Opinion ID: 2803325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Material Support Bar

Text: The INA prevents an alien from receiving a grant of asylum or withholding of removal if that alien has engaged in, is engaged in, or is likely to engage in terrorism. “The INA defines [these terms] broadly.” Haile v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2011). Engaging in terrorist activities, for example, includes “commit[ting] an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords material support . . . . to a terrorist organization . . . or to any member of such an organization, unless the actor can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the actor did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI). We first considered the meaning of material support in Singh-Kaur. 385 F.3d at 298-301. There, the asylum applicant, Singh-Kaur, was a member of a Sikh separatist group in India that was “fighting the Indian government,” for which he provided food and set up tents at the group’s religious meetings. Id. at 296, 299-301. We concluded that 9 Singh-Kaur’s actions, even if non-violent and tangential to any specific terrorist acts, were sufficient to count as material support and thus to render him ineligible for a grant of asylum. Id. at 300-01. It was enough, we held, that he provided general support to a group that had terrorist aims. Id. at 301.5 Since Singh-Kaur, the BIA and Courts of Appeals have repeatedly upheld findings that an alien’s support was material, even if it was relatively low-level. See Bojnoordi v. Holder, 757 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding finding of material support because the alien “passed out flyers, wrote articles, and trained [a terrorist group’s] 5 The Supreme Court has taken a similarly expansive view of what constitutes material support in the context of the criminal statute banning material support, stating that “[m]aterial support meant to promote peaceable, lawful conduct can further terrorism by foreign groups in multiple ways.” Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 30 (2010) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); id. at 36 (“At bottom, plaintiffs simply disagree with the considered judgment of Congress and the Executive that providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization—even seemingly benign support— bolsters the terrorist activities of that organization. That judgment, however, is entitled to significant weight, and we have persuasive evidence before us to sustain it.”); see also McAllister, 444 F.3d at 187 (observing that “the INA’s definition of ‘terrorist activity’ certainly encompasses more conduct than our society, and perhaps even Congress, has come to associate with traditional acts of terrorism, e.g., car bombs and assassinations”). 10 members on the use of guns in the mountains outside Tehran, knowing that this training would further [the terrorist group’s] goals”); Viegas v. Holder, 699 F.3d 798, 803 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding finding of material support because the alien “paid dues and hung posters” for a terrorist group); Barahona v. Holder, 691 F.3d 349, 351-52, 356 (4th Cir. 2012) (upholding finding of material support because the alien, under threat, allowed terrorists to use his kitchen, gave them directions through the jungle, and occasionally allowed them to stay overnight); Haile, 658 F.3d at 1129 (upholding finding of material support because the alien collected funds, passed along secret documents and supplied the terrorist organization with sugar, shoes, and cigarettes); Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 538 (7th Cir. 2008) (upholding finding of material support because the alien recruited and solicited funds for a terrorist group); In Re S-K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 945-46 (BIA 2006) (upholding finding of material support because the alien contributed a total of 1,100 Singapore dollars to a terrorist group). In the face of this case law, Sesay struggles to explain why his actions do not qualify as material support. His argument seems to be that the support he provided was so small in size that it was not “material,” pursuant to the plain meaning of that word. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1124 (10th ed. 2014) (defining material as “[h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts” and “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person’s decision-making; significant; essential”). The BIA and Courts of Appeals have not squarely addressed whether a de minimis exception exists in the statute, although the BIA has held in a well-reasoned, not precedential opinion that assistance must be more than de 11 minimis in order to give “material” some independent effect. See In Re:   , 2009 WL 9133770, at  (BIA July 10, 2009) (observing that even if the items taken from the alien, including “one packed lunch and the equivalent of about $4 U.S. dollars, which the terrorists expressly stated would be used to buy beer,” constituted “‘support’ for the terrorists, it cannot be said to be material”). We too, have held that “material” must be ascribed some meaning. See Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298 (examining Black’s Law Dictionary definition of the word). We need not define the outer boundaries of materiality today, however, because we conclude that Sesay’s actions exceeded a de minimis threshold. That is, if providing food and setting up tents at religious meetings constituted material support in Singh-Kaur, 385 F.3d at 298-301, then so too does carrying weapons and ammunition for a terrorist group during a brutally violent conflict. Accordingly, the IJ and the BIA were correct to find that Sesay provided material support to a terrorist organization.