Opinion ID: 2274252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Subrogation Interest Regarding Wrongful Death Recovery

Text: An employee who has been injured by a third-party tortfeasor may receive workers' compensation benefits from his or her employer and, in addition, may pursue a cause of action against the third-party tortfeasor. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-112 (2005). With respect to a recovery of damages from the third-party by an injured employee or a deceased employee's personal representatives, our workers' compensation statutes provide a subrogation lien in favor of the employer, in pertinent part, as follows: In the event of such recovery against such third person by the worker, or by those to whom such worker's right of action survives, by judgment, settlement or otherwise, and the employer's maximum liability for workers' compensation under this chapter has been fully or partially paid and discharged, the employer shall have a subrogation lien therefor against such recovery, and the employer may intervene in any action to protect and enforce such lien. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-112(c)(1) (2003) (emphasis added). The purpose of the employer's statutory subrogation lien is [t]o prevent the employee from receiving a double recovery. Hickman v. Cont'l Baking Co., 143 S.W.3d 72, 76-77 (Tenn. 2004). In contending that DuPont's subrogation interest does not extend to the settlement she received for the wrongful death of her husband in the Georgia products liability case, the plaintiff relies on our decision in Hunley, 38 S.W.3d at 555. In that case, we held that an employer's right to subrogation does not extend to amounts recovered by the worker's spouse for loss of consortium against a third-party tortfeasor and . . . amounts collected by a spouse for a cause of action vested solely in that spouse are beyond the reach of the statutory subrogation lien. Id. at 558. In so holding, we explained that an employee's spouse has no right under the workers' compensation statutes to bring suit against the employer for loss of consortium. Id. (citing Napier v. Martin, 194 Tenn. 105, 250 S.W.2d 35, 36 (1952)). The spouse's remedy for loss of consortium exists only against a third-party tortfeasor. . . . Id. at 558. Therefore, we held that the employer's subrogation right does not extend to an employee's spouse's recovery for loss of consortium. However, despite the plaintiff's argument, the rationale of Hunley does not mandate a similar outcome in this case. Here, in contrast to Hunley , the workers' compensation statutes provide for compensating a deceased worker's spouse with death benefits. Thus, the purpose of the statutory subrogation lien, i.e., to prevent a double recovery, is present when an employee's surviving spouse obtains a wrongful death recovery from a third-party tortfeasor but is absent when an employee's spouse obtains a recovery on a claim for loss of consortium. Indeed, this Court has previously held that an employer's subrogation interest under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 extends to a surviving spouse's recovery in a Tennessee wrongful death action. Hudson v. Hudson Mun. Contractors, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 187 (Tenn.1995); Beam v. Maryland Cas. Co., 477 S.W.2d 510 (Tenn.1972). Our holding in Hunley did not, as the plaintiff contends, change this result, [1] nor do we depart from our holding in Hudson today. The plaintiff asserts that the result in this particular case should be different because she obtained the wrongful death recovery under Georgia law. There are differences between the Georgia and Tennessee wrongful death statutes, but the differences are not relevant to the issue here. [2] The Georgia Court of Appeals in Mowell v. Marks, 269 Ga.App. 147, 603 S.E.2d 702 (2004), stated as follows regarding claims for wrongful death in Georgia: A survivor cannot recover for the decedent's wrongful death if the decedent could not have recovered in his or her own right. As we have found: `[a]lthough it is true that the action created by the wrongful death statute is different from the cause of action which the decedent would have possessed if he had lived, any defense which would have been good against the decedent is good against his representatives in a wrongful death action.' 603 S.E.2d at 704 (citations omitted). The need to prevent double recovery with respect to a wrongful death claim governed by Tennessee law also exists when the wrongful death recovery is obtained under Georgia law. The employer's right of subrogation under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 applies in both instances. Our decision concerning the applicability of the subrogation interest provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-112 is consistent with the result Georgia courts have reached concerning the subrogation interest employers are afforded by Georgia's workers' compensation statutes. See, e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-11.1; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 244 Ga.App. 338, 535 S.E.2d 511 (2000). The Chancellor calculated the extent of DuPont's subrogation interest in the wrongful death recovery that the plaintiff had received at the time of trial. He also stated that DuPont would have a subrogation interest in any future recovery the plaintiff received in the Georgia wrongful death action. DuPont has filed in this Court a motion to consider post-judgment facts; the motion relates to settlements that DuPont contends have been reached in the Georgia wrongful death case subsequent to the trial in this case. By an order filed contemporaneously with this opinion, this Court has denied DuPont's motion. However, upon remand, the parties may present to the trial court evidence of any recovery the plaintiff has received in the Georgia wrongful death case since the trial of this case. The Chancellor shall consider such evidence in calculating the extent of DuPont's subrogation interest.