Opinion ID: 71419
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grant of the Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: Mr. Ervin’s arguments on appeal seeking reversal of the district court’s grant of summary judgment are waived because he failed to oppose Sprint’s 3 The record discloses that Mr. Ervin sought a settlement of $1,000,000, suggesting that he did in fact seek recovery of these amounts. 4 Case: 09-60569 Document: 00511023206 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 09-60569 motion in the district court. We have explained that “[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that the scope of appellate review on a summary judgment order is limited to matters presented to the district court.” Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 2005). “If a party fails to assert a legal reason why summary judgment should not be granted, that ground is waived and cannot be considered or raised on appeal.” Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 877 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986). Here, Mr. Ervin raised no arguments in opposition to summary judgment in the district court,4 and we thus do not consider the legal arguments he advances for the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, in our de novo review, we, like the district court, are obliged to assess whether “[t]he movant has [met] the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . regardless of whether any response was filed.” Hetzel v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 362 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). We agree with the district court that Sprint’s summary judgment evidence established that Sprint owns the Railroad Grant Land in fee simple under Mississippi law.5 Mr. Ervin’s arguments to the 4 Mr. Ervin did raise some of the arguments he makes on appeal after entry of judgment in what the district court interpreted as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and denied. However, such “[m]otions for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment must clearly establish either a manifest error of law or fact or must present newly discovered evidence. These motions cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.” Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted). A legal argument not raised in opposition to summary judgment but improperly raised for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion is still waived because such an argument was never properly before the district court. See id. For the same reason, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Rule 59(e) motion under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. See Marseilles Homeowners Condo. Ass’n v. Fid. Nat’l Ins. Co., 542 F.3d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that “[t]he district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in denying [the appellant] the opportunity to raise [a] claim after judgment” that should have been argued before judgment was entered). 5 As our recent decision in Franks Investment Co. LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., ___ F.3d ___, No. 08-30236, 2010 WL 22337 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2010) (en banc), confirms, a diversity action sounding in state property law is permissible here and not preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803. 5 Case: 09-60569 Document: 00511023206 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 09-60569 contrary are unavailing in light of controlling Mississippi Supreme Court precedent. Mr. Ervin cannot prevail on his claims because he does not own the land in dispute. The Deed granted Great Northern an unspecified section of a particular parcel of land without specifying the precise interest in the land transferred. Applying Mississippi law, we read the Deed to convey, as a matter of law, fee title to the railroad in the land where the rail line was installed. First, as to what land was conveyed, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Alabama & Vicksburg Railway Co. v. Mashburn, 109 So. 2d 533 (Miss. 1959), addressed this very question. Mashburn held that where property is conveyed by a grantor to a railroad company for purpose of its right-of-way, without the full description of the land conveyed, the occupancy of a particular route by the grantee with the consent of the grantor will identify and locate the property for such purpose. It indeed would be a travesty on justice to hold a deed void for imperfect description where a railroad has constructed its right-of-way and has been operating trains over the same for over one hundred years. Id. at 537 (internal citation omitted). We find that Mashburn governs this issue and establishes that the scope of land at issue is that actually occupied by the railroad for the last century and a half, notwithstanding the lack of description in the Deed. Second, as to what interest in the land was conveyed, Mashburn is again highly instructive.6 Under Mashburn, the court is to look to the language of the deed read in conjunction with the railroad’s statutory charter. Id. at 535. In assessing the language of the deed, moreover, we are to apply Mississippi’s statutory presumption that “[e]very estate in lands . . . granted, conveyed, or 6 We have previously applied Mashburn to the facts of a very similar but nonprecedential case to reach the same result as here. See Johnson v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 208 F. App’x 292 (5th Cir. 2006) (unpublished). 6 Case: 09-60569 Document: 00511023206 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 09-60569 devised . . . shall be deemed a fee-simple if a less estate be not limited by express words or do not appear to have been granted, conveyed, or devised by construction or operation of law.” H UTCHINSON’S M ISS. C ODE, ch. 42, art. 1, para. 23 (1848); see also M ISS. C ODE A NN . § 89-1-5 (1999) (“Every estate in lands granted, conveyed, or devised . . . shall be deemed a fee-simple if a less estate be not limited by express words, or unless it clearly appear from the conveyance . . . that a less estate was intended to be passed thereby.”). Applying these three considerations here, we find, like the Mashburn court, that the Railroad Grant Land was conveyed in fee simple to Great Northern. In Mashburn, the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the use of the word “land” in the text of the deed, read together with both the statutory presumption and the railroad’s charter authorizing land acquisition in fee simple, was ultimately determinative. 109 So. 2d at 536 (“[T]he deed itself . . . conveyed that portion of the ‘land’ necessary or useful in the construction, use, and preservation of the Railroad. It did not convey a right. It conveyed the land.”). We find the same conditions here. The deed grants a “part and portion of the . . . tract of land”—not a right or set of rights in that land. 7 The statutory presumption is the same. The charter provided for a “complete title.”8 We therefore conclude that the Railroad Grant Land was conveyed in fee to the Great Northern, and that Mr. Ervin thus has no rights in the land. The summary judgment evidence that Sprint advanced establishes that Great Northern and its successors have owned the disputed land in fee simple 7 This difference distinguishes Ervin’s case from the case upon which he relies, New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad v. Morrison, 35 So. 2d 68 (Miss. 1948) (en banc). In that case, the grantor deeded a “right of way,” which, the court held, signified an easement. 8 The governing charter in this case provided for procedures that would “vest a complete title in said [railroad] company.” 7 Case: 09-60569 Document: 00511023206 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 09-60569 since 1853. That fact completely defeats Mr. Ervin’s claims, which are all based upon the premise that he owns the land in question; Illinois Central, as the successive fee owner, lawfully granted Sprint an easement to install the cable without any possible cognizable offense to Mr. Ervin or his antecedents.