Opinion ID: 901674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fraudulent Concealment and Equitable Estoppel

Text: [¶ 18.] Spencers argue that even if their causes of action accrued in 1984, the statutes of limitations were tolled under the doctrines of fraudulent concealment and equitable estoppel. Under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment: In the absence of some trust or confidential relationship between the parties there must be some affirmative act or conduct on the part of the defendant designed to prevent, and which does prevent, the discovery of the cause of action.... Where ... a trust or other confidential relationship does exist between the parties, silence on the part of one having the duty to disclose, constitutes fraudulent concealment in the absence of any affirmative act. Glad v. Gunderson, Farrar, Aldrich, & DeMersseman, 378 N.W.2d 680, 682 (S.D. 1985) (citing Hinkle v. Hargens, 76 S.D. 520, 525, 81 N.W.2d 888, 891 (1957)). Spencers contend the statute of limitations was tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment because, Dale fraudulently concealed the amended contract for deed and 1975 deed from the knowledge of [Spencers]. Spencers further contend that: Joe and Dale were tenants in common pursuant to the 1975 deed which was valid as between them.... [Therefore, a] fiduciary relationship existed to the extent that each co-tenant had a duty to sustain, or at least not to assail, the common interest or title. From this, Spencers conclude that there existed fraudulent concealment of the cause of action by Dale until discovery of the deed in 2003. We disagree. [¶ 19.] There was no tolling under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment because notwithstanding any concealment, by 1984, Spencers had actual knowledge of the basic operative facts necessary to commence a cause of action to obtain their claimed interest in the property. See One Star v. Sisters of St. Francis, Denver, Colo., 2008 SD 55, ¶ 32, 752 N.W.2d 668, 681 (concluding, [w]hen applicable, [fraudulent concealment] tolls the statute of limitations until the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered by the exercise of diligence) (emphasis added); Zephier, 2008 SD 56, ¶ 16, 752 N.W.2d at 666 (concluding, [f]raudulent concealment does not ... toll the statute of limitations, no matter the nature of the concealment if a plaintiff is already on notice of facts sufficient to give rise to a claim). [¶ 20.] In this case, Spencers became aware in 1984 of facts sufficient to give rise to their claim. Spencers were aware that Joseph had been excluded as a record title owner of the property, that Dale was the sole owner of record, and that a quiet title action would be necessary to claim their asserted interest. Further, Spencers confronted Dale about the exclusion of Joseph's name from the deed, and following Dale's refusal to discuss the matter, Spencers conceded that they felt totally duped, betrayed, deceived, and defrauded. Under those circumstances, Spencers were on notice of facts sufficient to give rise to their causes of action. Therefore, Dale could not, as a matter of law, have fraudulently concealed their causes of action. See One Star, 2008 SD 55, ¶ 35, 752 N.W.2d at 682. [¶ 21.] Similarly, equitable estoppel does not apply because one element of that defense requires the concealment of the material facts, and Spencers must have been without knowledge of the real facts. Heupel v. Imprimis Tech. Inc., 473 N.W.2d 464, 466 (S.D.1991). As previously discussed, however, even though Spencers were not aware of the 1975 deed, by 1984, Spencers possessed actual knowledge of the fact that Joseph had been excluded as a titleholder to the property and they had been deceived and defrauded. Because Spencers had knowledge of sufficient material facts to bring a cause of action in 1984, the circuit court correctly concluded that the Estate was not equitably estopped from asserting the statutes of limitations as a defense in 2006.