Opinion ID: 2071130
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Additional Individual Issues

Text: Also tipping the scales of the predominance inquiry against Respondents is the legal nature of their common law claims of fraud and deceit and negligent misrepresentation, and their statutory cause of action under various provisions of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. The unsuitability of such claims for class action treatment arises from the burden placed on Respondents of proving individual reliance upon Petitioners' alleged misrepresentations and material omissions regarding (1) the addictive nature of nicotine; (2) the adverse health effects of tobacco usage; (3) Petitioners' knowledge of and research concerning the addictive nature of nicotine and the adverse health effects of tobacco usage; (4) Petitioners' manipulation of nicotine levels and the bio-availability of nicotine in tobacco products; and (5) Petitioners' intent to addict consumers to tobacco usage. Concerning the propriety of prosecuting a civil fraud claim as a class action, the Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendments of Federal Rule 23 counsels as follows: [A] fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found, for separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals within the class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in the representations made or in the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were addressed. Federal Rule 23 Committee Note, supra, 39 F.R.D. at 103 (emphasis added). In light of these concerns, we conclude that reliance is another issue unique to each putative class member, thus adding extra weight to the predominance of individual over common questions and further rendering the present litigation unfit for class action treatment. Success in Maryland on a civil claim of fraud requires proof of reliance. As this Court has frequently reiterated, In order to recover damages in an action for fraud or deceit, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff, (2) that its falsity was either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indifference as to its truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation and had the right to rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff suffered compensable injury resulting from the misrepresentation. Nails v. S & R, Inc., 334 Md. 398, 415, 639 A.2d 660, 668 (1994) (emphasis added) (citing eleven cases dating back to 1872). [29] The common law tort of negligent misrepresentation likewise incorporates reliance as an element of proof. See Sheets v. Brethren Mutual, 342 Md. 634, 656-57, 679 A.2d 540, 551 (1996) (repeating that included within the prima facie elements of the tort of negligent misrepresentation in Maryland are that the defendant has knowledge that the plaintiff will probably rely on the [defendant's negligently asserted false] statement, which, if erroneous, will cause loss or injury and that the plaintiff, justifiably, takes action in reliance on the statement (quoting Gross v. Sussex, 332 Md. 247, 259, 630 A.2d 1156, 1162 (1993))). Reliance by consumers would also seem to be a necessary precondition to awarding restitution or damages pursuant to the statutory consumer protection provisions pleaded by Respondents. See Luskin's v. Consumer Protection, 353 Md. 335, 386, 726 A.2d 702, 727 (1999); Consumer Protection v. Consumer Pub., 304 Md. 731, 781, 501 A.2d 48, 74 (1985) (holding in case of agency-initiated action that blanket order of automatic restitution to all consumers was improper because restitution to particular purchasers was appropriate only after verification of actual reliance by those purchasers on company's misleading or deceptive advertisements); Consumer Protection v. Outdoor World, 91 Md.App. 275, 291, 603 A.2d 1376, 1383 (1992) (stating that actual restitution may not be ordered in the absence of some evidence that the individual purchaser was deceived by and relied upon the offending communication). One need only read the depositions of the named class representatives to recognize that reliance will vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. [30] Prospective class members may have heard or read some, all or none of the misrepresentations allegedly made by Petitioners. Moreover, in making the decision to purchase and use Petitioners' tobacco products, each member may have relied heavily, slightly or not at all on the various, arguably deceitful sales pitches, multimedia denials and assertions, and otherwise public claims of Petitioners with respect to their tobacco products. Such individual discrepancies obviously cannot be glossed over at trial on a classwide basis but must be allowed to be delved into by Petitioners, class member by class member. [31] Even more uncommon issues abound in this case. For instance, whether an individual is dependent on or addicted to nicotine, aside from the concomitant choice of law problems discussed earlier, is an issue that would need to be evaluated on an individual basis. See Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479, 500 (E.D.Pa.1997), aff'd, 161 F.3d 127 (3rd Cir.1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1114, 119 S.Ct. 1760, 143 L.Ed.2d 791 (1999); see also Emig v. American Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379, 389 (D.Kan.1998). Furthermore, to establish a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Respondents must establish that emotional distress is severe, thus requiring individual assessments. See Caldor v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 625 A.2d 959 (1993). Affirmative defenses will also come into play, with Petitioners alleging assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, and, where the place of wrong for a particular plaintiff occurred in one of certain other states, comparative negligence. On the issue of causation, Respondents argue that injury in fact causation focuses on the effects of Petitioners' conduct on each class as a whole and may be proved on a classwide basis. We have serious doubts, given each of the legal claims of Respondents, that the issue of causation will not need to be decided at some point as to each individual class member. See Insolia v. Philip Morris Inc., 186 F.R.D. 535, 546 (W.D.Wis.1998) (Causation remains one of the more formidable issues not subject to general proof.); Barnes, 161 F.3d at 135 (The resolution of this `general causation question' would accomplish nothing for any of the individual plaintiffs.); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 174 F.R.D. 90, 96 (W.D.Mo.1997) (`[A] finding of general causation would do little to advance this litigation.' Liability will not turn on whether cigarettes are generally capable of causing disease: liability will depend upon whether cigarettes caused a particular plaintiff's disease. (Quoting Harding v. Tambrands Inc., 165 F.R.D. 623, 630 (D.Kan.1996)) (other citations omitted)); In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 165 (2d Cir.1987) (The relevant question ... is not whether Agent Orange has the capacity to cause harm, the generic causation issue, but whether it did cause harm and to whom. That determination is highly individualistic....). [32]