Opinion ID: 755554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ADEA Remedies

Text: 77 Kirsch also contends that the district court improperly truncated the period for which he was entitled to backpay and erred in denying him the additional remedies of front pay and reinstatement. 78
79 Kirsch contends that the district court erred in ruling that the period for which he was entitled to backpay ended in June 1994. We reject this contention in light of the evidentiary and procedural record in this case. 80 A plaintiff who has proven a discharge in violation of the ADEA is, as a general matter, entitled to backpay from the date of discharge until the date of judgment. See, e.g., Dunlap-McCuller v. Riese Organization, 980 F.2d 153, 159 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 908, 114 S.Ct. 290, 126 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hospital, 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164, 114 S.Ct. 1189, 127 L.Ed.2d 539 (1994); Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir.1986) (court should compute the backpay award from the date of the discriminatory act until the date of final judgment). The backpay period ends prior to judgment, however, if the plaintiff has theretofore retired, for a discriminatee is not entitled to back pay to the extent that he fails to remain in the labor market, NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170, 174 n. 3 (2d Cir.1965) (discussing backpay entitlement under National Labor Relations Act), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 972, 86 S.Ct. 1862, 16 L.Ed.2d 682 (1966). A plaintiff may not simply abandon his job search and continue to recover back pay. Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 865 F.2d 1461, 1468 (5th Cir.) (ADEA plaintiff not entitled to backpay for period after he stopped looking for work), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 842, 110 S.Ct. 129, 107 L.Ed.2d 89 (1989); see, e.g., Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d at 1133-38 (no backpay for four-year period in which Title VII plaintiff chose not to work). 81 In the present case, the jury was not asked to make a finding as to when Kirsch retired. Rather, it was informed that he had retired in June 1994, in the question Did plaintiff make a diligent search for other work in the period after he retired to Florida in June 1994 (Verdict Form Question 7 (emphasis added)). The formulation of this question was doubtless based on Kirsch's testimony that when he and his wife moved to Florida in June 1994, I retired (First Tr. 164). And although Kirsch also testified that he had not wanted to retire before age 70 (i.e., some 3 1/2 years after the move to Florida), we see no indication in the record that he objected to the verdict form's description of him as having retired. Consistent with Kirsch's having retired, and consistent with his testimony that the extent of his efforts to seek work after moving to Florida was to inform some of his New York acquaintances that he was available to show their products in Florida, the jury found that after moving to Florida, Kirsch did not make a diligent search for other work. Further, having been instructed that Kirsch could be awarded front pay only if future damages were caused by the constructive discharge, the jury found--again consistent with Kirsch's having retired in June 1994--that Kirsch was not entitled to any front pay. 82 If Kirsch wanted a finding by the jury as to when he retired, it was incumbent on him at least to request, prior to the start of the jury's deliberations, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 49(a), that such a question be included in the verdict form and that the answer to that question not be treated as undisputed elsewhere in the verdict form. Since no such question was submitted or requested, if the question of when Kirsch retired was in dispute when the case was submitted to the jury, the resolution of that issue was left to the trial judge. See, e.g., id.; Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 730-31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 L.Ed.2d 764 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S.Ct. 2759, 97 L.Ed.2d 121 (1987); Getty Petroleum Corp. v. Island Transportation Corp., 878 F.2d 650, 656 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006, 109 S.Ct. 1642, 104 L.Ed.2d 157 (1989). 83 To the extent that the question was in dispute, the trial court fulfilled its responsibility to make a finding on that issue, ruling that Kirsch had retired in June 1994. In light of Kirsch's own testimony, that ruling cannot be overturned. The court's conclusion that the period for which Kirsch was entitled to backpay ended in June 1994 was therefore correct.
84 Kirsch also contends that he was entitled to be reinstated to his position at Fleet Street. We disagree. 85 Although the ADEA allows the court, in its discretion, to order reinstatement, see 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), which can serve to reestablish the prior employment relationship ... and at the same time assure the plaintiff of employment free of discrimination based on age, Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d at 728, the court may find that relief inappropriate if the employer-employee relationship may have been irreparably damaged, Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 92 F.3d 117, 125 (2d Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2453, 138 L.Ed.2d 211 (1997). Further, reinstatement is a forward-looking remedy that should not be awarded where the plaintiff's eligibility for relief under the ADEA has terminated before judgment. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir.1980) (reinstatement unwarranted where jury found that the plaintiff had been hired only for a one-year term, and that term had expired), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028, 68 L.Ed.2d 332 (1981). 86 In this case, the district court found, in light of, inter alia, the hostility Kirsch had described at trial and the fact that Kirsch had been retired since June 1994, that reinstatement was not a suitable remedy. 1996 Posttrial Order at 11. Given the record, we see no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to order reinstatement.
87 Where an ADEA plaintiff is entitled to forward-looking relief but reinstatement is inappropriate, the district court has discretion to award front pay. See, e.g., Padilla v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad, 92 F.3d at 125; Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1256-57 (2d Cir.1987); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d at 728. Kirsch contends that since the court did not award reinstatement, it should have awarded him front pay. This contention, even if properly preserved, is meritless. 88 As a procedural matter, it does not appear that the issue of front pay is properly before us, since we see no indication in the record that Kirsch moved the district judge to grant him that relief. His motion following the first trial requested reinstatement but did not request front pay. Indeed, in his affidavit supporting the motion for reinstatement, Kirsch argued that the court should grant him reinstatement [s]ince the jury concluded that I was not entitled to front pay. (Affidavit of Daniel Kirsch dated October 18, 1995, p 17.) Kirsch's apparent posttrial belief that the front pay issue had been resolved by the jury may or may not have been correct. The question of whether front pay should be awarded under the ADEA is one as to which the parties had no right to a jury trial, see, e.g., Dominic v. Consolidated Edison Co., 822 F.2d at 1257 (issues concerning equitable relief are not to be tried by a jury), although they could of course have consented to such a trial, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(c) (In all actions not triable of right by a jury ... the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right.). On this appeal, Kirsch invokes Dominic and argues that the jury's verdict was merely advisory and not binding on the court; his present view obviously contradicts the premise on which he urged the district court to grant his posttrial motion for reinstatement. On the other hand, his present view may be correct, for the record clearly indicates that at trial, defendants did not consent to have the issue of front pay decided by the jury. (See First Tr. 1120 (defense counsel stating defendants' objection and position that front pay is not an issue to be submitted to the jury. I understand from the court it will do so on an advisory issue [sic ] only with respect to front pay....)). Defendants' position on appeal, however, with a favorable jury answer in hand, appears to be that the jury's verdict was not merely advisory after all (see Defendants' brief on appeal at 42 (the jury already determined no front pay would be awarded)). 89 We need not determine, however, whether the parties are entitled to their opportunistic reversals of position. Whatever the validity of Kirsch's assumption following the first trial that the jury's denial of front pay was definitive, we see no indication that Kirsch moved the district court to award him front pay, nor any indication that the court understood him to move for front pay, for the court's denial of his motion for reinstatement did not mention front pay. Thus, even assuming that the jury's verdict on front pay was merely advisory and that the question remained open, we conclude that in light of Kirsch's failure to pursue that remedy by motion to the district court, the question of his entitlement to front pay has not been preserved for review. 90 Finally, as a substantive matter, if such a motion was thereafter properly presented to the district court, thereby preserving it for appellate review, we conclude that it was well within the district court's discretion to deny it. 91