Opinion ID: 2633437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Constitutional Principles

Text: Because I find simultaneous factors of both unreliability and reliability in Swiger's statement, I turn to a discussion of the majority's application of the constitutional principles to Swiger's statement which I find questionable. The majority distinguishes this case from Lilly by saying that although the accomplice [in Lilly ] confessed to being involved in a crime spree with his co-defendants, which included robberies and a murder, [he] denied any involvement in the murder, the most serious crime committed. Maj. op at 315, n. 7; see also maj. op. at 316. While it is accurate that Lilly's brother and co-defendant, Mark, stated that he didn't have nothing to do with the shooting, 527 U.S. at 121, 119 S.Ct. 1887, Mark did admit being present when the victim was shot, and by this admission he potentially subjected himself to murder charges based either on a felony murder or complicity theory. By emphasizing that Mark Lilly denied that he was the shooter while Swiger admitted to this role, the majority fails to acknowledge that Swiger, as did Mark Lilly, attempted to shift the blame for the murder by naming the defendant as the mastermind of the crime. [22] See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120-21, 119 S.Ct. 1887. Implicating the defendant as the instigator and mastermind of the murder plan, as Swiger did, is a factor that weighs against the inherent reliability of the statement. Sheets, 618 N.W.2d at 133 (A circumstance in which a declarant admits his or her presence and participation in a crime, but indicates that another was the `mastermind' or primary actor, is one of the more common fact patterns in which courts hold that a declarant's statements inculpating the defendant may not be admitted at trial.). The majority further distinguishes Lilly by stating that at the time Swiger made his statement he was not being detained for his involvement in the victim's murder and did not have the same outside pressures that existed in Lilly to make a statement to the investigating officers. Maj. op. at 316. Although Swiger was not in custody for the Colorado murder, he was in custody for the serious crimes of attempted murder and armed robbery that had allegedly occurred ten to twelve days before this interview. That police officers from Colorado, who had talked to Clontz, were in Tennessee to interview Swiger because of his own statements about the killing suggests that Swiger may have known that he was a suspect at the time of his interview. See Swiger Statement 71, lines 23-24 (I'd already got word `way y'all were comin' here, that y'all had a tape.). In fact, investigators informed Swiger that he was a suspect in the murder. Swiger Statement 41, lines 18-21 ([W]e look at you . . . [a]s a suspect in this crime.). These circumstances do not suggest that Colorado authorities failed to consider Swiger a serious suspect and had no evidence against Swiger as the majority suggests when it says: [I]t would appear that Swiger successfully escaped detection for the crime by fleeing the State and taking with him the only known eyewitness to the crime. Maj. op. at 316. The majority concludes that, unlike in Lilly, apart from informing Swiger that witnesses had come forward stating that they had heard Swiger bragging about his involvement in a murder, the police investigators did not tell Swiger that they had any other evidence linking him to the victim's murder. Maj. op. at 316. This statement fails to acknowledge that in addition to other witnesses, the interviewing officers told Swiger that they had interviewed his girlfriend, Bonnie Clontz, before talking to him. Officers expressly stated, [W]e've already talked to Bonnie, Swiger Statement 54, lines 12-13, and Bonnie's helpin' us, id. at 53, lines 6-7. See also id. at 52, lines 2-4. When Swiger denied telling Bonnie what happened the night of the murder, one of the officers confronted him: So Bonnie's lying? Swiger answered I don't know `cause I don't know what Bonnie told you. Id. at 58, lines 1-2. Although Swiger may have been unaware of the exact content of Bonnie's statements, he understood that the police had spoken with her and that her statements contradicted his earlier denials of involvement. A factor weighing against inherent reliability occurs when, as in this case, law enforcement officers have already interrogated another witness and thus knew what they were looking for when questioning the accomplice. Similar circumstances to those that occurred here have been found insufficient to rebut the presumption of unreliability of an accomplice confession. See Lee, 476 U.S. at 544, 106 S.Ct. 2056 (concluding that accomplice confession was unreliable where elicited only after [the declarant] was told that [the defendant] had already implicated him); Brooks, 2001 Fla. LEXIS at , 787 So.2d at 775 (concluding accomplice confession was unreliable where the accomplice was confronted with inculpatory evidence); see also Bass v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 373, 523 S.E.2d 534, 539 (2000) (concluding that factors indicating reliability were that law enforcement lacked knowledge of the declarant's role in the crime confessed and that the accomplice lacked knowledge that he or she had already been implicated in the crime). Another way in which the majority distinguishes Lilly is by noting the lack of any offers of leniency in this case whereas in Lilly, officers told the defendant's brother he would be facing life imprisonment if he did not make a statement. Maj. op. at 316 n. 9. Although it is true that no express offers of leniency were given to Swiger, as in Lilly, police officers implied that failure to confess would result in negative consequences to Swiger. Investigators urged Swiger to confess three times, specifically because someone else might roll on him. [23] Additionally, the majority states that Swiger did not inquire as to any possible benefit he would receive for cooperating with the investigating officers and making his confession. Maj. op. at 316. This conclusion misstates the facts. Swiger inquired as to benefits he would receive in exchange for his statement when he asked for protection for himself and his family [24] and when he requested leniency for his girlfriend Clontz. [25] Officers responded to both these requests by offering Swiger and his family protection [26] and implying an offer of leniency for Clontz. [27] These factors weigh against the trustworthiness of his statement. Castelan, 219 F.3d at 695-696 (concluding that statements by law enforcement that an accomplice could help himself by cooperating, offers of protection, and inquiries by the defendant asking what could be done to help him even without an express offer of leniency, weigh against a finding of reliability); Sheets, 618 N.W.2d at 132. [28] In particular, the implied offer of leniency to Clontz suggests unreliability because it gave Swiger a motive to lie about his girlfriend's possible involvement in the crime. Officers promised Swiger that if Bonnie had nothing to do with this other than lie to me when I first talked to her (pause) then we're not gonna do anything to her. Swiger Statement 61, lines 7-8. The majority states that the record does not support an assumption that Swiger's confession was hinged on this offer of protection. Maj. op. at 316 n. 10. I disagree. At the end of the interview, Swiger expressly states his belief that his confession earned his family police protection. When asked if he had been offered anything for his statement, Swiger responds, jus' that, jus' ahh if I told the truth, my family'd be protected. Id. at 72, lines 18-19. The majority also minimizes the role that the officers' leading questions played in obtaining Swiger's confession. The majority fails to acknowledge the extensive leading questions, or more accurately, statements that the officers made to Swiger. See Maj. op. at 315. Before Swiger's admission that he shot the victim, officers offered Swiger their version of the course of events leading to the shooting at least nine times. [29] A statement given in response to officials' leading questions, such as those stated by officers to Swiger, is a factor that weighs against a finding of inherent reliability. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139, 119 S.Ct. 1887; Lee, 476 U.S. at 544, 106 S.Ct. 2056; Castelan, 219 F.3d at 695; United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1119-20 (8th Cir.2000); Sheets, 618 N.W.2d at 131. In contrast to such leading statements produced while the declarant is in custody, the spontaneity of a statement is a factor that weighs in favor of a finding of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. An outburst in response to a non-leading question presumably indicates that the declarant did not have time to fabricate a version of events, thereby reducing the constitutional need for cross-examination to test the reliability of the statement. State v. Cook, 135 N.H. 655, 610 A.2d 800, 806 (1992) (A declarant's spontaneous statements are likely to be reliable because his reflective faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the instinctive and uninhibited expression of the speaker's actual impressions and belief. (quotation marks omitted)); Wilson, 639 A.2d at 136 (concluding that a statement which was the product of deliberate and particularized police interrogation could not be a spontaneous explanation of events). The majority attempts to diminish the impact of the numerous leading questions by officers by noting that Swiger admitted to officers that he had confessed his involvement in the victim's shooting to acquaintances in Tennessee. Maj. op. at 316. This statement misrepresents what Swiger said and why he said it. Swiger indicated to officers that he bragged about involvement in the murder to gain the respect of other bikers while simultaneously denying to those officers any actual involvement in the murder. See Swiger Statement 25, lines 15-16 (I told `em I did it, made me somebody. They respected me. They feared me.); p. 28, line 25 (denying involvement). Swiger did not indicate to officers that these boasts were true confessions, and thus these statements do not significantly minimize government influence in the making of Swiger's statement. In short, the government action played a significant role in producing Swiger's confession to shooting the victim: Swiger was in custody on serious felony charges in Tennessee; he knew that investigators had talked to his girlfriend about his involvement; [30] the officers promised safety for himself and his family; [31] the officers promised leniency for any possible involvement his girlfriend might have had in the crime; [32] the officers threatened that Swiger's co-conspirators might roll on him; [33] officers intimated that Swiger could receive mental health assistance if he confessed; [34] and Swiger was subjected to a host of suggestive questions by one of the interrogating officers. [35] The majority further downplays Swiger's underestimation of his role in the killing by concluding that [t]he only part of Swiger's confession that in any way minimized his culpability was his naked assertion that he could not withdraw from his agreement with the defendant to murder the victim because he believed that, if he did so, the defendant would harm his family. Maj. op. at 315. Again, I disagree. Swiger told police, before his confession, that he was not involved with the murder but only helped dispose of the gun. See Swiger Statement 13-22. Additionally, Swiger repeatedly stated that he was under the influence of drugs and alcohol at the time of the shooting. He told them that he drank more than two-fifths of whiskey that day and that the day before that he had done quite a bit of acid along with some cocaine. Swiger Statement 50, lines 17-19. He said that, in the weeks before the shooting, he drank at least two bottles of whiskey each day. Id., lines 2-3. Investigators suggested to Swiger that his condition may help him minimize his culpability if he had so much drugs and alcohol in [him] that [he was] not aware of what [his] physical actions are doing or maybe someone could talk [him] into doing something. Swiger Statement 48, lines 14-17. Thus, I conclude that Swiger attempted to minimize his involvement and put himself in the most favorable light to police by (1) telling them that he was drunk during the shooting, (2) repeatedly claiming, before confessing, that he only helped dispose of the gun, and (3) after confessing, claiming that he did so only because he was afraid that if he did not carry out the murder, the defendant and his cohorts would kill him and his family. Additionally the majority concludes, Nothing in the record suggests that Swiger thought his claim of coercion would exonerate him, maj. op. at 315, in part because Swiger was aware that confessing to killing the victim would lead to severe consequences, maj. op. at 315. Again, I disagree. While it is true that Swiger understood that confessing may result in life imprisonment, the record also contains evidence that Swiger hoped to mitigate this potential sentence. In my view, Swiger may have viewed his justification for committing the crimes he did, that is, because of threats of violence directed against him and his family, as mitigating his culpability. He told the detectives no less than seventeen times that he feared for his and his family's safety during the course of his statement. [36] These claims may represent an unsophisticated attempt to establish the defense of duress  a statutory defense available to a person who engages in unlawful conduct because of the threatened use of force upon him or another person. See § 18-1-708, 6 C.R.S. (2000); People v. Maes, 41 Colo.App. 75, 77, 583 P.2d 942, 944 (1978). As a matter of Colorado law, this defense is not available to a person in Swiger's situation, that is, a person under investigation for a class one felony. See § 18-1-708 (providing the defense of duress to offenses other than a class one felony). Nonetheless, I find it reasonable to conclude that Swiger's explanation of why he killed someone he hardly knew  that he did it to protect himself and his family  would put him in a favorable light with authorities. It placed blame on his cohorts, [that] may inure to his advantage. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 139, 119 S.Ct. 1887. [37] The majority concludes that Swiger's statement is genuinely self-inculpatory in part because it was obtained after a Miranda advisement. Maj. op. at 315. I note that Miranda warnings do not bear on the reliability of the accomplice's statement. Lee, 476 U.S. at 544, 106 S.Ct. 2056 (concluding that a finding that a confession was voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes . . . does not bear on the question of whether the confession was also free from any desire, motive or impulse [the accomplice] made have had either to mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by spreading the blame or to overstate [the defendant's] involvement); accord, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 138, 119 S.Ct. 1887; Sheets, 618 N.W.2d at 134. Additionally, although a statement that describes a crime in a level of detail suggests reliability, [38] a detailed description could simply be an elaborate lie, and thus should only be one of a number of factors considered as indicia of inherent reliability. People v. Turcotte-Schaeffer, 843 P.2d 658, 662 (Colo.1993). For instance, before Swiger confessed to the murder of the victim, he described in detail the appearance, residence, and family of the real shooter, Mike: Officer: You don't know anything else about this Mike? Swiger: No, sir, I . . . Mike in Oklahoma when I was down there. Officer: White guy, black guy? Swiger: Black guy, great big big guy. Big belly. He lives on an old farm, run, run down shack had a Harley parked out front. Lived with his wife, his two kids, his momma in the house, all of `em smoked dope. Got a hardwood floor. Swiger Statement 30, lines 12-18. Further, at least one state court has held that a high level of detail in a statement does not overcome the strong presumption of unreliability which attaches to a statement made in police custody where the declarant had a motive to curry favor with authorities. Sheets, 618 N.W.2d at 135. The majority concludes that Swiger's statement is inherently reliable because it provides us with no reason to believe that there was any animosity between Swiger and the defendant. Maj. op. at 317. Again, I disagree. Swiger said repeatedly that he lived in fear that the defendant and his cohorts would kill him and/or his family if he failed to commit the murder or reported it to authorities. If true, to me this suggests a great deal of animosity between Swiger and the defendant. In addition, Swiger showed signs of antagonism towards the defendant when he agreed with police officers that the defendant should not get away with this murder. Swiger Statement 59, lines 13-14. Antagonism between an accomplice and a defendant indicates the jig is up and that the accomplice has an interest in betraying a co-conspirator. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 131, 119 S.Ct. 1887. Later in its opinion, the majority states that Swiger knew that his statement could very well put himself and his family in danger, providing [him] with a strong incentive to avoid inculpating the defendant. That Swiger acted in the face of such knowledge supports a finding of trustworthiness. Maj. op. at 318. I suggest that these conclusions are contradictory: that Swiger made incriminatory statements despite fear of harm to his family appears inconsistent with the conclusion that there existed no animosity between Swiger and the defendant. Regarding Swiger's repeated lies about Clontz's trip to the liquor store, [39] the majority reasons that these fabrications raise[] no serious concerns regarding the trustworthiness of the part of Swiger's statement that inculpates the defendant. Maj. op. at 318. However, the fact that an accomplice lies about the role of a potential accomplice or co-conspirator raises serious concerns about the credibility of his statement inculpating another in the crime. See State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 721 N.E.2d 52, 63 (2000) (finding statement contained no elements of trustworthiness where defendant admitted that he had lied). [40] The majority asserts that Swiger's statement is inherently reliable in part because although the record shows that Swiger was very emotional during his confession, there is no evidence that he was mentally or physically unstable. Maj. op. at 318. While the degree of agitation of a codefendant may in some circumstances be indicative of the reliability of his statement, [41] in my view the majority's conclusion is too sweeping. The fact that the declarant was agitated or crying at the time he made his statement might indicate either that his statement is credible or that it is untrustworthy. Without an opportunity to observe Swiger's demeanor when he made this statement from a video recording or at least hear the audio recording of it, I believe it is impossible for us as an appellate court, to conclude whether the declarant's agitation weighed in favor of or against the inherent reliability of his statement. Although the self-inculpatory nature of Swiger's statement, his detailed description of the crime and his understanding that his confession could result in a lifetime sentence of imprisonment present indicia of reliability, the statements possess equally, if not stronger, indicia of unreliability. Swiger was in custody for serious crimes at the time he made his statement; he implicated the defendant as the mastermind of the murder; he repeatedly lied about his and Clontz's involvement in the murder; his confession was made in response to leading questions by government authorities who had other evidence of Swiger's guilt and knew what they were looking for; he asked for and received offers of police protection; he asked for and obtained a no prosecution promise for Clontz; and he attempted to minimize his role and shift blame to the defendant by saying he was drunk and participated only because of fear for his own safety and that of his family. Six of the Supreme Court Justices have agreed it is highly unlikely an accomplice statement will contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to rebut the heavy presumption against its admissibility in a criminal trial against the defendant. My application of the factors indicating inherent reliability leads me to conclude that Swiger's confession is not one of the rare accomplice statements that rebuts the presumption of unreliability. However, even applying the majority's grudging view of the presumption of unreliability, in other words, not affording the presumption much weight, the simultaneous existence of indicia of unreliability and reliability in Swiger's statement dictate that this presumption is not overcome. See Gomez, 191 F.3d at 1223 (concluding that where there are simultaneous indicators of both reliability and unreliability, the presumption of unreliability is not rebutted). In my view, the factors indicating reliability are at least counterbalanced by stronger indicia of unreliability. Hence, the admission of this statement in the defendant's trial violated the Confrontation Clause.