Opinion ID: 891638
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Facial Language Analysis

Text: {9} The first guiding principle in statutory construction dictates that we look to the wording of the statute and attempt to apply the plain meaning rule, recognizing that `[w]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.' Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (alteration in original) (citation omitted); State v. Johnson, 2009-NMSC-049, ¶ 10, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (The primary indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.). The Legislature itself has codified the plain meaning rule in the Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act: The text of a statute or rule is the primary, essential source of its meaning. NMSA 1978, § 12-2A-19 (1997). {10} Instead of writing a narrow anti-indemnification statute that addressed only contracts for construction, the Legislature defined the statutory scope as including all contracts relating to construction. Relating to is defined as hav[ing] connection, relation, or reference [to.] The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1472 (4th ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 2000); see also Bettini v. City of Las Cruces, 82 N.M. 633, 634, 485 P.2d 967, 968 (1971) (stating that [s]tatutory words are presumed to be used in their ordinary and usual sense). A contract to rent equipment that is designed and intended for use in a construction project certainly has a connection, relation, and reference to the construction project and is therefore in literal terms a contract relating to construction. See Elliott Crane Serv., Inc. v. H.G. Hill Stores, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 376, 380 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992) (holding that a rental agreement for a construction crane was, in the terms of the Tennessee anti-indemnification statute, an agreement relative to the alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure or appliance (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {11} The facts of this case demonstrate the relationship between the construction equipment rental contract and the construction project in which the scissor lift was to be used. The rental contract written by United specifically recited on its face the name of the construction project, its location, its job number, and the particular phase of construction. United employees delivered the commercial-sized scissor lift to the construction site where it was to be used. United knew it was contracting with Yearout Mechanical, a licensed subcontractor with purchase order credit privileges allowing for payment of charges within 30 days after the rental date. All concerned had to have known the lift was rented for use in relation to construction activities. {12} Despite all those factors, we share United's concern that the term relating to, standing alone, can be an uncertain term with no clear end to its reach. See Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335, 117 S.Ct. 832, 136 L.Ed.2d 791 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ([A]pplying the `relate to' provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else.); cf. McMunn v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., 791 F.2d 88, 92 (7th Cir.1986) (noting the danger of construing the word affecting too broadly because [i]n an interrelated economy almost everything affects everything else). {13} Examining the remainder of the statutory language, while often helpful, is not determinative in this case. On the one hand, United argues that rental agreements for construction equipment are not included in the general clause, agreement[s] relating to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of real property, because rental agreements are not named or implied in the ensuing list of specifically included agreements: architectural services, demolition, design services, development, engineering services, excavation or other improvement to real property. Section 56-7-1(E). Our caselaw, on the other hand, recognizes that the use of the word includes to connect a general clause to a list of enumerated examples demonstrates a legislative intent to provide an incomplete list of activities: A term whose statutory definition declares what it includes is more susceptible to extension of meaning by construction than where the definition declares what a term means. It has been said the word includes is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation. . . . It, therefore, conveys the conclusion that there are other items includable, though not specifically enumerated. . . . In re Estate of Corwin, 106 N.M. 316, 317, 742 P.2d 528, 529 (Ct.App.1987) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {14} The manner in which the Legislature actually wrote the statuteby providing a list of non-obvious examplesequally supports the contention that it sought to indicate the broad range of agreements relating to construction projects. A plain reading of the general phrase relating to construction, alteration, repair or maintenance does not clearly indicate that architectural, design, engineering, or development services would be included, nor does it make obvious that deconstruction activities, such as demolition and excavation, are included as activities related to construction projects. {15} In support of its argument that the examples are intended to exclude construction rental contracts, United defines the class of specifically enumerated examples as  services performed in connection with a construction project and argues that a rental service for construction equipment is not a service. While it is true that the specific terms listed, architectural services, demolition, design services, development, engineering services, [and] excavation, Section 56-7-1(E), are all services to be performed in connection with a construction project, renting construction equipment is also a service that can be performed in connection with a construction project. The contractor's use of rental construction equipment is just as necessary to the completion of a construction project as the use of the designer's vision, the architect's plans, the engineer's specifications, and the developer's resources. On its face, therefore, the statute neither clearly includes nor clearly excludes construction equipment rentals. {16} Because we cannot definitively interpret the statute by a simple consideration of statutory language that is susceptible to more than one interpretation on its face, we must look to other guides of statutory interpretation. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064 (observing that where statutory language is vague or ambiguous, it is to be construed according to its obvious spirit or reason); Tafoya v. Garcia, 1 N.M. 480, 483 (1871) (We have long adhered to the notion that [t]he spirit, as well as the letter of the statute, must be respected; and where the whole context of a law demonstrates a particular intent in the legislature to effect a certain object, some degree of implication may be called in to aid that intent. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).