Opinion ID: 1162726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: habitual intemperance

Text: In each instance in which the commission determined that appellant's conduct constituted willful misconduct, the commission further determined that appellant had engaged in habitual intemperance. Prior to the formal hearing, appellant moved the commission to strike the reference to habitual intemperance contained in the order of formal complaint because, appellant maintained, the term generally connotes alcohol abuse. Appellant noted that no evidence had been presented to the commission implicating appellant's indulgence or overindulgence in alcohol. In rejecting appellant's contention, the commission ruled: As used in our order, however, habitual intemperance is extreme or excessive behavior, marked by a lack of moderation, conduct that is not temperate. See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, p. 1214 (1983) (definition of temperate); see also Matter of Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727 (Mich. 1977) (a judge should be temperate, patient, courteous, and considerate to counsel and others appearing before him; proper judicial temperament is displayed when a judge discharges his duties in a professional manner with patience, courtesy and dignity). On appeal, appellant renews his contention and asserts that, as a ground for judicial discipline, the term habitual intemperance should be limited in its scope to the abuse of alcohol. See Matter of Mikesell, 243 N.W.2d 86, 94-95 (Mich. 1976) (a charge of habitual intemperance cannot be sustained without a finding of abuse of alcohol). Consequently, appellant argues, because there is no evidence in the record to support even an inference of his abuse of alcohol, the commission's finding of habitual intemperance must be reversed. We agree. Although the Interim Rules governing the commission proceedings against appellant did not define the term habitual intemperance, this court has since defined the term in procedural rules which became effective on April 29, 1988. Specifically, Comm. Rule 2(6) now provides: `Habitual intemperance' means habitual, excessive use of alcohol, or chronic abuse of any other substance which affects mental processes, awareness, or judgment. In our view, this definition more closely comports with the widely accepted meaning of the term. We therefore reject the special prosecutor's contention that a finding of habitual intemperance is justified when a judge's conduct demonstrates a pattern of conduct and temperament totally unbecoming a member of the judiciary. Conceptually and under our constitution and rules, conduct demonstrating a pattern of judicial temperament wholly unbecoming a member of the judiciary more appropriately falls within the term willful misconduct. See Comm. Rule 2(7); Comm. Rule 11. Thus, although a finding of habitual intemperance, as the term was defined by the commission, is supported by the evidence in the record, such a finding appears to focus on the same conduct that underlies the commission's additional findings of willful misconduct. See Furey, 743 P.2d at 923 (court declined to consider overlapping charges). Accordingly, we vacate the commission's determination that appellant engaged in habitual intemperance.