Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Polygraph Results/Supplemental Assignment 9

Text: Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to admit the testimony of a polygraphist at the penalty phase. Defendant asserts the polygraphist would testify the results of the polygraph test administered to Mr. Robertson show he was truthful in his confession concerning the events surrounding the offense. Specifically, defendant asserts the polygraphist was prepared to testify defendant answered truthfully when he said he was unarmed when he entered the house, that he was unarmed when he entered Mr. Prestenback's bedroom, that he was confronted by Mr. Prestenback who was armed with a knife, that he fought with Mr. Prestenback over this knife, and that Mr. Prestenback was ultimately stabbed with his own knife. Defendant alleges this information is relevant: (1) to corroborate defendant's confession and show defendant was telling the truth when he confessed; (2) to show defendant did not enter the house with the purpose of committing an aggravated burglary and did not arm himself upon entry; (3) to present an accurate account of the circumstances of the offense and defendant's culpability, (specifically that he was confronted by Mr. Prestenback holding a knife); and (4) to test the State's theory of the case. Defendant's position is erroneous in several respects. In State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La. 1979), this court held it was the judicial policy in this state to exclude polygraph evidence in criminal trials. Id. at 981. The results of a lie detector test are inadmissible in Louisiana when offered by either party, either as substantive evidence or as relating to the credibility of a party or witness. State v. Davis, 407 So.2d 702, 706 (La.1981); State v. Tonubbee, 420 So.2d 126, 132 (La.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081, 103 S.Ct. 1768, 76 L.Ed.2d 342 (1983). To admit such test results usurps the jury's prerogative on a question involving credibility. State v. Vinet, 352 So.2d 684, 690 (La.1977). The essential reasons to prohibit such evidence are the lack of probative value, insufficient scientific reliability, and the possible unduly prejudicial effect on lay triers of fact. Davis, 407 So.2d at 706. However, as we continued in Catanese. polygraph evidence may be admissible in posttrial proceedings whenever the evidence is reliable and will aid in a decision. Such a decision would be within [the] judicial discretion. Catanese, 368 So.2d at 982-983. In the instant case, defendant initially argues the penalty phase of a first degree murder trial constitutes a post trial proceeding under Catanese, and, thus, the polygraph results are admissible. However, defense counsel misunderstands our intent in Catanese. In Catanese, this court gave the following explanation of its reasons for allowing for the admissibility of polygraph evidence in post trial proceedings. Although we conclude that polygraph evidence is inadmissible in criminal trials, the reasons for our decision do not prevent its introduction in post trial proceedings, within judicial discretion and subject to guidelines such as those laid down by the trial judge in the instant case. Because the defendant's guilt or innocence is not at issue in such proceedings, there is less demand for the rigorous guarantees of accuracy which typify the rules governing introduction of evidence at trial. Consequently, the reasons for excluding polygraph evidence in criminal trials are not necessarily compelling in post trial proceedings. Catanese, 368 So.2d at 982-83 (emphasis added). This court mentioned a motion for a new trial as an example of this type of posttrial proceeding. Id. at 975. Consequently, in State v. Humphrey, 445 So.2d 1155 (La. 1984), we approved of a trial court's admission of polygraph evidence in a hearing on a motion for new trial after a conviction for manslaughter. We described Catanese 's holding as allowing for the introduction of such evidence in post-trial proceedings: in order to assist the trial judge in his post-trial deliberations and to be considered along with whatever other evidence is presented in those proceedings ... The introduction of polygraph examinations are allowed at the post-trial deliberations because the judge can properly assess and weigh the polygraph's validity and results with the other considerations and testimony presented in the post-trial proceedings. Humphrey, 445 So.2d at 1159. The above language indicates the penalty phase of a first degree murder trial, in which a jury of 12 men and women must assess and weigh the evidence in order to make a determination as to whether the defendant is sentenced to life in prison or to die by lethal injection, should not be considered a post trial proceeding in which polygraph evidence may be admissible. Indeed, echoing Catanese, unlike a motion for new trial ruled upon by a trial judge, there is a much greater demand in the penalty phase for the rigorous guarantees of accuracy which typify the rules governing introduction of evidence at trial because defendant's life is at stake and in the hands of twelve jurors. The reasons for Catanese `s proscription against the introduction of polygraph evidence in a criminal trialthe almost conclusive weight a trier of fact will give it, its questionable quality, and the lack of procedural rules governing its quality and introductionapply with even more force to the most important decision any criminal jury will have to make. Catanese and its progeny have held such polygraph evidence inadmissible because it usurps the jury's prerogative on a question involving credibility. Therefore, we hold the penalty phase of a first degree murder trial is not a post-trial proceeding contemplated by Catanese. Even assuming we were to find it so, however, we find the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying defendant's motion. Although a defendant has a constitutional right to introduce virtually any evidence in mitigation at the penalty phase of a capital trial, the polygraphist's testimony sought to be introduced herein was irrelevant, had virtually no probative value, and would have been highly prejudicial. Defense counsel wanted to introduce the polygraphist's testimony to show defendant was truthful when he said he entered the home and Mr. Prestenback's room unarmed, that Mr. Prestenback confronted him with a knife, and that a struggle ensued. Only two statements were introduced into the record and heard by the jury in the instant case. One statement denied all culpability. The second statement was a confession to the crimes, and at no time therein did defendant claim he was unarmed when he entered the bedroom or that Mr. Prestenback confronted him holding a knife. Defendant did not take the stand in the trial and testify that, nor was any statement admitted in which defendant stated that, he was unarmed or that he was attacked by the victim with a knife. Thus, introducing any evidence regarding whether he was truthful as to these statements to the polygraphist is totally irrelevant to the jury's determination based on the evidence before it. This assignment lacks merit.