Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal to racial prejudice

Text: (25) To persuade the jury to reject defendant's testimony that the victim had consented to sexual intercourse, the prosecutor made this argument: And what [defendant] wants you to believe, and what I believe to be perhaps the most telling thing in this whole case, is that this woman who, from all appearances is a happily married mother of three trying to make ends meet living out there where they can have a house they can afford, taking in sewing to help meet the family budget, keeping that kind of a house, that this woman is going to have intercourse with a strange man โ frankly any man โ a black man, on her living room couch with her five year old in the house. Prosecutorial argument that includes racial references appealing to or likely to incite racial prejudice violates the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. ( U.S. v. Doe (D.C. Cir.1990) 903 F.2d 16, 24-25 [284 App.D.C. 199]; McFarland v. Smith (2d Cir.1979) 611 F.2d 414, 416-417; Miller v. State of N.C. (4th Cir.1978) 583 F.2d 701, 707; United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick (2d Cir.1973) 481 F.2d 152, 159; United States v. Grey (6th Cir.1970) 422 F.2d 1043, 1045-1046; see also, McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 279, 309, fn. 30 [95 L.Ed.2d 262, 289-290, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1776] [The Constitution prohibits racially biased prosecutorial arguments.].) Because racial prejudice can strongly compromise a juror's impartiality ( Miller v. State of N.C., supra, at p. 706; United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, supra, at p. 157; People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d 839, 849 [97 Cal. Rptr. 684, 489 P.2d 564]), even neutral, nonderogatory references to race are improper absent compelling justification. [8] ( U.S. v. Doe, supra, at p. 25, fn. 63; McFarland v. Smith, supra, at pp. 416-417, 419.) Although we do not find compelling justification for the prosecutor's racial reference in this case, neither do we find prejudice to defendant. The reference to race occurred in the course of an argument listing factors that undermined the credibility of defendant's testimony that the victim had consented to sexual intercourse. The racial reference added little to the force of the argument, which relied primarily on the implausibility of the victim engaging in intercourse with a virtual stranger in the presence of her five-year-old child. The racial reference was a brief and isolated remark; there was no continued effort by the prosecutor to call attention to defendant's race or to prejudice the jury against him on account of race. We are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor's racial reference in argument did not affect the outcome.