Opinion ID: 1917581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Lexington Urges the First Approach

Text: Lexington urges us to adopt the first approach described above. Lexington contends that a reasonable construction of the waiver is that it has no relevance to claims for damage to non-Work property. [24] The New York Court of Appeals applied this approach in S.S.D.W. Co. v. Brisk Co. [25] The waiver clause in that case was nearly identical to the waiver clause here. The court explained that the waiver barred subrogation claims to the extent the damages sought were covered by either (1) `insurance obtained pursuant to [art 17] [here paragraph 11.4]' or (2) `any other property insurance applicable to the Work.' [26] Article 17.3 of the parties' agreement required the owner to provide insurance `upon the entire Work at the site.' [27] In deciding the waiver barred only claims for damages to the Work, the S.S.D.W. Co. court reasoned: It makes no difference whether the policy under which subrogation is sought is one which the owner purchased specifically to insure the Work pursuant to article 17.3 [here subparagraph 11.4.1] or some other policy covering the owner's property in which the owner has also provided coverage for the Work. In either event, the waiver clause, if given its plain meaning, bars subrogation only for those damages covered by insurance which the owner has provided to meet the requirement of protecting the contractor's limited interest in the buildingi.e., damages to the Work itself. [28] Therefore, the S.S.D.W. Co. court concluded that to the extent the plaintiff sought recovery for damages to non-Work property, that claim was not barred by the waiver of subrogation. Other courts have similarly decided the waiver applies only to damages to the Work. [29]