Opinion ID: 624240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Watkins’s Claim

Text: Watkins argues that the ALJ erred by finding that she had the RFC to perform a limited range of sedentary work for a full eight hours a day. Watkins points to Dr. Feussner’s RFC evaluation, to which the ALJ gave “great weight,” and argues that Dr. Feussner stated that even with a sit/stand option, Watkins could work only between five and six hours in an eight hour work day.6 “It is well-established that the testimony of a treating physician must be given substantial or considerable weight unless ‘good cause’ is shown to the contrary.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1)-(2), 416.927(d)(1)-(2).7 The ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to 6 Our review is limited to whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Under this limited standard of review, we may not make findings of fact, reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). We will reverse, however, if the ALJ fails to apply the correct legal standards or fails to provide sufficient reasoning to allow us to determine that the proper legal standards were applied. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). 7 Good cause exists “when the: (1) treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s opinion was 6 different medical opinions and the reasons therefore. Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987). Moreover, “[t]he ALJ must clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the opinion of a treating physician, and the failure to do so is reversible error.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2) (requiring the agency to “give good reasons” for not giving weight to a treating physician’s opinion). Here, in determining Watkins’s RFC, the ALJ explicitly addressed and gave great weight to Dr. Feussner’s RFC evaluation. And, in summarizing the RFC evaluation, the ALJ noted that Dr. Feussner had opined that Watkins could not work more than five or six hours in an eight hour workday if she had a sit/stand option (“sit/stand limitation”). However, the ALJ failed to incorporate Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation into his RFC finding or to give a reason for not doing so. Moreover, the ALJ did not include Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation in the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert.8 Thus, the ALJ erred when he failed to address Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation. conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records.” Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. 8 The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert asked whether there were jobs in the economy for a person with Watkins’s RFC who could “[s]tand/walk four to five hours in an eight hour day, sit four to five hours in an eight hour day.” 7 Although the ALJ is not required to specifically refer to every piece of evidence in the record, he is required to “sufficiently explain[ ] the weight he has given to obviously probative exhibits.” Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981). The ALJ also must “clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight” to a treating physician’s opinion. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. Without a clear explanation of the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation, we cannot determine whether the ALJ’s ultimate decision on the merits was rational and supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner argues that Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation is inconsistent with Dr. Feussner’s other statements in his RFC evaluation and with Dr. Steinberg’s release of Watkins to “full duty.” This point is debatable.9 However, even if it is true, the ALJ did not offer this or any other explanation in 9 The Commissioner argues that Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation is inconsistent with his other RFC findings that Watkins could work for four to five hours while standing (“standing limitation”) and for four to five hours while sitting (“sitting limitation”). This argument assumes that Dr. Feussner’s sitting limitation and standing limitation can be read together to mean that Watkins could work a total of eight to ten hours of sitting and standing per day. However, it is equally plausible that Dr. Feussner’s RFC statements mean that Watkins can work no more than five total hours per day if she either stands or sits, but that, if she combines sitting and standing, she can work up to six total hours per day. Similarly, the Commissioner argues that Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation is inconsistent with Dr. Steinberg’s finding that Watkins could return to “full duty” with only the limitation that she have ten minute breaks each hour of repetitive activity. However, Dr. Steinberg was treating Watkins’s carpal tunnel syndrome in her hands, not her neck pain. When Dr. Steinberg stated that Watkins had reached maximum medical improvement and released Watkins to “full duty,” he arguably was referring to Watkins’s impairments in her hands, not her neck. We leave the resolution of these issues to the ALJ on remand. 8 his apparent decision to discount Dr. Feussner’s sit/stand limitation. We cannot affirm based on a post hoc rationale that “might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion.” See Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1984) (involving ALJ’s failure to explain credibility finding); see also Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (involving ALJ’s failure to mention treating physician’s opinion). On remand, the ALJ must explicitly consider and explain the weight to be accorded to Dr. Feussner’s opinion as to how many hours per day Watkins can work with a sit/stand option, incorporate this finding into the RFC determination and re-examine, at steps four and five, whether there is work Watkins can perform. We express no opinion on the merits of Watkins’s claims for benefits.10 Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the case with instructions that it be returned to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. 10 We recognize Watkins’s claim that she is disabled because, if she can work only five or six hours with a sit/stand option, she cannot work a full eight hour work day, which Watkins’s argues is required at step five in the sequential evaluation. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474 (July 2, 1996). Because the ALJ’s RFC assessment failed to address the sit/stand limitation, we need not address this issue, but direct the ALJ to do so in the first instance. 9