Opinion ID: 854141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Consumer Transactions in Real Property

Text: McKinney contends that the subject of the consumer transaction in this case is real property, and as a result intent is required, even if it is not an element of every claim under the Act. McKinney cites § 4(c) and contends that for consumer transactions in real property, [7] only the attorney general may bring an action under the Act and he may seek relief only for incurable deceptive acts. Although we agree with McKinney's construction of § 4(c), we conclude that the transaction in this case was not a transaction in real property. Accordingly, the State was not required to allege or prove intent. Section 4(c) reads in part: The attorney general may bring an action to enjoin a deceptive act. However, the attorney general may seek to enjoin patterns of incurable deceptive acts with respect to consumer transactions in real property. Taken literally, this section does not seem to prohibit the attorney general from enjoining deceptive acts involving consumer transactions in real property. On its face, it simply expressly permits the attorney general to enjoin incurable deceptive acts involving real property. As a matter of syntax, the first sentence is a blanket grant of authority that is not explicitly diminished by the second sentence. However, the second sentence has no meaning unless it is taken as a restriction on the attorney general's authority as to real estate transactions. This conclusion is supported by the Act's legislative history. Until 1982 the Act applied to consumer transactions in goods or services. IND.CODE § 24-5-0.5-2(1) (1976). In 1982, this was changed to personal property, real property, intangibles or services. 1982 Ind. Acts, P.L. 152, § 1. At the time the General Assembly subjected real estate to the Act, it also added the provisions giving unique treatment to real estate transactions. The following sentence was added to § 4(a), which established a cause of action for consumers who rely on a deceptive act: This subsection does not apply to a consumer transaction in real property, except for purchases of time shares and camping club memberships. The same language was added to § 4(b), which authorizes class actions against suppliers. Section 4(c), which authorizes actions by the attorney general, was also changed. Before 1982 § 4(c) stated simply: The attorney general ... may bring an action to enjoin a deceptive act. The General Assembly added the following sentence: However, the attorney general may seek to enjoin patterns of incurable deceptive acts with respect to consumer transactions in real property. We can see no purpose to this additional sentence except to reflect the legislature's intent to limit the attorney general's authority under the Act as to the newly included category of real property. Accordingly, although the Amendment was inartfully drafted, we conclude that McKinney is correct that § 4(c) limits the authority of the attorney general in consumer transactions involving real property to seeking relief only for incurable deceptive acts. [8]