Opinion ID: 2066555
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Kevin Cofer regarding identity of Little Man

Text: Appellant next claims that the PCRA court erred in sustaining the Commonwealth's objections, on hearsay grounds, to questions posed by defense counsel while examining Kevin Cofer at appellant's PCRA hearing designed to elicit testimony that the individual known as Little Man was Aaron Montague. Appellant contends that such testimony would have been admissible under Pa.R.E. 803(19) because Cofer's personal knowledge of the identity of Little Man was based on Montague's reputation in the community. The Commonwealth responds that Rule 803(19) is inapplicable because a person's nickname is not among the facts enumerated in the Rule, nor is it a similar fact of personal or family history. In any event, the Commonwealth contends, Cofer's personal knowledge as to Montague's nickname would have been cumulative of trial counsel's PCRA testimony that he knew Montague to go by the name Little Man. In explaining its exclusion of Cofer's testimony as to Montague's nickname, the PCRA court relied upon Pa.R.E. 602 (Lack of personal knowledge). The court noted that Cofer testified that he did not know Montague personally and learned that Montague was called Little Man only from newspapers and people in the community. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial The following statements, as hereinafter defined, are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:     (19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other similar fact of personal or family history.     Pa.R.E. 803. Rule 803(19) refers to fact[s] of personal or family history that, due to their historical nature, are often very difficult to ascertain. Moreover, the pool of persons who have personal knowledge of an individual's birth, death, adoption, etc., is typically quite small, and some or all of such persons may no longer be living at the time proof is sought. See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1481. Reputations among family members or in the community as to such facts are considered inherently trustworthy in light of the `natural effusions'... of those who talk over family affairs when no special reason for bias or passion exists. Id. at § 1482. It is for these reasons that reputation evidence of facts of personal or family history is allowed. We agree with the Commonwealth that a person's reputed nickname is not a fact of personal or family history that is similar to one's birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, or relationship. Neither the necessity for, nor the inherent trustworthiness of, reputation evidence inheres in a mere acquaintance's testimony as to a person's reputed nickname. Therefore, the PCRA court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Cofer to have personal knowledge of Montague's nickname in order to testify with respect thereto.