Opinion ID: 599255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Role of Admiralty Law

Text: 41 Our conclusion that § 503 does not preempt Ellenwood's state statutory and common law claims does not end our inquiry into whether those claims are foreclosed by federal law. Exxon also contends that, even if § 503 does not preempt them, maritime law does. We consider this contention first as to the state statutes and second as to the contract and estoppel claims.
42 In a brief footnote, the district court observed that, even if it had erred in its judgment about § 503 preemption, the state handicap discrimination claims nevertheless would be foreclosed because maritime law, rather than state law, governs all issues surrounding Ellenwood's employment as a chief engineer on board ship. The court stated that, I am not aware of any basis under maritime law for such a recovery. Memorandum of Decision, Oct. 15, 1991, at 4 n. 3. 43 The district court underestimated the role state law plays in maritime cases. Supreme Court cases make it clear that courts in admiralty cases may reach beyond maritime precedents and apply state laws absent a clear conflict with the federal [maritime] law, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341, 93 S.Ct. 1590, 1600, 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973). See also Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 373-75, 378, n. 42, 79 S.Ct. 468, 480-81, 483, n. 42, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 391, 61 S.Ct. 687, 692, 85 L.Ed. 903 (1941); Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir.1988); 1 S. Friedell, Benedict on Admiralty § 112, at 7-36 (7th ed. 1991); 14 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure (hereafter Wright & Miller ) § 3672, at 441-444 (1985). 44 Exxon contends that this is a case of conflict. It asserts that applying state non-discrimination statutes in an admiralty case will contravene federal maritime law by undermining that most fundamental and long established characteristic of maritime law: the need for 'harmony and uniformity' of that law. Exxon Brief at 21 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 37 S.Ct. 524, 529, 61 L.Ed. 1086 (1917)). See also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 26-27, 111 S.Ct. 317, 322-23, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990) (noting  'the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country ' ) (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 398, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1786, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970) (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575, 22 L.Ed. 654 (1875))); Carey v. Bahama Cruise Lines, 864 F.2d 201, 207 (1st Cir.1988). 45 Once again, however, Exxon heralds the need for uniformity without an appreciation for the boundaries of its relevance. All state laws, if given effect in admiralty cases, will interfere to a degree with the uniformity of admiralty law. See 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 112, at 7-36. But when Congress established a separate admiralty jurisdiction and empowered the judiciary to develop substantive maritime principles for use nationwide, 14 Wright & Miller § 3671, it simultaneously assured that state law would continue to play some role in maritime affairs through the saving to suitors clause. 11 This provision allows plaintiffs to pursue, in addition to maritime relief, ordinary civil remedies provided by state law, so long as they do not conflict with the national substantive maritime law. See 14 Wright & Miller § 3672, at 440-444. 46 Through the years, the Supreme Court has confirmed that [t]he State and Federal Governments jointly exert regulatory powers in maritime matters, Romero, 358 U.S. at 374, 79 S.Ct. at 481, and it is by now well established that state law is displaced only when it materially prejudices the characteristic features of maritime law, 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 112, at 7-36. As we observed in Carey, the Supreme Court ... no longer construes the Admiralty Clause as requiring 'rigid national uniformity in maritime legislation.'  864 F.2d at 207 (citation omitted). See also Lyon v. Ranger III, 858 F.2d at 27; G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, at 49-50 (2d ed. 1975). In other words, a state law claim should not be dismissed simply because it would result in differing remedies for plaintiffs in different parts of the country; such a claim is foreclosed only if the state law in question frustrates a fundamental tenet of admiralty law. See Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir.1986). 47 For example, in Carey, 864 F.2d at 207, we held that a Massachusetts rule barring tort recovery when a plaintiff is more than 50 percent negligent could not be applied in a maritime case because [o]ne of the essential and longstanding features of substantive admiralty law is that contributory negligence can be considered only in mitigation of damages. The rule wholly foreclosing recovery is  'completely incompatible' with modern admiralty practice. Id. (quoting Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409, 74 S.Ct. 202, 204, 98 L.Ed. 143 (1953)). 48 Although the rule barring state claims only if they directly conflict with basic maritime principles often requires a delicate accommodation of federal and state interests, Carey, 864 F.2d at 207, we have been shown nothing in substantive maritime law that is even potentially at odds with state human rights statutes such as those underlying Count IV of Ellenwood's complaint. Congress's only legislation in the area of handicapped rights has not been directed at maritime cases and, as discussed supra, its legislation did not preempt state remedies. We find no indications that the absence of substantive maritime law governing issues concerning individuals with handicaps reflects a federal interest in protecting maritime employers from such obligations. See 1 Benedict on Admiralty § 112, at 7-37. To the contrary, the Rehabilitation Act's applicability to maritime employers demonstrates federal approval of such obligations. 49 Thus, the district court's observation that maritime law has not addressed handicap discrimination specifically is not a reason to dismiss the state claim but a basis upon which to give effect to the state provisions. Maritime law historically has appreciated the leading role of state statutes in creating additional bases of recovery. In maritime wrongful death cases, for example, remedies first were provided solely under state law. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 23-27, 111 S.Ct. at 320-23; Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 397, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 1785, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970). When Congress enacted maritime wrongful death legislation in 1920, it provided remedies only where state law did not. Miles, 498 U.S. at 23-24, 111 S.Ct. at 321; Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397-98, 90 S.Ct. at 1785-86. State statutes continued to play a primary role for another fifty years, until the Supreme Court created a general maritime cause of action for wrongful death. See Miles, 498 U.S. at 23-27, 111 S.Ct. at 321-323; Moragne, 398 U.S. at 398-402, 90 S.Ct. at 1786-88. 12 50 In its reply brief, the State of Maine notes a possible concern that strict state standards regarding employment of the handicapped would conflict with the maritime doctrine of seaworthiness. The State emphasizes, however, that under its law, any legitimate physical requirements for crew members under the seaworthiness doctrine would constitute bona fide occupational requirements that would provide a defense to claims brought under the statute. See 2A Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 5, § 4572(1) (Supp.1992). Of course, whether or not a state's statute specifically included such a defensive provision, vessel owners obviously could not be held liable for damages under state anti-discrimination laws when federal maritime principles required the employer to make the contested employment decision. In that narrow way, maritime law would be preemptive. 51 As a general matter, however, we conclude that state human rights statutes may be applied in maritime cases. Indeed, it would be anomalous for maritime law, which has always shown a special solicitude for the welfare of seamen and their families, Miles, 498 U.S. at 36, 111 S.Ct. at 327, to reject such an employee-sensitive provision. See also Smith v. Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., Inc., 653 F.2d 1057, 1063 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981) (noting the admiralty court's protective attitude towards the seaman).  '[C]ertainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy.'  Miles, 498 U.S. at 36, 111 S.Ct. at 327 (quoting Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387, 90 S.Ct. at 1781 (quoting Chief Justice Chase in The Sea Gull, Fed.Cas. No. 12,578 (CC Md.1865))). See also Austin v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 705 F.2d 1, 6 n. 1 (1st Cir.1983) (state law is generally referred to only when it affords greater protection to maritime employees than that afforded by admiralty law).
52 Exxon contends that, in allowing the jury to consider Ellenwood's contract and estoppel claims, the district court improperly created an exception to the well-established rule that maritime employment is terminable at will by either party in the absence of a contract setting a specific term. According to Exxon, maritime law has clung tenaciously to the at-will principle, and only one narrow exception previously has been carved from it. In Atlas Off-Shore Boat Serv., 653 F.2d at 1062-63, the court permitted a claim for wrongful discharge when a seaman was fired for filing a personal injury claim that he was entitled to file by statute. No additional exceptions should be allowed to erode the strength of the at-will doctrine, Exxon argues, since the seaman's rights as an employee already are well protected by federal statute. See generally, e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 10302, 10303, 10313, 10502, 10504, 10505, 10506 (prescribing procedures governing meals, hours and wages for seamen). 53 Exxon misperceives the district court's ruling. The court did not devise a new wrongful discharge cause of action on behalf of Ellenwood. It simply recognized the obvious fact that--notwithstanding the general rule that a seaman's employment is at-will--a maritime employer may make a contractual agreement with, or an enforceable promise to, its employees. 54 In this case, Ellenwood claimed that Exxon had promised that his job security and future opportunities would not be jeopardized if he sought treatment for alcoholism. The jury found that the requirements for establishing a binding obligation were met. We see no reason why maritime law would invalidate this self-imposed obligation. 13 55 Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment on the breach of contract and estoppel claims. See infra Section V. 56