Opinion ID: 195382
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Utility. We next consider whether appellants

Text: 4. Utility. presented a plausible basis for a belief that discoverable materials exist that would likely suffice to raise a genuine issue of material fact and, thus, defeat summary judgment. See Nestor Colon, 964 F.2d at 38; Price, 931 F.2d at 164. For purposes of achieving this benchmark, a Rule 56(f) proffer need not be presented in a form suitable for admission as evidence at trial, so long as it rises sufficiently above mere speculation. See Carney v. United States, F.3d , (2d Cir. 1994) [1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 5449 at ]. This is as it should be, for Rule 56(f) is best understood as a complement to other provisions contained in Rule 56, allowing the opposing party to explain why he is as of yet unable to file a full-fledged opposition, subject to the more harrowing evidentiary standard that governs under 19 Rules 56(e) and 56(c).12 See 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure 2740, at 530-31 (1987 & Supp. 1993). We think that appellants' proffer passes the test of utility. In the affidavit accompanying the motion, Cathy Brooks states, among other things: When I completed my review of documents that RTC did produce, I reviewed them with my client Betty Wells Scott . . . . Based in part upon her recollection, in part on my own experience with banks' procedures and record keeping with respect to construction loans, and in part on documents obtained through other sources, I have reason to believe that RTC has not produced all of the records requested. RTC attacks this statement as inherently unreliable. It draws analogies to two cases in which we discounted Rule 56(f) proffers for vagueness. See Mattoon v. City of Pittsfield, 980 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1992); Peterson-Leitch, 840 F.2d at 989. But here, the proffer contained more than gauzy generalities; it specified seventeen categories of materials requested but withheld. RTC also draws an analogy to Hebert, 744 F.2d at 220, a case in which a Rule 56(f) affidavit was rejected partly because it recounted the affiant's conversations with a third person. In this case, however, although the Brooks affidavit refers to 12Although Rule 56 sets out stricter standards for materials offered on the merits of a summary judgment motion, see, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1990), those standards do not apply to proffers under Rule 56(f). See Carney, supra; see also Committee for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir. 1992). 20 conclusions drawn by a third person, the challenged reference merely provides a partial basis for Brooks' good-faith belief. Since Rule 56(f) requires a movant to spell out the reasons underpinning the conclusion that further discovery would be futile, and since the other bases for Attorney Brooks' belief fell well within her personal knowledge, we are unprepared to say that this brief reference spoiled the proffer. Accordingly, appellants' motion satisfies the utility requirement. 5. Materiality. Conceding nothing, RTC also contests