Opinion ID: 2543365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of State v. Menzies in Carter II

Text: ¶ 24 We address these allegations of error in Carter II on their merits because these claims could only have been raised for the first time in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition for habeas corpus, Carter argued to the district court [3] that this court improperly applied State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994) in Carter II. On appeal in Carter II, Carter argued that his second death sentence should be reversed because during the 1992 penalty hearing he was forced to use peremptory challenges to remove three prospective jurors that the court should have removed for cause. As support for his argument, Carter relied on Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the law at the time, which required reversal in cases where the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss a juror for cause and the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to remove that juror. In Carter II, this court did not apply the automatic reversal rule of Crawford, but rather we applied the newly articulated rule of Menzies, which required the defendant to show that the jury that sat in the defendant's case was incompetent or partial before reversal was warranted. Carter II, 888 P.2d at 649. Applying the rule of Menzies in Carter II, we held that defendant had not shown that the jury that sat in his case was partial or biased, therefore, there was no reversible error. Id. We did not address whether the trial court erred in refusing to remove the jurors. ¶ 25 In his petition for habeas corpus, Carter alleged that this court erred in retroactively applying Menzies to his case because the law at the time of his 1992 sentencing hearing was the automatic reversal rule of Crawford. Analyzing the merits of this claim, the district court concluded that Carter had failed to show that he was prejudiced by the retroactive application of Menzies and dismissed this allegation. ¶ 26 The district court properly dismissed this claim. Carter's argument that the rule of Menzies should not be retroactively applied has been previously raised and rejected by this court. In State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951 (Utah 1999), the defendant argued that the rule of Menzies should not apply to his case because Menzies was decided after the defendant's trial. We specifically rejected the defendant's argument, stating, We now explicitly hold that Menzies applies both prospectively and retrospectively. Id. at ¶ 54. In so holding we explained that the long-standing traditional rule is that the law established by a court decision applies both prospectively and retrospectively, even when the decision overrules prior case law. Only if retrospective application of a decision creates `a substantial injustice' will a court limit a new decision to prospective application. Id. at ¶ 53 (citing Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 1992)). In Saunders, we found that no substantial injustice was created by the retroactive application of Menzies because pre- Menzies law was a procedural rule only and therefore there was no detrimental reliance on it. Id. at ¶ 54. ¶ 27 As in Saunders, Carter has not shown that a substantial injustice was created by our application of the Menzies rule to his case. Carter claims that a substantial injustice was created because he relied on the automatic reversal rule of Crawford during the 1992 penalty hearing. However, this argument fails because Carter cannot show that his reliance on Crawford affected his decisions regarding jury selection at the 1992 penalty hearing in any way. During that hearing, Carter's counsel challenged the three jurors for cause and then used peremptory challenges to strike them when the forcause challenges were denied by the court. Thus, none of the jurors Carter challenged sat on the jury. The fact that Carter thought he would be granted a new penalty hearing because he believed the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the jurors for cause does not amount to a substantial injustice. ¶ 28 Carter also argues that a substantial injustice was created because, in his brief before this court in Carter II, he argued for reversal under the automatic reversal rule of Crawford, and he was not given the opportunity to argue the merits under Menzies. This argument also fails. First, in the State's brief in Carter II, the State urged this court to overturn Crawford and adopt the rule later set forth in Menzies. Thus, Carter had the opportunity to address application of a Menzies -type rule to his case in his reply brief, and he took advantage of this opportunity, addressing this argument in his reply brief. ¶ 29 Because Carter has failed to show that a substantial injustice was created by the retroactive application of the Menzies rule to his case, we affirm the district court's ruling dismissing this claim.