Opinion ID: 782363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Davis's Alleged Prior Inconsistent Testimony

Text: 44 Murrell, in spite of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, contends that there is a reasonable likelihood that, if his counsel had presented during trial Davis's testimony from the probation revocation hearing (more than one year prior to date of trial), as he did at the post-conviction hearing, the outcome would have been different. Murrell's two-fold argument is that Davis's prior testimony from the probation revocation hearing — which differed from his trial testimony only as to the exact split second when Davis saw the gun ((1) as it left Murrell's hand and fell to the ground or (2) just after it hit the ground) — would have: impugned his general integrity at trial and directly challenged the most important part of his trial testimony, Appellant's Br. at 24, namely, the link between Murrell and the Glock nine-millimeter gun used in the shooting. We disagree. 45
46 Murrell claims that Davis's prior testimony at the probation revocation hearing concerning the footchase would have impugned Davis's general integrity; we disagree for it would have at most put in question but one single point in Davis's 63 pages of trial testimony, namely, his statement that, as he pursued Murrell during the footchase, he in fact saw him bring something out, and he shot it on the ground which was a gun. (Tr. at 227.) 47 A comparison of the probation revocation hearing and trial transcripts reveals that the only discrepancy between Davis's description of the shooting and subsequent footchase at trial and his prior description of the event at the probation revocation hearing was regarding his split-second observation of Murrell's gun — whether he saw the gun just before it hit the pavement as it left Murrell's hand, or immediately after it fell to the ground. See supra at 1107-1108. When taken in the context of his overall testimony, this single reference to an alleged inconsistency between his trial testimony and prior probation revocation hearing testimony as to this split second in time is more accurately described as a difference that is but a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind. After all, Davis's prior testimony that he couldn't say that he actually saw [Murrell] drop it, (PR Tr. at 40), must be read in conjunction with all of his other statements concerning the gun (possibly more than ten in number) — from the period in the time sequence when he had seen Murrell clutching what he believed was a gun, to the instant during the footchase that another security guard (DeNeal) made him aware that Murrell had dropped a gun, and at which point he looked down and saw the gun right at the spot that Murrell had just passed. 13 Reading Davis's probation revocation hearing testimony in its entirety, this prior statement was substantially the same as his claim to have actually seen the gun as it hit the ground (as Davis stated at trial). 14 And regardless whether he saw the gun at the split second it left Murrell's hand, or the fraction of a second when it hit or just after it hit the ground, the gun Davis saw during the footchase was later positively identified by forensic experts, after thorough testing, photographing and examining, as the Glock nine-millimeter gun used in the shootings. See supra at 1106. 48 It is important to note that it was amply clear, based on Davis's excited utterances to police officers just after the firing of the gun and the footchase, as well as the testimony he recited — time and time again — regarding the circumstances of the footchase, that the combined events surrounding the shooting led Davis to form the logical and reasonable belief that Murrell was in possession of the gun as he left the Club, and that Murrell had dropped a Glock nine-millimeter during the footchase. ( See, e.g., Day 4 Tr. at 10) (Officer Arndt's testimony recounting that after Murrell was apprehended, Davis was very excited, and told him that Murrell had thr[own] his gun to the ground after exiting the club). 49 It is also certainly very understandable for Davis, having seen a Glock nine-millimeter gun right in Murrell's immediate path, having heard someone holler, he dropped it, and having observed no one else in the area (other than Murrell), to have properly and logically reaffirmed his belief that the subject he was chasing had dropped the gun. ( Id. at 43.) It is equally understandable that Davis, in his excitement, stated to a police officer, immediately after the incident, that, while he was in hot pursuit of Murrell with his eyes focused on the fleeing suspect, he had seen the gun drop, as he very well may have. ( Id. at 60) (Henson's testimony that, with Davis's help, he was able to locate the Glock gun in a minute or minute and a half at most and that Davis indicated ... that [the Glock nine-millimeter located in the Club's parking lot] was the gun that he saw the person he was chasing drop. ) Indeed, according to Officer Henson's observation, Davis and Murrell were the first two people to leav[e] the area of the club after the shooting. 15 It is nigh unto impossible, under these circumstances, that the Glock nine-millimeter identified by forensic experts as having been the gun used in the shooting was thrown in the path of Davis and Murrell's footrace by any person other than Murrell. ( Id. at 51-52.) 50 Finally, prosecutors presented corroborating evidence supporting Davis's claim and testimony that he was in continuous hot pursuit of Murrell from the time he left the Club immediately after the shooting and that, during that time, he saw Murrell drop the gun. See supra at 1104-1106. Davis's initial recollection of Murrell's exit from the Club (clutching something under his arm at right side) was bolstered by Detective Shaw's testimony that the Club's videotape captured a uniformed security guard (Davis) running out the door [immediately after the shooting inside the club], as well as another individual who shortly thereafter exited the Club clutching their right arm towards their side.  ( Id. at 193-94.) 16 See supra at 1106. Officers Arndt and Henson verified that they saw a uniformed black male chase another black male through the parking lot outside the Club straight into the path of Arndt's squad car, where the individual, Murrell, was apprehended. ( Id. at 8) ( See also Day 4 Tr. at 40.) And Officer Henson confirmed that, after Murrell was taken into custody, the witness (Davis) was immediately  able to show [Henson] the area where the weapon had been dropped  and that Henson almost immediately  did locate a weapon [there]  (Glock nine-millimeter) ( Id. at 43, 53) (emphasis added). See supra at 1105 (same gun identified by forensic experts as the weapon used in the shooting). 51 A reading of Davis's trial testimony in its entirety makes it more obvious that any variance was very minimal at best from his prior testimony at the probation revocation hearing (more than one year before trial). Because Davis's account of the incident was further corroborated with the statements of Officers Henson, Arndt and Shaw, we are convinced that Davis would have remained a most credible witness, even if his prior testimony from the probation hearing had been presented.
52 Having established that Davis's prior testimony would not have affected his credibility, we turn now to the question of whether, as Murrell claims, introducing Davis's prior testimony that he had not in fact seen the gun drop would have challenged the accuracy of the most important part of [Davis's] trial testimony. Appellant's Br. at 24. Murrell speculates that, if Davis had been challenged on his claim to have seen the gun drop, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. But the single statement that Murrell attacks — regarding a split second time differential in Murrell's observation of the gun — was but a segment of one minute of what was, overall, a detailed, clear and convincing recitation of the facts, given by Davis, corroborated by other law enforcement officers and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the jury. And unfortunately for Murrell, even without Davis's statement at trial that he in fact saw Murrell drop the gun, Davis's clear, unequivocal and convincing testimony regarding Murrell's behavior just after the shooting, and his discovery of the gun right in Murrell's path of flight, combined with the corroborating testimony of other witnesses (Burrage, Arndt, Henson, forensic expert), as well as the videotape (Shaw), presented more than ample evidence to the jury and trial judge establishing that Murrell was in possession of and used the Glock nine-millimeter weapon to perpetrate the shootings at the Roxbury Club. 53 Notably, the State presented eyewitness testimony that Murrell committed the crimes charged. As recounted above, Burrage testified — consistent with a statement given to police the morning of the shooting — that while he was in the men's bathroom just prior to the shooting, he saw Murrell pull out a Glock nine-millimeter gun and work the slide in preparation for firing it. Burrage's testimony provided a motive for the shooting — namely, that Murrell had been informed by his friend (Owens) that there was a fight going on, and that Murrell was needed to attend to the situation by getting out the strap (the gun). Burrage also recounted that, after he followed Murrell and Owens out of the bathroom, he personally witnessed Murrell fire five or six shots into the crowd. 17 54 Even excluding Davis's single alleged inconsistent statement, his testimony linked Murrell to the Glock nine-millimeter gun used in the shooting. As we have already explained, Davis noticed that as Murrell exited the Club he was acting very suspicious because he appeared to be too calm considering what he had just witnessed, and that (as supported by the Club's videotape) he was tucking into his pants something that Davis could have sworn was a gun. Furthermore, Davis testified that Murrell refused to stop when Davis asked him to, and at that time took off at an accelerated pace. According to Davis, he either saw the gun drop (trial) or was made aware of the gun drop when he saw the Glock nine-millimeter on the ground (and, indeed, he stepped right over the gun) right at the place that Murrell had just passed (revocation hearing). In any case, Davis's observation of the Glock nine-millimeter gun — right in Murrell's path — helped confirm his prior suspicion that Murrell was the shooter (too calm, tucking what he thought was a gun into his pants, and under his sweater at the beltline) and that he was trying to discard the weapon in an attempt to do away with the most incriminating evidence — the gun used in the shootings. 18 55 Moreover, as discussed above, Officer Henson's trial testimony, as well as Davis's probation hearing testimony 19 , established that there was no other person in the Club's parking lot immediately after the shooting (the time frame when Davis observed the Glock nine-millimeter right in the immediate vicinity where Murrell had just passed). See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing Henson's observations of the footchase). In the absence of any other persons in the area, it is most unlikely that anyone but Murrell could have dropped the gun in the parking lot. 56 Circumstantial evidence is of equal probative value to direct evidence and in some cases is even more reliable. United States v. Reyes, 270 F.3d 1158, 1169 (7th Cir.2001) (internal citations omitted). In this case, prosecutors presented both circumstantial and direct evidence of Murrell's guilt, and one would be hard-pressed, in the face of this wealth of overwhelming evidence of Murrell's guilt, to find that there is a reasonable probability that Davis's previous testimony regarding the dropping of the gun would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) (to demonstrate prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different). After reviewing the record, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not find that there was such a reasonable probability; nor do we upon federal appellate review. We are convinced that, in light of the totality of the consistent and damaging testimony that Davis presented (both at the probation revocation hearing and at trial), the statements of the police officers, as well as the eyewitness testimony of Jermaine Burrage, the state court's decision was both reasonable and proper.