Opinion ID: 305193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Fair Housing Act of 1968

Text: 8 Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(c) (1970), makes it unlawful, with certain exceptions, [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin, or an intention to make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination. 9 In its opinion accompanying dismissal of appellants' complaint, the District Court found that the plain import of these words prohibited no more than conventional advertising indicating a racial preference. [T]he language cannot reasonably be tortured to embrace anything more. With due respect to Judge Corcoran, it seems clear to us that no torturing is required to extract more than this rigid result from the statutory language. On its face the Act prohibits making or publishing any notice, statement, or advertisement indicating a racial preference. (Emphasis added.) Unless the words notice and statement are to be treated as surplusage, they must mean that the Act prohibits at least some communications which cannot be classified as advertisements. Although the legislative history of this section is sparse, it indicates beyond doubt that, as the words themselves suggest, Congress intended to go beyond advertising to reach other sorts of notices and statements as well. See, e. g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 3296 etc., 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1105 (1966). Of course, the main purpose of a restrictive covenant is to give notice of a racial preference. And even if the word notice is defined in its narrowest possible sense, the covenants surely fall within the broader category of statements. 10 Nor can it be doubted that when the Recorder files restrictive covenants he make[s], print[s], [and] publish[es] these notices and statements. It might be argued that the Recorder prints the covenants when he causes them to be reproduced for purposes of preservation and inspection. But more broadly, he certainly publishes them by collecting them in a manner that facilitates access to them by prospective buyers. Black's Law Dictionary at 1396 (4th ed. 1951) defines publication as to exhibit, display, disclose or reveal. The whole purpose of the Recorder's office is to exhibit deeds in a convenient fashion so as to disclose or reveal possible clouds on the chain of title. To be sure, the Recorder does not publish the deeds in the sense that a newspaper publishes news copy. But we must, of course, presume that the statute was carefully drafted and that no part of it is redundant. If the framers had intended to limit the clause to publication of racial preferences in newspapers, the prohibition against printing notices and statements would have been sufficient to serve their purpose. The additional proscription against publication should therefore be read more broadly to bar all devices for making public racial preferences in the sale of real estate, whether or not they involve the printing process. Cf., e. g., In re Publishing Docket in Local Newspaper, 266 Mo. 48, 49, 187 S.W. 1174, 1175 (1913). And when the clause is so read, it can scarcely be doubted that the Recorder's publication of racial covenants falls squarely within the statutory prohibition. 11 Finally, the statute's effect is limited to making, printing and publishing notices, statements and advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any [racial] preference. Appellees argue that the statute is directed at the real estate industry, with which the Recorder has no connection. Real estate agents, they say, violate the statute by printing or publishing the racial convenants with respect to the sale    of a dwelling, whereas the Recorder merely records the racial covenants in the public record. But there is, of course, nothing in the statute which limits its effectiveness to real estate agents. Unlike other sections of the Fair Housing title, Sec. 3604 (c) does not provide any specific exemptions or designate the persons covered, but rather    applies on its face to 'anyone' printing or publishing illegal advertisements. United States v. Hunter, 4 Cir., 459 F.2d 205, 210 (1972) (footnote omitted). The statute prohibits notices of racial preference in the transfer of real estate however published, including, presumably, publication in the public records of the District of Columbia. The with respect clause obviously modifies the words notice, statement, or advertisement immediately preceding it in the statute rather than the words make, print, or publish. It describes the type of notice prohibited, not the mode or the author of the publication. A contrary reading of the statute would mean that a homeowner could publish in a newspaper an advertisement offering to sell his house indicating a racial preference, since newspapers are no more an arm of the real estate industry than is the Recorder. Yet the courts have clearly held that newspaper advertisements indicating a racial preference fall within the central prohibitions of the Act. See, e. g., United States v. Hunter, supra, 459 F.2d at 210. Whatever one thinks of the relationship between the Recorder and the real estate industry, it surely cannot be doubted that racially restrictive covenants have the purpose and effect of indicating a racial preference with respect to the sale    of a dwelling. It follows that the Recorder's actions with regard to these covenants are prohibited by the Act even if they do not themselves directly involve the sale    of a dwelling. 12 Moreover, assuming arguendo that the with respect clause was intended to modify the words make, print, or publish, we still think the clause describes the Recorder's conduct. We think it beyond dispute that virtually all of the Recorder's activities, including his publication of racially restrictive covenants, are undertaken with respect to the sale    of    dwelling[s]. It blinks reality to suggest that the official functions of the Recorder are unrelated to the transfer and sale of real estate. The Recorder's office is not a museum where scholars come to examine old deeds out of disinterested curiosity. It is, rather, a place where prospective buyers or their agents can quickly and easily determine the soundness of the title they are acquiring. We can take judicial notice of the fact that a visit to the Recorder's office is an ingredient in virtually every real estate transaction in this city and that, conversely, virtually everyone who visits the Recorder's office is involved in the real estate market. To say that the Recorder's publication of deeds is unconnected with the sale or rental of    dwelling[s] is to overlook the fact that such a sale may be ineffective as against a bona fide purchaser unless the deed is recorded. See 45 D.C.Code Sec. 501 (1967). More fundamentally, such a restriction on the statutory language would ignore the day-to-day responsibilities of the Recorder's office and pointlessly limit the applicability of the Fair Housing Act. 13 Thus a careful textual examination of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3604(c) makes clear that the Recorder's activity falls within its ambit. It is unnecessary to rest upon the words of the statute alone, however, since a purposive analysis of the provision yields precisely the same result. True, there is nothing in the legislative history tending either to support or to refute the inference arising from the language that the Act prohibits statements of racial preference emanating from the Recorder's office. In all likelihood, few congressmen even addressed their thinking to this particular problem. But no court has ever held that Congress must specifically indicate how a statute should be applied in every case before the judiciary can go about the business of applying it. In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 23 L.Ed.2d 318 (1969), for example, the Supreme Court recognized that most of the discussion in Congress regarding the coverage of Title II [of the 1964 Civil Rights Act] focused on places of spectator entertainment rather than recreational areas. Nonetheless, the Court held the Act applicable to a lake club with boating and dancing facilities, remarking that the Act's coverage should not be restricted to the primary objects of Congress' concern since the purpose of the law was to remove the daily affront and humiliation involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the general public. Id. at 307-308, 89 S.Ct. at 1702. 14 Similarly, Congress has clearly stated that the purpose of the Fair Housing Act is to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 (1970). Reading Section 3604(c) to forbid the Recorder from frustrating this purpose by placing the authority of government behind illegal housing discrimination is at least consistent with, if not compelled by, ordinary canons of statutory construction. It is well established that civil rights statutes should be read expansively in order to fulfill their purpose. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Daniel v. Paul, supra. There is no reason why our reading of Section 3604(c) should not comport with this rule. 4 15 Moreover, the contrary reading of the statute adopted by the District Court leads to anomalous results indeed. Such a reading authorizes governmental participation in what is now universally conceded to be an illegal endeavor- viz., maintenance of a segregated housing market. It need hardly be pointed out that the strongest sort of public policy considerations argue against a construction of the statute which would permit government to become a co-conspirator in this illegal scheme. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Cf. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 356 U.S. 30, 78 S.Ct. 507, 2 L.Ed.2d 562 (1958). 16 Furthermore, the District Court's reading of the statute would carve out a narrow exception to the statutory provision for the benefit of government officials. If private individuals attempted to publish or circulate racial covenants, their activity would clearly violate Section 3604(c). See note 1 supra. Yet under the opinion of the District Court, because it is a government official who violates the statutory command his activity is somehow insulated from judicial control. This position turns the old state action controversy on its head. Ever since the Civil Rights Cases were decided almost a century ago, it has been thought necessary to show some degree of state involvement before private discriminatory decisions could be judicially controlled. 5 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883). It is simply too late in the day now to say that judicial control is impossible for the very reason that the state is involved. Whatever one thinks of state action as a viable limiting principle on the constitutional command of equality, it should at least be clear that the most outrageous deprivations of equal rights are those perpetrated by the state itself. Surely Congress must have been aware of this principle-sanctified by 100 years of state action litigation-when it voted to enact Section 3604(c). We are unwilling to believe that the legislators who voted for that Act intended to exempt the most serious offenses from its coverage.