Opinion ID: 2996711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Corliss Hepburn

Text: As we discussed above, for us to enforce the Board’s order as to each individual employee, substantial evidence must support the Board’s conclusion that the decisionmaker who discharged the employee knew that the fired employee was involved in protected activities. As to Corliss Hepburn, the Board adopted the ALJ’s opinion regarding this element of 9 Inexplicably, the ALJ wrote that “Christine Smith testified that she had no problems with [Iaci] during the several months prior to August 1997.” The transcript of Smith’s testimony, as we have discussed at length, shows otherwise. Smith’s testimony was that, during the several months before August 1997, she had documented numerous instances in which Iaci had filed false reports. Smith also testified that she had told Iaci “[t]hat he needed to make sure that doing the ethical thing” was the way that he improved his performance record. Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 25 the prima facie case. We therefore look to the ALJ’s decision in search of substantial evidence that the decisionmaker, who in this case was Ralph Graettinger, knew that Hepburn was involved with the Union before he decided to discharge her. The ALJ provided three reasons for concluding that the element of knowledge existed: (1) Hepburn’s attendance and remarks at the meeting held during the week of February 23, 1998; (2) the “widespread belief” that Hepburn was the author of the unsigned letter that Joe Fowler had written and circulated in late February 1998, just before the union election; and (3) “Graettinger’s reaction to Hepburn’s mention of the Union after her discharge.” We begin by emphasizing again that the dispositive inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the view that the decisionmaker knew of the employee’s union activities. Regarding the ALJ’s first reason for finding the element of knowledge, Hepburn’s remarks at the meeting held during the week of February 23, 1998, the ALJ wrote that “[t]he fact that Hepburn made remarks at the mid-February 1998 meeting called by Respondent [i.e., Sears] and addressed by Charlie Young which would be construed as critical of Respondent is sufficient to show that Respondent had notice of her pro-union sentiments. . . . In addition, the fact that she and Richardson were both assigned to attend the Respondent-called meeting at which all the employees were Union supporters is also persuasive [sic] that Respondent knew that they were both Union supporters.” Hepburn’s remarks are relevant to the issue of knowledge only to the extent that they show that the decisionmaker, Graettinger, was aware of Hepburn’s protected activities. Vulcan, 219 F.3d at 685. For the ALJ to focus simply on the question of whether “Respondent,” i.e., Sears, knew of Hepburn’s comments was therefore not a reasonable application of the statute. For purposes of the prima facie case under §§ 158(a)(1) and (a)(3), an employer can only be said to 26 Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 know of the employee’s protected activities through the decisionmaker. See id. As to Graettinger, the decisionmaker who fired Hepburn, nothing in the ALJ’s opinion (or the record, as far as we can tell) provides any indication that he knew that Hepburn made any pro-union comments at the meeting. Hepburn’s testimony was that Graettinger made an appearance at the meeting only after she had finished speaking. Hepburn’s comments at the meeting, therefore, cannot constitute substantial evidence that Graettinger knew that she had engaged in protected acts. We also observe that no evidence cited in the ALJ’s opinion suggests that Graettinger was aware of the fact that employees attending the meeting were, ipso facto, in favor of the Union. Moreover, even if Graettinger had known that employees attending the meeting were sympathetic to the Union, that knowledge alone would not constitute substantial evidence that Graettinger knew that Hepburn was engaged in a protected activity. Sections 158(a)(1) and (a)(3) protect, as we discussed earlier, employees’ rights to engage in union activities. Van Vlerah Mechanical, Inc., 130 F.3d at 1262. There is no evidence that any employee’s attendance at the meeting was such an activity. Rather, as the General Counsel himself characterizes it, the meeting was a “mandatory anti-union meeting.” An employee’s compelled attendance at an antiunion meeting is not an activity that §§ 158(a)(1) and (a)(3) protect. Because Hepburn’s compelled attendance at the meeting was not protected activity, Graettinger’s ostensible knowledge of her attendance and of the pro-union sympathies of the employees present is irrelevant. We turn next to the second reason the ALJ gave for finding the element of knowledge regarding Hepburn: the “widespread belief” that Hepburn was the author of the unsigned letter that Joe Fowler had written and circulated Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 27 in late February 1998, just before the representation election. The ALJ points to no direct evidence that Graettinger himself shared this belief; instead, she implicitly imputed to Graettinger the “widespread belief” that others at the plant held. However, the only evidence to which the ALJ points in support of her conclusion is the testimony of Sandra Smith. The ALJ wrote that “Sandra Smith testified that she believed at the time that Corliss Hepburn was the author of the letter, and that she believed this opinion was widespread throughout Plantation.” After a thorough review of the transcript of Sandra Smith’s testimony, however, it is apparent that Smith said nothing of the kind. In reality, Smith testified that (1) she did not know who wrote the letter and (2) “there was a whole lot of gossip going . . . “, at which point her testimony was interrupted. Her earlier reference in her testimony about “gossip” referred to rumors about the letter and union organization in general. Smith said nothing about any “gossip” that Hepburn was supposedly the letter’s author. It is perplexing that the ALJ concluded that Sandra Smith had testified that there was a “widespread belief” that Hepburn wrote the unsigned letter. That finding was not supported by any evidence, much less substantial evidence. We now turn to the third and final reason that the ALJ found the element of knowledge regarding Hepburn: “Graettinger’s reaction to Hepburn’s mention of the Union after her discharge.” The ALJ reasoned as follows: Graettinger’s reaction to Hepburn’s mention of the Union after her discharge, his lack of any expression of surprise or any denial, and especially his smile, all support the finding that he was well aware of her union activities. The fact that a manager would smile at an employee whom he had just discharged and who was obviously very upset is inexplicable unless it is inter28 Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 preted as a smile of triumph responding directly to Hepburn’s remark that she was being fired because of the Union. I find that Graettinger’s smile was, in fact, a response to Hepburn’s accusation that she had been fired because of her union activities. I find, furthermore, that this reaction was an indication that not only was Graettinger well aware of Hepburn’s union activities, but also that he was delighted with the accomplishment of his unlawful action. In short, the ALJ reasoned that Graettinger’s smile, in conjunction with his failure to react or protest in the face of Hepburn’s remark that he fired her because of her union activities, leads inexorably to the inference that Graettinger knew of Hepburn’s protected acts. The problem with this reasoning is that it has no evidentiary support. Only Hepburn and Graettinger were in on this conversation. Hepburn’s version of the discussion was that the two spoke at the back door of the Plantation facility, as Graettinger was escorting Hepburn from the building. According to Hepburn’s testimony, she said “Ralph, I know why you’re doing this. It’s because of my involvement with the Union.” As Hepburn recounted the situation, Graettinger then “said, no, the Union has nothing to do with it, with a smile on his face.” Graettinger, by contrast, testified that Hepburn had not accused him of firing her for union activities and that he had not smiled at her. There are thus two permissible views of the evidence: (1) Graettinger smiled and denied Hepburn’s accusation that he discharged her for protected activities; or (2) Hepburn did not make the accusation and Graettinger did not smile. Although she supposedly credited Hepburn’s testimony, the ALJ came up with a third scenario, that Hepburn made the accusation and that “Graettinger did not answer, but smiled at Hepburn.” No evidence, let alone substantial evidence, supports that factual conclusion. Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 29 Hepburn did indicate that Graettinger smiled, but the ALJ did not reason that the smile, by itself, proved Graettinger’s knowledge; she found that a smile in the context of Graettinger’s silent response to Hepburn’s accusation established knowledge. But it was not a silent response. Hepburn quoted Graettinger as saying, “No, the union has nothing to do with it . . . .” Still, the ALJ concluded he lacked any expression of surprise “or denial.” (Emphasis added.) After ignoring his reported denial, the ALJ then concentrated on a motive for the smile. As the attorney for the General Counsel conceded during oral argument, the smile was “not at all critical to her [the ALJ’s] finding.” We nonetheless note that Graettinger’s smile, by itself, would have been too slender a reed upon which to find either knowledge or animus. See Staats and Staats, Inc., 254 NLRB 888, 894-95 (1981) (holding that the fact that a manager saw an employee smile at a notice for a representation election was not sufficient evidence of that manager’s knowledge of the employee’s pro-union sentiment). Yet, somehow, the ALJ concluded that “especially his smile” supported the finding that Graettinger was well aware of Hepburn’s union activities. The ALJ characterized it as “a smile of triumph,” indicating that “he was delighted with the accomplishment of his unlawful action.” The ALJ injected all of this psychoanalysis into Hepburn’s simple statement that Graettinger “had a smile on his face.” It is a stretch of the ALJ’s imagination, however, to find that Graettinger’s smile can only be explained by the inference that he knew of Hepburn’s union activities and was “delighted” to have fired her for those acts. People smile for many reasons. In Graettinger’s case, his smile may have reflected consternation that Hepburn had accused him of breaking the law. Or perhaps Graettinger did smile in triumph, because he was happy to be discharging an employee who, in his mind, was a thief. Or maybe he was 30 Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 just nervous, or relieved that the incident was over. See Paradise Post, 297 NLRB 876, 877 (1990). Since he smiled, according to Hepburn, while saying “No, the union has nothing to do with it,” perhaps he was showing some empathy for the predicament she had created. The fact is, we do not know why Graettinger smiled when Hepburn accused him of violating the law (if, indeed, he smiled at all), and neither does the ALJ. We are certain, however, that the ALJ was incorrect when she reasoned a manager’s smile in such circumstances compels the inference that the manager was aware of union activities. See id. (reasoning that “[t]he fact that Brown was smiling does not compel the inference that Brown was not upset”). There is an alternate reason that substantial evidence does not support the element of knowledge regarding Hepburn. All three factual predicates upon which the ALJ found knowledge share one determinative flaw: the ALJ did not rely upon substantial evidence indicating that any one of them had occurred before Graettinger decided to fire Hepburn. Knowledge of union activities is relevant only insofar as it allows the factfinder to conclude that the employer’s adverse decision could have been motivated by that knowledge. See NLRB v. Advance Transp. Co., 965 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that the court must determine “if there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that the General Counsel met his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Advance’s decision to terminate Tuffs and Bauldry was motivated in any way by animus toward their protected activity”). Thus, where substantial evidence shows that the decisionmaker learned of the employee’s union activities on Monday, and decided to fire that employee on Tuesday, the ALJ could find that the element of knowledge existed; conversely, where the decisionmaker decided to fire the employee on Monday, but substantial evidence shows that he did not learn of that Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 31 worker’s union activities until Tuesday, the element of knowledge could not be met, because a decisionmaker cannot be motivated by what he has yet to learn. This case is analogous to the latter scenario. The ALJ found as a matter of fact that Graettinger “immediately sought permission to discharge” Hepburn and Richardson as soon as he learned about Richardson’s incorrect report that a service flash covered Hepburn’s refrigerator. The ALJ did not make a finding as to the particular day on which Graettinger “immediately” decided to fire the two. The evidence, which the ALJ did not address, shows that Graettinger almost certainly learned of the service-flash incident by February 19, 1998. Richardson’s supervisor, Pat McLaughlin, testified that he had discovered Richardson’s false report on “either the 18th or 19th, more than likely” and that he and support manager Horacio Villazon then reported the problem to Graettinger on the same day that he uncovered it. Villazon, for his part, testified that McLaughlin had alerted him about Richardson’s false report on February 19 and that they had reported the matter to Graettinger on the same day. There is, as far as we discern, no contrary evidence in the record. We now turn to the dates on which, according to the ALJ, Graettinger learned of Hepburn’s protected activity. First, there is the company-mandated antiunion meeting at which Hepburn spoke in favor of the Union. Without discussing any of the evidence as to the meeting’s date, the ALJ found that meeting occurred in “mid-February.” “MidFebruary” is an elastic term that does not really tell us whether the meeting occurred before February 19. Most of the witnesses who testified as to the meeting’s date, however, recalled it as having been within one week of the representation election, which was held on Friday, February 27. Hepburn testified that the meeting “was the week before 32 Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 the election.” Graettinger testified that the meeting that Hepburn attended was held “about mid week” during the week of February 27. Joe Hofer, a co-worker of Hepburn’s and a fellow supporter of the Union, testified that the meeting was held within a week before the election. The only evidence to the contrary, as far as our own review of the record indicates, is that of Cordy Richardson. Richardson testified that the meeting was in early to mid-February. Had the ALJ explained why she found credible the part of Richardson’s testimony that placed the meeting in midFebruary and, arguably, before February 19 (as opposed to the part of his testimony suggesting that the meeting was in early February), and why she found incredible the testimony of Hepburn, Hofer, and Graettinger that the meeting was held no more than a week before the election (and thus after February 19), we would likely hold that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the antiunion meeting happened in mid-February, and prior to Graettinger’s decision to fire Hepburn. As we stated earlier, the ALJ’s credibility determinations are entitled to particular deference. The ALJ, however, never explained why she rejected the weight of the evidence and found that the antiunion-meeting happened early enough to have influenced Graettinger’s decision to fire Hepburn. That is not good enough. Even when the record contains some evidence that could conceivably have supported an ALJ’s finding, the substantial evidence standard is not met if the ALJ does not discuss, or even provide a citation to, that evidence. Scivally v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that “the ALJ must minimally articulate his reasons for crediting or rejecting” evidence). We hold that no substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s implicit finding that the February meeting occurred early enough to have influenced Graettinger’s decision to discharge Hepburn. Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 33 We next consider the unsigned letter that Joe Fowler circulated. Although the letter is dated February 20, the ALJ found that it was “widely circulated at Plantation in midFebruary.” The only evidence the ALJ mentions regarding this conclusion is Fowler’s testimony that he had drafted the letter “a few weeks before the election.” That Fowler drafted the letter a few weeks before the election (which was held on February 27), however, does not lead to the conclusion that the letter was necessarily distributed before Graettinger decided to fire Hepburn (by February 19). The evidence, as far as we can discern, supports the contrary conclusion, that Fowler’s letter was not distributed until the week before the election (which, as we have discussed, was almost certainly after Graettinger had made up his mind to terminate Hepburn’s employment). The letter itself is dated February 20, 1998. Hepburn testified that she received the letter “at or around the time” of the mandatory antiunion meeting. There is, as far as we can tell, no substantial evidence showing that Fowler’s letter was circulated early enough in February to have influenced Graettinger’s decision to fire Hepburn. We next address the third and final reason that the ALJ found knowledge regarding Hepburn: Graettinger’s reaction to Hepburn’s accusation of anti-union animus immediately after he officially fired her on March 6, 1998. If Graettinger decided to fire Hepburn “immediately” upon learning in February of the service-flash incident, then nothing Hepburn told him about her protected activity in March could have influenced his decision. To the extent that Graettinger’s reaction could reasonably be construed as an admission that he had known of Hepburn’s protected activities all along, it would constitute substantial evidence of knowledge. Here, however, there is no evidence that Graettinger could have known of Hepburn’s union activities until March 6, which was almost three weeks after he had 34 Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 made the decision to terminate her employment, and the reaction of Graettinger to Hepburn’s accusation is too amorphous to support the inference that he knew of Hepburn’s union activity when he made the decision to terminate in February. As discussed above, Graettinger’s smile and denial that he had fired Hepburn because of the Union does not constitute substantial evidence that he knew of Hepburn’s protected acts when he made his decision on February 18 or 19. The ALJ did not make findings of fact, grounded in the record, as to the chronological relationship between Graettinger’s decision to fire Hepburn and the events that (in the ALJ’s mind) showed that Graettinger knew of Hepburn’s union activities. Had she done so, she probably would have realized that those three events happened (if they happened at all) only after Graettinger decided, on February 18 or 19, to discharge Hepburn “immediately” upon learning of the service-flash incident. For the purposes of this appeal, it is enough to say that the ALJ did not rely on substantial evidence showing that Graettinger knew of Hepburn’s union activities when he decided to fire her. Our own review of the evidence indicates that Graettinger probably was ignorant of Hepburn’s protected acts, or at least the three ostensibly-protected acts that the ALJ identified, when he discharged Hepburn. Because Graettinger’s decision to fire Hepburn could not have been motivated by what he had yet to discover, none of the three reasons that the ALJ gave for concluding that Graettinger knew of Hepburn’s union activities is substantial evidence of the element of knowledge. Nos. 02-2504 & 02-2651 35