Opinion ID: 6103605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proportional-liability Defense

Text: ¶ 28. We conclude the proportional-liability defense was not available to plaintiff as a matter of law, because it does not apply to persons liable solely as current owners. Under 10 V.S.A. § 6615, responsible persons are presumptively held jointly and severally liable for the cleanup of a contaminated property. See 10 V.S.A. § 6615(c) (stating responsible persons “shall be strictly liable, jointly and severally, without regard to fault, for all cleanup, removal, and remedial costs”). The proportional-liability defense is an exception to the default rule and provides a way for responsible persons to limit their liability to a portion of the cleanup costs according to their responsibility. See id. (providing that “it shall be a defense to joint and several liability under 4 Though plaintiff’s statute-of-limitations argument opines the unfairness of holding him liable simply due to ownership, we will not relitigate the question of whether he is a responsible person under the statute. Plaintiff does not assert in this case, nor did he argue in the underlying case, that the innocent-purchaser exception applies to him. We held in Parkway Cleaners—and reiterate here—that the Legislature chose to define current owners as responsible persons, regardless of whether a hazardous-waste release occurred during their ownership, unless they meet one of the narrow exceptions available, like that for an innocent purchaser. 2019 VT 21, ¶ 23. 13 this section if the responsible person establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is responsible for only a certain portion of the costs . . . then that person’s liability shall be limited to the amount so established”). ¶ 29. Under the plain language of the statute, the defense does not apply in this case for two reasons. First, proportional liability concerns liability for actors who contaminate and are not merely owners of contaminated property. Second, proportional liability is relevant only when there is more than one contaminator so that their contributions to the hazardous-waste release can be directly compared. ¶ 30. Analyzing the plain language of the statute, the proportional-liability defense does not apply to responsible persons whose sole basis of liability is ownership under § 6615(a)(1). See In re M.C., 2018 VT 139, ¶ 9 (“Where the Legislature’s intent can be ascertained from the plain meaning of the statute, we interpret the statute according to the words the Legislature used.” (quotation omitted)). The statute starts the sentence containing the proportional-liability defense with “[w]here hazardous materials released by one person are or may be mixed with those released by another.” 10 V.S.A. § 6615(c). Thus, the defense concerns those actors who release hazardous materials, not those, like plaintiff, owning already-contaminated property. ¶ 31. The plain meaning also requires that there be two or more persons who released hazardous-waste materials for the proportional-liability defense to apply. When calculating the portion of costs attributable to the responsible person under the proportional-liability defense, the statute requires “consider[ation of] such factors as the volume and toxicity of the material contributed by the person to the release.” Id. This language demonstrates that the Legislature designed the proportional-liability defense to apply in situations where there are multiple releases by different responsible persons so that the amount of their release contributions can be compared. There can be no “proportionality” between the violations of those liable based on release and those liable based on current ownership because the nature of their violations is different. The statute is 14 clear on its face, and we need not inquire further. See State v. Eldredge, 2006 VT 80, ¶ 7, 180 Vt. 278, 910 A.2d 816 (“If the plain language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the statute according to its terms.”). Because plaintiff’s circumstances do not involve his contributing to the mixing of multiple hazardous-waste releases, the proportional-liability defense does not apply to him. ¶ 32. Plaintiff’s statutory analysis in support of the proportional-liability defense applying to him primarily relies on legislative history and is unavailing. Since the statute is clear, we need not address plaintiff’s argument that the legislative history of the proportional-liability defense demonstrates the Legislature intended it to apply to current owners. See Flint, 2017 VT 89, ¶ 5 (stating that we need not consider legislative history if plain language is clear). ¶ 33. Moreover, contrary to owner’s assertions, our interpretation of the statute would not lead to illogical results. See Rhodes, 166 Vt. at 157, 688 A.2d at 1311 (observing that “statutes should not be construed to produce absurd or illogical consequences”). Plaintiff argues it would be arbitrary and unfair to hold a current owner liable for 100% of the remediation costs while those who contributed to the hazardous-waste release could potentially reduce their liability to 1%. However, owners liable under subsection (a)(1) may eliminate their liability entirely by meeting the innocent-purchaser exception, so the statutory scheme as written does not arbitrarily deny owners the ability to defend against liability for the costs of cleanup. See 10 V.S.A. § 6615(e); Holmberg, 161 Vt. at 155, 636 A.2d at 335 (stating that we construe statutes as whole). If the innocent-purchaser exception does not apply, current owners may also attempt to reduce their financial burden for the costs of cleanup by seeking contribution and indemnification from other responsible persons. See 10 V.S.A. § 6615(i). ¶ 34. When applying the “canon of construction which counsels in favor of avoiding absurd or illogical results,” we must take “care to avoid substitut[ing] this Court’s policy judgments for those of the Legislature.” Billewicz, 2021 VT 20, ¶ 28 (quotation omitted). It is 15 reasonable to conclude that the Legislature made different judgements for the culpability of different types of responsible persons and designed various exceptions limiting liability accordingly; therefore, we do not consider the conclusion that the proportional-liability defense does not apply to current owners under § 6615(a)(1) to be absurd. See id. ¶ 29 (explaining that canon against absurdity appropriate “ ‘where it is quite impossible that [the Legislature] could have intended the result and where the alleged absurdity is so clear as to be obvious to most anyone’ ” (quoting Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699, 705-06 (2d Cir. 2019)). ¶ 35. Because the proportional-liability defense does not apply to responsible persons liable solely based on current ownership, plaintiff would not have succeeded in defending the state enforcement action even if defendants had raised this argument. ¶ 36. Therefore, we conclude plaintiff’s arguments on both the statute-of-limitations defense and the proportional-liability defense would have failed as a matter of law if raised in the underlying proceedings. As such, plaintiff cannot establish that but for defendants’ failure to raise these arguments, he would have successfully defended against the state’s enforcement action. For these reasons, the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Affirmed. FOR THE COURT: