Opinion ID: 4564883
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Heading: The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause

Text: applies to municipal parking fines. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Importantly here, the second clause — the Excessive Fines Clause — “limits the government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609– 610 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Excessive Fines Clause traces its lineage back to at least the Magna Carta which “guaranteed that ‘[a] Free-man shall not be [fined] for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement . . . .” Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682, 687 (2019) (citation omitted). For centuries, authorities abused their power to impose fines against their PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7 enemies or to illegitimately raise revenue. See id. at 694 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting, for example, that the Star Chamber “imposed heavy fines on the king’s enemies”). That fear of abuse of power continued to the colonial times. During the founding era, fines were “probably the most common form of punishment,” and this made “a constitutional prohibition on excessive fines all the more important.” Id. at 695 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Like the other enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment was established to shield the people from governmental overreach. See id. at 696 (noting that the Eighth Amendment is “an admonition” against “arbitrary reigns” by the government). Indeed, as the Supreme Court recently stated, the “right against excessive fines . . . has been consistently recognized as a core right worthy of constitutional protection.” Id. at 698. The Supreme Court has held that a fine is unconstitutionally excessive under the Eighth Amendment if its amount “is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336–37 (1998). To determine whether a fine is grossly disproportional to the underlying offense, four factors are considered: (1) the nature and extent of the underlying offense; (2) whether the underlying offense related to other illegal activities; (3) whether other penalties may be imposed for the offense; and (4) the extent of the harm caused by the offense. See United States v. $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (enunciating the “Bajakajian factors”). While these factors have been adopted and refined by subsequent case law in this circuit, Bajakajian itself “does not mandate the consideration of any rigid set of factors.” United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003). 8 PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES Excessive Fines Clause claims generally arise in the criminal forfeiture context. The Court in Bajakajian, for example, addressed the criminal forfeiture of a large sum of money for failing to report it during international travel in violation of federal law. 524 U.S. at 324. Many other courts in this circuit and elsewhere have mainly cited Bajakajian in similar criminal contexts. See, e.g., $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d at 1113–14 (criminal money forfeiture for knowingly making false statements in connection with failure to report international transport of cash); United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir. 2015) (criminal forfeiture of a residence for its use in harboring an illegal alien); United States v. Chaplin’s, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 849– 50 (11th Cir. 2011) (criminal forfeiture of jewelry store’s inventory for its use in a money laundering operation); United States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (criminal forfeiture of firearms and ammunition as a consequence of defendant’s drug addiction); United States v. Wallace, 389 F.3d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 2004) (criminal forfeiture of an aircraft for defendant’s knowing and willing operation of an unregistered aircraft). While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies only in the criminal forfeiture realm, this court has applied Bajakajian to civil penalties imposed by federal law. In Vasudeva v. United States, for example, we reviewed the constitutionality of civil monetary penalties for trafficking in federal food stamps. 214 F.3d 1155, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2000). Similarly, in Balice v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, we applied the Bajakajian factors to assess the constitutionality of civil fines levied pursuant to the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. 203 F.3d 684, 698–99 (9th Cir. 2000). PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9 Today, we extend Bajakajian’s four-factor analysis to govern municipal fines. We do so because the final link in the chain connecting the Eighth Amendment to municipal fines is forged by the Supreme Court’s recent Timbs decision. 139 S. Ct. 682. The Supreme Court in Timbs incorporated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 686–87. We hold that the Timbs decision affirmatively opens the door for Eighth Amendment challenges to fines imposed by state and local authorities. II. The initial fine of $63 does not violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Appellants challenge the constitutionality of the City’s initial parking fine of $63. Applying the Bajakajian factors, we conclude that the initial parking fine is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City for the initial fine. Looking to the first Bajakajian factor, we must determine the nature and extent of the underlying offense. See $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d at 1122. Courts typically look to the violator’s culpability to assess this factor. In Bajakajian, for example, the Supreme Court assessed defendant Bajakajian’s culpability based on his attempt to export over $350,000 in cash from the United States by concealing it during an international flight. 524 U.S. at 324–25. Bajakajian pleaded guilty to violating 31 U.S.C. § 5316, which requires anyone who transports more than $10,000 out of the country to report the transfer. Id. at 325. The federal government then sought forfeiture of the cash. Id. at 325–26. The Supreme Court found that Bajakajian’s culpability was minimal because the crime was “solely a reporting offense.” Id. at 337–38. 10 PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES In United States v. $100,348 in U.S. Currency, this court found that culpability increased if defendant’s violation involved reckless behavior. 354 F.3d at 1123. There, defendant had similarly failed to report the international export of a large sum of money, but he ignored several potential red flags. According to the defendant, a family friend had given him the money and instructed him to return with it to Israel. Id. at 1114–15. He did not ask about the source of the money but told his friend that he would not be responsible if anything happened to it. Id. at 1115. The defendant further testified that he asked essentially no questions about the money — nothing about its source, its purpose for being sent to Israel, or why the family friend hadn’t entrusted him with traveler’s checks instead. Id. at 1123. We found that his reckless behavior showed “more than a minimal level of culpability.” Id. So if culpability is high or behavior reckless, the nature and extent of the underlying violation is more significant. Conversely, if culpability is low, the nature and extent of the violation is minimal. It is critical, though, that the court review the specific actions of the violator rather than by taking an abstract view of the violation. See United States v. 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d 1191, 1197 (9th Cir. 1999), opinion amended on denial of reh’g sub nom., 172 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute on other grounds, 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2000). We note that benign actions may still result in some nonminimal degree of culpability. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Towers v. City of Chicago is instructive. There, the Seventh Circuit reviewed a municipal ordinance that fined car owners who allowed their vehicle to be used to transport illegal guns or drugs by others, even if they were unaware that their vehicle was used for that purpose. PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11 173 F.3d 619, 625–26 (7th Cir. 1999). The court emphasized the owners’ failure to report their cars as stolen (which implies consent to use), and further noted that an owner necessarily accepts the risks when she lets another person borrow her vehicle. Id. The Towers court rejected “the notion that the plaintiffs must be considered completely lacking in culpability,” even though the act triggering the fine was merely letting another person borrow their vehicle and nothing more. Id. at 625. We find the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning persuasive. Even if the underlying violation is minor, violators may still be culpable. Here, plaintiffs are indeed culpable because there is no factual dispute that they violated Los Angeles Municipal Code § 88.13 for failing to pay for over-time use of a metered space. But we also conclude that appellants’ culpability is low because the underlying parking violation is minor. We thus find that the nature and extent of appellants’ violations to be minimal but not de minimis. Moving to the second Bajakajian factor, we must determine whether the underlying offense relates to other illegal activities. See $100,348 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d at 1122. This factor is not as helpful to our inquiry as it might be in criminal contexts. We only note that there is no information in the record showing whether overstaying a parking meter relates to other illegal activities, nor do the parties argue as much. Similarly, the third Bajakajian factor — whether other penalties may be imposed for the violation — does not advance our analysis. See id. Neither party suggests that alternative penalties may be imposed instead of the fine, and the record is devoid of any such suggestion. 12 PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES Turning to the fourth factor, we must determine the extent of the harm caused by the violation. See id. The most obvious and simple way to assess this factor is to observe the monetary harm resulting from the violation. In 3814 NW Thurman St., this court held that because “neither creditors nor the government suffered any actual loss” from the violation, defendant’s “violations were at the low end of the severity spectrum.” 164 F.3d at 1198. In Mackby, on the other hand, we reviewed a civil fine imposed under the False Claims Act and were persuaded that because the government was monetarily harmed by defendant’s fraudulent conduct, the extent of the harm was significant. 339 F.3d at 1018–19. But our review of the fourth Bajakajian factor is not limited to monetary harms alone. Courts may also consider how the violation erodes the government’s purposes for proscribing the conduct. In Vasudeva, this court rejected the violators’ claim that no harm resulted because the trafficked food stamps were never redeemed. 214 F.3d at 1161. We found that a narrow focus on monetary harms failed to capture the full scope of the injury. Instead, we held that trafficking in food stamps is harmful, regardless of redemption status, because the very act of trafficking undermines the viability of the program. Id. Similarly in Mackby, this court held that non-monetary injury may be considered in assessing the harm caused by the violation. There, defendant provided legitimate physical therapy services to Medicare patients but was ineligible to receive payment from the Medicare Part B program. 339 F.3d at 1014–15. The defendant fraudulently used the credentials of his father, a physician, to make claims against the program. Id. at 1015. The court held that fraudulent claims for otherwise legitimate services “make the administration of Medicare more difficult, and widespread fraud would undermine public confidence in the system.” Id. at 1019; see PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 13 also Balice, 203 F.3d at 699 (noting that the violation “undermined the Secretary’s efforts to protect the stability of the almond market”); Towers, 173 F.3d at 625 (finding the violation harmed the City’s interests in public safety even though the harm is “not readily quantifiable”). Here, there is no real dispute that the City is harmed because overstaying parking meters leads to increased congestion and impedes traffic flow. Without material evidence provided by appellants to the contrary, we must afford “substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments.” Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). Pimentel further argues that the City has proffered no quantitative evidence showing that the initial fine deters parking violations or promotes compliance. While the Excessive Fines Clause curbs governmental overreach, the Supreme Court in Bajakajian also stated that legislatures nonetheless retain “broad authority” to fashion fines. Id. It further cautioned against “requiring strict proportionality between the amount of a punitive forfeiture and the gravity of a criminal offense.” Id. Instead, the “amount of the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish.” Id. at 334. In light of that guidance from the Supreme Court, we do not believe that the Eighth Amendment obligated the City to commission quantitative analysis to justify the $63 parking fine amount. That amount bears “some relationship” to the gravity of the offense. While a parking violation is not a serious offense, the fine is not so large, either, and likely deters violations. 14 PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES The most analogous case is the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Towers. 173 F.3d 619. In that case, the fine was $500 for the act of a car owner unwittingly allowing another to borrow their vehicle to be used for criminal ends. Id. at 626. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that $500 is not a “trifling sum,” but ruled that the City was “entitled to take into consideration that ordinances must perform a deterrent function.” Id. The court thus held that a $500 fine is “large enough to function as a deterrent,” but “is not so large as to be grossly out of proportion to the activity that the City is seeking to deter.” Id. Likewise here, the $63 parking fine is sufficiently large enough to deter parking violations but is “not so large as to be grossly out of proportion” to combatting traffic congestion in one of the most congested cities in the country. Pimentel argues that an Excessive Fines Clause analysis must incorporate means-testing to assess a violator’s ability to pay. This is a novel claim in this circuit, and one the Supreme Court expressly declined to address in Bajakajian. See 524 U.S. at 340 n.15. The Court in Timbs likewise left the question open. See 139 S. Ct. at 688. We, too, decline Pimentel’s invitation to affirmatively incorporate a meanstesting requirement for claims arising under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Considering the Bajakajian factors, we hold that the City’s initial parking fine of $63 is not grossly disproportional to the underlying offense of overstaying the time at a parking space. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Los Angeles on this issue. PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 15