Opinion ID: 1227585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sentencing (kidnapping and felonious breaking and entering)

Text: Defendant assigns as error the trial court's imposition of maximum sentences on the kidnapping and felonious breaking and entering charges. In sentencing defendant for kidnapping and felonious breaking and entering, the trial judge imposed the maximum sentence allowed for each offense under the Fair Sentencing Act. He did so after finding that the aggravating factors in each case outweighed the mitigating factors. The trial judge found the same aggravating and mitigating factors in each case. The aggravating factors found were: 1. The defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime. 2. Lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime. 3. This sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same crime. 4. The defendant engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society. The first aggravating factor was found to exist pursuant to G.S. 15A-1340.4(a)(1)i which states that the defendant was armed with or used a deadly weapon at the time of the crime. The remaining three aggravating factors were found to exist pursuant to the language of G.S. 15A-1340.4(a) which, in pertinent part, provides: In imposing a prison term, the judge, under the procedures provided in G.S. 15A-1334(b), may consider any aggravating and mitigating factors that he finds are proved by the preponderance of the evidence, and that are reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, whether or not such aggravating or mitigating factors are set forth herein, ... (emphasis added). Clearly, the trial judge properly found the aggravating factor provided for in G.S. 1340.4(a)(1)i since all of the evidence shows that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon. The aggravating factor that defendant engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society was also correctly found. In State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983), we held that a defendant's dangerousness to others was reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing one of which is `to protect the public by restraining offenders.' G.S. § 15A-1340.3. id., at 604, 300 S.E.2d at 702, and could be considered as a factor in aggravation. Accord State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E.2d 71 (1983). In instant case, the bizarre manner in which defendant perpetrated the crimes of murder and kidnapping was sufficient to support this finding. Further, his own testimony that he committed acts of violence upon his sister while blacked-out would support a finding that defendant engaged in a pattern of conduct which indicated a serious danger to society. The second and third aggravating factors, however, are contrary to this Court's recent decision in State v. Chatman, supra . In Chatman, as in instant case, the trial judge found as aggravating factors that the sentence imposed was necessary to deter others, and that a lesser sentence would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the crime. We held that the consideration of these factors in aggravation was error. Justice Meyer, writing for the Court, stated: These two factors fall within the exclusive realm of the legislature and were presumably considered in determining the presumptive sentence for this offense. While both factors serve as legitimate purposes for imposing an active sentence, neither may form the basis for increasing or decreasing a presumptive term because neither relates to the character or conduct of the offender. See State v. Ahearn, [307 N.C. 584, 300 S.E.2d 689 (1983) ]. Id. at 180, 301 S.E.2d at 78. We therefore hold that the trial judge erred in finding the second and third aggravating factors in the kidnapping and felonious breaking and entering cases. We do not discuss defendant's remaining assignments of error, all of which concern questions which have been heretofore decided by this Court or questions which in all probability will not recur at defendant's next trial. For the reasons stated, there must be a new trial in both the guilt-innocence phase and the sentencing phase. NEW TRIAL.