Opinion ID: 2974961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timing of referral for IDEA eligibility

Text: T.D. and his guardian first argue that the district court and the Appeals Board erred by failing to find that T.D. was denied a FAPE during the 1999-2000 and the 2000-2001 school years—his first and second grades. They also assert that T.D. was entitled to ESY instruction during the summer of 2002. The hearing officer found that the School District should have referred T.D. for evaluation in the second grade, and that the failure to do so resulted in the denial of a FAPE for only his third- and fourth-grade years. This finding was affirmed by both the Appeals Board and the district court. The IDEA imposes a “child-find” requirement on the states: their schools must have policies and procedures in place to identify, locate, and evaluate children with disabilities who need special education and related services. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a)(1). Even children who are only suspected of having a disability, although they are progressing from grade to grade, are protected by this requirement. 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(c). T.D. and his guardian argue that the School District’s failure to evaluate T.D. as early as kindergarten constituted a procedural violation of the IDEA child-find requirement that resulted in substantive harm to T.D. A school district may be held liable for procedural violations of the IDEA that cause substantive harm to the student. Metro. Bd. of Pub. Ed. v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 464 (6th Cir. 1999). What a claimant must show to establish a procedural violation is a matter of first impression in this circuit. We now adopt the standard first articulated in Clay T. v. Walton County Sch. Dist., 952 F. Supp. 817, 823 (M.D. Ga. 1997), which provides that the claimant “must show that school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.” This standard was also adopted by the district court below.
The district court affirmed the Appeals Board’s finding that the appropriate time for a referral was at the end of T.D.’s second-grade school year. It reasoned that “[i]t is difficult to assess whether a very young child is disabled or merely developing at a rate different from his peers, and the educational experts involved all seem to indicate that a hasty referral for special education can be damaging to a child.” On appeal, T.D. and his guardian offer an exhaustive review of T.D.’s educational and behavioral problems in support of their contention that the School District ignored “clear signs” of his ADHD and reading disability as early as kindergarten. None of this evidence, however, is new information that the hearing officer did not already consider, nor does any of it show why the hearing officer’s factual findings are clearly erroneous. An educational expert testified that T.D.’s performance in kindergarten should not have caused teachers to “jump to conclusions.” The hearing officer, and later the Appeals Board, also gave due weight to expert testimony concluding that “the nature of ungraded primary school recognizes the progress of very young students is not uniform.” No. 06-5534 Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Kentucky v. L.M., et al. Page 5 As the hearing officer noted, virtually all of the witnesses who testified at the due process hearing, including T.D.’s own expert, stated that T.D.’s difficulties would not necessarily indicate a disability or a need for special education, and that it would be inappropriate to rush to identify a child that young as disabled. School personnel similarly testified that T.D.’s behavioral and learning problems were not atypical of immature young boys. The School District did not ignore T.D.’s early problems. It took appropriate action by implementing specialized reading instruction, Reading Recovery Program participation, and behavior-management strategies. Under the IDEA, the School District was required to provide a basic floor of educational opportunity consisting “of access to specialized instruction and related services which are individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped child.” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201. There is no additional requirement, however, “that the services so provided be sufficient to maximize each child’s potential commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.” Id. at 198 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The School District provided additional services designed to aid T.D. in catching up to his peers in kindergarten and first grade, even though at that point he was not identified as being disabled within the meaning of the IDEA. We agree with the district court that these services provided a basic floor of educational opportunity through T.D.’s second-grade school year. The interventions in kindergarten and first grade were moderately successful, at least during those years. By the end of kindergarten, for example, T.D. was meeting expectations in all academic areas. T.D. did not start to fall significantly below grade level until the middle of his second-grade year. No teacher suggested that he repeat a school year until after the third grade. In short, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that the School District either overlooked clear signs of disability before T.D. entered second grade or had no rational justification for failing to evaluate him prior to that time. See Clay, 952 F. Supp. at 823.
T.D. and his guardian also contend that T.D. was entitled to ESY instruction during the summer of 2002, following his third-grade year. In lieu of ESY, T.D. received summer school instruction through the School District’s Extended School Services program. Extended School Services are available to students with or without disabilities. There is no evidence in the record regarding the nature of the instruction provided to T.D. that summer. Under the IDEA, schools are required to provide Extended School Services as necessary in order to provide a child with a FAPE. 34 C.F.R. § 300.106(a). A school must provide these services, however, only if the child’s IEP team determines that such services are necessary “for the provision of FAPE to the child.” Id. But a claimant seeking an ESY must satisfy an even stricter test, because “providing an ESY is the exception and not the rule under the regulatory scheme.” Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1473 (6th Cir. 1990). This court has held that the burden is on the claimant proposing an ESY to demonstrate, in a particularized manner relating to the individual child, that an ESY is necessary to avoid regression so severe that the child would not be able to catch up during the following school year. Id. “If the child benefits meaningfully within his potential from instruction under a proper IEP over a regular school year, then ESY service may not be required under the Act unless the benefits accrued to the child during the regular school year will be significantly jeopardized if he is not provided an ESY.” Id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). A claimant must show, in other words, that “an ESY is necessary to permit the child to benefit from his instruction.” See id. (brackets and quotation marks omitted). Claimants can rely on expert opinion testimony to make this showing and are not required to present empirical proof of actual prior regression. Id. at 1471-72. No. 06-5534 Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Kentucky v. L.M., et al. Page 6 T.D. and his guardian have offered no evidence that the Extended School Services T.D. received in the summer of 2002 were in any way inappropriate or insufficient to meet his needs. They instead make a conclusory statement that the record “clearly establishes” that T.D. was in need of specialized ESY instruction during that summer. T.D. and his guardian also argue that because the hearing officer found that there was evidence of regression entitling T.D. to ESY instruction for the summer of 2003 (and that evidence of regression was cumulative from kindergarten on), ipso facto he was also entitled to ESY instruction during the summer of 2002. We reject this argument as inappropriate bootstrapping. In any event, as noted by the district court, because T.D. has already received an award of compensatory education, a further award “based on the School District’s failure to identify T.D. as a child with a disability after T.D.’s second-grade year would be premature at this point.” T.D. and his guardian have failed to demonstrate that T.D. needed ESY instruction (instead of the Extended School Services that he did receive) during the summer of 2002 in order to benefit from the instruction provided to him during the previous school year. The hearing officer found that T.D.’s regression was cumulative from kindergarten on, but did not find that the regression during the summer of 2002 was severe enough to warrant the award of an ESY. T.D. and his guardian have offered no evidence in support of their claim to the contrary. Because T.D. and his guardian have not met their burden of showing why the exceptional remedy of ESY instruction was necessary, we will not disturb the district court’s ruling on this ground. C. Procedure for determining a compensatory-education award In fashioning a remedy for the School District’s denial of a FAPE for T.D.’s third- and fourth-grade school years, as well as for the summer following his fourth-grade year, the Appeals Board ordered T.D.’s Committee to prepare a plan for providing compensatory education to the student. The Appeals Board also ordered the Committee to meet periodically, not less than once every 12 months, to review and modify the plan until the Committee determines that the compensatory-education award had been fulfilled. On appeal, T.D. and his guardian argue that this remedy is “vague, unenforceable,” and “allows the school district to determine the remedy for its wrongdoing.” They instead seek hourfor-hour compensation for each hour of the school day for the four years that T.D. was allegedly denied a FAPE (1,050 hours per year), plus hour-for-hour compensation for the alleged denial of specialized ESY instruction during the summers of 2002 and 2003 (325 hours per summer). Because we agree with the district court that T.D. was denied a FAPE for two years plus one summer, an hour-for-hour award would equal 2,425 hours (1,050 hours per year for two years plus 325 hours for the summer of 2003). An award of compensatory education is an equitable remedy that a court can grant as it finds appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); see also Park ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 464 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The courts have discretion on how to craft the relief and there is no obligation to provide a day-for-day compensation for time missed.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We review the award granted by the Appeals Board and affirmed by the district court under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Park, 464 F.3d at 1033. The Appeals Board awarded compensatory-education services that it deemed sufficient to remedy the denial of a FAPE to T.D. for two years—covering his third and fourth grades—plus an additional award of time to cover the ESY instruction that he was entitled to but denied during the summer of 2003. Instead of ordering a specific number of hours as the hearing officer had done, however, the Appeals Board left it to T.D.’s Committee to determine the particular services necessary to remedy the denial of his FAPE. The Appeals Board reasoned that the total number of hours awarded was less important than “the amount of extra services that [T.D.] will receive in a No. 06-5534 Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Kentucky v. L.M., et al. Page 7 specific week, or over school breaks and the form of such services.” In affirming the award, the district court described the plan as “innovative and likely to be more tailored to T.D.’s needs than an award of a particular number of hours predetermined without benefit of observing T.D.’s progression.” We agree with the district court and the Appeals Board that a flexible approach, rather than a rote hour-by-hour compensation award, is more likely to address T.D.’s educational problems successfully. See Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting an hour-for-hour compensatory-education award in favor of a more flexible approach because some students may need only “short, intensive compensatory programs” while others may need extended programs that would exceed “hour-for-hour replacement of time spent without FAPE”). An appropriate award of compensatory education is “relief designed to ensure that the student is appropriately educated within the meaning of the IDEA.” Parents of Student W. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist., No. 3, 31 F.3d 1489, 1497 (9th Cir. 1994). T.D. may well need more than the 125 hours of compensatory education initially awarded by the hearing officer, but nothing in the record suggests that he needs hour-for-hour compensation in order to catch up to his peers. No one disputes that T.D. is a child of at least average intelligence. He has been shown to have an IQ score of 105. On the other hand, T.D.’s counsel stated at oral argument that this child reads at only a fifth-grade level despite the fact that he is now in the seventh grade. Although we are dismayed that no one has yet acted to remedy this deficiency during the two and a half years of pending litigation, we find no basis to claim that T.D., a child of average intelligence, needs over 2,400 hours of remedial instruction in order to arrive on an equal footing with his classmates. Such an award, in the absence of strong evidence in the record suggesting that so drastic a remedy is necessary, would border on punishment to the School District rather than an equitable remedy for a child in need. See Reid, 401 F.3d at 518 (“[C]ompensatory awards should aim to place disabled children in the same position they would have occupied but for the school district’s violations of IDEA.”). T.D. and his guardian also object to the Appeals Board’s resolution on the basis that remanding the details of the compensatory-education award to T.D.’s Committee improperly allows the School District to determine the remedy for its own wrongdoing. This raises the fundamental issue of whether the details of a compensatory-education award can be remanded to the Committee and still comply with the statutory scheme of the IDEA. We review issues of statutory construction de novo. United States v. Blood, 435 F.3d 612, 618 (6th Cir. 2006). Although there is no Sixth Circuit precedent on point, a recent case from the District of Columbia Circuit, Reid, supra, is instructive. In Reid, the hearing officer awarded the student in question 810 hours of compensatory education to remedy the school district’s denial of a FAPE for four and a half years. 401 F.3d at 518. He also vested the student’s IEP team with the power to reduce or discontinue compensatory services if and when the IEP team determined that the student either no longer needed or was no longer benefitting from the compensatory education. Id. Specifically, “[t]he team’s decision that [the student] no longer needs or is not benefitting from this award of compensatory education services will terminate this award.” Id. at 520. The district court affirmed. Id. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, holding that, under the IDEA, hearing officers may not authorize IEP teams to reduce or discontinue awards of compensatory education. Id. at 526. The Reid court began its analysis by noting that “IDEA due process hearings ‘may not be conducted by an employee of the State educational agency or the local educational agency involved in the education or care of the child.’” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)). An IEP team, in contrast, is statutorily required to include a representative of the local educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 No. 06-5534 Bd. of Educ. of Fayette County, Kentucky v. L.M., et al. Page 8 (d)(1)(B)(iv). Because the IEP team was delegated the power to reduce or terminate the compensatory-education award initially set by the hearing officer, the court held that “the IEP team would in effect exercise the officer’s powers.” Reid, 401 F.3d at 526. “In sum, while the IEP team certainly must monitor [the student’s] progress and coordinate compensatory relief with his current IEP, a delegation that permits the team to reduce or terminate his awarded amount of compensatory education exceeds the statute’s bounds.” Id. at 527. The fact that the IEP team was also comprised of nonemployees, including the student’s mother, did not change the court’s ultimate conclusion. Id. at 526. “Under the statute, the hearing officer may not delegate his authority to a group that includes an individual specifically barred from performing the hearing officer’s functions.” Id. Certainly one could make the argument that because an IEP is comprised of a number of individuals, only one of which must be a representative from the School District, that the School District does not have control over the actions of the IEP team and therefore is not really performing the hearing officer’s functions. But we believe that the Reid court takes the better approach, creating a clean and clear separation by barring altogether an IEP team’s power to terminate a compensatoryeducation award. Under the statute, an IEP team consists of the disabled child’s parents, at least one of the child’s regular education teachers, at least one special education teacher of the child, a representative of the local educational agency (here, the School District), “an individual who can interpret the instructional implications of evaluation results,” other individuals who have knowledge or special expertise regarding the child, and finally, “whenever appropriate, the child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (d)(1)(B). When the child is still enrolled in the school district that caused the violation, then, his IEP team may consist of three or more employees of that school district—potentially half of the IEP team. T.D. is not currently enrolled in the School District, so the possibility of the School District exerting an undue influence in his particular case is not great, but we decline to approve a practice that might have such an impermissible effect in the future. We therefore hold that neither a hearing officer nor an Appeals Board may delegate to a child’s IEP team the power to reduce or terminate a compensatory-education award. In the present case, the Appeals Board awarded “[t]wo years of compensatory education for the District’s delay in identifying and providing education services to the student,” as well as an additional award to compensate for the ESY instruction that T.D. should have received in the summer of 2003. The Appeals Board also authorized T.D.’s Committee to determine when the compensatory education award has been fulfilled. As previously noted, an Admissions and Release Committee in Kentucky is synonymous with an IEP team. See 707 Ky. Admin. Regs. 1:320. This case is therefore materially indistinguishable from Reid. Because we believe that Reid was correctly decided, we reverse the compensatory-education award and remand the case to the district court with instructions to reconsider the remedy awarded in a manner consistent with the foregoing analysis.