Opinion ID: 2998335
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Medical Record and Expert Testimony

Text: What remains are Agraja’s exhausted arguments that he was denied due process when the IJ failed to give any weight to the medical record he proffered and refused to recognize Camaj as an expert witness. The IJ’s concern about the medical record’s lack of authentication was valid, see Georgis, 328 F.3d at 969 (requiring authentication of documents introduced in immigration proceedings through any recognized procedure), and was enough in itself to support the judge’s decision to exclude it. (Our view might have been different if the exclusion had rested only on the fact that the Latin diagnosis was not translated. Does this mean that the Supreme Court needs to provide interpreters when it refers to writs of certiorari? Would this also necessitate an officially certified Latin interpreter, if there are any left outside of the Vatican, to interpret a phrase like res ipsa loquitur or expresio unius est exclusio alterius if it shows up in a French-language legal document? Fortunately, the IJ’s aversion to Latin had no practical effect on the present case, given the serious problem with authentication.) The IJ may have imposed an unduly high standard on Camaj, given the fact that there is no hard-and-fast rule that a witness must write books or publish academic articles on the subject matter of his or her testimony in order to qualify as an expert, Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 660 (7th Cir. 2004), and the fact that Camaj had testified as an expert in other immigration cases, see Hysi v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, it is not necessarily a compliment to be known as a professional witness (if indeed one could say this of Camaj), and an asylum applicant recently accused Camaj of unethical conduct in another circuit, though that court never decided whether the accusation was well founded. See Sinistaj v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 516, 517-18 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that petitioner accused Camaj of fraudulently holding himself out as qualified to represent aliens before the INS and erroneously advising alien to submit false and inconsistent information to the Service). In the end, even if both evidentiary rulings can be faulted, the BIA reasonably concluded that Agraja could not have been prejudiced by either one. See Podio v. INS, No. 04-2221 Page 5 153 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing that petitioner complaining about IJ’s refusal to entertain witness testimony must show that excluded testimony had potential to affect outcome). The BIA correctly pointed out that, even taking Agraja’s medical document at face value, it does nothing to link his injury to the Albanian authorities or the claimed persecution. At best the document shows that his leg was in fact broken and operated on. Likewise, not affording Camaj the status of expert did not prejudice Agraja. The IJ heard everything Camaj had to say, albeit as a lay witness. Camaj’s testimony related to the political climate in Albania, specifically the relations among the political parties. Even without deeming Camaj an expert, the IJ accepted the fact that the police in Albania often abuse detainees. Nonetheless, because the IJ rejected Agraja’s claim that he was a member of the Democratic Party, nothing Camaj said and nothing about his status could have salvaged Agraja’s case. For these reasons, we DENY the petition for review.