Opinion ID: 6110597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Habeas Petition

Text: Conley filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County Circuit Court on January 26, 2018. 2 Therein, Conley argued that (1) the existing judgment and commitment order under which he is committed is void or defective as a result of our decision in his Rule 37 appeal, which vacated two of the three sentences that he challenged; (2) his confinement under the judgment and commitment order is unlawful because his sentence on the remaining count was determined by a jury that also considered evidence deemed insufficient to support his conviction on the two dismissed counts; and (3) his confinement on the remaining count violates his due-process rights. Conley sought a new sentencing hearing limited to evidence supporting his delivery conviction and the entry of a new judgment reflecting the jury's sentence imposed on that count. The circuit court dismissed Conley's petition.
A writ of habeas corpus is proper when a judgment of conviction is invalid on its face or when a circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the cause. Philyaw v. Kelley , 2015 Ark. 465 , 477 S.W.3d 503 . Under our statute, a petitioner who does not allege his or her actual innocence must plead either the facial invalidity of the judgment or the lack of jurisdiction by the circuit court and make a showing by affidavit or  other evidence of probable cause to believe that the petitioner is being illegally detained. Id. ; Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103 (a)(1) (Repl. 2016). Unless the petitioner can show that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction or that the judgment is facially invalid, there is no basis for a finding that a writ of habeas corpus should issue. Williams v. Kelley , 2017 Ark. 200 , 521 S.W.3d 104 . A circuit court's decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. Johnson v. State , 2018 Ark. 42 , 538 S.W.3d 819 . A decision is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
Conley first argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that his claims were not appropriate for resolution in the habeas corpus process. In dismissing his petition, the circuit court found that Conley's delivery conviction had been addressed on direct appeal and in a Rule 37 petition, and that [a] habeas corpus proceeding does not provide a means to revisit the merits of issues that could have been addressed and settled, in the trial court, on appeal, or in a post-conviction proceeding. The circuit court concluded that Conley's allegations did not offer any evidence establishing probable cause that he is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Conley suggests that because his existing judgment and commitment order continues to reflect the two dismissed possession convictions, he has alleged a jurisdictional defect that is cognizable in a habeas petition. In our Rule 37 opinion, we affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part with directions to dismiss the charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Conley , 2014 Ark. 172 , at 13, 433 S.W.3d at 243 . We did not order a new sentencing hearing on the delivery charge or the entry of a new judgment. If Conley believed additional direction should have been given, he could have petitioned for rehearing rather than assuming that the mandate would have given direction that was not set forth in the opinion. Conley's argument that the issue of the correctness of the recitations in the existing judgment did not arise until after this Court's mandate issued, is not persuasive. Our mandate did not add to or subtract from our opinion, and it was not inconsistent with the opinion in any way. Regardless, what Conley has advanced as a jurisdictional claim does not establish the circuit court's lack of subject-matter or territorial jurisdiction. See Rayford v. Kelley , 2016 Ark. 462 , 507 S.W.3d 483 (per curiam) (holding that jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject matter in controversy, and that a circuit court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases involving violations of criminal statutes); Cloird v. State , 349 Ark. 33 , 76 S.W.3d 813 (2002) (per curiam) (holding that an allegation that an offense was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court is cognizable in a habeas proceeding). Conley also argues in this section that even a facially valid sentence may result in jurisdictional error when it is imposed in violation of a statutorily authorized process, or if there is a change in the law that renders a previously valid sentence invalid. However, Conley's sentence was not imposed in violation of a statutorily authorized process, and unlike the claim in Jackson , Conley's claim does not concern a statutorily authorized sentence that was later declared unconstitutional. See  Jackson v. Norris , 2013 Ark. 175 , 426 S.W.3d 906 (remanding for resentencing of a juvenile offender after his mandatory-life-without-parole sentence was declared unconstitutional). Conley argues in his second point that the existing judgment and commitment order is void or defective in that it continues to reflect his sentence on the two possession charges which have been dismissed. Conley asserts that the judgment contains erroneous findings regarding his delivery charge as a result of this Court's failure to direct the trial court to conduct a re-sentencing proceeding limited to Count 1, the only count on which the jury's original verdict withstood Review in the Rule 37 appeal. Conley argues that the trial court was not at fault in failing to order a re-sentencing hearing and that we should correct our procedural error in this case. The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to remedy a detention of an illegal period of time. Morgan v. State , 2017 Ark. 57 , 510 S.W.3d 253 (per curiam). Conley is not serving a sentence for the dismissed possession charges, and he does not argue that his sentence for the delivery charge is outside the statutory range for a habitual offender sentenced for a class Y felony. Therefore, Conley's delivery sentence is not facially invalid, and he is not being detained for an illegal period of time. See Beyard v. State , 2017 Ark. 203 , 2017 WL 2378181 (stating that if a sentence is within the limits set by statute, it is legal). Conley cites no law mandating the entry of a new judgment when fewer than all of the multiple convictions were dismissed, and it is undisputed that he is not serving a sentence for either dismissed possession charge. In his third point, Conley argues that the judgment is defective because the jury that set the sentence considered evidence not only on the delivery charge but also on the vacated possession charges. Conley cites two cases in support of this argument: Buckley v. State , 341 Ark. 864 , 20 S.W.3d 331 (2000), and Taylor v. State , 354 Ark. 450 , 125 S.W.3d 174 (2003). Neither is persuasive. Buckley was a direct appeal in which we held that reversible error occurred in the sentencing phase of Buckley's trial because a law-enforcement officer testified without firsthand knowledge to Buckley's prior drug activities. This type of evidentiary-error claim does not call into question the legality of the sentence or the jurisdiction of the circuit court. In Taylor , the circuit court lacked statutory authority to impose a twenty-year suspended sentence, and as a result, it lacked authority to revoke the suspension and sentence Taylor to twenty years in prison. Here, the sentence for the delivery charge was statutorily authorized, and we have said that a claim that the improper admission of evidence may have contributed to a sentence is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding. Philyaw v. Kelley , 2015 Ark. 465 , 477 S.W.3d 503 . For his final point, Conley argues that his due-process rights were violated because the jury sentenced him on the delivery count while considering evidence deemed insufficient to sustain his conviction on the two dismissed possession counts. Assertions of trial error and due process claims do not implicate the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the circuit court. Williams v. Kelley , 2017 Ark. 200 , 521 S.W.3d 104 . Thus, the trial court did not clearly err by denying relief on this claim.