Opinion ID: 1166190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lack of an Overriding State Interest in a One-Year Residency Requirement.

Text: The argument for the one-year residency requirement, put forth by the appellant, although it is not discussed in the majority opinion, is that the State's interest in the welfare of the children, affected by the divorce, is compelling and that the residency requirement is necessary to afford the family court an opportunity to gather accurate information on which to base a custody decision. While I agree that solicitude for the children's interests should be a paramount State objective in divorce proceedings, this interest may not be used broadly to infringe the due process rights of persons seeking divorces. Less restrictive alternatives exist for the achievement of the State's objectives and where fundamental rights are involved, the State is under a duty to employ these other devices. Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401 U.S. at 381-382, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113; Wymelenberg v. Syman, supra, 328 F. Supp. at 1355; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970). The appellee in this case has no children by the marriage she seeks to dissolve. Yet she is imposed upon by HRS § 580-1 because that provision applies to all who seek a judicial dissolution of their marriage, regardless of whether minor children are involved in the litigation. Clearly the State's declared purpose could be achieved by less restrictive means; HRS § 580-1 could have been narrowly defined so as to apply only to those divorces where custody of the children was in issue. [4] By failing to do so the State has unnecessarily constrained the appellee in the exercise of her due process rights and therefore the restriction must fall. Another State interest has been advanced by the majority opinion in an attempt to salvage the residency limitation of HRS § 580-1. It is contended that the one-year waiting period ensures that the family court has constitutionally valid jurisdiction. In my opinion this consideration is insufficient to override the interest of the appellee in having access to the only avenue open for dissolving her allegedly untenable marriage. The United States Supreme Court has consistently stated that jurisdiction over the marital status is dependent on one of the spouses being domiciled within the state. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577 (1945); Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175, 177, 21 S.Ct. 551, 45 L.Ed. 804 (1901). As the majority opinion recognizes, to acquire a new domicile there need be only physical presence in the new state and an intent to make it one's home. Yamane v. Piper, 51 Haw. 339, 340, 461 P.2d 131, 132 (1969). The length of actual residence is immaterial so long as, at some point, physical presence coincides with an intention to establish a permanent place of abode. Anderson v. Anderson, 38 Haw. 261, 263 (1948); Restatement of Conflict of Laws § 15 (1934). Thus, the residency limitation of HRS § 580-1 is not jurisdictionally compelled and cannot be used to override the constitutional rights of the appellee. Finally, the State may not justify its denial of access to the courts on the ground that the residency requirement is a necessary device to protect the courts from fraudulent allegations of domicile. The State has failed to make any showing that the danger of perjured testimony is greater in divorce proceedings than in other proceedings in which testimony is elicited from interested parties. Even were such a showing to be made, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the Boddie case, supra, 401 U.S. at 381-382, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, other alternatives, such as penalties for false pleadings or affidavits, exist to achieve this goal. These devices serve the State's interests without infringing upon the constitutionally protected rights of persons seeking a dissolution of the marital relationship. The State may not impose an irrebuttable presumption against residence or domicile under circumstances in which they may in fact exist merely to achieve the remote administrative benefit of providing a facile measure of their existence. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965). Based on the foregoing analysis it is clear that the State has failed to advance sufficient countervailing justifications for the residency restrictions imposed by HRS § 580-1 and, therefore, I would hold that due process of law requires that the appellee be granted an opportunity to be heard on her claimed right to a dissolution of her marriage.