Opinion ID: 2515893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appeals of Administrative Action

Text: [¶ 25] The liquor license process is administrative in nature. However, we must dispel any misperception that an appeal right might be available indirectly by application of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act (WAPA). By legislative design, the WAPA does not apply to cities: [4] The Administrative Procedure Act provides only for judicial review of action or inaction taken by an agency. Section 16-3-114(a), W.S.1977. An agency is any authority, bureau, board, commission, department, division, officer or employee of the state, a county, city or town or other political subdivision of the state, except the governing body of a city or town, the state legislature and the judiciary. Section 16-3-101(b)(i), W.S. 1977. Administrative decisions by a city council are not reviewable pursuant to the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act because a city council is not an agency. City of Evanston v. Whirl Inn, Inc., Wyo., 647 P.2d 1378 (1982). Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo.1986). For this reason, a license transfer request made to a city council, as the licensing authority, does not constitute a contested case under the WAPA, and neither the appeal rights of the WAPA nor the requirements for clearly delineated findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2001) are applicable to the City Council's final decision. [5] [¶ 26] Despite the provisions of § 12-4-104 which preclude the licensing authority from issuing, renewing, or transferring a license if it finds from evidence presented at the hearing that any one of five circumstances exists, [6] no express language requires any such finding to be made by a city denying a permit or a transfer. Whitesides, 319 P.2d at 526. The licensing authority is only prohibited from approving a transfer request if one of the five conditions exists. As the WAPA does not apply to the governing bodies of cities, there is no mechanism to compel cities to conduct administrative proceedings and issue administrative findings in compliance with the more formal requirements of the WAPA. Foster's Inc., 718 P.2d at 872. If we were to extend the WAPA to these circumstances, such a result would arguably impose the procedural requirements of the WAPA on all administrative proceedings. This would be contrary to legislative intent. Although we agree that providing a full explanation of their actions would benefit the public, we also acknowledge that cities are not compelled by law to do so. We decline to impose such a requirement without a legislative mandate. Further, we note, in the absence of a requirement for written findings and conclusions, the actions of the licensing authority cannot be construed as arbitrary and capricious merely because no reasons for the actions were given. Whitesides, 319 P.2d at 526. [¶ 27] No party contends the City Council failed to abide by the procedural requirements of § 12-4-104(e) and § 12-4-601(a). The record reflects notice was properly given, a hearing was held, and the parties and all other interested persons were allowed a sufficient opportunity to address the City Council. Adequate due process was afforded to the parties. [¶ 28] A limited argument was made that the process was insufficient because a property right was involved. This is an inaccurate portrayal of the nature of the right as between the licensing authority and the applicants for transfer. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-4-106(a) (LexisNexis 2001) provides in relevant part: A license or permit is considered a personal privilege to the holder and the term of the license or permit is for one (1) year unless sooner revoked. We have previously held, as between third parties, a liquor license is considered property. Johnson v. Smith, 455 P.2d 244, 251 (Wyo.1969), reflects, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, we deem the liquor license within the description of the property mortgaged, which upon foreclosure and sale ... would give the purchaser the `first chance' or opportunity to apply to the licensing authority for continuation or renewal. Similarly, in Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 46 (Wyo.1985), we held: [T]he provision of the lease containing the requirement that appellants transfer the liquor license to Northwestern at the conclusion of the lease is valid and enforceable as between the parties. Any such transfer is, however, subject to the provisions of § 12-4-601(b), W.S.1977, requiring public hearing and approval by the licensing authority. [¶ 29] The nature of this unique right has been succinctly described in the following terms: [A] liquor license is not property as between the licensing authority and the license holder, but it has sufficient attributes of property to be considered property as between private individuals. Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 663 A.2d 1318, 1326 (1995). In the context of this case, as between the City of Sheridan and the transferee applicants, the liquor license was merely a privilege to be granted or denied. We therefore conclude the process provided by the City Council, although not as formal or complete as the WAPA requires, was adequate for this action affecting a privilege granted by the City Council.