Opinion ID: 757674
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the 1990 amendments should apply retroactively

Text: 35 It is clear that if Means' acts had occurred after the 1990 amendments were enacted, the amendments would govern. (That is, of course, unless the amendments would be invalid even as prospectively applied, which, as discussed in note 7, supra, might well be the case. Again, however, we do not reach this issue.) Of course, Means' alleged acts occurred prior to 1990. Thus the amendments will only govern if they are applied retroactively. 36 A determination of whether a statute should be applied retroactively is generally made according to the criteria set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). A major part of the Landgraf analysis turns on whether or not Congress intended for the statute at issue to apply retroactively. In holding that Congress did intend for the 1990 Amendments to be applied retroactively, the court below relied heavily on Mousseaux, which contains a thorough analysis of the legislative history of the amendments. While there is some room for disagreement as to what Congress' intent really was, and whether that intent is clearly reflected in the statute, there is no need for us to resolve that question now. Regardless of whether Congress intends a statute to be applied retroactively, we cannot so apply it if its retroactive application would be unconstitutional. And since, as discussed below, the retroactive application of the 1990 Amendments would clearly violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, we must hold that the 1990 Amendments to the ICRA cannot and should not be retroactively applied. 37 Generally, there is an ex post facto violation when a law punishes as a crime an act which was not a crime when committed, increases the punishment for a crime after its commission, or deprives a defendant of a defense available at the time the act was performed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). Ex post facto laws are strictly forbidden. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. Thus if retroactive application of the 1990 amendments would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, the amendments may not be applied to crimes committed before their enactment. 38 Appellees argue that, since the 1990 amendments are merely jurisdictional, they do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. It is true that the Supreme Court has regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed, since [a]pplication of a new jurisdictional rule usually 'takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.'  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508, 36 S.Ct. 202, 60 L.Ed. 409 (1916)). However, this case appears to be the exception to any presumption there might be in favor of applying jurisdictional statutes retroactively, which, to the extent such a presumption exists, seems to have been applied mainly in civil cases, not criminal ones. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (citing various cases, all civil, which involved jurisdictional statutes). 39 Normally, jurisdictional statutes do simply change[ ] the tribunal that is to hear the case. Id. Here, however, allowing the Tribal Court to exercise jurisdiction does not prevent the federal courts from exercising jurisdiction as well. There is no question that the federal courts could prosecute Means for what he is alleged to have done. 8 Since each court could impose its own punishment, granting jurisdiction to the Tribal Court would effectively operate to increase the punishment for acts committed prior to passage of the statute. Prior to the 1990 amendments, Means would only have been subject to federal criminal jurisdiction, and his maximum punishment would have been equal to the maximum federal sentence for his crimes in effect at the time he committed them. If the 1990 amendments are applied retroactively, however, Means would be subject to the maximum federal penalties for his acts plus the maximum penalties the Tribal Court could impose for those same acts, which would appear to be, potentially, an additional fifteen years in jail and $75,000 in fines. 9 Thus, regardless of the fact that Means' acts would have been unlawful under federal law when he allegedly committed them, the increased punishment he would face under the subsequently affirmed Tribal Court jurisdiction would seem to present an ex post facto problem. 40 In addition to increasing the punishment, the retroactive imposition of Tribal Court jurisdiction would also seem to violate the other two strands of the Collins ex post facto test: i.e., punishing as a crime an act which was not a crime when committed, and depriving a defendant of a defense which existed when the act occurred. Collins, 497 U.S. at 52, 110 S.Ct. 2715. It is true that the acts with which Means is charged were crimes under the Tribal Code at the time they were allegedly committed. However, at the time, the Tribal Court could not have tried or punished Means for those crimes, since it lacked jurisdiction over him. Since what constitutes a crime is essentially what the sovereign defines as a crime, if the sovereign has no power over an individual then it essentially lacks the ability to define any of that individual's conduct as a crime. Thus while the conduct in question here might have been a crime, it was not a crime as to Means at the time it was allegedly committed. Imposing jurisdiction retroactively therefore makes it a crime as to Means after the fact-exactly what is forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause. 41 To look at it yet another way, the retroactive application of the 1990 amendments would also deprive Means of a defense that was available at the time of his alleged crimes. The fact that the Tribal Court lacked criminal jurisdiction over Means would have been a complete defense to his prosecution by the Tribe. The fact that the 1990 amendments if applied retroactively would deprive him of this defense after the fact is yet another reason why the amendments would pose a serious ex post facto problem if applied retroactively. 42 Since applying the 1990 amendments retroactively would produce an ex post facto problem, then we will not do so. Whether or not we assume that Congress intended to pass this unconstitutional ex post facto law, the result is the same-the 1990 amendments cannot be applied retroactively. Of course, as we have already mentioned, there might well be problems with the 1990 amendments even as prospectively applied, but such problems must await another day for resolution. 43 Therefore, given the ex post facto problems that would arise were we to apply the 1990 amendments retroactively, we hold that the 1990 amendments to the ICRA should not apply retroactively to grant criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts over acts committed by non-member Indians prior to 1990. Consequently, the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to try Means for the pre-1990 crimes with which he is charged, and the district court should thus have granted Means' petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 44 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's decision to apply the 1990 amendments retroactively, and remand to that court so Means' petition may be granted. 45