Opinion ID: 46231
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Against the MRHA, Murphy, and Wilson

Text: 42 At the close of the evidence, the jury found for Urban Developers on the following claims against the MRHA or its defendant officers, Murphy and Wilson: (1) a breach of contract claim against the MRHA; (2) a federal takings claim against the MRHA and Murphy; (3) a federal procedural due-process claim against the MRHA and Murphy; (4) a Mississippi takings claim against the MRHA and Murphy; (5) a Mississippi procedural due process claim against the MRHA and Murphy; and (6) a negligence claim under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act against the MRHA, Wilson, and Murphy. The jury awarded damages of $1,000,000.00, and the district court rendered judgment on the verdict awarding Urban Developers $1,000,000 damages, and $118,406 attorney's fees, against the MRHA, Wilson and Murphy, jointly and severally. The MRHA, Wilson and Murphy appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
43 All defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law both at the close of the plaintiff's case and again after the jury's verdict. In deciding such motions, the district court applies the standard established in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.1969) ( en banc ), overruled on other grounds, 107 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1997), and on appeal from such decisions, this court applies that same standard. Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d 695, 699-700 (5th Cir.1995). Boeing instructs us to: 44 consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the nonmovers case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of the motions is proper. 411 F.2d at 374. 45 However, the court cautioned that a mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury .... There must be a conflict in substantial evidence .... Id. at 374-75. This court does not evaluate witness credibility and it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000); see also 9A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, at 300 (2d ed.1995); Ham Marine, Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 72 F.3d 454, 461 (5th Cir. 1995) (Unless there was no credible evidence presented which might authorize the verdict, the jury's findings must stand.). Questions of law, however, including determinations of subject-matter jurisdiction, are reviewed de novo. USX Corp. v. Tanenbaum, 868 F.2d 1455, 1457 (5th Cir. 1989). 46
47 The MRHA disputes the jury's finding that the Mod Rehab contracts were validly assigned to Urban Developers from the Mitchell Company. The interpretation of a contract is a question of law and the appellate court is not bound by the ... standard of review [for fact findings] unless ambiguities require the court to consult extrinsic evidence. Tri-State Petroleum Corp. v. Saber Energy, Inc., 845 F.2d 575, 581-82 (5th Cir.1988). Where the very existence of the contract is at issue, however, review for sufficiency of the evidence is appropriate. Once a contract has been found and its essential terms have been identified and determined to be enforceable, the issue of breach is another question of fact, subject to review for substantial evidence. Ham Marine, 72 F.3d at 461. 48 We agree with the MRHA's contention that there is insufficient evidence of valid contract assignment from the Mitchell Company to Urban Developers, and that the purported assignment was void. The MRHA argued at trial that it had no contractual obligations to Urban Developers because the Mod Rehab contracts contained a prohibition against assignment without written permission, which the Mitchell Company never received before purporting to assign its rights and duties under the contracts to Urban Developers. MRHA further argues that even if the oral permission were sufficient to modify the contracts, it was invalid because Mississippi law requires all government board actions to be taken publicly and spread upon the minutes of the board meetings. 49 The Mississippi Supreme Court has long held that boards of supervisors and other public boards speak only through their minutes .... Thompson v. Jones County Cmty. Hosp., 352 So.2d 795, 796 (Miss.1977) (emphasis added); see also Bridges v. Bd. of Supervisors of Clay County, 58 Miss. 817 (1881). No cases directly address whether a public housing authority qualifies as such a public board, so we turn to that question first. Based on a review of the MRHA's organic statute, Mississippi case law, and the rationale underlying the spread upon the minutes requirement, we hold that it is. 50 The Housing Authority Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-1 et seq., established, in every city and county of the state of Mississippi, a public body corporate and politic to be known as the `housing authority.' Id. § 43-33-5. The legislature later provided procedures by which these local housing authorities might consolidate into larger, regional housing authorities, such as the MRHA. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-103 et seq. The board of supervisors of each county that is comprised in this regional housing authority is entitled to appoint a commissioner to the housing authority's board. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-115. The commissioners' qualifications, length of term, quorum and voting requirements, and compensation are all established by law. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-7; 43-33-49. 51 These housing authorities are created in perpetual succession to exercis[e] public and essential government functions, and, as public state bodies created by statute, they have no power or authority except that granted by statute. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-11. Finally, [t]he property of an authority is declared to be public property used for essential public and governmental purposes and such property of an authority shall be exempt from all taxes.... Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-37. 52 The Mississippi Supreme Court has not limited the public minutes requirement to only county boards of supervisors. In Thompson, the Mississippi high court applied the minutes requirement to invalidate an employment contract that was not spread upon the minutes of a county hospital's board of trustees, dismissing the plaintiff's claim of $160,764.80 in unpaid salary, and warning [i]t was the responsibility of the plaintiff to see that the contract was properly recorded on the minutes. 352 So.2d at 798. More recently, in Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Abernathy, the Mississippi Supreme Court impliedly suggested that the minutes requirement would apply to an urban renewal agency created by the City of Tupelo. 913 So.2d 278, 288 (Miss.2005). The organic statute that creates such urban renewal agencies, Miss.Code Ann. § 43-35-3 et. seq., contains implementing language identical to that found in the Housing Authority Act. See, e.g., Miss.Code Ann. § 43-35-33 (There is hereby created in each municipality a public body corporate and politic to be known as the `urban renewal agency.'...); see also Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-7 (establishing the term, voting requirements, and compensation for the board of commissioners). 53 Only once has the Mississippi Supreme Court expressly addressed whether an other public board was bound by the minutes requirement. Rawls Springs Util. Dist. v. Novak, 765 So.2d 1288, 1291 (Miss.2000). In that case, the court invalidated a contract that was not spread upon the minutes of a water utility district's board of commissioners, noting that [a]s the District Board is a public corporation and body politic, we conclude that the District Board's action[s] fall under those generally recognized holdings that limit such bodies to speak and act only through their minutes. Id. In so concluding, the court quoted implementing language from the water district's organic statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-151 et. seq., language that is nearly identical to that found in the Public Housing Act. See Novak, 765 So.2d at 1291 (The District Board is a public corporation . . . and is `a body politic and corporate with power of perpetual succession.') (quoting Miss.Code Ann. § 19-5-165). 54 We also find support for our holding in the reasons that support the rule requiring the acts of public boards to be reflected in their minutes. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated these reasons as follows: 55 (1) That when authority is conferred upon a board, the public is entitled to the judgment of the board after an examination of a proposal and a discussion of it among the members to the end that the result reached will represent the wisdom of the majority rather than the opinion or preference of some individual member; and (2) that the decision or order when made shall not be subject to the uncertainties of the recollection of individual witnesses of what transpired, but that the action taken will be evidenced by a written memorial entered upon the minutes at the time, and to which all the public may have access to see what was actually done. 56 Novak, 765 So.2d at 1291-92 (quoting Lee County v. James, 178 Miss. 554, 174 So. 76, 77 (1937)); see also Thompson, 352 So.2d at 796. These reasons apply with full force to the board of commissioners for the public housing authorities, who act as custodians of public property and are vested by the people of Mississippi with the power to exercise public and essential government functions consistent with quorum and voting requirements established by statute. 57 Having concluded that MRHA is bound by the minutes requirement, we now determine whether that requirement renders the unapproved contractual assignment void. We hold that it does. 58 The Mississippi Supreme Court has characterized the minutes requirement as an important public policy issue, cautioning that public interest requires adherence thereto, notwithstanding the fact that in some instances the rule may work an apparent injustice. Butler v. Bd. of Supervisors for Hinds County, 659 So.2d 578, 579 (Miss.1995) (quoting Colle Towing Co. v. Harrison County, 213 Miss. 442, 57 So.2d 171, 172 (1952)). Indeed, the policy of protecting the public's funds for use by and for the public is paramount to other individual rights which may also be involved. Butler, 659 So.2d at 579; see also id. at 581 (discussing Mississippi's past strict adherence to the requirement that a board of supervisors only be bound by a contract entered upon its minutes) and Warren County Port Comm'n v. Farrell Constr., 395 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1968) (describing the Mississippi requirement as stringent). 59 This requirement applies not only to contract formation, but to contract modification as well. Farrell Constr., 395 F.2d at 903-04 (The only permissible method for the alteration of a contract with a board of supervisors is by a subsequent order entered on its minutes) (citing Lamar County v. Tally & Mayson, 116 Miss. 588, 77 So. 299 (1918)). Moreover, in Butler, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the assignment of contract proceeds from a general contractor (who had contracted with the board) to a subcontractor (who had contracted only with the general contractor) had effectuated a contract alteration, rendering the assignment invalid because its approval had not been spread upon the minutes of the board. Butler, 659 So.2d at 580-81. 60 Applying these principles to our facts, we find no evidence of a valid assignment of the HAP contracts from the Mitchell Company to Urban Developers. Following the court in Butler, we hold that the minutes requirement does apply to the purported assignment here. For in Butler, the court held that an assignment of a right to mere proceeds was a contractual modification that implicated the minutes requirement, a closer question, we believe, than the assignment at issue here, where the Mitchell Company purported to assign both its rights and duties under the HAP contracts to Urban Developers. 61 Moreover, there is no evidence spread upon the minutes of the MRHA's board of commissioners that they approved the assignment. Not only was there undisputed testimony at trial in this respect, but there was also undisputed testimony that the Board had never so much as made reference to the HAP contracts during the relevant time period. In fact, the only action taken by the board that affected the HAP contracts was the resolution approving the Fiscal Year 2002 budget, on July 15, 2001, which declined to request further funding from HUD for those contracts. 62 Urban Developers argues in response that, even if the assignment is legally void, the Board should be estopped in equity from denying it. 12 Urban Developers notes that the officers of the MRHA made oral promises that the Mod Rehab contracts could be assigned to Urban Developers, and that, after the transfer, the MRHA continued to make rent subsidy payments to Town Creek and to demand compliance with the federal housing quality standards. Finally, Urban Developers notes that during the rental dispute, all letters from the MRHA were addressed to its principle member, Shahid Shaikh. 63 The general rule, however, is that [s]uch contracts when so entered upon the minutes may not be varied by parol nor altered by a court of equity. Farrell Constr., 395 F.2d at 904 (emphasis added) (citing McPherson v. Richards, 134 Miss. 282, 98 So. 685 (1924)). The plaintiff's invocation of equities to meet the spread upon the minutes requirement is usually prohibited, in part, because each person, firm or corporation contracting with a board of supervisors is responsible to see that the contract is legal and properly recorded on the minutes of the board. Thompson, 352 So.2d at 797; see also id. at 798 (It was the responsibility of the plaintiff to see that the contract was properly recorded on the minutes). The Colle Towing case is often cited as an example of the harsh application of Mississippi's spread on minutes requirement, equity notwithstanding. There, the Harrison County Board of Supervisors' president entered into an oral contract (later conceded to be invalid) with Colle Towing to perform emergency repairs on a drawbridge across the back bay of Biloxi. The board subsequently ratified the oral contract upon its minutes and began partial payment. After a dispute arose over the amount due, Colle Towing sued the Board in quantum meruit 13 and the district court dismissed. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that: 64 It has been repeatedly held in this State that a board of supervisors can contract and render the county liable only by a valid order duly entered upon its minutes, that all persons dealing with a board of supervisors are chargeable with knowledge of this law, that a county is not liable on a quantum meruit basis even though it may have made partial payments on a void oral contract, and, moreover, that in such case there is no estoppel against the county.  65 Colle Towing, 57 So.2d at 172 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 66 More recently, the Mississippi Supreme Court again declined to estop a public board, this time a public utility district. Rawls Springs Utility District v. Novak, 765 So.2d 1288, 1292 (Miss. 2000). The president and chief executive officer of the utility district, Bryant, had entered into an oral agreement with a developer, Novak, for the utility district's maintenance staff to install thirty-two water meters at Novak's trailer park. Id. at 1290. Bryant and Novak agreed to a price of $50 per installation, an agreement which was contrary to, and purported to modify, the utility district's regulations, which provided for a charge of $300 per installation. Id. During the following six years, the utility district billed Novak thirty-two times at the $50 rate, and Novak promptly made payment. 67 When the district board became aware of the oral agreement, they demanded back-payment from Novak for the already-installed meters. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the chancellor's ruling that the board was estopped from asserting a claim for back payment, holding that: 68 Bryant, and not the District Board, properly speaking through its minutes, entered into the subject agreement with Novak. Although Bryant may be said to be estopped from asserting a claim inconsistent with his representation to Novak, the District Board itself never spoke through its minutes to authorize meter installations for $50. The District Board has not changed its position or done other acts to justify the imposition of equitable estoppel. The District Board is not attempting to deny what it previously induced another party to believe and take action on. Nor is the District Board guilty of acts or declaration designed to induce another to alter his position injurious to himself. 69 Id. at 1292. 70 Urban Developers' best case is Cmty Extended Care Ctrs. v. Bd. of Supervisors for Humphreys County, a case in which the Mississippi Court of Appeals equitably estopped a county board of supervisors from arguing that the technical omission of not having the lease contract itself spread across the minute book should invalidate the lease contract. 756 So.2d 798, 804 (Miss. App.1999). 14 In that case, Community Care Extended Centers (CECC) offered to lease a nursing home from the Humphreys County Board of Supervisors. The Board then responded to the offer with a detailed resolution, reflected in the minutes, describing the property to be leased and authorizing the president of the Board to execute that specific lease. In accordance with the resolution, a 20-year lease was signed between the president of the Board and CECC. The lease contract was filed in the land records of the chancery clerk. The minute book and records of the board of supervisors are maintained by the chancery clerk. Id. at 802. Seven years later, on two separate occasions, the Board expressly acknowledged the existence of the lease contract with CECC by approving, upon its minutes, detailed amendments to the lease. Six years after the amendments, the Board notified CECC that it considered the lease contract void, threatening to repossess the nursing home unless CECC agreed to renegotiate. 71 The court of appeals first held that the minutes requirement had been satisfied, explaining that the lease contract was entered sufficiently into the Board's minutes to bind the Board to its terms and conditions. Id. at 801. The court explained, Looking at the minutes of the Board throughout the thirteen year period the lease contract has been in effect, we find sufficient evidence of the Board's intent to be bound by the lease contract. Id. at 802. And further, In this case, there was a substantial entry [in the minutes]—a resolution that authorized the president to execute `the original lease' that inferentially was physically presented to the Board and was recorded less than two weeks later. Id. at 803. 72 Then, in the alternative, the court applied equitable estoppel against the Board, holding that the resolutions passed by the board, as detailed above, were sufficient to estop the Board from denying its existence. Id. at 804. In conclusion, the court of appeals noted that although no estoppel may be enforced `against the state or its counties where the acts of their officers were unauthorized,' . . . the resolution entered on the Board minutes shows the supervisors unanimously approved the lease contract with CECC and authorized the Board president to sign the lease contract on behalf of the Board. Id. at 804. 73 The facts of our case far more closely resemble Novak than CECC. There is no evidence that the MRHA's board of commissioners even knew of the existence, let alone approved, the assignment from the Mitchell Company to Urban Developers (or any other assignment). The only evidence in the record that supports Urban Developers' position, is a resolution passed by the board of commissioners and entered upon its minutes in 1984, sixteen years before Urban Developers was even formed, which states RESOLVED, that the Chairman and Executive Director of the Authority are hereby authorized to execute all documents necessary to participate in the Rental Rehabilitation Program. MRHA Minutes of the Board of Commissioners 287 (Feb. 15, 1984). 74 This resolution is far less connected to the matter in question than the three resolutions upon which the court of appeals in CECC relied to enforce equitable estoppel against the Humphreys County board of supervisors. There, the resolutions authorized the president to execute a specific document, relating to a specific transaction. Then, when amendments to the lease contract were necessary, the board approved those amendments through resolutions spread upon their minutes. Here, where a contractual modification was also necessary to assign the rights and duties of the Mitchell Company to Urban Developers, the plaintiff never sought approval of the Board, and instead relied on the oral promises only of Wilson and Murphy. 75 In this respect, our case resembles Novak. For although it might be said that Wilson and Murphy can be estopped from asserting a claim inconsistent with their representation to Urban Developers, the Board itself never spoke through its minutes to authorize the assignment. Novak, 765 So.2d at 1292. The Board has not changed its position or done other acts to justify the imposition of equitable estoppel. Id. The Board is not attempting to deny what it previously induced another party to believe and take action on. Id. Nor is the Board guilty of acts or declaration designed to induce another to alter his position injurious to himself. Id. 76 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of the MRHA's motion for judgment as a matter of law on Urban Developers' breach of contract claim. The assignment of the HAP contracts from the Mitchell Company to Urban Developers was void. 77
78 Urban Developers asserts that when the MRHA defendants issued vouchers to the Town Creek residents, and then arbitrary forced the tenants to use the vouchers elsewhere, the result was the breaking of the leaseholds between the tenants and the plaintiff, which resulted in the taking of those [lease] contracts. Because Urban Developers has yet to be denied compensation for this taking by the state of Mississippi (principally because they have not sought such compensation through Mississippi procedures), we hold that these federal takings claims are not yet ripe for review. 79 As discussed above, because a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause does not occur until just compensation is denied, Williamson County requires the plaintiff to have sought compensation for the alleged taking through whatever adequate procedures the state provides. Williamson County, 105 S.Ct. at 3120. Furthermore, this court has held that the unsettled status of state law does not render the available procedures inadequate; that is it must be certain that the state would deny that claimant compensation were he to undertake the obviously futile act of seeking it. Samaad, 940 F.2d at 934. On this issue, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion. Id. 80 Urban Developers again has not discharged that burden here. The MRHA clearly wields the power of eminent domain, Miss.Code Ann. § 43-33-19, and the State of Mississippi has long provided for actions in inverse condemnation. See, e.g., Wright v. Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., 300 So.2d 805 (Miss.1974); City of Gulfport v. Anderson, 554 So.2d 873 (Miss. 1989). Moreover, since the Mississippi courts have interpreted Mississippi's Takings Clause in light of the federal Takings Clause, the courts of Mississippi also provide plaintiffs with a cause of action for regulatory takings. See, e.g., Walters v. City of Greenville, 751 So.2d 1206, 1210-11 (Miss.App.1999) (citing Penn Central with approval); Tippitt v. City of Hernando, 909 So.2d 1190, 1193-94 (Miss.App.2005). It is an unsettled question, of course, the extent to which many jurisdictions will recognize as protected by the Takings Clause a property right in contract, 15 yet the plaintiff has identified nothing, and we have found nothing, to suggest that Mississippi law unquestionably would afford them no remedy. Samaad, 940 F.2d at 935. Accordingly, the plaintiff's federal takings claims against the MRHA and Murphy are unripe, and the district court was without jurisdiction to consider them. 81
82 The plaintiff's state takings claims are a different matter. We reach the merits of the plaintiff's state takings claims, because, unlike the federal takings claims just discussed, Williamson County does not directly apply, and, unlike the state takings claims against the City of Jackson, the relevant government entity here has made a final decision as required by Mississippi law. 16 83 We nevertheless hold that the MRHA's actions did not effect a taking, regulatory or otherwise. The MRHA did not force the Town Creek tenants to abandon their leases, nor can it be said that the MRHA's issuance of vouchers interfered with Town Creek's reasonable investment-backed expectations. The tenants were simply given an option to either accept the voucher and use it elsewhere, or to decline the voucher and remain under their leases at Town Creek. It is, in fact, undisputed that a few tenants did remain at Town Creek, and that the MRHA continued to subsidize their leases through the existing Mod Rehab program. We find that, as a matter of law, the evidence does not suffice to show that the tenants' leases were taken by the MRHA's issuance of housing-choice vouchers in the aftermath of the flood. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of the MRHA and Murphy's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Mississippi takings claims. 84
85 Plaintiffs seeking protection under the federal Due Process Clause must first establish that they have a protected property interest. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 119 S.Ct. 977, 989, 143 L.Ed.2d 130 (1999) (The first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in `property' or `liberty.'). The Mississippi Due Process Clause, although worded differently from the Federal version, is implemented identically. Compare U.S. Const. amend. XIV with Miss. Const. Art. III, § 14; see also Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 873 (Miss.1990). 86 We must first, then, identify which of the plaintiff's protected property interests, if any, were violated without due process, and, because the Constitution protects rather than creates such property interests, their existence must be determined by reference to `rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.' Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 1925, 1930, 141 L.Ed.2d 174 (1998) (quoting Roth, 92 S.Ct. at 2709); see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) ([T]he sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law.). 87 Urban Developers alleged that three unique property interests were violated by the MRHA. First, they alleged that the MRHA deprived Urban Developers of its property interest in the HAP contracts when the MRHA breached those contracts by failing to conduct formal inspections and allowing the plaintiff time to make repairs. Because we have held, supra, that Urban Developers had no such contractual rights under Mississippi law, Urban Developers could not have been deprived of the HAP contracts (or rights thereunder) without due process. 88 Urban Developers' second due process claim was that the MRHA deprived Urban Developers of its property interest in the ACC contract between the Housing Authority and HUD, as well as its interest in HUD regulations which the ACC contracts reference. Because we agree with the cases which hold that landlords are not third-party beneficiaries of the ACC contract, and because this court has already held that landlords are not within the zone-of-interest of the HUD regulations, Urban Developers could not have been deprived without due process of any interest in the ACC contracts or the relevant HUD regulations. 17 89 Finally, Urban Developers' third due process claim was that the MRHA deprived them of their interest in their lease contracts with the Town Creek tenants. Because we have held, supra, that Urban Developers failed to pursue a post-deprivation remedy, which they have not shown to be unavailable under Mississippi law, we reject this final due process claim as unripe. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Dep't of Ins., 62 F.3d 115, 118 (5th Cir. 1995) (The second claim, denial of procedural due process, falls with the [takings] claim. The procedural due process claim fails because Liberty Mutual has not demonstrated that Louisiana does not offer a post-deprivation remedy ...). Accordingly, we reverse the district court's denial of the MRHA and Murphy's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the two procedural due process claims relating to an alleged property interest in the Mod Rehab Contract and the Annual Contribution Contract. Because we lack subject matter jurisdiction, we dismiss without prejudice the procedural due process claim relating to a property interest in the lease contracts with the Town Creek tenants.
90 The jury found the MRHA, Murphy and Wilson negligent under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act for accepting Mayor Johnson's erroneous statements about the impending condemnation of Town Creek and for relying on those statements (without conducting an investigation into their veracity) to issue housing choice vouchers to the Town Creek tenants. The jury considered, yet rejected, an affirmative defense that exempts governmental entities and their employees from tort liability based upon the exercise or performance [of] ... a discretionary function or duty ... whether or not the discretion be abused. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(d) (2001). We find no conflict in substantial evidence as to whether the issuance of housing vouchers during a declared state of emergency qualifies as a discretionary act under the MTCA, and we accordingly reverse the district court's denial of the MRHA, Wilson's and Murphy's motion for judgment as a matter of law on this question. 91 Waiver of a state's sovereign immunity, like waiver of any constitutional right, is strictly construed in favor of the holder of the right. . . . [T]he MTCA's exemptions to Mississippi's waiver should be liberally construed in favor of limiting liability. In re Foust, 310 F.3d 849, 864 (5th Cir.2002) (citations omitted). The basis for the immunity given to government officials is in the inherent need to promote efficient and timely decision-making without fear of liability. This . . . works to encourage free participation and hinder fear that goes with risk-taking situations and the exercise of sound judgment. Mississippi Dep't of Transp. v. Cargile, 847 So.2d 258, 268 (Miss.2003). 92 The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted a two-part analysis for determining when governmental conduct is discretionary: (1) whether the activity involved an element of choice or judgment; and if so, (2) whether the choice or judgment in supervision involves social, economic or political policy alternatives. Bridges v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 793 So.2d 584, 588 (Miss.2001); see also City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59, 73 (Miss.2005). Conversely, the court has held that governmental conduct is ministerial, and thus not entitled to immunity, if the conduct is imposed by law, and its performance is not dependent on the employee's judgment. Cargile, 847 So.2d at 267. 93 A wide variety of government conduct has been held to involve the implementation of social, economic or political policy, including the manner in which a police department supervises, disciplines and regulates its police officer, City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59, 74 (Miss.2005); the decision to grant or deny parole, Doe v. State ex rel. Mississippi Dep't of Corr., 859 So.2d 350 (Miss.2003); the placement or non-placement of traffic control devices or signs, Barrentine v. Mississippi Dep't of Transp., 913 So.2d 391 (Miss.App.2005); the acts or omissions of high school football coach which caused a player to suffer heatstroke during practice, Harris ex rel. Harris v. McCray, 867 So.2d 188 (Miss. 2003); and the decision of emergency medical personnel to use a load and go approach on an expectant mother. Sanders v. Riverboat Corp. of Mississippi-Vicksburg, 913 So.2d 351 (Miss.App. 2005). 94 On the other hand, where the law expressly proscribes certain conduct, the government official has no discretion to engage in that conduct, and, likewise, where the law expressly requires certain conduct, an official may not, in the exercise of discretion, abstain. See, e.g., City of Jackson v. Lipsey, 834 So.2d 687 (Miss. 2003) (where an officer failed to use his siren, as required by law, in response to an emergency dispatch, the discretionary exception was not available); Coplin v. Francis, 631 So.2d 752, 755 (Miss.1994) (where a governmental entity had failed to build a bridge to certain specifications, as required by statute, the discretionary exception was not available). Furthermore, even when the government official is acting in accordance with a statutory command, such that the official is implementing policy, not making it, the act is ministerial and not entitled to the discretionary exception. See Barrett v. Miller, 599 So.2d 559, 568 (Miss.1992) (the good faith execution of a search warrant is a ministerial act, and not entitled to the discretionary exception). 95 Applying these principles to our facts, we find no evidence that either Murphy or Wilson violated any statutory duties by issuing housing-choice vouchers to the tenants of Town Creek. Although trial testimony elicited many instances of Murphy's (or Wilson's) violation of HUD regulations, these violations related only to the administration of the Mod Rehab program. Indeed, Urban Developers' expert on HUD regulations acknowledged that the federal regulations were silent on the issuing en masse of housing choice vouchers to everyone in a complex where some of the units have been damaged by natural disaster. Their expert also acknowledge that housing authorities may adopt provisions in their administrative plans to help families affected by natural disasters. 96 In the absence of regulations to the contrary, Congress has vested public housing authorities with the maximum amount of responsibility and flexibility in program administration. 42 U.S.C. § 1437. The MRHA board has furthermore vested the executive director with the discretion in an emergency to issue (or not issue) vouchers, a discretion that squarely implicates social, economic, and political policy considerations. Indeed, granting such immunity for exercise of discretion during a declared state of emergency is consistent with the aims of the MTCA, which works to hinder fear that goes with risk-taking situations, and to encourage timely decision-making without fear of liability. Cargile, 847 So.2d at 268. 18 97 We find no conflict of substantial evidence on the question of whether Murphy's and Wilson's actions were discretionary. Their actions were exercises in judgment involving social policy and they and MRHA were therefore entitled to immunity from tort liability in respect thereto.