Opinion ID: 151442
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of the Motion for Leave to Amend

Text: Finally, this Court must consider whether the District Court properly denied STA's request for leave to amend its complaint in order to add an express refusal to deal or group boycott claim to the five substantive causes of action it had already alleged. We find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a last-minute attempt to amend a pleading for the fourth time. Given the fact that this motion was filed sometime after the expiration of the May 30, 2008 deadline stated in the District Court's own scheduling order, the District Court purportedly applied the good cause standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) (providing that [a] schedule [set forth in a scheduling order] may be modified only for good cause and with the judge's consent), as opposed to the more liberal approach to amendments established in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) (providing that [t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires). It further stated that, unlike Rule 15(a)(2) and its focus on the question of prejudice to the non-moving party, Rule 16(b)(4) focuses on the moving party's burden to show due diligence. While the District Court indicated that we have yet to address this tension between Rule 15(a)(2) and Rule 16(b)(4), STA acknowledges on appeal that it had the burden to demonstrate good cause and due diligence (and the District Court itself ultimately found that the proposed amendment would in fact prejudice the other parties). The District Court properly denied leave to amend. According to STA, it could not have discovered the key facts supporting this new claim until it reviewed hundreds of thousands of late-produced documents, which were not provided until after the deadline to amend had already passed. (Appellants' Brief at 57.) In turn, STA specifically takes issue with: (1) the District Court's statement that `it is not easy for the Court to discern when Plaintiffs were, or should have been, aware of the basis for the group boycott claim;' (2) the District Court's reliance on STA's failure to amend the scheduling order to seek more time for discovery (arguing that such a failure actually highlighted STA's own diligence); and (3) the District Court's finding of prejudice (on the grounds that STA never requested any additional discovery in its motion to amend). ( Id. (citation omitted).) On the other hand, as a practical matter, it bears repeating that this was the fourth time that STA desired to amend its complaint in this already very complicated and highly contentious litigation, in which STA had already alleged multiple theories of relief. Furthermore, STA evidently informed the District Court that, during an October 29, 2008 deposition of Hoosier's sales manager, Paul Mentink, Plaintiffs learned that the `Hoosieronly' rules known as the `national sprint tire' rule . . .. originated from a July 2006 Sprint Summit meeting in Pittsburgh arranged by [DMS]. (A7 (citation omitted).) The District Court then, quite reasonably, noted that: (1) the original complaint actually included an attached copy of the December 15, 2006 statement by Hoosier announcing the creation of a new sprint car tire at the request of several sanctioning bodies and tracks; and (2) the previous complaints expressly alleged that Hoosier agreed with multiple sanctioning bodies to develop a new sprint tire that the sanctioning bodies would use in their races. The District Court also understandably wanted this complicated case to move forward to its ultimate resolution. In any case, any attempt to add a new claim would be moot given our ruling on the merits of STA's existing claims. Therefore, we are unable to find that the District Court abused its discretion here.