Opinion ID: 71257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the effect of the erroneous jury charge

Text: 12 The government contends that, although the instruction with respect to use was incorrect, because the evidence was sufficient to establish that Range carried the firearm (as discussed above), the jury's general verdict can be upheld. 13
14 Initially, Range argues that the carrying charge was erroneous. 15 The court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows: 16 Now members of the jury, as to Count Three, Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1), makes it a separate crime or offense for anyone to use or carry a firearm during and in relation to the commission of a drug trafficking offense. 17 A defendant can be found guilty of that offense only if all of the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant committed the felony offense charged in count one and count two; second, that such offense was a drug trafficking offense; and, third, that the defendant knowingly used or carried the firearm described in the indictment while committing such drug trafficking offense. 18 To show use of the firearm the government need not prove that the firearm was fired, brandished, or even displayed during the drug-trafficking offense. However, mere presence of the firearm would not constitute use within the meaning of the statute. Rather, possession of a firearm constitutes use in relation to the drug-trafficking offense if the firearm played a purpose or function in carrying out the drug-trafficking offense. 19 Range contends that the court erred in failing to provide a definition of carry, but he specifically waived that objection at trial. He also contends, however, that the carrying charge was erroneous in omitting an essential element, i.e., that the firearm was carried during and in relation to the commission of the offense. He relies on United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867, 108 S.Ct. 192, 98 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), and United States v. Mendoza, 11 F.3d 126 (9th Cir.1993), both holding that failure to instruct on the relational element of section 924(c)(1) is constitutional error. In Mendoza, the court held that the omission was not cured by inclusion of the relational language in the description of the indictment and of the provisions of section 924(c)(1) that the trial court had given the jury. The court said: 20 It was Instruction No. 33 that informed the jury exactly what it must find in order to convict, and that instruction conspicuously omitted any requirement that the gun be used in relation to the drug offense. 21 11 F.3d at 129. 22 A later decision of the Ninth Circuit distinguished Mendoza on the ground that it had not been decided under the plain error rule, the defendant having raised the objection at trial. United States v. Gallegos-Corrales, 37 F.3d 548, 550 (9th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1716, 131 L.Ed.2d 575 (1995). In Gallegos-Corrales, the court declined to find plain error where a supplemental instruction included a statement that the government need only prove that the defendant chose to carry the firearm in relation to that transaction. Id. at 549. 23 The plain error rule applies here because Range raised this issue for the first time on appeal. United States v. Rojas, 502 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1369, 67 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981). While the court's instruction on what the jury had to find to convict initially omitted the relational requirement, it included that requirement at the end of the instruction, albeit with reference to use. But the omission of a specific instruction applying the relational element to the carrying prong is plain error only if there is a significant possibility the jury might have acquitted if it had considered the matter. United States v. Steward, 16 F.3d 317, 320 (9th Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir.1985)). 24 In Steward, the court held that failure to instruct on the relationship between the firearm and the underlying crime was not plain error where the requirement was spelled out fully elsewhere in the instructions, and there [was] little likelihood of acquittal because the defendant was carrying a loaded ... pistol in his pants while participating in a drug transaction. Id. at 320-21. Here, as in Steward, the relational element was stated elsewhere in the instructions and, in view of the undisputed evidence that Range knowingly carried the firearm under the floormat of the car in which he brought the money to the transaction, there is little likelihood that the instructional error misled the jury into convicting where it might otherwise have acquitted.
25 Range argues that (even if the carrying charge passes muster) because the jury was given an erroneous instruction on use and it cannot be determined whether it relied on that instruction, the conviction must be reversed, relying on Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991). In Griffin, the Court upheld a general verdict of conspiracy where the evidence was sufficient to support one of the unlawful objects charged but not the other. The Court distinguished the case before it, where one of the bases for conviction was factually insufficient, from one in which one of the bases for a general verdict is legally invalid. Range argues that his case falls into the second category; that because the jury might have relied on the erroneous use instruction, the verdict cannot stand. 26 The government responds that because alternate means were charged under section 924(c)(1), and the evidence clearly supported one of them, the jury's general verdict on that count must stand. It cites Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 654, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970), holding that [t]he general rule is that when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. And it relies on Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991), where the plurality opinion noted that due process does not require that a jury unanimously agree on one of several alternative statutory means of committing the charged offense. 27 The government's argument rests on the assumption that when the indictment charged Range with us[ing] and carry[ing] a firearm, it charged alternate means of violating section 924(c)(1) rather than separate offenses. Whether section 924(c)(1) is an alternate-means statute is a question of statutory interpretation, see 501 U.S. at 636, 111 S.Ct. at 2499, that appears not to have heretofore been decided. However, United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070 (5th Cir.1993), held that section 924(c)(1) did not require jury unanimity with respect to the particular firearm used. In reaching that conclusion, the court thought it significant that the offense is not the mere carrying or use of a firearm, but, rather, its employment in the commission of another predefined felony; that the statute was akin to a penalty enhancement provision; and that the legislative history reflected a Congressional purpose to achieve maximum deterrence against using firearms in connection with another crime. Id. at 1083. It was also influenced by decisions that the number of firearms used is irrelevant for conviction; use of more than one will not support more than one conviction based on the same predicate offense. Id. at 1085; see also United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (5th Cir.1991) (use of more than one gun will not support multiple counts for use of firearm during single drug trafficking offense), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1279, 117 L.Ed.2d 505 (1992). Compare, United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810 (3d Cir.1996) (en banc) (holding jury unanimity required on predicate felony offenses for violation of continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848). 28 The reasoning of Correa-Ventura is persuasive and suggests that jury unanimity is not required with respect to the use and carry elements. That conclusion appears also to be implicit in courts' articulation of the proof required for conviction. For instance, the Tenth Circuit has described the requisite proof as follows: (1) the defendant committed the underlying crime; (2) the defendant 'used ' or 'carried ' a weapon; (3) the use or carriage of the weapon was 'during and in relation to' the drug trafficking crime. United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537, 1546 (10th Cir.1996) (emphasis added). And in United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 622 (6th Cir.1996), the court said that under section 924(c)(1), the United States must prove that the defendant: (1) carried or used a firearm; (2) during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. (Emphasis added.) See also Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2053-54, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) (By its terms, the statute requires the prosecution to make two showings. First, ... that the defendant 'use[d] or carrie[d] a firearm.' Second, ... that the use or carrying was 'during and in relation to' a 'crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.' ). 29 The Supreme Court's Bailey opinion also supports the conclusion that section 924(c)(1) is an alternate means statute. The Court stated that Congress has specified two types of conduct with a firearm: 'uses' or 'carries.'  --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 501, 507, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). Consequently, [w]hile a broad reading of 'use' undermines virtually any function for 'carry,' a more limited, active interpretation of 'use' preserves a meaningful role for 'carries' as an alternative basis for a charge. Id. Thus, Congress provided two alternate bases for a section 924(c)(1) conviction--'uses or carries'.... Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 507. 30 While it is thus clear that a general verdict under section 924(c)(1) will be sustained so long as the evidence is sufficient to establish one of the means of violating it, the question remains whether, under Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991), a general verdict can stand where one of the possible bases of conviction rests on a legally erroneous instruction. 31 The courts confronted with this problem under section 924(c)(1) have dealt with it by applying the plain-error rule. Thus, in United States v. Baker, 78 F.3d 1241, 1247 (7th Cir.1996), the court affirmed the conviction where the defendant's gun was found resting underneath the driver's seat of his car when he was stopped carrying a quantity of crack and there was no evidence of use as opposed to carry. The court held that a properly instructed jury [would] have concluded that [defendant] carried the gun. Id. See also United States v. Richardson, 86 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir.1996) (conviction affirmed under the carrying prong where there was no evidence of use but evidence established that the defendant was arrested en route to a drug transaction with one gun in his pocket and another on the front seat of his truck); United States v. Pimentel, 83 F.3d 55, 59-60 (2d Cir.1996). 32 A court must, however, be able to determine with absolute certainty that the jury based its verdict on the ground on which it was properly instructed. United States v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir.1996). In Miller, the court reversed a conviction based on evidence that a bag found in the back of defendant's van contained, along with drugs and drug paraphernalia, two loaded weapons, holding that it is possible that the jury convicted ... solely because it found he 'used' the firearms merely by concealing them in the van, which directly conflicts with Bailey. Id. 33 Similarly, in United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647 (7th Cir.1996), in addition to evidence of carrying, evidence was also offered that defendants owned handguns which they kept at home for protection. The court reversed the conviction, holding that because the jury may well have relied upon this evidence in convicting the defendants ... we are not convinced that a properly instructed jury would have convicted ... [under] 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Id. at 650-51. 34 We are convinced that in this case, the jury based its verdict on the ground on which it was properly instructed. The evidence of the carrying of a firearm was overwhelming, and there was a complete absence of evidence from which the jury could have found use, as opposed to carrying, under the erroneous instruction. We conclude that a properly instructed jury would have found Range guilty of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.