Opinion ID: 2713050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: applying the griffith dissent

Text: The key provisions of the no-fault act applicable to this case are MCL 500.3105(1)1 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a).2 I continue to believe that Justice MARILYN KELLY provided the proper interpretation of these statutes in her Griffith dissent. See Griffith, 472 Mich at 542-554 (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting). Specifically, MCL 500.3105(1) establishes that an insured is eligible for certain benefits as long as the insured is injured in a motor vehicle accident. Thus, the only limitations placed on the benefits are the limitations stated in MCL 500.3107(1)(a). Id. at 543-546. This is true because “the Legislature did not expressly limit the expenses recoverable in no-fault cases to those that the injured person did not require before the injury.” Id. at 548. Thus, it was the Griffith majority, not the Legislature, that created the additional restriction that 1 MCL 500.3105(1) states: Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter. 2 MCL 500.3107(1) states in relevant part: [P]ersonal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following: (a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation. 2 personal injury protection (PIP) benefits are not recoverable for expenses that were necessary before the injury. Id. Applying the Griffith dissent’s interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions to this case, plaintiff clearly satisfied MCL 500.3105(1) given the catastrophic injuries plaintiff suffered in the motor vehicle accident. Next, it is necessary to determine whether the cost of the van is “reasonably necessary” for plaintiff’s “care.” As Justice MARILYN KELLY explained, in order to ensure that the word “care” in MCL 500.3107(1)(a) has a meaning independent of the words “rehabilitation” and “recovery,” the word “care” should be defined as “the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and protection of someone.” Griffith, 472 Mich at 547 (citation and quotation marks omitted).3 Although a van is not as obviously necessary for a person’s “welfare and protection” as the food at issue in Griffith, I think that the facts presented in this case adequately indicate that the van is reasonably necessary for plaintiff’s care because a van is the only mode of personal transportation available that will accommodate plaintiff’s severe injuries resulting from the motor vehicle accident. 3 The majority repeats the Griffith majority’s unfounded claim that this definition of “care” engulfs “rehabilitation” and “recovery.” Griffith, 472 Mich at 534 n 10. However, as Justice MARILYN KELLY explained, under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, “‘care’ fits with ‘recovery’ and ‘rehabilitation’ when ‘care’ is interpreted broadly to mean ‘the provision of what is necessary for the welfare and protection of someone’” because “[t]he Legislature intended that an injured person’s needs be furnished (‘care’) until ‘recovery’ has been accomplished through ‘rehabilitation.’” Id. at 547 (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting). The majority’s overly narrow definition of “care,” however, “turns ‘care’ into a mere redundancy.” Id. 3 The simplicity of applying the Griffith dissent’s interpretation of the plain language of MCL 500.3105 and MCL 500.3107(1)(a) is consistent with the long-held principle that the Legislature intended that the no-fault act be construed liberally “in favor of the persons intended to benefit from it.” Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 28; 528 NW2d 681 (1995). Likewise, the Griffith dissent’s approach addresses this Court’s oft-repeated concern regarding cost containment, because the dissent’s approach would eliminate much of the costly litigation spawned by the Griffith majority’s erroneous analysis, which will only be perpetuated by the majority opinion’s modifications to the Griffith majority’s analysis in this case.4 Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals because plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits under MCL 500.3107(1)(a).