Opinion ID: 1702948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether as a matter of law the grant of injunctive relief by the trial court was erroneous based on sustaining appellees' motion for summary judgment.

Text: ¶ 26. The Reynoldses fail to expand on this point of error other than to simply assert once again that genuine issues of material fact do exist. They cite no authorities. This Court has frequently held that an argument unsupported by cited authority need not be considered by the Court. See, e.g., Hankins v. Hankins, 729 So.2d 1283, 1286 (Miss.1999); Drennan v. State, 695 So.2d 581, 585-86 (Miss.1997); Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss. 1994). However, we have already determined that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that summary judgment was properly granted. We further find that the chancellor's grant of a permanent injunction was supported by the evidence. ¶ 27. The Reynoldses allege that genuine issues of material fact are raised by their own assertions and by the affidavits of their experts. However, they identify no specific material facts as being in dispute but instead address only the legal significance of the undisputed facts. Mere allegations which do not reveal detailed and precise facts will not prevent the award of summary judgment. Ellis v. Powe, 645 So.2d 947, 952 (Miss.1994) (quoting Brown v. Credit Ctr., Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983)). A deposition or affidavit relied upon in an attempt to show that summary judgment was wrongfully granted must do more than make general assertions and legal conclusions which do not give rise to a genuine issue of material fact. Liberty Leasing Co. v. Hillsum Sales Corp., 380 F.2d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir.1967). Such are the types of allegations, assertions, and conclusions which have been presented by the Reynoldses. Therefore, this Court finds that the motions for summary judgment were properly granted. ¶ 28. Further, we find that the permanent injunction was supported by the evidence. To obtain a permanent injunction, a party must show an imminent threat of irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law. City of Water Valley v. Trusty, 343 So.2d 471, 472 (Miss.1977). In the present case it is undisputed that on or about October 1, 1988, the date of expiration of the surface lease, Buel Reynolds, claiming that Hess no longer had the authority to utilize the equipment or the surface of his lands, shut down the pumps at Plant No. 6. In granting the preliminary and permanent injunctions, the trial court was apparently satisfied with Hess's showing of the magnitude of the potential irreparable harm that would have occurred as a result of Reynolds's actions. According to Hess, if the water injection plant is peremptorily shut down, the Reynoldses' property as well as other nearby property could be irreparably harmed from saltwater spills. Also, a disruption in the operation of the saltwater injection plant would require Hess to shut down all producing wells affected by the plant, resulting in damage to the entire project and to the oil reservoir. This Court has previously recognized that an oil and gas lessee is entitled to injunctive relief when a surface owner interferes with its operations. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ada Oil Co., 279 So.2d 622, 625 (Miss.1973); Pace v. State ex rel. Rice, 191 Miss. 780, 4 So.2d 270, 279 (1941). Hess met its burden in showing the immediacy of the threat of irreparable harm. Furthermore, Hess and Denbury would have no adequate remedy at law to prevent Reynolds and his successors from continuing this harmful action. Therefore, the permanent injunction was properly granted.