Opinion ID: 1838273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of Domestic Violence Exception

Text: La.Code Evid. art. 404 A, governing the admissibility of character evidence, provides in part: A. Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character, such as a moral quality, is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: . . . (2) Character of victim. (a) Except as provided in Article 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character, such as a moral quality, of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the character evidence; provided that in the absence of evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged, evidence of his dangerous character is not admissible; provided further that when the accused pleads self-defense and there is a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused and the accused lived in a familial or intimate relationship such as, but not limited to, the husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage relationship, it shall not be necessary to first show a hostile demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim in order to introduce evidence of the dangerous character of the victim, including specific instances of conduct and domestic violence; .... (emphasis added). Thus evidence of a person's character generally is inadmissible to prove that the person acted in conformity with his or her character on a particular occasion. However, there are several specific exceptions to this general rule. With respect to evidence of the dangerous character of the victim of a crime, such evidence is admissible (1) when the accused offers appreciable evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged, or (2) when the accused, relying on the defense of self-defense, establishes (a) a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused and (b) a familial or intimate relationship between the victim and the accused. When the latter exception has been established, the accused may offer evidence of specific instances of dangerous conduct and domestic violence without establishing a hostile demonstration or overt act by the victim. Inasmuch as we decide the present case on the basis of the domestic violence exception, it is not necessary to address whether the accused presented appreciable evidence of a hostile demonstration or an overt act by the victim. The trial court rejected defendant's use of the domestic violence exception because the accused and the victim were not living in an intimate relationship at the time of the commission of this crime. Further noting there is no such plea as self-defense, the trial judge also mentioned, but did not expressly rule upon, the requirement of a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the accused. We will address separately each of the three requirements for application of the domestic violence exception. First, Article 404 A(2)(a) states that the exception is applicable when the accused pleads self-defense. The only pleas authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure are guilty; not guilty; not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; and nolo contendere. La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 552. Self-defense is not a plea authorized by the Code, [2] but the Legislature, obviously knowing this, nevertheless included in Article 404 A(2)(a) the requirement that an accused plead self-defense in order to avail himself or herself of the domestic violence exception. The statutory language must have some meaning, and it is the function of the court to give a genuine construction to the language. La.Rev.Stat. 14:3; State v. Jones, 481 So.2d 598 (La.1986). We conclude that the legislative intent of the requirement was that the accused must rely in the particular case on self-defense as a defense to the prosecution. In the present case, defendant clearly relied on the defense of self-defense. From the time of her initial statement to the police, she admitted all of the essential elements of the crime of murder. However, she justified her conduct in stabbing the victim on the basis that he had dragged her into the home, forcefully detained and assaulted her, and attempted to force her to have anal sex against her will. Thus defendant pleaded self-defense, in the only possible way to do so, and relied on that defense as a justification for her conduct. As to the second requirement for use of the domestic violence exception, police records showed defendant had made at least one 911 emergency call for police assistance during a domestic dispute about the time of their break-up. Defense counsel attempted to introduce further evidence of alleged prior threats and assaults, but was denied the opportunity because of objections from the prosecutor which were sustained by the trial court. While defendant did not testify at trial, her statement to the police (introduced by the prosecutor) and the testimony of a police officer as to the 911 call tended to prove the required history of assaultive behavior between the accused and the victim. The defense offered further evidence of the alleged assaultive behavior, which the judge excluded because defendant and the victim were not living together in an intimate relationship at the time of the homicide. As to the third requirement of a familial or intimate relationship, defendant asserted in her statement to the police that they had lived together in an intimate relationship for about six months and had separated only about two weeks before the incident. Defendant's sister testified that the two were boyfriend and girlfriend, and the victim's sister referred to the victim's house as their house. Defense counsel also attempted to call defendant's mother to testify further about the victim's relationship with the accused and his allegedly assaultive behavior, but the prosecutor's objection prevented the introduction of additional evidence of the intimate relationship. As noted above, the trial court rejected the applicability of the domestic violence exception, not because of insufficiency of evidence (the issue on which the court of appeal's decision appears to turn), but because the accused and the victim were not living in an intimate relationship at the time of the incident. Because of this reasoning, the defense was precluded from introducing additional evidence of the intimate relationship. The court of appeal also suggested the requirement of a current intimate relationship. 714 So.2d at 209. The statute, however, contains no such requirement. Indeed, such a requirement would be contrary to the purpose of the statute, which was designed to provide a certain measure of relief for defendants in the so-called battered wife cases, as well as for a broader category of accused persons. George W. Pugh et al., Handbook on Louisiana Evidence Law 307, Authors' Note (4), Art. 404 A (1998). The domestic violence exception, as observed by the dissenting judge in the court of appeal, certainly did not contemplate that the battered party would not have the benefit of the provision when the batterer, as frequently happens, confronts and assaults the former mate shortly after the break-up of the intimate relationship. See State v. Thibeaux, 366 So.2d 1314, 1317 (La.1978) (pre-Code of Evidence case discussing the effect of time between past violent acts and the crime charged); State v. McMillian, 223 La. 96, 64 So.2d 856 (1953) (the length of time intervening between the alleged offense and the violent act is material only to the credibility and weight to be given to such evidence). We conclude that the trial court erred in rejecting the applicability of the domestic violence exception in La.Code Evid. art. 404 A(2)(a) and in preventing defense counsel from introducing further support for use of the domestic violence exception that would permit evidence of the allegedly dangerous character of the victim. Furthermore, we cannot say that the guilty verdict was surely unattributable to the error of disallowing this opportunity to present evidence of the victim's allegedly dangerous character. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Since defendant was erroneously deprived of her constitutional right to present a defense, she is entitled to a new trial before a jury that, in weighing the defense of self-defense, will have the benefit of the excluded evidence of the dangerous character of the victim (if the foundation is properly laid.) Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal is set aside, the conviction is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.