Opinion ID: 4574286
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felon In Possession (FIP) Conviction

Text: Blocker offers two arguments in contesting his FIP conviction. First, he argues that he was entitled to reversal because, after his FIP conviction, we overturned on appeal the felony (robbery) conviction on which his FIP conviction had been predicated. Second, Blocker maintains that even if the FIP conviction is affirmed, it should nonetheless be remanded for resentencing because enhancement 5 no longer was legally justified. Blocker, however, did not object at trial to use of his robbery conviction to establish an essential element of FIP or as a predicate for sentencing. Therefore, we review this conviction, including sentencing, for plain error.7
The FIP statute prohibits any person from possessing a firearm if that person “[h]as been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[.]”8 At the time of his arrest, Blocker had four felony convictions: robbery, receiving stolen property (over $1000), unauthorized use of a vehicle, and destruction of property (over $1000). Moreover, Blocker stipulated at trial that he had “previously been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Thereafter, Blocker was convicted of FIP and 7 Malloy v. United States, 186 A.3d 802, 814 (D.C. 2018) (permitting reversal only if there is “[1] ‘error’ that is [2] ‘plain’ (meaning ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’), that [3] ‘affects substantial rights,’ and that, if not corrected, [4] would result in a ‘miscarriage of justice’ (meaning conviction of an innocent defendant) or otherwise would ‘seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” (quoting Wooden v. United States, 6 A.3d 833, 834 n.5 (D.C. 2010) (brackets in original)). 8 § 22-4503(a)(1). 6 received an enhanced forty-month sentence based on his prior robbery conviction9 then pending on appeal. Approximately six months after he was sentenced in this case, we reversed his robbery conviction. 10 Blocker asks for reversal of his FIP conviction because the trial court used his robbery conviction to enhance his sentence, despite the fact that his robbery conviction, still pending appeal, was not final. The FIP statute, D.C. Code § 224503(a)(1), prohibits a person from possessing a firearm if that individual “[h]as been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”; 11 it does not require prior conviction of a crime of violence, such as robbery. Putting aside his robbery conviction, we note that Blocker had been convicted of three non-violent felonies, each of which could have been used to meet the FIP requirement of a prior felony conviction. Moreover, the indictment itself does not specify that Blocker had been convicted of a violent felony; it stated 9 See infra Section II.B. 10 Blocker, et. al. v. United States, No. 16-CF-388, Mem. Op. & J. (D.C. Aug. 21, 2018). 11 § 22-4503 (a)(1) (emphasis added). 7 only that he had been convicted of “a crime.”12 Finally, the jury did not know that Blocker had been convicted of a robbery; it knew only that he had stipulated to conviction of “a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.” Accordingly, because any of Blocker’s other three felonies would have satisfied the FIP requirement, the fact that his robbery conviction was reversed does not change the ultimate outcome; Blocker was not erroneously convicted of FIP — given that his sentence had not otherwise been contested at trial.
Blocker argues that if his FIP conviction is affirmed, he is nonetheless entitled to a remand for resentencing because his invalid robbery conviction had been used to justify an “illegal” sentence. The FIP statute states that a person who violates subsection (a)(1): shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 10 years and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a mandatory-minimum term of 1 year, unless she or he has 12 The indictment charges: “On or about September 2, 2017, . . . Denzel Blocker, previously having been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, owned, kept, and had within his possession and control, a firearm.” Mistakenly, Blocker states in his reply brief that “[t]he indictment and Information in this case reference a ‘crime of violence.’” 8 a prior conviction for a crime of violence other than conspiracy, in which case she or he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years and shall be sentenced to a mandatory-minimum term of 3 years.13 Following the jury’s guilty finding, the trial court used Blocker’s prior robbery conviction to sentence Blocker to an enhanced forty months. At the time of sentencing, this was not necessarily erroneous. We had not yet reversed his robbery conviction; Blocker therefore still had “a prior conviction for a crime of violence other than conspiracy,”14 and the trial court understandably considered itself required (absent objection to the contrary) to sentence Blocker, at the very least, to the mandatory minimum of three years. Blocker claims, however, that even if we do “not reverse,” he is entitled to resentencing because (1) “the underlying predicate felony, robbery, was reversed on direct appeal,” and (2) “the sentencing court considered a prior invalid conviction, robbery, that was unconstitutionally secured.” 13 § 22-4503(b)(1) (emphasis added). 14 Id. 9 Blocker offers no convincing authority, and elaborates no further rationale, establishing his ultimate argument that his FIP conviction had been “unconstitutionally secured.”15 His lesser, more elaborate argument is a statutory contention that, to justify an enhanced sentence based on a “prior conviction for a crime of violence,” the FIP statute presupposes reliance on a prior “final” conviction. According to Blocker, FIP “cannot be interpreted” to permit enhancement of sentences for “persons whose predicate convictions have been vacated or reversed on appeal” or — like Blocker’s robbery conviction — were “pending direct review” when employed to enhance a sentence. The federal cases on which Blocker relies, however, expressly requiring finality of a prior conviction 15 In making his constitutional claim, Blocker cites only one case: an Illinois intermediate appellate court decision reversing a conviction predicated on a sentence enhancement derived from a pending conviction later vacated as unconstitutional. See People v. Cavette, 118 N.E.3d 699 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). This non-binding decision from Illinois is inapposite. The predicate felony in Cavette was based on a statute that was declared “facially unconstitutional,” id. at 703-06, and therefore the predicate felony conviction was void at the outset. Here, however, Blocker’s robbery conviction was reversed because of misjoinder, not a constitutional deficiency with the statute. Finally, in his reply brief, Blocker states that the constitutional violations he has in mind are the Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. He offers no supportive reasoning, however, and we perceive none. 10 under differently worded felon-in-possession statutes, provide no guidance as to how our FIP statute must be read. 16 In any event, we need not resolve Blocker’s FIP contention because he offers still another argument for resentencing that we find persuasive: the trial court failed to follow a mandatory sentencing procedure. He stresses that, when considering a sentence enhancement, the prosecutor must file an “information” pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-111(a)(1) (2012 Repl.) stating “in writing the previous convictions to be relied on,” and then must serve a copy on the defendant or counsel. Thereafter, the trial court, “before pronouncement of sentence,” must also satisfy two requirements pursuant to § 23-111(b): [1] ask the defendant “whether he affirms or denies” the convictions “alleged in the information,” and [2] inform the defendant that “any challenge to a previous conviction which is not made before sentence is imposed may not thereafter be raised to attack the sentence.” 16 See, e.g., United States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 466-67 (11th Cir. 1982) (interpreting enhancement provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), mandating additional penalties where the defendant commits a federal drug offense “after one or more prior [federal drug law] convictions . . . have become final” and holding that the words “have become final” requires exhaustion of “all avenues of direct attack”) (emphasis added); United States v. Meraz, 998 F.2d 182, 184 (3d Cir. 1993) (same); Williams v. United States, 651 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1981) (same; holding exhaustion of appellate remedies includes petitions for writ of certiorari); United States v. Allen, 566 F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding “final” language in statute meant conviction was not subject to direct appellate review). 11 Blocker maintains that the court failed to satisfy these two requirements and that its failure to do so entitles him “to have his case remanded for re-sentencing.”17 The government responds to Blocker’s resentencing demand by arguing that Blocker had failed to “object to the use of his robbery conviction” for enhancement of his sentence, had “not shown good cause for his failure” to do so, and thus has “waived” the argument. The government premises waiver on an alleged “stipulation at trial that satisfied the prior-conviction element” and, further, on an “explicit agreement at sentencing that the enhanced mandatory-minimum term applied.” The government does not elaborate its support for this vague waiver argument beyond reliance on the court-initiated colloquy with counsel immediately before sentencing: “Mr. Blocker has a prior crime of violence. So . . . his guideline range is 30 to 72 months, but there is a 36 month mandatory minimum. Do both counsel agree with those calculations?” Both counsel replied “yes.” 17 Blocker did not expressly make his § 23-111(b) argument until his reply brief. However, by his citing § 23-111 generally in his opening brief, the government’s response citing § 23-111 (a) and (c) in its brief, and the government’s apparently basing its waiver argument on § 23-111(b), we are satisfied that the government was fully aware of, and responded to, all applicable provisions of § 23-111. Thus, we need not penalize Blocker for failing to raise § 23-111(b) in his opening brief. Cf. Stockard v. Moss, 706 A.2d 561, 566 (D.C. 1997) (“It is the longstanding policy of this court not to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). 12 Whatever ground this colloquy was intended to cover — and we assume that the government intended the colloquy to satisfy § 23-111(b) or to waive it — that colloquy did not track the language of § 23-111(b). And in any event, even if the colloquy could be interpreted to have covered the first requirement (asking Blocker to affirm or deny a qualifying previous conviction), it stretches the discussion too far to say that the court satisfied the second requirement: to inform Blocker that any “challenge to a previous conviction” must be made “before sentence,” otherwise an “attack” thereafter would be foreclosed. Contrary to the government’s argument, therefore, we cannot say for sure that a “stipulation” or “explicit agreement” at sentencing satisfied the trial court’s § 23-111(b) obligation. When it comes to sentence enhancement, § 23-111(b) imposes an initial burden on the trial court, not on the defendant, to announce and establish the ground rules for a defense challenge. We emphasized this allocation of responsibility in Sanders: “Because enhanced sentencing involves imprisonment for extended periods of time, we have repeatedly mandated strict compliance with the procedures set forth in the [D.C.] code.”18 We also stressed in Sanders that “the ‘touchstone’ of judicial compliance with § 23-111 is notice to the 18 Sanders v. United States, 809 A.2d 584, 601 (D.C. 2002) (quoting Boswell v. United States, 511 A.2d 29, 31 (D.C. 1986)). 13 defendant.”19 But we added that, even “when such notice is given,” harmless error, precluding “remand for resentencing,” is limited to “technical violations.” 20 It may be true here that both the court and the parties (represented by well informed counsel) had in mind, as the government puts it, that Blocker stipulated away any § 23-111(b) argument. But it is equally possible, indeed more likely, that the important purpose of that two-pronged provision was unfulfilled, especially the required warning about the time limitation on any further “attack” on the enhanced sentence. No mere technical violation is at issue here. We therefore must remand the case for resentencing premised on reversal of the unlawful robbery conviction that underlay Blocker’s enhanced sentence.