Opinion ID: 2830739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wrongful-Termination Claim

Text: Cope alleges, in the alternative, that he was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy for pursuing a whistleblower claim in Kentucky state court. Wright and GADD argue that the Kentucky Whistleblower Act precludes this claim and that Cope does not present a plausible factual basis for his claim.3 The elements of a Kentucky common-law wrongful-termination claim are: 1) The discharge must be contrary to a fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law. 2) That policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision. 3) The decision of whether the public policy asserted meets these criteria is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. Foster v. Jennie Stuart Med. Ctr., Inc., 435 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 2013). However, “[w]here the statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute.” Grzyb v. 3 Defendants also maintain that Cope’s arguments on appeal are different than those he made before the district court. However, Cope made several arguments below, including that if the state-court action was not a protected disclosure, his wrongful-termination claim would not be preempted by the Whistleblower Act. This is the same argument Cope makes on appeal. -8- No. 15-5104, Cope v. Gateway Area Dev. Dist., Inc. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky. 1985). The district court held that Cope can only pursue relief under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act and cannot bring a public-policy wrongful-termination action. Cope argues that the Kentucky Whistleblower Act does not itself provide a remedy for an employee who has been retaliated against for bringing a whistleblower claim. Counts I and III are properly understood as alternative claims. If Cope’s state whistleblower action vindicating the right to seek an opinion from the IRS without retribution from GADD and DAIL is itself protected by the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, Count III must be dismissed. However, if the lawsuit itself is not protected by the Whistleblower Act, the Act does not preclude Cope’s wrongful-termination claim and Cope may seek to establish that his employment was terminated in retaliation for vindicating a right protected by the Kentucky Whistleblower Act. Further, as discussed in relation to Count I, the factual allegations laid out in Cope’s complaint and supporting exhibits plausibly establish the basis for his allegation that DAIL and GADD impermissibly terminated his employment as a result of his state-court lawsuit. Specifically, Cope alleges that DAIL administers and funds GADD; he further laid out the timeline of events leading up to his termination. Based on the complaint, it is thus plausible that GADD and DAIL terminated Cope for pursuing his state-court action. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss Count III.