Opinion ID: 2330417
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Case Before Us Today

Text: [¶ 30] We turn then to Alexander's argument that we should adopt a previously unrecognized common law tort duty in this instance where the parties' relationship is informed by Mitchell's contract with the municipality. In essence, Alexander contends that Mitchell willingly undertook the task of snow and ice removal, was aware of his duties under the contract, and if he is found to have failed to perform his duty to maintain Pushaw Road, should be liable to injured members of the public in money damages. [13] [¶ 31] Applying the analysis above, we decline to shift liability to private parties, such as Mitchell, who contract to plow a municipality's roads. In doing so, we note that Mitchell's contractual obligation was to the Town; the Town was immune from liability through legislative action; the contractual responsibility was for the plowing of public roads; the precipitating cause of the road conditions was weather, not Mitchell's actions; and the assignment of a duty in tort in these circumstances could result in open-ended responsibility for those plowing Maine's roads. Our conclusion is based not only on legal precedent, but also on common law principles: creating a new duty is disfavored because of the pervasiveness of the annual risk caused by ice and snow on Maine roads. Cf. Denman, 1998 ME 12, ¶¶ 6-7, 704 A.2d at 413-14 (limiting a defendant's duty under circumstances involving potential liability for snow and ice related accidents); Ouelette, 134 Me. at 166, 183 A. at 343 (same). [¶ 32] In sum, on the facts of the matter before us, we agree with the Superior Court that Mitchell did not owe a duty to Alexander, and we decline Alexander's request to expand the common law duty of a person or company that is responsible for clearing the roads in the winter. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.