Opinion ID: 2037407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying mitchell's motion for mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct.

Text: During the jury's deliberation, Mitchell made a motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. The motion was denied. Mitchell contends that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the prosecutorial misconduct which occurred in four separate areas: (1) Reference to birth control in opening statement; (2) Violation of the court's order limiting surrebuttal; (3) Improper accreditation of a witness in the closing argument; and (4) Improper reference to Mitchell in closing argument as a con man. Trial courts have considerable discretion in granting or denying a mistrial. State v. Myers, 464 N.W.2d 608, 609 (S.D.1990); State v. Blalack, 434 N.W.2d 55, 58 (S.D. 1988). This court will overturn the trial court's decision only when this discretion is clearly abused. Id.; State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D.1987); State v. Farley, 290 N.W.2d 491, 494 (S.D.1980). To justify the granting of a mistrial, an actual showing of prejudice must exist. Blalack, 434 N.W.2d at 58; State v. Closs, 366 N.W.2d 138, 143 (S.D.1985). `Prejudicial error' for purposes of determining whether error constitutes grounds for mistrial is error `which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the jury's verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it.' Myers, 464 N.W.2d at 610 (quoting Blalack, 434 N.W.2d at 58); State v. Wimberly, 467 N.W.2d 499, 504 (S.D.1991); State v. Younger, 453 N.W.2d 834, 838 (S.D.1990); Michalek, 407 N.W.2d at 818); State v. Dokken, 385 N.W.2d 493, 498 (S.D.1986). With these standards in mind, we turn to the claimed incidents of misconduct.
S.D. testified at the preliminary hearing that she began taking birth control pills in April, 1985. She further testified that going on birth control pills was Mitchell's idea, although she was agreeable to the idea as she did not want Mitchell to get her pregnant. S.D. also testified that she was not sexually active at the time she began taking birth control pills. [3] Shortly after she began taking birth control pills, S.D. had sexual intercourse with a young man (not the same young man referred to in footnote 3). Prior to trial, State filed a motion to suppress S.D.'s prior sexual conduct. In response, Mitchell filed a rape-shield motion asking that he be allowed to present evidence of two incidents of sexual conduct involving S.D. and other young men. State filed its resistance to Mitchell's rape-shield motion stating, among other reasons, that State did not intend to introduce testimony that S.D. was placed upon birth control pills, thus making the issue of whether the birth control prescription was obtained at Mitchell's insistence irrelevant. The trial court decided to reserve its ruling on State's motion to suppress the victim's prior sexual conduct until after S.D.'s trial testimony. At a later motions hearing, State requested a ruling on its motion to suppress the victim's prior sexual conduct. At that time, Assistant Attorney General Ronald Campbell explained: The only way that I could see this would ever become relevant is if the State would introduce evidence concerning her taking birth control pills and then it might become relevant as to whether she hadwhether it was because [Mitchell] set it up or because she was having sex with someone, had had on one occasion sex with someone else. If the State does not bring this evidence in and at this time if the Court rules in favor of the State as far as suppression, it will not bring it in and it will not make it relevant. Or if at some time between now and the date of the trial, if the Court would rule, would make it much easier for the State to make its opening statement. It would make it much easier for the defense to know what he's going to be defending against. And the State would commit not to go into the birth control pills. For the obvious reason that he does not want to make this relevant. He does not want to put the victim through testifying about two incidents of sexual conduct with someone other than [Mitchell]. The trial court granted State's motion, ruling that the evidence of S.D.'s prior sexual conduct was of minimal or no relevance and that it would be highly prejudicial and, therefore, it would not allow any questions regarding other sexual activity. In his opening statement, Assistant Attorney General Campbell, while setting forth what S.D. would testify to, stated: Then this relationship [between Mitchell and S.D.] began to change. [Mitchell] began suggesting to her that she was getting to the age where she should start thinking about dating if she was going to date. That she should go on birth control pills and that, in order to have a sexual relationship with these boys she datedand it will soundshe can tell it to you much better, and that's the way it should be, than I can. But this was brought up many, many times. As a matter of fact, [Mitchell] told her that he'd call the doctor. And in order to be placed on these birth control pills it was necessary that a steel instrument be inserted inside of her and that this would really hurt unless someone did it ahead of time. Be almost impossible to have this test being placed on birth control pills[.] (Emphasis added.) During Mitchell's opening statement reference was made to birth control. State asked for a bench conference. The jury was briefly excused so that the trial court and counsel could clarify the ground rules regarding the birth control issue. State reiterated its position that it did not intend to present evidence about the birth control issue as it related to S.D.'s prior sexual conduct, but that it intended to present testimony that Mitchell used the gynecological examination as a means of getting S.D.'s permission to break her hymen with the butter knife. The trial court sustained State's objection. State argues that there were two separate and distinct stories regarding the birth control pills. First, there was the testimony regarding the need for a gynecological examination for S.D. to obtain birth control pills. This testimony relates to Count I of the information. The second type of testimony concerning birth control related to the period of time S.D. actually went on birth control pills. S.D. testified at the preliminary hearing that she was not sexually active when she went on the pill (except for Mitchell); however, she later engaged in sexual relations with a young man. This second type of testimony is the testimony which State sought to suppress. Mitchell argues that State has made the distinction in the testimony by using hindsight. However, we believe the trial court's comments reflect that the distinction was clear throughout: The statement about birth control is relevant, the original one, as a basis for the first penetration. The events of a year later which the State says it's not going to go into is a totally differentand as long as the State stays away from it the Court's ruling stands. Based on the above testimony, we believe State's references to birth control were within the trial court's ruling on the issue and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. Myers, supra ; Blalack, supra .
Although Mitchell did not testify during defense's case-in-chief, he called eight witnesses in his defense. One of these witnesses was James Casstenens, Mitchell's former employer. During cross-examination, Casstenens was asked the reason Mitchell had quit his job. Casstenens replied that Mitchell stated he was dying from sclerosis of the liver. Later, during cross-examination of Mitchell as a surrebuttal witness, Assistant Attorney General Campbell asked Mitchell if he had sclerosis of the liver. Mitchell replied no. Mitchell's counsel objected and the trial court struck the question and answer and instructed the jury to disregard the question and answer since it had nothing to do with S.D.'s rebuttal testimony. We stated earlier that the prejudicial error must be error which in all probability... produced some effect upon the jury's verdict[.] Wimberly, 467 N.W.2d at 504; State v. Tapio, 432 N.W.2d 268 (S.D.1988). While the question asked by State exceeded the bounds of surrebuttal, it did not rise to the level of prejudicial error and thus, did not warrant the granting of a mistrial.
Mitchell argues that because State successfully obtained pretrial rulings which prohibited references to S.D.'s prior sexual conduct, comments by State in closing argument improperly accredited S.D. thereby prejudicing Mitchell. Mitchell argues that the statements made by State were untrue and misled the jury. During closing argument, Assistant Attorney General Campbell said: You really think that those witnesses knew everything that was going on in that cafe every minute? What those witnesses really told you was that as much as we want you to not harm our father and our brother and our husband, we do not know anything bad about [S.D.] That's what those witnesses told you. Because you may rest assured that if there was one scrap of dirt that they could have picked up, they would have used it. .... MR. CAMPBELL: There was never one bad thing said about this girl by any of the defense's witnesses. (Emphasis added.) The fact that S.D. had sexual relations with young men other than Mitchell in no way reflects upon her credibility and veracity as a witness. In fact, references to her prior sexual conduct reflect on S.D.'s character, which is exactly the type of evidence that SDCL 23A-22-15 was designed to exclude. See also State v. Blalack, 434 N.W.2d 55 (S.D.1989). In its argument to the jury, State is allowed to comment on the evidence. Perhaps in this case, State exceeded the scope of what is fair and proper argument; however, we do not believe this error reaches the magnitude of prejudicial error. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict absent this error. While [t]he state's conduct in the present case is hardly in keeping with the prosecutor's `overriding obligation, shared by the court, to see that defendant receives a fair trial, however guilty he may be[,]' it did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Sahlie, 245 N.W.2d 476, 479 (S.D.1976) (quoting State v. Sha, 292 Minn. 182, 193 N.W.2d 829, 831 (1972)). The trial court properly denied Mitchell's motion for mistrial.
Mitchell claims Assistant Attorney General Campbell improperly referred to him as a con man during State's closing argument. The argument complained of is as follows: And he had the audacity to tell her that he was going to counseling. And his counselor had recommended that he have sex with her one last time. Why? So they could have a normal father/daughter relationship. My God. How could any manDo you think that that girl could sit up there and think up a lie as terrible as that? This is so cruel and so demeaning that no person in the world could think up a storythe truth is sometimes more outrageous, more damaging, more traumatic than any lie could ever be. This man is a con man. The evidence has shown you that. He's a manipulative man. And there are con men and manipulative men who, through pressure and fast talking, take money from old people or the mentally slow people or the greedy people. And that is bad. (Emphasis added.) After jury deliberations began, Mitchell made a motion for mistrial. Trial court denied the motion, stating that in the context in which the terminology con man was used, it was fair argument. We agree. In State v. McDowell, 391 N.W.2d 661, 666 (S.D.1986), this court stated: We note that ruling on a motion for mistrial is within the trial court's discretion, State v. Disbrow, 266 N.W.2d 246, 252 (S.D.1978); that an actual showing of prejudice must exist to justify the granting of a mistrial, State v. High Elk, 298 N.W.2d 87, 89 (S.D.1980); and that we will not disturb the trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial unless we are convinced there was a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Kidd, 286 N.W.2d 120, 122 (S.D.1979). Mitchell took advantage of S.D.'s trust in him and he convinced her that it was in her best interest for her to have sex with him. He told her that his counselor suggested that he have sex with her one last time to get it out of his system. S.D. was only thirteen years old when Mitchell began taking advantage of her trust in him. We agree with the trial court that, considering the context in which the reference was made, it was fair argument.