Opinion ID: 2612680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: was specific performance properly granted?

Text: Appellant's next contention questions the propriety of the trial judge's granting of specific performance in the appellees' favor. The contention is that appellees have behaved in ways that have the effect of precluding the granting of this equitable remedy. For instance, appellant alleges that appellees sat idly by while Rainbow Oil Company drilled two new wells on Old Rainbow and did not complain when the company undertook a program of reworking and modernizing several of the ten existing wells. As a matter of law, specific performance will be granted in the discretion of the court only where there is a valid, binding contract and the facts and special equities of the situation demand such relief. Reed v. Wadsworth, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1024 (1976); Merrill v. Rocky Mountain Cattle Co., 26 Wyo. 219, 181 P. 964 (1918). The party requesting specific performance must be able to establish that damages for breach are an inadequate and impractical remedy under the circumstances of the case. Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & Contracting Company, 58 Wyo. 330, 131 P.2d 339 (1942). Here, the facts plainly establish the existence of a binding and valid contract and they also establish that the appellees were ready, willing and able to assume control of Old Rainbow at all times contemplated by the contract, and would have done so but for appellant's refusal to turn operations over to them. Also, it was established that appellee Christmann had completed the drilling program on New Rainbow in a prudent manner and to the satisfaction of appellant. Christmann then made timely demands on Rainbow for relinquishment of control of Old Rainbow, which demands were refused. Given these circumstances, we find that the trial court properly concluded that specific performance was the proper remedy. No other relief would adequately transfer to Christmann that for which he bargained and which Rainbow Oil Company had agreed to convey. Appellant is correct in asserting that equity will not be available to one who has not acted in good faith and with due diligence, Merrill v. Rocky Mountain Cattle Co., supra, but appellant has failed to establish how Christmann had not complied with his good-faith responsibilities or acted without the diligence required of him. He abided by the terms of the contract and is merely asking that appellant be required to do the same. The district court correctly decided that the granting of specific performance was necessary.