Opinion ID: 1202713
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Drs. Sharma and Faerstein.

Text: In reliance on Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454 [68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866], defendant contends that the admission of the testimony of Drs. Sharma and Faerstein at the penalty phase violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. At the penalty phase defense counsel sought to strike the testimony of Dr. Sharma and to bar the testimony of Dr. Faerstein on the ground, among others, that neither psychiatrist gave defendant the advisement required by Smith. At the hearing on the motion, Dr. Faerstein testified: I did not specifically discuss the penalty phase with him. I did discuss with him the fact that there was no confidentiality in his disclosures to me; that I was reporting everything that I would discover in the process of the evaluation to the court; that my letter would go to the court, and that nothing he would say to me would be private or confidential. Although Dr. Sharma did not testify at the hearing, his Penal Code section 1026 report does state that defendant was informed about the non-confidential nature of the examination. It was undisputed that neither psychiatrist advised defendant that he had a right to remain silent or that any statement he made could be used against him at the penalty phase of his trial. The court denied defendant's motion. In rejecting the request to strike Dr. Sharma's testimony, it said the motion was untimely but plainly rested its ruling on the merits: I don't think the People should be penalized after the fact for introducing psychiatric testimony in good faith once the issue of the defendant's state of mind or mental capacity has been placed squarely before the jury by the defense. In rejecting the request to bar Dr. Faerstein's testimony, it reasoned: The doctor did testify that he advised the defendant that there was no privilege attaching. I don't see that any further qualification is required. Defendant's reliance on Estelle v. Smith, supra, 451 U.S. 454, is misplaced. The United States Supreme Court recently explained that Smith does not apply to a situation such as the present where the defendant had requested a psychiatric examination through his Penal Code section 1026 plea and had presented psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase. ( Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 483 U.S. 402 [97 L.Ed.2d 336, 354-357, 107 S.Ct. 2906].) (16) Buchanan squarely held that when a defendant initiates a psychiatric examination by court-appointed experts or presents psychiatric evidence, the prosecution may rebut this presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant had requested. There is no Fifth or Sixth Amendment violation under such circumstances. ( Ibid. ; accord People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 961-962 [245 Cal. Rptr. 336, 751 P.2d 395].)