Opinion ID: 1890795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Right to confront witnesses face-to-face

Text: Lastly, Appellant complains that the physical layout of the courtroom precluded him from being able to confront the witnesses face-to-face. See Ky. Const. § 11 (In all criminal prosecutions the accused has the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.). See also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988) (We have never doubted, therefore, that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.). The courtroom was set up in such a way that made it difficult, if not impossible, for anyone seated in the witness stand to see Appellant, who was seated at the table with his defense counsel. This became apparent during the testimony of both Geraldine Litton and Willie Sparks, who had to physically leave the witness stand in order to identify Appellant for the record. At the same time, Appellant, when seated at defense table, was unable to view the testifying witness. Appellant's trial counsel apparently declined an offer to move about the courtroom to alleviate this problem prior to trial. Eventually, defense counsel agreed to use a television monitor located at defense table, which allowed Appellant to view the witness. Though taking this accommodation, defense counsel repeated his objection, stating that he believed there was a confrontation issue due to Appellant being unable to physically face the witnesses. Appellant points to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990), which sets forth a test delineating those times when the right to face-to-face confrontation may be excused. Craig states that a defendant's right to confront accusatory witnesses may be satisfied absent a physical, face-to-face confrontation at trial only where denial of such confrontation is necessary to further an important public policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. Id. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157. See also Coy v. Iowa, supra . We agree with Appellant that the physical layout of the courtroom produced a Confrontation Clause violation, and we must now determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sparkman v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 667 (Ky. 2008). The problem with Appellant's reliance on Craig and Coy , however, is that those two cases involved fundamentally different scenarios than that which is present here. The basic facts of this case are not in dispute. The record is clear that Appellant admitted to shooting Jeff Mattox, Geraldine Litton, and Billy Proctor. While face-to-face confrontation is preferred, it is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right. Craig, 497 U.S. at 847, 110 S.Ct. 3157. The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact. Id. at 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157. Indeed, faceto-face confrontation enhances the accuracy of factfinding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent person. Id. at 846, 110 S.Ct. 3157. In Sparkman , this Court was confronted with a similar issue. There, the prosecutor stood between the defendant and two testifying child witnesses during direct examination. Though finding a Confrontation Clause violation, this Court held that the error was harmless. Sparkman, 250 S.W.3d at 671. Much like in this case, the basic facts were uncontroverted, with the only differences between the testimony of Appellant and the victim [being] the manner in which Appellant was alleged to have entered the victim's house and the number of times he struck the victim. Id. at 670. Arguably, the violation in that case was more severe than what we find here today, as there was some factual dispute. Unlike Sparkman , the evidence in this case was not predicated upon a he-said, she-said description of the events occurring on September 18, 2006. To the contrary, the sole issue in contention in this case was whether Appellant was criminally responsible for his actions. A determination of prejudicial error by this Court would require some showing that Appellant's unobstructed observation would have affected the substance and credibility of the ... witnesses. Id. at 671. In this case, Appellant has made no such showing. Accordingly, we believe that the error was harmless. We note, however, that trial judges are courting with danger by tolerating any kind of courtroom arrangement which impedes eye-to-eye contact between the defendant and witnesses. In this case, as in Sparkman , it did not loom critical, but in the next case it might. For the reasons stated herein, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Johnson Circuit Court. All sitting. All concur.