Opinion ID: 757675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We lack authority to impose Klingele.

Text: 61 We invented, in Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.1988), a rule that requires the district court to advise pro se prisoners about the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 before their claims are dismissed on summary judgment. Our rule in Klingele had no basis in the United States Code or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We lack authority to impose general rules for district courts. 62 Congress gave the authority to make procedural rules for the district courts to the Supreme Court and the district courts, not to the courts of appeal. We have rule-making authority for our own court, at 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), but not for district courts. The law on who has the power to make general rules of procedure for the district courts is clear: The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure ... for cases in the United States district courts.... 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). The procedure is elaborate, and includes various bodies, but does not include the courts of appeal. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(b), 2073. 63 Congress has clearly provided that district courts may, by prescribed procedures, promulgate rules consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the United States Code for management of pro se litigation and summary judgment procedure: all courts established by Act of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (emphasis added); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 83(a). The word their means that a court can make rules for itself, but not for other courts. Under this unambiguous scheme, the general rules are uniform nationally, made after consideration of views from many sources. Congress takes advantage of local knowledge by enabling courts to make rules not inconsistent with the national scheme for governance of their own affairs, about which their judges have direct knowledge. Circuit judges are in between those who have direct local knowledge and those who can make uniform national rules; we do not have much to contribute. 64 The Supreme Court has protected against issuance of rules by federal courts outside their statutory authority, in order to assure exacting observance of the statutory procedures: 65 The problem then is one which peculiarly calls for exacting observance of the statutory procedures surrounding the rule-making powers of the Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 331 (advisory function of Judicial Conference), 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (prior report of proposed rule to Congress), designed to insure that basic procedural innovations shall be introduced only after mature consideration of informed opinion from all relevant quarters, with all the opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment which such consideration affords. 66 Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650, 80 S.Ct. 1300, 4 L.Ed.2d 1462 (1960). See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, 12 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3153 at 516. The majority takes the view that we can infer authority to enact basic procedural innovations from the need to protect prisoners' access to the courts and from our general supervisory power. 67 We do not have supervisory power over district courts so broad that we can exercise authority that Congress expressly gave only to other institutions. The supervisory power is part of the common law, and no court has common law power to disregard a rule or statute that was within the authority of Congress to enact. United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 329 (7th Cir.1985). 68 The majority relies heavily on dicta in Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.1986), to justify the exercise of rule making authority. But Jacobsen rejected extension of prisoner protections to non-prisoner pro se cases; it did not decide anything about the rights of pro se prisoners who file lawsuits. And Jacobsen justifies its refusal to expand pro se rights by noting that even if desirable, expansion would (as in the case at bar) exceed our rule-making authority: 69 Finally, even if a substantive notice requirement were desirable, it should be enacted through formal amendment rather than piecemeal adjudication. Rule 56's separate notice provision (compare Rule 56(c) with Rule 6(d)) and description of summary judgment (compare Rule 56(e) with Rule 12(b)) indicate that the Supreme Court and its Advisory Committee have considered the special problems raised by the summary judgment procedure and, by failing to require specific notice of the nature of summary judgment, have concluded that the present federal rules ... already apprise litigants of their summary judgment obligations. Requiring additional notice to pro se litigants would be an accretion onto Rule 56(c), not an interpretation of it; and as an ad hoc amendment it would not be standardized, codified, or subject to collective decision making. 70 Id. at 1366 (footnotes omitted). 71