Opinion ID: 203925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Denial of Injunctive Relief

Text: The district court based its denial of the second motion for injunctive relief on its conclusion that Dr. González-Droz failed to make the requisite showing of irreparable injury. We agree. Asserting in his second motion that he had moved to California because of the Notice, appellant attached to his motion an Unsworn Statement Under Penalty of Perjury. In it, he described the considerable expenses and efforts he had taken to rebuild his cosmetic medicine practice there. He stated that he had lost income as a result of this move and that he had been harmed by the temporary inability to pursue a profession that requires its constant practice. He also made his only explicit argument on the record about irreparable injury: Because of its particular nature, medicine is a profession that requires the physician to constantly and continuously engage in its active practice. Otherwise, the physician would see her skills diminish due to inactivity. In the past 18 months, plaintiff González Droz has approved 150 credits of continuing medical education. That has helped him keep his mind busy and should help him in the continuing development of his career, but does not and could not compensate for his professional inactivity during those 18 months. That inactivity is only part of the irreparable harm suffered by plaintiffs at the expense of defendants and of their arbitrary and unconscionable actions. Besides, as the Supreme Court has held, [n]o later hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject to the right of procedural due process has already occurred. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). This argument is unpersuasive. First, all of the facts appellant marshals in an effort to demonstrate irreparable harm related to harm the plaintiff had already suffered, rather than to harm he would suffer if the preliminary injunction were not granted. When he filed the second motion for a preliminary injunction, he had already expended a substantial amount of time and resources in relocating his practice as a result of the Board's actions. These expenses, as well as the period of professional inactivity that he describes, were already behind him at the time of the district court's second injunction ruling. The motion thus rests on an assertion that he had been injured by an unlawful practice or that he had suffered [p]ast exposure to illegal conduct. Steir, 383 F.3d at 16. If he succeeds on the merits, appellant may be entitled to compensation for these past harms. [6] But he did not demonstrate the prospect of future harm, the essential prerequisite for equitable relief. Id. [7] Moreover, by the time he submitted his second motion, Dr. González-Droz could only have been harmed in the future if he returned to Puerto Rico and was unable to practice medicine. But the plaintiff asserted that he had moved to California and he made no showing (or even allegation) that he would have resumed the practice of medicine in Puerto Rico if his medical license were restored. He did not allege any ongoing detriment to his practice in California from the Board's decision in Puerto Rico. Nor did he assert that the suspension of his license inflicted a serious continuing reputational injury, notwithstanding the relocation of his practice to another jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir.1996). Therefore, we do not consider harm to his reputation in making our irreparable harm determination.