Opinion ID: 1685078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Duration of the Detention

Text: ¶ 80. While the Supreme Court determined in Royer that a 15-minute detention was impermissible, and in Place that a 90-minute detention was impermissible, it did not establish an absolute time limitation on investigative detentions. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 494, 503; Place, 462 U.S. at 698-99. In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that the focus in Royer was primarily on facts other than the duration of the defendant's detention particularly the fact that the police confined the defendant in a small airport room for questioning. The court held that an investigative detention is not transformed into an arrest solely because of the length of the detention. Id. at 686, 688. [19] ¶ 81. The court determined that the length of the detention in that case (approximately 40 minutes) was not impermissible because it did not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investigation of the law enforcement officers. Id. at 687. We reach the same conclusion in this case. [20] ¶ 82. Vorburger asserts that even if Becker's detention were permissible before the warrant was executed, her detention became an arrest when she was taken into room 229 and questioned, instead of being released. Vorburger contends that the officers found nothing in room 230 linking Becker to the drugs in the room and consequently they no longer had reasonable suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity. ¶ 83. We find this suggestion unpersuasive. Contraband is seldom invoiced and neatly labeled for a buyer. [21] We find more realistic the Seventh Circuit's comments in United States v. Perry, 747 F.2d 1165, 1169 (7th Cir. 1984), that it strikes us as incredible that [a drug dealer] would have a person accompany him to a drug deal where that person did not have [the dealer's] utmost trust and confidence, implying that the trust and confidence was most likely based on the person's involvement in the deal. See Pace, 898 F.2d at 1240. Here, Cramer was escorting Becker and Vorburger into a room containing 14 pounds of pungent marijuana in open view. Police were entitled to draw reasonable inferences from these facts. ¶ 84. We agree with the State that the officers continued to have reasonable suspicion about Becker after the warrant had been executed and that it was not unreasonable to question her in light of their discoveries in room 230. ¶ 85. Becker testified at the motion hearing that she and Officer Kosovac talked in room 229 for probably ten minutes. She stated that Officer Kosovac asked her about the events that had preceded us coming to the hotel room, and if Becker ever drank or used marijuana or used any other type of drugs. After Becker told Officer Kosovac about how she and Vorburger had smoked marijuana that day in their apartment, Officer Kosovac asked if officers could search the apartment. ¶ 86. Vorburger correctly points out that when Becker was taken into room 229, Officer Kosovac did not inform her again that she was not under arrest. We do not believe, however, that a reasonable person in Becker's position would have believed that she had been placed under arrest when her handcuffs had been removed and she was allowed to use the bathroom. For Becker, police were deescalating the conditions of her detention. [17] ¶ 87. Upon thorough review of the record, we determine, as the circuit court did, that the officers in this case acted reasonably in stopping and detaining Becker for questions and that the detention did not escalate into an arrest.