Opinion ID: 2071130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Predominance case law in other jurisdictions

Text: The predominance inquiry has proven to be the downfall of many mass tort class actions. Our concerns that individual issues would predominate over common issues in this litigation are mirrored in the United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on class actions, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Amchem involved a national asbestos class action lawsuit in which the Third Circuit had decertified the class because common issues did not predominate over individual issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing that an overarching dispute about the health consequences, id. at 624, 117 S.Ct. at 2250, of exposure to a potentially harmful product does not suffice for purposes of the predominance requirement of Federal Rule 23(b)(3) in the face of significant issues peculiar to individual class members: Class members were exposed to different asbestos-containing products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma.... Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation injury. Id., 117 S.Ct. at 2250 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-27 (3rd Cir.1996)) (ellipsis in Supreme Court's Amchem opinion). See also Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1336, 1344-45 (1999). The Supreme Court went on to note that differences in state law compound these disparities, and then observed: No settlement class called to our attention is as sprawling as this one. Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws. Even mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement. The Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that mass accident cases are likely to present significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, ... affecting the individuals in different ways. And the Committee advised that such cases are ordinarily not appropriate for class treatment. But the text of the Rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and District Courts, since the late 1970's, have been certifying such cases in increasing number. The Committee's warning, however, continues to call for caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among class members great. As the Third Circuit's opinion makes plain, the certification in this case does not follow the counsel of caution. That certification cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception of Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement irreconcilable with the Rule's design. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25, 117 S.Ct. at 2250 (citations omitted) (ellipsis in Amchem ). The Fifth Circuit, in perhaps the seminal case involving mass tort tobacco litigation, heralded a similar proclamation directly relevant to this same issue in the present case: The class members were exposed to nicotine through different products, for different amounts of time, and over different time periods. Each class member's knowledge about the effects of smoking differs, and each plaintiff began smoking for different reasons. Each of these factual differences impacts the application of legal rules such as causation, reliance, comparative fault, and other affirmative defenses. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742-43 n. 15 (5th Cir.1996). See also Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 319 (5th Cir.1998) (noting that under Texas law causation must be determined as to individuals, not groups) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cf. Arch v. American Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 488-89 (E.D.Pa.1997) (concluding that question of causation of actual rather than merely potential addiction is highly individualized and does not lend itself to Rule 23(b)(2) certification). While both Castano and Amchem involved nationwide class actions, these same problems of predominant individual issues have arisen in statewide class actions. For example, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri refused to certify a class of Missouri smokers defined as [a]ll persons in the State of Missouri who have suffered personal injury as a result of smoking cigarettes designed, manufactured or sold by Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company.... Smith v. Brown & Williamson, 174 F.R.D. 90, 92 (W.D.Mo.1997). That court stated that a separate inquiry will be required to determine which state's substantive laws will govern. In the case of a life-long Missouri resident, it seems clear that Missouri law would apply. In the case of a resident of another state who stopped smoking before moving to Missouri, it seems clear that Missouri law would not apply. In the case of a person (like Plaintiff) who began smoking in another state and then moved to Missouri, the choice of law inquiry will vary with the circumstances. It is inconceivable that [Missouri] law will apply to all members of the class; in fact, it is possible that different [states'] laws will apply to the different claims asserted by a single claimant: for instance, it may be that one state's laws will apply to a person's breach of warranty claims while another state's laws apply to that individual's strict liability claims. Ultimately, it is clear that Missouri law will not apply to all of the class members' claims. Thus, although Plaintiff does not seek certification of a nationwide class, the claims presented by the proposed class will still be governed by a myriad of [states'] laws. The wide variety of state laws that must be applied diminishes the common issues and prevents them from predominating. Id. at 95-96. See Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, 1997 WL 538921 (D.C.Super.Ct. Aug. 18, 1997) ( Reed I ) (refusing to certify a similar class of District of Columbia tobacco users); see also Barreras Ruiz v. American Tobacco Co., 180 F.R.D. 194, 197 (D.P.R.1998) (noting that [a]lthough the proposed class would number in the hundreds of thousands rather than Castano 's fifty million cigarette smokers, such a class nonetheless would present unprecedented challenges to the fundamental notion of commonality underlying a class action); Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 498 (E.D.Pa. 1997) (deciding to decertify class of Pennsylvania smokers because it is obvious that this action implicates far too many individual issues to proceed on a class-wide basis), aff'd, 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114, 119 S.Ct. 1760, 143 L.Ed.2d 791 (1999); Reed v. Philip Morris Inc., Civil No. 96-5070, slip op. (D.C.Super.Ct. July 23, 1999) ( Reed II ) (refusing to certify reduced class of District of Columbia tobacco users). Our analysis of the extent of the individual issues involved in this litigation leads us to conclude that individual issues overwhelmingly predominate over common issues. See Smith, 174 F.R.D. at 94 (Resolution of the common issues in this case will not promote judicial economy; in fact, in light of the individual issues a class action in this case will create judicial dise conomy.). We agree with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which, in rejecting class certification for Pennsylvania smokers, held that the individual issues raised not only predominate over the common issues but overwhelm the common issues Arch, 175 F.R.D. at 486. The seeming collective lynchpin of the Circuit Court's finding of predominance of common issues in the instant litigation is that the common questions regarding [Petitioners'] conduct and knowledge ... are at the core of all of [Respondents'] liability claims, (Cir. Ct. Mem. Op. at 37), that the jury's assessment of any one of these issues may potentially be dispositive of the entire [lawsuit], id. at 32, and that if [Petitioners] prevail in the adjudication of the significant common questions, the case is concluded, id. at 33 (footnote omitted). The crucial flaw with the Circuit Court's narrowing of the predominance analysis in this fashion was aptly explicated in a recent Michigan decision, Taylor v. American Tobacco Co., No. 97 715975 NP, slip op. (Wayne County, Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000). There the trial court denied class certification of a tobacco lawsuit in which plaintiffs relied in part on the Circuit Court's opinion below, which the court discredited as follows: [T]he rationale of courts that have certified tobacco personal injury suits as class actions, such as Richardson ..., relies heavily on the premise that an adverse ruling on certain common foundational issues would result in dismissal of the entire case. But missing from their analysis is any detailed explanation whether common questions would predominate if the common questions are resolved in plaintiffs' favor. While acknowledging that resolution of the common questions in plaintiffs' favor will not dispose of the case, it seems that they give little attention to the predominance question as it would be affected after the resolution of one or more common questions in favor of the plaintiffs. Id. at 10-11. In a District of Columbia tobacco lawsuit strikingly similar to the present one, see Reed I, after the trial court initially denied their motion for class certification, the representative plaintiffs purposefully excised certain, problematic causes of action from their complaintclaims that remain in the case now before this Courtin an effort to reduce the number of individualized issues, satisfy the predominance requirement and therefore, arguably, render their litigation suitable for class action treatment. See Reed II, slip op. at 4. The trial court deemed the maneuver futile, however, and ruled that the absence of claims of fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation and breach of express warranty was insufficient to tip the scales in the favor of class action certification: The Court concurs that a large portion of [Plaintiffs'] claim is based upon the Defendants' conduct in making and marketing cigarettes. Plaintiffs also are accurate that many common issues exist. Nonetheless, even with the changes to Plaintiffs' Complaint, too many individualized issues exist, such as injury-in-fact, addiction, causation and reliance, and individual defenses, which preclude this Court from finding that common issues predominate over individual issues. Reed II, slip op. at 30-31. It is equally clear the Circuit Court should have come to a like conclusion in the present case: class certification is simply not appropriate in the face of so many individualized, significant issues despite the purported qualitative force of the less numerous common questions. [33]