Opinion ID: 727366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: a fifth amendment issue.

Text: 15 The district court ordered McDougal to testify under the broad grant of use immunity prescribed in 18 U.S.C. § 6002. That immunity is coextensive with the scope of the [Fifth Amendment's] privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of privilege. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). McDougal nonetheless argues that the district court violated her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the court's immunity order left open the possibility that she may be prosecuted for committing perjury before the grand jury. Since she would face no such adverse consequences if allowed to remain silent, McDougal argues, the grant of immunity impermissibly leaves her worse off than if she exercises her Fifth Amendment privilege and remains silent. 16 Once again, McDougal's argument is foreclosed by controlling Supreme Court precedent. When called before a grand jury, every citizen is bound to divulge whatever information he or she possesses but retains the protection of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Immunity is the Government's ultimate tool for securing testimony that otherwise would be protected [by the Fifth Amendment].... [W]hen granted immunity, a witness once again owes the obligation imposed upon all citizens--the duty to give testimony--since immunity substitutes for the privilege. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 576, 96 S.Ct. at 1776. In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court squarely rejected McDougal's contention: it is ... analytically incorrect to equate the benefits of remaining silent as a result of invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege with the protections conferred by the privilege.... For a grant of immunity to provide protection 'coextensive' with that of the Fifth Amendment, it need not treat the witness as if [she] had remained silent. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 127, 100 S.Ct. 948, 955, 63 L.Ed.2d 250 (1980). 17 In her statement at the contempt hearing, McDougal complained that she has a particularly well-founded fear that truthful testimony to the grand jury will subject her to a perjury prosecution. Because I believe that my truthful answers to the grand jury's inquiries would be inconsistent with the testimony and statements of others and/or inconsistent with the independent counsel's view of those facts, McDougal explained, it is my belief that my answers would and could be used against me in future criminal prosecution. However, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument because it would provide practically all potential grand jury witnesses with a foolproof escape from testifying simply by claiming that the grand jury or a prosecutor might disagree with their version of the truth and charge them with perjury. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 819 F.2d 981, 983 (11th Cir.1987). And the First Circuit rejected a similar argument because a witness cannot refuse to testify simply because he believes, no matter how fervently, that his perception of the truth differs from that of the grand jury and that his perception is the correct one. Such a proposition would frustrate completely the investigative function of the grand jury.... In re Poutre, 602 F.2d 1004, 1005 (1st Cir.1979). Thus, the district court correctly concluded that McDougal's Fifth Amendment contention is contrary to governing law. 18