Opinion ID: 2648037
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Jury Bargaining

Text: Costa also argues that the prosecutor improperly accused Costa of trying to bargain with the jury. After summarizing the evidence against Costa, the prosecutor suggested that the reason Costa admitted his guilt on Counts I, II, and III at trial, but not 7 on Count IV, was because he was trying to “bargain” or “horse trade” with the jury – asking, in return for his concessions, that the jury find him not guilty of Count IV. (App. at A1585-86.) Costa also characterizes the prosecutor‟s attack on the defense as amounting to a statement that the defense was a “sham” aimed at “deceitfully bargaining directly with the jury.” (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 29.) As already discussed, the government did not presuppose Costa‟s guilt or shift the burden of proof, even though Costa admitted his guilt to Counts I, II, and III. Furthermore, “attacking and exposing flaws in one‟s opponent‟s arguments is a major purpose of closing argument.” United States v. Rivas, 493 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that permitting a comment that “attempted to focus the jury‟s attention on holes in the defense‟s theory” was not plain error). While it is improper for counsel to “introduce information based on personal belief or knowledge,” he “may state his views of what the evidence shows and the inferences and conclusions that the evidence supports … .” Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1265 n.11. In this case, the prosecutor‟s suggestion of the motive behind Costa‟s trial strategy was not so untoward as to warrant any conclusion that the District Court plainly erred in permitting it.6 6 Additionally, Costa argues that the prosecutor used his prior convictions improperly in closing arguments. The prosecutor asserted that “Costa knows about a bargain” because he was previously charged with five counts of felony Medicaid fraud in state court but pleaded to misdemeanors. (App. at A1585.) As the government recognizes, the District Court had ruled that the prior convictions were admissible for two limited purposes: impeaching Costa‟s character, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 609, and showing Costa‟s motive to sell Renaissance, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). It is arguable that Costa opened the door to a broader use of his prior 8 c. Reference to the Prosecutors’ Experience and Insight Costa argues that the prosecutor vouched for his own experience in prosecuting powder cocaine traffickers and for his co-counsel‟s “insight and knowledge of this case.” (App. at A1581.) Vouching “threatens to „convey the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges against the defendant.‟” United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 133 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Walker, 155 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1998)). Improper vouching may occur if a prosecutor makes “repeated comments aimed at establishing his own veracity and credibility as a representative of the government.” United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Lee, 612 F.3d at 195 (holding that a prosecutor is not allowed to speak about his own personal experiences). Costa promptly and successfully objected to the lead prosecutor‟s alleged vouching for his own experience in prosecuting other drug-related cases. Assuming that the prosecutor indeed engaged in improper vouching, however, “a new trial is not warranted because it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to [Costa‟s] conviction.”7 Lee, 612 F.3d at 195. The prosecutor did not continue the vouching after convictions, but, even if the prosecutor‟s use of the prior convictions was improper, the passing comment about bargaining inflicted no prejudice that would warrant a new trial. 7 Vouching is a non-constitutional error, United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 286 & n.10 (3d Cir. 1999), so the question of prejudice is whether it is “highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment,” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d Cir. 2000). 9 the District Court sustained the objection.8 He immediately moved on, emphasizing that “the trial necessarily focuses on [Costa]” and observing that the crimes were not victimless. (App. at A1605.) Moreover, the District Court reminded the jury that “what is said in closing arguments is not evidence.” (App. at A1565). Viewed in the context of the entire trial record, it is not highly probable that the prosecutor‟s vouching for himself weighed on the jury‟s decision, and, therefore, a new trial is not warranted. See Lee, 612 F.3d at 195 (holding that, “even though the prosecutor did cross the line into improper vouching,” a new trial was not necessary because, inter alia, “the prosecutor did not continue the vouching once an objection was raised and the District Court directed the prosecutor to move on”). Similarly, even if the lead prosecutor‟s passing reference to the knowledge and insight of his co-prosecutor was vouching, it was a passing comment and not so prejudicial as to warrant a new trial.