Opinion ID: 1625408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proper Scope of Review

Text: The bill of information charged the defendants with malfeasance and the conspiracy to commit malfeasance. In Count One, Perez and Leon are charged with conspiring with Assistant District Attorney Gilbert Andry, to commit malfeasance through one or more of the following: (1) Conspiring to cause the discharge of the additional grand jury of the Parish of Plaquemines aforesaid by willfully and unlawfully preparing, presenting, filing and signing a legal pleading containing false representations and recitals. (2) Conspiring to willfully and unlawfully deny the aforesaid additional grand jury the opportunity to exercise its statutory right to report on all offenses and matters presented and pending before it. (3) Conspiring to willfully and unlawfully refrain from advising the aforesaid additional grand jury that it or any of its members had a statutory right to make applications for direct review of its discharge by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In Count Two, defendants Perez and Leon are charged with malfeasance through any one or more of the following acts or omissions: (1) Causing the discharge of the additional grand jury of the Parish of Plaquemines aforesaid by willfully and unlawfully preparing, presenting, filing and signing of legal pleadings containing false representations and recitals. (2) Willfully and unlawfully denying the aforesaid additional grand jury the opportunity to exercise its statutory right to report on all offenses and matters presented and pending before it. (3) Willfully and unlawfully refraining from advising the aforesaid additional grand jury that it or any of its members had a statutory right to make applications for direct review of its discharge by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In Count Three, Leander Perez is charged with committing malfeasance in connection with the criminal prosecutions of Jury Foreman Elliott and Joseph Defley. Here, the state alleged that the bill against Elliott was filed in bad faith, without probable cause and with the felonious intention of punishing the said James Elliott for performing his duty as grand jury foreman. La.R.S. 14:134 provides that malfeasance in office is committed when any public officer or public employee shall: (1) Intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him, as such officer or employee; or (2) Intentionally perform any such duty in an unlawful manner; or (3) Knowingly permit any other public officer or public employee, under his authority, to intentionally refuse or fail to perform any duty lawfully required of him or to perform any such duty in an unlawful manner. The phrase in the statute upon which this opinion hinges is any duty lawfully required of him. Before a public official can be charged with malfeasance in office, there must be a statute or provision of the law which delineates an affirmative duty upon the official. State v. Passman, 391 So.2d 1140 (La.1980). The duty must be expressly imposed by law upon the official because the official is entitled to know exactly what conduct is expected of him in his official capacity and what conduct will subject him to criminal charges. The state alleges in the bill of particulars that Leander Perez violated the affirmative duties outlined in (1) La. Const. art. 10, § 30 which contains his oath of office; (2) La. Const. art. 5, § 26, La.R.S. 16:1 and La.C.Cr.P. art. 64 which state that the district attorney is the legal advisor to the grand jury; (3) La.R.S. 15:117 which states that the discharged grand jury has the right to have its dismissal reviewed; (4) La.C.Cr.P. art. 680(1) which states that the district attorney shall be recused if he has a personal interest in the proceeding; and (5) La.Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-103 and (6) La.C.Cr.P. art. 415.2, which provides for the duration of additional grand juries. The state alleges that Judge Leon violated the following affirmative duties: (1) signing the order accompanying the motion to discharge knowing that the representations were false with respect to the grand jury having completed its report; (2) La. R.S. 15:117 which states that the grand jury has a right of review of its discharge; (3) La.C.Cr.P. art. 415.2 which states that the grand jury has a right to report if discharged prior to the end of its term. No explanation is given in the bill of particulars of how these provisions of law impose the duties upon the defendants which they are accused of violating in the bill of information. In their brief, the state contends that La.C.Cr.P. art. 680(1) imposed a mandatory duty upon the district attorney to recuse himself in this case as he had a personal interest in the indictments pending before the grand jury at the time of its discharge. The state argues that La.C.Cr.P. art. 415.2 imposed a duty on both the district attorney and the trial judge not to effect the discharge of the grand jury without giving the panel an opportunity to report on matters pending before it at the time of its discharge. As legal advisor to the grand jury, the state contends that the district attorney had a duty to inform the grand jury of its right to report upon discharge and its right of review of that discharge under La.R.S. 15:117. The state argues that this was particularly true in this case as the district attorney and his family were the parties about to be indicted by that panel. La.C. Cr.P. art. 432 is said to impose a duty on Judge Leon to charge the grand jury with all its rights, powers and duties. The state argues that he violated that duty when he did not charge the grand jury of its right to report under La.C.Cr.P. art. 415.2 and of its right of review of the discharge under La.R.S. 15:117. The state also contends that the La.Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103 imposed an affirmative duty on the district attorney not to institute the extortion charges against Defley and Elliott in bad faith and without probable cause. The defendants contend that no provision of Louisiana law delineates an express affirmative duty on the defendants not to act in the manner outlined in the specifications of the bill of information. They argue that without such duties expressly set forth in some legislative provision, the bill of information fails to charge the defendants with crimes that are punishable under a valid statute. While there is merit to some of the defendants' arguments, we find that the bill of information does charge offenses punishable under a valid statute and should not have been quashed.