Opinion ID: 4339832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Abstention Doctrines

Text: The Supreme Court has recognized four principal categories of abstention: Pullman, Burford, Younger, and Colorado River, named after Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Two additional categories, O’Shea and Rizzo, can be considered extensions of Younger. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Younger, with its extension in O’Shea and Rizzo, is most closely applicable to the present 14 No. 18-1230 case; however, it is not a perfect fit, and we ultimately base our decision on the more general principles of federalism that underlie all of the abstention doctrines. Younger abstention ordinarily requires federal courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that seek to interfere with or interrupt ongoing state proceedings. FreeEats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th Cir. 2007). Younger abstention originally required federal courts to abstain when a criminal defendant seeks a federal injunction to block his state court prosecution on federal constitutional grounds. See 401 U.S. at 40–41. The Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to civil proceedings in limited circumstances, beginning with Huﬀman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 603–04 (1975). As we noted in SKS & Associates: The civil brand of Younger extends only to a fed- eral suit filed by a party that is the target of state court or administrative proceedings in which the state’s interests are so important that exer- cise of federal judicial power over those pro- ceedings would disregard the comity between the states and federal government. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13 (1987) (requirement for the posting of bond pending appeal); Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432–34 (1982) (attorney disciplinary proceedings); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 444 (1977) (civil proceedings seek- ing return of welfare payments wrongfully re- ceived); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335–36 & n.12 (1977) (civil contempt proceedings); Huﬀ- man, 420 U.S. at 604 (state court action to close No. 18-1230 15 adult theater); Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 712–13 (7th Cir. 1998) (nursing license sus- pension proceedings before state administrative board). 619 F.3d at 678. The situation here is not a traditional Younger scenario: there is no individual, ongoing state proceeding that plaintiﬀs seek to enjoin. As a result, the district court found Younger abstention specifically inapplicable. It is true that in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, the Supreme Court stated: “Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, therefore, application by the lower courts of Younger abstention was clearly erroneous.” 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (emphasis in original). We have also explained that a “paramount concern” in whether to abstain under Younger is that “the judicial or judicial in nature state proceedings must be on-going.” Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 1996). While this case does not fit neatly into the Younger doctrine, it fits better into the Supreme Court’s extension of the Younger principles in O’Shea and Rizzo. In O’Shea, plaintiﬀs filed a federal lawsuit asserting that a municipal court system was intentionally discriminating against African Americans in setting bail and in sentencing. 414 U.S. at 491–92. The district court dismissed the case, but this court reversed, holding that if plaintiﬀs proved their allegations, the district court should fashion appropriate injunctive relief to prevent the state court judges from depriving others of their constitutional rights in the future. Id. at 492–93. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed this court, finding that the claims were not ripe because there was an insuﬃcient probability that the plaintiﬀs would be brought 16 No. 18-1230 before the municipal courts again on criminal charges. Id. at 495–99. The Court also found that even if the claims were ripe, the principles of Younger should lead the federal courts to abstain. The Court reasoned that comity and federalism “preclude[d] equitable intervention” because the plaintiﬀs sought “an injunction aimed at controlling or preventing the occurrence of specific events that might take place in the course of future state criminal trials.” Id. at 499–500. The Court cautioned against injunctions that would lead to “an ongoing federal audit of state criminal proceedings which would indirectly accomplish the kind of interference that Younger v. Harris … and related cases sought to prevent.” Id. at 500. In Rizzo, the Supreme Court further extended the principles of Younger to limit federal court review of local executive actions. In that case, the plaintiﬀs alleged a pattern of unconstitutional police mistreatment of minority civilians in Philadelphia. 423 U.S. at 366. The Third Circuit aﬃrmed the district court’s injunction requiring city oﬃcials to come up with a “comprehensive program” for dealing with civilian complaints pursuant to the court’s detailed guidelines. Id. at 364– 66, 369–70. In reversing the injunction, the Supreme Court explained that the “District Court’s injunctive order here, significantly revising the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police department, was indisputably a sharp limitation on the department’s latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs.” Id. at 379 (quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned: When a plaintiﬀ seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with the well-es- tablished rule that the Government has No. 18-1230 17 traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal aﬀairs.    When the frame of reference moves from a unitary court system, governed by the princi- ples just stated, to a system of federal courts representing the Nation, subsisting side by side with 50 state judicial, legislative, and executive branches, appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief. Id. at 378–79 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that “federal courts must be constantly mindful of the ‘special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.’” Id. at 378, citing Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951). While the district court’s order in the present case does not map exactly on the orders in O’Shea and Rizzo, it would also impose a significant limit on the state courts and their clerk in managing the state courts’ own aﬀairs. Against the backdrop of Younger, O’Shea, and Rizzo, we find that CNS’s request for federal intrusion at this stage of the dispute between CNS and the Clerk calls for abstention. 2. Abstention Principles: Equity, Federalism, and Comity The situation here is quite similar to SKS & Associates, where we applied the principles of Younger and declined to exercise jurisdiction over a Section 1983 action against the Chief Judge and the Sheriﬀ of Cook County. 619 F.3d at 676. In that case, the Sheriﬀ was subject to a general order issued by the Chief Judge that directed him not to carry out 18 No. 18-1230 residential evictions during a two-and-a-half-week period in December and during periods of extreme cold weather. Id. The plaintiﬀ, a residential property manager, sought a federal injunction against the Sheriﬀ to speed up the eviction processes in state court. Id. In declining to exercise jurisdiction, we explained that it is important for federal courts to have ‘‘a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.’’ Id., citing New Orleans Public Service, 491 U.S. at 364, citing in turn Younger, 401 U.S. at 44. We concluded that it was not appropriate for the federal courts, in the face of these principles of equity, comity, and federalism, to undertake the requested supervision of state court operations. SKS & Associates, 619 F.3d at 682. Despite SKS & Associates not being a typical Younger scenario, we pointed out that the Supreme Court characterized the holding of Younger as “far-from-novel” because it rested primarily on the ‘‘even more vital consideration’’ of comity. Id. at 678 (citations omitted). ‘‘Cooperation and comity, not competition and conflict, are essential to the federal design,’’ and Younger abstention ‘‘reinforces our federal scheme.’’ Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 133 (2004), citing Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 586 (1999). Abstention in the present case tracks these general principles upon which all of the abstention doctrines are based. The level of intrusion CNS seeks from the federal court into the state court’s operations No. 18-1230 19 is simply too high, at least before the state courts have had a chance to consider the constitutional issue. Underlying Younger abstention is a deeper principle of comity: the assumption that state courts are co-equal to the federal courts and are fully capable of respecting and protecting CNS’s substantial First Amendment rights. As the Supreme Court underscored in Younger, the Constitution established a system in which there is sensitivity to the le- gitimate interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Gov- ernment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States. 401 U.S. at 44. This principle of comity takes on special force when federal courts are asked to decide how state courts should conduct their business. The Illinois courts are best positioned to interpret their own orders, which are at the center of this case, and to craft an informed and proper balance between the state courts’ legitimate institutional needs and the public’s and the media’s substantial First Amendment interest in timely access to court filings. It is particularly appropriate for the federal courts to step back in the first instance as the state courts continue to transition to electronic filing and, like many courts around the country, are working through the associated implementation challenges and resource limitations. The claims 20 No. 18-1230 here are not suitable for resolution in federal court at this time. CNS is free to pursue a remedy in the state courts. We acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit in Courthouse News Service v. Planet, a case nearly identical to this one, came to the opposite conclusion regarding abstention. 750 F.3d 776, 793 (9th Cir. 2014). The court there explained that CNS’s claims “raise novel and important First Amendment questions that the federal courts ought to decide” and reversed the district court’s decision to abstain “so that the First Amendment issues presented by this case may be adjudicated on the merits in federal court, where they belong.” Id. In declining to abstain under O’Shea, the Ninth Circuit explained that an injunction would not lead to continuous oversight of the state courts by the federal court. Id. at 791. The Ninth Circuit thought there would be no “ongoing federal audit” and that the “remedy that CNS seeks is more akin to [a] bright-line finding” rather than an impermissible “ongoing monitoring of the substance of state proceedings.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded, the First Amendment interests at stake outweighed what it thought would be minimal interference in the state’s administration of its judicial system. On this point, we respectfully disagree with our colleagues in the Ninth Circuit. If the state court clerk refuses or fails to comply with the federal court’s injunction or complies only partially, the federal court’s involvement would certainly continue as it oversees the implementation of its order. Further, we have no doubt CNS would attempt to use a different decision in this case to force the hand of other state courts that do not provide immediate press access to court filings. This would likely lead to subsequent litigation in the federal courts. We want to avoid a situation in which the No. 18-1230 21 federal courts are dictating in the first instance how state court clerks manage their filing procedures and the timing of press access. We also want to avoid the problems that federal oversight and intrusion of this sort might cause.6 In sum, the district court erred by exercising jurisdiction and issuing a preliminary injunction. Initial adjudication of this dispute in the federal court would run contrary to the considerations of equity, comity, and federalism as detailed in SKS & Associates and the Supreme Court abstention decisions on which SKS & Associates was based. This temporal access dispute with a state court clerk should be heard first in the state courts. The district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with instructions to dismiss this action without prejudice. 6 Because this opinion creates a circuit conflict on the abstention issue, we circulated it to all judges in active service. See 7th Cir. R. 40(e). No judge in active service requested to hear the case en banc.