Opinion ID: 160887
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Alcoholism

Text: As an additional basis for denying benefits, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s alcohol abuse “is a material factor in determining whether [she] is disabled.” Appellant’s App. at 36. At the time of plaintiff’s administrative hearing, drug and alcohol addiction could support a finding of disability, and plaintiff, who is an alcoholic, presented her case accordingly. Following her hearing, however, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide that “[a]n individual shall not be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchapter if alcoholism or drug addiction would (but for this subparagraph) be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C). Under the regulations, the key factor the Commissioner must examine in determining whether drugs or alcohol are a contributing factor to the claim is whether the Commissioner would still find the claimant disabled if he or she stopped using drugs or alcohol. 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(1). Under this regulation, the ALJ must evaluate which of plaintiff’s current physical and mental limitations would remain if plaintiff stopped using alcohol, and then determine whether any or all of plaintiff’s remaining limitations would be disabling. -8- The ALJ’s analysis of plaintiff’s alcohol abuse was flawed in several respects. First, the ALJ failed to determine whether plaintiff was disabled prior to finding that alcoholism was a contributing factor material thereto. The implementing regulations make clear that a finding of disability is a condition precedent to an application of § 423(d)(2)(C). 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(a). The Commissioner must first make a determination that the claimant is disabled. Id. He must then make a determination whether the claimant would still be found disabled if he or she stopped abusing alcohol. Id. § 416.935(b)(1). If so, then the alcohol abuse is not a contributing factor material to the finding of disability. Id. § 416.935(b)(2)(ii). If, however, the claimant’s remaining impairments would not be disabling without the alcohol abuse, then the alcohol abuse is a contributing factor material to the finding of disability. Id. § 416.935(b)(2)(i). The ALJ cannot begin to apply § 423(d)(2)(C) properly when, as here, he has not yet made a finding of disability. Second, the ALJ only indicated that plaintiff’s alcohol abuse contributed to her mental condition of depression. The ALJ failed to address whether plaintiff’s alcohol abuse was a “contributing factor” to either her post-poliomyelitis or her dysphagia. Moreover, none of the physicians who examined or evaluated plaintiff addressed whether her alcohol abuse was a contributing factor in any of her claimed disabilities. Thus, there is no evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s -9- finding that plaintiff’s alcohol abuse was a “material factor” in her disabilities. Accordingly, in evaluating plaintiff’s alcohol abuse under § 423(d)(2)(C), the ALJ failed to follow the applicable legal standards and his conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence. Whether plaintiff is disabled and what role her alcoholism plays in any disability are questions the Commissioner must address on remand. Because additional proceedings will now ensue at step three, it is unnecessary to reach plaintiff’s alleged errors at step four. We note, however, that for the ALJ to conclude validly that plaintiff can return to her past relevant work, the ALJ is required to make specific findings concerning: (1) plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (RFC), (2) the functional demands of each of plaintiff’s past jobs, and (3) plaintiff’s ability to return to these past jobs with the RFC the ALJ determines the claimant to have. Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017, 1023 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing three phases of Commissioner’s step-four analysis). The district court’s judgment is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings. -10-