Opinion ID: 2589386
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Putative spouse doctrine

Text: Under the putative spouse doctrine, when a marriage is legally void, the civil effects of a legal marriage flow to the parties who contracted to marry in good faith. [5] That is, a putative spouse is entitled to many of the rights of an actual spouse. [6] A majority of states have recognized some form of the doctrine through case law or statute. [7] States differ, however, on what exactly constitutes a civil effect. The doctrine was developed to avoid depriving innocent parties who believe in good faith that they are married from being denied the economic and status-related benefits of marriage, such as property division, pension, and health benefits. [8] The doctrine has two elements: (1) a proper marriage ceremony was performed, and (2) one or both of the parties had a good-faith belief that there was no impediment to the marriage and the marriage was valid and proper. [9] Good faith has been defined as an honest and reasonable belief that the marriage was valid at the time of the ceremony. [10] Good faith is presumed. The party asserting lack of good faith has the burden of proving bad faith. [11] Whether the party acted in good faith is a question of fact. [12] Unconfirmed rumors or mere suspicions of a legal impediment do not vitiate good faith `so long as no certain or authoritative knowledge of some legal impediment comes to him or her.'  [13] However, when a person receives reliable information that an impediment exists, the individual cannot ignore the information, but instead has a duty to investigate further. [14] Persons cannot act `blindly or without reasonable precaution.' [15] Finally, once a spouse learns of the impediment, the putative marriage ends. [16] We have not previously considered the putative spouse doctrine, but we are persuaded by the rationale of our sister states that public policy supports adopting the doctrine in Nevada. Fairness and equity favor recognizing putative spouses when parties enter into a marriage ceremony in good faith and without knowledge that there is a factual or legal impediment to their marriage. Nor does the doctrine conflict with Nevada's policy in refusing to recognize common-law marriages or palimony suits. In the putative spouse doctrine, the parties have actually attempted to enter into a formal relationship with the solemnization of a marriage ceremony, a missing element in common-law marriages and palimony suits. As a majority of our sister states have recognized, the sanctity of marriage is not undermined, but rather enhanced, by the recognition of the putative spouse doctrine. We therefore adopt the doctrine in Nevada. We now apply the doctrine to the instant case. The district court found that the parties obtained a license and participated in a marriage ceremony on August 26, 1973, in Verdi, Nevada. The district court also found that Marcie erroneously believed that her prior husband, Allmaras, had terminated their marriage by divorce and that she was legally able to marry Richard. In so finding, the district court also necessarily rejected Richard's argument that Marcie acted unreasonably in relying on Allmaras' statements because she had never been served with divorce papers and that she had a duty to inquire about the validity of her former marriage before marrying Richard. Although Richard's and Marcie's testimony conflicted on this issue, judging the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony are matters within the discretion of the district court. [17] This court reviews district court decisions concerning divorce proceedings for an abuse of discretion. Rulings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. [18] Substantial evidence is that which a sensible person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment. [19] We apply the same standard in annulment proceedings. The district court was free to disregard Richard's testimony, and substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that Marcie did not act unreasonably in relying upon Allmaras' representations. The record reflects no reason for Marcie to have disbelieved him and, thus, no reason to have investigated the truth of his representations. Although older case law suggests that a party cannot rely on a former spouse's representation of divorce, more recent cases indicate this is just a factor for the judge to consider in determining good faith. [20] We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Marcie entered into the marriage in good faith. She therefore qualifies as a putative spouse. We now turn to the effect of the doctrine on the issues of property division and alimony.