Opinion ID: 3040111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cumulative Effect of Prosecutorial Comments

Text: Fahy argues that cumulatively these comments had a substantial prejudicial effect on the defense. As noted above, the comments Fahy recites were either not improper, or if they were improper, not prejudicial. Taken together, their cumulative effect could not have deprived Fahy of a fair trial. E. All Prior Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance 78 In catch-all fashion, Fahy asserts that, to the extent that prior trial and direct appeal counsel failed to properly investigate and failed to make certain objections at trial, as alleged throughout his brief, he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. He raised this issue for the first time in PCRA #4, and we therefore review the claim de novo. We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). That is to say, the “defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Indulging this presumption after reviewing each of counsel’s claims, we are satisfied that prior trial and direct appeal counsel (here, the same counsel in both instances) provided reasonable professional assistance. Even assuming error by counsel, Fahy has failed to show that any alleged deficient performance actually prejudiced his defense. Berryman, 100 F.3d at 1094. That would require a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, i.e., a trial the result of which is reliable. Id. Fahy has failed to convince us that he was deprived of a fair trial, and we deny this claim. F. Cumulative Effect of All Errors Fahy also argues that the cumulative effect of all of the errors at trial entitle him to relief. Individual errors that do not 79 entitle a petitioner to relief may do so when combined, if cumulatively the prejudice resulting from them undermined the fundamental fairness of his trial and denied him his constitutional right to due process. Albrecht v. Horn, 471 F.3d 435, 468 (3d Cir. 2006). “Cumulative errors are not harmless if they had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict, which means that a habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief based on cumulative errors unless he can establish ‘actual prejudice.’” Id. (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). We have already concluded that the admission of Fahy’s confession was not error, and that at least two out of the four challenged prosecutorial remarks were proper comment. However, even if we were to combine all of the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remarks with the admission of Fahy’s detailed confession, there is still weighty evidence of Fahy’s guilt in the record. The testimony of the Commonwealth’s witnesses established that the person who killed Nicky Caserta entered the house between 7:15 a.m., when the child’s mother left, and 7:30 a.m. when the child was supposed to meet a schoolmate. The door was locked, so it was unlikely the victim would have let anyone in the house whom she did not know. Fahy had told a coworker at 6:45 a.m. that he would pick him up in five minutes, but then arrived over an hour later looking pale. Fahy later took a bath and washed his long underwear. Fahy’s girlfriend testified that he confessed to her, and Fahy himself testified that he confessed to the killing when speaking with his mother. The verdict was not, therefore, unreliable.