Opinion ID: 2514663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Washington At-Will Employment and the Public Policy Exception

Text: ś95 There are only four categories of clear public policy preventing an employer from firing an employee: when the employee (1) refuses to commit an illegal act, (2) performs a public duty or obligation, (3) exercises a legal right or privilege, or (4) reports employer misconduct. See Dicomes, 113 Wash.2d at 618, 782 P.2d 1002. Danny's claim here invokes the second and third exceptions because she accessed domestic violence services and helped police to prosecute her abuser. See order at 3-4. She also asserts there is a legislatively and judicially recognized clear public policy to combat domestic violence in Washington. Br. of Appellant at 14. Absent specific public policy language, a court cannot expand the limited holdings of prior public policy exception cases to create a new exception in the present case. ś96 Danny argues that accessing social services and moving her family were lifesaving acts, which this court has held to constitute an appropriate exception to the at-will employment rule. See Gardner, 128 Wash.2d at 943, 913 P.2d 377. [1] In Gardner this court held that firing an armored car driver who rescued a woman from a bank robbery contravened public policy. Id. at 933-35, 913 P.2d 377. The fact that the driver violated company regulations to save the life of the hostage was excused due to these clear public policy concerns. Id. at 943, 913 P.2d 377. ś97 Gardner carved a narrow exception in the at-will employment doctrine by protecting lifesaving behavior where a citizen's life is in imminent danger. Id. at 940, 913 P.2d 377 (emphasis added). Here, the nexus that connects Danny's potential danger from her abuser is not the same imminent danger exhibited by the hostage situation. This court has rejected the argument that broad statutory language [2] was sufficient to find an exception. Id. at 942-43, 913 P.2d 377. Gardner did not justify its conclusion based on a broad public policy of respect for human life; the exception was satisfied only by a limited class of good samaritans who render emergency care or transportation. Id. at 943-44, 913 P.2d 377. Under Gardner, one is protected from firing only if she assists `a citizen held hostage ... and/or who is in danger of serious physical injury and/or death.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting certified question). Danny's case does not present the court with the split-second, lifesaving behavior like that in Gardner. Danny's efforts to secure housing and access to domestic violence services are commendable, but they do not fit within the narrow, good-samaritan exception in Gardner. ś98 Another case, Roberts v. Dudley , demonstrates that rigorous application of the public policy exception is required even in the analogous, heavily regulated area of gender equality. 140 Wash.2d at 58, 993 P.2d 901. Roberts held that Washington had articulated a clear public policy with regard to gender discrimination by employers. Id. at 77, 993 P.2d 901 (This clearly articulated public policy is based on RCW 49.12.200 and RCW 49.60.010 and has been previously recognized in Marquis v. City of Spokane . ). Danny's claimed public policy support is very different from Roberts'. In Roberts, the court correctly relied upon a specific statute, [3] a constitutional amendment, [4] and a clear judicial precedent [5] to satisfy the clarity element of the gender discrimination exception. Id. In the current case, none of those critical elements are present. ś99 Finally, this court correctly exercised judicial restraint in another wrongful discharge case. Sedlacek v. Hillis, 145 Wash.2d 379, 389, 36 P.3d 1014 (2001). In that decision, this court declined to find protection for an able-bodied employee through relationship to a disabled co-worker. Id. The clarity element was not satisfied because Washington had not adopted a clearly articulated discrimination policy regarding this exception. See id. at 392, 36 P.3d 1014. Moreover, the legislature had chosen not to amend the Washington Law Against Discrimination, chapter 49.60 RCW, to adopt the sought-after ADA (federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213) protection for associates. Id. at 391, 36 P.3d 1014. The court correctly held that the adoption of a previously unrecognized public policy under Washington law is better addressed to the Legislature. Id. at 390, 36 P.3d 1014. Here, Danny is simply asking for the adoption of an exception that had not been recognized in Washington's statutes or case law. ś100 In sum, heavily regulated areas, such as disability protection, should be strictly interpreted by courts when the legislature has not granted a specific right. Clearly, we cannot conclude that a clear mandate of public policy exists merely because the plaintiff can point to a potential source of public policy that addresses the relevant issue. Id. at 389, 36 P.3d 1014. Here, the legislature had not amended existing domestic violence laws to provide the sought-after employment protection.