Opinion ID: 2328667
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Examination of Witnesses

Text: Rowland's remaining claim in his direct appeal is that rampant prosecutorial misconduct in the examination of witnesses obscured and distorted the defense case and prevented him from receiving a fair trial. Rowland complains that government counsel asked prejudicial questions without having a good faith basis for them, invited one defense witness to comment on the credibility of another, mischaracterized testimony, and badgered defense witnesses by shouting, interrupting, and asking the same question over and over. The government has several responses to what it calls Rowland's veritable laundry list of alleged abuses. First, the government denies that its counsel engaged in misconduct. In many instances, the government argues, the questioning was not even improper, let alone unethical. [20] Second, the government notes, Rowland did not object to some of the conduct of which he now complains. Nor did Rowland ask the trial judge to remedy the pattern of abuse in the prosecutors' questioning that he now perceives. Third, the trial court sustained Rowland's objections to some of the prosecutorial questioning he cites, and he did not request additional or different relief, such as a mistrial. Fourth, in other instances the trial court did not rule on Rowland's objections, and he did not seek a ruling. For all these reasons, the government argues, Rowland is not entitled to reversal on his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. The framework we use for evaluating claims of improper questions or comments by the prosecutor at trial is well-established. If the challenged questions or comments were improper, and the defendant made timely and appropriate objection to them at trial, we must determine whether the defendant suffered substantial prejudice necessitating reversal of his conviction, taking into account such factors as the gravity of the impropriety in context, the centrality of the issue affected by it, the effect of any corrective action by the trial judge, and the strength of the government's case. If the defendant did not object in a proper manner at trial, however, the scope of our review is limited to plain error. See Clayborne, 751 A.2d at 968; McGrier, 597 A.2d at 41. Under this framework, Rowland's claims of prosecutorial misconduct do not merit relief. Although Rowland cites numerous instances of allegedly improper questioning, his claims of prejudice are exaggerated. Take, for example, the single most serious instance of which he complains. Rowland argues that the prosecutor attemptedwithout a good faith basis and, seemingly, in direct violation of a prior ruling by the trial courtto ask a witness if Christie Hoyle had told her during a telephone conversation on the day of her death that Rowland had beaten her in the past. The question (which actually was more ambiguous than Rowland acknowledges) drew an immediate objection from defense counsel. The trial judge sustained the objection and admonished the prosecutor in front of the jury that she had already ruled on the subject, there was no evidence about the beating and we are not going to go into that! The witness, who was Hoyle's sister, did not answer the question. The prosecutor then asked a more general questiondid Hoyle tell her that she was having any problems? The witness said, simply, No. The matter then was dropped for good, the prosecutor asked no further questions, and the witness was excused. Even if a question about past beatings threatened to plant a false and damaging insinuation and should not have been asked, [21] we are convinced that Rowland did not suffer any significant prejudice. The reference to the possibility of past physical abuse was not pursued, the judge took prompt and forceful corrective action, and the witness herself ultimately negated the adverse implication. Other instances of which Rowland complains strike us as trivial. We need not list them all. To illustrate, Rowland cites two other occasions (in what was a lengthy trial) on which he claims the prosecutor asked questions without a proper foundation. In each instance the questions were tangential and the trial judge intervened to sustain the defense objection and defuse any potential for prejudice. [22] Similarly, Rowland cites a single occasion on which the prosecutor appeared to be asking one defense witness (the expert on suicide) to comment on another defense witness's credibility. [23] But the witness did not answer the question. As Rowland concedes, the trial judge again sustained the defense objection and warned the prosecutor that his question was improper. Rowland also complains that the prosecutor mischaracterized his testimony in asking the defense expert how it would affect his opinion if he knew that Rowland had admitted under oath that he would lie for his own convenience. The trial judge sustained the objection to this question and instructed the prosecutor that he could describe what Rowland had said without editorializing. The prosecutor then asked the expert witness what he would say if he knew that Rowland had admitted that it was convenient for him to lie to people with whom he was associated. Viewing this as a generic description of Rowland's acknowledgment at trial that he had lied to his girlfriends, the judge permit[ted] it but without any further comment. We see no reason to think that the jury was misled by the prosecutor's characterization of Rowland's trial testimony. Accordingly we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. To be sure, the cross-examination of defense witnesses may have been overly aggressive at times, as Rowland contends. Rowland sometimes objected, for example, to the prosecutor's tone of voice or failure to let a witness complete his or her answer. The trial judge sometimes did deem it necessary to caution the prosecutor or rein in the questioning. At other times, Rowland did not object, or the judge exercised her discretion not to intervene. Our sense, though, is that while any excesses on the part of the prosecution were regrettable, they were neither frequent nor egregious. They did not divert attention from the issues and evidence that were material. No defense witness was intimidated, embarrassed, or otherwise mistreated; no defense testimony was cut off, obscured, or distorted. There were no improper appeals to passion or prejudice. For these reasons we are persuaded that the alleged lapses on the part of the prosecution in the questioning of defense witnesses had no effect on the outcome of the trial.