Opinion ID: 1882035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence certain items seized during a search of crawford's home?

Text: ¶ 49. Crawford argues that the two searches of Crawford's home were unconstitutional searches and that any items, such as the hammer, that were obtained through the search are inadmissible as fruit of an illegal search. The first search occurred the day of the attack. Three of the officers who had responded to the call concerning the attack immediately went to Crawford's home after Nicole Cutberth told the police that Crawford had Kelly Roberts at his house nearby. The officers conducted a protective sweep. The officers discovered there was not anyone present at the home. Greg Hopper, a Tippah County deputy sheriff, testified [w]e immediately entered the residence because we felt that there was still a crime in progress .... [w]e made a thorough search of the residence by going through one room at that time. Hopper also testified as to what items were discovered and collected as evidence from Crawford's residence during the protective sweep: [1] Some of the items were rolls of duct tape, or one roll of duct tape that I remember. Also there was tape, other tape around the house that had what appeared to be hair fibers on them. Outside the residence also in the yard was duct tape with hair fibers. On the bed was where there was blood stains on the bed. Also a female Kotex was on the bed. There was some green, leafy substance in the, I believe in the hallway; a marijuana cigarette, which was also in the hall way or what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette. ¶ 50. The State contends this search was lawful under the emergency or exigency doctrine that would allow for a warrantless search under certain narrowly defined circumstances. The requirements of this exception are as follows: (1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. (2) The search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize the evidence. (3) There must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. Smith v. State, 419 So.2d 563, 570 (Miss. 1982). ¶ 51. The record reflects the officers entered the home believing Kelly Roberts to be in danger and that their action was necessary to protect Roberts' life. The officers had just been told Roberts was in the home with Crawford not long after Crawford had just inflicted great bodily harm to Cutberth. The officers only seized evidence in plain view and did not open drawers or do an in-depth search for evidence. ¶ 52. The day after the attack, Deputy Hopper went to Crawford's home looking for Crawford. Hopper testified that he had received a telephone call earlier that day that Mr. Crawford had been seen going back into the residence. Hooper testified as to what then occurred: Myself and Scott White responded to the call; and at the time of arrival his grandfather, which is Mr. Dewey Crawford, was outside; and we asked him at that time if he had seen Chuck. He advised us no; and we asked him at that time if we could be allowed to go through the residence and look for Mr. Crawford; and he advised us yes, we could. ¶ 53. The officers went through the home and out the back door. Hopper was crossing the garden headed to another house where [Crawford] apparently parked the truck the day before. Hopper happened to stumble across a hammer, the hammer that was used in the crime. On appeal Crawford argues that the grandfather did not have authority to give consent to the officers because the home was Crawford's and not the grandfather's. Indeed, at trial, Crawford made the following objection to testimony concerning the hammer: unless he establishes a predicate that either asserts warrant or permission to make the search, I don't believe its admissible. Yet in arguing the objection Crawford conceded that Hopper had permission to look and see if Mr. Crawford was on the premises. Because Hopper was on the premises with permission, the hammer (which was the only physical evidence introduced at trial) was legally obtained by the police. Any information obtained by means of the eye where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof is not illegally obtained. Franklin v. State, 587 So.2d 905, 907 (Miss.1991), (quoting Patterson v. State, 413 So.2d 1036,1038 (Miss.1982)). See also Waldrop v. State, 544 So.2d 834, 839 (Miss. 1989). This assignment of error is without merit.