Opinion ID: 2572520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court Err in Refusing to Give Tiffany's Requested Instruction Regarding Mental Illness?

Text: Tiffany based her mental illness defense upon the testimony of a Psychiatrist. In his opinion, Tiffany was suffering from what is commonly called postpartum depression at the time of Nathan's death. When asked whether, in his opinion, Tiffany was able to form the purpose to harm Nathan, the Psychiatrist answered, My opinion, given what I know of that day and what I've been told about that day, would be that her ability to form that intent would have been extremely compromised. On cross-examination, he testified that a major depressive episode compromises one's ability to carry out day-to-day activities because of the lack of energy, lack of interest, et cetera, that goes along with it. He stated that she was able to form the intent to care for Nathan when he needed care, such as feeding him and changing his diaper, and that she was able to understand the consequences of her actions, such as not making the bath water too hot. When asked whether he thought cutting off an infant's oxygen by placing a hand over his nose and mouth constituted abuse, the Psychiatrist responded: I believe what I said at the previous hearing that I did not believe Michelle's doing it was considered abuse, that she considered it an abusive thing, because it was a practice which had occurred in the family. That she may have done it in a way that was different from what her mother did is true. I don't think she intended to abuse the child. It is an abusive thing in general to put your hand over a child's nose and mouth and to cut off oxygen, certainly it is. On redirect, he answered, No, to the question, Do you believe that Michelle Tiffany had the purpose to abuse her baby on the day it died? The district court refused to give Tiffany's requested instruction regarding mental illness, which provided as follows: For the defendant to be guilty of Involuntary Manslaughter or Injury to a Child the state must prove the defendant had a particular purpose. Evidence was offered that the defendant was suffering from mental illness at the time of the alleged offense. You should consider the defendant's mental condition in determining whether the defendant had that required purpose. If from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was capable of forming such purpose, you must find the defendant not guilty. This instruction is a modified form of Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (ICJI) 1506. [1] Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 26 P.3d 31 (2001). Although a defendant is entitled to have his or her legal theory of the case submitted to the jury under proper instructions, the trial court does not err in refusing a proposed instruction where it is either erroneous in its statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, constitutes an impermissible comment on the evidence, or is adequately covered by other instructions given by the court. Id. The jury found Tiffany guilty of involuntary manslaughter by killing Nathan in the perpetration of an unlawful act, which was the crime of injury to a child. The felony crime of injury to a child, as defined in Idaho Code § 18-1501(1), can be committed in several ways: Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, [1] willfully [a] causes or permits any child to suffer, or [b] inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or [2] having the care or custody of any child, [a] willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be injured, or [b] willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years. (bracketed numbering added) The district court instructed the jury regarding the second manner of committing the crime. That portion of the statute does not require any intent or purpose to harm the child. Rather, it requires a knowledge or understanding of the consequences of one's volitional conduct. In State v. Young, 138 Idaho 370, 373, 64 P.3d 296, 299 (2002), we addressed the meaning of the word wilfully as used in the first manner of committing the crime. We stated: A plain reading of section 18-1501(1) indicates that its purpose is to punish conduct or inaction that intentionally causes a child to suffer. In this case application of the statute would require that the State prove that Young failed to take the child for medical treatment after the child was burned and that this failure was done with the knowledge that it would cause the child to suffer or would inflict unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering. The purpose of the statute is not to punish mistakes in judgment that are reviewed in hindsight. If Young knew that failure to take the child for medical care would cause unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain, then he would be guilty. The question is not limited to the issue of whether he failed to obtain reasonable medical attention. Once established that the child should have received reasonable medical attention, there must be a further showing that the failure to obtain that medical attention was done with knowledge that this would cause unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain. Otherwise custodians of children may be subjected to criminal penalties for good faith decisions that turn out poorlyinnocent mistakes in judgment. We did not hold that for Young to be guilty he must have intended to cause his child unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain. We said that he would be guilty if he knew that failure to take the child for medical care would cause unnecessary suffering or unjustifiable physical pain. If he had that knowledge, it would not matter whether his intent was to cause harm to his child, or to prevent an investigation into his child's burns, or to avoid medical expenses. In this case, the Psychiatrist testified that in his opinion, due to her postpartum depression, Tiffany's ability to form the purpose to harm Nathan would have been extremely compromised and that he did not believe she had the purpose to abuse Nathan on the day he died. He did not testify, however, that her depression would affect her ability to understand the consequences of her conduct. There was no evidence in this case that because of her depression, Tiffany did not understand that she was cutting off Nathan's oxygen supply when she placed her hand over his nose and mouth and that doing so would cause injury to his person or health. Her description of what occurred was that she placed her hand over Nathan's nose and mouth, and he passed out. There is no evidence that she did not understand that her conduct caused him to pass out. There is likewise no evidence that she did not understand the possible consequences of what could happen if she cut off his oxygen supply too long. She removed her hand, and he awakened about a minute later and began crying louder. She again placed her hand over his nose and mouth, and held it there until she noticed he was starting to turn blue. When she removed her hand, he was no longer breathing. Because the Psychiatrist's testimony did not address the mental element necessary for the crime of injury to a child, the district court did not err in failing to give the requested instruction. The district court also instructed the jury that Tiffany could be guilty of involuntary manslaughter by killing Nathan while perpetrating the crime of battery. It instructed them that battery could be committed in either of two ways, one of which was when a person unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an individual. The Psychiatrist's testimony would raise an issue of whether Tiffany had the state of mind required to commit a battery in that manner. The district court instructed the jury: Our law provides that mental illness is not a defense to any charge of criminal conduct. This means that mental illness, if the evidence shows such a condition to exist at the time the defendant committed the crime charged, is not of itself a defense in this case. This instruction is identical to ICJI 1505. Although the legislature has eliminated mental condition as a defense in criminal proceedings, IDAHO CODE § 18-207(1) (1997), expert evidence on the issue of any state of mind that is an element of the offense is admissible, subject to the rules of evidence, IDAHO CODE § 18-207(3) (1997). Where Tiffany's state of mind was an element of the offense of battery committed in one of the ways alleged, and there was expert testimony raising the issue of whether she had that state of mind, the district court erred in giving ICJI 1505 without also giving an appropriately-modified version of ICJI 1506. Without ICJI 1506, the jury could understand from ICJI 1505 that Tiffany's postpartum depression was irrelevant to deciding whether she unlawfully and intentionally caused bodily harm to Nathan. Such error was harmless, however. The jury found that Tiffany committed involuntary manslaughter both while committing the crime of injury to a child and while committing a battery. The verdict of guilty to involuntary manslaughter did not rest solely upon Tiffany having committed a battery; it rested upon the independent ground that she also committed injury to a child. Therefore, such error does not require reversal. State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207, 912 P.2d 94 (1996).