Opinion ID: 822504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Habeas Corpus

Text: As an initial matter, we wish to address a concern first articulated by James Armstrong, the assistant prosecutor, in responding to Petitioner’s filing of the subject habeas 12 The relief that the trial court awarded Petitioner in terms of altering the type of his electronic-monitoring device; providing for daily exercise time outside of his home; and authorizing out-of-state medical treatment was a modification of the terms of Mr. Elder’s home incarceration rather than a remedy warranted under principles of habeas corpus. 6 petition. Given that the post-conviction habeas statute provides relief to someone who is “incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment,” Mr. Armstrong questioned whether an individual who is not incarcerated in a prison or jail cell has standing to assert a postconviction habeas claim. See W.Va. Code § 53-4A-1. Echoing this argument, Respondent Scolapia, the Home Incarceration Supervisor for Harrison County, reasons that individuals on home confinement are not entitled to seek relief in habeas corpus based on our previous recognition that the definition of incarceration entails “confinement in a jail or penitentiary.” See State ex rel. Goff v. Merrifield, 191 W.Va. 473, 477, 446 S.E.2d 695, 699 (1994). Not only does Respondent fail to attribute Black’s Law Dictionary as the proper source of that definition, but she overlooks the reason for the lexical reference in Merrifield. This Court’s reference to the common usage of the term “incarceration” was prompted by a need to determine whether confinement within the county jail as a condition of probation qualified as a “sentence” for purposes of applying statutory good time credit. See Merrifield, 191 W.Va. at 476-78, 446 S.E.2d at 698-700 (discussing application of W.Va. Code § 7-8-11). As we made clear in State v. Lewis, 195 W.Va. 282, 465 S.E.2d 384 (1995): The statute being interpreted governs whether home incarceration is encompassed within its reach. Id. at 288, 465 S.E.2d at 390. Applying that concept in Lewis, this Court decided that for purposes of the probation statute “home incarceration is not considered the same as actual confinement in a county jail.” 195 W.Va. at 288, 465 S.E.2d at 390 (interpreting W.Va. Code § 62-12-9(b)). Critically, this Court’s interpretation of “incarceration” or “home 7 incarceration,” as those terms relate to the good time credit statute and the probation statute, have no bearing on the meaning of such terms for purposes of the habeas statute under review. See W.Va. Code § 53-4A-1. Until today, this Court has never squarely addressed the issue of whether home incarceration constitutes the qualifying level of incarceration for purposes of seeking postconviction relief in habeas corpus. See id. Federal law leaves no doubt that the remedy of habeas corpus is available to individuals on home incarceration. Beginning with its seminal decision in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963), the United States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the “in custody” triggering language of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to extend to any situation where there are significant restraints on an individual’s liberty. 371 U.S. at 242-43. The high court ruled in Jones that a parolee came within the ambit of the “in custody” requirement based on the numerous limitations placed upon his personal freedom, including the ongoing possibility that he could be rearrested at any time upon a violation of a term or condition of his parole. Id.; see Hatch v. Lapin, 660 F.Supp.2d 104, 108 (D. Mass. 2009) (holding that revocation of home confinement was proper subject of federal habeas corpus laws); Davis v. Nassau County, 524 F.Supp.2d 182, 187 (E.D. N.Y. 2007) (stating that “[p]hysical confinement is not necessary to satisfy the ‘in custody’ requirement” of federal habeas corpus statutes); U.S. ex rel. Wojtycha v. Hopkins, 517 F.2d 420, 423-24 (3d Cir. 1975) (extending rationale of Jones to individuals on 8 probation); see generally Syl. Pt. 4, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925) (recognizing origin of writ of habeas corpus as challenge to improper restraint of liberty or custody). Under the controlling habeas statute, post-conviction relief may be sought by “[a]ny person convicted of a crime and incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment.” W.Va. Code § 53-4A-1. While Respondent argues that Mr. Elder’s confinement in his own home pursuant to the Home Incarceration Act disqualifies him from seeking post-conviction habeas relief, we disagree. See W.Va. Code §§ 62-11B-1 to -13 (2010). We are not persuaded by Respondent’s contention that the use of an alternate means of sentencing such as home incarceration prevents an individual from asserting constitutional challenges13 to his or her sentence. What is critical to the assertion of a post-conviction challenge to a criminal sentence is whether that individual is “incarcerated” within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 53-4A-1. In the same manner that the United State Supreme Court analyzed the trigger for habeas corpus relief under federal law, we focus on whether there are substantial restraints on an individual’s freedom to assist us in identifying the requisite basis for seeking 13 It is axiomatic that habeas corpus proceedings are limited to matters of constitutional significance. See Edwards v. Leverette, 163 W.Va. 571, 576, 258 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1979) (distinguishing nature of review in direct appeals as compared to habeas corpus proceedings). 9 habeas corpus relief under state law. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 242. The fact that Petitioner is serving his sentence in an alternate fashion subject to the terms of the Home Incarceration Act does not mean that he has the freedom to come and go as he pleases; his daily activities are subject to both the supervision and control of the Home Incarceration Office. See State v. Long, 192 W.Va. 109, 111, 450 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1994) (recognizing that “entire statutory scheme [of Home Incarceration Act] is designed to place substantial restrictions on the offender”). The bulk of Petitioner’s complaints evidence his frustration with the significant restrictions imposed on his daily life under the terms of his home incarceration.14 Mr. Elder’s ongoing attempts to reduce the severity of those restrictions further manifest the appreciable nature of those restrictions. As the assistant prosecutor correctly observed in responding to Mr. Elder’s habeas petition, “[h]ome confinement is not designed to be fun or enjoyable, nor is it supposed to afford a confinee with the same liberties he or she enjoyed prior to being placed on home confinement.” Just as the United State Supreme Court equated the “in custody” trigger of the federal habeas corpus statutes with the imposition of significant restraints on an individual’s 14 Petitioner’s former counsel, Thomas G. Dyer, testified at the omnibus hearing that Mr. Elder called him once a week for several weeks at the beginning of the period of home incarceration and indicated that he “wasn’t going to be able to survive these strict terms and conditions of home confinement.” Mr. Dyer testified that Matt DeLuca, the sex offender counselor, called on Petitioner’s behalf and similarly related that Mr. Elder was not “tolerating the rather strict terms of this home confinement too well.” 10 “liberty to do those things which . . . free men are entitled to do,” we find the existence of significant restraints on Petitioner’s freedoms to be indicative of whether he is “incarcerated” for purposes of post-conviction habeas review. Jones, 371 U.S. at 243; W.Va. Code § 53­ 4A-1. As the record in this case makes clear, Petitioner does not enjoy the liberty to freely wander the physical confines of his yard, let alone his community, this state, or this country. Virtually every decision that he makes with regard to exiting his house is subject to the terms of the home incarceration order. And, as is the case with any offender,15 a violation of the terms of the controlling incarceration order can result in the revocation of that alternate means of sentencing and the imposition of a traditional sentence in the penitentiary or jail. See W.Va. Code § 62-11B-5(2) (requiring that home incarceration order contain “[n]otice to the offender of the penalties which may be imposed if the circuit court or magistrate subsequently finds the offender to have violated the terms and conditions in the order of home incarceration”); see also Horton v. Dobbs, 2011 WL 3606369 at  (N.D. W.Va. 2011) (discussing authority of home incarceration supervisor to arrest “home incarceration participant when reasonable cause exists to believe that such participant has violated the conditions of his or her home incarceration”). Finally, the decision to retitle the Home 15 Under the Home Incarceration Act, an “offender” is defined as “any adult convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment or detention in a county jail or state penitentiary; or a juvenile convicted of a delinquent act that would be a crime punishable by imprisonment or incarceration in the state penitentiary or county jail, if committed by an adult.” W.Va. Code § 62-11B-3(3). 11 Confinement Act as the Home Incarceration Act,16 suggests a legislative recognition that individuals who are serving their criminal sentences within the confines of their respective homes are to be viewed as incarcerated rather than merely confined. See W.Va. Code § 62­ 11B-3. Based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that an offender who has been sentenced pursuant to the Home Incarceration Act and is accordingly subject to substantial restrictions on his or her liberty by virtue of the terms and conditions imposed by a home incarceration order, which include arrest and resentencing for a violation of those terms and conditions, is “incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment” for purposes of seeking postconviction habeas corpus relief under West Virginia Code § 53-4A-1. In view of the clear and undisputed restrictions of a substantial nature that are currently imposed on Petitioner pursuant to the governing home incarceration order combined with the ongoing possibility that his alternative sentence could be revoked at any time, we have no difficulty in viewing him as “incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment.” Id. As a result, Mr. Elder is entitled to seek post-conviction habeas relief pursuant to West Virginia Code § 53-4A-1 for his claims that are grounded in constitutional law.17 16 See supra note 1. 17 See supra note 13. 12