Opinion ID: 175882
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mutual Agreement/Acceptance

Text: There is also sufficient evidence of mutual agreement notwithstanding KFI's insistence it never accepted Shelton's revisions to its original draft estoppel certificate. Although KFI never signed the Estoppel Certificate or told Shelton, I accept all of the terms of the Estoppel Certificate, KFI's conduct manifested its acceptance. See Childs v. Adams, 322 Ark. 424, 909 S.W.2d 641, 646 (1995) (holding conduct manifested acceptance of a counter offer); MDH Builders, Inc. v. Nabholz Constr. Corp., 70 Ark. App. 284, 17 S.W.3d 97, 100 (2000) (Acceptance of a contract may be accomplished by words or conduct.). A reasonable jury could find KFI (1) relied on Shelton's representations in the Estoppel Certificate when closing on the bridge loan; (2) included the Estoppel Certificate on the Settlement Statement; (3) sent the Estoppel Certificate to the IRS; and (4) used the Estoppel Certificate to obtain title insurance on Rest in Peace. The jury was not required to credit the self-serving testimony of Matthew Cole, KFI's Vice President, who testified KFI never accepted Shelton's terms in the Estoppel Certificate. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alter, 309 Ark. 426, 834 S.W.2d 136, 145 (1992) (holding the jury was free to disbelieve self-serving testimony regarding lack of mutual assent). KFI's conduct was powerful evidence that belied Cole's testimony. We reject KFI's suggestion, repeated throughout its briefs, that Moskowitz and others representing its interests acted ultra vires, because we find sufficient circumstantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could infer KFI's agents at all times acted within the scope of their authority. See Sterne, Agee & Leach, Inc. v. Way, 101 Ark. App. 23, 270 S.W.3d 369, 375-76 (2007) (stating agency may be a question of fact proven through circumstantial evidence).