Opinion ID: 546225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: evidence questions

Text: 280 1. Expert Testimony, Special Agent James Kossler 281 Special FBI Agent James Kossler testified as an expert as to the structure of organized crime families within the Italian Mafia. Tr. 9/30/88 at 47. He also explained the meaning of coded language used by the co-conspirators in intercepted conversations concerning their roles in the enterprise. Id. at 59. 282 Appellants do not deny that Kossler was qualified as an expert on La Cosa Nostra or that his testimony about the meaning of organized crime jargon used by the co-conspirators was admissible under prior decisions of this court. See United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 230-31. Brief for Ciancaglini at 33. However, they assert that Kossler's testimony exceeded the scope of admissible expert testimony when he identified the individuals depicted in several surveillance photographs as substantial Mafia figures and associates from New York crime families meeting with various appellants. 92 For example, he stated that one such photograph depicted James Angelina, then acting boss of the Columbo crime family in New York, meeting with Scarfo. Tr. 9/30/88 at 67. Appellants claim that this was factual testimony in the guise of expert testimony because it created an overwhelming impression that appellants must have been engaged in organized crime because they were meeting with high ranking organized crime figures. 283 We reject this contention for a variety of reasons. At the outset, we observe that appellants did not object to Kossler's testimony and therefore, if any error occurred, it must rise to the level of plain error to justify reversal of appellants' convictions. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. at 15, 105 S.Ct. at 1046. 284 As explained in United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3d Cir.), mandamus denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1179, 103 L.Ed.2d 246 (1989), [t]he overriding limitation on expert testimony is the requirement that '[u]nder Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact.'  Id. at 591 (quoting Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Evid. 704). Under Rule 704, an expert opinion is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a). Applying these principles, several courts, including this one, have approved the admission of expert testimony in circumstances in which stronger arguments against admissibility could be made than in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d at 1189 (expert could testify as to roles defendants played in illegal gambling operation); Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 591-92 (same, in context of complex narcotics organization); United States v. Kinsey, 843 F.2d 383, 387-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1223, 108 S.Ct. 2882, 101 L.Ed.2d 916 (1988) (police officer could testify about defendant's involvement in the distribution of cocaine). Considering that opinion testimony satisfying the helpfulness requirement of Rule 702 is admissible, even where it expressly implicates the defendants in the very activities charged in the indictment, we would be hard pressed to find that the admission of Kossler's testimony constituted error, much less plain error. 285 The helpfulness requirement of Rule 702 was met, as Kossler's testimony provided the jury with useful background information as to the structure of La Cosa Nostra families and the interplay between them on the national level. 93 See Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d at 592 (In dealing with organized crime or illegal narcotics operations, a lay jury is unlikely to have knowledge as to the structure of the organization or the interrelationships between the participants.). His identification of Scarfo and the New York bosses in the photographs was purely incidental to that testimony and, in any event, did not implicate them in any crimes. In fact, this latter point was fully explored during Kossler's cross-examination. 94 Thus, we fail to see what issues of ultimate fact were taken from the jury--the jury was left to draw its own conclusions as to the significance of Scarfo's meetings with the individuals shown in the photographs. We conclude that Kossler's testimony fell squarely within the boundaries of admissible expert testimony. 2. Reference to D'Alfonso Murder 286 Salvatore Wayne Grande contends that the district court's admission of an intercepted conversation between him and DelGiorno containing a reference to the D'Alfonso murder was reversible error because the evidence had no relevancy to any issue other than his propensity for violence and as such, did not constitute admissible evidence of other crimes under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). 95 Brief for S.W. Grande at 11-13. In response to defense counsels' objections, 96 the government asserted that the tape was offered to show the relationships among the co-conspirators, especially in reference to the shakedown operation, and that it would not question any witness about the D'Alfonso murder. 287 The district court permitted the government to play the tape and question DelGiorno extensively about its contents. Tr. 10/12/88 at 114-28. In its post-trial decision, the district court, in rejecting Grande's argument that he was thereby prejudiced, explained that any references to ... the murder investigation of Frankie Flowers ... were, without explanation, vague and meaningless. 711 F.Supp. at 1343. Accordingly, as the government had complied with the district court's order prohibiting it from exploring that issue during its examination of DelGiorno, it concluded that Grande suffered no unfair prejudice from the admission of the tape. Id. 288 We agree with the district court that the references to the D'Alfonso murder are unintelligible without explanation. So far as we can ascertain, the following remarks, made after Charles Iannece informed DelGiorno that subpoenas had been issued for DelGiorno and Grande, 97 form the primary basis for Grande's objection: 289 DELGIORNO: The cops said where they at, down the shore? He [Iannece] said probably. You can't tell 'em we were down here. He knew we were down the shore. He said where are them fucking guys at, down the shore again? He said probably. 290 GRANDE: Well what did they say, what name did they say, Wayne? 291 DELGIORNO: Grande, no they said Wayne (laughter). They said Salvatore Grande. 292 . . . . . 293 GRANDE: What did they say? 294 DELGIORNO: We got subpoenas for them. He said for what. They said for Flowers [D'Alfonso]. So Charlie says so where are they at down the shore? Charlie said probably. Tell 'em we got 'em ... so Nicky Crow says to them, well... 295 GRANDE: What do ya mean we got 'em? 296 DELGIORNO: We got subpoenas. 297 Book F, 8/30/85, 6:03 p.m. at 1-2. 298 The parties went on to discuss the possibility of hiding out for a couple of weeks, presumably to avoid responding to the subpoenas. 98 299 Although the jury could infer from these remarks that Grande and DelGiorno contemplated flight in response to the subpoenas, the jury had no way of knowing that the subpoenas were issued in connection with the D'Alfonso murder. Therefore, we do not reach the question of whether evidence concerning the D'Alfonso murder was admissible under Rule 404(b), as we conclude that the reference to the murder was too oblique to constitute evidence of other crimes. Accordingly, we reject Grande's contention for the reasons expressed in the district court's opinion. 99 3. Evidence of Iannece's Flight 300 FBI Agent Charles Warner testified that government witness Nicholas Caramandi became an informant on November 14, 1986. After that date, Warner saw little of Iannece in the south Philadelphia area. Tr. 11/8/88 at 31. In January 1987, an arrest warrant was issued for appellant Charles Iannece in connection with the Rouse extortion and Warner attempted to locate him. After some initial difficulties, Warner apprehended Iannece on October 29, 1987, at a residence in Lake Harmony, Pennsylvania, where Iannece had been staying. 100 In a search of Iannece's residence conducted with Iannece's consent, Warner discovered various items bearing on Iannece's identification, four in the name of Donald Casolaro. One of the items identifying Iannece as Casolaro was a driver's license in the name of Casolaro, but with Iannece's picture showing him to be Casolaro. Id. at 38. Warner also found a loaded .32 caliber automatic Colt pistol, a loaded .22 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, and several rounds of hollow-point ammunition. Warner testified that [h]ollow-point ammunition is much more devastating upon impact than a regular bullet. Id. Warner also stated that the Smith & Wesson revolver had been reported stolen from an individual in Washington, D.C., in 1977. Id. at 38-39. 301 Iannece asserts that he was entitled to a limiting instruction that the evidence of flight should be considered only in connection with the Rouse extortion, because he was in federal custody at the time of the RICO indictment and therefore, the flight had no probative value as to his guilt of other predicate acts included in the RICO charges. Brief for Iannece at 19-20. 101 He also argues that the district court should have excluded the evidence of guns and ammunition found during the search and that the reference to the stolen pistol was inadmissible other crimes evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). All of these contentions lack merit. 302 Evidence of a defendant's flight after a crime has been committed is admissible to prove his consciousness of guilt. United States v. Eggleton, 799 F.2d 378, 380-81 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1454 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 3189, 96 L.Ed.2d 678 (1987); United States v. Miles, 468 F.2d 482, 489-90 (3d Cir.1972). As the district court recognized, the admissibility of flight evidence does not depend on whether the flight was triggered by an actual indictment, as  'it is the act of departure that is itself evidential.'  Miles, 468 F.2d at 490 (quoting 2 Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 276 (3d ed. 1970)). See 711 F.Supp. at 1321. In this case, Iannece became a fugitive soon after he learned that Caramandi had become a government informant. We agree with the district court that Iannece's knowledge of Caramandi's cooperation could have triggered his flight, as Caramandi was capable of implicating him in many of the predicate acts included in the RICO indictment. 711 F.Supp. at 1321. Accord United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615, 622 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 156, 83 L.Ed.2d 93 (1984) (jury reasonably could infer that defendant turned fugitive because of co-conspirator's cooperation). Thus, Iannece was not entitled to a limiting instruction, as the fact that he was in federal custody at the time the RICO indictment was returned did not mean that the evidence's relevancy was confined to the Rouse extortion charge. 303 Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the guns and ammunition found during the search. The court rejected defense counsel's claim that the weapons evidence was cumulative and unfairly prejudicial, reasoning that the weapons were admissible because they showed more determined flight. Tr. 11/8/88 at 43. The district court had wide discretion in balancing the probative value of this evidence against its prejudicial impact. United States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 985, 99 S.Ct. 577, 58 L.Ed.2d 657 (1978). We find no error in the district court's determination, as it was consistent with the reasoning employed by other courts which have admitted weapons seized from a defendant in flight. Eggleton, 799 F.2d at 382; De Parias, 805 F.2d at 1454. 304 Moreover, given the violent nature of the enterprise and Iannece's role therein, the guns would be admissible to prove the offenses charged, regardless of whether they were introduced in the context of a flight. See United States v. Adams, 759 F.2d at 1108-09 (numerous weapons, including an Uzi submachine gun, were highly probative of the large scale of a narcotics distribution conspiracy and the type of protection the conspirators felt they needed to protect their operation.) See also United States v. Shakur, 888 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1152, 107 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1990) (bomb-related equipment was admissible in RICO trial where there was ample testimony that explosives played a part in the planning and tactics of the 'family's' crimes, and were consistent with the violent ends of the group.). Accordingly, Iannece did not suffer any unfair prejudice as a result of the district court's admission of the weapons evidence.