Opinion ID: 1266353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim of Negligent Misrepresentation

Text: As both parties have correctly asserted, a successful claim for negligent misrepresentation would require a finding that Ms. Markwas was a real estate broker and thereby maintained a special relationship or duty to the Appellants. See Teter v. Old Colony Co., 190 W.Va. 711, 441 S.E.2d 728 (1994) [11] The Appellants assert, and we agree, that a question of material fact exists regarding whether Ms. Markwas was a real estate broker with sufficient special relationship or duty toward the Appellants. A determination of whether a particular individual is acting within a capacity which is to be considered a real estate broker is a factual issue for jury determination, just as this Court has held that the factual distinction between an agent and an independent contractor must be resolved by a jury. See Levine v. Peoples Broadcasting Corp., 149 W.Va. 256, 261-62, 140 S.E.2d 438, 441-42 (1965) (holding that [w]here the evidence relative to whether a particular person is an independent contractor or employee is in conflict or even if it be not in conflict, where more than one inference can be drawn therefrom an issue is presented for jury determination). In addressing issues on summary judgment, this Court must remain cognizant that we are not called upon at this procedural stage to decide the outcome of this case; we are simply to determine whether summary judgment was appropriate. Logue v. Flanagan, 213 W.Va. 552, 557, 584 S.E.2d 186, 191 (2003). We find that summary judgment was not appropriate on the matter of negligent misrepresentation, and we consequently remand for further proceedings on that issue.