Opinion ID: 2811504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: In Title VII retaliation cases, the plaintiff must first make the following prima facie showing: “(1) that the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a 5 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761 causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate a legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose for the employment action.” Aldrup v. Caldera, 274 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). If the defendant does so, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse action was merely a pretext for the real, discriminatory purpose. Id. “The plaintiff must prove pretext by the standard of but-for causation.” Roberts v. Lubrizol Corp., 582 F. App’x 455, 460 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013)).
A. Whether Valderaz Engaged in Protected Activity Title VII forbids employment discrimination against any individual based on that individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). “When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (citation omitted). Title VII also protects employees for having “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). An employee need not prove that the discriminatory practice he reported was actually unlawful; he need only show a reasonable belief that such conduct constituted an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 6 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761 Valderaz engaged in protected activity when he reported sex harassment to his supervisor on March 2, 2011. UMC attempts to confuse the arguments by focusing on whether Valderaz had a claim for sex harassment. But that is not required under this prong. The district court properly concluded that Valderaz made an internal report of perceived discrimination, which is protected by Title VII. See Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981). B. Whether Valderaz Suffered a Materially Adverse Action Valderaz points to numerous events he claims constitute materially adverse actions: (1) Leal subjecting him to negative treatment by telling his coworkers he had complained about them; (2) the lack of assistance in caring for patients and false performance reports made by female coworkers; (3) being required to attend trainings as a result of those reports; and (4) his inability to be transferred to another department, which resulted in his termination. An adverse employment action is one that a reasonable employee would have found . . . materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. In determining whether an adverse employment action occurred, we focus on the final decisionmaker. The actions of ordinary employees are not imputable to their employer unless they are conducted in furtherance of the employer’s business. There must, however, be a direct relationship between the allegedly discriminatory conduct and the employer’s business. Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 657 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[P]etty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” are not actionable retaliatory conduct. Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 7 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761
Valderaz claims that after he reported his coworkers’ conduct to Leal, she immediately held a meeting where she told Valderaz’s coworkers about his complaints. He argues that this subjected him to additional negative treatment, which made it more difficult to work at UMC. “Whether a particular [action] is materially adverse depends upon the circumstances of the particular case, and should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position, considering all the circumstances.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 71 (2006) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Based on Valderaz’s allegations, Leal’s attempt to resolve the situation by informing Valderaz’s coworkers of his complaint was not actionable retaliatory conduct. Valderaz has not given the Court any reason to conclude that Leal set that meeting with any intentions other than to address the conflict. While there may be circumstances which would counsel against a supervisor confronting wayward employees about their treatment of a co-employee and disclosing that co-employee’s complaint with specificity, this is not one of them.
Next, Valderaz advances that his female coworkers refused to give him proper assistance and lodged false reports against him because he reported their harassing conduct. These incidents do not qualify as materially adverse because they were committed by ordinary employees and were not committed in furtherance of UMC’s business. 4 See Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 657 (citing 4Valderaz refers to his female coworkers interchangeably as both his “coworkers” and his “supervisors.” His assertion that their title as “charge nurses” makes them supervisors is conclusory. There is no evidence in this record that they were supervisors. See Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that supervisors have power over employment status). In fact, as mentioned by the district court, this Court has 8 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761 Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that employers are not liable for conduct of ordinary employees, because an ordinary employee’s conduct “will normally be so unrelated to the employer’s business that it cannot be deemed ‘in furtherance’ thereof”)).
Although not clearly articulated by Valderaz, he relies on the so-called “cat’s paw” theory of liability to establish that he was subject to a materially adverse action when he was forced to undergo training as a result of false performance reports made by female coworkers. This theory allows the coworkers’ alleged discriminatory animus to be imputed to Leal’s decision to require Valderaz to attend training, if Leal “acted as a rubber stamp, or the cat’s paw, for the [coworkers’] prejudice.” Ameen v. Merck & Co., 226 F. App’x 363, 376-77 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To invoke the cat’s paw analysis, Valderaz must submit evidence sufficient to establish two conditions: (1) that his coworkers exhibited retaliatory animus, and (2) that they possessed leverage, or exerted influence, over Leal. Id. at 377 (citation omitted). Valderaz has provided sufficient evidence showing that his coworkers had reason to retaliate once they learned that he complained of their illicit behavior, but he has not put forth evidence that they had any undue influence over Leal. Moreover, on this record, training in and of itself would not dissuade a reasonable employee from making a discrimination claim. Indeed, Valdarez admitted that he did not resent the fact that he was required to go through training. 5 previously found that “charge nurses” are not considered supervisors in labor-relations cases. See Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. NLRB, 253 F.3d 203, 210 (5th Cir. 2001). 5 Ironically, because training usually benefits the employee, many employees base their Title VII claims on a denial of training. See, e.g., Earle v. Aramark Corp., 247 F. App’x 9 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761
Valderaz next argues that UMC advised him to transfer as a ploy to ultimately terminate his employment. The parties do not dispute that Valderaz’s loss of employment is an adverse employment action, as this Court has always held that it is. See DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 214 F. App’x 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). C. Whether There Was a Causal Link Valderaz must next show that his termination on June 24, 2011 had a causal nexus to the report he made about his female coworkers on March 2, 2011. We have often looked to three factors when considering the causal link prong: “(1) the employee’s past disciplinary record, (2) whether the employer followed its typical policy and procedures in terminating the employee, and (3) the temporal proximity between the employee’s conduct and termination.” Id. at 442-43 (citation omitted). The record here supports only the third prong, which Valderaz employs. While suspicious timing alone is rarely sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection, see id., this Court allows for a prima facie case to be made on temporal proximity alone if it is “very close,” Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For example, a time lapse of up to four months has been found to be sufficient. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)); Hypolite v. City of Houst., Tex., 493 F. App’x 597, 606 (5th Cir. 2012). But see Flanner v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 600 F. App’x 914, 921-22 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that a four-month gap, or even a two-month gap, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation, and that Evans actually held that the fiveday gap in time was sufficient in that case.) 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2007); Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 354 (5th Cir. 2001); Wojciechowski v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 763 F. Supp. 2d 832, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 10 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761 Here, fewer than four months elapsed between the time that Valderaz reported sex harassment to his supervisor and his termination. Therefore, Valderaz has established his prima facie case for retaliation. II. Legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for termination The burden now shifts to UMC to articulate its legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. See Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 286. UMC proffers two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Valderaz’s termination: that his final termination was due to his lack of diligence in seeking available transfer positions and that he lacked the requisite number of on-call shifts to remain on the payroll. This is sufficient to satisfy its burden of production.
To prove pretext, Valderaz must bring forth “substantial evidence” demonstrating that UMC’s proffered reasons are a pretext for retaliation. Etienne v. Spanish Lake Truck & Casino Plaza, L.L.C., 547 F. App’x 484, 489 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Valderaz argues that UMC misled him into giving up his full-time position so that it could eventually terminate him. He also asserts that misrepresentations were made to him during the April 11 meeting so that he would agree to a transfer. In short, the April 11 meeting was a ruse in order for him to be terminated, says Valderaz. The testimony of Valderaz and his wife, standing alone, does not create a triable issue with respect to pretext. See id. at 490. It is his burden “to prove that a retaliatory motive was the but-for cause of, not merely a motivating factor behind, the decision to terminate h[im].” Id. (citing Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2533). There is no evidence to support Valdarez’s belief that he 11 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761 was terminated immediately after the April 11 meeting. 6 The evidence shows that UMC relaxed its policy so that Valderaz could continue to work in PICU as an on-call employee, while seeking open positions in other departments. On these facts, there is nothing other than Valderaz’s subjective belief that UMC retaliated against him. That belief, no matter how genuine, is insufficient to show pretext without further evidence. See Pennington v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 469 F. App’x 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). The record irrefutably shows that he was terminated weeks after having been placed as an on-call status employee. The record evidence also supports UMC’s reason regarding lack of diligence. UMC’s Director of Human Resources attempted to assist Valderaz in finding another position, but he missed at least one appointment with nursing recruitment that was set up to help him. Although there were other positions available that provided a higher wage, Valderaz applied to only two positions. When he received an interview for one of those positions, he had already taken another job. This record, including Valderaz’s testimony, taken in the light most favorable to Valderaz, does not provide the “substantial evidence” needed to preclude summary judgment on Valderaz’s retaliation claim. 6 In concluding that there is a genuine fact dispute, the dissent points to Valderaz’s affidavit. That affidavit (along with his wife’s affidavit) was executed on April 11, 2014, the same day that plaintiff filed his response to UMC’s motion for summary judgment. The affidavit contrasts with Valderaz’s deposition testimony. At his deposition, Valderaz acknowledges that his decision not to return to the PICU was not dependent upon any promise that he be transferred to another job with the hospital. Valderaz testified that the reason he did not go back was because of the perceived hostile work environment. That was his testimony, and his later filed affidavit should not be relied upon to defeat summary judgment. See Callahan v. Gulf Logistics, L.L.C., 456 F. App’x 385, 392 (5th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The record does not provide a basis for a jury to find but-for causation between Valderaz’s complaints about his co-workers and his termination. 12 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761