Opinion ID: 6107079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 825I Error in Failing To Instruct the Jury To View Defendant's Out-of-court Oral Statements with Caution

Text: Newton claimed during his videotaped police interview that he was present when defendant was talking about killing Faggins and Hightower. According to Newton, defendant announced, [W]e're getting rid of all the snitches and, pointing at the victims, said, [W]e can do them right here and right now. At trial, Newton repudiated his videotaped statements and testified that he had  been elsewhere at the time of the shootings. It was left to the jury to  decide which version of Newton's testimony to believe and whether defendant ever made these statements. Until recently, we had imposed on trial courts a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that a defendant's oral admissions should be viewed with caution. (See People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1 , 19, 73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620 , 178 P.3d 1113 ; CALJIC No. 2.71.7.) In People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 , 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ( Diaz ), though, we determined that the instruction need be given only on request. ( Id . at p. 1189, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 .) Because jurors must now be instructed-and were instructed here-with the general instructions on witness credibility ( id . at p. 1189, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ; see CALJIC No. 2.20 ), the cautionary instruction for oral admissions no longer qualified as one of the general principles of law upon which a court is required to instruct the jury in the absence of a request ( Diaz , at p. 1189, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ). We also concluded that defendants should be allowed to decide whether the instruction would be in their interests, rather than require the trial judge to give the instruction in every case, since such oral statements may sometimes include both incriminating and exculpatory elements. ( Id . at p. 1193, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 .) In rejecting the People's argument that the instruction never be given, even on request, we observed that the [cautionary] instruction may be useful to the defense in highlighting for the jury the need for care and caution in evaluating evidence of the defendant's statements. ( Id . at p. 1189, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 .) The trial court here failed to instruct the jury that it should consider defendant's oral statements with caution. The Attorney General concedes that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.71.7 7 or some equivalent instruction. Yet his concession predated our decision in Diaz , which declared that the instruction need be given only on request. We therefore consider whether our Diaz decision, which was issued well after the trial in this case, should be given retroactive effect-and whether defendant was therefore obligated to request a cautionary instruction if he desired one. We conclude the answer to both questions is no. The law in effect at the time of trial was clear: A trial court had the duty to instruct the jury sua sponte to view a defendant's oral admissions with caution. The required instruction dated from 1872 and was codified in the Code of Civil Procedure, former section 2061, subdivision 4. (See Diaz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 .) Although the Legislature repealed  that provision when it adopted the Evidence Code in 1965, we subsequently held that the repeal had no effect on a court's obligation to give the instruction contained in the former  statute. ( People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 , 455, fn. 4, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 492 P.2d 1 .) And this court reaffirmed a trial court's sua sponte duty to give the cautionary instruction just a year before the trial in this case. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 , 392-393, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 935 P.2d 708 .) Because defendant would have had no reason to anticipate that the burden was on him to request the instruction, we conclude that the Diaz rule should be applied only prospectively. (See People v. Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082 , 1108, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 25 P.3d 598 [new rule requiring a defendant to object to venue before trial should be applied only prospectively].) Accordingly, we accept the Attorney General's concession that the trial court erred under state law in failing to give the instruction. (See Diaz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 [We apply the standard for state law error.... Failure to give the cautionary instruction is not a violation of federal due process.... (citation omitted) ].) But ultimately, the error was harmless. The jury was fully aware of its duty to resolve whether defendant made these statements.  After viewing Newton's videotaped statement purporting to describe what defendant said, the jury saw Newton testify under oath that he had falsely inculpated defendant and Betton in an effort to secure a favorable resolution of a pending drug charge. Moreover, Newton's videotaped statement was riddled with factual errors: He told Waters that the murders occurred during the daytime, around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., on September 25, 1996-but they actually occurred around 10:00 p.m., well after dark, the next day. He said the shootings took place on 97th Street, but they actually happened on 99th Place. He said that defendant shot both victims with the same gun-but the forensic analysis showed they had been shot with different guns. He said that the shooter reached inside the car to shoot Hightower, but that was contradicted by the medical examiner and by Detective Vena. At trial, Newton attributed the discrepancies in his videotaped statement to his failure to attend the party. Accordingly, before the jury could credit Newton's videotaped account of defendant's statements, it necessarily had to decide which version of Newton's account should be believed. So we do not dispute that the jury needed to determine whether defendant made the statements described by Newton. But the other jury instructions made that reasonably apparent, and alerted the jury of the need to carefully consider Newton's account. In particular, the jury was instructed about the significance of a witness's prior consistent and inconsistent statements ( CALJIC No. 2.13 ), discrepancies in a witness's testimony or between the witness's testimony and that of others ( CALJIC No. 2.21.1 ), a witness's willfully false statement in material part ( CALJIC No. 2.21.2 ), conflicting testimony ( CALJIC No. 2.22 ), the believability of a witness convicted of a felony ( CALJIC No. 2.23 ), and a witness's credibility in general ( CALJIC No. 2.20 ). Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably likely or possible  that the error in omitting a cautionary instruction affected the outcome at the guilt or penalty phases. (See Diaz , supra , 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1196-1197, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884 , 906-907, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 647 , 111 P.3d 921 .) J. Challenge to the Instruction That Defendant Voluntarily Absented Himself from the Proceedings The trial court instructed the venire not to consider defendant's absence from the  trial: [T]he defendant Johnson will not be present for these proceedings. The court is instructing [ ] that you are not to speculate as to the reasons for his absence, nor is this a matter which in any way can affect you or your verdict in this case. No one raised a hand in response to the court's inquiry whether anyone would be unable to follow this instruction. At the end of trial, the court instructed the jury that defendant has voluntarily absented himself from these proceedings. This is a matter which must not in any way affect you in this case. [¶] In your deliberations, do not discuss or consider this subject. It must not in any way affect your verdicts or findings you may be asked to make in connection with your verdicts. The trial court overruled the defense objection to the word voluntarily, reasoning that it's been his choice on a daily basis to never even listen to this case and that he, by his conduct, waived his right to testify and to be present in court. Defendant renews his claim that the word voluntarily injected an untrue and unnecessary concept into the instruction. He relies on the trial court's acknowledgement that defendant probably would want to be present in the courtroom. We need not decide whether a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily disrupts the proceedings such that the trial cannot continue in his presence has voluntarily absented himself. (But see Maxwell v. Roe , supra , 606 F.3d at p. 570 ; U.S. v. Hemsi (2d Cir. 1990) 901 F.2d 293 , 296.) We find instead that even if the word should have been omitted, the jury did not construe the instruction to his detriment. The jurors were instructed-twice-that defendant's absence must not in any way affect their consideration of the case or their verdicts. The jury was also warned not to consider or discuss the topic in its deliberations. We presume the jury followed those instructions.  (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149 , 1214, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 , 105 P.3d 487 .) We also reject defendant's claim that the court's instruction to disregard defendant's absence was undermined by the standard flight instruction ( CALJIC No. 2.52 ), which, as given, provided: The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime or after he's accused of a crime  is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, may be considered by you in the light of all other proved facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty. The weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you to decide. (Italics added.) Defendant proposes that the jury, in reliance on the italicized language and his voluntary absence from trial, may have inferred (1) that he fled to escape trial, and (2) that they could consider that flight in deciding his guilt. But there was no evidence that defendant fled after being accused-nor did the prosecutor make any such argument to the jury. So any claim that the jury might have thought he fled would be entirely speculative. After all, the jury would have understood that it could consider such flight only if proved-and it was not proved here. Defendant is correct that the italicized phrase in CALJIC No. 2.52 was unnecessary in this case and could have been deleted. But the jury was instructed to [d]isregard any instruction which applies to facts determined by you not to exist and warned not [to] conclude that because an instruction has been given that I'm expressing an opinion as to the facts. So there was little risk that the jury misapplied the instruction to defendant's detriment. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044 , 1153-1154, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121 , 954 P.2d 384 ; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291 , 314, 261 Cal.Rptr. 348 , 777 P.2d 121 .)  Commonwealth v. Muckle (2003) 59 Mass.App.Ct. 631 , 797 N.E.2d 456 , on which defendant relies to suggest that the standard instruction may lead a jury to infer flight from the defendant's absence in some circumstances, is distinguishable. In that case, the defendant failed to appear at trial following the second day's lunch break. ( Id . at p. 459.) The trial court gave the standard instruction on flight for the sole purpose of enabling the prosecution to argue that his absence from the trial reflected a consciousness of guilt-even though the evidence before the jury did not establish the voluntariness of the defendant's absence or any other type of flight. ( Id . at p. 461 ; cf. People v. Snyder (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 195 , 199, 128 Cal.Rptr. 297 [upholding the flight instruction where the defendant, who was free on bail, absconded after the first day of trial].) In fact, the Muckle court determined that the consciousness of guilt instruction should not have been given at all. ( Muckle , at p. 462.) Here, by contrast, the flight instruction was justified by evidence that defendant fled the murder scene: Greer testified that he saw defendant and codefendant running from the area where the murders occurred. Moreover, the prosecution in this case never argued that defendant's absence from the trial constituted flight or reflected a consciousness of  guilt, and the jury was instructed not to consider defendant's absence from trial in any way. We therefore see no reasonable likelihood that the jury considered defendant's absence from trial as evidence of his guilt. K. Failure To Instruct the Jury That It Could Consider Huggins's Misdemeanor Conduct in Evaluating His Credibility At trial, Huggins admitted he had been convicted of misdemeanor spousal abuse in 1997. The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.20 that [i]n determining the believability of a witness, you may consider anything that has a tendency to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony, including, but not limited to ... a witness's prior conviction of a felony. But the court did not append the standard language allowing the jury also to consider [p]ast criminal conduct of a witness amounting to a misdemeanor. ( CALJIC No. 2.20 (6th ed. 1996).) Even assuming that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to include the reference to misdemeanor conduct (see People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123 , 157, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 , 314 P.3d 450 ), the instructions,  viewed as a whole, nonetheless allowed the jury to consider any evidence of Huggins's moral turpitude, including his misdemeanor spousal abuse. CALJIC No. 2.20, quoted above, instructed the jury to consider everything that has a bearing on a witness's credibility, and its list of suggested factors explicitly stated it was not exhaustive. (See People v. Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871 , 911, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 305 , 102 P.3d 228 .) So it is not reasonably likely that the jury believed it was precluded from considering Huggins's misdemeanor conduct in evaluating his credibility. L. Instruction Concerning Juror Misconduct (CALJIC Former No. 17.41.1) The trial court instructed the jury that [t]he integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all times during their deliberations conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the court of the situation. (CALJIC former No. 17.41.1) Although we disapproved of this instruction as an exercise of our supervisory power  in People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436 , 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 , 49 P.3d 209 , we acknowledged that the instruction does not infringe on a defendant's right to a jury trial, a unanimous verdict, or due process. ( Id . at pp. 439-440, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 862 , 49 P.3d 209 .) Defendant cites  nothing in the record indicating that the instruction nonetheless affected the deliberations in the guilt or penalty phases, nor does he offer a persuasive reason to reconsider our conclusion in Engelman . (See People v. Banks , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 1171, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 ; People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382 , 400-401, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624 , 93 P.3d 244 .) Accordingly, we reject the claim. M. Instructions Concerning Reasonable Doubt Defendant contends that certain instructions- CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, and 8.83.1 -undermined the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that certain other instructions- CALJIC Nos. 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, and 8.20 -individually and collectively diluted the reasonable doubt standard. Defendant acknowledges that we have repeatedly rejected similar challenges. (See People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256 , 286, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 724 , 362 P.3d 376 ; People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1 , 53, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 211 P.3d 520 .) We reject his claim too. N. Judicial Bias Defendant contends that the trial court was biased against him. As evidence, he submits a grab bag of the court's rulings. Yet defendant never objected to the vast majority of these rulings-and not once on the ground of bias-nor did he ever move to disqualify the court on the ground of bias. A defendant may not go to trial before a judge, betting on a favorable result and failing to raise objections of bias, and then argue on appeal that the judge was biased. ( People v. Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966 , 978-979, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 343 P.3d 808 , quoting People v. Rodriguez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 587 , 626, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 380 , 319 P.3d 151 .) So we deem the claim of judicial bias to be forfeited. (See Johnson , at pp. 978-979, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 343 P.3d 808 ; Rodriguez , at p. 626, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 380 , 319 P.3d 151 ; People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053 , 1110, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 210 P.3d 361 ; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067 , 1111, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118 , 129 P.3d 321 , overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76 , 151, 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454 , 180 P.3d 224 .) 8 Even if the court's rulings were erroneous-a question we do not reach-it would not in itself establish that the court was biased. (See People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393 , 447, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 541 , 297 P.3d 793 .) We likewise note that defendant's willingness to let the entire trial pass without articulating an appropriate objection strongly suggests his claim is without merit. ( Guerra , at p. 1112, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118 , 129 P.3d 321 .)  O. Penalty Phase Instructions The trial court declined to give defendant's requested instruction informing the jury that it was permitted to consider pity, sympathy or mercy for the  defendant in deciding whether to give life without parole or death. The court pointed out that CALJIC No. 8.85 adequately covered the topic. Factor (k) in that instruction, as it was given in this case, directed the jury to consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime ... and any sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant's character  or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is on trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err. (See People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745 , 801, 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 220 P.3d 820 ; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048 , 1098, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 , 864 P.2d 40 .) The court also denied defendant's request to instruct the jury that the sentence of death is to be considered a worse sentence than that of life without the possibility of parole, even though you may personally disagree. As we have previously held, the other jury instructions, particularly CALJIC No. 8.88, as well as the penalty trial itself make clear that death is the most severe penalty. (See People v. Contreras , supra , 58 Cal.4th at p. 170, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 204 , 314 P.3d 450 .) Once again, the trial court did not err. P. Cumulative Error Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case was so prejudicial as to require reversal of the judgment. But the only fact finder-related issues we have resolved on harmless error grounds are the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to view Newton's account of defendant's out-of-court statements with caution, and its passing assertion that defendant had voluntarily absented himself in the course of instructing the jury not to allow his absence to affect their decisionmaking in any way. Neither of these errors or potential errors, nor their cumulative effect, warrants reversal. (See People v. Perez , supra , 4 Cal.5th at p. 466, 229 Cal.Rptr.3d 303 , 411 P.3d 490 .) Nor does the trial court's asserted error in considering defendant's threats against Hauser and his family in deciding whether to exclude defendant from the courtroom. Q. California's Death Penalty Statute Defendant articulates several challenges to the constitutionality of California's capital sentencing scheme, but concedes these have each been consistently rejected by this court. Defendant's arguments do not persuade us to reconsider our precedent. ( People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402 , 488, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 387 P.3d 1187 .) The state's death penalty scheme does not violate the federal Constitution by failing to adequately narrow the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty (see, e.g., Winbush , at p. 488, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 387 P.3d 1187 ); apply a  limiting construction to section 190.3, factor (a) (see, e.g., People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577 , 630-631, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 199 P.3d 535 ); require jurors to find aggravating factors (other than § 190.3, factor (b) or (c) evidence) beyond a reasonable doubt (see, e.g., People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 , 1235, 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 265 , 367 P.3d 649 ); assign the burden of proof to the prosecution or inform the jury there was no burden of proof (see, e.g., Bennett , at pp. 631-632, 88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131 , 199 P.3d 535 ); require jurors to find unadjudicated criminal activity or other aggravating factors unanimously (see, e.g., Winbush , at p. 489, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 387 P.3d 1187 ; see also People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043 , 1130, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 , 384 P.3d 693 ); define what it means for the aggravating factors to be so substantial in comparison to the mitigating factors ( Thompson, at p. 1128, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 , 384 P.3d 693 ); instruct the jury to select the appropriate penalty ( People v. Farley , supra , 46 Cal.4th at p. 1133, 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 210 P.3d 361 ), to return a verdict of life if the mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors (see, e.g. People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145 , 199, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117 , 211 P.3d 617 ), and to presume that the appropriate penalty is life (see, e.g.,  People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1 , 46, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 69 , 406 P.3d 748 ); instruct the jury that there was no burden of proof as to  mitigating factors and that such factors need not be found unanimously (see, e.g., Winbush , at p. 490, 213 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 387 P.3d 1187 ); require written findings from the jury as to aggravating and mitigating factors (see, e.g., ibid . ); or require either intercase proportionality review or the disparate sentence review that is afforded under the determinate sentence law ( People v. Williams , supra , 1 Cal.5th at p. 1205, 211 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 384 P.3d 1162 ). Nor did the trial court err by instructing the jury about the aggravating and mitigating factors using a unitary list (see, e.g., People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181 , 1222, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 ), by using the word extreme in CALJIC No. 8.85 (see, e.g., Myles , at p. 1223, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 786 , 274 P.3d 413 ); or by telling jurors to consider section 190.3 factors if applicable (see, e.g., People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 439, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ). Defendant also concedes that we have repeatedly held that certain procedural distinctions between capital and noncapital sentences are sufficiently justified (see, e.g., People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210 , 1290, 126 Cal.Rptr.3d 465 , 253 P.3d 553 [ '[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws' ] ), and that arguments based on international law along the lines of what defendant advances in this case are not a basis to invalidate death sentences that are lawful under domestic law. (See, e.g., People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616 , 690, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 133 , 237 P.3d 474 .) We do the same today.