Opinion ID: 2518074
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under Common Law, Alaskan Riparian Owners Have a Qualified Right to Wharf Out.

Text: The existence, nature, and extent of the riparian right to wharf out is a matter of state law. [14] We therefore begin with an examination of the nature of the common-law right to wharf out in Alaska.
The right to wharf out in Alaska was addressed by courts prior to statehood in the context of actions by littoral [15] owners against private parties preventing their access to adjacent tidelands and submerged lands. While we are not bound by federal judicial rulings entered prior to the date of statehood, [16] these decisions help to define the context in which our constitutional framers and the first Alaska state legislature acted. In Dalton v. Hazelet, decided in 1910, the Ninth Circuit held: while in a territory a grant of land bordering on or bounded by navigable waters conveys to the grantee no right or title to the shore or soil below high-water mark, nevertheless such a grantee has the right to a free and unobstructed access to such waters. [17] This right to access includes the right to erect structures over waters too shoal [i.e. shallow] to be navigable, but only up to the point of navigability where the necessity for such erections ordinarily ceases. [18] The court noted, however, that a riparian owner's right of access by means of a wharf or other structure is subject to `the right of [a future state] to regulate the use' of `tide lands and beds of any of its navigable waters.' [19] The district court for the Territory of Alaska considered the right to wharf out in detail several years later. In Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co. v. Northern Lumber Mills, the court explained that a riparian owner may construct a wharf because he has a right of access to the deep water, and he cannot enjoy that right except by means of a wharf. The right to build a wharf in such cases is not a major right, not an independent right, not an all-sufficient right. It is a qualified right, having no potency whatsoever except in so far as it is referable and appurtenant to, and is a part of, that other right, called the right of access.[ [20] ] The court defined the right of access as an easement, and as such, the extent of a wharf built to exercise that right must be reasonable. [21] Reasonableness is dependent upon the purpose for which such access is desired, with reference to the size and kind of vessels which navigate the stream, and the kind of business done upon it. [22] The court found the proposed wharf in question, which could accommodate large vessels carrying coal and heavy mining machinery, to be necessary and reasonable for a large quartz mining operation. [23] Finally, the court noted that the right of access is one of which, when once it is vested, the owner can only be deprived in accordance with the established law, and if necessary that it be taken for the public good, upon due compensation. [24] Shortly before statehood, the territorial court again addressed the rights of a littoral owner, enjoining a defendant from removing gravel from tidelands where the removal would prevent plaintiff sawmill operator who owned adjacent tidelands from constructing a wharf to load lumber on barges and vessels. [25] Relying on Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co., the court stated: It is well established that a right of access such as claimed by the plaintiff, is a property right and may be exercised by constructing a wharf, pier or dock over the intervening tide lands to the navigable waters. [26] As a legal right, the right of access may not be impaired without compensation. [27] These cases make clear that prior to statehood, a riparian owner in the Territory of Alaska, while having no right or title to the soil below, had a common-law right to wharf out that, once vested, could not be taken without compensation. But the exercise of this right had to be reasonable; the wharf could be constructed only to the extent necessary to reach navigable waters, with reference to its intended use.
In Wernberg v. State, the only Alaska case since statehood relevant to the case before us, we referred to the many and varied rights of riparian owners that, generally speaking, include the right to build wharves and piers out to deep water if this can be done without interfering with navigation. [28] DNR characterizes this mention of the right to wharf out as a passing reference and classic obiter dictum, while Alaska Riverways argues that Wernberg firmly establishe[d] the right to wharf out in Alaska. The riparian rights listed in Wernberg were derived from a law review article published several years earlier, [29] and were not specific to Alaska nor, apart from the right of access to navigable waters, discussed in any detail in the opinion. It does not appear that the plaintiff in Wernberg had built or maintained a wharf. Wernberg involved a challenge to the state's construction of a highway preventing plaintiff's historical access to the Cook Inlet with his fishing boats via the creek and tidewaters adjacent to his property. Confirming the importance of the common-law right of access in Alaska, we held that this interference could constitute a taking requiring compensation. [30] We expressed a concern that a contrary holding might devalue riparian property: Alaska has a seacoast longer than that of the entire United States. A large number of Alaskan communities are located on the shores of bays and inlets in order to gain water access for transportation and shipping, or easy access to the fertile fishing grounds of Alaska. A substantial amount of development in these cities is along the waterfront.... [A] declaration that littoral access may be taken for any public purpose without compensation will immediately devalue property in such areas and limit the development of many isolated communities whose only means of access is by water.[ [31] ] While recognizing the importance of the right of access in Alaska, we also noted that the rights of riparian owners are not absolute, but are subject to those general regulations, which are necessary to the common good and general welfare, exercised pursuant to the state's police power. [32] We concluded that the Alaska Constitution, while authorizing the state to take plaintiff's right of access to construct a highway, [33] also required it to compensate plaintiff for his loss of access. [34] While Wernberg made a generalized statement that the right to wharf out was included among the rights of a riparian owner, it did not specifically address the scope and limitations of this right, nor whether it had been altered by the Alaska Constitution or by statute. Rather, Wernberg addressed a riparian owner's right of access, holding that the state may not take a riparian owner's right of access to navigable waters without compensation. It does not necessarily follow from this holding that the state may not require an owner who builds a wharf over state land to enter into a lease. For these reasons, Wernberg is not controlling. We next consider to what extent the common-law right to wharf out that was recognized in territorial days has been limited by the public trust doctrine, the Alaska Constitution, and actions by the Alaska Legislature, and whether any of these sources authorize DNR to require a riparian owner that builds a wharf over state land to enter into a lease.