Opinion ID: 6325613
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial Burden Provision

Text: The first operative provision of RLUIPA at issue in this case is the substantial burden provision. It provides: No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution— (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). This provision applies, inter alia, if the challenged government action involves “individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). The City’s denials of New Harvest’s applications constitute “individualized assessments.” See Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 987. 5 New Harvest “bears the burden to prove the [City’s] 5 As mentioned, New Harvest sought and was denied both a zoning code amendment and a conditional use permit. It has been argued that only the latter should constitute an “individualized assessment” under the substantial burden provision of RLUIPA. See Katie M. Ertmer, Note, 10 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS denial of its application imposed a substantial burden on its religious exercise.” Id. at 988. Only if New Harvest establishes that it has experienced a substantial burden does the burden shift to the City to show that its denial of the church’s application is narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. See Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). We have explained that a substantial burden “must place more than inconvenience on religious exercise.” Id. (quoting Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988). Instead, a challenged land use regulation must impose a “significantly great restriction or onus upon [religious] exercise.” Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1067 (quoting San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034); see also Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 988–89. Our previous cases indicate that some factors we consider in determining the existence of a substantial burden include, but are not necessarily limited to, whether the government’s reasons for denying an application were arbitrary, such that they could easily apply to future applications by the religious group; whether the religious group has ready alternatives available to it or whether the alternatives would entail substantial uncertainty, delay, or expense; and whether the religious group was precluded from using other sites in the city. See San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1035–36; Individualized vs. Generalized Assessments: Why RLUIPA Should Not Apply to Every Land-Use Request, 62 Duke L.J. 79, 98, 110–11 (2012). We have previously assumed, however, that the denial of a requested zoning code amendment could be an individualized assessment under RLUIPA. See San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1027, 1033–36 (9th Cir. 2004) (considering RLUIPA claim related to denial of a re-zoning application, following prior approval of a conditional use permit). In any event, because the City does not raise the issue, we have no occasion to revisit it. NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 11 Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 989; Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1067, 1070. These cases demonstrate that our approach to determining the presence or absence of a substantial burden is to look to the totality of the circumstances. The City, however, asks us to adopt two bright-line rules. First, the City contends that the existence of feasible alternative locations for a church to conduct its worship forecloses a finding of substantial burden. Second, the City argues that there can be no substantial burden when, knowing of the restrictions against use of a property for worship purposes, a church proceeds with the purchase anyway. We decline to adopt either of these bright-line rules. The availability of alternative locations, although plainly relevant to the substantial-burden inquiry, does not necessarily foreclose a finding of substantial burden. That is, other circumstances may create a substantial burden even where an alternative location is technically available. See Foursquare, 673 F.3d at 1068. Likewise, that a religious group has imposed a burden upon itself by acquiring a property whose use is already restricted is relevant to but not dispositive of the substantial burden inquiry. A city’s zoning code may be so restrictive that a religious group has no option other than to purchase a property where religious assembly is forbidden and hope that an accommodation will be made on its behalf. Looking, then, to the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district court that New Harvest has failed to demonstrate a substantial burden. That is so for three primary reasons, none of which alone is necessarily dispositive. First, New Harvest has not shown that the Assembly Uses Provision precludes it from conducting worship services in the Beverly Building. The record reflects that 12 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS New Harvest could have reconfigured the first floor of the building both to hold religious assemblies and to comply with the zoning requirements applicable in the Downtown Core Area. But New Harvest declined to adopt the City’s proposed modification to its plans for the first floor of the Beverly Building or otherwise reconfigure the first floor. 6 This stands in contrast to the plaintiff congregation in Guru Nanak, which we concluded had faced a substantial burden when it had “readily agreed to every mitigation measure” the government had proposed but was nonetheless denied the conditional use permit required to build the Sikh temple it proposed. 456 F.3d at 989. While the City’s proposed reconfiguration of the Beverly Building’s first floor might have resulted in a space that could fit only 208 seats rather than New Harvest’s preferred layout that could fit 299 seats, New Harvest never proved that this difference in capacity would have imposed a “substantial burden.” San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7 The Assembly Uses Provision also permits services on the second floor. New Harvest objected in proceedings 6 New Harvest argues that the City’s mitigation proposal “is unworkable because it contradicts the City’s own zoning code.” New Harvest, however, would have been free to apply for another zoning code amendment and conditional use permit incorporating the proposed modifications. Had the City denied applications after inviting New Harvest to file them, we would have been more likely to find a substantial burden. See Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 989 (finding a substantial burden where the city had a history of giving inconsistent reasons for denying a religious group’s applications, thus “lessen[ing] the possibility that future applications [for a conditional use permit] would be successful”). 7 With either layout, New Harvest would have had greater seating capacity than the 160–175 seats that could fit in the congregation’s rented facility. NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 13 before the City that using the second floor would not be “convenient” for worship services with live music because the second floor’s lower ceiling results in worse acoustics. While it might be that limiting services to the second floor could amount to more than a mere inconvenience in another case, New Harvest has offered no evidence other than the conclusory testimony of its pastor that the second floor’s nine-foot ceiling is too low for live music. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the second floor is acoustically suboptimal, New Harvest has not shown that the resulting inconvenience would be anything more than that—an inconvenience. Id. Second, even if we were to conclude that it would be a substantial burden for New Harvest to conduct worship on the second floor or to remodel the first floor, New Harvest has not shown that it was precluded from using other sites within the City. Under the zoning code, New Harvest is free to conduct worship services in almost any area of the City outside of the ground floor of the Main Street Restricted Area. To the extent that New Harvest would need to apply for a conditional use permit for religious assembly in other parts of the City, there is no evidence that suggests the City would deny such an application. To the contrary, over the past fifty years, the City has granted all but one such application from a church, among more than 100 applications. There is accordingly no record here that any subsequent application from New Harvest would be “fraught with uncertainty,” since the City has not exhibited the “inconsistent decision-making” and conflicting rationalizations for repeated denials that led us to find that the Guru Nanak congregation faced a substantial burden after it acquired a second property but was again denied zoning approval. 456 F.3d at 990–91. 14 NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS Moreover, many properties have become available in Salinas since New Harvest represented that it was intending to look for a new location. But New Harvest did not take steps to acquire any of these properties. The parties disagree as to the time frame relevant to determining whether a suitable alternative property was available to New Harvest. But we need not resolve this issue because a suitable property was available for sale during the pendency of this litigation. Before the district court, New Harvest argued that this property was unsuitable because it would require congregants to make a U-turn on a highway in order to reach the property on the other side. New Harvest presented no evidence, however, showing that this feature would render the property unsuitable for its congregation’s use. It did not show, for example, that the property was unsuitable because of “size, configuration, safety issues, or current uses.” See Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1068. Inconvenience alone is not a substantial burden. Finally, New Harvest’s wholesale failure of proof concerning available alternatives is more significant because New Harvest purchased a building that it knew at the time was subject to unique zoning restrictions that would preclude it from conducting worship services on the first floor. This, combined with New Harvest’s failure to diligently pursue other suitable buildings that came on the market since it represented to the City that its stay at the rented building would be temporary, suggests that New Harvest’s burden is at least partly of its own making. These three factual circumstances—that New Harvest could have conducted worship services in the Beverly Building had it been willing to hold services on the second floor or reconfigure the first floor; that New Harvest was not precluded from using other sites within Salinas and that at NEW HARVEST V. CITY OF SALINAS 15 least one suitable property has come on the market during the course of this litigation; and that at the time it purchased the Beverly Building, New Harvest was on notice that the Assembly Uses Provision would prohibit it from conducting worship services on the first floor—all militate against a finding of substantial burden. None is necessarily dispositive on its own, but taking all the circumstances together, we conclude that New Harvest has not met its burden of showing that the Assembly Uses Provision imposes a “significantly great” restriction, rather than an inconvenience, on its religious exercise. Foursquare Gospel, 673 F.3d at 1067. We therefore affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the City on New Harvest’s substantial burden claim.