Opinion ID: 2677168
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04

Text: The Panel declined to address Mr. Long’s constitutional challenge to Rule 9 on the merits because Mr. Long had not given the Attorney General notice of his facial constitutional challenge based on Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04. The Trial Court did not address the Panel’s ruling that Mr. Long had waived his constitutional issues for failing to comply with Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04. Instead, the Trial Court ruled that Mr. Long had “failed to demonstrate that Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9 is unconstitutional in any respect.” Rule 24.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: When the validity of a statute . . . or an administrative rule . . . of this state is drawn in question in any action to which the state or an officer or agency is not -9- a party, the court shall require that notice be given the Attorney General, specifying the pertinent statute, rule or regulation. By its terms, Rule 24.04 applies “in any action to which the state or an officer or agency is not a party.” As a self-sustaining entity established by this Court, the Board is a state agency. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-23-207 (2011) (providing in part that “any self-sustaining board, commission or agency created by the supreme court of Tennessee shall be deemed a state agency and all employees of such boards, commissions or agencies shall be deemed state employees and entitled to the same rights and benefits enjoyed by other state employees”). The Board, through the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, was the petitioner in the disciplinary proceeding. Because the Board is a state agency and a party in attorney disciplinary proceedings brought under Rule 9, Rule 24.04 is inapplicable in such proceedings. Thus, the Panel erred in ruling that Mr. Long was required to give notice to the Attorney General of his facial constitutional challenge to Rule 9. However, for the jurisdictional reason discussed below, that error is immaterial. 2. Jurisdiction to Consider Facial Challenges to Court Rules Under Tennessee law, only the Tennessee Supreme Court may determine the facial validity of its rules. Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn. 1976); see also Petition of Tenn. Bar Ass’n, 539 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tenn. 1976) (stating that “no other Court in Tennessee has jurisdiction to review and change or void any Rule promulgated by this Court”). Mr. Long asserted before the Panel and the Trial Court that Rule 9 was unconstitutional on its face. However, under Barger and Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass’n, neither the Panel nor the Trial Court had jurisdiction to decide Mr. Long’s facial constitutional challenge.8 8 To be clear, we are faced here with a facial challenge to a rule promulgated by the Supreme Court, over which trial courts (and, by inference, hearing panels) have no jurisdiction. As a general rule, however, Tennessee law permits administrative agencies to rule on as-applied constitutional challenges raised in hearings before those agencies. Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 455 (stating that “administrative agencies have no authority to determine the facial constitutionality of a statute. They are authorized, however, to determine the constitutionality of the application of statutes or rules and of the procedures employed”). Richardson pertains to agencies governed by the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-5-101 to -404 (2011 & Supp. 2013), which does not apply to attorney disciplinary proceedings under Rule 9. The standard of review in Rule 9 allows a trial court to reverse or modify a hearing panel’s decision “if the rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the panel’s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions. . . .” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 1.3. The question of whether hearing panels may rule on as-applied challenges is not before us in this case, and we therefore do not decide that issue. -10- There are two ways to challenge the facial validity of Supreme Court rules. The first is to file a petition directly with this Court. As the Court stated in Barger: When any individual deems any Rule of Court to be objectionable from any standpoint, it is his [or her] privilege to petition the Court for its elimination or modification. Indeed, it is the duty of the solicitors at the Bar of this Court to make suggestions and recommendations on the orderly administration of the appellate judicial process. Barger, 535 S.W.2d at 342. The Court treated the pleadings in Barger as constituting a motion to vacate or modify Rule 42 and addressed the facial challenge to the rule. Id. The second way to raise a facial constitutional challenge is to assert it in an appeal to this Court. See, e.g., Moncier v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 406 S.W.3d 139, 151-53 (Tenn. 2013) (addressing a void-for-vagueness challenge to Rule 9, § 24.3, among other issues raised in the appeal of a hearing panel’s decision on a petition for relief from costs); cf. Richardson, 913 S.W.2d at 456-57 (discussing the procedure for raising facial constitutional challenges in proceedings governed by the Administrative Procedures Act). Mr. Long pursued this second method by raising his facial constitutional challenge to Rule 9 as one of a number of issues before the Panel. We, therefore, will address Mr. Long’s constitutional challenge to Rule 9, even though the Panel and the Trial Court lacked the authority to rule on the issue below. 3. Constitutional Challenges Mr. Long asserts three separate arguments in his constitutional challenge to Rule 9. He contends that Rule 9 is unconstitutional and violates his due process rights because: (1) it combines investigative, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority in the same judicial agency; (2) it creates a financial incentive for the Board to pursue formal disciplinary proceedings; and (3) it gives rise to an institutional bias in favor of finding guilt and imposing discipline, because the Board derives income from costs only in the event that there is a finding of misconduct. We will address each of these issues in turn. First, Mr. Long argues that Rule 9 is unconstitutional because it combines investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in the Board. Pointing to general due process principles, Mr. Long argues that due process means “fundamental fairness and substantial justice,” State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tenn. 2012), and that in a disciplinary proceeding, an attorney “is entitled to procedural due process.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968). Mr. Long submits that the combining of investigative, -11- enforcement, and adjudicative functions within the Board inherently denies him the right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal. This, Mr. Long contends, is a structural constitutional error, requiring automatic reversal. Although Mr. Long cites a number of cases setting out general due process principles, he cites no case holding that a particular jurisdiction’s attorney disciplinary system is unconstitutional on the ground that investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions are combined in a single agency. Our own research indicates that Mr. Long’s argument is without merit. We previously addressed the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in the context of school disciplinary proceedings in Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Board of Public Education, 380 S.W.3d 715, 735 (Tenn. 2012), and found that the merging of these functions comports with due process. As we explained: Due process does not require all the structural safeguards in administrative and civil adjudicatory proceedings that we have come to expect in criminal proceedings. Accordingly, while the separation of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions is a hallmark of criminal proceedings, due process does not require the strict adherence to separation of functions in civil matters. [Thus], some combination of overlapping of functions in an administrative proceeding is not inconsistent with fundamental fairness. Id. (citations omitted). We also have addressed this issue, albeit tangentially, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In Moncier, we considered whether members of a hearing panel should have recused themselves on the ground of alleged bias due to the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in the Board. As we wrote: When an assertion of bias is premised solely on an administrative adjudicator’s exercise of both investigative and adjudicative functions, the party making the contention must show that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Any form of function combination, occurring alone -12- and without other exacerbating biasing influences, is very unlikely to run afoul of procedural due process. Moncier, 406 S.W.3d at 161 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We find the principles from Heyne and Moncier persuasive. Attorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal proceedings, and to prove a risk of bias that would give rise to a due process violation, a litigant must point to more than a simple combination of functions within the Board. Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected claims that the combination of investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in a single attorney disciplinary agency (or judicial disciplinary agency) violates due process principles. See, e.g., In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1975) (stating that the “combination of judicial and investigative functions in the Commission [on Judicial Qualifications] did not violate petitioner’s due process rights under eigher [sic] the federal constitution or Alaska’s constitution”); People v. Varallo, 913 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo. 1996) (holding that “[t]he fact that the members of the grievance committee and the disciplinary counsel are appointed by the supreme court is not enough by itself to establish a per se violation of due process”); In re Zoarski, 632 A.2d 1114, 1121 (Conn. 1993) (holding that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions in one judicial disciplinary agency does not violate due process); In re Baun, 232 N.W.2d 621, 623-24 (Mich. 1975) (holding that Michigan’s lawyer disciplinary proceedings do not violate due process, because the functions of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and review are “functionally separate” and are handled by different individuals); Goldstein v. Comm’n on Practice of Supreme Court, 995 P.2d 923, 928 (Mont. 2000) (rejecting claim that Montana’s attorney disciplinary system violated due process principles because investigatory and enforcement authority were combined in one agency). But see Tweedy v. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1054-55 (Okla. 1981) (holding that the Oklahoma Supreme Court, under due process principles, could not order the reinvestigation of an attorney disciplinary grievance but also noting that the Board of Governors of the state bar could review the matter). In Tennessee’s attorney disciplinary system, the investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions fall under the purview of the Board. Importantly, however, those separate functions are performed by different groups of individuals within the Board. The Board’s Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel investigates allegations of misconduct by Tennessee attorneys and then, when warranted, initiates formal disciplinary proceedings. Those proceedings are then adjudicated by hearing panels whose members are independent attorneys appointed by the Board. -13- Because the investigatory/enforcement responsibilities and the adjudicative responsibilities are functionally separate within the Board, Rule 9 does not violate due process principles. As the Colorado Supreme Court observed in upholding its attorney disciplinary structure, “[t]he contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias . . . must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators,” and “[n]othing in the structure of the disciplinary rules, the grievance committee, or the Office of Disciplinary Counsel overcomes this presumption.” Varallo, 913 P.2d at 4-5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court further observed that it ultimately held the power of review over these adjudicators, further reducing the risk of bias. Id. at 5. This reasoning applies directly to the circumstances in Tennessee. Under Tennessee’s system, the investigation/enforcement function is separate from the adjudicative function, and “the ultimate power of review is held by this court.” Id. Consistent with Varallo, Withrow, and the other cases cited above, we hold that Rule 9 is not facially unconstitutional on the ground that it combines investigatory, enforcement, and adjudicative functions in the Board. Mr. Long’s two other constitutional arguments are related, and we therefore address them together. Mr. Long asserts that Rule 9, Section 24 creates a financial incentive for the Board to initiate formal disciplinary proceedings. He also contends that the Rule results in an “institutional bias” in favor of finding the respondent guilty of misconduct and imposing a disciplinary sanction. Rule 9, Section 24 provides, in pertinent part: 24.1. Expenses. The salaries of Disciplinary Counsel and staff, their expenses, administrative costs, and the expenses of the members of the Board and of members of the district committees shall be paid by the Board out of the funds collected under the provisions of Rule 9. .... 24.3. Reimbursement of Costs. In the event that a judgment of disbarment, suspension, public censure, private reprimand, temporary suspension, disability inactive status, reinstatement, or denial of reinstatement results from formal proceedings, the Board shall assess against the respondent the costs of the proceedings, including court reporter’s expenses for appearances and transcription of all hearings and depositions, the expenses of -14- the hearing panel in the hearing of the cause, and the hourly charge of Disciplinary Counsel in investigating and prosecuting the matter. .... The hourly charges of Disciplinary Counsel on formal proceedings . . . filed on or after January 27,1992, shall be assessed at $30 per hour for investigative time incurred prior to the filing of formal proceedings and $80 per hour in connection with formal proceedings. Payment of the costs assessed by the Board pursuant to this rule shall be required as a condition precedent to reinstatement of the respondent attorney. Mr. Long contends that, as a result of Section 24, the Board has a financial incentive to initiate formal proceedings against Tennessee attorneys simply to derive income from the costs assessed under Section 24.3. Mr. Long argues that this offends due process. Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977); In re Dender, 571 S.W.2d 491 (Tenn. 1978). In response, the Board asserts that the cases relied upon by Mr. Long are not analogous to a disciplinary proceeding. For example, the Board observes that Connally v. Georgia involved a justice of the peace who received a fee for issuing a search warrant but collected no fee for denying a search warrant. Because the justice of the peace did not receive a salary and was compensated only when he issued search warrants, the United States Supreme Court held that “the issuance of the search warrant by the justice of the peace . . . effected a violation of the protections afforded [Mr. Connally] by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Connally, 429 U.S. at 251. Similarly, based on analogous facts to Connally, we held in In re Dender that “the issuance of a state’s warrant by a non-salaried justice of the peace does not satisfy the requirements of a neutral and detached magistrate and is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution of Tennessee.” In re Dender, 571 S.W.2d at 492. Unlike the respective justices of the peace in Connally and In re Dender, the members of the Hearing Panel receive no compensation, other than reimbursement for travel expenses, for sitting as the adjudicatory body in a disciplinary matter. For that reason, we reject Mr. Long’s claim that Rule 9 is unconstitutional under Connally and In re Dender. Mr. Long’s institutional-bias argument is based on Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) and In re Ross, 656 P.2d 832 (Nev. 1983). In Ward, the mayor of -15- Monroeville, Ohio, sat as a judge in cases of ordinance violations and certain traffic offenses. The mayor also “account[ed] annually to the council respecting village finances,” and “[a] major part of village income [was] derived from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his mayor’s court.” Ward, 409 U.S. at 58. After the mayor convicted Mr. Ward of two traffic offenses and fined him fifty dollars for each offense, Mr. Ward appealed, ultimately to the United States Supreme Court. Addressing Mr. Ward’s contention that the mayor was not a detached and neutral magistrate because of his responsibility for the village’s finances, the Supreme Court wrote: the test is whether the mayor’s situation is one “which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused . . . .” Plainly that “possible temptation” may also exist when the mayor’s executive responsibilities for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of contribution from the mayor’s court. This, too, is a “situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial, (and) necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants charged with crimes before him.” Id. at 60 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 534 (1927)) (citations omitted). The circumstances in the pending case are not analogous to the situation in Ward. The members of a hearing panel have no responsibility for the budget or the finances of the Board. Ward is therefore inapplicable. Mr. Long also cites In re Ross in support of his institutional-bias argument. That case involved a formal disciplinary proceeding against three attorneys conducted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of Nevada. In re Ross, 656 P.2d at 834. After the Board of Governors decided to discipline two of the attorneys for being untruthful during the disciplinary process, one of the attorneys challenged the validity of the process on appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court. Id. at 835. The attorney asserted that adjudication of the disciplinary hearing by the Board of Governors—the same body primarily responsible for the finances of the Bar—violated his due process right to an impartial tribunal since “the Board could only recoup its considerable expenses [for] the proceedings if charges of misconduct were sustained.” Id. The Nevada Supreme Court observed that the Board of Governors had primary responsibility for the Bar Association’s finances and that the assessment sought against the two attorneys “was equal to nearly 20% of the State Bar’s total revenue, and would more -16- than have defrayed its yearly deficit.” Id. at 836. The court concluded that this procedure of grouping adjudicatory duties and financial responsibilities within the same individuals and conditioning recovery of substantial costs only upon a finding of misconduct violated the due process rights of the accused. Id. at 840. In re Ross is inapposite to Mr. Long’s case. As discussed, the investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative functions of the Board are separate functions performed by different groups of people. Moreover, the Panel that adjudicated the disciplinary charges against Mr. Long is not “the body with primary responsibility for the finances of the [Board].” Id. at 836. Therefore, Mr. Long’s reliance on In re Ross to support his institutional-bias argument is misplaced. For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Long’s argument that Rule 9 is unconstitutional is without merit.