Opinion ID: 2756032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rejection of Motion to Continue Sentencing

Text: Perez-Barocela advances two related arguments regarding the district court’s rejection of his motion to continue sentencing. First, he claims that the court violated the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to explicitly rule on his motion or find that such a ruling was unnecessary. Second, he claims that the court plainly erred in failing to grant his motion.
The district court’s compliance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question of law subject to de novo review. See United States v. 10 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 11 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 874 (5th Cir. 1998). Under Rule 32(i)(3)(B), a court “must – for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter – rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing . . . .” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B). Perez-Barocela claims that the district court failed to rule on his motion for continuance. We start by noting that a motion for continuance, even if its grounds are that sentencing should be delayed, is not clearly encompassed within the justquoted subpart of Rule 32. Further, both parties spoke at length regarding the motion for continuance, and the judge posed numerous questions. The court then held there was not “any reason to pursue” additional debriefing, confirmed that the government did not wish to do so, and determined to “go ahead with sentencing.” These comments clearly though implicitly denied Perez-Barocela’s motion. Moreover, the court adopted the PSR and imposed a sentence within the range it prescribed, actions which were entirely inconsistent with Perez-Barocela’s motion for continuance. Denials of motions that are implicit in the rulings of a district judge are valid. United States v. Aggarwal, 17 F.3d 737, 745 (5th Cir. 1994). Regardless of the general acceptability of implicit rulings, PerezBarocela construes Rule 32(i)(3)(B) as requiring a court to state explicitly its denial of a motion or determination that a ruling is unnecessary. As noted, Rule 32(i)(3)(B) does not, by its terms, clearly apply to a motion for continuance during sentencing. It also does not require an explicit statement from the court. Indeed, we have suggested that an implicit rejection may suffice. For example, we have held that the imposition of a Guidelines sentence implicitly 11 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 12 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 denied a request for a downward departure. See United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 424 (5th Cir. 2006). The district court’s comments, adoption of the PSR, and imposition of a sentence falling within the Guidelines range prescribed by the PSR constituted an implicit and sufficient of the motion for continuance.
If a claim of error is raised for the first time on appeal, review is for plain error. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must prove that an error: (1) occurred; (2) was plain; (3) affects substantial rights; and (4) “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). Perez-Barocela argues that the district court plainly erred in rejecting his motion to continue his sentencing. He asserts that the court should have granted the motion because, had he debriefed with the government, the government might have filed a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion, which, if granted, would have decreased his sentencing range. Rule 32(i)(3)(B) does not, by its terms, require a judge to grant a motion for a continuance when there is any possibility that doing so might cause the government to file a motion that, if granted, would reduce the defendant’s sentence. In fact, since this possibility always exists, such a construction would render every denied motion for a continuance plainly erroneous. Perhaps for this reason, Perez-Barocela can cite no case supporting his interpretation. Accordingly, there are no grounds upon which to find that the district court’s denial of Perez-Barocela’s motion was error, let alone plain error. Additionally, under the third prong of plain error analysis, an error “must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507 12 Case: 13-40617 Document: 00512850813 Page: 13 Date Filed: 11/26/2014 No. 13-40617 U.S. at 734. Perez-Barocela, however, cannot demonstrate that he would have received a lower sentence if the court had granted his motion, because he has put forth no evidence suggesting that the government would have filed a Section 5K1.1 motion after debriefing. In fact, the existing evidence suggests the opposite. After conducting one debriefing with Perez-Barocela and determining that he had not been truthful, accepted responsibility for his actions, or provided useful information, the government determined that a second debriefing would be useless. The government did not file a Section 5K1.1 motion after the first debriefing, and the evidence suggests that it would not have done so after a second debriefing. Because we determine that no plain error affecting substantial rights occurred, the final factor of the plain-error analysis is inapplicable. The district court did not plainly err by denying Perez-Barocela’s motion for a continuance. AFFIRMED. 13