Opinion ID: 1206395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: trial court's denial of appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal

Text: We now turn to appellant's contention that the trial court erroneously denied appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal made at the end of the prosecution's case. Appellant maintains that the State's fingerprint and eyewitness identification evidence merely served to place him at the scene of the crime and did not prove that he actually committed the murder. We have herein recognized that the evidence linking appellant to the murder was entirely circumstantial. Of course, it is elementary that a criminal case may be proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of reasonable inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. Rudolph v. State, 78 Wis.2d 435, 254 N.W.2d 471 (1977); People v. Ingram, 60 Cal. App.3d 722, 131 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1976); Luker v. State, 552 P.2d 715 (Okl.Cr. 1976). The test to be applied in determining whether the prosecution has presented evidence sufficient to withstand a motion for acquittal is as follows: [A] trial judge, in passing upon a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, must determine whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Rocker, 52 Haw. 336, 346, 475 P.2d 684, 690 (1970), quoting Curley v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 392, 160 F.2d 229, 232, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850 (1947). To quote further from Curley v. United States, supra , regarding motions for acquittal: [I]f there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted. If ... [the trial judge] ... concludes that either of the two results, a reasonable doubt or no reasonable doubt, is fairly possible, he must let the jury decide the matter. In a given case, particularly one of circumstantial evidence, that determination may depend upon the difference between pure speculation and legitimate inference from proven facts. At 392-93, 160 F.2d at 232-33. The court below implicitly found that a prima facie case had been established and that a reasonable mind could fairly conclude that, based upon the prosecution's evidence, appellant was guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. After a careful review of the evidence, we are satisfied that the prosecution's evidence did not represent a case of pure speculation, and the action of the trial court in allowing the jury to draw justifiable inferences of fact from the evidence presented by the prosecution did not constitute error. Rocker, supra . There was substantial evidence to support the verdict, and we decline to reverse the conviction on this ground. See State v. Chong, 52 Haw. 226, 230, 473 P.2d 567, 570 (1970); State v. Kahunahana, 48 Haw. 384, 390, 402 P.2d 679, 682-83 (1965).