Opinion ID: 1934979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judge Laird's Judicial Conduct and Remarks

Text: Monsanto also argues that Judge Laird's comments during portions of the trial provide evidence that he appears to be biased and constitute grounds for his recusal. To support its argument, Monsanto cites 12 examples of what it considers to be biased judicial remarks by Judge Laird before the March 12, 2002, settlement conference. The plaintiffs respond that those isolated statements do not prove that Judge Laird appears biased and that Judge Laird's conclusions regarding Monsanto are justified based on the facts of the case; [21] therefore, they argue, those statements and conclusions do not warrant his recusal. Monsanto argues, for example, that Judge Laird's Trial Management and Scheduling Order, entered on June 7, 2001, contained gratuitous and unfounded criticism of Defendants' credibility, which bore no relation to trial management or scheduling, [and] was inappropriate as it apparently was made solely because Defendants sought mandamus relief, as is their right, from this Court with respect to numerous pending pretrial motions. (Petition at 37.) Monsanto quotes from Judge Laird's order: First, allow this Court to point out that Defendants, through counsel, have been less than completely honest and straightforward with not only this Court, but the Supreme Court of Alabama. (Petition at 36, quoting from Trial Management and Scheduling Order.) Judge Laird, however, continued in a portion of the order not quoted by Monsanto: Defendants would have one believe, and in fact tried to convince the Supreme Court of Alabama, that this Court has failed to provide the parties in this case with any guidance, direction, plan or management order whatsoever concerning the trial of this case. The same could not be further from the truth. This Court attaches hereto as Exhibit `A' a detailed `Pre-trial Scheduling Order' which was entered on May 13, 1998, setting this case for trial November 16, 1998, and setting strict, but realistic time lines within which to prepare this case for trial. All parties, however, while moving forward, ignored deadlines set by this Court and this Court continued the trial until February 1, 1999, and again to March 15, 1999. It should be noted that all parties announced ready when this Court attempted to select a jury on February 1, 1999. . . . . Other than creating a huge obstruction for the Plaintiffs in this case, this Court cannot understand why Monsanto would logically object to the above-mentioned trial plan. If the jury finds in favor of Monsanto after the liability phase, the case is over. By trying each Plaintiff's causation and damages issue separately, this Court has essentially granted Defendant's Motion to sever these Plaintiffs and try each Plaintiff's case separately, another issue in Monsanto's Petition for Writ of Mandamus. The only difference is that only one (1) jury will hear the cases rather than three thousand five hundred thirty-one (3,531) juries, which will substantially reduce the costs, not only for all parties concerned, but the State and its taxpayers as well. (Trial Management and Scheduling Order entered June 7, 2001; emphasis in original.) Monsanto also argues that in the trial court's order changing venue of the case to Etowah County, Judge Laird raised allegations of possible racism against the Defendants.... (Petition at 37.) Monsanto quotes from Judge Laird's change-of-venue order: This Court finds that the `potential' biases that may exist in the three (3) counties proposed by the Defendants to be much more troubling and certainly hopes that Defendants aren't attempting to inject issues of race into this case. (Petition at 37.) Monsanto takes this quotation from the portion of the order in which Judge Laird explains the rationale for his venue order. Judge Laird stated: Taking all of the factors into consideration, this Court finds that Etowah County is the most suitable county of the contiguous counties in which to try this case. It is most similar in both population, size and diversity. It is convenient for all parties and witnesses and maintains the only Courthouse that could adequately facilitate this trial. Therefore, this Court will now compare Etowah County and the Defendants' concerns to the counties of Blount, DeKalb, and Marshall. Defendants clearly state in their Motion that all of their concerns raise only `potential' biases. This Court finds these `potential' biases to be remote at best. This Court certainly finds the `potential' biases that may exist in the three (3) counties proposed by the Defendants to be much more troubling and certainly hopes that Defendants aren't attempting to inject issues of race in this case. A survey of the 2000 census data from the U.S. Census Bureau reveals that Calhoun County has a population of 112,249, 78.9% of which is Caucasian and 18.5% of which is African-American. Etowah County has a population of 103,459, 82.9% of which is Caucasian and 14.7% of which is African-American. Blount County has a population of 51,024, 95.1% of which is Caucasian and 1.2% of which is African-American. DeKalb County has a population of 64,452, 92.6% of which is Caucasian and 1.7% of which is African-American. Marshall County has a population of 82,231, 93.4% of which is Caucasian and 1.5% of which is African-American. . . . . Therefore, upon consideration of all concerns expressed by the parties, the law and Code of Alabama, the requirements of the Constitution, and in the interest of justice and the convenience of the parties and witnesses, this Court finds that Etowah County is the nearest county free from proper objection by any party. (Change-of-venue order entered June 7, 2001; emphasis in original.) Monsanto also argues that Judge Laird has made statements on the record in court that provide a basis for questioning his impartiality. From the more than 6,000 pages of transcript generated thus far in this trial, Monsanto cites 10 instances in which it alleges Judge Laird appeared biased. [22] Monsanto argues that on January 22, 2002, Judge Laird appeared biased when he stated: The Court: ... I don't think it's going to confuse the jury, but I do think that there is a real possibility and probability that this jury is going to think that these plaintiffs ought to be afraid. I think they ought to be afraid. I would be afraid, and I haven't had my blood tested and don't plan to, but I can tell you if I had elevated levels in my blood, and I think I'm a fairly reasonable person, if I had elevated levels in my blood, I [would] be afraid because I don't know what might happen. It would cause me concern. It would cause me to stay awake at night, and I think it would do the same for you. I think you're a fairly reasonable person, too, Harlan [Prater, defense attorney]. (Petition at 38-39, quoting transcript at 1620-21.) In the next paragraph of the transcript, Judge Laird discusses the exhibit: But I do have a concern about this exhibit that Mr. [Harlan] Prater has handed me about the conclusions because I have done a lot of reading, too. I haven't read everything I feel like I need to read and I haven't read everything I feel like I'm going to wind up reading before this case is ultimately over, but I do have a problem jumping from probable causes to causes. (Transcript at 1621.) The complete record is not before this Court, but from the limited context available from the excerpts provided to this Court by Monsanto in the exhibits offered in support of its petition, one can infer that Judge Laird, in the second paragraph recited above, states that he agrees with defense attorney Harlan Prater that one of the plaintiffs' exhibits has a problem. Because the trial transcript is excerpted, the transcript page incorporated as an exhibit in Monsanto's petition does not identify who is speaking in the passage immediately preceding Judge Laird's comments, but that page of the transcript reads: The potential is very real that it will confuse the issue and that that jury will sit there and say, `Wow, those people ought to be afraid because PCBs cause cancer, PCBs cause these other things.' And these people don't know that. (Transcript at 1620.) The transcript excerpt attributes the statement immediately following Judge Laird's remarks to Mr. Stewart, the lead plaintiff's attorney. Mr. Stewart states: Judge, I think what he is doing is he's going to the studies that have been done by other people and he's reviewed those, and he's linking PCB exposure and levels to those diseases.... (Transcript at 1621.) In this exchange, Judge Laird appears merely to describe how he believed a reasonable person would process the facts at issue in an exhibit. Monsanto argues that on January 28, 2002, Judge Laird exhibited bias when he stated: The Court: Well, a person's home is his castle, right. Mr. Prater: Yes, sir. The Court: I wonder what the king would think if his property was contaminated. I really wonder what the president of Monsanto would think if his property was contaminated and it was worth less thanit had a negative value, was going to cost twice as much to clean it up as it was worth, and his wife didn't want to leave that castle. What do you think the king would do when the queen didn't want to leave? (Petition at 39-40, quoting transcript at 2930-31.) That exchange took place as part of a discussion about the kind and amount of damages that would be permitted by law in this case. The discussion immediately preceding the quoted passage offers some context: [unnamed party]: I understand what they are talking about the property law, before and after, what the value of the property is before and after. And there is a law under nuisance that says they are supposed to be made whole under those circumstances, and that certainly was created. The other damage I was saying to the Court that is existing there is what is happening to these people as a result of the continuing problems on this particular site. The Court: Well, certainly Mr. Stewart: It is in the air breathe [sic] The Court: There again, if you are looking at it ifIf the jury comes back with an awardsay the difference between before and after fair market value is $50,000, and they come back and give a plaintiff $50,000, but yet it costs $100,000 to clean it up, then the plaintiff still can't clean it up. And there is still a continuous Mr. Prater: Perhaps, Your Honor, that plaintiff[s], may have to elect their remedy; although, I still think the law is clear in Alabama that they are not entitled in a property-damage case to get more than the value of the property before and after. That law is 200 years old in this state. Mr. Stewart: Of course, that law doesn't contemplate what happened in this instance Judge. At this point the portion quoted by Monsanto begins: The Court: Well, a person's home is his castle, right. Mr. Prater: Yes, sir. The Court: I wonder what the king would think if his property was contaminated. I really wonder what the president of Monsanto would think if his property was contaminated and it was worth less thanit had a negative value, was going to cost twice as much to clean it up as it was worth, and his wife didn't want to leave that castle. What do you think the king would do when the queen didn't want to leave? And this exchange with Peck and Prater, Monsanto's attorneys, followed immediately: Mr. Prater: One of those things we are going to persuade you, Your Honor. Mr. Peck: Your Honor, aside from the legal point that The Court: I'm ready to go. Mr. Peck: Okay. There is also a foundational problem. The Court: I'm past ready to go. Mr. Peck: Okay. Got it. Adjourned at 4:45 p.m. (Transcript at 2928-31.) Monsanto argues that Judge Laird displayed bias when he accused Solutia of posting something on its Web site in violation of a pretrial order that prohibited the parties from discussing the case with the press. Monsanto quotes that accusation and the colloquy that followed: The Court: ... I guess, since Solutia has settled the Owens case, it feels like that that's all it needed to do for the community. Mr White [defense counsel]: I don't believe that's correct, Your Honor, and I'm hopeful that Your Honor isn't viewing these statements from various sources that way. The Court: This is not a `various source.' This is the associate general counsel, assistant general counsel, for Solutia. Mr. White: Yes, sir. The evidence in this case, Your Honor, has shown efforts are ongoing in Anniston as we speak. The Court: For remediation, but we are looking at Mr White: And I will make sure, Your Honor, that those are taken off the Web site. The Court: Well, I don't really care if this one stays on there. Like I said, I think it's interesting where they at one time want to settle disputes because they believe it's good for the community, but now, rather than trying to avoid litigation expense, it looks like they're trying to increase litigation expense. (Petition at 40-41, quoting transcript at 3736-37.) The portions of the transcript immediately preceding and following the discussion cited by Monsanto indicate that Judge Laird was discussing his concerns about the inability of the parties to settle this case. In the transcript, he states (first quoting from the Solutia Web site): [The court]: ... `as expert fees, travel expenses and other items associated with preparing their case for trial. Certainly, this agreement contains no finding of wrongdoing or finding that Solutia is or would be liable to plaintiffs. Monsanto and Solutia have acted in a forthright and diligent manner in addressing PCBs found in the environment in Anniston. The companies have successfully invested over $40 million on extensive projects at and near the Anniston plant to manage and control PCBs associated with the plant's manufacturing operations. Solutia will continue to work cooperatively with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Alabama Department of Environmental Management and other governmental agencies to determine what actions are necessary and appropriate to deal with future remedial needs.' At this point the material quoted by Monsanto begins: The Court: ... I guess, since Solutia has settled the Owens case, it feels like that that's all it needed to do for the community. Mr White [defense counsel]: I don't believe that's correct, Your Honor, and I'm hopeful that Your Honor isn't viewing these statements from various sources that way. The Court: This is not a `various source.' This is the associate general counsel, assistant general counsel, for Solutia. Mr. White: Yes, sir. The evidence in this case, Your Honor, has shown efforts are ongoing in Anniston as we speak. The Court: For remediation, but we are looking at Mr White: And I will make sure, Your Honor, that those are taken off the Web site. The Court: Well, I don't really care if this one stays on there. Like I said, I think it's interesting where they at one time want to settle disputes because they believe it's good for the community, but now, rather than trying to avoid litigation expense, it looks like they're trying to increase litigation expense. The discussion continued immediately after the portion quoted by Monsanto: Mr. White: Your Honor, we have been participating in settlement negotiations in this case with Your Honor, and while they have not gone like The Court: And I think the settlement offers on both sides have been utterly ridiculous. Mr. White: Yes, sir. The Court: On both sides. Mr. White: Yes, sir. The Court: That means your side, too. Mr. White: I understand. The Court: In fact, they have been I'm trying to think of a real good phrase for it. Ridiculous isWell, they're insulting. More than just ridiculous, the offers that I know of have been insulting and ridiculous. Mr. White: Yes, sir. The Court: Ridiculous on both sides, but certainly insulting on one side, certainly compared to settlements that have been made in other cases with fewer plaintiffs. (Transcript at 3736-38.) Monsanto cites Judge Laird's comments on February 11, 2002, as an instance of bias: Mr. Prater: ... I just want to make sure I don't make you any angrier than I have to at any stage in these proceedings, Your Honor. The Court: I'm not sure you've had to make me as angry as I am yet, but y'all have chosen to do that, and I don't know that it's your choice. I do believe it's the folks in St. Louis that made this decision, and that's fine, but yeah, I want to know each day what has been done and I want to know each day what is going to be done and when and where. (Petition at 41-42, quoting transcript at 4206.) The transcript excerpt incorporated as an exhibit to Monsanto's petition contains one additional paragraph that Monsanto does not quote: [Mr. Prater]: ... We are continuing to work with Mr. Stewart in scheduling different activities. We're looking forward to receiving his status report in response to what we submitted last week. (Transcript at 4206.) Monsanto also cites Judge Laird's remarks during a discussion about discovery issues as further evidence of his bias: The Court: Y'all have other forms of discovery as well. Mr. Prater: Well, Mr. Stewart was just complaining about the other forms of discovery, Your Honor, I mean, we're trying to get this as efficiently as we possibly can in accordance with Your Honor's wishes. The Court: Me, too. Mr. Prater: Absolutely. Do you think we want to depose people unnecessarily? The Court: Yes. Mr. Prater: No, sir, we don't. No, sir, we don't. The Court: Y'all have not given me any indication that you want to do anything else in this case unnecessarily. There is so much in this case that has been unnecessary that I just don't believe, no, that you don't want to take these depositions unnecessarily. I think you want to take every one of them twice, for nothing else, just to harass the plaintiffs Mr. Prater: That isn't true. The Court:and make it as unbearable as possible for them as you have for everybody else. Mr. Prater: Your Honor, as an officer of the Court, I respectfully say that is not our purpose. The Court: Well it certainly appears to be when I read pages after pages of irrelevant questions. (Petition at 42-43, quoting transcript at 4212-14.) The discussion immediately surrounding the exchange Monsanto quotes indicates that the plaintiffs had complained that Monsanto was engaging in unnecessary discovery. The passage that immediately precedes the foregoing quoted material states: [Plaintiffs' attorney]: ... twice, and they're having them again. Now some of those are on the personal-injury claims, but some of them are not. Some of them are on these plaintiffs that are fresh and new, and a lot of the informationThere may be a word changed or two words changed or something like that, so what we're doing is we're spending a lot of time going back over the same ground that we've gone over again. (Transcript at 4212.) The material quoted by Monsanto in its petition appears at this point: The Court: Y'all have other forms of discovery as well. Mr. Prater: Well, Mr. Stewart was just complaining about the other forms of discovery, Your Honor, I mean, we're trying to get this as efficiently as we possibly can in accordance with Your Honor's wishes. The Court: Me, too. Mr. Prater: Absolutely. Do you think we want to depose people unnecessarily? The Court: Yes. Mr. Prater: No, sir, we don't. No, sir, we don't. The Court: Y'all have not given me any indication that you want to do anything else in this case unnecessarily. There is so much in this case that has been unnecessary that I just don't believe, no, that you don't want to take these depositions unnecessarily. I think you want to take every one of them twice, for nothing else, just to harass the plaintiffs Mr. Prater: That isn't true. The Court:and make it as unbearable as possible for them as you have for everybody else. Mr. Prater: Your Honor, as an officer of the Court, I respectfully say that is not our purpose. The Court: Well it certainly appears to be when I read pages after pages of irrelevant questions. The material immediately following the quoted portion reads: Mr. Prater: And we will talk, Your Honor, to our lawyers who are taking those depositions about that very thing. Mr. [Jere] White: And we didn't have any problems in preparation for the trial of these 16. We didn't have any problem with that, and if it got into an area that Donald or who else was there covering, they said, `I think this was adequately covered,' then, as a rule, they discussed it, worked it out and moved on. Mr. Stewart [plaintiff's counsel]: That may be true with you, Jere, but that's not necessarily true.... (Transcript at 4214.) Monsanto argues that, on February 12, 2002, Judge Laird took an adversarial position in response to an objection it raised about a witness's ability to testify as to a document, and that the judge's stance made it appear as if Monsanto were trying to mislead the jury. In support of that claim, Monsanto quotes from the transcript: The Court: What is the basis of the objection? Mr. Ford [defense counsel]: The witness is not familiar with this document. He can't identify the document. It was generated before he was ever at Monsanto. The Court: Okay. Tell me who was at Monsanto at the time that could come here and testify as to the authenticity of this document. Mr. Ford: I don't know, Your Honor, but if the plaintiffs wish to introduce the document, it's the plaintiff's job to get the person to come here and identify it. The Court: Okay. I'll tell you what. Have the president of Monsanto get on a plane today and be here tomorrow morning at 9:00. We can go ahead and recess until then. Mr. Prater [defense counsel]: Your Honor, perhaps I can help. The Court: Well, I hope somebody can. Mr. Prater: Yes sir. I am going to try. We have agreed with the plaintiffs about the authenticity of documents. I don't think that's anything we are questioning right now at all, Your Honor. I know Mr. Ford has a lot more experience than I do, but I think the basis of his objection was that Mr. Rainsaw himself had not seen this particular document and yet he was being cross-examined about it. The Court: I wanted him to be here so we can solve this situation. Who from Monsanto can come here and testify? Mr. Ford: Your Honor, I'll just withdraw the objection. The Court: Well, I want to know out of curiosity. Mr. Prater: I don't know if there is anybody that can identify anything from 1958, Your Honor, in all candor, and we withdraw the objection. I apologize if we have agitated the Court. That's certainly not what we had hoped to do or attempted to do. (Petition at 43-45, quoting transcript at 4483-85; emphasis in petition.) The material immediately preceding and following this exchange adds context. The material immediately preceding is as follows: Q [plaintiffs' counsel]: And this document is from 1958; is that correct? A [witness]: Yes, it is. Q: And this shows that they were measuring Niran and PNP at really sub part per million levels in the parts per billion; isn't that right? A: Well, I see parts per million here. I don't see anything that says parts per billion. Q: If you look on under the Niran, it's.3 parts per million. That would be 300 parts per billion wouldn't it? A: Yes. Mr. Fell: Judge, at this time I would move for the admission of Plaintiffs' Exhibit into evidence. Mr. Ford: Same objection. Your Honor. At this point, the portion of the exchange quoted by Monsanto begins: The Court: What is the basis of the objection? Mr. Ford [defense counsel]: The witness is not familiar with this document. He can't identify the document. It was generated before he was ever at Monsanto. The Court: Okay. Tell me who was at Monsanto at the time that could come here and testify as to the authenticity of this document. Mr. Ford: I don't know, Your Honor, but if the plaintiffs wish to introduce the document, it's the plaintiff's job to get the person to come here and identify it. The Court: Okay. I'll tell you what. Have the president of Monsanto get on a plane today and be here tomorrow morning at 9:00. We can go ahead and recess until then. Mr. Prater [defense counsel]: Your Honor, perhaps I can help. The Court: Well, I hope somebody can. Mr. Prater: Yes sir. I am going to try. We have agreed with the plaintiffs about the authenticity of documents. I don't think that's anything we are questioning right now at all, Your Honor. I know Mr. Ford has a lot more experience than I do, but I think the basis of his objection was that Mr. Rainsaw himself had not seen this particular document and yet he was being cross-examined about it. The Court: I wanted him to be here so we can solve this situation. Who from Monsanto can come here and testify? Mr. Ford: Your Honor, I'll just withdraw the objection. The Court: Well, I want to know out of curiosity. Mr. Prater: I don't know if there is anybody that can identify anything from 1958, Your Honor, in all candor, and we withdraw the objection. I apologize if we have agitated the Court. That's certainly not what we had hoped or attempted to do. And following that, the exchange continued: The Court: Well, y'all brought it up. I was trying to solve the question. Mr. Prater: Yes sir. I understand that. (Transcript at 4483-85.) Monsanto argues that Judge Laird exhibited bias during a discussion on February 18, 2002, on Monsanto's motion for a judgment as a matter of law. Monsanto quotes from the transcript: Mr. Prater: With all due respect, Your Honor, I think a reasonable inference can be made in the ongoing process with the [United States Environmental Protection Agency] that [cleaning up the plaintiffs' properties] is exactly what is being looked at. The Court: I think certainly this jury can make more of a reasonable inference that Monsanto plans to do nothing with these people's properties. Mr. Prater: Well, I'm glad you are not on the jury, Your Honor. The Court: Well, you better be glad I'm not on the jury. Mr. Prater: Yes, sir. The Court: Because I see no evidence in this case of Monsanto's desire to do anything for these plaintiffs. And I've seen nothing outside the evidence to show this Court that Monsanto desires to do anything for these plaintiffs. So all I have seen is that Monsanto will run down to Oxford to clean up the mall to zero or nondetect and clean up a ball field to nondetect but nothing else. And I just wonder how Monsanto can do that so quickly after it's discovered and not be willing to go [sic] more in this case. (Petition at 45-46, quoting transcript at 5271-72; second alteration in petition.) Monsanto quotes from 8 pages later in the transcript of February 18: The Court: They [defendants] are just hoping they can get out of this case on a technicality. Mr. Stewart: That is what I think they are doing. The Court: This is obvious as to what they are doing. (Petition at 46, quoting transcript at 5280; alteration in petition.) [23] Monsanto cites as another example of bias a discussion on February 25, 2002, about jury instructions. Monsanto recites from the transcript: The Court: ... That's all I'm asking; tell me whether or not the evidence in this case supports the fact that it is a public nuisance. Mr. White: But, Judge, how can they make that decision if they don't know about the others? The Court: Let me ask you: How can they not make that decision, considering the fact that it [PCBs] is in everyIt is in the waterways; it is in the air; it is in Oxford; it is in Talladega County. It is limited more than these 16 folks. So how can they not really reach the conclusion? That is my question. I don't see how they could not reach that conclusion. (Petition at 47, quoting from transcript at 5608.) [24] The discussion immediately preceding the material quoted by Monsanto reads: Mr. White: If certain conditions are met, you are correct. The Court: And I think we can answer those questions when we get to that part of asking them what the damages are. Mr. King: Judge, in addition if the Court is inclined to doIt sounds like you are inclined to ask that one question. We do think it needs to be put in context so that they can understand the difference between public and private. We had requested some charges before that we would request the Court to give, including 6.2, 6.3 I think now should ask if you determine that the conduct alleged by the plaintiffs would be a private nuisance, it has limited effects to only a few individuals, then you may not find a public nuisance exists. I think the Court has said you are not going to give that charge, but I think that would be an appropriate charge. I would especially ask for a modification of 6.5 to say this, because I don't think this is covered in what the Court has highlighted. `To be a public nuisance you must find that the conduct caused a special damage as to these plaintiffs, special damage[ ], damage which is different in kind and degree from the damage suffered by the public in general.' And that comes from the Russell case. The Court: Not necessarily, because in this portion of the case, we aren't dealing with just these 16 people and their damage. I think when we get to the point of charging the jury on damages, we will have to ask them if these plaintiffs suffered any special damage that weren't suffered at large. But at this point, for the sake of determining whether this is a public or private nuisanceor whether it is a public nuisance.... (Transcript at 5605-08.) This is the point where the material quoted by Monsanto begins: The Court: ... That's all I'm asking; tell me whether or not the evidence in this case supports the fact that it is a public nuisance. Mr. White: But, Judge, how can they make that decision if they don't know about the others? The Court: Let me ask you: How can they not make that decision, considering the fact that it [PCBs] is in everyIt is in the waterways; it is in the air; it is in Oxford; it is in Talladega County. It is limited more than these 16 folks. So how can they not really reach the conclusion? That is my question. I don't see how they could not reach that conclusion. (Transcript at 5605-08.) Monsanto also cites comments made by Judge Laird on February 25, 2002, that appear 32 pages later in the transcript, at a point when the parties were discussing what would come next in the trial: The Court: Well, I just thought about what else it was I wanted to say. Back in the record I have you saying that Judge, you know how these things work; we go for a little while in the courtroom and we hear the evidence, and then both sides start talking, and we will start talking and maybe settle this case. I also have the attorneys for the defendant in this case on the record, and I think even on the record before the Supreme Court of this state, stating that what the defense wanted was a benchmark trial then to determine what to do in the rest of this case. The only thing I see the defense doing in this case is try[ing] to run to Montgomery and stretch this thing out as far as possible. So I don't believe that the defense was arguing [in] good faith with the Supreme Court of this state. I don't believe the defense has been arguing to this Court in good faith. I don't believe the defense has been dealing with this Court in good faith, certainly has not been dealing in good faith in any mediations this Court has ordered. I certainly don't believe the defense has been dealing in good faith and trying to reach the most efficient and effective resolution of this case. So what else was it, Mr. Prater? Mr. Prater: I regret, Your Honor, that you feel that way. The Court: I regret that I do too. Mr. Prater: We take very seriously our obligations to this Court and other courts. I think in no way, Your Honor, have we shirked that responsibility in any way whatsoever. The Court: I just tend to disagree. (Petition at 47-49, quoting transcript at 5639-42.) The material surrounding this exchange puts those remarks in context: [unknown speaker]: ... The plaintiffs, though, with respect to these 16 plaintiffs have rested. Therefore, the evidence that pertains to these 16 plaintiffs has already been presented to this jury, and we think it would be appropriate at this time for that portion of the case to be The Court: Again, the plaintiffs rested as to phase one in this case. I tried my best to make it as clear as possible as long as three plus years ago that it was this Court's intent and plan to proceed with a phase one, with phase one solely being the determination of liability in this case. Now, the parties did convince me that in order to prove liability in this case, that some evidence would have to be presented as far as damages goes and that a certain number of plaintiffs would have to be allowed to testify in this first phase. That made sense to this Court. So the Court agreed. But this Court has never changed its plan of proceeding with phase one being liability and then damages being considered after phase one. I'm going to stick to that plan until somebody higher than me tells me I should go with a different plan. And certainly this Court will abide by any directives it is given. But what else, Mr. Prater? Mr. Prater: Yes sir. I understand your ruling on my previous two motions, Your Honor. In light of Your Honor's scheduling order that was entered in November of 2001, November 20, 2001 (Transcript at 5637-39.) At this point the portion of the exchange quoted by Monsanto begins: The Court: Well, I just thought about what else it was I wanted to say. Back in the record I have you saying that Judge, you know how these things work; we go for a little while in the courtroom and we hear the evidence, and then both sides start talking, and we will start talking and maybe settle this case. I also have the attorneys for the defendant in this case on the record, and I think even on the record before the Supreme Court of this state, stating that what the defense wanted was a benchmark trial then to determine what to do in the rest of this case. The only thing I see the defense doing in this case is try[ing] to run to Montgomery and stretch this thing out as far as possible. So I don't believe that the defense was arguing [in] good faith with the Supreme Court of this state. I don't believe the defense has been arguing to this Court in good faith. I don't believe the defense has been dealing with this Court in good faith, certainly has not been dealing in good faith in any mediations this Court has ordered. I certainly don't believe the defense has been dealing in good faith and trying to reach the most efficient and effective resolution of this case. So what else was it, Mr. Prater? Mr. Prater: I regret, Your Honor, that you feel that way. The Court: I regret that I do too. Mr. Prater: We take very seriously our obligations to this Court and other courts. I think in no way, Your Honor, have we shirked that responsibility in any way whatsoever. The Court: I just tend to disagree. And this follows immediately after the portion quoted by Monsanto: Mr. Prater: Yes, sir. As to other motions we would like to make at this time, in light of Your Honor's November 22, 2001, scheduling order, which required the plaintiffs to identify more than 75 days those plaintiffs that would be designated for subsequent phases, we move to dismiss all plaintiffs that were designated for the phase two portion of this trial because they were not designated more than 75 days before their case is to be presented. We ask for Your Honor to enforce that aspect of your scheduling order. The Court: Again, simplyand I believe I have already stated this for the record days ago. But this Court didn't draft that order. I'm not sure which party drafted the order. I know the defendants requested a certain number of days to be given notice as to which order the plaintiffs would be called. And this Court deems that to simply be a notice, period, as to notice of which plaintiffs are being called in which order, not, as I have said beforeThat 75 days was not a date within which the parties could begin getting this case ready for trial. I will note again on the record that over three years ago when this case was called up for trial in February that both sides announced ready to proceed. And at that time this case had over 2,000 plaintiffs in it at that time, around 2,700 I believe. So both sides have announced ready to proceed at that time. Both sides announced ready to proceedWell, no. One side asked for a continuance. But this Court cut discovery off in this case as of September 2001. The order that you are referring to that requires the plaintiffs to give 75 days notice. Does thatbut that order also says.... (Transcript at 5637-44.) At that point the transcript excerpt submitted with Monsanto's exhibits cuts off. Monsanto submits a final example of what it argues are prejudicial remarks by Judge Laird from the transcript of proceedings on Saturday morning, March 2, 2002. The portion of the transcript quoted by Monsanto reads: The Court: ... [T]his is a public case. Monsanto has chosen to litigate this case in a public forum. [It has] failed to act in good faith in the past to mediate the case, so I don't know that there's a problem in disclosing to the public that a settlement conference may be going on, but we will just say we're starting testimony next Wednesday on the injunctive phase. (Petition at 49, quoting transcript at 5810.) Monsanto included two pages from the transcript of the March 2, 2002, proceedings among its exhibits. The other included material reads: The Court: Let's go on the record, Rusty. Let the record reflect that today I had set a settlement conference for 9:00. It is about 9:25. I've got two clocks that sayWell, I've got three clocks that say 9:27, so it must be 9:27. Present in the court are the district attorney, Joe Hubbard, on behalf of the State of Alabama, John Buchanan, my bailiff; Rusty Houk, my court reporter; and me. I did receive a letter yesterday. First of all, it's on the record on Tuesday where the defense made a motion to delay or postpone this hearing today. I denied the motion. Since that day, the parties were here in this courtroom in Anniston on Wednesday. I believe Wednesday afternoon I received a phone call from Jere White, one of the attorneys for the defendants. Mr. White.... (Transcript at 5801.) There is a gap in the materials Monsanto submitted as exhibits; the transcript picks up nine pages later at page 5810. Nothing on the page in the materials Monsanto submitted to this Court indicates who is speaking at this point. Because Monsanto quotes Judge Laird from this page, we assume that Judge Laird is speaking at this point as well: ... testimony, if not sooner. That way we will avoid whatever problem Mr. White [Monsanto's attorney] had about calling this a `settlement conference.' Certainly, that's not admissible before the jury, any talks of settlement negotiations, and it wouldn't be admissible before the jury, so I'm not sureI know he doesn't want the news media knowing that the parties in this case are talking settlement, but I think the news media has a right to know under the Constitution. At this point the material quoted by Monsanto begins: [T]his is a public case. Monsanto has chosen to litigate this case in a public forum. [It has] failed to act in good faith in the past to mediate the case, so I don't know that there's a problem in disclosing to the public that a settlement conference may be going on, but we will just say we're starting testimony next Wednesday on the injunctive phase. (Transcript at 5801 and 5810.) Without citation to authority, Monsanto concludes that those remarks individually or collectively indicate that Judge Laird has improperly taken on the role of advocate and that, therefore, the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics require his recusal. Monsanto included among its exhibits some transcript excerpts from which it did not quote in its petition. An excerpt from February 25, 2002, reads: The Court: If I truly believed that the defendants would be prejudiced by proceeding, I wouldn't proceed. But I simply don't believe in looking at the information in Defendants' Bench Exhibit 11 that the defense says they need, and given the time within which the defense has had to obtain this information, the fact that they didn't even obtain it years ago when they had an opportunity to obtain it, then when they should have obtained itwhen this case was set for trial previouslygiven so many factors that I have already enumerated on the record, looking at the state of the testimony in this casemy goodness; Mr. Bliss, I simply don't understand how he is going to come in and say anything different than he did before. He has already found there is no market resistance. Mr. Prater [defense counsel]: Then I guess the plaintiffs won't need to take his deposition, Your Honor. The Court: I'm not going to let them. I'm not going to let them. Because his opinion is not going to change. You think he is going to come in here and testify on behalf of Monsanto thatmarket resistance? Mr. Prater: He is going to testify as the facts develop, Your Honor, and he is going to testify truthfully. The Court: Okay. Well, then, I don't think the plaintiffs are worried about the truth if that is what the truth is going to be. What I am saying is if his testimony is different, it just about had to [inure] to the benefit of the plaintiffs. If it is not any different, well, then, we don't need to waste the time of this Court and of Mr. Bliss and of a whole lot more folks in even Mr. Prater: And, Your Honor, we have discussed since Friday among ourselves, and we would be happy to discuss with Your Honor and Mr. Stewart [plaintiff's counsel] ways that the subsequent parts of this case can be streamlined. And it was our hope, Your Honor, and perhaps an incorrect expectation that perhaps we could sit down with Your Honor and Mr. Stewart after the phase that was completed on Friday to talk about ways to streamline the case through stipulations or other mechanisms. The Court: Okay. My ears are open. Start talking. Mr. Prater: We will need to discuss it further, Your Honor, and would be happy to talk with Your Honor. The Court: I told you my ears are open. I'm listening. Mr. Prater: Yes sir. There may be stipulations that can be applied to some of the testimony. Of course, stipulations go two ways, Your Honor, and we have to have the plaintiffs' cooperation with that. We will be happy to talk with them about it. The Court: This Court sees no reason why a lot of the remainder of the testimony in this case cannot be stipulated. Mr. Prater: Your Honor, that may be correct, and we merely askand I know that is exactly what Your Honor doesn't want to hear, but ask for some time to try and figure out ways to do that and make it manageable for everyone. The Court: Y'all have had plenty of timeWe have been in this trial since January Mr. Prater: I knew you wouldn't like it Judge. I knew you wouldn't like it. The Court: I like the idea. It is just too little too late. We have been here a long time already. We have got a very long time to go. I'm not going to waste any more time than I have to to reach a result that may not happen. I've spent these past seven weeks doing as the defense basically requested me to do three years ago with the belief that the defense was going to act in good faith in using this as a benchmark or in trying to settle this case once the testimony began. ButAnd again, I don't think it is the fault of any of the attorneys from Lightfoot, Franklin, & White [law firm]. I certainly don't think it is the fault of the Honorable George Ford. I think that directive came from St. Louis. And I think your hands have been tied. But I've got to proceed toward the finish line in this case. I have spent a great deal of time giving the parties time and the attorneys time to try to come up with ways to shorten this case or ways to resolve the issues in this case without going through this lengthy process. And I haven't gone forward on any of those efforts. If anything, I have gone backwards. I don't want to spend any more time to stay in the same spot or to go backwards. I'm moving toward the finish line in this case as best I can. So y'allBut just because I'm not going to call a recess for y'all to discuss ways doesn't mean y'all can't continue to discuss ways. Mr. Stewart: Judge, might I suggest that we do that and make some suggestions to the Court as to how we could shorten some aspects of the trial of this case? For instance, if they are willing to stipulate to some of the findingsIt is my understanding they don't intend to take any soil samples. That is what one of the parties told me, they are not going to take any soil samples on any of the remaining properties. (Transcript at 5701-08.) Monsanto cuts off the excerpt at this point. When Monsanto's counsel suggested to the trial court that in order to speed up the proceedings Monsanto would need a recess to discuss stipulations with the plaintiffs, Judge Laird refused to grant a recess. Instead, Judge Laird vented his frustration about the delays in the case. Judge Laird invited Monsanto to make suggestions about stipulations in open court; Monsanto demurred. The fact that Judge Laird saw this request for a recess as an attempt by a party to delay the proceedings and that he expressed his frustration with any delay does not indicate that Judge Laird appears biased. The plaintiffs argue that [a]ll of the allegedly prejudicial statements were made by the trial judge directly in the course of judicial proceedings and constituted the judge's assessment of the defendants' conduct during the litigation. (Plaintiffs' Answer at 17.) We agree. The evidence presented in Monsanto's petition does not suggest that Judge Laird exhibited any bias before the commencement of this action or from any source outside the proceedings. It is unrealistic to expect a trial judge not to form opinions during the course of litigation, and the expression of those opinions is not grounds for a judge's recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 550-51, 114 S.Ct. 1147. As Judge Jerome Frank pithily put it: `Impartiality is not gullibility. Disinterestedness does not mean child-like innocence. If the judge did not form judgments of the actors in those court-house dramas called trials, he could never render decisions. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147. Moreover, a trial judge's expression of annoyance at counsel is the expected result of the judge's attempt to enforce courtroom discipline and is expressly not a ground for recusal. See Ex parte Large, 501 So.2d 1208, 1210 (Ala.1986)(holding that a trial judge's characterization of the counsel/defendant's actions as unconscionable is not grounds for recusal); Hartman v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama, 436 So.2d 837, 841 (Ala.1983)(holding that a trial judge's expression of anger over the plaintiff's filing of a mandamus petition with this Court was not grounds for recusal); Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (A judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administrationeven a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administrationremain immune.). We hold that Monsanto has not demonstrated a clear legal right to Judge Laird's recusal based on Judge Laird's judicial remarks and actions.