Opinion ID: 4582075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the problem of legally impossible verdicts

Text: ¶13 Legally impossible verdicts are verdicts that are inconsistent ―as a matter of law because it is impossible‖ to reconcile the different determinations that the jury would have had make to render them. State v. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Iowa 2010). We begin with explaining why the jury verdict here is legally impossible. Then we show that legally impossible verdicts like Terry‘s cannot stand as a matter of law because they are ―not merely inconsistent with justice, but [are] repugnant to it.‖ People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. 1981). Next, we tackle the contrary position—which holds that legally impossible verdicts are valid—and explain why we are not swayed by it. Finally, we explain why our case law about factually inconsistent verdicts does not control legally impossible verdicts.
¶14 The City charged Terry with the offense of domestic violence assault, UTAH CODE § 76-5-102(1)(c) (2003),3 and the offense of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child, UTAH CODE § 76-5-109.1(2)(c). These two offenses are related because the latter offense is predicated on the commission of the former. Defining the latter offense, Utah Code section 76-5-109.1(1)(b) states that ―‘[d]omestic violence‘ has the same meaning as in Section 77-36-1.‖ Utah Code section 77-36-1(4), in turn, defines ―[d]omestic violence‖ to ―include commission‖ of ―assault, as described in Section 76-5- 102,‖ ―when committed by one cohabitant against another.‖ Thus, the offense of commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child is a compound offense that is predicated on the commission of domestic violence assault. A ―compound offense‖ is an ―offense composed of one or more separate offenses. For example, robbery is a compound offense composed of larceny and assault.‖ Compound _____________________________________________________________ 3 The statute was amended in 2015, after Terry‘s charging, and section (1)(c) became (1)(b). 6 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court Offense, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). And a ―predicate offense,‖ also known as a ―lesser included offense,‖ is a ―crime that is composed of some, but not all, of the elements of a more serious crime and that is necessarily committed in carrying out the greater crime.‖ Lesser Included Offense, BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Id., Predicate Offense. 4 ¶15 ―[I]t is impossible to convict a defendant of the compound [offense] without also convicting the defendant of the predicate offense.‖ Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 807 (footnote omitted); see also Md. Stewart, 211 A.3d 371, 384 (Md. 2019) (Opinion by Watts, J. (commanding majority for its analysis)) (―[A] guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict are legally inconsistent where the crime of which the jury finds the defendant not guilty is a lesser-included offense of the crime of which the jury finds the defendant guilty.‖). Yet the jury in Terry‘s case did the impossible. It convicted Terry of the compound offense (domestic violence in the presence of a child), while acquitting him of the predicate offense (domestic violence assault). ¶16 Legally impossible verdicts are verdicts that include an inconsistency ―as a matter of law because it is impossible‖ to reconcile different determinations that the jury made in them. Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 807. And here, it is impossible to reconcile a conviction with an acquittal on ―essential elements . . . identical and necessary‖ to sustain the conviction. State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Shavers v. State, 86 So. 3d 1218, _____________________________________________________________ 4 This case involves an exception to the general rule that a ―defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense.‖ UTAH CODE § 76-1-402(3). This rule does not apply ―where the Legislature has designated a statute as an enhancing statute,‖ State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, ¶ 70, 361 P.3d 104, which ―single[s] out particular characteristics of criminal conduct as warranting harsher punishment,‖ State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 615. Such designation requires an ―explicit indication of legislative intent.‖ Id. ¶ 11. Utah Code section 76-5-109.1(4) includes such indication: ―A charge under this section is separate and distinct from, and is in addition to, a charge of domestic violence where the victim is the cohabitant. Either or both charges may be filed by the prosecutor.‖ Thus, charges (and convictions) on both predicate and compound offenses are permissible in this case. 7 PLEASANT GROVE v. TERRY Opinion of the Court 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (―[L]egally [impossible] verdicts . . . arise when a not-guilty finding on one count negates an element on another count that is necessary for conviction.‖); Price v. State, 949 A.2d 619, 634 (Md. 2008) (Harrell, J., concurring in the judgment) (―A legal inconsistency . . . occurs when ‗an acquittal on one charge is conclusive as to an element . . . [of] a charge on which a conviction has occurred.‘‖ (citation omitted)) (adopted in McNeal v. State, 44 A.3d 982, 984 (Md. 2012)). ¶17 At oral argument, the City conceded the relationship between the offenses in this case and acknowledged the illogic embedded in Terry‘s verdict. Yet it still maintains that Terry‘s verdict is not legally impossible, for two reasons. First, in the City‘s view, there can be no legal impossibility when there is sufficient evidence, as Terry concedes is the case here. Second, according to the City and the dissent, because we evaluate every count separately, the contradicting results the jury reached are not legally impossible. See infra ¶¶ 57, 66, 69, 74. Both arguments do not persuade us. ¶18 First, the argument that there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the compound offense is of no moment to our holding that the verdict is legally impossible. Given that both the compound offense and the predicate offense were based on the same evidence and the same event, the jury also had sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the predicate offense. Yet they did not do so. And that acquittal was fatal to the jury‘s ability to convict on the compound offense, because ―an acquittal of [a predicate offense] effectively holds the defendant innocent of a [compound] offense involving that same [predicate offense],‖ Naumowicz v. State, 562 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), and ―negates a necessary element for conviction on‖ the compound offense, State v. Kelley, 109 So. 3d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). ¶19 Second, the argument that verdicts like Terry‘s are not legally impossible because we review claims that the State has not met its burden of proof on a particular count of conviction, on each count independently, see infra ¶¶ 57, 66, 69, 74; see also State v. Stewart, 729 P.2d 610, 613 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), is likewise unavailing. We do not deny that this our general rule, but it is not an inexorable mandate. If it yields absurd results—or in this case, legally impossible results—we should not blindly follow it.5 See, e.g., A.K. & _____________________________________________________________ 5 The dissent seems to be focused on this argument as the ultimate reason for us to affirm a legally impossible judgment, see infra ¶¶ 57, (continued . . .) 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court R. Whipple Plumb. & Heat. v. Guy, 2004 UT 47, ¶ 11, 94 P.3d 270 (describing with approval how our Court of Appeals refused to strictly apply our ―net judgment rule‖ because it led to ―absurd results‖); State v. Springer, 121 P. 976, 979 (Utah 1911) (refusing to submit a plea of former acquittal ―to the jury to be passed on by it as a question of fact‖ although past case law suggested ―courts have no alternative,‖ because it would ―lead to an absurd result.‖). If the State chose to intertwine the offenses, it cannot then disentangle them atwill when it‘s convenient. Here, the City repeatedly discussed the predicate and compound offenses together and explicitly relied on the same evidence for the two offenses. Similarly, the jury instructions also linked the two offenses—explaining that the basis for the compound-offense charge was that Terry allegedly ―committed an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child‖ by committing the predicate offense (assault) ―while the nine year old child was less than three feet away.‖ The City cannot have its cake and eat it too. Its prosecutorial choices show that the jury was presented with the compound offense predicated on the occurrence of the predicate offense. We cannot and should not review them separately in such circumstances. See, e.g., Streeter v. State, 416 So. 2d 1203, 1206 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting an ―exception to the proposition that separate counts must be viewed independently‖ when ―what the jury fails to find in one count vitiates a guilty verdict on a separate count to the benefit of the defendant‖). The dissent calls our approach ―novel,‖ infra ¶ 57, but this approach is practiced in every jurisdiction that refuses to accept legally impossible verdicts, see supra ¶¶ 15–16. ¶20 Thus, the verdict here—convicting Terry of a compound offense while acquitting him of the predicate offense—is legally impossible.
Are Anathema to Our Justice System ¶21 Having established that Terry‘s jury rendered a legally impossible verdict, we now explain why the verdict cannot stand. Two reasons lead us to this conclusion. First, a legally impossible verdict in which a defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but 66, 69, 74, but other than repeat our commitment to this rule, it does little to address the concerns we raise against a blind reliance in this case. 9 PLEASANT GROVE v. TERRY Opinion of the Court convicted on the compound offense doesn‘t just undermine our confidence in the trial‘s outcome, it eviscerates it. Second, upholding such legally impossible verdicts casts a cold shadow on the criminal justice system, and this shadow is far more worrisome than the inability to retry the defendant due to constitutional constrains. We then reject the argument that invalidating legally impossible verdicts of this kind somehow disrupts the jury verdict‘s finality or invades the jury process. ¶22 Legally impossible verdicts—in which a defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense—cannot stand for two reasons. First, they undermine ―our confidence in the outcome of the trial,‖ Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815, because for a defendant to ―be convicted for a crime on which the jury has actually found that the defendant did not commit an essential element, whether it be one element or all[,] . . . is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to it,‖ Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619. The legally impossible verdict means that the jury necessarily overstepped its ―historic role‖ as ―fact-finder,‖ McNeal, 44 A.3d at 986, and has ―taken the law into its own hands,‖ Md. Stewart, 211 A.3d at 376 (Opinion by McDonald, J.), by presumably ―engag[ing] in some . . . process that is inconsistent with the notion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815. The requirement that guilt must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is part and parcel of constitutional due process. State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 167, 299 P.3d 892 (―In the criminal justice system, a defendant is presumed innocent and the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖); State v. Swenson, 838 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Utah 1992) (―Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution require that the burden of proving all elements of a crime is on the prosecution.‖ (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). Such a constitutional insult cannot stand. ¶23 Second, we are deeply concerned about the perceptions of a criminal justice system that upholds such legally impossible verdicts. When liberty is at stake, we do not think a shrug of the judicial shoulders is a sufficient response to an irrational conclusion. We are not playing legal horseshoes where close enough is sufficient. It is difficult to understand why we have a detailed trial procedure, where the forum is elaborate and carefully regulated, and then simply give up when the jury confounds us. 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court Halstead, 791 N.W.2d at 815. ―[T]he possibility of a wrongful conviction in such cases outweighs the rationale for allowing verdicts to stand.‖ State v. Powell, 674 So. 2d 731, 733 (Fla. 1996). Terry‘s case may only present misdemeanors, but affirming such a legally impossible verdict extends beyond it, and applies equally to grave offenses, such as felony murder. See, e.g., Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. 1979). If we affirm the ability of a jury to render such a legally impossible verdict, we sanction the lengthy (perhaps lifelong) incarceration of a defendant for a murder although the jury acquitted him from the underlying felony that allowed the felony murder charge. We cannot stand by legally impossible verdicts and call our system a justice system.6 ¶24 We acknowledge the implications of our decision on the future prosecution of defendants who receive legally impossible verdicts in which the defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense. ―The double jeopardy provisions in both the United States and Utah Constitutions generally prohibit the State from making repeated attempts to convict an individual for the same offense after jeopardy has attached, which in jury trials occurs after a jury has been selected and sworn.‖ State v. Harris, 2004 UT 103, ¶ 22, 104 P.3d 1250 (footnotes omitted). And so, with legally impossible verdicts like the one here, the double jeopardy provisions may effectively preclude a retrial of the acquittal on the predicate offense. The same might be true for retrying the compound offense, the argument being that a defendant with a legally impossible verdict cannot be retried on the compound offense if ―there was insufficient evidence to support [that] conviction[].‖ _____________________________________________________________ 6 The dissent says that ―neither the United States Constitution, [nor] the Utah Constitution, . . . have been read to require‖ the invalidation of legally impossible verdicts. See infra ¶ 59. As for the U.S. Constitution, it is true that the U.S. Supreme Court remarked in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) that ―nothing in the Constitution would require such a protection,‖ but no such statement was conclusively made as to the Utah Constitution. We also stress that the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to adjudicate the issue ―under [its] supervisory powers over the federal criminal process,‖ id., allows for independent treatment by state courts, also in accordance to their constitutions, where appropriate. Therefore, as for the Utah Constitution, the fact that no such reading has been offered in the past should not signal that it is not possible. 11 PLEASANT GROVE v. TERRY Opinion of the Court Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 352, 364 (2016). Under this assumption, it seems that the prosecution would be estopped from a retrial on the compound offense.7 ¶25 But the inability to retry a defendant is far preferable to defendants being convicted of and punished for crimes that— according to the jury‘s acquittal on the predicate offense—they never could have committed. After all, Blackstone‘s ratio—the basis for our presumption of innocence and the core principle of our criminal justice system—tells us that ―[i]t is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.‖ 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ; see also State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, ¶ 11, 116 P.3d 305 (―Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the measure of certainty required to convict in a civilized society . . . .‖). If we succumb to the opposite rationale, we would be ―presum[ing] unlawful acquittal‖ ―rather than guard[ing] against unlawful conviction.‖8 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 213 (1989). ¶26 For these reasons, we hold that legally impossible verdicts— in which a defendant is acquitted on the predicate offense but convicted on the compound offense—cannot stand. In doing so, we do not ignore our usual deep reluctance to disturb the finality of a jury verdict, as the dissent suggests, or inquire into the jury‘s intent. See infra ¶ 71. These principles are simply not at play here. We confront other legal errors made at trial, and legally impossible verdicts should not fare differently. And legally impossible verdicts do not require inquiry into the jury‘s intent. _____________________________________________________________ 7 We note that the City has not indicated that it intends to prosecute Terry again, and the parties have not briefed this issue. Recognizing that it is a question of first impression, we leave the ultimate disposition of this question for an appropriate future case. 8 The dissent claims ―that is not so.‖ Infra ¶ 69. In its view, our approach leads courts to ―discard[]‖ jury verdicts that determined ―guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Infra ¶ 69. This claim crystalizes our different approaches to this question. To us, no such verdict has been discarded, because there is no logical way for a jury to acquit a person on a predicate offense and then finding them guilty on the compound offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 69 Opinion of the Court ¶27 We routinely overturn trial courts‘ decisions for legal errors. We should do the same when a jury makes a legal error. In fact, we must, because adjudicating matters of law is our duty as an appellate court. We review questions of law for correctness, and even under one of our more deferential standards of review—abuse of discretion—we have long held that a ―legal error is an abuse of discretion that undercuts the deference we would otherwise afford‖ a trial court. Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 2020 UT 47, ¶ 78, 469 P.3d 1003. In fact, other courts have refused to accept legally inconsistent verdicts rendered by a judge. See United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1960); State v. Williams, 916 A.2d 294, 305 (Md. 2007); Akers v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 13, 17 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). We see no reason why a legal error made by one fact finder—a jury—should be treated differently than one made by another—a judge. Any reluctance we might have to disturb the jury‘s verdict is a byproduct of judicial restraint—not an inexorable mandate. For example, we overturn a jury verdict—even a verdict that isn‘t impossible on its face—when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury, ―is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable [so] that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he or she was convicted.‖ State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ¶ 30, 326 P.3d 645. (citation omitted). Importantly, our restraint is connected to the jury‘s ―historical role‖ as ―the sole fact-finder in criminal jury trials.‖ McNeal, 44 A.3d at 986. But the jury does not act as a fact-finder when it misapplies the law—taking it ―into its own hands,‖ Md. Stewart, 211 A.3d at 376 (Opinion by McDonald, J.), and ignoring its ―duty . . . to decide a criminal case according to established rules of law,‖ Price, 949 A.2d at 627 (citation omitted)—as it does when it reaches a legally impossible verdict.9 _____________________________________________________________ 9 The dissent worries that we have created a ―mandate[e] that such [legally impossible] jury verdicts be overturned‖ and suggests that our decision ―weakens our longstanding and deep reluctance to disturb the finality of a jury verdict,‖ infra ¶ 71, because ―verdicts can be legally inconsistent in various ways and to different degrees.‖