Opinion ID: 1057914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Victims’ Rights

Text: The second issue presented in Layman’s case is whether the Victims’ Bill of Rights affords a victim’s family the right to be heard at pretrial hearings concerning a plea agreement and a nolle prosequi. For the reasons outlined below, we answer this question in the negative. The Tennessee Constitution guarantees the victims of crimes and their families12 a variety of rights. Of these rights, two are relevant in the instant case: “[t]he right to confer with the prosecution” and “[t]he right to be heard, when relevant, at all critical stages of the criminal justice process as defined by the General Assembly.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 35. The General Assembly, pursuant to its authority under article I, section 35, enacted legislation to implement victims’ rights and define their key terms. With regard to the right to be heard, crime victims may be heard at “critical stages of the criminal justice process,” which the General Assembly has defined as the following: (A) Bond hearings or bond reduction hearings if hearing from the victim is deemed relevant by the appropriate district attorney general; (B) The defendant’s sentencing hearing; (C) Any hearing at which the issue of whether the defendant should pay restitution or the amount of restitution that should be paid is discussed; and (D) Any parole hearing at which the defendant’s release on parole will be discussed or determined. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-302(2) (2006). With regard to the right to confer, the prosecutor is required to confer with the victim before the final disposition of a criminal offense and before the commencement of a trial. Id. § 40-38-114(a) to (b). However, the failure of a prosecutor to confer with the victim will not affect the validity of plea agreements or any other disposition of the case. Id. § 40-38-114(d). Furthermore, the right to confer does not include the authority to direct the prosecution of the case. Id. § 40-38-114(c). With these considerations in mind, we turn to the particular facts of the case before us. 12 If a person against whom the crime is committed is deceased, then a family member of that person may meet the definition of “victim.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-302(4)(A) (2006). -11- During several hearings concerning the nolle prosequi, the trial court allowed members of the Powers family to express opinions regarding the facts of the case, the threat Layman poses to society, and appropriate methods of punishment. Although the trial court made no explicit findings with regard to the propriety of the statements made by members of Powers’ family, it appears their statements were allowed out of a belief that the hearings were each “critical stages of the criminal justice process” at which the family had a right to be heard. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the hearings in question were “critical stages of the criminal justice process.” We disagree. The General Assembly has listed the proceedings that are “critical stages of the criminal justice process.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-302(2) (2006). Hearings concerning plea agreements and nolle prosequis are notably absent from the list of proceedings at which victims have a right to be heard. Id. It is a long-recognized rule of statutory construction that “the mention of one subject in a statute means the exclusion of other subjects that are not mentioned.” Carver v. Citizen Utils. Co., 954 S.W.2d 34, 35 (Tenn. 1997). On appeal, the State argues that the pretrial hearings were “critical stages” under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-302(2)(C) because the rejected plea agreement contained a clause regarding restitution. This argument is without merit. The plea agreement is not part of the record before us, and we are therefore unable to find that it includes a provision regarding restitution. Furthermore, the record does not reflect that restitution was considered at any of the hearings or that the Powers family was heard on that issue. The mere fact that the plea agreement may have ordered payment of restitution is insufficient to bring these hearings within the scope of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-302(2)(C). We therefore conclude that Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-38-302(2) provides victims no right to be heard at the pretrial hearings in this case.13 The State also argues that the trial court impermissibly allowed the Powers family to direct the prosecution of the case by permitting their attorney to participate in the hearing. We agree. The “right to confer” as defined by the General Assembly does not allow victims or their attorneys to appear before the court and offer legal arguments in opposition to those of the prosecutor. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-38-114(c). We conclude that the participation of the Powers family’s attorney in the pretrial hearing exceeded the right to confer granted to victims under the Tennessee Constitution. Although the victim’s family did not have the right to be heard at the pretrial hearings concerning the plea agreement and nolle prosequi, we conclude that any error was harmless. The trial court made it clear that it did not base its rejection of the nolle prosequi and pretrial diversion on the representations or arguments made by the victim’s family or their attorney. There is nothing in the record establishing that Layman was harmed by any participation by the victim’s family. 13 W e express no opinion with regard to the parties’ argument that the right to be heard does not include an ability to offer unsworn testimony, hearsay evidence, or testimony not subject to cross-examination. Because there is no right to be heard in the instant case, these issues are unnecessary to the determination of the issue before us. -12-