Opinion ID: 2295091
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to negotiate

Text: Counterpart's desire not to engage as a consultant a person who might be in litigation against the company could be considered a valid non-discriminatory business reason. [16] As discussed in the previous section, its character changes, however, and becomes unlawful, if Counterpart refused to enter into a contract or if negotiations it otherwise had expressed an intent to pursue are conditioned on a release of claims only once a complaint of discrimination has been made. Because these actions are retaliatory in nature, they cannot be a legitimate business reason that justifies adverse action under Title VII. See Lockheed Martin, 444 F.Supp.2d at 420 (holding that an employer's demand that an employee withdraw an E.E.O.C. charge to receive severance benefits was retaliatory and entitled plaintiff to summary judgment on claim of retaliation). [17] Here, Propp testified that Counterpart made the release of claims related to his termination a prerequisite only after Propp's counsel raised the issue that Propp's termination was unlawfully based on his age and ethnicity. Counterpart asserts on appeal, but without citing to support in the record, that the release of claims was a prerequisite to negotiations even before Propp's complaint of discrimination. Indeed, Counterpart's motion for summary judgment supports Propp's understanding that they would negotiate a consulting agreement once he accepted any of the separation options of which two clearly did not require a release of claims. [18] (Emphasis added.) As set out in Counterpart's statement of undisputed facts, two of the options presented to Propp (resignation or being fired without severance benefits) did not entail a release of claims. The option LeLaulu exercised de facto was Propp's termination without severance payand without a release of claims. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, in a response to a request for admissions Counterpart admitted that it never engaged or otherwise permitted [Propp] to concentrate on Counterpart Communities and other strategic opportunities for the organization because [Propp] refused to sign a separation agreement and release relating to the termination of his employment with Counterpart. (Emphasis added.) Based on this record, a jury could reasonably conclude that Counterpart initially intended to negotiate a consulting agreement without requiring a prior release of claims related to the termination, and then changed its mind once the potential discrimination claim was raised. [19]