Opinion ID: 222219
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Credit-Related Document

Text: After quickly concluding the Rees-Levering notice requirements are disclosures under Section 7.4008(d)(2)(viii), the district court considered whether such a notice is an other credit-related document. Aguayo, 658 F.Supp.2d at 1232. Relying again on the analysis in Crespo, the district court held the Rees-Levering notice requirements were expressly preempted because the post-repossession notice was a credit-related document. Id. at 1233. The pertinent section of the OTS regulation in Crespo preempts state laws pertaining to: (9) Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). Holding that a post-repossession notice is an other credit-related document, Crespo stated: [T]he purpose of such a notice is to notify a debtor that his or her credit was revoked and that the collateral with which the debtor secured the credit is being sold, as well as to inform the debtor what he or she needs to pay in order to restore his or her credit. Crespo, 580 F.Supp.2d at 623. There is no doubt that the OCC regulation at issue here is similar to the language in Crespo. For comparison, the operative part of the OCC regulation states: (viii) Disclosure and advertising, including laws requiring specific statements, information, or other content to be included in credit application forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, credit contracts, or other credit-related documents. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d)(2)(viii). The question then is whether the other credit-related documents language, both standing alone and when read with the other sections of Section 7.4008, was intended to preempt debt collection notices. Generally, all the words used in a list should be read together and given related meaning when construing a statute or regulation. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8, 105 S.Ct. 2458, 86 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (quoting Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors, FRS, 468 U.S. 207, 218, 104 S.Ct. 3003, 82 L.Ed.2d 158 (1984)). The choice and arrangement of words in the OCC regulation, starting with [d]isclosure and advertising and followed by including, indicate that the later words are meant to be examples of types of disclosure and advertising  two words that generally mean to present information to the public, particularly before or in the process of consummating a transaction. The next terms listed  credit applications and solicitations, credit contracts and billing statements  are all documents that embody a credit application, solicitation, and ongoing lending relationship between a lender and borrower. The final clause, other credit-related document[], seems to act as a catch-all term to describe any other documents that may be used in an ongoing lending relationship. In contrast, the Rees-Levering notification at issue was sent after the lending relationship had ended  the car had been repossessed, the lender was preparing to sell it, and the lender's primary concern was now recovery of a debt. U.S. Bank was no longer advertising, disclosing, or offering terms upon which it would like to strike a deal with Aguayo. Rather, it was simply stating the debt owed and attempting to collect that amount from Aguayo. Had the OCC wanted to expand the term other credit-related document to debt collection notices, it certainly could include a clear indication of its intent to do so. As discussed above, the OCC's discussion of its implementation of Section 7.4008 makes clear that the OCC specifically contemplated exemption of debt collection from preemption. There is no reason to now second guess the OCC's choice of terms. Review of the OTS regulation language analyzed in Crespo, and relied on by the district court, provides additional support that the inclusion of other credit-related documents was not meant to include post-repossession notices, but instead was intended to refer to documents commonly used in establishing and maintaining an ongoing credit relationship. Unlike the OCC section, the similar OTS regulation provides additional context for that term, stating, other credit-related documents and laws requiring creditors to supply copies of credit reports to borrowers or applicants. 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b)(9) (emphasis added). Unlike the preceding terms, the additional and laws requiring ... clause is not set off by commas to indicate it was meant to be a separate category but was meant to be read together with other credit-related documents. Traditionally, credit reports are obtained or supplied at the creation of a credit relationship and perhaps offered to a credit applicant when he or she is refused credit. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 202, app. C. There is little basis for supplying a credit report to an individual whose property has already been repossessed and whose lending relationship has ended. Though the court in Crespo did not consider this additional language or whether it modified the other credit-related documents term, it is difficult to discern an intent to extend the meaning of other credit-related documents to post-repossession notices when viewed in context with the other listed documents. Reading the express preemption and savings clauses together, we conclude that the Rees-Levering post-repossession notices are not preempted under the regulation's vague terms disclosure and other credit-related documents in light of the savings clause that clearly exempts a state's rights to collect debts. The district court's broad reading of the terms disclosure and other credit-related documents would effectively preempt any document related to debt collection, something the OCC was acutely aware of when deliberately choosing the final language of the preemption rule to save such state laws. See 69 Fed.Reg. at 1912.