Opinion ID: 797784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Matthews's Claim Involving Roulette

Text: 56 Both parties agree Matthews did not procedurally default his Brady claim involving Roulette. He raised the claim on direct appeal before the Court of Appeals of Ohio. While that court denied his appeal, it did so not under federal law, but rather on the basis of an Ohio state court decision, State v. Totty, 1983 WL 2920 (1983), which did not rely upon federal due-process concerns (e.g., Brady or its progeny). Thus, as Matthews's Brady claim was fairly presented but not reviewed on the merits by a state court, we review the claim de novo, 2 but with one important caveat: the state court did make a factual finding that plays a crucial role in the Roulette claim. We must accept this finding of fact unless it is rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). What exactly the finding is, however, has been a matter of considerable dispute in this litigation. 3 57 In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge determined that the Court of Appeals of Ohio found that there was no preexisting deal between the prosecution and Roulette: 58 The court [of appeals] concluded that the sequence of events subsequent to the trial created a strong inference that Roulette, the sole eyewitness, did receive consideration for his testimony. However, we must conclude that the deal was made after the trial. Therefore, the assistant county prosecutor would not have been able to disclose any plea agreements, as they were not made until after the trial. Thus, there was no prosecutorial misconduct under Totty. 59 Matthews v. Ishee, No. 01-2049, R & R at 3 (N.D.Ohio Jan. 24, 2003). The magistrate judge proceeded to note that the Court of Appeals' subsequent statements, including it was a `sad commentary ... to even think that deals are made with witnesses and not disclosed[,]' ... are not findings of fact. Id. at 3-4. The magistrate judge concluded [w]hile Matthews has certainly presented evidence that raises a suspicion [of a preexisting deal] ... this is not clear and convincing evidence to overcome the finding of the Ohio Court of Appeals. Id. at 10. 60 Upon de novo review of the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the district court came to the opposite conclusion on the factual finding made by the state court. After reviewing the portion of the majority opinion quoted in Section II, supra, the district court reasoned: 61 The Court notes that this portion of the appellate decision is quite confusing by first stating that the court found no deal was made prior to trial but then finding the subsequent events create a strong inference that Roulette did receive consideration for his testimony and finally ending with the conclusion that if consideration was received in exchange for his testimony, it should have been disclosed to Matthews and his counsel. The dissent, perhaps, lends some guidance as to what is being said by the majority: The record is clear, and the majority correctly recognizes, that at least as to Roulette (the sole eyewitness to the shooting), an understanding between the state and the witness had been reached at the time of this trial regarding Roulette's present testimony and considerations to be extended by the state on his behalf in sentencing on a pending unrelated multiple felony case. 62 If the opinion is read in total, it appears that the appellate court did determine that a deal existed between Roulette and the prosecution at the time of Matthews's trial but found that under Totty, Matthews received a fair trial. . . . It is ... noted that the appellate court's finding of fact that a deal was reached with Roulette prior to trial is presumed to be correct under § 2254(e)(1) absent a showing of clear and convincing evidence. 63 Matthews v. Ishee, 414 F.Supp.2d 792, 807-08 (N.D.Ohio 2006) (emphasis in original; citations omitted). Thus, looking at the same opinion, the magistrate judge and the district court arrived at opposite conclusions on the finding of fact actually made by the state court. 64 It is perhaps not surprising the state court's opinion has caused some interpretive problems. On the one hand, there is the plain reading of the majority's statement: [W]e must conclude that the deal was made after the trial. Therefore, the assistant county prosecutor would not have been able to disclose any plea agreements, as they were not made until after the trial. Matthews, 609 N.E.2d at 579. On the other hand, there is the subsequent discussion by the majority, including its determination that [t]he sequence of events . . . create a strong inference that Roulette . . . did receive consideration for his testimony. Id. There is also the dissent's gloss on what the majority meant. Finally, there is the possibility the majority was simply being sarcastic when it stated [ u ] fortunately, the assistant county prosecutor `lives his life as morally as the jurors' and thus we must conclude that the deal was made after the trial. Id. (emphasis added). A close reading, however, undercuts this possibility. 65 While the majority exhibited obvious displeasure with the assistant prosecutor, it analyzed his statements regarding Roulette through two prisms, one based on the record evidence and one grounded in the law. First, the majority pointed out that Roulette testified at trial that there was no plea agreement between him and the prosecution. Id. Roulette's testimony, while challenged by defense counsel, went unrebutted at trial by any contrary testimony or other evidence. Second, when it considered the assistant prosecutor's denial before the jury of any preexisting deal, the majority did so through the general presumption that prosecutors, like citizens in general, can be taken at their word. See, e.g., Widmeyer v. Felton, 95 F. 926, 929 (1899) (The law presumes that men will speak the truth; that they will act honestly and will obey the law. These are necessary presumptions.); State v. Patterson, 28 Ohio St.2d 181, 277 N.E.2d 201, 203 (1971) (In oral argument before this court, the prosecutor was asked, on his professional honor, if he knew of any evidence favorable to the appellant that had been concealed. He answered in the negative.... [N]o more than this could have been done by the trial court to satisfy Brady. ). Given both the unrebutted testimony and the general presumption of truthfulness, the majority found it must conclude that the deal was made after the trial. Matthews, 609 N.E.2d at 579. This is a clear and plain statement. 66 Importantly, the majority's subsequent discussion does not contradict this clear and plain statement. At various parts of the opinion the majority pointed to evidence creat[ing] a strong inference that Roulette . . . did receive consideration for his testimony, and that there is ample evidence to suggest that Roulette received such consideration. Id. But, the majority did not find conclusively that the consideration was made in exchange for Roulette's testimony before he actually testified. At one point the majority explained [ i ] f in fact Roulette received this consideration in exchange for his testimony, these facts should have been disclosed to [Matthews] and his counsel, id. (emphasis added), and then concluded: 67 It is a sad commentary on our criminal justice system to even think that deals are made with witnesses and not disclosed; assistant county prosecutors are permitted to represent to the trial court that no deals with witnesses have been have been made, knowing that after the trial the deal will be made; . . . . 68 Id. at 580 (emphasis added). As these statements make clear, the majority found the assistant prosecutor's actions during and after trial troubling, but not so troubling as to compel a finding of a preexisting deal with Roulette. 69 In the dissenting judge's view, however, the majority did conclude that there was a preexisting understanding between the State and the witness. Id. (Sweeney, J., dissenting). Of course, the dissenting judge's view has no precedential effect (as it failed to garner a majority); its effect is measured only by its persuasiveness. As explained above, the dissenting judge's view of what the majority understood does not comport with the explicit finding made by the majority, nor with the majority's subsequent use of noncommittal language, such as if in fact and to even think. The district court erred in relying upon the dissenting judge's gloss, especially when that gloss directly contravened the majority's clear and plain finding. 70 Matthews argues, however, that the majority's seemingly clear and plain factual finding was not a finding at all, but rather sarcasm, as evidenced by its statement that Unfortunately, the assistant county prosecutor `lives his life as morally as the jurors'.... This statement is replete with sarcasm, according to Matthews. While not wholly implausible, his suggested reading suffers from one fundamental defect: it never lets the cat out of the bag, so to speak. In general, sarcasm is notoriously difficult to express in writing because it is vocally oriented and is easily misinterpreted in written form. Wikipedia, Sarcasm, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Sarcasm (last visited March 23, 2007). 4 Had the majority intended to be sarcastic, one would have expected it to be more careful to alert readers at some point that regardless of what it said—we must conclude that the deal was made after the trial—it was actually holding the exact opposite—the deal was made before or during the trial. Nowhere in its opinion does the majority make the latter finding in clear and express terms. 71 The more natural and consistent reading is the one made by the magistrate judge. Rather than an attempt at sarcasm, the majority's use of the term unfortunate is a sign of sincere resignation on its part that the unrebutted testimony and presumption of truthfulness have compelled it to find there was no preexisting deal, regardless of its suspicions to the contrary. As sincere resignation, the majority's language is fully consistent with its subsequent discussion; as sarcasm, its language leaves unresolved (or at the very least quite muddled) one of the crucial factual issues raised by Matthews. Because the former reading is internally consistent and gives full effect to the entire opinion, we accept that reading and reject Matthews's and the district court's alternate reading. 72 Accordingly, we hold that the majority's statement the deal was made after the trial is a factual finding made by the state court. Under AEDPA, we are bound by this finding unless Matthews can rebut it with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 73