Opinion ID: 1316227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Ironi argues that the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict and the jury's acquittal on the methamphetamine count proves that the jury could not have found Ironi guilty on the cocaine count. We review de novo whether the district court properly denied Ironi's motion for judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Santoyo-Torres, 518 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir.2008). We are unpersuaded by Ironi's argument that the inconsistent verdicts of the jury prove that there was insufficient evidence for the guilty verdict on the cocaine count. Even if we characterize the verdicts as inconsistent, [w]e have previously held, when considering what are characterized as inconsistent verdicts, that we only ask whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support the conviction. We are reluctant to delve into the minds of the jurors to determine the reasons for apparently inconsistent verdicts. United States v. Opare-Addo, 486 F.3d 414, 416 (8th Cir.2007) (internal citation omitted). Thus, we turn to the sufficiency of the evidence. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial de novo and reverse only if no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hayes, 518 F.3d at 993. In conducting this review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, giving the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Id. Ironi argues that the evidence only shows that Ennen was involved in distributing cocaine and that Ironi did not know Ennen was storing and selling cocaine at his Beacon Street residence. Instead, Ironi argues he had the Inositol in his room for body building purposes and, at most, had a buyer-seller relationship with Ennen, all of which occurred at locations other than his residence. In light of all of the evidence presented by the Government, we conclude a reasonable jury could have found Ironi guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting Ennen's possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See id. The Government had to prove that Ironi associated himself with the unlawful venture, he participated in the unlawful venture as something he wished to bring about, and he sought by his action to make the unlawful venture succeed. United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 773 (8th Cir.2005). The Government presented evidence that Ironi owned the Beacon Street residence, a small, two-story building, and knew Ennen was a drug dealer when Ennen moved into the residence. Sergeant Boelter testified that informants told him Ennen and Ironi sold drugs from the residence, and Ironi was in his residence when the controlled buy between Ennen and an informant occurred the day before the November 17, 2005 search. The search revealed drug-related items in both Ennen's and Ironi's bedrooms and in their shared garage. Drug packaging materials, $1,321 in cash, and two bottles of Inositol were located in Ironi's bedroom, and empty wrappers for kilograms of cocaine were found in the garage. In addition to the cocaine, cash, empty wrappers, scale and Inositol found in Ennen's bedroom, Ennen's ledger revealed that Ironi bought cocaine from Ennen for at least fifteen months. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Ironi aided and abetted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. See United States v. Ellefson, 419 F.3d 859, 864 (8th Cir.2005) (finding a jury could have reasonably found that defendant aided and abetted possession with intent to distribute cocaine because she knew the cocaine was stored in her apartment); see also United States v. Engler, 422 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir.2005). While Ironi testified that he did not know of Ennen's activities in his residence, the jury could reject Ironi's explanation, consider the remaining evidence, and make reasonable inferences. See United States v. Blanton, 281 F.3d 771, 774 (8th Cir.2002) ([T]he jury was entitled to believe the government's witnesses and reject [the defendant's] explanations. . . .). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict, we find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury's verdict.