Opinion ID: 1236539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Explosives Expert

Text: Smith next challenges some of the testimony of the government's explosives expert. He concedes that the expert's conclusions were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, but argues that portions of the expert's presentation were unduly prejudicial and should have been disallowed. Specifically, Smith takes issue with the expert's use of a replica of the pipe bomb in a demonstration to show the jury how the bomb was intended to function. He argues that the expert's demonstration confused the jury by conflating a hypothetical pipe bomb with the actual pipe bomb and prejudiced the jury by giving undue weight to the government's theory that the bomb was intended to detonate. Smith objected to portions of the expert's testimony at trial, so we review for abuse of discretion the court's decision to allow the testimony. See United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir.2006). The explosives expert first testified about how pipe bombs function generally and then described the components of the particular pipe bomb used. He expressed his opinion that the bomb was intended to explode and that an unintended glitch  likely a flaw in the electrical connection or a short in the ignitercaused it to malfunction. He described how he assembled a model of the bomb and then used the model to demonstrate how the actual bomb was intended to function. The demonstration caused a small flash, which showed how the bomb would have ignited. The judge made clear to the jury that the actual bomb did not explodea fact that the jury had already heard many times during earlier testimony. The district court properly allowed the expert's demonstration. The testimony was relevant because it was necessary to help the government meet its burden to prove that Smith attempted to use a bomb with intent to cause harm. See Chavis, 429 F.3d at 671. Evidence that is probative of an element of the offense should be admitted in all but the most egregious cases. See United States v. Kapp, 419 F.3d 666, 677 (7th Cir.2005). The expert's testimony was important evidence that the bomb was designed to detonate and probative of the government's theory of the case. The government also was entitled to use its expert to counter Smith's theory that the bomb was designed specifically not to explode. See United States v. Glover, 479 F.3d 511, 518 (7th Cir.2007). And there was no undue prejudice to Smith. The expert's demonstration was not presented in an inflammatory way to incite the emotions of the jury. See Kapp, 419 F.3d at 677. And it is unlikely that the jury was confused, because it heard testimony that the actual bomb did not explode and the judge reminded the jury of this during the expert's testimony. See United States v. Kuzlik, 468 F.3d 972, 974-75 (7th Cir.2006). The record also reveals that the demonstration involved a replica of the actual bomb, not, as Smith suggests in his brief, of a hypothetical pipe bomb, and we find no indication that the jury could have been confused. To be sure, the expert's testimony conflicted with Smith's defense theory that the bomb was not intended to explode, but Smith was free to cross-examine the expert, which he did, see Glover, 479 F.3d at 517, or to call his own expert. The two cases cited by Smith are inapposite. In both, expert testimony was excluded because it was not in line with the proponent's theory of the case and was emotional and confusing to the jury. See Finchum v. Ford Motor Co., 57 F.3d 526, 530 (7th Cir.1995) (demonstration showing car seat crash tests performed under conditions unlike those in actual accident); United States v. Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir.1993) (demonstration involving shaking a doll was not similar to defendant's alleged actions). Here, by contrast, the expert's demonstration tracked the government's theory of the casethat the bomb was built to explodeand there is nothing to indicate that the demonstration incited the jurors' emotions or caused confusion.