Opinion ID: 2183692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: variances between allegations and proof

Text: The defendant contends that the trial justice erred in refusing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal in respect to counts 25, 26, and 34. This contention is supported by the argument that there were variances between the allegations in these counts and the evidence presented at trial. The variances may be summarized as follows. In respect to count 25, defendant was charged with directing, aiding and abetting Iannuccilli to make a false entry  a fictitious promissory note in the amount of $92,000 in the name of Thomas Campopiano. This spurious promissory note was introduced into evidence at the trial, but the amount stated in the note was $97,000. Count 34 charged defendant with directing, aiding and abetting Iannuccilli to make a false entry  a fictitious promissory note in the amount of $126,000 purportedly made by one Michael Loffredo. The note was introduced into evidence but was actually in the amount of $125,000. Count 26 of the indictment alleged that defendant did direct, aid and abet Iannuccilli to make a false entry  a fictitious promissory note in the amount of $27,000 in the name of John Delsesto. At trial Iannuccilli identified this promissory note and stated that he (Iannuccilli) had signed the name John Delsesto. It is clear that no person other than Iannuccilli signed this note. John Delsesto III was called as a witness and testified that he did not sign the note that purported to bear his signature. The indictment alleged that the fictitious promissory note was in the name of John Delsesto. The state's witness who testified that he did not sign the note was John Delsesto III. The defendant appears to argue that because of this variance in names, that is, the testifying witness's name contained a Roman numeral suffix while the name in the indictment did not, that the state failed to prove the identity of the putative fictitious borrower. The defendant claims that such proof is necessary to be convicted of the charge, and therefore, his motion for judgment of acquittal with respect to this count should have been granted. Although these variances existed, they were not fatal. General Laws 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 12-12-10 clearly states that a defendant shall not be acquitted or discharged on the ground of a variance between allegation and proof or by virtue of an immaterial misnomer of a third party. Section 12-12-10 reads as follows: Variances of proof and immaterial mistakes.  A defendant shall not be acquitted or discharged on the ground of variance between the allegation and proof if the essential elements of the crime are correctly stated in the indictment, information or complaint, unless the [defendant] is thereby prejudiced in his [or her] defense. [The defendant] shall not be acquitted or discharged by reason of an immaterial misnomer of a third party, by reason of an immaterial mistake in the description of the property or the ownership thereof, by reason of failure to prove unnecessary allegations in the description of the crime, or by reason of any other immaterial mistake in the indictment, information or complaint. In the case at bar the essential elements of the crimes were set forth in counts 25, 26, and 34 of the indictment. The clerical errors in respect to the amounts of the notes and the name of one of the parties did not constitute material variances. It should also be noted that these promissory notes were made available to defendant approximately eight months prior to trial so that no surprise would have impeded defendant in the preparation of his defense. As we stated in State v. Markarian, 551 A.2d at 1182, as long as the essential elements of the crimes charged are stated in the indictment or information, a defendant's conviction may be reversed only where the variance is prejudicial to his defense. See also State v. McKenna, 512 A.2d 113, 114-15 (R.I. 1986); State v. McParlin, 422 A.2d 742, 743 (R.I. 1980). In the instant case the essential elements of a violation of § 19-19-1 were (1) the making of the false entry, (2) the knowledge that the entry was false, and (3) the intent to deceive the director of the DBR or an agent appointed by the director. These essential elements not only were alleged in the challenged counts but were proven by the evidence introduced. The numerical variances with respect to the amounts of the two promissory notes and the misnomer of the purported maker (if misnomer it was) of the third note did not constitute fatal variances in regard to any material issue.