Opinion ID: 3173255
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Election Doctrine

Text: Article I, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution provides “[t]hat the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and no religious or political test shall ever be required as a qualification for jurors.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 6. This state constitutional provision has been interpreted as guaranteeing the right to trial by a jury of twelve persons in all criminal cases “where a fine of more than $50.00 or any confinement of the accused may -9- be imposed.” State v. Dusina, 764 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tenn. 1989); see also Grooms v. State, 426 S.W.2d 176, 176-77 (Tenn. 1968); Willard v. State, 130 S.W.2d 99, 100 (Tenn. 1939). This constitutional provision also guarantees every accused the right to a unanimous jury verdict before a conviction for a criminal offense may be imposed. State v. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d 166, 169-70 (Tenn. 1999); see also State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. 1993) (“Although the federal constitution‟s requirement of unanimity among jurors has not been imposed on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, there should be no question that the unanimity of twelve jurors is required in criminal cases under our state constitution.” (quoting State v. Brown, 823 S.W.2d 576, 583 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) [hereinafter Brown I] (internal quotation marks omitted))). Therefore, before a verdict of conviction may be rendered, jurors must unanimously agree on the particular criminal act the defendant committed. In most criminal trials, the constitutional guarantee of juror unanimity is readily satisfied. This is true because it is a general rule that evidence the defendant has committed “some other crime wholly independent of that for which he is charged, even though it is a crime of the same character” is generally excluded as “irrelevant.” State v. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting Bunch v. State, 605 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tenn. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 404(a) & (b). However, this general prohibition has been relaxed in the sex crimes context, specifically in cases where the defendant is alleged to have committed sexual offenses over a lengthy period of time against young children who are often unable to identify the dates on which particular acts were perpetrated. State v. Johnson, 53 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Tenn. 2001); Rickman, 876 S.W.2d at 828; Shelton, 851 S.W.2d at 137. Therefore, “where the indictment charges that sex crimes occurred over a span of time,” rather than on specific dates, then “evidence of unlawful sexual contact between the defendant and the victim allegedly occurring during the time charged in the indictment is admissible.” Rickman, 876 S.W.2d at 828 (citing Shelton, 851 S.W.2d at 137; State v. Brown, 762 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tenn. 1988) [hereinafter Brown II]). Relaxation of the general prohibition on the admissibility of prior acts evidence created the potential for a non-unanimous jury verdict because “each unlawful act of carnal knowledge is a separate, substantive offense, rather than a continuous offense.” Shelton, 851 S.W.2d at 137 (quoting Jamison v. State, 94 S.W. 675, 676 (Tenn. 1906)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Anderson, 748 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985) (treating allegations of sexual battery as separate offenses for the purposes of election), overruled on other grounds by Shelton, 851 S.W.2d at 138. The election of offenses doctrine developed to eliminate this potential. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d at 136-37. The election doctrine refers to the prosecutor‟s duty in a case where evidence of multiple separate incidents is introduced to elect for each count charged the specific incident on which the jury should deliberate to determine the defendant‟s guilt. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d at 828 (citing Shelton, 851 S.W. 2d at 137); see also Knowles, 470 S.W.3d at 423-24. The election must be made at the conclusion of the State‟s case-in- - 10 - chief. Rickman, 876 S.W.2d at 828. The election requirement “augment[s] the general unanimity instruction” and serves to ensure that the jury understands its obligation to agree unanimously that the defendant committed the same criminal act before it may convict the defendant of a criminal offense. Lemacks, 996 S.W.2d at 170 (quoting Brown I, 823 S.W.2d at 583) (internal quotation marks omitted). Were the State permitted to present proof of many criminal acts that all allegedly occurred within the time period covered by the charging instrument, but not required to make an election of offenses, juror unanimity would be compromised because nothing would prevent jurors from “reach[ing] into the brimming bag of offenses and pull[ing] out one for each count.” Tidwell v. State, 922 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tenn. 1996) (describing the “„grab-bag‟ theory of