Opinion ID: 4536265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the sentences were proper

Text: Finally, both Wilson and Moore argue that they should get the benefit of the recent First Step Act, which would lower their mandatory-minimum sentences. Wilson also argues that his prison sentence was substantively unreasonable. Neither argument succeeds.
retroactive to defendants sentenced before the Act was passed Wilson and Moore argue that they should benefit from the First Step Act because their cases were still pending on direct appeal when it was enacted. Thus, they claim, their sentence had not really been “imposed” within the meaning of section 403(b) of the First Step Act. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. But while this appeal was pending, we held that a defendant whom a district court had sentenced before the First Step Act was enacted could not retroactively claim the benefit of section 403(b). United States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162–64 (3d Cir. 2020). Wilson and Moore also advance a new argument that we did not address in Hodge: that by titling section 403’s amendment a “[c]larification,” Congress was suggesting that it was 24 simply conforming the text of § 924(c)(1)(C)(i) to what the statute was supposed to have meant all along. But whatever the merits of these arguments, as a later panel we are bound by Hodge’s reading of section 403. See Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2017). So we must reject the First Step Act argument. B. Wilson’s sentence was substantively reasonable The District Court sentenced Wilson to 519 months’ imprisonment (43 years and three months), at the top of his Sentencing Guidelines range. Wilson does not challenge the procedures the District Court followed, but claims that sentence was substantively unreasonable. He did ask for a lower sentence, right above the 32-year mandatory minimum, so he has preserved that claim. See Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766 (2020). We review the sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017). That means “we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Wilson explains that even a 32-year sentence would keep him in prison until he was in his fifties. He argues that imprisoning him longer serves no valid purpose and that we should not defer to a Guidelines range where, as here, it is pegged to a mandatory minimum. But the District Court considered the requisite statutory sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In particular, it focused on general and specific deterrence and retribution, factoring in the crimes’ effect on the 25 victims and Wilson’s recruiting of other participants. The Court did not defer blindly to the Guidelines; indeed, it considered both upward and downward departures. In the end, it chose the top of the Guidelines range. That decision was reasonable.