Opinion ID: 3025999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Competency Claims (Claims 1, 2, and 3)

Text: 9 We note that the District Court properly determined that there was no constructive denial of counsel in Taylor’s case, and thus no basis for a presumption of prejudice under Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-98 (2002) (rejecting broad application of Cronic). We reject Taylor’s arguments to the contrary. 20 Taylor argues that the proceedings leading to his conviction and death sentence violated three of his constitutional rights relating to his competency to stand trial: (Claim 1) his due process right to a competency hearing; (Claim 2) his due process right not be tried while incompetent; and (Claim 3) his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel with respect to competency issues. He also seeks an evidentiary hearing before the District Court to present newly-acquired evidence that he was not competent at the time of his proceedings.
The foundation of these competency claims is the wellestablished due process right to not to be tried, or plead guilty, while incompetent. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400 (1993) (holding that standards for competency to plead guilty and to stand trial are the same). The Supreme Court set the basic standard for competency in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960): To be competent to plead guilty or stand trial, a defendant must have a “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and must possess “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Id. at 402 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Drope, 420 U.S. at 171 (“[A] person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.”). B. State Court Proceedings and Standards of Review
At the outset, the state trial court “accept[ed] [Taylor’s] 21 guilty plea finding it to be knowingly and voluntarily given.” 10 (App. at 152.) In Godinez, the Supreme Court explained: The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings. The purpose of the “knowing and voluntary” inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced. 509 U.S. at 401 n.12 (citations omitted). If a defendant does not have the “ability” to understand the proceedings, it is impossible that he “actually does” understand them. It follows, then, that a finding of competence is a prerequisite to a determination that a plea is knowing and voluntary. Thus, the state trial court’s determination that Taylor’s plea was knowing and voluntary, included an implied finding that he was competent.11 10 Taylor contends that his plea was not in fact “knowingly and voluntarily” given, see Taylor Br. at 46-56, but that argument is not relevant to our determination of whether there was a state court determination of competency on the merits. Taylor’s argument is, however, appropriate in rebuttal to the presumption of correctness of the competency determination, and we address it in that context. 11 See, e.g., United States v. Pressley, 602 F.2d 709, 711 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The court’s finding that Pressley was competent to understand the proceedings at the time of his original plea, although a prerequisite to validity of the plea, does not end the inquiry. Such factors as whether . . . the original plea was knowing and voluntary . . . should be considered.”); White v. Horn, 54 F. Supp. 2d 457, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (“Even in the absence of an express finding of competence by the state courts, a defendant who alleges insanity in his habeas corpus petition may be presumed to be competent, since the trial court judge would not have otherwise allowed the trial to proceed.”); cf. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 165 (1990) (suggesting that a litigant has not demonstrated 22 Sitting as the first PCRA court, Judge Chronister held an evidentiary hearing and made factual findings on (1) Taylor’s competency during his proceedings and (2) effective assistance of counsel with respect to competence. Judge Chronister explicitly reaffirmed his implicit finding at the guilty plea hearing that Taylor was competent. The Judge also determined for the second time that Taylor had been competent to make decisions about his case, albeit affected by his remorse, and that counsel was not ineffective for entrusting Taylor with decisions about his case: There’s nothing in the testimony today which would show that the Defendant was not capable of making those decisions or that there was any legal impediment which would have forced counsel not to submit the decision to the Defendant. We recognize that perhaps the Defendant’s thinking at that time was colored by remorse. I don’t think there’s any question about that. His very actions of having counsel file for suppression, having the Court grant a suppression of a confession, and then the Defendant turning right around and sending a letter to the D.A. giving another confession to make sure that the conviction would occur makes it clear that the Defendant was acting out of remorse. But the Court does not find that to be a legal impediment. That remorse is a natural result and feeling of the circumstances of this particular death given the fact that it was the Defendant’s family and his children who were involved, and the fact that the Defendant’s mind may have been affected by the remorse is not an impediment to—legally to his mental incapacity for purposes of “next friend” standing “where an evidentiary hearing shows that the defendant has given a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to proceed”). 23 making the decisions as to what—how the trial will proceed unless his mind is so clouded that he becomes confused or subject to a mental status that would make him unable to participate in the trial. The Court was very careful to make sure that that was not the case, insisted upon the psychiatric evaluation prior to proceeding. The evaluation showed that the Defendant was capable of cooperating with counsel and making rational decisions, albeit affected by his remorse, and the Court finds that there’s no legal impediment because of that. (App. at 279-80.) The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this decision in Taylor II, recognizing that “[w]oven into Taylor’s claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] is the assertion that his mental state after the killings prevented him from making rational decisions, essentially rendering him incompetent. . . . In this case, Taylor’s claim of incompetency is completely unsupported in fact.” 718 A.2d at 745 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned, further: [T]he PCRA court’s determination that Taylor was competent in all matters of decision and strategy is supported by substantial evidence of record, including Taylor’s own testimony, the testimony of his trial counsel, and the report of the court-appointed psychiatrist. Taylor’s suggestion that stress and remorse associated with a capital case are such that he (and, by implication, others in his situation) are per se incompetent to make decisions of strategy does not comport with the well-established standard for determining mental competency . . . . Id. at 745-46.
24 Based on this record it is clear that the state courts addressed the merits of Taylor’s claim that he was tried while incompetent (Claim 2), and received ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard (Claim 3); we will therefore review both claims under § 2254(d).12 We will, however, review the trial court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing (Claim 1) de novo because that claim was not addressed on the merits. Moreover, regardless of whether a given claim was reached on the merits, competency is a state court factual finding that, if supported by the record, is presumed correct. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111 (1995) (citing Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 118 (1983)); Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735 (1990) (per curiam). Implicit factual findings are presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1) to the same extent as express factual findings. Campbell, 209 F.3d at 285-86. Thus, here, the state courts’ implicit and explicit factual findings that Taylor was competent are presumed correct, unless Taylor can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” See § 2254(e)(1); Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. C. The Merits of the Competency Claims 12 Taylor correctly notes that the state trial court never conducted a formal competency hearing. But this does not mean that his competency was not addressed on the merits. See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 281 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing PCRA court’s review of trial court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing as an adjudication on the “merits”). We appreciate that if a competency hearing was not held when it ought to have been, in accordance with minimal federal standards of procedural due process, then no deference is due to a state court’s competency determination. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 285559 (2007). However, the corollary is also true: if due process did not require the trial court to convene a competency hearing, and the issue was otherwise addressed on the merits, then we afford the competency determination due deference under § 2254(d). See, e.g., Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 290-91. 25 1.The Trial Court’s Failure To Hold A Competency Hearing (Claim 1) Taylor argues that the trial court’s failure to hold a competency hearing despite indicia of his incompetence violated his procedural due process rights under Drope, 420 U.S. at 171-72 and Pate, 383 U.S. at 385. A trial court’s failure to inquire into competency, sua sponte, where there is reason to doubt a defendant’s competency, violates due process because it deprives the defendant of his right to a fair trial. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385-86. But barring indicia of incompetence, due process does not require that a competency hearing be held. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402 n.13. The Supreme Court has not “prescribe[d] a general standard with respect to the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to require resort to an adequate procedure” but it has explained: a defendant’s irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required, but that even one of these factors standing alone may, in some circumstances, be sufficient. There are, of course, no fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated. That they are difficult to evaluate is suggested by the varying opinions trained psychiatrists can entertain on the same facts. Drope, 420 U.S. at 172, 180. Taylor argues, first, that rather than hold a hearing the trial court erroneously relied wholly on Dr. Sadoff’s conclusion that Taylor was competent to proceed. See Taylor Br. at 29-33. Although it would have been insufficient for the trial court to rest his entire competency determination on just one psychiatric report, see Pate, 383 U.S. at 383, that is not what happened here. 26 In addition to the Sadoff report, which concluded that Taylor was “mentally competent to proceed in that he does know the nature and consequences of his current legal situation and can work with counsel in preparing his defense,” App at 326, the trial court had the benefit of its own observations and interactions with Taylor, as well as reports of counsel’s observations and interactions with him. None of these indicated incompetency. The record shows that throughout the proceedings Taylor was able to engage with counsel and respond to the trial court’s inquiries, and that trial counsel never expressed concern over Taylor’s competency.13 See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 294-97 (3d Cir. 2001); Demosthenes, 495 U.S. at 736-37. The trial court also granted a continuance of the proceeedings when Taylor’s counsel sought a psychological evaluation from Mr. Briercheck, to supplement the Sadoff report, prior to the guilty plea. After having received Mr. Briercheck’s evaluation, which concluded that Taylor was “mentally competent to proceed with the legal aspects of his case,” 14 App. at 317, trial counsel did not seek a hearing on competency. The record does not disclose whether the court ever saw the Briercheck report, but we know that the court was aware counsel considered the issue of competence, had reviewed an expert opinion in addition to Dr. Sadoff’s, and still did not raise the issue. See Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 13 By contrast, the defendant in Drope “had difficulty in participating well,” “had a difficult time relating,” and “was markedly circumstantial and irrelevant in his speech.” 420 U.S. at 165 n.1. 14 Briercheck also wrote that Taylor was in complete contact with reality by September 1991, three months before he pleaded guilty, and Dr. Sadoff wrote in September 1991 that Taylor was without current evidence of a psychotic thought disorder, hallucinations or delusions, and was well-oriented, with unimpaired memory. Dr. Elyan, who treated Taylor immediately after the murders, concluded in his report that any cocaine-induced psychosis that Taylor may have experienced during the murders had remitted by the time he was discharged to the jail, which was less than a week later and seven months before he pleaded guilty. 27 292 (noting, in denying petitioner’s competency-hearing claim, that counsel did not give any indication to the trial court that he doubted petitioner’s competence). Second, Taylor argues that the court erroneously focused on Dr. Sadoff’s conclusion of competency, while ignoring portions of the report that indicated incompetency. He also argues that both Mr. Briercheck’s and Dr. Sadoff’s competency conclusions must be read in the context of their other observations of Taylor’s poor mental health. For example, both experts reported Taylor’s drug use, suicidal thoughts, acute grief reaction to the killings, and severe depression. It is plain from the face of these reports, however, that both took full account of these issues in reaching their respective conclusions that Taylor was competent. Indeed, as the District Court correctly observed, the Briercheck and Sadoff reports stand in stark contrast to the reports in Drope, which indicated that the defendant would have difficulty assisting in his case and reached no conclusion about whether the defendant was competent to stand trial. 420 U.S. at 164 n.1, 175-76. Third, notwithstanding the experts’ conclusions, we cannot agree with Taylor that his history of drug abuse or suicidal thoughts indicated that he was incompetent to participate in the proceedings. There is no evidence that Taylor was abusing drugs immediately prior to or during the proceedings. See United States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1987). And his suicide attempt occurred long before the plea and penalty proceedings.15 Compare 15 In his most recent declaration, Dr. Sadoff states that Taylor’s actively suicidal phase persisted for “at least one month,” after his discharge from York Hospital. (App. at 378.) This is not inconsistent with Dr. Sadoff’s statement in his original declaration that, by September 1991, Taylor was not actively suicidal. Dr. Sadoff noted specifically, before Taylor pleaded guilty, that “[Taylor] was actively suicidal after this happened, and since June 17, when he reached his conversion [he became a Born Again Christian], he has not been suicidal. He talks about having his life in God’s hands, and whether or not he gets the death penalty will be up to God.” (App. at 322.) Dr. Elyan reached a similar 28 Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 293 (early suicide attempt did not implicate competency vel non to stand trial) with Drope, 420 U.S. at 178-80 (mid-trial suicide attempt raised doubt as to competency); United States v. Loyola-Dominguez, 125 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir. 1997) (suicide attempt on eve of trial raised doubt as to competency); and Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 578 (11th Cir. 1990) (two suicide attempts while in pre-trial incarceration raised doubt as to competency). Finally, Taylor’s desire to confess and receive the death penalty as punishment, and refusal to allow witnesses during the penalty phase, are not indications that he was incompetent. These actions are consistent with Taylor’s repeatedly expressed desire to plead guilty and accept the consequences. Ultimately, the record reveals no indicia that compelled the trial court to hold a competency hearing. As the District Court aptly observed: “Taylor’s lucid and remorseful desire to plead guilty simply cannot, out of hand, be colored as utterly bizarre behavior indicative of incompetency.” App. at 35 (citing Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 288). We agree with the District Court’s analysis in this regard, and are satisfied that the state trial court’s decision to forego a competency hearing—before accepting Taylor’s guilty plea and through the end of the penalty phase—comported with federal standards of due process. 2. Competence To Stand Trial (Claim 2) Taylor also argues that he was incompetent during his proceedings, in violation of his due process rights. See Drope, 420 conclusion in Taylor’s hospital Discharge Summary, in which he stated that by June 28, 1991, Taylor “was not expressing any immediate suicidal plans even though he thought he should have joined his with his family . . . [he] add[ed] that if he was spared then God must have different plans for him, and he seemed to be willing to accept that.” (App. at 295.) Mr. Briercheck, too, noted that in 1991Taylor “den[ied] suicidal ideation, but at the same time [was] asking for the death penalty as punishment for his crimes.” (App. at 313.) 29 U.S. at 171-72; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385. As mentioned previously, to be competent a defendant must have “a sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and must possess “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. We will presume that the state courts’ finding that Taylor was competent were correct, unless Taylor can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. i. Taylor’s After-Acquired Evidence of Incompetence To rebut the presumption of competence, Taylor seeks an evidentiary hearing before the District Court, in order to present the testimony of four experts: Mr. Briercheck, and Drs. Sadoff, Blair, and Dudley. As indicated in their affidavits, these experts would testify that, contrary to the state courts’ competency findings, Taylor was incompetent to plead guilty or to waive his rights. This evidence was not presented to the first PCRA court, which held an evidentiary hearing on Taylor’s competency. It was first presented to the state courts in Taylor’s second PCRA petition, which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania dismissed as untimely. The limits on evidentiary hearings set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) are relevant here: If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that– (A) the claim relies on— ... (ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence ... Id. (emphasis added). We have explained the meaning of “failed to develop” under § 2254(e)(2) as follows: 30 The “failure” inquiry does not end once it is determined that the factual basis of a claim had not been developed in state court. Because “[i]n its customary and preferred sense, ‘fail’ connotes some omission, fault, or negligence on the part of the person who has failed to do something,” “a person is not at fault when his diligent efforts to perform an act are thwarted, for example, by the conduct of another or by happenstance.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 431-32, 120 S. Ct. 1479. Accordingly, “[u]nder the opening clause of § 2254(e)(2), a failure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” Id. at 432, 120 S. Ct. 1479. Thomas, 428 F.3d at 498 (emphasis added). Thus, if the state courts had failed to resolve the competency issue for some reason unrelated to Taylor’s diligence, § 2254(e)(2) would not apply and a new evidentiary hearing would be permitted. See Campbell, 209 F.3d at 286-87. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained in Taylor III, however, Taylor had every opportunity to present this evidence of his incompetency at the time of his proceedings, and again at his first PCRA hearing on the issue, nearly six years after the trial: “The issue to which this purportedly newly discovered evidence speaks is whether Appellant was mentally fit at the time of trial. All the facts regarding Appellant’s mental state, if not known, surely were ascertainable by the exercise of due diligence before Appellant’s trial.” 753 A.2d at 786-87. The Court also noted that “regardless of Appellant’s [after-acquired evidence] argument, the issue of whether Appellant was competent at trial has been litigated.” Id. at 787 n.8. Taylor argues, nonetheless, that because the second PCRA court declined to hear this evidence based on an inadequate state procedural default rule, it is not his fault that he failed to develop these facts in the state courts. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653, 31 665 (3d Cir. 2005) (“If a petitioner requests a hearing to develop the record on a claim in state court, and if the state courts . . . deny that request on the basis of an inadequate state ground, the petitioner has not failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings for purposes of § 2254(e)(2).”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the problem with an argument based on Wilson is that Taylor’s competency claim had been fully litigated well before he sought to have the second PCRA court consider his new evidence. To the extent that the state procedural default of Taylor’s claims was inadequate, it only bears on the claims that were new to his second PCRA petition.16 Unlike the petitioner in Wilson, Taylor’s competency claim was raised in his first PCRA petition and addressed on the merits. His resurrection of the claim in his second PCRA petition does not put it under Wilson’s rule. “Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 437. The only thing that prevented Taylor from presenting his new evidence of incompetency before the first PCRA court was a lack of diligence.17 Therefore, under § 2254(e)(2), we must affirm the 16 Taylor, in this regard, references the second PCRA court’s comment that “if the Defendant’s legal arguments were accepted . . . the factual basis that is offered would be sufficient to at least raise a question which would require the testimony [of the new experts] to be heard even though it may not be in the final decision on the merits convincing and may not prevail.” (App. at 361.) It is clear from Taylor III, however, that the Supreme Court considered the issue of competency precluded, based on its general observation, independent from the untimeliness of the second PCRA petition, that “the issue of whether Appellant was competent at trial has been litigated.” 753 A.2d at 787 n.8. Even if that were not the Supreme Court’s view, the fact that there may be a triable issue of fact under state law does not absolve us of our statutory obligation under § 2254(e)(2). 17 We have doubts about the effectiveness of Taylor’s postconviction counsel, who failed to obtain this evidence—or indeed, 32 District Court’s decision to deny an evidentiary hearing on this claim. ii. Taylor Has Failed Rebut the Presumption that the State Courts’ Competency Determinations Were Correct As we have explained, both the trial court and the first PCRA court determined as a factual matter that Taylor was competent throughout his proceedings. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed these determinations, and they are presumed correct under § 2254(e)(1). Because § 2254(e)(2) bars an evidentiary hearing on Taylor’s new evidence of incompetence, he must rely on the present record to rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See Lambert, 387 F.3d at 235. In our discussion about the trial court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing, however, we explained why the state court record shows no indication that Taylor was incompetent. Taylor therefore cannot rebut the presumption that the state courts’ competency determinations were correct. Moreover, under § 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review, Taylor’s claim lacks merit. His competency is amply supported by the state court record—based on, among other things, the original Sadoff and Briercheck reports and the trial court’s and trial counsel’s interactions with Taylor—and thus the state courts’ competency findings constituted a reasonable determination of the facts. See id. (“Section 2254(d)(2) mandates the federal habeas court to assess whether the state court’s determination was reasonable or unreasonable given that evidence.”). any evidence other than his client’s testimony—but ineffectiveness of postconviction counsel is not an exception to § 2254(e)(2)’s requirements. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (mandating that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is not a ground for habeas relief); Thomas, 428 F.3d at 498 (“[F]ailure to develop the factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”) (emphasis added); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752 (noting no federal constitutional right to post-conviction counsel). 33 Morever, nothing in the record suggests that the competency determinations were “contrary to” the teachings of Drope, Pate, or Dusky. See § 2254(d)(1). Ultimately, “[r]equiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402. Based on our review of the record, we are confident that aim was achieved in Taylor’s case. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Taylor’s claim that he was tried while incompetent. 3. Ineffective Assistance with Respect to Competency (Claim 3) Taylor argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a competency hearing. We have explained that Counsel’s failure to request the trial court to order a hearing or evaluation on the issue of the defendant’s competency . . . could violate the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel provided there are sufficient indicia of incompetence to give objectively reasonable counsel reason to doubt the defendant’s competency, and there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have been found incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised and fully considered. Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 283. Here, trial counsel testified before the PCRA court, in detail, about his observations of Taylor at the time of the proceedings: I did not see anything that [indicated] Paul did not understand the course of conduct that he chose. . . . In what he said or how he behaved or how he acted that would indicate that he didn’t understand what was going on. . . . I talked frequently with Pat [Gallagher] at the jail . . . Paul frequently talked to Pat Gallagher, and I received no indication from Pat 34 Gallagher that Paul Taylor did not understand what was happening. He appeared—everything I saw, Paul was competent to make decisions. (App. at 270-71.) Consistent with the legal standard for competency, counsel’s interactions with Taylor—paired with both the Briercheck and Sadoff reports concluding that Taylor was competent—were sufficient for counsel to reasonably forego a competency hearing. Nor do we agree with Taylor that counsel unreasonably failed to provide Mr. Briercheck and Dr. Sadoff with enough information for them to make well-informed competency determinations. Mr. Briercheck and Dr. Sadoff state in their new affidavits that they would have benefitted from reading one another’s reports,18 but this retrospective observation does not suggest that it was unreasonable of trial counsel, at the time, to seek two independent evaluations. In Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 2005), we disapproved of counsel’s failure to provide experts with any background information concerning the defendant’s history, the alleged crimes, or the Commonwealth’s pursuit of the death penalty. Id. at 103. But, in contrast to Jacobs, Taylor’s background and crimes are detailed in both Briercheck’s and Sadoff’s reports. These experts knew a great deal about Taylor’s history and the crime, and it is evident from their reports that Taylor discussed the possibility of the death penalty with both of them. In sum, Taylor’s competency-related, ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails on the first prong of Strickland because counsel’s decision not to pursue a competency hearing was objectively reasonable, considering all the circumstances. See 466 U.S. at 688. As with the trial court’s decision not to convene a competency hearing, there were insufficient indicia of incompetence to deem counsel’s decision unreasonable. 18 Sadoff did, however, review Dr. Elyan’s report before making his competency determination. 35 Taylor has also failed to show prejudice under Strickland’s second prong. Because we have found that the state courts correctly determined, based on all of the evidence available, that Taylor was competent, there is no “reasonable probability” that Taylor was incompetent, and therefore no prejudice caused by counsel’s failure to request a competency hearing.19 Id. at 694. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of this claim. V. Validity of Taylor’s Guilty Plea and Waiver of Specific Defenses (Claim 4); Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Regarding Waivers (Claim 5) Taylor next argues that his guilty plea, waivers of related 20 rights, and waiver of specific defenses to first degree murder were 19 Taylor argues that his newly-acquired evidence of incompetency shows that trial counsel’s investigation was inadequate, and is sufficient to establish prejudice because there is a reasonable probability that his new evidence would result in a finding that he was incompetent. On this basis, he contends, the District Court should have held an evidentiary hearing. Taylor Br. at 37. The problem, again, is that Taylor already had an evidentiary hearing on this issue before the first PCRA court, where he failed to produce Dr. Blair’s and Dr. Dudley’s evaluations. Cf. Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 749 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he defendant] did receive an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in state court. If, as [the defendant] contends, a reasonable investigation would have revealed the evidence discussed above, then it should have been developed in relation to his ineffective assistance claims during his first postconviction proceeding.”). 20 “Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Third, is the right to confront one’s accusers.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (citations omitted). 36 not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Primarily, he argues that the trial court’s inquiry into how his mental state influenced his waivers was inadequate, and he seeks an evidentiary hearing to develop the record on this issue. Taylor Br. at 63. For the reasons we explain below, however, we fully agree with the District Court that the waiver colloquies in this case, including the written one, made part of the record, were legally sufficient under federal law.21 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). A. Standard of Review Taylor’s claim that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary was first raised in his second PCRA petition and has never been reviewed on the merits by the state courts. Taylor I does not mention Taylor’s last minute decision to withdraw his guilty plea, and although the first PCRA court addressed Taylor’s competence to make decisions, it did not address the broader issue of whether his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. We will therefore review this claim de novo, Appel, 250 F.3d at 210, affording the state courts’ factual determinations a presumption of correctness, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). B. Constitutional Requirements for Knowing and Voluntary Waivers As noted, competence to plead guilty is subject to the same legal standard as competence to stand trial. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398-99. We have already established that Taylor had the requisite competence to stand trial. However, as the Supreme Court has explained, that is not enough for a valid waiver: In addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, 21 This holding does not extend to Taylor’s waiver of his state-law right to have a penalty-phase jury, for which there was no on-the-record colloquy. We address this waiver separately, below. 37 a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. In this sense there is a “heightened” standard for pleading guilty . . . . Id. at 400-01 (citations and emphasis omitted). Under Boykin, it is crucial that the record reveal not only that a defendant was aware of his rights, but also that he “intelligently and understandingly” waived them. 395 U.S. at 242; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (“[waiver must be] an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege”). Numerous cases have addressed the basic requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver, but there are few hard-and-fast rules. We have stated that no criminal defendant should plead guilty to a crime unless, and until, he has had explained to him and understands all of his constitutional rights and protections, including the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474, 480 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243); see also United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that “to be valid [a defendant’s] waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter”); but see United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing these same factors as “illustrative examples of factors that courts might discuss, not a mandatory checklist of required topics”). The Supreme Court has explained, further, that the level of detail in the colloquy is not dispositive: 38 [T]he law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in general in the circumstanceseven though the defendant may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it. . . . If [the defendant] . . . lacked a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver, it does not defeat the State’s showing that the information it provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004) (emphasis, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). With these guidelines in mind, we review the record of Taylor’s waivers. C. The State Court Record In accordance with Pennsylvania law, the trial court first accepted Taylor’s guilty plea to homicide generally, and then held a hearing to determine his degree of guilt. Before Taylor pleaded guilty, the court elicited the following: MR. EVANICK: . . . I have talked to Paul about this extensively. This is his desire to do this [to plead guilty]. He understands the consequences of what he is doing today. He is also aware of the likely outcome of the further proceedings. Specifically, he has directed me not to contact any witnesses or to call any medical personnel who have interviewed and talked with him. He understands that there are statutory aggravating circumstances and that the likely result will be the imposition of the death penalty. THE COURT: You heard the statement of your counsel. Is there anything you wish to add to that at this point? THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. 39 ... (App. at 137-38.) The court then asked Taylor whether he admitted to each of the murders he was charged with, including the method of each killing. Taylor admitted to committing each one. The court next asked: Also you have had the opportunity to review this guilty plea colloquy with your attorney and you filled it out? 22 22 Evanick assisted Taylor in filling out a “Guilty Plea Colloquy” form. The form is ten pages long, and contains fortyfour questions, most of which required Taylor to supply a handwritten answer, which he did. Taylor indicated in the form that he had completed 13 years of education, including “2 yrs of electrical and 3 yrs of electronic” school. (App. at 329.) The form asked, “[i]f you are presently being treated for a mental illness, do you still feel that you can cooperate with your attorney, comprehend what you are doing today, understand what these questions mean and know why you must answer these questions?” Taylor answered “No, Yes.” Taylor also affirmed on the form, among numerous other things, that he understood that he was entering a guilty plea (question 15); his attorney had explained all of the elements of the crime (question 16); he admitted doing all of things a person must do to be held guilty of the crimes he was charged with (question 17); he understood the presumption of innocence, and waiver of that presumption (question 18); he understood his absolute right to a trial before a jury to determine his guilt or innocence, and affirmed that he knew of all the rights he had in the course of a trial (questions 19a-19i); he understood he could waive his guilt-phase jury right and have the judge decide his case in its entirety (question 20); he understood that if he pleaded guilty he would be accepting that he was properly charged (question 21) and that his guilty plea would terminate his right to be heard on any challenge the propriety of the charges against him (question 22); he understood his right to be represented by counsel 40 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And from discussing the colloquy with him, do you understand your trial rights? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And by pleading guilty you are giving up those rights? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all about anything that is happening today or anything that has been involved in this whole process from (question 23); he understood that for first degree murder the court could impose the death penalty, and that lesser sentences were available for lesser degrees of murder and manslaughter (question 25); he was not coerced directly or indirectly to enter the plea (question 35); and he was doing so of his own free will (question 36). Taylor now argues that any reliance on this form is improper because the form misleadingly suggested that he would not have the opportunity to present witnesses at his degree-of-guilt hearing, and would not be allowed to challenge any trial court errors. Taylor Br. at 49-50 n.24. If the form had misled Taylor by erroneously informing him that his post-plea rights were more extensive than they actually were, we agree that the form might undermine the validity of Taylor’s plea, depending on the remainder of the record. We cannot agree, however, that his choice to plead guilty perhaps thinking that his post-plea rights were more limited than they actually were, undermines the validity of his guilty plea. This only shows Taylor would have chosen to plead guilty in spite of these limitations. To the extent that the form’s errors may have misled Taylor about his opportunity to present witnesses at the degree-of-guilt phase, we will consider this argument, below. 41 your discussions with your attorney or police or anything that you want to call to the Court’s attention at this time? THE DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: Mr. Evanick indicates that you advised him that essentially you don’t wish to challenge your guilt in these matters and, in effect, you are telling him to just plead guilty and get it over with and that you will accept the result which he thinks is likely to be the death penalty. Is that a correct statement by you? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, sort of. Yes. THE COURT: This would be a good time to add anything you want to add if you want to correct it or change it. THE DEFENDANT: No. I plead guilty to my charges and I accept it. THE COURT: What you are saying is whatever happens happens. . . . And has Mr. Evanick had the opportunity to go over with you the requirements for the charge of criminal homicide, the legality of it telling you what the elements of the offense are and telling you what the Commonwealth would have to prove? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you are satisfied that you understand what they are? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (App. at 141-43.) 42 The court then questioned Taylor about whether counsel had gone over with him the Commonwealth’s evidence of criminal homicide, and whether Taylor understood that he was pleading guilty to the general charge of homicide, and would later have the opportunity to contest his degree of guilt, but that the death penalty was possible. Taylor responded, “Yes.” (App. at 143-44.) Counsel asked the court to advise Taylor in more detail about the specific elements of homicide. The court did, explaining the possible verdicts of first and third degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter, as well as the difference between murder and manslaughter, along with the elements of the individual offenses. The court asked Taylor whether he had any questions, and then asked him to give a brief statement explaining precisely what happened the night of the killings. Taylor complied, describing the murders in detail, up to the point when he blacked out in the bathtub and found himself in the hospital. The court then accepted the guilty plea “finding it to be knowingly and voluntarily given.” (App. at 152.) Next, at the combined degree-of-guilt and penalty-phase hearing, the court began with argument on Taylor’s motion to suppress his hospital statements: THE COURT: . . . [A]re you aware that Mr. Evanick thinks there may be some problems in regard to the manner in which the police obtained those statements, that you were not properly advised of your rights prior to giving them? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And if that is correct, the Court would have a hearing and determine whether or not you were properly advised of your rights, and that if the Court found that you were not, it would be possible that the Court would suppress those statements; that is, not permit the Commonwealth to use those statements in evidence against you here today. That possibility exists, is what I'm telling you. Do you understand you have that right? 43 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And your attorney’s telling me that knowing that you have that right, you choose not to exercise it, that you are telling your attorney, do not file such a suppression motion, let the Commonwealth use whatever evidence they want to use, it doesn’t matter to me, I don’t want to suppress it? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you had a sufficient opportunity to talk to Mr. Evanick about that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (App. at 158-59.) Before Taylor chose to pursue his suppression motion, however, he confirmed that a victory would not require him to revoke his guilty plea: THE DEFENDANT: [I]f I lose, they would still use the statement, but if I win, I’d rather go on the road I’m going now, plead guilty for my charges. . . . ... I’m not dropping and I’m not going to fight it. ... THE COURT: If we have a suppression hearing and I rule in your favor . . . you are saying you still want to leave your guilty plea in? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you still want to proceed to have your hearing? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (App. at 159-61.) 44 After the colloquy, the court heard evidence and granted Taylor’s suppression motion.23 The court then reaffirmed Taylor’s desire to plead guilty: I have suppressed the statements at the hospital. Those statements may not be introduced into evidence against you. Before we proceed, I do want to make sure that you still wish to stand on your guilty plea and proceed with the case. This was only a possibility before. You now know. I have ruled in your favor. I have suppressed those statements and I want to know from you whether you still wish to proceed in the manner that you indicated earlier, whether you still wish to let your guilty plea stand and whether you still wish to proceed with the Degree of Guilt Hearing at this time? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, proceed with the guilty plea, and go on the same road I’m going now. (App. at 193-94.) After the Commonwealth’s six witnesses testified in detail about the circumstances surrounding the murders the court announced a recess. As soon as the hearing resumed, defense counsel stated that he had no argument on the degree of guilt, and the court read aloud the elements of first degree murder and found Taylor guilty of the charges. The first PCRA court credited counsel’s testimony that it was Taylor’s informed decision not to contest the first-degree murder charge. Counsel stated: Paul told us about using cocaine before the murders 23 Taylor’s June 15 letter of confession contained the same incriminating information as his hospital statement, and was not suppressed. 45 occurred and during—while the murders were occurring. He mentioned the prior use to Dr. Sadoff. But Paul did not want to exercise any of his rights and testify or present that defense. ... [There] was nothing from what Paul was telling us that the cocaine caused him not to understand what he was doing or not to understand that it was wrong. (App. at 273-75) (emphasis added). The court then found that there was discussion with Mr. Evanick about use of both alcohol and drugs and that Mr. Taylor made the decision not to present that testimony or any other testimony; that Mr. Evanick explained to Mr. Taylor his right to present testimony both by himself or by witnesses . . . but that he left it up to Mr. Taylor to make the final decision as to what witnesses would be called; and that Mr. Taylor acting out of remorse and being upset with what had occurred and wishing to receive the death penalty as being the only acceptable atonement for his actions decided not to call those witnesses and to proceed in the fashion that he did knowing and accepting the fact that it would lead directly to a death penalty. (App. at 278.) (emphasis added). D. Adequacy of The State Court Record Taylor argues that his on-the-record waivers were constitutionally deficient because (1) the trial court failed to undertake a “penetrating and comprehensive” inquiry into the impact of Taylor’s mental health; (2) the court relied heavily on a pre-printed waiver form; and (3) the court did not discuss the range of punishments allowable for lesser degrees of murder, knowing that there were facts supporting defenses to first degree murder. We address each of these contentions in turn. First, Taylor argues that the current state court record is 46 insufficient to judge whether his guilty plea and other waivers were knowing and voluntary. This argument relies largely on the findings contained in new affidavits Taylor has obtained from Mr. Briercheck, Drs. Sadoff, Blair, and Dudley. None of this evidence is part of the state court record and the District Court denied Taylor’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Because Taylor’s “knowing and voluntary” waiver claims were new to his second PCRA petition, which was barred by an inadequate state procedural rule, see supra, we cannot say that Taylor, by his own fault, failed to establish the factual basis for this claim under § 2254(e)(2). See Wilson, 426 F.3d at 665. Yet, a petitioner who diligently but unsuccessfully seeks an evidentiary hearing in state court still is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in federal court under AEDPA. Rather, as we explained previously, whether to hold a hearing for a petitioner who is not at fault under § 2254(e)(2) remains in the discretion of the district court, and depends on whether the hearing would “have the potential to advance the petitioner’s claim.” See Campbell, 209 F.3d at 287. We will therefore consider whether this after-acquired evidence raises an issue that warrants an evidentiary hearing. In doing so, we review the District Court’s decision not to hold a hearing for abuse of discretion. But, we will only consider this evidence to the extent it bears on the knowing and voluntary nature of Taylor’s plea—we will not revisit our determination that AEDPA bars a new hearing on competency. 1. Updated Briercheck Affidavit First, Taylor proffers testimony from Mr. Briercheck, who has submitted an updated affidavit. He opines, based on a more recent reevaluation of Taylor and newly available background material, that Taylor’s decision to waive his rights was “the result of his grief reaction and his depression.” (App. at 383.) This new evidence does not warrant a hearing. The fact that an otherwise competent waiver is the “result” of grief and depression, does not mean that it was not “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 47 464. Next, Mr. Briercheck suggests that Taylor’s psychological disturbances in 1991 make it difficult to determine whether Taylor’s waivers were knowing and voluntary by looking only at his statements in court. (App. at 382-83.) Fortunately, as the record currently stands, we have more than Taylor’s statements to consider. We also have Briercheck’s original, pre-trial report in which he expressed no reservations about Taylor’s ability to proceed with the legal aspects of his case. In this report, Mr. Briercheck reached his conclusion despite his contemporaneous finding that Taylor was “struggling psychologically,” App. at 317; despite the fact that his “testing did clearly show that [Taylor] was suffering from depression with secondary anxiety features,” and a “profound grief reaction,” App. at 381 (referring to testing in 1991); despite his diagnosis of “Depressive Disorder with Secondary Anxiety Features;” and despite his recognition that Taylor’s “coping skills and defenses [were] extremely taxed,” App. at 317. In short, no evidentiary hearing is needed to evaluate Briercheck’s new diagnoses, because his observations before Taylor pleaded guilty reveal the same functional limitations that he noted in his new affidavit. Assuming Taylor was competent, as we have concluded, we are confident on this record that his depression, anxiety, and grief did not undermine the knowing or voluntary nature of his plea. 2. Updated Sadoff Affidavit Second, Taylor proffers testimony from Dr. Sadoff, who also submitted an updated affidavit. In it, Sadoff concluded that Taylor’s waivers were the result of his depression, disturbed mental state, and desire to commit suicide. However, like Briercheck’s new affidavit, these clinical findings are consistent with Sadoff’s findings in 1991—which he does not retract—that despite his disturbed mental state and depression, Taylor “kn[ew] the nature and consequences of his current legal situation,” and was able to 48 “work with counsel in preparing his defense.” 24 (App. at 326.) Sadoff’s new affidavit fails to raise an issue about the knowing and voluntary nature of Taylor’s waivers because it tells us nothing new about whether Taylor actually and intentionally abandoned his known rights.
Third, Taylor proffers testimony from Dr. Dudley, who evaluated him for the first time more than seven years after the guilty plea. Dudley diagnosed Taylor with longstanding Borderline Personality Disorder, and states that “symptoms present in Mr. Taylor’s case prevented him from . . . making knowing, intelligent and voluntary waivers of his rights.” (App. at 369.) He also indicates that at the time Taylor waived his rights he was suffering from a “Major Depressive Episode.” (App. at 368.) Notably, Dr. Dudley states that Taylor’s Borderline Personality Disorder caused a psychotic breakdown in 1991 that was well documented by Mr. Briercheck and Drs. Elyan and Sadoff. And we already know, from Briercheck’s and Sadoff’s 1991 reports, that Taylor’s suicidal ideation and depression did not otherwise impair his ability to assist 24 Sadoff’s 1991 evaluation of Taylor shows that he appreciated the contours of Taylor’s mentally disturbed and suicidal state. In it, he noted Taylor’s reports of auditory hallucinations—voices telling Taylor what to do on the night of the murders and for a month after he was admitted to the medical unit in prison. He also reported that he had received and agreed with Dr. Elyan’s May 1991 report, which gave Taylor a diagnosis of “acute grief reaction, possible cocaine induced psychosis, and history of cocaine and alcohol abuse.” (App. at 325.) And, in his updated affidavit, Sadoff reiterated that at the time he initially evaluated him, Taylor “remained severely depressed and continued to suffer from an acute grief reaction.” (App. at 378.) In spite of all these issues, Sadoff concluded in 1991 that Taylor was “not actively suicidal at present, and [was] no longer hearing voices,” he “appear[ed] to have recovered from the acute situational disturbance that occurred in May 1991,” and was “currently mentally competent to proceed.” (App. at 326.) 49 counsel and proceed with the legal aspects of his case. The legal conclusions Dr. Dudley reaches based on facts that are already in the record—that Taylor’s waivers were not “knowing, intelligent and voluntary”—do not warrant an evidentiary hearing on that issue. See Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at1940 (“[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.”) (citing Totten v. Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (1998) (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can be resolved by reference to the state court record.”) (emphasis deleted)).
Fourth, and finally, Taylor offers the expert testimony of Dr. Blair, who also met Taylor for the first time nearly seven years after he pleaded guilty. Like Dr. Dudley, Dr. Blair diagnosed Taylor with longstanding borderline personality disorder. Contrary to Dr. Elyan’s, Mr. Briercheck’s, and Dr. Sadoff’s psychiatric evaluations conducted in 1991, Blair opines that Taylor “remained suicidal throughout the trial proceedings in late 1991 and early 1992.” (App. at 374.) In Blair’s opinion, Taylor’s “waivers were a passive way of committing suicide and were the product of his mental confusion, disorganization and depression rather than rational thinking.” (App. at 374.) Blair concludes from these observations that Taylor’s waivers were not “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent,” but her focus is entirely on Taylor’s potentially disordered motivation for seeking the death penalty. Thus, although she uses the terms “knowing and voluntary,” the substance of her proposed testimony assesses Taylor’s competency—his “ability to understand the proceedings” in 1991—not whether he actually did understand the “significance and consequences” of his decisions and whether they were uncoerced. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. In short, Taylor’s proffered evidence sheds no new light on whether his plea and other waivers were knowing and voluntary. The District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on the knowing and voluntary character of the plea or waivers was 50 therefore not an abuse of discretion.25 See Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1940. E. Taylor’s Remaining Guilt-Phase Waiver Arguments Taylor’s remaining arguments challenge the validity of his waivers based on the state court record as it currently stands. First, Taylor argues that the trial court’s failure to advise him of his potential defenses to first-degree murder invalidates his plea and waiver of defenses. Putting aside the fact that Taylor did acknowledge his understanding of the range of punishments for lesser degrees of homicide in his written waiver, the record shows that he chose to plead guilty after the court informed him of all lesser degrees of culpability, and the elements that the Commonwealth was required to prove for each. Moreover, Taylor’s discussions with Mr. Briercheck, Dr. Sadoff, his counsel, and the trial court, show that he was well aware that the death penalty was a possible consequence of a first degree murder conviction. Federal law requires no more detailed colloquy than what Taylor received. See United States v. Thomas, 389 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1125 (2005) (stating, in the context of a federal criminal trial, that defendants do not have a right to be “advised of possible defenses, such as voluntary intoxication, during [a] plea colloquy”); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1989) (“Relinquishment derives not from any inquiry into a defendant’s subjective understanding of the range of potential defenses, but from the admissions necessarily made upon entry of a voluntary plea of guilty”). Where, as here, the defendant fully “understands the nature of the right [being waived] 25 We are not suggesting that mental health evidence is never relevant to whether a plea is knowing and voluntary, rather, we reach our conclusion, here, because this particular mental health evidence—while it uses the words “knowing and voluntary”—is clearly focused on Taylor’s competence, and does not raise questions about Taylor’s waivers under the standards set in Boykin, Godinez, VonMoltke, or any other relevant federal law. 51 and how it would apply in general in the circumstances,” he may knowingly and intelligently waive that right “even though [he] may not know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629. Second, though we agree with Taylor that a pre-printed waiver form alone does not satisfy Boykin’s requirements, the form here—which Taylor reviewed with the assistance of counsel—was supplemented with an adequate oral colloquy. Third, considering the first PCRA court’s finding that Taylor instructed counsel not to present any testimony at the degree-of-guilt hearing, counsel’s in-court statement waiving defenses to first degree murder clearly represented Taylor’s knowing and voluntary choice. The record shows that Taylor apprehended the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the possibility of the death penalty and “all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter,” yet he repeatedly and clearly insisted on his right to plead guilty and not to present any testimony. See Peppers, 302 F.3d at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because he was competent to make those decisions, his private motivation does not undermine their validity under federal law. In sum, an evidentiary hearing on the knowing and voluntary character of Taylor’s guilty plea and related waivers is not warranted. The current record—including the mental health evidence from 1991—fully supports the District Court’s conclusion that Taylor appreciated the significance of his plea, despite his depression, grave remorse, and other mental deficiencies. With full information and understanding, Taylor repeatedly and clearly indicated his desire to plead guilty and waive his rights. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s decision that these waivers were knowing and voluntary. F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Guilty Plea and Waiver of Related Rights (Claim 5) Taylor argues, next, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that his waivers were knowing and voluntary. 52 (Taylor Br. at 56-58.) This argument is belied by the record, which shows that trial counsel repeatedly and unambiguously explained to Taylor the consequences of waiving his rights, and that Taylor repeatedly and unambiguously expressed his desire to waive them. Taylor’s argument that counsel should not have permitted him to make any decisions because of his incompetence has already been addressed. Based on our review of the record, and adopting the District Court’s well-reasoned discussion of this issue, counsel’s performance with respect to Taylor’s guilty plea was not constitutionally deficient under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.