Opinion ID: 2258708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Protection of Attorneys' Reputations

Text: It is undisputed that an attorney's reputation is his or her currency. A client's decision to retain a lawyer is based predominantly,222 if not exclusively, on the lawyer's good professional standing. Because of the nature of the practice of law, even the finest lawyers are bound to draw the ire of clients who are dissatisfied with the course of the representation or the outcome of a matter. Accordingly, it is understandable that the State, the OAE, and the NJSBA propose that the protection of attorneys from unfounded accusations of misconduct is a compelling interest. Although we are sympathetic to the plight of attorneys whose reputations are sullied, preventing reputational injuries is an insufficient reason `for repressing speech that would otherwise be free.' Landmark, supra, 435 U.S. at 841-42, 98 S.Ct. at 1543, 56 L.Ed. 2d at 12 (quoting N.Y. Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 272-73, 84 S.Ct. at 722, 11 L.Ed. 2d at 702); see also Doe v. Sup.Ct., supra, 734 F.Supp. at 988 (expressing doubt that suppression of truthful criticism of lawyers would somehow enhance or protect the reputation of the Bar). Even if safeguarding the good repute of lawyers was sufficiently compelling, Rule 1:20-9 is not narrowly tailored because it sweeps in far more speech than is necessary to achieve that objective when it punishes discussion of grievances found to have merit. See Doe v. Doe, supra, 127 S.W. 3d at 734-35 ([A] confidentiality provision precluding the disclosure of both frivolous and non-frivolous complaints is not sufficiently narrowly tailored....). The State further contends that even if speech about meritorious grievances cannot be restrained, meritless complaints deserve no such protection. According to the State, [p]ublication of grievances that are dismissed or unsubstantiated does not serve the purpose of protecting potential clients of the charged attorney, since the attorney has not been found to have acted unethically. To the contrary, if an attorney is cleared of unethical conduct, then his or her interest in suppressing the existence of an accusation is greatly diminished. Cf. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 632, 110 S.Ct. 1376, 1381, 108 L.Ed. 2d 572, 581-82 (1990) (stating that grand jury secrecy is no longer necessary once targeted individual has been exonerated). Indeed, revelation that the grievance was baseless should in most cases reassure clients and the public that the attorney did nothing wrong. Cf. N.Y. Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 279 n. 19, 84 S.Ct. at 729 n. 19, 11 L.Ed. 2d at 706 n. 19 ([T]he clearer perception and livelier impression of truth [is] produced by its collision with error. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The current rules, however, bar the grievant from ever discussing a dismissal of his or her grievance. Shielding dismissed grievances behind a permanent wall of silence does less to enhance respect for the legal profession and the ethics process than it does to engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt. Landmark, supra, 435 U.S. at 842, 98 S.Ct. at 1543, 56 L.Ed. 2d at 12 (quoting Bridges, supra, 314 U.S. at 270-71, 62 S.Ct. at 197, 86 L.Ed. at 207). We conclude, therefore, that even when the ethics authorities deem a grievance to be meritless, the grievant has the constitutional right to discuss and disagree with the determination of those authorities.