Opinion ID: 56302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disparate Treatment—promotions

Text: Following McDonnell Douglas, the former Fifth Circuit identified the necessary elements to establish a prima facie violation when an employee “loses out” to another applicant competing for a promotion. Crawford v. Western Electric 20 Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1315 (5th Cir. 1980).9 The elements of the prima facie case are: (1) [plaintiffs] are members of a group protected by Title VII; (2) they sought and were qualified for positions that [the defendant employer] was attempting to fill; (3) that despite their qualifications they were rejected; and (4) that after their rejection [the defendant employer] either continued to attempt to fill the positions or in fact filled the positions with [persons outside the plaintiffs’ protected class]. Id.; see also Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1187 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that erroneous dicta requiring a plaintiff to show that the promoted employee had “equal or lesser qualifications” had entered the Eleventh Circuit’s articulation of the standard, and reiterating that Crawford governs). As described above, if an appellant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to ESPN Zone to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason why the appellant was not given the promotion. If ESPN 9 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981. 21 Zone does this, the burden shifts to appellants to demonstrate that ESPN Zone’s reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Hardin and Plantt both applied to be a server trainer in February or March of 2000. Neither was given the promotion. Hardin was told by manager Sye that they already had enough trainers. Hardin testified that only white servers were hired during the time they applied, though she could not remember the names of the persons hired. When asked whether she believed she was not selected because of her race, Hardin replied that she could not say. Nonetheless, the magistrate assumed that Hardin met her prima facie case, especially because she had no discipline problems in her record. ESPN Zone argues that Hardin’s performance as a server made her unsuitable to be a trainer. This alone is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Hardin cites no evidence to show that this reason is pretext other than Bailey’s inadmissible hearsay testimony that a white server, Andrew Schwartzburg, was later promoted (after Hardin had resigned) with lower scores than Hardin received. We note that ESPN Zone also argues that the decision was not racially motivated because three other African-Americans servers were promoted to trainer around the time Hardin applied. This is strong evidence that the decision not to promote 22 Hardin was not the result of racial discrimination. The magistrate correctly ruled that Hardin had not rebutted ESPN Zone’s non-discriminatory reason for Hardin’s non-promotion. The magistrate also found that Plantt satisfied her prima facie case. ESPN Zone argued that she was not selected for the position because of her “chronic attendance problems.” Plantt replied that the attendance argument was pretext because she did not have attendance problems. The magistrate found that while ESPN Zone misstated the number of times Plantt was tardy, her attendance record was poor enough to make it a legitimate reason not to promote her. In her brief, Plantt argues that Sye’s statement that she had chronic attendance problems is inaccurate because she had only been tardy once when she applied to be trainer. But the record demonstrates that Plannt was absent two days in a row in addition to the day she was tardy at the time she applied to be a trainer. A poor attendance record is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to decline to promote Plantt. In response, Plantt argues that Bailey’s testimony regarding the selection of trainers supports her contentions that she was denied the promotion because of her race. However, nothing in Bailey’s testimony concerns the decision to not promote Plantt to server other than his opinion that Plantt (and Hardin) should have been 23 selected as trainers instead of Schwartzberg. As noted above, Schwartzberg was hired and promoted well after Plantt had been denied the promotion. Therefore, according to the undisputed evidence in the record, Plantt has not meet her burden to show her attendance problems were pretext for racial discrimination.
Both Harrington and Laney applied to be bartenders at ESPN Zone. They both met the first element of the prima facie case, being members of a protected class. The magistrate assumed that they met the second element, adverse job action, when they were denied jobs tending bar because it was likely more prestigious with better pay. But the magistrate ruled that they could not demonstrate that ESPN Zone treated a similarly-situated employee who was not African American differently, as the employee promoted to bartender, Ruth Heinzman, was more qualified than Harrington and Laney because of her past experience. And so the magistrate determined that neither Harrington nor Laney met their burden to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment with regard to the bartending position. Appellants argue, correctly, that Harrington and Laney should not have been required to prove that the successful applicant for the promotion, Heinzman, was less or equally qualified. See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1193 (11th Cir. 24 1998). Rather, Heinzman’s alleged superior qualifications should have been understood instead as a rebuttal to the initial presumption of discrimination that appellants would then need to show to be pretextual. Id. If Heinzman was promoted because of her previous bartending experience, this would be a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Appellants, however, contend that there is no admissible evidence that Heinzman (a) was a bartender, or (b) was hired because of her experience. The record evidence regarding Heinzman’s promotion and qualifications comes from the testimony of Steve Astles, the assistant general manager of ESPN Zone at the time. Astles testified that he learned that another manager, Heather Shaw, had promoted Heinzman because of her bartending experience. Appellants argue that Astles’ knowledge of Heinzman’s qualifications is inadmissible hearsay. The magistrate ruled below that Astles’ testimony was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but rather to demonstrate Astles’ state of mind with regard to Heinzman’s promotion. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1304 n.21 (11th Cir. 1999). Appellants argue that Astles’ state of mind is irrelevant because he did not make the decision to promote Heinzman. This argument is unavailing because it is undisputed that Astles had the authority to approve or reject this promotion. ESPN Zone correctly argues that Astles allowed Heinzman’s promotion to stand, which is 25 functionally equivalent to the decision to promote in the first place. Therefore, Astles’ belief that Heinzman had previous bartending experience is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Heinzman’s promotion. Appellants also argue that Heinzman’s experience is a pretextual justification because the real reason Astles allowed Heinzman to remain a bartender was because it would not be “fair to Ms. Heinzman to move her back to a server position because of Ms. Shaw’s mistake [in letting Heinzman apply to be bartender before her ninety-day probationary period had elapsed].” Yet this ostensible pretext is itself a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Heinzman’s promotion that appellants fail to prove pretextual. Summary judgment was appropriate regarding Harrington and Laney’s promotion claims. Harrington also asserts that she was treated differently with regard to discipline than white employees, specifically Mullhare, because they were both accused of using racial slurs but only she was suspended. The magistrate granted summary judgment to ESPN Zone because he found that Harrington had failed to prove an adverse job action because she was compensated fully and not otherwise punished for the suspension–“[i]t was not ‘objectively serious and tangible enough’ to alter Harrington’s ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 26 employment,” citing Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 588 (11th Cir. 2000). Appellants do not contest this ruling.
The magistrate found that Nanji did not present a plausible claim of an adverse job action and granted summary judgment to appellees. Nanji does not argue otherwise on appeal.