Opinion ID: 76008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Downward Departure — Reduced Mental Capacity

Text: 17 The government argues next that the district court erred in granting Caro a downward departure because Caro failed to carry his burden of proving that, due to his sexual addiction, he committed the offenses while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity. The government contends on appeal that Caro's expert's diagnosis — that Caro suffers from a sexual addiction and that collecting child pornography was his way of medicating this addiction — is not sufficiently different from impulse control disorder, which this court expressly rejected as a basis for a downward departure. United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir.1998). The government also maintains that this case does not fall outside the heartland of cases because Caro's expert admitted that Caro's condition was not atypical to other people who collect a sizeable amount of child pornography and are addicted to collecting it. Again, we agree with the government. 18 Caro's attempt to distinguish Miller because it was decided prior to the 1998 amendment of § 5K2.13 fails because Miller was not decided on the basis of the text of § 5K2.13, but rather on the basis that the defendant's case was not outside the heartland of cases. Miller, 146 F.3d at 1286. As in Miller, the offense conduct in this case — Caro's receipt, possession, and distribution of child pornography — is exactly the sort of conduct that Congress intended to regulate in 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), and (a)(5)(B). Miller, 146 F.3d at 1285 (applying the same rationale to 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1)). Additionally, the district court made no finding that Caro was not a typical collector or purveyor of child pornography. On the contrary, Caro's expert, Dr. McKay, admitted that most people who collect a sizeable amount of child pornography are in someway addicted to collecting it. Moreover, although it cannot be disputed that Caro collected child pornography as a method of medicating his addiction, and thus, his addiction was causally linked to the receipt and possession of child pornography, the offenses of conviction in Counts 1 and 2, there is no evidence in the record that shows a causal link between Caro's sexual addiction and his distribution of child pornography, the offense of conviction in Count 3. See United States v. Steele, 178 F.3d 1230, 1240 (11th Cir.1999). 19 Accordingly, because this case is not outside the heartland of cases, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in granting a downward departure pursuant to USSG § 5K2.13. Because there is no merit to any of the arguments Caro presents in this appeal, we vacate his sentence and remand this case to the district court with directions that on re-sentencing, it apply the four-level increase under § 2G2.2(b)(3), deny Caro's request for a downward departure, and re-sentence him within the guideline sentencing range of 70-87 months imprisonment. 20 VACATED and REMANDED.