Opinion ID: 2634887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Watson's Conflict

Text: I now turn to the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in taking into account former prosecutor Robert Watson's prior representation of principal witness and alternate suspect Michael Snyder in ordering disqualification of the district attorney's office. In my view, the trial court reasonably and appropriately took into account Watson's conflict to support its decision. I summarize my reasoning: The facts of the case in which Watson previously represented this witness are substantially related to the homicide in this case. In the course of his prior representation, Watson would normally have obtained confidential information about his client which bears on the sufficiency and reliability of the evidence against Perez in the Heird murder. Although Watson was deeply involved in investigating the Heird murder, he was prohibited from sharing this information with his investigative colleagues. Watson's conflict therefore hindered the investigation and, consequently, tainted the district attorney's decision to charge Perez. We previously addressed the potential conflict that arises because of a prosecutor's prior representation of a client-turned-witness in Lincoln, 161 P.3d 1274. In such circumstances, a conflict may arise because of the prosecutor's competing duties with regard to disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense. Id. at 1276. On the one hand, the prosecutor is obligated to maintain the confidences acquired in the course of representing the client-turned-witness. Id. On the other hand, the prosecutor is constitutionally obligated to disclose all exculpatory material to the defense under Brady, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, and its progeny. Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1280. In Lincoln, we held that this conflict may be mitigated by both the attenuated nature of the prior representation and the constitutional obligation of the prosecution to disclose exculpatory material, which would trump the prosecutor's ethical and statutory obligations to maintain client confidentiality. Id. at 1276. Ordinarily, a prosecutor who faces a potential conflict stemming from his prior representation of a witness may avoid disqualification of the entire prosecution office under section 20-1-107, and even personal disqualification, by following the procedures developed in Lincoln. Id. at 1281. However, Lincoln did not hold that a prosecutor's prior representation of a witness can never result in a conflict. Lincoln held that where it is unlikely that the prosecutor possesses exculpatory material because the former representation is not substantially related to the present prosecution and where Brady functions as an added security measure ensuring disclosure of any exculpatory material, disqualification is not necessarily required. 161 P.3d at 1276, 1280. Unlike Lincoln, Watson's conflict as an investigating attorney arises from the tension between his duty to maintain his former client's confidences and his duty to ensure that guilt is decided upon sufficient evidence, [13] rather than his duty to disclose exculpatory material to the defendant under Brady. When a prosecutor investigates and develops the prosecution's theory of a case before charge, the prosecutor faces a conflict if a witness is a former client and the prosecutor's former representation of that witness is substantially related to his investigation. In such a case, not only is there a danger that the investigating attorney's prior representation may color his personal view of the evidence, but, even if he vigilantly guards his judgment so as to remain completely impartial, his inability to communicate candidly with fellow investigators regarding the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence compromises the accuracy and completeness of the prosecution's investigation. In this way, a prosecutor's duty to maintain his former client's confidences hampers his duty to conduct a full and fair investigation. For example, a prosecutor charged with investigating a particular witness may know, as a consequence of prior representation, that the witness is a drug user or has some motive to lie, but is unable to discuss his concerns with other investigators. The conflicted prosecutor's colleagues, who are investigating other aspects of the case, may take his silence as an affirmation of the witness' credibility or, more likely, may simply fail to follow up, assuming that the conflicted attorney is handling the matter and addressing any potential problems. In such a situation, because of the conflicted prosecutor's involvement in the case, other members of the prosecution team may never discover a problem in their theory of the case they would otherwise have uncovered. A prosecutor whose view of the evidence is tainted by a prior confidential relationship, and who is unable to communicate freely regarding the reliability and trustworthiness of the prosecution's evidence, including witness testimony, is incapable of carrying out his obligation to seek justice in the performance of his investigation. Unlike Lincoln, this is not a conflict that Brady can mitigate. Brady addressed the prosecution's obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 106-07, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). For Brady to come into play, there must at least be a defendant to whom information will be disclosed. See In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Colo.2002) (obligation to disclose exculpatory material triggered before each critical stage of the proceeding). Before charges are filed, there is no defendant and thus, no one to whom information must be disclosed. Because Watson left the district attorney's office before charges were filed against Perez, Brady's disclosure obligations do not resolve his conflict. One caveat needs to be mentioned. Our precedent extends the Brady obligation to require that a pre-charge prosecutor preserve exculpatory evidence obtained during the investigation for disclosure to a future defendant. People v. Sheppard, 701 P.2d 49, 52 (Colo.1985). However, exculpatory evidence learned by the prosecutor as a result of an earlier client relationship would not be evidence obtained during his investigation as a prosecutor. As a result, this confidential information could not be shared with investigatory colleagues. Therefore, our analysis in Lincoln, which relied on the force of a prosecutor's Brady obligations to mitigate any conflict arising from prior representation of witnesses, will not apply to cases like Watson's, where exculpatory information valuable to the accused's defense will remain shielded from others involved in building a case against the defendant, thus tainting the defendant's right to a fair trial. [14] Having determined that Watson's conflict cannot be mitigated by the prosecution's Brady obligations, and thus that Lincoln is inapplicable to the present case, I turn to examine whether the circumstances of Watson's prior representation of Snyder make it likely that Watson received confidential client information which would compromise his ability to investigate fully and fairly the Heird murder and communicate candidly with other investigators on the case. Under the analysis discussed concerning Edwards, the answer to this question depends on whether there is a substantial relationship between Watson's representation and the prosecution of Perez. Lincoln, 161 P.3d at 1281 (considering the factual overlap between cases to determine whether a conflict arising out of prior representations of witnesses exists); Frisco, 119 P.3d at 1096 (applying the substantial relationship test to a witness conflict). Again, the substantial relationship test must be applied here because it serves to measure the danger that confidential information gained in the course of a prior representation will disadvantage the defendant in the present case by testing the factual overlap between the cases. [15] Watson previously represented Michael Snyder on a post-conviction motion challenging his conviction for the murder of Mark Henderson. Watson testified that Henderson, like Heird, had been an inmate who was labeled a snitch. Watson testified that Henderson's killing, like Heird's, was believed to have been gang related. Watson acknowledged that the prosecution believed that the Henderson murder was connected to the Aryan Brotherhood, a prison gang, and although Watson could not recall at the time of his testimony, there was evidence that Heird had also been connected to that gang. Henderson, like Heird, had been stabbed to death close to dinner time. Both cases involved two assailants and a lookout. In both cases, Watson recalled, similar steps were taken to dispose of the evidence. Watson also acknowledged that either Snyder's trial attorney's case file or the discovery he received in the course of representing Snyder mentioned the killing of another inmate, Daniel Shettler. The prosecution's theory of Shettler's murder was that Snyder, as vice president of the Aryan Brotherhood, had ordered it in retaliation for Shettler's acting as an informant in Henderson's murder. See Blecha v. People, 962 P.2d 931, 935 (Colo. 1998) (discussing facts of Shettler murder). Similar to the circumstances of both Henderson's and Heird's murders, Shettler's murder also involved three participants and was connected to the Aryan Brotherhood. Although Watson testified that he did not consider Snyder an alternate suspect in the Heird murder, he admitted that he received materials from the Department of Corrections as they conducted their investigation of Heird's death. The DOC investigation revealed that, within three hours of the discovery of Heird's body, a corrections officer reported a phone call made by Snyder the day before the homicide. Snyder told family members that he had been ordered to murder an inmate and that, if he failed to comply, he would be murdered himself. Snyder later told investigators that the individual he was instructed to stab was Jeffrey Heird. When asked by investigators about his phone call the day before the murder, Snyder offered conflicting stories. First, he claimed that he shouted the word kill into the phone just to see if the prisoner staff was listening to his conversation. He later changed this story, claiming that the DOC had spliced the word kill into the recording of the conversation in an attempt to frame him. When asked if an investigation would reveal the presence of his DNA in Heird's cell, Snyder stated that it probably would. He also acknowledged that he had blood on his clothing following Heird's murder. Thus, the facts of this case demonstrate that Watson's previous representation of Snyder is substantially related to the present prosecution in that the close connection between the prior representation and the present case makes it likely that Watson received information from his prior representation that may have implicated Snyder or, at the very least, cast doubt on the strength of his value as a witness against Perez. The facts uncovered by both the DOC and defense investigations strongly suggest that Snyder's involvement should have been scrutinized. However, as the trial court noted, for reasons unknown, Snyder was not investigated, his cell was never tossed and he was never considered a suspect in the case. Hence I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Watson's prior representation of Snyder tainted his ability to conduct a full and fair investigation and that his inability to communicate candidly with his fellow prosecutors impacted this investigation as a whole. Moreover, even if it were possible to rebut the presumption that confidences were reposed in Watson which tainted his ability to fairly conduct the investigation of the Heird murder, [16] nothing in the record suggests that the prosecution has succeeded in doing so. Contrary to the majority's assertion that there was no showing that Watson possessed confidential information from his prior representation of Snyder that could be passed to members of the [district attorney's office], maj. op. at 1232, ample evidence in the record supports the opposing conclusion. Watson's file on Snyder consisted of 900 pages. Watson asserted the attorney-client privilege over the entirety of his Snyder file when defense attorneys subpoenaed it. He testified that a substantial portion of Snyder's file was received from his trial counsel. Watson testified that he met in person with Snyder twice, each time for three or four hours. He reviewed reports compiled by defense investigators and he advised Snyder concerning his post-conviction motion. The majority states that the question is whether the confidential client information could be passed to members of the [district attorney's office] who continue to prosecute the case. Maj. op. at 1232. I disagree. In my view, the danger that Watson's conflict poses is that the confidential client information tainted the district attorney's investigation precisely because it could not be passed. Watson's substantial involvement in the Heird investigation, as detailed in my statement of facts, makes the threat of taint likely. The majority acknowledges the possibility that Watson's duty to maintain the confidences of a chief prosecution witness and potential alternate suspect could have compromised the completeness of the investigation. Maj. op. at 1233. However, the majority holds, based on the premise that Watson's conflict does not implicate the fairness of the trial itself, that Perez's only recourse is to explore the inadequacy of the investigation at trial under the appropriate circumstances. Id. This conclusion is problematic. Our precedent states that a conflict may affect the fairness of a trial, within the meaning of section 20-1-107, without directly impacting the procedural safeguards of the trial. People ex rel. N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 677-78 (Colo.2006) (likelihood that political indebtedness would cause a district attorney to over extend himself in deciding to file charges against defendant is relevant to the determination of whether special circumstances exist). In N.R., we were concerned, not with the effect of a prosecutor's conflict on the quality of discovery or its effect in creating a potential advantage in cross-examining witnesses, but rather with the fairness and impartiality of the district attorney's exercise of her discretion to prosecute. Id. Similarly, in Perez's case, where the decision to prosecute is tainted by an incomplete investigation stemming from an attorney conflict of interest, the fairness of the trial is implicated. Additionally, because exculpatory information that should make it into the hands of other prosecutors never does, the defendant's access to discovery is compromised, and his ability to plea bargain and fashion a defense is undermined. Watson's duty to maintain client confidences received in the course of his prior representation of Snyder compromised his ability to communicate with other prosecutors concerning Snyder's viability as an alternate suspect or, at the very least, Snyder's reliability as a key witness. Because Watson, by providing the prosecution team with reports and theories of culpability, was deeply involved in investigating the Heird murder, the prosecution's investigation as a whole has been affected, thus tainting the district attorney's decision to prosecute Perez. Where the district attorney's decision to prosecute has been affected by a conflict of interest, special circumstances making it unlikely that the defendant will receive a fair trial exist. N.R., 139 P.3d at 677-78; Wheeler v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 275, 504 P.2d 1094, 1095-96 (1973). Thus, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in taking Watson's conflict into account when it disqualified the district attorney's office.