Opinion ID: 748839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Congress Foreclosed Enforcement of Title I

Text: 43 The Supreme Court, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, stressed that courts [should] not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy. 496 U.S. at 520, 110 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-24, 107 S.Ct. at 770-71). 11 To prove that Congress had this intention, defendants have two options. They may show  'by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself that Congress intended to foreclose such private enforcement. Id. at 520-21, 110 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770). Or they may establish that the statute itself creates a remedial scheme that is  'sufficiently comprehensive ... to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.'  Id. at 521, 110 S.Ct. at 2523 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626-27, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981)); see also Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468-69, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) (rejecting use of § 1983 to circumvent Congress' carefully tailored scheme under the Education of the Handicapped Act). 44 We fail to locate any congressional intention to foreclose a § 1983 remedy for the enforcement of Title I for three reasons. First, the presence of administrative channels for a beneficiary to dispute the content of an IWRP does not preclude judicial review under § 1983. In Wright, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937 and the implementing regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development were sufficiently comprehensive that they left no room for additional remedies under § 1983. See 479 U.S. at 423-29, 107 S.Ct. at 770-73. The administrative procedures in Wright included informal and formal hearings and administrative appeals, conducted within each [Public Housing Authority (PHA) ] by impartial decision makers, to consider adverse decisions taken against tenants by the PHA. Id. at 426, 107 S.Ct. at 772. The Court held that review under § 1983 was possible, noting that the existence of a state administrative remedy does not ordinarily foreclose resort to § 1983. Id. at 427-28, 107 S.Ct. at 772-73 (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982)). The Rehabilitation Act contains analogous levels of administrative hearings and appeals to those at issue in Wright. 45 Second, the existence of a judicial remedy does not foreclose the availability of a § 1983 remedy. In Wright, the Supreme Court also distinguished the statute at issue from the ones in Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson, noting that those statutes provided judicial remedies, thereby evidencing congressional intent to supplant the § 1983 remedy. Id. at 427, 107 S.Ct. at 772. Even though the Rehabilitation Act provides for a judicial remedy, the statute does not foreclose a private remedy under § 1983 because only a state may use this statutory remedy. This remedy is available only to challenge the approval of a state's plan, any federal limitation on payments, and the proper disbursement of withheld funds. See 29 U.S.C. § 721(d)(1). A limited judicial remedy like § 721(d)(1) is not sufficiently comprehensive to preclude a private remedy under § 1983. 46 Finally, unlike the statutes in Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson, the only discernable congressional intent in the Rehabilitation Act is not to supplant the § 1983 remedy. Mallett argues that legislative history from an amendment evidences an intent to allow a private right of action. In its 1986 Amendment, Congress removed federal review of some of the state director's decisions. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, 100 Stat. at 1815-17. In the Amendment's House Conference Report, a disclaimer states that [n]othing in the conference agreement prohibits any individual from pursuing a private right of action. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 955, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3471, 3517, 3528. 47 We are wary, however, of accepting one line from a conference report as speaking for the entire Congress. Our reluctance stems from the fact that it is unclear whether this statement accurately reflects the view of the conference committee or whether it is the opinion of one House committee staff member. To us, this statement simply suggests that someone wanted to ensure that § 1983 would still be available. 48 We find the manner in which a private right of action fits into the Rehabilitation's administrative review structure to be persuasive evidence of a congressional intent to allow a private judicial remedy. A private right of action under § 1983 for Title I of the Rehabilitation Act complements the existing administrative procedures without creating overlapping systems of review. A plaintiff may use § 1983 only when he or she alleges that a state's plan does not satisfy a mandatory provision the federal statute requires as a condition for receiving federal funds. See Clifton, 969 F.2d at 285. For disputes about whether the application of state plan in a specific instance satisfies the federal requirement, a plaintiff must use the administrative review channels. See id. This interaction between judicial and administrative remedies mirrors the federal-state relationship in Spending Clause statutes like the Rehabilitation Act. Contrary to assertions that the Act's remedial scheme is too comprehensive to allow a § 1983 action, we conclude that the structure of the Rehabilitation Act invites a limited application of § 1983. 49 Thus, Mallett may challenge whether DVR's policy disfavoring funding graduate school education violates his right to an IWRP under § 1983. 12 50