Opinion ID: 1760343
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive damages/remittitur

Text: Appellants further maintain that the damages award is excessive. When an award of damages is alleged on appeal to be excessive, we review the proof and all reasonable inferences most favorably to the appellee and determine whether the verdict is so great as to shock our conscience or demonstrate passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Builder's Transp., Inc. v. Wilson, 323 Ark. 327, 914 S.W.2d 742 (1996). In its order denying appellants' motion for new trial, the trial court found that appellee had proved actual damage to her reputation. We agree that this evidence justified the award as remitted by the trial court in the present case. The appellee testified at trial that, after Burcham made the statements that she had stolen her customers' insurance premiums, she contemplated going to jail. She explained that her life was no longer the same, that she was miserable, and that the entire experience had been a nightmare. She described how people were now afraid to let her in their homes. The appellee's husband, Lonnie Murphy, testified that she was hurt real bad and was real tore up over Burcham's defamatory publications. He related that, after the incident, she would sit around and cry and had to take nerve pills and sleeping pills because she was so upset. According to Lonnie, their seven-year-old son did not understand these changes in his mother. The appellee also offered the testimony of several of her former customers. Florence Oglesby could not say that appellee still had a good reputation in the community. According to Oglesby, when appellee's name arises in conversation, people still talk about what she's supposed to have done. Ruby Anthony testified that her reputation in the community had changed, as she is known as a thief. Elizabeth Moie testified that Burcham's publication really knocked on [appellee's] reputation. Carol Lindeman testified that, while appellee's previous reputation of truthfulness had been tops or number one, Burcham's statements really bothered her and caused her to lose faith in appellee. According to Lindeman, after the statements were made, none of appellee's customers wanted to purchase insurance from her. Wilma Stennett testified that she believed the statements that Burcham had made, that the statements changed her opinion of appellee, and that she tried to convince others that Burcham's statements were true. As to the argument on cross-appeal, remittitur is appropriate when the compensatory damages awarded cannot be sustained by the evidence. Johnson v. Gilliland, 320 Ark. 1, 896 S.W.2d 856 (1995). We agree with the trial court that, while the appellee's evidence of actual damages supported an award of $600,000, the jury's award of $3,000,000 in compensatory damages cannot be sustained by the evidence. Turning to the issue of punitive damages, when reviewing such an award, we consider the extent and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party committing the wrong, all the circumstances, and the financial and social condition and standing of the erring party. McLaughlin v. Cox, 324 Ark. 361, 922 S.W.2d 327 (1996). Punitive damages are to be a penalty for conduct that is malicious or done with the deliberate intent to injure another. Id. When reviewing the testimony of appellee's former supervisor, Bobby Carey, the jury could have concluded that Burcham intentionally made the defamatory statements because he did not like to work with women and did not want appellee under his supervision. Moreover, when hearing the testimony of Jo Ann Scroggins, one of appellee's customers, the jury could have further concluded that an additional motive of Burcham's was to enlist appellee's customers as his own. Particularly, Scroggins testified that, when making the defamatory remarks, Burcham told her more than once, I'm your next agent. Regarding United, there was evidence presented at trial that the company's officers knew that Burcham had made the defamatory statements, were aware that Burcham was not following company audit or documentation procedures to substantiate the allegations of theft, and did nothing to stop Burcham and even permitted him to terminate appellee on the basis of these faulty allegations. In light of this evidence, the jury could have concluded that appellants displayed a conscious indifference for appellee and that their acts were done with the deliberate intent to injure her. See McLaughlin, 324 Ark. at 371-372, 922 S.W.2d 327; see also Ledbetter v. United Ins. Co., 845 F.Supp. 844 (M.D.Ala.1994). In sum, when viewing the facts in this case, the amount of punitive damages does not shock our conscience. Before leaving this point, we will not address appellants' constitutional argument, based on BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), that their due process rights were violated because they did not receive fair notice that they could be subject to such a severe penalty. They did not make this constitutional argument below; therefore, it is waived. Sebastian Lake Pub. Util. v. Seb. Lake Rlty., 325 Ark. 85, 923 S.W.2d 860 (1996).