Opinion ID: 779999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parker's Possession of a Handgun Shortly After the Shooting

Text: 31 The Government also offered evidence of Parker's means to kill Lewis through Cook's lay opinion testimony, admitted over objection, that a bulge he viewed from a distance of several houses away in Parker's jacket shortly after the shooting was caused by a handgun. 2 Cook testified that between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on the day of Lewis's shooting, he saw Parker, while walking down the street, raise both hands above his head for approximately five seconds as he called to Glenn to give him a ride in his car. Cook viewed Parker from an estimated distance of five or six houses 3 and testified that he perceived a bulge at Parker's waist that was about three or four inches long and two inches wide. 32 Cook was then permitted to offer lay opinion testimony about the manner in which drug dealers carry handguns, based on his personal experience in narcotics transactions. Cook explained that a dealer typically carries a larger handgun, such as a .380 caliber gun, by tucking it into his pants at his waist or at the small of his back because the gun is easier to conceal in those locations. Cook then was permitted to opine that, based on [his] experience on [sic] how people carry guns, the bulge at Parker's waist was caused by a gun and could not have been caused by a pager or any other item. (Transcript, June 7, 2001, at 360-61.) 33 At the outset we emphasize that, under Federal Rules of Evidence 701(c) and 702, this lay opinion was inadmissible and the District Court abused its discretion by admitting it. Rule 701(c) explicitly bars the admission of lay opinions or inferences that are based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. Fed.R.Evid. 701(c). The Advisory Committee explained that the purpose of Rule 701(c) is to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements set forth in Rule 702 will be evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert in lay witness clothing. Fed. R.Evid. 701 advisory committee note. That is precisely what happened here. 34 In the first place, a lay opinion must be rationally based on the perception of the witness. Fed.R.Evid. 701(a). This requirement is the familiar requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation. United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir.1992) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 701 advisory committee note). Cook observed, from a distance of about five or six houses away, a bulge that he estimated to be only three or four inches long and two inches wide. Based on this observation, Cook conclusively determined that the bulge was caused by a gun, and he was permitted to so testify. But Cook clearly lacked sufficient first-hand knowledge or observation to enable him to reach this conclusion. Id. 35 Secondly, the admission of a lay opinion based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge requires that a witness be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Fed.R.Evid. 701(c), 702. The Government did not offer Cook as an expert witness under Rule 702, and we are confident that Cook would not have qualified to testify as an expert. An expert opinion must be the product of reliable principles and methods that the witness has reliably applied to the facts of the case. Fed.R.Evid. 702(2)-(3). Cook did not arrive at his conclusions through reliable principles or methods but through casual, sporadic observations of drug dealers over some unspecified time period. Further, although the Government provided pretrial notice of its intent to offer this evidence as a lay opinion under Rule 701, it failed to provide pretrial notice of expert testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(E). 36 Nevertheless, for purposes of this opinion, we fully credit Cook's testimony. Even after doing so, however, we find that the combination of this testimony and the remainder of the Government's evidence is still insufficient to support a conviction. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39-40, 109 S.Ct. 285, 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). The ability of Cook's testimony about the bulge, even if properly admitted, to carry a circumstantial case was significantly diminished by Cook's testimony that drug dealers routinely carry guns and that the neighborhood where the shooting occurred routinely included numerous other armed drug dealers. In other words, a sizable inferential leap is required to conclude that Parker must have carried the gun that was used to kill Lewis when no testimony linked Lewis's killing to Parker's gun and when others in the immediate area had guns, access to Lewis, and motives to kill him.