Opinion ID: 2202592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligence and Strict Liability

Text: In ruling on Soft Sheen's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court summarized Payne's claim as follows: [Payne] urges that there is a defect in the manufacture of this [permanent wave product] and that the warnings were such that they were inadequate. . . . Payne, however, had never claimed that the defect in the product was an error in the manufacturing process, and put on no proof to that effect. Her sole claim was that the instructions contained in the manufacturer's manual were inadequate to alert the beautician, Thrower, to the danger of the product, and that this failure by the manufacturer to adequately warn Thrower resulted in Payne's injuries. The negligence cause of action for failure to warn a consumer of a product's dangers is summarized in section 388 of the Second Restatement of Torts. That section sets forth the general rule that the supplier of a product is liable to expected users for harm that results from foreseeable uses of the product if the supplier has reason to know that the product is dangerous and fails to exercise reasonable care to so inform the user. [7] A plaintiff may plead a claim of manufacturer negligence in failing to warn about foreseeable harm from a product, may claim strict liability for injury derived from the same failure, or may do both. Russell v. G.A.F. Corp., 422 A.2d 989, 991 (D.C.1980). In either case, the manufacturer's duty is the same: if its product could result in foreseeable harm [8] [the manufacturer] has a duty to give a warning which adequately advises the user of attendant risks and which provides specific directions for safe use. Id., citing Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., 366 A.2d 1079, 1086 (D.C. 1976); [9] see also Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 205 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 268, 637 F.2d 810, 814 (1980) (difference between two theories in failure to warn case lies not in manufacturer's duty but in defenses available to it); In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F.Supp. 333, 345 (D.D.C.1983). In this case we are dealing with a product that has both utility and danger. It is well known that permanent wave solutions can never be made completely safe for all users. . . . Beetler v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 431 F.2d 651, 653 (7th Cir.1970). Such a product is not unreasonably dangerous (and therefore defective) for purposes of section 402A if it is accompanied by an adequate warning. See comment j to section 402A (In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. . . . [A] product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.); see also comment k (There are some products which . . . are quite incapable of being made [absolutely] safe for their intended and ordinary use. . . . Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.) [10] Payne did have the burden of proof on two issues: to show, first, that the warning on the product was inadequate, and that the product was therefore defective, i.e., unreasonably dangerous; and second, that the defect in the product proximately caused her injuries. The trial court ruled that plaintiff's proof had failed to raise facts on either of these issues sufficient to warrant submitting the case to the jury. This was error.
It cannot be said as a matter of law that the warnings on the permanent product were adequate. It is true that the adequacy of warnings cannot be evaluated apart from the knowledge and expertise of those who may reasonably be expected to use the product, Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 1976). In this case, a warning that may be sufficient for a product distributed only through licensed beauticians, as this one was, may well be inadequate for the same product distributed through drugstores to consumers. The sufficiency of a particular warning, in light of the sophistication of its intended users, is ordinarily a question for the jury, however, Burch v. Amsterdam, 366 A.2d 1079, 1086-87 (D.C.1976). [11] This court, in Burch, held that in cases in which there is a potential for serious injury, the adequacy of even a relatively clear warning should not be determined as a matter of law but is a question of fact for the jury, id. at 1086-87. The manufacturer's warning in this case that the ammonium thioglycolate contained in the product may cause burns is included within the step-by-step instruction manual, but not under the heading Application of Chemical Rearranger, or Rins[ing of] Chemical Rearranger from Hair; instead, it is found only at the very end of the manual, in small print, following the heading Customer Care at Home. It is a jury question as to whether or not this warning was adequate under the circumstances to warn the beautician of the danger of the ammonia component of the product. [12] One element of an adequate warning is a description of the precautions necessary to avoid the injury. Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 552 F.Supp. 1293, 1304 (D.D.C.1982). The warning for the ammonia agent in the product says only that the instruction booklet must be followed carefully in order to avoid burns; and yet the instruction manual sets forth no specific instructions on this score, other than that the beautician should drape the customer and surround the scalp area with conditioning lotion. In connection with the description of the second, neutralizing step of the process, the beautician is instructed, if the patron complains of burning, to rinse area well and shampoo, and to prevent the neutralizer from dripping onto exposed skin. The beautician is also told that the patron's safety is your responsibility. But no similar warning is given in connection with a part of the process much more dangerous, the rearranger step. In fact, although the warning at the end of the booklet states that the product contains ammonium thioglycolate, which can cause burns, at no point is the beautician informed that the rearranger contains the ammonium thioglycolate, not the neutralizer. The plethora of warnings surrounding the neutralizing step may well have misled the beautician into thinking that the burn-causing ammonia agent in the product is found in the neutralizer. The plaintiff here testified that she told the beautician, Thrower, that her back was burning, and that Thrower did not know what to do. Thrower contradicted this testimony, but it was not the function of the trial court to weigh the relative credibility of Payne and Thrower. In a similar case, where a plaintiff alleged that a manufacturer's inadequate warnings on a permanent wave product applied to plaintiff in a beauty parlor had caused her glaucoma, the court ruled: The nature of [the beautician's] treatment of plaintiff's pain, the relationship of that treatment to the alleged lack of directions by the defendant with respect to same, and the plaintiff's [behavior], are proper jury matters. Briggs v. Zotos International, Inc., 357 F.Supp. 89, 91 (E.D.Va.1973). In sum, we cannot agree that as a matter of law the directions for Delavell Thrower's use were adequate. This is a jury question, precluding a directed verdict for the defendant. The manufacturer argues, in addition, that Thrower was independently aware of the danger, and that therefore no warnings were necessary. [13] We need not decide whether a plaintiff may recover from a manufacturer when an intermediary of this nature testifies that he is fully aware of the danger, because we do not agree that the evidence showed that Thrower knew with particularity of the danger. Thrower testified that she had attended several seminars arranged by Soft Sheen to demonstrate its products, and that she could infer from the directions for use of the permanent wave given at those seminars that it could cause injury. She never stated that she was told of its latent danger directly. Further, she was not aware of the chemical makeup of the two components of the product, or of the different types of injury that each component may cause. Even if the evidence showed that Thrower was generally aware of the dangerous propensities of Care Free Curl, a jury could find that in order to prevent this product from being unreasonably dangerous, specific warnings on the directions to remind the beautician of the danger, detailing the possible results of misapplication and the remedial measures to be taken in that event, are necessary. There was sufficient evidence in this case upon which the jury could base a finding that the actual warnings on the product here were insufficient and/or misleading.
The manufacturer contends that plaintiff also failed to meet her burden of proof on the issue of causation: that even if the warning was inadequate, plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that it was Thrower's failure to read the inadequate warning that proximately caused the injury. In this case there is no dispute that the product in some cases may cause burns. Plaintiff's case was not defective because she failed to put on evidence to that effect. On the question of whether the product had proximately caused Payne's injury in this case, plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to withstand a directed verdict. Plaintiff testified that she felt a burning sensation while the beautician was working; she entered a hospital emergency room the next day, and she produced records to show that she suffered second-degree burns. [14] Payne also supplied direct evidence: her treating physician, a burn expert, testified that an ammonia-containing product could have run down the back and caused the damage, even though it would not have burned the scalp. This evidence, and the inferences that could legitimately be drawn therefrom, were sufficient to allow the case to go to the jury. [15] It is true that in strict liability cases, courts often pose the question of causation as being whether the defect in the product proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. In a defective design or defective manufacture case, the plaintiff's burden is therefore clear; he must show that but for the defect, the injury would not have occurred. In a failure to warn case, however, the problem is not the product itself, which was designed and manufactured as intended. The defect is the failure to attach adequate warnings to a product that, as designed and manufactured, may in certain circumstances cause injury. Some courts, in keeping with the general rule that plaintiff must show that the defect proximately caused injury, have required the plaintiff to prove that it was the lack of warning that harmed the plaintiff. In other words, plaintiffs are required to show that, had an adequate warning been given, the user would have read and heeded it, and therefore, the accident would not have occurred. However, a rule requiring a plaintiff to prove not only that the failure to warn of a danger in a product made that danger unreasonable and that his injury grew out of the risk caused by that danger, but also that the failure to warn caused his injury, would impose an impossible burden on the plaintiff, and would often prevent his recovery because of pure speculation on the part of the jury. Several courts have fashioned a presumption to deal with this problem, finding a rebuttable presumption in cases of this type that the user would have read an adequate warning, and that in the absence of evidence rebutting the presumption, a jury may find that the defendant's product was the producing cause of the plaintiff's injury. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 237 U.S.App.D.C. 164, 736 F.2d 1529, 1538-39 (1984) (applying Maryland law); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S.Ct. 687, 42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974). We agree with this approach to the problem, and therefore hold that plaintiff here met her burden of proof on the issue of causation.
Soft Sheen also argues that if Payne's injury was caused by the product because it ran down her back, then the product was misused by the user, beautician Thrower. It alleges further, that negligence by Thrower in allowing the product to run down Payne's back was an intervening cause of the injury. Both the alleged misuse of the product and the alleged negligence of Thrower as an intervening and superseding cause, they contend, as a matter of law relieve the manufacturer of liability. In granting Soft Sheen's motion for a directed verdict, the trial court appeared to agree. For the following reasons, this was error. Product misuse is defined as use of a product in a manner that could not reasonably be foreseen by the defendant. Young v. Up-Right Scaffolds, Inc., 205 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 269, 637 F.2d 810, 815 (1980). Under both a negligence and a strict liability theory, the manufacturer has an obligation to anticipate reasonably foreseeable risks of harm arising in the course of proper use, and to warn of those risks, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Nutt, 407 A.2d 606, 610 n. 5 (D.C.1979), see Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 84 (4th Cir.1962). Proper use includes the incidental and attendant consequences that accompany normal use, Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 863 (5th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913, 88 S.Ct. 1806, 20 L.Ed.2d 652 (1968). Whether the injury here arose out of proper use of the product, out of use that could reasonably have been foreseen by defendant, or out of product misuse, is a jury question and should not have been decided as a matter of law by the trial court. Similarly, negligence by an intervening actor will not relieve the manufacturer of liability if the negligence could reasonably have been anticipated, under both negligence and strict liability theories of recovery, see Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN.L.REV. 791, 826-27 (1966). The manufacturer's action need not be the sole proximate cause of the injury: the manufacturer may still be held liable even though other causes proximately contributed to the injury. The question is whether the manufacturer's action was a proximate rather than a remote cause, and the test of proximate causation, again, is whether the result was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. The existence of an intervening cause does not alter this test. See Dreibelbis v. Bennett, 162 Ind.App. 414, 319 N.E.2d 634, 638 (1974). Rather, where harmful consequences are brought about by intervening, independent forces (like the beautician's actions here) whose operation could have been foreseen, the chain of causation extending from the original act (if it is established as wrongful) is treated as a proximate cause. See Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind.App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541, 555 (1979). Whether the manufacturer's action here was a proximate cause of the injury, i.e., whether it could reasonably have been foreseen that a chemical product with a propensity to burn that is applied to the hair as a lotion and then rinsed off might run down a patron's back and cause burns, is a question for the trier of fact, see id. [16]