Opinion ID: 2378871
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does an engineer's duty of care extend to the persons who have a property interest to use and occupy the property?

Text: ¶ 28 A duty's scope can be limited to designated classes of persons. See, e.g., ESCA Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 135 Wash.2d 820, 832, 959 P.2d 651 (1998). The issue is whether a duty of care respecting damage to property extends only to the persons who hold an ownership interest in that property. ¶ 29 LTK argues that regardless of whether SMS's property interest can be classified as a lease, a license, or some other property interest, only the owner of property can sue in tort for damage to the property. LTK's understanding of the relationship between ownership and the scope of tort duties would lead to absurd results. SMS would not be able to sue for trespass if someone occupied the monorail stations or trains without SMS's permission. SMS would not be able to sue for damages if an arsonist intentionally set the trains or stations afire. SMS would not be able to recover in a negligence suit if a truck driver on the Seattle Center grounds negligently fell asleep, lost control, and rammed into the monorail station and trains parked there. In these examples, under LTK's proposed rule, only the City, as owner, would be protected by tort law. ¶ 30 We reject LTK's argument and hold that the scope of an engineer's duty of care extends to the persons who hold a legally protected interest in the damaged property. `Property' is made up of an infinite collection of `interests' that may be held, separated, divided, transferred, restricted combined and recombined like jackstraws. 17 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & JOHN W. WEAVER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: REAL ESTATE: PROPERTY LAW § 1.1, at 3 (2d ed.2004). Accordingly, more than one person can own or hold an interest in property. See id. The law protects a wide range of property interests from harm. A license, a privilege to use property, is entitled to legal protection against interference by a third person if the license is not terminable at will or grants possession to the exclusion of the third person. Restatement of Property § 521(2)-(3) (1944). [6] An easement is a right to enter and use property for some specified purpose. 17 Stoebuck & Weaver, supra, § 2.1, at 80. A cousin of easements, a profit a prendré, is the right to sever and to remove some substance from the land. Id. Profits are typically to remove minerals, gravel, or timber. Id. Such nonpossessory interests are entitled to legal protection against actual or threatened harm. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.106, at 312 (A. James Casner, ed.1952). The holder of a nonpossessory interest does not have to hold title to the servient estate in order to sue for damage to the nonpossessory interest. See 28A C.J.S. EASEMENTS § 243, at 466 (2008) (The owner of an easement whose right has been invaded and injured or destroyed has a right of action therefor.). As this discussion shows, property interests falling well short of a full fee simple estate are worthy of legal protection. ¶ 31 In this case, we do not need to label SMS's property interest as a lease, a license, a profit, or an easement. It is plain that the City granted to SMS the concession right and privilege to maintain and exclusively operate the Monorail System including the facilities, personal property and equipment, together with the right to use and occupy the areas, described in this section. ER 030, Ex. 1, § III.A (emphasis added). These are property interests in using and possessing the Seattle Monorail, and thus SMS was within the scope of LTK's duty of care. [7] To be sure, the City reserved access to the Monorail System at all reasonable times to inspect the same and to make any repair, improvement, alteration or addition thereto of any property owned by or under control of the City. ER 095, Ex. 1, § XIX.A. But a landlord's retention of the right to enter, inspect and repair is not inconsistent with a full surrender of possession to the tenant. 49 AM.JUR.2D LANDLORD AND TENANT § 386 (2006). ¶ 32 Still, LTK asks us to view the agreement through the prism of contract. LTK argues that SMS' obligation to pay some of the repair cost . . . was a commercial obligation it undertook by contract, not the reflection of any ownership interest in the damaged property. Resp. Br. of LTK at 17. In a narrow sense, this is true. In Washington, commercial leases usually contain a contractual duty for either the landlord or tenant to make repairs or apportioning repair duties between the parties. 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 6.39, at 367. ¶ 33 But SMS's property interest derives not from the repair provisions, but from section III.A of the agreement, which granted the  right and privilege to maintain and exclusively operate the Monorail System including the facilities, personal property and equipment, together with the right to use and occupy the areas, described in this section. ER 030, Ex. 1, § III.A (emphasis added). That the City conveyed these enumerated property interests in a contract is unexceptional, because almost all property interests must be conveyed in writing. Oftentimes, these writings include contractual obligations that define the relationship between the parties with an interest in the property and allocate responsibilities among them for caring for the property. See, e.g., 17 STOEBUCK & WEAVER, supra, § 6.4, at 316 ([T]he act of leasing land is a conveyance, a transfer of an estate, and the various conventional undertakings that are practically always made, including the covenant to pay rent, are contractual promises.). Despite LTK's attempts to portray SMS's rights differently, SMS is not a simple third-party contractor hired by the City to maintain the monorail whenever necessary. ¶ 34 Because LTK's duty of care extended to SMS as holder of the property interests in using and possessing the Seattle Monorail, AFM properly seeks damages for the harm to property interests of SMS. Standing in SMS's shoes, AFM may claim the damages necessary to return SMS as nearly as possible to the position it would have been in, and any claimed damages for SMS's lost profits might be recoverable as damages consequential to LTK's negligence. See 16 DeWOLF & ALLEN, supra, §§ 5.3-5.4, 5.9, at 174-77, 186. [8]