Opinion ID: 2979384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attempted First-Degree Murder

Text: Christian also argues that the district court did not find specifically that Christian had attempted first-degree murder, and that only proof of premeditation could elevate Christian’s conduct from attempted second-degree to attempted first-degree murder. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1111 defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by . . . any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing . . . is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree.” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1 cmt. n.1 (defining first-degree murder by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111). Contrary to Christian’s claims, immediately after quoting the elements of first-degree murder from the statute, the district judge found both malice aforethought and premeditation: [T]he defendant got up, walked over to his car, had that distance to think about it, certainly got out a firearm, cocked it, came back, walked across the parking lot and then discharged the weapon into another human being. Some things can happen so quick that they wouldn’t constitute first degree murder had the victim died. But in this case, there was certainly malice aforethought. It was—it was willful, deliberate conduct. It was premeditated in the sense that he brought the weapon in his car, he had the weapon in his car, he went to the car and got it. He had people saying to him don’t do it, it’s not good, and he kept going anyway. And then he started shooting. I don’t find that there’s any credible evidence that . . . Mr. Washington engaged in any physically provocative activity. 7 No. 08-6527 United States v. Christian, Jr. R. 46 at 92-93 (emphasis added). The district judge then continued to discuss the evidence supporting his findings both of malice aforethought and premeditation. In response to the objection of Christian’s counsel that Christian’s actions did not constitute premeditated conduct, the district court asked the government to make an argument with respect to premeditation, and the district court concluded that the evidence supported the government’s position. The district court then overruled Christian’s objection and applied the cross-reference. Moreover, the district court did not clearly err in finding the requisite intent. We will “accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and [will] give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.” United States v. Williams, 355 F.3d 893, 897-98 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)). The evidence shows that Christian walked to his car, retrieved a loaded weapon, walked across the parking lot, and shot an unarmed man sitting inside his car numerous times, without evidence of physical provocation. Ample evidence supports the district court’s finding that Christian acted with intent to commit firstdegree murder. See United States v. McDaniel, No. 97-5233, 1998 WL 661106, at –5 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 1998) (unpublished opinion).