such as water and sewer, are property-related fees subject to the restrictions of article XIII D. This implication is reinforced by subdivision (c) of article XIII D, section 6, which expressly excludes fees or charges for sewer, water, and refuse collection services from the voter approval requirements that article XIII D imposes on property-related fees and charges. Because article XIII D does not include similar express exemptions from the other requirements that it imposes on property-related fee and charges, the implication is strong that fees for water, sewer, and refuse collection services are subject to those other requirements. (See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Roseville (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 637, 645, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 91 [reaching the same conclusion].) Thus, we agree that water service fees, being fees for property-related services, may be fees or charges within the meaning of article XIII D. But we do not agree that all water service charges are necessarily subject to the restrictions that article XIII D imposes on fees and charges. Rather, we conclude that a water service fee is a fee or charge under article XIII D if, but only if, it is imposed upon a person as an incident of property ownership. (Art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (e).) A fee for ongoing water service through an existing connection is imposed as an incident of property ownership because it requires nothing other than normal ownership and use of property. But a fee for making a new connection to the system is not imposed as an incident of property ownership because it results from the owner's voluntary decision to apply for the connection. Any doubt on this point is removed by considering the requirements that article XIII D imposes on property-related fees and charges. As with assessments, article XIII D requires local government agencies to identify the parcels affected by a property-related fee or charge. Specifically, it requires the agency to identify [t]he parcels upon which a fee or charge is proposed for imposition. (Art. XIII D, § 6, subd. (a)(1).) As we have explained, it is impossible for the District to comply with such a requirement for connection charges, because the District cannot determine in advance which property owners will apply for water service connection. As with assessments, this impossibility of compliance strongly suggests that connection fees for new users are not subject to article XIII D's restrictions on property-related fees. Because the connection fee, including the fire suppression charge, is not a property-related fee or charge within the meaning of article XIII D, it is not subject to article XIII D's prohibition on property-related fees or charges for general governmental services.