Opinion ID: 2482936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Zanghi Argument

Text: Relying on Zanghi, defendant contends that, regardless of whether the two charges were properly joined under CPL 195.20 and 200.20 (2) (c), the possession of stolen property charge could not be included in the waiver of indictment and SCI because it is a class D felony  a higher grade crime than the class E grand larceny charge in the superior court felony complaint, or the class E possession of stolen property offense, one of the charges for which he was held for grand jury action. In Zanghi, defendant was charged in a felony complaint with criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree. He later waived indictment and consented to be prosecuted on an SCI charging him with criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree, a charge to which he pleaded guilty. The waiver of indictment and SCI were deemed invalid in Zanghi because CPL 195.20 requires that the SCI charge an offense for which defendant was held for action of the grand jury. This means that the SCI must either charge defendant with the same crime as the felony complaint or a lesser included offense of that crime ( see Menchetti, supra ). The Zanghi SCI did not charge defendant with either of the offenses that had been included in the felony complaint, nor was the SCI charge a lesser included offense of either of the crimes in the felony complaint. To the contrary, the third-degree stolen property charge was of a higher grade than the fourth-degree stolen property offense included in the felony complaint. It is clear from our precedent that [t]he waiver procedure is triggered by the defendant being held for Grand Jury action on charges contained in a felony complaint ... and it is in reference to those charges that its availability must be measured ( D'Amico, 76 NY2d at 879; Trueluck, 88 NY2d at 551, quoting D'Amico ]). In Zanghi, no triggering offense derived from the felony complaint appeared in the SCI. The People in that case tried to overcome this fundamental deficiency by suggesting that the charge in the SCI would have been joinable with either of the offenses in the felony complaint. But we rejected that contention, noting that CPL 195.20 makes clear that where `joinable' offenses are included, the information must, at a minimum, also include at least one offense that was contained in the felony complaint (79 NY2d at 818). Since that minimum criterion was not met in Zanghi, vacatur of the guilty plea and dismissal of the SCI was required. We are presented with a different scenario in this case. The exact offense that was charged in the superior court felony complaint  grand larceny in the fourth degree  was included in the waiver of indictment and charged in the SCI. Thus, the triggering offense omitted from the SCI in Zanghi was present here. It is true that the SCI also contained another charge arising from a separate incident  criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree  and this is an offense of higher grade or degree than the grand larceny offense. But this, standing alone, does not establish the invalidity of the waiver of indictment and SCI under Zanghi. We did not discuss in that case what types of offenses would have been joinable had a proper triggering offense been set forth in the SCI. To be sure, a Zanghi violation would have occurred here if the People had attempted to rely on the local court felony complaint charging defendant with fourth-degree criminal possession of stolen property to support the waiver of indictment relating to the third-degree version of that offense. Instead, the People's rationale was that the third-degree stolen property offense was joinable with the grand larceny offense, the triggering offense included in both the felony complaint and SCI. Because reversal is not warranted based on the analysis in Zanghi, we must proceed to defendant's next argument  that the possession of stolen property offense was not properly joined with the grand larceny charge under CPL 200.20 (2) (c).