Opinion ID: 2318171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clothing Material Evidence

Text: The first step in a Deberry analysis is to determine whether the clothing from the car and sweatpants from the bedroom, if in the possession of the State, would have been subject to disclosure under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 or Brady. [14] As we noted in Deberry and Hammond v. State , [15] determining whether the clothes would have been discoverable under Brady would be a fruitless exercise, since they are no longer available for examination or testing. [16] Therefore, we begin our analysis with the provisions of Rule 16. [U]nder Superior Court Criminal Rule 16(b), a defendant need only show that an item `may be material to the preparation of his defense' to be discoverable. [17] It is well established that circumstantial evidence may be probative of constructive possession of weapons or drugs. [18] In Johnson's case, the jury was instructed, in part, as follows: A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time is regarded as being in actual possession of it. However, under the law, a defendant may have possession of a weapon if it's located in or about the defendant's person, premises, belongings, vehicle, or otherwise within his reasonable control. (emphasis added). The State frequently establishes a circumstantial case for possession by demonstrating that the contraband or weapon was in or near the defendant's belongings. [19] In Johnson's case, for example, the State presented evidence that the shotgun was found near other items, including mail, that belonged to Johnson in support of its circumstantial case of constructive possession. Thus, not only our prior precedents, but also the State's other evidence in this very case, demonstrate that a circumstantial case for constructive possession often rests upon who owns the belongings that conceal or are near the contraband or weapon. Therefore, if the clothes from the car and the sweatpants from the bedroom had been in the State's possession, they would have been discoverable under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 because they would be material to a defense argument that those items did not belong to Johnson. The second step in a Deberry evaluation requires an examination of the State's duty to preserve discoverable evidence. This Court has declined to prescribe the exact procedures that the various law enforcement agencies in this State must follow in order to fulfill their duties to preserve evidence. [20] This Court has held, however, that in fulfilling these duties, agencies should create rules for gathering and preserving evidence that are broad enough to encompass any material that could be favorable to a defense. [21] As observed in Deberry: It is most consistent with the purposes of those safeguards to hold that the duty of disclosure attaches in some form once the Government has first gathered and taken possession of the evidence in question. Otherwise, disclosure might be avoided by destroying vital evidence before prosecution begins or before defendants hear of its existence.... Only if evidence is carefully preserved during the early stages of investigation will disclosure be possible later. [22] We hold that in this case, where the police were gathering evidence to support convictions for two separate possessory weapons offenses, the police had a duty to gather and to preserve the clothing from the car, and the sweatpants from the bedroom, that concealed each of the weapons that were the basis for the criminal charges against Johnson.