Opinion ID: 757876
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Materiality of False Statements

Text: 29 Bok also argues that the trial court erred in not permitting the jury to decide whether the false statements Bok made on Abacus's corporate returns were material. In doing so, he appears to argue that United States v. Klausner, 80 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir.1996), which permitted a trial judge to decide issues of materiality in a § 7206 case, is wrongly decided under United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). Gaudin affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because the trial court had not submitted the question of materiality to the jury. Because the trial court did submit the question of materiality to the jury in this case, it is not necessary for us to examine or apply Klausner. 30 It is abundantly clear that the trial judge allowed the jury to decide the issue of materiality, even though Klausner did not explicitly require him to do so. The court charged the jury in pertinent part as follows: 31 ... [T]he third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the return at issue in the count you are considering was not true and correct as to every material matter.... 32 In relation to whether statements on a document are incorrect as to a material matter, a line on a tax return is a material matter if the information required to be reported on that line is capable of influencing or impeding the IRS in verifying or auditing the return. In other words, the test of materiality in this case is whether the information required to be reported on the tax return in question was necessary for the proper evaluation of the accuracy of the tax return.... 33 ... [I]f you find beyond a reasonable doubt that gross receipts were understated in such a way as to influence or impede the IRS in verifying and auditing the return, then you should conclude that the return was not true and correct as to all material matters.... 34 Trial Transcript at 1135-36. Thus, in his instructions, the trial judge did nothing more than define material for the jury, an action which is entirely permissible under Gaudin. See 515 U.S. at 513, 115 S.Ct. 2310. If the jury had found that the statements were false but would not influence or impede the IRS in its evaluation of the returns, the jury would have been free to acquit because the false statements were not material. 35 Because the trial judge left the question of materiality to the jury, he committed no error in his instruction on that issue.