Opinion ID: 706003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Federal Jurisdiction

Text: 12 Both Sherlin and Teague argue that the district court erred in failing to dismiss the arson and conspiracy counts for lack of federal jurisdiction. They claim that their alleged act of arson did not involve interstate commerce and was not within the powers granted by the U.S. Constitution pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. 13 In part, Sherlin and Teague were charged with violating section 844(i) of Title 18 of the United States Code, which stated the following in pertinent part at the time the Defendants committed the offense, were convicted and sentenced: 14 Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years or fined not more than $10,000, or both; and if personal injury results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection, shall be imprisoned for not more than twenty years or fined not more than $20,000, or both.... 15 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i) (1988) (emphasis added). 16 First, Sherlin and Teague rely on Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859-60, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 2456-57, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985), which held that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i) indicated that Congress intended to protect all business property, and to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause to that end. The Defendants contend that Ellis Hall was not a business, nor was it connected to a business in the normal sense of the word. Thus, they claim that the alleged arson was not encompassed by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i), and that consequently, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the arson charges. 17 Contrary to the Defendants' assertion, we find that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i) to encompass acts of arson such as the malicious burning of Ellis Hall. The plain language of the statute prohibits the malicious destruction, by means of fire, of any building ... used ... in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i). Ellis Hall was clearly a building, and the evidence adduced at trial was more than sufficient to establish that Ellis Hall was used in an activity affecting interstate commerce. 18 At trial, Dr. Paul Conn, the CEO of Lee College, testified that Lee College was in the business of providing educational services at the undergraduate level[;] people pay us money to teach them and provide them with college credit. He also testified that Lee College advertised out-of-state. As a result, Lee College had over 2,000 full-time students when the fire occurred and eighty-six percent of those students were from out-of-state. Significantly, the seventy-six students living in the Ellis Hall dormitory at the time of the fire were residents of twenty-one different states. Only four of the Ellis Hall residents were from Tennessee; the other seventy-two were from other states and countries. 19 Dr. Conn also noted that Lee College purchased numerous supplies from out-of-state. For example, approximately $1,000,000 worth of out-of-state food services was supplied by the Washington, D.C.-based Marriott Corporation. 20 Clearly, the educational business of Lee College was an activity affecting interstate commerce, and Ellis Hall was a building used in that activity. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i). Thus, the plain language of the statute encompassed the Defendants' act of arson. 21 At oral argument, the Defendants raised another fundamental challenge to the court's jurisdiction. Relying on United States v. Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), the Defendants contended that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i) exceeded the authority of Congress under the U.S. Constitution to regulate commerce among the several states. U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. In Lopez, a 12th-grade student, who carried a concealed handgun into his high school, was charged with violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993). Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1626. The Supreme Court found problematic that the statute neither regulate[d] a commercial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. Id. With regard to the latter point, the Court noted that 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(q) did not contain a jurisdictional element, which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affect[ed] interstate commerce. Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1631. Thus, the Court held that the statute exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause [t]o regulate the Commerce ... among the several States, U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3. Lopez, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1626. 22 Unlike the unconstitutional statute in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i) does contain a jurisdictional element, which ensures, through proper inquiry, that the arson in question affects interstate commerce. The statute specifically requires that the burned building must have been used in interstate ... commerce or used ... in an activity affecting interstate ... commerce. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i). Thus, Lopez is distinguished from the present case, and we find that Congress did not exceed its authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted 18 U.S.C. Sec. 844(i). In sum, the district court's jurisdiction over this matter was proper.