Opinion ID: 1213091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: stopping of the automobile by the police and the subsequent order-out and frisk

Text: Appellant complains that his constitutional rights [3] were violated when Harada stopped appellant's vehicle and he was ordered out and frisked; since the action of the police was unconstitutional, the evidence seized as a result of these unconstitutional acts should have been suppressed. [4] Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Initially, we conclude that appellant and Parker were seized by the police when their automobile was stopped. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Goudy, 52 Haw. 497, 479 P.2d 800 (1971); State v. Joao, 55 Haw. 601, 525 P.2d 580 (1974); State v. Ogata, 58 Haw. 514, 572 P.2d 1222 (1977). We now examine whether the seizure was done within the guidelines of constitutional validity. [5] Terry v. Ohio, supra ; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); State v. Joao, supra , and State v. Onishi, 53 Haw. 593, 499 P.2d 657 (1972). Following the doctrine laid out by Terry, we held in Onishi, Joao, State v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316, 603 P.2d 143 (1979) and State v. Kea, 61 Haw. ___, 606 P.2d 1329 (1980), that in order for a police officer to conduct a valid stop and frisk, he must have observed specific conduct on the part of the person whom he is about to stop and frisk, or have reliable information from which he may reasonably infer that criminal activity is afoot and that the person being frisked is armed and dangerous. And the test of whether the officer's conduct of intrusion was reasonable is to be determined by whether the facts known to the officer, judged against an objective standard, would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. In determining the reasonableness of the officer's conduct, the information which he has on hand is vital, but he is not limited to his own personal knowledge. Where police officers are acting in concert and are keeping each other informed of the progress of a particular investigation, the knowledge of each is deemed the knowledge of all. State v. Barnes, 58 Haw. 333, 336, 568 P.2d 1207 (1977). Also, what is reasonable depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Both Harada and Teller in separate vehicles heard the broadcast and the description given. The suspects were reported to be two males, one a Black and the other a White. The White was approximately 6 feet to 6 feet two inches, 150 to 170 pounds, wearing a dark green tee shirt, and a dark jungle fatigue pants. He had a military haircut and his hair was of brown color. The Black was possibly six feet, 160 to 170 pounds, with jungle fatigue shirt and trousers and Afro hair cut. Both were also reported to be wearing military combat boots. As both officers headed toward the scene of the crime, Teller was the first to be attracted by the white Pontiac, which was travelling in a direction away from the victim's apartment and was a block away. Teller noticed that the driver was Black, wearing fatigue uniform, and the passenger was White, wearing a tee shirt. Teller immediately radioed his observation to Harada in the back of him and requested Harada to stop the car. When Harada saw the car within four seconds later, he also noticed that the occupants were two male persons. He could see the driver clearly  a Black, wearing an army fatigue shirt. He could not see the passenger clearly, but Harada could tell he had dark-colored hair and Harada could also tell he wasn't a Black male. Harada immediately gave chase and turned on his blue flashing light. The car attempted to get away. [6] Harada finally turned on his siren and stopped the car a little more than a quarter of a mile away. The observations of Teller and Harada formed the basis for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspects had been involved in the criminal activity. Their observations were made within minutes of the crime and within a block of the alleged burglary at a time when there was hardly any traffic on the highway. While the suspects were last seen by Grimes fleeing on foot, it was reasonable to assume that they would be making their getaway by automobile. The automobile was heading in a direction away from Grimes' apartment. The suspects generally matched the description given. The car attempted to get away from Harada. We hold that the investigatory stop of the car was not based on inarticulate hunches as argued by appellant, but instead was reasonably justified based on the officers' observation and information on hand. We also hold that the circumstances which formed the reasonable basis for the stop of the car justified the order-out and frisk and, as part of such frisk, scanning the interior of the car with a flashlight. [7] Furthermore, there was added justification when one considers the seriousness of the nature of the offense, [8] that it was dark, that Parker refused to comply with an order to place both hands on the dash board, but kept one hand fiddling around under the dash board, [9] and there was reasonable apprehension for Harada's safety. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).