Opinion ID: 2621912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: Primarily alleging that defects existed with respect to the exterior stucco of their residences and the residences of others in the Sun City Summerlin community of Las Vegas, Nevada, real parties in interest instituted the underlying constructional defect action against Sun City Summerlin's developers, including petitioner Del Webb Communities, Inc. Asserting causes of action for negligence, negligence per se, breach of various implied warranties, and willful misconduct, real parties in interest sought, among other remedies, those available under Nevada's residential constructional defect statutes, NRS 40.600 through NRS 40.695. After answering real parties in interest's complaint, Del Webb instituted a third-party action against various subcontractors with which it had contracted to perform work in the Sun City Summerlin community during its construction, including petitioners ANSE, Inc.; MS Concrete Company; Pratte Development Company, Inc.; and Dean Roofing, Inc. [4] In its third-party complaint, Del Webb asserted various tort and contract causes of action and sought, among other remedies, indemnity and contribution for any damages that the district court determined Del Webb owed to real parties in interest. Thereafter, this court entered an opinion in an unrelated constructional defect case, Westpark Owners' Ass'n v. District Court , [5] in which we examined the scope of NRS Chapter 40 residential constructional defect remedies. Specifically, in determining whether NRS Chapter 40 applied to claims of alleged defects in condominium units that were previously rented as apartments, we noted that under NRS 40.615 constructional defect is defined as a certain kind of defect in a new residence. Thus, in Westpark, we primarily addressed what constituted a new residence and was thus susceptible to a constructional defect under NRS 40.615. [6] We ultimately determined that a new residence is a product of original construction that has been unoccupied as a dwelling from the completion of its construction until the point of sale. [7] Under that definition, petitioners in the present matter asserted below that NRS Chapter 40 governed only constructional defect matters pertaining to homes that have been continuously owned by the original purchaser. Believing that approximately 700 of the homes at issue in the underlying action had not been continuously owned by the original purchaser and thus did not constitute new residences susceptible to constructional defects remediable under NRS Chapter 40, petitioners moved the district court for summary judgment with respect to their NRS Chapter 40 liability regarding those homes. In particular, petitioners asserted that because ownership of those approximately 700 homes had changed since Del Webb sold the homes to the original purchasers, the homes failed to constitute new residences for NRS Chapter 40 purposes. Thus, petitioners contended that they were entitled to summary judgment as to their NRS Chapter 40 liability on claims related to those residences. Real parties in interest opposed petitioners' motion, arguing that in light of Nevada's residential constructional defect statutes' purposes to promote settlement between homeowners and contractors and to provide contractors with an opportunity to repair, this court's definition of new residence in Westpark should not be applied to restrict Nevada's residential constructional defect statutes' application to initial purchasers, a purportedly small class of homeowners. According to real parties in interest, Nevada's constructional defect statutes' legislative history and this court's decisional law indicate that the Legislature did not intend to preclude subsequent purchasers from the NRS Chapter 40 remedies. In so arguing, real parties in interest contended that Westpark is factually distinguishable from this case and, thus, inapposite. Real parties in interest, moreover, relied on the definition of a constructional defect claimant set forth in NRS 40.610(1), which provides that a claimant is [a]n owner of a residence and does not distinguish between original and subsequent purchasers of a residence. The district court ultimately denied petitioners' motion for summary judgment, unconvinced that, in light of NRS 40.610's definition of a constructional defect claimant and Westpark's unique facts, subsequent purchasers of recently constructed homes were precluded from the remedies that NRS Chapter 40 provides. This petition for extraordinary mandamus relief followed. Real parties in interest have timely filed their answer, as directed, and three amicus briefs supporting the arguments set forth by real parties in interest have been filed, as permitted. [8]