Opinion ID: 324541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Brewster Verdict

Text: 67 While the jury found Anderson guilty of bribery, it acquitted Brewster of that offense and fixed his guilt instead at unlawful receipt of gratuities. 133 Anderson claims that these verdicts are fatally inconsistent, and that reversal of his conviction is accordingly required. He argues that the Government's evidence details such a course of conduct between Brewster and himself that no distinction between their acts or intent could rationally be drawn. He reasons that in the presence of such factual similarity the jury erred in finding that he corruptly intended to give money to Brewster to influence his official action, but that Brewster lacked a corresponding intent in the receipt of such monies. 68 We note initially that inconsistent verdicts are not self-vitiating. 134 Beyond that, the verdicts as to Anderson and Brewster, respectively, are not per se inconsistent. The payment and the receipt of a bribe are not interdependent offenses, 135 for obviously the donor's intent may differ completely from the donee's. Thus the donor may be convicted of giving a bribe despite the fact that the recipient had no intention of altering his official activities, or even lacked the power to do so. 136 69 As ever so recently we recognized, these mental elements are the factors differentiating the offense of bribery from the lesser offense of unlawfully receiving gratuities. 137 Here, on the evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude that Anderson gave Brewster monies with corrupt intent to influence his vote on the proposed rate-increase legislation, and that Brewster, though insensitive to any influence, accepted the monies with knowledge that Anderson's purpose was to reward him for his stance on such legislation.