Opinion ID: 1992508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: judge quinn's common-law privacy right

Text: Defendant and the intervenor assert that the requested information, if released, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the late Judge Quinn's privacy. We find it helpful to our analysis to analogize to the common law of privacy. Thus, we evaluate the effect that disclosure of the test results would have on Judge Quinn's common-law privacy rights. Section 652I of the Restatement of Torts states the general rule with regard to privacy rights of a deceased person: Except for the appropriation of one's name or likeness, an action for invasion of privacy can be maintained only by a living individual whose privacy is invaded. [3 Restatement Torts, 2d,  652I, p 403. Emphasis added.] Comment (b) to the section provides that [i]n the absence of a statute, the action for the invasion of privacy cannot be maintained after the death of the individual whose privacy is invaded. Along the same lines, Prosser writes: The right [of privacy] is not assignable, and while the cause of action may or may not survive after his death, according to the survival rules of the particular state, there is no common law right of action for a publication concerning one who is already dead. [Prosser, Torts (4th ed),  117, p 815.] The Court of Appeals also followed this rule in Fry v Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich App 725, 730; 300 NW2d 687 (1980). There are no statutes in Michigan creating an action on behalf of Judge Quinn for violation of a right of privacy. Consistent with the rules set out above, we would find Judge Quinn's common-law privacy rights in disclosure of the disputed autopsy results to be virtually nonexistent.