Opinion ID: 3134271
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ill 2d 469, 495 (1989); People v. Hopkins, 29 Ill. 2d 260, 265-66 (1963);

Text: People v. Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d 311, 314 (1963). The trial judge's examination must be conducted in a fair and impartial manner, without indicating bias or prejudice against either party. People v. Marino, 414 Ill. 445, 450 (1953); People v. Santucci, 24 Ill. 2d 93, 98 (1962). Whether the trial judge's questioning is proper depends on the circumstances of each case and rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d at 456; Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d at 315. The trial judge's questions in the present case did not violate these principles. It is apparent from the record that the trial judge was attempting to clarify what he considered to be confusing testimony. On direct examination, defendant testified that on January 2, 1991, Anthony pulled a knife out of his pocket and pointed it at defendant. Defendant then slapped the knife away, and it struck Michelle. Defendant also stated that as he slapped the knife away, he was cut on the palm of his right hand. Defendant subsequently testified about the shooting incident at Michelle's house on January 3, 1991. Defendant stated that he had the gun in his pocket when he arrived at Michelle's house. According to defendant, Anthony put his hand in his jacket and defendant put his hand in his pocket. Defendant became paranoid that Anthony would pull out a gun so defendant pointed his gun at Anthony. Anthony then hit the gun and it went off and struck Michelle. On redirect examination, defendant demonstrated how Anthony swung at him when defendant had the gun. Defense counsel then asked, And when he swung in that manner ... is that when he struck your hand? and defendant replied, Yes, sir. The trial judge apparently perceived the foregoing testimony to be confusing in light of defendant's earlier testimony that he had been struck on the hand the previous day when Anthony pulled a knife. The trial judge asked questions to clarify whether defendant had a gun in his hand on January 2, 1991. The judge's questions about the gun did not indicate a bias, prejudice or hostility against defendant. Neither did the judge imply that he found defendant to be not credible. Rather, the judge merely sought to clarify defendant's version of the incident. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by questioning defendant about the gun. C. Improper Impeachment Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court committed reversible error in denying his motion to bar the State from impeaching his credibility with evidence of his 1986 conviction for aggravated battery. Defendant contends that his aggravated battery conviction had no bearing on his testimonial credibility. Instead, defendant protests, such evidence was highly prejudicial because it suggested to the jury that defendant had a propensity for violent criminal behavior. The rule governing the admission of prior convictions to impeach a witness' credibility has been examined by this court on a number of occasions. In People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), this court provided trial courts with discretion to allow impeachment of a witness' testimonial credibility by admitting a prior conviction. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 515. More specifically, the Montgomery rule provided that, for the purpose of attacking a witness' credibility, evidence of a prior conviction is admissible only if (1) the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year; or (2) the crime involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment. In either case, however, the evidence is inadmissible if the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516. In addition, evidence of a conviction under this rule is inadmissible if a period of more than 10 years has elapsed since the date of conviction or release of the witness from confinement, whichever is later. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516. This court recently reexamined the Montgomery rule in People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1 (1994). In Williams, this court determined that the lower courts were mechanically applying the Montgomery rule to allow impeachment of a testifying defendant with virtually all types of prior felony convictions. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 38-39. This court was concerned with the lack of emphasis lower courts had placed on the third prong of the Montgomery rule, that is, the balancing test. We emphasized the importance of conducting the balancing test of probative value versus unfair prejudice before admitting prior convictions for impeachment purposes. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 38-41. Following this court's decision in Williams, there has been confusion in the appellate court regarding whether Williams modified or changed the rule established in Montgomery. See People v. Bramlett, 276 Ill. App. 3d 201 (1995); People v. Elliot, 274 Ill. App. 3d 901 (1995); People v. Fomond, 273