Opinion ID: 168164
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of the district court order

Text: 28 Turning now to our own finality analysis, we conclude that the district court's decision is ambiguous as to whether dismissal was just of Mr. Moya's complaint or of his entire action. First, the terms used by the district court are ambiguous. The first paragraph of the district court's opinion describes Defendants' motion as a motion to dismiss the complaint against them, 12 then states that the court GRANTS Defendants' ... motion. Dist. Ct. Op. at 1 (emphasis added). That would seem to indicate that dismissal was of the complaint only. However, the final paragraph of the opinion concludes that [t]he case will be dismissed Without Prejudice and states that Defendants' ... motion to dismiss Mr. Moya's suit for failure to state a claim is Granted. Id. at 12 (emphases added). Use of the terms case and suit would seem to indicate that the district court intended to dismiss Mr. Moya's entire action, not merely the complaint. See Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004) (defining case as [a] civil or criminal proceeding, action, suit, or controversy at law or in equity (emphases added)); see also Amazon, Inc., 273 F.3d at 1275 ([W]here the dismissal finally disposes of the case ..., the dismissal is final and appealable.) (emphasis added); Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 601 F.2d at 1124 ([T]he practical effect of the District Court's dismissal order is the termination of the entire case in Federal District Court.) (emphasis added). 29 The substance of the district court's opinion is similarly ambiguous. It initially appears only to find Plaintiff's complaint deficient, as a matter of pleading: Mr. Moya failed to allege specific facts that show a violation of his free speech rights in either the complaint or the first amended complaint. The Court, therefore, views Mr. Moya's allegations as conclusory statements and grants Defendants' motion to dismiss. Dist. Ct. Op. at 5 (emphasis added). 13 That would seem to indicate that the district court thought that an amendment alleging additional facts could cure the defects 14 and that dismissal was therefore just of the complaint. However, the district court also proceeded to analyze Defendants' claim of qualified immunity. In conducting that analysis, the district court concluded that no [adverse employment] actions occurred, that Defendants' failure to respond to Mr. Moya's complaints did not violate any established free speech rights, and that Mr. Moya did not allege any facts that would constitute a First Amendment claim. Id. at 7. These more substantive conclusions tend to show that the district court considered Defendants to be entitled to qualified immunity and therefore intended to dismiss Mr. Moya's entire action, not just his complaint. 30 Although there is no easy resolution to the question of finality in the face of this ambiguity, we ultimately conclude that the district court's order evinces an intent to dismiss Mr. Moya's entire action, not just his complaint. Ambiguities at times are resolved in favor of finality, but at some point there is a sufficiently clear invitation to resurrect the action that finality is denied. Wright et al., supra, § 3914.6. We conclude that in this case, there is not a sufficiently clear invitation for Mr. Moya to amend the complaint or otherwise continue the proceedings in the district court. First, we consider the dispositive language in the final paragraph of the district court's opinion most clearly to express the district court's intent; there, the court states that the case is dismissed. Second, that paragraph states that each side is to bear their own costs and fees, which indicates that in the district court's view the case was finished. Third, when the district court granted Defendants' motion for a more definite statement, it specifically ordered that Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint that corrects the deficiencies identified by this Memorandum Opinion and Order by June 11, 2004. That the dismissal order contains no analogous statement or any other reference to amendment, which at this stage would have required leave of court or . . . written consent of the adverse party, Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a), is at least some indication that the court did not intend to allow for amendment. Finally, the overall tenor of the district court's order, Airparts Co., Inc., 28 F.3d at 1064, given the court's analysis of Defendants' claim of qualified immunity, evidences an intent to dismiss the entire action. Therefore, although it is a close question, we construe the district court's order as a dismissal of the entire action and exercise appellate jurisdiction accordingly.