Opinion ID: 1014470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against Thaxton and Kwascha

Text: Because the tortious interference claim is preempted, Freeman’s claim must be dismissed unless it states a valid § 301 claim. Section 301 allows claims for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2000). Applying the most natural interpretation of this language, we [have previously held] that a suit against a non-signatory of a contract cannot be considered a suit for violation of the contract. Covenant Coal Corp., 977 F.2d at 897. Bound, as both it and we are by prior controlling and unquestioned circuit precedent, the district court properly dismissed Freeman’s claim against Thaxton and Kwascha for interference with contract.
To state a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices against Thaxton and Kwascha under North Carolina General Statutes § 75- 1.1, Freeman must establish that (1) the defendants committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. Dalton v. Camp, 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (N.C. 2001). The purpose of G.S. 75-1.1 is to provide a civil means to maintain ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and the consuming public within this State[,] and [it] applies to dealings between buyers and sellers at all levels of commerce. Sara Lee Corp. v. Carter, 519 S.E.2d 308, 311 (N.C. 1999) (internal marks omitted) (alterations in original). The statute generally does not apply to employment situations, see Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 711, though the existence of an employment relationship will not necessarily defeat a claim if the parties are otherwise involved in a business relationship. See Sara Lee Corp., 519 S.E.2d at 312 (allowing an unfair trade practices claim brought by an employer against an employee where the employee was involved in buyer-seller transactions with his employer). Freeman’s complaint alleges only that the individual defendants acted to cause Duke Power to terminate Freeman’s employment conFREEMAN v. DUKE POWER CO. 13 tract. (J.A. at 232-34.) Although N.C.G.S. § 75-1.1(b) defines commerce broadly as business activities, however denominated, the Supreme Court of North Carolina has cautioned that the act is not intended to apply to all wrongs in a business setting, including most employment disputes. Dalton, 548 S.E.2d at 657 (distinguishing Sara Lee on the basis that the employee in Sara Lee owed a fiduciary duty to his employer, and the employee was entrenched in a buyer-seller relationship with his employer, which fell squarely within the purview of the unfair trade practices act). Freeman’s allegation that the defendants caused Duke Power to terminate him fails to meet the requirement that the defendants’ acts be in or affecting commerce, see Durling v. King 554 S.E.2d 1, 4-5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming summary judgment where no evidence was presented that the subject transactions had any impact beyond the parties’ employment relationships), and he therefore failed to state a claim under the state unfair and deceptive trade practices act.