Opinion ID: 2540167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Case Law Subsequent To Taylor I

Text: In Apprendi v. New Jersey , the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a defendant to be expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. 530 U.S. 466, 483, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Under Apprendi, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In Ring, the court extended its holding in Apprendi to provide that the Sixth Amendment affords a capital murder defendant the right to have a jury find the aggravating factors relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Ring stated: Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428.
In 2003, in Whitfield, this Court applied Ring retroactively [7] and set aside a defendant's death sentence that had been previously affirmed on appeal before Ring was decided. Whitfield held that, under Ring, the defendant was entitled to have a jury make the factual determinations on which his eligibility for the death sentence was predicated. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d at 256. In Whitfield, the judge had determined the factual issues necessary for imposition of the death penalty after the jury had found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder but then was unable to reach a verdict in the punishment phase of his trial. Id. at 261. Whitfield found that the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights to jury sentencing as outlined in Ring were violated when, after the jury deadlocked, the judge found the essential facts under section 565.030.4, RSMo 1994, that were necessary to impose the death sentence. Id. at 261-62. Whitfield observed that the burden was on the State to show that the Ring error was harmless, and it concluded that the State could not show the error was harmless because it was unknown, based on the jury deadlock, at what phase the jury reached an impasse when making the required statutory determinations for imposing a death sentence. Id. at 262-64. [8] Accordingly, the defendant in Whitfield had his death sentence reduced to a sentence of life imprisonment because his death sentence had been unconstitutionally imposed when it was based on determinations not made by a jury. Id. at 271-72.
Subsequent to this Court's holding in Whitfield, the United States Supreme Court extended the reach of Ring by declaring in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), that the Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing applies even where a defendant pleads guilty. In Blakely, the defendant pleaded guilty to kidnapping, and [t]he facts admitted in his plea, standing alone, supported a maximum sentence of 53 months under Washington state law. 542 U.S. at 298, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The state recommended a sentence within the standard range of 49 to 53 months. Id. at 300, 124 S.Ct. 2531. But the defendant was surprised when the judge enhanced his sentence beyond the state's recommendation based on the judge's determinations that the defendant had acted with deliberate cruelty toward the victim. [9] See id. at 300, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The judge imposed [on the defendant] an `exceptional' sentence of 90 months. Id. at 298, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The defendant appealed, contending that the sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential to his sentence. Id. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely concluded that the judge's imposition of the exceptional sentence based on his finding of deliberate cruelty violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 303-06, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely noted that [t]he facts supporting [the court's finding of deliberate cruelty] were neither admitted by [the defendant] nor found by a jury. Id. at 303. Blakely made clear that every defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts legally essential to the punishment. Id. at 313, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Blakely also outlined, however, that nothing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi rights. 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.Ct. 2531. According to Blakely, [w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. Id. Blakely states: If appropriate waivers are procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty. Even a defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements, which may well be in his interest if relevant evidence would prejudice him at trial. We do not understand how Apprendi can possibly work to the detriment of those who are free, if they think its costs outweigh its benefits, to render it inapplicable. Id.