Opinion ID: 2443539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Vouching for Witnesses' Credibility

Text: Petitioner argues that the prosecutor in the present case improperly vouched for the credibility of Detectives Taylor and Rice during closing arguments. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Petitioner on this point and so do we. In Spain, we discussed the problems inherent to vouching for witnesses during closing arguments: [O]ne technique in closing argument that consistently has garnered our disapproval, as infringing on a defendant's right to a fair trial, is when a prosecutor `vouches' for (or against) the credibility of a witness. Vouching typically occurs when a prosecutor `places the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity . . . or suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony.' 386 Md. at 153-54, 872 A.2d at 30 (citations omitted); see also Walker v. State, 373 Md. 360, 403-04, 818 A.2d 1078, 1103-04 (2003) (finding improper vouching to have occurred where a prosecutor made assertions, based on personal knowledge, that a witness was lying). The Supreme Court has recognized the dangers that prosecutorial vouching presents: [S]uch comments can convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant and can thus jeopardize the defendant's right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury; and the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence. U.S. v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d 1, 14 (1985). Petitioner specifically takes issue with the prosecutor's statements, as part of her rebuttal argument during closing arguments, that Detectives Taylor and Rice were not going to get up on the stand and lie because they want to keep their job and that what gets [Taylor and Rice] to keep going with the job is their credibility and their integrity. Petitioner argues that by making these statements, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of the State's two primary witnesses. Petitioner points to our decision in Spain for support. In Spain, the prosecutor made statements during closing arguments that were similar to the ones made by the prosecutor in the present case, stating: The Officer in this case would have to engage in a lot of lying, in a lot of deception and a conspiracy of his own to come in here and tell you that what happened was not true. He would have to risk everything he has worked for. He would have to perjure himself on the stand.    [Y]ou have to understand that Officer Williams has no motive to lie, because he has everything to risk in this case. 386 Md. at 151-52, 872 A.2d at 28-29. We concluded that the prosecutor's statements in Spain were improper for two reasons. First, we concluded that the prosecutor had improperly relied on facts not in evidence: Courts consistently have deemed improper comments made during closing argument that invite the jury to draw inferences from information that was not admitted at trial. Although the notion of adverse personnel implications flowing from perjured testimony by a police officer resonates at a common sense level, at no time during the trial scrutinized in the present case did the State introduce evidence from which it could be inferred ineluctably that [the police officer] risked his career or any of its benefits if he were to testify falsely. Spain, 386 Md. at 156, 872 A.2d at 31-32 (citations omitted); see also Hill, 355 Md. at 222, 734 A.2d at 208 (stating that counsel is not permitted to comment [during closing arguments] on facts not in evidence or state what could have been proven.. . .). We further concluded that even if the prosecutor had relied on facts in evidence, he had engaged in improper vouching: Although the State is free to highlight the incentive, or lack of incentive, of a witness to testify truthfully, courts consistently have held that it is improper to argue that a police officer may be deemed more credible simply because he or she is a police officer. By invoking unspecified, but assumed, punitive consequences or sanctions that might result if a police officer testifies falsely, a prosecutor's arguments imply that a police officer has a greater reason to testify truthfully than any other witness with a different type of job. Although the fact finder generally is made aware that a witness who is a police officer is testifying as to events witnessed while on duty as a police officer, a prosecutor must be careful not to insinuate that the credibility of statements made in this capacity may be assessed at a level of scrutiny other than that given to all witnesses. Spain, 386 Md. at 157-58, 872 A.2d at 32 (citations omitted). Looking at the statements that the prosecutor made in the present case, we conclude that they were improper. We recognize here, as we did in Spain, that [p]art of the analysis of credibility involves determining whether a witness has a motive or incentive not to tell the truth, and that, as a result, counsel feel[s] compelled frequently to comment on the motives, or absence thereof, that a witness may have for testifying in a particular way, so long as those conclusions may be inferred from the evidence introduced and admitted at trial. 386 Md. at 154-55, 872 A.2d at 30-31. As discussed above, however, we also explained in Spain that counsel cannot attempt to bolster the credibility of a witness by using facts not in evidence or by asserting that the witness should be believed simply because the witness is a police officer. 386 Md. at 156-58, 872 A.2d at 31-32. The prosecutor's statements in the present case ran afoul of both these prohibitions. The prosecutor argued in her rebuttal that Detectives Taylor and Rice might lose their jobs if they lied during their testimony, but there was no evidence at trial supporting that argument. The prosecutor also argued that the jury should find Taylor and Rice credible because, as police officers, they would be unlikely to lie. Like the prosecutor's statements in Spain, these statements in the instant case were improper. The State contends that even if the prosecutor's statements were improper, the trial court's ruling was proper because of the opened door doctrine. We disagree. We explained in Mitchell that the `opened door' doctrine is based on principles of fairness and permits a party to introduce evidence that otherwise might not be admissible in order to respond to certain evidence put forth by opposing counsel. 408 Md. at 388, 969 A.2d at 1001 (citing Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 545, 693 A.2d 781, 790 (1997)). In Mitchell, the defense attorney noted during closing arguments that the State had not presented the testimony of a number of people who had apparently witnessed the crime at issue. 408 Md. at 388-89, 969 A.2d at 1001-02. In response, the prosecutor asserted that the defendant could have brought those witnesses into court with his subpoena power. Mitchell, 408 Md. at 389, 969 A.2d at 1002. We concluded that the opened door doctrine applied to the prosecutor's statements. Mitchell, 408 Md. at 389, 969 A.2d at 1002. We explained, however, that the opened door doctrine is a narrow one, and we focused on the fact that [t]he prosecutor's remarks . . . were a tailored response to the defense attorney's statements. Mitchell, 408 Md. at 389, 969 A.2d at 1002. The prosecutor's improper statements in the present case were not a tailored response to defense counsel's assertion and, accordingly, do not fit within the narrow opened door doctrine. Defense counsel argued during his closing statement that Detective Taylor had testified that, we can't take a picture of someone who is trying to sell drugs out on the street. That would be too much. We don't want to videotape them either because our word is good enough. Defense counsel further argued that Taylor's testimony was, because I say it's so, that's good enough and, [y]ou need to believe us. You don't need anything to support [our testimony]. Just believe what I say because I'm a police officer. The prosecutor was certainly entitled to respond to these arguments in her rebuttal argument, which she did. She first argued that the defense attorney had mischaracterized Taylor's testimony, saying [n]o, that's not what [Taylor] said. This argument was entirely appropriate. She next responded by arguing her own interpretation of what Taylor had said. The first part of this argument was also appropriate: [Taylor] said, I stood up here and I said it's the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. [4] But the prosecutor's subsequent argumentsabout the officer's incentive to tell the truth because of his status as a police officerwent well beyond what was necessary for an adequate response. The opened door doctrine therefore did not save them. [5] B.