Opinion ID: 1104364
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The terms of the written agreement read, in part, as follows:

Text: Such employment to begin October 1, 1944 and end with termination of this agreement for any reason    the salary to be paid the Salesman shall be at the rate of $200.00 per month, payable monthly. The pertinent provision of the contract in Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 221 Ala. 680, 130 So. 411, was: `Salary to be at the rate of $2000.00 per annum, payable monthly, beginning October 1, 1926.' This court held such phraseology merely fixed the compensation, not the duration of employment, and that said contract was properly terminated at the will of the employer. An indefinite hiring is presumed to be at the will of either party, in the absence of custom or facts showing a contrary intention. The mere fact that the Ralston Company each year effected a new written agreement with appellant is not, alone, sufficient to show any such contrary intention. No terms of the contract state that it was meant to endure for a definite period; thus, we choose to follow the general rule that contracts for services which do not specify as to duration are construed to be terminable at will. Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699; Title Ins. Co. of Richmond, Inc. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387; Peacock v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., supra; Island Lake Oil Co. v. Hewitt, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W. 193; Stonega Coke & Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 1184; Greer v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 1 Pennewill 581, 43 A. 609; Lambie v. Sloss Iron & Steel Co., 118 Ala. 427, 24 So. 108; Howard v. East Tenn., Va. & G. R. Co., 91 Ala. 268, 8 So. 868; Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426. II. We must next determine whether the bulletin of February 1, 1945 amounted, in legal effect, to a promise to pay appellant a bonus on the territory in controversy. As previously stated, in said bulletin, the following is stated: There is to be no change in the present sales contracts of Nonnemacher, Carter or Summers. Upon examination of the original employment agreement, we find: 3. That it is mutually agreed between the parties to this agreement that in event of any change of territory, after the execution of this agreement, such change shall not affect the other terms of this agreement, unless mutually agreed upon when such change is made. Also, said agreement states: 12a. In addition to the Salary and expense allowance provided herein, the Company agrees to pay a monthly bonus for shipments of Chows, Sanitation Products and Farm Supplies made while the Salesman remains actively in charge of his territory, as follows. We think it clear, therefore, that appellee's bulletin of February 1, 1945 did amount to a promise to pay Summers a bonus on the Sherrel territory. Any other determination would completely ignore the provisions of the two instruments. Inasmuch as the bulletin of February 1st concluded with the statement that there would be no change in the present sales contracts of Nonnemacher, Carter or Summers, little, if any, import can be given the sentence which refers to the Sherrel territory as an open district. In the construction of all written instruments, the purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. To ascertain such intention, regard must be given not only to the nature of the instrument, but also to the condition of the parties, and the objects they had in view. Evington v. Smith Brothers, 66 Ala. 398. III. The final and most important question concerns the effect of certain conversations between Cardinal and Summers in Jackson, Mississippi, during February, 1945, the content of which is undisputed. There, Summers spoke with Cardinal about the bonus in question, and asked him whether he (Summers) was going to receive any such bonus for working the Sherrel territory. According to appellant's own uncontradicted testimony, Cardinal answered that the Ralston Company had no intention of paying any bonus upon the Sherrel territory during Sherrel's temporary absence. We think it clear enough that after that conversation, appellant knew the exact attitude of appellee concerning a bonus on the disputed territory. Thus, even though appellee's bulletin of February 1, 1945 amounted to a promise to pay Summers a bonus on Sherrel's territory, that agreement was terminated by Cardinal at the Jackson meeting when Cardinal told Summers that the Ralston Company was not going to pay Summers a bonus on said territory. In legal effect, the prior agreement to pay appellant a bonus on the Sherrel territory was eradicated, and an offer was made on the part of appellee to give Summers employment thereafter on the basis outlined by Cardinal. Summers, by continuing to work, accepted Cardinal's offer. From that date forward, a new and different contract, terminable at will, existed. Obligations under the prior agreement, also terminable at will, had been extinguished. Our conclusion is supported by the great weight of authorities touching upon this point. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. McDiarmid, 211 Ala. 127, 99 So. 849, holds that the law will not imply a promise against the expressed declaration of the party to be charged, made at the time of the supposed undertaking. The reason for said rule is that all contracts must be based on the mutual agreement of the parties. In this case, appellee definitely refused to pay a bonus on the disputed territory. Appellant argues that he dissented to any change in the terms of the original agreement. Appellant's argument, however, is unavailing. If he did not like the terms imposed by the employer, he had the election to quit or not to quit. He could either accept the terms imposed or resign. Appellant certainly could not continue to work, and over the express dissent of the employer hold said employer for something for which he had said he would not be liable. It is no answer to say that the employer could have discharged the employee. If anyone had to take any action toward severing the relationship, appellant, the employee, was under the necessity of taking that step. Such is clearly the holding of Meaher v. Pomeroy, 49 Ala. 146, and Hodges v. Sublett, 91 Ala. 588, 8 So. 800. The only reasonable conclusion fairly to be drawn from the fact that Summers continued to work is that reluctantly he decided it was better to take it than to leave it. The case of L. G. Balfour Co. v. Brown, Tex.Civ.App., 110 S.W.2d 104, 107, is in point. There, a salesman was employed on a commission basis under a contract which provided for termination on thirty days' notice. The employer issued a bulletin informing its salesmen that on and after a certain date in the future the commission would be lowered in certain respects. The salesman protested against the change made by the company, but continued to work. The Texas court, in dealing with this situation, stated the following: When appellant made this change in appellee's compensation at variance with the contract, he [employee] was called upon to elect whether he would accept the modified contract or rely upon the old and sue for its breach. He could not continue his services under the new or modified contract and later rely upon the terms of the old; his election must have been made within a reasonable time after the condition arose. Appellee continued in appellant's services with full knowledge of the new schedule of commissions and bonuses provided for in the letter of August 22, 1934; but of course this continued service was not without protest; however, an earnest protest was not sufficient, he was called upon to act; this he did by continuing in the service. (Emphasis added.) Also, the court's opinion stated: Appellee testified that, after receipt by him of the letter of August 22, 1934, from appellant, his net commissions were figured on the basis of that letter; that he continued to work for appellant thereafter until in June, 1935, when he resigned. We think this shows an election on the part of appellee to ratify, though reluctantly, the modified or changed contract as embraced in appellant's letter. (Emphasis added.) L. G. Balfour Co. v. Brown, supra, also is authority for the proposition that an employer's declaration of intention to modify a contract terminable at will, constitutes, in effect, a declaration of his option to terminate. Inasmuch as any employer can terminate a contract at will at any time and get rid of the employee entirely, quite often it is stated that there is embraced within such power the right of the employer to modify the contract as a condition of continued employment. Strictly speaking, however, a modification at the insistence of one party does not occur; instead, the birth of a new and different contract arises, upon the termination of its predecessor. In this respect, we prefer the language of Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silberman, 6 Cir., 45 F.2d 451, and White Sewing Machine Co. v. Shaddock, 79 Ark. 220, 95 S.W. 143, to that of Hauser v. Watson, D.C.Mun.App., 60 A.2d 698, Swalley v. Addressograph Multigraph Corp., 7 Cir., 158 F.2d 51, Flint v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 2 Cir., 143 F.2d 923, and Robinson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 175 Okl. 640, 54 P.2d 322, though all of these cases fully support the conclusion of this court. Smith Baking Co. v. Behrens, 125 Neb. 718, 251 N.W. 826, exhibits, in the opinion of this court, an extremely questionable holding. Even so, however, we do not agree that it supports appellant. There, the manner in which the suit was brought, as well as the relief asked, was entirely different from that of the case at bar. Donnellan v. Halsey, 114 N.J.L. 175, 176 A. 176, certainly does not support appellant; instead, it lends weight to the contentions of the appellee. Krause v. Bell Potato Chip Co., 149 Or. 388, 39 P.2d 363, also cited by appellant, is not in point. There, the contract was not terminable at will, but rather was one which could be cancelled only upon written notice of sixty days. Also, it appears that the employer undertook to lull the employee into believing that the reduction, at most, was only temporary. Thus, its holding cannot possibly have any bearing upon the determination of this case. Again, in Atkinson v. New Britain Machinery Co., 7 Cir., 154 F.2d 895, no support is found for appellant's contention. There, as the court stated, the contract on its face appeared to be terminable on a month-to-month basis. However, because of numerous other reasons clearly set forth by the court, the contract was correctly held to be a term contract, from year to year. As such, of course it could not be modified by one party without the consent of the other. Also, and of primary importance from our viewpoint, that case turned upon a question of fact as to exactly what took place. In the case now before us, no such question of fact is present, unless appellant's own testimony is disbelieved. Thus, it should be manifest that the holding of Atkinson v. New Britain Machinery Co., supra, dealt with an entirely different problem. Evans v. Henson, 73 Ga.App. 494, 37 S.E.2d 164, is not in point. It merely concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. We have fully considered all contentions of both parties. Having done so, we conclude that defendant's requested charge 40 should have been given by the trial court. In so holding, we rely upon appellant's own undisputed testimony. Thus, the action of the trial court in granting a motion for new trial must be upheld. Affirmed. SIMPSON, GOODWYN and CLAYTON, JJ., concur.