Opinion ID: 1219632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of Easements

Text: Having concluded that the trial court's findings are supported by substantial, albeit conflicting evidence, we now address whether the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard to the facts presented herein. It is well established in this jurisdiction that an easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Sinnett v. Werelus, 83 Idaho 514, 365 P.2d 952 (1961). In Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619, 277 P. 542 (1929), this Court stated: The use to which a right of way is devoted or for which it is created, determines the character of title with which the holder is invested. The character of the use or the necessity of complete dominion determines the extent to which he is entitled to possession. No greater title or right to possession passes under a general grant than reasonably necessary to enable the grantee to adequately and conveniently make the intended use of his way. 47 Idaho at 626, 277 P. at 544. Thus, the general rule concerning easements is that the right of an easement holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the easement. Id. In Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 704 P.2d 950 (Ct.App.1985), the Idaho Court of Appeals observed that an easement does not include the right to enlarge the use to the injury of the servient land. The use of an easement claimed under a grant or reservation must be confined strictly to the purposes for which it was granted or reserved, and in compliance with any restrictions imposed by the terms of the instrument. Where the grant or reservation of an easement is general in its terms, use of the easement includes those uses which are incidental or necessary to the reasonable and proper enjoyment of the easement, but is limited to those that burden the servient estate as little as possible. In other words, an easement granted or reserved in general terms, without any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited reasonable use. It is not restricted to use merely for such purposes of the dominant estate as are reasonably required at the time of the grant or reservation, but the right may be exercised by the dominant owner for those purposes to which that estate may be subsequently devoted. Thus, there may be an increase in the volume and kind of use of such an easement during the course of its enjoyment. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 74, pp. 479-80 (1966). The degree of change that will be allowed in the use of an easement differs with the manner in which the easement was conveyed, the language of conveyance, and the use of the servient estate before and after the conveyance. See 5 Restatement of Property § 483, p. 3010 (1944). In Boydstun Beach Ass'n v. Allen, 111 Idaho 370, 723 P.2d 914 (Ct.App.1986), the Idaho Court of Appeals applied the following rule to an easement: The rule is that, absent language in the easement to the contrary, the uses made by the servient and dominant owners may be adjusted consistent with the normal development of their respective lands. 111 Idaho at 378, 723 P.2d at 922. In Coulsen this Court indicated that the extent and scope of an easement for canals and ditches is different from other easements such as railroad rights of way. The Court stated: Railroad rights of way are distinguished from other ways principally, if not entirely, by the difference in use. There is not the same necessity for exclusive possession of a right of way by canal companies as by railroads. The reasons for according to railroads the right to the exclusive possession are not applicable to canal companies. [citation omitted]. The use of right of way for a ditch or canal does not require the exclusive possession of, or complete dominion over, the entire tract which is subject to the secondary as well as the principal easements. 47 Idaho at 627, 277 P. at 544-45. The Court in Coulsen further indicated that a canal or ditch constructed or granted pursuant to an original U.S. patent was only for the purposes of said canal or ditch, and then only so far as may be necessary for the construction, maintenance and care of said canal or ditch and that [n]o greater burden was to be placed upon the servient tenement than reasonably necessary for the exercise of the right. 47 Idaho at 628, 277 P. at 545. In Linford v. G.H. Hall & Son, 78 Idaho 49, 297 P.2d 893 (1956), this Court stated a general rule regarding the scope of a ditch or canal easement: As the right to the ditch or other artificial watercourse is an easement, no change can be made against the land-owner over whose land the ditch passes that is burdensome to the servient tenement, or that changes the character of the servitude; such as moving a ditch to a new place, or enlarging it. 78 Idaho at 55, 297 P.2d at 896. The Court in Linford then applied the rule to a ditch easement obtained by prescription. Respondent could clean the ditch and put spoilage on the bank, but could not deepen and enlarge the ditch and dump new quantities of dirt, other than cleaning, upon the servient estate without being liable in damages. The dominant estate has no right to enlarge its easement merely by doing so. 78 Idaho at 55, 297 P.2d at 896. In Idaho easements for irrigation laterals are also subject to the servient estate owner's right to move the lateral at his own expense. Idaho Code § 42-1207 allows such a change when it does not impede the flow of water or injure any person using the lateral ditch. [1] Other jurisdictions have allowed owners of canal and ditch easements to make various changes in the nature of the ditch, including the cementing and waterproofing of ditches, Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 109 Utah 213, 174 P.2d 148 (1946), and lining of a ditch with concrete, Papa v. Flake, 18 Ariz.App. 496, 503 P.2d 972 (1972). However, in Krieger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 137, 173 Cal.Rptr. 751 (1981), the California Court of Appeals held that lining an earthen ditch, obtained from an original U.S. patent with gunite, exceeded the scope of the easement holder's easement rights and was not within the scope of secondary easement of repairs. These secondary easements include the right to repair and maintain the primary easement and cannot be used to enlarge the burden to the servient estate. Such easements are to be exercised only when necessary and in such a reasonable manner as not to increase needlessly the burden on . . . the servient estate. 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 86, p. 493 (1966). Thus, the Irrigation District could make modifications to the irrigation ditch and its location within the bounds of the easement grant so long as it does not unreasonably increase the burden on Abbotts' property. It is clear that if the Irrigation District desired to place a concrete inlet collar and safety screen on Abbotts' property it could properly do so as long as it did not unreasonably increase the burden to Abbotts' property. The trial court expressly found and concluded that the placement of the irrigation ditch in an underground pipe was not an unusual occurrence and expressly found that the modifications, including the cement collar and safety screen, were within the scope of the easement and did not enlarge the use of the easement or constitute an unreasonable increase in the burden of the easement on the servient estate. On this issue the trial court applied correct law to the evidence presented. The trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed on appeal.