Opinion ID: 354030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Swanson

Text: 26 Although Swanson testified to his own substantial involvement in the scheme, he insists there was insufficient evidence to find that he had the requisite intent to injure required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 876. Swanson did not see a copy of the extortion letter until a few days after it was mailed to the recipients, so the intent element must be inferred from Swanson's participation in events leading up to the mailing. There is substantial evidence from which the jury could infer that Swanson knew the type of scheme Phipps was planning. After his first telephone conversation with Phipps, Swanson described the scheme as blackmail. The employment letter from Phipps to Swanson contained a number of thinly veiled references to extortion. The letter advised Swanson that his job would be to collect money from citizens in LaGrange. He was to contact two others to participate also, but he was to avoid using his real name. The letter stated that the scheme was illegal. Swanson and the other bag men to be recruited by him were each to draw up a list of 25 prominent LaGrange men with families. The family requirement was especially stressed, and Swanson was further instructed to list the number of family members and their names. Finally, the letter stated: 27 If you are questioning our ability, let me assure you that we are Professionals and that we will make sure the clients are more than willing to pay us. 28 Swanson later sent his list of 25 men to a General Delivery address. He and Phipps discussed these names over the telephone, eliminating those without families and those that Swanson felt could not afford $1,000 per month. 29 The question of a defendant's knowledge of a threat to injure should be submitted to the jury if the evidence tends to show beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person knowing the context of the letter would interpret the extortion letter as a threat to injure. U. S. v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356 (CA4, 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 933, 94 S.Ct. 1447, 39 L.Ed.2d 491 (1974). The judge correctly decided that a reasonable person in Swanson's position would have realized the threatening nature of the scheme he was advancing. Once the issue was properly submitted to the jury, the jury was free to evaluate Swanson's credibility against the government's evidence. 30 The convictions are AFFIRMED.