Opinion ID: 1658135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis of the public-interest privilege

Text: In this section, we address the fundamental question after Gertz: Should there be a qualified public-interest privilege applicable in cases involving nonpublic plaintiffs that is more protective than the constitutional minimum requirements now in place for publications involving both private and public persons? We answer that question in the negative and hereby adopt the Gertz negligence standard in such cases. We decline the opportunity to create further tests and standards to be applied in libel cases involving claims of a public-interest privilege, when the constitutional standard more than adequately addresses the policy concerns that prompted our formulation of the common-law privilege in the nineteenth century and that would militate in favor of one at this time were there inadequate constitutional protection. Our decision is in keeping with the majority of states that have considered this question, and comports with a careful balancing of the very weighty policy concerns that necessarily influence a decision in the area of libel privilege.
Our survey of states that have responded to the Gertz challenge indicate that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have expressly adopted the Gertz negligence standard as a matter of state law. [17] Eight states have assumed without discussion that Gertz represents the proper standard in cases involving private plaintiffs, and, in two states, federal courts have interpreted state law as having adopted Gertz. [18] By contrast, only four states have expressly adopted the Rosenbloom public-interest standard, [19] and one of those cases was a federal court's interpretation of state law. [20] New York has adopted neither the Gertz nor the Rosenbloom standard, opting instead for a gross-negligence standard. See Chapadeau v Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc, 38 NY2d 196; 379 NYS2d 61; 341 NE2d 569 (1975). The rationale most often given for adoption of a negligence standard is that first enunciated in Gertz, supra : [P]rivate individuals are more deserving of protection because, as a class, they are less likely to seek public attention and comment. Foster v Laredo Newspapers, Inc, 541 SW2d 809, 819 (Tex, 1976). The Supreme Court of Tennessee reasoned that only the Gertz negligence standard `recognizes that the special needs of the private plaintiff require a more stringent standard of liability than is imposed when the plaintiff is a public figure or official who has ready media access and has voluntarily assumed the risk of defamatory comment by placing himself in the public eye.' Memphis Publishing Co v Nichols, 569 SW2d 412, 418 (Tenn, 1978), quoting Note, State court reactions to Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc, 29 Vand L R 1431, 1444 (1976). State courts that have adopted a negligence standard also rely heavily on their own state constitutions as support for their decisions. [21] The state constitutions have been used most often as support for placing greater emphasis on privacy rights. See, e.g., Troman v Wood, 62 Ill 2d 184; 340 NE2d 292 (1975); Gobin v Globe Publishing Co, 216 Kan 223; 531 P2d 76 (1975); McCall v Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co, 623 SW2d 882 (Ky, 1981), cert den 456 US 975 (1982); Martin v Griffin Television, Inc, 549 P2d 85 (Okla, 1976); Gazette, Inc v Harris, 229 Va 1, 15; 325 SE2d 713 (1985); Denny v Mertz, 106 Wis 2d 636; 318 NW2d 141 (1982). In Troman, supra, p 195, the Illinois Supreme Court observed: The freedom of speech provisions ... recognize the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for they provide that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right. [See also Gobin, supra, pp 231-233.] The Kentucky Constitution was also found to mandate a standard which adequately protects the private individual from defamation. McCall, supra, p 886. In Martin, supra, p 92, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explicitly distinguished the language of the Oklahoma Constitution from that of the federal constitution. Like the previously mentioned state constitutions and our own, the free speech provision of the Oklahoma Constitution requires `[e]very person ... [to be] responsible for the abuse of that right....' Okla Const, art II, ง 22. The Martin court thus found the negligence standard to be more parallel with the Oklahoma Constitution. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also concluded that its state constitution does not provide for broader free press rights than does the federal constitution. Denny, supra, p 655, n 27. [22] Other state courts relied on state statutes or the common law as justification for adopting the negligence standard for private-person-plaintiff cases. See Phillips v Evening Star Newspaper Co, supra ; Troman, supra, pp 194-196; Denny, supra, p 656. At least one state court perceived practical advantages in adopting the negligence standard. The application of the negligence standard in tort cases is so well established that juries can safely be expected to comprehend the term when applied in defamation cases. Nor is the negligence standard unknown to common law defamation. [ Jacron Sales Co, Inc v Sindorf, 276 Md 580, 596; 350 A2d 688 (1976).] A final, and perhaps most significant, reason for state court rejection of anything but a negligence standard emanates from the courts' understanding and interpretation of public policy. See Miami Herald Publishing Co v Ane, 423 So 2d 376, 387 (Fla App, 1982); Cahill v Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp, 56 Hawaii 522, 533-534; 543 P2d 1356 (1975); Troman, supra, pp 194-196 (Illinois); Gobin, supra, pp 231-233 (Kansas); Stone v Essex Co Newspapers, Inc, 367 Mass 849, 856-857; 330 NE2d 161 (1975); Seegmiller v KSL, Inc, 626 P2d 968, 973 (Utah, 1981); Taskett v King Broadcasting Co, 86 Wash 2d 439, 448-450; 546 P2d 81 (1976); Denny, supra, p 656 (Wisconsin). The nonconstitutional policies cited by state courts are numerous, but, generally, the courts tend to focus on the seriousness of the injury to the allegedly defamed party. The Florida Supreme Court, for example, stressed the important role that the defamation action plays in a free society. [It] represents the individual's sole remedy against the occasional excesses of the print and electronic media which often have vast resources to inflict untoward damage upon an individual. Surely, a decent, open society cannot, in the name of press and speech freedom, so thoroughly undermine this remedy as to render it useless to those people who have been damaged by a defamatory falsehood negligently uttered in the mass media and have not in any way sought the public lime-light. [ Miami Herald, supra, p 387.] The Massachusetts Supreme Court likewise emphasized the state's interest in the individual's reputational protection, for this `reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being โ a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' Stone, supra, p 858, quoting Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 US 75, 92; 86 S Ct 669; 15 L Ed 2d 597 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Utah court equated freedom from defamation with freedom from physical violence. [W]e recognize that the integrity of an individual's reputation is essential to his standing in society, in his vocation, and even in his family. It may indeed be indispensable to one's sense of self-worth. The dignity of virtually every human being depends in part upon his right to be known as the person he truly is. For centuries it has been recognized that an assault upon a person's character may be far more damaging and long-lasting than an assault upon his person. Indeed, freedom from false attacks on one's personality may be viewed as at least as essential to ordered liberty as freedom from physical abuse. [ Seegmiller, supra, p 973.] The courts employed these policies and reasons for distinguishing between public and private individuals. Offering the protection of privilege to all matters of public interest is often said to be too broad an extension of a free press privilege. The Illinois court noted the infrequency of recoveries for actual malice and the fact that [w]hether a matter is one of public interest, ... depends to some degree on whether the media themselves have chosen to make it one. [ Troman, supra, p 196.] The Hawaii court envisioned the negligence standard as one way to make defaming publishers less willing to speak due to the risk of being found negligent. Cahill, supra, p 533. Those states adopting a Rosenbloom public interest-related standard relied most heavily on the constitutional arguments advanced by the Rosenbloom plurality, striking the balance in favor of free speech. See, e.g., Walker v Colorado Springs Sun, Inc, 188 Colo 86; 538 P2d 450 (1975), cert den sub nom Woestendiek v Walker, 423 US 1025 (1975); Diversified Management, Inc v Denver Post, Inc, 653 P2d 1103 (Colo, 1982); AAFCO Heating & Air Conditioning Co v Northwest Publications, Inc, supra . While we appreciate the concerns articulated by the courts adopting the Rosenbloom standard, we find the balance struck by the United States Supreme Court in its development of the constitutional privilege to be sufficiently protective of free speech and provides the publisher with more than adequate sanctuary from the cruel dilemma we referred to in Lawrence, supra, p 137.
There are several tension lines along which, to some extent, the original tort-law qualified privileges were developed and along which the United States Supreme Court struggled in developing the latter-day First Amendment privileges. They are basically: the need to balance a free flow of information and ideas necessary to our concept of freedom and democracy with the traditional right of the individual to redress harm to reputation, and the effect of privilege on public versus private figures. These fundamental principles and the conflicts between them have been eloquently expressed in New York Times and its progeny. Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.... [ New York Times, supra, p 270.]    The protection of the public requires not merely discussion, but information. [ Id., p 272.]    The right of free public discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental principle of the American form of government. [ Id., pp 274-275.] The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters. [ Philadelphia Newspapers, supra, 89 L Ed 2d 794 (quoting Gertz ).] These concerns are similar to those that we articulated in Lawrence: There is no need, at this date in our history, to urge that it is necessary to free institutions that the press itself be free. Today it is. The real issue before us is how free. Governmental interference is not the only threat to its freedom. On the contrary, a narrow or restrictive interpretation of the law of privilege in libel actions is equally dangerous. [ Id., p 137.] We find that the constitutional privilege that has evolved in the time period since Lawrence is neither narrow nor restrictive. Rather, it has equitably balanced the public's need to know with the individual's right to privacy. As the Court noted in Gertz : [T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues. [ New York Times, p 270.] They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. [ Gertz, supra, p 340.] Especially in cases involving the interests of private individuals, the balancing process must not abandon the legitimate need to redress reputational injuries. As Justice Marshall expressed it, The protection of the reputation of such anonymous persons from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being โ a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. ... But the concept of a citizenry informed by a free and unfettered press is also basic to our system of ordered liberty. Here these two essential and fundamental values conflict. [ Rosenbloom, supra, p 78 (dissent).] In concurrence in Rosenbloom, Justice White emphasized that the policies supporting the New York Times standard were much less applicable in cases involving private persons. [23] Similarly, the Gertz majority concluded that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them. [ Id., p 343.]