Opinion ID: 170275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment on Ms. Juarez’s Claims

Text: We apply our familiar summary judgment standards in reviewing the district court’s order: We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, together with the affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We resolve all factual disputes and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 741 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Ms. Juarez contends that she presented sufficient evidence in support of her claims for retaliation, disparate treatment, sexual harassment, and hostile work environment to avoid summary judgment. 7
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of [its] employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), a plaintiff first must establish the 7 Ms. Juarez includes in her opening brief separate sections labeled “Title VII” and “Harassment.” We have considered the arguments she makes in these sections as they relate to the claims she alleged. -16- three elements of a prima facie claim for retaliation under Title VII: “(1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.” McGowan, 472 F.3d at 741. Regarding the second prong, “[A]n employer’s action is adverse under Title VII if it ‘well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. at 742 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (quotation omitted)). “The materiality of a claimed adverse action is to be determined objectively; ‘petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners’ will not deter ‘a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415). Title VII “does not set forth a general civility code for the American workplace.” White, 126 S.Ct. at 2415 (quotation omitted). The district court concluded that Ms. Juarez produced sufficient evidence that she engaged in protected activity in making her sexual-harassment complaint against Dr. S. to Family Dental in January 2004. But, after reviewing each of her allegations of materially adverse action by Family Dental, the court held that she failed to satisfy the second prong. It concluded that the record failed to show material disputed facts that defendant changed her job duties in any material way, -17- selectively enforced policies against her, or transferred her to a different office solely to accommodate Dr. S. Regarding Family Dental placing Ms. Juarez on paid administrative leave and advising her not to discuss Dr. S.’s background in the workplace, the court reasoned that these actions would not constitute material adverse actions to a reasonable employee in the context of the competing sexualharassment complaints under investigation. The district court acknowledged that “co-worker hostility or retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, may constitute ‘adverse employment action’ for purposes of a retaliation claim.” Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998). “However, because harassment must be intentional on the part of the employer, . . . an employer can only be liable for co-workers’ retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or management personnel either (1) orchestrate the harassment, or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers’ actions.” Id. at 1265. Here, the district court concluded that [u]ltimately, the record fails to support an inference Family Dental orchestrated or had knowledge of co-worker harassment targeting Juarez sufficient to impute liability to Family Dental. After White, a person may suffer actionable retaliation even without suffering a tangible employment action, but Juarez’s allegations are insufficient to establish actionable retaliation. A jury would not reasonably find the actions Juarez alleges, even in totality, would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making a complaint. Aplt. App. at, Vol. I at 264 (footnote omitted). -18- On appeal, Ms. Juarez does not identify any error in any of the district court’s specific conclusions regarding her evidence of retaliation. She argues only that Family Dental’s actions must be examined in their entirety, but there is no indication that the district court failed to do so. It found that “[e]ven in the aggregate, Ms. Juarez’s evidence of retaliation by Family Dental fails to meet the White standard.” Id. In her discussion of the evidence, she relies primarily on her affidavit, which was excluded, and her other assertions are largely unsupported by her citations to the record. We have reviewed the record de novo and for substantially the same reasons as the district court’s Order, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Family Dental on Ms. Juarez’s retaliation claim.
Ms. Juarez claims that she was treated differently from Dr. S. because of her race and gender. A prima facie case of racial discrimination based upon disparate treatment requires a plaintiff to show: “(1) that [s]he is a member of a [protected class], (2) that [s]he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that similarly situated employees were treated differently.” Trujillo v. Univ. of Colo. Health Sciences Ctr., 157 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 1998). In the context of a Title VII discrimination claim, an adverse employment action is a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision -19- causing a significant change in benefits.” Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). “Similarly situated employees are those who deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline.” McGowan, 472 F.3d at 745 (quotation omitted). The district court held that Ms. Juarez satisfied the first prong of the prima facie test, because she is Hispanic and female, but that she failed to satisfy the other two elements. Noting that her evidence was insufficient to satisfy the lesser burden to show a “material adverse action” in support of her retaliation claim, the court concluded that she failed to present evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action amounting to a significant change in her employment status, as required for her discrimination claim. Furthermore, the court held that the evidence did not support an inference that Ms. Juarez and Dr. S. were similarly situated or treated significantly differently. In fact, the record shows Family Dental put both Ms. Juarez and Dr. S. on administrative leave, investigated both of their complaints, and ultimately found neither to be substantiated. On appeal, Ms. Juarez does not address the district court’s holding that she and Dr. S. were not similarly situated. She argues that the evidence shows she was stripped of her managerial duties and subjected to a hostile work environment, while Dr. S. was not. In support of this contention, she once again -20- directs this court primarily to her affidavit. 8 We have reviewed the record de novo and for substantially the same reasons as the district court’s Order, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Family Dental on Ms. Juarez’s disparate treatment claim.
“The gravamen of a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim is that tangible job benefits are conditioned on an employee’s submission to conduct of a sexual nature and that adverse job consequences result from the employee’s refusal to submit to the conduct.” Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987). “An employer is vicariously (or indirectly) liable for compensatory damages when a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee perpetrates the Title VII violation.” McInnis v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). The operative question is whether the harassing employee “had sufficient control over the plaintiff to be considered her supervisor.” Wright-Simmons v. City of Okla. City, 155 F.3d 1264, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998). “In addition, an employer may be vicariously liable when the harassing employee has apparent authority–gives the false impression that the actor was a supervisor, 8 In addition to the evidence she cited in support of her retaliation claim, she also refers generally to the evidence she cited in her opposition to summary judgment in the district court, which again primarily relied upon her affidavit. -21- when he in fact was not, and the victim’s mistaken conclusion was a reasonable one.” Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation and brackets omitted). The district court held that there was no evidence that Ms. Juarez’s job benefits were in any way conditioned upon her acquiescing in Dr. S.’s alleged sexual proposal. Moreover, the court concluded that no evidence supported her contention that Dr. S. had supervisory authority over her. She argues on appeal that Family Dental “altered [her] workplace environment and duties when [she] refused to comply with Dr. [S.’s] request.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 18. While she recognizes that her claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment must fail absent evidence that Dr. S. was her supervisor, see id., she merely refers to her “understanding that [he] was her supervisor,” id. at 21, and cites no evidence supporting that contention. Again, we have reviewed the record de novo and for substantially the same reasons as the district court’s Order, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Family Dental on Ms. Juarez’s quid pro quo sexual- harassment claim.
Finally, Ms. Juarez claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment because she is Hispanic and a woman. “In determining whether an actionable hostile work environment existed, we look to all the circumstances, to see if the workplace was permeated with -22- discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment, and if the plaintiff was subjected to this abusive environment because of her [protected class].” Montes v. Vail Clinic, Inc., 497 F.3d 1160, 1169-70 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted). Evidence of sporadic slurs is insufficient to support a claim; “there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial [or sexual] comments.” Bolden v. PRC Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 551 (10th Cir. 1994). “General harassment if not racial or sexual is not actionable.” Id. But, when considering a claim of hostile work environment, we “view the evidence in context, not simply in its segmented parts.” O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1096-97 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding conduct not explicitly sexual in nature is relevant “if it reasonably could be inferred [it] was related to gender or arose out of context in which admittedly sex and gender-related conduct occurred”); see also Bolden, 43 F.3d at 551 (considering racial comments along with general ridicule of the plaintiff). We consider “all the circumstances . . . from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” Montes, 497 F.3d at 1170. The district court noted that Ms. Juarez relied on the same evidence in support of her retaliation and hostile work environment claims, and as such, her hostile work environment claim must fail. “[J]ust as a reasonable jury could not find the conduct to be materially adverse for retaliation purposes, a reasonable -23- jury could not find it to be so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of Juarez’s employment or impede her ability to do her job.” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 272. The district court noted the evidence of overtly racial or sexual conduct qualified as, at most, a few isolated incidents. Ms. Juarez alleged that the general harassment she experienced was both in retaliation for her sexual-harassment complaint against Dr. S, and based upon race and gender animus. But the district court concluded that “it is not reasonable to infer the sex- and race-related conduct of [Dr. S.] so poisoned Family Dental or its other employees toward Juarez that their conduct arose out of gender- or race-related hostility.” Id. at 273. The court also held that the evidence failed to support “an inference Family Dental knew or should have known of most of the alleged co-worker harassment.” Id. at 275. Finally, after Ms. Juarez reported sexual harassment by Dr. S., he did not harass her again, indicating that Family Dental’s remedial response was reasonable and effective. We have reviewed the record de novo and for substantially the same reasons as the district court’s Order, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Family Dental on Ms. Juarez’s hostile work environment claim. -24-