Opinion ID: 3179278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Inmates’ Statements

Text: The trial court excluded out-of-court statements made by two other inmates, Harold Richardson and Charles Drume, to law enforcement officials on the ground that they were inadmissible hearsay. Masters contends their statements implied that he was not involved in planning the murder of Sergeant Burchfield and would have bolstered his theory that Willis misidentified Masters as a participant in the conspiracy. Masters acknowledges the statements were hearsay but contends they were admissible as statements against the declarants‘ interests. 37
In August 1986, around 14 months after Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder, Richardson told prison officials that he wanted to officially ―drop out‖ of the BGF, which would have meant the authorities would no longer classify him as a member of the gang. The officials told Richardson part of the process to do so would require him to provide them with information about the BGF. (See generally Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3378 [prison regulations regarding the identification and validation of gang members].) The officials explained that it was not their intent to ―use‖ the information Richardson would provide, that they ―would do everything possible to keep the information confidential,‖ and that they were ―also committed to keep him in as safe a housing as possible.‖ The officials told Richardson he was ―not under‖ Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436; that is, they did not advise him of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. In his interview with prison officials, Richardson said he was a lieutenant in the BGF and knew all the details about Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. Richardson claimed the murder was planned on the exercise yard by Johnson, Woodard, Willis, and himself. According to Richardson, the initial plan called for him to stab Sergeant Burchfield and for Johnson to be armed with a makeshift gun. Johnson was afraid to use the gun, so he and Richardson were to switch weapons. The plan to use a gun was abandoned because prison authorities had confiscated the BGF‘s gunpowder. Richardson said he helped make knives for the BGF, including the one that was used to stab Sergeant Burchfield. The prison authorities initially refused to disclose Richardson‘s statements to Masters, Johnson, and Woodard. Following litigation regarding the statements‘ confidentiality, the court ordered that redacted versions be disclosed. The court informed Richardson that his statements could be used against him in criminal 38 proceedings. Richardson then sent a letter to one of the prison officials who had interviewed him. In it, Richardson reminded the prison official that he had been assured Masters, Johnson, and Woodard would not be informed of his statements; he also noted that he had not been advised of his right to not incriminate himself. Richardson also clarified that the plan initially called for him to stab Sergeant Burchfield and for Johnson to shoot another correctional officer, but due to Johnson‘s fear of the makeshift gun, they agreed to switch targets. As noted, at the preliminary hearing, Richardson repeatedly asserted his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In addition, before the start of the trial, Masters moved to sever his case from Johnson‘s and Woodard‘s based on his intention to introduce Richardson‘s statements, among other grounds. The trial court, noting that Richardson‘s statements were unreliable and thus likely inadmissible, denied Masters‘s motion to sever. At trial, the prosecutor sought to preclude the admission of Richardson‘s statements, which Masters opposed. The trial court ruled that Richardson‘s statements were hearsay. The court also ruled that the circumstances under which the statements were made showed they were not against his penal interest and therefore were not admissible under Evidence Code section 1230. The court additionally excluded the statements under Evidence Code section 352. Outside of the jury‘s presence, Masters later proffered evidence that Richardson told another inmate sometime in August 1988 that the prison guards ―have me on a hot one trying to accuse me of that thing on a [prison guard in 1985]. I cleaned up my tracks and they got some other motherfuckers for it.‖ The trial court did not make a ruling on Masters‘s proffer, and the jury did not receive any evidence about this statement. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered for the truth of the matter stated and is generally inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) An extrajudicial 39 declaration against the declarant‘s penal, pecuniary, proprietary, or social interest, may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. (Id., § 1230.) ― ‗The proponent of such evidence must show ―that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant‘s . . . interest, and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character.‖ ‘ [Citation.] ‗The focus of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule is the basic trustworthiness of the declaration. [Citations.] In determining whether a statement is truly against interest within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1230, and hence is sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible, the court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant‘s relationship to the defendant.‘ [Citation.] . . . [¶] A trial court‘s decision to admit or exclude evidence is a matter committed to its discretion ‗ ―and will not be disturbed except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.‖ ‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 584–585; see People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1108–1109 (McCurdy).) It is undisputed that Richardson‘s assertion of his privilege against selfincrimination at the preliminary hearing made him unavailable as a witness. (See Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(1).) Because of the assurances Richardson received from prison officials, the parties dispute whether his statements were against his penal or social interest. At Richardson‘s debriefing, the prison officials expressly told him that his statements would not be used against him. The prison officials asked Richardson to incriminate himself without informing him of his right to remain silent; indeed, they deliberately did not advise him of his Miranda rights. And in his later letter, Richardson reminded the prison officials that he had been assured that Masters, Johnson, and Woodard would not be told of his statements. 40 The trial court ruled that Richardson‘s initial statements were not against his penal interest because he was advised they would not, and could not, be used against him. It further described Richardson‘s follow-up letter as a ―nonstatement‖ because it did not refer to Masters. The trial court‘s reasoning that Richardson‘s statements were not against his penal interest is questionable. ―[A]s one federal court has explained in rejecting a similar argument: ‗The question as to such declarations is whether under the circumstances the declarant would have been unlikely to say it had it not been true. To be against penal interest under [Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 804(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.], the statement need not be made to persons who are likely to use it against the declarant in court proceedings. Declarations against penal interest are received notwithstanding that they were spoken in confidence in the expectation they would not be repeated to the authorities. [Citations.] Indeed, that makes such declarations more trustworthy.‘ (U.S. v. Badalamenti (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 626 F.Supp. 658, 666–667 [rejecting argument that ‗the Mafia‘s code of silence eliminated any risk that the declarants would incur criminal liability in making the declarations‘].)‖ (People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 144 (Valdez).) Although Richardson‘s statements to the prison officials and this other inmate were likely made in confidence, his expectation that they would not be used in criminal proceedings against him or revealed to other inmates, including other BGF members, does not negate that they may have been against his penal interest. Nonetheless, Richardson‘s statements were properly excluded on the ground that they were insufficiently trustworthy and therefore unreliable. In ruling on Masters‘s motion to sever his trial from Johnson‘s and Woodard‘s, the trial court expressed doubt about ―the time element‖ with Richardson‘s statements: ―It wasn‘t made within a few days or a few weeks of the incident, it was made a year and a half, a year later . . . so that its reliability is questionable in that respect.‖ 41 The significant passage of time is a relevant circumstance to be considered when determining a statement‘s reliability. In fact, Richardson did not make his statements until after these charges had been filed. (Cf. Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 94, 139 [affirming introduction of gang member‘s statement against penal interest that was made three months before the victims‘ bodies were discovered].) As the trial court noted, ―Every prisoner who‘s testified has said they heard about the crime within hours or days of the crime itself and it went around the prison like wildfire which one would expect would happen.‖ Yet Richardson waited for over a year to make these statements to prison authorities. Thus, Richardson‘s statements did not necessarily show his personal knowledge of the crime, as he had ample opportunity to learn the details from other inmates. Masters nonetheless contends that no reasonable person in Richardson‘s position would have falsely confessed to planning Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder because the statements could have subjected Richardson not only to criminal prosecution but also to possible retaliation by the BGF. But Richardson could have decided to provide false statements to prison officials for various possible reasons — for example, in exchange for a benefit, to weaken the prosecutor‘s case against his fellow gang members by spreading disinformation, or because he thought the statements would convince the prison authorities about his desire to leave the BGF. Masters notes that Richardson unsuccessfully sought to maintain the confidentiality of his statements and also refused to cooperate with the defendants, from which he infers that Richardson believed the information was accurate. Richardson‘s desire to maintain the confidentiality of his statements, however, could have been motivated by his desire to prevent the defendants or other inmates from learning the very fact that he had collaborated with prison officials. His 42 efforts to conceal his statements did not necessarily vouch for the veracity of what he had told the prison officials. Moreover, Richardson was a convicted felon, a circumstance of which the trial court was undoubtedly aware when determining the reliability of his statements. (See Evid. Code, § 788 [a witness‘s credibility may be impeached by his or her felony convictions].) Richardson‘s status as a convicted felon was another possible factor upon which the trial court could have relied upon in determining that his statements were incredible and therefore unreliable. Masters further points out that prison authorities provided him with only redacted versions of Richardson‘s statements. He contends that Evidence Code section 1042 obligated the trial court to infer that the redactions contained information that would have bolstered Richardson‘s reliability. That statute provides, in pertinent part, that if a claim of privilege by the state is sustained in a criminal proceeding, the court shall make a finding of fact adverse to the public entity upon any issue to which the privileged information is material. Here, it was the court that redacted the privileged material in Richardson‘s statements. Evidence Code section 1042 is inapplicable because the court knew what the redacted information contained, and it had ruled that the information was not material to Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder. As such, and as the finder of fact in this situation, it was not required to assume an adverse inference about the withheld statements.
On December 8, 1987, around 30 months after Sergeant Burchfield‘s murder, Drume wrote in a letter addressed to the Marin County Clerk that he had information about ―the murder of a sergeant‖ at San Quentin. In an interview with law enforcement personnel later that month, Drume said he was the BGF head of 43 security for Carson section when Sergeant Burchfield was murdered. Drume said that he, Woodard, and two other BGF members planned the murder and that he ―made the knife‖ that was used to stab Sergeant Burchfield. As part of his pretrial motion to sever his case, Masters indicated his intention to introduce Drume‘s statements at trial. As with Richardson‘s statements, the trial court doubted the reliability of Drume‘s statements, and denied Masters‘s motion to sever. At trial, Masters sought to introduce Drume‘s statements into evidence. As with Richardson‘s statements, the trial court excluded Drume‘s statements as inadmissible hearsay because they were unreliable; it also excluded them under Evidence Code section 352. The parties do not dispute Drume‘s unavailability at trial or that his statements were against his penal interest. For substantially the same reasons as apply to Richardson‘s statements, however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Drume‘s statements lacked sufficient trustworthiness. Like Richardson, Drume could have been motivated to make the statements to curry favor with law enforcement, or to enhance his reputation among other prisoners. In addition, Drume had even more time than Richardson to glean information about the conspiracy before giving his version of events.