Opinion ID: 4538048
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to a Public Trial Generally

Text: ¶15 “Both the United States and the Colorado Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to a public trial.” Id. at ¶ 7, 351 P.3d at 420; see U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 16. ¶16 This right “is for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the importance of their functions.” Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984) (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979)). Courts specifically recognize the important role a defendant’s family members play in reminding the trial participants of this duty. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 272 (1948); United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2012). 6 ¶17 Further, “[i]n addition to ensuring that [the] judge and prosecutor carry out their duties responsibly, a public trial encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 46; see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (“Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process . . . . [P]ublic access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of self-government.”). ¶18 A public trial also protects the public’s and the press’s qualified First Amendment rights to attend a criminal trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 44; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). “While innocent defendants benefit from the potential advantages of public trials . . . a guilty defendant may prefer secret proceedings where bribes, intimidation, or unfavorable verdicts can pass without ‘the bracing sunshine of publicity.’ Society, however, has an interest in fair outcomes in both situations.” Kristin Saetveit, Close Calls: Defining Courtroom Closures Under the Sixth Amendment, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 897, 903 (2016) (citations omitted) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 677 (1996); see Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571 (“[T]he open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion.”). 7 ¶19 Armed with these noble sentiments, we must now figure out how to deploy them. First, what does it mean to have a “public” trial? Of course, in the most general sense, the term defines itself: A “public” trial is one that is not secret; it is one that the public is free to attend. Hampton v. People, 465 P.2d 394, 399 (Colo. 1970). ¶20 But this broad definition has limitations. Given competing interests, a criminal defendant’s right to a public trial is not absolute. At times, it must yield to concerns such as “the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.” Waller, 467 U.S. at 45; accord Hassen, ¶ 8, 351 P.3d at 421. Thus, while the total exclusion of the press and the public generally amounts to a closure, such closures may be permissible under certain circumstances. ¶21 Recently, we noted that these circumstances “will be rare” and “the balance of interests must be struck with special care.” Hassen, ¶ 8, 351 P.3d at 421 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 45). To justify a closure, (1) “the party seeking to close the [proceeding] must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced”; (2) “the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest”; (3) “the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding”; and (4) the “trial court must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Id. at ¶ 9, 351 P.3d at 421 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48). Regarding the third factor, we 8 recently emphasized that the Supreme Court insists that “[t]rial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials.” Id. (quoting Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 215 (2010)).