Opinion ID: 3000257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State-Law Tort Claim

Text: Finally, we must decide whether the district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ state-law tort claim. Illinois law recognizes the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was pleaded by the plaintiffs in Count III of their complaint. See McGrath v. Fahey, 533 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. 1988). Among other requirements, a plaintiff ’s emotional distress must be “severe,” and the defendant’s conduct “extreme and outrageous,” to give rise 18 No. 04-4162 to liability for this tort. See Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 767-68 (Ill. 1976). In the district court’s view, the plaintiffs’ tort claim failed because the complaint did not allege that Deputy Krieger’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous,” and because the complaint did not allege a severe emotional injury. In making this determination, the district court appears to have applied Illinois’ fact-pleading requirements for civil complaints. Yet this suit is in federal rather than state court, and each sovereign may apply its own procedural rules in its own courts. Rule 8 does not require plaintiffs to plead the “elements” of legal theories, or facts corresponding to each element. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510-11; Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1992). When state and federal practice differ, federal rules adopted under the Rules Enabling Act prevail. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980). This means, in particular, that when federal courts entertain claims under state law—whether under the diversity jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1332 or, as here, the supplemental jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. §1367—it is not necessary to plead facts matching elements of legal theories. See Hefferman v. Bass, 467 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 2006); AXA Corporate Solutions v. Underwriters Reinsurance Corp., 347 F.3d 272, 277 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Parties might prefer the notice-pleading regime of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure over the fact-pleading approach that prevails in Illinois courts, but no one thinks that the Illinois rules of pleading are binding on the federal courts.”). Although the district court was correct in observing that the complaint did not contain all of the facts that would be necessary to prevail, “a filing under Rule 8 is not supposed to do that.” Hoskins v. Poelstra, 320 F.3d 761, No. 04-4162 19 764 (7th Cir. 2003). Instead, the complaint “should be ‘short and plain’ and suffices if it notifies the defendant of the principal events.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Here, the plaintiffs’ factual allegations described the principal events giving rise to the suit and attached them to a right of action cognizable under state law. The plaintiffs’ state-law tort claim must be reinstated. Because the federal claims have been resolved, the district court should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction so that the state-law claims may be resolved in state court. 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).