Opinion ID: 1573271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Exclusivity and Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Text: The injured employee's right to workers' compensation is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer. Iowa Code §§ 85.3(1), 85.20 (1993); Glenn v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 1984). Christine does not dispute this. Nor does she dispute that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under chapter 85. Rather, she contends exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act is an affirmative defense, which Batchelder was required to plead pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 101. Rule 101 requires that any defense ... which admits the facts of the adverse pleading[s] but seeks to avoid their legal effect, must be specifically pleaded. Because Batchelder did not plead exclusivity, Christine insists such failure bars the defense. Christine believes Batchelder had a duty to raise the exclusivity issue because the statute of limitations had run on her workers' compensation claim by the time Batchelder filed his motion for summary judgment. This is especially true, Christine argues, when Batchelder acknowledges this court has never addressed the issue of injuries caused by a co-employee occurring in parking lots as the co-employees report to work. We think the Act's exclusivity goes to the heart of the district court's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the inherent power of the court to decide a case. State v. Bosworth, 145 W.Va. 753, 117 S.E.2d 610, 619 (1960). Jurisdiction is of two sortsjurisdiction of the subject matter and jurisdiction of the person. Id. Here we are dealing with subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the court's attention. Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989). Because an injured employee's exclusive remedy falls under chapter 85, our district courts do not have authority to hear workers' compensation cases. Such cases are not of the general class of cases the district court has authority to hear. In addition, lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time: Every court has inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it. It makes no difference how the question comes to its attention. Once raised, the question must be disposed of, no matter in what manner or form or stage presented. The court on its own motion will examine grounds of its jurisdiction before proceeding further. Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1984) (quoting Walles v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 252 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Iowa 1977)); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 104(a) (1997) ([T]he court shall dismiss the action at any time it finds, by suggestion of the parties or otherwise, that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter.) (substance of this portion of Iowa R. Civ. P. 104(a) is now included in Iowa R. Civ. P. 88(a), (d) (1998)). Unlike jurisdiction of the person, the parties cannot waive or vest subject matter jurisdiction. In re Estate of Dull, 303 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 1981). Thus, contrary to Christine's arguments, the Act's exclusivity is not an affirmative defense which a party must assert. This is so because the Act's exclusivity means the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a workers' compensation case. Once a court discovers it does not have subject matter jurisdiction, it has no choice but to dismiss the case, no matter where in the stage of the proceedings this jurisdictional defect comes to light. The district court correctly considered the lack-of-subject-matter-jurisdiction issue even though Batchelder did not raise the exclusivity issue in his pleadings.