Opinion ID: 755492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dukes

Text: 6 Dukes asserts that a judgment of acquittal or a new trial should be ordered. He claims that (1) trial testimony concerning a confession by codefendant Mullings improperly incriminated him in violation of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment; (2) the government knowingly presented false testimony, inconsistent theories of guilt and improper jury arguments; (3) his due process was violated by the introduction of unreliable identification testimony; (4) the court erred in not suppressing evidence from an apartment search conducted with a warrant obtained after presentation of an affidavit containing recklessly false information; (5) there was insufficient evidence to convict; (6) the court erred in admitting into evidence a firearm found in his apartment because its probative value was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial effect; (7) the court erred in failing to grant a new trial because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence; and (8) the court erred in counting a prior conviction in assessing his sentence. 7 As a result of an injury incurred in the course of his arrest, Mullings was hospitalized at the West Genesis facility. During this inpatient treatment time, Mullings gave a statement to the police that implicated both himself and Dukes. However, Mullings did not testify at the trial. 8 Dukes raised objections to the use of inculpatory information concerning his participation in the charged offenses contained in Mullings's communications to IDNE and MEG officers. The objections were based, at least in part, on confrontation clause limitations established by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). For various reasons, the objections were sustained and the trial court disallowed government use of the Mullings statement at trial. 9 The Mullings confession contained references to Dukes's use of the street name Chip. Mullings, while at the hospital, consented to the search of his apartment. This search produced a slip of paper containing the name Chip. One of the IDNE officers testified that the paper was found in the search and that it was seized because the officer was aware that Mullings's source of supply was a person called Chip. Dukes claims this testimony was a violation of Bruton because, in his view, the jury must have concluded that this information came from Mullings's confession. However, other witnesses established Dukes's usage of the name. Indeed, there was testimony from the same officer that his source of information about a person known as Chip being Mullings's source of supply emanated from a trial witness who had transported Chip (Dukes) to the hospital on the afternoon of January 7. Given this testimony and other trial evidence linking Dukes to the street name of Chip, we fail to see a Bruton violation. 10 A search warrant for Dukes's apartment was issued by a state magistrate judge based upon an affidavit now challenged by appellant. The issuing judge also received sworn testimony from a MEG agent who testified that he had obtained the apartment address from Dukes's girlfriend. A statement in the affidavit indicated that a vehicle registered to Dukes was seen at the last two purchases of drugs from Mullings. This automobile information was admittedly false, but, according to the government, not recklessly false, since Dukes was seen at the last two purchases and his car was seen at a November 26, 1996, sale. The government claims that this was nothing more than a modestly negligent mistake made by the attesting officer. Dukes also claims that the woman supplying the address was not his girlfriend in the usual sense. Although the friend was apparently not a person with whom Dukes had an intimate relationship, she was, without dispute, a woman and a friend. 11 Franks v. Delaware, the seminal case on the effect of the use of false information in a search warrant affidavit, requires a challenger of a warrant to show (1) that the affidavit contained false statements; (2) that the statements were material to the issue of probable cause; and (3) that the false statements were made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. 438 U.S. 154, 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Dukes's attack on the constitutionality of the search warrant fails on two grounds. First, even discounting the allegedly false statements, the affidavit was more than sufficient to establish probable cause to search. Second, the girlfriend reference was not false and the automobile reference was both immaterial and certainly not intentionally or recklessly advanced under all the facts. Thus, this challenge fails. 12 As noted, Dukes advances several additional challenges. We have examined each of them carefully in light of the record and the prevailing law of this circuit. Upon so doing, we find them to be without merit.