Opinion ID: 870455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Merits of Kaleikini's Appeal

Text: As quoted supra, Kaleikini presents three questions to this court for decision; however, all three questions center around the issue whether the circuit court erred in dismissing Kaleikini's agency appeal on jurisdictional grounds. As previously stated, the circuit court dismissed Kaleikini's agency appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Kaleikini did not participate in a contested case hearing. On application, Kaleikini contends that the circuit court, in so doing, erred because [t]his court[ ] has, in three cases, stated that a chapter 91 appeal to the circuit court is the correct procedure to challenge an agency's denial of a request for a contested case hearing (if a right to a contested case exists and proper procedures are followed). (Citing Mortensen v. Board of Trustees of Emp. Ret. Syst., 52 Haw. 212, 473 P.2d 866 (1970), Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai`i 64, 881 P.2d 1210 (1994), and PASH ). The right to appeal is purely statutory and exists only when jurisdiction is given by some constitutional or statutory provision. Lingle v. Hawai'i Gov't. Employees Ass'n, 107 Hawai`i 178, 184, 111 P.3d 587, 593 (2005). HRS § 91-14 confers jurisdiction on the circuit court to review final decision[s] and order[s] in [ ] contested case[s]. As previously quoted, HRS § 91-14 provides in relevant part that: (a) Any person aggrieved by a final decision and order in a contested case or by a preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter; but nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent resort to other means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo, including the right of trial by jury, provided by law. Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary, for the purposes of this section, the term person aggrieved shall include an agency that is a party to a contested case proceeding before that agency or another agency. (Emphasis added.) In dismissing the agency appeal, the circuit court relied exclusively on this court's decision in Kaniakapupu. Specifically, the circuit court stated: Because, as I have read ... Kaniakapupu ... affirming [the circuit c]ourt's decision that [it] lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction because there was no contested case hearing decision appealed from, it's clear that while you're appealing the decision not to give a contested case, obviously there hasn't been one. In other words, the circuit court determined that it did not have jurisdiction over Kaleikini's agency appeal, brought pursuant to HRS § 91-14, because she did not participate in a contested case hearing. On direct appeal, Kaleikini submitted that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of Kaniakapupu and extended the holding of that case too far inasmuch as Kaniakapupu merely stands for the proposition that the circuit court does not have jurisdiction [where] no `contested case' hearing [is] required by law. Kaleikini asserts that the circuit court should have, instead, looked at the framework set forth by this court in PASH to determine whether it had jurisdiction to review the denial of a request for a contested case hearing. Inasmuch as the circuit court's ruling was based primarily on Kaniakapupu, we first address the applicability of that case to the facts presented here.
In Kaniakapupu, landowners of a parcel of land petitioned the Land Use Commission (LUC) to amend the land use district boundary on the parcel of land from conservation district to urban district. 111 Hawai`i at 126, 139 P.3d at 714. The landowners indicated that they sought reclassification of the property to enable them to subdivide the [p]roperty, construct both replacement and new houses on the [p]roperty, and make such other repair and improvements of the existing units in a manner ordinarily and customarily allowed for urban residential uses and thereby provide house lots or homes for their children. Id. A hearing was held before the LUC, and, thereafter, the LUC entered FOFs, COLS, and a decision and order, approving the reclassification. Id. In its FOFs, the LUC found that the landowners, in order to provide reasonable assurance to the LUC that the proposed development is a family enterprise to provide housing for the family members and not a commercial enterprise for speculation, ... represented that they [were] willing to be subjected to a condition that members of the families... would have a right of first refusal to purchase if any interest in the [p]roperty were sought to be sold. Id. (original brackets omitted). Thus, the LUC imposed a condition on the landowners that, should they desire to sell or convey ownership of all or portions of the property, [they] shall first offer such interest to the other or in the alternative convey such interest to any of [their] children, as the case may be. Id. (original emphasis omitted). Kaniakapuputhe historic ruins of the royal summer cottage of Kamehameha III is located on property owned by the State that shares a common boundary with, and is situated approximately 200 to 300 feet from, the [reclassified property]. Id. at 126-27, 139 P.3d at 714-15. Approximately eleven years after the LUC approved reclassification of the property, a Hui [20] was formed in order to `care for and serve as a steward of Kaniakapupu.' Id. at 126, 139 P.3d at 714. Thereafter, the Hui sought to have the LUC issue an order to show cause [(OSC)] as to why the classification of the [property] should not be reverted to conservation district, contending that one of the landowners had violated the condition imposed by the LUC inasmuch as she listed portions of the property for sale to the public. Id. at 127, 139 P.3d at 715. The Hui additionally requested that a hearing be held, pursuant to HAR § 15-15-70(c) (governing motions practice), on its motion for an OSC. Id. The LUC held a hearing on the Hui's motion for an OSC [hereinafter, motion hearing] and, thereafter, denied it on the basis that the Hui had not met its burden of demonstrating a failure to perform a condition, representation, or commitment on the part of the landowners. Id. at 128, 139 P.3d at 716. The Hui filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court and, after briefing by the parties, the circuit court dismissed the Hui's appeal for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 129, 131, 139 P.3d at 717, 719. More specifically, the circuit court found that the LUC did not hold a contested case hearing.... If the motion for an [OSC] had been granted, then a contested case hearing would have been required. .... The [circuit] court concludes that the requirement in HRS § 91-14 that the order appealed from arise from a contested case hearing, has not been met. As such, this court lacks jurisdiction to reach the issue of whether a contested case hearing was required. See Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai`i 64, 69 n. 10, 881 P.2d 1210, 1215 n. 10 (1994). This court can only dismiss the appeal and therefore does so. Id. (original brackets omitted) (format altered). The Hui appealed the circuit court's decision to this court. Id. at 131, 139 P.3d at 719. At the outset, this court set forth the applicable law, stating that: HRS § 91-14(a) provides the means by which judicial review of administrative contested cases can be obtained. Among its prerequisites, the section requires that a contested case must have occurred before appellate jurisdiction may be exercised. Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai`i 64, 67, 881 P.2d 1210, 1213 (1994) (citation omitted). HRS § 91-1(5) (1993) defines a contested case as a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing. HRS § 91-1(6) (1993), in turn, defines an agency hearing as such hearing held by an agency immediately prior to a judicial review of a contested case as provided in section 91-14. Thus, [a] contested case is an agency hearing that [(]1) is required by law and [(]2) determines the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties.  [ PASH ], 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d [at] 1252 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id. at 132, 139 P.3d at 720 (emphasis added). In applying the above test, the Kaniakapupu court explained that the Hui's motion for an [OSC] was essentially a threshold motion or procedural vehicle to obtain a show cause hearing in order for the LUC to determine the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Id. at 134, 139 P.3d at 722 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Kaniakapupu court held that, although the motion hearing was required by law, i.e., not discretionary and mandated by HAR § 15-15-70(i), it did not determine the rights, duties, or privileges of the parties because the hearing merely addressed whether a not a contested case hearing was required regarding the Hui's motion to show cause. Id. at 133-34, 139 P.3d at 721-22. The Kaniakapupu court, however, acknowledged the argument raised by the Hui that, if the circuit court has no jurisdiction to determine if an appellant were entitled to a contested case hearing after having requested one, any agency could arbitrarily and capriciously deny anyone a hearing at any time, regardless of whether such hearing were required by law, and the aggrieved party could never obtain judicial review of such denial. Id. at 137, 139 P.3d at 725 (original brackets omitted). Nevertheless, this court held such argument was without merit, indicating that the Hui did not request a contested case hearing and emphasizing that, [i]ndeed, the Hui concede[d] that there is no procedural vehicle for `any party or interested person' to obtain a contested case hearing on whether a petitioner has failed to perform according to the conditions imposed or has failed to perform according to the representations or commitments she made. Id. (original brackets and some internal quotation marks omitted). Here, unlike in Kaniakapupu, there is a procedural vehicle for `any party or interested person' to obtain a contested case, i.e., HAR § 13-300-51, and Kaleikini did request a contested case hearing pursuant to that rule. Indeed, it is undisputed, as discussed more fully infra, that Kaleikini followed the procedures set forth for requesting a contested case hearing. [21] Thus, Kaniakapupu is distinguishable from the instant case on that ground. [22] As such, the appropriate inquiry here is whether Kaleikini has met the requirements of HRS § 91-14. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252 (indicating that the necessary inquiry was whether the appellant met the requirements of HRS § 91-14).
In PASH, we described the requirements of HRS § 91-14 as follows: first, the proceeding that resulted in the unfavorable agency action must have been a contested case hearing i.e., a hearing that was [(]1) required by law and [(]2) determined the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties; second, the agency's action must represent a final decision and order, or a preliminary ruling such that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of adequate relief; third, the claimant must have followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, have been involved in the contested case; and finally, the claimant's legal interests must have been injured i.e., the claimant must have standing to appeal. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252 (bold emphases added). We, therefore, examine each of the PASH requirements.
In order for an agency hearing to be `required by law,' it may be required by (1) agency rule, (2) statute, or (3) constitutional due process. Kaniakapupu, 111 Hawai`i at 132, 139 P.3d at 720. On direct appeal, Kaleikini argued that both HRS § 6E-43(c)[, quoted supra note 6,] and constitutional rights mandated that [she] be granted her request for a contested case hearing. In Bush v. Hawaiian Homes Commission, 76 Hawai`i 128, 870 P.2d 1272 (1994), this court stated: If the statute or rule governing the activity in question does not mandate a hearing prior to the administrative agency's decision-making, the actions of the administrative agency are not required by law and do not amount to a final decision or order in a contested case from which a direct appeal to circuit court is possible. 76 Hawai`i at 134, 870 P.2d at 1278. In other words, pursuant to HRS § 91-14, in order for proceedings before an agency to constitute a contested case from which an appeal can be maintained, the agency must be required by law to hold a hearing before a decision is rendered. Lingle, 107 Hawai`i at 184, 111 P.3d at 593. Here, HRS § 6E-43(c), as previously quoted, provides that determinations [by the OIBC] may be administratively appealed to a panel composed of three council chairpersons and three members from [BLNR] as a contested case pursuant to chapter 91. In turn, HAR § 13-300-51(a), as previously quoted, states that: When required by law, the appeals panel shall hold a contested case hearing upon timely written petition of any person who is aggrieved by [an OIBC] determination to preserve in place or relocate Native Hawaiian skeletal remains and any burial goods from a previously identified burial site and who is properly admitted as a party pursuant to section 13-300-54. (Emphases added). On direct appeal, DLNR argued that the statutory scheme did not mandate a contested case hearing because a contested case can occur only if the BLNR chairperson determines that one is required. The applicable rules do not provide an absolute right to such a hearing. See Bush, 76 Hawai`i at 135, 870 P.2d at 1279. In this case, [the BLNR chairperson], who had wide administrative discretion to determine the validity of a particular claim and [was] not required to hold a contested case hearing[,] [i ] d., determined that based on factual and legal grounds a contested case was not required and denied appellant's request for one. Accordingly, a contested case could not have occurred and did not occur. (Bold emphasis added.) (Emphasis and some brackets in original.) (Record citation omitted.) In support of its contention that a contested case can occur only if the BLNR chairperson determines that one is required, DLNR points to HAR § 13-300-53, which states: After a determination is made by the presiding officer [23] that a contested case hearing is required, the written notice of hearing shall be served by the [DLNR] upon the parties[.] DLNR, relying on Bush, further maintains that the BLNR chairperson has wide administrative discretion to determine the validity of a particular claim and [was] not required to hold a contested case hearing. Bush, 76 Hawai`i at 135, 870 P.2d at 1279. In our view, DLNR's reliance on Bush is misplaced. In that case, the appellants, who were native Hawaiian lessees pursuant to the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA), took an appeal from a denial of their request for judicial review of the Hawaiian Homes Commission's (Commission) approval of third party agreements (TPAs) between non-Hawaiian farmers and native Hawaiian lessees pursuant to the HHCA. 76 Hawai`i at 131, 870 P.2d at 1275. In December 1987, some appellants appeared before the Commission to contest the validity of the TPAs as violative of the HHCA provision prohibiting transfer of the native Hawaiian lessees' interest in the land. Id. at 132, 870 P.2d at 1276. Upon determining that the TPAs, when properly executed, did not violate the provisions of the HHCA, the Commission caused the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (DHHL) to notify all lessees that, if they intended to enter into a TPA, they must obtain written approval from the Commission in accordance with HAR § 10-3-35, entitled Contracts covering lease lands. Id. Four days before the Commission planned to consider the written submissions of a number of lessees, the appellants, in accordance with HAR § 10-5-31, quoted infra, petitioned for a contested case hearing. Id. Ultimately, the Commission approved the TPAs submitted by the lessees and denied the appellants' request for a contested case hearing. Id. at 133, 870 P.2d at 1277. The appellants appealed both agency decisions to the circuit court. Id. Upon motion by the Commission, the circuit court dismissed the appeal based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Thereafter, the appellants timely appealed to this court. Id. In determining whether a contested case was required by law, the Bush court looked to the administrative regulations at issue and determined that the regulations dictate[d] the appropriate procedure to follow in petitioning for a contested case but at the same time accord[ed] the Commission wide discretion in deciding whether to grant the petition. Id. at 135, 870 P.2d at 1279. Specifically, the HAR at issueHAR §§ 10-5-31 and 10-5-32stated in relevant part that: § 10-5-31 Contested case hearing requests. (a) Any person or agency including the commission and the department may request a contested case hearing and shall have the right and full opportunity to assert a claim provided that the claim is based on a law or rule over which the commission has jurisdiction. .... (c) Upon receipt of the complaint, the department shall initiate an investigation of the matters contained in the complaint. The complaint shall be presented within a reasonable time to the commission, together with investigator's report and staff recommendation and on the basis thereof the commission shall determine whether proceedings shall be initiated and the matter set for hearing. (d) It is the policy of the commission not to initiate proceedings where the matters complained of involve a private controversy redressable in the courts and where the public interest is not involved, or where it is clear on the face of the complaint that there has been no violation of the law or any rule of the commission. § 10-5-32 Decision to hold hearing, scheduling. (a) The commission shall hold a contested case hearing whenever it finds that: (1) Such a hearing is required by Chapter 91, HRS; (2) There is reason to believe that a law or rule of the commission has been violated; (3) Such a hearing would be in the best interest of one or more of the beneficiaries of the act; and (4) A proceeding by the commission would be in the interest of the department. Id. at 135, 870 P.2d at 1279 (italics in original) (bold emphases added). Based on the foregoing, the Bush court reasoned that, [i]n both sections, the Commission is allocated the discretion to determine whether contested case proceedings should be initiated and an actual hearing held. In other words, ... the allegedly aggrieved claimant has a conditional right to a contested case hearing, dependent upon the Commission's evaluation of the matter. Id. (underscored emphasis in original) (bold emphasis added). Thus, the Bush court concluded that, inasmuch as [t]he Commission [was] granted wide administrative discretion to determine the validity of a particular claim and [was] not required to hold a contested case hearing... there [was] no regulatory mandate for a hearing prior to the Commission's decision on TPA petitions, and, accordingly, no hearing was required by law. Id. (underscored emphasis in original) (bold emphases added). In determining the validity of a particular claim, the Commission was required to decide, pursuant to HAR § 10-5-32, whether it had reason to believe that a law or rule of the [C]ommission ha[d] been violated and that the hearing would be in the best interests of one or more of the claimants and the department. However, a similar substantive determination is not required nor contemplated by the regulations applicable to the instant case. Here, as pointed out by DLNR, HAR § 13-300-53 provides that, [a]fter a determination is made by the [BLNR chairperson] that a contested case hearing is required, the written notice of hearing shall be served by the department upon the parties[.] Unlike in Bush, there is nothing in the HARs applicable to the case at bar that indicates the criteria upon which the BLNR chairperson's determination is to be basedother than the regulatory mandate that a petition for a contested case hearing shall meet certain pleading requirements, see HAR § 13-300-52(b). In other words, the BLNR chairperson's determination is limited to whether the procedural requirements have been met, and, if so, HAR § 13-300-51 provides that the appeals panel shall hold a contested case hearing[.] (Emphasis added.) The lack of a regulation similar to that found in Bush underscores the fact that, in cases involving burial sites and human remainsas we have here,the BLNR chairperson is not permitted to substitute his or her judgment for that of the appeals panel with regard to the substantive merits of the claimant's petition. In fact, because the chairperson's assessment is limited to whether procedural requirements have been met, the viability and/or validity of the allegations made in the petition are not at issue until properly before the appeals panel. Thus, as stated previously, DLNR's reliance on Bush is misplaced. Additionally, DLNR argues: Section 6E-43(c), HRS, which permits but does not require contested cases arising from certain burial council decisions, states in relevant part that burial council determinations to preserve in place or relocate previously identified native Hawaiian burials may be administratively appealed to a panel composed of three council chairpersons and three members from the board of land and natural resources as a contested case pursuant to chapter 91. (Underscored emphasis added.) (Bold emphasis in original.) The DLNR further argues that, [i]t is clear from the foregoing statutory framework, as implemented by the administrative rules [(specifically focusing on HAR § 13-300-53, quoted supra )], that a section 6E-43(c) contested case can only occur if the BLNR chairperson determines that one is required. In so arguing, the DLNR believes that the word may refers to the discretionary authority of the BLNR chairperson to decide whether to allow an administrative appeal as a contested case. Seemingly, the DLNR would have us believe that, if the legislature intended to mandate a hearing, it would have used the word shall. We disagree with DLNR's reading of the statute. First, the word may, in our view, applies to the person aggrieved by the agency's determination and who has the discretion to decide whether to pursue an administrative appeal as a contested case in the first instance. Second, we agree with Kaleikini that it would have been absurd for the legislature to use the word `shall' because that would have meant that every council determination would be appealed. The language employed gave Kaleikini the right to a contested case hearing ... with all the procedural safeguards as articulated in HRS [c]hapter 91. Those procedural safeguards are found in HAR § 13-300-52, quoted supra, note 8. Third, when the request for a contested case hearing satisfies the procedural requirements of section 13-300-52, then, HAR § 13-300-51by virtue of the use of the mandatory language shallrequires that the appeals panel hold a contested case hearing. Thus, when read togetherand coupled with our reading of HAR § 13-300-53, discussed supra, HRS § 6E-43 and HAR § 13-300-51 confer upon an aggrieved claimantlike Kaleikinithe right to a contested case hearing as long as the written petition meets the procedural requirements of HAR § 13-300-52. Here, it is undisputed that Kaleikini complied with the requirements of HAR § 13-300-52, that is, her written petition was proper. As such, a contested case hearing was mandated by statute ( i.e., HRS § 6E-43) and agency rule (HAR § 13-300-51) and, thus, was required by law. Kaniakapupu, 111 Hawai`i at 132, 139 P.3d at 720 (agency hearing required by law when mandated by statute, rule or constitutional due process). [24] The concurrence argues that, [a]s the majority suggests, HAR § 13-300-53 grants the chairperson the power to decide whether a contested case will be convened or not. However, this authority exceeds the scope of HRS § 6E-43, because [HAR] § 13-300-53 gives the chairperson authority that the plain language of HRS § 6E-43 does not grant. There is nothing in the statute that empowers the chairperson to exercise a veto over a request upon so-called procedural or any other grounds. Accordingly, the provision in HAR § 13-300-53 that affords the chairperson the power to make such decisions is invalid and must be struck down. Concurring op. at ___, 237 P.3d at 1099 (citing Stop H-3 Ass'n v. State Dep't of Transp., 68 Haw. 154, 161, 706 P.2d 446, 451 (1985)) (emphasis added). We disagree. Preliminarily, we observe that, although an agency hearing can be required by law if required by an agency rule, see Kaniakapupu, 111 Hawai`i at 132, 139 P.3d at 720, a rule that exceeds the scope of its statutory authority is invalid and, consequently, could not legally require an agency hearing. Inasmuch as the concurrence attacks the validity of a DLNR agency rule, we first turn to examine the DLNR's rule-making authority. With respect to an agency's rule-making authority, this court has stated that: A public administrative agency possesses only such rule-making authority as is delegated to it by the state legislature and may only exercise this power within the framework of the statute under which it is conferred. Administrative rules and regulations which exceed the scope of the statutory enactment they were devised to implement are invalid and must be struck down. In other words, an administrative agency can only wield powers expressly or implicitly granted to it by statute. Capua v. Weyerhaeuser, 117 Hawai`i 439, 446, 184 P.3d 191, 198 (2008) (citing Haole v. State, 111 Hawai`i 144, 156, 140 P.3d 377, 389 (2006)) (emphasis and brackets omitted). However, it is also well-established that an administrative agency's authority includes those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted. The reason for implied powers is that, as a practical matter, the legislature cannot foresee all the problems incidental to carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the agency. Capua, 117 Hawai`i at 446, 184 P.3d at 198 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Here, the DLNR's authority to make rules related to the historic preservation of burial grounds is found in HRS § 6E-43.5 (2009), which provides in relevant part that [t]he [DLNR], in consultation with the [burial] councils, office of Hawaiian affairs, representatives of development and large property owner interests, and appropriate Hawaiian organizations ... shall adopt rules pursuant to chapter 91 necessary to carry out the purposes of this section.  (Emphases added). The purposes of this section, i.e., HRS chapter 6E, are set forth in HRS § 6E-1, as follows: The Constitution of the State of Hawai`i recognizes the value of conserving and developing the historic and cultural property within the State for the public good.... The legislature further declares that it is in the public interest to engage in a comprehensive program of historic preservation at all levels of government to promote the use and conservation of such property for the education, inspiration, pleasure, and enrichment of its citizens. The legislature further declares that it shall be the public policy of this State to provide leadership in preserving, restoring, and maintaining history and cultural property, to ensure the administration of such historic and cultural property in a spirit of stewardship and trusteeship for future generations, and to conduct activities, plans, and programs in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of historic and cultural property. (Emphases added.) Accordingly, the plain language of HRS § 6E-43.5 authorizes the DLNR to promulgate rules that are: (1) in accordance with HRS chapter 91 (governing administrative procedure); and (2) necessary to implement or carry out the purposes of HRS chapter 6E, including engag[ing] in a comprehensive program of historic preservation at all levels of government and/or promot[ing] the use and conservation of historical and cultural property. We now examine HAR § 13-300-53 in light of the DLNR's statutory rule-making authority. Title 13, subtitle 13, chapter 300 of the HAR, promulgated by the DLNR, sets forth the rules of practice and procedure relating to burial sites and human remains. HAR § 13-300-53, entitled notice of hearing, provides that, [a]fter a determination is made by the presiding officer that a contested case hearing is required, the written notice of hearing shall be served by the department upon the parties in accordance with section 91-9.5, HRS, and shall be served on all persons admitted as a party at their last recorded address not less than fifteen days prior to the beginning of the contested case hearing. (Emphasis added.) As indicated supra, the BLNR chairperson's authority to determine whether a contested case hearing is required is limited to whether a party has met the procedural requirements set forth in HAR § 13-300-52. Stated differently, the chairperson, in making his or her determination, examines only whether a party has complied with procedural requirements for filing an administrative appeal from an OIBC determination. If so, then HAR § § 13-300-51 mandates a contested case hearing and such hearing is, thus, required by law. A review of HRS chapter 91 demonstrates that HAR § 13-300-53 and our interpretation thereof do not conflict with the provisions of such chapter. Further, a contested case hearing that is required by law when a party complies with the procedural dictates of HAR § 13-300-52 enables parties to present the merits of their appeal. It follows that such process helps ensure that parties are able to present their claims regarding the preservation of burial grounds and other historic property in an expeditious manner, often in situations where time is of the essence, as was the case here because Kaleikini was seeking to preserve the iwi and prevent their imminent removal. As a result, HAR § 13-300-53 effectively creates an appellate system that is consistent with the preservation and enhancement of historic and cultural property and, thus, carries out the purposes of HRS chapter 6E. Consequently, it does not exceed the DLNR's rule-making authority under HRS § 6E-43.5. We now determine whether HAR § 13-300-53 exceeds the scope of HRS § 6E-43(c), as the concurrence contends. As indicated supra, HRS § 6E-43(c) provides that: Council determinations may be administratively appealed to a panel composed of three council chairpersons and three members of the [BLNR] as a contested case pursuant to chapter 91. In addition to the six members, the chairperson of the [BLNR] shall preside over the contested case and vote only in the event of a tie. In other words, HRS § 6E-43(c) provides for the right to administratively appeal a council determination to a panel. However, it does not set forth a specific process for initiating and conducting such an appeal. As stated above, the legislature cannot foresee all the problems incidental to carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the agency. As a result, agenciessuch as the DLNR in this casehave the power to make rules that are reasonably necessary to carry out its duties. Based on such rule-making power, the DLNR appropriately promulgated administrative rules necessary to implement the statutory right to appeal by establishing procedural rules to initiate and conduct an administrative appeal to the OIBC, including, inter alia, HAR § 13-300-53. As previously concluded, the determination of the chairperson pursuant to HAR § 13-300-53 is limited to an examination of whether a party has complied with the procedural requirements for submitting an appeal pursuant to HAR § 13-300-52. Indeed, the chairperson does not decide or even address the substantive merits of a party's appeal. As a result, HAR § 13-300-53 merely furnishes part of the process for appealing a council determination and ascertaining whether such hearing is required by law. Further, the chairperson's determination does not: (1) abrogate or alter a litigant's substantive right to appeal as set forth in HRS § 6E-43(c); (2) deprive the panel of their authority to adjudge the merits of the appeal; or (3) otherwise displace the role and structure of the appellate panel laid out in HRS § 6E-43. Thus, HAR § 13-300-53 does not exceed the scope of HRS § 6E-43, and, instead, carries out a function of the administrative appellate process, as authorized by HRS § 6E-43.5(c), quoted supra. Therefore, the concurrence's argument that HAR § 13-300-53 is invalid and must be struck down is unavailing. See Concurring op. at ___, 237 P.3d at 1099. The concurrence, however, disagrees with our conclusion that HAR § 13-300-53 does not exceed the scope of HRS § 6E-43 and, relying on Haole v. State, 111 Hawai`i 144, 140 P.3d 377 (2006), argues that, [b]ecause the legislature specifically defined the role of the chairperson in HRS § 6E-43, this court, as well as the DLNR[,] must give effect to the language of the statute itself. Concurring op. at ___, 237 P.3d at 1101 (citations and internal brackets omitted). It appears that the concurrence relies upon Haole to essentially assert that the role of the chairpersonas defined in HRS § 6E-43is a limited one, and that, because no other role for the chairperson was set forth in HRS § 6E-43, the chairperson has no further authority outside of presiding over the contested case and voting in the event of a tie. HRS § 6E-43. We disagree. The concurrence correctly observes that the Haole court examined an administrative rule imposing a regulatory duty on owners and operators conducting unloading activities on state piers to defend and indemnify the State of Hawai`i in order to determine whether such rule was authorized by the statutes governing the Department of Transportation (DOT). Haole, 111 Hawai`i at 146, 140 P.3d at 379. In so doing, the Haole court looked to and applied the test for reviewing an agency's construction of a statute which it administers set forth in Orca Bay Seafoods v. Northwest Truck Sales, Inc., 32 F.3d 433 (9th Cir.1994)the first question of which is whether Congress[, i.e., the legislature,] has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Haole, 111 Hawai`i at 155, 140 P.3d at 388. Looking to the first question of the test, the Haole court observed that the legislature had spoken to the issue of State liability when it enacted the State Tort Liability Act, which provided in part that the State is generally liable for actual damages caused by the negligence of its employees in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. Id. at 151, 140 P.3d at 384 (quoting HRS § 662-2 (1993)). It further observed that [t]his court has consistently held that private parties may contract to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own negligence but there must be a `clear and unequivocal' assumption of liability by one party for the other party's negligence. Id. (citations omitted). In examining whether the language of the DOT's governing statutes authorized the State to impose a duty of indemnification via statute (instead of contractually imposing such a duty), the Haole court determined that the DOT's authority was specifically defined in the governing statutes, and that such statutes did not explicitly state that DOT's rule-making authority includes the power to impose a duty of indemnification. Id. at 154, 140 P.3d at 387. With regard to the DOT's implied powers, the Haole court concluded that, because: (1) the DOT's authority is specifically defined by statute; (2) the legislature had spoken to the issue of State liability; and (3) the DOT could contract for the indemnity that it was attempting to impose in an administrative rule, the DOT was not permitted to bypass the general requirement that parties (in this case, the State) seeking to shift liability to another ... must secure the clear and unequivocal agreement of that party to assume the liability of another. Id. at 155-56, 140 P.3d at 388-89 (citation omitted). Consequently, the Haole court held, in relevant part, that the statutes governing the DOT do not explicitly or implicitly authorize the DOT to issue administrative rules exonerating the State from the negligence of its employees. Id. at 160, 140 P.3d at 393 (footnote omitted). Here, HRS § 6E-43 defines the role of the chairperson, just as the DOT statutes defined the powers of the DOT. Such defined powers indicate that the chairperson does not have explicit power, pursuant to HRS § 6E-43, to examine the procedural requirements for requesting a contested case hearingjust as the DOT did not have explicit power under the statute to promulgate an administrative rule which imposed a duty to indemnify the State. However, the language of HRS § 6E-43 does not limit the BLNR chairperson's authority to make a procedural determination, and the legislature has not spoken to the issue such that the DLNR is precluded from using its implied powers to delegate such authority. Indeed, unlike the State Tort Liability Act in Haole (in which the legislature had directly spoken to the issue of State liability), there is no statute or statutory scheme that directly speaks to the chairperson's authority to assess whether a contested case hearing is required. Further, as previously discussed, the statutes are silent as to the proper process for initiating and conducting an administrative appeal, and, thus, do not limit the DLNR's implicit authority to promulgate rules setting forth such an appellate process. Consequently, no intent or policy of the legislature precluded the DLNR from exercising its implied powers to promulgate HAR § 13-300-53 and grant the chairperson authority to determine whether a contested case hearing is required. Accordingly, Haole is not only distinguishable from the instant case, but also contrary to the concurrence. We now turn to examine whether the chairperson's authority under HAR § 13-300-53 directly conflicts with the plain language of HRS § 6E-43. The relevant language of HRS § 6E-43, i.e., that the chairperson of the [BLNR] shall preside over the contested case and vote only in the event of a tie, precludes the chairperson from making a substantive decision as to the merits of a party's contested case, except in the event of a tie. As discussed at length supra, HAR § 13-300-53, when read in conjunction with other relevant administrative rules, gives the chairperson the authority to make an assessment of only the procedural requirements set forth in HAR § 13-300-52(a), and such assessment is entirely unrelated to the merits. Consequently, the authority granted to the chairperson in HAR § 13-300-53 does not conflict with or usurp the role of the chairperson defined in HRS § 6E-43, nor does it contradict the plain language or intent of the statute. Based on the foregoing, we maintain that the DLNR had implicit authority to issue administrative rules that provide a procedure for requesting and obtaining a contested case hearing, including HAR § 13-300-53, which, in turn, permits the BLNR chairperson to make the determination whether a contested case hearing is required. Accordingly, the concurrence's argument that the role of the chairperson defined in HRS § 6E-43 is the end of the matter is incorrect. We turn next to examine whether the requested contested case hearing would have determined the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252.
Inasmuch as no contested case hearing was held, but, as discussed above, was required by HRS § 6E-43 and HAR § 13-300-51 the issue here is whether the hearing, had it been held, would have determined the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties. Id. In PASH, this court stated that, with regard to whether a hearing would determine the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties, its inquiry [was] properly directed at the party whose application was under consideration. Id. at 432, 903 P.2d at 1253. Likewise, in Puna Geothermal, this court stated that: The public hearings held by the DOH were proceedings in which PGV sought to have the legal rights, duties or privileges of land in which it held an interest declared over the objections of other landowners and residents of Puna. Mahuiki v. Planning Comm'n, 65 Haw. 506, 513, 654 P.2d 874, 879 (1982) (concluding that this characteristic is an obvious element of a contested case hearing); see also Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Haw. 538, 548, 524 P.2d 84, 91 (1974) (holding that adjacent property owner has a property interest in the amendment of a district boundary). Thus, the DOH hearings were contested case[s] because they were proceeding[s] in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties were required by law to be determined after an opportunity for agency hearing. HRS § 91-1(5). 77 Hawai`i at 68, 881 P.2d at 1214. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry in the instant case, as in PASH, is whether a contested case hearing would have determined the rights, duties, or privileges of GGP. The concurrence claims that: The majority decision today, coupled with the majority's decision in Kaniakapupu, creates different standards for determining whether an agency action is a contested case. Thus, on one hand, if there is a procedural vehicle for any party or interested person to obtain a contested case[,] then Kaniakapupu does not apply and the analysis as set forth in the majority's opinion here rests on whether the hearing, had it been held, would have determined the `rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties. Majority opinion at 51. If so, then the court has jurisdiction under HRS chapter 91. On the other hand, if there is no such procedural vehicle for obtaining a contested case, then Kaniakapupu applies and the court lacks jurisdiction because there was no contested case hearing, even though, had the hearing been held, the hearing would have determined the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties. Kaniakapupu, 111 Hawai`i at 134, 139 P.3d at 722. Consequently, the foregoing standard, even if the hearing, had it been held, would have determined the rights, duties, and privileges of specific parties, the court lacks jurisdiction pursuant to HRS chapter 91. Concurring op. at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1106-07 (footnotes omitted). However, the only support provided by the concurrence for such position is the dissenting opinion in Kaniakapupu, which is not binding on this court and, as importantly, not the law in this jurisdiction. Turning to the relevant inquiry whether a contested case hearing in this case would have determined the rights, duties, or privileges of GGP, we observe that OIBC's approval of GGP's burial treatment plan (and DLNR's subsequent approval of such plan without a contested case hearing) implicated GGP's use of its project site because HAR § 13-300-33 (2009) prohibits the [i]ntentional removal of human skeletal remains or burial goods from a previously identified Native Hawaiian burial site ... until a determination to relocate is made by the council[.] Moreover, the approval or disapproval of the burial treatment plan determined what GGP's duties were with respect to the iwi discovered on the project site. Accordingly, had a contested case hearing been held, it would have determined the rights, duties, or privileges of GGP. The concurrence contends that: The chairperson's review of a petition for a contested case hearing is analogous to the LUC's entertainment of the appellant's motion for order to show cause in Kaniakapupu in that both were essentially threshold motions that occurred before a contested case was conducted. Applying the majority's reasoning in Kaniakapupu, the chairperson's denial of a contested case did not constitute a contested case for the purposes of obtaining judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a), 111 Hawai`i at 134, 139 P.3d at 722, and, hence, the requirement in HRS § 91-14 that the order appealed from arise from a contested case hearing, had not been met[,] id. at 131, 139 P.3d at 719. Concurring op. at ___, 237 P.3d at 1107 (internal brackets omitted). Consequently, the concurrence argues that,  [i]f the provision in HAR § 13-300-53 regarding the chairperson's authority is valid, as the majority holds (and which I believe it is not, as indicated previously), then, pursuant to the majority in Kaniakapupu, the court in the instant case lacked subject matter jurisdiction under HRS chapter 91. Id. at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1104 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). However, the concurrence misconstrues our characterization of the BLNR chairperson's role in the administrative appeal process and, as such, incorrectly analogizes Kaniakapupu to the instant case. In Kaniakapupu, it was undisputed that, in order for the petitioner-Hui to obtain a contested case hearing, they had to first file an OSC motion, request a hearing on that motion, and meet their burden of proof in demonstrating that an order to show cause was required. Kaniakapupu, 111 Hawai`i at 127-128, 139 P.3d at 715-716. Indeed, the parties acknowledged that only if the LUC grants a motion and issues an order to show cause would a contested case be conducted. Id. at 136, 139 P.3d at 724. Finally, the Hui admitted that there was no procedure for themor any interested partyto directly request or obtain a contested case hearing in their case. Id. at 137, 139 P.3d at 725. Thus, the OSC motion filed by the Hui and subsequent motion hearing were the only procedural devices that could possibly have provided them with a contested case hearing that would determine the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Consequently, the Hui's OSC motion constituted a threshold motion, and the motion hearing provided the only procedural vehicle to obtain a contested case hearing. In the instant case, however, there was a statutory and agency rule which allowed Kaleikini to directly request and obtain a contested case hearing i.e., HRS § 6E-43(c) and HAR § 13-300-51. Further, as discussed supra at section C.2.b, we determined that, unlike the motion hearing in Kaniakapupu, a contested case hearinghad it been heldwould have determined the rights, duties, or privileges of GGP. Additionally, we determined that a party can meet the required by law element of HAR § 13-300-51 by complying with the procedural requirements set forth in HAR § 13-300-52, quoted supra, and, pursuant to HAR § 13-300-53, the BLNR chairperson is the designated officer to determine whether such procedural requirements have been met. Thus, the chairperson's determination is to ascertain whether a party seeking an appeal has met the required by law element of HAR § 13-300-51. Consequently, such determination by the chairpersonunlike the LUC's denial of the Hui's OSC motion in Kaniakapupu does not constitute a threshold motion to obtain a hearing that determines the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Accordingly, the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Kaniakapupu. Moreover, if the chairperson's determination whether a hearing was required by law constitutes a threshold motion or procedural vehicle, as the concurrence contends, then any inquiry as to whether a contested case hearing is required by law prior to holding the hearing would be a threshold inquiry that does not constitute a contested case for the purposes of obtaining judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a). Thus, under the concurrence's interpretation, a party would never have the ability to appeal the adverse determination that a hearing was not required by law, and any agency could arbitrarily and capriciously deny a party a hearing without being subject to judicial review of such denial. Such a result is contrary to fundamental notions of fairness and justice and abrogates the important interest in giving parties the opportunity to appeal adverse rulings. In sum, we are unpersuaded by the concurrence's attempt to analogize the instant case to Kaniakapupu. As a result, the concurrence's contention that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under HRS chapter 91, pursuant to the majority opinion in Kaniakapupu  is wholly without merit.
The second prong of the PASH requirements calls for an examination whether the agency's action ... represents `a final decision and order,' or `a preliminary ruling' such that deferral of review would deprive the claimant of adequate relief. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252. Kaleikini argues that this court has repeatedly found that the denial of a request for a contested case hearing (or to participate in one) is a sufficiently final decision for judicial review. (Citing Puna Geothermal, PASH, and In re Hawaii Gov't Employees' Ass'n, 63 Haw. 85, 88-89, 621 P.2d 361, 364 (1980)). We agree. As previously stated, this court, in PASH held that the circuit court properly exercised jurisdiction over an agency appeal where the agency denied a request by the appellants to participate in a contested case hearing. 79 Hawai`i at 431-33, 903 P.2d at 1252-54. Here, Kaleikini requested a contested case hearing, which DLNR denied. The denial of Kaleikini's request constituted a final decision and order inasmuch as it ended the litigation. Accordingly, this prong of the PASH requirements is met.
The third step requires a determination whether the claimant ... followed the applicable agency rules and, therefore, [was] involved `in' the contested case[.] PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252. Kaleikini states that she followed all applicable agency rules. More specifically, Kaleikini asserts that, [a]s in PASH and [ Puna Geothermal ], Kaleikini testified against the authorization to relocate the iwi. As in PASH and [ Puna Geothermal ], Kaleikini filed a written request for a contested case hearing. Kaleikini's petition was timely filed and included all the relevant information requested. Kaleikini followed the rules by requesting a hearing on a contested matter in her October 12, 2006 letter[.] As quoted supra note 8, HAR § 13-300-52 governs the procedures that must be followed in requesting a contested case hearing. Our review of Kaleikini's October 12, 2006 letter, reveals that she complied with HAR § 13-300-52 inasmuch as her letter contained statements regarding: (1) the legal authority by which appeal is requested, i.e., HRS § 6E-43 and HAR §§ 13-300-51 and 13-300-52; (2) the council determination being appealed and the date of the determination, i.e., the September 13, 2006 decision to relocate the iwi at the Ward Village Shops Project; (3) the nature of the interest that may be adversely affected by the council determination, i.e., Kaleikini's rights under article XII, section 7 of the Hawai`i constitution and her rights as a cultural decedent; (4) the relevant facts and issues raised; and (5) the relief being sought. HAR § 13-300-52. Thus, Kaleikini complied with the applicable agency rules.
The final prong requires that the claimant's legal interests must have been injured  i.e., the claimant must have standing to appeal. PASH, 79 Hawai`i at 431, 903 P.2d at 1252. Kaleikini argues that she has standing as a Native Hawaiian and as a cultural descendent of the iwi. As indicated above, Kaleikini's legal interests stem from her cultural and religious beliefs regarding the protection of the iwi. The HAR at issue here specifically provide standing to cultural descendant[s], such as Kaleikini. Additionally, the Hawai`i constitutionarticle XII, section 7protects such rights. Throughout the instant litigation, Kaleikini has averred that her cultural and religious beliefs require her to ensure that the iwi is left undisturbed and that the OIBC's decision, allowing GGP to disinter the iwi, has caused her cultural and religious injury. As such, we believe Kaleikini has alleged sufficient facts upon which this court can determine she has standing. Accordingly, Kaleikini has also met this final prong of the requirements set forth in PASH.