Opinion ID: 2822016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process—Excessive Bail

Text: ¶32 The District Court concluded that the fees imposed for the 24/7 Sobriety Program were pretrial punishment in violation of a defendant’s due process rights. The District Court specifically took issue with the nonrefundable, indeterminate nature of the fees and distinguished it from other fees traditionally borne by indigent defendants. ¶33 The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 17 of the Montana Constitution guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Due Process clause prohibits the state from subjecting an individual to punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1872 (1979); Billings v. Layzell, 242 Mont. 145, 150, 789 P.2d 221, 224 (1990). The Bell Court stated the test as follows: 16 In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, 99 S. Ct. at 1872. ¶34 While the State may not subject a pretrial detainee to punishment, it may impose conditions on a pretrial detainee so long as they are part of a legitimate governmental purpose and not intended as punishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S. Ct. at 1874; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2102 (1987). State law allows Montana courts to impose conditions that will ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial, but also ensure the safety of the community. Section 46-9-108(1), MCA; Miller, ¶¶ 7-8 (upholding the imposition of a high bail for the purpose of protection of the community from a defendant with three previous DUI convictions and a pending charge of Negligent Homicide). ¶35 Spady asserts that the effect of the fee requirement is punitive and amounts to pretrial punishment. We conclude that the fees required under the 24/7 Sobriety Program do not have a punitive effect on pretrial criminal defendants. While the individual must pay $2 for each test, he is free from physical restraint and able to carry on his daily activities. The fee is similar to other fees imposed at the pretrial phase, whereby the defendant forfeits some money for the privilege of release. Additionally, the fee is associated entirely with the cost of the testing program, not with traditional notions of punishment such as restitution or retribution. Even with potential criminal sanctions, the fees themselves are not punitive; both this Court and the United States Supreme Court 17 have held that a law may still be considered non-punitive even if enforced by criminal sanctions. State v. Wardell, 2005 MT 252, ¶ 47, 329 Mont. 9, 122 P.3d 443 (Leaphart, J. specially concurring); see also Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 96, 123 S. Ct. 1140, 1149 (2003).3 Finally, the program’s intent is clearly to protect the public from repeat drunk drivers and provide additional pretrial and posttrial prevention options to judges. Section 44-4-1202(2)(a), (b), MCA.4 The program’s purpose is squarely within the State’s power to protect the health and safety of its citizens. We conclude that, as written, the fees are not excessive in comparison to the statute’s purpose and have no punitive impact on criminal defendants. ¶36 Nonetheless, state law and due process considerations require that the court conduct an individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the condition for each defendant. Sections 46-9-108(2), -109(2), MCA; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751, 107 S. Ct. at 2103. Montana courts may impose any reasonable condition on bail that will ensure the appearance of the defendant and the safety of the community. Section 46-9-108(1), MCA; Miller, ¶ 7. While the district court has broad discretion in fashioning the conditions, they must be the least restrictive conditions necessary to meet the goals of public safety and the appearance of the defendant. Section 46-9-108(2), MCA; Miller, ¶ 7. Examples of permissible conditions include requiring the defendant to post bail, 3 Spady has not challenged the constitutionality of the criminal contempt statute, § 45-7-309(1)(g), MCA, as applied in this case. Nor was it decided by the courts below. Therefore, we decline to address the application of § 45-7-309, MCA, to the 24/7 Sobriety Program. 4 The 24/7 Sobriety Program’s purpose was amended in 2013 and 2015, with additions made both sessions. See 2013 Mont. Laws, ch. 309; 2015 Mont. Laws, ch. 312. 18 maintain employment, obtain mental health or chemical dependency treatment, or return to state custody during specified hours. Section 46-9-108(c), (j)-(l), MCA. ¶37 Although the District Court did not rely on the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment or Article II, Section 22 of the Montana Constitution in its decision, both parties have cited those provisions, and we find that analysis instructive. Bail may not be excessive. U.S. Const. Amend. VIII; Mont. Const. art. II, § 22; Layzell, 242 Mont. at 149, 789 P.2d at 223. To protect against excessive bail, courts are constrained by the factors listed in § 46-9-301, MCA. Layzell, 242 Mont. at 149, 789 P.2d at 223. Those factors help ensure that the bail is sufficient to protect the community, while not being oppressive to the criminal defendant. For example, when setting bail a court may consider the defendant’s prior criminal record, the nature of the offense, and the defendant’s financial ability. Section 46-9-301(5)-(7), MCA; State v. Couture, 2010 MT 201, ¶ 60, 357 Mont. 398, 240 P.3d 987. Implicit within the above statutory requirements is the necessity for the court to evaluate each case individually to determine the appropriate pretrial conditions to impose on each defendant. ¶38 The imposition of the 24/7 Sobriety Program can be an appropriate condition of release. However, enrollment in the program is discretionary, not automatic, and a court must consider an individual’s unique circumstances prior to imposing the testing requirement. A judge should conduct an individualized assessment to consider factors such as prior alcohol-related arrests, whether the defendant’s history and circumstances suggest an increased risk to the community, and whether the defendant is financially able to pay the fees associated with testing. Indeed, in 2013, the Montana Legislature codified 19 an aspect of this assessment, permitting other testing methodologies when the program presents a hardship for an individual or when a program participant requires less stringent testing requirements. 2013 Mont. Laws, ch. 309; § 44-4-1203(2), MCA (2013). ¶39 Here, the record does not support a conclusion that the Justice Court required the 24/7 Sobriety Program as a condition of bail for Spady after conducting an individualized assessment. Nothing in the record indicates that the Justice Court specifically considered whether twice daily testing of Spady was necessary, impractical, or financially feasible. Consequently, because Spady’s contempt charges were based on the imposition of the 24/7 Sobriety Program without an individualized assessment, we affirm the District Court’s decision to remand the case to the Justice Court with instructions to dismiss the contempt charges.