Opinion ID: 4543430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eligibility for Resentencing

Text: Flowers’ first argument on appeal is that the district court erred by implicitly deeming him ineligible for relief under the First Step Act because Flowers’ guidelines range did not change. Flowers believes the district court made such an error because it addressed the merits of his motion after saying, “[e]ven if the Court accepts Mr. Flowers’ position that a defendant may receive a reduced sentence under the First Step Act, whether or not his guideline range changed,” Flowers, 2019 WL 3068204, at , with the “[e]ven if” language suggesting that the court did not actually think Flowers was eligible. Under the First Step Act, “[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may . . . impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” § 404(b) (citation omitted). Within that provision, “‘covered offense’ means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010.” § 404(a) (citation omitted). The only limitations on eligibility for relief under the act are for sentences already imposed or reduced in accordance with those sections of the Fair Sentencing Act, or if an earlier motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act was denied on the merits. § 404(c). No. 19-3742 United States v. Flowers Page 7 To the extent that the district court considered Flowers ineligible for relief, that determination was in error. The statutory penalties for his crime of conviction were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act, and none of the First Step Act’s other limitations apply to him. Under the plain language of this statute, Flowers is eligible for relief, and the sentencing guidelines are irrelevant to that threshold determination. See United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789, 791–92 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Beamus is eligible for resentencing because, and only because, the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory range for his offense. That the Sentencing Guidelines also would have applied differently does not affect his eligibility for resentencing.”); see also United States v. Maxwell, 800 F. App’x 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing First Step Act eligibility). That said, any possible error on this point was harmless. This is because the district court went on to address the merits of Flowers’ motion and found that his “sentence is the same sentence that [it] would have imposed if the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” Flowers, 2019 WL 3068204, at . Because we can be certain that any potential error with respect to eligibility did not affect the outcome of Flowers’ motion, that error was harmless and cannot support reversal. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (discussing harmless error in sentencing cases); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 559, 564–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Brown, 444 F.3d 519, 522 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a sentencing error harmless when the reviewing court can be sure that the district court would have imposed the same sentence even without the error); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”); cf. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2016) (finding that a sentencing error prejudiced the defendant because “[t]he District Court said nothing to suggest that it would have imposed [the same] sentence” absent the error). Thus, we proceed to address the district court’s denial of Flowers’ motion on the merits.