Opinion ID: 4543349
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Warrantless Entry onto Private Premises

Text: Shelton next argues that Officer Estrada lacked the necessary probable cause to pursue Shelton onto private property without a warrant and that there were no exigent circumstances to support Officer Estrada’s pursuit of Shelton. We disagree. A warrantless entry onto private premises is presumptively unreasonable. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). The Supreme Court recognizes, 3 This observation, while never enough, standing alone, to establish reasonable suspicion, still weighs in favor of reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). -7- however, that if probable cause for an arrest exists, then “several exigencies . . . may justify a warrantless search of a home.” Id. at 460. For example, “officers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.” Id. “Hot pursuit” occurs when an officer is in “immediate or continuous pursuit” of a suspect from the scene of a crime. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976); see also United States v. Jackson, 139 F. App’x 83, 86 (10th Cir. 2005). A police officer has probable cause for arrest when there are “facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). Applying these principles, we hold Officer Estrada’s reasonable suspicion ripened into probable cause when Shelton attempted to flee, thus giving rise to the exigent circumstances necessary for Officer Estrada to pursue Shelton onto the property without a warrant. In United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060 (10th Cir. 2009), the court held that police officers’ reasonable suspicion ripened into “more than sufficient probable cause” when the defendant, who the officers already reasonably suspected of a crime, ran away from the officers. Id. at 1065; see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). Similarly, Officer Estrada’s reasonable -8- suspicion ripened into probable cause when Shelton ignored his commands and ran into the backyard. It was therefore permissible under the circumstances for Officer Estrada to pursue Shelton onto private property. 4 See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. at 460 (“[O]fficers may enter premises without a warrant when they are in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect.”). Shelton argues, however, that there were no exigent circumstances because Shelton’s choice not to comply with Officer Estrada’s order to “come here,” was within Shelton’s constitutional rights. He bases this argument on the principle that an individual has “the constitutional right to walk away from a law enforcement officer who lacks probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain or seize him or her.” Romero v. Story, 672 F.3d 880, 889 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). As discussed above, however, Officer Estrada already had reasonable suspicion in the first instance. 5 We therefore reject this argument. 4 It was later established at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Shelton in fact lived at the address where Officer Estrada first encountered him. This fact, however, has no bearing on our analysis. There is no evidence Officer Estrada knew that Shelton was in front of his own home when he encountered what he reasonably suspected was a car burglary in progress, nor did Shelton ever communicate that fact to Officer Estrada, even after he was arrested for battery and evading arrest. 5 The prior existence of reasonable suspicion also distinguishes this case from United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465 (10th Cir. 1996), on which Shelton also relies. In Davis, officers observed a known felon exit his vehicle, make eye contact with them, then look away and walk toward an establishment known for illegal activity. Id. at 1468. The court held this combination of factors did not (continued...) -9-