Opinion ID: 2116820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violations of code of professional responsibility.

Text: A. On this appeal, attorney Morris admits that his advertisement in the yellow pages of the Des Moines telephone book, which listed a total of nine areas of law comprising his practice, was not in compliance with DR 2-105(A)(2). This disciplinary rule provides that an attorney who limits his practice to certain areas of law may not list more than three such areas in an advertisement or communication allowed by the rules. See DR 2-101(B). Additionally, at the hearing before the commission, Morris admitted that he had not completed annually at least ten hours of accredited continuing legal education in immigration law, which is required before an attorney may list in an advertisement an area of limited practice of law. See DR 2-105(A)(4)(b). Our review of the advertisement also reveals that it does not comply with DR 2-105(A)(3) (listing of areas of law practice must be preceded by words practice limited to ... or practicing primarily in ...) and DR 2-105(B) (if advertisement uses term general practice, no reference to limited areas of practice is permitted). Morris also admits that his conduct in representing Craig violated DR 6-101(A)(1), which prohibits a lawyer from handling a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it. He also admits that his conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(2), which prohibits a lawyer from handling a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances. Based upon our de novo review of the record, we agree with the committee that Morris also violated EC 6-1 and EC 6-4, which contain essentially the same proscriptions as the above disciplinary rules. Due to Morris' failure to satisfactorily complete Craig's application for employment certification, we conclude that Morris also violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer). Furthermore, despite Morris' contentions that he did not engage in any intentional misconduct, we agree with the committee that Morris' conduct in representing Craig violated DR 7-101(A), which provides, among other things, that a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means. This is because we have repeatedly held that the neglect of a client's matters may constitute a violation of DR 7-101(A) without a showing of a specific intent to injure the client; instead, we have construed the term intentionally in DR 7-101(A) to mean a conscious disregard of the responsibilities assumed on behalf of a client. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Gill, 479 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Iowa 1991); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Gardalen, 414 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1987). We believe the record before us clearly demonstrates that Morris consciously disregarded the responsibilities he had assumed on behalf of Craig. The series of delays which occurred in the processing of Craig's application for employment certification, which extended over a period of months, was occasioned in large part by Morris' failure to complete certain aspects of the application. Indeed, Morris failed to complete the application despite repeated notices from Job Service that the application remained incomplete. Finally, our review of the record reveals that Morris violated DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Although an alien such as Craig has no right to work in this country merely because an application for employment certification is pending, Morris nevertheless assisted Craig in obtaining employment with Joseph's before his initial attempt to file the application with Job Service, and he told Craig that she could continue to work even after her arrest. Furthermore, after the committee initially contacted Morris, he represented in a letter to the committee that Craig had in fact received certification for alien employment, a statement he later conceded to be untrue. See EC 1-4. B. Although Morris admits that he violated DR 2-105(A)(2), DR 2-105(A)(4)(b), DR 6-101(A)(1) and DR 6-101(A)(2), he nevertheless asserts that the committee's recommendation that his license be suspended for eighteen months is unwarranted. Rather, he argues that he should only be reprimanded for his conduct. We believe a suspension is appropriate here. We have on several previous occasions suspended attorneys' licenses to practice law where those attorneys neglected the affairs of their clients. The suspensions have ranged from three to six months. See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Horn, 480 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1992) (attorney's delay in pursuing client's suit and falsely representing status of case to client warranted six month suspension); Gill, 479 N.W.2d at 307 (neglect of clients' cases and failure to notify clients of developments warranted three month suspension); Conzett, 476 N.W.2d at 46 (inaction in pursuing claim and failure to communicate with client warranted four month suspension); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Wenger, 454 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 1990) (neglect of legal matters and failure to respond to committee warranted three month suspension). See generally Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Havercamp, 442 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1989) (six month suspension); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Haney, 435 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1989) (three month suspension); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Minette, 424 N.W.2d 459 (Iowa 1988) (three month suspension); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Oleson, 422 N.W.2d 176 (Iowa 1988) (six month suspension). [1] In order to maintain consistency with our prior decisions, we conclude that Morris' violations require more than a reprimand. More specifically, we conclude that suspension is the more appropriate sanction if we are to further the goals of the Code of Professional Responsibility: to maintain public confidence in the legal profession as well as to provide a policing mechanism for poor lawyering. See Gill, 479 N.W.2d at 306. C. We have considered the other contentions made by Morris and find them without merit or unnecessary to discuss. III. Disposition. Based upon the foregoing authorities and the record in this case, we conclude that suspension of Morris' license to practice law is the more appropriate sanction for his violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, we do not agree with the commission's recommendation that Morris' violations warrant an eighteen-month suspension. Although Morris was suspended in a previous unrelated incident and violated several ethical considerations and disciplinary rules in the present case, we do not believe that his conduct was so egregious that it requires such a lengthy suspension. Accordingly, we suspend Morris' license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for six months from the date of this opinion. See Iowa Sup.Ct.R. 118.12. Costs should be taxed to Morris pursuant to Iowa supreme court rule 118.22. LICENSE SUSPENDED.