Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Act 2 is a special law.

Text: Having determined that Act 2 is an exercise of legislative power over State lands, we now examine the critical issue in this case: whether Act 2 is a general law or a special law. Sierra Club argues that Act 2 is a special law that violates Article XI, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution. [8] In support of this argument, Sierra Club contends that whether a law is special or general should be determined by its substance and practical operation, rather than on its title, form or phraseology. In contrast, DOT and Superferry argue that Act 2 is a general law that does not violate any provision of the Hawai'i Constitution. They argue that the correct test for a general law is whether it creates a rationally based classification and whether the law applies to all members of the class created. For the following reasons, we agree with Sierra Club.
Article XI, section 5 of Hawai`i's Constitution provides, in relevant part: [t]he legislative power over the lands owned by or under the control of the State and its political subdivisions shall be exercised only by general laws [.] Haw. Const. art. XI, ง 5 (emphasis added). Several other provisions of Hawai`i's Constitution also require the use of general laws. See, e.g., Haw. Const, art. V, ง 5 (requiring a general law to authorize the governor to grant pardons); art. VII, ง 12 (requiring a general law to authorize political subdivisions to issue bonds); art. VIII, ง 1 (requiring a general law to confer powers on political subdivisions); art. VIII, ง 2 (requiring a general law to set limits and procedures on the power political subdivisions have to frame and adopt a charter); art. IX, ง 6 (requiring the State and its political subdivisions to plan and manage the growth of the population by general law); art. XVI, ง 3.5 (requiring a general law to decrease the salary of an officer of the State during a term of office); art. XVIII, ง 6 (providing that a general law establish default policies and methods of real property tax assessment if not provided by ordinance). The meaning of a general law as used in these constitutional provisions has been interpreted by this court on only one prior occasion: in Bulgo v. County of Maui, 50 Haw. 51, 430 P.2d 321 (1967). In Bulgo, this court addressed whether a newly enacted statute, which included specific facts that affected only Maui County at the time of enactment, was a special law in violation of Article VII, section 1 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Id. at 57-59, 430 P.2d at 325-27.
At the time of the lawsuit in Bulgo, Article VII, section 1 provided that: Each political subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general laws. Id. at 54, 430 P.2d at 324. The plaintiff in Bulgo argued that Act 47 of the Session Laws of 1967 was a special law because one of its provisions could not possibly apply to any county other than Maui. Id. at 57, 430 P.2d at 326. Act 47 provided, in relevant part: SECTION 1. Chapter 138 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1955 is amended by adding a new section as follows: Section 138-____. Special elections. If a person elected in a general election to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county dies before January 2 following his election, the governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the occurrence of the death requiring special elections to be held to fill the vacancy so created. The proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days after, the occurrence of the death to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. The governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the approval of this Act requiring special elections to be held if any person elected in the general election of 1966 to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county died before January 2, 1967, and such proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the approval of this Act to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. In any case, the tenure of any holdover or temporary chairman then serving shall terminate when the successor chairman shall be so elected in a general election and qualified. If any special election is held in the county within one hundred and twenty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the occurrence of the death or approval of this Act, as the case may be, then such special election shall be held in conjunction with the general election provided by this Act. ... SECTION 2. This Act shall apply to each county in the State unless a county adopts a charter which provides for succession of the office of chairman of the board of supervisors under the contingency covered by this Act. ... SECTION 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. 1967 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 47 at 34-35. The plaintiff in Bulgo challenged the following provision in Act 47: The governor shall issue a proclamation within ten days after the approval of this Act requiring special elections to be held if any person elected in the general election of 1966 to the office of chairman of the board of supervisors of a county died before January 2, 1967, and such proclamation shall provide that a primary election be held within sixty days after, but no sooner than forty-five days, after the approval of this Act to nominate candidates for a general election to be held thirty days after the primary election. Bulgo, 50 Haw. at 53, 430 P.2d at 323. As alleged by the plaintiff in Bulgo, and as observed by this court, [a]t the time of approval of the Act, the county of Maui was the only county in which the person elected as county chairman in the 1966 general election had died before January 2, 1967. Id. at 54, 430 P.2d at 324. In interpreting Article VII, section 1, this court determined that the constitutional language was not vague and that it required the legislature to confer powers upon the counties only by general laws. Id. at 58, 430 P.2d at 326. The determinative question was whether the provision constitutes a general law or a special law. Id. In the context of Article VII, section 1, this court defined general laws as laws which apply uniformly throughout all political subdivisions of the State. Id. The court noted, however, that a law may apply to less than all of the political subdivisions and still be a general law, if it applies uniformly to a class of political subdivisions, which, considering the purpose of the legislation, are distinguished by sufficiently significant characteristics to make them a class by themselves. Id.
Relying on the unchallenged portion of section 1 in Act 47, this court determined that Act 47 applied to a class of political subdivisions consisting of every county other than a county which adopts a charter providing for succession to the office of county chairman when a chairman-elect dies before January 2 following his election. Id. The Bulgo court noted that under Article VII, section 1, the thing that is required to have uniform application is the power given to, and exercised by, political subdivisions. Id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 326. The court further observed that [t]he power given by Act 47 is the power to hold special elections for successor county chairman [sic] where the chairman-elect dies before January 2 following his election. The Act confers this power upon every county in which the contingency occurs so long as the county is within the class of political subdivisions encompassed by it. The Act provides for the timing of the special elections in three different situations. The challenged provision covers one situation. Such timing provision does not confer any power and relates only to the exercise of the power that has been granted. Id. The Bulgo court concluded that Act 47, including the challenged provision, was a general law because [t]he challenged provision does not give the county of Maui any power which is different from that which the Act gives to the counties of Hawaii and Kauai. It neither favors nor discriminates against Maui. The contingency contemplated in the Act now exists on Maui. The provision brings Maui within the scope of the Act in the present situation. Id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 327.
Bulgo is distinguishable from this case in two significant ways. First, Act 47 conferred a power to each county in the State unless a county had adopted a charter that provided an alternate process for addressing the situation described in Act 47. Act 47, ง 2 at 35. At least two other counties existed when Act 47 was enacted, and they also received the power conferred by the Act at the time of its enactment. See id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 327. In this case, only one member of the class created by Act 2 existed at the time of its enactment. Section 2 of Act 2 provides the following definitions: Large capacity ferry vessel means any inter-island ferry vessel that transports, is designed to transport, or is intended to transport per voyage at least five hundred passengers, two hundred motor vehicles, and cargo between the islands of the state. Large capacity ferry vessel company means any company that owns or operates a large capacity ferry vessel. Act 2, ง 2 at 7. Unlike Bulgo, in this case there is no evidence in the record that any company, other than Superferry, met the definition provided by section 2 when Act 2 was enacted. Secondly, the Bulgo court did not contemplate a statute that was subject to automatic repeal on a particular date or upon the happening of a one-time event. Compare Act 47 at 34-35 with Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21. Section 18 of Act 2 mandates such a repeal. Section 18 provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval; provided that this Act shall be repealed on the earlier of: (1) The forty-fifth day, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, following adjournment sine die of the regular session of 2009; or (2) Upon acceptance of the final environmental impact statement as provided in this Act; and provided further that: (1) The final environmental impact statement by the department of transportation that is accepted by the office of environmental quality control under this Act shall be and remain effective for all purposes under the laws of this state, notwithstanding the repeal of this Act; and (2) Section 16 of this Act shall not be repealed when this Act is repealed. [9] Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21 (emphasis added). In contrast, the Bulgo court considered an Act that was unlimited in duration. As such, it was possible that future circumstances would require another county to exercise the power conferred by Act 47. Such a possibility is highly unlikely, if not impossible, in this case. The rights and privileges conferred to a large capacity ferry vessel company by Act 2 exist for a limited period of time (less than twenty-one months) and the possibility that a company other than Superferry would be able to exercise those same rights before they are extinguished is beyond remote. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.ii. Thus, while Bulgo informs our approach to distinguishing between general and special laws, it is limited in its application, as the Bulgo court did not consider a statute that created a class with only one member nor did it consider a statute that was limited in duration. Therefore, we look to the case law of other jurisdictions. After reviewing other approaches to distinguishing between special and general laws, we believe that guidance on this issue is best found in the Colorado Supreme Court's approach in People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380 (Colo.2005). The Nebraska Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court provide further guidance in analyzing the future applicability of a class. See Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848-49 (1991); Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 800 P.2d 1251, 1258-59 (1990).
In Canister, the governor of Colorado called a special legislative session to consider legislation that would amend Colorado's capital punishment sentencing procedure to conform with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which concluded that a capital sentencing statute similar to Colorado's was an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Canister, 110 P.3d at 381. The Colorado legislature drafted and approved a bill that would apply to cases where the prosecution had announced it would seek a death sentence but a sentencing hearing had not yet been held. Id. at 381-82. At the time the law was enacted, the law was applicable to only two people, Randy Deon Canister and Abraham Hagos. Id. At the time of Canister's trial, Colorado's sentencing procedures provided that if a defendant was convicted of a crime eligible for the death penalty, a three-judge panel would determine whether the defendant would be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Id. at 381. While Canister's trial was in progress, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Ring. Id. The Colorado legislature responded with a bill that abolish[ed] the three judge panel and return[ed] responsibility for the capital sentencing determination to the jury that heard the guilt phase. Id. Canister challenged the following provision of the bill, inter alia, as special legislation: If, as of July 12, 2002, the prosecution has announced it will be seeking the death sentence as the punishment for a conviction of a class 1 felony and a defendant has been convicted at trial of a class 1 felony or has pled guilty to a class 1 felony, but a sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment has not yet been held, a jury shall be impaneled to determine the sentence at the sentencing hearing pursuant to the procedures set forth in this section or, if the defendant pled guilty or waived the right to a jury sentencing, the sentence shall be determined by the trial judge. Id. at 381-82 (emphases added). Canister argued that the State was precluded from seeking the death penalty against him because the challenged provision of the new statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 382. The trial court found that the provision violated constitutional prohibitions against special legislation, bills of attainder and ... ex post facto laws. Id. at 382. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial court's ruling on the basis that the challenged provision was unconstitutional special legislation. Id. at 385-86.
The Colorado Supreme Court outlined a two-step analysis to determine whether laws that implicate one of the express prohibitions enumerated in the constitutional provision are special or general. Id. at 383. The first step required the court to determine whether the classification adopted by the legislature is a real or potential class, or whether it is logically and factually limited to a class of one and thus illusory. Id. (quoting In re Interrogatory Propounded by Governor Roy Romer on House Bill 91S-1005, 814 P.2d 875, 886 (Colo.1991) (hereinafter  Interrogatory )) (internal quotations omitted). If the law created an illusory class it was prohibited special legislation. Id. If the law created a genuine class, the second step of the analysis required the court to determine whether the class was reasonable. Id.
In applying this analysis to the challenged statute, the Canister court determined that the statute created an illusory class and was prohibited special legislation. Id. at 385. In determining whether the statute created a real or illusory class[,] the court reviewed several Colorado cases that had concluded the legislation at issue created genuine classes. Id. at 383. The Canister court observed that a common characteristic of those cases was the [p]otential future applicability of the challenged statutes. Id. at 384; see also Darrow v. People ex. rel Norris, 8 Colo. 417, 8 P. 661 (1885) (determining that a statute creating a superior court in a town or city with 25,000 inhabitants was not special legislation despite it only applying to Denver at the time of enactment, because the legislature clearly intended that it apply to other towns and cities in the future, and the statute was unlimited as to time in its operation); Interrogatory, 814 P.2d 875 (determining that a statute providing incentives to encourage United Airlines to construct and operate a maintenance facility in Colorado did not create an illusory class because it contained no time limit and another aviation-related business could meet the statutory criteria in the future and receive the same benefits provided by the statute); Am, Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo.1994) (determining that Colorado's natural surface stream legislation was not special legislation despite only applying to two stream systems at the time of enactment because it had an indefinite period of application and it may be found to apply to other streams in the future); City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427 (Colo.2000) (determining that a statute that held an annexation proceeding in abeyance pending a conflicting incorporation proceeding, which involved a proposed city of over 75,000 inhabitants, was not unconstitutional special legislation because it was generic in its application, [was] applicable to other foreseeable situations, [and did] not deal with a class of one).
The Canister court then observed that [o]ur special legislation precedent illustrates that, even when the legislature had a specific entity in mind when drafting the legislation, the class created by the legislation is not illusory if it could include other members in the future. Canister, 110 P.3d at 384. The court further noted that [b]y contrast, a class that is drawn so that it will never have any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the legislation creating such a class is unconstitutional special legislation. Id. Such a class was considered in In re Senate Bill No. 95 of the Forty-Third General Assembly, 146 Colo. 233, 361 P.2d 350 (1961). In that case, the Colorado legislature passed an annexation bill that the Colorado Supreme Court determined could only apply to the annexation of the town of Glendale by the city of Denver. Id. at 353. The challenged bill, widely referred to as The Glendale Bill, provided in relevant part: Whenever any town existing under the general laws of this state contains less than six hundred and forty acres in area and shall have been surrounded for a period of not less than five years by a city or city and county, the territory included within such surrounded town shall become a part of the surrounding city or city and county and such surrounded town may be annexed to and become a part of the surrounding city or city and county by appropriate ordinance passed by the city council of the annexing city or city and county without complying with any of the other provisions of this article. Annexation shall be complete on the effective date of the annexation ordinance for all purposes except that of general taxation in which respect annexation shall not become effective until on and after the first day of January, next ensuing. Id. at 351-52 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Senate Bill No. 95). The bill also included a repealing clause, which provided that [t]he provisions of this act are hereby specifically repealed on and after July 1, 1962. Id. at 352. At the request of the governor, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the bill to determine if it was a special law in violation of the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 353. The court's review concluded that the bill was conclusively shown to be a special law based on two facts: (1) the bill applied only to 640-acre surrounded towns and not 640-acre surrounded cities, and (2) the repealing clause made it absolutely certain that the bill can apply only to a town now in existence and meeting the very special requirements of being less than 640 acres in extent and being completely surrounded by a special charter town or city. Id. at 353-54. The court further determined that the bill could not operate prospectively because it was impossible that before July 1, 1962, any circumstance [could] occur to allow another town to be surrounded for five years by a special charter town or city. Id. at 354. The court concluded that Senate Bill No. 95 was unquestionably conceived, cut, tailored and amended to accomplish a particular purpose with reference to a particular area, to-wit, Glendale. Once having accomplished that particular purpose the act would die before it could possibly accomplish a like purpose in any other place. Id. Based on this precedent, the Canister court determined that this description applied equally to the capital sentencing statute challenged in that case. Canister, 110 P.3d at 384. The court explained: [a]s of July 12, 2002, the date the statutory class created by section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) closed, as well as the date the statute became effective, Canister and Hagos were the only two people in Colorado for whom the prosecution had announced it was seeking the death sentence, who had been convicted at trial of a class 1 felony, and for whom a sentencing hearing had not yet been held. . . . Because of the time limitation built into the section, Canister and Hagos are the only two people to whom it will ever apply. Like the legislation in Senate Bill No. 95, section 18-1.4-102(1)(e) cannot operate prospectively, and will have no future effect after accomplishing its purpose of making the death penalty available as punishment for Canister and Hagos. Id. at 385. The Canister court concluded that the challenged provision was a violation of Colorado's constitutional prohibition against special legislation, stating that [b]ecause those two people are the only individuals to whom the statute will ever apply, the classification adopted by the legislature is logically and factually limited to a `class of one,' and thus is illusory. Id. at 385.
Like the Colorado Supreme Court in Canister, other courts have also emphasized future applicability as a determining factor in special legislation analysis, and they provide guidance for evaluating the likelihood of that future application. See Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d at 848-49; Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d at 1258-59. In Haman v. Marsh , the Supreme Court of Nebraska determined that a law that would pay $33.8 million of state tax money to depositors affected by the failure of industrial loan and investment companies in Nebraska was a special law. 467 N.W.2d at 841. In evaluating whether the challenged law created a permanently closed class, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated that a classification which limits the application of the law to a present condition, and leaves no room or opportunity for an increase in the numbers of the class by future growth or development, is special[.] Id. at 848. The Nebraska court also concluded that it was not limited to the face of the legislation to determine whether the class was closed, but could consider the act's application. Id. at 849. The court stated [i]n deciding whether a statute legitimately classifies, the court must consider the actual probability that others will come under the act's operation. If the prospect is merely theoretical, and not probable, the act is special legislation. The conditions of entry into the class must not only be possible, but reasonably probable of attainment. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d 1251). The Nebraska court noted the plaintiff's description of the improbable sequence of events required for entry into the class created by the challenged statute: First new industrials would have to be chartered. Second, they would have to become members of the [Nebraska Depository Institution Guaranty Corporation (NDIGC)] (or the only two industrials which presently exist would have to renounce their [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)] coverage and become members of the NDIGC), and the deposits of those industrials would have to be guaranteed by the NDIGC. Third, those industrials would have to go into receivership or bankruptcy. And, fourth, the depositors of those institutions would have to suffer deposit losses. Id. at 848-49. The Nebraska court determined that except for a highly improbable set of events the class [was] permanently closed to future members and that [t]o force the plaintiff to disprove every possible contingency would be to accept artful draftmanship over reality. Id. at 849. Similarly, in Town of Surprise, the Supreme Court of Arizona concluded that a deannexation statute that applied to a city or town having a population of less than ten thousand persons according to the 1980 United States decennial census within a county having a population in excess of one million two hundred thousand persons according to the 1980 United States decennial census was a special law that created a class that could not include future members. 800 P.2d at 1255 (emphasis removed). The Arizona court stated that [t]o decide whether a statute legitimately classifies, we will consider the actual probability that others will come under the act's operation when the population changes. Where the prospect is only theoretical, and not probable, we will find the act special or local in nature. Id. at 1259 (emphasis added). On the issue of future applicability of the challenged statute, the court found that the statute's focus, limited to a particular census for only 13 months, prevents any municipality from either coming within or exiting from its operation in the future. Id. These cases teach that in determining whether a law creates an illusory class depends not only on whether others may theoretically enter the class, but on the actual probability that others will enter the class in the future. See Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d at 848-49; Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d at 1258-59.
Applying the foregoing analysis to the facts of this case, we conclude that Act 2 creates a class that is logically and factually limited to a `class of one' and is, therefore, illusory. See Canister, 110 P.3d at 385. Section 1(b) of Act 2 provides: This Act adopts a new policy, and further clarifies and amends existing law, with respect to this new type of inter-island ferry service to provide that, during the period in which any required environmental review and studies, including environmental assessments or environmental impact statements, are prepared, and also following their completion: (1) A large capacity ferry vessel company and large capacity ferry vessels may operate subject to the employment of measures to mitigate significant environmental effects; (2) Agreements with respect to the operations of a large capacity ferry vessel company, including a large capacity ferry vessel company operating agreement, entered into between the State and a large capacity ferry vessel company, may be enforced as written or as executed or re-executed; and (3) Related harbor improvements may be constructed and used by the State, by a large capacity ferry vessel company, and by others, notwithstanding the fact that the non-preparation or non-completion of environmental assessments or environmental impact statements, the lack of acceptance of an environmental impact statement, or the lack of a finding of no significant impact, would otherwise have barred, delayed, been a condition precedent to, or interfered with paragraphs (1) through (3). Act 2, ง 1(b) at 6 (emphasis added). Section 1(b)(1) provides that the class of [a] large capacity ferry vessel company will be treated differently under the law pursuant to Act 2, most importantly, being once-again exempt from the requirements of HRS chapter 343. Id. For this class to be considered genuine, it must be reasonably probable that other members could enter the class in the future. See Canister, 110 P.3d at 384; Haman v. Marsh, 467 N.W.2d at 848-49; Town of Surprise, 800 P.2d at 1258-59. Such a conclusion is prevented by Act 2's repealing provision. See Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21.
Section 18 of Act 2 provides, in relevant part: This Act shall take effect upon its approval; provided that this Act shall be repealed on the earlier of: (1) The forty-fifth day, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, following adjournment sine die of the regular session of 2009; or (2) Upon acceptance of the final environmental impact statement as provided in this Act[.] Act 2, ง 18 at 20. Article III, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides, in relevant part: The legislature shall convene annually in regular session at 10:00 o'clock a.m. on the third Wednesday in January. . . . Regular sessions shall be limited to a period of sixty days. . . . Any session may be extended a total of not more than fifteen days. . . . Each regular session shall be recessed for not less than five days at some period between the twentieth and fortieth days of the regular session. . . . Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, the days in mandatory recess and any days in recess pursuant to a concurrent resolution shall be excluded in computing the number of days of any session. Haw. Const, art. Ill, ง 10. The third Wednesday in January 2009 is January 21st. The regular session of 2009 must end within seventy-five days (excluding at least five mandatory recess days, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays). Accordingly, sine die of the 2009 regular session will occur in approximately mid-May. Forty-five days (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays) following adjournment sine die will occur no later than the end of July. Thus, by its own language Act 2 will be repealed no later than July 31, 2009. Act 2 was enacted on November 2, 2007, and it will be repealed upon acceptance of the final environmental impact statement as provided in Act 2, or July 31, 2009, whichever occurs earlier. Consequently, Act 2 is viable for a maximum of twenty-one months. Any new company seeking to qualify under Act 2 would have to build or acquire a vessel that transports, is designed to transport, or is intended to transport per voyage at least five hundred passengers, two hundred motor vehicles, and cargo between the islands of the state. Act 2, ง 2 at 7. This new company would only be granted the right to operate and utilize State harbor improvements and facilities under Act 2 if it did so pursuant to and subject to agreements and contracts with State entities relating to the operation of a large capacity ferry vessel and the use of state harbor facilities. Act 2, ง 3(1) at 8. The company would also have to comply with all laws of general applicability, except as otherwise provided in this Act. Act 2, ง 5 at 10. Accordingly, any potential new class member under Act 2 would have no more than twenty-one months to build or acquire a qualifying vessel, enter into a qualifying agreement or contract with the State, and comply with all relevant federal and State requirements for operating a passenger service over water before it could attempt to benefit from Act 2. As discussed further below, Act 2's limited viability period of a maximum of twenty-one months effectively limited its benefits to Superferry, as no other large capacity ferry vessel company could realistically enter the market and compete with Superferry during this abbreviated time frame.
Superferry indicated in its July 22, 2004 application to the Public Utilities Commission for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) that it was not aware of any competing utilities providing similar service in the state of Hawaii, i.e., a roll-on/roll-off fast passenger ferry. As Superferry is the current and sole operator of this unique service in Hawai'i, we look to its experience as an example of: (1) the requirements that future ferry operators seeking to enter the class created by Act 2 would likely have to meet and (2) the time necessary to meet those requirements. Superferry's vessel which meets Act 2's transportation requirements (five hundred passengers, two hundred motor vehicles, and cargo) was built for Superferry. Construction of this vessel took approximately three years, as construction began in May 2004 and the vessel was delivered in or around July 2007. To finance the construction, Superferry applied for and received guarantees of 78% of the actual vessel construction costs from the Maritime Administration of the United States Department of Transportation under its Title XI ship financing program. For the remainder of the financing, Superferry arranged a loan from its shipbuilder, Austal USA, for 10% of the value of the shipyard contract, and expected to sell $58.3 million in preferred stocks. As a condition of financing, the Maritime Administration and Superferry's equity investors required a commitment from the State that it would build the harbor facilities necessary to accommodate the new ferry service. This commitment was confirmed on September 7, 2005 and the Maritime Administration financing closed on October 25, 2005. Prior to operating its new vessel, Superferry was required to: (1) enter an agreement with the State to use State harbor facilities, (2) construct passenger accommodations at all harbors excluding Honolulu, (3) secure various types of insurance, [10] (4) provide the State with a performance bond and a third preferred mortgage on each vessel, [11] (5) contract a marine management and crewing service, (6) apply for any relevant federal permits required to operate the ferry service, and (7) receive State approval of an operating schedule of arrival and departure times for each vessel at and from State harbors 90 days prior to commencing service. Superferry entered an operating agreement with the State on September 7, 2005, [12] approximately twenty-three months prior to commencing its commercial operations on August 26, 2007. The operating agreement was conditioned on Superferry receiving: (1) a CPCN from the Public Utilities Commission, (2) a certificate of inspection from the United States Coast Guard, and (3) evidence that the Superferry's vessels met the classification requirements of an independent classification society. In the operating agreement, Superferry and the State agreed that the construction of certain structures were required at the State harbors to accommodate the operation of Superferry's vessels. Some of these structures would be built by the State and others would be built by Superferry. The agreement acknowledged that the [State] does not have passenger accommodations at the Facilities [13] other than Honolulu. As such, the operating agreement allowed Superferry to construct, install, and use the [Superferry] Equipment for passenger accommodations and to accommodate [Superferry] security, vehicle and agricultural inspection, and other personnel at those Facilities. [Superferry] Equipment was defined in the agreement as: (1) Gangways (to the extent not provided by the [State] pursuant to Section IV.D.2), (2) furnishings, fixtures, and equipment purchased, constructed, or installed by [Superferry] at the Facilities, (3) tents for passenger accommodations (at all Facilities other than Honolulu), (4) tents for security, vehicle and agricultural inspection, and other personnel, (5) furnishings for the passenger accommodation areas, (6) portable restroom facilities (at all Facilities other than Honolulu), (7) minor improvements to existing Facilities, including, without limitation, booths, structures, and security, screening, and inspection devices or equipment, (8) utility service and connections (such as water, sewer, power, fire protection, electrical, and lighting) and all associated infrastructure and appurtenances, (9) security fencing and gates, (10) pavement and pavement striping, (11) infrastructure upgrades, signage, lighting, and public address and communication systems, (12) parking areas, storage areas, and other modified areas within the Facilities that will be used by [Superferry], (13) any other items described more particularly in Section VI.A.2., [14] and (14) all substitutions, replacements, modifications and alterations thereto. The agreement further stated that All [Superferry] Equipment shall be owned or controlled by [Superferry] and shall be for [Superferry's] exclusive use, except for the [Superferry] Modifications. [15] The [Superferry] Equipment shall include the [Superferry] Modifications. To the extent that any of the items listed in this Section I.V. as [Superferry] Equipment are provided by the [State] pursuant to Sections IV.D.2. or IV.D.3., the items so provided by the [State] shall be considered State Equipment and not [Superferry] Equipment or [Superferry] Modifications. (Emphasis added.) The operating agreement between Superferry and the State acknowledged that other ferry operators might enter the market during the term of the agreement and that [s]hould such situation arise, the [State] may make available to such other ferry operators, subject to the Schedule (to the extent permitted by law), use and access to Facilities subject to agreements containing general terms and conditions similar to that contained in this Agreement or with such revisions, updates, or modifications as the [State] deems necessary to meet specific conditions or circumstances that may prevail or occur at the time of the commencement of such additional, new, or competing ferry service operations. (Emphasis added.) The agreement later stated, however, that if or when a new ferry service operator desires to commence service,. . . the [State] may not be able to provide similar space to such other operator for its passenger accommodations.  (Emphasis added.) In that event, Superferry would be required to provide the new ferry service operator with a reasonable opportunity to work out a sharing arrangement with [Superferry] for the use of the [Superferry] Modifications at a fair rent or charge for such use. (Emphasis added.) However, Superferry [would] not be obligated to share [Superferry] Equipment, other than [Superferry] Modifications. (Emphasis added.) The installations planned for Kahului Harbor, including the passenger terminal and gangways, would be considered [Superferry] Equipment under Superferry's operating agreement with the State. If the State could not provide similar space to future ferry service operators for their own passenger accommodations, and Superferry would not be obligated to share its passenger accommodations, it is unclear how other ferry service operators would realistically operate at Kahului Harbor. Assuming, however, that the State was able to provide other ferry service operators with sufficient space to construct their own passenger accommodations at the neighbor island harbors, those service operators would ostensibly be subject to requirements similar to those imposed on Superferry. Prior to constructing passenger accommodations at any harbor, the operating agreement between Superferry and the State required Superferry to: (1) obtain the State's written approval of Superferry's equipment plans; (2) obtain all necessary permits and governmental approvals for Superferry's construction plans; and (3) obtain the State's written approval of Superferry's construction plans. Prior to use of these accommodations, Superferry was required to: (1) provide the State with detailed port facility and vessel security plans that had been approved by the United States Department of Homeland Security and (2) obtain the State's approval of Superferry's operational plans [16] for each harbor at 35%, 70% and 100% levels of development. Assuming that other ferry service operators, after meeting similar requirements, were allowed to construct their own passenger accommodations, those operators would need to utilize any facilities built by the State to accommodate ferry service operations at State harbors. Pursuant to the operating agreement between Superferry and the State, any structures built by the State to accommodate the new ferry service would be owned by the State and theoretically available for use by other operators. This equipment included barges and ramps necessary for the vessels to load and unload vehicles. When the State constructed this equipment, however, only Superferry's vessel design and specifications were available for the State to consult. Moreover, the operating agreement acknowledged that the State require[d] specific information on the design and operation of [Superferry's] ferry vessels in order to properly plan, engineer, design, procure, acquire, construct, and install the State Equipment. The agreement further stated that Superferry and the State shall work together to refine the plans, specifications, and drawings for the State Equipment, including providing information to and requesting information from Austal to the extent necessary to refine the design of the State Equipment. Despite the availability of the State's barges and ramps for other ferry service operators, unless those operators used vessels nearly identical to Superferry's vessels, it is unclear how realistic it would be for them to utilize the State's equipment. As in Haman v. Marsh , a highly improbable set of events would have to occur in order for another ferry vessel company to enter Act 2's class of large capacity ferry vessel company within the twenty-one month viability of Act 2. See, 467 N.W.2d at 848-49. First, the new company would have to build or acquire a vessel capable of transporting at least five hundred passengers, two hundred motor vehicles, and cargo between the islands of the state. Act 2, ง 2 at 7. There is no evidence in the record that any such vessel (other than Superferry's vessel) is in existence and could be acquired. The new company would thus have to build such a vessel, a process which ostensibly would be similar to Superferry's three years of construction. In addition, to utilize the State-built barges and ramps, the new vessel's dimensions and design would have to be nearly identical to Superferry's vessels. The new company would likely have to apply for and receive a CPCN from the Public Utilities Commission. Further, it would have to negotiate and finalize an operating agreement with the State. If space was available at the neighbor island harbors, the new company would have to construct its own passenger accommodations, subject to conditions similar to those imposed on Superferry. If space was not available for the construction of new passenger accommodations, the new company would have to negotiate and finalize an agreement with its competitor, Superferry, to share Superferry's existing passenger accommodations. If such an agreement could not be reached, however, it is unclear what options the new company would have. This entire set of events would have to begin and end in less than twenty-one months to allow the new company to operate during the life of Act 2. In sum, there is nothing in the record to support the theoretical possibility of this scenario occurring in reality. [17] Indeed, at oral argument on December 18, 2008, almost fourteen months after the enactment of Act 2 and seven months before its maximum expiration date, counsel for the State and Superferry could not represent to the court that any other large capacity ferry vessel company had expressed any interest in coming within the benefits of Act 2. Like the Glendale Bill considered in In re Senate Bill No. 95 of the Forty-Third General Assembly, once Act 2 accomplished its purpose of allowing Superferry to operate without meeting the requirements of HRS chapter 343, Act 2 will die before another large capacity ferry vessel company could come within its benefits. See 361 P.2d at 354 (Once having accomplished [its] particular purpose the act would die before it could possibly accomplish a like purpose in any other place.).
Section 1(b)(2) of Act 2 provides, in relevant part, that: Agreements with respect to the operations of a large capacity ferry vessel company, including a large capacity ferry vessel company operating agreement, entered into between the State and a large capacity ferry vessel company, may be enforced as written or as executed or re-executed[.] Act 2, ง 1(b)(2) at 6. The record in this case shows that only Superferry has an operating agreement with the State. Also, at oral argument on December 18, 2008, counsel for the State and Superferry could not represent to this court that any other large capacity ferry vessel company had an operating agreement with the State. The benefits provided by Act 2 to a large capacity ferry vessel company were clearly intended to benefit only Superferry, as only Superferry has an operating agreement with the State.
Section 8 of Act 2 restricts the benefits of Act 2's alternative environmental review process to considering the impacts of operating a single large capacity ferry vessel company. Section 8 of Act 2 provides that: The department of transportation shall prepare or contract to prepare an environmental impact statement for the improvements made or to be made to commercial harbors throughout the state that require the expenditure of public funds to accommodate the use thereof by a large capacity ferry vessel company and the secondary effects of those operations on the state's environment, including the operation of the large capacity ferry vessel company. Act 2, ง 8 at 12 (emphases added). There is no indication in section 8 that the required environmental impact statement must consider the impacts of operating more than one large capacity ferry vessel company. Id. Additionally, section 8 directs the preparation of only one environmental impact statement. Id. Upon the acceptance of this final environmental impact statement by the Office of Environmental Quality Control (OEQC), the Act and its alternative environmental review process will be repealed. See Act 2 ง 12 at 17, ง 18 at 20. Based on the language of section 8, if future members attempted to join the class of a large capacity ferry vessel company during the twenty-one-month life of Act 2, the environmental impact statement prepared by DOT, which considered the impacts of only one company using State harbor facilities, ostensibly Superferry as it is the only large capacity ferry vessel company presently operating, would be inadequate even under Act 2's alternative review process. See Act 2, ง 9(d) at 12 (The environmental impact statement shall contain an explanation of the environmental consequences of the action. The contents shall fully declare the environmental implications of the action and shall discuss all relevant and feasible consequences of the action.). In that case, an environmental impact statement for the additional large capacity ferry vessel company would likely be required. If an environmental impact statement became necessary to properly consider the impacts of an additional company using State harbor facilities, that statement would not be governed by the process provided by Act 2. The OEQC's acceptance of the first environmental impact statement would trigger the automatic repeal of Act 2. As such, any future class members attempting to use State harbor facilities would be subject to an environmental review process governed by the more rigorous requirements of HRS chapter 343. See HRS ง 343-5(b) (1993 & Supp. 2008) (Acceptance of a required final statement shall be a condition precedent to implementation of the proposed action. (emphasis added)). Accordingly, future members of the class created by Act 2 would not have the right to operate during the environmental review process, a right granted to Superferry, the only qualifying class member at the time Act 2 was enacted. Therefore, even if other companies attempted to enter the class of a large capacity ferry vessel company during the twenty-one-month existence of Act 2, those future members would not receive the same rights and benefits granted to Superferry, the single member in existence at the time of enactment. As such, the class created by Act 2 is logically and factually limited to a `class of one,' and thus is illusory. Canister, 110 P.3d at 385.
Section 13 of Act 2 also makes it clear that the addition of future members to the large capacity ferry vessel company class is not reasonably probable. Act 2, ง 13 at 18-19. Section 13 establishes a temporary Hawaii inter-island ferry oversight task force [18] and mandates that the thirteen-member task force shall include: (1) The director of transportation, or the director's designee; (2) The chairperson of the board of agriculture, or the chair's designee; (3) The chairperson of the board of land and natural resources, or the chairperson's designee; (4) The attorney general, or the attorney general's designee; (5) The president of a large capacity ferry vessel company, or the president's designee; (6) One representative from each of the four major counties, including at least one representative from the environmental community, one representative who is active or knowledgeable in native Hawaiian cultural practices, and one representative from the general business community; provided that each such representative shall be appointed by the speaker of the house of representatives; and (7) One representative from each of the four major counties, including at least one representative from the environmental community, one representative who is active or knowledgeable in native Hawaiian cultural practices, and one representative from the general business community; provided that each such representative shall be appointed by the president of the senate. Act 2, ง 13(b) at 18-19. (emphases added). The Act's description of these members makes clear that future members could not be added to the large capacity ferry vessel company class. Four of the mandatory members of the task force are designated by title, as they are official positions that may be occupied by only one person at a time (e.g. the director of transportation, the chairperson of the board of agriculture, the chairperson of the board of land and natural resources, the attorney general). Id. Eight of the other mandatory members are described as representative[s] of specific designated groups, which logically include more than one member. Act 2, ง 13(b)(6)-(7) at 19. For these representative members, Act 2 provides a method for selecting each representative (i.e., appointment by the speaker of the house, ง 13(b)(6), or by the president of the senate, ง 13(b)(7)). Significantly, the task force member related to a large capacity ferry vessel company is designated by title,  [t]he president of a large capacity ferry vessel company. Act 2, ง 13(b)(5) at 19 (emphasis added). Unlike the members of the task force that represent a group with multiple members, the president of a large capacity ferry vessel company is not described as a representative. More importantly, Act 2 does not provide a selection process to determine how this member would be selected in the event that more than one eligible person existed. See Act 2 ง 13(b)(5). Section 13, therefore, makes it clear that Act 2's class of a large capacity ferry vessel company did not anticipate the addition of future class members and was conceived, cut, [and] tailored for Superferry. In re Senate Bill No. 95, 361 P.2d at 354.
Because we find that Act 2 creates an illusory class, we need not address the second step of the Canister analysis for special legislation. Canister, 110 P.3d at 383. Accordingly, we hold that Act 2 is a special law in violation of Article XI, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution. The circuit court thus erred when it concluded that Act 2 was constitutional and dismissed Sierra Club's claims as moot.