Opinion ID: 6325241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Wilkins

Text: We begin with E.W.’s claim against Officer Wilkins for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures protects citizens from excessive force by law enforcement officers. Latits, 878 F.3d at 547 (citing Godawa, 798 F.3d at 463). The Fourth Amendment requires that the amount of force used to effectuate a seizure be “objectively reasonable” under the totality of the circumstances. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The court considers the situation at the moment force is used, “judged from the -6- Case No. 20-1790, E.W., et al. v. Detroit Public School District, et al. perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. While this inquiry into the totality of the circumstances is wide-ranging, three factors are particularly important: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. We have held that these standards govern the use of force by a police officer in the school setting. See, e.g., Williams v. Morgan, 652 F. App'x 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2016) (applying Graham factors to conclude a school resource officer used excessive force by breaking a student’s arm in response to the student’s misbehavior). Taking the facts in the light most favorable to E.W. as we must, all of those factors suggest that Wilkins’s use of force against E.W. was unreasonable. Wilkins had witnessed E.W. twice violate a school rule regarding which door to enter. He did not suspect E.W. of any crime. The first factor “thus cuts against a finding of justified use of force because there was no probable cause that [E.W.] had committed any crime at all” before Wilkins applied force. Wright, 962 F.3d at 867. Second, on E.W.’s version of the facts, he posed no threat to Wilkins or others. There were multiple security officers present, and Wilkins was an adult man significantly larger than E.W. Wilkins himself testified that he never saw E.W. strike or threaten Montgomery. Neither E.W.’s nor Wilkins’s version of events suggests that E.W. took any action to indicate that he wanted to strike or threaten Wilkins. Thus, on E.W.’s version of the facts, he posed no threat. Third, material disputes of fact exist as to whether E.W. was resisting at the time of Wilkins’s use of force. On E.W.’s account, he was standing still and was outside the school doors when Wilkins confronted him. Wilkins contends that E.W. verbally resisted Wilkins and that E.W. -7- Case No. 20-1790, E.W., et al. v. Detroit Public School District, et al. was running at the school doors when he was struck. But because we must take the facts in the light most favorable to E.W., we must conclude that E.W. was not resisting when Wilkins struck E.W. Taken together, on E.W.’s version of the facts, Wilkins’s use of force was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. E.W. was not suspected of any serious crime, was not posing a threat at the time he was struck and was not resisting arrest. On those facts, Wilkins’s striking E.W. with such force as to break his jaw is gratuitous violence amounting to unreasonably excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. See Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 311 (6th Cir. 2009) (use of force was unreasonable as applied to nonresistant arrestee suspected of a minor crime). E.W.’s right to be free from such violence was also clearly established at the time of Wilkins’s actions. A defendant is entitled to qualified immunity “so long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). “[E]xisting precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate,” though there does not need to be “a case directly on point.” RivasVillegas v. Cortesluna, 142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021) (quoting White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017)). On E.W.’s facts, he was not resisting (or indeed under) arrest, did not pose a threat to Wilkins or anyone else, and was not suspected of a crime when Wilkins swung at E.W. and broke his jaw. Thus, a reasonable officer in Wilkins’s position would have been on notice that he was violating E.W.’s Fourth Amendment rights. We very recently held that “[w]ell before [June 2016], our precedent had ‘clearly establish[ed] the right of people who pose no safety risk to the police to -8- Case No. 20-1790, E.W., et al. v. Detroit Public School District, et al. be free from gratuitous violence during arrest.’” Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., 25 F.4th 391, 403 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2022) (quoting Shreve v. Jessamine Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 452 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir. 2006)). Wilkins urges us to weigh the facts differently. He asks us to consider E.W.’s purported verbal resistance as the sort of active resistance to arrest that might justify his use of force. He also quibbles with the district court’s characterization of his straight-armed forearm strike as a “punch,” and disputes the accusation that he swung at E.W. But this account is disputed by E.W.’s version of the facts, and we must view these facts in the light most favorable to E.W. These factual disputes are for a jury to resolve, not for us to consider on interlocutory appeal.