Opinion ID: 110365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Compensation Clause

Text: The Compensation Clause has its roots in the longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an independent Judiciary. A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government. Our Constitution promotes that independence specifically by providing: The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office. Art. III, § 1. Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 79, P. 491 (1818) (emphasis deleted), emphasized the importance of protecting judicial compensation: In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The relationship of judges' compensation to their independence was by no means a new idea initiated by the authors of the Constitution. The Act of Settlement in 1701, designed to correct abuses prevalent under the reign of the Stuart Kings, includes a provision that, upon the accession of the successor to then Princess Anne, Judges Commissions be made Quamdiu se bene gesserint [during good behavior], and their Salaries ascertained and established . . . . 12 & 13 Will. III, ch. 2, § III, cl. 7 (1701). This English statute is the earliest legislative acknowledgment that control over the tenure and compensation of judges is incompatible with a truly independent judiciary, free of improper influence from other forces within government. Later, Parliament passed, and the King assented to, a statute implementing the Act of Settlement providing that a judge's salary would not be decreased so long as the Patents and Commissions of them, or any of them respectively, shall continue and remain in force. 1 Geo. III, ch. 23, § III (1760). These two statutes were designed to maintain both the dignity and independence of the judges. 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries . Originally, these same protections applied to colonial judges as well. In 1761, however, the King converted the tenure of colonial judges to service at his pleasure. [21] The interference this change brought to the administration of justice in the Colonies soon became one of the major objections voiced against the Crown. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence, in listing the grievances against the King, complained: He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries. Independence won, the colonists did not forget the reasons that caused them to separate from the Mother Country. Thus, when the Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to draft our organic law, they made certain that in the judicial articles both the tenure and the compensation of judges would be protected from one of the evils that had brought on the Revolution and separation. Madison's notes of the Constitutional Convention reveal that the draftsmen first reached a tentative arrangement whereby the Congress could neither increase nor decrease the compensation of judges. Later, Gouverneur Morris succeeded in striking the prohibition on increases; with others, he believed the Congress should be at liberty to raise salaries to meet such contingencies as inflation, a phenomenon known in that day as it is in ours. Madison opposed the change on the ground judges might tend to defer unduly to the Congress when that body was considering pay increases. The concern for the ravages of inflation is revealed in Madison's comment: The variations in the value of money, may be guarded agst. by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent value. 2 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 45 (1911). Morris criticized the proposal for overlooking changes in the state of the economy; the value of wheat may change, he said, and leave the judges undercompensated. The Convention finally adopted Morris' motion to allow increases by the Congress, thereby accepting a limited risk of external influence in order to accommodate the need to raise judges' salaries when times changed. [22] As Hamilton later explained: It will readily be understood, that the fluctuations in the value of money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation [of judges] in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-day might in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore necessary to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances; yet under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body to change the condition of the individual for the worse. The Federalist No. 79, pp. 491-492 (1818). This Court has recognized that the Compensation Clause also serves another, related purpose. As well as promoting judicial independence, it ensures a prospective judge that, in abandoning private practicemore often than not more lucrative than the benchthe compensation of the new post will not diminish. Beyond doubt, such assurance has served to attract able lawyers to the bench and thereby enhances the quality of justice. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S., at 253; 1 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 276 (1826).