Opinion ID: 2361208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony at Jackson's Trial Concerning a Robbery Plan

Text: [¶ 7] Geoffrey Motil testified that two and one-half weeks before the killing he and Jackson, along with Moore and a fourth person, staked out a house in Lewiston where crack cocaine was being sold. Motil testified that the group planned to enter the house with guns and rob a Dominican crack dealer they believed to be inside. Motil thought he heard someone mention that the dealer's name was Carlos, which was one of the names used by Rodriguez. The group subsequently abandoned its plan. [¶ 8] Jackson argues that Motil's testimony was character evidence inadmissible pursuant to M.R.Evid. 404(b). [1] We disagree. Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible to prove that a person acted on a particular occasion in conformity with his past behavior. Such evidence may be admissible, however, when offered for another purpose such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. See M.R.Evid. 404 advisers' note. Motil's testimony was admissible because it tended to establish that Jackson planned to rob Rodriguez when he entered the apartment on Knox Street, thus showing Jackson's intent at the time of the killing. Consequently, the testimony had a legitimate purpose rather than the illegitimate suggestion that Jackson had a propensity to commit crimes. [¶ 9] Moreover, we are not persuaded by Jackson's argument that the prejudicial effect of Motil's testimony rendered it inadmissible pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403. [2] The trial court has broad discretion to weigh the relevance of evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See State v. Case, 672 A.2d 586, 588 (Me.1996) (decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion because the question of admissibility frequently involves weighing probative value against considerations militating against admissibility); Field & Murray, Maine Evidence § 403.1, at 99 (4th ed. 1997). In this context, prejudice means more than simply damage to the defendant's cause; the rule is intended to proscribe evidence that has an `undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.' State v. Ardolino, 1997 ME 141, ¶ 10, 697 A.2d 73 (quoting State v. Hurd, 360 A.2d 525, 527 n. 5 (Me.1976)). We conclude that the court acted within its discretion in ruling that the significant probative value of Motil's testimony was not outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to Jackson.