Opinion ID: 853377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Petition

Text: Because we have determined that Reichhart had probable cause to file her lawsuit, and therefore New Haven's malicious prosecution claim was properly dismissed by the trial court, we need not address whether the First Amendment right to petition the government precludes a malicious prosecution action based on an attempt to exercise a statutory right to challenge the validity of a governmental action. Ind. Code § 34-14-1-2 (1998) [4] ; United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222, 88 S.Ct. 353, 19 L.Ed.2d 426 (1967) ([T]he rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for redress of grievances are among the most precious of liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.). We do, however, disagree with New Haven that the Court of Appeals opinion was as expansive as New Haven claims. Noting that this was a question of first impression in Indiana, the Court of Appeals turned to United States Supreme Court cases which considered immunity from malicious prosecution charges in the context of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the National Labor Relations Act. In those arenas, the Court of Appeals noted, it is settled that the First Amendment protects a citizen's right of petition regardless of intent. Reichhart II, 729 N.E.2d at 606. Applying the same principle, the court held that: where, as here, a qualified petitioner brings a legitimate claim against a governmental entity in the manner prescribed by law, that entity is prohibited from pursuing a malicious prosecution claim against the petitioner regardless of her motivation in bringing the petition. Id. On appeal, New Haven contends that: the ruling of the Court of Appeals means that any person may sue any state, county, or municipal entity, or any public school corporation or state university in Indiana, with an evil and malicious purpose and without probable cause, so long as there is standing and there appears to be no abuse of process. In effect, New Haven argues that Reichhart II nullifies the common law of malicious prosecution with respect to Indiana governmental entities, collapses the torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process and, under the First Amendment, nullifies various state statutes and court rules. New Haven's view of the Court of Appeals opinion appears to stem from footnote 10 of the opinion: We do not agree with Reichhart's broad assertion that she had an absolute privilege to maintain a taxpayer challenge without risking a malicious prosecution claim. It is more accurate to say that her taxpayer challenge was privileged because she was a qualified petitioner who brought her claim against the City in the manner prescribed by law. Id. at 607. As New Haven points out, this footnote does not specify that the claim must be legitimate. Yet the opinion takes care to establish that Reichhart's claim was legitimate [5] and makes it clear that she was entitled to immunity from the malicious prosecution action because she had both standing and grounds to bring the taxpayer's challenge. Id. New Haven asserts that the words in the manner prescribed by law mean a mere procedural hurdle and will therefore open the door for a flood of frivolous, malevolent taxpayer challenges sheltered from malicious prosecution actions. We do not believe this accurately captures the holding of the Court of Appeals. Instead, we think it is clear that the court found a limited immunity from malicious prosecution actions for qualified citizens who bring legitimate taxpayer challenges against a governmental entity in compliance with all relevant statutes and court rules. The Court of Appeals took the view that the motivation of the taxpayer bringing the challenge is irrelevant as long as the claim is legitimate. We do not address the constitutional issue other than to observe that the Court of Appeals opinion is not as expansive as New Haven claims.