Opinion ID: 1651821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Swapped Plates

Text: Judge Franklin has illegally swapped tags from the family's Caprice (right) and her 1991 Lexus (above). A series of photos shows that the tags have been swapped on a regular basis in order to evade taxes. Fact: Judge Franklin drives a 1991 Lexus, one of the most expensive cars made. The Lexus is registered in her name. The tag on the Lexus expired in April, 1995, but Franklin has continued to illegally operate the car with swapped license plates from another car. Hurdle was responsible for the content and publishing of the ad. Thompson took the pictures of the cars depicted in the ad. For the purposes of our inquiry today, we are concerned only with the actions of Thompson and not those of his co-defendant, Hurdle. ¶ 12. To establish a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning plaintiff; (2) unprivileged publication to third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on part of publisher; (4) and either actionability of statement irrespective of special harm or existence of special harm caused by publication. Moon v. Condere Corp., 690 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss.1997); McCullough v. Cook, 679 So.2d 627, 630 (Miss.1996); Blake v. Gannett Co. 529 So.2d 595, 602 (Miss.1988). In addition, because Judge Franklin is a public official, she must also prove that Thompson acted with actual malice. Moon v. Condere Corp., 690 So.2d 1191, 1195 (Miss.1997). Actual malice is defined as a statement made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. (citing Blake, 529 So.2d at 600-01); see also Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The appropriate summary judgment question is whether the evidence in the record could support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff has shown actual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has not. Stegall v. WTWV, Inc., 609 So.2d 348, 352 (Miss.1992) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). ¶ 13. The threshold question in a defamation suit is whether the published statements are false. McCullough, 679 So.2d at 631. (citing Blake, 529 So.2d at 602). A defamatory statement is [a]ny written or printed language which tends to injure one's reputation, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, degrade him in society, lessen him in public esteem or lower him in the confidence of the community. Fulton v. Mississippi Publishers Corp., 498 So.2d 1215, 1217 (Miss.1986)(quoting Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So.2d 271, 275 (Miss. 1984)). The statement must have clearly been directed toward the plaintiff, and the defamation must be clear and unmistakable from the words themselves and not be the product of innuendo, speculation, or conjecture. Ferguson, 448 So.2d at 275. ¶ 14. Applying the facts of the case at bar, it is apparent that they do not pass the test for defamation. The pictures truly and accurately depicted the vehicles, each bearing the license plate of the other one. Truth is complete defense to libel or slander. Daniels by Glass v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 634 So.2d 88, 92 (Miss.1993). Judge Franklin does not submit that the pictures had been altered or tampered with in any way. And, Thompson did not make an unprivileged publication when he released the pictures to Hurdle. ¶ 15. Thompson stated that his whole impetus for investigating Judge Franklin arose from the fact that she had dismissed the DUI case in which Thompson was a prosecution witness. However, a person's ill will or personal spite will not, standing alone, support a finding of actual malice. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 n. 7, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). In order for Judge Franklin to carry her burden, the evidence must show that Thompson made a false publication with a high degree of awareness of... probable falsity, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), or must have entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication, St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). ¶ 16. Judge Franklin bases her argument on this Court's statements in McCullough. In McCullough, Cook told a reporter that McCullough owned a truck which was seized in a drug bust. McCullough, 679 So.2d at 629. In fact, Cook possessed information which suggested that McCullough was no longer the owner of the truck, even though title records indicated otherwise. Id. This Court found that whether Cook acted with malice was a question on which reasonable minds could differ. Id. at 633. ¶ 17. Judge Franklin argues that Thompson knew that the car had been up on blocks and that it had only been driven on a couple of occasions with the switched license plates. Thus, she alleges that Thompson possessed some knowledge that it was Mr. Franklin, and not Judge Franklin, who had switched the tags. Thompson contends that he did not publish the pictures in a manner which constituted a high degree of awareness of... probable falsity. See Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. 209. ¶ 18. Judge Franklin has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Thompson acted with actual malice. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate because: 1) Thompson did not make a false statement; and 2) his statement was not made with a reckless disregard for the truth. In fact, it is the opposite. Thompson told Hurdle that he could not prove either that Judge Franklin drove the car, or that she had knowledge of the switched plates. ¶ 19. Judge Franklin argues that it is not enough for the photo itself to be true, its underlying implication must be true as well and cites McCullough as authority for this proposition. Despite the disclaimer by Thompson, Judge Franklin alleges that Thompson told Hurdle that based on the evidence, he believed that she was either swapping the plates, or knew the plates were being swapped, and that he believed that she was either operating the car, or knew it was being operated. She contends that Thompson's opinion is actionable because it attached an import to the photos knowing, and even intending, that Hurdle attach the same import.... Thompson argues that his opinion is not actionable libel. ¶ 20. There is no First Amendment based protection for defamatory statements which are categorized as opinion as opposed to fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). This Court, following Milkovich, has held that `[a] statement, even if phrased as an opinion, will not enjoy constitutional protection if the court concludes that its substance or gist could reasonably be interpreted as declaring or implying an assertion of fact.' Roussel v. Robbins, 688 So.2d 714, 723 (Miss.1996)( quoting Keohane v. Wilkerson, 859 P.2d 291, 297 (Colo.Ct.App. 1994)). `[T]he relevant inquiry is whether the statement could be reasonably understood as declaring or implying a provable assertion of fact.' Roussel, 688 So.2d at 714 (quoting Keohane, 859 P.2d at 296). Thus, if Thompson's opinion satisfies the foregoing criteria, it is actionable. ¶ 21. Judge Franklin's only evidence tending to support the allegation that Thompson gave an opinion is Hurdle's response to an interrogatory propounded by Judge Franklin. Given the fact that Thompson told Hurdle that he did not see Judge Franklin driving the Lexus and that he did not know if she knew that the plates were switched, it is unreasonable to conclude that Hurdle's interrogatory response, assuming that it is true, could be viewed as implying or declaring that Thompson could prove either that she drove the car with the illegal license plate or that she knew of the switch. As a matter of law, the statement made by Thompson does not rise to the level of an actionable opinion.