Opinion ID: 4188856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FDCPA Venue in the Seventh Circuit

Text: In the three states in this circuit, almost all state trial courts are organized county by county, so the relevant “judicial dis‐ trict or similar legal entity” under § 1692i is ordinarily a county. The sticky issue has been the meaning of “judicial dis‐ trict or similar legal entity” in counties that divide their small claims courts among court subdivisions that are smaller than the entire counties. These are Cook County, Illinois (Chicago), and Marion County, Indiana (Indianapolis). In Newsom, we held that municipal department districts of the Circuit Court of Cook County were not “judicial districts” under § 1692i(a), and that the relevant “judicial district” for Cook County was the entire county. 76 F.3d at 819. The prac‐ tical effect of that decision was to allow debt collectors in Cook County to choose freely among the six different munic‐ ipal department districts, at least as far as the FDCPA was con‐ cerned. In the wake of Newsom, debt collectors in Cook County could file collection suits in municipal department districts that were distant from the consumers’ residence or the location where the relevant contract was signed. No. 15‐2516 7 In 2014, however, we revisited the venue issue in a case dealing with the nine township small‐claims courts in Marion County, Indiana, in Suesz, 757 F.3d 636. In Suesz, we overruled Newsom and held that a “judicial district or similar legal en‐ tity” under § 1692i is “the smallest geographic area that is rel‐ evant for determining venue in the court system in which the case is filed.” Id. at 638. That meant in Suesz itself that a col‐ lection suit filed in a township other than where the consumer resided or the contract was signed violated the Act. The reasoning and holding of Suesz clearly extend to the municipal department districts in Cook County, Illinois. It ap‐ pears that collectors of consumer debts in Cook County quickly adapted their practices to comply with Suesz after the en banc decision. This appeal concerns FDCPA claims based on collections suits filed before our en banc decision in Suesz.2 2 The question presented in this appeal has arisen in a number of sim‐ ilar cases in the Northern District of Illinois. All of the district court deci‐ sions on point other than Oliva have ruled in favor of retroactive applica‐ tion of Suesz. See Oberg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 C 7369 2015 WL 9478213, at  (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2015) (Kennelly, J.); Des‐ fassiaux v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 142 F. Supp. 3d 667, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (Feinerman, J.); Browne v. John C. Bonewicz, P.C., No. 14 CV 6312, 2015 WL 6165033, at  (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2015) (Shah, J.); Rowan v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 CV 08923, 2015 WL 5920873, at  (N.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2015) (Chang, J.); Conroy v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, No. 14 C 6725, 2015 WL 5821642, at  (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2015) (Hart, J.); Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC, 125 F. Supp. 3d 810, 817 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (Kennelly, J.); Maldanado v. Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC, Nos. 14 C 6694 et al., 2015 WL 2330213, at  (N.D. Ill. May 14, 2015) (Leinenweber, J.). Other similar cases have failed for sep‐ arate reasons, though, such as the statute of limitations. 8 No. 15‐2516