Opinion ID: 2042608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Voir Dire Proceedings

Text: In Houston I, this court determined that defense counsel's waiver of the court reporter for voir dire constituted deficient performance, and defendant therefore satisfied the first prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance. Houston I, 226 Ill.2d at 148, 314 Ill.Dec. 113, 874 N.E.2d 23. We now turn to whether the second prong of the Strickland test has been met. This second prong requires a showing that counsel's deficient performance resulted in prejudice. A defendant establishes prejudice by showing that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v. Peeples, 205 Ill.2d 480, 513, 275 Ill.Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641 (2002). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Peeples, 205 Ill.2d at 513, 275 Ill. Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must satisfy both the performance and the prejudice prongs of Strickland. People v. Evans, 209 Ill.2d 194, 220, 283 Ill.Dec. 651, 808 N.E.2d 939 (2004). In the case at bar, defendant's pro se motion for a new trial included a complaint about the composition of his jury. In this motion, defendant stated that he felt a predjudice [ sic ] and discriminating [ sic ] patter[n] going on with the jury, which he noted consisted of eleven white people and one black person. [1] We determined in Houston I that this complaint amounted to a claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the equal protection clause for the prosecution to use a peremptory challenge to exclude a prospective juror solely on the basis of race. Under Batson, a three-step process is employed to evaluate claims of discrimination in jury selection. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that relevant circumstances give rise to an inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove panel members based on their race. People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 70-71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding each of the venirepersons in question. Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 70, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638; People v. Williams, 209 Ill.2d 227, 244, 282 Ill.Dec. 824, 807 N.E.2d 448 (2004). Finally, the trial court considers those explanations and determines whether the defendant has met his burden of establishing purposeful discrimination. Williams, 209 Ill.2d at 244, 282 Ill.Dec. 824, 807 N.E.2d 448; Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 70-71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638. In the case at bar, the circuit court of Peoria County submitted to this court a reconstruction of the voir dire record consisting of two items: (1) transcripts of the proceedings that resulted in the creation of a Bystander's Report Re: Voir Dire Reconstruction, and (2) the bystander's report itself, certified per Supreme Court Rule 323, dated November 21, 2007, and signed by counsel for defendant and the State. This second item, the bystander's report, includes a summary of the jury-selection proceedings at defendant's trial, along with seven exhibits containing documents that apparently were used in assembling the report. Exhibit 1 is a list of the names of the 29 members of the jury panel. Exhibits 2 through 5 consist of juror profile questionnaires  with photos  for the 29 panel members. [2] Three of these 29 appear to be African-American. Included in exhibit 2 are juror profile questionnaires for the 12 members of the final jury, which included one African-American. Also included in exhibit 2 is the questionnaire for the alternate juror. Exhibit 3 consists of juror profile questionnaires for the seven venire members who were excused by the defense, and exhibit 4 includes questionnaires for the six members excused by the State. Exhibit 5 includes questionnaires for the three panel members excused by the court. Exhibit 6, which is a jury seating diagram, lists the names of the panel members who were called for each seat, including those who were excused and those finally seated. Exhibit 7 is the court clerk's thumbnail summary of the trial, a three-page document that includes, among other items, the names of the final jurors; the names of the panel members excused by the court, the State, and the defense; and the names of the witnesses testifying at trial, along with the dates and times of their testimony. Our review of the reconstruction proceedings and the resulting bystander's report reveals the following pertinent information. The reconstruction proceedings were conducted by a judge other than the judge who presided at defendant's trial. David Gast, the prosecutor at defendant's trial, appeared for the State in the voir dire reconstruction proceedings. A public defender was appointed to represent defendant, whose trial counsel had since retired from the practice of law. No information was available from defendant's trial counsel. According to the bystander's report, the judge at defendant's trial questioned potential jurors in groups of four, and counsel for the State and the defense asked supplemental questions. The questions posed by the Court were standard questions regarding availability, bias, prejudice, prior service, burden of proof, presumed innocence of the Defendant, duties as jurors, among other things, as well as any personal questions gleaned from the Juror Questionna[i]res. No notes were taken or memoranda created regarding the supplemental questioning by the attorneys. Attached to the juror profile questionnaires of each of the six panel members challenged by the State are photocopies of the panel members' drivers' license photographs. Of those six panel members, one  Tracy Mosley  appears to be African-American, and the remainder appear to be Caucasian. Gast, the prosecutor at trial, recalled the particular reasons for four of the challenges. These panel members either had a criminal conviction or a close family member with a criminal conviction. Included in these four was Mosley, who checked the blank marked Yes on her juror profile questionnaire in answer to the question of whether she or a family member had ever been convicted of a criminal offense other than a traffic ticket. Gast did not recall the reasons for challenging the other two panel members, each of whom was born in 1928. As noted, neither of them appears to be African-American. Of the three venire members excused by the court, one appears to be African-American. Gast recalled that this panel member was excused because his spouse was employed by the county sheriff as a courthouse security officer. The bystander's report concludes by stating: After investigating all sources for this report, the reasons given, if any, for the particular challenges made by the State or the Defense, or    by the Court in removing three potential jurors for cause, further information is otherwise unknown and cannot be ascertained by any other means. Having reviewed the bystander's report and the transcripts of the reconstruction proceedings, we see no prima facie case of racial discrimination. First, we do not find an impermissible pattern of strikes against African-Americans or a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons. See Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638. As previously noted, the State challenged six venirepersons, only one of whom appeared to be African-American. The remaining five appeared to be Caucasian. This does not suggest an impermissible pattern of strikes against African-Americans, nor does it indicate a disproportionate use of peremptory challenges against African-American venirepersons. Second, we find no appreciable disparity between the level of African-American representation in the venire and the level of such representation in defendant's jury. See Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638. Here it is undisputed that there was one African-American juror. In a jury of 12 persons, where 1 is African-American, the level of African-American representation is 8.3%. According to the bystander's report, the venire as a whole consisted of 29 persons. Of those 29 persons, 3 appear to be African-American. The representation of African-Americans in the venire was thus 10.3%. While the level of representation of African-Americans in the venire was slightly higher than in the jury, the difference between the two is just 2%, which is negligible. The level of African-American representation in the jury was essentially the same as the level in the venire. It is true that defendant and Mosley were both African-American, and the shooting victim in the robbery was Caucasian. See Williams, 173 Ill.2d at 71, 218 Ill.Dec. 916, 670 N.E.2d 638. However, when compared with the totality of relevant facts (see People v. Rivera, 221 Ill.2d 481, 500, 304 Ill.Dec. 315, 852 N.E.2d 771 (2006)), this does not give rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. We conclude that, even if a court reporter had recorded the voir dire proceedings, defendant would not have been able to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Moreover, even if a prima facie case had been established, it appears that the State could have articulated a race-neutral reason for excusing Mosley: either she or a close relative had been convicted of a criminal offense. It follows that, under these circumstances, the prejudice prong of the Strickland test has not been met. It cannot be said that, but for defense counsel's waiver of the court reporter for voir dire, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Peeples, 205 Ill.2d at 513, 275 Ill.Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641. We reject defendant's claim that his counsel's waiver of the court reporter for voir dire constituted ineffective assistance. Defendant's second claim regarding the impropriety of the voir dire proceeding is that he was deprived of due process when the trial court allowed jury selection to proceed with no court reporter present. This argument arises from essentially the same basis as defendant's claim of ineffective assistance regarding jury selection: counsel's affirmative waiver of defendant's right to the presence of a court reporter during voir dire. [3] In each instance, defendant's claim is that, because of the lack of a voir dire record, he was prejudiced in that he was unable to establish that his jury was improperly seated in violation of Batson. As a result of our remand in Houston I, we were supplied with a reconstructed voir dire record, which enabled us to review defendant's claims regarding improper jury selection. Having reviewed these claims under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel, and having determined  under Strickland  that defendant suffered no prejudice, we are satisfied that there was no due process violation. We reject defendant's claim that the trial court, in allowing voir dire to proceed without a court reporter present, deprived him of due process.