Opinion ID: 222127
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The State Court Properly Applied the Strickland Standard to Muniz's Claim

Text: Muniz contends the state court's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law because it applied the ineffective assistance standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), rather than the standard set out in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that in order to successfully claim a lawyer's assistance was so ineffective as to violate the Sixth Amendment a defendant must meet two requirements. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. In Cronic, however, the Supreme Court held there are circumstances so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified and prejudice is presumed. 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S.Ct. 2039. The [m]ost obvious of these circumstances is the complete denial of counsel. Id. at 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039. Where the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial, we are required to conclude that a trial is unfair, and an independent showing of prejudice is not required. Id. The Ninth, Fifth, and Second Circuits have all considered the question of when sleeping by trial counsel becomes the effective denial of counsel and so likely . . . prejudice[s] the accused that Cronic applies and prejudice is presumed. All of these circuits have held that the denial of counsel with presumed prejudice only occurs once counsel sleeps through a substantial portion of [defendant's] trial. Javor v. United States, 724 F.2d 831, 834 (9th Cir.1984); see also Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 340-41 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc) (concluding a defendant's right to counsel was violated where defense counsel was repeatedly unconscious through not insubstantial portions of the defendant's capital murder trial); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 685 (2d Cir.1996) (holding the defendant's right to counsel was violated where defense counsel was asleep for numerous extended periods of time). However, Muniz cannot establish that his trial counsel was asleep for a substantial portion of his trial. The only evidence he offers to show that his counsel was asleep for any period of time is an affidavit from a juror, which states, in relevant part: 4. While the prosecutor was cross-examining Mr. Muniz, I glanced at defense table and was surprised to see that Mr. Muniz'[s] defense attorney [was] sleeping; 5. It was apparent to me that Mr. Muniz'[s] attorney was actually sleeping through a portion of his client's testimony. This alleges only that Muniz's attorney was asleep for an undetermined portion of a single cross-examination. The record shows that Muniz's attorney was not asleep for the entire cross since he objected near the end of the questioning. This is especially significant, given that the total cross-examination was fairly short, spanning only 26 pages of trial transcript. Muniz's lawyer therefore must have only been asleep for a brief period. This is in contrast to Tippins, in which the trial judge himself testified that [defense counsel] `slept every day of the trial.' 77 F.3d at 687. The state court's application of Strickland to Muniz's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law.