Opinion ID: 2584106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Helmers' Testimony and Statements in Prior Judicial Proceedings Are Absolutely Privileged and the Helmers Are Accordingly Immune from this Action for Defamation.

Text: Lawson asserts that the superior court's grant of immunity to the Helmers was improper, claiming that the court used immunity as a means to avoid admitting that it had made a mistake in the custody dispute after Lawson proved that the Helmers had committed perjury in that proceeding. Lawson misunderstands the superior court's application of absolute privilege and the resulting witness immunity for the Helmers' testimony and statements to the custody investigator. [6] As we said almost thirty years ago in Nizinski v. Currington : [7] The authorities are virtually unanimous that defamatory testimony by a witness in a judicial proceeding, which is pertinent to the matter under inquiry, is absolutely privileged. In such instances an action for libel or slander will not lie even though the testimony is given maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity. [8] Because testimony that is pertinent to the matter under inquiry is absolutely privileged, the witness is immune from later suit. [9] The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 588 provides that: A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding or as a part of a judicial proceeding in which [the witness] is testifying, if it has some relation to the proceeding. [10] Even defamatory testimony is privileged, and the witness granted immunity, because of the public policy rationale that the privilege leads to more just trials by (1) encouraging more witnesses to come forward and (2) ensuring that witnesses will be more open and honest in testifying. [11] The widespread recognition of the privilege is predicated on the idea that parties are protected from witness misconduct by (1) their ability to reveal any deficiencies in testimony through cross-examination and (2) the threat of prosecution for perjury or other sanctions against the witness. [12] While Nizinski v. Currington is dispositive of this case, our recognition of the privilege and resultant immunity from suit for defamation in Zamarello v. Yale [13] is also instructive here. In Zamarello we held that a party to a property dispute is immune from suit for slander or disparagement of title when the party files a quitclaim deed that has a direct relation to [the] claim of an interest in the property. [14] In recognizing the privilege for the filing of a quitclaim deed related to judicial proceedings, Zamarello effectively adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587, [15] which provides: A party to a private litigation or a private prosecutor or defendant in a criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates, if the matter has some relation to the proceeding. In sum, the Helmers' testimony and related statements made during the course of the prior litigation were absolutely privileged and the superior court correctly determined that the Helmers were immune from Lawson's defamation action.