Opinion ID: 1296935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Statutes to the Appellant's Case

Text: We are satisfied that this rule allowing a trial court to consider one's silence as affirmative evidence of culpability, as set forth in Wright, is soundly supported by the authorities and is consistent with the policy of this State which encourages prompt hearing of abuse and neglect cases and a paramount concern for the best interests of the children involved in such proceedings. We are also satisfied that the rule does not offend the protections against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article III, Section 5 of our State Constitution. As applied to the issue of culpability, the rule simply confronts the accused parent with a choice: Assert the privilege against self-incrimination with the risk that silence will be considered in the civil proceeding as evidence of culpability, or waive the privilege and offer such evidence as the accused may alone possess to refute the charge of abuse and neglect. The Appellant argues, however, that this Court was in error when it concluded in Wright that the statutory protections cited in Wright are sufficient to permit Appellant's full and proper exercise of the right against self incrimination guaranteed to him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and by Article III, Section 5 of our State Constitution. The Appellant contends that the statutes relied upon in Wright do not protect him in all of the circumstances which might arise if he undertook a vigorous effort to maintain his parental rights and prevent their termination in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The Appellant maintains that participation in interviews with DHHR workers, participation in multi-disciplinary team meetings and submission to treatment, as contrasted with mere diagnostic examinations, by medical or other professional personnel are not within the scope of the protections afforded by the statutes relied upon in Wright. The Appellant further argues that none of the statutes protects him against the use of evidence gathered in the abuse and neglect proceedings to impeach any testimony offered against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding involving his alleged abuse and neglect of the children. To address the Appellant's claims, we will discuss each relevant statute. West Virginia Code § 49-7-1, as quoted in pertinent part above, is a statute providing generally for the confidentiality of records of the Department of Health and Human Resources accumulated in abuse and neglect cases. The statute is replete with exceptions, including exceptions directing release of the information to law-enforcement agencies and prosecuting attorneys, ... [a] grand jury, circuit court or family law master.... We find that West Virginia Code § 49-7-1 provides no meaningful protection of confidentiality or privilege for statements made by an accused in an abuse and neglect proceeding and is, in fact, designed to facilitate the dissemination of information to those charged with the public duty of prosecuting those who may be or are accused of criminal conduct. The remaining statutes at issue appear to provide some substantive protection to those involved in abuse and neglect cases who may also be charged with crime related to the alleged abuse and neglect. The Appellee argues that these protective statutes provide adequate opportunity for a parent accused of abuse and neglect and also accused of a crime arising from any such alleged abuse and neglect to exercise rights against self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding. The Appellee further argues that the protections adequately balance the paramount interest of the State in the protection of children with the right of the Appellant against self-incrimination. The Appellee contends that those protective statutes therefore do not unconstitutionally deprive the Appellant of those rights. Finally, the Appellee argues that if the lower court is reversed [t]he entire system for resolving abuse cases would be destroyed. We do not shrink from a close examination of the Appellant's claims because of this warning of dire results. We share the view of the lower court that the issues raised by the Appellant present a very difficult situation. The trial court addressed the complexity of this issue on at least three separate occasions, as evidenced by the record of the proceedings below. During the February 23, 2000, adjudicatory hearing, the lower court astutely observed as follows: I think wein cases of this nature and specifically in this case, we put the father between the proverbial rock and a hard place in the sense that we tell him to go for clinical diagnosis, but he knows going in that anything he says which may incriminate him may be used against him at a later time. And so if he doesfaces the prospect of criminal charges, if he does exercise his right not to make a statement, which which is a constitutional right, then that can be used against him to say, Well, no improvement period. We're going to terminate your custodial rights. I think in this case inasmuch as the child has never been removed from her mother and is being placed with her mother and will remain there. That there'sthere's no harm to be done by granting the father an improvement period just for the simpleI don't think this Court or any Court has any way of getting him out of the situation he's in now, and that is choosing between losing his child or making admissions which my subject him to criminal penalties.... I'm hesitant about totally terminating his parental rights because counsel properly advised him that if thethese matters could be used against him, and he exercised his Fifth Amendment Rights. During a May 31, 2000, hearing at the termination of one of the improvement periods, this issue was again raised, and the lower court stated: I think he's in that place that we refer to between a rock and a hard place, and that is if hethe only way he can see the children is to admit itadmit the sexual abuse. And if he admits the sexual abuse, he's looking at criminal chargesan admission in criminal charges. During the November 28, 2000, dispositional hearing, the lower court explained: The Court isagain recognizes the situation the father's in. He's not been tried yet and obviously would not be to his best interest in the criminal proceeding toto admit the acting in this proceeding. If the protective statutes are narrowly read and applied, it appears to this Court that they do, in fact, provide little comfort to an accused abuser who desires (1) not to waive his right against self-incrimination, and (2) make a bona fide effort to fully participate in the process established for resolving abuse and neglect cases, including remedial examination and treatment. While the Appellee asserts in its brief that it can be argued that the protections of West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 could apply to Multi-Disciplinary Team proceedings, the Appellee did not so concede, and the Appellant, at the lower court level, had every reason to fear that the Appellee would not so concede in his upcoming criminal prosecution. [11] We recognize that if the statutes are construed to provide protections only for statements made in diagnostic examinations by a physician, psychiatrist or psychologist and to legal examinations had under oath, then the protections they offer may be seen as illusory. We likewise recognize that those statutes cannot, under any circumstances, operate to protect a criminal defendant's statements in an abuse and neglect proceeding from subsequent use in a criminal proceeding in any and all circumstances. Nevertheless, the statutes appear to provide substantial protections in this regard if carefully observed and liberally construed to achieve the remedial purposes for which it appears they were enacted.