Opinion ID: 1401390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was It Appropriate to Appoint a Conservator for S.H.?

Text: S.H. first argues that the master erroneously treated the petition filed by CPS titled a Petition for Appointment of Limited Conservator/Guardian Ad Litem of a Personas a petition for conservatorship. Although CPS's petition originally referred to the statutes governing guardianships, not the statutes governing conservatorships, it appears that S.H. had notice that the proceeding would be conducted under the conservatorship statutes. When the parties briefly dismissed and then reinstated the proceeding, they both treated it as a petition for conservatorship. The court treated the proceeding from the beginning as one for appointment of either a conservator or a guardian. The court's appointment of a visitor under the guardianship statute presumably covered all possible future options. It also appears that S.H. did not raise this objection until after the master made his recommendation on August 7, 1997, and that S.H.'s original attorney acceded to the procedure the master and the superior court followed. We conclude that S.H. did not preserve the issue. Finally, it is not apparent that S.H. was materially prejudiced by this alleged error. The superior court appointed counsel for S.H., appointed a court visitor, and concluded that CPS had demonstrated incapacity by clear and convincing evidence. We next reject S.H.'s assertion that a conservatorship did not appropriately deal with S.H.'s circumstances. S.H. argues that settling a legal claim is outside the scope of conservatorship powers, because it extends beyond the purely financial and touches on questions of justice and emotional satisfaction. We conclude, however, that AS 13.26.280(c)(19) gives a conservator authority to settle a lawsuit. That statute grants a conservator the power to act, without court authorization or confirmation, to settle a claim by or against the estate or the protected person by compromise, arbitration or otherwise. [17] S.H. next argues that the superior court made insufficient factual findings and applied the wrong standard for appointment of a conservator. Alaska Statute 13.26.165 permits appointment of a conservator only when the court determines: (A) the person is unable to manage the person's property and affairs effectively for reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, confinement, detention by a foreign power, or disappearance; and (B) the person has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless proper management is provided, or that funds are needed for the support, care and welfare of the person or those entitled to be supported by the person and that protection is necessary or desirable to obtain or provide funds. [18] The superior court made no finding satisfying subsection (2)(B). The master's report addresses only subsection (2)(A). But any error in failing to make the necessary findings was harmless, given the evidence in this case that made it essentially undisputed that S.H. had property (the lawsuit) which would be wasted or dissipated unless proper management were provided. The evidence included S.H.'s threats to deal independently with opposing counsel, his talk of dismissing the case, and the opinions of the CPS attorneys that S.H. had deteriorated in the deposition and that the $500,000 offer was a windfall. S.H. further argues that the court erred in considering his ability to make litigation-related decisions, as opposed to his ability to make a rational decision in general. We disagree with S.H.'s interpretation of the standard for appointing a conservator in Alaska. Alaska Statute 13.26.165 does not require that a person be altogether incompetent in all aspects of life. And AS 13.26.205(c) states: If only certain powers need be given to the conservator or the services of a conservator are needed only for a limited number of transactions, a special conservator may be appointed. A special conservatorship cannot be reconciled with a requirement that a conservatorship candidate be found wholly incapable of making any rational decision. And it is counter-intuitive to think that an ability to function at some level, perhaps around the house, or while shopping or driving, would require denial of a conservatorship for more complex matters. We think the need for a conservator must be assessed in context of the person's incapacity and the specific matters for which management or protection may be required. The superior court here applied the appropriate standard called for by the issue at hand. The final appointment question is whether there was sufficient factual basis under AS 13.26.165 to find S.H. unable to manage his property effectively. That statute required the court to find that S.H. was unable to manage [his] property and affairs effectively due to mental illness, mental deficiency, or some other factor. [19] The master's report, adopted by the superior court, found that S.H. was unable to reasonably and meaningfully work with [CPS] on his very important property interest in the ARI Case, and decide on whether the settlement offer from ARI should be accepted or the matter should go to trial. The master specifically cited the following findings: (1) the extensive contact by [S.H.'s] ARI Case attorneys with him; (2) their attempts to apprise him of the problems he was causing; (3) their having [S.H.] go to Dr. Marjorie Smith for psychiatric assistance in order to be more able to deal with the ARI Case; (4) Dr. Smith's professional opinion after five months of regular involvement with [S.H.] as to his having a mental illness and his inability to work with his counsel and make a decision; (5) Justice Moore's [20] opinion as to [S.H.] becoming irrational in the mediation process; and (6) [S.H.'s] post-mediation contact with opposing counsel against his attorney's longstanding warnings. S.H. argues that none of these findings of fact supports a conclusion that [he] is unable to effectively manage his property and affairs on a long term basis, which is clearly the requirement for appointment of a conservator contemplated by AS 13.26.165. Because we have never before addressed AS 13.26.165, no Alaska cases support S.H.'s view that the statute requires a long term inability to manage one's property. We must look to the statute to determine its requirements. It does not express or imply a requirement of long term inability; it only specifies that property be in danger of waste or dissipation. [21] Under this standard, inability to manage one's property and affairs need not be long-term to justify a conservatorship. Even brief incapacity could permit loss of property in a given case; invariably requiring long-term incapacity would be at odds with the protection the statute appears intended to provide. S.H.'s doctors provided considerable evidence of his inability. Dr. Marjorie Smith opined that she did not believe S.H. could work with any attorney on the ARI case and come to a reasonable decision. Dr. Bruce Smith opined that S.H. was functionally impaired and disconnected from others' reality. Dr. Aaron Wolf stated that he agreed with Dr. Marjorie Smith's diagnosis of S.H. right down the line. And Betty Wells, the court visitor, recommended that a guardian be appointed to make litigation decisions for S.H. The superior court did not commit clear error in accepting the evidence as clear and convincing proof of S.H.'s inability to manage his property and affairs effectively. S.H. insists that AS 13.26.165 requires a finding of mental illness. We conclude that, even assuming mental illness does not describe S.H.'s condition, the incapacity documented here satisfied the statute. [22]