Opinion ID: 199063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requisites of a Title II Claim

Text: 11 Our task in construing Title II's applicability in the case at hand is a difficult one. Although Title II of the ADA took effect on January 26, 1992, 4 there is sparse caselaw interpreting its scope and limits. See Accessibility Under the Americans With Disabilities Act and Other Laws 118 (Earl B. Slavitt & Donna J. Pugh eds., ABA 2000) (noting that few cases have been decided to date under either Title II or Title III of the ADA). Neither party directs us to any case in which Title II has supported a claim for damages resulting from a personal injury to a disabled person that occurred at a location operated by a public entity. Our research likewise has produced no case directly on point. 12 We begin our analysis with the language of the statute. Title II provides, inter alia, thatno qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 13 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Pursuant to the plain language of Title II, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability. The University does not dispute that Parker is a qualified individual with a disability. See id. § 12131(2) (defining qualified individual with a disability as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity). To the extent that the alleged defect in the path prevented Parker from using his wheelchair to access the Monet Garden safely, it is self-evident that it did so by reason of his disability. 14 That leaves us to decide whether the Parkers established a prima facie case that Parker was denied access to the University's services, programs, or activities within the meaning of Title II. Having examined the duties imposed by Title II on public entities and the evidence presented by the Parkers, we conclude that they did so.