Opinion ID: 2517978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Faghri's free speech claim

Text: Because the deanship of the School of Engineering is an executive, policymaking position, the management of the university was entitled to have such a position occupied by one who voiced support for, or at least did not voice opposition to, the university's policies. It was therefore entitled to remove Faghri from that position for publicly opposing the university policies. To be sure, the First Amendment protects Faghri's right to speak in opposition to university policies. He could not have been jailed or held liable for such speech or enjoined from speaking. But the management of a public institution, such as a university, is not required to retain in a management or policymaking position a person who publicly opposes its policies. Such an institution is entitled, for the sake of effective implementation of its policies, to have in management positions, especially high-ranking executive positions, persons who will support its policies, rather than persons who will undermine its goals by voicing public opposition to them. In Pickering v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court explained that because the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general, a court must balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Thus, in Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.2002), we considered whether the New York City Police Department could terminate a police officer for making racist and bigoted statements. We determined that even if the officer had the constitutional right to engage in bigoted speech, and therefore could not be prohibited by law from doing so, [t]he restrictions of the First Amendment do not require the New York City Police Department to continue the employment of an officer whose dissemination of such racist messages so risks to harm the Department's performance of its mission. Id. at 147. Similarly, in Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159 (2d Cir.2006), we concluded that the New York City Police Department and the Fire Department of New York did not violate the law in terminating employees for engaging in a racist performance as part of a parade. We held that the defendants' interest in maintaining a relationship of trust between the police and fire departments and the communities they serve outweighed the plaintiffs' expressive interests. Id. at 183. The interests of an employer may be particularly weighty if the employee in question holds an executive or policymaking position. The balance shifts in this manner because the expressive activities of a highly placed supervisory, confidential, policymaking, or advisory employee will be more disruptive to the operation of the workplace than similar activity by a low level employee. McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.1997). In Lewis v. Cowen, we noted: The dilemma faced by a public employee who privately disagrees with his superiors on matters of public policy is not an uncommon one. A well-respected senior policymaking employee with public speaking responsibilities who objects to a position held by his superior frequently may be forced to choose between speaking out in favor of his supervisor's program and keeping his job, or voicing his personal opinion and perhaps losing his job. 165 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir.1999); see Kaluczky v. City of White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 210 (2d Cir.1995) (Neither the Constitution nor the Pickering balancing test requires a public employer to entrust an adversary or critic with a sensitive, confidential or policy role.); see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (Brennan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (stating that although a public employer may not terminate a nonpolicymaking employee solely on the basis of his political affiliation, that prohibition may not apply in the case of a policymaking official). It is uncontested that Faghri repeatedly and publicly opposed the policies of the university administration. He spoke out in opposition to the campus in Dubai. He spoke out against the closure of certain academic programs. He accused the administration of mismanaging funds. He publicly opposed the university's position on CCAT and communicated his opposition to state and federal lawmakers. He opposed the university's position regarding the audit of federal funds. And he criticized the university for creating an unsupportive research environment. In fact, Faghri's claim is based on his public opposition to the administrative policies of the university, as he contends he was demoted because of his exercise of his constitutional right to voice that opposition. If the facts are as he alleges them to be, then Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because they had no obligation to retain in a management position, especially a high-ranking executive position, one who publicly opposed the university management's policies. We conclude that at the very least, there was no clearly established law which prohibited Defendants from removing Faghri from his deanship. Our conclusion might well be different had the university fired Faghri from his professorship. The reasoning of our decision depends upon the fact that it was from a management position that the university removed him. We do not suggest that a public university can fire a teacher for voicing opposition to university policy. Faghri, however, lost only his position on the university management team; he retained his chaired professorship. His vocal opposition to university policies entitled the university management to remove him from the deanship. [1] Faghri had no clearly established right to remain as dean while voicing opposition to the policies of the team he was hired to be part of. We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and grant summary judgment to Defendants on Faghri's First Amendment claim.