Opinion ID: 1357706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Regulations 403.00 and 404.09, Vagueness Challenges

Text: (12a) Finally, the Ford Dealers challenge two regulations, claiming that both are unconstitutionally vague. Regulation 403.00 provides as follows: 403.00 Advertisements. Any advertised statements, representations, or offers made in connection with the sale or attempted sale of any vehicle(s) shall be clearly set forth, and based on facts and shall be subject to these regulations and the Vehicle Code. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 13, § 403.00.) (13a) Regulation 404.09 provides: 404.09 Qualifying Statements. Qualifying statements used in connection with vehicle advertisements, including the qualifying statements required by this article, shall be large enough and displayed for a sufficient period of time to enable the average reader or viewer to comprehend such statements. (Cal. Admin. Code, tit. 13, § 404.09.) (12b) The Ford Dealers complain that the phrases based on facts and clearly set forth are vague. (13b) In addition, they attack as vague the requirement that statements be large enough and displayed for a sufficient period of time so that an average person can understand them. (14a) Initially, it is important to note that when an administrative regulation is challenged the standard of constitutional vagueness is less strict than when a criminal law is attacked. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. ( Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville (1972) 405 U.S. 156, 162 [31 L.Ed.2d 110, 115-116, 92 S.Ct. 839]; Winters v. New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507, 515 [92 L.Ed. 840, 849, 68 S.Ct. 665] [(14b),(15) (See fn. 12.) The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement.].) [12] Further, when commercial speech is regulated, the United States Supreme Court has been less concerned with the dangers of overbreadth or a chilling effect because of the limited danger of inhibiting speech. ( Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, supra, 433 U.S. at pp. 380-381, 383 [53 L.Ed.2d at pp. 833-835]. See also United States v. National Dairy Corp., supra, 372 U.S. at p. 36 [9 L.Ed.2d at pp. 567-568].) (12c) The first phrase challenged by the Ford Dealers, based on facts, easily overcomes a vagueness attack. A statement is based on facts if the speaker knows facts which support the statement. Thus, an advertiser who makes a claim or offer about a vehicle must be aware of facts which support that claim or offer. The next phrase, clearly set forth, is somewhat more difficult, because it must be applied in particular factual settings. Viewed in the abstract, it means merely that such statements, representations or offers cannot be hidden or camouflaged. Further explication would depend on a case-by-case evaluation. The courts can refine and develop standards under the [statute] on a case-by-case basis.... [T]his is neither unusual nor unconstitutional. ( Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen (1st Cir.1966) 360 F.2d 437, 445.) Numerous cases from around the country have upheld regulatory statutes despite the presence of phrases of this ilk, which must be refined through application. For instance, the United States Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a statute penalizing those who forced a broadcaster to hire more personnel than the number of employees needed. ( United States v. Petrillo (1947) 332 U.S. 1, 6-8 [91 L.Ed. 1877, 1882-1883, 67 S.Ct. 1538].) Similarly, the courts have regularly upheld statutes barring unfair competition. (See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm. v. Raladam Co. (1931) 283 U.S. 643, 648 [75 L.Ed. 1324, 1329, 51 S.Ct. 587, 79 A.L.R. 1191]; People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of Cal. (1962) 201 Cal. App.2d 765, 772 [20 Cal. Rptr. 516]. See also CSC v. Letter Carriers (1973) 413 U.S. 548, 576-579 [37 L.Ed.2d 796, 815-817, 93 S.Ct. 2880] [actively participating in ... fund-raising and taking an active part in managing not vague]; Boyce Motor Lines v. United States (1952) 342 U.S. 337, 341-343 [96 L.Ed. 367, 371-372, 72 S.Ct. 329] [so far as practicable not vague]; Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, supra, 360 F.2d at p. 445 [good faith requirement not vague].) In a case very similar to the instant situation, the Second Circuit upheld an agency order that a publisher print certain information in clear, conspicuous type, in a position adapted readily to attract the attention of a prospective purchaser. ( Bantam Books, Inc. v. F.T.C. (2d Cir.1960) 275 F.2d 680, 683, cert. den., 364 U.S. 819 [5 L.Ed.2d 49, 81 S.Ct. 51].) The court held that a more specific order would not be feasible, since clarity and conspicuousness would vary with the size, color, placement and design of the publications. We shall not require the Commission to attempt to devise a universal formula that would take account of all these permutations.... ( Ibid. ) More recently, the Seventh Circuit upheld an order requiring that certain notices be clearly and conspicuously displayed in advertising and promotional materials. ( Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. F.T.C., supra, 605 F.2d at p. 969, cert. den., 445 U.S. 934 [63 L.Ed.2d 770, 100 S.Ct. 1329].) (13c) These cases also dispose of the vagueness challenge to the requirement that statements be large enough and displayed for a sufficient period of time so that an average person can comprehend them. It would not be possible for the DMV to set forth specific guidelines covering all the possible advertisements that might fall within the mandates of this regulation. The fact that the exact reach of the statute must be determined through application does not thereby render it vague. [G]eneric terms like `nuisance' or `negligence' ... must be translated into specific situations of fact in order to be cognizable. The attribute of generality does not of itself, however, require a holding of nullity for vagueness.... [¶] [I]t would be impossible to draft in advance detailed plans and specifications of all acts and conduct to be prohibited [citations], since unfair or fraudulent business practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery.... What constitutes `unfair competition' or `unfair or fraudulent business practice' under any given set of circumstances is a question of fact [citation], the essential test being whether the public is likely to be deceived [citation]. ( People ex rel. Mosk v. National Research Co. of Cal., supra, 201 Cal. App.2d at p. 772.) Here, the essential test is whether the reader or viewer is likely to be deceived or confused by an advertisement that is so small or displayed so briefly that it cannot be understood. This is a reasonable standard to which the industry can reasonably be expected to conform its conduct. It is not vague. Finally, the regulation's reference to the average reader or viewer is not vague. Indeed, the definition of vagueness is often phrased in terms of the average person's ability to understand a statute. (See, e.g., People v. Newble (1981) 120 Cal. App.3d 444, 453 [174 Cal. Rptr. 637].) Further, obscenity laws frequently refer to the average citizen. ( Miller v. California (1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24 [37 L.Ed.2d 419, 430-431, 93 S.Ct. 2607]; Bloom v. Municipal Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 71, 76 [127 Cal. Rptr. 317, 545 P.2d 229].) It is no less fair to ask the advertiser to conform advertisements to the abilities of the average reader or viewer than it is to ask society as a whole to conform to the expectations of the archetypal reasonable person. Regulations 403.00 and 404.09 are not void on vagueness grounds.