Opinion ID: 2552719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Habitual-Criminal Status

Text: Finally, defendant argues that the trial justice should not have imposed an additional ten-year sentence on him for being a habitual criminal because the requisite notice of intent to seek such a sentence under § 12-19-21(b) was not timely filed. The defendant argues that his initial appearance in the Sixth Division District Court on August 18, 2004, on the robbery charge and his presentment as a probation violator of a felony sentence on the next day constituted his arraignment. Thus, he contends that the state had forty-five days thereafter to file a habitual-criminal notice. Because the notice was not filed until February 16, 2005, more than forty-five days from the initial appearance, defendant asserts that the state missed its window of opportunity to impose the habitual-criminal statute on him. The state maintains that the triggering arraignment in this case occurred on February 4, 2005, and that the habitual-criminal notice was timely served twelve days later. The state also argues that even if this Court finds that the notice was not served within forty-five days of the arraignment, it still was timely because it was not served later than February 16, 2005, the date of the pretrial conference. This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Curtis v. State, 996 A.2d 601, 604 (R.I.2010). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings. Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996). When a statute is unclear or ambiguous, however, this Court's ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature. Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I.2001). In those instances, this Court will examine the statute in its entirety to discern the legislative intent and purpose behind the provision. State v. LaRoche, 925 A.2d 885, 888 (R.I.2007). Section 12-19-21 reads in pertinent part: (b) Whenever it appears a person shall be deemed a `habitual criminal,' the attorney general, within forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date of the pretrial conference, may file with the court a notice specifying that the defendant, upon conviction, is subject to the imposition of an additional sentence   . The defendant's argument on this issue is without merit. The fact that he initially appeared before the District Court on the robbery complaint is of no moment because the offense of robbery is not within the jurisdiction of the District Court to try and determine. The defendant was charged and presented by indictment handed up by the grand jury and returned to the Superior Court on November 23, 2004. See G.L.1956 § 8-2-15 (All indictments found by grand juries shall be returned into the [Superior] [C]ourt.). The defendant then was arraigned on the indictment on February 4, 2005. Thus, the state was acting well within the statutory time frame of § 12-19-21 when, on February 16, 2005 (only twelve days after the arraignment), it notified the defendant that upon conviction he would be subject to an additional sentence as a habitual offender. We conclude, therefore, that the trial justice did not err by imposing the additional sentence upon the defendant as a habitual offender.