Opinion ID: 786209
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Impact of the Jurisdictional Divestment

Text: 36 The parties disagree over what should be the next step once we rule that the district court did not have jurisdiction over the § 301 claim. The Plaintiffs argue that the district court should have dismissed their § 301 claim without prejudice, but should have retained jurisdiction over their ERISA claims. Pls. Br. at 31-33. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs believe that the district court's opinion, which holds that summary judgment was proper because there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the USWA's alleged breach of its duty of fair representation, should be disregarded. For their part, RBX and the USWA suggest that the district court properly granted summary judgment. They ask the panel to affirm the district court's opinion as a straightforward application of binding precedent. Unions Br. at 19; see also RBX Br. at 16-20. 37 Generally, when a court lacks jurisdiction over a particular claim for relief, that court cannot proceed. Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.) (quotation omitted). No formal motion is needed to raise the issue, and an objection to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time at either the trial or appellate level. 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1393, at 773-75 (2d ed.1990). 38 Dismissal is undoubtedly the appropriate action, but the remaining question is whether prejudice should attach. The Supreme Court recognized that [a]t common law dismissal on a ground not going to the merits was not ordinarily a bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285, 81 S.Ct. 534, 5 L.Ed.2d 551 (1961). The Supreme Court has declined to alter this common-law rule, writing, If the first suit was dismissed for ... want of jurisdiction... the judgment rendered will prove no bar to another suit. Id. at 286, 81 S.Ct. 534; see also Mitan v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., No. 00-1554, 2001 WL 1216978, at  (6th Cir. Oct.3, 2001) (Dismissals of actions that do not reach the merits of a claim, such as dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, ordinarily are without prejudice.). In Heussner, a case that like Adcox is directly on point, we affirmed the district court's dismissal without prejudice when the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 301. Heussner, 887 F.2d at 675. We therefore vacate the district court's judgment because the court was without jurisdiction to consider whether the Unions breached their duty of fair representation. The district court should have dismissed the § 301 claim without prejudice and should have refrained from granting summary judgment on the § 301 issue because it did not have jurisdiction to do so. We do not reach the merits of the duty-of-fair representation component of the § 301 claim because of this jurisdictional limitation. 39