Opinion ID: 6497671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: a threat to private property

Text: ¶37 The majority's poor fit rationale is not the majority's only error. As explained in the prior section, the majority misapplies legal terms of art in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). Properly understood, those terms pose no barrier to Backus' argument, as even Waukesha County concedes. More fundamentally, the majority's misunderstanding of fundamental property law principles endangers private property rights. Taking the majority's reasoning to its logical conclusion, there has not even been a taking in this case. ¶38 First, the majority states the word remainder (as contrasted with 'whole property') means [t]hat which remains when a part has been taken away, used, or otherwise dealt with; The majority relegates the language to a footnote and 11 never analyzes it. Id., ¶18 n.10. 11 No. 2020AP307.rgb the rest, or the remaining part or fragment of something.12 The majority then claims, a TLE takes land only for temporary use; all portions of the land remain under the property owner's control upon the TLE's termination. . . . Without a continuing division or severance of land, what 'remainder' is there to value?13 The majority seems to suggest Waukesha County did not take any property at all, in which case, no compensation is due; however, the majority acknowledges the taking of a TLE is compensable. With such conflicting statements, the majority only compounds the confusion spawned by its opinion. See generally Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 427–28, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983) ([I]t would violate the constitutional mandate of the just compensation clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions to hold that a temporary taking is not compensable.). ¶39 The majority's error in this regard stems from its failure to consider the temporal component of property. Although the TLE eventually expired, its expiration does not restore the temporal interest taken. A taking occurs whenever government action directly interferes with or substantially disturbs the owner's use and enjoyment of the property. Bros. v. United States, 594 F.2d 740, 741–42 (9th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted); see also Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 179 (1871) ([T]here are [nu]merous authorities to Id., ¶15 (quoting Remainder, Oxford English Dictionary 12 (edition and year not provided)). 13 Id. 12 No. 2020AP307.rgb sustain the doctrine that a serious interruption to the common and necessary use of property may be . . . equivalent to the taking of it, and that under the constitutional provisions it is not necessary that the land should be absolutely taken.). Although the government's interference or disturbance of private property may end at some point, it is nonetheless a compensable taking. ¶40 The right to exclude is 'one of the most treasured' rights of property ownership. Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2072 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)). Even if the government's invasion of Backus' land did not cause permanent or physical damage to his property, the government's invasion is a taking for which Backus must be compensated. According to Blackstone, the very idea of property entails 'that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.' Id. at 2072 (quoting 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries ). [T]he right to exclude is 'universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,' and is 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.' Id. (quoting Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179–80 (1979)). ¶41 Backus alleges more than an interference with his right to exclude, however; he also claims the TLE adversely affected the value of the remainder by creating a permanent embankment——in the easement area——with damaged and dying trees 13 No. 2020AP307.rgb on his property. Backus also alleges that trees and other vegetation were removed and not replaced. Nevertheless, the majority asks, [w]ithout a continuing division or severance of land, what 'remainder' is there to value?14 The majority seems to ignore Backus' complaint altogether. ¶42 The majority couples its faulty understanding of remainder with its equally faulty conception of severance damages, a phrase appearing nowhere in Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). It asserts [t]he term 'remainder' . . . is particularly informative as it denotes that the property has been divided or severed in some way.15 The majority seems to think severance means physical division or detachment. The majority is wrong. ¶43 Severance damages do not presuppose the government permanently took a physical parcel of land. Severance damages compensate a property owner whose interest in the land has been taken——severed from the remaining interests in the land, resulting in a loss to the remainder's fair market value. E.g., Narloch v. State Dep't of Transp., Div. of Highways, Div. II, 115 Wis. 2d 419, 422 n.2, 340 N.W.2d 542 (1983) (Severance damage means the diminution in value of the remaining property resulting from the taking. (citation omitted)); Wis. JI——Civil 8102, at 1 (2008) (Severance damages reduce the fair market value of the remaining property because of the partial taking.); see also United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376 (1943) (explaining that severance damages is a somewhat 14 Id. 15 Id. 14 No. 2020AP307.rgb loosely used phrase and defining it to include any element of value arising out of the relation of the part taken to the entire tract (emphasis added)); 26 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 281 (updated May 2022) (A landowner may recover as just compensation not only the fair market value of land actually taken but also damages for injuries to the owner's remaining lands, frequently called 'severance damages.' An award may be made for any diminution in the value of the remainder as long as those damages are directly caused by the taking itself.). In the case of an easement, [s]everance damages, are calculated by us[ing] the fair market value of the entire tract immediately before and immediately after the taking. Ala. Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jones, 574 So. 2d 734, 735 (Ala. 1990) (citation omitted). ¶44 The majority's misconception of severance damages permeates its discussion of Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6). That subsection contains an illustrative list of damages a property owner may seek in addition to the diminution in fair market value. The statute commands giving effect to items of loss or damages to the property regardless of whether the statute specifies them (without restriction because of enumeration but without duplication) provided the property owner proves them (where shown to exist). Despite this unambiguous language, the majority treats the list as if it were exhaustive, and then proclaims, those items [in the list] contemplate permanent losses or involve damages from 'actual severance of land,' and 15 No. 2020AP307.rgb thus would compensate for only limited aspects of a TLE.16 The majority quotes the actual severance of land language in the first sentence of § 32.09(6)(e) but conveniently does not address the very next sentence of the statute, which is not only more expansive but expressly encompasses temporary invasions of property: In determining severance damages under this paragraph, the condemner may consider damages which may arise during construction of the public improvement, including damages from noise, dirt, temporary interferences with vehicular or pedestrian access to property and limitations on use of the property. This statutory language defeats the majority's hyper-literal construction of actual severance of land. See Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2022 WI 7, ¶13, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (rejecting a hyper-literal approach). ¶45 Contrary to the majority's atextual conclusion that the statute is a poor fit for anything but permanent easements, the statutory language expressly grants compensation for temporary interferences with access to property, which is precisely (at least in part) the taking for which Backus seeks to be compensated. The majority's failure to address the second sentence——containing the non-exhaustive list of possible damages——shows the lengths to which the majority will go in order to justify its results-oriented decision in this case. Backus is statutorily entitled to present evidence of the damages he sustained as a result of the TLE, and to recover them 16 Id., ¶18 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e)). 16 No. 2020AP307.rgb if shown to exist. Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g). The majority instead removes this statutory compensation for takings in the form of TLEs. ¶46 If the majority were correct, its logic would seem to foreclose Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g)'s application not only to TLEs but to many permanent easements as well. Few easements literally sever land in a literal and physical sense; nevertheless, the United States Constitution requires just compensation. See, e.g., Cedar Point Nursery, 141 S. Ct. at 2074 (reasoning that a physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary. . . . [T]he duration of an appropriation . . . bears only on the amount of compensation. . . . [A]fter finding a taking by physical invasion, [this court has] remanded the case to the lower court to determine 'whether the easement taken was temporary or permanent,' in order to fix the compensation due (citations omitted; quoted source omitted)). Section 32.09 was obviously drafted to comply with the constitutional command to justly compensate property owners whose interests in land are taken by the government, however temporarily. See 260 N. 12th St., LLC v. State of Wis. Dep't of Transp., 2011 WI 103, ¶44, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 N.W.2d 372 (Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 codifies the constitutional requirement that a property owner receive just compensation for the taking of his or her property. Because § 32.09 is a statute intended to benefit an owner whose property is taken against his or her will, we afford it liberal construction. (citations omitted)). The statute, after all, 17 No. 2020AP307.rgb applies [i]n all matters involving the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings[.] § 32.09(intro.). The majority's engrafting of a permanence prerequisite does not comport with the Takings Clause and creates a situation not contemplated by the statute's introduction: a just compensation case in which the statute's rules will not be applied. ¶47 Logically, if Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) does not apply to TLEs, they cannot be easements within the meaning of the statute. And if they are not easements under § 32.09(6g), then § 32.09(6) must govern compensation for their taking. Section 32.09(6) applies [i]n the case of a partial taking of property other than an easement but the majority does not calculate compensation under its terms, without explaining why. Of course, the calculation in this case would be no different than under § 32.09(6g), so the majority silently deactivates this section of the statute too, ostensibly to avoid a result it regards as unreasonable.