Opinion ID: 2518032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Misconduct in Closing Argument

Text: Defendant claims that during closing argument the prosecutor referred to evidence outside the record and improperly argued evidence admitted for a limited purpose. He asserts this misconduct violated various state and federal constitutional provisions. [8]
(5) Witness Michael Hernandez was in custody and testified that he was afraid of defendant. Hernandez stated that before taking the stand he asked if he could change clothes so that defendant would not know where he was incarcerated. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated: [Hernandez] was wearing a tee shirt when he came to court that had the name of the institution that he is in and he asked for another shirt. We didn't have one and he put the shirt on inside out hoping that he would hide the name of where he was. No evidence had been introduced regarding these particular facts. Defendant complains that the prosecutor referred to facts outside the record. While counsel is accorded `great latitude at argument to urge whatever conclusions counsel believes can properly be drawn from the evidence [citation],' counsel may not assume or state facts not in evidence [citation] or mischaracterize the evidence [citation]. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 133-134 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296].) Defendant forfeited his claim by failing to timely object and request an admonition. ( People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 785-786 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956].) Further, any misconduct was harmless. The jury was aware that Hernandez was in custody and feared defendant. Seeing that Hernandez testified with his T-shirt inside out, the jury could reasonably infer that Hernandez sought to hide his location from defendant.
On direct examination, Sergio Zamora said the items grabbed from the glove box by defendant and thrown out of the car were [c]redit cards and I think a watch. Asked to describe the watch, Zamora replied that it was black. The prosecutor showed Zamora a Casio watch of the same model usually worn by Rose. Zamora could not identify the watch as similar because he saw only the wristband of the watch thrown by defendant. [9] On cross-examination, defendant denied throwing a watch out the window, and believed Zamora made up this information with prodding and pumping and suggestive questions. The prosecutor referred to a page from Zamora's statement to Detective Castillo and told defendant: I'm referring to the interview which took place on January 25th at 2:15 a.m. at Bakersfield jail, Mr. Zamora said, he's asked basically what had been thrown out of the car and he says, `and a watch.' And the detective says `Yes?' Does that sound like the detective told [Zamora] what's been thrown out? Defendant answered, No, it does not. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's quotation of the transcript. In closing argument, defense counsel questioned Zamora's reliability about the watch, noting that Zamora testified I think a watch was thrown from the car. He asked the jury to consider Zamora's sobriety at the time of the observations and pointed out that no watch was recovered. In rebuttal, the prosecutor urged that defense counsel's representation of Zamora's testimony was utterly false. She then read to the jury the portion of Zamora's interview with Detective Castillo, which she used in her cross-examination of defendant. Defendant complains the prosecutor committed misconduct by improperly referring to facts not in evidence. He points out that while the transcript of Zamora's interview was used in cross-examination of defendant, Zamora was never questioned about the quoted portion's accuracy. Therefore, no foundation was laid for its admissibility. Respondent concedes that the quoted portion of the transcript was merely the statement of counsel. However, respondent correctly observes that defendant has forfeited his claim by failing to object and request that the jury be admonished. Further, the misconduct was not prejudicial. Defendant claims Zamora's equivocal trial testimony was the only evidence linking defendant to Rose's watch. The argument fails. While Zamora's initial trial statement I think a watch was equivocal, his additional testimony was not. He described the watch as black. He could not say the Casio he was shown in court was similar because he had just seen the bottom, or wristband. While defendant parses Zamora's testimony, the jury, considering all the answers in context, could find he was not equivocal about having seen defendant throw a watch. The prosecutor read from the transcript in an attempt to rebut defendant's claim that officers prompted Zamora. But the transcript exchange added nothing to the essence of Zamora's testimony that he saw defendant discard a watch from the car. Zamora, of course, was subject to cross-examination on this subject. We are satisfied that the prosecutor's reference to this extrajudicial statement was harmless under any standard.
In the third instance of alleged misconduct, defendant contends that the prosecutor made improper use of his prior robbery conviction. The court ruled in limine that the prosecutor's introduction of defendant's prior conviction was admissible for impeachment. Defendant himself made use of the conviction without limitation. In his direct examination, defendant testified that he had been convicted of armed robbery, assaults and possession of narcotics and that he had been to prison. He explained that he had been released shortly before he stole Rose's car. In her closing argument, the prosecutor discussed possible reasons why Rose might have cooperated with defendant: Fred Rose didn't know this defendant. He knew nothing about his background. Didn't know about [defendant's] prior robbery with a gun, and perhaps his decision that he wasn't going to leave any witnesses alive this time. Defense counsel did not object. Instead, defense counsel responded in his closing argument: You have an instruction ... that the prior record of a witness ... has a limited evidentiary value and it has a bearing upon the truthfulness of that witness on the stand. Defense counsel argued that the prosecution has gone just a little bit beyond that and they have said, `Well, what has happened in this particular situation is that [defendant] could not afford, did not want to leave a witness against him,' and that it's his motivation and the cause and the explanation for the death of Fred Rose. In rebuttal, the prosecutor responded: Well, think about it. If you were a young man his age and you had just gotten out of prison for an armed robbery and you had just robbed someone else and kidnapped them, would you want to leave that person alive to identify them so you could go back to prison? The prosecutor stated further, Obviously the way he went to prison the first time someone must have identified him. He is not going to risk that again. Outside the jury's presence, defense counsel argued: I think counsel is now saying what may have been implied yesterday and that is because of [defendant's] prior episode of criminality, that he had a predisposition to commit that criminality. And that somehow would cause him to commit a murder as a consequence of it. Defense counsel urged that the prosecutor's argument is an impermissible use of the prior conviction. And I would ask that the jury be admonished in that regard. The trial court stated, Well, if I understand [the prosecutor's] argument, it assumes a fact not in evidence, but it makes use of a rhetorical device that somebody might have identified him otherwise he would not have been to jail before. And that his motive now having been to jail before is to avoid going to jail by eliminating a witness. The court then sought to confirm the basis of defense counsel's objection, asking, You're taking the position that [the prosecutor's] argument is that the jury should consider the prior conviction as tending to show that the defendant is a bad person who is more likely because of that conviction to offend again? Defense counsel responded, And commit a homicide. The prosecutor replied, That was not the thrust of my argument whatsoever. The trial court suggested the prosecutor clarify her argument and stated: [I]f the People are allowed to argue that the motive is to eliminate a witness to avoid apprehension, then the fact that he was convicted of a felony and in prison once before has got nothing to do with that, and [T]he basic thrust of the argument is that the person doesn't want to be [convicted] and, therefore, has a motive to eliminate a witness. And that stands on its own whether or not there was a prior conviction. The court offered to read again the instruction concerning how [the jury] can use a felony conviction. Defense counsel agreed it would be appropriate for the court to do so. The prosecutor advised the court that she would refer to the instruction in her argument. She asked the number of the particular CALJIC instruction to which the court referred, but the record does not indicate she received an answer before counsel and the trial judge returned to the courtroom. Continuing her argument, the prosecutor told the jury that one of the instructions has to do with defendant's prior conviction. And for what purpose you can consider it. And you are not to consider it merely to show that he is a person predisposed to commit crimes. So the argument that I just gave you has nothing to do with his actual conviction. What I'm arguing to you is that inference[] that I believe common sense tells you why somebody who has been to prison before would not want to go back and would therefore want to eliminate a witness. Defendant did not object. At the close of the prosecutor's rebuttal, the trial court reread CALJIC No. 2.50, which had been modified to address the driveby shooting in Bakersfield, during which items were later thrown from the car by defendant. [10] Defendant did not object to this instruction or request that any other instructions be read. On appeal, defendant claims the prosecutor raised the issue of motive in the context of arguing that the evidence in her case supported a verdict that [defendant] committed the crimes charged. In short, she was arguing that evidence of motive was evidence of identity. Defendant did not object in the trial court on the basis that he advances on appeal. Rather, he confirmed below that he was objecting to the prosecutor's use of his prior conviction as showing a propensity to commit homicide based on a past offense, and asked that the jury be admonished in that regard. The trial court, which impliedly rejected defendant's interpretation of the prosecutor's argument, suggested the prosecutor clarify her argument to eliminate any reference to the prior conviction or imprisonment. Defendant did not object to the trial court's suggested clarification or otherwise renew his argument. He did not request any additional admonition and agreed that the trial court should again instruct the jury regarding the use of a felony conviction. He did not object to the prosecutor's further argument. Nor did he advise the court, as he now claims here, that the applicable jury instruction was CALJIC No. 2.23 [11] rather than CALJIC No. 2.50. For these reasons we conclude defendant has forfeited his objection to the prosecutor's closing argument as finally framed. Defendant asserts that any further objection would have been futile. However, the trial court did not overrule his initial objection, and indeed proposed a solution to address it. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court, upon a prompt objection, would not have addressed the argument as finally presented by the prosecutor. (6) In any event, the prosecutor's argument as ultimately delivered was not misconduct. The prosecution is given wide latitude during closing argument to make fair comment on the evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn from it. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 345 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545].) The prosecutor did not rely on defendant's prior conviction to argue his predisposition to commit a crime. Nor did she urge that because defendant had a motive to kill he must have been the perpetrator. There was ample evidence that defendant was the person who kidnapped and robbed Rose. Indeed, the question of defendant's motive arose only in the context of what he chose to do with Rose after the robbery. Defendant testified that he had recently been released from prison at the time he took Rose's car. Based on this testimony, the prosecutor could argue the inference that defendant did not want to return to prison and decided to kill Rose to eliminate him as a witness. This argument was relevant to defendant's state of mind in connection with the prosecutor's theory that defendant committed first degree malice murder.