Opinion ID: 563773
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pre-Arrest Records

Text: 44 The records pertaining to Doe that were compiled prior to his explosives arrest, including references to his attendance at the SDS/MDS-sponsored meeting and the hearsay statement that Doe had admitted to being a Communist who advocated overthrow of the Government by whatever means necessary, were collected pursuant to the FBI's Administrative Index (ADEX), described by the agency as a program for identifying individuals who might pose a danger to national security. 10 One of the functions of this highly controversial and now-defunct program was to safeguard the national security from attempts forcibly to overthrow the Government. While the FBI's use of the ADEX program in the late 1960s to target those individuals whose political orientation the agency deemed radical was misguided,, there can be no denying that the national security interests underlying the ADEX program were within the scope of the FBI's law enforcement mission. See Pratt, 673 F.2d at 422 (whatever we may think of the FBI's methods, we cannot conclude therefrom that ... [its] activities ... lacked any law enforcement purpose). Accordingly, the FBI's investigation of Doe satisfies the first prong of the Pratt test, since the investigatory activities leading to the creation of the relevant records were directly linked to the maintenance of national security. 11 45 We also conclude that the FBI's investigatory activities had a colorable claim of rationality. The FBI's attention was drawn to Doe when it received reports of his disturbing a speech by a presidential candidate and of his advocating violent overthrow of the Government on radio. The FBI then instituted a limited investigation of Doe, aimed solely at determining whether his activities warranted more serious investigation as a potential threat to national security. This investigation revealed, among other things, that Doe had been arrested at a rally sponsored by the MDS/SDS organizations. The FBI concluded, however, that Doe posed no genuine security risk and terminated its investigation. 46 As we recognized in Pratt, a law enforcement agency often must act upon unverified tips and suspicions based upon mere tidbits of information. 673 F.2d at 421. Although the evidence prompting the FBI's investigation of Doe was sketchy at best, Doe has not cited any tangible evidence to indicate that, at the time the FBI included the pre-arrest records in the CRS, its investigation was motivated by anything other than a genuine concern about the national security. Given Pratt 's deferential standard, we cannot deem the relationship between the investigatory activities leading up to these records and legitimate security concerns to be so tenuous as to render pretextual the FBI's assertion of law enforcement purpose. Accordingly, we find that these records are also exempted from subsection (d) pursuant to the FBI's exemption regulation, and that Doe may not seek their expungement under subsection (g)(1)(A). 47