Opinion ID: 187164
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: TRO Costs

Text: The Estate also contends the district court erred in requiring that the Estate pay the cost of mailing the remedial notices mandated by the TRO. In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief, the district court must consider whether: (1) the party seeking the injunction has a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the party seeking the injunction will be irreparably injured if relief is withheld; (3) an injunction will not substantially harm other parties; and (4) an injunction would further the public interest. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Williams, 406 F.3d 667, 670 (D.C.Cir.2005). The test is a flexible one. `If the arguments for one factor are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the arguments in other areas are rather weak.' Id. (quoting City Fed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 747 (D.C.Cir.1995)). We review the district court's weighing of the four factors under the abuse of discretion standard. . . . Id. We find no abuse of discretion here. The TRO did not involve the trademark infringement counts but rather the Non-Profits' counterclaim for deceptive trade practices under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Applying the four injunction factors, the district court concluded that (1) the Non-Profits had shown a likelihood of success on the merits because promoting the Osceola, Iowa congress as including a meeting of the board of directors of Inner Peace Movement® was likely to be a violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), (2) immediate and irreparable harm will be incurred if [the Estate] or those in active concert with them continue to interfere with the annual meeting of the board of directors of Inner Peace Movement, Inc., (3) the Estate would not be harmed by issuance of the TRO and (4) injunctive relief was in the public interest. TRO 1-2. In making these determinations, the court did not abuse its discretion. The potential for harm to IPM in the absence of the TROthe disruption of corporate business resulting from confusion over the site of the official IPM board meetingwas both significant and irreparable. Further, the Non-Profits' likelihood of success on their deceptive trade practices counterclaim was substantial. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes civil liability on any person who uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). The Estate's conduct in promoting the competing Inner Peace Movement board meeting at least arguably met the statutory criteria. Finally, the Estate was not likely to be harmed by the TROexcept to the extent it was prevented from deceiving persons into attending its own meeting rather than IPM'sand the public interest was served because the deception was mitigated. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the TRO, we reject the Estate's challenge to the award of costs thereunder. Because there remain disputed issues of fact regarding whether Coll controlled the trademarks under the related companies doctrine and in what capacity he registered the marks, neither the Estate nor the Non-Profits are entitled to summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. We therefore reverse the district court's March 25, 2004 order insofar as it granted summary judgment to the Non-Profits on the Estate's two trademark claims (Counts I and II). For the same reason, we affirm the order's denial of the Estate's partial summary judgment motion on the two trademark claims. We further affirm the district court's June 27, 2001 temporary restraining order imposing costs on the Estate because the district court did not abuse its discretion therein. Finally, we remand to the district court for further proceedings. So ordered.