Opinion ID: 2982747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: CERCLA Background

Text: Before turning to the facts of this particular case, some background on CERCLA is useful. In general, CERCLA imposes liability on parties who played a role in polluting a site: by owning and operating the site; by sending hazardous waste to the site; or by participating in transporting hazardous waste to the site.3 CERCLA also gives a variety of methods for liable parties to obtain reimbursement from other liable parties to apportion costs in an equitable fashion. For example, parties that voluntarily incur costs can bring cost recovery actions under CERCLA § 107 against other liable parties.4 CERCLA § 113(f) separately allows contribution actions for any “person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement.”5 We have repeatedly considered the interplay between cost recovery actions and contribution actions, including most recently in Hobart, where we resolved several issues relevant to this appeal. First, in Hobart, we held that a response cost directly incurred by a party that is recoverable using a § 113(f) contribution action is not also recoverable under the cost recovery provisions of § 107.6 3 CERCLA § 107(a). For simplicity, throughout this opinion we cite to CERCLA without providing the parallel U.S. Code citation. In general, CERCLA § 1xx can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 96xx. For example, CERCLA § 107 is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 4 CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B); see United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128 (2007). 5 CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B). 6 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 767-68. -3- No. 14-5730, LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp. et al. Second, in Hobart, we held that for an administrative settlement to support a contribution action, it must resolve the plaintiff’s “liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action.”7 This determination is case-specific, and requires the court to “interpret the settlement agreement as a contract according to state-law principles.”8 Third, in Hobart, we addressed the relevant statute of limitations where the plaintiff seeks contribution after an administrative settlement. In doing so, we considered two potentially relevant limitations provisions. On one hand, under CERCLA § 113(g)(2)(A), a party seeking to recover the costs of a removal action under § 107 faces a three year statute of limitations running from the completion of the removal action.9 On the other hand, under CERCLA § 113(g)(3) (the “Contribution Limitations Provision”), a party seeking contribution after an administrative settlement with the EPA that resolves liability must satisfy a three year statute of limitations running from the settlement’s effective date.10 7 Id. at 768 (quoting CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(B)). 8 Id. (citation omitted). 9 CERCLA § 113(g)(2)(A) (“An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section [107] must be commenced– (A) for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal action, except that such cost recovery action must be brought within 6 years after a determination to grant a waiver under section [104(c)(1)(C)] for continued response action . . . .”). 10 CERCLA § 113(g)(3) (“No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more than 3 years after– (A) the date of judgment in any action under this chapter for recovery of such costs or damages, or (B) the date of an administrative order under section [122(g)] (relating to de minimis settlements) or [122(h)] (relating to cost recovery settlements) or entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.”). -4- No. 14-5730, LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp. et al. We concluded in Hobart that CERCLA’s Contribution Limitations Provision gives a three year statute of limitations on all actions for contribution after an administrative settlement.11 The Contribution Limitations Provision mentions two types of administrative settlements, those reached under CERCLA § 122(g) or CERCLA § 122(h), and expressly provides that the statute of limitations begins to run on the effective date of these kinds of settlements.12 In Hobart, we also recognized that administrative settlements other than those expressly referenced in CERCLA’s Contribution Limitations Provision can give rise to contribution rights. For example, although the settlement in Hobart was reached under § 122(a)–not a type of settlement mentioned in the Contribution Limitations Provision–it nonetheless gave rise to contribution rights because it resolved liability.13 In Hobart, we further observed that the Contribution Limitations Provision was silent on the triggering date for the statute of limitations for these types of administrative settlements. We rejected the idea that the statute of limitations should have no starting date. Instead, we “borrowed” an analogous triggering event.14 We concluded that the most similar triggering event was the effective date of the agreement that gave rise to the right to pursue the contribution action.15 11 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 772 (citing RSR Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 496 F.3d 552, 556, 558 (6th Cir. 2007)). 12 CERCLA § 113(g)(3). 13 Hobart, 758 F.3d at 774-75. 14 Id. 15 Id. at 775. -5- No. 14-5730, LWD PRP Group v. Alcan Corp. et al. In reaching these conclusions, we rejected a number of contrary arguments, including the argument that because the Contribution Limitations Provision gave some triggering events, it should not apply outside the presence of the identified triggering events.16