Opinion ID: 1698996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority Under Florida Law

Text: In the order below, the Commission stated that its authority to provide a definition of a local calling area derives from section 364.01(4)(b), (g), and (i), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides: The commission shall exercise its exclusive jurisdiction[ [7] ] in order to: .... (b) Encourage competition through flexible regulatory treatment among providers of telecommunications services in order to ensure the availability of the widest possible range of consumer choice in the provision of all telecommunications services. .... (g) Ensure that all providers of telecommunications services are treated fairly, by preventing anticompetitive behavior and eliminating unnecessary regulatory restraint. .... (i) Continue its historical role as a surrogate for competition for monopoly services provided by local exchange telecommunications companies. The Commission also cited Florida Interexchange Carriers Ass'n v. Beard, 624 So.2d 248, 251 (Fla.1993), wherein this Court stated: By giving the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over telecommunications services, the Legislature has provided the Commission with broad authority to regulate telephone companies.... The exclusive jurisdiction in section 364.01 to regulate telecommunications gives the Commission the authority to determine local routes. On the basis of these authorities, the Commission concluded that it had the authority to define a local calling area where necessary to ensure the widest range of consumer choice and to eliminate barriers to competition. Because the Commission further found that the issue of defining a local calling area had become too commonplace in arbitration cases between carriers and some finality was necessary to avoid the issue being litigated multiple times, it decided to establish a default definition that was as competitively neutral as possible. Sprint and Verizon, however, argue that section 364.01(4) provides only a general pronouncement of legislative intent and that sections 364.16(3)(a) and 364.163, Florida Statutes (2002), [8] more specifically prohibit the Commission's action. They assert that the decision to set the default definition as the originating carrier's local calling area allows ALECs to limit the charge to be paid to ILECs for terminating ALEC-originating calls by enlarging the ALECs' local calling areas. This practice, they argue, would run counter to the purposes behind the Legislature's 1995 enactment of sections 364.16(3)(a) and 364.163, which were to take away from the Commission the authority to adjust access charges and to prevent a diminution of access revenues to which ILECs are entitled. Sprint and Verizon argue that the specific provisions within sections 364.16(3)(a) and 364.163, therefore, must control over the general provisions of section 364.01(4). In response, the Commission acknowledges that sections 364.16(3)(a) and 364.163 restrict its authority in the area of access charges but also asserts that those provisions relate to access charges once the local calling scope has been defined. The Commission points out that those sections contain no language expressly prohibiting it from defining a default local calling area. The Commission also acknowledges that the Legislature has reserved for itself the authority to determine access charge rates but asserts that revenues and rates are distinct entities in intercarrier compensation schemes and under the law. Sprint and Verizon do not argue that sections 364.16(3) and 364.163 expressly and directly prohibit the Commission from establishing a definition of local calling area. Rather, Sprint and Verizon argue that the Commission's choice for the default, i.e., the originating carrier's local calling areas, will create a situation in which ALECs may circumvent access charges in violation of sections 364.16(3) and 364.163. However, what future actions ALECs may or may not take as a result of the Commission's order does not affect the Commission's jurisdiction to enter the order. [9] We agree with the Commission that the Commission's broad authority to regulate telephone companies under section 364.01 provides the Commission with jurisdiction to enter an order that sets out the default provision.