Opinion ID: 852652
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indiana's Arson Statute

Text: Dorsey argues that the structure of Indiana's arson statute is the same as the OWI statute addressed in Kelly. Specifically, he argues that the actus reus of the crime of arson is damaging of property, and the results of that action (pecuniary loss, death, or bodily injury) are factors to enhance the punishment for the arson, but do not create separate crimes for which a sentence can be imposed and consecutively enforced. We agree that the arson statute has some of the same structure as the OWI statute, but it is not entirely of the same character. Indiana Code section 35-43-1-1 (2004) provides: [1] (a) A person who, by means of fire, explosive, or destructive device, knowingly or intentionally damages: (1) a dwelling of another person without the other person's consent; (2) property of any person under circumstances that endanger human life; (3) property of another person without the other person's consent if the pecuniary loss is at least five thousand dollars ($5,000); or (4) a structure used for religious worship without the consent of the owner of the structure; commits arson, a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant. (b) A person who commits arson for hire commits a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if it results in bodily injury to any other person. (c) A person who, by means of fire, explosive, or destructive device, knowingly or intentionally damages property of any person with intent to defraud commits arson, a Class C felony. (d) A person who, by means of fire, explosive, or destructive device, knowingly or intentionally damages property of another person without the other person's consent so that the resulting pecuniary loss is at least two hundred fifty dollars ($250) but less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) commits arson, a Class D felony. This statute, first enacted in 1977, has a rather complex structure. When it is parsed with some difficulty, it produces the following results: It is a crime knowingly or intentionally to damage property by fire, explosive, or destructive device if either without the owner's consent, another person's property is damaged between $250 and $5,000, a D felony, [section 1(d)], or without the owner's consent, another person's property is damaged at least $5,000, a B felony, [subsection (a)(3)], or an A felony if bodily injury results to a non-defendant, [section 1(a), last sentence] or the property is the dwelling of another person and is damaged without that person's consent (whatever its value and whoever owns it), a B felony, [subsection (a)(1)], or an A felony if bodily injury results to a non-defendant [section 1(a), last sentence], or the property is a structure used for religious worship and is damaged (in any amount) without the owner's consent, a B felony, [subsection (a)(4)], or an A felony if bodily injury results to a non-defendant [section 1(a), last sentence], or the property (whatever its value and whoever owns it) is damaged under circumstances that endanger human life, a B felony, [subsection (a)(2)], or an A felony if bodily injury results to a non-defendant [section 1(a), last sentence], or the property (of any value and whoever owns it) is damaged with intent to defraud, a C felony, [section 1(c)], or any of the above, if done for hire, a B felony, or an A felony if it results in bodily injury to another person, [section 1(b)]. As already noted, the OWI statute in Kelly criminalized the operation of a vehicle while intoxicated without any resulting harm, and elevated the penalty if bodily injury resulted and further elevated it for death. Unlike the OWI statute, the arson statute does not simply create a base crimedamaging property by fireto which elevated penalties are attached for various consequences. Rather, damaging of property is a necessary but not sufficient condition of an arson. The arson statute defines B felony arson by alternative sets of elements that include consequences (damage of at least $5,000), motivation (for hire), character of the property destroyed (dwelling, place of worship), and the risk of consequences that do not result (endangerment of human life). We therefore do not agree that arson as a B felony is governed by Kelly. Despite this lack of entirely modular structure, however, we think the statute's A felony provisions are of the same structure as the OWI statute, and produce the same result in Dorsey's case (only one A felony) as the OWI statute did in Kelly (only one OWI). How we reach this conclusion requires some explanation.