Opinion ID: 2383323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whittlesey asserts:

Text: The State's decision not to charge [Whittlesey] was based solely on a desire to get more evidence to increase the chances of getting a murder conviction and not on insufficiency of the evidence. He declares, without citation of authority; The recognized legal standard, however, is `sufficiency of the evidence,' not `more evidence.' He points out that the State conceded in oral argument at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that it could have brought a murder charge at the time it obtained the robbery indictment because there was probable cause then to support a charge of murder. But, the State posited, it was not constitutionally compelled to do so. Contrary to Whittlesey's assertion, we think that the recognized legal standard for bringing a charge provides more leeway to a prosecutor than Whittlesey would give. It reaches beyond probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed by the suspect. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) the Court addressed the obligation of a prosecutor to seek an indictment in the frame of reference of the constitutional guarantees of due process of law. In an opinion delivered by Marshall, J., in which Burger, C.J., and Brennan, Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, the Court declared: It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from fundamental conceptions of justice when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause. It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the subject's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 790-791, 97 S.Ct. at 2048-49, quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966) (footnote omitted). To impose such a duty, the Court continued, `would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.' Id., quoting Ewell at 120, 86 S.Ct. at 776. From the perspective of potential defendants, the Court explained: requiring prosecutions to commence when probable cause is established is undesirable because it would increase the likelihood of unwarranted charges being filed, and would add to the time during which defendants stand accused but untried. These costs are by no means insubstantial since, as we recognized in [ United States v.] Marion, [404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)], a formal accusation may interfere with the defendant's liberty, ... disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 791, 97 S.Ct. at 2049, quoting Marion 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S.Ct. at 463 (footnote omitted). From the perspective of law enforcement officials, the Court went on, a requirement of immediate prosecution upon probable cause is equally unacceptable because it could make obtaining proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt impossible by causing potentially fruitful sources of information to evaporate before they are fully exploited. And from the standpoint of the courts, such a requirement is unwise because it would cause scarce resources to be consumed on cases that prove to be insubstantial, or that involve only some of the responsible parties or some of the criminal acts. Thus, no one's interests would be well served by compelling prosecutors to initiate prosecutions as soon as they are legally entitled to do so. Id. 431 U.S. at 791-792, 97 S.Ct. at 2049-50 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that once the Government has assembled sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it should be constitutionally required to file charges promptly, even if its investigation of the entire criminal transaction is not complete. Id. at 792, 97 S.Ct. at 2050. Adopting such a rule, the Court observed, would have many of the same consequences as adopting a rule requiring immediate prosecution upon probable cause. Id. The Court noted that insisting on immediate prosecution once sufficient evidence is developed to obtain a conviction would pressure prosecutors into resolving doubtful cases in favor of early  and possibly unwarranted  prosecutions. Id. at 793, 97 S.Ct. at 2050. So it is that neither probable cause [6] to believe that a suspect has committed an offense nor the availability of evidence legally sufficient to prove the guilt of a suspect beyond a reasonable doubt, [7] constitutionally compels a prosecutor to go forward with prosecution forthwith. Of course, prosecutors desire to present as strong a case as possible, and this may require further investigation. Lovasco recognized that an investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely `to gain tactical advantage over an accused,' United States v. Marion , 404 U.S. [307, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 465, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)], precisely because investigative delay is not so one-sided. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 795, 97 S.Ct. at 2051. Such an investigative delay does not necessarily offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. Rather than deviating from elementary standards of fair play and decency, a prosecutor abides by them if he refuses to seek indictments until he is completely satisfied that he should prosecute and will be able promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [8] Id. The teachings of Lovasco stand vital in the law. They have been applied, for example, in Howell v. Barker, 904 F.2d 889, 894-895 (4th Cir.1990); United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 403-404 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Williams, 684 F.2d 296, 301 (4th Cir.1982); United States v. Naserkhaki, 713 F. Supp. 190, 192 (E.D.Va. 1989); United States v. Beall, 581 F. Supp. 1468, 1469-1470 (D.Md. 1984); United States v. Sample, 565 F. Supp. 1166, 1181-1182 (E.D.Va. 1983). Even though the State conceded that there might have been probable cause to arrest Whittlesey for murder at the time the robbery indictment was returned, in the circumstances here, the State was entitled to continue its investigation in an attempt to find Jamie's body rather than put its case at risk by an immediate prosecution. No more than does the Double Jeopardy Clause, does due process interpose a bar to prosecution under the murder indictment.