Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The scope of the duty of loyalty is ambiguous.

Text: 60 Founding constitutional doctrine on the lawyer's duty of loyalty is an enterprise set in shifting sand. The term duty of loyalty, narrowly defined, refers to an attorney's responsibility to place his client's interest ahead of his own interest or, in the case of multiple representation, not to sacrifice one client's interest for the other's. See, e.g., ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 cmt. (1992). But even on this level, legal ethics rules generally distinguish between the duty of loyalty as measured against an attorney's self-interest and cases of multiple representation. More troublesome, the boundaries of the duty of loyalty are elastic; they potentially subsume or overlap a number of other ethical responsibilities to the client. 61 Taking the narrow sense of the duty of loyalty, the canons and rules of ethics treat separately conflicts arising from the attorney's self-interest and those involving multiple client representation. See, e.g., ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7: Conflict of interest: General Rule 62 (a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless ... 63 (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests unless.... 16 64 The reason for distinguishing multiple representation conflicts from those involving self-interest is clear. When multiple representation exists, the source and consequences of the ethical problem are straightforward: counsel represents two clients with competing interests and is torn between two duties. Counsel can properly turn in no direction. He must fail one or do nothing and fail both. Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d at 1492, (Higginbotham, J., concurring). An attorney cannot properly serve two masters. United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 933 (2d Cir.1993). Conflicts between a lawyer's self-interest and his duty of loyalty to the client, however, fall along a wide spectrum of ethical sensitivity from merely potential danger to outright criminal misdeeds. Sources of potential conflict, from among the manifold variations possible, include: matters involving payment of fees and security for fees; doing business with a client; the use of information gained while representing a client; a lawyer's status as a witness; and a lawyer's actions when exposed to malpractice claims. Ethical rules typically separate each of these problems, for each type deserves particular consideration. See, e.g., ABA Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8. 65 Ultimately, the duty of loyalty in its broad sense resonates against the lawyer's obligation to perform competent, effective work. The ABA Model Professional Rules express this overlap: 66 The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. 67 ABA Model Rule 1.7 cmt. Rule 1.1 states the lawyer's duty of competence, Rule 1.5 the duty to charge a reasonable fee. If the lawyer stints on his work or is not sufficiently diligent for a client either because he is not well paid by that client or because of an extrinsic influence, he has potentially breached the duty of loyalty. Where the obligation to a single client is concerned, the duties of loyalty and competence are intertwined. 68 2. The effects of breaching the duty of loyalty are clearest in multiple representation cases. 69 Because multiple defendant representation poses a unique, straightforward danger of conflict, the Cuyler rule of not quite per se  prejudice makes eminent sense. A defendant whose attorney actively represented conflicting interests has had no real lawyer secured to him by the Sixth Amendment. As Justice Powell put it in Cuyler, [t]he conflict itself demonstrated a denial of the 'right to have the effective assistance of counsel.'  446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1719 (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76, 62 S.Ct. at 467). Moreover, this type of conflict may be addressed by a prophylactic rule, whereby a court, made aware of multiple representation, can insure early in the criminal proceeding that the client has been informed of the pitfalls of multiple representation and knowingly waived any conflict. See, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 44(c). As Strickland pointed out, Given ... the ability of trial courts to make early inquiry in situations likely to give rise to conflicts, ... it is reasonable for the criminal justice system to maintain a fairly rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts of interest. 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. 70 But only in the multiple representation context is the duty of loyalty so plain. Only then is the risk of harm high enough to employ a near-per se rule of prejudice. 17 While loyalty may be implicated in other judgments a lawyer makes, in no other category of conflicts is the risk of prejudice so certain as to justify an automatic presumption. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349, 100 S.Ct. at 1719. When the duty of loyalty is challenged by an attorney's self-interest, the range of possible breaches, as previously shown, is virtually limitless. Likewise, their consequences on the quality of representation range from wholly benign to devastating. Compare United States v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1418-21 (7th Cir.1988) with United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102, 1106-09 (7th Cir.1986) and Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 769-70 (7th Cir.1994). Applying a near-per se rule of prejudice to this spectrum of potential ethical problems is a draconian remedy. 71 3. Strickland best addresses attorney self-interest conflicts. 72 In stark contrast to multiple representation situations, there is little meaningful distinction between a lawyer who inadvertently fails to act and one who for selfish reasons decides not to act. The conflict between the lawyer's self-interest and that of his client is not a real conflict in the eyes of the law. Rather than being immobilized by conflicting ethical duties among clients, a lawyer who represents only one client is obliged to advance the client's best interest despite his own interest or desires. Even though his disloyalty does not leave the client bereft of counsel, it may well impinge on the effectiveness of his representation. 73 A few illustrations demonstrate the persistent overlap between self-interested duty of loyalty problems and attorney effectiveness: 74 (1) An attorney represents a client charged with white collar crime. His fee will be paid from the profits of the business. The attorney has an incentive to plea bargain rather than risk the business's closing if the client is unsuccessfully defended. 75 (2) An attorney has neglected to file a competency motion. To cover up the mistake, it is alleged, he tardily files an inadequate motion. 76 (3) An attorney undertakes client representation despite an overabundance of work. He then neglects to interview a potential alibi witness. 77 (4) An attorney is a potential witness for a client he has represented in the past. Rather than testify, however, he continues to represent the client in the case. 78 See also cases cited in n. 10, supra. The duty of loyalty and other ethical rules have arguably been tested or breached in each of these cases, but each also raises a question of lawyer competency. 79 Because the scope of the duty of loyalty with respect to attorney self-interest is inherently vague and overlaps with professional effectiveness, Strickland ought to set the constitutional norm of adequate representation. The Court has already hinted at such a possibility: 80 Under the Strickland standard, breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel. 81 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 166, 106 S.Ct. at 993. Nix invoked Strickland, not Cuyler, as the benchmark for judging ethical violations. In so doing, the Court hesitated to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable under the Sixth Amendment so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct and thereby intrude into the state's proper authority.... Id. A standard that requires a showing of prejudice and affords appropriate latitude to professional judgment best addresses ethical breaches under the Sixth Amendment. 82 Strickland lists other powerful reasons supporting its more flexible test of constitutional competence. Strickland declined to exhaustively define obligations of counsel [or] form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney performance. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The Court stated that [p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides. Id. As Strickland astutely warned, [a]ny such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Indeed, 83 [T]he existence of detailed guidelines for representation could distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the defendant's cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 84 Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. 85 These considerations, which prompted the Court's reluctance to micromanage standards of professional and ethical behavior, apply with full force to the duty of loyalty with respect to attorney self-interest. The interests of both the defendant and society are served by a standard that, as far as possible, does not straitjacket counsel in a stifling, redundant federal code of professional conduct. Moreover, the purpose of the Sixth Amendment is not primarily to police attorneys' ethical standards and create a constitutional code of professional conduct; its purpose is to assure a fair trial based on competent representation. Finally, while Strickland does state that counsel owes the client a duty to avoid conflicts of interest (citing Cuyler ), this is just one duty listed among others--the duties to advocate the defendant's cause, to consult with and keep the defendant informed, and to employ skill and knowledge on the defendant's behalf. The Court emphasizes these as an unexhaustive list of the basic duties of counsel. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. To list these duties is thus the starting point, not the conclusion, of constitutional analysis. We are firmly persuaded that it is most consistent with Strickland to assess the duty of loyalty pitted against a lawyer's self-interest under the Strickland test. 18 4. Cuyler v. Strickland 86 If Cuyler's more rigid rule applies to attorney breaches of loyalty outside the multiple representation context, Strickland's desirable and necessary uniform standard of constitutional ineffectiveness will be challenged. Recharacterization of ineffectiveness claims to duty of loyalty claims will be tempting because of Cuyler's lesser standard of prejudice. See Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 769-70 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. McLain, 823 F.2d 1457, 1463-64 (11th Cir.1987). A blurring of the Strickland standard is highly undesirable. As a result of the uncertain boundary between Cuyler and Strickland, the focus of Sixth Amendment claims would tend to shift mischievously from the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings--the goal of prejudice analysis--to slurs on counsel's integrity--the conflict analysis. Confining Cuyler to multiple representation claims poses no similar threats to Strickland. The dissent, of course, purports to avoid unwarranted expansion of Cuyler by confining its scope, apart from multiple representation cases, to instances involving extraordinary attorney-client conflicts stemming from a highly particularized and powerful source. This open-ended, though hyperbolic, language is bereft of any animating principle and, as such, is unfortunately guaranteed to spawn far more litigation that it resolves. 87 For all these reasons, we conclude that Strickland governs the issue whether Andrews's media rights contract and status as a witness resulted in the denial of constitutionally adequate counsel to Beets.