Opinion ID: 1695861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment on Breach-of-Contract Claim

Text: We review a summary judgment de novo. Potter v. First Real Estate Co., 844 So.2d 540, 545 (Ala.2002) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate only when `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' A court considering a motion for summary judgment will view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; will accord the nonmoving party all reasonable favorable inferences from the evidence; and will resolve all reasonable doubts against the moving party. Ex parte Rizk, 791 So.2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000) (citations omitted). `[W]hen the movant makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show substantial evidence in support of his position.' Substantial evidence is defined as `evidence of such weight and quality that fairminded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' Boackle v. Bedwell Constr. Co., 770 So.2d 1076, 1079 (Ala.2000) (citations omitted). We will state the facts in accordance with these principles. Sanders had inspected the Joneses' property in the summer of 1995, two to four months before Hurricane Opal, as part of a re-write application to increase the coverage on the Joneses' property. On that occasion, Sanders had not seen any sheetrock damage or brick damage. The policy insured the Joneses' house, garage, personal property, and barn for wind damage. However, the policy excluded loss resulting from earth movement and settling ... of foundation, walls, floors, roofs, or ceilings. The policy covered debris removal. In the insurance claim the Joneses submitted to Alfa, they claimed that wind had: (1) damaged the roof of their house; (2) cracked sheetrock inside their house (sheetrock damage); (3) cracked and displaced bricks in the veneer of the garage (brick damage); (4) damaged their barn; and (5) created debris that had to be removed. Bradshaw, on behalf of Alfa, inspected the damaged property on October 26, 1995. Bradshaw agreed that wind had damaged the barn and the roof of the Joneses' house. However, he wanted an engineer to determine whether wind had caused the sheetrock damage and brick damage. For that purpose, he brought Engineer Jones to the Joneses' property on November 13, 1995. Engineer Jones opined that settlement of the foundation of the house rather than wind had caused the sheetrock damage and brick damage. Bradshaw estimated the cost of replacing the roof at $3,280 and the cost to repair the damage to the barn at less than the $500 deductible. On December 29, 1995, Bradshaw mailed to the Joneses' lawyer a draft in the amount of $3,280 as payment for the roof damage. The letter stated: Enclosed is an estimate for the replacement of the insured's shingle roof and a draft representing payment less the deductible for that roof. I also understand that you are in possession of a copy of the engineer's report which indicates the shifting and settlement of the insured house was not related to the hurricane winds. Should you have any questions concerning that report or any aspect of the insured's claim or policy please feel free to give me a call. Also if there is any other damage that the insured has found as a result of the hurricane that we have not already addressed please have him to submit itemized estimates for those to be considered. I thank you for your help and cooperation and look forward to hearing from you. In March of 1996, the Joneses delivered to Sanders at the Alfa office a bill in the amount of $3,627.11 from roofer Floyd Jerkins for replacement of the roof of the Joneses' house. Alfa took no action in response to the delivery of the Jerkins bill. About December 1996, the Joneses delivered to Sanders an estimate of $4,320 by contractor Howard Lee for repair of the barn. On January 20, 1997, Bradshaw prepared a new estimate of the cost to repair the barn. He reduced the Howard Lee estimate from $4,320 to $850, subtracted the $500 deductible, and allowed an amount due of $350. Bradshaw then sent the Joneses a $350 draft, but without any apparent explanation of what aspect of the Joneses' claim the draft was to pay. Bradshaw did not inform the Joneses that Alfa would not pay any further amounts on their claim. Thereafter, an Alfa representative telephoned the Joneses to inquire whether they were satisfied with the way Alfa had handled their claim. The Joneses complained to this representative that they were very dissatisfied because they could not repair their severely damaged house. As a result of this telephone conversation, Hilton Godwin, an Alfa claims manager, telephoned the Joneses. However, when Harold Jones told Godwin that the Joneses were represented by a lawyer, Godwin told Harold Jones that Godwin could not discuss the Joneses' claim. The Joneses submitted the deposition of their expert witness, David Carlysle (Carlysle), a registered engineer and licensed home inspector, in opposition to the summary-judgment motion. Alfa, contending that Carlysle lacked sufficient training or experience to express his opinions and that Carlysle had based his opinions on hearsay, moved to strike Carlysle's deposition and report. While the trial court noted that Carlysle had relied on hearsay for some of his opinions, it held that Carlysle's training and experience as an engineer were sufficient for him to testify as an expert. Carlysle based his opinions regarding the cause of the brick damage entirely on his expertise and his own observations of the damage to the brick and the foundation of the house and garage. He opined that wind had caused the brick damage and that no evidence supported Engineer Jones's opinion that settlement of the foundation had caused the brick damage. Because the period of the statute of limitations for a contract action is six years, § 6-2-34(9), Ala.Code 1975, no statute-of-limitations defense is at issue. To establish a breach-of-contract claim, a plaintiff must show `(1) the existence of a valid contract binding the parties in the action, (2) his own performance under the contract, (3) the defendant's nonperformance, and (4) damages.` Ex parte Coleman, 861 So.2d 1080, 1085 (Ala.2003) (citation omitted). Alfa moved for summary judgment on the breach-of-contract claim only on the grounds that the Joneses could not establish that they had submitted to Alfa any substantiation of any covered but unpaid wind damage or that Alfa had not performed the contract. Alfa relied on the evidence that it had paid $3,280 for the roof damage, that it had paid $350 for the barn damage, and that, according to Engineer Jones, a peril not covered by the policy had caused the sheetrock damage and brick damage. However, the Jerkins bill for replacement of the roof of the Joneses' house constitutes substantial evidence that Alfa owed the Joneses an additional $347.11 ($3,627.11 minus the $3,280.00 Alfa paid equals $347.11) for the damage to the roof. The Lee estimate for repairing the barn constitutes substantial evidence that Alfa owed the Joneses an additional $3,470 ($4,320 minus the $500 deductible and the $350 Alfa paid equals $3,470) for the damage to the barn. Sanders's testimony that he had not seen any sheetrock damage or brick damage when he inspected the Joneses' property in the summer of 1995 before Hurricane Opal constitutes substantial evidence that a sudden occurrence such as wind caused the damage rather than a long-term occurrence such as the settling of the foundation. Carlysle's opinion testimony likewise constitutes substantial evidence that a covered peril caused the brick damage. Finally, the Joneses presented evidence that wind caused debris that they had to remove, and Alfa presented no policy defense to the Joneses' claim for debris removal. All of this evidence creates genuine issues of material fact whether the Joneses had not performed the contract in submitting their claim and whether Alfa had performed the contract by paying the claim in part. Thus, this evidence precludes summary judgment on the Joneses' breach-of-contract claim. Therefore, we reverse the summary judgment for Alfa on the Joneses' breach-of-contract claim and remand this case for further proceedings on this claim consistent with this opinion.