Opinion ID: 200856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Regarded As Being Impaired

Text: 20 We also cannot conclude that Neiman Marcus regarded Sullivan as being substantially impaired within the meaning of the ADA. By protecting employees from discrimination based on their employer's mistaken impression that they are disabled, Congress recognized that `society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment.' Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (quoting School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987)). See also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-90, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (stating that the purpose of the regarded as prong is to cover individuals `rejected from a job because of the myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities') (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. & § 1630.2( l )). Accordingly, there are two ways in which an employee can demonstrate that his employer regarded him as disabled: 21 (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or 22 (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 23 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139. 24 Alcoholics can be fully-functioning and productive employees who do not experience any substantial limitation in their ability to work. Employers who harbor misperceptions and prejudice about alcoholics may not recognize the abilities of these employees and may regard them as being substantially impaired even though they are not. Theoretically, an employee subject to this mistaken belief could qualify as disabled under the regarded as prong of the ADA, as elaborated in Sutton, without confronting the Catch-22 dilemma posed by proof of actual impairment, which runs the risk of establishing that the employee is unqualified for the job. That is, Sullivan could argue, as he essentially did, that his alcoholism did not affect his ability to do his job at Neiman Marcus. Rather, the company unfairly believed that, as an alcoholic, he could not do the job. 25 However, this theoretical possibility can founder because of the proof requirements when working is the major life activity at issue under the regarded as prong. According to the precedents, the employee must demonstrate not only that the employer thought that he was impaired in his ability to do the job that he held, but also that the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)); Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1170 (affirming summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate that the employer regarded him as unfit for either a class or a broad range of jobs). 26 In an answer to an interrogatory, Sullivan claimed that Neiman Marcus either believed that a person who had previously suffered from alcoholism could not satisfactorily perform his or her job, or... it simply was not willing to employ someone who had the stigma of having either suffered from the disease of alcoholism or who had the stigma or having been treated in an alcohol rehabilitation/detoxification facility for alcoholism. When he was pressed to explain how he knew that Neiman Marcus thought that alcoholics could not satisfactorily perform their jobs, he said it was [b]ecause of the actions they took [against him]. 27 We rejected a similar argument in Bailey, where we observed that [a] plaintiff claiming that he is `regarded' as disabled cannot merely show that his employer perceived him as somehow disabled; rather, he must prove that the employer regarded him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169 (emphasis in original). We concluded that nothing in that record, including Bailey's termination, demonstrated that the plaintiff's employer considered him to be unfit for either a class or a broad range of jobs.... Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1170. 28 Similarly, Sullivan failed to present any evidence beyond his own termination demonstrating that Neiman Marcus may have believed that he could not perform the essential functions of either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. In both Bailey and this case, the employers were aware of the plaintiff's problems with alcohol but claimed that they terminated the plaintiffs for job performance reasons rather than their status as alcoholics. Even if, for purposes of summary judgment, we accept Sullivan's contention that Neiman Marcus terminated him because of their concern that alcoholism impaired his ability to do his job rather than the job misconduct cited by the company, Sullivan has not demonstrated that Neiman Marcus considered him to be limited in his ability to work in a broad range of jobs required by the rigorous standards of the ADA. 4 In fact, he did not even mention the broad range of jobs requirement in his brief. Accordingly, we conclude that Sullivan did not establish that the company regarded him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 29 Affirmed.