Opinion ID: 1372032
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ORS 137.550(2) Discussed

Text: ORS 137.550(2) provides: At any time during the probation period, the court may issue a warrant and cause a defendant to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of probation.    Thereupon the court, after summary hearing, may revoke the probation and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be executed or, if no sentence has been imposed, impose any sentence which originally could have been imposed.    In the case of any defendant whose sentence has been suspended but who is not on probation, the court may issue a warrant and cause the defendant to be arrested and brought before the court at any time within the maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced. Thereupon the court, after summary hearing, may revoke the suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be executed. (Emphasis added.) ORS 137.550(2) provides that in probation revocation proceedings, the trial court may sentence a defendant according to the following rules: 1. Where a suspended sentence has been imposed, and probation granted, the probation and suspension of sentence may be revoked, and the trial judge can cause the sentence imposed to be executed. 2. Where no sentence has been imposed and probation has been granted, the court may revoke the probation and impose any sentence which originally could have been imposed. 3. Where defendant has a sentence imposed and suspended but is not placed on probation, the court may revoke the suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be executed. The parties do not agree as to the application of ORS 137.550(2). The state claims: (1) Under ORS 137.550(2), where no sentence has been imposed following conviction, the trial judge can later revoke probation and impose any sentence which originally could have been imposed following the first conviction. (2) Turner is inapplicable to probation revocation proceedings. (3) The Turner rule should be abandoned. Defendant contends: (1) Turner is applicable; the same reasons which led to our adoption of the Turner rationale in 1967 equally apply in probation revocation proceedings. (2) Under ORS 137.550(2), defendant cannot be sentenced to a term greater than that originally imposed, that being three years  the sentence imposed following the first conviction. The statute says that a judge who has previously imposed no sentence and granted probation may, following revocation of probation, impose any sentence which originally could have been imposed. Normally, this would mean the maximum allowable sentence under the appropriate penal statute. But in the situation of a second trial after a prior appeal and reversal, the sentencing judge (by virtue of Turner ) can impose no greater sentence than the sentence the earlier judge imposed before appeal. Thus, determining the meaning of the statute may require a choice between two possible constructions. The state's contention is that the words impose any sentence which originally could have been imposed mean that the sentencing judge  even a second sentencing judge  could impose up to the statutory maximum, that being the limit which could originally have been imposed following the first trial. The defendant argues that had Judge Allen (the judge who placed the defendant on probation) decided to sentence the defendant to prison in December, 1974, he was limited, under Turner, to a three-year sentence, that that is the maximum sentence which originally could have been imposed following revocation of probation. We find it unnecessary to construe the statute, for we are of the opinion that even if the statute were construed as the defendant claims, the Turner rule should not be applicable following revocation of probation.