Opinion ID: 1174739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Psychological Evaluation of State Witnesses

Text: Defendants in their pro se brief claim that the court below erred in denying their motion for further psychiatric evaluation of Virginia Lairby and Wanda Lairby. In their supplemental memorandum, defendants appear to be contesting the denial of the motion only as to Virginia Lairby, a complaining witness. The record discloses the following chronology relating to this claim of error: On July 11, 1981, the defense, on behalf of Mildred Lairby, motioned the court to require a psychiatric evaluation of Virginia Lairby and Wanda Lairby in the interest of justice. There is no record of any action on that motion or effort to have it heard. On March 14, 1982, defense counsel, on behalf of Mildred Lairby (the cases of Mildred Lairby and Timothy Lairby had not yet been joined), requested a continuance of the trial of Mildred Lairby on the ground that additional time was required in order to conduct a psychological evaluation of Wanda Lairby. The prosecution did not object, and the continuance was granted. Wanda Lairby submitted to a psychological evaluation on June 7 and 10, 1982. [5] On the second day of trial, October 27, 1982, defense counsel moved to have the court compel psychiatric evaluations of Virginia Lairby and Wanda Lairby. As a factual basis for the motion, defense counsel offered the June 1982 evaluation of Wanda Lairby. [6] The court responded: [T]here is nothing before the Court at this time that indicates that the child [Virginia Lairby] was influenced in any manner whatsoever by her mother as to her testimony. Because the defense did arrange for Wanda Lairby to be evaluated psychologically and because defendants did not, in either the pro se brief or the supplemental memorandum, offer any basis for compelling Wanda Lairby to submit to further evaluation, we consider the claimed error only as to a psychiatric evaluation of Virginia Lairby. Defendants rely on Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966), for the proposition that the trial judge should order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling reason for such an examination. Utah has never adopted such a rule requiring a psychiatric evaluation of a prosecutrix in a sex violation case. Nor do we find it necessary or appropriate to adopt such a rule. With respect to a defendant's right generally to compel a psychiatric evaluation of a witness, this Court has stated: [I]f it were made to appear that there is a substantial doubt that a witness is capable of understanding and appreciating the duty to tell the truth, or that he is able to perceive, remember and communicate facts with reasonable accuracy, the trial judge might grant a request for [a psychiatric] examination before permitting him to testify... . [T]he determination as to whether such an examination should be had must necessarily rest largely within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Hubbard, Utah, 601 P.2d 929, 930 (1979). See U.C.A., 1953, § 78-24-1 (1977); Utah R.Evid. 8, 17, 9B U.C.A., 1953 (1977). Thus, the question we must decide is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that defendants did not raise a substantial doubt as to Virginia Lairby's mental condition as affecting her veracity. Defendants did not raise at trial, nor are they able to do so now, a substantial doubt as to Virginia Lairby's mental condition as it affected her appreciation for telling the truth. At trial, the defense was apparently satisfied that Virginia was qualified to testify, no objection to her competence being made. She was also subject to extensive cross-examination during which defense counsel was persistent in his questions regarding the source of her testimony. She described her relationship with her mother and the conversations between them to help Virginia remember the facts. She remained firm, however, that the experiences she described actually occurred. Moreover, her testimony was corroborated by that of Carri Long. Defendants offered no evidence that Virginia Lairby had any history of mental problems or had previously acted out any of her mother's alleged hostilities toward her father. Defendants testified that Virginia Lairby was very imaginative, but neither was able to describe any events or behaviors unusual for a four year old. Under the circumstances, defendants did not raise a substantial doubt as to Virginia Lairby's suffering a mental aberration affecting her veracity.