Opinion ID: 2626372
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wright's reference to a lie detector test

Text: ¶ 35 We next address Allen's contention that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after Wright made an improper comment during the course of his testimony. ¶ 36 During the State's examination of Wright, the following exchange took place: Q. What, if anything, did you and Paul discuss about the nature of your telephone conversation after Jill's death? A. We just made it seem  we talked about what the investigators were coming out to talk to me about, things like that. Paul would reassure me that these things were happening to all of his friends and don't worry about it. You don't got nothing to worry about, you haven't done anything. They're going to continue to do this. Things like that. He had told me that they had asked him to come in for a lie detector test. (Emphasis added.) Allen allowed the State's examination to continue briefly following this statement before requesting a bench conference and asking the court for an opportunity to request a mistrial. Upon conclusion of the State's direct examination, Allen moved for a mistrial, arguing that the State had inappropriately and prejudicially elicited the lie detector reference from Wright. ¶ 37 The district court denied Allen's motion. Given the context in which it was made, the court did not find the lie detector reference to have been intentionally elicited or planned. Because Wright made the statement in passing and neither party attracted attention to it, the court concluded that the statement was simply innocuous and would not prejudice the jury. The court did offer to give a curative instruction regarding the comment, however, which Allen declined. ¶ 38 On appeal, Allen argues that Wright's reference to a lie detector test most likely caused the jury to speculate about why the results of [Allen's] polygraph examination were not placed into evidence or discussed at trial, and that [s]uch speculation logically led the jury to conclude that he was trying to hide the negative results of the lie detector test. He argues that this reference prejudiced his right to a fair trial, and that as a result the district court abused its discretion when it denied Allen's request for a mistrial. [6] We disagree. ¶ 39 Because a district judge is in an advantaged position to determine the impact of courtroom events on the total proceedings, once a district court has exercised its discretion and denied a motion for a mistrial, we will not reverse the court's decision unless it is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial. State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ¶ 45, 24 P.3d 948. Applying this standard in this case, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. ¶ 40 A review of our case law amply reveals that a mistrial is not required where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony presented. For example, in State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, 27 P.3d 1133, we held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after a witness testified that he had obtained the defendant's photograph from the Salt Lake County Jail. Id. at ¶ 47. We explained that the statement was not intentionally elicited, was vague and fleeting, and the defendant could not point to evidence in the record suggesting that the jury had relied on the witness's statement. Id. ¶ 41 Similarly, in Wach, we held that a district court did not abuse its discretion where it declined to grant a mistrial after a witness violated the parties' previous stipulation by introducing evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts. 2001 UT 35 at ¶¶ 44-46, 24 P.3d 948. We reasoned that the statement was not elicited by the prosecutor, was an isolated, off-hand remark, buried in roughly 244 pages of testimony, and was not necessarily inflammatory. Id. at ¶ 46. ¶ 42 Finally, in State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837, we concluded that a district court's refusal to grant a mistrial after a witness made improper references to other crimes the defendant had committed was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 38. We explained that the reference to other crimes was vague and came only after a lengthy direct examination and lengthy cross-examination, and that the proceedings move[d] along without undue interruption and directed the jury's attention to other matters. Id. at ¶ 39; see also State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 881, 883 (Utah 1988) (holding a district court did not commit reversible error by allowing a witness to improperly state that the defendant possessed an outstanding warrant on another offense because the statement was unintentionally elicited, was very brief and only made in passing, provided no details of why the warrant was issued or to which offense it was related, and the district court admonished the jury to disregard the statement); State v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah 1976) (holding the district court properly denied a defendant's motion for a mistrial after a witness stated that the defendant had been incarcerated in the Utah State Prison where the statement was inadvertent, not intentionally elicited, and neither counsel nor court made further reference to it). ¶ 43 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a mistrial for many of the reasons articulated in the cases described above. First, Wright's reference to a lie detector test was not intentionally elicited or planned. Second, the reference was vague and mentioned only that Allen had been asked to take a lie detector test  not that Allen had actually taken or failed to pass such a test. Third, the reference was brief and came only near the end of a three-hour direct examination. Fourth, the proceedings continued without undue interruption. Fifth, no further attention was directed to either a lie detector test or Wright's statement. Finally, the district court offered to give the jury a curative instruction regarding the lie detector reference, which Allen declined. ¶ 44 Because we agree with the district court that Wright's statement was innocuous, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant Allen's motion for a mistrial.