Opinion ID: 450642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Finality and Exhaustion

Text: 8 In order to obtain judicial review of a decision of the Secretary, section 405(g) of the Social Security Act requires a claimant to have obtained a final decision ... made after a hearing .... 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g) (1982). The Supreme Court has interpreted this requirement as consisting of two elements: (1) a waivable element that administrative remedies be exhausted; and (2) a nonwaivable element that the claim for benefits be presented to the Secretary. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328, 96 S.Ct. 893, 899, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The exhaustion requirement may be waived either by the Secretary, see, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 767, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 2467, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) (Secretary did not challenge some of claimants' allegations of exhaustion; Secretary's determinations deemed final as to those claimants), or by a court, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 328-30, 96 S.Ct. at 899-90 (plaintiff seeking pretermination hearing not required to exhaust his administrative remedies). Mathews v. Eldridge held that a court may excuse exhaustion, because in some cases a claimant's interest in having a particular issue resolved promptly is so great that deference to the agency's judgment [of finality] is inappropriate. 424 U.S. at 330, 96 S.Ct. at 900. The Court found compelling that the plaintiff had raised a constitutional challenge which was entirely collateral to his substantive claim of entitlement, that he suffered irreparable harm, and that upholding plaintiff's substantive compensation claim on other grounds would not answer his constitutional challenge. Id. at 330-32, 96 S.Ct. at 900-01. 9 Salfi and Eldridge express the established principle that the availability of judicial review for colorable constitutional claims is presumed. Since constitutional questions are unsuited to resolution in administrative forums, statutory schemes will not be read to foreclose such review unless congressional intent is clear and convincing. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109, 97 S.Ct. 980, 986, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). See, e.g., Leschniok v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 520, 522 (9th Cir.1983) (Secretary's failure to follow explicit statutory restriction presented constitutional claim; exhaustion excused); Singer v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir.1982) (rejection of disability claim without opportunity for hearing on the merits presents colorable constitutional challenge; exhaustion excused). 10 Boettcher asserts that his action falls within the Eldridge-Salfi principle because he has raised a colorable constitutional claim. Certainly, his claim is collateral to his underlying substantive claim that he is entitled to an onset date earlier than the one set by the SSA. The claim he asserts here, that he is entitled to a hearing limited to the issue of the onset date, is procedural, not substantive. 11 Also, as in Eldridge, 424 U.S. 331-32, 96 S.Ct. at 900-01, denying or upholding Boettcher's entitlement to benefits on other grounds would not answer his constitutional challenge. If Boettcher had proceeded to a hearing on the merits and the ALJ had determined that the earlier onset date was appropriate, Boettcher's constitutional challenge to the scope of the hearing would have gone unanswered. 3 12 Whether Boettcher's constitutional claim is colorable poses a more difficult issue. Courts have not expressly defined what a colorable claim is. One court has held that claims were reviewable because they were not without some merit. Jensen v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 1227, 1230 n. 2 (8th Cir.1983). Another court has indicated that a putative constitutional claim should be dismissed if it  'clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or ... is wholly insubstantial or frivolous.'  Holloway v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir.) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2664, 81 L.Ed.2d 369 (1984). 13 Determining whether Boettcher's constitutional claim is colorable necessarily involves a review of its merits. A determination that it lacks merit does not necessarily mean, however, that it is so insubstantial and immaterial that it does not pass the colorable test. On balance, we cannot say that the challenge Boettcher raises is wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous. We find the claim colorable, but ultimately incorrect. 14 Although the question of whether Boettcher's claim is colorable is close, the factors weighing in favor of deciding the case on the merits at the appellate level are strong: the issue is a legal one; the development of an administrative record would be wasteful and unhelpful; the issue is cast in terms of a due process claim; and the inquiry we make to determine whether the claim is colorable is essentially the same inquiry we undertake to decide the case on the merits. Accordingly, we go on to resolve the merits of Boettcher's claim. 15