Opinion ID: 706688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the relatedness of the prior convictions

Text: 8 Ranson argues that the two criminal episodes were part of a common scheme or plan and therefore cannot be counted separately under the career offender provision. In determining whether prior offenses are part of a common scheme, we consider certain factors: (1) whether the crimes were committed within a short period of time; (2) whether the crimes involved the same victim; (3) whether the defendant was arrested by the same law enforcement agency for both crimes; (4) when the arrests occurred and whether both crimes were solved during the course of one investigation; and (5) whether the offenses were similar. United States v. Chapnick, 963 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1992) (prior offenses unrelated because they involved different modus operandi and different victims in spite of their closeness in time); United States v. Davis, 922 F.2d 1385, 1389 (9th Cir. 1991) (prior crimes which were of a similar type and shared the same modus operandi were not necessarily part of a common plan); cf. United States v. Houser, 929 F.2d 1369, 1373-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (prior narcotics offenses related where defendant was charged and convicted of two offenses because of a mere accident of geography and not because of nature of offenses). 9 Here, Ranson's crimes occurred more than two months apart. Although in both crimes Ranson targeted a single household, the specific victims of his robberies and assaults were different. The fact that Ranson was arrested by the same law enforcement agency and that both crimes were solved following that arrest does little to link the crimes together as part of a common plan. Ranson also argues that the crimes shared a common purpose, that is, to get money and sexually molest the victims. Motives of greed and lust are common to numerous crimes; but do not necessarily evidence a common plan. 10 Likewise, the similarities in Ranson's modus operandi in the two cases is unavailing. Just because a criminal has a favorite method of practice or even a favorite victim, his entire predatory career does not meld into a single series of related crimes for purposes of sentencing. Davis, 922 F.2d at 1388-89 (common criminal method of passing bad checks does not demonstrate a single common scheme). Nor are we persuaded that Ranson's threat to return if the police were called makes these two crimes related. Giving a felon a substantially lighter sentence because he had the practice of threatening to return and further harass his victims would be ironic indeed. For purposes of career offender status, the district court correctly found that Ranson's prior crimes were not part of a common scheme or plan.
11 Ranson's argument that his prior crimes were effectively consolidated for sentencing is even weaker. [A]ll prosecutions combined for trial or sentencing count as a single conviction. United States v. Smith, 991 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993). See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2, Application Note 3. No formal order of consolidation is required for cases to be deemed consolidated for sentencing under the career offender provision. U.S. v. Chapnick, 963 F.2d 224, 228 (9th Cir. 1992). In lieu of a brightline rule, we have adopted a functional, fact-specific approach with the ultimate touchstone being whether the previous sentencing court believed the ends of justice required the ... cases to be consolidated for sentencing. Id. at 229. Several factors to consider in making this determination can be gleaned from the existing caselaw. We look to see whether sentencing occurred 1) on the same day, 2) in the same court, 3) for the same offenses, 4) pursuant to a single plea agreement, 5) under the same docket number, and 6) whether concurrent sentences were imposed. Id. at 228. However, these are only factors to be considered, interpretive guideposts which are not amenable to mechanistic application, none of which alone is dispositive. See U.S. v. Davis, 922 F.2d 1385, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1991) (neither fact that sentencing occurred on same day or fact that concurrent sentences given is dispositive). 12 In the present case, the defendant was sentenced by different judges, under different docket numbers in different proceedings conducted days apart. There was no plea agreement. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently by operation of Nevada law. Neither judge ordered the sentences to run concurrently or otherwise acknowledged the other conviction in sentencing. On these facts, Ranson's cases were not consolidated for sentencing. U.S. v. Davis, 922 F.2d at 1390-91 (cases not consolidated where concurrent sentences given but no indication sentencing judge considered the offenses related); U.S. v. Taylor, 984 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).