Opinion ID: 1930886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: II-A The first action (Cohen v. Ketchum, et al)

Text: In this action, as previously mentioned, a single named plaintiff has sued as a resident taxpayer of the Town of Kennebunk. Since this sole plaintiff has neither alleged nor proved that he is a duly qualified voter, he has neither alleged nor proved that he suffered such damage as, under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed.2d 663 (1962) relative to malapportionment claims, may constitute special damage:that the alleged malapportionment has diluted the power of plaintiff's vote relative to that of other voters. As a plaintiff suing without special injury, Cohen lacks standing to achieve any form of remedial relief concerning allegedly illegal action by a local governmental body to which he has the relationship of a resident taxpayer. If plaintiff is to have relief at all, he must show himself entitled to preventive relief. Blodgett v. School Administrative District 73, Me., 289 A.2d 407 (1972). The question remains, however, whether even preventive relief may be afforded to the plaintiff, Cohen, insofar as, without suffering special damage, he has sued as the only named plaintiff and is not joined by at least nine other resident taxpayers of the local governmental unit alleged to be engaging in illegal activity. In Eaton v. Thayer, 124 Me. 311, 128 A. 475 (1925) more than ten taxpayers had sued, invoking the so-called special equity enabling ten taxpayers statute (then R.S. 1916, Chapter 82 § 6, par. XIII). [4] Because the illegality alleged to inhere in the governmental action under attack was of a kind other than that delineated in this special statute, it was held inapplicable to the case. The Court concluded, however, that this deficiency would not defeat the standing of plaintiffs to have preventive relief pursuant to the full equity jurisdiction embodied in R.S.1916, Chapter 82 § 6, par. XIV (reflecting the grant of full equity jurisdiction originally conferred in 1874 by P.L.1874, Chapter 175). The Court said: Since this enlargement of the equity powers . . . jurisdiction to grant preventive relief has been regarded as not limited as by Paragraph XIII [the so-called ten taxpayers special equity enabling statute]. (p. 314, 128 A. p. 476) (emphasis supplied) In Tuscan v. Smith, 130 Me. 36, 153 A. 289 (1931) an action by ten taxable inhabitants of the Town of Skowhegan claimed that a lease given by the Town to one of the defendants and assigned to another of the defendants was illegal because (1) one of the selectmen was pecuniarily interested in the grant of the lease and its assignment, and (2) the lease had been knowingly made for a less rental than could have been obtained from other parties . . .. (p. 38, 153 A. p. 291) Plaintiffs sought cancellation of the lease and an injunction against the lessee or his assignee taking possession of the demised premises. (p. 38, 153 A. p. 291) As in Eaton v. Thayer , the Court in Tuscan v. Smith , because of the nature of the illegality asserted, was obliged to hold the special ten taxpayers equity enabling statute inapplicable. Again, however, as in Eaton v. Thayer , the Court held that this was not fatal to plaintiffs' maintenance of the action since once full equity powers had been conferred, according to the weight of authority . . . taxable inhabitants [without special damage] are not barred from maintaining a bill in their own names in a proper case. (pp. 43, 44, 153 A. p. 293) As to the criteria of a proper case Tuscan v. Smith , stated: Our court has very clearly defined the limits of such right. It has held that it should be restricted to an application for preventive relief, and that individual taxpayers have not the right to apply for remedial relief after the commission of an illegal act, where the act is one which affects the entire community and not specifically the individual bringing the bill. (p. 44, 153 A. p. 293) In Eaton v. Thayer and Tuscan v. Smith as in all subsequent cases which have addressed the standing issues here under consideration (including Blodgett v. School Administrative District 73, Me., 289 A.2d 407 (1972))the named plaintiffs happened to be ten or more resident taxpayers. For this reason, uncertainty has persisted whether fewer than ten resident taxpayersor, indeed, one such named plaintiffwill have standing to sue, without special damage, to achieve preventive relief by invoking the full equity powers of Maine Courts as currently embodied in 14 M.R.S.A. § 6051 (13). We now have occasion to remove this uncertainty and clarify the law of Maine. The underlying logic of the reasoning in Eaton v. Thayer and Tuscan v. Smith is that once full equity jurisdiction was conferred upon Maine Courts (after 1874), the need to establish the special conditions required by the so-called ten taxpayers statute had been superseded. In practical effect, in short, the restricted equity jurisdiction conferred by the ten taxpayers statute had become a vestigial relic of the step-by-step evolution of equity jurisdiction in this State which ultimately culminated, in 1874, in the grant of a total equity jurisdiction. Such is the plain meaning of the statement: Since . . . enlargement of the equity powers . . . jurisdiction to grant preventive relief has been regarded as not limited as by Paragraph XIII. (p. 314 of 124 Me., p. 476 of 128 A.) This abstract logic of Eaton v. Thayer and Tuscan v. Smith is given concrete shape in Tuscan v. Smith in two respects. First, in illustrating that the weight of authority recognizes taxable inhabitants . . . [may maintain] a bill in their own names, Tuscan v. Smith cites Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 25 L.Ed. 1070 (1879), a case in which only three resident taxpayers were named plaintiffs seeking preventive relief against illegal governmental action causing them no special injury. This citation reveals that the Court in Tuscan v. Smith saw no magic in ten as the minimum number of resident taxpayers who have standing to invoke the full equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of courts of equity,. . . where there is not a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law. 14 M.R.S.A. § 6051(13) Second, Tuscan v. Smith indicates that as there is no magic in ten, there is none in any plurality of resident taxpayers as the named plaintiffs. This appears from the manner in which the Court describes the difference between the law of Maine and the law of Massachusetts. The Court says: We are aware that Massachusetts has held that the statute conferring general equity powers on its courts did not give the right to the individual taxpayer to file a bill. . . . It is perhaps sufficient to say that this court has construed our own statute differently. (130 Me. p. 44, 153 A. p. 293) (emphasis supplied) The use of the singular, the individual taxpayer, is further confirmation that the ultimate import of the logic of the Court's analysis is that neither ten nor, indeed, a plurality of resident taxpayers must be the named plaintiffs in an action in which, in the absence of special injury, preventive relief is sought. For such purpose, even one person as the named plaintiff has standing to seek to achieve preventive relief against illegal action by a local governmental unit of which plaintiff is a resident taxpayerespecially when, as here, the asserted illegality relates to a subject matter of direct interest to any taxpayer, the incurring of governmental indebtedness. We now so decide. In the first action, then, Herman Cohen suing as a solitary resident taxpayer suffering no special damage has standing to invoke the full equity jurisdiction conferred upon the Superior Court by 14 M. R.S.A. § 6051(13) for an award of appropriate preventive relief against the particular local governmental action complained of by him as illegal.