Opinion ID: 2550813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Juror Tonya Staten-McFarland

Text: Defense counsel also contends that the trial court erred by granting the State's challenge of Tonya Staten-McFarland. According to defense counsel, the State did not establish a valid basis under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 798 to dismiss McFarland. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 798 states in pertinent part: It is good cause for challenge on the part of the state, but not on the part of the defendant, that: (2) The juror tendered in a capital case who has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment and makes it known: (a) That he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him. Here, early in voir dire, Ms. McFarland made it known that, while she does not find the death penalty morally objectionable, she believes that a life sentence is a more severe punishment. When questioned by the defense counsel, Ms. McFarland stated that she would be more likely to impose a life sentence because it would subject the defendant to more suffering. Later, during further questioning by the defense counsel, the following exchange took place: [Counsel]: . . . If you found somebody guilty of first degree murder, then are you saying that you would pretty much already have your mind made up on what the penalty should be? The penalty phase would be decided at the verdict phase? That is once you found a person guilty of first degree murder, you would have already made up in your mind what the penalty would be? McFarland: Yes, sir. [Counsel]: Because it is your belief that anytime somebody is found guilty of first degree murder, then that life would be the appropriate penalty, not becausebecause you feel that life is a more severe penalty than death? McFarland: Yes. [Counsel]: Now, let me ask you this, though. Would it be possible for you to consider both life and death or is life the only penalty that you would consider? McFarland: Life. The trial court granted the State's cause challenge of Ms. McFarland finding that she was unable to consider rendering a death verdict. Defendant's issue with this ruling appears to be that Ms. McFarland did not demonstrate conscientious scruples against the death penalty because she has no moral objection to it, therefore, the challenge did not meet the requirements of Article 798. However, given that Ms. McFarland clearly stated that she would automatically vote for a life sentence after the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder, and would not consider the possibility of the death sentence, it appears she was properly excluded. See, Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770 (holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded).