Opinion ID: 2612261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: this plaintiff's claims

Text: Plaintiff's first four causes of action allege unlawful removal of forest land designation, while the last four allege torts. Since within its jurisdiction the tax court has power to decide all questions of law, ORS 305.410(1), we need not analyze the eight causes separately. But the distinction between actions for relief from a tax status and actions for relief from wrongdoing of tax assessors does determine the nature of plaintiff's claim and which actions are within the tax court's jurisdiction. If this were a pure tort action, then jurisdiction would evidently lie in circuit court, not in tax court. [21] A tort is not a tax matter simply because the tortfeasors are tax assessors. Plaintiff's tax claims are unaffected by whether the assessors committed any torts. Even if defendants maliciously harassed plaintiff, the assessment may be correct. The tax issue is whether plaintiff's land was used in a fashion that qualifies it for the status of forest land. The regulations, supra note 3, define that status in terms of the objective uses of the land, either adequate tree stocking or reasonable efforts to restock. Eligibility for the tax status depends on the actual or planned use of the land for growing marketable trees, not on misdeeds of officials. Tortious misconduct of the assessors, however heinous, does not qualify plaintiff's land for that tax status. The only alleged acts of misconduct relevant to plaintiff's tax status are the omission to state reasons for the assessor's removal of tax status, ORS 321.820(1)(b), and various other procedural defects including lack of notice of the impending disqualification, lack of predetermination hearing, and misrepresentation and surprise at the Department hearing. None of these procedural irregularities give rise to any claim for relief cognizable in an action ex delicto. Plaintiff's tort claims are outside the jurisdiction of the tax court, and many of the factual allegations are relevant only to those claims and not to the tax claims. Further analysis of whether plaintiff's nontort claims arise under the tax laws requires examining separately the nature of relief sought with respect to each claim presented by the facts alleged. [22] The ninth prayer, for costs and fees, requires no separate discussion, since it is contingent on other relief. The first and eighth prayers, for a special prosecutor and for damages, relate to the tort claims and hence are barred. The second through seventh prayers relate to the tax claims. Plaintiff's seventh prayer, for refund of excess taxes, is within the express jurisdiction of the tax court. ORS 305.440(2), 311.806(2). The sixth prayer, for reinstatement of forest land status, is also expressly within the tax court's jurisdiction. ORS 321.820(2). [23] The fifth prayer, for a declaration that plaintiff's forest practices were adequate, seeks to establish the factual predicate for forest land status and is therefore within the tax court's jurisdiction. The third prayer seeks to establish defendants' legal responsibility for determining the adequacy of plaintiff's forest practices, which again arises under the tax court's jurisdiction to decide forest land status. ORS 305.275(1)(c). The second prayer seeks to establish that plaintiff was inadequately represented by counsel at his Department hearing, and while the allegations suggest that this was plaintiff's own fault, it is a matter which the tax court might consider in reviewing the Department's opinion and order and therefore is within its jurisdiction. The fourth prayer seeks to apply to plaintiff the provisions of ORS 321.367(4), which empower the state forester to certify that the owner has corrected deficiencies in the management plan, in order to requalify land for forest land status. [24] On its face that statute applies only to western Oregon. ORS 321.257(2), (9). However, eastern Oregon applicants must state whether they are implementing a forest management plan, ORS 321.815(2)(d), (e), and the regulations take standard forestry practice as the benchmark, OAR 150-321.805(4). Arguably this imports to eastern Oregon the procedures of ORS 321.367(4), but we need not decide the merits of the claim. It is within the tax court's jurisdiction, although it may fail to state a claim for relief. The parties have argued over whether there is original jurisdiction in the tax court, but once the tort claims are omitted this complaint becomes wholly an appeal from the order of the Department. Therefore, the Department was a necessary defendant. ORS 305.560(1), (2). Naming the Department as defendant is a requirement unrelated to whether the mistaxation resulted from errors by the Department or by others. Since plaintiff prayed for a declaration of the county defendants' obligations as tax assessors, they were proper parties in their official capacity. ORCP 28 A, 29 A. As required by ORS 305.560(1), the complaint attached a copy of the Department's order. Apart from failure to name the Department as defendant, the complaint satisfies the pleading requirements of ORS 305.560(2). The Department was sent the complaint, and one of its attorneys was special assistant to the county counsel. In contrast to Wright v. Hazen Investments, Inc., 293 Or. 259, 266, 648 P.2d 360 (1982), the trial has not yet proceeded beyond the opening salvo. Since some proper defendants are retained, joining the Department would not be total substitution of parties. [25] Under these circumstances the Department is wholly unprejudiced and thus may be joined on terms that are just, ORCP 30, quoted supra note 1. [26] Defendants argue that the complaint was not brought within the 60-day limit of ORS 305.560(1). But since that time is a period of limitations and is not jurisdictional, ORS 305.425(2), the timeliness of the complaint can be disputed before the tax court. Plaintiff contends that a second amended complaint naming the Department could relate back to the date of the original complaint, because the Department received actual notice of the amended complaint before us, ORCP 23 A., but that question does not yet arise. If (as defendants contend) service on the Department was defective, the Department can raise that defense by motion before the tax court. In summary, we hold that a claim is not one arising under the tax laws unless it has some bearing on tax liability. Therefore, plaintiff's tort claims against tax assessors are not within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tax court. The claims regarding plaintiff's qualification for forest-land tax status do arise under the tax laws and are within the tax court's jurisdiction. The cause is reversed and remanded with leave to further amend the complaint in accordance with this opinion.