Opinion ID: 6227007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Who Made the Contact

Text: ¶41 The critical first inquiry is the identity of the person with whom the jury made contact. The more important the speaker in the proceedings, or the more authoritative the speaker within the criminal justice system, the more likely we are to presume prejudice. Despite the urgings of the parties, we decline to adopt any categorical rule as to which ―court personnel‖ might trigger the presumption. This is because not all ―court personnel‖ are equal in the eyes of a jury, and the question of who made the contact is only the first step of our inquiry. ___________________________________________________________ 9 The dissent argues that we are ―develop[ing] a new balancing test to determine whether a particular instance of unauthorized jury contact triggers a presumption of prejudice.‖ See infra ¶ 130. Not so. As we explain in depth in this opinion, the balancing test comes not from our imagination, but from our case law, and specifically from past cases analyzing who said what and the circumstances of the contact. 14 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court ¶42 We are more likely to assume prejudice when a juror contact is made by an individual whose credibility the jury may need to assess. As Pike notes, such individuals include ―witnesses‖ and ―attorneys.‖ Id. And our case law is clear that outside contacts ―beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact‖ between jurors and witnesses or attorneys will trigger the presumption. Id.; see also id. at 280–81 (applying the presumption of prejudice to a brief conversation between an officer-witness and jurors because the nature of the conversation ―no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly affect the jurors [sic] judgment as to credibility‖); State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987) (holding that a four- or five-minute conversation between a juror and a key state witness about personal matters unrelated to the trial ―was more than a brief, incidental contact where only remarks of civility were exchanged‖ and thus triggered the rebuttable presumption of prejudice); Anderson, 237 P. at 944 (applying the presumption because a juror rode daily to and from the court with a witness during the threeweek trial); State v. Swain, 835 P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (applying the rebuttable presumption of prejudice when a juror and a witness talked about their high school reunion because it ―was clearly beyond the mere exchange of civility‖). ¶43 But our case law is concerned not just with the credibility of the speaker, but also their authority. We are more likely to assume prejudice when outside jury contacts are made by authoritative speakers—individuals who are neither witnesses nor advocates in the trial, whose credibility is not at issue, but who nevertheless carry greater influence over a juror than an everyday citizen. ¶44 Our cases involving jury contacts between judges and bailiffs illustrate this reasoning. For example, in State v. Maestas, we stated that ―it may be appropriate to presume prejudice‖ when ―the judge discusses substantive matters with jurors.‖ 2012 UT 46, ¶ 70, 299 P.3d 892. ―In such cases, the judge‘s communication may have influenced the jury in unknown ways that could potentially affect the outcome of the case.‖ Id. And in State v. Garcia, we said that a judge must not communicate with a juror ―on any subject connected with the trial.‖ 355 P.2d 57, 59 (Utah 1960). Ultimately, we decided in both cases that the presumption did not apply because the judge did not discuss substantive matters with the juror. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶¶ 69–70; Garcia, 355 P.2d at 59. Still, these cases stand for the well-understood premise that even though judges act as neutral arbiters whose credibility a juror need 15 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court not assess, their words carry great weight with a jury because of their authority within the courtroom. ¶45 Similarly, our court of appeals has given greater consideration to outside contacts made by bailiffs. In Logan City v. Carlsen, the court of appeals applied Pike‘s language—that contacts by ―court personnel‖ are likely to trigger the presumption of prejudice—to comments made by a bailiff to the jury regarding various courts‘ jurisdiction and sentencing authority. 799 P.2d 224, 225–27 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court noted ―how a seemingly innocent response by the bailiff to a juror‘s question opens a Pandora's box of possibilities of improper juror influence and the appearance of impropriety.‖ Id. at 226; see also State v. Ham, 2006 UT App 278, paras. 4–6 (applying Pike to a juror contact with a bailiff on the first day of trial but finding the contact to be ―incidental and brief‖); State v. Hale, 2000 UT App 297, paras. 2–4 (applying the Pike test to a comment made by a bailiff not assigned to the case but concluding the same). ¶46 The federal courts have likewise found the authority of the speaker to be relevant to Sixth Amendment analyses. In Remmer v. United States, the United States Supreme Court considered a situation in which an F.B.I. agent investigated a juror during trial in response to an alleged bribe. 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954). Although the details of what transpired between the juror and agent were unknown, the court presumed prejudice to the defendant: ―The sending of an F.B.I. agent in the midst of a trial to investigate a juror as to his conduct is bound to impress the juror and is very apt to do so unduly.‖ Id. at 229. The court continued: ―A juror must feel free to exercise his functions without the F.B.I. or anyone else looking over his shoulder.‖ Id. ¶47 Later, in Parker v. Gladden, the Court considered comments made by a bailiff to a jury suggesting that the jury should convict. 385 U.S. 363, 363–64 (1966) (per curiam). The prosecution argued that ―no harm could have resulted‖ because ten out of twelve jurors later testified to not hearing the comments. Id. at 365. The Court rejected this argument, explaining that it ―overlooks the fact that the official character of the bailiff—as an officer of the court as well as the State—beyond question carries great weight with a jury which he had been shepherding for eight days and nights.‖ Id. (emphases added). The Court also found the number of jurors potentially influenced by the comments to be of no moment: ―In any event, petitioner was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors.‖ Id. at 366. 16 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court ¶48 Citing Remmer and Parker, the Ninth Circuit has concluded that ―undue contact with a juror by a government officer almost categorically risks influencing the verdict.‖ Tarango v. McDaniel, 837 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 967 (9th Cir. 2017). In Godoy, a juror kept regular contact during trial with a ―judge friend,‖ unconnected to the case, who explained procedural details to the juror, which she in turn shared with the rest of the jury. 861 F.3d at 960. The court held that although the judge ―was not a state officer ‗entangled in this case,‘ his status as a judge is nonetheless relevant to the [presumption] inquiry.‖ Id. at 969 (citation omitted). ―The weight a judge‘s comments would carry with the jury greatly increases the risk that his advice about the case swayed its decision.‖ Id. And the court concluded that even procedural questions, ―such as why certain evidence was excluded, or how the jury was to determine guilt, could certainly influence the jury's decision.‖ Id. at 969–70. ¶49 These Utah and federal cases illustrate how communications by out-of-court personnel who nevertheless represent state authority are likely to influence a juror. On the other hand, non-authoritative court personnel, such as law clerks, administrative staff members, or cafeteria workers, are less likely to influence a juror. Yet we stop short of saying that all such individuals should be treated the same as average laypeople in the presumption analysis. Say, for example, a juror conversed with the court librarian about whether the trial judge tends to give harsh sentences to criminal defendants. A court might rightly conclude that the librarian‘s answer is more likely to influence the juror than if the juror had asked a person on the street. ¶50 To summarize, Pike provides a convenient springboard for the who analysis—statements by ―witnesses, attorneys or court personnel‖ are more likely to influence a juror.10 712 P.2d at 280. ___________________________________________________________ 10 Pike itself implies that it did not intend to declare a brightline rule. At one point, the opinion states: ―The rule in this jurisdiction is that improper juror contact with witnesses or parties raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice.‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 280 (emphasis added). But it also says: ―We have long taken a strict approach in assuring that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial not be compromised by improper contacts between jurors and witnesses, attorneys, or court personnel.‖ Id. at 279 (emphasis added). We take this potentially conflicting rule language to suggest what (continued . . .) 17 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court Still, not all ―court personnel‖ are the same. Those who represent state authority—in particular, the authority of the criminal justice system—are more likely to ―consciously or unconsciously . . . influence the judgment of the juror.‖ Anderson, 237 P. at 943. Whereas run-of-the-mill court employees are less likely to do so. The State and the dissent both resist this conclusion and propose categorical rules limiting the scope of ―court personnel.‖ We find their arguments unpersuasive. ¶51 The State argues that the patrolman and the IT technician were ―court personnel‖ but not ―court participants—individuals participating in the proceedings.‖ This distinction matters to the State because it views this court‘s precedent as limited to comments made to the jury by trial or in-court participants: witnesses, attorneys, and courtroom staff. And it asks us to not ―extend‖ our case law to include court personnel not involved in the case the jury must decide. ¶52 We reject the State‘s argument for three reasons. First, the State essentially asks us to limit our precedents to their facts. But we have explained that stare decisis ―requires us to extend a precedent to the conclusion mandated by its rationale,‖ not its facts. Pleasant Grove v. Terry, 2020 UT 69, ¶ 41, 478 P.3d 1026 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 58, 416 P.3d 663. The rationale of our improper-contacts cases draws no categorical distinction between in-court and out-of-court personnel. ¶53 Second, the State points to our statement in State v. Allen that the presumption ―only applies when the contact is between a juror and other court participants, not jurors and third parties unrelated to the proceedings.‖ 2005 UT 11, ¶ 51, 108 P.3d 730. However, the court made that statement in response to the defendant‘s argument that, given the public nature of the trial, a juror‘s contact with her spouse somehow amounted to contact with ―court personnel.‖ See id. at ¶¶ 51–53. Thus, that statement was meant to highlight the chasm of difference between juror contacts with truly disinterested parties—such as a spouse—and juror contacts with individuals participating in a proceeding or we expressly expound today: that ―court personnel‖ will often carry greater weight in the improper contacts analysis than the everyday citizen, but it still comes down to who said what and the circumstances. 18 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court representing the authority of the state courts system. Further, and as we elucidate below, we cannot conceive or concede that an individual who is not an active participant in the proceedings, but who is still an authoritative figure within the criminal justice system, would necessarily be ―unrelated to the proceedings.‖ Cf. UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (―Conduct that compromises or appears to compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge undermines public confidence in the judiciary.‖). ¶54 Third, the State‘s position would invite the appearance of impropriety. To say that comments to a juror by a judge, bailiff, or police officer not affiliated with the proceedings are tantamount to those made by an everyday citizen would not keep the purity of the jury ―above suspicion.‖ See Anderson, 237 P. at 944; see also UTAH CODE JUD. CONDUCT R. 1.2 (―A judge should act at all times in a manner that promotes—and shall not undermine—public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.‖); supra ¶¶ 33, 37. ¶55 The court of appeals‘ example colorfully illustrates the absurdity of the State‘s proposal: ―Consider a hypothetical encounter where another trial court judge enters a nonpublic, court-employee elevator with the jury and urges the jury to convict the defendant because, in the judge‘s experience, criminal defendants are ‗almost always‘ guilty and deserve to be convicted ‗99 times out of 100.‘‖ State v. Soto, 2018 UT App 147, ¶ 16 n.2, 427 P.3d 1286. Under the State‘s view, that behavior would not trigger a rebuttable presumption of prejudice because the judge was not a ―participant[] in the case the jurors must decide.‖ Nor would it matter to the State if the entire Utah Supreme Court, robes and all, were in the elevator and said the same thing to a juror. We agree with the court of appeals that ―such an encounter . . . would surely violate the right to an impartial jury and trigger the rebuttable presumption of prejudice‖ because of the perceived authority of the judge (or justices) as agents of state power. See id. ¶56 Similar to the State, the dissent argues that Pike used the term ‖court personnel‖ as ―a synonym for court participants or courtroom personnel.‖ Infra ¶ 134. The dissent acknowledges that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice attaches when jurors have ―unauthorized contact‖ with ―witnesses, attorneys or court personnel.‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. But the dissent does not believe that the facts of Soto‘s case implicate this rule because the highway patrolman and IT technician were not ―court participants or 19 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court courtroom personnel.‖ Infra ¶¶ 133–34. Like the State‘s argument, this reading is narrower than ours, see supra ¶¶ 50, 50 n.10, and we similarly reject it. ¶57 We believe that the dissent‘s underlying rationale for its narrow interpretation of ―court personnel‖ is also inconsistent with our case law. The dissent posits that such individuals are not more likely to trigger the presumption of prejudice because they have no stake in the outcome of the trial or because a juror never needs to assess their credibility or determine their rights. Infra ¶¶ 113, 135–37. Yet Utah courts have repeatedly assessed juror contacts with judges or bailiffs under a more heightened standard than they use for juror contacts with ordinary citizens. Supra ¶¶ 44–45. The federal courts have likewise done so under the Sixth Amendment, including juror contacts with other government agents. Supra ¶¶ 46–48. Under the dissent‘s theory, these cases all should have treated the contacts as no different from juror contacts with everyday citizens because the court personnel involved had no interest in the outcome of the trial or because the jurors never needed to assess the credibility of, or decide the rights of, such individuals. ¶58 Besides disagreeing with our reading of the case law in this area, the dissent also relies on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47(l) in its analysis. See infra ¶¶ 113, 122. Indeed, it bases its analytical framework for its three rules of jury contact on our rules of procedure. Compare UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(l) (―There shall be no offthe-record communication between jurors and lawyers, parties, witnesses or persons acting on their behalf.‖), with Dissent I.A (―Jurors and trial participants must not communicate outside of the trial‖); compare UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(l) (while the jury is deliberating, ―they shall be kept together,‖ and ―the officer having them under [his or her] charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them‖), with Dissent I.C (―During deliberations, the jury may not separate or communicate with anyone‖); compare UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(l) (―Jurors shall not communicate with any person regarding a subject of the trial.‖), with Dissent I.B (―Jurors may not have off-the-record communications with any person about a subject of the trial‖). While our rules provide useful guidelines for juror behavior, they do not and cannot supplant our case law interpreting the breadth of the constitutional right to trial ―by an impartial jury.‖ UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Nor do the rules prescribe the remedy for their violation. 20 Cite as: 2022 UT 9 Opinion of the Court ¶59 Fortunately, rule 47(l)‘s limitations on outside communications are broader than our constitutional limits and thus create no constitutional problems. Most notably, rule 47(l) prohibits a juror from communicating with “any person regarding a subject of the trial.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 47(l) (emphasis added). This rule prescribes a noble standard of juror behavior, but it does not tell us when a court must presume prejudice from such communication. To answer that question, we must look to our case law. For example, a juror‘s communication with her spouse about a procedural matter of the trial did not trigger the presumption because of the unimportance of who communicated with the juror. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, ¶¶ 47, 53. Conversely, a bailiff‘s comments to a juror regarding sentencing triggered the presumption, in part because of the importance of who made the communication. Carlsen, 799 P.2d at 226. ¶60 Similarly, rule 47(l)‘s prohibition on all ―off-the-record communication between jurors and lawyers, parties, witnesses or persons acting on their behalf‖ does not tell us when we should presume prejudice for its violation. Our cases explain we will presume prejudice when such a communication ―goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact.‖ Pike, 712 P.2d at 280. We further explain this below when we address what was said. ¶61 In short, the dissent‘s reliance on rule 47(l) is misplaced.11 When deciding whether a juror contact with an outsider triggers the rebuttable presumption of prejudice, we do not apply rule 47(l). We instead analyze who said what and under what circumstances. At the threshold inquiry—who communicated with the juror—we consider both the extent that the individual‘s credibility must be weighed by the jury and the individual‘s authority within the criminal justice system at large. The more at issue the speaker‘s credibility is, or the more authoritative the speaker, the more likely we are to apply the presumption of prejudice. ___________________________________________________________ 11To the extent the rule has any play in this matter, its broad prohibitions on juror contacts cut against the dissent‘s narrow proposed application of the presumption. 21 STATE v. SOTO Opinion of the Court