Opinion ID: 1948183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: exclusion of juror testimony

Text: The jury returned their verdict on July 20, 1977. In accordance with traditional procedure, each juror was called by name and asked to remain standing while the verdict was delivered. The court clerk asked whether a verdict had been reached, and the foreman replied that it had. The clerk then stated: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, look upon the accused, you that have been sworn. What say you as to Case Number 12,468, Connecticut versus Bernard Avcollie. Is Bernard Avcollie guilty of the crime of Murder, in violation of Section 53a-54a of the Connecticut General Statutes, or not guilty? The foreman replied [h]e is guilty, and no juror took exception to the verdict. Defense counsel immediately asked that the jury be excused, and the court excused the jury. The court then granted the defendant's motion for acquittal and the jury were discharged. As previously noted, this court set aside the judgment of the trial court, reinstated the verdict, and remanded the case with direction to render judgment that the defendant was guilty and to impose sentence. After the remand, the defendant attempted to bring to the trial court's attention for the first time a claim that the original jury verdict was not unanimous. In support of this claim, the defendant proposed to call juror Edith Cass to testify that her vote was the result of ill health and coercion by her fellow jurors. The trial court refused to hear this testimony, stating in its memorandum of decision that it was limited to the specific direction of the [Supreme Court] mandate as interpreted in the light of the opinion. State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 146 Conn. 556, 561 [153 A.2d 453 (1959)]. In carrying out the mandate the Superior Court may not render a new or different judgment. Mazzotta v. Bornstein, 105 Conn. 242, 244 [135 A. 38 (1926)]. Compliance means that the direction is not deviated from. The trial court cannot adjudicate rights and duties not within the scope of the remand. Nowell v. Nowell, 163 Conn. 116, 121 [302 A.2d 260 (1972)]. The trial court was correct in not going beyond the scope of the remand. Furthermore, the defendant's offer of proof concerns either the personal reasons for Mrs. Cass' vote or the deliberative process itself. In Aillon v. State, 168 Conn. 541, 550, 363 A.2d 49 (1975), we announced a rule concerning juror testimony `which excludes, as immaterial, evidence as to the expressions and arguments of the jurors in their deliberations and evidence as to their own motives, beliefs, mistakes and mental operations generally, in arriving at their verdict.' McCormick, Evidence (2d Ed.) § 68, p. 148. Testimony concerning a juror's illness or the persuasive tactics of fellow jurors is clearly excluded under this rule, and it would have been highly improper to allow testimony of the sort proposed by the defendant. Aillon v. State, supra, 550 n.3. Finally, we note that the defendant failed to move for the jury to be polled, [11] but rather moved to excuse the jury immediately after the verdict was announced. The decision to poll the jury is discretionary with the court; State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 420, 435 A.2d 986 (1980); however, we are reluctant to review a claim that a verdict is not unanimous when trial counsel, who observed the jury when the verdict was delivered, saw no reason to request a poll at that time. There is no error.