Opinion ID: 553847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cruel and Unusual Punishment under the Eighth Amendment

Text: 57 We turn next to defendant's assertion that his sentence under Sec. 1111 violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it does not allow for an individualized assessment of the offender. For support, defendant cites Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 97 L.Ed.2d 56 (1987), which held the mandatory imposition of the death penalty unconstitutional under circumstances where the sentencing court was not permitted to consider possible mitigating factors at defendant's sentencing because of his status of serving a life sentence at the time of the offense. The obvious distinction between Sumner and the instant case is that the analysis here is of the mandatory imposition of life imprisonment, not capital punishment. We have previously ruled that in a noncapital case no due process right to individualized sentencing exists. See United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1989). 58 Gonzalez urges that a life sentence without parole sentences him to a living death because no matter what he does in prison he can only leave there in a coffin. Such an argument is not without substance, yet a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is not an irreversible deprivation in the same manner as a sentence of death. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1138, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). The Supreme Court's close and careful review of how the death penalty may be imposed describes the difference between the death penalty and all other punishments: Death is a unique punishment in the United States. In a society that so strongly affirms the sanctity of life, not surprisingly the common view is that death is the ultimate sanction. Furman, 408 U.S. at 286, 92 S.Ct. at 2750 (Brennan, J., concurring). Individualized assessment of a defendant in noncapital cases, in contrast to capital cases, has been based not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Thus, the Eighth Amendment does not compel individualized assessment of a defendant facing a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 59 Discussion now turns to exploring the proportionality argument. In several cases decided in the 1980's the Supreme Court wrestled with the issue of proportionality under the Eighth Amendment. Underlying the discussion is the analysis contained in the leading case of Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). In that case, Weems was convicted of falsifying a public and official document, and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. The Court graphically described the statute under which Weems was convicted as requiring confinement for twelve years and one day, a chain at the ankle and wrist of the offender, hard and painful labor, ... [and, following release,] tormenting regulations that, if not so tangible as iron bars and stone walls, oppress as much by their continuity, and deprive of essential liberty. Id. at 366, 30 S.Ct. at 548. After reviewing the history of the Eighth Amendment and quoting Mr. Justice Story as ascribing its genesis to the English Bill of Rights of 1688, id. at 371, 30 S.Ct. at 550, the Court goes on to say [i]n the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be. Id. at 373, 30 S.Ct. at 551. It showed through historical analysis how all the old forms of torture and barbarous conduct, whipping, pillory, burning, quartering and the like came gradually to be considered by courts in this country to fall within the Eighth Amendment's prescription against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court then declared the Philippine statute under which the punishment was imposed unconstitutional both on account of the[ ] degree and kind [of punishments it imposed]. Id. at 377, 30 S.Ct. at 553. But it added this caveat: the function of legislature is primary. Id. at 379, 30 S.Ct. at 554. There is a certain subordination of the judiciary to the legislature, and its presumptions of legality are not lightly to be interfered with, nor attacked based on judges' notions of right and wrong. The only limitations on the legislature are constitutional ones. Id. 60 In 1980 the Supreme Court had before it a Texas two-time recidivist who, upon a third felony conviction, received a mandatory life term sentence. It held the sentence did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). A few years later a South Dakota recidivist with six prior felony convictions received on his seventh felony conviction for altering a worthless $100 check a life term without possibility of parole. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence focusing on its disproportion to the crime committed. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). 61 Distinctions exist between these two cases: for example, in Rummel the prisoner was eligible for parole in 12 years; that possibility did not exist in Solem. Although difficult to harmonize, we may nonetheless glean some applicable principles from their teachings. The final clause of the Eighth Amendment--nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted--prohibits not only the barbaric punishment addressed in Weems, but also sentences grossly disproportionate to the offense committed. One example all the members of the Supreme Court agreed upon was that were parking overtime to subject a person to life imprisonment, the proportionality principle would come into play. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n. 17, 310-11 nn. 2 & 3, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 n. 17, 3020-21 nn. 2 & 3; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274 n. 11, 288, 100 S.Ct. at 1139 n. 11, 1146 (Powell, J., dissenting). 62 These decisions instruct that only in a rare case should a court engage in reviewing disproportionality of sentences because the legislature's line drawing--when it fixes terms for imprisonment--is primary and presumptively valid. A legislative body may conduct hearings, take surveys, and hear a broad range of public opinion in determining what is appropriate punishment. Hence, such a body is better equipped to determine what sentences should be imposed for given offenses. Plainly, the Supreme Court established no general rule of appellate review for sentences. Instead, appellate examination is confined to deciding whether a sentence reviewed is within constitutional limits. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. at 3009 n. 16. It might be safely said that when the offense causes less revulsion than the punishment imposed for its commission, as it did in Weems, then grossly disproportionate punishment has been inflicted in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 63 In light of Solem, Rummel, and Weems, it seems clear that there is no valid proportionality claim in the case at hand. The Eighth Amendment condemns only punishment that shocks the collective conscience of society. A sentence of life without parole for a drug dealer and killer, even a first-time offender, is not so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the public's conscience. See United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir.1988) (judge did not abuse his discretion by sentencing defendant to life without parole where defendant was large supplier of hard drugs); Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 505-507 (5th Cir.1988) (mandatory sentence of life without parole given to 21 year old heroin addict held constitutional despite court's expressed sympathy that the tiger trap has sprung on a sick kitten), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020, 109 S.Ct. 1140, 103 L.Ed.2d 201 (1989). Consequently, the imposition under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1111 of a life sentence without parole in this case is not so grossly disproportionate to the offense as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. II Sufficiency Challenges 64 The sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict on the elements of guilt, intent implicated in the murder, and the venue where the action was tried are next to be discussed. An appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence bears a very heavy burden, see United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 216 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Buck, 804 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.1986), since the evidence and all inferences and ambiguities are viewed in a light most favorable to the government. The evidence is not viewed piecemeal, but as a whole, United States v. Geaney, 417 F.2d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028, 90 S.Ct. 1276, 25 L.Ed.2d 539 (1970), and the verdict must be sustained if, viewing the evidence in that manner, there is substantial evidence to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). For those reasons, a conviction must be upheld where any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Badalamenti, 794 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir.1986). 65 The first issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Gonzalez killed Pichardo. The proof, already related, consisted of one eyewitness to the murder, two witnesses who saw Gonzalez run from the scene of the crime, identification of the murder weapon, telephone records of the call used to lure the victim to the place where he was killed, and Gonzalez' threats made in the presence of several witnesses that he was going to kill Pichardo. This is more than sufficient proof to support the jury's verdict. 66 The next issue is whether the evidence supports the finding that the defendant shot Pichardo with the requisite intent. A defendant is guilty of tampering with a witness or informant only if he committed the act withintent to--(A) prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding; (B) prevent the production of a record, document, or other object, in an official proceeding; or (C) prevent the communication by any person to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings. 67 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(a)(1) (1988). The prosecutor is not required to prove the defendant's state of mind with respect to the elements of the federal nature of the proceeding, the judge, agency, or law enforcement officer. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(f) (1988); see United States v. Scaife, 749 F.2d 338, 348 (6th Cir.1984). 68 Gonzalez' argument that there was no testimony that he was afraid Pichardo would rat him out to the DEA--as opposed, for example, to some state or local law enforcement agency--therefore, is meritless, as is the similar point that he might have killed Pichardo for some reason other than to prevent the communication of evidence against him. See United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 555 (2d Cir.) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for drug trafficking since rational juror could conclude defendant's statements indicated his participation in heroin conspiracy, not his desire to get involved in legal gambling operation as defendant claimed), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988). The evidence amply proved defendant intended to kill Pichardo to prevent him from communicating information to the DEA. Proof included Delvalle's testimony that Gonzalez thought Pichardo had marked him, as well as other statements admitted into evidence that Gonzalez knew Pichardo was an informant. III Venue A. Standard of Proof 69 The next question presented is whether the government was required to prove venue in the Southern District of New York beyond a reasonable doubt. Subsection (h) of Sec. 1512 states that a witness tampering prosecution may be brought in the district in which the official proceeding (whether or not pending or about to be instituted) was intended to be affected or in the district in which the conduct constituting the alleged offense occurred. As a general rule, [v]enue turns on whether any part of the crime was committed within the district, and the government need only prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 455 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103, 97 S.Ct. 1128, 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977). Precedent does not support defendant's contention that venue under Sec. 1512 is subject to a higher burden of proof. He relies on United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934, 105 S.Ct. 332, 83 L.Ed.2d 269 (1984), which is of no help to him, for it correctly articulates the standard as preponderance of the evidence, even though in that case the trial court improperly instructed the jury that venue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt under Sec. 1512. Id. at 791. 70 The history of the venue statute prevents reading into it any design that proof of proper venue is subject to the highest standard of proof. Enacted in 1988, six years after the substantive provisions of Sec. 1512 (of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982) were passed, the legislative history of subdivision (h) reveals that Congress enacted the venue section because there was a split in authority on the question of where proper venue was laid under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512 and under a related statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. Some circuits chose the district where the acts were committed and some selected the district where government proceedings were affected. See United States v. Frederick, 835 F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1013, 108 S.Ct. 1747, 100 L.Ed.2d 210 (1988); United States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 484-85 (2d Cir.1985) (collecting cases). 71 Congress enacted subdivision (h) of Sec. 1512 to resolve the division in authority, so that if a witness scheduled to testify in a District of Columbia trial is killed while dining at a restaurant in Maryland, the prosecution for obstruction of justice could take place in either Maryland or in the District of Columbia. 134 Cong.Rec. S7446-01 (June 8, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). Simply because Congress felt compelled to clarify the proper venue for prosecution under these statutes did not thereby elevate the standard of proof needed to establish that prosecution was laid in the proper district. 72 In any event, Gonzalez waived any objection to the preponderance of the evidence instruction because he failed to state an objection before the jury retired. Fed.R.Crim.P. 30; United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 555-56 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 1637, 104 L.Ed.2d 153 (1989). Trial counsel did comment that one of the factual issues to be considered by the jury is perhaps that telephone call which is a fact that would have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. Standing alone this statement might have been enough to preserve an objection, but immediately after he made it, defense counsel agreed to a modification of the charge eliminating the reference to the telephone call, but leaving the burden of proof language in the charge at a preponderance of the evidence. Further, when the trial judge asked counsel if he had any objections, though counsel stated he had several, he did not voice any to the venue charge as modified. The objection was therefore waived. B. Official Proceeding 73 The next matter considered is whether the investigation within the Southern District constituted an official proceeding within the meaning of Sec. 1512(h). Defendant's first argument, that official activity beyond the investigatory level is mandated because Secs. 1512(a)(1)(A) and (a)(1)(B) refer to the production of records or documents and to the attendance of persons, is meritless. Section 1512(a) is written in the disjunctive--the action is punishable if it violates subsection (A) or subsection (B) or subsection (C), and the elements of one subsection have no bearing on the elements of another. 74 Yet, defendant's second official proceeding argument has some plausible merit, in part because of the added venue section that does not mirror all of the substantive provisions of Sec. 1512. Gonzalez was convicted under Sec. 1512(a)(1)(C), which makes illegal the killing of a person with intent to prevent the communication of information relating to the commission of a Federal offense. The statute does not refer to an official proceeding. The venue provision, on the other hand, contemplates the existence of some official proceeding, defined as a proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is authorized by law. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1515(a)(1)(C) (1988). 75 The Victim and Witness Protection Act was enacted to protect those persons with knowledge of criminal activity who are willing to confide in the government. See United States v. DiSalvo, 631 F.Supp. 1398, 1402 (E.D.Pa.1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir.1987); United States v. Hernandez, 730 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir.1984). Consistent with this purpose, Congress explicitly overruled case law requiring that an official proceeding be pending in order for a defendant to be subject to prosecution for witness tampering. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(e)(1) (1988); United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 454-55 (5th Cir.1984); DiSalvo, 631 F.Supp. at 1402. 76 In enacting Sec. 1512(h), Congress surely did not aim to narrow the reach of the Victim and Witness Protection Act. Were we to adopt defendant's reading of the venue provision and hold that some official proceeding beyond the investigatory stage be pending or contemplated, the effect would be to read out of the statute much of the criminal activity ostensibly covered by Sec. 1512(a)(1)(C). That portion of the statute generally extends protection to individuals willing to furnish information regarding a federal offense. We decline to rule that a person who kills a witness while an official proceeding is pending or in progress cannot escape prosecution, but that same person may escape prosecution if he happens to commit the same murder during the investigatory stage. That loophole is one Congress has already closed. Cf. Hernandez, 730 F.2d at 898 (Sec. 1512 explicitly extends protection to potential witnesses, whereas former Sec. 1503 did not). 77 As a consequence, in construing Sec. 1512(h) in conjunction with Sec. 1512(a)(1)(C), we read the term official proceeding broadly in order to effect Congress' purpose in passing it. Here, there was an ongoing investigation in Lower Manhattan, where the narcotics activity itself occurred. That was where Arroyo and Delvalle were arrested for selling heroin. Gonzalez' purpose in killing Pichardo was to affect this investigation in Lower Manhattan. To the extent that Sec. 1512(h) provides for venue in the place where the act was intended to have an effect--that is to say, to interfere with the government's attempt to ferret out and prosecute criminal wrongdoing--Lower Manhattan was that place in this case. See Frederick, 835 F.2d at 1214 (We view the assault in the present case not just as an assault upon an individual victim but as an assault upon the grand jury ... and upon the judicial process.). 78 We hold therefore that the proper standard of proof of venue under Sec. 1512 is a preponderance of the evidence, and conclude that venue was properly laid in the Southern District of New York where the narcotics investigation was taking place at the time of the murder.