Opinion ID: 1059625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Buffer Requirements

Text: Finally, relying on Code §§ 1-13.17, 15.2-1200, and 15.2-2283, the Dails contend that, even if the provision regarding clear cutting is not preempted, it, along with other provisions establishing buffer zones, are invalid because they conflict with, or are inconsistent with, state law. The Dails assert that the statutory scheme for regulating silvicultural activity includes delegating to the State Forester the development of best management practices, Code § 10.1-1105, and placing the sole authority to enforce and implement the laws pertaining to forest and woodlands in the State Forester, Code §§ 10.1-1181.2 and 10.1-1181.3. Citing Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 357 S.E.2d 200 (1987), the Dails conclude that the provisions of the Ordinances establishing buffer requirements are invalid because they address these matters of silviculture activity in a manner that conflicts with the provisions of the best management practices promulgated by the State Forester. This conflict, however, does not render the Ordinance provisions void. A local ordinance may be invalid because it conflicts with a state regulation if the state regulation has the force and effect of law. Loudoun County v. Pumphrey, 221 Va. 205, 206-07, 269 S.E.2d 361, 362-63 (1980). The Dails' argument fails because the best management practices promulgated by the State Forester do not have the force and effect of law. The best management practices are only guidelines for use in forestry activities. Moreover, the State Forester's enforcement authority extends to the issuance of special orders for silvicultural activity which is causing or is likely to cause pollution or an alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of any state waters resulting from sediment deposition presenting an imminent and substantial danger to the public health, water supply, or other endeavors such as recreation or commerce. Code § 10.1-1181.2(B), (C). The State Forester cannot issue special orders solely for the violation of a best management practice. [5] Therefore, the provisions of the Ordinances establishing buffer zones are not invalid based on a conflict with the buffer zones suggested by the best management practices because the best management practices do not have the force and effect of law. The Dails make a similar argument regarding the validity of provisions of the Ordinances which regulate silvicultural activity for the purposes of maintaining water quality. The Dails say that the State Water Control Board is the sole agency authorized to administer the state's water control law and to establish standards for protection of state waters. The Dails argue that the State Water Control Board has recognized the best management practices for non-point pollutant sources such as forestry as practices to be the most effective, practicable means of preventing or reducing the amount of non-point source pollutants entering a water course. 9 VAC XX-XXX-XXX. These practices, therefore, according to the Dails, are standards promulgated as part of an overall scheme designed to regulate and foster the State's forestry industry and to the extent the Forestry, EMA, and WMP Ordinances exceed these standards, they are invalid. As we have just said, the best management practices are merely guidelines and do not have the force of state law. State Water Control Board recognition of these guidelines as preferred methods for maintaining clean water does not transform them into enforceable regulations. Therefore, provisions in the challenged Ordinances which conflict with the best management practices are not invalid on the basis that they conflict with state law governing water quality. Finally, we note that in their reply brief, the Dails argue that the limitations placed on a locality's general police powers and zoning authority by Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) reflect an intent by the General Assembly to change the status quo,  and to impose the burden upon localities if they enact requirements that exceed the best management practices to show that the State regulations are inadequate to protect the health, safety and welfare of their citizens and that local regulation is necessary to meet identified shortcomings in the State program. We reject this invitation to abandon the presumption of validity afforded a local government ordinance and to adopt the burden shifting scheme proposed by the Dails. We find the suggestion particularly inappropriate in this case because the Ordinances at issue address conditions contained in guidelines, not in state statutes or regulations, and because many of the challenged requirements of those Ordinances may be altered by the zoning administrator. Furthermore, to the extent that this argument addresses the requirement of Code § 10.1-1126.1(B) that a locality's ordinance regulating silvicultural activity be reasonable and necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the locality's residents, we will not consider the argument because the Dails did not assign error to the trial court's conclusion that the ordinances are reasonable and necessary, and serve to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public. For the above reasons, we will reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment concluding that the Dails were required to exhaust their administrative remedies, and affirm that portion of the judgment concluding that the challenged provisions of the York County zoning ordinance are valid. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and final judgment.