Opinion ID: 1808976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Venireperson Hempstead

Text: First, the defense argues that venireperson Judith Hempstead's voir dire responses showed that she would automatically vote to impose the death penalty if defendant were convicted and, therefore, the district judge erred when he refused to allow the defense to strike her for cause. The appropriate standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) (citing Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)); State v. Sullivan, 596 So.2d 177, 186 (La.1992). Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), as clarified by Witt, if the venireperson will not consider a life sentence and ... will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him, the prospective jurors views substantially impair the performance of his other duties. See State v. Robertson, 92-2660 (La. 1/14/94); 630 So.2d 1278, 1284. See also La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(2) and (4). [5] However, under Witt and its progeny, reviewing courts owe a trial court's determinations about a venireperson's fitness for service great deference, and must affirm them if a trial court's findings are fairly supported by the record. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852; State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886, 895 (La.1989). A trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause, and his ruling will be reversed only when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the judge abused his discretion. State v. Knighton, 436 So.2d 1141, 1148 (La.1983). A refusal by a trial judge to excuse a prospective juror on the ground he is not impartial is not an abuse of discretion where, after further inquiry or instruction (frequently called rehabilitation), the potential juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the case impartially according to the law and the evidence. State v. Cross, 93-1189, p. 8 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 687. A trial judge's discretion is based on the fact that: the trial judge has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questioning by the parties' attorneys. Such expressions and intonations are not readily apparent at the appellate level where review is based on a cold record ... As such, we are reluctant to reverse a ruling of the trial judge on a challenge for cause where it does not appear from a review of the record as a whole that the trial judge somehow abused his discretion. State v. Lee, 93-2810, p. 9 (La. 5/23/94); 637 So.2d 102, 108. During initial voir dire examination, Ms. Hempstead stated that she had no religious or moral opposition to the death penalty and, if appropriate, she could impose the death penalty. Thereafter, the following exchange took place between Ms. Hempstead and the defendant's attorney: Q What ... can you explain to me what you mean by appropriate? What circumstances would have to exist for it to be appropriate for you? A I think that if we prove him guilty of murder of two people and three attempts to murder three other people I'm going to vote for the death penalty. Q OK. Then that leads me to the question would you automatically vote for the death penalty without regard to the mitigating circumstances that (Interrupted) A Right. Q You would? A I would. Q OK. Is there anything that would change that opinion? A I don't think so. Later, the district attorney examined Ms. Hempstead. The transcript of the district attorney's rehabilitation questioning reads in pertinent part as follows: Q I listened to your answers yesterday and I listened to your answers this morning and I listened to your answers just now, I'm a little confused. Do you understand statutory (sic) scheme we have, aggravating circumstances, mitigating circumstances. I'm talking about the penalty itself? A Yes. Q Do you understand the Judge is going to tell you that you have to consider the aggravating circumstances and if you find ... at least one of those, and maybe more aggravating circumstances then you are to perform a balancing test to determine whether the death penalty is appropriate. You understand that? A OK. I understand that. Q You understand that. Now, at this point he is considered not guilty. A Right. Q Right. He's innocent ... excuse me, he's considered not ... not not-guilty, he's considered innocent, because you don't know any facts. A That's right. Q The question is, are you going to give him the benefit of that presumption of innocence? A Am I going to give him the benefit of the doubt? Yes, I am. Q Benefit of the presumption of innocence. A Right now, right. Q No matter what's happened in the past? A Right. Q As he sits here right now if you had to vote your vote would be not guilty? A Right. Q Do you know of any mitigating ... let's assume for a second that he's found guilty of second degree murder [sic], now we have to go to the penalty phase. Do you know of any mitigating circumstances? A I don't know anything right now. Q Do you know any aggravating circumstances? A I know nothing right now. Q Can you make a decision on what the appropriate penalty is? A (NO RESPONSE RECORDED) Q At this point. A At this point, no. Q No, of course not. Will you follow the Judge's instructions? A Yes. Q Which say that you have to consider whether there's aggravating circumstances or not and if they're present will you apply the mitigating circumstances? Will you do that? A Yes, I will. Q I think a second ago a question was asked you ... a scenario was given. A Right. Q And they asked for a commitment from you as to what your vote would be? A Right, and I tried to give them that. Q Right. I understand. But did you consider the fact that there may be mitigating circumstances? A I tried to and ... and like you said, if he's found guilty of two murders and three attempted murders my first opinion is going to be the death penalty. Q OK. A Do you understand what I'm saying. Q Sure. A But we haven't heard any facts, we know nothing about the case right now. Q Right, and you haven't heard about any mitigating circumstances. A Right. Q So, is your answer that you could consider the death penalty in a case like that but you would apply the mitigating circumstances, the aggravating circumstances and balance it out? A I would try to, yes. Q You would do that? A Yes. Q As much as you could? A As much as I could. Q And you feel like you could follow the Judge's instructions? A Yes. Q All right. Thank you very much. Defense counsel then unsuccessfully moved to challenge Ms. Hempstead for cause. At the time, defense counsel had only used one of his twelve peremptory challenges. Nonetheless, defense counsel accepted juror Hempstead following his failed cause challenge. Eventually, defendant's peremptory challenges were exhausted. Based on a reading of the entire voir dire of Ms. Hempstead, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to grant the defendant's challenge. While Ms. Hempstead's responses reveal that her first opinion would be to vote for the death penalty where two people are murdered and there is an attempt to murder three other people, upon further questioning by the district attorney, Ms. Hempstead said she would follow the trial judge's instructions in determining whether the death penalty was appropriate, including balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances under the factual circumstances of the present case. Ms. Hempstead not only agreed to follow the judge's instructions, but she also responded that she believed that she could follow the judge's instructions. A review of the voir dire of Ms. Hempstead reveals a willingness on the part of Ms. Hempstead to decide the imposition of a penalty in accordance with the law and the evidence. Ms. Hempstead's responses indicate that her views on the death penalty would not substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror. Additionally, we find this conclusion supported by defense counsel's failure to use one of the eleven peremptory challenges still available. This tactical decision gives the appearance that defense counsel believed that Ms. Hempstead had been rehabilitated. Based on the foregoing, we find that this juror was successfully rehabilitated, and the challenge for cause was properly denied.