Opinion ID: 454710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misallocation of the Burden

Text: 32 Notwithstanding the court's two statements at the time of the fitness hearing to the effect that Billingsley carried the burden of proving his unfitness, the government now contends that the court correctly allocated the burden to the government when it ultimately found him fit to stand trial. This contention rests first on the absence of any reference to the burden of proof in the court's minute order of November 4, which simply stated that the court found the defendant presently psychologically fit to stand trial. In addition, the government points to the court's denial of the motion for a new trial, in which the defendant expressly argued that the burden of proof on fitness had been misallocated. Under the government's theory, the court's denial of a post-trial motion specifically raising the burden of proof issue might be read as a statement either that the burden on fitness had not been allocated to the defendant, or that even if the burden had been mistakenly so allocated, the defendant would be found fit for trial even if the government were required to prove the defendant fit by a preponderance of the evidence. 33 We do not doubt the general proposition that a trial court can correct its previous misstatements concerning the burden of proof by indicating in its final oral or written ruling on fitness, or perhaps in its ruling on a post-trial motion, 12 that the burden was actually allocated to the government. Nevertheless, the statements made by the court after the fitness hearing in this case, which explicitly placed upon Billingsley the burden of proving his unfitness, cannot be vitiated by two subsequent rulings that make no mention whatsoever of who carried the burden of proof on fitness. Indeed, the court's oral ruling on Billingsley's motion for a new trial did not mention the question of fitness at all, but merely stated generally that the motion does not state adequate grounds and ... is denied. Assuming that this record leaves some ambiguity as to whether the burden was ultimately misallocated, 13 the logic of Bilyew precludes us from construing such ambiguity against the defendant when we are dealing with a potential error of constitutional magnitude. 34 Therefore, as in Bilyew, we must carefully review the record on the defendant's fitness to assess whether there is a reasonable possibility that he would have been found unfit had the burden been allocated properly.