Opinion ID: 1365332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unnatural will.

Text: Contestants claim that the will in question makes an unnatural disposition of the property of the deceased. The second class of evidence introduced in the case bears on that point. The property was inventoried at about $640,000. It is common knowledge that livestock interests have suffered severely in the last two years or more. We do not know the percentage. Let us say 30%. The ranch is mortgaged for $80,000. Federal estate taxes will amount to about $150,000. Current debt was shown at $5,000. A claim of $21,000 was filed by Brimmer and Bible. Then there are to be paid fees for the executor and attorneys. If the testatrix had disposed of her property fairly equally among her relatives, it would, of course, have been absolutely necessary to sell the ranch property, and that is probably, judging from the record as a whole, the last thing which the testatrix would have wanted. It was not an unnatural wish to prevent the property from falling into the hands of strangers, and Elmer Peterson is the only near relative able to take over the ranch and run it. Furthermore, Elmer Peterson is the son of the favorite brother of testatrix (the brother Elmer died in 1933). Elmer, himself, worked on the ranch when but a boy commencing about 1934 and did so for a number of years. The testatrix being without children herself not unnaturally became fond of the boy preferring him to all others and making him, in her judgment, the main object of her bounty. We said in the case of In re Johnston's Estate, 63 Wyo. 332, 181 P. (2d) 611, 616, quoting from In re Miller's Estate, 10 Wash. (2d) 258, 116 P. (2d) 526, 531, as follows: `A will is unnatural when it is contrary to what the testator, from his known views, feelings and intentions would have been expected to make. If the will is in accordance with such views it is not unnatural however much it may differ from ordinary actions of men in similar circumstances'. See also In re Lavelle's Estate, Utah, 248 P. (2d) 372. In view of her relation to Elmer, the will, it would seem, was in accordance with her views, feelings and intentions. So we shall consider the other relatives. In February 1951, testatrix bought, it seems, a Financial Industrial Fund of $12,000, the beneficiaries of which are the three children of Ellen Kastner, sister of testatrix, along with Elmer and Rogene Peterson. Her brother Hugo died in 1948. She had loaned him the sum of $2,000 to buy an interest in the ranch. They did not get along well. He had broken or twisted her wrist in a quarrel. She bought him out at $60,000. The minor son of Hugo had at least $36,000. So that as far as they are concerned, the will cannot be said to be an unnatural one. The deceased had a living mother, nearing 80 years of age, when the will of 1944 was made and about 85 years old when the codicil of 1951 was made. Testatrix loved her mother. Not much is known as to how the mother lived for a number of years. She acquired a house in Rawlins in 1923, worth about $8,000 to $10,000, which she deeded to her daughter Ellen Kastner in October 1943, but which was recorded much later. She received some $11,000 in 1948 as the result of an insurance policy in her favor and which was invested in Government bonds. She also had a limited number of shares in the Financial Industrial Fund. So far as we can tell from the record, she had an income of $720 from rentals in 1951 besides some other small income. We find in the record that in 1942 testatrix paid her mother $600; in 1944, $300 and in the same year an additional $600. These sums were paid for wages. It can hardly be said with counsel for contestants that testatrix disinherited her mother. She made a provision in the will, kept intact by the codicil, to the following effect: I hereby order and direct that my executor hereinafter named, during the administration of my estate, shall see that my Mother, Alma A. Peterson at all times is provided for and at no time shall be in want of food, clothing, shelter, medicines, medical, hospital and nursing care and attention and I do give for said purposes the money needed in providing for the same. I do further request that if no provision is hereafter made for the care and maintenance of my Mother after my estate is closed and settled, that then my nephew Elmer G. Peterson personally assume said obligation and at all times see that her needs are provided for. It is not claimed that this provision is not enforceable. We hardly think that in view of the advanced age of the mother, the provision of the will in her favor was inappropriate and showed a lack of love and respect. Rogene Peterson, sister of Elmer, was left $20,000 in the codicil. She is not complaining. So that leaves for consideration Ellen Kastner, sister of the deceased. The latter testified at length to the effect that she was at all times on a sisterly footing with the testatrix. It may be admitted for the purpose of this case that she was fairly friendly with testatrix at all times although the record shows that the testatrix was not particularly fond of Ellen. The latter was out of the state for many years and did not come to Rawlins until 1940. Her children, so far as the record shows, paid no attention to the testatrix and the latter complained that Ellen did not pay her very much attention and in fact feared, as turned out to be true, that Ellen would attempt to break her will. Ellen Kastner was not penniless. She had property when testatrix died valued at some $14,000 in addition to the house which she received from her mother. In 1951 she had an income of $2,240 as salary; $1,000 received as support payments from the Veterans Administration; $600 from the Red Cross; $1,494.56 income from a Financial Industrial Fund, a total of about $5,400 in addition to some other small income. She was made the residuary legatee in the will, and might, according to counsel for appellants under favorable circumstances, receive approximately $19,000. They say, however, that she may not receive anything, since the residuary estate could, under the will, be used in running the sheep. We do not know that to be true. In any event testatrix remembered her sister and showed her good will toward her. There was no duty on testatrix to make an equal division of her property among her relations. Thomas v. Thomas' Adm'r. 258 Ky. 236, 79 S.W. (2d) 982. These facts must be considered in the light of the rules of law applicable on the subject before us. In re Johnston's Estate, supra, we upheld a will which disinherited a sister in favor of a stranger. The court in the case of In re Goist's Estate, 146 Neb. 1, 18 N.W. (2d) 513, 521, 522, quoting from a previous case stated as follows: `No right of the citizen is more valued than the power to dispose of his property by will. No right is more solemnly assured to him by the law. Nor does it depend in any sense upon the judicious exercise of that right. It rarely happens that a man bequeaths his estate to the entire satisfaction of either his family or friends. The law wisely secures equality of distribution where a man dies intestate, but the very object of a will is to produce inequality   . In this country a man's prejudices form a part of his liberty. He has a right to them. He may be unjust to his children or relatives. He is entitled to the control of his property while living, and by will to direct its use after his death, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed by law. Where a man has sufficient memory and understanding to make a will, and such instrument is not the result of undue influence, it is not to be set aside without sufficient evidence, nor upon sentimental notions of equality.   ' Isaac V. Halderman, 76 Neb. 823, 107 N.W. 1016, 1019. In 57 Am. Jur. § 150, p. 136, it is stated as follows: In modern times, unless a statute otherwise provides, or there is a binding contract to the contrary, a testator with the requisite capacity, observing the formalities prescribed by statute for the execution of wills, may disinherit his children or other persons who would take his estate by descent in case of intestacy, without mentioning them or disclosing a reason for not favoring them with a bequest. Next of kin and relatives, no matter how near they may be, cannot be said to have any natural right to the estate of the testator which can be asserted against the legally executed will of the latter. A father may exclude his son from all share in his estate provided the estate is given to someone else. In 1 Page On Wills, supra, pp. 73, 74, 75, 76, the author states: The fact that the will is unjust and unnatural does not render it invalid. In the absence of specific statutory restrictions, testator may alter the statutory course of descent without rendering his will invalid, and may disinherit those who would take by descent if it were not for such will, such as children, acknowledged illegitimate children, although by statute they would take by descent in case though by statute they would take by descent in case of intestacy, adopted children, grandchildren, or brothers and sisters, or nephews and nieces, or parents, no matter how unjust his exclusion of his hears may be; and he may give all his property to a stranger to his blood. In the case of In re Hill's Estate, Oregon, 256 P. (2d) 735, 738, the supreme court of Oregon states: Many a contestant's high hopes, destined to disappointment, spring from a carelessly bandied use of that phrase which refers to them as the `natural objects of the testator's bounty.' Too many seem to garner therefrom a rule of law not present nor to be implied. It confers no inferential rights, nor indeed any rights, to take from one dying testate. It compels no duty upon the part of a testator to make any provision for those comprehended by its words. We recognized the rule above stated in In re Lane's Estate, 50 Wyo. 119, 58 P. (2d) 415, and in Branson v. Roelofsz, 52 Wyo. 101, 70 P. (2d) 589, although on account of the peculiar facts in that case, we held that it was not error to refuse an instruction stating the rule above mentioned without qualification.