Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Evidence from First Trial

Text: At the penalty phase, defense counsel sought a ruling that, should defendant testify and state he was remorseful, the prosecutor would not be permitted to question him about the circumstances of the crimes or use defendant's prior testimony for impeachment. The court declined to make such a ruling, and defense counsel indicated that as a result he would not call defendant as a witness. Defendant contends the trial court's ruling denied him his rights to effective assistance of counsel and to testify in his own defense under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution. Defendant has failed to preserve this claim of error. It is well established that the denial of a motion to exclude impeachment evidence is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant subsequently declines to testify. (See Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 ( Luce ) [denial of in limine motion to preclude impeachment of the defendant with a prior conviction is not reviewable on appeal if the defendant did not testify]; People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-388, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173 ( Collins ) [prospectively adopting the Luce rule].) Defendant argues that the Luce rule does not apply, because defendant's prior testimony was constitutionally tainted and because evidence that he had perjured himself in the prior trial would completely undermine his current testimony regardless of its content. (See People v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461, 468, 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 652 [defendant need not testify in order to preserve his claim that trial court erred in admitting for impeachment purposes a statement obtained in violation of his right to counsel].) We are not persuaded. The rationale for the Luce rule applies fully here. First, in order to determine the admissibility of defendant's prior testimony, the court must balance its probative value against its prejudicial effect under Evidence Code section 352, an analysis that cannot be performed unless the record discloses the content of the defendant's testimony. (See Luce, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 41, 105 S.Ct. 460; Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 384, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173.) Second, if the defendant does not testify, any possible harm from the trial court's ruling is wholly speculative. The ruling might change in response to the actual content of the defendant's testimony, or the prosecution might choose not to use the evidence at issue. (See Luce, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 41, 105 S.Ct. 460; Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p.384, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173.) Third, if the trial court erred in its ruling, the appellate court could not intelligently weigh the prejudicial affect of that error. ( Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 384, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173; Luce, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 42, 105 S.Ct. 460.) Here, defendant proposed to testify that he was remorseful more than 10 years after the offense. On the present record, it is impossible to evaluate what effect his false testimony many years earlier might have had on such a defense. Defendant additionally contends the prosecutor improperly used the circumstance of defendant's first trial and death sentence to rebut mitigating evidence demonstrating remorse, consisting of his offer to plead guilty and accept a life sentence. The record does not support this contention. The prosecutor questioned some of the defense witnesses concerning whether defendant may have offered to plead guilty in order to avoid the death penalty, rather than because he felt remorse. There was nothing improper in this tactic. The prosecutor's questions constituted a reasonable response to the defense testimony and did not focus on the results of the first trial.