Opinion ID: 2315959
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Heading: -II- A. Jury Charge on Passion/Provocation Manslaughter

Text: We begin with the jury charge that impermissibly shifted to defendant the burden of proving passion/provocation. As the United States Supreme Court has held, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of a crime. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970). A requirement that defendant prove adequate provocation beyond a reasonable doubt violates that rule. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975) (holding that prosecution must disprove adequate provocation beyond a reasonable doubt when the issue is raised in a homicide case). When a defendant places passion/provocation in issue, the State, to prove a knowing or purposeful murder, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's actions were not the result of passion. Grunow, supra, 102 N.J. at 145, 506 A. 2d 708; State v. Powell, 84 N.J. 305, 315, 419 A. 2d 406 (1980). At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel requested an instruction that the State bore the burden of disproving passion/provocation. Without objection from the State, the trial court rejected the request. Instead, after explaining the elements of passion/provocation manslaughter, the court instructed: So if you're satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the decedent's death under circumstances that would [otherwise] be murder but was committed in the heat of passion, then you may return a verdict of guilty of manslaughter. A fair reading leads to the conclusion that the charge erroneously placed on defendant the burden of proving passion/provocation. This error requires reversal. Grunow, supra, 102 N.J. at 148-49, 506 A. 2d 708. Although the State acknowledges that the quoted portion of the charge was erroneous, it contends that taken as a whole, the charge was at worst ambiguous. The State's argument continues that the proper standard for appellate review is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury    applied the challenged instruction in an unconstitutional fashion. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198, 108 L.Ed. 2d 316, 329, reh'g denied, 495 U.S. 924, 110 S.Ct. 1961, 109 L.Ed. 2d 322 (1990) (enunciating test for adequacy of ambiguous jury instructions). To support its contention that the charge was merely ambiguous, the State points to an earlier instruction: [T]he burden of proof is on the State.    [T]hat burden never shifts and it remains on the State throughout the whole case, so no burden with respect to proof is imposed upon the defendant, Mr. Erazo. He is not obligated to prove his innocence. That general statement, although accurate, lacks the muscle to shift to the State the burden to disprove passion/provocation. At best, the charge was contradictory. As we have previously stated, `[c]ontradictory and inconsistent charges are inherently inadequate as they create a reasonable likelihood that a juror understood the instructions in an unconstitutional manner.' State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 433, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991) ( S. Moore ) (quoting Humanik v. Beyer, 871 F. 2d 432, 442 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 812, 110 S.Ct. 57, 107 L.Ed. 2d 25 (1989) (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 323 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1975 n. 8, 85 L.Ed. 2d 344, 359 n. 8 (1985))). In brief, the charge was fatally flawed. On appeal, the State also contends that the erroneous instruction was harmless because the evidence was insufficient to support a charge of passion/provocation manslaughter. In particular, the State argues that the evidence did not provide a rational basis for a jury to conclude that there had been adequate provocation. See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8e (prescribing the rational basis test for an instruction on a lesser-included offense). Again, we disagree. Our review of the record persuades us that the evidence of provocation was sufficient to support the charge on passion/provocation manslaughter. At trial, both the court and the State reached the same conclusion. As both the prosecutor and the court recognized, Erazo's defense was that he had committed manslaughter, not murder. At defendant's request, and without objection from the State, the trial court included a manslaughter instruction in the charge. A court should grant a request for a charge on a lesser-included offense of manslaughter if the record provides a rational basis for a manslaughter conviction. State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265, 276, 508 A. 2d 167 (1986). Although a rational basis requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence, it is [n]evertheless    a low threshold. Id. at 278, 508 A. 2d 167; see also State v. Coyle, 119 N.J. 194, 224, 574 A. 2d 951 (1990) (applying the low threshold test). In effect, the question is whether there is room for dispute whether the jury could find defendant guilty of manslaughter. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 415, 568 A. 2d 879 (1990). The Penal Code defines passion/provocation manslaughter as [a] homicide    [that] is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2). Passion/provocation manslaughter has four elements: (1) adequate provocation of the defendant; (2) inadequate time for the defendant to cool off; (3) provocation of the defendant to a state of passion; and (4) the failure of defendant to cool off. Mauricio, supra, 117 N.J. at 411, 568 A. 2d 879. Here, the focus is on the first element, adequate provocation. As we have cautioned, an abstract definition is only a guide in defining the parameters of passion/provocation manslaughter. Crisantos (Arriagas), supra, 102 N.J. at 275, 508 A. 2d 167. Also, [t]he specific evidence in each case must be carefully evaluated in the context of the entire record to determine whether passion/provocation manslaughter may properly be considered by the jury. Ibid. The record demonstrates the tension between defendant and the victim on the night of the slaying. That tension was not an isolated occurrence, but a continuing strain in a marriage fraught with violence. The stress began the preceding evening when the victim rejected the flowers defendant had brought her. On the night of the homicide, the couple continued to feud. Defendant chastised the victim for rearranging the furniture and disconnecting the stereo. She refused to join his guests in the living room and remained in the kitchen with her friend Blanca until after dinner. Both defendant and the victim consumed alcoholic beverages that evening. Objective evidence establishes that she was intoxicated. The defense emphasized, moreover, that the partner-switching while dancing the merengue may have fueled their mutual feelings of jealousy and suspicion. At one point defendant told Harrison that the victim was making him mad. After Blanca returned from taking the guests home, the victim drunkenly swung her pocketbook at Blanca, began to cry, and accused Blanca of trying to go after my husband. According to statements made by defendant after the homicide, the victim returned from her walk having deliberately cut her hand. He claims that he became enraged and attacked her when she told him she intended to have his parole revoked by telling the police that he cut her. His version is consistent with the fact that the victim previously had threatened to report defendant to the authorities. Moreover, defendant's parole had previously been revoked because of an anonymous report from one of the victim's children that defendant was violating his parole. Thus, defendant argues that he was infuriated by the victim's threat to fabricate facts to cause the revocation of his parole. In this regard, we note that on the penalty phase the jury found that the victim had participated in the conduct that resulted in her death. That finding, as defendant argues, is consistent with the proposition that the victim's conduct and death are causally connected. As is now well settled, the purpose of our review is not to determine whether the jury would have accepted defendant's explanation, Mauricio, supra, 117 N.J. at 415, 568 A. 2d 879, but whether the evidence provided a rational basis for a passion/provocation charge, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8e. We so find. See Coyle, supra, 119 N.J. at 224, 574 A. 2d 951 (evidence of a confrontation between defendant, his lover, and the victim sufficient to support manslaughter charge). The error in the manslaughter charge was aggravated by the court's instruction that the jury should first consider whether defendant was guilty of murder and that if it acquitted defendant of that offense, it should then consider the manslaughter charge. As we recently noted, a sequential charge can confuse jurors in a murder case when the court also charges on manslaughter. See id. at 222-24, 574 A. 2d 951. This part of the charge contained two errors. First, the instruction had the capacity to confuse the jurors about the elements of knowing or purposeful murder. As explained above, when a defendant places passion/provocation in issue, the State, to prove a knowing or purposeful murder, must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act from passion aroused by reasonable provocation. Hence, the initial problem with the charge is that it may have foreclosed the jury from considering passion/provocation during its deliberations on the murder count. Second, the court erroneously instructed the jury that it could find passion/provocation manslaughter only if it first acquitted defendant of knowing or purposeful murder. This instruction is backwards. Only a homicide that would otherwise be a knowing or purposeful murder may be reduced to manslaughter by the presence of passion/provocation. If, on retrial, the court should again give a sequential charge, it should make clear both that the absence of passion/provocation is an element of murder on which the State bears the burden of proof and that the jury may convict defendant only of manslaughter when the homicide would have been murder but for the existence of passion/provocation.