Opinion ID: 4536549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Third Trial

Text: [¶7] The third trial—the one at issue here—took place over three days in October 2018. Prior to the trial, the court held a motion hearing addressing the State’s motion in limine to introduce expert testimony. The proposed witness was trained in the forensic interviewing of child victims and was the program manager of the Children’s Advocacy Center of York County. The State argued that because the victim had been interviewed by law enforcement, the witness’s expertise would help the jury understand and evaluate the interview methods used. The State indicated that it would not ask the expert witness to testify as to whether the victim was telling the truth. The court granted the motion in limine, allowing the witness to testify. [¶8] On the first day of trial, the State’s witnesses testified that the victim disclosed incidents of sexual acts to them. The witnesses also testified to the 4 victim’s manifestations of anxiety, and other changes in her behavior, during the summer when the incidents occurred. [¶9] On the second day of trial, the State called its expert witness.1 The expert testified that methods of interviewing child victims of sexual abuse had evolved in the past decade. [¶10] On the final day of the trial, Westgate testified that he never sexually touched the victim. At the close of evidence, the court instructed the jury—over Westgate’s objection—with the State-requested instruction on lesser-included charges. The court instructed the jury, If the State does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of those facts, as I have just outlined them with respect to each particular count, you must find Mr. Westgate not guilty of that particular count or counts. If you conclude with respect to any of the counts, any or all of the counts in Counts 1 through 5, that the State has proven all but the age, in other words, the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Nicholas Westgate intentionally subjected [the victim] to sexual contact in . . . the summer of 2009 and at the time he was three years—at least three years older than she was and she was not his spouse, but the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense or offenses occurred prior to her 12th birthday but you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that for that count or counts that the unlawful sexual contact occurred prior to her 14th birthday, then you would convict Mr. Westgate of the lesser included offense of unlawful 1 Westgate did not cross-examine the witness and did not object to her testimony. 5 sexual contact against a person under the age of 14 for that particular count or counts. On the other hand, if you find that the State has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt any one of the facts required to be proven as outlined above with respect to the lesser included offense, including, without limitation, that the offense occurred prior to [the victim’s] 14th birthday, then you must acquit Mr. Westgate of the lesser included offense with respect to any particular count or counts. The court provided similar instructions as to Count 6. [¶11] During its deliberations, the jury submitted notes with questions. Specifically, the jury asked for written copies of the six charges, “to be clear on each one.” Furthermore, the jury asked, “If we cannot agree on guilty for under 12, will we be then asked about the under 14 charge?” The court, after conferring with Westgate and the State, provided the jury with the written copies of the six charges and responded to the jury’s second question with the word, “Yes.” [¶12] After deliberating for approximately thirty minutes, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Westgate guilty of all charges. The jury’s verdict was delivered to the court as follows: THE CLERK: Members have you agreed upon a verdict? THE FOREPERSON: We have. JURORS: Yes. 6 THE CLERK: What say you, Mr. Foreperson, is the defendant Nicholas Westgate guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 1? THE FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 2? THE FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 3? THE FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 4? THE FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of unlawful sexual contact whereof defendant stands charged in Count 5? THE FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE CLERK: Guilty or not guilty of the offense of visual sexual aggression against a child whereof defendant stands charged in Count 6? THE FOREPERSON: Guilty. THE CLERK: Mr. Foreperson, have you correctly report[ed] the verdict? THE FOREPERSON: I have. 7 THE CLERK: So say you, Mr. Foreperson? THE FOREPERSON: Yes. THE COURT: So say you all? JURORS: Yes. After the verdict was read, the jury was polled at Westgate’s request. Westgate made no objections at the reading of the verdict or at any other time before this appeal. [¶13] On February 5, 2019, the court sentenced Westgate to ten years’ imprisonment with all but sixty-eight months suspended on Count 5, with ten years of probation, and concurrent sixty-eight-month sentences on the other four counts of unlawful sexual contact (Counts 1–4). As to the charge of visual sexual aggression, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The court imposed $210 in fines. [¶14] On February 7, 2019, the State filed a motion for correction or reduction of sentence. The motion was continued and was later granted on May 6, 2019. The court amended Westgate’s sentences for Counts 1 to 4 to increase them from sixty-eight months to ninety-six months. The suspended portion of the sentence on Count 5 was increased to ninety-six months. As to Count 6, Westgate’s sentence was reduced to twelve months. Save for those 8 alterations, Westgate’s sentence remained unchanged. Westgate timely appealed on May 15, 2019. M.R. App. P. 2B(b)(2)(D).