Opinion ID: 805640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Affidavit of Thomas Benecke

Text: During trial, Gordon moved to admit an affidavit from his deceased accountant, Thomas Benecke (“Benecke”). The district court excluded the affidavit as hearsay. In the affidavit, Benecke explained that he prepared Gordon’s personal income tax returns for 2002, 2003, and 2004. Income from the security business was not included because, according to the affidavit, Benecke planned to 9 amend the returns after he “determined the answers to several accounting questions.” Gordon contends Benecke signed the affidavit in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom was a notary public. The Government, however, counters that Gordon never produced a dated or notarized copy of the affidavit. Gordon argues that the exclusion of the affidavit prejudiced his defense because it spoke directly to his “willfulness” in violating the tax laws. Gordon argues that the affidavit was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule, FED. R. EVID. 807, because the affidavit bore circumstantial guarantees of reliability. Gordon asserts the affidavit is reliable because Benecke executed the sworn statement before two witnesses, the statement was against Benecke’s civil interests, and Benecke was in poor health and knew his death was imminent. Finally, Gordon argues that because the district court admitted letters from Benecke to Gordon it was an error to exclude the affidavit. In opposition, the Government argues that the affidavit lacked significant indicia of reliability because Gordon never produced a notarized copy. Further, Benecke died fifteen (15) months after he gave the statement, a time period that does not suggest he believed his death was imminent such that would create a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness similar to a “dying declaration.” Lastly, the Government says that Benecke gave a statement to a federal agent completely inconsistent with that affidavit. The residual exception to the rule against hearsay, FED. R. EVID. 807, provides that hearsay evidence is admissible when: 10 (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness [as the exceptions listed in FED. R. EVID. 803 & 804]; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the affidavit into evidence. Gordon’s assertion that the affidavit contained circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness has no merit. First, Gordon failed to produce at trial a dated and notarized copy of the affidavit. Second, Benecke’s knowledge of his impending death does not provide a circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness, similar to a dying declaration. Although Benecke had serious health problems, the affidavit was not written on his deathbed. Benecke’s statement was not made in the face of imminent death, nor did it relate to the cause or circumstances of his demise. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(1)-(5). Further, Gordon’s whole argument regarding the letters is patently misleading. Gordon correctly notes that the district court admitted several personal letters by Benecke into evidence, which the United States was able to us with devastating effect against Gordon’s case. He then disingenuously argues that, if unsworn personal letters by Benecke could be used against his defense, the district court should certainly have allowed in a sworn, notarized, Benecke affidavit to support the defense. But this argument is completely mendacious; it was Gordon-not the United States-who introduced Benecke’s letters. Indeed, the letters were devastating only because the United States 11 made the strategic decision not to oppose their introduction-and instead had Benecke’s widow testify that Benecke’s signature at the end of each letter was a forgery and that one of the letterheads put Benecke in an office that he did not open until a year after the date of the letter. Moreover, documents created in anticipation of litigation are presumptively less trustworthy than ordinary business records. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 111 (1943). As such, Benecke’s affidavit does not meet the criteria listed in FED. R. EVID. 807. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying admission of the affidavit into evidence.