Opinion ID: 2408514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Place Adequate Warning Devices

Text: On cross-appeal, Sharp argues that the trial court erred when it found that Sharp's claim that the railroad failed to place adequate warnings at the crossing was preempted by federal law. We find no error in the trial court's ruling, and accordingly we affirm the entry of summary judgment on this issue. In 1970, Congress passed the Federal Railroad Safety Act which directed the Secretary of Transportation to study and develop solutions to safety problems created by railroad crossings. 45 U.S.C. §§ 421 to 447. Based on the Secretary's report and suggestions, Congress passed the Highway Safety Act of 1973. 23 U.S.C. § 130. This Act made federal funds available to states to improve railroad crossings, in return for which the states were required to: conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose. 23 U.S.C. § 130(d). In 1975, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) promulgated regulations that determined the states's eligibility for the federal funds provided by the Highway Safety Act. Of particular importance to this case, is 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) which states that automatic gates with flashing signals must be installed if one or more of certain listed conditions exist [3] . The regulation also provides that: For crossings where the requirements of § 646.214(b)(3) are not applicable, the type of warning device to be installed, whether the determination is made by a State regulatory agency, State highway agency, and/or the railroad, is subject to the approval of the FHWA. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(4). Pursuant to the Highway Safety Act, the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department and Union Pacific's predecessor became involved in a state-wide project to upgrade railroad crossings throughout the state. The state plan included a determination that two crossbucks should be placed at all railroad crossings in the state, including the Louisiana Street crossing in Marianna. On January 4, 1980, the FHWA approved the state plan and subsequently entered into a contract to pay for 90% of the improvements. On March 3, 1981, the FHWA inspected and approved the completed improvements, and made final payment to the state on March 22, 1988. The issue presented by this cross-appeal is whether federal funding of the improvements at the Louisiana crossing pursuant to the Highway Safety Act preempted Sharp's claim that the railroad was negligent in failing to install adequate warning devices. It is uncontested that according to 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b) automatic gates and flashing lights are required only if one or more of the conditions listed in 646.214(b)(3) exist at a particular crossing. The ultimate issue in this case is what kind of federal participation triggers federal preemption under the Highway Safety Act. Sharp argues that preemption occurs only when a diagnostic team has determined whether the 646.214(b)(3) conditions exist at a particular crossing. Because a diagnostic team did not evaluate the Louisiana Street crossing, Sharp contends that the federal government has not made a final determination in this respect, and thus it is proper to submit the issue to a jury for resolution. In contrast, the railroad asserts that, by providing federal funds, FHWA determined that the State Highway Department's plan for the installation of crossbucks at the Louisiana Street crossing was adequate. Hence, the railroad argues that once federal funds have been spent to upgrade a railroad crossing, negligence claims such as Sharp's are preempted. We agree with the railroad's position, and accordingly we affirm the trial court's ruling. The United State Supreme Court first addressed the preemptive effect of the Highway Safety Act and its regulations in CSX Transportation Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). In Easterwood , the plaintiff claimed that the railroad was negligent in failing to place adequate warning devices at a railroad crossing where her husband was killed. Id. As in this case, the railroad argued that the claim was preempted by the federal act and supporting regulations. Id. The Supreme Court explained that negligence actions are preempted by the act because 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) remove the railroad's decision-making authority to determine what type of warning devices are needed at a particular crossing. Id. The Court concluded that: for projects in which federal funds participate in the installation of warning devices, the Secretary has determined the devices to be installed and the means by which railroads are to participate in their selection. The Secretary's regulations therefore cover the subject matter of state law which, like the tort law on which respondent relies, seeks to impose an independent duty on a railroad to identify and/or repair dangerous crossings. Id. Because federal funds were not expended to improve the railroad crossing in Easterwood , the Court found that the plaintiff's tort claim was not preempted. After Easterwood , it was disputed whether preemption is triggered by the mere use of federal funds to improve a crossing or whether greater federal participation is required. In Shots v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 38 F.3d 304 (7th Cir.1994), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to read Easterwood literally, and held that the Secretary's mere funding of the installation of crossing devices did not necessarily imply federal approval of the state's determination of what warning devices were required at each crossing. Id. Instead, the Seventh Circuit suggested that preemption would occur only when there was greater federal participation such as the completion of an evaluation of the crossing in question by a diagnostic team. The remaining federal circuit courts of appeal that have addressed this issue, have rejected the Shots holding, and have held that by providing funds the federal government has implicitly approved the states' improvement plans and their determinations of whether a particular crossing requires automatic gates and lights under 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3). Armijo v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 87 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir.1996); Michael v. Norfolk S. Ry., 74 F.3d 271 (11th Cir.1996); Hester v. CSX Transp., Inc., 61 F.3d 382 (5th Cir.1995). As stated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hester , these courts find that: The fact that federal funds participated in the installation of the warning devices legally presupposes that the Secretary approved and authorized the expenditure, which in turn legally presupposes that the Secretary determined that the safety devices installed were adequate to their task. Hester, supra . Likewise, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that once warning devices paid for with federal funds are installed and operating, the railroad's common-law duty of care ceases, and it is entitled to the benefit of federal preemption. Kiemele v. Soo Line R.R., 93 F.3d 472 (8th Cir.1996); Elrod v. Burlington Northern R.R., 68 F.3d 241 (8th Cir.1995); St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 39 F.3d 864 (8th Cir.1994). See also Dallari v. Southern Pac. R.R., 923 F.Supp. 1139 (E.D.Ark.1996); Cartwright v. Burlington N. R.R., 908 F.Supp. 662 (E.D.Ark.1995). In response, Sharp directs our attention to Williams v. Burlington N. R.R., 849 F.Supp. 682 (E.D.Ark.1994), where the district court held that preemption does not occur unless federal funds are expended and a diagnostic team has determined what warning devices are adequate for the crossing in question. The Williams case, however, was decided before the Eighth Circuit first spoke on this issue in Malone , and thus we find it unpersuasive. We agree with the Eighth Circuit that, federal funding is the touchstone of preemption in this area because it indicates that the warning devices have been deemed adequate by federal regulators. Elrod ; supra. We find that such a holding is consistent with Section 109 of the Highway Safety Act which declares that no funds shall be approved for expenditure by the FHWA unless proper safety protective devices complying with safety standards determined by the Secretary at that time as being adequate shall be installed or be in operation at any highway and railroad crossing. 23 U.S.C. § 109(e). Moreover, 23 C.F.R. § 630.114(b) declares that the FHWA can authorize a project only after applicable prerequisite requirements of Federal laws, and implementing regulations and directives have been satisfied. Finally, we do not agree with Sharp's contention that the Hester and Elrod decisions are distinguishable because it was undisputed that the crossings did not contain the conditions listed in (b)(3). We find that such an analysis begs the question presented by this case. As we have previously explained, whether the conditions listed in (b)(3) exist at a particular crossing is for the FHWA, not a jury, to decide. Once the FHWA has spoken on the issue by providing federal funds for a state improvement project, the determination of whether (b)(3) conditions exist has already been made, and it may not be revisited by the state courts. For these reasons, we follow the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Easterwood and hold that once warning devices paid for with federal funds are installed and operating, the railroad's common-law duty to determine what warning devices are adequate for a particular crossing ceases, and it is entitled to the benefit of federal preemption. In this case, the Arkansas State Highway Commission determined that in the interest of safety two crossbuck warning signs should be installed at every railroad crossing in Arkansas, including the Louisiana Street crossing in Marianna. When the FHWA paid for the installation of these crossbucks, it implicitly determined that such safety devices were adequate to their task pursuant to 23 U.S.C. §§ 109(e); 23 C.F.R. §§§ 630.114(b), and 646.214(b). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's ruling that Sharp's claim that the railroad failed to place adequate warning devices at the crossing is preempted by federal law. The dissent argues that such a holding is contrary to public policy because federal preemption will provide blanket immunity to the railroad when proof that conditions have changed over time was offered at trial. This argument, however, ignores the fact that the regulations promulgated by the FHWA have stripped the railroad of any decision-making authority to determine what type of warning devices are needed at a particular intersection, and placed such authority in the FHWA. See Easterwood, supra . As later acknowledged in the dissent, any failure to monitor the changing nature of an intersection thus must be attributable to a break down in the federal system. Moreover, the dissent suggests that preemption is not absolute, and that at some undeterminable point preemption disappears and the railroad's authority to determine what type of warning devices are needed is mysteriously resurrected. We, however, do not agree that federal preemption can be a revolving door. Rather, we find that federal preemption is absolute once federal funds have been expended to implement the installation of warning devices at a particular intersection.