Opinion ID: 537469
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: United States Sovereign Immunity

Text: 8 The district court correctly stated the law of this circuit when it held that claims against HUD for violations of 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981 and 1982 are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Selden Apartments v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 785 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir.1986); but see Baker v. F & F Investment Co., 489 F.2d 829 (7th Cir.1973) (holding that sovereign immunity is waived). Some confusion may arise regarding the district court's citation of Selden due to the fact that plaintiff's complaint does not, on its face, assert violations of either section 1981 or section 1982. From a reading of Walber's complaint, she appears to base her claim on section 1983, and to assert a Bivens action, see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), for violation of the federal constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. However, neither 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 nor the Bivens line of cases will avail the plaintiff in this action. 9 Section 1983 fails for the simple reason that it imposes liability only on a person acting under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. HUD, of course, is a federal agency, operating under color of federal rather than state law; section 1983 is hence unavailable on these facts. See, e.g., Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir.1987) (section 1983 provides no remedy for deprivation of rights by federal officials acting under color of federal law). 10 Plaintiff's claim that HUD officials were acting under color of Federal law and that Plaintiff's allegations arise directly under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is equally insubstantial. (App. 9). The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws is, as with section 1983, not available in a claim against the federal government. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 320 F.2d 843, 846 (9th Cir.1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916 (1964). It is true that the fifth amendment has been held to confer a constitutional right to be free from illegal discrimination. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236 (1979) (footnote omitted). In Passman, the court held that a federal official could be sued, in his individual capacity, for discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the plaintiff's right to due process under the fifth amendment. A direct action under the fifth amendment against an agency of the United States is, however, barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Clemente v. United States, 766 F.2d 1358, 1362-64 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). 11 Apparently, the district court determined, as we have here, that plaintiff's claims under section 1983 and Bivens were barred, and thereupon construed the complaint to allege violations of sections 1981 and 1982. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f) (All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). It should be recognized, however, that neither of these statutes is addressed to categories of selectivity based on sex. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (section 1981 applies only to racial discrimination, not discrimination based on sex); Lee v. Minnock, 417 F.Supp. 436, 439 (W.D.Pa.1976), aff'd, 556 F.2d 567 (3rd Cir.1977) (discrimination on the basis of sex is not a basis for redress under section 1982). Plaintiff would, therefore, have had no claim against HUD under section 1981 or section 1982, regardless of the holding in Selden Apartments. 12 Approving the district court's dismissal of the discrimination claims in count one, we proceed to an examination of the court's ruling on the remainder of the complaint. 13