Opinion ID: 570987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cable Act Claims

Text: 6 The parties dispute whether Weeden's may use section 1983 to bring claims under the Cable Act. The parties further dispute the merits of Weeden's Cable Act claims. 7 Parties injured when a state deprives them of rights secured by the Constitution and laws may sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 is available when a state violates rights secured by federal statute. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980). The Supreme Court has held, however, that when the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). 8 Where a federal statute creates enforceable rights, a section 1983 action will lie against a state's political subdivisions unless the defendant can show that Congress intended the statute in question to provide the exclusive remedy. Keaukaha-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1467, 1470-71 (9th Cir.1984); see also Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987). 9 The district court ruled that the Cable Act was a comprehensive scheme providing its own enforcement mechanisms, and that review under section 1983 was therefore precluded. The court was examining Weeden's section 1983 claims alleging violations of sections 541, 544, 545, and 546 of the Cable Act. 10 Section 555 sets out a procedure by which cable operators may bring actions under sections 545 and 546. The Act does not discuss judicial remedies for alleged violations of sections 541 and 544. The parties break the section 1983 question into two parts: (1) Whether a section 1983 action can exist for the sections of the Cable Act that do not mention judicial remedies; and (2) Whether a section 1983 action can exist for the sections of the Cable Act that explicitly provide judicial remedies. 11 A. Sections of the Cable Act That Do Not Provide a Judicial Remedy--Sections 541 and 544 1. Section 1983 12 The Town cites two cases that found no implied private right of action for sections of the Cable Act that do not expressly provide for a judicial remedy. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 680 F.Supp. 174, 178-80 (M.D.Pa.1987), aff'd on other grounds, 867 F.2d 151 (3d Cir.1989); Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enters., 633 F.Supp. 1315, 1317-20 (D.Del.1986). 13 This circuit has noted that a plaintiff must overcome a much higher burden to establish an implied private right of action than to establish a right to bring a section 1983 action. To establish the former, the plaintiff must show congressional intent to create a private cause of action. By contrast, courts presume the availability of a section 1983 cause of action, and the defendant has the burden of showing contrary congressional intent. See Keaukaha-Panaewa, 739 F.2d at 1470-71. 14 Other courts have permitted section 1983 actions for sections of the Cable Act that do not provide their own judicial remedies. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n of P.R., 906 F.2d 25, 31-33 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 388 (1990) (permitting a section 1983 action regarding the Cable Act's provisions relieving operators of liability for the content of transmissions); Van Meter v. Township of Maplewood, 696 F.Supp. 1024, 1027-28 (D.N.J.1988) (permitting a section 1983 action regarding the Cable Act's provisions on receiving satellite signals). We need not decide this question, because we hold that Weeden's has raised no colorable claims under these sections. 2. Merits 15 Weeden's claims under sections 544(f)(1) and 541(a)(2) of the Cable Act concern restrictions placed on them by the Town. Once Weeden's failed to renew its bond, the Town immediately barred the company from performing any new construction or adding new customers, even in areas where construction had been completed. These restrictions were initially imposed when the bond first expired, before the franchise was terminated, and then were renewed when the Town decided to permit Weeden's to continue its existing operations after termination of the franchise. 16 Franchising authorities retain the power to enforce the terms of existing franchises, so long as those terms are not inconsistent with the Act. Section 557 provides that the terms of existing franchises remain in effect. Further, the House Report expressly states that matters not specifically covered in the legislation remain subject to state and local regulation, and that bonds are one such matter. See House Report at 4696 (matters subject to state and local regulation, and that bonds are one such matter. See House Report at 4696 (matters subject to state and local authority include, to the extent not addressed in the legislation, ... the enforcement and administration of a franchise (e.g., ... bonds, letters of credit, insurance and indemnification ...).). 17 The franchise at issue in this case included a provision permitting the Town to terminate for cause. Under Weeden's interpretation, when faced with a violation of a franchise term, the Town could have terminated the franchise completely but could not have permitted the franchise to continue operations under some restrictions. Nothing in the legislation appears to so restrict an authority's power to choose the means of enforcing a franchise. 18 B. Sections of the Cable Act Providing Judicial Remedies--545 and 546 1. Section 1983 19 Although there may be cases permitting section 1983 suits for violations of Cable Act sections that do not provide judicial remedies, we have been cited no case allowing § 1983 actions for violations of sections 545 and 546, where the Cable Act does provide a judicial remedy. The Town argues that Weeden's should not be able to circumvent the procedures of section 555 by electing to sue under section 1983. Section 555 establishes procedures that cable operators must follow to obtain judicial relief for violations of sections 545 and 546. 20 In Sea Clammers, the Court held that where a statute sets out specific procedures for pursuing private causes of action and the plaintiff fails to comply with those procedures, section 1983 is not available as an alternative remedy. See 453 U.S. at 14. If we were to allow a claim under section 1983 for the alleged violations of sections 545 and 546, we would render meaningless the specific procedural requirements of section 555. We hold that section 1983 is not available for such claims. Remedies for violations of sections 545 and 546 must be pursued in accordance with section 555. We affirm the district court on this point. 2. Compliance with section 555 21 a. Renewal--Section 546 22 Section 555 provides that a cable operator adversely affected by a determination made under section 546 must commence an action within 120 days of a final determination. The district court held that a final determination occurred either on May 6, 1986, when the Town Council voted to terminate Weeden's franchise, or on June 30, 1986, when the termination became effective. Hence, the court concluded that Weeden's had failed to seek judicial review within 120 days of the final determination. We find no error in this conclusion. 23 Construing the facts as alleged by Weeden's, Weeden's submitted a request, which it deemed a request for renewal, on June 30, 1986. The Town treated the June 30 request as an application for a new franchise. The town stated that it was soliciting other proposals, which were due on December 1, 1986, and that it would consider Weeden's proposal at that time. Weeden's filed this action on December 3, 1986, after it became clear that the Town would not consider its proposal. 24 Weeden's argues that at the time it filed suit, the Town had made no final determination on its renewal proposal, and that its renewal claim did not violate section 555's 120-day limitation. 25 Construing all facts favorably to Weeden's, Weeden's had lost its franchise on June 30. Because there was no longer an existing franchise, the Town was free to consider Weeden's new request a proposal for a new franchise, rather than a renewal proposal. Therefore, Weeden's did not have a renewal proposal pending at the time it filed suit. Weeden's did not file its action within 120 days of the Town's final action on its earlier proposals. Weeden's renewal under section 555 was not timely. 26 b. Modification Request-Section 545 27 Section 555 provides that a cable operator adversely affected by a determination made under section 545 must commence an action within 120 days of a final determination. As with the renewal provision, the parties dispute whether the action was brought within 120 days of a final determination. Weeden's argues that under Washington law, a municipality such as Clyde Hill can act only through a formal vote, and that the Town Council never took a formal vote on the modification request. 28 At the May 6, 1986 Town Council meeting, the Council passed a formal resolution terminating the franchise. Although the resolution did not explicitly refer to the request for modification of the bond, the minutes make clear that the Council was terminating the franchise because of Weeden's failure to post the $60,000 bond. Therefore, a final determination regarding the modification request occurred on either May 6, 1986, the date of the vote, or June 30, 1986, the date the termination became effective. Because Weeden's did not initiate its suit until December 1986, Weeden's failed to seek judicial review within the required 120 days.