Opinion ID: 3025336
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err in granting

Text: summary judgment for Long Branch on the RLUIPA Equal Terms claims? We have construed the RLUIPA Equal Terms section to include neither a substantial burden nor a strict scrutiny requirement. What the Equal Terms section does require is that the plaintiff show that it was treated less well than a nonreligious comparator that had an equivalent negative impact on the aims of the land-use regulation. In sum, a plaintiff asserting a claim under the RLUIPA Equal Terms provision must show (1) it is a religious assembly or institution, (2) subject to a land use regulation, which regulation (3) treats the religious Midrash-Sephardi court defined “comparator” so broadly – despite the “equal terms” language of section 2(b)(1) – that, in order to conform to Free Exercise jurisprudence, the court had to create a “strict scrutiny” element in section 2(b)(1). Similarly, our concern with the dissent is that it formulates an equally boundless definition of “assembly” as did the Midrash-Sephardi court, but then the dissent requires no substantial burden, no strict scrutiny and no limitation on the secular comparator. This expansive reading of section 2(b)(1), in our opinion, goes beyond existing free exercise jurisprudence and as such would render section 2(b)(1) unconstitutional by creating a substantively altered right not heretofore cognizable in Free Exercise jurisprudence. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 37 assembly on less than equal terms with (4) a nonreligious assembly or institution (5) that causes no lesser harm to the interests the regulation seeks to advance. Cf. Primera Iglesia Bautista, 450 F.3d at 1307 (enumerating elements 1-4 as the requirements of a RLUIPA section 2(b)(1) cause of action). We must now determine under this analytical framework whether the District Court correctly decided that Long Branch was entitled to summary judgment on Lighthouse’s Equal Terms claims with regard to both the Ordinance and the Plan.
We begin, out of chronological order, with the Plan. The Plan allows non-religious assemblies such as theaters, cinemas, performance art venues, restaurants, bars and clubs, culinary schools, and dance studios, but not any non-listed uses, including churches and synagogues. Thus the question is whether the exclusion of churches and religious assemblies from the Broadway Corridor treats the churches on less than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions whose presence would cause no lesser harm to the redevelopment and revitalization of the Corridor. We conclude that it does not. Long Branch’s goal in adopting the Plan is well documented – it was to “achieve redevelopment of an underdeveloped and underutilized segment of the City.” Long Branch’s hope is for the “Broadway Corridor” to become a core “sustainable retail ‘main’ street” that will anchor a “vibrant” and “vital” downtown residential community. Long Branch argues that churches are by their nature not likely to foster the kind of extended-hours traffic and synergetic spending it wishes to 38 foster in the Broadway Corridor and that churches are different from the allowed secular assemblies because, by operation of a New Jersey statute prohibiting the issuance of liquor licenses in the vicinity of houses of worship, permitting churches into the Broadway Corridor would hinder the development of the kind of modern entertainment-oriented district that Long Branch envisages. See N.J.S.A. 33:1-76 (with the exception of certain “grandfathered” establishments, “no license shall be issued for the sale of alcoholic beverages within two hundred feet of any church or public schoolhouse or private schoolhouse not conducted for pecuniary profit”). We do not need to reach the question whether a church by its very nature is unlikely to contribute to the development of a “vibrant” and “vital” downtown community centered on an entertainment and retail district. We agree with Long Branch that churches are not similarly situated to the other allowed assemblies with respect to the aims of the Plan where, by operation of a state statute, churches would fetter Long Branch’s ability to allow establishments with liquor licenses into the Broadway Corridor. It would be very difficult for Long Branch to create the kind of entertainment area envisaged by the Plan – one full of restaurants, bars, and clubs – if sizeable areas of the Broadway Corridor were not available for the issuance of liquor licenses.15 15 We note that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its recent decision in Digrugilliers, 2007 WL 3151201 at , interpreting the Equal Terms provision of section 2(b)(1), held that government “cannot, by granting churches special privileges 39 Lighthouse, with the support of amici Association of Christian Schools International and the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, argues that the existence of the New Jersey statute is not dispositive for three reasons. First, Lighthouse has offered to waive its rights under it in perpetuity; second, a State cannot “immunize” itself against a constitutional duty by artificially creating a distinction that it can then invoke to justify disparate treatment; and, third, Long Branch admitted that it had not actually conducted any studies to determine if churches would have a negative impact. Long Branch responds that a waiver would be ineffective because it would have to be renewed at every license renewal or transfer. Long Branch is correct. Under N.J.S.A. 33:1-76.2, if a church annually waives its protection under the statute with respect to a license for 15 years, the holder of the license can apply for renewal “without further or renewed authority, or waiver, of the church of the school.” Every new licensee, however, would require a new waiver. This could cause [Indiana law forbids the sale of liquor within 200 feet of a church] . . ., furnish the premise for excluding churches from otherwise suitable districts.” We do not so easily dismiss N.J.S.A. 33:1-76, the New Jersey statute barring liquor licenses within 200 feet of a church. The statute was enacted many years ago – not to discriminate against churches, but to favor them. We point out also that the New Jersey statute bars liquor licenses within 200 feet of a non-profit “schoolhouse,” an another type of assembly which is not permitted in the Redevelopment District. 40 confusion and might give the church unacceptable control over the development of the downtown area. In addition, even if a perpetual waiver were practically possible, in order to act neutrally toward all potential religious applicants, Long Branch could not simply grant Lighthouse an exemption. It would have to amend the regulation to allow all religious institutions to establish themselves within the relevant zones on the condition that they waive their rights under the law. It is not inconceivable that such a requirement would interfere with a potential applicant’s religious tenets and cause Long Branch impermissibly to entangle itself in an individual religious institution’s exercise of religion.16 16 Similarly, Lighthouse argues that it is, in fact, the kind of church that would have a positive impact on the kind of downtown district Long Branch is trying to create because its Pentecostal services are “upbeat” and because it would hold several services a day, including late at night. Rev. Brown testified he would want to use the building “24 and 7,” and place a storefront religious retail store there. The city planner conceded that the presence of a retail store would make the church “more compatible” with its retail neighbors. However, for Long Branch to allow Lighthouse an exemption because of the “upbeat” nature of its services and their frequency, as well as Lighthouse’s willingness to engage in commercial activities, is to risk discriminating between religious uses in order to avoid potential discrimination against religious uses. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (invalidating a state statute that regulated the solicitation of donations by charitable organizations if, but only if, the organization solicited more than 41 Lighthouse’s second argument is equally unpersuasive. On its face, the alcohol-free-zone law was enacted to favor churches, not to disfavor them. Although its effect in this context is to handicap religious institutions, it cannot be said that the Plan and the New Jersey statute, taken together, suggest improper motives. Indeed, we have no concern about the earnestness of Long Branch’s intent with the Plan. The Plan allows only the kind of assemblies that are likely to further its goal – theaters, cinemas, and performing arts centers, but not, for example, strip clubs. The allowed uses are establishments that generate relatively high income and encourage visitors to linger in the downtown area into the evening. In addition, the Plan exhibits internal consistency by not allowing schools – under the New Jersey statute non-profit “schoolhouses” would trigger the same restrictions as churches on the availability of liquor licenses. See N.J.S.A. 33:1-76. Finally, we are not persuaded by Lighthouse’s argument that Long Branch failed to present any evidence that the unavailability of liquor licenses would detrimentally affect its plans for a “vibrant” and “vital” downtown centered on a hightraffic, extended-hours retail and entertainment district. Although there may be room for disagreement over Long 50% of its funds from nonmembers: the statute “created a denominational preference because the burdens of the regulation clearly discriminated against religious organizations that were significantly involved in fund raising activities aimed at nonmembers.”) We do not believe Long Branch must run this risk. 42 Branch’s prioritizing of the availability of alcohol consumption over the ability to seek spiritual enlightenment, it is clear that Long Branch could not create a downtown area where restaurants, clubs, bars, retail and entertainment facilities synergize if Long Branch could not issue liquor licenses throughout that area. Thus, we agree with the District Court that Long Branch is entitled to summary judgment on Lighthouse’s RLUIPA claim as regards the Plan because Lighthouse has placed no evidence in the record that the Plan treats a religious assembly on less than equal terms with a secular assembly that would cause an equivalent negative impact on Long Branch’s regulatory goals.
We reach a different result with respect to the Ordinance. Unlike the Plan, the Ordinance’s aims are not well documented. The Ordinance permitted a range of different uses in the Central Commercial District, including a restaurant, variety store and other retail store, educational service and college, “Assembly hall, bowling alley, and motion picture theater,” governmental service, municipal building, new automobile and boat showroom, and “High Technology - Light Industrial.” Among the uses permitted upon issuance of a conditional use permit were motor vehicle service station and public utility. Although it appeared to us in Lighthouse I that the Ordinance, on its face, might allow all forms of assembly under the “Assembly Hall” category, later discovery clarified that Long Branch’s construction of the term “Assembly Hall” did not 43 include use as a religious assembly. Cf. Lighthouse I, 100 Fed Appx. at 74-75. Because there is nothing in the record describing Long Branch’s objectives for the Central Commercial District under the Ordinance and because it is not apparent from the allowed uses why a church would cause greater harm to regulatory objectives than an “assembly hall” that could be used for unspecified meetings, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Long Branch on this claim. Rather, Lighthouse is entitled to summary judgment in its favor because Long Branch has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Ordinance treated religious assemblies or institutions on less than equal terms with non-religious assemblies or institutions that caused equivalent harm to its governmental objectives. We will therefore remand this claim to the District Court to enter summary judgment for Lighthouse and to determine compensatory damages for the period between Lighthouse’s application for a waiver as a church and the enactment of the Plan. The District Court may also, at its discretion, award appropriate attorney fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Since Lighthouse’s claim for injunctive relief under the Ordinance is moot, however, only monetary relief is available to it.