Opinion ID: 2295861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: denial of a multiple conspiracy instruction

Text: Appellants contend that their convictions for conspiracy to commit kidnapping while armed (Count I) should be reversed because of the trial court's failure to give, at their request, a multiple conspiracy instruction. [32] The argument, more specifically, is this: (1) the court instructed the jury with respect to Count I, which charged a single conspiracy; (2) there was sufficient evidence for another instruction permitting the jury, in the alternative, to find up to three conspiracies  defined by reference to each building seized  rather than one, all-encompassing conspiracy; (3) in the event that the jury found one or more smaller conspiracies, appellants would be entitled to acquittal under Count I, although the variance principle would not necessarily have precluded conviction for the lesser conspiracy in which a particular appellant may have participated; [33] (4) it was therefore reversible error for the trial court to deny appellants' requested instruction and bar them from arguing that issue to the jury. Perhaps the most commonly expressed basis for granting a defense request for a special instruction occurs when a defendant admits one or more essential elements of the offense but attempts to carry the burden of proving circumstances which would excuse the act, including accident, self-defense, and defenses bearing on intent such as claim of right, insanity, or intoxication. See, e. g., Rhodes v. United States, D.C. App., 354 A.2d 863, 864 (1976); Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 337 A.2d 772, 774 (1975); ( Curtis ) Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 330 A.2d 519, 521 (1974); ( Charles ) Smith v. United States, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 58, 59 (1973); Grigsby v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 721, 187 S.W.2d 259 (1945); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 748, 265 S.W. 339, 344 (App.1924). In such situations, the defendant will be entitled to an instruction on any issue `fairly raised by the evidence.' ( Charles ) Smith, supra at 59 (quoting Womack v. United States, 119 U.S. App.D.C. 40, 336 F.2d 959 (1964)). But even more broadly  when a defendant admits nothing  he or she may be entitled to an instruction incorporating a theory of the case, most commonly a lesser-included offense, provided that there is some evidence which tends to bear upon that issue, Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 315, 16 S.Ct. 839, 840, 40 L.Ed. 980 (1896). Accord, Day v. United States, D.C. App., 390 A.2d 957, 961-62 (1978); Pendergrast v. United States, D.C.App., 332 A.2d 919, 924 (1976); Bailey v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 281 A.2d 440, 442 (1971); Belton v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 201, 206, 382 F.2d 150, 155 (1967). Appellants' request for a multiple conspiracy instruction is akin to both categories of cases where special instructions are given; it is an attempt both to excuse responsibility for some of the acts (for which, as is undisputed, there is substantial evidence) by disavowing the required intent for an overall conspiracy, and to achieve findings of lesser culpability by narrowing the scope of any conspiracy and its related criminal acts. Their right to the instruction, therefore, turns on whether the multiple conspiracy issue is `fairly raised by the evidence,' ( Charles ) Smith, supra; Womack, supra  whether there is some evidence tending to support appellants' theory. Stevenson, supra, 162 U.S. at 314, 16 S.Ct. 839. No one disputes that there is substantial evidence to support the single conspiracy charge in Count I. Appellants attacked the three buildings in similar fashion; they took hostages at all three sites; appellants warned that if the police moved into any of the three locations, hostages would be killed at each; throughout the siege, Khaalis was in telephone contact with appellants at all three buildings and acted as spokesman for all; appellants at all sites made the same demands; and, upon Khaalis' final order, they all released their hostages and surrendered simultaneously. In contrast, the inferences which appellants argue in support of their multiple conspiracy theory  the disparity in the amount of weaponry and ammunition at the three sites, a difference in the quality of the attack (sloppiness at the District Building compared with military precision at B'nai B'rith), and the fact that Muzikir and Nuh assaulted the District Building after hearing news over the radio about the other two takeovers  do not constitute sufficient evidence for a multiple conspiracy instruction. [34] On this record, therefore, we cannot say that a multiple conspiracy issue is fairly raised by the evidence  that the evidence tends to bear upon appellants' claim here. Stevenson, supra at 315, 16 S.Ct. 839. [35] The fact that the jury found all the appellants guilty of a single conspiracy, as charged, but only guilty of the substantive offenses at the buildings where they were, does not militate against this conclusion. Juries are permitted to return inconsistent verdicts. See, e. g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974); Steadman v. United States, D.C.App., 358 A.2d 329, 332 (1976). We cannot permit speculation about the jury's reasons for its verdicts to influence our analysis of the extent of the evidence supporting a multiple conspiracy theory. In conclusion, there was no error here.