Opinion ID: 550741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Three-fourths Vote for Sentencing

Text: 28 Defendant next claims that no three-fourths vote was taken on his sentence and that the statute requires a three-fourths vote, even on mandatory sentences. The government's response that a three-fourths vote for a mandatory sentence is unnecessary appears logical at first glance. However, when we consider that the military court could refuse to impose any sentence if the required number of votes are not cast, we then understand why a separate vote is necessary for sentencing even in mandatory sentence cases. 29 Section 852(b)(2) contains a blanket requirement of a three-fourths vote for any sentence over ten years. No person may be sentenced to life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years, except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the members present at the time the vote is taken. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 852(b)(2) (1988). There is no exception to section 852(b)(2) for mandatory sentences. Nevertheless, any ambiguity in the Uniform Code of Military Justice created by the Code's requirement of a mandatory life sentence for defendant must be resolved in favor of the accused. See Jackson v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 569, 576, 77 S.Ct. 1027, 1031, 1 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1957). In this case, we must resolve any ambiguity in favor of the accused by requiring a three-fourths vote on even a mandatory sentence. 30 Strong additional authority for requiring a three-fourths vote on a mandatory sentence, and a source helpful in resolving any ambiguity in the Code, is the 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial in effect during defendant's court-martial. The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial specifically required a vote on sentencing, even in cases with mandatory sentences. 31 It is the duty of each member to vote for a proper sentence for the offense or offenses of which the accused has been found guilty, without regard to his opinion or vote as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. Any sentence, even in a case where the punishment is mandatory, must have the concurrence of the required number of members.... No person may be sentenced to life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years, except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the members present at the time the vote is taken. 32 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, p 76b(2) at 13-14 (Rev. ed. 1969) (emphasis added). 4 The Manual for Courts-Martial is written by the President of the United States under authority granted to the President by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 33 Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter. 34 10 U.S.C. Sec. 836(a) (1988). Thus, the President may prescribe rules as long as they are not inconsistent with the Uniform Code. The rule promulgated in Manual paragraph 76b(2) is not inconsistent with the Code. At worst the rule clarifies an existing ambiguity. 35 We must emphasize that the Manual for Courts-Martial has the force of statutory law. This court has affirmed a district court within our circuit that held the Manual for Courts-Martial to have the force of statutory law. Congress, by enacting Article 36, UCMJ (10 U.S.C.A. Sec. 836), granted to the President the power to prescribe rules for the military courts. Pursuant to this authority, the President by executive order prescribed the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) which has the force of statutory law. Levy v. Dillon, 286 F.Supp. 593, 596 (D.Kan.1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.1969) (emphasis added). See also Harper v. Jones, 195 F.2d 705, 707 (10th Cir.1952) (The President is authorized to make and publish regulations for the government of the army which shall be enforced and obeyed until altered or revoked by the same authority.); Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 551, 64 S.Ct. 737, 743, 88 L.Ed. 917 (1944) (War Department regulations have the force of law). The Manual--which has the force of law--specifically requires a three-fourths vote for a life sentence, even in cases of mandatory sentences. Thus, we now hold that a military court would be compelled by the Manual alone to require a three-fourths majority to sentence defendant to life imprisonment. 36 We note that our prior holding that the Manual has the force of law agrees with the holdings of the military courts themselves. As far back as 1951 the Court of Military Appeals held that [f]or the purposes of this case we can and do hold that the act of Congress (the Code) and the act of the Executive (the Manual) are on the same level and that the ordinary rules of statutory construction apply. United States v. Lucas, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951). Subsequent military court cases have consistently upheld the Manual as having the force of law. 37 Similar to its grant of authority to the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in Federal civilian cases, which have the force of statutory law, the Congress, by Article 36 of the Code, supra, 10 USC Sec. 836, granted to the President the parallel power to make such rules for the military courts. 38 Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399, 403 (1967).Article 36(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 836(a), empowers the President to prescribe rules of procedure for cases before courts-martial. Pursuant thereto he has promulgated the Manual. His authority in that regard is limited only by the requirement that the rules be consistent with the Constitution or other laws.... A valid Manual provision, therefore, has the force and effect of law. 39 United States v. Kelson, 3 M.J. 139, 140-41 (C.M.A.1977). 40 The [Manual for Courts-Martial] was promulgated by the President of the United States in Executive Order 12473 pursuant to the authority vested in him by the U.S. Constitution and Article 36 of the UCMJ (10 U.S.C. Sec. 836). Executive rules falling properly within the valid delegation of power by Congress have the force and effect of law. 41 United States v. Daniels, 20 M.J. 648, 649 (N.M.C.M.R.1985) (footnotes omitted). Again we point out that a Manual provision having the force and effect of law was binding on the military courts in this case. 42 The government claims that this issue is settled by our Mendrano opinion and the published opinions of every other court that has addressed this issue. We believe that the government misreads these cases. This is an area in which the majority of circuit cases are from this court. Although our cases clearly uphold the two-thirds requirement for convictions, our cases do not create any exception from the three-fourths requirement for sentencing. 43 In Anderson we first pointed out that the record indicated there was a three-fourths vote for both conviction and sentence. We then went on to state: In a case [in which the charge is murder and the sentence is life imprisonment] it is sufficient if two-thirds or more of the members of the court concur in the conviction and three-fourths or more concur in the sentence. Anderson, 177 F.2d at 771. In another case we held: [W]hen the charge is [rape] and the sentence life imprisonment it is sufficient if two-thirds or more concur in the conviction and three-fourths or more in the sentence. McKinney v. Warden, 273 F.2d 643, 644 (10th Cir.1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 816, 80 S.Ct. 1253, 4 L.Ed.2d 1156 (1960). These cases at least imply support for the three-fourths vote requirement in mandatory sentence cases. 44 In the Mendrano case, relied on heavily by the government, we simply held that the two-thirds conviction rule did not violate due process. Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1544-47. There is no discussion on mandatory sentences or the three-fourths voting requirement. Thus, Mendrano does not provide the basis for a holding that an exception exists to the three-fourths voting requirement for sentencing in cases carrying a mandatory sentence. 45 Two district court cases support our prior holdings. In Brown v. Hiatt, 81 F.Supp. 647 (N.D.Ga.1948), the court noted in dicta: 46 [W]hile the death penalty might have been imposed, it was not mandatory and ... therefore the vote of three-fourths of all of the members present at the time the vote is taken concurring was sufficient to support the sentence, although the finding of guilty was by a vote of two-thirds of the members present. 47 Brown, 81 F.Supp. at 650. Another district court noted: 48 The vote on conviction and the vote for the proper sentence for the offense of which the accused had been found guilty by the court are separate steps in the proceeding before the court-martial. A vote on a proper sentence for the offense is entirely distinct from a vote on the charges. There is no inconsistency in requiring a two-thirds vote for conviction and a three-fourths vote for sentencing. 49 In re Campo, 71 F.Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y.1947). 50 We acknowledge that dicta in two other non-binding cases could be construed to hold that no three-fourths vote on sentencing was required in mandatory sentence cases. See Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.1944); Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F.Supp. 363 (N.D.Tex.1945). However, the facts of these cases both include sentencing by at least a three-fourths vote. In addition, their holdings do not concern the three-fourths sentencing vote issue. Nevertheless, to the extent these cases stand for the proposition that no three-fourths vote is necessary on a mandatory life sentence, we simply disagree. 51 The only other circuit case to discuss this issue is Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.1944). The Stout case contains a facially troubling statement. 52 [A]fter conviction has been voted in a prosecution for murder or rape, the only punishments permissible under the law are death and life imprisonment. The vote on punishment, therefore, is but a choice between these two; and, unless there is a unanimous vote in favor of the death penalty, life imprisonment necessarily follows. 53 Stout, 146 F.2d at 744. However, this statement is mere dicta. The holding in Stout was only that a unanimous vote for conviction is not required unless the death penalty is a mandatory punishment. Id. In fact, the Stout court went on to note the inconsistency of the statutes and the court's lack of power to fix the problem. 54 Nor do we feel impelled to put a different interpretation upon article 43 because of the possibility that in voting punishment under article 92 the court-martial, while failing to vote unanimously for death, might fail to give a three-fourths vote for life imprisonment.... If there is any real difficulty in sentencing under that article, the matter is one which addresses itself to Congress and not to the courts. 55 Id. In addition, the Stout court stated that the conviction was by more than two-thirds and sentence by three-fourths of the members of the court-martial, which is all that the law requires. Id. at 745. Therefore, although the Stout case contains some troubling language, we believe that the remaining language in the case and its underlying facts make it weak authority for the proposition that no three-fourths vote on sentencing is required in a mandatory sentence case. 56 A district court adopted the troubling language of the Stout court in a case the year after Stout. [A]fter conviction has been voted in a prosecution for murder, the only punishment permissible under the law is death or imprisonment. The vote on imprisonment, therefore, is but a choice between those two; and unless there is an unanimous vote in favor of the death penalty, imprisonment necessarily follows. Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F.Supp. 363, 365 (N.D.Tex.1945) (emphasis in original). However, this statement is at least partially dicta since the facts of the case included a two-thirds vote for conviction--under an old statute allowing a two-thirds vote in cases involving mandatory death sentences--and later a unanimous vote for the death penalty. In addition, the holding of the case was simply that a two-thirds vote for conviction when the death penalty is imposed is proper under the old statute. We believe that Hurse is very weak authority for the proposition that no three-fourths vote on sentencing is necessary in cases involving mandatory sentences. 57 Although the military courts have been less clear, they also appear to have generally interpreted the statute to require a three-fourths vote on sentencing. For example, in a case holding that only a two-thirds majority must vote to convict for a crime involving a mandatory life sentence, the court quoted the troubling language of Stout, but also quoted the language supportive of our disposition of the case from Campo. See United States v. Morphis, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 748, 23 C.M.R. 212, 217 (1957). 58 In United States v. Walker, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 669, 23 C.M.R. 133 (1957), the court quoted the requirements for voting on guilt and sentence in the Code. The court then stated that [t]hese provisions of the Code are plain and clear, and set out the number of votes required to convict and to sentence under different subsections. This is appropriate, for findings and sentence are separate functions.... Id. at 137. The Walker court then went on to quote the precise language of the Manual for Courts-Martial that states that even mandatory sentences must have the concurrence of the required number of court-martial members. Id. Although the holding in Walker was that only two-thirds were required to vote for conviction, the court certainly intimated that three-fourths would be required to sentence, even on a mandatory sentence. In another case, the Court of Military Appeals actually questioned the propriety of a court-martial which did not require a three-fourths vote on a mandatory life sentence. 59 It is open to question whether the procedure followed at either hearing was proper. Long ago, this Court decided that the President, through the Manual, may place an additional burden upon the ... [military judge] and the president of courts-martial not expressly imposed by the Code, but [which] ... is not prohibited by the Code. United States v. Lucas, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 22, 1 C.M.R. 19, 22 (1951). It seems possible, though, that the voting requirement in paragraph 76b(2) of the 1969 Manual might on occasion conflict with the Code's mandatory life imprisonment for felony-murder--e.g., if three-fourths of the members refused to vote for a sentence which included life imprisonment. 60 In any event, no issue in this connection was raised by defense on appeal, so we need not address this question any further. 61 United States v. Garrett, 24 M.J. 413, 419 (C.M.A.1987). 62 A recent Court of Military Appeals case contains some language that on its face might be interpreted to state a rule that no three-fourths vote is required to sentence in a mandatory sentence case. In United States v. Shroeder, 27 M.J. 87 (C.M.A.1988), the court identified the first issue for review: 63 Whether the military judge erred by failing to instruct the members, as required by R.C.M. 1006(d)(5), that a sentence which includes confinement for life may only be adjudged if at least three-fourths of the members present vote for that sentence. 64 Id. at 88. The court then stated that it decided this issue against appellant. Id. However, in reality the court's formulation of the issue misstates the actual question before the court. On the same page as the formulation of the issues the court states that the military judge further instructed [the court-martial members] that the sentence in its entirety had to receive the votes of three-fourths of the members--five out of six. Id. Since the military judge actually instructed the court-martial that a three-fourths vote was required, the court's formulation of the issue as asking whether the judge's failure to so instruct was in error is not a correct statement of the issue in the case. The actual issue before the court is identified by its holding. [W]e think it was entirely appropriate for the military judge to instruct--as required by R.C.M. 1005(e)(1)--that, because Shroeder had been found guilty of felony murder, any sentence adjudged by the court members must include confinement for life. Id. at 90. The court was addressing whether the military judge could instruct the court-martial that their sentence must include life imprisonment, not whether the sentence must be supported by a three-fourths vote. In fact, the Shroeder court's opinion never questioned the military judge's instruction requiring the three-fourths vote. In addition, the court continually cited with approval its prior Walker opinion that at least impliedly supported the three-fourths vote. Therefore, we conclude that, although the military courts have not been entirely clear on this issue, they seem to support our interpretation of the current statutory structure requiring a three-fourths vote for a mandatory sentence. 65 Thus, we hold that a three-fourths vote is required on all sentences of life imprisonment, even if the sentence is mandatory. This holding is supported by the Manual for Courts-Martial. The Manual obviously contemplates just such a vote and provides for a remedy if three-fourths do not vote for a mandatory life sentence. After discussing the requirement that a concurrence of the required number of votes is required even for mandatory sentences, the Manual states: If the required proportion of the court members are conscientiously unable to reach agreement on a sentence, this fact shall be announced in open session and a mistrial declared. The convening authority may thereafter direct a rehearing on the sentence before a different court. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969, p 76(b)(2) at 13-14 (Rev. ed. 1969) (emphasis added). We believe that the use of the word may indicates that the convening authority had discretion whether to order rehearing on the sentence. This means that the convening authority also had the discretion to order no punishment as the sentence. This implicit interpretation is made clear by the clarifying language of the current manual. If the required number of members do not agree on a sentence after a reasonable effort to do so, a mistrial may be declared as to the sentence and the case shall be returned to the convening authority, who may order a rehearing on sentence only or order that a sentence of no punishment be imposed. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, R.C.M. 1006(d)(6) at II-154 (1984). See also United States v. Miller, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 296, 27 C.M.R. 370 (1959). 66 The military judge in this case did not require a three-fourths vote on punishment. The judge gave the following instructions: 67 The voting on the part relating to confinement at hard labor for life or death will follow the following procedures: 68 When the Court has completed its discussion, the members shall vote first on the sentence of confinement at hard labor for life, that is, the less severe of the two punishments. The Court will vote by secret ballot as to the sentence of confinement at hard labor for life.... If the ballot results in one or more votes for a sentence to confinement at hard labor for life, then there will be no need to go forward and vote on a sentence of death, since a sentence of death requires a unanimous vote of the members. The logic is as follows: 69 If one person votes for confinement at hard labor for life, obviously, there cannot be a unanimous vote on death. So, if you have one or more votes for confinement at hard labor for life, then you need not go forward and vote for the sentence of death, that is, vote on the sentence of death. In other words, if the ballot has resulted in a sentence of confinement at hard labor for life, and if there is one or more votes for sentence of confinement at hard labor for life--if the ballot results in no vote for a sentence of confinement at hard labor for life, then the members proceed to vote on a sentence of death. That is, if there are no votes for a sentence to confinement for life, then you can go on and consider the sentence of death and vote thereon. 70 Record, vol. 4, at 837-38. The judge's instructions did not require the court to reach a three-fourths majority vote in order to impose life imprisonment. We hold that these instructions do not fulfill the requirement of a three-fourths vote on a sentence of over ten years imprisonment contained in 10 U.S.C. Sec. 852(b)(2) (1988). 71 In the context of this case, we hold that the court-martial's failure to follow the statutory requirements was a violation of defendant's right to due process. It is clear that military courts-martial are not held to the exact due process requirements created for civil courts. [W]hat constitutes due process in a trial by a military tribunal is gauged by the principles of military law exacted by the Congress.... De War v. Hunter, 170 F.2d 993, 997 (10th Cir.1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 908, 69 S.Ct. 1048, 93 L.Ed. 1720 (1949) (citing Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 31 S.Ct. 230, 55 L.Ed. 225 (1911); French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326, 42 S.Ct. 505, 66 L.Ed. 965 (1922)). Thus, the Supreme Court's cases striking down a unanimous jury of only five persons, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234 (1978), and holding that a six-person jury must be unanimous, Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S.Ct. 1623, 60 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979), are not applicable to military courts-martial. However, the lower due process rights accorded to military defendants are the exception to the general rules. As such, we hold the military courts to the specific statutory requirements created by Congress and the President as an exception to general due process jurisprudence. Because the military court failed to follow the principles of military law enacted by Congress, De War, 170 F.2d at 997, we hold that defendant's due process rights were violated in this case. There can be no question that the congressional standard and the authorized regulations clearly mandated at the time of defendant's sentence the results we set out here. Therefore, we reverse the district court's holding on this issue and order the case remanded to the convening authority to either order rehearing on sentencing or to order no punishment entered consistent with the provisions of Rule for Court Martial 1006(d)(6) of the 1984 Manual for Courts-Martial.