Opinion ID: 164351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effectiveness

Text: 22 The telemarketers assert that the do-not-call registry is unconstitutionally underinclusive because it does not apply to charitable and political callers. First Amendment challenges based on underinclusiveness face an uphill battle in the commercial speech context. As a general rule, the First Amendment does not require that the government regulate all aspects of a problem before it can make progress on any front. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993). Within the bounds of the general protection provided by the Constitution to commercial speech, we allow room for legislative judgments. Id. The underinclusiveness of a commercial speech regulation is relevant only if it renders the regulatory framework so irrational that it fails materially to advance the aims that it was purportedly designed to further. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489, 115 S.Ct. 1585, 131 L.Ed.2d 532 (1995); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564, 100 S.Ct. 2343 (If a regulation provides only ineffective or remote support for the government's purpose it cannot be said to bear a reasonable fit with that purported objective). Cf. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51, 114 S.Ct. 2038, 129 L.Ed.2d 36 (1994) (underinclusiveness provides a basis for a First Amendment claim when it constitutes an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people). 23 In Rubin, for example, the Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting brewers from putting the alcohol content of their product on beer labels, purportedly in an effort to discourage strength wars. 514 U.S. at 478, 115 S.Ct. 1585. However, the law allowed advertisements disclosing the alcohol content of beers, allowed sellers of wines and spirits to disclose alcohol content on labels (and even required such disclosure for certain wines), and allowed brewers to signal high alcohol content by using the term malt liquor. Id. at 488-89, 115 S.Ct. 1585. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that there was little chance that the beer label rule would materially deter strength wars in light of the irrationality of this unique and puzzling regulatory framework. Id. at 489, 115 S.Ct. 1585. 24 Likewise, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, the Court struck down a law prohibiting commercial newsracks on public property, purportedly in order to promote the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and sidewalks. 507 U.S. 410, 412, 113 S.Ct. 1505, 123 L.Ed.2d 99 (1993). However, the ban applied to only 62 of the 1,500 to 2,000 newsracks in the city, thus addressing only a minute and paltry share of the problem. Id. at 417-18, 113 S.Ct. 1505. Moreover, the challenged ordinance was not enacted in an effort to address problems posed by newsracks, but was actually an outdated prohibition against the distribution of any commercial handbills on public property ... enacted long before any concern about newsracks developed. Id. For these reasons, the Court held in part II of that opinion that the city did not establish the reasonable fit we require. Id. at 417-18, 113 S.Ct. 1505. 25 Yet so long as a commercial speech regulation materially furthers its objectives, underinclusiveness is not fatal under Central Hudson. For example, in Edge Broadcasting the Supreme Court approved a regulation that prohibited broadcasters in North Carolina (which did not permit lotteries) from broadcasting lottery advertisements on the radio, even as applied to a broadcaster located near the border of Virginia (where lotteries were legal) whose audience consisted of 92.2 percent Virginians. 509 U.S. 418, 423-24, 431-33, 113 S.Ct. 2696, 125 L.Ed.2d 345 (1993). The Court found it determinative that the regulation prevented lottery ads from reaching about 127,000 North Carolina residents (7.8 percent of Edge's listeners): 10 26 It could hardly be denied ... that these facts, standing alone, would clearly show that applying the statutory restriction to Edge would directly serve the statutory purpose of supporting North Carolina's antigambling policy.... [T]his result could hardly be called either ineffective, remote, or conditional. Nor could it be called only limited incremental support for the Government interest. 27 Id. at 432, 113 S.Ct. 2696 (citations omitted). The Court rejected Edge's argument that the regulations banning lottery advertising by in-state radio failed materially to advance the government's interests because North Carolina residents were already inundated with lottery advertising from other sources, such as Virginia radio and television programs. Id. at 434-35, 113 S.Ct. 2696. [T]he Government may be said to advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even where it is not wholly eradicated. Id. at 434-35, 113 S.Ct. 2696; see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) ([P]rohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising.). 28 As discussed above, the national do-not-call registry is designed to reduce intrusions into personal privacy and the risk of telemarketing fraud and abuse that accompany unwanted telephone solicitation. The registry directly advances those goals. So far, more than 50 million telephone numbers have been registered on the do-not-call list, and the do-not-call regulations protect these households from receiving most unwanted telemarketing calls. According to the telemarketers' own estimate, 2.64 telemarketing calls per week — or more than 137 calls annually — were directed at an average consumer before the do-not-call list came into effect. Cf. 68 Fed.Reg. at 44152 (discussing the five-fold increase in the total number of telemarketing calls between 1991 and 2003). Accordingly, absent the do-not-call registry, telemarketers would call those consumers who have already signed up for the registry an estimated total of 6.85 billion times each year. 29 To be sure, the do-not-call list will not block all of these calls. Nevertheless, it will prohibit a substantial number of them, making it difficult to fathom how the registry could be called an ineffective means of stopping invasive or abusive calls, or a regulation that furnish[es] only speculative or marginal support for the government's interests. See also id. (noting the effectiveness of state do-not-call lists in reducing unwanted telemarketing calls). 11 30 Furthermore, the do-not-call list prohibits not only a significant number of commercial sales calls, but also a significant percentage of all calls causing the problems that Congress sought to address (whether commercial, charitable or political). The record demonstrates that a substantial share of all solicitation calls will be governed by the do-not-call rules. See H.R.Rep. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991) ([M]ost unwanted telephone solicitations are commercial in nature.); 68 Fed.Reg. at 44153-54 (the high volume and unexpected nature of commercial calls subject to the national do-not-call registry makes those calls more problematic than nonprofit calls and solicitations based on established business relationships). 31 The telemarketers asserted before the FTC that they might have to lay off up to 50 percent of their employees if the national do-not-call registry came into effect. See 68 Fed.Reg. at 4631. It is reasonable to conclude that the telemarketers' planned reduction in force corresponds to a decrease in the amount of calls they will make. Significantly, the percentage of unwanted calls that will be prohibited will be even higher than the percentage of all unsolicited calls blocked by the list. The individuals on the do-not-call list have declared that they do not wish to receive unsolicited commercial telemarketing calls, whereas those who do want to continue receiving such calls will not register. Cf. 68 Fed.Reg. at 4632 (under the national do-not-call regulations, telemarketers would reduce time spent calling consumers who do not want to receive telemarketing calls and would be able to focus their calls only on those who do not object). 32 Finally, the type of unsolicited calls that the do-not-call list does prohibit — commercial sales calls — is the type that Congress, the FTC and the FCC have all determined to be most to blame for the problems the government is seeking to redress. According to the legislative history accompanying the TCPA, [c]omplaint statistics show that unwanted commercial calls are a far bigger problem than unsolicited calls from political or charitable organizations. H.R.Rep. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991) (noting that non-commercial calls were less intrusive to consumers' privacy because they are more expected and because there is a lower volume of such calls); see also 68 Fed.Reg. at 44153. Similarly, the FCC determined that calls from solicitors with an established business relationship with the recipient are less problematic than other commercial calls. 68 Fed.Reg. at 44154 (Consumers are more likely to anticipate contacts from companies with whom they have an existing relationship and the volume of such calls will most likely be lower.). 33 Additionally, the FTC has found that commercial callers are more likely than non-commercial callers to engage in deceptive and abusive practices. 68 Fed.Reg. at 4637 (When a pure commercial transaction is at stake, callers have an incentive to engage in all the things that telemarketers are hated for. But non-commercial speech is a different matter.). Specifically, the FTC concluded that in charitable and political calls, a significant purpose of the call is to sell a cause, not merely to receive a donation, and that non-commercial callers thus have stronger incentives not to alienate the people they call or to engage in abusive and deceptive practices. Id.; cf. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980) ([B]ecause charitable solicitation does more than inform private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services, it is not dealt with as a variety of purely commercial speech.). The speech regulated by the do-not-call list is therefore the speech most likely to cause the problems the government sought to alleviate in enacting that list, further demonstrating that the regulation directly advances the government's interests. 34 In sum, the do-not-call list directly advances the government's interests — reducing intrusions upon consumer privacy and the risk of fraud or abuse — by restricting a substantial number (and also a substantial percentage) of the calls that cause these problems. Unlike the regulations struck down in Rubin and Discovery Network, the do-not-call list is not so underinclusive that it fails materially to advance the government's goals.