Opinion ID: 1974989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Anderson Appeal

Text: Defendant Anderson claims reversible error in the Justice's instructions to the jury in relation to what constitutes knowing conduct underlying one type of culpable state of mind in murder. We disagree. To support a conviction of murder under 17-A M.R.S.A., § 201(1)(A), the State must either prove that it was the defendant's conscious object to cause the death of his victim (17-A M.R.S.A., § 10(1)(A)) [the culpable state of mind intended by the term intentionally in the murder statute  see note 2, supra] or that the defendant was aware that it was practically certain that his conduct would cause Lalumiere's death (17-A M.R.S.A., § 10(2)(A)) [the culpable state of mind intended by the term knowingly in the reference murder statute]. The trial Justice did instruct the jury correctly respecting the requisite mens rea in murder when he explained to them what was meant by intentional and knowing conduct necessary to support the prerequired culpable state of mind in the crime of murder. Although the Maine Criminal Code definitionally states that a person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result, here, the trial Justice did not confine himself to the exact statutory definition, but told the jury, in the alternative, that the defendant acted knowingly if he knew that death would almost certainly result from his conduct. We reject the defendant's contention that the Justice's amplification in his definition of knowing conduct introduced a lower standard of evidentiary proof than the statutory requirement or practical certainty between cause and effect. The word certain, standing alone, used in the context of cause to effect, connotes, amongst other things, the sense of being exact and precise, sure and dependable. It is the antonym of doubtful. When conjoined with either of the words practically or almost, it then loses its characteristic of absolute exactitude or definitive sureness and embraces, instead, the qualitative concept of certainty to all practical purposes though not entirely or absolutely so (practically) or certainty to a very close degree of correctness (almost). Webster's Third New International Dictionary, in defining the word practically, indicates the near-identical conceptualization of the two terms, since one of the meanings given to practically is nearly, almost. In our view, the jury understood the dual phraseology as being synonymous. There was no error.
Defendant Anderson argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he intentionally or knowingly killed Lalumiere, and that, at most, the evidence supports a conviction of manslaughter only. This argument is to no avail. The State's evidence showed that the fatal bullet which killed Lalumiere passed through the victim's chest, heart and lung. Anderson himself testified that he knew the gun was loaded, that he intentionally pulled the trigger, and that, after firing once, he pulled back the hammer of the single action pistol in preparation for a second shot. Where the existence of a culpable state of mind such as a conscious object to cause death (intentional conduct) or an awareness that it is practically certain that death will result from the actor's conduct (knowing conduct) is a necessary constituent of the crime of murder, the intent with which the accused committed the acts underlying the criminal accusation must be proved as any other fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Such proof of the accused's intent at the time of the commission of the alleged criminal act may be drawn from the act itself or from the existing circumstances surrounding the incident, as well as from any other evidence having a legitimate tendency to shed light upon the accused's intent or mental state at the time. See State v. Gagne, Me., 362 A.2d 166, 174 (1976); State v. Pinnette, Me., 340 A.2d 17, 21 (1975); State v. Eaton, Me., 309 A.2d 334, 339 (1973). Thus, the defendant's testimony regarding his subjective intent at the time the shooting occurred was admissible evidence, because it could have an important bearing with the jury in revealing the defendant's state of mind. See State v. Clark, Me., 394 A.2d 779, 782 (1978). One's state of mind, since it is the result of a mental process, may be established by direct proof of it from the person who has formulated the foundational intent, but such evidence, although competent, is not conclusive upon the triers of fact. State v. Nathan, 138 Conn. 485, 86 A.2d 322 (1952); People v. Levan, 295 N.Y. 26, 64 N.E.2d 341, 345 (1945). The accused may testify as to his state of mind at the time of the homicide, but the jury is not bound by his statement and may consider the attendant circumstances in resolving the true character of his act, including the degree of criminality involved therein. See Walker v. People, 175 Colo. 173, 489 P.2d 584, 586 (1971). The jury was not required to accept Anderson's testimony that he merely intended to wound Lalumiere by shooting him in the arm. The location of the fatal bullet wound supported the contrary inference that the defendant intended to kill Lalumiere. In addition, Anderson's testimony that he fired when he saw Lalumiere was making a move for a gun supports the conclusion that the defendant shot to kill Lalumiere in order to preserve his own life. Finally, the conclusion that Lalumiere's death was Anderson's conscious object is further supported by Anderson's own testimony that he pulled back the pistol hammer to prepare it for a second shot, indicating that he was prepared to finish the job of killing Lalumiere, if a second shot proved necessary to accomplish that result. Alternatively, the jury could conclude that, even if it was not Anderson's purpose to kill Lalumiere, the evidence that he fired a shot into the victim's chest from a relatively close range supports the conclusion that Anderson was aware that his conduct made Lalumiere's death practically certain. We conclude that the evidence adduced by the State was sufficient to support the jury's verdict that Anderson was guilty, beyond any reasonable doubt, of the murder of Joseph H. Lalumiere, Sr., and that the jury was justified in rejecting Anderson's exculpatory statements in the face of attendant physical facts and conduct so unreasonable and inconsistent with the experience of mankind. See State v. Bevineau, 460 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo.1970).
On March 31, 1978 Anderson's counsel filed a motion to sever his trial from that of Sabatino pursuant to Rule 14, M.R.Crim.P. [4] The motion for severance stated that only the co-defendants are in a position to know who committed the crime for which they are charged. It further alleged that, from what occurred at a pretrial bail hearing, Sabatino's trial strategy would be to place all blame for the murder on Anderson. Asserting that prejudice from a joint trial was inherently probable, given the possibility of antagonistic defenses, Anderson's counsel prayed that Anderson and Sabatino be tried separately. On April 12, 1978 a hearing was held on the motion. The presiding Justice heard the legal arguments of counsel but received no evidence. The sole ground advanced by Anderson's counsel in support of his motion was the possibility of antagonistic defenses. Although Anderson's argument was based on testimony adduced at a prior bail hearing, the transcript of that hearing was not presented to the Justice hearing the pretrial severance motion until May 1, 1978, eleven days after the presiding Justice denied the severance motion. At no time during the trial did Anderson renew his motion for severance, nor did the trial Justice deem it necessary to grant a severance, sua sponte, to protect the rights of either defendant. [5] We have noted on prior occasions that joint trials are generally favored in the interest of conserving judicial resources, avoiding duplicative trials, minimizing the public expenditure of funds and promptly bringing the accused to trial. See United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 529 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958, 92 S.Ct. 327, 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971), quoted in State v. Rich, Me., 395 A.2d 1123, 1128 (1978). On the other hand, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to confront and cross examine all witnesses against him, and this right, secured by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution, may be jeopardized where a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements incriminating the defendant are admitted in evidence, and the declarant does not take the stand at the joint trial. See Parker v. Randolph,  U.S. ____, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In State v. Wing, Me., 294 A.2d 418 (1972), we set out in detail the procedure to be followed, where one defendant demands a severance on the ground that a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements will be admitted at trial, to avoid endangering the defendant's Sixth-Fourteenth Amendment confrontation rights. The Wing court approved of the practice proposed by the American Bar Association's Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial § 2.3. [6] No detailed pretrial examination of the substance of co-defendant Sabatino's extrajudicial statements was conducted in this case. The failure to conduct this inquiry, however, is attributable to the failure of Anderson's defense counsel to indicate clearly in his March 31, 1978 severance motion that Sabatino's incriminating extrajudicial statements were at the heart of Anderson's contention that he would suffer prejudice from a joint trial. The mere mention of antagonistic defenses was not sufficient to alert the motion Justice that a potential Bruton problem existed. Thus, we find no error in the motion Justice's denial of Anderson's pretrial severance motion. The record clearly shows, however, that the trial Justice was well aware of the Bruton problem and that he discussed it thoroughly with all counsel before the trial began. The prosecuting attorney explained that he intended to use extrajudicial statements made by both defendants and that each in their respective statements implicated the other. The State intended to avoid any Bruton problem, so he maintained, by demonstrating that each co-defendant affirmed and adopted the extrajudicial statements of the other, thus making them admissible against both defendants, as the admissions of one, and the adoptive admissions of the other. [7] Where the statements of a co-defendant are adopted by the other defendant, the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause is no longer operative, since the defendant's constitutional privilege is to enjoy the right to be confronted with, i. e. to cross-examine, the witnesses against him, not himself. In assessing the trial Justice's decision not to order a severance of the joint trial, we must address the issue, whether or not the trial Justice properly concluded that the extrajudicial statements of co-defendant Sabatino were adopted and affirmed by defendant Anderson.
Anderson contends that Sabatino's extrajudicial statements were not admissible against him, because the State's evidence did not show that he, Anderson, adopted Sabatino's statements as his own. There are two sets of statements made by Sabatino which are challenged by Anderson, those made prior to the robbery and those made following its commission.