Opinion ID: 204350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ANALYSIS.The PLRA's Exhaustion Requirement

Text: Congress enacted the PLRA in the wake of a sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (internal citations omitted). The law seeks to alleviate the burden of this litigation by requiring prisoners to exhaust all administrative remedies before they can file suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997a. The dominant concern of the PLRA is to promote administrative redress, filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528, 122 S.Ct. 983, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002) (making the exhaustion requirement mandatory). Specifically, the law provides that [n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This requirement is a strong one. To further the purposes behind the PLRA, exhaustion is required even if the prisoner subjectively believes the remedy is not available, Brock v. Kenton County, 93 Fed.Appx. 793, 798 (6th Cir.2004); even when the state cannot grant the particular relief requested, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001); and even where [the prisoners] believe the procedure to be ineffectual or futile . . . . Pack v. Martin, 174 Fed.Appx. 256, 262 (6th Cir.2006). Because he was clearly a prisoner at the time he filed suit, Napier was subject to the PLRA's requirements. And because it applies to a person in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, this is true whether he was housed at the LCDC or the Marion facility. The only question is whether the LCDC's grievance procedure was available to Napier.