Opinion ID: 1846577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in its refusal to grant authority to perfect an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial of denton's motion to compel discovery.

Text: ¶ 35. Denton argues that the trial court erred in not allowing him to perfect an interlocutory appeal after his motion to compel Michelle to reconvene her deposition was denied. Denton first moved the trial court to grant him authority to perfect an interlocutory appeal before trial started. The chancellor reserved its consideration of that motion until the conclusion of trial. Then, at the end of trial, Denton again made the motion and was denied. ¶ 36. Permissive interlocutory appeals are governed by M.R.A.P. 5.: a) Petition for Permission to Appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought if the order grants or denies certification by the trial court that a substantial basis exists for a difference of opinion on a question of law as to which appellate resolution may: (1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation and avoid exceptional expense to the parties; or (2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or (3) Resolve an issue of general importance in the administration of justice. ¶ 37. In Haynes v. Anderson, 597 So.2d 615, 617 (Miss.1992), the Court found that, as a general rule, this Court has declared that it is not about to become involved in the wholesale granting of interlocutory appeals of civil discovery disputes. Pre-trial discovery is governed by flexible rules well within the administrative capacity of our trial courts. In re Knapp, 536 So.2d 1330, 1333 (Miss.1988); Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney L, 511 So.2d 119, 121 (Miss.1987) (Rarely will we entertain an interlocutory appeal regarding a discovery matter.) A limited exception has been carved out for substantial questions of privilege... where correction of any error on appeal from a final judgment would be futile. Knapp, 536 So.2d at 1333.... ¶ 38. Under Issue III, we found that the chancellor cured any error that may have occurred when he allowed Denton leniency in questioning Michelle at trial. Therefore, the chancellor's denial of Denton's motion to compel did not warrant an interlocutory appeal.