Opinion ID: 987122
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Summons Process (Claim 11)

Text: Yates first alleges a violation of his constitutional rights on the basis that the jury selection process failed to produce a venire drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Yates satisfies the first Duren requirement by identifying AfricanAmericans and Latinos as two distinctive groups that were excluded from his venire. However, he fails to meet the second Duren requirement-demonstration that the representation of a 'distinctive' group in the community was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. Id. at 364. Yates provides no census statistics relating to ethnicity of either Pierce County residents or the venire members in his case. The sole evidence of underrepresentation Yates relies on comes from a declaration by Mary Kay High, Yates's defense attorney at trial. In her declaration, High states, To the best of my recollection, AfricanAmericans and Latinos were under-represented on Mr. Yates' venire. In addition, Asians may have also been under-represented. Pet'r's Reply Br. App. LL. High based her conclusion on her personal familiar[ity] with the community and its ethnic diversity that came from having lived and worked in Pierce County for many years. Id. High's declaration fails to establish a prima facie case of a fair-cross-section violation because mere underrepresentation, in the sense that a group's representation is not at least equal to its proportion of the community, is not sufficient 8 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 to show that the representation is not fair and reasonable, Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. For example, in United States v. Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (lOth Cir. 2006), a defendant presented evidence that in a given year, four groups were underrepresented injury venires: African-Americans comprised 8.63 percent of the eligible population but only 5.06 percent of the venires, Native Americans comprised 4.27 percent of the eligible population but only 2.64 percent of venires, Asians comprised 1.64 percent of the eligible population but only .80 percent of venires, and Latinos comprised 2.74 percent of the eligible population but only 1.49 percent of the venires. The court held that this failed to establish the second Duren factor (i.e., that the representation of the groups was not fair and reasonable in relation to the population). !d. at 798-99. Although there is no single test to determine whether underrepresentation runs afoul of the fair and reasonable requirement, Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 130 S. Ct. 1382, 1393-94, 176 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2010), Orange illustrates that a mere allegation of underrepresentation is insufficient to establish the second Duren factor. Consequently, the mere recollection ofunderrepresentation is insufficient to establish the second Duren requirement, and Yates's claim fails. 2. Exclusion of Jurors by Court Personnel (Claim 12) Yates next argues that court personnel violated his Sixth Amendment faircross-section right by excusing prospective jurors. This argument suffers from the 9 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 same defect as above-it fails to establish that the venire did not contain a fair and reasonable representation of any distinctive group. Yates asserts that the court personnel's exclusion of jurors without Yates's participation violated his due process rights. However, Yates provides no admissible evidence of Pierce County venire selection processes. Helpfully, the State provided documents on juror selection that are admissible under the business records hearsay exception, RCW 5.45.020. State's Corr. Resp. toPers. Restraint Pet. App. B. These documents indicate that Pierce County creates a master source list using voter registration, driver's license, and Washington State identification card databases. !d. App. B(l). That method of creating a jury source list was upheld in Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d at 230-32. At the time ofYates's trial, jury clerks in Pierce County were authorized to excuse, without judicial oversight, persons who failed to meet the statutory requirements for jury service set forth in RCW 2.36.070, those completing two weeks of jury service within the past year, age-related requests, those with religious beliefs interfering with jury service, and those with permanent medical conditions interfering with jury service. State's Corr. Resp. toPers. Restraint Pet. App. B(4). Jury clerks also had authority to grant deferrals based on a variety of factors, such as verified temporary medical conditions preventing service, sole care for dependent family members, and persons with appointments or obligations that could not be canceled without undue hardship. !d. 10 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 Yates argues that this scheme is somehow unlawful. In State v. Rice, 120 Wn.2d 549, 561, 844 P.2d 416 (1993), however, this court squarely held that judges may delegate to clerks the ability to excuse or defer persons summoned for jury service pursuant to RCW 2.36.100. That statute allows for excusal or deferral upon a showing of undue hardship, extreme inconvenience, public necessity, or any reason deemed sufficient by the court. RCW 2.36.1 00(1 ). The policies at issue here were adopted by the Pierce County Superior Court Executive Committee and were, therefore, reasons deemed sufficient by the court. Yates is therefore incorrect in asserting that the reasons go beyond the statutory excusal factors. As such, no statutory violation occurred in Yates's case that might give rise to a due process violation. In sum, Yates's Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim fails because he cannot identify a distinct group that was excluded from the jury venire. Additionally, Yates fails to establish a due process claim based on a statutory violation. 3. Juror Pay and Failure To Enforce Summonses (Claim 13) Yates's next fair-cross-section claim focuses on Pierce County's juror pay and failure to enforce jury summonses, which Yates suggests excludes working class and nonelderly persons. Yates asserts, based on a hearsay declaration, that Pierce County pays jurors $10 per day and does not pursue prosecution of persons who fail to respond to a jury summons. Even assuming the nonelderly and working class persons 11 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 Yates identifies are considered distinct groups under the first Duren requirement, Yates is unable to establish the second Duren element. The second Duren element requires that Yates demonstrate that the representation of [these] group[s] in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. Though Yates includes the percentage ofPierce County residents that are between 18 and 65 years of age and the percentage that are over 65 years of age, he fails to establish the percentage of members of the venire within each of these categories. As to working class persons, Yates fails to show either their percentage of Pierce County residents or their representation in the venire. Yates's bare allegation of a discrepancy is insufficient, for nowhere in our jurisprudence is it suggested a bare allegation that the jury list is not representative is sufficient to bring this issue into play. Cienfuegos, 144 Wn.2d at 232. Yates therefore fails to make a prima facie showing of a fair-cross-section violation. We therefore dismiss Yates's claims that the Pierce County jury summons and exclusion procedures and jury pay violated his Sixth Amendment right to a venire that represents a fair cross section of the community. 4. Related Eighth Amendment Claims For each of his three fair-cross-section claims, Yates also alleges a violation of the Eighth Amendment guaranty of a reliable sentencing determination in capital 12 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 cases. The United States Supreme Court has indeed stated that the Eighth Amendment requires greater reliability in capital cases than in noncapital cases. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976) (lead opinion). The clear import of the Eighth Amendment reliability principle is that in capital cases, defendants are entitled to have juries make determinations about life and death after full consideration of the circumstances. See id. at 304; Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). Yates appears to argue that any defect with respect to a jury summons procedure in a capital case necessarily renders the result unreliable and is structural error. Yates's briefing is not clear about the nature of the Eighth Amendment reliability-guaranty violation, but he seems to assert that it is established either (1) in the same manner as the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section violation or (2) by some lesser showing than is required to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section violation. The first assertion, that the Eighth Amendment reliability error is demonstrated in precisely the same manner as the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section error, fails for the reasons discussed above. Insofar as Yates is arguing for a lesser showing, he is, in effect, contending that the same set of facts that are insufficient to make out a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section claim are sufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment reliability claim in a capital case. Yates presents no applicable 13 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 precedent and does not set forth what he believes would be the appropriate test. Moreover, this would extend the Eighth Amendment reliability principle well beyond the purpose for which it was conceived and has been employed. The Sixth Amendment and Eighth Amendment guaranties complement one another in capital cases; there is no basis to conclude that the Eighth Amendment subsumes the Sixth Amendment's guaranties in capital cases. Accordingly, we dismiss all ofYates's Eighth Amendment claims in Claims 11-13. B. Death Qualification is a Violation ofthe Washington Constitution (Claim 16) Yates begins this claim by asking us to overrule State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 940 P.2d 546 (1997), and hold that the process of death qualification violates article I, sections 21 and 22 of the Washington Constitution. Death qualification, as explained in Brown, is the process by which prospective jurors whose 'views would prevent or substantially impair' their ability to impose the death penalty may be challenged for cause in a capital case. Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985)). The Brown court conducted a Gunwall4 analysis and concluded that the Washington Constitution provided no broader protection in the context of death qualification than does the Sixth Amendment. I d. at 595-98. 4 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). 14 In re Pers. Restraint of Yates No. 82101-1 When a party urges us to overrule an earlier decision, that party must make 'a clear showing that [the] established rule is incorrect and harmful.' City ofFederal Way v. Koenig, 167 Wn.2d 341, 346-47, 217 P .3d 1172 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004)). Yates has not done so here. Where Yates's argument clearly fails is the absence of any showing that the rule announced in Brown is harmful. To do so, Yates would have to show, at a minimum, that the process of death qualification results in juries that are not broadly representative of the community or are otherwise not impartial. Cf Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (emphasizing the importance of a jury pool broadly representative of the community). While he makes conclusory statements to this effect and supports them