Opinion ID: 2319474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confrontation Clause Analysis as Applied to DNA Evidence

Text: When reviewing a case under the Confrontation Clause, the following principle must be followed: a testimonial statement may not be introduced into evidence, through admission or testimony, without the in-court testimony of the declarant. A court must first identify what statements are being offered as evidence in a criminal trial. Then, a court must determine whether the statements are testimonial in nature. Unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination, when an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial, and its admission invokes the Confrontation Clause. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2713, 180 L.Ed.2d at 619. This is because the prosecution may not introduce such [evidence] without offering a live witness competent to testify to the truth of the statements made in the report. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2709, 180 L.Ed.2d at 615. In the case of DNA testing, the DNA profile is a statement of the analyst that essentially says: This is the DNA profile for this person. If the DNA profile is inputted into CODIS and a match is obtained, then that match is derived from the statement of the analyst. In light of Bullcoming and Melendez, it is inescapable that the testing procedures and method employed, the DNA profile created, and the conclusion that there is a match are testimonial in nature, and therefore the analyst who performed the DNA testing or the supervisor who observed the analyst perform the DNA testing must testify in order to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, unless the witness is unavailable and the defense had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. See Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2713-17, 180 L.Ed.2d at 619-24. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, the DNA profile and report are made for the primary purpose of establishing facts relevant to a later prosecution, and an objective analyst would understand that the statements will be used in a later trial. Stated differently, the analyst who generated the report must have known that the purpose of the testing was ultimately to establish the perpetrator's identity through DNA evidence. Second, the testing results, and the resulting DNA profile, can be considered an affidavit because they are the functional equivalent of in-court testimony, offered to establish prima facie evidence of guilt, which constitutes formalized testimonial material. Third, the statements produced by DNA testing are testimony under Crawford because the statements are solemn declarations made to prove a fact, namely the identification of the sample and possible match. Finally, the analyst who performs the DNA analysis is a witness for the purpose of the Confrontation Clause because the DNA profile created is a representation relating to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data[.] Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2714, 180 L.Ed.2d at 621. Therefore, the DNA profiles created by lab analysts, the reports they produce, and the conclusions or opinions they form contain testimonial statements that are subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. [12] In reaching this holding, we find support in the jurisprudence of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which has determined repeatedly that DNA evidence is comprised of the conclusions, and therefore the testimonial statements, of the analysts who performed the testing, and is thus subject to the Confrontation Clause. Gardner v. United States, 999 A.2d 55, 58-59 (D.C.2010); Veney v. United States, 936 A.2d 811, 831 (D.C.2007); Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 938 (D.C.2007). In each of these cases, an expert testified as to his or her own conclusions based on DNA testing results, despite the fact that the expert took no part in the actual testing. Roberts is particularly instructive because, similar to the case at bar, the defendant in Roberts argued that the expert relied on the conclusions of others in forming his opinion, while the government countered that the expert performed an independent analysis based on the raw data produced by the analysts, and that the admission of the evidence was valid under Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Roberts, 916 A.2d at 937-38. The facts in Roberts were as follows: Dr. Baechtel was not the original examiner; that job had been performed by Dr. Maribeth Donovan, who no longer worked for the FBI and was not called as a witness by either side. As Dr. Baechtel acknowledged, he had not done the original hands-on work in the case and in a sense was testifying in the place of Dr. Donovan. At the same time, Dr. Baechtel testified that the opinions he was testifying to were his own. He explained that all FBI DNA reports are subjected to two levels of review before being issued. In the first or more intensive review, the original examiner's report is given to a second examiner who sit[s] down with that information and go[es] through it as if it was his or her own case. That was Dr. Baechtel's role here. He took the case ... as having been given to [him] without regard to what the actual examiner [had] decided. He went through it as if it's my case ... and [came] to [his own] conclusions and ... interpretation, only then comparing them to the first examiner's interpretation. After this technical or peer review was complete, he transmitted the report, which he signed only because he agreed with its conclusions, to the unit chief for a final administrative review. Id. Despite the government's contention that Dr. Baechtel formed his own independent conclusion, the court held that [o]ur review of the record confirms that, at least in part, Dr. Baechtel's opinion that appellant could not be excluded as a contributor to the DNA evidence rested on the conclusions reached by the team that did the actual laboratory analysis and set forth those conclusions in the report he reviewed. Roberts, 916 A.2d at 938. Further, the court explained that there is no room for dispute that the conclusions of FBI laboratory scientists ... [that were] admitted as substantive evidence at trial are `testimonial' under Crawford. ... Id. This holding was affirmed in Gardner, in which the District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated, In light of the fact that the conclusions of FBI laboratory scientists have been indisputably held to be `testimonial,' the Roberts court concluded that the appellant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation rights could have been satisfied only by cross-examination of those scientists who actually conducted the testing. Gardner, 999 A.2d at 61. The court also emphasized that, just as in Roberts and Veney, the experts [in Gardner ] quoted and directly referred to the conclusions of the lab analysts and further that the experts repeatedly read from and directly referenced the testing results and conclusions of the analysts who conducted [the] test. Gardner, 999 A.2d at 61, 61 n. 12. Importantly, in addressing whether Fed.R.Evid. 703 [13] survived Crawford, the court stated, [T]hat determination does not help the government in this case, where the experts did not simply rely upon inadmissible hearsay in forming their expert opinions. Rather, here, the experts repeatedly directly referred to the inadmissible hearsay evidence and thus used it to prove the `truth of the matter asserted.' Gardner, 999 A.2d at 60 n. 11 (citation omitted). [14] In Veney, the trial court admitted Dr. Luttman's testimony, which was based on FBI laboratory reports, while neither the serologist who tested the items for blood and semen, nor the PCR/ STR technician who extracted and amplified the samples from these items, testified at trial. Veney, 936 A.2d at 831. The government emphasized that Dr. Luttman was the supervisory analyst, she was the only member of the three-person DNA team in this case who interpreted the DNA test results, and the only one who prepared a report based on those results, and further that Dr. Luttman based her interpretation of the DNA profiles on her reading of a computer-generated graph, called an electropherogram, that was produced by the PCR/STR machine. Id. The court concluded: Dr. Luttman made references to the serology tests and the data produced by operation of a DNA-typing instrument, both carried out by other scientists on the team that she managed, which indicated that the DNA in semen stains found on S.P.'s clothing matched appellant's DNA. These test results, therefore, arguably were offered as substantive evidence. Id. [15] In evaluating a Confrontation Clause claim of this sort, involving surrogate testimony and scientific testing, we must address the continued validity and application of Md. Rule 5-703. We shall hold that, because of the Confrontation Clause, an expert may not render as true the testimonial statements or opinions of others through his or her testimony. Although the Rule allows for an expert to base his or her opinion on inadmissible evidence, to the extent that Md. Rule 5-703 offends the Confrontation Clause, such testimony will not be admissible. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Crawford, [w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of `reliability.' Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61, 124 S.Ct. at 1370, 158 L.Ed.2d at 199. Specifically, if the inadmissible evidence sought to be introduced is comprised of the conclusions of other analysts, then the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of such testimonial statements through the testimony of an expert who did not observe or participate in the testing. Conversely, if the evidence relied upon by an expert in his or her testimony assembles nontestimonial information from one or more sources, and then draws a conclusion based on that information, then the expert is not merely serving as a surrogate to convey the conclusions of other analysts, but rather, is forming and testifying as to the expert's own independent opinion. In such a case, Md. Rule 5-703, as applied, would not appear to offend the Confrontation Clause. The key distinction in this type of case is whether the testifying expert relies on raw data in forming his or her conclusions, as opposed to relying on the conclusions and opinions of others when testifying. As the United States Supreme Court made clear in Bullcoming, a certification is more than machine-produced data, and instead constitutes representations relating to past events and human actions. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2714, 180 L.Ed.2d at 621. This is important because the testifying witness must be able to convey what [the analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed, which cannot be achieved through surrogate testimony. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2715, 180 L.Ed.2d at 622. Further, surrogate testimony [cannot] expose any lapses or lies on the certifying analyst's part. Id; see also Melendez, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2537, 174 L.Ed.2d at 326 (stating that [c]onfrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well). Based on this explanation, we view the term raw data in the context of a Md. Rule 5-703 inquiry to be limited to the data or materials which have not yet been subjected to scientific testing. Therefore, we hold, in accordance with Bullcoming, that the testimonial statement of the analyst is comprised of more than just the results of the testing. Instead, the testimony includes the underlying procedure or process because the methodology requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on cross-examination. Melendez, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2537, 174 L.Ed.2d at 327. Accordingly, we agree with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that, although Dr. Luttman used the data to inform her testimony, the data itself was both substantive and testimonial evidence, and therefore the analysts who actually performed the testing were also required to testify in order to satisfy Derr's right to confrontation. [16] Turning specifically to the case sub judice, there are three pieces of evidence and related testimony that implicate the Confrontation Clause: (1) the serological report from 1985 in which the biologist identified sperm and semen on genital and vaginal swabs taken from the victim; (2) a DNA profile generated in 2002 by Dr. Donovan when the sample was submitted to the FBI for DNA testing, which provided a match between the profile generated from the sample taken from the victim at the time of the crime and Derr's DNA profile stored in CODIS; and (3) a DNA profile created from a new sample of Derr's DNA in 2004. Similar to the prosecution in Bullcoming, the State in this case employed surrogate testimony, calling another analyst who was familiar with the laboratory's testing procedures, but had neither participated in nor observed the test[s] to testify as to the forensic examinations and results, providing evidence to establish Derr's guilt. This scientific evidence was presented through the testimony of Dr. Jennifer Luttman, an FBI forensic examiner who supervised the laboratory work of biologists on her team. Dr. Luttman took no part in the 1985 serological testing or the 2002 DNA testing. She did not perform the actual bench work with regard to the 2004 test, nor is there any indication that she actually observed the biologists perform the test, notwithstanding the fact that the test was conducted by her team and she reviewed the results. Dr. Luttman therefore acted as a surrogate for the analysts who actually performed the tests, thereby creating a Confrontation issue because the testimonial witnesses involved in the process were not available for cross-examination. Derr argues that he was denied the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the analysts who performed the scientific testing of the biological evidence that was the foundation for the DNA `match' evidence[.] He continues that testimonial statements (the opinion of the serology examiner, and the DNA test results) of witnesses (the serology examiner and the DNA analyst) who did not appear at trial were introduced against Mr. Derr and therefore [t]he admission of these testimonial statements violated Mr. Derr's Confrontation Clause right.... Derr maintains that the testing is a highly analytical and complex scientific test that involved the exercise of judgment and interpretation in anticipation of a criminal prosecution. Derr argues that by not allowing him to confront the analysts, the jury was [led] to believe that the match itself established the reliability of the underlying serological examination and DNA analysis.... In addition, Derr asserts that Dr. Luttman's forensic testimony served the dual purpose of providing the sole identification evidence of appellant Norman Derr as the perpetrator of a rape and sexual assault, while simultaneously shielding the forensic testing from any effective cross-examination. Further, Derr claims that the State never explains precisely how Mr. Derror any other criminal defendant confronted with scientific evidencecould meaningfully challenge the actual conduct of the forensic testing, when the results of the testing (whether in the form of opinions or `raw' data) are introduced into evidence through surrogate forensic testimony. Relying on Melendez, Derr asserts that [a]llowing expert witnesses ... to testify about forensic tests performed by third party analysts strips defendants of the opportunity to probe the analyst's `honesty, proficiency, and methodology,' thus making it impossible to `weed out' fraudulent analysts as well as incompetent ones.... Derr concludes that [t]he opinion of the serologist, and the DNA test results, are testimonial under Crawford because they were made under circumstances that would lead an objective analyst reasonably to believe the statements would be available for use at a later trial and further that [t]he information about the perpetrator's DNA profile conveys in a graphic form precisely what the analyst would be expected to testify about on direct examination at trial. The State bases much of its argument on Md. Rule 5-703, maintaining that the DNA results were not testimonial. The State characterizes the DNA results as raw data and states that the data was not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather, as the basis of Dr. Luttman's opinion, and therefore the data is not hearsay. The State also argues that data is not testimonial hearsay because it is not a statement made by a person. The State then argues that even if the information is hearsay, it is not testimonial under Crawford, because it is not an affidavit, a certified record, a deposition, or anything else intended to be a `weaker substitute for trial testimony.' The State concludes that experts are entitled to base opinions on data generated by others, and maintains that Dr. Luttman delivered her own opinions and conclusions in her testimony. We shall hold that the trial judge erred in admitting the 1985 serological test, and the 2002 and 2004 DNA test results because the reports were testimonial statements and their admission through the testimony of Dr. Luttman violated Derr's right under the Confrontation Clause. Specifically, we address the results of the 1985 serological test. Dr. Luttman testified regarding the opinion and conclusion of the serologist that semen and sperm were present on the swabs. Dr. Luttman testified that a serology examiner at the FBI in 1985 performed the test by viewing the sample under a microscope and concluding that the cells he viewed were sperm cells. The actual test and the procedures used are unknown. Dr. Luttman knew only that the serological examiner was an FBI agent named Babiak; she did not know whether Babiak did the bench work ( i.e., the testing, calculations, and reporting), what his credentials were, how long he worked at the FBI, his proficiency ratings, or any other information regarding who actually performed the bench work. Dr. Luttman knew only that Babiak interpreted the results of testing performed by a biologist, who analyzed the serology sample. Someone wrote a report analyzing the serology sample and an agent named Babiak signed that report. Specifically, the following exchange took place during a bench conference regarding the admissibility of the 1985 serology evidence: Defense Attorney: [The report] contains his [ i.e., the serologist's] conclusions with regard to his interpretations of the tests, right? Luttman: Those notes contain the biologists's [sic] results and then the examiner took those results and drew their conclusions, just like I do today. Defense Attorney: All right. But I thought you said you didn't know if Babiak [the serologist] was a biologist. Luttman: No. Babiak was a forensic examiner, forensic serology examiner. Defense Attorney: Okay. So who was the biologist then? Luttman: I do not know who the biologist was. Defense Attorney: So there's actually more than one person involved in this process then? Luttman: Yes. Just like it's current practice now. There was a biologist and an examiner who did the work. And I do no[t] know in 1985 who the biologist was. Defense Attorney: And at that time in '85 were lab examiners special agents? Luttman: Yes they were. Babiak was a special agent. Defense Attorney: So he was actually a sworn law enforcement official, right? Luttman: That's correct. Defense Attorney: And I guess it's pretty obvious that he knew he was examining a sex crime kit, right? Luttman: That's correct. He did not do the actual bench work a biologist did, but he knew. Defense Attorney: So he was, the FBI officer was doing the interpretation of whatever bench work was done? Luttman: Right. The State then asked Dr. Luttman about notations on the report that was admitted into evidence. Dr. Luttman said, They were by the person who did the bench work. And then the report was written by Babiak, that has the conclusions. Finally, in her testimony Dr. Luttman relied on the serological examiner's conclusion that sperm cells were present, and she stated that it is the FBI's policy not to repeat tests where ... we have reports from laboratory results. Ultimately, Dr. Luttman conceded that she could not form an independent basis for her conclusions without trusting the report. [17] Accordingly, it is clear that Dr. Luttman did not testify as to her own independent conclusions, but rather, relied on the conclusions of Babiak, which in turn were based on the lab work of an unknown biologist. Furthermore, those conclusions were clearly prepared for possible later use at trial because the serologist was a sworn law enforcement officer engaging in a criminal investigation. [18] Therefore, the findings contained in the serological report indicating the presence of sperm and semen are testimonial because the report contains a solemn declaration of fact, reflecting the functional equivalent of in-court testimony, and the report was prepared for later use at trial. See Melendez, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d at 321; see also Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2712, 180 L.Ed.2d at 619. Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the serology report and Dr. Luttman's testimony regarding the report. As to the DNA profile created in 2002, the trial judge erred in concluding that, although Dr. Donovan's report was testimonial, the underlying data was not. The DNA profile was based on the test performed by Dr. Donovan, an FBI examiner who did not testify at trial, and it provided the basis for the match between the unknown sample and the profile in the CODIS database. Dr. Luttman testified as to the methodology used and the results obtained from the 2002 test, and she also testified that neither she nor her team were involved in the testing. When asked whether she was involved in the 2002 test, Dr. Luttman responded, No. But I interpreted those tests that were done in 2002. When asked to clarify, she then stated, I do not do any of the bench work tests, whether it was in 2002, 2004 or 2006. I interpret the results. Clearly, Dr. Luttman relied on the report authored by Dr. Donovan as the basis for her testimony. Dr. Luttman revealed that once the sample was submitted for testing, the biologist who did that documented the day she did it, the steps she took to do that and then a portion of that sample was then further characterized through DNA typing. Dr. Luttman also described the roles of the various analysts who were involved, stating that the extraction of the DNA started May 31, 2002 and then the DNA for the biologist was finished I think it was June 17, 2002. And then the examiner did the interpretation in September of 2002, thus explaining that multiple parties were involved in the testing process, none of whom were Dr. Luttman. Despite her lack of involvement, Dr. Luttman testified on direct examination: My opinion is that specimen K10, which is Norman Derr, is the source of the DNA found on specimens Q 15 and Q 16 [from the PERK kit] to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Derr argues that [t]he DNA test results, although computer-generated in their final form, were the end product of a highly analytical process that required the analyst to exercise judgment and interpretation, and were therefore testimonial statements of the analyst. Derr continues that the test results, although computer generated during the final stage of the DNA analysis, were produced with the assistance and input of the analyst and must, therefore, be attributed to the analyst. Finally, Derr contends that [a] DNA analyst must follow a detailed protocol that requires the exercise of judgment and discretion at each stage of the process, and therefore the results cannot be attributed solely to a machine. We agree. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in Melendez, whatever testimony is introduced must be live. Melendez, 557 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 n. 1, 174 L.Ed.2d at 322 n. 1. The prosecution does not have discretion in determining who may testify regarding testimonial statements at issue; its discretion lies in deciding which testimonial statements it chooses to admit. While Dr. Luttman had a general knowledge of the procedures employed in the lab, she did not have first-hand knowledge of the actual procedures performed in this case, and thus she could not be cross-examined regarding Dr. Donovan's statements without violating the Confrontation Clause. The DNA test results and the report were therefore not admissible without Dr. Donovan's testimony. As stated in Bullcoming, the analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation, and therefore the admission into evidence of the 2002 DNA analysis and DNA profile through the surrogate testimony of Dr. Luttman violated the Confrontation Clause. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2715, 180 L.Ed.2d at 621. Hence, it was improper to receive into evidence Dr. Luttman's testimony regarding Derr's DNA profile created in 2002, merely because she was a supervisor and had been designated by the court as an expert in the field of DNA analysis. As stated in Bullcoming, surrogate testimony of the kind [the supervisor] was equipped to give could not convey what [the analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process he employed. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2715, 180 L.Ed.2d at 622. Finally, with regard to the 2004 test, the record regarding the full extent of Dr. Luttman's involvement in developing the DNA profile is unclear. In Bullcoming, the Court opined that the in-court testimony of a scientist who performed tests or who observed tests being performed could satisfy the constitutional requirements of the Confrontation Clause. Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2709-10, 180 L.Ed.2d at 616. Although the Court did not go so far as to define the extent of observation necessary to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, it is indisputable that some level of actual observation of the testing would be necessary to safeguard the principles underlying this constitutional right. Dr. Luttman indicated that she supervised the team of biologists who conducted all of the bench work and, according to her testimony, the supervisor evaluates the analyst's results before formulating the report. Dr. Luttman reiterated several times throughout her testimony that she did not perform any of the actual testing in the 2004 analysis. In addition, it is not clear whether she was present and observed the actual procedures. Nowhere in Dr. Luttman's testimony did she indicate that she was physically present to observe the biologists conduct the relevant tests. In fact, when asked whether she might be at a conference or testifying and [her] team is back at the lab doing the bench work, Dr. Luttman responded, Yes they are. Dr. Luttman's consistent description of her involvement with the 2004 analysis was that she reviewed the results of the bench work performed by the biologists. Therefore, on the basis of the record before us, we cannot say that Dr. Luttman observed the 2004 testing being performed. Because our disposition of this case is to reverse and to remand to the Circuit Court for further proceedings, further probing of Dr. Luttman's involvement in the 2004 testing procedures can be done at that time. Consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Bullcoming, if on remand to the Circuit Court evidence is presented by the State indicating that Dr. Luttman did in fact observe the 2004 testing, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, indeed, may be satisfied, and the 2004 DNA analysis may be properly admissible through surrogate testimony. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Charles County and hold that the trial judge erred in admitting the results of scientific testing through a surrogate analyst who did not, on the basis of this record, perform or observe the actual testing. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUNTY REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR PURPOSES OF A NEW TRIAL. COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY CHARLES COUNTY. HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ., Concur and Dissent. HARRELL, J., concurring and dissenting, in which BATTAGLIA, J., joins. Recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence reconfigures the contours of the admissibility of evidence and testimony for purposes of the Confrontation Clause; however, the Court's holdings in that regard are highly fact-bound and therefore make difficult extrapolating a broad rule of law to be applied prospectively. See generally Bullcoming v. New Mexico, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Although the Majority opinion here accepts wholly these cases as controlling in the present case, the Majority ignores, to my thinking, several critical factual distinctions between the present case and the latest Supreme Court decisions. I believe these distinctions render the 1985 and 2004 scientific reports (and Dr. Luttman's testimony regarding these reports) admissible, because these reports are distinguishable from the specific facts with which the Supreme Court dealt in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz. [1] Working within the confines of these cases (and subsequent cases applying their holdings), I would hold that, on this record extract, Dr. Luttman's testimony regarding the 1985 serological test and the 2004 DNA test (and the reports themselves), are admissible, as they do not frustrate Derr's confrontation rights. I agree with the Majority, however, that Dr. Luttman's testimony regarding the 2002 test is inadmissible in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bullcoming. That is, because I agree that the 2002 test is a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certificationmade for the purpose of proving a particular factthrough in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification, [2] Bullcoming, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2710, 180 L.Ed.2d at 616, I believe the Majority opinion is correct to hold that the admission of testimony regarding the 2002 test was reversible error.
In 1984, when hospital personnel collected evidence using a physical evidence recovery kit (PERK) on Alida Cook (now Berman), and the FBI conducted tests on the physical evidence, DNA testingprolific todaywas not a standard procedure utilized in the course of rape investigations. The FBI personnel (a biologist and a forensic serological examiner), therefore, did not conduct DNA testing on the physical evidence; rather, the serological test performed in 1985 identified merely the existence of sperm and semen in the swabs collected from the PERK.