Opinion ID: 738512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Woodson's Retaliation Claims

Text: 25 Section 704(a) of Title VII forbids an employer from discriminating against an employee because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation ... under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). It is similarly unlawful under § 5(d) of the PHRA for an employer to discriminate in any manner against any individual because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this act, or because such individual has made a charge ... under this act. 43 Pa.S. § 955(d). 26 The allocation of the burden of proof for both the federal and state retaliation claims follows the familiar Title VII standards. Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 468 (3d Cir.1993); Waddell v. Small Tube Products, Inc., 799 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.1986). These standards will vary depending on whether the suit is characterized as a pretext suit or a mixed motives suit. For Woodson's retaliation claim, which has proceeded under a pretext theory, the standards have been laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). 27 The plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case of retaliation: he must show that (1) he was engaged in protected activity; (2) he was discharged subsequent to or contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the discharge. Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3d Cir.1991); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir.1989). 2 The issue here concerns whether Woodson has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a prima facie case of retaliation. 28 Scott concedes that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to satisfy two of the three components of the prima facie case: Woodson engaged in protected activity--the filing of race discrimination charges with the EEOC and the PHRC--and he was discharged after he engaged in that activity. Scott contends, however, that the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find the requisite causal link between the protected activity and his eventual discharge. 29 Our cases have established that temporal proximity between the protected activity and the termination is sufficient to establish a causal link. See, e.g., Jalil, 873 F.2d at 708. We have also held that the mere passage of time is not legally conclusive proof against retaliation. Robinson v. SEPTA, 982 F.2d 892, 894 (3d Cir.1993); see also Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.1997); Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1085 (3d Cir.1996). In the Robinson case, almost two years passed between the protected activity and Robinson's discharge. However, the district court found that SEPTA had subjected Robinson to a pattern of harassment during that time period. We therefore held that there was sufficient evidence supporting a causal link: The temporal proximity noted in other cases is missing here and we might be hard pressed to uphold the trial judge's finding were it not for the intervening pattern of antagonism that SEPTA demonstrated. Robinson, 982 F.2d at 895; see also id. (The court could reasonably find that the initial series of events thus caused Robinson's and SEPTA's relationship to deteriorate, and set a pattern of behavior that SEPTA followed in retaliating against Robinson's later efforts at opposing the Title VII violations he perceived.). Thus, a plaintiff can establish a link between his or her protected behavior and subsequent discharge if the employer engaged in a pattern of antagonism in the intervening period. 3 30 Scott correctly points out that the protected activity Woodson engaged in--filing complaints with the PHRC and EEOC in November 1989 and February 1990--is temporally remote from Woodson's termination in January 1992. Thus, the argument continues, Woodson can prevail only if a reasonable jury could find that Scott engaged in a pattern of antagonism in the period between his administrative complaints and his firing. Scott contends that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Woodson, the evidence does not support a finding of a pattern of antagonistic behavior against Woodson that would allow Woodson to prevail on the causal link prong. Rather, according to Scott, the evidence points only to the conclusion that Woodson was terminated in a company-wide cost reduction program nearly two years after he filed his discrimination complaints and after Scott had already promoted him to the position he sought when he filed those complaints. Under such circumstances, Scott submits, no reasonable jury could find a causal link between Woodson's discrimination complaints and his discharge. 31 Woodson, in response, contends that the evidence is clearly sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable jury that between February 1990, when he filed the second of his administrative complaints, and his termination in 1992, Scott engaged in a pattern of retaliation against him. This pattern is said to include Scott's setting Woodson up to fail by hiring him as a product system leader in the poorly performing napkin division and then refusing to provide him with adequate resources; Scott's failure to respond appropriately to racist graffiti in its plant; and Scott's termination of Woodson pursuant to a sham ranking process performed by individuals who were not familiar with his employment record, but only with his charges of discrimination. 32 For the reasons that follow, we agree with Woodson that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the district court did not err in finding the evidence sufficient to support a causal link between Woodson's administrative complaints and his discharge. While each piece of evidence alone is not sufficient to support an inference of a pattern of antagonistic behavior, taken together the evidence is sufficient. Thus, while we will discuss each piece of evidence, and Scott's objections to them, in turn, we must determine whether the evidence is sufficient based on the whole picture. Cf. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 (3d Cir.1990) (A play cannot be understood on the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance, and similarly, a discrimination analysis must concentrate not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario.). We also keep in mind, recognizing that much of the record is comprised of trial testimony, that the jury had the unique opportunity to judge the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses who testified at the trial, and that it reached its conclusions based in part on those observations. Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 502.
33 After Woodson had filed his first administrative complaint, he received his 1989 performance evaluation which suggested that he work with an outside consultant to improve his perception by superiors. The district court apparently believed that this recommendation, appearing in a formal written evaluation, was a response to his perception of racial animus among his superiors. 898 F.Supp. at 303. Scott objects to the district court's reliance on this recommendation because Zohlman, the human resources director, had suggested in a conversation with Woodson in May or June 1989, before Woodson had filed his first complaint, that he consult a behavioral psychologist to improve his working relationships. Thus, according to Scott, the recommendation in the performance evaluation is not probative of retaliatory animus because the same recommendation was made to Woodson before he filed the discrimination complaint. While Woodson acknowledged that the conversation with Zohlman took place, and Scott's argument has considerable force, it is not conclusive, as it is clear to us that a jury could rely on the written performance evaluation to find a pattern of antagonism. More specifically, the jury was entitled to conclude (if it wished) that the recommendation was made official when it was included in the written evaluation, which was used to determine promotions and salary, and that this was done in response to Woodson's complaints to the PHRC and EEOC. 34 Woodson also points to the fact that, soon after he was promoted, Zohlman suggested, during the course of a congratulatory phone call, that Woodson drop the administrative complaints against Scott. Woodson refused to do so. Pointing out that Zohlman did not participate in Woodson's ranking, Scott contends that this statement is irrelevant as a matter of law because it was a stray remark made by a non-decisionmaker. The record at trial, however, showed that Zohlman designed the ranking procedures and presented the results of the forced ranking, along with Wadsworth, to the Corporate Review Committee. He participated in the process through which Woodson was fired to such an extent that we cannot say that he was outside the chain of decisionmakers who had the authority to hire and fire plaintiff, Gomez v. Allegheny Health Serv., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1085 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2524, 135 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1996), which is our standard for determining whether statements are stray remarks. But even if Zohlman's statement was a mere stray remark, it can constitute evidence of the atmosphere in which the forced ranking was carried out, and would, therefore, be relevant to the question whether Scott retaliated against Woodson after he filed his discrimination complaints. See Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1302 (3d Cir.1996). 4 35 The district court also noted that [w]hen plaintiff was eventually promoted in 1990, after a number of requests, it was to lead the poorest performing division. He was paid at a lower level than similarly situated colleagues and denied adequate staffing and management support. 898 F.Supp. at 303 (citations omitted). We acknowledge that management has the clear right to assign its employees to positions where they can contribute most effectively to the firm's profitability, but we must agree with the district court that Woodson's assignment to this division, and the treatment just described, could at least support an inference by the jury that Scott responded to his discrimination complaints by granting him a promotion, but setting him up to fail in his new position. 5 36 We have held that an atmosphere of condoned [racial] harassment in a workplace increases the likelihood of retaliation for complaints in individual cases. Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 195 (3d Cir.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); Aman, 85 F.3d at 1086. In other words, evidence of condoned harassment can support an inference by the fact-finder that the employee, having failed to respond to the harassment, also engaged in retaliatory conduct against the plaintiff. This precept is germane in view of the testimony that, in June or July of 1991, racist graffiti appeared on the wall of the men's bathroom in the Chester plant, coupled with Woodson's evidence that the company's response to the incident was inadequate. The jury was entitled to consider these factors when deciding whether Woodson's termination was in retaliation for his complaints. Later that year, Woodson applied for an important promotion, which he did not receive. While this may not prove much by itself, in conjunction with the other facts it could have been taken into account by the jury in finding a pattern of antagonism. 37 Testimony about the process by which Woodson was fired also was probative of a causal link between his discrimination complaints and his termination. First, two of the three company officials who ranked the product system leader work group, Wadsworth and Czepiel, admitted that they were aware that Woodson had filed discrimination complaints when they ranked him. 6 Second, Zohlman and Peiffer were also aware of Woodson's discrimination charges when the ranking was carried out. Although neither participated directly in the ranking process, Zohlman designed the process and provided human relations support to the rankers and Peiffer was Woodson's direct supervisor at the Chester plant. 7 As we explained above, even if they were not directly evaluating Woodson in the process, their testimony is probative of the environment in which the employment decision was made. 38 Moreover, two of the evaluators, Wadsworth and Goldberg, admitted that they had little first-hand knowledge of Woodson's past performance record and that they did not review his personnel file in making their evaluations. Hence, they were unaware of Woodson's consistently high performance reviews during his tenure at the Chester plant. Such testimony would provide support for Woodson's contention that the ranking process was a sham, as he was evaluated by managers who knew of the discrimination complaints but not of his past performance at the plant. The third evaluator, Czepiel, stated in his affidavit that he considered Woodson a borderline insubordinate in his rejection of certain cultural changes that Scott was trying to implement. The district court noted that the jury may have concluded that what Woodson's superiors considered to be the ultimate act of insubordination was his filing of administrative (discrimination) charges. 898 F.Supp. at 304. We believe that the jury could have reasonably drawn such an inference. 39 In addition, the discrepancies between Woodson's ranking and his past performance evaluations were not presented to the Corporate Review Committee, as they should have been under the reorganization plan. Scott contends that this is not probative of a causal link because all of the employees who were evaluated during the reorganization were subjected to the same process--their performance evaluations were not considered by either the initial evaluators or the Corporate Review Committee. Woodson, however, need not have been treated differently during the reorganization process for the jury to conclude that a causal link existed between his complaints and his termination. Under the facts described above, the decision to terminate Woodson may have been related to his discrimination complaints even if there was no disparate treatment with respect to the process by which he was fired. 40 Finally, a confidential work shedding memorandum, which was prepared by Peiffer, recommended eliminating Woodson's job, but predicted that an emotional reaction from [Woodson] could result in an age/race discrimination claim. The record shows that the work shedding process, in which the plant managers were involved, was part of the overall reorganization effort, but was unrelated to the ranking carried out by Wadsworth, Czepiel, and Goldberg. This memorandum was drafted on December 17, 1991, and was provided to the evaluation team and to Zohlman after the ranking was completed, but before the recommendations were presented to the Corporate Review Committee. 8 Scott, therefore, contends that this memo is not probative of retaliation because there is no evidence that actually links the memo to the decision to fire Woodson. 41 Although there was no testimony at trial that this memorandum actually affected the decision to fire Woodson, it too would have been probative of the environment in which the employment decision was made. It also suggests that Woodson's superiors were keenly aware of the discrimination complaints that Woodson had lodged against the company. The jury could have drawn many conclusions from this evidence, but we agree with the district court that [t]hese predictions could reasonably have been interpreted by the jury as warnings based on the previously filed discrimination charges--warnings that went unheeded. Id. at 303. 42 Although the question is very close, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to Woodson, is sufficient to support a causal link between Woodson's discrimination complaints and his termination. The jury might reasonably have concluded that Scott engaged in a pattern of antagonistic behavior against Woodson after his complaints, setting him up to fail in a poorly performing division and then terminating him through a sham ranking procedure. Although none of the pieces of evidence that we have discussed, standing alone, would be sufficient to allow this inference (especially the environment evidence), the evidence as a whole can be so, particularly when we consider, as we must, that the verdict may have been based in part on the jurors' evaluation of each witness' credibility and demeanor.