Opinion ID: 471615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kunaknana and Gambell II.

Text: 12 In Kunaknana v. Clark, 742 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.1984), we read section 810(a) as requiring notice and public hearings if the agency first concludes that the contemplated action may significantly restrict subsistence uses. Id. at 1151 (emphasis added). 13 The inference to be drawn from [the phrase which would significantly restrict subsistence uses] is that Congress intended a two-step process: first, the agency determines whether the contemplated action may significantly restrict subsistence use; if it may, the agency must comply with the notice and hearing procedures. This construction of the statute is a reasonable one, relying on the plain meaning of the words of the statute. 14 Id. 15 Although the Kunaknana court was not called upon specifically to decide when section 810(a)(1)-(3) procedures would be required, its analysis has subsequently formed the basis for a holding in this circuit. 16 In People of the Village of Gambell v. Hodel (Gambell II), 774 F.2d 1414 (9th Cir.1985), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2274, 90 L.Ed.2d 717 (1986), the Secretary's section 810(a) evaluation indicated that development and production of the proposed lease sale may significantly restrict subsistence uses in certain areas. Id. at 1422. The court held that under Kunaknana the Secretary's finding required that he proceed with the notice and hearing procedures under section 810(a)(1)-(3). Id. 17 Moreover, the argument that the Secretary makes here was presented in nearly identical form to the Gambell II court: 18 Interior has interpreted the language of Section 810 to require a likelihood of a significant restriction to be evident before the procedures of Subsections 810(a)(1)-(3) come into play. Thus, it found here that given the low probability that oil will be found, these possible restrictions [at the production stage] are not likely to occur, even locally, as a result of the sale .... It also found that significant restrictions on subsistence at the exploration stage are not likely     .... 19 Secretary's Brief at 26, Gambell II. 20 The Gambell II court rejected the Secretary's view that section 810(a)(1)-(3) procedures required a likelihood of significant subsistence restrictions, and, on findings not meaningfully different than those here, concluded that the Secretary was required to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of the statute. We believe that Gambell II governs this case, and that the district court did not err in determining that appellants had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the Secretary had failed to comply with the notice and hearing requirements of section 810(a)(1)-(3). 21