Opinion ID: 778658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy and violation of plea agreement

Text: 31 Garcia argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on grounds that the prosecution violated his plea agreement in an earlier case. He claims that his earlier guilty plea barred this prosecution because the government agreed not to charge him for acts which he committed prior to the date of the plea agreement and which he disclosed to the government, provided they were not crimes of violence or violations of Title 26 of the United States Code. 32 We review de novo the legal question of whether the government's conduct violates the terms of the plea agreement, 1 but Garcia bears the burden of proving the facts establishing a breach of the agreement — specifically, paragraph 9 providing that the government agrees [n]ot to charge Defendant with any other criminal violations concerning activities committed prior to the date of this agreement which the Defendant makes known to the United States and which did not involve crimes of violence or Title 26 offenses — by a preponderance of the evidence. 2 The uncontroverted evidence offered at the hearing on Garcia's motion established that Garcia did not disclose the crimes for which he is charged within the instant indictment. Garcia did not prove that the government breached paragraph 9 of his plea agreement by indicting Garcia in cause number 4:98-CR-47. We affirm the district court's denial of Garcia's motion to dismiss on these grounds.
33 Pineda argues that the district court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds because his indictment in an earlier case barred this prosecution for possession with intent to distribute heroin. 3 34 [W]hether a prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is a question of law and is reviewed de novo, but the district court's factual findings are reviewed only for clear error. 4 Pineda's challenge to the indictment fails. Pineda may be charged with conduct in a conspiracy count, as overt acts, in the instant indictment (4:98-CR-47) for criminal conduct of which he has previously been convicted under a different indictment (4:98-CR-3) under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 5 Even to the extent conduct charged in Counts 1, 19-21, 23-25, and 28 of the instant indictment was used as relevant conduct in sentencing Pineda in cause number 4:98-CR-3, there is no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the indictment for this conduct in the instant cause. Moreover, the sentences imposed on Pineda in the two cases run concurrently. 6 35 Collateral estoppel completely bars a subsequent prosecution only when a fact `necessarily determined' in the first prosecution is an essential element of the offense charged in the subsequent prosecution. 7 The facts necessary to the determination of Pineda's guilt for possession with intent to distribute heroin in cause number 4:98-CR-3 are not essential elements of the conspiracy charge in Count 1 of the instant indictment, even if alleged therein as overt acts. 8 The court did not err in denying Pineda's motion to dismiss.
36 Favela argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss Counts 1, 4, 5, and 13 of the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. He argues that he pled guilty in an earlier prosecution in state court to the exact transactions listed in Overt Acts 5, 6, and 16 in Count 1 of the instant indictment and that his prior conviction in state court is for the same alleged criminal conduct listed in Counts 1, 4, 5, and 13, all requiring the same elements, except for the conspiracy charge in Count 1. Favela argues that his claim is excepted from the dual sovereignty doctrine because of the comprehensive interaction between the state and federal agencies involved in his arrest. 9 37 It is well-established that, [u]nder the dual sovereignty doctrine, successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns for crimes arising out of the same acts are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, unless `prosecution by one sovereign is used as a tool for successive prosecution by another sovereign.' 10 However, [w]hen a defendant claims collusion between federal and state law enforcement officials, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence to show a prima facie double jeopardy claim. 11 The district court's determination of whether the defendant has come forward with evidence to show a prima facie case of collusion between the federal and state government is a factual finding we review only for clear error. 12 38 Favela's double jeopardy claim is without merit. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, there is no double jeopardy violation in any overlap that may exist between Favela's state court drug convictions and substantive counts or overt acts charged in the instant indictment. Favela has not established any clear error in the district court's finding that there was no collusion between the federal and state prosecutors in this case or, more specifically, that there was no evidence that the state prosecution of Favela was merely a tool of the federal authorities. The district court did not err in denying Favela's motion to dismiss. 39