Opinion ID: 1189752
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial Entry onto the James Property to Arrest Cantrell

Text: Cantrell contends the evidence seized during the search of the James home should be suppressed because officers entered the James property with a warrant for Cantrell's arrest, but without a search warrant and without a reasonable belief Cantrell resided at or was currently at the James residence. [P]olice officers do not need a search warrant to enter the home of the subject of an arrest warrant in order to effectuate the arrest. United States v. Powell, 379 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Boyd, 180 F.3d 967, 977 (8th Cir.1999)). An arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Id. (citing Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981)). Officers may enter a third party's home to execute an arrest warrant if the officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at the [third party's home] and have reason to believe that the suspect is present at the time the warrant is executed. Id. (citations omitted). Otherwise, officers cannot legally search for the subject of an arrest in the home of a third party without a search warrant, unless exigent circumstances exist or officers have obtained the third party's consent. Id. (citing Steagald, 451 U.S. at 215-16, 101 S.Ct. 1642). In Cantrell's case, the warrantless entry into the James home to arrest Cantrell did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights because: (1) officers had a reasonable belief Cantrell resided at the James home and Cantrell was inside the James home at the time the warrant was executed; and (2) officers obtained James's express consent to enter her home and arrest Cantrell. Officers learned from a confidential informant, who had provided reliable information in the past, that Cantrell resided at and was currently at the James home. [3] James confirmed the informant's tip, informing officers shortly after her arrest that Cantrell was currently inside her home. This information was more than sufficient to support the officers' reasonable belief Cantrell resided at the James home and was inside the home at the time officers executed the warrant. Even if officers had no reasonable basis for their belief Cantrell was inside the James home when they served the arrest warrant, James's consent provided an independent basis for officers to enter her home to arrest Cantrell. James's consent was unequivocal: Deputy Wallace requested permission to get Cantrell from the James residence to place Cantrell in custody, and James gave her permission. The officers were not required to obtain a search warrant before entering the James home and arresting Cantrell. Upon Cantrell's arrest, a protective sweep like the one officers conducted here is permissible without a search warrant or probable cause when the officers' legitimate interest in assuring themselves the house in which the suspect has just been arrested is not harboring anyone who could pose a threat to officer safety is `sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail.' United States v. Cash, 378 F.3d 745, 747 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333-34, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276 (1990)). The level of suspicion required for such a protective sweep is the same level of suspicion required for a stop and frisk under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Cash, 378 F.3d at 748. Such a protective sweep requires `articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.' Id. (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 334, 110 S.Ct. 1093). The circumstances of Cantrell's arrest  particularly James's acknowledgment there were weapons in the house  warranted the officers' protective sweep of the James residence. Cantrell completely fails to distinguish between the initial entry into the James home to effectuate his arrest; the protective sweep immediately following his arrest; and the subsequent full-scale search of the James home based on James's consent. When officers arrested Cantrell just inside the James residence front door, officers did not search the James home or seize any evidence. During the protective sweep immediately following Cantrell's arrest, officers apparently observed only two contraband items: a marijuana cigarette in a Marlboro pack on the kitchen table, and a brown vial containing a substance later determined to be methamphetamine. It was the subsequent full-scale search, conducted pursuant to James's express consent, that yielded the five firearms and the extensive evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing and distribution which Cantrell seeks to suppress. Cantrell does not argue the consent search was the poisonous fruit of the initial entry or the protective sweep, nor does Cantrell argue the initial entry or the protective sweep otherwise operated to invalidate James's consent. As discussed below, Cantrell merely argues James's consent was invalid because Cantrell was a lawful co-occupant who was present and objected to the search. Thus, even if the initial entry into the James residence or the protective sweep were somehow unlawful, Cantrell provides no basis to suppress the evidence seized in the subsequent consent search. [4]