Opinion ID: 2286750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the claim against spencer, white & prentis

Text: Under Article 9 of the General Conditions attached to the foundation contract, Spencer, White & Prentis, as contractor, agreed that Unless otherwise stipulated, the Contractor shall provide and pay for all materials, labor, water, tools, equipment, light, power, transportation and other facilities necessary for the execution and completion of the work. On this appeal, it is argued that that promise, running from Spencer, White & Prentis to International Land, will not support an action for payment by the appellee as a third party beneficiary. In support of that argument, appellant contends that except where surety contracts are involved, the District of Columbia has not adopted the third party beneficiary doctrine, and that in any event, appellee is at most an incidental beneficiary, and would, accordingly, be without enforceable rights even in those jurisdictions where the doctrine prevails. Our research reveals no case in this jurisdiction expressly adopting or rejecting the third party beneficiary rule. However, in Marranzano v. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, D. C., 87 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 196, 184 F.2d 349, 350 (1950), there was a recognition that there are exceptions to the general rule that a stranger to a contract may not sue to enforce its terms or to recover damages for a violation thereof; and there are other cases indicating that the third party beneficiary rule would be applied in a proper case. Hall v. Gardiner, 75 U.S.App.D.C. 226, 126 F.2d 227 (1942); Schwartz v. Brown, D.C.Mun.App., 64 A.2d 298 (1949). [2] In Guinn Company v. Mazza, 111 U.S.App. D.C. 319, 296 F.2d 441 (1961), the rule was recognized, but that case was controlled by the law of New York. Turning to other jurisdictions we find that a large majority of the states have adopted the rule. The great weight of authority recognizes a direct enforceable right, both at law and in equity, arising from a contract promising performance for either of the first two types of beneficiaries the donee beneficiary and the creditor beneficiary   . 2 Williston, Contracts § 356 (3d ed. Jaeger 1959). [3] Restatement, Contracts §§ 133-147 (1932) also recognizes the rule, and it has been said that the Restatement is entitled to particular respect when authorities are in conflict   . Bailey v. Zlotnick, 80 U. S.App.D.C. 117, 118, 149 F.2d 505, 506 (1945). We perceive no reason why this jurisdiction should not adopt the rule followed by the majority of jurisdictions in this country. In Nash Engineering Co. v. Marcy Realty Corporation, 222 Ind. 396, 54 N.E. 2d 263 (1944), it was held that Article 9, as quoted above, afforded unnamed materialmen a remedy as third party beneficiaries against the contractor. As the Maryland court stated in a case reaching a similar result under the same provisions: We find the obligation assumed by the general contractor in the case before us was just what he wrote that it would be, read literally, namely, to pay for all of the materials necessary for the doing of the job. Kirby v. Board of Ed. of Cecil County, 210 Md. 383, 123 A.2d 606, 610 (1956). Save for the fact that materials were furnished rather than labor, in both the cases cited the plaintiffs stood in precisely the same position vis a vis the contractor as the appellee here. It follows that appellee is entitled to recover for the work it performed, and the judgment against Spencer, White & Prentis is, accordingly, affirmed. [4]