Opinion ID: 744751
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cipollone

Text: 52 We begin with Cipollone, which concerned the viability of state common-law damages actions against cigarette manufacturers for injuries stemming from the lung-cancer death of Rose Cipollone. See 505 U.S. 504, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992). The Court analyzed the statutory preemption language of both the 1965 and 1969 Acts, but because the plaintiffs' claims arose before 1984, the Court did not consider the CSEA's potential effect on those claims. See id. at 508, 112 S.Ct. at 2613. In the Court's mixed ruling, Justice Stevens' opinion spoke for a majority of the Court in certain sections, but largely represented the views of only a plurality of the Court. The ruling also produced two separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Principally, the Justices disagreed over whether or not state common-law damages actions, as opposed to positive enactments by state legislatures or administrative bodies, fell within the scope of the express preemption provisions in the 1965 and 1969 Acts. While a majority of the Court held that the 1965 Act did not preempt state common-law damages actions, see Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518-19, 112 S.Ct. at 2618-19, a plurality found that the 1969 Act's broader preemption language did encompass some common law claims, see id. at 520-21, 112 S.Ct. at 2619-20. 53 To determine whether or not a particular common law claim fell within the express preemption clause, the plurality formulated the following central inquiry: we ask whether the legal duty that is the predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health ... imposed under State law with respect to ... advertising and promotion,' giving that clause a fair but narrow reading. Id. at 524, 112 S.Ct. at 2621. 20 According to the plurality, each phrase within that clause limits the universe of common-law claims pre-empted by the statute. Id. In Lohr, a Court majority approved a similar approach. See Lohr, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2257 (parsing language in express preemption clause to determine federal statute's preemptive scope); id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2258 (looking to [t]he legal duty that is the predicate for [plaintiff's common-law state damages claim] to determine whether or not it was preempted by federal requirements). 54 On this basis, we apply a modified version of the test in this case and ask whether or not the predicate legal duty created by the Disclosure Act constitutes a(1) a requirement or prohibition ... imposed under State law, (2) based on smoking and health, (3) with respect to the advertising or promotion of any [properly labeled] cigarettes. § 1334(b). 21 55