Opinion ID: 1856724
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: act charged done to prevent a legal harm

Text: ¶ 20. To meet the requirements of this element McMillan must have shown that the act charged (trespass) was done to prevent a legal harm (illegal activity). The majority states that [McMillan] did not seek to prevent a legal harm. The majority relies upon Hill v. State, 688 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1996), and the cases cited therein [3] as authority for their decision. In these cases, the defendants' activities were carried out in an effort to prevent legal abortions, or to educate women about the effects of legal abortion. ¶ 21. All the courts who have considered this issue have held that the necessity defense is not applicable in abortion protest cases based on either or both of the following premises: (1) abortion is a constitutionally protected right and a legal activity that cannot be used to justify an illegal activity (such as trespass); (2) other legal alternatives (door-to-door solicitation, leaflets, advertisements, etc.) are available to accomplish the goal of educating women regarding abortions or persuading women not to have abortions. ¶ 22. In reaching their decision, the majority accepts the proposition that because abortion is a constitutionally protected right under Roe v. Wade , it is a legal activity that as a matter of law cannot be a harm used to invoke the necessity defense. However, the facts of this case differ considerably from those in the cases relied upon by the majority. In the case sub judice, McMillan claims that her efforts were necessary to prevent illegal abortions from occurring at that clinic on that particular morning. ¶ 23. Several of the cases which have held in the same manner as the majority holds today, specifically point out that the defendants made no claim that illegal abortions were being performed. City of Wichita v. Tilson, 253 Kan. 285, 855 P.2d 911, 913 (1993) (There was no evidence introduced, and no claim has been made by the defendant, that the abortions performed by the Clinic were illegal or that the Clinic was operating in any illegal manner.) (emphasis added); State v. Thomas, 103 N.C. App. 264, 405 S.E.2d 214, 216 (1991) (Since there was no evidence at the defendants' trial that the clinic was performing or about to perform illegal abortions, it is implicit that the `evil' which the defendants sought to avoid by blocking the clinic's entrances was nonexistent.) (emphasis added); State v. Clowes, 310 Or. 686, 801 P.2d 789, 791 (1990) (Defendants do not assert that the clinic was unlicensed or otherwise failed to comply with any applicable law.); Erlandson v. State, 763 S.W.2d 845, 852 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (Nothing in appellants' bills of exception tends to show that the clinic's staff or its patrons were acting other than within the constitutionally recognized principles which permit abortion.). Additionally, in People v. Archer, 143 Misc.2d 390, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 (N.Y.City Ct. 1988), the court allowed the defense of necessity on the condition that the jury found that illegal abortions were being performed. Roe prohibits the State statutory necessity defense whenever there are intentional interruptions which interfere with the performance of first trimester abortions... . Accordingly, the Court will instruct the Jury that the defendants can present and argue the defense of necessity so long as the Jury finds that the [clinic] was about to perform other than first trimester abortions [on the day of the trespass]. People v. Archer, 143 Misc.2d 390, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726, 734-35 (N.Y.City Ct. 1988). ¶ 24. Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa.Super. 341, 541 A.2d 347 (1988), Judge Tamilia maintains that the necessity defense may apply to late-term abortions and thus appellants should have been allowed to present supporting evidence. He admits that the proof may not be forthcoming, despite the offer, but that the appellant should have the opportunity to invoke the justification defense in respect to the viability standard utilized by the clinic and the likelihood that viable fetuses might be aborted. Commonwealth v. Markum, 373 Pa.Super. 341, 541 A.2d 347, 354-56 (1988) (Tamilia, J., dissenting). ¶ 25. McMillan's counsel indicated that they had evidence and testimony to show that it was reasonable for McMillan to believe that viable fetuses were being aborted at the Mississippi Women's Clinic on the day she trespassed. This information is relevant in determining whether the first element has been met since there is no constitutional right to abort a viable fetus. In Casey, the United States Supreme Court noted, [t]he woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability is the most central principle of Roe v. Wade .  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2817, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (emphasis added). Neither Roe nor Casey held that any constitutional right to abortion exists once a fetus is viable. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). On the contrary, any injury or killing of a viable fetus must carry the presumption of illegality. In fact, a Mississippi statute specifically prohibits the killing of an unborn quick child. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-37 (1994). ¶ 26. Additionally, the State Department of Health is required by law to promulgate and enforce rules, regulations, and standards in relation to abortion facilities. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-75-13 (Supp. 1997). In accordance with this statutory authority, the Department has issued regulations prohibiting the performance of an abortion beyond the sixteenth (16th) week of pregnancy, in an abortion facility. Minimum Standards of Operation for Abortion Facilities, Mississippi State Department of Health (amd. 1996). Anyone found to be in violation of these regulations is subject to license revocation and if the violation is by intent, fraud, deceit, unlawful design, willful and/or deliberate misrepresentation, or by careless, negligent or incautious disregard ... shall constitute a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine not to exceed One Thousand Dollars ($1,000) for each such offense. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-75-26 (1994). ¶ 27. This Court has declared that [i]t is, of course, an absolute right of an accused to have every lawful defense he asserts, even though based upon meager evidence and highly unlikely, to be submitted as a factual issue to be determined by a jury under proper instruction of the court. O'Bryant v. State, 530 So.2d 129, 133 (Miss. 1988). ¶ 28. This Court will never permit an accused to be denied this fundamental right. Id. at 133 ( citing Ward v. State, 479 So.2d 713 (Miss. 1985); Lancaster v. State, 472 So.2d 363 (Miss. 1985); Pierce v. State, 289 So.2d 901 (Miss. 1974)). This Court has also identified the only basis on which an accused should be denied instruction on a defense. Our familiar rule, of course, provides that whether an issue should be submitted to the jury is determined by whether there is evidence which, if believed by the jury, could result in resolution of the issue in favor of the party requesting the instruction. Conversely, only where the evidence is so one-sided that no reasonable juror could find for the requesting party on the issue at hand may the trial court deny an instruction on a material issue. Phillips v. State, 493 So.2d 350, 353 (Miss. 1986) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Additionally, [t]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. Nassar v. Concordia Rod & Gun Club, Inc., 682 So.2d 1035, 1042 (Miss. 1996) (quoting Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983)). ¶ 29. McMillan's only defense was that her actions were necessary to prevent illegal abortions. Whether or not illegal abortions were taking place is a question of fact not a matter of law. Thus, in keeping with this Court's previous holdings (ensuring McMillan's absolute right of asserting a lawful defense and viewing the information in the light most favorable to McMillan), McMillan should have been allowed to present her only defense, even if it were meager and highly unlikely, to the jury for a factual determination of whether legal harm existed. ¶ 30. The primary purpose of [a motion in limine] is to exclude evidence highly prejudicial to the movant. Gifford v. Four-County Elec. Power Ass'n, 615 So.2d 1166, 1171-72 (Miss. 1992). Before granting a motion in limine, courts must be certain that such action will not unduly restrict opposing party's presentation of its case. Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So.2d 1341, 1344 (Miss. 1988) (citation omitted). The use of a motion in limine against a defendant in a criminal case    is questionable considering the constitutional rights of defendants. State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (Randall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). ¶ 31. The evidence McMillan proposed to present was relevant as to whether or not illegal activity was occurring, which was essential to establish a material element of the necessity defense. Likewise, the testimony McMillan proposed would not have been highly prejudicial to the movant. The prosecution had several methods available to solicit information in support of their position. Direct examination of clinic employees, cross examination of defense witnesses and jury instructions were available to ensure the prosecution's theory of the case was presented to the jury. However, because the motion in limine was granted McMillan had no method to present her theory of the case to the jury. ¶ 32. The present case is not analogous to the situations in the cases relied upon by the majority where the defendants were trying to stop a legal abortion. In those cases it naturally follows that if the activity they were attempting to prevent is legal there is no imminent harm as a matter of law. However, where the defendant proposes to present evidence of an illegal activity the court cannot say as a matter of law there is no imminent harm. Where evidence of illegal activity is proposed, that evidence must be weighed to determine if the defendant has met his burden of proof and offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that the activity is legal or illegal. Whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that an illegal activity was taking place is a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of law to be decided by the court.