Opinion ID: 2829039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady and Discovery Violations

Text: ¶12. Claiborne argues that the State failed to disclose the results of a gunshot-residue test, and that the State violated the discovery rule by failing to give notice that it intended to put on testimony by the chancery clerk that Claiborne and the victim had a divorce hearing scheduled. No gunshot-residue evidence was presented at trial by either side. Claiborne attaches a report (not made part of the appellate record) to his pro se brief indicating that Claiborne’s hands were “swabbed” for gunshot residue, and that Claiborne filed pro se motions requesting the results of any gunshot-residue testing. At trial, defense counsel explicitly stated to the bench at the end of trial that the defense had elected not to present any gunshot-residue evidence “as a matter of trial strategy.”1 ¶13. In determining whether a Brady violation has occurred, this Court applies the fourpart Brady test adopted in King v. State, 656 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (Miss. 1995), under which a defendant must show a) that the State possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); b) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; c) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and 1 This exchange arose when Claiborne asked to address the jury before it left for deliberation. Claiborne intended to address the jury on the issue of gunshot residue. While the judge was willing to permit Claiborne to speak, he would not permit discussion of evidence that was not admitted at trial. Claiborne ultimately chose not to address the jury. 7 d) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 1174. Carr v. State, 873 So. 2d 991 (Miss. 2004); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). Here, it is not apparent from the record that the State possessed and suppressed evidence favorable to the defense. Moreover, defense counsel expressly stated on the record that the decision not to submit gunshot-residue evidence was made consciously pursuant to trial strategy. Claiborne has failed to demonstrate a Brady violation. ¶14. Claiborne also argues that the State failed to disclose its intent to call the chancery clerk to testify that he had a divorce hearing scheduled for the day after the murder. At trial, defense counsel did not object to the clerk’s testimony on the ground of unfair surprise, and the record does not indicate that the witness was, in fact, unexpected. Rather, the defense objected to the clerk’s testimony as irrelevant. The court overruled the objection. ¶15. We review a trial court’s decisions on discovery violations and whether or not to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. Conley v. State, 790 So. 2d 773, 782 (Miss. 2001). A failure to request a continuance or mistrial when faced with an undisclosed witness or evidence results in waiver of a violation of the rule governing admission of untimely or nondisclosed evidence. See Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 9.04(I)(1-2); Magee v. State, 124 So. 3d 64, 70 (Miss. 2013). Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 8 overruling Claiborne’s objection, and if the witness was indeed unexpected, Claiborne waived his right to object.2