Opinion ID: 2296854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Establishing Vindictiveness Pretrial

Text: As the Supreme Court acknowledged in United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982), and this court reaffirmed in United States v. Mahdi, 777 A.2d 814 (D.C.2001), [t]o punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort. Id. (quoting Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485). Because [m]otives are complex and difficult to prove, 457 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, however, in certain cases in which the prosecution has taken actions against the defendant after the defendant exercised a protected statutory or constitutional right, the courts have presumed an improper vindictive motive which may warrant the dismissal of the prosecution's charge. Mahdi, 777 A.2d at 819. As we observed in Mahdi, the rationale for the presumption is not grounded on the proposition that actual retaliatory motivation must inevitably exist, rather. . . since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of his or her rights, . . . due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the prosecutor. Id. (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). This presumption may be overcome by objective evidence justifying the prosecutor's action. Id. The Supreme Court's decision in Goodwin and this court's decisions in Shiel v. United States, 515 A.2d 405 (D.C.1986), and Mahdi are the most recent decisions explaining how to analyze claims of prosecutorial vindictiveness raised pretrial. These cases control our analysis. [14] The question confronted by the Supreme Court in Goodwin was whether a defendant raising a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness pretrial should have the benefit of the presumption of vindictiveness developed in the post-trial context in cases where a defendant had exercised a legal rightthe right to challenge a convictionand then faced additional, more serious charges at a new trial. 457 U.S. at 369-70, 102 S.Ct. 2485. The Court noted that because of the potential severity of such a presumptionwhich may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus may block a legitimate response to criminal conductit had limited the use of a presumption of vindictiveness to cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485. Although the Court held that it was more difficult pretrial to establish the requisite reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, necessary to trigger the presumption, see id. at 380-84, 102 S.Ct. 2485, and that Goodwin himself had failed to carry this burden, it did not hold that the presumption was unavailable pretrial. It simply held that the presumption should not be inflexibly applied in this context. Id. at 381, 102 S.Ct. 2485. The Court's determination that a presumption of vindictiveness should not be applied pretrial in Goodwin was inextricably tied to the facts presented. Goodwin had been charged with several misdemeanors arising out of a traffic stop on the Baltimore-Washington Parkway where he had fled from police, striking an officer with his car. Id. at 370, 102 S.Ct. 2485. Goodwin absconded after his arraignment and was not located for three years. Id. After he was taken back into custody, his case was initially assigned to a prosecutor who was detailed from the Department of Justice to try misdemeanor cases and who did not have authority to present cases to the grand jury. Id. at 370-71, 102 S.Ct. 2485. After Goodwin declined a plea offer and demanded a jury trial, his case was transferred to an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA), who reviewed the case and determined that more serious charges were warranted. Id. at 371, 102 S.Ct. 2485. The AUSA obtained a four-count indictment, including one felony count of forcibly assaulting a federal officer. Id. After he was convicted, Goodwin alleged that his indictment on new, more serious charges had been motivated by his request for a jury trial and unsuccessfully moved to set aside the verdict on the ground of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. Reviewing these facts, the Supreme Court held that Goodwin was not entitled to a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness. The Court's reasoning was two-fold. First, the Court noted At this stage of the proceedings, the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized. In contrast, once a trial begins . . . it is much more likely that the State has discovered and assessed all of the information against an accused and has made a determination, on the basis of that information, of the extent to which he should be prosecuted. Id. at 381, 102 S.Ct. 2485 (emphasis added). Second, the Court observed that a defendant before trial is expected to invoke procedural rights that inevitably impose some `burden' on the prosecutor. Id. Given that [t]he invocation of procedural rights is an integral part of the adversary process in which our criminal justice system operates, the Court deemed it unrealistic to assume that a prosecutor's probable response to such motions is to seek to penalize and to deter. Id. On the basis of this analysis, the Court found that the timing of the prosecutor's actions in this case suggests that a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness is not warranted. Id. (emphasis added); id. at 382, 102 S.Ct. 2485 (again noting that a presumption of vindictiveness is not warranted in this case). In other words, the mere addition of a charge after a defendant was returned to custody after a long hiatus, rejected a plea offer, and opted to exercise his right to a jury trial (prompting reassignment of his case to another prosecutor who had authority to present cases to a grand jury), did not create the requisite reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, id. at 373, 102 S.Ct. 2485, that would warrant the recognition of a rebuttable presumption. Rather it was to be expected that the prosecution in these circumstances might reassess the extent of the societal interest in prosecution and determine that additional charges were warranted. Id. at 382, 102 S.Ct. 2485. This court first had occasion to examine and apply Goodwin in Shiel. In Shiel, demonstrators at the United States Capitol who opted to forgo a trial were permitted to plead guilty to unlawful assembly, whereas protestors who elected to stand trial faced the more serious charge of unlawful entry. 515 A.2d at 410. The latter group challenged their convictions on grounds of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Id. We affirmed, relying on Goodwin, which we held stands for the proposition that . . . no presumption of vindictiveness arises out of an upward modification of charges before trial. Such a modification, without more, proves only an opportunity for vindictiveness, not actual vindictiveness. Id. at 411 (emphasis added). Looking at the facts of Shiel, we determined that like the defendant in Goodwin, appellant can point to no more evidence of vindictiveness than the fact that a higher charge was instituted after he insisted on a trial. Id. We also noted that there were countervailing indications of a lack of prosecutorial intent to be vindictive, among them, the fact that the demonstrators had been notified in advance that they would be offered an option to avoid an unlawful entry charge. Id. Most recently, in United States v. Mahdi , we took the opportunity to state the basis for the doctrine of vindictive prosecution and to clarify the procedure the court should employ to determine whether a defendant is entitled to relief in the pretrial context. 777 A.2d at 818. Referring back to pre- Goodwin precedent, we h[e]ld that the test laid out in Schiller, [15] which refined Wynn, [16] most clearly lays out the appropriate test for evaluating prosecutorial vindictiveness: The appropriate procedure is that, [t]he trial court should, upon motion, review the accumulation of circumstances of record and decide, without more, as a threshold matter whether the allegations as to a prosecutor's actions give rise to a realistic likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness. If . . . the examination results in an affirmative finding, the obligation is then on the government to answer or explain the allegations. Id. at 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the government has met its burden to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness, we said that the trial court should consider the nature of the case; status of the case, including the fact that a prosecutor should have broader leeway to add charges before an initial trial than in a case where a defendant is being a tried a second time; the nature of the right involved as to which vindictiveness is alleged; and the nature of the harm involved, including the length of potential incarceration. Id. at 820-21. Applying this analysis in Mahdi, we held that a pretrial presumption of vindictiveness was warranted where, after a drug charge against the defendant was dismissed and after the defendant filed a civil suit against the police, the government rebrought the previously dismissed drug charge with a newly added simple assault charge. Id. at 821. We ultimately concluded, however, that the claim of vindictiveness failed because the government provided evidence, credited by the trial court, that aptly rebutted the presumption and showed that there was no actual prosecutorial vindictiveness. [17] Id. We take from Goodwin, Shiel, and Mahdi the following. First, a presumption of vindictiveness is available pretrial. Second, although the fluidity of pretrial proceedings makes it more difficult as a practical matter to demonstrate that a presumption is warranted pretrial, the actual burden to obtain the presumption remains the low hurdle of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. [18] This hurdle can be overcome with a demonstration of an accumulation of circumstances; no direct evidence of retaliatory intent is required. Third, where, as here, the factors in Goodwin motivating deference to the prosecution pretrial are absent, the reasonable likelihood standard will not be out of reach.