Opinion ID: 1670476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Significance of Tyler's Youth

Text: The only real distinction between this case and Mata for Miranda purposes is the fact that Tyler is a minor. But it is not clear how a suspect's age factors into the custody determination. As a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court held in Yarborough, [27] Our opinions applying the Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age, much less mandated its consideration. The plurality conceded that a suspect's age is relevant when assessing the voluntariness of a statement, [28] because that inquiry has been said to depend on the characteristics of the accused, [29] including the suspect's age, education, and intelligence ... as well as a suspect's prior experience with law enforcement. [30] But unlike the voluntariness determination, the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect's individual characteristics including his agecould be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry. [31] Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Yarborough to emphasize that [t]here may be cases in which a suspect's age will be relevant to the `custody' inquiry under Miranda.  [32] She did not think the suspect's age was relevant in that case, however, because the suspect was almost 18 years old at the time of his interview. [33] A fair reading of Yarborough therefore compels the conclusion that [t]he Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on whether a suspect's youth is part of the objective Miranda custody analysis. [34] The difficulty in resolving this issue stems from an inherent tension between the two legitimate policy interests at stake. On one hand, the blanket declaration that a suspect's age is wholly irrelevant to the custody determination would seem clearly wrong in cases involving a young child. For example, the Fifth Circuit observed in dicta that [t]he case of an eleven-year-old is different and that when presented with such a young suspect, police should have no difficulty recognizing that their suspect is a juvenile and adjusting their determination whether the suspect would understand his freedom of movement to be constrained accordingly. [35] On the other hand, it would be difficult to take a suspect's age into account in any principled manner. Courts in a number of states apply a `reasonable juvenile' standard, focusing on the impact of the objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation of a juvenile of specific age. [36] But such a standard may offer more in theory than it does in practice. What, for example, is an officer to make of the difference between a reasonable 16-year-old suspect and a reasonable 13-year-old suspect? As Justice O'Connor observed, Even when police do know a suspect's age, it may be difficult for them to ascertain what bearing it has on the likelihood that the suspect would feel free to leave. [37] Moreover, the assumption that all suspects of one particular age are equally sophisticated is almost as unsatisfying as the assumption that all people adults and childrenare equally sophisticated. Thus, if a suspect's age is to be taken into account, why not include other objective circumstances that ... are [also] relevant to the way a person would understand his situation, [38] such as the suspect's education and intelligence? [39] But [o]ne of the principal advantages of the Miranda rule is that it `has the virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such interrogation are not admissible.' [40] Consideration of a suspect's age and other factors would substantially undermine this crucial advantage of the [Miranda] doctrine [41] by forcing police to make guesses as to [the circumstances] at issue [42]  and, as Justice O'Connor observed in her concurrence in Yarborough, the effect of those circumstancesbefore deciding how they may interrogate the suspect. [43] [13] In short, there is no easy answer to the issue of whether a suspect's age should factor into the custody assessment. The complexity inherent in this issue suggests that we proceed cautiously in our attempt to answer it. Ultimately, we believe there are two reasons why it would be best to avoid resolving this difficult question today. First, neither party addressed whetherlet alone how a suspect's age should factor into the custody assessment. This is significant because [s]ound judicial decisionmaking requires `both a vigorous prosecution and a vigorous defense' of the issues in dispute. [44] Second, our ability to dispose of the instant case does not depend on a definitive resolution of this issue. When compared to interrogations in case law from other jurisdictions, Tyler's interrogation would not be custodial even if we took his age into account. In In re Jason W.T., [45] the Wisconsin Court of Appeals heard a case involving a police interrogation of a 12-year-old suspect. A uniformed police officer escorted the suspect from class and proceeded to interrogate him in the principal's office. (The principal was not present.) At the outset of its analysis, the court explained: [I]n applying the objective test, it is appropriate to ask what a reasonable child in [the suspect's] circumstances would understand his situation to be; we cannot see how to apply the objective test in a rational way while overlooking the fact that he is twelve years old and not an adult. [46] Nonetheless, the court concluded that there is no question that when the officer began to question [the suspect], a reasonable child in his situation would have understood he was not in custody. [47] The court's conclusion was based on the fact that [t]he officer told [the suspect] that he was free to go, that he was not under arrest, and that he did not have to talk to him if he did not want to. [48] The Oregon Court of Appeals used nearly identical reasoning in State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Loredo. [49] In that case, a 13-year-old suspect was summoned from his classroom over the school intercom, went to the principal's office, and was interrogated by a single police officer in plain clothes. Relying on its decision in Matter of Killitz, [50] the court explained that its custody assessment must take into consideration whether a reasonable person in [the] child's positionthat is, a child of similar age, knowledge and experience, placed in a similar environmentwould have felt required to stay and answer all of [the officer's] questions. [51] The court concluded that the police-student encounter was not custodial because the officer informed [the] child that he was not under arrest, did not have to speak and could leave if he wanted to. [52] Moreover, the court placed some weight on the fact that the officer, much like the officers in this case, was dressed in plain clothes [with] his gun ... hidden from view under his jacket [53] and, therefore, had clearly made an effort to be unimposing in dress and demeanor. [54] More recently, the Wyoming Supreme Court addressed this issue in CSC v. State. [55] In CSC, officers arrived at a high school to question a 16-year-old suspect for his part in a sexual assault. School officials brought the suspect from his class to a room in the school administration building where three police officers, the school resource officer, and a school official were waiting. The court, citing Justice O'Connor's reasoning [56] from her concurrence in Yarborough, [57] acknowledge[d] that there could be instances where the suspect is so young that his age must be considered by the police. [58] Nevertheless, the court held, We do not, however, feel that it applies to [the] 16-year-old [suspect] in this case, especially in light of the fact that he was repeatedly advised ... that he was not under arrest, was not obligated to answer ... questions, and could leave at any time. [59] Accordingly, the court concluded that the interview was noncustodial. [60] Tyler's encounter with police was in all relevant aspects indistinguishable from the encounters in In re Jason W.T., Loredo, and CSC. Those cases involved interrogations wherein the juvenile suspect was not restrained and was advised by officers that he was not under arrest and could leave the interrogation at any time. As was demonstrated earlier, the same is true in this case. Moreover, the facts here are far less indicative of custody than those present in cases where age-sensitive courts concluded that juvenile-police encounters were custodial. In Evans v. Montana Eleventh Jud. Dist. Court, [61] the Montana Supreme Court took a 14-year-old suspect's age into account in concluding that he was in custody for Miranda purposes. The suspect was questioned for two and one-half hours ... by two officers wearing visible badges and weapons. [62] Of note is the fact that [t]he officers repeatedly suggested that [the suspect] had `more to tell them' and misled him into believing the police had fingerprints from [the victim's] body that could be matched to his and that [i]mmediately following the interview, [the suspect] was arrested. [63] Similarly, in State v. Doe, [64] an age-sensitive court held that a 10-year-old suspect was in custody when he received a mandatory directive to leave his fifth-grade class and report to the faculty room and was not informed by school officials or by the [school resource officer] that he could leave, that he did not have to answer the officer's questions or that he could terminate the questioning at any time. [65] Finally, in State v. D.R., [66] a detective dressed in plain clothes interviewed a 14-year-old suspect in a school administrator's office. In concluding that the encounter was custodial, the court placed significant weight on the fact that, unlike Tyler, the suspect was not told he was free to leave. [67] In sum, this case is similar to cases where age-sensitive courts found police-juvenile encounters to be noncustodial in nature and is distinct from several cases where such courts concluded that the juvenile was in custody. As a result, we are confident that Tyler's youth does not disturb the fact that his encounter with police officers at OCHS was noncustodial. So although we do not rule out the possibility that a suspect's age may factor into the custody assessment in a different case, it is not necessary to resolve that issue here.