Opinion ID: 572415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Indictment for Outrageous Governmental Conduct

Text: 22 Gomez-Galvis contends that [l]egitimate undercover operations can be conducted without federal agents acting like modern day Mata Haris. On appeal, Gomez-Galvis claims that Agent DeLaCova romanced [her] and had sexual intercourse with her in order to assist his inquiries into suspected narcotics trafficking. She asserts that this scheme of sexual entrapment violates due process and is demeaning to the integrity of the criminal justice system. Since a pre-trial evidentiary hearing was not held on her motion to dismiss for outrageous governmental conduct, Gomez-Galvis relies upon her trial testimony to support her allegations. She notes that she testified that she was a young, struggling Colombian business woman; that DeLaCova charmed her and impressed her with his wealth and power; [that he] initiated an intense sexual relationship, and [that he] then used the romance to persuade her to act as a go-between in a cocaine deal. 23 Gomez-Galvis claims that her case differs from other cases in which it was alleged that the government had engaged in outrageous conduct by employing informants who engaged in sexual conduct with defendants, because DeLaCova was a full-time federal agent throughout their relationship and because he acknowledged, while testifying, that he sought to establish a love interest between her and himself. She further claims that her constitutional right to privacy, which purportedly encompasses sexual intimacy, was violated by Agent DeLaCova's conduct even though the conduct for which she was indicted occurred several weeks after their alleged sexual relations had ended. 24 Gomez-Galvis' governmental conduct claim is based upon dictum in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1642-43, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973) and statements in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 489-90, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1649-50, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976). In federal court, if the government violates a protected right of the defendant, due process principles may bar the government from invoking the judicial process to obtain a conviction, see Hampton, 425 U.S. at 489-90, 96 S.Ct. at 1649-50, if the government's conduct reach[ed] a demonstrable level of outrageousness. Id. at 495 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. at 1653 n. 7 (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v. Carpentier, 689 F.2d 21, 25-27 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 735, 74 L.Ed.2d 957 (1983); United States v. Alexandro, 675 F.2d 34, 39-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835, 103 S.Ct. 78, 74 L.Ed.2d 75 (1982). The outrageousness of the government's conduct must be viewed standing alone and without regard to the defendant's criminal disposition, United States v. Chin, 934 F.2d 393, 398 (2d Cir.1991), and there is no meaningful distinction between physical and psychological harm inflicted upon the defendant. Id. at 399 n. 4. 25 There are significant differences between a claim of entrapment and a claim of outrageous governmental conduct. A successful entrapment defense requires that a defendant convince the fact-finder that government agents induced her to commit an offense that she was not otherwise predisposed to commit. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62-63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 886-87, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988). However, to obtain dismissal of an indictment based upon a claim of outrageous governmental conduct, a defendant must establish that the government engaged in outrageous behavior in connection with the alleged criminal events and that due process considerations bar the government from prosecuting her. Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1642-43; see Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-11, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952). A defendant who unsuccessfully advances an entrapment defense before the trier of fact may nonetheless succeed in mounting a successful attack on an indictment based upon a showing of governmental conduct that is found by the court to be outrageous. United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 372 (2d Cir.1983); Alexandro, 675 F.2d at 39. 26 We are unaware of any cases in which a federal appellate court has scrutinized the government's investigatory procedures in light of an alleged sexual relationship between a principal undercover agent and a person who is thereafter charged. 5 Our inquiry is guided, however, in part, by some of the decisions of our sister circuits in cases involving government informants. For example, in United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.1989), United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 356, 98 L.Ed.2d 381 (1987) and United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 898, 108 S.Ct. 233, 98 L.Ed.2d 192 (1987), defendants moved to dismiss the indictments because an intimate sexual relationship existed between the defendant and a government informant. In each case, the court considered whether, in light of the sexual relationship between the defendant and the informant, the government was barred from prosecuting the defendant because of outrageous governmental conduct. 27 In Miller, state officials employed the defendant's former girlfriend, Linda Zefo, a known drug abuser, as a confidential informant on a contingent fee basis. The Seventh Circuit rejected Curtis Miller's claim that the government's use of Zefo constituted outrageous conduct in violation of due process. The court noted that the government apparently did not know that Zefo and Miller had previously been sexually intimate prior to employing her and, further, their sexual relationship had ended prior to Zefo's employment with the state officials. Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit observed that even if the agents in charge of the investigation had known of Zefo's and Miller's past relationship, there was no suggestion that the state officials ever encouraged Zefo to use sex as a weapon in their investigation of Miller's drug activities. Miller, 891 F.2d at 1268. 28 Shoffner involved a government informant, one Ruth Ann Wright, who was the daughter of one defendant, mother of a second defendant's child, niece of a third defendant, and who also had had a sexual relationship with defendant Leonard Michael Stange during the investigation of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit, without distinguishing among the defendants, rejected their claims that Wright's behavior precluded the government from prosecuting them. The court noted that it was unclear whether Wright's sexual behavior could be attributed to the government since as soon as the government learned of her relationship with Stange it expressed its strong disapproval and instructed her to not repeat such conduct. In any event, the court concluded that under the facts of the case the due process clause was not violated. Shoffner, 826 F.2d at 626. 29 And in Simpson, the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit from an order dismissing an indictment against defendant Darrel Simpson. In that case, the FBI employed one Helen Miller, a prostitute and heroin user, as an informant in the investigation of Simpson, and continued to employ her after learning of her sexual involvement with Simpson. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the FBI's conduct violated due process. The appellate court disagreed, concluding that these circumstances fell short of the type of brutality and coercion previously found violative of due process in cases such as Rochin and Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 381 (9th Cir.1968), and that the government could not be deemed responsible as readily as in these two cases. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466. 30 The Ninth Circuit noted that the deceptive creation or exploitation involved in Simpson's and Miller's intimate relationship did not exceed permissible law enforcement tactics and that Simpson voluntarily reposed his trust in Miller. Thus, the court declined Simpson's invitation to interpret the due process clause as prohibiting, per se, the government from using informants who established emotionally intimate, as distinguished from purely physical, sexual relationships with their suspects, since the clause did not prohibit an informant from forming an emotionally intimate relationship with the suspect. The court concluded that because it was Miller's initial decision to establish a sexual and personal relationship with Simpson, despite the FBI's repeated instructions for her not to become sexually involved with Simpson, the relationship could not be used to characterize the government's conduct in th[e] case as outrageous, id. at 1467 (emphasis in original), notwithstanding the government's passive tolerance of the relationship after it discovered the extent of Miller's and Simpson's sexual involvement. Accordingly, based upon the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government's conduct did not bar Simpson's prosecution; it reversed the order dismissing the indictment on due process grounds, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The court explicitly left open whether the use of sex as a law enforcement tool would 'shock the conscience' under circumstances where the government is clearly responsible, as would be the case if Miller had been a law enforcement officer rather than a paid informant. Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1468 n. 4; see United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1429 (10th Cir.1988) (appellate court reversed district court's finding that entrapment existed as a matter of law; appellate court, in remanding, did not address district court's having squarely rejected defendant's claim of outrageous governmental conduct arising out of relationship between defendant and long-time friend, with whom defendant became sexually intimate, while friend was serving as governmental informant and arranged for defendant to sell drugs to undercover officer). 31 In addressing the question as to whether an indictment must be dismissed based upon outrageous governmental misconduct when a sexual relationship between a defendant and a governmental agent has been shown to exist, we believe that, at a minimum, the defendant must show: (1) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed; (2) that the government agent initiated a sexual relationship, or allowed it to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; and (3) that the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged therein. We determine only that allegations meeting these criteria warrant a hearing so that the precise facts may be ascertained. Once those facts are found, after either a hearing or a trial, we can then proceed to determine whether any violation of due process standards has occurred. 32 A motion to dismiss an indictment alleging outrageous governmental conduct is a question of law directed to the trial judge and review of rulings thereon is de novo. United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds with respect to one defendant sub nom. United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802, 802 (9th Cir.1986). Clearly, such a review is facilitated when a hearing on the issues presented has been held by the district court and a record has been constituted. See United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093, 1098 (2d Cir.1980); see also United States v. Myers, 527 F.Supp. 1206, 1216 (E.D.N.Y.1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 823, 839 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 961, 103 S.Ct. 2347, 2348, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983). It cannot be gainsaid that myriad facts and circumstances can arise in the complex context of what is commonly frequent and close interaction among government agents, witnesses and prospective defendants. A hearing allows for a searching inquiry into the particulars of the investigative process employed by the government, as the court undertakes to sort through the various conflicting claims, and permits factual determinations to be made by the district judge. A hearing also provides the district judge with an opportunity to observe the demeanor and assess the credibility of various witnesses. Most often, conducting a hearing is the preferred course of action in cases where disputed factual issues exist. 33 We accept Gomez-Galvis' trial attorney's assertion that he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment as soon as was reasonably practicable once he learned of his client's allegations. As a general rule, it is clearly preferable if such a motion is filed sufficiently in advance of trial so that the district judge has a full opportunity to decide whether a pre-trial hearing is necessary and, if so, the breadth and extent of the hearing required in order to decide the motion and to furnish a sufficient record. See, e.g., Myers, 527 F.Supp. at 1214-16. 34 However, as in this case, circumstances may not allow for timely filing of such a motion. In such instances, we acknowledge, as Judge Knapp suggested at oral argument of Gomez-Galvis' motion to dismiss, that a judge may defer ruling on such a motion until after all the evidence has been submitted at trial and, if the defendant is convicted, the judge may handle the motion to dismiss as a post-verdict motion. See United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 768-69 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193, 105 S.Ct. 969, 83 L.Ed.2d 973 (1985). Frequently, this approach can have several advantages: it is fair to both the defendant and the government; it conserves judicial resources; and, in a multi-defendant case, such as this one, it allows for consideration of the allegations raised by a single defendant without further delaying the prosecution of the government's case against that defendant or the co-defendants.