Opinion ID: 2763303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the motor vehicle exception

Text: The motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, provides: Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948. This provision has remained unchanged from its original phrasing when enacted as part of the GTLA in 1964.35 The heart of our inquiry is the interpretation of the phrase “liable for bodily injury,” which contains two key components: (1) “liable for” and (2) “bodily injury.” 34 The six statutory exceptions to governmental immunity contained within the GTLA precede and follow the general grant of immunity in MCL 691.1407(1): “the highway exception, MCL 691.1402; the motor-vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405; the publicbuilding exception, MCL 691.1406; the proprietary-function exception, MCL 691.1413; the governmental-hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4); and the sewage-disposalsystem-event exception, MCL 691.1417(2) and (3).” Wesche v Mecosta Co Road Comm, 480 Mich 75, 84 n 10; 746 NW2d 847 (2008). 35 1964 PA 170. The motor vehicle exception existed before the GTLA was enacted, though the wording differed and there were separate statutes relating to the liability of the state’s political subdivisions and the state itself. See 1945 PA 87, which became 1948 CL 691.141; 1945 PA 127, which became 1948 CL 691.151. 12
Our recent decision in Bradley Estate sheds light on the proper interpretation of the phrase “liable for,” though the motor vehicle exception was not at issue in that case. Instead, we interpreted the phrase “tort liability” found in the GTLA’s broad grant of immunity, MCL 691.1407(1),36 which grants immunity to governmental entities from “tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.” Specifically, we were called on to decide whether a particular cause of action sought to impose “tort liability” within the meaning of MCL 691.1407(1), thus, triggering governmental immunity pursuant to that provision.37 We concluded that “ ‘tort’ as used in MCL 691.1407(1) is a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.”38 Looking at the phrase as a whole, we explained: Our analysis, however, requires more. MCL 691.1407(1) refers not merely to a “tort,” nor to a “tort claim,” nor to a “tort action,” but to “tort liability.” The term “tort,” therefore, describes the type of liability from which a governmental agency is immune. As commonly understood, the word “liability,” refers to liableness, i.e., “the state or quality of being liable.” To be “liable” means to be “legally responsible[.]” Construing the term “liability” along with the term “tort,” it becomes apparent that the Legislature intended “tort liability” to encompass legal responsibility arising from a tort. We therefore hold that “tort liability” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) means all legal responsibility arising from a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.[39] 36 Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 371. 37 Id. at 371, 380-385. 38 Id. at 385. 39 Id. (footnotes omitted; some emphasis added; alteration in original). 13 Because this Court concluded that “liable” means “legally responsible,” our interpretation of “tort liability” in MCL 691.1407(1) informs how to interpret the phrase “liable for” in the motor vehicle exception. We see no reason why this Court’s prior analysis of the word “liability,” which stems from the word “liable,” should not likewise apply in this case, particularly given that the phrases “tort liability” and “liable for” are contained within the same statute—the GTLA.40 Thus, the phrase “liable for bodily injury” means legally responsible for bodily injury.
We interpreted the phrase “bodily injury” in Wesche v Mecosta Co Rd Comm, specifically within the context of the motor vehicle exception.41 The central issue in Wesche was “whether the motor vehicle exception . . . authorizes a claim for loss of consortium against a governmental agency.”42 In analyzing the language of the motor vehicle exception, we stated: “This language is clear: it imposes liability for ‘bodily injury’ and ‘property damage’ resulting from a governmental employee’s negligent operation of a government-owned motor vehicle.”43 Because the GTLA does not define “bodily injury,” this Court resorted to dictionary definitions, stating: 40 See Robinson, 486 Mich at 17 (“[U]nless the Legislature indicates otherwise, when it repeatedly uses the same phrase in a statute, that phrase should be given the same meaning throughout the statute.”). 41 Wesche, 480 Mich 75. 42 Id. at 79. 43 Id. at 84. 14 The word “bodily” means “of or pertaining to the body” or “corporeal or material, as contrasted with spiritual or mental.” Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2000). The word “injury” refers to “harm or damage done or sustained, [especially] bodily harm.” Id. Thus, “bodily injury” simply means a physical or corporeal injury to the body. It is beyond dispute that a loss of consortium is not a physical injury to a body. A claim for loss of consortium is simply one for loss of society and companionship. . . . Thus, because loss of consortium is a nonphysical injury, it does not fall within the categories of damage for which the motor-vehicle exception waives immunity.[44] We see no reason to deviate from our prior analysis. Thus, because we have interpreted “bodily injury” to mean “a physical or corporeal injury to the body,” “liable for bodily injury” means legally responsible for a physical or corporeal injury to the body.
Our final consideration in looking at the phrase “liable for bodily injury” as a whole is to determine the scope of the liability to which the government is exposed under the motor vehicle exception. Essential to this inquiry is the fundamental difference between an injury and the damages that arise from that injury. This Court’s decision in Henry is instructive for determining the scope of liability in that it delineates this distinction.45 There, we set forth the traditional elements of a negligence action—“(1) duty, (2) breach, (3) causation, and (4) damages”46—but explained that “it has always 44 Id. at 84-85 (quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added; alteration in original). We point out that a prior decision of this Court, Roberts v Detroit, 102 Mich 64; 60 NW 450 (1894), effectively resolved the question whether a loss of consortium is a “bodily injury,” within the context of an early version of the highway exception, concluding that it was not. 45 Henry v Dow Chemical Co, 473 Mich 63; 701 NW2d 684 (2005). 46 Id. at 74. 15 been implicit in this analysis that in order to prevail, a plaintiff must also demonstrate an actual injury to person or property.”47 We then made clear that “such injury constitutes the essence of a plaintiff’s claim,”48 and that “injury” and “damages” are distinct from one another, explaining: While the courts of this state may not have always clearly articulated this injury requirement, nor finely delineated the distinction between an “injury” and the “damages” flowing therefrom, the injury requirement has always been present in our negligence analysis. It has simply always been the case in our jurisprudence that plaintiffs alleging negligence claims have also shown that their claims arise from present physical injuries. We are not aware of any Michigan cases in which a plaintiff has recovered on a negligence theory without demonstrating some present physical injury. Thus, in all known cases in Michigan in which a plaintiff has satisfied the “damages” element of a negligence claim, he has also satisfied the “injury” requirement.49 Thus, “damages” and “injury” are not one and the same—damages flow from the injury. In light of this Court’s prior interpretation of “tort liability” in Bradley Estate, this Court’s interpretation of “bodily injury” in Wesche, and this Court’s delineation of the difference between “injury” and “damages” in Henry, “liable for bodily injury” in the present case means legally responsible for damages flowing from a physical or corporeal injury to the body. Stated differently, “bodily injury” is simply the category of harm (i.e., the type of injury) for which the government waives immunity under MCL 691.1405 and, thus, for which damages that naturally flow are compensable. Therefore, the legal 47 Id. (emphasis added). 48 Id. (emphasis added). 49 Id. at 75 (emphasis added). 16 responsibility that arises from “bodily injury” is responsibility for tort damages that flow from that injury. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the GTLA generally grants immunity from “tort liability,”50 and to the extent that this immunity is waived, the resulting liability, logically, is liability for tort damages. It is a longstanding principle in this state’s jurisprudence that tort damages generally include damages for all the legal and natural consequences of the injury (i.e., the damages that naturally flow from the injury), which may include damages for loss of the ability to work and earn money, as well as pain and suffering and mental and emotional distress damages. For example, in Sherwood v Chicago & WM R Co,51 this Court approved of a jury instruction that stated: In estimating the compensatory damages in cases of this character, all the consequences of the injury, future as well as past, are to be taken into consideration, including the bodily pain, which is shown by the proofs to be reasonably certain to have naturally resulted from the injury. The injured party, when entitled to recover, should be awarded compensation for all the injuries, past and prospective. These are intended to include and embrace indemnity for actual nursing and medical expenses; also for loss of power, or loss of capability to perform ordinary labor, or capacity to earn money, and reasonable satisfaction of physical powers. The elements of damages which the jury are entitled to take into account consist of all effects of the injury complained of, consisting of personal inconvenience, the sickness which the plaintiff endured, the loss of time, all bodily and mental suffering, impairment of capacity to earn money, the pecuniary expenses, the disfigurement or permanent annoyance which is liable to be caused by the deformity resulting from the injury; and, in considering what would be a just sum in compensation for the sufferings or injury, the jury are not only at liberty to consider the bodily pain, but the mental suffering, anxiety, suspense, and fright may be treated as elements of the injury for 50 MCL 691.1407(1); Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 378, 384-385. 51 Sherwood v Chicago & WM R Co, 82 Mich 374, 383; 46 NW 773 (1890). 17 which damages, by way of compensation, should be allowed. [Emphasis added.] Thus, damages for both a loss of the ability to work and earn money as well as pain, suffering, and emotional distress have long been understood as consequences of an injury for which damages are compensable.52 Additionally, in Beath v Rapid R Co, this Court concluded that “[t]he plaintiff was not confined in her recovery to damages sustained by reason of physical pain and anguish suffered, but had the right to recover for the mental pain and anxiety she was compelled to undergo by reason of the injuries sustained,” because “the shame and mortification which the plaintiff had suffered by being obliged to use crutches” “was one of the elements of damages which might naturally flow from the injury.”53 Moreover, recent caselaw of this Court reiterates this longstanding principle. For example, in Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc,54 we noted the general rule regarding recovery of damages in a tort action recognized in Sutter v Biggs55 that “the tort-feasor is liable for all injuries resulting directly from his wrongful act, whether foreseeable or not, provided the damages are the legal and natural consequences of the wrongful act, and 52 See also Power v Harlow, 57 Mich 107, 119; 23 NW 606 (1885) (involving an action for damages for injury caused by negligence and approving of jury instructions on damages, stating, “It was proper for the jury to take into account how the plaintiff might be restricted in his choice of occupation by the injury, and limited in his ability to work; and though the word ‘humiliation’ was not a fortunate one to make use of, there can be no supposition that its use was misleading”). 53 Beath v Rapid R Co, 119 Mich 512, 517-518; 78 NW 37 (1899) (emphasis added). 54 Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 493 Mich 238; 828 NW2d 660 (2013). 55 Sutter v Biggs, 377 Mich 80; 139 NW2d 684 (1966). 18 are such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated.”56 This body of caselaw collectively demonstrates the longstanding principle that tort damages generally include the damages that naturally flow from the injury, which may include both economic damages, such as damages incurred due to the loss of the ability to work and earn money, as well as noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering and mental and emotional distress damages.57 As indicated by the Hannay Court of Appeals panel, concluding that “bodily injury” does not include damages naturally flowing from that injury would conflate the requirement of a bodily injury (i.e., the injury requirement recognized in Henry) with the 56 Price, 493 Mich at 255, quoting Sutter, 377 Mich at 86. We held in Price, however, that because no case in this state had permitted a plaintiff to recover for noneconomic damages resulting only from the destruction of property, the narrower common-law rule applicable to negligent destruction of property controlled. Id. at 254-256. See also Grenawalt v Nyhuis, 335 Mich 76, 87; 55 NW2d 736 (1952) (holding that the trial court properly refused to charge the jury with an instruction that the plaintiff, who was injured at a beauty salon, “was not entitled to recover damages for annoyance, discomfiture[,] and humiliation suffered by her as the result of her inability to have her hair dyed or tinted”). 57 We note that, under the common law, a plaintiff might be able to recover damages for emotional distress even if that distress is not alleged to flow from an injury for which the plaintiff seeks compensation. We have limited recovery on that basis, however, to circumstances in which the alleged emotional distress is accompanied by physical symptoms. See Henry, 473 Mich at 79 (explaining that “our common law recognizes emotional distress as the basis for a negligence action only when a plaintiff can also establish physical manifestations of that distress”); Daley v LaCroix, 384 Mich 4, 12-13; 179 NW2d 390 (1970) (overruling caselaw imposing the “impact requirement” and holding “that where a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant’s negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock”). 19 items of damages that are recoverable as a result of that injury (i.e., the damages that naturally flow from the bodily injury). Thus, the statutory language of MCL 691.1405 does not support a conclusion that the Legislature intended to restrict liability to certain items of damages resulting from a bodily injury. Instead, the language only indicates that the Legislature intended to restrict the categories of injury for which the tort damages that naturally flow are compensable. We therefore hold that the phrase “liable for bodily injury” within the motor vehicle exception means that a plaintiff who suffers a bodily injury may recover for items of tort damages that naturally flow from that physical or corporeal injury to the body, which may include both economic and noneconomic damages. As discussed later in this opinion, however, the scope of these damages is limited by the no-fault act.58 4. “BODILY INJURY” IS A TERM OF ART IN MICHIGAN JURISPRUDENCE Our analysis interpreting the phrase “liable for bodily injury” gains further support from our state’s history of governmental-immunity legislation, which indicates that “bodily injury” is a term of art used by the Legislature in the context of governmental immunity to refer to a category of injury for which damages that naturally flow are compensable, as long as those damages are properly pleaded. As a legal term of art, “bodily injury” is a technical phrase that has “acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law” and, therefore, “shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.”59 58 See Part III.B.6 of this opinion. 59 MCL 8.3a. See also Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 377. 20 This phrase appeared in the context of governmental immunity in 1861 in the first version of the highway exception. Public Act 197 of 1861 provided [t]hat any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways in this State, by reason of neglect to keep in repair any bridge or culvert, by any township or corporation whose duty it is to keep such bridge or culvert in repair, such township or corporation shall be liable to, and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled, just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case, before any court of competent jurisdiction.[60] The 188561 and 1887 versions of the highway exception added sidewalks to the list of structures for which there was a duty to keep in repair.62 Therefore, as far back as 1861, the phrase “bodily injury” was used by the Legislature to connote a category of injury for which damages—specifically, “just damages”—were compensable. Our decisions implicating these early versions of the highway exception urge a consistent interpretation in this case. For example, regarding damages because of an inability to work, this Court’s decision in Moore v Kalamazoo is instructive.63 In that 60 1861 PA 197 (emphasis added). See also several versions that followed that were materially the same with regard to imposing liability for “just damages” for “bodily injury”: 1879 PA 244, 1885 PA 214, and 1887 PA 264. 1887 PA 264 ultimately became 1897 CL 3441. 61 Public Act 214 of 1885 was ruled unconstitutional by this Court because the statute contained a provision abrogating common-law liability with regard to injuries covered by the statute and a provision setting dollar limitations on sidewalk claims that were not expressed in the title of the act. Church v Detroit, 64 Mich 571, 573-574; 31 NW 447 (1887). However, the sidewalk provision was included in the version that followed, 1887 PA 264. 62 1887 PA 264. 63 Moore v Kalamazoo, 109 Mich 176; 66 NW 1089 (1896). The statute in effect at the time was 1887 PA 264, which became 1897 CL 3441, and provided 21 case, the plaintiff was injured due to a defective sidewalk, and the trial court instructed that the jury “should take into account her past earnings . . . during the time that she has already been injured, and the time that you find, from the evidence, that she will remain incapable of earning anything in the future . . . .”64 This Court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to warrant admission of the proofs of damages and the instruction given.65 This case made clear that the damages that were recoverable as a result of a bodily injury included damages resulting from an inability to work that flow from the injury, if properly alleged.66 [t]hat any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges, sidewalks, cross-walks and culverts on the same in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel by the township, village, city or corporation whose corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge, sidewalk, crosswalk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in reasonable repair, such township, village, city or corporation shall be liable to and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case before any court of competent jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.] 64 Moore, 109 Mich at 178. 65 Id. at 179. 66 See also Abbott v Detroit, 150 Mich 245, 251-252; 113 NW 1121 (1907), a defective crosswalk case in which this Court approved of jury instructions regarding loss of earnings, stating: The charge is not subject to the criticism that it allowed the jury to speculate. It was confined to such damages arising from this injury as the jury from the evidence might find by reason of the impairment of her earning capacity. There was evidence as to the wages she earned upon which the jury could base their judgment as to the amount of these damages. The small verdict returned is an indication that no speculation was indulged in by the jury. 22 In another example, this Court’s 1894 decision in Roberts v Detroit demonstrated that pain and suffering damages, like damages resulting from an inability to work, were recoverable for a bodily injury in the context of the highway exception.67 The plaintiff sought loss-of-consortium damages from the city of Detroit that resulted from injuries his wife incurred due to falling on a defective sidewalk. The issue was whether the highway exception applied to provide the plaintiff a cause of action in light of the fact that it was the plaintiff’s wife who was physically injured, rather than the plaintiff himself.68 This Court stated, “[s]o far as [the highway exception] is concerned, it limits the liability to cases of bodily injury,” and concluded that: The plaintiff’s case does not fall within [the highway exception] (1) because he has no right to recover for the bodily injury—i.e., pain and suffering, etc—of another; (2) because the statute in terms limits the recovery to the person so injured or disabled.[69] It is clear from Roberts that had the plaintiff, rather than his wife, suffered a bodily injury, damages naturally flowing from that injury would have been recoverable under the highway exception, including damages for “pain and suffering.” Further, this case demonstrates that while damages that naturally flowed from the injury were compensable, the person seeking such damages must have had a bodily injury. The statute in effect at the time was 1887 PA 264, which became 1897 CL 3441. 67 Roberts v Detroit, 102 Mich 64; 60 NW 450 (1894). 68 Id. at 65-66. 69 Id. at 67 (emphasis added). 23 More generally, this Court’s decision in Hall v City of Cadillac demonstrated that damages that were the natural consequence of a bodily injury were recoverable.70 Hall involved a city’s failure to keep a sidewalk in reasonable repair, which resulted in bodily injury to the plaintiff, and this Court reviewed the instructions to the jury.71 This Court concluded in relevant part that the trial court properly instructed the jury that “damages for the injury suffered and its natural consequences were recoverable, up to the time of trial, together with such prospective damages of like character as were reasonably probable . . . .”72 Thus, damages that were a natural consequence of the bodily injury were recoverable. In light of the foregoing, by the time the phrase “bodily injury” appeared in the 1964 version of the motor vehicle exception,73 that phrase long had a settled meaning in Michigan law. “Bodily injury” was understood to be a category of injury for which damages that were the natural consequence flowed, including both damages resulting from an inability to work, as well as pain and suffering, so long as those damages were properly pleaded. 70 Hall v City of Cadillac, 114 Mich 99, 100; 72 NW 33 (1897). The statute in effect at the time was 1887 PA 264, which became 1897 CL 3441. 71 Id. 72 Id. at 103. 73 1964 PA 170. 24 5. THE HUNTER COURT’S RELIANCE ON WESCHE IS MISPLACED The Court of Appeals in Hunter relied in part on Wesche’s definition of “bodily injury” in concluding that because noneconomic damages do not constitute a physical injury, such damages are not compensable under the motor vehicle exception.74 The panel first looked to Wesche and agreed with this Court’s conclusion that the term “liable for bodily injury” does not create a threshold requirement, explaining, “[h]ad the Legislature intended to simply create a threshold that, once established, would permit noneconomic or emotional damages, it would have done so explicitly . . . .”75 The panel determined that the Wesche definition of “bodily injury” was correct, and based on that definition, concluded that damages for pain and suffering as well as shock and emotionaldistress damages do not constitute a “bodily injury” that is compensable under the motor vehicle exception.76 We agree with the Hunter panel only to the extent that it concluded that Wesche correctly defined “bodily injury.” We concluded in Wesche that the motor vehicle exception does not waive governmental immunity for loss-of-consortium claims, reasoning that “a loss of consortium is not a physical injury to a body,” and while “a lossof-consortium claim is derivative of the underlying bodily injury, it is nonetheless regarded as a separate cause of action and not merely an item of damages.”77 We 74 Hunter, 300 Mich App at 240-241. 75 Id. at 236. 76 Id. at 240-241. 77 Wesche, 480 Mich at 85 (emphasis added). 25 concluded that the motor vehicle exception “does not state or suggest that governmental agencies are liable for any damages once a plaintiff makes a threshold showing of bodily injury or property damage.”78 Unlike provisions of the no-fault act that create a statutory threshold, such as MCL 500.3135(1), MCL 691.1405 “contains no such language.”79 Instead, “[i]t merely provides that governmental agencies ‘shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage’ and says nothing to suggest that a separate cause of action, such as one for loss of consortium, may be asserted once a threshold of ‘bodily injury’ has been met.”80 For these reasons, this Court held “that a loss of consortium is not a ‘bodily injury,’ ” and therefore, governmental entities are entitled to governmental immunity for loss-of-consortium claims.81 We disagree with the Hunter panel’s construction of Wesche because it conflates injury with damages. We stated in Wesche that “[t]he waiver of immunity is limited to two categories of damage: bodily injury and property damage.”82 Notably, the word “damage” in the singular has a very different meaning than the plural word “damages.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “damage” as “[l]oss or injury to person or property ,” and “damages” as “[m]oney claimed by, or ordered to be paid to, a person as compensation for loss or injury Id. at 85-86. 79 Id. at 86. 80 Id. 81 Id. at 87. 82 Id. at 84 (emphasis added). 26 seeks $8,000 in damages from the defendant>.”83 The Court of Appeals in Hunter ostensibly read the word “damage” in our opinion in Wesche to mean “damages,” which was an error.84 Moreover, our decision in Wesche focused on the fact that a loss of consortium does not constitute an “item of damages” because it is not a claim for bodily injury.85 Thus, it can be inferred from our decision that items of damages naturally flowing from a bodily injury are compensable. Our conclusion in Wesche that a bodily injury is not a threshold requirement that, once met, permits recovery of all potential damages and that, instead, a plaintiff seeking damages for a bodily injury must have actually suffered a bodily injury, is consistent with this Court’s decision in Roberts.86 The Roberts decision made clear that a plaintiff cannot seek damages for a bodily injury when the requested damages resulted from the bodily injury of another.87 We therefore reaffirm that “bodily injury” in the motor vehicle exception is not a threshold requirement that opens all doors of potential liability for tort damages; rather, it is a category of injury for which items of tort damages that naturally flow are available, as confined by the limitations of the no-fault act.88 83 Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed). 84 Hunter, 300 Mich App at 241 (“Such damages simply do not constitute physical injury to the body and do not fall within the motor vehicle exception.”) (emphasis added). 85 Wesche, 480 Mich at 85 (“It is beyond dispute that a loss of consortium is not a physical injury to a body.”). This Court went on to expressly state that “loss of consortium is not merely an item of damages.” Id. 86 Roberts, 102 Mich 64. 87 Id. at 67. 88 See Part III.B.6 of this opinion. 27 6. DAMAGES COMPENSABLE UNDER THE MOTOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION Our analysis, however, does not end with our interpretation of the phrase “liable for bodily injury” within the motor vehicle exception. While governmental entities are legally responsible for damages naturally flowing from a physical or corporeal injury to the body under the language of the motor vehicle exception, this liability is limited by the no-fault act, which generally abrogates “tort liability arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use within this state of a motor vehicle,” unless the damages come within an enumerated exception.89 As we explained in Hardy v Oakland Co, “the restrictions set forth in the no-fault act control the broad statement of liability found in the immunity statute.”90 Thus, to the extent that the no-fault act narrows the damages available in a third-party tort action through its general abolition of tort liability and provision of certain enumerated exceptions, those restrictions likewise apply when the tortfeasor is a governmental entity. Relevant to the present cases, MCL 500.3135(1), (2), and (3)(b) allow third-party tort actions for noneconomic damages if the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold is met, while MCL 500.3135(3)(c) allows for third-party tort actions for certain kinds of economic damages, specifically “[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor’s loss . . . in excess of the daily, monthly, and 3-year limitations contained in” the sections applicable to those three 89 MCL 500.3135(3). 90 Hardy v Oakland Co, 461 Mich 561, 565; 607 NW2d 718 (2000). 28 types of no-fault benefits.91 Therefore, we hold that a plaintiff may bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements under MCL 500.3135 have been met.92 In this respect, we affirm the Hannay panel’s conclusion that work-loss benefits that exceed the statutory maximum are available against a governmental entity,93 and we reverse the Hunter panel’s conclusion that noneconomic damages “do not fall within the motor vehicle exception.”94 91 MCL 500.3135(3)(c); Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 197; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). 92 We note, however, that our holding in this regard is not intended to suggest that the nofault act supersedes the GTLA. Rather, MCL 691.1405 and MCL 500.3135 may be read harmoniously to provide that a plaintiff may avoid governmental immunity if he suffers “bodily injury” under the motor vehicle exception, but he must also meet the requirements contained within the enumerated exceptions to the no-fault act’s abolition of tort liability, such as the “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” threshold pertaining to recovery of noneconomic damages. 93 Hannay, 299 Mich App at 270. 94 Hunter, 300 Mich App at 241. The Hunter panel further erred in its analysis of plaintiff Hunter’s claimed damages by conflating certain questions of liability under the no-fault act with questions of immunity under the GTLA. As previously noted, after the Hunter panel erroneously concluded that noneconomic damages were beyond the scope of the motor vehicle exception’s waiver of immunity, it remanded for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve outstanding factual issues bearing on whether the City was immune from plaintiff Hunter’s claimed excess economic damages and, thus, entitled to summary disposition as to those damages under MCR 2.116(C)(7) as well. The Hunter panel included among these factual issues whether plaintiff Hunter suffered a “serious impairment of body function” as contemplated under MCL 500.3135, reasoning that “[a] plaintiff making a tort claim for excess damages under the motor vehicle exception must, as a threshold, show a serious impairment of body function.” Id. at 241. This reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, while we agree a showing of “death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement” is necessary under the no-fault act in order for a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages 29