Opinion ID: 2032369
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: when plaintiff is a keeper

Text: [4] We hold that when the legal owners of a dog are not negligent and are not exercising control over their dog, a person acting in the capacity as the dog's keeper cannot collect damages under Wis. Stat. § 174.02. Armstrong argues that whether or not she is a keeper is irrelevant to this case. Under the argument advanced by Armstrong, a keeper would be liable under Wis. Stat. § 174.02 only when a third party non-owner was injured. However, a legal owner would be liable to all injured parties, including other statutory owners such as a keeper. [5] We reject this position. There is no evidence that the legislature intended to treat keepers or harborers differently than legal owners. We conclude that the purpose of the statute is to protect those people who are not in a position to control the dog, and not to protect those persons who are statutorily defined as owners. An owner injured while in control of the dog may not use the statute to hold another owner liable. [8] The weight of extrajurisdictional authority provides persuasive support for our conclusion. The court of appeals of Ohio faced a very similar factual scenario in Khamis v. Everson, 623 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993). There, the plaintiff was working as a volunteer at his friend's boarding kennels. The plaintiff was bitten while trying to get a dog to return to its cage after he had changed the water and hay in the cage and left fresh food for the dog. Khamis, 623 N.E.2d at 684. Although the plaintiff did not contest his status as a keeper, he argued that the legal owner of the dog was liable for the damages under Ohio's absolute liability statute. [9] The court disagreed, concluding that, the legislature intended to protect those people who are not in a position to control the dog. In contrast, we believe the legislature did not intend to protect those persons (the owner, keeper or harborer of the dog) who have, by the terms of the statute, an absolute duty to control the animal. Id. at 687. In Minnesota, the court of appeals addressed this issue in a case involving an employee in a veterinary who was bitten as she attempted to move a dog out of the kennel area. Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). The court noted that their statute [10] was designed to compensate third-party plaintiffs and could be analyzed as not creating strict liability for a two party action involving people who both meet the statutory definition of owner. Tschida, 462 N.W.2d at 411. Because the veterinarian and the plaintiff had possession and control of the dog and plaintiff was assisting in caring for the dog at the time of her injury, the court held that she fell within the statutory definition of keeper. Id. at 412. And ultimately, the court held that where there is no negligence by the legal owner, we further interpret the statute to exclude liability of the legal owner to the second party owner [keeper or harborer] for damages from being attacked or injured by the dog. Id. at 412-13. Similarly, the court of appeals in Illinois ruled that a dog groomer who had accepted the responsibility of controlling a dog could not subsequently maintain a cause of action for injuries resulting from her own failure to control the animal under the Illinois Animal. Control Act. [11] Wilcoxen v. Paige, 528 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988). A person who voluntarily steps into a position of control over an animal comes within the statutory definition of owner and cannot maintain an action against the dog's legal owners for injuries they might suffer. Id. In contrast, we find the cases upon which Armstrong relies unpersuasive. True, the kennel employee in Wipperfurth v. Huie, 654 So. 2d 116, 118 (Fla. 1995), was found not to be an owner, but the statute in effect at the time of the injury only referred to liability of an owner and, unlike our own statute, did not define owner as including those who keep or harbor dogs. Further, as the Florida Supreme Court noted in Wipperfurth, the accident had occurred prior to passage of a new statutory provision which now defines an owner as any person, firm, corporation, or organization possessing, harboring, keeping, or having control or custody of an animal ... Florida Stat. § 767.11(7). Id. at 118, n. 4. In Collins v. Kenealy, 492 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Iowa 1992), the Iowa Supreme Court held that delivery of a dog to a temporary custodian was not sufficient to bring that person within the statutory definition of owner as one who keeps or harbors. However, we find Collins both factually and statutorily dissimilar and therefore not persuasive. The plaintiff dog groomer only had custody of the animal for a short period of time for the limited purpose of grooming and provided none of the sustenance or shelter associated with the definition of keeper developed under Wisconsin case law. Additionally, the court based its decision on long established interpretations by the Iowa courts of the state's strict liability statute which, unlike Wis. Stat. § 174.02, does not even allow contributory negligence as a defense. Collins, 492 N.W.2d at 682.