Opinion ID: 853002
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Immunity for Law Enforcement

Text: The District also relies on section 3(7) of the ITCA for its claim of immunity. That section provides: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from ... [t]he adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law (including rules and regulations), unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment. I.C. § 34-13-3-3(7). The District argues it is immune pursuant to section 3(7) because the [District] failed to prevent an assault or battery, or failed to enforce a rule or regulation (student misconduct, substantial disobedience or unlawful activity). Appellee's Br. in Supp. of Pet. to Trans. at 13. In Quakenbush v. Lackey, 622 N.E.2d 1284, 1288-91 (Ind.1993), this Court discussed at some length the meaning of enforcement as used in section 3(7). [4] We concluded first that section 3(7) was intended to codify the common law of immunity in this area as that law existed at the time the ITCA was passed. Second, under that common law regime, governments and their employees were subject to liability for the breach of private duties owed to individuals, but were immune from liability for the breach of public duties owed to the public at large. Id. at 1291. Subsequent Indiana decisions relied on this public/private duty test in applying section 3(7), [5] but others have concluded Benton eliminated the test. [6] As explained in Part I.A., Benton addressed only the common law presence or absence of duty of a governmental unit. It did not deal with statutory immunity under the ITCA. Indeed, Benton expressly observed, In general, it is only after a determination is made that a governmental defendant is not immune under the ITCA that a court undertakes the analysis of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances. Benton, 721 N.E.2d at 232. Although Benton did not expressly disavow Quakenbush's public/private duty test under section 3(7), we believe it implicitly achieved this result. Quakenbush held that section 3(7) adopted the common law of immunity for law enforcement activities, and concluded that the public/private duty test was the common law approach to law enforcement immunity at the time the ITCA was enacted. We do not believe the public/private duty test was frozen by statutory adoption. It is a tool for applying the adopting or enforcing of a law language, but as Benton pointed out, this test is frequently not susceptible to ready application. Id. For that reason, Benton overruled the public/private duty test at common law. We think the courts remain free to interpret the statutory language without referring to the public/private duty analysis when appropriate. We think the statute itself provides the key to resolution of the immunity issue in this case. Section 3(7) confers immunity on governmental units for the adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce a law. We think this language restricts the immunity to the adoption and enforcement of laws that are within the assignment of the governmental unit. First, it is clear that laws include rules and regulations. Thus, a variety of administrative and executive functions engage in some immunized activities. But not all actions are immunized. The statute refers to immunity for the adoption and enforcement of a law. Only a unit charged with regulating the areas of law involved can adopt a law. Similarly, the enforcement of a law is an activity assigned to specific units of government: the police, the Board of Health, etc. The immunity for failure to adopt or enforce is similarly limited. We think this interpretation is supported by the language of section 3(7) and is also consistent with other provisions of the ITCA and existing case law. An employee is protected under the terms of section 3 of the ITCA only if acting within the scope of the employee's employment. I.C. § 34-13-3-3. Similarly, case law has held that the ITCA expresses a legislative policy to protect the State's finances and also to ensure `that public employees can exercise their independent judgment necessary to carry out their duties without threat of harassment by litigation or threats of litigation over decisions made within the scope of their employment.' Celebration Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450, 452 (Ind.2000) (quoting Ind. Dep't of Corr. v. Stagg, 556 N.E.2d 1338, 1343 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied ). See also Martin v. Heffelfinger, 744 N.E.2d 555, 559 (Ind.Ct.App.2001); Ind. State Police Dep't v. Swaggerty, 507 N.E.2d 649, 651-52 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied; Bd. of Comm'rs of Hendricks County v. King, 481 N.E.2d 1327, 1330 (Ind.Ct.App.1985). An employee's scope of employment consists of activities involving the pursuit of the governmental entity's purpose. Similarly, we think the legislature intended that a governmental entity be immune only for failing to adopt or enforce a law that falls within the scope of the entity's purpose or operational power. Case law supports the notion that section 3(7) is limited to those laws, rules, or regulations that fall within the realm of the governmental entity. Stagg, 556 N.E.2d at 1342 (The defendants were acting within the scope of their employment in enforcing laws, rules or regulations pertaining to the standards and procedures for the operation of the correctional facilities pursuant to [the Indiana statute].); City of Seymour v. Onyx Paving Co., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 951, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) ([T]he zoning ordinance at issue here is part of the municipal code of Seymour [and] adopted in accordance with [the Indiana act] delegating to local legislative bodies the authority to enact zoning ordinances and amendments thereto.), trans. denied; Ind. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Taylor, 419 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Ind.Ct.App.1981) (Insomuch as this action was undertaken by the Department pursuant to a duty entrusted to it by statute, it qualifies for immunity under [subsections (5), (6), or (7)].). We do not think a school district is enforcing a law when it provides for school security, even if the action taken may deter or prevent acts that would violate a law adopted and enforced by other units of government. It is correct, as the District points out, that schools are authorized to promulgate rules for school discipline. [7] But preventing crime is not an activity schools are expected to carry out pursuant to a school's operational purpose. Put another way, even though the school must reasonably supervise the students for safety reasons, it is not the mission of the school to prevent crime. Indeed, the statutes the Indiana legislature enacted on behalf of the elementary and secondary schools providing for student discipline authorize disciplinary rules reasonably necessary to carry out the school purposes. I.C. § 20-8.1-5.1-7(c). Schools have the power to expel or suspend students for student misconduct or unlawful activity and can claim immunity for doing so or failing to do so. But we think a school has no immunity for failing to prevent an assault and battery. It has the obligation to take reasonable steps to provide security on its premises, even if it has not adopted any rules or regulations prohibiting assaults. As the District stated in its brief, Law enforcement is not a traditional responsibility of the School. Appellee's Br. in Supp. of Pet. to Trans. at 16. Accordingly, immunity for enforcement of laws prohibiting an assault and battery is reserved to governmental units with police powersnot schools. The District relies on Klobuchar v. Purdue Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990), in claiming it is immune under section 3(7). In Klobuchar, the plaintiff, a part-time student at Purdue University, was seriously injured when attacked by her estranged husband after class. When the plaintiff was attacked, she was parked in a campus parking lot that required vehicles to exhibit a school parking ticket. The campus police routinely checked vehicles in the lot for permits. The plaintiff claimed her injuries were proximately caused by the University's failure to provide adequate security for the school's parking lot. The University moved for summary judgment claiming it was immune under the ITCA. Id. at 170. The court found that the University was given the authority to provide campus security by statute, and the decision to provide security or to patrol the parking lot for permit violators is a decision on whether or not to enforce the law. Id. at 173. Relying in part on the public/private duty test, the court concluded that the police duty is one owed to the general public and does not give rise to an individual action. As a result, the University was immune from liability for failing to enforce the law. Id. Assuming Klobuchar was correctly decided, it does not extend immunity to the District in King's case. Purdue University, pursuant to statute, provided campus security for the safety of the general public. [8] Id. Here, although the school must exercise reasonable care and supervision for the safety of the children under its control, it is not charged with general law enforcement on its premises. See Miller, 308 N.E.2d at 706.