Opinion ID: 25
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Teenagers' Statements

Text: The government introduced four statements made by C through the testimony of Cambridge Detective Cherubino and three statements made by P through the testimony of Boston Detective Blair. Two of the statements related to setting up the Cambridge prostitution call. Although the speaker was not identified at the time these statements were made, Diaz attributes both of them to C and the record reflects general agreement as to that assumption. The first such statement was made by the person who answered the phone at the escort service when Cherubino called from the Cambridge hotel to set up a rendezvous there, and the second was made by the person who called him back a short time later. They were: . . . she told me that she would return a call within five minutes. And there was discussion of the price for a half hour for $175 for full service, and I agreed, and I was told that she would respond within a half hour to my location. C's other two statements were made in the hotel room. According to Cherubino: [S]he told me that she wanted to take care of the financial obligation and asked me for the $175. . . . I asked the female what I would get for this fee, and she replied `a full service.' She also remarked upon handing Cherubino a condom: `Put it on. You won't be disappointed.' P's three challenged statements, which all occurred in the Boston hotel room where she and Lewis met Detective Blair, were: Her report to a male on the other end of a phone call that `[w]e're in.' Her statement to Blair that `I don't fuck. I'll jerk you off.' Her statement to Lewis, `Give me the money, give me the money. I'll run it downstairs.' The district court admitted the first six statements on the basis that they were non-hearsay directions whose truth or falsity was immaterial. It allowed the final statement into evidence for the limited purpose of showing P's state of mind. We briefly address the group of six before considering the court's treatment of the final statement.
The government acknowledges that certain of the statements admitted by the district court as non-hearsay probably should not be classified as instructions or requests that categorically fall outside the hearsay rule. It nonetheless argues that such statements were properly admitted as non-hearsay because they constitute verbal acts or verbal parts of acts that evidenced the prostitution transactions. See, e.g., United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 59 (1st Cir.2008); United States v. Murphy, 193 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1999); 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 801.11[3][4], at XXX-XXX-XX (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., 2d ed. 2009). [9] We find it unnecessary to closely examine the propriety of allowing the six statements into evidence because we are persuaded that any error in their admission was harmless. [10] See United States v. Benitez-Avila, 570 F.3d 364, 372 (1st Cir.2009) (Improper admission of testimony is harmless if it is highly probable that the error did not influence the verdict.) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Although all six of the statements provided telling evidence about Evelyn's business, and the statements made by C and P in the hotel rooms confirmed that minors employed by her were engaging in prostitution, none of the statements implicated appellant Diaz in Evelyn's activities. [11] Moreover, Diaz does not dispute that Evelyn was involved in prostitution with her younger sisters and other minors, and there was substantial evidence about the sting operations, other than the challenged statements, that would have led the jury to find that prostitution was occurring on those occasions. Nor do we find merit in Diaz's contention that the sexually graphic nature of the statements could have confused or misled the jurors, or provoked their disgust with him, thereby causing undue prejudice. As an initial matter, we note that Diaz never argued to the district court that the probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, Fed.R.Evid. 403. We therefore would reverse the district court's ruling only for plain errora standard that certainly was not met here. The jury heard other far more pertinent, explicit testimony linking Diaz to the prostitution scheme and Evelyn's exploitation of her sisters, including his admission to Agent Harty that P was among the girls he had driven to calls. We thus see no meaningful possibility that the distasteful nature of the statements contributed to the jurors' finding that Diaz was a knowing and willing participant in Evelyn's business.
Diaz also contends that P's request for the money and her assertion that she would bring it downstairs was improperly admitted under a sub-category of the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule known as the Hillmon doctrine. See Fed. R.Evid. 803(3) (describing the state-of-mind exception); Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 12 S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892); Minh Tu v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 77, 81 (1st Cir.1998). [12] That doctrine allows admission of a hearsay statement of intent for the purpose of showing that the declarant later acted in accordance with his or her expressed intention, see Minh Tu, 136 F.3d at 81, and some courts also have allowed such evidence to prove the actions of a third party, see 2 George E. Dix, et al., McCormick on Evidence § 275, at 275-76 (Kenneth S. Broun, ed., 6th ed. 2006). We need not delve into the intricacies of the Hillmon doctrine here. Although the court raised the doctrine during the final pretrial conference, it gave only a standard state-of-mind instruction when it ruled during trial that P's statement was admissible. [13] Moreover, defense counsel objected to admission of the statement during the pretrial colloquy only on the ground that P's intent was not relevant and offered no additional explanations for the objection at trial. [14] Any other contention regarding the statement's admissibility is therefore subject to plain error review. See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir.2010). The Hillmon claim and appellant's other contentions would be unavailing even under a less onerous standard, [15] however, because the statement's admission, if error at all, was harmless. P's intention to bring the money downstairs shows that she believed someone would be there to collect it from her, but her statement does not explicitly identify appellant as the expected recipient. Diaz argues that the statement was nonetheless prejudicial because it included an implied assertion that he was the individual to whom P expected to give the money. Even if such an implied assertion were subject to an appropriate hearsay objection (an issue we do not decide), the jury's finding of guilt would not be compromised. Diaz's willing participation in the Boston transaction, and thus the conspiracy, was more directly shown through other evidenceparticularly that he had driven P and Lewis to the hotel, stayed in the area after the drop-off, and gave an odd reason for remaining. In addition, the government presented evidence that appellant had admitted knowingly driving females, including P, to prostitution calls. P's statement added only marginally to this evidence, and we have no doubt that the jury would have reached the same outcome without it.