Opinion ID: 867213
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Interrogation

Text: ¶ 21 Police arrested Cota on January 6, 2004, at about 5:30 p.m. Cota later told police that he had used drugs in the hour before being arrested. Peoria Detectives Laing and Hickman began interrogating Cota at approximately 9:20 p.m. After approximately two hours, Cota invoked his right to counsel and the interrogation ended. During the interrogation, Cota appeared to fall asleep a few times. ¶ 22 Cota contends that the trial court erred by admitting his videotaped interrogation because (1) his statements were involuntary as a result of drug intoxication, and (2) he invoked his right to remain silent two times before the police finally acknowledged the invocation of his right to counsel. In the superior court, however, Cota objected to the introduction of the interrogation only on voluntariness grounds. We review the trial court's voluntariness finding for abuse of discretion. State v. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. 335, 342, 690 P.2d 54, 61 (1984). We review the Miranda claim only for fundamental error. See State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005).
¶ 23 The trial court found Cota's statements voluntary after an evidentiary hearing. We uphold factual findings as to the voluntary nature of a confession if the findings are supported by adequate evidence in the record. State v. Rhymes, 129 Ariz. 56, 57-58, 628 P.2d 939, 940-41 (1981). ¶ 24 Statements are not automatically inadmissible if given under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Clabourne, 142 Ariz. at 342, 690 P.2d at 61. But, if the defendant is so intoxicated that he could not understand the meaning of his statements, then the statements were involuntary. State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 446, 759 P.2d 579, 592 (1988). We look[] to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the accused was able to reason, comprehend, or resist. Id. ¶ 25 Our review of the videotape of the interrogation confirms that Cota fully comprehended the questions posed and gave appropriate answers. The record supports the trial court's finding that his statements were voluntary.
¶ 26 After being advised of his rights, [i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Invocation of the right to remain silent need not be made with precision. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir.1996) (A suspect need not rely on talismanic phrases or any special combination of words to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.). However, the invocation must be unambiguous, Berghuis v. Thompkins, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2260, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010), judged from the perspective of a reasonable police officer in the circumstances, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). ¶ 27 Cota cites two alleged invocations of the right to remain silent during the interrogation. We examine each in turn.
¶ 28 The first alleged invocation occurs at page 24 of the interrogation transcript (the Page 24 Statement), after the detectives had repeatedly told Cota (apparently inaccurately) that they had discovered blood on his clothing: Laing: That's why we are asking you. The blood's on your clothing. I don't see any big injuries on you to get that kind of blood. Cota: There ain't no blood on my shirt. Laing: Yes there is. Cota: I'm not saying nothing no more[;] you guys are fucking with me. ¶ 29 This statement was not an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. A reasonable officer could have construed Cota's comments as meaning that he knew the officers were lying about blood on his shirt and that he no longer wished to talk about this subject. See State v. Lawson, 144 Ariz. 547, 554-55, 698 P.2d 1266, 1273-74 (1985) (finding that statement, I've got nothing to say, made in response to the questionYou got anything to say to that? could fairly be read as a refusal to talk about that specific question and not a general invocation of the right to remain silent).
¶ 30 The second alleged invocation occurs at page 40 (the Page 40 Statement): Laing: Hey Benjamin we're not lying to you man. We've got your clothes and they've got blood on them. You've got some explaining to do because you're going to be in a lot of shit of [sic] that blood comes back and it belongs to Victor. You're gonna have a lot of explaining to do. If things just went crazy you need to let us know. But I've been doing this job too long Benjamin. Don't... don't sit there and play ... play me to be the fool, I know when you're lying to me, you're not telling the truth now. What happened? Cota: I'm sorry, what was your name? Laing: Detective Laing ... Bill Laing. Cota: Laing I ain't saying nothing no more. ¶ 31 The Page 40 Statement was an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent, and questioning should have ceased at this point. In contrast to the Page 24 Statement, Cota was responding not to a specific question about blood on his clothing, but to a very general question: What happened? Cota's answer was unequivocal, and more calm and thoughtful than the Page 24 Statement, as evidenced by his demeanor, tone of voice, and the additional step of asking the detective his name. ¶ 32 The Page 40 Statement is indistinguishable from those we have previously found to be unambiguous invocations of the right to remain silent. In State v. Finehout, for example, we rejected the argument that the following exchange was ambiguous: JONES: You might as well be honest with us, cause you know DEFENDANT: I'm trying to be honest. JONES: No you're not `cause everytime we ask you something DEFENDANT: Well, I ain't going to say any more. 136 Ariz. 226, 227-29, 665 P.2d 570, 571-73 (1983); see also State v. Castaneda, 150 Ariz. 382, 386, 724 P.2d 1, 5 (1986) (I have nothing to say invoked right to remain silent.); State v. Szpyrka, 220 Ariz. 59, 61-62 ¶ 5, 202 P.3d 524, 526-27 (App.2008) (I ain't got nothin' to say invoked Fifth Amendment rights.); State v. Strayhand, 184 Ariz. 571, 585, 911 P.2d 577, 591 (App.1995) (`Well I don't want [to] answer anymore,' could not have been clearer invocation of Fifth Amendment rights.).
¶ 33 To warrant reversal, however, Cota must show fundamental error. Fundamental error goes to the foundation of the case, takes away a right essential to the defense, and is so severe that the defendant could not have received a fair trial. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶¶ 19-20, 115 P.3d at 607. No fundamental error occurred here in admission of the interrogation after page 40 because the continued questioning did not prejudice Cota at any phase of the trial. ¶ 34 Cota did not admit to the murders, either before or after page 40. Rather, he continued to maintain his innocence even after invoking his right to remain silent. Thus, the only prejudice Cota could have suffered from admission of statements after page 40 was from a lack of credibility in his protestations of innocence. However, virtually all of Cota's statements after page 40 mirrored others made earlier in the interrogation. ¶ 35 The one significant exception is Cota's claim after page 40 that Martinez came back to the house at some point, stating that Zavala was dead in his heart. But other evidence on this point was properly admitted at trial. Cota's drug dealer testified that Cota had told her that the couple had gone on vacation to Mexico, but that Martinez had returned and said Zavala was dead in his heart.