Opinion ID: 1392154
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Appellant argues the trial judge should have submitted to the jury the mitigator relating to capacity, without regard to whether Appellant made a specific request for that mitigating circumstance at trial. We disagree. The proper procedure for the submission of statutory mitigating circumstances to the jury in the penalty phase of a capital case is found in State v. Victor, 300 S.C. 220, 224, 387 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1989): Once a trial judge has made an initial determination of which statutory mitigating circumstances are supported by the evidence, the defendant shall be given an opportunity on the record: (1) to waive the submission of those he does not wish considered by the jury; and (2) to request any additional mitigating statutory circumstances supported by the evidence that he wishes submitted to the jury. Our recent cases have stated that absent a request by counsel to charge a mitigating circumstance at trial, the issue whether the mitigator should have been charged is not preserved for review. See State v. Humphries, 325 S.C. 28, 36, 479 S.E.2d 52, 57 (1996); State v. Vazquez, 364 S.C. 293, 301, 613 S.E.2d 359, 363 (2005); State v. Bowman, 366 S.C. 485, 494, 623 S.E.2d 378, 383 (2005); and State v. Sapp, 366 S.C. 283, 621 S.E.2d 883, n. 3 (2005). Appellant cites State v. Caldwell, 300 S.C. 494, 388 S.E.2d 816 (1990), to support his position. In Caldwell, we held the trial judge erred by failing to charge the mitigating circumstances found in S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(2), (6), and (7) after evidence was presented of the defendant's mental disorder, even though these mitigating charges were never requested. Caldwell, however, does not support Appellant's position because we reviewed that error in favorem vitae. [4] Caldwell, 300 S.C. at 506, 388 S.E.2d at 823. We abolished the doctrine of in favorem vitae in State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991) (Toal, J., concurring). In Torrence we stated, a contemporaneous objection is necessary in all trials beginning after the date of this opinion to properly preserve errors for our direct appellate review. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 69, 406 S.E.2d at 328. Two post-Torrence cases have held that when the defendant is intoxicated at the time of the capital crime, the trial judge must submit three statutory mitigating circumstances [5] to the jury. See State v. Young, 305 S.C. 380, 409 S.E.2d 352 (1991); State v. Stone, 350 S.C. 442, 567 S.E.2d 244 (2002). Recent cases have cited Stone as holding that a trial judge is required to charge those intoxication mitigators regardless whether they are requested at trial. See, e.g., Bowman, 366 S.C. at 494, 623 S.E.2d at 383 (acknowledging holding of State v. Stone, supra , as requiring trial court to submit mitigating circumstances to jury if there is evidence of intoxication, regardless of whether they are requested); Vazquez, 364 S.C. at 301, 613 S.E.2d at 363 (same). We never explicitly stated in Young, Stone, or any other intoxication case that statutory mitigating circumstances related to intoxication must be submitted to the jury even if the defendant does not request them. [6] Our intoxication cases have not created an exception to the post-Torrence preservation requirements for challenging jury charges during a capital sentencing proceeding. Although there is some evidence of drinking in the days leading up to the incident, intoxication at the time of murders is not at issue here. Appellant argues that this purported preservation exception in intoxication cases also applies to mitigators stemming from mental disorders. For the reasons previously stated, no such exception exists. By failing to make a contemporaneous objection or request for the capacity mitigator, Appellant did not properly preserve this issue for our review. Accordingly, we decline to address whether the evidence supported the submission of the mitigating circumstance of Appellant's capacity.