Opinion ID: 2175676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: III: Severance

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to sever because the admission of the other crimes evidence against Bullock would not have been admissible against him in a separate trial and therefore prejudiced him. When two or more persons are charged with jointly committing a criminal offense, [however,] a strong presumption arises that they will be tried together. Tillman v. United States, 519 A.2d 166, 169 (D.C.1986). Hence, this court will reverse a denial of a severance motion only upon a clear showing that the broad discretion accorded the trial court in this regard has been abused. To demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their severance motions, appellants must show not simply that they were prejudiced, but that they suffered `manifest prejudice' from the joinder of the case. Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 489 (D.C.1986) (citations omitted). An appellant does not suffer such prejudice merely because a significant portion of the government's evidence admitted at trial is applicable only to his codefendants. This is so even though some of the evidence concerns prior criminal offenses or bad acts relating only to other codefendants. Id. at 490 (citations omitted). The inquiry, therefore, is only whether the evidence presented is so complex or confusing that the jury would be unable to ... make individual determinations about the guilt or innocence of each defendant. Id. Johnson has not made such a showing of manifest prejudice. His argument fails because the drug debt evidence admitted would have been equally admissible against Johnson in a separate trial, and the trial court did not rule to the contrary. Johnson had a substantial connection with the prior drug transaction and efforts to collect the debt since the evidence showed he was the distributor to Smith; thus, the evidence was relevant and probative of Johnson's motive to shoot Smith. Even if some of the evidence would not have been admissible against Johnson, we have held that [s]everance is not required merely because evidence would be admissible against one defendant and not the other or because evidence against one defendant is more damaging than the evidence against the other. Cunningham v. United States, 408 A.2d 1240, 1243 (D.C.1979); accord, Payne, supra, 516 A.2d at 490-92; Christian v. United States, 394 A.2d 1, 20 (D.C.1978); United States v. Mack, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 166, 466 F.2d 333, 337 (1972) (severance unwarranted where evidence admissible against both principal and aider and abettor of murder). There was simply no evidence that the jury could not make individual determinations about the guilt or innocence of each individual appellant. Moreover, at no time did Johnson request that the court give a limiting instruction permitting the jury to consider the drug evidence only against Bullock. We can find no abuse of the trial court's broad discretion in making severance determinations. Affirmed.