Opinion ID: 2977897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Custodial Statements

Text: Zagorski contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements that he made to police on three occasions—June 1, July 27, and August 1, 1983—after he invoked his rights to silence and to counsel. The Tennessee Supreme Court found that although Zagorski invoked his right to counsel, “the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the defendant initiated the interrogations, that he was not subject to any coercive action . . . and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right . . . .” Zagorski, 701 S.W.2d at 812. We deny relief because this conclusion was neither “contrary to” federal law, nor an “unreasonable application” of Supreme Court precedent. Although Zagorski challenges statements made on three dates, we focus on the latter two—July 27 and August 1. We need not address the June 1 statement; even assuming that the trial court should have suppressed it, the error was harmless if the subsequent inculpatory statements were admissible. See Coomer v. Yukins, 533 F.3d 477, 488 n.4 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991)). Consequently, admission of the June 1 statement could not have had a “substantial and injurious effect in determining the jury’s verdict.” Id. The crucial conversations occurred on July 27 and August 1, when detective Ronnie Perry spoke with Zagorski. Perry received two notes from Zagorski on July 22, stating that Zagorski 7 No. 06-5532 Zagorski v. Bell “need[ed] to see the Sheriff or Ron Perry, Ed Z, or E.D.Z.” Perry recounted the following conversation from his July 27 visit to Zagorski: So I went back down to the jail and went in the lower cell block into Ed’s cell and asked him what he needed. He asked me, said, what’s going to happen today? I said, well, we’ve got to show proof, and then it will probably be bound over to the Grand Jury. He said, are my lawyers going to be there? I said, yes. He said, well, I’ll tell you what I’ll do—if you’ll let me pick the type of execution and the day of execution, I’ll confess to these murders. I told him, I said, look, man, you need to stop right here and go talk to your lawyers; don’t be doing stuff like this right now. He said, well, he didn’t need to talk to his lawyers; he knowed [sic] what he wanted to say. I said, well, I think you need to talk to them. After this exchange, Zagorski told Perry that the murders occurred in Hickman County and Boiling Springs. Perry did not ask any questions, but the men spoke again two days later, at Zagorski’s insistence. Perry recalled: [Zagorski] said that he wasn’t the trigger man in the murders, but he did have something to do with them. He said that he just set them up; said he was hired by a man from—no, it was a man from Florida that was the trigger man, and all he done was drove them to the spot in Boiling Springs. He got out of the car, Porter and Dotson got out of the car, and they were shot. Zagorski also told him that the bodies were placed in plastic bags and transported to Robertson County; that his role was to “set the murders up”; that Dotson’s murder was a mistake because he had been hired to kill only Porter; and that it took about five seconds to kill both men. Perry asked only one question—to confirm that Zagorski wanted to speak with him. 8 No. 06-5532 Zagorski v. Bell Zagorski contends that these exchanges were inadmissible because they resulted from “coercive police activity.” See Jackson v. McKee, 525 F.3d 430, 433. Namely, he alleges that he made the statements because he had been incarcerated under oppressive conditions, kept in isolation, and deprived of exercise or sunlight. But the need for security prompted Zagorski’s confinement, not coercion. Sheriff Emery testified that Zagorski attempted suicide by overdosing on medication obtained from other prisoners and that he attempted to escape (and injured himself in the process) on another occasion. Moreover, Zagorski requested to speak with Detective Perry on his own initiative and insisted on confessing even though the detective advised him to speak with his lawyer first. An accused, “having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981). But the accused’s statement may be admitted nevertheless if an Edwards initiation occurs; that is, the statement is admissible “when, without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to talk generally about his case.” United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963, 967 (6th Cir. 1994). Zagorski did not just express a voluntary willingness “to talk generally about his case”—he insisted on giving Detective Perry specific details. As a result, the state court decision was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. Moreover, Zagorski cannot demonstrate that the admission of his June 1 statement was not harmless error. See Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 9 No. 06-5532 Zagorski v. Bell 374, 382–83 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the admission of a statement obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), resulted in harmless error because the defendant repeated the substance of the statement in a later admissible statement).