Opinion ID: 1196421
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Redirect Examination of Detective Cook

Text: Prior to the penalty phase, the parties discussed the admissibility of defendant's confession in the 1975 Pierce killing. In that confession, defendant apparently claimed that he killed Pierce as a result of a homosexual advance the victim had made. Because the confession had been ruled inadmissible on Miranda grounds ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436) in the 1975 case, the prosecutor agreed he would not attempt to introduce that evidence on direct examination. He gave this caveat, however: if there would be an attempt by the defense to mitigate the murder by showing that [Pierce's killing] ... was in response to a homosexual lewd-type advance by the victim, then I would be desirous of presenting evidence to negate that. In addition, the prosecutor said he would not ask the detective anything about defendant's confession but if that comes up through cross-examination, ... then looking forward to that I want [the court] ... to be aware of what I would be trying to introduce to rebut the thought that this really wasn't that bad of a murder because the victim had it coming type argument, or he provoked it or started it, or something like that. In cross-examining Detective Cook, the officer to whom defendant confessed his guilt in the Pierce slaying, defense counsel asked, During your discussion with Mr. Wharton regarding the rape [of Jane B.], did he at some time tell you he was responsible for the murder of Mr. Pierce? Cook replied, Yes, he did. On redirect, the prosecutor then elicited, over objection, the balance of defendant's admission of guilt. [19] Defendant claims this was misconduct. (42) To the extent defendant is now claiming the prosecutor's line of questioning was improper because of the earlier Miranda violation, his claim fails because he did not object on that ground. ( Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 282.) Defendant argues it is sheer sophistry to require an objection when the prosecutor had just informed counsel (outside the presence of the jury) that Cook had been instructed not to mention the previously suppressed evidence. The record, however, shows that although the prosecutor agreed he would not elicit the information, he reminded the court that should defendant bring out such information, he would as well in order to rebut any adverse inferences generated by the officer's testimony. Under these circumstances, we cannot excuse defendant's failure to make a timely Miranda objection. Defendant also argues that he was improperly lured into asking Detective Cook whether defendant had accepted responsibility for the Pierce killing because defense counsel had asked the same question of another witness and failed to provoke the same response from the prosecutor. He claims this tactic violated his right to due process. We perceive no error. By eliciting evidence that defendant had accepted responsibility for the Pierce killing, defendant presented evidence from which the jury could infer that his moral culpability for that crime was somewhat reduced. On redirect, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut that inference with evidence of the entire conversation, revealing that defendant's admission of guilt was not an admirable expression of remorse but was instead made under circumstances showing a false and morally objectionable sense of personal justification. Where part of ... [a] conversation ... is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party. (Evid. Code, § 356.)