Opinion ID: 3011156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Potential Conflict of Interest

Text: Roizman also claims that his conviction should be reversed under a potential conflict theory. We reject this claim as well. When a district court is aware, or should be aware, of a potential conflict of interest on the part of the defendant's attorney, the court must inquire as to whether the defendant is aware of and waives this conflict. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 (1981); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1143 (3d Cir. 1990). Roizman argues that reversal is required not only when the trial court is aware of such a conflict and fails to act but also when the prosecutor and defense attorney are aware of one. Although Roizman cites several cases from courts within the Second Circuit in support of this claim, see, e.g., United States v. Rahman, 861 F. Supp. 266, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), the court of appeals in that circuit has at most only exhorted prosecutors to advise the trial courts when they are aware of conflicts, see United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Cerro v. United States 872 F.2d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 1989) (We do not disagree with the propriety of such a recommendation under like circumstances, but we conclude that it is not a constitutional requirement. In the present case, the prosecutor was under no constitutional duty to advise the trial court of a potential conflict based on the information available to him.). They have not held, and we do not hold, that a prosecutor's -- or a defense attorney's -- failure in this respect is grounds for reversal. Since Roizman makes no claim that the District Court was or should have been aware of Silverman's potential conflict, he is not entitled to a reversal on these grounds. 17 _________________________________________________________________ Porotsky. We reject this contention. If Silverman had not represented Porotsky and thus created the alleged conflict of interest in this case, he would not have had access to this information. Roizman cannot prevail on the argument that his interests were harmed by Silverman's failure to use information he acquired in confidence from Porotsky to impeach Porotsky. Accordingly, we conclude that no actual conflict with Silverman's duties to Porotsky affected his representation of Roizman. 17. Finally, Roizman argues that we should reverse the District Court's decision because it failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his 26 For all these reasons, the judgments of the District Court with respect to both Morelli and Roizman will be affirmed. A True Copy: Teste: Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit _________________________________________________________________ claims. Because we conclude that the District Court did not err in rejecting Roizman's claims based on the documentary evidence before it, we see no need for the court to have conducted further evidentiary proceedings. 27