Opinion ID: 1252037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lost Profits or Income Summary-Judgment Issue

Text: In its motion, the appellant-defendant third-party plaintiff moved for summary judgment    [a]gainst plaintiff [appellees here] as to plaintiff's claim against defendant for lost income. According to the movant: This motion is based on the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, responses to requests for production of documents, depositions, and any and all items of record at this time, as well as on the attached affidavit as specifically incorporated herein. Such pleadings, filings, affidavits and other materials established that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact as outlined in the case authority under Rule 56 of Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and that therefore the defendant and third-party plaintiff Landmark is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as stated in its answer and counterclaim. The record fails to disclose any depositions, interrogatories or answers to interrogatories. Nor does it contain a demand for the production of documents and there are no documents on file which appear to be responsive to such a demand. There are no exhibits, materials or filings of record which speak to lost income or profits which appear to have been of record when the motion for summary judgment was filed and denied. The record does contain two affidavits of Stephen F. Hughes, President of Landmark, Inc., appellant-defendant, third-party plaintiff, in support of Landmark, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. These affidavits address other subjects and do not even mention lost profits. The appellees-plaintiffs filed responsive affidavits which also do not mention lost income or profits. The record contains no other evidence or testimony  deposition-affidavit  response to interrogatory or other form of factual representation  pertaining to lost profits or income which predates the testimony of witnesses elicited at the trial. Given this state of affairs, we are therefore forced to consider the appellant's contention of error as though the motion for summary judgment is based only on the pleadings. In this regard, the appellees' complaint alleges: That by virtue of Defendant's breach of contract in its failure to complete the project on time and to conform to the plans and specifications as agreed, the Plaintiffs have suffered damages by reason of the additional expenses, interest and costs for the project, and for lost income in a sum in excess of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), in response to which the appellant Landmark, Inc. makes a general denial. No other mention of lost profits or income is contained in the pleadings. The relevant aspects of Rule 56, W.R.C.P. provide: Summary judgment.       (b) For defending party.  A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (c) Motion and proceedings thereon.     The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.  (Emphasis added.) The ultimate question for our decision on this issue is this: Can we say, given the nature of the case, that an allegation of loss of profits countered by a pleading denial is sufficient substructure to support a summary judgment for the party entering the denial? A Rule 56 summary judgment has been described as an appropriate procedural device for the disposition of cases where there exists no question of material fact and only questions of law are involved. Carter v. Davison, Wyo., 359 P.2d 990, 994 (1961), quoting from Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corporation v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871, 877 (6 Cir.1943), cert. denied 320 U.S. 800, 64 S.Ct. 431, 88 L.Ed. 483. In Carter v. Davison, supra, a malicious-prosecution action, it was shown that the defendant in the underlying criminal case had waived his preliminary hearing and was ultimately found not guilty. The defendant in the malicious-prosecution case, who had been the complaining witness in the criminal prosecution, moved for summary judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that he had made out a prima facie case of probable cause in the criminal case according to the law pertaining to such matters. It was the movant's contention that, if he were right in this as a matter of law, it would then be impossible to elicit such facts as would structure a question of material fact and, therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. In this case we held that a motion for summary judgment may be made wholly on the pleadings, 359 P.2d at 994, citing Reynolds v. Needle, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 132 F.2d 161 (1942), and 6 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 2063. In Reynolds, supra, it was apparent upon the face of the pleading that the statute of limitations had run and it was held that summary judgment was therefore appropriate without presentation of supporting evidence. In Moore's Federal Practice, supra, the author observes that, while a motion for summary judgment may be based solely upon the pleadings, it is then    functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or a motion for judgment under Rule 12(c). [1] We have followed this concept in Wyoming, when we recently said in Lafferty v. Nickel, Wyo., 663 P.2d 168, 169 (1983): In this case appellees based their motion for summary judgment on the pleadings without providing any other competent evidence to support the motion. In this posture appellees' motion for summary judgment is equivalent to either a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., or a motion for a judgment on the pleadings made pursuant to Rule 12(c), W.R.C.P. Schwartz v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2nd Cir.1968); United States v. Mills, 372 F.2d 693, 696 (10th Cir.1966); Parker v. De Kalb Chrysler Plymouth, 459 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.C.Ga. 1978), aff'd 673 F.2d 1178 (11th Cir.1982); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶¶ 56.02[3], pp. 56-29, 56.11[3], p. 56-229. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admitted and the allegations contained therein are viewed in a light most favorable to the appellant. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979); State Highway Commission v. Bourne, Wyo., 425 P.2d 59, 63 (1967). Applying this rule to the case at bar, the appellees having alleged that they have    suffered damages by reason of    lost income in a sum in excess of One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), and the appellant movant having simply denied the allegation, and it being our obligation, for summary-judgment purposes, to treat the facts alleged in the complaint as though they are admitted, we conclude that the appellant has failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does not exist [2]  and thus denial of summary judgment must be affirmed insofar as the first issue raised by the appellant is concerned.