Opinion ID: 2234512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: prior violent conduct

Text: The final argument raised in the State's appeal is that the appellate court erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling excluding evidence of prior violent conduct by Keith and Lila Cearlock. Following jury selection, but prior to the commencement of trial, the State moved to exclude testimony by Glenda Ashworth concerning the physical and emotional abuse she suffered as a child from her parents, Keith and Lila Cearlock. In addition, during the testimony of one of Jon's expert witnesses, Dr. Stuart Hart, the State objected to any testimony concerning Dr. Hart's interview with Glenda. The trial court sustained the objection, so Jon made an offer of proof concerning Dr. Hart's testimony. Jon also presented a written offer of proof of Glenda's testimony. In the written offer of proof, Glenda indicated that as young as ages four to six, she was beaten with a belt or razor strap. As she grew older, she had to retrieve the razor strap prior to being beaten. In addition, Keith and Lila constantly put Glenda down and referred to her as stupid. Lila spanked Glenda with a belt or with a yardstick or flyswatter. Glenda claimed that when Keith beat her, he beat her with his full strength. Glenda also claimed that Lila pushed Keith into punishing Glenda. When Glenda was around 13 to 16 years old, Keith broke several yardsticks beating her, and began using boards to beat her. Glenda also said that Keith told her that if she resisted him, he would kill Glenda in her sleep. Glenda believed Keith. Glenda said that when Keith brought Jon to Virginia in March or April 1995, Keith admitted to Glenda that he had been whipping Jon. Glenda asked Jon about the whippings, and Jon told her that everything was all right. Glenda stated that she allowed Jon to live with her parents even though they had abused her because she was looking for her parents' approval. In the offer of proof concerning Dr. Hart's testimony, Dr. Hart testified that he interviewed Glenda over the telephone for approximately 1 hour and 45 minutes to see what Glenda knew about Jon's experiences with the Cearlocks and to learn about Jon's early development and experiences with Glenda and about Glenda's experiences as the Cearlocks' child. Glenda told Dr. Hart that, as a child, she experienced physical and psychological mistreatment by the Cearlocks which brought her to the point of considering suicide. Dr. Hart testified that Glenda described a repetitive and persistent pattern of frequent beatings with a belt, of repeated criticism, and of battling between Keith and Lila. Dr. Hart agreed that he had to consider the passage of time and that changes may occur within people or families, but he did not believe any substantial changes had occurred in the Cearlock home. Dr. Hart found it significant that the experiences described by Jon were very similar to Glenda's experiences as a child. On cross-examination, Dr. Hart testified that he had never contacted or spoken with Glenda's brother Doug in order to corroborate her statements about her childhood. In ruling on the offer of proof concerning Glenda's testimony, the trial court considered the fact that there was a period of 20 to 25 years between the abuse allegedly suffered by Glenda and the abuse to which Jon testified. In addition, the trial court stated that there was no one that could rebut the testimony set forth in Glenda's offer of proof. The trial court also stated, this court, anyway, does not have the indicia of reliability that the court believes it should have. The trial court declined to find a nexus between Glenda's testimony concerning events of 25 years ago and Jon's testimony of events in the past couple years, and therefore denied the offer of proof. The trial court also held that Jon could not directly or indirectly bring in Glenda's testimony through the testimony of Dr. Hart. After Jon made his offer of proof concerning Dr. Hart's testimony, the trial court stated the offer contained nothing the Court hasn't heard before, and denied the offer of proof. On appeal, the appellate court held that it was error for the trial court to exclude the evidence presented in the offers of proof. See 307 Ill.App.3d at 710, 240 Ill. Dec. 725, 718 N.E.2d 206 (unpublished material under Supreme Court Rule 23). The appellate court, citing People v. Lynch, 104 Ill.2d 194, 199-201, 83 Ill.Dec. 598, 470 N.E.2d 1018 (1984), observed that where a theory of self-defense is raised, evidence of a victim's violent or aggressive character is relevant (1) to show that the defendant's knowledge of the victim's behavior and tendencies affected the defendant's perceptions of and reactions to the victim's actions, and (2) to support the defendant's version of events where there are conflicting accounts. Despite its citation to Lynch, the appellate court then stated that the testimony of Glenda and Dr. Hart was not offered for either of the two purposes permitted by Lynch, but instead was offered to corroborate Jon's account of his life in the Cearlock home. See 307 Ill. App.3d at 710, 240 Ill.Dec. 725, 718 N.E.2d 206 (unpublished material under Supreme Court Rule 23). Relying on People v. Robinson, 163 Ill. App.3d 754, 114 Ill.Dec. 898, 516 N.E.2d 1292 (1987), the appellate court held that Glenda's corroborative testimony was admissible. The appellate court also stated that Jon's lack of knowledge concerning his mother's childhood experiences had no bearing on the purpose for which her testimony was offered. Likewise, the appellate court held that Dr. Hart's testimony should have been admitted to explain his reliance on the family history provided by Glenda. In support of its finding, the appellate court noted that an expert witness may base his opinion on information that has not been admitted into evidence. The appellate court further concluded that the error was harmless with respect to the verdict of second degree murder as to Keith, but was prejudicial error with regard to the verdict of first degree murder as to Lila. It is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether evidence is relevant and admissible. People v. Hayes, 139 Ill.2d 89, 130, 151 Ill.Dec. 348, 564 N.E.2d 803 (1990). A trial court's decision concerning whether evidence is relevant and admissible will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Hayes, 139 Ill.2d at 130, 151 Ill.Dec. 348, 564 N.E.2d 803. An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court's decision is `arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable' or where no reasonable man would take the trial court's view. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d 353, 364, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991), quoting People v. M.D., 101 Ill.2d 73, 90, 77 Ill.Dec. 744, 461 N.E.2d 367 (1984), quoting Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 942 (9th Cir.1963). Evidence is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an action either more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d at 365-66, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515. However, a trial court may reject evidence on the grounds of relevancy if the evidence is remote, uncertain or speculative. People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill.2d 483, 501, 190 Ill.Dec. 744, 622 N.E.2d 774 (1993). For the reasons that follow, we cannot conclude that the trial court's ruling excluding the proffered testimony was so arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. In so holding, we find the appellate court's reliance on People v. Robinson, 163 Ill.App.3d 754, 114 Ill.Dec. 898, 516 N.E.2d 1292 (1987), to be misplaced. In Robinson, the court held that, where a theory of self-defense is raised, a victim's violent and aggressive character is relevant to show who was the aggressor. Robinson, 163 Ill.App.3d at 772, 114 Ill. Dec. 898, 516 N.E.2d 1292. The Robinson court noted that it generally is a defendant's right to present evidence of a victim's character for violence when the defendant alleges that he acted in self-defense against the victim, because such evidence tends to show circumstances confronting the defendant, the extent of the defendant's apparent danger, and the motive influencing the defendant. Robinson, 163 Ill.App.3d at 773, 114 Ill.Dec. 898, 516 N.E.2d 1292. Accordingly, the defendant in Robinson should have been permitted to introduce evidence of prior threats and violence by the victim against the defendant, even where the victim was killed when the defendant and a third man struggled over a shotgun. Robinson, 163 Ill.App.3d at 774, 114 Ill.Dec. 898, 516 N.E.2d 1292. Here, in contrast to Robinson, Jon was allowed to testify concerning his grandparents' aggressive and violent character. Jon also testified concerning how his knowledge of that violent and aggressive character affected his perceptions of and reactions to his grandparents' behavior after he fired the gun at the Tilex bottle. Jon claimed that when he saw Keith coming toward him, he thought Keith was going to beat him to death, and shot Keith [s]o he couldn't get to me. Jon further claimed that he shot Lila because [s]he was just as dangerous as my grandpa and because Keith would never beat Jon without Lila forcing him into it. The trial jury apparently found Jon to be credible, as the jury found Jon guilty of second degree murder with respect to Keith. Although the appellate court claimed that the testimony of Glenda and Dr. Hart was not offered for either of the two purposes permitted by Lynch, the testimony clearly was offered to corroborate Jon's claim of self-defense. With that in mind, we fail to see how Glenda's testimony concerning her childhood many years earlier was relevant to Jon's claim of self-defense. Under Lynch, one of the purposes for which the Cearlocks' violent and aggressive character could be introduced was to show how Jon's knowledge of their character affected his perceptions and reactions. Because there was no testimony that Jon was aware of his mother's childhood experiences, however, testimony concerning Glenda's childhood could not have affected Jon's perceptions and reactions. Likewise, the other purpose for which evidence of a victim's propensity for violence can be admitted under Lynch is to support a defendant's version of events where there are conflicting accounts of what happened. Here, too, the account of Glenda's childhood was not relevant to Jon's claim of self-defense because there were no conflicting accounts of what had happened. In fact, all accounts of what had happened were based upon Jon's statements and testimony. As noted, relevant evidence must have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an action either more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. We agree with the trial court that any nexus between testimony concerning Glenda's childhood and Jon's claim of self-defense was remote at best. Indeed, with regard to Lila, we fail to see how the information concerning Glenda's childhood was relevant at all. When Lila saw Jon with the gun, she screamed and began to run out of the house, at which point Jon shot her in the back. Jon then followed Lila as she made it out of the house, and attempted to shoot her some more when she fell face forward into the grass, but his gun jammed. Jon then went inside the house to look for Lila's gun, so that he could go back outside and continue shooting her. We find no nexus between Glenda's childhood and Jon's pursuit of a fleeing Lila. Even if Jon feared Lila because she goaded Keith into beating Jon, that threat had been removed when Keith was shot first. Under the circumstances, we disagree with the appellate court that the testimony of Glenda and Dr. Hart should have been admitted to corroborate Jon's account of life in the Cearlock home. Consequently, we reverse the appellate court's finding that it was prejudicial error to exclude the evidence set forth in Jon's offers of proof, and affirm the trial court's ruling excluding the evidence.