Opinion ID: 747742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Peer Review and Publication

Text: 28 Two other factors that a district court can take into account in assessing reliability are peer-review and publication. They may not, however, in every case be necessary conditions of reliability. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97; Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742. In the instant case, Dr. Gerson admitted that he has not produced any publication on organophosphates. Because the toxic effects of organophosphates on humans are well recognized by the scientific community, however, Dr. Gerson's opinion is not a novel scientific theory regarding organophosphates. 8 Instead, Dr. Gerson merely reported that Dr. Kannankeril exhibited the signs and symptoms of chronic toxicity related to exposure to chlorpyrifos (Dursban). Thus, although Dr. Gerson did not write on the topic, his opinion is supported by widely accepted scientific knowledge of the harmful nature of organophosphates. See also McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1042 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that peer review and publication or general acceptance of an expert's theory goes to the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility). 29 Based on the record before us, we conclude that Dr. Gerson's opinion on causation has a factual basis and supporting scientific theory. Dr. Gerson based his opinion on Dr. Kannankeril's medical records, Dr. Grober's reports confirming her medical condition, and Terminix's application receipts. He also relied on general experience and readings, general medical knowledge, standard textbooks, and standard references. After considering all the relevant facts, Dr. Gerson reported that [t]he temporal relationship and the nature of her complaints lead me to conclude that with reasonable medical certainty, the cause of Dr. Kannankeril's Central Nervous System manifestations of toxicity is exposure to Dursban in 1989 to 1990. App. at 51. Dr. Gerson's testimony is neither conjecture nor speculation. His opinion was clearly stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 30 Whether the appellants' expert might have done a better job is not the test. We have stated that it is an abuse of discretion to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not deem the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court considers most appropriate. Holbrook, 80 F.3d at 782. If the expert meets liberal minimum qualifications, then the level of the expert's expertise goes to credibility and weight, not admissibility. See Paoli, 35 F.3d at 741. The Second Circuit addressed a similar issue and commented that the expert's alleged shortcomings were raised properly on cross-examination and went to the credibility, not the admissibility, of his testimony. McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir.1995). Consequently, we reject Terminix's suggestion that Dr. Gerson must be a specialist in Dursban to provide expert testimony on the causation of Dr. Kannankeril's injury. 31 The Kannankerils' burden is only to provide an expert opinion that is relevant and reliable and that will assist the trier of fact. As we have repeated above, issues of credibility arise after the determination of admissibility. Credibility is for the jury. We conclude that, under the facts presented here, the district court erred in ruling that Dr. Gerson's expert testimony on causation was inadmissible.