Opinion ID: 884377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: kornder-owen's alleged failure to maintain a lookout and to yield the right-of-way

Text: Roe contends that, because Kornder-Owen failed to observe the presence of Roe's vehicle at the intersection until immediately prior to the collision, Kornder-Owen negligently failed to maintain an adequate lookout for oncoming traffic. Roe also claims that, once she legally and properly started to proceed through the intersection, it then became Kornder-Owen's responsibility, pursuant to § 61-8-341, MCA, to yield the right-of-way and that Kornder-Owen negligently failed to comply with that responsibility. Section 61-8-341, MCA, is entitled Vehicle entering through highway or stop intersection and provides, in relevant part, as follows: (1) The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by 61-8-344 at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through highway. Section 61-8-341(1), MCA. In Montana, automobiles approaching an intersection are accorded the status of favored or disfavored drivers in order to facilitate the orderly movement of traffic. A favored driver cannot ignore obvious dangers by blindly relying on her right-of-way, DeVerniero v. Eby (1972), 159 Mont. 146, 151-52, 496 P.2d 290, 292-93, but instead must maintain a proper lookout and use reasonable care. Pachek v. Norton Concrete Co. (1972), 160 Mont. 16, 24, 499 P.2d 766, 770. However, the favored driver has the right to assume that the disfavored driver will yield the right-of-way to her when the law so requires. Olson v. Parchen (1991), 249 Mont. 342, 347, 816 P.2d 423, 427. Therefore, it is not negligent for a motorist to fail to anticipate injury which can result only from a violation of law or duty by another. Slagsvold v. Johnson (1975), 168 Mont. 490, 493, 544 P.2d 442, 444. In this case, Kornder-Owen was the favored driver and Roe was the disfavored driver. Roe, therefore, was required to stop and then to yield to other vehicles which have entered the intersection ... or which are approaching so closely ... as to constitute an immediate hazard. Section 61-8-341(1), MCA. Based on the facts in this case and the application of the aforementioned principles of law to those facts, we conclude that Roe owed Kornder-Owen a duty, pursuant to § 61-8-341, MCA, to yield the right-of-way and that Roe failed to comply with that duty. Furthermore, we conclude that Kornder-Owen had the right to rely on Roe's compliance with § 61-8-341, MCA, and that she was not required to anticipate Roe's violation of that statute. Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that Roe was negligent for failing to comply with § 61-8-341, MCA, and that the predicate for imposition of a duty on Kornder-Owen to yield did not occur. To summarize, it was Roe's negligence, and not Kornder-Owen's, that caused the parties' collision.