Opinion ID: 173891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Awash in Maritime Presumptions

Text: Liability in collision and allision cases has always been apportioned based on fault. Fischer v. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d 586, 593 (11th Cir.2007). Maritime law, however, uses evidentiary, fault, causation, and other presumptions throughout its resolution of negligence suits. SCHOENBAUM, supra, § 14-3 (4th ed.2004). These presumptions shift the burden of production and persuasion to the defendant.
Two common presumptions are presumptions of fault, based on the rules articulated in THE OREGON, 158 U.S. 186, 15 S.Ct. 804, 39 L.Ed. 943 (1895) and THE LOUISIANA, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) 164, 18 L.Ed. 85 (1865). The rule of THE OREGON creates a presumption of fault that shifts the burden of production and persuasion to a moving vessel who, under her own power, allides with a stationary object. THE OREGON, 158 U.S. at 192-93; James, 686 F.2d at 1132 n. 2. The rule of THE LOUISIANA creates the same presumption for a vessel who drifts into an allision with a stationary object. THE LOUSIANA, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) at 173, 18 L.Ed. 85; James, 686 F.2d at 1131-32. Both of these presumptions are closely related to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor which creates a rebuttable presumption of fault on the part of the person controlling the instrumentality. SCHOENBAUM, supra, § 14-3. And, although the two presumptions apply to different types of vessels vessels under their own power and drifting vesselsthe courts treat them similarly, looking to law on one to inform decisions on the other. See S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593 (doctrines are the same except the vessels to which they apply); City of Chicago v. M/V MORGAN, 375 F.3d 563, 572 n. 11 (7th Cir.2004); Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat'l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880, 886 (7th Cir.1993) (Posner, J.); James, 686 F.2d at 1132 n. 2. These presumptions shift the burden of production and persuasion on the issue of fault. They are `[e]videntiary presumptions ... designed to fill a factual vacuum. Once evidence is presented... presumptions become superfluous because the parties have introduced evidence to dispel the mysteries that gave rise to the presumptions.' In re Mid-South Towing Co., 418 F.3d 526, 531 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 887); see also In re Omega Protein, Inc., 548 F.3d 361, 368-69 (5th Cir.2008). But see Bunge Corp. v. M/V FURNESS BRIDGE, 558 F.2d 790, 795 n. 3 (5th Cir.1977) ([W]e reject the holding of the Third Circuit that when both sides had `fully presented testimony regarding their version as to what happened prior to the collision ... the presumption disappeared as a matter of law.' (quoting Pa. R.R. Co. v. S.S. Marie Leonhardt, 320 F.2d 262, 264 (3d Cir.1963))). And, they must be properly confined to the issue of breach only not causation (either in fact or legal cause) or the percentages of fault assigned to the parties adjudged negligent. Mid-South Towing, 418 F.3d at 532. Application of [one of these presumptions] does not supplant the general negligence determination which requires a plaintiff to prove the elements of duty, breach, causation and injury by a preponderance of the evidence. M/V MORGAN, 375 F.3d at 572-73 (citing Bunge Corp., 558 F.2d at 798; Brown & Root Marine Operators, Inc. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 377 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1967)). In a recent case regarding damage to a dock from an allision with a pleasure yacht drifting during Hurricane Frances, the Eleventh Circuit outlined the three ways in which a defendant could rebut the presumptions established by both THE LOUISIANA and THE OREGON. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593. The defendant can demonstrate: (1) that the allision was the fault of the stationary object; (2) that the moving vessel acted with reasonable care; or (3) that the allision was an unavoidable accident.... Each independent argument, if sustained, is sufficient to defeat liability. Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 571 F.3d 206, 211 (2d Cir.2009). The first route is essentially the contributory negligence route. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593. For example, the drifting vessel may argue that the operator of the dock was also negligent in failing to moor the drifting vessel properly. Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 889. Or, a vessel under its own steam may argue that its allision was caused by the improper placement of a navigational buoy. Inter-Cities Navigation Corp. v. United States, 608 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir.1979) (Brown, J.). The second route requires the defendant to negate negligence. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 593. Here, the moving vessel bears the burdens of production and persuasion, and the risk of non-persuasion. James, 686 F.2d at 1132. The appropriate standard of care in this regime is based upon `(1) general concepts of prudent seamanship and reasonable care; (2) statutory and regulatory rules...; and (3) recognized customs and usages.' S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 594 (quoting SCHOENBAUM, supra, § 89); Bunge, 558 F.2d at 802. The third route places the most difficult burden on the defendant, because as a superceding causation argument it can free the moving vessel from all liability. S/Y NERAIDA, 508 F.3d at 596. If the drifting or moving vessel offers as a defense that the collision was an unavoidable accident or vis major, [t]he burden of proving inevitable accident or Act of God rests heavily upon the vessel asserting such defense. The vessel must show that the accident could not have been prevented by human skill and precaution and a proper display of nautical skills[.] James, 686 F.2d at 1132 (quoting Petition of United States, 425 F.2d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1970)). The case of THE LOUISIANA was an Act of God case. 3 Wall. (70 U.S.) at 173, 18 L.Ed. 85. There, the steamer LOUISIANA loosed her moorings in a stiff breeze and drifted into a collision with the steamer FLUSHING which was aground and out of the channel or course of passing vessels. Id. The Court found that although the wind and tide had risen considerably, [t]he drifting of this vessel was not caused by any sudden hurricane which nautical experience could not anticipate. Id. The Court concluded that the collision was caused by inadequate mooring and held the LOUISIANA liable for the collision damage. Id. Notably, though the Eleventh Circuit's drifting yacht case, S/Y Neraida, also involved a hurricane, the argument that prevailed there was not the Act of God argument, but rather the argument that the yacht's owner took reasonable precautions when securing the yacht in light of the impending storm. Arguably, the NERAIDA could have tried the Act of God route to exoneration had it failed to demonstrate reasonable care.
In addition to the presumptions of fault placed on moving vessels in allisions, maritime law recognizesalthough not as widely  a presumption of fault on a passing vessel when its wake causes damage to a properly moored vessel. See West India Fruit & Steamship Co. v. Raymond, 190 F.2d 673, 674 (5th Cir.1951); New Orleans Steamboat Co. v. M/T HELLESPONT GLORY, 562 F.Supp. 391, 392 (E.D.La. 1983) (quoting Shell Pipe Line Corp. v. M/T CYS ALIANCE, 1982 A.M.C. 389, 395 (E.D.La.1981)); SCHOENBAUM, supra, § 14-2. The passing vessel may rebut the presumption of fault by showing that it took reasonable care in passing. Id. Alternatively, it may demonstrate that the stationary vessel was improperly moored. New Orleans Steamboat, 562 F.Supp. at 392.
If the two parties to a collision or allision suit each have a presumption of fault against them, then it is likely that the presumptions would merely cancel each other out. In Rodi Yachts, Judge Posner examined this question. In that case, a moored barge slipped its moorings and allided with a dock and two other vessels. Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 881. The barge owner impleaded the dock owner, claiming that the dock had improperly moored the barge. Id. The plaintiffsthe owners of the damaged propertyhad the rule of THE LOUISIANA working in their favor. Id. at 886. While the barge owner also had a presumption against the dock. Id. at 887. [I]f a vessel that has been docked for a substantial period of time breaks loose from its moorings and an accident results, the operator of the dock shall have the burden of proving that the breaking loose was not the result of his negligence. Id. The Court examined two main questions in resolving the issue: (1) against whom do the presumptions operate; and (2) what happens when the presumptions clash. First, the Court examined the presumption against the drifting vesselhere, the barge. It found that the drifting vessel presumption did not operate between co-defendants. The issue [on appeal] is not the allocation of responsibility for the accident between the owner of the drifting vessel and the owners of the stationary objects that were damaged by it. The issue is the allocation of responsibility between the owner and the third party that let the vessel slip its mooring and drift into collision with the plaintiffs' property. The drifting-vessel presumption is not designed for the allocation of liability between the injurers, as distinct from the allocation of the loss between them and their victims, and although occasionally mentioned in the former context as well it does not control decision there, as well shown by Pasco Marketing, Inc. v. Taylor Towing Service, Inc., 554 F.2d 808 (8th Cir.1977), and Lancaster v. Ohio River Co., 446 F.Supp. 199, 202 and n. 1 (N.D.Ill.1978). For while as between drifting vessel and stationary object struck by it common sense suggests that the former is more likely to have been at fault in the collision than the latter, there is no similar presumption when the issue is whether the drifting vessel itself or the dock that, as it were, let it drift was at fault in the subsequent collision of the vessel with a stationary object. Id. at 886. Therefore, the Court found that the presumption against the drifting vessel did not apply to the issue of comparative fault. This Court, although presented with this argument in Mid-South Towing, did not reach the issue of the directionality of presumptions. Mid-South Towing, 418 F.3d at 531. We found instead that the district court had determined fault based on the facts in the case without resort to the presumptions. Id. Citing Rodi Yachts with favor, we explained that with the presence of evidence of fault in the record, the need for presumptions evaporates. Id. (citing Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 887). In Rodi Yachts, the Seventh Circuit went on to determine that if the two presumptions had clashed, they would have disappeared, leaving the burdens of production and persuasion in their original pre-presumption state. Id. at 887. There, however, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence in the record to dispense with the presumptions altogether. Id.
In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc ., the Supreme Court ushered in the practice of comparative fault in maritime collision law. We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault. 421 U.S. 397, 411, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975). The presumptions under the rules of THE LOUISIANA and THE OREGON do not affect this principle. See, e.g., Mid-South Towing, 418 F.3d at 532 ([P]roperly cabined the scope of the Oregon rule, which speaks explicitly only to a presumed breach on the part of the alliding vessel, and is not a presumption regarding either the question of causation (either cause in fact or legal cause) or the percentages of fault assigned parties adjudged negligent.); accord M/V Morgan, 375 F.3d at 578 (applying presumption and dividing the damages); Hood v. Knappton Corp., 986 F.2d 329, 332-33 (9th Cir.1993) (applying presumption and dividing damages); Rodi Yachts, 984 F.2d at 888-89 (applying presumption and remanding for further findings on apportionment of damages).