Opinion ID: 1444899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues relating to pretrial matters

Text: In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue. He argues that prejudicial pretrial publicity made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial, thus violating his rights under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. With regard to change of venue, ORS 131.355 provides: The court, upon motion of the defendant, shall order the place of trial to be changed to another county if the court is satisfied that there exists in the county where the action is commenced so great a prejudice against the defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial. We review the trial court's denial of a motion to change venue to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Little, 249 Or. 297, 312, 431 P.2d 810 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 955, 88 S.Ct. 1048, 19 L.Ed.2d 1148 (1968). We address issues of state statutory and constitutional law before resolving issues of federal constitutional law. Stelts v. State, 299 Or. 252, 257, 701 P.2d 1047 (1985); State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316 (1983). However, for purposes of this case, we assume, without deciding, that the analysis of the issue presented is the same under the statute and the state and federal constitutions, because defendant has not suggest[ed] any different analysis under the [statute and] Oregon Constitution than under the United States Constitution. Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568, 573 n. 4, 825 P.2d 641 (1992). In the present case, defendant moved for a change of venue after the court and the parties had spent several weeks impaneling a jury. In order to ensure the impartiality of the jury, the court had taken special precautions; it ordered that each prospective juror be questioned separately and increased the number of peremptory challenges from 12 to 48 for each side. Defendant exhausted his 48 peremptory challenges. After hearing defendant's motion, the trial court found that the pretrial publicity had not been prejudicial, that any risk of prejudicial publicity had been diminished by the period of delay between defendant's trial for the Smith homicide and the trial in this case, and that any jurors with prior knowledge of the facts of this case or of defendant's prior conviction had indicated that they could and would base their verdicts on the evidence presented at trial and not on any prejudice against defendant. The court denied the motion for change of venue. The trial court carefully presided over the extensive jury selection process and was satisfied that the impaneled jurors could and would base their verdicts on the evidence presented. The trial court's determination that the jurors in the present case would be impartial is entitled to great weight. State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 575, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-38, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2891-92, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (trial court's determination that an individual juror would be impartial is a finding of historical fact entitled to special deference on direct and collateral review). There is no evidence, nor any suggestion, that the trial below was a media circus such as would have prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966) (the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect [the accused] from the inherently prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in the courtroom). Nor was the jury exposed to information in media accounts that was not presented during trial. [1] See Patton v. Yount, supra, 467 U.S. at 1035, 104 S.Ct. at 2890 (The relevant question is not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors at [the defendant's] trial had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant); accord State v. Savage, 36 Or. 191, 203, 60 P. 610 (1900); cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, 384 U.S. at 356-61, 86 S.Ct. at 1518-22 (noting prosecution and police leaks to media of information that was not admissible or offered at trial); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312-13, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 1172-73, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959) (the defendant was entitled to a new trial where the trial court excluded evidence as too prejudicial, but the jury was exposed to that evidence through the news media). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an order authorizing expenses for a pretrial public opinion poll. He wanted the poll in order to gauge the extent of pretrial publicity in Clackamas County about him and his connection to the Molalla Forest killings and the Smith homicide, in order to determine whether to seek severance of the six indictments for trial or whether he could receive a fair trial in Clackamas County. Defendant argues that the denial of his motion violated his rights under ORS 135.055(3) and his constitutional rights to adequate assistance of counsel, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and due process, citing Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We first address defendant's statutory argument. Stelts v. State, supra, 299 Or. at 257, 701 P.2d 1047; State v. Kennedy, supra, 295 Or. at 262, 666 P.2d 1316. ORS 135.055(3) provides in part: The person for whom counsel has been appointed is entitled to reasonable expenses for investigation, preparation and presentation of the case. The person or the counsel for the person may upon motion, which need not be disclosed to the district attorney prior to conclusion of the case, secure approval and authorization of payment of such expenses as the court finds are necessary and proper in the investigation, preparation and presentation of the case   . This court has not decided what the appropriate standard of review is for a trial court's denial of an expense request under ORS 135.055(3). The Court of Appeals has concluded that the decision whether to allow an expense request will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case and must be committed to the sound discretion of the court to which the request for expenses is directed. State v. Acosta, 41 Or.App. 257, 260, 597 P.2d 1282 (1979); accord State v. Gleason, 100 Or.App. 236, 238-39, 785 P.2d 376 (1990). We agree. Of course, the exercise of discretion is subject to an indigent defendant's constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the basic tools necessary for the preparation of an adequate defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). Where a defendant establishes the probable value of the assistance sought such that there is a significant risk of error in the proceedings if that assistance is denied, the defendant is entitled to that assistance at state expense. Ibid.; see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n. 1, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2637 n. 1, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (the denial of a court-appointed ballistics expert did not deprive the defendant of due process where he offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial). The trial court denied defendant's request for the expenses for the opinion poll, concluding that it was satisfied that the individual voir dire of prospective jurors and the additional peremptory challenges will permit the selection of a jury unaffected by pretrial publicity. Implicit in the court's conclusion was that a pretrial public opinion poll was not  necessary and proper [for] the investigation, preparation and presentation of the case. ORS 135.055(3) (emphasis added). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding. As to the constitutional claims, [2] the trial court's provision for extensive voir dire allowed the court and counsel the opportunity to select a jury capable of deciding the case on the evidence presented rather than on anything that the jurors might have heard outside the courtroom. Defendant failed to establish the probable value to him of the public opinion poll in light of the extensive voir dire provided or that there was a significant risk of error in the proceedings without the poll. Ake v. Oklahoma, supra, 470 U.S. at 77, 105 S.Ct. at 1093. The trial court's denial of defendant's motion for expenses for a public opinion poll therefore did not violate his constitutional rights. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of all prospective jurors who knew of his earlier conviction for the aggravated murder of Smith. Specifically, defendant contends that knowledge of the conviction was so prejudicial that it demonstrated an actual bias from which a prospective juror could not be rehabilitated. Because five of the jurors at trial were aware of defendant's conviction for the Smith murder, defendant asserts that he was not tried by an impartial jury, in violation of Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant's contention is not persuasive. Although it is questionable whether the court committed error by refusing to excuse those five jurors, [3] any such error was harmless in the circumstances of the present case. Defendant's complaint is that the five jurors who knew of his conviction for the Smith murder necessarily would be biased against him. However, during the guilt phase of his trial, the state introduced extensive evidence concerning the Smith murder. Because the jury heard substantial evidence about the Smith murder, any concern about prejudice that might have resulted from some jurors' having knowledge that other jurors did not have was obviated, and any prejudice resulting solely from the five jurors' prior knowledge would be, at most, insignificant. State v. Pinnell, 311 Or. 98, 109, 806 P.2d 110 (1991). We conclude, therefore, that there was little, if any, likelihood that those jurors' prior knowledge affected the jury's verdict. Ibid.; State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587, 595-96, 761 P.2d 524 (1988) (explaining standard for harmless error). In his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause of juror Morgan. He argues that Morgan's responses on voir dire indicated that she strongly approved of the death penalty and thus could not be an impartial juror, because she would vote to impose the death penalty if defendant were convicted. For essentially the same reasons, defendant also assigns as error the trial court's refusal to excuse juror Burklund. With respect to both Morgan and Burklund, defendant's only argument is that they would have been biased in the penalty phase if defendant were convicted. Defendant never has contended that either juror would not be impartial during the guilt phase of his trial. Because defendant's sentence of death is being vacated and defendant will be receiving a new penalty-phase proceeding before a new jury, he has suffered no harm by the court's refusal to exclude Morgan and Burklund for cause. Thus, even if the trial court's denial of defendant's challenges to Morgan and Burklund for cause was in error, an issue we need not and do not decide, any error was harmless. Defendant also assigns as error the trial court's granting of the state's challenge for cause of prospective juror Rohm, on the basis of her expression of opposition to the death penalty. The standard for excluding juror Rohm for cause is whether her views concerning capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions or [her] oath.' State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523, 536, 789 P.2d 1326 (1990) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). The trial court's ruling granting the state's challenge for cause implicitly includes a finding that Rohm's views concerning capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair her performance of her duties as a juror. There is evidence in the record to support that finding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding prospective juror Rohm for cause. State v. Montez, supra, 309 Or. at 574-76, 789 P.2d 1352. In his next three assignments of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause of prospective jurors Thomas, Somers, and Green for implied bias. The basis for defendant's challenge was ORS 136.220, which provides in part: A challenge for implied bias shall be allowed for any of the following causes and for no other:      (2) Standing in the relation of    master and servant    with the: (a) Defendant; (b) Person alleged to be injured by the offense charged in the accusatory instrument; or (c) Complainant. (3) Being    in the employment of any person referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (2) of this section   . Defendant argues that the state is the complainant in this case and that, because each of the three challenged jurors was employed by the stateThomas as a maintenance worker on a bridge crew with the State Highway Division, Somers with the Motor Vehicles Division, and Green with the Oregon Health Sciences Centerthe statute mandates their exclusion for cause for implied bias. [4] Defendant asserts that the trial court's refusal to allow his challenge for cause violated his statutory rights under ORS 136.220 and his constitutional rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In determining what the term complainant means in the context of ORS 136.220, we look to the legislation itself. The term complainant, which was added to the statute in a 1961 amendment to ORS 136.220, Or.Laws 1961, ch 444, § 1, [5] is not defined in ORS chapter 136. The 1961 amendment to ORS 136.220 substituted the term complainant for the phrase the person indorsed thereon as the prosecutor in both subsections (1) and (2) of ORS 136.220. [6] The amendment also reworded and divided former subsection (2) into subsections (2)(a) to (c) and (3) and added the word or information after indictment in referring to the charging instrument. [7] It appears that the legislature intended no major substantive changes by the 1961 amendment. In the minutes of the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill was referred to as a housekeeping amendment that would delete `prosecutor' because the private prosecutor no longer exists in the law. Minutes, Senate Judiciary Committee (HB 1171), April 13, 1961. There is nothing to suggest that the legislature intended that the state would be the complainant and, thus, that all state employees must be disqualified for implied bias from serving on all criminal juries. The language of ORS 136.220, as well as the usage of the term complainant elsewhere in the Oregon Revised Statutes, suggests that the legislature intended the term to have a much more limited meaning. ORS 136.220(3) lists three types of relationshipsfamilial, business partnership, and employmentthat give rise to an implied bias sufficient for disqualification. ORS 136.220(3) suggests that the complainant, one of the person[s] referred to in ORS 136.220(2)(c), is not the state, because person does not ordinarily include the state. See ORS 174.100(4) (defining person broadly, but not so broadly as to include the state). Because the complainant is a person, and the state is not a person, the state is not the complainant referred to in ORS 136.220. Other provisions support this reading of ORS 136.220. In ORS 135.165, the legislature has distinguished between the complainant and the state, thereby implying that the complainant is not the state. That statute provides: The complainant may employ counsel to appear against the defendant in every stage of the preliminary hearing; but the district attorney for the county, either in person or by some attorney authorized to act for the district attorney, is entitled to appear on behalf of the state and control and direct the prosecution. ORS 135.165 (emphasis added). In defining the parties in a criminal action, ORS 131.025 provides that the State of Oregon is the plaintiff, not that the state is the complainant. The statutory definition of a [c]omplainant's information as a written accusation, verified by the oath of a person, ORS 131.005(4), in contrast to a [d]istrict attorney's information, which is a written accusation by a district attorney, ORS 131.005(9), also suggests that the legislature did not intend the term complainant to mean the state. Although it is clear that the complainant is not necessarily the victim of the crimeORS 136.220(1) and (2)(b) separately refer to the person alleged to be injured by the offense charged and the complainantwe conclude that the legislature did not intend the broad definition asserted by defendant. Rather, we read ORS 136.220(2)(c) and (3) as providing for the disqualification for implied bias of persons in the specified relationship to persons who verify or swear to an accusatory instrument, such as a prosecuting attorney or grand jurors. In the present case, there is no contention that any of three jurors challenged for implied bias under ORS 136.220 was employed by the district attorney or any of the grand jurors who returned the indictment. Thus, none of the three jurors could be challenged for implied bias under ORS 136.220, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant's challenge on that ground. Further, because defendant has not asserted that any of the three jurors was actually biased or incapable of being an impartial juror, there can be no successful contention that defendant's state or federal constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury were violated. See State v. Montez, supra, 309 Or. at 594, 789 P.2d 1352 (rejecting the argument that `common sense and human experience' suggest that    a police officer[ ] could not serve as a fair and impartial juror in [a capital] case); see also United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 147-50, 57 S.Ct. 177, 185-87, 81 L.Ed. 78 (1936) (rejecting imputation of bias simply by virtue of governmental employment). Because neither ORS 136.220 nor the state or federal constitution required the disqualification of the state-employee jurors, defendant's claim is not well taken.