Opinion ID: 1100352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of the Cases

Text: These cases are before this Court for the second time. The City of Tampa and the City of Pinellas Park enacted similar juvenile curfew ordinances. J.P. was cited for violation of the Tampa ordinance; T.M., A.N., and D.N. were cited for violation of the Pinellas Park ordinance. The State Attorney's Office filed petitions for delinquency against these juveniles. Prior to trial, the juveniles moved to dismiss their cases, arguing that the ordinances are unconstitutional because the ordinances infringe on their fundamental rights of free speech, association, and assembly, are vague and overbroad, and are inconsistent with state law. In the case of J.P., the trial court denied the motion, and J.P. pled no contest but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion. In the case of T.M., A.N., and D.N., the trial court granted the juveniles' motions to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that the juveniles' parents have a fundamental right to raise their children without governmental intrusion. In assessing the constitutionality of the Pinellas Park ordinance, the trial court applied the strict scrutiny test. The trial court determined that while Pinellas Park has a compelling interest in reducing juvenile crime and victimization, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored in the least restrictive manner to achieve that interest. In both cases, the losing party appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal. In reviewing the ordinances, the Second District applied intermediate or heightened scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny. Under this standard, the district court ruled that both ordinances were constitutional. State v. T.M., 761 So.2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 784 So.2d 442 (Fla. 2001); J.P. v. State, 775 So.2d 324, 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), quashed, 788 So.2d 953 (Fla.2001). In both cases, the Second District also certified two questions to this Court, asking what level of scrutiny is applicable in reviewing the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance and whether the ordinances are constitutional. T.M., 761 So.2d at 1150; J.P., 775 So.2d at 325. In reviewing the decisions in both T.M. and J.P., this Court held that strict scrutiny should be applied when reviewing a juvenile curfew ordinance and answered the first certified question accordingly. T.M. v. State, 784 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2001); J.P. v. State, 788 So.2d 953, 953 (Fla.2001). However, this Court declined to answer the second question regarding the constitutionality of the ordinances, quashed the decisions under review, and remanded the cases to the Second District for further proceedings. T.M., 784 So.2d at 444; J.P., 788 So.2d at 953. On remand, the Second District applied the strict scrutiny standard and concluded that both the Tampa and Pinellas Park juvenile curfew ordinances are unconstitutional. J.P., 832 So.2d at 114; T.M., 832 So.2d at 121. In J.P., the Second District concluded that, while the City of Tampa may have a compelling governmental interest in controlling the whereabouts of juveniles during late night hours, the ordinance is not narrowly tailored to accomplish this goal by the least intrusive means available. 832 So.2d at 112. The district court concluded that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored because it imposes criminal sanctions on a juvenile who violates the Tampa ordinance for a second time and because the State did not present statistical data to support the expansive scope of the ordinance. Id. at 113-14. The district court explained that under the Tampa ordinance, [o]therwise innocent conduct by a minor with the permission of his parent(s) is criminalized . . . simply because he/she is in a public place or establishment after hours. Id. at 114. In T.M., the Second District noted that the Pinellas Park ordinance is very similar to the Tampa ordinance but is even broader in its application because it applies to seventeen-year-olds and provides an exception only for errands involving emergencies. 832 So.2d at 120. Although the State did present statistical data showing a decrease in some categories of juvenile crime after the ordinance was enacted, the district court concluded that this data did not necessarily support the conclusion that the ordinance reduced juvenile crime during the curfew hours as the data did not indicate the time of day in which the criminal events occurred. Id. Thus, the district court concluded, the Pinellas Park ordinance is not narrowly tailored to meet the test of strict scrutiny. The district court affirmed the trial court's determination that the Pinellas Park ordinance is unconstitutional. Id. at 121. In both J.P. and T.M., the Second District certified a question of great public importance to this Court regarding the constitutionality of the juvenile curfew ordinances. This Court granted oral argument and sua sponte consolidated the two cases for purposes of oral argument.