Opinion ID: 2994208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer

Text: The district court refused to allow any testimony by Dr. Mary Capelli-Schellpfeffer, the head of the clinical team at the University of Chicago that examined and evaluated Mr. Walker. Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer concluded, based to a significant extent on her discussions with members of the team, that Mr. Walker had post- traumatic stress disorder and had lost function because of an electrical injury. She was also prepared to testify that it was not unusual for electrical injuries to first manifest themselves long after the electrical trauma that caused them, as Mr. Walker argued his did. The district court determined that Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer was not qualified to testify about post-traumatic stress disorder because she was not qualified as a psychiatrist or psychologist. It acknowledged that she was qualified to testify about the effect of electrical trauma on the human body, but still barred her testimony in its entirety. Although the district court’s statement of its reasons for excluding Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer’s testimony are not stated with optimal clarity, it is clear that the wholesale disallowance of this testimony was not an acceptable exercise of discretion. At the outset, we think that it was proper for a physician working in the role that Dr. Capelli-Schellpfeffer held on the diagnostic and evaluation team to rely on the work of her team members in forming her opinion. Medical professionals have long been expected to rely on the opinions of other medical professionals in forming their opinions. See Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-80 (5th Cir. 1965) (With the increased division of labor in modern medicine, the physician making a diagnosis must necessarily rely on many observations and tests performed by others and recorded by them . . . .); see also Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 892-93 (10th Cir. 1984); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Boehme v. Maxwell, 309 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (quoting Birdsell). Federal Rule of Evidence 703, the rule governing the appropriate bases of expert testimony, specifically contemplates, in its advisory committee notes, reliance on reports and opinions from nurses, technicians and other doctors. Fed. R. Evid. 703; see also Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Rule 703). Indeed, courts frequently have pointed to an expert’s reliance on the reports of others as an indication that their testimony is reliable./4 Expert testimony relying on the opinions of others should, of course, be rejected if the testifying expert’s opinion is too speculative, see Washington v. Armstrong World Indus., 839 F.2d 1121, 1123-24 (5th Cir. 1988), or the underlying basis is faulty, see National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 965 F. Supp. 1490, 1523-24 (E.D. Ark. 1996), aff’d, 133 F.3d