Opinion ID: 812701
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Likelihood of Confusion Factors

Text: The SPCA also argues the district court erred by not resolving more strongly in its favor the five factors other than actual confusion. For example, regarding the similarities between the marks, the district court concluded the two marks were dissimilar in many ways (such as typeface, color, and the use of the acronym “SPCA”) but similar in a few key ways (both logos prominently feature the word “Heartland” and a silhouetted dog and cat; moreover, the visual distinctions between the marks were lost when the SPCA’s services were marketed via radio). The SPCA argues these conclusions place too much weight on the similarities and insufficient weight on the dissimilarities between the two marks. Regarding the manner of marketing, the district court acknowledged the SPCA utilizes a wider variety of marketing methods than the Animal Clinic and offers a number of services the Animal Clinic does not. However, the court also acknowledged a non-negligible portion of the SPCA’s customers are people who might otherwise seek services from the Animal Clinic. On appeal, the SPCA reiterates the differences between its marketing methods and services and those of the Animal Clinic, and therefore asserts this factor should have weighed in its -13- favor. Regarding the relative care used by consumers, the district court concluded the SPCA markets its services to a relatively unsophisticated segment of the market, and therefore did not consider the factor to favor the SPCA. Before this court, the SPCA points to testimony it believes supports a contrary conclusion. Regarding the strength of the marks, the district court concluded the factor was neutral because, while the term “Heartland” was widely used by other businesses in the Kansas City area, it was not used by any veterinary care organizations other than the Animal Clinic and the SPCA. The SPCA argues this conclusion was error because the widespread use of the term Heartland in any context renders the Animal Clinic’s mark “extremely weak.” As with its challenges to the district court’s findings of actual confusion, the SPCA’s arguments as to the remaining likelihood of confusion factors amount to a simple invitation to re-assess the evidence before the district court. This exceeds the scope of this court’s review. La Resolana, 555 F.3d at 1177. D. Other Preliminary Injunction Factors Finally, the SPCA argues the district court abused its discretion in balancing the harms when determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction. In particular, the SPCA argues the district court erred by discounting the harms it would suffer as a result of an injunction because it brought such harms upon itself. This court has previously concluded self-inflicted harm can weigh in favor of granting a preliminary injunction. See Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1116 -14- (10th Cir. 2002). Moreover, the district court also concluded the potential harm to the SPCA from an erroneously granted injunction was mitigated by requiring the Animal Clinic to post a surety bond. The SPCA’s arguments on appeal therefore fall well short of demonstrating the district court’s judgment was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d at 1208.