Opinion ID: 1234691
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Ferber Factor

Text: The compelling government interest inquiry at issue here overlaps with the strict scrutiny analysis discussed presently. No matter how appealing the cause of animal protection is to our sensibilities, we hesitatein the First Amendment contextto elevate it to the status of a compelling interest. Three reasons give us pause to conclude that preventing cruelty to animals rises to a compelling government interest that trumps an individual's free speech rights. First, the Supreme Court has suggested that the kind of government interest at issue in § 48 is not compelling. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). The Supreme Court in Lukumi held that city ordinances that outlawed animal sacrifices could not be upheld based on the city's assertion that protecting animals was a compelling government interest. Id. at 546-47, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Government contends that Lukumi is inapplicable to a compelling government interest analysis. Although that case dealt with the Free Exercise Clause rather than the Free Speech Clause, and was limited by the Court to the context of the particular ordinances at issue, it remains instructive. The possible relevance of Lukumi was noted under the Dissenting Views section of the House Report of § 48: Although the Supreme court [sic] recognized the governmental interest in protecting animals from cruelty, as against the constitutional right of free exercise of religion[,] the governmental interest did not prevail. Therefore, it seems that, on balance, animal rights do not supersede fundamental human rights. Here, while Government can and does protect animals from acts of cruelty, to make possession of films of such acts illegal would infringe upon the free speech rights of those possessing the films. H.R.REP. NO. 106-397, at 11. When we consider Lukumi along with the fact that the Supreme Court has not expanded the extremely limited number of unprotected speech categories in a generation, the only conclusion we are left with is that weas a lower federal courtshould not create a new category when the Supreme Court has hinted at its hesitancy to do so on this same topic. Second, while the Supreme Court has not always been crystal clear as to what constitutes a compelling interest in free speech cases, it rarely finds such an interest for content-based restrictions. When it has done so, the interest haswithout exceptionrelated to the well-being of human beings, not animals. When looking at these cases, as well as the interests at issue in the unprotected speech categories, it is difficult to see how § 48 serves a compelling interest that represents a government objective of surpassing importance. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348. The Supreme Court has suggested that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment clause violation may be compelling, although that remains an unsettled question of law. Compare Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.) with Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 112-13, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001) (We have said that a state interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation `may be characterized as compelling,' and therefore may justify content-based discrimination. However, it is not clear whether a State's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation would justify viewpoint discrimination.) (citations omitted). The Government also has a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by those who harm them and ensuring that criminals do not profit from their crimes. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118-19, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991). But see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 348-49, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-25, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988); Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230-32, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). Similarly important human interests are at issue in constitutionally valid statutes regulating fighting words, threats, speech that imminently incites illegal activity, and obscenity. In Ferber, the Court illustrated the type of interest that must be at stake in order for it to be compelling. The Court stated, [i]t is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling because [a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 244, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (The sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people.); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L.REV. 2417, 2420-21 (1996) (discussing other legitimate compelling government interests). Nothing in these cases suggests that a statute that restricts an individual's free speech rights in favor of protecting an animal is compelling. Similarly, and even more fatal to the Government's position, because the statute does not regulate the underlying act of animal crueltywhich must be a crime under state or federal law in order to trigger § 48we can see no persuasive argument that such a statute serves a compelling government interest. While the statute at issue in Ferber also prohibited the distribution of the depiction of sexual performances by children under the age of 16, 458 U.S. at 749, 102 S.Ct. 3348, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to cabin its discussion of the depiction/act conflation because of the special role that children play in our society. [7] Preventing cruelty to animals, although an exceedingly worthy goal, simply does not implicate interests of the same magnitude as protecting children from physical and psychological harm. Third, there is not a sufficient link between § 48 and the interest in preventing cruelty to animals. As the Government recognizes, Congress and the states already have in place comprehensive statutory schemes to protect animals from mistreatment. The Government states that all fifty states have enacted laws which criminalize the infliction of cruelty on animals. This includes laws which outlaw dog fighting in all 50 states. Gov't Br. 32. These statutes are materially different from § 48. Section 48 does nothing to regulate the underlying conduct that is already illegal under state laws. Rather, it regulates only the depiction of the conduct. In order to serve the purported compelling government interest of preventing animal cruelty, the regulation of these depictions must somehow aid in the prevention of cruelty to animals. With this depiction/act distinction in mind, it seems appropriate to recast the compelling government interest as preventing cruelty to animals that state and federal statutes directly regulating animal cruelty under-enforce. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 683, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the question here is whether the Act, given its restrictions ..., significantly advances that [compelling] interest). The House Committee Report for § 48 stated that the statute targeted the depiction rather than the act because under-enforcement of state animal cruelty laws is a particular problem in the crush video industry. H.R.REP. NO. 106-397, at 3. The Report approvingly cited witnesses who testified to this effect. [8] Consistent with these findings, the Government states that as a practical matter, it is nearly impossible to identify the persons involved in the acts of cruelty or the place where the acts occurred. Gov't Br. 32. While this justification is plausible for crush videos, it is meaningless when evaluating § 48 as written. By its terms, the statute applies without regard to whether the identities of individuals in a depiction, or the location of a depiction's production, are obscured. The Government also argues that § 48 indirectly serves to deter future animal cruelty and other antisocial behavior by discouraging individuals from becoming desensitized to animal violence. As support for its position, the Government approvingly cited the House Committee Report, which cited research that suggest[ed] that violent acts committed by humans may be the result of a long pattern of perpetrating abuse, which `often begins with the torture and killing of animals.' Gov't Br. 31-32 (citing H.R.REP. NO. 106-397, at 4[sic]). The full quote is as follows: The committee also notes the increasing body of research which suggests that humans who kill or abuse others often do so as the culmination of a long pattern of abuse, which often begins with the torture and killing of animals. When society fails to prevent these persons from inflicting harm upon animals as children, they may fail to learn respect for any living being. If society fails to prevent adults from engaging in this behavior, they may become so desensitized to the suffering of these beings that they lose the ability to empathize with the suffering of humans. H.R.REP. NO. 106-397, at 4. We read this passage to mean that, by broadly prohibiting these depictions of animal cruelty, the drafters of the House Committee Report believed that fewer individuals will see and make such depictions and therefore not be subject to this desensitization. This reasoning is insufficient to override First Amendment protections for content-based speech restrictions. The Supreme Court has rejected a similar argument in the context of virtual child pornography, stating that [w]hile the Government asserts that the images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect. The harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250, 122 S.Ct. 1389 (internal citation omitted). When balanced against First Amendment rights, the mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it. Id. at 253, 122 S.Ct. 1389. The Supreme Court cannot speak more clearly than it has on this issue: The prospect of crime... by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech. Id. at 245, 122 S.Ct. 1389. Similarly, general references to speech repugnant to public mores cannot serve as a compelling government interest sufficient to override constitutional protections of speech. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990) (If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989)); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000)). For these reasons, we fail to see how 18 U.S.C. § 48 serves a compelling government interest.