Opinion ID: 6111308
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State-Created-Danger Exception

Text: Next, Yang contends that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because his section 1983 claims fall under the state-created-danger exception. He asserts that the City's water-rescue-operations policy prevented any rescue attempts by others and that this policy deprived his son of his life and liberty interests. There are two exceptions to the general rule that the government has no constitutional duty to render aid: (1) the special-relationship exception and (2) the state-created-danger exception. Johnson v. City of Seattle , 474 F.3d 634 , 639 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the state-created-danger exception, there is a duty to protect when the state official affirmatively places an individual in a position of danger that [the person] would not otherwise have faced. Repking , 2010 Ark. 356 , at 9, 377 S.W.3d at 218 . In Ross v. United States , 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990), a mother brought an action against the city and others after her son fell into Lake Michigan at the tip of the breakwater. Emergency personnel arrived at the scene. One of the deputies ordered civilian scuba divers to cease their rescue efforts. Thirty minutes later, the authorized divers retrieved the boy's body, and he was pronounced dead the following morning. His mother filed suit. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the deputy. The Seventh Circuit stated, Absent a constitutional duty to provide these rescue services, ... the city cannot be held liable. On this point, we need do no more than cite the line of precedent from the Supreme Court and this court, holding that the government's failure to provide essential services does not violate the Constitution. See  DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs. , 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) ; Doe v. Milwaukee County , 903 F.2d 499 , 502 (7th Cir. 1990) ; Archie v. City of Racine , 847 F.2d 1211 , 1220-23 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 , 109 S.Ct. 1338 , 103 L.Ed.2d 809 (1989). The plaintiff's allegations of municipal policy cannot surmount the main obstacle to her claim: the city simply had no constitutional obligation to save William's life. Id. at 1428. In Ross , the court held that the county's policy-not the city's-of arbitrarily cutting off private sources of rescue without providing a meaningful alternative ... led to the deprivation of William's constitutionally protected right to life, [and Ross's] claim is cognizable under section 1983. Id. at 1431. Ross is distinguishable from the present case because Yang did not present any evidence that a rescue attempt by any person, whether official or civilian, was arbitrarily prohibited by the City. Here, unlike the circumstances in Ross , there were no reasonable alternative avenues of rescue, and the City did not arbitrarily cut off any private source of rescue. By failing to offer proof with proof, Yang did not demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact that the City, during its rescue efforts, affirmatively placed Yang's son in a position of danger that he would not otherwise have faced. Repking , 2010 Ark. 356 , at 9, 377 S.W.3d at 218 . Because the state-created-danger exception does not apply, we hold that, as a matter of law, the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on Yang's civil-rights claims brought under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed.