Opinion ID: 2787500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: state law claims against the officers

Text: Under Ohio law, a municipal employee is generally immune from civil liability unless one of a small number of exceptions applies. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6). The only exception to state law immunity at issue in the instant case is whether the Officers’ “acts or omissions” were made “in a wanton or reckless manner.” Id. If the officers’ acts were wanton or reckless, they are not entitled to immunity for state law claims under Ohio law. Id. The lone basis for the Officers’ appeal of the district court’s decision not to grant them state law immunity on summary judgment is that “[n]o evidence shows that Officers had actual knowledge of a great probability of harm to strip them of immunity on state law claims.” Appellants’ Br. at 24 (emphasis added). The Officers further stress that “the standard for wanton and reckless under Ohio law is greater than negligence and requires actual knowledge, which none of the officers had.” Appellants’ Br. at 25 (emphasis added). The Officers are mistaken on this point, as their cited authority demonstrates. Though wantonness requires awareness of a given risk, recklessness does not. Anderson v. Massillon, 983 N.E. 2d. 266, 273 (Ohio 2012). Wantonness and recklessness are “different and distinct degrees of care and are not interchangeable.” Id. “Reckless conduct is characterized by the conscious disregard of or indifference to a known or obvious risk of harm to another that is 3 The Officers argue that the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), favors their position and controls this issue. But in Atwater the Court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense that is punishable only by a fine. Id. at 323. The plaintiffs in Atwater had consistently conceded that the woman taken into custody had violated the seatbelt statute at issue. Id. at 325 (“Given Atwater’s admission that she had ‘violated the law’ . . .”). Whether the officer had probable cause to arrest Ms. Atwater was not the issue. Here, the issue is not whether the officers could take Ms. Nall into custody if she had indeed violated the disorderly conduct statute; rather, the issue is whether the officers had probable cause to determine that she violated the disorderly conduct statute in the first place. Atwater therefore does not have any bearing on the probable cause issue in this case. No. 14-3120 Goodwin v. City of Painesville, et al. Page 26 unreasonable under the circumstances and is substantially greater than negligent conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). An actor can be found to be reckless either based on his actual knowledge of a risk of harm or under an objective standard (that the risk is “obvious”). That § 2744.03(A)(6) looks to an objective standard of proof for recklessness is further illustrated by Anderson’s reference to § 500 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts. Comment a to § 500 states that an actor can be found to be reckless when he has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so. An objective standard is applied to him, and he is held to the realization of the aggravated risk which a reasonable man in his place would have, although he does not himself have it. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 (1965). Because there is no requirement that the officers have actual knowledge of a risk of harm for a jury to find that they met the objective recklessness standard provided for in the Ohio statute, we affirm the district court’s holding with regard to state law immunity.