Opinion ID: 199998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Traditional Practice.

Text: 33 The respondent notes, correctly, that legal memoranda in the Cianci case have been made available to the public so long as they do not contain restricted information. Building on that foundation, he argues that the District of Rhode Island's traditional method of treating memoranda is not properly before us. We do not agree. 34 The district court has made clear that its handling of legal memoranda in the Cianci case represents an ad hoc exception to the District of Rhode Island's standard practice. Absent mandamus review, the constitutional questions stemming from this standard practice — a practice that amounts to a blanket nonfiling policy — are likely to recur and to evade effective resolution. Moreover, an immediate adjudication of the matter will clarify matters for judges, litigants, lawyers, and journalists in a wide range of cases. 35 On suitable occasions, we have employed advisory mandamus to resolve issues which are both novel and of great public importance. In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1005 n. 4 (1st Cir.1988). The considerations enumerated above lead us to conclude that the blanket nonfiling policy is a suitable candidate for advisory mandamus. E.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-12, 85 S.Ct. 234, 13 L.Ed.2d 152 (1964); Horn, 29 F.3d at 769-70. 36 Having concluded that we have an institutional interest in oversight of the District of Rhode Island's standard practice vis-a-vis the handling of legal memoranda, we turn to the validity of that practice. Motions and objections filed in the District of Rhode Island typically become part of the case file (and, thus, available for public inspection) at the moment they are filed in the clerk's office. Legal memoranda submitted in conjunction with such motions are treated differently: those memoranda do not become part of the case file, but, rather, go directly to the judge to whom the case is assigned. This leaves the question of access solely in the discretion of the trial judge and places on persons desiring access the onus of initiating action. Whether viewed as a restriction on access or as a practical inconvenience, this protocol reverses the constitutional presumption of public access to documents submitted in conjunction with criminal proceedings. Cf. Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 507 (indicating that a statute that restricts public access to judicial records in criminal cases by plac[ing] on the public the burden of overcoming inertia is impermissible). 37 The respondent attempts to justify the blanket nonfiling policy on five bases. First, the legal memoranda are directed to the judge. Second, and relatedly, routing memoranda directly to the judge's chambers lessens the need for the judge to requisition the entire case file. Third, incorporating memoranda into the case files maintained in the clerk's office would needlessly burden ... already taxed storage facilities. Fourth, a blanket nonfiling policy serves to discourage overzealous counsel from attempting to gain an unfair tactical advantage by improperly influencing the public. Finally, memoranda submitted in connection with criminal proceedings might disclose grand jury testimony or refer to other matters prejudicial to a defendant's right to a fair trial. None of these reasons justify the constitutional intrusion that results from the District of Rhode Island's standard practice of treating legal memoranda as presumptively nonpublic. 38 The respondent's first asserted justification proves too much. Although legal memoranda are directed to the judge, so are virtually all the other papers filed in the case (including motions and objections). The second asserted justification is no justification at all: requiring legal memoranda to be filed in the clerk's office would not mean that the judge would have to haul the entire case file into chambers whenever he or she wished to check a particular point. Copying is a routine exercise in most clerks' offices, and at any rate the district court's local rules require counsel to file memoranda in duplicate. See D.R.I. R. 12(d). That would permit placing one copy in the case file and routing the other directly to the judge. 39 Nor does the third asserted justification withstand scrutiny. While storage limitations may well have prompted the adoption of the blanket nonfiling policy two decades ago, the recently-completed renovation of the Federal Courthouse in Providence, coupled with the court's acquisition of the adjacent Pastore Building, have eliminated any intractable problem in that regard. 40 We are equally unpersuaded that the court's policy of keeping all legal memoranda hidden from public view is warranted based upon hypothetical concerns about overzealous counsel behaving badly. Judges deal every day with the need to ensure that lawyers play fair and square, and we are unwilling to assume, without hard evidence, that lawyers who practice in the District of Rhode Island are so unruly that ordinary antidotes to fractiousness (e.g., sanctions, contempt, loss of the right to practice) will prove impuissant. 41 As to the district court's fifth concern, we acknowledge that specific cases may pose greater risks of prejudicial disclosures (and, thus, may warrant special treatment). But there is no need to discard the baby with the bath water. Safeguards against prejudice can be implemented on a case-specific basis. Where a particularized need for restricting public access to legal memoranda exists, that need can be addressed by the tailoring of appropriate relief. As contrasted with the District of Rhode Island's existing practice of treating all legal memoranda as presumptively nonpublic, this would be a considerably less restrictive, but equally effective, means for dealing with the specter of potential prejudice. Cf. Pokaski, 868 F.2d at 506-07 (rejecting blanket sealing rule on ground that case-by-case evaluation of defendants' sealing requests represented a viable less restrictive means). 42 We hold, therefore, that the District of Rhode Island's blanket nonfiling policy — its standard practice of refusing to place memoranda submitted in conjunction with motions on file in the clerk's office when tendered — violates the First Amendment. 5