Opinion ID: 2156908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forgery Charge.

Text: The statute that sets forth the elements of forgery, as charged in the trial information in this case, provides as follows: 1. A person is guilty of forgery if, with the intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that the person is facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the person does any of the following: .... b. Makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or transfers a writing so that it purports to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or so that it purports to have been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or so that it purports to be a copy of an original when no such original existed. Iowa Code § 715A.2(1)( b ). In interpreting this statute, we have recognized that the elements of the crime are that the defendant: (1) made, completed, executed, or transferred a writing purporting to be the act of another who did not authorize the act, and acted (2) with the specific intent to defraud or injure another person or financial institution or knew his act would facilitate a fraud or financial injury. State v. Calhoun, 559 N.W.2d 4, 6 (Iowa 1997); State v. Smith, 223 N.W.2d 223, 226 (Iowa 1974). Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to show that the use of Adrian Alonzo's name was not authorized or that defendant acted with an intent to defraud. A. Whether the use of Alonzo's name was authorized. Because of the use of the words purports to be the act of another contained in the statutory definition of forgery, we have held that the making of an instrument with a fictitious name may be forgery. State v. Calhoun, 618 N.W.2d 337, 339-40 (Iowa 2000). In such situations, it is axiomatic that a fictitious person cannot consent to the use of the fictitious identity. Id. If Adrian Alonzo was a fictitious name, the lack-of-authorization element would be satisfied as a matter of law, but defendant urges that Adrian Alonzo is a real person, and the State's witnesses at trial confirmed that this was also their belief. The State did not produce any direct evidence concerning who Adrian Alonzo was or that he had not authorized defendant to act in his name, but this is not fatal to its case. We have previously determined that [f]or purposes of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence for jury consideration, we view it in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 810, 815 (Iowa 1996); State v. Constable, 505 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Iowa 1993); State v. Sims, 239 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1976). We are satisfied that the evidence produced was sufficient for the jury to find that defendant had not received authorization from the real Adrian Alonzo to execute the bail bond in his name. In determining the sufficiency of the evidence for this purpose, we may consider all of the evidence presented at trial, including that which pertained to the aborted certificate-of-title transaction. The consideration that weighs most heavily in favor of upholding the jury's finding in this regard is the fact that the action taken with regard to the bond may not be separated from the effort, successfully carried out, to have the resulting criminal conviction entered against Alonzo rather than the person who actually committed the crime. Alonzo could not have consented to the use of his name on a bail bond without simultaneously agreeing to assume the role of the person charged with the crime. The record indicates that defendant contacted no one other than Sanchez between his arrest and release on bail. Because defendant assumed the name of Adrian Alonzo immediately on being arrested, any authorization would have had to have been prearranged with regard to future arrests suffered by defendant. This is highly unlikely. Persons do not willingly allow themselves to suffer criminal convictions resulting from undesignated acts that another person might commit in the future or to suffer the collateral consequences that can flow from such convictions such as driver's license revocations. The fact that it would have been a criminal act to do that also weighs heavily in favor of the jury's determination that the real Adrian Alonzo did not consent to the use of his name in the bail-bond transaction. In addition to the extreme unlikelihood that anyone would give consent to the action that defendant took in Alonzo's name, the evidence surrounding the aborted certificate-of-title transaction strongly suggests defendant's assumption of a stolen identity. B. Intent to defraud. We also reject defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to show that he acted with an intent to defraud. Intent may be shown by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 289 (Iowa 1998); State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1995). The evidence is undisputed that defendant gave false information concerning his identity when booked into the Woodbury County jail and in completing the papers for release on bond. Such conduct evinces an attempt to deceive jail officials and avoid the consequences of the criminal process. To deliberately make false statements or give false information in order to gain some advantage is to act with fraudulent intent in the criminal context. State v. Timmer, 260 Iowa 993, 999-1000, 151 N.W.2d 558, 561 (1967). The evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict defendant of forgery.