Opinion ID: 1515913
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Default Judgments

Text: We turn now to the central issue before us. What is the effect of the judgments by default entered in this case and what is the measure of damages? It is well established in this jurisdiction that a default does not concede the amount of damages, nor may a default judgment include the measure of damages for which the defaulting party is liable unless, pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1), the damages are for a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, a situation notrelevant to this controversy. [11] Rule 54(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part: Judgment  Costs.     (c) Demand for Judgment. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings. (Emphasis added.) In Troutbrook Farm, Inc. v. DeWitt, 540 A.2d 18 (R.I.1988), faced with a default judgment that was twice the amount of the demand, we held that a default judgment that exceeds the amount claimed in the demand for judgment to be null and void in its entirety. Further, although we recognized the existence of a split of authority concerning the effect of damages that exceeded the demand for judgment in a defaulted action; noting that while that some courts consider it null and void, [o]thercourts have applied a different remedy and have reduced the amount of the default judgment to a sum equal to that set forth in the demand for judgment, we recognized that was not the case where the relief awarded is more than or different in kind. Id. at 20 (citing 10 Wright, Millier & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2663 at 139-42 (1983)). Additionally, we declared that a judgment in a defaulted case that awards relief that is either more than or different in kind from that requested originally is null and void, and a defendant may attack it collaterally in another proceeding. Id. It is the law in this state that [a]lthough the factual allegations of a complaint will be taken as true upon default, those allegations relating to the amount of damages suffered generally are not. Bashforth v. Zampini, 576 A.2d 1197, 1200 (R.I.1990). Moreover, a [j]udgment by default may be granted only for such relief as may lawfully be granted upon the well-pleaded facts alleged in the complaint. Patray v. Northwest Publishing, Inc., 931 F.Supp. 865, 869 (S.D.Ga.1996) (quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice § 55.02(2) at 55-20). Significantly, in Bashforth, we declared that a defaulted defendant had a right to conduct discovery to determine whether plaintiff's extensive medical treatments are causally related to [the incident giving rise to the default judgment]   . Bashforth, 576 A.2d at 1200; see also Calise v. Hidden Valley Condominium Association, Inc., 773 A.2d 834, at 837-38 (R.I.2001) (this Court adheres to the majority rule that precludes a defaulted defendant from attempting to mitigate its damages by introducing evidence of the comparative negligence of settling tort-feasors who are no longer before the court). We are not persuaded that the so-called Final Judgments entered upon the default of the town were conclusive of anything beyond the allegations of fact pleaded in the various complaints. Certainly a party's default is deemed to constitute a concession of all well pleaded allegations of liability, [however] it is not considered an admission of damages. Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2nd Cir.1992). A default judgment does not give plaintiff a blank check to recover from [defendant] any losses it had ever suffered from whatever source. Id. at 159 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 70 (2nd Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S.Ct. 647, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 (1973)). Even in the face of a default, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the limits of recovery according to the liability that is conceded by the default. Just as a default does not give the plaintiff carte blanche to recover for every harm ever sustained, a default does not in itself permit recovery for matters not addressed in the complaint or allow recovery unless there is a sufficient basis contained in the pleadings to support the judgment sought to be entered. Greyhound Exhibit Group, Inc., 973 F.2d at 159; see also Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd., v. Houston National Bank, 515 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir.1975). As the Supreme Court stated in the `venerable but still definitive case' of Thomson v. Wooster : a default judgment may be lawfully entered only `according to what is proper to be decreed upon the statements of the bill, assumed to be true' and not `as of course according to the prayer of the bill.' Nishimatsu Construction Co., Ltd., 515 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113, 5 S.Ct. 788, 792, 29 L.Ed. 105, 108 (1885)). Thus, although a plaintiff is relieved from the burden of establishing liability in a defaulted case he or she nonetheless bears the burden of establishing the damages he or she is legally entitled to recover. Moreover, conclusions of law set forth in the complaints are not deemed established by a default judgment. The defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law. Nishmatsu Construction Co., Ltd., 515 F.2d at 1206. Although the defendant may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant may contest the sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations to support the judgment. Id. An examination of the complaints filed by these plaintiffs reveals that three complaints alleged that the named plaintiff contracted an [injury or] illness in the performance of his duties as a police officer for the Town of Johnston was declared wholly incapacitated and ceased the performance of his duties as a full-time police officer for the town. [12] The complaints further alleged that,  pursuant to R.I.G.L. 45-19-1, the Town of Johnston should be paying the Plaintiff the salary, wages and other benefits he would have been entitled to had he not been so incapacitated and the defendants have refused, and continue to refuse, to make the payments required by law. (Emphasis added.) A second count alleged that, at the time that the plaintiff ceased working as a full-time police officer, a collective bargaining agreement was in effect between the town and International Brotherhood of Police Officers Local 307, the bargaining unit for the rank and file officers, that provided in Article X, the section dealing with sick leave and not in Article XV, the section on retirement as follows:  All members of the police department who are injured or contact [ sic ] illness in the line of duty shall receive benefits in conformity with the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island 45-19-1 amended. (Emphasis added.) Finally, the third count contained an allegation that on November 30, 1995, this Court issued a decision, unidentified, that decided the legal issue which forms the basis of the [p]laintiff's claim and the defendant's refusal to recognize that decision constitutes bad faith. This allegation amounts to a conclusion of law that has no relevance in a default judgment and is therefore a nullity. Significantly, the fourth complaint, filed by plaintiff Ferrante, makes no reference to § 45-19-1; makes no claim that the plaintiff was on IOD status and merely alleges that, prior to 1983, Ferrante wasemployed as a police officer for the defendant town and a member of Local 307; that the town has failed to afford Plaintiff the benefits of a disability retirement, failed to appropriately calculate his pension entitlements and periodic increases, and has failed to provide Plaintiff with the medical and other benefits to which he is entitled. (Emphases added.) Accordingly, Ferrante's complaint is completely devoid of any allegations that would support the relief ordered in this case and has no relevance to § 45-19-1, or any purported IOD status. That fact was no deterrent to Ferrante, however, for the final judgment entered in Ferrante's case affords him identical relief to that of the remaining plaintiffs and bears no resemblance whatsoever to the allegations contained in his complaint. We deem this judgment to be null and void. [13] See Troutbrook Farm, Inc. v. DeWitt, 540 A.2d 18 (R.I.1988). Here, the record demonstrates that although defendant was remiss in fulfilling its discovery obligations and has conceded the failings that led to the defaults, the town tried mightily to challenge the language in the judgments as having no relevance to the factual allegations in the complaint. The defendant valiantly sought to have the language modified to comport with the law as it relates to default judgments and urged the hearing justice to award the plaintiffs only the amount of damages they were entitled to  pursuant to § 45-19-1,  exactly what was prayed for in the complaints. Having carefully reviewed the record of these proceedings, we are satisfied that the relief awarded in these judgments is not supported by the allegations in the pleadings and that the trial justice erred in refusing to set aside or modify what in actuality were merely default judgments and not final judgments. Further, having refused to grant the relief requested pursuant to Rule 60, it was incumbent upon the trial justice in the context ofa hearing on oral proof of claim, to make an independent determination relative to plaintiffs' entitlement to the damages claimed in the complaint. We are satisfied that the trial justice erred in failing to examine the pleadings to determine whether plaintiffs are legally entitled to recover the relief awarded in this case and our own examination of the pleadings leads us to conclude that plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief awarded in the judgments.