Opinion ID: 715846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Sentencing--Drug Quantity Determination

Text: 135 Marcel, Frederick, and Adam contend the district court erred in imposing sentence based on a determination that they negotiated to possess two kilograms of cocaine. They base this argument on Application Note 12 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, which at the time of sentencing provided in pertinent part: 136 In an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. However, where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing. 2 137 Defendants argue that, although the amount under negotiation was two kilograms, there was no evidence that they intended to and could produce the negotiated price for that amount. Defendants had just under $10,000 with them during the negotiations with the undercover officer, and brought only $6,910 into the hotel, which was enough to buy less than one kilogram at the agreed $15,000 per kilo price. During negotiations in the motel room, they expressed interest in buying only one kilo, and there was some evidence that they said they only had enough money for one kilo. They argue that under Note 12, the applicable amount is the amount they could pay for, rather than the amount they said they wanted to buy. 138 A sentencing court's factual findings on the quantities of drugs attributable to a defendant are reviewed for clear error, while legal issues are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Bara, 13 F.3d 1418, 1420 (10th Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1662, 128 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994). 139 The first sentence quoted from Note 12 applies whether a defendant was negotiating to sell to or to buy from government agents or informants. It applies to offenses involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, which is broad enough to include purchases as well as sales. See, e.g., United States v. Adames, 901 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir.1990). The applicable amount of drugs in a reverse sting is the amount under negotiation. See Bara, 13 F.3d at 1420. 140 Whether the second sentence quoted from Note 12 applies in reverse stings is unsettled. On its face, it applies only when the defendant lacks the intent and ability to produce the amount of drugs under negotiation. The Second Circuit has held it is inapplicable to reverse stings. See United States v. Alaga, 995 F.2d 380, 382-83 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 886, 127 L.Ed.2d 80 (1994). But see United States v. Vargas, 986 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 91, 126 L.Ed.2d 59 (1993) (applying both parts of note to reverse sting). 141 However, the majority of courts that have addressed the issue have applied both parts of the note to reverse stings. See United States v. Naranjo, 52 F.3d 245, 250 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Fowler, 990 F.2d 1005, 1006-07 (7th Cir.1993); United States v. Nichols, 986 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Brown, 985 F.2d 766, 768-69 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Gates, 967 F.2d 497, 500 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 632, 121 L.Ed.2d 563 (1992); United States v. Panet-Collazo, 960 F.2d 256, 260-61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 506 U.S. 876, 113 S.Ct. 220, 121 L.Ed.2d 158(1992); United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1150-51 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 505 U.S. 1228, 112 S.Ct. 3051, 120 L.Ed.2d 917 (1992). This circuit has not decided the issue. In Bara, 13 F.3d at 1420, the defendant did not argue inability and lack of intent, and the court did not address that issue. 142 Assuming without deciding that the second sentence quoted from Note 12 applies to reverse stings, it is a defendant's intent and ability to obtain the negotiated amount of drugs rather than intent and ability to pay the negotiated price that is crucial. A drug buyer who lacks the full purchase price may nonetheless intend to obtain the negotiated quantity by force or deception, or on a credit or consignment basis. A defendant's intent and ability to pay the full purchase price for the negotiated amount of drugs is not determinative of his or her intent or ability to obtain the drugs, although it may be relevant. 143 The second sentence quoted from Note 12 would be inapplicable in this case. In rejecting defendants' arguments that the relevant drug quantity was limited to the amount that could be purchased for the $6,910 they brought to the motel room, the court noted defendants were convicted of conspiracy with intent to distribute two kilos of cocaine, in effect finding they intended to obtain the two kilos. 144 Intent to obtain the negotiated amount precludes application of the second sentence of Note 12 even if defendants lacked the ability and intent to pay the negotiated price. To the extent the second sentence can apply to reverse stings, it would require exclusion of quantities only if a defendant lacked both intent and ability to obtain them. See United States v. Muniz, 49 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Raven, 39 F.3d 428, 434 (3d Cir.1994). 145 The district court's findings are not clearly erroneous. The record supports the finding that defendants had the intent to obtain the negotiated amount of drugs--two kilos. Defendants' possession of less than $10,000 at the motel did not compel an inference that they lacked the ability to pay more. See. United States v. Barnes, 993 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 96, 130 L.Ed.2d 46 (1994). The record shows they claimed the ability to pay and there was evidence that they had purchased large amounts of drugs in the past. See Vargas, 986 F.2d at 41. 146 The record is sufficient to support an inference that defendants intended to obtain the drugs and worry about paying for them later, if at all. Their actions were consistent with taking possession of the entire amount. Once in possession, they could promise to pay later. Fronting, or supplying drugs on consignment or on credit, is a known practice among drug dealers. See Torres, 53 F.3d at 1133. 147 Even if defendants did not intend to pay more than the $6,910 they brought to the room, the evidence supports an inference that they intended to take possession of the two kilos. The undercover officer feared a jack or theft, and while defendants knew she was armed, they believed she was outnumbered. Although no gun was found at the motel, defendants had access to guns. The district court's finding that defendants intended to obtain the two kilos of cocaine is not clearly erroneous. 148 Adam raises a sentencing entrapment issue based on 2D1.1, Application Note 17, effective November 1, 1993, before sentencing, which provides: 149 If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant), the court finds that the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance, thereby leading to the defendant's purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would have allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by the government agent, a downward departure may be warranted. 150 Adam argues the $15,000 per kilo price was substantially below market value for cocaine in Wichita. He points to the undercover officer's testimony that the market price of a kilo of cocaine in Wichita was $25,000. However, the undercover officer was posing as a courier from Los Angeles, where the market price was $12,000 to $18,000, and she testified that the price was presented as a discount for the first transaction in a continuing business relationship. She also testified that in a reverse sting operation, an excessively low price would create a lot of suspicion and put the undercover officer at greater risk. The trial court's finding that the $15,000 per kilo price was reasonable is supported by the evidence. 151