Opinion ID: 2567212
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: denial of a continuance after the state's motion to amend the information

Text: ¶ 7 Mr. Taylor challenges the trial court's refusal to grant him a continuance to meet the State's motion to amend its information. He argues that the denial of a continuance violated his due process rights under the Utah Constitution [2] and rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State argues this issue was not preserved because Mr. Taylor's counsel did not specifically request a continuance. However, without invitation, the trial court turned away the option of continuing the trial to permit Mr. Taylor to adjust his defense to meet the amended date. In light of these circumstances, we conclude that the issue was properly preserved. ¶ 8 A trial court's decision to grant a continuance is a matter of discretion, and we review the decision for abuse of that discretion. Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court denies a continuance and the resulting prejudice affects the substantial rights of the defendant, such that a review of the record persuades the court that without the error there was `a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.' State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (quoting State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984)); see also Utah R.Crim. P. 30(a) (Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.). ¶ 9 Guided by this standard, we examine whether the amended information denied Mr. Taylor adequate notice to meet the charged offenses. The right to adequate notice in the Utah Constitution requires the prosecution to state the charge with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense. State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Utah 1991). Beyond requiring a statement of the elements of the offense, however, the test for notice has few rules. It does not, for example, expressly mandate identification of the exact date when an alleged offense occurred. Instead, we require a weighing of the completeness of the notice and its adequacy for the defendant's purposes against the background of the information legitimately available to the prosecuting authority. Id. In other words, [a]s long as a defendant is sufficiently apprised of the State's evidence upon which the charge is based so that the defendant can prepare to meet that case, the constitutional requirement is fulfilled. Id. at 1032 n. 1. ¶ 10 We recently had occasion to summarize the information content and communication obligation that the State owes a defendant relating to the nature of the offense with which he is charged. We stated: The right of an accused to know the nature of the offense with which he is charged is a fundamental right guaranteed by both our federal and state constitutions. This right is rooted in the recognition that when the government exercises its authority to bring criminal charges against a person and thereby places him at risk of losing his liberty, the accused should be entitled to insist that the crime be defined with such reasonable clarity that he can mount a defense. By requiring that an offense be specifically identified, the right to be apprised of the nature of the crime also reinforces the protection against double jeopardy. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives practical expression to these fundamental rights. It defines the charging documents, describes the scope of their content, provides rules of construction, and, of importance here, sets out the limitations on their amendment. Specifically, rule 4(d) states that the court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense was charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ¶¶ 17-18, 94 P.3d 186 (quoting Utah R.Crim. P. 4(d)) (footnote and other citations omitted). ¶ 11 In Nelson-Waggoner, the defendant challenged the State's attempt to narrow the claimed dates of a rape by amending the information. 2004 UT 29 at ¶ 4, 94 P.3d 186. The defendant argued that his alibi defense would be undermined by the amended information because the alibi testimony covered a period outside the dates for the offense in the amended information. Id. at ¶ 19. We turned this argument away. Id. at ¶ 21. We held that where a defendant is initially required to defend against a crime potentially committed within a range of possible dates, and the amended information refines the field of dates within the initial range, the defendant's defense is not prejudiced. Id. ¶ 12 We have also acknowledged that in child sexual abuse prosecutions, identifying the specific date, time, or place of the offense is often difficult owing to the inability of young victims to provide this information. Responding to the realities of cognitive development, we have been less demanding of exact times and dates when young children are involved. We have noted that [i]f we were to hold that . . . no offense could be charged because the alleged victim is too young to testify with certainty concerning the time, dates, or places where the abuse occurred, we would leave the youngest and most vulnerable children with no legal protection. An abuser could escape prosecution merely by claiming that the child's inability to remember the exact dates and places of the abuse impaired the abuser's ability to prepare an alibi defense. Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033. [3] We acknowledge that by permitting a prosecution involving a child victim to proceed despite uncertainty over the date, time, and place of the alleged offense, we are balancing the interest of protecting vulnerable and cognitively limited children from exploitation against the interest of an accused to mount a defense. This policy-driven balance cannot be struck using a categorical rule; it will always have a thumb resting on one side of the fulcrum or the other. ¶ 13 Here, Mr. Taylor claims that his substantive rights were prejudiced when the trial court declined to continue the trial and allowed the State to expand the possible dates for his alleged conduct. According to Mr. Taylor, his rights were prejudiced because without a continuance he was generally rendered unable to impeach the victim's testimony based on her inconsistent recollection of dates. In particular, he argued, he was unable to establish that because he first began babysitting the victim in September 2002, he could not, therefore, have abused her during a four-month span of the period the State claimed the abuse occurred. ¶ 14 The victim testified that Mr. Taylor abused her before Christmas, before Halloween, and before her August 2 birthday. She also testified that at the time of the abuse, Mr. Taylor was watching football on television. Mr. Taylor argues that had he known she would testify that the abuse took place before August 2, he would have shown that no abuse could possibly have occurred before September or October. He argues that a continuance would have enabled him to assemble evidence to show that he did not babysit the victim before September, that he worked the night shift before September, and that he could not have been watching football on television before September, because football is broadcast only in the fall. Mr. Taylor argues that he would have used these inconsistencies to establish that the victim's memory generally was not credible. Her confusion over the dates of the abuse could, according to Mr. Taylor, persuade the jury that reasonable doubt existed as to whether the victim was abused at all. ¶ 15 Echoing our earlier observations about the unreasonableness of expecting children to recount dates with a precision out of step with their cognitive development, we have recognize[d] that children are often not able to identify with a high degree of reliability, and sometimes not at all, when an event in the past took place. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). That was certainly the case here. Mr. Taylor's attorney attempted to expose the victim's immature temporal understanding by asking her various time-sensitive questions. Her uncertain grasp of time is illustrated by the following conversation: Defense Attorney: [D]o you know the seasons of the year? Victim: Yeah. Defense Attorney: Can you tell me what they are? Victim: Yeah. Defense Attorney: What are they? Victim: Valentines, Easter, Christmas, Mother's Day. Defense Attorney: Well, those sound like holidays. Are those holidays? Victim: Yeah. Defense Attorney: Okay. So let me tell you what I think the seasons are and you tell me if I'm right. Spring, summer, winter, and fall. Are those seasons? Victim: Yeah. Defense Attorney: Now, can you remember what season of the year it was when [the abuse] happened? Victim: Yeah. Defense Attorney: What do you remember that being? Victim: Summer. Defense Attorney: Can you remember if it was hot out or cold out when this happened? Victim: Cold. ¶ 16 It is clear from this testimony that the victim's understanding of time was nascent, at best. She was incapable of anchoring her graphic and detailed recollection of the events of her abuse to calendar landmarks. It is indeed difficult for us to imagine what evidence Mr. Taylor could have produced that would have shown the victim to be less calendar-savvy than that already in the trial record. We do not, however, share Mr. Taylor's belief that the victim's tenuous attachment to time could reasonably have shaken the jury's conviction that the victim was in fact abused and that Mr. Taylor was the abuser. ¶ 17 The record presented the jury with ample evidence from which it could conclude that the victim was incapable of comprehending or communicating the when of the abuse. That the jury nevertheless convicted Mr. Taylor is explained less by his ability to reinforce the victim's fragile grip on time than by the convincing character of the who and what components of her testimony. In assessing her credibility regarding the abuse itself, the jury clearly did not rely on her ability to pinpoint a specific date. ¶ 18 Next, we turn to Mr. Taylor's contention that without a continuance he was unable to show that the abuse could not have occurred anytime before September because he did not babysit the victim any time before then. This claim bears on a defense theory that shares features with an alibi defense and is, therefore, different from his defense that the victim's testimony was not credible. It is a defense that, like an alibi, endeavors to place Mr. Taylor at a location other than the site of the abuse. It is undisputed, however, that Mr. Taylor was at the site of the abuse under circumstances that provided him an opportunity to rape and sodomize the victim. The State alleged that Mr. Taylor committed the abuse while he was babysitting the victim at her home. Mr. Taylor admits that he did babysit the victim in her home on occasion, but denies abusing her. Even if Mr. Taylor could prove that it was impossible to abuse the victim on particular dates or even during extended spans of time, his defense would not be compromised by the expanded range of dates because he admittedly babysat the victim during the relevant period, and because his core defenseI didn't do itis not time-sensitive. ¶ 19 The trial court reasoned that whether the abuse occurred in September or January was immaterial to Mr. Taylor's argument. From the bench, the trial court explained: [I]t's Mr. Taylor's testimony from the stand that [the abuse] never happened, not that it didn't happen in December or November, but it never happened. And these dates establish his residency were May 15 through January 9, and that does conform with the testimony, so . . . I can't find any bias or prejudice to him by allowing the amendment, no substantial right . . . that's been violated. We agree; Mr. Taylor's theory of the case was not affected. [4] His theory, that the victim's testimony of the fact of abuse could not be believed because she could not reliably say when the abuse occurred, remained the same after the information was amended. What Mr. Taylor sought was an opportunity to make the victim's testimony about the dates of the abuse appear even more frail than it already appeared to be. In our view, this would have been an enterprise with negligible returns. We find it implausible that a jury that convicted Mr. Taylor in the face of the victim's inability to link events to time would have changed its mind after being presented with an additional helping of what it already knew. We therefore conclude that the outcome would not have been different if the continuance had been granted, and Mr. Taylor's substantial rights were not affected.