Opinion ID: 1368316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Taylor

Text: Mr. Taylor argues that the chancery court had no authority to modify its findings of fact more than ninety days after entry of the decree absent an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, he objects to the language in the order dated July 2, 1999, wherein the chancery court stated that there had been no finding that beaver dams were the cause of any flooding. A trial court may modify a judgment at any time to correct a purely clerical error. Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(a). After the expiration of ninety days, however, the trial court may modify its orders for reasons other than to correct a clerical error only under the following conditions: (1) granting a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; (2) granting a motion for new trial in proceedings against a constructively summoned defendant; (3) for misprisions of the clerk; (4) for misrepresentation or fraud; (5) for erroneous proceedings against an infant or incompetent; (6) for the death of a party prior to judgment; or (7) for errors in judgment shown by an infant within twelve months of reaching majority. Ark. R. Civ. P. 60(c). Furthermore, although the time restraints placed upon trial courts in modifying other orders are not applicable to the modification of injunctions, the trial court must find that the circumstances underlying the injunction have changed before it is authorized to modify an injunction. West v. Belin, 314 Ark. 40, 858 S.W.2d 97 (1993) (stating that a trial court retains jurisdiction to modify an injunction beyond the time limit placed on other types of orders or decrees); Ozark Bi-Products, Inc. v. Bohannon, 224 Ark. 17, 271 S.W.2d 354 (1954) (holding that trial court may modify injunction where the circumstances of the parties are shown to have so changed that it is just and equitable to do so); see also Haberman v. Van Zandvoord, 1 Ark.App. 203, 614 S.W.2d 242 (1981) (holding that, upon proper notice and following a hearing wherein the evidence was fully litigated, modification was not an abuse of discretion). There is no finding in the record of any change in circumstances supporting modification, and the Zanone appellees do not argue that circumstances have changed. Neither does the record reflect that the change was authorized pursuant to Rule 60 and the Zanone appellees do not argue as such. Therefore, if the change in the language of the court is indeed a modification of the prior order, the chancery court acted outside of its authority and the order is a nullity. Hayden v. Hayden, 291 Ark. 582, 726 S.W.2d 287 (1987). In its original 1998 decree, the chancery court found as a matter of fact that the damages to the Zanone property seemed to be related more to Zanone's failure to mitigate damages and to acts of nature, such as beaver dams and debris, than to the Taylor water control structure. In fact, the chancery court found credible the evidence that the Taylor structure contributed little to the plaintiffs' damages; and yet, in its July 2, 1999 order, the chancery court noted that there had been no evidence of damages attributable to beaver dams. On its face, this appears to be a minor change in the court's language. Certainly, the chancery court had never specifically found that beaver dams had caused damage to the Zanone property. However, the court had found that the damages suffered by Zanone were related more to acts of nature, which included beaver dams, than to Mr. Taylor's water control structure. This minor alteration in the decree's language might not merit further scrutiny were it not for the findings that the chancery court issued orally from the bench: My memory of this case was not the beaver dams causing the flooding. It was the earthen dam [Mr. Taylor] built and this ... elaborate dam. In its September 29, 1998 decree, the chancery court specifically held that Mr. Taylor was not liable for any damage to the Zanone property. However, following the chancery court's July 2, 1999 order, viewed in light of the court's pronouncements from the bench, the chancery court's findings of fact could be called into question. In effect, the findings of fact in the September 29, 1998 decree have been modified, possibly subjecting Mr. Taylor to future claims for damages where previously he had been found not liable. It is evident from the record before us that the trial court was not intentionally exercising its authority to modify the decree. It appears that the trial court was merely stating its memory of what its previous findings of fact had been. The difficulty arises because, in so doing, the court altered those findings sufficiently to create confusion as to its previous findings regarding liability. Because no evidence was presented to demonstrate changed circumstances and none of the Rule 60(c) conditions have been shown to support the actions of the court, the modification to the findings of fact, as stated by the trial court in its order of July 2, 1999, is null and void. See Hayden v. Hayden, supra .