Opinion ID: 1038522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Motion for Severance

Text: Prior to trial, Washburn moved to sever the financial counts (the wire fraud and money laundering charges) from charges relating to alleged false statements to the United States Probation Office. Before the district court, Washburn claimed that the use of his prior fraud conviction and incarceration as evidence for the prosecution in the false statements case would only cloud the wire fraud and money laundering prosecutions and would thus be exploited by the government at trial and greatly prejudice Washburn. Additionally, Washburn claimed that had the court severed the charges, he would have testified in his defense in the false statements trial. The district court denied the motion and, as a result, Washburn argues he was prejudiced. Even if charges are properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8, a district court may exercise its discretion and sever the charges if the defendant will be prejudiced by the joinder of them. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. The parties here dispute the proper standard of review this court should apply to the district court's denial of Washburn's pretrial motion to sever. The government argues that the review is for plain error because Washburn did not renew his motion for a separate trial at the close of the government's case nor raise it in his motion for new trial. United States v. Kirk, 528 F.3d 1102, 1107 (8th Cir. 2008). Washburn, on the other hand, claims that this issue was, indeed, preserved and that our review is de novo. United States v. Tyndall, 263 F.3d 848, 849 (8th Cir. 2001). Having determined that Washburn did not, in fact, renew his motion to sever at the close of the government's case-in-chief or at the close of the evidence, we acknowledge what appears to be a split in authority on the appropriate standard of review in these circumstances. United States v. Garrett, 648 F.3d 618, 625-26 n.5 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that in similar circumstances courts of this circuit have applied an abuse of discretion standard as well as plain error review). We need not settle the -10- matter, however, because whether reviewing for either plain error or for an abuse of discretion, the outcome in this case remains the same. See United States v. Carter, 481 F.3d 601, 606 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007). Applying an abuse of discretion standard, which, of the two, would be most favorable to Washburn, we will reverse only when that abuse of discretion results in severe or clear prejudice. United States v. Reynolds, No. 12-2968, 2013 WL 3466822, at  (8th Cir. July 11, 2013). 'Severe prejudice occurs when a defendant is deprived of an appreciable chance for an acquittal.' Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 653 F.3d 656, 662 (8th Cir. 2011)). The district court held that evidence of Washburn's prior convictions was admissible on the challenged counts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). [S]ince Defendant's prior conviction would be admissible in a separate trial on Counts 1 through 36, Defendant will not be unduly prejudiced by the joinder of Counts 1 through 49. In the event he proceeds to trial, any prejudice to Defendant's case will be adequately lessened when the court instructs the jury on the appropriate use of Rule 404(b) evidence.5 Too, the court held that Washburn's claim that he may very well wish to testify failed to provide the court with sufficient information to conduct the necessary inquiry. We affirm the court's denial of Washburn's motion to sever because the district court did not abuse its discretion in its determination that Washburn's prior conviction for wire fraud and money laundering would be admissible on all charges and would not be unduly prejudicial. The prior conviction entailed a scheme almost identical to 5 On appeal, Washburn also claims that the district court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on the use of Rule 404(b) evidence as it indicated but Washburn did not offer such an instruction nor object to the proposed instructions during the conference with the court. Accordingly, this claim is forfeited, as Washburn makes no showing of plain error. Natale, 719 F.3d at 729 ([W]hen a defendant does not object to a jury instruction before the jury retires to deliberate, the defendant may later attack that instruction only for plain error.). -11- the charged schemes and would thus be probative of motive, intent, plan, identity, and absence of mistake. Relevant here, this court has held in similar circumstances that the unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of a defendant's prior conviction for similar schemes because the close similarity of the prior incidents made the evidence especially probative on the question of the defendant's intent and the absence of accident. United States v. Shillingstad, 632 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2011). As a matter of course, Washburn cannot demonstrate that a joint trial caused him severe prejudice since his prior conviction would have been probative and admissible in a separate trial on counts 1 through 36. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Washburn's pretrial motion to sever.