Opinion ID: 2594045
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tahni's Motion for Entry of Judgment Was Properly Granted.

Text: The main question in this case is whether Tahni had presented to the superior court just and sufficient reasons for her failure to obtain a writ of execution within five years after the entry of judgment. [13] The question is governed by AS 09.35.020, which provides: When a period of five years has elapsed after the entry of judgment and without an execution being issued on the judgment, no execution may issue except by order of the court in which judgment is entered. The court shall grant the motion if the court determines that there are just and sufficient reasons for the failure to obtain the writ of execution within five years after the entry of judgment. In Dean, we construed this statute to require a showing of good cause for delay in execution. [14] Alaska Statute 09.35.020 is implemented by Civil Rule 69(d). [15] In its order granting Tahni's motion, the superior court found two reasons for Tahni's delay that it considered just and sufficient: (1) the high level of animosity in this case; and (2) the fact that the case was appealed and was not affirmed until 2000. Douglas disputes that either reason constitutes a just and sufficient reason for Tahni's delay. We disagree and hold that the first reason is a factual determination well within the superior court's discretion and that the second is a just and sufficient reason as a matter of law. Douglas first disputes the superior court's determination that Tahni's delay was justified by the high level of animosity in the case by noting that [h]igh levels of animosity are present in many of the [divorce] cases that end up going to trial. But there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the superior court's finding that Tahni's delay was due to the acrimonious relationship between the parties. Both parties have had ongoing conversations about and attempted to come to agreement about the debt in the past. It remains in dispute whether Tahni in fact forgave the debt. There has been at least one settlement negotiation meeting in Douglas's attorney's office concerning the divorce decree and the parties have attended therapeutic counseling. In addition, as Tahni points out, she deferred enforcement action since 2000, as [she] feared for the consequences it would have on [their] already fractured relationships, especially the effects it might have on [their] children. The parties have engaged in an ongoing and bitter custody dispute with hearings before the superior court as recently as January 2005. The record contains materials pertaining to the custody case indicating that the parties have found little common ground. Thus, the superior court did not err in determining that Tahni's delay was excused given the high level of animosity in the case. Douglas also disputes the superior court's second finding, that Tahni's delay was excused because the case was appealed and was not affirmed until 2000. Implicitly, the superior court found that waiting until all appeals are exhausted is in itself a just and sufficient reason for delay for the purposes of AS 09.35.020. We agree with the superior court. In this case, it is undisputed that Douglas vigorously appealed the award of one-half of the equity in the Wasilla property until all avenues of appeal were exhausted. [16] It is a general rule that a judgment creditor executes on a judgment at his or her peril while appeals are pending because any monies received in excess of the final amount of the award must be returned. [17] In this case, as Tahni points out, she was uncertain of the status of the award as well as the amount of the award until all avenues of appeal were exhausted. Indeed, the dollar amount of the award had already been reduced once. Tahni therefore had reason to wait until the appeals were exhausted and she was certain of the amounts due her before executing on the judgment. And Tahni's delay did not prejudice Douglas, since it is difficult for the person who is appealing to claim unfair surprise when the opposing party executes upon the judgment within five years of the appeal. [18] In short, waiting for exhaustion of the appeals process before executing on the judgment constitutes a just and sufficient reason to excuse delay and strikes a proper balance of rights and duties of both parties implicit in the language of AS 09.35.020. [19] We therefore hold that the superior court's decision to allow execution was well within its discretion and that waiting until the appeals process is exhausted before moving for execution of judgment provides a just and sufficient reason to excuse delay.