Opinion ID: 2270962
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of the Ordinance

Text: [¶ 11] Because the ZBA acted only in an appellate capacity, we review the CEO's determination directly for error of law, abuse of discretion or findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Davis v. SBA Towers II, LLC, 2009 ME 82, ¶ 10, 979 A.2d 86, 91 (quotation marks omitted); see Mills v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 13, 955 A.2d 258, 263. Whether a proposed use falls within the terms of a zoning ordinance is a question of law that we review de novo. Peregrine Developers, LLC v. Town of Orono, 2004 ME 95, ¶ 9, 854 A.2d 216, 219. Any undefined or ambiguous terms in the Ordinance must be construed reasonably with regard to both the objects sought to be obtained and to the general structure of the ordinance as a whole. Davis, 2009 ME 82, ¶ 15, 979 A.2d at 92 (quotation marks omitted). The provisions of the Ordinance should be construed harmoniously so as not to render ineffective particular provisions. Id. [¶ 12] In determining that the Owners' proposed use constituted two dwelling units and not a boarding house, the CEO began with two definitions in the Ordinance: Dwelling Unit. A group of rooms providing living quarters containing independent cooking, sleeping, and bathroom facilities for one household. . . . . Household. One person, or a group of two or more persons living together in the same dwelling unit as a single housekeeping entity. [3] Brunswick, Me., Zoning Ordinance, ch. 1, § 111 (May 7, 1997). [¶ 13] The CEO found that for each of the two apartments, the lessees were living as a household in a dwelling unit because they not only shared the same kitchen and bathroom facilities, they were also collectively responsible for fulfilling the lease, so that [i]f one or more students were to leave during the term of the lease, then the holder of the master lease would still be responsible for the entire premises. [4] Those findings are supported by the record. Diagrams of the house show separate kitchen, bathroom, and sleeping facilities for each apartment. The Neighbors speculate that the tenants of the two apartments share the house communally through a first floor interconnecting door, but the Superior Court found no evidence that that was the case, nor is any apparent in the record. The leases establish that each tenant is responsible to the Owners for the rent for the whole apartment and most utilities, not just for his or her pro rata share. Like all households then, if one member does not do his or her share, the others suffer. [¶ 14] As aptly put by the Superior Court: The [Neighbors] essentially argue that a group of unrelated students cannot constitute a household unit. The problem with this argument is that household units are not limited to family units but may involve families, extended families, unrelated individuals cohabitating together, and friends whose only relationship is that of roommate. Students are not per se excluded from the category of persons who may form household units, and the court is reluctant to adopt a definition of household unit that would require code enforcement officers to investigate the nature of the personal relationships that may exist among the residents of a dwelling unit. [¶ 15] The reason for the court's reluctance is evidentto hold otherwise would open an inquiry into what is of no concern to the Town: are the tenants blood relatives; married; engaged; significantly committed; how committed and for how long; and if not any of those things, then why are they living together? The CEO and the ZBA recognized that the Town had no legitimate interest in the relationship between the individual tenants, because the Ordinance's definition of household is not restricted by relationship, but rather by living arrangement: if the group of people occupying an apartment do so as a collective enterprise in a unit providing independent kitchen, bathroom and sleeping facilities, then their occupancy qualifies as a residential use, whether they are college students or college professors. [5] [¶ 16] Although the textual definitions in the Ordinance make no reference to any particular relationship that is required before two or more people may constitute a single housekeeping entity eligible to live in a household, the dissent emphasizes that the Ordinance's use table lists the applicable use permitted in the TR2 zone as, Dwelling, Single/Two Family. There was discussion at the ZBA hearing suggesting that the Ordinance's definitions of household and dwelling unit used the word family at one time, but the Ordinance was later amended and now refers only to persons living together as a housekeeping entity. In written findings supporting its decision to uphold the CEO's interpretation of the Ordinance, a majority of the ZBA members found that [t]he ordinance definitions do not refer to `family' and could apply to an associated group of people. The ZBA discussions and findings suggest that the appearance of the word family in the use table is simply an outdated holdover. Even if it remains in the use table intentionally, it is abundantly clear that its inclusion in this context is intended to describe a physical structure, not the relationships of the people who live in it. The textual definitions in the Ordinance are controlling, and they do not limit either households or dwelling units to families. See Power v. Town of Shapleigh, 606 A.2d 1048, 1049 (Me. 1992) (stating that in construing a municipal ordinance, plain meaning of the language controls). [¶ 17] The dissent warns that [t]he majority's rationale opens the door for any landlord to transform a single or two-family residence into a building housing an unlimited number of unrelated and unaffiliated tenants. That dire prediction is unfounded. Although we conclude that students may not be prevented from residing at 17 Cleaveland in a living arrangement conforming to the Ordinance simply because they are students, our decision today in no way restricts the Town of Brunswick's prerogative to regulate occupancy based on current or future density requirements, fire and safety codes, or other municipal regulations affecting the number of residents who may occupy a residential building. [¶ 18] After considering whether the Owners' proposed use qualified as a residential use, the CEO also examined whether it created a prohibited boarding house as defined by the Ordinance: Boarding House. A building other than a hotel containing a shared kitchen and/or dining room, with sleeping rooms accommodating no more than two persons per room (excepting minor children) which are offered for rent, with or without meals. Includes a college fraternity or sorority. Brunswick, Me., Zoning Ordinance, ch. 1, § 111. [¶ 19] The CEO's May 30 memorandum concluded that the use did not constitute a boarding house because in the case of a Boarding House the rent is for individual rooms, not the entire premises, with each tenant being responsible for the rent of their own room only. We agree with this analysis. As discussed earlier, the tenants here qualify as a household because their tenancy is a shared endeavor. If one tenant fails to pay his share, the others are still responsible for the entire rent. Conversely, in the common understanding of a boarding house, if one boarder does not pay he may be evicted with no impact on other boarders. A household is a collective enterprise; a boarding house is an individual one. [¶ 20] The Ordinance's definition of boarding house also supports the CEO's conclusion. It begins with the phrase [a] building other than a hotel, suggesting that a boarding house is in the same general category as a hotel, which certainly imposes only an individual obligation. It is immaterial to a hotel guest how many other guests there are, or when they come and go. [¶ 21] The definition ends with the sentence, Includes a college fraternity or sorority. In their brief, the Neighbors argue that [s]ince a fraternity is included in the definition of a boarding house, a house such as 17 Cleaveland that is filled with students ... cannot reasonably be considered anything other than a boarding house. However, there are two ways to analyze the [i]ncludes a college fraternity provision that both lead to a contrary conclusion. First, if a fraternity already meets the definition of a boarding house, then there is no reason to single it out for inclusion. Under this analysis, the Ordinance does not include a fraternity as an example of a boarding house; rather it recognizes that a fraternity would not qualify as a boarding house absent special language including it. Such a specific provision could not be read to encompass all living situations that happen to involve students, as the Neighbors would urge. [¶ 22] Second, if the definition was intended to include a fraternity as an example of a boarding house, that inclusion serves to further illustrate the difference between a boarding house and the occupancy of 17 Cleaveland by these two groups of tenants who happen to be students. A fraternity has a lasting purpose independent of its current residentsstudents are admitted to and expelled from it, they may quit, drop out of school or graduate, but the fraternity remains. Its membership changes, but it is always populated by students, and its mission and existence are unaffected by who the current members are. Like a boarding house, then, the departure of one has little impact on the living arrangements of the others. Conversely, 17 Cleaveland happens to be leased to two groups of students now, but that may not always be the case. After the leases expire, the Owners may occupy it themselves, sell it, or rent to non-students. The surface similarity to a fraternity exists only because students are the current tenants. Accordingly, the inclusion of a fraternity in the definition of a boarding house is immaterial to the question of whether 17 Cleaveland also constitutes a boarding house. [¶ 23] We considered a similar argument in Peregrine Developers, LLC, 2004 ME 95, 854 A.2d 216, a case that is not controlling here but is nonetheless instructive. There the issue was whether a large housing complex marketed to University of Maine students qualified under the ordinance as an allowable multifamily dwelling planned unit development, or as a prohibited dormitory. Id. ¶ 3, 854 A.2d at 218. The developers sought to prevent their proposal from being classified as a dormitory by having a separate lease for each unit, which in turn would have its own kitchen, living room, bathroom, and bedrooms. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 854 A.2d at 218. [¶ 24] In rejecting an argument much like that advanced by the Neighbors, we noted that one party would have us conflate... terms so as to transform the meaning of multifamily dwelling into a dormitory if enough students live there. Id. ¶ 15, 854 A.2d at 221. In language adaptable to this case, we held: [T]here is no indication in the Ordinance that a dormitory is a structure defined by the types of individuals who would reside in the structure. The Town ... may not deny applications for development by using a more restrictive standard for regulation than is contained in its Ordinance. Id. ¶ 19, 854 A.2d at 221. [¶ 25] As in Peregrine Developers, the Brunswick Ordinance does not define a dwelling unit or a boarding house by the types of individuals who live there, and the Neighbors cannot force the Town to apply a more restrictive regulatory standard than is contained in its Ordinance. Cf. Spain v. City of Brewer, 474 A.2d 496, 500 (Me.1984) (stating that government agency cannot deny permits on grounds other than those specified by ... local ordinance, and where the applicant has demonstrated compliance with all the statutory criteria, the municipal officers must issue the permit). The Neighbors argue that the Owners are somehow taking unfair advantage of the Town's zoning scheme by structuring their leases to put students into residential areas where they should not be. The fatal flaw in that assertion is that if the leases comply with the requirements of the Ordinance, then the Owners are not abusing the system but rather operating within it, and consequently their student tenants have an opportunity to live in the TR2 zone equal to that of the Neighbors. [¶ 26] Because the CEO's determination that the Ordinance does not bar the Owners from leasing two apartments at 17 Cleaveland to two groups of students is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and reveals no error of law or abuse of discretion, it is affirmed.