Opinion ID: 2604134
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Kidnap.

Text: No testimony was presented by the victim of the 1973 kidnap conviction. The parties stipulated that defendant had been convicted of kidnap on May 2, 1974. 2. Defense Case. Defendant's mother, brother and sister testified about defendant's upbringing in Belzoni, Mississippi. He was the youngest of six children. Defendant, who was 29 years old at the time of trial, had attended segregated schools and had a perfect attendance record until he dropped out in high school. He played baseball, went to church and participated in civil rights activities with the rest of the family. Defendant's sister Carrie Gates, a music teacher with a master's degree, described Belzoni as a very prejudiced place to live at the time. Defendant's brother, who also had a master's degree, confirmed his sister's description of Belzoni. Defendant never had any trouble until an incident at the Western Auto Store when he was between 14 and 16. [8] He spent six months in jail as a result of the incident. After that the police would look for defendant any time there was a problem. On one occasion defendant was picked up for the shooting of a bus station attendant. Defendant's family was continually misled as to where he was being held, and they spent considerable time trying to locate him. Eventually, they had to call the Justice Department to find him. The charges were dismissed after the victim said his assailant was not Black. Defendant then moved to California. Defendant's mother visited him once in California in 1973. He was in the jail hospital and had been beaten by the police. She next saw him in 1978 when he came to Belzoni for a visit. Three people who had been neighbors of defendant in the Fairmount apartment building in Oakland testified. Desiree Pugh described defendant as a very dear friend who was always sweet and considerate toward her and her family. He checked in on her regularly when she was pregnant and was very concerned about her welfare. Defendant continued to check in by phone after he was in jail. Frances Marion, who lived with Joe Lombard at the Fairmount building, described defendant as a good-hearted, good-natured person who never got angry or raised his voice. Joe Lombard testified that defendant got along extremely well with people. He had a friendly, outgoing personality. Dr. Paul Berg, a clinical psychologist, testified that on the basis of his interview with defendant and his review of defendant's prison records, he thought defendant was an unusually well-adjusted prisoner. In his opinion, there was a great likelihood that defendant would again adjust well to prison and present no problem. B. PROCEDURE At the conclusion of the penalty phase evidence, the court gave only three instructions: CALJIC Nos. 8.84, 8.84.1, and a modified version of 8.84.2 using the word may instead of the word shall. [9] The court gave no instruction on sympathy. During deliberations, the jury requested the evidence from the second part of the trial, particularly the tape of defendant's phone conversation with Evelyn Bostic. Sometime later the jury requested the court to explain the use of the word may in its modified CALJIC No. 8.84.2. The court gave a lengthy explanation, which we discuss later. The next day the jury requested further instructions as to how much of the second part of the trial should be considered in arriving at our decision. The court explained that the first phase of the trial had concerned guilt or innocence and the special circumstance finding. In the second phase the jury was to determine the penalty  life without possibility of parole or death  by considering the factors previously listed. The court's review of the factors will also be discussed later. The jury reached its verdict the next day, imposing a sentence of death. C. CONTENTIONS 1. Denial of Motion to Re-Voir Dire the Jury. (15) After the guilt phase verdicts had been returned, defense counsel moved for a new jury, and when that motion was denied, he moved to re-voir dire the jury. Both motions were based on general allegations of prejudice and general publicity regarding crimes and criticism of the judicial system. Section 190.4, subdivision (c) states: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. The court shall state facts in support of the finding of good cause upon the record and cause them to be entered into the minutes. Section 190.4, subdivision (c) expresses the longstanding legislative preference for a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty. ( People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482, 499 [58 Cal. Rptr. 361, 426 P.2d 929].) As we noted in People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 351-352 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680], the statutory preference for a single jury in capital cases is supported by a number of weighty considerations. It seems clear that the court did not err in denying the defense request to re-voir dire the jury. No cause for genuine concern was raised by the publicity about other crimes and criticism of the criminal justice system. There is no direct authority on the meaning of good cause in this context. There are, however, cases involving the question of good cause for discharge of a juror under sections 1123 and 1089. As to the latter statutes, the facts must show an inability to perform the functions of a juror, and that inability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality. ( People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 60 [98 Cal. Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537].) Defendant's showing was entirely speculative, raising no duty on the part of the court to question the jurors. [10] 2. Instructions and Argument on Mitigation. Defense efforts at the penalty phase were devoted to showing redeeming features of defendant's character and background that would warrant the jury's mercy. As noted, the defense presented seven witnesses who testified about defendant's character and background. Extensive portions of defense argument were directed to this evidence and a lesser portion of prosecution argument. The argument of one of defendant's attorneys was almost entirely a plea for mercy which was not directly related to the facts of the crime. Defense counsel did not attempt to contest the evidence of other crimes presented by the prosecution. The trial court gave CALJIC No. 8.84.1 as it read before its amendment in response to a suggestion in People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, footnote 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], for clarification of the subdivision (k) factor of section 190.3. (16) Defendant contends that the giving of this instruction with the unadorned factor (k) language, coupled with comments made in the prosecution argument, misled the jurors into believing that they were not allowed to consider the mitigating evidence presented by the defense. [11] We do not agree. CALJIC No. 8.84.1 has since been amended to add the following phrase to factor (k): and any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death. We do not believe that simply because this phrase was not included, the jury was left with the impression it could not consider the defense evidence presented concerning defendant's background and character. Indeed, the jury was specifically instructed to consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial in this case. It would defy all logic and reason to conclude that the jury which heard seven witnesses testify concerning the defendant's background and character, was directed to consider all of the evidence, and heard defense counsel argue this evidence at length, would somehow have concluded that it could not consider this testimony in its penalty determination. Jurors are not without common sense; the jury necessarily must have considered this defense evidence in its penalty decision. (17) Defendant further contends that the instructional defect was exacerbated by the prosecutor's penalty phase argument: It's not a time to talk for mercy or forgiveness for Oscar Gates. It's too late for that. All throughout voir dire we talked about would you follow the law, would you base your decision on evidence received in the court, not religion, not mercy, forgiveness, philosophy, anything you personally might believe or feel, not feelings of guilt on your part or sorrow for his family. [¶] The evidence that you received in the case, that's what you promised the judge you'd base your decision on, because the time now is not for philosophy or religion, mercy, forgiveness, sorry [ sic ] for the family, feelings of guilt on your own part. The time now is, I would say, a time for justice for Oscar Gates. Now is the time for an accounting finally. Although defendant raised no objection at trial, he now contends that the prosecutor was telling the jurors they could not consider any sympathy toward defendant based on the evidence of his upbringing and background. We believe that is not a fair assessment of the argument. The prosecutor was stating that in his view of the evidence, defendant was not worthy of mercy. He did not say that the jury could not consider any mercy or sympathy factors which were supported by the evidence. This is not like the argument in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 58 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279], where the prosecutor told the jury not to consider the defendant's family background and other sympathy factors on which evidence had been presented. In this case the prosecutor never argued that the jury could not consider any of the defense evidence presented. The prosecutor did, in fact, review the evidence presented by the defense regarding defendant's background and family and argue his interpretation of it. 3. Burden of Proof. (18) Defendant contends the due process and cruel and/or unusual punishment clauses of the federal and state Constitutions require that a capital jury be instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances and that death is the appropriate penalty. We recently rejected such a claim in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]. 4. Evidence of Other Crimes. Defendant makes a number of claims of error with regard to the admission of evidence of other crimes committed by him. As noted, the prosecution introduced evidence relating to the robbery, beatings and murder at the Conner-Johnson Mortuary in Los Angeles on November 6, 1978. At the time of trial defendant had not been convicted of those crimes. The other crimes all involved convictions  1973 convictions for kidnapping of one victim and the rape of another, and 1980 convictions of robbery of the McDonald's manager and assault with a deadly weapon on the two trash collectors. (19) Defendant correctly asserts that the court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte that the jury could not consider the other-crimes evidence unless the commission of such crimes had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [12] ( People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d 247, 280; People v. Robertson, supra, 33 Cal.3d at pp. 53-55.) The error, however, is harmless. It principally affects the mortuary crimes, since defendant had been convicted of the other crimes. [13] The evidence of defendant's guilt as to these crimes was overwhelming. The testimony of David Garcia and Calvin Miller regarding defendant's involvement was remarkably consistent, even as to small details. The blue cloth bag found under the murder victim's body was the one Garcia had given defendant. Evelyn Bostic testified about defendant's admissions of guilt, and her testimony was substantiated to a great extent by the tape recordings. More importantly, defendant did not challenge or object to any of the evidence of other crimes presented by the prosecution. Nor did he cross-examine any of the prosecution witnesses. Defendant now points to alleged weaknesses in the mortuary crimes evidence  e.g., bias of Miller and Bostick, inability of Ann Townsend to identify her assailants  which he claims illustrate the impossibility of concluding that his guilt was established as a matter of law. He also notes that his trial on these charges ended with a hung jury. [14] Defendant's argument is unconvincing. The evidence presented in this case leaves no doubt that defendant committed the mortuary crimes. Whatever caused the Los Angeles jury to deadlock may have been impeaching evidence that was not presented here. On the record before us, it is inconceivable that the jury would have reached a different result had it been instructed that it could not consider the mortuary crimes unless it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed them. (20) Defendant also claims that section 190.3, subdivision (b) is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the jury which has already determined a defendant's guilt to consider other violent crimes on which he was neither charged nor convicted. We rejected a similar claim in People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 204-205. (21) Defendant claims that in addition to being instructed that they could not consider the mortuary crimes unless they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed them, the jury should also have been required to make written findings to that effect. We rejected such a claim as to the 1977 law in People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 178-180 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587] and People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316-317 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149]. Our reasoning relating to the 1977 law applies equally to the 1978 law. (22) Defendant contends that the prosecution should not have been allowed to present testimony regarding one of the 1972 assaults and the McDonald's incident, since his counsel had stipulated to these convictions. We disagree. When dealing with violent conduct it is not the fact of conviction which is probative in the penalty phase, but rather the conduct of the defendant which gave rise to the offense. Defendant's contention might have had merit had the convictions involved nonviolent conduct, since the admission of such evidence is strictly limited by subdivision (c) of section 190.3. But the convictions here involved violent conduct and were thus admissible pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 190.3, which permits the introduction of all evidence of violent crimes and does not require a conviction. [15] (See People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 202-203.) 5. Instruction on Weighing Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances. In People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 538-545 [230 Cal. Rptr. 834, 726 P.2d 516] (revd. on other grounds California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S.  [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837]), we concluded that the directive of section 190.3 that the trier of fact shall impose a sentence of death if it concluded that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, did not impermissibly restrict the jury's constitutional sentencing discretion. We rejected the defendant's proffered mechanistic construction of the words outweigh and shall in favor of one which directed the jury to weigh the various factors and determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is appropriate in a particular case. We noted, however, that the statutory language  particularly the words shall impose  left room for some confusion about the jury's role and therefore directed courts in the future to instruct on the scope of the jury's discretion. We further stated that each prior case must be examined on its own merits to determine whether, in context, the sentencer may have been misled to defendant's prejudice about the scope of its sentencing discretion under the 1978 law. ( Id. at p. 544, fn. 17.) Our concerns in Brown were essentially two: The first was that the jury might be confused about the nature of the weighing process, that it is not a mere mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale but rather a mental balancing process. Our second concern was that use of the word shall might mislead the jury as to the substance of the ultimate determination it was called upon to make. In Brown, we concluded that the statutory language should not be understood to require any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the `weighing' process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circumstances. Thus the jury, by weighing the various factors, simply determines under the relevant evidence which penalty is appropriate in the particular case. (40 Cal.3d at p. 541.) In the present case, the court sought to avoid any confusion about the scope of the jury's sentencing discretion by substituting the word may for the word shall in the instruction. (23) Defendant contends that confusion was nevertheless created by the court's reinstruction in response to a question from the jury and the language of the verdict forms. [16] We do not agree. A review of the court's comments dispels such a conclusion. In response to the jury's request for explanation of the word may in the instructions, the court stated: ... I instructed that: If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you may impose a sentence of death. I did that because it is the duty of the Judge to instruct the jury as to the law. The statute says that: `If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a verdict of death.' In other words, the statute, itself, says it in a mandatory way. It does say `shall.' The jury may properly say: Well, Judge, why did you say `may'? And the reason I said `may,' in effect, the word `shall' means you should impose death but you don't have to. Because you see, you are the final, ultimate triers of the facts. You're very much like I am everyday when I sentence people. I decide whether they go to prison, how long. You decide what the penalty is. If, even though the statute says, that: `If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death,' you will, as a juror and as an ultimate judge of which penalty, you still can do what you want. And for that reason I use the word `may,' so I don't take away from you the ultimate discretion of making the ultimate decision. Now, I feel somewhat apologetic. I didn't mean  I understand what l'm doing to you. I understand it's a terrible decision, and I hope you don't think I deliberately tried to mislead you. What I tried to do is give you that ultimate discretion that you have in order to arrive at what you feel is a fair verdict. I did substitute the word `may.' Again, I'll tell you what the statute says: `If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a verdict of death.' But even if it says that, you can do what you want and nobody can say anything about it. You might say: Hey, Judge, what kind of thing is this to do? That's the way the law is. The jury later sent out another note asking the court how much of the second part of the trial they should consider. A portion of the court's response to that question contained further explanation of the weighing process: And six is the general catchall, which is why, in effect, I substituted the word `may' instead of `shall.' Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it may not be and is not, in fact, a legal excuse for the crime. Now, you then have all these factors in aggravation and mitigation. And then you weigh them; and then you say that, if you conclude that the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, then you select this punishment. If you find the factors in mitigation outweigh those in aggravation, you select the other punishment. Now, I don't know if I can answer anymore precisely that. I can't say: You give a certain percentage to the first phase, ten percent to the aggravation, five to the mitigation, what have you. I've got to give you it in this general way I did. A juror then asked, Regardless of which way it goes, whether it's  If we find, say, predominantly in one direction, do we still have the option to vote the opposite way? The court responded: Well, let me only answer it this way: The decision must be unanimous. Each person must render the judgment according to his own finding. [¶] However, the way you determine which punishment is proper is to look at the evidence. From the evidence you must find: Do the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation? If the factors in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation, you vote one way. If the factors in mitigation outweigh the factors in aggravation, you vote another way. The court then reviewed the factors again and ended by stating: I can't answer any more precisely than that. You do it from the evidence, of course. You make your decision. You don't make a decision [demonstrating]. You make it from the evidence. You take the evidence, and then you weigh it. And in weighing the evidence, you decide a verdict. You don't do it from something outside the courtroom. We find that the court's comments, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed to the jury the message that it had the ultimate discretion to determine the appropriate penalty and was not bound by any mechanistic counting process. 6. Comment on the Evidence. (24) Defendant contends that the court's re-instruction on the aggravating and mitigating factors, with examples from the evidence, amounted to improper comment on the evidence because all of the examples referred to aggravating evidence, thus implying that there was no mitigating evidence. The re-instruction was in response to the jury's question about how much of the second part of the trial should be considered in arriving at its decision. The court noted that in the second phase of the trial the jury must determine which of the two punishments it feels is proper based upon the evidence. It then listed the aggravating and mitigating factors again: Now, one of the factors  What are the factors in aggravation? I listed roughly six of them for you. Let me take them again. Now, one of them, one factor is: The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted  that's the first phase  and the existence of any special circumstance found to be true. So, you can take into consideration as one factor in aggravation, in effect, the killing and robbery of Lonnie Stevenson. Second, you can take into consideration: The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involve the use of force or the attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. Now, that can be the evidence which was introduced  the mortuary murder, the assaultive behavior upon the two garbage men. Another factor you can consider in aggravation or mitigation, depending on what you find: The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. You have had evidence introduced to you as to a prior rape conviction and another prior robbery conviction  or kidnap. You had that evidence submitted to you. Another factor you consider: Whether or not the offense  that's going back now to the first phase  was committed under circumstances which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or extenuation of his conduct. You may take into consideration the age of the defendant, for or against, in aggravation or mitigation.[ [17] ] And six is the general catchall, which is why, in affect, I substituted the word may instead of shall. Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it may not be and is not, in fact, a legal excuse for the crime. Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution authorizes the court to make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the cause. This provision allows the court to do more than merely summarize the evidence. ( People v. Cook (1983) 33 Cal.3d 400, 407 [189 Cal. Rptr. 159, 658 P.2d 86].) The court's comments, however, must be scrupulously fair and may not invade the province of the jury as the exclusive trier of fact. ( Id. at p. 408.) [A] judge may restrict his comments to portions of the evidence or to the credibility of a single witness and need not sum up all the testimony, both favorable and unfavorable. ( People v. Friend (1958) 50 Cal.2d 570, 578 [327 P.2d 97]; overruled on other grounds in People v. Cook, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 413, fn. 13.) No improper comment was made here. The court did not suggest a particular verdict or an opinion on the ultimate issue. Although all of the factual examples cited were aggravating factors, they were not matters of dispute. The mitigating factors, by contrast, were more amorphous and subject to interpretation. Defendant reads far too much into the court's re-instruction in asserting that the failure to give any examples of mitigating evidence necessarily implied that there were none. 7. Instruction That Circumstances of the Crime Is an Aggravating Factor. (25) Defendant contends that the court's CALJIC No. 8.84.1 instruction that the jury may consider the circumstances of the crime left the jury with too much discretion. We rejected such a contention in People v. Phillips, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pages 63-64. 8. Duty to Instruct Regarding Defendant's Failure to Testify at Penalty Phase. (26) Defendant, who testified at the guilt phase but not at the penalty phase, contends that the trial court had a duty to instruct sua sponte not to draw any adverse inferences from defendant's failure to testify at the penalty phase. The short answer to this contention is that since the trial court does not even have a sua sponte duty to give such an instruction at the guilt phase ( People v. Preston (1973) 9 Cal.3d 308, 316 [107 Cal. Rptr. 300, 508 P.2d 300]; People v. Gardner (1969) 71 Cal.2d 843, 852 [79 Cal. Rptr. 743, 457 P.2d 575]), a fortiori the court has no sua sponte duty at the penalty phase. Although the United States Supreme Court has discussed the giving of a cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection ( Lakeside v. Oregon (1978) 435 U.S. 333 [55 L.Ed.2d 319, 98 S.Ct. 1091]) and on request ( Carter v. Kentucky (1981) 450 U.S. 288 [67 L.Ed.2d 241, 101 S.Ct. 1112]), it has never held that a cautionary instruction is required sua sponte. Accordingly, nothing persuades us to alter our rule set forth in Gardner that the court has no sue sponte duty to instruct against adverse inferences from a defendant's failure to testify. Moreover, the instruction could cause great confusion if it were given at the penalty phase when, as here, the defendant testified at the guilt phase. At the penalty phase the jury was instructed to consider all the evidence received at the guilt phase, necessarily including defendant's testimony. 9. Failure to Specify Which Guilt Phase Instructions Were Applicable to Penalty Phase. (27) The instructions given at the end of the guilt phase of defendant's trial included the appropriate standards for judging the credibility of witnesses (CALJIC Nos. 2.20, 2.21, 2.22) and the standard introductory instruction with its no-sympathy admonition (CALJIC No. 1.00). Defendant contends that the court prejudicially erred at the penalty phase by failing to instruct that the credibility instructions continued to apply and that the no-sympathy instruction did not. The result, according to defendant, was either that the jury thought none of the guilt phase instructions applied and had no standards to guide them on assessing witness credibility, or that they thought all of the guilt phase instructions applied, including the no-sympathy admonition. We are not convinced that either scenario necessarily occurred. The language of the no-sympathy instruction specifically referred to deciding a defendant's guilt or innocence and would not be necessarily understood as applying to the penalty phase. The witness credibility instructions, by contrast, were not specifically limited to the issue of guilt or innocence. Nor do we find that there was a prejudicial carryover effect from the guilt phase no-sympathy instruction. As previously mentioned, all of the defense evidence at the penalty phase went to showing redeeming features of defendant's character and background. Most of the defense argument was directed to this evidence. The prosecutor also referred to it and urged his interpretation of it.