Opinion ID: 187525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Schuler's 1999 and 2000 claims under the ADEA

Text: Schuler does not dispute that in 2004 the district court correctly dismissed as untimely his ADEA claims for 1999 and 2000. Schuler maintains, however, that the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009(LLA), Pub.L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, which applies by its terms to claims of discrimination in compensation pending on or after May 28, 2007, § 6, 123 Stat. at 7, made his claims timely. Section 4 of the LLA provides, in relevant part: [A]n unlawful practice occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in violation of [the ADEA], when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted, when a person becomes subject to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or when a person is affected by application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice. . . . Misquoting the statute, Schuler argues the decision not to promote him was an `other act' . . . intertwined with a discriminatory compensation decision because as a result of that decision he received significantly less remuneration than he would have done as a partner. In support of this position he refers us to the decisions of two district courts interpreting the LLA, see Gentry v. Jackson State Univ., 610 F.Supp.2d 564, 566 (S.D.Miss.2009); Rehman v. State Univ. of N.Y., 596 F.Supp.2d 643, 651 (E.D.N.Y.2009), and to the failure of two proposed amendments, one to the 2009 bill that became the LLA and one to an identical bill proposed in 2007, that would have deleted the phrase other practice. Schuler contends the failure of those amendments makes clear that Congress did not intend to limit the [LLA] only to `compensation decisions.' For its part, PwC distinguishes between an employee's claim he was paid less than another employee for doing similar work and Schuler's claim that he should have been promoted to a higher paying position. The former is clearly discrimination in compensation and covered by the LLA; the latter, PwC argues, is not. There can be no dispute that in order to benefit from the LLA Schuler must bring a claim involving discrimination in compensation and point to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice. The question is whether he did so by claiming PwC did not make him a partner because of his age. The answer is that he did neither. As PwC's distinction implies, in employment law the phrase discrimination in compensation means paying different wages or providing different benefits to similarly situated employees, not promoting one employee but not another to a more remunerative position. See Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 338 (D.C.Cir.1999) (plaintiff alleging wage discrimination under Title VII must show he was performing work substantially equal to that of . . . employees . . . compensated at higher rates (internal quotation marks omitted)); Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 522 (5th Cir.2008) (prima facie case of discrimination in compensation under Title VII involves showing plaintiff was paid less than a non-member [of the protected class] for work requiring substantially the same responsibility); MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 922 F.2d 766, 774 (11th Cir.1991) (proof of discrimination in compensation under ADEA requires showing similarly situated persons outside the protected age group received higher wages). In contrast, a discriminatory failure to promote is actionable regardless whether it affects an employee's compensation. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1277-78 (10th Cir.2005) (prima facie case of failure-to-promote under ADEA requires showing only that qualified plaintiff was rejected and position was filled by someone outside the protected class); Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 514, 516 (D.C.Cir.2000) (prima facie case of deni[al] [of] a promotion under Title VII requires showing only that qualified plaintiff was rejected and either someone not of his protected class filled the position or the position remained vacant and the employer continued to seek applicants). In context, therefore, we do not understand compensation decision or other practice to refer to the decision to promote one employee but not another to a more remunerative position. Our interpretation of the LLA is fully consistent with the patent intent of the Congress to overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007), see § 2, 123 Stat. at 5. The plaintiff there claimed she was the victim of discrimination because, based upon allegedly discriminatory performance reviews, she was being paid significantly less than any of her male colleagues, 550 U.S. at 622, 127 S.Ct. 2162, and the Court repeatedly referred to her claim as one of pay discrimination, id. at 622-23, 638-42, 127 S.Ct. 2162. The Court held Ledbetter's claim was untimely because she filed an administrative charge too long after the decisions about her compensation were made. Id. at 627, 127 S.Ct. 2162. In the LLA the Congress characterized Ledbetter as having significantly impair[ed] . . . protections against discrimination in compensation and ignore[d] the reality of wage discrimination. § 2, 123 Stat. at 5. That the Congress drafted and passed the LLA specifically in order to overturn Ledbetter strongly suggests the statute is directed at the specific type of discrimination involved in that case and not to other unspecified types of discrimination in employment. Nor does our interpretation of the phrase discriminatory compensation decision or other practice read other practice out of the statute. We need look no further than Ledbetter itself for an example of a discriminatory other practice, viz., giving an employee a poor performance evaluation based upon her sex (or any other unlawful criterion) and then using the evaluation to determine her rate of pay. See 550 U.S. at 622, 127 S.Ct. 2162. For these reasons, we conclude the decision whether to promote an employee to a higher paying position is not a compensation decision or other practice within the meaning of that phrase in the LLA and Schuler's failure-to-promote claim is not a claim of discrimination in compensation. The LLA therefore does not revive his claims under the ADEA. []