Opinion ID: 2452008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: witness credibility instruction

Text: Adams next contests the propriety of the district judge's instruction on the credibility of witnesses, which went beyond the wording of PIK Crim.3d 52.09. The district judge declined to heed the Advisory Committee's recommendation in the comment to PIK Crim.3d 52.14, which says no separate instruction about expert witnesses should be given. As set forth above, the judge added language regarding experts borrowed from PIK Civ. 4th 102.50. Adams' counsel objected to this instruction at trial on the ground that it deviated from the standard pattern instruction for Kansas. Although this is true, such deviation is not automatically fatal. Use of PIK instructions is encouraged but not mandatory. If the particular facts of a case require modification of a pattern instruction, the court should not hesitate to change it. See State v. Gallegos, 286 Kan. 869, 190 P.3d 226 (2008) (citing State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, Syl. ¶ 4, 7 P.3d 1135 [2000]). This court has acknowledged, however, a trend away from instructions that focus on the credibility of certain witnesses. State v. Willis, 240 Kan. 580, 587, 731 P.2d 287 (1987). The Advisory Committee Notes on Use also demonstrate this trend. See PIK Crim.2d 51.10 (defendant as witness); PIK Crim.2d 52.11 (number of witnesses); PIK Crim. 52.14 (expert witness); PIK Crim.2d 52.15 (impeachment). This goes to the essence of Adams' argument on appeal; she asserts that the district judge's instruction put undue emphasis on the four experts' trial testimony. We acknowledge that the notes to the PIK Criminal instruction and the PIK Civil instruction used here counsel against inclusion of a supplemental expert witness instruction. PIK Crim.3d 52.14 Comment (The Committee believes that an expert should be considered as any other witness as set forth in PIK 3d 52.09, [Crim.] Credibility of Witnesses.); PIK Civ.3d 102.50 Notes on Use (While this instruction may be requested, the Committee discourages its use.). But it appears in this case that, if anything, the hybrid instruction was intended to de-emphasize the weight and credit of the expert witnesses' testimony. Its plain language discouraged jurors from being overly impressed with the expertise and official positions of those testifying during the State's case-in-chief. In a case where, as here, the nonexpert defendant is her only witness, as a matter of common sense, the hybrid does no harm and may actually help. Moreover, our legal standard for assessing jury instructions requires that we view them as a whole and determine whether they accurately state the law so the jury could not reasonably have been misled by them. See Gallegos, 286 Kan. at 877, 190 P.3d 226 (citing State v. Wilkerson, 278 Kan. 147, 158, 91 P.3d 1181 [2004]). On this standard, Adams' claim fails. The instruction accurately stated the law as it stands in Kansas. The jury should weigh expert witness testimony in the same manner it weighs all testimony. See PIK Civ.3d 102.50 Notes on Use (The essence of the instruction is nothing more than a statement justifying the decision of the trial judge to allow a supposed expert to testify more broadly than an ordinary witness is allowed to testify.). The State laid a proper foundation for all of its expert medical witnesses, making the jury well aware of their qualifications to give opinions on medical issues and cause of death. In addition, Adams' jury would not reasonably have been misled by the instruction. Had the first paragraph of the hybrid stood alone, the jury still would have been instructed as to how to assess credibility of all witnesses, regardless of expertise. The effect of the second paragraph on experts was merely cautionary. Again, it guarded against a likely misimpression about the influence of experts. The district judge was justified in adding the second paragraph because it was helpful to the jury. In sum, although the district judge deviated from the standard jury instructions on witness credibility, doing so was not error in this case. Any practical effect would have worked to Adams' benefit, and the instructions as given were fair and accurate statements of the law that would not reasonably have misled the jury.