Opinion ID: 836190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mason erroneously interpreted mcl 722.25(1) by adding a determination of fitness

Text: We again note, as a preliminary observation, that MCL 722.25(1) does not refer to fitness of the natural parent as a prerequisite for applying the statutory presumption in the parent's favor. MCL 722.25(1) applies to all natural parents who are parties in custody disputes with third persons, not merely fit natural parents. Nothing in the statute explicitly or implicitly suggests that the presumption applies only in cases involving a parent adjudged to be a fit parent. Rather, we believe that, in enacting the CCA, the Legislature set forth clear best interest factors in MCL 722.23 that constitute a de facto evaluation of each individual's fitness to raise a child. [46] In doing so, the Legislature rejected the amorphous fitness/neglect/abandonment standard outlined in Mason by not including any reference to that standard. [47] Mason erred by holding that the statutory presumption in the natural parent's favor applies only to fit parents. This was an improper interpretation of Heltzel, Troxel, and the CCA generally. The statutory presumption in MCL 722.25(1) is `a presumption of the strongest order[,]' [48] and one that does not turn solely on the question of fitness. [49] Numerous cases decided since the CCA was enacted have agreed: the parental presumption controls unless the third party shows by clear and convincing evidence that custody with the natural parent is not in the best interests of the child. [50] As discussed earlier in this opinion, the parental presumption has some constitutional provenance, whereas the custodial environment presumption has none. This persuades us that the parental presumption should properly control over the established custodial environment presumption. Mason held that the parental presumption controls with regard to fit parents only because they alone are constitutionally protected. Mason further held that unfit parents have the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in the established custodial environment with the guardian was in the child's best interests. [51] However, Mason and its predecessors created this new standard out of thin air. [52] In the case before us, the Legislature has provided us with two standards that irreconcilably conflict. Rather than resolve the conflict by divining a new standard, as Mason did, we believe that the better course is to decide which of the two presumptions controls. We are convinced that the parental presumption must control. We are persuaded of this (1) by the fact that, whereas the parental presumption has some constitutional provenance, the established custodial environment presumption does not, (2) by caselaw interpreting the tension between MCL 722.25(1) and MCL 722.27(1)(c) and (3) by the lack of reference to fitness in the CCA. The Court is unwilling to restrict the parental presumption absent clear evidence from the Legislature that a restriction was intended. Moreover, the CCA's notable silence regarding fitness, abandonment, or neglect of children suggests these words should not be read into the statute. The statutory presumption favoring natural parents is not contravened merely because the statute provides greater protection for parental rights than Troxel mandated as a constitutional matter. Mason's contrary holding is contradictory to the weight traditionally afforded to the parental presumption. [53] Because the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1) satisfies the constitutional standards mandated for fit parents, no justification existed for Mason to restrict that presumption only to fit parents. Nothing in Troxel can be interpreted as precluding states from offering greater protection to the fundamental parenting rights of natural parents, regardless of whether the natural parents are fit. This rule applies here. Defendant also argues that Mason's arbitrary and subjective fitness standard, and the trial court's equally subjective application of that standard in this case, violated her Fourteenth Amendment [54] due process rights. She claims that, because the Mason standard does not utilize objective criteria for evaluating parental fitness, it lacks procedural protections sufficient to protect her due process rights. Given our holding that Mason improperly limited the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1), we find it unnecessary to reach defendant's constitutional argument. We conclude that Mason erred by reading a fitness requirement into the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1). The statute is entirely silent on the issue of a parent's fitness. [55] Nothing in the statute or the CCA generally [56] suggests that parental fitness is a prerequisite to entitlement to the parental presumption in MCL 722.25(1). Because Mason's holding was neither constitutionally mandated nor consistent with the statute, Mason is hereby overruled.