Opinion ID: 2112722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Filing, Recording and Indexing Generally

Text: A central issue to the case sub judice is which party should bear the burden, or possible loss, occasioned by an incorrect indexing of an apparently properly filed (although possibly mis-captioned) notice of lis pendens. The receiver argues that the [Clerks'] improper indexing of the notices of lis pendens did not negate the effect of filing of said notices as to Appellants. In appellants' view, on the other hand, their inability to locate the filed but incorrectly indexed notices of lis pendens among the Clerks' records, prompts them to depict themselves, although they are not technically purchasers, as more akin to bona fide purchasers than to purchasers pendente lite. Maryland Code (1974, 2003 Repl.Vol.), § 3-301 of the Real Property Article entitled Record Books combined with Real Property Article Section 3-302 Indexes, read together as they must be, express the intent of the Legislature in this area. Section 3-301(a) Land Records., provides in relevant part: ..., the clerk of the circuit court of each county shall record every deed and other instrument [ [10] ] affecting property in well-bound books to be named `Land Records', if that is the practice in the county, or on microfilm, if that is the practice.... Section 3-302(a) In general., provides in relevant part: The clerk of the circuit court of each county shall make and maintain a full and complete general alphabetical index of every deed, and other instrument in a well-bound book in his office.... (Emphasis added.) Section 3-302(e)(2) provides in relevant part: The clerk shall rely on the instrument that is accompanied by the intake sheet for indexing of grantor's and grantee's names. A notice of lis pendens is intended to, and does, affect the title to property, in that its purpose is to notify any future purchaser of the title to the property that they will take the property subject to the result of the pending litigation. Because a notice of lis pendens affects title to real property, it is required by statute to be recorded  in well-bound books  to be named Land Records. If it is required to be recorded in the Land Records, as we hold it is, then it comes under the provisions of the statute that require it to be maintained in a complete alphabetical index. The Legislature has required any instrument affecting title to real property, to be both recorded and to be indexed. The stated purpose of Md. Rule 12-102 is to facilitate the creation of constructive notice in respect to any action that affects title to ... real property. Section (a) Scope. This Court's adoption of Rule 12-102, and its language as to filing, must be considered in light of the requirements of the statutes and common law it was intended to facilitate, and thus must be read broadly as incorporating the indexing (and other) requirements of the various statutes. Were the Court to hold that because the Rule does not contain a direct indexing requirement, it affords notice without indexing, we in effect, would overrule the statutory requirement that instruments affecting title must be indexed. Such an interpretation would change the statutory requirements for the placing of notices, i.e., instruments affecting title to real property in the land records of a county  and that they be indexed. It is helpful to understand one of the important purposes of recording and indexing in the first instance. Instruments of conveyance (including mortgages) were, under the common law, valid as between the grantor and grantee even if never recorded. Recordation systems, as they relate to real property, evolved in order to insure that owners of property were not able to convey or mortgage the same property to several people at the same time. A primary purpose of the recording and indexing statutes that came into being was to provide a way to give notice to purchasers, mortgagors, lien holders and the like, of the prior conveyances of, or encumbrances on, the property of a particular person. Recording and indexing was not necessary to determine title to property as between the seller and buyer but only to determine priorities as between subsequent claimants to title interests, i.e., third parties, such as the banks in the instant case. This Court long ago recognized the importance of recording and indexing in the case of Plaza Corp. v. Alban Tractor Co., 219 Md. 570, 583, 151 A.2d 170, 176-77 (1959), where we were concerned with a legislative enactment relating to the recording and indexing of certain instruments in Baltimore County. A provision of the Baltimore County Code provided that in cases where an instrument affects title to, or any interest in, both land and personal property that the clerk `shall include a notation that such instrument has been recorded among such Land Records...' in the chattel index. Id. at 583, 151 A.2d at 177. As relevant to the instant case, the Court went on to note that the statutory provision makes the entry or notation in the chattel index constitute an essential part of the actual recordation of the instrument in the Chattel Records. Id. We noted our reasons, reasons equally relevant in the real property indexing case sub judice: If this were not so, we would have this anomalous situation: We would have a registry statute requiring the clerk to keep a set of Land Records, a set of Chattel Records and a separate general alphabetical index for each; when an instrument is presented for record that covers both real and personal property, the statute provides that it shall be spread upon the Land Records and not upon the Chattel Records, but a notation thereof shall be made in the general index of the Chattel Records, which shall have the same effect as though it were spread in full upon the Chattel Records; if this [were to] be treated as a mere failure to index and not as a lack of a complete recording, there would be no possible way for a subsequent prospective purchaser or creditor to locate the instrument dealing with [the] personal property without a search of the Land Records, something that no one would do .... .... The clerk spread it upon the Land Records and the general index of the Land Records, but failed to comply with the statute in noting the same in the general index of the Chattel Records. Who must suffer for the clerk's mistake? There is a division of opinion in this country as to the correct answer to this question. Some cases hold that the grantee [In the case sub judice the Receiver is the person seeking to establish his priority and is in essence in the position of what the Plaza Corp Court refers to as a grantee [11] ] controls the instrument; he can record it or not as he pleases; he, alone, has the right and the opportunity to see that it is properly recorded by the registration officer; hence, if he fails to give the notice required by law, he must bear the consequences, and third persons need not go beyond the records to ascertain the title of the property involved. Other cases, under certain statutes and construction of statutes, which make instruments operative as records from the time they are filed for record, hold to the contrary, and state that any error occurring after the instrument is filed for record is chargeable to third persons.... 4 American Law of Property, sec. 17.31; 5 Tiffany, Real Property, (3rd Ed.), sec. 1273. Tiffany, op. cit., and the American Law of Property place Maryland in the first category with the case of Brydon v. Campbell, 40 Md. 331 [(1874)]. There, a deed conveyed a four-tenths portion of a tract of land. By mistake, the clerk transcribed it upon the register as a fourteenth part thereof. This Court held that a third party was only chargeable with constructive notice of what the record disclosed. The American Law of Property, supra, at page 620 agrees with the Brydon case, and points out with force and persuasive reasoning that sound logic implies that ... the record itself is the only evidence upon which a later purchaser is to rely, or which should be considered in deciding whether he has record notice; otherwise a purchaser's only safe course would be to insist upon an opportunity to inspect all of the original instruments in his grantor's chain of title, something that is entirely impractical. [ [12] ] We therefore hold that as the notation of the Plaza mortgage in the general Chattel Record index was an essential part of its recordation and the clerk failed to note it in said Chattel Record Index, he failed to `record' the same in the Chattel Records, which rendered it ineffective to constitute constructive notice to third parties.  Id. at 583-585, 151 A.2d at 177-178 (some emphasis added); accord Waicker v. Banegura, 357 Md. 450, 745 A.2d 419 (2000). One of the issues in Brydon, supra, involved an issue extremely similar to the present issue as to who should bear the burden of mistake in respect to mistakes made by a clerk in the recording process. It involved who, if anyone, would bear the risk when the clerk manually copied a deed presented for record. [13] We initially noted, [b]ut it is very clear that such notice can only be of what the record disclosed. Brydon, 40 Md. at 337. When copying from the original document, the clerk had written in the land records that the particular instrument conveyed: ` [T]he undivided fourteenth part of the land. This, it seems, resulted from a mistake of the clerk, which was corrected long afterwards, so as to read four-tenths, according to the words of the original deed; this correction was made as late as August 7th, 1865, after the commencement of this suit. So far, therefore, as Brydon is affected with constructive notice from the land records, it can only be, of an interest in Governeur Jr., to the extent of one fourteenth part. ' Id. at 338. Because of the Clerk's mistake, the Court held that the third party was only on notice of an encumbrance as to a fourteenth part interest instead of a four-tenths interest. Thus the risk was on the party filing the instrument. Frank v. Storer, 308 Md. 194, 517 A.2d 1098 (1986) and Standard Finance Co. v. Little, 159 Md. 621, 152 A. 264 (1930) are cases that on the surface might appear to support the position of the Receivers. But, Standard Finance was not a case of priorities between parties asserting interests in real property, but a claim by a party against a Clerk of Court, where the party had lost his priority because of mis-indexing. The party in question was suing the Clerk for damages and, thus, its language as to burdens to correct mistakes in indexing as between parties was dicta. The Frank case was based solely on the language of Standard Finance. In relying on the Standard Finance case in Frank, we stated that we were doing so, at least in part, because the Legislature had not changed the statute subsequent to our Standard Finance case. We were mistaken. The Legislature had in fact changed the statute. At the time of Standard Finance, the statute as to recording included the phrase and other instruments affecting the title, but the provision in respect to indexing did not. Md.Code (1957, 1966 Repl.Vol.), Art. 17 § 50. At that time the indexing statute used the language and other conveyances of record instead of instruments affecting title or instruments of record. Md. Code (1957, 1966 Repl Vol.), Art. 17 § 54 (emphasis added). Notices of lis pendens, although instruments, are not conveyances  they convey nothing. That older language in the indexing statute (conveyances) stayed the same through the 1966 Replacement Volume. By the time of the 1981 Replacement Volume, however, Article 17 section 54 had become § 3-302 Indexes of the Real Property Article. In the process of this re-enactment of the provisions relating to recording and indexes, the language of the section relating to indexes was changed, and as changed was consistent with the recording section. It used and other instrument instead of conveyances of record. Md.Code (1974, 1981 Repl.Vol.), § 3-302(a) of the Real Property Article. Accordingly, when this Court in overruling the Court of Special Appeals decision in Frank v. Storer, 66 Md.App. 459, 504 A.2d 1163 (1986) based its holding on the fact that the Legislature had not changed the statute in a relevant manner since the time of Standard Finance, albeit the Court was referring to an express allocation of risk, we simply were not correct. At the time of Standard Finance, only conveyances were required to be indexed, albeit instruments affecting title were required to be recorded. Today, instruments affecting title, including notices of lis pendens, are required to be recorded and indexed  the indexing provisions require that any instruments in the land records must be indexed. In that event, our recent Waiker case clearly controls in spite of Frank and Standard Finance. Indexing mistakes should be at the risk of the person who had the ability to insure that the document was indexed correctly  the filer. We distinguished both Standard Finance and Frank in Waicker and specifically noted they were not controlling there. Waicker, 357 Md. at 462 n. 9, 745 A.2d at 424 n. 9. The Standard Finance and Frank cases were based on far different contexts and, as applicable here in a case between competing priorities, can not be read as overruling the specific prior holdings of Plaza Corporation and Brydon. To the extent that Frank and Standard Finance, conflict with the present case or with Waicker, they are overruled. We continue by offering a brief description of the process of examination of titles, i.e., the examination of land record instruments, which is a relatively laborious process that changed little during the first centuries following this nation's founding. The importance of correct indexing being a necessary part of filing and recording of instruments affecting property  if the purpose of the document is to afford constructive notice  can only be understood, if one fully understands the nature of the title examination process. In this respect, we refer not to the commercial operators of title houses, but to the primary examination of titles located in land records, upon which all purchasers and insurers basically rely. [14] A title examiner goes to the place where the land records and other applicable records repose. He or she develops a chain of title, i.e., a list of the people who have owned the property for the last specified period of years. The property, or various fractional interests in it, may have been owned by one person or a hundred persons over that particular period of time. Then, during the periods in which each owner owned the property, or any portion of it or interest in it, the examiner must check to see whether during the period that particular owner owned the property, he or she had sold or mortgaged his or her interest in it to someone other than the person above him in the chain of title (in essence selling or mortgaging the same property more than once) or whether during the period of time each particular owner owned the property any judgments were rendered against such respective owner or whether, during that period any suits were filed anywhere that might constitute lis pendens against the respective owner and to the property while that owner owned it. As a practical matter it is impossible in a lifetime to examine every original document of every kind ever filed in the land and other records, which would be necessary if the buyer or lender is to be assured that the property is lien free and is owned by the person who is selling it, if the buyer or mortgage lender is required to be responsible for non-indexing or mis-indexing. Presume that an owner in 2000 had owned a subject property in Baltimore City for four years. In the year 1999-2000 there were 31,000 civil cases alone filed in that jurisdiction; in the year 1998-1999 there were 32,742 civil cases filed; in 1997-1998 there were 28,119 civil cases filed; and in 1996-1997 there were 26,877 civil cases filed in the Circuit Court of that jurisdiction. Altogether, during the period our seller owned the property there were 118,737 civil cases filed. Additionally, the title examiner under such circumstances would have to examine all cases pending at the beginning of the respective period of time  in the example given there were an additional 107,920 civil cases pending in that jurisdiction at the beginning of 1996-1997. If mis-indexing were to be at the risk of the buyer or, as in the present case, at the risk of the banks who are the third-party mortgagees, the person examining the title would have to personally read all the papers filed in those 226,658 cases in addition to federal lien dockets, tax records and the millions of other documents in the land records in order to insure that none of them constituted lis pendens against the property and to verify that nothing adversely affecting title occurred while the last owner (seller) held complete and clear title to the property. [15] Then, once that is accomplished (which is impossible in the first instance) the title examiner would have to do the same thing in respect to the period of time that each prior owner owned the property, millions of additional documents (usually for a period of at least 60 years at the time the writer was examining titles). Relying on indexing is the only thing that makes it possible for title attorneys to limit the examination of documents to those that are relevant, generally those cases and documents indexed in the grantor's or debtor's name. If indexing were to be eliminated, the marketability of titles would be seriously compromised and the entire system of property in this country might collapse. The contrary position, i.e., indexing is not required, would result in millions of documents having to be reviewed to certify a clear title. It would be an impossible task. With indexing as a requirement of the process as provided for by statute, the title examiner needs to review only the documents reflected on the appropriate index entries under the respective owners, and prior owners' names, to verify that the documents identified on the indexes do, or do not, affect title. It is still tedious but it can be, and regularly is, accomplished. The most important public records relating to the examination of land titles are the indexes. Everything depends on indexing. Without indexing nothing works. The Legislature has recognized that importance by requiring indexing as a vital part of the recording of instruments affecting title to real property. The court in Coco v. Ranalletta, 189 Misc.2d 535, 733 N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y.Sup. Ct.2001) in determining that a name indexed with an additional letter did not provide constructive notice of the senior mortgagee's lien, stated: [A]lthough the name Ranaletta and the name Ranalletta may appear and sound similar, there are actually 25 letters of the alphabet separating the two names. If the alphabetical method of indexing, as provided in [the statute], were interpreted to include methods such as searching by use of the first several letters of a person's last name or a phonetic search, uncertainty would be introduced into the recording and searching of land titles and liens. Such a system would depend, in part, upon the community standards for title examination, which has been held to be relevant only in an action brought against a recording officer or title examiner, but irrelevant on the question of constructive notice. Id. at 540, 733 N.Y.S.2d at 853. In the case of Vicars v. Salyer, 111 Va. 307, 68 S.E. 988, 989 (1910), the Supreme Court of Virginia early on observed that, although not explicitly stated in that state's lis pendens statute, indexing was an integral part of the docketing of the lis pendens. Were it not a crucial component, the remedial aspects of the lis pendens statute would be thwarted: Because of the hardship which frequently resulted from the enforcement of the rule, especially to bona fide purchasers, statutes have been passed in England and in many of the states of this country intended, as far as practicable, to remedy the mischiefs of the old law, or to lessen its hardships. One of the objects of the Legislature in enacting [the lis pendens statute] manifestly was to provide a means by which a person desiring to purchase land might by an examination of the deed books in the county where the land was situated ascertain whether or not there was pending a suit which might affect the title to the land. This object could not be accomplished by the mere leaving of the memorandum required with the clerk. An examination of the deed books would disclose nothing in regard to the pending suit, unless, as the section provides, that memorandum was spread upon or recorded in the deed book. As before stated, if indexing the lis pendens after it has been spread upon or recorded in the deed book is not an essential part of its docketing, then copying the memorandum in the deed book is not, for the language of the section cannot be mandatory as to the one and merely directory as to the other. In an action to quiet title, Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac, 80 N.J. 446, 404 A.2d 21 (1979), the New Jersey Supreme Court opined, in respect to the New Jersey Recording Act which compels the recording of all instruments affecting title, on the notice provided by a prior recorded deed: The statutes have been consistently interpreted to mean that the subsequent purchaser will be bound only by those instruments which can be discovered by a ` reasonable ' search of the particular chain of title. That is, a prospective purchaser need only search the records to discover conveyances or other significant acts of an owner from the date the deed into that person was recorded until the date he relinquishes record title. Id. at 456, 404 A.2d at 26 (emphasis added). [16] The holding of Palamarg Realty was invoked by the plaintiffs in Manchester Fund, Ltd. v. First American Title Ins. Co., 332 N.J.Super. 336, 753 A.2d 740 (Law Div.1999), a case in which the United States sought civil forfeiture of a property purportedly purchased with money acquired through drug trafficking. The government filed a notice of lis pendens that was indexed in the county records under United States of America instead of under the last name of the property's title holder (similar to the situation in the present case). Soon thereafter, the title owner ceased paying property taxes and Manchester Fund purchased the tax lien on the property and sought title insurance from First American Title Insurance Company and another title company. The title policy included a rider which disclaimed certain defects, liens or encumbrances on the title. Having learned of Manchester Fund's summons and complaint for forfeiture of the right to redeem, the United States contacted Manchester Fund and informed it of its forfeiture claim, but the Fund failed to notify the title companies until after the government brought an action to divest Manchester Fund of title. The government cited its notice of lis pendens, which had not been discovered through the regular and customary title search process, in support of its effort to strip Manchester Fund of title. Observing that the recorded, but the mis-indexed Notice of Lis Pendens, did not provide constructive notice of the adverse claim of the United States, id. at 347, 753 A.2d at 746, the court held that consequently neither the title insurers nor Manchester Fund had the ability to discover the mis-indexed notice of lis pendens. The court determined, however, that Manchester Fund must bear the loss because the policy was actually issued at a time when Manchester Fund had already been actually alerted to the government's prior claim. In other words, it had actual notice. Most notably for purposes of the instant case, the Manchester Fund court stated, A successful title search depends on the correct spelling and indexing of each owner and claimant in the chain of title. Id. at 344, 753 A.2d at 744. Similarly, in Jones v. Parker, 107 N.J.Super. 235, 258 A.2d 26 (App.Div. 1969), an intermediate appellate court determined that a judgment mistakenly indexed under the name Ace Parker was sufficiently dissimilar from the name of Asa Parker so as to fail to constitute notice of a judgment against an Asa C. Parker. The court observed that in that state (as is the case in Maryland) a trial court judgment becomes a lien upon real estate from the time of the actual entry of such judgment on the minutes or records of the court and noted that case law had interpreted New Jersey's judgment recording statute to [hold] that unless the judgment is entered against the same name, both the Christian or first name and surname, as that in which the record title stands, it does not constitute notice to a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer and is not a lien on the real estate. Id. at 240, 258 A.2d at 29. The court then clarified its determination: In reality, a judgment against Ace Parker could be against anybody named Parker and the searcher would have no way of knowing what that first name might be. The cases recognize that slight variations in names, which do not have the capacity to mislead, will not vitiate the judgment creditor's lien. Thus, the abbreviation Edw. for Edward would be sufficient to give constructive notice as to the identity of the judgment debtor. So too, the entry of a judgment against A. Parker might be sufficient to alert a searcher who was running down the name Asa Parker. But, where there [are] dissimilar names, no obligation is imposed on the title searcher to go behind what the record judgment shows on its face, particularly where the last name being searched is a common name like Jones, Smith or Parker. Id. at 241, 258 A.2d at 30. See also Venetsky v. West Essex Bldg. Supply Co., 28 N.J.Super. 178, 187, 100 A.2d 291, 295 (App.Div.1953) (stating that a judgment must be properly docketed [in an index] by the correct Christian name and surname of the judgment debtor to constitute notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers or encumbrancers). In Federal National Mortgage Ass'n v. Levine-Rodriguez, 153 Misc.2d 8, 579 N.Y.S.2d 975 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1991), a case closely on point with the case sub judice, and a case which addressed an improperly indexed earlier mortgage, a New York supreme court examined that state's tortured and evolving case law in respect to the indexing of real property instruments, which theretofore had placed New York among those states which hold that the filer of the mortgage instrument need not stand by or later investigate to see if the document was properly recorded, since delivery of the document to the recorder is itself sufficient. Id. at 11, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 978. A 1924 amendment to New York's real property recording statute had altered the law so that an `error in indexing prevent[ed] the record from constituting constructive notice of the filed instrument,' id. at 15, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 980, and the change prompted the Federal National Mortgage Ass'n court to query the wisdom of distinguishing between non-indexing and mis-indexing. That court observed that the indexing requirement should be viewed as mandatory and nonfeasance is to be equated with misfeasance since negligence is negligence whether the act be of omission or by commission, active or passive. Id. at 17 n. 2, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 981 n. 2. The Federal National Mortgage Ass'n court rejected the notion that the mere delivery of a deed for filing was sufficient and held that, in the absence of misfeasance or malfeasance, the harm, if any, in cases of this kind vis-à-vis competing mortgagees must be borne by the party who presents the instrument for recording for, as it has been noted, that is the one party who can readily ascertain if the instrument was properly indexed as part of recording. Id. at 16, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 980. A commentary, cited by the Federal National Mortgage Ass'n court, supports that case's outcome: `A cogent reason underlying the rule which places upon the grantee of a deed or other instrument the responsibility for seeing that the record made of the instrument is accurate is that one who files a paper for recording always has it in his power to examine the records and satisfy himself that his paper has been duly and accurately recorded, while it is impossible for a prospective purchaser or creditor to anticipate and inquire about and ascertain the innumerable forms which the negligence or mistakes of the [recording] officer may assume.' Id. at 11, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78 (citing 66 Am.Jur.2d, Records & Recording Laws, § 130, p. 421). In a pair of 1936 Pennsylvania cases, the supreme court of that state opined on the importance of indexing. In re Tourison's Estate, 321 Pa. 299, 184 A. 95 (1936), addressed the result when a creditor's action against the executors of an estate was not indexed for more than a year after the commencement of the suit. When the prothonotary discovered the omission, he indexed the action nunc pro tunc. In ruling that the lower court had proper jurisdiction to rule on the propriety of the notary's actions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that revisions of the applicable statute had seen fit to include provisions making necessary the indexing of the action in the judgment index. Id. at 302, 184 A. at 96. The purpose of the indexing was to charge prospective purchasers or third parties dealing with a decedent's land with notice that it was subject to certain claims. Id. Concomitantly, in Negley v. Reiser, 324 Pa. 190, 188 A. 123 (1936), the appellee sought to recover from an estate for personal injuries sustained though the negligence of the deceased. The appellee filed his action, but it was not indexed as provided in the applicable statute. The court ruled that the appellee could not claim against decedent's real estate because [i]ndexing is as essential to the preservation of a creditor's right against a decedent's realty as is the commencement of the action. Id. at 192, 188 A. at 124. Several years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania made a definitive statement as to the burden of assuring correct indexing in Commonwealth v. Roberts, 392 Pa. 572, 586, 141 A.2d 393, 400 (1958), wherein that court stated, it is the duty of a person offering an instrument for record to see that it is both properly recorded and properly indexed. In a suit by a creditor against a title company, the court in Chemical Bank v. Title Services, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 245 (D.Minn.1989), amalgamated the holdings of several cases addressing which party is charged to assure the accuracy of a filed instrument: `Variations in the debtor's listed name are of particular concern, because that name is the key to the indexing upon which the entire notice system relies.' Thus, the burden is properly on the creditor to make a proper filing and the creditor bears the risk of misfiling.[ [17] ] The filing clerk is required to index the statement under the name he found in it and is not required to engage `in some second guessing.' In re Brawn, 6 U.C.C.Rep.Serv. 1031, 1036 (Bankr. D.Me.1969) (Brawn misspelled Brown). Permitting excessive latitude in the accuracy of a filing impermissibly shifts the burden from the creditor [who filed the instrument] to the searching party. Accordingly, this court declines to impose a duty on searchers to search under possible misspellings of a debtor's name. Such a duty would undermine the purpose of the notice filing system by `promot[ing] careless filing' and `invit[ing] deceptive practices.' Chemical Bank, 708 F.Supp. at 249 (some citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Iowa held an earlier judgment lien on property junior to a subsequent mortgage, where the judgment against Ellen Desney had been indexed under the name of Helen Desney. Thomas v. Desney, 57 Iowa 58, 10 N.W. 315 (Iowa 1881). Thus, the subsequent mortgagee could not be charged with having constructive notice of the judgment because of the indexing error. The court ruled that it was immaterial whether the mortgagee actually examined the index book. He was bound by whatever appeared in said book, whether he examined it or not. He was not bound to examine it, and, in such case, is only chargeable with notice of what it contains. Id. at 317. The same court reached a similar holding in Parry v. Reinertson, 208 Iowa 739, 224 N.W. 489 (Iowa 1929), where the deed was indexed showing as the grantee, the party that actually was the grantor  a situation very similar to the captioning of the notice in the present case. The Parry court stated that a deed requires the filing, the recording, and proper indexing to afford constructive notice. Without proper indexing, there is no constructive notice of the rights of the mortgagee or grantee. Id. at 492. We observe that some states have held that the party filing the notice is not responsible for another's indexing and recording mistakes or omissions. See Preece v. Hardin, 253 Ky. 226, 69 S.W.2d 361, 362 (Ct.App.1934), Guaranty State Bank of Fort Worth v. La Hay, 98 Okla. 29, 224 P. 189, 190 (1924), and Sykes v. Keating, 118 Mass. 517, 519-20 (1875). We decline to adopt the view taken by these jurisdictions that relieves the person seeking to record the instrument or file the lien from the burden of assuring the document's proper recording and indexing.