Opinion ID: 186085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subsection 512(h) by its Terms

Text: 13 We begin our analysis, as always, with the text of the statute. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct. 941, 950, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Verizon's statutory arguments address the meaning of and interaction between §§ 512(h) and 512(a)-(d). Having already discussed the general requirements of § 512(h), we now introduce §§ 512(a)-(d). 14 Section 512 creates four safe harbors, each of which immunizes ISPs from liability for copyright infringement under certain highly specified conditions. Subsection 512(a), entitled Transitory digital network communications, provides a safe harbor for infringement of copyright by reason of the [ISP's] transmitting, routing, or providing connections for infringing material, subject to certain conditions, including that the transmission is initiated and directed by an internet user. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)(1)-(5). Subsection 512(b), System caching, provides immunity from liability for infringement of copyright by reason of the intermediate and temporary storage of material on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the [ISP], § 512(b)(1), as long as certain conditions regarding the transmission and retrieval of the material created by the ISP are met. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(2)(A)(E). Subsection 512(c), Information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users, creates a safe harbor from liability for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, as long as the ISP meets certain conditions regarding its lack of knowledge concerning, financial benefit from, and expeditious efforts to remove or deny access to, material that is infringing or that is claimed to be the subject of infringing activity. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)-(C). Finally, § 512(d), Information location tools, provides a safe harbor from liability for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools such as a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link, subject to the same conditions as in §§ 512(c)(1)(A)-(C). See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(d)(1)-(3). 15 Notably present in §§ 512(b)-(d), and notably absent from § 512(a), is the so-called notice and take-down provision. It makes a condition of the ISP's protection from liability for copyright infringement that upon notification of claimed infringement as described in [§ 512](c)(3), the ISP responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(2)(E), 512(c)(1)(C), and 512(d)(3). 16 Verizon argues that § 512(h) by its terms precludes the Clerk of Court from issuing a subpoena to an ISP acting as a conduit for P2P communications because a § 512(h) subpoena request cannot meet the requirement in § 512(h)(2)(A) that a proposed subpoena contain a copy of a notification [of claimed infringement, as] described in [§ 512](c)(3)(A).  In particular, Verizon maintains the two subpoenas obtained by the RIAA fail to meet the requirements of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) in that they do not — because Verizon is not storing the infringing material on its server — and can not, identify material to be removed or access to which is to be disabled by Verizon. Here Verizon points out that § 512(h)(4) makes satisfaction of the notification requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A) a condition precedent to issuance of a subpoena: If the notification filed satisfies the provisions of [§ 512](c)(3)(A) and the other content requirements of § 512(h)(2) are met, then the clerk shall expeditiously issue and sign the proposed subpoena ... for delivery to the ISP. 17 Infringing material obtained or distributed via P2P file sharing is located in the computer (or in an off-line storage device, such as a compact disc) of an individual user. No matter what information the copyright owner may provide, the ISP can neither remove nor disable access to the infringing material because that material is not stored on the ISP's servers. Verizon can not remove or disable one user's access to infringing material resident on another user's computer because Verizon does not control the content on its subscribers' computers. 18 The RIAA contends an ISP can indeed disable access to infringing material by terminating the offending subscriber's internet account. This argument is undone by the terms of the Act, however. As Verizon notes, the Congress considered disabling an individual's access to infringing material and disabling access to the internet to be different remedies for the protection of copyright owners, the former blocking access to the infringing material on the offender's computer and the latter more broadly blocking the offender's access to the internet (at least via his chosen ISP). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(i) (authorizing injunction restraining ISP from providing access to infringing material) with 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A)(ii) (authorizing injunction restraining ISP from providing access to a subscriber or account holder ... who is engaging in infringing activity ... by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder). [W]here different terms are used in a single piece of legislation, the court must presume that Congress intended the terms have different meanings. Transbrasil S.A. Linhas Aereas v. Dep't of Transp., 791 F.2d 202, 205 (D.C.Cir.1986). These distinct statutory remedies establish that terminating a subscriber's account is not the same as removing or disabling access by others to the infringing material resident on the subscriber's computer. 19 The RIAA points out that even if, with respect to an ISP functioning as a conduit for user-directed communications, a copyright owner cannot satisfy the requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) by identifying material to be removed by the ISP, a notification is effective under § 512(c)(3)(A) if it includes substantially the required information; that standard is satisfied, the RIAA maintains, because the ISP can identify the infringer based upon the information provided by the copyright owner pursuant to §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) and (iv)-(vi). According to the RIAA, the purpose of § 512(h) being to identify infringers, a notice should be deemed sufficient so long as the ISP can identify the infringer from the IP address in the subpoena. 20 Nothing in the Act itself says how we should determine whether a notification includes substantially all the required information; both the Senate and House Reports, however, state the term means only that technical errors ... such as misspelling a name or supplying an outdated area code will not render ineffective an otherwise complete § 512(c)(3)(A) notification. S.Rep. No. 105-190, at 47 (1998); H.R.Rep. No. 105-551 (II), at 56 (1998). Clearly, however, the defect in the RIAA's notification is not a mere technical error; nor could it be thought insubstantial even under a more forgiving standard. The RIAA's notification identifies absolutely no material Verizon could remove or access to which it could disable, which indicates to us that § 512(c)(3)(A) concerns means of infringement other than P2P file sharing. 21 Finally, the RIAA argues the definition of [internet] service provider in § 512(k)(1)(B) makes § 512(h) applicable to an ISP regardless what function it performs with respect to infringing material — transmitting it per § 512(a), caching it per § 512(b), hosting it per § 512(c), or locating it per § 512(d). 22 This argument borders upon the silly. The details of this argument need not burden the Federal Reporter, for the specific provisions of § 512(h), which we have just rehearsed, make clear that however broadly [internet] service provider is defined in § 512(k)(1)(B), a subpoena may issue to an ISP only under the prescribed conditions regarding notification. Define all the world as an ISP if you like, the validity of a § 512(h) subpoena still depends upon the copyright holder having given the ISP, however defined, a notification effective under § 512(c)(3)(A). And as we have seen, any notice to an ISP concerning its activity as a mere conduit does not satisfy the condition of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) and is therefore ineffective. 23 In sum, we agree with Verizon that § 512(h) does not by its terms authorize the subpoenas issued here. A § 512(h) subpoena simply cannot meet the notice requirement of § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).