Opinion ID: 1706565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Implied Promises of Leniency

Text: Willie next argues that the trial judge erred in concluding that his statements were freely and voluntarily given. Willie contends that despite the fact that he waived his Miranda rights before giving each of five statements, his first statement was induced by a promise of leniency or benefit by the sheriffs, and therefore, it and the subsequent confessions, which were a direct and continued result of the inducement, were inadmissible. The alleged inducement occurred during Willie's initial questioning on January 20, when Sheriff Middleton told Willie that it was always best to tell the truth and the only thing that [Sheriff Bryan] wanted him to do was tell the truth, and Sheriff Bryan told Willie that if he said anything it would be better for him to tell the truth. The trial court did not fully consider the totality of the circumstances when it concluded that Willie's confessions were voluntary. The State had the burden to prove all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 169 (Miss. 1989), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990) (cites omitted). Once the evidence indisputably showed that the sheriffs told Willie that it would be best or better for him to tell the truth, the trial court should have determined whether these statements were mere exhortations to tell the truth or were inducements or implied promises of leniency. See Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237, 240 (Miss. 1989). The trial judge did not make this determination. Instead, the judge relied on the sheriffs' testimony that they made no threats or promises to Willie and the irrelevant fact that the sheriffs had been law enforcement officers for a long period of time in making its finding of voluntariness. [1] The determination of whether a statement by an officer to an accused is a mere exhortation or an inducement to confess generally depends on the specific circumstances surrounding the confession. We previously have found youth, good reputation, and naivety of the criminal justice system to be circumstances which caused a youth to be induced to confess by an officer telling the youth that he would be better off telling the truth. Miller v. State, 243 So.2d 558, 559 (Miss. 1971). Likewise, we have found that an accused who was personally acquainted with the interrogating officer, worked with the officer's wife, and obviously trusted the officer were circumstances which induced the accused to confess when the officer told the accused that he would do whatever was legal with[in] my realms to help. Dunn v. State, 547 So.2d 42, 46 (Miss. 1989). Willie contends that Miller, supra, and Dunn, supra, are indistinguishable from his case, and that his youth and obvious trust in Sheriff Middleton caused him to confess. We disagree. Willie, at the time of his trial, was a twenty-two year old adult who clearly was familiar with the criminal justice system. Willie had prior convictions of grand larceny and simple assault, numerous traffic violations for driving with a suspended license, and pending charges of two counts of burglary and four counts of sale of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. We do not find Miller applicable to Willie's case. We also find that Dunn is not applicable to Willie's case. Willie was acquainted with Sheriff Middleton and expressed his trust in him, but this relationship and trust emanated from past dealings with the sheriff, not a friendship or personal relationship. We find that neither Willie's youth nor relationship with Sheriff Middleton were circumstances which likely caused Willie to confess when the sheriffs told him it was always best to tell the truth ... and if he said anything it would be better for him to tell the truth. Moreover, two circumstances weigh heavily against Willie's claim of inducement. First, Willie's first statement after the sheriffs' alleged inducements was not a confession, but a denial. Obviously, Willie was not overly influenced by the alleged promises of leniency or benefit. Second, Willie testified at his suppression hearing that the sheriffs did not make him any specific promises. In Layne v. State, 542 So.2d 237 (Miss. 1989), we found that an officer telling an accused that if you're going to talk, tell the truth was not making an implied promise, especially when no evidence showed that the alleged promise was the reason the accused confessed. Layne, 542 So.2d at 240. As in Layne, Willie has shown no evidence that the sheriffs' statements induced him to confess. We find that the statements made by the sheriffs to Willie were mere exhortations to tell the truth. In reaching this decision, we caution law enforcement officers in making statements of this nature to defendants. Had Willie not denied being in Maben in his first statement and not testified that the sheriffs did not make any specific promises to him, we may have found that under the totality of the circumstances the confessions were induced.