Opinion ID: 197774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Empire Strikes Back.

Text: 14 On March 3, 1997, PSNH, NU, and NAEC (collectively PSNH or the plaintiffs) filed suit in New Hampshire's federal district court against the members of the PUC. Their amended complaint limns a litany of federal preemption claims. These include a claim premised on section 201(b) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1994); a claim premised on sections 205 and 206 of the same statute, 16 U.S.C. § 824d, e; a claim premised on the filed rate doctrine, see, e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 856 F.2d 361, 369 (1st Cir.1988) (discussing doctrine); a claim premised on section 201 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 16 U.S.C.); and a claim premised on the Public Utility Holding Companies Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1994). The complaint also includes several constitutional claims, including three separate theories under which the PUC's orders allegedly work an unlawful taking; a Commerce Clause claim to the effect that the PUC is attempting impermissibly to regulate interstate commerce; a Contracts Clause claim to the effect that the Plan unlawfully compromises the Agreement; and a First Amendment claim that defies ready comprehension. Lastly, the complaint contains claims that the Plan transgresses an injunction entered by the bankruptcy court in 1990 and simultaneously violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 3 The complaint prays, inter alia, for an injunction against implementation of the Plan and a declaration that the Plan is unlawful. 15 On March 10, 1997, the district court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) that enjoined the defendants from enforcing those sections of the Plan that purported to restrict PSNH's ability to recover fully its stranded costs. Four days later, the court heard argument on a gallimaufry of intervention motions and took them under advisement pending a decision on ripeness and abstention (issues which, if determined adversely to the plaintiffs, would render intervention moot). The court scheduled a hearing on these issues for March 20 and granted the would-be intervenors leave to file amicus curiae briefs. On the appointed date, Judge Lagueux heard arguments and reserved decision. The next day, he amended the TRO to enjoin portions of the Plan that, in the plaintiffs' view, repudiated obligations created by the Agreement. He then continued the TRO pending further order of the court. 16 In due course, Judge Lagueux ruled that the case not only was ripe, but also an inappropriate candidate for abstention. See PSNH I, 962 F.Supp. at 229-44. The judge simultaneously signaled his intent to address the motions to intervene without further delay, noted that the TRO would remain in effect pending further order, and directed the clerk of court to schedule a preliminary injunction hearing in June. 4 See id. at 244. 17 On June 12, 1997, the district court denied the appellants' motions to intervene. See PSNH II, 173 F.R.D. at 26. The court held in substance that the appellants' interest in securing lower electric rates was too generalized to justify intervention as of right; that the appellants retained the ability to protect their interests in the Plan's implementation regardless of whether they were allowed to participate in the court case; and that, in all events, the presence of the PUC members as defendants ensured adequate representation of the appellants' interests in respect to the issues raised by the complaint. See id. at 26-27. The court did permit three other parties, Granite State Electric Company, Unitil Corporation, and the New Hampshire Electric Cooperative, to intervene on the plaintiffs' side of the case. See id. at 28. One would-be intervenor, the City of Manchester, moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.