Opinion ID: 1238139
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Death Penalty as Deterrent/Future Dangerousness

Text: (68) The prosecutor argued that the death penalty was morally appropriate because we, as a community, as a larger society and group of people, have [the] ... right to defend ourselves against this man.... We have the right to live secure against people like David Fierro. On a moral basis, I'm not talking law, I'm talking morality, on a moral basis we have a right to live secure from a man like this. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor's argument improperly urged the jury to impose the death penalty because it was a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment. (See People v. Bittaker, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1105.) We perceive no such implication in the prosecutor's remarks, however, and believe that no reasonable juror would have construed them as such. (69) The prosecutor went on to observe that imprisonment would not protect other inmates from defendant. He described defendant as a violent man and observed: The best predictor of future conduct is past conduct. And especially that is true in this case. You look at the things that David Fierro has done that you have before you and you ask yourselves: will this man be violent again? And the answer to that clearly in my mind is yes. We see a pattern of escalating violence. These remarks were not improper. [W]e have held that argument directed to a defendant's future dangerousness, when based on evidence of the defendant's past conduct rather than expert opinion, is proper and does not invite speculation as to the defendant's possible release. [Citations.] ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 635-636 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].) Moreover, we have consistently held that it is not misconduct for a prosecutor to argue at the penalty phase that if a defendant were sentenced to prison he might kill another prisoner. [Citations and fn. omitted.] ( People v. Taylor, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 750.)