Opinion ID: 2971927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidentiary Issues and Motion for New Trial

Text: Plaintiffs also assert that the district court erred in admitting certain testimony concerning what Plaintiffs’ Union representatives said during negotiations. If a trial court has improperly admitted evidence and a substantial right of a party has been affected, a new trial may be warranted. Generally, the grant or denial of a new trial is purely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed except upon a showing abuse of discretion. Whittington v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 775 F.2d 698, 700 (6th Cir. 1985). Plaintiffs argue that Tyson should not have been permitted to shift responsibility for its discriminatory conduct to the Union. Before trial, Plaintiffs moved to limit any testimony that would attempt to show that they had waived their rights by being members of a union that had agreed to the policy about which they were complaining. Plaintiffs based their arguments on the district court’s reasoning in its Opinion and Order dismissing Tyson’s third-party complaint against the Union. The district court did not rule on this motion. Mike Gostomski testified that Joe Villines, a Union representative, had suggested the basic parameters of the retiree-applicant policy. Plaintiffs now assert that the testimony should not have been admitted because it was hearsay. A district court’s evidentiary determinations are subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See United States v. Rios, 842 F.2d 868, 872 (6th Cir.1988). A district court’s 23 conclusions of law, however, such as whether proffered evidence constitutes hearsay within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Evidence, are reviewed de novo. United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir. 1990). Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The district court’s determination to admit Mr. Gostomski’s testimony that Joe Villines, Staff Representative for the Union, suggested and agreed to the retiree-applicants’ portion of the Memorandum of Agreement was proper. First, the statements were admissible non-hearsay used to show Gostomski’s state of mind. Whether the retiree-applicant reductions would be agreeable to the Union members is immaterial; the testimony that the Union would not accept the across-theboard reductions, but would allow selective reductions, was not used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to show Tyson’s state of mind in adopting the proposal. Second, this statement, having a bearing on the intent underlying Tyson’s subsequent conduct, is admissible. McCormick on Evidence § 249, 100-01 (5th Ed. 2003). The statements constituted part of the verbal act of contract offer and acceptance of the type that is excluded from the definition of hearsay. Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Indian River Estates, Inc., 276 F.3d 790, 798 n.5 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The verbal acts doctrine applies where ‘legal consequences flow from the fact that words were said, e.g. the words of offer and acceptance which create a contract.’” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1558 (6th Ed. 1990))). Third, even assuming that the statements were otherwise inadmissible hearsay, they would be admissible either as a statement by Plaintiffs’ agent concerning a matter within the scope of the agency made during the existence of the relationship, or as a statement by a person authorized by 24 the Plaintiffs to make a statement concerning the subject. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(C). Because the district court correctly ruled that Gostomski’s testimony concerning what Plaintiffs’ union representative said during negotiations was admissible, Plaintiffs were not entitled to a new trial on that basis. The district court decision in this respect, therefore, is affirmed.