Opinion ID: 1037770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absolute Immunity for Thomas and Aubuchon

Text: The question here is whether, in the circumstances of this case, Thomas and Aubuchon are entitled to absolute immunity from claims arising out of their initiation of the civil RICO suit. Defendants have the burden of showing that STAPLEY V. PESTALOZZI 17 they are entitled to absolute immunity. See Burns, 500 U.S. at 486. We conclude that Defendants have not carried their burden. Because the RICO suit was civil, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq., it was not “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added). Defendants therefore try to analogize this case to Butz, where absolute immunity was extended in the civil context to “functions analogous to those of a prosecutor.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 515. We conclude that Defendants’ actions here were not “analogous to those of a prosecutor” for two reasons. See id. First, the federal RICO statute does not provide any special authorization for county attorneys to file civil RICO suits. County attorneys may file civil RICO suits under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), but they have no status as plaintiffs different from private citizens. Compare § 1964(b) (authorizing the United States Attorney General to initiate a RICO suit), with § 1964(c) (authorizing “[a]ny person injured in his business or property” to sue under the RICO statute). As the district court noted, Thomas and Aubuchon were thus “in the same position as . . . private lawyers” in bringing the RICO suit. 869 F. Supp. 2d at 1056. This case is therefore distinguishable from all cited cases where a government attorney was granted absolute immunity. In those cases, the government attorney was taking action that only a legal representative of the government could take. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410 (criminal prosecution); Butz, 438 U.S. at 480 (federal agency enforcement action); Fry, 939 F.2d at 834 (civil tax collection proceeding); Flood, 532 F.2d at 1249 (same). Inasmuch as Defendants did not act in a uniquely governmental role in filing their civil RICO 18 STAPLEY V. PESTALOZZI suit, their actions were not “analogous to those of a prosecutor.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 515. Second, the circumstances of this case indicate that the civil RICO suit was not “analogous” to a criminal prosecution. Rather, Defendants filed the RICO suit as part of their long-running “political war” against members of the Board of Supervisors, judges, and others. The suit was essentially a harassing public-relations ploy. Defendants filed baseless criminal suits against Stapley and others both before and after filing the RICO suit, seeking media publicity for their actions in connection with these suits. Before initiating the civil RICO suit, Defendants received warnings from attorneys both inside and outside their office that the suit had no basis in fact or law and would likely result in sanctions. Defendants had also been warned of ethical conflicts related to filing the suit. Defendants nonetheless filed the RICO suit, announcing it to the media immediately after filing. Then, before the court had any opportunity to assess its validity, Defendants voluntarily dismissed the suit. After dismissing the suit, Defendants held a press conference, announcing that the Department of Justice had agreed to investigate the RICO Lawsuit defendants. The DOJ had, in fact, made no such agreement, and it later announced that it was “dismayed to learn” of the press conference. Through these actions, Defendants deliberately “side-stepped the judicial process,” like the prosecutor in Lacey who avoided judicial scrutiny and thereby lost the protections of absolute immunity. Lacey, 693 F.3d at 914. We need not determine whether each of the distinguishing characteristics here, standing alone, would be sufficient to STAPLEY V. PESTALOZZI 19 defeat absolute immunity. We hold only that, under the circumstances presented here, Defendants are not entitled to absolute immunity because their actions were not sufficiently “analogous to those of a prosecutor.” Butz, 438 U.S. at 515.