Opinion ID: 59548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Garcetti v. Ceballos

Text: Before proceeding to examine the substance of Charles's speech, we must first focus on his role when he uttered it. Emphasizing the distinction between a speaker acting in her role as `citizen' and her role as `employee,' Garcetti held that the First Amendment does not protect `expressions made pursuant to [the employee's] official duties.' Even if the speech is of great social importance, it is not protected by the First Amendment so long as it was made pursuant to the worker's official duties. [13] Stated differently, when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. [14] Albeit in the alternative to his primary proffered reason for firing Charles (insubordination), Grief insists that Charles's First Amendment claims are foreclosed by Garcetti v. Ceballos [15] and Williams v. Dallas Independent School District [16] because his speech was made in the context of his employment as a systems analyst for the Commission. Grief substantially overstates the reach of Garcetti and Williams in his briefs: Charles's speech does not come within their ambits. [17] In Garcetti, a deputy district attorney reported to his supervisor that there were inaccuracies in an affidavit supporting a search warrant and recommended that the office refrain from prosecuting the case. The deputy alleged that he was subjected to a series of retaliatory actions in response to this intra-office speech. The Supreme Court concluded that the deputy's speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it was made pursuant to his official duties, specifically in fulfillment of his responsibility to advise his supervisor about how best to proceed with a pending case. [18] Williams requires us to determine the extent to which a public employee's speech was protected if his speech was not necessarily required by his job duties but was nevertheless related to them. [19] In that case, an athletic director was removed from his position after he wrote memoranda to high-ranking school officials, including the principal, calling into question the school's handling of its athletic fund. We concluded that the athletic director's speech concerned the fulfillment of his daily operations, namely budgeting for various athletic department expenses. [20] Accordingly, we held that, under Garcetti, his speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it was made in the course of performing his employment responsibilities. Grief insists that Garcetti and its progeny control, emphasizing that (1) Charles's speech concerned special knowledge that he had obtained through his employment at the Commission, and (2) Charles identified himself in his e-mails as a Commission employee. Even when accepted as true, neither of these assertions is dispositive. To hold that any employee's speech is not protected merely because it concerns facts that he happened to learn while at work would severely undercut First Amendment rights. Also, it is apparent that Charles identified himself as a Commission employee solely to demonstrate the veracity of the factual allegations he was making in his e-mails to the legislators. After introducing himself as a Commission employee, Charles further emphasized the foundation for his allegations by stating that he was available to speak to the legislative officials about activities that he had witnessed while employed. Moreover, Charles submitted the e-mails from his private e-mail address and listed his home address and phone number for his contact information, all of which further undermines the emphasis Grief tries to place on Charles's identification of himself as a Commission employee. Most significantly, though, Charles's speechunlike that of the plaintiffs in Garcetti and Williams was not made in the course of performing or fulfilling his job responsibilities, was not even indirectly related to his job, and was not made to higher-ups in his organization (as were Ceballos's and Williams's) but was communicated directly to elected representatives of the people. As a systems analyst, Charles worked in the area of Information Resources as a senior technical lead coordinating and supporting the Commission's computer network operations. He was not in a professional position of trust and confidence like those of an assistant district attorney or a sheriff's deputy. Even though his job description is not contained in the record on appeal [21] and is therefore unavailable to us, we are convinced that his e-mails concerned topics far removed from the realm ofand unrelated toany conceivable job duties. As the district court indicated, there can be no Garcetti -like nexus between Charles's systems analyst's work and the malfeasance that he sought to expose to the cognizant public authorities. Moreover, the persons to whom Charles directed his e-mails further distinguishes his speech from that of the plaintiffs in Garcetti and Williams: Charles voiced his complaints externally, to Texas legislators who had oversight authority over the Commission, not internally, to supervisors. His decision to ignore the normal chain of command in identifying problems with Commission operations is a significant distinction. We conclude that Charles's speech is not left unprotected by Garcetti 's genre of non-protected speech and turn next to examine whether his speech involved matters of public concern.