Opinion ID: 1135115
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to bring Elvik before a magistrate in a timely manner

Text: Elvik claims that he was arrested on September 1, 1995, interrogated on September 1-2, 1995, extradited to Carson City on September 14, 1995, and formally arraigned on September 15, 1995. Elvik argues that the fourteen-day period between his arrest and his arraignment violated his right to a timely arraignment, warranting dismissal of the case or suppression of evidence. Elvik moved for dismissal or preclusion of evidence on this basis, but the district court denied his motion. Pursuant to NRS 171.178(1), a person who has been arrested must be brought before a magistrate without unnecessary delay. [9] The purpose of NRS 171.178(1) is to ensure that the accused is promptly informed of his privilege against self-incrimination. Huebner v. State, 103 Nev. 29, 32, 731 P.2d 1330, 1333 (1987). Failure to bring a defendant before a magistrate without unnecessary delay does not warrant reversal absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant's constitutional rights. Id. Elvik was apprised of his Miranda rights, waived those rights, and made inculpatory statements in the hours immediately following his arrest. A similar situation was recently addressed in Powell v. State, 113 Nev. 41, 930 P.2d 1123 (1997), in which we concluded that failure to bring the defendant before a magistrate within the required time period did not warrant exclusion of the defendant's subsequent confession because the defendant had made inculpatory statements at the time of his arrest, before the delay in bringing him before a magistrate. Our holding in Powell was consistent with Deutscher v. State, 95 Nev. 669, 680, 601 P.2d 407, 414 (1979) (citations omitted), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Angelone, Director, Nevada Dept. of Prisons v. Deutscher, 500 U.S. 901, 111 S.Ct. 1678, 114 L.Ed.2d 73 (1991), in which this court opined: We subscribe to the rule of law which provides that when an accused voluntarily waives his right to silence and his right to counsel, he concurrently waives his right to be seasonably arraigned. The reason for this rule is that the primary purpose of an arraignment is to inform the defendant of his rights. But a delay in arraignment is not prejudicial when a defendant has already been advised of his rights, was promptly so advised, and voluntarily waived those rights. Based on Powell and Deutscher, Elvik's waiver of his Miranda rights and subsequent inculpatory statements, which occurred within forty-eight hours of his arrest, effected a waiver of his right to a timely arraignment and, alternatively, establish that his constitutional rights were not prejudiced by the delay. Moreover, Elvik was arraigned within forty-eight hours of his arrival in Carson City, and the State's delay in arraigning Elvik prior to his arrival in Nevada was necessary because Elvik's physical presence in Nevada was required to bring him before a magistrate. Based on these considerations, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Elvik's motion to dismiss the charges against him or to suppress his inculpatory statements.