Opinion ID: 783855
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Has Provided or Made Service Available Requirement

Text: 14 The key question is whether Le-Ax satisfies the requirement that the association has provided or made service available in the disputed area. Id. at 517. Unfortunately, the statute and the legislative history provide no help in explaining this phrase, which is derived from the statute itself. See Scott Hounsel, Note: Water Associations and Federal Protection Under 7 U.S.C. § 1926(b): A Proposal to Repeal Monopoly Status, 80 TEX. L.REV. 155, 159 (2001) (noting that the statute does not define provided or made available). Without any guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, federal appellate courts have interpreted this language in a variety of ways. Different circuits use different factors to determine whether a water association can invoke the protections of § 1926, including whether the water association has the physical ability to serve the area in question, and whether it has a legal duty or legal right to do so. 15 To determine whether service was made available, many courts begin with a pipes in the ground or physical ability approach that examines whether the water association has the physical means presently to serve the area. This inquiry asks whether the association can demonstrate `that it has adequate facilities within or adjacent to the area to provide service to the area within a reasonable time after a request for service is made.' Sequoyah County Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. Town of Muldrow, 191 F.3d 1192, 1203 (10th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has adopted this approach but has also required that the water association have the right under state law to serve the area in question. Id. at 1202 n. 8. The Eighth Circuit applies this same test, requiring that a water association show both that it has the physical means to serve the area and that it has a legal right to do so. Rural Water System # 1 v. City of Sioux Center, 202 F.3d 1035, 1037 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 820, 121 S.Ct. 61, 148 L.Ed.2d 28 (2000). 16 Neither of those circuits requires that a water association have a legal duty to serve in order to receive protection under § 1926. That is, however, the approach of the Fourth Circuit, which apparently requires both a state-law duty to serve and a physical ability to serve. Bell Arthur Water Corp. v. Greenville Utils. Comm'n, 173 F.3d 517, 525-26 (4th Cir.1999). 1 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a far looser approach, apparently holding that service is made available through either a state-law duty to serve or a physical ability to serve. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San Juan, 90 F.3d 910, 916 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1029, 117 S.Ct. 586, 136 L.Ed.2d 515 (1996). 17 As the above analysis makes clear, the circuits are in conflict as to what they require. In Lexington — S. Elkhorn, we adopted the same two-part approach that the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have taken. The first requirement under Lexington — S. Elkhorn is the pipes in the ground requirement. In Lexington — S. Elkhorn, we plainly stated that [i]f an association does not already have service in existence, water lines must either be within or adjacent to the property claimed to be protected by Section 1926(b) prior to the time an allegedly encroaching association begins providing service in order to be eligible for Section 1926(b) protection. Lexington — S. Elkhorn, 93 F.3d at 237 (emphasis added). The second requirement of Lexington — S. Elkhorn is that the water district must have the legal right under state law to serve the area in question. Id. at 235-36 (noting that Lexington South Elkhorn admits that it has not obtained ... from the Kentucky Public Service Commission [the right] to construct facilities or to serve customers within portions of the disputed areas, which distinguish[es] this case from other cases in which courts have upheld water districts' rights to Section 1926(b) protection). Because neither of these requirements was met, we dismissed the water district's claim under § 1926(b). Id. at 238 (stating that because the plaintiff has not established its authorization to serve the disputed properties or its ability to provide the service, it cannot be said to have made service available). 18 In this case, Le-Ax has clearly satisfied both of these requirements. First, under state law, Le-Ax has a legal right to serve the area. As even Athens seems to acknowledge, Ohio law permits water districts [t]o supply water to users within and without the district. OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 6119.01(A) (emphasis added). Under the plain text of this statute, which Athens has not even attempted to distinguish, Le-Ax has the right to provide service outside its boundaries. Second, Le-Ax has the physical ability to serve University Estates within the meaning of our pipes in the ground test. It is undisputed that Le-Ax has water lines within or adjacent to the relevant property that could meet University Estates's needs. Le-Ax currently has an eight-inch line immediately adjacent to University Estates, and also has water storage tanks that augment the system. Athens's only argument is that some additional work would have to be done before Le-Ax could supply University Estates with water. Athens points out that Le-Ax's own expert testified that Le-Ax would need a pressure-reducing valve, some tap-ins, and a pumping station in order to supply University Estates with water. The pressure-reducing valve is apparently a minimal addition that costs roughly $2,000, and the tap-ins and pumping station would be provided by University Estates, regardless of whether Athens or Le-Ax supplied the water. To argue, as Athens does, that water service must be available immediately (evidently in the sense that someone at University Estates must be able to go over to the faucet and turn on the water), would be to ignore our statement in Lexington — S. Elkhorn that the made available requirement is satisfied not only when the pipes are within, but also when they are merely adjacent to the property. The evidence here admits of only one conclusion, that Le-Ax has adequate facilities within or adjacent to the area to provide service to the area within a reasonable time after a request for service is made. Sequoyah County, 191 F.3d at 1203 (quotation omitted); cf. Bell Arthur, 173 F.3d at 526 (holding that service was not made available when the water district only had a six-inch pipeline running near the disputed area and a fourteen-inch pipeline was necessary to serve the area); Glenpool Util. Servs. Auth. v. Creek Cty. Rural Water Dist., 861 F.2d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.1988) (holding that service was made available when the water district had a water line that ran within fifty feet of the property), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067, 109 S.Ct. 2068, 104 L.Ed.2d 633 (1989). 19