Opinion ID: 2750493
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the link of the activity to the territory of the

Text: regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted[;] (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2) (1987). 50 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN of the conduct in question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy interests. When some or all of a plaintiff’s claims arise under state law, the state’s interests, if any, should be considered as well. The doctrine of comity is particularly concerned with “sovereign interests,” Childress III, supra, at 61–62, and the sovereign whose interests are relevant when a federal court is hearing state-law claims is as much the individual state—whose law the federal court must faithfully apply—as the United States.22 Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2)(c) (courts considering whether jurisdiction is reasonable should assess “the importance of regulation to the regulating state” (emphasis added)). We caution, however, that in cases of this kind there is always a 22 It bears mentioning that a state’s interest will not necessarily be in the application of its own law to a case. Here, for example, although Plaintiffs pled California causes of action, if the case were to proceed to litigation, the district court would follow California’s conflict-of-laws methodology, which calls for a governmental-interest analysis. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). That analysis could favor the application of Colombia’s law rather than California’s. See, e.g., Arno v. Club Med, Inc., 22 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) (under California’s governmental-interest analysis, French law, rather than California law, applied to plaintiff’s tort claims against former employer and supervisor); McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1422–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (Saudi law, rather than California law, applied to plaintiffs’ state-law claims against employer); Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 89 Cal. App. 4th 180, 194 (Ct. App. 2001) (Dominican Republic law, rather than California law, applied to tort and worker’s compensation claims); Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 804 (Ct. App. 1980) (Mexican law, rather than California law, applied to personal-injury claims arising out of auto accident in Mexico). Thus, in stating that a court sitting in diversity should consider the state’s interests, we mean to refer primarily to the state’s interest, if any, in providing a forum or remedy for particular claims. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 51 risk that “our foreign relations could be impaired by the application of state laws, which do not necessarily reflect national interests.” Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1232–33. Out of regard for that risk, we should be careful not to give undue weight to states’ prerogatives. We will discuss each of the foregoing factors in turn. First, comity is most closely tied to the question of territoriality. We should consider where the conduct in question took place. This is a critical question in determining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes, see Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–65; Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248, and it is a relevant consideration in adjudicatory comity as well. The general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law recognizes that “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454. Comity similarly rests on respect for the legal systems of members of the international legal community—a kind of international federalism—and thus “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.” Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248. Not surprisingly, U.S. courts have afforded far less weight, for comity purposes, to U.S. or state interests when the activity at issue occurred abroad. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing action under comity where the “activity and the alleged harm occurred entirely in Peru [and] Plaintiffs are all residents of Peru”), aff’d, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (declining jurisdiction under comity where challenged activity occurred entirely in Ecuador); see also Chowdhury v. 52 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2014) (reversing lower court and foreclosing jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by Bangladeshi plaintiff allegedly detained and tortured by Bangladeshi authorities in Bangladesh). See generally Koh, supra, at 18–19, 51–57 (describing courts’ aversion to adjudicating extraterritorially as rooted in principle of national sovereignty). Second, we should take account of whether any of the parties are United States citizens or nationals, and also whether they are citizens of the relevant state. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating dismissal, on forum non conveniens, comity, and failure to join indispensable party grounds, of action by Ecuadorians against American oil company for injuries that allegedly resulted from action in Ecuador); Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 556–57 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction where some parties were U.S. corporations and U.S. persons and other non-nationals had substantial contacts with the United States). As we previously discussed in the context of the ATS, even if the presence of U.S. nationals as defendants does not establish jurisdiction in this country on its own, it can, as we have noted, contribute to a finding that there is a “nexus” between the United States and the parties and claims in a case. See supra; see also, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (“Sarei III”), 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) and aff’d, 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). Kiobel and the lower-court decisions that have followed in its wake confirm the importance of these first two factors MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 53 to courts’ jurisdictional analyses in cases involving international events. While Kiobel and its progeny specifically address the interpretation of a statute—the ATS—and not the prudential international comity doctrine, the guiding principle of those cases applies equally in the context of adjudicatory comity: the weaker the nexus between the challenged conduct and U.S. territory or U.S. parties, the weaker the justification for adjudicating the matter in U.S. courts and applying U.S. federal or state law. The third factor we should consider bearing on U.S. interests is the nature of the conduct in question. We should ask whether the action is civil or criminal; whether it sounds in tort, contract, or property; and whether the conduct is a regulatory violation or is a violation of international norms against torture, war crimes, or slavery. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–33 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). These inquiries may inform our judgment of the importance of the issue to the United States or to an individual state. The closer the connection between the conduct and core prerogatives of the sovereign, the stronger that sovereign’s interest. For example, in Timberlane I, which was an antitrust case, we considered “the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, . . . and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.” Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 614. Fourth, we must take cognizance of the foreign policy interests of the United States. As we do when applying the political question, act of state, and foreign affairs doctrines, we must respect the Constitution’s commitment of the foreign 54 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN affairs authority to the political branches. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”); art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and he . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls); art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”). See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413–15; Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964); Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. Courts have found that U.S. interests weigh against hearing cases where doing so would be harmful to U.S. foreign policy. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing as nonjusticiable ATS claims brought by Korean women in light of U.S government’s argument that “adjudication by a domestic court not only would undo a settled foreign policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan’s delicate relations with China and Korea, thereby creating serious implications for stability in the region” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1239 (abstaining in light of strong foreign policy interest in promoting settlement of Nazi-era claims through government-backed forum); O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal where district court concluded that U.S.-Colombian relations would likely suffer if U.S. litigation proceeded in light of foreign state’s “strong interest” in relevant protectionist legislation and ownership interest in defendant). This deference is rooted, in part, in separation of power concerns. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (dismissing claim by Guatemalan widow alleging MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 55 federal officers concealed information about her husband’s fate and holding that “if there is to be judicial enquiry, it will raise concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches”). Fifth, we may also weigh U.S. public policy interests, and those of the relevant state to a lesser extent, for “courts will not extend comity to foreign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to the policies . . . of the United States.” Pravin, 109 F.3d at 854. For example, we have held that there is a strong U.S. interest justifying U.S. jurisdiction in “preventing trademark violations,” Reebok Int’l, 970 F.2d at 556, and we have spoken of the strong U.S. policy favoring enforcement of arbitration and forum selection clauses. See Dependable Highway Exp. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 1059, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit has also refused to extend international comity to a foreign state’s debt negotiations as contrary to American policy because the United States “encourages participation in, and advocates success of” such debt resolution procedures, and the United States “has a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts . . . owed to United States lenders.” Pravin, 109 F.3d at 855. We have treated differences in legal approach cautiously, however. Even when foreign practices may differ from American ones, we will respect those differences so long as the variance does not violate strongly-held state or federal public policy. See Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that decision allowing Government of Belize to remove directors of telecom company did not “violate[] American public policy” where decision “merely g[ave] effect to the plain language” 56 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN of corporate articles of incorporation, which were interpreted under Belizean law).