Opinion ID: 413379
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Appropriateness of a Bivens-Type Action

Text: 29 When this case was before this court on interlocutory appeal concerning appellee's claim of immunity, we confined our decision to the narrow question of immunity that was before us. 32 In so doing, we explicitly avoided the question of when and whether Bivens establishes a cause of action for violations of the Sixth Amendment, as distinct from Fourth Amendment violations which were at issue in Bivens. Such caution was warranted because the scope of the Bivens cause of action had produced sharp conflict among the circuits. 33 30 We find it conceptually awkward to continue our avoidance of that issue in the present posture of this case. Appellee contends that we should affirm summary judgment because appellants have failed to state a valid cause of action under Bivens. A decision on that issue seems necessary prior to a decision on whether an individual enjoys an immunity to that cause of action. Moreover, in the few years since our last opinion in this case, several Supreme Court opinions have provided some clarity in this area. As a consequence, the need to proceed with such caution has diminished. 31 In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Court upheld a cause of action brought by a woman against a Congressman who allegedly engaged in sex discrimination in a staff employment decision. By relying on Bivens, despite the fact that the right asserted was protected by the Fifth Amendment, the Court made clear that the Bivens holding was not limited to violations of the Fourth Amendment. In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court expanded the law created by Bivens and Davis still further. A mother sued for damages allegedly caused by federal prison officials' violation of her deceased son's constitutional rights protected by the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that a tort remedy was available directly under the Constitution, even though the allegations could also support a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. That holding made clear that a Bivens-type suit can exist even where other remedies are available. The Court interpreted the Bivens holding in a sweeping manner: 32 Bivens established that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of any statute conferring such a right. Such a cause of action may be defeated in a particular case, however, in two situations. The first is when defendants demonstrate special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. 403 U.S., at 396 [91 S.Ct., at 2004]; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 [99 S.Ct. 2264, 2277, 60 L.Ed.2d 846] (1979). The second is when defendants show that Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective. Bivens, supra [403 U.S.] at 397 [91 S.Ct. at 2005]; Davis v. Passman, supra [442 U.S.] at 245-247 [99 S.Ct. at 2277-2278]. 33 446 U.S. at 18-19, 100 S.Ct. at 1471 (emphasis in original). 34 By saying that the cause of action may be defeated in two situations, the Court implied that it may not be defeated in other situations. Appellee in this case has not, thus far, demonstrated that either of these situations obtains in the instant case. He has not shown an alternate remedy that Congress has explicitly labelled as a substitute for a Bivens action. Nor has appellee identified special factors counselling hesitation. Appellee contends that, as prosecutor, he needs absolute immunity from such cases, but this claim was fully considered by this court before. In that decision, we determined that the requirements of Goodwin's job justified only a qualified immunity, an immunity that depended on the good faith of his actions. 35 Thus, we see no apparent reason why the Sixth Amendment rights in this case ought to be treated differently from the Fourth Amendment rights at issue in Bivens, the Fifth Amendment rights at issue in Davis v. Passman, or the Eighth Amendment rights at issue in Carlson v. Green. In addition, the damage remedy provided by a Bivens-type suit is appropriate in this context. Damages are a traditional remedy for unwarranted harm resulting from the judicial process; the Bivens-type action involved here is analogous to tort actions for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. Moreover, alternative remedies are often unavailable for violation of Sixth Amendment rights. An exclusionary rule may provide prospective relief in some cases, but does not offer any compensatory relief. Appellate review of convictions provides no relief for those who would have been convicted in spite of the Sixth Amendment violation, for those who are acquitted, and for those who are never even taken to trial but who are nonetheless dragged through the early stages of the criminal process. The vindication of Sixth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel for such persons will depend solely on the availability of a damage remedy. For such persons the 'exclusionary rule' is simply irrelevant[;] [f]or people in [their] shoes, it is damages or nothing. 34