Opinion ID: 1134606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: downstream effects

Text: The operation study recognizes the downstream water rights of the Nine Mile and Highland Systems and shows bypasses to satisfy these rights . . .. Storage (except under the Model decree) was limited to water which would otherwise spill from the John Martin Reservoir. As a result of these operating criteria, average stream flow below the project will be about the same in the future as it has been in the past. Section D1(a) of Article IV of the Operating Principles provides: Bypasses to the river shall be made at any time during the year to satisfy downstream senior rights as ordered by the Colorado State Engineer to the extent that such demands are not met by stream gains or otherwise satisfied but are limited to the extent as determined by the Colorado State Engineer to actually benefit such rights without unnecessary waste through channel losses. The transfer decree, following the thought of House Document 325 and the Operating Principles, provides: 5. That the Petitioners' storage of water in the Trinidad Reservoir under the Model Reservoir Right shall be regulated in such manner that the quantity of water occurring in the Las Animas or Purgatoire River at a gauging station on said River below Von Bremmer Arroya shall remain and be the same, as determined by the State Engineer, during any period of ten consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with January 1, 1954 as it would have been had the Model Reservoir Right not been transferred to the Trinidad Reservoir. The decree then provides that there shall be adequate measurement and recording of the flow of the water, and that there shall be established and maintained not less than three gaging stations. These three stations are designated, one of which is to be located immediately below Von Bremmer Arroya. Von Bremmer Arroya enters the Purgatoire River immediately above the Thatcher Gage. Thus, the 1965 decree places upon the State Engineer and Division Engineer the duty to make determinations and act so that in the winter Highland will receive the same amount of water which it would have received without the Trinidad Project and with a continuation of historical use of winter water by the Project ditches. With this basis now established, the next central issue for determination is: Would the operation of the Project with storage of all winter direct flow rights cause a diminution in the winter water reaching Highland by reason of a lessening of the return flow from the Project lands? Whether or not there is storage of the winter direct flow rights of the District ditches, it appears to be undisputed that the historical winter irrigation through the Project ditches dries up the river at the location of the headgates of those ditches. Highland maintains the proposition that, if the Project ditches continue with historical winter irrigation, the return flow from that irrigation will supply its historical uses in the winter. The Highland point of view was supported by the testimony of a hydrologist, Mr. John M. Dumeyer. He expressed the opinion that the return flow to the river resulting from winter irrigation through the Project ditches would occur within a month or two. He concluded that storage of the winter water would materially injure Highland. The other or District point of view was expressed in the testimony of Dr. Ted M. Zorich, another hydrologist. He was of the opinion that it takes much longer for the return flow to reach the river. In effect, his opinion was that the return flow of water used upon the Project lands during the irrigation season would be extended enough that operation of the Project plan would not materially lessen the amount of return flow from Project lands reaching Highland in the winter time. The court elected to follow the opinion of Mr. Dumeyer. If the case had been in a posture in which the court properly could rule on the requests for the temporary restraining order, we would be bound by the court's acceptance of the opinion of Mr. Dumeyer. The issuance of the orders, however, was premature. There have been no empirical studies from which it can be determined to a degree approaching categorical certainty whether the opinion of Mr. Dumeyer or the opinion of Dr. Zorich is correct. The order of January 25th was a result of the desire of the State Engineer and Division Engineer to observe the Project plan in operation for a month or so to see if the soundness of either of the conflicting points of view could be demonstrated. It appears from the testimony that, if they had been permitted to make the test and if it had appeared that Highland was injured thereby, Highland's loss could have been promptly compensated. The court found that from December 29 through January 25 the river flow at Highland averaged 8.43 c. f. s., and that the flow through the Trinidad gates averaged 9.2 c. f. s. The January 25th order attempted to stop diversion by the Project ditches and to close the gates of the reservoir for a period of approximately 30 days. This order was expressly issued under the authority of section 37-80-120, C.R.S.1973 and the order specifically stated that this would be out-of-priority storage. This section of the statute states . . . the state engineer may permit such upstream storage out of priority, but such storage water shall be promptly released on demand of a downstream senior whenever needed by such senior for actual use. The State Engineer and Division Engineer testified to the effect that they wished to see what result this temporary operation of the Project plan would have upon the water reaching the Highland headgate. This, according to them, might be demonstrated by observing the inflow reaching the Trinidad Reservoir as measured at the Madrid Gage, and by observing the water going to Highland as measured at the R-Bar Gage. They further testified in effect that, if it appeared that this test was lessening the water reaching Highland, they would terminate the test and order the gates of the reservoir opened that Highland might have replacement water for the lessened flow. With a minimum hazard to Highland, they were attempting to ascertain how long it would take the return flow from the Project lands to reach Highland. This is the type of matter in which the water authorities  and not the court  have the right to make the initial determination. That this is the legislative intent is shown in the following statutory provisions: The state engineer shall be responsible for the administration and distribution of the waters of the state, and in each division such administration and distribution shall be accomplished through the offices of the division engineer as specified in this article. Section 37-92-301(1), C.R. S.1973. Each division engineer shall order the total or partial discontinuance of any diversion in his division to the extent the water being diverted is not necessary for application to a beneficial use; and he shall also order the total or partial discontinuance of any diversion in his division to the extent the water being diverted is required by persons entitled to use water under water rights having senior priorities, but no such discontinuance shall be ordered unless the diversion is causing or will cause material injury to such water rights having senior priorities. In making his decision as to the discontinuance of a diversion to satisfy senior priorities the division engineer shall be governed by the following: The materiality of injury depends on all factors which will determine in each case the amount of water such discontinuance will make available to such senior priorities at the time and place of their need. Such factors include the current and prospective volumes of water in and tributary to the stream from which the diversion is being made; distance and type of stream bed between the diversion points; the various velocities of this water, both surface and underground; the probable duration of the available flow; and the predictable return flow to the affected stream. Each diversion shall be evaluated and administered on the basis of the circumstances relating to it and in accordance with provisions of this article and the court decrees adjudicating and confirming water rights. In the event a discontinuance has been ordered pursuant to the foregoing, and nevertheless such does not cause water to become available to such senior priorities at the time and place of their need, then such discontinuance order shall be rescinded. If a well has been approved as an alternate means of diversion for a water right for which a surface means of diversion is decreed, such well and such surface means must be utilized to the extent feasible and permissible under this article to satisfy said water right before diversions under junior water rights are ordered discontinued. (emphasis added) Section 37-92-502(2), C.R. S.1973. The statute gives a division engineer the right to make an evaluation. Here, he attempted to do this, but the court prevented it. After the division engineer has conducted a reasonable empirical study, the court has its role to play in judging whether his orders of release or impoundment have been correct. Therefore, the temporary restraining order of January 26th, together with the injunction making the same permanent, are reversed. [8] ABANDONMENT The court's judgment was entered on June 23, 1977. [9] It ruled that Highland Irrigation Company, not having been a party at the time of the entry of the transfer decree relating to the Model Storage Right on April 15, 1965, it could raise the issue of abandonment. It further ruled that of the 20,000 foot decree of the Model Storage Right, 13,800 acre feet had been abandoned and the storage right was reduced to 6200 acre feet. Thereafter, on January 30, 1978 we announced our opinion in Purgatoire River Water Conservancy District v. Highland Irrigation Company, 194 Colo. 510, 574 P.2d 83. In 1976, prior to the supplementary decree of December 3, 1976, Highland Irrigation Company attempted to intervene in the transfer proceedings, alleging that for many years the storage capacity of the Model Reservoir had been 6,000 acre feet or less. It prayed that the April 15, 1965 decree be modified to allow the storage of a maximum of 6,000 acre feet. On November 12, 1976 the district court, finding that Highland Irrigation Company had been validly notified at the commencement of the transfer proceedings, dismissed its attempted intervention. This ruling was appealed to us. In our January 30, 1978 opinion we affirmed and held that Highland Irrigation Company was bound by the 1965 decree. Thus, we then in effect overruled the portion of the judgment in the instant case relating to abandonment. Our opinion is dispositive on the same issue so far as Nine Mile Canal Co., Amity and Fort Lyon are concerned. [10] Highland, Amity and Fort Lyon argue that under City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445, P.2d 52 (1968), the district court here had jurisdiction to decree abandonment. We find the argument without merit. As distinct from the situation in Westminster, here Highland Irrigation Company was before the court in both cases, the issue was decided in the proceedings culminating with our January 30, 1978 opinion, and the matter is res judicata. The district court is reversed as to the abandonment issue.