Opinion ID: 1715839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Removal Costs.

Text: Hill contends that the court erred in allowing the city to collect these costs in the injunction action because the city's only means of reimbursement is through a restitution order in a criminal prosecution. (Hill was charged with misdemeanor violations of these ordinances, but his brief states that the criminal charges were still pending at the time of this appeal.) However, ordinance section 24½-12, set out above, provides that the city may demand reimbursement of its towing and storing costs as a part of the abatement process. Our statutes give broad powers to a city to collect the costs of a nuisance abatement. For example, Iowa Code section 364.12(3)(h) (1993) provides that, if a property owner does not perform an action required under this subsection (which includes the abatement of a nuisance), the city may do so and assess the costs for collection in the same manner as a property tax. Under Iowa Code section 364.12(4), [i]n addition to any other remedy provided by law, a city may also seek reimbursement for costs incurred in performing any act authorized by this section by a civil action for damages against a property owner. The city did not utilize either of these procedures; rather, it used a method provided by its ordinance, which requires the payment of costs as a condition precedent to a return of the vehicles or the city's disposal of them. This procedure, we believe, is authorized by Iowa Code section 364.12(3), which provides: A city may: a. Require the abatement of a nuisance, public or private, in any reasonable manner. The city's demand for payment of its costs as a condition precedent to either a return of the vehicle or the city's disposal of it is reasonable under the provisions of section 364.12(3). Moreover, the city's use of a civil remedy is not, as argued by Hill, precluded by the fact that the ordinances make a junkyard violation a misdemeanor. A city may pursue its civil remedy of injunction as a preventative measure despite the fact that the ordinance on which it is based is couched in penal terms. We have said that a court of equity will enjoin the violation of the provisions of a statute enacted for the public interest though the violation is made a misdemeanor. Town of Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 431, 1 N.W.2d 677, 680 (1942) (junk dealer nuisance case) (citing State v. Fray, 214 Iowa 53, 56, 241 N.W. 663, 664 (1932)). In Fray we quoted a Louisiana case that said: The remedy given [an injunction] is purely preventative; defendant is not punished for what he has done; this is left to the criminal courts.... Where an injunction is necessary for the protection of public rights, property or welfare, the criminality of the act complained of does not bar the remedy by injunction. 214 Iowa at 56, 241 N.W. at 664. In Grundy Center we concluded that the only effective relief from a nuisance is its abatement and it is too clear to require discussion that a criminal prosecution is not an adequate remedy at law. 231 Iowa at 432, 1 N.W.2d at 680. Our statutes now recognize this principle; Iowa Code section 701.10 provides: The fact that one may be subjected to a criminal prosecution in no way limits the right which anyone may have to a civil remedy. We reject Hill's argument that the city must seek reimbursement through a criminal case.