Opinion ID: 1439460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mary Green

Text: Fifth, Appellant maintains that Mary Green's testimony was also improperly admitted over his objections. Appellant points to a series of Mary's statements that he deemed to be prejudicial in nature, such as (1) her testimony about Appellant being an abusive husband and father; (2) that she did not pay much attention to Appellant's business because it would just get her in trouble; (3) that she figured Appellant was involved with the Elliott murders; (4) that she had been going to the police for thirty years to get protection from Appellant; (5) that she knew more things about him but could not tell the jury; and (6) that since Appellant's arrest she had been safer than she had ever been since meeting him but she still felt that he would get to her like he always said he would. A review of the record reflects that Appellant did not make a contemporaneous objection to statements two, four, and five, and that the trial court ruled in favor of Appellant's speculation objection to statement three. Nevertheless, we will still examine all statements for prejudice and error as required by Rule 10(b). Statements one, two, and four involve Mary's testimony as to Appellant's physical and mental abuse. The trial court allowed the testimony, over Appellant's objections that it was character evidence outside the scope of Rule 404(b), because the statement went to the control factor that was a major issue in the trial. As with other Green family testimony, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the testimony was admissible. Additionally, statement three reflected Mary's belief that Appellant was involved with the murders. While this statement may be relevant as to whether Appellant committed the crimes, the court properly granted Appellant's speculation objection. Furthermore, statement five was so prejudicial that the court should have stepped in and either issued an admonishment or granted a mistrial. Mary's reference to her further knowledge of Appellant was clearly prejudicial because it amounted to nothing more than speculation on her part as to Appellant's guilt. There was no basis for allowing this testimony and it should not have been allowed. Lastly, the trial court erred in allowing Mary's last statement, that she feels safer since Appellant was arrested. After this statement, Appellant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the statement was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) as it was too prejudicial to Appellant. The trial court ruled that what basically happened is that you impeached her and he rehabilitated her and she went on and on and on. The court overruled the objection, and offered a limiting instruction to advise the jury to disregard her redirect testimony. The jury was never instructed, however, as Appellant chose not to have the limiting instruction given. The lack of a limiting instruction is irrelevant, however, because an admonishment or curative instruction could not have cured the prejudicial effect of this statement. Mary's statement was improper and unrelated to any portion of the State's case against Appellant. Rather than being relevant to the case, Mary's final statement was highly prejudicial to Appellant because he was again labeled as the abusive and violent husband. In sum, the statement, that he would get to her like he always said he would, was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b), and the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this statement.