Opinion ID: 208216
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mr. cushman's due process claim

Text: We now turn to the issue of whether Mr. Cushman acquired a due process right in his claim for benefits that was violated by the process he received from the Portland Regional Office, Board, and Veterans Court. [2] When Mr. Cushman was injured while serving in a United States combat infantry battalion in Vietnam, he acquired a legitimate claim of entitlement to veteran's disability benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1110 et seq. Applications for benefits cannot be denied unless the DVA factually determines that the applicant does not suffer from a disability originating from service. Id. The government asserts that even if due process attaches to veteran's benefits, Mr. Cushman received adequate process, citing his multiple hearings before the Regional Office and appeals before the Board, Veterans Court, and this court. The sheer number of times that Mr. Cushman has appealed the denial of his claim, however, is not relevant to the question of whether he has ever received a fair hearing. The initial determination of Mr. Cushman's TDIU claim was tainted by the presence of an improperly altered document. That initial determination has been subject to nothing but deferential review, on a record that still contained the altered document. The source of the fundamental unfairness that tainted the initial evaluation of Mr. Cushman's claim was never removed from any prior proceedings. Therefore, none of the subsequent appeals and rehearings that Mr. Cushman received satisfied his due process right to a fair hearing on the merits of his disability claim. The government argues that the question of what process is due does not turn upon the allegations of an individual claimant. The government cites language from National Association of Radiation Survivors, stating that a process must be judged by the generality of cases to which it applies, and therefore, process which is sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims is by constitutional definition sufficient for them all. 473 U.S. at 330, 105 S.Ct. 3180. The government reasoned in its brief, and elucidated in oral argument, that because the veteran's claims procedures provide due process generally, there is no violation when due process is denied on the basis of an error in an individual case. The government's position is predicated on a misinterpretation of National Association of Radiation Survivors. The challenger in National Association of Radiation Survivors alleged that the $10 fee limitation for attorneys representing veterans in disability cases denied him a meaningful opportunity to obtain legal counsel. Id. at 307, 105 S.Ct. 3180. The Court reasoned that the statutorily imposed fee limitation did not violate due process because a majority of veterans are able to effectively pursue their claims without counsel. Id. at 330, 105 S.Ct. 3180. Unlike the veteran in National Association of Radiation Survivors, Mr. Cushman does not challenge an entire statutory scheme. He does not challenge the adequacy of any procedures in place for filing a claim for veteran's benefits. He does not challenge the constitutionality of the CUE framework provided in 38 U.S.C. § 7111. [3] Mr. Cushman instead argues that the government failed to fairly apply the existing procedures in his case due to the introduction and consideration of improperly altered medical records. [4] We agree. The procedural framework for adjudicating claims must be sufficient for the large majority of a group of claims in order to be constitutionally adequate for all. See Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. at 330, 105 S.Ct. 3180. A fundamentally fair adjudication within that framework, however, is constitutionally required in all cases, and not just in the large majority. Cf. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12-13, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (explaining that the admission of improper evidence is a denial of due process where it infects the proceedings with fundamental unfairness.) The government's application of the generality standard to Mr. Cushman's claim is therefore misdirected. The presentation of improperly altered material evidence has been found to constitute a due process violation in analogous cases. See, e.g., Grillo v. Caughlin, 31 F.3d 53, 56-57 (2d Cir.1994) (finding that the presentation of an altered urinalysis record was a violation of due process in the criminal context); Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 872 (6th Cir.1997) (applying Grillo in the civil context). Fraudulent intent on the part of the presenter of the false evidence is not required to find a due process violation. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (finding that the state's inadvertent but prejudicial suppression of favorable evidence was a due process violation). Alterations of evidence are material for due process purposes if there is a reasonable probability of a different result absent those alterations. Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). We find, in this case, that the presentation of the altered medical document was indeed prejudicial. The Regional Office was instructed by the Board on remand to consider medical evidence in determining Mr. Cushman's employability. The altered document was the only piece of medical evidence that addressed Mr. Cushman's then current employability. The substance of the alterations spoke directly to the type of work that Mr. Cushman could perform in light of his progressing disability. Although, as the government argues, the Regional Office and Board did not discuss which evidence was determinative, any reasonable fact finder would have at least considered the altered medical record under these circumstances. The content of the altered document indicated that Mr. Cushman was more employable than did the content of the unaltered document. We find that there is a reasonable probability that the result of Mr. Cushman's TDIU hearing would have been different in the presence of the unaltered document instead of the altered document. Accordingly, consideration of the altered document instead of the unaltered document in adjudicating Mr. Cushman's claim was a violation of his constitutional right to a fair hearing. Mr. Cushman is entitled to a new hearing without the presence of the altered document. We therefore vacate the decision of the Veterans Court and remand the case with instructions to further remand to the Board for a de novo determination of Mr. Cushman's 1977 TDIU request.