Opinion ID: 499711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: authority of the district court to grant injunctive relief

Text: 15 ICC charges error in the District Court's denial of its motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Wagner was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking injunctive relief from the alleged reprisals. 33 The question whether interim injunctive relief is available to federal employees seeking to prevent acts of retaliation is one of first impression in this court. 34 Upon consideration of the language and history of Title VII, and informed by the courts' traditionally broad equitable power to fashion preliminary relief, we conclude that the District Court was correct in assuming jurisdiction. 35 16 During oral argument, Wagner's counsel made clear that the interim injunction sought would remain in force until completion of both the administrative and judicial-review processes. We cast aside any notion that the District Court, prior to conclusion of administrative proceedings, could properly have indefinitely or permanently enjoined ICC from engaging in retaliation. To hold otherwise is to sanction a circumvention of the administrative procedures carefully erected by Congress in Title VII. 36 Any decision to impose a long-term injunction must be postponed until a district court, following final agency action, has obtained jurisdiction to review the case on the merits. 37 But we agree with the District Court that federal courts have authority to enjoin, when appropriate, retaliatory transfers and other acts of reprisal while the administrative or the judicial-review process is advancing. 17 The Supreme Court has recognized  'a limited judicial power to preserve the court's jurisdiction or maintain the status quo by injunction pending review of an agency's action through the prescribed statutory channels.... Such power has been deemed merely incidental to the courts' jurisdiction to review final agency action....'  38 If the court may eventually have jurisdiction of the substantive claim, the court's incidental equitable jurisdiction, despite the agency's primary jurisdiction, gives the court authority to impose a temporary restraint in order to preserve the status quo pending ripening of the claim for judicial review. 39 And, of course, if the court has already assumed jurisdiction following completion of the administrative proceeding, its authority to do so is all the more evident. 18 If the courts are to be divested of that inherent equitable power to maintain the status quo by temporarily enjoining retaliation against a Title VII claimant, there must be clear evidence of a congressional intent to do so. 40 In cases involving private-sector employees, some courts have found such evidence in the section of Title VII 41 that expressly authorizes EEOC and the Attorney General to seek interim injunctive relief against employers allegedly in violation, but which does not expressly empower claimants to do so. 42 The theory is that by giving EEOC and the Attorney General the explicit right to proceed for temporary relief, Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive means by which an individual could be protected from irreparable harm. Under this construction, if neither EEOC nor the Attorney General applies for an injunction, none would be available to claimants threatened with transfers, firing, or harassment. Other courts, however, have disagreed, and have held that the absence of express statutory authorization does not preclude a court from exercising its traditional power to afford protection to claimants facing irreparable harm while they are pursuing their administrative remedies. 43 Taking Title VII as a whole, and considering the legislative history of the 1972 amendments 44 and the broad statutory powers designed to effectuate and preserve the rights of Title VII claimants, we conclude that Congress did not intend to foreclose federal courts from providing injunctive relief in favor of worthy claimants, whether employed federally or nonfederally. 19 From its inception in 1964, Title VII has expressly conferred a private right of action by which an individual could pursue a remedy for its violation. 45 EEOC was not given authority to seek judicial relief on its own. Both Title VII and its legislative history are silent as to the individual claimant's ability to obtain temporary injunctive relief against reprisals. As we indicated earlier, however, without an express contrary indication from Congress, federal courts have inherent equitable power to issue such injunctions to preserve the status quo. 46 Thus, under the 1964 legislation, a private suit for a temporary injunction for this purpose was proper. 47 20 We may construe the 1972 Amendments to eliminate the availability of such relief to claimants only if we can discern an intent by Congress to do so. The language of the section, 48 however, does not itself support that interpretation. It seems clear that Congress, in that section, merely spelled out the full range of newly-created enforcement methods available to EEOC, thereby leaving no doubt as to that agency's ability to seek injunctive relief in the courts--a remedy already available to private litigants by virtue of the historic power of federal courts to afford it. 49 Congress likely felt that without explicit language authorizing EEOC to request injunctions in appropriate cases, needless litigation on that score was invited. But the delineation of authority granted to EEOC does not, in the face of congressional silence as to claimants, provide a sufficient basis for an inference that Congress meant to circumscribe the claimant's ability to seek interim injunctive relief from retaliatory acts. 50 As the court stated in McCarthy v. Cortland County Community Action Program, Inc., 51 21 [i]t is ... difficult to appreciate how a congressional effort to define the scope of the Commission's newly enacted powers could fairly be construed as an implied repeal of remedies which had theretofore been available to private litigants, particularly since repeals by implication are not favored and will not be assumed absent a clear manifestation of legislative intent. 52 22 Moreover, nothing in the legislative history of Title VII evinces a congressional purpose to preclude a claimant from seeking interim injunctive relief. But the section-by-section analysis approved by the Conference Committee does stress the congressional perception of the importance of such relief to claimants faced with retaliation: 23 The importance of preliminary relief in actions involving violations of Title VII is central to ensuring that persons aggrieved under this title are adequately protected and that provisions of this Act are being followed. Where violations become apparent and prompt judicial action is necessary to insure these provisions, the Commission or the Attorney General, as the case may be, should not hesitate to invoke the provisions of this subsection. 53 24 The need to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of Title VII proceedings becomes particularly compelling when claimants experience reprisals for asserting their rights. Retaliation threatens the very core of Title VII's guarantees, for it may well dissuade employees from ventilating their grievances. 25 The indispensable role of interim injunctive relief in achieving the goals of Title VII has been aptly described in a decision by the Second Circuit holding such relief available to a claimant against a nonfederal employer: 26 [W]e think it plain that for the court to renounce its incidental equity jurisdiction to stay such employer retaliation pending the EEOC's consideration would frustrate Congress's purposes. Unimpeded retaliation during the now-lengthy (180-day) conciliation period is likely to diminish the EEOC's ability to achieve conciliation. It is likely to have a chilling effect 54 on the complainant's fellow employees who might otherwise desire to assert their equal rights, or to protest the employer's discriminatory acts, or to cooperate with the investigation of a discrimination charge. And in many cases the effect on the complainant of several months without work or working in humiliating or otherwise intolerable circumstances will constitute harm that cannot adequately be remedied by a later award of damages. 55 27 EEOC has supported the availability of interim injunctive relief to employees and has, in the past, filed amicus curiae briefs advocating that position. 56 Moreover, EEOC regulations explicitly state that [n]othing in th[e] section [prescribing the procedure by which EEOC may seek such relief] shall be construed to prohibit private individuals from exercising their rights to seek temporary or preliminary relief on their own motion. 57 EEOC added this provision in 1977 to underscore its view that private interim relief constituted an independent right already recognized by the case law. 58 28 We reject ICC's thesis that awards of interim injunctive relief in appropriate cases would short circuit [ ] the rigorous exhaustion requirements and time limits thereby undercutting the crucial administrative role Congress gave to the agencies and the EEOC. 59 Maintenance of the status quo to prevent irreparable injury differs radically from the sort of circumvention and disruption decried by the exhaustion doctrine. 60 EEOC, the agency charged with broad implementation of Title VII, has expressed the view that courts should be free to exercise this traditional equitable power at the call of an individual claimant when necessary. There is no clear indication in the statutory text or the legislative history that the will of Congress was otherwise. 29 Having concluded that private-sector employees are entitled to seek interim injunctive relief to maintain the status quo, we are bound by precedent to hold that federal employees enjoy the same right. Congress 61 and numerous federal courts 62 have declared that the provisions granting federal employees protection under Title VII confer upon them the same rights and remedies as are available to their nonfederal counterparts. 63 30 The overarching purpose of the 1972 amendments was to achieve the goal of effectively eradicating employment discrimination. 64 Nothing in the language or legislative history of Title VII leads us to conclude that Congress intended to divest the federal courts of their ancient equitable power to fashion interim injunctive relief. We hold that the District Court has jurisdiction to grant such relief to federal Title VII claimants when the prerequisites for equitable intervention are met. 65 31