Opinion ID: 510217
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The District Court's Publicly Reported Assessment of Friedman's Credibility

Text: 250 Friedman's next claim concerns another unusual incident, one that occurred in Judge Knapp's robing room during the seventh week of trial. This incident involves a publicly reported comment made by the district judge about Friedman's testimony. Friedman claims that the judge's comment requires either dismissal of the indictment or a new trial. This claim is both waived and meritless. 251 On the morning of November 11, 1986, Friedman took the witness stand in his own defense. After denying all of the government's charges against him, he testified at length about his career as a lawyer and a politician, emphasizing, for example, his continuing membership in the Democratic National Committee and his reelection during the week before trial as Chairman of the Bronx County Democratic Committee. In addition, Friedman testified that, among other things, he had represented the Kaplan Group in connection with its attempt to obtain and fulfill a PVB contract to develop a hand-held computerized device that would issue parking tickets. While admitting that Kaplan had given him three 50,000-share blocks of stock in Citisource, Friedman claimed that he had intended to give two of the blocks to his children, but had decided not to put the stock in his children's names because he believed that others might conclude he was attempting to conceal his own ownership. 252 The government's cross-examination of Friedman began late in the afternoon but was interrupted when defense counsel objected to the government's attempt to cross-examine Friedman about his representation of clients before City agencies (other than the PVB) in which he held patronage power. The haggling over the scope of cross-examination continued the next morning in Judge Knapp's chambers. The government argued that Friedman's lobbying efforts constituted extortion and were relevant to impeaching Friedman's claim that he was an honest politician. See Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). Defense counsel argued that evidence of Friedman's lobbying efforts was irrelevant and prejudicial. After extensive discussion, Puccio asked the district court to defer its decision on the scope of cross-examination. The following colloquy took place: 253 [MR. PUCCIO]: Judge, can I make a suggestion? Why--could you ask the United States Attorney to question him about the case here first, and then after that, make this decision? I think that's a fairer way. 254 THE COURT: What's this? 255 MR. PUCCIO: Could you request that the United States Attorney defer this and question him about what's involved here? Maybe you'll decide after that he doesn't need all this. 256 THE COURT: I can't tell the United States Attorney how to try the case. I know how I would if I were doing this. I wouldn't do all this bullshit. 257 MR. PUCCIO: If you wouldn't do all this bullshit, I don't think you should permit him to do it. 258 THE COURT: I'm not trying the case. I wouldn't do it because I think it's illegal. I think it's a waste of God damn time. 259 MR. PUCCIO: I think's its highly prejudicial to my client. 260 THE COURT: With the highly improbable story that your client told, I think that should be what we're talking about, not this bullshit. But that's neither here nor there. 261 (emphasis added). 262 Representatives of the press attending the session in the robing room heard this remark as it was made. After Puccio expressed concern about the comment, Judge Knapp asked the media representatives who were present to refrain from reporting it, stating: 263 I can't ask you to make any commitment to me. That's way beyond my province. I point out I think it would be very unfortunate and very unfair to Mr. Friedman if that should bet [sic]--just as it was unfair to the Government--to have that newspaper account that said I said that Lindenauer is a liar, which I didn't say. But I'm not so concerned about fairness in Government as I am about fairness to the defendant. I made a mistake, and if you exploit it, it's just unfair to the defendant, and I think maybe you wouldn't want to do that. 264 The judge's comment about Friedman's highly improbable story was nevertheless widely reported in New York City. 265 Following the robing room session, Judge Knapp agreed in open court to give the jury a cautionary instruction based upon a proposal Puccio had submitted. The jury was then brought in, and the United States Attorney resumed his cross-examination of Friedman. At the end of the morning session, Judge Knapp instructed the jury as follows: 266 Ladies and gentlemen, this is the time for my usual homily about newspapers and radios. It becomes pertinent now because I understand now ... the local radio may have started picking up bulletins from this trial. 267 ... A discussion may be going on [among] three or four people for a half hour or so, and in the course of it, somebody may say something which is quoted. [A]nd anybody who had been at the conference may not even--not remember it was said, because it obviously had no meaning. But all by itself, it could sound as though it had meaning. 268 And this is particularly pertinent [to] any conversation that Mr. Puccio and I may have engaged in, because we get under each other's skin. 269    270    271 I might have well said Point A, and then half a dozen times after said B, and whoever was listening thought A was more noteworthy, newsworthy, and so A goes out on the television or these bulletins. You can see the newspaper usually puts in qualifications, but bulletins just put in what you get. 272 So if you ever hear any bulletin that anybody here, myself or anybody else, made some statement about the case, just assume that the statement was wrong. I'm not saying that you can assume that the statement wasn't made, but the statement may or may not have been. But assume that the statement didn't mean what it appears to mean in that three seconds it's allowed on a bulletin--in a three second quote. 273 So I'll see you at quarter past 2:00. 274 (emphasis added). 275 After the jury had left the courtroom, the following exchange took place: 276 MR. PUCCIO: Judge, if I may, with respect to Your Honor's instruction, and purely for the record, and the last thing that Mr. Friedman desires here is a mistrial, but for the record, I think in light of the in-chambers conference, that we have to make that application. It may be premature, but I want to protect the record. 277 THE COURT: What application do you want? 278 MR. PUCCIO: I said for the record, I would make an application for a mistrial. 279 THE COURT: If you want a mistrial, make a mistrial. If you don't want a mistrial, don't make an application. If the application is made, I've got to rule on it. I don't rule on things that are made for the record. 280 MR. PUCCIO: Let me think about it, Judge, and see what-- 281 THE COURT: All right. 282 (emphasis added). The court then recessed for lunch, after which the United States Attorney continued his examination of Friedman. 283 On the next morning, before the jury was brought in, Puccio told the district court that my comments before lunch period yesterday were somewhat premature. I still think any kind of motion is premature. Puccio nevertheless stated that in light of the tremendous publicity that remark got, ... I think it's incumbent upon the Court [to] spend[ ] a half hour to individually talk to each juror and see if anybody heard anything about this. After some discussion, Judge Knapp, the lawyers and the defendants agreed that Judge Knapp would conduct a voir dire of each juror in his robing room. 284 In the robing room, in the presence of only his two law clerks, a court reporter, Puccio and the United States Attorney, Judge Knapp asked each juror individually if he or she had read or heard anything about the case in the previous twenty-four hours. None of the seventeen Hartford-area jurors had read or heard of the district court's comment, and when proceedings resumed in open court, Puccio made no mention of any motion for a mistrial or other relief. No mistrial motion was ever made. 9 285 There can be little question that Friedman's considered decision not to seek a mistrial constitutes a waiver of any claim that he was prejudiced by Judge Knapp's comment. 10 In United States v. Dukes, 727 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir.1984), for example, we confronted an analogous situation involving an allegedly prejudicial line of questioning undertaken by a prosecutor. Although the defendant in Dukes did object to one of the prosecutor's questions, he neither moved for a mistrial nor sought to have the entire colloquy stricken. We held that absent ... a motion [for mistrial], the allegedly prejudicial conduct may be reviewed only for plain error. Id.; see also United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 734 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978). The fact that the conduct challenged here was that of the trial judge rather than of the prosecution does not diminish the force of this rule. Cf., e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 776 F.2d 1291, 1294-95 (5th Cir.1985) (trial judge's comment that I still haven't heard [a defense] reviewed for plain error in absence of objection); United States v. Salazar, 293 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir.1961) (trial judge's hostile questioning of defendant reviewed for plain error in absence of objection). 286 Relying on United States v. Hammond, 605 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.1979), Friedman nevertheless asserts that his claim should not be deemed waived, because Judge Knapp's comment presented him with a Hobson's choice between the equally unattractive options of continuing a trial with an arguably tainted jury and of facing the expense and delay of a new trial. Acceptance of this argument, however, would for the most part relieve defendants of the obligation to make mistrial motions, for a motion by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by a prosecutorial or judicial error. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 485, 91 S.Ct. 547, 557, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion)). Friedman thus asks for a rule under which a wise defendant would almost always (except in those few cases where reprosecution after a mistrial would be barred) forego a mistrial motion, safe in the knowledge that, after a verdict of guilty, he or she could safely point to the potential expense and delay of a new trial and argue that he or she was now entitled to suffer that expense and delay. We decline to adopt such a rule. 287 Friedman's reliance on Hammond, moreover, is misplaced. In Hammond, the government had intimidated the defendant's witnesses. Instead of moving for a mistrial, however, defense counsel agreed to stipulate to the testimony of the intimidated witnesses. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's due process claim was not waived under the extraordinary circumstances presented because the alternatives posed ... amounted to a Hobson's choice: either there would be a mistrial, after which a new trial would present the same problems as the present trial, or the trial would proceed on the basis of the stipulation. 605 F.2d at 863. In contrast, the instant case involves no such Hobson's choice, for any prejudice that might have resulted from the district court's comment could have been completely cured by a new trial. Accordingly, we review Friedman's claim only for plain error. 288 There was no reversible error, much less plain error. Judge Knapp's comment was made outside the presence of the jury, and the jury never learned of it. Cf., e.g., United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 209 (2d Cir.) (no impact on jury where allegedly biased behavior of court took place outside presence of jury), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 466, 98 L.Ed.2d 405 (1987); United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 403-04 (2d Cir.1985) (same). Moreover, Friedman's claim that there is no adequate assurance that the jury was not exposed to the court's remark is directly contradicted by the very record that he urged the district court to make and that led him to drop any request for a mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir.1975) (failure to object to prosecutor's remark not only constitutes waiver but indicates counsel's own difficulty in finding any prejudice), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059, 96 S.Ct. 796, 46 L.Ed.2d 650 (1976). 289 G. The Effect of the Dismissal of the Mail Fraud Counts 290 The government concedes that the mail fraud charges in the instant case must be dismissed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987). We therefore vacate appellants' mail fraud convictions. 291 In addition, Shafran contends that his RICO conviction must be reversed because of the supposedly inflammatory nature of the now-dismissed mail fraud charges. The indictment charged that the defendants 292 unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud the City, the DOT, the PVB[,] [the City Taxi and Limousine Commmission, the City Department of General Services] and the citizens of the City of their right to the honest and loyal services of [Donald Manes and Geoffrey Lindenauer, and/or Lester Shafran] and of the right to have the business and affairs of the City, the DOT[,] [and] the PVB[,] [the City Taxi and Limousine Commission and the City Department of General Services] conducted honestly and free from fraud, corruption, and the illegal receipt of bribes. 293 Indictment paragraphs 49, 53, 57, 62, 72; see also id. p 40. In turn, the jury was asked 294 as to each of the mail fraud counts ... to ascertain whether or not the Government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular defendant whose case you are considering knowingly and willfully participated in a fraudulent scheme to deprive the City of New York of the honest services of one of its employees through bribery. 295 Under McNally, of course, the intangible rights theory does not allege a violation of the mail fraud statute. 296 We cannot agree that Shafran's RICO convictions must be reversed because of the inflammatory impact of the government's mail fraud theory. As we stated in United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 65 (2d Cir.1983), [i]nvalidation of the convictions under [one] [c]ount ... does not, of course, lead automatically to reversal of the convictions on the other counts. Rather, we must consider whether the presence of the [invalidated] count had any spillover effect sufficiently prejudicial to call for reversal. Id. We see no prejudice here. 297 The RICO charges in this case were the core of the indictment, and the core of the RICO charges were state-law bribery allegations. Specifically, the first twenty-nine pages of the forty-one-page indictment were devoted to the two racketeering counts. Of the twenty-five racketeering acts alleged, and the twenty-two that went to the jury, only one, a mail fraud allegation against Friedman involving bribery, did not charge an act of bribery as defined under New York law. The seven mail fraud counts, moreover, paralleled the RICO predicate acts both factually, see supra Background Part A, and legally, see, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983). Accordingly, [t]he elimination of the [mail fraud] count[s] would not have significantly altered the trial strategy of the defense, Ivic, 700 F.2d at 65, if at all. 298 Indeed, the likelihood of prejudice in the instant case is even less than that found to be insufficient in Ivic, a case in which we reversed the appellants' RICO conspiracy convictions but affirmed as to the remaining counts. In Ivic, the predicate acts charged in the RICO conspiracy count, murder and arson, were factually and legally distinct from much of the rest of the indictment. Moreover, we expressed our concern about the decidedly perjorative connotation, id., that may occur when the Government ... tar[s] a defendant with the label of 'racketeer.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Guiliano, 644 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.1981)). In contrast, the intangible rights theory is hardly inflammatory. It is fanciful to think that the indictment's boilerplate accusation that Shafran had deprived the City of New York of the honest and loyal services of persons such as Lindenauer, Manes and himself could have caused the jury to take leave of reason, particularly in the presence of the numerous valid bribery and racketeering charges. We note in this regard Shafran's acquittal on the mail fraud count concerning the alleged Candler Building bribe. Cf. id. (noting jury's discriminating acquittal on Count 4). In sum, Shafran suffered no prejudice as a result of the invalid mail fraud counts. 11 H. Preindictment Publicity 299 Finally, we address contentions concerning the extensive publicity that surrounded this case during the grand jury investigation. Appellants and amicus contend that much of this publicity, which Judge Knapp described as outrageous, was instigated by the government. In addressing this issue, we will assume arguendo that the government persistently leaked information about grand jury proceedings to the press in an unethical and unlawful campaign both to induce the cooperation of potential witnesses and to supplant state prosecutorial efforts in a bureaucratic turf fight. For reasons stated immediately infra, we believe that this claim is precluded by pertinent Supreme Court precedent, no matter how pervasively the rules concerning grand jury secrecy were violated. 300 Appellants rely in particular upon Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(2), which provides that an attorney for the government ... shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules, and upon Rule 7 of the Criminal Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, which provides that 301 [w]ith respect to a grand jury or other pending investigation of any criminal matter, a lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation shall refrain from making any extrajudicial statement which a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication that goes beyond the public record or that is not necessary to inform the public that the investigation is underway, to describe the general scope of the investigation, to obtain assistance in the apprehension of a suspect, to warn the public of any dangers or otherwise to aid in the investigation. 302 Assuming that the government willfully and repeatedly violated these rules, we must nevertheless affirm in light of United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986). In that case, the Supreme Court rejected a contention that government misconduct during grand jury proceedings required reversal of a defendant's conviction in the absence of any effect on the outcome of his trial. Mechanik involved alleged violations of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(d), and the Court 303 assume[d] for the sake of argument that the simultaneous presence and testimony of ... two Government witnesses before the grand jury violated Rule 6(d), and that the District Court would have been justified in dismissing portions of the indictment on that basis had there been actual prejudice and the matter been called to its attention before the commencement of the trial. 304 Id. at 69-70, 106 S.Ct. at 941. Nevertheless, the Court held that the supervening jury verdict made reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the indictment inappropriate. Id. at 70, 106 S.Ct. at 941. The Court reasoned that the petit jury's subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Court concluded that [m]easured by the petit jury's verdict ... any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 305 Amicus curiae seeks to distinguish Mechanik because of the Court's statement that it express[ed] no opinion as to what remedy may be appropriate for a violation of Rule 6(d) that has affected the grand jury's charging decision and is brought to the attention of the trial court before the commencement of trial. Id. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 943. According to amicus, Mechanik does not govern here because the government's misconduct was brought to Judge Knapp's attention before trial. This argument, however, ignores the underlying justification given in Mechanik. Specifically, the Court stated: 306 The reversal of a conviction entails substantial social costs: it forces jurors, witnesses, courts, the prosecution, and the defendants to expend further time, energy, and other resources to repeat a trial that has already once taken place; victims may be asked to relive their disturbing experiences.... These societal costs of reversal and retrial are an acceptable and often necessary consequence when an error in the first proceeding has deprived a defendant of a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. But the balance of interest tips decidedly the other way when an error has had no effect on the outcome of the trial. 307 Id. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 942-43 (emphasis added). Once the district court denies, as Judge Knapp did, a motion to dismiss an indictment based on a violation of Rule 6(e), and the trial thereafter takes place, the balance of interest is precisely that faced by the Court in Mechanik. 308 Nevertheless, this case stands on a somewhat different footing than Mechanik, for the quite simple reason that this case involves a violation of Rule 6(e) as opposed to a violation of Rule 6(d). A betrayal of grand jury secrecy, unlike misconduct or error confined to the grand jury room, jeopardizes the defendant's right to a fair trial before a petit jury. We recognized this distinction recently in United States v. Midland Asphalt Corp., 840 F.2d 1040, 1045-46 (2d Cir.1988), where we held that an order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment was not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). We reached this conclusion because Mechanik by its terms does not bar reversal of a conviction when misconduct before the grand jury has deprived [the] defendant of a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72, 106 S.Ct. at 943; see Midland Asphalt, 840 F.2d at 1046. 309 However, appellants simply cannot show resultant prejudice from the publicity surrounding the grand jury proceedings and make no claim that the Connecticut petit jury was affected by the government's misconduct. Rather, they assert only that the illicit publicity about impermissible facts is safely to be supposed, and could undoubtedly have been shown, to have infected the grand jury. In view of the limited nature of appellants' claim, we have little doubt that the change of venue, and the use of a Hartford jury pool, along with voir dire, removed any possibility of prejudice at trial. Under Mechanik, therefore, the government's conduct does not now afford appellants a basis upon which to claim error.