Opinion ID: 6221175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Direct Threat Analysis

Text: “[I]n order to prevail on its summary judgment motion as‐ serting that [Pontinen] posed a direct threat to himself and others, [USS] must show that the evidence on the question of direct threat is so one‐sided no reasonable jury could find for [Pontinen].” Branham, 392 F.3d at 907 (citing Anderson v. Lib‐ erty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)).
The first factor that the ADA requires us to assess is the duration of the risk. The parties dispute whether the duration of the risk is the length of one seizure or indefinite. The district court relied on E.E.O.C. v. Rexnord Industries, LLC for the proposition that, “[g]enerally speaking, if the risk is not con‐ trolled or controllable, the duration is indefinite and thus would weigh more heavily in favor of a finding of direct threat.” 966 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (collecting Seventh Circuit cases, among others). We recognize that there is contrary nonbinding authority, see, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 917 F. Supp. 419, 429 (W.D. Va. 1996) (finding that duration of risk of seizure was fleeting), but we agree with the Rexnord proposition, at least as applied here. Dr. Abu‐Aita warned Pontinen that going oﬀ of his medication would put him at an elevated risk of having a seizure, yet he insisted on discontinuing his medication. We find that the duration of the risk is indefinite. This weighs in favor of a direct‐threat find‐ ing. No. 21‐1612 13
The next area of assessment is the nature and severity of potential harm. Pontinen argues that the nature and severity of the potential harm are low because he sometimes gets a “warning signal” anywhere from thirty seconds to two minutes before the seizure’s onset. He argues that this gives him enough time to remove himself from any dangerous sit‐ uation, retreat to a safe place, and prepare for the seizure. He told this to Dr. Abu‐Aita, who wrote it in his notes. However, he only got a warning signal before two of his three or four seizures, so it is not guaranteed that it would happen again. And if warned, there is no guarantee how much warning he would get or that he would be able to get to safety. Consider‐ ing Pontinen’s seizures cause him to lose consciousness, the consequences in the Midwest Plant could be disastrous. We already recited at length the requirements of the “safety‐critical” Utility Person position. It involves working with and around torches, shovels, power actuated tools, mo‐ bile equipment, pneumatic equipment, oxygen lances, mate‐ rials that may be hot, heavy, or sharp, hazardous chemicals, and molten metal, and will involve, eventually, cranes, trac‐ tors, trucks, dozers, loaders, boom trucks, and feeders. Given the unreliability of his warning signal and the po‐ tentially catastrophic consequences of losing consciousness in this dangerous setting, the nature and severity of the risk nec‐ essarily weigh in favor of a direct‐threat finding.
We have “recognized that where the plaintiﬀ’s medical condition is uncontrolled, of an unlimited duration, and ca‐ pable of causing serious harm, injury may be considered 14 No. 21‐1612 likely to occur.” Darnell, 417 F.3d at 662 (citing Bekker, 229 F.3d at 668). The best available objective medical evidence here demonstrates that all three of these characteristics are true with respect to Pontinen’s seizure disorder. Therefore, we conclude that harm is likely to occur, and this factor also fa‐ vors a direct‐threat finding.
Finally, with respect to imminence, the undisputed evi‐ dence is more mixed. Pontinen’s medical history shows only four seizures spread over many years, so it is true that they are fairly rare. However, just before and after he began con‐ trolling his seizure disorder with Depakote, there were two incidents in as many months. And now that he has stopped taking the medication, he is at a higher risk of having a sei‐ zure. It is possible that he could have a seizure at any moment, but most of his seizures have been separated by long, une‐ ventful periods. This factor weighs in favor of USS, but not as heavily as the others.
Because all of the factors weigh in favor of finding that there is a direct threat, we are compelled to reach that conclu‐ sion. While Pontinen can point to a few pieces of evidence that support the idea that he has been doing well, he cannot point to evidence that creates a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to whether USS’s decision to rescind his employ‐ ment oﬀer because he constituted a threat to himself and oth‐ ers was proper. The evidence shows that USS’s determination relied on appropriate evidence, was made after an individu‐ alized assessment, and revealed an uncontrolled seizure dis‐ order that would create an intolerable risk at its Midwest No. 21‐1612 15 Plant. In other words, “the evidence on the question of direct threat is so one‐sided [that] no reasonable jury could find for [Pontinen].” Branham, 392 F.3d at 907. Therefore, it was not a violation of the ADA for USS to rescind, on that basis, the job oﬀer it extended to Pontinen.