Opinion ID: 1379151
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Superior Court Err in Granting Summary Judgment to the State Defendants?

Text: The superior court ruled that the State defendants were immune from suit. After Karen moved for reconsideration, the court also concluded, applying the so-called D.S.W. duty factors, that the State defendants owed Karen no duty of care, and granted complete summary judgment to the State defendants. [6] Karen argues that the superior court erred in analyzing those factors. Karen's claims did not allege that the State defendants caused her to suffer physical injury or abuse. They alleged instead that she had suffered psychological and emotional injury or emotional distress because (1) she and C.L. were subjected to risk of harm from abuse; (2) C.L. was given inadequate treatment; (3) she lost filial consortium with her son; or (4) she suffered a loss of employment. [7] She now argues that her emotional distress was inflicted both intentionally and negligently. Underlying Karen's various negligence claims against the social worker defendants (the State, DHSS, DFYS, and their officers and employees, but not OPA and the individual GALs) is the notion that the State and its employees owed her, as mother of C.L., an actionable duty of care to protect her from emotional distress as a result of C.L.'s CINA proceedings. Karen asserts on appeal that DFYS breached duties it owed her personally when it negligently investigated K.L.'s suitability as a foster parent for C.L., negligently placed C.L. with K.L., negligently licensed K.L. as a temporary foster parent for C.L., and negligently failed to monitor the placement. She claims that the social worker defendants negligently allowed C.L. to be exposed to dangerous and abusive adults living in or visiting K.L.'s homes. The narrow question is whether the State defendants owed Karen a duty of care to protect her from emotional distress with respect to the CINA proceeding. [8] This requires us to determine whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care under the circumstances. Hawks v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 908 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Alaska 1995); Stephens v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 746 P.2d 908, 910 (Alaska 1987); see also Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 203 (Alaska 1995) (stating that a plaintiff's right to recover emotional damages caused by mere negligence should be limited to those cases where the defendant owes the plaintiff a preexisting duty). Because common law is the only potential source of any actionable duty owed by the social worker defendants to Karen, [9] we look to the D.S.W. factors to resolve the duty issue. Foreseeability of the harm. The foreseeability of the harm suffered by the plaintiff is often regarded as the most important D.S.W. factor. R.E. v. State, 878 P.2d 1341, 1346 (Alaska 1994); Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Alaska 1986). We must therefore decide whether it was foreseeable that Karen would suffer actionable emotional distress because of the CINA proceeding. In another context we have required `reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff-witness would suffer emotional harm.' Beck v. State, Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 109 (Alaska 1992) (quoting Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038, 1043 (Alaska 1986)). In Beck we considered whether it was error to grant summary judgment dismissing a parent's negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claim after she saw her seriously injured daughter enter the hospital on a gurney following an accident. We noted that the facts were intermediate between two prior cases, Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson College, 743 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1987), and Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986). In distinguishing those two cases in Beck, we noted that the father in Kavorkian was permitted to assert an NIED claim after rushing to the scene of his daughter's fatal automobile accident and watching rescuers remove her from the wreckage. See Kavorkian, 727 P.2d at 1040-43. In comparison, we observed that the Mattingly plaintiff was in Ketchikan when he learned of an accident that had occurred in Sitka. We found it significant that the plaintiff was a considerable distance from the accident scene, that the shock of observing the injured victims did not follow closely on the heels of the accident, and that he had time to steel himself during the 150-mile flight to Sitka. Mattingly, 743 P.2d at 365-66. In Beck, the mother experienced shock as the result of a sudden sensory observation of her daughter's traumatic injuries during the continuous flow of events in the immediate aftermath of the accident. It could not be said she had time to steel herself. Beck, 837 P.2d at 110-11. We consequently held that it was error to dismiss Beck's NIED claim. In so ruling, we recognized that [O]ne who is thrust, either voluntarily or involuntarily, into such dramatic events and who makes a sudden sensory observation of the traumatic injuries of a close relative in the immediate aftermath of the event which produced them is no less entitled to assert a claim for his or her emotional injuries than one who actually witnessed the event. By contrast, one who learns of the injury or death of a loved one, or who observes the pain and suffering or the injuries only after a considerable period of time has elapsed since the accident, suffers a harm which, while foreseeable, policy and reason dictate the law should not regard as compensable. Id. at 110-11. That observation is equally pertinent here. That a parent may foreseeably suffer some distress as a result of concerns about the placement and treatment of her child is not alone sufficient to establish the existence of a duty. The foreseeability we require is not present just because it is foreseeable that most parents will suffer some distress whenever their children's well-being is at risk. We require `that the shock result more or less contemporaneously with the plaintiff's learning of the nature of the victim's injury.' Id. at 109 (quoting Mattingly, 743 P.2d at 365-66). Certainly the extent of trauma suffered by the child bears on the foreseeability of the harm suffered by the plaintiff. We note that C.L. did not suffer serious physical injury or death, as did the plaintiffs' children in Hawks and Beck. At worst, C.L. was allegedly exposed to unsafe or abusive living conditions and did not receive treatment. He was not alleged to have suffered the sort of sudden and grave trauma that would generate acute shock, nor did Karen allege that she suffered a revelatory contemporaneous observation of C.L. in an injured condition. We think that it is not reasonably foreseeable that the conduct of the social workers and the consequences to C.L. would cause Karen to suffer the sort of actionable emotional harm that foreseeably results when a parent observes a gravely injured child soon after an accident. Moreover, it is to be expected that any litigation, and certainly a CINA proceeding in which the child is taken from its parent following allegations of abuse, will cause the parent some distress. That does not mean that the distress should be actionable. The simple foreseeability that a parent will suffer distress proves too much. It is foreseeable that the parent of a child severely injured in an automobile accident may come upon the scene of the accident and observe the child's traumatic injuries in the immediate aftermath of the accident. It is not nearly so foreseeable that a parent who is a participant in judicial proceedings in which the parent's suitability is at issue will be unable to steel herself over concerns for her child and the course of the proceedings. Given that a parent in such a situation has a right to counsel, Alaska Child in Need of Aid Rule 12, it is also foreseeable that the parent will have a fair opportunity to participate in the CINA proceedings and urge return of the child or placement with another custodian, thus avoiding or minimizing the parent's distress. It is not self-evident that the sort of harm which a parent may suffer during a CINA proceeding is one the law regards as compensable. Cf. Beck, 837 P.2d at 109-11. Other factors. The other D.S.W. factors weigh against imposing a duty here. A recent case involving emotional distress claims against the State is illustrative. In Hawks v. State, Department of Public Safety, 908 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1995), Hawks alleged that the State negligently delayed identification of the remains of her daughter. Hawks sued for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 1015. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State. Id. In affirming, we noted that even though two D.S.W. factors, foreseeability of harm and degree of certainty the plaintiff suffered injury, weighed in favor of imposing a duty, the remaining factors militated against holding the State liable. Id. at 1016. We noted that Hawks's injury was most closely connected to the depraved conduct of the man who murdered Hawks's daughter, and that there was little moral blame to attach to the investigating authorities' possible failure to correlate every known characteristic of every known missing person with every John Doe or Jane Doe decedent. Id. at 1016-17. We also noted that the consequences of imposing liability would be considerable and would invariably lead to the diversion of resources from other projects and investigations. Id. at 1017. We consequently affirmed dismissal of the NIED claim. [10] These criteria militate against imposing a duty of care on the social worker defendants. It is not obvious that any distress suffered by Karen was caused by the conduct of the social workers, nor is it at all certain what injury Karen actually suffered. An emotional distress claim is necessarily amorphous, in both its origins and its effects. C.L. ran away from Karen's home as a result of her conduct. See supra note 1. It was that conduct that led to the commencement of the CINA proceeding. When C.L. ran from the original foster home placement and expressed a preference for placement with K.L., he was placed in K.L.'s home. The CINA court issued the custody order and later declined to find an abuse of discretion in the placement on review. Attempting to determine the sources of Karen's distress would be difficult; attributing any part to the social workers' conduct would be problematic. It also appears that no moral blame attaches to the conduct of the social workers in following state policy regarding foster care placement with a relative, notwithstanding Karen's objections. A social worker and the GAL both investigated Karen's placement complaints and found them to be unsubstantiated. The State later obtained a psychological evaluation of the foster mother, as well as the parties, and found no basis to remove C.L. The D.S.W. factors concerning the policy of prevention of future harm, the extent of the burden on the defendant, and the consequences to the community of imposing liability can easily be considered together. We agree with the superior court's observation that allowing aggrieved parents to sue the State for actions or inactions during the course of a CINA investigation or proceeding would greatly burden society's already scarce social worker resources. Social workers should be helping children in need of aid. They should not be spending their time in burdensome collateral litigation. The superior court also concluded that imposing liability would have a chilling effect on the actions of social workers. The court noted that the best interests of the child should guide social workers, and they should not have their decision making colored by the specter of collateral litigation. We agree. It does not appear that the policy of preventing future harm would be advanced by imposing a duty here, because it is not obvious that Karen's distress would have been avoided by anything less than immediate dismissal of the CINA proceeding and return of C.L. Moreover, CINA proceedings already incorporate substantial protections for parents and children. Karen had the assistance of capable and vigorous advocacy, and C.L. had a GAL. The causal connection between the social worker defendants' conduct and Karen's alleged injury is remote. See D.S.W., 628 P.2d at 555. The removal of C.L. from Karen's custody into State custody was the result of a court order, based on a finding of probable cause that Karen had abused C.L. Karen never challenged this order. Although DFYS investigated and licensed K.L. as a temporary foster parent, the final placement decision was the product of an adversarial CINA proceeding in which the superior court had an opportunity to hear the views of all interested persons and agencies. Thus, at the September 2, 1992, CINA hearing conducted by Master Lucinda J. McBurney, Karen agreed that C.L. could be placed in a foster home so long as it was not K.L.'s home, and C.L. insisted that he wanted to stay at his sister's. The master found that at this point the relative [K.L.] placement is not in his best interests.... C.L. then ran away from the Daniels' foster home. C.L. was thereafter placed with his sister, K.L. The custody decision was reviewed at an October 5 hearing at which Karen was represented by counsel. DFYS acknowledged the mother's objections to the placement, but stated that the sister's home was ... an appropriate place for him. DFYS and the GAL indicated that it was also probably the only place where he would stay and not run away. Magistrate William D. Hitchcock stated an intention to enter an order finding that it was in C.L.'s best interests to continue the custody order and the placement with K.L. Karen later moved for placement review, as she was entitled to do under CINA Rule 10(d)(2). The main issue then presented by Karen and her counsel in the CINA proceeding was whether C.L. should be placed at Charter North Hospital for a seventy-two-hour evaluation, as Karen requested. Karen also asserted that the continued placement with K.L. was undesirable, and that DFYS had not fulfilled its duty of engaging in permanency planning for reunification. After a two-day hearing, Magistrate Hitchcock denied Karen's request for a court-ordered inpatient mental health evaluation of C.L. and implicitly approved of C.L.'s continuing placement with K.L. The CINA proceeding was the proper forum for addressing complaints about foster care placement and treatment. The CINA court's approval of the temporary placement decision further attenuates any connection between the social worker defendants' conduct and the injury. The loss of consortium claim is governed by the D.S.W. factors discussed above. Karen's alleged loss of employment cannot be the basis for an emotional distress claim (assuming that is what Karen's complaint attempted to plead). Considered independently, the loss of employment claim is also foreclosed by the D.S.W. factors. Such a harm is not foreseeable, and any causal connection is too remote. The superior court did not err in dismissing Karen's claims against the social worker defendants for want of a duty of care.
Karen argues that the court-appointed GALs (OPA and individual GALs Malchick and Perry) owed duties to C.L., such as a duty to zealously represent C.L.'s interests as his legal counsel. See AS 25.24.310(c) (concerning appointment of a GAL and limiting GAL's authority to matters related to representation of child's best interests). She does not, however, establish that the GALs owed any duty to her. Nor does she demonstrate how a breach of any duty the GALs owed C.L. could give her any cause of action against the GALs. CINA Rule 11(a) states that the GAL represents the child's best interests, and CINA Rule 11(c) states that the GAL is a party. By implication, the duties a GAL owes the child do not extend to other parties, especially to parties whose interests may be adverse to those of the child. C.L. implicated Karen in abuse, resulting in commencement of the CINA proceedings, and expressed a preference for placement with K.L., contrary to Karen's own wishes. As the State notes, a GAL owes no duty of care to a parent who is an adverse party in the CINA litigation. We conclude that the court did not err in granting summary judgment to OPA and the individual GALs. We consequently need not reach any issue of sovereign and official immunity.