Opinion ID: 2143014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Redirect Examination of Dr. Marshall.

Text: On direct examination, Dr. Marshall was asked about the significance of the prior 1953 injury as reflected in the condition [of plaintiff] as of March 16, 1959. He replied that the 1953 fracture had certainly healed and [t]here was no evidence of activity of any infection which had been present prior to even 1957, . . . He was asked to express his opinion based on reasonable medical probabilities whether,  but for this accident of March 16, 1959, the amputation would have been necessary. His answer was, My opinion is that the accident as given to me, of what occurred, including my subsequent findingsmy opinion is that amputation would not have occurred in this extremity except for the accident of March 16, 1959. On cross-examination Dr. Marshall was questioned in detail concerning plaintiff's medical history from the time of the 1953 accident up to and beyond the accident of March 16, 1959. Then on redirect examination the witness was asked these two questions: Q. Now, doctor, I believe just one more question. There has been paraded here the history of Mr. Chapnitsky's record, medical record, since 1953. I ask you of what, if any, relevancy is there to this history from 1953 up to March, 1959, when this auto accident occurred? Q. What, if any, bearing do the 1953 injuries have upon the condition of Boris Chapnitsky's leg as it was on March 16, 1959, when this accident occurred? Defendants' counsel objected to both questions on the ground that they invaded the province of the jury. The trial court sustained the objections to both questions. Plaintiff contends this ruling constituted prejudicial error. The questions were not objectionable on that ground. This same issue was recently before us in Fehrman v. Smirl, ante, pp. 1, 18, 121 N. W. (2d) 255, and we therein stated: It is urged that these questions and answers were incompetent because they invaded the province of the jury. This court, however, is committed to the principle that expert opinion testimony is not objectionable merely because it covers one of the ultimate facts to be determined by the jury. Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-operative Lumber Co. (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 67, 76, 117 N. W. (2d) 646; Zarnik v. C. Reiss Coal Co. (1907), 133 Wis. 290, 301, 113 N. W. 752; and Daly v. Milwaukee (1899), 103 Wis. 588, 590, 79 N. W.  752. See also 7 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), p. 18, sec. 1921. Nevertheless, we find no prejudice as a result of the trial court's sustaining these objections since Dr. Marshall had voiced his opinion on direct examination with respect to the same issue which these two questions sought to raise on redirect examination. Furthermore, the form of the first of these two questions was objectionable because the relevancy inquired about was not connected to any particular point at issue in the case.