Opinion ID: 2981353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Greens’ Breach of Contract Claim

Text: The Greens challenge the district court’s dismissal of their breach of contract claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Whether a complaint sufficiently states a basis for 5 relief is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering the district court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). At this early stage of litigation, a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement” showing the claimant is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement has recently been interpreted as demanding that the facts stated provide a plausible basis for the claims in the complaint. Napolitano, 648 F.3d at 369 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is plausible if the facts alleged allow a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the purported misconduct. Id. A dismissal of a complaint may be affirmed on any reasonable ground, even if the district court invoked other grounds. Ind. State Dist. Counsel of Laborers & Hod Carriers Pension & Welfare Fund v. Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 2009). “[W]e have an obligation to enforce a district court's orders if grounds for doing so are apparent from the record before us.” Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Vulcan Dev., Inc., 323 F.3d 396, 404 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Russ' Kwik Car Wash, Inc. v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 772 F.2d 214, 216 (6th Cir.1985)). The Greens argue that they are third-party intended beneficiaries of the Agreement and, therefore, the district court erred in dismissing their breach of contract claim. The Greens contend that the warranty provisions in the attachments to the Agreement provide them with third-party intended-beneficiaries status under the Agreement. However, breach of contract is a different cause of action than breach of express warranty. Thus, the Greens ask us to either elide the distinction between these causes of action or to read into their breach of contract claim a claim for breach of express warranty. 6 We decline to eliminate the distinction between the two causes of action out of respect for the balance that Pennsylvania courts have struck in providing third-party intended-beneficiary status. In dismissing the Greens case, the district court thoroughly examined the doctrine of third-party intended-beneficiary status in Pennsylvania and found that non-named third parties should only receive this status in a narrow class of cases. Flex Homes, Inc. v. Ritz-Craft Corp of Mich., Inc., No. 07cv1005, 2008 WL 746669, at  (N.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Flex I] (collecting cases). After completing this review, the district court held that the warranty at issue in this case was “not sufficient to confer the full benefits of third-party beneficiary status to [the Greens], particularly in light of the principles of Pennsylvania third-party beneficiary law . . . .” Id., at . Because the Greens have not explained a limiting principle to their argument, permitting them to claim thirdparty beneficiary status in this case would indicate that all warranty claims should be given this status. Adding a new type of action to third-party intended-beneficiary status unnecessarily broadens a class of claims which Pennsylvania courts have kept narrow. See Manor Junior College v. Keller’s Inc., 507 A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Super. 1986) (explaining that third-party intended-beneficiary status should be restricted to a “narrow class”). Rather than expanding a class that Pennsylvania courts have sought to keep narrow, it is appropriate to require a party with an express warranty claim to plead that cause of action. Thus, we will not ignore the distinction between the two types of claims. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that this is an appropriate case to read a breach of warranty claim into a claim for breach of contract. See Superior Kitchen Designs, Inc. v. Valspar Indus., Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 140, 148 (D. Mass. 2003) (“While the allegations of the complaint are construed favorably to the plaintiff, the court will not read causes of action into the complaint which are not alleged.”). The complaint in this case was submitted by an attorney who is learned in the 7 law. The complaint alleged both a breach of contract claim and a breach of implied warranty claim. When faced with Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Greens’ counsel requested permission to submit documentation of a warranty to bolster Greens’ third-party intended-beneficiary status. Flex I, 2008 WL 746669, at  n.7. At this point, counsel could have made a motion to amend the complaint to allege a breach of express warranty claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 provides that the court should freely grant this motion when justice so requires. However, counsel never took this action. Due to these decisions, we will not read a breach of express warranty claim into a claim for breach of contract. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the Greens’ breach of contract claim.