Opinion ID: 1879617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Negligent-Failure-to-Adequately-Warn Claim

Text: The elements of a claim based on a negligent failure to adequately warn are duty, breach, causation, and damages. [T]he plaintiff must provide ... evidence that [the] defendant breached a duty, and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. Gurley v. American Honda Motor Co., 505 So.2d 358, 361 (Ala.1987). The issues raised by the parties as to Carruth's claim that Pittway negligently failed to adequately warn relate to the negligence elements of breach and causation. Pittway does not contend that it had no duty to warn about installation in dead air space, but, rather, that it did not breach its duty, and it contends that in any event Carruth showed no causal link between the alleged breach and the deaths. We will first address the parties' arguments as to the breach questionwhether the Pittway pamphlet conveyed an inadequate warning about installation in dead air space. As stated, Carruth concedes that he did not read in depth the pamphlet he complains of. He suggests that he was unaware of information about locating the detector in dead air space, even after casually scanning the pamphlet and observing information on the box the detector came in regarding where to locate the detector. He argues that the instructions in the Pittway pamphlet were so formidable in general that a consumer is discouraged from reading them fully. Carruth says that the breach of duty in this case comes from the Pittway pamphlet's presentation of information about dead air space concerns; he says those concerns were presented in a manner not calculated to attract the user's attention. If a vital warning is not read by the user of a product because it is conveyed in such a way that it is `not calculated to attract the user's attention, due to its position, size, and ... coloring,' then it can constitute a legally inadequate warning. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So.2d 963, 970 (Ala.1985), quoting Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 87 (4th Cir.1962). The law does not require that necessary warnings be conveyed in the best way possible, Gurley, 505 So.2d at 361, but does require that they not be conveyed in a manner that effectively prevents a consumer from reading them and being warned. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 477 So.2d at 971. Pittway argues that its pamphlet adequately conveys all the information that one needs regarding dead-air-space concerns. [4] However, a warning might even be perfectly adequate with respect to wording, but there can still be a breach of due care if the warning is such that it causes a potential plaintiff to fail to read the warning. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 477 So.2d at 970. In this regard, Pittway states that, based on ... a visual examination of the instructional material ..., [Pittway] adequately gave warnings and instructions about the proper location of smoke detectors in residences. Turning to an examination of that instructional material, the pamphlet, we observe the following: The pamphlet covers such matters as installation of the detector, general fire protection advice, special effectiveness limitations for the hard-of-hearing, information on use in a recreational vehicle or mobile home, and wide-ranging cautionary statements. The size of the pamphlet's text print is approximately half to two-thirds the size of typical print in a newspaper and could be fairly characterized as tightly spaced. Section headings are approximately the size of print in a newspaper. The pamphlet is seven pages in length, with the first page alone containing over 900 words, inclusive of a table of contents. The words warning, caution, and danger are interspersed throughout the pamphlet, but no section of the pamphlet covers all cautionary statements or directs the user to the locations of all cautionary statements. Cautionary statements and information about dead-air-space matters are interspersed in the text of the pamphlet. The pamphlet is in black ink on a white background. None of the statements related to dead-air-space is captioned by the words warning, caution, or danger, as are other cautionary statements. We observe also that a diagram on the box the detector came inthat diagram, Carruth said, was where he got a general idea of where would be the place, I thought, to put this [detector]could reasonably be understood to convey all the information one needs regarding where to locate the detector. Specifically, the box has a colored, and highly visible, diagram that unequivocally purports to show effective Detector ... Locations in Typical 2-Story Home. This diagram clearly suggests that the area immediately below a wall-ceiling junctionan area indicated by the record to constitute a potential dead air space is a suitable location for the detector. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Carruth, one could reasonably infer that Pittway conveyed important cautionary information about dead-air-space concerns in a way not calculated to attract the user's attention. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 477 So.2d at 970. Most particularly, from the pamphlet's format and print size, and the seemingly sufficient diagram on the box, a fair-minded person could reasonably infer that a user would be induced to only scan the pamphlet and thereby not get from the pamphlet the information about dead-air-space. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence presents a jury question as to whether the Pittway pamphlet provided a legally adequate warning about dead-air-space concerns. However, Carruth's claim alleging a negligent failure to adequately warn would still fail if, as Pittway argues, Carruth failed to produce substantial evidence as to causation. The crux of Carruth's claims is that the deaths in this case were proximately caused by the failure of the detector to sound a timely alarm (Carruth says that failure was caused by the failure of the pamphlet to properly alert him to dead-air-space concerns). Necessarily then, Carruth must show in support of his claim that the detector did not timely sound an alarm; otherwise, there is no causal link between the alleged breach of the duty to adequately warn, and the deaths. Pittway argues that the evidence indicated that the decedents were too far from the alarm to have heard it and, therefore, that one cannot reasonably infer, from the fact that everyone in the house at the time of the fire perished, that the alarm did not timely sound. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Carruth, we determine that there was substantial evidence that those in the house could have heard a timely alarm and that the detector did not sound a timely alarm. [5] We agree with Pittway that there is no direct evidence that the alarm did not timely sound. The witnesses perished as a result of the fire. However, Pittway wrongly assumes that an absence of direct evidence as to matters of causation equates to a lack of substantial evidence. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Harris, 630 So.2d 1018 (Ala.1993). Circumstantial evidence can constitute substantial evidence. Id. at 1026. In the present case, Munger testified that had the detector sounded a timely alarm, it would have sounded at least 15 decibels over normal noise in the upstairs bedroom area; such an alarm would have been sufficient, he said, to awaken those persons upstairs. In taking into account the level of background noise around the time of the fire, Munger testified that it was his understanding that it was pretty well stone quiet. When asked specifically about the existence of background noise from fans or air conditioning units in the bedroom areas, Munger stated that it was his understanding that [t]here was no air conditioning running, there were no fans running. As our discussion of the facts of this case indicates, this was incorrect. It is undisputed that both fans and window air conditioners were in use in the bedroom area around the time of the fire. Munger further testified, however, that the tests that I've doneI've been able to show a decibel reading of 45 decibels over a quiet background, so you've got a substantial margin there to have still supplied the [necessary] 15 decibels over a background ambient noise. This testimony indicates that there could be, in Munger's opinion, a substantial range of background noise over which the detector alarm could still have timely alerted those persons in the house. Also, Coy Carruth testified that Brian Carruth had heard the detector from an upstairs bedroom the last time it was tested by Carruth and had complained that it was too loud. The record indicates that Brian Carruth was upstairs and had been awake on the morning of the fire. Munger testified that the positions of the bodies of those killed indicated that six of them, including Brian Carruth, had made no attempts to flee the fire. Another person escaped the dwelling with burns of such severity as to indicate, according to Munger, that the house was well ablaze before that person had attempted to escape. Munger's testimony indicates that those facts are inconsistent with a timely alarm. Viewing the evidence most favorably to Carruth, we hold that there was substantial evidence from which fair-minded persons could infer that the lack of a timely alarm caused the deaths in question.