Opinion ID: 1344731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Proof of Valley's Participation in Illegal Conduct

Text: Allum also argues that instructions no. 25 (defining the whistleblowing claim) and no. 26 (defining the refusal to participate in illegal conduct claim) contained errors of law because recovery was conditioned on proof that VMC, in fact, participated in illegal misconduct. Valley argued at trial and maintains on appeal that public policy is not served by reporting conduct which is not illegal. Allum contends that he should only have been required to prove that he suspected the defendants were engaging in illegal activity. We have not, as yet, specifically addressed this issue. In Wiltsie v. Baby Grand Corp., 105 Nev. 291, 774 P.2d 432 (1989), we stated the following: We believe that whistleblowing activity which serves a public purpose should be protected. So long as employees' actions are not merely private or proprietary, but instead seek to further the public good, the decision to expose illegal or unsafe practices should be encouraged. Id. at 293, 774 P.2d at 433 (quoting Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz.1986)). In Sands Regent v. Valgardson, 105 Nev. 436, 777 P.2d 898 (1989), this court stated that public policy tortious discharge actions are severely limited to those rare and exceptional cases where the employer's conduct violates strong and compelling public policy. Id. at 440, 777 P.2d at 900 (footnote omitted). Allum relies on Palmer v. Brown, 242 Kan. 893, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan.1988), in which the Kansas Supreme Court held: Public policy requires that citizens in a democracy be protected from reprisals for performing their civil duty of reporting infractions of rules, regulations, or the law pertaining to public health, safety, and the general welfare. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding termination of an employee in retaliation for the good faith reporting of a serious infraction of such rules, regulation, or the law by a co-worker or an employer ... is an actionable tort. Id. at 689-90. That court also refers to good faith reporting as that not motivated by malice, spite, jealousy or personal gain as opposed to a good faith belief that an infraction has occurred. Id. at 690. Other jurisdictions have also considered this issue. In McQuary v. Bel Air Convalescent Home, Inc., 69 Or.App. 107, 684 P.2d 21 (Or.Ct.App.1984), a nurse was fired after she threatened to report that her employer had abused a patient. The court stated: [W]e turn to the question whether she must prove that [the defendant's] actions in fact constituted patient abuse in the broad sense of the term, or must only show that she in good faith believed that they did. ... We ... hold that an employe [sic] is protected from discharge for good faith reporting of what the employe [sic] believes to be patient mistreatment to an appropriate authority. Id. at 23-24 (footnote omitted); see also Melchi v. Burns International Security Services, 597 F.Supp. 575 (E.D.Mich.1984) (citing legislation prohibiting termination for reporting suspected violations of law (M.C.L. § 15.361)). The reasoning espoused by the court in McQuary supports this court's goal expressed in Wiltsie, to encourage the decision to expose illegal or unsafe practices. Wiltsie, 105 Nev. at 293, 774 P.2d at 433. In McQuary, the Oregon court also stated the following: We are required to choose between competing social values: Either plaintiff must act at her peril in making a complaint, risking her job if the complaint later turns out to be unfounded, or the employer must act at its peril in firing her, risking damages if she turns out to have acted in good faith. On balance, we believe that the social harm from reporting in good faith a complaint that may turn out, after investigation, to be unfounded is potentially far less than the harm of not reporting a well-founded complaint for fear of the consequences. Id. at 23-24. Arizona appears in agreement. In Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial, Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz.1985), Wagen seller claimed she was fired for refusing to participate in activities which arguably would have violated the Arizona indecent exposure statute. Id. at 1035 (emphasis added). That court held that the termination for refusal to commit an act which might violate A.R.S. § 13-1402 may provide the basis of a claim for wrongful discharge. Id. (emphasis added). Valley relies on Wagner v. City of Globe, 150 Ariz. 82, 722 P.2d 250, 257 (Ariz. 1986) (cited with approval in Wiltsie, 105 Nev. 291, 774 P.2d 432), for the proposition that the plaintiff' must show that a law has actually been violated. In that case, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that, [t]he relevant inquiry is not limited to whether any particular law or regulation has been violated, although that may be important, but instead emphasizes whether some important public policy interest embodied in the law has been furthered by the whistleblowing activity. Wagner, 722 P.2d at 257. Contrary to Valley's assertion, case law suggests that while an actual violation is sufficient in a claim for retaliatory discharge, it is not essential. See generally Wagenseller (holding that employee may refuse to participate in behavior which violates public policy, even though no technical violation of the law results). We hold that instructions no. 25 and no. 26 were given in error insofar as they required proof that the defendants actually participated in illegal conduct. The district court should have required Allum to show that he reasonably suspected, in good faith, that Valley participated in illegal conduct. We conclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying Allum's motion for a new trial with respect to his contentions that instructions no. 25 and no. 26 were given in error. We therefore reverse the district court's order and remand for a new trial with a proper instruction specifying that Allum is required to show only that he reasonably suspected, in good faith, that Valley participated in illegal conduct.