Opinion ID: 885373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 11 Were the District Court's findings sufficiently specific to support its award of long-term custody of T.Z. and J.Z. to DPHHS with the right to assign custody to the children's grandmother? ¶ 12 Christina contends that when the District Court granted DPHHS long-term legal custody, it did so based on evidence offered in support of the petition to terminate parental rights and that there was insufficient evidence to support long-term custody. She argues that the District Court based its decision on law applicable to termination of her parental rights, not § 41-3-412, MCA, the statute for long-term custody. ¶ 13 The State responds that the youth in need of care statutes give the district court broad discretion to act in the children's best interest and to make certain that children who are unable to return to their parents do not remain in temporary foster care. ¶ 14 A natural parent's right to custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest, which must be protected by fundamentally fair procedures. In re J.N., ¶ 12. However, if the State follows fundamentally fair procedures, the State can divest a parent of custody. Section 41-3-406(5), MCA, provides in part: Before the expiration of the order for temporary legal custody, the county attorney, the attorney general, or an attorney hired by the county shall petition for one of the following: (b) termination of the parent-child legal relationship and either; [or] (c) long-term custody pursuant to 41-3-412; The procedure for termination of the parent-child legal relationship is set forth in § 41-3-601, MCA, et. seq. The procedure for long-term custody is set forth in § 41-3-412, MCA, which provides in part: (6) If the permanency plan hearing results in a finding that reunification of the child with the child's parent or guardian is not in the best interests of the child, a subsequent petition filed must be one of the following: .... (c) long-term custody of a child if the evidence demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence, which is reflected in specific findings by the court, that: (i) the child has an emotional or mental handicap that is so severe that the child cannot function in a family setting and the best interests of the child are served by placement in a residential or group setting; (ii) the child is at least 16 years of age and is participating in an independent living program and that termination of parental rights is not in the best interests of the child; (iii) the child's parent is incarcerated and circumstances, including placement of the child and continued, frequent contact with the parent, indicate that it would not be in the best interests of the child to terminate parental rights of that parent; (iv) the child is in a group of siblings, at least one of whom meets the requirements of subsections (6)(c)(v)(A) through (6)(c)(v)(D), and the best interests of the child will be met by continued placement in the sibling group in long-term foster care; or (v) the child is at least 12 years of age and meets the following criteria: (A) the child has been adjudicated a youth in need of care; (B) the department has made reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and child, further efforts by the department would likely be unproductive, and reunification of the child with the parent or guardian would be contrary to the best interests of the child; (C) termination of parental rights to the child is not in the child's best interests; and (D) the child has been in a placement in which the foster parent has committed to the long-term care and to a relationship with the child, and it is in the best interests of the child to remain in that placement. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 15 The narrow issue in this case is whether the District Court's findings were sufficiently specific pursuant to § 41-3-412(6)(c)(v), MCA. Christina does not contend that the District Court's findings are erroneous. ¶ 16 The District Court found that J.Z. and T.Z. were youths in need of care on November 1, 1996. The District Court found that DPHHS developed treatment plans for Christina; that Cook warned her that the last treatment plan was her last chance; and that Christina has been given many chances to straighten herself out and retain custody of her children. The District Court also found that continuation of the parent/child legal relationship will likely result in continued abuse or neglect if the children are returned to Christina, and that the conduct and condition of Christina renders her unfit, unable and unwilling to give the children adequate parental care. These findings are sufficiently specific with respect to § 41-3-412(6)(c)(v)(A) and (B), MCA, to satisfy the specific findings requirement of § 41-3-412(6)(c), MCA. ¶ 17 Although the District Court found that it was not in J.Z. and T.Z.'s best interest to live with Christina it found that it would be in the best interest of the children if their mother were allowed to visit with them. This finding is sufficiently specific with respect to § 41-3-412(6)(c)(v)(C), MCA. ¶ 18 Finally, the District Court found that since J.Z. and T.Z. began living with Potter, they improved in school and became more socially involved. The District Court also found that Potter's home was thoroughly reviewed by the State of Idaho and that Potter is willing to act as the children's guardian. This finding is sufficiently specific with respect to § 41-3-412(6)(c)(v)(D), MCA. Accordingly, we hold the District Court's findings were sufficiently specific to support its award of long-term custody of T.Z. and J.Z. to DPHHS with the right to assign custody to the children's grandmother, Potter.