Opinion ID: 1936306
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probation Violation/Right to Counsel

Text: Indigent defendants charged with crimes have an absolute federal Constitutional right to the appointment of counsel during all critical stages of their case. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972). Jones was not represented by an attorney in the probation violation proceeding in the Court of Common Pleas. The question presented by Jones in this appeal is whether or not an indigent person is entitled, as a matter of federal Constitutional law, to the appointment of counsel in such a proceeding. We find that the United States Supreme Court has held that the federal Constitution does not afford an indigent person with an absolute right to assistance of counsel in a probation violation proceeding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). In Gagnon, the Supreme Court noted that there are significant differences between criminal trials and probation violation hearings: In most cases, the probationer or parolee has been convicted of committing another crime or has admitted the charges against him. And while in some cases he may have a justifiable excuse for the violation or a convincing reason why revocation is not the appropriate disposition, mitigating evidence of this kind is often not susceptible of proof or is so simple as not to require either investigation or exposition by counsel. Id. at 787, 93 S.Ct. at 1762 (footnote omitted). [1] Consequently, Gagnon held that due process does not necessitate that an indigent person be afforded the usual trial rights in a probation violation proceeding. Id. at 789-90, 93 S.Ct. at 1763. [2] In particular, for present purposes, Gagnon established a case by case approach to the right to counsel for indigent probationers: We thus find no justification for a new inflexible constitutional rule with respect to the requirement of counsel. We think, rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system. Although the presence and participation of counsel will probably be both undesirable and constitutionally unnecessary in most revocation hearings, there will remain certain cases in which fundamental fairness  the touchstone of due process  will require that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees. Id. Following Gagnon, in articulating the requirements of due process in a probation proceeding, the Supreme Court has strived to balance divergent and equally legitimate interests: Probationers have an obvious interest in retaining their conditional liberty, and the State also has an interest in assuring that revocation proceedings are based on accurate findings of fact and, where appropriate, the informed exercise of discretion. Our previous cases have sought to accommodate these interests while avoiding the imposition of rigid requirements that would threaten the informal nature of probation revocation proceedings or interfere with exercise of discretion by the sentencing authority. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 2257-58, 85 L.Ed.2d 636, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 921, 105 S.Ct. 3548, 87 L.Ed.2d 671 (1985) (citation omitted). In Romano, the Supreme Court concluded, once again, that a probation revocation hearing does not require the full panoply of procedural safeguards associated with a criminal trial. Id. at 613, 105 S.Ct. at 2258 (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789-90, 93 S.Ct. at 1763). In particular, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Gagnon and Morrissey that an indigent probationer is only entitled to assistance of counsel in some circumstances. Id. 471 U.S. at 612, 105 S.Ct. at 2258.