Opinion ID: 2978663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Traffic Stop

Text: Bonilla argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Bemis did not have probable cause to effectuate the traffic stop. “[S]o long as the officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the resultant stop is not unlawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345, 352 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 210 (6th Cir.1996)). In arguing that the traffic stop lacked probable cause, Bonilla first asserts that Bemis’s and Barrett’s testimonies were not credible. His argument is unpersuasive; the district court found no issue with the credibility of Bemis or Barrett, and neither do we. “We afford the district court’s credibility determinations regarding witness testimony great deference and must uphold its findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Esteppe, 483 F.3d 447, 452 (6th Cir. 2007). Concerning Bonilla’s argument that the initial stop by Bemis was not supported by probable cause even if Bemis’s testimony is considered credible, Bonilla’s argument fails in this respect as well. Probable cause is satisfied when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, -4- based on reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed. Davis, 430 F.3d at 352. Bonilla was stopped for violating Ohio Rev. Code § 4511.34(A), which provides, The operator of a motor vehicle . . . shall not follow another vehicle . . . more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle. . . and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. Section 4511.34 requires one car-length between vehicles for every ten miles per hour of speed. See United States v. Dukes, 257 F. App’x 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2007). Bemis witnessed Bonilla following approximately one car-length behind a Saturn and also following too closely to a tractor-trailer at speeds approaching sixty miles per hour. Although Bemis admitted that he began following Bonilla based on Barrett’s initial observation, his motivation is irrelevant. See Hill, 195 F.3d at 264 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996)) (“[A]n officer may stop a vehicle for a traffic violation when his true motivation is to search for contraband, as long as the officer had probable cause to initially stop the vehicle.”). Bemis had probable cause to believe a traffic violation had occurred. Since his testimony has not been proven incredible, the evidence supporting the probable cause determination is sufficient.