Opinion ID: 795823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Angeles-Mascote and Dominguez Benitez

Text: 17 Both parties call our attention to United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.2000). In Angeles-Mascote, the defendant was charged with knowingly entering and being found in the United States after deportation, contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The defendant pleaded guilty to that charge but argued on appeal the Rule 11 evidence showed that he only attempted entry, and could not have been found in the United States since he never actually entered. Id. at 531. Under plain error review, this court vacated the guilty plea because the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant had actually entered: 18 The appropriate indictment ... would have been to charge [defendant] with attempting to enter the United States after previously being deported . . . there is a clear distinction between actual entry into the United States, and attempted entry. [citation] That distinction being that `actual entry' has been found by most courts to require both physical presence in the country as well as freedom from official restraint, while `attempted entry' only requires that the person approach a port of entry and make a false claim of citizenship or non-resident alien status. Id. 19 This court held that the government's failure to charge the correct offense in the indictment could not be harmless since [a]n indictment is intended to provide notice to the defendant that allows him to intelligently consider his defense or plea. Id. at 532. This court also found unpersuasive the government's argument that even if the factual basis is insufficient none of [the defendant's] substantial rights were affected because a charge of attempted entry provides for the same statutory maximum sentence as a charge of actual entry. Id. 20 It is not clear that the Angeles-Mascote panel regarded attempted entry as a lesser included offense of the charged section 1326 offense, as the panel apparently viewed the attempted entry offense as requiring the making of a false claim of citizenship or non-resident alien status. Id. at 531. In any event, Angeles-Mascote was decided without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decisions in Vonn 17 and Dominguez Benitez, 18 and necessarily must be construed in light of those cases. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Dominguez Benitez stresses: 21 [T]he point ... is not to second-guess a defendant's actual decision [to plead guilty]; if it is reasonably probable he would have gone to trial absent the error, it is no matter that the choice may have been foolish. The point, rather, is to enquire whether the omitted [Rule 11 procedure] would have made the difference required by the standard of reasonable probability. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S.Ct. at 2341. Dominguez Benitez holds further: 22 [A] defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea. A defendant must thus satisfy the judgment of the reviewing court, informed by the entire record, that the probability of a different result is `sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome' of the proceeding. Id. at 2340 (internal citations omitted). 23 Dominguez Benitez necessarily modifies our reasoning in Angeles-Mascote by increasing the burden for defendants in situations similar to Castro-Trevino's. As such, Castro-Trevino must demonstrate both that his substantial rights were adversely affected and that he would not have entered his guilty plea but for the error. 24