Opinion ID: 3132420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: TAG’s Standing

Text: We first consider the City’s argument that TAG lacks standing to bring its FHA claims because standing is a “threshold matter we must resolve before reaching the merits.” 5TAG also timely appealed successive judgments entered on August 30, 2012 and January 13, 2013. 14 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. v. Town of Huntington, 316 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 2003). The FHA makes it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race . . . [or] familial status.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The Act permits any “aggrieved person” to bring a suit challenging such discriminatory housing practices. Id. § 3613(a)(1)(A). The term “aggrieved person” is broadly defined to include any individual or corporation that “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice” or “believes that [it] will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.” Id. § 3602(d), (i). “This FHA definition of ‘aggrieved person’ extends as broadly as permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 158 (2d Cir. 2014). As such, there are no prudential barriers to a plaintiff’s standing under the FHA, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982), and, to maintain suit a plaintiff is required only to demonstrate an “injury in fact within the meaning of Article III” by showing that it suffered “distinct and palpable injuries that are fairly traceable to [the defendant’s] actions,” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted). “We review legal questions relating to standing de novo and factual findings for clear error.” Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 382 (2d Cir. 2000). The City argues that TAG does not have standing because it lacked an ownership or contractual interest in the land where Spring Run Village was to be built and, therefore, TAG is indistinguishable from any other corporation or contractor that “had a future interest in the prospective profits” that the Spring Run Village proposal might have provided. It is true that in many of the FHA zoning cases that have found valid developer 15 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs standing, the developer possessed some form of contractual or possessory interest in the property to be developed. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 256 (1977) (99-year lease with contingent contract to purchase); Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 134–35, 138–42 (3d Cir. 2009) (exclusive option to buy land at a fixed price); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 392, 394–95 (2d Cir. 1982). We do not believe, however, that such possessory or contractual interests are an absolute requirement for developer standing under the FHA. Rather, as framed by the Supreme Court, the “essence of the standing question, in its constitutional dimension, is whether the plaintiff has . . . such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf.” Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 260–61 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The Supreme Court’s decision in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), is instructive. That case involved a challenge to an exclusionary zoning ordinance brought by numerous plaintiffs, including an association of “firms engaged in the development and construction of residential housing” in the area. 422 U.S. at 514–15. The association alleged that the challenged zoning restrictions deprived a number of its members of “substantial business opportunities and profits.” Id. The Court found these allegations insufficient to establish injury-in-fact because the association had not identified any “specific project . . . that [was] precluded by the ordinance” and had not alleged that any of its members had “applied . . . for a building permit or a variance with respect to any current project.” Id. at 516. The Court observed, however, that a member of a second non-profit corporation that had 16 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs applied for a zoning variance to construct a moderate-income housing project “possibly would have had standing” but for the fact that the application had been submitted many years before and there was no indication that the project remained viable at the time the action commenced. Id. at 516–17. Several facts in this case set TAG apart from the developers in Warth, the most relevant being that TAG developed a detailed proposal for a “specific project,” was denied a special use permit to construct that project, and asserted an injury that was not limited to future or prospective profits. The City does not dispute that TAG introduced evidence demonstrating that it expended $81,000 on architects, consulting firms, land use studies, and application fees in connection with the Spring Run Village proposal. Trial Tr. 213–16, 264. Nor does it contest TAG’s evidence that the City’s February 2005 zoning decision, which led to the denial of TAG’s special use permit application, rendered the development of Spring Run Village impossible. Trial Tr. 135–36. TAG’s actual expenditures made to develop the specific Spring Run Village proposal, which became worthless upon the City’s February 2005 zoning decision and permit denial, are economic losses that constitute concrete and particularized injuries for standing purposes. See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 262 (identifying the expenditure of “thousands of dollars on the plans for [a development] and on the studies submitted to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning” as valid economic injuries supporting standing). We have held, moreover, that the denial of an entity’s special use permit application, such as those jointly submitted by TAG and Gail Anderson in this case, is an injury sufficient in itself to confer standing. Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 46 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002), superseded by statute 17 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs on other grounds, ADA Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553, as recognized in McCulloch v. Town of Milan, 559 Fed. App’x 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2014) (unpublished decision); accord Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 477 (9th Cir. 1988) (city’s denial of project developer’s permit applications satisfied injury in fact requirement because it “constitute[d] an absolute barrier to constructing the housing the developer planned to build”). In sum, we hold that, under the specific circumstances of this case, TAG’s lost upfront economic expenditures on a detailed development proposal for a specific piece of property, coupled with the denial of a necessary special use permit, constitute injuries-in-fact that are fairly traceable to the City’s actions, thus affording TAG standing to maintain this action. We turn now to the merits.