Opinion ID: 147192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Oaks next argues the evidence was insufficient to prove his status as a convicted felon as required under 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1). As an initial matter, Oaks incorrectly asserts the jury convicted him under  924(e) instead of  922(g)(1). Section 922(g)(1) is the statute defining the substantive offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1). One of the elements of the offense requires the government to prove, and the jury to find, that the defendant was a convicted felon. United States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 964 (8th Cir.2010). Ordinarily, a defendant convicted under section 922(g)(1) faces a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years. 18 U.S.C.  924(a)(2). Section 924(e), or the Armed Career Criminal Act, is a sentencing provision, and the determination of whether a defendant qualifies for the enhanced penalties contained therein is a determination made by the sentencing court ÔÇö not the jury. See United States v. Van, 543 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir.2008) (discussing the district court's imposition of ACCA in calculating the defendant's sentence). If ACCA applies and the defendant has three previous convictions for a violent felony, he is subject to a more stringent minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years. United States v. King, 598 F.3d 1043, 1044 (8th Cir.2010). As a result of the distinction above, we assume for purposes of this appeal that Oaks is arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt he was a convicted felon for purposes of  924(g)(1). This argument is without merit. The record shows Oaks stipulated in advance of trial to his status as a convicted felon in order to prevent the government from presenting evidence of all his felonies to the jury. Because he stipulated to being a convicted felon, he cannot now argue the evidence was insufficient to prove that element. See United States v. Poulack, 236 F.3d 932, 938 (8th Cir.2001) (Because [the defendant] stipulated to the reduced drug quantity figure when he had knowledge that quantity was a key factor, he waived his right to a jury determination on that issue.). Oaks's challenge to the district court's application of ACCA at sentencing is similarly without merit. First, Oaks correctly notes the government must prove each of the facts necessary to support a sentencing enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir.2008). However, as noted above, the district court may accept any undisputed portions of the PSR in determining whether the government has met its burden. Id. Contrary to Oaks's argument, his not guilty plea to the charge in the indictment does not suffice to establish an objection to the PSR at sentencing regarding his prior convictions. Id. (noting the defendant has to object to specific factual allegations in the PSR, or the court may accept those facts as true in calculating its sentence). The PSR concluded Oaks was convicted of three prior felony crimes of violence, and he did not object to this determination. Therefore, the district court properly adopted the findings in the PSR as facts for its consideration in determining Oaks's sentence. We therefore reject Oaks's argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and his ACCA status.