Opinion ID: 1811133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Chancery Court awarded excessive punitive damages.

Text: The chancellor awarded $1,000,000 in punitive damages unconditionally based on Valley Forge's assertion of subrogation rights and another contingent $1,000,000 based on the failure to obtain court approval for the Louisiana settlement. We affirm the unconditional award under this heading and address the contingent award below. Valley Forge's argument on this issue consists of two assertions that punitive damages in any amount are improper. First the company denies any malice or recklessness. According to Valley Forge, the Stricklands' insurance claim was handled promptly and fairly, with coverage acknowledged and limits paid one month after notification of the claim. Thus, in Valley Forge's estimation, there was no evidence of an intent to cause harm. Next Valley Forge denied any actual damage and cited precedent to the effect that, an award of punitive damages must be supported by the existence of actual damages. See Defenbaugh and Co. v. Rogers, 543 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Miss. 1989). The company claims that Tina suffered no actual harm as a result of its conduct. According to Valley Forge, the Chancery Court did not articulate how, and in what amount, Tina had been actually harmed. No hard and fast rule exists for establishing the maximum amount of punitive damages awardable in any given case. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172 (Miss. 1990); Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254 (Miss. 1985). Instead, the amount must be considered in light of several factors. First, the amount awarded should serve to punish the insurer and to deter it from committing similar offenses in the future. Second, the amount should serve as an example set to deter others from committing similar offenses. Third the amount awarded should account for the insurer's pecuniary ability and financial worth. And fourth, the amount constitutes compensation for the plaintiff for his or her public service in bringing the action. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172 (Miss. 1990). On appeal, an award will be disturbed only where it is so excessive that it evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience of the court. Williams, 566 So.2d at 1190; Crenshaw, 483 So.2d at 278. The $1,000,000 amount awarded unconditionally below is not shocking to the conscience of the Court. In fact the 1.5% of net worth awarded here is proportionately lower than in other similar cases. See e.g., Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172 (Miss. 1990) (5 1/4 per cent of net worth affirmed). Given the egregiousness of Valley Forge's conduct in holding up Tina's recovery for her injuries, as well as the serious actual damages suffered, it cannot be said that this award was so excessive as to evidence passion, bias, or prejudice on the part of the chancellor. Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.