Opinion ID: 1359258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Comments Concerning Silence

Text: Appellant alleges that his state and federal constitutional rights against compelled self-incrimination were violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony and made comments about Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent. `[T]he use for impeachment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Brecht v. Abrahamson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1716, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ( quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976)). This Court has extended the protection offered by the federal constitution by broadly interpreting Wyoming's constitutional prohibition against infringing upon a defendant's right to remain silent: Historically, our Court has jealously guarded the right provided in Art. 1, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming against any infringement.... [U]nder this section of our state constitution any comment upon an accused's exercise of his right of silence, whether by interrogation of the accused himself, or by interrogation of others inherently is prejudicial, and will entitle an accused to reversal of his conviction. Such a breach of the accused's constitutional protections is plain error and prejudicial per se. Clenin v. State, 573 P.2d 844, 846 (Wyo.1978). See also Westmark v. State, 693 P.2d 220, 225 (Wyo.1984). We apply the Clenin rule on a case-by-case basis. Parkhurst v. State, 628 P.2d 1369, 1381 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 899, 102 S.Ct. 402, 70 L.Ed.2d 216 (1981). Absent a showing of prejudice and where the statement is not a comment upon an appellant's silence, but merely a reference to it, we will not reverse. 628 P.2d at 1382. We consider the comments in the context in which they were made. Gomez v. State, 718 P.2d 53, 55-56 (Wyo.1986). Appellant refers to five occurrences which he claims constituted direct comments concerning his silence. The first two occurrences took place while the prosecutor was questioning Patrolman Townsend: Q. ... You testified you found this baggie as you indicated on the diagram, which would be at the feet of [Appellant]. What did you then do? A. I held the baggie up so the four of them could see it, asked who owned it, and none of them said anything. .... Q. [Defense counsel] asked you if it was true that [Appellant] was the most cooperative out there, do you remember that question? A. Yes. Q. Now, did [Appellant] admit to you that they were his drugs when you first found that bag, stood up and turned and said whose are these, did he say anything then? A. No. (Emphasis added.) The second two occurrences took place during the prosecutor's direct examination of one of the DCI agents: Q. He indicated to you that he was looking at coming to Cheyenne and maybe buying a car? A. Yes. Q. Did he explain how it was that he could drive a car away and he didn't have a driver's license? A. I was looking through his wallet and I was asking him why he was coming to Cheyenne to buy a car and drive it out since he didn't have a driver's license, he didn't answer. .... Q. Any conversations as you drove to town? A. While we were going back, I told [Appellant] that we were going to submit all the drugs to the crime lab to be analyzed, and I told him that one of the things they do is take fingerprints off the bags and off the bindles and if the drugs weren't his, then he wouldn't have to worry because his fingerprints won't be on them. But I asked him if there was any reason why they should be on there and he didn't say anything. So I told him to think about it and we would talk a little more down at the office. (Emphasis added.) The last occurrence transpired during the prosecutor's closing argument: That's what we know. Then we have a search of the car and we find the bindles of cocaine that you've seen in the plastic bag. Patrolman Townsend pulls it out of the car, holds it up in the air, calls back to the four people and says whose is this. Nobody says anything. So he calls [one of the DCI special agents who] comes out to the scene. .... Now if you recall [defense counsel] in his opening statement characterized that as cooperation. You will see and the testimony will show [defense counsel] said his client cooperated with law enforcement. Well, what I just described to you, the testimony of the officers, is that cooperation or is it more limited self-serving statements and actions that he does as he needs to as the case unfolds and he's confronted with the evidence. (Emphasis added.) Appellant argues that these comments were much like the comments which we condemned in Jerskey v. State, 546 P.2d 173 (Wyo.1976). While some of the comments in this case were similar to those in Jerskey, they were not made in a similar context at trial. In Jerskey, the prosecutor raised the issue of the defendant's silence when he elicited testimony about that silence from the investigating officers. 546 P.2d at 178-79. We concluded that the prosecution had elicited the testimony to create the inference that an honest answer would have established the appellant's guilt. 546 P.2d at 183. Here, by contrast, defense counsel opened the door to the comments by repeatedly raising the issue of Appellant's cooperation. The defense claimed that Appellant would not have been cooperative if he had intended to deliver the cocaine rather than to possess it for his own use. The prosecutor offered the comments in an effort to rebut Appellant's theory. In this context, the statements were not comments which pertained to Appellant's exercise of his right to remain silent. See Gomez, 718 P.2d at 55-56. We conclude that the comments did not constitute a violation of either the state constitution or the federal constitution when they are considered in the context in which they were made.