Opinion ID: 1195075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hostile and Exclusive Possession

Text: Similarly, the Morinoues have failed to meet their burden of showing that their possession of L.C.A. 9932 was hostile and exclusive. Specifically, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Roys and/or their predecessors in interest had a cotenancy in the subject property. As the Roys argue, it could be inferred from the language of the conveyance document, dated June 19, 1940, transferring Alinakai Kepoikai and Ami Charman's interest in L.C.A. 9932 to their brother, John A. Hoopale, see supra section I.B.2, that Hoopale had held only partial title to the subject property. The deed identifies the siblings' common interest in the land by way of inheritance through their mother, Kaoo, who was the daughter of Kealalio, Lumaawe's only child. If, as the language of the deed appears to indicate, each of Kealalio's offspring inherited equal, undivided interests in L.C.A. 9932, then (1) Kaoo, as one of Kealalio's eight children, would have inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in the land, and (2) each of Kaoo's three children i.e., Alinakai Kepoikai, Ami Charman, and John A. Hoopale would have inherited an undivided one-third of her undivided one-eighth interest, namely, an undivided one-twenty-fourth interest in L.C.A. 9932. Thus, when John A. Hoopale and his wife, Lily, sold their interest in L.C.A. 9932 to Kinshiro Yamamoto on October 13, 1920, see supra section I.B.1.a, they conveyed only an undivided one-twenty-fourth interest because his sistersAlinakai Kepoikai and Ami Charmanstill retained their interests. The foregoing inference would seem to be bolstered by paragraph seven of Ayako Morinoue's affidavit, in which she avers, inter alia, that John A. Hoopale had stated, during two separate visits to her home, that he had not intended to sell his sisters' shares in the property. See supra section I.B.1.b. It is therefore consistent that, as noted above, he purchased his sisters' interests in L.C.A. 9932 after having conveyed his own to Kinshiro Yamamoto. It is likewise consistent that, after John A. Hoopale's death, his widow, Lily, purported to sell those very interests to Josephine Roy, see supra section I.B.2, through whom the defendant Carlton A. Roy claims an interest. Finally, it would not be inconsistent that David Roy would thereafter undertake, see id., to purchase the interests in the land (if there were any) to which five of John A. Hoopale's heirs held title. But see supra note 4. If they are cotenants with the Roys, the Morinoues and their predecessors in interest would be subject to a special burden in proving hostile possession of L.C.A. 9932; they would be obligated to show that they had acted in good faith in relation to their cotenants. City and County of Honolulu v. Bennett, 57 Haw. 195, 209, 552 P.2d 1380, 1390 (1976) (establishing rule that, because of the general fiduciary relationship between cotenants, a tenant in common claiming by adverse possession must prove that he acted in good faith towards the cotenants during the statutory period (emphasis in original)). In most circumstances, this requirement of good faith will in turn mandate that the tenant claiming adversely must actually notify his cotenants that he is claiming against them. In the following exceptional circumstances, however, good faith is satisfied by less than actual notice: where the tenant in possession has no reason to suspect that a cotenancy exists; or where the tenant in possession makes a good faith, reasonable effort to notify the cotenants but is unable to locate them; or where the tenants out of possession already have actual knowledge that the tenant in possession is claiming adversely to their interests. In these limited circumstances, the notice requirements will be satisfied by constructive notice and open and notorious possession. Id. at 209-10, 552 P.2d at 1390 (emphases in original) (footnote omitted). The facts underlying In re Keamo, 3 Haw. App. 360, 650 P.2d 1365 (1982), clearly illustrate circumstances in which a tenant in possession may have no reason to suspect the existence of a cotenancy. In that case, the claimants' mother had abandoned her family while her children were infants and, unknown to the claimants, had begun a new family elsewhere. Id. at 362, 650 P.2d at 1367-68. The claimants' father had obtained a divorce from their mother, but the divorce decree failed to mention their mother's other children. Id. at 362, 650 P.2d at 1368. When their mother died, some forty years before the case arose, the circuit court found and declared the claimants to be her sole heirs, evidently not discovering the existence of the other children. Id. at 362-63, 650 P.2d at 1368. In applying the Bennett test, the Keamo court ruled that this case falls within the `limited circumstances' category and that the claimants had `no reason to suspect' that cotenants ... existed[.] Id. at 368, 650 P.2d at 1371. By contrast, in the present case, the Morinoues have not made not made a sufficient showing that they had no reason to suspect the existence of cotenants. It is true that paragraph six of Ayako Morinoue's affidavit, see supra section I.B.1.b, avers that, prior to 1952, the Morinoues had no indication ... of a dispute regarding title to the land[.] Paragraph six, however, is ambiguous at best because it is silent with respect to why the Morinoues had no such indication. In particular, neither paragraph six nor any other portion of Ayako Morinoue's affidavit expressly avers that the Morinoues' recorded chain of title was free of any indication of cotenancies in the subject property. [7] Therefore, because the burden of proving good faith was on the Morinoues, see Bennett, 57 Haw. at 209, 552 P.2d at 1390, they were required affirmatively to adduce evidence that there was no reason to suspect that a cotenancy exist[ed]. Id. (emphasis omitted). Thus far, the Morinoues have not only failed to do so, but have actually injected evidence to the contrary into the record. In paragraph seven of her affidavit, see supra section I.B.1.b, Ayako Morinoue avers, inter alia, that in the course of his two visits to the Morinoues' home, John A. Hoopale expressly held out that he had not intended to sell his sisters' shares in the property, representations that should have placed the Morinoues on actual notice of competing claims of title to L.C.A. 9932. Ayako Morinoue does not allege that she advised Hoopale at that time that the Morinoues claimed to hold the subject property adversely to the cotenancy interests that Hoopale described. Moreover, contrary to the Morinoues' contention, Hoopale's inquiries, in themselves, do not necessarily establish that he was aware that the Morinoues were purporting to hold the subject property adversely to his sisters' interests. We acknowledge that Ayako Morinoue has alleged in paragraph ten of her affidavit that the [p]laintiffs have defended the property against intrusion by posting signs and otherwise discouraging the Roys and others from exercising any unauthorized control over the property. See supra section I.B.1.b. We are also aware that, in paragraph nine, she has averred that the [p]laintiffs very clearly told the Roys that [the] [p]laintiffs were the rightful owners of the subject property, presumably at the time that Josephine Roy and her heirs came to ask about it. See id. The foregoing allegations, with elaboration, could potentially establish that the Morinoues placed the Roys on actual notice of hostile possession and could likewise establish exclusivity. However, the Ayako Morinoue affidavit does not identify when any of the events described in paragraphs nine and ten occurred. Accordingly, the affidavit fails as proof of the time when any period of allegedly hostile and exclusive possession of L.C.A. 9932 began. It could be inferred that the period began at some time prior to November 1989, because Ayako Morinoue mentions Josephine Roy in paragraph nine, and Carlton Roy averred in an affidavit that his mother, Josephine Roy, died in late November 1989. Beyond this inference, however, the record provides no guidance as to exactly when the Morinoues allegedly placed the Roys on notice of hostile and exclusive possession. As noted above, the statutory period required for establishing title to real property through adverse possession for any period commencing after 1973 is twenty years. See supra note 6. But because we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the Roys, we cannot, on the record before us, infer that the statutory period has been satisfied. We therefore hold that the Morinoues have failed to establishby clear and positive proofthe elements of hostile and exclusive possession for the entire statutory period.