Opinion ID: 2058374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Should the Trial Court Have Charged the Jury on Aggravated Manslaughter?

Text: Defendant's counsel acknowledged in his opening statement that defendant had killed Paul Reynolds and Stacey Elizardo, but asserted that the homicides had occurred in the heat of passion provoked by reasonable provocation. According to defense counsel's review of the evidence in summation, the provocation consisted of Reynolds' making insulting and mocking remarks to Pitts, Reynolds' suggesting that Stacey was engaging in prostitution to earn money for drugs, an exchange of pushes and shoves, and, finally, Reynolds' telling Pitts that he was going to his bedroom to get a gun. As requested, the trial court charged the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2). Defendant did not request a charge of aggravated manslaughter, but did request the trial court to instruct the jury on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. The argument advanced was that defendant's honest, but not necessarily reasonable, belief that Reynolds' threat to get a gun endangered defendant's safety constituted sufficient provocation to support a verdict of passion/provocation manslaughter. The trial court denied the requested instruction. Before this Court, defendant renews his contention that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. Alternatively, defendant contends that our decision in State v. Bowens, 108 N.J. 622 (1987), filed after trial but before argument of defendant's appeal, requires a trial court to charge aggravated manslaughter whenever evidence offered to prove imperfect self-defense is material to the state of mind required to prove murder. In State v. Bowens, supra , we reviewed the sequence of events leading to adoption of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Justice (the Code) relating to self-defense. Id. at 629. We noted that the legislature expressly rejected a subjective test for self-defense, adopting instead a standard of objective reasonableness to determine when a decision to use force for self-protection was justifiable under the Code. Ibid.; see N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(a). In Bowens, we also concluded that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to use force for self-protection, insufficient under the Code to justify an otherwise unlawful homicide, could not of itself constitute a basis for mitigating homicide to an unspecified form of manslaughter. Id. at 630-31. Nevertheless, we observed in Bowens that evidence of facts sufficient to establish imperfect self-defense may in certain cases bear directly on the question of whether the homicide was knowing or purposeful, and would be admissible to counter these essential elements of the offense of murder. Id. at 632. We noted examples of circumstances in which an unreasonable but honest belief in the need to use force could be pertinent to the elements of Code offenses: An example given by the Attorney General of the multi-faceted nature of the defense includes the overreaction in self-defense to aggressive or threatening conduct, e.g., shooting to kill an unarmed attacker who has fallen to the ground. He noted that to the extent the victim's conduct constitutes reasonable provocation the offense may be mitigated to become the Legislature's special homicide offense, passion-provocation manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(2). Evidence of imperfect self-defense does not justify the conduct, it mitigates the offense. Another example given is the reckless use of mortal force in self-defense, as when one seeking to repel an attacker disregards a risk that pushing the aggressor down a cliff will result in death. That person may not have committed murder purposely or knowingly but may be guilty of one of the forms of manslaughter: either reckless homicide under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b)(1) or reckless homicide manifesting extreme indifference to human life under N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a). The evidence bears on the essential elements of a Code offense. [ Id. at 633.] Accordingly, we held in Bowens that although imperfect self-defense was not recognized by the Code as a justification for otherwise unlawful conduct, in many cases the issues of the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct presented to the jury in defense of the substantive crimes charged will have relevance to the essential elements of the homicidal act: whether it was the actor's conscious object to inflict deadly force, whether death was almost certain to follow, or whether the act was done recklessly or with reasonable provocation. [ Id. at 634.] Defendant contends that our holding in Bowens compels the conclusion that the trial court committed reversible error in failing, sua sponte, to charge aggravated manslaughter on the basis of the evidence that defendant killed Reynolds because of an honest but unreasonable fear for his own safety. However, as we explained in Bowens, not every claim of imperfect self-defense leads to an aggravated manslaughter charge. The predicate for such an instruction, when it is based on evidence of imperfect self-defense, is that such evidence either negates the mental state required for murder, or demonstrates acts of provocation on the part of the victim to an extent sufficient to afford the jury a rational basis for convicting the defendant of one of the Code's forms of manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a and 4b; see id. at 633. In this case, defendant testified that Reynolds made a move to one of the bedrooms    to get this gun, and it was at that time    that I pulled the knife out from the back of me and assaulting [ sic ] Paul with that knife. Defendant described the assault as almost an instantaneous like reflex, committed in a frenzied type state of mind. We construe defendant's testimony relating the Reynolds murder to Reynolds' threat to get this gun as relevant to the crime of passion/provocation manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2), on which the trial court charged the jury. However, defendant's version of the Reynolds' homicide does not present facts that negate the state of mind indispensable for a conviction of murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(1) and (2), or afford the jury a rational basis on which to convict defendant of either aggravated or reckless manslaughter. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4a or 4b(1). No aspect of defendant's testimony suggested that his state of mind was reckless. [2] Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's failure to charge aggravated or reckless manslaughter on its own initiative based on defendant's testimony offered to prove imperfect self-defense in connection with the Reynolds homicide.
Expert psychiatric testimony offered on defendant's behalf included a diagnosis of defendant's mental and emotional condition as well as an opinion concerning defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicides. See supra at 591-592. Although defendant did not argue before us the defense of diminished capacity, N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2; see State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, nor assert that the testimony of defendant's psychiatric expert supported a charge of aggravated manslaughter, we requested supplemental briefs on these questions. In response to that request, defendant now contends that the testimony of Dr. Cooke concerning defendant's cyclothymic personality disorder, supra at 591, combined with that expert's opinion of defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims, supra at 592, compelled the trial court, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on diminished capacity and aggravated manslaughter. The State disagrees sharply, arguing that defendant's psychiatric expert did not establish any connection between defendant's personality disorder and his state of mind when the homicides were committed. Moreover, the State asserts that throughout the trial defendant conceded that he killed the victims knowingly, infra at 612-613, but based his entire defense on the theory that the homicides occurred in the heat of passion, induced by reasonable provocation. Finally, the State contends that since defendant did not request instructions on either diminished capacity or aggravated manslaughter, the trial court had no duty meticulously [to] sift through the entire record to determine if some combination of facts and inferences might support such jury charges. See State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 299 (1985). In State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, we considered the diminished capacity defense and concluded that [it] was designed by the Legislature not as a justification or an excuse, nor as a matter of diminished or partial responsibility, but as a factor bearing on the presence or absence of an essential element of the crime as designated by the Code. The Legislature contemplated that all are not born with equal mental capacity, and it would want a jury to consider whether a mentally defective person would be as practically certain as would another that death would result from the infliction of a serious blow. [ Id. at 608.] We also observed that the mere presence of mental disease or defect does not perforce reduce murder to an unspecified degree of manslaughter. For the purpose of determining criminal guilt, diminished capacity either negates the state of mind required for a particular offense, if successful, or it does not. [ Id. at 609.] Although the discussion in Breakiron does not amplify the meaning of the phrase mental disease or defect, as it is used in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, we adverted to the difficulties inherent in attempting to correlate mental diseases with the categories of criminal culpability contained in the Code: Not every mental disease or defect has relevance to the mental states prescribed by the Code. The variety and forms of mental disease are legion. They range from paranoia and schizophrenia to affective disorders and psychopathy. Some, such as depression or anti-social disorders, have little or no relevance to knowledge. Others, such as schizophrenia, are clearly relevant. Some states have attempted to define the relevant mental diseases or defects. Our Code does not. But [b]oth jurists and mental health professionals recognize that there is no perfect correlation between legal standards of `insanity' and psychiatric classifications of mental disorder. [108 N.J. 618-19 n. 10 (citations omitted).] Defendant's psychiatric expert Dr. Cooke diagnosed defendant as having a cyclothymic personality disorder, a condition classified as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association. APA, DSM III-R: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders (DSM III-R) 226-28 (3d ed. Rev. 1987). Dr. Cooke described the condition as a mood disorder that at times causes significant depression, but does not cause one to lose contact with reality the way a manic depressant might. In addition, Dr. Cooke testified that defendant had a chronic anxiety disorder, and above-average level of anxiety on a chronic basis, a condition also recognized by the American Psychiatric Association, DSM III-R at 251, and characterized by unrealistic or excessive anxiety manifested by tension and hyperactivity. Ibid. After testifying to his diagnosis of defendant's mental condition, Dr. Cooke was asked his opinion of defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicides. He explained that that opinion was based on diagnostic tests of defendant, physical evidence at the crime scene, and defendant's statements to him. Although quoted above, supra at 592, the relevance of Dr. Cooke's opinion to the issues under consideration warrants its restatement: [U]nder that situation he experienced some of that feeling from Vietnam, not a specific flashback, but a feeling in which he perceives himself to be in danger, perceives himself as having to strike out to protect himself in part. But even more important, that he had an emotional response there, an impulsive emotional response, not a response where he stopped and thought and decided, I will do this, I will do that, but, rather, a loss of control under the influence of extreme emotions and what I would say, combining all that data, a rage reaction, a reaction in which his anger reached the point of rage, which I would define as an anger that goes out of control and an anger which interferes with the cognitive ability a person has, planning, judgment, recognizing consequences, deliberating, that in my opinion, he experiences such a loss of control. Dr. Cooke did not expressly connect his opinion of defendant's state of mind to his diagnosis of defendant's mental condition, but observed that his testing revealed defendant's potential for loss of control. On this record, we cannot conclude that it was plain error for the trial court to have failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on diminished capacity and aggravated manslaughter on the hypothesis that defendant's mental condition was the cause of the loss of cognitive ability described in Dr. Cooke's testimony. As Justice O'Hern noted in Breakiron, supra : Not every mental disease or defect has relevance to the mental states prescribed by the Code. 108 N.J. at 618 n. 10. We also observed in Breakiron that the only evidence of mental disease that should be admitted in respect of diminished capacity is that relevant to the question of whether defendant had the requisite mental state to commit the crime. Id. at 618. Dr. Cooke did not testify that defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims was caused by his mental disorders; rather, he based his opinion on what defendant had told him about the homicides and on the physical evidence, as well as on his testing of defendant. Nor did Dr. Cooke testify that defendant's particular mental disorders were generally acknowledged among psychiatrists to be capable of affecting one's ability to possess the state of mind required by the Code for murder. Rather, the thrust of Dr. Cooke's testimony was that defendant committed the homicides in a state of rage, provoked by his emotional reaction to the encounter with Reynolds. Inasmuch as defense counsel did not request a diminished capacity charge, and the evidence offered did not significantly relate defendant's mental disorder to the state of mind described by defendant's psychiatric expert, we hold that it was not plain error for the trial court to have failed, sua sponte, to instruct the jury on diminished capacity and aggravated manslaughter on the theory that defendant's mental condition afforded the jury a rational basis for convicting defendant of the lesser charge. See State v. Choice, supra, 98 N.J. at 299; cf. State v. Juinta, 224 N.J. Super. 711 (App.Div. 1988) (plain error for trial court to fail to charge diminished capacity in murder prosecution where principal issue at trial concerned insanity defense).
Although not raised by counsel at trial or before us, the testimony of defendant's expert concerning defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims warrants our consideration of the appropriateness of an aggravated manslaughter charge based solely on the expert's state-of-mind testimony. We address this issue independently of defendant's contentions concerning imperfect self-defense and diminished capacity. [W]here the death penalty is involved, it is the duty of this Court to examine the record for any errors affecting the substantial rights of the accused, even though not made a ground of appeal. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 69 (1988) (quoting State v. Taylor, 213 S.C. 330, 330, 49 S.E. 2d 289, 289 (1948)). We focus particularly on Dr. Cooke's statement that defendant experienced a loss of control under the influence of extreme emotions    a rage reaction,    which I would define as an anger that goes out of control and    which interferes with the cognitive ability a person has, planning, judgment, recognizing consequences, deliberating   . Unquestionably, this testimony by Dr. Cooke provided support for the court's instruction to the jury, specifically requested by defense counsel, on passion/provocation manslaughter. As we noted in State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515 (1971): Voluntary manslaughter    is an intentional homicide done in sudden passion or heat of blood, without malice aforethought. [ Id. at 523.] In State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191 (1963), we described passion/provocation manslaughter as follows: Voluntary manslaughter is a slaying committed in a transport of passion or heat of blood induced by an adequate provocation, provided the killing occurs before the passage of time sufficient for an ordinary person in like circumstances to cool off. The common law deemed such circumstances to negate the malice required for murder. Involved is a concession to the frailty of man, a recognition that the average person can understandably react violently to a sufficient wrong and hence some lesser punishment is appropriate. [ Id. at 209-10 (citations omitted).] Thus, our cases recognize that evidence sufficient to support a finding that a homicide was committed by one in a state of rage, induced by reasonable provocation, ordinarily would warrant a charge of passion/provocation manslaughter. See State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 319-24 (1980); State v. Bishop, 225 N.J. Super. 596, 605 (App.Div. 1988); State v. Washington, 223 N.J. Super. 367, 377 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 612 (1988). Although Dr. Cooke testified that defendant's anger interfered with his cognitive ability, the expert did not conclude that defendant lacked the state of mind required for purposeful or knowing murder. Under the Code, conduct is purposeful, with respect to a result, if it is the person's conscious object to cause such a result, N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1); conduct is knowing if the person is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2). The testimony that defendant's anger interfered with [his] cognitive ability [for] planning, judgment, recognizing consequences was consistent with the concept that the passion sufficient to sustain a passion/provocation manslaughter verdict must disturb a defendant's reason: [T]o reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter it must appear that the killing occurred during the heat of a passion resulting from a reasonable provocation, a passion which effectively deprived the killer of the mastery of his understanding, a passion which was acted upon before a time sufficient to permit reason to resume its sway had passed. [ State v. King, 37 N.J. 285, 300 (1962).] [3] Thus the expert's testimony supported a passion/provocation manslaughter theory, but did not describe defendant's state of mind in a manner inconsistent with responsibility for knowing murder. Defense counsel conceded as much in his colloquy with the trial court concerning his request for a charge on imperfect self-defense: THE COURT: In terms of the manner in which the case has been tried to this jury we don't have self-defense, we have at best manslaughter, heat of passion, reasonable provocation; if I perceive your defense, that is the way the case has been tried to the jury. MR. GOLDSTEIN: That is absolutely correct. THE COURT: And the knowing aspect of the killing you admit in your opening statement and the defendant testified to it and that is not in issue really: MR. GOLDSTEIN: That is not in issue that he killed  that when he was doing what he was doing he was doing it knowingly. That is not in issue. But he was doing it knowingly because he may have in the words of Dr. Cooke temporarily misperceived the situation as one in which he had to defend himself and act impulsively and emotionally at the time. That is what Dr. Cooke said. I don't think that means he didn't do it knowingly. In fact, if he has the honest belief that in the need to use deadly force to defend himself, that would be consistent with knowingly because he makes that decision at that time that he must use deadly force to defend himself. What I am saying is that decision is unreasonable under all the facts and circumstances, but it should constitute what was known under 2A as the imperfect self-defense   . Moreover, Dr. Cooke offered no testimony suggesting that defendant's state of mind when he stabbed the victims was reckless rather than purposeful or knowing. See N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3) (A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.). Thus, we do not find in Dr. Cooke's expert testimony a rational basis on which the jury could have convicted defendant of any other lesser-included offense of murder, except for passion/provocation manslaughter. See State v. Crisantos ( Arriagas ), 102 N.J. 265, 276 (1986). Hence, we conclude, based on our review of Dr. Cooke's opinion testimony concerning defendant's state of mind at the time of the homicides, that the trial court properly charged the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter and did not err in omitting to instruct the jury on any other lesser-included offense of murder. To recapitulate, we hold that it was not plain error for the trial court to have omitted to charge the jury on aggravated manslaughter  whether in connection with the proofs offered by defendant bearing on imperfect self-defense, diminished capacity, or state of mind. Examined in the context of the entire trial, defendant's proofs attempted to persuade the jury that the homicides, although committed deliberately, were the product of impassioned impulse, provoked by circumstances that caused defendant to lose control of his emotions. The thrust of defendant's proofs was that his actions were uncontrollable, not that his conduct was reckless in the sense of consciously disregarding a known risk. We are satisfied that the jury, charged on passion/provocation manslaughter, was thereby afforded the opportunity to consider that alternate verdict to murder to which defendant's proofs were essentially directed. Thus, although we hold that defendant was not entitled to a charge on aggravated manslaughter, we are also satisfied that its submission to the jury would have had no effect on the verdict.