Opinion ID: 2734031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implied Grant of an Easement

Text: Before addressing the issues presented in this case, we briefly review the various types of easements recognized in this jurisdiction. An easement is “[a]n interest in land owned by another person, consisting in the right to use or control the land. . . for a specific limited purpose.”5 An express easement, acknowledged in a deed conveying ownership of property, is always preferred under the law. 6 Under certain circumstances, however, courts will recognize an implied easement. As this court has recognized, “[g]enerally, there are two types of implied easements, an implied grant, and an implied reservation.” Hefazi v. Stiglitz, 862 A.2d 901, 912 (D.C. 2004). In the case of an implied grant of an easement, a property owner has subdivided and sold some or all of his property, but it is implied that he also granted to the purchaser of one parcel, the dominant estate,7 an easement over another parcel, the servient estate8—perhaps to allow access to a 5 Black‟s Law Dictionary 622 (10th ed. 2014). 6 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.11 cmt. b (2000) (“If the transaction is properly handled, the nature of the servitude, the land benefited and burdened by the servitude, [and] the nature of the interests of the parties . . . will be expressly identified.”). 7 Defined as “[a]n estate that benefits from an easement.” Black‟s Law Dictionary 667 (10th ed. 2014). 8 Defined as “[a]n estate burdened by an easement.” Id. 7 necessary resource (e.g., water or a public road).9 In the case of implied reservations of easement, the owner has subdivided but retained possession of the dominant estate, impliedly reserving use of a portion of the servient estate for his benefit. Because these two types of easements arise under different circumstances, each implicating distinct equitable concerns, the elements required to establish the existence of these easements are different. For implied grants of easements, the owner of the dominant estate need only assert that the easement is reasonably necessary to the use of his property. But for implied reservations of easements the owner of the dominant estate must show that the implied easement is strictly necessary. In this case, the trial court seemed to hold the Martins to the standard for an implied reservation of an easement instead of an implied grant. In its order granting Mr. Bicknell‟s motion to dismiss, the trial court incorrectly stated that Mr. Martin had to allege that his use of the easement is “apparent, continuous, and strictly necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained,” citing DLY-Adams Place, LLC v. Waste Mgmt. of Md., Inc., 2 A.3d 163, 167 (D.C. 2010) (analyzing a claim 9 Where an easement is implied through a “simultaneous conveyance” of two parcels once held in unity, the easement is recognized as a “grant and [not an] implied reservation.” See Leonard A. Jones, A Treatise on the Law of Easements § 139 (New York, Baker, Voorhis & Company 1898). 8 of an implied reservation of an easement). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the Martins‟ claim that they had an implied grant of an easement. The Martins argue that the question of how to prove an implied grant of an easement “is a case of first impression in the District of Columbia.” While both parties have failed to cite to them, we have identified a number of decisions on this subject, which, while old, are still binding precedent. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). Since the early twentieth century, courts in the District of Columbia have held that that in order for an easement to be transferred through an implied grant, the dominant and servient estates must have at one time been held in unity of title, that unity must have been severed, and the implied easement created at severance must be apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the property. See Scaggs v. Gallagher, 45 App. D.C. 450, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1916) (upholding an implied easement where the easement was “reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the parcel conveyed”); Robinson v. Hillman, 36 App. D.C. 241, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (upholding an implied easement where the “use was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of [the] premises”); Wilson v. Riggs, 27 App. D.C. 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1906) (noting that “[t]his court and the supreme court of this District . . . have not limited such appurtenances to those 9 which are absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of the property”); Frizzell v. Murphy, 19 App. D.C. 440, 445-46 (D.C. Cir. 1902) (emphasis added) (recognizing an implied grant of an easement where the easement was “reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part granted”). The reasonable necessity standard makes sense in light of the rationale for recognizing implied grants of easements: to give value to the consideration given by a purchaser for all apparent and implied advantages attached to the property,10 while also balancing the burdens such an easement may impose on the servient property.11 Implied reservations of easements are different. Where the seller of the servient estate is also the owner of the dominant estate, there is greater concern that he will take advantage of the situation. In order to sufficiently protect an unsuspecting purchaser from unfair burden and surprise,12 we recognize implied reservations of easements only in those situations where it is manifestly clear that 10 See Jones, supra note 9, at § 126 (“The privilege apparently annexed to the estate granted must be of value to it, and the grantee must be presumed to have taken it into consideration as an advantage to such estate and to have paid for it in his purchase.” (citations omitted)). 11 See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.11 cmt. f (explaining that the rationales for recognizing implied grants of easements include “meeting the reasonable expectations of land owners and purchasers, and arriving at results that are fair to all parties,” as well as the “overall economic impact” on each party of a decision to grant or deny an implied easement). 12 See id. 10 the dominant property will retain an easement over the purchaser‟s land, i.e., situations where the easement is “strictly necessary”13 to the use and enjoyment of the dominant estate. Douglass v. Lehman, 66 F.2d 790, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1933). In their brief on appeal, the Bicknells cite Douglass to support their contention that the applicable standard is “strict necessity” for both an implied reservation and an implied grant of an easement. But there was no implied grant of an easement in Douglass. Thus the passing statement in Douglass that “an implied reservation or grant of an easement can only be said to arise where at the time of the deed or grant the existing servitude is . . . strictly necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant estate,” id. at 792, is merely dicta in so far as it purports to set a higher bar for the degree of necessity of an implied grant of an easement. Nor does this statement in Douglass gain the force of binding precedent by its repetition— again as dicta—in Wood v. Neuman, 979 A.2d 64 (D.C. 2009). In Wood, this court 13 The case law discussing “strict necessity” has confusingly defined “necessary” as “meaning that there could be no other reasonable mode of enjoying the dominant tenement without [the] easement.” Douglass v. Lehman, 66 F.2d 790, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1933); see also Hefazi, 862 A.2d at 913 (citing Jones, supra note 9, at § 156). Whatever it means, “strictly necessary” unquestionably demands a higher degree of necessity than the “reasonably necessary” element for an implied grant. In any event, because there is no claim of an implied reservation of an easement in this case, we need not resolve any ambiguity in the elements for proof of such an easement. 11 upheld the trial court‟s ruling that the plaintiff had no implied easement where “the „need‟ for an easement (in lieu of „making arrangements‟ with neighbors to facilitate repair work) arose from the parties‟ „simple inability to get along as neighbors in a productive and cooperative manner‟; and because there „appears to be no current need‟ [for the neighbors to access each other‟s property].” 979 A.2d at 71-72. In other words, this court upheld the trial court‟s ruling determining that the plaintiffs did not enjoy an implied grant of an easement where the trial court determined that the plaintiff had failed even to show reasonable necessity for such an implied easement. Having clarified that a showing of reasonable necessity is all that must be alleged to state a claim for an implied grant of an easement, we determine that the trial court incorrectly granted the Bicknells‟ motion to dismiss on the ground that the Martins had failed to plead strict necessity. The Bicknells additionally argue, however, that the Martins failed to allege even reasonable necessity for an implied easement. We are not persuaded. The Martins did not merely recite the words “reasonably necessary” in their complaint. They also explained that their property and the property of the Bicknells (adjacent lots 52 and 53) had been jointly developed with a common driveway; that both 12 lots have garages that can accommodate a vehicle that is seven feet wide; that the shared driveway between them is only twelve feet wide; that the lots had been individually sold; and from the time of the original sale to present,14 the buyers of these lots had “drive[n] a vehicle . . . over the portion of that common concrete driveway” belonging to their neighbor in order to gain access to their garage from the alley and vice versa. The Martins further asserted that they had insisted that the Bicknells keep the driveway clear so that the Martins could access their garage and that on the day that the Bicknells parked their vehicle in the driveway with “all four of the wheels . . . parked on their side of th[e] common concrete driveway” Mr. Martin was “prevented . . . from driving his vehicle from the alley into his garage.” Taking these facts in the light most favorable to the Martins as we must,15 there is ample basis for an inference that the Martins‟ use of a portion of the Bicknells‟ driveway is reasonably necessary for them to be able to travel between the alleyway and the garage, and thus to the enjoyment of their property. Moreover there is sufficient basis for an inference that this has been the case since the time the adjacent properties were developed and divided (as noted above, an implied easement may only be created at the time the dominant estate is severed 14 The Martins explained that the only interruption in this reciprocal practice was the brief period of time when the predecessor owner to the Bicknells‟ property converted their garage into a rental unit. 15 See supra note 3. 13 from the servient estate). As designed, the driveway was originally twelve feet and the garage was built to house a seven-foot vehicle; a seven-foot-wide vehicle cannot stay on its “own” side of a twelve-foot-wide driveway. The Bicknells also argue that that the Martins‟ interest is purely aesthetic, because they could access their garage if they were willing to remove the hedge growing on their side of the driveway or alter their backyard patio. These assertions have no foundation in the Amended Complaint, and are based on documents that are not part of the appellate record.16 It may be that the Martins will not be able to prove their case, in particular, the requisite reasonable necessity for an implied grant of an easement; but that is not the question before us. We hold only that the Martins have fairly stated a claim that they enjoy an implied grant of an easement, see Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 543-45 (D.C. 2011) (adopting federal pleading standards that require plaintiffs to make “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 16 While the Amended Complaint mentions the existence of a hedge, it does not contain any allegation as to the impact of the hedge on the Martins‟ ability to use the driveway. To support their assertion that the Martins merely refuse to remove the hedge, the Bicknells cite in their brief on appeal to a declaration that was filed by Mr. Martin after the notice of appeal had already been filed, and is thus not part of the record before us. 14 accusation” and to allege sufficient facts which if accepted as true would “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))), and thus that the trial court erred in granting the Bicknells‟ motion to dismiss this claim.