Opinion ID: 430483
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Majority's Theory of Taking

Text: 58 In my view, the burdensomeness of the uncompensated appointments is not material to determining whether a taking has occurred in this case. This case, unlike the cases relied upon by appellants and the authorities cited by the majority, does not involve conditioning the practice of law on the acceptance of uncompensated appointed cases. Indeed, a majority of the cases dealing with such requirements have squarely held that requiring counsel to serve without compensation as a condition of being permitted to practice law does not constitute a taking. See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (8th Cir.1982); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978, 86 S.Ct. 550, 15 L.Ed.2d 469 (1966); Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488, 489-90 (Alaska 1966); MacKenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So.2d 200, 201 (Fla.1973); Weiner v. Fulton County, 133 Ga.App. 343, 148 S.E.2d 143, 147 (Ga.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S.Ct. 393, 17 L.Ed.2d 304 (1966); In re Meizlish, 387 Mich. 228, 196 N.W.2d 129, 134-35 (Mich.1972); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441, 446 (N.J.1966). 3 These cases reason, correctly, that the uncompensated representation of individuals in need constitutes an attorney's duty as an officer of the court. See Williamson v. Vardeman, supra, 674 F.2d at 1214-15. Some courts have, to be sure, relaxed this absolute obligation, reasoning that although requiring an attorney to accept uncompensated cases as a condition of practicing law does not normally violate due process, the level of appointments may rise to the level of a taking when an attorney is substantially impaired in his ability to engage in remunerative practice. See People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d 34, 219 N.E.2d 337, 341 (Ill.1966); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 295, 297-98 (Ct.App.Ky.1972); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Mo.1971) (en banc ); Honore v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms, 77 Wash.2d 660, 466 P.2d 485, 496-97 (1970) (en banc ); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 318 (W.Va.1976). 59 Although appellants contend, and the majority now holds, that they should be permitted to prove that the Family Division appointments have risen to this level of burdensomeness, this analysis is, in my judgment, inapposite inasmuch as appellants, unlike the attorneys in all of the cases in which a taking has been found, have in no wise been drafted to perform such services. By accepting compensated juvenile cases, appellants agreed each and every month to accept uncompensated neglect cases as well. Only by their voluntarily seeking compensated cases were they then required to take on uncompensated cases. Moreover, appellants made no claim that they were required to continue uncompensated representations in the face of a request to withdraw. As a matter of law, I would conclude that no level of burdensomeness could rise to the level of a taking as long as appellants have volunteered their services. In short, the element of voluntariness, which the majority fully concedes is present in this case, vitiates any fifth amendment claim of taking just as it does the even more far-fetched claim of involuntary servitude under the thirteenth amendment. 60 Although the majority concedes that proving a taking in a situation like this one is obviously a formidable task, its outline of the circumstances that would have to be shown in this case reveals that the appellants' task is not only formidable but impossible. The majority states that appellants would have to demonstrate, on remand, that the attorney's expectations of pursuing a specialty practice before the Family Division are sufficiently established within the norms and traditions of legal practice to constitute a property interest. Majority Op. at 707. It would be easier for the proverbial camel to pass through the eye of a needle than to satisfy this fanciful standard. 61 First, the notion that an attorney can have a property right in pursuing a specialty practice, as opposed to a property right in pursuing his profession, is completely without precedent. It should thus be emphatically clear that the majority has departed completely from the precincts of prior decisional law. See supra p. 713 (citing cases discussing attorneys' property right in pursuing profession). Second, even assuming that precedential support for the majority's notion exists, the majority fails to take into account the fact that the system involved here in no way prevents these attorneys from pursuing a specialty practice in the Family Division. To the contrary, only those attorneys who seek compensation from the public are even governed by the system at issue here. Finally, matters handled by the Family Division include not only child neglect and intrafamily disputes, but also juvenile matters, domestic relations, and mental health matters. See 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS 68. The majority therefore considers far too narrow a proportion of the types of cases encompassed by Family Division practice in suggesting that the number of compensated cases may be so small that withdrawing from the market of government compensated cases would effectively be a decision to withdraw from practice before the Family Division. In sum, I do not believe there is any legal basis for the majority's theory that the District of Columbia is putting Family Division lawyers to a Hobson's choice of either not working or working under such a great burden as to amount to a taking. 62 More fundamentally, this court recently has repudiated the approach advocated by the majority in defining property under the taking clause of the fifth amendment. In Kizas v. Webster, 707 F.2d 524 (D.C.Cir.1983), this court rejected a claim by FBI employees that special preferences for a training program could give rise to a property right. Id. at 539-40. In that case, the plaintiffs attempted to analogize their interest in the benefits of the training program to a property interest such as that protected from deprivation without due process procedures. Id. at 538-39. Judge Bazelon, writing for the court, squarely rejected the notion that a claim of deprivation of property, without due process of law [can] be blended as one and the same with the claim that property has been taken for public use without just compensation. Id. at 539 (emphasis in original). Yet, the majority premises the possibility of appellants' taking claim on the same erroneous analogy by seeking to import Family Division attorneys' expectations of practicing before the Family Division into its analysis of property protected by the taking clause.