Opinion ID: 2511845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 2009 Amendments Do More Than Merely Clarify the Meaning of an Earlier Enactment

Text: ¶ 43 It is well established in our case law that when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the meaning of an earlier [statute], the amendment may be applied retroactively in pending actions. Due South, Inc. v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 2008 UT 71, ¶ 14, 197 P.3d 82 (alteration in original) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 2001 UT 107 ¶ 59, 37 P.3d 1130). An amendment serves as a clarification when it corrects a discrepancy or merely amplif[ies]... how the law should have been understood prior to [the amendment]. Richards Irr. Co. v. Karren, 880 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah Ct. App.1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). In cases of doubt or uncertainty as to the character of an amendment, the title or preamble to a statutory amendment may be examined to clarify the purpose of the change. See, e.g., Shelter Am. Corp. v. Ohio Cas. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (noting the preamble to a statutory amendment stated that the purpose of the amendment was to clarify that a mobile home constituted a motor vehicle, under the statute). ¶ 44 When we examine the 2009 amendments to Utah Code section 19-4-111, nothing in their text appears to be an attempt to clarify preexisting language. Rather, the amendments add a new subsection to the statute providing an additional exemption to the fluoridation requirement that did not exist in any form before the amendments were made. Should there be any doubt as to the character of these amendments, the preamble to Senate Bill 29, amending section 19-4-111, is instructive. It states, [t]his bill defines terms; requires the majority of the voting shareholders of a corporate public water system to approve the addition or removal of fluori[d]e in the public water system; and makes technical changes. See Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments, ch. 371 § 1, 2009 Utah Laws 2029-30. This language makes clear that the amendment added a substantive requirement to the statute and was more than a mere clarification. We find the language in our case of Salt Lake Union Stock Yards v. Tax Comm'n , to be applicable to describe the situation: In this case we see no room for the argument that the Legislature intended to give a definition retroactively to words used in a previous enactment. There is no language used in the ... amendment from which this can be inferred. [The amendment] is clearly an attempt to extend [a new] exemption to [another class] of [individuals]. 93 Utah 166, 71 P.2d 538, 541 (1937). Senate Bill 29 was not a mere clarification of the law; it was an affirmative addition of a new exemption to the statute. We now turn to whether this addition was procedural in nature, or if it affected the substantive rights of the parties.