Opinion ID: 1307282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Content Questions

Text: In advance of trial, defense counsel submitted for approval a list of questions designed, in part, to determine what a prospective juror had seen, read, or heard about the case. Such questions are of a type characterized at bar as content questions. The trial court refused to allow counsel to propound such questions, and Mu'Min argues on appeal that the court's refusal constituted a denial of due process of law and a violation of his right to trial by an impartial jury. [5] Sixteen of the 20 members of the jury panel had indicated on voir dire that they had acquired some information from the news media or from conversations with acquaintances. In reply to questions propounded, both by the court and by counsel during the course of an examination that consumed 172 pages of the transcript, all members of the panel attested, collectively and in groups of four, that they had not formed any opinion based upon the information they had acquired, were not sensible of any bias or prejudice, could enter the jury box with an open mind, and were able to render a fair and impartial verdict based upon the law and the evidence admitted at trial. We agree with the Attorney General that an opportunity to pose the kind of content questions the defendant proposed is not a matter of right. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 67-8 (D.C. Cir 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933, 97 S.Ct. 2641, 53 L.Ed.2d 250 (1977) (affirming trial court's rejection of content questions on voir dire related to pre-trial publicity). The information a person acquires about a case from others may or may not prove to be the facts of the case as developed by evidence admitted at trial. Such information may or may not induce a person to form an opinion before trial. Any opinion formed before trial may or may not affect a person's ability as a juror to reach a different conclusion at trial. Of course, parties litigant may properly inquire whether a prospective juror has acquired information about the case before trial. It does not follow that litigants have a constitutional right to know what that information is. They are entitled to know only whether the prospective juror, in reliance upon the information acquired, has formed an opinion and, if so, whether the juror can yet stand indifferent in the cause. Code § 8.01-358; L.E. Briley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 180, 184-87, 279 S.E.2d 151, 154-55 (1981). To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1643, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (citations omitted). Quoting and applying this rule in a later case, the Supreme Court upheld the seating of a juror who had said on voir dire, My experience of [the accused] is such that right now I would find him guilty. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802 n. 5, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2037 n. 5, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). Here, none of the members seated on the panel had formed an opinion based upon the information acquired before trial, and all had affirmed on oath that they could stand indifferent in the cause. We hold, therefore, that the trial court did not err in disallowing the content questions proposed by the defendant.