Opinion ID: 793247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for Firm Resettlement Findings

Text: 10 In general, we review an IJ's findings of fact for substantial evidence, see, e.g., Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir.2005), and the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). We agree with the conclusion of our sister circuits that the substantial evidence standard applies when reviewing findings of firm resettlement. See, e.g., Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.2005); Salazar v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir.2004); Diallo v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir.2004); Elzour v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 1143, 1150-51 (10th Cir.2004); Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 611-12 (8th Cir.2004); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483 (3d Cir.2001); Mussie v. INS, 172 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir.1999). 11 Our sister circuits have diverged, however, as to what constitutes firm resettlement as a matter of law. According to the relevant regulation, 12 [a]n alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival in the United States, he or she entered into another country with, or while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement .... 13 8 C.F.R. § 208.15 (emphasis supplied). In some circuits, absent an offer of some kind of permanent resettlement, firm resettlement is not demonstrated. See Diallo, 381 F.3d at 694-95; Abdille, 242 F.3d at 486. Even in circuits hewing closely to the regulation, however, an extended, undisturbed residence in a third country creates a presumption of firm resettlement that will satisfy the definition. Maharaj v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir.2005) (citing Cheo v. INS, 162 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir.1998)). 14 Other circuits have adopted a broader conception of firm resettlement by applying a totality of the alien's circumstances test. See Mussie, 172 F.3d at 331-32 (denying petition for review upon a finding of firm resettlement in part based on six-year stay in third country, receipt of government assistance, and renting of personal apartment); Abdalla v. INS, 43 F.3d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir.1994) (considering family ties); Farbakhsh v. INS, 20 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir.1994) (listing factors relevant to determination of firm resettlement, such as family ties and business or property connections) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chinese Am. Civil Council v. Att'y Gen., 566 F.2d 321, 326 (D.C.Cir.1977) (finding Chinese asylum applicants had firmly resettled during lengthy stay in Hong Kong); but see Diallo, 381 F.3d at 695 (rejecting the now outdated `totality of the circumstances' analysis). 15 We are convinced by the reasoning of those circuits that have applied the totality of the circumstances test for two reasons. First, as discussed below, the plain language of the regulation supports this understanding of firm resettlement. Second, the underlying purpose of asylum regulations—to provide refuge to desperate refugees who reach our shores with nowhere else to turn—accords with reserving the grant of asylum for those applicants without alternative places of refuge abroad, regardless of whether a formal offer of permanent settlement has been received. 16 The regulation states that one is firmly resettled if prior to arrival in the United States he has received, an offer of permanent resident status, citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement.... 8 C.F.R. § 208.15. By its terms, the regulation places particular importance on the presence vel non of an actual offer of permanent resident status issued by an intermediate third country prior to arrival in the United States. While permanent resident status has an analog in American law, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 101.1, as of course does citizenship, the regulation presumably refers to some other type of permanent resettlement so that foreign statutes not precisely analogous to United States immigration provisions could be recognized by IJs evaluating whether an applicant has firmly resettled. Because not every nation employs an immigration regime as elaborate as that of the United States, offers of some other type of permanent resettlement may not always include written documentation, much less formal state-issued identification cards. The language of the regulation therefore also requires an IJ to examine the specific circumstances of an applicant's case to decide whether he has firmly resettled in a third country. 5 17 Additionally, the purpose guiding this country's asylum regulations supports the result compelled by the regulatory language. The United States offers asylum to refugees not to provide them with a broader choice of safe homelands, but rather, to protect those arrivals with nowhere else to turn. This purpose is borne out, among other places, in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), which exempts from the general rule allowing any alien physically present in the United States to apply for asylum those aliens who could be removed to a [s]afe third country.