Opinion ID: 2611437
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davis v. United States

Text: In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), defendant Robert L. Davis, a member of the United States Navy, was convicted of murder in connection with the beating death of Keith Shackleford in October 1988. Approximately a month following the beating, Davis was interviewed in connection with the murder at the office of the Naval Investigative Service. Prior to any questioning, [a]s required by military law, the agents advised [Davis] that he was a suspect in the killing, that he was not required to make a statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an attorney and have an attorney present during questioning. Id. at 454, 114 S.Ct. at 2352-53. Davis waived those rights both orally and in writing. About an hour and a half later, Davis said, Maybe I should talk to a lawyer. The agents stopped questioning Davis about the murder and focused on determining if he in fact wanted a lawyer before questioning resumed. Davis responded that he was not asking for a lawyer and that he did not want a lawyer. After a break, the agents reminded Davis of his rights and then continued questioning him. Approximately an hour later, Davis announced, I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else, whereupon, the interrogation ceased. At his court-martial proceeding, Davis moved to suppress his statements made during the interview. However, the military judge denied the motion. Id. at 455, 114 S.Ct. at 2353. The United States Court of Military Appeals affirmed, holding that Davis's reference to an attorney was ambiguous and that the agents properly clarified his statement before proceeding with the interview. Id. at 456, 114 S.Ct. at 2353-54. The United States Supreme Court affirmed but took the opportunity to discuss whether and when an officer must cease questioning a suspect and clarify a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal reference to a Miranda right. In briefly recounting the development of the prophylactic Miranda rules, the Court stated: If a suspect effectively waives his right to counsel after receiving the Miranda warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him. But if a suspect requests counsel at any time during the interview, he is not subject to further questioning until a lawyer has been made available or the suspect himself reinitiates conversation. Id. at 458, 114 S.Ct. at 2354-55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, the Court held that if the suspect is not reasonably clear in his reference to an attorney, officers are not required to stop questioning or focus on clarifying the suspect's statement. The Court stated that the suspect must unambiguously request counsel, and if his statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, then the officers are not required to stop questioning the suspect. Id. at 459, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. The Court then explicitly held that after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney. Id. at 461, 114 S.Ct. at 2356.