Opinion ID: 1755891
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Heading: Finality of the Partial Summary Judgments.

Text: Plaintiff contends the appeal should be dismissed because no final judgment or order has yet been entered. A party may appeal as of right only from a final order or judgment; a party seeking to appeal an interlocutory order must obtain permission of the appellate court. See Rowen v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Co. of Iowa, 357 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 1984); Iowa R.App.P. 1, 2. Defendants point out that when a judgment or order disposes of less than the entire case, it may still be deemed final for purposes of appeal if it completely disposes of one or more claims which are distinct and separable from the undecided claims. McGuire v. City of Cedar Rapids, 189 N.W.2d 592, 596-97 (Iowa 1971). This case, however, is not like McGuire which explained and applied that separability exception. In McGuire, the plaintiff had asserted causes of action against the city of Cedar Rapids and a contractor and engineer on a construction project, and the trial court had granted summary judgment to the city on the ground of governmental immunity. We held that the judgment for the city was final for purposes of appeal because it was based on a different theory than issues affecting other defendants; and we concluded that the issues involving the other defendants would neither affect nor be affected by the issue appealed. Id. at 596-98. Here, in contrast, the issues resolved by partial summary judgments are inextricably entwined with unresolved issues. There is no sharp line of demarcation between the adjudged liability of some defendants on some notes and the alleged liability of other defendants on those same notes. Moreover, the terms which will be included in an appropriate decree of foreclosure will depend on which defendants are liable, whether their liability is primary or secondary on each note, and what credits should be allocated to each note. This case is more akin to Shoemaker v. City of Muscatine, 275 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1979), where we held interlocutory and not final the dismissal of two divisions of a civil claim, which left for trial two divisions alleging different theories. We there distinguished McGuire, stating: The result in McGuire depended upon the fact that there were two defendants whose interests were severable. Thus dismissal of one defendant could have no effect on the other.... It was this independent basis of liability against each defendant which provided the distinct line of demarcation ... which rendered the causes of action against each defendant separable from those against the other. Id. at 208. This case also resembles Lerdall Construction Co. v. City of Ossian, 318 N.W.2d 172 (Iowa 1982), where we found a summary judgment as to some but not all defendants did not present issues separable and appealable, because the liability of a defendant left in the case was based on a similar theory. We there said: In the case at bar, we find no claim asserted against the individual defendants which does not affect or will not be affected by a determination of the issues involved in the claims against the city. Therefore, this appeal does not come within the McGuire rule and is not appealable as a matter of right. 318 N.W.2d at 175-76. The issues decided by partial summary judgment are not final and ripe for appeal as a matter of right because they are not separable from the issues which remain to be decided in the district court. Defendants also contend that the issues disposed of by summary judgment have been put beyond the power of the court to correct, therefore the partial summary judgments are final and appealable. We disagree because this is not like cases in which an interlocutory ruling required transfer of property to a non-party, terminating the district court's ability to correct a ruling and return the parties to their original position. See, e.g., Lyon v. Willie, 288 N.W.2d 884, 886-87 (Iowa 1980); Johnson v. Johnson, 188 N.W.2d 288, 293 (Iowa 1971). Until trial in this equity action is completed and a final order or decree rendered, the trial court will have the power to correct any of the rulings, orders, or partial summary judgments it has already entered. See Davenport Bank & Trust Co. v. City of Davenport, 318 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa 1982) (court could set aside default entry at any time before final judgment); Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Harris, 248 N.W.2d 145, 146 (Iowa 1976) (summary judgment on plaintiff's claim not finally decisive of the case or beyond the power of the court because counterclaim left open). Defendants had no right to appeal from the partial summary judgments entered by the district court.