Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Undue activity in procuring the execution of the will

Text: Finally, to survive the summary-judgment motion as to their undue-influence claim, Pirtle and Prchal must present substantial evidence of undue activity by Tucker in procuring the execution of Miller's will. Undue activity in the procurement or execution of a will may . . . be proved by circumstantial evidence. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117. This Court has described this sort of activity in the procurement of a will as being where the primary beneficiary `[is] active in and about the execution and preparation of said will, such as the initiation of the proceedings for the preparation of the will, or participation in such preparation, employing the draftsman, selecting the witness, excluding persons from the testat [or] at or about the time of the execution of the will, concealing the making of the will after it was made, and the like. . . . ' Hayes, 826 So.2d at 803 (quoting Reed v. Shipp, 293 Ala. 632, 636, 308 So.2d 705, 708 (1975)). In Hayes, the evidence showed that the proponent had drafted the testator's will; had employed someone whom he had provided with specially lined paper to type the will; had arranged for the execution of the will and had selected the witnesses; and had excluded the testator's friend from the execution of the will. The notary testified that she did not know the nature of the documents being signed, and the testator's brother, who executed a will prepared by the proponent on the same day, stated the same. The proponent was present in the room when the documents were handled and executed and left only when the notary asked the testator if she understood what she was doing. Also, the proponent had previously attempted to have a will prepared and signed by the testator. Under these facts, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the proponent, finding that the judgment, which followed a bench trial and had been based on ore tenus evidence, was against the great weight of evidence. 826 So.2d at 804. Additionally, this Court has found substantial evidence of undue activity in the following cases. In Helms, supra, this Court held that the contestants to the will had presented substantial evidence precluding a judgment as a matter of law on the basis that the proponent had engaged in undue activity to procure the execution of the will; the evidence showed that the proponents obtained money and property from the testator; one proponent suggested the lawyer who drafted the . . . will; one proponent must have driven [the testator] to the office where the will was executed, and both proponents falsely denied any knowledge of the . . . will. . . . 873 So.2d at 1149. Similarly, in Sconyers, supra, this Court reversed a summary judgment despite testimony that the testator was alert and intelligent, when the evidence also showed that the testator exhibited signs of Alzheimer's disease days before the execution of the will, the testator's affairs were solely in the hands of the proponent, and the will radically deviated from the testator's previous will. This Court stated: In light of the circumstances of this case, a jury could infer that the 1992 will's radical deviation from the bequests made in the 1990 will was the product of undue influence. 669 So.2d at 117. Keeping these precedents in mind, we turn to the evidence presented in this case by Pirtle and Prchal. That evidence shows that Tucker was with Miller when Miller purchased the will kit. Tucker's wife, whose testimony neither side presented, typed the will, which left Miller's entire estate to Tucker. The will was a radical departure from Miller's statements to Pirtle and Prchal that he wanted them to have everything and his statements to Tucker that he wanted Pirtle and Prchal to have whatever was left. Tucker disclaimed knowledge of the contents of the will and failed to advise Miller's family that he had executed a will. Tucker drove Miller to the notary's office to have the will executed and was present during the execution. Although the notary asked Miller whether he knew what he was signing and he responded that he did, she did not question him about the contents of the document. After it was executed, Miller gave the signed will to Tucker. Additionally, Tucker's wife prepared a power of attorney for Miller appointing Tucker his attorney in fact, which Tucker subsequently used for his own financial gain. A court does not look at individual facts or evidence in isolation in determining whether the evidence supports the element of undue influence. . . . Hayes, 826 So.2d at 803. A jury could reasonably infer from the evidence, when viewed in its totality, that Tucker was unduly active in procuring the execution of the will, which left the entirety of Miller's estate to Tucker. A jury could also reasonably infer that Tucker merely acted in accordance with Miller's wishes. Because the evidence, therefore, gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding undue activity, it is a matter to be determined by a jury. Accordingly, Pirtle and Prchal presented substantial evidence supporting each element of their undue-influence claim, and there existed genuine issues of material fact that precluded a summary judgment as to this claim.