Opinion ID: 1219292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: claim or issue preclusion

Text: We have held that for preclusion to attach to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative agencies, at least where there is no statutory authority directing otherwise, [5] the prior decision must be rendered pursuant to the agency's adjudicatory authority and the procedures employed by the agency must be substantially similar to those used in a court[.] Liller v. West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n, 180 W.Va. 433, 440, 376 S.E.2d 639, 646 (1988). In addition, [t]he identicality of issues litigated is a key component to the application of administrative res judicata or collateral estoppel[.] 180 W.Va. at 440, 376 S.E.2d at 646. Using that analysis, we find no preclusive effects to the Grievance Board's determinations over human rights claims. First, there are not identical issues. As we stated above, a discrimination claim under W.Va.Code, 18-29-2(m), only need establish that the adverse employment decision was neither job related nor agreed to by the employees. Section 2(m) imposes no requirement for proving that the discrimination was caused by an illicit motive or was the result of a discriminatory policy having a disparate impact, [6] as would be the case under the Human Rights Act. E.g., University of West Virginia v. Decker, 191 W.Va. 567, 447 S.E.2d 259 (1994). Thus, claim preclusion would apply only if we were to hold that subsequent litigation by grievants of claims arising out of the same facts as their grievances is barred not only as to arguments actually litigated, but also as to those that could have been litigated in the grievance. See Syl. pt. 2, Conley v. Spiller, 171 W.Va. 584, 301 S.E.2d 216 (1983); Lane v. Williams 150 W.Va. 96, 100, 144 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1965). As we did in Liller, [7] supra, we refuse to impose such a bar on subsequent litigation under the Human Rights Act. Employees appearing before the Grievance Board may have legitimate reasons for not raising the more difficult and far more contentious issue of discriminatory motive, and because many grievants lack the assistance of a lawyer, they may not even recognize the potential for a human rights claim. By not imposing a collateral bar, we reinforce the Legislature's purpose in enacting W.Va.Code, 18-29-1, et seq., of creating a simple and expeditious procedure for resolving employees' grievances. The second reason that causes us to reject claim preclusion also persuades us that issue preclusion should not apply. The procedures employed by the Grievance Board are not substantially similar to those employed by either a court of law or the Human Rights Commission (Commission), and the differences are of profound significance. Thus, even if a grievance hearing examiner concludes that an employer's adverse action to a grievant was not discriminatory, but was job related, that determination is not binding on a court or the Commission deciding a claim under the Human Rights Actregardless of whether the grievant alleged or adduced evidence of discriminatory motive or disparate impact at the grievance hearing and regardless of whether the Grievance Board made a determination about such issues. As noted above, the Legislature designed the grievance process to be simple and expeditious. Consequently, the process is streamlined and lacks many of the adversarial accoutrements found in judicial and Commission's proceedings. In the vast majority of grievances, for example, the grievant is not represented by a lawyer. Moreover, and more importantly, the grievance process does not provide for any of the discovery mechanisms available under the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Commission's procedural rules. [8] Finally, in stark contrast to the Human Rights Act, the grievance statute does not provide for the right to an independent investigation of each grievance filed before the Board, [9] does not make available at public expense representation by a lawyer for cases that proceed to a hearing before an administrative law judge, [10] and does not give employees the option of skipping the administrative process and pursuing their claims de novo in circuit court where jury trials and the full array of legal and equitable remedies are obtainable. [11] The issues in a human rights caseespecially unlawful motive and disparate impact are extremely difficult and often complex. Invariably, they require substantial degrees of fact gathering and familiarity with the concepts of discrimination law. A grievant without a lawyer could not possibly be expected to grasp the significance of that law, put together a case of discrimination, and comprehend the full impact of claim and issue preclusion doctrines. A grievant with a lawyer would have an unfairly difficult task trying to prove illicit motive or disparate impact without access to the full panoply of discovery opportunities. The problem especially is apparent by the fact that in matters of motive and disparate impact the employer ordinarily possesses the crucial evidence. Thus, in the language of Syllabus Point 3, in part, of Mellon-Stuart Co. v. Hall, 178 W.Va. 291, 359 S.E.2d 124 (1987), the plaintiff in this case was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matters in dispute[.] We stated in Liller, 180 W.Va. at 441, 376 S.E.2d at 647, that where separate legislative enactments exist which provide separate administrative remedies, preclusive doctrines will not necessarily be applied. See Collins v. Elkay Mining Co., 179 W.Va. 549, 371 S.E.2d 46 (1988); Davis v. Kitt Energy Corp., 179 W.Va. 37, 365 S.E.2d 82 (1987); Wiggins v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 178 W.Va. 63, 357 S.E.2d 745 (1987). Indeed, our cases require us to determine whether applying the doctrines [of preclusion] is consistent with the express or implied policy in the legislation which created the body. Syllabus Point 3, in part, Mellon-Stuart Co., supra . In this case, we have W.Va.Code, 18-29-1, et seq., a legislatively provided administrative remedy for state employees that is designed to assure them of a fast, easy-to-use, and inexpensive procedure for resolving the entire spectrum of legitimate employee complaints. We also have in the Human Rights Act a complex array of procedures and protections designed to give effect to the civil right of all persons to equal employment opportunity and to end the invidious discrimination that is contrary to the principles of freedom and equality of opportunity and is destructive to a free and democratic society. W.Va.Code, 5-11-2 (1989). We think our answers to the certified questions best accommodate the different legislative goals that support the two statutes involved in this case. [12] In so holding, we particularly remain mindful of the primacy that the Legislature has accorded to eliminating invidious discrimination in this State. As we stated in Allen v. State Human Rights Commission, 174 W.Va. 139, 149, 324 S.E.2d 99, 109 (1984), [e]qual opportunity in this State is a fundamental principle grounded in several provisions of our State Bill of Rights. [E]very act of unlawful discrimination in employment... is akin to an act of treason, undermining the very foundations of our democracy. 174 W.Va. at 148, 324 S.E.2d at 108. The sense of betrayal is even greater when the discriminator is, as alleged in this case, a public servant. We cannot allow the substantial protections promised by the Human Rights Act from such assaults on our personal and institutional integrities to be compromised by unthinking adherence to technical doctrines. If we permit public employers to use prior decisions rendered by a loose administrative apparatusengaged in by unwary and often uncounseled employees and lacking important procedural rudimentsto preclude victims of discrimination from subsequently invoking the promises made by the Human Rights Act, we, thereby, would add our own breach of trust to those already committed by public discriminators. Thus, we refuse to so hold. [13] We, therefore, find it unnecessary to resolve the dispute between the parties in the present case as to whether the plaintiff actually litigated her discrimination claim before the Grievance Board. [14] Accordingly, our response to the District Court's second certified question is negative. A civil action filed under the Human Rights Act is not precluded by a prior grievance decided by the Grievance Board arising out of the same facts and circumstances. The grievance procedures and the Human Rights Act provide enforcement mechanisms to accomplish different legislative purposes and neither preempts the other. [15]