Opinion ID: 2804920
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Arbitrary & Capricious Challenges

Text: The Texas Petitioners’ primary arguments are that the EPA erred when it (i) used HYSPLIT modeling rather than prevailing wind patterns 18 and (ii) adjusted the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling. 19 To prevail on either argument, the Texas Petitioners must demonstrate that the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously and, to do that, they must show that the EPA either failed to consider “all relevant factors” or to articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336. Mindful of the “extreme degree of deference” we owe to the EPA “when it is evaluating scientific data within its 18 See State & County Br. 45–46; Industrial Br. 14–26. 19 See State & County Br. 39–44; Industrial Br. 26–30. 52 technical expertise,” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, and for the reasons stated below, we conclude that neither argument has merit.
The Texas Petitioners challenge the EPA’s use of HYSPLIT modeling on three fronts. First, they argue that the EPA could not legitimately use HYSPLIT modeling at all because HYSPLIT “cannot measure ozone formation or transport.” State & County Br. 45. Second, they contend that the EPA arbitrarily treated Wise County differently by using HYSPLIT modeling to designate it as nonattainment while using historic wind patterns to designate other allegedly similar counties as attainment. And third, they argue that, even among other counties that the EPA subjected to HYSPLIT modeling, it arbitrarily treated Wise County worse because the respective HYSPLIT models demonstrated that wind moved through those other counties—each of which the EPA designated as attainment—more frequently than it moved through Wise County. We address each argument in turn. First, we find no merit in the Texas Petitioners’ conclusory argument that the EPA erred by using HYSPLIT modeling at all because HYSPLIT modeling “cannot measure ozone formation or transport. See State & County Br. 45–46. Indeed, we rejected a materially indistinguishable challenge in ATK Launch Systems, 669 F.3d at 339, a case involving the EPA’s 2006 fine particulate matter NAAQS designations. See id. at 334. We did so there because the EPA had taken “reasonable steps to ensure that the ‘HYSPLIT’ model’s limitations were considered.” Id. at 339 (quotation mark omitted). Here too, the EPA took reasonable steps to account for HYSPLIT’s limitations by evaluating the 53 source-apportionment modeling and historical wind data that the Texas Commission submitted during the comment period. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 14–20, 23. Because “[o]zone and ozone precursors can be transported to an area from sources in nearby areas or from sources located hundreds of miles away,” see 2008 Designations Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,088, the EPA reasonably concluded that HYSPLIT modeling, as a more precise measurement of the path taken by air masses containing ozone precursors, was useful in determining whether wind moving through Wise County could have transported emissions to the areas with the violating monitors. Second, we find no merit in the Texas Petitioners’ argument that the EPA’s use of HYSPLIT modeling to designate Wise County as nonattainment amounts to arbitrarily disparate treatment. At the outset, it bears repeating that this Court has expressly sanctioned the EPA’s use of a holistic, multi-factor, totality-of-the-circumstances test for making NAAQS determinations, see ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336; Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 39, and we have twice iterated that, when using a multi-factor test, “ ‘discrete data points’ are not determinative” because isolating any one discrete consideration “ ‘ignores the very nature of the . . . test, which is designed to analyze a wide variety of data on a case-by-case basis.’ ” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336 (quoting Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 39) (emphasis added; alteration omitted)). Indeed, because the EPA’s “holistic assessment of numerous factors . . . drives the process,” we have recognized that “no single factor determines a particular designation.” Id. For this reason, the EPA could have subjected Wise County to arbitrarily disparate treatment only if it treated genuinely “similar counties” dissimilarly. Id. (emphasis in original). Given “significant” differences among counties, “a direct one-to-one comparison of the data,” including the methods 54 used to measure such data, could be “inappropriate” or even “illogical.” Id. at 337. As noted, the EPA conducted a HYSPLIT analysis in areas where it “believed [HYSPLIT] could provide additional insight into whether [the] area[] contribute[s] to nonattainment.” Resp’t’s Br. 110 n.47. The EPA reasonably determined that Wise County was one such area because Dallas–Fort Worth “experiences light wind speeds and winds from variable directions,” making HYSPLIT’s more sophisticated evaluation of wind patterns “a more useful tool than annualized wind patterns.” EPA Response to Pet. for Reconsideration from Devon Energy Corp. at 12. According to the EPA, this more refined analysis was not necessary for all areas of the country, particularly those in which “there was not significant debate over whether [they] should be included” in a nonattainment area. See Resp’t’s Br. 111. The EPA’s decision to use HYSPLIT analysis in one area but not in another fits comfortably within the agency’s “technical expertise,” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, and the EPA’s explanation for the differing treatment was rational. Moreover, although the Texas Petitioners direct this Court to other attainment areas that were not evaluated using HYSPLIT modeling—specifically, Orange County and Cattaraugus County in New York—the “significant” differences between Wise County and those counties “make a direct one-to-one comparison of the data underlying the analyses inappropriate.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 337. For instance, the EPA justified its Orange County attainment designation, in part, on its finding that “the density of [Orange County’s] emissions and vehicle usages are not of the level of the other counties in the CSA that are in New York’s proposed New York–Northern New Jersey–Long Island, NY-NJ-CT nonattainment area.” New York-Northern New Jersey-Long 55 Island, NY-NJ-CT Nonattainment Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 16 (emphasis added). In contrast, the EPA justified its nonattainment designation of Wise County, in part, based on the “[t]he close proximity of [Wise County’s] comparatively high emissions to violating monitors.” Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 23 (emphasis added). Similarly, the EPA designated Cattaraugus County as attainment not only because “it is in the prevailing downwind direction from” the nearest violating monitor but also because “other monitors representative of Cattaraugus County, as well as the rest of upstate New York, are attaining the ozone standard.” See Attainment Status for Jamestown, New York and the Remainder of Upstate New York at 6 (emphasis added). But in the Dallas–Fort Worth area, seven violating monitors surrounded Wise County and some of the monitors—including one located one-half mile from Wise County’s border—reported levels of ambient ozone higher than anywhere else in the United States. Because “the core reason for the disparate designations” did not, as the Texas Petitioners would have it, reflect an “inconsistent approach to meteorology,” Industrial Br. 19, the EPA did not arbitrarily and capriciously treat Wise County differently by evaluating its wind patterns using HYSPLIT modeling instead of prevailing wind patterns. Third, when Wise County is compared to other counties for which the EPA used HYSPLIT modeling, it is clear that the EPA did not arbitrarily subject Wise County to disparate treatment. The Texas Petitioners point to four other counties—York, Dauphin and Lawrence Counties in Pennsylvania and Roane County, Tennessee—each of which the EPA designated as attainment notwithstanding HYSPLIT modeling demonstrated that air moved through them to violating monitors more frequently than through Wise County. 56 But again, a holistic look at why the EPA designated these counties attainment but designated Wise County nonattainment demonstrates that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously. For example, York and Dauphin Counties are both near Lancaster County, which houses all violating monitors in the area. Because Lancaster County “is served by a single-county transportation-planning agency,” the EPA concluded that there were “strong jurisdictional arguments” for designating Lancaster as “a single county nonattainment area” and, accordingly, designating all other counties in the vicinity—including York and Dauphin—as attainment. See Pennsylvania Area Designations for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS at 29–31. In contrast, Wise County is part of the Dallas–Fort Worth CSA (which means it is presumptively included in the Dallas–Fort Worth nonattainment area) and is also part of the Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan planning organization (which implements programs and projects to reduce emissions across all included counties). In other words, jurisdictional and regional planning concerns—not differing approaches to HYSPLIT modeling data—drove the EPA’s conclusion that York and Dauphin Counties should be designated as attainment while Wise County should be designated as nonattainment. The Texas Petitioners’ comparisons of Wise County to Roane County, Tennessee, and Lawrence County, Pennsylvania, fare no better. Roane County is “geographically separated from the nearest county with a violating monitor” by approximately thirty miles and the ozone levels in the county between Roane and the next county with a violating monitor are in attainment. Resp’t’s Br. 122. The monitor in Lawrence County reports ozone levels that, at 0.066 ppm, are well below the EPA’s NAAQS 0.075 ppm threshold. 57 Moreover, the county with a violating monitor nearest to Lawrence County—Allegheny County—is not adjacent to Lawrence County. In contrast to both Roane County and Lawrence County, Wise County is adjacent to multiple counties reporting severe NAAQS violations, the closest of which is located a mere half mile from the Wise County line. The dispositive principle that the Texas Petitioners try to, but ultimately cannot, avoid is that under the EPA’s holistic analysis, “discrete data points” like the data from HYSPLIT modeling “are not determinative, because elevating them ignore[s] the very nature of the [holistic] test, which is designed to analyze a wide variety of data on a case-by-case basis.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336 (quotation mark omitted). Based on the foregoing analysis, we cannot say that, had the EPA declined to evaluate Wise County’s wind patterns using HYSPLIT modeling, Wise County “would not have been designated nonattainment.” Industrial Br. 19. Because none of the areas discussed by the Texas Petitioners is truly “similarly situated” to Wise County, and because the EPA fully and rationally supported its use of HYSPLIT modeling for Wise County, it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
The Texas Petitioners also challenge the EPA’s modification of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling on three fronts. First, they argue that the EPA has not rationally explained why it considered the source-apportionment modeling’s projected absolute impact—instead of its projected relative impact—that wind from Wise County would have on violating Dallas–Fort Worth area monitors. Second, they argue that the EPA’s analysis of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling was inconsistent with its analysis of 58 source-apportionment modeling submitted in connection with Illinois’s designation of Lake County. And third, they argue that the EPA’s decision to examine the model’s projected absolute impact rather than its relative impact violated the EPA’s earlier modeling guidance. We note, at the outset, that the EPA’s application, interpretation and modification of source-apportionment modeling plainly fall “within its technical expertise” and thus we owe it “an extreme degree of deference.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 338 (quotation marks omitted). To withstand judicial review, the EPA needs to articulate only a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168, show that it treated “similar counties” similarly, ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 336 (emphasis in original), and demonstrate that it did not run afoul of binding guidance, see generally Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020–23 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Because the EPA has done all three, we will not disturb its designation of Wise County as nonattainment based on the Texas Petitioners’ objections to its interpretation of the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling. First, the Texas Petitioners challenge the EPA’s decision to reinterpret the source-apportionment modeling submitted by the Texas Commission. As discussed, supra § III.F.1, when the EPA received the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling data during the comment period, it observed that the model did not rely on data from an entire ozone season. Rather, the projections in the Texas Commission’s model relied on data from June 2006 only. The Texas Commission based its approach on the fact that June 2006 purportedly presented “an exceptionally rich set of air quality and meteorological measurements,” “had the most high-ozone days of any month” and experienced “all the 59 meteorological conditions linked to formation of high ozone concentration.” See Response to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality’s Reconsideration Pet. at 3. Despite these assurances, the EPA did not agree that one month of data, even an “exceptionally rich” month, was sufficient. Specifically, the EPA observed that the ozone season in the Dallas–Fort Worth area was bimodal (i.e., reporting its highest ozone values in July-September but experiencing a lower ozone peak in May-June) and that the Texas Commission’s reliance on limited data meant that it failed to account for “all of the meteorology regimes conducive for ozone events” in the Dallas–Fort Worth area. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 16. According to the EPA, “emphasis on the average modeled impact is more appropriate when a full ozone season of model results is available.” See Resp’t’s Br. 131. Because the Texas Commission’s model was premised on baseline data excluding “events that happen in mid to late-summer that often set” the Dallas–Fort Worth area’s ozone levels, the EPA examined both the projected average impact and the projected maximum impact of Wise County emissions. See Final Dallas–Fort Worth Area Designations at 16. At bottom, the EPA had a “basic obligation” to conduct “reasoned decisionmaking.” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 25. When presented with the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling, the EPA determined that it “needed to be carefully evaluated and could not simply be accepted at face value,” Resp’t’s Br. 126, identified several methodological flaws in the Texas Commission’s data, adjusted the Texas Commission’s submissions to account for the flaws and articulated, quite thoroughly, a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., 371 U.S. at 168. On this record, 60 we cannot say that the EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously in re-evaluating the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling data. Rather, the EPA’s thorough treatment of all available data indicates that it in fact “surpassed” its “obligation of reasoned decisionmaking.” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 25. Second, the Texas Petitioners argue that the EPA’s modification to the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling subjected Wise County to arbitrarily disparate treatment. They compare the EPA’s interpretation of the Texas Commission’s modeling to its interpretation of source-apportionment modeling for the Chicago area. Specifically, they argue that (1) emissions from Jasper County, a Chicago-area county with attainment status, had a projected average impact on violating monitors similar to Wise County’s; (2) the EPA should have evaluated the average impact of Wise County’s emissions on violating monitors as it did for Jasper County; and (3) the EPA’s evaluation of Wise County’s maximum, as opposed to relative, estimated impact was, accordingly, inconsistent and resulted in an arbitrarily different result between Wise County and Jasper County. Again, we emphasize that applying different methods to different areas, standing alone, does not give rise to arbitrarily disparate treatment and given “significant” relevant differences between two areas, “a direct one-to-one comparison of the data” or the methods used to measure such data can be “inappropriate.” ATK Launch Sys., 669 F.3d at 337. Here, the significant difference lies in the quality of data submitted by the Texas Commission compared to that submitted in support of Jasper County. Specifically, the source-apportionment model submitted in support of the Chicago-area designations included data from a full ozone 61 season, which made “emphasis on the average modeled impact . . . more appropriate.” Resp’t’s Br. 131. As noted, the EPA modified the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model because it did not include data from a full ozone season. Moreover, the EPA had to compensate for the fact that the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model underestimated the number of days that monitors in the Dallas– Fort Worth area exceeded the ozone NAAQS because the model under-predicted peak ozone levels around the monitors, sometimes by a significant range. The source-apportionment model for Jasper County, however, had the opposite problem; it did not account for recent emissions reductions at a Jasper County power plant and thus the Chicago-area source-apportionment model over-reported Jasper County’s emissions impact. See Chicago Area Designations at 9–10. Stated differently, because Wise County’s model under-reported its emissions impact and Jasper County’s model over-reported its emissions impact, the EPA reasonably concluded that the two counties should receive different attainment designations. Third, the Texas Petitioners argue that the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously deviated from its earlier guidance on source-apportionment modeling, which guidance allegedly expressed a preference for relative, rather than absolute, modeling. Specifically, they argue that the EPA’s reliance on Wise County’s maximum potential emissions impact directly conflicts with the EPA’s 2007 “Guidance on the Use of Models and Other Analyses for Demonstrating Attainment of Air Quality Goals for Ozone, PM2.5, and Regional Haze” (2007 Attainment Guidance). In that guidance, the EPA stated that its “recommended test is one in which model estimates are used in a ‘relative’ rather than ‘absolute’ sense.” Id. at 15. 62 As a threshold matter, the 2007 Attainment Guidance does not speak to the use of source-apportionment modeling in the designation process; rather, it recommends procedures that a state can use after it has been designated as nonattainment to show that its proposed emission control strategy will eventually result in attainment status. But even assuming that the 2007 Attainment Guidance informs the current NAAQS designation process, the EPA did not err by deviating from it. Indeed, the 2007 Guidance expressly contemplates deviations in appropriate cases: This document does not substitute for any Clean Air Act provision or EPA regulation, nor is it a regulation itself. Thus, it does not impose binding, enforceable requirements on any party, nor does it assure that EPA will approve all instances of its application. The guidance may not apply to a particular situation, depending upon the circumstances. The EPA and State decision makers retain the discretion to adopt approaches on a case-by-case basis that differ from this guidance where appropriate. . . . Users are cautioned not to regard statements recommending the use of certain procedures or defaults as either precluding other procedures or information, or providing guarantees that using these procedures or defaults will result in actions that are fully approvable. . . . EPA cannot assure that actions based upon this guidance will be fully approvable in all instances. 2007 Attainment Guidance at ix. 63 As noted, the EPA fully explained why it revised and independently evaluated the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment modeling to account for “the limited data set [the Texas Commission] relied upon.” Resp’t’s Br. 136. Because the 2007 Attainment Guidance did not compel the EPA to limit its consideration to relative projected impacts, and because the EPA articulated a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,” Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, it did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it relied on Wise County’s absolute, rather than relative, impact on NAAQS-violating monitors. The fundamental deficiency in the Texas Petitioners’ challenges to the EPA’s revision of the Dallas–Fort Worth area source-apportionment model is that, to establish that “EPA’s administration of the complicated provisions of the Clean Air Act” was erroneous, Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41, they have to demonstrate more than mere disagreement with the EPA’s reasoning. Barring an unreasonable or irrational application of the “scientific data within [the EPA’s] technical expertise,” City of Waukesha, 320 F.3d at 247, we cannot say that the EPA acted arbitrarily or capriciously. The record plainly shows that the EPA “considered all relevant factors and articulated a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made’ ” when it declined to accept the Texas Commission’s source-apportionment model without modification. Catawba Cnty., 571 F.3d at 41 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, 371 U.S. at 168). We therefore hold that the EPA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it did so. 64