Opinion ID: 779670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Abela's habeas petition is within our Article III jurisdiction.

Text: 26 We note that subject matter jurisdiction over this matter is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) because Abela was in custody at the time he filed his habeas petition with the district court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) require that a § 2254 habeas petition be filed when a person is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. An incarcerated convict's challenge to the validity of his conviction satisfies the in custody requirement of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978) 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998). A prisoner who is placed on parole likewise satisfies this requirement because his release is not unconditional — the parolee is required to report regularly to his parole officer, remain at a given job, residence, and community, and refrain from certain activities. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242, 83 S.Ct. 373, 9 L.Ed.2d 285 (1963); see also Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923, 104 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989) (per curiam). 27 Although subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate in this case, this Court must consider whether Abela's release from custody and the subsequent conclusion of his parole term render his appeal moot under Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Where no actual case or controversy exists between the parties, or when `events occur during the pendency of a litigation which render the court unable to grant the requested relief,' then the case is moot and outside our jurisdiction. Speer v. City of Oregon, 847 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir.1988) (quoting Carras v. Williams, 807 F.2d 1286, 1289 (6th Cir.1986)). Because mootness is a jurisdictional issue, we may raise it sua sponte on appeal even though the issue was neither raised nor briefed below. Berger v. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 721 (6th Cir.1993). 28 As long as a petitioner files a habeas petition attacking his underlying criminal conviction while incarcerated or in custody, even where he is later released before the petition is considered, he will satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III because of the continuing collateral consequences to a wrongful criminal conviction. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8, 118 S.Ct. 978 (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-56, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968)). These collateral consequences to a criminal conviction include an inability to enter certain businesses, to serve as an elected official or juror, or to vote. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-238, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968). 29 Abela's habeas petition, filed while on parole, attacks his underlying criminal conviction. Because Abela was on parole when his habeas petition was filed, he meets the in custody requirements of §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491, 109 S.Ct. 1923. Because he is challenging his underlying criminal conviction, the collateral consequences of that conviction provide Abela the personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit he needs to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7, 118 S.Ct. 978. With subject matter jurisdiction and an actual case or controversy before us, Abela's case is not moot and therefore is within our jurisdiction. Speer, 847 F.2d at 311. 30 B. Whether Abela's habeas petition is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 31 Abela argues that the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) does not bar his habeas petition. The district court found that the statute of limitations did not bar Abela's habeas petition, in part because the statute of limitations period was tolled under the language of § 2244(d)(2) while Abela applied for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court following the denial of state post-conviction collateral review by the Michigan Supreme Court. Section 2244(d)(1) provides for a one-year statute of limitation for habeas claims after the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review. A one-year grace period after the April 24, 1996, enactment of AEDPA is permitted if the judgment became final before the passage of AEDPA. See Austin v. Mitchell, 200 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir.1999). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending will not count against this one-year limit. Accordingly, the issue before us is whether the § 2244(d)(1) statute of limitations period is to be tolled during: (a) the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court on collateral review of a petitioner's claims; and (b) the period in which the United States Supreme Court considers a petition for certiorari following the denial of collateral review at the state level. 32 Abela's direct appeal ended on March 31, 1995, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied Abela's motion for relief from judgment. Because Abela's claim became final before the passage of AEDPA, the § 2244(d)(1) one-year statute of limitations period for the filing of a § 2254 habeas petition began to run on April 24, 1996. On August 20, 1996, after the one-year statute of limitations period had run for 118 days, Abela filed his motion for relief from judgment and the § 2244(d)(2) tolling provision stayed the limitations period. The one-year statute of limitations period began running again on May 28, 1998, when the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave on Abela's motion for relief from judgment after his appeal through the state collateral review system. See § 2244(d)(2). The one-year statute of limitations ran for an additional 333 days until Abela filed this habeas petition on April 26, 1999. Taking the entire elapsed time (118 days from the period April 24, 1996 to August 20, 1996, plus 333 days from the period May 28, 1998 to April 26, 1999) amounts to 451 days of untolled time after Abela's conviction became final — well outside the one-year statute of limitations provided by AEDPA. For that reason, we dismiss Abela's § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. C. Elements of this tolling calculation 33 Uncontested by the parties is the 118 days of untolled time between April 24, 1996, when AEDPA was enacted, and August 20, 1996, when Abela filed his motion for relief from judgment. See Austin, 200 F.3d at 393; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, the parties do contest the calculation of the final 333 days of untolled time following the Michigan Supreme Court's May 28, 1998, denial of Abela's motion for relief from judgment after his appeals through the state collateral review system. The Respondent argues that more than 333 days of untolled time had passed because the time between the lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to the higher state court on collateral review of Abela's claims should qualify as untolled time. Abela argues that less than 333 days of untolled time had passed because the language of § 2244(d)(2) provides for additional tolling until October 19, 1998, when the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari from the Michigan Supreme Court's denial of leave. Under the language of § 2244(d)(2), we reject both of these contentions. 34 1. Tolling during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court on collateral review of a petitioner's claims. 35 The statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is ambiguous as to whether the one-year limitations period should be tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court on collateral review of a petitioner's claims. The relevant section states: 36 The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 37 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The tolling in the intervals between each level of state court collateral review turns on the definition of the word pending in § 2244(d)(2). The United States Supreme Court recently clarified this issue, noting that a petitioner's claim is pending for the entire term of state court review — including those intervals between one state court's judgment and the filing of an appeal with a higher state court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, ___, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2138, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). As the district court pointed out, Abela timely filed his application for collateral review at each stage of the appellate process, and thus meets the properly filed and pending language of § 2244(d)(2). 38 2. Tolling for the certiorari period for United States Supreme Court review of Abela's state post-conviction collateral review petition. 39 The remaining issue before us is whether § 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling of the one-year statute of limitations period in § 2244(d)(1) for the period of time in which a petitioner seeks certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court following the denial of post-conviction collateral relief by the State. This is of particular importance here, as the timeliness of Abela's petition turns on this very issue. If § 2244(d)(2) cannot be read to toll the statute of limitations period while a petitioner seeks review from the United States Supreme Court, then § 2244(d)(1) cannot be tolled for the 116 days in which Abela filed and received a petition for certiorari, thus rendering his petition untimely by 86 days. Likewise, if § 2244(d)(2) can be read to permit tolling for this period of time, Abela accumulates 189 days from when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to when the petition for habeas corpus was filed. This results in a total of 335 days of untolled time from the date Abela's conviction became final to the date he filed his petition for habeas corpus, thus satisfying the one-year § 2244(d)(1) statute of limitations. 40 Section 2244(d)(2) allows for tolling of the time associated with the filing of an application for State post-conviction or other collateral review. Abela argues that a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court following the denial of state post-conviction collateral relief constitutes other collateral review and thus permissibly tolls the one-year § 2244(d)(1) statute of limitations. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 177, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (parsing but not deciding the limits of, and overlap between, State post-conviction review and other collateral review). This Court must first determine, then, whether the word State modifies both post-conviction and other collateral review. The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Duncan, 533 U.S. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 2120, indicates that it does. After an extensive analysis of congressional intent and principles of statutory construction, Duncan concluded that in the operative tolling phrase of § 2244(d)(2), State post-conviction or other collateral review, State modifies both post-conviction and other collateral review. 533 U.S. at 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120; see also Isham v. Randle, 226 F.3d 691, 695 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1201, 121 S.Ct. 1211, 149 L.Ed.2d 124 (2001). With the addition of the State modifier, the § 2254(d)(2) language of other collateral review forms other state collateral review. See Duncan, 533 U.S. at 175, 121 S.Ct. 2120. Thus, § 2244(d)(2) permits tolling only for State post-conviction, or other state collateral review. Id. at 181-82, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (concluding federal habeas review does not toll § 2244(d)(1) statute of limitations because it is not State post-conviction or other collateral review under § 2244(d)(2)). 41 Given that § 2244(d)(1) can only be tolled for State post-conviction, or other state collateral review, we must now consider whether a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court following the denial of state post-conviction collateral relief can be considered as such. The holding in Isham, 226 F.3d at 695, answers this question in the negative. There, this Court found that, 42 A petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is not state post conviction relief. Neither is such a petition other state collateral relief. As the Tenth Circuit observed in Rhine, [182 F.3d at 1156,] a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is simply not an application for state review of any kind.... 43 Isham, 226 F.3d at 695. 44 Because Duncan mandates that § 2244(d)(2) permits tolling only for the time associated with State post-conviction, or other state collateral review, and because our holding in Isham precludes us from considering a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court as State post-conviction, or other state collateral review, we cannot read § 2244(d)(2) to permit tolling here. No other avenues are left for tolling in the statute. 2 45 Most of the circuits that have addressed this issue also have held that state post-conviction collateral review is complete once the state's highest court has ruled. See Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1227 (11th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1166, 121 S.Ct. 1129, 148 L.Ed.2d 995 (2001) ([A]n application `for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending,' [under] 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), only so long as the case is in the state courts.); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1084, 120 S.Ct. 808, 145 L.Ed.2d 681 (2000) (The time after the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals finally denied his post-conviction application until the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari was not `time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction... review ... [was] pending.'); Ott v. Johnson, 192 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1099, 120 S.Ct. 1834, 146 L.Ed.2d 777 (2000) ([Section] 2244(d)(2) does not toll the limitations period from the time of denial of state habeas relief by the state high court until the time in which a petitioner could have petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.); cf. Gutierrez v. Schomig, 233 F.3d 490, 492 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 950, 121 S.Ct. 1421, 149 L.Ed.2d 361 (2001) (deciding not to toll for the ninety-day period in which a litigant potentially could have filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court using the properly filed application ... [that] is pending language of § 2254(d)(2), and specifically reserving for later the question of whether a petition for certiorari that has been filed with the United States Supreme Court falls within the statutory language of § 2254(d)(2)). 46 While allowing tolling for Supreme Court review in this circumstance would better effectuate the incentive for litigants to exhaust all available state remedies before proceeding in the lower federal courts, we are foreclosed from reaching this result under the authority of Duncan and Isham. As such, we hold that tolling of the one-year statute of limitations period in § 2244(d)(1) for State post-conviction or other collateral review in § 2244(d)(2) does not extend to the period in which the United States Supreme Court considers a petition for certiorari following the state collateral review process. Thus, Abela's statute of limitations period began running immediately following the final denial of his state post-conviction review by the Michigan Supreme Court on May 28, 1998. See § 2244(d)(2). Abela's § 2254 habeas petition is untimely because 451 days of untolled time passed between the date his conviction became final and the filing of his § 2254 petition. This is beyond the one-year statute of limitations period required by AEDPA and § 2244.