Opinion ID: 218334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Security

Text: Sutton's first claim is that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise two objections under Holbrook v. Flynn, which prohibits trial practices that prejudice the defendant without sufficient cause. 475 U.S. 560, 568, 571, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). He first argues that his counsel should have objected to the conspicuous, or at least noticeable, deployment of ten uniformed guards in the courtroom, [1] seven of whom were armed, because they suggested official concern or alarm that he was particularly dangerous or culpable, id. at 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340. The state appellate court reasonably rejected this claim because the underlying Flynn claim failed. The guards' presence likely caused little prejudice: as the trial judge testified during postconviction proceedings, they were not overly conspicuous because they were spaced out in the very full courtroomfour were behind the defense table, one was next to the jury, two were in the balcony, and one was posted at each of the courtroom's three doors. And we agree with the trial judge that the legitimate security concerns involved in trying three inmates for violently murdering a fourth inmate, where the defendants were not wearing upper-body restraints and six other inmates were testifying as witnesses, was sufficient cause for any prejudice. See Flynn, 475 U.S. at 571, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (holding that the State's need to maintain custody over defendants who had been denied bail as flight risks was sufficient cause for whatever prejudice resulted from the spectacle of four [uniformed and armed] officers quietly sitting behind the defendants); Bell v. Hurley, 97 Fed.Appx. 11, 16-17 (6th Cir.2004) (noting that visibly shackling the defendantwhich, unlike the presence of guards, is inherently prejudicial under Flynn was justified because he was accused of attacking a guard during a prison riot); see also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 632, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (recognizing the need to give trial courts latitude in making individualized security determinations); United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 371 (6th Cir.1991) ([T]he degree of security relating to a defendant is within the [trial] judge's discretion.). Sutton also contends that his counsel should have raised a Flynn objection to what he calls the shanks incident. Before introducing the murder weapons into evidence, the prosecutor placed them on the defense table, within reach of the defendants, for inspection by counsel. Sutton's counsel jerked away from him in fear and the guards reached for their weapons; there is conflicting testimony over whether any were actually drawn. Although the shanks were moved to the state's table for inspection without further incident, Sutton claims that his counsel's and the guards' reactions suggested that he was very dangerous and were therefore so prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to [his] right to a fair trial, Flynn, 475 U.S. at 572, 106 S.Ct. 1340. The state court again rejected Sutton's ineffective-assistance claim because the underlying Flynn claim failed. This decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law because [n]o holdings of [the Supreme] Court required the [state court] to apply the test of . . . Flynn to counsel's and the guards' reactions, Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75-77, 127 S.Ct. 649, 166 L.Ed.2d 482 (2006). In Musladin, the Supreme Court held that Flynn 's application to private-actor[s'] courtroom conduct was an open question under its case law, and therefore a state court's application of Flynn to spectators' conduct could be neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Flynn. Ibid. Sutton's counsel was a private actor, at least for these purposes, and therefore we cannot say the state court's decision that his reaction did not cause Flynn error was improper. See ibid. Flynn's applicability to the guards' reaction is similarly uncertain. As Musladin noted, Flynn and its related case law focus exclusively on state sponsored practices,  id. at 75-77, 127 S.Ct. 649 (emphasis added); they do not address security's response to, e.g., courtroom outbursts or attacks. See Flynn, 475 U.S. at 567-71, 106 S.Ct. 1340 (discussing practices and procedures such as the presence of guards); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503-04, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976) (addressing the practice and procedure of requiring defendants to wear prison clothes); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 340, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) (addressing the binding and gagging of defendants). Furthermore, courts have long recognized that forceful reactions to courtroom outbursts or attacks may require a new trial even where there was sufficient cause for the responseand thus where Flynn would not imply a constitutional error. See, e.g., United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827, 830-31 (6th Cir. 1971) (collecting cases, on direct appeal, about requests for a mistrial based on courtroom outbursts or attacks); Braswell v. United States, 200 F.2d 597, 600-02 (5th Cir.1952) (holding on direct appeal that the trial judge improperly refused to grant a mistrial after two of the defendants violently attacked a United States Marshal and were forcefully subdued in front of the jury). [2] The lack of a textual mandate, plus the existence of doctrine predating Flynn that more stringently evaluates events such as the shanks incident, leads us to conclude that, at the least, Flynn 's applicability to the guards' reaction is an open question. Therefore, we cannot say that the state court improperly applied Flynn to the guards' reactions. See Musladin, 549 U.S. at 77, 127 S.Ct. 649.