Opinion ID: 1694339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to put on Linda Johnson's testimony in rebuttal instead of its case-in-chief?

Text: Powell accuses the prosecution of withholding Johnson's testimony as a surprise intended to defeat her defense. The State, however, discovered through one of its witnesses only several days before the trial that Johnson had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Hodges' death. Powell relies on Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 827, 150 So. 774, 775 (1933), which we recently reaffirmed in Smith v. State, 646 So.2d 538 (Miss. 1994), as being outcome determinative. Generally, the party who has the burden of proof must introduce all substantive evidence in his case-in-chief. Smith, 646 So.2d at 543; Roney, 150 So. at 775. However, where there is a doubt as to whether evidence is properly case-in-chief or rebuttal evidence, then the court should resolve the doubt in favor of reception into rebuttal if: (1) its reception will not consume so much additional time as to give an undue weight impractical probative force to the evidence so received in rebuttal, and (2) the opposite party would be substantially well prepared to meet it by surrebuttal as if the testimony had been offered in chief, and (3) the opposite party upon request therefor is given the opportunity to reply by surrebuttal. Smith, 646 So.2d at 543, quoting Riley v. State, 248 Miss. 177, 157 So.2d 381, 385 (1963). However, in cases were there is no doubt that the testimony should have been offered in the case-in-chief, allowing the testimony into evidence in rebuttal is reversible error. Hosford v. State, 525 So.2d 789, 791 (Miss. 1988). As distinguished from the case sub judice, the State in Hosford made no effort during the presentation of its case-in-chief to present evidence of the defendant's alleged sexual acts with his stepchildren. In Powell's case, the State, through virtually every witness, attempted to determine whether anyone saw the victim with a gun or an opened purse. Hosford, 525 So.2d at 791. In its case-in-chief, the State put on proof that the victim did not threaten the life of the defendant, had no weapon in her hand or purse, and that her purse was closed. Defense witnesses testified that Barr, who placed Hodges in the car, bragged about retrieving Hodges' gun from her purse. Johnson's testimony conflicted with Barr's testimony in that she said she put Hodges' purse in the back seat, and Barr claimed that the purse was in the front seat. Powell asserts that if Johnson's testimony had been offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief, she would have been better able to cross-examine Barr about the inconsistencies in his testimony. Powell states that she could not have used his testimony by surrebuttal; yet she did not make the request required by Roney. This Court has encouraged liberal application of the rebuttal evidence rule. See Meeks v. State, 604 So.2d 748, 755 (Miss. 1992). Even though the defense was not informed of the prosecution's intent to call Johnson as a rebuttal witness until the third day of trial, it was within the trial judge's discretion to allow additional testimony. See Smith, 646 So.2d at 544. The State argues that its first contact with Johnson the day before trial did not indicate that she would be helpful toward explaining the circumstances, but after the self-defense argument developed around Jennifer Hodges' purse, it became crucial to put on more proof in this area. Powell argues that she was prejudiced by the rebuttal because she might have structured her defense differently had Johnson testified as part of the State's case-in-chief. This argument was rejected by the Seventh Circuit when the appellant could cite no authority to support it. United States v. Braxton, 877 F.2d 556, 561 (7th Cir., 1989). Powell further asserts that she was unable to impeach Johnson or discover if any impeachment material existed. We impliedly rejected this argument in Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186 (Miss. 1987), where the State, in its case-in-chief, introduced a last-minute witness, and the trial court allowed the defense to interview him the night before his testimony. Griffin, 504 So.2d at 195. Likewise, the trial judge allowed Powell's attorney to cross-examine Johnson, outside the presence of the jury, before the actual testimony. Powell further argues that she was prejudiced because Johnson refused to be interviewed prior to the proffered testimony. However, a witness has the right to refuse to say anything. Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368, 1378 (Miss. 1987). Finally, she contends that she was prejudiced by allowing Johnson's testimony at the end of trial, thus impressing on the minds of the jury immediately prior to entering the jury room to deliberate. This argument is not well founded since the State has the opportunity to present a rebuttal. Johnson's testimony was offered as rebuttal evidence. The determination of whether evidence is properly admitted as rebuttal evidence is within the trial court's discretion. Wakefield v. Puckett, 584 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Miss. 1991). We find that the trial judge did not abuse this discretion.