Opinion ID: 1282340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clifford Instruction[4]

Text: The defendant claims that it was reversible error for the trial court to have given State's Instruction No. 3, taken from State v. Clifford, 59 W.Va. 1, 16, 52 S.E. 981, 987 (1906). [5] The specific complaint advanced by the defendant is that the instruction by stating it is only necessary that [the] intention [to kill] should have come into existence for the first time at the time of the killing, contradicts the concept of premeditation, an essential element of the crime of first degree murder. We do not agree with the defendant's analysis of the Clifford instruction. In the preceding section we have discussed the elements of first degree murder in regard to a homicide by shooting as drawn from our prior case law. It can be conceded that the definition as developed from our cases has some degree of redundancy since we utilize the terms malice or intentional killing as well as a deliberate and premeditated killing. The terms deliberate and premeditated have not often been defined in our cases but do carry a certain degree of definitional overlap. [6] This point is made in LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law § 73, at 563 (1972 ed.): To be guilty of this form of first degree murder the defendant must not only intend to kill but in addition he must premeditate the killing and deliberate about it. It is not easy to give a meaningful definition of the words `premeditate' and `deliberate' as they are used in connection with first degree murder. Perhaps the best that can be said of `deliberation' is that it requires a cool mind that is capable of reflection, and of `premeditation' that it requires that the one with the cool mind did in fact reflect, at least for a short period of time before his act of killing. (Footnotes omitted) But, as LaFave & Scott also point out: The intention may be finally formed only as a conclusion of prior premeditation and deliberation. Id. Here, the Clifford instruction refers primarily to the intention to kill not existing for any particular time and arising at the moment of the killing. This means the specific intent to kill and is to be distinguished from the elements of deliberation and premeditation which are the state of mind conveying the characteristics of reflection. The present case illustrates these distinctions. There was an interval of time after the defendant and the victim argued and the victim went into his house and came out again. It was during this interval that the defendant armed himself. This speaks to deliberation and premeditation. Upon the victim's emergence from his house, these elements continued culminating in the specific intent to kill with the firing of the weapon. Defense counsel points to Edwards v. Leverette, W.Va., 258 S.E.2d 436, 438 (1979), where disapproval was voiced generally about this type of instruction. The specific discussion in the case, however, was whether the instruction relieved the State from proving a necessary element of first degree murder. We held it did not. We are also cited the Virginia case of Baker v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 88 (Va.1977), where in a per curiam opinion, the court concluded that the instruction might be made clearer if the word premeditated was removed in the prefatory clause. We do not believe that this adds any clarity to the instruction since the prefatory clause to constitute a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing is nothing more than a statement of the elements of first degree murder. The instruction is an intent instruction and could have begun (assuming another instruction had been offered giving the entire definition of first degree murder) with the prefatory statement to constitute first degree murder it is not necessary that the intention to kill should exist, etc. It is possible from a cursory reading of this instruction standing alone to infer that premeditation and deliberation could arise at the moment of the killing and thus arguably erase the distinction between first and second degree murder. [7] When the questioned instruction however is fitted with others in the case, the jury was apprised of the difference. This is the reason for the traditional rubric that instructions should be considered in their entirety. State v. Milam, W.Va., 226 S.E.2d 433 (1976); State v. Slider, 156 W.Va. 653, 196 S.E.2d 85 (1973); State v. Snider, 81 W.Va. 522, 94 S.E. 981 (1918). State's Instruction No. 1 clearly delineated the critical difference between first and second degree murder by stating that murder in the second degree is when one person kills another person unlawfully and maliciously, but not premeditatedly. We decline to reverse on this ground. Defendant's complaint as to State's Instruction No. 2 can be more readily dispatched. State's Instruction No. 2 defined the elements of first degree murder. The instruction also stated and if no extenuating circumstances appear from the evidence, you, the jury, should so find him guilty of murder in the first degree. The specific contention is that this instruction prejudicially singled out first degree murder by not covering all of the other lesser degrees of verdicts the jury might find. State's Instruction No. 1, however, gave to the jury a comprehensive definition of all verdicts the jury could return, i.e., first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter and not guilty. We see no reason why the State could not offer a separate specific instruction covering a particular form of verdict.