Opinion ID: 1925757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Foundation and Relevancy of Expert's Opinion

Text: American Tool contends that the Workers' Compensation Court should have applied Daubert to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. It argues that due process requires the use of Daubert to determine whether expert testimony is admissible even if the rules of evidence do not apply in a workers' compensation case. [5,6] As a general rule, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-168(1) (Reissue 1998) and 27-1101(4)(d) (Reissue 1995); Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., supra . Subject to the limits of constitutional due process, the Legislature has granted the compensation court the power to prescribe its own rules of evidence and related procedure. § 48-168; Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., supra . Before we adopted the Daubert standards in Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), we held that due process, not the Frye standard, provided the standard for admitting expert testimony in a workers' compensation case. Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., supra , citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Schafersman, we specifically limited our ruling to those cases where the question was the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under the Nebraska rules of evidence. 262 Neb. at 232, 631 N.W.2d at 876. Recently, we determined that Daubert does not apply to cases involving the termination of parental rights where the Nebraska rules of evidence do not apply. In re Interest of Rebecka P., 266 Neb. 869, 669 N.W.2d 658 (2003). In reaching that decision, we specifically cited to cases from other jurisdictions holding that Daubert does not apply in a workers' compensation case where the rules of evidence do not apply. In re Interest of Rebecka P., supra , citing Mulroy v. Becton Dickinson Co., 48 Conn. App. 774, 712 A.2d 436 (1998), and Armstrong v. City of Wichita, 21 Kan. App. 2d 750, 907 P.2d 923 (1995). [7] Because the application of Daubert standards in Nebraska is limited to cases in which the Nebraska rules of evidence apply, and those rules do not apply in Workers' Compensation Court, we conclude that the Daubert standards do not apply in a workers' compensation case. Thus, rather than the formal rules of evidence, admissibility of Murphy's testimony is analyzed under due process. [8-10] We have stated that in a workers' compensation case, the witness must qualify as an expert and the testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. The witness must have a factual basis for the opinion, and the testimony must be relevant. Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. 825, 566 N.W.2d 110 (1997). Expert testimony in a workers' compensation case must be based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty or a reasonable probability. Berggren v. Grand Island Accessories, 249 Neb. 789, 545 N.W.2d 727 (1996). An expert opinion in a workers' compensation case based on a mere possibility is insufficient, but the standard also does not require absolute certainty. See Paulsen v. State, 249 Neb. 112, 541 N.W.2d 636 (1996). In addressing the admissibility of an expert's opinion in a workers' compensation case, we have stated: A qualified expert may not testify without adequate basis for his or her opinions concerning the facts of the case on which the expert is testifying. Expert testimony should not be received if it appears that the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable the expert to express a reasonably accurate conclusion, and where the opinion is based on facts shown not to be true, the opinion lacks probative value. [Citation omitted.] The opinion must have a sufficient factual basis so that the opinion is not mere conjecture or guess. [Citation omitted.] Thus, a trial court may exclude an expert opinion because the expert is not qualified, because there is no proper foundation or factual basis for the opinion, because the testimony would not assist the trier of fact to understand the factual issue, or because the testimony is not relevant. Sheridan v. Catering Mgmt., Inc., 252 Neb. at 832, 566 N.W.2d at 114-15. Despite the foundational and relevancy requirements, due process does not require that the Daubert standards be applied. See id. Here, Murphy admitted, and the record shows, that some disagreement exists whether repetitive stress can cause avascular necrosis. Murphy, however, presented medical evidence that microtrauma caused by repetitive motion can cause the condition. Murphy also explained his reasoning for his opinion why other injuries Veatch sustained were not the cause of the avascular necrosis. He further explained why he did not need to review Veatch's medical records and history to reach his determination. After sufficient explanation of his qualifications and reasoning, Murphy stated that it was his opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the avascular necrosis was caused by Veatch's employment at American Tool. There is some dispute in the record about the role of repetitive trauma in causing avascular necrosis. American Tool disputes that Murphy could give his opinion without reviewing Veatch's medical records. From our review of the record, however, we determine that the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Murphy's testimony was relevant and based on proper foundation.