Opinion ID: 591882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Supply a Blood Sample

Text: 15 Phillips argues that the refusal to supply a blood alcohol sample before any arrest cannot be used as evidence at trial because the use of such evidence violates the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Whether such evidence is admissible is a question of law that we review de novo. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (issues of law reviewed de novo), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). 16 It is well settled that a breath test or blood sample test is a search that is subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 766-72 (1966); Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.1986). It is also well established that refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing. United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir.1978); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 969 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 928 (1988). Thus, where an underlying right to refuse such a blood test is present, it would be improper to draw adverse inferences from failure of the accused to respond to a request for a blood test because the accused would thereby be penalized for exercising his rights to refuse the test. Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 518 (9th Cir.1969) (discussing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n. 9 and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37 (1966)), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970); see Prescott, supra. 17 The government cites South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and Deering v. Brown, 839 F.2d 539, 541 (9th Cir.1988) for the proposition that a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test to show consciousness of guilt is admissible. However, Neville and Deering are inapposite. Both cases involve defendants who were lawfully under arrest when the blood test was requested. Thus, neither Neville nor Deering was a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into choosing the option it had no right to compel.... Neville, 459 U.S. at 563. The government has the right to compel a blood sample after or contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, and the defendant has no Fourth Amendment right to refuse such a test. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-72; United States v. Harvey, 701 F.2d 800, 805 (9th Cir.1983). In short, the cases cited by the government do not address the refusal to submit to a blood test when the defendant has a Fourth Amendment right to refuse such a test. 18 The Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures requires that there be probable cause for arrest before a defendant forfeits his right to refuse a blood test. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768-70. Unless there is probable cause and a valid arrest, a defendant's refusal to submit to a blood test cannot be used as evidence of guilt. See Burnett, 806 F.2d at 1451 (a defendant may challenge evidence of his refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test by attacking the validity of the arrest). 19 Although there may have been probable cause for arrest in this case, the government does not contend that Phillips' refusal to supply a blood sample was contemporaneous to a valid arrest. Therefore, the district court erred by admitting this refusal as substantive evidence. Nevertheless, because there was ample evidence of Phillips' intoxication presented at trial, the error was harmless. See Taxe, 540 F.2d at 969 (reversal is not necessary when the record as a whole indicates that comments on the refusal to consent to a search were harmless); Thame, 846 F.2d at 207 (the use of the defendant's refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt did not require reversal because there was considerable other evidence of guilt). Therefore, we affirm despite the district court's error.