Opinion ID: 778298
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of Cox's Privilege Claim

Text: 81 1. Construction of Evidentiary Privileges. Because claims of privilege derogate from the public's `right to every [person's] evidence,' Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50, 100 S.Ct. 906 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331, 70 S.Ct. 724, 94 L.Ed. 884 (1950)), they must be strictly construed and accepted `only to the very limited extent that permitting a refusal to testify or excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth,' id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); see also Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709-10, 94 S.Ct. 3090 (noting the exceptional nature of evidentiary privileges); accord Keenan, 47 N.Y.2d at 168, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 230, 390 N.E.2d at 1155 (emphasizing the enduring command that every man owes a duty to society to give evidence when called upon to do so) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 82 2. A.A.'s Status for Purposes of Establishment Clause Analysis. We have twice treated A.A. as a religion for purposes of Establishment Clause analysis. DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 407 (2d Cir.2001); Warner v. Orange County Dep't of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1075 (2d Cir.1997), reaff'd after remand, 173 F.3d 120 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1003, 120 S.Ct. 495, 145 L.Ed.2d 382 (1999). In Warner, we held that the Department of Probation of Orange County, New York, violated the Establishment Clause by in effect compelling the plaintiff to attend A.A. meetings as a condition of probation, because `at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.' 115 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992)). We observed that 83 [t]he A.A. program to which [the plaintiff] was exposed had a substantial religious component. Participants were told to pray to God for help in overcoming their affliction. Meetings opened and closed with group prayer.... We have no doubt that the meetings [the plaintiff] attended were intensely religious events. 84 Id. at 1075. In DeStefano, where we inquired into the propriety of State funding of an alcoholism treatment center, we said that the district court had correctly treated A.A. as a `religion' for Establishment Clause purposes. 247 F.3d at 407. We perceived no basis for distinguishing the A.A. program at issue in DeStefano from that in Warner because both use[d] the same Twelve Step system, distributed literature encouraging members to take religious `steps,' and conduct[ed] meetings in which these beliefs [we]re inculcated. DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 407. 11 85 The district court in this case now before us evidently thought itself constrained by these decisions to conclude that § 4505 must be extended to protect from disclosure communications made among members of A.A. See Cox II, 154 F.Supp.2d at 792. It saw no principled basis for a court to hold that AA is a religion for Establishment Clause purposes, and yet that the disclosure of wrongs to a fellow member as ordained by the Twelve Steps does not qualify for purposes of a privilege granted to other religions similarly situated. Id. 86 Asking that we reject the district court's conclusion, the appellant cautions us against establishing A.A. as a religion and concomitantly labeling its members as members of a religious sect, lest we offend atheists and agnostics [and members of other organized religions] who have reconciled their personal beliefs with their participation in AA. Appellant's Br. at 49. We do no such thing. 12 87 Organizations and community activities of many kinds, including, as here, therapeutic recovery-programs for alcohol or drug addiction, may involve substantial religious component[s], Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075, such that the government may not coerce individuals to participate in them or fund the inculcation of their beliefs without violating the Establishment Clause. But plainly, as the appellant urges, such organizations or community activities do not, for that reason, become or consider themselves to be religions in the ordinary sense of the word. 13 Step Three of the A.A. Twelve-Step Program invites A.A. members to turn [their] will and [their] lives over to the care of God as [they] underst[and] him. We doubt, however, that many members of A.A. would therefore identify themselves as members of the A.A. religion. A Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, or Zoroastrian alcoholic need not relinquish his or her religious beliefs and convert to A.A. in order to follow its precepts. 88 We have nonetheless held that when engaging in Establishment Clause analysis in certain settings we must treat A.A. the same as we would a group or organization that is a religion in the popular sense because some of A.A.'s activities and modes of expression are religious in nature. As the Seventh Circuit observed, the inclusion of qualifiers in the tenets of A.A. (e.g., God as we understood Him ) — which indicates that A.A. does not mandate one religious dogma — fails to remove it from the realm of religious activity in which the government may not, consistent with the Establishment Clause, compel citizens to participate and which the government may not fund: 89 True, [the] God [referred to in the twelve steps of the materially indistinguishable Narcotics Anonymous program] might be known as Allah to some, or YHWH to others, or the Holy Trinity to still others, but the twelve steps consistently refer to God, as we understood Him.  Even if we expanded the steps to include polytheistic ideals, or animistic philosophies, they are still fundamentally based on a religious concept of a Higher Power. 90 Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir.1996) (emphasis in original). 91 We have treated A.A. the same as we would a traditional religion where the State compelled participation in A.A. despite its intensely religious nature, Warner, 115 F.3d at 1075; and where the State allegedly funded  governmental indoctrination in A.A., DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 415 (emphasis in original). In DeStefano we explained, citing in part Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), that 92 when presented with Establishment Clause challenges, we are required to ask `whether the government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion' and `whether the aid has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.'... We employ three primary criteria to answer the latter question: [1] whether the action or program results in governmental indoctrination; [2] defines its recipients by reference to religion; or [3] creates an excessive entanglement. 93 DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 406 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Both Warner and DeStefano were decided under the first of the three primary criteria — governmental indoctrination. Both involved governmental coercion to engage in or pay for religious activity. It is in the course of that inquiry in DeStefano that we referred to A.A. as a `religion' for Establishment Clause purposes. 94 But Cox's challenge to New York's cleric-congregant privilege here appears to be based on the second of the three primary [ Agostini ] criteria: whether New York determines the applicability of its cleric-congregant privilege by reference to the religion of the person asserting it. We are not certain whether we would treat A.A. the same as we treat traditional religions in this context. We need not address this question, however, because, as we will discuss, Cox failed to establish that he spoke with fellow A.A. members in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d at 609, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 627 N.E.2d at 962. His communications at issue here would therefore not be privileged even if A.A.'s activities were required to be treated the same as those of Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, and Christian Science.
95 Cox confessed his killing of the Chervus — at times explicitly, at other times less so — to no fewer than seven fellow A.A. members: (1) Jessica, his former girlfriend, (2) Mr. C, Cox's A.A. sponsor, (3) Mr. O, a senior member of Cox's A.A. chapter, (4) Mr. A, a former gang member who attended some A.A. meetings at which Cox was present, (5) Mr. S, another fellow A.A. member, (6) Mr. R, Cox's roommate and personal friend, and (7) Ms. H, another A.A. member who shared an apartment with Cox and R for about two months. Cox, the congregant seeking to invoke the privilege, bore the burden to establish that his communications to these persons fell within the scope of § 4505. See Drelich, 123 A.D.2d at 443, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 748; accord Schultz, 161 A.D.2d at 971, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 545. He failed to carry it. Assuming that all the relevant conversations were made in confidence, the record makes clear that Cox did not confess his culpability for the Chervu killings for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d at 609, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 627 N.E.2d at 962. 96 The first fellow A.A. member to whom Cox confessed was Jessica, then his girlfriend. In a fit of tears, Cox told her that he believed he had killed the Chervus. Nothing in Cox's testimony suggests that this emotional outpouring to a lover reflected a search for spiritual guidance. 97 Jessica told Cox to speak to his A.A. sponsor, Mr. C., about his fears. Cox argues that he sought C's guidance about a spiritual matter, namely, how to handle the fourth step of A.A.'s religiously imbued program of recovery from alcoholism. But the record does not, we think, bear out this argument. C, by his own account, did not think himself capable of dealing with Cox's confession. He responded by asking for and receiving Cox's permission to speak to other A.A. members. Mr. C and Mr. O, with whom C later shared Cox's story, advised Cox to get a private detective or a lawyer. While the relevant inquiry is what Cox sought rather than what advice C and O, the putative clerics, in fact gave him, the nature of their ongoing communications with Cox suggests that he sought practical and legal, not spiritual, advice. See Wells, 446 F.2d at 4 (rejecting a federal commonlaw privilege claim where the defendant requested that a priest help him to contact an FBI agent); Drelich, 123 A.D.2d at 443, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (rejecting a privilege claim under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 where the defendant sought the advice of clergy for the secular purpose of seeking assistance in the retention of counsel); Schultz, 161 A.D.2d at 971-72, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 545 (same). 14 98 Cox subsequently confessed to Mr. A because, Cox testified, A was someone who talked openly about his gang involvement in Oakland ... someone who I felt possibly could identify with what I was going through. Cox appears to have viewed A as a friend with whom he might share a common experience. A testified that Cox spoke to him because he was getting close to the fourth step and didn't want to go to jail. No plausible reading of this testimony supports the view that Cox sought A's spiritual guidance. Similarly, there is no basis in the record for a conclusion that Cox's multiple conversations with Mr. S., in which Cox described the Chervu killings in some detail, had anything whatever to do with Cox's desire for spiritual or religious guidance. 99 Finally, Cox revealed his culpability for the Chervu killings to Mr. R, his roommate, and to Ms. H, who proceeded to share their apartment for two months. The record indicates that Cox told R about the killings not to seek spiritual guidance, but because the two of them had become friends. And far from seeking spiritual guidance from H, the A.A. member who first informed law enforcement officers of Cox's story, Cox testified that he told H about the killings because he thought she should be aware of them before deciding to share an apartment with him. 100 In sum, Cox spoke with other A.A. members primarily to unburden himself, to seek empathy and emotional support, and perhaps in some instances to seek practical guidance (e.g., legal advice). Nothing in the record suggests that Cox confessed to A.A. members for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d at 609, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 627 N.E.2d at 962. Under New York State law, the statements made by Cox therefore do not fall within the scope of § 4505, even assuming that A.A. is a religion to which the cleric-congregant privilege ordinarily would apply. 15 101
102 In response to Cox's conviction, [n]umerous self-help groups ... expressed outrage. Jessica G. Weiner, Comment, And the Wisdom to Know the Difference: Confidentiality v. Privilege in the Self-Help Setting, 144 U. Pa. L.Rev. 243, 244 (1995); see also Jan Hoffman, Faith in Confidentiality of Therapy is Shaken, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1994, at A2; Jimmy Breslin, Without a Shield, AA May Not Survive, Newsday, June 14, 1994. While one witness who testified at Cox's trial reportedly remarked that AA is not above the law, Breslin, supra (quoting Ms. [sic] S), others thought that the conviction threatened the confidentiality of A.A., a sine qua non of its therapeutic efficacy as a program for recovering alcoholics, see id. A priest, also an A.A. member, commented: 103 The confidentiality at AA is almost the same as the confessional.... Good Lord, if you don't have it at an AA meeting, then we are all threatened.... [O]nce you make [A.A.] people talk about one thing, what is to stop the authorities from deciding that they can come around for anything, an income tax case. Therefore, is a double murder more important than the confidentiality of AA? There had to be a better way to solve this case. 104 Id. (quoting anonymous A.A. member and priest). 105 We repeat our observation in DeStefano that [w]e have no reason whatever to doubt what we have been told: that A.A. is a vastly worthwhile endeavor; that it has saved the lives, health or well-being of thousands of Americans, at least in part because it requires participants to engage in intensive religious self-reflection. DeStefano, 247 F.3d at 422. Cox may be a case in point. He testified that since joining A.A., he has never again consumed an alcoholic beverage. We also have no reason to doubt the importance of confidentiality of communication to the success of the A.A. program. 106 But our role is not to decide the policy issues that underlie the State of New York's legislative or judicial choice to adopt or reject such an evidentiary privilege — whether the confidentiality of A.A., and the social values it may promote, outweigh the State's interests in enforcing its criminal law and promoting the public's right to every person's evidence. Our role is strictly limited. We must decide whether the state court's refusal to shield Cox's communications with fellow A.A. members from disclosure, even though New York law protects certain kinds of disclosures between clergy and congregants, violates the Establishment Clause. We hold that it does not because, even if the Establishment Clause requires that some communications between A.A. members in some circumstances be protected by New York's cleric-congregant privilege, Cox's communications to fellow A.A. members do not qualify for such protection. We have neither the occasion nor the authority to consider the wisdom of that conclusion or the policy issues that may be relevant to New York's decision whether to protect the confidentiality of communications among members of A.A. Those considerations remain the exclusive province of New York State's legislature and governor in enacting state law, 16 and its courts in interpreting statutes and crafting common-law privileges. 17