Opinion ID: 2462392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: verdict-urging instructions in general

Text: Instructions such as that here in question have often been referred to as dynamite or Allen charges. The first reference is to the supposed effect of the charge; that is, to blast a jury from deadlock to verdict. The second reference is to the charge approved in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). In Allen, a criminal prosecution, the U. S. Supreme Court approved a charge which instructed the members of the minority of a deadlocked jury to reconsider their position in light of the fact that a larger number of their panel were of the opposite view. The particular charge in Allen [2] has been the subject of much critical commentary since its approval and appears now to have been rejected by a majority of jurisdictions for use in criminal cases. See, e. g., People v. Gainer, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997 n. 8 (Cal.1977); Note, 50 Tulane L.Rev. 706 (1976); The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 Am. Crim.L.Rev. 637 (1972); Note, 53 Va.L.Rev. 123 (1967); WIEHL, Instructing A Jury in Washington, 36 Wash.L.Rev. 378 (1961); Note, 25 Vand.L.Rev. 246 (1972); Note, 25 Ark.L.Rev. 542 (1972); Note, 13 W. & M.L. Rev. 672 (1972). See also, ABA Standards Relating To Trial By Jury, § 5.4 (Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 1968). [3] Instructions other than the particular Allen Charge which, in less objectionable terms, urge juries to return verdicts have also been the subject of extensive litigation and commentary. See, e. g., cases collected in Annot. 38 A.L.R.3d 1281 (1971); Annot. 41 A.L.R.3d 845 (1972); Annot. 41 A.L.R.3d 1154 (1972). See also, Comment, INSTRUCTING DEADLOCKED JURIES: THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE ALLEN CHARGE, 3 Tex.Tech.L.Rev. 313 (1972); Note, 9 Hous.L.Rev. 570 (1972); Note, 78 Yale L.Rev. 100 (1968). These less overtly coercive instructions are used in both criminal and civil cases and, except as to the requirement of unanimous verdicts in criminal prosecutions, are essentially similar. It appears that in civil cases a majority of jurisdictions do not prohibit such instructions as a matter of course; but rather analyze the propriety of a particular charge by its terms, and in the light of the circumstances under which it was given. See, e. g., Taylor v. Murray, 102 Ga.App. 145, 115 S.E.2d 776 (Ga.App.1960). See generally cases collected in Annot. 38 A.L.R.3d 1281, 1291-96 (1971). At least one commentator has read our decision in Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, supra , as a possible bar to all verdict-urging instructions. See Annot. 38 A.L. R.3d 1281 at 1290; Annot. 41 A.L.R.3d 845 at 854; Annot. 41 A.L.R.3d 1154 at 1164. We do not so interpret the case. Johnson involved an inquiry, made after two days of fruitless deliberation, in which the jury asked whether it was ... legal and right for a jury, in case they have failed to agree upon a verdict in a case, to make concessions in order to agree upon a verdict? The trial judge, in response, instructed the jury that ... it is entirely lawful and proper to make concessions, provided, of course, your verdict, as agreed to, is based alone upon the law as given in the charge and the facts as you find them from the evidence. This court held the instruction was impermissible. The basis for this holding was not that the charge coerced a verdict from an unwilling jury; but, rather, it was that the instruction invaded a forbidden area when it addressed the subject of concessions and compromises in the jury room. This rationale is not a blanket condemnation of verdict-urging instructions but is a condemnation of the charge as it was given. Quoting from Richardson v. Coleman, 131 Ind. 210, 29 N.E. 909 (1892), the court said: The fundamental objection to such instructions is that the law, in our opinion, prescribes no rule for the court to lay down, except that the jury are to find in accordance with the truth as their judgments, honestly applied to the evidence, lead them to believe it to be, or, as their oath expresses it, `that they will a true verdict render according to the law .. and the evidence.' 90 S.W. at 165. Although there is no precedential restriction on the authority of trial judges to give properly worded verdict-urging instructions, the serious questions presented by Travelers' argument that all such charges are inherently coercive must be considered before their continued use is sanctioned. Any supplemental charge, such as the original Allen charge, which is addressed specifically to the minority jurors of a deadlocked panel is expressly and inherently coercive. With this conclusion Travelers would agree; but Travelers would then contend that a supplemental charge, not coercive by its terms, is made coercive by the mere fact that it is given. Travelers argues that the minority juror is already under pressure by being in the minority; and that any verdict-urging instruction places additional, and impermissible, pressure on him to alter his position for the sole purpose of reaching a verdict. This argument is unavailing. The relationship of judge to jury is a complex and contradictory one. The two entities are equal in function; that is, the former is the exclusive judge of the law, while the latter is the exclusive finder of fact. At the same time, a superior-inferior relationship exists between the two. The judge is the supervisor of judicial proceedings. See, generally, POPE, The Judge-Jury Relationship, 18 Sw. L.J. 46 (1964). This fact is well known by juries and is reinforced by the instructions given them before and after they are impaneled. Rule 226a, Tex.R.Civ.P. Our law does not contemplate that every jury will function perfectly and, to that end, broad discretion is vested in the trial judge to aid in administering and expediting the fact finding process. It is this concern for the expeditious administration of justice that must be balanced against the concern for impartiality in the fact finding process in determining whether it is proper for judges to insert themselves into that process at all. There is admitted substance in the thesis that minority jurors more often than not are disproportionately influenced by supplemental instructions urging the jury to reach a verdict. This consideration, however, is more than counterbalanced by the fact that jurors are aware of the function of the trial judge as an administrator and the fact that the instructions given to them are based upon the experiences of the judge with other juries. We conclude, therefore, that even though there is a latent danger of coercion, supplemental, verdict-urging instructions are not, in and of themselves, erroneous, so long as the particular charge given is not otherwise objectionable.