Opinion ID: 389571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative History of DR5-105(C).

Text: 36 The history of the consent provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility's conflict of interest section indicates that consent was never intended to be meaningless or ineffective. Canon 6 of the 1908 Code of Professional Responsibility, 7 provided that: 37 It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client required him to oppose. 8 38 Although Canon 6 seemingly allowed multiple representation whenever the clients consented, the courts have interpreted it in a more restrictive manner. 9 In Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368, 378-79, 244 N.E.2d 456, 462, 296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 945-46 (1968), for example, the court remanded on the issue of whether there was consent, but indicated in dicta that even with consent multiple representation is not always appropriate. The court noted that although Canon 6 expresses the general policy that a client who is fully cognizant of potential or actual conflicts is entitled to take his chances, multiple representation is not always allowed. The court stated that instances where the multiple representation would not be allowed would be when the public interest was involved or where the likelihood of prejudice to one party is extremely great. 23 N.Y.2d at 378, 244 N.E.2d at 462, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 945-46. See, e. g., In re A. and B., 44 N.J. 331, 209 A.2d 101 (1965) (held, no conflicting dual representation, but a municipality's attorney may not also represent a land developer in that municipality. Consent is irrelevant when public interest is involved). Indeed, Henry Drinker, one of the leading authorities on the old Code, argued that (Canon 6) does not sanction representation of conflicting interests in every case where such consent is given, but merely forbids it except in such cases. H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 120 (1953). 39 Despite the restrictive interpretation of Canon 6's expansive language, consent was still available to justify representation which would otherwise be improper. See, e. g., Opinions of the Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Oregon State Bar, No. 57 (1957) (citing Canon 6 to say that with consent, an attorney may represent an insurance company and also sue it in an unrelated case on behalf of another client); Arden v. State Bar of California, 52 Cal.2d 310, 341 P.2d 6 (1959) (held, multiple representation of adopting parents and natural mother was not improper even though a conflict later developed because the attorney had obtained consent). Moreover, the ABA committee repeatedly refused to approve an amendment deleting the express consent clause in Canon 6. See H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 120, n.16 (1953); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Opinions No. 296 (unpublished, cited in ABA Opinions on Professional Ethics p. 28 (1967)). 40 Thus, Canon 6 of the old Code of Professional Responsibility contemplated that consent would be available to authorize multiple representation which would otherwise be inappropriate. 41 In 1969, a new Model Code of Professional Responsibility was enacted. Disciplinary Rule 5-105(C), which differed from old Canon 6 in several respects, provided that: 42 (A) lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent judgment on behalf of each. 43 DR5-105(C) has a broader scope than Canon 6. Canon 6 only applied to conflicting interests which arose when the lawyer had a duty to contend for that which duty to another client required him to oppose. DR5-105(C), in contrast to Canon 6, applies whenever the attorney's representation of one client is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, 10 or when it would involve him in representing differing interests. 11 Moreover, whereas Canon 6 on its face would have allowed representation of conflicting interests if there were consent after full disclosure, DR5-105(C) requires that it also be obvious 12 that an attorney can adequately represent the clients with differing interests. The changes in the new Code appear to be changes in substance, not merely form. 44 The case law and bar association opinions have continued, however under DR5-105(C), to allow multiple representation in certain situations if there has been consent after full disclosure. See Opinions of the Comm. on Legal Ethics of the Oregon State Bar, No. 218 (1972) (attorney can represent both parties in a divorce if there are no children and if there is no property of significant value); Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz.App. 17, 545 P.2d 979, 982 (1976) (insurer's reservation of rights created a conflict of interest, but dual representation of insured and insurer was proper because there was consent; thus, no malpractice or bad faith cause of action available to insured against insurer); Matter of Farr, 264 Ind. 153, 340 N.E.2d 777, 782-83 (1976) (held, in a case involving a conflict against insurer and insured, that case did not fall within category of cases where multiple representation is absolutely prohibited; thus, representation would have been proper had disclosures been made, but none were); see also, In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1978) (held, attorney must return fee where he did not obtain consent to advocate against a present client in an unrelated manner); Matter of Kali, 116 Ariz. 285, 569 P.2d 227, 229 (1977) (dual representation improper because no consent); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183 (2nd Cir. 1977) (if consent is given, the court may not unilaterally interfere with a person's choice of counsel). 45