Opinion ID: 1917678
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the aiding and abetting instruction plain error?

Text: At trial, which took place before our en banc decision in Wilson-Bey, the government requested and received the then-standard aiding and abetting instruction without objection from the defense. Both parties on appeal agree that the now discredited instruction [8] failed to require the correct level of mens rea on the part of an aider and abettor. The aiding and abetting instruction given in this case amounted to what we have called essentially... a negligence instruction. [9] This does not end the inquiry, however. It merely shows that Williamson received an erroneous jury instruction. Where a defendant has failed to object to a deficient jury instruction, we review for plain error. [10] An appellant faced with the plain error standard bears a difficult burden. [11] An erroneous aiding and abetting instruction that relieves the jury from having to find the requisite mens rea automatically satisfies the first two requirements (error, that is plain). [12] At the same time, we have yet to find either of the other two plain error requirements satisfied where there was sufficient independent evidence of the defendant's guilty state of mind to sustain the charges. [13] Here, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer Williamson's guilty state of mind. The government presented evidence of a grudge between Williamson and Chambliss. In addition, based on the facts in the record, the jury must have concluded that, although he did not pull the trigger himself, Williamson likely provided the murder weapon to his accomplice and drove him to and from the murder scene. Throughout the trial the prosecution's theory was that Williamson hatched the plot to kill Chambliss, and that he was the only person with the motive and the means to do so. The defense did not contend otherwise. Instead, the defense presented an alibi and advanced a misidentification theory, arguing that neither Williamson nor his truck were at the crime scene. Thus, in order to arrive at a guilty verdict, the jury had to have rejected Williamson's alibi as well as his misidentification theory. Kidd [14] is on point. There, we affirmed appellant's conviction for first-degree murder when he stood on one side of the victim while pointing a gun at his stomach; a second person stood on the other side with a gun; a third person came around the back and shot the victim in the head; and appellant immediately fled the scene. [15] We held that [R]easonable jurors could infer and conclude from the [government's] testimony... that beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Kidd had thought about and reflected on killing [the victim], and further that he had the specific intent to participate in the killing, as evidenced by his possession of a gun pointed to the stomach or side of [the victim]; his anger and argument over [the victim's] throwing paint balls at his car.... [16] Importantly, the evidence from which a jury could infer appellant's mens rea with respect to pre-meditation and intent to kill was uncontroverted by any defense evidence. The defense only presented defendant's own statement that he was not at the crime scene, which we discounted as self-serving. [17] Given the substantial similarity between Kidd and this case, we hold, as we did in Kidd, that the erroneous aiding and abetting jury instruction did not violate Williamson's substantial rights, nor did it cause a miscarriage of justice.