Opinion ID: 2631199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Control Over Trial Tactics and Theory of Defense

Text: Another of Petitioner's arguments should be considered here even though it was not fully briefed as a separate claim in the PRP: that a defendant has the right to control his own defense and that to the extent there was a conflict between Stenson and Leatherman regarding strategic choices, the wishes of the defendant should prevail. This argument underlies the entire PRP rather than supporting only one claim. Petitioner first raises this issue in his discussion of the conflict issue: While a defendant is not entitled to a meaningful relationship with his attorney, Morris v. Slappy, supra , the Sixth Amendment requires that a defendant has the right to decide the type of defense that he wishes to mount and the right to an attorney whose actions are based upon the defendant's informed strategic choices. State v. Benn, 120 Wash.2d 631, 664, 845 P.2d 289 (1993) citing [I]n re Jeffries, 110 Wash.2d at 332-33, 752 P.2d 1338 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Pet'r's Reply Br. at 5. See also PRP at 13 (The Sixth [A]mendment requires that a defendant has a right to decide, within the bounds of permissible defenses, the type of defense he wishes to mount.) and at 14 (The Sixth [A]mendment provides the defendant with a right to personally control his defense.). This sentence from the Reply is not quite an accurate paraphrase of the quotation from Strickland since it implies that that decision defined a constitutional right of a defendant to control his own defense. Strickland does not create such a right. The passage in question is part of an analysis of what constitutes effective representation and reads: The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court is inquiring into what is reasonable representation, not defining a defendant's right. The United States Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and this court have given counsel wide latitude to control strategy and tactics. In the appeals context, the Court has stated: Neither Anders [v. State of Cal., 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967)] nor any other decision of this Court suggests, however, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment, decides not to present those points. .... For judges to second-guess reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed counsel a duty to raise every colorable claim suggested by a client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective advocacy that underlies Anders. Nothing in the Constitution or our interpretation of that document requires such a standard. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 754, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). The Court later expressed similar views about representation at the trial court level: Although there are basic rights that the attorney cannot waive without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer hasand must havefull authority to manage the conduct of the trial.... Putting to one side the exceptional cases in which counsel is ineffective, the client must accept the consequences of the lawyer's decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to disclose the identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit has stated that appointed counsel, and not his client, is in charge of the choice of trial tactics and the theory of defense. United States v. Wadsworth, 830 F.2d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir.1987) (citing Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451, 85 S.Ct. 564, 13 L.Ed.2d 408 (1965) (counsel's deliberate choice of strategy is binding on his client)). Washington law also affords trial counsel great leeway: We note, with increasing concern, that it seems to be standard procedure for the accused to quarrel with court-appointed counsel, or to develop an undertone of studied antagonism and claimed distrust, or to be reluctant to aid or cooperate in preparation of a defense. This appears to be done in order to argue on appeal that the accused was deprived of due process alleging he was represented by incompetent counsel. State v. Piche, 71 Wash.2d 583, 589, 430 P.2d 522 (1967) (quoting State v. Keller, 65 Wash.2d 907, 908, 400 P.2d 370 (1965)). The Piche court went on to say: To assure the defendant of counsel's best efforts then, the law must afford the attorney a wide latitude and flexibility in his choice of trial psychology and tactics. If counsel is to be stultified at trial by a post trial scrutiny of the myriad choices he must make in the course of a trial: whether to examine on a fact, whether and how much to cross-examine, whether to put some witnesses on the stand and leave others offindeed, in some instances, whether to interview some witnesses before trial or leave them alonehe will lose the very freedom of action so essential to a skillful representation of the accused. Counsel is not, at the risk of being charged with incompetence, obliged to raise every conceivable point, however frivolous, damaging or inconsequential it may appear at the time, or to argue every point to the court and jury which in retrospect may seem important to the defendant; nor is he obliged to obtain a written waiver or instructions from the defendant as to each and every turn or direction the accused wants his counsel to take. ... For many reasons, therefore, the choice of trial tactics, the action to be taken or avoided, and the methodology to be employed must rest in the attorney's judgment. State v. Piche, 71 Wash.2d at 590, 430 P.2d 522. The courts have indicated that the decision to call or not to call a witness is for counsel to make. On the other hand, the opinions quoted above do not directly address the issue of whether counsel may employ, over the objection of the defendant, the tactic of admitting guilt during the penalty phase of a death penalty trial, an issue of great concern to Stenson. Pet'r's Reply Br. at 6. Apparently courts have not spoken to this issue: General agreement exists that the decisions as to guilty plea, jury trial, appeal, defendant's presence at trial, and the defendant testifying are for the defendant, and that decisions on a substantially larger group of matters, such as objecting to inadmissible evidence, are for counsel. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6(a), at 603 (2d ed.1999) (footnote omitted). This treatise does not list the decision we are concerned with here among the substantially larger group of matters. The ABA guidelines are more helpful: (a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) whether to waive jury trial; and (iii) whether to testify in his or her own behalf. (b) The decisions on what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after consultation with the client. 1 ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE std. 4-5.2 (part) (2d ed. Supp.1986) (emphasis added). Although these standards are merely advisory, they do represent the Bar Association's judgment that the tradition of legal practice in this country has divided up the responsibilities between the attorney and client in the manner enumerated above: As established by the history of the criminal justice process and the rights vested in an accused under the Constitution, certain basic decisions have come to belong to the client while others fall within the province of the lawyer. Id. at Commentary. One can infer from the ABA standards that a decision to admit guilt during the penalty phase would fall within the exclusive province of the lawyer. Since Petitioner cites no authority for the proposition that the defendant should make such a decision, and given the wide latitude allowed to appointed counsel by the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and Washington law, this court has no basis upon which to find that a constitutional right of the Petitioner was abridged when his counsel made the decision at issue.