Opinion ID: 2267990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the possibility of a blackout

Text: In urging the Board to reject the hearing committee report, Mr. Tidwell proffered evidence [12] which, in his view, would show that at the time of the accident he might have been suffering from an alcohol-induced blackout. Such a blackout, he maintained, would explain why he did not stop his car, render assistance, or report the accident to the authorities. Because this evidence was not presented to the hearing committee, the Board refused to consider it, ruling that Mr. Tidwell had not shown the extraordinary circumstances necessary for the consideration of evidence offered after the hearing had ended. [13] Mr. Tidwell argues that this evidence should have been considered by the Board and urges this court to take judicial notice of certain articles from medical journals on the subject of blackouts. We are not persuaded. First, even if the proffered evidence were to be considered, it does not show that Mr. Tidwell suffered a blackout on the night of the accident. At most, it raises a possibility that a blackout may have occurred at some undefined point that evening. [14] Moreover, any suggestion that Mr. Tidwell might have experienced a blackout is contradicted by his testimony at the hearing in which he admitted hitting something that night, as well as his statement during the plea hearing that he hit a person with [his] vehicle. Second, when Mr. Tidwell pleaded guilty to the felony of leaving the scene of a fatal accident, he admitted as a matter of law the elements of that offense and the underlying facts. See In re Wolff, 490 A.2d 1118, 1119 (D.C.1985), adopted en banc, 511 A.2d 1047 (D.C.1986) (a guilty plea represents both a conviction of a crime and an admission by the accused of the underlying facts (citation omitted)); In re Colson, 412 A.2d at 1164, 1167 (a valid guilty plea acts as an admission of all material facts and as conclusive proof that the attorney did the underlying acts which constitute the crime). Mr. Tidwell's current attempt to deny his knowledge of the incident by proffering evidence that suggests the possibility of a blackout is merely an effort to deny an element of the offense which he has already admitted. Under Wolff and Colson, he cannot do that. Finally, the Board quite properly refused to consider the proffered materials because they were both irrelevant and untimely, and because, in the words of the Board, they had not been tested by the adversarial system so as to establish their trustworthiness. The Board explained its reasoning at some length in its report, and we find no reason to disagree with it.