Opinion ID: 71908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Count One Charge

Text: 13 Whether sufficient evidence supports the Highs' convictions on Count One is a question of law we review de novo. United States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 983, 136 L.Ed.2d 865 (1997). In so doing, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the jury's verdict. We will uphold the jury's verdict if a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the evidence establishes the Highs' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir.1995). To sustain a conspiracy conviction, we must conclude that a reasonable factfinder could determine that (1) an agreement existed among two or more persons; (2) that the defendant knew of the general purpose of the agreement; and (3) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the agreement. United States v. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir.1995). Because a conspiracy is generally secretive, a reasonable factfinder may infer its existence from the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Simon, 839 F.2d 1461, 1469 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223, 108 S.Ct. 2883, 101 L.Ed.2d 917, and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861, 109 S.Ct. 158, 102 L.Ed.2d 129 (1988). When, as here, a conspiracy conviction may be based on an aider and abettor theory of liability pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2, the evidence must show that the conspiracy occurred, and that the defendant associated himself with a criminal venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it succeed. United States v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 450, 454 (11th Cir.1982). 14 The Highs contend that the government failed to present evidence that they knew about the conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. According to the Highs, the conspiracy had three objectives: (1) to acquire cocaine for the purpose of distribution; (2) to acquire property as fruits of an unlawful scheme to distribute cocaine; and (3) to conceal the wealth derived from the distribution of cocaine through the use of false and fictitious names. The Highs contend that no evidence existed showing that Virginia High was involved with the cocaine or assisted the cocaine wholesalers in using false and fictitious names. The Highs also contend that no evidence existed that establishes a substantial link between George High and the drug conspiracy. The Highs further contend that any services that they provided that helped the cocaine wholesalers acquire property cannot constitute evidence of their participation in the conspiracy, as those services only potentially constitute evidence of money laundering--which was allegedly not an objective of the drug conspiracy described in Count One of the indictment. 15 The government counters that sufficient evidence existed to find the Highs guilty of the offense alleged in Count One of the indictment. The government contends that the Highs knew the illicit source of the cocaine wholesalers' money and voluntarily helped them fulfill objects of the conspiracy, which included laundering the proceeds of the cocaine sales in order to ensure the continued success of the cocaine distribution network. The government concedes that the Highs did not possess drugs, but contends that this is irrelevant, as the evidence showed that the Highs knew the illicit source of the money they received and invested that money in real estate on the cocaine wholesalers' behalf. 16 Upon review of the facts and evidence, we agree with the government that sufficient evidence existed to find the Highs guilty on Count One. At trial, the government presented circumstantial evidence that showed the Highs knew the source of the cocaine wholesalers' money and with that knowledge, continued to funnel their money, derived from unlawful activities, through High Realty. Ample evidence demonstrated that the Highs voluntarily assisted the cocaine wholesalers in investing money in real estate. This evidence showed that the Highs purposefully aided the cocaine wholesalers in their efforts to acquire property, and that the Highs helped the cocaine wholesalers conceal wealth using Virginia High's name on a deed for a residence that a cocaine wholesaler actually owned. 17 The unambiguous language of the indictment belies the Highs' contention that money laundering was not an alleged objective of the drug conspiracy described in Count One of the indictment: 18 Further, it was an object of the conspiracy that the coconspirators would conceal the wealth derived from the trafficking in cocaine ... and their use and ownership of instrumentalities of the crimes, including real property ... and United States currency, through the use of false and fictitious names, and otherwise. 19 (Emphasis added.) Moreover, to the extent that the Highs argue that money laundering activity cannot be a basis for establishing culpability in a drug conspiracy, that contention is meritless. In United States v. Bollinger, we held that a defendant involved only in the money laundering facet of the drug business could be considered a part of the conspiracy to distribute those drugs. 796 F.2d 1394, 1407-08 (11th Cir.1986), modified on other grounds, 837 F.2d 436 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1737, 100 L.Ed.2d 200 (1988). The holding we set forth in Bollinger simply means that a money launderer may be held liable as a principal or aider and abettor of a drug conspiracy even though the money launderer's conduct takes place after the actual drug distribution activity. The rationale underlying our holding is based on a recognition that money laundering often ensures the success of the underlying substantive crime, drug trafficking. See United States v. Perez, 922 F.2d 782, 786 (11th Cir.) (money laundering can be an integral part of certain drug distribution conspiracies) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223, 111 S.Ct. 2840, 115 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1991). 20 Given the more than sufficient evidence establishing the Highs' guilt regarding the charges in Count One of the indictment, we affirm their convictions on that count. 21