Opinion ID: 1722768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the lower court erred in permitting the state to elicit highly prejudicial statements in front of the jury regarding appellant's bad character, prior bad acts and previous trials.

Text: The appellant contends (1) that the State erred in inquiring of the appellant's witness, Jerry Miley, whether or not he had been a character witness for appellant. Miley was called to the stand by appellant, and at the conclusion of his direct examination, he was asked whether or not he had been subpoenaed as a witness by the State. Miley answered in the affirmative. On cross-examination, District Attorney Peters asked the following questions: CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. PETERS: Q. Mr. Miley, after you were subpoenaed by the State, did we find out that you had been a character witness for this Defendant before? A. If you did, it was unbeknowing to me. Q. Have you been a character witness for this Defendant before? A. Certainly have. BY MR. WILKINS: Your Honor, I object to that. It's improper and I move for a mistrial. BY THE COURT: Overruled. Move along. The appellant argues that the district attorney's question as to whether or not Miley had been a character witness for appellant and his response in the affirmative informed the jury that Stringer had been tried for other crimes, and constituted reversible error. We do not agree. The obvious purpose of the district attorney's questions was to show that Miley was interested in appellant's defense and that he was biased in favor of the appellant. The interest, bias or prejudice of a witness may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility. Tate v. State, 317 So.2d 23 (Miss. 1975). We are of the opinion that the question and answer did not amount to evidence of previous crimes and did not constitute reversible error. Appellant contends (2) that the State erred in eliciting from witness Miley information of other crimes regarding the carrying of a concealed weapon. The district attorney cross-examined Miley as follows: Q. How much bigger is Larry Moak than this Defendant  I mean, Larry  Larry Westbrook than this Defendant? A. They're somewhat of the same size. Q. Same size. What is it that would be a good equalizer between them? A. A .357 Magnum. Q. Is that what Jimbo Stringer shot that man with? A. I presume so. Q. Why do you presume that? BY MR. WILKINS: Your Honor, I object to what he presumes. Ask it be stricken  BY MR. PETERS: He volunteered  BY THE COURT: Well, I think that's his question, Mr. Wilkins. Move along. BY MR. WILKINS: I didn't hear your ruling, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: Overruled. Q. Where did you get that information? A. Because I know quite frequently he carried a.357. Q. Who? A. Jimmy Stringer. Q. Jimmy Stringer? A. That's right. Q. The Defendant? A. Mr. Stringer. Q. Mr. Stringer. How often have you seen him with it? A. Maybe a hundred times. Q. Over what period of time? A. Couple of years maybe. Q. Couple of years. And how old is that person? A. I believe he's twenty years old. Q. Twenty years old and since he was eighteen, he's been carrying a .357 Magnum that you've seen a hundred times? A. Probably. BY MR. PETERS: Nothing further. The objection was to the answer that I presume so. Subsequent to that objection, the district attorney was told by Miley that appellant had frequently carried a .357 Magnum pistol; that he had seen him with it probably a hundred times over a couple of years; and that he had been carrying it since he was eighteen years of age. No objection was made to that testimony, and we are of the opinion that there is no merit in this contention. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Robertson, 350 So.2d 1348 (Miss. 1977). Appellant argues (3) the State introduced evidence that appellant was in jail at a time when he was in jail on another offense and (4) the State made a concerted effort to bring out and draw attention to appellant's nickname Jimbo in order to acquaint the jury with bad publicity surrounding appellant and his father, both of whom had been involved in a capital murder charge. We have carefully examined the record and find that the reference to appellant's being in jail did not specify any particular offense and we are of the opinion that the examination by the district attorney did not prejudice the jury. Further, the court sustained the objection of appellant's attorney and instructed the jury to disregard the questions and answers. It is presumed the jury followed these directions. Holifield v. State, 275 So.2d 851 (Miss. 1973) and progeny. Prior to the commencement of the trial, counsel for appellant orally moved the court to direct that any reference to the appellant be either under the name Mr. Stringer or Jimmy Stringer in an effort to avoid publicity accorded to appellant as Jimbo Stringer. [1] The court instructed the State to do the best it could in avoiding the designation Jimbo Stringer throughout the trial. Many of the witnesses knew appellant and referred to him as Jimbo Stringer, although during the trial Jimbo was used sparingly. The prosecution referred to appellant by name a total of twenty-eight (28) times and in only four (4) of those instances was the nickname Jimbo used. [2] We are of the opinion that there is no merit in this contention.