Opinion ID: 2156669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Modify Custody/Placement

Text: Our review of the record supports the Family Court justice's decision that defendant failed to prove a sufficient change of circumstances from those that existed when the Family Court entered the divorce decree in 2000. Moreover, after reviewing the record and the bench decision, we conclude that the Family Court justice's decision is more than sufficiently predicated on evidence independent of the polygraph results. Not only did defendant fail to satisfy his burden with respect to demonstrating a significant change of circumstances, but also it is clear that he failed to convince the trial justice that a modification of the custody or placement order would be in the interest of the child's welfare. As is evident from her decision, the trial justice was uncomfortable with any custody arrangement involving these parents, both of whom she found had a clear misunderstanding of the rights and responsibilities of a joint custodial parent. She noted that the parties have been utterly unable to communicate with each other on behalf of the child, resorting to their attorneys and the court as their only means of parley. Perhaps the trial justice's findings are best summarized by her comment that there were times during this testimony, frankly, where this Court became satisfied that neither one of these parties could stand the scrutiny of being measured against any, let alone all of the variables in the Pettinato case; that seminal case that gives judges guidance in determining what is in the child's best interest. [4] The trial justice then evaluated the allegations of possible sexual abuse within this context of enmity and extreme distrust. She found that the child had in fact made a disclosure to plaintiff suggesting that she had been inappropriately and sexually touched by both her father and stepmother. The trial justice specifically found that the child made a similar disclosure to a DCYF social worker, and was overheard at daycare telling other students that she told Mrs. Sticca-Guertin and defendant not to touch her private parts. The trial justice considered the disparate evidence. She noted that court personnel were instructed to observe visits between defendant and the child, and that the child showed absolutely no fear or apprehension of being around the father and stepmother. Yet videotapes taken by plaintiff after the child returned from visits with her father depicted the child engaging in sexual behavior. Although DCYF ultimately deemed the allegations of abuse unfounded, the trial justice lamented the manner in which both parties had conducted themselves: The bottom line, although there was an attempt made to suggest that this child never displayed any so-called `red flag' behaviors, it is clear to this Court that the fact that she had made a disclosure to her mother and to the social worker and made those comments at preschool, had this child been properly evaluated when the suggestion was made that she be seen at the Child Safe Clinic, perhaps then we could have resolved with some sort of clarity whether or not there has ever been any kind of abuse against this baby. Now, however, it is probably too late for anyone to get an accurate reading of what may or may not have happened to [this child]. It is clear, for example, based on statements in this record that the child spoke of walking in on her father and stepmother having sex. Clearly, that may well have had some impact on her sexual knowledge and the comments that she made to her mother, understanding based on the history of this case, that any kind of comments made to either one of them were immediate cause for government intervention. Since parental alienation was the basis of defendant's motion for sole custody, the Family Court justice denied his motion. The Family Court justice also found that there was no significant change of circumstances justifying a change in placement. We are satisfied that she made a thorough review of the testimony and the evidence and did not misconceive or overlook anything in the record. The Family Court justice properly relied on ample evidence independent of the references to the polygraph examination to support her ultimate decision to deny defendant's motion to amend the custody award. For instance, the trial justice characterized defendant's behavior as hypervigilant, and found that he exhibits significant controlling behavior when it comes to his daughter's day-to-day life, and that that behavior has materially contributed to the inability of these parents to effectively communicate for the benefit of this child. She also noted that he had made at least three complaints to DCYF, all of which had been determined to be unfounded. Significantly, the trial justice found that Mr. Guertin clearly demonstrated his need to control and his inability to foster a good relationship between the child and the child's mother   . The trial justice expressed her incredulity when defendant testified that plaintiff had limited his visitation on Father's Day 2001, yet photographs clearly established that he had had the child for the entire day. Moreover, the trial justice was dismayed that defendant had denied plaintiff time with the child on Mother's Day 2002 in disregard of what this Court clearly indicated would be an appropriate time frame for her to enjoy her daughter on Mother's Day. Unfortunately, the parties' behavior, their inability to communicate, their hypervigilance, their mutual misunderstanding of the responsibilities of joint custodial parenthood were extant at the time of the original custody order. Mr. Guertin had failed to show a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of either custody or placement. Moreover, there was ample evidence suggesting that it might well not be in the child's best interest for him to be the sole custodial parent. Although the trial justice's comments about the polygraph examination may have been imprudent, her reference to plaintiff's polygraph test results was harmless error in the circumstances of this case. We long have held that because test results of polygraph examinations have not been established as scientifically accurate and reliable    it is improper for them to be introduced for any purpose. State v. Villafane, 760 A.2d 942, 944 (R.I.2000) (citing State v. Dery, 545 A.2d 1014, 1017-18 (R.I.1988)). We do not retreat from that position today. However, defendant's argument that the trial justice erred because she undertook no analysis whatsoever of the reliability of [the polygraph] evidence fails to persuade us that her decision must be reversed. We first note that the results of the polygraph examination were contained within Dr. Parsons' report, which was proffered into evidence by defendant, over plaintiff's objection, without any attempt to redact the references to the polygraph examination. Later in the trial, defendant objected to plaintiff's use of psychological testing raw data on her cross-examination of Dr. Parsons. The defendant said he would have no objection to placing into evidence all the records that Dr. Parsons referred to in his evaluation, stating the report speaks for itself. At no point did he attempt to draw the trial justice's attention to the fact that the report referred to a polygraph examination. Having placed the psychological evaluation referring to the polygraph results into evidence in this civil, nonjury matter, defendant has waived any claim of error regarding its admission into evidence. Secondly, in light of our review of the trial justice's decision, we are satisfied that she did not impermissibly rely on the polygraph results in finding that plaintiff has not prompted, coached or tried to alienate the child from defendant. Rather, the trial justice considered the circumstances of the child's various disclosures and the conflicting evidence, and concluded that, regrettably, given the poisoned atmosphere created by both parents, it was probably too late to resolve with any certainty what may or may not have happened to the child. Simply put, defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proof to establish a significant change of circumstances or to show that plaintiff repeatedly had attempted to make unfounded and untrue statements to damage his relationship with the minor child. We perceive the trial justice's reference to the results of plaintiff's polygraph examination as an attempt to secure some reassurance in her decision to maintain the custodial status quo in light of the hostilities between the parents. As the trial justice said, she was well aware that the results of a polygraph test are not routinely accepted into evidence. But, here, as they were included as a recommendation by Dr. Parsons, she believed she could consider the record as presented. Although we disagree with her conclusion  polygraph results have not yet been established as reliable  her consideration of the results in this case was harmless error.