Opinion ID: 852644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Agencies as Subject to the ADEA

Text: Montgomery argues that state employers such as Purdue are not subject to the ADEA because they are shielded from private suits for monetary damages by the Eleventh Amendment and because other enforcement mechanisms are not meaningful. Purdue concedes that absent consent by the State, the Eleventh Amendment bars private litigants from seeking monetary damages from state agencies under the ADEA. Purdue argues that state agencies are nonetheless subject to the ADEA because employees can obtain injunctive relief against state agencies. Moreover, the EEOC, as an arm of the federal government, is not subject to the Eleventh Amendment and can seek both monetary and non-monetary remedies against state agencies. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n. 9, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001); State Police for Automatic Ret. Ass'n v. DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 12 (1st Cir.2003). In support of his contention that the ADEA provides no meaningful remedy, Montgomery notes that the EEOC's decision to bring a legal action for monetary or injunctive relief on behalf of an aggrieved individual is discretionary. He argues that the EEOC rarely exercises this discretion citing annually published statistics comparing the number of substantiated administrative charges and the number of those charges the EEOC chooses to pursue in court. We find this argument unpersuasive. Whether the enforcement mechanism is vigorous or not, there is no question that the ADEA's substantive requirements apply to Purdue and other state agencies. All taxpayers are subject to the Internal Revenue Code even if less than two percent are subject to audit. Even if we assume lax or nonexistent enforcement, state employers are similarly subject to the ADEA. Moreover, the remedial provisions of the ADEA place the EEOC in a central role. The statutory structure [of the ADEA] plainly gives the EEOC the dominant role in enforcing the ADEA and ADEA private lawsuits therefore are secondary in the statutory scheme to administrative remedies and suits brought by the [EEOC]. EEOC v. Pan Amer. World Airways, Inc., 897 F.2d 1499, 1505 (9th Cir.1990). As a result, state agencies subject to EEOC enforcement are subject to the ADEA as that term is used in the IADA. Montgomery also contends that private lawsuits seeking injunctive relief against state employers do not provide a meaningful remedy for violations of the ADEA and therefore state employers are not subject to the ADEA. Montgomery first argues that the Eleventh Amendment bars not only claims for money damages, but also private civil actions for injunctive relief against the State. This is technically correct, but under the doctrine announced in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), the Eleventh Amendment does not shield state officials from private lawsuits seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This has been found by at least some federal courts to allow private injunctive action under the ADEA. See, e.g., DiFava, 317 F.3d at 12 (Neither Kimel, nor the Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, prevents individuals . . . from obtaining injunctive relief against a state based upon the ADEA pursuant to Ex Parte Young ). And several post- Kimel cases hold that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar private actions for injunctive relief, including reinstatement, against state officials. [4] Montgomery cites Miranda v. University of Maryland, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944 (S.D.Md. Feb. 9, 2005), where the federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's ADEA claims for injunctive relief. The court noted that although Ex Parte Young allows a suit seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against state officials for prospective equitable relief from ongoing violations of federal law, the only defendant Miranda sued was the University of Maryland, College Park. Consequently, the Ex Parte Young exception is inapplicable. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944, at . Miranda does not exempt the ADEA from the Ex Parte Young doctrine. It merely establishes that aggrieved employees who want to pursue that remedy must identify the correct defendant (state officials as opposed to the State itself) in their pleadings. Finally, Montgomery argues that private action to compel equitable reinstatement by state officials is a meaningless and illusory remedy because the decision whether to grant reinstatement is within the discretion of the trial judge and is based on equitable considerations such as the availability of positions. See Price v. Marshall Erdman & Assoc., Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 325-26 (7th Cir.1992). At bottom, this is an argument that state employers are not subject to the ADEA because a court may find other factors to outweigh the requested relief. This is a risk with any enforcement scheme. It does not render the law a nullity to say that it may not accomplish all that some plaintiffs think desireable. In sum, the ADEA's substantive protections for state employees are enforceable through private actions for injunctive relief and direct enforcement by the EEOC. If the law imposes standards of conduct on state employers, they are subject to it. The fact that some remedies may be constitutionally barred does not change this result. Accordingly, we hold that state employers, including Purdue, are government entities subject to the federal ADEA. We therefore also hold that they are not statutory employers under section 1 of Indiana's Age Discrimination Act and affirm the trial court and Court of Appeal's dismissal of Montgomery's IADA wrongful dismissal claim under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).