Opinion ID: 613237
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prejudice: Materiality of Withheld Information

Text: Because the state courts did not address the merits of the Brady claim, we are not constrained by AEDPA deference; like the district court below, we undertake de novo review of materiality and prejudice. See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1784, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009). Again, in order to make out a Brady violation, Jalowiec must show that (1) evidence favorable to the defense, (2) was suppressed by the government, and (3) the defense was prejudiced. In determining whether withheld information was material and therefore prejudicial, a reviewing court considers it in light of the evidence available for trial that supports the petitioner's conviction. Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 502 (6th Cir.2008). [E]vidence is `material' within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1783. [A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Favorable evidence is material if it could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1783 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555). If materiality of the suppressed evidence is established, making out a Brady violation, harmless-error inquiry does not apply. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. In reviewing for materiality, we consider the effect of the suppressed evidence collectively, rather than item by item. Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1785 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555). Nonetheless, we begin, like the district court, by considering each item asserted in Claim 20 individually.
Danny Smith, one of the defendants (along with Raymond Smith) against whom Ronald Lally had been set to testify in connection with drug-trafficking charges just before he was killed, gave a recorded statement to police during custodial interrogation on January 7, 1995. Danny Smith told Elyria Police Detective Alan Leiby, investigating the Lally murder, that he never really suspected of [sic] Stan [Jalowiec] would do something like that until everything started coming in and people start [sic] bringing up his name. This statement was not disclosed to Jalowiec prior to or at the time of his trial. Although Danny Smith, as a suspected co-conspirator, was unavailable to testify at Jalowiec's trial, Jalowiec argues the statement should have been disclosed as Brady material because it tended to exonerate him, refuting the prosecution's theory that he was involved in a suspected conspiracy to kill Lally. The district court summarily held that Danny Smith's January 7, 1995 statement was material because, had it been disclosed prior to trial or at trial, the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . However, the court ultimately concluded that this  Brady violation, viewed in light of all the evidence implicating Jalowiec, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at . On appeal, Jalowiec correctly contends the district court's reasoning is self-contradictory. He contends the district court, having once found that the statement was material, and its nondisclosure a  Brady violation, was not at liberty to engage in harmless-error review to deny habeas relief. Indeed, the district court expressly recognized earlier in its opinion that once a Brady violation is found, there is no need for further harmless-error review[;] ... [a] Brady violation is never harmless. Id. at  (citations omitted). The Warden does not deny the facial inconsistency. However, in view of the court's unambiguous denial of habeas relief, the Warden contends the opinion should be construed as concluding that Danny Smith's statement was potentially exculpatory and should have been disclosed per Brady, but was not, ultimately, material. The Warden's position finds support not only in a common-sense reading of the opinion as a whole, but also in the Supreme Court's recognition that not every violation of [the prosecution's duty of disclosure] necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281, 119 S.Ct. 1936. As the Strickler Court further observed: [T]he term  Brady violation is sometimes used to refer to any breach of the broad obligation to disclose exculpatory evidencethat is, to any suppression of so-called  Brady materialalthough, strictly speaking, there is never a real  Brady violation unless the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict. Id. Consistent with this observation, we read the district court's opinion, despite its misleading language, as concluding that the prosecution breached its duty of disclosure under Brady, but that the Danny Smith statement was not so material that its timely disclosure to the defense would have given rise to a reasonable probability of a different verdict. This is a conclusion that we also reach de novo. We find no error in the district court's determination that the January 7, 1995 statement should have been disclosed. Yet, the statement is arguably as incriminating as it is exculpatory. Jalowiec has not demonstratedeven assuming he could have found a way of introducing Danny Smith's hearsay opinion about a friend's characterthat he could have made such effective use of it as would put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Nor has he explained how the statement might have led to other admissible exculpatory evidence. The statement is therefore not material for Brady purposes, and its nondisclosure was not so prejudicial as to amount to a  Brady violation. In addition to the January 7, 1995 statement, the prosecution withheld recorded conversations between Danny Smith and prosecution witness Carl Hartman in which Danny attempted to bribe Hartman and influence him as a witness. Jalowiec contends that Danny's statements could have been used to cross-examine Hartman and to undermine the prosecution's theory that Jalowiec conspired to kill Lally by tending to show Danny Smith's greater involvement and culpability. The district court held this evidence was neither exculpatory nor material. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655 at . On appeal, Jalowiec has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in either respect. Jalowiec has not demonstrated how he could have effectively used such evidence of Danny Smith's efforts to influence Hartman to undermine confidence in the jury's assessment of the evidence against him.
Terry Hopkins was staying in an apartment with Danny Smith at the time of the Lally murder. He was out drinking with Danny Smith and others in the early morning hours on the day of the murder, January 19, 1994. He gave inconsistent recorded statements to officers on January 4 and 6, 1995, concerning conversations he had with Danny Smith, Raymond Smith and Jalowiec in the hours after the murder. Although Hopkins first stated that Jalowiec admitted shooting Lally, he later stated that Jalowiec identified Raymond Smith as the shooter. The district court concluded that these statements should have been provided to Jalowiec, but that they were not material because Hopkins also made various inconsistent statements at trial and was subject to effective cross-examination. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . We find no error in the district court's assessment. On cross-examination, Hopkins readily admitted that he gave multiple statements to the police. He acknowledged that he was not very cooperative on one occasion because he didn't want to get involved. He did not deny that he subsequently gave a revised statement. Hopkins seemed unable to remember when he gave specific statements to the police. He admitted he had drunk heavily the night Lally was killed and was pretty drunk when he heard the conversations he reported on. Thus, it is apparent that even without the benefit of specific inconsistent statements from undisclosed police interviews, Jalowiec's counsel managed to effectively cross-examine Hopkins, highlighting weaknesses in his testimony. Although we agree with the district court's determination that Hopkins' prior inconsistent statements should have been disclosed, Jalowiec has not demonstrated that his efforts to impeach Hopkins would have been so significantly aided by the statements as to create a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The nondisclosure of these statements was therefore not material under Brady.
Lynne Altpater was an acquaintance of Jalowiec and Danny Smith who testified for the prosecution in Jalowiec's trial. She testified that she was working at a doctor's office in December 1993 when Danny Smith approached her and asked if she could get him some poison to take care of a person who could cause him to be in a lot of trouble. She had previously given recorded statements to the police on January 6, 1995 and January 19, 1995statements that were not disclosed to the defense. Her testimony was consistent with her prior statement of January 19, but inconsistent with her January 6 statement, when she told Detective Leiby that Danny Smith wanted the poison to kill some cats that had crawled on his car at work. Although Jalowiec could have used the January 6 version as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach Altpater, the district court concluded that the statement was not material for Brady purposes. The court reasoned that Altpater's testimony was not that damaging to Jalowiec, considering (a) there was no evidence that he was privy to the conversation between Altpater and Danny, and (b) poison was not used to kill Lally. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . We find no error in this assessment. Altpater's testimony was useful to the prosecution to show that Danny Smith, one of the persons Jalowiec was suspected of conspiring with, had explored at least one other way of preventing Lally from testifying against him and his father on the then pending drug-trafficking charges. Otherwise, it had no tendency to incriminate Jalowiec. Further, even if Jalowiec could have used the January 6 statement to attack Altpater's credibility, the prosecution could have used the January 19 statement to rehabilitate her by showing that Altpater had gradually become more cooperative and forthcoming. Considering the broader context, the January 6, 1995 statement was not so material as to warrant a finding that its disclosure to the defense would have made a difference. Jalowiec asserts a second Brady violation in relation to witness Altpater. At Danny Smith's trial, subsequent to Jalowiec's, prosecution witness Lynne Altpater testified that Detective Leiby had offered her husband, Richard Altpater, assistance with drug charges pending against him in exchange for his cooperation with the prosecution of Danny Smith. That is, according to a statement recorded by attorney Michael Duff on October 23, 1995, Richard Altpater said Detective Leiby asked him to corroborate information obtained from other witnesses to the effect that Danny Smith had offered him, Richard Altpater, money to kill a person or take him out of town. Richard Altpater purportedly told Leiby he would cooperate, even though, in truth, Danny Smith had not offered him money, but had only asked if he knew anyone who could hurt someone for money. In his recorded statement, Richard Altpater went on to explain that he used to whoop people's ass for money, but that he's getting too old for that. As it turned out, Richard Altpater was not called to testify and Leiby did not provide assistance with Richard Altpater's pending charges. Nonetheless, Jalowiec argues that the prosecution should have disclosed evidence of Leiby's offer to induce Richard's cooperation for his use in impeaching Lynne Altpater's testimony in his trial. The district court held that information relating to Leiby's offer should have been disclosed to Jalowiec, but that the nondisclosure did not result in cognizable prejudice. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at -73. Although the district court carelessly referred to the nondisclosure of the information as a  Brady violation, Jalowiec has not otherwise demonstrated error by the district court. Jalowiec has failed to identify evidence that Lynne Altpater's testimony in his case was actually induced or influenced by any promise or offer of assistance with her husband's charges. Even though she actively participated in the statement recorded on October 23, 1995, the statement includes no suggestion that she was influenced by Leiby's offer to her husband. Moreover, as indicated above, Lynne Altpater's testimony in Jalowiec's trial about Danny Smith's request for poisonirrespective of whether he couched his request in terms of a need to kill a cat or a personwas of marginal relevance in establishing Jalowiec's guilt. There is no reasonable basis to conclude that the disclosure of Leiby's offer would have affected the verdict.
Joann Fike was the owner of the Chrysler LeBaron that Jalowiec borrowed on the night of Lally's murder. She testified for the prosecution that her nephew Brian Howington let Jalowiec borrow the car, and that it was covered with ice and had blood on it when Jalowiec and Raymond Smith returned it several hours later. After the LeBaron was impounded in connection with the murder investigation, Detective Leiby helped Joann Fike find another car, gave her $200 for a set of four tires, and helped her obtain the car's return. Jalowiec contends Leiby's help represents evidence that he induced Fike's cooperation, evidence that should have been disclosed. The district court acknowledged that the help Leiby gave may or may not have been usual protocol, but concluded that this information should have been disclosed to Jalowiec. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . Nonetheless, the district court concluded the error was harmless. Id. Jalowiec argues that any inducement given to Fike was important because she was a key witness who placed Jalowiec in her car on the night of the homicide. The Warden concedes that the economic consideration Fike received was relevant to her credibility, but argues that the evidence would not have altered the outcome of the trial if it had been given to the defense. We agree. Fike's testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. There is no good reason to question her credibility. Even though the evidence of help Fike received should have been disclosed, Jalowiec has presented no reason to believe the information could have been used to so impeach Fike as to call the fairness of the trial and its outcome into question. We also find no error in the district court's determination that evidence that Fike was granted transactional immunity in exchange for her cooperation with the investigation of Lally's death was not material for purposes of Brady. Again, the grant of immunity should have been disclosed, but inasmuch as Fike did not reveal any self-incriminating information, the impeachment value of the immunity agreement was minimal. See Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 56 (3d Cir.2002) (recognizing that the impeachment value of the immunity agreement is inextricably tied to the self-incriminating evidence that was provided after the immunity agreement was executed.).
Jalowiec contends the prosecution withheld evidence that Sharon Hopkins's testimony was induced by Detective Leiby's having obtained a signature bond for her boyfriend after he turned himself in on misdemeanor warrants. The district court concluded that this information was not material because the charges were minor and the boyfriend would have more than likely obtained a bond without Leiby's help. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . Sharon Hopkins's testimony was important to the prosecution. She corroborated Michael Smith's description of the transfer of passengers (Raymond and Michael Smith) from Danny Smith's car to Fike's LeBaron (containing Jalowiec and Lally) in the middle of the night, a transfer that linked Howington's and Fike's testimony about the LeBaron and linked Jalowiec to Lally throughout the night. Although the prosecution improperly withheld the information that Leiby assisted Hopkins's boyfriend, we affirm the district court's assessment that the information would not have undermined confidence in the outcome if it had been made available to Jalowiec. Considering that the benefit accrued to a boyfriend and not Sharon Hopkins herself, that minor charges were involved, and that Jalowiec has not disputed that the boyfriend might well have received the bond regardless of Leiby's intercession, Jalowiec has not shown that the information was material under Brady.
Michael Smith was the prosecution's star witness. Jalowiec contends that the prosecution withheld: evidence that Michael called Detective Leiby in 1993 or 1994 and tried to take the blame for the drug charges then pending against Danny Smith and implied that he might do something when Leiby rejected his story; evidence that Michael called Leiby in February 1996 and told him that he knew nothing about a conspiracy between Danny and Raymond Smith relating to Lally; and comments in police files reflecting belief that Michael had a violent nature. Jalowiec also contends the prosecution withheld information suggesting a connection between Michael's testimony against Jalowiec and lenient sentencing treatment Michael received on an unrelated offense. The district court discounted the supposedly withheld information that Michael Smith had been granted favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony at Jalowiec's trial. See Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at . The court noted that on November 22, 1994long before Jalowiec's trialMichael was given shock probation on a five-to-fifteen-year prison sentence for a crime unrelated to the events of Jalowiec's case. Then, after Michael testified, he received an early discharge from probation. Id. The district court correctly found there was no evidence, only speculation, linking the two. Further, as the district court determined, id. at , Michael Smith's telephonic denial of knowledge of any conspiracy between his brother and father was completely consistent with his trial testimony, in which he expressed shock and surprise at what was happening during the early morning hours of January 19, 1994. The statement thus had little if any impeachment value and was not otherwise exculpatory of Jalowiec. Similarly, the cited comments about Michael's suspected violent nature were unsubstantiated and, even if admissible, bore little if any exculpatory or impeachment significance. They can hardly be considered material under Brady.
Jalowiec contends that Tammy Green, Danny Smith's girlfriend, was given transactional immunity for her grand jury testimony and that this fact was not disclosed to the defense. The district court correctly concluded that, even if Tammy Green was given immunity for her grand jury testimony, the prosecution was under no obligation to disclose it because she did not testify at Jalowiec's trial. Jalowiec, 2008 WL 312655, at  (citing United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1372 (6th Cir.1994) (observing that because the prosecution did not call the agreement's beneficiary as a witness at trial, there was no one to impeach.)). Further, Jalowiec maintains that Green's grand jury testimony was contrary to Sharon Hopkins's trial testimony and that he could have used it to impeach Hopkins if it had been disclosed to him. The district court reasoned that the prosecution had no duty to disclose the grand jury testimony, despite its potential impeachment value, because there is no showing that Jalowiec could not have obtained Green's story from her directly and called her as a witness. Id. (citing Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601 (6th Cir.2000) (holding there was no Brady violation where the defendant should have known of the information and it was available from another source)). See also Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 460 (6th Cir.2008) (same). On appeal, Jalowiec argues the district court's reasoning is flawed. He contends he had no reason to know Green's version of the events on January 19, 1994 was different than Sharon Hopkins's and Michael Smith's. Yet, Green's presence among those involved in the events of January 19 was attested to by others. Her recollection of the events should have been readily discoverable with minimal investigation by defense counsel. Under such circumstances, the Brady rule does not assist a defendant who is aware of essential facts that would allow him to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence at issue, such as when the evidence in question would have been discoverable with minimal investigation by [defense] counsel. Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 438 (6th Cir.2001); see also Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 236, 243 (6th Cir.2007). Moreover, in her grand jury testimony, Green testified not only that she did not know who Sharon Hopkins was, but also that Michael Smith was not in the car with her and Danny that night. She also stated that she did not see Fike's LeBaron that night. Her version of events before she and Danny and Raymond and Jalowiec parted ways on January 19, read in isolation, would have assisted Jalowiec's defense insofar as it contradicted the testimony of two prosecution witnesses on some background details. Generally, however, Green made clear her unwillingness to get involved. She admitted that she wanted to remain willfully ignorant of Danny's criminal activities. Hence, even if the prosecution ought to have disclosed the substance of her grand jury testimony, it is unlikely that the account of such a reluctant witness would have effectively impeached the testimony of Michael Smith and Sharon Hopkins. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's ruling.
Jalowiec contends that the prosecution withheld significant, credible evidence regarding alternate suspectssuspects who actually had a motive to kill Lally. Jalowiec identifies several trial witnesses, including all three Smiths, Terry Hopkins, and Vernard Berry, who, unlike him, were involved in the drug world. Jalowiec also refers to an undisclosed transcript of a November 29, 1995 interview with a Melissa Arroyo, who told officers that Danny Smith had told her that he, Danny, had killed Lally. Finally, Jalowiec refers to several potential suspects named in various police reports as being close to Danny Smith or having involvement with Lally. These bases for Jalowiec's Brady claim were not asserted in his amended habeas petition, but only in his traverse. It is apparently for this reason that the district court properly declined to address these asserted grounds for relief. See Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that district court did not err in declining to address claim first raised in traverse rather than in habeas petition). Even if we were to find these grounds properly presented, they would be unavailing. Jalowiec's identification of trial witnesses as alternate suspects is based largely on their trial testimony and is not undisclosed Brady evidence at all. Further, the mere fact that these witnesses were allegedly involved in the drug world is insufficient to render them suspects in Lally's murder. According to Melissa Arroyo's statement, Danny Smith told her that he killed somebody in the fall season; that they beat the crap out of him and then um, they tied his feet to the bumper and they drove him up and down the street, and then they ran him over. Danny did not tell her who the person was and she had no idea whether Danny was referring to Lally. Although this statement might be deemed Brady material, Jalowiec has not shown how it could have been used, in view of the other trial evidence, to call the integrity of the verdict into question. The remaining alternate-suspects evidence Jalowiec cites is so vague or peripheral to the facts of the Lally murder that it can hardly be deemed exculpatory, much less material.
Jalowiec contends that the prosecution revealed only after trial that Detective Leiby had arranged for the placement of snitches, including Danny Smith, in his pre-trial cell in a vain attempt to procure admissions. He contends that he made no incriminating statements and that he should have been able to use this information at trial to discredit the prosecution. This theory of relief was not asserted in Jalowiec's petition either, but only in his traverse. It was not addressed by the district court and is not properly before us. See Tyler, 416 F.3d at 504. The claim is patently meritless in any event because Jalowiec has offered no rationale whereby his asserted silence or failure to make an incriminating statement could be deemed exculpatory evidence that the prosecution was obliged to disclose under Brady.