Opinion ID: 242210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excusability of Delay.

Text: 18 If we thought, as we do not, that Blunt's time to take further steps in pursuit of his appeals commenced to run on November 2, 1953, we would hold that the delay until March 1956 was the result of excusable neglect, and would therefore review the convictions. 19 From the day he was sentenced until March 9, 1956, Blunt was in prison and without counsel. Whether he knew he had been allowed to appeal is very doubtful. The judicial determination, still outstanding, that he was incompetent to stand trial, applies equally to every step involved in prosecuting an appeal. We must conclude that his neglect to do anything until we appointed new counsel was excusable. In the face of the very substantial questions 18 raised by the appeals as to the lawfulness of the convictions, we would defeat the interests of justice if we refused to entertain the appeals. As we said in Christoffel v. United States, 1950, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 6, 190 F.2d 585, 590: 20    in a criminal case in which a sentence of imprisonment is involved, there is a public interest against denial of consideration on appeal of substantial questions as to the lawfulness of the conviction. For if the conviction is erroneous it is abhorrent to justice that a defendant shall nevertheless suffer such a penalty for the crime charged. 19