Opinion ID: 1812472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable inference

Text: ¶ 77 Setting aside the issue of Johnson's consent to search his vehicle, the majority also errs when it concludes that Johnson's furtive movement as the officers approached his vehicle could not reasonably be interpreted by the officers as Johnson placing a weapon under the vehicle's front seat. See majority op., ¶¶ 29-30. ¶ 78 The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search] other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967)). The need to search is affected by the location in which an officer encounters a suspect because that factor may affect officer safety. For example, investigative detentions involving suspects in vehicles are especially fraught with danger to police officers. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). ¶ 79 One study showed that approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Id. at 1048 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 3469. As the Supreme Court has noted, suspects may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed. Id. at 1048, 103 S.Ct. 3469. And finally, the passenger compartment of an automobile, to which a suspect who has been briefly detained may return, provides access to any weapons that are inside that compartment. Id. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. 3469. If a suspect is `dangerous,' he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested. Id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469. ¶ 80 When a suspect who has been detained but has not been arrested is about to return to his vehicle, an officer must make a quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger. Id. at 1052, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868). In order to engage in a weapons search of the passenger compartment of an automobile subsequent to a traffic stop where the vehicle's occupant has not been arrested, an officer must have an articulable suspicion that re-entry of the vehicle by the suspect has the capacity to create a potentially dangerous situation for the officer or others. Id. at 1052 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. ¶ 81 The search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is not so intrusive as the search of one's person. See Matejka, 241 Wis.2d 52, ¶ 28, 621 N.W.2d 891. Therefore, when the need for a search is balanced with the intrusiveness of a search, need for officer safety may weigh more heavily in the balance if a passenger compartment were being searched than it would if a suspect's person were being searched. ¶ 82 Here, two officers testified that as they approached Johnson's vehicle he leaned forward to the extent that much of his head and shoulders disappeared from view, and that his movement was considered furtive because it appeared he was concealing something underneath the front seat. Both officers also testified that in their experiences such a movement can occur when the occupant of the vehicle is placing a weapon under the seat. ¶ 83 The officer's conclusion that Johnson's furtive movement could have resulted from placing a weapon under the seat was reasonable because they accurately described what Johnson did, and they had past experience with similar movements of occupants who had secreted a weapon under the front seat. Accordingly, the officers reasonably believed that Johnson's actions had the potential to create a dangerous situation upon his re-entry into the vehicle because he would have access to any weapon he placed under the front seat. ¶ 84 The officers had to make a quick decision about their own safety after they decided not to arrest Johnson. They had two choices. They could ignore what they believed to be Johnson's reaching under the front seat and also ignore their experiences as law enforcement officers as to what such a reaching could mean or they could conduct a limited search of the area of Johnson's vehicle into which he would re-enter. They chose the latter course of action. ¶ 85 The majority concludes that the limited search of the passenger compartment of Johnson's vehicle was not reasonable because Johnson could have been trying to retrieve his driver's license, or picking up a fast food wrapper from the floor or several other innocuous acts. Majority op., ¶ 43. While I have no quarrel with the majority's discussion of what Johnson could have been doing, the discussion demonstrates only that the majority of this court, none of whom have any experience conducting traffic stops, is merely substituting its judgment for that of two experienced officers. But more importantly, the majority opinion does not explain why the officers' belief was not reasonable as is required. Stout, 250 Wis.2d 768, ¶ 31, 641 N.W.2d 474. ¶ 86 That Johnson's furtive movement could have an innocent explanation is not persuasive because, as this court has explained, a suspicious circumstance, such as a furtive movement, by its very nature is an ambiguous circumstance. See State v. Anderson, 155 Wis.2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). Simply because Johnson's furtive movement could have resulted from something other than concealing a weapon, it does not follow that the officers' belief that Johnson's movement had the potential of weapon concealment, was unreasonable. Stout, 250 Wis.2d 768, ¶ 31, 641 N.W.2d 474 (concluding that while there may have been an innocent reason for Stout's furtive movement, it was also reasonable to conclude that he was reaching for a weapon). [5] ¶ 87 As the United States Supreme Court has explained, traffic stops are very dangerous for law enforcement personnel. Long, 463 U.S. at 1048, 103 S.Ct. 3469. Therefore, when an officer releases a suspect who has made a furtive movement that could have been due to securing a weapon under the front seat, the officer must make a quick decision about whether to ignore what he has seen and his training and experience about the import of that observation or he can secure his own safety and that of others by conducting a limited search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle to which the suspect may return. In situations such as this case presents, when the officer opts for safety, no constitutional right is violated because the search is reasonable under the circumstances. Because the majority opinion does not balance the officer's need for the search with the level of intrusion on Johnson's privacy, it errs in concluding the vehicle search was not lawful. In so doing, it unnecessarily increases the risk of harm for officers who, in the future, choose the lack of action that the majority opinion requires.