Opinion ID: 1127477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Penalty-phase Only Retrials

Text: (1) Defendant contends that penalty-phase only retrials are unconstitutional per se, depriving him due process, equal protection of the law, his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, Eighth Amendment right to a reliable and proportional sentence, and analogous provisions of the California Constitution, and that we should therefore remand his case for a new unified trial. We have recently rejected a substantially similar claim. In People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 966 [42 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574] the first jury deadlocked at the penalty phase. The second penalty phase jury unanimously agreed on a sentence of death. ( Ibid. ) On appeal, Hawkins made several claims of error revolving around the constitutionality of having a second penalty phase jury sentence him to death without having heard all the guilt phase evidence. ( Ibid. ) First, he noted that a defendant has an Eighth Amendment right to introduce mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and argued that [b]y divorcing the penalty phase from the guilt phase and presenting defendant's guilt in the ... murder as a given, defendant was deprived of the possible benefit of whatever lingering doubts the first jury may have possessed as to whether defendant was the murderer. ( Ibid. ) It was this lack of lingering doubt, [Hawkins] contend[ed], that allowed the second penalty phase jury to do what the first jury was unable to do: unanimously agree on a sentence of death. ( Ibid. ) We rejected this claim, stating, It is true that residual doubt about a defendant's guilt is something that juries may consider at the penalty phase under California law, and a trial court errs if it excludes evidence material to this issue. ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 966-967.) Here, however, defendant was not prevented from putting on guilt phase evidence at the penalty phase so as to raise the possibility of lingering doubt, or from advocating this theory at closing argument. Defendant did in fact argue to the jury that the forensic evidence had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the ... murder had been committed with premeditation and deliberation; he chose not to present evidence or to make an argument, however, that would raise the issue of reasonable doubt regarding his identity as [the] murderer. We have never held that the right to introduce evidence of residual doubt translates into the right to have the same jury at the guilt and penalty phases. Indeed, the Terry court, which first recognized the former right, assumed that a capital defendant's trial by different guilt and penalty phase juries was lawful, so long as defendant was able to introduce to the penalty phase jury guilt phase evidence intended to show lingering doubt. ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 967.) We also rejected Hawkins's further contention that a capital defendant has [a] federal constitutional right to have the jury consider lingering doubt at the penalty phase of the trial. ( Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174, fn. 6 [101 L.Ed.2d 155, 165-166, 108 S.Ct. 2320].) ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 967; see People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1240 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210] [United States Supreme Court has ... essentially found constitutionally sound the practice of penalty-only retrials].) Finally, as relevant to this case, we rejected Hawkins's equal protection claim that he was put in a worse position than a similarly situated, death-eligible defendant whose guilt and penalty were decided by the same jury, because he could not benefit from lingering doubt to the same degree as the latter defendant. ( People v. Hawkins, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 967.) We observed, a bifurcated trial does not restrict a defendant's ability to introduce guilt phase evidence designed to foster residual doubt. Nor, of course, is it at all clear that a defendant whose penalty has been determined by a second jury is put at a disadvantage; he may also benefit from having a jury which has not focused at length on the details of his crimes. Defendant's equal protection claim is therefore without merit. ( Ibid. ) Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, penalty-phase only retrials are not unconstitutional per se. Indeed here, unlike Hawkins, the first penalty jury did unanimously agree on a judgment of death; however, that judgment was reversed on appeal. Moreover, also unlike Hawkins, a significant portion of the guilt phase evidence was presented to the jury. Defendant strenuously litigated this evidence and sought to raise a lingering doubt in the penalty jurors' minds as to the torture-murder special circumstance, i.e., whether Lingle was alive when she was impaled by the stake. In addition, in an abundance of caution, the court instructed jurors to consider any lingering doubt as to whether the murder involved torture, and placed no limitation on counsel's argument regarding this theory. Defendant did in fact argue that the forensic evidence had failed to establish that Lingle died after she was impaled by the stake.