Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prosecutor's behavior

Text: The defendants collectively raise about a half-dozen claims of prosecutorial misconduct throughout the trial. We review preserved claims de novo and unpreserved claims for plain error. United States v. Sepúlveda-Hernández, 752 F.3d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Either way, we may first consider whether the government's conduct was, in fact, improper. See 9 For Rule 801's purposes, it matters not that Uvaldo was a government informer when Drucaste spoke to him about the conspiracy. See Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 28 & n.5. - 36 - United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir. 2007). If so, we will only reverse if the misconduct so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected. United States v. Vázquez-Larrauri, 778 F.3d 276, 283 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Kasenge, 660 F.3d 537, 542 (1st Cir. 2011)). Four factors guide our analysis: (1) the severity of the prosecutor's misconduct, including whether it was deliberate or accidental; (2) the context in which the misconduct occurred; (3) whether the judge gave curative instructions and the likely effect of such instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendant. Id. (quoting Kasenge, 660 F.3d at 542) (alteration omitted). In short, we find the well untainted. Most of the defendants' claims lack arguable merit, so we do not discuss them further. Rose, 802 F.3d at 117. The arguably closer calls, to which we turn next, miss the mark for reversible error. A. Withdrawing the Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) request The government indicated that it intended to introduce prior-bad-acts evidence relating to drug-trafficking convictions against Gómez and Hernández. The district court instructed the jurors that they were about to be presented documentary evidence [that Gómez and Hernández] committed acts similar to those charged in this case. After a brief recess, the government changed its mind and told the district court that it would not seek to introduce this evidence after all. Gómez and Hernández maintain - 37 - that the prosecutor committed misconduct by allowing the jury to hear the judge's instruction and then not presenting the evidence -- and that this misconduct led the jury to speculate as to the defendants' previous trafficking activities, thereby leaving them in a worse position than they would have been in had the actual evidence been introduced. We are unconvinced. Assuming only for argument's sake that withdrawing a valid Rule 404(b) request and not presenting prior-bad-acts evidence is misconduct, the district court gave two curative instructions (one immediately after the government announced that it would not introduce the evidence, and one when charging the jury). And the defendants concede that the government had sufficient direct evidence to obtain a conviction without the Rule 404(b) evidence. In these circumstances, there was no reversible misconduct. B. Government objections during defense direct examination Gómez argues that the prosecutor's constant objections during his direct examination of two defense witnesses disrupted the testimonies' flow and undermined his case. There was no misconduct here: the district court sustained nineteen of the prosecutor's twenty-three objections during the first witness's direct examination and overruled five of ten objections during the second witness's direct examination. See Sepúlveda-Hernández, 752 F.3d at 32 (stating that no misconduct when [m]ost of the - 38 - objections . . . were either sustained by the court or elicited clarifications and further noting that the failed objections . . . do not seem so groundless as to be vexatious). C. Closing argument The defendants argue several different theories of prosecutorial misconduct during the government's closing argument, none of which constitutes reversible error. 1. Parties' roles First, the defendants claim that the prosecutor improperly commented on the parties' roles and strengthened his personal credibility by, among other things, telling the jury I represent the United States government. After carefully reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the prosecutor's simple factual statement did not improperly place[] the prestige of [his] office behind the government's case, United States v. Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d 89, 95 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2003)), nor did it improperly describe the parties' roles. Cf. United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 573 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting it was improper to liken [defense attorneys] to Shakespeare's players, full of sound and fury signifying nothing). - 39 - 2. Vouching The defendants' second claim, that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the credibility of government witnesses, is a closer call. Improper vouching can occur when a prosecutor implies that the jury should credit the prosecution's evidence simply because the government can be trusted. VizcarrondoCasanova, 763 F.3d at 95 (quoting Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 9). Here, in his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor discussed the defense's closing arguments relating to the credibility of government witnesses: They want you to believe the bad things that don't implicate their client, but they want you to know the good things. You makes [sic] that choice. You are the judges. You decide who you want to believe, what you want to believe, and how you want to believe it. But in order to find any of these defendants not guilty, you are going to have to disbelieve all the cooperators. In other words, where are we getting our witnesses if the only witnesses that we can get in this case are all liars? As in Vizcarrondo-Casanova, we think that the prosecutor unwisely put his toes up to the line. 763 F.3d at 96 (finding no clear and obvious error when the prosecutor argued that government witnesses' inconsistent statements enhanced credibility because the government could have gotten the witnesses into a room together and had them create a consistent story). But we recognize that [t]he line between the legitimate argument that a witness's testimony is credible and improper 'vouching' is often a hazy one, - 40 - to be policed by the trial court in the first instance. Id. (quoting Innamorati, 996 F.2d at 483). And here, the district court did not sustain the defense objection to the prosecutor's argument. Even if this argument were improper, it did not likely affect the trial's outcome, so it would not warrant reversal. First, any misconduct was not severe: though one might read into the rebuttal here a suggestion that the government itself concluded that the stories were credible, id., this is a far cry from the sorts of credibility arguments that merit reversal. See VázquezLarrauri, 778 F.3d at 284 (collecting cases). Second, the context militates against reversal. At closing, the defendants argued extensively that the government witnesses were bought and paid for witnesses whose testimonies have to be rejected completely because [t]here is no reason to trust a liar. Cf. VizcarrondoCasanova, 763 F.3d at 96 (noting hesitance to find misconduct when defense counsel pretty much invited the rebuttal by suggesting that the government's witnesses were liars). Third, not only did the judge instruct the jury that the lawyers' arguments were not evidence, but the prosecutor himself, in the very statement complained of, also told the jurors that they alone were the judges of witness credibility. In these circumstances, any prosecutorial misconduct did not so poison the well that the - 41 - trial's outcome was likely affected. Vázquez-Larrauri, 778 F.3d at 283. 3. Teton's murder Finally, Gómez and Setiawan argue, albeit with different points of emphasis, that the prosecutor committed misconduct by referring to Teton's murder in his closing argument. We can easily dispose of Gómez's argument. The prosecutor argued that the jury could find that Gómez could have foreseen that drug traffickers would be carrying weapons and doing what drug traffickers do, like Bryant Setiawan Ramos [sic] and Teton. The prosecutor clarified on rebuttal that in no way did [he] suggest that Mr. Jorge Gómez Gonzalez [sic] was involved in the murder of Teton. The district court gave a prompt instruction that there was no evidence that Jorge Gómez Gonzalez [sic] was anywhere near that overt act. Even if the statement were improper, this instruction was enough to cure any prejudice. See Olszewski v. Spencer, 466 F.3d 47, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2006) (This court has consistently held that where the prosecutor unintentionally misstates the evidence during closing argument, a jury instruction ordinarily is sufficient to cure any potential prejudice, particularly where, as here, the instruction was given immediately after the statement.) (quoting United States v. Bey, 188 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 42 - Setiawan objects, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Teton's murder for the impermissible purpose of inflaming the jury's passions. In addition to the remark that Gómez points out, the prosecutor also said that Teton is dead. . . . [He is a] victim[] of drug trafficking; and [one witness] testified that he was there that evening Bryant Setiawan Ramos [sic] ended the life of another seller named Teton. And Teton hasn't come back. Although we vacate Setiawan's convictions on separate grounds, we note that these comments were not improper because they served a noninflammatory purpose. Cf. Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527–28 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing examples of inflammatory language). The prosecutor introduced evidence at trial linking Setiawan to Teton's murder, which was presented as an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, commenting on Teton's murder at several points in closing argument did not impermissibly interject issues broader than [Setiawan's] guilt or innocence. Id. at 527 (quoting United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945, 956 (1st Cir. 1989)). In conclusion, we find no basis in the prosecutor's conduct on which to disturb the convictions.