Opinion ID: 1904395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The 55/45 Equitable Distribution of the Marital Property

Text: Appellant last contends that the master's 55/45 division of the marital property was in error. Specifically, appellant argues that the master (1) failed to give due regard to the § 401(d) factors; (2) erred in considering appellant's greater anticipated Social Security benefits; (3) failed to consider appellee's dissipation of marital assets; (4) took into account appellant's marital misconduct in equitably distributing the marital property, misconduct not being a § 401(d) factor; and (5) failed to consider appellee's employment (and related health benefits). These claims are meritless. Section 401(d) of the Divorce Code provides as follows: In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon request of either party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including: (1) The length of the marriage. (2) Any prior marriage of either party. (3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties. (4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party. (5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income. (6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits. (7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as a homemaker. (8) The value of the property set apart to each party. (9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage. (10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective. 23 P.S. § 401(d). We believe that the master gave more than adequate regard to these factors, see Master's Report at 23-31, in finding that, [i]n order to attempt to recognize the health insurance and Social Security factors and effectuate economic justice, ( id. at 31), he recommended a 55/45 division of the property. We find no error in the master's consideration of appellant's anticipated Social Security benefits in equitably distributing the marital property. Section 401(d) requires that [t]he sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits, be considered by the court (or master, see Pa.R.Civ.P. 1920.51(a)(2)(i)) in equitably distributing the marital property. 23 P.S. § 401(d)(6). The master found, but we need not find here, that the benefits were not marital property subject to equitable distribution. See Sorbello v. Sorbello, 21 Pa. D. & C.3d 187, 196-97 (Ct.C.P. Cumberland County 1981) (holding that Social Security benefits are not marital property subject to equitable distribution). Appellant also argues that the master erred in failing to consider appellee's dissipation of the marital assets. We disagree. The master consider[ed] the monies paid by [appellee] out of the funds withdrawn from [two joint accounts] as dissipation of marital assets. . . . (Master's Report at 30). Moreover, the master included the two accounts in question as assets within appellee's control when he equitably distributed the marital property. See id. at 32-34. Therefore, any monies that appellee dissipated were included in her fifty-five percent share of the marital estate. We also find that the master did not improperly consider appellant's marital misconduct in equitably distributing the marital property. Equitable distribution is to be done without regard to marital misconduct. 23 P.S. § 401(d). Here, the master mentioned appellant's extra-marital affair only in the context of computing appellant's dissipation of marital assets. See Master's Report at 29-30. Thus, such misconduct was not a factor in the master's recommended distribution of the marital property other than as it related to appellant's dissipation of marital assets. Appellant last argues that the master erred in failing to consider appellee's employment at Mack Trucks and the health benefits she received in conjunction with such employment. Our review of the record indicates that appellee's position was only temporary. See Appellant's Petition for Suspension of Support Order and Appellee's Objection to Petition for Suspension of Support Order (appellee expects to be [employed] for . . . several months). [10] Furthermore, in discussing the third factor to be considered when equitably distributing marital property, [t]he . . . employability. . . of each of the parties, 23 P.S. § 401(d)(3), the master noted that, after appellee's employer, Hellertown Manufacturing, closed its Hellertown plant, she made application to Western Electric, Durkee's and Burron, [but] she was not able to obtain employment. (Master's Report at 25). This finding supports an inference that appellee had difficulty in obtaining permanent employment. Accordingly, this claim is meritless. For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the lower court, affirm in part and reverse in part the court's order, and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment vacated; order affirmed in part and reversed in part; case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.