Opinion ID: 1179765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: entry of plea

Text: 1. I have had enough time to talk to my lawyer about the case and have told him/her all the facts and circumstances known to me about the case. 2. My lawyer has carefully gone over with me this Waiver of Constitutional Rights form. My lawyer has explained the possible sentence which could be imposed as a result of my plea of guilty/no contest. I understand the nature of the charge(s) against me. 3. I have discussed with my attorney the charge(s), prior conviction(s), enhancement(s), prior prison term(s), and/or serious felony offense(s) alleged against me and any facts and possible defenses. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 5. I offer my plea of `Guilty' or No Contest freely and voluntarily with a full understanding of all the matters set forth on this form. No one has made any threats against me, used any force against me, my family or loved ones, nor has anyone made any promises except as set out on this form in order to convince me to plead guilty or no contest. I am not under the influence of any drug(s), medication, alcohol or any other substance which would impair my judgment. .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 7. I hereby waive and give up my right to appeal from the sentence I will receive in this case. I also waive and give up my right to appeal the denial of any and all motions made and denied in my case. 8. I have personally initialed each of the above boxes and discussed them with my attorney. I understand each and every one of the rights outlined above and I hereby WAIVE and GIVE UP each of them in order to enter my plea to the above charge(s). Below defendant's signature on the Waiver and Plea agreement, the following statement appears along with defense counsel's signature: I am the attorney of record and I have explained each of the above rights to the defendant. I have explored the facts with him/her and studied his/her possible defenses to the charge(s) and enhancing allegations. I believe there is a factual basis for each of the pleas and admissions set forth above. I concur in his/her decision to waive the above rights and to enter a plea of guilty or no contest. I further stipulate this document may be received by the court as evidence of defendant's intelligent waiver of these rights and that it should be filed by the clerk as a permanent record of that waiver. No promises of a particular sentence or sentence recommendation have been made by me or, to my knowledge, by the prosecuting attorney or the court which has not been fully disclosed in this form. I personally went over this document with the defendant. I observed the defendant to read, date and sign this document. The document also reflected the People's concurrence in the plea, as well as the trial judge's signature and his findings that defendant expressly, knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights and that defendant's plea was freely and voluntarily made with an understanding of the nature and consequences thereof. At a hearing on the change of plea, defendant represented he recognized the Waiver and Plea agreement and affirmed he had had ample time to review it with his attorney. As to the charges to which defendant agreed to plead no contest, defendant acknowledged his maximum prison exposure of life with the possibility of parole plus 19 years and the agreed-upon sentence of life with the possibility of parole plus 12 years. He also confirmed that he had read, understood, and personally initialed the relevant paragraphs of the agreement, and that he had signed and dated it. Defense counsel likewise acknowledged his signature on the document and expressed his belief that defendant was knowingly and intelligently giving up his constitutional rights. The trial court then found that defendant had freely and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. Defendant asserts the above record fails to demonstrate a valid waiver of the right to appeal because he was not properly admonished regarding that right. ( People v. Rosso (1994) 30 Cal. App.4th 1001, 1006 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 218].) This assertion is devoid of merit. (8) As noted previously, a trial court normally must admonish a defendant of the direct consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. ( People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1022.) However, a court may rely upon a defendant's validly executed waiver form as a proper substitute for a personal admonishment. ( People v. Castrillon (1991) 227 Cal. App.3d 718, 722 [enforcing, as part of a plea agreement, defendant's written waiver of the right to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress pursuant to § 1538.5, subd. (m)]; cf. In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 286 [193 Cal. Rptr. 538, 666 P.2d 980] [[A] defendant who has signed a waiver form [waiving Boykin-Tahl rights] upon competent advice of his attorney has little need to hear a ritual recitation of his rights by a trial judge.].) Only if in questioning the defendant and his attorney the trial court has reason to believe the defendant does not fully comprehend his rights, must the trial court conduct further canvassing of the defendant to ensure a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights. ( People v. Castrillon, supra, 227 Cal. App.3d at p. 722; cf. In re Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 286 [The judge need only determine whether defendant had read and understood the contents of the form, and had discussed them with his attorney.].) Thus, in People v. Castrillon, supra , a trial court was not required to question a defendant specifically regarding the right to appeal where both the defendant and his attorney had signed a waiver form and had attested to the defendant's knowing and voluntary relinquishment of his rights and where the trial court's examination of the defendant and his attorney raised no questions concerning defendant's comprehension of his rights and of the consequences of his plea. (227 Cal. App.3d at pp. 722-723; see also People v. Kelly (1994) 22 Cal. App.4th 533 [27 Cal. Rptr.2d 383] [written waiver of right to appeal contained in change of plea form enforced where form recited that defendant's attorney had reviewed and explained the terms and consequences of the plea to defendant]; People v. Evanson (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 698 [71 Cal. Rptr. 503] [waiver of right to jury trial upheld where defense counsel represented to trial court that he had explained such right to the defendant], cited with approval in In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 133, fn. 6 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].) (6c) Consideration of the foregoing principles leads us to conclude that the record in this case demonstrates an enforceable waiver of defendant's right to appeal his sentence. Even though the trial court did not admonish defendant regarding the right to appeal, the Waiver and Plea agreement signed by defendant and his attorney contains defendant's representations that he understood the sentence that would be imposed if he pleaded no contest, that he had discussed with his attorney both the paragraph specifying the sentence to be imposed and the paragraph containing the waiver of the right to appeal the sentence, and that he fully understood all matters set forth in the document without exception. The Waiver and Plea agreement also reflects defense counsel's representation that he personally went over the document with defendant and concurred in defendant's decision to waive the rights specified in the document, as well as counsel's stipulation that the trial court could consider the document as evidence of defendant's intelligent waiver of such rights. At the court hearing, both defendant and his attorney attested to the document's valid execution. Additionally, the in-court questioning of defendant and his attorney raised no doubts as to defendant's understanding of his rights and the consequences of his no contest plea. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that defendant's waiver of the right to appeal the bargained sentence was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the absence of a specific admonishment by the trial court. ( People v. Castrillon, supra, 227 Cal. App.3d at p. 722; cf. In re Ibarra, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 284-286.) People v. Rosso, supra, 30 Cal. App.4th 1001, does not support defendant's position. In that case, the reviewing court rejected the People's claim that the defendant had orally waived his appellate rights as follows: `[The Court]: ... Have you discussed these [constitutional] rights with your attorney? [¶] [Rosso]: Yes. [¶] The Court: Do you understand each and every one of these rights? [¶] [Rosso]: Yes, I understand. [¶] The Court: Do you waive and give up these rights and your right to appeal ? [¶] [Rosso]: Yes, I waive them.' (30 Cal. App.4th at p. 1006.) As noted in the decision, however, this was the only mention of appellate rights. The record in that case, unlike that here, apparently contained no evidence of a written waiver of appellate rights read and signed by the defendant after discussion with his attorney and no evidence that an attorney had explained the right to appeal to the defendant. Consequently, People v. Rosso, supra , stands in sharp contrast to the instant situation and does not call for a different result. Defendant next argues that any error occurring after the entry of his plea constituted future sentencing error that was beyond the scope of the waiver. In particular, defendant contends that [w]hen, as here, the sentence a defendant receives pursuant to a plea bargain is challenged on the basis of its constitutional disproportionality in comparison with sentences imposed subsequently on his codefendants, even a specific waiver as to sentencing error cannot logically encompass prospective events that the defendant did not contemplate in agreeing to a specified sentence. Relying upon the principle that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege ( Johnson v. Zerbst (1938) 304 U.S. 458, 464 [82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 146 A.L.R. 357], italics added; People v. Charles (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 552, 569 [217 Cal. Rptr. 402] (conc. opn. of White, P.J.)), defendant asserts that a specific waiver of the right to appeal a negotiated sentence is unenforceable as to unforeseen or unknown errors occurring subsequent to the waiver. To support this argument, defendant relies upon two cases finding that a defendant's waiver of possible future error is outside the defendant's contemplation and knowledge at the time the waiver is made. ( People v. Sherrick (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 657, 659 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 25]; People v. Vargas, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th at p. 1662.) But while these authorities generally support the proposition that a defendant's general waiver of the right to appeal, [11] given as part of a negotiated plea agreement, will not be construed to bar the appeal of sentencing errors occurring subsequent to the plea, the defendants in those decisions were attempting to appeal sentencing issues that were left unresolved by the particular plea agreements involved. In People v. Sherrick, supra, 19 Cal. App.4th 657, the defendant was permitted to argue on appeal that the trial court utilized a patently erroneous standard in determining his ineligibility for probation where the plea agreement and waiver of appellate rights evidently contemplated no specific sentence or probation eligibility. Similarly, in People v. Vargas, supra, 13 Cal. App.4th 1653, the defendant was not barred from challenging an alleged misapplication of conduct credits on appeal where the plea agreement and waiver of appellate rights apparently made no mention of conduct credits. In each of those decisions, the appellate court viewed the sentencing issue as not being within the contemplation and knowledge of the defendant at the time the waiver was made and so refused to extend thereto a general waiver of the right to appeal. That, however, is not the situation here. Not only did the plea agreement in this case specify the sentence to be imposed, but by its very terms the waiver of appellate rights also specifically extended to any right to appeal such sentence. Thus, what defendant seeks here is appellate review of an integral element of the negotiated plea agreement, as opposed to a matter left open or unaddressed by the deal. Since both the length of the sentence and the right to appeal the sentence are issues that cannot fairly be characterized as falling outside of defendant's contemplation and knowledge when the waiver was made, the reasoning of People v. Sherrick, supra , and People v. Vargas, supra , is inapposite. Defendant's characterization of the issue on appeal as an unforeseen or unknown error is off the mark because the sentence imposed by the court was neither unforeseen nor unknown at the time defendant executed the Waiver and Plea agreement. Moreover, the essence of defendant's claim is that his sentence is disproportionate to his level of culpability (see People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697]), a factor that also was known at the time of the plea and waiver. Thus, the real thrust of defendant's claim concerns events predating entry of the plea and waiver. It is true that in People v. Dillon, supra , we looked to the relatively lenient sentences of a defendant's coconspirators to underscore our conclusion that the punishment imposed upon the defendant was grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability. (34 Cal.3d at p. 488.) But even if defendant here did not know or contemplate the fact that his codefendants would later negotiate and receive sentences more lenient than his, we see no reason to deem his waiver of appellate rights unenforceable. The reasoning articulated by the United States Supreme Court in upholding the general validity and enforceability of plea agreements is persuasive in putting into proper perspective the claim that a defendant should be relieved of a waiver of appellate rights because of the subsequent occurrence of unforeseen events perceived to be favorable to the defense. Often the decision to plead guilty is heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. Considerations like these frequently present imponderable questions for which there are no certain answers; judgments may be made that in the light of later events seem improvident, although they were perfectly sensible at the time. The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision. ( Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 756-757 [25 L.Ed.2d 747, 761, 90 S.Ct. 1463].) This logic applies with equal force to dispel any notion that the subsequent unfolding of unknown or unforeseen events somehow renders a waiver of appellate rights unintelligent or otherwise defective at the time it was given. Contrary to defendant's assertions, nothing in U.S. v. Jacobson (2d Cir.1994) 15 F.3d 19 compels a different conclusion. In that case, the defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to receive misbranded and adulterated drugs in interstate commerce and to commit wire fraud. Both he and the government agreed not to appeal in the event the court imposed a sentence within a range of eight to fourteen months under the federal sentencing guidelines. [12] After receiving a sentence of 12 months, the defendant appealed on the ground that the length of sentence, when compared with those subsequently received by his coconspirators, was based on a constitutionally impermissible factor (naturalized status) and therefore constituted a denial of due process. The appeals court held that the defendant did not waive his right to appeal on the aforementioned ground. Although the court recognized that an agreement not to appeal a sentence within the agreed guidelines range is enforceable, it observed that a waiver of the right not to be sentenced on the basis of a constitutionally impermissible factor may be invalid. (15 F.3d at pp. 22-23, citing U.S. v. Marin (4th Cir.1992) 961 F.2d 493, 496 [a defendant could not be said to have waived his right to appellate review of a sentence ... based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race].) Accordingly, the court read the plea agreement at issue narrowly, noting that the defendant's appeal raised no guidelines issues. (15 F.3d at p. 23.) Additionally, the court rejected the government's argument that the defendant had waived his challenge by failing to raise the issue in the district court. Observing that the coconspirators were all sentenced after him, the court reasoned that an objection based on unconstitutional disparity could not have been made at the time of the defendant's sentencing. ( Ibid. ) U.S. v. Jacobson, supra , does not, as defendant suggests, undermine the enforceability of his waiver of the right to appeal his negotiated sentence. In this case, the People do not argue that defendant's failure to raise the disparity issue at the time of his sentencing constituted an implied waiver of the right to appeal such a matter. Consequently, defendant's reliance upon that portion of the federal decision is misplaced. [13] Moreover, defendant here makes no claim that his sentence  which reflected the terms of his negotiated plea bargain with the People  was based upon a constitutionally impermissible factor arguably not waivable by agreement. Accordingly, this case does not call for construing defendant's waiver of the right to appeal the sentence in a manner so as to avoid a waiver of that issue. Finally, invoking the principle that [a]n appellate court may `correct a sentence that is not authorized by law whenever the error comes to the attention of the court' ( In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 842 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 373, 855 P.2d 391]), defendant argues that California decisional law has long recognized the necessity of affording judicial review where, as here, a sentence is challenged as invalid or in excess of the court's jurisdiction. We disagree. Appellate courts have relied upon the principle to which defendant refers in allowing habeas corpus review of a claim or sentencing error amounting to an excess of jurisdiction when a defendant has delayed in raising the issue (e.g., In re Harris, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 842) and in holding that an unauthorized sentence is no bar to the imposition of a proper, even if more severe, judgment thereafter (e.g., People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 764-765 [109 Cal. Rptr. 65, 512 P.2d 289], disapproved on other grounds, People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 689, 693 [89 Cal. Rptr. 237]). These authorities, however, do not support appellate review of a sentence disproportionality claim where, as here, the sentence has been negotiated as part of a plea bargain and is not in excess of the maximum statutory penalty. [14] Indeed, considerations of fairness weigh against the availability of review since the absence of a fully developed factual record in a plea bargained case is likely to place the People at a significant disadvantage in meeting such a claim. Accordingly, we find that a valid, express, and unrestricted waiver of the right to appeal a negotiated sentence should be deemed to include a waiver of the right to appeal it on the ground that it is disproportional and therefore invalid.
Although defendant maintains he is not contesting the validity of his bargained plea, he seeks to challenge the very sentence he negotiated as part of the plea. Consistent with the reasoning of McNight, supra, 171 Cal. App.3d 620, we conclude that such a claim is, in substance, an attack on the validity of the plea which is not reviewable on appeal because defendant failed to seek and obtain a certificate of probable cause. (See People v. Jones, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1112, fn. 5.) Further, even if it is assumed that defendant's claim does not challenge the validity of the plea, the claim still is not reviewable on appeal because the terms of the plea bargain preclude any appeal of the negotiated sentence. In light of our conclusion that the Court of Appeal should not have disregarded defendant's failure to comply with section 1237.5 and rule 31(d) or, alternatively, his waiver of appellate rights, we do not reach the merits of defendant's challenge to the sentence. [15] The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss defendant's appeal.