Opinion ID: 223685
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Computer Equipment

Text: Knope argues that computer equipment seized from his residence should be suppressed because it was the fruit of an illegal search. During his interview with Detectives DuCharme and McQuown, Knope stated that there was a strap-on dildo in his car, that he had viewed and downloaded child pornography on his home computer, and that he had used his home computer to chat online with Maria. DuCharme eventually asked Knope for permission to go to his house and search his computer. Knope said that he wanted to be present for the search because there was stuff on his external hard drive that he didn't have a chance to go through yet. DuCharme told Knope, That's the problem ... you can't be [there]. Knope continued, [T]here is probably stuff on it.... And it's in a separate folder ... that needs to be deleted.... [B]ut all I'm saying is I just ... I want to make this go away the best I can. DuCharme responded, Listen.... It's already there so whether you give me permission I can go other ways and try to do it. I'm asking for your permission. Knope stated, What's done is done, and asked when his computers would be returned to him. DuCharme explained that they would not be returned if they contained contraband and continued to question Knope about the items he downloaded from the Internet. As she spoke to Knope, DuCharme filled out the top of a Milwaukee Police Department consent to search form. The form stated that Knope gave consent for the search of [his] premises and all property found therein and located at 105 Randolph as well as his car, personal computers, data storage devices, and cell phone. DuCharme read the form aloud to Knope, who confirmed that he understood what the consent entailed. DuCharme then handed the form to Knope to complete, instructing him to check off the boxes if you agree ... and then sign your name on the bottom. She also asked Knope additional questions about the items that might be found in his car. During this exchange, Knope asked, When we get down there [to the police station], [i]s it possible to have a lawyer there? DuCharme told him, Sure.... You have a right to a lawyer, whatever you want. Knope responded that he did not want to worm [his] way out of anything that's done and that he knew that their conversation was recorded. DuCharme told Knope the date, which he wrote on the form, and then said, Okay, Randy, just so you know where I'm at now, because you're asking for a lawyer at this point, I can't ask you any more questions. You can go ahead and you can talk to me but you've limited what I can do.... DuCharme testified that she decided to stop asking Knope questions to be on the safe side, even though she was not sure whether he was asking for a lawyer at that time or stating that he wanted a lawyer to be present when he arrived at the police station. She could not recall whether Knope had already signed the consent form when he invoked his right to an attorney. After the interview, DuCharme and McQuown traveled to Burlington to conduct the search. They stopped at the Burlington Police Department on the way because they wanted uniformed officers to be present when they arrived at Knope's residence. There they confirmed that Knope lived at 109 Randolph Street. As they arrived, DuCharme realized that she had written 105 Randolph on the top of Knope's consent form. After reviewing her notes, DuCharme concluded that 109 Randolph was correct, as it was what she had initially written down when she asked Knope for his address. The detectives proceeded to 109 Randolph Street, where they met Knope's girlfriend and her mother, both of whom lived with Knope. The detectives explained that Knope had been arrested for a computer-related crime and that he had consented to a search of his area of the residence. The mother then showed the detectives where Knope's belongings were located. The detectives recovered a DVD with child pornography images, Knope's laptop computer, and an external hard drive. Before the DVD and laptop were searched, DuCharme obtained a search warrant to examine the items that had been seized. Knope first argues that he was coerced into signing the consent form when DuCharme told him whether you give me permission [to search the residence] I can go other ways and try to do it. The court looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether Knope's consent was voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The factors we consider include Knope's age, education, and intelligence, the length of his detention prior to consent, whether the police repeatedly asked for consent, whether physical coercion was used, and whether he was in custody. United States v. Strache, 202 F.3d 980, 985 (7th Cir. 2000). An empty threat to obtain a search warrant may render consent involuntary, but if the expressed intention to obtain a warrant is genuine ... and not merely a pretext to induce submission, it does not vitiate consent. United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 572 (7th Cir.2008). Here, Knope had admitted that he viewed and downloaded child pornography on his home computer and that he had been using that computer when he engaged in online chats with Maria. Therefore, DuCharme would have had a legitimate belief that she could obtain a warrant to search Knope's residence. Moreover, the record shows that DuCharme explained Knope's rights to him in a non-threatening manner and that he readily consented to the search of his residence. The district court did not err in concluding that Knope's consent was voluntary. Knope also asserts that his consent was invalid because he signed the consent form after he invoked his right to counsel. He cites Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), where the Supreme Court held that police cannot continue an interrogation after the accused invokes his right to counsel. Knope's argument is foreclosed, however, by this court's holding that a consent to search is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. United States v. Shlater, 85 F.3d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1994). Indeed, we rejected nearly identical arguments in Shlater and LaGrone. Knope's consent was not invalid on these grounds. Finally, Knope argues that the consent form was not valid because it contained the wrong address. There is no question that Knope consented to the search of his residence, that he told DuCharme that his address was 109 Randolph Street, or that the Burlington Police Department confirmed that Knope lived at that address. DuCharme's transcription error does not invalidate Knope's voluntary consent. [4] For these reasons, the district court correctly denied Knope's motion to suppress.