Opinion ID: 200476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: B.1., above.

Text: -19- drug amount beyond a reasonable doubt.12 Typically we do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d 480, 485 (1st Cir. 1994). Such claims usually present mixed questions of law and fact, and should be addressed at the district court level in the first instance. See id. Here, however, the key facts are not in dispute, the record appears sufficiently developed to allow a reasoned consideration of Amparo-Hernández's claim, and both sides contend that further factfinding is unnecessary. United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we consider Amparo-Hernández's claim of ineffective assistance. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). To demonstrate a violation of this right, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that prejudice resulted. See id. at 687. The first prong of the analysis, the performance prong, is 12 These are the only claims of ineffective assistance discussed in any detail in Amparo-Hernández's brief, although he makes references, not developed on appeal, to the fact that (1) counsel failed to adequately inform him of his rights and the consequences of the drug stipulation (Amparo-Hernández Br. at 19); and (2) the stipulation was forced upon the defendant (Amparo-Hernández Br. at 26). These types of fact-based allegations are not suitable for consideration on direct review. See United States v. GonzalezVazquez, 219 F.3d 37, 42 (1st Cir. 2000). Accordingly, our disposition of Amparo-Hernández's remaining ineffective assistance arguments is without prejudice to Amparo-Hernández raising these two fact-based allegations in a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. -20- applied with deference to counsel's professional judgment, and is based on what counsel knew or should have known at the time counsel exercised such judgment. See Natanel, 938 F.2d at 309. Counsel's performance will be deemed deficient only if, considering all relevant circumstances, counsel's conduct or omissions fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. See Ouber v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2002)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). Amparo-Hernández's claim fails at the first prong of this analysis. Accepting Amparo-Hernández's characterization of the stipulation as one in which he agreed to the quantity of cocaine at issue (and not a mere agreement to the forensic chemist's testimony, as Sánchez-Hernández suggests on appeal), this stipulation spared the defendant the spectacle of twenty-eight bales of cocaine on parade before the jury. This was an approach apparently agreed to by all of the defendants, who devoted their defense to disputing the connection between the defendants and the cocaine without highlighting the amount of contraband involved. Under the circumstances, this was a reasonable tactical decision. Similarly, no objection to the related jury instruction would have been appropriate in light of the stipulation as it was understood by the defendants and their counsel at the time. Amparo-Hernández has demonstrated no deficiency in counsel's performance on these facts. -21- C. Transcription of Jury Charge (Ward-O'Neill) Ward-O'Neill contends that he was denied due process of law because the jury charge was not transcribed, and that his conviction should be reversed because this gap in the transcript deprived him of the opportunity to seek review of the jury instructions for substantial error. But due process does not automatically require reversal when a defendant is denied a full verbatim transcript. United States v. Brand, 80 F.3d 560 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 135 (1st Cir. 1987)). Here, Ward-O'Neill and his co-defendants do not dispute that they were provided written copies of the jury instructions, that the district court read from them, and that all counsel were afforded the opportunity to make objections on the record. There has been no due process violation under these facts.13 See Bundy, 815 F.2d at 135 (A defendant's right to a transcript can be satisfied by providing him with a written substitute that reports 13 Although raised for the first time only in Ward-O'Neill's reply brief and therefore not considered on appeal, see RiveraMuriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 1992), the failure to transcribe any portion of the proceedings in open court is inconsistent with the requirements of the Court Reporters Act, 28 U.S.C. § 753(b)(Each session of the court and every other proceeding designated by rule or order of the court or by one of the judges shall be recorded verbatim . . . )(emphasis added). Technical noncompliance, without more, does not give rise to reversible error, but there could be cases in which prejudice results. The practice of not transcribing the instructions as actually given is inadvisable. -22- the portions of the trial which underlie his appellate contentions.). D. Sentencing (Ward-O'Neill) Ward-O'Neill challenges his sentence, alleging that he should have received a greater reduction in his offense level under the federal sentencing guidelines than the two-level reduction as a minor participant he received at a re-sentencing held in March 2001.14 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.2(a) (2002). Specifically, Ward-O'Neill claims he was entitled to a four-level reduction as a minimal participant, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), on the ground that there was no evidence at trial that he did anything more than off-load drugs from another vessel. In challenging the fact-based determination as to his role in the offense, Ward-O'Neill bears the burden of proving that the district court's determination was clearly erroneous. United States v. 14 In a crime involving multiple participants, a district court may decrease a defendant's offense level by two to four levels if the defendant had a mitigating role in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. A four-level reduction may be granted for a minimal participant, which is defined as someone who is plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conduct of a group. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n.4). A defendant may fit in this category if he is shown to lack knowledge or understanding of the scope or structure of the enterprise and of the activities of others. Id. A two-level reduction is available for those who are also less culpable, but whose role could not be described as minimal. Id. (n. 5). For those defendants falling between minimal and minor, a three-level reduction is available. Sánchez-Hernández, Amparo-Hernández, and Ward-Bryan each received two-level reductions in their offense level; Salazar and Downs received three-level reductions. -23- Murphy, 193 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (This is normally a factbound decision, reviewed only for clear error and rarely reversed.); United States v. Gonzalez-Soberal, 109 F.3d 64, 73 (1997); United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 332-33 (1st Cir. 1990). Ward-O'Neill did not present evidence that he had a minimal role in the offense. In fact, during his testimony at trial, he denied having any role at all, for the most part repeating the fishing-trip story he told investigators upon his arrest. The district court found that, because of the size of the cocaine shipment, the size of the boat used, and the number of defendants involved in its transport, the offense involved more than minimal planning, and was not likely to involve strangers to the transaction who had no role in the enterprise. Despite these conclusions, the district court gave Ward-O'Neill the benefit of a two-level reduction in his offense level. Ward-O'Neill has not shown that the court clearly erred in declining to grant a fourlevel reduction, an adjustment that the sentencing guidelines note should be used infrequently. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment (n.4); see United States v. Munoz, 36 F.3d 1229, 1238 (1st Cir. 1994). E. Waiver of Miranda Rights (Downs) Downs contends that his post-arrest statement, including his admission that he had been wearing a life vest that matched another defendant’s, should have been suppressed on the ground that -24- his waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was not knowingly and intelligently made. Downs raised this issue below in a May 20, 1999, motion to suppress, which was denied by the district court in January 2000 at the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Justo Arenas. A defendant may make a valid waiver of his rights under Miranda if he does so voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; United States v. Palmer, 203 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2000). The district court must begin with the presumption that the defendant did not waive his rights. Palmer, 203 F.3d at 60. The government bears the burden of proving a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.; United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d 54, 69 (1st Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, United States v. Marenghi, 109 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1997), recognizing that if there are two plausible interpretations of the evidence, the district court’s choice of one of these interpretations cannot be clearly erroneous. Palmer, 203 F.3d at 60. Conclusions of law, including the determination as to whether a waiver of rights was voluntary, engender de novo review. See id.; United States v. Bienvenue, 632 F.2d 910, 913 (1st Cir. 1980). The magistrate judge held evidentiary hearings in November and December 1999 and recommended that Downs's motion to suppress his post-arrest statement be denied. In reaching his -25- decision, the magistrate judge described the findings of the experts15 and the testimony of one of the Customs agents who interviewed Downs and witnessed his waiver of his Miranda rights. The magistrate judge focused almost exclusively on the issue of whether Downs’s waiver of his rights was voluntary, finding no indicia that his statement was “the product of force, intimidation, or fatigue.” As to whether Downs’s waiver was knowingly and intelligently made, the magistrate judge observed only that there were varying opinions in terms of [Downs's] intellectual capacity, and that [t]here is enough in his personal history, as well as the embellished saga of the Costa Rican containership and the strangers the defendant found on the high seas, like a scenario from a Clive Cussler novel, to belie the argument that his waiver was not intelligently made. Even were we to assume arguendo that the district court erred in finding that Downs's waiver was made knowingly and intelligently, the introduction of the confession at trial would 15 The defense expert testified that Downs had an IQ of 61, placing him in the extremely low range of intellectual functioning. She testified that, on an intellectual level, Downs is mentally retarded. She also found that Downs had a limited vocabulary, and did not have the capacity to make a rational choice because he lacked an appreciation of the consequences of his decisions. The government's expert found that Downs's intellectual capacity seemed average despite his lack of formal education. She found that Downs's memory and recollection also seemed average and that when lapses were apparent they were more the result of a conscious denial and not a cognitive deficiency. She concluded, however, that under the circumstances, Downs's competency to waive his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest was questionable. -26- constitute a trial error. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991). Trial errors -- unlike structural defects in a prosecution, id. at 309-10, such as the total deprivation of the right to trial counsel -- occur during the presentation of evidence to the jury and therefore may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 308. In reviewing the evidence, we are mindful that the harmless-error doctrine is essential to preserve the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of a defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The admission of Downs's post-arrest statement, including his story about being on a Costa Rican container ship and his identification of the life vest he was wearing when he was found at sea, was insignificant in the context of the other evidence presented. Without this statement, the government still had testimony placing Downs in the water beside two defendants afloat on bales of cocaine. The government had five other defendants who gave contradictory explanations regarding how they came to be at sea, and denied knowing most of the other defendants, including Downs. And contrary to representations made by Downs's counsel at oral argument, Downs's post-arrest statement was not the sole -27- evidence presented at trial linking Downs to the life jacket he signed; Downs, through trial counsel, volunteered to stipulate that the signature on the life vest was his. The life vest, with a distinctive dolphin logo and brand name, was then shown to the jury, as was a matching life vest worn by one of the other defendants. On these facts, we find that even if an error occurred in admitting Downs's statement, it was harmless. F. Other Assignments of Error (Downs) In a supplemental pro se brief, Downs raises three additional issues that may be readily dispatched. First, Downs alleges a violation of his right to a public trial because, during voir dire, the jury venire panel filled every seat in the courtroom making it virtually impossible to seat anyone who wasn't a juror. Downs does not reference any portion of the record supporting his claim that the courtroom was ever closed, nor does he contend that this arrangement was ever the subject of an objection or a request for alternative accommodations. Without more, Downs fails to show any violation of his right to a public trial. See, e.g. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1949) (The courts . . . have denied that the constitutional right to a public trial involves the necessity of holding the trial in a place large enough to accommodate all those who desire to attend.). -28- Second, Downs argues that the prosecution improperly referenced his decision not to testify, citing two exchanges during the cross-examination of Ward-O'Neill by the prosecution. As support, Downs cites questioning directed at whether Downs spoke English and at whether Ward-O'Neill knew Downs (Ward-O'Neill volunteered that he and Downs were held in the same prison pending trial). Downs complains that these questions put him in a position where he felt pressured to testify to explain how he learned English and why he had been incarcerated. In determining whether there has been an improper reference to a defendant's silence, we ask whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. United States v. Akinola, 985 F.2d 1105, 1111 (1st Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Glantz, 810 F.2d 316, 322 (1st Cir. 1987)). We fail to see how a jury could have drawn any connection between these questions and Downs's silence at trial. That Downs would have liked to give an explanation of his co-defendant's answers (a sentiment no doubt shared by many defendants who choose not to testify) does not render the questions improper nor the questioning constitutionally infirm. Third, Downs contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, alleging that his counsel was assigned to -29- his case only fifteen days before trial and that his performance was deficient because he failed to (1) discuss the possibilities of a plea bargain with Downs; (2) seek to plea bargain with the government; or (3) attempt to minimize Downs's sentence through the provision of substantial assistance to the government. Unlike the claims raised by Amparo-Hernández and resolved in this direct appeal, see Section II.B.3., above, Downs's claim is a mixed question of law and fact for which we have virtually no record support. We therefore decline to address this claim on appeal, without prejudice to Downs asserting it in a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.