Opinion ID: 1349797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference with petitioner's right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

Text: (5a) Petitioner asserts the People impermissibly interfered with his rights under the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....), and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution (The defendant in a criminal cause has the right to... compel attendance of witnesses in the defendant's behalf ....). Specifically, he asserts the prosecution unconstitutionally prevented six of his inmate witnesses  George Oglesby, Leslie White, Sidney Storch, Ferril Mickens, Larry Montez, and Steven Cisneros  from testifying on his behalf. The People dispute whether the compulsory process right, which plainly attaches at trial in a criminal proceeding, also applies in a habeas corpus evidentiary hearing. Assuming, however, that the right applies, we discern no violation here. (6) A defendant's constitutional rights to compel the attendance of witnesses, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and to due process, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, are violated when the prosecution interferes with the defendant's right to present witnesses. ( In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 29-30 [241 Cal. Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374].) ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 460 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388], hereafter Mincey. ) To establish a violation, the claimant bears the burden of showing three elements: First, he must demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct, i.e., conduct that was entirely unnecessary to the proper performance of the prosecutor's duties and was of such a nature as to transform a defense witness willing to testify into one unwilling to testify. ( Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 460; see also In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 31 [241 Cal. Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374].) Second, he must establish interference, that is, a causal link between the prosecutorial misconduct and the defendant's inability to present the witness. ( Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 460; see also In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31.) In this regard, the claimant is not required to prove that the conduct under challenge was the `direct or exclusive' cause. [Citations.] Rather, he need only show that the conduct was a substantial cause. [Citations.] The misconduct in question may be deemed a substantial cause when, for example, it carries significant coercive force [citation] and is soon followed by the witness's refusal to testify [citation]. ( In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 31.) Finally, the claimant must demonstrate materiality. To carry his burden under federal law, `he must at least make some plausible showing of how [the] testimony [of the witness] would have been both material and favorable to his defense.' [Citation.] Under California law he must show at least a reasonable possibility that the witness could have given testimony that would have been both material and favorable. [Citations.] ( In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 32.) We will test petitioner's claims, as to each prospective witness, against the three-part test set out above.
(5b) As noted above, Oglesby died of a heart attack one day before the evidentiary hearing was scheduled to begin. [15] The record establishes that he had been treated for a heart condition for years. Documents appended by the People to their postevidentiary-hearing briefs in this court, and not objected to by petitioner, disclose that the prison authorities transported Oglesby to a medical center soon after he complained of chest pains, and that the county coroner observed no trauma associated with his death. Petitioner suggests the prosecutor committed misconduct by arranging to transport Oglesby to the hearing in the same bus with petitioner, and that Oglesby was literally scared to death by this prospect. (Both the record, and various exhibits appended to the briefs in this court, suggest petitioner is a strong, muscular man who is a member of the Crips street gang, and the Black Guerilla Family, a prison gang.) As the People observe, however (again, by reference to documents appended to their post-evidentiary-hearing briefs in this court, and not objected to by petitioner), they were most solicitous of Oglesby's safety, and obtained from our referee a protective order regarding transportation and housing of Oglesby. The order expressly noted that Oglesby, who was then housed in Soledad State Prison, was in significant danger as a result of information and testimony provided against members of the Mexican Mafia, Aryan Brotherhood, and Hoover Crips, and that Oglesby had been in protective custody since 1981. The order concluded it was necessary to effect a protective keep away order so that the witness does not mingle with any other prisoners or gang members, particularly defendant Stanley Williams. ... (Italics in original.) Finally, the order specified that Oglesby's heart medicine be made available to him on a regular basis. [16] We conclude petitioner has failed to show any misconduct on the part of the prosecutor that contributed to Oglesby's refusal (i.e., failure) to testify. As the People observed at the evidentiary hearing, the intervention came from a higher authority.
(7) As noted above, the allegations in petitioner's habeas corpus petition were largely supported by transcripts of tape recordings and declarations of Leslie White. [17] Petitioner notes that on March 3, 1992  two days before the rescheduled evidentiary hearing was set to begin  the Attorney General indicted and arrested White, apparently for perjury in past cases. One week later, after petitioner called White as a witness on his behalf, White invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and declined to testify. Petitioner asserts the timing of the government's indictment and arrest transformed White from a willing witness to one who refused to testify, and hence constituted misconduct as defined in In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1, 31. Once again, documents appended as exhibits to the People's briefs, and not objected to by petitioner, disprove petitioner's theory. The exhibits include the following: (i) An April 18, 1991, memorandum (and contemporaneous handwritten notes) by Deputy Attorney General Preminger. The memorandum states that on April 9, 1991, Leslie White and George Oglesby telephoned Preminger. According to the memorandum, Oglesby stated he feared his life would be endangered if he testified, and asked that he be given protective custody during the hearing. White stated that his 1989 declaration (in which he asserted that Oglesby told him Oglesby had lied in petitioner's case) was itself a lie, and that insofar as he knew, Oglesby had indeed told the truth in petitioner's case. (ii) An August 1, 1992, handwritten letter from Leslie White to Mr. Price (one of petitioner's attorneys), informing him that White would invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and decline to testify in petitioner's evidentiary hearing. The letter stated: Further, I'm not sure if I've ever told the truth regarding the Williams case or Oglesby  I can't recall, as the cops say.... It continued: I will not testify. If you bring me down I'll plead the 5th AFTER I tell about why I signed your declaration. It won't be pretty. Leslie White. (Italics and capitalization in original.) [18] (iii) A March 17, 1992, declaration by Deputy District Attorney Martin, recounting that on February 6, 1992, Leslie White telephoned him after he was served with a subpoena to testify at the evidentiary hearing by the People. According to Martin, White said his 1989 declaration was untrue. White claimed he signed the declaration while he was in county jail, and feared for his life. Moreover, White asserted, he was told by petitioner's counsel that the declaration would lead to his transfer to federal custody. White asserted he would testify at petitioner's hearing that his own 1989 declaration was a lie. We conclude, based on the hearing record and the above described exhibits, that petitioner has failed to show the indictment and arrest of Leslie White shortly before he was scheduled to testify for petitioner constitutes misconduct as defined in In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 31. Petitioner cannot show that the government's conduct was wholly unnecessary to the performance of its duties and was of such a character as to transform White from a willing witness to one who refused to testify.
(8) Storch was indicted in April 1991, apparently for perjury. [19] Petitioner asserts the People indicted Storch in order to intimidate him and prevent him from testifying. Exhibits appended to the People's briefs (and not objected to by petitioner), however, show that the People were not apprised that Storch was a possible witness until eight months after his indictment, when his name appeared, buried among one hundred and one other names in a list of petitioner's possible witnesses. Given this, it is difficult to discern in what way the prosecutor might have committed misconduct as that term is used in In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 31. In any event, the record reveals that petitioner's counsel, and not the People, are ultimately responsible for Storch's failure to testify. The record shows that Storch was in custody out of state, and was fighting extradition on his indictment. Petitioner's counsel failed to subpoena Storch (see Pen. Code, §§ 1334.4-1334.6 [Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without the State in Criminal Cases]). His attempt to now blame the People for Storch's absence at the hearing is wholly unpersuasive.
(9) All three of these witnesses were serving substantial prison terms at the time they were subpoenaed by petitioner to testify at his evidentiary hearing. Each, when called to the stand, invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and refused to testify. [20] Petitioner asserts that each was intimidated by the prospect that the People, who had indicted White one week earlier (and Storch over eight months earlier), might also indict him for perjury, in violation of his rights under In re Martin, supra, 44 Cal.3d at page 31. Again, petitioner has not established misconduct. As noted above, there is no evidence that the indictments were unnecessary to the performance of the prosecution's duties. Accordingly, we again reject petitioner's claim. In any event, for the reasons set out below, it appears unlikely petitioner can prove the second element of his claim, namely, that the government's conduct was a substantial cause of his witnesses's failure to testify. (i) Mickens. Petitioner offers only conjecture to support his claim that the government's indictments were a substantial cause of Mickens's refusal to testify. The record and supporting exhibits, however, suggest the following: Petitioner's counsel interviewed Mickens while he was in prison, concerning informant practices in the Los Angeles County Jail, and Mickens apparently offered information helpful to petitioner's case. It appears, however, that petitioner's attorneys failed to disclose the identify of their client. Thereafter, Mickens was transported (without a protective order) to the Los Angeles County jail, in preparation for his testimony at the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Mickens invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. He thereafter explained on cross-examination by the People that after his arrival at the Los Angeles County jail, he telephoned Sergeant Mattson of the Los Angeles Police Department (whom he knew through his sister). Mickens said he told Mattson he feared for his life because he had been transported without protective custody, and because he found out who the defendant was in this case. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked, Now, are you taking the Fifth Amendment because you feel you would incriminate yourself, or because you feel that you're intimidated? Mickens responded, Both. In a declaration attached to the People's brief (and not objected to by petitioner), Sergeant Mattson states he visited Mickens at the Hall of Justice, at which time Mickens told him he had been brought to Los Angeles to testify in a case involving a prominent member of the BGF [Black Guerilla Family, a prison gang] by the name of Williams. The declaration asserts, Mickens said he had not volunteered to testify but that another inmate at Soledad had supplied his name. He claimed fear for his life and the lives of his sister and father if he testified in the case, and said that he planned to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege. Finally, he stated that on March 3, 1992 (the date originally set for the start of the hearing), one of petitioner's attorneys visited him. The declaration reports that when Mickens made it clear he would not testify, the attorney started to leave, and told Mickens: I'm going down to see Williams and I'll give him your regards. The declaration concludes: Mickens said this remark by the attorney terrified him because it implied bodily harm would come to him or his family. We question whether, on this record, the prosecution's indictment of White and Storch was a substantial cause of Mickens's failure to testify. It appears instead that Mickens's fear for his and his family's safety  a fear of petitioner and his counsel, not the People  was the primary cause of Mickens's refusal to testify. Although we may assume that Mickens also considered the prospect that his testimony might, if false, result in an indictment for perjury, that prospect cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim of improper interference with petitioner's Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process. Nor are we willing to assume that Mickens could reasonably have believed that his truthful testimony would result in a perjury prosecution. Accordingly, we conclude that whatever the effect of the indictments for perjury of White and Storch, that effect was insubstantial insofar as it concerned Mickens's refusal to testify. (ii) Montez. As with Mickens, petitioner apparently failed to secure a protective order for Montez's transportation to and housing during the evidentiary hearing. And, like Mickens, on cross-examination Montez admitted he wished to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights for two reasons: He believed the answers would incriminate him, and he felt intimidated by petitioner. Again, for many of the reasons set out above in our discussion of Mickens, we conclude that whatever the effect of the indictments for perjury of White and Storch, that effect was insubstantial insofar as it concerned Montez's refusal to testify. (iii) Cisneros. Finally, as to Cisneros, we again doubt that petitioner has proved the second element of his claim, namely, that the government's conduct was a substantial cause of Cisneros's failure to testify. Again, it appears petitioner failed to secure a protective order for Cisneros's transportation to and housing during the evidentiary hearing, and that this contributed substantially to the witness's refusal to testify. Although Cisneros refused to elaborate at the evidentiary hearing concerning why he invoked his Fifth Amendment right, his declaration, signed about two weeks earlier (and appended, without objection, to petitioner's brief) asserts he planned to invoke his Fifth Amendment right for two reasons: First, as a result of the indictment and arrest of Sidney Storch and Leslie White, I am now unwilling to testify at petitioner's evidentiary hearing for fear that I will be indicted if I provide testimony helpful to Petitioner. I am further fearful for my safety should I be transported to and housed in the Los Angeles County jail system. (Italics added.) Moreover, although we may assume that Cisneros considered the prospect that his testimony might, if false, result in an indictment for perjury, as noted above, that prospect cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim of improper interference with petitioner's Sixth Amendment right of compulsory process. Nor are we willing to assume that Cisneros could reasonably have believed that his truthful testimony would result in a perjury prosecution. Accordingly, we conclude that whatever the effect of the indictments for perjury of White and Storch, that effect was insubstantial insofar as it concerned Cisneros's refusal to testify.