Opinion ID: 1894732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: bloodstain testing testimony by state witness rex riis

Text: Adams contends that the trial court erred in allowing Rex Riis of the Division of Criminal Investigation (D.C.I.) crime laboratory to testify about the results of tests Riis ran on bloodstains found on newspapers and the victim's handkerchief and pickup. Riis' conclusions were that certain bloodstains on Jensen's handkerchief could have come from Adams, but not from Jensen or Boykin. As he did at the motion hearing, Adams argues that the scientific testing methodology and the specific techniques employed by Riis were not sufficiently reliable to warrant admission of the test results.
Initially, we clarify the standards for determining whether scientific testimony will be admitted. For many years, this court and the courts of many other jurisdictions have been guided by the test enunciated in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.1923). [1] Under this test, before testimony related to a scientific principle or discovery is admissible, the principle must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Id. at 1014. The necessity for such a determination is obvious. It would be impractical to place upon the trial court the sole responsibility for determining whether a scientific principle is valid. While experienced judges are perhaps better positioned than most laypersons to evaluate complex scientific data, they have not been trained to evaluate scientific principles. The Frye test does not simply elevate the opinion of the scientist over the layperson in determining the validity of scientific principles. It requires a general acceptance of the principle by those who are best equipped to evaluatethe experts in the particular scientific field. Not every scientist in a given field need embrace the principle, but a significant percentage must do so. Dismissed by some as a rather repugnant form of majoritarian head-counting, Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 292 S.E.2d 389 (1982), we perceive the Frye test as requiring reasonable and necessary verification. [2] Therefore, we continue to adhere to the Frye test as controlling the issue of admissibility of evidence involving scientific principles.
Electrophoretic blood testing is utilized in several scientific fields, but has been employed most extensively in the area of criminal forensics. The identification of specific blood characteristics in bloodstains which are part of a criminal investigation is commonly the key to the prosecution's attempt to tie a particular defendant to a particular crime. Electrophoresis is the movement of charged particles through a buffered conducting medium by application of a direct current. The term isozyme is used to describe enzymically active blood proteins which can be identified by their relative mobilities in an electric field. After separation of the proteins into marker bands by application of a current, specific chemicals are applied to make the proteins visible. [Citations omitted] The relative distance of the bands from a common origin is compared with known standards, and evaluated by established guidelines. The results are then compared to population studies which show the known frequency of each factor in a given population. This produces a statistic which is representative of the percentage of the population that has that group and those factors in common. [Footnote omitted] The more genetic markers identified, the smaller the population of persons who might possess a particular combination of factors. People v. Young, ( Young III ), 425 Mich. 470, 515-16, 391 N.W.2d 270, 290-91 (1986) (Boyle, J. dissenting). In State v. Dirk, 364 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 1985), we found electrophoretic testing to be sufficiently reliable to pass the Frye test. Although the Dirk decision appears to control, the question of the reliability of electrophoretic blood testing continues to be challenged. [3] The 1986 Young decision demonstrates several difficulties in applying the Frye test to electrophoretic testing. As noted above, electrophoresis is most commonly used in criminal forensics. As the Young court noted: The number of scientists not working for a police agency who are familiar with electrophoresis of evidentiary bloodstains is small. Young, supra, 391 N.W.2d at 271. However, where the Young court was not convinced that sufficient significant testing had been undertaken to insure reliability of electrophoresis, we find sufficient documentation of this procedure's reliability for admissibility. [4] We do not interpret Frye to require that the scientific community be restricted to a narrowly defined class of disinterested experts. To do so would question the integrity and commitment of hundreds of criminal forensic experts who have the most practical experience in the area of electrophoresis. We do not question the importance of independent scientific documentation. Instead, we simply refuse to read this requirement into Frye.
The multi-system technique is one method of applying the principle of electrophoresis. It is clearly the method which has generated confrontations as to the reliability of electrophoresis in other cases. The issue of the reliability of the multi-system method appears to result from a continuing disagreement among several of the scientists responsible for its development. The cases noted in footnote 3 provide a relevant synopsis of this battle of experts. It is not necessary to discuss the respective merits of each position as the decision that electrophoresis satisfies the Frye test dictates that criticism of the specific methodology employed goes to the credibility of the testimony, not admissibility.
Adams appeals the admissibility of Riis' testimony not only on the basis of the alleged unreliability of the principle and technique, but also that Riis' testing procedures require a finding that the results are unreliable. Specifically, Adams claims that: 1. Riis engaged in an unscientific selection of known standard controls in that instead of using different known standards, he used the same known standard numerous times. Adams claims this results in skewed results. 2. Riis' actual test results were so inconclusive, that they could not be used validly for interpretation. 3. Riis did not make any effort to eliminate the possible effect of contaminants (such as dirt and pesticides). 4. Riis may have utilized impure/defective testing plates. The State responds that:

3. Contamination is not a factor because of the limited number of enzymes which could be affected. None of the tests on Adams' blood show any of the changes known to be characteristic of contamination. 4. The evidence which Adams alleges is supportive of impure or defective plates is slight and was refuted by the testimony of Riis and the State's other expert witness. Adams also questions the reliability of Riis as the interpreter of the results. He claims Riis followed procedures which did not include insuring that his interpretations and conclusions could be rechecked by himself or others. We agree with Adams that the procedures utilized by the person performing the relevant tests and the qualifications of that operator must meet certain basic standards. Proponents of the admissibility of scientific test results must show the reliability of the operator and the procedures. State v. Guthrie, 85 S.D. 228, 180 N.W.2d 143 (1970); State v. Spry, 87 S.D. 318, 207 N.W.2d 504, 510 (1973), overruled on other grounds State v. Buckingham, 90 S.D. 198, 240 N.W.2d 84 (1976); State v. Helmer, 278 N.W.2d 808, 812-813 (S.D.1979). We have examined the record in connection with each specific contention and are satisfied that the basic procedures were sufficiently followed to allow the admission of this evidence for the jury's determination of the weight it should be given.