Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ineffective cross-examination

Text: Defendant also contends that defense counsel's allegedly ineffective cross-examination of Loar rendered this testimony unreliable. He complains that prior defense counsel never asked Loar, among other things, how many times he testified in other cases, whether he expected any leniency or benefit for his testimony, about his ability to remember, and about his meetings with detectives or prosecutors. Defendant argues the cross-examination of Mr. Loar in the first trial failed to adequately and zealously confront his testimony, and failed to test Mr. Loar's credibility in any meaningful way. For reasons that follow, we disagree. Contrary to defendant's contention, defense counsel's failure to explore certain areas on cross-examination does not render Loar's testimony inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1291. As long as defendant was given the opportunity for effective cross-examination, the statutory requirements were satisfied; the admissibility of this evidence did not depend on whether defendant availed himself fully of that opportunity. [Citations.] ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 975, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704, italics added; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 611, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302 [it is the opportunity and motive to cross-examine that matters, not the actual cross-examination].) Moreover, the admission of ... testimony under Evidence Code section 1291 does not offend the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution simply because the defendant did not conduct a particular form of cross-examination that in hindsight might have been more effective. ( People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 851, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2, citing People v. Zapien, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 975, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) We reject defendant's claim that we must nonetheless examine the effectiveness of the cross-examination under Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, and Mancusi v. Stubbs (1972) 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 33 L.Ed.2d 293. In Ohio v. Roberts , the high court explained that in an extraordinary case, for example, where a court had already determined that a defendant received ineffective representation from counsel appointed only four days before trial (see Mancusi v. Stubbs, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 209, 92 S.Ct. 2308), it was necessary to explore the character of the actual cross-examination to ensure that an adequate opportunity for full cross-examination had been afforded to the defendant. [Citation.] ( Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 73, fn. 12, 100 S.Ct. 2531.) Absent such unusual circumstances, no inquiry into effectiveness is required. ( Ibid. ) We conclude that no such unusual circumstances are present here. For instance, unlike in Mancusi v. Stubbs , the record does not indicate, and defendant does not suggest, that his prior defense counsel had minimal time for trial preparation and therefore could not effectively cross-examine Loar. Moreover, as the Attorney General contends, defense counsel's ineffective assistance in the first trial, which was based on his failure to object to certain testimony under Massiah v. United States, supra, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, did not bear directly on his actual questioning of Loar. Defense counsel's failure to identify a meritorious Massiah claim does not necessarily indicate an inability to effectively cross-examine a witness.