Opinion ID: 439958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claimed Trial Error

Text: 8
9 Oxman and Pflaumer both contend that a new trial is warranted because the prosecuting attorney, during the trial and in closing argument, vouched for the truthfulness of the witnesses Frank Jock and John Luciano. 10 The alleged instances of vouching during the trial occurred when on direct examination the prosecuting attorney called to the jury's attention that the plea agreements, which had been disclosed to defense counsel, obliged them to testify truthfully. The government could reasonably anticipate that the beneficial features of the agreements would be used for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. If they were so used, reference to the condition requiring truthful testimony would be proper rehabilitation. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (2d Cir.1980). Since the government could reasonably anticipate such impeachment, it was not improper to anticipate it on direct examination by disclosing the truthful-testimony condition. See United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 137-38 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1006, 79 L.Ed.2d 238 (1984). Indeed, some courts have held that reference to the truthful-testimony condition is proper even when the witness' credibility is not put in issue. See United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir.1981); United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1198-99 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 513, 519 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820, 99 S.Ct. 83, 58 L.Ed.2d 111 (1978). 11 The vouching during closing argument on which Oxman and Pflaumer rely occurred when the prosecuting attorney argued: 12 John Luciano's testimony and the agreement that he entered into with the government is tied in to a condition that is written, and it is carved in stone, and there is no way around it. John Luciano must tell the truth. If he does not, he is going to be in far worse trouble than he already is. 13 App. at 1424-25. These two sentences, while hyperbolic, accurately describe the agreement with Luciano and the likely consequences of its breach. They were, therefore, appropriate responses to the defendants' attack on Luciano's credibility. Several sentences later, however, the prosecuting attorney continued: 14 If I made a mistake in entering into that deal with John Luciano, then I personally will have to be responsible for it. 15 App. at 1425. The reference to counsel's personal responsibility in the event the jury believed him mistake[n] in entering into that deal with John Luciano was not an appropriate response. But this isolated reference to the possibility that the prosecuting attorney would be personally disadvantaged for entering injudiciously into a plea bargain with a witness, while in our view improper, is not ground for a new trial. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a).

16 Oxman contends that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of an accountant that Luciano had defrauded Temple University of over $350,000. The trial court properly held that this evidence of specific instances of misconduct of a witness was inadmissible by virtue of Fed.R.Evid. 608(b).
17 Pflaumer urges that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that during the time WHP was defrauding the states of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey of about $200,000 in excise taxes, another company owned by him, C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., was paying the federal government about $40 million a year in excise taxes. Pflaumer contends that this evidence would tend to negate any motive on his part to participate in the small fraud committed by WHP. The trial court excluded the testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 403 on the ground that any probative value it might have would be outweighed by the possibility of jury confusion. We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling.
18 Pflaumer contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give a proffered instruction as follows: 19 The indictment charges that the last tax return mailed as part of the alleged scheme and conspiracy was dated June 30, 1979. It was at that time, therefore, that the alleged conspiracy or scheme terminated. You may not find any defendant guilty merely on the basis of anything he did or said after June, 1979. This is because a conspirator cannot join a conspiracy or scheme after its attempts to achieve illicit objectives [have] ended.... In short, if you find that the government has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Pflaumer knowingly and willfully became a member of the alleged conspiracy or scheme to defraud Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland of diesel fuel taxes prior to June, 1979, you must acquit Mr. Pflaumer of all charges. 20 App. at 1498. To understand this request one must appreciate what was charged in the indictment. 21 The first twenty-one counts alleged twenty-one separate mailings, each a separate substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341 (1982). The first mailing took place on April 3, 1978, the last on June 30, 1979. These mailings were alleged to violate section 1341 because they were for the purpose of executing a scheme or artifice, which arguably extended over a longer period, to defraud the three states. The scheme itself does not, however, violate federal law; only the use of the mailings to effectuate the scheme does so. See Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94-95, 65 S.Ct. 148, 150-151, 89 L.Ed. 88 (1944); United States v. Tarnopol, 561 F.2d 466, 471 (3d Cir.1977). 22 The twenty-second count charges a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371 (1982), which proscribes conspiracies to commit any offense against the United States. The conspiracy charged in the indictment alleges: 23 a scheme and artifice to defraud the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the State of New Jersey, and the State of Maryland by means of false and fraudulent pretenses and representations, and for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice to defraud and attempting so to do, to place in and cause to be placed in an authorized depository for mail matter, certain matter as described in Counts One through Twenty One, in violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1341 .... 24 App. at 17. As with the substantive section 1341 counts, the fraudulent scheme itself does not violate the federal conspiracy statute. The federal conspiracy must be to violate a federal substantive law--in this instance, the substantive prohibition against the use of the 21 mailings alleged in the first 21 counts. 25 Pflaumer's point in making the quoted request for charge was straightforward. A conspiracy to violate a substantive prohibition in a federal statute ends when the unlawful object has been accomplished. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 406-15, 77 S.Ct. 963, 974-79, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). The object of the conspiracy charged in the indictment was the use of the mails to effectuate a scheme to defraud three states of tax revenues. Although the scheme may have continued until 1981--an issue on which we express no opinion--the use of the mails to effectuate the scheme ceased in 1979. Thus, the conspiracy charged in the indictment ended in June of 1979, and in order to convict the jury must have found that Pflaumer joined the conspiracy before that date. 26 From the viewpoint of Pflaumer's defense, this issue was quite significant. There is evidence from which the jury could have found that when state agencies conducted audits of WHP after June of 1979, Pflaumer's actions tended to conceal the scheme. This evidence was admitted at trial not to show Pflaumer's membership in the conspiracy--that was prohibited by Grunewald --but to raise an inference of consciousness of guilt. See United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776, 790-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 945, 103 S.Ct. 260, 74 L.Ed.2d 203 (1982); App. at 1665-66. The jury, however--not finely versed in these subtle distinctions--might have mistakenly applied evidence of concealment to show membership in the conspiracy. Hence Pflaumer requested an instruction expressly charging that the jury must, in order to convict, establish membership in the conspiracy based on evidence of acts before June of 1979. 27 The court refused the requested instruction. The government defends that refusal on several grounds. One is that post-June 30, 1979 efforts at concealment constitute a ratification of the co-conspirator's antecedent conduct including any mailings made in furtherance of the scheme. Appellee's Br. at 50. That contention must be rejected because it conflicts with Grunewald v. United States, supra, which holds that acts of concealment after the principal object of the conspiracy (here use of the mails to defraud three states of tax revenues) has been completed do not comprise part of the conspiracy. See 353 U.S. at 403-06, 77 S.Ct. at 973-75. 28 Alternatively, the government contends that the charge as given was substantially in accordance with the request. The court charged in part: 29 In order to find any defendant guilty on Count 22 [conspiracy] you must find all the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 30 (1) That the conspiracy described in the Indictment was existing at or about the time alleged; 31 (2) That the particular defendant willfully became a member of the conspiracy with knowledge of its illegal objectives; 32 (3) That one of the conspirators thereafter knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts alleged in the indictment, at or about the time charged and during the period of the conspiracy; and 33 (4) That the overt act was knowingly done in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy as charged. 34 If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that the existence of the conspiracy charged in the Indictment has been proved and that during the existence of that conspiracy one of the overt acts alleged was knowingly done by one of the persons found by you to have been a conspirator, in furtherance of some object or purpose of the conspiracy, that proof of the conspiracy is complete; and it is complete as to every person found by you to have been willfully a member of that conspiracy at the time the overt act was committed, regardless of which of the conspirators did the overt act. 35 App. at 1458-59. Had the court stopped at this point, we could have accepted the government's alternative argument. This much of the charge, while less specific in advancing Pflaumer's theory than the requested instruction, is not inconsistent with the indictment and complies with Grunewald. But the court continued: 36 The Indictment alleges numerous overt acts in furtherance of each conspiracy. What must be shown is that after the defendant, whom you are considering, joined the conspiracy, some one of the conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 37 Keep in mind that the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one of the overt acts as alleged in the Indictment occurred while the conspiracy was still in existence. That is, the overt act must have occurred between approximately November, 1976, and January, 1981. You're not to consider any acts that occurred after the conspiracy was terminated. 38 App. at 1467-68 (emphasis added). Thus, the court charged that the jury may find that the defendants joined each conspiracy as late as January, 1981. Plainly the court here rejected Pflaumer's theory that a section 371 conspiracy to violate the mail fraud statute ends with the last mailing, here in June of 1979. The reference to plural conspiracies, and to overt acts after June 30, 1979, suggests that the court focused on a conspiracy to defraud the states as itself a violation of section 371. Such a conspiracy would not be a violation of section 371, nor does the indictment so charge. In any event, because the charge permitted the jury to find that the defendants joined the conspiracy after its principal object had terminated in June of 1979, the charge as given is inconsistent both with the indictment and with Grunewald v. United States, supra. 39 Finally, the government notes that, as the penultimate paragraph of the charge above (denoted indicates, the court charged that [w]hat must be shown is that after the defendant ... joined the conspiracy, some one of the conspirators performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. App. at 1467. The last overt act charged in the indictment occurred in March of 1978. The jury had a copy of the indictment. Therefore, the government maintains, although the charge permitted the jury to find an overt act as late as January, 1981, the jury must have found an overt act no later than March of 1978. Thus, the government concludes, the jury must have found that Pflaumer joined the conspiracy before that date. Appellee's Br. at 47. 40 We cannot agree. We see no basis for believing that the jury would ignore the court's instruction that it may find that the last overt act occurred in 1981. And we view with skepticism the suggestion that the jury would have understood which of the court's instructions to obey and which to ignore. Moreover, the jury heard a significant amount of evidence suggesting possible concealment by Pflaumer after 1979, inviting it to do exactly what Pflaumer feared--find that he joined the conspiracy after the last mailing. Thus, far from suggesting that the jury may have ignored the court's instructions, the evidence suggests that it may well have done precisely what the jury is expected to do: abide by them. 41 We must also determine whether the error is harmless. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). If the evidence connecting Pflaumer to the conspiracy prior to June 30, 1979 were overwhelming, we could accept such an analysis. But as we observe in Part IV infra, that is not the case. Although some evidence tended to connect Pflaumer to the conspiracy before 1979, it is not sufficient to negate the possibility that the jury established his membership based in significant part on the post-1979 evidence. Because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury may have considered acts of concealment as evidence of membership in the conspiracy alleged, we cannot find the error harmless. 42 Pflaumer's counsel preserved his objection to this aspect of the charge at its completion. App. at 1486. Oxman neither requested a charge with respect to the termination date of the conspiracy nor objected to the charge, evidently for the reason that none of the evidence bearing on possible concealment by Pflaumer after June 30, 1979, implicated him. Thus the error in the charge affected only Pflaumer.