Opinion ID: 1710912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's inability to admit the crime.

Text: Appellant contends that because she does not admit her guilt the acceptance of the guilty plea was a manifest injustice. As a factual matter, appellant does not deny that she stabbed Taylor nor that she had a knife, nor that the deceased was stabbed while he was arguing with her. Appellant's claim is that she does not remember the precise moment of the stabbing. On the other hand, considerable evidence was taken at the original hearing when she entered her guilty plea, demonstrating that Deborah and Taylor were arguing and that Deborah threatened to kill the man. Appellant approached Taylor with a knife and slashed out at two friends who attempted to subdue her. Deborah then stabbed Taylor in the throat. This evidence unquestionably establishes that appellant's action constituted the crime of second-degree murder, killing by conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life. [4] Deborah's own testimony indicates that she had the knife, was angry with Taylor, that she cut Taylor's finger with a knife, and saw blood on decedent's throat while the knife was in her hand. In Ernst v. State [5] this court, in spelling out the procedure to be followed by a trial court in considering a guilty plea, required the court to determine `that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.' In urging a reversal here, counsel relies on State v. Stuart, [6] wherein this court, based on this Ernst requirement, reversed a criminal conviction when the defendant denied an element of the crime. The guilty plea here was accepted before Ernst and since Ernst is not retroactive, the additional requirement of Ernst is not applicable. [7] Furthermore, Stuart is distinguishable for the reason that in Stuart the defendant specifically denied one element of the crime, to wit, having an intent to do harm (Stuart having been charged with conduct endangering the safety of another in violation of sec. 941.30, Stats.). There is no such denial of the crime or one of its elements here. At the time the plea was entered and accepted, Deborah did not deny the commission of the crime or a single element of that crime. At the hearing on her attempt to withdraw her plea she denied remembering inserting the knife in the victim. From our independent review of this record we have no hesitancy in concluding that the plea was voluntary and was knowingly made. There was no manifest injustice which required the trial court to allow the appellant to withdraw that plea. By the Court. Order affirmed.