Opinion ID: 212239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Section 4A1.2(c)(1)

Text: We leave to the District Court to decide in the first instance whether Gonzalez-Rivera's conviction should be counted or excluded under section 4A1.2(c)(1) and how that determination might affect Gonzalez-Rivera's sentencing. We do note that Gonzalez-Rivera's sentence on the driving while ability impaired conviction was not more than one year of probation or imprisonment for at least thirty days, and his prior offense is not similar to his drug distribution conspiracy convictions. Thus, neither condition (A) nor (B) of section 4A1.2(c)(1) applies, and the issue for the District Court to decide on remand is whether Gonzalez-Rivera's conviction is similar to a conviction for careless or reckless driving. In applying section 4A1.2(c)(1), the District Court's goal will be to determine whether Gonzalez-Rivera's DWAI offense is categorically more serious than, United States v. DeJesus-Concepcion, 607 F.3d 303, 304 (2d Cir.2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), careless or reckless driving. A district court may consider multiple factors in making its determination, including: [1] a comparison of punishments imposed for the listed and unlisted offenses, [2] the perceived seriousness of the offense as indicated by the level of punishment, [3] the elements of the offense, [4] the level of culpability involved, and [5] the degree to which the commission of the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. Id. at 305 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 12(A). It may also consider any other relevant factor, including the actual conduct involved and the actual penalty imposed. DeJesus-Concepcion, 607 F.3d at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).