Opinion ID: 3001539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reann Taylor

Text: Following Taylor’s guilty plea, the probation officer concluded that she was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine. The district judge overruled Taylor’s objection to that drug‐quantity calculation, noting that she had admitted seeing two pounds of glass in the Nelsons’ bedroom and had distributed multiple‐ounce quantities Nos. 06‐3633, 06‐3726 & 06‐3851 Page 3 of the drug for them over the course of 18 months. That calculation earned Taylor a base offense level of 34, see U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1(c)(3), which the district court increased by two levels after attributing the guns in the Nelsons’ home to Taylor, see id. § 2D1.1(b)(1), but then reduced by three levels because she accepted responsibility for the crime, see id. § 3E1.1. The resulting total offense level of 33 coupled with Taylor’s criminal history category of III yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 168 to 210 months. See id. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The court sentenced Taylor to 180 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Taylor first challenges the district court’s conclusion that she was responsible for between 1.5 and 5 kilograms of methamphetamine. She argues that the district court should not have added to her drug quantity the two pounds of methamphetamine she saw in the Nelsons’ home at an unspecified time, and that the court failed to explain its finding that she had distributed multiple‐ounce quantities of methamphetamine for a period of about 18 months. We review the court’s drug‐quantity calculation for clear error. United States v. Wilson, 481 F.3d 475, 483 (7th Cir. 2007). The government had to prove the applicable drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Artley, 489 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2007). Any amount from 1.5 to 5 kilograms of methamphetamine would have yielded the same base offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). Taylor was accountable not only for what she sold personally but also for the reasonably foreseeable amounts sold by her coconspirators as part of the jointly undertaken activity, id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); Wilson, 481 F.3d at 483. And although a sentencing court may not speculate about the quantity of drugs for which a defendant is responsible, the guidelines do permit the court to make a reasonable estimate. United States v. Hollins, 498 F.3d 622, 631 (7th Cir. 2007). In making that estimate, however, the court cannot include coconspirators’ conduct that occurred before the defendant joined the conspiracy—even if the defendant knew about the conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2; United States v. Zaccagnino, 467 F.3d 1044, 1047 (7th Cir. 2006). That is what the district court did here, says Taylor, when it added in the two pounds of glass she saw in the Nelsons’ house. We do not agree. Although Taylor never said precisely when she observed the glass, the district court reasonably concluded that the date was after Taylor had joined and endorsed the full scope of the Nelsons’ conspiracy. Taylor had lived with the Nelsons for only a short time before she started dealing for them, and the district court reasonably concluded that she saw the two pounds (roughly 907 grams) at some point during the 18 months she was involved in the conspiracy. Moreover, nothing in this record suggests that Taylor limited her involvement in the conspiracy; she stood ready and willing to sell—or at least try to sell—whatever amount of methamphetamine the Nelsons could supply, so the two pounds she saw after joining the conspiracy was properly attributed to her. See Hollins, 498 F.3d at 630‐31. Nos. 06‐3633, 06‐3726 & 06‐3851 Page 4 Even without the two pounds, though, the 1.5‐kilogram quantity was satisfied because the district court reasonably relied on the probation officer’s conclusion that Taylor had sold multiple‐ounce quantities for approximately 18 months. Taylor says there is no evidence to support that conclusion, but her presentence report recounts Michele Nelson’s statement that Taylor “went through between an ounce and a quarter pound of ‘glass’ each week,” and we know that Taylor was involved for 18 months. According to that estimate, if Taylor sold just one ounce (28.35 grams) per week, her relevant conduct would exceed 1.5 kilograms (28.35 grams x 78 weeks = 2.2 kilograms). So given Nelson’s information, which Taylor never contested in the district court, the finding that Taylor was responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms of methamphetamine is not clearly erroneous. See Hollins, 498 F.3d at 631. Taylor next argues that the district court erred in assessing a two‐level upward adjustment for possessing guns in relation to the drug‐trafficking activity. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Because most of the customers related that they had seen guns in the Nelsons’ home, often near their drug supply, the district court concluded that it was not clearly improbable that the guns were connected to the conspiracy’s drug trafficking activity and that they were reasonably foreseeable to Taylor. Taylor did not object to the increase, nor does she dispute that the Nelsons kept guns to further the conspiracy. But she now asserts that the government adduced no evidence that she knew about the guns or that they were reasonably foreseeable to her. The sentencing court did not plainly err in determining that the guns were reasonably foreseeable to Taylor. See United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 558 (7th Cir. 2007); U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) & 2D1.1(b)(1). Numerous customers reported seeing shotguns, rifles, pistols, and a revolver in the Nelsons’ bedroom, living room, and yard. They also reported seeing Taylor in the Nelsons’ home. Given the frequency of Taylor’s visits to the Nelsons’ home and the Nelsons’ open possession of the guns, the district court did not err in concluding that the guns were reasonably foreseeable to Taylor. Finally, Taylor argues that her 180‐month prison term is unreasonable. Her first contention—that we should stop presuming that a sentence with the guidelines range is reasonable—is a nonstarter now that Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), has upheld that appellate presumption. And Taylor’s general challenge to the reasonableness of her sentence also is unavailing. She contends that the district judge did not meaningfully address mitigating factors, including her substance‐abuse problem, a troubled childhood that led her to run away at age 12 and have two children by age 16, and the physical and emotional abuse she suffered at the hands of her children’s father. But in fact the district court did consider Taylor’s history and characteristics, including everything she mentions Nos. 06‐3633, 06‐3726 & 06‐3851 Page 5 here. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The court also considered the nature and circumstances of the offense, see id., particularly Taylor’s sales of drugs to young people, and the fact that her substance abuse made her a likely candidate for recidivism, see id. § 3553(a)(2). The judge concluded that a 180‐month term would hold Taylor accountable for her conduct, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), protect the community, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(C), allow her to participate in substance‐abuse treatment and vocational training, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(D), and achieve parity with similarly situated offenders, see id. § 3553(a)(6). Given this adequate statement of reasons, see Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468, we will not reweigh the sentencing factors.