Opinion ID: 2593976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Strict adherence vs. substantial compliance

Text: We next address the parties' arguments about whether a strict adherence or substantial compliance standard should apply to evaluating whether the committee satisfied Article 19, Section 2(4)'s mandate. The opponents argue that strict adherence should apply here, where the constitutional requirement at issue is designed to protect the initiative process. The committee, on the other hand, advocates for a substantial compliance standard to apply in cases that do not involve constitutional authentication requirements. We conclude, as set forth below, that Article 19, Section 2 must be adhered to strictly. And since the committee has made a distinction between different types of constitutional procedural requirements, urging this court to adopt a looser standard of compliance for some constitutional requirements, while maintaining a strict standard for constitutional authentication requirements, we take this opportunity to clarify Governor v. Nevada State Legislature, [23] wherein this court, in construing the Nevada Constitution, distinguished between procedural and substantive requirements, concluding that procedure must yield to substance if the requirements conflict. [24] We expressly overrule that portion of the opinion. The Nevada Constitution should be read as a whole, so as to give effect to and harmonize each provision. [25] We now turn our analysis to the facts at issue in this case and explain why strict adherence is required with respect to Article 19, Section 2(4)'s filing requirement. The district court in this case, relying on the California Supreme Court's decision in Costa v. Superior Court, [26] applied a substantial compliance standard. In Costa, the court, in a divided 4-3 decision, opted for a substantial compliance standard when it reviewed whether California's Proposition 77 should be invalidated on the basis that the petition filed with the Attorney General's Office differed from the petition circulated for voter signatures. [27] The facts in Costa indicated that Proposition 77 proposed to amend the California Constitution by transferring the power to draw election districts from the legislature to a three-member panel of retired judges, who would act as special masters in developing redistricting plans. [28] Proposition 77 opponents challenged the initiative in the California Superior Court on the basis that the version filed with the Attorney General's Office was not the version circulated for signatures. [29] The discrepancies between the filed and circulated versions of Proposition 77 included (1) a different introductory section setting forth the findings and purpose, (2) a one-day difference in the time period in which the legislature could make its nominations and exercise peremptory challenges for selecting the final list of judges from which the special masters were to be chosen, and (3) an explicit statement that, with regard to the redistricting process, the initiative power was to be used only in the manner prescribed in Proposition 77. [30] The Superior Court invalidated Proposition 77 after determining that `the purposes of the constitutional [31] and statutory [32] requirements at issue would be frustrated if the court were to apply the substantial compliance doctrine to excuse the clear defects in this situation.' [33] When the case reached the California Supreme Court, the majority concluded that Proposition 77 should not be invalidated for its procedural deficiencies. The majority reasoned that discrepancies between petition versions should be analyzed under a substantial compliance standard and that `technical deficiencies in ... initiative petitions will not invalidate the petitions if they are in substantial compliance with statutory and constitutional requirements.' [34] The court indicated that a substantial compliance standard was consistent with the people's initiative power and the judicial policy to liberally construe this power. [35] The dissenting justices reasoned that the confusion and uncertainty about which version, if either, would be placed on the ballot necessarily impaired the ability of interested parties to understand the measure and to debate its merits during a crucial preelection period and that there was no need to so jeopardize the integrity of the electoral process, given that the constitutional and statutory mandate of providing to the attorney general a true copy of the initiative to be circulated is readily and easily met and is a simple matter of proofreading. [36] The dissent agreed with the trial court's conclusion that `[t]here is no good reason to put the courts in the position of having to decide what is good enough for qualifying an initiative measure for the ballot when actual compliance is easily attainable.' [37] The dissenting justices also noted that [w]hen two versions of a proposed initiative differ in ways that change its meaning, ... the doctrine of substantial compliance should not apply, in light of the significant risk of confusing or misleading the public. [38] According to the dissent, given the narrow time frame for a preelection challenge, a court could not reliably determine that the differences in meaning in the two versions were not significant to any organization, group, or prominent individual in taking an early stand for or against the proposed initiative measure. [39] Further noting that the application of a vague and subjective substantial compliance standard presents a risk that inappropriate considerations will actually influence a court's substantial compliance determination, or that the public will perceive the court to be so influenced, the dissenting justices asserted that this standard was unsuitable. [40] The dissent also pointed out that widely disseminated inaccurate information about the meaning of a proposed initiative can subtly alter the entire electoral process and thereby compromise its integrity. [41] Like the dilemma presented in Costa, in this case, the committee's proposed initiative petition filed with the Secretary of State on March 8, 2006, differed from the petition that was circulated for signatures and later certified for placement on the ballot. In Costa, however, no party contended that the variations between the two versions would affect the estimate of the initiative's fiscal impact. [42] Here, the opponents alleged below and maintain on appealas supported by financial analysts' and the LCB fiscal analysts' affidavits and financial datathat the difference in the two versions would have an approximately $1.5 billion fiscal impact. Although significant factual differences exist between the instant case and Costa, the Costa majority and dissent cogently present the policy rationales underlying substantial compliance and strict adherence in the context of a constitutional requirement for initiative petitions. We are persuaded that the Costa dissent presents a stronger rationale and, accordingly, that strict adherence is required with respect to Article 19, Section 2(4)'s filing requirement. The Costa majority recognized the importance of the people's power to initiate constitutional amendments. We agree that the people's power to amend the Nevada Constitution through the initiative process is paramount. But that power exists within the current constitution's boundaries, which place significant value and weight on ensuring that the people are properly and adequately notified about proposed constitutional amendments, that the people are able to understand the effect that the proposed amendment would have if enacted, and that the people are afforded an opportunity to study the initiative and debate its merits during the preelection stage. As the Costa dissent pointed out, when inaccurate information about a proposed initiative is widely disseminated, as it was here, the integrity of the electoral process is jeopardized. And there is no good reason to put courts in the position to decide whether the discrepancy was so insignificant that it satisfies a substantial compliance standard, when a requirement is clearly and unambiguously mandated by the Nevada Constitution, and compliance with that requirement entails nothing more than using a photocopy machine. This court's previous decisions also indicate that strict adherence should be required in this instance. For instance, we have demanded strict adherence with respect to our Constitution's authentication requirements governing an initiative petition, [43] and in Stumpf v. Lau, [44] we concluded that failure to include in a petition a constitutionally mandated enacting clause, which would have advised voters whether the proposed law was constitutional or statutory, invalidated the initiative and required its removal from the ballot. In so doing, this court noted that `[w]e cannot assume that people are indifferent whether they are asked to approve an ordinary law or to amend their constitution.' [45] Similarly, in Rogers v. Heller, [46] we concluded that an initiative was void for failing to comply with the constitutional provision that prohibits the proposal of any statute making an appropriation without also providing a means for raising revenue. Although some of this court's decisions have applied a substantial compliance test, these decisions concerned statutory requirements for initiative petitions. [47] This court addressed the strict adherence and substantial compliance dichotomy in Cirac v. Lander County, [48] concluding that substantial compliance should apply to a challenge that an initiative did not meet a statutory requirement. In so concluding, this court distinguished Lundberg v. Koontz, [49] a previous case that discussed  constitutional and not statutory requirements when it called for strict construction. [50] Thus, our case law points us in the same direction as the Costa dissent: Article 19, Section 2(4) demands strict adherence. [51] Further, the Nevada Constitution is the organic and fundamental law of this state, and to allow a sweeping amendment to it or to this state's legislative acts, without strict adherence to the rules set forth therein, would work against government stability. [52] The strict adherence rule can hardly be considered burdensome, especially when, as here, actual compliance was easily attainable and there exists no acceptable excuse for noncompliance. The importance of following the letter of this state's seminal law becomes even more apparent in a case such as this, when the two versions of the petition differed in such a way that the initiative's substantive meaning was altered. While the committee's error in circulating a different version of the petition appears inadvertent in this case, the resultant effect of the error is that the initiative's stated purpose of cutting government spending would be defeated in favor of the circulated petition's language, which enables government spending to grow above and beyond its historical rates. Moreover, anything less than strict compliance would require courts to assume an impossible line-drawing function, weighing or measuring differences between a circulated and filed petition in order to determine whether the circulated petition was properly certified for the ballot. The problem with the substantial compliance standard is illustrated by the split decision in the Costa case. Although the majority characterized the discrepancies between the two Proposition 77 petitions as technical, it also concluded that the two versions differed with regard to some substantive details. [53] As the dissent in Costa pointed out, there is no good reason to put the courts in the position of shooting at a moving target, deciding what is good enough for qualifying an initiative for the ballot, `when actual compliance is easily attainable.' [54] This holds especially true given the shortened time frame for an initiative's preelection challenge, which does not allow courts to reliably determine whether the degree of noncompliance was significant to voters or groups in deciding whether to support an initiative. Moreover, although a strict adherence standard may work to disqualify an initiative from a particular ballot, its proponents may refile and recirculate a conforming initiative in a future election. In sum, we conclude that the constitutional requirements for engaging in the initiative process provide important safeguards that protect the people's right to initiate laws and, when coupled with the ease of complying with these requirements, the result is that a strict adherence standard must apply to Article 19, Section 2(4)'s filing requirement. Accordingly, here, as the committee did not strictly adhere to the requirements of Article 19, Section 2(4), the TASC initiative necessarily fails. [55]