Opinion ID: 1058076
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Corrections Employee Victim

Text: The record in this case contains a copy of the jury's verdict form which includes the written jury instructions provided to the jury by the trial court. These instructions informed the jury that it could apply as an aggravating circumstance that [t]he murder was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, engaged in the performance of official duties. The verdict form returned by the jury contains a handwritten finding by the jury that it applied as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, engaged in the performance of official duties. The written instruction provided to the jury on this aggravating circumstance was erroneous. Our criminal code provides that the fact-finder may consider as an aggravating circumstance that [t]he murder was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties. Id. at (i)(9) (emphasis added). The trial court's written instruction to the jury in this case omitted the element requiring that Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, or corrections employee engaged in the performance of official duties. Defendant did not raise this issue at trial, in his motion for new trial, or on appeal. Nevertheless, this Court will review a patently incomplete instruction at a capital sentencing hearing under the plain error doctrine, regardless of a defendant's failure to raise the issue. See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 554 (Tenn.1994); see also State v. Hines, 758 S.W.2d 515, 523 (Tenn.1988) (characterizing as plain error the trial court's incomplete instructions on two of three aggravating circumstances found by the jury). This Court will grant relief under the plain error doctrine only where necessary to do substantial justice. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 52(b). As we have stated previously, the error must be of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial. State v. Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn.2005). An appellate court will reverse for plain error only if: (a) the record ... clearly establish[es] what occurred in the trial court; (b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law [has] been breached; (c) a substantial right of the accused [has] been adversely affected; (d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e) consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994)). All five factors must be established and an appellate court need not consider all five factors if any one factor indicates that relief is not warranted. Id. at 283. In this case, the proof at trial was uncontroverted that Defendant knew the victim was a corrections employee: indeed, Defendant committed the murder because of the victim's performance in that role. The proof at trial was further uncontroverted that Defendant knew the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties when Defendant brutally stabbed him to death. Defendant told Mr. Dunaway that he approached the victim during a counseling session only to be ignored. At that point, Defendant determined to kill the victim. The trial court's error in its written instruction to the jury on this aggravating circumstance is analogous to that committed when a trial court omits from its instructions an essential element of an offense. In State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Tenn.2000), the trial court omitted from its charge one of the mens rea elements of the indicted offense. This Court found the erroneous instruction harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because proof of the omitted element was not contested at trial and was essentially conceded by the defendant. Id. at 435; see also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18-20, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (finding trial court's failure to instruct on an element of offense harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where omitted element was supported by uncontroverted evidence). The same result obtains here for the same reason: Defendant admitted his knowledge of the victim's employment and that the victim was engaged in official duties at the time Defendant killed him. Thus, the instructional error did not adversely affect a substantial right of the accused. Finally, given the nature of the proof in this case, we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found and applied this aggravating circumstance had it received the correct instruction. Therefore, Defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of the trial court's error and we need not reverse his sentence of death in order to do substantial justice. Defendant is entitled to no relief on the basis of the trial court's instructional error on this aggravating circumstance.