Opinion ID: 1707000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: does sovereign immunity exempt the city of philadelphia from liability.

Text: ¶ 6. Our recent decision in Hord v. City of Yazoo City, 702 So.2d 121 (Miss.1997) controls the disposition of this case. We said in Hord: In 1982, this Court abolished judicially-created sovereign immunity in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982), ruling that determining the existence and extent of sovereign immunity is the province of the Legislature, not the Court. In 1984, the Legislature responded by enacting a comprehensive tort claims act, providing for a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 et seq. (Supp.1996). However, § 11-46-6 provided that the Act's provisions were not yet effective, and that until such time as they became effective, the law of sovereign immunity would be governed by the common law doctrine as it existed in 1982 before the Pruett decision. On August 31, 1992, we decided Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Com'n, 608 So.2d 1288 (Miss.1992), wherein we held § 11-46-6 to be unconstitutional because it intended to revive law by reference. Then, in Robinson v. Stewart, 655 So.2d 866 (Miss.1995), we held that Presley was to be applied prospectively only. The Legislature responded to Presley by reaffirming sovereign immunity in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-3, but then waived said immunity to a large degree in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-5. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-5 provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the State from and after July 1, 1993 and for political subdivisions of the state from and after October 1, 1993, subject to a number of substantive and procedural limitations set forth in later sections of said chapter. Gressett v. Newton Separate Municipal School District, 697 So.2d 444, 445 (Miss.1997). In Gressett, we decided that a cause of action that arose on August 26, 1993, over four months after § 11-46-3 went into effect, was surely governed by the statutory immunity annunciated in that statute. We reasoned that the Presley holding was not controlling because § 11-46-3 does not contain the constitutionally offensive language present in § 11-46-6. § 11-46-6, however, still applies to post- Pruett, pre- Presley causes of action. In the case sub judice, [the plaintiffs'] cause of action arose on [November 4, 1989], before Presley, so under Robinson, we apply § 11-46-6, which directs us to apply pre- Pruett common law. Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So.2d 275, 278-79 (Miss. 1993) (holding that since cause of action arose in 1987, before Presley, the trial court erred in applying the tort claims act, but instead should have applied pre- Pruett common law). Under pre- Pruett common law, whether a city enjoys the defense of sovereign immunity depends upon whether the alleged conduct occurred in the exercise of a governmental function or in the exercise of a proprietary function. Morgan, 627 So.2d at 279; Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 952 (Miss.1991). A city performing a governmental function is immune from a negligence suit, whereas a city performing a proprietary function is not immune from a negligence suit. Morgan, 627 So.2d at 279; Webb, 583 So.2d at 952. The classifications of those functions which are governmental and those which are proprietary are very general, and are often difficult to define. We have described governmental functions applicable to cities as activities or services which a municipality is required by state law to engage in and to perform. Anderson v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, 419 So.2d 1010, 1014 (Miss.1982). Conversely, proprietary functions are activities in which a municipal corporation engages, not required or imposed upon it by law, about which it is free to perform or not. Anderson, 419 So.2d at 1014. Proprietary activities are those which, while beneficial to the community and very important, are not vital to a City's functioning. Morgan, 627 So.2d at 279. Hord, 702 So.2d 121, 123. ¶ 7. The placing of warning signs is within the purview of a city's governmental functions. Therefore, the city is immune from liability under the facts established in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court. ¶ 8. AFFIRMED. PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur. McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J., and BANKS and WALLER, JJ.