Opinion ID: 1362580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Garcia-Lara's Sentence

Text: We now turn specifically to Mr. Garcia-Lara's sentence. Applying the career offender provision of the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(A), and an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the District Court correctly calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. The court then sentenced Mr. Garcia-Lara to 140 months' imprisonmenta 47%, 122-month decrease from the 262-month Guidelines minimum. We note at the outset that the problem here does not lie in the manner in which the District Court set forth its reasoning concerning the sentence imposed. In other words, the sentence is reasonable in a procedural sense. See Cage, 451 F.3d at 591 (explaining [r]easonableness has both procedural and substantive components). Indeed, the District Court correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines sentence and then noted the pertinent § 3553(a) factors it considered in varying from that advisory sentence. See United States v. Sanchez-Juarez, 446 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir.2006) (holding district courts must provide sufficient reasons to allow meaningful appellate review of their discretionary sentencing decisions). The issue before us is therefore whether the District Court's reasons for the sentence imposed support the conclusion that the sentence is substantively reasonable. We have held that, [t]he farther the [trial] court diverges from the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must be. [1] Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1239 (quotation omitted) (alterations in original). Specifically, an extreme divergence is reasonable given dramatic facts. Cage, 451 F.3d at 594. A substantial variance requires compelling reasons, although they need not be as dramatic as the reasons supporting an extreme divergence. Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1128 (quotations omitted). A lesser but still significant variance needs only sufficient explanation and justification to be within the range of reasonableness. United States v. Bishop, 469 F.3d 896, 908 (10th Cir.2006). To assess the magnitude of a variance, we look to the difference between the advisory Guidelines range and the sentence imposed in terms of both percentage and absolute number of months. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. In terms of the absolute number of months, the 122-month divergence in this case more closely resembles variances we have characterized as extreme, see, e.g., United States v. Mateo, 471 F.3d 1162, 1170 (10th Cir.2006) (99 months), than those we have characterized as substantial, see, e.g., Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1128 (27 months). The 47%-percent decrease, however, more closely resembles divergences we have characterized as substantial or significant. See id. at 1127-28 (reviewing and categorizing variance cases). But we need not decide whether the divergence is extreme or substantial because, even under the level of scrutiny we apply to substantial variances, the sentence imposed is not reasonable. As we explain below, the District Court did not justify the variance with compelling reasons. The District Court based the 140-month sentence on its conclusion that the defendant's criminal history category and the overall impact of the career offender adjustment overstates the seriousness of [the] defendant's criminal history and produces a sentence which is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553. In reaching this conclusion, the court specifically noted that none of Mr. Garcia-Lara's convictions were for crimes of violence, his prior drug convictions did not involve large quantities of drugs, his last drug conviction was at the age of 22 (Mr. Garcia-Lara was 30 years old at the time of sentencing), and his longest term in prison has been about 2½ years. Based on these facts, the court concluded that a sentence of 140 months was proper and reasonable to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to provide just punishment, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (2)(C), (6). First, the fact that Mr. Garcia-Lara's crimes were nonviolent and involved moderate quantities of drugs does not support the District Court's conclusion that the career offender enhancement overstates his criminal history. The Guidelines do not condition application of the career offender provision on prior commission of crimes of violence; indeed, § 4B1.1 requires only two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (emphasis added). Nor does the career offender provision set a threshold quantity requirement in order for a controlled substance conviction to qualify. Indeed, the purpose behind the career offender guideline is to carry out congressional intent to target specific recidivism, including repeat drug traffickers. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 cmt. background. As reflected in the PSR, there is no question that Mr. Garcia-Lara is a recidivist drug dealer. Since Mr. Garcia-Lara entered the United States from Mexico in 1990, he has spent most of his time in prison or on probation, largely for controlled substance offenses. The PSR lists arrests beginning in August 1990 for narcotics offenses and indicates that Mr. Garcia-Lara's deportation was ordered in 1990. Shortly thereafter, in March 1991, he was convicted for selling cocaine. Apparently while Mr. Garcia-Lara was serving probation for this offense, he was arrested for the transport or sale of a controlled substance; was arrested, convicted, and spent ten days in jail for criminal trespass; and was arrested for the sale of cocaine. Less than a week after this last arrest for selling cocaine, Mr. Garcia-Lara's probation for the March 1991 conviction was revoked. It appears that he then served over one year of his three-year prison term and was paroled in January 1994. Approximately two months after being released on parole, Mr. Garcia-Lara was arrested and subsequently convicted for possession of cocaine and was sentenced to two years in prison. After serving over one year in prison, he was paroled in May 1995. Just short of two months after being released from prison, Mr. Garcia-Lara was arrested and subsequently convicted of possession of cocaine base for sale. He received a five-year prison sentence and served over two-and-a-half years in prison before being released on parole in June 1998 and subsequently deported. Less than two years after he was deported, Mr. Garcia-Lara was again arrestedthis time for re-entry after deportationand was sentenced to 48 months in custody followed by three years of supervised release. He served three-and-a-half years in prison and was released from custody in November 2003. Less than one year later, on November 20, 2004, he committed the instant offense involving 18 pounds of marijuana and over 500 grams of methamphetamine. For every separate criminal conviction, Mr. Garcia-Lara gave a different alias. We recount Mr. Garcia-Lara's criminal history in such detail to illustrate his demonstrated propensity to break the law and, in particular, to commit drug offenses. Thus, to the extent the District Court believed the career offender enhancement over-represented Mr. Garcia-Lara's prior criminal history, it ignored Congress's policy of targeting recidivist drug offenders for more severe punishment. [2] Such an exercise of the District Court's discretion may be reasonable if there are sufficiently compelling reasons, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, that justify the imposition of a non-Guidelines sentence. Here, the District Court has provided none. In particular, the court's decision not to apply the career offender guideline is not justified by particular characteristics of the defendant that are sufficiently uncommon. Mateo, 471 F.3d at 1169. Rather, Mr. Garcia-Lara's criminal history satisfies the requirement for the guideline's application, namely two prior controlled substance offenses. In addition to these offenses, the PSR notes several controlled substance arrests that did not result in conviction or for which the disposition is unknown. Further, the fact that Mr. Garcia-Lara's last controlled substance offense occurred when he was 22 years old ignores the fact that he spent much of the intervening time in prison or, presumably, outside the country after he was deported. Similarly, even the fact that Mr. Garcia-Lara's longest prison term was three-and-a-half years (not two and a half, as the District Court found) ignores the reality that he had several such sentences, many following just a few months after a prior release from prison. In short, Mr. Garcia-Lara's characteristics and criminal history are not out of the ordinary. [3] Cage, 451 F.3d at 596. As our case law makes clear, a sentencing court may not accord ordinary facts extraordinary weight. Id. at 595; see also Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1129 (holding that sentence was unreasonable because the court did not distinguish the defendant or his offense from the ordinary defendant upon which the Guidelines sentence is calculated). That is, a sentencing court may not ignore the Guidelines calculation for the ordinary defendant and instead adopt its own sentencing philosophy. [4] See Hildreth, 485 F.3d at 1129. Moreover, in the present case, because the District Court failed to distinguish Mr. Garcia-Lara from other career offenders, it incorrectly applied the § 3553(a) factor requiring consideration of the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among [similar] defendants. [5] § 3553(a)(6). The District Court explained that the 140-month sentence did not create disparity among defendants with similar records because the sentence would be within the Guidelines range of a defendant under the same facts who was not treated as a career offender. But this logic depends on the court's unreasonable determination that Mr. Garcia-Lara should not be treated as a career offender. The statute specifically requires that a sentencing court consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. § 3553(a)(6) (emphasis added). Because the court did not distinguish Mr. Garcia-Lara from the ordinary career offender, the court should have considered how the chosen sentence would further the goal of sentencing uniformity with respect to other career offenders with similar records convicted of the same offense. The court's substantial divergence from the applicable Guidelines range clearly does not further that goal. In sum, sentencing a career offender as if he did not have a career offender's criminal record, absent sufficiently compelling circumstances, does not serve the statutory purposes noted by the District Court. The District Court's 140-month sentence is therefore unreasonable.