Opinion ID: 1292234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the Superior Court Abuse Its Discretion When It Bifurcated Balough's Case into an Administrative Appeal Limited to the Agency Record and a Separate Civil Suit for Balough's Section 1983 Claims?

Text: The superior court bifurcated Balough's Section 1983 claims from her claims relating to the BOA's decision to deny her grandfather rights. In its decision regarding Balough's administrative appeal, the superior court addressed five issues: (1) whether the Borough Assembly had substantial evidence to support the rezoning; (2) whether the rezoning was unconstitutional spot zoning; (3) whether the Assembly erred in not exempting Balough's property from the rezone; (4) whether the BOA had substantial evidence to revoke Balough's grandfather rights; and (5) whether the Assembly's or BOA's actions violated Balough's rights to due process or equal protection of law, or amounted to an unconstitutional taking. The court explicitly stated that Balough could not raise estoppel in her administrative appeal. In its decision regarding Balough's direct Section 1983 suit against FNSB, the superior court addressed: (1) whether Balough stated a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in any of the six counts in her complaints; (2) whether the administrative appeal decision should have precluded Balough's Section 1983 claims; (3) whether FNSB was entitled to summary judgment on the merits on all of Balough's remaining claims; and (4) whether Balough was entitled to summary judgment on her claim that she had a vested right in the GU-1 zoning. The superior court declined to address whether FNSB could be estopped from denying Balough grandfather rights, because it concluded that her estoppel claim did not state a cause of action under Section 1983. Balough appeals virtually every determination made by the superior court. In effect, Balough argues that the superior court abused its discretion when it bifurcated her single civil suit into an administrative appeal and a direct suit encompassing her Section 1983 claims, because [a]ny direct challenge that [her] Complaint presents to the FNSB Board of Adjustment's decision is intertwined with her accompanying challenges to the constitutionality of the FNSB grandfather-rights and zoning scheme and her civil-rights claims to damages and other relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court's decision to bifurcate the administrative-appeal aspects of the case so that part of the case then proceeded under an administrative-appeal briefing schedule and the other part proceeded under the Civil Rules ... [was] not practical in view of the intertwined nature of the various aspects of the case. Balough urges this court to grant her a full trial de novo on the administrative appeal aspects of her case. If not, Balough argues, she will be denied her right to a jury trial. 1. Trial de novo Balough cannot now assert that the superior court abused its discretion in not granting her a full trial de novo on her administrative appeal claims because she never moved the superior court to do so. The superior court specifically told Balough that if she wanted a trial de novo on her administrative appeal she would have to file a motion so requesting. She never filed such a motion. She did file a motion to supplement the agency record with depositions. In that motion, Balough stated that the Court has expansive powers to supplement the record and to otherwise conduct a trial de novo under Appellant Rule 609. Accordingly, under Appellate Rule 210(c)(3), the Court has broad authority to grant leave to file a supplemental excerpt. Thus, while Balough noted that the superior court could conduct a trial de novo, Balough merely requested that the court exercise its power and grant [her] leave to supplement the record with the referenced portions of depositions. The court denied Balough's motion, and later sanctioned her for referring to documents not in the agency record in her brief and excerpt of record. At oral argument the court again repeated its refusal to consider evidence outside of the agency record, stating that it had consistently refused to consider a partial de novo trial in the sense that the court takes a look at new evidence. Because Balough failed to move the superior court to hear her administrative appeal in a de novo trial, and because the court denied all of her motions to supplement the agency record because it believed the record was complete, we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to limit Balough's administrative appeal to the agency record. 2. Bifurcation of Balough's case The superior court bifurcated the administrative aspects of Balough's case from the Section 1983 claims, because it concluded that several of the claims [were] functionally administrative appeals because they require the Court to consider the propriety of agency determination, agency in the broadest sense, including the Borough sitting as the Board of Adjustment. The court stayed all proceedings regarding the Section 1983 claims pending the resolution of the [administrative] appeal. We have previously held that bifurcation of a trial is generally within the discretion of a trial court, and a ruling on this issue will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. [27] We have further stated that `[a] claim is functionally an administrative appeal if it requires the court to consider the propriety of an agency determination' [28] and that the key question ... is whether the claim challenges a prior administrative decision. [29] A BOA decision is an administrative decision. [30] An aspect of Balough's original suit challenged the BOA's decision to revoke her grandfather rights, requiring the court to look at the propriety of the BOA's decision. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that part of her suit was functionally an administrative appeal, and to bifurcate her claims accordingly. [31] Furthermore, the superior court did not eliminate Balough's Section 1983 claims when it converted part of her case to an administrative appeal; rather, the court merely stayed those proceedings, and later heard separate oral argument on the Section 1983 claims.