Opinion ID: 1119167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to correct psi

Text: W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C) reads as follows: If the comments of the defendant and the defendant's counsel or testimony or other information introduced by them allege any factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as to each matter controverted, make: (i) A finding as to the allegation; or (ii) A determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. A written record of such findings and determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy of the presentence investigation report thereafter made available to penal institutions. The PSI shows Wayt's familiarity with juvenile courts, including at least two delinquency adjudications and a Boys' School placement for auto theft. The PSI also lists more than eleven adult offenses, including seven DUI convictions and thirty days of jail in Nebraska for Fraud/Swindle, Property Damage. The wrongful disposition of property conviction was also listed, with no mention of subsequent appellate reversal. Prior to sentencing, Wayt filed and served his objections to the PSI asserting, inter alia: (1) the Nebraska conviction was for property damage only; (2) his earlier wrongful disposition of property conviction had been overturned on appeal; and (3) he had pled guilty to an eighth DUI charge. Wayt's counsel noted at sentencing that Wayt understood the district court to be well aware that the wrongful disposition of property conviction had been overturned. The district court made no mention of corrections prior to sentencing, stating only: Mr. Wayt, the big problem I have with your case is that you have been in trouble with the law for nearly 25 years now. Clearly, the PSI erred in failing to note that Wayt's wrongful disposition of property conviction had been overturned. Just as clearly, the district court erred in failing to make findings as to Wayt's proposed PSI corrections, as required by W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(3)(C). Having demonstrated procedural error, however, Wayt remains obliged to show prejudice under circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Johnson v. State, 790 P.2d 231, 232 (Wyo. 1990) (quoted with approval in Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1115 (Wyo.1993)). Further, it is his burden to establish that the sentencing judge in fact rested the sentence on false or improper premises. Smallwood v. State, 771 P.2d 798, 802 (Wyo.1989). Johnson and Smallwood, although decided prior to adoption of the current Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure, apply to review of due process challenges brought under the current W.R.Cr.P. 32. Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1115. We do not approve of the district court's failure to comply with W.R.Cr.P. 32, but the sentence is well within the ten year maximum punishment for burglary and may not be set aside absent a clear abuse of discretion. Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-301(b) (1988); Betzle v. State, 847 P.2d 1010, 1024 (Wyo.1993). Wayt has neither established abuse of discretion nor demonstrated prejudicial harm. It is a matter of record that the sentencing judge in this case presided at the earlier conviction of Wayt which was subsequently set aside by this court. Wayt acknowledged the district court's awareness that the earlier conviction had been overturned. Wayt is chargeable with the knowledge that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in cases closely related to the one before it. State in Interest of C, 638 P.2d 165, 172 n. 10 (Wyo.1981). However, Wayt mounted no effort to disqualify the district judge, either peremptorily or for cause pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 21.1. More to the point than identity of courts is the identity of sentences imposed for the overturned conviction and the present offense. Like the 1994 burglary, wrongful disposition of property was, in 1989, a felony punishable, inter alia, by a maximum of ten years imprisonment. Wyo.Stat. § 6-3-403(a)(i) (1988). It is fair to infer that, were the district court considering Wayt's earlier overturned conviction as an aggravating factor in the burglary sentence, the burglary sentence would have been noticeably more severe than the earlier sentence. Not having attacked the overturned sentence, Wayt is ill-situated, six years and three DUI's later, to complain that the district court was unduly harsh in its later identical sentencing decision. Wayt, 809 P.2d at 803. This speaks not so much to waiver of the right to complain as it does to the inherent fairness of the later sentence. Furthermore, it is abundantly clear that Wayt has, as the district court observed, been in trouble for twenty-five years, dating back to a 1970 delinquence adjudication. A defendant's juvenile record and his adult record, including dismissed charges, are important clues to his character and are worthy of consideration for sentencing purposes. Mehring, 860 P.2d at 1117 ( quoting United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314-15 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117, 103 S.Ct. 754, 74 L.Ed.2d 971 (1983)). Under the circumstances, Wayt's three to five year sentence in this matter represents a model of judicial restraint.