Opinion ID: 351559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prosecutor's rebuttal summation

Text: 30 As we have had occasion to note, (w)e suppose it is inevitable, in a trial of this complexity and length and especially with extensive summations . . . that claims of prejudice with respect to the prosecutor's summation would be raised. United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951, 964 (2 Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Reynolds v. United States, 429 U.S. 850 (1976). Here, as there, such claims have been raised. 31 Bubar, Coffey, Just, Peter Betres and Ronald Betres claim that the United States Attorney's repeated mention in his rebuttal summation of their failure to produce evidence to rebut elements of the government's case amounted to commentary on their failure to testify and as such violated their Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination. Specifically, the statements challenged all were directed either to the defendants' failure to explain some piece of evidence (a telephone call, a fingerprint in the Danbury motel, or Coffey's signature under a false name in the motel registry) or to their failure to produce evidence substantiating the innocent explanations which they had argued to the jury. 8 32 We hold that in neither category did the substance of the prosecutor's comments violate appellant's constitutional rights. The prosecutor is entitled to comment on a defendant's failure to call witnesses to contradict the factual character of the government's case, United States v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 81-82 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), as well as his failure to support his own factual theories with witnesses. United States v. Rodriguez, 556 F.2d 638, 641 (2 Cir. 1977); United States v. Lipton, 467 F.2d 1161, 1168 (2 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1973). A constitutional violation occurs only if either the defendant alone has the information to contradict the government evidence referred to or the jury naturally and necessarily would interpret the summation as a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. United States ex rel. Leak v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1266 (2 Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 (1970). 33 Such was not the case here. None of the United States Attorney's remarks related to evidence rebuttable solely by a defendant. A valid, corroborated alibi defense could have explained the fingerprints, the telephone calls and Coffey's false signature. Appellants' claims really go to the prosecutor's phrasing rather than the substance of his remarks. On several occasions he referred to a defendant's failure to explain or refute certain evidence. 9 Viewing such remarks in the context of the rebuttal summation as a whole, we do not believe that this ambiguous form of expression naturally and necessarily would be interpreted by the jury as a comment on a defendant's failure to testify. The thrust of the prosecutor's rebuttal summation was directed at the prior arguments of defense counsel. We believe that the jury so understood the remarks in question. Moreover any conceivable misunderstanding on the part of the jury was nipped in the bud by Judge Newman's emphatic curative instructions given first sua sponte at the end of the prosecutor's rebuttal summation and again after a recess in a formulation submitted by Peter Betres' counsel. 10 United States v. Lipton, supra, 467 F.2d at 1169; United States v. Nasta, 398 F.2d 283, 285 (2 Cir. 1968). 34 We hold that appellants were not prejudiced by the prosecutor's rebuttal summation.