Opinion ID: 2512667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602 as a Civil Proceeding

Text: Taking first the view that wardship proceedings are properly characterized as civil, we follow the United States Supreme Court's lead in Tafflin v. Levitt (1990) 493 U.S. 455 [107 L.Ed.2d 887, 110 S.Ct. 792] and find no preemption. In Tafflin, the Supreme Court considered whether state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968). Civil RICO is an unusual statute, in that a civil RICO claim may depend upon proof that one of an enumerated list of federal criminal laws has been violated. ( Id., §§ 1961(1), 1962, 1964(c); Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 909 [221 Cal.Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375].) Thus, to adjudicate whether a civil RICO claim has been established, a court or jury may need to determine whether a federal criminal violation has occurred. The Tafflin plaintiffs, arguing for exclusive federal court jurisdiction over such claims, contended permitting a state court to make this predicate determination would violate section 3231's grant of exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction and thus be incompatible with federal interests. The United States Supreme Court found no incompatibility. [C]oncurrent jurisdiction over [18 U.S.C.] § 1964(c) suits, it explained, is clearly not incompatible with § 3231 itself, for civil RICO claims are not `offenses against the laws of the United States,' § 3231, and do not result in the imposition of criminal sanctionsuniform or otherwise. ( Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 464.) It went on to conclude that state courts interpreting and applying federal criminal law posed no threat to federal interests, as state courts would be bound by federal precedent and their interpretations would be subject to direct review in the United States Supreme Court. ( Id. at pp. 465-466; see also id. at p. 468 (conc. opn. of White, J.) [opining that federal misapplication of state law under RICO posed greater risk than the reverse].) The Tafflin court asserted its full faith in the ability of state courts to handle the complexities of civil RICO actions ( Tafflin, at p. 465) and declined to denigrate the respect accorded coequal sovereigns by concluding jurisdiction must be withheld ( id. at p. 466). (3) In short, though a civil proceeding such as civil RICO may require adjudication of whether a federal criminal law has been violated, that determination does not of itself convert the civil proceeding into an offense[] subject to the exclusive jurisdictional bar of section 3231. Rather, Tafflin makes clear, a proceeding involves adjudication of an offense only if, at a minimum, it also involves the imposition of criminal sanctions. ( Tafflin v. Levitt, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 464.) Assuming, as we do at present, that a state wardship proceeding involves only civil sanctions and is, like civil RICO, primarily remedial rather than punitive ( Tafflin, at p. 464; see In re Charles C. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 952, 955 [284 Cal.Rptr. 4]), the identical reasoning applied here demonstrates that adjudication of federal criminal violations in the course of a state wardship proceeding does not convert those proceedings into offenses and render jurisdiction preempted by section 3231. [1]