Opinion ID: 297280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the discharge question

Text: 18 The second issue before this Court is whether the district court abused its discretion in ordering the outright release of the appellee. 2 No unusual or exceptional circumstances were present to justify the immediate release. The discharge order should have been delayed for a reasonable time so as to afford the state an opportunity to correct the defects on which the order was based. 19 28 U.S.C. § 2243 directs a trial court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to dispose of the matter as law and justice require. However, the prevailing practice under this mandate is to delay the petitioner's discharge so as to allow the state reasonable time in which to retry the petitioner if it wishes to do so. See, e. g., Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 444, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed.2d 751 (1961); Wynn v. Page, 390 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1968); Miller v. State of Oklahoma, 363 F.2d 843, 844 (10th Cir. 1966). 20 The court in Wynn v. Page, supra, said that delaying the petitioner's discharge was procedurally appropriate in part because of the caution with which federal courts impose jurisdiction in cases involving state processes. Wynn v. Page, supra, 390 F.2d at 546. Furthermore, the determination that Ridge's plea was coerced was not, of course, an adjudication of his guilt or innocence. Id. Setting aside the conviction cleared the record and cleared the way for Utah to retry the defendant if it saw fit to do so. It follows then that petitioner remains subject to being apprehended and retried on the original charge which is still pending. See, e. g., Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 366 U.S. at 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639. 21 If the district court's order were based on defects which the state could not correct or if, for instance, a new trial were a practical impossibility, then an outright release would be appropriate. But where — as here — it is a matter of rearraignment, the proper course was to delay the discharge order for a reasonable period of time. If the state fails to retry the appellee within such a reasonable time, the writ could issue and could be made final. 22 The trial court's judgment voiding the plea of guilty as involuntary is affirmed. 23 The trial court's order discharging petitioner is reversed. The State of Utah can validly reapprehend the petitioner and proceed to retry him if it elects to do so. 24 The mandate in the instant case shall issue forthwith. The clerk of the district court is ordered to forthwith issue all necessary process, including the issuance of a bench warrant, to effectuate our mandate. Such, however, shall in no way be interpreted as limiting the warden, or any other authorized officer of the State of Utah, from using state authority to effectuate the return of the petitioner to the custody of the warden.