Opinion ID: 4561508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Empowered by Law

Text: The government next argues that, even if TSOs are officers, they are not empowered by law. It asks this court, when evaluating if an actor is empowered by law, to “look to whether there is a specific statutory grant of authority to search, seize, -10- or arrest.” Appellee’s Br. at 18. That standard appears consistent with the ordinary meaning of empowered. Dictionaries from the time of the proviso’s enactment defined empower as “to give official authority to” or to “delegate legal power to.” Empower, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1971). Under that definition, TSOs are empowered by law to execute searches. Through the ATSA, Congress requires the Administrator of the TSA (the “Administrator”) to “provide for the screening of all passengers and property . . . that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). Congress also required that those screenings “be carried out by a Federal Government employee”—the TSOs. Id. The ATSA indicates that those screenings can include various electronic means, canine detection teams, and “a physical search . . . with manifest verification.” Id. § 44901(g)(4). Congress thus mandated that TSOs carry out screenings and authorized physical searches as one means to complete that duty. The statute specifically authorizes federal employees, TSOs, to screen passengers and property. We consider this sufficient to conclude that they are empowered by law to conduct searches. The government argues that delegation does not constitute empowerment for two reasons. First, it argues that the ATSA delegates the authority to search to the Administrator—not to the TSOs. That argument is contrary to the statutory language. Section 44901(a) indicates that the Administrator “shall provide for the screening of all passengers.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a) (emphasis added). Yet it specifies that “the screening . . . shall be carried out by [TSOs].” Id. (emphasis added). Congress requires that the Administrator provide the screening, and that TSOs carry out the screening. The party providing for the screening “make[s] provision” to ensure that it is conducted. Provide, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2007). But the party carrying out the screening must have the authority to put the screening “into practice” and bring it “to completion.” Carry Out, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. 2007). -11- Because it is during the execution of the screening that the power to search is exercised, Congress necessarily empowered TSOs to effectuate searches. Second, the government urges that the statutory authorization is limited and non-discretionary. We disagree. Congress gave TSOs discretion. The ATSA did not direct TSOs to “physically search” all passengers or cargo. Instead, it indicated that they could also use “x-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection, explosives detection canine teams . . . . [and] additional methods.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(4). Therefore, TSOs have discretion in exercising their authority to search passengers and property. Thus, we conclude TSOs are “empowered by law to execute searches.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis added). C. To Execute Searches for Violations of Federal Law The government also maintains that TSOs do not “execute searches . . . for violations of Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (emphasis added). This belies the ordinary meaning of search. Webster’s defines search as “to look into or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find or discover.” Search, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1971). Black’s indicates that it means “[a]n examination of a man’s . . . person, with a view to the discovery of contraband or illicit or stolen property.” Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed., rev. 1968). By statute and practice, TSOs satisfy these definitions. TSOs are tasked with executing screenings “of all passengers and property.” 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a). Those screenings include “a physical examination or non-intrusive methods of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security.” Id. § 44901(g)(4). TSOs are empowered to use “x-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection, explosives detection canine teams certified by the Transportation Security -12- Administration, or a physical search.” Id. Accordingly, while screening, TSOs “look into or over” passengers and their property “carefully . . . in an effort to find or discover” “contraband or illicit . . . property.” Search, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1971); Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed., rev. 1968). Therefore, the screenings satisfy search’s ordinary meaning. The same is true for TSOs’ practices. TSOs use “[m]illimeter wave advanced imaging technology,” which “safely screens passengers . . . for metallic and non-metallic threats, including weapons and explosives, which may be concealed u n d e r c l o t h i n g . ” S e c u r i t y S c r e e n i n g , T r a n s . S e c . A d mi n . , https://www.tsa.gov/travel/security-screening (select “Screening Technology” tab) (last visited March 25, 2020). They may also conduct “[p]at-down procedures,” which include “inspection[s] of the head, neck, arms, torso, legs, and feet.” Id. (select “PatDown Screening” tab). Those “are used to determine whether prohibited items or other threats to transportation security are concealed on the person.” Id. These methods allow TSOs to look over passengers “carefully . . . in an effort to find or discover” “contraband or illicit . . . property.” Search, Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary (1971); Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed., rev. 1968). We hold that TSOs conduct searches. The government argues that (1) the proviso’s use of execute searches refers to traditional law enforcement searches, and therefore, (2) TSOs’ administrative searches do not satisfy the proviso. The textual indicium that supports the government’s first argument is that execute searches is followed by “seize evidence, or . . . make arrest.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The powers referred to, it argues, are traditional law enforcement activities, so the searches referred to are only traditional law enforcement searches. The interpretative canon of noscitur a sociis undergirds that argument. That canon -13- “counsels lawyers reading statutes that a word may be known by the company it keeps.” Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 287 (2010) (internal quotations omitted). Put another way, a word’s meaning is ascertained “from the words around it.” Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 702 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). Because execute searches is followed by seize evidence or make arrest, execute searches’ meaning, the argument goes, is limited by those terms. Since those terms refer to traditional police powers, the government urges searches does as well. The Pellegrino majority rejected the same argument. See 937 F.3d at 174–75. Two of its rationales for doing so are particularly persuasive. Id. First, because the term searches is clear, the court was hesitant to apply the canons. Id. at 174 (citing Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 520 (1923) (“‘Noscitur a sociis’ is a well-established and useful rule of construction, where words are of obscure or doubtful meaning, and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to remove the obscurity or doubt by reference to the associated words.”)). Second, “the three duties in the proviso are listed in the disjunctive,” where “the canon often is of little help.” Id. at 174–75 (internal quotations omitted). We agree with that analysis. Noscitur a sociis may only be used “where words are of obscure or doubtful meaning.” Russell Motor Car Co., 261 U.S. at 520. Searches is neither an obscure word nor is its meaning doubtful. In addition, the canon is not “particularly illuminating” where there is “[a] list of three items, each quite distinct from the other.” Graham Cty., 559 U.S. at 288. That is especially so where that list is joined by the disjunctive “or.” See id. Therefore, we believe that the terms in the list need not modify each other. Even if the terms do limit each other and execute searches in the proviso has a law enforcement connotation, TSOs satisfy that definition. The ordinary meaning -14- of search remains broad, even if limited to a criminal investigation context. Under a heading indicating that it is discussing “Criminal Law,” Black’s defines a search as “[a]n examination of a man’s . . . person, with a view to the discovery of contraband or illicit or stolen property.” Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed., rev. 1968). As discussed above, TSOs are given the power to execute physical searches, such as pat downs, with the intent of finding weapons, explosives, or other prohibited items. So even in the criminal context, TSOs’ screenings constitute searches. For those reasons, TSOs execute searches, as required by the proviso. Therefore, we conclude they are contemplated within the meaning of the phrase “any officer . . . empowered by law to execute searches.”3 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In consequence, TSOs satisfy the proviso’s definition of an investigative or law enforcement officer. D. Proviso as a Whole Reading the proviso as a whole does not alter our analysis. Its full text provides the following: [W]ith regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, “investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 3 In its brief, the government does not challenge that TSOs’ searches are for violations of federal law. Therefore, we assume that argument is waived. See United States v. Frausto, 636 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2011). -15- The proviso does not use the phrase traditional law enforcement to modify officers of the United States Government. Instead, it uses the phrase “investigative or law enforcement officers.” Id. (emphasis added). Certainly, the language used contemplates traditional law enforcement officers in various federal law enforcement agencies. But there is nothing in the language of the proviso to prevent TSOs from also being included as they perform their specialized searches to ensure public safety and national security. The proviso itself expressly defines the officers whose acts can cause injuries that are actionable irrespective of sovereign immunity. That definition is not narrow but broad as it includes “any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.” Id. (emphasis added). TSOs search persons and baggage for weapons and explosives which might be transported by plane in violation of federal law. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 46505 (providing criminal penalties for “[c]arrying a weapon or explosive on an aircraft”). Whether traditional or not, these officers fall into the class of “investigative or law enforcement officers.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The government also argues that legislative history4 indicates that Congress intended the proviso to refer to traditional law enforcement personnel. “In the usual case, if the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms, without reference to its legislative history.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Supervalu, Inc., 651 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). We decline to resort to legislative history to interpret the proviso. It is not ambiguous. 4 The government points out that the proviso was enacted in response to certain abusive police actions. See Appellee’s Br. at 15 (citing S. Rep. No. 93-588, at 8 (Nov. 29, 1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791). That may be true, but the language Congress ultimately enacted suggests a broader context. And per that language, the need to compensate citizens for injuries caused by certain acts of the government’s officers would obtain in airports as well as other locales. -16- The dissent views our reading as inconsistent with the “general rule that ambiguity in waivers of sovereign immunity are construed in favor of the government.” See infra. But as the Pellegrino majority indicated, the Supreme Court has held that conflicts “in the FTCA context” “do[] not implicate the general rule that a waiver of the Government’s sovereign immunity will be strictly construed . . . in favor of the sovereign.” Dolan, 546 U.S. at 491–92 (internal quotation omitted); see also Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 171–72. In Millbrook, the Court further counseled against “a cramped reading of the proviso.” Pellegrino, 937 F.3d at 172 (citing Millbrook, 569 U.S. at 56–57 (“declin[ing] to read . . . a limitation” of the law enforcement proviso’s waiver of sovereign immunity “into unambiguous text”)). In light of Millbrook and Dolan, two of our sister circuits have adopted similarly broad interpretations of the law enforcement proviso. See id.; Bunch v. United States, 880 F.3d 938, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2018). Our analysis here is consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions and our sister circuits’ interpretations. The dissent also believes that we should construe the proviso in the government’s favor because it is an exception to the exception. See Foster v. United States, 522 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We interpret not an exception to the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, but instead interpret an exception to the exception.”). But as discussed above, the Court’s language in Dolan is broad; it does direct application of strict construction “in the FTCA context.” 546 U.S. at 492. Whether analyzing an exception or an exception to the exception, we are within the FTCA context, and therefore the rule does not apply.5 5 In LaFromboise v. Leavitt, a panel of this court noted, even in light of Dolan, that “the scope of waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.” 439 F.3d 792, 795 (8th Cir. 2006). However, that panel was not interpreting the proviso and said that its statement was “not necessary to our conclusion.” Id. The language is dicta and thus nonbinding. See Boaz v. United States, 884 F.3d 808, 810–11 (8th Cir. 2018). -17- Thus, given the powers delegated to TSOs and the highly intrusive search techniques they are authorized to use, we find that they fall within the ordinary public meaning of the proviso’s definition of investigative or law enforcement officers. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). In enacting the proviso, Congress waived sovereign immunity for actions arising out of battery claims committed by such officers. Therefore, we hold that sovereign immunity does not bar Iverson’s battery claim. In addition, because the battery claim is not barred, Iverson’s negligence claim is not barred, regardless of whether it “aris[es] out of” his battery claim. See id. (stating that the proviso applies to “any claim arising . . . out of . . . battery”).