Opinion ID: 2031663
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Heading: The Summary Judgment Merits.

Text: The district court concluded that the issue raised by the declaratory judgment action was rendered moot by the 1986 legislation. Such a characterization refers to cases which no longer present a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or nonexistent. E.g., In re E.C.G., 345 N.W.2d 138, 141 (Iowa 1984); Hamilton v. City of Urbandale, 291 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1980). The test is whether a judgment, if rendered, would have any practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. E.g., Elview Const. Co. v. North Scott Community School Dist., 373 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Iowa 1985); Toomer v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 340 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Iowa 1983). Given this test, we cannot concur with the district court's conclusion. Although we agree the 1986 legislation resolved the issue for the prospective period beginning July 1, 1986, we do not believe this effectively disposed of the entire case. Still at issue is the period beginning July 1, 1985the date Senate File 570 section 27 would have increased the compensation level absent Governor Branstad's vetoand ending July 1, 1986the date Senate File 2175 returned the level of compensation to its pre-Senate File 570 level. Plaintiffs argued this issue in resisting the summary judgment motion. As the district court noted in its order, [p]laintiffs also resist Defendant's Motion For a Summary Judgment by urging that the instant lawsuit should not be regarded as moot because whether or not the governor used the item veto properly is necessary to determine whether or not monies for the judicial retirement fund need to be collected for the year of June 30, 1985 to July 1, 1986. The district court held that this issue did not alter its mootness determination because [p]laintiffs did not ask for a determination concerning the collectability of contributions to the judicial retirement fund for the period commencing July 1, 1985. We think that, in reaching this conclusion, the district court applied an unduly restrictive view of the potential effect of the pending declaratory judgment action. We do not believe the mootness issue is resolved solely by reference to a narrow reading of the particular pleading before the court. Relatedly, we think that in order to avoid a mootness dismissal, a petition need not catalog every consequence that may conceivably follow from a particular judgment. The issue is not whether the petition is sufficient to raise a particular issuehere collectabilityfor judicial resolution. Rather, the issue is whether resolution of the issues actually presented would have any practical legal consequence upon the existing controversy. E.g., Elview Constr., 373 N.W.2d at 142. In In re E.C.G., 345 N.W.2d 138 (Iowa 1984), for example, we dealt with a father's motion to vacate an order terminating his parental rights. The district court had concluded the motion was mooted by the child's death one day after the order's entry. In reversing the district court's mootness determination, we noted that a ruling on the motion to vacate would affect the parent's potential recovery if a wrongful death suit was brought. In addition, we noted the ruling would have consequences for the parent's desire to have a voice in the appointment of a personal representative of the child ... and also a voice in determining where the child should be buried. 345 N.W.2d at 141. Accordingly, we concluded it apparent ... that the issues involved are not merely academic. Id. Similarly here, the petition, by seeking a determination of the legality of the item veto's exercise, perforce sought an opinion on whether section 27 became the law. If it did, collectability of payments from the judges, absent some intervening prohibition, would follow. This consequence illustrates one potential practical legal effect the declaratory judgment could have on the existing controversy, i.e., that the judgment would have ramifications on the collection issue. Although plaintiffs' petition failed to request resolution of all potential issues involved in the controversy, we do not think such a failure renders the issues actually submitted moot. We think this reasoning particularly persuasive in the context of the present declaratory judgment action. Our rules governing declaratory judgment do not allow the court to refuse relief simply because such relief would not terminate the entire controversy. Wright v. Thompson, 254 Iowa 342, 353, 117 N.W.2d 520, 526 (Iowa 1962). Similarly here, we do not believe the issues inhering in the declaratory judgment petition were mooted simply by the fact there may be further litigation between the parties concerning, for example, the collectability issue. Certainly, the declaratory judgment petition raises for determination the issues of uncertainty and controversy which give rise to the proceeding. Moreover, our law makes such judgments res judicata as to all issues actually determined between the parties. Lynch v. Lynch, 250 Iowa 407, 414-15, 94 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1959). A declaration that defendant Governor Branstad had exceeded his constitutional authority and that, as a result, the increased contribution was the law of this state, may be binding in an action instituted for the incremental contribution's collection, at least as against the intervenor judges. See Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 126 (Iowa 1981). Consequently, such a judgment would have a practical legal effect upon the existing controversy. E.g., Toomer, 340 N.W.2d at 598. We take no position on the resolution of the merits of the declaratory judgment action; we simply note the issues involved are not merely academic.