Opinion ID: 2347232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is the City bound by the 1971 comprehensive rezoning?

Text: We think that the City is estopped from attempting to enforce the 1971 zoning ordinance in this instance because of the Cranes' substantial change in position. There is no question that the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be asserted against a municipal corporation in circumstances like those here, Prince George's County v. McBride, 268 Md. 522, 534-35, 302 A.2d 620, 626 (1973); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. Gaithersburg, 266 Md. 117, 134-35, 291 A.2d 672, 680-81 (1972); City of Baltimore v. Chesapeake Marine Ry. Co., 233 Md. 559, 578, 197 A.2d 821, 830 (1964); Hagerstown v. Hagerstown Ry. Co., 123 Md. 183, 91 A. 170 (1914). It is the last of these cases which is particularly persuasive here. There, the City of Hagerstown, by ordinance, permitted the individual who owned an electric plant to install poles and string wires on the city streets, a right later assigned to the Railway Company. When the City determined to construct a municipal electric plant, it attempted to revoke the franchise. Our predecessors held that the City was estopped from taking this action. Indeed, where a municipal corporation has made an offer by ordinance which has been accepted and acted upon by another, a contract may arise, the obligation of which is constitutionally protected against impairment, 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 19.39, at 499 (1969); 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law §§ 422-23, at 762-64 (1964). Further, the vested contractual interest acquired under a statute or ordinance may in some circumstances survive the repeal of the statute or ordinance, Causey v. Gray, 250 Md. 380, 387, 243 A.2d 575, 581 (1968); McMechen v. City of Baltimore, 2 H. & J. 41 (1803).