Opinion ID: 1697053
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance at Voir Dire

Text: Evans next contends that counsel provided ineffective assistance during voir dire by failing to object when the trial court limited his right to back strike unqualified members of the panel and by allowing two unqualified jurors, Schumann and Combs, to sit on the panel. As to the issue of back striking, the trial court conducted further voir dire to fill a vacancy on the panel and gave each side additional peremptories to do so. Defense counsel asked whether the parties could back strike and the judge, although initially indicating that he wanted to complete jury selection, confirmed that he would not prohibit the defense from further back striking. The record indicates that the judge was frustrated and wanted to complete jury selection; however, competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the judge never enforced such a prohibition and counsel therefore cannot be deficient for failing to object. Evans also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge juror Schumann for cause or take advantage of back striking to remove her from the jury because of her views on the death penalty. Although juror Schumann clearly supported the death penalty and initially indicated that a case of self-defense would be the only time she would recommend life, she immediately confirmed that she would listen to the judge's instructions, consider all circumstances and follow the law. Based on her clear confirmation of her ability to follow the law and counsel's belief that she would be a good guilt-phase juror, counsel's decision not to challenge juror Schumann was reasonable and a matter of trial strategy. See Dufour v. State, 905 So.2d 42, 54-55 (Fla.2005); cf. Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So.2d 1253, 1256 (Fla.1995) (concluding that counsel's decision not to strike a juror who appeared biased as to guilt but favorable as to the sentence was reasonable). Evans' last assertion in this claim is that counsel was ineffective for failing to reassert his challenge for cause against juror Combs or use a peremptory challenge to remove him from the jury when Combs stated that he knew two potential witnesses. However, even if counsel was deficient in failing to object based upon juror Combs' potential bias, we conclude that Evans cannot demonstrate prejudice because neither of the identified witnesses testified during the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.