Opinion ID: 1940840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of Defendant's Statements in Interviews of July 6 and July 10.

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to police officers during the interviews of July 6 and July 10. He contends that these statements were involuntary. Because these arguments present factual questions surrounding alleged violations of constitutional rights, we review the facts de novo. See Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 407 (Iowa 1982); Hamann v. State, 324 N.W.2d 906, 909 (Iowa 1982); Kellogg v. State, 288 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1980). In the present case, the defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of the waiver of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), except as he claims this may have been the product of promises of leniency. The district court found there had been no promises of leniency, and we uphold that determination upon our review of the evidence. Because detailed Miranda warnings were given and a written waiver of rights voluntarily obtained from defendant prior to the initiation of both the July 6 and July 10 interviews, it is not significant whether or not the interrogation which followed be characterized as custodial or noncustodial. The rules for determining voluntariness subsequent to valid Miranda warnings are the same regardless of the characterization of the setting in which the interrogation took place. The evidence of how defendant's interrogation was conducted in the present case supports the trial court's finding that his statements were the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice and that his will was not overborne nor his capacity for self-determination critically impaired. See State v. Whitsel, 339 N.W.2d 149, 153 (Iowa 1983). Although defendant contends that he erroneously believed that having once signed the Miranda waiver he was not free to thereafter halt the interrogation, it was not necessary that he be apprised of that right in order to satisfy Miranda. See, e.g., State v. McGhee, 280 N.W.2d 436, 441-42 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1039, 100 S.Ct. 712, 62 L.Ed.2d 674 (1980). Defendant claims that at a certain point he did request that the interrogation cease but that this plea went unheeded. The trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses present at that time. The court credited the testimony of the interrogating officers that defendant had in fact never requested that the interrogation be terminated. Upon our review of the evidence, we uphold the findings of the district court on these issues of fact. We find no basis for reversal with respect to the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of statements given by defendant in the July 6 and July 10 interviews.