Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Problems with the Admission of Garrison's Testimony

Text: Garrison was obviously the People's star witness. Defendant contends the trial court committed a number of errors in deciding to admit Garrison's testimony.
Garrison, who is African-American, testified that prior to the crime, he had body work done on his Oldsmobile Cutlass. He did not know the man who worked on his car, but Garrison described him as a darkskinned man, five feet six to eight inches tall, with kind of straight hair. This description matched defendant. Significantly, Garrison also testified that the man had the word Apache tattooed on the inner part of his forearm. Defendant bears such a tattoo. Garrison testified the two agreed to commit a robbery, jointly decided to target Barry's Chevron, and consummated their plan, resulting in Elliott Dolinka's murder. Garrison testified the man he knew as Apache lived four blocks from the body shop. Sergeant Quinn later testified defendant lived in that area. Garrison's account was corroborated by Shirley Funk, who reported seeing an African-American man at Barry's Chevron, and then a man who was neither Caucasian nor African-American, but possibly Hispanic or Asian, come up and speak to the African-American man. Another witness, David McLaughlin, positively identified defendant as the dark-skinned man who came up to converse with Garrison. At trial, which (it must be remembered) was seven years after the crime, defense counsel asked Garrison whether defendant was the man he knew as Apache, who had participated in the Dolinka crime with him. The following exchange took place: A. [Garrison] It doesn't look like him to me, no. Q. [Defense Counsel Barnett] So is it your testimony that that is or is not the person or that you don't know? A. I would say I don't know. Defense counsel then moved to strike Garrison's testimony. It's apparent that Mr. Garrison is not identifying Mr. Gurule as the person whom he knew as Apache and who committed this crime with him. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to strike Garrison's testimony because, in light of Garrison's failure to identify defendant in court, his testimony was not relevant. A trial court has no discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. ( People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302, 321, 208 Cal.Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669, disapproved on another ground in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1149, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306; Evid.Code, § 351 [all relevant evidence is admissible].) Respondent counters that defendant failed to preserve the claim for appeal. Although a close case is presented on the forfeiture issue, we conclude that even if defendant adequately preserved this claim, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike Garrison's testimony. Addressing the forfeiture issue first, respondent argues defendant failed to preserve the claim for appeal because the trial court denied the motion to strike Garrison's testimony without prejudice, stating it was premature, thereby impliedly inviting defendant to renew the motion after the People had completed presenting their case. Defendant rightly points out the trial court expressly stated The court denies your request to strike the testimony of Mr. Garrison ..., suggesting he had made a timely objection and had obtained a final decision on the objection. But immediately after denying the motion, the trial court explained that over a period of time people do change in their appearance, not deliberately necessarily, but by reason of age alone. The court noted the prosecutor had not yet completed his presentation of the case and that the relevance of Garrison's testimony might be shown by other evidence the prosecutor might yet introduce. Accordingly, [y]our motion to that exten[t] may be taken under submission to the extent there is no connection drawn between Mr. Gurule and Apache. However, ... at best I would say that your motion is premature. (Italics added.) As can be seen, by stating it was taking the matter under submission, the trial court left the door open for defendant to renew his objection if, on completion of the People's case, insufficient evidence linked defendant to the person Garrison referred to as Apache. Because no additional evidence on the issue of Garrison's identification of defendant was presented, it is at least arguable that defendant was justified in relying on his earlier objection and that the matter was preserved for appeal despite his failure to renew his objection. We need not, however, resolve the forfeiture point. Assuming for argument the issue was preserved, we find the trial court did not err. The trial court has broad discretion to determine the relevance of evidence ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93, disapproved on another point in People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 369, fn. 2, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 2%, 914 P.2d 846 (cone. opn. of George, C. J., joined by a majority of the court)), and its decision to await the complete presentation of the People's case before making a final decision was reasonable. Defendant further argues his defense counsel were ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial in light of Garrison's inability to identify defendant. A motion for mistrial is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We have explained that '[a] mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions.' ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 985-986, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, quoting People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) In light of the other evidence of defendant's guilt, most prominently his admission to police of his participation in the robbery, it is clear the trial court would have denied a motion for mistrial for lack of prejudice had defense counsel made the motion. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that his counsel were constitutionally ineffective. We likewise reject for the same reason defendant's further claim, made with little discussion, that the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal.
As noted ( ante, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 371, 51 P.3d at p. 246), the terms of Garrison's plea bargain permitted the People to reopen his case if new evidence was uncovered that he, and not defendant, was the actual killer. Defendant contends this made Garrison an inherently unreliable witness because his plea bargain was conditional upon his promise to testify in conformity with the state's theory that [defendant] was the actual killer. Once again respondent contends that defendant failed to preserve the issue by making a timely objection. Defendant gives this issue scant attention, merely alleging in his reply brief that if counsel failed to object, they were constitutionally ineffective. Defendant makes no attempt to elucidate whether or not defense counsel objected to Garrison's testimony on the ground his plea bargain was inherently coercive (see People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1050, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 15(a), now see rule 14(a)(1)(C)), and our reading of the record discloses no such objection. Accordingly, we conclude defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Turning to whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object (but see People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [failure to object rarely ineffective]), defendant contends counsel should have been aware of the issue, as People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133 states the legal proposition and was decided well before trial. The rule is more definitively set forth in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251-1252, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115, a case also decided before defendant's trial: `[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion.' ( People v. Medina [, supra, ] 41 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 455, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133....) Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police ( id., at p. 450 [116 Cal.Rptr. 133]), or that his testimony result in the defendant's conviction [citation], the accomplice's testimony is `tainted beyond redemption' [citation] and its admission denies the defendant a fair trial. On the other hand, although there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid. (Fn.omitted.) Garrison's plea agreement did not run afoul of these limits. It provided in pertinent part that Garrison would plead guilty or nolo contendere to first degree murder, admit the truth of a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and receive a sentence of 30 years to life in prison. The bargain further states that Garrison will fully cooperate with [authorities] in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses, including but not limited to the murder of Elliott Dolinka. Defendant Garrison's cooperation will include, but not be limited to, providing truthful and complete statements concerning the actions and criminal offenses of all persons involved in the murder of Elliott Dolinka and/or the robbery of Barry's Chevron gas station on May 15, 1982, including Raymond Anthony Gurule and defendant Garrison himself. Further, defendant Garrison will remain available to law enforcement agencies during the investigation and prosecution of persons involved in the murder of Elliott Dolinka and/or the robbery of Barry's Chevron station, and will testify truthfully and completely in all criminal proceedings involving the murder of Elliott Dolinka and/or the robbery of Barry's Chevron station, regardless of whether those proceedings occur before or after the sentencing of defendant Garrison in this case, and regardless of whether the proceedings involve an initial trial, a retrial, should one become necessary, or a proceeding following trial, [¶] ... Provided that no evidence is obtained proving that defendant Mark Anthony Garrison is the actual killer of Elliott Dolinka, the defendant [Garrison] will not be prosecuted for special circumstance murder in this case. [¶] ... Should defendant Mark Anthony Garrison refuse to testify or should he at any time testify untruthfully, then this entire agreement is null and void and all of the original charges will be automatically reinstated with no limitation on possible sentence. Garrison did not agree to testify in conformity with a prior statement or agree to ensure defendant would be convicted. Instead, he agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and to provid[e] truthful and complete statements concerning the actions and criminal offenses with which he was involved. This case is thus like People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1217, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163, where we approved a condition of immunity in which an accomplice was allowed to plead guilty on the condition she give a complete and truthful account at trial in order to avoid breaching the plea agreement. As we explained in People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 768, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419, [a] prosecutor may grant immunity to one jointly charged with a crime upon the condition that he or she testify fully and fairly as to the facts involved. Although it is true this immunity agreement was conditional on there being no new evidence showing Garrison was the actual killer, [14] and this condition probably resulted in some pressure on Garrison not to testify that heand not defendant actually stabbed the victim, that pressure already existed, for the plea agreement required Garrison to provid[e] truthful and complete statements, and it was clear the prosecutor believed that Garrison's statement to police that defendant was the actual killer was true. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1229, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Because nothing about the terms of Garrison's plea bargain was improperly coercive, we conclude counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to his testimony on that ground.
Defendant contends he was denied his constitutional rights to confrontation, due process and a fair trial by the trial court's ruling denying his counsel an opportunity to examine the daily transcript of Garrison's testimony on direct examination before they began their cross-examination. Considered together with the additional alleged errors of being denied full access to Garrison's psychiatric records, the prosecutor's deliberately not taking or producing notes of interviews with Garrison, and the trial court's denial of defendant's request to interview Garrison before trial (all addressed, ante, and found wanting), defendant contends he was unfairly surprised by Garrison's testimony on cross-examination. He also suggests that denial of the daily transcripts was for financial reasons, which he claims also violates his constitutional rights. We agree with respondent that the record does not support defendant's claim. The record shows that on completion of Garrison's direct examination, the defense asked to continue the proceedings until 1:30 p.m. the next day on the ground that the daily transcripts of Garrison's direct testimony would not be available until 9:00 a.m. The trial court simply denied the request. The determination of whether a continuance should be granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, although that discretion may not be exercised so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare. ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 646, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152.) Defendant does not explain how the trial court's ruling deprived him of a reasonable opportunity to prepare. Accordingly, we reject the argument that the court's ruling violated his constitutional rights.
Defendant next contends the trial court violated his constitutional rights to confrontation, due process and a fair trial (i) when it failed to curtail the prosecutor's practice of interposing numerous objections to defense counsel's questioning of Garrison about his prior sexual molestation of a small boy; (ii) by prohibiting questioning about an incident in which Garrison beat a 15-month-old baby with a belt; and (iii) when it prohibited counsel from introducing evidence that Garrison had minimized his responsibility in previous crimes. We address these claims seriatim. (i) Defense counsel resumed their cross-examination of Garrison on September 12, 1989, by asking him about his previous conviction for molesting a small boy. Counsel's point was to convey Garrison's belief that allowing the boy to live and testify against him had been a mistake, making it more likely that Garrison had killed Dolinka so as to leave no witnesses. Counsel also wished to demonstrate that in his prior crimes, Garrison had admitted culpability but had attempted to shift the majority of the blame elsewhere, thus bolstering the defense position that it was Garrison, not defendant, who actually killed Dolinka. The record shows that counsel was able to get Garrison to admit his prior sex crime without interruption. During subsequent defense questioning, however, the prosecutor interposed numerous objections, all of which the trial court overruled. Defendant now contends the prosecutor made so many frivolous objections that the flow and meaning of the cross-examination were lost, and the trial court violated his constitutional rights by failing to curtail the prosecutor's actions. [15] We note at the outset that counsel made no objection on this particular ground, so defendant must be heard to complain that the trial court violated a sua sponte duty to control the prosecutor. Although defendant presents a generalized argument on the acknowledged benefits of cross-examination, he fails to assert any argument or authority on the specific theory raised. (See, e.g., § 1044.) [16] We may reject his claim for that reason alone. Were we to address it further, we would conclude the record fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor's actions were so severely prejudicial the trial court was obligated to intervene, even in the absence of a defense objection. (See People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 159-160, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) (ii) Defendant next argues the trial court erred by precluding him from impeaching Garrison with evidence that he had beaten a 15-month-old child with a belt. Counsel argued the evidence was relevant to impeach Garrison's statements that he was not a violent man and that he would not use violence on another human being unless he was defending himself. The trial court explained that it was defense counsel, and not the prosecutor, who had elicited this testimony, and a party cannot ask a witness a question in order to later impeach him. ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 748, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485; People v. Lavergne (1971) 4 Cal.3d 735, 744, 94 Cal.Rptr. 405, 484 P.2d 77.) Although it sustained the prosecutor's objection to this line of questioning, the court noted it had allowed defendant's questioning about the sex crime, and the jury would undoubtedly consider that to be evidence of Garrison's violent nature. In any event, whether or not Garrison had beaten the infant with a belt was a collateral matter; trial courts have discretion to admit or exclude evidence offered for impeachment on a collateral matter ( People v. Mayfield, supra, at p. 748, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485), and defendant does not demonstrate the trial court abused its broad discretion in this matter. Defendant also contends he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense by the trial court's subsequent decision to preclude him from calling as witnesses the mother and sister of the child involved in the beating incident. He claims their testimony would have been proper rebuttal evidence. As we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding defendant from questioning Garrison on this collateral matter, it similarly did not abuse its discretion in ruling defendant could not call witnesses to prove the same point. (iii) Defendant also argues the trial court erred in prohibiting him from introducing evidence of other crimes whose circumstances indicated that Garrison employed a habit of admitting some blame but then shifting the bulk of the blame elsewhere. It seems doubtful the proffered instances of prior misconduct demonstrate that Garrison engaged in blame-shifting as a habit or custom (as defense counsel argued), as distinct from the common tendency of criminal offenders generally to minimize their culpability (as the trial court suggested). In any event, it does not appear the trial court abused its wide discretion in this matter. As we explained in an analogous situation, defendant merely was precluded from proving [his point] with time-consuming hearsay and character evidence that was not particularly probative on the question. ( People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 305, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) To the extent defendant contends the alleged restrictions on his cross-examination of Garrison, addressed above, violated his rights to confrontation, due process, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty, we reject those claims as well: `As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's right to present a defense. Courts retain, moreover, a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice.' ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99]) ( People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 305, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) Defendant does not explain why the routine evidentiary rulings of which he complains rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by permitting Sergeant Quinn to testify and recount Garrison's admissions. Defendant characterizes Garrison as less than an ideal witness and claims the People were unfairly permitted to bolster his credibility by having a police officer testify and essentially repeat everything Garrison said. Defendant specifically identifies those portions of Quinn's testimony in which Quinn reported that Garrison had called the police with no prompting and had confessed to his participation before being offered a plea bargain, that Quinn determined the man Garrison knew only as Apache was defendant, and that Garrison stated that defendant told him he (defendant) had killed someone in the past. The gist of defendant's argument is that all such testimony was inadmissible hearsay. The trial court disagreed, ruling the evidence was admissible on the basis that, because the defense had suggested Garrison's story was a recent fabrication to come within the terms of his plea bargain, the People were entitled to show that his prior statement to Sergeant Quinn, given before the plea bargain, was consistent with his testimony. In truth, however, the jury had already heard much of the evidence of which defendant now complains from when Quinn testified earlier in the trial. Thus, for example, Quinn already had recounted the circumstances of how Garrison called the police and reported his involvement in the Dolinka murder. [17] Although respondent contends defendant failed to object to the admission of any evidence on this ground, defense counsel made a standing objection and thus preserved the issue for appeal. In any event, we find no error, as the trial court properly ruled that Garrison's prior consistent statements were admissible to rebut the suggestion he recently had fabricated his story. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 609, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376; Evid.Code, §§ 791, subd. (b), 1236.) Consequently, we also reject defendant's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant defense counsel's motion for a mistrial based on Quinn's testimony. Although defendant further claims that Sergeant Quinn's testimony constituted a form of improper vouching for the credibility of a witness (cf. People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 848, 97 Cal.Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564 [a prosecutor [may not] express a personal opinion or belief in a defendant's guilt]), he is incorrect. Quinn merely testified to prior consistent statements of the witness to rebut a claim of recent fabrication. In addition, defendant contends Quinn was allowed to usurp the role of a psychiatric expert when the trial court permitted him (over defense objection) to answer the prosecutor's question whether he had observed any delusional or hallucinatory speech or conduct on the part of Mr. Garrison. Quinn was not qualified to offer a professional psychological diagnosis, as both the prosecutor and the trial court stated before the jury. Nevertheless, the court made clear to the jury that Quinn's answer would reflect his own observations as a layperson. Quinn thereafter testified that Garrison did not appear distracted or hesitant during the interview, was responsive to questions, and his attention was always toward the speaker. We perceive no error: laypersons may testify to their observations of a witness's behavior outside the therapeutic setting that is relevant to the overall question of the witness's mental state. ( People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 32, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) To the extent defendant contends the admission of Quinn's testimony violated his rights to confrontation, due process, a fair trial, and fundamental fairness, we reject those claims as well. (See People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 305, 70 Cal. Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.)