Opinion ID: 179075
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Common Sense Approach to Determining Similarity

Text: We first address the test for determining similarity as used in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). Before 2007, there was disagreement among the circuits (and even within our own circuit) about what test courts should apply in this context. See generally Lopez-Pastrana, 244 F.3d at 1027-30 & nn. 2-3. One of the two broad tests articulated by the Ninth Circuit, which was similar to the common sense test used by the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, [i]n essence defined similar to on the basis of the underlying seriousness of the offense. Id. at 1027 & n. 2. The other test, which was similar to the elements test used in the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, defined similar to with reference only to `whether the activity underlying [the prior offense] is similar to the activities underlying the listed offenses.' Id. at 1027 & n. 3 (quoting United States v. Martinez, 69 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir.1995)). In 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission responded by promulgating Application Note 12 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, in which the Commission explicitly adopted the common sense test employed by the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12 (2009); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual supp. to app. C at 240 (2009); United States v. Martinez-Santos, 184 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.1999); United States v. Booker, 71 F.3d 685 (7th Cir.1995); Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 281. Application Note 12 provides In determining whether an unlisted offense is similar to an [enumerated] offense ... the court should use a common sense approach that includes consideration of relevant factors such as (i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses; (ii) the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment; (iii) the elements of the offense; (iv) the level of culpability involved; and (v) the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A) (2009). Although the guidelines themselves are advisory only, the applicable guidelines sentence must be calculated correctly. See, e.g., Carty, 520 F.3d at 993. Commentary in the Application Notes interpreting or explaining a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993); Bays, 589 F.3d at 1037. In determining the similarity of prior and enumerated offenses, we are therefore guided by Application Note 12 to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c), and so apply the common sense approach. Both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have employed this approach in addressing whether the crime of criminal mischief (or, in the case of the Seventh Circuit, criminal damage to property) is similar to disorderly conduct. In United States v. Reyes-Maya, 305 F.3d 362, 366-67 (5th Cir.2002), the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, began by noting that a comparison of the authorized statutory punishments demonstrated that the offense of criminal mischief can be more serious than the offense of disorderly conduct, but that [m]ore important than the statutory range of punishments is the actual punishment given. [1] The Fifth Circuit also observed that a comparison of the statutory elements of the two crimes shows both similarity and difference, but that [t]he fact that the elements are somewhat different is not dispositive, because the different elements do not necessarily make criminal mischief a more serious offense than disorderly conduct. Id. at 367. (citing Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 281). Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, given the similarity in punishments between Appellant's criminal mischief conviction and disorderly conduct and ... the small fine Appellant received suggest[ing] low culpability and low predictiveness of future criminal conduct, criminal mischief under Texas law was similar to the enumerated crime of disorderly conduct. Id. at 368. Therefore, the district court had erred by counting Reyes-Maya's criminal mischief conviction. Id. In Booker, 71 F.3d at 690-91, the Seventh Circuit similarly concluded that, given the particular circumstances of Booker's prior conviction for damage to property under Illinois law, that crime was similar to the enumerated crime of disorderly conduct. The Seventh Circuit began by observing that a comparison of the two offenses was complicated by the fact that both offenses are crimes of generic definition that proscribe a great variety of activity and, depending on type of behavior involved, can be classified as a minor misdemeanor or a felony. Id. at 689. [T]ak[ing] counsel from our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit concluded that it should instead focus not so much on the elements of each offense or on the possible range of punishments in abstracto, but rather on the actual offense conduct and the actual penalty deemed appropriate by the sentencing court. Id. (citing United States v. Kemp, 938 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir.1991)). For breaking a window at his girlfriend's apartment, Booker had been sentenced to one month's supervisiona light sentence that militate[d] strongly in favor of treating the crime for purposes of this guideline provision as akin to a relatively minor breach of the peace. Id. at 689-90. Emphasizing that its decision does not preclude a contrary result when the circumstances surrounding the commission of the damage to property offense are different, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Booker's conviction for criminal damage to property was a minor petty offense similar to disorderly conduct and of the sort meant to be excluded under § 4A1.2(c)(1). Id. at 690-91.