Opinion ID: 195367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Mandatory Presumption.

Text: 10 The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove every essential element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, if a court instructs a trial jury in such a way as to create a mandatory presumption that relieves the government of its burden, the court runs afoul of the Constitution. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524, 99 S.Ct. at 2459. 11 In the circumstances of this case, the tripartite test of Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646 (1st Cir.1990) governs the merits of petitioner's Sandstrom claim. Under Hill, a reviewing court must first determine whether a reasonable juror would have interpreted the challenged portion of the instruction as creating a mandatory presumption. Id. at 648-49. If so, the court must then consider whether other parts of the charge clarified the ill-advised language with the result that a reasonable factfinder would not have understood the instruction to create an unconstitutional presumption. Id. at 649. Finally, if the court determines that the charge as a whole left the jurors with an impermissible impression, the court must proceed to evaluate the harmlessness vel non of the error. Id. at 649, 654. 12 Using Hill v. Maloney as our yardstick, we take the measure of petitioner's case. 13 1. Nature of the Presumption. First and foremost, we do not believe that a reasonable juror would have viewed the disputed instruction as setting up a mandatory presumption. Petitioner suggests that the substitution of the verb would for might was tantamount to the judge telling the jurors that, if you do not find complete self-defense--the only circumstance under which an ordinary man would kill--you must find insufficient provocation and, therefore, malice. And since there was no evidence of self-defense, the thesis runs, the judge effectively directed a finding of malice. 14 Although ingenious, petitioner's thesis is severely flawed. One principal problem with it is that, while a legal theorist perhaps might have reasoned in this way, the judge did not instruct the jury to follow such a course. As we explained in Hill, [a] mandatory presumption instructs the jury that it must infer an 'elemental fact' such as intent or malice from proof of a 'basic fact' such as a knowing act. Hill, 927 F.2d at 648. Where, as in this case, the charge merely permits the inference to be drawn, the presumption, by definition, is not mandatory. See, e.g., id. at 649. 15 Judges should not divorce themselves from the reality of human experience. Taking a practical, commonsense approach, we conclude that, in all probability, a typical juror would not have known the appropriate legal standard for perfect self-defense, and, therefore, would not even have considered the possibility that a finding of malice was mandated by the court's instruction. Hence, the erroneous substitution of would for might in a single sentence of the charge did not forge a mandatory presumption. At most, the ailing instruction, by itself, would have had the effect of lowering the burden placed by state law on the prosecution, not eliminating it. 16 2. The Totality of the Charge. Even assuming, for argument's sake, that the erroneous substitution of would for might in the instructions created an impermissible presumption, we deem it highly unlikely that a reasonable juror would have understood the instructions, overall, as directing that malice was to be presumed. 17 If the specific language challenged on appeal creates a mandatory presumption, the court then must consider whether other parts of the instruction explained 'the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.'  Hill, 927 F.2d at 649 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). Of course, in studying this question, an inquiring court must bear in mind that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). 18 We believe that petitioner focuses too single-mindedly on the challenged sentence in the abstract. A fair reading of the judge's instructions, taken in their totality, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the court explained the matter with sufficient care that a reasonable juror would not have understood the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption. We explain briefly. 19 The judge began the relevant segment of the charge by opening the jurors' minds to an expansive definition of provocation. Specifically, he told the jury that, [t]he law does not attempt to define in any narrow way the provocation which may reduce the crime to manslaughter. He went on to instruct that reasonable provocation is that kind of provocation that would inflame a reasonable ordinary and law abiding man to the point where he would be capable of killing another person. The judge then stated that, provocation must be such as would likely produce in an ordinary man such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright or nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection or restraint and actually did produce such a state of mind in the defendant. 20 Only at this point did the judge interject the objectionable language. 3 Even then, it was promptly followed by further clarification in the form of a question; the judge asked the jury to mull whether the situation [would] be such that [the ordinary man] would likely be in such a state of passion, anger, fear, fright or nervous excitement as would eclipse his capacity for reflection and restraint? The judge then proceeded to outline the additional requirements for a finding of voluntary manslaughter, making it plain that a verdict less than murder was an option. 21 Viewed against this backdrop and considering the judge's repeated admonitions that the jury must resolve the provocation issue, we think it is highly improbable that a reasonable juror would have understood, from the entire charge, that the absence of provocation was to be assumed. Thus, even if the challenged sentence, viewed in isolation, carried the potential of creating a mandatory presumption--and we do not believe, realistically, that such a potential loomed--we consider it extremely unlikely that a reasonable juror, heeding all the instructions, would have taken an unconstitutional tack. 22 3. Harmlessness. Finally, assuming arguendo that the instructional error created a legally impermissible presumption, we would find the error harmless. This court has recently held that, under applicable Supreme Court precedents, an instructional error of the type alleged by petitioner is to be considered trial error, not structural error, for purposes of habeas review. See Libby v. Duval, 19 F.3d 733, 739-740 (1st Cir.1994); see also Ortiz v. Dubois, 19 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir.1994) (dictum). 23 Trial errors--even trial errors of constitutional dimension--are reviewed in habeas corpus proceedings under the so-called whole-record test for harmless error. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1718-19, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). In such circumstances, the writ should issue only if the reviewing court concludes that the instructional error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1714 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)); see also United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954, 957 (1st Cir.1989) (explicating Kotteakos fair assurance standard). 24 We think the Commonwealth's case passes Kotteakos muster with flying colors. Like the veteran district court judge, we simply do not believe that a one-word deviation from the norm spoiled the trial's overall integrity. To the exact contrary, it seems transpicuous that the judge's charge, taken in its entirety, fairly presented the law and adequately limned petitioner's theory of the case. Furthermore, given the strength of the prosecution's case and the weaknesses inherent in his provocation defense, 4 it is surpassingly difficult to believe that so subtle a shading of the charge had any discernible impact on the jury's verdict. 25 We will not paint the lily. The trial judge's slip of the tongue, though regrettable, was not egregious. For the reasons indicated, we deem it highly probable that the single erroneous portion of the instruction had no bearing whatever on the jurors' consideration of petitioner's defense. It follows inexorably that the error was benign under the Kotteakos standard. 26