Opinion ID: 205134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Proceedings in Federal District Court

Text: After the Supreme Court of South Carolina's affirmance of his criminal contempt conviction, Brandt filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. [2] See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argued that his conviction and sentence [were] contrary to the Constitution of the United States, based on, inter alia, a denial of due process, including the denial of his rights to notice, counsel, and an opportunity to be heard on the charge of criminal contempt. J.A. at 13-14. Brandt ultimately filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate judge recognized that [i]t is only where the contempt behavior occurs within the view of the judge so that the judge has personal knowledge of the conduct that due process procedural safeguards are dispensed. Brandt, 664 F.Supp.2d at 640 (citing Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536-37, 45 S.Ct. 390, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925)). Because the state court's knowledge of the letter's fraudulent nature hinged on expert testimony, the magistrate judge determined that Brandt was not guilty of direct criminal contempt, as that phrase has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Brandt was consequently entitled to due process safeguards. Id. at 641. After surveying the record, the magistrate judge reached the conclusion that Brandt had been deprived of these basic rights. Id. at 645. He accordingly recommended the district court grant Brandt's motion for summary judgment. Gooding subsequently filed a motion to intervene in Brandt's habeas proceeding under the Criminal Victims Rights Act (CVRA or the Act), see 18 U.S.C. § 3771, in order to correct various factual inaccuracies she identified in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Once Brandt's custodians had filed their objections to the report and recommendation, the district court proceeded to review the magistrate judge's conclusions de novo. The district court similarly concluded that [a]ssuming . . . the South Carolina Supreme Court adjudicated [Brandt's] due process claim on the merits . . ., its holding was contrary to or unreasonably applied controlling federal law. Brandt, 664 F.Supp.2d at 630. As the district court explained, [t]he trial judge did not have personal knowledge that [Brandt] forged the letter, but instead had to rely on the testimony of a document expert and evidence put forth by [Gooding]. Without the trial judge having personal knowledge, the contempt cannot be said to have occurred under the eye or within the view of the court, and therefore, it did not occur in open court. Because the contempt occurred outside of open court, [Brandt] was entitled to his due process rights, and as described by the Magistrate Judge, [Brandt] was denied many of his rights, including his rights to counsel, notice, and the opportunity to be heard. Hence, by upholding the proceeding where the trial judge denied [Brandt] many of his due process rights when convicting him of criminal contempt that occurred outside of open court, the South Carolina Supreme Court arrived at a decision that was contrary to or unreasonably applied controlling federal law. Id. at 631. As to Gooding's motion to intervene, the district court held that Gooding essentially sought to add to the factual record and that this interest failed to satisfy the requirements for intervention of right or permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Id. at 632. The court indicated, however, that it had construed [Gooding's] submissions as amicus briefs. Id. Brandt's custodians and Gooding noted timely appeals over which we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 2253(a).