Opinion ID: 2520185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Proper Characterization of Section 11383(f)

Text: It is against this backdrop that we analyze defendant's contentions on appeal. Defendant argues that, while the possession of hydriodic acid with intent to manufacture methamphetamine is a crime under section 11383(c)(2), the possession of the essential chemicals of hydriodic acid (red phosphorus and iodine) with intent to manufacture methamphetamine is not a crime under section 11383(c)(2). Therefore, insofar as section 11383(f) deemed the possession of red phosphorus and iodine to be the possession of hydriodic acid, it mandatorily presumed an element of the crime (possession of hydriodic acid) from a noncriminal act (possession of red phosphorus and iodine), and impermissibly lessened the prosecutor's burden of proving all the elements of section 11383(c)(2). Defendant suggests that the only way to avoid this constitutional infirmity is for the Legislature to enact the separate substantive crime of possession of red phosphorus and iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. We disagree. Section 11383(f), contrary to defendant's contention, was not phrased in the manner of a mandatory rebuttable presumption: there was no ultimate fact to be presumed from one or more basic facts. Instead, the statute provided that the possession of red phosphorus and iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine shall be deemed to be possession of hydriodic acid with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. The phrase shall be deemed, as utilized in section 11383(f), simply created a rule of substantive law; to wit, the possession of red phosphorus and iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine was the legal equivalent of possession of hydriodic acid with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Like the term shall be conclusively presumed, the term shall be deemed simply created substantive law. As the Fifth Circuit stated in City of New Port Richey v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. (5th Cir.1939) 105 F.2d 348, 351: We recognize that the legislature cannot make certain [ultimate] facts conclusive proof of another ultimate fact when there is no logical connection or probability in experience to connect them. But the real legislative intent may not be to make a rule of evidence, but a rule of substantive law, and if the legislature may constitutionally do the latter, the form of words used will not defeat the intent. Statutes often say that certain acts `shall be deemed,' or `shall be held to be,' or `shall be conclusively presumed to be' something else which is enjoined or forbidden, when the real purpose and effect is to enjoin or forbid those acts, and not to stultify the courts into really `deeming' or `presuming' one thing to be another. Indeed, the definitional phrase shall be deemed is a legislative staple that appears in thousands of California statutes. In the Penal Code alone, the phrase shall be deemed appears in over 125 provisions, and is often used, as in section 11383(f), to define one thing in terms of another. For example, Penal Code section 12001, subdivision (j), provides that For purposes of [Penal Code] Section 12023 [Every person who carries a loaded firearm with the intent to commit a felony is guilty of armed criminal action], a firearm shall be deemed to be `loaded' whenever both the firearm and the unexpended ammunition capable of being discharged from the firearm are in the immediate possession of the same person. In essence, the shall be deemed language of Penal Code section 12001, subdivision (j) expands the definition of loaded for purposes of Penal Code section 12023. Penal Code section 627.1 provides that as used in this chapter (Access to School Premises), an outsider is any person other than a student of the school, except that a student who is currently suspended from school shall be deemed an outsider. The shall be deemed language here expands the definition of outsider to encompass suspended students. Section 11054, subdivision (a) provides: The controlled substances listed in this section are included in Schedule I. Methaqualone is not one of the substances listed. Section 11150.6 provides: Notwithstanding ... subdivision (a) of Section 11054, methaqualone, its ... isomers, and salts of its isomers shall be deemed to be classified in Schedule I for the purposes of this chapter. The shall be deemed language in this instance expands the list of substances included in Schedule I to include methaqualone. Here, section 11383(f) provided that  For purposes of this section,  the possession of essential chemicals sufficient to manufacture hydriodic acid, with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, shall be deemed to be possession of hydriodic acid. (Italics added.) The For purposes of this section language of section 11383(f) referred to section 11383(c)(2), which criminalizes the possession of hydriodic acid with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Section 11383(f), therefore, simply expanded the scope of section 11383(c)(2) to prohibit possession of red phosphorus and iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. As such, section 11383(f) contained no presumption at all. Instead, section 11383(f) was nothing more than a definitional section that specified the conduct deemed criminal [f]or purposes of section 11383(c)(2). Section 11383(f) told us that possession of hydriodic acid, the conduct made criminal by section 11383(c)(2), did not, for purposes of that subdivision, merely carry its lay meaning, but was a term of art that included the possession of hydriodic acid's essential chemicals. Substantive due process allows lawmakers broad power to select the elements of crimes, and to define one thing in terms of another. (See Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S. 292, 305, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 [due process requires no more than a `reasonable fit' between legislative ends and means]; Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 765, 150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227 [Legislature has broad power to define crimes].) The legislative history of section 11383(f) supports the view that the Legislature intended to criminalize the possession of red phosphorus and iodine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. In 1972, the Legislature enacted the California Uniform Controlled Substances Act (the Act). (Stats.1972, ch. 1407, § 3, p. 2987 et seq.) Section 11383, as added by the Act, provided that [a]ny person who possesses both methylamine and phenyl-2-propanone (phenylacetone) at the same time with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine is guilty of a felony.... (Stats.1972, ch. 1407, § 3, p. 3024.) In 1977, section 11383 was redesignated as section 11383, subdivision (a). Its substantive language remained unchanged. Section 11383, subdivision (c), the predecessor of section 11383(f), was enacted. It provided: For purposes of this section, possession of the immediate precursors sufficient for the manufacture of methylamine and phenyl-2-propanone (phenylacetone) ... shall be deemed to be possession of such derivative substance. (Stats.1977, ch. 165, § 3.6, p. 640.) In 1995, section 11383 was expanded to its form at the time of the current offense. (Stats.1995, ch. 571, § 1, p. 4418.) [16] Section 11383, subdivision (c) was redesignated as subdivision (c)(1), and section 11383(c)(2) was added. The following language was added to section 11383(f), which had provided that possession of immediate precursors sufficient for the manufacture of ... hydriodic acid ... shall be deemed to be possession of the derivative substance: Additionally, possession of the essential chemicals sufficient to manufacture hydriodic acid, with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, shall be deemed to be possession of hydriodic acid. The Legislature's purpose in enacting section 11383(c)(2) and amending section 11383(f) was clearly stated in a report of the Assembly Committee on Public Safety: Hydriodic Acid (HI) was a substance sought after by operators of illegal methamphetamine labs and has been the main reducing agent. Legislation in 1993 added HI as a controlled substance. The criminals have found a loophole with an HI substitute by purchasing large amounts of iodine and iodine crystals. This bill would close that loophole by making it a felony to possess such substitutes with intent to manufacture methamphetamine.  (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 419 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended Mar. 28, 1995, p. 1, italics added.) The manner of closing this loophole was also described in the report of the Senate Committee on Criminal Procedure: This provision would make possession of iodine, for instance, with intent to manufacture methamphetamine, as culpable as possession of the finished product.  (Sen. Com. on Criminal Procedure, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 419 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 21, 1995, p. 6, italics added.) The report also stated: This bill would provide that possession of any essential chemicals ... sufficient to manufacture ... methamphetamine are deemed to be possession of the precursor itself. Thus, possession of iodine, which is used to make hydriodic acid, would be legally equivalent to possession of hydriodic acid. ( Ibid., italics added.) [17]