Opinion ID: 169811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Mr. Moran

Text: When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the district court's factual findings and determinations of witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Harris, 313 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir.2002) (quotation omitted). We are permitted to consider evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, as well as any evidence properly presented at trial, id., and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004). We review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. [S]topping a car and detaining its occupants [for investigatory purposes] constitute[s] a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985). We measure the constitutional validity of an investigatory stop by the standard set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), asking whether the stop is supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Treto-Haro, 287 F.3d 1000, 1004 (10th Cir.2002). In so doing, we examine the events that occurred leading up to the stop to determine whether the `historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion.' United States v. Vercher, 358 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). We have explained that an officer with reasonable suspicion need not `rule out the possibility of innocent conduct' as long as the totality of the circumstances suffices to form `a particularized and objective basis' for a stop. Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-78, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002)). Mr. Moran argues that the District Court should have suppressed physical evidence obtained after officers unlawfully stopped the SUV he was driving. Specifically, Mr. Moran argues that the stop was unreasonable because the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was driving the SUV when they pulled him over. In addition, Mr. Moran contends that police may stop an individual based on suspicion of past criminal activity only when the crime at issue is a felony offense; because the officers were investigating a completed misdemeanor, he argues the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. As we explain below, we reject both arguments.
We first address Mr. Moran's argument that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that he was driving the SUV. Mr. Moran does not dispute that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that he criminally trespassed on the Fergusons' property. Instead, he argues that the officers lacked particularized suspicion that he was driving the black SUV. To the contrary, the totality of circumstances here is sufficient to lead an objectively reasonable officer to believe that Mr. Moran was driving the black SUV when the officers stopped the vehicle. The evidence shows that Mrs. Ferguson had encountered Mr. Moran in the past on her property. As a result, Mrs. Ferguson could reliably identify him as the alleged trespasser when she reported the two incidents of trespass to the Otero County sheriff's office. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (concluding officer had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant based on information from a citizen informant); United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.2002) (noting that citizen informants known to police are presumed to be reliable). When Sergeant Braziel arrived at the Fergusons' property at approximately 5:00 p.m., the Fergusons reported that Mr. Moran was still on their property or in the area behind it. Sergeant Braziel observed a black SUV across the road from the Fergusons' property and had personal knowledge that one of the cars Mr. Moran drove was a black SUV. Thus, the totality of the circumstances the Fergusons' reliable report that Mr. Moran was in the vicinity of the alleged crime, the fact that Sergeant Braziel saw a black SUV in the immediate vicinity of the alleged crime, and his knowledge that Mr. Moran drove a black SUVis sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Moran was driving the black SUV.
Mr. Moran also argues that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers stopped the vehicle to investigate a completed misdemeanor. In United States v. Hensley , the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct an investigatory stop if they have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony. 469 U.S. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. The Court made clear, however, that [w]e need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted. Id. Despite the Court's explicit reservation, Mr. Moran argues that Hensley prohibits all investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor. We note that this is a matter of first impression in our Circuit and that the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have split on the issue. Compare Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 771 n. 6 (6th Cir.2004) (Police may . . . make a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though not of a mere completed misdemeanor.), with United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that, in reviewing the reasonableness of a stop to investigate a completed misdemeanor, a court must consider the nature of the misdemeanor offense in question, with particular attention to the potential for ongoing or repeated danger . . . and any risk of escalation). Mindful of the fact-specific nature of the [Fourth Amendment] reasonableness inquiry, Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996), we hold that the officers' investigatory stop of Mr. Moran was reasonable in light of the particular facts and circumstances of this case. Following the Supreme Court's approach in Hensley, we determine the constitutionality of an investigatory stop by balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 675. [4] We first evaluate the governmental interests involved in the officers' stop of Mr. Moran. In Hensley, the Court explained that the governmental interest in crime prevention and detection, necessarily implicated in a stop to investigate ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, may not be present when officers are investigating past criminal conduct. Id. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 675. A stop to investigate past criminal activity may, however, serve the governmental interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. Id. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. This interest is particularly strong when the criminal activity involves a threat to public safety. Id. (noting the interest is particularly strong in the context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety); see also Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1080 (holding a court reviewing the reasonableness of an investigative stop must consider the nature of the offense, with particular attention to any inherent threat to public safety associated with the suspected past violation). The circumstances of the present case implicate a strong governmental interest in solving crime and bringing offenders to justice because the alleged underlying criminal activity posed an ongoing risk to public safety. First, a criminal trespass inherently involves some risk of confrontation with the property owner. Importantly, in this case, the risk of confrontation was not hypothetical. Mr. Ferguson reported that he had previously encountered Mr. Moran on his property and had confronted him about trespassing. See Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081 (noting police may consider past altercation with a potential for violent escalation as a threat to public safety). The record also shows that the officers received reliable information that Mr. Moran had threatened the Pattersons to gain access across their land to the national forest. Furthermore, because Mr. Moran was allegedly crossing the Fergusons' property to hunt, a reasonable officer could assume that he was likely carrying a weapon. Finally, the officers had reason to believe that criminal activity would recur: the officers received two complaints on the same day that Mr. Moran was trespassing across private property for the purpose of hunting, and the Fergusons' reports indicated that the trespassing was a recurring problem. See id. at 1080 (noting law enforcement interest is stronger when intervention of investigating officer might eliminate any ongoing risk that an offending party might repeat the completed misdemeanor or . . . might stem the potential for escalating violence arising from such conduct). In sum, the alleged history of confrontation and threats, combined with the specific nature of the trespass (i.e., for the purpose of hunting) and the likelihood that the alleged criminal activity would recur, created a situation involving a threat to public safety, Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. Under these circumstances, it is in the public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible. Id. We acknowledge that the governmental interest in solving crime may be weaker when police have alternative methods of investigating the crime. See id. (explaining that, where police have been unable to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past crime, an investigatory stop promotes the strong governmental interest in solving crimes (emphasis added)). Here, the officers knew Mr. Moran and could have attempted to locate him at his home or elsewhere. But because Mr. Moran had allegedly committed the criminal trespass just minutes before the officers stopped him, the governmental interest in solving the crime was strong. To restrain police action in such a situation would be to require police to turn their backs on potential criminal activity and to enable the suspect to flee, id. at 229, 105 S.Ct. 675. Indeed, at the time he was stopped, Mr. Moran more nearly represented an individual in the process of violating the law or a suspect fleeing from the scene of a crime than a suspect in a past crime who now appears to be going about his lawful business, id. at 228, 105 S.Ct. 675. Under these circumstances, when past criminal activity suggests an ongoing threat to public safety, a stop may further a strong governmental interest in solving crime. Recognizing this governmental interest, we next consider whether, balanced against the nature of the intrusion, the stop was reasonable. An investigatory stop is by definition brief and non-intrusive. United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir.2004); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (noting investigatory stop of automobile is limited [in purpose] and the resulting detention quite brief); United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir.1993) (explaining Terry stop is usually characterized as a brief, nonintrusive detention during a frisk for weapons or preliminary questioning). Balanced against the strong governmental interest in solving crime, the relatively limited intrusion on personal security occasioned by an investigatory stop was warranted and the officers' seizure of Mr. Moran was not unreasonable. To be clear, we stress the limited and fact-dependent nature of our holding. We do not suggest that all investigatory stops based on completed misdemeanors are reasonable or even that any stop based on a completed criminal trespass is per se reasonable. Several facts are essential to our holding: the officers had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Moran repeatedly committed the very same crime in question (criminal trespass on the Fergusons' property); the officers received a report of the same crime earlier on the day of the stop; a reasonable officer could conclude that Mr. Moran was likely to repeat the crime in the future; the specific nature of the trespass and Mr. Moran's reported history with the Fergusons and Pattersons indicated a threat to public safety; and the officers encountered Mr. Moran just minutes after the crime allegedly occurred. These facts implicate the governmental interest discussed above, which when balanced against the brief and nonintrusive nature of an investigatory traffic stop, render the officers' actions in seizing Mr. Moran reasonable.