Opinion ID: 179722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Nelson's recantation testimony

Text: Brooks's final claim on appeal appears to be a catch-all argument concerning prosecutorial misconduct that goes well beyond the issues certified for appeal. In addition, Brooks attempts to argue the cumulative effect of the alleged errors by the prosecution, which is also not an issue certified for appeal. Thus, distilled to the claims that have been properly certified, Brooks in his final claim addresses (1) whether the prosecution knowingly presented the perjured testimony of Nelson, and (2) whether the prosecution recruited Nelson as an informant in violation of Brooks's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He argues that the district court clearly erred in crediting the testimony of the state prosecutors and discrediting the testimony of Nelson at the federal evidentiary hearing. The State responds by asserting that any claims arising out of Nelson's recanting of his trial testimony are procedurally defaulted. It contends that, [h]ad [Nelson's] testimony been false, Brooks plainly had notice of that fact at the time it was uttered, and therefore Brooks is unable to demonstrate cause for the default. In addition, the State argues that Brooks cannot demonstrate prejudice because the district court correctly determined that Nelson's testimony at the federal evidentiary hearing was not credible. The Supreme Court, in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), held that a criminal defendant is denied the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where the prosecution use[s] against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents ... deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. Id. at 206, 84 S.Ct. 1199. This rule applies where the government recruits an undercover jailhouse informant, or otherwise intentionally creat[es] a situation likely to induce [a defendant] to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269, 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). Because Brooks's claims that the prosecution recruited Nelson as a State informant and knowingly presented his false testimony at trial depend wholly on Nelson's testimony, Brooks's argument hinges on the credibility of Nelson as a witness at the federal habeas proceedings. But the district court discredited Nelson's testimony, and this court views with great suspicion the recantation testimony of trial witnesses in postconviction proceedings. E.g., Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 539 (6th Cir.2006). Brooks presents a plausible explanation for the placement of Nelson in Brooks's cell, the failure of the State to disclose Nelson's convictions for perjury and forgery, and the State's failure to disclose Nelson's history of mental illness; i.e., that the State engaged in knowing and deliberate prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Brooks's constitutional rights. This is not, however, the only reasonable explanation, as Brooks claims. The district court's conclusion is also reasonable, where the court found that, [g]iven [Nelson's] mental history, his prior convictions and reputation for untruthfulness, his inconsistent testimony about his role in these matters, and the testimony of the state prosecutors,... [Nelson's] testimony about the state prosecutors is not credible. We review the district court's credibility determination under the highly deferential clear-error standard. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). There can virtually never be clear error where the trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, and where that finding is not internally inconsistent. Id. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504. Brooks presents on appeal an alternative, plausible explanation for Nelson's testimony. But he has failed to demonstrate that the district court's rejection of Nelson's story is contradicted by extrinsic evidence or is internally inconsistent. See id. And because the merits of Brooks's claim depend entirely on the credibility of Nelson's testimony, a rejection of that credibility necessitates a finding that Brooks has not shown prosecutorial misconduct.