Opinion ID: 2422962
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Capital Resentencing

Text: Before turning to the penalty phase claims upon which Lesko was granted relief, we will first address Lesko's claim that a death sentence should not have been deemed available at all following the federal habeas court's order. Lesko contends that resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to argue, after the conditional grant of habeas corpus sentencing relief in 1991, that any capital resentencing would violate his life and liberty interest in the imposition of a life sentence following the reversal of his prior death sentence. Brief of Appellant Lesko at 15. Lesko acknowledges that on the direct appeal of his resentencing, this Court rejected his argument that subjecting him to resentencing under the 1988 amendment to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(4) constituted an ex post facto application of the law and a violation of due process. See Lesko, 719 A.2d at 220. But, Lesko asserts that his current theory of objection to capital eligibility is materially distinct from the claim raised on that appeal. Specifically, Lesko argues that if this Court had correctly granted him relief on his original direct appeal in 1983, he would have received a life sentence on remand by operation of law since at that time Section 9711(h) vested in a capital defendant the right to a life sentence if his death sentence was overturned upon appeal. Brief of Appellant Lesko at 15. He further argues that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to raise the life and liberty interest argument following the federal reversal of his first death sentence, and that counsel's failure to do so prejudiced him. Id. at 17. The PCRA court rejected this claim on the basis that it was previously litigated. PCRA Court Opinion, 8/7/06, at 65-66. Lesko is seeking to obtain relief on a previously rejected claim by casting it in terms of ineffectiveness, and faulting counsel for failing to forward a different theory. This Court has recognized that a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct ground for relief and thus this manner of presenting new theories on collateral attack is not per se precluded by the PCRA's previous litigation restriction. Collins, 888 A.2d at 571. Nevertheless, we conclude that his attack on appeal counsel based on his new theory fails on the merits for the reasons expressed on direct appeal. In rejecting Lesko's claim on his resentencing appeal, this Court acknowledged that under the prior capital sentencing statute, if this Court found an error in the penalty phase, a remand for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment would have been required. We then explained that the statute was amended in 1988 to provide that a new sentencing hearing must be conducted whenever a sentence of death is vacated, except where it is vacated for disproportionality or lack of evidence of aggravating factors. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(4). Finally, we noted that we had already rejected, in other cases, the same argument as that made by Lesko and had concluded that the revised sentencing provision could be applied to cases that were pending in the appellate process at the time of the amendment. Lesko, 719 A.2d at 219-20 (case citations omitted). Lesko does not explain how his current ineffectiveness claim can survive the reasoning of this Court in his direct appeal. He fails to provide any argument as to how counsel fell short in his presentation of this claim on direct appeal except to assert that counsel should have presented a life and liberty argument in support of the same claim. Such an argument does not change the jurisprudential nature of the claim that counsel presented on direct appeal. Furthermore, Lesko's new claim, as stated, is meritless since he speaks of a life and liberty interest that supposedly matured following the federal court's reversal of his prior death sentence. But, as we have pointed out at some length above, a conditional grant of coercive, collateral federal habeas corpus relief is not a reversal of a state court judgment. Nor does a lower federal court's conditional habeas order prove that this Court's affirmance of the initial death sentence was incorrect. In any event, the interest of which Lesko speaks, if it existed at all, was a function and part of Pennsylvania's direct review scheme, and Lesko's success on collateral review in federal court is simply not the same thing as success on direct review in this Court. Lesko went to federal court, seeking the civil relief available in federal habeas proceedings; and Pennsylvania afforded him precisely the conditional relief that was ordered. He was entitled to no more. Finally, even if this Court were to agree that counsel's presentation of this claim was lacking on direct appeal, we note that this Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that retroactive application of § 9711(h)(4) offends a defendant's due process and equal protection rights, see Commonwealth v. Chambers, 546 Pa. 370, 685 A.2d 96, 101 (1996), and has held that application of § 9711(h)(4) is constitutionally permissible. Commonwealth v. Young, 536 Pa. 57, 66, 637 A.2d 1313, 1317 (1993) (rejecting appellant's argument that retroactive application of § 9711(h) deprived him of the right to have his death sentence automatically modified to life imprisonment and the right not to face the possibility of a death sentence). Lesko's life and liberty theory is of no discernible, qualitative difference. Accordingly, Lesko's underlying argument is without merit, counsel was not ineffective, and the death penalty was an available sentence at the time of his second sentencing proceeding. We now turn to a consideration of trial counsel's performance during that proceeding.