Opinion ID: 2109125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Manner of the Investigatory Stop

Text: In determining whether an investigatory stop is in actuality an arrest requiring probable cause, courts consider the totality of the circumstances. See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 375, 735 A.2d 491, 501 (1999); United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 632 (9th Cir.1981). Under the totality of circumstances, no one factor is dispositive. See Ferris v. State, 355 Md. at 376, 735 A.2d at 501. For example, a police officer's pointing a gun at a suspect does not necessarily convert an investigatory stop into an arrest. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838-39 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that defendant was not under arrest when officers approached his vehicle with guns drawn and ordered him out of the car); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 708-709 (9th Cir.1983) (holding that the encounter was an investigatory stop and not an arrest when police approached suspects with drawn guns after having been warned that the suspects were dangerous). Likewise, an investigatory stop is not elevated automatically into an arrest because the officers handcuffed the suspect. See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1211, 103 S.Ct. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 447 (1983) (finding that, under the circumstances, placing suspect in handcuffs was justified when police believed another suspect was close by and at large). In short, an investigatory stop will not be transformed into an arrest when the officers take reasonable measures to neutralize the risk of physical harm and to determine whether the person in question is armed. Alvarez, 899 F.2d at 838. In Alvarez, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether an investigatory stop was escalated to an arrest requiring probable cause when the defendant was forced to exit his car at gunpoint. Id. at 838. The court said: The Supreme Court has permitted limited intrusions on a suspect's liberty during a Terry stop to protect the officer's safety; a police officer may take reasonable measures to neutralize the risk of physical harm and to determine whether the person in question is armed. In this circuit it has been held that `the use of force does not convert the [investigatory] stop into an arrest if it occurs under circumstances justifying fears of personal safety.' Id. (citations omitted). In Lee v. State, 311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235 (1988), this Court considered whether a forceful Terry stop was an unconstitutional seizure. Id. at 661, 537 A.2d at 244. The police conducted what is sometimes referred to as a hard take down. They ordered the suspects to lie on the ground and pointed weapons at them. We noted that the test, one of reasonableness, balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. Id. (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228, 105 S.Ct. at 680, 83 L.Ed.2d 604). We held that although the nature of the subject intrusion was substantial, the brief but forceful detention of the suspects was constitutionally justified by reasonable suspicion under the circumstances. Lee, 311 Md. at 667, 537 A.2d at 247. In weighing the intrusion on the suspects' liberty against the governmental interest in effective crime detection and prevention, we reasoned as follows: The determinative element in the balancing process here is that the police reasonably suspected that Lee and Hall were armed and dangerous. On one side of the scales the nature of the subject intrusion was substantial. Petitioners were ordered to lie on the ground and weapons, including shotguns, were pointed at them. On the other side of the scale is the governmental interest in effective crime detection and crime prevention. Petitioners not only were suspected of an earlier robbery and attempted murder but also of then carrying a concealed weapon. This is buttressed by the State's interest in protecting the safety of the officers and the other persons on the basketball court, toward whom no suspicion had been directed. Further, the intrusion, though substantial in degree, was brief in duration. No more than two minutes elapsed from the time the officers moved in until petitioners were advised they were under arrest. The police located both suspects at the place where the informant said they would be. The problem was that, to get close enough to the suspects to investigate, one or more police officers would have to have made an approach across a parking lot or tennis courts or both, or from around surrounding buildings, and go onto the outdoor basketball court. It is extremely unlikely that one or more strangers in that high crime area could saunter up to the basketball court and be considered by the suspects as potential recruits for a pick up game. Yet, if the petitioners became alarmed they might go for the pistol which was said to be in the bag a few feet from them. Consequently, Sergeant Straughan decided on a show of force to control the situation and minimize the risks. Under the circumstances that was reasonable. Id. at 661-62, 537 A.2d at 244. Important to our conclusion was the notion that the police display of weapons did not per se elevate a seizure to one requiring probable cause. Id. at 664, 537 A.2d at 245 (citing United States v. Doffin, 791 F.2d 118 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861, 107 S.Ct. 210, 93 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L.Ed.2d 286 (1983); United States v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 1453, 71 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982)). We also noted that the ordering of the suspects to lie on the basketball court did not convert the investigative stop into a seizure requiring probable cause. Id. at 665-666, 537 A.2d at 246, and cases cited therein. Judge Rodowsky, writing for the Court in Lee, quoted with approval from People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14, 431 N.Y.S.2d 485, 409 N.E.2d 958 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1018, 101 S.Ct. 582, 66 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980), where police officers encountered a person whom they suspected of having just received a handgun used in a street robbery. The Court of Appeals of New York held that a police officer may order a defendant and his cohort to lie on the ground to conduct a stop and frisk where there is probable cause to arrest the cohort for armed robbery and reasonable suspicion that the cohort passed a weapon to defendant. Id. at 962. In reaching its conclusion, the court was sensitive to the competing interests of individuals to be free from interference and the obligations of law enforcement. The court said: Street encounters between private citizens and law enforcement officers are inherently troublesome. This is so because two competing, yet equally compelling, considerations inevitably clash, to wit: the indisputable right of persons to be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers and the nondelegable duty placed squarely on the shoulders of law enforcement officers to make the streets reasonably safe for us all. While in an ideal society the two might never clash, a quick glance through our newspapers reveals that our society is far from perfect. Thus, the judiciary is put to the task of balancing these competing considerations, so that they can reasonably coexist. Id. at 960. Balancing the competing interests, the court reasoned that by ordering the two men to lie on the ground, the police officer did no more than maintain the status quo until additional information could be elicited. Further, the single question posed by [one of the officers present]'Where is the gun?'was certainly justified in order to protect the officers' welfare. Id. at 962-63. Finally, the New York court rejected the notion that drawn guns elevated the stop and frisk to an arrest. The court found that because the officers had reason to believe that one of the suspects had shortly before committed a robbery and was armed with a revolver, they were justified in taking precautionary measures to ensure their own safety and well-being, not knowing for certain whether [either suspect] has possession of the gun. Id. at 961. As for forcing the suspects to the ground, the court reasoned as follows: It is true that defendant was ordered to lie on the ground, but it is simply inconceivable that the constitutional protection against arbitrary interference by police officers turns upon whether the detainee is positioned against a wall so that a frisk may be effectuated or ordered to lie on the ground. Id. at 961. In the case at bar, we hold that the police had reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, to believe that respondent committed, or attempted to commit, a crime and that he had a gun in his waistband. Cpl. Segalman saw respondent and Hall engage in what appeared to be a burglary, and he saw respondent place a dark object, which looked like a handgun, in the front of his waistband. Therefore, the police were justified in conducting an investigatory stop of respondent and Hall. We hold that the stop was a legitimate Terry stop, not tantamount to an arrest. Several police officers conducted a hard take down of respondent. See Lee, 311 Md. 642, 537 A.2d 235. The officers, with their weapons drawn, forced respondent to the ground and placed him in handcuffs. This conduct was not unreasonable because the officers reasonably could have suspected that respondent posed a threat to their safety. Considering the totality of the circumstances, as they appeared to the officers at the time, in order to maintain their safety, handcuffing respondent and placing him on the ground for a brief time was reasonable and did not convert the investigatory stop into an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Although this is a severe form of intrusion, we conclude that under the circumstances, it was reasonable. In United States v. Sharpe , the Supreme Court considered whether a person, reasonably suspected of engaging in criminal activity, may be detained for twenty minutes to enable police officers to conduct a limited investigation of the suspected criminal activity. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 676-77, 105 S.Ct. at 1570, 84 L.Ed.2d 605. The Court stated that when police officers are acting in swiftly developing situations, reviewing courts should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing of the officer. Id. at 686, 105 S.Ct. at 1575, 84 L.Ed.2d 605. The Supreme Court emphasized that the test is one of reasonableness: A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have been accomplished. But, the fact that the protection of the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive means does not, itself, render the search unreasonable. The question is not simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it. Id. at 686-87, 105 S.Ct. at 1575-76, 84 L.Ed.2d 605. The rationale is applicable to the case before us. In light of this deferential stance and the apparent reasonableness of the officers' actions, we find that the stop of respondent did not exceed the permissible bounds of a Terry stop.