Opinion ID: 1490462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions to Quash the Indictment

Text: The grand jury which returned the indictment was empanelled for the term of the District Court which commenced at Camden on the first Tuesday in December, 1939. The term ended on January 16, 1940, when a new term of the court began at Trenton. Sec. 96 Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 176. By an order dated January 11, 1940, a District Judge continued the grand jury in office after the expiration of the term to enable it to complete all unfinished business. This action was taken pursuant to the authority of Sec. 284 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S. C.A. § 421, the material part of which is set out in a footnote. [1] The grand jury found the indictment against the defendants on April 16, 1940. These facts appear in the record. The date when the grand jury began its investigation as to these defendants does not appear in the record. Before the trial began the defendants, with leave of court, withdrew their pleas of not guilty and each orally moved to quash the indictment on the ground that the grand jury was without power to find it. They alleged that the indictment was defective because it did not show that the grand jury's investigation was begun before the extension and they offered to prove that it was in fact begun after the extension of the grand jury's term of service in direct violation of the Act of Congress. The government contended that the defendants' objections could not be raised by motions to quash, and that, even if they could be, the motions should have been verified. The court denied the motions to quash and the requests for leave to offer testimony to substantiate the allegations of the motions. The denial of these motions is assigned as error. The practice in criminal cases in the District Court for the District of New Jersey is determined by the law of New Jersey as it existed at the time of the passage of the Judiciary Act in 1789, unless later changed or modified by acts of Congress or by the decisions of the federal courts. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 12 How. 361, 13 L.Ed. 1023; United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 52 S.Ct. 63, 76 L.Ed. 210, 82 A.L.R. 1376. At common law in New Jersey indictments which were defective for errors extrinsic to the record might be attacked by motion to quash. State v. Nicholls, 5 N.J.L. 621; State v. Rickey, 9 N.J.L. 293. The same procedure has been followed in many federal courts. [2] Accordingly it cannot be said that motions to quash were improper to raise the question of the grand jury having exceeded its powers in this case. There is, however, another objection to the motions to quash which were made in the present case. The court was called upon by the motions to determine factual matters not before it in the record and to enter into a trial of facts which had no bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. Something more than a bare allegation by the accused is required to justify a court in permitting itself to be thus diverted from the merits of the accusation. The existence of valid grounds for quashing the indictment must be clearly shown. Accordingly it is held at common law in New Jersey as well as in the federal courts that a motion to quash must be verified, either by facts of record, by admissions of the government, or by affidavits as to the alleged irregularities. State v. Simon, 113 N.J.L. 521, 174 A. 867; United States v. Coolidge, Fed.Cas. No. 14,858; Colbeck v. United States, 7 Cir., 10 F.2d 401; Kastel v. United States, 2 Cir., 23 F.2d 156; United States v. Reilly, D.C., 30 F.2d 866. The defendants in the present case wholly failed to comply with this requisite. They made their motions to the trial judge orally and suggested that they could call the district attorney to testify as to the date when the investigation was begun by the grand jury. There was absolutely no basis laid in support of the allegation that the investigation was begun after the extension of the grand jury's term. The offer to cross-examine the district attorney indicated merely that the defendants desired to engage upon a fishing expedition. There were presented to the court in support of the motions neither record facts, admissions by the government nor affidavits by persons acquainted with the facts. Because of this lack of verification the motions to quash were properly denied.