Opinion ID: 884679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err by denying Belgarde's motion to suppress statements he made at the time of his arrest and prior to being given his Miranda warnings?

Text: ¶ 25 The statements at issue in Belgarde's motion to suppress were referenced by Officer Tuttle in his Arrest Report. After explaining that Belgarde failed the HGN test, Officer Tuttle wrote: I TOLD HIM THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS TO [sic] INTOXICATED TO BE SAFELY OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE. I PLACED HIM UNDER ARREST FOR DRIVING OR BEING IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. HE ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE WAS TO [sic] DRUNK. HE SAID HE WAS TRYING TO GET TO HIS DADS [sic] HOUSE IN JEFFERSON CITY. HE SAID, I DIDN'T THINK I COULD MAKE IT TO WHITEHALL. I ASSUMED HE WAS REFERRING TO HIS INTOXICATED STATE OF MIND. I TRANSPORTED MR. BELGARDE TO THE JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE FOR D.U.I. PROCESSING. THE ENTIRE WAY TO THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE MR. BELGARDE ADMITTED THAT HE WAS TOO DRUNK TO DRIVE, BUT HE WANTED ME TO CUT HIM SOME SLACK. I TOLD HIM SEVERAL TIMES THAT I COULD NOT. ¶ 26 After briefing and hearing arguments concerning these statements, the District Court denied Belgarde's motion to suppress. We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether those findings were correctly applied as a matter of law. State v. Steinmetz, 1998 MT 114, ¶ 10, ___ Mont. ___, ¶ 10, 961 P.2d 95, ¶ 10, 55 St.Rep. 450, ¶ 10 (citing State v. Widenhofer (1997), 286 Mont. 341, 345-46, 950 P.2d 1383, 1386). The United States Supreme Court has ruled that, unless the proper Miranda warnings have been given, the states may not use confessions or admissions resulting from a custodial interrogation which the Court defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 706. ¶ 27 Relying on Miranda and Rhode Island v. Innis (1980), 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, Belgarde argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to Officer Tuttle that he was too drunk to drive which were made after his arrest but before he was read his Miranda rights. The State responds that no custodial interrogation occurred, and, therefore, the District Court properly denied Belgarde's motion to suppress. ¶ 28 Here, as the State concedes, Belgarde was in custody at the time he made the statements at issueOfficer Tuttle had arrested him for DUI and was transporting him to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department. However, no evidence suggests that Belgarde's statements were made in response to questions asked by Officer Tuttle. Rather, Belgarde simply volunteered the information that he was too drunk to drive in an attempt to request that Officer Tuttle cut him some slack. Consequently, we conclude that although Belgarde was in custody, no custodial interrogation occurred, and, therefore, his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was not violated. ¶ 29 Furthermore, Belgarde relies on Innis to argue that his statements should be suppressed because Officer Tuttle engaged in the functional equivalent of express questioning. This argument is raised for the first time on appeal. It is axiomatic that a party may not change the theory on appeal from that advanced in the district court. State v. Smith (1996), 276 Mont. 434, 442, 916 P.2d 773, 778 (quoting State v. Henderson (1994), 265 Mont. 454, 458, 877 P.2d 1013, 1016). Therefore, we decline to address this argument. Accordingly, we affirm the District Court's denial of Belgarde's motion to suppress.