Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Trial Court's Failure to Voir Dire Jurors Regarding Newspaper Article.

Text: Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to question jurors individually regarding whether they had read a newspaper article about the case that was published shortly after rendition of the guilt phase verdict and before the commencement of the penalty phase. The circumstances were as follows: On May 17, 1983, defense counsel called the trial court's attention to two articles published in the Modesto Bee on May 14 and May 16, respectively. The first, a front page article discussing the guilt phase verdicts, quoted the prosecutor as saying that several new witnesses came forward after Marshall was not convicted at the first trial. Among them was convicted robber Gary Lee Rabbit Brady, whom [the prosecutor] credited with persuading the jury of Marshall's guilt. The article then quoted the prosecutor as listing various factors, including Brady, that enhanced the prosecution's case at the second trial: the waterbed frame and the testimony of David Moore and other witnesses as to the white suit. The second article, published two days later, read as follows: A story in Saturday's edition of the Bee incorrectly quotes Stanislaus County Deputy District Attorney Roger Beauchesne as saying convicted robber Gary Lee Rabbit Brady persuaded a jury that George Edward Marshall was guilty of three counts of first degree murder and one of attempted murder. Defense counsel moved for discharge of the jury and impanelment of a new jury for the penalty phase, citing prosecutorial misconduct in connection with the stories. In reply, the prosecutor admitted that after the return of the guilty verdicts he had spoken with a Modesto Bee reporter, to whom he had listed the evidence presented in the second trial but not the first. The prosecutor denied, however, expressing any opinion as to the basis for the jury's verdict. He described his efforts to get the newspaper to publish a retraction, which resulted in the publication of the second article. The trial court denied the defense motion to discharge the jury, stating he intended to ask the jurors whether they had read the article and to tell them, if they had, that he had made inquiry into the situation. The defense continued to press for specific inquiry into possible prejudice. When the penalty phase was about to resume, the trial court said to the jury: I don't know whether any of you read the newspaper on Saturday and the article that was in there  it was on the front page  concerning this case. But that is illustrative of the proposition that sometimes the most interesting fiction we read, we read in the newspaper. [¶] Mr. Dunford [defense counsel]  Mr. Beauchesne [the prosecutor]  particularly was upset at the remarks attributed to him, particularly to the extent that they implied or said that he had presumed to comment to a reporter as to why the jury had reached their verdicts that the jury had reached, because Mr. Beauchesne had made no such statement. The newspaper did carry a small, kind of weaselworded retraction on Monday. I don't know whether any of you read that or not, but I have made inquiry into it, and I am satisfied, I am sure that Mr. Dunford is satisfied, we are all satisfied, that Mr. Beauchesne in no way presumed to express your state of mind, or anything concerning it, to a Bee reporter. And I wanted you to understand that so that there would be, you would not be upset with him or with any of us, because I am sure that nobody connected with this proceeding, or with the courts here, has made any comment of that kind to anyone, particularly to anybody in the media. So I hope that you weren't distressed about it; or, if you were, that you will set it aside for now so that we can get on with the business at hand. Defendant argues, first, that the prosecutor's statements to the reporter constituted prejudicial misconduct, and second, that the trial court's failure to conduct individual voir dire of the jurors amounted to reversible error. We consider his arguments in turn. (34) Defendant contends the prosecutor's comments to the reporter violated the then applicable rule of professional conduct, American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 7-107(E), which provides as follows: After the completion of a trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and prior to the imposition of a sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by public communication and that is reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence. [15] This breach of ethics, defendant argues, prejudiced him, because the prosecutor's remarks could have erased any lingering doubt about defendant's guilt the jury might still have harbored. Defendant reasons that by implying his conviction resulted from the new evidence introduced by the prosecution during the second trial, the first Bee article lent this additional evidence a credibility the jury had not necessarily given it during their guilt phase deliberations. Defendant also contends the article reinforced in the jurors' minds the evidence against him at the critical point when they were to decide whether he lived or died. We must reject at the outset the contention the prosecutor acted unethically in saying what he did to the reporter. The prosecutor described on the record his conversation with the reporter, and his description was accepted as truthful by both the trial court and defense counsel. During the conversation, the prosecutor merely listed the evidence that was presented for the first time during defendant's second trial, information that was a matter of public record. The information he conveyed to the reporter was not of a sort reasonably likely to affect imposition of sentence. (ABA Model Code Prof. Responsibility, DR 7-107(E).) The prosecutor was not required, on pain of a misconduct citation, to anticipate the reporter's inaccuracy. (35) Next we reject the contention the trial court committed reversible error in failing to voir dire the jurors on whether they had read the offending article. Nothing in the record, other than defense counsel's supposition, indicates any juror indeed had read the article. At the outset of trial, the court admonished prospective jurors to avoid reading any articles about the trial, and in the absence of evidence to the contrary we must presume they followed the court's admonition. ( People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 252-253 [253 Cal. Rptr. 55, 763 P.2d 906].) As defendant points out, for a juror to read newspaper articles about the case he or she is deciding is misconduct, raising a presumption of prejudice ( People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1108 [269 Cal. Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327], disapproved on another point in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 [38 Cal. Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588]) and triggering a duty of the trial court to make appropriate inquiry. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1199 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Given the lack of the required threshold showing in this case, however, we do not presume prejudice, and the trial court was put on no duty of inquiry. Even if we were to accept as true the supposition one or more jurors read the first Bee article, we would find the article's innocuous substance rebutted the presumption of prejudice. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 1108, 1110.) First, the enumeration of the new evidence presented in the second trial largely repeated what defense counsel himself told the jury during his closing argument in the guilt phase. (See People v. Martinez (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 1, 23-25 [147 Cal. Rptr. 208] [jury considered maps that duplicated evidence already before the jury; presumption of prejudice rebutted].) Second, the article's false statement that the prosecutor credited the new information with persuading the jury of defendant's guilt simply was not matter of a kind that could have influenced the jury adversely to defendant, as by eliminating any lingering doubt as to his guilt. Like the trial court, we surmise the article, rather than prejudicing defendant, might have caused the jury to become annoyed at the prosecutor for presuming to articulate the basis of the guilt verdict. Because of the harmless nature of the articles, and the consequent rebuttal of any possibility of prejudice, there was no error in the trial court's failure to question the jurors individually concerning whether they had seen the article.