Opinion ID: 2976834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Investigate Mitigating Factors

Text: Van Hook is correct that the performance of his trial counsel was deficient during the mitigation phase because his attorneys failed to fully investigate and present evidence of all the potential mitigating factors that could have reduced his sentence from death to life imprisonment. Counsel has a duty to investigate fully, unless counsel makes a reasonable strategic choice to limit the investigation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable judgments support the limitations on investigation.”). Our Court’s precedents make clear that a partial but ultimately incomplete mitigation investigation is inadequate. See Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 695-97 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that trial counsel was ineffective, despite having presented eight witnesses at mitigation, for failing to discover and introduce evidence that the defendant had a low I.Q., had a borderline personality disorder, was taunted at school, and was referred to as “the moron” by his mother); Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding trial counsel deficient at mitigation for failing to fully investigate the defendant’s family history and mental health, despite having conducted at least six interviews). This is particularly true when counsel’s investigation failed to reveal any of the significant, potentially mitigating details of the defendant’s personal and family history. See Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 713 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the Sixth Circuit has frequently considered [the defendant’s family history of abuse] an important mitigation factor”). Because the “history, character, and background of the offender” is expressly listed as a statutory mitigating No. 03-4207 Van Hook v. Anderson Page 4 factor, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B), it is of utmost importance for counsel to investigate fully and present any of the aspects of the defendant’s upbringing that might bear on his culpability. The ABA Guidelines explain that this investigation ought to include interviews with family members and all other people who knew the client: “It is necessary to locate and interview the client’s family members (who may suffer from some of the same impairments as the client), and virtually everyone else who knew the client and his family, including neighbors, teachers, clergy, case workers, doctors, correctional, probation or parole officers, and others.” ABA Guidelines ¶ 10.7, at 83. Such thorough interviews are necessary to reveal all potential arguments to support a case for mitigation. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have also held counsel’s performance deficient when counsel’s last-minute investigation resulted in overlooking potentially powerful mitigating evidence. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396-99 (2000) (explaining that counsel only began preparing for the mitigation proceeding “a week before the trial,” thus not having enough time to uncover records of the defendant’s “nightmarish childhood”); Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 398 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that the trial counsel spent only “two full business days” preparing for mitigation); Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1207 (holding that counsel’s failure to make any significant preparations for the mitigation phase until after the conclusion of the guilt phase was itself “objectively unreasonable”). The requirement for counsel to perform thorough, not last-minute, investigations before a mitigation hearing is further reinforced by the ABA Guidelines: “The mitigation investigation should begin as quickly as possible, because it may affect the investigation of first phase offenses, decisions about the need for expert evaluations, motions practice, and plea negotiations.” ABA Guidelines ¶ 10.7 at 82 (internal parentheticals omitted). The ABA Guidelines also explain that preparing for the mitigation phase of trial “requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family history.” Id. ¶ 10.7, at 81. Applying these clear rules to the performance of Van Hook’s trial counsel, it is clear that counsel’s investigation into and presentation of mitigating evidence was deficient. While Van Hook’s trial attorneys uncovered a little information about his traumatic childhood experience in their last-minute investigation, many of the most important details were not discovered and therefore were never presented to the sentencer. Significantly, trial counsel’s investigation failed to reveal that Van Hook’s parents repeatedly beat him (J.A. at 1619), that he had witnessed his father attempt to kill his mother several times (J.A. at 1619), and that his mother was committed to a psychiatric hospital when he was between four and five years old (J.A. at 1570). These details of his childhood are even more unsettling and potentially mitigating than the omitted family background evidence in Dickerson, where the omitted evidence simply included the fact that the defendant had been taunted at school and referred to as the “moron.” The details about Van Hook’s childhood, which were uncovered later by the more thorough investigation of Van Hook’s habeas counsel, demonstrate that trial counsel’s investigation into Van Hook’s background was never finished because the investigation was conducted at the last minute. Van Hook’s counsel did not “begin quickly” before trial. Rather after the guilt phase, counsel started a last minute investigation for the mitigation hearing. (J.A. at 4400-04.) His attorneys thus spent far less time preparing than the counsel in Williams, where counsel was deemed ineffective for not having begun preparing for mitigation until a week before the guilt phase of trial. This cursory preparation for mitigation also parallels the preparations by counsel in Glenn, which this Court held to be objectively unreasonable. By not performing the sort of extensive, thorough investigation that is a minimum requirement of trial counsel in these cases, the performance of Van Hook’s counsel turned up very little of the available mitigation evidence. Contrary to the perception of the state appellate court, this omitted evidence was much more than “merely cumulative.” State v. Van Hook, 1992 WL 308350, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 21, 1992). This omitted evidence goes far beyond the brief details of his parents’ alcohol abuse and dysfunctional relationship that were presented at mitigation. No. 03-4207 Van Hook v. Anderson Page 5 Nor can counsel’s decision to terminate the mitigation investigation before uncovering this information be considered a reasonable, strategic decision. Considering the information that they had already learned about Van Hook’s abusive family background, counsel certainly had reason to suspect that much worse details existed. But his attorneys decided not to interview or even contact Van Hook’s step-sister, his paternal uncle, two of his paternal aunts, his maternal uncle, and the psychiatrist who treated his mother when she was committed. All of these individuals could have helped his counsel narrate the true story of Van Hook’s childhood experiences in mitigation. All of them would have been willing to testify on his behalf. (J.A. 1569-73, 1619-26.)2 Failing to complete a mitigation investigation when additional family witnesses are available is not sound trial strategy; neither is waiting until four days before the mitigation hearing to begin the investigation. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395 (2000); Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 712 (6th Cir. 2007); Dickerson v. Bagley, 453 F.3d 690, 695 (6th Cir. 2006); Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2005). Because his trial lawyers failed to conduct a full mitigation investigation and present available mitigating evidence to the sentencer, their performance fell short of “prevailing professional norms,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. II. The Failure to Seek an Independent Mental Health Expert to Testify for the Defendant Trial counsel’s last minute mitigation investigation led to another violation of ABA Guidelines respecting the effective assistance of counsel: the failure to put on evidence that Van Hook’s criminal behavior was the result of severe mental illness. Only in the post-conviction phase of the case did Van Hook’s counsel seek or find an expert witness to testify that Van Hook’s crime was the result of a mental disease. All three of the experts who testified at trial were appointed by the court, not selected by the defense, and testified in favor of the prosecution’s argument that Van Hook did not suffer from a mental illness. The failure to seek or put on a mental health expert who would give evidence favorable to Van Hook was a serious error. The ABA Guidelines state what effective death penalty counsel have known and practiced for years: In deciding which witnesses and evidence to prepare concerning penalty, the areas counsel should consider are the following: Expert . . . witnesses along with supporting documentation (e.g. school records, military records) to provide medical, psychological, sociological, cultural or other insights into the client’s mental and/or emotional state and life history that may explain or lessen the client’s culpability . . . [to] otherwise support a sentence less than death . . . and/or to rebut or explain evidence presented by the prosecutor. ABA Guidelines ¶ 10.11, at 104. These standards for determining prevailing professional norms in death penalty cases highlight the way that an expert witness working closely with counsel can 2 Counsel’s decision not to introduce additional family background witnesses also cannot be justified under the strategy of attempting to prevent the sentencer from learning about prior criminal convictions. In several of our recent cases where few mitigation witnesses were introduced, we refused to find counsel’s performance deficient in large part because these witnesses likely would have had to reveal the defendant’s history of violence. See Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding counsel not to be deficient when introducing family and friend witnesses might have caused prior rape convictions to come up in cross-examination); Tinsley v. Million, 399 F.3d 796, 809 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding counsel’s decision not to introduce any mitigating character evidence reasonable because it might have revealed his prior manslaughter conviction); cf. Hartman v. Bagley, 492 F.3d 347, 360 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding counsel’s decision not to introduce expert’s report “strategic” because “it paint[ed] a decidedly unsympathetic portrait” of the defendant). To the contrary, the sentencer in Van Hook’s case already knew of his prior convictions, and any additional witnesses that might have been called would have only further developed his case for mitigation. No. 03-4207 Van Hook v. Anderson Page 6 strengthen the defense’s case for mitigation. This court has long held that these standards “represent a codification of longstanding, common-sense principles of representation understood by diligent, competent counsel in death penalty cases.” Hamblin, 354 F.3d 482, 487. They are “the clearest exposition of counsel’s duties at the penalty phase of a capital case.” Id. at 488. The complexities of Van Hook’s case demonstrate his particular need for an independent mental health expert to assist in the defense. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (J.A. at 362), and his justification for this was that he had been diagnosed with a mental illness, i.e., “borderline personality disorder.” Furthermore, after Van Hook was found guilty, one of the few statutory mitigating factors relevant to his case was whether he “lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of [his] conduct or to conform [his] conduct to the requirements of the law” as a result of a “mental disease or defect.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.04(B)(3) (emphasis added). Presenting a strong case that his psychiatric disorder constituted such a “mental disease or defect” required the aid of an independent psychiatric expert. Moreover, the other potentially mitigating factors to be weighed for his benefit were his “history, character, and background,” as well as any other mitigating factors “relevant to the issue of whether [he] should be sentenced to death.” Id. § 2929.04(B)(7). Van Hook had experienced a violent, traumatic childhood. Testimony by his father and mother during the mitigating hearing revealed that his father was abusive to his mother (J.A. at 4497), his parents had divorced when he was young (J.A. at 4500), and his father began taking him to bars at age eleven, where he was encouraged to consume alcohol and participate in fights (J.A. at 4467-69). An independent defense expert was therefore also crucial to explain to the sentencer how the details of his upbringing affected him psychologically, thereby reducing his overall culpability for the murder. An independent mental health expert was necessary to establish the strongest case of mental illness for the sentencer. Despite the fact that Van Hook was entitled to an independent mental health expert and that such an expert would have bolstered his case, his trial counsel failed to exercise this right. Because the court had found Van Hook to be indigent (J.A. at 363), and because he pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity (J.A. at 362), Van Hook had triggered his right to an expert. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 85 (1985); Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir. 2003). While the court did appoint three mental health experts to evaluate Van Hook, it is clear that none of these experts was the sort of independent expert needed by the defense. The circumstances surrounding the appointment of experts, as well as their evaluations as reported to the trial court, are summarized by the district court: Petitioner was indicted on April 18, 1985. Less than a week later, on April 23, 1985, petitioner’s defense attorneys filed a plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (“NGRI”), which triggered three court-ordered psychiatric evaluations. The trial court appointed Dr. Emmet Cooper, Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling, and the Court Psychiatric Center to conduct evaluations of petitioner pursuant to the NGRI plea. Dr. Emmet Cooper, a psychiatrist, was called by defense counsel during petitioner’s case in chief [and during the penalty phase of the trial]. He testified that petitioner suffered from a borderline personality disorder . . . . But Dr. Cooper could not say that petitioner suffered from a mental disease or defect. Dr. Nancy Schmidtgoessling, a clinical psychologist, testified for the prosecution during its rebuttal case and was also called by the defense during the penalty phase of the trial . . . . She also testified, however, that petitioner never suffered from a mental disease or defect, that he was aware of the quality and wrongfulness of his action, and that he was able to conform his conduct. No. 03-4207 Van Hook v. Anderson Page 7 Dr. Teresito Alquizola, a physician and psychiatrist, testified for the prosecution during its rebuttal case. . . . Dr. Alquizola testified that petitioner did not suffer from a mental disease or defect, and that at the time of the offense, he possessed the capacity to know the wrongfulness of his actions and, to a large extent, was able to conform his conduct. . . . In addition to the testimony given by Drs. Cooper, Schmidtgoessling, and Alquizola, a fourth report was prepared by Dr. Donna E. Winter of the Court Psychiatric Center in connection with the mitigation phase of petitioner’s trial, pursuant to [Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.06]. Dr. Winter found that petitioner suffered form a borderline personality disorder. Dr. Winter went on to conclude that . . . . petitioner was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, that he was able to appreciate the criminality of his actions, and that he was capable of conforming his conduct. (Emphasis added, J.A. at 5934-36.) It is evident from a review of the district court’s summary that, of the four experts whose evaluations were considered as evidence, three were appointed by the trial court as an automatic response to Van Hook’s insanity plea, and the fourth was retained by the prosecution. Van Hook’s counsel did not seek an independent expert, as did the prosecution, but instead relied on the experts that had been triggered for Van Hook by his plea. This deficiency parallels the performance of counsel in Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 717 (6th Cir. 2007), where we recently held counsel’s performance to be deficient for choosing to rely on the report of a courtappointed expert instead of utilizing available funds for an independent expert. It is also analogous to the performance of counsel in Glenn v. Tate, 71 F.3d 1204, 1210 (6th Cir. 1995), where we faulted counsel for “settl[ing] for court-appointed experts whose reports were to be given to the jury . . . rather than exercising the [defendant’s] right to obtain defense experts.” The record undermines the State’s argument that Dr. Cooper (whom Van Hook called in the absence of his own expert during both the guilt and mitigation phases of trial) was a sufficient expert who was independent of the prosecution. Dr. Cooper testified during the mitigation hearing that Van Hook had “no remorse,” that he was a “dangerous individual,” and that he did not suffer from a “mental illness or defect.” (J.A. at 4443.) Dr. Cooper was not an effective substitute for a real mental health expert selected by the defense. The expert opinion of Dr. Martin Ryan, a psychiatrist retained by Van Hook’s habeas counsel, demonstrates the magnitude of this failure. Dr. Ryan stated that it is more likely than not that a reasonable psychiatrist at the time would have concluded that Van Hook’s severe borderline personality disorder was indeed a mental disease and met the test of “mental disease or defect” established by the Ohio statute quoted above. (J.A. at 5879.) His affidavit, which was submitted to the district court, explained that the disorder was considered a mental disease under the generally accepted standards approved by the American Psychiatric Association. (J.A. at 5879.) Respondent did nothing to rebut these statements by Dr. Ryan either in its brief or at oral argument. No. 03-4207 Van Hook v. Anderson Page 8