Opinion ID: 778298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New York's Cleric-Congregant Privilege

Text: 67 The statute codifying New York's present version of the cleric-congregant privilege provides: 68 Unless the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited Christian Science practitioner, shall not be allowed [to] disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor. 69 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4505 (footnote omitted). Three seminal decisions of the New York Court of Appeals elucidate the meaning and scope of § 4505. 70 In Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226, 390 N.E.2d 1151 (1979), a State grand jury subpoenaed an ordained Roman Catholic priest and former New York City Councilman to testify about alleged abuses within the New York City Department of Corrections. Id. at 163-64, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 227-29, 390 N.E.2d at 1152-53. The priest refused to testify, claiming both that his conversations were privileged under § 4505 and that to compel him to testify would jeopardize the free exercise of his ministry. Id. at 165, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 229, 390 N.E.2d at 1153. Rejecting both arguments, the Court of Appeals first observed that the New York legislature had enacted an earlier version of § 4505 in respon[se] to the urgent need of people to confide in, without fear of reprisal, those entrusted with the pressing task of offering spiritual guidance so that harmony with one's self and others can be realized. Id. at 166, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 229, 390 N.E.2d at 1154. For this reason, the privilege does not attach to statements merely because they are made to a clergyman; rather, it is only confidential communications made to a clergyman in his spiritual capacity which the law endeavors to protect. Id. The court observed that the communications sought to be privileged had not been made in the context of the cleric-congregant relationship, and therefore, the revelation of such conversations, spoken outside the sphere of confidentiality, cannot be said to fall within the sanctuary of the priest-penitent privilege. Id. at 167, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 230, 390 N.E.2d at 1154. 71 In People v. Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d 603, 606 N.Y.S.2d 879, 627 N.E.2d 959 (1993), the New York Court of Appeals explained § 4505 at greater length in the context of criminal proceedings. Carmona had murdered a woman by strangulation and then fled. He surrendered to the police after consulting two clergymen, both of whom had advised him to do so. See id. at 605-07, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81, 627 N.E.2d at 960-61. The court considered whether Carmona, by confessing his crime to the police, effectively waived his right to invoke the privilege to exclude the testimony of the clergymen to whom he had confessed previously, a question the court answered in the negative. See id. at 608, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81, 627 N.E.2d at 960-61. In the course of its analysis, the Court of Appeals explained: 72 Although often referred to as a priest-penitent privilege, the statutory privilege is not limited to communications with a particular class of clerics or congregants.... 73 [T]he New York statute is intentionally aimed at all religious ministers who perform significant spiritual counselling which may involve disclosure of sensitive matters.... Accordingly, what is more appropriately dubbed the cleric-congregant privilege is applicable to ministers of all religions, most of which have no ritual analogous to that of the Catholic confession.... New York's test for the privilege's applicability distills to a single inquiry: whether the communication in question was made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance.... 74 Id. at 608-09, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 627 N.E.2d at 961-62 (citations omitted). Carmona thus made it clear that far from discriminating among religions, the New York legislature intended § 4505 to protect confidential communications between clerics and congregants of all religions, 8 provided that the communication in question qualifies as the kind that the legislature intended, as a matter of policy, to protect: those made in confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. Id. at 609, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 882, 627 N.E.2d at 962; see also Keenan, 47 N.Y.2d at 166, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 229, 390 N.E.2d at 1154 (explaining § 4505's policy rationale). 75 Most recently, in Lightman v. Flaum, 97 N.Y.2d 128, 736 N.Y.S.2d 300, 761 N.E.2d 1027 (2001), the New York Court of Appeals drew a critical distinction between the cleric-congregant privilege and other evidentiary privileges set forth in Article 45 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. The court noted that [s]tatutes and regulations specifically prohibit the disclosure of confidences and [at times prescribe] sanctions for professional misconduct with regard to, inter alios, attorneys and physicians. Id. at 136, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 305, 761 N.E.2d at 1032. By contrast, clerics are free to engage in religious activities without the State's permission, they are not subject to State-dictated educational prerequisites and, significantly, no comprehensive statutory scheme regulates the clergy-congregant spiritual counseling relationship. Id. 76 Citing the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the United States Constitution, the Court of Appeals emphasized that to hold court on the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, to engage in fact-finding to determine the right interpretation of a religion, would threaten simultaneously [to] establish one religious belief as correct... while interfering with the free exercise of the opposing faction's beliefs. Id. at 137, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 306, 761 N.E.2d at 1033 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Because establishing civil liability based on purported breaches of a § 4505 fiduciary duty would require a trier of fact to determine the true religious rules governing the revelation of communications between clergy and congregants, the court rejected the congregant's claim for damages based on an alleged breach of the fiduciary duty she asserted her rabbis owed her by virtue of § 4505. Id. at 137, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 305-306, 761 N.E.2d at 1032-33.