Opinion ID: 2632698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Petitioner's motion for a default judgment

Text: Finally, Means claims that the district court erred by refusing to enter a default judgment in his favor after the State failed to timely respond to his habeas corpus petition. The record reveals that Means petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus on April 5, 2002. On April 11, 2002, the district court ordered the State to respond to the petition within forty-five days of the date of its order. On or about June 26, 2002, the district court, receiving no response from the State, set the matter for a hearing. On August 12, 2002, Means moved for a default judgment based upon the State's unresponsiveness. The State did not file a response to Means's petition until September 25, 2002, over five months after it was ordered to respond to Means's petition and four months after the deadline to respond that was imposed by the district court. On September 27, 2002, the State opposed Means's motion for default judgment. On October 9, 2002, the district court denied Means's motion for default judgment. Means claims error in the district court's denial of his motion for default judgment, arguing that since a convicted person's failure to meet statutory timelines is a proper ground for summary dismissal of a petitioner's habeas corpus writ petition, so should the State be equally bound by procedural rules or face the identical sanction. The statutory provisions governing post-conviction habeas procedures are silent with respect to consequences in the event the State fails to abide by procedural rules. [48] These same provisions do specifically address, in contrast, the consequences if a habeas petitioner fails to comply. NRS 34.800 and NRS 34.810 allow the district court to dismiss a petition if the habeas petitioner fails to comply with procedural rules. NRS 34.780 incorporates the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure in post-conviction habeas proceedings to the extent that those rules do not conflict with NRS 34.360 to 34.830. We conclude that the default provisions of NRCP 55 are inapplicable to post-conviction habeas proceedings. In Beets v. State, [49] we addressed the propriety of a district court entertaining and denying a petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment in the context of a post-conviction habeas proceeding. We determined that the statutes governing post-conviction habeas proceedings do not provide for summary judgment as a method for determining the merits of issues raised in these types of proceedings. [50] If the rules of civil procedure governing summary judgment are inappropriate for post-conviction cases, then permitting entry of default pursuant to NRCP 55 is even more inappropriate. In Beets , we noted that habeas corpus proceedings are unique  neither civil nor criminal for all purposes. Because of the unique nature of post-conviction habeas corpus proceedings, we recognized in Beets and reaffirm here that reference to the rules of civil procedure is only appropriate when the statutes governing post-conviction practice do not address the issue presented. [51] While it is true that the question of sanctions in the event of the State's failure to respond is not addressed in the post-conviction statutes, it is equally true that the statutes specifically address the only ways in which these cases can be resolved. The post-conviction statutes limit the availability of relief by the grounds upon which relief can be based, [52] and the time period within which the petition must be brought. [53] If a petitioner sets forth adequate legal and factual grounds and if the petition is timely, then the petition may only be resolved through an evidentiary hearing. NRS 34.770(1) specifically states that a petitioner must not be discharged or committed to the custody of a person other than the respondent unless an evidentiary hearing is held. This is entirely inconsistent with disposition of the petition through entry of a default judgment. The district court in this case was within the proper exercise of its discretion when it considered the State's very untimely answer. We note, in passing, that the unavailability of default judgment as a sanction against the State for its disregard of court imposed deadlines does not mean the district court is powerless to sanction the State for dilatory conduct. The district court, in its sound discretion, may consider sanctions, including but not limited to the imposition of an attorney fee or other monetary sanctions, or in the most egregious cases, an order of confinement of the person at fault.