Opinion ID: 2238063
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plea proceeding

Text: We initially consider whether the defendant's trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective at the guilty plea stage of the trial court proceedings. The general standard for determining whether a defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel at trial has two components: incompetence and prejudice. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693; People v. Albanese (1984), 104 Ill.2d 504, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246.) Although Strickland dealt with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a capital sentencing proceeding, the same two-part standard is applicable to ineffective-assistance claims arising out of guilty plea proceedings. ( Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369-70, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 209; People v. Huante (1991), 143 Ill.2d 61, 67, 156 Ill.Dec. 756, 571 N.E.2d 736.) To satisfy the first prong of Strickland in cases such as this, where a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the defendant must show that his counsel's advice fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The inquiry in such cases is not whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773; see also People v. Huante (1991), 143 Ill.2d 61, 68-69, 156 Ill.Dec. 756, 571 N.E.2d 736; People v. Correa (1985), 108 Ill.2d 541, 549, 92 Ill. Dec. 496, 485 N.E.2d 307. A defendant must also satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard in cases involving guilty pleas. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697.) To show prejudice, the defendant must prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. ( Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. at 370, 88 L.Ed.2d at 210.) In this respect, the Supreme Court has observed: In many guilty plea cases, the `prejudice' inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial. For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error `prejudiced' the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the `prejudice' inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial. Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370-71, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210. In the present case, the defendant claims that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel in the plea proceedings and, consequently, did not make a voluntary, knowing and intelligent guilty plea. The defendant raises several arguments in support of this ineffective-assistance claim. He argues that his counsel was incompetent because he (1) did not adequately investigate the charges against the defendant or prepare the case for trial before advising the defendant to plead guilty; (2) failed to investigate the insanity defense; and (3) induced the defendant to plead guilty by advising him erroneously that the trial judge owed counsel a favor and would not sentence the defendant to death. We first consider the defendant's contention that his counsel did not adequately investigate the charges against him or prepare the case for trial. The defendant raises a number of acts and omissions on the part of counsel in support of this claim and we will address each instance of alleged neglect individually. The defendant first points out that counsel did not file any motions or discovery requests prior to trial. The record, however, does not support the claim that counsel was negligent for failing to file such motions. As stated, the defendant was initially represented by an assistant public defender. Shortly after the defendant's arraignment, the assistant public defender filed standard defense motions, including motions for discovery, to suppress any confessions made to the police, and to suppress any witness identifications of the defendant. After filing these motions on behalf of the defendant, the public defender withdrew because of a conflict of interest and Gagen was appointed to represent the defendant. Although the record discloses that Gagen did not file any additional motions for discovery, it also shows that the prosecution complied fully with the discovery motions filed by the public defender and that no additional requests for discovery were warranted. The defendant next contends that Gagen was incompetent because he did not argue the motion to suppress that the public defender filed on the defendant's behalf. The record reveals, however, that the public defender simply filed a standard, generalized motion to suppress which did not specifically refer to the factual circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. Gagen testified at the post-conviction hearing that he spoke with both the defendant and the police officer who took the defendant's confession about the circumstances surrounding the confession, and concluded that there was no basis for pursuing the motion to suppress. Although the defendant argues that counsel's decision was unreasonable, he does not suggest any factual circumstance which Gagen overlooked that could have been raised at a hearing on the motion to suppress. We cannot conclude that Gagen was incompetent in failing to pursue a suppression motion which appears to have had no merit. See People v. Pirt (1987), 164 Ill.App.3d 379, 115 Ill.Dec. 486, 517 N.E.2d 1172 (defendant who pleaded guilty pursuant to his counsel's advice was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's alleged failure to review police records, where there was no evidence that counsel did not review police records or failed to discover facts which would have induced the defendant to persist in his not guilty plea). The defendant also claims that Gagen failed to investigate the factual basis for the State's charges or any possible defenses to the charges. The record persuasively refutes this contention. Gagen testified at the post-conviction proceeding that he reviewed the investigative file of the prosecuting attorney, interviewed the woman who was with the defendant on the day of the crimes, spoke with the attorney representing the defendant's accomplice, and interviewed the police officer who took the defendant's confession. He also testified that he met with the defendant on numerous occasions. The defendant never denied committing the crimes with which he was charged and did not provide counsel with any information casting doubt upon the validity of his confession to those crimes. As the defendant readily concedes in this appeal, no factual defense to the charges existed. Gagen testified at the second post-conviction proceeding that, when he realized that he could raise no factual defense to the charges, he considered raising two possible defenses predicated upon the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense: (1) inability to distinguish right from wrong due to the influence of narcotic substances and (2) insanity. Gagen testified that he abandoned the intoxication defense because the defendant repeatedly denied using any alcohol or drugs prior to committing the offenses in question. The defendant also told the court psychologist, Cheryl Prost, and the trial court at the plea proceeding that he did not have a drug or alcohol problem. The defendant claims, however, that his counsel did not adequately investigate the insanity defense. The defendant argues that, given the availability of information to support the insanity defense and the apparent lack of any other plausible defense, Gagen had a duty to obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation of the defendant's sanity before recommending that he plead guilty. The defendant points out that a subsequent psychological evaluation showed that the defendant's I.Q. score placed him in the borderline retarded range and that his I.Q. scores had declined over a number of years. We must reject the defendant's claim that his counsel did not adequately investigate the insanity defense. Gagen admitted at the post-conviction hearing that the defendant specifically asked him to raise the insanity defense. Gagen testified, however, that after several interviews with both the defendant and the woman who was with the defendant on the day of the murders, he became convinced that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Gagen also testified that he contacted Cheryl Prost, a psychological consultant for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit who was counseling the defendant, to obtain her opinion on the defendant's mental state. Gagen testified that Prost informed him that she believed that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense and fit to stand trial. Gagen concluded, based on these interviews and on his experience as a public defender and as a judge in the criminal division of the circuit court of St. Clair County, that there was no basis for raising the insanity defense. Although defendant argues that Gagen should have requested an independent psychological evaluation of the defendant before advising the defendant to plead guilty, the record demonstrates that the decision not to pursue the insanity defense was one of trial strategy made after reasonable investigation and based upon sound and experienced professional judgment. Furthermore, evidence obtained after the defendant entered his guilty plea established that defense counsel's failure to investigate the insanity defense more thoroughly did not prejudice the defendant. To prove that he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged incompetence, the defendant must show that further investigation of the insanity defense would have led Gagen to change his recommendation as to the guilty plea or that the insanity defense would have succeeded at trial. ( Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203.) Although the defendant claims that insanity was his only viable defense to the charges, the record persuasively demonstrates that insanity was not a viable defense. Cheryl Prost, a psychological consultant, conducted an intensive psychological evaluation of the defendant immediately after he pleaded guilty to the three murders. Prost subsequently filed a four-page report of her findings in the trial court, which stated, in part: [N]o pathology was found concerning psychosis or mental retardation nor significant substance abuse. What has been found is a very pathological personality disorder which has been present since childhood and which has not changed through the efforts of numerous state penal institutions. Mr. Jones [the defendant] has had poor control over his anger and impulsiveness as well as had little respect for the rights and lives of others. Prost's report substantiates Gagen's professional judgment that the defendant was not insane at the time of the offense. Gagen also requested and obtained a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant between the time the defendant pleaded guilty and the sentencing hearing. Gagen testified that, although he did not believe that a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant was warranted before the defendant pleaded guilty, he did request such an evaluation after the plea proceeding, because the defendant confessed to murdering an elderly couple in East St. Louis. Gagen testified that he asked the court to order a psychiatric evaluation because the defendant stated, in his confession, that he heard voices which told him to commit the murders. Pursuant to the trial court's order, the defendant was evaluated by Dr. Heinbecker, a psychiatrist. Dr. Heinbecker filed a report in the trial court which concluded that the defendant was sane at the time of the offense. Dr. Heinbecker's report also expressed skepticism over the defendant's reported hallucinations. Thus, the evidence in the record demonstrates that further investigation of the defendant's psychological condition would have substantiated Gagen's conclusion that there was no basis for pursuing an insanity defense. Had counsel investigated the matter more thoroughly, he would have still recommended that the defendant plead guilty. The evidence also establishes that, had the defendant rejected this advice and gone to trial, he would not have succeeded in establishing the affirmative defense of insanity at trial. Thus, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish either that his counsel was incompetent in failing to investigate the defendant's psychological condition more thoroughly or that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of his counsel's failure to pursue an insanity defense. See People v. Thompson (1988), 166 Ill.App.3d 909, 117 Ill.Dec. 795, 520 N.E.2d 1146 (defense counsel's failure to further investigate the possible use of an insanity defense did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel where record indicated that further investigation would not have revealed any evidence in support of insanity defense). The defendant next complains that, on the date scheduled for trial, Gagen had not subpoenaed any witnesses to appear on the defendant's behalf and had not prepared any defense to the charges. Gagen admitted at the post-conviction hearing that he had not subpoenaed any witnesses to appear on the date set for trial. He explained, however, that all of the witnesses he anticipated presenting had voluntarily agreed to appear for trial and that subpoenas were therefore unnecessary. Trial attorneys often choose not to intimidate a willing witness with a subpoena, preferring instead to informally request the witness' presence at trial. ( Kubat v. Thieret (7th Cir.1989), 867 F.2d 351, 361.) Furthermore, the defendant does not identify any witnesses who he claims should have been subpoenaed but were not. In the absence of such evidence, we cannot say that failure to subpoena witnesses constituted deficient performance. People v. Pirt (1987), 164 Ill.App.3d 379, 115 Ill.Dec. 486, 517 N.E.2d 1172 (defendant was not deprived of the effective assistance of counsel based on counsel's alleged failure to review police records, where there was no evidence that police records contained facts which would have induced the defendant to persist in a plea of not guilty). The defendant next claims that Gagen was deficient for allowing the defendant to enter a guilty plea without obtaining any concessions from the prosecutor. The defendant claims that Gagen did not even pursue the possibility of a plea bargain. Nothing in the record, however, supports this claim. The defendant did not ask Gagen at the post-conviction hearing whether he attempted to negotiate a plea bargain. Instead, counsel asked Gagen whether a plea bargain existed when the defendant entered his guilty plea and Gagen responded that there was no plea bargain to be made. Other evidence in the record suggests that Gagen attempted to negotiate a plea but was rebuffed by the State's Attorney's office. At the plea hearing, the State's Attorney informed the court that he had told Gagen from the outset that the State would not dismiss any charges nor were we going to fall short in presenting this case as a death penalty case and seek that penalty against the defendant. As to the defendant's claim that Gagen was not prepared to offer a defense on the date set for trial, we find nothing in the record which supports this contention. Defendant's post-conviction counsel never specifically asked Gagen at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing what strategy he intended to pursue at trial. Gagen testified, however, that he had reviewed discovery, interviewed police officers and others with knowledge of the crimes, spoke with the defendant and the defendant's grandmother on numerous occasions, and conversed with the attorney representing codefendant Freddie Tiller. He testified that, although he did not anticipate that the defendant would defeat the charges, he was prepared to try the case on the date set for trial and would have proceeded to trial, had the defendant so desired. The defendant next contends that Gagen improperly pressured him into pleading guilty by suggesting that the sentencing judge owed Gagen a favor and would not impose the death penalty. The defendant introduced the affidavits of his mother, his grandmother, and his former girlfriend in support of this claim. The affiants attested that they met with the defendant and Gagen on the date set for trial. They attested that the defendant stated that he did not want to plead guilty, but that Gagen informed him that if he entered a plea of guilty the judge would not impose the death penalty because the judge owed Gagen a favor. The defendant, his mother and his former girlfriend testified similarly at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. The defendant argues that the evidence clearly establishes that his guilty plea was involuntary and the result of Gagen's erroneous advice that Judge Hoban owed him a favor and would not impose the death penalty. We note, however, that the evidence on this question was not undisputed. The record of the plea proceedings shows that, before accepting the defendant's plea, the trial judge questioned the defendant in open court as to whether his plea was obtained by coercion, threats or promises. The trial court also repeatedly warned the defendant that he could receive the death penalty for his crimes. The defendant specifically advised the trial court that no threats or promises had been made to induce him to plead guilty and that he understood that death was a possible sentence. The defendant nevertheless claims that his expectation that the death sentence would not be imposed was permissible, given the alleged assurances of his counsel. To accept the defendant's claim would require us to characterize the court's lengthy and exhaustive admonitions as merely a perfunctory or ritualistic formality; a characterization we are unwilling to make. ( People v. Robinson (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 622, 628-29, 110 Ill.Dec. 19, 510 N.E.2d 1050.) The court thoroughly questioned the defendant to determine that no promises or agreements had been made as to his sentence and that he understood the consequences of his guilty plea. The defendant repeatedly stated that he understood the consequences of his plea and reiterated his desire to plead guilty. The defendant's acknowledgment at the plea proceeding that he understood that death was a possible sentence and that there were no agreements or promises regarding his sentence contradict the petitioner's current assertion that he pled guilty in reliance upon his counsel's promise that he would not receive the death sentence. This case is distinguishable from People v. Morreale (1952), 412 Ill. 528, 107 N.E.2d 721, where this court held that the court's admonitions at the plea proceedings were insufficient to negate the effect of counsel's erroneous advice regarding the defendant's sentence. In Morreale, the court found several circumstances peculiar to the record, which led it to believe that the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary. These factors are not present here. The defendant in Morreale pled guilty to the charge of committing a crime against nature and was sentenced to a term of 5 to 10 years' imprisonment. The record demonstrated that the defendant initially pled not guilty to the charge and retained counsel to represent him. When the cause was called for trial, a youthful associate of the defense attorney appeared and asked that the matter be continued because defendant's counsel was engaged in the trial of another case. The prosecutor advised the court that the matter could be disposed of quickly and asked that the case be passed, rather than continued, while he spoke with the defendant's attorney. The prosecutor then sought out the defendant's counsel in another courtroom and suggested that the defendant plead guilty and seek probation. When defendant's counsel stated that he could not appear and dispose of the matter that day, the State's Attorney urged that counsel's associate appear on the defendant's behalf. Defendant's counsel acquiesced and his associate advised the defendant to plead guilty. When the defendant expressed doubts about following this course, he was taken to the other courtroom, where his retained counsel told him not to worry about anything; plead guilty and you will get probation. ( Morreale, 412 Ill. at 530, 107 N.E.2d 721.) The defendant then returned to the courtroom, withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, the trial court denied probation and entered sentence as described above. In holding that the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, the court in Morreale relied upon unique facts not present here. Specifically, the court noted that the hurried consultations between the defendant, his attorney, the youthful associate and the prosecutor, which took place during a recess of court by passing back and forth between two courtrooms, inevitably engendered confusion and misapprehension in Morreale. The court also noted that the pressure exerted by the prosecutor resulted in denying Morreale of representation by the actual counsel of his choice. The haste and manner in which the guilty plea was arranged led the court to believe that Morreale was induced to change his plea while confused. Considering all of the circumstances, including the fact that the prosecutor was the one who suggested that Morreale would not be harmed by pleading guilty, the court found that Morreale's guilty plea was not a knowing and studied attempt to throw himself on the mercy of the court in a hope for milder punishment. Morreale, 412 Ill. at 533, 107 N.E.2d 721. Here, on the other hand, the defendant was not being represented by his counsel's youthful associate. The State's Attorney was not advising or pressuring the defendant to plead guilty in return for a more lenient sentence. The defendant was not induced to change his plea while confused and in a state of misapprehension. ( Morreale, 412 Ill. at 533, 107 N.E.2d 721.) Finally, the trial court's admonitions to the defendant under Supreme Court Rule 402 (73 Ill.2d R. 402) were more comprehensive than those required in 1952 when Morreale pleaded guilty, and adequately ensured that the defendant was entering a voluntary guilty plea. (See People v. Robinson (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 622. 110 Ill.Dec. 19, 510 N.E.2d 1050. Compare Ill.Rev.Stat. 1951, ch. 38, par. 732, with 73 Ill.2d R. 402.) In sum, the record demonstrates that the defendant's guilty plea was not the result of counsel's alleged promise that the defendant would not receive the death sentence, but represented a `voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' ( Hill v. Lockhart (1985), 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 208, quoting North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 168.) The defendant here, unlike Morreale, made a knowing decision to throw himself on the mercy of the court in a hope for milder punishment. See People v. Robinson (1987), 157 Ill.App.3d 622, 625-30, 110 Ill.Dec. 19, 510 N.E.2d 1050. Furthermore, Gagen's testimony regarding the events which transpired prior to the defendant's decision to plead guilty was not consistent with that offered by the defense witnesses. Gagen testified that he never specifically advised the defendant to plead guilty; he simply presented the options to the defendant and let the defendant decide whether to plead guilty. Gagen testified that he told the defendant that the evidence against him was very strong and that death was a possible penalty because the State's Attorney refused to make a plea bargain. He also testified that he was ready and willing to proceed to trial if the defendant so desired and that it was the defendant's idea to plead guilty. He conceded that the defendant decided to plead guilty after Gagen stated that he believed Judge Hoban was personally opposed to the death penalty and would not impose death if the defense offered any valid reason for not imposing it. Gagen explained: [Gagen]: Well, we had many discussions, and I was very open, I thought [ sic ] with Mr. Jones, Andre, and told him that I had been a Circuit Judge here in St. Clair County and that for a number of years Judge Hoban [the trial judge] and I had worked very closely together and that I had known Judge Hoban for longer than the period of time that we had served as judges together. In fact, I had been a friend of his family and he of my parents for many years and that I knew that he was personally opposed to the death penalty and I explained to Andre that if we had any kind of chance, if we could give Judge Hoban any reason not to impose the death penalty, I didn't think that he would. The defendant responds that Judge Hoban was not personally opposed to the death penalty or reluctant to impose it in the defendant's case. The defendant points out that Judge Hoban specifically stated during the plea colloquy that the murder charges carried a possible penalty of death and that he wouldn't hesitate to put [defendant] to death. Later in the same proceedings, Judge Hoban told the defendant: [I]f there's any thought in your mind that by pleading guilty I might give you natural life, I want to erase that thought from your mind. Because if they prove the factors like in the commission of a felony crime described by the Statute as Armed Robbery being one of them, two murders being another one, I won't hesitate to sentence you to death. The defendant also notes that, several years after the defendant's sentencing proceeding, Judge Hoban did impose the death penalty in a bench proceeding. The defendant argues that this evidence shows that Judge Hoban was not opposed to the death penalty and that there was no valid strategic reason for Gagen to urge the defendant to plead guilty. We disagree. The defendant has not demonstrated that Gagen's beliefs about Judge Hoban were incorrect. The fact that Judge Hoban sentenced another defendant to death several years after the defendant's sentencing hearing does not demonstrate that Judge Hoban would have imposed such a sentence at the time of the defendant's hearing. Moreover, Judge Hoban's statements to the defendant during the plea colloquy do not persuasively establish that he would have sentenced the defendant to death had the defendant elected to be sentenced in a bench proceeding. As stated, Judge Hoban was required under Supreme Court Rule 402 to advise the defendant of the nature of the charges against him and the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by law before accepting the defendant's guilty plea. (See 73 Ill.2d R. 402(a).) Judge Hoban's statements regarding a death sentence may have been intended to impress the defendant with the gravity of his decision to plead guilty and to ensure that the defendant entered those pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Even if we construe the comments as expressing Judge Hoban's belief that the defendant's crimes warranted a death sentence, Gagen may have nevertheless believed that Judge Hoban would be persuaded by the defendant's expressions of remorse and would impose a more lenient sentence. The defendant argues that there was no valid strategic reason for him to plead guilty, even if Judge Hoban was opposed to the death penalty. He argues that it would be improper for a sentencing judge to punish a defendant who exercises his right to trial more severely than one who pleads guilty. The post-conviction court rejected this claim, stating: While this contention is unquestionably correct from a theoretical view point and while it would seem that no judge or jury would consciously punish such a defendant, people are not dispassionate machines and it is quite possible that, subconsciously, the sentencing entity would have reacted adversely to an `audacious' assertion of nonguilt by a defendant who could not to any degree contest the evidence against him. We live in an imperfect world and experienced trial attorneys are aware of such imperfections. The defendant insists that he did not benefit at all by entering a guilty plea, since he still received a death sentence. In considering whether Gagen was incompetent in advising the defendant to plead guilty, however, we must eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,    and    evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694.) We must also indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. Although it is true that the defendant ultimately gained nothing by pleading guilty, the record persuasively demonstrates that the defendant had little to gain by insisting upon a trial. It is undisputed that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming and that his chances of acquittal were minimal. The defendant had confessed to the crimes and ballistics evidence was available to prove that bullets from the defendant's gun matched those recovered from the victims' bodies. Confronted with the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt, Gagen advised the defendant to plead guilty in the reasonable hope of obtaining leniency from the trial judge. Gagen may have reasonably believed that the trial judge would view the defendant's guilty plea as an expression of remorse warranting a less severe sentence than that imposed upon a defendant who protests his innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt. Moreover, by pleading guilty, the defendant avoided having the prosecutor inform the trial judge of all of the evidence available to establish the defendant's guilt. Instead, the trial judge simply heard the evidence necessary to establish a factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea. When viewed from Gagen's perspective at the time he advised the defendant to plead guilty, we must reject the defendant's claim that such advice was outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. ( McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773.) The Supreme Court has recognized that the expectation or hope of a lesser sentence or the convincing nature of the evidence against the accused are considerations that might suggest the advisability of a guilty plea. ( United States v. Agurs (1976), 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342; see also Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747.) Here, counsel made a tactical decision that a guilty plea was in the defendant's best interest and advised the defendant accordingly. Gagen's strategy was to avoid the death sentence by asking for a bench sentencing hearing and having the defendant testify about his remorse for the crimes. Gagen testified that he spoke with the defendant on several occasions, believed his remorse was sincere, and thought he would make a good witness at the sentencing hearing. Thus, the record suggests that Gagen intended to use the defendant's guilty plea for tactical advantage at the sentencing hearing. Generally, questionable trial tactics `which arise[ ] from a matter of defense strategy will not    support a claim of ineffective representation.' ( People v. Holman (1989), 132 Ill.2d 128, 159, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124, quoting People v. Madej (1985), 106 Ill.2d 201, 214, 88 Ill.Dec. 77, 478 N.E.2d 392.) Trial counsel's informed strategic choices are virtually unchallengeable. ( People v. Steidl (1991), 142 Ill.2d 204, 154 Ill.Dec. 616, 568 N.E.2d 837.) We believe counsel's decision to advise the defendant to plead guilty was an informed strategic choice. Had counsel's strategy succeeded it is doubtful that it would now be argued that he was incompetent. Unfortunately, Gagen's strategy for avoiding the death penalty was thwarted by several circumstances beyond his control. First, the defendant rejected Gagen's advice to have a bench sentencing hearing and insisted that his sentencing hearing be held before a jury. Second, the defendant refused to testify about his remorse for the crimes at the sentencing hearing; again, contrary to the advice of his counsel. Finally, Gagen was unaware of the defendant's involvement in the Wallace murders at the time he advised the defendant to plead guilty. Between the time of the plea proceedings and the sentencing hearing, however, the defendant gave a statement to the police in which he admitted that he forced his way into the Wallaces' home, stabbed the woman repeatedly in the neck, decapitated the man, and set the house on fire. The defendant also admitted that he took the man's head with him and had left it in the location where the skull was later found. The introduction of this evidence at the defendant's sentencing hearing severely diminished the defendant's chances of obtaining a lenient sentence. Although Gagen's strategy for avoiding the death penalty was thwarted, his decision to pursue that particular strategy cannot be deemed incompetent. A defendant is entitled to competent, not perfect, representation. Errors in judgment or trial strategy do not establish incompetence ( People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 95, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868) and trial performance is not to be judged by a hindsight perspective ( Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694; see also McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773 (That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a requirement that all advice offered by defendant's lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing)). Accordingly, after reviewing the record, we agree with the post-conviction court's determination that the defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at the guilt stage of the proceedings.