Opinion ID: 3051362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Probable Cause as to Charges Two and Four

Text: We will uphold a magistrate judge’s determination that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed the crime charged if there is any competent evidence in the record to support it. Then, 92 F.3d at 854 (citing Quinn, 783 F.2d at 791); Zanazanian, 729 F.2d at 626 (citing Merino, 326 F.2d at 11). Manta contends that the magistrate judge’s conclusion that there was probable cause to believe that Manta committed the crimes in charges two and four was not supported by competent evidence because depositions supporting the Greek arrest warrant were never produced, and the magistrate judge considered unsworn witness statements. Manta also argues that the use of unsworn testimony to support extradition violates the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the district court that the magistrate judge’s probable cause determination was supported by competent evidence, and we also conclude that Manta’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. suggestive when seven-photograph lineup contained two photographs of suspect); In re Extradition of Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d 725, 737 (W.D. La. 1999) (identifications based on photos unreliable when no evidence established the circumstances surrounding the identifications, the “witnesses were told that the men in the photographs were found in possession of stolen travelers checks, suggesting their guilt,” and the relevant treaty required the Government to “furnish ‘facts and personal information of the person sought which will permit his identification . . . .’ ”). MANTA v. CHERTOFF 2299 [14] Section 3190, which controls the admissibility of evidence in extradition proceedings, is clear that “[d]epositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof . . . shall be received and admitted as evidence [at an extradition] hearing for all the purposes . . . if they shall be properly and legally authenticated . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3190. The usual rules of evidence do not apply in extradition hearings and, unless the relevant treaty provides otherwise, the only requirement for evidence is that it has been authenticated. Oen Yin-Choy, 858 F.2d at 1406; Then, 92 F.3d at 855. According to Manta, Article XI of the Treaty required more than authentication. Article XI provides, in relevant part, that: If [a] fugitive is merely charged with a crime, a duly authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest in the country where the crime was committed, and of the depositions upon which such warrant may have been issued, shall be produced, with such other evidence or proof as may be deemed competent in the case. 47 Stat. 2185. Manta argues that Article XI required the government to submit “depositions” supporting the Greek arrest warrant, and also contends that unsworn witness statements submitted by the government are not competent evidence under the Treaty because they are not under oath and, therefore, do not qualify as “depositions.” [15] The plain language of the Treaty defeats Manta’s latter argument, that witness statements are not competent because they are unsworn. Article XI is clear that depositions “shall be produced, with such other evidence or proof as may be deemed competent in the case.” 47 Stat. 2185 (emphasis added). As stated above, the only requirement of evidence in extradition hearings is that it has been authenticated. Oen YinChoy, 858 F.2d at 1406; Then, 92 F.3d at 855. Nothing in Article XI or elsewhere in the Treaty suggests that anything more is required for “other evidence or proof” to be consid2300 MANTA v. CHERTOFF ered competent, and Manta does not suggest that the magistrate judge considered any unauthenticated documents. Manta’s other argument, that the magistrate judge’s proba- ble cause determination was not supported by competent evidence because no depositions supporting the Greek arrest warrant were produced, also fails. In reaching this conclusion, our reasoning differs slightly from that of the district court. See Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (appellate court may affirm “on any proper ground supported by the record”).6 [16] The plain language of the Treaty is clear that depositions are not required in every case. The Treaty requires the submission of depositions only when a warrant “may have been issued” upon those depositions. See 47 Stat. 2185 . The record does not confirm that any statements in support of the Greek arrest warrant exist and were not produced. The government submitted the investigation report by the Public Prosecutor, which served as the basis for the Greek arrest warrant. While it is true that the Public Prosecutor’s statement referenced “testimonies” by Kiskiras and three other witnesses, nothing in the record suggests that any of these witnesses’ statements were documented and we have no reason to 6 Citing to Zanazanian, the district court concluded that the magistrate judge had relied on documents that could qualify as “depositions” within the meaning of the Treaty; in Zanazanian, the relevant treaty provision permitted a request for extradition to be supported by “the depositions, record of investigation, or other evidence upon which such warrant or order for arrest may have been issued and such other evidence or proof as may be deemed competent in the case.” 729 F.2d at 627 (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We concluded that the extradition treaty between the United States and Sweden, which referenced “depositions,” did not require sworn statements. Id. at 626-27. Though our opinion was not explicit as to whether the term “deposition” did not require statements under oath or whether the hearsay reports fell within the category of “other evidence,” we need not settle this question today because, as we will discuss, there is no evidence that the government withheld any documents supporting the Greek arrest warrant, sworn or unsworn. MANTA v. CHERTOFF 2301 believe that the Greek arrest warrant was based on anything more than the summary version of the “testimonies” in the form of the Public Prosecutor’s statement. Moreover, the fact that the Public Prosecutor’s investigation report summarized witnesses statements is not significant. See Then, 92 F.3d at 855 (hearsay evidence admissible to support a probable cause for extradition); Zanazanian, 729 F.2d at 626-27 (citations and internal quotations omitted) (noting that to eliminate hearsay from extradition proceedings would defeat one of the primary purposes of extradition treaties, which is to “obviate the necessity of confronting the accused with the witnesses against him”). [17] Manta’s final argument is that the use of unsworn testimony to support extradition violates the Fourth Amendment. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, a magistrate judge is authorized to issue both a provisional warrant, to bring the accused before the court to hear evidence against him, and a final warrant, to commit the accused to prison until the foreign government requests surrender of the accused. Manta is correct that the Fourth Amendment’s protections extend to those arrested pursuant to treaties. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 15 (1957) (“[N]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”); see also U.S. Const. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation . . .”). But Manta’s attempt to expand the Fourth Amendment’s oath requirement to all evidence offered in an extradition proceeding is unfounded. [18] Manta cites no cases to support that the Fourth Amendment requires that every piece of evidence relied on in an extradition proceeding be sworn. Moreover, such a requirement would run contrary to our well-established case law that evidence offered for extradition purposes need not be made under oath. Zanazanian, 729 F.2d at 627 (“Neither the applicable treaty nor United States law requires evidence offered 2302 MANTA v. CHERTOFF for extradition purposes be made under oath.”). We therefore hold that Manta has not established that the Fourth Amendment entitles her to relief.