Opinion ID: 2980662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fees Incurred in O’Brien

Text: In its attempt to comply with our directive to provide adequately detailed billing records on remand, Ferron submitted to the district court the same invoice that accompanied its initial application for fees. The district court noted that Ferron had not amended the actual Invoice to include only those time entries that directly benefit [Appellants]. Rather, [Ferron] has created a 124-page Index that is derived from the original Invoice. It essentially cuts a few lines from the Invoice and randomly discounts a few entries, but still includes numerous entries that do not even remotely benefit [Appellants]. . . . The Index does not further clarify [the inadequacies previously identified in the Invoice], but rather is just derivative of what appears on the Invoice. The Court is therefore unable to determine the exact amount of attorneys’ fees that benefitted [Appellants] as instructed by the Sixth Circuit. . . The Court finds that [Ferron’s] Invoice lacks sufficient detail to review the reasonableness of the hours expended that benefit [Appellants]. Further, the intermingling of the time entries, in combination with the lack of detail, make it impossible to distinguish the tasks within each entry that benefit [Appellants]. The district court acknowledged that Ferron had “deleted a few entries as not benefitting the Dellarussiani Plaintiffs,” but found that it had “not nearly excluded enough.” For instance, Ferron sought to recover time spent on unsuccessful motions in O’Brien and on motions that pertained only to the claims of O’Brien plaintiffs who were not parties to the instant case. Additionally, the court rejected as inadequate Ferron’s “generic statement[s] that the work performed benefits the Dellarussiani Plaintiffs,” as these statements failed to describe the work that Ferron actually -7- Nos. 10-3836/10-3901 Dellarussiani, et al., v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., et al. performed. The court concluded that the non-specific nature of Ferron’s billing entries made it impossible to simply “subtract the number of hours that did not benefit the Dellarussiani Plaintiffs.” Thus, the court fashioned what it determined to be an appropriate formula for calculating the fees Ferron could recover for work performed in O’Brien. The court started with the assumption “that the general descriptions on the Invoice were for all 38 original O’Brien plaintiffs.” Considering that Appellants constituted six of the thirty-eight O’Brien plaintiffs, the court ordered a proportional award—sixteen percent, or roughly six thirty-eighths—of the O’Brien fees sought. Having reviewed the invoice and the Index, we agree with the district court’s characterization of Ferron’s submissions. Each billing entry on the thirty-one page O’Brien invoice is supplemented by a corresponding “explanation” in the Index. We note, initially, that the Index does not provide additional evidence, as we requested, to support the fees Ferron sought in the O’Brien matter. Rather, as EDE pointed out to the district court, the Index contains Ferron’s arguments, which attempt to characterize various billing entries in ways that show at least a tangential relationship to the claims of Appellants in the instant case. The generic descriptions in the Index, however, shed little or no light on the particular work that each billing entry represents. We agree with the district court, therefore, that it is impossible to determine if or how the work represented by those billing entries furthered the claims of Appellants, or even if the amount of time billed for each entry is reasonable. Moreover, given that there is no supporting documentation to substantiate Ferron’s attempt to supplement vague descriptions of work performed as much as five years ago, we are skeptical about the reliability of the explanations in the Index. -8- Nos. 10-3836/10-3901 Dellarussiani, et al., v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., et al. Despite these deficiencies, and consonant with our conclusion that the FLSA was not an absolute bar to the recovery of some portion of the fees generated in O’Brien, the district court endeavored to award Ferron what it determined to be a reasonable proportion of those fees. If Ferron believed it was entitled to recover a greater fee award, it was incumbent upon the firm to produce adequate proof that the fees sought specifically benefitted Appellants. Ferron’s failure to do so was to its detriment. The district court concluded that the evidence Ferron presented was inadequate to justify the fees sought. The court considered the evidence before it and articulated a logical rationale for its calculation of fees. This was not an abuse of discretion. We likewise reject EDE’s argument that the district court erred in awarding any fees for Ferron’s work in O’Brien. EDE contends that the district court “was required to award fees only where there was a specific showing of benefit to [Appellants],” and points out that the district court’s order repeatedly noted that Ferron’s Index did not make such a showing. Therefore, EDE argues, “upon the district court’s clear conclusion that it was unable to determine the amount of attorneys’ fees that related to [Appellants], it should have denied [Ferron’s] application in its entirety, and its award of fees contrary to this Court’s directive was an abuse of discretion.” We disagree. When determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee, courts consider a myriad of factors “in light of the congressional policy underlying the substantive portions of the statute providing for the award of fees.” United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Ass’n, Local 307 v. G & M Roofing and Sheet Metal Co., 732 F.2d 495, 501 (6th Cir. 1984). The FLSA was enacted to “eliminate labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard [of] living for workers.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The availability of attorneys’ fees under the -9- Nos. 10-3836/10-3901 Dellarussiani, et al., v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., et al. FLSA reflects the congressional intent that these policies be vindicated and that workers have effective access to the judicial process. Id. at 502. It is true that we cautioned Ferron that it could not recover O’Brien fees absent a specific showing of benefit to Appellants. However, we also acknowledged “[t]he reality . . . that discovery concerning the Dellarussiani plaintiffs’ claims took place in O’Brien,” and it goes without saying that Ferron expended time and resources and incurred fees throughout the discovery process. Inasmuch as these efforts ultimately contributed to the judgment in Appellants’ favor—albeit, pursuant to EDE’s Offer—there undeniably was some benefit to Appellants. To preclude Ferron from recovering any of its discovery-related fees and expenses in the instant matter would not further the congressional policy underlying the FLSA and its provision for attorneys’ fees for prevailing plaintiffs. In light of these considerations, the district court’s award of a reasonable proportion of O’Brien fees was not an abuse of discretion. B. Fees Incurred on Appeal of the District Court’s First Order Ferron also argues that the district court erred in declining to award it fees “in prosecuting the Plaintiffs’ successful appeal” of the district court’s first order. In the appeal to which Ferron refers, Appellants challenged the district court’s entry of judgment on Counts One and Two of the complaint, the grant of summary judgment in favor of EDE on Count Three, and the amount of the attorneys’ fee award.6 On appeal, we upheld the district court’s disposition of Counts One and Two 6 In the same appeal, counsel also challenged several of the district court’s rulings in O’Brien. However, to the extent that any of those challenges were successful, they do not bear on our analysis of the present issue. For the purposes of the instant case, we consider only whether Appellants were successful in their appeal of the district court’s rulings in Dellarussiani. - 10 - Nos. 10-3836/10-3901 Dellarussiani, et al., v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., et al. in accordance with the Offer of Judgment. We also upheld the district court’s summary disposition of Count Three in favor of EDE. In light of our reading of the FLSA, however, we remanded the issue of attorneys’ fees to the district court, admonishing Ferron to present billing records sufficiently detailed to allow the court to calculate an appropriate award. Because we affirmed its disposition of the substantive portions of Appellants’ claims, the district court concluded that Appellants were not “prevailing parties” on appeal—at least, not as that phrase is commonly understood. Ferron was only successful in securing a second chance to submit adequate billing records so the court could determine an appropriate fee award. The district court determined that this was not an outcome that justified an award of attorneys’ fees for a “successful appeal” within the meaning of the FLSA. However, acknowledging that Ferron was at least partially successful on the issue of attorneys’ fees, the district court awarded Ferron its costs incurred on appeal. We find this resolution reasonable, and not an abuse of discretion. C. Fees Incurred on Remand Finally, Ferron argues that it was entitled to recover fees and costs incurred in “prosecuting Appellants’ claims on remand.” On remand, however, Ferron was no longer prosecuting the claims of the Dellarussiani plaintiffs. The only task with which Ferron was charged on remand was the preparation and submission of adequate billing records to reflect the time billed in O’Brien that specifically benefitted the Dellarussiani plaintiffs. The district court properly concluded that Ferron was not entitled to collect fees incurred as a result of its own inadequate billing practices. As the court noted, these fees could have been avoided entirely had the original application been sufficiently - 11 - Nos. 10-3836/10-3901 Dellarussiani, et al., v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., et al. detailed. Thus, Ferron is not entitled to a statutory award of fees for this additional expenditure of time and effort.