Opinion ID: 3049765
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: habeas jurisdiction under the real id act

Text: [4] We next consider a question of first impression— whether the REAL ID Act precludes habeas review of IAC claims that arise from an attorney’s failure to file a timely petition for review of the BIA’s decision. When Congress enacted the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act in 2005, it was not writing on an empty slate. Rather, Congress was reacting to what it perceived as a troubling development in immigration case law. In analyzing the jurisdictional effect of the REAL ID Act on Singh’s second claim, it is helpful to consider the legal landscape in which Congress was legislating. Thus we preface our analysis with a brief discussion of the relevant statutory background. See generally Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106, 112-17 (2d Cir. 1998) (providing historical overview of changes to judicial review in the INA prior to the enactment of the REAL ID Act).
Between 1961 and 1996, the INA provided that courts of appeals “shall be the sole and exclusive” forum for judicial review of orders of deportation. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 172 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240, 297. Congressional intent was to abbreviate the process of judicial review by eliminating “the previous initial step in obtaining judicial review—a suit in a District Court.” Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 225 (1963). Habeas review remained available to a limited class of aliens, including those being held in detention and those subject to orders of exclusion.9 See H.R. Rep. No. 9 “Prior to the 1996 amendments, the law distinguished between deportation and exclusion proceedings. Aliens who were physically present in the SINGH v. GONZALES 10481 87-1086 (1961), as reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966. This system was designed to ensure that “no alien who has once had his day in court, with full rights of appeal to the higher courts, should be permitted to block his removal and cause unnecessary expense to the Government by further judicial appeals, the only purpose of which is delay.” Id. at 2968. In 1996, Congress sought to further streamline immigration proceedings by enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3546 (1996). Through these two Acts, Congress repealed the provision allowing habeas review for certain aliens. In addition, Congress eliminated all forms of judicial review of deportation orders against certain classes of criminal aliens. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 172 (discussing history of AEDPA and IIRIRA regarding habeas review). [5] The IIRIRA also added § 1252(b)(9) to Title 8, a consolidation provision known as the “zipper” clause. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). This section is a “ ‘zipper clause’ in the sense that it consolidates or ‘zips’ ‘judicial review’ of immigration proceedings into one action in the court of appeals.” Mahadeo v. Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 12 (1st Cir. 2000) (discussing INA § 242(b)(9), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)); see also Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining the legislative history of § 1252(b)(9)). Through this section, “Congress made clear that review of a final removal order is the only mechanism for reviewing any United States were placed into deportation proceedings. Exclusion proceedings dealt with aliens who were literally at the border seeking entry as well as those who had been physically paroled into the country but who, through a legal fiction, remained for immigration purposes at the border. The [Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996] combined the two proceedings into a new process known as a ‘removal proceeding.’ ” Henderson, 157 F.3d at 111 n.5 (citations omitted). 10482 SINGH v. GONZALES issue raised in a removal proceeding.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 173. Despite these efforts by Congress to streamline and to place statutory limitations on judicial review, the Supreme Court expanded judicial review for criminal aliens just five years later. In INS v. St. Cyr, the Court held that criminal aliens could challenge their removal orders in a habeas proceeding given “the absence of . . . a forum” to review their claims if habeas were deemed to be unavailable, “coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas.” 533 U.S. 289, 314 (2001) (emphasis added). The Court held that there would be a “serious Suspension Clause issue”10 if the 1996 reforms were read to withdraw all forms of review over claims of criminal aliens. Id. at 305. The ultimate effect of the decision in St. Cyr was to allow criminal aliens more judicial review than they had before the 1996 reforms, and more review than accorded to non-criminal aliens. H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 173. [6] Congress enacted § 106 of the REAL ID Act to “ad- dress the anomalies created by St. Cyr and its progeny” by restoring judicial review “to its former settled forum prior to 1996.” Id. at 174. To achieve these goals, the REAL ID Act expressly eliminated habeas review over all final orders of removal, but restored to the appellate courts jurisdiction over “constitutional claims or questions of law” in all cases— criminal and non-criminal. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). As described by the Third Circuit, “[t]hese modifications effectively limit all aliens to one bite of the apple with regard to challenging an order of removal.” Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 10 Article I, § 9, cl. 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” SINGH v. GONZALES 10483
The starting point for any statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); United States v. Hoffman, 794 F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986). Although statutory titles are not part of the legislation, they may be instructive in putting the statute in context. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (“[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). The title of § 1252 is “Judicial review of orders of removal.” Indeed, the entire section is focused on orders of removal. [7] Sections 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) are particularly significant to our analysis. Section 1252(a)(5) (titled “Exclusive means of review”), a new provision added to the INA by § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii) of the REAL ID Act, states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sec- tions 1361 and 1651 of such title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) of this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (emphasis added). Section 1252(b)(9) (titled “Consolidation of questions for judicial review”), as we have noted earlier, was originally enacted by IIRIRA in 1996 to serve as a “zipper clause.” As originally enacted, § 1252(b)(9) stated: 10484 SINGH v. GONZALES Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (1997). [8] The only change that the REAL ID Act imposed on § 1252(b)(9) was to add the following language explicitly prohibiting habeas review: Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas corpus under section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2007). [9] By virtue of their explicit language, both §§ 1252(a)(5) and 1252(b)(9) apply only to those claims seeking judicial review of orders of removal. Section 1252(a)(5) is prominently directed to “judicial review of an order of removal.” Section 1252(b)(9) explicitly covers “any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien.” To the extent that this language could be viewed as broader than § 1252(a)(5), as argued by the government, we are guided by the Supreme Court. In St. Cyr, the Court confirmed that § 1252(b)(9) “applies only ‘with respect to review of an order of removal under [8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)].’ ” 533 U.S. at 313 (emphasis added) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).11 The Court further 11 Congress’ purpose in enacting § 1252(b)(9) in 1996 was simply “to consolidate judicial review of immigration proceedings into one action in SINGH v. GONZALES 10485 emphasized, “[s]ubsection (b)(9) simply provides for the consolidation of issues to be brought in petitions for ‘[j]udicial review’ . . . .” Id. The language added by the REAL ID Act does nothing to change or undermine that analysis. The legislative history of the REAL ID Act is consistent with this conclusion. According to the House Conference Report on the REAL ID Act, “[u]nlike AEDPA and IIRIRA, which attempted to eliminate judicial review of criminal aliens’ removal orders, section 106 would give every alien one day in the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional concerns [expressed in St. Cyr].” H.R. Rep. No. 109-72, at 175. The House Report concluded, “[m]oreover, section 106 would not preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are independent of challenges to removal orders. Instead, the bill would eliminate habeas review only over challenges to removal orders.” Id. (emphasis added). Post-REAL ID Act cases considering the applicability of § 1252 have also distinguished between challenges to orders of removal and challenges that arise independently. See e.g., Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that “the REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions . . . does [sic] not apply [if the] claim is not a direct challenge to an order of removal” (emphasis added)); Kumarasamy v. Att’y Gen., 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an the court of appeals.” St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Congress enacted [§ 1252(b)(9)] for the important purpose of consolidating all claims that may be brought in removal proceedings into one final petition for review of a final order in the court of appeals.”). That the REAL ID Act now precludes habeas review of “questions of law or fact” arising from “action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien” simply means that if the alien fails to consolidate his claims as required under § 1252(b)(9), he may not later bring a separate habeas claim to raise “questions of law or fact” that should have been brought as part of a challenge to his final order of removal. 10486 SINGH v. GONZALES alien who is challenging the legality of removal because he allegedly never received notice of his removal order is “not seeking review of an order of removal”); Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 470 F.3d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a “petitioner who contests the very existence of an order of removal does not seek ‘review of an order of removal’ within the meaning of the REAL ID Act”); Ali v. Ashcroft, 421 F.3d 795, 797 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (order denying reh’g) (noting that jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the REAL ID Act do not apply to a claim that petitioners may not be removed to a country that does not have a functioning government, “because petitioners do not challenge or seek review of any removal order”). [10] Therefore, the question before us is whether Singh’s second IAC claim is a claim that seeks review of a final order of removal within the meaning of § 1252. An “order of removal” means “the order of the special inquiry officer, or other such administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the responsibility for determining whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A); Molina-Camacho v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A), which defines “order of deportation,” now applies to orders of removal as well), overruled on other grounds by Lolong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2007); Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2003). An order of removal becomes final upon the earlier of “(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). [11] At the time Lawyer 2 filed the late petition for review before this court, the removal order against Singh had become final. The alleged ineffective assistance of Lawyer 2 occurred after the issuance of the final order of removal, and the SINGH v. GONZALES 10487 claimed injury that Singh suffered as a result was the deprivation of an opportunity for direct review of the order of removal in the court of appeals. Thus, even assuming the district court permits Singh’s habeas petition to proceed and determines that Lawyer 2 provided ineffective assistance in failing to file a timely appeal, Singh’s only remedy would be the restarting of the thirty-day period for the filing of a petition for review with this court. See Dearinger ex rel. Volkova v. Reno, 232 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The district court granted the petition and ordered the government to reenter the BIA’s order denying the appeal and restart the thirtyday period for filing the petition for review in the court of appeals.”). In other words, a successful habeas petition in this case will lead to nothing more than “a day in court” for Singh, which is consistent with Congressional intent underlying the REAL ID Act. For these reasons, Singh’s second IAC claim cannot be construed as seeking judicial review of his final order of removal, notwithstanding his ultimate goal or desire to overturn that final order of removal. The government contends that the BIA has authority to remedy the type of IAC claim that Singh has alleged against Lawyer 2 through reissuance of the BIA’s original decision, thereby allowing the clock to begin ticking anew for the filing of a timely petition for review. That Singh may have an alternative avenue for relief does not change our statutory analysis. Our decision is limited to the question of jurisdiction in the district court. On remand, we cannot predict what procedural or substantive hurdles Singh might face, such as his failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Lozada.12 12 Dearinger held only that where, as here, an alien is prevented from filing an appeal in an immigration proceeding due to counsel’s error, the alien may seek habeas review in a district court without filing a motion to reopen. 232 F.3d at 1045 n.4. Dearinger did not address the issue of Lozada. Although the requirements of Lozada are not “rigidly applied, especially when the record shows a clear and obvious case of ineffective assistance,” an alien generally must satisfy the procedural requirements of Lozada. Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 587-88 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Rodriguez-Lariz v. INS, 282 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002)). 10488 SINGH v. GONZALES We offer no judgment as to whether the district court will proceed with the claim on the merits or what additional administrative remedies may remain for Singh. We do not take lightly Congress’s general concern over the proliferation of habeas petitions in the immigration area. However, we can interpret that concern only in the context of specific statutory language. The maze of immigration statutes and amendments is notoriously complicated and has been described as “second only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.” Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration and Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The recent amendments under the REAL ID Act do not make our task any easier. Nonetheless, we assume that Congress is familiar with the intricacies of the overlapping laws and that it meant what it said when it directed the limitations on habeas relief to challenges to orders of removal. Our decision today is limited to a narrow class of cases that do not fall within the habeas restrictions of the REAL ID Act.