Opinion ID: 2791285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Examination of

Text: Herrera-Gutierrez Stricklin assigns that the district court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of his cross-examination of HerreraGutierrez. He contends that he should have been permitted to question Herrera-Gutierrez regarding his gang affiliation, his knowledge of the confidential informant, and his history of drug trafficking, including the circumstances of a 2002 conviction.
Before Herrera-Gutierrez testified, the State moved to prevent Stricklin and Newman from asking any questions regarding Herrera-Gutierrez’ membership in a gang and, specifically, his affiliation with “MS-13.” The State further sought to prevent any questions regarding Herrera-Gutierrez’ knowledge of the confidential informant. The district court sustained the State’s motion as to the informant and as to Herrera-Gutierrez’ affiliation with “MS-13.” But it permitted the defendants to make a general inquiry into his membership in a gang. And during cross-examination, Newman’s counsel asked Herrera-Gutierrez, “You’re pretty familiar with the sale of drugs. Is that fair to say?” Herrera-Gutierrez responded, “I don’t think so because if it was that way, I would have a nice house, cars, but I didn’t have money to pay my rent.” Newman’s counsel then asked, “You went to federal prison for it, didn’t you?” The State objected, and the district court determined that the form of the question was improper. Newman’s counsel made an offer of proof, in which Stricklin joined, that Herrera-Gutierrez had been indicted by a federal court in 2002, had signed a plea agreement as to one count of knowingly and intentionally distributing less than 50 grams of methamphetamine, and had pled guilty. The district court explained that Herrera-Gutierrez could be questioned regarding the prior conviction and that if he denied it, the record of conviction could be offered. However, the court determined that he could not be asked any questions regarding the circumstances of the conviction. And it further Nebraska Advance Sheets 560 290 NEBRASKA REPORTS provided that any questions regarding the sale of drugs were to be limited to the individuals and locations involved in this case.
Stricklin’s assertions regarding Herrera-Gutierrez’ affiliation with a gang and his knowledge of the confidential inform­ ant are without merit. There was no indication that Herrera-Gutierrez was a member of “MS-13.” Further, the district court permitted the defendants to ask general questions as to Herrera-Gutierrez’ membership in a gang, and neither defend­ant chose to do so. As to Herrera-Gutierrez’ knowledge of the confidential informant, the court correctly concluded that Herrera-Gutierrez could provide no testimony that would overcome the exclusion of the confidential informant’s statements under the hearsay rule. [26] As to the scope of cross-examination, we find no abuse of discretion in the limitation of questions regarding HerreraGutierrez’ history of drug trafficking and his 2002 conviction. The scope of cross-examination of a witness rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will be upheld on appeal unless there is an abuse of discretion.37 [27] Evidence of the circumstances of Herrera-Gutierrez’ 2002 conviction was inadmissible under Neb. Evid. R. 609, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-609 (Reissue 2008). That rule permits the offer of evidence of a witness’ having committed a crime punishable by death or imprisonment of more than 1 year, or a crime which involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, provided that not more than 10 years have elapsed since the date of such conviction or of the release of the witness from confinement, whichever is the later date. But once having established the conviction, the inquiry must end there, and it is improper to inquire into the nature of the crime, the details of the offense, or the time spent in prison as a result thereof.38 37 State v. Poe, 276 Neb. 258, 754 N.W.2d 393 (2008). 38 See, State v. Castillo-Zamora, 289 Neb. 382, 855 N.W.2d 14 (2014); State v. Johnson, 226 Neb. 618, 413 N.W.2d 897 (1987). Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. STRICKLIN 561 Cite as 290 Neb. 542 [28] As to Herrera-Gutierrez’ prior history of drug trafficking, Stricklin was authorized to inquire into specific instances of conduct not resulting in conviction under Neb. Evid. R. 608(2), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-608(2) (Reissue 2008). There appears to have been some confusion regarding the interplay between rules 608(2) and 609, and we have not previously addressed the issue. However, several federal courts have arrived at a uniform conclusion. They hold that the federal equivalent of rule 608(2) applies only to specific instances of conduct that were not the basis of a criminal conviction. Evidence relating to a conviction is treated solely under the federal equivalent of rule 609.39 Because rules 608(2) and 609 are substantially similar to their federal counterparts, we adopt the federal courts’ conclusion.40 Rule 608(2) permits questioning during cross-examination only on specific instances of conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction. [29] Moreover, rule 608(2) conditions inquiry into specific instances of conduct upon the trial court’s discretion. And under Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2008), evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.41 In the case at bar, the district court permitted inquiry into any incidents of prior drug trafficking involving the locations and individuals in this case. But the court determined that any other instances of drug trafficking were too remote for cross-examination. We find no abuse of discretion in this determination. This assignment of error is without merit.