Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Before DeCoster I

Text: 95 The early cases in this Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment only established a defendant's right to appointment of competent counsel. Subsequent negligence of that counsel did not implicate the Sixth Amendment. However, the Fifth Amendment's due process clause guarantees the accused a fair trial, and the early cases recognized that the performance of counsel might have been so inept that the defendant did not receive a fair trial. Thus, initially, the adequacy of counsel was considered to involve a Fifth Amendment question. 3 96 The Sixth Amendment, however, guarantees more than the appointment of competent counsel. By its terms, one has a right to Assistance of Counsel in his defence. Assistance begins with the appointment of counsel, it does not end there. In some cases the performance of counsel may be so inadequate that, in effect, no assistance of counsel is provided. Clearly, in such cases, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have Assistance of Counsel is denied. Thus, in Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970) we recognized that the right to adequate assistance of counsel is derived from the Sixth Amendment as well as from the Fifth. 4 97 In addition to applying the Sixth Amendment to the adequate assistance of counsel area, the pre-DeCoster I cases established two principles. First, they delineated a constitutional standard by which the adequacy of attorney representation can be tested. Second, they clearly allocated the burden of proof in adequacy of representation cases. 98 (a) The Standard. In our earliest decisions on the subject, we stated that a defendant's constitutional right to adequate representation is violated when counsel is shown to be so inept that the trial is a farce and a mockery of justice. 5 Later cases stated that the farce and mockery of justice test was meant as an example of a constitutional violation; it was not intended to restrict the Sixth Amendment's application to only those cases in which the trial could be called a farce. See Mitchell v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 63, 259 F.2d 787, 793 (1958). 6 99 Once the ambiguity surrounding the farce and mockery of justice test was cleared up, this court consistently held that a defendant's right to assistance of counsel is violated when his attorney's ineptness substantially prejudiced defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. In United States v. Hammonds, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 169, 425 F.2d 597, 600 (1970) we stated that  '(t)he question    is whether (counsel's) representation was so ineffective that Appellant was denied a fair trial.'  Similarly, in Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970) the court held that the appropriate standard for ineffective assistance of counsel . . . is whether gross incompetence blotted out the essence of a substantial defense. 100 (b) Burden of Proof. The pre-DeCoster I cases also established that the burden rests on the defendant to show that he did not receive a fair trial. In Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 339-40, 379 F.2d 113, 116-17, 121 (1967) (emphasis added) Judge Leventhal wrote for the Court: 101 In earlier cases it was said that a claim based on counsel's incompetence cannot prevail unless the trial has been rendered a mockery and a farce. These words are not to be taken literally, but rather as a vivid description of the principle that the accused has a heavy burden in showing requisite unfairness. Although the cases are rare and extraordinary, it appears that an accused may obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 if he shows that there has been gross incompetence of counsel and that this has in effect blotted out the essence of a substantial defense either in the District Court or on appeal. 102 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel might be made out if the wishes of the appellant were in fact diverted by clearly erroneous legal advice and he was substantially prejudiced thereby. 103 The defendant in Bruce was seeking habeas corpus release. Since his constitutional claim was made as a collateral attack on his conviction, Judge Leventhal acknowledged that a more powerful factual showing was necessary than would have been required were defendant seeking a new trial on direct appeal. 7 But the fact that Bruce was a collateral attack case does not denigrate the relevance of its holding that the defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice. 8 104 Judge Leventhal in a concurring opinion filed on petition for rehearing in Matthews v. United States, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 449 F.2d 985 (1971) reiterated that the defendant must show prejudice. He wrote: 105 I have taken the trouble of outlining the prejudice I think occurred, because I am by no means of the view, as suggested in the Petition for Rehearing, that in these cases no possibility of prejudice need be shown. Where defendant has not been provided with counsel, that fact in and of itself establishes the need for reversal without regard to any other possibility of prejudice. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), but when the claim is posed in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel, then I think the ineffectiveness has to be measured in terms of whether the attorney has in effect blotted out the substance of a defense, Bruce v. United States, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 336, 340, 379 F.2d 113, 117 (1967). 106 145 U.S.App.D.C. at 332, 449 F.2d at 994. This excerpt expresses the basic difference between those cases in which the defendant was actually denied counsel and those in which it is asserted that his counsel was ineffective: in the ineffectiveness types of claims the burden of proving prejudice rests on the defendant. 107 Judge Fahy's majority opinion in Matthews, joined by Judge Wright, rested explicitly on United States v. Hammonds, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 166, 425 F.2d 597 (1970). Hammonds, which involved a direct appeal, reaffirmed the earlier case law in this circuit that required the defendant to show prejudice. 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 169, 425 F.2d at 600. Hammonds was decided in favor of the defendant. But this was because (a)ppellant ha(d) sustained his burden of establishing his claim that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 138 U.S.App.D.C. at 173, 425 F.2d at 604 (emphasis added). 9 108 Hammonds relied heavily on then Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger's opinion for the court in Harried v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 330, 389 F.2d 281 (1967). Though Harried involved a direct appeal, the court relied on Bruce, supra, and Mitchell, supra, and explicitly stated that the 109 burden on the Appellant to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is heavy. The question . . . is whether his representation was so ineffective that appellant was denied a fair trial. 110 128 U.S.App.D.C. at 333-34, 389 F.2d at 284-85 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 111 Finally, in Scott v. United States, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 339, 340, 427 F.2d 609, 610 (1970) the court held that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals properly applied the standard in Bruce  in a direct appeal case. Scott is significant both because it is a direct appeal case and because it was the first case to acknowledge that inadequate assistance of counsel claims have Sixth Amendment underpinnings. By relying on Bruce, the Scott court held that in the Sixth Amendment context, as well as under the Fifth Amendment, the burden is on the defendant to show prejudice from the acts or omissions of his counsel. 112 To recapitulate, both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments are implicated in cases involving alleged ineffectiveness of counsel. The Fifth Amendment is violated if counsel's performance is so inadequate that defendant is denied a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment is violated when the performance of counsel is so inadequate that, in effect, the required Assistance of Counsel in his behalf has not been afforded. Under either Amendment, the pre-DeCoster I cases indicate that the defendant has the burden of showing that he was prejudiced by his counsel's inadequacy. The DeCoster I opinion and subsequent cases in this Circuit do not abandon nor do they provide a basis for abandoning the decisions in this Circuit as to the burden of proof. 10