Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mention of Public Defender Status of Case

Text: Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by his expert witness's statement that the Public Defender was representing defendant. We are satisfied that the statement was inadvertent and that the prejudice caused thereby, if any, was harmless. During the cross-examination of Dr. Greenfield, the prosecutor asked the expert what fee he was receiving for examining defendant and filing a report. In response, Dr. Greenfield observed that the case was a Public Defender case. Defendant did not object. The prosecutor proceeded to demonstrate that Dr. Greenfield had billed approximately $2000 for his work prior to his trial testimony. Defendant argues that the reference was improper for two reasons. First, the comment may have suggested to the jury that defendant was indigent and had a financial motive for his crimes. Second, the remark may have led the jury to conclude that taxpayers, including the jurors themselves, were financing the defense. Defendant asserts that the court should have stricken the testimony or, at the least, should have issued curative instructions. Defendant also contends that Dr. Greenfield's remark tainted the testimony of his penalty-phase expert witness Diana Aviv, a psychiatric social worker. During cross-examination of Ms. Aviv, the prosecutor asked: Q. What are you getting paid for your testimony? A. Eighty dollars an hour. Q. How many hours so far? A. I haven't assessed. I'll have to check. Q. I'm not going to take up any more time. After an objection by defense counsel, the court instructed the jury that there was nothing wrong with an expert charging a reasonable fee for services. Defendant contends that Dr. Greenfield's previous comments also injected the public expense taint into Ms. Aviv's testimony. Defendant overstates the potential impact of Dr. Greenfield's inadvertent remark. Of course, evidence of a defendant's financial state should not be admitted nor commented on. State v. Farr, 183 N.J. Super. 463, 468, 444 A. 2d 593 (App.Div. 1982). However, in most instances such evidence is elicited for the improper motive of establishing that defendant had no apparent means of income and hence was likely to commit a crime for dollar gain   . State v. Mathis, 47 N.J. 455, 472, 221 A. 2d 529 (1966); State v. Robinson, 139 N.J. Super. 58, 63, 352 A. 2d 587 (App.Div. 1976), certif. denied, 75 N.J. 534, 384 A. 2d 514 (1977). Defendant does not argue that the prosecutor intentionally attempted to elicit the challenged testimony in order to have the jury infer a motive for the kidnapping. Nor does the record suggest that that was the case. Dr. Greenfield's comment was brief and non-responsive. In addition, there having been no objection, the remark was not called to the attention of the jury. Indeed, defendant's failure to object to the comment at the time it was made may well reflect his desire not to highlight the topic. Additionally, defendant stretches the effect of the comment a bit far by suggesting that it influenced Diana Aviv's testimony. Dr. Greenfield's testimony was admitted during the guilt phase. Ms. Aviv testified later during the penalty proceeding. The latter witness mentioned nothing of defendant's financial status. Furthermore, the trial court instructed the jury that experts were entitled to reasonable fees for their services. Even assuming arguendo that Dr. Greenfield's remark created a potential prejudice in the minds of jurors, that prejudice was surely incapable of bringing about an unjust result. Defendant's financial motive was not at issue, he having admitted to participating in the kidnapping. The central question before the jury was defendant's asserted cocaine addiction and diminished capacity. If any harm resulted from the inadvertent remark, it was undoubtedly minimal.