Opinion ID: 1290282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hubers' Statute of Limitations Claim

Text: The trial court ruled that the proper statute of limitations to be applied in this case is NDCC § 28-01-15. [1] Apparently this was due to the fact that the Hubers' contract with the County was contained in an instrument granting the County an easement across their land. An easement is defined at least in part as [a]n interest which one person has in the land of another. Black's Law Dictionary 509 (6th ed. 1990). Granting another an interest in real property necessarily affect[s] the title to real property. NDCC § 28-01-15(2) (1991). Therefore, on the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court erred in applying this statute of limitations. Based on the trial court's ruling, the Hubers' action had to have been commenced within ten years after the claim for relief ha[d] accrued. NDCC § 28-01-15. The application of the statute of limitations is a legal bar to a cause of action. If it is applicable the claim ceases to be a legal obligation and becomes a mere moral one which the law will not lend its aid to enforce. Hagen v. Altman, 79 N.W.2d 53, 58-59 (N.D.1956). The statute of limitations begins to run when the underlying cause of action accrues. Keller v. Clark Equipment Co., 474 F.Supp. 966, 969 (D.N.D.1979), aff'd, 715 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044, 104 S.Ct. 713, 79 L.Ed.2d 176 (1984). The Legislature has not defined when a cause of action has accrued; in the absence of such a definition, it is for the judiciary to determine what controls the accrual of an action. Hebron Pub. Sch. Dist. v. United States Gypsum Co., 475 N.W.2d 120, 121 (N.D.1991). A cause of action accrues when the right to commence it comes into existence; when it can be brought in a court of law without being subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Keller, 474 F.Supp. at 969. We have recognized that [a]n injury usually arises contemporaneously with the wrongful act causing the injury. Erickson v. Scotsman, Inc., 456 N.W.2d 535, 537 (N.D.1990). A plain language reading of the contract in the instant case contemplates the possibility that the County's provisions to keep water flowing through the Hubers' oxbow might, over time, prove inadequate. As noted, the contract provides that if the culvert proves unsatisfactory[,] ... another method shall be examined and installed at the expense of the County. However, the contract fails to establish any time limit within which the County is required to accomplish such an alternative remedy. Where the parties have failed to specify a time for performance, the law will allow a reasonable time. NDCC § 9-07-22 (1987). Determination of what a reasonable time may be is a question of fact, depending upon the particular circumstances of each case. First Nat'l Bank of Belfield v. Burich, 367 N.W.2d 148, 154 (N.D.1985). The instant case comes to us from a summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when, after viewing the evidence most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Even if a factual dispute exists, summary judgment is appropriate if its resolution will not alter the result. Such facts are not material. Berg v. Lien, 522 N.W.2d 455, 456 (N.D.1994) (citations omitted). In order to determine when the statute of limitations expired for the Hubers, it must be determined when the County failed to perform its obligation under the contract. Determining when a plaintiff's cause of action has accrued is generally a question of fact. Schmidt v. Grand Forks Country Club, 460 N.W.2d 125, 129 (N.D.1990). From the record before us we find no undisputed facts which allow us to determine what a reasonable time for performance would be, or when the County's failure to perform actually occurred. It is therefore impossible for us to calculate when the statute began to run. For these reasons, we remand to the trial court for determination of these factual questions. The Hubers also claim that because of discussions taking place between them and the County, the statute should have been tolled. This claim is essentially one of equitable estoppel against the County. In order to implement an equitable estoppel claim, plaintiff must show that defendant made statements intending that plaintiff would rely on them; that plaintiff did in fact rely on them, and as a result failed to commence an action within the prescribed period; and, finally, that defendant's statements were made prior to expiration of the appropriate limitation period. [2] Burr v. Trinity Medical Ctr., 492 N.W.2d 904, 908 (N.D.1992). We have said that `the mere conduct of settlement negotiations or discussions by a defendant with a plaintiff does not alone provide a basis for estopping the defendant from pleading the statute of limitations.' Schmidt, 460 N.W.2d at 130 (quoting Annotation, Settlement Negotiations as Estopping Reliance on Statute of Limitations, 39 A.L.R.3d 127, 131 (1971)). It is only when defendant's actions are calculated to induce plaintiff to believe that the claim will be settled without suit that negotiations may give rise to equitable estoppel. Schmidt, 460 N.W.2d at 130 (citing Szarkowski v. Reliance Ins. Co., 404 N.W.2d 502, 507 (N.D.1987)). The Hubers failed to allege any facts that would move the instant case from mere discussions into the realm of actions calculated to induce the plaintiffs' forbearance. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court erred when ruling there was no tolling of the statute.