Opinion ID: 1233056
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does Campbell's Fraud Allegation Raise an Affirmative Defense?

Text: ¶ 51 Campbell also contends he should have been allowed to present evidence at trial of Denise's alleged misrepresentation as part of an affirmative defense. [10] Campbell argues that, similar to the now-abrogated common law privilege to resist an unlawful arrest, see State v. Hobson, 218 Wis.2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998), Wisconsin allows a defendant to disregard an order procured by fraud and then collaterally attack the fraudulently obtained judgment when the judgment supplies the basis for a criminal prosecution. He relies on Boots v. Boots, 73 Wis.2d 207, 243 N.W.2d 225 (1976); Zrimsek v. American Automobile Insurance Company, 8 Wis.2d 1, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959); State v. Bouzek, 168 Wis.2d 642, 484 N.W.2d 362 (Ct.App.1992); Schramek v. Bohren, 145 Wis.2d 695, 429 N.W.2d 501 (Ct.App.1988); and State v. Madison, 120 Wis.2d 150, 353 N.W.2d 835 (Ct.App.1984), as authority for his collateral attack on the custody order. ¶ 52 A party's ability to collaterally attack a judgment for fraud has had a checkered history in Wisconsin. Early in Wisconsin jurisprudence, a judgment could not be collaterally attacked for fraud. Werner v. Riemer, 255 Wis. 386, 403, 39 N.W.2d 457 (1949) (citing Cody v. Cody, 98 Wis. 445, 452, 74 N.W. 217 (1898)). In Cody this court held that a judgment could be collaterally attacked only if the court that rendered the judgment lacked jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 53 Subsequently, this court revised the Cody rule to permit a party to collaterally attack a judgment that was procured by fraud. See Boots, 73 Wis.2d at 215-16, 243 N.W.2d 225 (discussing the evolution away from the rule in Cody ). Now, Wisconsin courts may exercise their equitable powers to relieve an aggrieved party from a judgment procured by fraud in a collateral attack if the party acts seasonably and was without excusable negligence in the action, and where refusing to afford relief would subject the party to an unconscionable judgment. Weber v. Weber, 260 Wis. 420, 430-31, 51 N.W.2d 18 (1952); see also State Cent. Credit Union v. Bayley, 33 Wis.2d 367, 373, 147 N.W.2d 265 (1967); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 244-45, 248, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944) (overruled on other grounds). Thus, [e]quitable relief against fraudulent judgments . . . is a judicially devised remedy fashioned to relieve hardships which, from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence to another court-made rule, the general rule that judgments should not be disturbed .... Hazel-Atlas Glass Co., 322 U.S. at 248, 64 S.Ct. 997. ¶ 54 In Bouzek, the court quoted at length from Schramek: A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid, evade or deny the force and effect of a judgment in an indirect manner and not in a direct proceeding prescribed by law and instituted for the purpose of vacating, reviewing, or annulling it.... For [plaintiff] to ... request consideration in separate proceedings of any cause of action [based on the invalidity of the domestic abuse injunction] would be sanctioning a collateral attack on the order of another [ ] judicial body. [Her] only basis for [an] attack [on the injunction would be] if she had demonstrated fraud in the procurement of the injunctive order. Bouzek, 168 Wis.2d at 644-45, 484 N.W.2d 362 (quoting Schramek, 145 Wis.2d at 713, 429 N.W.2d 501). ¶ 55 In an earlier criminal case, the court of appeals said: As a general rule a judgment is binding on the parties and may not be attacked in a collateral action unless it was procured by fraud. Madison, 120 Wis.2d at 154, 353 N.W.2d 835 (citing Boots, 73 Wis.2d at 216, 243 N.W.2d 225). Though the court of appeals has stated in criminal cases that a judgment or order may be collaterally attacked if procured by fraud, the court of appeals has never applied the rule in these cases. See Madison, 120 Wis.2d at 154, 353 N.W.2d 835; Bouzek, 168 Wis.2d at 645, 484 N.W.2d 362. ¶ 56 There are good reasons not to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud to interference with child custody. ¶ 57 One species of affirmative defense  exemplified by self-defense and the now-abrogated privilege to resist unlawful arrestthat courts recognize arises where a person is faced with the difficult decision whether to commit a crime or suffer an injury not otherwise susceptible to effective redress. See Hobson, 218 Wis.2d at 373-80, 577 N.W.2d 825. In Hobson the court recognized that the privilege to resist unlawful arrest developed at a time when arrest was likely to lead to illness, torture, or prolonged detention without an opportunity for a hearing. Id. at 374, 577 N.W.2d 825. Hobson, however, abrogated this privilege because judicial process had advanced to the point that it offered a more effective response to unlawful arrest than physical resistance. Id. at 375-76, 577 N.W.2d 825. ¶ 58 For similar reasons, no affirmative defense for fraud can justify interference with legal custody of a child unless there is a credible threat of physical harm. See Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a); State v. McCoy, 143 Wis.2d 274, 295-96, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988). Adequate judicial processes exist to attack an order or judgment for fraud. In this case, Campbell received a de novo hearing on the family court order in the circuit court. See Wis. Stat. § 757.69(8). If he had fully pursued the de novo hearing, he would have received a decision, and he could have sought an appeal of an adverse determination. In addition, he could have attacked the order for fraud after the appeal period lapsed. See Wis. Stat. § 806.07. [11] It is in the courts that disputes [over the custody of children] should be resolved except in those situations where action is required by one parent to protect a child from imminent physical harm. McCoy, 143 Wis.2d at 296, 421 N.W.2d 107. ¶ 59 Recognition of an affirmative defense entails the balancing of competing policy considerations. We believe the legislature properly balanced the competing policies when it established four affirmative defenses to interference with legal custody of a child. See Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a). Interference with legal custody will not result in a conviction where the action: 1. Is taken by a parent or by a person authorized by a parent to protect his or her child in a situation in which the parent or authorized person reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to the child; 2. Is taken by a parent fleeing in a situation in which the parent reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to himself or herself; 3. Is consented to by the other parent or any other person or agency having legal custody of the child; or 4. Is otherwise authorized by law. Wis. Stat. § 948.31(4)(a). ¶ 60 None of these legislatively created affirmative defenses applies in this case. There is no suggestion in the record that Denise posed a threat either to the boys or to Campbell; Denise did not consent to Campbell taking the boys to Mexico; and Campbell's actions were not authorized by law. The family court commissioner's custody order was a valid order, with which Campbell was obligated to comply. See Orethun, 84 Wis.2d at 490-91, 267 N.W.2d 318. Campbell's position would require us to overrule cases like Orethun and Anderson, which held that an injunctive order must be obeyed even if erroneous. See Orethun, 84 Wis.2d at 490, 267 N.W.2d 318. ¶ 61 Furthermore, even if we were inclined to recognize an affirmative defense to interference with legal custody for fraud, the facts of this case would not warrant relief. Requiring Campbell to obey the custody order does not shock the conscience. Campbell not only raised the question of fraud before the family court commissioner, but also had the opportunity to contest the validity of the custody order at the 1998 de novo hearing in circuit court. Instead of pursuing the de novo hearing, he abandoned judicial process in favor of absconding to Mexico with Randy and Cody in contravention of a valid court order. In short, Campbell should be precluded from litigating the alleged fraud since he already had the opportunity to do so. Cf. Smith, 283 Wis.2d 57, ¶ 22, 699 N.W.2d 508. ¶ 62 Under the facts of this case, we refuse to recognize a common law affirmative defense of fraud. [12] Therefore, the circuit court properly prevented Campbell from collaterally attacking the underlying custody order despite his allegations of fraud. This holding does not eviscerate the Bouzek rule; it helps define and give substance to the Bouzek rule. Were we to hold otherwise, we would be rewriting decades of law on the operative effect of voidable judgments.