Opinion ID: 1179776
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right of Absence From Trial; Prejudicial Effect of Defendant's Outburst.

Text: Defendant urges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial, and to an impartial jury, were violated when the trial court erroneously refused his request to be absent from the trial, thus forcing him to engage in disruptive behavior and display his courtroom restraints while the jury was present. We find no error and no cognizable prejudice. The relevant facts are as follows: Pursuant to the court's usual policy, defendant was restrained when in the courtroom by handcuffs, and by a chain, not visible to the jury, which fit around his waist and attached to the counsel table. On several occasions both before and during trial, defendant had been disruptive in open court, interjecting protests about his lawyers' performance or the proceedings in general. During a recess on the morning of November 2, 1989, defense counsel announced that defendant believed the prosecution was engaging in gamesmanship by calling surprise witnesses. According to counsel, [defendant] does not want to be a part of it and was asking to be excused. After satisfying itself that the defense had received proper discovery, the court said, let's proceed. Defendant raised no objection. The prosecution then presented witness Linda McCord. The lunch recess was called at the completion of McCord's direct testimony. At the commencement of the afternoon session, defense counsel advised the court, outside the jury's presence, that defendant believed the trial was unfair, no longer wished to be present, and had threatened disruption if forced to remain. A three-way conversation ensued among court, counsel, and defendant. The court explained that it read the cases to require defendant's nonwaivable presence at all stages of a capital trial. Defendant indicated that the court's insistence on his continued presence made him feel boxed in a corner and might make him do something he would regret. Ultimately, the court decided that we're going to continue [i.e., proceed with] the trial this afternoon. I will give you an opportunity to renew your request in the morning with some citations that would allow me to proceed in [defendant's] absence.... (Italics added.) The court expressed a desire to finish with the current witnesses and asked defendant to cooperate for the rest of the afternoon because [w]e've only got a couple of hours to go. Later that afternoon, during the examination of witness Steven Spillmer, the court called a 15-minute recess. Outside the jury's presence, the court noted that for about 30 minutes, there had been a sound like handcuffs clicking together, and that a juror had complained. At the bailiff's suggestion, the court ordered defendant's handcuffs to be double-locked. The court warned that while it wished to avoid shackling, it would resort to that measure if necessary. Defendant responded that [i]f you don't shackle me up, now, you'll have to do it later on. So I'd like to be shackled in front of the jury. The court extended the jury recess, during which defendant was apparently taken downstairs to use the restroom. When he returned, the court observed, outside the jury's presence, that he had torn off his overshirt, but did have an undershirt on, at which point defendant quipped, Temporarily. Defense counsel pointed out that defendant had also torn open his pants, leaving his undershorts exposed. Counsel moved for a continuance on grounds of defendant's disheveled appearance. The prosecutor objected, asking that the current witness, at least, be completed. The court agreed, noting that defendant could be seated close to the counsel table so his torn pants would not be visible to the jury. The jury was recalled, and the examination of Spillmer continued. Defendant interrupted with a request that he be excused from the proceedings. The court denied the request. The following colloquy then occurred in the jury's presence: THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, [y]our Honor, but I'm trying to tell you I'd like to be excused. I been trying to tell you that all this afternoon, so if you don't mind โ [ถ] THE COURT: I will indicate to you, Mr. Arias, that if you continue your disruptive behavior โ [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: That's what I been trying to tell you. I know what you're trying to tell me, and that's what I have been asking. [ถ] THE COURT: Just sit down and be quiet. You are already sitting down. Just be quiet. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Well, I got no choice. I have got this chain around my stomach. [ถ] THE COURT: There will be more chains to you tomorrow if โ [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: That's good. Whatever it takes. [ถ] I'd like to be excused. [ถ] THE COURT: Just be quiet. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: I'd like to be excused from these proceedings, if you don't mind. [ถ] THE COURT: I indicated to you no. THE DEFENDANT: This is โ I tell you I want to be excused, and you give me no other choice, but to disrupt the courtroom. And I'm trying to express to you I'm facing a death penalty case, and I'd like to be excused for a moment so I can get myself composed. [ถ] Excuse me, [y]our Honor. [ถ] THE COURT: Would you pull him around from the table. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: I'm trying to tell you, I'd like to be excused, if you don't mind. [ถ] THE COURT [to the prosecutor]: Go ahead. [ถ] ... [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Excuse me, [y]our Honor. Trying to tell you, right now, I'd like to be excused from the courtroom. [ถ] THE COURT: I will tell you, Mr. Arias, if you continue acting this way, you will have a gag in your mouth. [ถ] THE DEFENDANT: Well, gag me if you want to. But I'd like to be excused from the courtroom. At this point, the court called the evening recess and excused the jury. The court noted for the record that defendant had torn off his T-shirt and removed his pants and shoes, and had been knocking his chains on the counsel table. The court warned defendant again that if a similar disruption occurred the next day, he would be further chained and gagged. Defense counsel protested that defendant could not appear before the jury in such a fashion. Counsel suggested defendant be allowed to observe the proceedings on closed-circuit television in an adjoining room. The court indicated there were no adjoining rooms, and it was aware of no procedure for closed-circuit television. Furthermore, the court observed, we can't put Mr. Arias in a position of running the courtroom. The court announced that the trial would proceed in the morning and asked the sheriff to be prepared with appropriate chains, and, if necessary, a gag. Defendant responded, Well, tell you what. It will be necessary, and we'll deal with it on appeals, if that's what it takes. It don't bother me. At the beginning of the next day's session, the court spoke to the jury about the problems that arose yesterday. The court admonished that you are to consider this case only on the evidence that comes from the witness stand here and make your decision based on that evidence, and not what you observed in the courtroom, the acts or antics of the defendant. [ถ] You're to ignore these actions in making your decision and base it solely on the evidence that comes from the witness stand. The court then excused the jury to take up defendant's absence request, as it had promised to do. The court explained that defendant had an absolute right to be present during evidentiary proceedings, but that under People v. Robertson (1989) 48 Cal.3d 18 [255 Cal. Rptr. 631, 767 P.2d 1109] (then recently decided), he could make a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right. The court ruled it would excuse defendant from each day's proceedings if, for each such day, defendant executed a separate written waiver of his right to be present. Defendant agreed to this procedure. Outside the jury's presence, he executed a waiver for the afternoon session of November 3, 1989, and was thereupon excused for that day. When the jurors were recalled, the court advised them that defendant had exercised his right to be absent and instructed that this should not affect their deliberations. The court again admonished that the things that you've heard or the antics you've heard up to this point you're to ignore, and that's not to influence your decision whatsoever. Defendant thereafter executed waivers for several additional days. However, he eventually returned to the courtroom and was present throughout the remainder of the guilt trial. Based on the events of November 2, defendant moved for a mistrial. He also sought permission to question the jurors in camera about the effects of these events. These motions were denied. (11a) Defendant first argues that the trial court erred under People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, when it did not immediately grant, upon appropriate waiver, his request to be excused. The error was prejudicial, defendant urges, because it created the very dilemma which influenced this court in Robertson to recognize an orderly waiver of the constitutional and statutory right of trial presence. That is, the court's ruling forced defendant to disrupt the courtroom in order to accomplish his removal. According to defendant, both his disruptive behavior, and the consequence that it revealed his waist chain and handcuffs to the jury, prejudicially undermined his case. (12a) We have held that the constitutional and statutory right to be present at critical stages of the trial can be formally waived, at least where our statutes do not provide otherwise. ( People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 809-810 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, 59-62; see also People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 405-406 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610]; but see ง 977, subd. (b).) We noted in Robertson that disruptive conduct which forces the accused's removal from the courtroom had already been recognized as a waiver of the right to be present. ( Robertson, supra, at p. 60, citing Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 343 [25 L.Ed.2d 353, 358-359, 90 S.Ct. 1057]; see also ง 1043, subds. (b)(1), (c).) It would be anomalous, we reasoned, if the right could not also be waived by more peaceable means. To hold otherwise ... would force a defendant into `the untenable position of having to disrupt the courtroom to such an extreme as to result in his removal, thereby seriously prejudicing his case.' [Citations.] ( Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 61, quoting Peede v. State (Fla. 1985) 474 So.2d 808, 815.) (11b) But the trial court in this case imposed no such dilemma upon defendant. Believing that the waiver-of-presence issue justified briefing and argument, the court merely sought to delay a hearing and ruling on this matter for the remainder of the court day. This would allow the examination of scheduled witnesses to be completed, and would also allow defense counsel time to gather their authorities and prepare a coherent argument. [21] The court promised defendant and his counsel that it would hear the waiver matter promptly upon resumption of court the next day, and it asked for defendant's indulgence and cooperation in the meantime. In so doing, the court merely exercised its inherent power to control and order the proceedings. Nothing in our cases required the court to suspend the trial instantly in order to consider and grant defendant's impulsive demand, unsupported by any recitation of authority, that he be excused. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to postpone the waiver matter for this relatively brief period. (12b) Moreover, People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d 18, does not stand for the proposition that a defendant may obtain reversal of his conviction by responding disruptively when the trial court declines to grant his absence request on the spot. It is well established that the accused shall not benefit on appeal from his own misconduct before the jury. (E.g., People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1156 [245 Cal. Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901].) When the accused voluntarily [chooses] to protest the court's order [requiring his presence] [by acting] in [a disruptive] manner[,] [he] is estopped from complaining on appeal about his conduct. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 253-254 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) (11c) Defendant claims the court violated his Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and a fair trial when it denied counsel's request for a voir dire examination of the jurors to determine the effects of his outburst. The court further erred, he posits, by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard his handcuffs and waist chain. (Citing People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290-292 [127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, 90 A.L.R.3d 1] [sua sponte admonition required when security concerns necessitate visible restraints].) We disagree. Because the court saw exactly what the jurors saw, it was in a position to assess the probable effect on their ability to perform their duties. Hence, the court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing individual voir dire examination. (See People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989 [39 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153].) Moreover, the court promptly and carefully admonished the jurors on two occasions to disregard everything they saw and heard in connection with defendant's outburst, and to decide the case solely on the trial evidence. These warnings were broad enough to cover both defendant's misbehavior and the shackles thereby made visible. We must assume the jury followed the court's admonitions. (E.g., People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728 [274 Cal. Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215].) No further action was necessary. No basis for reversal appears.