Opinion ID: 2595503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutory penalty and attorney fees

Text: ¶ 12 The district court relied on Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-207 to assess a $500 penalty against Turner and McMillan and to award Green $10,000 in attorney fees. That section reads as follows: Any county commissioner who refuses or neglects to perform any duty imposed upon him without just cause therefor or willfully violates any law provided for his government as such officer, or who, as commissioner, willfully, fraudulently, or corruptly attempts to perform an act unauthorized by law shall, in addition to the penalty provided in the penal code, forfeit to the county $500 for every such act, to be recovered on his official bond, and shall be further liable on his official bond to any person injured thereby for all damages sustained. Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-207 (emphasis added). The district court held that, based on the stipulated facts, Turner and McMillan had willfully ... attempt[ed] to perform an act unauthorized by law. Additionally, the court concluded that Turner's and McMillan's liability in damages under this section extended to payment of Green's attorney fees. ¶ 13 In holding Turner and McMillan had acted willfully, the district court reasoned that the statute does not require bad faith or malice, but only deliberate and purposeful conduct. The court cited State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993) Larsen examined section 61-1-1(2) of Utah's Uniform Securities Act, which dealt with making untrue statements or omitting necessary facts in the context of offers, sales, or purchases of securities. Penalties for violation of that section were in turn prescribed by section 61-1-21, which at that time imposed criminal liability for [a]ny person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter. See id., 865 P.2d at 1358. With reference to the operation of section 61-1-21 in conjunction with subsection 61-1-1(2), we concluded that there was no scienter requirement inherently associated with the term willfully, and that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury that it must find an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. See id. at 1358-60; see also Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 8 (Utah 1995). ¶ 14 The district court in the instant case adopted the same reasoning in the context of section 17-5-207. Because Turner and McMillan clearly intended to deduct money from Green's salary, and because the district court determined that the Commission did not have the legal authority to make deductions from Green's salary, the court concluded that Turner and McMillan had willfully attempted an act unauthorized by law. ¶ 15 Turner and McMillan argue that Larsen does not provide a correct analogy for usage of the term willfully in the context of section 17-5-207. Instead, they urge this court to look to the definition employed in the context of judicial conduct complaints. In In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 869 (Utah 1996), we construed the grounds described in article VIII, section 13 of the Utah Constitution and in section 78-7-28(1) of the Utah Code as permitting disciplinary action against a judge for willful misconduct in office, or willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties. We held that the term willful consisted not merely of deliberate or volitional action, but that it necessarily included a specific element of wrongful purpose or scienter. Otherwise, a judge could have been acting out of the best of motives, could have been negligent only in exceeding his or her powers, and still could be found guilty of `willful misconduct.' Id., 926 P.2d at 868. The standard we adopted required a showing that a judge intentionally committed a lawful act for an improper purpose or intentionally committed an unlawful act that the judge knew or should have known to be beyond his or her lawful power and committed the act for an improper purpose. Id. at 869. ¶ 16 In the instant case, section 17-5-207 does not expressly indicate whether the term willfully includes an implied scienter component. As both Larsen and Worthen illustrate, the inclusion or exclusion of a scienter requirement depends largely on the context and purposes of the statute or rule at issue. In Osguthorpe, for instance, we held no scienter requirement was implicated in a willful failure to respond to discovery. See 892 P.2d at 8; see also Morton v. Continental Baking, 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997). On the other hand, in Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 1999 UT 13, ¶¶ 14-15, 974 P.2d 288, 293-94 we revisited the Uniform Securities Act previously construed by Larsen and held that scienter was required with respect to a different subsection of the Act. Specifically, we concluded that section 61-1-1(1) of the Act, which proscribes any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, implicitly required scienter. We relied heavily on interpretations of the Uniform Act in other jurisdictions, which in turn had found a scienter requirement implicitly necessary to the concepts of device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. See 974 P.2d at 294. Thus, in two different cases treating precisely the same word in section 61-1-21 of the Uniform Securities Act, we attributed different interpretations. When interpreted in conjunction with subsection 61-1-1(2) of the Act, the term willfully did not include a scienter requirement, but when interpreted in conjunction with the preceding subsection 61-1-1(1), willfully did include such a requirement. [5] ¶ 17 Looking to the context and purposes of section 17-5-207, we are persuaded that Worthen and Fibro Trust provide better analogues than Larsen. The overall tenor and context of section 17-5-207 indicates it was directed at punishing bad faith misconduct. The other terms within the same phrase, fraudulently, and corruptly, invoke concerns about bad faith abuses of public office. Cf. Fibro Trust, 974 P.2d at 294 (holding contextual implication of device, artifice, and scheme necessarily required element of scienter). Even the first portion of the provision, which contains no specific requirement of willfulness, states that refusal or neglect to perform duties may be sanctioned only if the dereliction was without good cause. ¶ 18 Moreover, the concerns relating to judicial conduct provide a much closer analogue to the situation at hand than any criminal statutes. Both judges and county commissioners are public officials who have affirmative duties to act in the public interest. Although there are significant differences between the specific powers and responsibilities of judges and the specific powers and responsibilities of county commissioners, the fundamental concepts relating to acts beyond, or in derogation of, a judge's or commissioner's legal authority are fundamentally similar. If county legislative officials are unable to act upon affirmative duties in good faith and without fear of personal sanction or liability, they lose the capacity to act vigorously because they must constantly second-guess their actions. A mere mistake in judgment regarding the scope of authority could trigger serious personal consequences. [6] County legislative officials must necessarily exercise judgment and discretion in many of the decisions they undertake. We do not believe the legislature designed section 17-5-207 to function as an instrument for rendering commissioners personally liable for those good faith misjudgments. There is a substantial policy justification for assuming the legislature intended this provision to apply only to actions implicating an element of bad faith. [7] We therefore hold that the term willfully, as used in section 17-5-207, implicitly requires a finding that the commissioner who willfully ... attempts to perform an act unauthorized by law either knew or should have known that the act was unauthorized by law. A mere mistake in legal judgment, which is all that has been shown thus far, based on the stipulated facts in this case, does not suffice for a finding of willfulness. The district court erred in its interpretation of section 17-5-207. [8] ¶ 19 In conclusion, we affirm the court's summary judgment with respect to the issue of the Commission's authority to make deductions from Green's paycheck, but reverse on the issue of the statutory penalty and attorney fees. [9] We remand the case for further proceedings, if any. ¶ 20 Chief Justice HOWE, Associate Chief Justice RUSSON, Justice DURHAM, and Justice WILKINS concur in Justice DURRANT's opinion.