Opinion ID: 394177
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The certification system

Text: 37 The certification requirement is the centerpiece of the Warren-Alquist Act's regulatory scheme. In order to decide whether to certify a proposed plant, the Energy Commission gathers information from many sources including the applicant, on a wide variety of issues. The utilities challenge the Energy Commission's power to gather such information, as well as its power to deny certification. 38 We find that the challenges to the provisions establishing this regulatory scheme, Cal.Pub.Res. Code §§ 25500, 25502, 25504, 25511, 25512, 25514, 25516, 25517, 25519, 25520, 25523, 25532, are not ripe for adjudication. On the record before us, we have no way of knowing what types of information the Energy Commission might require of the utilities, or to what purposes the information might be put. As we explain infra at pp. 920-923, the utilities' preemption claim may depend upon the reasons for which the Energy Commission requests information or, ultimately, its reasons for denying certification. We cannot presently tell whether the Energy Commission will ever deny certification, or whether such a denial might be based upon impermissible reasons. Because the issue presented requires factual development, and should not be decided in the abstract, Pence v. Andrus, 586 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1978), we hold that the challenges to these sections are not ripe. 39 We also note that a delay in adjudication will not cause any undue hardship for the parties. The certification scheme, in general, does not have an immediate and substantial impact on the utilities, Gardner v. Toilet Goods Association, 387 U.S. 167, 171, 87 S.Ct. 1526, 18 L.Ed.2d 704 (1967); neither PG&E nor SCE has a notice of intention or application for certification pending, 20 and the threat that procedural burdens might someday be imposed or that certification might someday be denied for failure to meet Energy Commission standards is remote at best. 40 The utilities contend that the certification system precludes planning for new nuclear plants, and thus does have an immediate impact. In the utilities' view, their planning abilities are compromised by the risks that the Energy Commission will deny certification and/or the plaintiffs will be caught in a maze of conflicting decisions and requirements imposed by the Commission and the NRC. Such risks are, however, present whenever a plaintiff challenges a statute that has not yet been applied. E. g., Boating Industry Associations v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 1376, 1384-85 (9th Cir. 1979). The utilities cannot establish a justiciable controversy by simply asserting that the risk of future harm causes them a present injury. As we said in Sea Ranch Association v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commissions, 537 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1976), (a) case or controversy is not presented simply because a party is subject to a general regulatory process which, when applied to the specific facts developed in some future administrative proceeding, might cause a state agency to take a particular action which some court might thereafter determine to be unconstitutional. Id. at 1063 (emphasis in original). See Toilet Goods Association v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163, 87 S.Ct. 1520, 1524, 18 L.Ed.2d 697 (1967).