Opinion ID: 2260302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: โ Modifiability โ

Text: Although existing case law on this subject is not perfectly clear, in my view one basic and highly salutary proposition does emerge. To a large degree, our case law has made the resolution of the question of modifiability dependent on the intent of the parties to the agreement. Even the most cursory review of the applicable cases reveals this common thread. In Brown v. Hall, 495 Pa. 635, 435 A.2d 859 (1981), the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an agreement providing for child support, executed after entry of one support order, survived a subsequently entered support order for a lower amount. The court concentrated its analysis on ascertaining the intent of the parties. The Brown court engaged in a lengthy review of both the terms of the agreement and the negotiations leading to it and concluded that there was no evidence that the parties intended that the agreement would simply merge with the existing support order and, therefore, be subject to modification by a later entered order. Instead, the court found evidence of the parties' intent to create a separate contractual support obligation, which the court held to be enforceable through an action in equity for specific performance. Brown was followed by the decision of this court in Millstein v. Millstein, 311 Pa.Super. 495, 457 A.2d 1291 (1983), which raised a similar issue. Although both Brown and Millstein involved support orders and support agreements and did not involve divorce decrees and property settlement/support agreements, which are at the center of the instant case, both Brown and Millstein are nevertheless instructive. Once again, the question in Millstein involved the interplay of a support agreement and a support order. In Millstein, however, unlike in Brown, the support agreement had been executed before any support order had been entered. The court held this to be a distinction without a difference, holding that the analysis of Brown still applied. The intent of the parties would determine the impact of the subsequently entered support order on the existing support agreement. Since the Millstein court found no evidence that the parties intended a subsequent support order to override the agreement or to constitute a merger of the agreement into the order, the court held that the agreement survived the support order. Importantly, the Millstein court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the agreement provided that upon the parties' divorce, the support obligation of the husband would be entered in the form of a court order. The court was not persuaded that this indicated an intent that the agreement itself would merge into any such order. Thus, the agreement was held to be a separately enforceable obligation, the significance being that the agreement is a private contract between the parties which the court cannot modify. The accepted exception to this proposition is that the court, in adjudicating the agreement, can raise the level of child support, but not lower it, on the rationale that a parent cannot contract away the child's right to adequate support. Brown, 495 Pa. at 643 n. 11, 435 A.2d 859, 863 n. 11. It was in 1984 that the first variation from the principles of Brown and Millstein appeared in the form of Commonwealth ex rel. Tokach v. Tokach, 326 Pa.Super. 359, 474 A.2d 41 (1984). Up to this point the intent of the parties controlled. In Tokach, the parties had entered into an agreement providing for child support prior to their divorce. The agreement itself appeared not to have mentioned anything regarding either the incorporation or merger of the agreement into the anticipated divorce decree. However, the divorce decree provided that the agreement was incorporated into the decree. There was no mention of merger into the decree. As we noted, a divorce decree was not implicated in Brown and Millstein while it was in Tokach. The Tokach court held that there is no distinction between the incorporation of an agreement into a decree and its merger therein. In other words, the court ascribed to the parties the intent to merge their agreement into the decree simply from the use of the word incorporate. Merger caused the agreement to be eliminated as a separately enforceable support obligation. The surviving order was in the form of a court order, the divorce decree, exposing the husband's support obligation to modification, whether by way of increase or decrease, upon a showing of changed circumstances. Under the Tokach decision for the first time the intent of the parties did not control. By construing incorporation to equal merger, the incorporated agreement which was now viewed as also merged could not survive as an independently enforceable contract and could be modified by the court. Thus, Tokach simply enunciated a different rule applicable to divorce decrees. The law, thereby, evolved so that support agreements did not survive if they were incorporated into divorce decrees but that support agreements did survive a support order if the parties so intended. Millstein. Later decisions have limited the effect of Tokach and returned to the Brown and Millstein approach. For example, in Madnick v. Madnick, 339 Pa.Super. 130, 488 A.2d 344 (1985), the parties had agreed to the entry of a support order and then executed a separation agreement containing a support obligation identical to that in the order. The amount of support provided for in the order was later reduced by a further court order. Wife then attempted to enforce husband's obligation under the agreement. The trial court refused, finding the agreement merged into the order. This court reversed. The court returned to an analysis of the parties' intent as expressed in their agreement and concluded that the parties had clearly not intended the obligations expressed in the agreement to be merged into the order. In so deciding, the court specifically distinguished Tokach as having involved a divorce decree as opposed to a support order. The court did not explain why this difference commanded a different result, other than to state that to construe Tokach as applying to support orders as well as divorce decrees would be to construe it as having overruled Millstein. This, of course, was beyond the power of the Tokach panel to do. Presumably in reaction to the decision in Tokach or to similar decisions in cases decided in other jurisdictions, the language used in both separation or property settlement agreements and divorce decrees underwent a revision. The language used, at least by parties who were fortunate enough to be represented by attorneys who devoted themselves to weaving their way through the maze of precedent on this issue, became incorporated but not merged. By using this language, it appears that parties have attempted to accomplish two distinct objectives. First, by specifically eschewing merger, they attempted to ensure that their agreements and divorce decrees would be construed in the fashion dictated by Brown and Millstein. In other words, they attempted to express, as clearly as possible, their intent that their agreements would survive their divorce and would continue as separately enforceable obligations. In so doing, they attempted to ensure that their contractual obligations survived and that those contractual obligations, with limited exceptions, could not be modified by action of the court. Second, parties who agreed to incorporation without merger attempted to secure to themselves the availability of the court's special enforcement powers applicable to support orders. By agreeing that the agreement was to be incorporated in the decree, and then consenting to the entry of a decree that provided for such incorporation, the parties intended that in the event of a default under the agreement, remedies like contempt and attachment of wages would be available. In 1987, this court addressed the first intended meaning of incorporation without merger and confirmed that the use of this language would in fact accomplish the parties' first goal. This language would serve to preserve the agreement and would put the support obligations contained therein beyond the reach of the court's modification powers. McGough v. McGough, 361 Pa.Super. 391, 522 A.2d 638 (1987). The only exception permitted was the situation noted in Millstein, i.e. where the best interests of the child required that the amount of support provided for in the agreement be increased. Id., 361 Pa.Superior Ct. at 392-93 n. 1, 522 A.2d at 639 n. 1. McGough is unquestionably a proper resolution. It follows precisely the mandate of Brown and Millstein and cases following Tokach by focussing on the language the parties themselves use to decide whether the agreement will survive and create an unmodifiable obligation or will cease to exist once a divorce decree is entered. With the exception of modifying child support upwards, incorporation alone does not permit the court to alter the support terms of the private agreement entered into by the parties. If the parties wanted to permit the court to be able to modify the terms of the agreement, then the agreement must clearly call for incorporation and merger. For example, a party with an insecure financial future may have desired a safety valve so that he or she could petition the court to reduce his or her support obligation. If that is the case, the party should have negotiated an agreement that is not only incorporated but merged. Application of this principle in the present case requires that we affirm the trial court's refusal to remit the arrearages due under the Sonders' agreement or to reduce the amount of support payable by husband in future. Although in some situations the parties' intent may be difficult to ascertain, there is no doubt on the present record as to what the Sonders intended. Their intentions are clearly expressed in the agreement itself. They agreed to a weekly support payment of $800 per week. They prefaced their agreement with a statement indicating their intent that the agreement would be the final settlement of all financial matters between them. See McGough and Madnick (similar language considered evidence of intent that agreement would survive divorce decree and support order). They also provided repeatedly for the survival of the agreement in the event of divorce and indicated that it would not merge into the decree. The parties specifically acknowledged that this agreement was their entire agreement relating to the subject matter thereof. Lastly, they agreed that the agreement would continue in full force and effect unless terminated by the mutual written consent of both parties or by the death of one of them. Moreover, after execution of the agreement, both parties consented to the entry of a divorce decree that excluded merger and neither party appealed that decree. It was not until wife attempted to have husband held in contempt for his willful refusal to pay that husband took the position that the agreement had in fact merged into the decree and that the court could therefore adjust husband's obligations thereunder. I would categorically reject this belated attempt by husband to avoid the clear intent of the parties and I would affirm the trial court in appeal number 1423 PHL 1986. [3]