Opinion ID: 573212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Right to Confront Accusers

Text: 17 The Pavliks argue that NOAA's failure to put its investigating agent on the stand also denied them due process because they could not effectively confront their accusers. The Pavliks posit that, had the agent taken the stand, they could have cross-examined him and thereby revealed that the witnesses allegedly selected by this agent (Callaghan and Husby) were not credible and that the Pavliks had not in fact possessed halibut. 18 The absence of an investigating agent's testimony at the hearing did not violate the Constitution. Assuming that due process requires that defendants be allowed to confront the witnesses against them in NOAA proceedings to assess civil penalties, cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-70, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1020-21, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970), the Pavliks had that opportunity. The Pavliks exhaustively cross-examined the two witnesses who testified against them--Callaghan and Husby. 19 The Pavliks argue that due process guarantees them a right to confront not only the actual witnesses against them, but also persons who could have been witnesses against them. However, we have specifically held, in the context of a criminal trial, that no such right exists. United States v. Heck, 499 F.2d 778, 789 & n. 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1088, 95 S.Ct. 677, 42 L.Ed.2d 680 (1974). In Heck, a defendant was convicted of assaulting Special Agent Robert Meyer. Agent Meyer did not testify and the defense did not attempt to subpoena him. Id. In words that speak directly to the Pavliks' argument, we found that the agent's absence did not violate the sixth amendment's confrontation clause: A defendant has no right to confront a 'witness' who provides no evidence at trial. Nor is the government required to call all of the witnesses to a crime. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 20 Even assuming, moreover, that the due process clause guarantees defendants in civil proceedings an effective opportunity, Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268, 90 S.Ct. at 1020, to confront non-testifying witnesses, the Pavliks had that opportunity here. The Halibut Act allows defendants in civil penalty proceedings to subpoena witnesses. 15 C.F.R. § 904.245. The Pavliks concede that they made no attempt to subpoena a NOAA investigating agent. 4 Any harm their case suffered as a consequence of the absence of a NOAA agent's testimony was thus self-inflicted. Heck, 499 F.2d at 789 & n. 9 (Appellant could have called Agent Meyer if he had desired to do so. His right of confrontation was satisfied by this available opportunity.); cf. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 2664, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) ([T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense may wish.'  (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294-95, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985))) (emphasis in original). 21 The Pavliks respond that they did not invoke the subpoena power because they had no obligation to make the government's case. While that is true, the Pavliks certainly had every interest in making their own case as strong as possible. If they considered a witness critical to their defense, they should have called or attempted to call that person. Absent evidence of improper motives or that the government possesses exculpatory materials, the due process clause does not require the government to call witnesses simply for the sake of facilitating the defense's presentation of its own case. See Heck, 499 F.2d at 789 & n. 9; cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). 5 Because the Pavliks have neither demonstrated that NOAA acted with improper motives in failing to call an investigating agent nor shown (as opposed to argued) that an agent's testimony would have been exculpatory, the conduct of the hearing did not violate the due process clause.