Opinion ID: 2272642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Current Status of the Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Kentucky

Text: In Bass v. Williams, 839 S.W.2d 559, 563 (Ky.App.1992), the Court of Appeals concluded that the shift from contributory negligence to comparative negligence eliminated the need for a sudden emergency instruction. The Bass court reasoned that the sudden emergency doctrine has a quality to it that diminishes the duties of the defendant-driver ... and is in violation of the `direct proportion to fault' concept in Hilen [ [6] ], and further, that it violates the concept that [a party] is liable for an amount equal to his degree of fault, no more and no less. Bass, 839 S.W.2d at 563; see also Stratton v. Parker, 793 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Ky.1990). The demise of the sudden emergency doctrine in Kentucky was short-lived. Twelve years later, in Regenstreif v. Phelps, 142 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.2004), this Court overruled Bass. Regenstreif rejected the notion that the sudden emergency doctrine was incompatible with comparative negligence, finding instead that it necessarily complements comparative negligence in those particular cases where additional circumstances alter the way in which one's degree of fault should be determined. Id. at 6. Despite Regenstreif the question of the sudden emergency doctrine's viability lingered. Now, we reaffirm its place as a necessary component of the process by which juries must determine the fault of parties who, finding themselves suddenly and unexpectedly in a position of imminent peril, respond in a way that might otherwise breach a specific duty of due care.