Opinion ID: 722508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restrepo's Jencks Act and Brady Arguments

Text: 99 Evidence at trial showed that one Jimmy Bynoe (brother of the Billy Bynoe referred to earlier as a supplier) was defendant Restrepo's boyfriend and business associate, acting under her direction in their dealings with the go-between Claude Juggins to supply the R Street Crew. Over two and a half years, they sold the Crew between nine and ten million dollars' worth of cocaine. Bynoe was arrested on June 22, 1990 at Union Station with three kilograms of cocaine for delivery to Juggins. According to evidence and government representations at trial and in its brief, Bynoe agreed to cooperate with the government, but then skipped bond and fled to Panama, with which we evidently have no extradition treaty. So Bynoe never testified. Through Juggins, the government introduced at trial a number of recorded telephone calls involving Bynoe and Restrepo, as well as other second-hand statements of Bynoe. See F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). All of these statements predated Bynoe's arrest. Alba Restrepo claims that admission of his coconspirator statements triggered the government's duty under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, to provide any statements made by him to the government after his arrest (and apparently his plea agreement as well). It is clear that Restrepo sought these items, and, if counsel failed to mention the Jencks Act (which is unclear), the government makes no point of the omission. Whether the Jencks Act applies under these circumstances is a question of statutory construction that we review de novo. See United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 348 (D.C.Cir.1994) (reviewing de novo whether Jencks Act requires government to produce a trial transcript that it has not requested or received from the court reporter). 100 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(2) prohibits discovery of statements by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses except as provided in the Jencks Act. That statute provides: 101 § 3500. Demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses 102 (a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case. 103 (b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to produce any statement ... in the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified. 104 18 U.S.C. § 3500. 105 Because Bynoe was never called by the government, Restrepo uses elements of the Federal Rules of Evidence to argue that admission of his statements was the equivalent of his being called. That admission occurred under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which defines statements by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy as not being hearsay. In addition, Rule 806 says that when a statement is admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E), the opposing party may impeach the statement with any evidence which would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. If the equation of a declarant's 801(d)(2)(E) statement with conventional testimony is good enough for Rule 806, Restrepo argues, it should be good enough to trigger the Jencks Act. As far as we can tell, we are the first court of appeals to address this argument. 106 We dealt with a similar issue in United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1418 (D.C.Cir.1988). The defendant there sought statements by a coconspirator who was listed among the government's prospective witnesses but did not testify at trial. The defendant pointed out that a statement admitted [319 U.S.App.D.C. 290] under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) becomes, for hearsay purposes, a statement of the defendant, and that a defendant is entitled to obtain his own statements under F.R.Crim. Pro. 16(a)(1)(A). Reading the two rules together, the appellant argued that because the coconspirator's statements may be treated as the defendant's own for purposes of hearsay analysis, ... they should be discoverable in the same manner as the defendant's own statements. 846 F.2d at 1418. We rejected the theory, on the ground that Rule 16(a)(1)(A) could not be read to permit such discovery, implicitly because it would violate the balance chosen by Congress between the defendant's interest in use of non-witness materials and the government's interest in their non-disclosure. Id. Several other circuits have reached the same result. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 811 F.2d 257, 258-59 (4th Cir.1987) (en banc); United States v. Orr, 825 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir.1987) (not interpreting the Jencks Act). 107 Of course in Tarantino the coconspirator's statements were not introduced into evidence at trial, so the exact issue was different. But the principle of Tarantino surely was broader: merely because one set of rules (internally consistent, one hopes) makes two distinct items equivalent for some specific purpose, it does not follow that they are equivalent for all related purposes. That a declarant's statement becomes a statement of the defendant under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) does not mean it becomes the defendant's statement for purposes of F.R.Crim. Pro. 16(a)(1)(A), Tarantino; that a declarant is treated as a witness for purposes of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) or Rule 806 does not mean he becomes one for purposes of the Jencks Act. 108 The automatic subjection to the Jencks Act of statements by declarants embraced by Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), and (E) would carry broad implications. As we have said, that Act represents Congress's balance of the defendant's need for such statements for impeachment purposes against the government's interests--concern for witness intimidation, subornation of perjury, and other threats to the integrity of the trial process. Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1414. The fear is that if witness statements were disclosed before their testimony, witnesses could be threatened or bribed to change their stories and denounce their previous statements. Of course the timing aspect of that balance would be explicitly upset under Restrepo's approach in any case where the government planned to call a coconspirator but introduced a statement of his in furtherance of the conspiracy earlier in the trial. Even for the coconspirator that is not expected to be called, the Fourth Circuit has reasoned that the risk of intimidation argues powerfully against disclosure of statements made to the government by a non-testifying coconspirator. Roberts, 811 F.2d at 259 (adopting the analysis of Wilkinson, J., dissenting in United States v. Jackson, 757 F.2d 1486,1492-94 (4th Cir.1985)). 109 Finally, we note that our hewing to the standard meaning of § 3500 by no means leaves the defendant bereft of means for discovering a declarant's statements to the government. If a declarant contradicted himself on a key point, then Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), would likely require disclosure. Accordingly, we reject Restrepo's Jencks Act claim and turn to the one she makes under Brady.
110 Restrepo argues that the government was obliged under Brady to disclose the material also sought under the Jencks Act. (She apparently does not make a separate argument based on F.R.Crim. Pro. 16(a)(1)(C), which requires disclosure of documents material to the preparation of the defendant's defense.) The prosecution certainly has an affirmative duty to disclose material evidence favorable to an accused, Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196, including evidence that could be used to impeach a witness, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). The Supreme Court has defined material evidence favorable to the defendant to mean  'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'  Kyles v. Whitley, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. [319 U.S.App.D.C. 291] 1555, 1565, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383-84, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (opinion of Blackmun, J.)); see also United States v. Smith, 85 F.3d 646, 646 (D.C.Cir.1996) (denying petition for rehearing). The Third Circuit has followed the Ninth in holding that [w]e think it is unwise to infer the existence of Brady material based upon speculation alone.... '[U]nless defendant is able to raise at least a colorable claim that the [disputed material] contained evidence favorable to [him] and material to his claim of innocence or to the applicable punishment,'  no Brady violation will be established. United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 659 F.2d 932, 939 (9th Cir.1981)). We also adopt that approach. 111 Except for bare speculation, Restrepo has nothing to suggest the existence of favorable materials. Many of Bynoe's statements introduced at trial were recorded as he and others went about committing the crimes, and it seems improbable that these would be vulnerable to impeachment. All the statements of his that were admitted were made before his arrest, so that they could not have been affected by his later plea agreement. The prosecutor, who had the responsibility under the Brady framework to make the first determination about whether material was exculpatory, United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504 (D.C.Cir.1992) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1002, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987)), said in court that the defense would not be happy with Bynoe's statements to the government. Restrepo gives us no reason to doubt it. 112