Opinion ID: 208183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Inconsistent Jury Verdicts on Obviousness

Text: Acushnet contends that a new trial as to obviousness is required because the district court denied its timely request for JMOL or a new trial, instead entering judgment on irreconcilably inconsistent jury verdicts. See JMOL Order, 585 F.Supp.2d at 617. The jury ruled dependent claim 5 of the '293 patent invalid for obviousness while finding all other asserted claims, including independent claim 4 from which claim 5 depends, not invalid. At the outset, Callaway contends that Acushnet waived its objection to the allegedly inconsistent verdicts by failing to object before the jury was released. We review inconsistent verdicts, an issue not unique to patent law, under regional circuit law. Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1325 (Fed. Cir.2001). The Third Circuit has not directly spoken to the question of whether an objection is required to preserve error in the face of inconsistent general verdicts, and how that court would rule if squarely presented with the issue is not entirely clear. [9] We need not resolve this question, however, because even assuming that such an objection is required, it is apparent that Acushnet did not waive its claim here. After the jury was polled at the conclusion of the trial, counsel for Callaway (not Acushnet) called for a sidebar and the following exchange occurred: [Callaway]: Your Honor, the issue is the one claim which they did find invalid is a dependent claim. THE COURT: [A]ll right. Do you want to send them back? [Callaway]: I'm not sure that they understand  THE COURT: I'm not going to do this. All right? [Callaway]: I just wanted to raise it. Trial Tr. 1427:22-1428:5. The jury was then excused without objection from Acushnet's counsel. Though it did not object on the record, Acushnet contends that because the court rendered a final decision in response to Callaway's objectionI'm not going to do this. All right?no purpose would have been served by repeating the point. The district court evidently concluded here that there was no waiver. Callaway argued waiver in its post-trial briefing before the district court, but the district court did not adopt Callaway's waiver theory, stating that it was sensitive to [Acushnet's] argument that it was essentially `beaten to the punch' by [Callaway's] counsel and did not feel the need to reiterate the same concerns following the court's decision. JMOL Order, 585 F.Supp.2d at 616. The district court then proceeded to decide Acushnet's claim concerning the inconsistency on the merits. Id. at 616-17. The district court here was in the best position to evaluate the import of its statements at sidebar, and we see no basis for disturbing its determination that a waiver did not occur. Turning to the merits, we first must determine whether the verdicts were in fact inconsistent. There is no dispute that the verdicts with respect to claim 5 of the '293 patent (invalid) and claim 4 of that patent (not invalid) were inconsistent. A broader independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that independent claim is invalid for obviousness. See Ormco Corp. v. Align Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed.Cir.2007). Callaway contends, however, that the verdict is not irreconcilably inconsistent with regard to five of the remaining asserted claimsclaim 1 of the '293 patent, claims 1-3 of the '156 patent, and claim 1 of the '873 patent. The basis for Callaway's argument is that unlike claims 4 and 5 of the '293 patent, claim 5 of the '130 patent, and claim 3 of the '873 patent, which require the inner cover layer to be made of an ionomer resin, those five claims require the inner cover to contain a blend of ionomer resins. Thus, Callaway argues, the jury could have rationally concluded that the blend claims were not obvious even if Claim 5, lacking a blend limitation, was obvious. The district court properly rejected this theory, noting that Callaway's reasoning, which would at best render the verdict consistent with respect to the 5 `blend' claims, but . . . inconsistent with respect to the four `non-blend' claims, did not give the court sufficient means to reconcile the verdicts. JMOL Order, 585 F.Supp.2d at 616. Reconciliation of inconsistent verdicts must be consistent with the evidence and theories adduced at trial. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 145-46. The contents of the four Sullivan patents, which share essentially the same specification and claim priority to the same parent application, were presented to the jury as a group. The evidence and theories at trial were also advanced concerning the patents as a group, not on a claim-by-claim basis. No party at trial asserted any patentable difference among the asserted clams before the jury or otherwise meaningfully distinguished between claims on the basis of the blend limitation. The district court recognized that under Third Circuit law a court faced with inconsistent general verdicts after the jury is dismissed has an obligation to attempt to read the verdicts in a manner that will resolve the inconsistencies. JMOL Order, 585 F.Supp.2d at 616-17; see Mosley, 102 F.3d at 90. Although the district court agreed with Acushnet that the verdicts here were genuinely and irreconcilably inconsistent, it nevertheless denied Acushnet's motion for a new trial. The court noted that Acushnet stipulated that it infringes each of the Sullivan patents; three of which were held valid by the jury without reservation, and that the inconsistency therefore was harmless. JMOL Order, 585 F.Supp.2d at 617. This reasoning is flawed. Although it is true that the jury found without reservation that eight claims were not invalid, it is equally true that the jury found claim 5 invalid without reservation. Moreover, the evidence at trial was such that the jury could have rationally reached either verdict with regard to the asserted claims; neither party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under Third Circuit law, in a case where a reading of the verdicts that would solve the apparent inconsistency proves impossible and the evidence might support either of the two inconsistent verdicts, `the appropriate remedy is ordinarily, not simply to accept one verdict and dismiss the other, but to order an entirely new trial.' Mosley, 102 F.3d at 90 (quoting Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 806, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). [10] In these circumstances, Acushnet is correct that a new trial rather than entry of judgment was required as to claims 4 and 5 of the '293 patent. In sum, we agree with Acushnet that the verdict form returned by the jury reflects an irreconcilable inconsistency. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for a new trial on obviousness.