Opinion ID: 605
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Defense's Motion to Re-Open Following the Commencement of Jury Deliberations

Text: The Sabhnanis next contend that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant their motion to reopen the proceedings after the jury had begun its deliberations in order to present newly discovered evidence of the alleged bias of a prosecution witness. After closing arguments, during which some of her testimony had been attacked by the defense, prosecution witness Deborah Litras sent an e-mail to a family friend that read in relevant part as follows: I really do hope that the theatrics of the closing arguments by the defense will not sway the jury away from the right decision. The thing that scares me is that there never seems to be any justice in the world. I guess we'll just have to wait and see. I don't think it's going to be much longer. See `ya. Deb. Tr. 5150. The defense, upon discovering the e-mail, moved to reopen the case and to recall Litras for the purpose of questioning her about it. Defense counsel argued that the e-mail showed that Litras was biased in favor of conviction. The prosecution argued that the e-mail, fairly read, did not indicate a bias, but a desire for justice to be done, and also that it was irrelevant to any issue the jury was considering in that it principally expressed Litras's opinion of the closing arguments. The district court denied the defense motion to reopen. The judge noted that the e-mail did not expressly state that Litras was biased in favor of conviction and that, in any event, her trial testimony was explicit that she believed the maids' complaints. Tr. 5188. It was obvious from [Litras's] testimony ... that she favored the maids [and] felt sorry for the maids, and she was behind the maids in this case. Id. Because her testimony indicated that Litras favor[ed] the maids over her own boss, Tr. 5189, and because the jury also heard evidence that she had refused to speak to defense counsel while meeting with the government several times, Litras's leanings were already clear. The court also noted that reopening the case solely for testimony regarding the e-mail would create enormous practical difficulties and would be needlessly disruptive of the jury's deliberations. Finally, the court agreed with the prosecution that the e-mail was irrelevant to the question whether Litras was biased when she testified, and only reflected her dismay ... [at] the theatrics of the closing argument[s], which somewhat denigrated her. Tr. 5196. We review a district court's determination whether to reopen a case after the jury has begun its deliberations for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Crawford, 533 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2008); United States v. Golomb, 754 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.1985). In Crawford, we noted the factors that a district judge should consider in exercising this discretion: The court must consider the timeliness of the motion [to reopen], the character of the testimony, and the effect of granting the motion. The party moving to reopen should provide a reasonable explanation for failure to present the evidence in its case-in-chief. The evidence proffered should be relevant, admissible, technically adequate, and helpful to the jury in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused. The belated receipt of such testimony should not imbue the evidence with distorted importance, prejudice the opposing party's case, or preclude an adversary from having an adequate opportunity to meet the additional evidence offered. Crawford, 533 F.3d at 138 (quoting United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 579 (4th Cir.2005)) (emphasis omitted). Considering the Crawford factors, timeliness cannot be counted against the appellants here, as their counsel obtained Litras's e-mail only just before making the motion to reopen. Each of the other relevant factors, however, weighs against the Sahbnanis' position. We conclude based on these factors that the district court did not abuse its discretion. At the start, the parties disagree about whether, in assessing the character of the evidence, we should construe it in the light most favorable to the defense. We need not resolve this question, however, because even viewing the e-mail and its potential effect in the Sabhnanis' favor, we conclude that the e-mail's significance did not merit reopening. We agree with the district court that to the extent the e-mail tended to show that Litras favored the maids, it was already obvious from her testimony that she believed the maids' stories of abuse and sympathized with them. Litras testified that she felt sorry for the maids, Tr. 3937, that she provided the maids with food surreptitiously and hid the evidence from the Sabhnanis, that she was upset after Samirah displayed her injuries, Tr. 3874, 3901, and that she was glad when she learned that Samirah had fled the Sabhnanis' home. Tr. 3969. Mahender contends that the e-mail would have corrected a misimpression created by the government that Litras, who suffered from cancer, was reluctant to testify because doing so would place her job and her health insurance in jeopardy. Despite her personal concerns, however, Litras made it abundantly clear to the jury that her sympathies were with the maids and that, for this reason, she was not a reluctant witness. The e-mail would thus have added very little to what the jury had already heard. The district court also properly considered the practical difficulties that would be caused by stopping the jury's deliberations and recalling Litras to testify. The potential for such a course of events to give distorted importance to evidence that is of marginal significance is obvious: here, there was a real risk that the jury would be distracted in its deliberations from the main issues. See Crawford, 533 F.3d at 140-41 (collecting cases noting a presumption that the significance of evidence introduced after the jury has begun deliberating will be misconstrued). We conclude that the district court's reasons for denying the motionthat the e-mail was of little or no evidentiary value in the determination of the Sabhnanis' guilt, that it would not meaningfully add to what the jury already knew or could infer about Litras's leanings, and that the disruption that would ensue would outweigh any potential usefulness of the evidence to the jurywere sound. The district court did not err in denying the motion to reopen, much less abuse its discretion.