Opinion ID: 1956270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: More constitutional standing

Text: After Stanley v. Illinois , the United States Supreme Court continued to develop the constitutional recognition of biological fathers. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (statute allowing adoption of child born out of wedlock not violative of Due Process Clause where unwed father never legitimated the child and did not seek visitation rights until after adoption petition filed); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) (statute giving right to unmarried mother, but not to unmarried father, to block adoption by withholding consent, violated Equal Protection Clause); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) (unwed father not entitled to notice of child's adoption proceedings where father had not made prompt effort to establish a relationship with child). Recently, in Adoption of K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d 558, 562 (N.D.1993), we recognized the fundamental nature of a parent's rights to nurture and rear his or her child: In examining the private interests at stake, the Lassiter [ v. Dept. of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981)] Court underscored the fundamental nature of a parent's rights to nurture and rear his or her child: This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to `the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children' is an important interest that `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 [(1972)]. Lassiter, supra, 452 U.S. at 27, 101 S.Ct. at 2159-2160 [1981]. Later, Justice Brennan summarized the direction of the decisions: [A]lthough an unwed father's biological link to his child does not, in and of itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his relationship with that child, such a link combined with a substantial parent-child relationship will do so. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by `com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' ... his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. At that point it may be said that he `act[s] as a father toward his children.' Lehr v. Robertson, supra, [463 U.S.], at 261 [103 S.Ct., at 2993], quoting Caban v. Mohammed, supra [441 U.S.], at 392, 389 [99 S.Ct., at 1768, 1766 n. 7.] n. 7. This commitment is why Mr. Stanley and Mr. Caban won; why Mr. Quilloin and Mr. Lehr lost; and why Michael H. should prevail today. Michael H. is almost certainly Victoria D.'s natural father, has lived with her as her father, has contributed to her support, and has from the beginning sought to strengthen and maintain his relationship with her. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142-43, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2352, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989) (Justice Brennan, dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). From the beginning in this case, by coming forward soon after the birth of Anna, Barry has demonstrated his commitment to his child and to participating in her parenting.