Opinion ID: 2063092
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does the city of madison have standing to challenge the constitutionality of sec. 102.03(4), stats.?

Text: The City of Madison and Employers Mutual assert that the amendment to sec. 102.03 (4) violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. They argue that a retrospective extension of the statute of limitations after its expiration amounts to a taking of property without due process of law. [1] The first question is whether the appellants have standing to bring such a challenge to the statute. This court has repeatedly held that a municipality, as a creature of the legislature, lacks the legal capacity to challenge the constitutionality of a statute. In Town of Germantown v. Village of Germantown, 70 Wis.2d 704, 709, 235 N.W.2d 486 (1975), this court restated the general rule: It has been a long-standing rule in this state that legislatively created entities of the state, including towns, have no capacity to make constitutional challenges to statutes. Village of Sussex v. Department of Natural Resources, 68 Wis.2d 187, 197, 228 N.W.2d 173 (1975); Marshfield v. Cameron, 24 Wis.2d 56, 63, 127 N.W.2d 809 (1964); State ex rel. LaCrosse v. Rothwell, 25 Wis.2d 228, 233, 130 N.W.2d 806, 131 N.W.2d 699 (1964); Columbia County v. Wisconsin Retirement Fund, 17 Wis.2d 310, 116 N.W.2d 142 (1962). An argument similar to that raised by the town with respect to procedural statutes granting a legal entity the capacity to sue to protect its interests was raised in Columbia County, supra . This court therein held that such enabling statutes do not abrogate the traditional rule cited above. [2] This court has recognized two exceptions to this nostanding rule: (1) if it is the agency's official duty to do so, or the agency will be personally affected if it fails to do so and the statute is held invalid, and, (2) if the issue is of great public concern. Town of Germantown, supra at 710. The great public concern exception was advanced in Fulton Foundation v. Department of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312 (1961) in which the court allowed the Department of Taxation to challenge the constitutionality of a retroactive exemption from gift tax. Reciting the general rule that state agencies or public officers cannot question the constitutionality of a statute unless it is their official duty to do so, or they will be personally affected if they fail to do so, and the statute is held invalid, the court nevertheless allowed the department standing to challenge the tax exemption, commenting, we deem the exceptional situation in which it will be permitted to do so should be limited to situations involving issues of great public concern. Id. at 11, 13. The court also stated in Fulton Foundation, supra at 14b that There is a further reason of policy for holding that the department should be permitted to raise this particular issue of constitutionality. This is that unless the department is permitted to do so there is little likelihood that any taxpayer will. . . . However, this court has emphasized that Fulton Foundation did not create a third exception based on the sole fact that there is little likelihood that any other affected individual would bring a challenge. Rather the fact that no individual is likely to challenge the statute may be a consideration in the judicial determination of whether the issue falls into the great public concern exception. Town of Germantown, supra at 711. The great public concern exception has been applied sparingly. In Fulton Foundation, supra, the issue was whether a retroactive exemption from gift tax resulted in a diversion of public funds for private purposes. In Associated Hospital Service v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis.2d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271 (1961), the city of Milwaukee challenged a tax exemption for non-profit hospital service corporations as violative of the uniformity of taxation clause of the state constitution and of equal protection of the laws. State ex rel. Singer v. Boos, 44 Wis.2d 374, 171 N.W.2d 307 (1969) raised the question of whether an ordinance increasing the retirement allowances of retired county employees was for a public purpose. In Unified School District No. 1 of Racine County v. W.E.R.C., 81 Wis.2d 89, 259 N.W.2d 724 (1977), the school district was allowed to argue that the Municipal Employment Relations Act violated the one person, one vote principle of the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, the court has declined to allow constitutional challenges by legislatively created entities in: Town of Germantown, supra (challenge to the constitutionality of statute providing for annexation of town islands); State ex rel. LaCrosse v. Rothwell, supra (challenge to statute requiring that all territory within the state be within school districts operating high schools); Columbia County, supra (challenge to mandatory inclusion of twenty-six counties in retirement program which had not voluntarily become subject to the Wisconsin Retirement Fund); Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis.2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976) (challenge to the negative aid provisions of the school finance law as violative of the rule of uniform taxation mandated by the state constitution). [3] In comparison, the instant case deals with the extension of worker's compensation eligibility to a small class of applicants. The fiscal note to the bill creating this amendment (AB 505, 1971) estimated that perhaps one or two individuals would fall into the class. The court has refused to apply the great public concern exception in cases which were of much broader statewide concern. We decline to apply it here.