Opinion ID: 894476
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicable Tenets of Statutory Construction

Text: We begin our analysis by reviewing the relevant principles of statutory construction. In construing a statute, `our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the Legislature's intent.' Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tex.2002) (quoting Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex.2000)). We start with the plain and common meaning of the statute's words. State ex rel. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex.2002) (quoting Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 865 (Tex. 1999)). If the statutory language is unambiguous, we will interpret the statute according to its plain meaning. Id. However, we will not give an undefined statutory term a meaning that is out of harmony or inconsistent with other provisions in the statute. See Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 318. We may consider other matters in ascertaining the Legislature's intent, including the objective of the law, the legislative history, and the consequences of a particular construction. See Tex. Gov't Code § 311.023(1), (3), (5); Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 889 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex.1994). Finally, because statutory construction is a question of law, we review the court of appeals' opinion de novo. Gonzalez, 82 S.W.3d at 327.
The court of appeals concluded that a fact issue existed as to whether Dr. McIntyre fell within the subsection (b)(1) exception for care administered for or in expectation of remuneration. The only statutory explanation of that phrase is found in section 74.001(d). Reading these two provisions together, the court of appeals determined that section 74.001(d) provides two distinct possibilities ... for when a person is deemed to be acting for or in expectation of remuneration: when the individual would ordinarily (1) receive remuneration for administering care, or (2) be entitled to receive remuneration for such services. 59 S.W.3d at 824. The court concluded that Dr. McIntyre could only claim exemption from liability under the Good Samaritan statute if he proved conclusively that he would not customarily receive remuneration for the services he performed and he would not legally be entitled to remuneration. Id. We agree with the court of appeals that the burden of proof was on Dr. McIntyre to negate the exception for care provided for or in expectation of remuneration. By its terms, subsection (b)(1) applies to the entirety of section 74.001, including subsection (c) under which Dr. McIntyre falls. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.001(b). Furthermore, we observe that the purpose of this statute is to increase the incentive for volunteersand particularly physiciansto respond to medical emergencies. See Rosell v. Cent. W. Motor Stages, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 643, 658 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2002, pet. denied); Howell v. City Towing Assocs., Inc., 717 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Keith, Medical Expert Testimony in Texas Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 Baylor L.Rev. 1, 132 n. 850 (1991) (The Texas Good Samaritan statute was originally enacted in 1961 to encourage reluctant physicians to administer emergency care to victims without delay.). We therefore conclude that the Legislature intended that any person raising the Good Samaritan defense must prove that he or she acted without expectation of remuneration within the meaning of subsection (b)(1). The question, then, is what effect do we give subsection (d)? Subsection (d) clarifies the application of subsections (b)(1) and (c)(1). Specifically, subsection (d) prevents a person from waiving payment as an attempt to come within the protection of the statute when he or she would otherwise ordinarily receive or be entitled to receive payment. We agree with the court of appeals that subsection (d) defines two situations in which a person could be deemed to be acting for or in expectation of remuneration: when the person would ordinarily (1) receive or (2) be entitled to receive payment under the circumstances of the case. We also agree with the court of appeals that by the phrase ordinarily receive, the first situation speaks toward what is customary. 59 S.W.3d at 824. In other words, if a person presents evidence that he or she does not customarily receive payment under the circumstances in question, he or she can negate the first prong of subsection (d). [2]
However, we disagree with the proposition that a person must prove that he or she is not legally entitled to receive payment to negate the second prong of subsection (d). This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. The modifier legally is not found in the text of subsection (d). Indeed, a straightforward reading of subsection (d) leads to the conclusion that the adverb ordinarily modifies both the verb received and the verb phrase be entitled to receive. See, e.g., Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 38-39 (Tex.2000) (holding that modifier knowingly refers to two verb phrases separated by the disjunctive); Tovar v. State, 978 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (en banc) (determining that adverb knowingly modifies three predicate verbs connected by the conjunction or); Long v. United States, 199 F.2d 717, 719 (4th Cir.1952) (stating as a rule of grammatical construction that [t]he use of the adverb `forcibly' before the first of the string of verbs, with the disjunctive construction used only between the last two of them, shows quite plainly that the adverb is to be interpreted as modifying them all), quoted in United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 48 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.2002). Proof that Dr. McIntyre is not legally entitled to remuneration under any conceivable circumstance or theory is unnecessary. As the dissent in the court of appeals correctly observed, the court of appeals' definition would significantly alter, rather than clarify, the language and the common sense meaning of subsection (b)(1). [3] 59 S.W.3d at 830 (Patterson, J., dissenting). Thus, reading subsection (d) to require that the person seeking protection of the statute prove that he would neither ordinarily receive nor ordinarily be entitled to receive remuneration comports with the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of subsection (d) and ensures that this section is consistent with subsection (b)(1).
The legislative history of the statute supports this interpretation of subsection (d). The Legislature added subsection (d) to the statute in 1993. Before 1993, the Good Samaritan defense was not available to persons who regularly administered care in a hospital emergency room. The statute at that time read: (a) A person who in good faith administers emergency care at the scene of an emergency or in a hospital is not liable in civil damages for an act performed during the emergency unless the act is wilfully or wantonly negligent. (b) This section does not apply to care administered: (1) for or in expectation of remuneration; (2) by a person who was at the scene of the emergency because he or a person he represents as an agent was soliciting business or seeking to perform a service for remuneration; (3) by a person who regularly administers care in a hospital emergency room; or (4) by an admitting physician or a treating physician associated by the admitting physician of the patient bringing a health-care liability claim. Act of September 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 959, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3299, amended by Act of May 22, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 960, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 4193, 4194. In 1993, the Legislature expanded the scope of the statute primarily to enable emergency room personnel, who respond to medical emergencies when they are not obligated to do so, to claim the benefit of this affirmative defense. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 74.001(a), (c)(1); see also Senate Comm. on Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 386, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (stating that the purpose of the amendment is to remove a person who regularly administers care in a hospital emergency room from the list of exceptions in the statute). The Legislature amended subsection (a) and added subsection (c)(1), which protect from liability emergency room personnel who respond to emergencies occurring outside a hospital, or emergencies occurring in a hospital when they are at the scene of the emergency for reasons unrelated to their work in administering health care. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 74.001(a), (c)(1). The Legislature also added subsection (d), which ensures that emergency room personnel (acting under the circumstances of subsection (c)(1)), or anyone else who might ordinarily receive or be entitled to receive payment as contemplated by subsection (b)(1), could not waive or elect not to charge their fee to obtain the protection of the statute. Id. § 74.001(d). The legislative history indicates that the explanatory language contained in subsection (d) was added to ensure that emergency room personnel, who became eligible for protection under the 1993 amendments, could not circumvent the purpose of the statute to protect only persons who respond to emergencies absent a pre-existing obligation or legal duty. Ramirez argues that the legislative history shows that the Legislature never intended for an obstetrician delivering a baby in a hospital to be exempt from liability. Ramirez cites a House report on Senate Bill 386, which states that the purpose of the bill is to create an incentive for physicians who are hesitant to administer emergency care to a person injured along a road, and not to give ... physicians a way of avoiding liability when they are negligent in providing care in a hospital. See House Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 386, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993). But this legislative history does not support her argument. On the contrary, had the Legislature intended to except from the statute all doctors who provide care in hospitals, it could have said so without carving out the specific exceptions for certain doctors or medical personnel. Before 1993, the statute clearly contemplated that a non-treating, non-emergency-room doctor who responded to an emergency in a hospital could claim the Good Samaritan defense. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Lukefahr, 879 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (determining that a pediatrician who responded to an emergency situation in a hospital was covered under the pre-1993 version of the statute). Nothing in the legislative history suggests that subsection (d) was added to exclude doctors who were entitled to Good Samaritan immunity before the 1993 amendments.
Finally, we believe that the consequences of Ramirez's interpretation of subsection (d) would undermine the purpose of the statute. The effect of such a decision would be to place physicians who act as Good Samaritans in the impracticable position of having to disprove every possible legal theory by which they might be legally entitled to compensation for emergency care. Ramirez's approach would have the exception swallow the rule. Contrary to the statute's purpose, there would be little if any incentive for doctors to render emergency care if they could be entitled to remuneration under some unarticulated legal theory. See 59 S.W.3d at 831 (Patterson, J., dissenting). Ramirez contends that the court of appeals' opinion does not frustrate public policy for three reasons. First, she observes that the applicable standard of care for a physician responding to an emergency already takes into account the emergency circumstances. Second, she asserts that hospitals already have incentives to provide emergency care by requiring staff doctors to agree to respond to emergency pages. Third, she notes that the record contains no evidence that Dr. McIntyre responded to the emergency page because he knew that he would be sheltered from liability. These arguments challenge the policies behind the enactment of the Good Samaritan statute. Our role here, however, is not to second-guess the policy choices that inform our statutes or to weigh the effectiveness of their results; rather, our task is to interpret those statutes in a manner that effectuates the Legislature's intent.