Opinion ID: 2293977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Damage to Your Work

Text: Property damage to your work arising out of it or any part of it and included in the products-completed operations hazard. The policy defines your work as [w]ork or operations performed by you or on your behalf and [m]aterials or equipment furnished in connection with such work operations. It also includes [w]arranties or representations made at any time with respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of `your work.' Thus, the your work exclusion is triggered only if (1) the damage at issue is to work performed by you and is caused by work performed by you, and (2) the damage is included in the products-completed operations hazard. The policy defines products-completed operations hazard, in relevant part, as: [A]ll bodily injury and property damage occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of your product or your work except: (1) Products that are still in your physical possession; or (2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned. However, your work will be deemed completed at the earliest of the following times: (a) When all of the work called for in your contract has been completed. (b) When all of the work to be done at the job site has been completed if your contract calls for work at more than one job site. (c) When that part of the work done at a job site has been put to its intended use by any person or organization other than another contractor or subcontractor working on the same project. Work that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement, but which is otherwise complete, will be treated as completed. According to this language, damage falls within the products-completed operations hazard only if the damage is to work that has been completed, as defined by the clause. See Mosser Const., Inc. v. The Travelers Indem., 430 Fed.Appx. 417, 418 (6th Cir.2011). Therefore, the second requirement of the your work exclusion requires the work to be completed. This leads to the conclusion that your work does have a limitation in that it contemplates discrete jobs that have an endpoint. Indeed, the policy provides a detailed explanation of when your work shall be deemed completed. Although this explanation is contained in the products-completed operations hazard definition and not in the your work definition, it is nevertheless germane to the meaning of your work because the products-completed operations hazard is an explicit element of the exclusion itself. We thus hold that the your work exclusion does not uniformly apply to all work ever performed by you, but rather excludes coverage on a job-by-job basis, with individual jobs being demarcated by their completion as explained in the products-completed operations hazard. Accordingly, the your work exclusion does not necessarily exclude coverage in a situation where an insured's work causes damage to something the insured had previously constructed. If the previous work has been completed, then it is not part of the work at issuethe current work that caused the damage to the previous workand thus the damage would not be excluded under the your work exclusion. This interpretation is supported by the your work definition itself. Your work explicitly includes [w]arranties or representations made at any time.  This at any time language is conspicuously absent from the first portion of the definition work or operations performed by you. Had Concord Group intended your work to mean work performed at any time without regard to completed jobs, it could have included that language in the relevant part of the definition. See State v. McDonald, 163 N.H. 115, 127, 35 A.3d 605 (2011) (The legislature could have permitted the use of deadly force against any `aggravated felonious sexual assault' by using that term in the self-defense statute. Indeed, the legislature has used the specific phrase `aggravated felonious sexual assault' in other statutes.). Thus, for the purpose of Spencer's 2007 repairs under the your work exclusion, Spencer's work only includes his 2007 repairs, not his original construction work in 2003. The 2003 construction was a separate act, distinct from the 2007 repair, and the 2003 construction was evidently completed in 2003. As such, if the damage at issue was caused by Spencer's 2007 repair, the your work exclusion would exclude coverage for damage to that repair, but would not exclude coverage for damage to Spencer's 2003 work. On the other hand, if the damage at issue was caused by Spencer's 2003 original construction, the your work exclusion would exclude coverage for any damage to that construction, which would apparently foreclose any possibility of coverage. The question of whether the damage in 2009 was caused by the 2003 original construction or the 2007 repair is, therefore, a material question of fact. Furthermore, to the extent that the trial court may have ruled that the damage originated with the 2003 construction, it erred. At the summary judgment stage, all evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 151 N.H. at 652, 864 A.2d 368. The party opposing summary judgment must put forth contradictory evidence under oath sufficient to indicate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Phillips v. Verax Corp., 138 N.H. 240, 243, 637 A.2d 906 (1994). Here, plaintiff Marc Brown's deposition testimony indicates that the ice and water shield applied by Spencer in 2007 may have actually exacerbated the problem by trapping water in the wall. His testimony also indicates that Spencer's failure to properly repair the wall caused water to continue infiltrating and damaging the wall. Thus, the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to indicate that a genuine issue of material fact existed. We now turn to the issue of whether there was an occurrence in this case. The policy provides coverage only for damage caused by an occurrence. It is well-established that to constitute an occurrence, the damage at issue must have been to property other than Spencer's work product. See Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Green & Co. Bldg. & Dev. Corp., 160 N.H. 690, 693, 8 A.3d 24 (2010). The policy, however, merely defines occurrence as an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions. It gives no indication as to whether work product means all the work Spencer has ever done. Given that the explicit text of the policy contemplates separate work, we hold that, for the purpose of determining whether there was an occurrence, work product also means discrete jobs demarcated by their completion. Therefore, Spencer's 2003 work and his 2007 work are separate work products. Accordingly, the factual dispute as to whether the damage was caused by the 2007 repair work or the 2003 original construction of the house is material to whether the damage was caused by an occurrence. If the 2007 work caused damage to the 2003 work, then the damage was caused by an occurrence because the 2007 work is not the same work product as the 2003 work. Conversely, if the damage at issue was actually caused by the 2003 work, then it was not caused by an occurrence because the damage was not to a separate work product. We therefore hold that it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment to Concord Group because what caused the damagethe 2003 work or the 2007 workis a genuine issue of fact material to whether the policy provides coverage in this case. Reversed and remanded.