Opinion ID: 2633165
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Friends Is Entitled to Full Reasonable Attorney's Fees as a Prevailing Party Public Interest Litigant.

Text: Under Alaska law, the prevailing party is the one who successfully prosecuted or defended the action and prevailed on the main issue. [10] The prevailing party in civil litigation is normally entitled to recover partial attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. But if the prevailing party is a public interest litigant, it is normally entitled to full reasonable attorney's fees. [11] Because the city does not argue on appeal that Friends is not a public interest litigant, Friends is entitled to full reasonable attorney's fees if the superior court did not err in finding it to be the prevailing party. After the superior court issued the preliminary injunction, the city rendered the merits of the competitive bidding dispute moot by amending KMC 7.15.050(5) to exempt facilities management from KMC 7.15.040's competitive bidding requirement and by entering into a new contract with the club. We will decide the merits of otherwise-moot cases in order to determine the prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fee awards. [12] We therefore focus on whether Friends successfully prosecuted the case and prevailed on the main issue in obtaining the preliminary injunction; this requires us to consider whether the superior court abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction.
We have recently described what a plaintiff must show to obtain a preliminary injunction: The showing required to obtain a preliminary injunction depends on the nature of the threatened injury. If the plaintiff faces the danger of irreparable harm and if the opposing party is adequately protected, then we apply a balance of hardships approach in which the plaintiff must raise serious and substantial questions going to the merits of the case; that is, the issues raised cannot be frivolous or obviously without merit. If, however, the plaintiff's threatened harm is less than irreparable or if the opposing party cannot be adequately protected, then we demand of the plaintiff the heightened standard of a clear showing of probable success on the merits.[ [13] ] The superior court found that Friends faced irreparable harm, that the city was adequately protected, and that Friends demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of [its] claim.
Although the city argues that the superior court did not make adequate findings that Friends was faced with irreparable harm, [14] it does not contend that Friends was not faced with irreparable harm. If we were reviewing the issuance of a preliminary injunction in a pending case, and concluded that the findings were inadequate, we would remand to the superior court for additional findings. [15] But remanding for additional findings in this case would be a needless exercise, given that the ultimate issue in this attorney's fees appeal is whether Friends was the prevailing party. The dispute that resulted in the injunction in this case is moot. Because the city does not argue that Friends was not faced with irreparable harm, we decline to consider whether the superior court abused its discretion in finding the threat of irreparable harm here. The superior court also found that [t]he security posted by [Friends] under the circumstances is sufficient to protect the city. The city argues that it was not adequately protected and that the superior court's finding was clearly erroneous. When a party requesting a preliminary injunction has shown probable success on the merits, a preliminary injunction may be issued even if the injury from the preliminary injunction may not be adequately indemnified by a bond. [16] The superior court found that Friends had demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Because the court thought it was more likely than not that Friends would prevail on the merits of its claim, we interpret the court's finding of substantial likelihood of success on the merits as a finding of probable success on the merits. [17] If the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Friends had demonstrated probable success on the merits, any possible error in its finding that the city was adequately protected is harmless. We therefore turn to whether Friends demonstrated probable success on the merits.
There is no factual dispute on appeal that the city did not conduct competitive bidding before awarding the original management contract to the club. Whether Friends demonstrated probable success on the merits therefore turns on the legal question whether the pre-amendment version of KMC 7.15.050(5) exempted management of the center from KMC 7.15.040's competitive bidding requirement. Before September 3, 2003 KMC 7.15.050 provided: The following may be purchased without giving an opportunity for competitive bidding: ... (5) Contractual services of a professional nature, such as engineering, architectural, and medical services.
The city, citing Laborers Local No. 942 v. Lampkin, [18] contends that the reasonable basis test applies to the city's interpretation of its procurement code. In Lampkin we held that a city's interpretation of its own procurement code will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis for the interpretation. [19] Under the rational basis test, we will uphold a governmental unit's decision if it is supported by the facts and has a reasonable basis in law, even if we may not agree with the [unit's] ultimate determination. [20] The city argues that because it had a reasonable basis to conclude that the term professional services included management of the center, the superior court abused its discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction. But we apply the reasonable basis standard of review to a municipality's interpretation of its own ordinances only when this interpretation implicates complex matters or the formulation of fundamental policy. [21] Lampkin concerned a Fairbanks North Star Borough requirement that the successful bidder for a school renovation project enter into a previously negotiated Project Labor Agreement (PLA). [22] We noted that the construction project unquestionably presented special challenges, and that the PLA would facilitate necessary flexible scheduling and eliminate the potential for strikes or other labor difficulties. [23] We held the borough had a reasonable basis to conclude that the PLA would allow the borough to satisfy its minimum needs, its procurement code's policy of maximum practicable competition, and the procurement code's provisions dealing with sole source procurement. [24] The legal question in this case is far less complex, involving only the meaning of services of a professional nature. Nor is there any indication that defining that phrase implicates the formulation of fundamental policy. We therefore conclude that although the superior court held that the city's interpretation failed even the reasonable basis test, the court could have interpreted pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5) using its independent judgment. Because we review de novo the superior court's legal determinations in issuing the preliminary injunction, [25] we review the meaning of pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5) using our independent judgment. We then review for abuse of discretion the superior court's determination of probability of success on the merits and its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction.
The superior court relied on what it characterized as the clear language of the ordinance in determining that management of the center was not a service of a professional nature. The city cites several cases from other jurisdictions holding that in the context of similar procurement codes, management of various facilities was professional in nature. [26] At least some of these cases are easily distinguishable. [27] Moreover, numerous cases from other jurisdictions hold that management of facilities is not professional in nature and requires competitive bidding. [28] Opinions from other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutes can be persuasive, [29] but we turn first to our own methods of statutory interpretation. Interpretation of a statute begins with its text. [30] We apply the same rules of interpretation to municipal ordinances. [31] In interpreting statutes, we have adopted a sliding scale approach, under which [t]he plainer the statutory language is, the more convincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be. [32] Black's Law Dictionary defines professional as [a] person who belongs to a learned profession or whose occupation requires a high level of training and proficiency. [33] Webster's Third International Dictionary provides a similar definition. [34] [S]ervices of a professional nature are therefore commonly understood to be services that are rendered by a member of the learned professions or that require a high level of training and proficiency. The illustrative clause  such as engineering, architectural, and medical services  that follows services of a professional nature provides textual support for this interpretation. [35] Pursuant to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, a general term, when followed by specific terms, will be interpreted in light of the characteristics of the specific terms, absent clear indication to the contrary. [36] Before its 2003 amendment, KMC 7.15.050(5) listed only engineering, architectural, and medical services as examples of services of a professional nature. These specific examples all require extensive education, training, and proficiency. Most professions encompassed by these examples require licensing in Alaska. [37] There has been no contention, much less any evidence, that successful management of the city's recreation center requires education, training, or proficiency equivalent to that required of engineers, architects, and providers of medical services. In light of the plain meaning of services of a professional nature and the specific examples listed in pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5), we conclude that the phrase services of a professional nature does not include facilities management. We therefore agree with the superior court that management of the center does not involve services of a professional nature as that phrase was used in pre-amendment KMC 7.15.050(5). The superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that Friends had demonstrated probable success on the merits.
The city asserts that Friends is not the prevailing party because the city accomplished exactly what it set out to accomplish and what Friends's lawsuit sought to preventprivate management of the center. It argues that because Friends did not achieve its goal, Friends is not the prevailing party. When determining prevailing party status, we have consistently looked to whether the party successfully prosecuted or defended the action and to whether the party prevailed on the main issue. [38] Our determination of prevailing party status has therefore traditionally focused on the litigation itself. Furthermore, the purposes of the public interest litigant exception to Civil Rule 82 suggest that the city's political success in amending KMC 7.15.050(5) and entering into a second management contract with the club is not an appropriate basis for concluding that Friends is not the prevailing party. We award prevailing public interest litigants full reasonable attorney's fees to encourage plaintiffs to raise issues of public interest. [39] This suggests that the focus of the prevailing party determination should be on the litigation, rather than on contemporaneous political or contractual developments. The city has not convinced us that a public interest litigant that brings a meritorious claim against a governmental unit and obtains a preliminary injunction loses its prevailing party status if, through the political process, the governmental unit later moots the lawsuit and accomplishes its challenged goals. Because Friends succeeded in obtaining the only judicial relief granted in this case before it was dismissed without objection as moot following amendment of the ordinance, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Friends was the prevailing party. [40]