Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidentiary rulings: admission of evidence of threats; impeachment with prior conviction; cross-examination of defense expert witness

Text: Defendant contends that several other evidentiary rulings deprived him of a fair trial and prejudiced the guilty verdicts, requiring reversal. None of the rulings, in our view, constituted error, prejudicial or otherwise. Over defendant's objection, Rose V. was permitted to testify in the prosecution's case-in-chief that several times during their marriage defendant told her he did not like police officers and wanted to kill or blow one away. The testimony was admitted as probative of defendant's state of mind in attempting to kill Officer Dunavent. Thereafter, defendant testified on direct examination that he did not intend to kill Officer Dunavent and did not remember putting a gun to his head. He also denied on cross-examination that he hated police officers or wanted to kill them, and testified he had never made any threats to kill law enforcement officers. Accordingly, the prosecution was permitted to call Deputy Shafia on rebuttal to testify that on April 26, 1990, at the San Bernardino County jail, defendant told the deputy he wanted to take out, i.e., kill, a deputy. The court specifically found the probative value of the evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant challenges these rulings, claiming the statements made to Rose V. were too remote in time, that the statement made to Deputy Shafia was not probative because it was made while he was awaiting trial, and that all such evidence merely portrayed him as a bad or violent person. The objections were properly overruled. The evidence was manifestly admissible to show defendant's state of mind in attempting to murder Officer Dunavent. ( People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 757-758, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113 [threats and statements of contempt for police]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 637-638, 250 Cal.Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189 [threat to kill those who would send defendant back to prison].) Nor, with regard to defendant's statement to Deputy Shafia that he wanted to kill a deputy, does it matter that the statement was made after the instant crimes. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 33-34, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) The trial court was within its sound discretion in overruling defendant's objections and admitting the evidence. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 214-215, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Defendant contends the trial court erred in ruling that he could be impeached with his 1984 prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace officer. He concedes the prior conviction was for a crime of moral turpitude, but urges it was excludable as too similar to the crime with which he was charged, the attempted murder of Officer Dunavent. The claim is specious. In cross-examining Rose V. in order to establish that she had betrayed defendant while he was in prison by entering into a relationship with Stopher, defense counsel expressly requested the trial court to reverse its prior ruling and rule admissible for impeachment purposes the 1984 prior conviction. Pursuant to the request, the court determined the prior conviction was a crime of moral turpitude and expressly found that its probative value outweighed potential prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. Thereafter, contrary to defendant's assertions, it was defense counsel who, in questioning V., proceeded to first elicit before the jury the fact that defendant had been in prison and that he had served time for assault on a peace officer. The doctrine of invited error bars defendant from challenging the ruling on appeal. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 827-828, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) Moreover, as a substantive matter, the ruling admitting the prior conviction for impeachment purposes was not error, even though the prior offense was similar in some respects to the charged attempted murder of Officer Dunavent. ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111; see People v. Tamborrino (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 575, 590, 263 Cal.Rptr. 731 [robbery priors identical to charged offense].) Defendant next complains of the admission of the rebuttal testimony of nurse Violet Garday. After a hearing pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b), the trial court overruled defendant's objection to the testimony of Garday, the head nurse at the San Bernardino County jail, regarding her opinion of defendant's reputation for honesty. Defendant objected on the ground that he had not elicited reputation evidence, and therefore Evidence Code section 1102 precluded the prosecution from attacking his veracity. Garday testified on rebuttal that as the head nurse she knew defendant while he was in the San Bernardino County jail; he was housed in the infirmary for nearly three years, during which period she had daily contact with him. Based upon her contacts with him and discussions with other nursing staff, it was Garday's opinion that defendant had a reputation for dishonesty. By taking the stand, defendant put his own credibility in issue and was subject to impeachment in the same manner as any other witness. Moreover, the record reflects that defendant's own expert witness, Dr. Pursich, testified on direct examination that in his opinion defendant was honest. Garday's rebuttal testimony that defendant had a reputation for dishonesty was properly ruled admissible. (See People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1081, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619.) Defendant also contends Garday gave what amounts to impermissible expert opinion testimony when she was asked on rebuttal, Based on your contact with [defendant] on almost a daily basis for several years, have you seen any signs that he's brain-damaged or has something wrong with his brain or mind? Garday replied, No sir. As defendant concedes, there was no objection to the question or answer. Accordingly, the claim of error has not been preserved on appeal. (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 186, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) In any case, Garday was asked if, in her capacity as defendant's daily nurse for a number of years, she had seen any signs that defendant was brain damaged or had something wrong with his mind not whether it was her opinion that defendant was brain damaged. The specific question posed was subject to a layperson's answer by someone with the length of contacts that Garday had with defendant. Accordingly, defendant's alternative claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object must be rejected; counsel undoubtedly realized an objection would have been unavailing.