Opinion ID: 2633001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maness's Remaining Claims Are Moot or Waived.

Text: As previously noted, Maness contends that Judge Smith in issuing the temporary custody order did not properly follow the Alaska civil commitment statute, AS 47.30.700, and, alternatively, that the statute is unconstitutional. He also contends that the superior court should have issued an injunction against Judge Smith. Maness writes that he is in continuing danger of a repeat performance of the terror he suffered on [that] harrowing night. We reject these claims for procedural reasons. We have noted that [a] claim is moot where a decision on the issue is no longer relevant to resolving the litigation, or where it has lost its character as a `present, live controversy.' [17] The issue of Maness's commitment order has every mark of no longer being a present, live controversy. The commitment order was issued against Maness over six years ago. Maness is currently serving a ten-year prison term. The issue of whether there should be an injunction against the enforcement of the original civil commitment order is moot. There is yet the possibility that Maness's case falls under the public interest exception where we will . . . consider a question [that] otherwise [is] moot. [18] We weigh three factors in deciding whether to apply the public interest exception: (1) whether the disputed issues are capable of repetition, (2) whether the mootness doctrine would, if applied, repeatedly prevent review of the issues, and (3) whether the issues are so important to the public interest as to warrant overriding the mootness doctrine. [19] Maness alleges that his ex-girlfriend will again have him committed: he says that she has clearly shown her proclivity for the abuse of process and to vexatiously manipulate the judges of Alaska. We find that Maness's claim fails at the first step; he has presented a theory but no evidentiary basis for the claim that he will be the subject of another commitment order when he is released from prison. [20] And even assuming arguendo that the commitment order issued on June 27, 2001, was in error, we cannot further assume that this will be true of any future commitment order issued against Maness. Should someone seek to have Maness taken into temporary custody, this motion would be based on a different set of facts specific to different circumstances. [21] An injunction against such future orders would be inappropriate, especially one as wide-ranging as Maness originally proposed. [22] Maness also makes a constitutional challenge to the civil commitment statute itself in his brief. Maness states that a commitment process that allows temporary custody based solely on a judge's evaluation of the facts and credibility of a single witness (in Maness's words, solely . . . the unsubstantiated say-so of, for instance, a vexatious ex-spouse), such as the process embodied in AS 47.30.700, should be held unconstitutional. Maness cites several cases designed to show that greater due process is required in the civil commitment process. [23] The State rightly notes in its brief that Maness's constitutional challenge was not raised in the superior court; it asserts that as a result the challenge ought to be considered waived. We agree. Maness's original complaint only alleged that the Ex Parte mental commitment order was wrongly issued by . . . Judge Eric Smith. But this complaint pertains to the application of the statute and does raise the issue of the constitutionality of the statute itself. Maness's response to the trial court's dismissal of the suit against Judge Smith also merely repeats his attack on Judge Smith's alleged failure to follow the letter of the statute in committing him. Nor can a constitutional attack on the statute be gleaned from any of Maness's pleadings in the superior court. [24] The question of the constitutionality of the statute has therefore been waived. [25]