Opinion ID: 4534204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probative Value vs. Prejudicial Impact

Text: Smiley further contends that the court improperly admitted photographic exhibits 161 and 162 on the ground that the photographs’ prejudicial effect substantially outweighed their probative value. Defense counsel objected to the admission of photographic exhibit 161 because it showed Smiley holding a liquor bottle and Bisbee gesturing as if he had a gun. Photographic exhibit 162 showed Smiley making the gun gesture and Bisbee smoking what appeared to be a blunt. We apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court’s application of the unfair prejudice test of section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2019). Floyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 564, 574 (Fla. 2005). Combining aspects of testimony given by John McDonald, by Samantha Lee, by Mark Wilkerson, and by the defendant himself, the photographs supported - 18 - the State’s theory that Smiley and Bisbee were close friends and that Bisbee was Smiley’s accomplice during the Drake murder. Smiley argues that this probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice caused by the photos. According to Smiley, the photos had only limited relevance and were unfairly prejudicial because they portrayed the defendant “like a thug.” We disagree that the danger of unfair prejudice from the photos substantially outweighed their probative value. The identity and appearance of Smiley’s accomplice during the murder were material issues in the case. And while the photos may have shown Smiley in an unfavorable light, they were not inflammatory or improperly directed at the jury’s emotions. See McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 327 (Fla. 2007) (exclusionary rule of unfair prejudice “is directed at evidence which inflames the jury or appeals improperly to the jury’s emotions” (quoting Steverson v. State, 695 So. 2d 687, 688-89 (Fla. 1997))). “The weighing of probativeness versus unfair prejudice is best addressed by the trial court,” Floyd, 913 So. 2d at 575, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these photos. We deny relief on this claim. III. Testimony About Smiley’s Prior Crimes or Bad Acts On direct examination, the State elicited testimony from John McDonald that Smiley had gloves with him at the time of the Drake murder. On crossexamination, defense counsel asked McDonald why he thought that Smiley had - 19 - gloves with him. McDonald responded: “Well, when we normally operate like that, we normally use gloves.” The trial court denied Smiley’s subsequent motion for a mistrial, and Smiley now argues that this was an error that requires reversal for a new trial. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. “ ‘A motion for mistrial should be granted only when it is necessary to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.’ In other words, ‘[a] motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.’ ” Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 44 (Fla. 2017) (first quoting Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 372 (Fla. 2008), and then quoting England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006)). McDonald’s vague reference to “when we normally operate like that” lacked any detail about other crimes and does not come close to meeting the high standard that justifies a mistrial. Moreover, the defense itself invited the response through its open-ended question: “But why do you think he had [gloves] with him then?” Finally, defense counsel declined the trial court’s offer of a contemporaneous curative instruction. This claim lacks merit. IV. Testimony About Smiley’s Interest in the Outcome of His Case John McDonald initially denied to law enforcement that he had been involved in the Drake murder. And even after he had told investigators about his involvement in the crime, he considered changing his story again. On redirect, the - 20 - State asked McDonald if that was “because Benjamin Smiley is your cousin?” Following up, the State asked: “Do you want to see him in trouble?” McDonald responded: “No. He said that it—they was trying to give him the death penalty.” Smiley contends that, because this was a bifurcated trial and the guilt-phase jury was not death-qualified, this comment improperly alerted the jury to the possibility that Smiley would be eligible for and receive the death penalty if found guilty. Smiley argues that the trial court’s denial of his request for a mistrial based on McDonald’s statement is error that warrants a new trial. We disagree. A fleeting, isolated comment like McDonald’s here does not meet the high standard required for a mistrial. See Fletcher v. State, 168 So. 3d 186, 207 (Fla. 2015) (“A comment that is brief, isolated, and inadvertent may not warrant a mistrial.”). We deny relief on this claim.