Opinion ID: 1762983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Redrafted Contract

Text: Martinson first asserts that Hjellum was negligent in redrafting the December 1977 contract between Oakes and the Martinsons. He relies primarily on our statement in Oakes Farming Ass'n, supra, 318 N.W.2d at 908, that the contract is, at best, confusing or ambiguous as to what was actually purchased by Martinson. After hearing expert testimony on the issue, the trial court found that Hjellum exercised the appropriate degree of care in redrafting the purchase agreement because the first agreement was vague and unclear and Hjellum worked diligently with what his clients furnished him to better protect his clients. A lawyer, without an express agreement, `is not a guarantor ... that the instruments he will draft will be held valid by the court of last resort.' Feil, supra, 193 N.W.2d at 224 [quoting McCullough v. Sullivan, 102 N.J.L. 381, 384, 132 A. 102, 103 (1926)]. See also Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal.3d 303, 146 Cal.Rptr. 218, 578 P.2d 935 (1978); Dillard Smith Const. Co. v. Greene, 337 So.2d 841 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1976). A successfully asserted claim of legal malpractice requires more than the fact, standing alone, that a trial or appellate court interpreted a document differently than the lawyer or his client assumed they would. Denzer v. Rouse, 48 Wis.2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970). The record reflects that Hjellum redrafted the agreement because of various omissions in the contract. The proposed contract failed to describe the real or personal property to be sold and the amounts remaining due on the contracts to be assumed by the Martinsons. Hjellum incorporated into the agreement the contract for deed and installment sales contract between Oakes and the Streichs and the contract for deed between Oakes and the Spitzers, and also added a provision that the Martinsons would have up to one year to pay $420,000 as additional earnest money. Although the Martinsons provided Hjellum with a list of the personal property to be purchased, they had forgotten to bring an inventory allocating individual amounts to the personal property. It appears that both parties were anxious to consummate the purchase and wished to have the agreement expedited. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Hjellum did not negligently redraft the agreement. Martinson also asserts that Hjellum created an ambiguity in the contract by including a provision that Oakes warranted good title to the real property obtained through the contracts for deed with the Streichs and Spitzers, even though the Oakes-Streich contract was subject to an option to purchase a 100-acre tract in favor of the Oakes Community Industrial Development Corporation. According to Martinson, Hjellum did not insist that a title search be conducted before the agreement was executed. It appears from the record that the Martinsons were aware of the option. The expert witness for the defense testified that conducting a title search at this stage of the proceedings would not be the usual or customary practice of attorneys because of the Martinsons' relatively limited initial investment and their request to expedite the matter. This testimony adequately supports the trial court's finding. Cf. O'Brien v. Noble, 106 Ill.App.3d 126, 61 Ill.Dec. 857, 435 N.E.2d 554 (1982). Martinson also contends that Hjellum failed to incorporate in the contract alleged promises made by Oakes that it would provide the Martinsons assistance and advice regarding the potato operation. Hjellum denied being informed of the promises prior to the date the agreement was consummated. A trial court is not bound to accept as truth the testimony of any particular witness, and where the trial court chooses between two permissible views of the evidence, its decision on the matter is not clearly erroneous. Bismarck Realty Co. v. Folden, 354 N.W.2d 636 (N.D.1984).