Opinion ID: 885241
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to Zancanella?

Text: ถ 100 The District Court, in its January 6, 1997 Order, dismissed Zancanella from the action based on the conclusion that he did not have the duty to either keep the Steiners' bull off the highway in question, or maintain any fence on the property leased to the Steiners. ถ 101 Larson-Murphy's argument on appeal rests primarily on the contention that Zancanella had a non-delegable statutory duty to maintain the fences on the property leased to the Steiners, notwithstanding the lease agreement. As discussed above, Zancanella had no statutory duty to maintain a legal fence, pursuant to ง 81-4-101, MCA, and therefore this argument must fail. ถ 102 Moving to a common-law theory, however, Larson-Murphy further relies on Fagan v. Silver (1920), 57 Mont. 427, 188 P. 900, for the proposition that a lessor and lessee may both be liable for damages resulting from maintaining a nuisance or hazard, and that, generally, lessors under certain circumstances may be liable for damages suffered by a third party that result from the lessee's activities. Contrary to the District Court, which did not actually cite authority for its conclusions, we find merit in this argument to the extent that material facts related to this theory remain in dispute. ถ 103 Zancanella is correct that a lessor of land usually has no control over the conduct of the lessee or the person upon the leased land while the lessee is in possession of it. Therefore, the traditional common law rule has been that the lessor is under no obligation to anyone to look after the premises or to keep them in repair, and is not responsible, either to persons injured on or off the land for conditions which develop or are created by the tenant after possession has been transferred. See Prosser & Keeton, ง 63; Parrish v. Witt (1976), 171 Mont. 101, 104, 555 P.2d 741, 743 (requiring plaintiff to show that exception to general rule); Lake v. Emigh (1948), 121 Mont. 87, 119-20, 190 P.2d 550, 566 (stating general rule that in the absence of an agreement in the lease binding the landlord to put or keep the premises in repair, he is not liable in damages for failure to do so or for injuries sustained by the tenant by reason thereof) (citations omitted). ถ 104 Two relevant exceptions to the foregoing general rule, to which Larson-Murphy's argument alludes, are expressed under two, related sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts งง 379A and 837, which we conclude are persuasive authority in this instance. Section 379A provides that a lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to persons outside of the land caused by activities of the lessee or others on the land after the lessor transfers possession if, but only if: (a) the lessor at the time of the lease consented to such activity or knew that it would be carried on, and (b) the lessor knew or had reason to know that it would unavoidably involve such an unreasonable risk, or that special precautions necessary to safety would not be taken. Restatement (Second) of Torts, ง 379A (1965). Similarly, ง 837 provides that a lessor of land is subject to liability for a nuisance caused by an activity carried upon the land while the lease continues and the lessor continues as owner, if the lessor would be liable if he had carried on the activity himself; and (a) at the time of the lease the lessor consents to the activity or knows or has reason to know that it will be carried on, and (b) he then knows or should know that it will necessarily involve or is already causing the nuisance. Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 837 (1979). See also Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant ง 18.4 (1977) (providing substantially the same rule as ง 379A). These Restatement sections and interpretive case law suggest that where, for example, a land owner abutting a public highway leases the property knowing it will be used for a potentially hazardous purpose, and as a result a traveler on the highway is injured, the owner may be subject to liability. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 379A, comment c; Park v. Hoffard (1993), 315 Or. 624, 847 P.2d 852, 855-56 (holding that landlord may be liable for damage caused by tenant's dog); Klimkowski v. De La Torre (1993), 175 Ariz. 340, 857 P.2d 392, 395 (holding that if landlord has knowledge of nuisance, and has opportunity to reenter and abate the nuisance, he may be held liable if a third party suffers damage as a result of the nuisance); Easson v. Wagner (S.D.1993), 501 N.W.2d 348, 351 (stating that a landlord may be held liable for damage to adjoining property occasioned by a tenant's use of the property that was sanctioned by the landlord, pursuant to negligent leasing theory); Walker v. L.G. Everist, Inc. (App.1985), 102 N.M. 783, 701 P.2d 382, 387 (providing rule that if the potential harm is sufficiently substantial and predictable, it is the duty of the lessor to abate the nuisance created by his lessee). ถ 105 Further, our decision in Criswell v. Brewer (1987), 228 Mont. 143, 741 P.2d 418, upon which Zancanella relies, can be distinguished from the facts here. In that case, we concluded that the owner of a ranch could not be liable for the ranch foreman's dog that bit a third party, concluding that the ranch owner was not a keeper of the dog. We nevertheless concluded that the ranch owner must still exercise reasonable care as a landowner. The facts indicated that the dog had bitten someone approximately two years before the incident with the plaintiff, the ranch owner was aware of the earlier biting, and had satisfied his duty of reasonable care by providing materials to the dog's owner to build a fence and dog pen behind the ranch house, and requiring that the foreman keep the dog in the pen unless accompanied by the foreman. See Criswell, 228 Mont. at 144, 741 P.2d at 419. ถ 106 Thus, the claim of negligence against Zancanella gives rise to two questions of fact: whether he knew of, or consented to, the tenant's activity which caused the harm and whether he realized the risks associated with that activity. If the expected activity under the lease resulted in a reasonably anticipated injury, the landlord cannot disclaim liability. See Easson, 501 N.W.2d at 351 (relying on Restatement (Second) of Property, ง 18.4 and Restatement (Second) of Torts, ง 379A). ถ 107 The facts here indicate that Zancanella understood and consented that livestock, including bulls, would be kept by his lessees, the Steiners, and consequently it was a condition of the lease that they maintain the fences, and take whatever precautions were necessary for keeping such animals. Obviously, Zancanella was aware of the potential risks involved, having kept livestock, including a bull, on the property in the mid-1970s. Further, in anticipation of any damages the livestock may cause, he required that the Steiners carry liability insurance. ถ 108 While such contractual obligations may give Zancanella a right to indemnification from the Steiners, we conclude that an injured third party, such as Larson-Murphy, is not a party to such an agreement, and thus Zancanella cannot avoid liability if a legal duty was owed. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, ง 379A, comment d. Further, the facts are unclear, and therefore in dispute, as to what degree Zancanella exercised reasonable care in addressing whether this activity on his property would pose a risk to users of the adjacent roads. Zancanella's argument here, in fact, is premised on the notion that he owed no duty of care under any circumstances, and this assertion formed the basis of the District Court's conclusion. Unless all material facts undisputedly show that Zancanella fully satisfied his duty of ordinary care under the circumstances as an owner and lessor of the premises, summary judgment in his favor is improper. Accordingly, the District Court's order dismissing Zancanella from the action is reversed.