Opinion ID: 430563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scofield Test and Post-Resignation Discipline

Text: 25 In Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 89 S.Ct. 1154, 22 L.Ed.2d 385 (1969), the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining when a union disciplinary rule is reasonable. A union is free to enforce a properly adopted rule that (1) reflects a legitimate union interest, (2) impairs no policy that Congress has embedded in the labor laws, and (3) is reasonably enforced against union members. Id. at 430, 89 S.Ct. at 1158. The Court elaborated part (2) of the test by holding that it could not enforce a rule that invades or frustrates an overriding policy of the labor laws. Id. at 429, 89 S.Ct. at 1157-58 (emphasis added). 26 The Board, see 263 N.L.R.B. at 986, suggests that this is a balancing test. It is not. Scofield sets out an orderly three-step analysis for determining when the Board may approve and the courts of appeals may enforce a union rule. Scofield says that the rule cannot be enforced unless it first meets all three conditions. Scofield does not invite either the Board or the courts to conduct an ad hoc weighing of the allegedly competing interests described in the main text of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) on the one hand, and the proviso to Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) on the other. 27 For reasons that we offer below, we hold that the rule in question meets all three parts of the test and does not impair any congressional labor policy. 28 1. Legitimate union interest. Unions exist to pool the resources of employees so that the employees can bargain most effectively for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. For at least two reasons, post-resignation strikebreaking presents the most appealing case for allowing unions to restrain the activities of those who have resigned. Note, Union Power to Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1536, 1549 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Union Discipline]. 29 First, post-resignation strikebreaking is a serious threat to a union's viability. It can set off a chain reaction capable of destroying the collective bargaining environment. If a union cannot punish the few employees who fail to honor the results of a strike vote, then those employees can escape their obligations to their colleagues in the majority simply by resigning and returning to work. If those members return to work and collect paychecks from the struck employer while the others remain on the picket line, some loyal union members will feel pressure to do the same. Eventually, a substantial number of defections could break the union and once again give the employer greater power to set the terms and conditions of employment. See Note, Union Discipline, supra, at 1549-51. 30 Second, members who participate in the strike vote and then fail to honor the result are breaching a promise to their colleagues. There is little point in taking a strike vote if the people who disagree with the outcome are free to resign anytime and escape its effects. The strike vote itself involves mutual reliance on the promise to honor it. Note, Union Discipline, supra, at 1554; see 263 N.L.R.B. at 995 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting) (In effect, the provision [for fining post-resignation strikebreakers] permits the Union to enforce its contract with each member--a contract which was freely entered into by all parties--and thereby protect its other members then exercising 'the ultimate weapon in labor's arsenal.'  (citation omitted)). 31 The problems that post-resignation strikebreaking poses, then, implicate the serious and legitimate interests of a union attempting to represent all its members. 32 2. Impairment of labor policy. The Board creates a false conflict between the employee's right to resign union membership and the union's interest in making rules regarding the acquisition and retention of membership. 5 These rights are preserved in Sec. 7 and Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, respectively. Because both the employee's right and the union's interest are policies that have been embedded in the labor laws for over 35 years, neither can impair or override the other within the meaning of Scofield. They must--and do--coexist. 33 Consequently, we look beyond the non-existent conflict to the particular facts of this case. The Machinists simply fine the union member who resigns to take a job with the struck employer. The union constitution, however, does not force a member to remain a member forever or even for the remainder of the strike. Our previous finding that the rule constitutes a restriction on a member's right to resign, Machinists I, 608 F.2d at 1222, means only that the rule puts some obstacles in the way of resignation. We do not dispute the employee's Sec. 7 right to resign from the union. But we disagree with the view that it is unreasonable for the union to penalize a member for breaching certain crucial obligations--here, the duty to refrain from strikebreaking. 34 Relying on language in NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213, 217-18, 93 S.Ct. 385, 387-88, 34 L.Ed.2d 422 (1972), the Board argues that the Machinists' rule works unfair hardship on an employee who votes to strike, walks out, and entertains second thoughts months later when he is unable to pay the bills and feed the family. We share the Board's concern but reject its remedy. If union members believe that a strike should end, they have several options. They may work within the union to persuade their colleagues, and the leadership, to end the walkout. They may resign from the union and take a job with another employer. Ultimately, they may elect new leaders who share their views, or even petition the Board to decertify the bargaining representative. But they may not betray their colleagues and expect to get away without paying a price for weakening the collective bargaining environment. 35 3. Reasonable enforcement. The Board contends that the union's rule is too harsh because it restricts resignation for a period beginning two weeks before the strike starts through the duration of the strike. We believe this restriction is not only reasonable, but also critical. First, these periods represent times when presenting a solid front to the employer is most important. Even the appearance of uncertain membership support may encourage the employer to be recalcitrant during negotiations. Note, Union Discipline, supra, at 1553-54. 36 Second, once a member decides to resign from a labor organization, the union has no effective means of discouraging him from working for the struck employer unless it can threaten to collect a fine. To a member prepared to resign, of course, the threat of expulsion carries no weight. Cf. Local 1255, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 1214, 1217 (5th Cir.1972) (union may condition readmission of expelled member on payment of fine for strikebreaking if such measure is the only way to collect the fine). 37 The Board argues, and we agree, that the power of the union over the member is certainly no greater than the union-member contract. Granite State, 409 U.S. at 217, 93 S.Ct. at 387. But the terms of the contract before us condition the member's right to resign on his promise not to break the strike. If the member can escape his obligation by pleading, when the union attempts to collect the fine, that he is no longer part of the union, then the terms of this contract mean little. 38 Because the union has no other practical means of enforcing its rule against a member's resigning and returning to work for the struck employer, we believe that collecting fines from members who break the rule is a reasonable means of enforcement.