Opinion ID: 2615512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Part Four: Standing and the Great Public Importance Doctrine

Text: {21} Plaintiffs correctly point out that where plaintiffs do not have standing due to direct and personal harm to their status as citizens, taxpayers, voters, or on any other grounds, this Court has occasionally granted standing under the doctrine of great public importance. However, the fact that a case involves a duty that state officials owe to the general public as a whole is not sufficient to show that the case involves an issue of great public importance. Recent cases in which this Court has granted standing under the great public importance doctrine have generally involved clear threats to the essential nature of state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their Constitutiona government in which the three distinct departments, ... legislative, executive, and judicial, remain within the bounds of their constitutional powers. N.M. Const. art. III, § 1. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sandel v. New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm'n, 1999-NMSC-019, ¶ 11, 127 N.M. 272, 980 P.2d 55 (holding that the commission's order exceeded its statutory authority and unlawfully intruded upon the province of the Legislature); State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, ¶¶ 22-25, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768 (holding that the Governor's actions encroached on constitutional prerogative of the Legislature to make substantive law); Johnson, 120 N.M. at 573, 904 P.2d at 22 (The Governor may not exercise power that as a matter of state constitutional law infringes on the power properly belonging to the legislature.); State ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing Bd., 119 N.M. 12, 15, 888 P.2d 458, 461 (1995) (holding that Article XIX, Section 1 prohibits the Legislature from exceeding its authority by logrolling proposed constitutional amendments); State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 364, 524 P.2d 975, 980 (1974) (holding that, with executive veto power, the Governor may not properly distort legislative appropriations or arrogate unto himself the power of making appropriations). In such cases, this Court exercises jurisdiction as a matter of controlling necessity, State ex rel. Owen v. Van Stone, 17 N.M. 41, 47, 121 P. 611, 613 (1912), because the conduct at issue affects, in a fundamental way, `the sovereignty of the state, its franchises or prerogatives, or the liberties of its people,' Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 492, 71 P.2d 140, 151 (1937) (quoting Van Stone, 17 N.M. at 46, 121 P. at 612). {22} Issues of such constitutional moment are not present in this case. We note that the Arizona Supreme Court recently reached the same conclusion in a similar Indian gaming case. See Sears, 961 P.2d at 1020 (Unlike those unique [Arizona] cases discussed above, this action does not present issues of such great public importance that we should waive standing.). Here, Plaintiffs do not dispute that HB 399 was duly passed by both houses of the Legislature and that the Governor duly signed the bill into law. For this reason and for the reasons we discuss below, we decline to recognize the district court's grant of standing to Plaintiffs under the great public importance doctrine. {23} Plaintiffs next allege that HB 399's provision for revenue sharing between the gaming Tribes and Pueblos and the state amounts to a bribe, and citing the Magna Carta, Plaintiffs contend that the Legislature and the Governor have engaged in a prohibited sale of legal favors by passing and signing HB 399 into law. Additionally, Plaintiffs broadly accuse the Governor of conspiring or conniving to establish casino gambling throughout New Mexico. Further, even though they seek the same relief granted by this Court in Johnson, Plaintiffs suggest that revenue sharing under HB 399 infringe[s] the judicial power because courts will refuse to penalize the State by limit[ing] Indian gaming through an adverse ruling. {24} We agree with Plaintiffs that threats to the integrity of state government might very well justify an exercise of this Court's jurisdiction as a matter of controlling necessity when such threats affect, in a fundamental way, the state's definition of itself as sovereign. In none of Plaintiffs' allegations, however, do they identify specific conduct by any member of the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of state government that is illegal or fraudulent. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the Legislature at any time may legalize or criminalize gambling. It appears that Plaintiffs' allegations result simply from a difference of opinion with the Legislature and the Governor over the legalization of Indian gaming. As we have said on many occasions, however, it is not the province of this Court to question the wisdom, policy, or justness of legislation enacted by our Legislature. Madrid v. St. Joseph Hosp., 1996-NMSC-064, ¶ 10, 122 N.M. 524, 928 P.2d 250; see also 55 C.J.S. Mandamus § 155 (1998) (noting that mandamus ordinarily will not lie for legislative actions requiring the exercise of judgment and discretion); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 3-20, at 152-53 (2d ed.1988) (concluding that an individual legislator does not have any special interest. . . in challenging the constitutionality of a law duly passed over his or her objection). Similarly, we will not second-guess the Governor's decision to sign or veto bills passed by the Legislature. See State of New Mexico ex rel. American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-031, Vol. 38, No. 33, SBB 15 (order denying mandamus petition, citing separation of powers principles and stating that [t]his Court cannot override the Governor's vetoes). Thus, we decline Plaintiffs' invitation to transform the doctrine of great public importance into a justification for eviscerating the principle that a writ of mandamus lies only to force a clear legal right against one having a clear legal duty to perform an act. Brantley Farms, 1998-NMCA-023, ¶ 16, 124 N.M. 698, 954 P.2d 763. Nor will we allow Plaintiffs' invocation of the great public interest doctrine to blind us to traditional standards of justiciability. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (listing common characteristics used in determining what constitutes a nonjusticiable `political question'). Plaintiffs' generalized insinuations of governmental wrongdoing do not set forth a clear legal duty to perform the actions they seek in this case, and Plaintiffs' oblique references to the Magna Carta and the people's right of self-government do not provide judicially manageable standards which the Court can utilize in order to determine the lawfulness of HB 399. We therefore view the foregoing claims as insufficient for review under the great public importance doctrine. {25} Plaintiffs do not have standing to assert any of their remaining claims. Plaintiffs contend on behalf of the state that no contracts were formed between the State and the tribes ... because there was no meeting of the minds on the essential terms of the contracts, and they further contend that many or most of the Tribes and Pueblos have breached the contracts by not paying the revenues specified under the gaming compacts negotiated pursuant to HB 399. As this Court noted in Burg, however, `in cases where the state, as such, is directly interested as a party, the attorney general should apply for the writ, or in some manner signify his [or her] assent to the proceeding.' 31 N.M. at 585, 249 P. at 246 (quoting with approval State ex rel. Dakota Hail Ass'n v. Carey, 2 N.D. 36, 49 N.W. 164, 165 (1891)). Here, the Attorney General not only has not applied for or assented to the writ sought by Plaintiffs, but in fact has been named as a defendant by Plaintiffs. As we have discussed, there is no basis for Plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general, and our Rule 1-019 analysis precludes Plaintiffs from advancing claims that so heavily implicate the rights and duties of the Tribes and Pueblos under the gaming compacts when the Tribes and Pueblos cannot be joined as parties to the litigation. We are confident that the Attorney General can well represent the state on the foregoing claims raised by Plaintiffs, in her discretion. {26} Finally, Plaintiffs argue both that HB 399 discriminates against non-Indian citizens and entities who want to engage in the business of casino gambling, contrary to Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, and also that HB 399 violates the constitutional right of Indian tribes and tribal enterprises to be free from state taxation under Article XXI, Section 2 of our constitution. While these rights may be personal in nature instead of merely abstract, they do not belong to Plaintiffs but to individual non-Indians who might be interested in casino gambling operations and to Indians who may view the revenue-sharing provisions of HB 399 as a tax. Citing Doe v. Roman Catholic Church of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe, Inc., 1996-NMCA-094, 122 N.M. 307, 924 P.2d 273, Plaintiffs advance the broad proposition that plaintiffs can assert the rights of third persons. That argument is unavailing in this case because Plaintiffs' evident opposition to all forms of legalized casino gambling is antithetical to the interests of the parties whom Plaintiffs seek to represent. See id. ¶ 34 (recognizing that the fact that a person does not choose to litigate a personal right does not mean that any officious third party should be granted standing to litigate that right); see also New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 14, 126 N.M. 788, 975 P.2d 841 (holding that physicians and reproductive health care providers had standing to assert the rights of their patients because, among other things, the physicians and health care providers had a close relation to the Medicaid-eligible women whose rights they seek to assert in court).