Opinion ID: 495040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Burglary Conviction

Text: 50 During the sentencing proceeding, the state introduced evidence that Campbell had been convicted of two prior felonies. The first conviction was for the assault and sodomy of Renae Wicklund in 1974 and is not challenged here. The other was a 1976 conviction for second degree burglary entered on Campbell's plea of guilty. Campbell argues that evidence of this latter conviction should not have been admitted because the conviction was based on an invalid guilty plea. 51 It is ... well-established that a sentence is subject to review if it has been enhanced in reliance on an unconstitutional conviction. United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972)). To prevail on his claim Campbell must show that (1) the prior conviction was unconstitutional and (2) his sentence was enhanced in reliance on the prior conviction. See Williams, 782 F.2d at 1466. 52 We need not address the first prong of this test because Campbell fails to satisfy the second prong. He has not shown that his sentence was enhanced by the jury's reliance on the prior conviction. See Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1354 (9th Cir.1978) (en banc) (recommending determination of enhancement question prior to addressing constitutionality issue). The underlying facts of this case speak for themselves. The jurors were not only confronted with the sheer savagery of the murders, but they, like the Supreme Court of Washington, must have been hard pressed to find killings more premeditated and revengeful than those committed by defendant. Campbell, 691 P.2d at 946. The state focused on the facts of Campbell's crime in its case before the jury and only briefly presented the nonviolent second degree burglary conviction in the sentencing proceeding. In a case unprecedented in the state of Washington with respect to the number of aggravating factors found by the jury, see id. at 945, there is no reasonable probability that the jury relied on the 1976 burglary conviction in determining whether there were sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. See Farrow, 580 F.2d at 1355 (adopting reasonable probability standard).C. Effective Assistance of Counsel 53 Campbell contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorneys' failure to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing proceeding. The appropriate standards for judging Campbell's claim are set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 54 A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a ... death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the ... death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. 55 Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. In reviewing alleged deficiencies of representation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. To establish prejudice, [t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068.
56 The record amply supports the district court's finding that the decision of Campbell's counsel not to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding was a reasoned strategic choice falling well within the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. One reason for the decision not to present mitigating evidence was to avoid opening the door to possible damaging rebuttal evidence by the state. The record shows that the state was prepared to present a vast array of aggravating evidence in rebuttal, including the forcible rape of Campbell's ex-wife, repeated rape and intimidation of fellow inmates, drug- and alcohol-induced violence, and the report of a psychologist that Campbell was imminently harmful to all who directly or indirectly capture his attention or interest. In addition, there were reportings of sexually abhorrent conduct with animals, stranglings of animals, [and] alleged child abuse. As one of Campbell's attorneys testified, [t]here pretty much was every kind of bad thing you could imagine [that] had been represented as potential aggravating testimony to be presented by the State. 57 In addition, Campbell's counsel correctly interpreted Bartholomew 's restriction on the state's ability to present aggravating evidence. Faced with the choice of limiting the state to a relatively tame presentation of Campbell's prior convictions, or potentially opening the door to devastating rebuttal evidence, Campbell's counsel chose the former route by electing not to present mitigating evidence. In one of the attorney's words, [p]resentation of those [mitigating] items in my mind would bring forth a parade of horribles that in my opinion would so far bury those factors in mitigation that any chance we had of saving his life would have been lost. 5 58 Campbell also faults his attorneys for not filing motions in limine to determine exactly what evidence the state would be able to present in rebuttal. We recognize, however, that counsel is strongly presumed to have ... made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. The record shows that Campbell's lead counsel was very experienced--a veteran of hundreds of felony trials, including many first-degree murder cases--and was specifically engaged as co-counsel because of his past capital experience. Counsel testified that he did not file any motions in limine because, based on his education and experience, he had a splendid idea of what was going to be allowed. We respect that professional judgment. 59 Campbell next argues that counsel were ineffective because they did not thoroughly investigate all possible avenues which may have led to mitigating evidence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary). The record indicates, however, that Campbell's attorneys conducted a reasonable investigation. 6 See Burger v. Kemp, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3116, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987) (decision not to mount an all-out investigation into petitioner's background was supported by reasonable professional judgment); Woratzeck v. Ricketts, 820 F.2d 1450, 1456-57 (9th Cir.1987) (counsel conducted sufficient inquiry into mitigating value of potential witness' testimony), amended, (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 1987). Counsel were well aware of the potential mitigating factors which may have been introduced at the sentencing proceedings: Campbell's father was an alcoholic; Campbell was the victim of child abuse; he suffered from various medical problems as a young child; he had a history of drug and alcohol abuse; he had reportedly attempted suicide on one occasion; he had requested a transfer from the Everett Work Release Facility because he did not want to be near Renae Wicklund; and he was the father of two children. 60 Campbell does not suggest any potential mitigating evidence that could have been uncovered through a more thorough investigation. He does criticize his attorneys, however, for failing to interview his family and childhood friends, classmates, and teachers. Nevertheless, Campbell specifically requested his attorneys not to contact members of his family. The client's wishes are not to be ignored entirely. The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. Moreover, Campbell's wishes were again consistent with the professional judgment of his attorneys that such interviews were unnecessary and would not have made any difference in the context of this case. One counsel testified: 61 It is my conclusion, after reading all of the files and talking with Mr. Campbell and going through the case, that Mr. Campbell's activities in prison were such that anything presented about his childhood was not going to make any difference. The one hope that I had in trying to save his life was that there was no evidence before the Jury that he had misconducted himself in prison. And what I hoped--obviously it didn't work out--but what I hoped was that the Jury might spare his life because there was no evidence that he was not a model prisoner in a controlled environment. 62 Here, counsel's decision not to mount an all-out investigation into [Campbell's] background in search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional judgment. Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 3126. 63 Finally, Campbell asks this court to apply a per se rule requiring the presentation of mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Such a rule, however, would directly conflict with Strickland. 64 In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.... No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. 65 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Moreover, the Supreme Court has implicitly rejected Campbell's position by its decisions holding no constitutional error despite counsel's failure to present any mitigating evidence. See, e.g., Burger, 107 S.Ct. at 3126; Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 187, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2474, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). 66 We conclude that considering the particular circumstances of this case, including Washington's rule of law limiting the evidence the state may present at the sentencing proceeding, the decisions of Campbell's counsel regarding mitigating evidence meet the standard for professionally competent assistance set forth in Strickland.
67 Even if we were to conclude that Campbell's counsel did not meet the Strickland competency standard, we additionally must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069. Campbell cannot meet this burden. He concedes that some of his potential mitigating evidence would have been met with strong rebuttal evidence from the state, but he speculates that evidence of his background, childhood and family relationships, and possibly evidence of his child abuse, upbringing and drug abuse, could have been presented without opening the door to rebuttal evidence. Even if this is the case, we agree with the district court that given the overwhelming aggravat[ing] factors, and the heinous nature of the crime, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdict would have been different had the mitigating evidence been introduced. 68 D. Constitutionality of Washington's Capital Punishment Statute 69 Campbell argues that Washington's capital punishment statute is facially unconstitutional because it (1) fails to adequately channel and guide jury sentencing discretion; (2) vests unbridled discretion in the prosecutor to decide when to seek the death penalty; and (3) creates a mandatory presumption in favor of the death penalty that a defendant must overcome. 1. Adequate Guidelines to Jury 70 Campbell contends that the Washington Supreme Court improperly modified Washington's capital punishment statute by declaring that a jury's liberal mandate under section 10.95.070 to consider any relevant factors in making its sentencing determination is limited to mitigating factors. See Bartholomew, 683 P.2d at 1086-87. He argues that only the legislature can supply the necessary guidelines and that a court cannot constitutionally cure a defective statute. 71 Campbell's contention is meritless. The Supreme Court has often relied upon state judicial constructions of death penalty statutes in reviewing such statutes for constitutionality. In Gregg, 428 U.S. at 202, 96 S.Ct. at 2938-39, the petitioner objected to the vagueness of a particular aggravating factor. In upholding the statutory provision, the Court stated that [w]hile such a phrase might be susceptible of an overly broad interpretation, the Supreme Court of Georgia has not so construed it. Id. Similarly, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2967, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), involved a challenge to the vagueness of statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Court stated that [t]hese provisions must be considered as they have been construed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Id. at 255, 96 S.Ct. at 2968. In Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272, 96 S.Ct. at 2956, the Court upheld a Texas statute because the state court had interpreted the statute broadly, despite its facial narrowness, to allow consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances [the defendant] may be able to show. See also Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.1986) (Although the statutory language is broad, ... the Arizona Supreme Court need not construe the statute open-endedly.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1911, 95 L.Ed.2d 516 (1987). 7 2. Prosecutorial Discretion 72 Campbell argues that Washington's capital punishment statute is unconstitutional because it vests unbridled discretion in the prosecutor to decide when to seek the death penalty. That argument has been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. at 2937; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 254, 96 S.Ct. at 2967; Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274, 96 S.Ct. at 2957. As Justice White stated in his concurring opinion in Gregg, [a]bsent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be motivated in their charging decisions by factors other than the strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death penalty if it convicts. 428 U.S. at 225, 96 S.Ct. at 2949 (White, J., concurring). 73 Nothing in the Washington statute makes Justice White's observation any less applicable here. A Washington prosecutor may not seek the death penalty unless he or she has reason to believe that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.040(1); Campbell, 691 P.2d at 943. Campbell's contention that the statute guides and restrains the prosecutor in decisions not to seek the death penalty, but not in decisions to seek the death penalty, is, as the state asserts, semantical at best. The same is true of Campbell's attempt to distinguish Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. For purposes of prosecutorial discretion, the practical effect of the various statutes is the same. See, e.g., Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270, 96 S.Ct. at 2955 (involving a statute like Washington's which requires proof of aggravating factor at guilt phase rather than penalty phase). 74
75 Campbell argues the Washington capital punishment statute creates a mandatory presumption in favor of the death penalty and places the burden on the defendant to prove there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. The language of the statute and the construction placed on the statute by the Washington Supreme Court belie these contentions. Under the Washington scheme, a death sentence may be imposed only for aggravated first degree murder, after the jury finds a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase of the trial. Wash.Rev.Code Secs. 10.95.020-.030. At the penalty phase, the jury is required to deliberate on the following question: Having in mind the crime of which the defendant has been found guilty, are you convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency? Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.060(4) (emphasis added). Evidence from the guilt phase carries over to the penalty phase. Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.060(3); Campbell, 691 P.2d at 951 (Rosellini, J., concurring). 76 The language of the statute clearly indicates that the burden of proof is on the state to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Wash.Rev.Code Sec. 10.95.060(4). Campbell's apparent contention that convince does not mean the same thing as prove has been rejected by the Washington Supreme Court. See State v. Mak, 105 Wash.2d 692, 718 P.2d 407, 444 (construing section 10.95.060(4) to place the burden of proof on the state, and suggesting that an instruction expressing the state's burden in terms of proving rather than convincing may be more appropriate), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 599, 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986); see also State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 683 P.2d 571, 593 (1984) (rejecting similar burden of proof argument). Moreover, the trial judge specifically instructed the jury at Campbell's sentencing proceeding that the state had the burden of proof: 77 During these special sentencing proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. 78 The law of this state presumes that a defendant enters the special sentencing meriting leniency, that is a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole. This presumption continues throughout the entire proceeding unless you find it has been overcome by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 79 As the instruction indicates, the state's burden of proof carries with it a presumption of leniency, a presumption which the state can overcome only by showing beyond a reasonable doubt that there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Campbell contends instead that the statute creates a mandatory presumption in favor of the death penalty (and a corresponding burden on the defendant to produce evidence of mitigating circumstances) because the statute compels the jury to return a verdict of death whenever the defendant fails to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding. This argument ignores the fact that the sentencing jury has before it all the evidence from the guilt phase, including whatever mitigating evidence may have been presented by the defendant at the guilt phase. The jury's decision is not based solely on what is presented at the sentencing proceeding. Moreover, even if the defendant never introduced any mitigating circumstances at either phase of the trial, the state still bears the burden of overcoming the presumption of leniency, and the jury is free to consider any relevant [mitigating] factors in making its sentencing determination. Bartholomew, 683 P.2d at 1086-87. 80 Campbell's reliance on Mak, 718 P.2d at 444, is misplaced. That case simply states that there is no constitutional right to a presumption of leniency. It does not hold that there is no presumption of leniency created by the Washington statute. On the contrary, Mak says explicitly that the state bears the burden of proof on the issue. Id. That burden of proof necessarily carries with it a presumption in favor of the defendant. 81 Consistent with Lockett, 438 U.S. at 602-08, 98 S.Ct. at 2963-67, the Washington statute imposes no limits on the mitigating evidence a capital defendant may introduce at a sentencing proceeding, subject, of course, to minimal standards of probative value and relevance. Bartholomew, 683 P.2d at 1088. The statute also imposes upon the state the burden of proof at such a proceeding. The defendant cannot manufacture a presumption of death simply because he chooses not to present mitigating evidence. The jury in Campbell's case was properly instructed on the state's burden of proof and the presumption of leniency in accordance with Washington law.CONCLUSION 82 We reject Campbell's arguments. 8 The judgment of the district court is affirmed in its entirety.