Opinion ID: 1060043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Criminal Negligence

Text: In King, 217 Va. at 607, 231 S.E.2d at 316, we defined involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor vehicle as an accidental killing which, although unintended, is the proximate result of negligence so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard of human life. Under this definition, involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth should be predicated solely upon criminal negligence proximately causing death. Id. Greenway contends that the Commonwealth's evidence failed to establish that he had actual or constructive knowledge that his actions would place the lives of others in danger, either because the accident resulted from his falling asleep while driving or because his negligence was predicated solely upon excessive speed. We disagree. The trial court expressly found that the evidence did not support a finding that Greenway had fallen asleep while driving. Rather the trial court found that Greenway, though driving erratically, was making a conscious effort to maneuver his vehicle through traffic. Since the record supports this finding of fact, it will be upheld on appeal. Code § 8.01-680. Accordingly, we turn to Greenway's contention that the trial court's determination of criminal negligence was improperly predicated solely upon his driving at an excessive speed. What distinguishes a speeding violation from the misdemeanor of reckless driving, and the misdemeanor from the felony of involuntary manslaughter, is the likelihood of injury to other users of the highways. And the degree of the hazard posed by a speeding automobile depends upon the circumstances in each case. Mayo v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 644, 648, 238 S.E.2d 831, 833 (1977). Greenway's contention is based on the presumption that a speed of eighty-five to ninety miles per hour on an interstate highway, while constituting civil negligence, does not rise to the level of a criminal disregard for the safety of others. The fallacy of his contention is that it views speed in isolation while ignoring the attendant circumstances of the accident, of which speed was merely a factor. In addition to Greenway's excessive speed, the evidence showed that Greenway was weaving through heavy holiday weekend traffic, straddling the lane markers, that he was aware of a near-miss of another motor vehicle, and that he continued shifting lanes abruptly rather than adjusting his speed to the flow of traffic. Viewed in the context of these circumstances, the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Greenway's actions showed a reckless disregard for human life constituting criminal negligence sufficient to support the convictions for involuntary manslaughter. For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.