Opinion ID: 2174363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Admissibility of Appellant's Statement

Text: Appellant Sprowls argues that his taped statement given to Sheriff Edlin was involuntary and inadmissable at trial. At the juvenile transfer hearing, the district court suppressed the statement on the grounds that KRS 610.200 had been violated. At trial, Appellant's counsel objected to the use of the statement and moved for suppression on the same grounds. Without a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. KRS 610.200 requires a peace officer to immediately notify a child's parent that the child has been taken into custody, and to give the parent notice of the specific charge and the reason for taking the child into custody. In Davidson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 613 S.W.2d 431 (1981), the Court of Appeals held that the statutory language, the officer shall immediately notify, was mandatory [2] . In Davidson , however, the statements of two juveniles were suppressed on the grounds that not only did the police officer violate the statutory language of KRS 208.110, but he failed to give the juveniles any Miranda warnings: An admission by the juvenile may (not) be used against him in the absence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission was made with knowledge that he was not obligated to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent. . . . . [T]he greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not a product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. Id. at 435 (quoting In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)). Here, the district court found that Sheriff Edlin made no attempt to notify Appellant's parents in violation of KRS 610.200. However, no issue was raised as to the voluntariness of Sprowls' statements. In fact, Sheriff Edlin testified at trial that Sprowls was read his Miranda rights and voluntarily signed the waiver of rights form. The crux of Appellant's argument on appeal is that his statement should have been suppressed because it was involuntarily obtained. He contends that the trial court erred in failing to hold a Bradley hearing to determine the voluntariness. Bradley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 439 S.W.2d 61 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 974, 90 S.Ct. 1091, 25 L.Ed.2d 268 (1970). However, a review of the record reveals that Appellant only moved to suppress his statements on the grounds that the district court had found a violation of KRS 610.200. Absolutely no mention of the voluntariness of Appellant's statements was raised in the trial court. As such, and in light of the fact that the record clearly establishes that Appellant was read his rights prior to giving his statement, we cannot conclude any error occurred. We must note however, that the Commonwealth has again argued that this issue is moot because Appellant's statement was not introduced into evidence. In fact, however, Sheriff Edlin testified concerning the content of Appellant's statement. Contrary to the Commonwealth's belief, the statement was introduced at trial.