Opinion ID: 1385357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: abridgment of vested or contractual rights of judges in office

Text: (2) We recognize the often quoted language that public employment is not held by contract and therefore is not protected by the contract clause. ( Markman v. County of Los Angeles (1973) 35 Cal. App.3d 132, 134-135 [110 Cal. Rptr. 610]; see also Butterworth v. Boyd (1938) 12 Cal.2d 140, 150 [82 P.2d 434, 126 A.L.R. 838].) Those and other cases involve purported rights to remain in office or to continued public employment. On the other hand, we deal here with the right to compensation by persons serving their term of public office to which they have undisputed rights. [P]ublic employment gives rise to certain obligations which are protected by the contract clause of the Constitution.... ( Kern v. City of Long Beach (1947) 29 Cal.2d 848, 852-853 [179 P.2d 799]; see also California League of City Employee Associations v. Palos Verdes Library Dist. (1978) 87 Cal. App.3d 135, 139 [150 Cal. Rptr. 739].) Promised compensation is one such protected right. ( Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma (1979) 23 Cal.3d 296, 308-309 [152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 591 P.2d 1].) Once vested, the right to compensation cannot be eliminated without unconstitutionally impairing the contract obligation. ( Id., at p. 314.) When agreements of employment between the state and public employees have been adopted by governing bodies, such agreements are binding and constitutionally protected. ( Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, 304, quoting from Glendale City Employees Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328, 337-338 [124 Cal. Rptr. 513, 540 P.2d 609].) (3a) In the instant case the Legislature in 1969 adopted the full cost-of-living increase provision, binding the state to pay persons employed at the represented compensation for their terms of office. Prior to the 1976 amendment judges had a vested right not only to their office for a certain term but also to an annual increase in salary equal to the full increase in the CPI during the prior calendar year. (4) (See fn. 3.) With the 1976 amendment the state purported to withdraw that right unilaterally thus impairing a vested interest. [3] (3b) The question remaining is whether in the circumstances of this case the impairment is in some way permissible. (5) In Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296 this court reiterated the four factors identified by the United States Supreme Court in Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell (1934) 290 U.S. 398 [78 L.Ed. 413, 54 S.Ct. 231, 88 A.L.R. 1481] warranting legislative impairment of vested contract rights. Those factors are: (1) the enactment serves to protect basic interests of society, (2) there is an emergency justification for the enactment, (3) the enactment is appropriate for the emergency, and (4) the enactment is designed as a temporary measure, during which time the vested contract rights are not lost but merely deferred for a brief period, interest running during the temporary deferment. (23 Cal.3d at pp. 305-306.) In applying these standards the enactment's severity must be measured to determine the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear. ( Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (1978) 438 U.S. 234 [57 L.Ed.2d 727, 98 S.Ct. 2716].) This court stated in Sonoma County that impairing a granted increase in wages goes to the heart of the employment contract and is therefore severe and permanent. ( Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of Sonoma, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296, 308-309.) (3c) Therefore the state's hurdle in applying the four factors in the instant case is heightened because section 68203 is an impairment affecting the heart of the employment contract. Defendants, offering no reason or justification for the state action, fail even to approach their burden of demonstrating the impairment of plaintiffs' rights is warranted by an emergency serving to protect a basic interest of society. (6) A judge entering office is deemed to do so in consideration of  at least in part  salary benefits then offered by the state for that office. If salary benefits are diminished by the Legislature during a judge's term, or during the unexpired term of a predecessor judge (see Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16; Gov. Code, §§ 71145, 71180), the judge is nevertheless entitled to the contracted-for benefits during the remainder of such term. The right to such benefit accrues to a judge who served during the period beginning 1 January 1970 to 1 January 1977, whether his term of office commenced prior to or during that time period. (7) An employee's contractual pension expectations are measured by benefits which are in effect not only when employment commences, but which are thereafter conferred during the employee's subsequent tenure. ( Betts v. Board of Administration, supra, 21 Cal.3d 859, 866.) [4] (3d) A judge who completes one term during which he was entitled to unlimited cost-of-living increases and elects to enter a new term has impliedly agreed to be bound by salary benefits then offered by the state for the different term. Thus, while a judge is entitled to a salary based on unmodified Government Code section 68203 throughout a term ending, for instance, in 1978, his salary for a new term beginning on or after the effective date of the 1976 amendment  1 January 1977  will be governed by the statute as amended. Likewise, a judge entering office for the first time on or after 1 January 1977, including a judge entering upon his own term or upon the unexpired term of a predecessor judge, cannot claim any benefit based on section 68203 before the 1976 amendment. As will be seen, our conclusions based on the contract clause as affecting salaries of judges in office are consistent with our conclusions regarding Proposition 6.