Opinion ID: 1934122
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiff's Standing as Assignee to Maintain Suit.

Text: The defendants contend that the plaintiff, as assignee of Auerbach, cannot maintain this suit for specific performance, at least in the absence of Auerbach as an obligor or guarantor under the deed of trust to be executed to secure the deferred payments of the purchase price. The defendants point out that Auerbach is not a party to the suit and that he is not a resident of Maryland and urge that he is hence not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. It is perfectly evident that the contract is assignable. Indeed, it contemplates the possibility of assignment, and is made binding upon the respective heirs, executors, administrators or assigns of the sellers and of the purchaser. The rule has long been established in this State that wherever the specific execution of a contract or covenant respecting lands would have been decreed as between the original parties, it will be decreed as between all persons claiming under them in privity of estate, or of representation, or of title, unless other controlling equities have intervened. Worthington v. Lee, 61 Md. 530, 535; substantially repeated in Hollander v. Central Metal and Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 154, 71 A. 442. The defendants assert that this rule is inapplicable to the present case because they are entitled to the personal obligation of Auerbach under the deed of trust. The plaintiff points out that the contract does not provide for notes to be signed by the purchaser, but only for the giving of a deed of trust secured by the land. The similarity between deeds of trust, which are in common use in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties, and mortgages has previously been noted by this Court. LeBrun v. Prosise, 197 Md. 466, 79 A.2d 543; Silver Spring Title Co. v. Chadwick, 213 Md. 178, 131 A.2d 489. We have also had occasion recently to recognize and reaffirm the rule that if a mortgage or deed of trust of real estate is given as security for an indebtedness but contains no promise to pay the indebtedness, no implied covenant to pay it arises. See Alexander v. Hergenroeder, 215 Md. 326, 138 A.2d 366, and cases therein cited. There is no indication in the contract or elsewhere in the evidence that the Dawsons relied on the personal credit of Auerbach. Even if the contract of sale should be interpreted as requiring that Auerbach join in the execution of the deed of trust and of any notes which might be secured thereby, Baker has offered to procure Auerbach's joinder. It is true that Auerbach was not joined as a party to this suit, but there seems to be no reason why he should have been made a party initially. The Dawsons' objections to consummating the sale were based primarily (if not wholly) upon a controversy over the making of a survey and over who should pay the cost thereof, and perhaps on a general claim of invalidity. We find no merit in their contention that Auerbach was not a party to the suit; and we think that in view of the position which the Dawsons took, it was sufficient for the maintenance of this suit that Baker offered, during his testimony, to obtain the joinder of Auerbach in whatever documents might be necessary. Relief might have been granted on condition that he do so. There was no lack of mutuality of remedy as that doctrine is now interpreted and applied by this Court. Stamatiades v. Merit Music Service, Inc., 210 Md. 597, 124 A.2d 829; Messina v. Moeller, 214 Md. 110, 133 A.2d 75. Want of mutuality of remedy will not preclude specific performance unless the court finds that it is unable to insure the receipt by the defendant of that to which he was entitled under the contract. A further ground for rejecting the defendants' contention on this point is that under the contract, which provided for payment of the balance of the purchase price on or before eleven years from the date of settlement and payments of $2,000 or more per year until payment in full should be made, there is no reason why the plaintiff should not be entitled to a decree for specific performance, if he so elected, conditioned upon the payment of the entire balance of the purchase price in cash upon a conveyance being made. Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45 A.2d 329. As is stated in 138 A.L.R. 219: Even though the contract calls for the vendee's personal obligation or signature, the assignee, by providing the same or, in some circumstances, a cash equivalent, may become entitled to a decree of specific performance. In view of Baker's offer to procure Auerbach's joinder in whatever documents his joinder might be necessary and in view of the fact that the contract could have been satisfied by payment of the entire purchase price in cash, we think that Baker is not precluded, by reason of his failure to join Auerbach as a party or to make a tender in the bill of Auerbach's joinder in the execution of any necessary documents, from maintaining this suit for specific performance conditioned upon either Auerbach's joinder in any necessary instruments or payment in full in cash. The Chancellor did not determine whether Auerbach's joinder in the deed of trust or in any notes to be secured thereby was required, nor do we consider it necessary to decide that question at this time. We do, however, in accordance with Rule 885, Maryland Rules, express the opinion that no notes, whether executed by Auerbach or by Baker, or by both of them, are required, since the contract does not call for any notes.