Opinion ID: 1268291
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contrary-to or Unreasonable-Application-of Supreme Court Precedent

Text: Railey contends that Judge Bertram was obligated  based on the Supreme Court's possible-temptation test  to recuse himself sua sponte, due to his familial relationship with Prosecutor Bertram, and that his failure to do so violated Railey's right to due process. As demonstrated in the preceding sections, such an application of the possible-temptation test is not clearly established, but is instead best characterized as arguable. This determination effectively ends the analysis. But, even assuming that Railey's formulation was clearly established, the question would remain as to whether the Kentucky court's decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that formulation. The answer is again no, but a brief explanation may be beneficial. The phrase contrary to federal law means that the state court arrive[d] at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or decide[d] a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). Furthermore, clearly established law as determined by [the Supreme] Court refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 660-61, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We have explained that [a] state-court decision is considered contrary to clearly established Federal law if it is diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed. Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir.2007) (quotation marks and editorial marks omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495). Because the Supreme Court has never ruled on this particular question of law (other than in the matters of kinship dicta) and has never decided a case on a materially indistinguishable set of facts, this contrary to aspect of the AEDPA test cannot apply. The Kentucky court's decision  essentially finding no structural error, which is the kind of error that would flow from a judicial-bias-based due process violation  is simply not diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed, see Benge, 474 F.3d at 241, to any existing Supreme Court case. Therefore, the present decision is not contrary to any existing Supreme Court precedent. The phrase unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent means that the state court identifie[d] the correct governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495. As opposed to the contrary to prong, the unreasonable application of prong does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2858, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007). But, we have explained that to be found an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, the state-court decision must be objectively unreasonable and not simply erroneous or incorrect. Benge, 474 F.3d at 241 (quotation and editorial marks omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495). Thus, the question is whether the Kentucky court was objectively unreasonable, see Benge, 474 F.3d at 241, in reaching its decision that there was no constitutional violation. That is: was the Kentucky court objectively unreasonable in failing to apply the possible-temptation test to a matter of mere kinship and, correspondingly, failing to find a due process violation, based on that test. It is noteworthy that, in considering this question, at least two circuit courts have ruled similarly on facts virtually identical to those before the Kentucky court, see, e.g., Davis, 506 F.3d at 1325; Dyas, 705 F.2d at 993, and every other circuit court, without exception, to apply the possible-temptation test has done so in a manner limited to pecuniary interest or contempt. Even acknowledging that all of these courts could be wrong  though we by no means suggest here that they are  the important fact is that their possible (or even probable) wrongness is irrelevant; what is relevant is the mere existence of these cases, which were in October 2004  just as now  unrefuted. Their existence means that a similar outcome (even if similarly wrong), is not objectively unreasonable, it is instead presumptively reasonable. Indeed, that is the fundamental theory of persuasive precedent (particularly persuasive precedent from other jurisdictions)  although a court is not bound by it, it is presumptively reasonable (even prudent, and often commendable) to follow it because, having been created through the adversarial process and the thoughtful consideration of our fellow judges, it is presumptively meritorious (albeit, still subject to reasoned disagreement). So, unless we could demonstrate the objective unreasonableness of every court to decide this issue  which we cannot  or we are willing to condemn the entire concept of persuasive precedent  which we are not  we cannot conclude that the Kentucky court's decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. We must wait until another day for an answer to whether mere kinship between prosecutor and judge is enough to create probable bias and violate due process. Indeed, we might have that opportunity on a direct appeal, but we do not have it here. For his part, Railey relies primarily on 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5) (governing when a federal judge must disqualify himself based on a close familial relationship), the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, and the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. But Railey concedes that the Supreme Court has never held that § 455(b)(5) creates a constitutional standard for judicial recusal in the state courts. In fact, the Supreme Court has indicated that a statute requiring the disqualification of a judge based on bias or prejudice would not be [a] sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement [for disqualification] under the Due Process Clause. Aetna, 475 U.S. at 820-21, 106 S.Ct. 1580. Therefore, neither the federal recusal statute nor the judicial codes of conduct provide any basis for granting habeas relief. See Davis, 506 F.3d at 1336 (the federal recusal statute establishes stricter grounds for disqualification than the Due Process Clause); Couch, 896 F.2d at 81 (§ 455 and the Due Process Clause are not coterminous); Hardy, 878 F.2d at 97 (§ 455's appearance of impropriety standard is not mandated by the Due Process Clause). The Kentucky court's determination that Railey's constitutional rights were not violated by Judge Bertram's presiding over Railey's proceedings is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Railey is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.