Opinion ID: 2234065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Access to Department of Correctional Services' Records

Text: Vela argues that the district court erred in initially granting, without limitation, the prosecutor's motion for access to his medical file maintained by the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services. His two-pronged argument is (1) that no statute permits this form of discovery in a criminal action and (2) that such records are privileged pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. ง 27-504 (Reissue 1995). Vela bases the first prong of his argument on State v. Kinney, [109] where we recognized that discovery in a criminal case is generally controlled by either a statute or court rule and that `[i]n Nebraska, the prosecution has not been granted a right of discovery except as permitted by the court, with limitations clearly defined by statute.' We held in Kinney that based upon these principles, the trial court erred in requiring a defendant to produce his trial exhibits and disclose his potential out-of-state witnesses to the State before trial. The discovery issue arises in this case in a markedly different context. Vela's guilt had been determined by the acceptance of his guilty pleas, and the only remaining issue was whether he would be sentenced to life imprisonment or death for his crimes. That determination depended in part upon the resolution of Vela's assertion that he was a person with mental retardation and therefore could not be executed pursuant to ง 28-105.01(2). While the statutory proceeding in which this determination is made is a part of the criminal action, [110] it is decidedly civil in nature. The defendant must file a verified motion requesting a ruling that the penalty of death be precluded on the basis of mental retardation, and bears the burden of proving the existence of mental retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. [111] In this unique circumstance, we conclude that general principles applicable to discovery in the guilt phase of a criminal case are not controlling. Contrary to Vela's claim, his medical and mental health records maintained by the Department of Correctional Services were not privileged after he filed his verified motion to preclude the death penalty based upon mental retardation. There is no physician-patient privilege as to communications relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he or she relies upon the condition as an element of his or her claim or defense. [112] A substantially similar rule applies to communications between psychologists and their patients. [113] The State's motion for access to medical and psychological records maintained by the Department of Correctional Services was filed pursuant to ง 83-178, which governs access to confidential inmate records. The statute clearly contemplates that medical records are included in its scope. [114] The statute provides that confidential records shall not be subject to public inspection except by court order for good cause shown. [115] We hold that when a defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding places his or her mental health at issue either by asserting mental retardation as a basis for precluding the death penalty pursuant to ง 28-105.01(2) or by asserting mental illness as a mitigating circumstance pursuant to ง 29-2523(2)(g), there is good cause under ง 83-178(2) for the prosecution to obtain access to the defendant's mental health records in the possession of the Department of Correctional Services. Accordingly, the district court did not err in permitting access to such records in this case and in overruling Vela's objection to testimony of the State's expert based in part upon his review of those records.