Opinion ID: 2165135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Nature and Elements of the Tort.

Text: To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress. District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277, 289-90 (D.C.1990) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), vacated on other grounds, 593 A.2d 621 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 380, 116 L.Ed.2d 331 (1991). The dispositive issue in this case is whether Detective Vaccaro's alleged conduct, as described by Ms. Drejza, was sufficiently extreme or outrageous or, more precisely, whether an impartial jury could reasonably so view it. The requirement of outrageousness is not an easy one to meet. See, e.g., Bown v. Hamilton, 601 A.2d 1074, 1079 (D.C.1992). [10] The outrageous and extreme [ vel non ] nature of the conduct to be examined should not, [however,] be considered in a sterile setting, detached from the milieu in which it took place. The salon of Madame Pompadour is not to be likened to the rough-and-tumble atmosphere of the American oil refinery. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1986) (quoted in W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 12, at 62 (Supp.1988 to 5th ed. 1984)). There were circumstances in the present case which, in our view, were not adequately considered by the trial judge, and which profoundly affect the outrageousness calculus. We refer to Ms. Drejza's emotional state immediately following a dehumanizing sexual assault on her, to Vaccaro's knowledge of her susceptibility, and to the position of authority and trust which Vaccaro occupied during his interaction with Ms. Drejza. First, Vaccaro was dealing with a woman who was in an extraordinarily vulnerable condition. An hour or so before the first interview, as Vaccaro well knew, Ms. Drejza had endured a violent rapeone of the most harrowing ordeals that can befall a woman. [11] [A]cts which are not generally considered outrageous may become so when the actor knows that the other person is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress. Thompson, supra, 570 A.2d at 291. Conduct which would otherwise constitute no more than rudeness has been held to be outrageous, for example, where the plaintiff was a distraught mother with an unconscious baby who was totally dependent on [the defendant physician] to diagnose the baby's condition and do something about it. Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28, 31 (1971). Under ordinary circumstances, screaming at a plaintiff and ordering her out of one's office would be viewed as uncivil but hardly as outrageous, but this court has upheld a verdict in favor of a patient where the defendant doctor had prescribed Valium for her and was therefore aware of her fragile condition; the victim's special susceptibility to injured feelings was dispositive of the result. See Anderson v. Prease, 445 A.2d 612, 613 (D.C. 1982) (per curiam). [12] The reasoning of cases like Anderson and Rockhill surely applies with even greater force to Ms. Drejza; to hold otherwise would be to trivialize the dehumanizing consequences of rape. Rape is a dire experience for women because it implies total loss of selfthe woman is a function, not a person. The victim experiences that emptiness from self and society. D. Metzger, It Is Always the Woman Who is Raped, 133 Am. J. Psychiatry 4 (1976) (quoted in CAROL H. LEFCOURT, WOMEN AND THE LAW § 10.03(4), at 10-33 (1984)). Moreover, the effects of rape tend to be compounded and prolonged where, as here, the assailant was a man whom Ms. Drejza trusted, and the traumatic event took place in her own apartment where she had every reason to believe that she was safe. LEFCOURT, supra, § 10.03(4), at 10-35. In the present case, Detective Vaccaro was aware not only that Ms. Drejza had been raped, [13] but also that, as a result of her ordeal, she had probably been severely traumatized. [14] Denying that he had attempted to influence the decision of Ms. Drejza or of any other complainant as to whether or not to press charges, Detective Vaccaro insisted that we do not further traumatize any sexual assault victim to go either way. The detective's volunteered choice of words itself acknowledges the existence of trauma in cases such as Ms. Drejza's. The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment (f); [15] see also Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1979) ([t]hough there is no evidence that Wenk knew the precise nature of Mrs. Boyle's physical susceptibility, his knowledge that she had just returned from the hospital put him on notice that she might be more vulnerable to harassment or verbal abuse). [16] The experience of being raped may reasonably be viewed as bringing about a higher degree of vulnerability than a recent stay in the hospital. Finally, Vaccaro was a police detective. More important, he was a member of the Sex Offense Branch. He was the individual to whom Ms. Drejza was taken by other police officers. He was the specialist in sex crimes. He was an official, Ms. Drejza could reasonably suppose, who could be trusted to assist her and investigate her complaint in a professional and helpful manner. If Ms. Drejza's account of her encounter with Detective Vaccaro is credited, as it must be for purposes of summary judgment, then, instead of helping and reassuring her, Vaccaro abused the authority of his office to ridicule, bully, humiliate and insult her. Outrageous conduct may consist of [the] abuse of [a] position of authority, particularly by, inter alia, police officers. Carter v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 94, 795 F.2d 116, 139 (1986) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment e (1965)). [17]