Opinion ID: 2328667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Direct Appeal Claims

Text: Rowland's direct appeal raises a variety of other claims of error in the conduct of his trial. First, Rowland contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial when the prosecution adduced evidence of a previously undisclosed oral statement that he allegedly made to police on the night of Hoyle's death. Second, Rowland contends that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to rehabilitate two witnesses with their prior consistent statements. Third, Rowland contends that the trial court also erred in permitting the prosecution to introduce extrinsic evidence to impeach defense witnesses on collateral matters. Fourth, Rowland contends that pervasive prosecutorial misconduct in the examination of witnesses deprived him of a fair trial.
Metropolitan Police Lieutenant Tommy Musgrove testified that when Rowland consented to have his hands examined for gunpowder residue on the night of Hoyle's death, he made the comment, I know a little bit about evidence. [14] That comment was arguably incriminating; by suggesting that Rowland knew enough to remove any gunpowder residue from his hands before the police arrived, the comment neutralized the seemingly exculpatory fact that no residue was detected. The defense was surprised by Lieutenant Musgrove's testimony, which had not been elicited in Rowland's first trial. Rowland moved for a mistrial on the ground that the government had violated its obligations under Superior Court Criminal Rule 16 by not having disclosed his alleged comment to Lieutenant Musgrove in pretrial discovery. The government responded, inter alia, that Rowland's comment was outside the purview of Rule 16 because it was not a response to any police questioning. The trial court rejected that distinction; agreeing with Rowland, the court concluded that it made no difference under Rule 16 that Rowland had volunteered his remark. The court declined, though, to grant either a mistrial or Rowland's alternative request to strike Lieutenant Musgrove's testimony in its entirety. Instead, the court decided to strike only the testimony reporting what Rowland had saidrelief that Rowland contends was inadequate. The government has the better of the argument. Rule 16 does not require the government to disclose a defendant's oral statementin contrast to a defendant's written or recorded statementunless that statement was made in response to interrogation by a known government agent. [15] Spontaneous oral statements are not discoverable as of right under the Rule. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 223 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir.2000) (collecting cases); United States v. Small, 316 U.S.App. D.C. 15, 24 n. 2, 74 F.3d 1276, 1286 n. 2 (1996). [16] Although the term interrogation is not defined in Rule 16, we may assume arguendo that it should be accorded an expansive interpretation encompassing not only express questioning, but also ... any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response . . . . Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); see Small, supra . Even so, the record does not support Rowland's claim on appeal that his alleged comment to Lieutenant Musgrove was the product of interrogation. Rowland did not make that claim in the trial court. There he acquiesced in the characterization of his comment as something he volunteered without being asked. Perhaps his comment was an incriminating response to Lieutenant Musgrove's request that he allow his hands to be swabbed, see footnote 14, supra, but if so, it was an unsought and unforeseeable response, much like the statements at issue in Scott, supra . [17] Rule 16 therefore did not require the government to disclose the comment that Rowland made to Lieutenant Musgrove. As the government did not violate the Rule, no sanction at all should have been imposed, and the trial court certainly did not err in denying Rowland's motion for a mistrial or alternative relief.
Three police officers testified that Rowland referred to Hoyle derogatorily as a bitch on the night of her death. [18] On cross-examination the officers admitted that their reports that night omitted this fact. Over defense objection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to rehabilitate two of the officers with their grand jury testimony, in which they did report Rowland's references to Hoyle as a bitch. Rowland contends that the court abused its discretion in admitting the officers' prior consistent statements before the grand jury when his cross-examination of the officers did not suggest explicitly that their trial testimony was a recent fabrication. The impeachment of a witness with his or her prior inconsistent statements (including, as in this case, impeachment by omission) does not open the door to the introduction of any and all prior consistent statements that the witness may have made. [R]epetition does not imply veracity. Prophet v. United States, 602 A.2d 1087, 1093 (D.C.1992). Nonetheless, the trial court has broad discretion to permit a party to introduce a witness's prior consistent statements (a) to rebut a suggestion of recent fabrication by the witness, if (b) the prior statements were made at a time when, considering all the circumstances, the witness did not have a motive to fabricate. Id. at 1093, 1094 (citations omitted). In this case the court made what it said was a judgment call with full awareness of these requirements. While the defense had not accused the officers in so many words of having collusively fabricated their testimony about Rowland's remarks to support a prosecution theory that his behavior after Hoyle died was suspicious, the court found that to be the logical implication of the cross-examination. The court found it improbable that the officers could have had such a motive at the time they testified before the grand jury. Rather, the court reasoned, if there was any motive to fabricate, it [arose] only after the case was at the point of being tried, where it was clear what the Government's theory was.... The evidentiary issue was a close one that was committed to the trial court's discretion. An exercise of judicial discretion will not be reversed unless it appears that it was exercised on grounds, or for reasons, clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Clayborne v. United States, 751 A.2d 956, 963 (D.C.2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There is no such appearance here. On the contrary, the trial court articulated a reasonable assessment of the evidence and correctly apprehended the governing law. We uphold its ruling on the admission of the officers' prior consistent statements in the grand jury.
Rowland next complains that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecution to present extrinsic evidence in its rebuttal case to impeach Officer Washington and other defense witnesses on collateral matters. Rowland cites the testimony of Sergeant Wagner and others concerning Washington's failure on the night of Hoyle's death to tell the police about her recent suicidal behavior, his offer and refusal to take a lie detector test, and Hoyle's lack of access to the Vice Unit safe. In addition, Rowland cites the testimony of a former girlfriend, Doreatta Garner, that in her presence he had made suicidal gestures of his own (threatening on more than one occasion to shoot himself with his service weapon), and that he had, when he was still seeing her, concealed an intimate relationship he was maintaining with another woman (not Hoyle). Finally, Rowland cites testimony of police witnesses clarifying the informal status of a Vice Unit safety policy that Hoyle had violated, and of Lieutenant Musgrove contradicting an assertion by Rowland's father that the police originally classified Hoyle's death as a suicide. In a criminal trial, [t]he purpose of rebuttal is `to explain, repel, counteract or disprove the evidence' of the accused. Gregory v. United States, 393 A.2d 132, 137 (D.C.1978) (citation omitted). The decision to allow rebuttal evidence is committed to the discretion of the trial judge; we will reverse her decision only for an abuse of discretion. Fitzhugh v. United States, 415 A.2d 548, 551 (D.C. 1980). When we undertake to assess the true import of questionable evidence, we owe considerable deference to the superior vantage point of the judge who oversaw the trial; hence we are disinclined to overturn a trial judge who has determined after watching a case unfoldthat testimony properly rebuts an inference that a party's adversary has sought to make. Hughes v. United States, 633 A.2d 851, 852 (D.C.1993) (internal brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). The common law rule to which this jurisdiction still adheres is that a party may not present extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness on collateral issues. Patterson, 580 A.2d at 1322 (citation omitted). If a witness is cross-examined about a matter that is classified as collateral (including, but not limited to, a prior inconsistent statement about a collateral matter), this rule bars the examiner from presenting extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness. This principle is simpler to state than it sometimes is to apply, for there is not always agreement on whether an issue is genuinely collateral. We have stated that a matter is collateral if it would not have been admissible independently for any purposes other than the contradiction in the party's case-in-chief. McClain v. United States, 460 A.2d 562, 569 (D.C. 1983) (citing treatises); accord, Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 972; Hampton v. United States, 318 A.2d 598, 600 (D.C.1974). Thus, [T]he matter is non-collateral and extrinsic evidence consequently admissible if the matter is itself relevant to a fact of consequence on the historical merits of the case. When the fact is logically relevant to the merits of the case as well as the witness's credibility, it is worth[y] of the additional court time entailed in hearing extrinsic evidence. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 49, at 203 (5th ed.1999). This core sense of the term collateral does not exhaust its scope, however. Some linchpin facts may appear collateral in isolation but yet be so central to a witness's testimony about a material transaction or matter that the probative value of extrinsic impeachment is too great to ignore: [T]he extrinsic evidence is non-collateral and again admissible when it relates to a so-called linchpin fact. Under this prong of the test, for purposes of impeachment a part of the witness's story may be attacked where as a matter of human experience, he could not be mistaken about that fact if the thrust of his testimony on the historical merits was true. Id. Stated a bit more generally, evidence technically classified as collateral may be admitted, in the trial court's discretion, provided it has sufficient bearing on the issues which the trier of fact must resolve. Patterson, 580 A.2d at 1322-23. This is a concededly vague test, and the trial court's discretion in admitting extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness is correspondingly broad. Id. at 1323. [19] We do not agree with Rowland that the trial court abused its broad discretion here. We have already addressed Sergeant Wagner's rebuttal testimony about Officer Washington's offer and refusal to take a lie detector test. Assuming error in the admission of that testimony, we have concluded that the error was harmless. There was no error in admitting extrinsic evidence to impeach Washington on the two other matters Rowland cites. Whether Hoyle had made a suicidal gesture, as Washington testified, was not a collateral matter in this trial, for it bore on whether Hoyle actually did commit suicide in Rowland's apartment as he claimed. The prosecution therefore was entitled to present extrinsic evidence that Washington had made prior inconsistent statements about that matterincluding statements on the night of Hoyle's death that were inconsistent because they omitted any mention of recent suicidal behavior on her part. See Mercer v. United States, 724 A.2d 1176, 1196 (D.C.1999); Moss v. United States, 368 A.2d 1131, 1135 (D.C. 1977); Hampton, 318 A.2d at 600. Extrinsic evidence was also properly admitted to impeach Washington's testimony that Hoyle deposited her service weapon in the Vice Unit safe. As we already have observed, this fairly could be viewed as the sort of linchpin fact which as a matter of human experience [Washington] would not have been mistaken about if [his] story were true. Patterson, 580 A.2d at 1323 (citation omitted). Ms. Garner's testimony that Rowland himself had made suicidal gestures with his service weapon similar to the gestures he attributed to Hoyle does not strike us as collateral either. Rather, the trial court reasonably could deem such evidence to be independently admissible on the question whether Rowland was drawing on his own experience to fabricate his claims about Hoyle. Similarly, the status of the Vice Unit safety policy was not collateral either; it was independently relevant (even if only marginally so) to the issue of whether Hoyle's violation of the policy was serious enough to contribute to her supposed despondency. On the other hand, we think that Garner's testimony about Rowland's dishonesty in his relationship with her (not Hoyle) was collateral. The government argues that whether or not the point was collateral, the trial court had discretion to allow the government to rebut Rowland's assertion that he had been open and candid in his various relationships with both women. Inasmuch as Rowland did not make this broad assertion in his direct testimony, see footnote 19, supra, but only in response to cross-examination, we find this argument less than compelling though if pressed, perhaps we still might suppress our doubts and defer to the trial court's considered judgment that, under all the circumstances, the matter had sufficient bearing on the issues to justify introduction of the rebuttal testimony. Patterson, 580 A.2d at 1322. We need not decide that question, however. Although Garner's testimony was unflattering to Rowland, it was so tangential that we are satisfied he suffered no significant prejudice from it. Given the focus of the trial and the quantity of evidence directly material to the issue of [Rowland's] guilt or innocence, we have difficulty imagining that [Garner's] testimony was of any moment in the jury's deliberations in this case. Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 972. Lastly, we come to the testimony that the police never classified Hoyle's death as a suicide, contrary to what Rowland's father said. While this matter too was collateral in our view, it apparently was a distracting side issue that deserved to be put to rest, and the trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion by permitting the government to do that. The testimony did not prejudice Rowland in the slightest.
Rowland's remaining claim in his direct appeal is that rampant prosecutorial misconduct in the examination of witnesses obscured and distorted the defense case and prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Rowland complains that government counsel asked prejudicial questions without having a good faith basis for them, invited one defense witness to comment on the credibility of another, mischaracterized testimony, and badgered defense witnesses by shouting, interrupting, and asking the same question over and over. The government has several responses to what it calls Rowland's veritable laundry list of alleged abuses. First, the government denies that its counsel engaged in misconduct. In many instances, the government argues, the questioning was not even improper, let alone unethical. [20] Second, the government notes, Rowland did not object to some of the conduct of which he now complains. Nor did Rowland ask the trial judge to remedy the pattern of abuse in the prosecutors' questioning that he now perceives. Third, the trial court sustained Rowland's objections to some of the prosecutorial questioning he cites, and he did not request additional or different relief, such as a mistrial. Fourth, in other instances the trial court did not rule on Rowland's objections, and he did not seek a ruling. For all these reasons, the government argues, Rowland is not entitled to reversal on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The framework we use for evaluating claims of improper questions or comments by the prosecutor at trial is well-established. If the challenged questions or comments were improper, and the defendant made timely and appropriate objection to them at trial, we must determine whether the defendant suffered substantial prejudice necessitating reversal of his conviction, taking into account such factors as the gravity of the impropriety in context, the centrality of the issue affected by it, the effect of any corrective action by the trial judge, and the strength of the government's case. If the defendant did not object in a proper manner at trial, however, the scope of our review is limited to plain error. See Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 968; McGrier, 597 A.2d at 41. Under this framework, Rowland's claims of prosecutorial misconduct do not merit relief. Although Rowland cites numerous instances of allegedly improper questioning, his claims of prejudice are exaggerated. Take, for example, the single most serious instance of which he complains. Rowland argues that the prosecutor attemptedwithout a good faith basis and, seemingly, in direct violation of a prior ruling by the trial courtto ask a witness if Christie Hoyle had told her during a telephone conversation on the day of her death that Rowland had beaten her in the past. The question (which actually was more ambiguous than Rowland acknowledges) drew an immediate objection from defense counsel. The trial judge sustained the objection and admonished the prosecutor in front of the jury that she had already ruled on the subject, there was no evidence about the beating and we are not going to go into that! The witness, who was Hoyle's sister, did not answer the question. The prosecutor then asked a more general questiondid Hoyle tell her that she was having any problems? The witness said, simply, No. The matter then was dropped for good, the prosecutor asked no further questions, and the witness was excused. Even if a question about past beatings threatened to plant a false and damaging insinuation and should not have been asked, [21] we are convinced that Rowland did not suffer any significant prejudice. The reference to the possibility of past physical abuse was not pursued, the judge took prompt and forceful corrective action, and the witness herself ultimately negated the adverse implication. Other instances of which Rowland complains strike us as trivial. We need not list them all. To illustrate, Rowland cites two other occasions (in what was a lengthy trial) on which he claims the prosecutor asked questions without a proper foundation. In each instance the questions were tangential and the trial judge intervened to sustain the defense objection and defuse any potential for prejudice. [22] Similarly, Rowland cites a single occasion on which the prosecutor appeared to be asking one defense witness (the expert on suicide) to comment on another defense witness's credibility. [23] But the witness did not answer the question. As Rowland concedes, the trial judge again sustained the defense objection and warned the prosecutor that his question was improper. Rowland also complains that the prosecutor mischaracterized his testimony in asking the defense expert how it would affect his opinion if he knew that Rowland had admitted under oath that he would lie for his own convenience. The trial judge sustained the objection to this question and instructed the prosecutor that he could describe what Rowland had said without editorializing. The prosecutor then asked the expert witness what he would say if he knew that Rowland had admitted that it was convenient for him to lie to people with whom he was associated. Viewing this as a generic description of Rowland's acknowledgment at trial that he had lied to his girlfriends, the judge permit[ted] it but without any further comment. We see no reason to think that the jury was misled by the prosecutor's characterization of Rowland's trial testimony. Accordingly we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. To be sure, the cross-examination of defense witnesses may have been overly aggressive at times, as Rowland contends. Rowland sometimes objected, for example, to the prosecutor's tone of voice or failure to let a witness complete his or her answer. The trial judge sometimes did deem it necessary to caution the prosecutor or rein in the questioning. At other times, Rowland did not object, or the judge exercised her discretion not to intervene. Our sense, though, is that while any excesses on the part of the prosecution were regrettable, they were neither frequent nor egregious. They did not divert attention from the issues and evidence that were material. No defense witness was intimidated, embarrassed, or otherwise mistreated; no defense testimony was cut off, obscured, or distorted. There were no improper appeals to passion or prejudice. For these reasons we are persuaded that the alleged lapses on the part of the prosecution in the questioning of defense witnesses had no effect on the outcome of the trial.