Opinion ID: 6355971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Describing the Framework

Text: ¶ 26. The best way to understand this series of decisions is that the Court has rejected the broad theory of de facto parenthood advanced in Titchenal and necessary to support the putative father's claims in Moreau , but has in Miller-Jenkins embraced a far more targeted exception to its general understanding that parental status arises from biological connection to a child or a marriage or a civil union to a child's legally recognized parent at the time of the child's birth. This narrower framework may be limited to cases like Miller-Jenkins in which a child would otherwise have only one legally recognized parent, the legally recognized parent (usually a biological parent) and the other intended parent have mutually agreed to bring a child into their family to raise the child together as equal co-parents, and the parents have in fact  done so. 3 On this view, the fundamental distinction between Moreau and Miller-Jenkins arises from the joint decision of the Miller-Jenkins parents to bring a child into their home in the first place and their joint conduct in doing so. This approach reconciles our past decisions, promotes the best interests of children, and is consistent with the modern trend in other states.
¶ 27. The framework described above harmonizes all of our past decisions without implicitly overruling or rewriting them, and is consistent with the spirit of our past decisions. The central fear that animated Moreau is of a broad de facto parent doctrine ... that essentially would allow any former domestic partner to compel a biological parent to defend against the unrelated ex-partner's claim that he or she is a 'parent' entitled to judicially enforced parental rights and responsibilities. 2014 VT 31 , ¶ 21, 196 Vt. 183 , 95 A.3d 416 . The Court in Moreau conceived of Mr. Moreau as an on-again-off-again boyfriend who did not jointly plan with the children's mother to form a family but, rather, came along and helped parent the children for a period of time. Id. ¶ 1. In the context of that vision of the record, the Moreau Court was resistant to a legal regime that would allow a mother to unwittingly afford her boyfriend the rights that flow from a legally recognized parental status merely by relying on him to help parent the children during the course of their relationship. See also Titchenal , 166 Vt. at 382-83 , 693 A.2d at 688 (noting concern that relatives, foster parents, and even day-care providers might claim rights to parent-child contact on basis of parent-like relationships). ¶ 28. These concerns do not apply to the more restrictive test articulated in Miller-Jenkins , in which the Court assigned considerable significance to the following facts: before bringing the child into their family, both parents intended and expected that the nonbiological parent would be the child's legal parent; the nonbiological mother participated in the decision that the biological mother would bear a child conceived through donor insemination and participated actively in the prenatal care and birth; both parents treated the child as a child of both the biological and nonbiological mother during the course of their relationship; and there was no other person with a claim to parental status, as the child was conceived using an anonymous sperm donor. 2006 VT 78 , ¶ 56, 180 Vt. 441 , 912 A.2d 951 . The facts and legal factors set forth in Miller-Jenkins do not raise the specter of accidentally created legal parenthood, but do allow for legally recognized parental status in limited circumstances, arising from the joint decision and actions of the legal and putative parent, even in the absence of a biological or adoptive relationship between putative parent and child or marriage (or civil union) between the parents. The parties' mutual plan to bring a child into their family to co-parent and their joint actions in pursuit of that plan distinguish Miller-Jenkins from Moreau and explain the divergent analyses in the two decisions.
¶ 29. This narrow framework focusing on the pre-conception agreement of the parents would promote the welfare of children without undermining parental rights. As this Court has repeatedly recognized,  the core purpose of our various laws relating to parent-child status is to protect the welfare of children. See, e.g., In re B.L.V.B. , 160 Vt. at 371 , 628 A.2d at 1273 (In interpreting Vermont's adoption statutes, we are mindful that the state's primary concern is to promote the welfare of children ....). The Court's paramount concern should be with the effect of our laws on the reality of children's lives. Id. at 376 , 628 A.2d at 1276 . ¶ 30. The even narrower view-limiting parental status to individuals who are biologically linked to the child, have legally adopted, or are married or joined in civil union with the child's legal parent at birth-would have dire consequences for many children. Under such a regime, even if two parents mutually agree to bring a child into their home and raise that child together, even if the child comes into the home with no other potential parental attachments (because, for example, the child was conceived through anonymous sperm donation), even if those parents raise the child as fully equal co-parents, even if the parents themselves intended and believed they were both the child's legal parents, and even if neither the child nor anyone in the world outside of the child's family ever had any reason to doubt that both parties were, in fact, the child's legal parents, upon termination of the parties' relationship with each other the children can legally be denied any continued relationship with one of the parents and any financial or other support from that parent. It is hard to imagine how such an approach that allows for a complete and involuntary severing of a lifelong parent-child relationship could possibly promote children's welfare. In many cases, the consequences of such a rule would be nothing short of tragic. ¶ 31. The New York Court of Appeals recently recognized the negative impact on children of a doctrine that entirely foreclosed nonbiological and nonadoptive parents from seeking parental rights, even when they had planned with a partner to bring a child into the family, noting that [a] growing body of social science reveals the trauma children suffer as a result of separation from a primary attachment figure ... regardless of that figure's biological or adoptive ties to the children. Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C. , 28 N.Y.3d 1 , 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d 488 , 499 (2016). That court observed that a rule that fixates on biology has inflicted disproportionate hardship on the growing number of nontraditional families in that state. Id. ¶ 32. Our prior cases reflect a concern for protecting the parental rights of a legally recognized parent by refusing to dilute those rights by recognizing a second legally recognized parent on the basis that the latter at some point assumed parental responsibilities for the child. But where a parent jointly plans and conceives a child with a partner, with the mutual intent and agreement to raise that child together, that parent has no reasonable expectation of sole parental rights in the event of a breakup. The understanding that our cases reject a broad theory of de facto parenthood, but at the same time recognize a narrow class of cases in which neither marriage nor biology is a prerequisite to parental status, protects against the erosion of the reasonable expectations of legal parents while ensuring that children in those families can benefit from the ongoing relationship with and support of a lifelong parent.
¶ 33. Adopting this approach puts Vermont in line with the modern trend, and with all of our fellow New England states that have recognized some limited circumstances in which an intended parent may be legally recognized even in the absence  of biological or marital connection. For example, in Brooke S.B. , the New York Court of Appeals recently overruled its longstanding precedent and concluded that in certain circumstances New York law gives a nonbiological, nonadoptive parent standing to petition for custody and visitation. 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 499-500 . In that case, two different unmarried lesbian couples each jointly decided to have a child and raise the child together. In both cases, pursuant to mutual agreement, one mother became pregnant through donor insemination, and the other participated in prenatal appointments and was present and engaged during the child's birth. In both cases, the nonbiological mother and the biological mother shared the range of parental responsibilities for a period of years. And in both cases the mothers broke up and the nonbiological mother's parental status became an issue. ¶ 34. In reviewing the cases, the Court of Appeals considered its longstanding precedent, established in Alison D. v. Virginia M. , 77 N.Y.2d 651 , 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 , 572 N.E.2d 27 (1991), concluding in the context of a similar fact pattern that the nonbiological mother had no standing to seek visitation with the child. The Brooke S.B. court explained that in Alison D. it had been concerned about preserving the rights of biological parents, and that because the legislature had expressly allowed specified nonparents to seek custody or visitation it did not intend to allow others to do so. Brooke S.B. , 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 494 . However, the court acknowledged then-dissenting Judge Kaye's prediction that the court's decision in Alison D. would 'fall[ ] hardest' on the millions of children raised in nontraditional families-including families headed by same-sex couples, unmarried opposite-sex couples, and stepparents, as well as her argument that the majority opinion in Alison D.  'turn[ed] its back on a tradition of reading [New York's statute] so as to promote the welfare of the children.'  Id. (quoting Alison D. , 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 , 572 N.E.2d at 30, 32 (Kaye, J., dissenting)). Revisiting Judge Kaye's prescient dissent, the court in Brooke S.B. concluded that this was one of the rarest of cases in which the court may overrule a prior decision on the basis of an extraordinary combination of factors that undermine the reasoning and practical viability of the prior decision. Id., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 497 . ¶ 35. In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that Alison D. strayed from the longstanding practice in New York courts of resolving matters of custody, visitation, and support in a manner that serves the best interests of children, id ., and considered the impact of the prior holding on children's best interests. The court concluded that, as projected by Judge Kaye, [b]y 'limiting their opportunity to maintain bonds that may be crucial to their development,' the rule of Alison D. has 'fall[en] hardest on the children.'  Id., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 498 (quoting Alison D. , 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 , 572 N.E.2d at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting)). Citing a litany of scholarly sources, the court acknowledged the trauma to children of separating them from a lifelong parent. Id., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 499 . The court concluded that children have fundamental liberty interests in preserving intimate family bonds that must inform the definition of 'parent,' a term so central to the life of a child. Id., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 499-500 . Summarizing its reasons for overruling Alison D. , the court explained: The bright-line rule of Alison D. promotes the laudable goals of certainty and predictability in the wake of domestic disruption. But bright lines cast a harsh light on any injustice and, as predicted by Judge Kaye, there is little  doubt by whom that injustice has been most finely felt and most finely perceived. We will no longer engage in the deft legal maneuvering necessary to read fairness into an overly-restrictive definition of parent that sets too high a bar for reaching a child's best interest and does not take into account equitable principles. Id., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 500 (citations omitted). ¶ 36. Although the court overruled its holding in Alison D. , it took an extremely cautious approach to expanding the definition of parent. It declined to adopt the kind of functional test for standing that has been employed in other jurisdictions, and that considers a variety of factors, many of which relate to the post-birth relationship between the putative parent and the child. Id. It likewise declined to adopt a test that would apply globally in cases involving all nonbiological, nonadoptive, nonmarital parents who are raising children: We reject the premise that we must now declare that one test would be appropriate for all situations, or that the proffered tests are the only options that should be considered. Id. Instead, the court focused on the allegations in both cases that the couples entered into a pre-conception agreement to conceive and raise a child as co-parents. It declined to decide in that case whether, in a case where a biological or adoptive parent consented to the creation of a parent-like relationship between his or her partner and child after conception, the partner may later seek visitation and custody. Id. Instead, the court left for another day all issues involving variations on the facts before it and decided narrowly that where a petitioner proves by clear and convincing evidence that he or she has agreed with the biological parent of the child to conceive and raise the child as co-parents, the petitioner has standing to seek custody and visitation of the child. Id., 39 N.Y.S.3d 89 , 61 N.E.3d at 500-01 . The New York Court of Appeals' approach in Brooke S.B. is consistent with this Court's decisions in both Moreau and Miller-Jenkins insofar as the mutual intent of the mothers at the time they brought the child into their family, rather than agreements or conduct after that time, was determinative. ¶ 37. Similarly, last year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court unanimously issued a decision protecting parent-child relationships in limited circumstances. In Partanen v. Gallagher , a nonbiological mother sought to establish parentage through a state statute that created a presumption of fatherhood when a child was born to unmarried parents and the parents  'received the child into their home and openly held out the child as their child.'  475 Mass. 632 , 59 N.E.3d 1133 , 1135 (2016) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 209C, § 6(a)(4) ). Construing the parentage statute in gender neutral terms, the court concluded that [n]othing in the language of [the statute] expressly limits its applicability to parentage claims based on asserted biological ties. Id. at 1138 . It emphasized that a biological connection is not necessary to the establishment of parentage under the statute, and that the consideration of what is in a child's best interests will often weigh more heavily than the genetic link between parent and child. Id. at 1139 (quotation omitted). Noting that the statute's stated purpose was to provide [c]hildren born to parents who are not married to each other ... the same rights and protections of the law as all other children, id . at 1138 (quotation omitted), the court construed the statute to protect the parental status of the nonbiological parent despite the fact that she was not married to the biological mother. Id. Responding to the suggestion that its decision undermined the rights of the biological mother, the court explained, [t]he question in this case ... is not whether courts  may impose a second parent onto a single-parent family, but whether this was, in fact, a single-parent family in the first place. Id. at 1141 . Citing cases from other states, the court added that courts in other jurisdictions have read comparable provisions to establish parentage in the absence of biological relationships, and have done so, in part, out of concern for the welfare of children born out of wedlock. Id. ¶ 38. The New York and Massachusetts decisions reinforce the modern trend, and both offer a carefully limited analysis of nonbiological and nonmarital parenthood, focusing on the parties' agreement and intentions at the time they brought a child into their home. 4