Opinion ID: 1695312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for directed verdict as to the issue of negligence.

Text: McKinzie contends that evidence in the instant case clearly establishes the negligence of Coon as a matter of law. Therefore, McKinzie submits the trial court erred in failing to grant her a directed verdict or, alternatively, a new trial since the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The record indicates that at the close of McKinzie's case, both Coon, without supporting argument, and McKinzie moved for a directed verdict. Both parties' motions were denied. At the close of all evidence, McKinzie renewed her motion for directed verdict on the issue of Coon's negligence. The lower court heard argument by the defense that it is still a jury question as to whether or not Billy Coon entered the intersection at a point and time when it was safe for him to do so. Counsel added that there was also the affirmative defense of Coon that McKinzie was comparatively negligent as to speed and failure to yield. Following arguments, the court again denied the directed verdict. It is first necessary to examine the applicable traffic laws. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-3-805 (1972), regarding vehicles entering through highways or stop intersections, provides, in its entirety: The driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this chapter at the entrance to a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the intersection from said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. However, said driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle so proceedings into or across the through highway. The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as required by this chapter at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one or more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway and shall proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may then proceed. The undisputed evidence at trial was that McKinzie was traveling in a direct route on Highway 98 West to Pensacola. Officer Bullock explained that Highway 98 is a through highway, in that the travel of vehicles thereon is in no way impeded or deterred by traffic lights or stop signs. Intersecting Highway 98 is Highway 63, upon which Coon was traveling. Highway 63 is not a through highway, evidenced by the stop sign at its entrance point to the intersection. McKinzie estimated she was traveling at 50 miles per hour just prior to the collision. Officer Bullock testified his investigation included measuring the two sets of skid marks left by McKinzie's vehicle, interviewing both drivers and the witnesses on the scene, noting damage to the vehicles and recording the relevant facts. Bullock estimated he had investigated 300-400 accidents prior to this one, and based on his investigation, he found nothing to indicate McKinzie was speeding at the time of the collision. Bullock further testified damage to the vehicles was consistent with the quoted speeds of the drivers. The testimony of witnesses Clark and Prece, two disinterested local witnesses who were driver and passenger in the same vehicle, was practically identical. Prece testified it appeared that Coon was not paying attention when he pulled out at the point when McKinzie's vehicle was pretty close to the intersection. Prece first noticed McKinzie's vehicle when the two things hit my eye at the same time; the car coming off the stop sign when it shouldn't have been. Clark concluded that Coon just forgot what he was doing or something. He just pulled out in front of her. There was no way to miss him. In his defense, Coon's only explanation was his observation made just after the accident, that he just didn't see her, she come out of nowhere. Applying the law as set forth in § 63-3-805, traffic proceeding on Highway 63 and approaching the intersection must first obey the stop sign and may only proceed into the intersection after yielding to any oncoming vehicles which are approaching so closely on [Highway 98] as to constitute an immediate hazard. Both drivers were familiar with the intersection, Coon driving it daily and McKinzie frequently. Estimates by the two witnesses of the distance of McKinzie's vehicle at the time Coon pulled into the intersection ranged from pretty close to between 100 and 200 feet. McKinzie believed she was about 75 feet from the intersection. Coon testified he did not see McKinzie, that she came out of nowhere, and that he stopped and looked both ways but never saw her. In Meo v. Miller, 227 Miss. 11, 85 So.2d 568 (1956), this Court also considered the evidence of an intersectional car collision: A brief summary, therefore, of appellant's evidence, not only by himself and his wife, but also by three disinterested local witnesses, who are the only ones to actually see all of the events, is that Miller pulled out on the highway directly in front of Meo's car, which was traveling 40 to 50 miles an hour (his wife said 50 to 60), at a time when the Meo car was only 60 to 100 feet from the intersection; that when the Meo car passed through the intersection the truck was occupying a part of the east or Meo's right side of the highway, and Meo had to turn right quickly to avoid a collision. In other words, according to appellant's evidence, Miller pulled out on the highway when Meo's car was entirely too close to the intersection and when it constituted an immediate hazard within the meaning of Code Section 8197. Miller said ... that he drove up to the highway, stopped, looked up and down the road, and saw a car below the bridge, 800 to 1000 feet south; ... and that he went out in the road and `when I looked I saw the car was closer and I went in low and done all I could.' He admitted he could not estimate the plaintiff's speed, but he could tell he was coming fast. He said that he heard the horn blow, and ... when the horn started, that `he was pretty darn close.' 227 Miss. at 17-18, 85 So.2d 568. (emphasis added). In reversing a jury verdict in favor of the defendant/appellee, Miller, the Court recognized the crucial issue in the case was whether Miller pulled out on the highway at a time when Meo's car was so close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard. Id. at 19, 85 So.2d 568. The Court concluded: The great weight of the evidence indicates that Miller did this at a time when Meo's car was only 60 to 100 feet from the intersection, and that when appellant's car crossed the intersection appellee's truck was occupying part of the east lane. Although appellee's evidence was sufficient to prevent the granting of a peremptory instruction to the plaintiff on liability, for the above stated reasons we think that the overwhelming weight of the evidence is contrary to the verdict rendered, so the case must be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Id. (emphasis added). A similar decision resulted in Jones v. Carter, 192 Miss. 603, 7 So.2d 519 (1942). In that case, the appeal was from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Ms. Carter, a passenger in a car driven by her husband when it collided with a vehicle driven by Jones. Jones was crossing a through highway from a gravel road at the two roads' intersection. The proof showed Jones' car had already crossed the highway so that its front wheels were on the gravel on the opposite side and its rear wheels were past the center line. Jones' vehicle had thus begun to clear the intersection when the Carters' vehicle first came into view some 468 feet away. This Court noted that while traffic laws did provide that vehicles preparing to cross a through highway must yield to traffic approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, this principle was not dispositive: In other words, the statute ... does not require the driver of a vehicle who has already entered onto an intersection with a through highway to yield the right-of-way to an approaching vehicle which has neither entered the intersection nor approached so closely thereto from said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. Id. at 609, 7 So.2d 519. The Court reversed and remanded the verdict in favor of the Carters, stating: [I]t is sufficient to say that the case presented is extremely close on the question as to whether the defendant was entitled to a peremptory instruction in his behalf. At any rate, we are of the opinion that the case should be reversed and remanded on account of the verdict being contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. In contrary situations where the evidence presented at trial was in dispute and differing conclusions could easily be reached, this Court has refused to take an issue from the jury or to interfere with a jury's decision. In Bush Construction Co. v. Walters, 250 Miss. 384, 164 So.2d 900 (1964), three occupants of a car were killed while crossing a through highway when their vehicle was struck by a loaded gravel truck. Conflicting evidence was that the truck's driver was speeding and failed to keep a proper lookout as he entered the intersection, and that Walters, driver of the car, failed to obey a stop sign and entered the intersection when the truck was so close as to create a hazard. Although of the opinion that the evidence conclusively showed Walters was negligent, this Court could not also say the appellant was entitled to a directed verdict: It was a jury question whether appellant's driver ... was guilty of negligence proximately contributing to the collision, and we are unable to say that the jury was not correct in its verdict. Id. at 390, 164 So.2d 900. Marshall v. Conley, 391 So.2d 656 (Miss. 1980), presented an intersection collision where the appellant, Marshall, was a passenger in a vehicle traveling eastward on a through highway at between 50-60 miles per hour. Appellee Conley approached an entrance to the highway and stopped at a stop sign, facing north. At the same time, heading west, was appellee Browdowski, traveling on the highway. Entering the highway, Conley stated he looked both ways, waited for the truck to get even with him as it passed, and then pulled into the intersection. Conley's pickup truck was struck by the Marshall car. The Marshall car was thrust into the westbound lane, where it was struck by the Brodowski truck-tractor. From a directed verdict in favor of both appellees, Marshall appealed. This Court found with two to three seconds to react, there was nothing Brodowski could have done to prevent the second collision and the directed verdict was proper as to him. However, regarding the initial collision between Conley and Marshall, the Court stated: The directed verdict in favor of Conley is in a considerably different status. Mississippi Code Annotated, section 63-3-[805] (1972) placed the duty on Conley of stopping and yielding the right-of-way to the Marshall car, if the car had entered the intersection on the through highway, or was then approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. Although Conley did not see the Marshall vehicle, it was there. Id. (Emphasis added). The directed verdict for Conley was reversed and the case remanded for trial. Finally, in Mills v. Nichols, 467 So.2d 924 (Miss. 1985), the core issue ... was whether Mills was so close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard of collision. This Court observed that the proof presented at trial did not allow the jury verdict to be disturbed: [I]t becomes a swearing contest as to which vehicle had preempted the intersection and which vehicle had the duty to yield. Mills said that Cooksley pulled out at the last minute; Cooksley said that he looked down the road and saw nothing coming. This is a classic jury question of fact. Id. at 931. This Court, where the cause of the collision is at issue and conflicting evidence is presented, so that a juror could reasonably accept the nonmovant's version of the facts, has consistently held that a motion for directed verdict was properly denied, or should have been. Such was the result in every case analyzed above. Returning to the case at bar, however, there was no conflicting evidence presented. Coon presented nothing contrary to the evidence of McKinzie. Unlike some of the cited cases, Coon did not testify that McKinzie was speeding or was otherwise negligent. He merely stated he looked and never saw her. Witnesses situated opposite Coon, stopped at the same intersection, clearly saw McKinzie approaching and contemplated the accident would occur moments later, to the extent that they hurriedly backed up in order to avoid being struck by Coon's car after it was struck and propelled forward. In fact, just as in Meo v. Miller , [two] disinterested local witnesses testified she was pretty close, between 100-200 feet from the intersection when Coon pulled out, and, as one witness described, At that time this car pulled out, ... there was oncoming traffic. Neither of these witnesses felt there was anything McKinzie could have done to avoid the collision. Coon's only theory that McKinzie was negligent appears to have been his intimation that McKinzie must have been speeding since he looked and did not see her and shortly afterwards he heard tires skidding and was struck. Only by stretching this testimony beyond imagination is it possible that reasonable jurors could have reached different verdicts as to whether or not Coon was negligent. Factually, the case at bar most closely resembles Vines v. Windham, 606 So.2d 128 (Miss. 1992). However, even Vines can be distinguished in part from the case at bar. In Vines, this Court considered the appeal of a plaintiff who sued for personal injuries after her vehicle struck another which pulled out in front of her at an intersection. The lower court submitted all issues to the jury, including comparative negligence. The jury found both plaintiff and defendant negligent and awarded $20,000 in damages to Vines, the driver, and $3500 to her husband, also injured in the accident. This Court reviewed the evidence of both drivers and held the comparative negligence of Vines should never have been submitted to a jury: There is no direct evidence that Hattie Vines was speeding or otherwise negligent when she struck Windham's automobile. There were only two witnesses who testified on the issue of negligence  Windham and Hattie Vines. Windham certainly had nothing probative to say about Hattie Vines' actions, because he never even saw her until after the impact. Hattie Vines, on the other hand, testified that Windham pulled out immediately in front of her. This cannot in any way be construed as an admission of negligence. A driver who approaches an intersection at which he has the right of way is entitled to assume that crossing traffic will obey stop signs, look for oncoming vehicles before entering the intersection, and yield to through traffic. Neither Windham nor Vines offered any testimony that Vines' conduct was in any way unreasonable or imprudent. The only circumstantial evidence of negligence on Hattie Vines' part is Windham's testimony that when he last looked in her direction, he did not see her. The only way the trial court could have concluded that an issue of fact existed concerning Hattie Vines' contributory negligence was by building a tower of inferences on this slender reed of testimony. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). The Court in reversing and remanding for a new trial concluded: The evidence is clearly insufficient to support the trial court's decision to submit the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. It goes without saying that the evidence is likewise insufficient to support the jury's verdict to the extent it found that the plaintiff was liable for contributory negligence. Id. at 132. Vines is distinguished in part from the case at bar because Vines and Windham were the only witnesses to the collision between their vehicles, thus there was a swearing match for the jury to determine. However, in the case sub judice, there were two disinterested witnesses, both testifying that there was nothing McKinzie could have done to avoid the accident. Both stated McKinzie was within 100-200 feet of the intersection when Coons pulled out in front of her. McKinzie thought she was within 75 feet of the intersection when Coons entered Highway 98. Coon simply pulled out in front of McKinzie. Additionally, Trooper Bullock's investigation revealed nothing which indicated McKinzie was speeding. Bullock's investigation was consistent with the speeds related by the parties. Milam, Coon's aunt, while not actually seeing the collision, did observe Coon stopped at the intersection. More importantly, Coon admitted telling his grandmother, I just didn't see her, she come out of nowhere. Coon did not see McKinzie, but she was there on Highway 98, the through highway, so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. In McGill v. Bradley, No. 90-CA-01206, ___ So.2d ___ [1994 WL 287816] (Miss. June 30, 1994), this Court, finding that there was no evidence that McGill's employees were negligent in causing Bradley's injuries, reversed and rendered the jury's decision in favor of McGill. Accordingly, based on a review of this Court's caselaw and our standard for determining whether the grant or denial of a directed verdict was proper, we reject granting Coon a new trial on the issue of liability giving him the opportunity to prove contributory negligence which he could not prove the first time around. The verdict is clearly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and McKinzie was entitled to a directed verdict on liability. McKinzie's issue has merit. The verdict of the jury must be reversed and rendered on liability and remanded for a new trial on damages alone.