Opinion ID: 4241826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mark Hammerschmidt

Text: Mark argues that the district court erred by applying the aggravating role adjustment set forth in Guidelines § 3B1.1(b) and increasing his offense level by 3 for being a manager or supervisor in the Guatemalan conspiracy. He contends that the adjustment applies only if he managed or supervised at least one other participant, a fact that the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. The government maintains that the adjustment was appropriate because Mark exercised management responsibility over the activities of the Guatemalan conspiracy, even if he did not exercise control over another participant. We review de novo the question whether the government was required to prove that Mark managed or supervised at least one participant in the Guatemalan conspiracy. See United States v. Reid, 827 F.3d 797, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We review the district court’s interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”). Guidelines § 3B1.1 instructs the district court to increase the defendant’s offense level if the defendant served as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in committing the offense. There has long been confusion about whether a defendant must exercise some degree of control over another participant to qualify as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor for purposes of § 3B1.1. To resolve a split that had developed among the courts of appeals, the United States Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment 500 in 1993. U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 500; see United States v. McFarlane, 64 F.3d 1235, 1237 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting the circuit split and citing cases). The amendment added the following application note to § 3B1.1: To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more other participants. An upward departure may be warranted, however, in the case of a defendant who did not organize, lead, manage, or supervise another participant, but who nevertheless exercised management -5- responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. The note thus clarified that a § 3B1.1 adjustment was appropriate only if the defendant had organized, led, managed, or supervised another participant. See United States v. Fones, 51 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]his note now requires that a defendant have control over at least one participant of the criminal activity in order to be subject to a sentencing enhancement under § 3B1.1.”); United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n enhancement (as opposed to an upward departure) is the appropriate vehicle only for those defendants who controlled people.”). We conclude that for the § 3B1.1(b) adjustment to apply, the government was required to prove that Mark managed or supervised another participant in the Guatemalan conspiracy. See United States v. Padilla-Pena, 129 F.3d 457, 470 (8th Cir. 1997) (“If the evidence does not support the finding that [the defendant] managed or supervised other participants, then her offense level could only be increased by means of a departure and not by means of an adjustment.”); see also United States v. Irlmeier, 750 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e have always required evidence that the defendant directed or procured the aid of underlings.”) (quoting United States v. Rowley, 975 F.2d 1357, 1364 n.7 (8th Cir. 1992)). Because the district court did not determine whether Mark managed or supervised another participant in the Guatemalan conspiracy, we must remand the case. See United States v. Musa, 830 F.3d 786, 78889 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e remand the case to provide the district court the opportunity to clarify whether [the defendant] organized or led at least one other participant, and to identify what evidence in this record supports that finding.”). We are not persuaded by the government’s argument that a footnote from United States v. Gaines allows us to uphold the application of the § 3B1.1(b) adjustment to Mark’s offense level. 639 F.3d 423, 428-29 n.4 (8th Cir. 2011). -6- Although the Gaines footnote concluded that proof of control over another participant was not necessary to sustain a § 3B1.1 adjustment, it did not cite or otherwise address § 3B1.1 application note 2. Moreover, to the extent that the Gaines footnote conflicts with our earlier precedent, e.g., United States v. Pena, 67 F.3d 153, 156-57 (8th Cir. 1995); McFarlane, 64 F.3d at 1237-38, we are bound by the decisions of the panels that predate Gaines.2 See Owsley v. Luebbers, 281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel is bound by the decision of a prior panel.”). Mark next argues that the district court erred in determining his criminal history category. He contends that he should not have received criminal history points for a purged sentence for contempt that did not result in an adjudication of guilt or a definite sentence. The government agrees and has requested resentencing. We review de novo this issue of law. See Reid, 827 F.3d at 800-01 (standard of review). In 2008, Mark was sentenced to “[s]erve 60 days in jail, with a purge of $1,500” for contempt of court, a misdemeanor, in the Orange County, Florida, Domestic Relations Court. Mark did not remember being charged with contempt, but believed that he likely was past due on child support payments. During the sentencing hearing, Mark proffered that he had paid the $1,500 purge amount and served only an hour in jail. The district court accepted those representations as true. Over Mark’s objection, 2 The footnote in Gaines relied on a statement in United States v. Brown, 311 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2002), that “[w]e will uphold this enhancement if the defendant controlled at least one other participant in the drug trafficking offense.” Our holding in Brown, however, was that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the defendant was an organizer, in light of evidence that he had organized cross-country transport and delivery of drugs and had “paid operatives . . . to serve in supporting roles.” Id. at 891 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2; Pena, 67 F.3d at 157 (“The guidelines only require that [the defendant] supervised ‘one or more other participants’ to trigger this enhancement.”)). -7- however, the district court added 2 criminal history points for the contempt disposition. Those 2 points raised his criminal history category from II to III. Guidelines § 4A1.1(b) instructs the district court to add 2 points “for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days.” A “prior sentence” is defined as a “sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Sentences for misdemeanor offenses of “contempt of court” or of “non-support” are counted under § 4A1.1 only in certain circumstances, including if the sentence was a term of imprisonment of at least thirty days. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). Mark’s contempt disposition does not meet the definition of “prior sentence” because he purged his contempt by paying $1,500. Imprisonment in a case of civil contempt “is intended to coerce the defendant to do the thing required by the order.” Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911). The term of imprisonment is indefinite because the defendant can “end the sentence and discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to do.” Id. Here, Mark was behind in child support payments. Presumably, his arrest and hour-long imprisonment were intended to coerce him to pay. When he did pay the past-due amount, he purged his contempt and ended his sentence. Accordingly, he was never adjudicated guilty, and he did not receive a definite sentence. Because the contempt disposition was not a “sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt,” see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1), Mark should not have received the disputed criminal history points. See United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 139-40 (4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the defendant’s six-month sentences for contempt were properly awarded criminal history points because the sentences “were ‘for a definite period’ and could not be purged by any affirmative act”). -8-