Opinion ID: 389240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Summary Judgment was Appropriate

Text: 19 Applying that standard, we find the evidence relied upon by the district court to be inconclusive. Several of the evidentiary items cited by the court were tainted or one could reasonably infer they were tainted by procedures and practices that the Complaints Examiner found to be unreasonable or evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination. 20 For example, the court adjudged Kyle and several other candidates clearly superior in qualifications to Toney and then cited to the findings of the first evaluation panel. Yet that panel was using criteria, such as a sole reliance on operational experience to the exclusion of any reliance on staff experience, that, the Complaints Examiner found, unreasonably tilted the results against Toney. Moreover, both panels based their judgments not only on the applicants' SF-171's, but also on the applicants' most recent performance evaluation. App. 186. This evaluation, presumably, was the supervisory appraisal. It is a reasonable inference that Toney's adverse appraisal, cited by the Complaints Examiner as evidence of a prima facie case of racial discrimination, thus infected the evaluation of both panels. It is also fair to infer from this record that these evaluations in turn played some substantial role in the ultimate selection of Kyle over the other candidates, for Pranger, one of the two selecting officials, stated, I reviewed the SF-171's and the panel evaluation of each of the candidates of the Best Qualified Roster. In my opinion Kyle was far better qualified for the position. App. 197-98. 21 The administrative record thus does not foreclose any dispute that Kyle clearly would have been the selectee even absent discrimination. Nor is it apparent, without some further explanation, that any other candidate was clearly superior to Toney. The district court relates Pranger's testimony that another individual on the list was also well qualified for the position, but was not selected because of a policy of hiring from within the agency. App. 154-55. This statement implies that the other individual was better qualified than Toney, but it does not remove the reasonable inference that Toney's adverse supervisory appraisal played a substantial role in the determination that he was not also well qualified for the position. Because the undisputed facts in the administrative record do not make a clear and convincing showing that someone other than Toney would have been selected in the absence of racial discrimination, the summary judgment in the Department's favor is reversed. 22 Having made that determination, we are immediately met by Toney's contention that the district court should have granted summary judgment for him. His basic claim is that the selection process (was) tainted to its core (Appellant's brief at 45), and that there is no way that the district court could find for the Department on the issue of causality. 23 We disagree that Toney is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The evidence that Kyle would have been selected even absent discrimination, while not conclusive, is sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. First, Toney's assertion that Kyle's selection was irredeemably tainted by improper procedure is rebutted by the testimony of a selecting official, Pranger, that Kyle was far better qualified than Toney for the vacant position based on (t)he total experience of both individuals, the knowledge that I would have of both of them working in a relatively small office of a little over 100 people primarily. App. 346. Pranger added, Well, the most glaring item in my mind, and I am going to state this is a judgmental factor, is the significantly greater experience that Kyle had had over the years in the area of employee relations, including the full range labor relations and things like that. App. 347. Of course, this testimony indicating Pranger's clear preference for Kyle on the basis of Kyle's experience and Pranger's own observations may be inconsistent with Pranger's earlier statement indicating he relied in some part on the panel evaluations. See App. 197-98 (quoted at p. 8 supra). However that may be, this testimony alone is basis for a reasonable inference that the Department can clearly and convincingly demonstrate that racial discrimination was not the reason Toney was passed over. 24 Toney contends that reliance on Kyle as the selectee even absent discrimination is improper because Kyle failed to meet the minimum requirements of the job. Specifically, Toney asserts that Kyle failed to meet the vacancy notice's requirement of performing (o)ne year of this specialized experience (in various areas of employee relations) at the GS-13 level and that Kyle also failed to satisfy the requirements of Qualification Standard X-118. The government responds that it need only show that Kyle was selected for non-discriminatory reasons and in any event disputes Toney's contentions as to Kyle's lack of qualifications. 25 We need not reach the government's argument that a non-discriminatory rationale would be sufficient, for we find the record supports a reasonable inference that Kyle clearly met the minimal qualifications of the job in question. 26 We first examine the contention that Kyle failed to meet the basic requirements set out in Qualification Standard X-118. These requirements, applicable to one aspiring to be a personnel officer at the GS- 11/15 levels, include three years of specialized experience (App. 228), which may consist of:(1) Experience in the specialized kind of work as described in part I of this standard; or 27 (2) Experience in a combination of the kind of work covered by the series involved and other substantive personnel management specialist work, provided : 28 (a) It can be clearly established that the candidate's total experience in the functional specialization of the position to be filled was at least one year, and 29 (b) At least six months of the experience was at a level of difficulty comparable to the next lower grade or the second lower grade in the specialization. (reprinted in App. at 229.) 30 Kyle, on the basis of his SF-171 and supplemental attachments, clearly met this part of the standard. Kyle had worked, prior to his two year stint as a GS-201-13, for two years as a GS-230-12, for one year as a GS-230-11, and for another two years as a GS-201-9. See App. 207-10. It thus appears that he met the three year requirement on the basis of paragraph (1) alone, since his three years as a GS-230 was (e)xperience in the specialized kind of work as described in part I of (the) standard. The parties, however, have addressed paragraph (2), and so we address it also. Here again it appears that Kyle clearly qualified. His work at the GS-12 and 13 levels alone provided him with more than the necessary three years in a combination of the kind of work covered by the series involved and other substantive personnel management specialist work. Kyle also met the requirements of the proviso: (a) his total experience in formal GS-230 work was at least one year and (b) (a)t least six months was at the second lower grade (GS-12) in the specialization. 31 Toney reads X-118 to establish an additional requirement, which he claims Kyle lacks. The basis for Toney's view is X-118's Level of Experience requirement: Level of experience 32 Except for those who qualify solely on the basis of education, candidates for positions at grades GS-11 and below must have had at least six months of experience at a level equivalent to the next lower grade in the Federal service, or one year equivalent to the second lower grade. Candidates for grades GS-12 and above must have had at least one year of experience equivalent to the next lower grade. (reprinted in App. at 230.) 33 Toney interprets the last sentence, supra, to require that the specialized experience be at the next lower level. Appellant's brief at 25. Toney then points out that Kyle's GS-230-12 experience is not enough. We disagree with Toney's interpretation. The standard does not specify specialized experience; the plain meaning of its language is that any experience at the appropriate grade would suffice. As a candidate for grade GS-14 Kyle met the requirement with his two years as a GS-13. 34 Toney asserts, however, that his interpretation of X-118 is corroborated by the vacancy announcements introduced at the administrative hearing. Appellant's brief at 25. Our examination of the vacancy announcements does not bear this out. It is true that some announcements do require at least 1 yr. of specialized experience equivalent to next lower level, see, e. g., App. 381 (Employee Relations Specialist GS-230- 12/13). There are abundant examples, however, of vacancy announcements that can easily be read to require simply a year of experience at the next lower level, with no requirement that that year have involved work in the same specialized series. See, e. g., App. 363 (for GS-230- 11/12 (o)ne year of experience must be at the GS-9 or GS-11 level respectively); App. 365 (for GS-201- 13/14 (a)pplicants must have served at least one year at the next lower grade ...); App. 366 (for GS-230-12 (a) pplicants must have served at least one year at the GS-11 level and have competitive status); App. 369 (for GS-221-9, one year must have been at GS-7; for GS-221-11, one year at GS-9; for GS-12, one year at GS-11; App. 373 (for GS-212-13, one year must have been at GS-12; for GS-212-14, one year must have been at GS-13); App. 377 (for GS-230-11, at least 6 mos. or experience must be equivalent to GS-10 or 1 yr. at GS-9; for GS-12, at least 1 year must be equivalent to GS-11; at GS-13, at least 1 year at GS-12); App. 380 (for GS-212-9/11/12, (a)t least 6 months of exper. must have been at a level equivalent to the next lower grade, or 1 yr. equivalent to the second lower grade for GS-9 & 11. Candidates for GS-12 must have had 1 yr. of exper. equiv. to the next lower grade.); App. 382 (Candidates (for GS-201-14) must have served at least 1 year at the GS-13 level or equivalent.); App. 383 (for GS-235-13 one year must have been at the GS-12 level). 35 These examples demonstrate that in at least several instances the Level of Experience requirement of X-118 was interpreted in accordance with its plain meaning. That is, the vacancy announcements simply required experience at the next lower grade, and did not require specialized experience. Announcements that required the next-lower-grade experience to be specialized experience went beyond the literal requirements of X-118 and appear to have been exceptions rather than examples of an informal interpretative agency rule. It is worth noting in this connection that the Department labels the vacancy notice requirement in this case as a mistake. Gov't brief at 4. 36 Toney would argue that regardless of whether Kyle met the X-118 requirements, it is the one-year-of-specialized-experienced requirement of the vacancy announcement that must control. Neither the Complaints Examiner nor the district court agreed with this view. The former found Kyle's GS-201-13 experience only peripherally involved aspects of employee relations, App. 5, and made no finding as to whether Kyle met the literal terms of the vacancy announcement requirement. For her it was sufficient that Kyle's background could reasonably be found to qualify him for a GS-230-14 position under the terms of the Civil Service Commission's Handbook X-118. Id. The district court similarly disposed of this issue. It relied on the testimony of Personnel Staffing Specialist Mark Sayko, who drafted the vacancy announcement and determined that Kyle qualified under it, to establish that Kyle and plaintiff( ) were evaluated under and met the requirements of the CSC handbook, Qualifications Standards, X118, December 1968. App. 154. 37 Even if we were to accept Toney's view, and hold that the vacancy announcement notice is to control to the extent that its requirements are stricter than those of the X-118 standard, we are not convinced that Toney is entitled to a summary judgment that the Department cannot make its case on this point. In this connection we note that Kyle, at the time of his application for the GS-230-14 post, had been for two years a GS-201-13 Personnel Management Specialist. As such, he had performed work in two or more of the specialized personnel management functions described in Part I of Qualification Standard X-118: Personnel Staffing Specialist (GS-212), Position Classification Specialist (GS-221), Salary and Wage Administration Specialist (GS-228), Employee Relations Specialist (GS-230), and Employee Development Specialist (GS-235). In determining that Kyle (as well as four other GS-201-13 Personnel Management Specialists) qualified for the vacancy notice requirement of one year of specialized GS-13 experience in various areas of employee relations, Personnel Staffing Specialist Sayko reviewed the description of Kyle's GS-201-13 work and determined it qualified as employee relations work. Sayko specifically singled out Kyle's advisory role in matters pertaining to employment policies and practices concerning corrective actions, reductions-in-force, and employment matters involved in appeals at the Department level. Sayko also pointed to Kyle's analysis of written classification evaluations on positions under appeal. Sayko concluded, In my personal opinion, I think you could get just about any (Personnel Staffing Specialist) in here and they would qualify this person (Kyle). I EEO Complaint Hearing Transcript 60; App. 208. We find this testimony, presented by the expert in the field who drafted the vacancy announcement, sufficiently strong to preclude summary judgment for Toney, even assuming that the announcement's requirement of one year of specialized GS-13 experience is to control. 38 The foregoing examination convinces us that, at the least, Toney is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The administrative record leaves room for the government to argue that Toney would not have been chosen even absent any discrimination.