Opinion ID: 72279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to Procedural Due Process

Text: 15 No due process hearing was provided to Brett, Hannah, Hattaway, or Hudson upon Hutchins failure to reappoint them as deputy sheriffs. The former deputy sheriffs, thus, argue that they were denied their constitutional right to procedural due process. To establish such a claim, the former deputy sheriffs must show that they had a protected property interest in their employment. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). State law determines whether a public employee has a property interest in his or her job. Warren v. Crawford, 927 F.2d 559, 562 (11th Cir.1991). Under Georgia law, a public employee generally has no protected property interest unless he or she is employed under a civil service system, which allows termination only for cause. Id. 16 The district court opined that the former deputy sheriffs had no protected property interest under Georgia law because Compton's efforts to place the deputy sheriffs under the civil service system failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-1-21(b). We agree. Sheriffs have statutory authority to appoint deputy sheriffs at their discretion. O.C.G.A. § 15-16-23. Section 36-1-21(b), however, provides a means for extending the civil service system to departments, like the Jefferson County Sheriff's Department, which are subject to the jurisdiction of elected county officers. Specifically, section 36-1-21(b) requires that (1) the elected county officer apply to the proper governing authority in writing for such an extension and (2) the governing authority formally provide by ordinance or resolution that the positions be subject to the county civil service system. There is no evidence in the record that Compton made a written application to the Board of Commissioners; rather, the former deputy sheriffs allege that Compton made the request orally at a meeting of the Board. Thus, even if the Board passed the necessary resolution or ordinance, 13 the formal requirements of section 36-1-21(b) were not satisfied and the deputy sheriffs were not subject to the Jefferson County civil service system. 17 The former deputy sheriffs contend that, even if the statutory requirements were not satisfied, a de facto civil service system existed based on Compton's adoption and distribution of departmental rules and regulations that integrated by reference the county civil service system. While protected property interests in continued employment can arise from the policies and practices of an institution, Perry, 408 U.S. at 602-03, 92 S.Ct. at 2700, a property interest contrary to state law cannot arise by informal custom, Warren, 927 F.2d at 564. In the absence of satisfaction of the requirements of section 36-1-21(b), the deputy sheriffs were at-will employees with no protected property interest in continued employment. Thus, we affirm the summary judgment on the former deputy sheriffs' procedural due process claim.