Opinion ID: 769526
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discharge because of Plaintiff's Protected Activity

Text: 40 The district court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact demonstrating that McKenzie's discharge was because of activities which the employer had reason to believe were taken in contemplation of a qui tam action against the employer. The FCA's legislative history states that the employee must show that the retaliation was motivated at least in part by the employee's engaging in protected activity. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5300. McKenzie has failed to show that her discharge was because of the protected activity or that BellSouth was aware of her protected activity, and thus, BellSouth's termination of McKenzie could not have been motivated by her protected activity. Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of BellSouth on McKenzie's § 3730(h) retaliation claim.