Opinion ID: 727334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Involuntary Manslaughter in Ohio is a Violent Felony

Text: 12 The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), prescribes an enhanced penalty for a person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (being a felon in possession of a firearm) and who has three previous convictions for violent felonies. Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) defines a violent felony as 13 any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that--(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another ... 14 In Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), the Supreme Court prescribed a categorical approach for determining whether a particular crime constituted a violent felony as that term is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Under this categorical approach, sentencing courts are required to focus on the statutory definition of the crime charged rather than the actual facts of the individual's prior conviction. Id. at 602, 110 S.Ct. at 2160. According to the Supreme Court, this approach avoids the impracticability and unfairness of allowing a sentencing court to engage in a broad factfinding inquiry related to a defendant's prior offenses. Id. at 601, 110 S.Ct. at 2159-60. Only in a narrow range of cases where a statute broadly defines a felony, does the categorical approach permit a sentencing court to examine the charging papers and jury instructions. United States v. Seaton, 45 F.3d 108, 111-12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2012, 131 L.Ed.2d 1011 (1995). 15 This Circuit has had numerous opportunities to apply the categorical approach enunciated in Taylor. We have repeatedly held that in order to constitute a violent felony under this approach, a defendant's conduct must generally be of the type that presents a serious risk of injury to another. See Seaton, 45 F.3d at 111-12 (noting that for a § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) inquiry, a sentencing court must examine the statutory definition of the felony in question, and determine whether that felony, as a category, involves a serious potential risk of physical injury); United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 324 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that even though actual force or injury may not have been used in a particular instance of kidnapping, i.e., in those instances initiated by deception, kidnapping was generally the kind of offense that always presented a serious risk of injury to another); United States v. Mack, 53 F.3d 126, 128 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 153, 133 L.Ed.2d 97 (1995) (holding that the crime of sexual battery through deception is a violent felony because it carries with it the ever-present possibility that the perpetrator may have to resort to actual physical restraint to complete the crime). 16 In the present case, the Ohio involuntary manslaughter statute provides: 17 (A) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a felony. 18 (B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor. 19 (C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Violation of division (A) of this section is an aggravated felony of the first degree. Violation of division (B) of this section is an aggravated felony of the third degree. 20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04. Sanders claims that since § 2903.04(B) provides that misdemeanors 1 can serve as a predicate for involuntary manslaughter convictions, there is no guaranty that a person convicted of involuntary manslaughter would have engaged in conduct that presented a serious risk of injury to another. In addition, a concern was raised at trial that at the time Sanders was convicted, even minor misdemeanors, i.e., offenses that do not carry a penalty greater than a fine of $100.00, could serve as the basis for involuntary manslaughter convictions. See State of Ohio v. Westfall, 1991 WL 149573 at  2 (Ohio.Ct.App. July 31, 1991) overruled by State of Ohio v. Collins, 67 Ohio St.3d 115, 616 N.E.2d 224 (1993) (finding that minor misdemeanors could serve as the underlying charge in an involuntary manslaughter conviction). 21 However, a close reading of the statute reveals that only deaths which are the proximate result of the defendant's unlawful conduct can bring about a conviction under the statute. The Ohio judiciary has strictly adhered to this statutory requirement in convicting defendants of involuntary manslaughter. See State v. Losey, 23 Ohio App.3d 93, 491 N.E.2d 379, 382 (1985) (holding that the term proximate result in Ohio's involuntary manslaughter statute means that death reasonably could be anticipated by an ordinarily prudent person as likely to result from the defendant's conduct under the circumstances); State v. Sabatine, 64 Ohio App.3d 556, 582 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1989) (The term 'proximate result' used in R.C. 2903.04, involuntary manslaughter, mandates that a person will be criminally responsible for causing the death of another only where the consequences of his conduct are direct, normal, and reasonably inevitable when viewed in the light of ordinary experience.). Accordingly, since the Ohio involuntary manslaughter statute requires that the offender engage in conduct which directly and proximately results in another's death, that conduct must necessarily present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 2 22 Indeed, this finding is consistent with a host of authorities from other Circuits which have examined various involuntary manslaughter statutes and have all concluded that the crime of involuntary manslaughter is either a violent felony for purposes of § 924(e) or a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). See, United States v. Fry, 51 F.3d 543, 546 (5th Cir.1995) (involuntary manslaughter conviction based upon defendant's causing death of another by driving under the influence is a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(ii)'s otherwise clause); United States v. Moore, 38 F.3d 977 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that involuntary manslaughter is a crime of violence because it is a crime which by definition, always results in the unlawful death of another human being ... [thus] it is a crime in which there inheres the substantial risk that physical force will be used in its commission); United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 860, 863 (9th Cir.1987) (finding that involuntary manslaughter is a crime of violence because  'by its nature' [it] involves the death of another person and is thus highly likely to be the result of violence); United States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1009 (9th Cir.1988) (noting that involuntary manslaughter is assumed to be a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Consequently, the district court was correct in finding that Sanders' involuntary manslaughter conviction could serve as a predicate offense for an enhanced sentence under the provisions of the ACCA.