Opinion ID: 1914584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the regulation disputed

Text: The key statute implemented by the disputed regulation says: Following constructive denial of a claim or issuance of an administrative order under chapter 28-32 reducing or denying benefits, an aggrieved employee may request that the action be submitted to binding arbitration before the workers' compensation binding arbitration panel in lieu of a formal administrative hearing or judicial remedy. NDCC 65-02-17. See n. 3 for complete text. The new statutes are silent about an employer's right to elect or refuse arbitration. The challenged feature of the regulation gives most employers a right to refuse the employee-claimant's election of arbitration. In all cases relating to an injury for which the risk or payments are chargeable to an employer with an open account with the bureau, the employer has fifteen days from the date of mailing of the notice to give notice in writing to the bureau if the employer does not agree to submit to binding arbitration. The employer may notify the bureau of its consent to submit to binding arbitration prior to expiration of the fifteen days. An employer that fails to file timely notice in writing of refusal to consent to arbitration is deemed to have consented. If the employer files a timely notice of refusal to consent to arbitration, the matter is deemed submitted for reconsideration and formal rehearing and the employee is not entitled to arbitration. If the risk or payments are not chargeable to any employer, the employee is entitled to binding arbitration upon filing of the request with the bureau. NDAC XX-XX-XX-XX(2). Although the new statutes express the employer's role in selecting one member of the arbitration panel, see NDCC 65-02-15 at n. 1 above, they do not express a role for the employer in the election to arbitrate. Still, the Bureau's regulation makes arbitration hinge in most cases on the employer's consent or refusal. It is a basic rule of administrative law that an administrative regulation may not exceed statutory authority or supersede a statute, and that a regulation which goes beyond what the Legislature has authorized is void. Moore v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 374 N.W.2d 71, 74 (N.D.1985); Steele v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 273 N.W.2d 692, 701 (N.D.1978). If a regulation conflicts with the statute that it implements, the regulation is beyond the agency's authority to adopt. NDCC 28-32-19.1(3). Such a regulation is invalid. The Bureau says that [t]he statute is uncertain as to the rights of the employer, and insists that there is no language in any of the four arbitration statutes that effectively provides that the employer must submit to arbitration if there is a request for arbitration by an aggrieved employee. The Bureau argues that, because the employer has a right of appeal and a right not to consent to binding arbitration, it would be an unjust result for an employee to dictate whether or not an employer has a right to an appeal and to effectively bar the employer's right of appeal. [10] The Bureau says that the regulation's interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent because [t]he statutory language does not expressly require that the employer submit to arbitration. The Bureau infers legislative intent to permit the employer to refuse arbitration from a speech by one senator during a conference committee session that recommended an amendment to insert the word binding into the sections on arbitration: Ordinarily, anybody involved with the administrative process would have the option of going through a series of appeals. That is their right under other statutes which presently exist and will continue to exist. However, administratively, if the Bureau properly advises the claimant and the employer of their options, and advises them in a miranda-type of situation that they can waive their rights of appeal and agree to binding arbitration, in my opinion, if they're properly advised and there is proper legislative intent, that can be done. We have a right to remain silent if we're charged with a crime as guaranteed by the Constitution. We can waive that right and confess to the police that we're guilty. It's the same mentality, I think, with this arbitration panel. If they're properly advised, they can waive their rights of appeal, and this would be binding and final which would have a remarkable impact on the system. Little and Dietz suggest that a statement by another senator during a senate committee session, the person [claimant] can elect which way to go, evidences a contrary legislative intent. They argue that [i]t is impossible to tell for certain about legislative intent from these fragments of legislative history. Random statements by legislative committee members, while possibly useful if they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history, are of little value in fixing legislative intent. See Schaefer v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 462 N.W.2d 179, 181 (N.D.1990) (Assuming for purposes of argument that the Bureau's expectations are indicative of the Legislature's intent in enacting the amendment, they are not necessarily controlling.) (citations omitted); Metric Construction, Inc. v. Great Plains Properties, 344 N.W.2d 679, 683 (N.D.1984) (The legislative history provides little insight. It mostly consists of sponsor testimony or citizen testimony preserved in the form of sparse committee notes.); Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 147 (N.D.1974) (It is our view that we cannot accept Senator Sinner's statement of the objective of the amendment ..., as encompassing all of the objectives of the amendment, or any of the objectives of the amendment, for that matter.). See also 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 48.10 (Statements of committee members or interested parties are not admissible.), 48.13 (The statements of individual legislators, however, can be given effect if they are consistent with statutory language and other legislative history which justifies reliance upon them as evidence of legislative intent.) (5th ed. 1992 revision). Furthermore, Little and Dietz argue, the legislative history is not legally relevant in light of the clear, unambiguous language of the statute, citing NDCC 1-02-05: Construction of unambiguous statute. When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. They argue that, since the language of NDCC 65-02-17 is very specific in providing claimants with an absolute right to choose the arbitration dispute resolution process, legislative history cannot be used to expand the language of the statute. Generally, the law is what the Legislature says, not what is unsaid. The Bureau recognizes that [t]here exists a principle of statutory interpretation that the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, citing In re Township 143 North, Range 55 West, Cass County, 183 N.W.2d 520 (N.D.1971). That is correct. It must be presumed that the Legislature intended all that it said, and that it said all that it intended to say. The Legislature must be presumed to have meant what it has plainly expressed. It must be presumed, also, that it made no mistake in expressing its purpose and intent. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot indulge in speculation as to the probable or possible qualifications which might have been in the mind of the legislature, but the statute must be given effect according to its plain and obvious meaning, and cannot be extended beyond it. City of Dickinson v. Thress, 69 N.D. 748, 290 N.W. 653, 657 (1940) (citations omitted). Usually, when the plain meaning of a statute is apparent, it is unwise and unnecessary to delve further. Therefore, we conclude from the usual rules of statutory construction that the statute gives the employee-claimant an unrestricted election to arbitrate in lieu of an agency hearing. Still, the Bureau insists that the statute is vague, ambiguous, uncertain or of doubtful meaning on the rights of the employer. Without citation, documentation, or elaboration on the source of those rights, the Bureau insists that the employer has a right of appeal and a right not to consent to binding arbitration, [11] even though unexpressed in the new sections. Little and Dietz make no reply to this assertion of rights of the employer, perhaps because the Bureau's position is so sparely stated. Although the Bureau implies that an employer has some overriding right to refuse compulsory arbitration in a workers' compensation case, the Bureau has not demonstrated that to us. The regulation adopted by the Bureau exceeds the scope of the Bureau's authority under NDCC 65-02-17 by giving the employer the right to refuse an employee's election of panel arbitration. The regulation is to that extent invalid. We reverse the judgment of the district court and, in conformity with the concluding section of NDCC 28-32-19.1, remand to the agency for disposition in accordance with this opinion. VANDE WALLE, C.J., and LEVINE, J., and RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge, concur. RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge, was Chief Justice at the time this case was heard and serves as surrogate judge for this case pursuant to NDCC 27-17-03. J. PHILIP JOHNSON, J., who was a member of the Court when this case was heard, did not participate in this decision. NEUMANN and SANDSTROM, JJ., not being members of the Court when this case was heard, did not participate in this decision. RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge, specially concurring. I specially concur in the majority opinion written by Justice Meschke in this case to expedite its release so that, if the Legislature which is now in session does not believe that we have accurately discerned its intent in this area of the law, it may yet act within this session of the Legislature to clarify the law. I am concerned not only about who may request arbitration, but also about whether or not an appeal may be taken from a decision of an arbitration panel, and if so, what the scope of review by this Court on appeal will be. Language which especially requires clarification is that part of Section 65-02-18 N.D.C.C., which reads: A decision of the workers' compensation binding arbitration panel is final and nonreviewable by a district court.... Does this mean that the decision of the arbitration panel is final, or does it mean that an appeal must be taken directly to the Supreme Court and not first to the district court and then to the Supreme Court. If it means that there is an appeal available, is the appeal to be taken under Section 28-32-19, N.D.C.C., in the interpretation of which we have said we must affirm a decision of a Workers Compensation Bureau unless its findings of fact are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, or its conclusions are not supported by its findings of fact. Howes v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 429 N.W.2d 730 (N.D.1988). In determining whether or not the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence, we have applied the rule laid down in Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214, at 220 (N.D.1979). In Power Fuels, in construing the preponderance of the evidence standard to permit us to apply the weight-of-the-evidence test to the factual findings of an administrative agency, we said: [W]e do not make independent findings of fact or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. We determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have determined that the factual conclusions reached were approved by the weight of the evidence from the entire record. This standard of review on appeal is to be contrasted with the standard of review we have applied when considering appeals from an arbitration panel. After considerable discussion of case law from other states construing the statutes comparable to our own, we said: In conformity with the decisions discussed herein construing arbitration statutes similar to our own, we conclude that our review of a judgment entered upon an arbitration award is strictly limited. We adopt the New York rule which is to the effect that save for complete irrationality, arbitrators are free to fashion the applicable rules and determine the facts of a dispute before them without their award being subject to judicial revision. When a motion to vacate an arbitration award is made under subsection 4 of Section 32-29-08, N.D.C.C., the award will not be set aside unless it is completely irrational. Nelson Paving Co., Inc. v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d 225, 234 (N.D.1973) Subsequent to Nelson Paving, the Legislature repealed Chapter 32-29, and replaced it with Chapter 32-29.2 N.D.C.C., when it adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act with the passage of Chapter 408 of the Session Laws of 1987. The pertinent sections in the current code are Section 32-29.2-12 relating to vacating an award, and Section 32-29.2-13 relating to the modification or correction of an award.