Opinion ID: 74722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admitted Evidence

Text: We review the district court’s ruling on admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Maragh, 174 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 1999). Jimenez first challenges the district court’s admission of the evidence of Jimenez’s involvement with marijuana and firearms. He argues that both should have been excluded under the Federal Rules of Evidence because they were irrelevant to his prosecution for offenses relating to methamphetamine, and he further postulates that the only purpose this evidence could serve was to make the jury think he had a propensity for dealing drugs. This evidence, he continues, citing to Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644, 650 (1997), was prejudicial because it invited the jury to generalize his earlier bad acts into bad character traits, improperly increasing the odds that he committed the methamphetamine crime charged. The marijuana and firearm possession is evidence of uncharged criminal activities, which is generally considered inadmissible extrinsic evidence under 1 Because we hold that probable cause existed to support the warrant, we do not address the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). See United States v. Foree, 43 F.3d 1572, 1577 n.7 (11th Cir. 1995). 12 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). However, such evidence is admissible if it is “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Ramsdale, 61 F.3d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1995). Marijuana evidence is not necessarily irrelevant to proof of methamphetamine distribution.2 The marijuana evidence may not tend directly to prove Jimenez’s distribution of methamphetamine, but it arose as part of the methamphetamine conspiracy, and it corroborates the government’s evidence that referenced both methamphetamine and marijuana. For example, the government introduced taped telephone conversations containing references to both “cupcakes with white icing” and “cupcakes with green icing,” explaining that “white icing” referred to methamphetamine and “green icing” referred to marijuana. Evidence that Jimenez was involved with marijuana supports the government’s proposed meanings of these code words and, therefore, indirectly supports the government’s claim that 2 We will not explore here whether, and to what extent, for purposes of admission of evidence under FED. R. EVID. 404, offenses involving one controlled substance are crimes “other” than the same offense involving another controlled substance. Cf. Horton v. United States, No. 99-3481, citation pending (7th Cir. 2000); Edwards v. United States, 105 F.3d 1179, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding types of drug that formed the object of a conspiracy is only a sentencing factor). This possible issue has not been raised as such by the parties. 13 Jimenez was guilty of the charged methamphetamine offense. The fact that Jimenez drew a gun on the police when they searched his house does, as the government argues, lend support to the government’s claim that he was involved in a drug conspiracy that required him to arm himself. Although this may not be the most obvious case for admissibility of this evidence, we cannot say that the admission of the marijuana or firearm evidence was an abuse of discretion.3 Jimenez also challenges the admission of evidence of his physical abuse of Sims. The district court admitted and the government played tapes of two conversations made on May 27, 1995. On these tapes, the jury heard Sims say, in an understandably agitated state, “He jumped on me again and beat me. . . . He hit me in my stomach, too! . . . He beat the hell out of me . . . with his fists.” The government justified playing these portions of the tapes by claiming that they were “inextricably intertwined” with comments Sims made regarding Jimenez’s ongoing participation in the drug conspiracy. In United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999), we explained that “[s]ome types of extrinsic acts are particularly likely to incite a jury to an irrational decision . . . . [F]ew would doubt that violent spousal abuse falls into this category,” id. at 1328 (quotation omitted), and we find 3 In any event, even if we were to assume that this evidence was improperly admitted by the district court, there was plenty of properly admitted evidence that supports Jimenez’s conviction. We would therefore find the admission of the marijuana and firearm evidence harmless. See United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). 14 it hard to believe that the government could not have successfully redacted the abuse-related comments from these taped conversations. We need not, however, actually decide whether the abuse references were inextricably intertwined with other government evidence or were erroneously admitted because “[a]n erroneous evidentiary ruling will result in reversal only if the resulting error was not harmless.” Id. at 1329. Here, there was much properly-admitted evidence against Jimenez, and we are convinced that any possible error “‘had no substantial influence on the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir. 1992)).