Opinion ID: 794060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The IJ's Denial of Relief Under the Convention Against Torture

Text: 54 The IJ erred as a matter of law in rejecting Tun's claim under the Convention Against Torture on the basis that his only fear was of torture in retaliation for violating criminal laws, and not in retaliation for his political activities. As noted above, while the Convention as originally drafted does exempt pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions from the definition of torture, Convention Against Torture art. 1, ¶ 1, the Senate's understanding that a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture, 136 Cong. Rec. S17491, ¶ II(c), has been incorporated into this country's refugee law. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3). Thus, punitive treatment that is feared as retaliation for criminal acts or as part of a system of sanctions lawful in the proposed country of removal may nevertheless constitute grounds for relief under the Convention if that punitive treatment would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture. Such a limitation on relief as that assumed by the IJ would similarly contravene Congress's explication of the policy of the Convention as not to. . . effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1231 note. 55 The IJ properly relied in the alternative on the total absence from the record of evidence that individuals who have failed to pay their taxes or jumped ship are likely to be tortured on return to Burma. However, for the same reasons that the IJ erred in failing to consider whether Tun had a well-founded fear of persecution in retaliation for his political activities in the United States, the IJ erred in failing to consider whether Tun established that he would likely be tortured on return to Burma in retaliation for those activities. While the IJ found that Tun lacked a genuine political belief, the IJ failed to address whether he is likely to be identified as someone with politically dissident views and consequently tortured, despite the evidence that Tun presented that such identification is likely because of the extensive surveillance activities conducted by the Burmese government of politically active Burmese exiles. See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (IJ must consider [e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal in determining whether torture is likely there). Because entitlement to relief under the Convention may be proved by purely objective evidence that torture is likely, and does not require proof of a subjective component, the genuineness or lack thereof of Tun's political beliefs is irrelevant to his entitlement to relief under the Convention. See Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d at 184. It would be sufficient to establish that the Burmese authorities are likely to perceive Tun as a dissident and torture him for that reason, regardless of whether his dissent was genuine or self-serving.