Opinion ID: 2757933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Chen’s Asylum Claim

Text: In denying Chen asylum, the agency determined that he had failed to demonstrate economic harms manifesting either past persecution or a well founded fear of future persecution. We identify no error in the past persecution determination, but we vacate the agency’s rejection of Chen’s claimed fear of future persecution and remand for further proceedings on that issue.
Chen argues that the agency erred in rejecting his past persecution claim because the imposition of an 18,000 (or 23,000) rmb fine on a man with an income of only 1,000 to 1,500 rmb per year must, as a matter of law, be found to constitute economic persecution without regard to whether the fine was paid. That argument improperly conflates the issue of when an economic sanction is severe enough to have persecutive potential with when such a sanction in fact effects persecution. A total 23,000 rmb fine, more than twenty times Chen’s annual income, was certainly “extraordinarily severe” and “particularly onerous”—i.e., the kind 18 of economic sanction that In re T‐Z‐ recognized could amount to persecution. I. & N. Dec. at 171, 174. But In re T‐Z‐ does not state that the mere imposition of a severe or onerous fine necessarily effects persecution. Rather, In re T‐Z‐ explains that an economic sanction constitutes persecution when it actually “depriv[es] [the alien] of basic necessities such that life or freedom is threatened,” id. at 171, or reduces the alien “to an impoverished existence,” id. at 174. The imposition of a severe or onerous fine does not, by itself, have these persecutive effects. A severe fine may, after all, go unpaid. The government might not attempt to collect the fine, or its attempts might not deprive the alien of life’s necessities or render him impoverished. Thus, while imposition of a severe or onerous fine may have the potential to impoverish or to deprive a person of life’s necessities in the future, a person has not suffered past persecution until payment or collection efforts actually have such persecutive effects. See id. at 168 (observing that immigration law requires that there be “actual harm . . . amounting to persecutory harm”); see also Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d at 72 (collecting cases describing persecution as “infliction of suffering or harm” on proscribed ground (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).2 Rather, 2 Efforts to collect an onerous fine may result in persecution that goes beyond the 19 imposition of a severe or onerous fine, on its own, can support only a well founded fear of future persecution. This conclusion finds support in our precedent, as well as that of our sister circuits, holding that threats of persecution, no matter how credible, do not demonstrate past persecution. See Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d 408, 412–13 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Zhen Hua Li v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 400 F.3d 157, 164–65 (3d Cir. 2005) (cited approvingly in Gui Ci Pan) (stating that even “sinister and credible” threats, including “death threats,” would not qualify as past persecution unless fulfilled or “highly imminent”); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 932–33, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (cited approvingly in Gui Ci Pan) (identifying no past persecution despite highly credible death threats). That is true even where, as here, the threat implicit in an onerous fine—that collection will render one impoverished or without the necessities of life—leads the alien to flee his own village and hide in a neighboring one to avoid suffering these effects. See generally Gui Ci Pan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 449 F.3d at 412 (stating that where economic, as the Seventh Circuit demonstrated through a dramatic hypothetical. See Xiu Zhen Lin v. Mukasey, 532 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that persecution would have occurred where “government tells a religious heretic we are going to fine you $1 million for your heresy and if you cannot pay we are going to burn you at the stake, and the heretic cannot pay and therefore is executed”). That is not this case. 20 petitioner’s girlfriend was able to avoid forced abortion by couple’s going into hiding, petitioner could not claim past persecution from threat of abortion); Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d at 70 (holding that petitioner who fled village after imposition of economic fine and threat of detention had not demonstrated past persecution).3 Instead, threats may be used to establish only a well founded fear of future persecution. See Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d at 70; see also Zhen Hua Li v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 400 F.3d at 165 n.3 (“[U]nfulfilled threats are generally within that category of conduct indicative of a danger of future persecution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d at 936 (“[Threats are] precisely that—threats of future harm.”). Chen cites no case in which a court has found past economic persecution on the basis of an unpaid fine. Indeed, in the one case he cites where a court’s 3 In Miljkovic v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit held that an alien had satisfactorily demonstrated persecution where he fled Serbia after receiving a draft notice that, based on his ethnicity, targeted him for hazardous military duty, possibly violative of international law. “Being driven out of one’s country is another crossing of the line that separates mere discrimination from persecution.” Id. at 756. Chen does not cite Miljkovic, nor would that case help him given that Chen’s initial flight involved a move to a neighboring village, not a change of country. Nor does the record indicate any change in circumstances that, after years in that village, drove Chen out of China. 21 finding of past persecution rested, in part, on a fine, the alien had been forced to pay the fine before fleeing China. See Zhen Hua Li v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 400 F.3d at 169 (finding economic persecution based partly on fine); id. at 174 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (noting that alien had paid fine while in China). Moreover, when our court has considered whether a particular fine constituted past persecution, we have required the alien to demonstrate that payment of the fine actually “constituted a substantial disadvantage to him.” Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F.3d at 70 (noting that alien claimed to have paid fine). In short, because economic persecution occurs only when a person is deprived of the necessities of life or rendered impoverished, and because Chen failed to show that the fine imposed on him ever had such effects before he left China, he necessarily fails to demonstrate that the BIA erred as a matter of law in rejecting his claim of past persecution. The 2003 termination of Chen’s farming leasehold warrants no different conclusion, because past persecution references persecution that the alien has experienced in his native country before departing from it. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1) (requiring alien claiming past persecution to have been persecuted “in the past in the applicant’s country of nationality or, if stateless, in 22 his or her country of last habitual residence”). Chen left China in 2001. Thus, by the time his leasehold was terminated, he had been in the United States for almost two years. Moreover, he was working in this country, earning enough to support himself, repay loans, accumulate modest savings, and—after termination of the leasehold—support his wife and children in China. Whatever economic hardships the leasehold termination may have visited upon his wife and children, Chen cannot show that the sanction ever resulted in his own economic persecution. Instead, the loss of Chen’s leasehold is a factor properly considered in assessing whether he has a well founded fear of future economic persecution if returned to China. Accordingly, we conclude that there is no merit to Chen’s argument that, as a matter of law, the record compels a finding that he suffered past economic persecution. To the contrary, the agency reasonably concluded that the record does not admit such a finding.
The BIA and IJ concluded that despite an outstanding 18,000 rmb fine and the loss of his farming leasehold, Chen did not have a well founded fear of future economic persecution upon return to China because (a) he had not claimed that Chinese officials made any attempt to collect the fine after 2003; and (b) even if 23 payment were demanded, Chen could (1) make arrangements for installment payments, (2) borrow money from friends and relatives, (3) earn money working in a neighboring village, as he had before fleeing China, and (4) use his savings of $1,716.75. A number of these findings rest on misstatements of fact or are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. First, as the government concedes, Chen testified that Chinese officials have frequently come to his family’s home over the past decade looking for money to satisfy his outstanding fine. See J.A. 133. Thus, the agency finding that Chen failed to claim continued collection efforts in the past decade—the basis for its conclusion that Chen might not face continued persecutive fine obligations upon return to China—is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, the finding that Chen could likely arrange for reasonable installment payments of his outstanding 18,000 rmb fine upon return to China finds no support in the record. To the contrary, the record shows that in September 1996, within five months of Chen’s initial payment of 5,000 rmb on the original 13,000 rmb fine, Chinese officials came to Chen’s home and told him he had ten days to pay the outstanding 8,000 rmb owed plus an additional 10,000 rmb delinquency penalty. In short, far from being permitted to make reasonable 24 installment payments on his fine, Chen was under orders to pay a total of 23,000 rmb, more than twenty times his annual income, within a period of less than six months. The agency’s reasonable‐installment conclusion appears to derive from the IJ’s reference to September 1998 as the time when the additional 10,000 rmb penalty was imposed and full payment demanded. See J.A. 93, 96, 97. The record, however, shows that Chen consistently maintained that the demand for full payment and the imposition of the additional penalty occurred in September 1996. See J.A. 109, 617, 970, 1214. Indeed, in previous decisions, the IJ found and the BIA acknowledged that the additional fine was imposed in 1996. See J.A. 263 n.3, 289–90. Thus, the IJ’s finding that the additional fine and full payment demand occurred in 1998—the basis for his determination that Chen had been given two years to pay the fine and might, therefore, reasonably expect to negotiate installment payments upon return to China—is not supported by substantial evidence. Third, the agency found that because Chen had borrowed and repaid substantial amounts from friends and relatives in the past—2,000 rmb from his sister to make his initial fine payment and $50,000 from friends and relatives to cover the smuggling fee that got Chen to the United States—he could likely do so 25 again to pay any fine demanded upon return to China. While the record can support a finding that Chen’s sister might again lend him money to pay his fine, the same conclusion does not necessarily obtain with respect to further loans from others. In Xue Yun Zhang v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit reviewed a similar agency finding that an alien’s family could help her pay a fine in China because it had paid for her to come to the United States. See id. at 1247–48. The court concluded that the finding was not supported by substantial evidence insomuch as the alien had explained that family members had paid for her to come to the United States because they knew she could earn enough here to reimburse them, but that they would not lend her money to repay a fine in China because there was no prospect that she would ever earn enough in that country to make repayment. See id. at 1248. Although Chen gave similar testimony here, see J.A. 121, neither the IJ nor the BIA made any attempt to distinguish this case from Xue Yun Zhang or to indicate what, if any, reasoning might support an agency decision not to apply that holding to cases outside the Ninth Circuit. In the absence of any such discussion—which we do not foreclose on remand—we are inclined to agree with the Ninth Circuit that a loan of money to help an alien travel to the United States, where he can earn 26 enough to repay his lenders, is not substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the same persons can or would lend the alien money to help pay a fine in China where there is little prospect of repayment. Chen does not dispute, and we identify no error in, the agency’s other findings, i.e., that he could use his savings to pay part of his outstanding fine, and that, despite loss of his farming leasehold, he could find some gainful employment in China, whether in his own village or neighboring ones. Nevertheless, these findings are not sufficient for us to conclude with confidence that, with the other factual errors corrected on remand, the agency would still conclude that Chen does not have an objectively reasonable fear of future economic persecution if returned to China. See Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2010). Assuming that Chen could use both his savings of $1,716.75 (10,565 rmb) and another 2,000 rmb borrowed from his sister to pay the outstanding 18,000 rmb fine, he would still fall 5,435 rmb short of the full amount due. Whatever employment Chen might be able to find in China, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that a man who never earned more than 1,500 rmb per year in that country and who no longer had a farming leasehold could quickly earn more 27 than three times that amount so as to pay the more than 5,000 rmb due after depleting his savings and borrowing from his sister, much less that he could do so without becoming impoverished or deprived of the necessities of life—i.e., without suffering economic persecution. Indeed, the probability of such future persecution is only reinforced by evidence that Chinese authorities previously demanded that Chen pay his fine in full and responded to his failure to do so with additional monetary sanctions and, eventually, the termination of Chen’s farming leasehold—which termination, but for Chen’s United States earnings, would have left his family impoverished. Thus, even if termination of the farming leasehold while Chen was in the United States did not subject him to economic persecution at that time, the action is relevant to whether Chen might reasonably fear economic persecution upon return to China if he could not make full payment on the outstanding fine. See generally Fei Mei Cheng v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 623 F.3d 175, 194–95 & n.14 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that confiscation of family farm and truck constituted economic persecution where “family depended on the farm to make a living,” even though alien “was able to ‘get by’ with a job she located in another city” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zhen Hua Li v. Att’y Gen. of 28 U.S., 400 F.3d at 169 (concluding that fine equal to one‐and‐one‐half years’ salary was “extremely onerous”). Accordingly, because substantial evidence in the present record does not support some of the critical findings of fact informing the agency’s conclusion that Chen’s subjective fear of future economic persecution in China is not objectively reasonable, and because we cannot conclude with confidence that the agency will reach that same conclusion with the record corrected on remand, we vacate so much of its order as denies Chen relief based on a fear of future persecution. We neither require nor foreclose the agency on remand from expanding the record on factual matters relevant to the feared future persecution claim, such as whether an 18,000 rmb fine against Chen remains outstanding in China; whether Chinese authorities have a continuing interest in collecting such a fine; and whether Chen has the ability to pay the full fine amount demanded (whether from savings, loans, or earnings) without becoming impoverished or deprived of life’s necessities, in short, without economic persecution. It is not our task to engage in such factfinding, see Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 334–35 (2d Cir. 2006), but only to ensure that the agency’s findings are supported by the requisite substantial evidence. If, however, the IJ finds a 29 reasonable probability that an onerous fine remains outstanding against Chen, and that a reasonable person would fear that he would be forced to pay that fine upon return to China although he lacked means sufficient to do so without becoming impoverished or deprived of life’s necessities, then the agency should find Chen to have established the well founded fear of future economic persecution necessary to render him eligible for asylum and exercise its discretion accordingly.