Opinion ID: 1111377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the lower court's opinion and judgment are contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Text: The record favorable to appellee reflects that Vera Mae Stevens was alone in the office of Attorney Marcus Martin when he drew the deed conveying the 82 1/2 acres to appellee. Martin testified that Stevens had contacted him in early 1984 concerning the sale of her property; that she had found a potential buyer, i.e., appellee Patrick; that Stevens directed Attorney Martin to draft the necessary documents; that on January 16, 1984, There were [no] flags  red flags to indicate anything out of the [ordinary]; that at all times Stevens appeared competent and cognizant of the transaction she was undertaking; and that she was competent to execute the deed of conveyance. Appellee Patrick testified that he had no part in the selection of Attorney Martin as the attorney to draft the deed in question; that Stevens initiated the negotiations over the sale with appellee; and that he could never recall in his dealings with Stevens, ever having seen Vera Stevens confused or out of sorts. Dr. Curtis C. Roberts, physician for Stevens during the past twenty-five years prior to the trial, testified on cross-examination that in 1983, a CT scan of Vera Mae Stevens showed only normal degeneration for a person of her age; that his notes from August, 1983, on an examination of Stevens reflected that she appeared alert; that in May, 1984, approximately four months after the execution of the deed in question, Miss Stevens had occasion to visit another physician and that the records reflected there were no signs or clinical manifestations confirming senile dementia found at that time; and that Dr. Roberts did not see Miss Stevens on January 16, 1984. David L. Morrow, Jr., a licensed real estate appraiser, testified that he appraised the subject property; that the property had a value of forty-seven thousand three hundred fifty dollars ($47,350), without taking into account Stevens' reservation of a life estate; that, in his opinion a Rankin County appraisal from 1982 which valued the Stevens property at sixty thousand dollars ($60,000) was unreasonable and was flawed in that it failed to discount the value of the Stevens home, which was somewhat old and in need of repairs. [1] The chancellor made the following findings of fact: On the issue of mental capacity: [T]he fact alone that Miss Stevens was aged and suffered from senile dementia, a characteristic of old age, did not of itself prevent herself from making a deal that she was accustomed to doing similarly for years previously... . In fact, the conservator Ludie S. Varner and her son dealt with Miss Stevens in December of 1984, almost a year after the conveyance of her property to the defendant, and purchased her car in the same manner as Mr. Patrick had purchased the property in question. On the question of inadequate consideration: The price given for the property in question certainly does not meet the test of inadequacy of consideration, in the opinion of this court. The price of $42,000 may not have been the highest price that could have [been] obtained by the grantor for this property, but the testimony with respect to the possible price that could have been given certainly is questionable enough that the court doubts that the value of $60,000 would have been a true and best value at the time of this sale.... Mr. Morrow, the only appraiser who testified and who, incidentally, gave a very convincing and believable report of his appraisal, testified that the price paid for Miss Stevens' land was adequate. On the issue of a confidential relationship between Stevens and Patrick: The court did consider the testimony concerning the confidential relationship alleged but did not believe that Mr. Patrick had overreached the ward Miss Stevens with any confidential relationship. This court doubts any such relationship, but in the event the testimony in this case causes such presumption to be raised, the court is of the opinion that same was sufficiently overcome by the testimony of the defendant so that any such confidential relationship, coupled together with the age of the ward, did not create a situation that would require this court to set aside the deed made by Miss Vera Mae Stevens to D.K. Patrick. The burden of proving lack of mental capacity rests on the party seeking to have the deed of conveyance set aside. Clear and convincing evidence is required to establish lack of mental capacity and the crucial time in such incapacity is when the document is executed. Richardson v. Langley, 426 So.2d 780 (Miss. 1983); Thigpen v. Payton, 391 So.2d 629 (Miss. 1980); Williams v. Wilson, 335 So.2d 110 (Miss. 1976); Moore v. Stone, 208 So.2d 585 (Miss. 1968); Texaco, Inc. v. Musgrove, 253 Miss. 209, 175 So.2d 490 (1965); Herrington v. Herrington, 232 Miss. 244, 98 So.2d 646 (1957); Gillis v. Smith, 114 Miss. 665, 75 So. 451 (1917). In Richardson, supra, this Court held: We have traditionally made a distinction between weakness of intellect and a total lack of capacity to execute a deed. Such a weakness of intellect when coupled with another factor, such as grossly inadequate consideration, or the existence of a confidential relationship may be sufficient to warrant the granting of equitable relief. Absent such a confidential relation, or grossly inadequate consideration, a weakness of intellect in and of itself, which does not rise to the standard of a total lack of capacity to execute a deed is an insufficient basis upon which to set aside a deed. [Citations omitted]. 426 So.2d at 783. See also Cunningham v. Lockett, 216 Miss. 879, 63 So.2d 401 (1953); Harvey v. Meador, 459 So.2d 288 (Miss. 1984). We are of the opinion that the chancellor's findings were supported by substantial evidence and we cannot say that he was manifestly wrong in dismissing the complaint. Leard v. Breland, 514 So.2d 778 (Miss. 1987); Est. of Johnson v. Adkins, 513 So.2d 922 (Miss. 1987); Ford v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 513 So.2d 880 (Miss. 1987); Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So.2d 1259 (Miss. 1987); Gulf National Bank v. Sturtevant, 511 So.2d 936 (Miss. 1987); Brown v. Williams, 504 So.2d 1188 (Miss. 1987); Harkins v. Fletcher, 499 So.2d 773 (Miss. 1986); Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328 (Miss. 1986). The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON, PRATHER, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., not participating.