Opinion ID: 488009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the standard of review over the university's decision

Text: 42 The foregoing analysis of Dr. McConnell's breach of contract claims assumes that the trial court's posture in reviewing these claims is no different than the posture a court would take in analyzing any breach of contract claim. Namely, the court is charged with interpreting the meaning of the contractual terms, and determining whether the facts establish that a party has breached those terms. Both the District Court and the appellee have advanced reasons why a court should not engage in its typical role in this case, and ought to take a more deferential stance toward Howard University's decision to terminate Dr. McConnell's tenured appointment at the University. These arguments are without merit. 43
44 The District Court seized on language in the section of the Faculty Handbook dealing with the dismissal procedures stating that [t]he decision of the Board of Trustees shall be final. Faculty Handbook, reprinted in McConnell v. Howard Univ., 621 F.Supp. at 335. It assumed that the decision referred to is the decision whether to terminate the services of the faculty member. The court then concluded: 45 The plaintiff having agreed to accept employment on those terms, this Court should uphold the Board's decision and grant defendant's motion for summary judgment, unless the Board's decision was arbitrary, or plaintiff has proffered evidence of improper motivation or irrational action. 46 621 F.Supp. at 331. 47 In other words, according to the trial court, any Trustees' decision to fire a tenured faculty member is largely unreviewable, with judicial scrutiny limited to a modest inquiry as to whether the Trustees' decision was arbitrary, irrational or infected by improper motivation. Such a reading of the contract renders tenure a virtual nullity. Faculty members like Dr. McConnell would have no real substantive right to continued employment, but only certain procedural rights that must be followed before their appointment may be terminated. We find this to be an astonishing concept, and one not compelled by a literal reading of the Faculty Handbook. 48 We begin with the language from the Faculty Handbook relied on by the District Court. It is clear to us that the language in the contract is not intended to shield decisions of the Board of Trustees from judicial scrutiny, but is designed to indicate the endpoint of the internal grievance procedures. When viewed in context, the decision referred to could well be the Board's decision either to review the case or to accept the recommendations of the Grievance Committee without review. This can be easily seen by reading the sentence in the context of the complete paragraph in which it appears: E. CONSIDERATION BY THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 49 The Dean shall transmit the full report of the Grievance Committee and its recommendation to the President for presentation to the Board of Trustees or its Executive Committee. If the Board of Trustees or its Executive Committee chooses to review the case, its review shall be based on the record of the hearing. The decision of the Board of Trustees shall be final. 50 Id. at 335. Alternatively, the decision could be the action taken by the Board of Trustees with respect to the faculty member. Under either view, the final nature of the Board's decision has nothing to do with whether the parties have attempted to limit the power of courts to engage in a review of the contractual claims. It speaks only to further avenues of review within the University. 51 Given the structure of the prescribed procedures, it appears that the Board of Trustees has tremendous leeway to reject findings of the Grievance Committee. If we were to adopt a view limiting judicial review over the substance of the Board of Trustees' decision, we would be allowing one of the parties to the contract to determine whether the contract had been breached. This would make a sham of the parties' contractual tenure arrangement. 11 52 On remand, the trial court must consider de novo the appellant's breach of contract claims; no special deference is due the Board of Trustees once the case is properly before the court for resolution of the contract dispute. 12
53 Howard University attempts to argue from higher education cases involving public universities, usually involving due process claims, that courts should view the decisions of private universities as if they were made by government agencies. There is no basis for this conceptual leap. See Rosenblum, Legal Dimensions of Tenure, in FACULTY TENURE, supra, at 161 (A tenure plan promulgated by a governing board of a public institution is generally considered a form of sublegislation having the force of law.... In a private institution, any right to tenure is contractual rather than statutory.). The public university cases often involve situations in which there is no contract, or where no contract claim is alleged. See, e.g., Sabet v. Eastern Va. Medical Auth., 775 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir.1985); Levitt v. University of Tex. at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 599, 88 L.Ed.2d 578 (1985); McDonough v. Trustees of the Univ. Sys. of N.H., 704 F.2d 780 (1st Cir.1983); Bates v. Sponberg, 547 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.1976); Bignall v. North Idaho College, 538 F.2d 243 (9th Cir.1976); Stebbins v. Weaver, 537 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041, 97 S.Ct. 741, 50 L.Ed.2d 753 (1977); Prebble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir.1976). Frequently, the only issue in these cases is whether, by taking certain disciplinary action, the university violated due process. By the very nature of such claims, the focus is on the reasonableness of the university's actions. 54 Here, in contrast, there is a contract to review, and it has been brought into issue by the appellant's legal complaint. The reasonableness of the University's actions is relevant only insofar as the actions are consistent with the parties' contract. It would make no sense for a court blindly to defer to a university's interpretation of a tenure contract to which it is an interested party. Moreover, the theory of deference to administrative action flows from prudential concepts of separation of powers, as well as statutory proscriptions on the scope of judicial review. Obviously, none of those factors apply here. The notion of treating a private university as if it were a state or federal administrative agency is simply unsupported where a contract claim is involved. 13 55 In Krotkoff v. Goucher College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.1978), the court entertained a claim that a private college breached its contract by terminating the appointment of a tenured professor due to financial exigencies. The college attempted to shield its decision from judicial scrutiny, arguing by analogy to public university cases. The court correctly rejected the analogy: 56 [The public university] cases, however, generally have involved the application of the fourteenth amendment to state institutions or the interpretation of statutes prohibiting racial or sexual discrimination. Since Goucher is a private college and Krotkoff does not allege the type of unlawful conduct proscribed by civil rights acts, the cases on which the college relies to forestall judicial inquiry are not dispositive. 57 Krotkoff's claims must be resolved by reference to her contract. This involves ascertaining, first, what contractual rights she had, and second, whether the college breached them. 58 585 F.2d at 681-82.
59 The appellee urges us to adopt the view of the District Court that a federal court should hesitate before significantly intruding in the administration of university affairs, particularly in a three-cornered dispute between a professor, a student and a university. 621 F.Supp. at 330 n. 13. We find no support for this argument in this case. This is not a three-cornered dispute; rather, what is at stake are the contractual rights of Dr. McConnell. However, taking the point more broadly, we do not understand why university affairs are more deserving of judicial deference than the affairs of any other business or profession. Arguably, there might be matters unique to education on which courts are relatively ill equipped to pass judgment. However, this is true in many areas of the law, including, for example, technical, scientific and medical issues. Yet, this lack of expertise does not compel courts to defer to the view of one of the parties in such cases. The parties can supply such specialized knowledge through the use of expert testimony. Moreover, even if there are issues on which courts are ill equipped to rule, the interpretation of a contract is not one of them. We find no precedent in the District of Columbia for the District Court's view, nor do we find persuasive precedent in any other jurisdiction. 60 Howard University's reliance on Gray v. Canisius College, 76 A.D.2d 30, 430 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1980), is misplaced. In Gray, the discharged tenured professor's suit was not based on a breach of contract theory. See id. at 35 & n. 3, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 167 & n. 3. Rather, the suit was premised on the theory that New York courts may compel corporations chartered in New York to fulfill obligations imposed by their internal rules, such as the termination procedures set forth in the Canisius College Manual. Id. at 33-34, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 166-67. In contrast, Dr. McConnell's case raises a breach of contract claim. Cf. Williams v. Howard Univ., 528 F.2d 658, 660-61 (D.C. Cir.) (distinguishing between standard of review of university conduct under breach of contract claim and in the absence of a contract), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850, 97 S.Ct. 138, 50 L.Ed.2d 123 (1976). 61 The District Court erroneously relies on our decision in Williams v. Howard University as support for employing a deferential standard of review in the university context. In Williams, an applicant who had been denied admission to Howard University Medical College brought suit, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, as well as contract and tort claims. We affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the civil rights claim, finding no government action to deprive Williams of his rights. We then found that Williams ha[d] adduced no evidence of a violated contractual right, 528 F.2d at 660, and that Williams' tort claim was actionable only on a showing of improper motivation or irrational action on the part of Howard. Id. at 660-61. Williams did not hold that actions by Howard University allegedly in contravention of a contract were actionable only if the plaintiff could show improper motivation or gross arbitrariness. See also Greene v. Howard Univ., 412 F.2d at 1131 (distinguishing between claims of expelled students, who lacked contractual rights, and discharged faculty members, who enjoyed contractual rights). We find no basis in law or reason for applying such a standard to a case involving the rights and obligations of parties to a contract, whether or not the case arises in a university setting. 62 In a thoughtful examination of the role of the courts in reviewing claims involving dismissal determinations, Clark Byse and Louis Joughin have written: 63 The role of the courts in reviewing dismissal determinations by institutions which have sound, written tenure plans should be quite conventional and relatively simple. It would be the court's responsibility to determine whether the requirements of the plan had been complied with. Was there failure to follow the stated procedure? Were the facts proved by a preponderance of the evidence? Did the proved facts constitute disqualifying conduct within the meaning of the plan? 64 Byse & Joughin, Tenure in American Higher Education: Specific Conclusions and Recommendations, reprinted in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 210, 214 (L. Joughin ed. 1969). We find no reason not to do here what courts traditionally do in adjudicating breach of contract claims: interpret the terms of the contract and determine whether the contract has been breached. 14 On remand, we expect the District Court to fully consider Dr. McConnell's contract claims.