Opinion ID: 2998113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants’ Sentencing Challenges

Text: Both Seals and Johnson point out that their sentences and the amounts they were ordered to pay in restitution were based upon judge-made findings of fact and argue that these findings violated their Sixth Amendment rights as interpreted in Booker. Seals’ sentence of 360 months’ imprisonment included a term of 276 months for the count of aggravated robbery and a term of 84 months for the count of using a firearm during the robbery, to be served consecutively. Johnson’s sentence of 162 months’ imprisonment included a term of 78 months for the count of 2 Taylor’s testimony about Johnson’s efforts to instruct him how to testify was the basis for the district judge’s finding that Johnson obstructed justice. 14 Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 aggravated robbery and 84 months for the count of using a firearm during the robbery, to be served consecutively. Both defendants’ sentences for the first count included enhancements based on the district court’s findings of fact that they had robbed a financial institution, acquired over $10,000 in proceeds from the robbery, and obstructed justice. As for the second count, the Sentencing Guidelines directed the district judge to impose the statutory minimum for the offense, which he did in both of their cases. In addition, the district judge determined that Seals qualified as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and adjusted his sentence accordingly. Because neither defendant raised a challenge below invoking the Sixth Amendment or the line of cases that began with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we review for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993). We begin by addressing Seals’ challenges to the district judge’s finding that he qualified as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. First, he argues that his career offender sentence must be vacated because the jury did not find that he was represented by counsel during his two predicate convictions. Seals acknowledges that his prior convictions were obtained in full compliance with this Constitutional prerequisite, but contends that the jury was required to make that finding. We disagree. Section 4B1.1 does not specifically require such a finding. Moreover, there is a strong presumption that prior convictions are constitutionally valid which Seals has not overcome. United States v. Redding, 104 F.3d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Cuppett v. Duckworth, 8 F.3d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc)). Seals also contends that his career offender sentence must be vacated because the jury did not find that he was 18 years old at the time of the robbery, which is a prerequisite for application of § 4B1.1. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(1). Seals does not dispute that he actually was 18 at the time of the robbery; in fact, his presentencing report indicated he was Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483 15 21. His argument is that the jury’s failure to make this threshold determination violated his Sixth Amendment rights. In United States v. Pittman, 388 F.3d 1104 (2004), we held on this same issue that any error that occurred as a result of the judge—as opposed to the jury—finding for purposes of § 4B1.1(a)(1) that a defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of his offense was harmless. Id. at 1109. Pittman, however, was recently vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for further consideration in light of Booker. Pittman v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 1946 (U.S. Apr. 25, 2005), reh’g denied, 125 S.Ct. 2539 (U.S. June 6, 2005). Our reconsideration of the matter is pending. There is no need to resolve the Pittman issue today because both Seals and Johnson are otherwise entitled to a limited remand pursuant to the procedure set forth in Paladino. United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 835 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that “the mere mandatory application of the Guidelines—the district court’s belief that it was required to impose a Guidelines sentence—constitutes error.”). We will vacate and remand the case for resentencing if the district judge indicates that he would have imposed different sentences had he known that the Guidelines were merely advisory. Id. If the district judge tells us that his sentences would have been no different under an advisory sentencing regime, we will affirm the original sentences provided they are reasonable. Id. Both defendants also contend that the district court’s order of restitution violated their Sixth Amendment rights because Booker requires that juries, not judges, determine restitution. We disagree. This court has ruled that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to restitution because it is a civil remedy, and one for which there is no statutory maximum. United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the district court’s order of restitution was unaffected by Booker. 16 Nos. 02-4235 & 03-2483