Opinion ID: 769911
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The New Federal Definition of Conviction in the Immigration Statute

Text: 34 In 1996, as part of a broad series of changes to the immigration laws, Congressfor the first time decided to deal explicitly with the meaning of the word conviction. It enacted a statutory definition of that term for immigration purposes. That definition provides that: 35 The term conviction means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where -- 36 (i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 37 (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be imposed. 38 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(48)(A). 39 Without question, the new definition eliminated the distinction between the different types of deferred adjudication statutes set forth in the third prong of the Ozkok definition. It is clear that Congress intended the new definition to mean, generally, that a conviction occurs prior to the time the probationary period begins in cases processed under state deferred adjudication laws, regardless of whether the state statute requires further proceedings prior to the formal entry of a judgment of conviction in the event of a probation violation. The BIA's decision in Ozkok is specifically discussed in the legislative history of the new definition, and Congress adopted verbatim the first two sub-parts of the Ozkok definition, while notably omitting the third. 23 40 The INS argues, however, that the effect of the definition goes further. According to the INS, the new definition not only eliminates the specific rule that where further proceedings are required a deferred adjudication does not constitute a conviction, it also eliminates the general rule that convictions expunged under state rehabilitative laws may not serve as the basis for deportation. The INS's position is that, as a result of the recent statutory amendment, even after a conviction (or the record involved in a deferred adjudication) has been expunged under a state rehabilitative statute, the court's earlier determination of guilt must still be treated as a conviction for immigration purposes. 41 Although we find the INS's argument highly unpersuasive, see inter alia note 24 supra, we need not resolve the question definitively in order to decide the case before us. The question we must decide is not what effect the new definition has on state expungements under state rehabilitation laws in general, but whether the new definition repeals the First Offender Act in whole or in part, and, along with it, the rule we established in Garberding and Paredes , which requires similar treatment for first-time simple drug possession offenses prosecuted and expunged under state laws. As we have explained, the Act prohibits the use of offenses expunged pursuant to its provisions for any purpose, and that rule has been extended to similar stateexpungements 24 . Therefore, unless the new definition is construed as repealing the Act, insofar as it applies to immigration laws, the petitioners are entitled to prevail here. 25 Ultimately, the INS squarely meets this issue by asserting not only that the new definition of the term conviction prevents the agency, as a general matter, from recognizing rehabilitative actions taken by the states pursuant to deferred adjudication and other state rehabilitative laws, but also that it repeals the First Offender Act, insofar as it applies to deportation proceedings. 26