Opinion ID: 894898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Minden's Contacts

Text: With this in mind, we turn to an analysis of Minden's Texas contacts, as the court of appeals concluded that Minden had continuous and systematic contacts with Texas sufficient to support general jurisdiction. 202 S.W.3d at 204. We first determine the appropriate time period for assessing contacts for purposes of general jurisdiction, an issue on which our courts of appeals are in conflict. Some examine the defendant's forum-related activities up to the time of the occurrence that prompted the suit. See MedCost, L.L.C. v. Loiseau, 166 S.W.3d 421, 434 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, no pet.); Schott Glas v. Adame, 178 S.W.3d 307, 313-14 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); AmQuip Corp. v. Cloud, 73 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Others focus on contacts up to the time of filing suit. See, e.g., Equitable Prod. Co. v. Canales-Trevino, 136 S.W.3d 235, 237-38, 245 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (considering corporate defendant's relocation from Texas, which occurred after the cause of action accrued but before suit was filed, for purposes of determining jurisdiction); see also Tuscano v. Osterberg, 82 S.W.3d 457, 467 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.) (holding that jurisdictional contacts were too attenuated in time, because such activities occurred more than three years before service of this suit was effected). Another  the court of appeals in this case  noted the conflict and assessed contacts under both timetables. [4] 202 S.W.3d at 203 (A relevant continuous contact in this analysis includes those contacts over a period up to the date of injury . . . or up to and including the date suit commenced. . . . ). We conclude that the relevant period ends at the time suit is filed. As noted above, general jurisdiction is dispute-blind; accordingly, and in contrast to specific jurisdiction, the incident made the basis of the suit should not be the focus in assessing continuous and systematic contacts  contacts on which jurisdiction over any claim may be based. See Charles W. Rocky Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study of the Effects of a Generally Too Broad, But Specifically Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L.REV. 135, 238 (2005) (noting that analyzing the contacts at the time of accrual is not appropriate under the proper explanation of general jurisdiction as dispute-blind general adjudicative authority); see also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (noting that a court should consider all of a defendant's contacts with the forum state prior to the filing of the lawsuit). We also agree that a mere one-time snapshot of the defendant's in-state activities may not be sufficient, see Rhodes, Predictability Principle, 57 BAYLOR L.REV. at 239, and contacts should be assessed over a reasonable number of years, up to the date suit is filed, see Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir.1999). This includes contacts at the time the cause of action arose, and it comports with the Supreme Court's guidance on the issue, as well as our prior caselaw. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409-11, 104 S.Ct. 1868 (evaluating contacts over the seven-year period before suit was filed); American Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 807-08 (Tex.2002) (assessing contacts over the twenty-year period preceding suit). We now turn to Minden's contacts up to the time of suit. A general jurisdiction inquiry can be tedious, as it demands . . . that all contacts be carefully investigated, compiled, sorted, and analyzed for proof of a pattern of continuing and systematic activity. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 359 (Tex.1990). In conducting this dispute-blind inquiry, Jajah's Eddington's status as a Texas resident, her treatment in Minden Hospital's emergency room, and her family's choice not to sue Minden are irrelevant. Instead, we focus solely on Minden's contacts with Texas. Minden is a nonresident limited partnership that owns a hospital licensed by the state of Louisiana. Minden's only facility is in Minden, Louisiana, and ninety percent of its patients reside within a twenty-five mile radius of Minden Hospital. Minden does not advertise in Texas. It owns no Texas property and has no Texas office or bank accounts, nor does it maintain a registered agent for service of process here. The court of appeals relied on three categories of contacts in determining that Minden's Texas contacts were continuous and systematic: (1) Minden employees' attendance at seminars in Texas; (2) Minden's purchases from vendors with Texas addresses; and (3) three contracts with Texas entities. We examine each in turn.
The evidence showed that, since 1999, Minden employees attended two Province-sponsored meetings in Dallas. These isolated trips fall short of the continuous and systematic contact the Supreme Court requires. In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that multiple trips to Fort Worth supported general jurisdiction, noting that the trips did not in any way enhance[] the company's contacts with Texas. 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868; see also Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978) (basing California jurisdiction on 3-day and 1-day stopovers in that State would make a mockery of due process limitations on assertion of personal jurisdiction); Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex.1995) (concluding that attending a meeting in Texas, as well as periodic mailings to Texas members, presented no evidence of general jurisdiction). We agree with that analysis.
Since October 1, 1999, Minden paid $1,508,467.20 to 136 entities with Texas addresses. The largest payment, $515,650.15, was to Alcon Laboratories in Dallas, Texas, and the second largest, $209,997.36, to Centerpoint Energy in Houston, Texas. Most of the remaining payments are for less than $10,000.00 each. In Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418, 104 S.Ct. 1868, the Supreme Court held that mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions. And we have recognized that purchases from Texas vendors will not alone support the exercise of general jurisdiction. American Type Culture Collection, 83 S.W.3d at 808. We conclude that the payments to Texas vendors do not support general jurisdiction over Minden in Texas.
The court of appeals also identified three contracts with a Texas connection: (1) a September 23, 2003 contract with Cox Business Services, a Tyler, Texas-based company, for internet service (at a charge of $59.95 per month) and a cable modem; (2) a July 2002 contract with Lone Star Research, located in The Woodlands, Texas, pursuant to which Lone Star Research would conduct a one-time marketing survey of 200 adult residents in Minden Hospital's service area; and (3) an April 2001 professional services agreement with Horizon Radiology, P.A., a Texas company, whereby Horizon would provide specialty coverage (via teleradiology equipment) to Minden Hospital, in exchange for $1600 per month. We agree with the court of appeals that the 2003 Cox contract, entered into after suit was filed, is irrelevant to the jurisdictional inquiry here. 202 S.W.3d at 203. The 2002 Lone Star contract pursuant to which a Texas company conducted a marketing study of residents in Minden Hospital's service area  presumably Louisiana, as ninety percent of the hospital's patients live within twenty-five miles of the hospital  does not establish a continuous and systematic Texas contact. Lone Star agreed to conduct 200 telephone interviews and analyze the data within a week of the survey's completion, in exchange for $5,200. This type of sporadic Texas contact is not substantial enough for general jurisdiction. Of the three contracts, the Horizon agreement has the most substantial connection to Texas. The agreement, signed in 2001 and renewed twice thereafter, required that Louisiana-licensed physicians (located in Texas) provide teleradiology services, for which Minden supplied the necessary equipment, in exchange for $1600 per month. Even this agreement, however, does not support general jurisdiction. Hiring a contractor to perform such limited services in the forum state does not equate to continuous and systematic contacts. Even when amassed, Minden's Texas contacts simply are not continuous and systematic general business contacts sufficient to support general jurisdiction, particularly when compared to the substantial, regular business activities conducted by the nonresident defendant in Perkins. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416, 104 S.Ct. 1868; Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48, 72 S.Ct. 413. Instead, the facts here are more like those described in Helicopteros: the nonresident defendant had limited contacts with Texas but none sufficient to support general jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.