Opinion ID: 751894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did appellant Nelson suffer double jeopardy?

Text: 58 Appellant Nelson argues that his prosecution on charges related to the San Diego robberies violated his double jeopardy protection because he was previously convicted of a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act in Indianapolis, Indiana. Because of that previous conspiracy conviction, the district court in this case dismissed a conspiracy count against Nelson, finding that the San Diego conspiracy was part of the Indiana conspiracy. However, the district court refused to dismiss the aiding and abetting counts against Nelson. 59 Such refusal was proper. This court has expressly held that conspiracy and aiding and abetting are separate offenses and one is not a lesser included offense of the other for purposes of double jeopardy. United States v. Arbelaez, 812 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1987). 10 This court has specifically applied this principle to Hobbs Act violations. See United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 601 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that a conspiracy to violate the Hobbs Act and a substantive violation of the Hobbs Act under an aiding and abetting theory were separate offenses for purposes of double jeopardy). 60 Thus, the district court did not err in refusing to dismiss the substantive Hobbs Act violations on double jeopardy grounds. 61