Opinion ID: 1950063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Relevancy of a Pending Appeal

Text: Respondent contends he should not be suspended pending his appeal, citing In re Ming [5] and this Court's decisions in The Florida Bar v. Cohen [6] and The Florida Bar v. Smith. [7] He also cites The Florida Bar v. Ragano , which was two separate proceedings. [8] The real issue requires us to determine the relvancy of a pending appeal to any suspension proceeding. In analyzing the effect of an appeal on our Integration Rule 11.07(3), it is immediately apparent that paragraph (3) is not self-contained. It cannot be understood without reference to other provisions in Rule 11.07. Its opening reference is to any such determination or judgment of guilt (emphasis added). [9] The adjective such necessarily refers elsewhere in the rule for meaning. Moreover, the corollary paragraph pertaining to state court convictions, and the paragraph authorizing discipline after appeal, can only be comprehended and operate fully if they are read with paragraph (3). An integrated reading of the entire Rule 11.07 demonstrates clearly that the status of a convicted attorney's appeal is irrelevant to his suspension under that Rule. Regarding the term such, the obvious reference is to Rule 11.07(1), the relevant portion of which provides: (1) Determination or judgment of guilt. Determination or judgment of guilt of a member of The Florida Bar by a court of competent jurisdiction upon trial or plea of any crime or offense that is a felony under the laws of this state, or under the laws under which any other court making such determination or entering such judgment exercises its jurisdiction, shall be conclusive proof of the guilt of the offense charged for the purposes of these rules. Unquestionably this sentence in Rule 11.07(1) was designed both to trigger the Rule and to establish proof of guilt for the purpose of suspension when a determination or judgment of guilt is made upon trial or plea. Regarding Rule 11.07(2) governing state court convictions, subparagraphs (b) and (c) expressly describe the later effects of an appeal on a suspension previously entered. In like manner, Rule 11.07(4) directs the continuance of any suspension under the Rule (whether resulting from a Florida, a federal or another court's determination or judgment of guilt) upon its becoming final without appeal or by affirmance on appeal. These related provisions, and the consistent use of the phrase determination or judgment of guilt throughout the Rules to mean a trial-level event, are uniform and uncontradicted. It cannot seriously be contended that our Rule is ambiguous or contemplates suspension only after a felony conviction is upheld by the last appellate court whose jurisdiction may be invoked. Even beyond the technical clarity and internal consistency of Rule 11.07, the immateriality of appeal on the issue of suspension is commanded by logic. Paragraph (1) has made a trial-level determination of guilt conclusive proof of the underlying facts for the obvious purpose of preventing suspension proceedings in this Court from becoming factual retrials. There is neither an adequate record nor an inherent capability in this Court to pass upon the validity of the attorney's conviction or the merits of his appeal. [10] Attempts to assess the likelihood of reversal from the arguments of counsel invite a form of speculation with which this Court should have no part. [11] A majority of other states interpreting rules or statutes similar to our rule have held that suspension may be ordered where a conviction is being appealed, even though (as our rule provides) it may be lifted if the appeal results in a reversal. [12] Respondent contends In re Ming, supra, absolutely requires the exhaustion of all direct appeals before conviction of a criminal offense may be used as a basis of suspension. We emphatically disagree. The Ming court, in reaching its decision, recognized there was authority to suspend a lawyer while his appeal was pending, saying: We do not, however, tie the hands of the district court so that it can never suspend a person until his conviction reaches finality. Ming's suspension was under a federal rule applicable solely to misdemeanor charges, which is neither comparable to nor as specific as the Florida rule. [13] We do not even have a misdemeanor rule in Florida. It is clear from Ming that the federal court was only construing its own rule and was not establishing a federal constitutional guideline. The treatment of a felony conviction in the federal system more nearly parallels our own, as illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's suspension of former Attorney General John Mitchell pending an appeal, upon being furnished proof that he had been convicted of a felony. [14] The standard for withholding suspension under our rules is identical for felony convictions emanating from both Florida and other courts. [15] Although the procedure for initiating a suspension case necessarily differs, [16] the standard in all cases has been that the convicted attorney must show good cause. This standard is expressly set out in subparagraph (a) of Rule 11.07(2) for suspensions arising from Florida convictions, and there is nothing in Rule 11.07 to suggest a different standard for suspensions arising from federal convictions. The Court recently applied a good cause standard in a federal conviction case by quoting the Florida conviction provision. [17] Except in three out of 42 felony suspension cases brought to this Court since 1965, the Court has consistently held that an attorney who has been convicted of a felony should be suspended pending the appeal of that conviction. [18] These three exceptions are The Florida Bar v. Cohen, [19] The Florida Bar v. Ragano , [20] and The Florida Bar v. Smith, [21] The circumstances in those cases are vastly different from the instant case. In Cohen, the Court exercised its discretion to defer suspension until an appeal had been decided because the Bar had failed to request suspension until approximately one year after the appeal had been filed. Significantly, Cohen also agreed voluntarily to withdraw from the practice of law pending his appeal. When later faced with another convicted attorney seeking to rely on Cohen, the Court was obliged in The Florida Bar v. Levenson [22] to note that Cohen was an extraordinary decision necessitated by the Bar's dilatory action. In Levenson the Court returned to its previous pattern and ordered the suspension of an attorney convicted of federal felonies under technical provisions of the national banking laws, even though an allegedly meritorious appeal was pending and the federal trial court had found that the attorney did not deserve serious punishment. In so doing, the Court stated: We do not overlook the possibility of a reversal of a conviction. While circumstances will vary situations, generally a conviction of a felony should justify suspension until the blot is removed. Conviction of a federal felony automatically suspends a lawyer from practicing in the federal courts. In the ordinary case we are not inclined to impose a lesser standard of professional responsibility in our state system. 211 So.2d at 174. After Levenson, convicted attorneys continued to ask us to defer suspensions pending appeals. In every subsequent instance but Ragano and Smith we steadfastly adhered to the principle that a pending appeal was not an extraordinary circumstance which would provide good cause to allow a convicted felon to practice law. In the 1972 Ragano case this Court applied a relaxed standard in large part because good character letters were written by numerous judicial and other public officers at the request of the convicted attorney. These laudatory letters were written before the promulgation of the new Code of Judicial Conduct, and no one then suggested that they were improper. As we will discuss later in this opinion, such letters are not proper. In any event, the 1972 Ragano case is simply not consistent with earlier decisions of this Court. Similarly, Smith can only be reconciled with precedent on the basis of the convicted attorney's agreement to suspend his practice voluntarily. In reviewing these three past decisions, we believe it would be appropriate to recede from them insofar as they authorize this Court to consider the assertion of a meritorious appeal as a controlling factor in suspension cases.