Opinion ID: 836486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ARGUMENT (Affirmative)

Text: Submitted by the joint committee of the senate and house of representatives, thirty-sixth regular session, legislative assembly, in behalf of the Amendment Authorizing Criminal Trials Without Juries by Consent of Accused. The purpose of this proposed constitutional amendment is to permit the accused in criminal cases, with the consent of the trial judge, to waive trial by jury and be tried by judge alone. This would apply to all crimes excepting capital offenses. Although not expressly required by the wording of the amendment, it is nevertheless thought the consent of the district attorney should be obtained as well as that of the judge before whom the case may be tried. Under present requirements of the constitution, jury trial is compulsory in criminal cases. There are many cases that may be tried by the judge, and without jury, speedily, economically and fully protecting the right of the accused. The requirement that consent of accused and judge must both be obtained, with the suggestion that the approval of the district attorney be secured also in applying the measure, assure its carefully considered and reasonable use. Similar provisions are effective in many states. Rights of the state and accused are fully preserved and the adoption of the amendment should accomplish a substantial saving in the time and expense now incurred in criminal trials. Where adopted its use is general and the percentage of court trials has been large. It should be kept in mind [that] the right to waive trial by jury, provided herein, applies only to criminal cases and requiring consent of accused and trial judge, cannot be used oppressively. 305 Or. at 132-43, 752 P.2d 1136 (emphasis added; boldface in original). The state relies on the emphasized parts of the Voters' Pamphlet materials to claim that the history of the 1932 amendment establishes that the waiver clause in Article I, section 11, was not intended to create a right in a criminal defendant to insist on a court trial or to bar the legislature from granting to the state the right to demand a jury trial. To the contrary, the state asserts, the sponsors of the amendment at issue stated precisely the opposite i.e., that a court should obtain the district attorney's approval of a trial to the court before it accepts a defendant's waiver. The flaw in the state's argument is that, like the wording of the amendment itself, the Voters' Pamphlet material speaks only to what the amendment requires with respect to what the defendant must do and what the trial judge may do. The district attorney is not mentioned in the amendment. The district attorney is mentioned only in the Voter's Pamphlet material and, even there, mention of the district attorney's participation in the decision whether to allow a defendant to have a court trial is couched, as is the state's argument to this court, in terms of should, rather than must. By its plain terms, the wording in the Voters' Pamphlet materials on which the state relies is a recommendation that, in making its discretionary decision whether to allow a criminal defendant to waive trial by jury, the trial judge should consider and give due weight to the preferences of the district attorney. That is why the materials forthrightly acknowledge that the district attorney's consent is not expressly required, and suggest only that such consent should be obtained. We conclude that nothing in the wording, case law, or history of Article I, section 11, indicates that it should not be given its natural and ordinary meaning. The constitution grants to only one person, the trial judge, the discretionary choice to deny a criminal defendant in a noncapital criminal case the right to waive trial by jury. The legislature's choice to provide such a right to the district attorney in ORS 136.001(1) infringes on the right granted by Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court did not err in refusing to recognize the state's assertion of its statutory right under ORS 136.001(1). Petition for writ of mandamus denied.