Opinion ID: 2221346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Corporate Culpability.

Text: The jury also found Barnholtz Automotive guilty of two counts of theft in the second degree (counts I and II) and four counts of forgery (counts V, VI, VII, and VIII). Barnholtz Automotive contends there was insufficient evidence to convict it of counts I, V, and VI. Barnholtz Automotive further contends that as a matter of law it could not be convicted of counts II, VII, and VIII. It reasons that specific intent is an element of those offenses, and a corporation cannot legally be convicted of a crime with such an element. Iowa Code section 703.5 pertinently provides: A public or private corporation . . . shall have the same level of culpability as an individual committing the crime when any of the following is true: . . . . 2. The conduct or act constituting the offense is committed by an agent, officer, director, or employee of the accused while acting within the scope of the authority of the agent, officer, director, or employee and in behalf of the accused and when said act or conduct is authorized, requested, or tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent. High managerial agent means an officer of the corporation . . . or other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.
1. Count I (theft in the second degree). The basis for this offense was that Barnholtz Automotive had received, by deception, cash and a trade-in from a customer. The alleged deception was the concealment of the true mileage of a Plymouth automobile that the customer had purchased. Barnholtz Automotive argues that the salesmanJeff Joneswith whom the customer dealt made the representation of low mileage. Barnholtz Automotive further argues that (1) there was no showing that Jeff Jones was a high managerial agent, and (2) there was no proof that his actions were authorized, requested, or tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent. We agree with both contentions and conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of this offense. 2. Count V (forgery). The State's theory for count V was that Barnholtz Automotive executed a title to a 1984 Ford Escort, purporting it to be the act of Daniel Grey, who did not authorize that act. A handwriting expert for the State could not identify the author of Daniel Grey on the certificate of title. Nor was there any proof that the board of directors or a high managerial agent had authorized, requested, or tolerated the forgery. We agree the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of this offense. 3. Count VI (forgery). In this count, the State charged both Barnholtz Automotive and Bonnie with forgery. The State's theory for count VI was that Barnholtz Automotive, through Bonnie, had forged the signature of Randy Gray to the title assignment for a 1985 Ford LTD. The State's handwriting expert testified that in his opinion the signature of Randy Gray was probably made by Bonnie Barnholtz. The expert admitted that probable means room for doubt because irreconcilable differences are present. Given this weak testimony, it is not surprising that the jury found Bonnie not guilty. And given this verdict, there was therefore no evidence that a high managerial agent of the corporation had authorized, requested, or tolerated the forgery. Additionally, there was no evidence that the board of directors of the corporation had authorized, requested, or tolerated the forgery. We agree the evidence was insufficient to sustain Barnholtz Automotive's conviction of this offense. B. Specific intent. Count II alleged that Barnholtz Automotive had committed theft in the second degree for misappropriation of property of another in its control, more specifically overcharges for license and title fees. Count VII alleged that the corporation had committed forgery of a title certificate to a 1985 Ford LTD. Count VIII alleged that the corporation had committed forgery of a title certificate to a 1985 Plymouth van. Barnholtz Automotive contends that, because the three counts were submitted to the jury as specific-intent crimes, the juryas a matter of lawcould not convict it of these offenses. The corporation relies on Stewart v. Waterloo Turn Verein, in which this court held that a corporation cannot be charged criminally with a crime involving malice, or the intention of the offense. 71 Iowa 226, 230, 32 N.W. 275, 277 (1887). The short answer to this contention is that Iowa Code section 703.5 has changed the law. By statute, a corporation now hasunder certain circumstancesthe same level of culpability as an individual committing the crime. The statute makes no distinction between general intent and specific intent crimes. We therefore reject Barnholtz Automotive's argument.