Opinion ID: 3011956
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the history of open deportation proceedings

Text: sufficient to satisfy the Richmond Newspapers experience prong? For a First Amendment right of access to vest under Richmond Newspapers, we must consider whetherthe place and process have historically been open to the press and general public, because such a tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8. Noting preliminarily that the question whether a proceeding has been historically open is only arguably an objective inquiry, we nonetheless find that based on both Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedents, the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access. The strongest historical evidence of open deportation proceedings is that since the 1890s, when Congress first codified deportation procedures, [t]he governing statutes have always expressly closed exclusion hearings, but have never closed deportation hearings.8 (Newspapers’ Br. at 3031.) In 1893, the Executive promulgated the first set of immigration regulations, which expressly stated that exclusion proceedings shall be conducted separate from the public. See Treasury Dept., Immigration Laws and Regulations 4 (Washington D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1893). Congress codified those regulations in 1903 and, since that _________________________________________________________________ 8. Although both exclusion and deportation hearings are now formally styled removal hearings, see Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 394 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1999), significant differences exist between the two. Exclusion proceedings occur when an applicant seeks entry into the United States, whereas in deportation proceedings, the United States seeks to expel a person who has already gained such entry. The Supreme Court has consistently held that persons facing deportation possess far greater legal rights than those contesting exclusion. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ([While] it is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law, . . . [a]n alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing.). For clarity, we refer throughout this opinion to deportation and exclusion, rather than removal. 22 time, it has repeatedly reenacted provisions closing exclusion hearings.9 In contrast, although Congress codified the regulations governing deportation proceedings in 1904 and has reenacted them many times since, it has never authorized the general closure that has long existed in the exclusion context.10 The Newspapers submit that under the rule of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius, _________________________________________________________________ 9. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1903 S 25 (Ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213); Act of February 20, 1907 S 25 (Ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898); 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, SS 236, 242 (same); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1893); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1895); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1898); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1900); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1902); Treasury Department, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1903); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3, 9 (1904); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3 (1906); Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 34 (1907); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Labor, Immigration Laws; Rules of May 1, 1917, 33 (1919); 8 C.F.R. pts. 12 & 19 (1938); 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1941 Supp.); 12 Fed. Reg. 5108 (July 30, 1947); 8 C.F.R. pt. 130 (1949); 32 Fed. Reg. 9628 (1967) codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 236 (1968). 10. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1903 S 25 (Ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213); Act of February 20, 1907 S 25 (Ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898); Act of May 10, 1920 (Ch. 174, 41 Stat. 593); Act of May 26, 1924 (Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153); 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163,S 242; Bureau of Immigration, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 3, 9 (1904); Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Department of Commerce and Labor, Immigration Laws and Regulations 34 (1907); Bureau of Immigration, Department of Labor, Immigration laws; Rules of May 1, 1917, 33 (1919); 8 C.F.R. pt. 19 (1938); 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1941 Supp.); 9 Fed Reg. 11884 (Sept. 19, 1944) (amendment to INS regulations governing deportation hearings, codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1944 Supp.)); 10 Fed Reg. 8096 (Aug. 1, 1945) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1945 Supp)); 12 F3d Reg. 5114 (July 30, 1947) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1947 Supp.)); 8 C.F.R. pt. 150 (1949); 17 Fed. Reg. 11512 (Dec. 19, 1952) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (1952)); 22 Fed. Reg. 9795 (Dec. 6, 1957) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (1958)); 22 Fed. Reg. 9519 (Nov. 28, 1957) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242 (1958)). 23 Congress’s practice of closing exclusion proceedings while remaining silent on deportation proceedings creates a presumption that it intended deportation proceedings to be open. In support of this interpretation, they point out that the current Justice Department regulations provide explicitly that [a]ll hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public except that . . . [f]or the purpose of protecting . . . the public interest, the Immigration Judge may limit attendance or hold a closed hearing. 8 C.F.R. 3.27. From this they conclude that the regulations state explicitly what the statutes had long said implicitly, namely that deportation hearings are to be open unless an individualized case is made for closure. But there is also evidence that, in practice, deportation hearings have frequently been closed to the general public. From the early 1900s, the government has often conducted deportation hearings in prisons, hospitals, or private homes, places where there is no general right of public access.11 Even in recent times, the government has continued to hold thousands of deportation hearings each year in federal and state prisons. See H.R. Rep. No. 104469, pt. I, at 124 (1996). Moreover, hearings involving abused alien children are closed by regulation no matter where they are held, and those involving abused alien spouses are closed presumptively. See 8 C.F.R. 3.27(c). We ultimately do not believe that deportation hearings boast a tradition of openness sufficient to satisfy Richmond Newspapers. In Richmond Newspapers itself, the Court noted an unbroken, uncontradicted history of public _________________________________________________________________ 11. The Newspapers contend that there is no evidence that hearings conducted in hospitals, prisons, and private homes were closed to the public. The Sixth Circuit agreed, concluding that this evidence does not even hint that the public could not attend a hearing [in these places] . . . . Certainly, one could imagine family and friends being present. Detroit Free Press, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17646 at . While we agree it is possible that some select non-party individuals might have been present in such places, we are unwilling to assume that the general public enjoyed unfettered access, a clearly counter-intuitive suggestion, particularly since Richmond Newspapers, in asking whether the place and process have historically been open, seems to place the burden of proof on the party claiming openness. 24 access to criminal trials in Anglo American law running from before the Norman Conquest to the present, and it emphasized that it had not found a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country. 448 U.S. at 565, 572, 573 & n.9. Likewise, in Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1059, we found that access to civil trials at common law was beyond dispute. The tradition of open deportation hearings is simply not comparable. While the expressio unius distinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings is a tempting road to travel, we are unwilling effectively to craft a constitutional right from mere Congressional silence, especially when faced with evidence that some deportation proceedings were, and are, explicitly closed to the public or conducted in places unlikely to allow general public access. Although the 1964 Department of Justice regulations did create a presumption of openness, a recent -- and rebuttable -- regulatory presumption is hardly the stuff of which Constitutional rights are forged. The Newspapers contend, quite correctly, that at least within the geographic confines of the Third Circuit, a showing of openness at common law is not required. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 555 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding a right of access to pretrial hearings even though no right existed at common law); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 838 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding a right although no history predated 1980); Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 181, (finding a tradition of accessibility based on a recent statutory guarantee). We agree that under these decisions a 1000-year history is unnecessary, and that in some cases, largely limited to the criminal context, relatively little history is required. These cases do not, however, allow us to dispense with the Richmond Newspapers experience requirement where history is ambiguous or lacking, and to recognize a First Amendment right based solely on the logic inquiry. In Criden, 675 F.2d at 552, the defendant requested that the court conduct in camera his pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and the court acquiesced. A reporter filed suit alleging a First Amendment right to view those proceedings. 25 As Criden arose before Press-Enterprise II formalized the Richmond Newspapers test, we were not bound to apply it, and we stated that: We do not think that historical analysis is relevant in determining whether there is a first amendment right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings. We recognize that, at common law, the public apparently had no right to attend pretrial criminal proceedings. On the other hand, there was no counterpart at common law to the modern suppression hearing . . . . [W]e proceed to examine the current role of the first amendment and the societal interests in open pretrial criminal proceedings. 675 F.2d at 555. Although this language supports the Newspapers’ contention that we have overlooked the experience requirement in certain cases, it does not bind us here. Criden arose in the criminal context, where First Amendment rights of access had been found many times previously. More importantly, in Criden we were not bound to apply the Richmond Newspapers test because in Richmond Newspapers itself, no approach commanded a majority, and the Court had not yet decided Press- Enterprise II. We are now obligated to apply that test, and we have recognized that the role of history in the access determination is crucial. Capital Cities Media, 797 F.2d at 1174. The Newspapers’ reliance on our decision in Simone, 14 F.3d at 833, is similarly misplaced. The District Court believed that Simone allows us to find a First Amendment right based solely on the logic prong where there isneither a clear history of openness nor one of closure, North Jersey Media, 205 F.Supp. 2d at 300, but this greatly overstates our holding. In assessing whether there is a right of access to post-trial examinations of jury misconduct, we noted that the only available evidence postdated 1980. We recognized that evidence of such recent vintage[does] not establish a tradition of closure, Simone, 14 F.3d at 838, and concluded that the ‘experience’ prong of the ‘logic and experience’ test provides little guidance. Id. We then found a right while focusing mainly on the logic prong, but critical to that giant step was our reflection that [g]iven the 26 overwhelming historical support for access in other phases of the criminal process, we are reluctant to presume that the opposite rule applies in this case in the absence of a distinct tradition to the contrary. Id. (emphasis added). This logic effectively limits Simone’s scope to the criminal context, or at least to those areas with overwhelming historical support for access. As discussed supra, the tradition of public access in the administrative realm is inconsistent at best, so we must rigorously apply both prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test. Finally, despite our potentially misleading language in Whiteland Woods, 193 F.3d at 177, that case has no proper application here. Whiteland Woods, a real estate developer, was denied permission to videotape a Township Planning Commission meeting, and it sued for access. Although we recognized that [t]he primary issue on appeal is whether there is a federal constitutional right to videotape public meetings of a township planning commission, id. at 180 (emphasis added), we stated in passing that [w]e have no hesitation in holding Whiteland Woods had a constitutional right of access to the Planning Commission meeting. Id. at 180-81. As the Planning Commission never actually denied Whiteland Woods the access guaranteed by state law, however, our broad statement was dicta and we do not follow it here. Although we are confident that our precedents do not allow us to find a First Amendment right of access to deportation hearings absent strong historical evidence, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in FMC v. South Carolina Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. at 1864, gives us pause. In holding that state sovereign immunity bars an administrative agency from adjudicating a private party’s complaint against a nonconsenting state, the Supreme Court recognized that formalized administrative adjudications were all but unheard of  during the Framers’ time. Id. at 1872. It nevertheless found that because Federal Maritime Commission adjudications walk[ ], talk[ ], and squawk[ ] like a civil lawsuit, id. at 1873 (quoting the Court of Appeals decision), they are the type of proceedings from which the Framers would have thought the States possessed immunity when they agreed to enter the Union. 27 Id. at 1872. The Court therefore concluded that state sovereign immunity applies to administrative proceedings. Ports Authority had not been decided when the District Court heard this case, and the Newspapers now assert that it forces us to distinguish the procedures in deportation hearings from those in civil trials before finding that different rights exist in each context. Were this suggestion correct, we would indeed be hard pressed to find meaningful differences between the two types of proceedings. A deportation proceeding is commenced with a Notice to Appear, see 8 C.F.R. S 239.1, a document strongly resembling a civil complaint. In turn, a respondent may proffer affirmative defenses. See Martinez-Montoya v. INS, 904 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990). As in a civil trial, a respondent has the right to be represented by counsel of his choosing, see 8 C.F.R. S 240.3, and has the right to be present during his hearing. See 8 U.S.C.S 1229a(b)(4). He or she is also guaranteed an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence on his or her behalf. Id. While slight differences exist regarding such minor matters as the admissibility of hearsay evidence, we agree that on a procedural level, deportation hearings and civil trials are practically indistinguishable. Despite these undeniable similarities, however, we do not believe that the Supreme Court intended in Ports Authority to import the full panoply of constitutional rights to any administrative proceeding that resembles a civil trial. The Court’s reasoning was based fundamentally on its enduring presumption that the Constitution was not intended to ‘raise up’ any proceedings against the States that were ‘anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted.’  Ports Authority, 122 S.Ct. at 1872 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)). Put slightly differently, the Court started from the premise that state sovereign immunity shields nonconsenting states from complaints brought by private persons, regardless of where private persons bring those complaints. It then concluded that since Federal Maritime Commission proceedings strongly resemble civil trials to which state sovereign immunity applies, the Framers would have intended the same right to freedom from private suit to apply in each context. 28 In contrast, there is no fundamental right to attend government proceedings underpinning the Newspapers’ alleged right to attend deportation proceedings. See discussion supra. This is not a situation where the Framers contemplated a perfectly transparent government, only to have deportation proceedings, which they did not foresee, jeopardize that intended scheme. This is also not a situation involving allegations that the government assigned to an administrative agency a function that courts historically performed in order to deprive the public of an access right it once possessed. And most importantly, this is not a situation that risks affront to states’residual and inviolable sovereignty, id. at 1870 (quoting The Federalist No. 39, p. 245 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison)), the concern that motivated the Ports Authority Court. We therefore decline to loose the Ports Authority analysis from its Eleventh Amendment moorings. Instead of analogizing procedures, the proper approach is that developed in Richmond Newspapers, and as we have explained, under that test we find an insufficient tradition of openness to support the right.