Opinion ID: 2207698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim settlement.

Text: (a) In general.  Subject to approval by the Commission under subsection (b) of this section, after a claim has been filed by a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee, the covered employee or dependents may enter into an agreement for the final compromise and settlement of any current or future claim under this title with: (1) the employer; (2) the insurer of the employer; (3) the Subsequent Injury Fund; or (4) the Uninsured Employers' Fund. (b) Contents.  The final compromise and settlement agreement shall contain the terms and conditions that the Commission considers proper. (c) Approval.  A final compromise and settlement agreement may not take effect unless it has been approved by the Commission. (d) Effect.  (1) When approved by the Commission, a final compromise and settlement agreement is binding on all of the parties to the agreement. (2) Unless the Commission orders otherwise, a final compromise and settlement agreement between a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee and the employer or its insurer precludes the right of the covered employee or the dependents of the covered employee to proceed against the Subsequent Injury Fund on the claim. (e) Survival of right to payment.  If an individual entitled to payment under a final compromise and settlement agreement dies before the individual receives the total amount payable, the balance payable is an asset of the estate of the individual. Article 101, § 52, as a part of the Workers' Compensation Act, is not haunted by a ghost of legislative intent. The Legislature long ago pronounced loudly and clearly the legislative purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act, its general aim and policy, the ends to be accomplished and the evils to be redressed. Eighty years ago, aware of a national trend to protect and compensate industrial workers injured on the job, the General Assembly passed Chapter 800 of the Acts of 1914, which has since become the Workers' Compensation Act. In the preamble to the Act, the legislators recognized that industries necessary for the prosperity of the state involve injury to large numbers of workmen, resulting in their partial or total incapacity or death and that, under the legal system at the time, determining the responsibility of the employer meant great and unnecessary cost... in litigation, which cost is borne by the workmen, the employers and the taxpayers.... Beyond that, the State and its taxpayers are subjected to a heavy burden in providing care and support for such injured workmen and their dependents, which burden should, in so far as may be consistent with the rights and obligations of the people of the State, be more fairly distributed.... Acts of 1914, ch. 800. To alleviate the burden on both the citizens of Maryland and the workers and their families, the Act withdrew from private controversy all questions of fault in accidents arising in hazardous employment. To provide sure and certain relief for workmen injured in extra-hazardous employments and their families and dependents, the General Assembly created the State Industrial Accident Commission, which is now the Workers' Compensation Commission. The Legislature bestowed upon the Commission the exclusive administrative and supervisory authority over the Act. The Commission's duties, in the main, were to examine individual cases and decide whether to order employers to compensate injured employees, and, if so, in what amount, so as to fulfill the expressed policy, aims and objectives of the legislation. This Court has long recognized the purposes and aims of the Act as expressed by the Legislature. See Gross v. Sessinghause & Ostergaard, 331 Md. 37, 39, 626 A.2d 55 (1993); Queen v. Agger, 287 Md. 342, 343, 412 A.2d 733 (1980). We have construed its provisions as liberally as possible in favor of injured employees and their families, in compliance with the Legislative command to interpret the Act in ways that effectuate its general purpose. Art. 101, § 63. [2] See Alitalia v. Tornillo, 329 Md. 40, 48-49, 617 A.2d 572 (1993); Howard Co. Ass'n, Retard. Cit. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980).