Opinion ID: 4027532
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Photo Array and Lineup Construction

Text: Researchers have also found that the way that a photo array or live lineup is constructed can affect the reliability of the resulting identifications. A number of considerations are critical. First, not surprisingly, mistaken identifications are more likely where the suspect stands out in comparison to the 86 See Clark, Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions, supra, at 421; Steblay, Social Influence in Eyewitness Recall, supra, at 284. 87 J.A. 1537 (emphasis added). 88 J.A. 1548 (emphasis added). 89 J.A. 1555 (emphasis added). 19 fillers.90 Using fillers that are relative look-alikes forces a witness to examine her memory, whereas placing the suspect among a group of individuals that bear little resemblance to him causes him to stand out. “[A] biased lineup may [also] inflate a witness’ confidence in the identification because the selection process seemed easy.”91 As of yet, there is no clear agreement among researchers about whether fillers should more closely resemble a witness’ pre-lineup description of the suspect or the actual suspect.92 However, whether the fillers more closely resemble the suspect or the witness’ pre-lineup description, the fillers’ appearances should not make the suspect stand out. Second, all lineups should include a minimum of five 93 fillers. The logic here, which appears to be a matter of general agreement, is again clear: the greater the number of choices, the less the chance of making a lucky guess, and the more the 90 See Roy S. Malpass, Colin G. Tredoux, & Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, Lineup Construction and Lineup Fairness, in 2 The Handbook of Eyewitnesses Psychology 155, 156-58 (2007). 91 State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 898 (N.J. 2011), holding modified by State v. Chen, 27 A.2d 930 (N.J. 2011) (citing David F. Ross et al., When Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses Look the Same: A Limitation of the ‘Pop-Out’ Effect and the 10-to 12-Second Rule, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 677, 687 (2007) and Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Measuring the Goodness of Lineups: Parameter Estimation, Question Effects, and Limits to the Mock Witness Paradigm, 13 Applied Cognitive Psychol. S27, S30 (1999)). 92 Compare Steven E. Clark & Jennifer L. Tunnicliff, Selecting Lineup Foils in Eyewitness Identification Experiments: Experimental Control and Real-World Simulation, 25 L. & Hum. Behav. 199, 212 (2001), and Gary L. Wells, Sheila M. Rydell, & Eric P. Seelau, The Selection of Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 835, 842 (1993), with Stephen Darling, Tim Valentine, & Amina Memon, Selection of Lineup Foils in Operational Contexts, 22 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 159, 165-67 (2008). 93 See Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement 29 (1999). 20 witness is forced to rely on her own memory to identify the suspect. Third, for similar reasons, lineups should not feature more than one suspect. In its landmark decision on the issue of eyewitness identification, the Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized that, “if multiple suspects are in the lineup, the reliability of a positive identification is difficult to assess, for the possibility of ‘lucky’ guesses is magnified.”94 The trial judge here noted that the composition of the lineup was somewhat suggestive because Dennis was slightly shorter than the rest of the participants, causing him to stand out. The jurors were therefore able to consider this disparity as they evaluated the reliability of the identifications. However, the court did not provide the jury with an explanation of how this may have affected the witnesses’ identifications of Dennis in that lineup. Nor did it give the jurors information that would allow them to consider the lineup construction in context with all of the other factors that were involved in the identifications of Dennis. 4. Interactions with Witnesses: Witness Feedback Another critical system variable is whether law enforcement provides a witness with any feedback or other information in the course of her identification. As I touched on in my discussion of blinding procedures, “[t]he nature of law enforcement interactions with the eyewitness before, during, and after the identification plays a role in the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and in the confidence expressed in the accuracy of those identifications by witnesses.”95 Elizabeth Loftus, a pioneering researcher in the field of human memory and cognition, has thoroughly documented the effects of received information on memory accuracy. In one study, she 94 Henderson, 27 A.3d at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted). 95 National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit, supra, at 91 (citing Steven. E. Clark, Tanya E. Marshall, & Robert Rosenthal, Lineup Administrator Influences on Eyewitness Identification Decisions, 15 J. of Experimental Psychol.: Applied 63 (2009)). 21 showed college students a video of a car crash on a country road.96 Afterward, she asked them to estimate how fast the car was going. Half the students were asked how fast the car was going when it “passed the barn” along the country road; the other half were simply asked how fast the car was going “along the country road.”97 A week later, she asked the same students whether they had seen a barn in the film. Approximately seventeen percent of the students who were given the “passed the barn” cue recalled seeing the barn in the video.98 In contrast, less than three percent of the non-barn cue group remembered a barn.99 In reality, there was no barn in the video.100 This demonstrates the very subtle—yet extremely powerful—effect statements at the time of memory recall can have. In the eyewitness identification context, such information often comes in the form of pre- or postidentification information that may reinforce an identification. For example, research confirms the intuitive proposition that when investigators give cues that suggest “you got the right guy,” the witness’ confidence in the identification is artificially inflated. A meta-analysis of twenty studies covering 2,400 identifications found that witnesses who received feedback “expressed significantly more retrospective confidence in their decision compared with participants who received no feedback.”101 Such feedback not only causes a witness to misjudge the reliability of her identification, it can also result in the witness embellishing the opportunity she had to observe the perpetrator and the crime. “Those who receive a simple post-identification confirmation regarding the accuracy of their identification significantly inflate their reports to suggest better witnessing conditions at the time of the crime, stronger 96 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 Cognitive Psychol. 560, 566 (1975). 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 100 Id. 101 Amy B. Douglass & Nancy M. Steblay, Memory Distortion in Eyewitnesses: A Meta-Analysis of the Postidentification Feedback Effect, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 859, 863 (2006). 22 memory at the time of the lineup, and sharper memory abilities in general.”102 Furthermore, confirmational feedback need not be immediate to corrupt a witness’ memory. One study showed that the effects of confirmational feedback may be the same even when it occurs two days after an identification.103 Other research further substantiates that these effects can withstand the passage of time.104 The particular perils of witness feedback are evident in many of the documented cases of false identifications. Here again, the story of Ronald Cotton and Jennifer Thompson is illustrative: officer feedback led Thompson to harden her false memory of Cotton as her rapist. In the process, her memory was effectively immunized from any impact cross-examination may otherwise have had on her confidence, which impeded the jury’s ability to properly assess her testimony. I realize, of course, that law enforcement officials are not completely in control of the feedback witnesses receive. Interactions among witnesses outside the confines of police proceedings, for instance, can affect the reliability of the witnesses’ identifications.105 For example, if one witness talks 102 Id. at 864-65; see also Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360 (1998). 103 See Gary L. Wells, Elizabeth A. Olson, & Steve D. Charman, Distorted Retrospective Eyewitness Reports as Functions of Feedback and Delay, 9 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 42, 49-50 (2003). 104 See Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., The Effects of PostIdentification Feedback and Age on Retrospective Eyewitness Memory, 19 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 435, 449 (2005). 105 See, e.g., Rachel Zajac & Nicola Henderson, Don’t It Make My Brown Eyes Blue: Co-Witness Misinformation About a Target’s Appearance Can Impair Target-Absent Line-up Performance, 17 Memory 266, 275 (2009) (“[P]articipants who were [wrongly] told by the [co-witness] that the accomplice had blue eyes were significantly more likely than control participants to provide this information when asked to give a verbal description.”); Lorraine Hope et al., “With a Little Help from My Friends . . .”: The Role of 23 to another, she can alter or reinforce the other’s memory of the same event. “[P]ost-identification feedback does not have to be presented by the experimenter or an authoritative figure (e.g. police officer) in order to affect a witness’ subsequent crimerelated judg[]ments.”106 In one study, after witnesses made incorrect identifications, they were told either that their cowitness made the same or a different identification.107 Not surprisingly, confidence rose among the witnesses that were told that their co-witness had agreed with them and fell among those told that co-witnesses had disagreed.108 Though law enforcement officials may not be able to completely insulate witnesses from this system variable, police did not even attempt to guard against it here. The witnesses Co-Witness Relationship in Susceptibility to Misinformation, 127 Acta Psychologica 476, 481 (2008) (noting that all participants “were susceptible to misinformation from their co-witness and, as a consequence, produced less accurate recall accounts than participants who did not interact with another witness”); Helen M. Paterson & Richard I. Kemp, Comparing Methods of Encountering Post-Event Information: The Power of Co-Witness Suggestion, 20 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 1083, 1083 (2006) (“Results suggest that co-witness information had a particularly strong influence on eyewitness memory, whether encountered through co-witness discussion or indirectly through a third party.”); John S. Shaw III, Sena Garven, & James M. Wood, Co-Witness Information Can Have Immediate Effects on Eyewitness Memory Reports, 21 Law & Hum. Behav. 503, 503, 516 (1997) (“[W]hen participants received incorrect information about a co-witness’s response, they were significantly more likely to give that incorrect response than if they received no co-witness information.”); C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 714, 717-18 (1994). 106 Elin M. Skagerberg, Co-Witness Feedback in Line-ups, 21 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 489, 494 (2007). 107 Luus & Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence, supra, at 717-18. 108 Id.; see also Skagerberg, supra, at 494-95 (showing similar results). 24 who identified Dennis viewed the lineup in the same room and at the same time. Detective Wynn’s instruction to the witnesses not to react or show emotion during the lineup reduces the risk of feedback, but this instruction did not eliminate it. Therefore, the risk that the witnesses’ reactions may have influenced the results of the lineup cannot be discounted, and the jurors should have been instructed about this possibility. Furthermore, the record of Bertha’s photo array identification establishes the existence of at least some officerto-witness feedback. Detective Santiago asked Bertha to affirm his identification: “Can you be sure that photo #1 is the male that you saw get away from the girl and run at you with the gun after the gunshot?”109 Only then did Bertha state he was “sure”110 Dennis was the shooter as opposed to his initial statement that Dennis’ photo merely “look[ed] like”111 the shooter. I am not suggesting that Detective Santiago’s question ultimately negated Bertha’s ability to make an in-court identification. Nor am I suggesting that Detective Santiago intentionally tried to reinforce Bertha’s confidence in his identification or “prime” him for a subsequent in-court identification. I am, however, suggesting that the jury should have been informed of how Detective Santiago’s response to Bertha’s initial selection of Dennis’ photo may have affected the reliability of Bertha’s lineup identification and, as I next explain, his subsequent in-court identification as well. 5. Multiple viewings Another crucial system variable—and one that was clearly present here—is the opportunity to engage in multiple viewings of a suspect. Allowing a witness to view a suspect more than once during an investigation can have a powerful corrupting effect on that witness’ memory. It creates a risk that the witness will merely identify a suspect based on her past views of him rather than her memory of the relevant event. Meta-analysis has revealed that while fifteen percent of 109 J.A. 1556. 110 Id. 111 J.A. 1555. 25 witnesses mistakenly identify an innocent person during the first viewing of a lineup, that percentage jumps to thirty-seven percent if the witness previously viewed that innocent person’s mug shot.112 This phenomenon is known as “mug shot exposure.” Related studies have also shown the existence of “mug shot commitment.” This refers to the fact that once witnesses positively identify an innocent person from a mug shot, “a significant number” then “reaffirm[] their false identification” in a later photo lineup.113 This is true even when the real suspect is actually present in the lineup.114 Nonetheless, multiple viewings seem to have no impact on the reliability of a lineup identification “when a picture of the suspect was not present in photographs examined earlier”115 by the witness. The incredible story of John White that I mentioned at the outset serves as a powerful example of the impact that multiple viewings can have on witness identifications. In 1979, John White was accused of breaking into the home of a seventy-four-year-old woman and then beating and raping her.116 After the victim picked White out of a photo array, he was placed in a live lineup.117 White was the only person repeated in both the photo array and live lineup. The victim 112 Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Brian H. Bornstein, & Steven D. Penrod, Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30 L. & Hum. Behav. 287, 299 (2006). 113 See Gunter Koehnken, Roy S. Malpass, Michael, S. Wogalter, Forensic Applications of Line-Up Research, in Psychological Issues in Eyewitness Identification 205, 219 (Siegfried L. Sporer, Roy S. Malpass, Gunter Koehnken eds., 1996). 114 Id. 115 Id. at 218. However, as noted earlier, Dennis’ picture was presented in photo arrays that witnesses saw prior to viewing the lineup. 116 The Innocence Project, John Jerome White, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/john-jerome-white/ (last visited July 5, 2016). 117 Id. 26 identified White from that live lineup.118 DNA analysis later revealed that the victim’s actual assailant was not White, but a man named James Parham. By the cruelest of ironies, Parham had actually been placed in the live lineup with White as a filler when the victim identified White as her assailant. Despite having an opportunity to view her real rapist in the lineup, the victim affirmed her initial selection of White. Her erroneous identification led to a life sentence for White, who served twenty-seven years before the DNA evidence exonerated him.119 A leading researcher offered the following explanation of White’s case: The witness had already identified John White from a photographic lineup. And, John White was the only person who was in both the photographic lineup and the live lineup. Hence, what we have here, I believe, is a strong example of how a mistaken identification from one procedure (a photo lineup) is repeated in the next procedure (a live lineup) even though the real perpetrator is clearly present in the second procedure. Repeating the same mistake can occur for several reasons. One possibility is that the initial mistaken identification changed the memory of the witness; in effect John White’s face “became” her memory of the attacker and the face of Parham no longer existed once she mistakenly identified John White. Another possibility is that she approached the live lineup with one goal in mind - find the man she had identified from the photos. Perhaps she never really looked at Parham because she quickly saw the man she identified from photos and did not need to look further.120 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Gary Wells, The Mistaken Identification of John Jerome White, 27 The witnesses who identified Dennis at trial were given not two, but three, opportunities to view Dennis. These multiple views could help explain why initially tentative guesses became certain identifications by the time the witnesses took the stand. The possibility cannot be ignored that the witnesses here, like the victims in White and Cotton’s cases, selected Dennis in the live lineup because they were looking for the man they had already identified from the photo arrays. The jurors should have been informed of the impact of multiple viewings so that they could have considered that effect in determining how much weight to afford the lineup identifications and/or the in-court identifications. Absent that information, the jurors were ill equipped to assess the possibility that Howard, Bertha, and Cameron’s lineup and incourt identifications of Dennis may have been based on prior viewings of his picture rather than their memories of the crime. These system variables on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications highlight the importance of the procedures law enforcement officials use when soliciting identifications. As the Oregon Supreme Court has explained, “it is incumbent on courts and law enforcement personnel to treat eyewitness memory just as carefully as they would other forms of trace evidence, like DNA, bloodstains, or fingerprints, the evidentiary value of which can be impaired or destroyed by contamination. Like those forms of evidence, once contaminated, a witness’ original memory is very difficult to retrieve.”121