Opinion ID: 3179189
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Dismiss and Preservation of the Issue

Text: Blue Ocean moved to dismiss Ms. Lockett’s appeal pursuant to Maryland Rule 8- 603(c), based on Maryland Rule 8-602(a)(1) (“the appeal is not allowed by these rules or other law”). Blue Ocean argues that the issue of the meaning of “rent” was not raised in 7In its brief to us, Blue Ocean refers to $837 as the “base rent,” a phrase that does not appear in the lease. 8 The question of what specific relief she would be entitled to is not before us. 16 the Circuit Court, so the issue is not preserved for review under Maryland Rule 8-131, and this Court cannot consider it, so the appeal should be dismissed. The short answer is that these grounds are not a basis for dismissing an appeal. The longer answer – if Blue Ocean’s motion is considered an argument about preservation of the legal issue for appellate review – is that the issue was adequately preserved. Grounds for dismissal of an appeal First, failing to meet the requirements of Maryland Rule 8-131 is not grounds for dismissing the appeal under Maryland Rule 8-602. See State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship, 438 Md. 451, 495, 92 A.3d 400 (2014) (“Neither a lack of preservation nor failure to present an argument in the petition for writ of certiorari is listed as a permissible ground upon which this Court may dismiss an appeal.”). Thus, while a failure to comply with Rule 8-131 might affect whether we address the particular issue in our decision, it would not mandate dismissal of the appeal. In any event, this issue has been preserved in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8-131. Raised below Rule 8-131(a) provides, in pertinent part: “Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any other issue,” except subject-matter and personal jurisdiction of the trial court, “unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court ....” The definition of “rent” does plainly appear to have been raised in the trial court. Testimony and documentary evidence was introduced in the Circuit Court, including the lease, related documents, and ledger sheet that concerned Ms. Lockett’s obligation to pay 17 rent and other charges and her history of payment. Both sides presented argument to the Circuit Court as to what that court should consider in resolving whether Ms. Lockett was current on her rent. For example, in closing, counsel for Ms. Lockett told the Circuit Court: [The] District Court, both in the failure to pay rent action in June and in the rent escrow case[,] had made a determination [of] what the rent owing would be and Ms. Lockett paid those amounts as the Court specified her to pay. Blue Ocean can’t come now and say that there are other amounts that they did not specify as rent and allege now that she was not current on the rent at that time. (emphasis added). Similarly, in closing rebuttal, counsel for Blue Ocean said: You’ve heard testimony from Ms. Lockett that she believed she didn’t owe different monies on [May 28 and August 15], but, in fact, a careful review of the record and the ledger shows that she did, in fact, owe monies. Those monies could be included or were counted as rent. And as such she wasn’t current on rent on the days of alleged retaliation. (emphasis added). Thus, counsel for both sides disputed the definition of rent in the Circuit Court and whether she was “current on the rent” at the time the tenant holding over action was filed. The Circuit Court found, as to whether Ms. Lockett was current on her rent on August 15, 2014, that it was “fairly muddled and it was unclear to the Court and I cannot find that on [August 15] that — that Ms. Lockett was up to date on her rent.” Because there was no dispute that Ms. Lockett had paid fixed monthly installments of $837 as of August 15, the court’s reluctance to find that she was current on the rent necessarily includes a legal holding that her “rent” for purposes of RP §8-208.1 was more than $837− that is, it included at least some of the additional charges. 18 To raise an issue, a party need not discuss it at length. See Brock v. State, 203 Md. App. 245, 270, 37 A.3d 1030 (2012) (party preserved the question of the admissibility of a statement for impeachment purposes by mentioning impeachment in a single sentence of an argument mostly devoted to admissibility for substantive use). When, as here, both parties discussed the issue and the court necessarily decided it in reaching its decision, the issue has been raised for the purposes of Rule 8-131(a). Raised in the petition and preserved for review Raising the issue below is not all that is ordinarily required. In addition, Rule 8- 131(b)(1) provides, “Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a[n appellate] decision, the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue [1] that has been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and [2] that has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals.” As to the first prong, the petition for certiorari in this case stated the following question, “Did the trial court err in relying on the landlord’s claim of certain non-rent charges due and owing to conclude that the tenant was not current on her rent and thus not eligible for relief on her claim for retaliatory eviction in violation of RP § 8-208.1?” This question raises the issue of the definition of rent because it asks whether the trial court erred in considering other charges beyond the fixed monthly amount of $837 as “rent” for the purposes of the statutory condition. The second prong requires that the issue be preserved for review, but Rule 8-131(a) already pertains to preservation in the trial court. Hence, the second prong of Rule 8-131(b) 19 essentially adds that the issue must not have been waived in an intermediate appeal. Here, there was no intermediate appeal, so this prong is satisfied. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is denied and this issue is properly before this Court under Rule 8-131.