Opinion ID: 1702363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the amount awarded as reasonable attorney fees upon disolution of the preliminary injunction exceeds the amount which the evidence shows the appellees to have actually incurred for having been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.

Text: Kelso admits that if the injunction was properly dissolved, Pollack was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to MRCP Rule 65(c). Rule 65(c) provides in part: No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such costs, damages, and reasonable attorney's fees as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. (emphasis added). [2a] Kelso's only contention is that since appellees put on proof at the trial of attorney's fees totaling $6,580.74, then the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding $10,000 in attorney's fees. Kelso fails to note that appellees introduced the $6580.74 figure as proof of fees as of the day of the hearing (March 7, 1988). On April 1, 1988 appellees filed a Supplement to Motion to Dissolve Preliminary Injunction and Suggestion of Damages which itemized attorney's fees totaling $10,517.18 as of March 31, 1988. The chancellor set attorney's fees at $10,000 in his Order and Judgment of August 18, 1988. According to Curphy v. Terrell, 89 Miss. 624, 42 So. 235 (1906), the chancellor can increase an award of attorney's fees following trial even without any amended bill having been filed, and without any further steps to cause additional attorneys' fees. Id., 89 Miss. at 625, 42 So. 235; see also New Orleans, M. & C.R. Co. v. Martin, 105 Miss. 230, 62 So. 228, 229 (1913) (amount of attorney's fees in dissolving wrongful injunction left to chancellor's discretion). The assignment of error is without merit.