Opinion ID: 2599891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Courts Have Recognized Different Sentences for Different Forms

Text: ¶ 33 Other states impose different punishments for possession of different forms of the same substance. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir.1994). In Stevens the defendant challenged the sentencing guidelines on equal protection grounds because they treated crack and powder cocaine differently, although each had the same chemical properties. The Second Circuit analyzed the sentencing scheme to determine whether it was rationally related to a government purpose, Stevens, 19 F.3d at 96, and quoted United States v. Haynes, 985 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir.1993): A downward departure may not be predicated on the fact that penalties for cocaine crack are more severe than those involving cocaine. A departure on such basis is not permitted because the enhanced penalties for crack reflect a rational and specific congressional aim of deterring drug transactions involving crack. The purpose is obvious  crack cocaine is the most addictive and destructive form of cocaine, and because it is also cheaper it is more widely available and has had therefore a corresponding increase in usage. Stevens, 19 F.3d at 97 (quoting Haynes, 985 F.2d at 70). The court found the United States Congress had a rational reason to differentiate between the two forms of the same substance: This passage makes plain our view that Congress had a valid reason for mandating harsher penalties for crack as opposed to powder cocaine: the greater accessibility and addictiveness of crack. See also United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-79 & n. 9 (8th Cir.1990) (detailing congressional hearings in which legislators and drug abuse experts commented on the perils of crack versus powder cocaine). Id. It buttressed its decision by pointing out that other circuits have upheld different punishments for different forms of the same drug: [W]e join six other circuits that have similarly held that the Guidelines' 100 to 1 ratio of powder cocaine to crack cocaine has a rational basis and does not violate equal protection principles. See United States v. Reece, 994 F.2d 277, 278-79 (6th Cir.1993) (per curiam); United States v. Williams, 982 F.2d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir.1992), cert. denied, [507 U.S. 1010,] 113 S.Ct. 1661, 123 L.Ed.2d 279 (1993); United States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir.1992) (per curiam); United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956, 959-60 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, [502 U.S. 881,] 112 S.Ct. 230, 116 L.Ed.2d 187 (1991); and United States v. Lawrence, 951 F.2d 751, 754-55 (7th Cir.1991). Although not directly referring to the 100 to 1 ratio challenged by Seagers, four other circuits have also rejected equal protection challenges to the enhanced penalty structure for crack offenses. See United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam); United States v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412-14 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, [506 U.S. 1070,] 113 S.Ct. 1025, 122 L.Ed.2d 170 (1993); United States v. Thomas, 900 F.2d 37, 39-40 (4th Cir.1990); and United States v. Cyrus, 281 U.S.App. D.C. 440, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C.Cir. 1989). But see United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226-27 (8th Cir.1992) (Heaney, J., concurring) (criticizing 100 to 1 ratio); [ State v. ] Russell, 477 N.W.2d [886,] 888 [Minn. 1991] (invalidating Minnesota's differential penalty scheme for crack and powder cocaine under equal protection clause of Minnesota Constitution). Id. ¶ 34 Contrary to the majority's position that the salt and base forms of methamphetamine are essentially the same, other courts have distinguished between these forms. For example, in United States v. Cook, 891 F.Supp. 572, 573 (D.Kan.1995), the court was asked to determine by expert testimony the chemical nature of two different types of methamphetamine isomers. The court held: Both [isomers] are methamphetamines, but they stay molecularly different. They have all the same properties, except [one isomer] bends polarized light to the right and [the other isomer] bends polarized light to the left. These properties cause major differences in the effects produced by the substances. [One isomer] is a bronchial dilator, [the other isomer] is a central nervous system stimulant. Thus, the pharmacological differences in the two methamphetamines are significant. Id. The two different methamphetamine isomersL and D methamphetamine isomers and their different effects, were also recognized in United States v. Sieruc, 1996 WL 383305, at , 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, at -4 (E.D.Pa.1996). That court held: L-methamphetamine produces little or no physiological effect when ingested while D-methamphetamine produces the physiological effect desired by its users. The Bogusz court noted that because of this difference, the Sentencing Guidelines treat L-methamphetamine much less severely than D-methamphetamine. Specifically, the reference to L-methamphetamine appears only in the Guidelines' Drug Equivalency Tables in the Commentary to section 2D1.1. In contrast, the Drug Quantity Tables, under section 2D1.1(c), refer only to methamphetamine and methamphetamine (actual). As a result, the Bogusz court concluded that the references to methamphetamine and methamphetamine (actual) in the Drug Quantity Tables of section 2D1.1(c) refer solely to quantities of D-methamphetamine. The Court stated that the government has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the exact isomeric composition of the methamphetamine (D or L) involved. Sieruc, 1996 WL 383305, , 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9495, -4 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82, 89 (3d Cir.1994)). We likewise should not conclude this is a distinction without a difference.