Opinion ID: 890164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the District Court erred in granting Johnson's motion for a change of venue to his county of residence.

Text: ¶ 9 Venue is determined by the status of the parties and pleadings at the time of the complaint or at the time the moving party appears in the action. Lockhead v. Weinstein, 2001 MT 132, ¶ 5, 305 Mont. 438, 28 P.3d 1081. Section 25-2-114, MCA, permits a defendant to move for a change of venue when an action is brought in a county not designated as the proper place for trial. ¶ 10 Section 25-2-118, MCA, the general rule for venue in civil actions, provides in pertinent part: (1) Except as provided in subsection (3) [concerning family law matters], the proper place of trial for all civil actions is the county in which the defendants or any of them reside at the commencement of the action. (2) If none of the defendants reside in the state, the proper place of trial for a contract action is as provided in 25-2-121(1)(b) or (2) and the proper place of trial for a tort action is as provided in 25-2-122(2) or (3). [Emphasis added.] With respect to tort actions, § 25-2-122, MCA, states: (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (4), the proper place of trial for a tort action is: (a) the county in which the defendant or any of them reside at the commencement of the action; or (b) the county in which the tort was committed. . . . (2) If the defendant is a corporation incorporated in a state other than Montana, the proper place of trial for a tort action is: (a) the county in which the tort was committed; (b) the county in which the plaintiff resides; or (c) the county in which the corporation's resident agent is located, as required by law. [Emphasis added.] ¶ 11 Ward argues that § 25-2-122(2), MCA, controls here because Powder River is incorporated in a state other than Montana. Johnson asserts that subsection is applicable only where an out-of-state corporation is sued independently, or with another out-of-state corporation or individual. Finding our precedent determinative, we agree with Ward that subsection (2) allowed her to file her complaint in Yellowstone County. ¶ 12 In Nelson, the plaintiff filed his complaint in Lewis and Clark County, alleging tort claims against three corporate entities and two individual defendants. Nelson, ¶ 3. CHS, Inc., the successor-in-interest to the three corporate defendants, was incorporated and maintained its principal place of business in Minnesota. CHS's registered agent in Montana was located in Lewis and Clark County. The two individual defendants were residents of Yellowstone County, and Nelson resided in Missoula County. The district court denied CHS's motion for a change of venue and this Court affirmed. Nelson, ¶ 13. We reaffirmed that § 25-2-118(2), MCA, did not apply where one or more of the defendants reside[s] in Montana. Nelson, ¶ 12 (citing Platt v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 222 Mont. 184, 187, 721 P.2d 336, 338 (1986)). We disagreed with CHS's argument that § 25-2-122(1), MCA, required the case to be brought in the resident defendants' county of residence. Rejecting the contention that subsection (1) controlled because subsections (2) and (3) only applied where none of the defendants reside[s] in Montana, we stated that when § 25-2-118(2), MCA, is inapplicable, venue must be determined according to other venue statutes. Nelson, ¶¶ 11-12 (emphasis added). We held that Lewis and Clark County was a proper place for trial under § 25-2-122(2), MCA, and Nelson was legally correct in filing his complaint there. Nelson, ¶ 13. ¶ 13 Nelson compels a similar conclusion in this case. We agree with Johnson that Pondera County would have been a proper place for trial under § 25-2-122(1), MCA. Nonetheless, because Powder River is incorporated in a state other than Montana, § 25-2-122(2), MCA, also specifies a proper place for trial. Accordingly, Ward's decision to file her complaint in Yellowstone County was legally correct under § 25-2-122(2)(b), MCA. ¶ 14 Johnson attempts to distinguish Nelson by noting that in that case it was CHS, the out-of-state corporation, that challenged venue; here, Johnson, the in-state individual defendant, is asserting his right to have the trial conducted in his county of residence as provided by § 25-2-118(1), MCA. This distinction is not supported by our construction of the statute in Nelson. Our decision there did not depend on which defendant sought a change of venue, but on whether one or more of the defendants was a Montana resident. ¶ 15 We recognize the historical preference of the law for defendants to be sued in their county of residence ( See Hardenburgh v. Hardenburgh, 115 Mont. 469, 475, 146 P.2d 151, 153 (1944); McNussen v. Graybeal, 141 Mont. 571, 578-79, 380 P.2d 575, 578-79 (1963)). Johnson makes a plausible argument for construction of the venue statutes, but it is one we already rejected in Nelson. If our holding there does not accurately reflect the intent of the statute, it remains the prerogative of the Legislature to amend it. Certain v. Tonn, 2009 MT 330, ¶ 18, 353 Mont. 21, 220 P.3d 384 (citing Sampson v. Natl. Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 2006 MT 241, ¶ 20, 333 Mont. 541, 144 P.3d 797). The Legislature has not done so; therefore our interpretation in Nelson controls. ¶ 16 Moreover, the law makes clear that where there are two or more defendants, a proper place of trial for any defendant is proper for all defendants. Section 25-2-117, MCA. This statute is intended to apply to all venue provisions. Weiss v. State, 219 Mont. 447, 450, 712 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1986). [T]he right to move for a change of venue under § 25-2-117, MCA, applies only if the action is filed in a county that is a proper place of trial for none of the defendants. Farmers Union Ass'n v. Paquin, 2009 MT 305, ¶ 12, 352 Mont. 390, 217 P.3d 74 (emphasis added). Since Yellowstone County is a proper county for trial as to defendant Powder River under § 25-2-122(2), MCA, it also is a proper county as to Johnson.