Opinion ID: 1236984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State's Failure to Produce Tape Recordings.

Text: Romeo seeks a new trial on the basis of the State's failure to produce tape recordings of conversations between Sonderleiter, Hirsch and law enforcement authorities. He claims that the State's failure to produce these tapes violates his rights under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(2)(b)(8) and under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. We conclude Romeo is not entitled to a new trial because (1) the evidence withheld from him would not have changed the outcome of his trial as required for a rule 23 violation, and (2) the due process requirement that the absence of the evidence undermine our confidence in the jury's verdict is not present. In December 1993, the State provided copies of all statements or summaries of statements of the State's witnesses to Romeo's attorney in response to a request by him for those documents. Three months later, an assistant Polk County attorney not assigned to Romeo's case, Schneider and Ponsetto interviewed Sonderleiter and Hirsch to obtain information from them pertaining to stolen property that had surfaced in other cases. These interviews were tape recorded. During the interviews there was an informal discussion about the terms of a plea agreement. The assistant Polk County attorney indicated he would not charge the thieves with any offenses in Polk County and no habitual offender charges would be filed if Sonderleiter and Hirsch provided the requested information. Two weeks after the interviews, Romeo's attorney deposed Sonderleiter. Sonderleiter revealed that as part of his agreement to testify in Romeo's case, the Polk County attorney would not file any charges against him in Polk County. He acknowledged that the Polk County charges could have totaled nearly 200 years of prison time. After the completion of trial but before sentencing, Romeo's attorney learned of the existence of the tapes when they were produced in another case.
[w]hen the defendant has discovered important and material evidence in his or her favor since the verdict, which the defendant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial. Romeo must show (1) he discovered the tape recordings after the verdict, (2) he could not have discovered them earlier in the exercise of reasonable diligence, (3) the recordings are material to the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) the evidence probably would have changed the result of the trial. See State v. Allen, 348 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1984). The trial judge concluded that the tapes were not material and would not have affected the outcome of the trial. Because the trial judge sat through the trial, he is in a superior position to decide whether the information on the tapes would have changed the result of the trial. Consequently, we give weight to his conclusion that the result would not have been altered had the tapes been available for use at trial. Id.; State v. Jackson, 223 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1974). Therefore, we review the trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial on the basis of newly-discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion. Jackson, 223 N.W.2d at 233. Romeo argues that the tapes would have allowed him to impeach the credibility of Sonderleiter and Hirsch at trial. However, during the testimony of both witnesses, the prosecutor brought out the fact that they were testifying with the understanding that if they cooperated with the authorities, they would not be charged with crimes in Polk County. Sonderleiter testified that he faced twenty to thirty theft charges in Polk County with the possibility of almost 200 years in prison. He also stated that he would not be charged with crimes in other counties that might have resulted in another 100 years in sentences. Hirsch admitted that he would not be prosecuted on any charges in Polk County and additionally, that he would not be tried as a habitual offender. The only information contained on the tapes that was not brought out at trial was the fact that the authorities had also agreed not to charge Sonderleiter as a habitual offender. We are unable to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding this additional fact would not have affected the outcome of the trial. The jury knew that Sonderleiter agreed to testify in exchange for 300 years of charges being dropped. Any additional motivation to fabricate that might have arisen from the prosecutor's agreement to abandon any habitual offender charges was de minimis. In other words, if the jury found Sonderleiter credible despite the fact that he would not be prosecuted for 300 years worth of crimes, the jury certainly would not have had a different opinion of his credibility merely because the concessions were somewhat greater than the 300 years to which Sonderleiter admitted. We agree with the trial court that the result of the trial would not have been altered had the State produced the tapes. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Romeo's motion for new trial under rule 23(2)(b)(8). B. Due process claim. A defendant's due process rights are violated when the prosecution fails to produce upon request evidence favorable to the accused where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963). Evidence that may be used to impeach a witness's credibility is included in this rule. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985). The good faith or bad faith of the prosecution in failing to produce the evidence is unimportant in deciding whether a defendant's due process rights have been infringed. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. To establish a Brady violation, Romeo must prove (1) the prosecution suppressed the tapes, (2) the tapes were favorable to his defense, and (3) the tapes were material to the issue of guilt. See Cornell v. State, 430 N.W.2d 384, 385 (Iowa 1988). The trial court found that the tapes were not material. We review this constitutional issue de novo, Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Iowa 1989), and find that Romeo failed to satisfy the materiality element of this test. Whether the evidence was material depends on whether there is a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3384, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494. A reasonable probability of a different result is shown when the Government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, 506 (1995) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S.Ct. at 3381, 87 L.Ed.2d at 491). The defendant need not show that the disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in his acquittal. Id. Thus, we must decide whether the fact that Sonderleiter would not be charged as a habitual offender so impeaches his testimony as to undermine our confidence in the jury verdict. Upon our review of the record and the suppressed evidence, we find no reasonable probability that the result of Romeo's trial would have been different if the tapes had been disclosed prior to trial. Romeo's counsel knew that Sonderleiter and Hirsch were testifying under an agreement with the prosecuting authorities and he cross-examined them on this point at trial. Although Romeo's attorney was unaware that Sonderleiter would not be prosecuted as a habitual offender, we do not think knowledge of this fact would have changed his trial preparation or strategy. Moreover, as we concluded in our discussion of Romeo's rule 23 claim, the impeachment value of this evidence was merely incremental. Even if Romeo's counsel had brought out the habitual offender aspect of Sonderleiter's deal with the government, we do not believe it is reasonably probable that this fact would have changed the jury's evaluation of Sonderleiter's credibility. See United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1987) (no due process claim where the impeachment information not supplied to the defendant was already, in substance, before the jury); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009, 98 S.Ct. 1883, 56 L.Ed.2d 392 (1978) (where defense knew of basic content of plea agreement with prosecution's star witness before trial, [k]nowledge of the precise details of the agreement was unlikely to add significantly to its impeachment potential); Rowe v. Grizzard, 591 F.Supp. 389, 397 (E.D.Va.1984) (if suppressed impeachment evidence would have had no significant effect on the witness's credibility, there is no due process violation); Brewer, 444 N.W.2d at 83 (failure of prosecution to reveal complete details of star witness's grant of immunity was not a Brady violation in part because the evidence was not material). Therefore, the suppression of this evidence does not raise a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different. For these reasons, our confidence in the correctness of the jury's verdict is not undermined by the suppression of evidence by the State. Therefore, the evidence Romeo claims was suppressed is not material and consequently, his due process right to a fair trial was not infringed.