Opinion ID: 2974394
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity for Individual Defendants

Text: The district court held that Fannin and Pennington were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities because they “had credible, good faith reasons to believe that the road in question did, indeed, belong to the county and that, thus, they were charged with the maintenance of same . . . .” To evaluate qualified immunity, a court must follow the sequential analysis prescribed in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-203 (2001). The threshold question is whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [] the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right.” Id. at 20. Then, “if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. Here, Wilson has failed to prove that Pennington and Fannin were not protected by qualified immunity. See Silberstein v. City of Dayton, 440 F.3d 306, 311 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Once the qualified immunity defense is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the officials are not entitled to qualified immunity.”). There is little debate that what Wilson alleges was a violation of his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless seizures. However, a right is not “clearly established” merely by virtue of its having been stated in the abstract. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987). Rather, the inquiry must take into account the applicable context and whether “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Wilson failed to offer any -5- No. 05-6015 Wilson v. Elliott Cty. et al. evidence suggesting that it was objectively unreasonable to believe that there was a county road through Wilson’s property and that it was their official responsibility to maintain it. In fact, the Defendants’ belief was supported by documentation and affidavits by a postal worker and a deputy sheriff. Wilson offers evidence from a surveyor and an affidavit from another person that a road used to run along the boundary of Wilson’s property. Neither is relevant to whether Pennington and Fannin reasonably believed there was a road through Wilson’s property. Under these circumstances, Wilson’s right to have his gate on that part of the land was murky at best, and we cannot conclude that Fannin and Pennington acted unreasonably.