Opinion ID: 2330300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Officers' entry of Albert's room.

Text: While Albert is not a party to this case, the rights of MacKenzie in at least two significant areas (entry and disclosure of stolen goods) are affected by Albert's status and conduct at the scene under consideration. The only person who had any proprietary or possessory rights in the room involved, was Albert. He was the tenant, he was present, and he was in possession. He was the only person present to whom the constitutional right to have his house free from unreasonable searches and seizures was extended. [3] He, as an accused, did not challenge the entry of the officers. He did not testify at the hearing on MacKenzie's motion to suppress evidence and MacKenzie did not testify at that hearing that Albert challenged, in any way, the entry of the officers. The exceptant, MacKenzie, had standing neither then nor now to challenge the entry of the officers. The entry is not significant per se. It is significant only as it bears upon any subsequent search and seizure of property affecting MacKenzie's rights. It is in no way contended that the officers physically forced their way into Albert's room. The legal question is whether the officers were invited, expressly or impliedly, by Albert to enter the room or whether, as urged by exceptant, the principles of Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1947), as to the entry apply. Johnson is urged upon us as controlling wherein, on facts somewhat analogous, the court held that the officers gained entrance, without warrant, to Johnson's living quarters under color of office and that admission was granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right [1] at page 368 of 68 S.Ct. In Johnson the petitioner to suppress evidence was the accused and the person whose living quarters were entered. The case would be on point were Albert the exceptant here. In Johnson the tenant upon being informed that a Lieutenant Belland was at the door, who stated that he wished to talk with her, stepped back acquiescently and admitted the officers. The rationale of the court is that the tenant, overawed by the mere presence at the door of a Lieutenant (the case does not indicate that she was aware he was a police lieutenant), did not voluntarily permit the officers to enter, and that any evidence thereafter found by a search should have been suppressed. We do not accept Johnson as controlling the facts of this case. The single justice here found, upon disputed facts, that Officer Rideout's entry of Albert's room was with Albert's permission, voluntarily given and his volition unaffected by any aura of the law. As applied to the entry, no constitutional violation is established. There is no error in the conclusion of the single justice,  even though MacKenzie were in a position to challenge it. [4]