Opinion ID: 790313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sergeant Michelle Lindsay

Text: 65 Miller argues that a jury might find that Lindsay had not disclosed all the information concerning Stanford's medical condition as she was required to do under County policy. From this starting point, Miller then makes the extraordinary leap of speculating that a jury could find that Lindsay testified untruthfully during her deposition and that she concealed most of the background facts regarding the decedent's head injuries. Miller's Br. at 42. In similar fashion, Miller conjectures that the initial episode that Stanford experienced in his cell was a seizure, and that he suffered continued seizures throughout the night while under observation. Id. at 42-43. 66 In this Circuit, it is established that [k]nowledge of the asserted serious needs or of circumstances clearly indicating the existence of such needs, is essential to a finding of deliberate indifference. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 896 (citing Horn, 22 F.3d at 660); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970 ([T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.). When viewed under this standard, the record supports the District Court's conclusion that Miller failed to demonstrate that Lindsay possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. There is no dispute that Lindsay lacked actual knowledge of Stanford's true health status. Miller argues instead that Lindsay had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding Stanford's deteriorating condition as they unfolded in the early morning of April 26, 1998, and her failure to take action amounted to deliberate indifference. As the Supreme Court has instructed, however, Lindsay would have had to draw the inference that a substantial risk of serious harm existed before a jury could be permitted to consider whether her failure to act amounted to deliberate indifference. Miller has produced no evidence that Lindsay drew such an inference. 67 Indeed, the record contains numerous instances of uncontroverted evidence tending to show that at no time during her shift did Lindsay infer the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm. Upon arriving at Stanford's cell, Lindsay questioned Stanford and found him to be responsive. He indicated that he had not hit his head when he fell. Lindsay checked Stanford's pulse and found it to be strong and steady. J.A. at 284. Although Stanford's cellmate expressed an opinion that Stanford had suffered a possible seizure, Lindsay observed no seizure activity. She ascertained that Stanford's pupils were dilated, but equally so. The deputies, under Lindsay's direction, transported Stanford to Intake, and Lindsay promptly consulted the on-call physician. Following the doctor's advice, Lindsay placed Stanford under 30-minute observation to monitor him for a change in condition. At one point, in response to Stanford's suggestion that low blood sugar might be causing his headache, Lindsay administered a blood sugar test and found Stanford's blood sugar to be within normal range. Lindsay also inquired whether Stanford had taken any drugs, and when he had had his last drink. Despite rolling around on floor for much of the night, Stanford was coherent when spoken to and appeared O.K. during the 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m observations. J.A. at 288-89, 291, 741. Even with the benefit of hindsight, Dr. Ismailoglu testified that Stanford's seizure at 8:10 a.m on April 26, 1998 was the first concrete evidence that there was a neurological disorder going on. J.A. at 674 (Ismailoglu Dep. at 60:22-24). In short, nothing in this record supports the conclusion that Lindsay had inferred the existence of a substantial risk of serious harm. 68 With respect to Lindsay's phone call to Dr. Ismailoglu, the record does support a conclusion that the sergeant may have failed to relate all relevant information concerning Stanford's condition. There is no evidence, however, that Lindsay's omissions were deliberate. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (holding that prisoner must allege acts or omissions evidencing deliberate indifference to serious medical needs). Accordingly, while the record might support a conclusion that Lindsay was negligent in failing to inform the doctor of all relevant facts, there is no support for a finding that such failure rose to the level of a constitutional violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. 1970 ([A]n official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.). 69 For the reasons discussed, we find that the record fully supports the District Court's grant of summary judgment for Lindsay.