Opinion ID: 217262
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Entry of Defendant Kempf’s Default

Text: A plaintiff must “serve[ ] on every party . . . a pleading filed after the original complaint.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a)(1)(B). Service is proper if it complies with the methods outlined under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2) or under the law of the state where the district court is located or where service is made. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Generally, a defendant must serve a responsive pleading within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Afterwards, “a default judgment ordinarily must be entered by the district judge” under Rule 55(b)(2). See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 08-4804-cv, 09-1345-cv, 2011 WL 1663427,  (2d Cir. 2011). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling on a motion for entry of a party’s default or for entry of default judgment, see Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com Ltd., 249 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2001), bearing in mind that we have expressed a “strong preference” for resolving disputes on the merits, and that a default judgment is “the most severe sanction which the court may apply,” see New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castiglione’s motion for entry of Kempf’s default, which the Court construed as a motion for default judgment, because Kempf never defaulted. Although the record demonstrates that Kempf was properly served with the summons and original complaint on December 16, 2009, Castiglione filed her amended complaint less than 21 days later, on December 23, 2009, see ROA doc. 15, thus eliminating Kempf’s obligation to respond to the original 2 complaint and averting his default, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B). Although the parties dispute whether service of the amended complaint by mail on Kempf was proper, the District Court did not abuse its discretion based upon the record before us. Even assuming service was proper, we affirm the denial of the default on alternative grounds. As there was no prejudice to plaintiff in denying entry of the default, Kempf had meritorious defenses to the claims against him, and there is a strong preference in this Circuit in favor of resolving disputes on the merits, entry of a default was properly denied.