Opinion ID: 2551646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Injunctive ReliefCharges Against PRC's Annual Free Entitlement

Text: [¶ 23] The last issue that we address on appeal is PRC's contention that the district court essentially abused its discretion when it ruled that PRC does not have any right to drill for subsurface water on the lands subject to the Agreement and, as a result, the amount of water taken from residential wells drilled on lands within Quarter Circle Five after April 18, 1995, be charged against the annual free water allocation from the City to PRC called for under the Agreement. PRC asserts a very brief argument on appeal and argues that the district court erred because it created contract terms out of whole cloth and resorted to adding additional terms to the Agreement which do not appear anywhere within the four corners of that Agreement. The City, in an equally brief argument, contends that the district court's ruling is in the nature of affirmative injunctive relief, well within the district court's exercise of broad equitable powers. In addition, the City maintains that the district court's ruling simply acknowledges that the Agreement is binding upon PRC's successors in interest. [¶ 24] In East Broadway Associates, Ltd. v. Dowell, 2002 WY 106, ¶¶ 17 and 18, 49 P.3d 1004, ¶¶ 17 and 18 (Wyo.2002), citing, in part, our opinion rendered with respect to the previous litigation, we stated: The primary purpose in interpreting or construing a contract is to determine the intent and understanding of the parties, and our initial inquiry centers on whether the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous. Reed v. Miles Land and Livestock Co., 2001 WY 16, ¶ 10, 18 P.3d 1161, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001). The interpretation and construction of a contract are done by the court as a matter of law. Id. Where an agreement is in writing and the language is clear and unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be secured from the four corners of the contract. Cliff & Co., Ltd. v. Anderson, 777 P.2d 595, 598 (Wyo.1989). We consider the contract as a whole, taking into consideration the relationship between the various parts. Id. We turn to extrinsic evidence and rules of contract construction only when the contract language is ambiguous and its meaning is doubtful or uncertain. Wolter v. Equitable Resources Energy Company, Western Region, 979 P.2d 948, 951 (Wyo.1999). Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court. Corpening v. Corpening, 2001 WY 18, ¶ 8, 19 P.3d 514, ¶ 8 (Wyo.2001). (Emphasis added.) Collins v. Finnell, 2001 WY 74, ¶ 15, 29 P.3d 93, ¶ 15 (Wyo. 2001). This court has also enunciated: Common sense and good faith are leading precepts of contract construction, and the interpretation and construction of contracts is a matter of law for the courts. Reed [v. Miles Land and Livestock Co., 2001 WY 16], ¶ 10 [18 P.3d 1161, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001)]. We have also recognized that the language of a contract is to be construed within the context in which it was written, and the court may look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and the purpose of the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made. Polo Ranch Company v. City of Cheyenne, 969 P.2d 132, 136 (Wyo.1998). Williams Gas Processing-Wamsutter Co. v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶ 12, 25 P.3d 1064, ¶ 12 (Wyo.2001). Finally, this court has stated that in the absence of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its terms because no construction is appropriate. Boley v. Greenough, 2001 WY 47, ¶ 10, 22 P.3d 854, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2001) (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership Co., 2 P.3d 534, 539-40 (Wyo.2000) and Burbank v. Wyodak Resources Dev. Corp., 11 P.3d 943, 946-47 (Wyo.2000)). [¶ 25] Moreover, in Kincheloe v. Milatzo, 678 P.2d 855, 861 (Wyo.1984) this court recognized that: Preliminarily, it is to be remembered that, when courts are called upon to employ their injunctive authority, they must utilize this power with great caution. We have said: The extraordinary remedy of an injunction is a far-reaching force and must not be indulged in under hastily contrived conditions. It is a delicate judicial power and a court must proceed with caution and deliberation before exercising the remedy. Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., Wyo., 548 P.2d 1, 3 (1976). Injunctions are extraordinary remedies and are not granted as of right. In granting an injunction, the court exercises broad, equitable jurisdiction. Brown v. J.C. Penney Co., D.C.Wyo., 54 F.Supp. 488 (1943). This discretion is, however, not unfettered, but must be exercised reasonably and in harmony with well established principles, 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14, p. 772. Where injunctive relief is sought, it is the trial court that grants or denies it, based upon the factsnot the appellate court, 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 14, pp. 769, 773. Crosby v. Watson, 144 Colo. 216, 355 P.2d 958 (1960); Hansen v. Galiger, 123 Mont. 101, 208 P.2d 1049 (1949). [¶ 26] In Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498-99 (Wyo.1997) (quoting Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 801 (Wyo.1981)), we further recognized: Although actions for injunctive relief are authorized by statute, Wyo. Stat. §§ 1-28-101 to -111 (1988 & Supp.1996), they are, by nature, requests for equitable relief which are not granted as a matter of right but are within the lower court's equitable discretion. Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 332 (Wyo.1986). Injunctions are issued when the harm is irreparable and no adequate remedy at law exists. Id.; Gregory v. Sanders, 635 P.2d 795, 801 (Wyo.1981). Injunctive relief is appropriate when an award of money damages cannot provide adequate compensation. Rialto Theatre, Inc., 714 P.2d at 332. An injury is irreparable `where it is of a peculiar nature, so that compensation in money cannot atone for it. Gause v. Perkins, 56 N.C. 177 (1857).' Frink v. North Carolina Board of Transportation, 27 N.C.App. 207, 218 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1975). Gregory, 635 P.2d at 801. The traditional office of injunction has been to protect property rights. 42 Am. Jur.2d Injunctions § 69 at 814 (1969). Jurisdiction to prevent threatened disturbance of the peaceful use and enjoyment of real property is inherent in a court of equity, and injunction is a proper and ordinary remedy for the protection of owners in the enjoyment of their rights in real estate .... (Footnotes omitted.) 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions, § 71, p. 815 (1969). [¶ 27] In this case, the district court specifically found: 1. In the prior litigation between the parties, which is found at Doc. 124, No. 343, Doc. 138, No. 363, and Doc. 138, No. 492, the City of Cheyenne and its Board of Public Utilities filed an Amended and Supplemental Complaint on April 18, 1995, in which it sought, in its Seventh Claim for Relief, a declaratory judgment that the City has the exclusive right to drill for subsurface water on the lands described in the 1955 Agreement. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the trial in those combined cases, this Court specifically concluded, in its Conclusions of Law at paragraph 45, that the City has the exclusive right to drill for subsurface water on all lands subject to the 1955 Agreement, with the limited exception set forth therein. That finding was a judicial determination by this Court that the City's exclusive right to drill in the 1955 Agreement means what the City says it means, i.e., that the Polo Ranch Company does not have any right to drill for subsurface water on the lands subject to the 1955 Agreement, any such rights having been given up by the Bells in the 1955 Agreement. As a result, the Plaintiffs in this litigation are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating this issue, and the City and its Board of Public Utilities are entitled to summary judgment as requested.... The City is also entitled to injunctive relief to preserve its exclusive drilling rights on the lands subject to the 1955 Agreement, as requested .... Water produced from wells drilled by Plaintiffs or their successors in interest on lands subject to the 1955 Agreement should be counted as water provided to the Polo Ranch Company pursuant to paragraph 6 of the 1955 Agreement, except to the extent this Court determined that the City waived the right to charge existing residential wells, as set forth in paragraph 45 of this Court's Conclusions of Law mentioned above. Thereafter, the district court ordered, adjudged and decreed: (3) The 1955 Agreement grants to the City the exclusive right to drill for water under the lands covered by the 1955 Agreement, that this exclusive right applies to all aquifers beneath the lands, and that Polo Ranch [Company] and any successor in interest is precluded from drilling for water beneath those lands, without regard to the depth of the well or whether the production of water from the well interferes with the City's production of water from under the lands covered by the 1955 Agreement. (4) Polo Ranch [Company] and John and Norma Morris are permanently enjoined from drilling underground water wells on the land covered by the 1955 Agreement, and further, from representing to subsequent purchasers that such purchasers may drill for and use underground water on land subject to the 1955 Agreement. .... (6) Water produced from wells drilled after April 18, 1995, by Polo Ranch Company or its successors in interest, on lands subject to the 1955 Agreement, shall be counted as water provided to the Polo Ranch Company under paragraph 6 of the 1955 Agreement. [¶ 28] As we stated previously, we agree that the district court's ruling in the previous litigation with respect to the exclusivity of the City's drilling and usage rights under the Agreement are res judicata. In making this determination, the district court obviously felt that the Agreement was unambiguous with respect to this issue, and we are not now in a position to challenge that determination. Likewise, we cannot, at this time, question that court's decision with respect to the alleged affirmative defense made by PRC that the terms of the Agreement violated public policy. [¶ 29] Moreover, upon our review, we fail to see that the district court in this case abused its discretion in granting the injunctive relief that it chose. Under the circumstances that exist, irreparable harm would continue in the future if sufficiently tailored injunctive relief was not imposed upon PRC and no adequate remedy at law existed with respect to PRC's past violation of the City's previously clearly expressed exclusivity to drill and use the water under the Agreement. Therefore, we hold that the district court's imposed injunctive relief in this case to be reasonably exercised in good faith, with common sense, and in harmony with the well-established principles expressed in past Wyoming case law authority. Indeed, we note that if some injunctive relief was not imposed by the district court in this matter, as requested by the City, PRC would be simply able to continue unfettered into the future to violate the exclusive rights granted to the City under the Agreement without any risk of appropriate consequences.