Opinion ID: 1848390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the forfeiture cases

Text: In Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So.2d 56 (Fla.1992), the State sought civil forfeiture of Caggiano's residence following Caggiano's conviction on one count of racketeering in violation of the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and fifteen counts of bookmaking. The State sought forfeiture of Caggiano's homestead on the grounds that the property was used by Caggiano in the course of racketeering activity. Id. This Court, in rejecting the State's attempted distinction between forfeitures and the constitution's reference to forced sale[s], held that article X, section 4 prohibited the forfeiture of Caggiano's homestead: Consequently, in light of the historical prejudice against forfeiture, the constitutional sanctity of the home, and the rules of construction requiring a liberal, nontechnical interpretation of the homestead exemption and a strict construction of the exceptions to that exemption, we hold that article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution prohibits civil or criminal forfeiture of homestead property. Id. at 61. While our conclusion was influenced by the legally disfavored status of forfeitures, [6] paramount in our reasoning was the plain language of the homestead provision and the strict construction of the exceptions enumerated therein: Most significantly, article X, section 4 expressly provides for three exceptions to the homestead exemption. Forfeiture is not one of them. According to the plain and unambiguous wording of article X, section 4, a homestead is only subject to forced sale for (1) the payment of taxes and assessments thereon; (2) obligations contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereof; or (3) obligations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the realty. Under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alteriousthe expression of one thing is the exclusion of another forfeitures are not excluded from the homestead exemption because they are not mentioned, either expressly or by reasonable implication, in the three exceptions that are expressly stated. Id. at 60 (first emphasis added). Notably, we rejected the State's attempt to imply an exception for homesteads acquired through criminal or immoral conduct: The homestead provision of our Constitution sets forth the exceptions and provides the method of waiving the homestead rights attached to the residence. These exceptions are unqualified. They create no personal qualifications touching the moral character of the resident nor do they undertake to exclude the vicious, the criminal, or the immoral from the benefits so provided. The law provides for punishment of persons convicted of illegal acts, but this forfeiture of homestead rights guaranteed by our Constitution is not part of the punishment. Id. at 60 (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Apt v. Mitchell, 194 Kan. 463, 399 P.2d 556, 558 (1965)). We were again faithful to our strict construction of the exceptions to the exemption five years later in Tramel v. Stewart, 697 So.2d 821 (Fla.1997). In Tramel, the Stewarts faced forfeiture of their homestead under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act after they were arrested for selling marijuana and a search of their home revealed drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a sophisticated marijuana growing operation. [7] The State thus sought forfeiture of the Stewarts' real and personal property, claiming that the property was either being used as an instrumentality of the drug operation or that the property was acquired with funds obtained from the drug activity. Consistent with Caggiano, we held: As we found in respect to the Florida RICO Act in Caggiano, we find that article X, section 4, does not provide an exception for the forfeiture of homestead property for a violation of the Forfeiture Act. The homestead guarantee uses broad language protecting the homestead from involuntary divestiture by the courts. The constitutional protection of homesteads has not changed since our discussion in Caggiano to include forfeiture as one of the enumerated exceptions. In the absence of such a provision, this court cannot judicially create one. Tramel, 697 So.2d at 824 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). [8] Indeed, it is on the strength of our decisions in Caggiano and Tramel that several federal courts have rejected attempts by creditors to enforce claims against homestead property. In Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Lang, 898 F.Supp. 883 (S.D.Fla.1995), the Langs, New Jersey residents, owned and operated a New Jersey educational training business for which they secured $1.8 million in financing from Bank Leumi in exchange for corporate promissory notes and personal guarantees. Id. at 884. The Langs' business filed for bankruptcy in 1989 and Bank Leumi filed suit in New Jersey federal district court to collect on the Langs' debt in April of 1990. Id. In May of 1990, the Langs sold their New Jersey home for $940,000, purchasing a home the following month in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, for $522,000. [9] Id. Bank Leumi obtained a $1.8 million judgment against the Langs in November of 1990 and filed a post-judgment petition seeking to enforce the judgment against the Langs' Palm Beach Gardens home. Id. In its findings of fact, the district court determined that the Langs converted their nonexempt assets into the exempt homestead for the sole purpose of hindering and avoiding their creditors and defeating their claims. Id. at 885. Nevertheless, the court concluded, albeit reluctantly, that Florida's homestead exemption did not except property acquired with the intent to hinder and defeat the claims of creditors from its protection: [T]he homestead exemption does not contain an exception for real property which is acquired in the state of Florida for the sole purpose of defeating the claims of out-of-state creditors. In light of the Supreme Court's admonition in Caggiano that the three exceptions to the homestead exemption should be read narrowly, this Court is unwilling to graft an additional exception. Id. at 887. Several bankruptcy courts have followed Bank Leumi 's lead, reading the exceptions to the exemption strictly consistent with Caggiano and Tramel. See In re Young, 235 B.R. 666 (M.D.Fla. 1999); In re Hendricks, 237 B.R. 821 (M.D.Fla.1999); In re Lazin, 221 B.R. 982 (M.D.Fla.1998); In re Clements, 194 B.R. 923 (M.D.Fla.1996); In re Lane, 190 B.R. 125 (S.D.Fla.1995); In re Popek, 188 B.R. 701 (S.D.Fla.1995). Nevertheless, the petitioner and amici curiae argue that this Court has not hesitated to reach beyond the literal language of the exemption to allow the imposition of equitable liens against homestead property used as an instrument of fraud or imposition upon creditors. Milton, 58 So. at 719. Admittedly, we have strayed from the literal language of the exemption where the equities have demanded it; however, we have done so rarely and always with due regard to the exceptions provided in article X, section 4.