Opinion ID: 1925910
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collateral Estoppel and Double Jeopardy

Text: Although collateral estoppel and double jeopardy were argued before the trial judge, based upon the padlocking of the Club Destination by the A.B.C. Board for the same transaction which gave rise to this prosecution, there is no evidence to support defense counsel's assertion that such a padlocking occurred. Nor did the trial judge base his judgment upon this argument. Nevertheless, the issue will be considered because the statute on its face stipulates that a violation of its terms subject the offender to a fine or imprisonment, or both, which are criminal penalties; and a violation based upon the exact same conduct is sufficient cause for suspension or revocation of a permit, which are civil penalties. Referring to criminal prosecutions, Article I, Section 15 of Louisiana's Constitution of 1974 declares in part that No person shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, except on his application for a new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or when a motion in arrest of judgment is sustained. Article 591 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to the same effect. Article 593 requires that a plea of double jeopardy be raised by a written motion, setting forth the name of the court, the proceeding in which the defendant was in jeopardy and the facts constituting double jeopardy. No such motion appears in this record. Furthermore, a plea of double jeopardy is not available to these defendants because Article 595 highlights the fact that double jeopardy contemplates a second criminal prosecution for the same offense when it refers to the prosecution and the indictment involved in the first case. [1] Double jeopardy then prohibits merely punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938) (emphasis added). See also Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Booth, 76 So.2d 15, 19 (La.App.1954). Therefore, assuming that defendants have been subjected to the civil penalty which the statute authorizes, they cannot plead double jeopardy in the case at bar unless they can establish that they have heretofore been prosecuted for the same offense in a criminal proceeding. Likewise, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is inapplicable to this case. It is a doctrine first announced in United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 37 S.Ct. 68, 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916), and now firmly established by Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). The doctrine augments the traditional double jeopardy protection by incorporating into the Fifth Amendment the idea that an ultimate issue of fact which has been established in defendant's favor in a prior criminal trial cannot be relitigated by the State. Jerome Hall, Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd ed. 1976), pp. 1048-49. State v. Jackson, 332 So.2d 755 (La.1976); State v. Cain, 324 So.2d 830 (La.1975); State v. Latil, 231 La. 551, 92 So.2d 63 (1956). But for a defendant to successfully raise this issue, he must have been acquitted in a prior criminal prosecution. See One Lot Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972); Moton v. Swenson, 488 F.2d 1060 (8th Cir. 1973). Two factors militate against applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel here: defendants were not successful in the alleged suspension action, and if it did take place, it was not a criminal prosecution.