Opinion ID: 2319358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exceptions to the Findings of Fact

Text: Petitioner did not file exceptions to the hearing judge's findings of fact or conclusions of law, however, Respondent did file several exceptions. Respondent's written exceptions to the hearing judge's findings of fact, and our responses, are set forth below. Exception 1: Respondent contends that the record does not support the hearing judge's finding that Respondent's medical and other employment benefits were essentially the same as those given to associates at B & S. Respondent further states, if the implication that [his] position as `Of Counsel' at B & S was effectively no different than an associate, this is not true. According to Respondent, it is more accurate to say that `This was the same arrangement for all employees at the firm except for Michael Brown and David Sheehan, including all other of-counsels, associates and non-equity partners.' The hearing judge found that Respondent and B & S had agreed that Respondent would hold an `of counsel' designation at the firm in order to denote a more senior status than an associate. The hearing judge therefore understood that Respondent's Of Counsel position was different from an associate position, and credited evidence to this effect. The hearing judge considered unrefuted testimony that Respondent received employment benefits while Of Counsel to B & S. In addition, Respondent testified during his hearing that he understood his Of Counsel relationship with B & S to be the same status that [he] had at Greenberg Trowick's D.C. office, where, according to his own testimony during the hearing, Respondent received employment benefits. Respondent's testimony supports the hearing judge's finding of fact. Therefore, the hearing judge's finding is not clearly erroneous, and we overrule Respondent's first exception. Exception 2: Respondent excepts to the hearing judge's finding that Respondent signed an acknowledgment form, indicating that he had received the B & S personnel handbook. In his written exception to this finding, Respondent states that, [i]t is undisputed in the record that the handbook contained no prohibition against maintaining a side practice or definition of what an `of counsel' can and cannot do. The hearing judge did not find, nor did she infer, that the personnel handbook contained a prohibition against maintaining a side practice or a definition of the Of Counsel relationship. Respondent's own testimony during the hearing supports the hearing judge's finding that Respondent signed a form acknowledging his receipt of the personnel handbook. In addition, Respondent testified that he did not read the personnel handbook. Respondent's second exception does not challenge any findings of fact or conclusions of law, but merely refers to an inference that the hearing judge did not make. The fact that the employee handbook did not contain language expressly prohibiting an attorney from maintaining a side practice is not dispositive of the issues in this case. There was evidence before the hearing judge that B & S did not authorize Respondent to hold a side practice of law while in the employ of B & S. Accordingly, we overrule the exception. Exceptions 3, 6, 8 & 10: Respondent's third exception is to the hearing judge's general finding that Respondent used B & S retainer agreements, letterhead and stationary in his representation of his side practice clients. Respondent's sixth, eighth and tenth exceptions are to the hearing judge's specific findings that Respondent used such materials in his representation of Ms. Stewart, Ms. Victors and Mr. Lennon. Respondent admits that he used B & S retainer agreements, letterhead and stationary in his representation of these clients as part of his side practice. Respondent contends, however, that he used his own language, and not the standard B & S retainer agreement language. Respondent admits, however, that there is nothing in the record to support this distinction. The hearing judge based her findings on both oral testimony and Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9, which includes several communications between Respondent and one of his side practice clients, Ms. Stewart. The client communications were on B & S letterhead and signed by Respondent. The communications did not state whether Respondent was acting on behalf of B & S or on his own behalf, nor did the communications indicate that Respondent was Of Counsel to B & S. In his testimony during the hearing, Respondent neither explained why he used B & S stationary for his side practice, nor did he assert that there was any distinction between B & S retainer agreements and retainer agreements for his side practice, written on B & S stationary. This Court has held previously that a material omission of fact by an attorney in client communications constitutes a violation of Rules 7.1 [8] and 7.5 [9] of the MRPC. Attorney Grievance v. Brown, 353 Md. 271, 290, 725 A.2d 1069, 1078 (1999) (finding that an attorney who included his co-counsel's name on firm letterhead, without disclosing co-counsel's jurisdictional limitations, violated Rules 7.5 and 7.1 of the MRPC). Similarly, Respondent's use of B & S materials supports the hearing judge's conclusion that Respondent intentionally deceived his clients and B & S. Respondent's assertions do not persuade us that the hearing judge's findings were clearly erroneous. Therefore, we overrule Respondent's third, sixth, eighth and tenth exceptions. Exception 4: Respondent admits that he performed work for clients as a result of his side practice during the hours that he was working at B & S, but contends that, [t]here is no support in the record that such work for the Respondent's clients during B & S hours impeded work for B & S clients. The hearing judge did not find, nor do we consider, whether Respondent's work for his side practice in fact impeded his work for B & S. Judge Ausby's finding that Respondent represented side practice clients during his B & S hours is material to her analysis, and her conclusion that Respondent violated the MRPC. It is not material to the case whether Respondent's work for his side practice impeded his work for B & S. We therefore overrule Respondent's fourth exception. Exception 5: Respondent contends that the record does not support the hearing judge's conclusion that some of the clients Respondent represented in his side practice had been terminated previously as clients by B & S. Respondent contends that these clients had not been terminated by B & S, but were never accepted by B & S as clients in the first place, due to their inability to pay B & S rates. The hearing judge's findings of fact were based on Respondent's testimony during the hearing. While Respondent never used the word terminated to refer to the clients, he clearly stated that the clients in question had been entered into the B & S billing system and had outstanding balances to B & S, that Mr. Sheehan had told Respondent to withdraw from his representation of those clients, and that Respondent continued to represent the clients on his own, against Mr. Sheehan's command. Respondent testified that, [i]n the Victors case she had made payments to Brown & Sheehan up until the end of December. . . . Then she went three months without making payments to Brown & Sheehan. So in March of 2008, approximately, in her case was when I decided I couldn't keep her on the Brown & Sheehan system with uncollected money for Brown & Sheehan. . . . Respondent further testified that, when I decided to keep [Ms. Victors and another B & S client] as a side practice to avoid from withdrawing the cases and I knew, or had been informed from David Sheehan, and withdrawing from . . . their cases and I decided to keep their cases, I knew there was going to be a problem in discussing them in terms of time. . . . I tried to get [Mr. Sheehan] to talk to [Ms. Victors and other clients] and what [Mr. Sheehan] said to me was that you need to withdraw from these cases. In light of Respondent's testimony during the hearing, the hearing judge's finding that Respondent retained several clients that were previously B & S clients, but had been terminated by B & S for failing to pay their legal fees, is not clearly erroneous. We therefore overrule Respondent's fifth exception. Exception 7: Respondent excepts to the hearing judge's finding that Respondent did not begin work for Ms. Stewart until after Respondent deposited her first payment into his personal account. Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge's finding that Respondent requested that his clients forward payment to his personal address, claiming instead that the address was a P.O. Box used for business. The hearing judge referred to Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9 to support her conclusion that, [o]n September 27, 2007, the Respondent directly received an initial retainer of one-thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from Ms. Stewart and deposited the check into his personal account. However, the Respondent did not begin work on Ms. Stewart's matter until September 28, 2007. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9 contains a written affidavit signed by Respondent, stating that he deposited Ms. Stewart's initial retainer into his personal account on September 27, 2007, and began work on her case on September 28, 2007. The affidavit further states that Respondent requested that Ms. Stewart forward all payment to Respondent's personal address. Therefore, the hearing judge's findings with respect to Respondent's representation of Ms. Stewart are based on Respondent's signed affidavit and are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we overrule Respondent's seventh exception. Exception 9: Respondent's ninth exception states, [t]he [hearing judge] credited none of the undisputed evidence and testimony from the client herself that the Respondent worked on the Victors case before payment was made by Ms. Victors. The hearing judge did not find that Respondent deposited payments received from Ms. Victors prior to earning the legal fees. In addition, any finding that Respondent did not engage in any type of misconduct during his representation of one client would not alter Judge Ausby's finding that Respondent engaged in misconduct during his representation of another client. Accordingly, we overrule Respondent's ninth exception. Exception 11: Respondent's eleventh exception refers to the hearing judge's finding that, in the B & S billing system the Respondent only billed one-hundred and twenty-five dollars ($125.00) for a `meeting with client' on September 4, 2007. Respondent's eleventh exception states that, [t]his evidence contradicts Respondent's testimony that he did substantial work for Mr. Lennon before his first payment and also contradicts Mr. Lennon's testimony. This contradiction in the evidence does not measure up to clear and convincing evidence. Respondent did not demonstrate sufficiently that he had done substantial work for Mr. Lennon before he deposited the fees into his personal account. The hearing judge was not bound to adopt Respondent's testimony on this issue. The hearing judge concluded that Respondent reported only a portion of his legal fees to B & S, and withheld the remainder for himself. Consistent with the standard of review for factual findings in attorney discipline cases, we have iterated that the judge `may elect to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon.' Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 403 Md. 142, 158, 939 A.2d 732, 742 (2008) (quoting Attorney Grievance v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 543, 810 A.2d 457, 477 (2002)). Respondent has not presented evidence to persuade us that the hearing judge's findings were clearly erroneous. Thus, we overrule Respondent's eleventh exception. Exception 12: Respondent contends that B & S did not discover that Respondent was maintaining a side practice. According to Respondent, he kept his side practice files in his B & S office, where the files remained in plain sight. In Respondent's view, B & S could not be said to have discovered anything about Respondent's side practice, because he did not actively hide these files. The hearing judge found that Respondent used his side practice to represent clients that B & S had specifically told him not to represent. In addition, Respondent used B & S resources for his own benefit without authorization. Respondent's lack of transparency in representing former B & S clients and using B & S resources constitutes clear and convincing evidence that he intended to deceive B & S. The possibility that B & S employees could have discovered Respondent's conduct by entering his office and examining his files does not rebut this evidence. Therefore, we overrule Respondent's twelfth exception. Exception 13: Respondent contends that the hearing judge did not credit evidence that Respondent deposited two CJA checks into his personal account, and then promptly issued two checks to B & S as payment for the legal fees. Respondent contends that these checks were accepted and deposited by B & S without incident or complaint. Contrary to Respondent's exception, the hearing judge did describe Respondent's practice of depositing the CJA checks, and issuing cashier's checks to B & S as payment for the legal fees. The hearing judge pointed to this practice as an indication that Respondent did not intend to deceive B & S, or deprive B & S of these legal fees. We therefore overrule Respondent's thirteenth exception. Exception 14: Respondent contends that B & S was aware of his side practice, because he notified B & S of his individual side practice clients through conflict check emails. Respondent testified that it was his practice to send emails containing his client's names to other B & S attorneys, so that the attorneys could avoid any potential conflicts of interest in client representations. Respondent testified that he included the names of his side practice clients in these emails, but never received a response from any B & S attorneys. It has already been established and unrefuted that Respondent continued to represent clients that had been entered, at one time, into the B & S client database. Respondent has not presented any evidence that the extent to which he disclosed certain of his client representations to B & S actually gave notice to B & S that Respondent was maintaining a side practice. Furthermore, the hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence that, while Respondent had several opportunities to expressly notify B & S that he was maintaining a side practice, he instead intentionally concealed his side practice from B & S. For example, Respondent testified that he had several conversations with Mr. Brown or Mr. Sheehan in which he expressed his interest in me marketing. Respondent testified that he initially used this term in his interview to convey his desire to become a partner at B & S, but later discussed me marketing in reference to both his side practice and his interest in becoming a partner. Respondent never expressly disclosed his side practice to B & S, but instead omitted the word partner from some of his conversations about me marketing. Respondent has not presented evidence that the hearing judge's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we overrule Respondent's fourteenth exception.