Opinion ID: 2006531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Massiah and subsequent cases.

Text: The precise issue presented on this appeal and on which there is disagreement, is whether defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel as construed by Massiah v. United States [9] and subsequent United States Supreme Court decisions applying that case, has been violated. The conclusion is inescapable that under any permissible reading of these cases, the alleged incriminating statement here involved was improperly admitted against defendant. The majority dismisses the sixth amendment challenge by citing this court's decision in Davis v. State , [10] which erroneously interprets Massiah as applicable only to situations involving police trickery and deception, and a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v. De Loy , [11] which takes a restrictive view of Massiah but even under which view I think the incriminating admission was improperly admitted. In Massiah, the defendant was indicted with another person for a violation of federal narcotics laws; Massiah retained an attorney, entered a plea of not guilty, and was released on bail. While free on bail, defendant had a conversation with a codefendant in an automobile, unaware that government agents, with the codefendant's cooperation, were monitoring the conversation by means of an electronic eavesdropping device. The agent testified to incriminating statements made by the defendant during the conversation. The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated. The holding of the court was clearly stated: ... We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. It is true that in the Spano case [ Spano v. New York, 360 U. S. 315] the defendant was interrogated in a police station, while here the damaging testimony was elicited from the defendant without his knowledge while he was free on bail. But, as Judge Hays pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals, `if such a rule is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.... (Emphasis supplied.) [12] Some courts thereafter pointed to the concluding sentence of the Massiah opinion to reach the conclusion reached by this court in Davis v. State : ... All that we hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him [original emphasis] at his trial. (Emphasis added.) [13] In light of the express language of the holding, supra, however, it is clear that the circumstances here disclosed was not to be limited to deception only. And apparently the majority of courts did not so limit it. [14] Any doubt as to the invalidity of such an interpretation was dispelled in McLeod v. Ohio . [15] In McLeod the defendant, under indictment for murder, made certain oral incriminating statements to police while helping them look for a gun used in a robbery. Testimony of the police regarding these statements was admitted against defendant at trial. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, finding no constitutional question involved. [16] The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed without opinion, remanding for further consideration in light of Massiah. [17] The Ohio court distinguished Massiah, holding that McLeod had made the incriminating statements voluntarily, before he was represented by counsel or had even requested any, and that there was no deception involved since defendant was knowingly and willingly cooperating with police officers. [18] This position, which is the same as that adopted by the majority here, was summarily rejected by the United States Supreme Court when it again granted certiorari and reversed without opinion, citing Massiah. [19] The majority apparently ignores McLeod. However, it seems to imply that because Massiah was decided before Miranda, it has little vitality today. If there was any doubt about such a view, it was removed by the United States Supreme Court's post- Miranda decision in Beatty v. United States. [20] In Beatty the defendant, under indictment for selling firearms in violation of the National Firearms Act, was represented by counsel and free on bail. The defendant notified one Sirles, the person to whom he had sold the guns, and requested a meeting with the purpose of persuading Sirles not to testify for the prosecution. Sirles notified federal agents who told him to go ahead with the meeting. In addition a federal agent was secreted in the trunk of the car where the conversation was held. At trial, both the informer Sirles and the federal agent testified as to the incriminating statements voluntarily made by the defendant. On appeal, defendant contended the testimony of both Sirles and the agent should have been excluded under Massiah. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the argument, and affirmed. In doing so it noted that Massiah would exclude incriminating statements where deliberately elicited by police in the absence of retained or appointed counsel. It then cited the last sentence of the Massiah majority opinion and stated: ... We interpret this language as meaning that the exclusionary rule does not apply to all incriminating statements made under any circumstances by an accused after his indictment, but such rule only applies to those statements induced or deliberately elicited by officers or their agents from the accused after his indictment while he is without assistance of counsel.... [21] The court then went on to distinguish Massiah, noting that in Beatty the government did not in any way set up the meeting, but that it was suggested by the defendant; that defendant clearly needed no inducement of any kind since he wanted to assure that Sirles would not aid the prosecution; and that although an agent was secreted in the trunk of the car, Sirles' testimony was clearly admissible and sufficient with other evidence to convict defendant. The United States Supreme Court reversed without opinion, citing Massiah. In addition to McLeod and Beatty, a 1968 dissenting opinion of four members of the United States Supreme Court, in Miller v. California , [22] sheds considerable light on this area. In Miller a police informant was placed in defendant's cell to give oral reports of anything she might say with regard to the murder of her husband with which she was charged. At trial the informant testified as to certain unsolicited statements made by defendant. The California Court of Appeals recognized the validity of defendant's constitutional argument under Massiah, but also noted defendant's failure to object to the testimony in the trial court. The controlling factor, however, was that the court concluded the statements were not incriminating. [23] The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, but subsequently withdrew it as improvidently granted. [24] Four members of the court dissented. They viewed an objection made at trial as adequate to preserve the question on appeal, and further disagreed that the statements were not incriminating. As pertinent here, they stated: Respondent also contends that petitioner's constitutional rights were not violated, because [the informant] engaged in no `process of interrogations,' Escobedo v. Illinois ... designed to obtain a confession from petitioner, or that statements from her had not been `deliberately elicited,' Massiah v. United States ... In the state's view, so long as [the informant] acted simply as a listening post, she could testify as to any statements made to her by petitioner. That view was, however, rejected in Massiah itself. The government in that case pointed to the fact that the record did not reveal that its agent had induced the defendant by persuasion (there based on friendship) to discuss his activities, and urged that `providing a defendant an opportunity to talk' [citing the government's brief in Massiah ] did not violate his right to counsel. See also Beatty v. United States ... [25] Under these United States Supreme Court cases the majority's view regarding the interpretation to be given Massiah is erroneous. In addition, the majority of federal courts which have addressed themselves to the question have held that once counsel has been retained or appointed, any deliberate attempts on the part of the police or their agents to elicit information from a defendant in the absence of his counsel or a clear and explicit waiver of the right to have him present, are prohibited, and that any incriminating statements so obtained may not be used against him at trial. [26] The vast majority of state courts have so held also. [27] This is the restrictive view noted by the Fifth Circuit in De Loy, supra . In addition, those courts considering the question who have considered McLeod and/or Beatty, have gone further and held that Massiah commands that all oral communications between defendant and the police made after indictment in the absence of counsel are inadmissible. [28] This is the broader interpretation of Massiah referred to in De Loy. I have no doubt that the present case comes clearly within the purview of even the restrictive reading of Massiah as stated by the Fifth Circuit itself, [29] and by other courts that apparently adopt the restrictive view. [30] While there may not have been any interrogation in the sense of formal question-and-answer sessions, there is little doubt that the testimony of Detective Daniels himself indicates his conversation with defendant was aimed at getting incriminating information from defendant. Under any of the readings of Massiah discussed above, the admission should have been excluded. I agree with the majority that the administration of criminal justice is to be in fact a search for the truth ... However, I cannot agree with the implication that the mere presence of a defendant's counsel will somehow prevent the truth from being determined. This argument was expressly considered and rejected in Miranda. The essential problem in all these cases is not so much a question of right to counsel as a waiver of that right. The entire line of supreme court cases in this area, including Spano, [31] Gideon, [32] Massiah, [33] Escobedo, [34] Miranda, [35] etc., lead to the inescapable conclusion that the presence of counsel will best effectuate the truthfinding process and do so consistently with constitutional principles. These cases indicate a continuing concern with the precise situation here involved: a swearing match between a police officer who states the defendant made an incriminating statement in a manner consistent with his constitutional rights, and a defendant saying either that he did not make the statement at all, or that it was made in response to unconstitutional methods of reaching the truth. This court is duty bound to abide by the provisions of the constitution and the mandates of the United States Supreme Court interpreting these provisions. To do so here requires that the alleged incriminating admission here involved be excluded. The failure to do so in the trial court in this case requires reversal.