Opinion ID: 1038228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lewis - Step One

Text: Lewis instructs us to first question whether Reed’s conduct is made punishable by “any enactment of Congress.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 164. An “enactment of Congress,” for purposes of the ACA, encompasses federal regulations as well as statutes. See United States v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2000). The parties agree that the federal DUI regulation, 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1), is the lone federal enactment which could punish Reed’s behavior of driving while impaired. As mentioned, this regulation prohibits “[o]perating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle” when the operator is “[u]nder the influence of alcohol, or a drug, or drugs, or any combination thereof, to a degree that renders the operator incapable of safe operation.” 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1). UNITED STATES V. REED 11 When considering Lewis’s first prong, the district court compared Reed’s conduct to the federal DUI regulation, and determined that the regulation punished his conduct. Specifically, the district court found: Reed drove 40 miles per hour in a 15 miles per hour zone, entered the exit of a one-way loop, and passed two “Do Not Enter” signs. Reed had slurred speech and failed three Field Sobriety Tests. Reed admitted taking a sip of alcohol and smoking marijuana before driving. When [the park ranger] searched Reed’s vehicle, he found an open container of “Mike[’]s Hard Lemonade” and 1.33 grams of marijuana. Reed’s blood contained 3.7 ng/ml of marijuana. The [federal DUI regulation] punishes this conduct. Indeed, Count One of the Amended Complaint charged Reed with violating the [federal DUI regulation] for this very conduct. United States v. Reed, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1205 (D. Nev. 2012). We agree with the district court and conclude that Reed’s conduct is punishable under the federal DUI regulation. Reed operated a motor vehicle in an unsafe manner while under the influence of drugs. This conduct is directly punishable by § 4.23(a)(1).2 We thus proceed to the second prong of Lewis. 2 The government argues that the precise conduct in question is not punishable by the federal DUI regulation, thereby concluding the ACA analysis at Lewis’s first prong. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 164. The government reaches this result by noting that the elements of Nevada’s per 12 UNITED STATES V. REED