Opinion ID: 1060156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury inquiry

Text: During deliberation on the punishment for the non-capital offenses, the jury submitted a two-part question to the trial court asking it to define a life sentence with respect to the effect of parole and asking whether mandatory sentences were served concurrently or consecutively. The trial court responded that the jury should impose such punishment it felt the evidence warranted and not to concern [itself] with what might happen afterwards. Clagett objected, stating that the jury should be instructed that the [mandatory] sentences have to run consecutively. The trial court's answer to the jury was appropriate. Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 418-19, 329 S.E.2d 815, 828, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 189, 88 L.Ed.2d 158 and 474 U.S 888, 106 S.Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed.2d 178 (1985). Moreover, we have consistently rejected efforts to permit jurors to consider a defendant's parole eligibility or ineligibility. Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 83-84, 452 S.E.2d 862, 866, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 204, 133 L.Ed.2d 137 (1995). Relying on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), Clagett asserts that the jury should have been instructed regarding parole eligibility. Clagett failed to establish and the record does not show that he was parole ineligible. Therefore, Simmons does not apply. Roach, 251 Va. at 346, 468 S.E.2d at 111.