Opinion ID: 480341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section 7116(b)(3) to the facts

Text: 27 Since we will remand this case for further consideration by the FLRA, we will defer judgment on the question of substantial evidence. Nevertheless, to ensure adequate review by the Authority, we will highlight certain inquiries that must be made on remand. We do this because, on the record before us, there is a substantial question whether a violation of the Act may be found on any plausible reading of section 7116(b)(3). 28 We begin with the findings of the ALJ, which were adopted by the FLRA. The ALJ found that Poteat was removed because he was not and could no longer be an effective steward. There is no evidence that any Union officer told Poteat that he should not have reported the alleged incident of patient abuse. At most, the Union's position was that it would have been prudent, given Poteat's lack of a frame of reference in determining what constituted patient abuse, to discuss the matter prior to reporting it. 17 Moreover, there is no evidence that the Union has ever taken any action against one of its members for reporting patient abuse or would do so in the future. 29 The FLRA, whatever it found, clearly did not see the Union's action as constituting a punishment or reprisal. Further, the Union's action cannot sensibly be viewed as a fine. Thus, the application of section 7116(b)(3) in this case has to be limited to whether the Union had engaged in a practice to coerce, discipline ... or attempt to coerce a member of the labor organization ... for the purpose of hindering or impeding the member's work performance or productivity as an employee or the discharge of the member's duties as an employee. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 7116(b)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). There is certainly no evidence that the action had any coercive or disciplinary intent, and the FLRA does not suggest otherwise. Arguably there could have been a coercive or disciplinary effect, but that effect seemingly is severely limited because there is no indication that the Union would take any action against Poteat in the future; nor is there any indication that the Union would have acted against Poteat if he had not been a Union steward. Since it is apparently undisputed that the Union had no interest in interfering with Poteat's filing of reports of patient abuse, and would take no actions to prevent him from doing so, it is difficult to see any substantial coercive or disciplinary effect on him or other members. Obviously, the FLRA cannot ignore these considerations on remand. 30 Turning to the second part of section 7116(b)(3), the record is devoid of evidence that the Union's purpose was to hinder or impede Poteat's work performance or productivity or the discharge of his duties. The Union never used the possibility of Poteat's removal as steward as leverage to get him not to file the report. On the contrary, the evidence clearly appears to point to Poteat's ineffectiveness as a steward as being the Union's sole concern, and it made no attempt to prevent Poteat from filing the report. 31 Finally, even assuming a violation of section 7116(b)(3) could be found, there are some serious questions regarding the remedy imposed by the FLRA--i.e., there is an issue concerning the legitimacy of reinstatement of Poteat to his position as steward. It is undisputed that Poteat was an ineffective steward, even before the final incident that led to his removal. On this record, it would be the utmost in wishful thinking to suppose that, if reinstated, he would become an effective steward. The FLRA does not indicate at what point after reinstatement the Union would be justified in removing Poteat. If the removal of Poteat was tainted by his having reported the incident of patient abuse, when would this taint disappear? We are concerned that the FLRA's order, in effect, eliminates the Union's ability to remove an ineffective steward. The implications of this for labor-management relations are obvious and important.