Opinion ID: 2254901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The March 2005 letter

Text: For the reasons we have explained, the Surrogate and the Appellate Division were correct to hold, for purposes of this proceeding, that LMB became John Doe's father in June 2004, not only under the law of Cambodia but also under the law of New York. Under Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1) (b) and (5), ERJ could not adopt John Doe without the consent of his existing parent. The next question is whether LMB effectively gave that consent in March 2005, by signing a letter saying that he wished to relinquish the permission to adopt John Doe that the Cambodian government had granted him. We agree with the courts below that no effective consent was given. Domestic Relations Law § 115-b provides two methods by which a parent may consent to a private-placement adoption (i.e., an adoption other than through an authorized agency) of his or her child. Section 115-b (2) (a) says that such a consent may be executed or acknowledged before any judge or surrogate in this state having jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. All consents not given before a judge or surrogate are subject to the formal requirements of section 115-b (4), which requires, among other things, a statement in conspicuous print of at least eighteen point type of the name and address of the court in which an adoption proceeding has been or is to be commenced (§ 115-b [4] [a] [i]); an equally conspicuous description of the consenting parent's right to revoke his or her consent (§ 115-b [4] [a] [ii]); and execution or acknowledgment of the consent before a notary public or another officer (Domestic Relations Law § 115-b [4] [b]). It is undisputed that the March 2005 relinquishment letter does not meet the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. ERJ does not defend the validity of the relinquishment under New York law. Her sole argument on this issue is that Cambodian law should govern the question. She cites no authority supporting this suggestion, and we reject it. It may be debatable, as we explained above, whether parental rights created by a Cambodian adoption should, under circumstances like these, be treated as valid in New York. But once parental rights have been validly established under New York law, between an adoptive parent and child who continue to live in New York, the choice of law governing the parental relationship is much less difficult: New York law applies. Under established conflict of laws principles, the applicable law should be that of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation ( Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473, 481 [1963]). New York's interest in a parent-child relationship between two of its residents is plainly greater than the interest of Cambodia in a relationship between an adult who never lived in Cambodia and a child who, with the approval of the Cambodian government, has been adopted by a non-Cambodian and taken to live elsewhere. When New York parents have acquired, by virtue of a foreign country adoption, parental rights that are recognized in New York, those rights can no longer depend upon the vagaries of a foreign country's law. The rule ERJ seeks would create unacceptable uncertainty for every New York parent raising a child he or she has adopted in a foreign country.