Opinion ID: 1890458
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact. Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987). The court draws no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. See ( Michael) Taylor v. United States, 662 A.2d 1368, 1371 n. 7 (D.C.1995) (citing Jones v. United States, 625 A.2d 281, 288 (D.C.1993)). Reversal of the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is warranted only where there is no evidence upon which a reasonable [juror] could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Curington v. United States, 621 A.2d 819, 824 (D.C.1993) (quoting Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 622 (D.C.1982)). The government's evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C.1990), nor compel a finding of guilt. See ( Maurice D. ) Taylor v. United States, 601 A.2d 1060, 1062 (D.C.1991). The court must be assured, however, that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Since there was no eyewitness testimony at trial other than from the appellant and the complainant, the issue of who was the first aggressor came down to a credibility contest between the two women. Appellant's argument is essentially that, given the evidence of the complainant's prior violence against appellant, no reasonable jury could have found that the complainant was not similarly aggressive in this instance, and therefore no reasonable jury could find that the appellant did not act to defend herself in response. [C]ontradictions among witnesses at trial are inevitable and are matters for the jury to resolve as they weigh all the evidence, Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 495 (D.C.1986) (citing Graham v. Solem, 728 F.2d 1533, 1541 (8th Cir.1984)), and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150 (1949)). The government presented evidence through the complainant that it was the appellant who assaulted her first, and despite the appellant's testimony to the contrary, the jury was entitled to believe the complainant. See Booth v. United States, 120 U.S.App. D.C. 39, 39, 343 F.2d 321, 321 (1965) (jury permitted to reject defendant's considerable claim of self-defense). Moreover, the jury was specifically prohibited by the case law discussed above from drawing the very inference that is the basis of the appellant's argument for reversal: that the complainant's prior acts of aggression prove she must have been the first aggressor in this instance. Finally, even if the jury had believed that the complainant attacked appellant first, the evidence of the injuries suffered by the complainant  coupled with the fact that appellant suffered none of consequence  permitted the jury to find that appellant forfeited her right of self-defense by using excessive force. See Perry v. United States, 137 U.S.App. D.C. 260, 262-63, 422 F.2d 697, 699-700 (1969) (citing Inge v. United States, 123 U.S.App. D.C. 6, 9, 356 F.2d 345, 348 (1966) (one has no right to use excessive force in self-defense)).