Opinion ID: 1828702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: lack of authority of review panel to enter nunc pro tunc order

Text: We have repeatedly held that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court, as a statutory tribunal, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction and possesses only such authority as is delineated by statute. See, e.g., Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., supra ; Crabb v. Bishop Clarkson Mem. Hosp., 256 Neb. 636, 591 N.W.2d 756 (1999); Thach v. Quality Pork International, 253 Neb. 544, 570 N.W.2d 830 (1997). In its second order, the review panel does not cite to any statutory authority for its issuance of its nunc pro tunc order which by its terms changes its original order of affirmance to a reversal. In Sheldon-Zimbelman, we determined that the only Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act provisions which permit the Workers' Compensation Court to modify or change previously issued orders were Neb.Rev. Stat. §§ 48-141 and 48-180 (Reissue 1998). Accordingly, we review the appropriateness of the second order under these sections. Section 48-141 permits, inter alia, the Workers' Compensation Court to modify an award on the ground of increase or decrease of incapacity due solely to the injury. § 48-141(2). Because the review panel's nunc pro tunc order reversing the single judge's award was not based upon an increase or decrease in Fay's incapacity, the nunc pro tunc order cannot be justified under § 48-141. Section 48-180 provides that the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court may, on its own motion, modify or change its findings, order, award, or judgment at any time before appeal and within ten days from the date of such findings, order, award, or judgment for the purpose of correcting any ambiguity, clerical error, or patent or obvious error. Although the review panel did not cite to § 48-180 in its second order, it appears the review panel was attempting to come within the section's provisions by stating that the basis for the second order was a clerical error. The second order states that [i]nadvertently, the order of affirmance on this cause was sent out.... We believe that this is the kind of clerical error that is correctable by a nunc pro tunc order. Accordingly, we analyze the review panel's second order which it characterized as necessitated by clerical error under § 48-180. When construing a statute, we are guided by the presumption that the Legislature intended a sensible, rather than an absurd, result in enacting the statute. Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 258 Neb. 568, 604 N.W.2d 396 (2000); Battle Creek State Bank v. Haake, 255 Neb. 666, 587 N.W.2d 83 (1998). As a further aid to statutory interpretation, we must look to the statute's purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it. Id. When considering a series or a collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter which are in pari materia, we have stated that they may be conjunctively considered to determine the intent of the Legislature, so that different provisions of the act are consistent and sensible. Sheldon-Zimbelman v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., supra . The language used by the Legislature in § 48-180 is comparable to language generally describing a court's inherent power to issue nunc pro tunc orders. In this regard, we have repeatedly recognized that the function of a nunc pro tunc order is to correct a clerical error or a scrivener's error. Neujahr v. Neujahr, 223 Neb. 722, 726, 393 N.W.2d 47, 50 (1986). See, also, Continental Oil Co. v. Harris, 214 Neb. 422, 333 N.W.2d 921 (1983) (nunc pro tunc order corrects clerical error); Larson v. Bedke, 211 Neb. 247, 318 N.W.2d 253 (1982), modified 212 Neb. 134, 322 N.W.2d 367 (same); State ex rel. Schuler v. Dunbar, 208 Neb. 69, 302 N.W.2d 674 (1981) (same). Section 48-180 is the statutory embodiment of nunc pro tunc principles. Thus, pursuant to § 48-180, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is statutorily authorized to issue proper nunc pro tunc orders. We therefore examine the review panel's second order under nunc pro tunc principles in order to determine if it was properly issued. We have previously recognized that [t]he office of an nunc pro tunc order is to correct a record which has been made so that it will truly record the action had, which through inadvertence or mistake was not truly recorded. Interstate Printing Co. v. Department of Revenue, 236 Neb. 110, 113, 459 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1990). See, also, Andersen v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 249 Neb. 169, 542 N.W.2d 703 (1996). We have also held that [i]t is not the function of an order nunc pro tunc to change or revise a judgment or order, or to set aside a judgment actually rendered, or to render an order different from the one actually rendered, even though such order was not the order intended. Interstate Printing Co. v. Department of Revenue, 236 Neb. at 113, 459 N.W.2d at 522. See, also, IAFF Local 831 v. City of No. Platte, 215 Neb. 89, 337 N.W.2d 716 (1983) (nunc pro tunc order cannot be used to enlarge judgment as originally rendered or to change rights fixed by judgment); Continental Oil Co. v. Harris, 214 Neb. at 424, 333 N.W.2d at 923 (nunc pro tunc order cannot be employed where the fault in the original judgment is that it is wrong as a matter of law, nor can it be employed to allow the court to review and reverse its action with respect to what it formerly did or refused to do); Gunia v. Morton, 175 Neb. 53, 56, 120 N.W.2d 371, 373 (1963) ([i]t is not the purpose of an order nunc pro tunc to correct, change, or modify action previously taken by the court). In its nunc pro tunc order, the review panel did not seek to correct the issuance of an order which did not accurately reflect the decision of the review panel. Instead, the review panel sought to substitute a reversal for an affirmance. As demonstrated in the above cases, an order nunc pro tunc cannot be used to change or reverse a judgment entered. The review panel could not change the action previously taken affirming the award of the single judge to reversing the award under the auspices of a nunc pro tunc order. Thus, the review panel exceeded its authority under § 48-180 in issuing its second order, and accordingly, we vacate the review panel's second order and consider the order of affirmance originally entered.