Opinion ID: 769603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Drug Conspiracy Investigation

Text: 7 Law enforcement officials tried to penetrate the Stanley drug conspiracy using an undercover agent, confidential informants, videotapes, pen registers, toll records, trap and trace devices, TRW credit reports, and physical surveillance. They amassed information implicating Stanley in drug distribution. They also learned of the existence of the ongoing drug conspiracy of which Stanley served as the leader. They were unable, however, to obtain information about the extended organization, such as other members, couriers, buyers, and suppliers. 8 The most successful informant, Chambers, tried to infiltrate the organization. He made contact with Stanley, and on several occasions law enforcement officials monitored his purchase of drugs from Stanley. Chambers's relationship with Stanley as a drug customer, and not as an involved member of the drug-trafficking organization, however, limited the amount of inside information he could obtain. He was able to buy drugs from Stanley, but Stanley did not disclose his source of supply nor did he identify other members of his organization. 9 Agent Twersky interviewed a second informant who agreed to provide information about the Stanley organization in exchange for a reduced prison sentence he was serving. This informant's incarceration, however, prevented him from participating in the investigation. Agent Twersky's third informant attempted but failed to engage Stanley in drug-related conversations. The fourth informant was too afraid to testify. Finally, Agent Twersky debriefed investigators from the police department and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Las Vegas. In particular, Agent Twersky interviewed an undercover officer who infiltrated the Stanley organization for a brief period in 1993, but that officer's interaction with Stanley ended abruptly after about one week. 10 The other conventional investigative techniques--physical surveillance, telephonerecords, and TRW credit reports--did not reveal the details of Stanley's transactions. See United States v. Brown, 761 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that telephone records, though raising the suspicion that illegal activity was occurring, failed to identify specific users or reveal the substance of the conversations); Brone, 792 F.2d at 1506 (stating that pen registers and toll records did not disclose the nature of the business being transacted by telephone). 11 Law enforcement officials had other investigative tools available to them, but Agent Twersky explained in his affidavit why they were not useful in the investigation. Agent Twersky detailed how the use of suspect interviews and grand jury subpoenas, to be productive, would necessarily involve granting immunity to the most culpable individuals in the conspiracy. Suspect interviews, grand jury subpoenas, and search warrants would also alert the suspects to the ongoing investigation. See Torres, 908 F.2d at 1422; Brown, 761 F.2d at 1276 (noting that [m]ass search warrants or interviews would more likely have compromised the investigation rather than promoted it). Twersky also explained that installation of closed-circuit television would risk detection and not provide specific information. Wiretaps, therefore, were necessary. 12 The appellants dispute that the wiretaps were necessary. They point to the degree of success the government had achieved using traditional investigative methods, and they argue the continued use of those and other such methods would have sufficed -or at least should have been given a chance to succeed. They also challenge any reliance on statements attributed to the confidential informant, Chambers. 13 A judge must determine that ordinary investigative techniques employing a normal amount of resources have failed to make the case within a reasonable period of time.  United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1977). However, the government need not exhaust every conceivable investigative technique in order to show necessity.  Torres, 908 F.2d at 1422. [T]he necessity requirement is . . . to be interpreted in a practical and commonsense fashion .. . . United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 241 (9th Cir. 1979). We have consistently held that the wiretap statute does not mandate the indiscriminate pursuit to the bitter end of every non-electronic device as to every telephone and principal in question to a point where the investigation becomes redundant or impractical or the subjects may be alerted and the entire investigation aborted by unreasonable insistence upon forlorn hope. 14 United States v. Baker, 589 F.2d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 1979). 15 Thus, the mere attainment of some degree of success during law enforcement's use of traditional investigative methods does not alone serve to extinguish the need for a wiretap. See Bailey, 607 F.2d at 242 (noting that the need for the wiretap arose when investigators, notwithstanding some success, had been unable, after six months of intensive effort, to learn of the full extent of the operation); see also Torres, 908 F.2d at 1422. 16 Appellants contend that the informant Chambers's ability and willingness to participate in the investigation indicates that further use of this traditional technique could have been productive and nullifies the government's plea of necessity. We disagree. Chambers was able to buy drugs from Stanley, but he was unable to penetrate the Stanley organization. This is similar to the situation in Brone, 792 F.2d at 1504. There, we held that the government showed sufficient necessity despite an undercover agent whose cover was apparently so believable that she was able to make several direct purchases of drugs. Id. at 1505. Like the agent in Brone, Chambers successfully bought drugs but was unable to identify the drug suppliers. Unlike the agent's credibility in Brone, however, Chambers's credibility as a paid government informant would beunder attack and would therefore require further corroborating evidence. See United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 605 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that paid informants necessitate further corroboration because the government knows that the informant would be subject to impeachment). 17 We conclude that the government satisfied the necessity requirement.