Opinion ID: 158786
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trinidad: Existence of an official municipal policy

Text: 40 To survive Trinidad's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs must show a genuine issue as to whether the employees who violated their rights were acting pursuant to an official municipal policy. Because we hold some of the violations occurred pursuant to an official municipal policy, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of Trinidad and remand for further proceedings. 41 The plaintiffs' suit against the City of Trinidad might be dismissed on a motion for summary judgment even if the agents of the City did violate the plaintiffs' rights. The Tenth Circuit has held: 42 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a local government may be held liable for the constitutional violation of its employees only when employee action pursuant to official municipal policy . . . caused a constitutional tort. Therefore, to establish municipal liability a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged. 43 Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 742 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 44 The first prong, existence of a municipal custom or policy, is satisfied by the City Police Department's issuance of General Order 95-03. That order instructed law officials to seize any person who exhibits any potential of intoxication. See Aplt's App. at 63 (emphasis supplied). 45 The second prong, a causal link between the custom or policy and the alleged violation, is satisfied by the fact that the standard for detaining and transporting people to detox under Order 95-03 was itself a standard well below that required by the Fourth Amendment. To the extent officers conducted the unreasonable seizures under the directive of General Order 95-03, the City of Trinidad is liable. That is, by creating an official policy of detaining any person exhibiting any potential of intoxication, the city basically instructed law enforcement officers to conduct unreasonable seizures. The standard of any potential of intoxication is substantially lower than probable cause to believe the person is a danger to himself or others. Thus, the unreasonable seizures that occurred can be said to be the direct result of the city policy. 46 Not all the plaintiffs were seized pursuant to Order 95-03, however. Some seem to have been detained after the implementation of General Order 95-04. Order 95-04 directs officers to detain the intoxicated only based on probable cause that such person is intoxicated and incapacitated by alcohol and is clearly a danger to the health and safety of him\herself or others. Aplt's App. at 64. This language satisfies the probable cause standard. Thus the municipal policy was no longer a causal link to the detentions. However, the plaintiffs allege that the new policy did nothing to alter the municipal custom, and suggest the seizures made under the new policy support that allegation. An established municipal custom is sufficient to support a section 1983 action against a town, see Hollingsworth, 110 F.3d at 742, so the issue turns to whether plaintiffs will be able to establish the custom in light of a contrary policy. This will clearly be a more difficult burden for the plaintiffs to satisfy, but at this stage they have established triable issues of fact as to whether General Order 95-04 did anything to alter the custom for detaining the allegedly intoxicated in Trinidad. 47 The same standard applies to the lawsuits against defendants in their official capacities. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978). Thus, the lawsuits against the City of Trinidad and the defendants in their official capacities survive the motions for summary judgment. 48