Opinion ID: 877465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: right to jury trial on death penalty aspect of crime

Text: Issues HH and PP claim that Coleman has a right to a jury trial on the death penalty aspects of this case. In Issue HH, he claims that the jury should have the final right to determine whether he should live or die. By Issue PP, he claims that the jury should have the right to determine the presence or absence of both aggravating factors and mitigating factors. He has raised only one of these issues before, Issue PP, and this Court in Coleman II, ruled against him. 605 P.2d 1015 to 1018. I dissented. 605 P.2d 1022. By adopting verbatim the findings and conclusions prepared and presented by the State, the trial court, of course, decided against him. (See Appendix, Issues HH and PP of sentencing judge's order.) In part IV of its omnibus ruling disposing of 27 issues, this Court today rules against him, without ever discussing the issue as to whether the jury should be the ultimate sentencing authority in a capital case. Contrary to the implied assumption of the majority opinion, this issue is not foreclosed. In Lockett v. Ohio, supra, Lockett claims that she had a right to a jury trial on all issues and that a jury should decide the ultimate issue of life or death. The United States Supreme Court, however, vacated the death sentence on other grounds, and expressly reversed judgment on this issue. 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973. The court expressly noted in footnote 10: nor do we address her contention that the Constitution requires that the death penalty be imposed by a jury ... If the death penalty can be called civilized, the only way it can remain so within concepts of contemporary community standards, is to require the jury to make that final, fateful decision. In Humphrey v. Cady (1972), 405 U.S. 504, 509, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052, 31 L.Ed.2d 394, the United States Supreme Court recognized that in determining facts and being involved in capital sentencing the jury serves the critical function of introducing into the process a lay judgment, reflecting values generally held in a community. Later, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 the Court recognized the need to involve the juries in the capital sentencing process as a significant and reliable index of contemporary values. 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859. And eight years earlier, the Supreme Court stated that jury involvement in a capital case serves to maintain a link between contemporary values and the penalty system  a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect `the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 520, n. 15, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1775, n. 15, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, n. 15. In my dissent in Coleman II, I briefly set out my views as to why a jury should be involved in the sentencing process in a capital case, and why a jury should make the final and fateful decision whether a defendant should live or die. 605 P.2d at 1045. My experience since then, in dealing with the capital cases that have been and are now before this Court for review, has convinced me even more of the correctness of this view. In addition to what I stated there, all that I have stated concerning the procedural irregularities and errors that took place before the trial, during trial, and after trial (during the sentencing process) should be considered. The final blow to Coleman in his application for post-conviction relief, came when the trial court adopted verbatim the proposed findings and conclusions presented by the State of Montana, denying any relief to Coleman, and affirming all that the trial court had done before. Combine all the errors or irregularities taking place during the history of this case, and I do not believe too many appellate courts could state in good conscience that Coleman has been granted due process of law sufficient to sustain constitutional attack. Add to that the fact that we are dealing with a death penalty case, and I don't think any appellate court could state in good conscience that Coleman has been granted due process of law. In effect, by refusing to discuss or even identify any of the substantive issues raised by Coleman in his petition for post-conviction relief, the majority here has done nothing more than rubber-stamp the findings and conclusions of the trial court and those findings and conclusions came straight from the State of Montana's typewriter.