Opinion ID: 2739309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The relevant facts are procedural. In July 1980, petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree rape, and one count each of first-degree kidnapping and firstdegree sodomy; he was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment on each count, consecutive to each other and to previous sentences for attempted murder and first-degree robbery. On the same day, petitioner was convicted of third-degree robbery and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, consecutive to the other sentences. In 1990, petitioner was convicted of supplying contraband while he was incarcerated, and he was sentenced to 15 months in prison for that offense, consecutive to his previous sentences. In September 2008, the board conducted an exit- interview hearing to determine whether petitioner was suitable for parole on his projected release date—March 2009—or whether his circumstances warranted a two-year postponement of that date. Before the hearing, the board obtained a psychological evaluation from Dr. Frank Colistro. In that evaluation, Dr. Colistro diagnosed petitioner as having a “severe” “Antisocial Personality Disorder” with a “very high degree of psychopathy.” In Colistro’s opinion, petitioner’s personality disorder continued “to predispose [petitioner] to the commission of crimes to a degree rendering him an ongoing threat to the health and safety [of] the community.” No other psychological evaluation was submitted to the board. After the exit-interview hearing, the board issued a Board Action Form (BAF) that postponed petitioner’s release 190 Jenkins v. Board of Parole date for 24 months pursuant to ORS 144.125(3) (1977),4 which authorized the board to postpone parole release dates for inmates who suffer from a present severe emotional disturbance (PSED). The BAF explained that, “[b]ased on the doctor’s report and diagnosis, coupled with all the information that the board is considering, the board concludes that the inmate suffers from a present severe emotional disturbance that constitutes a danger to the health or safety of the community.” Petitioner sought administrative review of that decision; in response to that request, the board issued a more detailed administrative review response (ARR) that provided, in part: “On September 24, 2008, the board conducted an exit interview with you. After considering all of the evidence presented at this hearing, including a psychological evaluation prepared by [Dr. Calistro], and applying the substantive standard in effect at the time you committed your crime as well as the applicable procedural rules, the board found that you were suffering from a present severe emotional disturbance such as to constitute a danger to the health or safety of the community. “     “To the extent that you are alleging that the board lacks authority to defer your parole release date past the termination of your original prison term set, the board is unpersuaded by your arguments. The board acted under ORS 144.125(3) (1977) and OAR 254-50-015(3) (7/19/1978), postponing your projected release date on the basis of your severe emotional disturbance and dangerousness.” Ultimately, the board denied reconsideration in the ARR, and it advised petitioner at the conclusion of the ARR: “YOU HAVE EXHAUSTED YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. PURSUANT TO ORS 144.335, YOU MAY PETITION THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR JUDICIAL 4 ORS 144.125(3) (1977)—which was the version of the statute in effect when petitioner committed his crimes—provided: “If a psychiatric or psychological diagnosis of present severe emotional disturbance has been made with respect to the prisoner, the board may order the postponement of the scheduled parole release until a specified future date.” Cite as 356 Or 186 (2014) 191 REVIEW OF THIS ORDER, WITHIN 60 DAYS OF THE MAILING DATE OF THIS ORDER.” Petitioner sought judicial review in the Court of Appeals, asserting that the board’s order did not provide substantial reason because the board failed to “explain its findings or the reasoning supporting its conclusion” in the order. The board responded that the order was legally sufficient for two reasons. First, the board argued that ORS 144.335(3) exempted the board’s order from the substantialreason requirement. Second, and alternatively, the board argued that the final order, including the board’s administrative review response, contained substantial reason and was otherwise sufficient, because it “provided petitioner with a legal basis for deferring his parole release, as well as a factual foundation for its legal conclusion,” by referring to and relying on Colistro’s evaluation. The Court of Appeals reversed. The court held that, notwithstanding the 1999 amendment to ORS 144.335(3), the substantial reason requirement continued to apply to the board’s parole release postponement orders. Jenkins v. Board of Parole, 258 Or App 430, 443, 309 P3d 1115 (2013). The court further held that the board’s order in this case lacked substantial reason, because it “offer[ed] a mere conclusion” and did not permit a reviewing court “ ‘to determine if the board’s findings, reasoning, and conclusions demonstrate that it acted in a rational, fair, and principled manner in deciding to defer petitioner’s parole release.’ Id. at 444 ” (quoting Gordon v. Board of Parole, 343 Or 618, 634, 175 P3d 461 (2007)). The dissent would have affirmed. Jenkins, 258 Or App at 444-52 (Armstrong, P. ., dissenting). After J examining the statutory text, context, and legislature history of the 1999 amendment, the dissent concluded that “the legislature intended to relieve the board of the substantialreason requirement otherwise implicit in the judicial-review provisions of ORS 183.482(8).” Id. at 452.