Opinion ID: 2507910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Granting the Motions for Summary Judgment

Text: [¶23] We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal. The evidence presented by the Abrahams structured one or more genuine issues of material fact that must be resolved by the fact finder. See, e.g., Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 642 P.2d 36 (Colo.App. 1982) (buyer of inherently dangerous product, propane, need not prove it was in a defective condition when it left hands of seller); Tune v. Synergy Gas Corporation, 883 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Mo.banc 1994) (failure to warn cases have two separate requirements of causation: (1) product for which there was no warning must cause injury complained of; (2) plaintiff must show that warning would have altered his behavior. Where plaintiff testified he did know what propane smelled like, but did not know that odorant might not be effective under some circumstances, plaintiff made out prima facie case); Crook v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 54 F.Supp. 2d 947, 959-60 (D.Neb. 1999) (where plaintiffs were intimately familiar with properties of propane, e.g., that it was heavier than air and could lose its odorant, failure to warn not proximate cause of injury, summary judgment appropriate); and see generally Parkinson v. California Company, 233 F. 432 (10th Cir. 1956); Wade R. Habeeb, Annotation, Duty and Liability in Connection with Odorization of Natural Gas, 70 A.L.R.3d 1060 (1976 and Supp.2002). For this reason the order granting summary judgment must be reversed.