Opinion ID: 719627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sentencing enhancement for brandishing a firearm

Text: 18 Finally, McCall challenges the five-point sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). Although the jury acquitted McCall of using or carrying a firearm in the commission of the bank robbery (the § 924(c) charge), the district court added five points to his offense level, under the 1992 guidelines, for brandish[ing], display[ing], or possess[ing] a firearm. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) (Nov.1991). McCall now contends that the § 924(c) acquittal precluded the district judge from making this enhancement. 19 A district court's determination that a defendant possessed a firearm during an offense is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 650 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933, 111 S.Ct. 2055, 114 L.Ed.2d 461 (1991). In Duncan, this court was faced with virtually the same sentencing issue as found here, and we held that an acquittal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) does not necessarily preclude a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b). The rationale for this conclusion was that the government's burden is significantly lighter for sentencing purposes: [A]n acquittal on a firearms carrying charge leaves ample room for a district court to find by the preponderance of the evidence that the weapon was possessed during the drug offense. Duncan, 918 F.2d at 652. 2 The same rationale applies to McCall's sentence. Even though the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that McCall used or carried a firearm, the district court could logically have found that McCall did brandish, display, or possess a firearm by a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, the district court explicitly cited Georgina Ansell's and Beverly Hutchens's testimony as the basis for the enhancement, stating that none of these tellers indicated any doubt during the trial ... that this was, in fact, a firearm, and as a result, that is why subdivision C is being applied in this case. Sentencing Hr'g at 7-8. Given the unequivocal testimony at trial and the district court's clear citation in the record, we cannot say that the district court's factual finding was clearly erroneous. In addition, we discern no error in the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C). 20 The district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.