Opinion ID: 1223077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jury determination of both guilt and punishment.

Text: Next the defendant contends that the submission to the jury of both the questions of guilt and punishment in the case of murder at the same time violates the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the due process clause of the Arizona Constitution. The defendant contends that because the jury in this case determined both the punishment and the question of innocence or guilt, he did not receive equal protection of the law as the jury did not have access to the probation officer's report when punishment was determined as the judge would have if the defendant pleaded guilty, etc. The United States Supreme Court has held that it is not unconstitutional for a jury to determine the sentence as well as the guilt of a defendant in a single trial procedure, see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971), and we do not find Arizona's procedure constitutionally infirm. B. AS TO THE TRIAL ITSELF 1. PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES. The defendant Taylor next contends that the pretrial identification was so unfairly suggestive as to deprive the defendant of due process of law. The witness, Ida Long, was unable to identify the defendant Taylor from photographs shown to her on three separate occasions. In each of these instances, the witness Long was shown photographs of the defendant wearing an afro or natural hairdo. In the robbery itself, the defendant Taylor wore a sailor-type hat over his head. Ida Long was able to identify the defendant at the lineup. A picture before this court of the lineup indicates six male negroes, three with shorter type haircuts and three with afro or natural haircuts were present, and it is apparent that the subjects in the lineup were presented fairly and that it was not impermissively suggestive so as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). We do not believe that the pretrial identification was unduly suggestive, or that the in-court identification was tainted. State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 453 P.2d 951 (1969). See also State v. Lang, 107 Ariz. 400, 489 P.2d 37 (1971). 2. REFUSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT TO PERMIT THE OFFICER TO TESTIFY AS TO STATEMENTS MADE TO HIM BY WITNESS LONG IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT. Defendant next contends that the court erred in refusing to permit Officer Carl Matthews to relate, on cross-examination, the description of the assaultant given by Mrs. Ida Long fifteen minutes after the crime occurred: Q Officer, then I assume that you also discussed this with Mrs. Long; is that correct? A That I did. Q And was she able to give you a description of any kind? A Yes, she was. Q And what was that description? MR. BENNETT: Objection, your Honor, as being hearsay. MR. GARRETT: Does the Court wish that we be heard? THE COURT: Objection will be sustained. The defendant obviously asked the officer about Mrs. Long's identification to show a discrepancy in her description to the police and her subsequent identification of the defendant in the lineup and in the courtroom. These questions were asked of the officer prior to the time Mrs. Long actually took the stand and while the answer to the question might be admissible on one or more grounds, it was not error to exclude the testimony at this state of the proceedings. The order of proof is largely within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Vallejos, 89 Ariz. 76, 358 P.2d 178 (1960); State v. Dowthard, 3 Ariz. App. 237, 413 P.2d 296 (1966). Also, the matter was covered by the testimony of Officer Villa later in the trial as to the description of the defendant given by Mrs. Long: Q At the time you arrived at the market, did you have occasion to speak with two women, a Mrs. Long and Mrs. Toland, that were clerks at that market on that evening? A Yes, sir.       Q Did you also have a conversation with Mrs. Long? A Yes. Q And did you obtain a description of these two people from her? A Yes. Q Could you please tell us what descriptions you were able to obtain? A She said that one of them was Negro male, 22 to 23 years old, about five feet three inches tall, one hundred twenty pounds, with brown eyes, medium build, and medium complexion. Q Did she tell you that was the one carrying the pistol? A Yes. In closing argument, the attorney for defendant discussed the misidentification at length and we believe the jury was adequately informed as to the discrepancy in the description by Mrs. Long of the defendant Taylor. 3. REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON IDENTITY. The defendant contends that since the case against the defendant pivots on the issue of identification, the refusal of the trial court to give specific instructions as to identity constituted reversible error. The defendant Taylor requested two instructions concerning identity, one stating: The identity of the defendant must be proven with that degree of certainty that amounts to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The other would have directed the jury that they    must carefully consider these factors [of identity when] passing upon the credibility    [of] the witness' testimony   . The trial court refused to give these specific instructions, but did instruct generally as follows:    In determining the weight to be given to the testimony of any witness, you must take into account his ability and opportunity to observe, his memory, his manner while testifying, his reputation for truth and veracity, any motive, interest, bias or prejudice he may have, and the credibility of his testimony considered in the light of all the evidence in the case. And: Evidence has been introduced that the defendant Melvin Taylor was not present at the time when and at the place where the alleged crimes were committed. This is a legal and proper defense. If, after consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant was present at the time and place of the alleged crime, you must find him not guilty. The trial court has a duty to instruct on all matters of law reasonably supported by the facts developed during the trial. State v. Stevens, 107 Ariz. 565, 490 P.2d 571 (1971); State v. Ross, 107 Ariz. 240, 485 P.2d 810 (1971). When examining instructions for error on appeal we will consider the instructions as a whole, and where matters are adequately covered by other instructions it is not error for the trial court to refuse to single out a particular element of the case for special instruction. As we have stated:    The requested instruction on `identification' would not have added anything to these general instructions given to the jury. The trial court's references to the presumption of innocence, the necessity of proving `all material allegations,' and the credit to be given witnesses would certainly have meaning for the jury as applied to the testimony of the `identity' witnesses. The weight to be given the testimony of such witnesses is a matter for the determination of the jury or court trying the case. (citations omitted) State v. Corrales, 95 Ariz. 401, 404, 391 P.2d 563, 565-566 (1964). We find no error in the failure of the trial court to give the requested instructions on identity. 4. IMPROPER CONDUCT BY THE PROSECUTOR DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT. The defendant Taylor contends that the prosecutor in his final summation improperly argued to the jury by expressing his personal belief regarding the guilt of the defendant and also asserting his personal opinion as to the credibility of the State's witnesses. The jury was given the standard admonition by the court: Arguments and comments of counsel are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the law. While arguments are not evidence, counsel may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. If any comment of counsel has no basis in the evidence, you are to disregard that comment. The defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's statement and neither did he move for a mistrial. While we do not condone what appears to be improper and unprofessional argument by counsel for the State, since the defendant did not object to the offending comment at trial, he cannot object to it now: We have carefully reviewed the allegedly improper statements by the prosecutor in this case. These statements cannot constitute a ground for appeal because any such ground has been waived by failure to make a timely objection. We note also that even though no objection was made, the jury was instructed that arguments of counsel are not evidence and further that `if any comment of counsel has no basis in the evidence, you are to disregard that comment.' We believe that such instruction may well have corrected any prejudice which the prosecutor's statements may have created. See State v. Abney, supra [103 Ariz. 294, 440 P.2d 914], State v. Propp, 104 Ariz. 466, 455 P.2d 263 (1969). State v. Adair, 106 Ariz. 58, 62, 470 P.2d 671, 675 (1970). See also State v. Boozer, 80 Ariz. 8, 291 P.2d 786 (1955); State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348, 464 P.2d 793 (1970); State v. Abney, 103 Ariz. 294, 440 P.2d 914 (1968). A cautionary instruction was given. We find no error at this time and if there was it was harmless. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). DEATH SENTENCE The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the death penalty is contrary to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Stewart v. Massachusetts, supra. We have the authority to reduce a sentence on appeal. § 13-1717, subsec. B A.R.S. The sentence is hereby reduced to life imprisonment. DOUBLE PUNISHMENT Defendant was convicted of two counts of robbery, one of Ida Long and one of Barbara Toland, and of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, one committed on Ida Long and the other on Barbara Toland. Our statute reads: An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the laws may be punished under either, but in no event under more than one. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other. § 13-1641 A.R.S. We have applied the identical elements test in interpreting this section stating: The practical test is to eliminate the elements in one charge and determine whether the facts left would support the other charge. State v. Mitchell, 106 Ariz. 492, 495, 478 P.2d 517, 520 (1970). In the instant case, it is clear that both the charge of assault with a deadly weapon and robbery cannot stand together. State v. Jorgenson, 108 Ariz. 476, 502 P.2d 158 (1972); State v. Belcher, 108 Ariz. 290, 496 P.2d 590 (1972); State v. George, 108 Ariz. 5, 491 P.2d 838 (1971). Our court has stated that where a person is convicted and sentenced on two counts based upon one act, that the trial judge should then set aside the lesser conviction. (citations omitted) In view of the fact that the sentences imposed herein are the same and are concurrent, it will not be necessary to remand for resentencing. State v. Mendoza, 107 Ariz. 51, 56, 481 P.2d 844, 849 (1971). It is therefore ordered, with the issuance of the mandate herein, the conviction, judgment, and sentence for assault with a deadly weapon are reversed and set aside. Affirmed in part, reversed in part. HAYS, C.J., STRUCKMEYER and LOCKWOOD, JJ., and LEVI RAY HAIRE, Court of Appeals Judge, concur. HOLOHAN, J., did not participate in the determination of this matter.