Opinion ID: 185296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express grant of confidentiality

Text: 13 Mays argues, first, that the district court lacked adequate evidence to conclude that one source in this case received an express grant of confidentiality. This claim is without merit. Wassom's affidavit attributes four of the contested pages to a single coded informant and describes the DEA's standard practice of identifying confidential informants in this way. The Vaughn index confirms that each of the four pages is marked by the same DEA confidential informant code. This evidence is cognizable and unrebutted. 14 Mays nonetheless maintains that the record is insufficient to support summary judgment for the Government in light of our recent explication of the evidence required: 15 To withhold information under Exemption 7(D) by express assurances of confidentiality, the [Government] must present probative evidence that the source did in fact receive an express grant of confidentiality. Davin [v. DOJ, 60 F.3d 1043, 1061 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Such evidence can take a wide variety of forms, including notations on the face of a withheld document, the personal knowledge of an official familiar with the source, a statement by the source, or contemporaneous documents discussing practices or policies for dealing with the source or similarly situated sources. 16 Campbell v. DOJ, 164 F.3d 20, 34 (1998) (emphasis supplied). This obviously is not an exhaustive list. In any event, the Vaughn index in this case plainly refers to notations on the face of [the] withheld document[s] -specifically, the DEA confidential informant code -indicating that this source received an express assurance of confidentiality. The Government is therefore entitled to summary judgment with respect to the four pages so coded.