Opinion ID: 145827
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The relevant statutory provision states:

Text: No civil action may be commenced by an individual under [the ADEA] until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. . . . . . . . . Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The Act does not define charge. While EEOC regulations give some content to the term, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. The agency has statutory authority to issue regulations, see § 628; and when an agency invokes its authority to issue regulations, which then interpret ambiguous statutory terms, the courts defer to its reasonable interpretations. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-845, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The regulations the agency has adoptedso far as they goare reasonable constructions of the term charge. There is little dispute about this. The issue is the guidance the regulations give. One of the regulations, 29 CFR § 1626.3 (2007), is entitled Other definitions. It says:  charge shall mean a statement filed with the Commission by or on behalf of an aggrieved person which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in actions in violation of the Act. Section 1626.8(a) identifies five pieces of information a charge should contain: (1)-(2) the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of the person making the charge and the charged entity; (3) a statement of facts describing the alleged discriminatory act; (4) the number of employees of the charged employer; and (5) a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. The next subsection, § 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is sufficient if it meets the requirements of § 1626.6 i.e., if it is in writing and . . . name[s] the prospective respondent and . . . generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s). Even with the aid of the regulations the meaning of charge remains unclear, as is evident from the differing positions of the parties now before us and in the Courts of Appeals. Petitioner contends an Intake Questionnaire cannot be a charge unless the EEOC acts upon it. On the other hand some Courts of Appeals, including the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, take a position similar to the Government's in this case, that an Intake Questionnaire can constitute a charge if it expresses the filer's intent to activate the EEOC's enforcement processes. See, e.g., Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 542 (C.A.7 1988). A third view, which seems to accord with respondent's position, is that all completed Intake Questionnaires are charges. See, e.g., Casavantes v. California State Univ., Sacramento, 732 F.2d 1441, 1443 (C.A.9 1984).