Opinion ID: 1034187
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Eligibility for Relief

Text: To establish eligibility for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on one of five protected grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Maryam v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 60, 62 n.3 (1st Cir. 2005); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A). An applicant may satisfy this burden through proof of past persecution, which creates a rebuttable presumption of a well-grounded fear of future persecution. Escobar v. Holder, 698 F.3d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 2012). Alternatively, the applicant must show both that he or she genuinely fears such persecution and that an objectively reasonable person in [his or her] circumstances would fear such persecution. Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 2010). A prima facie case for asylum requires the applicant to demonstrate only a reasonable likelihood of future persecution, defined as a realistic chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that asylum should be granted. Smith, 627 F.3d at 437 (quoting Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 564 (3d Cir. 2004)). Even a prima facie case, however, requires several threshold showings. First, the applicant must demonstrate a realistic chance of persecution based on a statutory ground, limited to race, religion, nationality, membership, or political opinion. Id. Second, a showing of persecution requires 'more than mere -9- discomfiture, unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment,' Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at 25 (quoting Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2005)), but rather must show serious harm, id. Finally, the alleged persecution must involve some connection to government action or inaction. Raza, 484 F.3d at 129 (quoting Orelien v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 67, 72 (1st Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Sutuj's motion to reopen does not make out a prima facie case for persecution on a statutorily protected ground. In Sutuj's initial removal proceedings, the IJ found and the BIA affirmed that Sutuj's childhood encounters with Guatemalan guerillas before 1984 did not give rise to a continuing well-founded fear of persecution due to political opinion. Sutuj did not appeal the BIA's decision at the time and does not challenge this finding now. Rather, his motion to reopen relies on the rise of criminal syndicates in Guatemala to argue that, as an American repatriate, he will be newly subject to criminal extortion upon his return. Even acknowledging, for purposes of argument, Sutuj's suggestion that Guatemalan criminal gangs might be aided by the government, an assertion for which he presents no substantiating evidence,2 Sutuj's fear of financial extortion does not qualify as 2 In his motion to reopen, Sutuj suggests a conspiracy by the government and narco-trafficking. The record does not support this statement or connect it to the applicant's personal fears of -10- persecution on the basis of a statutorily protected ground. We have consistently rejected the theory that criminal exploitation motivated by greed or wealth, including that based on one's status as a former inhabitant of the United States, triggers statutory protection. E.g., Escobar, 698 F.3d at 39 (rejecting applicant's theory that Guatemalan gangs will assume that he amassed significant wealth during his two-decade-long stay in the United States in denying asylum); Ruiz v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 31, 36-37 (1st Cir. 2008) (finding it significant in denying asylum that the threats about which the witnesses testified were not connected with any statutorily protected ground but, rather, were clearly motivated . . . by greed); Lopez de Hincapie v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 213, 220 (1st Cir. 2007) (finding that extortion does not call for statutory protection). As we have remarked, being a target for thieves on account of perceived wealth, whether the perception is temporary or permanent, does not satisfy the bar for persecution but is merely a condition of living where crime is rampant and poorly controlled. Escobar, 698 F.3d at 39. The BIA's decision followed this precise line of reasoning. The BIA specifically noted the requirement that asylumseekers allege persecution on race, religion, nationality, membership, or political opinion, concluding that [g]ang action motivated by extortion is not equivalent to persecution on a extortion. -11- [protected] ground. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in determinating that Sutuj failed to present a prima facie case for eligibility for asylum.3 Alternatively, Sutuj's motion to reopen suggests that, as a victim of past persecution, he is eligible for asylum even absent a well-founded fear of future persecution if he can establish a reasonable probability of other serious harm upon removal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). As the BIA properly noted, however, the IJ in Sutuj's initial removal hearings rejected the claim that Sutuj's childhood experiences in Guatemala amounted to 3 Sutuj additionally claims that the BIA abused its discretion in requiring him to submit affidavits from first-hand sources in order to support his prima facie case. We read the BIA's reference to affidavits somewhat differently: not as requiring affidavits from first-hand sources per se, but rather as listing the lack of personal affidavits as among the evidentiary gaps that make Sutuj's prima facie showing deficient in this case. We note that, although the petitioner's argument fails because it is not supported by the record, it is not legally unsound. We have considered -- and in some cases upheld -- numerous asylum applications and motions to reopen that relied exclusively on an applicant's affidavit and documentary evidence. See, e.g., Escobar, 698 F.3d at 39 (reviewing a motion to reopen supported by personal knowledge of violence and reports by the State Department and human rights organizations); Smith, 627 F.3d at 434 (holding that BIA erred in denying a motion to reopen due to changed country circumstances supported by reports from human rights organizations, the United States government, and the press); Mendez-Barrera, 602 F.3d at 24 (reviewing an application for asylum based on generalized accounts of country conditions); López-Castro v. Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2009) (reviewing an application for asylum supported by Amnesty International and State Department reports); Raza, 484 F.3d at 129 (reviewing a motion to reopen based on a series of internet articles describing contemporaneous country conditions); Fesseha, 333 F.3d at 18 (reviewing a motion to reopen supported by reports from the U.S. government and human rights organizations). -12- persecution motivated by political opinion. Following the BIA's adoption of the IJ's decision, Sutuj did not seek further review of appeal. Accordingly, in considering Sutuj's motion to reopen, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in deferring to this earlier finding and in denying Sutuj's eligibility for relief under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).