Opinion ID: 73252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A, infra. See IMPACT, 893 F.2d at 1193-94.

Text: 7 Finally, we stated that the issue of recertification would “remain open for consideration by the trial court on remand.” Id. at 1196. On remand, the district court stated that each plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie was required to prove the following four elements: 1) The plaintiff was a member of a protected class; 2) The plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the position in question; 3) A person not a member of the protected class with equal or lesser qualifications received the position, and; 4) The adverse employment action complained of was actually taken against him. The court concluded that none of the plaintiffs had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case under these criteria with respect to any of their claims; therefore, no plaintiff was entitled to judgment in his or her favor. The court then concluded that, because no plaintiff had succeeded on his or her individual claim, the issue of recertification was moot. Finally, the court held that because there existed no certified class, and because it had dismissed all disparate impact claims before trial, employment testing evidence was irrelevant. Having disposed of all issues included in our IMPACT mandate, the district court entered judgment, on May 22, 1995, against every plaintiff save Gracie Holton (now named Gracie Dejerinette).9 The plaintiffs now appeal that judgment, claiming that the district court erred on remand in 1) finding that none of the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimination at 9 The court stated that it would hold an evidentiary hearing on Gracie Dejerinette (neé Holton)’s claims. Thus, because the court did direct that the judgment be entered as a “final judgment” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), we had no jurisdiction to review the judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). On July 19, 1995, however, Dejerinette gave notice of a settlement with the defendants and voluntary dismissed of all her claims. Her voluntary dismissal converted the district court’s judgment into a final judgment and cleared the way under § 1291 for this appeal. 8 trial, 2) refusing to allow plaintiffs to pursue their claims concerning employment tests, and 3) refusing to recertify the class. We consider these claims in turn. In part II.A, we conclude that the district court misapplied the law when evaluating the prima facie strength of most of the plaintiffs’ claims; thus, we hold that the court erred in entering judgment for the defendants on those claims. We then look to the record ourselves to determine whether any of the erroneously-decided claims were supported by evidence at trial that, if believed by the district court as the trier of fact, would suffice to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of Title VII. In part II.A.2, we vacate the court’s judgment with respect to those claims for which the plaintiff established a prima facie case and remand for further proceedings. In part II.A.3, we affirm the court’s judgment with regard to all other claims. As we explain in part II.B, because we hold in part II.A that the plaintiffs’ prima facie cases are determinative, we need not reach the plaintiffs’ arguments regarding admissibility of testing evidence. With regard to the plaintiffs’ third issue – recertification – we again leave the matter open for the district court on remand.