Opinion ID: 487477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Conflict With The Board's Interpretation

Text: 38 The D.C. Circuit noted that its interpretation of the statute agreed with the Board's interpretation, citing several Board opinions. See Athens II, 743 F.2d at 8. The Secretary argues here that because the statutory language is at least ambiguous, the Board's interpretation of the statute is entitled to substantial deference by this court. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781-82, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). However, assuming arguendo that the statute is ambiguous, the Secretary's reliance on Chevron is misplaced for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court recently explained that Chevron 's rule of deference to agency interpretations is applicable only in situations where the agency is required to apply [legal] standards to a particular set of facts. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1221, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). Interpretation of the Board's jurisdiction requires no such application of an accepted legal standard to specific facts; rather, it requires interpretation of a contested legal standard and therefore is a pure question of statutory construction for the courts to decide. Id. Second, the Board has not consistently adhered to a single interpretation of its jurisdictional authority, as it sometimes has reviewed matters not presented to an intermediary. See St. Luke's, 810 F.2d at 330 and cases cited there. In Cardoza-Fonseca the Supreme Court declared that the inconsistency of the positions [an agency] has taken through the years is grounds for rejecting the Government's request for heightened deference to its position. 107 S.Ct. at 1221 n. 30. Finally, deference to an agency's interpretation of the statutory scheme it is designed to administer is not warranted when the construction requires consideration of broad concerns beyond the agency's expertise. Grunfeder v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 503, 505 (9th Cir.1984) (en banc). While the Board may enjoy special expertise in interpreting and applying the substantive provisions of the Medicare statutory scheme, unlike courts it has no special expertise at interpreting provisions governing jurisdiction. Hence, even if we agreed with the Secretary that the statutory language was ambiguous (which we do not), we would still be bound to embrace the most plausible interpretation of the jurisdictional provision without deferring to the Board's preferred construction. Along with the First and Seventh Circuits we read the statute and regulations to allow the Board to consider matters included in a cost report but not expressly claimed before an intermediary. 39 One question remains: must the Board consider all matters timely raised before it? The First Circuit held that the Board had discretion to hear appeals or not, relying on language in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395oo (d) providing that the Board shall have the power to do certain things. See St. Luke's, 810 F.2d at 327-28. We disagree. The discretionary language does not describe the Board's power to accept or reject appeals. It describes the Board's options once an appeal is filed. More fully quoted, section (a) provides that the Board shall have the power to affirm, modify, or reverse a final determination ... and to make any other revisions.... The Board has no discretion to reject an appeal, for as 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1395oo (a) provides, 40 Any provider of services which has filed a required cost report within the time specified in regulations may obtain a hearing with respect to such cost report by a Provider Reimbursement Review Board.... (emphasis added) 41 The word may in the emphasized language connotes not contingency but entitlement. Cf. Goodman v. City Products Corp., 425 F.2d 702, 703 (6th Cir.1970) (the phrase a civil action may ... be brought refers to the option of the aggrieved party to bring a lawsuit, not to a discretion in the Court....). III