Opinion ID: 1707939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutional Requirements in the Termination of Parental Rights

Text: Section 39.806(1)(i) authorizes the termination of parental rights when the parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been terminated involuntarily. [5] We have previously addressed a similar statutory provision and have established the constitutional requirements for a termination of rights based on the parent's conduct toward a different child. See Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565 (Fla.1991). In Padgett, a mother appealed the termination of her rights to her fifth child. Her rights to her previous four children had been terminated based on serious abuse and neglect. Id. at 566-68. The trial court terminated the mother's rights to her fifth child based on a finding of a substantial likelihood of future abuse and neglect of the child. Id. at 568. The mother argued that the termination of her rights could not be based on prospective abuse. Id. In Padgett, we rejected the mother's argument. We recognized that parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and upbringing of their children. Id. at 570. Nonetheless, Padgett emphasized that parental rights may be superseded by the State's compelling duty to protect children. Id. (stating that the [parental] right is not absolute but is subject to the overriding principle that it is the ultimate welfare or best interest of the child which must prevail) (quoting In re Camm, 294 So.2d 318, 320 (Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 866, 95 S.Ct. 121, 42 L.Ed.2d 103 (1974)). To protect the rights of both parent and child, Padgett held that to terminate parental rights, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child. Id. at 571. We said that this ordinarily means that the state must show that the parent abused, neglected, or abandoned the child; however, a termination of rights to one child under circumstances of abuse or neglect can serve as grounds to terminate the parent's rights to another child. Id. Nonetheless, Padgett held that in either case, the state must establish that the termination of rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. Id. Implicit in our decision in Padgett is the recognition that in some cases, but not in all cases, a parent's conduct toward another child may demonstrate a substantial risk of significant harm to the current child. In all cases, we emphasized that to pass constitutional muster, the termination of parental rights to the current child must be the least restrictive means of protecting that child from harm. Id. at 571. This determination can be made only after a judicious assessment of all relevant circumstances. As we explained in In re M.F., 770 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2000), our decision in Padgett was not based on any single fact; instead, it was based on extensive and wide-ranging evidence of abuse and neglect. 770 So.2d at 1193. Thus, Padgett requires that a termination decision be based on the totality of the circumstances. See also M.F., 770 So.2d at 1194 (holding that a trial court may not base a final ruling of dependency solely on the fact that the parent committed a sex act on a different child, but must focus on all of the circumstances surrounding the current petition).