Opinion ID: 1653405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: basis for action

Text: Neb.Rev.Stat. § 43-512.03 (Reissue 1988) provides in part: The county attorney or authorized attorney shall: (1) On request by the Department of Social Services or when the investigation or application filed under section 43-512 or 43-512.02 justifies, file a petition against a nonsupporting parent or stepparent in the district, county, or separate juvenile court praying for an order for child support in cases when there is no existing child support order. The State argues that § 43-512.03 relates to cases when there is no existing [Nebraska] child support order. Thus, the issue is whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction for the action commenced under § 43-512.03(1). Jurisdiction is the inherent power or authority to decide a case. Chicago Lumber Co. v. School Dist. No. 71, 227 Neb. 355, 365, 417 N.W.2d 757, 763 (1988). Accord, Millman v. County of Butler, 235 Neb. 915, 458 N.W.2d 207 (1990); Blitzkie v. State, 228 Neb. 409, 422 N.W.2d 773 (1988); State ex rel. Bauersachs v. Williams, 215 Neb. 757, 340 N.W.2d 431 (1983). Subject matter jurisdiction is a court's power to hear and determine a case of the general class or category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general subject involved in the action before the court. In re Interest of Adams, 230 Neb. 109, 430 N.W.2d 295 (1988); Lewin v. Lewin, 174 Neb. 596, 119 N.W.2d 96 (1962). When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is needed to ascertain the statute's meaning so that, in the absence of a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning. State v. Crowdell, 234 Neb. 469, 473-74, 451 N.W.2d 695, 699 (1990). Accord, State v. Carlson, 223 Neb. 874, 394 N.W.2d 669 (1986); Anderson v. Peterson, 221 Neb. 149, 375 N.W.2d 901 (1985); NC + Hybrids v. Growers Seed Assn., 219 Neb. 296, 363 N.W.2d 362 (1985). In § 43-512.03, in cases when there is no existing child support order is unambiguous, but supplies no specificity for, definition of, or language to identify the jurisdiction wherein an existing child support order has been entered in relation to an action brought under that statute. The State argues that unless Nebraska is inserted into § 43-512.03 in reference to an existing child support order, i.e., no existing [Nebraska] child support order, then a child support obligee could not obtain an order of child support in Nebraska or any other jurisdiction simply because a Colorado RURESA order exists. Brief for appellee at 7. To accomplish the State's suggested interpretation, this court would have to apply the rule of statutory construction expressed in Board of Regents v. Gillette, 149 Neb. 56, 66, 30 N.W.2d 296, 301 (1947): The rule is that words may be supplied by the courts in construing a statute where that is necessary to complete the sense thereof and give effect to the intention of the Legislature manifested therein. However, the preceding rule was rejected in State v. Reynolds, 235 Neb. 662, 457 N.W.2d 405 (1990). Addition of Nebraska in reference to an existing child support order within § 43-512.03 is accomplished by legislative language, not verbal injection from the judiciary. Consequently, as a prerequisite for an action under § 43-512.03, there cannot be an existing child support order in any jurisdiction. Hence, a court has subject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03 only when there is no existing child support order in Nebraska or any other jurisdiction. Here, as acknowledged in the State's petition and substantiated at trial, there was a subsisting Colorado child support order when the action was commenced under § 43-512.03. Therefore, in the case before us, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03. Child support from Charles Gaddis may be attainable in Nebraska, for we note that under the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, §§ 42-762 to 42-7,104 (Reissue 1988), an obligee may register the foreign support order in a court of this state, § 42-797, and [u]pon registration of the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of this state, § 42-7,101(a). If there is personal jurisdiction over a child support obligor, an obligee may then seek a modification of a registered foreign child support order in the same manner as an obligee may seek modification of a child support order initially entered by a Nebraska court. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-364 (Reissue 1988) (modification of child support order); Johnson v. Johnson, 215 Neb. 689, 340 N.W.2d 393 (1983). Cf., Wilson v. Ransom, 233 Neb. 427, 446 N.W.2d 6 (1989) (challenge to personal jurisdiction over obligor or presentation of a defense when a foreign URESA order is sought to be enforced in Nebraska).