Opinion ID: 1887042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Evidence of Monetary Damages to Dunn's Car

Text: Dunn's second claim on appeal is that she is entitled to a new trial because the Superior Court erred by precluding her from presenting evidence of the damage to her car in the accident, after Riley had testified that the cars were not damaged. Again, the standard of review is for abuse of discretion. [10] To establish an abuse of discretion, Dunn must show that Riley's comments caused substantial prejudice that could not be cured by a trial judge's jury instruction. [11] Unless there is evidence of bad faith, the sustaining of a prompt objection followed by a curative instruction ... will usually suffice to remedy the impropriety. [12] Here, the Superior Court committed no error in refusing to grant a new trial, because any arguable prejudice caused by Riley's comments was cured by the Court's jury instructions on this question. Before the trial began, Dunn filed, in limine, a motion to exclude from evidence any photographs taken of the vehicles after the accident. The trial judge granted the motion, and Riley's attorney agreed not to characterize the nature or severity of the collision before the jury. Despite the trial court's ruling, Riley referred to that issue twice during his testimony, implying on both occasions that the impact was not severe. After each of those references, Dunn's counsel objected and requested leave to submit rebutting evidence that her car had sustained $865 in property damage or, in the alternative, requested the trial judge to declare a mistrial. The trial judge sustained Dunn's objections, but refused to grant a mistrial and also refused to admit the evidence of the damage to Dunn's car, because that would open the door to evidence that the court had already excluded, namely, the photographs of the cars. Instead, the judge gave two curative jury instructions, both cautioning the jury not to draw any conclusions about the severity of the crash. The first curative instruction was given after Riley referred to the lack of damage caused to the cars. The second was given during the judge's final instructions to the jury, directing the jurors to disregard any evidence of the severity of the impact. Dunn argues that the curative instructions were insufficient as a matter of law. Relying upon Davis v. Maute , Dunn contends that Riley's comments were improper, that she was entitled to rebut those comments with evidence of the damage to her car, and that the trial court's refusal to allow that evidence entitles her to a new trial. In Davis v. Maute , we held that a party in a personal injury case may not argue that the seriousness of personal injuries from a car accident correlates to the extent of the damage to the cars, unless the party can produce competent expert testimony on the issue. [13] Dunn argued, and the trial judge agreed, that Riley's references to the (non)severity of the collision were improper under Davis. But from that it does not follow that Dunn thereby became entitled to introduce evidence of the extent of the damage to her car or (alternatively) to a new trial. Dunn's argument fails because she has not shown that the evidence she sought to introduce was otherwise legally admissible or that, if admitted, the evidence would have cured any prejudice caused by Riley's statements. Dunn sought to introduce evidence of the monetary damage to her car to show that the crash was in fact severe, and that therefore her injuries were caused by the crash. Such evidence, if admitted, would have been improper under Davis v. Maute , because Dunn did not offer any expert testimony to connect the severity of the crash and the extent of her injuries. Nor has Dunn shown that the curative instructions given by the trial judge were insufficient to cure whatever prejudice may have resulted from Riley's improper testimony. Although some evidentiary violations may be so flagrant that a mistrial is required, a curative instruction is normally sufficient to cure prejudice caused by an inadmissible statement. [14] In Davis v. Maute , we found that the trial court had abused its discretion by not giving a curative instruction after defense counsel had characterized the accident as a fender bender and after photographs of the plaintiff's car had been admitted into evidence without expert testimony that correlated the seriousness of the injuries with the force of the accident. [15] Here, in contrast, Riley's first improper reference to the (non)severity of the impact was cut short by Dunn's objection, and was immediately followed by the trial judge's curative instruction. Riley's second improper reference to the (non)severity of the impact came during his cross examination, after Dunn's counsel repeatedly asked whether Riley hit the back of Dunn's vehicle, to which Riley responded that he tapped the vehicle. Although no curative instruction was given at that point, the trial court's final jury instructions again warned the jury to disregard that comment. Riley made only two brief references to the severity of the crash. In short, the trial court addressed any potential prejudice in two separate jury instructions. Given those circumstances, Dunn has not shown prejudice that was so substantial at to warrant a new trial. If there was any prejudice, it was cured by the trial judge's jury instructions.