Opinion ID: 332063
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The identity of the officer applying and the officer authorizing. This was done.

Text: 14 (b) '(A) full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his belief that an order should be issued, including (i) details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed, (ii) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (iii) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (iv) the identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted   .' 15 The applications in all respects complied. The first application was for an interception at a residence on Kinglet Drive. From affidavits in support of the application it appeared that several informants of proven reliability all had stated that 'Billy' Ethridge was dealing in heroin and cocaine out of that residence. The method of operation, as described by informants, was that the buyer would leave money with Ethridge at the Kinglet Drive residence and then be instructed to pick up the narcotics at a second residence. Ethridge would then call the second residence and advise someone there as to what was to be given to the buyer. Statements of informants were corroborated by agents who had participated in controlled purchases of narcotics by the informants. Lending further support was proof that Ethridge had a prior criminal record for narcotics involvement. 16 The second application, for an interception at a residence on Blue Heights Drive, was accompanied by excerpts from the interception at Kinglet Drive. Analysis of the phone calls corroborated the fact that the Kinglet Drive residence was being used for transaction of narcotics business and that a new outlet for narcotics distribution had been established at Blue Heights Drive by Sandra Gayle Woodrow and Ethridge. 17 The third application sought to extend the original interception at Kinglet Drive by ten days. A new showing of probable cause was made, including excerpts from interceptions at the Kinglet and Blue Heights Drive addresses. 18 (c) '(A) full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous   .' 19 In this respect the affidavits in support of the applications stated that Ethridge was suspicious of being followed by law-enforcement officers; that the Kinglet Drive and Blue Heights residences were located on single-lane roads in mountainous areas, making undetected visual observations extremely difficult; that informants were unwilling to testify against Ethridge for fear of retaliation; that Ethridge's unwillingness to deal with strangers precluded undercover infiltration of his organization; that while agents had knowledge of Ethridge's involvement, they had been unable, by resort to normal investigative procedures, to obtain evidence to convict him and the other members of his organization. 20 In our judgment these affidavits provided that necessary 'factual basis,' see United States v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35, 38 (9th Cir. 1975), to indicate that the 'practical and commonsense' standard, S.Rep.No.1097, supra, at 101, required under the statute was satisfied. See United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 224 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. James, 161 U.S.App.D.C. 88, 494 F.2d 1007, 1014--16 (1974); United States v. Falcone, 364 F.Supp. 877, 888--90 (D.N.J.1973), aff'd on this issue on opinion below, 505 F.2d 478, 480 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 1339, 43 L.Ed.2d 432 (1975). 21 (d) '(A) statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception shall not automatically terminate when the described type of conversation has first been obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter   .' 22 Here the original applications specified 20 days, while the application for extension of the interception at Kinglet Drive specified an additional 10 days. The applications sufficiently established probable cause to believe that repeated communications concerning narcotics would occur. 23 (e) '(A) full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application    and the action taken by the judge on each such application   .' 24 In both the second application and the application for a 10-day extension of the tap at Kinglet Drive, such showing was made by Prager. 25 Appellants contend that under the language of this paragraph, by its reference to 'the individual authorizing    the application,' the Attorney General himself or the specially designated Assistant Attorney General must give a 'full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications,' and thus that a showing by Prager does not suffice. We cannot agree. 26 The requirement seeks to ensure that the judge receives a full and complete report with respect to previous interceptions and the extent of information obtained thereby so that he can decide whether there is need for the further interception sought and whether there is probable cause to believe that further interception would provide seizable evidence. It is revelation of information that this paragraph seeks, and not demonstrable exercise of authority. The latter was accomplished by the Attorney General's authorization of the second application and the application for the 10-day continuation. The authorizing officer is not the primary source of knowledge in this area. Whatever enlightenment he could give the court would be second-hand. 27 (f) '(W)here the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.' 28 The application for a 10-day extension of the tap at Kinglet Drive contains such a showing. 29 We conclude that the applications by Prager met the requirements of § 2518(1). 3. The Orders of the District Judge 30 Section 2518(3) authorizes entry by the district judge, to whom application was made, of an order for interception. As a condition it requires that the judge make certain determinations: first, that there is probable cause for belief that certain offenses have been, are being, or are about to be committed, that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained by the interception, and that the facilities to be subjected to interception are, among other things, being used in connection with the offenses; second that normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed. The orders of the judge authorizing the interceptions made such required determinations. The application and supporting affidavits provided sufficient basis for the requisite findings. 31 Section 2518(4) requires each order authorizing interception to specify the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted, the nature and location of the facilities to be subjected to interception, the type of communication to be intercepted and the offense to which it relates, the identity of the authorized intercepting agency and the person authorizing the application, the period of time covered by the authorization order, and directives whether the interception must cease when the first communication of the described type has been intercepted. The orders of the judge made all such required specifications. They provided that the interception should continue 'until the communications intercepted reveal the details of the importation, possession and distribution of heroin and cocaine by Joseph Levi Ethridge in violation of the above-described offenses   .' The interceptions were to terminate when this objective was attained but in any event were to terminate 20 days from the dates of the first and second orders and 10 days from the date of the third extension order. In addition, the first two orders required the applying officer, Irving Prager, to provide Judge Lucas 'with a report on the fifth, tenth, and fifteenth day following the date of this order showing that progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need, if any, for continued interception'; the third order required such report on the fifth day following its date. 32 With reference to the conversations the agents were authorized to intercept, the first order entered by Judge Lucas authorized the agents to intercept 'wire communications of Joseph Levi Ethridge and others, many who are as yet unknown, concerning the above-described offenses   .' Those offenses and communications were substantially specified by the following findings contained in the order: 33 'There is probable cause to believe that Joseph Levi Ethridge and others, many of whom are as yet unknown, have committed and are committing offenses involving the importation, possession with intent to distribute and the distribution of heroin and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), 952, 960 and conspiracy to commit the aforesaid offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 963 and the use of communications facilities to facilitate the commission of said offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 34    (T)hese were communications will be between Joseph Levi Ethridge and his associated (sic) concerning: 35 (1) the date, time, place and manner in which illegal narcotic drugs will be delivered to Josph Levi Ethridge, and 36 (2) the price Joseph Levi Ethridge is to pay for the illegal narcotic drugs and the date, time, place and manner of payment for said drugs. Also, these wire communications will be between Joseph Levi Ethridge and buyers concerning: (1) the date, time, place and manner in which illegal narcotic drugs will be delivered to buyers and (2) the price paid for the narcotic drugs, and the date, time, place and manner of payment for said drugs.' 37 The second and third orders were substantially identical but named, in addition to Ethridge, Sandra Gayle Woodrow, 'Jane Doe' Sharon, and Barbara Nice. 38 Appellants contend that, in describing the subject matter of and participants in the conversations to be intercepted, the orders lack the specificity essential under the statute and required by the Fourth Amendment. They assert: 'It left to the judgment of each individual listener the selection of those conversations which were 'narcotics.' Each agent was directed to use his own discretion.' Contending that this amounted to a general warrant, appellants refer to Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961), where the Court stated: 39 'The warrants gave the broadest discretion to the executing officers; they merely repeated the language of the statute and the complaints, specified no publications, and left to the individual judgment of each of the many police officers involved the selection of such magazines as in his view constituted 'obscene    publications.'    It is plain that in many instances, if not in all, each officer actually made ad hoc decisions on the spot and, gauged by the number of publications seized and the time spent in executing the warrants, each decision was made with little opportunity for reflection and deliberation.' 40 Obscentity cases present problems peculiar to themselves. The issue in the usual case is not whether the defendant engaged in certain conduct, but whether the material involved was obscene. A warrant that authorized the searching officer to exercise his own discretion in seizing anything he happens to think offensive presents problems of generality that do not occur here. Here the authorization was to intercept conversations having to do with the narcotics business--the purchase and sale of heroin and cocaine. If this allowed leeway it was not because the listener could decide for himself whether certain conduct violated the law, but because (as we shall note in discussing minimization) it was not readily apparent that a conversation related to narcotics. In our judgment the order was sufficiently precise. Indeed it would appear to be as precise as it could have been made, considering that those who were likely to be parties to narcotics conversations were as yet unknown. Warrants to search for or seize tangible objects have been upheld against such challenge where the places to be searched and the things to be seized are described as precisely as the circumstances permit. E.g., Quigg v. Estelle, 492 F.2d 343, 345--46 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 848, 95 S.Ct. 86, 42 L.Ed.2d 78 (1974); United States v. Scharfman, 448 F.2d 1352, 1354--55 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919, 92 S.Ct. 944, 30 L.Ed.2d 789 (1972); James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467, 472--73 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907, 928, 90 S.Ct. 902, 903, 938, 25 L.Ed.2d 87, 108 (1970). These orders met that test. 41 Section 2518(5) provides limitations on the period of time to be covered by the interception. The orders here did not exceed the times specified. This subsection also provides: 42 'Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in thirty days.' 43 The orders here contained such provisions. 44 We conclude that the orders of the judge authorizing the interception complied with the provisions of Title III. 4. Notice of Interception 45 Section 2518(8)(d) and (9) provides that notice of the interception and of the application and order therefor shall be given by the issuing judge to persons concerned within specified periods after the issuance of the order or before contents of intercepted communications are to be received in evidence. Such notice was given here. 46 We conclude that in the applications and orders there was full compliance with Title III by the Attorney General, his authorized law-enforcement officers and the district judge. 5. Privilege 18 U.S.C. § 2517(4) provides: 47 'No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, the provisions of this chapter shall lose its privileged character.' 48 California law makes criminal the tapping of telegraph or telephone lines, Cal. Penal Code § 631 (West 1970), and eavesdropping upon or recording any confidential communications, id. § 632, without consent of all concerned parties. Appellants contend that by these prohibitions all confidential communications, interception of which is foreclosed, are rendered privileged within the meaning of § 2517(4). 49 We rejected this argument in United States v. Kerrigan, supra, 514 F.2d at 37 n. 1. The section's use of the language 'otherwise privileged' to us means privileged other than by virtue of their character as private telephone conversations. Title III, in providing for judicially authorized telephone interceptions, contradicts any claim of privilege attaching generally to all conversations so intercepted. The legislative history of the section indicates the limited effect Congress envisioned for § 2517(4): 50 'Traditionally, the interest of truth in the administration of justice has been subordinated in the law to the interest of preserving privileged communications where four relationships have been involved: physician-patient, lawyer-client, clergyman-confidant, and husband-wife. The scope and existence of these privileges varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The proposed provision is intended to vary existing law only to the extent it provides that an otherwise privileged communication does not lose its privileged character because it is intercepted by a stranger.' 51 S.Rep.No.1097, supra, at 100, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1968, p. 2189.B. Compliance With the Court's Orders 52 Appellants contend that the manner in which the interception was carried out was in violation of the orders. 53 Specifically, it is contended that there was not compliance with that portion of the orders providing that they 'shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception   .' 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) provides: 54 'Any aggrieved person    may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that--   (iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval   .' 55 The parties take extreme positions with respect to this language. Appellants contend that failure to minimize during the interceptions taken as a whole requires suppression of the entire product of interception. The Government contends that only those conversations in which there was failure to comply with the court's order are subject to suppression; that only the parties to such conversations and the persons on whose premises the tapped telephones were located have standing to move for suppression of such nonminimized conversations from use against them; that a person seeking suppression must allege with particularity the circumstances in which minimization was not observed in the interception of those conversations as to which that person has standing to object; and that all but two appellants-- Ethridge and Woodrow--have not met their burden in this respect. 56 The view which we take of the proof adduced on minimization in the court below makes it unnecessary for us to resolve the complex questions of standing to challenge the introduction of intercepted conversations as evidence and of the range of conversations to which each appellant may refer in seeking to suppress, for lack of minimization, those conversations as to which standing exists. As set forth more fully below, we hold that the evidence adduced on minimization was sufficient to support the trial court's ruling that the minimization requirement was complied with as to any relevant group of conversations. 57 Minimization as a process is not subject to the rigid standards appropriate where the process is one of elimination. The statute does not require that all conversations unrelated to the criminal activity specified in the order be free from interception. Rather it requires that measures be adopted to reduce the extent of such interception to a practical minimum while allowing the legitimate aims of the Government to be pursued. See, e.g., United States v. James, supra, 494 F.2d at 1018--19; United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 2623, 41 L.Ed.2d 223 (1974); cf. United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 783--85 (2d Cir.) (New York State interceptions), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973). In a case where it is clear that the minimization provision of the order was disregarded by the Government throughout the period covered by the order, a total suppression might well be appropriate. We assume, arguendo, that such should be the rule. Here, however, the district court found reasonable and good-faith effort on the part of the Government to comply with the orders authorizing the interceptions. 58 Appellants dispute this finding. They contend first that failure to minimize during the early period of the interception permitted the officers to obtain evidence from which continuation of the first interception, establishment of the second interception, and extension of the first interception were justified, and consequently that all the wiretap evidence must be suppressed because derived from information obtained in violation of the statute and the order. Their second contention is that the evidence on minimization fails to establish that minimization was observed in the interceptions considered as a whole. They write in one of their briefs: 59 'The Government listened to everything: conversations about moving problems; conversations about the baby teasing the dog; conversations about license tags on automobiles; conversations about disagreements with relatives. The 'minimization' consisted of listening to conversations to confirm or deny 'suspicions' and hunches. The agents' suspicions were such that they listened to virtually everything, from beginning to end. No conversation which apparently had no narcotic character at its inception was terminated promptly; no conversation which turned from what the Government thought was a narcotic conversation to something else was terminated. The agents simply had a field day listening in on the private lives of a group of people 24 hours a day for approximately 40 days.' 60 The Government introduced evidence tending to show that efforts were made to minimize the interception of innocent conversations. The listening agents had been given instructions on the need for minimization. They were told not to listen to privileged or irrelevant conversations but to be alert for conversations involving particular persons or places suspected of narcotics involvement and to attempt to identify the parties to conversations. They were further told to use their common sense and judgment regarding termination of interception of calls as to which they were uncertain of narcotics connection. 61 A summary compiled from logs kept by the listening agents during the interceptions showed the following with respect to the interceptions on all tapped telephone numbers taken as a whole: 62 'Of a total of 1,788 intercepted conversations, 539 of those conversations involved busy signals, wrong numbers, and misdialings. Of the remaining 1,259 conversations which were completed telephone calls, 670 of those conversations, or 54% of the total, were conversations which lasted less than one minute. Of the 589 conversations monitored which lasted longer than one minute, 185 of those conversations or approximately 1/3 of this total were minimized to the extent that the recorders were terminated or shut off during the conversation. Twenty-two percent of all nonterminated (sic; completed) conversations related to narcotics conversations.' 63 Apart from minor variations, this summary fairly represents the percentages of conversations of different varieties and actions by the monitoring agents as revealed in the interception logs for each of the four telephone numbers actually tapped. It can be said to be lacking in detail and in analysis of the content of the intercepted conversations. However, the district court offered to entertain challenges to each conversation sought to be introduced as evidence on grounds that interception of such conversation should have been terminated by the listening officers. No rulings on any such challenges are assigned as error on this appeal. The question, then, is whether the testimony submitted and the figures compiled by the Government state a prima facie case of compliance with the minimization directive in the judge's order with respect to whatever group of intercepted conversations may be referred to by each appellant for that purpose. In our judgment they do. 64 The intercepting officers confronted a situation difficult in that the number of persons involved in the conspiracy and their identity were unknown and therefore that the identity of those likely to be using the telephones for narcotics business purposes was unknown; that those using the telephone for narcotics business were careful to avoid the use of terms connected with narcotics and talked in code; that it was impossible to ascertain the character of conversations ambiguous to a listener without first establishing a reliable pattern of the conversations and obtaining an understanding of basic elements of the code being used. This pattern has become familiar in the reports, see, e.g., United States v. Capra, 501 F.2d 267, 273--76 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990, 95 S.Ct. 1424, 43 L.Ed.2d 670 (1975); United States v. Cirillo, 499 F.2d 872, 878--80 & nn. 5, 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056, 95 S.Ct. 638, 42 L.Ed.2d 653 (1974); and it has been recognized that the use of code and the status of close acquaintances as co-conspirators present listening officers with special problems. It was to be expected, then, that the extent of interception might be somewhat larger at the inception of the surveillance--before the code was understood--than in the surveillance taken as a whole. 65 In our judgment the record supports the finding of the district court that reasonable and good-faith efforts to comply with the minimization requirement were made. Suppression for failure to minimize was not then warranted. 66 It is also contended that the interceptions should have been limited to conversations to which Ethridge or one of the other individuals named in the second and extension orders was a party and consequently that all other interceptions must be suppressed. No contention is made that either order or the extension failed to name any person who the Government had probable cause to believe would be using the tapped telephone facilities to commit the offenses specified in the orders. The challenge must therefore be rejected. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155--58, 94 S.Ct. 977, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974). 67 Appellants further contend that it was improper to continue the interceptions beyond January 22, 1973, since Ethridge was incarcerated on a prior, unrelated narcotics charge from January 23, 1973, until after February 21, 1973. The 'purpose' of the first order was then accomplished, we are told, because Ethridge was no longer able to conduct his activities in person. We cannot agree. The first order contemplated revelation of the details of the operation of Ethridge's organization. After Ethridge's incarceration it became evident that other members of the organization were carrying on business as usual. This fact was brought to Judge Lucas's attention together with the fact of Ethridge's incarceration in the second five-day progress report required under the order. Judge Lucas did not disapprove the continuance of the interceptions. Such on-going supervision by the issuing judge is entitled to weight in determining whether the continued interceptions were proper. 68 We conclude that there was compliance with the judge's order as to the manner in which the interception was to be carried out. C. Constitutionality of Title III 69 1. 'On its Face' 70 Appellants argue that even though the interceptions and orders be found to comply with the statute, Title III 'on its face' permits an invasion of home and office by general warrant, contrary to the command of the Fourth Amendment and the penumbral right of privacy cast by several amendments. 71 Nine circuits have passed on the constitutionality of Title III. See United States v. Sklaroff, 506 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3540 (U.S.Mar.2, 1975) (No. 74--1249); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524, 526--31 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 932, 95 S.Ct. 1136, 43 L.Ed.2d 405 (1975); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464, 467--68 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056, 95 S.Ct. 639, 42 L.Ed.2d 654 (1974); United States v. James, supra, 494 F.2d at 1012--13; United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 771--75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 978--82 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., Gray v. United States, 421 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 1557, 43 L.Ed.2d 774 (1975); United States v. Whitaker, 474 F.2d 1246 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'g, 343 F.Supp. 358 (E.D.Pa.1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950, 953, 93 S.Ct. 3014, 37 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1973); United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489, 493--501 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 2622, 41 L.Ed.2d 223 (1974); United States v. Cox, supra, 462 F.2d at 1302--04; United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 683--87 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934, 92 S.Ct. 1783, 32 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972). All have held the statute constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. In many of these cases extended consideration has been given to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1966), and to the safeguards there discussed and held to be essential under the Fourth Amendment. The courts have all concluded that once those specified safeguards are met, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are also satisfied; that in enacting Title III Congress was aware of the decisions of the Supreme Court in this area and had complied with the standards there set forth. 72 We agree.