Opinion ID: 794148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exhaustion under the IDEA

Text: 22 The City defendants also assert that the plaintiffs should have exhausted administrative remedies with respect to their federal claims pursuant to the IDEA, the ADA, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It is well settled that the IDEA requires an aggrieved party to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a civil action in federal or state court . . . . J.S. v. Attica Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir.2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 968, 125 S.Ct. 1727, 161 L.Ed.2d 616 (2005). The [IDEA administrative review] process includes review by an impartial due process hearing officer and an appeal from that hearing. Id. The [IDEA's] exhaustion requirement also applies where plaintiffs seek relief under other federal statutes when relief is also available under the IDEA. Id.; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415( l ). 23 We have not yet ruled on whether the IDEA's exhaustion requirements are subject to waiver. In Polera v. Board of Education, 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.2002), the appellant admitted that she had failed to exhaust available IDEA administrative remedies. Id. at 481. We noted our recogni[tion] that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement does not apply in situations in which exhaustion would be futile because administrative procedures do not provide adequate remedies. Id. at 488 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, we concluded that absent an applicable exception, id., a plaintiff's failure to exhaust IDEA administrative remedies deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 483, 488-90. 24 We need not decide today whether the defendants' waiver of the non-exhaustion defense would constitute such an exception. IDEA exhaustion in the instant case is excused under the futility exception for challenges addressing systemic issues. See J.S., 386 F.3d at 112. 25 In J.S., the plaintiffs brought a claim in which they alleged that they had been denied a free appropriate public education under the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and New York law. Id. at 110. We noted that [t]he complaint was styled as a class action, and the district court described it as containing `complain[ts] of wrongdoing that [are] inherent in the program itself and not directed at any individual child.' Id. at 110 (second alteration added). [T]he plaintiffs' problems could not have been remedied by administrative bodies because the framework and procedures for assessing and placing students in appropriate educational programs were at issue, or because the nature and volume of complaints were incapable of correction by the administrative hearing process. Id. at 114. We therefore concluded that IDEA exhaustion was not required. Id. Unlike challenges with respect to the content of a particular student's Individualized Education Plan (IEP), J.S. addressed a total failure to prepare and implement [IEPs]. Id. at 115. 26 Similarly here, the plaintiffs challenge the DOE's and DOC's actions with respect to providing educational services to all entitled inmates at Rikers Island. As we concluded in J.S., individual administrative remedies would be insufficient to address the defendants' failure to provide the service required by the IDEA to all relevant inmates. See id. at 112. The purposes of exhaustion — to allow[] for the exercise of discretion and educational expertise by state and local agencies, id. (quoting Polera, 288 F.3d at 487) — are unavailing where the alleged issue is the absence of any services whatsoever. Id. at 114-15. As to the plaintiffs' claim, then, exhaustion is futile, and administrative remedies are effectively unavailable. 3 We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by section 1415(f)-(g), (i) for IDEA claims (and ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for overlapping relief that would also be available under the IDEA as per section 1415( l )) does not bar our subject matter jurisdiction over this suit.