Opinion ID: 2465153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Extension Application for Subject Telephone Two

Text: The trial court found several problems with the extension application for Subject Telephone Two. Foremost, the trial court was concerned because the application for extension on Subject Telephone Two was signed and notarized two days prior to the filing of the initial application. Based on this oddity, the court found that the extension application was not made by the district attorney on oath or affirmation to a judge, and the court concluded that personal application was required by section 16-15-102(1)(a). Additionally, the trial court determined that the application was deficient for failing to contain either a statement about the results already obtained or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain any results. Based on our review of the evidence in the record before us, we disagree with both of these conclusions. We note two problems with the trial court's finding that the application was not made by a district attorney upon oath or affirmation to a judge. First, upon closer inspection of the renewal application, it appears that the date was likely a clerical error. Second, even assuming it was not a clerical error, there is no evidence of a violation of the wiretap statute because despite the problem with the date, there is no evidence that the district attorney did not personally apply for the extension. Clerical errors do not invalidate a wiretap application or order. United States v. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d 528, 537 (5th Cir. 1977). The original application for Subject Telephone Two was signed on the 21 day of July, 2009. The number 21 was written in by the notary and the rest of the date was typed. The application for renewal was signed before the notary on this 19 day of July, 2009. Once again, the 19 was written in by the notary and July was part of the typed form. Although the parties did not raise this in court, the body of the application contains evidence that the renewal application was in fact prepared and signed well after the initial application. Paragraph eight refers to events that occurred after the original application was filed. Specifically, paragraph eight lists the prior wiretap orders, including the initial order for Subject Telephone Two on July 22 and an order for Subject Telephone Three on July 30. The affidavit also discusses events that transpired and evidence that had been collected since the issuance of the order. Furthermore, the application was filed with the court on August 20, making it likely that the actual date the application was signed was August 19, and that the notary simply did not notice that the form still said July. If this was a clerical error, as it appears, it does not provide a basis for suppression of all evidence obtained from the resulting wiretap order. However, even assuming that the renewal application was signed on July 19, there still is no evidence to support the court's finding that the District Attorney did not personally apply for the extension, which is the factual predicate for the claimed violation of the wiretap statute at issue here. Section 16-15-102 requires that an application for a wiretap order be made by the district attorney or his designee upon oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction. We have assumed that the district attorney must personally initiate the wiretap and must personally apply for any extension of the duration of the wiretap. Milnes, 527 P.2d at 1167, 186 Colo. at 417. When a defendant has introduced no evidence tending to show that the authorizing signature is inauthentic or that someone other than an authorized person approved the application, however, the evidence should not be suppressed. de la Fuente, 548 F.2d at 537. Even assuming that the district attorney must personally apply for an extension of a wiretap order, we have not set out, and the statute does not require, a particular time for signature or notarization. Consequently, even if the district attorney signed the extension in advance, the district attorney has still personally applied for the extension. Although it certainly raises concerns to have a district attorney signing extension applications before an initial application has been filed, it does not raise the issue of whether personal application is required by the statute. The trial court has asserted that the violation is that the application was not made by the district attorney, but there is no evidence in the record to support that conclusion. The dispute here concerns when the application was signed rather than by whom it was signed. We hold that the early dating of the renewal application does not raise the question of whether there was a violation of the personal application requirement of the wiretap statute. We also disagree with the trial court's conclusion that the application for extension on Subject Telephone Two is deficient for the lack of a statement of results. Section 16-15-102(2)(f) specifies that an application for an extension of a wiretap order must contain a statement setting forth the results obtained from the interception or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain results. Although the application itself does not contain such a statement, the affidavit attached to the extension application contains a detailed description of the results obtained from the interception on Subject Telephone Two. Because the affidavit is physically attached to and incorporated into the application, the application cannot be considered incomplete when the statement of results is contained in the affidavit. See, e.g., People v. Gable, 647 P.2d 246, 250 (Colo.App. 1982) (holding that an application satisfied the wiretap statute requirement of an exhaustion statement when the statement was contained in the accompanying affidavit). Furthermore, wiretap authorization orders are presumed valid, and the sufficiency of the statement of results is a matter left to the discretion of the judge issuing the extension order. Mitchell, 274 F.3d at 1310-11; see United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 853-54 (3d Cir.1976). Likewise, where the objective of a wiretap is to identify the scope and participants of a large scale conspiracy, the permissible duration of the wiretap is necessarily longer than where the investigation concerns only a single criminal episode. Gable, 647 P.2d at 251. Here, Chief Judge Samelson did not abuse his discretion by finding that the affidavit satisfied section 16-15-102(2)(f). Proceeding suspect by suspect, the affidavit methodically provides a ten-page description of pertinent intercepted conversations and how each one is consistent with a drug transaction. The affidavit also makes it clear that the goals of the investigation had not yet been met. Law enforcement still sought to identify additional members of the drug distribution organization. . ., residences, vehicles, storage facilities, time(s) of deliveries of the controlled substances to the organization, the transportation and disposition of drug proceeds, and the like. . . . Based on our review of the affidavit and also taking into account that the wiretap orders at issue here were being used to investigate a large scale conspiracy, we see no support for the trial court's finding that the renewal application for Subject Telephone Two did not contain a statement of results sufficient to support the issuance of the extension order.