Opinion ID: 1035458
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to Nebraska Law

Text: Trial Courts As the foregoing discussion revealed, a common approach taken by many courts in other jurisdictions to the use of demonstrative exhibits in jury deliberations is to allow such use at the trial judge’s discretion. This approach is consistent with Nebraska jurisprudence, which frequently addresses evidentiary matters to the trial judge’s discretion. [5] In Nebraska, “[a] trial judge has broad discretion over the conduct of a trial.”46 It is the judge’s statutory duty to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence.”47 The judge also possesses “inherent powers” that “include the broad discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a fair and orderly trial.”48 [6] In practice, a trial judge is called upon to make many decisions during the course of a trial based upon this broad discretion. The Nebraska Evidence Rules explicitly place many evidentiary matters at the discretion of the trial judge.49 And the exercise of discretion “is implicit in decisions to admit evidence based on relevancy or admissibility.”50 When the Nebraska Evidence Rules commit the evidentiary question at issue to the discretion of the trial court, an appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of 45 See People v. Manley, supra note 18. 46 Connelly v. City of Omaha, 278 Neb. 311, 319, 769 N.W.2d 394, 400 (2009). 47 § 27-611(1). 48 Schindler v. Walker, 256 Neb. 767, 779, 592 N.W.2d 912, 920 (1999). 49 See, e.g., Neb. Evid. R. 104(1), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-104(1) (Reissue 2008); Neb. Evid. R. 106(2), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-106(2) (Reissue 2008); Neb. Evid. R. 201(3), Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-201(3) (Reissue 2008); § 27-611(2); Neb. Evid. R. 705, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-705 (Reissue 2008). 50 Sack v. Castillo, 278 Neb. 156, 164, 768 N.W.2d 429, 436 (2009). Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PANGBORN 377 Cite as 286 Neb. 363 discretion.51 In addition, a trial judge is given the discretion to determine when a sufficient basis has been laid for lay opinion testimony,52 when photographs can be admitted into evidence,53 and when demonstrative exhibits can be used in trial.54 When it comes to matters regarding the jury, under Nebraska case law, the trial judge has discretion to allow the jury to reexamine evidence during deliberations.55 Under this rule, “trial courts have broad discretion in allowing the jury to have unlimited access to properly received exhibits that constitute substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt.”56 [7] In accordance with this broad discretion already accorded to trial courts, particularly in evidentiary matters, we believe that the submission of demonstrative exhibits to the jury during deliberations should be left to the discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, we hold that a trial judge may exercise his or her broad judicial discretion to allow or disallow the use of demonstrative exhibits during jury deliberations.
This discretion, however, is not unlimited. Despite their potential usefulness, demonstrative exhibits also carry the potential to prejudice the party against whom such exhibits are used. If used improperly, demonstrative exhibits can distract the jury from considering all of the evidence presented, causing them instead to unfairly emphasize only portions of the evidence.57 If all parties to a case do not submit demonstrative exhibits, the jury may be tempted to focus more heavily on the 51 Erickson v. U-Haul Internat., 278 Neb. 18, 767 N.W.2d 765 (2009). 52 See Childers v. Phelps County, 252 Neb. 945, 568 N.W.2d 463 (1997). 53 See Steele v. Sedlacek, 267 Neb. 1, 673 N.W.2d 1 (2003). 54 See American Central City v. Joint Antelope Valley Auth., supra note 3. 55 See State v. Dixon, 259 Neb. 976, 614 N.W.2d 288 (2000). 56 State v. Pischel, 277 Neb. 412, 427, 762 N.W.2d 595, 607 (2009). 57 See, e.g., United States v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1974); State v. Lord, supra note 14. Nebraska Advance Sheets 378 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS evidence to which it has “easy reference.”58 Because they are often prepared specifically for use in litigation, demonstrative exhibits can be tempting vehicles for conveying prejudicial language and assumptions59 or inadmissible evidence60 to the jury. Furthermore, if not instructed on the limited purposes of demonstrative exhibits, the jury may assume that demonstrative exhibits constitute primary proof of the information contained therein, leading the jury to shirk its duty to determine the truth and accuracy of the evidence.61 The jury may attribute undue weight or credibility to evidence summarized or illustrated in demonstrative exhibits.62 Or a jury may find the simplicity with which demonstrative exhibits present complex or technical information to be compelling and persuasive.63 On the other hand, demonstrative exhibits that are not properly explained may ultimately confuse or mislead the jury.64 58 See, e.g., U.S. v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 916 (3d Cir. 1991). Accord, United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957); Steele v. United States, 222 F.2d 628 (5th Cir. 1955); Thomas v. State, 259 Ind. 537, 289 N.E.2d 508 (1972) (superseded by rule on other grounds as stated in Litherland v. McDonnell, 796 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. App. 2003)). 59 See, e.g., U.S. v. Irvin, supra note 21; U.S. v. Taylor, supra note 21; United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 941 F. Supp. 1262 (D.D.C. 1996)); U.S. v. Gazie, Nos. 83-1851, 83-1852, 83-1860, 1986 WL 16498 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1986) (unpublished disposition listed in table of “Decisions Without Published Opinions” at 786 F.2d 1166 (6th Cir. 1986)); Vanlandingham v. Gartman, 236 Ark. 504, 367 S.W.2d 111 (1963). 60 See, e.g., United States v. Lemire, supra note 59. 61 See, e.g., U.S. v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Scales, supra note 18; Baines v. United States, 426 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ellenbogen, 365 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1966). 62 See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Ohio Oil Co., supra note 14. 63 See, e.g., U.S. v. Irvin, supra note 21; Elder v. United States, 213 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1954). 64 See, e.g., United States v. Citron, 783 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Gazie, supra note 59. Nebraska Advance Sheets STATE v. PANGBORN 379 Cite as 286 Neb. 363 [8] Given the possibility for such forms of prejudice, a trial judge must carefully consider the potential prejudice that may arise from the use of demonstrative exhibits during jury deliberations. Each demonstrative exhibit must be considered individually, because both the usefulness of a demonstrative exhibit and the potential prejudice arising from its use will depend on the form and substance of each particular exhibit. We note that a trial court is already required to weigh these considerations before allowing the use of demonstrative exhibits in trial.65 We now hold that the trial judge must do so again before allowing the jury to use a demonstrative exhibit during deliberations. It is an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to send a demonstrative exhibit to the jury for use in deliberations without first weighing the potential prejudice in allowing such use against the usefulness of the exhibit and employing adequate safeguards to prevent prejudice.
Significantly, many of the dangers in allowing the use of demonstrative exhibits in jury deliberations stem from the improper use of such exhibits or a disregard for their limited purpose. As such, these dangers often can be avoided by the use of limiting instructions that advise a jury of the limited purpose for which demonstrative exhibits should be employed. As noted earlier, the limiting instruction is the most prevalent safeguard used by the circuit courts. Moreover, several circuits have held that limiting instructions can limit66 or even eliminate67 the harms posed by demonstrative exhibits. In addition to jury instructions, there are other safeguards that can be employed to limit the prejudice that will result from allowing the jury to use demonstrative exhibits in deliberations. These safeguards include requiring the proponent of the exhibit to lay foundation for its use outside the presence 65 See State v. Daly, supra note 6. 66 See, e.g., U.S. v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Francis, 131 F.3d 1452 (11th Cir. 1997). 67 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 633 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. 1980); Sanseverino v. United States, 321 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1963). Nebraska Advance Sheets 380 286 NEBRASKA REPORTS of the jury,68 having the individual who prepared the exhibit testify concerning the exhibit,69 allowing extensive cross-­ examination of the individual who prepared the exhibit,70 giving the opponent of the exhibit the opportunity to examine the exhibit prior to its admission and to identify errors,71 excising prejudicial content prior to submitting the exhibit to the jury,72 and giving the opposing side the opportunity to present its own exhibit.73 As noted above, the prejudicial potential of any particular demonstrative exhibit will vary depending on the exhibit. Having presided over the presentation of evidence, the trial judge should exercise sound discretion to ensure that adequate safeguards are present to prevent that prejudice.