Opinion ID: 3013382
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The New Parole Policy of 1996

Text: The Ex Post Facto clause of the United States Constitution applies to a statutory or policy change that alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. California Dep’t of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 506 n.3 (1995). A new law or policy violates the Ex Post Facto clause (1) when it is retrospective, i.e., when it appl[ies] to events occurring before its enactment, and (2) when it disadvantage[s] the 15 offender affected by it. Weaver v. Graham , 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981); see Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 488 (3d Cir. 2001). As to the first criterion for an Ex Post Facto violation, the Board strenuously argues in its brief (p. 14) that the 1996 amendments . . . did not change the Board’s standards for determining parole. First, it asserts that Pennsylvania’s statement of public policy for parole, 61 P.S. S 331.1, refers to the supervision of parolees, rather than to conditions of release. The foregoing argument has little merit. The statute unequivocally has been interpreted by Pennsylvania courts to express broad and general aspirations of Pennsylvania’s parole policy. See Stewart v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 714 A.2d 502, 508 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (Section 1 of the Parole Act, 61 P.S. SS 331.1, . . . enunciates the state’s public policy concerning parole . . . .). The essential matter before us is not whether the statute on its face pertains to parole decisionmaking, but whether, in practice, the new language has altered the fundament for reviewing parole applications. See Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 256 (2000). We look beyond the language of the statute and examine the Board’s pronouncements of policy and its public statements that shed light on the interpretation of its statutory mandate. These suggest that after 1996 the Board gave foremost importance to the public safety factor. This is confirmed by the report in the September 20, 2000 Harrisburg PatriotNews, when then-Board chairman William Ward observed that legislative changes around 1995 recast the Board’s mission to put public safety first. The Board also asserts that its policy historically has placed equal emphasis on the interests of the inmate and the interests of public safety, and it points in its brief to us to statutory language in effect in the 1940s to prove this point: whenever in its opinion [1] the best interests of the convict justify or require his being paroled and[2] it does not appear that the interest of the Commonwealth will be injured thereby, a prisoner will be granted parole. Board Brief at 11-12. The Board correctly notes that the potential risk to public safety in granting parole has always been a consideration in the decisional process. It claims that other 16 provisions of the parole statute have, under both the earlier and the current versions, required that the Boardconsider the nature and circumstances of the offense committed, [and] the general character and background of the prisoner. 61 P.S. S 331.19.13 However, to state that public safety was always a consideration does not mean that the Board gave it the same weight after 1996 in the decisional equation. The record is convincing that after 1996, the Board applied to the public safety interest far greater weight. The evidence here demonstrates that since 1996, the Board has given special weight to the risk to public safety. Pre-1996, a prisoner could be denied parole because of public safety concerns only if those concerns together with other relevant factors outweighed, by a preponderance, the liberty interests of the inmate. The 1996 policy change placed first and foremost the public safety to the disadvantage of the remaining liberty interest of the prisoner. The Pennsylvania courts have suggested that the 1996 public safety directive has caused the Board to review the petitions of violent offenders with redoubled scrutiny: As a result [of statutory and policy changes in 1996], violent offenders are subjected to a more stringent standard of review for parole eligibility than nonviolent offenders. The _________________________________________________________________ 13. The provision provides in pertinent part: It shall be the duty of the board . . . to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense committed, any recommendations made by the trial judge and prosecuting attorney, the general character and background of the prisoner, participation by a prisoner who is serving a sentence for a crime of violence as defined in 42 Pa.C.S. SS 9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses) in a victim impact education program offered by the Department of Corrections and . . . the testimony of the victim or the victim’s family . . . . The board shall further consider the notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any, together with such additional information regarding the nature and circumstances of the offense committed for which sentence was imposed as may be available. The board shall further cause the conduct of the person while in prison and his physical, mental and behavior condition and history, his history of family violence and his complete criminal record . . . to be reported and investigated. 17 purpose behind the classification and the disparate treatment between the violent and nonviolent offenders is the protection of public safety. Myers v. Ridge, 712 A.2d 791, 799 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998). Furthermore, the policy change around 1996 took place in the ambience of numerous policy statements that shed light on the Board’s interpretation of its statutory mission: it clearly viewed its statutory mandate to require special emphasis on public safety. Our attention is directed to the 50th Anniversary Report of the Board (1991), which states in its concluding paragraph that protection of society is the Board’s primary goal. App. 187. Read in context, however, this passage applies to the Board’s supervision of parolees. This same passage provided that conditional release permits the Board to meet its goal of protecting society. An earlier section of the document states that [t]he immediate goal of parole supervision is the protection of society, by closely supervising the parolee and setting conditions for continued release, pertaining to work, health, education or other needs, that ensure smooth reintegration and, hence, the public safety. App. 185 (emphasis added). Upon analyzing this language, it is obvious that the Board meant in this report that conditional release, with fixed conditions for continued parole, is designed to safeguard the public after a parole has been granted. Thus, this 1991 anniversary report sheds no light on the post-1996 Board treatment of public safety as a factor before parole is granted. The statistical evidence is quite staggering here, and strongly confirms the change in policy in 1996: of the 266 historical instances of commuted sentences on which the Board has kept records, all were granted parole on the first or second application. Many, if not most, of these original sentences were for violent crimes. Doubtless, these earlier Parole Boards spanned a wide spectrum of political and penological philosophies. Yet, the gubernatorial grant of commutation of sentence had such significance that the Board agreed to parole every commutee on his or her first or second application. The Thomas application is distinguished from these 266 cases only by the intervening policy directive of 1996, emphasizing public safety. 18 In addition to these statistics, substantive declarations of Board policy strongly support the proposition that, after 1996, the Board applied a new standard. A 1996 report by the Legislative Judiciary Committee strongly exhorted the Board to reform its parole policies by placing greater stress on public safety. A 1997 self-assessment by the Board specifically noted that during the 1995-1997 period, public safety became the Board’s new foremost concern. The new Guidelines, implemented between 1998 and 2000, placed more weight on Victim Injury. The 2000 Board Decision denying Thomas’s parole noted that its action was consistent with the Board’s mandate to protect the public. This language did not appear on earlier Board decisions and reflects its new parole policy. These declarations stand in bold contrast to the pre-1996 policies, which commanded that the Board give weight to various factors in the parole process, such as Department of Corrections staff recommendations, educational accomplishments, job training, and therapy programs. This factor-based approach strongly suggests that dispositive weight should not be given to any one factor.14 Pre-1996, release upon eligibility for parole was presumed, and any decision to deny parole based on public safety considerations had to be supported by specific reasons, which outweighed those factors favoring release. Prior to 1996, a Board recommendation contrary to the Guidelines required that the Board have appropriate reasons for [its parole denial] decision. Because the pre-1996 Guidelines already factored in the risk to public safety vis-a-vis relevant recidivism indicators, the Board after 1996 could not give added, and certainly not exclusive, weight to public safety in overruling the Guidelines. We conclude, then, that prior to 1996, the Board’s concern for potential risks to public safety could not be the sole or dominant basis for parole denial under the existing Guidelines. Considerations of public safety were already _________________________________________________________________ 14. The Guidelines themselves embody this philosophy. They are designed so that: No single reason-for-refusal will justify the denial of parole: a preponderance of negative reasons will countervail release. App. 253. 19 incorporated into its Guidelines analysis; the Board had to point to unique factors as a basis for its rejection of the Guidelines. Moreover, the Board had to weigh all factors, militating for and against parole, and make its decision on the totality of the factors pertinent to parole, and give appropriate weight to the interests of the inmate. Heavy foot application on one factor could not have been the basis of granting or rejecting parole. Policy declarations in and after 1996 demonstrate that Board stance shifted and that, indeed, post-1996 considerations of public safety became the dominant concern of the Board.