Opinion ID: 22192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: In Pierce v. Underwood, the Supreme Court determined that a district court’s decision regarding an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA was subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard. See 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988). Appellants argue that the factors articulated in Pierce militate against an abuse of discretion standard and support de novo review in this 13 case. We disagree and conclude that the close ties between the EAJA and the Hyde Amendment coupled with an application of the factors relied upon by the Court in Pierce support an application of the abuse of discretion standard.8 Awards made pursuant to the Hyde Amendment “shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitation (but not the burden of proof) provided for an award under [the EAJA].” Hyde Amendment, supra. The proper standard of appellate review is not one of the procedures and limitations of the EAJA, but the language of the Hyde Amendment indicates Congress’ intent to have proceedings under the Hyde Amendment treated similarly to those under the EAJA. While the language quoted above does not conclusively determine the proper standard of review, the tie-in between the two provisions lends support to finding that the same standard applies in both situations. In Pierce, the Supreme Court considered several factors in determining the correct standard of review for EAJA proceedings. First, the Court looked to the language of the statute itself. The EAJA provides that attorney’s fees shall be awarded “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). This formulation, as opposed to simply 8 In United States v. Gilbert, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the only other circuit court to consider the proper standard of review for Hyde Amendment cases, likewise determined that an abuse of discretion standard was appropriate. See 198 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 1999). 14 “unless the position of the United States was substantially justified,” emphasizes that the determination is for the district court to make, and thus suggests some deference to the district court on appeal. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559. The Hyde Amendment similarly provides that “the court . . . may award . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexations, frivolous, or in bad faith . . . .” Hyde Amendment, supra (emphasis added). The similar language in the Hyde Amendment supports deference to the district court’s decision as well. The Court in Pierce also considered whether “‘one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.’” 487 U.S. at 560 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). The Court noted that some aspects of the government’s litigating strategy may be known only to the district court. Also, the circuit court may have to spend inordinate time becoming more familiar with the record than is usually required for appeals in order to evaluate not only the merits of the case, but also the government’s litigating strategy. While the Hyde Amendment deals with criminal cases rather than civil cases, we find these considerations weigh equally in favor of applying a deferential level of review in Hyde Amendment appeals. The district court is much more familiar with the ins-and-outs of the case, and its judgment will often reflect its unique perspective. Applying a less deferential 15 standard of review would show disrespect for that unique perspective. Finally, the Supreme Court recognized that flexibility was needed in the area in order for the “substantially justified” standard to develop. “[T]he question . . . is . . . little susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization, and likely to profit from the experience that an abuse-of-discretion rule will permit to develop.” Id. at 562. The “vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith” standard of the Hyde Amendment, along with the “for good cause shown” standard that governs whether the court may receive evidence in camera and ex parte, will similarly benefit from the experience envisioned by the Supreme Court in Pierce. We conclude that an abuse of discretion standard should apply to appeals from judgments in Hyde Amendment proceedings. Legal determinations underlying the district court’s decision are, however, reviewed de novo. See Spawn v. Western Bank-Westheimer, 989 F.2d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 1993). “As Judge Friendly has stated, ‘[i]t is not inconsistent with the discretion standard for an appellate court to decline to honor a purported exercise of discretion which was infected by an error of law.’” Id. (quoting Abrams v. Interco, Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir.1983)). 16