Opinion ID: 2608685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the macias matter

Text: Marcelino Macias retained petitioner's law firm to represent him in postmarital dissolution proceedings, and paid $2,000 as advance fees to the law firm. Petitioner performed certain services for Macias, but before he had earned the entire $2,000 for his services, petitioner withdrew without giving notice to Macias and without taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to Macias' rights. Petitioner failed and refused to promptly return to Macias the unearned portion of the $2,000 fee. [2] It is acknowledged that petitioner wilfully collected an unconscionable fee from Macias in view of legal services contemplated to be performed. It appears from the foregoing that petitioner admits wilful misconduct consisting of (1) misappropriation of clients' funds, in two matters, in the aggregate amount of $5,750; (2) forgery of a client's signature on a settlement check; (3) failure to perform services in three separate matters; (4) failure to promptly return unearned fees; (5) failure to forward files and documents to substitute counsel retained when petitioner failed to perform diligently; (6) collection of an unconscionable fee in light of the legal services contemplated to be performed; and (7) withdrawal from representation without taking reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client's rights. Petitioner's behavior unquestionably constitutes serious misconduct that could warrant disbarment or actual suspension for a substantial period of time. (1) Misappropriation of a client's funds is a serious breach of professional ethics which may endanger the confidence of the public in the legal profession ( Schultz v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal.3d 779, 803 [126 Cal. Rptr. 232, 543 P.2d 600]; Bradpiece v. State Bar (1974) 10 Cal.3d 742, 746 [111 Cal. Rptr. 905, 518 P.2d 337].) Disbarment is appropriate discipline in the absence of mitigating circumstances. ( Cain v. State Bar (1979) 25 Cal.3d 956, 961 [160 Cal. Rptr. 362, 603 P.2d 464]; Weir v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 564, 576 [152 Cal. Rptr. 921, 591 P.2d 19].) (2a) Petitioner has additionally committed acts of forgery, has improperly obtained unearned fees and has collected unconscionable fees. (3) Even the wilful failure to perform legal services for which an attorney has been retained in itself warrants disciplinary action, constituting a breach of the good faith and fiduciary duty owed by the attorney to his clients. ( Lester v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 547, 551 [131 Cal. Rptr. 225, 551 P.2d 841]; Selznick v. State Bar (1976) 16 Cal.3d 704, 708-709 [129 Cal. Rptr. 108, 547 P.2d 1388]; Taylor v. State Bar (1974) 11 Cal.3d 424, 431, 435 [113 Cal. Rptr. 478, 521 P.2d 470].) (2b) Additionally, petitioner has failed to forward files and documents to substitute counsel and has prejudiced his client by his unnoticed withdrawal. When an attorney's disregard of his clients' interests is habitual severe discipline has been imposed. ( Lester v. State Bar, supra, 17 Cal.3d 547; Ridley v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 551 [99 Cal. Rptr. 873, 493 P.2d 105].) The board's recommendation, although for five years' probation upon numerous conditions of probation, does not provide for actual suspension. In making that recommendation, it must be apparent the board considered and weighed heavily mitigating factors that petitioner was an alcoholic when the misconduct occurred; that petitioner stopped drinking intoxicants in February 1979 and has since associated himself with an attorney who is active in the State Bar's alcohol abuse program; that as to the Whitla matter, petitioner had been a long time friend of his client and, based upon their prior relationship and conversations, petitioner believed he had Whitla's implied authority to sign Whitla's name to the check; and that petitioner has no prior disciplinary record. [3] (4) Although we recognize alcoholism and subsequent rehabilitation as affording some explanation of a petitioner's conduct aiding in the assessment of his present character as bearing on the appropriate discipline, alcoholism does not excuse or exonerate serious misconduct. Whatever the reason for an attorney's misconduct, our concern is and must be the protection of the public in the high duties of an attorney, the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession, and the maintenance of the highest professional standards for attorneys. ( Demain v. State Bar (1970) 3 Cal.3d 381, 387 [90 Cal. Rptr. 420, 475 P.2d 652].) (2c) We favorably note petitioner's acknowledgment of wrongdoing, his cooperation through disciplinary proceeding and his continued efforts and progress in rehabilitation. [4] However, restitution in the Whitla and Pope matters is entitled to little weight since it was made pursuant to confrontation by petitioner's law partners in the Whitla matter and under pressure of the State Bar in the Pope matter. (See Fitzpatrick v. State Bar (1977) 20 Cal.3d 73, 88 [141 Cal. Rptr. 169, 569 P.2d 763].) In Inniss v. State Bar, supra, 20 Cal.3d 552, 557, we noted in similar situations that even [w]here ... mitigating circumstances are present, this court has tended to order actual suspension.... Although we attach great weight to disciplinary recommendation of the board (see Hamilton v. State Bar (1979) 23 Cal.3d 868, 878 [153 Cal. Rptr. 602, 591 P.2d 1254]; Cain v. State Bar (1979) 25 Cal.3d 956, 960 [160 Cal. Rptr. 362, 603 P.2d 464]), we have on numerous occasions imposed more severe penalties when we deemed it appropriate ( Cain v. State Bar, supra, 25 Cal.3d 956; Martin v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717 [144 Cal. Rptr. 214, 575 P.2d 757]). In light of the seriousness of petitioner's misconduct, we deem a six-month period of actual suspension is necessary and proper. It is ordered that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years, that execution of this order be stayed and that petitioner be placed on probation for the five-year period on conditions that he be actually suspended from the practice of law for the first six months of such period of probation and that he comply with those additional conditions of probation set forth in the stipulation entered into with the State Bar Disciplinary Board. It is further ordered that petitioner comply with California Rules of Court, rule 955. Performance of those acts required in subdivisions (a) and (c) of rule 955 are to be accomplished within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of this order. These orders are effective 30 days after the filing of this opinion. NEWMAN, J., Dissenting. The majority opinion, I fear, may chill commendable efforts of the State Bar to foster settlement procedures. A stipulation, even when comprehensive, is not designed to serve as the record below. It rather reflects a bargain acceptable to both sides. Absent a record below, to increase penalties seems to me to be a risky business. (See dis. opn. of Bird, C.J. in Giovanazzi v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 465, 479 [169 Cal. Rptr. 581, 619 P.2d 1005]: [T]he economies made possible by the stipulation process could be lost if every attorney accused of misconduct felt impelled to insist on a formal evidentiary hearing on mitigating factors in anticipation of the prospect that this court might later decide to consider an increase in discipline.)