Opinion ID: 1127461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Primacy of congressional intent on issue of exhaustion of state remedies.

Text: (7) The State Bar also argues that, if a section 1983 action is available to plaintiffs, they should be required to seek judicial review of the arbitration decision because doing so would serve general principles of comity, judicial economy, and finality, and would be consistent with the constitutional rights in issue. Plaintiffs respond that Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents (1982) 457 U.S. 496 [73 L.Ed.2d 172, 102 S.Ct. 2557] precludes imposition of an exhaustion of state administrative remedies requirement on a section 1983 plaintiff. Again we agree. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a section 1983 plaintiff need not have exhausted alternative remedies before initiating a section 1983 action. [8] The arbitration-related cases discussed above did not directly address the question of when, if ever, a state remedy will foreclose a section 1983 action for violation of a constitutional or federal statutory right, or if exhaustion of administrative or arbitral remedies may be required as a prerequisite to a section 1983 action. Other Supreme Court decisions hold, however, that in the absence of a clearly expressed congressional intent to require exhaustion of an alternative remedy before initiating a section 1983 action, a court may not require exhaustion. A fortiori, a state may not require exhaustion of alternative administrative and judicial remedies as a prerequisite to a section 1983 suit brought in state court. The court emphasized the overriding importance of congressional intent most recently in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn. (1990) 496 U.S. 498 [110 L.Ed.2d 455, 110 S.Ct. 2510]. `We do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy for the deprivation of a federally secured right.' [Citation.] The burden is on the State to show `by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement.' ... In the absence of such an express provision, we have found private enforcement foreclosed only when the statute itself creates a remedial scheme that is `sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.' ( Id. at pp. 520-521 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 474].) Wilder also addressed exhaustion requirements. The issue in Wilder was whether health care providers could maintain a section 1983 suit against the Governor of Virginia to compel the state to comply with federal law and regulations requiring that Medicaid reimbursement rates be reasonable and adequate. The court concluded that Congress had not foreclosed a private section 1983 action, as it had not expressed an intent to do so and the administrative procedures did not establish a comprehensive scheme that manifested such congressional intent. The court specifically rejected the argument that the existence of administrative procedures under which the health care providers could obtain review of payment claims evidenced congressional intent to foreclose reliance on section 1983 and stated that the availability of judicial review under the Virginia Administrative Procedure Act was irrelevant to whether relief under section 1983 was available. ( Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., supra, 496 U.S. 498, 522 & fn. 20 [110 L.Ed.2d 455, 475-476].) The court then restated the rule: The availability of state administrative procedures ordinarily does not foreclose resort to § 1983. See Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 [73 L.Ed.2d 172, 187-188, 102 S.Ct. 2557] (1982.) ( Id. at p. 523 [110 L.Ed.2d at p. 476].) The court had repeated that admonition six months earlier in Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles (1989) 493 U.S. 103 [107 L.Ed.2d 420, 110 S.Ct. 444]. There the trial court concluded that section 1983 did not authorize an award of compensatory damages to a taxicab operator whose right to renewal of its franchise had been improperly conditioned on settlement of a pending labor dispute between the operator and its union. The court of appeals agreed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) created rights enforceable under section 1983. The court held that the NLRA did create rights enforceable under section 1983 notwithstanding the comprehensive enforcement mechanisms created by the NLRA. The court reemphasized its prior holdings that the coverage of section 1983 must be broadly construed. ( Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 105 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 427].) It then directed a two-step inquiry, asking first if a federal right had been violated, and second whether Congress had specifically foreclosed a section 1983 remedy. (493 U.S. at p. 106 [107 L.Ed.2d at pp. 427-428].) The court also noted that the burden is on the defendant to establish that Congress had withdrawn the remedy, and the court will not lightly conclude that it has done so. ( Id. at p. 107 [107 L.Ed.2d at pp. 428-429].) The Supreme Court's most extensive consideration of the question of congressional intent appears in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, supra, 457 U.S. 496, to which the court referred in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Assn., supra, 496 U.S. 498. There the issue arose in the context of a claim that a section 1983 plaintiff could be required to exhaust state remedies before prosecuting a section 1983 action. The defendant in the section 1983 action, which was brought in the federal court by one of defendant's employees, argued that the action should be dismissed because the employee had not exhausted available administrative remedies. The employee claimed that she had been subjected to intentional discrimination on the basis of race and sex. In Patsy the Supreme Court reviewed the history of section 1983 and of the then recent Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 United States Code section 1997 et seq., which included a specific, but limited, exhaustion requirement in section 1997e. The court began its historical review with the debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (17 Stat. 13), the precursor of section 1983, and found three recurring themes that supported a conclusion that exhaustion of state administrative remedies should not be required in a section 1983 action in federal court. [9] The first was the congressional belief that immediate access to the federal courts was essential because Congress gave the federal courts `the paramount role ... to protect constitutional rights.' (457 U.S. at p. 500 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 178].) Next was a concern that state authorities had been unable or unwilling to protect the constitutional rights of individuals or to punish those who violated these rights ( id. at p. 505 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 181]), and that Congress was reluctant to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies when that might require judicial deference to the questionable factfinding of state administrative agencies. Last was congressional intent to provide dual or concurrent fora, a consideration that is particularly relevant here. [M]any legislators interpreted the bill to provide dual or concurrent forums in the state and federal system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which to seek relief. Cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 [5 L.Ed.2d 492, 502-503, 81 S.Ct. 473] (1961) (`The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked'). ( Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 506 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 181].) The court also based its decision on congressional action in the then-recent adoption of 42 United States Code section 1997e, as part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, in which the question of exhaustion had been expressly considered, and a limited exhaustion requirement that would otherwise have been unnecessary had been created for actions under that act. If Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, supra, 457 U.S. 496, did not compel a conclusion that exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be made a prerequisite to a section 1983 action in a state court, the court's subsequent decision in Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131 [101 L.Ed.2d 123, 108 S.Ct. 2302], does. In Felder, the court held that Patsy is applicable to state court actions. Felder is dispositive here. In Felder v. Casey, supra, 487 U.S. 131, the Supreme Court addressed the nature of conditions a state may place on actions to vindicate federal statutory rights. The plaintiff had initiated a section 1983 action in a Wisconsin state court. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that dismissal of the action was proper because the plaintiff failed to comply with a state tort claims statute. The United States Supreme Court reversed in a decision which addresses the limits on a state's ability to impose its procedural requirements on a litigant in a section 1983 action. Building on past cases in which the court had held that a federal court may not import state-created immunities ( Martinez v. California (1980) 444 U.S. 277, 284 [62 L.Ed.2d 481, 488-489, 100 S.Ct. 553]) and statutes of limitation ( Burnett v. Grattan (1984) 468 U.S. 42, 50-55 [82 L.Ed.2d 36, 44-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924]), the court held that notice-of-claim provisions could not be applied to section 1983 actions. It did so because there is no such requirement for a section 1983 action brought in the federal court. Therefore, if the requirement were permitted in a state court action the enforcement of such statutes in § 1983 actions brought in state court will frequently and predictably produce different outcomes in federal civil rights litigation based solely on whether that litigation takes place in state or federal court. States may not apply such an outcome-determinative law when entertaining substantive federal rights in their courts. ( Felder v. Casey, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 141 [73 L.Ed.2d at pp. 139-140].) The court also looked again to the history on which it had relied in Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, supra, 457 U.S. 496, which led it to conclude that Congress did not intend to allow state law provisions to deny section 1983 plaintiffs immediate access to the federal courts. The state notice-of-claim provision had the effect of forcing the plaintiff both to give notice within 120 days of the civil rights violation, and also to wait an additional 120 days while the defendant investigated the claim and attempted to settle it. This, the court concluded, was incompatible with the congressional intent underlying section 1983. The court rejected the state's argument that the delay was de minimis and did not alter the right to seek full compensation in a lawsuit, explaining that the argument ignores our prior assessment of `the dominant characteristic of civil rights actions: they belong in court. ' Burnett, 468 U.S. at 50 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 44-45] (emphasis added). `These causes of action,' we have explained, `exist independent of any other legal or administrative relief that may be available as a matter of federal or state law. They are judicially enforceable in the first instance. ' Ibid. (emphasis added). The dominant characteristic of a § 1983 action, of course, does not vary depending upon whether it is litigated in state or federal court, and States therefore may not adulterate or dilute the predominant feature of the federal right by imposing mandatory settlement periods, no matter how reasonable the administrative waiting period or the interests it is designed to serve may appear. ( Felder v. Casey, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 148 [101 L.Ed.2d at p. 144].) In a subsequent discussion, the court equated the claims requirement to an exhaustion requirement. ( Felder v. Casey, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 149 [101 L.Ed.2d at pp. 144-145].) It also rejected the state's comity argument on preemption grounds. In a State that demands compliance with such a statute before a § 1983 action may be brought or maintained in its courts, the outcome of federal civil rights litigation will frequently and predictably depend on whether it is brought in state or federal court. Thus the very notions of federalism upon which respondents rely dictate that the State's outcome-determinative law must give way when a party asserts a federal right in state court. [¶].... [¶] Wisconsin ... may not alter the outcome of federal claims it chooses to entertain in its courts by demanding compliance with outcome-determinative rules that are inapplicable when such claims are brought in federal court.... The state notice-of-claim statute is more than a mere rule of procedure: as we discussed above, the statute is a substantive condition on the right to sue governmental officials and entities.... ( Id. at pp. 151-152 [101 L.Ed.2d at pp. 146-147].) While there is a recurrent concern in the Felder v. Casey opinion that a notice-of-claim statute forces the plaintiff to seek administrative relief from the party that caused the violation of the plaintiff's civil rights, the basis for the decision is far broader, making it impossible to distinguish the exhaustion requirement defendant would have this court impose on plaintiffs' section 1983 action. It is clear from these cases that we may not deny plaintiffs the right to a judicial action for relief in the first instance by imposing a requirement that the plaintiff initiate or exhaust state remedies before filing a section 1983 action. Were we to do so, we would delay the time at which a section 1983 action could be brought and thus deny immediate access to the federally created right. And we would create an outcome-determinative rule that would lead to inconsistent results in state and federal section 1983 actions. Those brought in federal court could proceed regardless of whether administrative relief had been sought, but those brought in state court would be subject to dismissal unless the plaintiff not only exhausted administrative remedies, but followed that by seeking review of the administrative action in the state court system. The State Bar offers no evidence or argument on which this court might base a conclusion that Congress has foreclosed or conditioned a section 1983 remedy here or intended that a state might do so. We conclude on the basis of these decisions that the Court of Appeal correctly held that the State Bar arbitration of plaintiffs' claim is not an adequate or exclusive remedy. Plaintiffs are entitled, as a matter of controlling federal law, to seek relief in a section 1983 action, under Hudson, supra, 475 U.S. 292, and McDonald v. West Branch, supra, 466 U.S. 285. [10]