Opinion ID: 430578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: effective assistance of counsel at trial

Text: 10 On cross-appeal, Alvord first argues that the district court erred in deciding that he received effective assistance of counsel at trial and that his counsel's assistance at his sentencing hearing, although ineffective, did not prejudice him. He contends that his trial counsel, Mr. Meyers, failed adequately to investigate the possibility of an insanity defense at trial and committed a clearly prejudicial mistake in failing to raise such a defense. He also contends that Meyers failed to unearth and present evidence at the sentencing hearing demonstrating his lack of ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. We conclude that the district court properly resolved both issues against Alvord. 6 11 The record demonstrates that Alvord has a long history of mental illness. He first entered a mental hospital at age thirteen. In 1967, he was charged with the rape and murder of a ten year old girl in Michigan; after spending two years in an institution, he was declared competent to stand trial on the charge but was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Alvord committed the three murders for which he received the death sentence after escaping from the Ionia State Hospital in Michigan. 12 Meyers was appointed counsel for Alvord shortly after Alvord was indicted in 1973. Alvord refused to talk with Meyers; however, Meyers learned from the prosecutor that Alvord had been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity in Michigan. Meyers therefore moved for a mental examination of Alvord, and the trial judge directed two court-appointed psychiatrists, Drs. Sprehe and Gonzales, to conduct the examination. Alvord refused to talk with the psychiatrists without his attorney present, and the psychiatrists could give no opinion as to Alvord's mental state. The trial judge therefore committed Alvord to a state hospital for observation. The judge later rescinded this order, however, because he doubted his authority to issue it, 7 and the state instead invited Dr. Robey, a psychiatrist who had worked with Alvord in Michigan, to come and conduct an examination. 8 13 Alvord talked with Dr. Robey, and Robey testified at a pretrial hearing held by the court that Alvord was competent to stand trial. See infra Sec. IV (setting forth Robey's testimony). Robey again examined Alvord after the hearing and concluded that Alvord was both competent to stand trial and sane at the time he committed the offense. (Apparently the illness suffered by Alvord is a type that can suddenly recur or go into long remissions.) The court ordered that Sprehe and Gonzales again attempt to examine Alvord; at another competency hearing, Sprehe testified that Alvord was competent to stand trial, but qualified his opinion because Alvord was still uncooperative. Gonzales, because of Alvord's lack of cooperation, could form no opinion. Relying on the testimony of Robey and Sprehe, the court ruled Alvord competent to stand trial. 9 14 Nevertheless, a few weeks before trial, the court ordered Sprehe and Gonzales again to examine Alvord. Sprehe again testified, after the examination, that Alvord was competent; Gonzales again could not form an opinion. Neither doctor could testify as to Alvord's sanity at the time of the offense. Although Meyers asserted that the Michigan conviction constituted prima facie evidence of incompetency, the trial judge, noting that Meyers had produced no documentary evidence of that judgment, again pronounced Alvord competent to stand trial. Before trial, Meyers moved unsuccessfully for Alvord to be committed for observation and filed a notice of intent to plead insanity, attaching a copy of Alvord's previous acquittal on the basis of insanity, which is now inexplicably absent from the state trial record. 10 15
16 Meyers conducted no independent investigation into Alvord's history of mental illness. He did not contact doctors, other than Robey, at the Michigan hospital at which Alvord spent a considerable amount of time, nor did he obtain any except a small portion of Alvord's medical record. He did not raise at trial the presumption of insanity afforded Alvord under Florida law by reason of his prior adjudication of insanity, the effect of which is to place the burden on the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. See Parkin v. State, 238 So.2d 817 (Fla.1970); Livingston v. State, 383 So.2d 947 (Fla.App.1980); Hixon v. State, 165 So.2d 436 (Fla.App.1964). Alvord contends that these actions and inactions constitute ineffective assistance. 17 In response to Alvord's contentions, the state argues that Meyers properly failed to investigate the possibility of raising the insanity defense because Alvord refused to allow that defense and properly failed to raise the defense because Alvord insisted on relying on an admittedly weak, unsupported alibi. 11 Meyers testified at the evidentiary hearing that Alvord's lack of cooperation caused him to abandon the insanity defense; given Robey's opinion that Alvord was sane at the time of the offense, Meyers did not think it would be successful without Alvord's cooperation. 18 The question we must decide is whether, under the circumstances, Meyers' decisions and actions constituted reasonably effective assistance. See Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 77 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1983). It is now axiomatic that the petitioner must prove his counsel ineffective by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1250. It is also axiomatic that counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation under the circumstances. Id. at 1251-58. The issue presented in this case, however, is slightly different than the issue in Washington v. Strickland and in many other cases: here, the defendant, Alvord, did not want and affirmatively sought to prevent his trial attorney from asserting the insanity defense that he now claims his attorney, as a matter of constitutional law, should have raised. Thus, this is not the same case as several cited by Alvord in which the defendant was willing to assert the defense but his attorney's inadequacy prevented him from doing so successfully. See Beavers v. Balkcom, 636 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Davis v. Alabama, 596 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir.1979), vacated as moot, 446 U.S. 903, 100 S.Ct. 1827, 64 L.Ed.2d 256 (1980); United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.1976). 19 We conclude that in this case the assistance rendered by Meyers met the requirements of the Constitution. See, e.g., Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1356 (5th Cir.1981) (effectiveness may not be assessed through the finely ground lenses of 20/20 hindsight). Here, the state provided three psychiatrists to interview Alvord, and he would only communicate with Robey. Robey, who indicated that he was more familiar with Alvord than any other psychiatrist, testified that Alvord was both sane and competent to stand trial. See infra Sec. IV (setting forth testimony from transcript). After repeated and conscientious attempts to have doctors communicate better with Alvord, the trial judge ruled Alvord competent. Meyers repeatedly advised Alvord to assert the insanity defense, but Alvord refused to do so. Meyers therefore did not assert the defense but argued that Alvord's incapacity weighed against imposition of the death penalty. 20 In light of Alvord's refusal to assert the insanity defense, although earnestly counseled by his defense attorney to do so, we conclude that Meyers rendered competent assistance. Further research into Alvord's background would have been fruitless because Alvord would not allow Meyers to produce evidence of insanity. The trial judge held Alvord competent--on the unrebutted advice of two psychiatrists--and the only psychiatrist able to form an opinion would have testified that Alvord was sane. In addition, given Alvord's competency, Meyers was ethically bound to follow his client's wishes. See Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir.1983). In Foster, the attorney wanted to present a second-degree murder defense based on a depraved-mind theory; the defendant refused to allow that defense, and this court held that the decision of the attorney to follow his client's wishes did not constitute ineffective assistance. Id. 21 We realize that there may be cases in which the client's faculties are so impaired that the client cannot choose for himself what to do. Alvord argues that this is the problem here and cites Brennan v. Blankenship, 472 F.Supp. 149, 156 (W.D.Va.1979), aff'd mem., 624 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir.1980); however, we need not comment on the resolution of that case by our sister circuit nor do we need to speculate here on what facts might lead us to conclude that the attorney should ignore his client and pursue some other unspecified course of action. Hopefully, if the client cannot adequately help prepare his defense, the trial judge will rule him incompetent to stand trial. Here both psychiatrists testified to Alvord's competency, and Meyers made a reasonable effort to convince the judge to rule Alvord incompetent. 12 Given this determination, Meyers adopted a reasonable course of action under the circumstances. 22
23 Alvord contends that Meyers failed to provide effective assistance at his sentencing hearing because he failed to collect and present as mitigating evidence Alvord's extensive history of mental illness; failed effectively to cross-examine Robey, who testified for the state, because of Meyers' unfamiliarity with Alvord's background; failed to produce other psychiatrists as rebuttal witnesses; and failed to produce witnesses to testify favorably regarding Alvord's character. The record demonstrates that Meyers called no witnesses at the sentencing hearing; however, Meyers testified before the district court that, had the state not called Robey, he would have called him because Robey would testify to the existence of the two mitigating circumstances found by the jury and judge. The district court stated that it was prepared to conclude that Meyers rendered ineffective assistance because of his failure adequately to investigate Alvord's background; however, the court denied the writ on this issue because it found that Alvord suffered no prejudice. We also conclude that Alvord suffered no prejudice; we therefore need not decide whether Meyers' assistance was ineffective. 13 3] See Washington, 693 F.2d at 1264 n. 33 (no need to address ineffectiveness if no prejudice). 24 At the sentencing hearing, Robey testified to the existence of the two mitigating circumstances found in this case. He stated that Alvord had been previously adjudicated insane and asserted strongly that Alvord's mental illness was not of the type that Alvord could not be rehabilitated. The state called Robey, so Alvord cannot blame Meyers for any testimony by Robey that he now considers damaging. 14 As the district judge noted, Alvord offered at neither the state nor the federal habeas evidentiary hearings evidence that Meyers could have produced had he conducted an investigation and called other witnesses; he also did not explain how Meyers could more effectively have cross-examined Robey. Alvord has called our attention to no evidence that Meyers should have produced at the sentencing hearing but did not; Alvord has not, therefore, carried his burden of establishing prejudice. 15 25 Alvord contends that he deserves a new sentencing hearing despite our conclusion that he has not been prejudiced because in this case the ineffectiveness of counsel is so pervasive that a particularized inquiry into prejudice would be 'unguided speculation.'  Washington, 693 F.2d at 1259 n. 26 (quoting United States v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122, 125 (10th Cir.1980)). We are mindful that actual prejudice need not be demonstrated in some cases. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) (state improperly requires single attorney to represent multiple defendants at same trial); Adams v. Balkcom, 688 F.2d 734, 739 n. 1 (11th Cir.1982) (representation functionally equivalent in every respect to having no representation at all). We recognized in Washington v. Strickland that prejudice need not always be demonstrated, 693 F.2d at 1259; however, Washington clearly implies that prejudice must be shown in this case. In both this case and Washington, the alleged inadequacy stems from a failure adequately to investigate, and we required the petitioners to show prejudice in Washington. We sit as a habeas corpus tribunal to grant relief to persons harmed because their constitutional rights have been violated. In some cases, we will infer harm because, although it is difficult or impossible to prove, the circumstances of the petitioner's conviction are inherently prejudicial. In some cases, the harm is so obvious it would be a waste of resources to prove it. This case presents neither situation; the district court correctly held that Alvord must prove prejudice to obtain the writ. 26