Opinion ID: 6495845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sanchez v. Mayorkas

Text: In Sanchez, the Supreme Court considered whether conferral of TPS constituted an admission to the United States for purposes of obtaining lawful permanent resident status and concluded that it did not. 141 S. Ct. at 1811. Applying a plain language analysis, the Court concluded that “[l]awful status and admission . . . are distinct concepts in immigration law: Establishing one does not necessarily establish the other.” Id. at 1813. Accordingly, the Court held that “because a grant of TPS does not come with a ticket of admission, it does not eliminate the disqualifying effect of an unlawful entry.” Id. at 1813–14. The Court rejected the argument that without providing admission, TPS “accomplishes precious little” and listed the benefits that an alien gains from nonimmigrant status. Id. HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND 13 at 1815. TPS allows an alien to become a lawful permanent resident, and “[s]ome TPS recipients need exactly that assistance—without needing a constructive admission.” Id. For example, “a foreign national who entered the country legally on a tourist visa” but overstayed the visa’s expiration can satisfy the lawful-permanent-resident statute’s admission requirement but cannot show nonimmigrant status without a grant of TPS. Id. The Court acknowledged that “Congress . . . could have gone further”—granting TPS recipients nonimmigrant status and admission—but it did not. Id. It recognized, however, that despite not deeming TPS recipients lawfully admitted, “the statute does something—and this Court does not get to say that the something it does is not enough.” Id. Our precedent judicially expanding the statutory definition of “admission” based on the benefits conferred by a lawful status is “clearly irreconcilable,” Gammie, 335 F.3d at 893, with Sanchez’s holding that “[l]awful status and admission . . . are distinct concepts in immigration law.” 141 S. Ct. at 1813. As Hernandez argues, TPS recipients enjoy substantial benefits based on their lawful status. But Sanchez is clear that, no matter how great those benefits, TPS does not constitute an admission to the United States. See id. It is irrelevant that Sanchez analyzed whether a TPS recipient had been “admitted . . . into the United States” for purposes of adjusting his status rather than cancellation of removal. See id. at 1812–13. Instead, what matters is what Sanchez held that TPS did not do—confer admission. See id. at 1813. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f) (not including admission in the list of benefits and status conferred by TPS). Accordingly, we hold that Sanchez “effectively overrule[s]” our precedent judicially expanding the statutory definition of admission and also establishes that Hernandez’s TPS does not constitute an admission “in any 14 HERNANDEZ V. GARLAND status” under Section 1229b(a). See United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gammie, 335 F.3d at 900).