Opinion ID: 186589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board's Case Under Wright Line's First Prong

Text: 30 Detroit News argues that the Board's Wright Line analysis should not have advanced beyond the first prong, as the Board's General Counsel was unable to establish any concrete connection between Hydorn's protected activity — his participation in the strike from 1995-97 — and his eventual discharge. The Company takes exception to each of the Board's findings supporting its justification for the conclusion that Hydorn's protected conduct was a motivating factor in his discharge. Whether taken separately or as a whole, Detroit News asserts that the record evidence clearly shows that Hydorn was fired solely for his blatant insubordination. 31 Our review of the Board's findings of fact is limited to whether they are `supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.' Palace Sports, 411 F.3d at 220 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2000)). But while the Board's findings are entitled to respect[,]. . . they must nonetheless be set aside when the record . . . clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within its special competence or both. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). Thus, `a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.' Epilepsy Found. of NE Ohio v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1103 (D.C.Cir.2001) (quoting Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. 456). 32 As noted above, the Board offered three primary reasons for holding that the General Counsel met its burden of proving that Hydorn's protected activity was a motivating factor in his discharge. We evaluate each of the Board's contentions below.
33 Hydorn was informed by letter that his discharge was the result of his refusal to follow the instructions and the direct order given by [his] supervisor. Discharge Letter, supra, J.A. 60. It is undisputed that Hydorn repeatedly told his supervisors that he would never perform the required work. This defiance continued even after the supervisors' position was confirmed by the Union Steward, whose presence Hydorn requested. Indeed, Hydorn went so far as to say that the employer would have to fire him before he would comply. Therefore, the discharge letter was accurate in stating that Hydorn had refused to follow the instructions and direct orders of his supervisors. 34 This notwithstanding, the Board found that the Respondent's stated reason for discharging Hydorn is false. Detroit News, 2004 WL 2203014, at . Why? Because, according to the Board, while Hydorn may have exhibited insubordinate behavior on August 25, we agree with the [ALJ] that `he never defied a direct order to remedy a pending paper drag.' Id. (quoting Decision, slip op. at 11, J.A. 15). At oral argument, the Board's counsel attempted to explain the Board's theory: Who knows what would have happened if they had actually let [Hydorn] . . . . process the papers? He may have agreed to do it. Recording of Oral Argument at 19:46. 35 The Board's claim is disingenuous. Hydorn precipitated the incident leading to his discharge by stating, in unequivocal terms, that he would not perform the specific, clearly delineated duties associated with his job. An employee like Hydorn can refuse to follow a direct order to perform specific work that is pending at the time the order is given, or he can refuse to perform that work when it arises in the future. In either case, the refusal to perform the duties of the job is a flagrant act of insubordination. In other words, in either instance, an employee who, like Hydorn, says he will not perform work that is within the compass of his assigned duties has flatly defied the instructions of management. The orders given to Hydorn were not hypothetical and neither were Hydorn's refusals. Therefore, we find that Detroit News' discharge notice to Hydorn was not false, as the Board found, in stating that Hydorn was fired for his refusal to follow the instructions and the direct order given by [his] supervisor.
36 To support its contention that the acrimonious backdrop of the discharge was evidence of discriminatory motive, the Board referenced the prolonged and bitter strike and the antiunion sentiments allegedly expressed by a Company supervisor. Without more, however, these claims are virtually meaningless. The strike ended over two and a half years prior to Hydorn's return, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that there was reason for the Company to single out Hydorn for negative treatment. The only evidence offered was that Hydorn had picketed along with many other striking Union members. It was never alleged, however, that he was a Union leader or that he had any exceptional run-in with the Company as part of his Union activity. Nothing indicates that he was singled out for bad treatment when he returned to work. And there is not one iota of evidence relied upon by the Board in its first-prong Wright Line analysis to suggest that the employer engaged in a pattern or practice of negative treatment aimed at returning strikers. 37 The alleged antiunion statements made by supervisor Monroig also offer little to the Board's case. First, it is unclear whether Monroig actually uttered those statements, as the lone testimony supporting this claim came from Union Steward Harold Sorenson, who the ALJ found to be very lacking in credibility. See Decision, slip op. at 8, J.A. 12. And while the Board notes that the ALJ credited Sorenson's testimony where it was not contradicted by other witnesses, see Detroit News, 2004 WL 2203014, at  n. 7, it failed to note that the ALJ did not rely on Sorenson's Monroig testimony to support his finding of antiunion animus. Second, it appears that those alleged statements were made only to Sorenson. See Trial Tr. at 203 (3/14/00), J.A. 355. Monroig's alleged passing comments to Sorenson hardly constructed a viable backdrop against which to assess the Company's discipline of Hydorn. Finally, Monroig was not directly involved in the final decision to terminate Hydorn, so any potential impact he had on that decision was necessarily circumscribed. 38
39 The Board's final rationale supporting its first-prong decision is that Detroit News both failed to thoroughly investigate the incident leading to Hydorn's suspension and discharge, thereby contravening its own guidelines, and neglected to adhere to its progressive discipline policy. Detroit News, 2004 WL 2203014, at -6. These arguments are red herrings. The Board does its best to paint Taylor's seminar as installing mandatory guidelines for disciplinary review, but that implication is specious. The Board has not cited any agreed-upon termination procedure between the Union and the Company, and puts forth no cogent reason for why Taylor's alleged departure from his written seminar outline is evidence of antiunion animus. Indeed, Detroit News was not obliged to investigate Hydorn's case in any particular way, and further, the Board offers nothing material that the employer would have uncovered had it investigated the matter differently. 40 In addition, there is no evidence that Detroit News promulgated a progressive discipline policy that limited the action that it could take against Hydorn. We made clear in Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio v. NLRB that 41 [t]he Board does not have authority to regulate all behavior in the workplace and it cannot function as a ubiquitous personnel manager, supplanting its judgment on how to respond to unprotected, insubordinate behavior for those of an employer. It is well recognized that an employer is free to lawfully run its business as it pleases. This means that an employer may discharge an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason, so long as it is not for an unlawful reason. 42 268 F.3d at 1105. 43 In short, the three reasons relied upon by the Board to justify its finding that the General Counsel met its burden under the first prong of Wright Line are not supported by substantial evidence. Without more, they fail to meet the necessary threshold to support a conclusion that antiunion animus was a motivating factor in Hydorn's discharge. 44