Opinion ID: 1465791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Interpretation of the Pre-2006 Motor Vehicle Tax Rate Statutes [9]

Text: The hearing justice determined that both statutes at issue in this case constituted legislative limitations on the permissible motor vehicle tax rate for the year in question. In his view, in addition to abiding by the prohibition in § 44-34.1-1(c)(4) against exceeding the 1998 tax level in § 44-34.1-1 (which the town concededly did), the town was also obliged to abide by the prohibition in § 44-5-11.8(a)(2) against exceeding by 50 percent the tax rate applicable to any of the other statutorily created classes. If § 44-5-11.8(a)(2) were the only relevant statutory provision, we would agree with the hearing justice's rulingbecause it is undisputed that the 2004 tax rate for motor vehicles exceeded by more than 50 percent the tax rate for residential property. See footnote 6, supra. Very significantly, however, § 44-5-11.8(a)(2) does not stand alone: in very close propinquity to that statute in the General Laws is § 44-5-11.8(a)(5), which at the pertinent time clearly provided as follows: Notwithstanding subdivisions (2) and (3) of this subsection, the tax rates applicable to motor vehicles within Class 4    are governed by § 44-34.1-1. The fundamental mistake of the hearing justice was in restricting his focus to § 44-5-11.8(a)(2) without acknowledging the important limitation that is set forth in § 44-5-11.8(a)(5). See In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I.2006) (When performing our duty of statutory interpretation, this Court consider[s] the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). Essentially, the pre-2006 version of § 44-5-11.8(a)(2) set a limit on the tax rate applicable to various categories of taxable property, requiring that the tax rate to be applied to any one category of property may not exceed the tax rate on another class by more than 50 percent. However, § 44-5-11.8(a)(5) specifically addressed the taxation of motor vehicles and indicated that, notwithstanding the language of subdivision (2), the tax rates for motor vehicles were to be governed by § 44-34.1-1. The use of the term notwithstanding in § 44-5-11.8(a)(5) pellucidly indicates that the 50 percent limit on tax rates found in subdivision (2) was not to be applied to motor vehicle tax rates. When, as is the case here, a statute does not define a word, courts will often apply a common meaning as provided by a recognized dictionary. See Defenders of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1989); see also Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 962 (R.I.2007) (scrutinizing dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of statutory language); 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 47.28 at 468-69 (7th ed. 2007) (Dictionaries    provide a useful starting point to determine what statutory terms mean   .). It so happens that this Court has had occasion to discuss the meaning of the term notwithstanding when used in a statute. In Defenders of Animals, Inc., 553 A.2d at 543, this Court quoted with approval from an earlier edition of The American Heritage Dictionary that defined notwithstanding as meaning regardless of hindrance by. Similarly, the third edition of that reference work [10] defines notwithstanding (when used as a conjunction) as meaning [i]n spite of the fact that; although. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1238 (3d ed.1992). When one reads the pre-2006 version of § 44-5-11.8(a)(5) in light of these definitions, it becomes crystal clear that the tax rate on motor vehicles was to be governed solely by § 44-34.1-1, without being affected by the limitations on tax rates set forth in § 44-5-11.8(a)(2). In view of our reading of the statutes at issue, it is our opinion that the hearing justice erred in his interpretation of said statutes and in granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. [11]