Opinion ID: 2916030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Two Motions for Mistrial

Text: The State‟s second witness during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial was Belinda Bell, the Defendant‟s mother. Early in her testimony, after the prosecutor established that Bell lived at 7612 Richardson Landing Road, the following colloquy ensued: Q. Now, back in June 2010 who lived with you?
Q. Okay. And among those three boys was [the Defendant], correct? A. [The Defendant], correct. Q. Now, in June of 2010, and listen carefully to my question. In June of 2010 how long had [the Defendant] lived there? When had he moved in with you before June of 2010? A. Well, he came—he came to me in February after—after—after prison, in February, the 20th. After a few more questions, the defense moved for a mistrial on the basis that Bell‟s reference to the Defendant‟s previous location “was extraordinarily prejudicial . . . , that he had only lived [at home] three months from prison.” The trial court denied the Defendant‟s motion, noting that the State had not elicited that information. The defense declined the trial court‟s offer of a curative instruction. Toward the end of the State‟s case-in-chief, during Husband‟s testimony, the State asked Husband if he knew the Defendant in June 2010. Husband responded affirmatively, and the prosecutor asked, “And how did you know him?” Husband 17 replied, “His brothers had actually worked for me once or twice, and I knew his—well, I met his mom once, but I knew him from around the corner. And my son came to me and told me that he was, you know, just got out of jail—” The defense objected and moved for a mistrial, emphasizing that “this is the second reference to his prior criminal history.” The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and instructed the jury to ignore the question and response. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying either motion for mistrial. See Bell, 2014 WL 2547721, at . The Defendant renews his argument in this Court. A. Standard of Review “The law is well-settled that the decision of whether or not to enter a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court will not interfere with the trial court‟s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion on the record.” State v. Reid, 91 S.W.3d 247, 279 (Tenn. 2002). “Normally, a mistrial should be declared only if there is a manifest necessity for such action.” State v. Saylor, 117 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tenn. 2003). “In other words, a mistrial is an appropriate remedy when a trial cannot continue, or a miscarriage of justice would result if it did.” State v. Land, 34 S.W.3d 516, 527 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). “The purpose for declaring a mistrial is to correct damage done to the judicial process when some event has occurred which precludes an impartial verdict.” State v. Williams, 929 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The party seeking a mistrial has the burden of establishing its necessity. State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 137 (Tenn. 2008).
The Defendant argues in his brief to this Court that, “[i]n a capital case such as this, proceeding with the trial after disclosure by a State witness—during direct examination—that [the Defendant] had previously been in prison was extremely prejudicial.” We disagree that the Defendant is entitled to a mistrial on this basis. This Court has recognized three nonexclusive factors that a reviewing court should consider when determining whether the trial court should have granted a mistrial because of inappropriate testimony before the jury: “(1) whether the State elicited the testimony, or whether it was unsolicited and unresponsive; (2) whether the trial court offered and gave a curative jury instruction; and (3) the relative strength or weakness of the State‟s proof.” State v. Nash, 294 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tenn. 2009) (citing State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 923 (Tenn. 1994)). 18 In this case, the State did nothing to elicit the testimony from either witness about the Defendant‟s prior incarceration. The defense rejected the trial court‟s offer of a curative instruction after Bell‟s testimony. After Husband‟s remark, the trial court sua sponte told the jury to “ignore” Husband‟s testimony and to “[p]ut it out of your mind.” We also note that the unsolicited testimony was very brief and included no information about the length of the Defendant‟s prior incarceration or the reason for it. As to the third prong of the inquiry, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that “the State‟s case against the [D]efendant was strong such that the jury would have convicted [him] in the absence of the improper testimony.” Bell, 2014 WL 2547721, at . As set forth in more detail below, the Defendant‟s acknowledged presence at the victim‟s house shortly before her last known communication with anyone else; the Defendant‟s DNA on the handgun replica and a condom found in the same area as a branch on which were found hairs consistent with the victim‟s head hair; multiple blunt force injuries to the victim‟s head; and a trail from this scene leading to the area where the victim‟s body was found; all point very strongly to the Defendant as the perpetrator. Accordingly, we hold that Bell‟s and Husband‟s brief references to the Defendant‟s prior incarceration did not preclude an impartial verdict and did not create a manifest necessity for a new trial. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis that the trial court denied his two motions for a mistrial. See Smith, 893 S.W.2d at 923 (holding that trial court properly denied capital defendant‟s motion for mistrial after defendant‟s sister referred to defendant‟s having been in jail).