Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cleveland's Penalty Phase Claims

Text: Cleveland adopts Veasley's argument that the prosecutor committed error under Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633. The argument fails for the same reason the argument fails as to Veasley. Cleveland also claims the prosecutor committed two other kinds of misconduct in her argument to the jury. He objected to none of the alleged misconduct. Because an admonition could have cured any harm, the contentions are not cognizable. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1212, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) In any event, no misconduct appears. In discussing section 190.3, factor (h) (whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of intoxication), the prosecutor said: That has to do with insanity[  ]whether a person is insane and can't understand the nature of his acts or whether he is so drunk or so intoxicated by drugs or alcohol that he doesn't have control over himself or doesn't realize what he's doing. There's absolutely no evidence of that in this case whatsoever, so (h), doesn't apply. Noting that Peterson testified that he had drunk some tequila, and that she had earlier stated that he had been blacking out off and on at her house the day he was shot in the hand, Cleveland claims this argument violated his right to have the jury consider any evidence a defendant offers in mitigation. ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1986) 476 U.S. 1, 4-8, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1.) It did not. The prosecutor reasonably argued that there was no evidence of impairment. She did not argue that the jury was not permitted to consider section 190.3, factor (h), but only that no evidence supported it. Although a jury may not be prevented from considering mitigating evidence, the prosecutor may argue that the evidence does not, in fact, support a particular mitigating factor. (See People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1222, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) The prosecutor argued, I haven't heard Cleveland make any excuses for his violent conduct. Cleveland claims this argument improperly commented on his failure to testify. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106.) It did not. The prohibition does not extend to comment on the state of the evidence or the defendant's failure to introduce evidence or call logical witnesses other than himself. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 662, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 572, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776.) Contrary to Cleveland's argument, excuses for his violent conduct could have come in many forms other than his testimony: for example, expert testimony regarding his mental state, evidence of his past, evidence from Peterson or someone else that might have provided some kind of an excuse, even argument by defense counsel. We find no reasonable likelihood the comment could have been understood, within its context, to refer to defendant's failure to testify. ( People v. Clair, supra, at p. 663, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705.)
Cleveland argues the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury at his bifurcated penalty trial not to consider the evidence and argument presented at Veasley's penalty trial. He notes that the court gave standard penalty phase instructions, which said that the jury must determine what the facts are from the evidence received during the entire trial ..., and referred to the jury's having heard all of the evidence and ... having heard and considered the arguments of counsel.... (See CALJIC Nos. 8.84.1, 8.88.) He argues that without further instruction, the jury would believe it should consider the evidence and arguments presented at Veasley's trial as well as at Cleveland's trial. We disagree. The court explained to the jury at the outset of the penalty phase that that portion of the trial would be bifurcated, and the first part will be as to Mr. Veasley only ... and then we will have the penalty phase as to Mr. Charan and Mr. Cleveland after that. The evidence presented at Veasley's penalty trial was relevant only against Veasley. Although some of the argument at that trial might also have been relevant to Cleveland, that argument was directed solely against Veasley. All argument relevant to Cleveland was also made at Cleveland's own penalty trial. It was clear to the jury that the two penalty trials were separate, a concept that was not difficult to understand. Under the circumstances, the jury would have understood the references to the entire trial and to the evidence and arguments of counsel to refer to Cleveland's trial, not Veasley's. If Cleveland had believed further explanation was required, he should have requested it. ( People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 504, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) He did not. Cleveland also reiterates a number of instructional arguments we have already rejected. The jury need not agree unanimously as to aggravating circumstances or find that death is the appropriate sentence beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 421, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) The recent decisions of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 do not affect California's death penalty law. ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302, and cases cited.) The standard jury instructions on the weighing process the jury must undertake (CALJIC No. 8.88) adequately channel the jury's discretion. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 170-171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.)
Cleveland claims the court denied him his right to make a statement in allocution before it imposed the death sentence. However, he never asserted the right and, in any case, the right does not exist. A few days after the jury rendered its verdict, Cleveland sent a handwritten note to the judge asking him to modify the sentence to life in prison. The note contained no substantive argument why the court should do so. At the next court hearing, the court stated it had not opened the letter because it wanted to give Cleveland's attorney an opportunity to review it first. Defense counsel asked the court to consider the letter. The court postponed the matter until it actually heard the modification motion but told Cleveland, If you want to make a statement I would certainly entertain the statement that you would want to make. At the hearing on the modification motion, defense counsel argued at length that the court should modify the verdict to a life sentence. Neither counsel nor Cleveland suggested that Cleveland wanted to address the court personally. After counsel finished arguing, the court made its oral ruling denying the motion. Cleveland interrupted the court twice during its ruling, once saying, I'll tell you that much, and once saying, Are you done now? After the court denied the motion, it asked if there was legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced. Defense counsel stated there was not and also responded affirmatively when the court asked whether the defendant waived arraignment for judgment. At this point, Cleveland stated, You talk to me about waiving the arraignment and stuff? The court did not respond to this statement but instead proceeded to pronounce judgment. At the end of the hearing, Cleveland said, Short shit. Thus, Cleveland sent the court a short note that simply asked it to modify the verdict, and he interrupted the court a few times in open session. But he never sought to exercise any right of allocution despite the court's statement that it would permit him to speak. Instead, defense counsel spoke for him and supplied the arguments that were missing from Cleveland's handwritten note. Thus, the court did not prevent Cleveland from speaking. In any event, because a defendant has the right to testify at the penalty trial, we have repeatedly held that the defendant does not have the `right to address the sentencer without being subject to cross-examination in capital cases.' ( People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 989, 264 Cal.Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608; see also People v. Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1209, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068.) Moreover, at the hearing on the modification motion, the court is limited to considering the evidence presented at the penalty trial. ( People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 921, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) The court did not deprive Cleveland of any right of allocution.