Opinion ID: 1280343
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Proportionality Requirements

Text: Historically, the eighth amendment merely ensured that the severity of the crime justified the severity of the sentence; it did not guarantee that a given defendant's sentence matched sentences imposed on others for similar crimes. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 & n. 6, 104 S.Ct. 871, 875-76 & n. 6, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Legislatures and appellate courts rarely examined proportionality in a comparative sense until after the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), which held that the death penalty, in light of its uniqueness and severity, could not be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 96 S.Ct. at 2932. In so doing, Furman merged traditional eighth amendment analysis with notions of fundamental fairness underlying due process, see State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 349, 524 A.2d 188, 303 (1987), and ultimately required the overhaul of many existing capital-sentencing statutes to prevent the wanton and freakish imposition of death sentences. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44, 104 S.Ct. at 876. As part of an effort to comply with Furman, many states endorsed cross-case appellate review demonstrating that similarly situated defendants received the same sentences. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198, 96 S.Ct. at 2937 (Georgia statute required comparative proportionality review); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 250-51, 259, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2966, 2969-70, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) (Florida appellate court performs a proportionality review despite the absence of a statutory requirement). This practice became so commonplace, in fact, that some defendants demanded comparative sentence review as a matter of constitutional right. See, e.g., Pulley, 465 U.S. at 39-40, 104 S.Ct. at 874 (defendant challenged the California capital punishment statute because it failed to require the state supreme court to perform a comparative proportionality review). Furman and its progeny, however, did not establish proportionality review as a constitutional requirement. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 876; accord Walton v. Arizona, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3058, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (proportionality review not required under Arizona's sentencing scheme); State v. Serna, 163 Ariz. 260, 269, 787 P.2d 1056, 1065 (1990) (proportionality review not mandated by the United States Constitution). As the Supreme Court explained, [T]hat some [state] schemes providing proportionality review are constitutional does not mean that such review is indispensable. We take statutes as we find them. To endorse the statute as a whole is not to say that anything different is unacceptable. As was said in Gregg, , [w]e do not intend to suggest that . .. any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on an individual basis. 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. at 2935 (footnote omitted). Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44-45, 104 S.Ct. at 876. The disparate results criticized in Furman, to be sure, resulted from statutes vesting unguided sentencing discretion in juries and trial judges,  Pulley, 465 U.S. at 44, 104 S.Ct. at 876 (emphasis added), [4] not from defective judicial review on appeal. Furman is best satisfied, therefore, not by any specific type of appellate review, but by carefully drafted statutes coupled with precise application ensuring that the sentencing authority at a bifurcated proceeding receives adequate information and guidance and focuses on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.  Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 199, 96 S.Ct. at 2935, 2937 (emphasis added); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 307, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1775, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). If the sentencing authority concentrates sufficiently on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant, Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206, 96 S.Ct. at 2941, an appellate court lawfully may presume, without regard to comparative proportionality, that death sentences are not wantonly or freakishly imposed. Walton, ___ U.S. at ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3058; McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308, 107 S.Ct. at 1775. In Jurek, for example, the Court sustained the Texas death statute primarily because of the limitations placed on the jury's sentencing discretion. 428 U.S. at 276, 96 S.Ct. at 2958. The Court manifested little concern for appellate practices. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 49-50, 104 S.Ct. at 878-79. Neither the state statute, as in Georgia ( Gregg, ) nor state case law, as in Florida ( Proffitt, ) required the Texas Supreme Court to make a comparative proportionality inquiry. Id. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 878. The Texas statute required only some sort of prompt or automatic judicial review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction. Id. at 49, 104 S.Ct. at 878. The Supreme Court later relied on Jurek to sustain California's death penalty statutes and procedures, which were similarly silent as to a comparative proportionality requirement. Id. at 50-51, 104 S.Ct. at 879. Jurek, therefore, illustrates the established rationale behind the Supreme Court's refusal to require comparative proportionality review under Furman: so long as a state's capital sentencing procedures are sufficiently tailored and guided, defendants cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 306-07, 107 S.Ct. at 1775 (emphasis in original). In theory, then, comparative proportionality review is premised on the faulty notion that the United States Constitution requires total uniformity in capital sentencing. Our federal constitution, however, is not offended by inconsistency in results based on the objective circumstances of the crime. Numerous legitimate factors may influence the outcome of a trial and a defendant's ultimate sentence, even though they may be irrelevant to his actual guilt. If sufficient evidence to link a suspect to a crime cannot be found, he will not be charged. The capability of the responsible law enforcement agency can vary widely. Also, the strength of the available evidence remains a variable throughout the criminal justice process and may influence a prosecutor's decision to offer a plea bargain or to go to trial. Witness availability, credibility, and memory also influence the results of prosecutions. Finally, sentencing in state courts is generally discretionary, so a defendant's ultimate sentence necessarily will vary according to the judgment of the sentencing authority. The foregoing factors necessarily exist in varying degrees throughout our criminal justice system. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 307 n. 28, 107 S.Ct. at 1775 n. 28 (emphasis added).