Opinion ID: 795541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of drug ledgers

Text: 69 Medina argues that the DEA agents' reference to the contents of several scraps of paper, which the agents characterized as drug ledgers, constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence that violated Medina's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Because Medina did not raise a hearsay objection to the admission of the drug ledgers in district court, we review the admission of the evidence for plain error, requiring an error that is clear or obvious, affecting a defendant's substantial rights, and seriously affecting the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Wilson, 168 F.3d 916, 920 (6th Cir.1999). 70 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment protects a criminal defendant's right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Confrontation Clause permits the use of out-of-court statements that are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in a criminal trial only where the statements fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or otherwise bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 328 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). The admission of a co-conspirator's statements under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) is among the recognized firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 184, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). 5 Before a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted may be entered into evidence against a defendant under Fed. R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), the government must show by a preponderance of evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy, and that the statement was made in the course and furtherance of the conspiracy. Martinez, 430 F.3d at 325. These three-part findings, referred to as the Enright findings in light of our holding in United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 986-87 (6th Cir. 1978), must be made by the trial court. Martinez, 430 F.3d at 325. Although the district court may consider the hearsay statements themselves in determining whether a conspiracy existed in which both the declarant and the defendant participated, the statements cannot alone suffice to satisfy the evidentiary burden. Wilson, 168 F.3d at 921. We conclude that the district court's admission of the drug ledgers here did not constitute a clear or obvious error. 71 As an initial matter, we conclude that the notations found in the drug ledgers were used to prove the truth of the matters asserted. The agents' opinion testimony regarding the meaning of the scraps of paper was used to prove the number of shipments in the alleged conspiracy, the quantity of drugs sold in each shipment, and the selling price of the shipments. In its closing argument, the prosecution summarized the contents of the documents to prove the elements of the conspiracy charge: Remember primera transportacion —that's first transportation—was 73 boxes or kilos. Caja No. 2, second load, was roughly 74 kilos. For about 147 kilos total. JA 862 (referring to document at JA 224). The prosecution continued to refer to the contents of the documents to explain further why more money was not recovered from Medina's home, explaining that there was a Round 1, Round 2, Round 3, Round 4, rounds of shipments in which Medina was allegedly [s]ending out $575,000. JA 863 (referring to document at JA 222). The prosecution continued, The money wasn't there because the money had been sent by a young girl, a young man, by trailer, and various other transfers of money, referring to the words muchacho, muchacha, and trailer written across from 1 Round, 2 Round, and 3 Round in the alleged drug ledger. JA 863. The prosecution added, And remember how [the ledgers] were split up. He kept track of received cocaine, Cajas, and sent out money. He kept track of money bundles being put together. 17 times 20 equals 340, for a total of half a million. JA 867. The Government's use of the documents against Medina is in clear contrast with those cases in which the alleged drug ledgers were found to be more akin to physical evidence than to hearsay statements because the statements themselves were not central to the government's case. See, e.g., United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 680 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Wilson, 532 F.2d 641, 645-46 (8th Cir. 1976). 72 To prove the first Enright factor, the existence of a conspiracy, the prosecution must establish that there was: 73 (1) an object to be accomplished. (2) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object. (3) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the defendants whereby they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means. 74 Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 420. The agreement need not be formal, and may consist of a tacit understanding inferred from the interdependence of different portions of a single enterprise. Id. Nevertheless, a mere buyer-seller relationship does not constitute a drug conspiracy. United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 514 (6th Cir.2004). 75 Since the drug ledgers themselves cannot alone establish the existence of a conspiracy under the Enright test, see Wilson, 168 F.3d at 921, we must look to the rest of the record. Although Jackson's visit to Medina's residence and subsequent flight from the police are suspicious, these actions are consistent with a mere buyer-seller relationship between the two. See United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1990) (finding mere presence at time of drug bust was insufficient evidence of agreement). We have said that the trust involved in fronting drugs to a buyer before payment is complete may demonstrate more than a mere buyer-seller relationship, see Henley, 360 F.3d at 514, but the record contains no direct evidence that Medina was on either end of a fronting arrangement. Mundy testified only that fronting is a common practice in drug trafficking, and the jury was invited to speculate that the amount of money recovered was less than expected for a 150-kilogram cocaine deal because some drugs were fronted. 76 On the other hand, the large quantity of opened wrappings, numerical markings on the wrappings that Mundy testified were consistent with typical markings used to denote different drug dealers' shipments within a single piggybacking load, heat-sealing equipment, scales, and unidentified white powder consistent with cut, all suggest that someone in Medina's residence was receiving large shipments of drugs from multiple sellers and repackaging them for resale. We have recognized that drug distribution conspiracies often take the form of chain conspiracies involving numerous sales and resales of drugs until they reach the ultimate consumers, United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 549 (6th Cir.1982), and that in such circumstances a common scheme or plan can be inferred despite the absence of a formal agreement because of the interdependence of the enterprise, United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir.1999). We have also noted that large quantities of drugs, such as a kilogram or more, support an inference of a conspiracy. Id. at 747. Furthermore, Medina's interaction with the individual in the red truck suggests some level of trust and cooperation beyond a mere buyer-seller relationship, given that the truck picked up and dropped off Medina at his residence, the truck made two visits to Medina's residence in a short period of time, and the driver was assisted by Medina when unloading the suitcases. We therefore conclude that, under a plain error standard, the Government established by a preponderance of evidence the existence of a drug conspiracy. 77 The Government was also required to establish that both Medina and the author of the drug ledgers were involved in the conspiracy and that the statements contained in the documents were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a case in which the author of a drug ledger was unknown, the Ninth Circuit found that the Government failed to fulfill its burden of tying the document to the conspiracy or to the defendant. United States v. Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 692-93 (9th Cir.1986). In this case, however, the documents at issue were found in Medina's residence. Unlike the Ninth Circuit, see United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 800 (9th Cir.1984), we have held that possession of documents constitutes adoptive admission, particularly when no objection was made at trial to the admissibility of documents found, see United States v. Marino, 658 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir.1981). Here the documents were found in Medina's basement and he has not disclaimed ownership of them until now. Medina's involvement in narcotics trade is further established through the testimony of Terry Strayn. In addition, Medina's consciousness of guilt may be inferred from his dishonest responses to Mundy's questioning, further suggesting Medina's involvement in whatever illicit activity occurred in his residence. Furthermore, Mundy and Riddle provided lengthy testimony linking the documents to the alleged conspiracy. The words and numbers as interpreted by the agents are consistent with a plan to deliver, and receive payment for, several shipments of cocaine totaling approximately 150 kilograms, consistent with the other circumstantial evidence available in this case. Under plain error review, we cannot conclude that the Government failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Medina was involved in the conspiracy or that the documents at issue were in furtherance of the conspiracy. 78 Because we conclude that it would not be a clear or obvious error to find that the Government demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a conspiracy, Medina's involvement in the conspiracy, and the drug ledgers' use in furtherance of the conspiracy, admission of the documents at issue did not violate Medina's rights under the Confrontation Clause. 6