Opinion ID: 781722
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bases of Jurisdiction over the Counts Charged

Text: 70
71 Jurisdiction over Yousef on Counts Twelve through Nineteen was based on 18 U.S.C. § 32. Yousef argues that this statute cannot give rise to jurisdiction because his prosecution thereunder conflicts with established principles of customary international law. Yousef's argument fails because, while customary international law may inform the judgment of our courts in an appropriate case, it cannot alter or constrain the making of law by the political branches of the government as ordained by the Constitution. 72 Principles of customary international law reflect the practices and customs of States in the international arena that are applied in a consistent fashion and that are generally recognized by what used to be called civilized states. That is, principles of customary international law consist of the  settled rule[s] of international law as recognized through the general assent of civilized nations. 25 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694, 20 S.Ct. 290, 44 L.Ed. 320 (1900) (emphasis added); id. at 686, 20 S.Ct. 290; see generally Ian Brownlie, Principles of International Law 5-7 (5th ed. 1999) (explaining generally the principles of customary international law). 73 It has long been established that customary international law is part of the law of the United States to the limited extent that where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290 (emphasis added); see also Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.1986) (noting that public international law is controlling only in the absence of controlling positive law or judicial precedent). 74 While it is permissible for United States law to conflict with customary international law, where legislation is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the interpretation that does not conflict with the law of nations is preferred. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804). 26 The Charming Betsy canon comes into play only where Congress's intent is ambiguous. Attorney General of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 128 (2d Cir.2001) (stating that United States courts `are not to read general words ... without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers.' (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.1945) (emphasis added))). 75 If a statute makes plain Congress's intent (instead of employing ambiguous or general words), then Article III courts, which can overrule Congressional enactments only when such enactments conflict with the Constitution, see, e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 215, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962) (stating that, [i]n dealing with problems of interpretation and application of federal statutes, we have no power to change deliberate choices of legislative policy that Congress has made within its constitutional powers), must enforce the intent of Congress irrespective of whether the statute conforms to customary international law. Thus the Supreme Court stated in The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 3 L.Ed. 769 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.), that while courts are bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of the land, Congress may manifest [its] will to apply a different rule by passing an act for the purpose. Id. at 423. The Court reaffirmed this principle in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963), stating that Congress may enact laws superseding the law of nations if the affirmative intention of the Congress [is] clearly expressed. Id. at 21-22, 83 S.Ct. 671; see also, e.g., Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C.Cir.1988) (holding that under domestic law, statutes supersede customary international law and that statutes are not subject to challenge on the basis of a violation of customary international law); United States v. Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that the United States may violate international law principles if Congress enacts federal statutes that conflict with international law). It also is established that Congress may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law. United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir.1983). 76 In the event that there is no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision that the court must apply, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, a court should identify the norms of customary international law by looking to the general usage and practice of nations[,] or by [looking to] judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law ...[, or by] consulting the works of jurists writing professedly on public law, United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (Story, J.). However, materials beyond the laws and practices of States, such as the writings of jurists, 27 may serve only as evidence of these principles of customary international law, to which courts may look not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, 20 S.Ct. 290 (emphasis added); see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 789 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (relying on The Paquete Habana for the proposition that courts should identify the law of nations primarily from the official acts and practices of States and, secondarily, as evidence of existing state practices, from the writings of scholars). We adopted the teaching of The Paquete Habana and Smith on the appropriate use of the sources of international law in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238-39 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-61, 18 U.S. 153), and in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.1980), in which we emphasized that, to the extent that we rely on secondary writings by publicists as evidence of international law, we do so only for evidence of what the law really is,  id. at 881 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 77
78 Treaty law also may provide a basis for a State's action independent of the principles of customary international law. A treaty creates obligations in States parties to it that may differ from those of customary international law, and it generally is immaterial whether customary international law points in the same or in a different direction than the treaty obligation. See, e.g., The Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, (Great Britain v. France) 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7) (Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), recognizing that a country's treaty obligations could supersede the general norms of customary international law for the purpose of determining which questions of nationality fall within the domaine réservé of a State); see also Clive Parry, The Sources and Evidences of International Law 33 (1965) ([I]f two or more States have unequivocally agreed to something by treaty, in relation to the matter in hand nothing other than the treaty has much relevance.). 79 Norms of customary international law can vitiate a treaty's effect only in the rare instance where the treaty or a provision thereof violates one of the few so-called peremptory norms of international law, or  jus cogens.  See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 4 n. 5 (9th Cir.1995) (stating, in dicta, that [ j ] us cogens norms, which are nonderogable and peremptory, enjoy the highest status within customary international law, are binding on all nations, and can not [sic] be preempted by treaty); Comm. of United States Citizens Living in Nicaragua, 859 F.2d at 940 (stating in dicta that [a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332, 344, S. Exec. Doc. L, 92-1 (Vienna Convention) 28 (stating that a treaty is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 627 (5th ed. 1999). A treaty between two nations to engage in the slave trade, for example, would be void; a treaty to engage in the ivory trade, though repugnant to many contemporaries, would not be. 80 Beginning with the Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, a number of international treaties have provided that where an individual who has committed an offense proscribed by the treaty is present in a State party to the treaty, the State is obliged either to prosecute the offender (even if the offense was extraterritorial) or to extradite the offender for prosecution by another State party to the convention. 29 id.; see Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 41 I.L.M. 536, 560 (2002) (separate opinion of ICJ President Guillaume ¶¶ 7-9) (listing agreements); Michael P. Scharf, Symposium: Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects: Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party States, 35 New Eng. L. Rev. 363, 363-66 & nn. 4-13 (2001) (listing conventions that require States parties to either extradite or prosecute offenders). 81 As discussed above at Section I.A.4, the Montreal Convention is one such treaty. The express purpose of the Convention is to ensure that terrorists who commit crimes on or against aircraft cannot take refuge in countries whose courts otherwise might have lacked jurisdiction over an offense against a foreign-flag aircraft that transpired either in another State or in international airspace. See Montreal Conv., art. 5, 24 U.S.T. at 565. 82 The Montreal Convention, unlike the customary international law principles of criminal jurisdiction (including universal jurisdiction), creates a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction that is moored in a process of formal lawmaking and that is binding only on the States that accede to it. The jurisdiction thus created is not a species of universal jurisdiction, but a jurisdictional agreement among contracting States to extradite or prosecute offenders who commit the acts proscribed by the treaty — that is, the agreements between contracting States create aut dedere aut punire (extradite or prosecute) jurisdiction. Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 64 (1994). 83 Article 1 of the Montreal Convention provides: 84 1. Any person commits an offence if he unlawfully and intentionally: 85 ... 86 (c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight, or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight[.] 87 24 U.S.T. at 565. Section 2 of that article makes it an offense for anyone to attempt to commit such an offense or to act as an accomplice to one who commits such an offense. Id. Article 7 of the Convention establishes aut dedere aut punire jurisdiction, stating in relevant part: 88 The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. 89 Id. 90