Opinion ID: 798437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pre-trial Detention

Text: Wilson next claims that the prolonged period of his pre-trial detention violated his due process rights. We have previously held that “when [pre-trial] detention becomes ‘excessively prolonged,’ it may no longer be reasonable in relation to the regulatory goals of detention, in which even a violation of due process occurs.” United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1043 (1993), quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 n.4 (1987). However, the constitutional right at issue in Millan is the right to bail pending trial when pre-trial detention is found to be excessive; the case does not suggest that prolonged pretrial detention can support a claim for monetary damages. Morever, to the extent that a 4 criminal defendant believes that his pre-trial detention has extended beyond what is reasonable, he has a remedy in the form of an application for bail to the court in which charges are pending. It is the court that is responsible for deciding whether and for how a defendant may be detained, not the defendant police officers. “[I]n the absence of evidence that the police officer misled or pressured the official who could be expected to exercise independent judgment,” the “intervening exercise” of such judgment by the prosecutor, grand jury, and/or judge breaks the chain of causation for purposes of § 1983 liability for the plaintiff’s incarceration. Townes v. City of N.Y., 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999). Wilson’s reliance on Russo v. City of Bridgeport is unavailing. Russo had been arrested for his alleged robbery of a convenience store after the store clerk selected him from a photographic lineup. Russo, 479 F.3d at 199. Russo, however, had extensive tattoos on his arms, hands, and neck; the perpetrator of the robbery, as depicted in the surveillance video under the defendants’ exclusive control, did not. Id. at 199-200. The defendants failed to turn over the exculpatory evidence to either the prosecutor or the defense for a period of over 200 days. We held that criminal defendants have a right to be protected from “a sustained detention stemming directly from the law enforcement officials’ refusal to investigate available exculpatory evidence” particularly where the officials “retain[] sole custody of the [exculpatory] evidence . . . .” Id. at 208. The factual allegations in this case are not similar to those in Russo. Here, most of the evidence was testimonial, and while the evidence was conflicting, some of it 5 specifically identified Wilson as a non-shooter accomplice. The later developments that caused the prosecutor to dismiss charges against Wilson – including challenges to witnesses’ credibility – occurred well after the appellees no longer controlled Wilson’s detention. For these reasons, the district court did not err in determining that the officers could not be held liable for Wilson’s detention.