Opinion ID: 3167560
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refugee Relief Framework

Text: American immigration law provides three primary forms of relief for aliens at risk of persecution if returned to their home countries: withholding of removal under the I.N.A., 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); withholding of removal under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), as provided in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-18; and asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. “To prevail on a petition for withholding of removal under the INA, [§ 1231(b)(3)], an alien must show that it is more likely than not that he would be subject to persecution . . . were he removed from this country.” Shkulaku-Purballori v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 499, 503 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o be eligible for withholding of removal under the Convention, [an] applicant [must show] it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed . . . .” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). These forms of relief are mandatory, provided that the applicant has not rendered himself statutorily ineligible for them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)1 (“[subject to enumerated exceptions,] the 1 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), titled “Restriction on removal to a country where alien’s life or freedom would be threatened,” provides in pertinent part: (A) In general Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. (B) Exception Subparagraph (A) does not apply to an alien deportable under section 1227(a)(4)(D) of this title or if the Attorney General decides that-- No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 5 Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(4) (“If the immigration judge determines that the alien is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal, the alien is entitled to protection under the Convention Against Torture.”). Asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158 is generally available for applicants who meet the definition of refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), which requires only a well-founded fear of persecution: The term “refugee” means . . . any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . . Unlike withholding of removal, asylum is discretionary relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum . . . [if] such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) . . . .”) (emphasis added). Although asylum is discretionary, it nonetheless serves a vital role in America’s system for protecting refugees from persecution. Indeed, the current asylum regime provided for in 8 U.S.C. § 1158 was originally enacted as part of the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §208(a), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (1980), which the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as carrying out the United States’ international treaty obligations regarding refugees: (i) if the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of an individual because of the individual’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; (ii) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States; (iii) there are serious reasons to believe that the alien committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States before the alien arrived in the United States; or (iv) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States. No. 14-4136 Marouf, et al. v. Lynch Page 6 As this Court has twice recognized, one of Congress’ primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles agreed to in the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. 6577 (1968), as well as the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (July 28, 1951), reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6259. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). Moreover, discretionary denials of asylum are “unusual” and “exceedingly rare.” Huang v. I.N.S., 436 F.3d 89, 90, 92 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Gulla v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It is rare to find a case where an [Immigration Judge] finds a petitioner statutorily eligible for asylum and credible, yet exercises his discretion to deny relief.”). The grounds upon which asylum can be discretionarily denied to an otherwise-eligible applicant appear in practice to be limited to cases of “egregious conduct by the applicant,” such as criminal convictions or fraud. Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 507 (4th Cir. 2008). Examples of reasons for discretionary denials upheld on appeal include multiple drunk driving convictions, Kouljinski v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 534, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2007), visa fraud, Aiqin Xue v. Holder, 538 F. App’x 35, 36-37 (2d Cir. 2013), marriage fraud, Singh v. Holder, 568 F. App’x 512 (9th Cir. 2014), multiple convictions for counterfeiting and disorderly conduct, Barrie v. Gonzales, 228 F. App’x 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2007), multiple burglary convictions, Kazlauskas v. I.N.S., 46 F.3d 902, 904-07 (9th Cir. 1995), and a history of seven convictions, most for drug crimes, Dhine v. Slattery, 3 F.3d 613, 615-20 (2d Cir. 1993).