Opinion ID: 2718156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mutually Exclusive Subsections

Text: ¶16. Although the State argued that the indictment was brought under subsection (ii), we hold that the subsections are not mutually exclusive, and the State is not required to distinguish the subsections in every indictment so long as the indictment is sufficient to inform the defendant of the claims against him or her. Under Section 97-3-7, one can be charged with simple assault under 97-3-7(1) or aggravated assault under 97-3-7(2). Simple assault and aggravated assault are different crimes with different elements and different punishments. The distinction between simple and aggravated assault in an indictment has been the subject of numerous cases, but even in those cases, where the indictment used terms from both the simple assault and aggravated assault subsections, the indictments were not 9 rendered defective.2 If an indictment is not rendered insufficient where it intermingles terms from both the simple and aggravated assault sections, we decline to find that an indictment is insufficient where it intermingles terms from subsections under simple assault only. ¶17. One can be found guilty of simple assault in several situations: if he or she “(i) attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (ii) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; or (iii) attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily harm[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(1)(a) (Supp. 2013). Then, if the victim of any of the above actions is listed in subsection (b), the punishment may be increased. We hold that the three subsections delineating how one can be found guilty of simple assault are not mutually exclusive. ¶18. The Court has held that the subsections under aggravated assault are not mutually exclusive. Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 920 (¶ 35) (Miss. 2002). And the same is true for the subsections of simple assault, found in the same statute. In Stevens, the Court wrote: Stevens also complains that the indictment should have been dismissed because it did not enumerate the elements of aggravated assault. Stevens argues that without having been informed of the elements of aggravated assault which the State sought to prove at trial, he was unable to adequately prepare 2 In assault cases, the Court and the Court of Appeals have held that indictments were not defective even where words from both the simple and aggravated assault subsections were used. See Anthony v. State, 349 So. 2d 1066, 1067 (Miss. 1977) (defendant need only compare the indictment with the statute to know he was charged with aggravated assault rather than simple assault); Toliver v. State, 337 So. 2d 1274, 1276 (Miss. 1976) (it was clear that defendant was charged only with simple assault, even though indictment included language from both simple and aggravated assault subsections). See also Johnson v. State, 910 So. 2d 1174, 1179 (¶ 16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (indictment that used “phraseology from both subsections” was not defective). 10 his defense. Miss[issippi] Code [Section] 97-3-7(2) (2000), the aggravated assault statute, provides in pertinent part: (2) A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm; . . . . This Court noted in Ward v. State, 479 So. 2d 713, 715 (Miss. 1985), that this statute may be used to cover “varying factual situations of considerable latitude.” The indictment did not contain a reference to the above statute. However, this Court has stated that aggravated assault has an easily ascertainable statutory definition, and the label “aggravated assault” gives a defendant reasonable notice of what he is charged with even without the code section number. Harbin v. State, 478 So. 2d 796, 798 ([Miss.] 1985) (citing Jones v. State, 461 So. 2d 686, 692-94 (Miss. 1984)). Stevens does not complain of the failure of the indictment to reference § 97-3-7, but takes issue only with the indictment’s failure to specify the particular subsection, (2)(a) or (2)(b). Because Stevens was charged not under a specific single subsection of § 97-3- 7(2), it necessarily follows that he was charged under both subsections comprising that section. Stevens was therefore put on notice that he was being charged with aggravated assault under both subsections, i.e., by causing injury under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life and by causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. Stevens, 808 So. 2d at 919-20 (¶¶ 35-36). The Court of Appeals, applying Stevens, reached the same conclusion in Johnson v. State: We find that Johnson’s actions plainly, clearly, and obviously would qualify as aggravated assault under either subsection (a) or (b) [now 97-3-7(2)(a)(i) and (ii)] of Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-7(2), because he (1) used a deadly weapon and (2) caused serious bodily injury through recklessness, manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. Yet, even if there was some doubt about the particular subsection of Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3- 7(2) that was intended to be covered by the indictment, we note that our [S]upreme [C]ourt has held that Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-7(2) may 11 be read to cover a “considerable latitude” of varying factual situations. Stevens v. State, 808 So. 2d 908, 920 (¶ 35) (Miss. 2002). The Stevens [C]ourt also held that one may be simultaneously charged under both subsections of Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-7(2); thus, the two subsections are not mutually exclusive. Stevens, 808 So. 2d at 920 (¶ 36). The Stevens case supports the finding we alluded to above, namely that the blending of the subsections of this particular statute is not necessarily a defect and in this case does not warrant reversal. See also Stegall v. State, 765 So. 2d 606, 614 (¶ 23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (Irving, J., concurring). Johnson v. State, 910 So. 2d 1174, 1179-80 (¶ 20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). ¶19. In Harris v. State, another aggravated assault case, the indictment charged that Harris did “recklessly attempt to cause serious bodily injury” to a police officer. Harris v. State, 642 So. 2d 1325, 1327 (Miss. 1994). Discussing the sufficiency of the indictment, the Court wrote: As can be readily seen, one violates the statute by simply attempting to cause serious bodily injury. One also violates the statute when one causes serious bodily injury either intentionally or “recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” The indictment mixes the concept of attempt which . . . embraces the element of intent, with the concept of actually causing injury through recklessness, which requires no specific intent. The indictment goes on to specify the exact conduct charged and, therefore, standing alone, is salvageable. Id. Like the indictment in Harris, the indictment at issue mixes the concept of willfulness, or intent, with negligence. However, the indictment clearly charges Hawkins with simple assault of a vulnerable person and specifies the exact conduct charged. The indictment against Hawkins is “salvageable.” ¶20. The courts have also held that “the incorrect citation of a statute number does not alone render an indictment defective, but rather is ‘mere surplusage’ and not prejudicial to a defendant.” Shields v. State, 130 So. 3d 160, 162 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting 12 Brown v. State, 944 So. 2d 103, 106 (¶ 8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). See also Culp v. State, 933 So. 2d 264, 277 (¶¶ 40-41) (Miss. 2005) (defendant not prejudiced by citation to wrong subsection); White v. State, 169 Miss. 332, 153 So. 387, 388 (1934) (reference to incorrect statute “was mere surplusage in the indictment” and did not prejudice the defendant). In fact, the Court has held that citing the code section under which the charge is brought is not an absolute requirement, although it is recommended. See Winters v. State, 52 So. 3d 1172, 1175 (Miss. 2010). See also Culp, 933 So. 2d at 277 (¶ 40) (indictment not required to include citation to specific statute, but should include enough facts to put the defendant “on notice as to the statute that is alleged to have been violated”); Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Miss. 1987) (“while it is not always necessary to recite the statute number under which a defendant is being indicted, the better practice is to include it”).3 ¶21. In addition, the Court of Appeals has held that it is not necessary for the indictment to specify a particular subsection of a statute where the subsections provide several variations of the crime. See Shields, 130 So. 3d at 162 (¶ 12) (quoting Evans v. State, 916 So. 2d 550, 552 (¶ 6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)) (“When an indictment provides the essential elements of the crime, the statutory subsection under which the defendant was charged need not be specified.”); White v. State, 958 So. 2d 241, 244 (¶ 10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (same); Brown, 944 So. 2d at 106 (¶ 8) (same); Evans v. State, 919 So. 2d 231, 236-37 (¶¶ 22-26) 3 There are exceptions to the general rule, for instance, in an indictment for capital murder “the underlying felony that elevates the crime to capital murder must be identified in the indictment along with the section and subsection of the statute under which the defendant is being charged.” Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 665 (Miss. 2009) (citing Bennett v. State, 933 So. 2d 930, 952 (Miss. 2006); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-20). 13 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (no error in form of indictment for shoplifting where it did not specify with which of the five types of actions, set forth in five subsections under Section 97-2393(2), she was charged); Stewart v. State, 839 So. 2d 535, 538 (¶ 12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (indictment for burglary was sufficient to provide notice “of the nature of the charge against him and out of what transaction or occurrence it arose despite its failure to note a particular subsection”); Carroll v. State, 755 So. 2d 483, 487 (¶ 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (“The indictment’s failure to narrowly focus onto a particular subsection within the section was not necessary to inform Carroll of the essential elements of the crime.”). ¶22. If including the code section is not required, as the Court has held, we cannot hold that an indictment must identify the specific subsection. We agree with the previous cases from the Court of Appeals that citing a specific subsection is not required. Further, the Court has held that subsections of aggravated assault are not mutually exclusive, and we hold that the same logic applies to the subsections of simple assault. While the language used in the indictment could have been cleaner, the State is not required to distinguish the subsection under which it brings the charges because the subsections are not mutually exclusive.