Opinion ID: 1611086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Right to Auxiliary Services

Text: In a related argument, defense counsel contends that Reeves was entitled to retain counsel of choice while securing auxiliary services from the state, citing to State v. Jones, 1997-2593 (La.3/4/98), 707 So.2d 975. Defense counsel's primary contention in this regard is that the district court's action, in removing Cuccia and da Ponte as counsel, and re-appointing and substituting Ware in response to Cuccia's motions for reimbursement and future funding, was neither requested nor warranted, and that less drastic options were available. As stated previously, in Jones, the defendant's father retained counsel for his son. Although the criminal defendant did not retain counsel himself, counsel was provided to him by a collateral source; counsel was not appointed. Jones held that a defendant provided private counsel, through a collateral source, has a constitutional right to counsel of choice. In addition, the case stands for the proposition that retention of private counsel from a collateral source, at no cost to the defendant, does not remove the defendant's right to a fair trial. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the criminal defendant has no need for appointed counsel, the defendant may still be entitled to state funding for auxiliary services, such as experts. Jones, 1997-2593 p. 4, 707 So.2d at 977. We find no violation of the precepts set forth in Jones in our review of the record of this case. Reeves' entitlement to funding for experts was never in doubt. Reeves was declared indigent and the public defender's office was appointed to represent him. Thereafter, the public defender's office, through the district indigent defender board, contracted with a capital trial program in connection with LIDAB for Reeves' initial trial counsel. For his retrial, Reeves was represented by the local Public Defender's Office. Thus, there is no question that Reeves was entitled to state funding for expert assistance. Moreover, the record confirms that expert assistance was afforded to him at both his first and second trials. Several motions for funding were considered in ex parte hearings and granted prior to Reeves' second trial. [99] Some of those motions involved reimbursement of experts who testified in the first trial. [100] In some cases, the expert witnesses were to be used in both trials and Judge Canaday found [the outstanding balances were] interfering, not only with communications possibly with regard to using those experts again at a second trial, but also with Mr. Cuccia and Ms. da Ponte, as well as any other use of those experts in Louisiana defense cases. Judge Canady noted ... that many of the tests, many of the interviews, many of the expenses, will not have to be duplicated, but that there will be some additional refreshings, some reviewing of the materials, and also the appearance at [re]trial itself. [101] Ware expressed his complete agreement with those comments. [102] The record clearly shows that Reeves was provided with expert assistance in defending himself against the charge of first degree murder and that Reeves' right to expert assistance has never been denied. Further, we find the district court did not inject himself arbitrarily into this funding morass. This complicated and confusing situation was brought to the court's attention through defense trial counsel's motions for reimbursement and for future expenses; trial counsel properly solicited the court's aid in resolving these issues. Although defense counsel on appeal suggests the district court should have halted the prosecution going forward until adequate funds were available, as authorized by this court in Citizen, we note that Citizen had not yet been handed down at the time of this funding hearing. Even so, the record shows the district court was assured by Ware that additional funding was not available and would not be available in any foreseeable future. The defense argued in brief, and at oral argument in this court, that the removal of Cuccia and da Ponte did not actually save the state money, since the state had to pay for St. Dizier's appointment. [103] However, the subject of the funding of St. Dizier's appointment was not raised in the district court by the defense. In fact, Ware testified at an ex parte status conference held June 22, 2004, that the IDB had sufficient funds through its Capital Defense Fund to pay St. Dizier's fee into the next several months. [104] At a subsequent hearing, Ware explained that the Capital Defense Fund replenishes itself each month with the monthly receipts of court cost revenue. [105] The court noted that ... the Capital Defense Fund is an ongoing account for which deposits are made on a monthly basis.... [106] For reasons not apparent from the record, Ware had not thought sufficient funds would have been available for the reimbursement of Cuccia. [107] We note the district court fully discussed his proposed action with all counsel prior to the hearing in an attempt to reach a proper solution. There were many competing interests for the district court to consider. Paramount, of course, were the defendant's rights to a fair trial and effective counsel. The public defender's office had no solution to offer the district court, other than to suggest that someone else be appointed or that the trial be halted. Without doubt, Cuccia and da Ponte were owed reimbursement of their expenses. Future funding was, considering the lack of resources for indigent defense, necessarily, going to be an issue for the district court to address in an on-going manner, and ease of scheduling hearings to deal with the anticipated funding motions was an additional factor which the district court took into consideration. In addition, the district court also had to consider the rights of the victim's family in having this case prosecuted in a timely fashion, as well as the time limitations imposed by the Code of Criminal Procedure for bringing indicted defendants to trial. [108] Moreover, Citizen does not stand for the proposition that ordering a halt to a trial is the only authorized remedy for a district court when adequate funds are not available to provide for an indigent defendant's constitutionally-protected right to counsel. Indeed, Citizen authorizes courts to take other measures consistent with this opinion which protect the constitutional or statutory rights of the defendants. Id., XXXX-XXXX p. 17, 898 So.2d at 339. Reeves was constitutionally entitled to effective counsel and a fair trial. In the circumstances presented here, we find that the solution fashioned by the district court accomplished both constitutional requirements. Reeves was appointed able and effective lead counsel in the person of the local, capital-certified, chief public defender, and able and effective associate counsel in the person of an experienced local attorney. Moreover, a third attorney who worked with the Public Defender's Office, was also enrolled as counsel for Reeves and participated in Reeves' retrial. Adequate funding was subsequently found to enable Reeves to present his defense at his retrial with expert assistance. Although the district court could have chosen a different solution from the universe of possible alternatives, we hold the measures taken by the district court here adequately protected the defendant's constitutional rights to effective appointed counsel and a fair trial.