Opinion ID: 173302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Arising out of” element

Text: “Having determined that defendant[] ‘purposefully directed’ [his] activities at the forum state, due process requires us next to ask whether plaintiff[’s] injuries ‘arise out of’ defendant[’s] contacts with the forum jurisdiction.” Id. at -14- 1078. Regardless of whether this involves a basic but-for or a more restrictive proximate-cause inquiry, see id. at 1079 (noting but not choosing between these two tests where alleged facts would satisfy either one), the answer is obvious here. Given that the alleged injury (pain and liver deterioration associated with untreated Hepatitis C) is a direct and immediate function of the allegedly wrongful act purposefully directed at Colorado by BOP Director Lappin (denial of Mr. Arocho’s treatment for Hepatitis C at the Florence facility), the actionable harm in this case clearly arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. 3. Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice Because Mr. Arocho has established the requisite minimum contacts between BOP Director Lappin and the forum state for purposes of the particular claim asserted here, exercising personal jurisdiction over him is proper absent “a compelling case” that to do so would “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 1080 (internal quotations omitted). Appellees’ brief just reasserts the points and authorities cited by the district court with respect to minimum contacts and makes no case, much less a compelling one, that the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on the contacts here would somehow be unfair or unjust. 8 See Aplee. Br. at 16-17. 8 Lappin also asks us to affirm the district court on the alternative basis that Mr. Arocho’s pro se brief, which challenges the dismissal of his claims in general (continued...) -15- Nor do we discern circumstances indicating that such a case could be made. In this regard, we consider such factors as: “(1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests in resolving the dispute, (3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving convenient and effectual relief, (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states [or foreign nations] in furthering fundamental social policies.” Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1080 (quoting OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th Cir. 1998)) (alterations in original). The plaintiff’s interest certainly favors the local forum he has chosen, and given that the majority of relevant testimonial and documentary evidence is directly available there, overall judicial efficiency aligns with his interest. While the facility involved is a federal prison, the forum state is not disinterested in the proper treatment of inmates residing there (even if they may be citizens of another 8 (...continued) terms and does not present any argument specifically as to personal jurisdiction, has waived the matter. Aplee. Br. at 14-15. Whether to disregard an erroneous ruling on waiver grounds is a matter committed to our discretion. Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1179 n.8 (10th Cir. 2005). We note Lappin was not prejudiced by the pro se briefing here; the only ground stated by the district court for dismissing the claim against him was lack of personal jurisdiction, so he was clearly on notice of the ruling he needed to defend on appeal and he has briefed the issue. Moreover, this court has favored ruling on the merits notwithstanding grounds for waiver where the dispute involves a question of law and its resolution is certain. See Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1325-26 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing several cases). As our discussion of the personal jurisdiction issue demonstrates, that is the case here, and we resolve the matter accordingly in the interest of justice. -16- state 9). And even assuming Lappin would prefer to litigate the claim against him in Washington D.C. (i.e., that his challenge to jurisdiction here countenances transfer to or re-filing in Washington D.C., rather than just the immediate tactical advantage of dismissal 10), the “burden on the defendant” factor would not suffice to tip the scale compellingly in his favor. As these proceedings reflect, the BOP Director can count on the resources and legal staff of the United States Attorney for Colorado to defend his interests in this pro se lawsuit. We cannot say “that the exercise of jurisdiction in the chosen forum will ‘make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient that [BOP Director Lappin] unfairly is at a severe disadvantage in comparison to his opponent.’” Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478). In sum, sufficient contacts exist between Lappin and the forum State of Colorado to support specific personal jurisdiction in this case, and the exercise of 9 “[I]ncarceration in a state does not make one a citizen of that state.” Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 763 (7th Cir. 2002); accord Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2006). 10 We note that if we agreed with the district court’s analysis of personal jurisdiction, its dismissal of the claim against Lappin without an evaluation of whether justice warranted, rather, a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 would require a remand for consideration of that alternative. See Trujillo, 465 F.3d at 1223. And we would in any event have to correct the district court’s dismissal of the claim with prejudice; when a court lacks jurisdiction over a party, the proper disposition is dismissal without prejudice to permit refiling where personal jurisdiction may be exercised, Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002). -17- such jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Dismissal of the action against Lappin on this basis was, therefore, in error. We note, however, that, in conjunction with their defense of the dismissal of the other defendants on the merits, appellees contend we may affirm Lappin’s dismissal from the case on the alternative basis that Mr. Arocho failed to state a claim against him. We take up that argument below, considering de novo whether Mr. Arocho “plausibly (not just speculatively) has a claim for relief.” 11 Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1223, 1224 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 742 (2009). 11 We recognize that, absent cross-appeal, an appellee may argue alternative grounds only to affirm the order under review and may not urge grounds “with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary.” Montgomery v. City of Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 944 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). And converting a dismissal without prejudice (the proper disposition for lack of personal jurisdiction, see supra page 17, note 10), to a dismissal with prejudice (the disposition that would attend a merits ruling), represents an enlargement of an appellee’s rights requiring a cross-appeal. See, e.g., Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 560 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2009); Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 471 (7th Cir. 2003). But the order under review here actually did dismiss the claim against Lappin with prejudice (albeit erroneously), so arguing now for a merits dismissal would not entail an enlargement of the rights granted Lappin by the district court. The fact that the disposition was erroneous does not bar alternative arguments for affirmance; indeed, error in the order under review is the occasion for raising such arguments. -18- Dismissal of Bivens Damages Claims on the Merits A. BOP Director Lappin An Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim may be shown if “a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health,” where a serious medical need—such as a condition diagnosed as requiring treatment—is involved. Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation omitted). Defendants assert that “there is no allegation that Defendants Wiley or Lappin—who are not doctors—knew that Mr. Arocho required access to this specific treatment [i.e., Interferon/Ribavirin], and on an emergency basis, or that failure to approve that treatment would seriously and irreparably harm him.” Aplee. Br. at 23. On the contrary, as our prior review of the complaint shows, the crux of the claim against Lappin is that he knew the serious disease Mr. Arocho suffers from and knew that Clinical Director Nafziger recommended treatment of the condition with Interferon/Ribavirin, and yet refused to approve the treatment. The facts alleged make out a plausible case of deliberate indifference. That Lappin is not a doctor does not undermine such a claim; rather it only focuses the claim on a long-recognized scenario of deliberate indifference: acts by lay officials that prevent access to treatment recommended or prescribed by medical personnel. See, e.g., Martinez, 430 F.3d at 1304; Ledoux v. Davies, 961 F.2d 1536, 1537 (10th Cir. 1992); Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 n.3 (10th Cir. 1985); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980). -19- Of course, Lappin may still attempt to show that he had a constitutionally legitimate justification for denying treatment. But, at this stage, Mr. Arocho has stated a plausible claim of deliberate indifference against him. Factual challenges to that claim must be pursued through summary judgment. 12 12 We note an erroneous line of analysis in this vein in the district court’s decision, which is repeated in appellees’ briefing. The court cited an affidavit submitted by defendants indicating that nine months after this suit was filed, another physician at Florence conducted additional tests on Mr. Arocho and determined that he was then (in October 2008) not a candidate for treatment due to blood-count parameters. R. vol. 4 at 147-48. In the district court’s view, this showed that Mr. Arocho’s claim turned on a mere difference of medical opinion, which cannot demonstrate deliberate indifference. Id. at 148. There are procedural and substantive problems with this analysis. As for procedure, it is improper to decide a motion to dismiss on the basis of evidence submitted by the defendant–that is what summary judgment is for. The court considered its course of action authorized by the fact that it “may take judicial notice of court documents and matters of public record.” Id. (quotation omitted). But a party’s evidentiary materials are not “court documents” that may be judicially noticed as true: “a court cannot notice pleadings or testimony as true simply because these statements are filed with the court” and “a court cannot take judicial notice of the truth of a document simply because someone put it in the court’s files.” 21B Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5106.4 at 232, 234 (2d ed. 2005). Thus, for example, the content of an affidavit generated to support a party’s case does not become judicially noticeable fact when the party files the affidavit with the court. See, e.g., United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666, 672 (10th Cir. 1999). If it were otherwise, a party could just attach all of his evidence to a motion for dismissal and thereby vitiate the critical distinction between dismissal proceedings, which are supposed to challenge the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and summary judgment proceedings, which properly encompass opposing evidence. As for substance, defendant’s affidavit, indicating that the treatment recommended in 2007 was no longer appropriate in October 2008, does not demonstrate a difference of opinion as to the initial recommendation. And, of course, as Mr. Arocho has consistently claimed, the failure to treat his disease for (continued...) -20-