Opinion ID: 52848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence of an Extrinsic Offense

Text: (1) Standard of Review This Court review[s] a district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir.1999). [F]or any of the evidentiary rulings to be reversible error, the admission of the evidence in question must have substantially prejudiced [the defendant's] rights. United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.2003). (2) Applicable Law This Court has held that [w]hether Rule 404(b) or Rule 608(b) applies to the admissibility of other-act evidence depends on the purpose for which the prosecutor introduced the other-acts evidence. United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1388 (5th Cir.1995). Rule 404(b) applies when extrinsic evidence is offered as relevant to an issue in the case, such as identity or intent. Id. Rule 608(b) applies when extrinsic evidence is offered to impeach a witness, to show the character of the witness for untruthfulness. Id. (internal quotation omitted). This Court employs a two-prong test to examine the admissibility of extrinsic evidence under Rule 404(b). Sanders, 343 F.3d at 517-18. First, the Court must determine whether the extrinsic evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Id. at 518. Second the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice. . . . Id. (internal quotation omitted). Rule 404(b) also requires that the government give notice to the defendant of the use of extrinsic evidence. The government did provide notice of the evidence regarding Morgan's activity at Compass Bank. However, [a] defendant makes his character an issue when he testifies. Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1388. Rule 608(b) provides that: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . . FED.R.EVID. 608(b). The rule authorizes inquiry only into instances of misconduct . . . such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement. Tomblin, 46 F.3d at 1389 (internal quotation omitted). The government may not use impeachment as a guise for submitting to the jury substantive evidence that is otherwise unavailable. Id. at 1388 (internal quotation omitted). (3) Analysis Morgan claims that the district court erred in admitting over objection Wu's testimony and Compass Bank records on rebuttal. Because Morgan testified, her character for truthfulness became an issue allowing the government to question Morgan about specific instances of misconduct on cross-examination under Rule 608(b). Morgan's violations of the conditions of her pretrial release rise to a level of dishonest conduct sufficient to allow the government's inquiry. However, Rule 608(b) does not allow extrinsic evidence of specific instances of misconduct outside of cross-examination and could not be the basis for admission of Wu's rebuttal testimony or the bank records. That evidence could only be admitted if allowed under Rule 404(b). In United States v. Mortazavi, this Court held that rebuttal testimony originally offered to impeach the defendant was admissible as substantive evidence of intent under Rule 404(b). 702 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir.1983). This Court reasoned that an undercover agent's testimony of a prior attempt by the defendant to deal drugs nine years earlier was on point in proving the defendant's intent, as it contradicted his direct testimony that he lacked any intent to deal drugs. Id. at 527-28. Therefore, the testimony was admissible as substantive evidence, not just as impeachment evidence. Id. at 528. In United States v. Jensen, this Court held that documentary evidence of extrinsic offenses that was not admissible under Rule 608(b) was admissible under Rule 404(b). 41 F.3d 946, 958 (5th Cir.1994). The documents were evidence of extrinsic false statements on a bankruptcy document and a false tax return. Id. at 957. Jensen was charged as part of a massive loan fraud scheme. Id. at 952. The Court reasoned that since the defendant's theory was that he lacked a culpable state of mind and did not intentionally mislead people, the documents were properly admitted to rebut the defense of lack of intent. Id. at 958. Morgan's defense was also that she lacked the intent to defraud. In closing, defense counsel relied heavily on the theory that the others in the conspiracy would not have involved her in the scheme. Also, Morgan testified that her signature on exhibits one through twelve were forgeries. Wu's testimony and the Compass Bank records were similar to the extrinsic evidence admitted in Jensen. Documents indicating extrinsic false statements by Jensen rebutted his lack of intent defense. Evidence of Morgan's attempt to circumvent pretrial release conditions by concealing her opening of a new bank account by using her daughter's name rebutted her defense that she lacked fraudulent intent. Also, Morgan's apparent perjury at trial proved fraudulent intent as to the underlying scheme for which she was on trial. Wu's testimony also indicated that Morgan had knowledge of how to commit fraud. She approached Wu with her daughter to open an account and made certain that Wu knew who she was so that she could later have access to that account. Such knowledge of how to circumvent signature requirements rebutted her testimony that she had not signed the forms associated with counts one through twelve. Even if she had not signed the forms, her activity at Compass Bank proved that she knew how to benefit from the use of her identity without fully disclosing it. Wu's testimony also fell short of being substantially prejudicial. While the jury saw Morgan's testimony directly contradicted by Wu, such a contradiction would have been probative of her intent and knowledge. The probative value of Wu's testimony and the bank records do not appear to be substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Wu's testimony and the Compass Bank records under Rule 404(b).