Opinion ID: 2218516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: shelbyville police department

Text: Complainant: Robert D. Marshal Case Number: 67-115 Address: 1215 S. Miller Street Date Received: 12-7-67 City: Shelbyville State: Ind. Time Received 7:52 a.m. Phone Number: ____ Extension: ____ Received By: McKinney Method of receiving complaint: Ph. Assigned To: PD Nature of Complaint: ______________ _______________________ ___________________________________ Radio Log Nbr.: #6333 Exact Location: Same Case Closed: ____ ___________________________________ Number Arrests: ____ Initial Complaint: Wants Police to come down that a B & E. of his office (All the information with a line under it was in handwriting in the actual exhibit.) Dennis McKinney, who had been employed as a radio operator by the Shelbyville Police Department in December, 1967, testified that that report was part of the normal records of the Shelbyville Police Department, and he prepared it at the time of the call in the regular course of his duties as radio operator for the Department. The handwriting and name were his but he could only vaguely recall this particular report and could not recall who had made the complaint. After several unsuccessful offers the prosecutor offered Ex. 2 only for the purpose of showing the time and date it was received. Appellant objected that the report contained matters which were hearsay because the result of conversations outside the presence of appellant. The trial court admitted the exhibit as a business entry exception to the hearsay rule and appellant argues that this trial court ruling was erroneous. Hearsay evidence has been defined as follows: Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. (McCormack, Evidence § 225) See also Trustees of Indiana University v. Williams (1969), 252 Ind. 624, 251 N.E.2d 439; Mark v. City of Indianapolis, Etc. (1966), 247 Ind. 511, 219 N.E.2d 434; Wayne Works v. Hicks Body Co. (1944), 115 Ind. App. 10, 55 N.E.2d 382; 5 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1361 (3d ed., 1940); 2 Jones, Evidence, § 268 (Gard ed. 1958); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63; Model Code of Evidence, Rule 501; Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, Rule 8-01. The principal reasons for the exclusion of hearsay evidence are that the out-of-court declarant was not under oath, not subject to confrontation by the trier-of-fact, and most importantly, not subject to cross-examination by the accused. McCormack, §§ 224, 225; Wigmore, §§ 1360 to 1365; 2 Jones, § 269. Not all evidence of extra-judicial utterances qualifies as hearsay evidence. The theory of the Hearsay rule ( ante, § 1361) is that, when a human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted in it, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of our inference, and therefore the assertion can be received only when made upon the stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. If, therefore, an extra-judicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to evidence the matter asserted, but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the Hearsay rule does not apply. The utterance is then merely not obnoxious to that rule. It may or may not be received, according as it has any relevancy in the case; but if it is not received, this is in no way due to the Hearsay rule. The prohibition of the Hearsay rule then, does not apply to all words or utterances merely as such. If this fundamental principle is clearly realized, its application is a comparatively simple matter. The Hearsay rule excludes extra-judicial utterances only when offered for a special purpose, namely, as assertions to evidence the truth of the matter asserted. 6 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1766 (3d ed. 1940). See also Trustees of Indiana University v. Williams, supra ; McCormack, § 225; 2 Jones, § 271. If the questioned evidence is hearsay and does not fall within one of the exceptions to the rule, then it is inadmissible in evidence. Compton v. Fleming (1846), 8 Blackf. 153. The question for this court then would be whether the erroneous admission of such evidence was harmless error. One of the well-recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that for business records. Originally there was a distinction made between the business records of a party and those of a third person. The former were admitted in evidence under the shopbook exception to the hearsay rule in order to offset the harsh results due to the incompetency of a party as a witness. When that rule of incompetency was abolished the justification for the distinction disappeared and now all business records belonging to any person may be treated alike. 5 Wigmore, § 1518; McCormack, § 282; 3 Jones, § 610. Business records when offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein, are hearsay since they rely for their credit on someone who at the time he made the record was neither under oath nor subject to confrontation or cross-examination. The exception to the hearsay rule for business records is based on the fact that the circumstances of preparation assure the accuracy and reliability of the entries. McCormack, ch. 32; 5 Wigmore, §§ 1521 to 1522. The common law rule, without benefit of modification by statute, stated in general terms, was that in order to come within this exception the following requirements had to be met: 1) The records offered must have been the original entries; 2) They must have been made in the regular course of business at or near the time of the event recorded; 3) The facts must have been within the first hand knowlof someone whose business duty it was to observe and report the facts; 4) The witness who had knowledge of the facts must be unavailable. See McCormack, ch. 32; 5 Wigmore, §§ 1523 to 1530; 2 Jones §§ 290 to 294. The modern trend has been to clarify and simplify the rule by adopting one or another of the model rules, e.g. Uniform Rule of Evidence, Rule 62 (13); Proposed Rules of Evidence for U.S. District Courts, Rule 8-03 (b) (6); Model Code of Evidence Rule 514 (1). [1] Indiana has not yet adopted such a rule, however there has been some modification of the common law requirements. Note, The Need for a Liberal Business Entry Statute in Indiana, 31 Ind. L.J. 312. The first requirement has been modified in Indiana by Acts 1949, ch. 168, §§ 1 and 2, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-1656 and 2-1657, which provide for the admission of duplicate copies of the original records. The fourth requirement is satisfied in Indiana even if the witness is present and merely cannot recall the facts so as to testify from memory. Culver v. Marks (1889), 122 Ind. 554, 23 N.E. 1086. The definition of business has been broadened to include every business bank, industry, profession, occupation and calling of every kind. Acts 1949, ch. 168, § 3, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-1658. The history of the Indiana rule and the cases up to that time are well discussed in Note, 31 Ind. L.J. 312, supra. The heart of the rule then is the requirement that the observation, reporting, and the recording of the facts all be made by someone in the regular course of the business. Without this there is no assurance of the accuracy and reliability of the fact which justifies the admission of the record as evidence of the facts asserted therein. In applying the rule to the case before us we see that Exhibit 2 was filled out by the witness McKinney in the regular course of his duties as an employee of the Shelbyville Police Department. Of all the information placed on the report by McKinney, he had first hand knowledge only of the date, time, log number, case number, his name, and the use of a phone. The witness did not have first hand knowledge that the caller was Robert Marshall nor that there actually had been such a breaking and entering. The caller, who as far as McKinney knew at the time of recording may or may not have had first hand knowledge of the burglary, was not an employee of the Shelbyville Police Department and was not acting in the regular course of business of the Police Department in observing and reporting the facts to McKinney. Consequently the only portion of Exhibit 2 which was admissible was the part showing the time, date, log number, case number, McKinney's name, and the fact that a phone was used. The fact that in this case such evidence would have been of very dubious relevance is not a consideration on this appeal. In another case it could have been relevant if material to a different issue e.g. whether or not McKinney had filled out a report at that time. Kelley v. Ford Motor Co. (1937), 280 Mich. 378, 273 N.W. 737. This decision is in line with the leading case of Johnson v. Lutz (1930), 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517, where the court held that a memorandum concerning an accident prepared by a police officer who wasn't present at the time of the accident and which memo was based on statements made to him by persons present when he arrived was inadmissible as evidence of the facts asserted in the memo about the accident. The person operating in the regular course of business did not have first hand knowledge of the fact and the persons who did have first hand knowledge of the facts were not observing and reporting these in the regular course of business. The trial court error here is not reversible however, because the appellant was in no way prejudiced thereby. The erroneously admitted evidence merely purported to show that Robert Marshall reported a burglary on December 7, 1967. Appellant did not at the trial and does not on appeal challenge the fact that Robert D. Marshall, Inc., was broken into on December 6, 1967, and that Robert Marshall discovered that fact on December 7, 1967, and reported it to the police at 7:30 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. E. Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting State's Exhibits 6 through 16, which purport to be payroll checks from Robert D. Marshall, Inc., payable to Eugene Wells and with the name Eugene Wells written on the back. The exhibits were introduced on the State's rebuttal through Sgt. Douglas Buck, a state police handwriting expert. Prior to the offer of Exhibits 6 through 16, Sgt. Buck had been given Defendant's Exhibit C, two admitted genuine specimens of appellant's handwriting of the name Norman Thompson. The witness was asked if he had compared the handwriting on Defendant's Exhibit C and State's Exhibit 5, the stolen check, and if so what was his conclusion. He said: A. It is my opinion that the author of the handwriting on State's Exhibit C. Defendant's Exhibit C  I am sorry  Defendant's Exhibit C. also authored and wrote the Norman Thompson signature appearing on the reverse of State's Exhibit 5. It was only after that unequivocal testimony that the state offered into evidence Exhibits 6 through 16, as additional specimens of appellant's handwriting to further support the witness' already stated conclusion. With reference to such specimens Acts 1913, ch. 312, § 1, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. § 2-1723 says: In any proceeding before a court or judicial officer of the state of Indiana where the genuineness of the handwriting of any person may be involved, any admitted or proved handwriting of such person shall be competent evidence as a basis for comparison by witnesses, or by the jury, court or officer conducting such proceeding, to prove or disprove such genuineness. The state clearly did not comply with this statute. The appellant did not admit that any of the writing in Exhibits 6 through 16 was his, nor did the State make any effort whatsoever to prove that any of the writing in the exhibits was his. The prosecutor asked Sgt. Buck whether he could identify Exhibits 6 through 16 and he replied simply, Yes, Sir. Then the prosecutor immediately offered the exhibits into evidence and the trial court admitted them over appellant's objection. There was no testimony that the checks were really from Robert D. Marshall, Inc., and even if they were, there was no evidence at all that appellant wrote on them. Snider, Executor v. Preachers Aid Society (1942), 111 Ind. App. 410, 41 N.E.2d 665; Plymouth Savings and Loan Assoc. No. 2 v. Kassing (1919), 72 Ind. App. 1. Although the admission of these exhibits was error we do not think that it was reversible error. Prior to the admission of these exhibits the witness had already testified that it was his opinion that the author of Exhibit C, admittedly the appellant, was also the author of the endorsement on the reverse side of Exhibit 5, the stolen check. Both of these exhibits concerned the name Norman Thompson. The witness did discuss Exhibits 6 through 16 in his testimony demonstrating how he reached his conclusion. However he also testified [2] that there was very little weight given to the checks in the comparison because the points of comparison between the Eugene Wells on Exhibits 6 through 16 and the Norman Thompson on Exhibit 5, the stolen check, were extremely small in number. The witness at one point said it was almost impossible to make a comparison with so few points of comparison. To the extent that Exhibits 6 through 16 were comparable, it would seem that they were authored by the same person who wrote Exhibit C and the endorsement on Exhibit 5. The witness said: A. It is my opinion that the author of the reverse endorsement, `Eugene Wells,' which appears on the reverse of each State's Exhibit 6 through 16, inclusive, and Defendant's Exhibit C, also authored the reverse endorsement `Norman Thompson,' appearing on the reverse of State's Exhibit 5. Under these circumstances we think that the erroneous admission of Exhibits 6 through 16 constituted harmless error. Judgment affirmed. Hunter, C.J., Arterburn and Givan, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.