Opinion ID: 2514236
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The factual findings on liability were sufficiently clear and explicit.

Text: MAPCO claims that we must reverse because the superior court's factual findings were not clear and explicit, as required by Civil Rule 52(a) and our prior decisions. [8] We explained the requirements of Rule 52(a) in Sullivan v. Subramanian : Under Alaska Civil Rule 52(a), the trial court had a duty, upon completing the non-jury trial, to find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. This rule required the court to deal adequately with and state with clarity what it finds as facts and what it holds as conclusions of law. The findings and conclusions should be so clear and explicit as to give the Supreme Court a clear understanding of the basis for the decision made. [9] If the superior court's findings are not adequate, we must remand the case to the superior court for more explicit findings. [10] MAPCO claims that the superior court's findings were inadequate because the court failed to comment on (i) the inconsistency between Faulk's trial testimony and a prior written statement and (ii) the fact that Faulk presented no evidence in support of his causation theory. MAPCO claims that there is an inconsistency between Faulk's prior written statement and his testimony at trial. On May 16, 1996, Faulk wrote a letter to the Municipality of Anchorage regarding a tax assessment for his property. In that letter, Faulk claimed that the parking area was constructed using substandard methods and materials, and that this resulted in the asphalt breakup problems in the loading area that Odom had complained of in 1994 and 1995. MAPCO claims that this prior written statement is inconsistent with Faulk's position at trial, since Faulk's position at trial was that the problems with the asphalt surface of the loading area were caused not by substandard materials, but rather by MAPCO's migrating snow melt. MAPCO claims that it is impossible to determine how the superior court resolved this conflict, and that the superior court should have issued findings specifically dealing with this inconsistency. Secondly, MAPCO claims that the superior court should have commented on Faulk's failure to address MAPCO's expert testimony. MAPCO's two expert witnesses testified that the snow melt could not have caused the damage to the loading area and the warehouse floor. Faulk presented no expert testimony of his own. Instead, he relied on his own testimony and that of his employees to support his theory that the snow melt migrated under the building to cause his damages. MAPCO claims that the superior court should have explained why it disagreed with the expert testimony presented by MAPCO. In response, Faulk argues that the superior court is not required to explain these inconsistencies, and that the superior court's findings are adequate because each of the critical disputes in the case were resolved by these findings. Faulk is correct: the superior court's findings are clear and explicit because the findings are sufficiently detailed to allow review by this court, and because each of the critical disputes in this case was resolved by these findings. Two major principles emerge from our past decisions concerning Civil Rule 52(a). A trial court's findings are sufficiently clear and explicit if they (i) allow for meaningful appellate review and (ii) resolve all critical issues and disputes between the parties. [11] We will remand for more detailed findings only if these standards are not met. The superior court's findings are sufficiently detailed to allow for meaningful appellate review. Superior Court Judge John Reese found that MAPCO committed a trespass by allowing snow melt to invade Faulk's property. The superior court further found that the water from the snow melt migrated under Faulk's building and made the surface of the loading area unstable; when the block under the loading area broke open, this water flowed out of the block with sufficient volume to create channels under the warehouse floor, causing voids to form that subsequently caused the floor slab to fail. Finally, the superior court found that the costs of the repairs undertaken by Faulk were directly caused by the flow of water from MAPCO's property. MAPCO cites this court's decision in Murray v. Murray [12] in its attempt to show that the trial court here issued incomplete factual findings. MAPCO claims that this case and Murray are similar because in both cases the trial court did not fully reveal its reasoning and the appellate court was unable to apply meaningful review. Murray was a divorce and property division proceeding in which the lower court awarded the wife some of the husband's separate property without valuing the marital estate. [13] We remanded in Murray because a clear understanding of the lower court's ruling was impossible: without factual findings on the value of the marital estate, we could not review the decision to invade separate property. [14] MAPCO claims that the case at bar is similar to Murray because [i]t is impossible to determine from the trial court's verdict how, if at all, the trial court resolved [the] material conflict between [Faulk's] testimony and his documents. That is, MAPCO claims that we cannot meaningfully review the superior court's ruling because the superior court failed to comment on the inconsistency between Faulk's trial testimony and his 1996 written statement to the Municipality. However, it is obvious how the trial court resolved this conflict: it accepted Faulk's testimony as credible, in spite of the allegedly inconsistent earlier statement. Because the superior court accepted Faulk's trespass theory, which was based primarily on evidence from Faulk's own testimony, [15] we must infer that the superior court accepted Faulk's testimony as credible, and did not view the 1996 letter as destroying this credibility. Similarly, in Frontier Saloon, Inc. v. Short, we refused to remand because, even though the factual findings were brief, it was readily apparent that the lower court accepted the testimony of one side's witnesses and rejected the testimony of witnesses presented by the other side. [16] In Frontier Saloon, a builder brought suit to recover for extra work done, and the lower court entered a judgment for the builder. [17] We held that detailed findings were not necessary because it is readily apparent that the trial court accepted [the builder's] testimony and rejected [the saloon's] conflicting testimony as to the disputed items. [18] Here it is also obvious that the trial court accepted Faulk's testimony and Faulk's causation theory. The findings of the superior court below also addressed and resolved all critical issues and claims and are therefore sufficiently detailed under Civil Rule 52(a). MAPCO cites the Fifth Circuit's decision in Echols v. Sullivan [19] in its attempt to show that the superior court's findings failed to address critical issues-the inconsistency between Faulk's trial testimony and his 1996 letter and Faulk's failure to rebut or address MAPCO's expert testimony. In Echols, the trial court entered a judgment against a prisoner who filed a § 1983 action; the Fifth Circuit held that the trial court did not issue adequate findings because it failed to address critical issues, including whether the prisoner was beaten or threatened. [20] However, this case is not like Echols or any of our similar decisions ordering a remand on this basis. The critical issues here were the elements of Faulk's trespass claim: ownership, invasion, and damages. Judge Reese addressed and resolved all three of these issues. MAPCO is essentially arguing that the superior court should have been required to explain its determination of each witness's credibility, and to explain why it found Faulk's witnesses to be more credible than MAPCO's witnesses. We have never required a lower court to do this.