Opinion ID: 1190386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Probable Acquittal at a New Trial

Text: The final consideration is whether the new evidence would probably result in Hinkson's acquittal at a new trial. The district court noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not apply any differently in a new trial, such that the proferred extrinsic evidence would ... [not] probably result in an acquittal. The newly discovered evidence fails this fifth prong of the Harrington test because it simply does not make an acquittal probable. The majority states that to convict Hinkson of solicitation, a jury at a new trial must believe that Hinkson had been serious in asking Swisher to kill Cook, Hines, and Lodge. Op. at 1287. The government has ample ammunition against Hinkson to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinkson solicited Swisher. A new trial cannot erase the long, detailed history between Hinkson and Swisher. It will not change the undisputed testimony that Hinkson believed that Swisher, as a result of his military background and gun expertise, had the wherewithal to execute a hit. Nor will it erase the third party testimony that Hinkson wanted the three officials killed, that he hoped that they would die, and that to him, it would be worth at least $10,000 a head for that to happen. In short, nothing in the record suggests that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that a new trial would probably not result in Hinkson's acquittal. The majority suggests that the evidentiary deck was equally stacked against Hinkson on the Swisher-related counts as on the Harding-related counts, implying that Swisher's tales of military awards and combat injuries might have swayed the jury to convict Hinkson only on the Swisher-related counts. [7] But the effort to construct perfect parallels between Swisher and Harding is too simplistic. There were myriad reasons other than those listed by the majority that may have made Hinkson's guilt seem more solid to the jury on the Swisher counts. Unlike Swisher, who had known Hinkson for over two years and been a close friend at the time of the alleged solicitations, Hinkson had known Harding for only a few weeks before the first time that he allegedly asked Harding to kill three federal officials. Hinkson knew Swisher to be a vindictive person who, like Hinkson, acted on his dislike for those who had wronged him, like Albers. Hinkson had known Swisher through his regular consulting work for WaterOz, whereas Harding was a sometime radio show host who had recently worked on shows dealing with the paranormal. The fact that Hinkson believed Swisher to have significant combat experience was yet another reason that a solicitation to Swisher was both believable and a pragmatic choice. Swisher's lies simply enhanced his prowess from Hinkson's perspective. These distinctions illustrate that the Harding and Swisher solicitations cannot be neatly squared off, with evidence of Swisher's actual rather than represented military service tipping the scales at a new trial. In reviewing the district court's denial of a new trial, we must be mindful of the factors articulated in Harrington and the deference accorded to the district court in making its discretionary ruling on a new trial. The district court provided a long and thoughtful recitation of his weighing of each of these factors. No legal error undermines that conclusion, and nothing in the district court's reasoning and conclusions was an abuse of discretion. I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to grant Hinkson a new trial. At most, I would remand for further factfinding on the issue of when the government knew, or should have known, of the Dowling letter. In doing so, if warranted by evidence of the government's knowledge, I would give the district court the first opportunity to evaluate a new trial motion under the Zuno-Arce test. United States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886 (9th Cir.2003). Barring a majority for remand, I would affirm the denial of the motion for a new trial.