Opinion ID: 2436949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Involuntariness of Guilty Pleas

Text: When Atkins came before the court to change his plea from not guilty to guilty of burglary, the judge engaged counsel in the colloquy noted above with respect to the agreement. He then addressed Atkins as follows: THE COURT: You understand, of course, that you have to make your own decision as to whether you enter a plea of guilty to Burglary or not? You can follow Mr. Pawlik's advice or you don't have to, depending on what you feel is in your best interests, but he can defend you in court and he can advise you and you're entitled to accept his advice, but it is still your decision. Do you understand that? MR. ATKINS: Yes, Sir. THE COURT: Are you offering a plea of guilty to this charge of your own free will? MR. ATKINS: Yes, Sir, Your Honor. THE COURT: And nobody has leaned on you or twisted your arm to get you to plead guilty? MR. ATKINS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Has anybody promised you whether I would accept the plea or not? MR. ATKINS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, let's see here. I'll set his sentencing for October the 29th. That's more than forty-five days, but that is the nearest date I have got to that. The questions asked by the court fell short of the requirements of Ark.R. Crim.P. 24.4 which provides: Advice by Court The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a defendant without first addressing the defendant personally, informing him of and determining that he understands: (a) The nature of the charge; (b) the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge; (c) the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that possible from consecutive sentences; (d) that if the offense charged is one for which a different or additional punishment is authorized because the defendant has previously been convicted of an offense or offenses one (1) or more times, the previous conviction or convictions may be established after the entry of his plea in the present action, thereby subjecting him to such different or additional punishment; and (e) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere he waives his right to a trial by jury and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, except in capital cases where the death penalty is sought. The judge asked questions of his own design to ascertain if the plea was voluntary. The rule, however, is designed to see to it that the plea is voluntary after the accused has certain information. Atkins was not personally informed by the court of the nature of the charge or any of the other items the rule requires except that he could have a jury trial. Nor was there any compliance with Ark.R.Crim.P. 24.6 which requires the court to make such inquiry as will establish that there is a factual basis for the plea. In Clark v. State, 271 Ark. 866, 611 S.W.2d 502 (1981), we emphasized the requirement that the court ascertain that the plea was voluntary. We said substantial compliance with Rule 24.4 was sufficient. That opinion contained the following paragraph describing what we considered to have been substantial compliance in that case: At sentencing the trial court questioned appellant as to the voluntariness of his plea. Appellant stated he understood the charges and the punishment; he was satisfied with the services of his attorney; he knew that he was entitled to a jury trial; his plea of guilty was voluntary because he was in fact guilty; he advised the court of a prior conviction in another state; and, after the court imposed sentence, appellant stated he understood the sentence and had no questions concerning it. As indicated, the court told appellant he would be required to serve one-third of the ten year sentence before becoming eligible to apply for parole. In Clark v. State, supra , not only was there a far more detailed inquiry of the accused with respect to the items mentioned in Rule 24.4, but there the court ascertained a factual basis for the guilty plea in accordance with Rule 24.6. No court should accept a plea of guilt without determining whether the accused believes he is guilty and that belief has a substantial factual basis. Because of this failure to comply with Rules 24.4 and 24.6, we must set aside Atkins' plea of guilty to the burglary charge. The only argument made as to the involuntariness of the guilty plea to the charge of failure to appear is that Atkins at first indicated uncertainty of the extent to which his attorney had advised him of the matters mentioned in Rule 24.4. The public defender stated in open court substantially all of the information required by the rule, and Atkins ultimately acknowledged he had been advised. While it would have been better had the court personally addressed Atkins on those matters, the record is sufficient to show substantial compliance with the rule at that point.