Opinion ID: 368276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Administrative Interpretation of Section 210

Text: 17 In the years immediately following the passage of Section 210, the Commission granted applications for dual operations on a fairly routine basis. 7 18 However, in 1940, in considering an application for dual operations in Canada Common Carrier Application, 26 M.C.C. 563, 565 (1940) the Commission concluded: 19 Clearly this (dual operations) cannot be done consistently with the public interest. Not only would it put applicant in a position to prefer by contract any shipper between points now authorized to be served while at the same time charging his full common-carrier rates to others, but equally objectionable, it would enable him by varying his contract-carrier charges to a particular shipper to grant, in effect, a rebate in his common-carrier charges between other points. We do not imply that any such practices would be indulged, but the mere possibility is enough to preclude the finding of consistency with the public interest required by Section 210. (emphasis supplied) 20 In Block Common Carrier Application, 49 M.C.C. 651, 654-655 (1949) the Commission articulated its rationale for adopting the mere possibility of discrimination standard: 21 In our administration of Section 210 of the act, we are charged with carrying out The clear and unmistakable intent of Congress to preclude the opportunity for discriminatory practices which might well result from the simultaneous holding, by two commonly controlled carriers, of both a certificate and a permit. Where the same shipper is or may be served in both capacities the door is open for objectionable practices even though the operations be wholly different. It is not necessary to point out the many and complex situations, involving substantial injustices to shippers and carriers, which are potentially present when a single carrier, or two commonly controlled carriers, are in a position to offer both common and contract-carrier services within the same territory. Neither is it necessary that we find the actual existence of such discrimination or even a probability thereof. We have consistently held that The mere possibility of discrimination warrants our refusal to relax the express prohibition contained in the statute. (Citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). 22 For a number of years, proceeding under the mere possibility test, the Commission remained wary of approving dual operations. 8 23 However, by 1977, the Commission had altered its stance and specifically concluded in Delaware Express Co. v. Milford Express, Inc., 126 M.C.C. 462, 466 (1977) that (t)he 'mere potential or opportunity' for discrimination standard is in our view overly restrictive and can in certain circumstances lead to seemingly absurb results. The Commission determined, accordingly, that in future cases it would require, as a reason for denial of dual operating permits, a showing (1) that there existed a likelihood that the applicant would serve the same party both as a common carrier and as a contract carrier and (2) that a Realistic possibility of discrimination would result from granting the application. 9 At the same time the Commission expressed its continued belief that (t)he determination as to whether a realistic possibility of discrimination will result from a grant of dual operating authority should of course be made on a case-by-case basis. Delaware Express Co. at 467.