Opinion ID: 778069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard of Review of State Court Judgments in Habeas Proceedings

Text: 57 Jenkins's habeas corpus petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA), because he filed his petition after April 24, 1996, the AEDPA's effective date. See Pavel v. Hollins, 261 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir.2001). The AEDPA states in pertinent part: 58 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — 59 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.... 60 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 61 The AEDPA place[d] a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, but only with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (opinion of O'Connor, J. ). When the district court entered judgment in the instant case, Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 108-09 (2d Cir.2001), provided this Court's definition of adjudicated on the merits. Under this version of Schriver, deference [to a state appellate court was only] due when [it], for example, discuss[ed] or at least cite[d] Supreme Court case law or state court decisions which refer to federal law. Id. at 109. Subsequently, after the decision by the district court in the case now before us, we withdrew that version of Schriver and substituted a new opinion in which we declined to reach the issue of § 2254(d)'s standard of review ... because nothing turn[ed] on it. Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 55 (2d Cir.2001) (concluding that irrespective of whether or not post-AEDPA deferential review applied, the district court properly denied the writ). 62 Two months later, we revisited this issue. We decided that a state court adjudicates a claim on the merits when it (1) disposes of the claim `on the merits,' and (2) reduces its disposition to judgment ... even if the state court does not explicitly refer to either the federal claim or to relevant federal case law. Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir.2001). To determine whether a state court disposition is on the merits, we ask `(1) what the state courts have done in similar cases; (2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and (3) whether the state court's opinion suggests reliance upon procedural grounds rather than a determination on the merits.' Id. at 314 (quoting Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999)); accord Morris, 264 F.3d at 46. 63 The Appellate Division dismissed Jenkins's assertions under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including the claim of prosecutorial misconduct, as without merit. Jenkins, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 536, 230 A.D.2d at 807. In Sellan, we found that an even more concise Appellate Division disposition — the word denied — triggered AEDPA deference. Sellan, 261 F.3d at 314. The Appellate Division in this case therefore adjudicated the due process question on the merits. Because it also reduced its ruling to judgment, we apply AEDPA deference to its decision. 64