Opinion ID: 739296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Back and front pay: the Reinstatement Letter

Text: 37 Lightfoot argues that summary judgment was improperly granted because there are genuine issues of fact as to whether Lightfoot acted reasonably in declining Carbide's offer of reinstatement in December 1992. 38 In Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982), the Supreme Court held that when an employer makes an unconditional offer to reinstate an employee terminated as a result of discrimination, the employee's rejection of that offer forecloses any claim for future front pay and tolls the continuing accrual of back-pay liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 227, 102 S.Ct. at 3063. Back pay is tolled as of the date of the employee's rejection. Id. The Court based its holding in Ford on the statutory duty of a Title VII complainant to mitigate damages, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), and the statute's underlying legislative purpose to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole by restoring them so far as possible ... to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination. Id. at 230, 102 S.Ct. at 3065 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2373, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 39 The NYSHRL substantially tracks Title VII, both in its requirement that plaintiffs mitigate their damages by seeking and accepting alternative employment, see Ryan v. New York State Thruway Auth., 889 F.Supp. 70, 80-81 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (citations omitted), and in the legislative purpose behind the law, see N.Y.Exec.Law § 290(3) (describing purpose of article as, inter alia, to eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment). The rationale of Ford 's unconditional offer rule thus supports the application of that rule to NYSHRL plaintiffs as well as those seeking relief under Title VII. 40 Lightfoot maintains that he should not have had to accept the offer to resume his old job as Market Manager on the same terms and conditions as existed when he was fired because the salary he had been getting as Market Manager had been affected by Carbide's prior discriminatory actions, and he was entitled to a higher salary. That, however, is not the law. To toll the accrual of back-pay liability, an employer need only offer reinstatement to a job substantially equivalent to the one he was denied, Ford, 458 U.S. at 232, 102 S.Ct. at 3066, not a job equivalent to the one to which the employee must prove he was entitled if he is to prevail in his suit. In short, an employer is not required to insure the claimant against the risk that the employer might win at trial. Id. 41 Lightfoot also suggests that Carbide's offer was made in bad faith as part of a maneuver to put Lightfoot back under the power of defendant Shackelford where he could be subjected to further harassment until a more propitious scenario for his termination could be devised. Appellant's Brief at 35. Although we are required, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and to draw all inferences in favor of that party, see Yerdon v. Henry, 91 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir.1996), Lightfoot cannot defeat summary judgment with his wholly unsupported claims that there was an ulterior motive behind the offer, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ([A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. (quotations and citations omitted)). Lightfoot has failed to set forth anything concrete to support his position that the unconditional offer of employment was a ploy. 42 Lightfoot further contends that his rejection of Carbide's offer was reasonable because (1) he had already agreed to accept a position with a consulting company and (2) the stress of returning to work for Carbide (particularly under Shackelford) would have imperiled his health and well-being. 43 It is a matter of law that a commitment to a new employer does not preserve the employee's right to recover back pay for discriminatory termination from a previous employer. See Ford, 458 U.S. at 234-36, 102 S.Ct. at 3066-68 (The claimant who [rejects an offer of reinstatement in favor of remaining in a replacement job] does so ... not because [the previous job] provides inadequate compensation, but because the value of the replacement job outweighs the value of the defendant's job supplemented by the prospect of full court-ordered compensation.). 44 As to Lightfoot's second point, although Lightfoot raised the issue of his medical condition in an affidavit attached to his original motion papers, he did not at that time present the district court with a physician's affidavit to support his claim. Instead, Lightfoot later attempted to introduce the affidavit of Dr. Stanley Portnow in a motion to vacate and amend the court's order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court properly declined to consider Dr. Portnow's affidavit, as it had been in Lightfoot's possession for two years before the court's order and therefore was not newly discovered evidence that might have justified reconsideration of the court's decision. 45 Finally, Lightfoot contends that under Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence the reinstatement letter should not have been considered. Rule 408 bars the admission of statements and conduct made in the course of compromise negotiations. See Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 826-29 (2d Cir.1992) (affirming trial court's exclusion of evidence of reinstatement offer made during settlement negotiations). By definition, an unconditional offer may not require the employee to abandon or modify his suit, and no such request was made by defendants. The offer therefore cannot be considered an offer of settlement or compromise. 46 In sum, because Lightfoot continued to receive his full salary and benefits as severance pay through February 1993, he cannot recover back pay for the period between his termination in April 1992 and his rejection of the offer of reinstatement in December 1992. Because his rejection of Carbide's offer foreclosed his claims to back pay and front pay after December 1992, the district court properly granted Carbide summary judgment on all of Lightfoot's claims for back and front pay.