Opinion ID: 1652195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Analysis of Constitutionality

Text: We previously have recognized several purposes underlying the confidentiality requirement: Foremost, the rule serves to protect both the complainant from possible recriminations and the attorney from unsubstantiated charges while a thorough investigation is conducted. Moreover, removing or unnecessarily qualifying the confidentiality requirement would eliminate many sources of information and reduce complaints received by the Board from lay citizens, litigants, lawyers, and judges. Finally, the rule serves to protect public confidence in the judicial system by preventing disclosure of a charge until the directives of section 25 are satisfied. Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d at 472. These purposes are similar to the following interests identified by the Attorney General as compelling: (1) protection of the reputation of an attorney and the Bar from meritless complaints; (2) protection of the anonymity of complainants and other persons supplying information to the Board; and (3) maintenance of the integrity of pending investigations. The Attorney General asserts that each of these state interests provides more than sufficient basis to justify the restriction on speech by section 25 of Rule 9. We address first the interest of protecting reputation. In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S.Ct. 1535, 56 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the United States Supreme Court struck down a Virginia confidentiality provision relative to judicial disciplinary proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that the confidentiality provision was justified by the purpose of protecting the reputation of judges and the judiciary: Moreover, neither the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the reputation of its judges, nor its interest in maintaining the institutional integrity of its courts is sufficient to justify the subsequent punishment of speech at issue here, even on the assumption that criminal sanctions do in fact enhance the guarantee of confidentiality. Admittedly, the Commonwealth has an interest in protecting the good repute of its judges, like that of all other public officials. Our prior cases have firmly established, however, that injury to official reputation is an insufficient reason for repressing speech that would otherwise be free. The remaining interest sought to be protected, the institutional reputation of the courts, is entitled to no greater weight in the constitutional scales. Id. at 841-42, 98 S.Ct. 1535 (citations omitted). Relying on Landmark Communications , the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the state's interest in protecting the reputation of the State Bar and individual attorneys from frivolous complaints was insufficient to constitute a compelling state interest. Petition of Brooks, 678 A.2d at 144-45. Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida concluded that [i]f maintaining the reputation of the judiciary as an abstract end is insufficient to justify encroaching upon the robust exercise of free speech, then maintaining the reputation of lawyers or the Bar is, in our view, equally insufficient. Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F.Supp. at 986. As the Attorney General notes, Petition of Brooks and Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida are the only two cases directly analyzing confidentiality provisions for attorney disciplinary proceedings. Both cases involve confidentiality provisions similar to section 25 of Rule 9. The Attorney General argues, however, that we should not follow these cases for several reasons. First, the Attorney General asserts that Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida and Landmark Communications , on which Doe relies, are distinguishable from the present case because no evidence was presented supporting the claim that the confidentiality provision was necessary for the protection of reputation. In contrast, the Attorney General has submitted in this case two exhibits: (1) a state-wide survey regarding the effect on the public of information concerning attorney disciplinary proceedings and (2) an affidavit of Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the Board of Professional Responsibility regarding the disposition of disciplinary complaints from 1976 to 2002. We conclude that this distinction is not significant. In Landmark Communications , the United States Supreme Court assumed for purposes of decision that the confidentiality provision served legitimate state interests. 435 U.S. at 841. Likewise, in Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida , the federal district court concluded that, even if it were to accept the claim that the confidentiality provision was necessary, protecting the reputation of an individual, or indeed the profession as a whole, would be insufficient justification for absolutely barring the dissemination of truthful information. 734 F.Supp. at 986. Therefore, the lack of empirical evidence was not a determinative factor in the analysis in either Landmark Communications or Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida . Second, the Attorney General contends that Landmark Communications is distinguishable because the person seeking to publish the confidential information was a non-participant in the proceeding. The United State Supreme Court subsequently addressed the issue of punishing a participant in Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 110 S.Ct. 1376, 108 L.Ed.2d 572 (1990). In Butterworth , a reporter who had testified before a grand jury filed suit seeking a declaration that a Florida statute proscribing disclosure of his testimony was unconstitutional. The Court concluded that Florida undoubtedly retains a substantial interest in seeing that `persons who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule' and the ban in question serves that interest to some extent. Id. at 634 (citation omitted). The Court, citing Landmark Communications , nevertheless held that absent exceptional circumstances, reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech. Id. Therefore, the analysis in Landmark Communications regarding the interest of protecting reputation applies to cases involving disclosure of confidential information by a participant in the proceeding. Finally, the Attorney General suggests that the reasoning in Petition of Brooks is questionable because, in relying on Landmark Communications , the New Hampshire Supreme Court analogized attorneys to judges. The Attorney General contends that, unlike judges who are elected for eight-year terms, attorneys must be protected from public disclosure of frivolous complaints because their livelihood depends on their reputation. Although the court in Petition of Brooks recognized that attorneys are not public officials in the sense that judges are, it concluded that the fundamental importance of the first amendment, combined with the role of attorneys as officers of the court, compels the application of similar principles of free expression to the reputational interests of attorneys, at least with respect to the issues in this case. 678 A.2d at 144-45. We note also that in Butterworth the United States Supreme Court applied the principles of Landmark Communications to the reputational interests of persons targeted by the grand jury without regard to whether they were public officials or private citizens. Therefore, contrary to the Attorney General's assertion, the reasoning in Petition of Brooks is sound. Applying the principles of these cases, we conclude that to the extent a legitimate interest in reputation is at stake in requiring confidentiality under section 25 of Rule 9, such interest should not be recognized as compelling. Assuming arguendo that protection of reputation from frivolous complaints constitutes a compelling state interest, a confidentiality provision precluding the disclosure of both frivolous and non-frivolous complaints is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet such interest. See Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F.Supp. at 988; Petition of Brooks, 678 A.2d. at 145. Rule 9, section 25 requires confidentiality regarding a complaint even when the Board determines that there is probable cause for the filing of formal charges and the attorney-respondent receives an admonition or reprimand. Unless public discipline is imposed, the complainant is barred from publicly discussing not only the fact that a meritorious complaint was filed but also the Board's handling of the complaint. We agree with the following observation by the federal district court in Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida : The idea that the suppression of truthful criticism of lawyers would somehow enhance or protect the reputation of the Bar is not persuasive. To the contrary, continuing the prohibitory effect of the Rule after a grievance against an attorney is found to be meritorious is far more likely to engender suspicion than foster confidence. 734 F.Supp. at 988. Consequently, even if we were to assume that section 25 is necessary to serve a compelling state interest of protecting the reputation of an attorney and the Bar from meritless complaints, we cannot conclude that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. We consider next the interest of protecting anonymity. The Attorney General contends that the State has a compelling interest in protecting the anonymity of complainants or participants who might not otherwise file valid complaints or provide information to the Board in the absence of the confidentiality provision. We recognized in Doe v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility that the rule serves to protect complainants from possible recrimination while a thorough investigation is conducted and that removing or unnecessarily qualifying the confidentiality requirement would eliminate many sources of information and reduce complaints received by the Board from lay citizens, litigants, lawyers, and judges. 104 S.W.3d at 472. As the United States Supreme Court assumed in Landmark Communications , and as we stated in Doe, confidentiality serves a legitimate state interest in encouraging the filing of complaints and the willing participation of relevant witnesses. 435 U.S. at 835, 841, 98 S.Ct. 1535. We cannot conclude, however, that this interest is sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement on free speech by section 25. The interest of promoting meritorious complaints and assistance in investigations could be advanced by permitting and encouraging confidentiality, not requiring it. See Doe v. Supreme Court of Florida, 734 F.Supp. at 985; Petition of Brooks, 678 A.2d at 145. Moreover, we note that, under section 13.1 of Rule 9, subpoenas may be issued to compel the appearance of witnesses to give evidence in matters under investigation and in formal proceedings before the Board. The additional effect on potential witnesses of the ban on disclosure is, in our view, marginal at best. See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 634, 110 S.Ct. 1376. Maintaining the integrity of pending investigations is the final state interest identified by the Attorney General as compelling. This interest overlaps somewhat with the second interest. The Attorney General claims that any person who is aware of an investigation due to inquiries by Disciplinary Counsel could easily thwart the efforts of the investigation by simply bringing the matter to the attention of the public at a particularly delicate moment in the investigation and that [t]his could easily cause hesitant potential witnesses to refuse to talk and essentially doom the investigation. As discussed above, because the testimony of hesitant potential witnesses may be compelled by subpoena, the guarantee of confidentiality has little additional effect. To the extent that Disciplinary Counsel serves a function analogous to a grand jury, we agree with the Attorney General that confidentiality furthers a legitimate state interest in maintaining the integrity of pending investigations. We do not believe, however, that this interesteven if it were considered to be compellingwarrants a permanent ban on disclosure of information. See Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632, 110 S.Ct. 1376 (holding that interests in preserving grand jury secrecy were not sufficient to sustain a Florida statute that prohibited a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony after the term of the grand jury had ended). Once the investigation has been completed and a probable cause determination has been made, even the most compelling state interest cannot justify a ban on pubic disclosure of allegations of misconduct. See Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1994). Insofar as section 25 of Rule 9 prohibits disclosure of such information even after a determination of probable cause for the filing of formal charges, it is not sufficiently narrowly drawn to further the interest of maintaining the integrity of pending investigations. We conclude that the three interests advanced by the Attorney Generalprotection of reputation of an attorney and the Bar from meritless complaints, protection of anonymity of complainants and other persons supplying information to the Board, and maintenance of the integrity of pending investigationswhile legitimate, are not sufficiently compelling to justify the restriction on free speech by section 25, particularly considering the broad scope of its confidentiality requirement. Having determined that section 25 does not pass constitutional muster, we address as a final matter the propriety of contempt sanctions under the circumstances of this case.