Opinion ID: 712236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Philip May's Double Jeopardy Argument

Text: 55 Mr. May suffered several adverse rulings from which he appeals in the claimants' opening brief: the district court's refusal to grant his motion to suppress evidence obtained in the search of his home and business, the court's conclusion that Unit 10 was forfeitable, 8 and the standard applied by the court in determining whether the forfeiture was excessive. In a supplemental brief, Mr. May also asserts for the first time in the litigation that the civil forfeiture amounted to double jeopardy. If successful, this last argument would provide Mr. May more complete relief than any of the others since it could entirely bar forfeiture of his interest in the property. We therefore begin with double jeopardy, and ultimately conclude that forfeiture of Mr. May's property in a second, civil proceeding is barred to the extent that it is based on conduct for which Mr. May has already been prosecuted.
56 As a threshold matter, the government asserts that Mr. May cannot raise his double jeopardy argument for the first time on appeal. It points to our general rule that, absent manifest error, an issue will not be considered if raised for the first time on appeal. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir.1991). The government next argues that double jeopardy rights are subject to waiver. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 575, 109 S.Ct. 757, 765, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989). 57 The rule against considering new issues on appeal is subject to exceptions required in the interest of justice. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557, 61 S.Ct. 719, 721, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941). One such exception is required in the event of plain error in a criminal proceeding. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We have previously noted in a criminal case that a violation of double jeopardy would surely be the type of 'plain error' which could be raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Gunter, 546 F.2d 861, 865 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 947, 97 S.Ct. 1583, 51 L.Ed.2d 794 (1977), and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 2189, 53 L.Ed.2d 232 (1977); see also United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 540-41 (10th Cir.1991) (considering on appeal a double jeopardy argument raised below but not in the initial brief or at oral argument), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 951, 112 S.Ct. 402, 116 L.Ed.2d 351 (1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 52 F.3d 298 (10th Cir.1995). Although there is no analogous federal plain error rule for civil cases, there are two reasons for applying a similar analysis here under the Hicks manifest error exception. First, we have noted before that this court has discretion to review previously unraised, purely legal issues in the civil context. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1539 (10th Cir.1992). This is true especially when the law changes during the pendency of an appeal. See United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449, 1451-52 (D.C.Cir.1995) (rejecting government's argument that defendant waived his double jeopardy claim by failing to raise it in the district court and concluding that the issuance of two relevant Supreme Court decisions during the pendency of the appeal constituted good reason for the omission); Parks Sch. of Business, Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1488 (9th Cir.1995). 9 Second, it would beg the question to predicate review on a distinction between civil and criminal actions when the distinction itself is at the heart of the case. 58 We also reject the government's contention that Mr. May's failure to assert his double jeopardy argument in district court amounted to a voluntary waiver of his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is true that double jeopardy is subject to knowing and intelligent waiver, for example in the context of a plea bargain. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 11, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 2686, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Montoya v. New Mexico, 55 F.3d 1496, 1499 (10th Cir.1995). A guilty plea can also waive a later double jeopardy argument, Broce, 488 U.S. at 569, 109 S.Ct. at 762, although the government overstates this rule's limited application. See id. (warning that waiver does not apply where on the face of the record the court had no power to enter the conviction or impose the sentence). However, even if Broce were as broad as the government suggests, Mr. May took no analogous affirmative step in this case, and we hold that he did not voluntarily waive this important constitutional right merely by failing to plead it. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (distinguishing between forfeiture through failure to plead and actual waiver); United States v. Rivera, 872 F.2d 507, 509 (1st Cir.) (refusing to infer waiver of double jeopardy rights simply from the defendant's failure to argue the issue below), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S.Ct. 71, 107 L.Ed.2d 38 (1989). 10 We conclude that it is proper to exercise discretion to hear this issue, and we turn to the merits.

59 The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy has been said to consist of three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnotes omitted). These protections guard against two evils: successive prosecutions and impermissibly multiplicitous punishments. Regarding the successive prosecution aspect, the Supreme Court has said: The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not have to marshal the resources and energies necessary for this defense more than once for the same alleged criminal acts. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99, 79 S.Ct. 666, 673, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959). 60 In this case the government first obtained a conviction against Philip May, then sought forfeiture of his property on the basis of the conduct for which Mr. May had already been convicted. In its motion for summary judgment, the undisputed facts on which the government based its case included the facts on which Mr. May had been convicted, plus the facts establishing a relationship between the defendant property and the illegal activity. Aplt.App. vol. I, at 4-7. Had this been a criminal forfeiture proceeding brought under 21 U.S.C. § 853, the double jeopardy problem would be apparent. The forfeiture proceeding would have been a second jeopardy, resulting in a second punishment, for the same offense. 61 However, the traditional view of civil forfeitures exempted them from double jeopardy analysis because the proceeding, being civil, could not be a jeopardy, and because forfeiture of the defendant property was not a punishment. 11 Mr. May urges that this view can no longer be maintained in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), and Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). We agree. 62
63 In Halper, the government sought civil sanctions against a former medical service manager who had already been criminally charged and convicted for filing sixty-five inflated Medicare claims that each charged $12.00 for what was really a $3.00 procedure. In the civil proceeding, the government sought more than $130,000 under a statute that provided for a $2,000 penalty plus double damages for each violation, and the manager challenged on double jeopardy grounds. The Court rejected the government's argument that double jeopardy could not apply in a civil case. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. It observed that a civil penalty normally construed as remedial could become punitive where the penalty authorized by statute was so extreme and so divorced from the Government's damages and expenses as to constitute punishment. Id. at 442, 109 S.Ct. at 1898. It concluded that in such cases the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to civil penalties that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901, and remanded the case for an accounting of the government's actual damages, id. at 452, 109 S.Ct. at 1903. 64 Austin, although decided on Eighth Amendment grounds, underscored the need to pierce the civil-criminal veil in determining the scope of constitutional protections in forfeiture cases. The owner of a body shop and mobile home pleaded guilty to a charge of selling cocaine, then challenged as an excessive fine the subsequent forfeiture of his house and mobile home pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7). The Court conducted a historical review of the purposes behind in rem forfeitures in general and concluded that they have been understood, at least in part, as punishment. Austin, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2810. It then concluded that the specific forfeiture provisions in the case, § 881(a)(4) and (7), were not remedial, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, not  'a reasonable form of liquidated damages,'  id. (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 93 S.Ct. 489, 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972)), and not exempt from Eighth Amendment analysis even if the provisions' aim was in part nonpunitive. Id. The Court then remanded the case for a determination of whether the forfeiture was excessive. Id. 65 Guided primarily by Halper and Austin, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir.1994), reh'g denied and modified on other grounds, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir.1995), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 762, 133 L.Ed.2d 707 (U.S.1996), that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the forfeiture of property under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) where the forfeiture was based on conduct for which the claimants had been previously convicted. In reaching its conclusion, the court held first that the civil and criminal trials, although roughly contemporaneous, were not the same proceeding for double jeopardy purposes, id. at 1216, and then held that § 881(a)(6), the drug proceeds provision which Austin did not address, was as punitive for double jeopardy purposes as the other two forfeiture provisions in § 881. Id. at 1220. The court concluded that the entire forfeiture was a second attempt by the government to exact punishment for the same conduct and was thus barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 1222. 66 The last case on which Mr. May relies is Kurth Ranch. After the Kurths were convicted of growing marijuana on their ranch, the State of Montana sought to collect a $1,000-per-ounce tax on the harvested marijuana, and the Kurths challenged the assessment on double jeopardy grounds. The Supreme Court first cited Halper 's unequivocal statement that labels do not control in a double jeopardy inquiry, Kurth Ranch, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1946, and then scrutinized the state tax statute to determine whether it exacted punishment or merely revenue. Id. Based on the high rate of tax in proportion to the value of the taxed items, the tax's deterrent effect, its predication on the commission of a crime, and the fact that, as contraband, the taxed items were never legally owned, the Court concluded that the tax was in fact punitive. Id. at ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1947-48. As such, it could be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. 67 In the wake of Kurth Ranch, Judge Easterbrook agreed, in dicta, with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that civil forfeiture following a criminal trial is a punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 68 [I]f, as Kurth Ranch holds[,] a civil proceeding to collect a monetary penalty for crime counts as an independent jeopardy, it does not require much imagination to see the problem. Civil and criminal proceedings are not only docketed separately but also tried separately, and under the double jeopardy clause separate trials are anathema. 69 United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 669, 130 L.Ed.2d 603 (1994). In short, The United States would do well to seek imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture in one proceeding. Id. at 1464. 70 We are constrained by Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch to conclude that forfeiture under § 881(a)(7) constitutes punishment as far as Mr. May is concerned. Austin makes it clear that forfeitures under § 881(a)(7) are punishment, and we agree with the Ninth Circuit that there is no difference between the excessive fines and the double jeopardy definition of punishment. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1219. Finally, since Halper and Kurth Ranch make it clear that the Double Jeopardy Clause brooks no distinction between civil and criminal punishments (as opposed to remedial penalties), we must conclude that double jeopardy concepts apply to the forfeiture of Mr. May's interest in his house and business property.
71 We must consider separately the forfeiture of Mr. May's interest in the $13,050 he carried to his ill-fated drug deal and the $2,800 found in his home. The district court held the $13,050 to be forfeitable on the grounds that it was furnished or intended to be furnished for the purchase of controlled substances, and was intended to facilitate an illegal drug activity. The district court held the $2,800 to be forfeitable on the grounds that it was either drug proceeds or was to be furnished for the purchase of controlled substances or to facilitate drug trafficking. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 72 The forfeiture of these two sums involves two issues not directly addressed in the three Supreme Court cases on which we rely above. First, they were forfeited under § 881(a)(6), which was not addressed in Austin. Second, both sums were either held by the court or asserted by the government to be drug proceeds, and the government contends that forfeiture of such proceeds is never punishment. 73 As to Austin 's silence on § 881(a)(6), we see no reason why that provision--at least where the money forfeited thereunder is not drug proceeds--should be analyzed any differently than § 881(a)(7). The government apparently concedes this point, since it suggests no reason to treat that section differently in terms of its intent, effect, or legislative history. 74 Instead, the government saves its ammunition for the drug proceeds argument. Here the government relies on United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 573, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994), and cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 574, 130 L.Ed.2d 490 (1994); United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231 (8th Cir.1994); and SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689 (D.C.Cir.1994). Cf. United States v. $21,282 in United States Currency, 47 F.3d 972, 973 (8th Cir.1995) (holding criminal forfeiture of drug proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1) not to be punishment). But see $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1220; United States v. Borromeo, 1 F.3d 219, 221 (4th Cir.1993) (remanding a § 881(a)(6) drug proceeds case to determine whether the Excessive Fines Clause had been violated). We ultimately conclude that the correct approach to § 881, as dictated by Austin, precludes application of the government's cases. 75 Alexander, Bilzerian, and Tilley all hold in different statutory contexts that forcing a wrongdoer to disgorge ill-gotten gains is never punishment, and so cannot violate the Double Jeopardy clause. Alexander involved a civil RICO forfeiture and a claimant who had previously been convicted on criminal racketeering charges. Considering various elements of the forfeiture for excessive fines purposes, the Eighth Circuit held that [f]orfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered punishment, ... as it simply parts the owner from the fruits of the criminal activity. Alexander, 32 F.3d at 1236. Bilzerian involved a civil action by the SEC to force a defendant previously convicted of illegal stock trading to disgorge the profits from his schemes. The District of Columbia Circuit held that disgorgement was not punishment because it  'merely places that party in the lawfully protected financial status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal scheme.'  Bilzerian, 29 F.3d at 696 (quoting Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300). 76 Tilley is the only one of these cases to address the forfeiture of illegal proceeds under § 881. There the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the forfeiture of drug proceeds under § 881(a)(6) should be considered punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. The court reasoned that such forfeiture was purely remedial, first because it was repayment for the social cost of the illegal activity and the government's costs in investigating and prosecuting such activity, id. at 298-99, and second because the possessor of drug proceeds has no reasonable expectation that the law will protect, condone, or even allow, his continued possession of such proceeds, id. at 300. Thus, the seizure of drug proceeds is more closely akin to the seizure of the proceeds from the robbery of a federal bank than the seizure of lawfully derived real property. Id. 77 The difficulty with the repayment to society argument is that it applies as readily to all § 881 forfeitures as it does to the forfeiture of drug proceeds. If the remedy effected by forfeiture is understood broadly enough to encompass not only direct governmental losses, as with Medicaid fraud in Halper, but also the nearly incalculable social costs of an entire class of illegal conduct, then all forfeitures are purely remedial. This conclusion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Austin. 78 Tilley 's second line of analysis, the analogy of drug proceeds to the loot from a bank robbery, comprises both a legal and an equitable aspect. Legally, just as one cannot own contraband, see, e.g., Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 1234, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948) (holding that illegally seized contraband need not be returned to defendants because they had no right to it), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), it can be argued that one cannot own the proceeds from the sale of contraband. Of course, § 881(a) itself provides that no property right shall exist in anything forfeitable under that subsection, but the use of that provision to establish the lack of ownership in proceeds not only amounts to a petitio principii, but also again offends Austin by making all forfeitures nonpunitive. Tilley does not state, and we do not find, any clear authority for the proposition that legal ownership of drug proceeds is impossible. In fact, drug proceeds are ownable by anyone who can establish an innocent owner defense. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 128, 113 S.Ct. 1126, 1137, 122 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Thus, even a noninnocent possessor of such proceeds must own them insofar as he can alienate them. We must conclude that the proposition that drug proceeds may not be owned is false as a statement of law. 12 79 Tilley also rests on the equitable argument that the forfeiture of drug proceeds simply denies the claimant the benefit of his or her misconduct. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 153 n. 6, 76 S.Ct. 219, 222 n. 6, 100 L.Ed. 149 (1956) (stating that the civil sanction imposed in that case might serve to avoid unjust enrichment), cited in Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300. However, Rex Trailer involved a scheme to defraud the government at the expense of a group, namely veterans, that the government had intended to benefit. Unjust enrichment typically involves the illicit enjoyment of a benefit taken from its rightful owner. Restatement of Restitution § 1 (1936). The force of the equitable analogy is diminished where, as here, there simply is no rightful owner to whom the money may be returned. 80 Finally, Tilley is inconsistent with the analysis the Supreme Court has already applied to § 881. In Austin, the Court held § 881(a)(4) and (7) to be punishment based on the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2812, the focus of the provisions on the culpability of the owner, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2811, and the fact that Congress tied forfeiture directly to the commission of specified offenses, id. These factors apply as readily to § 881(a)(6) as they do to § 881's other provisions. See $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1221. 81 In addition, we note a further difficulty with Tilley 's drug proceeds exception. Drug proceeds are also forfeitable under the criminal forfeiture statute. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). If the forfeiture of drug proceeds under § 881(a)(6) were held not to be punishment, and if the civil and criminal labels are indeed not dispositive of the double jeopardy issue, there would be no principled way to avoid applying Tilley 's reasoning to § 853(a)(1). Criminal forfeiture could then be imposed in a proceeding separate from the criminal trial without constituting double jeopardy, as long as drug proceeds only were forfeited. 13 82 For the above reasons, we reject the government's invitation to analyze the drug proceeds portion of § 881 separately from the rest of the statute. Forfeiture of Mr. May's interest in the $13,050 and $2,800 was punishment for double jeopardy purposes whether those sums were forfeited as drug proceeds or otherwise. 14 83 Having determined that the forfeiture in this case was punishment, we must next consider whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the forfeiture to the extent that it was based on conduct already punished criminally. Mr. May says it does, and contends that he is entitled to an immediate judgment to secure the full extent of his interest in the forfeiture res. The government responds in two ways. First, it argues that the forfeiture proceeding is not a second jeopardy. Next, the government argues that the forfeiture is not a jeopardy for the same offense. We reject the former argument completely, and accept the latter only insofar as the record indicates that forfeiture can be based on conduct for which Mr. May was not previously prosecuted. 84
85 The government first contends that the forfeiture proceeding was not a second jeopardy. It bases its position on United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 922, 127 L.Ed.2d 215 (1994). In that case the Second Circuit held that double jeopardy did not bar a criminal proceeding following a § 881 forfeiture where both were part of a single, coordinated prosecution. Id. at 20. The court noted that although the civil and criminal actions were filed separately, they bore various indicia of simultaneity and coordination, and concluded that the two proceedings constituted a single prosecution that did not implicate constitutional concerns about prosecutorial abuse. 15 Id. The same analysis has been adopted in the Eleventh Circuit, see United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir.1994), but was rejected in the Ninth Circuit, $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. We reject Millan as well. 86 We note initially that the authority for Millan 's distinction between proceeding and prosecution consists entirely of one sentence from Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984): [T]he [Double Jeopardy] Clause does not prohibit the State from prosecuting respondent for such multiple offenses in a single prosecution. Id. at 500, 104 S.Ct. at 2541, quoted in Millan, 2 F.3d at 20. But Johnson did not involve multiple proceedings; the question was instead whether a single proceeding could be subdivided like amoebae into more than one jeopardy for Fifth Amendment purposes. Id. at 501, 104 S.Ct. at 2542. The Johnson Court had no reason to consider, and gave no evidence that it did consider, the definition of prosecution in the context of multiple proceedings. Thus, Johnson is a very thin reed on which to perch the proposition that a single prosecution may comprise multiple proceedings without violating double jeopardy. 87 Moreover, Millan and progeny are also implicitly inconsistent with the approach taken in Halper and Kurth Ranch. In both cases the civil proceedings that followed the criminal convictions were arguably part of a single, coordinated prosecution, yet neither case took the view that two proceedings could constitute one prosecution. Moreover, the Court's choice of terminology in those cases is inconsistent with such a view. In Halper, the Court used the term prosecution synonymously with proceeding. See, e.g., Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1901-02 ([U]nder the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction....) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Kurth Ranch the Court stated that the raid on the Kurth Ranch gave rise to four separate legal proceedings, including the criminal trial and the tax proceeding, Kurth Ranch, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1942, and then concluded that the tax proceeding was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution, id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added). 88 The practical result, as Judge Easterbrook noted, is that two trials mean two jeopardies. In Kurth Ranch itself the tax proceeding was begun at the same time as the criminal prosecution; the Supreme Court did not think the fact that the two were pending contemporaneously mattered. Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465. 89 Finally, Millan also underestimates the policy concerns that underlie the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants against more than a prosecutor's dissatisfaction with the results of the first trial. The clause is implicated whenever a defendant is obliged to marshal the resources and energies necessary for his defense more than once for the same alleged criminal acts. Abbate, 359 U.S. at 198-99, 79 S.Ct. at 673. The practice of instituting multiple proceedings against a single defendant, which the government benignly terms a coordinated law-enforcement effort, has as much or more capacity to harass and exhaust the defendant than does a post hoc decision to retry him. See $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1217 (We believe that such a coordinated, manipulative prosecution strategy heightens, rather than diminishes, the concern that the government is forcing an individual to 'run the gantlet' more than once. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190, 78 S.Ct. 221, 225, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957))); see also United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 850-51 (10th Cir.1992) (illustrating how coordinated prosecutions may become a form of prosecutorial abuse). 90 In the present case there is certainly no indication that the government's prosecution was impelled by improper motives. The government points out that it was procedurally constrained to institute two actions in order to do everything to Mr. May that the statutes appear to allow, and it is certainly true that attempts to punish both civilly and criminally must, in our legal system, give rise to separate proceedings. Nonetheless, the government's good faith does not make two proceedings a single jeopardy. 91 As the Ninth Circuit has observed, Millan contradicts controlling Supreme Court precedent as well as common sense. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. We conclude that the government's single-prosecution argument is justified by neither policy nor precedent, and that [t]wo trials, even if close in time, are still double jeopardy. Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465. 92
93 The government's next contention is that, even if the instant forfeiture is punishment, the civil proceeding that imposed it was not a jeopardy for the same offense. First, the government contends that at least some of the property is forfeitable on the basis of acts for which Mr. May was never tried. Next, the government contends that the elements of civil forfeiture differ from those of the criminal offense and are thus different offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), recently reaffirmed in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993), a court faced with a claim of double jeopardy must ask whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the 'same offence' and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2856. Finally, the government argues that whatever conclusion is reached under Blockburger, the same conduct may form the basis of two proceedings if Congress so intends.
94 As to the argument from unindicted conduct, it is axiomatic that a party cannot rely on the Double Jeopardy Clause to avoid punishment for conduct for which he was never previously placed in jeopardy. In this case, the court found that one possible basis for forfeiture of the $2,800 was the possibility that it was proceeds from drug sales. The government also made the same argument, with supporting evidence, as to the $13,050, although the court did not explicitly predicate forfeiture thereon. We agree that basing forfeiture on previous conduct for which Mr. May was never indicted cannot constitute double jeopardy. See United States v. One 1978 Piper Cherokee Aircraft, 37 F.3d 489, 495 (9th Cir.1994). 95 In light of our earlier discussion of the ownership of the $2,800, we hold that Mr. May's interest in that sum may be forfeited on remand if he is found to have had any ownership interest therein and if the money is found to be proceeds from previous, unprosecuted sales. As to the $13,050, the record is insufficient to affirm summary judgment for the government on this alternative theory, but we hold that that sum may also be forfeited on remand to the extent that it is found to be proceeds from previous, unprosecuted sales. However, the record is devoid of any indication by the government that either the house or the business property are forfeitable based on unprosecuted conduct. Thus, we must turn to the government's more ambitious contentions.
96 The government next argues that civil forfeiture, even when based on precisely the same conduct previously used to establish criminal charges, cannot violate the Double Jeopardy Clause; either the criminal penalty and the forfeiture are not punishment for the same offense, because under Blockburger the forfeiture offense and the crime each require proof of a fact that the other does not, or they do punish the same offense, but with congressional approval. Neither argument is persuasive. 97
98 We note first that the government's Blockburger argument presupposes that § 881 defines an offense as well as a punishment--presumably, the offense of being the owner of guilty property. This proposition is by no means self-evident; in general, a statute may very well create a punishment without defining a separate offense. In Kurth Ranch, for instance, the Court did not find itself obliged to consider whether Montana's drug tax statute defined a separate offense; it was enough for double jeopardy purposes that the statute imposed a second punishment for offenses defined elsewhere. Similarly, 21 U.S.C. § 853, the criminal forfeiture statute for drug offenses, merely prescribes a punishment, not a separate offense. Libretti v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 356, 364, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995). 99 Moreover, the idea that § 881 itself defines a separate offense is at odds with Austin 's review of that section's legislative history. Although at common law the forfeiture of guilty property was sometimes described as a penalty for carelessness, Austin, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2806 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683, 94 S.Ct. at 2091), the Court noted in Austin that the innocent owner defense contained in § 881 revealed a congressional intent to punish only those involved in drug trafficking, id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2811. The section's legislative history also reveals an intent to punish, not negligent ownership, but  'the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs.'  Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. at 191 (1983)). Finally, none of the opinions in Austin analyzes the excessive fines issue in that case in terms of a second offense. See id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that proportionality of the forfeiture be measured in terms of the property's relationship to the crime previously committed); id. at ---- n. 15, 113 S.Ct. at 2812 n. 15 (noting Justice Scalia's suggestion that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture's excessiveness is the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense, and declining to rule out the possibility that the connection between the property and the offense may be relevant) (emphasis added). 100 The foregoing considerations indicate that, with respect to claimants previously prosecuted for the illegal activity occasioning the forfeiture, § 881 defines a punishment, but not a separate offense. However, even if a second offense had been created, we conclude below that prosecution therefor in a second, postconviction proceeding is barred under Blockburger. 101
102 Under Blockburger, two offenses are different only if each contains an element not present in the other. Dixon, 509 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2856. When only one offense contains an extra element not found in the other, the latter is a lesser included offense of the former, and a defendant may not be charged with both in separate proceedings. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 421, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 2267, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980) (holding that, where a defendant convicted of failing to reduce speed was subsequently tried for involuntary manslaughter, remand would be necessary to determine whether under state law the former was an element of the latter); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-69, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2227, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) (holding that a defendant could not be tried for auto theft once convicted of the lesser included offense of joyriding); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682, 97 S.Ct. 2912, 2912, 53 L.Ed.2d 1054 (1977) (per curiam) (holding that a defendant could not be tried for felony murder once convicted of the lesser included offense of robbery). 103 The situation appears to be similar here. Property is forfeit under § 881(a) whenever it has the requisite relationship to a violation of title 21, chapter 13, subchapter I. Thus, if any provision of § 881(a) defines an offense, it is one with two elements: the underlying drug violation and the use of property in connection therewith. All drug violations in subchapter I, and a fortiori their underlying elements, would therefore be contained within § 881(a) as lesser included offenses of the forfeiture offense. Under Harris and its progeny such an offense may not be prosecuted once a jeopardy for the lesser included offense has occurred. 104 Against this reading of § 881(a), the government argues that the forfeiture provision passes the Blockburger test because, unlike the drug crime, it has no mens rea element, does not require proof of an individual claimant's unlawful conduct, and may give rise to a forfeiture when there are no claimants at all. Of course, these arguments tend to undermine the government's basic position by suggesting that § 881 does not define an offense at all. In addition, they overlook the fact that the government must show mens rea and unlawful conduct on someone's part, or the forfeiture will fail for lack of an underlying drug crime. But more fundamentally, these arguments apply Blockburger at too abstract a level. The government's argument is that forfeiture in general need not be based on any particular past offense by a particular claimant, so forfeiture does not punish the same offense when in a particular case it is based squarely on such a past offense. However, in applying Blockburger, courts are not so free to ignore the facts on which prosecutions are based. For example, felony murder need not be based on any particular felony, yet in Harris the Court considered a felony murder conviction to bar prosecution for the underlying felony of robbery. 433 U.S. at 682, 97 S.Ct. at 2912. Similarly, in Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980), the Court held that a District of Columbia statute codifying Blockburger made rape a lesser offense included within the offense of felony murder. Id. at 694 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 1439 n. 8. Thus, where commission of one of a certain class of offenses is a necessary element of another offense, and where the identical conduct or unit of prosecution is the factual basis of both, each offense within the class is a species of lesser-included offense in relation to the greater offense. Vitale, 447 U.S. at 420, 100 S.Ct. at 2267. For purposes of the government's Blockburger argument, we conclude that the crimes for which Mr. May was previously convicted constitute a species of lesser-included offense in relation to the civil forfeiture, which is therefore barred under the cases discussed above. 105
106 Finally, the government contends, apparently in the alternative, that legislative intent, not Blockburger, is what controls the government's ability to impose multiple punishments in successive proceedings. Blockburger has been held to be a mere rule of statutory construction, to be utilized only when the will of Congress is not clear. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368, 103 S.Ct. 673, 679, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). Relying on such language, the government appears to argue that two offenses that are the same offense under Blockburger can still be separately tried and punished if Congress so chooses. 107 However, we must conclude that congressional intent, no matter how clear, cannot bestow constitutional legitimacy upon multiple punishments for the same offense when they are imposed in multiple proceedings. The government's position is correct with respect to multiple punishments in the same proceeding. See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 103 S.Ct. at 678; Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689, 100 S.Ct. at 1436; Yparrea v. Dorsey, 64 F.3d 577, 579 (10th Cir.1995). But neither Hunter nor Whalen was decided in the context of multiple proceedings. On the other hand, cases that do involve multiple proceedings have applied Blockburger or an analogous elements test and have almost uniformly failed to consider legislative intent. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2860-63 (reviewing cases and concluding that the elements test is the sole test for double jeopardy in the multiple proceeding context); Vitale, 447 U.S. at 419-20, 100 S.Ct. at 2266-67 (holding that double jeopardy would bar prosecution for manslaughter after conviction for failure to reduce speed if, as a matter of state law, the latter is a necessary element of the former); Harris, 433 U.S. at 682, 97 S.Ct. at 2912 (holding that a defendant previously convicted of felony murder during a robbery could not then be tried for the robbery); Brown, 432 U.S. at 168-69, 97 S.Ct. at 2226-27 (holding that Blockburger prevents prosecution for auto theft after conviction for the lesser included offense of joyriding); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 344, 31 S.Ct. 421, 423, 55 L.Ed. 489 (1911) (upholding successive criminal prosecutions because [e]ach offense required proof of a fact, which the other did not); Ex parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188, 9 S.Ct. 672, 676, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889) (holding that a defendant convicted of one offense may not then be prosecuted for a lesser included offense). In Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985), where the Court did consult legislative history in a multiple prosecution setting, id. at 782-85, 105 S.Ct. at 2413-15, the Court then proceeded to perform an independent double jeopardy analysis based on identity of conduct, id. at 786, 105 S.Ct. at 2415, before reaching its conclusion that double jeopardy was not violated by the use of a prior drug conviction as a predicate offense of the crime of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise. Thus, we do not read Garrett as an exception to the approach set forth in Nielsen, Gavieres, Brown, Harris, and Vitale. 108 These cases culminate in Halper and Kurth Ranch, where the Court limited the effect of federal and state statutes by barring the imposition of civil penalties for an offense previously prosecuted. The point is especially clear in Kurth Ranch, where the Montana legislature chose to impose a civil penalty only on those potentially subject to a first prosecution. --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1947. Once the Court determined that the tax was a punishment, it inquired no further into the intent of the legislature, but held that the tax must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. 109 With respect to nonremedial civil penalties, we take Halper and Kurth Ranch to be dispositive. Although Congress may allow multiple punishments for the same offense in the same proceeding, it cannot legitimize multiple punishments for the identical offense in different proceedings.
110 Thus, whether the forfeiture is seen merely as another punishment for Mr. May's prior drug conviction or as a punishment for a separate offense, the result is the same. Following his conviction on drug charges, Mr. May was punished again in a separate proceeding for the same offenses. Insofar as it was based on previously prosecuted conduct, the second punishment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Since the government did not argue and the record does not indicate that either Unit 10 or the Mays' home is forfeitable on the basis of unprosecuted conduct, we hold that Mr. May's interest in these properties may not be forfeited.