Opinion ID: 765840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper Measure of Damages

Text: 5 Federal courts have considerable discretion to fashion remedies that provide the most complete relief possible to victims of workplace discrimination who bring an action against their employer under Title VII. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (noting that Title VII is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole, and that the Act requires that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination.); Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1517-18 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the cash equivalent of medical or life insurance premiums that would have been paid by an employer is not necessarily an accurate measure of plaintiff's damages). California courts have adopted a similar approach in wrongful termination cases brought under state law. See, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 191 Cal. App. 3d 976, 985 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that the objectives and purposes of the FEHA and Title VII are identical, and observing that California courts have often turned to federal Title VII authority to interpret provisions of the FEHA); and see generally DFEH v. Madera County, FEHC Dec. No. 90-03 (1990); DFEH v. Rayne Water Conditioning, FEHC Dec. No. 84-01 (1984). 6 Although the precise question at bar has not been addressed in this circuit or by the state courts, we believe that the California courts would apply their traditionally broad 7 remedial approach to the unusual facts of this case. Accord- ingly, the proper measure of Ms. Sposato's damages is the face value of the employer-provided life insurance policy that would have been in effect but for the wrongful termination, less any proceeds received by Ms. Sposato's estate from the pay-out on the substitute life insurance coverage. 8 Appellee's contention that Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985), should control here is unpersuasive. In Fariss, as in this case, the complainant brought a wrongful termination suit against his former employer but died during the pendency of the proceedings. Id. at 961. Mr. Fariss' wife was substituted as plaintiff, but the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the wrongful termination claim. Id. On appeal, a panel of the Fourth Circuit considered whether Mrs. Fariss would be able to recover any damages, assuming that she could prove that her husband had been wrongfully terminated. Id. at 963. 9 As in this case, Mrs. Fariss sought to recover the face value of an employer-provided life insurance policy that would have been in effect but for her husband's allegedly wrongful termination. Id. The court held that the insurance coverage, not the proceeds, is the benefit for which the employer must be held liable, and that the proper measure of the Fariss' damages would be the amount of the premiums the employer would have paid had the termination not occurred. Id. at 965-66. However, the court stated that [b]ecause there [was] no evidence here that Mr. Fariss attempted to obtain any substitute coverage, plaintiff can recover only the premiums the employer would have paid. Id. at 966. 10 We believe that Fariss is inapposite here because, while the complainant in Fariss chose not to self-insure after his termination, the parties have stipulated in this case, pursuant to arbitration, that Ms. Sposato mitigated her damages fully by obtaining substitute life insurance coverage. The employer should bear the economic consequences of its choice to terminate Ms. Sposato's employment and her life insurance policy.