Opinion ID: 2301195
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Abdication of the Defense

Text: Appellant first asserts that counsel was ineffective because he abdicated the defense. Appellant raises three distinct claims under this rubric. Appellant initially contends that counsel was ineffective because he failed to give an opening statement, which would have laid the foundation for an attack on the witnesses' credibility. Brief of Appellant at 9. Appellant presents no further argument or analysis in support of his bald assertion. As the Commonwealth and the PCRA court articulated, existing decisional law, which Appellant inexplicably fails to acknowledge, makes clear that the decision concerning such statements falls within the realm of trial strategy. This Court has recognized that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective per se for failing to make an opening statement. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 531-32 (2009) ([W]e will not presume that the PCRA court was unaware of the prevailing law, which holds that trial counsel `cannot be deemed ineffective per se for failing to make an opening statement.' Commonwealth v. Busanet, 572 Pa. 535, 817 A.2d 1060, 1066 (2002).). Appellant's undeveloped claim relative to counsel is insufficient to prove an entitlement to relief. Commonwealth v. Wharton, 571 Pa. 85, 811 A.2d 978, 986 (2002). In his second claim, Appellant argues that counsel's performance was deficient because counsel failed to adequately cross-examine three of the Commonwealth's witnesses: Zeb Liverman, Charles Russell, and Robert Henderson. Although the PCRA court did not address this allegation in its opinion, a remand is unwarranted because it is apparent from the record that the claim lacks merit. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 609 Pa. 605, 17 A.3d 873, 888 (2011). Where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he chose a particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests. Commonwealth v. Colavita, 606 Pa. 1, 993 A.2d 874, 887 (2010) (quoting Commonwealth v. Howard, 553 Pa. 266, 719 A.2d 233, 237 (1998)). A finding that a chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis is not warranted unless it can be concluded that an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued. Id. A claim of ineffectiveness generally cannot succeed through comparing, in hindsight, the trial strategy employed with alternatives not pursued. Commonwealth v. Miller, 572 Pa. 623, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (2002). It must also be kept in mind that, as the Commonwealth avers, even though Appellant's hindsight claims involve trial strategy, Appellant herein failed even to make an allegation as to what counsel would state in response to the accusations. Commonwealth Brief at 17-19. Instead, Appellant presents mere conclusory allegations or requests a remand for a hearing. PCRA hearings are not discovery expeditions; rather, they are conducted when necessary to offer the petitioner an opportunity to prove that which he already has asserted, and only when his proffer establishes a colorable claim about which there remains a material issue of fact. See Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 578 Pa. 284, 851 A.2d 883, 887 n. 3 (2004). It is not enough to take a cold record, state that counsel could have done this instead, or in addition, and then declare an entitlement to relief or discovery and further delay. On the proffers made, Appellant has not proven that counsel was ineffective or that he is entitled to a hearing. With respect to Zeb Liverman (Liverman), Appellant argues that counsel failed to use available evidence to undermine his credibility. In particular, Appellant claims that counsel failed to elicit evidence pertaining to Liverman's history of drug use and criminal behavior. This assertion is belied by the record. Defense counsel aggressively cross-examined Liverman about his lengthy criminal history, including twenty prior arrests, six convictions, and several parole violations. N.T., 3/11/85, at 139-42. Defense counsel also elicited testimony regarding Liverman's activities as a drug dealer and his drug use on the night in question, including the large quantity of cocaine he consumed. Id. at 142-50, 159. Thus, there is no merit to the contention that defense counsel failed to inquire into Liverman's drug use or criminal history. Appellant further avers that counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Liverman about a statement he gave to the police. Appellant cites the following excerpt: I could have been [at the garage at 17th and Kater] but I don't remember[,] I was doing heavy drugs at the time, I was doing heroin, cocaine, meth, anything I could get my hands on, so I don't really remember. Exhibit D, Certified Record (C.R.) at D-25. Appellant conveniently omits that immediately after claiming he remembered nothing about the murder, Liverman stated, Wait a minute let me tell you the truth about this. Id. Liverman then proceeded to recount the events surrounding the shooting and also told police about the murder of Anthony D'Amore, another of Appellant's victims, discussed infra. If counsel had questioned Liverman about the initial comment, the Commonwealth could have rehabilitated him with the remainder of his statement. Consequently, we will not find counsel ineffective for failing to introduce this statement, as counsel's strategy had a reasonable basis designed to effectuate Appellant's interests. As previously noted, defense counsel forcefully cross-examined Liverman, portraying him as a habitual criminal who was high on drugs at the time of the murder. The mere fact that current counsel might have utilized an alternative strategy does not render the approach of trial counsel ineffective. Accordingly, the claim that defense counsel failed to adequately cross-examine Liverman fails. Appellant makes a similar claim of dereliction of duty with regard to counsel's cross-examination of Charles Russell (Russell). He asserts that counsel did next to nothing with Russell's initial statement to the police, taken shortly after the murder, in which he denied any knowledge of the events. Brief of Appellant at 15. Once again, a review of the record belies this claim. Indeed, defense counsel thoroughly queried Russell about his initial statement, his motives for denying knowledge of the crime, subsequent false statements he made to the police, and his eventual accurate recitation of the events surrounding the murder. N.T., 3/11/85, at 86-100. Thus, the record rebuts Appellant's allegations of ineffectiveness and this claim fails. Also baseless are Appellant's allegations of ineffectiveness founded upon the cross-examination of Robert Henderson (Henderson). Appellant does not explicate the precise grounds for his claim of ineffectiveness other than to state that counsel failed to adequately impeach Henderson regarding his criminal background. Appellant intimates that this failure was particularly egregious since Henderson was the only witness who could place Appellant near the crime scene. We find these contentions to be completely devoid of merit. Defense counsel's first question to Henderson concerned his arrest record, which elicited testimony that Henderson had been arrested at least fifteen times for numerous robberies and burglaries. N.T., 3/12/85, at 36. Counsel's cross-examination also exposed Henderson's drug use, his failure to report the murder, and numerous inconsistencies in his testimony. Id. at 37-90. Consequently, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that counsel did not adequately cross-examine Henderson. In his final claim that counsel abdicated his defense, Appellant asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to present the exculpatory testimony of three witnesses: David Paris, Natalie Dickerson, and Dewitt Poindexter. According to Appellant, all three individuals gave statements to the police in 1980 indicating that Appellant was not present in the garage near the shooting on the night in question. He faults trial counsel for failing to speak to these witnesses and for failing to present their testimony to the jury. When raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and prejudice requirements of the Strickland test by establishing that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (2009); Commonwealth v. Clark, 599 Pa. 204, 961 A.2d 80, 90 (2008). To demonstrate Strickland prejudice, a petitioner must show how the uncalled witnesses' testimony would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case. Commonwealth v. Gibson, 597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134 (2008). Thus, counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to call a witness unless the petitioner can show that the witness's testimony would have been helpful to the defense. Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305, 1319 (1996). A failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves matters of trial strategy. Id. As the PCRA court observed, Appellant has not  and cannot  show that the testimony of these witnesses would have been helpful to the defense. The statements on which Appellant relies are not exculpatory; rather, they demonstrate only that the witnesses in question possessed no knowledge about the shooting. Indeed, the prosecutor stated before the court: [T]here are copies of statements by other people that were inside the garage at 17th and Kater on the night that the event[s] surrounding the shooting began. Specifically, there are statements attributable to [David Paris, Natalie Dickerson, and Dewitt Poindexter]. All of them gave information saying that they didn't know anything. However, if [defense counsel] needs any of them to be present during his trial or during his part of the case ... I will of course make them available. N.T., 3/13/85, at 9-10 (emphasis added). Defense counsel responded, I have reviewed those copies of the statements ... and as part of our defense, we agreed that they would not be necessary to be introduced. Id. at 11. Counsel clarified that we referred to me and my client. Id. Since the statements do not exculpate Appellant, he has failed to show that the testimony of the uncalled witnesses would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case. Gibson, 951 A.2d at 1134. Thus, Appellant has not demonstrated prejudice. As such, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective, and the PCRA court did not err in denying this claim without a hearing.