Opinion ID: 1199771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issue Two Internal Investigation Documents

Text: The Hospital contends the trial court erred in granting discovery of the documents generated during the Hospital's internal investigation [6] and in allowing the documents to be used in questioning witnesses at trial. The Hospital maintains these orders violate RCW 70.41.200 and RCW 4.24.250. RCW 70.41.200 requires hospitals to establish quality assurance committees which will review hospital services in order to improve patient care and prevent medical malpractice. RCW 70.41.200(1)(a). Documents generated by these committees are entitled to special protection: Information and documents, including complaints and incident reports, created, collected, and maintained about health care providers arising out of the matters that are under review or have been evaluated by a review committee conducting quality assurance reviews are not subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action.... Former RCW 70.41.200(3). [8-11] We conclude, however, this statute does not apply to the internal investigation documents which were created in 1984, 2 years prior to the statute's enactment. See Laws of 1986, ch. 300, § 4. Absent contrary legislative intent, statutes are presumed to operate prospectively only. Washington Waste Sys., Inc. v. Clark Cy., 115 Wn.2d 74, 78, 794 P.2d 508 (1990). The Legislature has not expressed any intent for retroactive application of RCW 70.41.200. This presumption in favor of prospectivity is strengthened when the Legislature, as here, uses only present and future tenses in drafting the statute. Johnston v. Beneficial Mgt. Corp. of Am., 85 Wn.2d 637, 641-42, 538 P.2d 510 (1975), modified on other grounds in Salois v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). Moreover, former RCW 70.41.200(5) creates a new civil penalty for noncomplying hospitals, and statutes imposing new penalties are applied prospectively only. Johnston, 85 Wn.2d at 642; State v. Fisher, 108 Wn.2d 419, 426 n. 3, 739 P.2d 683 (1987). Because applying RCW 70.41.200 to documents that were created prior to the statute's enactment would contravene legislative intent, we conclude RCW 70.41.200 does not apply to this case. The second statute relied on by the Hospital is RCW 4.24.250. This statute was in effect in 1984. The statute creates certain immunities that come into play when a hospital has formed a regularly constituted review committee ... whose duty it is to review and evaluate the quality of patient care. At issue in the present case is the following language: The proceedings, reports, and written records of such committees ..., or of a member, employee, staff person, or investigator of such a committee ..., shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings in any civil action.... RCW 4.24.250. [12] We have already recognized that this statute, being contrary to the general policy favoring discovery, is to be strictly construed and limited to its purposes. Coburn v. Seda, 101 Wn.2d 270, 276, 677 P.2d 173 (1984); Anderson v. Breda, 103 Wn.2d 901, 905, 700 P.2d 737 (1985). Moreover, the burden of proving the statute's applicability rests with the party seeking its application. Anderson, 103 Wn.2d at 905. [13, 14] Here, despite the plaintiffs' repeated arguments that a regularly constituted review committee never acted in this case, the Hospital at no point presented any evidence to show that such a committee even existed in 1984. The Hospital instead argued the informal review reflected in the internal investigation documents is sufficient to meet the requirements of RCW 4.24.250, especially when one of the participants in this review was designated a quality assurance coordinator. Nevertheless, as we clearly stated in both Coburn and Anderson, this showing of an informal investigation is not sufficient under RCW 4.24.250. Rather, we recognized the statute requires a regularly constituted review committee. We went further and specified how a hospital could prove its committee was regularly constituted: [T]he trial court may wish to consider, in addition to other relevant evidence, the guidelines and standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and the bylaws and internal regulations of [the Hospital]. These materials may aid the trial court in ascertaining the organization and function of the committee as well as whether it is regularly constituted. Coburn, 101 Wn.2d at 278; see also Anderson, 103 Wn.2d at 905-06. Here, despite the clear guidance of Coburn and Anderson and its repeated opportunities to present evidence, the Hospital never made any showing as to the factors listed above. The Hospital never presented any of its bylaws or internal regulations; never referred to the standards and guidelines of relevant accreditation bodies; and never even identified the committee members or the procedures involved in reviewing hospital care in 1984. [7] We simply have no evidence the Hospital had in place a regularly constituted review committee in 1984. To the contrary, one of the doctors being deposed in this case believed the review committee existing today did not exist in 1984. In Coburn, after we determined we did not have sufficient evidence upon which to determine whether a particular review committee was regularly constituted, we remanded for further evidentiary proceedings on this point. Coburn, 101 Wn.2d at 279. Such a remand is not appropriate in the present case. In Coburn, this court required exactly what the statute describes  a review committee that is regularly constituted. We held the same in Anderson, and also made explicit what was already implicit  the burden of proof is on the hospital on this issue. Given the notice these cases imparted to the Hospital, and the Hospital's multiple opportunities to present evidence on these points below, we can only conclude a remand would be futile. We hold instead the Hospital simply failed to meet its burden of proving RCW 4.24.250 applies to this case. [15] Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's orders regarding the internal investigation documents, though on a basis different than the waiver theory adopted by the trial court. See LaMon v. Butler, 112 Wn.2d 193, 200-01, 770 P.2d 1027 ([A]n appellate court can sustain the trial court's judgment upon any theory established by the pleadings and supported by the proof, even if the trial court did not consider it.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).