Opinion ID: 1154894
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Child molestation jury instruction

Text: The instruction given on the child molestation count reads as follows: The crime of molestation of a child requires proof that the defendant knowingly touched directly or indirectly the private parts of a child under the age of 15 years, or caused a child under the age of 15 years to touch directly or indirectly the private parts of the defendant. Defendant claims that this instruction erroneously omitted a requirement that the act be motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent. Defendant argues that this is a necessary element of the offense. Without again addressing the issue, we will assume that it is. See In re Pima County Juvenile Appeal No. 74802-2, 164 Ariz. 25, 33, 790 P.2d 723, 731 (1990). But cf. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-121430, 172 Ariz. 604, 606-07, 838 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Ct.App. 1992). Because Defendant did not object at trial, we must decide whether this omission was fundamental error. The failure to instruct on a necessary element of an offense is not fundamental error where there is no issue as to that element. State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338, 710 P.2d 440, 448 (1985). Initially, we note that the asserted trial defense in this case did not raise the motivation issue. Although Defendant pleaded not guilty  thus requiring the State to prove every element of the charge  his defense at trial was that he did not commit the physical act charged. Defendant did not assert that his motivation for committing the act was natural and normal or that the act was somehow privileged. The facts of this case  both those found by the jury and those undisputed in the record  show that Defendant's motivation was not in question. The guilty verdict on the kidnapping charge necessarily means that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly restrained the victim. The undisputed facts show that she was restrained by force  her hands were bound. As to the molestation charge, considering the instruction given, the guilty verdict necessarily means that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly had sexual contact with the nine-year-old victim. Defendant was approximately twenty-six years old at the time. The age difference, the bound hands, the panties hung on a tree limb, and the nude body belie any suggestion that Defendant was motivated by anything other than an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest with respect to children. Cases with facts less compelling support this conclusion. In State v. Roberts, 126 Ariz. 92, 612 P.2d 1055 (1980), the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his child molestation conviction. Testimony in that case showed that the defendant moved his hands inside the diaper of a seven-year-old emotionally and physically retarded girl. Id. at 93, 612 P.2d at 1056. We affirmed the conviction, stating that [t]hese acts, by their very nature, manifest that defendant was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to children. Id. at 95, 612 P.2d at 1058 (emphasis added); see also State v. Brooks, 120 Ariz. 458, 461, 586 P.2d 1270, 1273 (1978) (finding acts by their very nature manifest the required motivation); State v. Johnson, 120 Ariz. 21, 22, 583 P.2d 1341, 1342 (1978) (same). In light of Defendant's trial strategy, the facts necessarily found by the jury, and the undisputed facts of record, this case law amply demonstrates that the omission in the jury instruction was not fundamental error in this case. See Cook, 170 Ariz. at 50, 821 P.2d at 741. N. Prosecutorial misconduct Defendant claims that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his due process rights. Prosecutorial misconduct does not require reversal unless the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel. State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 400, 783 P.2d 1184, 1192 (1989) (citing State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 37, 668 P.2d 874, 880 (1983)); accord Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). [The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.... [W]hile he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); accord Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 103, 677 P.2d 261, 266 (1984). With this standard in mind, because no objection was made, we again review for fundamental error. 1. Comments about the jury questionnaire During voir dire, the prosecutor stated that some of the questions in the questionnaire may seem a little silly to you, and some of them are silly, as a matter of fact, but please be very honest when you fill out this form. Defense counsel told the venire that he wrote the questionnaire and took exception to its characterization as silly. While the prosecutor's comment was inappropriate, we believe that it falls far short of actionable misconduct. Furthermore, the trial court told the venire: I have gone through all of these proposed questions and approved them, so they are approved questions by the Court. Don't worry about what the attorneys think about them. I have approved them and they should all be answered by you truthfully. We find no error and, accordingly, no fundamental error. 2. Vouching for witnesses It is black letter law that it is improper for a prosecutor to vouch for a witness. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 401, 783 P.2d at 1193. Two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching exist: (1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness, and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. In addition, a lawyer is prohibited from asserting personal knowledge of facts in issue before the tribunal unless he testifies as a witness. Id. (citation omitted). The prosecutor in this case made the following declaration in opening statement: I promise you that I'm gonna be honest with you, that the witnesses that I call, there is a reason for them to be here. They have something important to tell you. I'm not gonna waste your time. If there is [sic] two or three people that did the same thing in this case, you will probably only hear from one of them. It's gonna be a straightforward, no nonsense case. .... But as you know, we wouldn't be here unless what I'm about to tell you really happened. This statement clearly includes both forms of improper vouching. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 401, 783 P.2d at 1193. If Defendant had objected, the court should have sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the remark. Such judicial action would have been appropriate even absent an objection. Cf. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 54, 68 S.Ct. at 395. There was no objection, however, and we again review for fundamental error. In determining whether a prosecutor's improper statement constitutes fundamental error, we examine, under the circumstances, whether the jurors were probably influenced and whether the statement probably denied Defendant a fair trial. See, e.g., Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 611, 832 P.2d at 628; Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 401, 783 P.2d at 1193; Valdez, 160 Ariz. at 15, 770 P.2d at 319. The focus is on the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 608, 832 P.2d at 625; Valdez, 160 Ariz. at 15, 770 P.2d at 319. Given the entire record, we do not believe that the statement tipped the scales of justice and denied Defendant a fair trial. Thus, the prosecutor's statement, although highly improper, did not constitute fundamental error in this case. 3. Speculation that the victim was tortured In opening statement, the prosecutor suggested that the victim was perhaps tortured. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that, after the victim's hands were tied, she may have been forced into some sort of torment. Defendant claims that these statements were unsupported by evidence and thus improper. The comment during opening statement that the victim was perhaps tortured was improper. Opening statement is counsel's opportunity to tell the jury what evidence they intend to introduce. See Charles M. Smith, Arizona Practice  Civil Trial Practice § 455, at 395 (1986). Opening statement is not a time to argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not yet admitted. Id. § 455, at 395; § 457, at 396. There was no direct evidence that the victim was tortured, and the record does not indicate that any such evidence was anticipated when opening statements were made. Accordingly, the reference to torture during opening statement was improper. The comment during closing argument that the victim may have been tormented was proper. Unlike opening statements, during closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions. Id. § 527, at 455-56; see also State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 64, 859 P.2d 169, 174 (1993); Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 171, 800 P.2d at 1279. Given the evidence presented at trial, we find no impropriety in the prosecutor suggesting  during closing argument  that the victim had been tormented. The nine-year-old victim was abducted, taken to a remote area, her clothes removed and scattered, her hands tied, and her head beaten. Such evidence would permit a jury to infer that she had been subject to both physical and emotional torment. Thus, we hold that the comment during opening statement was improper but find no reason to reverse. While, the comment during opening statement was improper at that point, it was a reasonable inference from evidence later introduced and would have been proper during closing argument. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the improper comment did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. We find no fundamental error.