Opinion ID: 201336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Considering Cheal's Ability To Pay When Ordering Restitution

Text: 82 Cheal argues, citing United States v. Haddock, 50 F.3d 835 (10th Cir.1995), that the district court erred by not reviewing her financial resources before deciding whether to order restitution and in what amount. Haddock, decided the year before Congress passed the MVRA, interpreted the MVRA's predecessor statute, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub.L. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248. The MVRA gives the court no discretion in ordering restitution in cases of fraud, see 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1), or in calculating the amount of restitution owed: 83 In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim's losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant. 84 Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A). See United States v. Chay, 281 F.3d 682, 686 (7th Cir.2002) (noting that the MVRA prohibits the court from examining the defendant's ability to pay restitution); United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F.3d 783, 784 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Alalade, 204 F.3d 536 (4th Cir.2000) (same); United States v. Myers, 198 F.3d 160, 168-69 (5th Cir.1999) (same); United States v. Coates, 178 F.3d 681, 683 (3d Cir.1999) (same). 85 The court may take a defendant's financial resources into account only insofar as they affect the manner in which, and the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid.... Id. § 3664(f)(2). Cheal did not object below to the repayment plan, and she does not do so now. In any event, § 3664(k) requires her to notify the court of any material change in the defendant's economic circumstances that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution. This provision accounts both for windfalls and for tighter times. Cheal remains subject to its strictures. 86 Affirmed.