Opinion ID: 171744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does the Tucker Act Expressly or Impliedly Forbid the Relief Sought?

Text: Even when a claim seeks relief other than money damages, the [APA's] waiver does not apply where any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. Robbins, 438 F.3d at 1080 (internal quotations omitted). We read the APA in conjunction with other jurisdictional statutes waiving sovereign immunity in order to determine whether those statutes forbid the relief sought in the case at hand. Id. (internal quotations omitted). In Robbins, we concluded that the Tucker Act `impliedly forbid[s]' federal courts from ordering declaratory or injunctive relief, at least in the form of specific performance, for contract claims against the government, and that the APA thus does not waive sovereign immunity for such claims. Id. at 1082. (emphasis added). Importantly, however, while the plain language of the Tucker and Little Tucker Acts does not distinguish between claims founded on contracts and those founded on the Constitution, statutes, or regulations, welike other circuitshave limited the application of the impliedly forbids exception to the APA waiver of sovereign immunity to contract claims. [3] See Robbins, 438 F.3d at 1083 n. 9; see also Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523-24 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Scalia, J.). Therefore, in order to determine whether the Tucker Act impliedly forbids the relief sought in this case, we must evaluate whether Normandy's claim is properly understood as one founded on contract or on the federal Constitution, statutes, or regulations. We recently had occasion to elaborate on the proper approach to categorizing a claim as contractually or otherwise-based. In Robbins, we quoted with approval the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C.Cir.1982) that [t]he classification of a particular action as one which is or is not `at its essence' a contract action depends both on the source of the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claims, and upon the type of relief sought (or appropriate). Robbins, 438 F.3d at 1083. Although the district court recognized that the two counts of Normandy's complaint were based on distinct sourcesupon an express contract with the United States and on regulations of an executive departmentit erroneously concluded that both claims sounded equally in contract. We agree with the district court that Count II, alleging an ordinary breach of contract, seeks equitable relief for a contract claim against the government. Because the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction to hear such a claim, the district court properly declined to take jurisdiction over it. We disagree, however, with the district court's similar characterization of Count I, in which Normandy alleged HUD's violation of various federal regulations. It is true, of course, that because the regulatory violations that Normandy asserts implicate its contractual relationship with HUD, plaintiff could not even assert [its claim] if it did not have a... [c]ontract with HUD. Normandy Apartments, Ltd., 2007 WL 3232610 at . But this does not convert a claim asserting rights based on federal regulations into one which is, at its essence, a contract claim. When the source of rights asserted is constitutional, statutory, or regulatory in nature, the fact that resolution of the claim requires some reference to contract does not magically transform [the] action ... into one on the contract and deprive the court of jurisdiction it might otherwise have. Megapulse, 672 F.2d at 968. Rather, litigants may bring statutory and constitutional claims in federal district court even when the claims depend on the existence and terms of a contract with the government. Robbins, 438 F.3d at 1083-84 (quoting Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 610 (D.C.Cir.1992)). Similarly, [a]n order compelling the government to follow its regulations is equitable in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. Ferreiro v. United States, 501 F.3d 1349, 1353 n. 3 (Fed.Cir. 2007). In Sharp v. Weinberger , then-Judge Scalia addressed the implications of the Tucker Act to a case, like ours, in which the plaintiff asserted that the government's intent to breach a contract would not only violate the terms of that contract, but would also be contrary to federal regulations (as well as statutes and the Constitution). 798 F.2d 1521. As the D.C. Circuit described in Transohio, Judge Scalia answered the question of jurisdiction by dividing the claims into categories: One category was [t]hat part of appellant's complaint and prayer seeking a declaration that he had a valid contract with appellees and an injunction requiring appellees to perform that contract. The district court, Judge Scalia wrote, lacked jurisdiction to hear that part of the complaint, the contract claim, because Tucker Act jurisdiction over contract claims was exclusive, and § 702 of the APA did not waive sovereign immunity. Over the other major category of ... claims, Judge Scalia wrote, the district court properly took jurisdiction. The other category included appellant's claims that his transfer would be contrary to regulations, statutes and the Constitution, and his request for a declaration to that effect and an injunction of the transfer. As to those claims, [t]he District Court properly exercised jurisdiction to consider appellant's claim that his reassignment would violate federal regulations, statutes and the Constitution. Tucker Act jurisdiction over those claims was not exclusive, and § 702 waived sovereign immunity. Transohio, 967 F.2d at 610 (describing Sharp, 798 F.2d at 1523-24) (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although Robbins itself dealt only with a constitutional claim, the D.C. Circuit's approach in Megapulse and Transohio would support extending the holding of Robbins to regulatory and statutory claims against the government. What we implied in Robbins, we now explicitly hold: when a party asserts that the government's breach of contract is contrary to federal regulations, statutes, or the Constitution, and when the party seeks relief other than money damages, the APA's waiver of sovereign immunity applies and the Tucker Act does not preclude a federal district court from taking jurisdiction. We thus conclude that the district court has jurisdiction to consider Normandy's regulatory claims and should proceed to address them on the merits.