Opinion ID: 1302154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Docherty: Sentencing enhancement for her role as manager

Text: The district court increased Docherty's base offense level by three levels upon finding that she was a manager during the commission of the instant offense that involved five or more participants. See USSG § 3B 1.1(b). Docherty argues that the court erred in doing so because she was somewhere in the middle of the drug distribution chain and because the evidence does not support a finding that she managed other participants. She contends that she was involved only in the distribution of very small scale distribution and personal use quantities of ecstacy to others, that she did not direct or control when or how [the pills] were carried across the border as Mr. Jeross did, and that she did not direct or control what happened to the pills after they left her immediate possession. A district court's determination regarding a defendant's role in the offense is reversible only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 709 (6th Cir.2006). Factors that a court should consider in making this determination include the exercise of decision-making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. USSG § 3B1.1, app. n. 3. The standard applied to sentencing factors is preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Garcia, 19 F.3d 1123, 1125 (6th Cir.1994). Leto, the drug courier on whose testimony the district court relied, testified at length about Docherty's role in the conspiracy, as discussed in Part II.B.3. above. His testimony was based on his own firsthand observations of the inner workings of the conspiracy, as well as information that he obtained when Docherty confided in him. Leto testified that Docherty's role in the organization was to handle the distribution between the four or five major smaller distributors. Specifically, he stated that Docherty's house was the repackaging and redistribution location when the Ecstacy pills arrived from Canada, and that she would distribute the repackaged pills to others. Leto further explained that [t]hose four or five people would be taking a thousand or two thousand [pills] per week, Kathleen would usually regulate that. Joe [Jeross] tended to be a hands-off type of guy. When Leto worked as a distributor, he said that one of his jobs was to sell the pills he received from Docherty and give any profits to Docherty, who would in turn hand them over to Jeross. Docherty, he said, handl[ed] the transactions on behalf of Mr. Jeross, including drug transactions that occurred in Jeross's presence. According to Leto, Docherty also managed all of the money that was made from the eventual sale of the pills. Leto said that Jeross was financing the whole program and [paid] Kathleen a salary of . . . [$]2,000 to $2,500 per week to handle the drug distribution and cash transactions. He further testified that he saw Docherty writing in a notebook that was later found to contain drug-transaction records. The notebook showed that she would often front drugs to the distributors, including Leto, whose debt totaled $8,465 at the time that the notebook was seized. The numbers in the notebook also recorded debts that other people owed to Docherty. As noted in Part II.B.1. above, Leto's testimony is corroborated by Agent Manns's testimony, Manns's review of the notebook, and information obtained through interviews with other participants in the conspiracy. Based on these facts, all but two of the Guidelines factors support the district court's determination of Docherty's role in the conspiracy. The record does not contain evidence that she recruited accomplices (this was apparently Jeross's job) or that she claimed a right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, but it contains ample evidence relating to the other factors. Leto's testimony shows that Docherty handled the transactions with individual distributor-sellers. She received the drugs from Canada, permitted the pills to be repackaged for distribution in her home, doled out the repackaged pills to four or five distributors whom she regulated, kept detailed transactional and financial records, collected the profits that the distributors returned to her, and, finally, passed the profits along to Jeross. Her role as a distributor may have placed her in the middle of the drug distribution chain as she asserts, but it was no less important for that reason, and does not preclude the finding that she was a manager who exercised decisionmaking authority. Docherty's recordkeeping, which was consistent with both Leto's observations and with other evidence seized in the investigation, reveals that she kept track of the drug transactions. It also establishes that she regularly fronted drugs to the distributors, sometimes in exchange for future cash payments and sometimes for work around her house, thus supporting the conclusion that she had the authority to decide how to manage and value the inventory of pills. In Leto's case alone, she fronted him drugs that she valued at over $8,000. The scope of the illegal activity was also significant. As discussed in Part II.B.1. above, Docherty was responsible for at least 100,000 pills that came through her hands as part of a drug conspiracy that led to a seizure of approximately $450,000 in cash. Docherty fails to cite anything in the record to refute her role as a manager. The amount of evidence against her, moreover, is much greater than that which was present in the cases she cites for support. See United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1091-92 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that the district court's U.S.S.G § 3B 1.1(c) finding was clearly erroneous where not a single witness discussed any organizational, administrative, or decisionmaking role for the defendant in the drug operation); United States v. Burgos, 324 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.2003) (holding, under a de novo standard of review, that the defendant was not a manager because he did not exercise control over anyone else; rather, the extent of his involvement was that he offered his services as a stolen-check broker to a coconspirator and demanded that another coconspirator make an advance payment on a set of checks); United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 473, 482-83 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that the district court's finding under USSG § 3B1.1 was clearly erroneous where evidence showed that the defendant merely sold drugs for resale, and where none of the USSG § 3B1.1 factors were present); United States v. Graham, 162 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C.Cir.1998) (holding that the defendant was not a manager under USSG § 3B 1.1(b) where a coconspirator's vague, nonspecific testimony showed only that the defendant was sometimes a lieutenant, and that the defendant referred potential drug buyers to fellow conspirators who actually sold the drugs). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Docherty was a manager for the purpose of enhancing her sentence.