Opinion ID: 2655982
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amend the complaint to add the person as a

Text: defendant pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15 and cause process to be issued for that person; or (2) Institute a separate action against that person by filing a summons and complaint. If the plaintiff elects to proceed under this section by filing a separate action, the complaint so filed shall not be considered an original complaint initiating the suit or an amended complaint for purposes of this subsection (a). (b) A cause of action brought within ninety (90) days pursuant to subsection (a) shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. This section shall not extend any applicable statute of repose, nor shall this section permit the plaintiff to maintain 3 See Act of May 13, 1993, ch. 407, 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts 699. The General Assembly amended Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 in 1999 to clarify that the statute applied to suits involving governmental entities. See Act of May 27, 1999, ch. 485, 1999 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1198. -5- an action against a person when such an action is barred by an applicable statute of repose. (c) This section shall neither shorten nor lengthen the applicable statute of limitations for any cause of action, other than as provided in subsection (a). (d) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to any civil action commenced pursuant to § 28-1-105, except an action originally commenced in general sessions court and subsequently recommenced in circuit or chancery court. (e) This section shall not limit the right of any defendant to allege in an answer or amended answer that a person not a party to the suit caused or contributed to the injury for which the plaintiff seeks recovery. (f) As used in this section, “person” means any individual or legal entity. (g) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, this section applies to suits involving governmental entities. Consistent with the four core principles undergirding the comparative fault doctrine, the purpose of this statute was to provide a plaintiff “with a fair opportunity to bring before the [trial] court all persons who caused or contributed to the [plaintiff’s] injuries.” Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d 42, 50 (Tenn. 2012) (quoting Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., 50 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)). It enables a plaintiff to amend its complaint to add any non-party, alleged by another defendant to have caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injury, even if the applicable statute of limitations would otherwise bar the plaintiff’s claim against the non-party. Jones v. Professional Motorcycle Escort Serv., L.L.C., 193 S.W.3d 564, 567-68 (Tenn. 2006). This Court has stated repeatedly that Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 should not be construed narrowly because it is an integral part of a comparative fault system that is built on the concepts of fairness and efficiency. Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d at 50; Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tenn. 1998). However, we have also pointed out that plaintiffs desiring to take advantage of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1- 119(a)(1) must, within ninety days of the filing of the defendant’s answer asserting a comparative fault claim against a non-party, (1) file a motion to amend their complaint, as well as an amended complaint, (2) obtain an order granting their motion to amend, and (3) issue process. Jones v. Professional Motorcycle Escort Serv., L.L.C., 193 S.W.3d at 570; see also Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity, 380 S.W.3d at 47. -6- Following the enactment of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119, a question arose concerning whether a plaintiff should be permitted to invoke Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 to file an amended complaint naming as a defendant a third party that the plaintiff was aware of but did not name as a defendant in its original complaint. The first appellate court to address this issue was the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Even though Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 had not yet been interpreted by Tennessee’s appellate courts, the United States Court of Appeals elected not to certify the question to this Court in accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23.4 Accordingly, in 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, assuming that the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 was to prevent a defendant from “naming and attributing fault to a previously unknown responsible party,” held that “[i]t is . . . plain that § 20-1-119 was not intended to apply to a plaintiff . . . who, long before the defendant’s answer to the complaint, had knowledge that a third party may be at fault for the complained of injuries.” Whittlesey v. Cole, 142 F.3d 340, 345 (6th Cir. 1998). Approximately eight months later, the Western Section of the Court of Appeals adopted the United States Court of Appeals’s interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119. Lipscomb v. Doe, No. 02A01-9711-CV-00293, 1998 WL 886601, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 1998). This Court granted the plaintiff’s application for permission to appeal, but the majority opinion reversed the intermediate appellate court’s decision without directly addressing the application of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119. Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d 840, 848-49 (Tenn. 2000). However, in a separate opinion, Justice Holder stated that the plaintiff was entitled to take advantage of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 because “[n]othing in the statute requires that the party sought to be added be unknown at the time of the filing of the complaint.” Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d at 851 (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting). In 2001, the question regarding Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 resurfaced twice before the Court of Appeals. First, the Middle Section of the Court of Appeals, rejecting the reasoning of both Whittlesey v. Cole and the Court of Appeals opinion in Lipscomb v. Doe, held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 made “no reference to a plaintiff’s diligence in discovering the identity of potentially liable parties” and, therefore, that “a plaintiff’s knowledge of the existence of other persons who might be liable for the plaintiff’s injuries is irrelevant [to the operation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119].” Townes v. Sunbeam Oster 4 Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 23, § 1, which was adopted in 1989, explicitly permits the United States Court of Appeals to certify to this Court questions regarding the interpretation of state law when it appears that “there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.” This procedure avoids a federal court’s diminishment of state sovereignty by making state law. Haley v. University of Tennessee-Knoxville, 188 S.W.3d 518, 521 (Tenn. 2006). -7- Co., 50 S.W.3d at 452-53. Approximately three months later, the Western Section of the Court of Appeals, while acknowledging Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co., adhered to its opinion in Lipscomb v. Doe adopting the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 in Whittlesey v. Cole. McClendon v. Bunick, No. E1999-02814-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 536614, at -6 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2001). Applications for permission to appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 11 were filed in both Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. and McClendon v. Bunick. On July 16, 2001, this Court entered an order denying the Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application in Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. and recommending, pursuant to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(D),5 that the Court of Appeals opinion be published. In accordance with Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(H)(2) (currently Rule 4(G)(2)), the publication of Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. rendered that opinion “controlling authority for all purposes unless and until such opinion is reversed or modified by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Two months later, this Court granted the Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application in McClendon v. Bunick and summarily remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. McClendon v. Bunick, No. E199902814-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Sept. 24, 2001). On December 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals filed a memorandum opinion adopting the reasoning in Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. and reversing the trial court’s judgment and its earlier opinion. McClendon v. Bunick, No. E2001-02816-COA-RM-CV, 2001 WL 1660845 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2001). The combined effect of this Court’s orders in Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. and McClendon v. Bunick established beyond peradventure that the holding of Townes v. Sunbeam Oster Co. is the controlling authority in Tennessee with regard to the interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119. At no time during the intervening thirteen years has a state court of competent jurisdiction reversed or modified the holding in Townes. To the contrary, Tennessee courts have continued to follow Townes and to cite it with approval. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 222 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tenn. 2007). Nevertheless, in 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit continued to adhere to its Whittlesey v. Cole decision. Schultz v. Davis, 495 F.3d 289, 294-95 (6th Cir. 2007).6 5 At the time, Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(D) stated: “If an application for permission to appeal is filed and denied with the recommendation that the intermediate appellate court opinion be published, the author of the intermediate appellate court opinion shall ensure that the opinion is published in the official reporter.” 6 The Sixth Circuit in Schultz v. Davis went so far as to state that “the Tennessee Supreme Court has been clear that this savings statute applies only when the new defendant is discovered in the answer after the statute of limitations has run.” Schultz v. Davis, 495 F.3d at 294. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit again (continued...) -8-