Opinion ID: 160106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conversion of Motion to Dismiss to Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: 11 In response to Mr. Whitesel's Complaint, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and attached supporting affidavits and exhibits. Mr. Whitesel in turn filed a Motion for Leave to Treat Portions of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as a Motion [for Summary Judgment] Under Rule 56 and for Leave to Respond. Aplt's App. at 84. He informed the court that he was awaiting the transcript of a ruling by Judge Hoppin that would support the allegations in his complaint. 12 The district court issued an order dismissing pretrial services defendants Ms. Sengenberger, Ms. Stransky, and Ms. Candelario, (collectively pretrial service officers), finding they were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from civil suit. In the same order, the court granted Mr. Whitesel's motion to treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment to the extent either party submitted materials outside the pleadings as to issues involving the remaining defendants. The court granted Mr. Whitesel leave to file a response brief. 13 Mr. Whitesel now argues that the district court was limited to, but went beyond, the four corners of the complaint in dismissing the pretrial service officers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). He further implies the court erred in dismissing these individuals without first permitting him to respond. 14 Mr. Whitesel's procedural argument is unavailing. First, Mr. Whitesel overlooks the fact that, although the court's initial order dismissed the pretrial service officers pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), at Mr. Whitesel's subsequent request, it reconsidered their dismissal under summary judgment standards, eventually entering judgment as a matter of law in their favor. See Aplt's App. at 147, 152, 155. Thus, the court was not limited to the facts alleged in the complaint and was entitled to consider any evidentiary materials submitted by either party. 15 Second, conversion of the motion to dismiss, with respect to the pretrial service officers, was proper. A court may convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment in order to consider matters outside of the plaintiff's complaint. Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1995). Prior to conversion, however, the trial court must give the parties notice of the changed status of the motion and thereby provide the parties to the proceeding the opportunity to present to the court all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56. Id. (quotations omitted). 16 These requirements were satisfied here. First, Mr. Whitesel himself initially requested the court to treat the motion to dismiss as one for summary judgment to the extent it relied on matters outside of the complaint. Thus, he had notice that the court might convert the motion. See Gurary v. Winehouse, 190 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating that [t]he essential inquiry is whether the appellant should reasonably have recognized the possibility that the motion might be converted to one for summary judgment). 17 Second, although the sequence of events here was unique, Mr. Whitesel had an adequate opportunity to respond before the court granted summary judgment in favor of the pretrial service officers. Although the court initially dismissed these individuals pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without allowing Mr. Whitesel to respond, Mr. Whitesel alleged in his response brief on the remaining claims that their dismissal was in error. In essence, he asked the court to reconsider its ruling under summary judgment standards. See Aplt's App. at 152 (interpreting Mr. Whitesel's position as objecting because [the court had] dismissed [Sengenberger] and Stranski and Candelario on a motion to dismiss when [it] should have dismissed them on a motion for summary judgment.). 18 More importantly, in support of this claim of error, he attached an affidavit and the transcript of Judge Hoppin's ruling to his response brief, thus, clearly urging the court's consideration of both documents. See Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 603 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding conversion is proper when the non-movant appends materials to his opposition and urges the court to consider them). Therefore, Mr. Whitesel was able to present evidentiary materials before the court reconsidered, and upheld, dismissal of the pretrial service officers under summary judgment standards. 19 Additionally, we note that Mr. Whitesel's counsel did not argue during the district court hearing, nor does he maintain on appeal, that there exists additional evidence that would support denial of summary judgment. Further, he does not contest the authenticity or accuracy of the evidentiary materials attached to the motion to dismiss. Cf. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 n.4 (stating that where a defendant attaches a document to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that is integral to the plaintiff's claims and its authenticity is not disputed, the plaintiff obviously is on notice of the contents of the document and the need for a chance to refute evidence is greatly diminished.) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 20 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Mr. Whitesel had notice and an adequate opportunity to respond before the court reconsidered dismissal of the pretrial service officers under summary judgment standards. Accordingly, there was no error in the court's conversion, and it was entitled to rely on materials outside of the complaint.