Opinion ID: 185059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Issues of Fact

Text: 29 Bankers challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on the ground that the court improperly resolved genuine issues of material fact which should be left to a jury. Bankers raises three allegedly key facts as in dispute: First, whether FICO could have met its interest payment obligations in the fourth quarter of 1996 without the special assessment; second, whether the FDIC played an active or passive role with respect to the assessment; and third, whether the FDIC is capable of paying a refund. An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as governed the district court's decision. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we must determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists in this case. See Byers v. Burleson, 713 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 30 Bankers's claim misapprehends the district court's decision and the nature of the inquiry at hand. Summary judgment is appropriate when evidence on file shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Not all alleged factual disputes represent genuine issues of material fact which may only be resolved by a jury. Material facts are those 'that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law,' and a genuine dispute about material facts exists 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'  Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Grain Board of Iraq, 904 F.2d 732, 735-36 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The factual issues raised by Bankers do not meet this standard. 31 With respect to FICO's ability to meet its interest payment obligation, the FDIC's concern was with the construction of the statutory funding scheme overall. The FDIC at no point in the record said that FICO could not make its fourth quarter 1996 interest payment unless it retained the funds collected on September 30, 1996. Instead, the FDIC reasoned that Bankers's interpretation of the statute could yield inconsistent funding and disrupt FICO's ability to meet its bond interest obligation, that another reading wouldgenerate a more stable cash flow for FICO, and that the stable cash flow was consistent with congressional intent. Thus, the FDIC's discussion of FICO's ability to meet its bond interest obligation represents statutory construction, not fact finding, and the district court appropriately treated it as such. 32 The nature of the FDIC's role in the FICO assessment process is also a legal, not a factual, question. The adequacy of the Savings Fund reserves is not a material fact because it is not relevant. But even if we considered these allegedly factual disputes to be issues of fact, and a jury found that the FDIC was an active participant, that finding would only influence whether Bankers clears the Article III standing hurdle, a question which we have already decided in Bankers's favor as a matter of law; and for a jury to find that the Savings Fund reserves are adequate to cover the refund would resolve nothing. Neither finding would inform the question of whether the FDIC properly interpreted its statutory obligation with respect to the FICO assessment. Put simply, even if Bankers were correct in characterizing these so-called disputes as issues of fact, they do not involve material facts because they have no bearing on the outcome of the case. This case turns on whether the FDIC properly interpreted the statutory scheme governing Savings Fund and FICO assessments, not on determinations of fact. The district court did not invade the jury's province.