Opinion ID: 1868390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Motion to Suppress Defendant's In-Custody Statements

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that defendant's in-custody statements were made freely and voluntarily and in denying his motion to suppress the statements. The argument initially focuses on the trial court's acceptance of Sgt. Merida's testimony. Defendant argues that Sgt. Merida's assertion that he saw the mustached defendant wearing a red cap is unworthy of credibility, in light of the testimony of Sgt. Toca, White Fleet driver Burbank, and the defendant, himself. Apparently taking the quantitative approach to weighing credibility, the defense asserts that Merida, contrary to his sworn testimony, did not see defendant wearing the red cap when he decided to stop the White Fleet cab. The defense insists Merida had no legitimate reason to stop the White Fleet cab on Causeway Boulevard, concluding the stop was pre-textual in nature and, thus, illegal. Next, the defense claims there was pre- Miranda interrogation of the defendant, also discounting Sgt. Merida's testimony that he promptly advised the defendant of his rights even as Seals demonstrated a desire to talk immediately, to explain why he had bloody clothes. The defense insists that the White Fleet driver's testimony that questioning by Sgt. Merida took place should be accepted, despite defendant Seals' own testimony at the motion hearing to the contrary. The defendant argues that he suffered substantial harm as a result of the admission of Seals' station house statements on July 27, 1991, asserting that the statements' contents so undermined the credibility of his crucial trial testimony that, had they not been admitted, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The defense concludes that the defendant's statements were not freely and voluntarily made. A law enforcement officer's right to stop and interrogate one reasonably suspected of criminal activity is recognized by La. Code Crim.P. art. 215.1 as well as by state and federal jurisprudence. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Davis, 92-1623 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 1012. In the Davis opinion, this Court acknowledged that the right to make an investigatory stop must be based on sufficient knowledge justifying a belief that the person being stopped has been or is about to be engaged in criminal conduct. What Sgt. Merida knew, combined with what he observed when the White Fleet cab caught his attention, constituted the degree of information necessary to justify the investigatory stop he conducted. Sgt. Merida's suspicions were strengthened when he viewed the bloody defendant and his bloody possessions in a plastic grocery bag on the passenger side of the front of the cab. Sgt. Merida's testimony provided ample evidence that Seals was given the proper Miranda warnings at the scene of the stop. From the observations about hearing testimony interspersed among the arguments of defendant's claims, it is clear that there is no persuasive basis for finding Merida's stop of the White Fleet cab pre-textual, no compelling reason why Sgt. Merida's assertion that he Mirandized Seals should not be accepted, no reason for concluding there was mistreatment of any party, or promises or threats which prompted Seals to give his statements. Sgt. Merida's testimony established he heard the description of a black mustached man wearing a red cap broadcast in connection with an armed robbery-murder report involving a cab. His sighting of defendant, a mustached black male wearing a red cap and riding in a cab, constituted reasonable cause to justify an investigatory stop, especially because he observed defendant slouch in his seat when they made eye contact. The state's burden of proving the free and voluntary nature of a confession as a condition precedent to its admission into evidence is codified in La.R.S. 15:451 and La. Code Crim.P. art. 703 D. This Court's review must be deferential to the trial court's findings unless it finds the ruling inadequately supported by reliable evidence. State v. Green, 94-0887 (La.5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272. The defense's complaint of the trial court's acceptance of Sgt. Merida's testimony fails to establish the inadequacy of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusions. The defense's efforts to discredit evidence which refutes claims of inadequate grounds for an investigatory stop, interrogation prior to the giving of Miranda warnings, and coercion, fall far short of establishing that the trial court lacked reliable evidence upon which to base its ruling. It is clear that the trial judge found credible the testimony of those witnesses whose representations supported adequate grounds for the stop, timely Miranda warnings, lack of coercion and lack of promises. This Court recognizes its obligation to apply a standard of review which requires it to leave undisturbed a trial court's conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of testimony relating to the voluntary nature of a confession unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Sanders, 93-0001 (La.11/30/94), 648 So.2d 1272 at 1282. By this standard, the Court finds this assignment of error lacking in merit.