Opinion ID: 2335720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: We Affirm The Superior Court's Order Denying Attorney's Fees.

Text: The Borough sought an award of fees under Rule 68 or Rule 82 as the prevailing party. Gold Country opposed the Rule 68 request, arguing that the Borough was awarded approximately $2,350 in attorney's fees when it prevailed in Gold Country's administrative appeal of the Planning Commission decision. [50] The superior court entered judgment in favor of the Borough but denied the Borough's request for attorney's fees under both Rule 68 and Rule 82. The court first noted in its order that the offer to settle made by the borough to Gold Country [was] not addressed in any way to [William] Cramer and there was no reason, under these facts, to award any attorney fees ... against Cramer. The court further determined that the suit was not brought in bad faith and that the portion of [Gold Country's] suit which brought under scrutiny the ... operation of local government [was] within the public interest. The superior court concluded that [t]o this extent [a Rule 68] offer by the borough to settle a claim, so as to seek upon prevailing enhanced attorney fees, would chill legitimate suits against the government. We agree with the superior court that a citizen litigant's claim alleging violation of the Open Meetings Act, with no accompanying claim for monetary damages, is unlikely to be an appropriate vehicle for a Rule 68 offer. Rule 68 provides that [i]f the judgment finally rendered by the court is at least 5 percent less favorable to the offeree than the offer, the offeree must pay all costs and a fixed percentage of actual reasonable attorney's fees under a schedule that is pegged to the date of the offer. [51] Here Gold Country's claim requested no monetary damages. A Rule 68 offer of judgment serves no legitimate purpose in a citizen's Open Meetings Act claim against the government where there is no accompanying claim for monetary damages. To allow the recovery of attorney's fees would force the citizen litigant to drop its suit or face a potentially ruinous attorney's fee award, despite its good-faith effort to require the government to follow its own processes. Moreover, the Borough's offer of $2,000 an amount that was completely unrelated to the relief sought and which could have no effect on the allegedly illegal governmental actioncould have been perceived by Gold Country as an attempt to force Gold Country to drop its effort to hold the government accountable. As the superior court concluded, to approve of [t]he government's offer of a nominal sum[] to entice a party to waive what it views as a right would chill legitimate suits against the government and would be counter-productive to good lawmaking and law review. And as the superior court correctly noted, [a] suit may ultimately fail but requiring the government to defend its processes is not an abuse of the system. For such issues, the tort or business litigation strategies of offers [of] judgment are inapplicable. Additionally, it was within the superior court's power to deny the fee award under Civil Rule 82. Rule 82(b)(3)(I) permits the trial court to vary a fee award to the extent to which a given fee award may be so onerous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of the courts. This rule provision embodies the concern expressed by Justice Matthews in his dissenting opinion in Bozarth v. Atlantic Richfield Oil Co., [52] where he cautioned: If the superior court is to serve its constitutional purpose as a forum available to all the people, superior court judges must consider whether an award of attorney's fees will impair the constitutional right of access to the courts. [53] In State v. Native Village of Nunapitchuk, [54] we expressly stated that Rule 82(b)(3)(I) continues to apply to all cases, including those intended to effectuate public policies. [55] We further observed that [t]rial courts remain free to reduce awards that would otherwise be so onerous to the losing party as to deter similarly situated litigantsincluding litigants that would have previously been identified as public interest litigantsfrom accessing the courts. [56] Gold Country, and those similarly situated, have a right to seek remedial relief from perceived Open Meetings Act violations. Here, the superior court determined that an award of fees against Gold Country would chill further suits seeking review of the government's actions under its own processes. Thus, it properly applied Rule 82(b)(3)(I) to relieve Gold Country of the obligation to pay a fee award. We therefore affirm the superior court's order denying attorney's fees. [57]