Opinion ID: 2514202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: W.R.C.P. 52(c)

Text: [¶ 13] The parties also raise the issue of the proper standard of review when W.R.C.P. 52(c) is utilized in a worker's compensation case. [W]hether an employee's claim is to be barred for failure to timely file notice or a claim is a mixed question of fact and law. Wesaw, ¶ 11. The standard provides that, when determining the time a particular injury became compensable, it should be asked: When would a reasonable person, under the circumstances, have understood the full extent and nature of the injury and that the injury was related to his or her employment? Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 842 P.2d 1077, 1082 (Wyo.1992); see also Wesaw, ¶ 11. The division argues the hearing examiner properly weighed the factual evidence without affording Mr. Jensen the benefit of any special inference. Mr. Jensen argues the standard of review required the hearing examiner to take his evidence as true and afford it all favorable and reasonable inferences. The factual issues presented in this appeal are not in dispute, but rather the parties disagree as to the proper application of the law to those facts. Therefore, the appropriate standard of review for factual issues is of no consequence as the application of law to the facts is determinative. Nevertheless, we will address the propriety of W.R.C.P. 52(c) in the instant case. [¶ 14] We conclude W.R.C.P. 52(c) was an available tool for the hearing examiner to utilize. However, hearing examiners should bear in mind our suggestion set forth in Rice v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 21, ¶ 18, 19 P.3d 508, ¶ 18 (Wyo.2001), which explained that, when contested case hearings are conducted which take evidence on all issues, hearing examiners should make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues properly before them to best serve judicial economy and facilitate appellate review. It seems apparent that the hearing examiner in this case determined Mr. Jensen's failure to file a report of injury within ten days pursuant to § 27-14-502(a) and his subsequent failure to rebut the presumption of claim denial were dispositive of this case. However, the hearing examiner did not make a determination of whether Mr. Jensen carried his burden of proof that he suffered a compensable injury, which upon remand must be proved. Therefore, the hearing examiner's decision to grant the W.R.C.P. 52(c) motion on certain limited issues did not serve the interests of judicial economy. [¶ 15] We affirm the district court's conclusion that a presumption of claim denial did not arise and its remand to the hearing examiner for a determination of compensability.