Opinion ID: 2087078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Governing Standard.

Text: In granting NBW's motion to dismiss, [18] the trial judge relied on the purported majority rule that only the specific intent to injure the employee falls outside of the WCA. The judge stated that the substantial certainty argument had appeal on its face, but he was unwilling to make what he perceived to be an expansion of existing law. The judge further acknowledged that, while intent in the traditional tort context is predominately defined in terms of the known probability that certain consequences will flow from one's actions, the use of this definition was less appropriate for workplace injuries because the WCA already provides a means of redress; in his view, the use of the broad substantial certainty test is more understandable when a tort action is the only remedy available to the injured party. The judge analogized WCA intent to tort claims that qualify for punitive damages and to the distinction between first and second degree murder: for punitive damages there must have been a specific purpose to injure and for a first-degree murder conviction there must have been a premeditated and positive design to kill. Appellants' theory is that Durham's death was the result of the intentional acts of NBW since NBW knew with substantial certainty that Durham would be killed in the absence of installation of bullet-proof safety glass at the teller window. Under the oft-stated version of the majority rule, the intentional tort exception does not apply unless the employer had formed the specific intent to injure the employee. See generally 2A LARSON, supra, § 68.13, at 13-45 (adopting restrictive view of majority rule deliberate infliction of harm comparable to left jab to the chin). Appellants, therefore, urge us to adopt a definition of specific intent which embraces the substantial certainty standard recognized in tort. See Johnson v. United States, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 391, 395, 547 F.2d 688, 692 (1976) (act substantially certain to cause false imprisonment; citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 comment h (1965)); see also Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 427 Mich. 1, 24, 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 & n. 67 (1986). Although appellants have presented evidence which goes far beyond the allegations and innuendoes relied on by the widow in Rustin, supra, 491 A.2d 496, their arguments ultimately fail. Not only is the statute clear regarding coverage of injuries caused by the intentional act of a third party, but appellants' reliance on the substantial certainty standard adopted by some jurisdictions is misplaced. [19] Section 36-301(12) of the WCA provides that a compensable injury includes an injury caused by the willful act of third persons. In construing a statute, this court looks first to the language of the statute. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 753 (D.C. 1983) (en banc). The language unquestionably provides coverage for the injury caused by a third party. It is well established that the deliberate assault upon an innocent employee by some third person or co-employee is an `accidental injury.' See 2A LARSON, supra, § 68.12, at 13-9. Durham was killed by a bank robber. Rustin, supra, 491 A.2d 496, involved a statute that contained identical language to § 36-301(12), and the analysis in that decision is, therefore, persuasive if not binding on this division. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C.1971); see note 15, supra. The legal theory presented by appellants in the instant case is similar to that presented in Rustin, and under the analysis in Rustin it is likewise clear that appellants have failed to present evidence that NBW conspired with the robber or participated in any manner in the killing. The removal of safety glass does not provide the basis for finding that NBW committed an intentional tort upon Durham. Consequently, it seems clear that appellants must seek to recover under the WCA and cannot avoid the immunity which is provided to NBW by the statute. In Rustin, supra, 491 A.2d 496, a widow sued for the wrongful death of her husband who was employed as a security guard and killed by a fellow employee. Her theory was that although the actual shooting had been done by the co-employee, the corporate officials had intentionally conspired to have her husband killed since their negligent certification and employment of the co-employee, in violation of District of Columbia laws regulating security officers, had proximately caused the killing. Id. at 498-99. On appeal from the dismissal of the complaint, this court held that the widow had failed to introduce any proof, other than conclusory allegations and innuendo which would support a finding that the employer specifically intended to kill [its employee, her husband]. Id. at 502. Hence she was limited to the recovery provided under the LHWCA. In agreeing with the trial judge that no jury reasonably could conclude that [the employer] had participated in any manner in the killing of [the employee], the court expressed the intentional tort exception in terms of the employer's specific intent to kill the employee. Id. (quoting trial judge; emphasis added); see also Tredway, supra, 403 A.2d at 732 (rape of school teacher working after hours is a compensable injury and only remedy against employer is under the FECA). This definition of the intentional tort exception is in accordance with the WCA's coverage of injuries caused by the intentional act of third persons and the legislative goals as well as the overwhelming weight of authority. The facts of the instant case are somewhat similar to those in Sullivan v. Atlantic Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 454 So.2d 52 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984). A widower alleged that the bank failed to provide any reasonable adequate security measures ... with conscious knowledge that such a decision would expose [the plaintiff's decedent, Mrs. Sullivan] to certain harm, and alternatively that the decision by the bank not to provide any reasonable adequate security measures ... was made with willful, wanton and reckless indifference to the fact that [Mrs. Sullivan] would thereby be exposed to certain harm, including but not limited to actual injury or death caused by an armed robber. Id. at 54. Two armed robberies had occurred at the bank, and on the second occasion the robber threatened to return and kill Mrs. Sullivan. Id. at 53. Despite repeated requests by the employees for improved security, the bank refused and the robber subsequently returned and in the course of a robbery shot Mrs. Sullivan. The court rejected the widower's breach of duty (or dual capacity) theory as well as his contention based on the bank's conscious knowledge that its refusal to improve security would expose Mrs. Sullivan to certain harm caused by the armed robber. Although recognizing that the element of intent in civil assault does not necessarily involve a subjective desire to do harm, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for failure to state a cause of action of assault and battery since it was premised on an omission or failure to act. Id. at 54. The court stated: Mere negligence, or even recklessness which only creates a risk that the contact will result, may afford a distinct cause of action in itself, but under modern usage of the term it is not enough for battery. W. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 9, at 35-36 (4th ed. 1971). Because the complaint in this case purports to establish the intentional tort of assault and battery on the basis of an omission, it is insufficient as a matter of law to state a cause of action against [appellee bank]. Id. at 55. Accordingly, the court declined to reach the issue whether the suit was barred by the exclusivity provision of the state workers' compensation act. Id.; see also Schutt v. Lado, 138 Mich.App. 433, 437, 360 N.W.2d 214, 216 (1984) (allegations distinguishable from those allegations of intentional tort which, in essence, claim only that an employer was negligent in permitting another person to commit an intentional tort). In Houston v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., 522 F.Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1981), relied on by the trial judge in the instant case, the District Court judge reached the exclusivity issue in construing identical exclusivity and accidental injury or death provisions of the LHWCA. The judge dismissed a complaint notwithstanding allegations that the employer had willfully, wantonly, recklessly or negligently and in violation of applicable safety regulations exposed the plaintiff to unreasonably high levels of silica dust, as a result of which he contracted silicosis. Id. at 1095. The case is factually distinguishable from the instant case, and presents an issue we do not decide, but the judge's interpretation of the statute provided accurate guidance to the trial judge here. In commenting that [n]othing short of a specific intent to injure the employee falls outside the scope of [the exclusivity provision of the statute], id., the District Court judge declined to expand the exceptions to that provision because of the comprehensive nature of the legislative scheme and because [k]nowledge and appreciation of risk is not the same as the `intent' to cause injury. Id. at 1096 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 8 (4th ed. 1971)); see also id. for cases relied on. Quoting Professor Larson, the judge explained: The intentional removal of a safety device or toleration of a dangerous condition may or may not set the stage for an accidental injury later. But in any normal use of the words, it cannot be said, if such an injury does happen, that this was deliberate infliction of harm.... 522 F.Supp. at 1096-97 (quoting 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 68.13, at 13-9 (1976)). In the instant case the trial judge did not address the intervening third-party provision of the WCA, § 36-301(12) and instead, in responding to appellants' contention, equated specific intent with the actual desire to injure, relying on his perceptions as to the comparable definitions of intent. See Johnson, supra, 178 U.S.App.D.C. at 395, 547 F.2d at 692. In some jurisdictions this analysis has been criticized as giving the employer an advantage that is unprecedented in other tort contexts, see, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash.2d 197, 202-03, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1955) (pulling chair from underneath one about to sit down), and that it does not comport with the plain language of the statute. The argument is that the WCA only covers accidental injuries, and it is difficult to characterize as accidental an injury that the employer knew with certainty would follow from his or her actions, and such an act must also be considered to be premeditated. It is enough, the argument continues, that a person commits an act with the certain knowledge of its consequences, even if he or she does not desire them. The employee, accordingly, should receive equal compensation regardless of whether the employer intended the injury out of personal hatred or economic gain. For example, if the employer orders a certain task to be performed, for the good of the business, with the certain knowledge that the employee will be injured, the employer has intended to inflict that injury. The injury cannot be characterized as incidental or undesired: if the choice comes as a package, the employer must be charged with choosing all of its elements. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., supra, 427 Mich. at 23-24, 398 N.W.2d at 892-93 (discussing fact situation in which Spanish speaking employees who could not read warning labels were ordered to work near vats of cyanide without ventilation). Appellants rely on cases adopting this argument. `If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.' Boudeloche v. Grow Chem. Coatings Corp., 728 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir.1984) (quoting Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 482 (La.1981)). [20] These cases, however, do not involve an injury caused by the action of an intervening third party. Rather, in the jurisdictions that have adopted a substantial certainty standard, the injury at issue has occurred where the employer was aware of a dangerous condition in or around the workplace that was relatively certain to result in the death or injury of one or more of their employees. [21] Moreover, as Professor Larson points out, these jurisdictions have been unable to exclude ordinary negligence actions from intentional torts with any kind of consistent justification. 2A LARSON, supra, § 68.12 nn. 10.1 & 11 (Supp.). This court does not have the option to reconsider the policy arguments in favor of enhanced recovery for injuries caused by reckless misconduct. The WCA represents a legislative acknowledgement that industry inevitably exposes workers to great risks of injury and a legislative judgment that those workers should be compensated according to the WCA schedule. Nor are we persuaded that the WCA evinces any different legislative intent as to coverage and exclusivity than the LHWCA. See note 15, supra. Accordingly, the majority rule of the restrictive definition of intentional adopted by this court in Rustin, supra, is properly applicable here. Professor Larson observes that, if these decisions seem rather strict, one must remind oneself that what is being tested here is not the degree of gravity or depravity of the employer's conduct, but rather the narrow issue of intentional versus accidental quality of the precise event producing injury. 2A LARSON, supra, § 68.13. The rationale that a workers' compensation statute covers only accidental injuries fits only if the actor in fact intended the injury  not merely that the act resulted in the injury. Id. § 68.15, at 13-66. The conceded injustice resulting from the loss of full compensation is, as Professor Larson explains, partially mitigated by the benefits provided under the workers' compensation acts, and the harshness of the result in accordance with the goals of workers' compensation regarding exclusivity  maintaining the quid pro quo between the employer and the employee and minimizing litigation, even litigation of undoubted merit. Id. § 68.15, at 13-65. What appellants urge is not a clarification of the majority rule, but adoption of a new exception to the exclusivity provision of the WCA, in disregard of the coverage of injuries caused by a third-party, based on the evidence that NBW violated laws designed to assure the safety of the workplace and was aware that one of its employees had been killed by a robber under similar circumstances. Even those jurisdictions that have adopted the substantial certainty standard do not go so far when the injury is the result of an intentional act by a third person over whom the employer has no control. Thus the remedy must lie with the legislature. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.