Opinion ID: 752071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of Warranty Claim as a Basis for Removal

Text: 29 AT & T makes an alternative argument in support of removal. It asserts that the Marcus appellants' breach of warranty claim, although presented in the complaint as a state law claim, in reality arises under federal law and therefore provides an alternative basis for removal jurisdiction pursuant to the artful-pleading doctrine. The artful-pleading doctrine, another corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, prevents a plaintiff from avoiding removal by framing in terms of state law a complaint the real nature of [which] is federal, regardless of plaintiff's characterization, or by omitting to plead necessary federal questions in a complaint. Derrico v. Sheehan Emergency Hosp., 844 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir.1988) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1430 (2d Cir.1993) ([A] complaint which appears to be grounded solely in state law actually may be federal in nature, and thus removable, if its true nature has been disguised by the plaintiff's artful pleading.); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.1986) ([I]n certain limited circumstances a plaintiff may not defeat removal by clothing a federal claim in state garb, or, as it is said, by the use of 'artful pleading.' ). 30 AT & T argues that the breach of warranty claim necessarily arises from AT & T's only contract between it and its customers--the tariff filed with the FCC in accordance with 47 U.S.C. § 203(a). Because the tariff is filed with the FCC pursuant to the FCA, AT & T argues, the breach of warranty claim arises under federal law. We agree, and on this basis we affirm the district court's order denying the Marcus appellants' motion to remand. 31 The Marcus appellants' breach of warranty claim alleges that by choosing defendant as their long distance telephone carrier or by using defendant for making long distance calls using residential service, [the Marcus appellants] entered into agreements for long distance telephone service with AT & T. See Marcus Complaint p 42. The complaint further alleges that those agreements contain two warranties: (1) that defendant would disclose the true nature of its billing practices for residential long distance telephone calls and (2) that defendant would bill in a manner that would result in 'True Savings' to its customers. Id. 32 In essence, the Marcus appellants' breach of warranty claim seeks to enforce the terms of the agreements between AT & T and its customers. Although the Marcus appellants do not expressly identify the source of these agreements, the only possible source is the tariffs filed in accordance with the FCA. Cf. Derrico, 844 F.2d at 28. The legal relationship between AT & T and its customers is defined by the tariffs, which consist of the terms and conditions of the common carrier's service and rates, that AT & T is required to file and maintain with the FCC under the FCA. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 83 F.3d 549, 552 (2d Cir.1996); see Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir.1994). Moreover, federal tariffs are the law, not mere contracts. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Garden State Inv. Corp., 981 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir.1992). See also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of New York, 83 F.3d at 552 (filed tariffs have the force of law and are not simply contractual.); Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.2d 486, 496 (5th Cir.1966) ([A] tariff, required by law to be filed, is not a mere contract. It is the law.). The tariffs conclusively and exclusively enumerate the rights and liabilities of the contracting parties. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New York City Human Resources Admin., 833 F.Supp. 962, 970 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (emphasis added); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 449 n. 1 (2d Cir.1973); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401, 1403 (2d Cir.1969). See also MCI v. Garden State Inv., 981 F.2d at 387. Therefore, the breach of warranty claim necessarily raises a substantial federal question over which federal courts may properly exercise jurisdiction. We therefore affirm so much of the district court's order that denied the Marcus appellants' motion to remand and hold that removal was proper. 33