Opinion ID: 1667375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Relating to the Penalty Phase

Text: Anderson's arguments relating to the penalty phase of his trial are next addressed.
Anderson claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike Juror Dormeyer for cause because of statements he made during voir dire. These statements indicated that he would vote for a death sentence unless the defense could convince him otherwise. To determine whether Anderson's attorneys' failure to strike Juror Dormeyer was ineffective assistance of counsel, it is necessary to discuss some of the circumstances surrounding the statements. Anderson had two attorneys involved in the relevant portion of voir dire. Attorney Charles Moreland questioned the panelists, while Attorney Scott McBride communicated the strikes for cause to the trial court. The statements at issue were made while Moreland was questioning panelists about their views on the death penalty. Moreland asked if there was anyone who believed that if a person deliberately takes a life, they must forfeit their own life. Two panelists raised their hands in response to this question. Panelist Sabourin stated unequivocally that he would vote for death in all instances. Panelist Bowers stated she would vote for death unless there were other factors where it would be life imprisonment. Moreland then explained that the burden of proof would be on the prosecution throughout the trial. He also explained the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the penalty phase. He then asked Bowers whether she would be able to give serious consideration to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole if the defense was not able to present any reasons to spare Anderson's life. Bowers responded that she would probably weigh more heavily to the death penalty. She also stated that she believed in an eye for an eye and that when someone is convicted of first degree murder, a life must be given. Panelist Craft indicated that he shared this view. Thereafter, two other panelists stated that death would be the only appropriate punishment where the murder was carried out in front of children. Panelists Sabourin, Bowers, and Craft were later stricken for cause because they indicated a strong preference for the death penalty. After questioning the group as a whole, Moreland began asking individual panelists whether they could give serious consideration to a life sentence even if the defense presented no evidence in mitigation. Panelist Williams stated that she could not. At this point, the prosecutor objected, arguing that Moreland's questions were leaving the jury with the impression that Anderson would not produce mitigating evidence when, in fact, he intended to present a mitigation case. The court admonished Moreland to tailor his questions to what he anticipated presenting to the jury and not to give an impression that there would be no mitigation case when he fully expected to develop one. Moreland then asked if Williams would have any difficulty following an instruction to keep the burden with the State at all times. Williams responded that she would think the mitigating circumstances would have to be provided by the defense. To this, Moreland clarified that the jury could consider anything in evidence at trial in mitigation. Williams responded that she could consider a life sentence under those circumstances. McBride also later moved to strike Williams for cause because she indicated a strong preference for the death penalty. Moreland proceeded to question other panelists individually, asking if they could follow the court's instructions and give serious consideration to a sentence of life in prison without parole. When he questioned Juror Dormeyer, however, the following exchange took place: [Moreland]: Would you be able to give serious consideration to a sentence of life without parole? [Dormeyer]: Well, can I ask a question? [Moreland]: I don't know if I'll be able to answer or not. [Dormeyer]: Well, if there's no evidence otherwise, I probablyI mean, I believe in capital punishment, but that's not, I have to be really convinced. That's what I'm saying. [Moreland]: Are you saying you really have to be convinced by the State, or you really have to be convinced by me? [Dormeyer]: I would have to be convinced that the person was not deserving of capital punishment. [Moreland]: Okay. So your position in enteringif you're on the jury and entering the penalty phases, the death penalty is automatically an appropriate punishment in your mind, right? [Dormeyer]: Uh-huh. [Moreland]: And a life imprisonment could be an appropriate punishment if I can persuade you so? [Dormeyer]: Right. [Moreland]: All right. Would you require me to put on evidence to persuade you that life imprisonment would be appropriate in this case before you would give serious consideration to a life sentence? [Dormeyer]: I believe so. [Moreland]: Okay. And you understand the burden of proof is on the state? [Dormeyer]: Yes. [Moreland]: But you would nonetheless require us to put on, to convince you otherwise? [Dormeyer]: Right. [Moreland]: Against the death sentence? [Dormeyer]: Right. Unlike Panelists Sabourin, Bowers, Craft, and Williams, McBride did not move to strike Juror Dormeyer despite his statements indicating that he would put the burden on the defense to convince him that Anderson did not deserve the death penalty. A defendant has a right to a fair and impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Mo. Const. art. I, § 18(a). In cases where the death penalty may be imposed, [a]ny veniremember who cannot be impartial is unfit to serve, whether the partiality is due to an aversion to the death penalty, an excessive zeal for death, or any other improper predisposition. State v. Clark, 981 S.W.2d 143, 148 (Mo. banc 1998). Failure to strike a juror that is unfit to serve because of such an improper predisposition is structural error. See Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)). A death sentence imposed by a jury tainted with structural error must be vacated. Gray, 481 U.S. at 660, 107 S.Ct. 2045. The State argues that the decision not to strike Juror Dormeyer was trial strategy and that any prejudice to Anderson was cured when the defense presented a mitigation case. For trial strategy to be the basis for denying a Rule 29.15 claim, however, the strategy must be reasonable. Wilkes v. State, 82 S.W.3d 925, 930 (Mo. banc 2002). Nothing in the record reflects any reasonable basis for trial counsel's decision not to move to strike Juror Dormeyer. Indeed, both Moreland and McBride testified that the oversight occurred because of a note-taking error. [7] They stated that they could think of no strategic reason for leaving Juror Dormeyer on the jury. Neither can this Court. No competent defense attorney would intentionally leave someone on the jury who indicated a strong preference for the death penalty and also stated that he would require the defense to convince him that death was not appropriate even though he was aware that the burden of proof remains with the state. Any strategy that would place someone with such a predisposition on the jury is wholly unreasonable. The State's argument that any prejudice caused by Juror Dormeyer serving on the jury during the sentencing phase was cured when the defense presented its mitigation case is also unpersuasive. The State cites State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Mo. banc 1991), to support this proposition. In that case, one of the jurors indicated in voir dire that he would presume guilt unless the defendant testified. 815 S.W.2d at 423. The defendant did take the stand in Hadley , and it was held that [a]ny potential miscarriage of justice in having [the disputed venireperson] on the jury was entirely dependent upon defendant failing to testify. Id. at 424. Hadley is distinguishable from the present case. It is true that, prior to questioning Juror Dormeyer, Moreland asked Panelist Williams if she would give serious consideration to a life sentence if the defense could present no evidence in mitigation. The trial judge sustained an objection to this question because it presented a hypothetical that the defense did not expect to actually occur. This, however, was not the question that was asked of Juror Dormeyer. As set out above, Juror Dormeyer made his statements in response to Moreland asking, would you be able to give serious consideration to a sentence of life without parole? He stated that he would have to be convinced that the person was not deserving of capital punishment. He also indicated that, although he could be persuaded to vote for life, death was automatically an appropriate punishment unless the defense could convince him otherwise. These comments suggest that Juror Dormeyer would not give serious consideration to a sentence of life imprisonment and that he would not employ the proper burden of proof. See State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 532, 544 (Mo. banc 2000) (challenge for cause will be sustained if it appears that the venireperson cannot consider the entire range of punishment, apply the proper burden of proof, or otherwise follow the court's instructions in a first degree murder case.) Such a predisposition, which amounts to structural error as noted above, is not cured simply by the defense presenting a mitigation case. As such, Hadley is inapplicable. [8] It is important to note that the structural error in this case could have been easily cured. Anderson's counsel, the prosecutor, or the trial court could have followed up to ask Juror Dormeyer whether, despite his belief that the death penalty was automatically appropriate unless the defense convinced him otherwise, he could put aside his personal beliefs and follow the instructions of the court. Failure to do so denied Anderson his right to a fair and impartial jury and constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Knese, 85 S.W.3d at 632-33. This error only affected the penalty phase. None of Juror Dormeyer's statements indicated a predisposition to vote for guilt. As such, the motion court's judgment is reversed as to penalty phase only, and the case is remanded. On remand, a properly selected jury may consider again whether death is appropriate for the killing of Debbie Rainwater.
Having found that Anderson is entitled to a new penalty phase, there is no need to address his remaining points related to the penalty phase, including that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call clinical social worker Cessie Alfonso in the penalty phase, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to some of the prosecutor's penalty phase arguments, and that Missouri's method of execution is unconstitutional. Although there is no need to address Anderson's assertions that the State could not seek the death penalty against him because the State's information failed to allege any aggravating factors, this Court reiterates its position that this argument is without merit. Anderson's argument on this issue mirrors the defendant's argument in State v. Gill, 167 S.W.3d 184, 193-94 (Mo. banc 2005), wherein it was noted that such claims have been repeatedly rejected.