Opinion ID: 1474082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: As to the Award for Damages

Text: In her complaint in the trespass action Mrs. MacDonnell alleged the jurisdictional facts; that she was the owner in possession of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 28, etc.; that defendant (California Lands, Inc.), within three years next preceding commencement of the action, forcibly entered and trespassed upon plaintiff's property. The complaint then went on to allege a series of specific acts of trespass and damage, and concluded with a prayer for damages in the total amount of $57,642. California Lands answered, alleging it conveyed the premises to plaintiff, reserving to itself the oil, gas, and mineral rights therein; that plaintiff had not then, nor ever had any interest in said oil, gas, and mineral rights; that there was pending in the state court in Santa Barbara County an action wherein MacDonnell was plaintiff and California Lands defendant, and in which action plaintiff claimed ownership of said mineral rights. The answer further alleged that in said state court action defendant California Lands alleged that it was owner of the oil, gas, and mineral rights in said property; that it was entitled to enter upon said real property, to drill wells thereon, to produce and take oil, gas, etc.; that in said action a decree and judgment entered in its favor. The answer in the court below admitted certain acts upon the real property in question pursuant to said decree and denied the remainder of the alleged specific acts of trespass for which plaintiff prayed damages. As affirmative defenses in the court below defendant California Lands alleged the pendency of the state court action, and the judgment therein; that execution on said judgment was not stayed; that all of the alleged acts of trespass were pursuant to and in accordance with said judgment; and that an appeal, prosecuted by the plaintiff, was then pending. Parenthetically, we state that the appeal was disposed of, as heretofore referred to, by the supreme court of the state of California on April 12, 1940, which affirmed the judgment in favor of California Lands, Inc. In his oral opinion the trial judge, referring to the action for trespass, stated:    In this action I think the plaintiff is entitled to recover something. Defendant has entered upon her land, drilled a well, which is in operation, built roads and storage tanks, and dug sumps. This development occupies about four acres of the tract. President of defendant company admits that it is proposed to fully develop the property in an endeavor to bring in five producing wells. Such development will destroy whatever value the land has for agricultural purposes. Evidence offered by plaintiff upon the question of damages is meager and unsatisfactory, and damages would have been difficult of ascertainment had it not been for the offer made by defendant at the close of the trial. Defendant renewed an offer heretofore made to plaintiff to pay to her in settlement of her claim for damages the amount of money she paid for the property, permitting her to retain the dwelling house and curtilage, reserving to itself, however, all sub-surface rights. Based upon this generous offer, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages from defendant in the sum of $8,078.82, for which sum I give her judgment with costs. The lower court found that the jurisdictional facts existed; that the conveyance from California Lands to plaintiff excepted the oil, gas, and mineral rights; that defendant was the owner thereof; that the judgment in the state court action had become final and by said judgment California Lands was entitled to enter upon said real property, to drill wells thereon, to take oil therefrom, to store the same thereon, to construct and maintain such structures as may be reasonably necessary for the said purposes, to occupy and have right of ingress and egress to and from said property; that defendant entered upon the said property and exercised the above privileges; that all of said work was in accordance with good oil field practice and was reasonably necessary to the drilling of said well and the production of oil therefrom and the storage and transportation of such oil; that in doing said work California Lands did not use any more of said property than was reasonably necessary for the said purposes; that in the course of said work certain specific things were done (enumerated by the court); that plaintiff alleged the acts set forth damaged plaintiff; that plaintiff failed to introduce satisfactory evidence of such damages; that plaintiff was not damaged by such acts except as thereafter set forth. The court further found that under the state court judgment California Lands had and will continue to have the right to enter upon the real property and perform said acts, and other acts as may be reasonably necessary to a realization of its mineral rights, but that under the law California Lands Inc. upon exercising the said right became obligated to pay whatever damages the plaintiff may have suffered or may hereafter suffer by reason thereof. It was further found that California Lands intends to drill four additional wells on the property, but may or may not do so, depending upon the market; that the well and tanks, etc., now in existence occupy three and seven-tenths acres of the said real property; that the contemplated wells, sumps, and roads, if constructed, will occupy additional surface; that when the five wells are completed, the real property will no longer have any value as agricultural land; that California Lands, prior to the trial, without admitting any legal obligation, offered by way of settlement to pay to plaintiff the sum of $8,078.82 (the total of principal and interest theretofore paid by plaintiff on her note) and to allow plaintiff to retain title and to use the house and the surface of the surrounding grounds; that this offer was made on condition that plaintiff convey clear title to the surface of all the property except the house and surface of the grounds surrounding, waive and surrender to California Lands all claim to mineral rights, not appeal from any judgment in favor of California Lands in the specific performance action (in the event such was the judgment entered), dismiss with prejudice an action then pending in Santa Barbara County in which MacDonnell was seeking to establish title to strips of land on the west and south sides of the property (heretofore referred to), and execute a release to the defendants of all demands and claims against them; that plaintiff be allowed the sum of $8078.82 as payment for all damages plaintiff has suffered or may hereafter suffer.    Judgment was entered against California Lands, Inc., in this action in accordance with the findings, and both plaintiff and defendant Capital Company (successor to California Lands) appeal. Capital Company urges, in support of its appeal, that all the essential facts were found in favor of California Lands and the trial court should be directed to enter judgment, in accordance with these findings, that Mrs. MacDonnell recover nothing from California Lands. Mrs. MacDonnell complains that the judgment should be set aside because insufficient and inadequate damages were allowed and because the court allowed the damages for future as well as past trespass, it being Mrs. MacDonnell's contention in this respect that the court was without power to deprive her of the right to collect damages for any future acts of trespass. The state of the law in California requires rather summary disposition of the appeal in the trespass action. Section 1069 of the Civil Code of California provides: A grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantee, except that a reservation in any grant    is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor. There is, apparently, complete unanimity amongst the various jurisdictions as regards the rule that an expressed mineral reservation contained in a deed carries with it, by necessary implication, the right to remove such minerals (including gas and oil) by the usual or customary methods of mining and thus reduce them to possession even though the surface ground may be wholly destroyed as a result thereof. 40 C.J. Mines and Minerals, § 571, p. 984, § 678, p. 1061; 48 L.R.A.,N.S., 883, note; 36 Am.Jur, Mines and Minerals, § 177, p. 402. The case of Yuba Investment Co. v. Yuba Consolidated Gold Fields, 184 Cal. 469, 479-481, 194 P. 19, has established that rule as a part of the law of California. See, also, the very recent case Trklja v. Keys, Cal. App., 121 P.2d 54, wherein the rule is reiterated. The opinion and findings of the trial court indicate convincingly that it was well advised as to the law governing the case. We are satisfied that the reservation of the mineral rights in the deed from California Lands to Mrs. MacDonnell gave it the right to enter the premises and to remove the minerals in a manner consistent with proper oil field practice. The trial court found that the appellee had conformed to that practice up to the time of trial. It is unfortunate that the plaintiff should find herself in a position where she is unable to recover damages for being deprived, by the dominant tenement, of the use of the greater part of the land which she purchased. But, such is the law in California. This hardship was apparent to the trial judge and realized by the defendant, which, by way of an offer in settlement made prior to the trial, tendered a sum of money equal to that which plaintiff had paid for the property and also to permit plaintiff to retain surface title to the house and surrounding grounds. This was not accepted. In the controversy over the legal aspects of the case the proof upon the question of damages was slighted and obscured; the trial court so stated. Assuming that all parties would accept the judgment, the court awarded to plaintiff what had been offered by defendant in settlement for all damages, past, present, and future. The apparent fairness of the offer under the circumstances as disclosed, together with a full realization of the unhappy situation in which the law left the plaintiff, clearly influenced the decision of the court. But the plaintiff declined to accept the judgment and by the appeal set at nought the Solomonian pronouncement of the learned trial judge. Under the law as set out above, we are required to set aside this part of the judgment. That part of the judgment in favor of Katherine MacDonnell for damages allegedly suffered prior to the trial of this action is reversed. That portion of the judgment denying plaintiff relief in her action for specific performance is affirmed.