Opinion ID: 2392444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Certification of Specialists

Text: It will be noted that the rule we have promulgated permits a lawyer to advertise any legal service he or she proposes to render with certain limitations. See DR 2-101(B)(2). It will be further noted that the rule bars a specification of any area of practice, or any statement of specialization, or any statement that he or she accepts clients only in a particular area, or restricts or limits his or her practice. See EC 2-8, EC 2-14. Such statements are calculated to convey to the lay public the impression that the lawyer is a specialist and, therefore, possesses particular expertise in the advertised field. At the present time so advertising, be it ever so well intentioned, would be deceptive and misleading. We cannot embrace those provisions of Proposal A of the American Bar Association, or any kindred plan, that would permit such advertising, until such time as we have an established procedure for the certification of specialists. Bates specifically did not address the quality of legal services and, therefore, provides no guidance in that area. The matter of quality was not before the Court. We, however, are vitally concerned with lawyer competence with particular respect to lawyer advertising. When we permit a lawyer to advertise, we must insure that the public is not victimized by any form of advertising that has the effect of a holding out to the public of special or unique qualification or expertise. The full implementation of Proposal A must await the availability of a program of specialization. When we consider the innovative idea of specialization we must be careful lest we work an undue hardship on lawyers who do not choose to advertise. Specialization has become a fact of life in the legal profession today. The complicated demands of a complicated society have combined to make it impossible for any given lawyer to practice with requisite competence in all fields of law. More and more general practitioners have come to realize that there are some areas wherein the necessity for the services of a legal specialist has become a reality. This has produced a form of de facto specialization. The time has come for the bench and bar to join forces in a realistic recognition that the wave of the future in the legal profession is specialization. This program need not, and should not, be instituted abruptly; but we would be remiss if we did not recognize the trend toward specialization. Immediately following the release of this opinion, we will announce the appointment of a Commission on Specialization charged with the duty and responsibility of conferring with bar groups, individual lawyers and the academic community and, after doing so, reporting to this Court a beginning plan of certification. In considering this matter and making its recommendation, the commission will be guided by these considerations: a. Participation by lawyers will be on a wholly voluntary basis. No lawyer will be forced to participate in the plan against his will. b. No lawyer will be denied the right to practice in any field of law, even though he or she is not certified therein. c. Participating lawyers will pay all costs of administering the program. d. Any plan must require that specialists who have accepted clients referred by other lawyers not take advantage of their position to enlarge the scope of their representation. While these considerations are guidelines only, we make it clear that any program we adopt must be voluntary, self-supporting, and must not, in any way, trench upon the right of a lawyer to practice in any area in which he or she, acting in good faith, considers himself or herself to be competent. We recognize that the rule we adopt in a new and untried area of professional activity may contain flaws. As they develop, they may be corrected. As we said in Barger v. Brock, 535 S.W.2d 337, 342 (Tenn. 1976): This Court welcomes the continuing criticisms of its Rules. They never become final, and are always subject to change. We solicit advice and suggestions from the Bench and Bar for their improvement. The enforcement of the rule is the responsibility of the Disciplinary Board of this Court; however, it is not charged with the responsibility of advance approval of proposed advertising. Mr. Justice Fones and Mr. Justice Brock concur in all except Section VI(A). It is their view that we should defer a decision on electronic media advertising for observation and study of the experience in other states before determining (1) whether to authorize electronic media advertising and (2) if authorized, the appropriate limiting guidelines. The Rule of Court we adopt amending the Code of Professional Responsibility will become effective on the 15th day of April 1978. COOPER and HARBISON, JJ., concur fully. FONES and BROCK, JJ., concur in all except Section VI(A) relating to the electronic media.