Opinion ID: 2976592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Capable of Carrying a Defamatory Meaning

Text: The Supreme Court has refused to construe the First Amendment to provide an opinion exception to defamation law, reasoning that sufficient protection already exists for “statements that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts’ about an individual.” Jolliff v. N.L.R.B., 513 F.3d 600, 610 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990)). Nevertheless, “‘a statement of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. . . .’” Id. (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20). In other words, statements of pure opinion, hyperbole, or rhetorical exaggeration will receive First Amendment protection, but statements deemed capable of carrying a defamatory meaning will not. Id. Whether a statement is capable of carrying a defamatory meaning is a question for the court. Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Falls v. Sporting News Publ’g Co., 834 F.2d 611, 615-16 (6th Cir. 1987)). The court does not decide whether a statement was actually defamatory, but 12 only whether a reasonable fact-finder could interpret it as containing false assertions of fact. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991). While the Supreme Court provided examples of how to determine whether protected opinion is at issue, it did not set out an explicit test. In Jolliff, we canvassed the tests and approaches of other circuits and created a framework for ascertaining whether a defamatory meaning can be gleaned from the allegedly defamatory statement. Jolliff, 513 F.3d at 610-612. Under this approach, the court parses the language of the statement under a multi-factor test: (1) The common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory words themselves, whether they are commonly understood to be loose, figurative, or hyperbolic words; (2) The degree to which the statements are verifiable, whether the statement is objectively capable of proof or disproof; (3) The immediate context in which the statement occurs; and (4) The broader social context into which the statement fits. Id. at 611-12. Applying these factors to the case before us, we conclude that Hocker’s statements were not protected.5 First, while many of Ogle’s sermon statements were 5 Ogle makes two assertions relating to the applicability of Milkovich. First, he claims that this case involves a private figure and a matter of private concern and that Milkovich does not apply in such contexts. But see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. c, at 173 (1977) (“Although it is . . . possible that [the Supreme Court will treat] private communications on (continued...) 13 either figurative or hyperbolic (for example, the claim that Ogle was a “false prophet”), the common meaning of other phrases suggests, as a literal fact, that Ogle wished to engage in homosexual behavior (for example, “[h]e also wanted me to become his very good friend. . . .”). See Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding defamatory factual assessment in a TV segment otherwise was filled with hyperbole and humor). Second, many of the statements are verifiable. While that verification may depend on whose story a listener believes, most of the assertions are tied to underlying factual assertions. For example, a phrase like “manifested issues of homosexuality,” which cannot easily be reduced to a clear meaning, nevertheless carries implicit factual assertions (i.e., that Ogle wished to engage in homosexual behavior).6 Like the allegations of perjury in Milkovich, these assertions may be disputed, but they are verifiable. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21-22, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1. Third, the context of the statement cuts both ways. Hocker’s sermon was intended to excite and outrage his congregation. Thus, some 5 (...continued) private matters . . . differently, the logic of the constitutional principle would appear to apply to all expressions of [pure] opinion. . . .”). Second, he argues that in the private figure/matter of private concern context, Michigan law requires the defendant to show that a statement is “not provably false.” Since we conclude that Milkovich provides no protection (and because neither party briefed the issue of whether a matter of public concern is at issue), we decline to address these additional points. 6 Some statements, like Hocker’s declaration that Ogle was a “false prophet” cannot be verified. Nevertheless, the underlying factual assertion that Ogle attempted to engage in homosexual behavior can be. 14 of his statements might be considered as rhetorical flourishes. See Jolliff, 513 F.3d at 613 (distinguishing letter to management from “leaflets, pamphlets, or organizing slogans meant to excite workers or rally their support . . .”). On the other hand, Hocker also passed his declarations on to others in a number of conversations, which suggests he intended his statements to be accepted as literally true. In both contexts, however, Hocker’s statements invited his audience to believe that Ogle made homosexual advances. As such, this factor suggests an underlying defamatory meaning. The fourth factor, the broader social context, mirrors the third factor. The sermon statements were more likely to be rhetorical and exaggerated, whereas the one-on-one statements would likely convey the message that Hocker’s version of events was literally true. See id (distinguishing between private communications, which are more likely to be taken as literally true, from public communications, which are more likely to be rhetorical). Weighing these factors together, we find that a reasonable trier of fact could attribute a defamatory meaning to Hocker’s statements. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on Milkovich.