Opinion ID: 2357828
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voir Dire Regarding Penalty Deliberations

Text: During voir dire the court examined the willingness of potential jurors to impose the death penalty if the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that they concluded death was warranted. However, in querying individual jurors, the court used a shorthand expression: the bad outweighs the good. For example, the court asked: If the bad outweighs the good, can you see yourself actually voting for death? Prospective Juror No. 11: Yes. The Court: If the bad outweighs the good, can you see yourself nevertheless voting for life? Prospective Juror No. 11: Yes. The defense never objected to the shorthand usage, or asked for further elaboration on the point during jury selection. Defendant now contends these colloquies amounted to de facto instructions that were prejudicially defective in two respects: (1) The word good misleadingly suggested that only positive behavior on the part of the defendant might be considered as a mitigating circumstance; and (2) the shorthand expression also failed to inform jurors that in order to return a verdict of death, each of them would have to be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating factors that death was warranted, instead of life without possibility of parole. Neither claim is meritorious. The court covered both of these points when it initially explained the law to the jury before conducting voir dire. At the penalty phase we deal with different kinds of evidence, mitigation and aggravation, good things, to make it simple, versus the bad things. The court clarified that good was not limited to good deeds, but rather included background factors, such as a tough childhood or brain damage, that might explain the defendant's conduct and help the jury decide what the appropriate penalty is. It repeatedly emphasized that rendering a death verdict would be appropriate only if the jurors concluded that the aggravating factors substantially outweighed the mitigating factors. Both points were covered again in formal instructions before the penalty deliberations. The jury was specifically told: A mitigating circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does not constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in determining the appropriateness of the death penalty. To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (7) We have repeatedly upheld the pattern jury instruction [12] used by the court in its formal instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1249 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171] ( Bramit ).) The jury was properly instructed, and the court explained its shorthand usage. It is not required that every utterance by the court be so formulaic as to constantly repeat cumbersome phrases or unduly consume time. A party concerned about lack of clarity may certainly interpose an objection. None was made here. Finally, there is no indication that the jury was actually misled.