Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Denying Motions to Sever Counts Charging Fowler and Chavez Murders From Count Charging Carter Murder

Text: On March 19, 1986, defendant filed a motion to sever trial on counts I and II of the information  the counts alleging the 1976 murders of Fowler and Chavez  from count III, which alleged the 1978 Carter murder. Relying on Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 452-454 [204 Cal. Rptr. 700, 683 P.2d 699], defendant argued that all the factors that case listed as favoring severance applied to him. Specifically, he maintained that the evidence would generally not be cross-admissible if presented in separate trials because the facts relating to the Carter killing were quite different  e.g., the method was different and it occurred years later  and hence the facts of the killings did not show a particular modus operandi. He also argued that presenting evidence of the killing of three children to one jury would be inflammatory  at the hearing he contended that extreme prejudice would result from the fact that the victims in the 1976 killings were ten and twelve years old but the victim in the 1978 killing was only seven. He maintained that the case against him for the 1976 murders was weaker because there was no evidence to connect [him] to these crimes, and he also observed that count III made him potentially death-eligible whereas counts I and II did not. In reply, the prosecution argued that defendant killed Fowler and Carter for sexual reasons and Chavez because he witnessed Fowler's killing. It also argued that the cases were of equal strength because in each he confesse[d] to information that only the killer would know. It asserted that no killing was more inflammatory than the others. And it maintained that defendant would present a psychiatric defense as he had at his prior trial, raising the issue of intent and requiring litigation of his mental state when he killed all his victims. The prosecution conceded that one of the charges carried the potential for the death penalty, but argued that the fact would not prejudice defendant. It also argued that judicial economy favored conducting one trial. After hearing argument at length, the court denied the motion without comment. On October 31, 1986, defendant filed papers asking the court to reconsider its ruling in light of People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 Cal.3d 415 [228 Cal. Rptr. 913, 722 P.2d 197]. There were two different hearings on the motion to reconsider. At the first, held February 27, 1987, defendant asked the court to hold an in camera hearing so that he could present an offer of proof of possible inconsistent defenses. He asserted, and the court agreed, that presenting inconsistent defenses was a factor to consider in favor of severance. But it refused to hold an in camera hearing, saying it would deny the People due process of law by forcing their absence at a critical stage in the proceedings. It postponed a ruling on the motion because it was unsure whether it had jurisdiction to decide it. The second hearing occurred March 18, 1987. On that date, the court initially said it would deny the motion on procedural grounds. It ruled that  Smallwood does not state any new law.... Defendant nonetheless urged the court to reconsider its ruling in light of the new evidence he had wanted to present in the in camera hearing almost three weeks before. When the court reminded him that it would not hold an in camera hearing, he declared that request no longer mattered because in the interim the prosecutor had seen the new evidence. He explained that the new evidence consisted of other suspects that were identified by people in the first two murders and therefore identity was at issue. After defendant raised this argument the court elected to hear the motion to reconsider on the merits. It ruled that under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence of each crime was cross-admissible because it seems [the prosecution is saying it can show evidence of] motive, intent, plan, otherwise adopted the arguments the prosecution set forth, and denied the motion for severance. It emphasized that the People did not have to present their entire case to defeat a motion for severance; their offer of proof was enough. It ruled that there was no issue of identity, notwithstanding defendant's offer of proof. It did agree that inconsistent defenses to the 1976 and 1978 murder charges  a possibility defendant broached during the hearing on the motion  might conceivably justify severance, but it pointed out that his moving papers never raised the possibility that he might present inconsistent defenses, and for that reason it refused to consider such a scenario in making its ruling. That [point] is not in any of your moving papers filed at any time that I am aware of. All that you have really talked about is the prejudice.... At trial, defendant presented no psychiatric defense to any charge. The governing statute is section 954, which provides in relevant part: An accusatory pleading may charge ... two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts, ... provided, that the court in which a case is triable, in the interests of justice and for good cause shown, may in its discretion order that the different offenses or counts set forth in the accusatory pleading be tried separately or divided into two or more groups and each of said groups tried separately.... (26a) The statutory requirements for joinder were met here because both incidents involved the same class of crimes  murder. Since the requirements for joinder were satisfied, defendant can predicate error only on a clear showing of potential prejudice. [Citation.] (27) `The burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.' [Citation.] `The determination of prejudice is necessarily dependent on the particular circumstances of each individual case, but certain criteria have emerged to provide guidance in ruling upon and reviewing a motion to sever trial.' [Citation.] Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where: (1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the defendant; (3) a `weak' case has been joined with a `strong' case, or with another `weak' case, so that the `spillover' effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case. [Citations.] ( People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 172-173 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862], affirmed in Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. ___ [127 L.Ed.2d 583, 114 S.Ct. 1239].) The criteria listed in Sandoval should not be misunderstood as being equally significant, however. [T]he first step in assessing whether a combined trial [would have been] prejudicial is to determine whether evidence on each of the joined charges would have been admissible, under Evidence Code section 1101, in separate trials on the others. If so, any inference of prejudice is dispelled. ( People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 171-172 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480]; see People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 934 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].) Cross-admissibility suffices to negate prejudice, but it is not needed for that purpose. Although `we have held that cross-admissibility ordinarily dispels any inference of prejudice, we have never held that the absence of cross-admissibility, by itself, sufficed to demonstrate prejudice.' ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 173; see also § 954.1, enacted June 5, 1990 [codifying rule].) (26b) We review the court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1284 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1].) A court abuses its discretion when its ruling falls outside the bounds of reason. ( People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210].) The ruling was reasonable. The court had before it the prosecution's statement that in the prior trial defendant had relied on a psychiatric defense. It could reasonably conclude that evidence of the killing of Chavez, who the prosecution believed was murdered because he was a witness, would be introduced to challenge an available psychiatric defense ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 639, fn. 1) that defendant lacked the mental capacity to premeditate, deliberate, or conform his behavior to the law's requirements because a personality disorder existing since childhood caused him to fly into rages in certain sexual situations. ( People v. Gay (1972) 28 Cal. App.3d 661, 667-668, 670 [104 Cal. Rptr. 812].) That was the defense at the prior trial. ( Memro I, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 693-694.) Defendant did not say that he would not rely on that defense. And the court had before it the prosecution's theory that defendant's modus operandi was to seek out boys to fulfill his sexual desires. Given its discretion to decide severance questions, the court's conclusion that intent, motive, or plan was at issue was reasonable. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) It properly rejected defendant's surmise that he might offer inconsistent defenses as not having been raised in a timely fashion  he mentioned the matter too late for the court to consider it as possibly weighing in favor of severance. In sum, then, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no cross-admissibility consideration that might favor severance. For that reason, its ruling ordinarily must be sustained. (See Frank v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 632, 639 [257 Cal. Rptr. 550, 770 P.2d 1119].) An exception might apply if the joinder was so grossly unfair as to deny defendant due process. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 174.) No such gross unfairness appears. The crimes were of a similar class: murder. If one was inflammatory, all were. Defendant also contends that the court erred by not holding an in camera hearing on an offer of proof regarding inconsistent defenses. (He does not point us to anything in the record, however, that shows that the court would have understood his request as pertaining to an offer of proof regarding inconsistent defenses, if indeed it would have so pertained.) Citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967], he maintains that he was unconstitutionally forced to waive one constitutional right to invoke another. He asserts that he had to diminish his right to due process of law in presenting his basis for severance of the charges in order to protect the invasion of his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.... Defendant waived any claim of error, however, when, at the resumed session almost three weeks after the court's initial hearing on the motion to reconsider, he stated that because the prosecution already had the relevant materials he no longer required a closed hearing.