Opinion ID: 197501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Unmistakability Doctrine

Text: 15 In order to deem a state legislative enactment a contract for the purposes of the Contract Clause, there must be a clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself in a contractual manner. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 84 L.Ed.2d 432 (1985) ([A]bsent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption is that 'a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.'  (quoting Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 100, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937))); United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17-18 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 1515-16 n. 14 (a statute may be treated as a binding contract when the language and the circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the state.). 16 This threshold requirement for the recognition of public contracts has been referred to as the unmistakability doctrine. See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 19 (citing United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d 964 (1996)). In United States v. Winstar, the Supreme Court traced the history of the unmistakability doctrine from Justice Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810), and explained its purpose. Because legislatures should not bind future legislatures from employing their sovereign powers in the absence of the clearest of intent to create vested rights protected under the Contract Clause, courts developed canons of construction disfavoring implied governmental contractual obligations. Thus,  'neither the right of taxation, nor any other power of sovereignty, will be held ... to have been surrendered, unless such surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.'  Winstar, 518 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2455 (quoting Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446 (1861)). The requirement that the government's obligation unmistakably appear thus served the dual purposes of limiting contractual incursions on a State's sovereign powers and of avoiding difficult constitutional questions about the extent of State authority to limit the subsequent exercise of legislative power. Winstar, 518 U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2455. 17 In its most recent Contract Clause case holding a state to its obligations under a public contract, the Supreme Court found ample evidence that a promise on the part of the state had been made in a contractual setting, in return for a specific bargained-for benefit, and found that the statutory scheme clearly employed the language of contract. See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 18, 97 S.Ct. at 1515 (involving a legislative covenant between New York and New Jersey and future bondholders where the very purpose of the covenant was to invoke the constitutional protection of the Contract Clause as security against repeal). In the instant case, we must determine whether the MSRS also evinces a clear intent on the part of the Maine legislature to create contractual rights against the modification of pension benefits.