Opinion ID: 37901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ex Post Facto Conduct

Text: Defendants did not raise this argument before the district court. We therefore review it for plain error.54
Defendants argue that, by presenting evidence of their conduct that took place prior to the August 1996 effective date of § 1347, the government violated the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto clause. In response the government emphasizes that (1) the indictment specified that the criminal scheme extended from August 1996 until 2000, (2) the only executions listed in the indictment took place after August 1996, and (3) the district court instructed the jury that it must find a scheme or plan to defraud “substantially the same as the one alleged in the indictment.” Although the government did adduce evidence relating to pre-enactment conduct, 53 See, e.g., Baytank, 934 F.2d at 610 (holding no plain error where court did not give special unanimity instruction on single count, duplicitous indictment); United States v. RazoLeora, 961 F.2d 1140, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding no plain error despite trial court’s failure to give special unanimity instruction on duplicitous indictment). 54 United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 197 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000). 27 this evidence demonstrated the existence of a continuing offense and, as it was not listed in the indictment, could not have been the conduct for which the jury convicted defendants. A law violates the Ex Post Facto clause if it punishes acts that, when committed, were not criminal.55 In Hickman, we held invalid the defendant’s conviction on three specific counts under § 1347 for violation of the Ex Post Facto clause.56 Although we noted that a scheme to commit health care fraud is a continuing offense, we found that these three counts charged behavior that had been fully executed before the effective date of the statute.57 With respect to continuing offenses in general, however, the Ex Post Facto clause is not violated by application of a statute to a continuing scheme that began before the effective date of a statute but continued thereafter.58 Unlike the Hickman indictment, the one-count indictment against Kirkham and Murphy did not charge them on or list any individual counts or executions of transactions that were fully executed before the effective date of the statute. In fact, all of the executions listed in the indictment involved transactions that 55 Hickman, 331 F.3d at 445. 56 331 F.3d at 447. 57 Id. at 447. 58 United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Garfinkel, 29 F.3d 1253, 1259-60 (8th Cir. 1994). See also Hammen, 977 F.3d at 385. 28 took place well after August 1996, and each “patient” who testified at trial was billed after 1998. There is no danger that defendants were convicted on the basis of their pre-enactment behavior.59 We hold that, as no Ex Post Facto violation occurred, the trial court did not err by admitting the evidence in question.