Opinion ID: 828424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: harmonization of statutes

Text: The majority asserts that there is a relevant distinction for purposes of compliance with the LDA between quieting title by adverse possession in a manner that would alter a plat and requesting the alteration of that plat.13 As a result, because plaintiffs here only sought to do the former, they were relieved of any obligations under the LDA. The majority is, of course, correct that our law recognizes a distinction between actions to quiet title, MCL 600.2932, and actions to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat,” recorded plat.” The fact that plaintiffs’ interest in the disputed property does not arise from the plat is irrelevant; the important thing is that, as a result of legal action, the plat would be “vacated,” “corrected,” or “revised.” Moreover, the township’s property interest does arise from the plat, and it is entitled to the protections of the LDA. 12 While holding that the defendants’ action was required to be brought pursuant to the LDA, Hall also decided that it was unnecessary to remand for additional proceedings under the LDA because the bench trial was “full and fair.” Hall, 255 Mich App at 286; see also Binkley v Asire, 335 Mich 89; 55 NW2d 742 (1952). Although I have no doubt that defendants in this case received both a “full and fair” trial, I would not fashion the same remedy. While such a remedy may have been appropriate in Hall because all necessary lot owners, as well as numerous governmental officials, had been joined as parties, here by contrast, a number of necessary parties under the LDA were absent. In my judgment, plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their complaint, and to add all necessary parties. See Martin, 469 Mich at 552. 13 The majority refers to Olsen v Grand Beach, 282 Mich 364; 276 NW 481 (1937), and Howard v Berrien Springs, 311 Mich 567; 19 NW2d 101 (1945), for this proposition, but those cases have little relevance to the instant case. While both acknowledge that title to platted property may be established by adverse possession-- an entirely unremarkable proposition-- neither purported to answer whether plaintiffs must bring an adversepossession claim pursuant to the LDA. Further, those cases were decided before the 1978 amendment of MCL 560.222 that made compliance with the LDA mandatory for actions seeking to “vacate, correct, or revise a plat.” 20 MCL 560.222. But what the majority fails to acknowledge is that, while under ordinary circumstances these actions serve different purposes and do not impinge on one another, under somewhat less ordinary circumstances, the actions overlap and do impinge on one another, as in this case, in which a quiet-title action has directly and necessarily altered a plat. This overlap, or tension, will not arise in every quiet-title action, and it will not arise in every adverse-possession action, but it has arisen in this case. Under these specific circumstances, the quiet-title action must be brought under the auspices of the LDA because, necessarily and indisputably, if successful, it will cause a recorded plat to be “vacated, corrected, or revised,” and the “exclusive” means of doing so is through the LDA.14 Because the majority sees no tension between these statutes-- the majority views it as of little moment whether a plaintiff avails himself of the quiet-title statute or the LDA-- it engages in no effort to harmonize these statutes. On the other hand, because I believe that there is tension between these statutes under the instant circumstances, and because I believe that it is of considerable moment-- in terms of the procedural rights of affected persons, the public interest in accurate platting, and regard for the Legislature’s intentions in enacting the LDA-- an effort to harmonize these statutes is required, in my 14 Martin recognized this point when it remanded the plaintiffs’ quiet-title action to the trial court to proceed under the LDA. If Martin had followed the majority’s approach here, it would have fashioned the same remedy as the majority: an affirmance of the trial court’s grant of title to the plaintiffs, but a nullification of that portion of the trial court’s order revising the plat. But Martin did not do this, and instead held that the plaintiffs’ quiet-title action was required to be brought under the LDA. 21 judgment, and such harmonization compels the conclusion that plaintiffs must file under the LDA. First, it is axiomatic that the more specific statute prevails over the more general. Jones v Enertel, Inc, 467 Mich 266, 270-271; 650 NW2d 334 (2002). “[T]o determine which provision is truly more specific and, hence, controlling, we consider which provision applies to the more narrow realm of circumstances, and which to the more broad realm.” Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601, 613; 751 NW2d 463 (2008). The quiet-title statute provides that “[a]ny person . . . who claims any right in, title to, equitable title to, interest in, or right to possession of land, may bring an action in the circuit courts against any other person who claims or might claim any interest inconsistent with the interest claimed by the plaintiff . . . .” MCL 600.2932(1). This statute, which applies to any person claiming any interest in property, seemingly applies to plaintiffs’ action seeking to establish title to the land free and clear of the township’s interest. On the other hand, MCL 560.222 provides the exclusive means available to “vacate, correct, or revise a recorded plat or any part of a recorded plat . . . .” This statute is applicable only to a much smaller subset of property actions. Thus, because MCL 600.2932 applies to all property actions and MCL 560.222 applies only to a limited subset of property actions, it would seem that the latter, the more specific provision, would tend to control. Second, there are relatively few quiet-title actions under MCL 600.2932 that also seek to “vacate, correct, or revise” a plat, while nearly all actions that seek to “vacate, correct, or revise” under MCL 560.222 also seek to quiet title. See, e.g., Martin, supra; Hall, supra. That is, actions to quiet title are rarely accompanied by a claim to “vacate, 22 correct, or revise,” while actions to “vacate, correct, or revise” are often accompanied by a claim to quiet title. Not only does this suggest that the more efficient means of proceeding in cases in which these claims coexist would be through an LDA action, but it underscores that the likely legislative intention when these statutes overlapped was that the more specific statute would control. If, after all, in a relatively high proportion of “vacate, correct, or revise” cases there would exist an alternative quiet-title action, it would seem that this would create a reasonably high likelihood that the Legislature’s intention to render plats increasingly accurate over time through the LDA could well be undermined. By contrast, there would be a relatively small proportion of quiet-title cases in which there would be the alternative of a “vacate, correct, or revise” action, and therefore a reasonably small likelihood that the LDA could interfere in any significant way with the Legislature’s intentions in enacting the quiet-title statute. Third, the potential harm that might arise if plaintiffs proceeded with their cause of action pursuant to the LDA, rather than in an action to quiet title, is inconsequential in comparison with the harm that might arise if plaintiffs proceeded with their cause of action as one to quiet title. Specifically, if plaintiffs proceed with their quiet-title action under the LDA, the only apparent harm is that a greater burden would be placed on plaintiffs to apprise persons with a potential interest in litigation of the pendency of such litigation. By contrast, the potential harm of not bringing an action to “vacate, correct, or revise” under the LDA is that persons with a potential property interest in ongoing litigation would not be apprised at all of such litigation and, as a result, would either be prejudiced in later asserting their interests or compelled to file new lawsuits, or that later property transactions would be thrown into confusion as a result of inaccurate plats and 23 affected persons compelled to file new lawsuits. Of these respective harms, I believe that the latter is far more potentially injurious to the integrity of the law, which again argues in favor of resolving the tension between these statutes in favor of compliance with the LDA. Finally, although the Legislature has provided plaintiffs with two avenues to assert their interests in the disputed property, the “doctrine of last enactment” also supports the position that plaintiffs’ quiet-title action must yield to the mandate that an action seeking to “vacate, correct, or revise” a plat be brought under the LDA. That doctrine presumes that the Legislature is aware of the existence of the law in effect at the time of its enactments and recognizes that, since one Legislature cannot bind the power of its successor, existing statutory language cannot be a bar to further exceptions set forth in subsequent, substantive enactments. [Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co, 468 Mich 702, 713; 664 NW2d 193 (2003).] Section 222 of the LDA was substantially altered in 1978 to state that a party seeking to “vacate, correct, or revise” a recorded plat “shall” file a complaint pursuant to the LDA. MCL 560.222, as amended by 1978 PA 367. On the other hand, MCL 600.2932 has not been substantively altered since its enactment in 1961. Compare 1961 PA 236, § 2932 and MCL 600.2932, as amended by 1964 PA 8. The fact that the LDA is the most recent statement of the Legislature again argues in favor of compliance with the requirements of the LDA. 24