Opinion ID: 683558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: coercion defense

Text: 35 At trial, the defendant attempted to present a defense of coercion; namely, that he had engaged in the heroin transaction solely to avoid deportation to Iran. In response, the government filed a motion in the district court to preclude the defendant from introducing evidence of coercion on the ground that he was unable to prove the elements of that defense. The district court granted the government's motion to the extent that it excluded the defendant's proffered expert testimony on the defense of coercion. In addition, the district court refused to give the defendant's proposed jury instruction on the coercion defense. 36 Mr. Bastanipour argues that the district court erred in concluding that his coercion defense failed as a matter of law and in holding that he was not entitled to present evidence of that defense in the form of expert testimony to the jury. A district court's determination that a defendant has failed to present sufficient evidence to become entitled to a jury instruction on a theory of defense is reviewed de novo. United States v. Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1630, 128 L.Ed.2d 354 (1994). Our review of the district court's decision to bar expert testimony is limited to whether the court committed an abuse of its discretion. United States v. Tanner, 941 F.2d 574, 585 (7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1190, 117 L.Ed.2d 432 (1992). 37 Coercion is available as a defense only if the defendant reasonably feared immediate death or severe bodily injury which could be avoided only by committing the criminal act charged. See Tanner, 941 F.2d at 587. Further, to satisfy a threshold showing of a coercion defense, there must be sufficient evidence as to all of the elements of that defense. See Tanner, 941 F.2d at 588. 38 The theory underlying Mr. Bastanipour's coercion defense was that engaging in the drug transaction with Mr. Long provided his sole means of avoiding deportation to Iran where he would face execution because he had converted to Christianity. This is so, he argues, because the heroin sale was the only way he could generate the money needed to challenge the deportation order or to obtain false identification if he was ordered deported. 39 We agree with Judge Aspen that the evidence fails to establish the requisite elements for a coercion defense. The threat identified by Mr. Bastanipour cannot be said to have been immediate, present or pending. See Tanner, 941 F.2d at 587. At the time of the commission of the offense at issue in this case, Mr. Bastanipour's order of deportation had been stayed pending resolution of his appeal of that order to this court and any appeal to the United States Supreme Court. He faced deportation only if this court upheld the deportation order and if he was unsuccessful in securing relief via review by the United States Supreme Court or via a new immigration hearing. Thus, at the time Mr. Bastanipour committed the instant offense, the threat of deportation and injury was contingent and uncertain. 40 Moreover, even if Mr. Bastanipour's petition for review of the deportation order had been rejected by this court at the time of the commission of the offense, he would not have had a viable coercion defense. There is no merit to his contention that only through committing the charged offense could he alleviate the threat of deportation. Mr. Bastanipour had numerous legal avenues available to him to challenge the deportation order. Also, Mr. Bastanipour, a certified public accountant, could have generated money through legitimate methods. 41 Having failed to meet his burden as to his defense of coercion, the defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on that defense. In addition, because Mr. Bastanipour's coercion defense was insufficient as a matter of law, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude the expert testimony offered by Mr. Bastanipour on the issue of coercion. See United States v. Trapnell, 638 F.2d 1016, 1030-31 (7th Cir.1980).