Opinion ID: 391067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Extrinsic Acts: The Testimony of Hayla Gay Carr.

Text: 16 Prior to trial, Guerrero moved in limine to exclude the whole of the testimony subsequently given by government witnesses Hayla Gay Carr, Lorraine Smith, and Gwen Durrenberger on the ground that it was extraneous to the offenses charged in the indictment, and therefore inadmissible. That motion was denied. 17 On appeal, Guerrero contends that the trial court erred in denying that motion with regard to the testimony of Hayla Carr, and, in addition, challenges the admission of particular portions of her testimony as hearsay and as unduly prejudicial. 18 We agree with both contentions and find that prejudicial error was thereby occasioned. 19 Hayla Carr testified that she had heard from her brother, her cousin, and various friends that pills were obtainable from Dr. Guerrero and that they had obtained pills from him. She noticed five or six young people in Guerrero's waiting room, dressed in blue jeans and T-shirts. Some of these were school acquaintances whom she knew to be drug users. Carr filled out a detailed medical history form and had her weight and blood pressure measured. She complained to Dr. Guerrero of a chronic backache and nervousness. Guerrero talked to her about her personal life, including the fact that she had been separated from her husband for some time. He told her she was underweight. He gave her some sample tranquilizers and a prescription for Percodan (a painkiller) which she filled and shared with her brother and his roommate. (There is no intimation that Dr. Guerrero should have known of this sharing subsequent to his giving Carr the prescription.) 20 In asserting error in the trial court's denial of his motion in limine with regard to Carr, Guerrero contends that Carr's testimony constituted inadmissible evidence of crimes, wrongs, or acts extrinsic to the offenses charged in the indictment against him. See Fed.R.Ev. 404(b). 4 21 In United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979), this court rather exhaustively discussed the prerequisites to the admissibility of extrinsic act evidence under Rule 404(b). The rule calls for a two step test: (1) The extrinsic act evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character, and (2) the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger it presents of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 911. See Fed.R.Ev. 403. 5 22 To be relevant under the first step of the Beechum test, the evidence sought to be admitted must tend to make the existence of some fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action either more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 911. See Fed.R.Ev. 401. Where that evidence involves an extrinsic act, its relevancy under Beechum is a function of the degree of similarity between the extrinsic act and the offenses charged. United States v. Beechum, supra. This means more than the existence of a common characteristic. For the purposes of the Beechum test, the common characteristic must be the significant one for the purpose of the inquiry at hand. Id. Thus, where the issue is the defendant's intent to commit the offenses charged, the relevancy of the extrinsic act evidence derives from his having had the same state of mind in the commission of both the extrinsic act and the charged offenses. Id. See also id. at 911 n. 15. 23 Obviously, as this court noted in Beechum, extrinsic act evidence can be relevant only if the act was in fact committed and only if the defendant in fact committed it. Id. at 912. Thus, as a predicate to the admission of such evidence, the government must show that the defendant did, in fact, commit the extrinsic act. Id. at 913. See Fed.R.Ev. 104(b). 6 The standard of proof in this instance is relatively low: this preliminary fact can be decided against the proponent of the evidence only where the jury could not reasonably find the preliminary fact to exist. United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 913, quoting 21 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5054, at 269 (1977). 24 Once it is determined that the extrinsic act required the same intent as the offenses charged, and that the jury could find that the defendant committed the extrinsic act, the second step of the Beechum test is reached: the balancing of the probative value of the extrinsic act evidence against its potential for undue prejudice. United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 913. This determination lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, id. at 915, and calls for a commonsense assessment of all the circumstances surrounding the extrinsic offense, id. at 914, including prosecutorial need, id. at 914, 915, the overall similarity of the extrinsic act and the charged offenses, id. at 915, and the temporal proximity of the two, id. 25 Applying these standards to the case at hand, we conclude that the testimony of Hayla Carr was improperly admitted. Although the government does not directly address this portion of Guerrero's argument in its brief, it is clear from oral argument that Carr's testimony like the other extrinsic act evidence presented in this case was presented as relevant to Guerrero's intent in unlawfully dispensing controlled substances to Robert Burger as charged in the indictment. The problem with this approach is readily apparent. As Beechum makes clear, the relevancy of such evidence pivots squarely upon the existence of one crucial element of similarity: 26 Where the issue addressed is the defendant's intent to commit the offense charged, the relevancy of the extrinsic offense derives from the defendant's indulging himself in the same state of mind in the perpetration of both the extrinsic and charged offenses. The reasoning is that because the defendant had unlawful intent in the extrinsic offense, it is less likely that he had lawful intent in the present offense. 27 United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 911 (italics added) (footnote omitted). 28 In the case at hand, that crucial point of concurrence between the extrinsic act and the charged offenses exists only if Dr. Guerrero unlawfully dispensed controlled substances to Hayla Carr outside the usual course of professional practice for other than legitimate medical reasons. Thus, absent some evidence that Dr. Guerrero acted with unlawful intent in prescribing to Hayla Carr, it cannot be said that Carr's testimony is in any way relevant to the question of his intent in prescribing to Robert Burger. We find no such evidence in the present case. 29 Carr's testimony shows only that an underweight young woman with low blood pressure, complaining of stress, nervousness, and a chronic backache, received a painkiller and a tranquilizer from a duly licensed physician who was acting on the basis of a detailed medical history. There is nothing to indicate that the drugs prescribed were an inappropriate medical response to Carr's complaints or that the drugs were dispensed in an unusual amount or frequency. There is nothing to indicate that Dr. Guerrero was, or should have been, aware of Carr's admitted propensity to abuse such drugs. There is nothing, in short, that would allow the jury to infer that Guerrero acted with unlawful intent in prescribing to Carr. See United States v. Jones, 570 F.2d 765, 768 (8th Cir.1978). See generally United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179, 184-86 (5th Cir.1977) (dicta). Thus, we conclude that the extrinsic act evidence elicited from Hayla Carr lacks substantial relevancy with regard to the offenses charged in the indictment. 7 30 Even if relevant to some material issue of intent, motive, plan, or scheme, Carr's testimony could not survive application of the second step of the Beechum test. At best, its probative value with regard to any or all of those issues is minimal. That minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury presented by Carr's statements concerning the attire of the five or six young people in Guerrero's waiting room, her knowledge of their use of drugs, the hearsay statements made to her by her brother, her cousin, and others, and her dubious motives in seeking treatment from Dr. Guerrero. From those statements, none of which fairly implies unlawful intent on the part of Dr. Guerrero, the jury could have been led to the speculative conclusion that Guerrero acted unlawfully in prescribing to Carr, and thus was less likely to have acted lawfully in prescribing to Burger. The chain of logical inference leading to that conclusion is far too attenuated in probative force to counterbalance the potential prejudicial impact of those statements, see United States v. Jones, supra, 570 F.2d at 768-69, particularly where, as here, the jury received no instruction on the limited use to which extrinsic act evidence may be put in proving unlawful intent, see United States v. Beechum, supra, 582 F.2d at 917 & n. 23. 31 In addition, among the most damaging statements made by Carr were those concerning out-of-court declarations made to her by her brother and her cousin. Carr testified without objection that she had heard about Dr. Guerrero from her brother and various friends, and that she went to him in order to obtain pills Percodan and tranquilizers which she shared with her brother and his roommate. Following that testimony, counsel for the government began a question which presupposed that Carr's brother and friend had in fact obtained pills from Dr. Guerrero. 8 Dr. Guerrero's objection to the question was sustained. Carr then testified in response to direct examination that she knew her brother had obtained pills from Dr. Guerrero because she saw the prescriptions, because her brother told her so, and because she saw the filled prescriptions in bottles. She further testified that she knew her cousin had obtained pills from Dr. Guerrero because he had told her so. Both statements were objected to as hearsay. Carr also testified that her brother shared his pills with her and from her school days she recognized patients in the waiting room as drug users. 32 The government contends that the challenged statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the extrajudicial declarations, and thus were not hearsay at all. See Fed.R.Ev. 801(c). 9 The significance of these extrajudicial assertions, the government argues, lies not in their truth or falsity, but in the mere fact that they were made: they reveal Carr's state of mind her belief that she could obtain controlled substances from the doctor when she went to Guerrero's office. The context in which these statements were made, however, belies the government's characterization. Carr had already testified without objection that she went to Guerrero's office to obtain pills because she had heard about Guerrero from her brother and various friends. As the record shows (see note 8), she related the challenged out-of-court declarations in response to direct questions from government counsel concerning her knowledge of whether pills were actually dispensed by Dr. Guerrero to her brother and cousin. The questions eliciting this testimony were not designed to show merely that a conversation concerning Dr. Guerrero had taken place, or that Carr believed she could obtain controlled substances from Dr. Guerrero. They were designed to lay the necessary predicate for Carr's testimony that her brother had shared his pills with her. Even if this testimony had been elicited in order to show its effect on Carr's state of mind, we find it significant to note that Carr's mental state was not relevant to any issue in this case. See e. g., United States v. Rubin, 591 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Bobo, 586 F.2d 355, 371-72 (5th Cir.1978); United States v. Carter, 491 F.2d 625, 628-29 (5th Cir.1974). See also 4 Weinstein's Evidence P 801(c)(01), at p. 801-70 (1979). The admission of this hearsay evidence alone is sufficient grounds for reversal. 33 For the reasons delineated above, we conclude that the testimony of Hayla Carr was improperly admitted in violation of Fed.R.Ev. 404(b) and the standards set out in United States v. Beechum, supra. In view of the closeness of the evidence in this case, we cannot hold that error harmless. Accordingly, we reverse Dr. Guerrero's conviction as to all counts. 34