Opinion ID: 1111735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: written opinion

Text: The California Constitution provides that [decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.) Is an attorney discipline proceeding a cause[ ] that is determine[d] by an order of suspension or disbarment? If it is, then a decision of this court to grant such an order must be explained in a written opinion. The majority acknowledges that cause means `a proceeding in court, a suit or action,' but it denies that an attorney discipline proceeding resulting in suspension or disbarment falls within this definition because, the majority insists, these proceedings are sui generis. (Maj. opn., ante, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 314, 993 P.2d at p. 970.) I disagree. An attorney suspension or disbarment proceeding is a proceeding in court because, as the majority explains, it is a proceeding in which this court exercises original jurisdiction ( id. at pp. 306-307, 993 P.2d at pp. 963-964) and renders decisions or orders imposing discipline ( id. at p. 306, 993 P.2d at p. 963). Deciding that an attorney discipline proceeding falls within the general definition of a cause does not end the inquiry. In interpreting the state Constitution's written opinion provision, this court has held that certain rulings of appellate courts in judicial proceedings do not determine causes within the meaning of that provision. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.) Thus, a written opinion is not required before an appellate court grants or denies a petition for rehearing ( Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams (1942) 19 Cal.2d 463, 468, 122 P.2d 257), dismisses an appeal ( People v. Brown (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 175, 176, 307 P.2d 949), grants or denies an alternative writ ( Funeral Dir. Assn. v. Bd. of Funeral Dirs. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 104, 106-107, 136 P.2d 785), or denies a petition for review ( Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 350-351, 156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579). But the majority does not explain what logic or principle, other than mere custom or convenience, serves to explain when a ruling in a judicial proceeding will or will not trigger our Constitution's written opinion requirement. Our decisions in this area indicate that a ruling in a judicial proceeding determines a cause for purposes of the written opinion requirement if it is a final rather than an interim ruling and if it produces an enforceable determination of the parties' rights. Interim rulings do not trigger the written opinion requirement. An appellate court need not issue a written opinion when granting a writ of review, an alternative writ, an order to show cause, or a petition for rehearing, because none of these rulings terminate the proceeding or determine the parties' rights. Rather, in the ordinary course of events, each of these rulings is an intermediate step to be followed by oral argument and a final decision on the merits. It is only at the final stage, when the court enters an order or judgment that determines the parties' rights, that a written opinion is required. There is another group of rulings that have the effect of terminating a judicial proceeding in an appellate court but nonetheless do not trigger the written opinion requirement. In this category are rulings denying rehearing, dismissing an appeal, or declining to issue a writ of review, alternative writ, or order to show cause. In each instance, the ruling indicates a decision by the appellate court not to intervene and not to disturb an existing order or judgment that is itself enforceable. Thus, when an appellate court denies rehearing following a decision on appeal, the court has decided not to disturb its own previous decision, which it has already explained in a written opinion. In the other instances, such as an order of this court denying review of a Court of Appeal's decision on appeal, the order is not itself enforceable as a judgment; it merely permits enforcement of an order or judgment of another court or administrative agency. This is so even when the appellate court's ruling declining review necessarily reflects a decision on the merits. (See Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 24 Cal.3d 335, 350-352, 156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579.) Although the majority insists there is no legal basis (maj. opn., ante, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d at p. 315, fn. 11, 993 P.2d at p. 972, fn. 11) for distinguishing this court's orders in attorney suspension and disbarment matters from this court's orders summarily denying original writ petitions or denying review of decisions rendered by the Courts of Appeal or by state administrative agencies such as the Public Utilities Commission, there is a fundamental difference. As the majority stresses, only this court renders decisions or orders imposing [attorney] discipline (maj. opn., ante, at p. 306, 993 P.2d at p. 963) and we exercise original jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings... ( id. at pp. 306-307, 993 P.2d at pp. at 963-964). This court, acting through the State Bar, assumes the duty of enforcing our attorney discipline orders. When this court undertakes to exercise original jurisdiction in a proceeding, and in so doing makes a final judicial determination of the parties' rights in that proceeding, embodied in an enforceable order, we have necessarily made a decision that determines a cause within the meaning of the state Constitution's written opinion requirement. In this respect, this court's decisions in attorney suspension and disbarment matters are similar to, and in my view functionally indistinguishable from, decisions granting a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance. In mandate proceedings, a court's decision not to grant an alternative writ or an order to show cause does not excuse the court from its obligation to explain its reasons in writing when it grants a peremptory writ that is an enforceable judgment determining the parties' rights. (See Raima v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178, fn. 6, 203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893.) So also with this court's attorney suspension and disbarment orders. The majority cannot have it both ways. The majority insists that this court has not improperly delegated attorney discipline to the State Bar Court, and that this court's suspension and disbarment orders are the product of this court's exercise of its own original jurisdiction and this court's own judicial determination of the merits of the disciplinary proceeding. Yet the majority denies that in so determining the merits of a disciplinary proceeding this court renders a decision that determines a cause within the meaning of the state Constitution's written opinion requirement. These positions seem utterly irreconcilable. The majority is correct in concluding that attorney suspension and disbarment orders result from this court's judicial determination of the merits of attorney discipline proceedings. But, unlike the majority, I would accept what follows logically and unavoidably from this conclusion: Decisions in attorney suspension and disbarment matters determine causes and therefore must be in writing with reasons stated.