Opinion ID: 2398709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The case under consideration might be termed a jurisdictional hybrid, having followed a rather circuitous path to reach this court. Section 38-351a, printed in full in the footnote, [1] represents an attempt by the legislature to seek this court's opinion prior to the effective date of the act on the various foreseeable constitutional questions that almost inevitably would arise upon its implementation. That portion of the act to which these questions apply was effective January 1, 1973. However, § 38-351a was effective May 19, 1972, the date of its approval, and by this provision the legislature sought to eliminate what it foresaw as the principal causes of procedural delay in achieving a prompt judgment from this court. The unfortunate effect of this section in its actual application was to color with uncertainty some of the acts of the parties performed in perfecting the present reservation. To avoid procedural impediments to a full and final determination of all of the issues presented, the parties agreed upon a course that, in their determination, satisfied our traditional procedures for such actions, as well as the requisites of § 38-351a. The action was begun, as intended by the legislature, prior to the effective date of the challenged provisions ; however, the complexity of the various issues and the enormous and far-reaching consequences of any judicial resolution, of necessity affecting a significant class of potential parties, mandated a very deliberate, thorough notice process to define the necessary parties and to ensure their opportunity to participate. Thus, more than two years subsequent to the effective dates of the complete act, the case finally has reached the threshold of resolution. The plaintiffs have raised some questions with respect to which their standing is uncertain, but the parties have urged that we exercise our discretion and consider all issues raised in this action. We adhere to our rule that where, as here, the plaintiffs have standing to raise certain issues pertaining to the controversy, this court, in matters of significant public moment where the public interest would best be served by a dispersal of all constitutional clouds over the act in question, will exercise that discretion and decide all closely related issues. Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 184, 169 A.2d 652; West v. Egan, 142 Conn. 437, 441, 115 A.2d 322; Ruppert v. Liquor Control Commission, 138 Conn. 669, 673, 88 A.2d 388. The parties have meticulously respected the bounds of propriety in developing the class of plaintiffs and defendants actually involved, and we find that further efforts to join all of those who have standing to raise each of the remaining few particular issues for which the present parties' standing may be challenged might well border on barratry. The interests of the plaintiffs are unquestionably adverse to those of the defendants and, further, their interest in nearly all aspects of this controversy is sufficient to guarantee a true and complete adversary presentation of all the questions discussed in the briefs. Numerous specific questions are propounded in the stipulation for reservation; the parties, however, centered their attention on certain major issues, leaving others unmentioned in their briefs. The exercise of our discretion to waive the standing requirements for each issue cannot be extended to allow us to treat those issues not briefed. Rather than answer each question as propounded in the stipulation, we have chosen to follow the format suggested by the briefs and will discuss the issues as they were therein raised and argued.