Opinion ID: 1004158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Single Act of Aberrant Behavior

Text: The Sentencing Commission has noted that it has not dealt with the single acts of aberrant behavior that still may justify probation at higher offense levels through departures. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Ch. 1, Pt. A, 4(d), p.s. (1998). Courts interpreting this policy statement have concluded that single acts of aberrant behavior may justify sentences below the guideline ranges. In United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991), we set forth the standards for determining whether conduct constitutes a single act of aberrant behavior. In reversing the district court’s departure, we stated that Aberrant behavior, therefore, means something more than merely a first offense. A single act of aberrant behavior suggests a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act rather than one which was the result of substantial planning because an act which occurs suddenly and is not the result of a continued reflective process is one for which the defendant may be arguably less accountable. Because of the extensive planning, number of actions involved, and length of time over which Glick planned and perpetrated his offense, his actions do not constitute a single act of aberrant behavior. The district court erred in so concluding. Id. at 338 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted and emphasis added).5 Applying this standard to the present case, we cannot agree 5 The Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits agree with our approach in United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1991). See United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that aberrant behavior requires more than an act which is merely a first offense or out of character for the defendant (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Marcello, 13 F.3d 752, 761 (3d Cir. 1994) (Aberrant behavior must involve a lack of planning; it must be a single act that is spontaneous and thoughtless. . . .). The First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits disagree, concluding that a totality of the circumstances approach is more appropriate, under which a wide variety of extenuating circumstances are considered. See United States v. Grandmaison, 77 F.3d 555, 563 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that determinations 6 UNITED STATES v. COBLE that Coble’s conduct constituted a single act of aberrant behavior that warrants a departure. The record reveals that Coble’s conduct was not a spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act but rather was the result of substantial planning and was the result of a continued reflective process rather than an impulsive act for which a defendant may arguably be less accountable. The act of sending the warrant reflects substantial planning and a lack of spontaneity on Coble’s part because, in sending the warrant, Coble took the warrant, calculated his refund, wrote a letter to the IRS to accompany the warrant, and then sent the warrant and letter by certified mail. Coble then sent additional correspondence dated February 1, 1996 (received by the IRS on February 13, 1996), and February 14, 1996 (received by the IRS on February 20, 1996), demanding that the Government honor his warrant notwithstanding the fact that Agent Shanks had already informed Coble on February 1, 1996 that the warrant had been dishonored.6 Coble’s acts of sending the letters, two months after sending the warrant and within days after Shank’s visit, undermines the argument that his initial act of sending the warrant was the product of a thoughtless, aberrant moment based upon a misunderstanding of the warrant’s validity, and demonstrates that additional time and reflection would not have deterred Coble from seeking to use the warrant to discharge his tax liability and obtain an improperly issued refund. about whether an offense constitutes a single act of aberrant behavior should be made by reviewing the totality of the circumstances, and that spontaneity and thoughtlessness may also be among the factors considered, though they are not prerequisites for departure); United States v. Takai, 941 F.2d 738, 743 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court’s decision to depart downward after finding that the defendants who pled guilty to bribery of and conspiracy to bribe an Immigration and Naturalization Service official, inter alia, received no pecuniary gain, had no criminal record, and had been influenced by a government agent). In Glick, we explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that a series of actions calculated to further criminal misconduct can be classified as aberrant behavior. See Glick, 946 F.2d at 338 n. (rejecting Takai). 6 Although the letter dated February 1, 1996 apparently was sent the same day as Shank’s visit, that letter referenced the fact that the warrant was dishonored. Thus, Coble presumably sent that letter after Shank’s visit. UNITED STATES v. COBLE 7 We therefore reject this basis for the district court’s downward departure.