Opinion ID: 844218
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Guilt Phase Challenges

Text: As mentioned above, defendant presented testimony regarding the ongoing hostility between defendant's gang, the Young Crowd, and the group of deputies from the Lynwood area known as the Vikings. Defendant, Ernesto Avila, and Jose Nieves each testified to some degree on the subject. Before the trial began, defendant had notified the trial court he intended to introduce more extensive evidence related to alleged misconduct by sheriff's deputies, including testimony concerning a civil lawsuit filed in federal court that alleged widespread civil rights violations by sheriff's deputies in the Lynwood area during 1990 and 1991, [10] as well as evidence of the shooting of two Young Crowd members (Nieves and Lloyd Polk) by sheriff's deputies. After several discussions concerning what evidence, if any, would be admitted, and a formal hearing on the subject that included live witness testimony, the trial court allowed defendant to present evidence of (1) specific acts of alleged misconduct by Deputy Blair (see Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (a)(1)), (2) specific acts of alleged misconduct that other deputies inflicted upon defendant and Avila, (3) the circumstance that Nieves was shot by deputies several days before Deputy Blair was killed, and (4) Blair's membership in the Vikings. The court did not permit defendant to present evidence regarding the lawsuit, the specific circumstances of the shooting of Nieves, or alleged misconduct by other members of the Vikings or other unaffiliated deputies against other citizens. The court also ordered redacted a portion of the transcript of the jailhouse conversation between defendant and his mother and sister in which defendant discussed the lawsuit. In the trial court's view, presenting evidence of the lawsuit and other misconduct by other deputies would be going too far afield, would sidetrack and unduly prolong the trial, and would invite[] the jury to speculate as to what the lawsuit was about. The court also noted the incidents in the lawsuit were remote in time, having occurred five years or more before Deputy Blair was shot, and concluded the lawsuit doesn't really provide in the court's view any legitimate basis for Blair to have shot at [defendant], which is the defense allegation. The court therefore exercised its discretion under section 352 of the Evidence Code to exclude the lawsuit and other evidence of alleged deputy misconduct. (See Evid. Code, § 352 [providing that a trial court may exclude otherwise relevant evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or consumption of time].) During the trial, the court similarly excluded as too remote evidence concerning the shooting of Lloyd Polk after Avila testified that the shooting occurred in 1989 or 1990. Defendant, however, was permitted to testify that he had heard about the fatal shooting of Polk. The trial court later denied defendant's new trial motion contesting the exclusion of the proffered evidence. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court's decisions. [11] Stated succinctly, defendant's asserted basis for introducing this evidence is as follows: He proposed to introduce other persons' allegations that other deputies engaged in unlawful conduct in order to bolster his evidence that Deputy Blair unlawfully shot at him and Avila, and therefore defendant's shooting at Blair was justified. Pursuant to defendant's theory of admissibility, there were two primary grounds for admitting the evidence: to establish that (1) Blair was the aggressor and (2) defendant reasonably believed the use of force against Blair was necessary in order to prevent unlawful harm to Avila or defendant. As to the former, evidence of past misconduct by other deputies, defendant urges, might have tended to establish both Blair's propensity to act in this manner and his motive for doing sothat is, to eliminate or intimidate a plaintiff in the lawsuit. (8) We will assume without deciding that these grounds met the relevance threshold of sections 351 and 210 of the Evidence Code. (See Evid. Code, §§ 351 [Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.], 210 [`Relevant evidence' means evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.]; People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 13-14 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748] ( Scheid ) [The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends `logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. [Citations.]' [Citation.]].) [12] We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling to exclude proffered relevant evidence under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 929-930 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 286, 200 P.3d 898]; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640] ( Osband ) [A court abuses its discretion when its ruling `falls outside the bounds of reason.']; People v. Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 195 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 117, 211 P.3d 617] ( Carrington ) [an abuse of discretion is established by `a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice'].) (9) We agree with the trial court that the connection between the excluded evidence and the issues in this trial was unduly tenuous. Law enforcement officers, of course, lawfully may use force in order to perform their duties. The defense in the present case raised the question whether Deputy Blair unlawfully used deadly force against Avila and/or defendant, such that defendant was justified in using deadly force against Blair. The relevance (if any) of evidence regarding other deputies' past acts in establishing Blair's propensity or motive to engage in the supposed unlawful use of force on the night in question likewise was tied to establishing that these past acts by other deputies also were unlawful. Defendant implicitly acknowledges this in his briefs, throughout which he describes the other deputies' actions as wrongful and lawless. If, however, the past uses of force and other actions by these other deputies were lawful, any relevance in proving Deputy Blair's propensity to use unlawful force is greatly diminished, if not eliminated. Similarly, if the past acts by other deputies were lawful, there would be little likelihood that, as defendant asserts, Blair was motivated to initiate a gun battle in plain view of numerous bystanders in order to eliminate or intimidate a plaintiff in what would have been an unmeritorious lawsuit against the sheriff's department. The trial court reasonably found that providing the jury with a full picture of the significance of the lawsuit, the shootings of Polk and Nieves, and any other alleged misconduct by other deputies would seriously sidetrack the trial, consuming undue time with a series of trials within this trial concerning whether the deputies' actions in those past incidents legally were justified. In asserting that the lawsuit evidence could have been presented in relatively abbreviated testimony, defendant fails to acknowledge that the allegations of misconduct in the lawsuit could not be offered for the truth of the matters asserted; such use would violate the hearsay rule, section 1200 of the Evidence Code. (Evid. Code, § 1200 [evidence of an out-of-court statement is inadmissible when offered to prove the truth of the matter stated].) The trial court would have acted within its discretion in finding that evidence of the mere existence of the lawsuit, divorced from any proof of the truth of the allegations raised in it, would not have been relevant to prove Deputy Blair's propensity or motive to engage in the unlawful use of force. (See Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 132-133 [the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence as irrelevant when the defendant had failed to establish the necessary preliminary fact of a correlation between the proffered evidence and the inference to be drawn from it].) (10) In sum, the trial court's ruling was not beyond the bounds of reason. It was reasonable for the trial court to find that any probative value in admitting the lawsuit evidence (proffered with the hope of supporting an inference that because other deputies had engaged in unlawful activities unrelated to defendantor the lawsuit so allegedit was more likely Blair acted unlawfully in the shooting incident) was minimal and would have been substantially outweighed by the risk of jury confusion and undue consumption of time. To the extent defendant also contends the trial court should have admitted evidence of other persons' allegations of misconduct by other deputies as establishing defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting, we again conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence. The reasonableness of defendant's asserted belief that he was justified in shooting at Deputy Blair was not tied to anything defendant claimed to know regarding the past actions of Deputy Blair, the Vikings, or other deputies. Defendant did not testify that he preemptively shot at Deputy Blair first because, based upon defendant's knowledge of past misconduct by the deputies, defendant feared that Blair was about to shoot him or Avila. He testified, rather, that Deputy Blair unjustifiably started the gunfight. The jury's decision, therefore, turned on its assessment of the credibility of defendant's and his other witnesses' testimony regarding the issue of who shot first, not the issue of defendant's fear of the deputies. (See also People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337] [although evidence of threats by third parties can be relevant to defendant's state of mind, such threats inherently carry less weight than threats from the victim and evidence of a third party's reputation for violence may be particularly susceptible to exclusion].) (11) Defendant contends the federal and state Constitutions do not permit a trial court to exclude defense evidence that goes to the heart of the case based solely on the court's concerns regarding the consumption of time. We need not decide whether this assertion is correct because here the trial court's decision was not grounded solely on the consumption of time that would have been required had defendant's proffered evidence been admitted. Rather, the court also reasonably was concerned that essentially undertaking a series of trials concerning the numerous allegations of misconduct by other deputies ran the risk of distracting the jury from its task of deciding defendant's guilt. (See People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 607 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683].) In addition, the trial court found at least some of the evidence was too remotethat is, of at most minimal relevanceanother valid ground for declining to admit it. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] [stating, in addressing a challenge to the exclusion of evidence of third party culpability, that we do not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted . . .].) (12) Although defendant correctly points out that his defense made the issues of who shot firstand why Deputy Blair might have done socentral to the resolution of the charges, this does not mean the trial court constitutionally was compelled to permit defendant to introduce all possibly relevant evidence on these subjects despite its marginal relevance, the possible effect upon the jury's ability to remain focused on the issues before it (rather than becoming sidetracked on collateral questions), and the potentially significant amount of time entailed in admitting the evidence in a manner fair to both sides. (See People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 82 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622] [a state court's application of ordinary rules of evidence including the rule stated in Evidence Code section 352generally does not infringe upon the constitutional right to offer a defense]; accord, People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137]; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 90 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749].) Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court's assessment of the possible probative value of defendant's proffered evidence in its weighing of the risk of confusion and undue consumption of time did not impermissibly invade the province of the jury. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 373 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34].) We also observe that the trial court permitted defendant to present evidence concerning alleged misconduct that Deputy Blair himself committed and of Blair's membership in the Vikings, and that defendant, Avila, and Nieves also testified regarding their own negative experiences with the Vikings. For these reasons, the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence regarding alleged misconduct by other deputies did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.
The trial court, over defendant's objections, permitted the prosecution to present in its guilt phase case-in-chief evidence concerning defendant's two prior convictions for assault with a firearm, and his being on parole at the time of the shooting of Deputy Blair, including the conditions of defendant's parole prohibiting him from possessing firearms and associating with Young Crowd members. Because the court decided this evidence was to be admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief, it also ruled there would not be a bifurcated trial regarding the prior-prison-sentence-enhancement allegations. The prosecution proffered the evidence of defendant's prior convictions and parole status to establish defendant's motivethat he shot at Deputies Blair and Lyons in order to avoid being apprehended for possessing two handguns in violation of the law [13] and his parole. Defendant raises five related claims challenging the admission of this evidence at the guilt phase: The trial court erred by (1) admitting evidence of both of defendant's prior felony convictions, rather than, more generally, of his status as a convicted felon; (2) failing to sanitize the prior conviction evidence, and instead permitting the jury to learn that the convictions were for assaults with a firearm; (3) admitting evidence that defendant was on parole when he shot Deputy Blair; (4) admitting evidence regarding the terms of defendant's parole prohibiting him from possessing firearms and associating with Young Crowd members; and (5) admitting prison records concerning his convictions. He contends the trial court's decision to admit the challenged evidence was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his constitutional right to a fair trial. We are not persuaded. Citing various decisions of this court and others, defendant asserts that because the prejudice arising from this challenged evidence was devastating and overwhelmed its probative value, the trial court was obliged to exclude it pursuant to section 352 of the Evidence Code. Although defendant does not precisely identify the asserted prejudicial effect of the evidence, we may presume from the decisions upon which he relies that he believes the evidence was unduly prejudicial because, apart from tending to establish his motive for shooting Deputy Blair, the evidence would have tended to convince the jury that defendant was guilty solely because he had a criminal disposition. (See People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 317 [165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883] [As Wigmore notes, admission of [criminal history] evidence produces an `over-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts.'].) To the contrary, however, the challenged evidence was highly probative on the central issue in the case, and the trial court took appropriate measures to reduce the risk of undue prejudice. (13) Subdivision (a) of [Evidence Code] section 1101 prohibits admission of evidence of a person's character, including evidence of character in the form of specific instances of uncharged misconduct, to prove the conduct of that person on a specified occasion. Subdivision (b) of section 1101 clarifies, however, that this rule does not prohibit admission of evidence of uncharged misconduct when such evidence is relevant to establish some fact other than the person's character or disposition. ( People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) Evidence that a defendant committed crimes other than those for which he is on trial is admissible when it is logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference relevant to prove some fact at issue, such as motive, intent, preparation or identity. [Citations.] The trial court judge has the discretion to admit such evidence after weighing the probative value against the prejudicial effect. [Citation.] When reviewing the admission of evidence of other offenses, a court must consider: (1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative value of the other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant. [Citation.] Because this type of evidence can be so damaging, `[i]f the connection between the uncharged offense and the ultimate fact in dispute is not clear, the evidence should be excluded.' [Citation.] ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 856 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) `We review for abuse of discretion a trial court's rulings on relevance and admission or exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352.' [Citation.] ( People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 602 [94 Cal.Rptr.3d 322, 208 P.3d 78] ( Davis ).) [14] Under the prosecution's theory of the case, the connection between the challenged evidence and the charges being tried was clear and central to establishing defendant's guilt. The prosecution's theory was that defendant knew, because of his prior convictions and parole status, that it was illegal and a violation of his parole for him to possess firearms (and a separate violation of his parole to associate with Young Crowd members), and he shot at Deputies Blair and Lyons in order to avoid being apprehended and returned to prison. (See People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 168-169 [246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629]; People v. Durham (1969) 70 Cal.2d 171, 187-189 [74 Cal.Rptr. 262, 449 P.2d 198].) The circumstance that defendant had suffered two prior felony convictions for assault with a firearm corroborated the prosecution witnesses who would testify that defendant believed not only that he would be returned to prison if he was caught with the handguns, but also that he would be subject to a more lengthy third strike sentence. This evidence also bolstered the prosecution's interpretation of defendant's jailhouse comment to his motherthat if the police had caught him with the guns, it would have been all over for himas another reference to a third strike or a long prison sentence. Contrary to defendant's contention on appeal, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to decline to sanitize the evidence concerning the prior convictions. A reasonable juror could find the circumstance that both convictions were for the same serious offense of assault with a firearm supported the testimony that defendant feared a third strike if he was caught, even though, as defendant testified, he later learned that only one of his convictions constituted a strike under the law. We need not consider the validity of the trial court's particular reason for not sanitizing the prior convictionsthat, in the court's view, it likely would have been even more prejudicial to defendant if the jurors were not informed of the nature of his prior offenses, and instead engaged in speculation on the subject. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704] [if the trial court's ruling is correct `upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion'].) There was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence because establishing defendant's strong motive to shoot first at the deputies was critical to the prosecutor's case, and, as discussed post, the trial court took steps to avoid any unduly prejudicial effect on the jury. The prosecutor needed to convince the jury that defendant was the shootera fact the defense had not conceded when the disputed evidence was admittedand also the aggressor to disprove any claims of self-defense. Defendant next contends the evidence concerning his parole status and the conditions of his parole should have been excluded as cumulative at best, because any motive to avoid a third strike completely overshadowed any motive to avoid a parole sanction. Even assuming that defendant is correct in his assessment of the relative weight of these possible motivating factors for his actions, this does not resolve the relevant question: did the trial court act outside the bounds of reason in determining that the probative value of the evidence that defendant (1) was on parole, (2) had been expressly warned by his parole agent he could not possess firearms, and (3) if discovered, would probably be returned to prison, was not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice if it were admitted? In the same manner that defendant claims his parole status was less compelling evidence of his motive to shoot at the officers, the jury's learning that defendant was on parole also was less likely to result in undue prejudice. But in any event, this evidence nonetheless provided important insight regarding the central issue of the trial by establishing a related, but alternative, motive for defendant to shoot at the officersto avoid being returned to prison for a parole violation. (See People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1070-1071 [132 Cal.Rptr.3d 808, 263 P.3d 1].) This is particularly so in light of the circumstance that only one of his prior convictions actually counted as a strike, and the possibility that defendant was not aware of or concerned with the three strikes law at the time of the shooting, as, in fact, he claimed in his subsequent trial testimony. The trial court also took actions to limit the possible unduly prejudicial effect of the prior crimes and parole status evidence. The court instructed the jury at the commencement of the trial that, unless the court were to instruct the jury otherwise, evidence concerning defendant's prior convictions could be considered only for the limited purposes of establishing defendant's motive and the truth of the prior-prison-sentence-enhancement allegationsin other words, by negative implication, it would be improper for the jury to consider this evidence as establishing defendant's criminal propensity. The court reiterated its instruction on this subject when the parole agent testified concerning the terms of defendant's parole and his prior convictions. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 34 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224] ( Cain ) [the jury is presumed to follow the trial court's instructions].) In addition, defendant was permitted to testify that only one of his convictions actually was a strike. In light of the significant probative value of the challenged evidence and the trial court's efforts to limit the possible undue prejudice, we cannot say the trial court's rulings were an abuse of its discretion. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion under state law in admitting this evidence over defendant's objections, his claim that the admission of this evidence violated his constitutional right to a fair trial, to the extent it is preserved for appeal, also is without merit. ( People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 292 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 187 P.3d 363] ( Riggs ) [a defendant's failure to raise a distinct constitutional claim at trial forfeits such a claim on appeal, and to the extent the appellate claim was merely a gloss on the objection raised at trial, it is preserved but is without merit because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence].) Defendant also challenges the admission of his prison records because the records included a chronology of his imprisonment and parole, along with notations that, he contends, might have led the jury to infer he had committed numerous violations of prison rules, and that he might have been continued on parole (i.e., released from custody) after he was arrested on the charges in the present case. [15] Defendant contends the trial court should have sanitized the report to remove the notations. Defendant, however, did not object to the contents of the records, or ask the trial court to redact them, and he therefore has forfeited this claim. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 125-126 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] ( Clark ) [In the absence of a timely and specific objection on the ground sought to be urged on appeal, the trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed.].) In any event, even if the prison records should have been redacted to remove the notations at issue, any error was harmless under any standard. Defendant merely speculates that the jury might have understood the cryptic notations at issue in the manner he asserts. Moreover, even if the jury had deciphered the meaning of the notations, there is no reasonable probability that the verdict could have been affected by such collateral issues.
Defendant contends the trial court erred when it allowed Deputy Lyons to testify, in essence, that Deputy Blair was not the type of deputy who would harass people. This contention is without merit. During direct examination, Deputy Lyons testified that earlier during their patrol on the night of the shooting, he and Deputy Blair had talked with a group of approximately 15 members of a gang in Compton, who were standing around their cars, drinking beer, and listening to loud music. Although Deputy Blair told them to discard their beer and to turn down the music, the encounter was not particularly adversarial. The gang members soon thereafter entered their cars and drove away. The prosecutor later asked Deputy Lyons whether he and Deputy Blair jack[ed] them around and [said] get in your car and then watch them drive away and then stop them for driving under the influence? After Deputy Lyons answered no, the prosecutor continued, You sort of laughed when I asked you that question. Why is that? Deputy Lyons answered, That's just notwe just didn't do that. We weren'tI'm not that type of deputy and Deputy Blair was not that type of deputy. Defense counsel then objected that Deputy Lyons's answer was nonresponsive, and the trial court overruled the objection. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have struck Deputy Lyons's answer that he and Deputy Blair were not the type of deputies who would jack around people in the manner the prosecution suggested, because the testimony was irrelevant, lacked a proper foundation, and was prejudicial. The only objection he raised at trial, however, was that the answer was nonresponsive. The trial court properly overruled that objection because the answer was, in fact, responsive to the question the prosecution had asked, which was why Deputy Lyons had laughed at the previous question that had been posed. Defendant forfeited the grounds he asserts on appeal by not raising them at trial. ( Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 125-126.) Nonetheless, even if defendant had preserved his appellate challenges, and assuming for the sake of argument that the testimony should have been excluded as irrelevant or lacking a proper foundation, any error was harmless under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]. (See Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 21 [applying the Watson standard to claim of erroneous admission of evidence].) There is no reasonable probability the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict had the trial court struck Deputy Lyons's brief statement that he and Deputy Blair were not the type of deputies who would jack around people by ordering them to do something and then arresting them after complying.
Defendant next contends the trial court erred by admitting Sergeant Harris's testimony concerning his opinion, based upon his experience as a deputy and firearms examiner in the sheriff's department, that a person might mistakenly identify the location from which a firearm was fired based upon the sound of the gunshot. Defendant's contention lacks merit. The prosecutor asked Sergeant Harrisin a hypothetical question paralleling Deputy Lyons's testimonywhether, in essence, a person who heard gunshots in such circumstances might mistake the direction from which the shots were fired. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the question call[ed] for speculation and was not his expertise. After a brief sidebar conference, the trial court overruled the objections and the prosecutor repeated the question. Sergeant Harris testified that, drawing from his experience when [he] was working at the training academy investigating, from a tactical standpoint we investigated officer involved shootings and deputy involved shootings in the actual training of deputies under stress conditions, that once we put people under stress and shots are being fired, the determination of where a shot came from, even though we know the shot came from the right, the person might say it came from the left or vice versa. So under times of stress, determining where a shot came from often is not possible. Sergeant Harris agreed that although an individual might have said that he or she did not know where the shot came from but [he or she] heard it from the left, based upon that alone you can't necessarily say whether the shot was coming from the right or left. On appeal, defendant urges that the foundation for Sergeant Harris's opinion was too vague and skimpy. According to defendant, because Harris had no training or credentials in the science of acoustics or auditory perceptions, which was the subject of his testimony, his opinion was no better than a guess. To the contrary, as we will explain, Sergeant Harris's testimony was not based on the science of acoustics or auditory perceptions, but rather on his specialized expertise gained from his involvement in the training of deputies. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 131 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357] ( Catlin ) [the trial court's admission of expert opinion testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion].) (14) `A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he [or she] has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him [or her] as an expert on the subject to which his [or her] testimony relates.' (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) An expert witness's testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to a subject `that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. . . .' (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) ( Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 131.) The witness's qualifications may be established by his or her own testimony. (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (b).) In the present case, Sergeant Harris's testimony stemmed from his special knowledge [and] experience in training deputies at the academy. His opinions (that people under stress often are unable accurately to determine from where a shot came, and that if a person were to say that he or she heard a shot from the left this would not necessarily mean the shot did, in fact, come from the left) were sufficiently beyond common experience so as to assist the jury in assessing the significance of Deputy Lyons's testimony that it sounded to him like the first shots were fired from behind him and to his left. Accordingly, admitting this testimony was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
In conjunction with Deputy Lyons's testimony concerning the information he and the other members of the gang unit received regarding the Young Crowd gang at the briefing prior to the killing of Deputy Blair, the prosecutor presented six pictures of the pickup truck that had been painted to resemble a sheriff's department patrol vehicle, and on which various confrontational statements directed at the sheriff's department had been written. Defendant contends on appeal that a photograph of the interior of the truck, which includes what appears to be a handmade representation of a shotgun, and Deputy Lyons's testimony concerning that photograph, should not have been admitted because Deputy Lyons testified that he was not shown that photograph at the briefing. Defendant did not object to the admission of the photograph or the testimony. His assertion to the contrary on appeal mischaracterizes the record. Although the prosecutor at one point stated he was not offering the testimony for the truth of the matter asserted at this point in time, the trial court twice suggested that defense counsel might have made a tactical decision to allow the testimony to show state of mind as to Blair as he went out (that is, that he might have been in a heightened emotional state) and therefore the defense may want all of that. Defense counsel agreed, stating, Pretty much. When Deputy Lyons's testimony continued the following day after the evening recess, there was no other discussion concerning the prosecution's grounds for proffering the photographs and Deputy Lyons's testimony, or any objections by defendant to the admission of this evidence. Indeed, another witness, Deputy Roberts, also testified without defense objectionthat he was shown the photographs, including the one with the mock shotgun, at a briefing approximately one week before Deputy Blair was shot. Accordingly, defendant has forfeited his appellate claim. In any event, even if defendant had preserved the claim, any error was harmless. The photograph of the mock shotgun inside the truck did not, by itself, facilitate[] the prosecutor's promotion of the truck as signifying a deadly threat to the deputies, as defendant urges. Rather, the photographs of the truck Deputy Lyons testified he did see at the briefing (which included various disparaging and profane statements regarding the sheriff's department and the statement that the Crowd's gonna get you, as well as what appeared to be numerous bullet holes in the truck's body) effectively supported the prosecutor's argument that members of Young Crowd were angry with and hated the sheriff's deputies. Contrary to defendant's arguments, even if the photograph of the mock shotgun had not been admitted, there is neither a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different verdict at the guilt phase, nor a reasonable possibility that it would have reached a different penalty verdict (see People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [250 Cal.Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]).
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting several photographs of a mannequin dressed in Deputy Blair's undershirt, bulletproof vest and uniform shirt illustrating the location of the bullet holes in these items and the possible trajectory of the bullets. Defendant forfeited this challenge by failing to object at trial. In any event, for decades we have concluded the use of similar evidence is `a perfectly proper method of introducing highly relevant evidence.' ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 443 [quoting People v. Robillard (1960) 55 Cal.2d 88, 99 [10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295]].) Contrary to defendant's assertion, the circumstance that the prosecution's ballistics expert testified that the sheriff's detectives had set up and photographed the mannequin, but the expert didn't necessarily require that we do that, did not render the evidence irrelevant. The expert, in fact, referred to the photographs during his testimony, and even if he had not done so, the jury properly could have considered the photographs in determining the manner in which Deputy Blair had been killed. Had defendant objected to the evidence as being irrelevant, the trial court properly would have overruled that objection.
Over defendant's objections, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of Martha Godinez. After a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial court ruled that Godinez was unavailable as a witness because she could not be found, and that the prosecution had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate her. Defendant contends the trial court erred by finding the prosecution's efforts to find Godinez were adequate. The trial court did not err. (15) `The confrontation clauses of both the federal and state Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.) That right is not absolute, however. An exception exists when a witness is unavailable and, at a previous court proceeding against the same defendant, has given testimony that was subject to cross-examination. Under federal constitutional law, such testimony is admissible if the prosecution shows it made a good-faith effort to obtain the presence of the witness at trial.' [Citations.] (16) `In California, the exception to the confrontation right for prior recorded testimony is codified in [Evidence Code] section 1291, subdivision (a), which provides: Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness and: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he has at the hearing. A witness is unavailable if [a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court's process. ([Evid. Code,] § 240, subd. (a)(5).) Although section 240 refers to reasonable diligence, this court has often described the evaluation as one involving due diligence.' [Citation.] ( People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 848-849 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 264, 200 P.3d 879].) We have said that the term `due diligence' is `incapable of a mechanical definition,' but it `connotes persevering application, untiring efforts in good earnest, efforts of a substantial character.' [Citations.] Relevant considerations include `whether the search was timely begun' [citation], the importance of the witness's testimony [citation], and whether leads were competently explored [citation]. ( People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 904 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 23, 15 P.3d 243].) When, as here, the facts are undisputed, a reviewing court decides the question of due diligence independently, not deferentially. [Citation.] ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 610 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302] ( Smith ).) Detective Verdugo, a sergeant in the homicide division of the sheriff's department who had served as a deputy sheriff for more than 31 years, testified that he was assigned the task of attempting to locate and serve a subpoena upon Godinez in order to obtain her testimony at trial. He began looking for Godinez approximately two weeks before the date set for the start of the trial, first checking her two last known addressesthe motel where she had been residing at the time of the preliminary hearing, and her brother's house. Detective Verdugo found that Godinez had checked out of the motel, and her brother's house was vacant. One neighbor at the brother's house believed that Godinez had gone to Mexico, and another neighbor had not seen her in quite awhile. Detective Verdugo checked the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, but found only an address that appeared to predate the last known addresses he had already checked. He nonetheless went to that address, but did not find Godinez there. Detective Verdugo had no knowledge of Godinez's ever having been employed. He checked the hospital and jail records in Los Angeles County on a pretty regular basis to determine whether Godinez or her brother had been admitted into either system. He also gave the patrol deputies in the Century Station a photograph and physical description of Godinez, and directed the deputies to contact him if she was spotted, and to take her into custody if that was necessary to ensure that she would appear in court. Based on this testimony, we conclude the trial court properly ruled that the prosecution had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to locate Godinez. First, the reasonableness of the activities is supported by the circumstance that her testimony was not of critical importance in the trial. She testified at the preliminary hearing that on the night of the shooting she was seated inside her car, which was in the parking lot near the park at the end of Walnut Avenue, when she heard gunshots. She then saw defendant and several other people run from Walnut Avenue into the park, thereby placing defendant near the scene of the shooting. Other prosecution witnesses and evidence, including defendant's own jailhouse conversation with his family members, provided much stronger support for the jury finding that defendant was the person who shot Deputy Blair. [16] (17) Second, Detective Verdugo began the search a reasonable period of time before the trial was to commence. Defendant urges that the prosecution should have kept tabs on Godinez between the preliminary hearing and the trial because she testified that she had been fearful of testifying, and, therefore, the prosecution should have known she might choose to flee or hide rather than testify. We disagree. Although Godinez testified that she had been fearful, she did testify at the preliminary hearing, and, moreover, she testified that she had moved (with the assistance of the sheriff's department) since the shooting, which presumably was for her protection. Moreover, we rejected a claim similar to defendant's in People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 564 [244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776]: [W]e could not properly impose upon the People an obligation to keep `periodic tabs' on every material witness in a criminal case, for the administrative burdens of doing so would be prohibitive. Moreover, it is unclear what effective and reasonable controls the People could impose upon a witness who plans to leave the state, or simply `disappear,' long before a trial date is set. (See also People v. Herrera (2010) 49 Cal.4th 613, 630 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 729, 232 P.3d 710] ( Herrera ).) In Hovey we also distinguished the decision upon which defendant relies, People v. Louis (1986) 42 Cal.3d 969 [232 Cal.Rptr. 110, 728 P.2d 180], because the witness at issue in Hovey, like Godinez in the present case and unlike the witness in Louis, could not be deemed a `critical' or `vital' witness. ( Hovey, at p. 564.) Finally, Detective Verdugo competently pursued the leads he had concerning Godinez's whereabouts. He checked two possible addresses of which he initially was aware, and a third address he learned from Department of Motor Vehicle records. He periodically checked county hospital and jail records to determine whether she had been placed into either system. He attempted to locate her brother. He interviewed neighbors at the brother's house and learned that Godinez might have gone to Mexico, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Detective Verdugo should have suspected she might have gone somewhere else. (See Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 611 [the prosecution may reasonably rely upon hearsay in deciding what steps should be taken to locate a witness, and need not attempt a `futile act,' such as trying to compel an unwilling witness outside the court's jurisdiction to return to testify].) Because Detective Verdugo had no information concerning Godinez's employment history, he had no lead to follow in that area. In sum, the prosecution exercised reasonable diligence under the circumstances in attempting to locate Godinez. (See Herrera, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 623.) Even if, as defendant asserts, the prosecution could have contacted the law enforcement officers who assisted in moving Godinez before the preliminary hearing, attempted to find other people who knew her, or searched for her in Mexico, the circumstance that additional efforts might have been made or other lines of inquiry pursued does not affect this conclusion. [Citation.] It is enough that the People used reasonable efforts to locate the witness. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1298 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] ( Cummings ); Hardy v. Cross (2011) 565 U.S. ___, ___ [181 L.Ed.2d 468, 132 S.Ct. 490, 495] (per curiam) [when a witness disappears before trial, it is always possible to think of additional steps that the prosecution might have taken to secure the witness' presence [citation], but the Sixth Amendment does not require the prosecution to exhaust every avenue of inquiry, no matter how unpromising.].) [17] Accordingly, the presentation at trial of Godinez's preliminary hearing testimony did not violate defendant's statutory and constitutional rights. To the extent defendant separately contends the use of Godinez's preliminary hearing testimony was unduly prejudicial because the jury might have inferred that her absence at trial indicated that the fears of being harmed that she had expressed at the preliminary hearing had come to fruition, defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object or request an admonition that might have prevented such speculation by the jury. Moreover, there is nothing in the record demonstrating the jury drew such an inference from Godinez's absence, and we observe that the prosecutor in no way implied that Godinez had been harmed. In addition, we might surmise that because Renele Brooks and Sara Frausto, who also expressed fear of retaliation for testifying and yet provided much more damaging evidence, testified in person at the trial, it was even less likely the jury would have believed Godinez had been harmed to prevent her from testifying. Further, Godinez had testified at the preliminary hearing that the reason she feared she might be harmed was because she initially had lied to the police to provide an alibi for someone other than defendant, but she later told the police that that person was, in fact, not with her when the shooting started. She confirmed that her false statements to the police had nothing to do with defendant. Accordingly, we discern no reasonable probability that defendant could have been unduly prejudiced by the admission of Godinez's preliminary hearing testimony.
Defendant claims the trial court's evidentiary rulings, especially those concerning each party's motive evidence (defendant's evidence concerning the Vikings and the lawsuit, and the prosecution's evidence concerning defendant's criminal history), demonstrate the court improperly applied a more burdensome standard of admissibility to defense evidence than the standard it applied to prosecution evidence. We are not persuaded. Defendant points to no instances in the record in which the trial court explicitly applied inconsistent standards. Moreover, as is often the case, the trial court at times excluded evidence proffered by the prosecution, and at other times admitted defense evidence over the prosecution's objections. We have concluded the trial court did not err with regard to the evidence that both sides proffered concerning the motives of defendant and Deputy Blair (see ante ), but even if we were to conclude the trial court had abused its discretion in those (or other) rulings, any such errors would not without more establish that the trial court had improperly employed inconsistent standards. (See People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 376-377 [121 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 247 P.3d 82].) Defendant has not established that the trial court utilized different standards with regard to the admission of evidence at the trial, and, therefore, his claim that his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial were violated in this manner is without merit. (Cf. People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 420-425 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 161 P.3d 3] [rejecting the claim that the trial court had imposed different standards in assessing the ability of prospective jurors to serve on a capital case when nothing in the record suggested the court applied different standards].)

(18) Defendant claims the prosecutor engaged in numerous instances of misconduct during the guilt phase of the trial, thereby violating his rights under both the state and federal Constitutions. Under California law, a prosecutor commits reversible misconduct if he or she makes use of `deceptive or reprehensible methods' when attempting to persuade either the trial court or the jury, and it is reasonably probable that without such misconduct, an outcome more favorable to the defendant would have resulted. [Citation.] Under the federal Constitution, conduct by a prosecutor that does not result in the denial of the defendant's specific constitutional rightssuch as a comment upon the defendant's invocation of the right to remain silentbut is otherwise worthy of condemnation, is not a constitutional violation unless the challenged action `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' [Citation.] ( Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298.) We note that, as will be applicable to many of defendant's assertions of misconduct, [a]lthough it is misconduct for a prosecutor intentionally to elicit inadmissible testimony [citation], merely eliciting evidence is not misconduct. ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1218 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354].) Defendant's briefing on the prosecutorial misconduct issue is difficult to follow, making it somewhat challenging to identify his exact claims of misconduct. Rather than identifying a specific instance of asserted misconduct and then discussing why the prosecutor's action was improper and how defendant was prejudiced, defendant seems to have taken a more global approach, often asserting an overarching theme of misconduct, and then mentioning a number of actions by the prosecutor from various points in the trial that assertedly fall within the theme of asserted misconduct at issue. (19) In addition, defendant at trial did not object to a large majority of the alleged instances of misconduct he now mentions on appeal, nor did he request that the trial court admonish the jury in each instance when an objection was sustained, or assert that the admonitions the trial court did give on various occasions were insufficient. A defendant generally `may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion and on the same groundthe defendant made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety. [Citation.]' [Citation.] ( Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298.) A defendant's failure to object and to request an admonition is excused only when an objection would have been futile or an admonition ineffective. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 159 [51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980].) Defendant therefore forfeited appellate claims of misconduct related to many of the prosecutor's actions listed in his briefs. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 820 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673] ( Hill ).) Defendant asserts that we should excuse his failure to preserve misconduct claims as to all these actions by the prosecutor because objections would have been futile, no action by the trial court could have cured the prejudice, and the prosecutor's alleged misconduct throughout the trial was so pervasive that defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to bring every instance of misconduct to the trial court's attention. (See Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 820-821.) This case, however, is not on par with the circumstances of Hill. As was the case in People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1352 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 242 P.3d 105], defense counsel here was not faced with a `constant barrage of [the prosecutor's] unethical conduct' and counsel's objections did not provoke `the trial court's wrath.' Unlike in Hill, the trial court in this case did not suggest before the jury that counsel was `an obstructionist,' and was merely `delaying the trial with meritless objections.' ( Foster, at p. 1352; see People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520] ( Friend ) [defense counsel's failure to object to alleged misconduct is excused when the `misconduct [is] pervasive, defense counsel [has] repeatedly but vainly objected to try to curb the misconduct, and the courtroom atmosphere was so poisonous that further objections would have been futile']; People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 775 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 78, 209 P.3d 1] ( Dykes ) [exception to forfeiture rule does not apply when the case did not involve counsel experiencingas did counsel in Hill a `constant barrage' of misstatements, demeaning sarcasm, and falsehoods, or ongoing hostility on the part of the trial court, to appropriate, well-founded objections].) Here, the record does not establish that properly framed objections would have been in vain or provoked any wrath on the part of the trial court; rather, all indications are that the court was reasonably responsive to defense objections throughout the trial; indeed, the trial court at times interposed its own objections to what it perceived as improprieties by the prosecutor. (See Friend, supra, at p. 30 [in light of defense counsel's frequent objections and the trial court's having sustained several of them, exception to the forfeiture rule did not apply because the record established the trial court kept a firm hand on the actions of the attorneys and maintained a fair proceeding].) There is no reason to suspect the trial court was predisposed to overrule objections to the prosecutor's deeds (i.e., that an objection would have been futile), or that corrective actions, such as appropriately strong admonitions, would not have been able to cure any prejudicial effect on the jury had defendant requested them. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 432 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391] ( Boyette ).) Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, the trial court did not have a general duty to intervene on his behalf to counteract the asserted misconduct such that, as defendant urges, his specific failures to object and request admonitions would be excused on appeal. ( Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 298 [rejecting claim that a trial court has an independent duty to remedy unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct in order to control the proceedings]; see also People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 806-807 [102 Cal.Rptr.3d 786, 220 P.3d 820].) For the most part, we address the asserted instances of misconduct in the order in which they are presented in the opening brief, but at times reframe the claims so they can be addressed in a more coherent and logical manner. We do not separately analyze each and every one of the multitude of particular acts by the prosecutor that are mentioned in passing in the brief in the context of defendant's global assertions of misconduct. We discuss the merits of those claims that were preserved for appeal through a proper objection and request for an admonishment, as well as claims of misconduct in which the issue of forfeiture is close and difficult, and we therefore assume the claim was preserved and proceed to the merits. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93].) As for claims that plainly were not preserved, we simply identify the claims and conclude they are forfeited, without undertaking an analysis of the merits of the claims. As we shall discuss, however, within the category of forfeited claims there are two instances of improper actions by the prosecutor that, although forfeited as a basis for reversal on appeal, give us grave concern and warrant special condemnation.
Defendant contends that during trial the prosecutor at times improperly introduced evidence concerning defendant's criminal history and referred to such evidence in his statements to the jury. Although defendant acknowledges the evidence in general was properly admitted, he urges that the prosecutor commented and embellished on the evidence in such an intentionally sarcastic, repetitive and prejudicial manner that it constituted misconduct and a denial of [defendant's] right to confrontation of the evidence against him. Even assuming defense counsel's various trial objections to aspects of this questioning preserved this claim, we discern no misconduct. As the trial court ruled, defendant's criminal history initially was relevant to establish his motive to shoot at the deputies and the truth of the prior prison term sentencing allegations. Ultimately, after defendant introduced evidence to establish Deputy Blair's character for violence, the prosecutor was permitted to establish and comment upon defendant's character for violence, demonstrated by his having committed violent acts, such as the prior assaults using a firearm. (See Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).) Defendant has not convinced us that either the prosecutor's actions regarding the introduction of evidence of defendant's criminal history or the prosecutor's arguments on the subject were improper. To the extent defendant claims the prosecutor's comments during his opening statement to the jury that the shooting of police officers was an unintended but not unanticipated side effect result of the three strikes law, and that [w]e knew that these three strikes candidates are going to kill police officers rather than go to jail constituted misconduct separate from the assertedly improper reliance upon defendant's criminal history, we again are not persuaded. Assuming defense counsel's objection to the first statement as being improper argument was sufficient to preserve defendant's appellate claim, and even assuming misconduct occurred because the statements constituted argument (see People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 168 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988] [`[t]he purpose of the opening statement is to inform the jury of the evidence the prosecution intends to present']), and referred to matters outside the evidence to be presented at trial, defendant could not have been prejudiced by these brief and not particularly inflammatory comments. ( People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1080 [255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619].) This is especially so in light of the trial court's having instructed the jury several times that the statements of the attorneys did not constitute evidence.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning Avila regarding the meaning of Smokey, defendant's nickname. The prosecutor, after eliciting from Avila testimony that in street parlance, to smoke someone meant to kill him or her, asked whether defendant had earned his nickname by smoking people. Avila denied that this was the meaning of defendant's nickname. Even assuming that defense counsel's objection to the initial question concerning defendant's nickname (which was overruled) was sufficient to preserve defendant's appellate claim, it is without merit. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the shared root of the two words at issue provided a good faith basis for the prosecutor to ask whether defendant's nickname derived from his having smoked someone. The circumstance that Avila testified this was not the meaning of defendant's nickname did not make the prosecutor's questions improper. Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly questioned Avila concerning certain subjects with the intention to emphasize group violence to incite the jurors against [defendant] and the defense witnesses. Even to the extent defendant made adequate objections to the prosecutor's assertedly improper conduct, he failed to request that the trial court admonish the jury not to draw any such adverse inference from the testimony. In light of the circumstance that the trial court sustained several of defendant's objections to the questions at issue, we cannot say that a request for such an admonition would have been futile, nor can we conclude that a properly framed admonition would have been ineffective in preventing the asserted prejudice defendant raises on appeal. Accordingly, even to the extent the claim was preserved, there was no prejudicial misconduct. Defendant also urges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct because he continued to ask questions regarding certain subjects after the trial court had sustained defendant's objections to earlier questions, thereby assertedly disregarding the court's rulings. [18] Even assuming defendant adequately raised objections to the prosecutor's questions, defendant at no time asked the trial court to admonish the jury regarding the prosecutor's having ignored the court's rulings, and we discern no reason to believe that such an admonition could not have corrected any impropriety that might have been occurring. These claims, too, are forfeited. Moreover, we observe that it is not necessarily improper for an attorney to attempt to overcome prior sustained objections by asking a witness similar questions that have been reframed in an effort to meet the trial court's ruling. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning Avila concerning his knowledge of defendant's having been incarcerated, and Avila's own history of being in jail and prison. Defendant asserts that by eliciting this testimony, the prosecutor sought to impeach Avila in an impermissible manner, and improperly painted Avila as a dangerous person whose testimony should be disbelieved for that reason, and further smeared [defendant] by association. Defendant forfeited this contention by failing to object in the trial court to any of the assertedly improper questions on that basis. Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by misleading the jury when questioning Avila concerning his testimony that Deputy Blair subjected him to so-called flashlight therapy, that is, that Deputy Blair hit Avila with a flashlight for being disrespectful. At an earlier hearing outside the presence of the jury at which the trial court considered whether to permit defendant to present evidence concerning the civil lawsuit against the sheriff's department and the Vikings, Avila testified that Deputy Blair inflicted flashlight therapy on him a few times. When questioning Avila at the hearing, the prosecutor's questions concerning flashlight therapy and Avila's subsequent answers were framed as though there had been only one incident of flashlight therapy by Deputy Blair. [19] Defendant did not object, or attempt to clarify Avila's testimony on the issue in redirect examination. During his trial testimony, Avila stated on direct examination that he had been subjected to flashlight therapy by members of the Vikings three or four times, and specifically by Deputy Blair on more than one occasion. On cross-examination, the prosecutor confronted Avila with what the prosecutor perceived as an inconsistency between Avila's cross-examination testimony at the hearing, which, in response to the prosecutor's questions, seemed to imply that there was only one incident involving Deputy Blair, and Avila's trial testimony that there had been more than one incident. [20] Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was misstating the evidence, and that the prosecutor's question concerning why Avila might have changed his testimony was argumentative. The trial court overruled each objection. The prosecutor then elicited from Avila that although he had testified that Deputy Blair gave him flashlight therapy in June or July of 1994, Avila, in fact, had been in jail and prison at that time, and Deputy Blair had not assaulted him while he was incarcerated. Avila ultimately stated that he was not exactly sure when he had received flashlight therapy from Deputy Blair. Defendant did not revisit this subject during Avila's redirect examination. Defendant contends the prosecutor blatantly misstated the facts and referred to facts that were beyond the trial evidence in challenging Avila's credibility concerning the subject of flashlight therapy. Assuming defendant's objections at trial preserved this claim, we conclude it is without merit. Avila's testimony at the hearing outside the presence of the jury was ambiguous concerning how many incidents involved Deputy Blairalthough he initially testified to a few incidents, he later appeared to adopt the prosecutor's characterization that there was only one incident. Thereafter, he testified before the jury that there was more than one incident. The prosecutor was permitted to explore the apparent inconsistency in this testimony. Indeed, defendant was free to attempt to clarify Avila's testimony in redirect examination, but he chose not to do so. (See People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 283 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 180 P.3d 351] ( Valencia ).) Defendant next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct in his questioning of Avila regarding whether he told his parole agent that on the day Deputy Blair was shot some Young Crowd members had spoken of killing the next deputy that came down the street. After Avila stated that he did not make such a statement, the prosecutor asked Avila whether his parole agent would be lying if she testified to the contrary. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's would she be lying question, and therefore forfeited his appellate claim of misconduct. Defendant contends the prosecutor's questions regarding whether Avila's father lied to the police concerning where Avila was during the shooting also constituted misconduct, because the prosecutor smuggled in hearsay evidence about Avila's father covering for him and denied defendant the opportunity to confront the evidence against him. [21] Defendant forfeited this claim by failing to object at trial. Defendant next asserts that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by asking Avila a series of questions essentially concerning whether, in his experience as a gang member, if the police were harassing one member of the gang, other gang members who were nearby and were armed would respond to help the person being harassed. Avila testified that some would do so and others, including Avila, would not. Defendant urges that Avila's answers introduced irrelevant evidence that was intended to make [defendant] look that much worse, suggesting that [defendant] shot simply to kill a deputy. Defendant did not object on that basis at trial, and therefore forfeited this claim. Defendant also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by mischaracterizing Avila's testimony concerning where defendant was the last time Avila saw him before the shooting started. [22] As defendant observes, Avila did not agree with the characterization of the facts as stated in the prosecutor's questions, and the trial court, in response to defense counsel's objections, explicitly advised the prosecutor (and the jury) that the prosecutor had misstated the evidence. Accordingly, even to the extent we could be convinced the prosecutor was purposefully misstating the testimony and was not merely mistaken or properly attempting to clarify the witness's testimony, any such misconduct could not have been prejudicial. Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor's cross-examination of Avila in general was inappropriately argumentative and inflammatory, noting that at certain points the trial court sustained objections to argumentative questions, or advised the prosecutor not to interrupt the testimony, and to keep [his] voice down. It is clear from the record that the cross-examination of Avila was contentious. Even to the extent we might characterize the prosecutor as having overreacted to the difficulties he faced in effectively questioning Avila, however, it is clear that the trial court monitored the situation and intervened when it felt it necessary to do so. Defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court's actions were insufficient to ameliorate any possible prejudice arising from the prosecutor's behavior.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during the cross-examination of defendant by questioning him regarding his prior criminal history in a repetitive and derisive fashion intended to prejudice the jury against him. Assuming defense counsel's objections were sufficient to preserve this claim, because defendant presented evidence in an attempt to establish Deputy Blair's violent character, the prosecutor was permitted to explore defendant's violent character, which included not only the nature of his past violence, but also its frequency, and its persistence even in light of the punishment he received. In the present case, evidence of defendant's violent character was intertwined with his criminal history, and evidence regarding his criminal history, including his parole status, was relevant insofar as it related to his motive to shoot at the deputies and to the truth of the prior-prison-term-sentence-enhancement allegations. Accordingly, the prosecutor's exploration of this subject was not misconduct. Defendant also observes that at various points during the cross-examination the trial court sustained objections to some questions as being argumentative, or as having been asked and answered. As with the cross-examination of Avila, even from the cold record on appeal we can discern that defendant's cross-examination also was quite contentious. Again, however, defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court's actions to control the proceeding were inadequate to prevent any intemperate behavior by the prosecutor from prejudicing the jury against the defense case.
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting from Deputy Lyons emotional testimony intended to inflame the jury's passions and its sympathy for the victims, and then highlighting that evidence in his arguments to the jury at the close of the guilt phase. Defendant urges that the prosecutor, in essence, improperly sought to introduce victim impact evidence and arguments into the jury's determination of defendant's guilt. Other than one instance in which defendant objected on relevance grounds to a question concerning whether Deputy Lyons thought the shooting affected his ability to be an effective deputy, defendant failed to object to any of the asserted misconduct. He therefore has forfeited this claim except as to that particular question. The trial court sustained the objection to that question, and Deputy Lyons was not permitted to answer it. Even assuming the mere asking of the question could be characterized as misconduct, defendant could not have been prejudiced. Defendant contends the prosecutor also engaged in misconduct by asking an argumentative question that improperly sought to mislead the jury concerning whether Deputy Blair shot first. [23] The trial court sustained defendant's objection to the question however, eliminating any possibility of prejudice. ( Dykes, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 763.) Similarly, to the extent that any misconduct occurred when the prosecutor asked whether the person who shot at the deputies was taking cover behind a tree, the trial court's sustaining of defendant's objections precluded any prejudice to defendant. Defendant also urges that the prosecutor's questions to Deputy Lyons regarding whether he had known where his assailant was located improperly assumed facts not in evidence (that Deputy Lyons had been assaulted). Defendant failed to object to the question, thereby forfeiting his appellate claim.
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he asked Nieves several times whether the deputies who searched his house recovered an AK-47 assault rifle. Defendant asserts the prosecutor's questions insinuated that, contrary to Nieves's testimony, the deputies did find such a weapon in the house, and that, because the prosecutor ultimately did not present any evidence confirming that such a rifle had been recovered during the search, the prosecutor knew his insinuation was false. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's questions on these grounds, and therefore forfeited his appellate claim.
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in improper vouching for the credibility of Renele Brooks's testimony when, during redirect examination, he asked her, [On] June first when you finally talked to the deputies truthfully, you didn't call them, did you? Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's question, and, therefore, his appellate claim is forfeited. Defendant contends the prosecutor also improperly vouched for Brooks's testimony on another occasion during redirect examination when, in the course of questioning her concerning the circumstances of her later interview with the homicide detectives, the prosecutor asked whether Brooks had been accompanied by her lawyer because you wanted to make sure that everything was legal that was going on? After defendant objected, the trial court ruled that the question was beyond the scope of proper redirect examination, and ordered the jury to disregard Brooks's answer, which was yes. In light of the trial court's ruling, we conclude no prejudicial misconduct occurred. Defendant next contends the prosecutor improperly dwelled upon an inflammatory term and twisted the meaning of Brooks's testimony concerning what defendant said concerning the reason he shot at the deputies. During her direct examination, Brooks testified defendant said that after Avila threw his gun, all defendant could think of was that because he had two strikes and was in possession of two handguns, he would go back to jail for the rest of his lifeand so, instead, he shot at the deputies in order to escape. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether Brooks remembered telling the deputies that defendant had said he wasn't going to jail for . . . no bullshit. Brooks stated she did tell the deputies that, and also testified that she did not ask defendant what the bullshit was, and that it was never explained in the conversation. On redirect examination, the prosecutor sought to clarify Brooks's understanding of what defendant meant by saying he was not going to go to jail for no bullshit. She testified that she understood defendant's statement to mean he viewed the possibility of his being convicted of a third strike for possession of the handguns and sent to prison for the rest of his life was the subject bullshit. Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's questions as leading and beyond the scope of redirect examination, but the trial court overruled the objections. Defendant asserts on appeal that the repeated use of the word bullshit during redirect examination was intended to inflame the jury, and that the prosecutor's questions twisted the assertedly obvious meaning of defendant's statement namely, that any criminal charge arising out of that shooting would be groundless. Because at trial defendant did not object on these specific grounds, his claims are forfeited. Defendant contends that when the prosecutor asked Brooks questions regarding whether she had heard Young Crowd members speaking of the sheriff's deputies' having shot a member of the gang, these questions improperly emphasized gang membership in order to inflame the jury. The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to the question, finding it argumentative, and the prosecutor rephrased the question. Defendant did not request an admonition. Even to the extent that a claim of misconduct regarding the question was preserved, defendant could not have been prejudiced in light of the trial court's action and the circumstance that the jury already was aware of defendant's membership in the gang. Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when questioning Sara Frausto concerning what she heard Douglas Bristol say regarding the shooting. The substance of what she heard Bristol say was that defendant did it. The trial court initially sustained defendant's hearsay objection to Frausto's testimony, but, contrary to defendant's characterization of the record, also recognized that the prosecutor might seek to have the statement admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish Frausto's state of mind when she later asked defendant about the shooting. Defendant urges that the prosecutor's subsequent questions regarding Bristol's statement constituted misconduct because the prosecutor continue[d] to ask the same questions to which the trial court ha[d] just sustained an objection and [reminded] the jury of the stricken answer. Assuming defendant's claim is not forfeited, it lacks merit. The prosecutor asked questions regarding Bristol's statement for a nonhearsay purpose (to establish Frausto's state of mind), which the trial court acknowledged would be proper. When the trial court ultimately permitted the prosecutor to elicit what Frausto heard Bristol say, the court gave a proper and detailed instruction to the jury concerning the limited purpose for which the testimony was being admitted. [24] Accordingly, there was no misconduct.
Defendant appears to contend that the prosecutor committed misconduct by questioning Douglas Bristol in a hostile manner and misstating his testimony in the questions posed. Even to the extent that we would conclude defendant's claim was preserved for appeal by defense counsel's objections to aspects of the questioning, and that any misconduct occurred, the record demonstrates that the trial court took appropriate action to prevent any prejudice to defendant. There is no reasonable probability that any misconduct could have affected the verdict.
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly questioned Claretha Jackson, who was Ernesto Avila's parole agent, concerning Avila's having told her that Young Crowd members had spoken of shooting a deputy because the deputies had been harassing them. The claim is forfeited because defendant did not object at trial.