Opinion ID: 1964006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Fowlkes Appeal

Text: For these reasons, we think that the wrongful death claim of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes was barred by limitations, having been asserted in the second amended declaration, filed more than two years after the cause of action arose. We are simply unpersuaded by her principal contention that the two-year period within which an action for wrongful death must have been brought did not bar her claim because Rule Q 43 permits any person claiming to be entitled to damages in a wrongful death action to intervene as a party plaintiff at any time prior to verdict or judgment nisi. The Fowlkes claim did not merely relate to the manner in which the total amount of recovery originally claimed would be divided, but to an additional amount of recovery. Indeed, the fourth count by its terms set forth a separate and distinct cause of action. In simplest terms, Mrs. Williams' claim for mental anguish was over and above her claim for pecuniary loss, and the Fowlkes claim, instead of being based on the assertion of a claim to some part of Mrs. Williams' recovery under the original declaration, was for a wholly different pecuniary loss and further pyramided the amount sought. We shall therefore affirm the judgment for $20,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Williams against Worsham, reverse the judgment for $30,000.00 in favor of Mrs. Williams against Worsham only, and remand the case for a new trial on the question of pecuniary damages. Judgment for $20,000.00 in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams as personal representative against Morris A. Morrell reversed, without a new trial. Judgment for $20,000.00 in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams as personal representative against John Lee Worsham affirmed. Judgment for $30,000.00 in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams against Morris A. Morrell reversed without a new trial. Judgment for $30,000.00 in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams against John Lee Worsham reversed, and case remanded for trial on issue of damages only. Judgment for $20,000.00 in favor of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes against John Lee Worsham reversed without a new trial. Costs to be paid, one-third by Sylvia Hall Williams; one-third by John Lee Worsham and one-third by Raynetta Renee Fowlkes. Eldridge, J., dissenting in part: I cannot agree with that part of the majority's opinion which holds that Sylvia Hall Williams's amended declaration seeking damages for mental anguish is barred by limitations. The amendment merely supplements a timely filed declaration stating a cause of action for wrongful death, by introducing an element of damages expressly permitted by statute. The amendment does not, in my view, predicate liability upon some new, independent cause of action. It is well settled that an amendment to a declaration which states a cause of action not encompassed in the original declaration will be barred if not filed within the limitations period. But an amendment such as the one in the present case, introducing a new element of damages, does not constitute a new cause of action and relates back to the commencement of the action. The courts have so held, and have permitted such amendments even though the statute of limitations had run. Hall v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 257 Pa. 54, 100 A. 1035, 1039-1040 (1916). Thus, in Caldwell v. Hodges, 18 Tenn. App. 355, 77 S.W.2d 817, 822 (1934), the plaintiff was permitted to amend the original declaration in a wrongful death action to include as damages certain medical expenses, even though the amendment introduced an element of damage not mentioned in the [original] declaration and was filed after the statutory period of limitations. The court held that an amendment claiming increased damages, or additional items of damages, for the same wrongful act seasonably pleaded, does not introduce a new cause of action within the statute of limitations. (77 S.W.2d at 823.) Similarly, in Schwab v. P.J. Oesterling & Son, Inc., 386 Pa. 388, 126 A.2d 418 (1956), the plaintiff in a survival action was permitted to amend the original complaint after the limitations period to include loss of earnings of the decedent, an element of damages not included in the original complaint. The court held that an amendment introducing `an additional element or an added claim of damage arising from the same circumstances' is not barred by limitations. (126 A.2d at 421.) See also Indiana Toll Road Commission v. Bartusch, 135 Ind. App. 123, 184 N.E.2d 34 (1962). Similarly, I believe that the amendment naming Raynetta Renee Fowlkes was proper. A child of the decedent is a primary beneficiary in an action for wrongful death. Maryland Code (1974), § 3-904 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. A person entitled to bring an action under a wrongful death statute may intervene in a pending action even after the period of limitations has run. Rabe v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 198 Cal. 290, 244 P. 1077, 1079-1081 (1926); 2 S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death § 11:55 (2d ed. 1975). And the wrongful death action of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes cannot constitutionally be barred by reason of her illegitimacy. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436 (1968); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct. 1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972). For these reasons, I believe that the judgment in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams against Worsham and the judgment in favor of Raynetta Renee Fowlkes against Worsham should both be affirmed. Judge Levine has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views expressed in this dissent. Digges, J., following reargument, concurring in part and dissenting in part: While I agree with the majority in all other respects, I would affirm the judgment for $30,000.00 in favor of Sylvia Hall Williams against John Lee Worsham for the reasons stated by Judge Eldridge in his dissenting opinion.