Opinion ID: 2127958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for Evaluating Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Text: In People v Bachert (69 NY2d 593 [1987]), we noted that there was no comprehensive statutory mechanism to address collateral claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and called on the Legislature to remedy the problem. [3] We held, however, that a defendant who claims to be aggrieved by appellate counsel's failures could proceed by writ of error coram nobis before the appellate court in which the allegedly deficient representation took place. In the absence of a statutory scheme, this Court recognized that it had no power to entertain appeals from appellate orders granting or denying coram nobis relief ( see People v Marsicoveteri, 79 NY2d 913 [1992]) [4] and could not establish a standard for claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Legislature remedied the problem by amending CPL 450.90 (L 2002, ch 498), authorizing appeals (by permission) to this Court from appellate orders granting or denying coram nobis relief based on claims of ineffective assistance or wrongful deprivation of appellate counsel. Now presented with the opportunity to review these claims, we must set the appropriate standard. We begin with the premise that defendants in criminal cases have a federal and state constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. [5] Twenty-three years ago, in Baldi, we went through a similar exercise when addressing claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and concluded that a meaningful representation criterion comports with both the Sixth Amendment and our own state constitutional sensibilities. The road to Baldi extended over several decades. Because that analysis leads us to the same result in fashioning a rule for evaluating appellate effectiveness, it is important to recognize some of the turns along the way. Equally important is that we have retained Baldi in preference to the federal ( Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]) standard in evaluating claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Although appellate lawyers have increasingly challenged the effectiveness of trial counsel (as a basis for reversing convictions), the right to effective trial counsel is not new. [6] In the earliest such cases  late 19th and early 20th century decisions  a few courts addressed claims relating to counsel's abject incompetency and, once in a great while (based generally on the court's supervisory powers), ordered new trials. [7] In New York, we have long recognized the importance of adequate counsel in criminal cases ( see e.g. People v Silverman, 3 NY2d 200 [1957]; People v McLaughlin, 291 NY 480, 483 [1944]), but it was not until 1960 that we began to articulate something approaching a constitutional basis for claims of attorney ineffectiveness ( see People v Tomaselli, 7 NY2d 350, 353-354 [1960]). In Tomaselli, we held that a defendant is entitled to reversal when counsel's representation rendered the trial a farce and a mockery of justice ( id. at 354). We adhered to that standard [8] and in assigned counsel cases reversed some convictions under it on constitutional grounds. [9] In 1976 and 1979, this Court in two cases found counsel's representation ineffective and thus constitutionally unacceptable ( see People v Droz, 39 NY2d 457 [1976]; People v Bell, 48 NY2d 933 [1979]), but did not use the farce or mockery test or even refer to the cases that established it. Finally, in Baldi, we departed from the farce or mockery test and articulated a new standard of meaningful representation. We recognized, in essence, that a criminal trial should be more efficient, and fairer, than one that rises just above the level of farce. But we have been careful to distinguish between true ineffectiveness and losing tactics or unsuccessful efforts in advancing appropriate defenses ( see People v Henry, 95 NY2d 563, 565 [2000]; People v Berroa, 99 NY2d 134 [2002]). In Strickland v Washington (466 US 668 [1984]), the Supreme Court established a standard for evaluating defendants' Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To prevail, the defendant must prove that trial counsel did not render reasonably competent assistance and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's inadequacy, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland 's prejudice prong is what chiefly separates it from Baldi. From time to time, we have referred to the Strickland standard and measured counsel's performance under it, [10] but have never applied it with such stringency as to require a defendant to show that, but for counsel's ineffectiveness, the outcome would probably have been different. Under our Baldi standard, we are not indifferent to whether the defendant was or was not prejudiced by trial counsel's ineffectiveness. We would, indeed, be skeptical of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim absent any showing of prejudice. But under our Baldi jurisprudence, a defendant need not fully satisfy the prejudice test of Strickland. We continue to regard a defendant's showing of prejudice as a significant but not indispensible element in assessing meaningful representation. Our focus is on the fairness of the proceedings as a whole. Based in part on our State Constitution, this Court had decided Baldi three years before Strickland, and in two later cases [11] declined to abandon the Baldi standard for Strickland 's. [12] We now decide that we should apply the Baldi standard in connection with claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. To begin with, it is inapt to have one standard for trials and another for appeals. We are confident that the appellate courts will be able to apply the Baldi standard appropriately when dealing with allegations of appellate counsel's ineffectiveness. Appellate courts are uniquely suited to evaluate what is meaningful in their own arena. Allegations relating to trial counsel's performance are difficult to measure based on a cold record. A trial lawyer's decision to adopt one course or another often rests on strategies that cannot be gleaned from the record on appeal. For that reason, appellate courts usually can't tell whether trial counsel's approach was the result of a tactic that does not appear on the record. For example, to the uninitiated eye, it may appear that an attorney should have called a particular witness. Often, however, the trial record will not reveal that the attorney may have had a very good reason, known only to the defense, for not doing so. An appellate court cannot fault the attorney until after the nonrecord proof has been aired. This is in contrast to appellate argument, which must be based on the record. The appellate court is eminently suited to evaluate appellate counsel's product because the court examines the very same record and ordinarily requires no proof beyond its four corners. In delineating what is meaningful, however, it would be unwise and possibly misleading to create a grid or carve in stone a standard by which to measure effectiveness. Just as defense attorneys enjoy a wide latitude in defending clients at the trial level, appellate lawyers vary in style and approach. A lengthy brief may be a virtue in some instances but not in others. Some arguments properly emphasize two or three cogent issues while others may raise a multiplicity of claims. There can be no rules about these appellate tactics, but there are certain general guidelines. [13] Appellate advocacy is meaningful if it reflects a competent grasp of the facts, the law and appellate procedure, supported by appropriate authority and argument. Effective appellate representation by no means requires counsel to brief or argue every issue that may have merit. When it comes to the choice of issues, appellate lawyers have latitude in deciding which points to advance and how to order them. With that in mind, we turn to the claim before us.