Opinion ID: 806000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary Hearings in Habeas Proceedings

Text: Before reaching the information uncovered at the evidentiary hearing, we must address the State’s contention that the hearing itself was impermissible. The State argues, in light of Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011), that our remand for an evidentiary hearing on the ineffective-assistance issue was improper. In Pinholster, the Supreme Court explained “that evidence introduced in federal court has no bearing on § 2254(d)(1) review.” Id. at 1400. Instead, it h[e]ld that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits. Section 2254(d)(1) refers, in the past tense, to a state-court adjudication that “resulted in” a decision that was contrary to, or “involved” an unreasonable application of, established law. This backward- looking language requires an examination of the state-court decision at the time it was made. It follows that the record under review is limited to the record in existence at that same time i.e., the record before the state court. No. 11-1577 13 131 S. Ct. at 1398; see also Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In light of [Pinholster] we should not have ordered such a hearing insofar as Price was seeking relief under section 2254(d)(1).”). Pinholster does not apply to Mr. Toliver’s case because the Wisconsin courts never addressed whether Mr. Toliver’s counsel performed deficiently. Pinholster prohibits federal evidentiary hearings only on inquiries that are subject to AEDPA—that is, inquiries that the state courts have addressed. Accordingly, the district court properly received evidence on the unaddressed Strickland prong. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003). The same conclusion is true for the hearing on whether the prosecutor received Smith’s letter. The Wisconsin courts passed over that part of the inquiry and went directly to prejudice. Therefore, Pinholster’s restriction on evidentiary hearings under § 2254(d)(1) does not apply to Mr. Toliver. Pinholster itself anticipates this distinction in its discussion of § 2254(e)(2), which provides for federal evidentiary hearings when § 2254(d)(1) does not apply: Section 2254(e)(2) continues to have force where § 2254(d)(1) does not bar federal habeas relief. For example, not all federal habeas claims by state prisoners fall within the scope of § 2254(d), which applies only to claims “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.” At a minimum, there- fore, § 2254(e)(2) still restricts the discretion of federal habeas courts to consider new evidence 14 No. 11-1577 when deciding claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401; see James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 780, 803-04 (9th Cir. 2012); Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2012); Robinson v. Howes, 663 F.3d 819, 823 (6th Cir. 2011). An evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) was proper in this case because Mr. Toliver diligently tried to develop the facts of his two claims in state court. In his state appeal, the state trial court, which heard the appeal under a provision of Wisconsin law, see Toliver I, 539 F.3d at 771 & n.4, denied Mr. Toliver’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Instead, the trial court relied on the record from Mr. Toliver’s first appeal in 1993, even though Mr. Toliver had proceeded without counsel then. That record contained Angeal’s, Harvey’s and Smith’s affidavits, but no in-court testimony. Mr. Toliver complained about this issue in his subsequent appeal to the Wisconsin appellate court. Our colleagues on that court acknowledged that, with respect to the issue of whether the State had received the letter from Smith, the record was not developed, and they indicated that an evidentiary hearing would be necessary to resolve the issue. There was nothing else Mr. Toliver could have done to develop the factual record. Therefore, the federal evidentiary hearing was proper under § 2254. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (“If there has been no lack of diligence at the relevant stages in the state proceedings, the prisoner has not ‘failed to develop’ the facts under § 2254(e)(2)’s opening clause, and he will be No. 11-1577 15 excused from showing compliance with the balance of the subsection’s requirements.”); see also Dalton v. Battaglia, 402 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2005); Richardson v. Briley, 401 F.3d 794, 800 (7th Cir. 2005).