Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Was the statement made to Pettigrew obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel because Pettigrew was acting at the instigation of the prosecution?

Text: The law is set forth in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed. 2d 246 (1964), which held that a defendant has a right to counsel after being indicted. Absent defendant's waiver of that right, the State may not seek an uncounseled statement from him, nor may it use an undercover agent to circumvent that constitutional right. However, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly found no violation of the constitutional right in this case. Such a violation requires that a jailhouse informant act as a State agent in deliberately eliciting incriminating statements from the defendant. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 2186, 65 L.Ed. 2d 115, 122 (1980). Here Pettigrew testified that he first considered contacting police in connection with the Long case after being sentenced on March 15, 1985, to thirty-five years with a seventeen-and-one-half-year parole disqualifier. Defendant, who had been advising him on legal strategy, helped him with an appeal and motion for reconsideration of sentence. But Pettigrew said he thought he could get his sentence reduced by turning State's evidence. He called the Atlantic City Major Crimes Squad and was connected with the prosecutor's office on March 25, 1985. On hearing that Pettigrew had information on the Long case, the prosecutor's office told Pettigrew on March 27 that although it would make no sentence recommendation, it would inform the court of his cooperation and would move him out of the jail where defendant was held and into protective custody. Pettigrew was cautioned not to discuss the case further with defendant, and was moved to the Yardville Correctional Facility the following day, March 28, 1985. On April 3, 1985, six days later, Pettigrew gave his statement on Long's confession, which he testified had been made between March 12 and March 15, more than ten days before Pettigrew's March 25 communication with the police. Under those facts, there was no agreement between Pettigrew and the State at the time defendant confided in him, and therefore no agency relationship and no Massiah violation. Defendant contends, however, that because Pettigrew had called an assistant prosecutor to discuss his own charges in December 1984, he was likely acting as the prosecutor's agent when, early in March, defendant allegedly confessed to him. The State counters that the December communication, which shortly included counsel, pertained solely to negotiations for Pettigrew's plea bargain on nine pending indictments. Pursuant to that bargain, Pettigrew entered retraxit pleas of guilty on January 31, 1985. Pettigrew became acquainted with defendant in August 1984, when both were inmates in the Atlantic County jail. Defendant advised him on his legal defense. The two saw each other frequently although they slept in different sections, Pettigrew in a dormitory and defendant in a cell block. In February, Pettigrew requested a transfer to a cell block, but when offered Cell Block C, which was not near defendant, he declined. Pettigrew explained that he declined because at the time of the offer the move to the new jail was imminent. On March 12, 1985, all inmates were moved to a new facility, where Pettigrew and defendant were placed in the same cell block. Pettigrew said that they became close there and that defendant confided in him concerning the crimes. The warden testified that the two were placed in the same cell block completely by chance, but defendant points out that Pettigrew was the only inmate from his dormitory in the old jail placed in defendant's area of the new jail, which he claims breached the original relocation plan. The trial court denied defendant's request for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on the relationship between Pettigrew and the prosecutor's office and to discover what promises had been made in exchange for his cooperation. The court also denied defendant's renewed request for a Massiah hearing during trial. As evidence of an agency relationship, defendant pointed to the three days between March 25 and March 28, when Pettigrew, having already been in touch with the prosecutor's office, continued to speak to defendant. The State countered that defendant had confided in Pettigrew before the initial March 25 communication, and had not spoken to Pettigrew concerning the crimes after that date. The facts of record were insufficient to warrant suppression of the alleged confession. Nor do we find that the court's denial of an evidentiary hearing on the Massiah issue was an abuse of discretion. Such pretrial hearings require a threshold showing of good cause. R. 3:13-1(b); see State v. Ortiz, 203 N.J. Super. 518, 522, 497 A. 2d 552 (App.Div.) (pretrial hearing held at discretion of trial judge under totality of circumstances), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 335, 508 A. 2d 212 (1985). Lest this issue crop up again in collateral proceedings, see, e.g., Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F. 2d 1299 (3d Cir.1987) (State resolution of constitutional claim reversed on federal habeas corpus ), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed. 2d 661 (1988), it may be wise on remand to permit examination of any of the prosecutor's staff who met with Pettigrew any time before he was moved away from defendant on March 28, 1985. Resolution of the Massiah issue is especially significant here, inasmuch as Pettigrew's testimony is crucial in establishing defendant's intent to kill.