Opinion ID: 2981267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fair-Trial Claim

Text: Wilkens argues that the seating of guards in Department of Corrections uniforms near him and presence of discarded shackles in the jury box created such a probability of prejudice that his trial inherently lacked due process, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. He also claims that these conditions actually prejudiced jury deliberations.
“Under AEDPA, we may grant habeas petitions for claims that the state court adjudicated on the merits if that adjudication ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Foust v. Houk, 655 F.3d 524, 533 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Wilkens urges us to review Michigan’s adjudication de novo notwithstanding § 2254(d)(1), for two reasons. 6 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden First, he argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals failed to consider the lack of state interests justifying the presentation of guards in Department of Corrections uniforms (as opposed to plainclothes or county uniforms) when evaluating the fair-trial claim. But we cannot fault the court for ignoring an argument that Wilkens failed to raise on appeal. Though Wilkens objected to the guards’ uniforms during the trial, he omitted this argument in his state appellate briefs. R. 1-5, at 39–40 (protesting generally to “presen[ce]” of prison guards, without focusing on choice of clothing); R. 16-21, at 14 (arguing the same in motion for reconsideration); R. 16-23, at 51 (arguing the same in brief for motion for remand). Second, Wilkens contends that the state appellate court addressed only the state fair-trial claim on the merits, ignoring the federal fair-trial claim. Because the state requirement of “affirmative prejudice” differs from the federal standard articulated in Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 572 (1986), which looks for actual prejudice or an inherently prejudicial practice, Wilkens argues that the state court failed to “examine the Holbrook issue” and “focused exclusively on actual prejudice.” Wilkens fails to rebut the presumption that the state court adjudicated the federal claim on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (“The presumption [that a state court adjudicated a claim on the merits before denying relief] may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.”). Though the Michigan Court of Appeals cited no federal cases, it expressly identified the claim as a 7 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden federal one, referring to “[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to a fair trial” before addressing whether the discarded shackles and guards prejudiced Wilkens. To the extent that Wilkens criticizes the state court for failing to examine the possibility of “inherent prejudice,” we construe this as a critique of the state court’s application of a rule contrary to federal law, rather than its failure to adjudicate a claim. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002) (“A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the ‘contrary to’ clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in our cases . . . .”); accord Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 806 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)) (treating application of a contradictory rule as triggering the “contrary to” analysis of § 2254(d)(1), rather than the “adjudicated on the merits” analysis); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (acknowledging that claims adjudicated on the merits may yet result in a decision contrary to clearly established federal law, meriting habeas relief). In any case, we discern no conflict between the state appellate court’s reasoning and Holbrook’s instruction to consider inherent prejudice, and deem Wilkens’s excerpted readings of the state opinion insufficient to rebut the presumption that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (“Avoiding these pitfalls [of reaching a result “contrary to” clearly established federal law] does not require citation of our cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of our cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”). For one, though Wilkens faults the state court for citing to the state standard of “affirmative[] prejudice,” the state court explained that it was applying this standard to evaluate the “juror misconduct” claim—a claim not presented in this appeal. See R. 16- 8 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden 21, at 2 (“To obtain a new trial based on juror misconduct, the defendant must show that the misconduct ‘affirmatively prejudiced the defendant’s right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury’ [citing a state case].”). By contrast, the state court’s analysis of the limited claim before us—regarding the prejudicial effect of guards and discarded shackles—began by quoting the general federal principle that “one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on the grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial.” See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). (Indeed, Wilkens’s own analysis in the state appellate briefs ventured no further, citing Holbrook only for this general principle and conclusorily stating, “Violations are prejudicial per se,” without distinguishing its inherent-prejudice and actual-prejudice arguments.) The court then contrasted the practices targeted in Wilkens’s complaints to what Holbrook deemed a quintessential example of an “inherently prejudicial practice”—presenting a shackled defendant before a jury—and concluded that no case law supported treating the use of shackles and guards in Wilkens’s trial in the same fashion. See Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568–69. Then, the state court observed that Wilkens “[a]dditionally” failed to show “how he was prejudiced by the shackles being seen near him”—addressing the lack of actual prejudice. Though that court never mentioned the terms “Holbrook,” “inherent prejudice,” or “actual prejudice,” the opinion’s analysis suggests that it applied the correct rule, touching on both types of analysis required under Holbrook. We thus 9 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden conclude that the state court did not “appl[y] a rule different from the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” Cone, 535 U.S. at 694, or fail to adjudicate the federal claim on the merits. Because Wilkens fails to show the applicability of de novo review, we now turn to the last avenue remaining under § 2254(d)(1) for habeas relief on this claim: whether the state decision involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. B. A Fairminded Jurist Could Conclude That Wilkens Received A Fair Trial. A state decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if “‘fairminded jurists could disagree that [the arguments or theories that could have supported the state court’s decision] are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme Court].’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786). As a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury applies to state proceedings. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). A petitioner may show that a state procedure violated his right to a fair trial either by identifying an inherently prejudicial practice or by demonstrating actual prejudice. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572.
A procedure “involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process” if it presents “an unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into 10 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden play.” Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has yet to address whether placing uniformed prison guards near a defendant during his trial inherently prejudices him. The closest analogues that the Court recognizes as “inherently prejudicial” involve “compelling an accused to wear jail clothing,” Williams, 425 U.S. at 504, or “the sight of shackles and gags” on the accused, Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970); Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005) (reiterating that shackling, absent special need, inherently prejudices defendant). But the Court also recognizes that some practices fall short of “inherent prejudice”: the placement of four uniformed troopers in the first row of spectators, for example, does not brand the defendant with an “unmistakable mark of guilt.” Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 571 (quoting Williams, 475 U.S. at 518). This case falls somewhere between these two poles. On the one hand, Holbrook’s reassurance that jurors will simply treat these guards as safety officers for the court rather than “reminders of the defendant’s special status,” id. at 569, no longer applies when the uniforms identify the guards as prison officers rather than peace officers. On the other hand, the presence of uniformed prison guards near Wilkens presents a subtler indication of incarceration than shackles or prison garb on a defendant. See id. at 571 (contrasting shackling and prison clothes, as “unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large,” against the presence of four officers quietly sitting in close proximity to the defendant, a more ambiguous indication possibly too subtle to notice or open to multiple interpretations). For example, a fairminded jurist could conclude that most jurors would overlook the detail of the insignia on the 11 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden guard uniforms or infer nothing from them, especially since jurors might not know enough about courtroom procedures to think that the presence of guards from the Department of Corrections are atypical in criminal proceedings. (Wilkens’s allegation that the particular jurors in this case did notice the insignia relates to the “actual prejudice” analysis, rather than the “inherent prejudice” analysis.) Similarly, the discarding of shackles in the jury box at some point during the trial presents a smaller risk of becoming a “constant reminder of the accused’s condition” or a “continuing influence throughout the trial,” see Williams, 425 U.S. at 504–05, than the shackling of a defendant throughout the trial as a physical restraint. Given these differences, fairminded jurists could conclude that the presence of a few guards near Wilkens with Department of Corrections insignia fails to create an “inherently prejudicial” circumstance or an “unacceptable risk” of affecting the jury deliberations. Rather than articulating specific rules for identifying unacceptable risks, the Supreme Court simply entreats judges to use common sense: Holbrook calls for a case-by-case approach, 475 U.S. at 569, and Williams emphasizes scrutiny “based on reason, principle, and common human experience,” 425 U.S. at 504. Absent more specific guidance from the Supreme Court, fairminded jurists could vary widely in assessing various details and risks, especially since the closest Supreme Court analogues involve easily distinguishable circumstances. See Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010) (“[T]he more general the rule at issue—and thus the greater the potential for reasoned disagreement among fair-minded judges—the more leeway state courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case 12 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden determinations.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)). We thus reject Wilkens’s inherent-prejudice argument.
Since Wilkens cannot rely on inherent prejudice, he must show actual prejudice. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (equating the term, “actual prejudice,” to the Kotteakos standard courts typically use for the harmless-error analysis on collateral review: demonstrating an error’s “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict” (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))). Wilkens’s sole evidence of actual prejudice consists of an affidavit from trial counsel paraphrasing hearsay from an alternate juror that, prior to the close of proofs, the jury noticed shackles left in the jury box, discussed the presence of the Department of Corrections officers, and speculated that Wilkens was in prison. According to trial counsel’s affidavit, his investigator and the alternate juror discussed these matters in a public waiting area while the jury deliberated, and trial counsel himself interviewed the alternate juror after the reading of the verdict. But rather than present an affidavit of the juror’s statements, counsel provided a general paraphrase only, based on counsel’s account of the investigator’s report, leaving scant record of what the alternate juror might have actually said—whether the jurors speculated about the guards in passing and quickly forgot about them, or whether the indicia of incarceration became a running theme throughout their preproof discussions. 13 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden Moreover, Wilkens’s brief repeatedly claims that the jury “actually discussed [Wilkens’s possible imprisonment] in connection with possible verdicts,” but, notably, the trial counsel’s affidavit fails to assert any “connection” between the jury’s observations about the guards and shackles and their deliberations on the verdict. And even if the jury noticed the shackles and recognized the guards as prison staff, an alternate juror who sat outside with counsel’s investigator during deliberations would have no knowledge of the actual discussion in the jury room or how prominently the jurors’ earlier observations of the shackles and guards figured into their verdict, if at all. Lacking other evidence, Wilkens urges us to assume prejudice because the trial pivoted on a credibility contest between Wilkens, on the one hand, and M.C. and Peto, on the other. Because the trial judge instructed the jury that it could consider M.C.’s criminal history in determining her credibility, Wilkens contends that the jury probably considered the indicia of his incarceration while weighing his credibility, as well. But this is speculation. Wilkens also argues that the state court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” because “the appellate court’s rejection of actual prejudice is objectively unreasonable.” But in doing so, he merely faults the legal conclusion that the state appellate court draws from the facts; he points to no erroneous determination of fact. With nothing more than an affidavit based on hearsay, and no evidence illuminating what the jury actually discussed in the jury room, a fairminded jurist need not conclude that the guards and shackles had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the verdict. 14 No. 10-1089 Wilkens v. Lafler, Warden In the alternative, Wilkens asks for an opportunity to supplement the state record with a habeas evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), claiming that he diligently requested an evidentiary hearing at each stage of the state proceedings but failed to obtain one. The government correctly notes that Pinholster prohibits this relief. See 131 S. Ct. at 1398 (“We now hold that review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”). Though Wilkens cites Sheppard v. Bagley, 657 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 2011), where one post-Pinholster panel considered granting an evidentiary hearing to supplement its § 2254(d)(1) review, we cannot overturn prior panels recognizing that Pinholster limits § 2254(d)(1) review to the facts before the state courts. See, e.g., Bray v. Andrews, 640 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398, 1400); see also Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The prior decision remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”).