Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: marital communications

Text: While incarcerated awaiting trial, Burns wrote several letters to his wife. Those letters contained incriminating statements by Burns and differing versions of the events surrounding Cooley's murder. Penny turned the letters over to Thomas, who had the letters examined by a handwriting expert. That examination revealed that Burns had written the letters. Relying on Code § 8.01-398, Burns filed a motion in limine to exclude the letters from evidence. The circuit court concluded that Rifle statute does not prevent a third party who is in possession of the letters, and has gained that possession lawfully, from testifying. Therefore, the court denied Burns' motion, and the letters were introduced into evidence during the trial through the testimony of Thomas. Penny did not testify about the letters. On appeal, Burns contends that the privilege created in Code § 8.01-398 is separate and distinct from the privilege granted in Code § 19.2-271.2, and that the former privilege applies in any case irrespective of whether the spouse of an accused testifies. According to Burns, the court's ruling eviscerates the marital privilege and renders it meaningless with regard to written communications. We do not agree. Code § 8.01-398(A) provides: Husband and wife shall be competent witnesses to testify for or against each other in all civil actions; provided that neither husband nor wife shall, without the consent of the other, be examined in any action as to any communication privately made by one to the other while married, nor shall either be permitted, without such consent, to reveal in testimony after the marriage relation ceases any such communication made while the marriage subsisted. As Burns argues, we have construed the privilege embodied in this statute broadly to include all information or knowledge privately imparted and made known by one spouse to the other by virtue of and in consequence of the marital relation through conduct, acts, signs, and spoken or written words. Menefee v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 900, 912, 55 S.E.2d 9, 15 (1949). However, the plain words utilized in this statutory provision limit the privilege to situations where a spouse is being examined in an action or is revealing a private communication through testimony. When a statute does not contain an express definition of a term, we infer the intent of the legislature from the plain meaning of the words used. City of Virginia Beach v. Flippen, 251 Va. 358, 362, 467 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1996). Consequently, since Penny did not testify about the letters or their content, Code § 8.01-398(A) does not apply to the present situation. Thus, the circuit court did not err in admitting Burns' letters into evidence through the testimony of a law enforcement officer.