Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Prejudicial Effect of Autopsy Photographs

Text: (24) The trial court admitted into evidence 44 photographs, including 2 photographs of the autopsies of Juan and Juanita Bocanegra depicting the extensive nature of their scalp wounds. (Exhibits Nos. 13 & 14.) The autopsy photographs had been excluded from the guilt phase following a successful motion in limine by defendant. The trial court overruled defendant's objection to the admission of the autopsy photographs, however, for the penalty phase. We first review his contention that the trial court erred in admitting the autopsy photographs because they were cumulative, misleading and inflammatory, and their prejudicial effect substantially outweighed their probative value. In overruling defendant's objection, the court stated: These scalp wounds are absolutely very important that the jury see. And they are not the kind of autopsy pictures  they're bad, I'll say that, all autopsy pictures are bad, but they're not the blood and guts type of thing that you sometimes see in autopsy pictures. And I think the prejudicial effect is far, far, far, and I can't stress it enough, outweighed by the probative value of these scalp wounds. Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting exhibits Nos. 13 and 14 in violation of his right to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. The thrust of his argument is that the photos were not relevant to the penalty determination, were cumulative to the testimony of Dr. Holloway (the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsies on the Bocanegras), and seriously misled the jury as to defendant's culpability in the Bocanegra murders. In sum, the sole purpose of allowing the photographs, defendant asserts, was to improperly shock and horrify the jury. Defendant points to the prosecutor's explanation to the jury as to why she believed the autopsy photographs were important evidence and asserts her comment actually exploited the prejudicial effect of the evidence: You will have the pictures available to you. Look at the scalp wounds. You make the decision. But whatever, [Mrs. Bocanegra] would not have been killed but for the help of Teddy Brian Sanchez, and he is just as guilty of the murder as Joey Bocanegra. Defendant claims that because the probative value of the photographs was clearly outweighed by their prejudicial effect, their admission violated his constitutional rights. The decision whether to admit photographs is within the trial court's discretion and will not be disturbed unless their prejudicial effect substantially outweighs their probative value. (See People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 199 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781] [hereafter Hardy ] [admission of photos at penalty phase within trial court discretion unless prejudicial effect outweighs probative value]; Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 596 [same].) We have examined exhibits Nos. 13 and 14 and have determined they are not so horrific or shocking that we can conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting them. ( Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 199.) The jury was familiar with the facts of the crime, and the photographs had substantial probative value in demonstrating defendant's culpability as an aider and abettor, and as corroborative of Hernandez's testimony implicating defendant in the crimes. Moreover, the probative value of the photographs was not diminished simply because the scalp wounds alone were not fatal to the victims. The photographs corroborated the testimonial evidence and were relevant to a determination of the appropriateness of the death penalty. ( People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 914 [8 Cal. Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712], fn. omitted, citing People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330], and People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 182 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857] [Defendant's intent to kill or lack thereof was one of the circumstances of the crime.].) Defendant's claim that there was no dispute as to the circumstances of the murders is not supported by the facts. Defense counsel Frank argued at the penalty phase that defendant should be spared the death penalty if the jury had a lingering doubt about the extent of defendant's participation in the Bocanegra killings. Nor is defendant assisted by People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843, 856-857 [3 Cal. Rptr. 665, 350 P.2d 705], in which we held that the trial court's admission of a photograph showing the victim's face as she was dying, and of a tape recording of her last words as she lay on a hospital table in extreme pain, was prejudicial because it served primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors. ( Id., at p. 857). Here, by contrast, the autopsy photographs depicting the Bocanegras' scalp wounds were clearly probative of (i) the manner in which the victims were wounded, (ii) defendant's culpability as an aider and abettor, (iii) the malice and aggravation of the crime, and (iv) the appropriate ultimate penalty. ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 247 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669]; cf. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 199-200.) Because we find no error in admitting the autopsy photographs, we need not address defendant's claims that admission of other photographs during the penalty phase (exhibits Nos. 9, 18, 19 & 25, depicting the wounds on the Bocanegras and Tatman) did not render harmless the prejudicial effect of the autopsy photos. Nor do we address defendant's related argument that, assuming we conclude the admission of these photographs undercut the prejudice resulting from the admission of the autopsy photographs, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to their admission. Neither argument is persuasive in light of our conclusion that the court did not err in admitting the autopsy photographs at the penalty phase. [7]