Opinion ID: 901719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Unfortunate or Bad Condition Instruction

Text: [¶ 52.] The trial court gave the following instruction designated as Instruction No. 15: A finding of negligence may not be based solely on evidence of bad result to the claimant in question, but a bad result may be considered by you, along with other evidence, in determining the issue of negligence. You are the sole judges of the weight to be given to this kind of evidence. (Emphasis added). Dr. Schwartz contends that instructing the jury that it could consider Kostel's bad result along with other evidence in deciding whether Dr. Schwartz had been negligent was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. In support of his position, he compares this Court's analyses in Hansen v. Isaak, 70 S.D. 529, 19 N.W.2d 521 (1945) and Shamburger v. Behrens, 380 N.W.2d 659 (S.D.1986). [¶ 53.] In Hansen, this Court in effect characterized the factual circumstances as a res ipsa loquitur case, where the presence of negligence speaks for itself without the need for expert testimony to show a breach of the standard of care. 70 S.D. at 530, 19 N.W.2d at 522. Plaintiff's child was burned by a device that was operated by and under the exclusive control of the defendant chiropractor at all times relevant. While the plaintiffs submitted expert testimony at trial that when the device of the type that injured the plaintiff was operated correctly no burn would result, they offered no expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care in operating such a device. Id. at 532, 19 N.W.2d 521, 523. The trial court entered a directed verdict for the defendant. Id. at 531, 19 N.W.2d at 521. [¶ 54.] Reversing the directed verdict, this Court concluded that [t]he character of the injury in connection with other facts and circumstances and the fair inferences which the jury could draw from them constitute substantial credible evidence and would have sustained a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 534, 19 N.W.2d at 523. In reaching this conclusion this Court set out the applicable rule in a case of res ipsa loquitur: [W]hile the result alone is not, in itself, evidence of negligence, yet same may nevertheless be considered, together with other facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence in a given case in determining whether or not such result is attributable to negligence or want of skill. Id. at 533, 19 N.W.2d at 522 (quoting Berg v. Willett, 212 Iowa 1109, 232 N.W. 821, 823 (Iowa 1930)) (citations omitted). [¶ 55.] In Shamburger, the plaintiff underwent colon surgery and thereafter his condition inexplicably deteriorated. 380 N.W.2d at 661. Eventually, it was determined that the plaintiff had developed an abscess at the location where the colon had been resected. Following the presentation of evidence at the trial on the plaintiffs malpractice suit, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: The fact that an unfortunate or bad condition resulted to Plaintiff ... during the care afforded to him by Defendant ... does not alone prove that Defendant ... was negligent. [25] Id. at 663 n. 5 (emphasis added). [¶ 56.] On appeal, the plaintiff in Shamburger argued that the instruction was prejudicial and did not properly instruct the jury on causation without the inclusion of language from the rule set out in Hansen  that his bad result was some evidence in itself that could be considered with other evidence in the record in determining whether the physician had been negligent. Id. at 663. This Court affirmed the instruction given by the trial court based on the distinction between the factual circumstances in Hansen and the case at bar. Id. at 664. Significant to this Court was that unlike the injury in Hansen, the injury to the Shamburger plaintiff was not the type ... which in and of itself could be evidence of negligence. Id. (emphasis added). [¶ 57.] Returning to the instant case, Instruction No. 15 clearly allowed the jury to consider Kostel's bad result along with other evidence in reaching its finding of negligence. Dr. Schwartz contends that the trial court should have given an instruction similar to the Shamburger instruction because, as in Shamburger, this too is a case in which negligence is not apparent without expert testimony and such an instruction would have informed the jury that Kostel's bad result was no evidence of negligence. [¶ 58.] However, Shamburger did not go that far. It is clear that while this Court did not intend for a bad result, arising out of circumstances comparable to Shamburger, to alone prove negligence, the Shamburger instruction does not foreclose the jury from considering the bad result along with other evidence in determining whether the defendant was negligent. See id. at 663; see also supra 55. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury that it could consider Kostel's bad result along with other evidence in determining whether Dr. Schwartz was negligent. See Kennelly v. Burgess, 337 Md. 562, 654 A.2d 1335, 1340 (1995) (in a case where plaintiff suffered brain injury during an operation on his sinus cavity and experts disputed whether defendant physician met the applicable standard of care, the court opined that instructing the jury that [a]n unsuccessful result following medical treatment is not evidence of negligence implying to the jury that the bad result was  no evidence at all of negligence) (emphasis added). As such, in Kennelly the court held that the instruction was erroneous because the well settled principle that no presumption or inference of negligence arises from the bare happening of [a bad result] meant the bad result may nonetheless be taken into consideration in assessing negligence. Id. at 1340-41 (citations omitted). [¶ 59.] Moreover, we conclude that the jury was properly instructed overall in this regard. While the jury was instructed that it could consider Kostel's bad result along with other evidence in reaching a finding that Dr. Schwartz was negligent, such could not be reached unless it concluded he had failed to provide the applicable standard of care set out in other instructions. See Williams v. Viswanathan, 64 S.W.3d 624 (Tex.App.2001) (holding in a medical malpractice case where an alert and responding, near-drowning victim died after receiving emergency room treatment and the record reflected that there was dispute among experts whether defendant physician had provided decedent with the applicable standard of care, trial court did not abuse its discretion when it instructed the jury that while it could not base a finding of negligence solely on evidence of a bad result, a bad result could be considered along with other evidence); see also Kennelly, 654 A.2d at 1343.