Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Delegation by Congress

Text: Higgs next contends that, by affording prosecutors virtually unlimited discretion in identifying and defining nonstatutory aggravating factors, the FDPA impermissibly delegates legislative power to government prosecutors in violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. We likewise reject this argument. First, the statute does not delegate a legislative function to the prosecutor. The prosecutor’s discretion with regard to defining what is a death-eligible offense is wholly circumscribed by the statute’s requirement that the jury unanimously find at least one intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor before the defendant becomes death eligible. Cf. Jones, 527 U.S. at 376-77 (noting that, [e]ven on a finding of intent, . . . a defendant is not death eligible unless the sentencing jury also finds that the Government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt at least one of the statutory aggravating factors set forth at § 3592). Only after the selection of those critical, legislatively-defined factors is made is the prosecutor afforded discretion to argue that additional nonstatutory aggravators combine with the statutory aggravators to outweigh any mitigating factors that have been submitted for consideration, thus assisting the jury in its task of determining whether a death-eligible defendant should indeed receive that maximum sentence. See, e.g., id. at 377-78; Jones, 132 F.3d at 240. Moreover, to the extent that this discretion could be viewed as a delegation of legislative power, such delegation is constitutionally UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 53 permissible. See Tipton, 90 F.3d at 895 (rejecting facial challenge to the death sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C.A. § 848, which also permits the consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors, because any delegation involved was sufficiently circumscribed by ‘intelligible principles’ to avoid violating separation of powers principles); Paul, 217 F.3d at 1003 ([T]he prosecutor’s authority to define nonstatutory aggravating factors is a constitutional delegation of Congress’ legislative power.); Jones, 132 F.3d at 239-40 (same); McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1106 (holding that [t]he prosecutorial discretion to promulgate non-statutory aggravating factors falls squarely within the permissible delegation of power to the Executive Branch).