Opinion ID: 202706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to a Public Trial

Text: 35 Owens claims that the district court erred in not holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim that barring his family from the courtroom violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) (finding a First Amendment right to public jury selection); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) ([T]here can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of the press and public.). Two members of Owens family submitted affidavits stating that uniformed officers prevented them from entering the courtroom during the first day of jury selection in Owens' trial. 36 The district court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing because it found that Owens' allegations were inherently incredible. Further, the district court concluded that Owens was not entitled to relief even taking his allegations as true. Specifically, the district court concluded that the trial closure was not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant relief. Further, the district court noted that Owens had procedurally defaulted this claim, and found that Owens could show neither cause nor prejudice to excuse the default. 37 A defendant has a right to a trial that is open to members of the public. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210. The guarantee of a public trial is for the benefit of the defendant; a trial is far more likely to be fair when the watchful eye of the public is present. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979) (Our cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.). The public trial guarantee has been considered so important that courts have reversed convictions or granted habeas relief where the courtroom was closed for the announcement of the verdict, United States v. Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir.1997), where a trial inadvertently ran so late one night that the public was unable to attend, Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir.2004), and where the trial was closed for the testimony of just one witness, United States v. Thunder, 438 F.3d 866, 868 (8th Cir.2006). 38 As such, it is clear that trial closures are to be rare and only for cause shown that outweighs the value of openness. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. 819; Waller, 467 U.S. at 47, 104 S.Ct. 2210 ([U]nder the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.). A closure may be justified only by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. 819; United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1361 (3d Cir.1994). In particular, a court must consider (and reject) alternatives to closure before barring public access. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 511, 104 S.Ct. 819. 39 Given the absence of on-the-record findings, it is difficult for us to discern whether it was necessary for the entire courtroom to be cleared of spectators to permit the jury pool to enter. 11 Most justifications for trial closure have involved the need to protect witnesses or maintain courtroom order. See, e.g., United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases). To our knowledge, a trial closure has not yet been justified on the basis of convenience to the court. See People v. Harris, 10 Cal. App.4th 672, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 758, 766 (Cal. App.1992) (deciding that no cogent argument can be mounted that expediting jury selection is a higher value than the right to a public trial). Given the strong interest courts have in providing public access to trials, the district court could have considered whether a larger courtroom was available for jury selection. If the closure alleged by Owens did occur, the court was obligated to consider this alternative. Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 511, 104 S.Ct. 819. 40 Even assuming that the courtroom needed to be initially cleared of spectators, once prospective jurors began to leave the courtroom, the court's interest in closing the courtroom dissipated. For example, in State v. Ortiz, the Hawaii Supreme Court found that while an order excluding the defendant's family from voir dire was initially justified by a compelling state interest, 41 the circuit court's exclusion order remained in place even after the court had conducted a voir dire of all of the jurors and had satisfied itself that no jury tampering had taken place. Ortiz's family was prevented from entering the courtroom, not merely during the testimony of one or two witnesses, but over the course of at least five days of trial. It is therefore obvious that the circuit court's exclusion order was not narrowly tailored to meet the state's purported interest. 42 91 Hawai'i 181, 981 P.2d 1127, 1138 (Haw. 1999); see also People v. Baldwin, 142 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1424, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 (Cal.Ct.App.2006) (reversing for a public trial violation where the court failed to fashion a narrow exclusion order to infringe on the competing interests as little as possible). Once there was sufficient space in the courtroom, we see no state interest—compelling or otherwise—in not permitting Owens' family, friends, 12 or other members of the public to observe the proceedings. 43 The Government protests that this was a trivial, inadvertent courtroom closure. Bowden v. Keane, 237 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir.2001); see also Peterson v. Williams, 85 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir.1996) ([I]n the context of this case, where the closure was 1) extremely short, 2) followed by a helpful summation, and 3) entirely inadvertent, the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were not breached.). However, this was not a mere fifteen or twenty-minute closure; rather, Owens' trial was allegedly closed to the public for an entire day while jury selection proceeded. Jury selection is, of course, a crucial part of any criminal case. See Gómez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (Jury selection is the primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice . . . or predisposition about the defendant's culpability ....). Furthermore, even if the courtroom was closed because of inattention by the judge, courts have expressed concern in the past where a court officer's unauthorized closure of a courtroom impeded public access. See, e.g., Walton v. Briley, 361 F.3d 431, 433 (7th Cir.2004) (Whether the closure was intentional or inadvertent is constitutionally irrelevant.); Martineau v. Perrin, 601 F.2d 1196, 1200 (1st Cir.1979) (noting Sixth Amendment concern where marshals locked courtroom doors without authorization); see also United States v. Keaveny, 1999 WL 525954, at -2, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 3630 at  (1st Cir.1999) ([C]onstitutional concerns may be raised even by a court officer's unauthorized partial exclusion of the public.). 44 Finally, to the extent that the Government suggests we determine whether the trial closure was prejudicial, the cases on this issue are clear: once a petitioner demonstrates a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, he need not show that the violation prejudiced him in any way. The mere demonstration that his right to a public trial was violated entitles a petitioner to relief. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1315 (11th Cir.2001). Thus, we conclude that if the trial court barred spectators from the courtroom as Owens alleges, he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to have a public trial. 45 However, our inquiry does not end here. Owens procedurally defaulted his public trial claim by failing to object to the courtroom closure at trial and failing to preserve the objection on appeal. Thus, Owens must demonstrate cause for the procedural default and that the public trial error caused him actual prejudice. Knight, 37 F.3d at 774. 46 Owens claims that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise this issue, and that this ineffective assistance is cause for the procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753-54, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel to excuse a procedural default, Owens must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 47 Owens' attorneys' failure to notice or object to the closure of his trial may show that their performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The courts have been clear on the importance of a public trial to a defendant. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 630, 113 S.Ct. 1710; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270, 68 S.Ct. 499 (The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power.); see also Canady, 126 F.3d at 364 ([I]f we were to hold that the [public trial] error was not structural and thus subject to harmless error analysis, it would almost always be held to be harmless. In this way, the [public trial] right would become a right in name only, since its denial would be without consequence.). Counsel's failure to object to closing the trial for an entire day of jury selection, one of the most important phases of a criminal trial, deprived Owens of a substantial fair trial right. On the record before us and without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing, we do not see how the failure to object to the closure could have been sound trial strategy. Furthermore, given that the courtroom was closed to the public for an entire day, and that those excluded include Owens' mother and uncle, we do not believe that the failure to object could have been mere inadvertence. Thus, we conclude that Owens' counsel may have been ineffective in failing to object to the closure of jury selection to the public. 48 Prejudice presents a thornier issue. 13 The Government urges us to find that closure of Owens' trial for an entire day of jury selection was not prejudicial. The flaw in this argument is that structural errors, such as a failure to hold a public trial, defy harmless-error review and infect the entire trial process. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In discussing the difference between structural error and trial error, the Supreme Court has noted that trial errors that are commonly prejudicial, such as the admission of involuntary confessions, are different than structural errors, for which courts must eschew[] the harmless-error test entirely. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 312, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991). Unlike trial rights, structural rights are `basic protection[s]' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Structural error thus has consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate. Id.; United States v. González-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 734 (10th Cir.2005) ([I]f, as a categorical matter, a court is capable of finding that the error caused prejudice upon reviewing the record, then that class of errors is not structural.). The Supreme Court recently said that this is particularly true in the public trial right context. See United States v. González-López, ___ U.S. ___, n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2564 n. 4, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (citing Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210, for the proposition that violation of the public-trial guarantee is not subject to harmlessness review because `the benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance'). 49 If the failure to hold a public trial is structural error, Neder, 527 U.S. at 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, and it is impossible to determine whether a structural error is prejudicial, Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281, 113 S.Ct. 2078, we must then conclude that a defendant who is seeking to excuse a procedurally defaulted claim of structural error need not establish actual prejudice. 14 See Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.2000) (If [an error] did constitute structural error, there would be per se prejudice, and harmless error analysis, in whatever form, would not apply.); see also Becht v. United States, 403 F.3d 541, 549 (8th Cir.2005) (suggesting, but not deciding, that counsel's failure to raise a structural error on appeal would constitute per se prejudice); McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 475 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that where counsel's deficient performance resulted in structural error, prejudice will be presumed); Canady, 126 F.3d at 364 (even though habeas petitioner had not raised public trial claim on direct appeal, deciding that he was entitled to relief because public trial claim is structural error). We will not ask defendants to do what the Supreme Court has said is impossible. 50 A brief analysis of Owens' public trial claim shows the logic of this conclusion. A defendant's right to a public trial keep[s] his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages perjury. Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. 2210. [J]udges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform their respective functions more responsibly in an open court than in secret proceedings. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Owens' trial was allegedly closed to the public during jury selection. It is possible that jurors might have been more forthcoming about biases and past experiences if they had faced the public. It is also possible that Owens and the Government might have picked a more impartial jury or asked different questions with local citizenry watching. All of these possibilities call into question the fundamental fairness of Owens' trial. Requiring that Owens prove any of them by a preponderance of the evidence would be a burden impossible to meet. See González-López, 126 S.Ct. at 2565 (refusing to apply harmlessness review to violation of right to counsel because [w]e would have to speculate upon what matters the rejected counsel would have handled differently—or indeed, would have handled the same but with the benefit of a more jury-pleasing courtroom style or a longstanding relationship of trust with the prosecutors. And then we would have to speculate upon what effect those different choices or different intangibles might have had.). As such, on remand, the court need not require Owens to prove that his counsel's failure to object to the trial closure was actually prejudicial. 51 Thus, to summarize, closure of jury selection to the public for an entire day without meeting the strict requirements of Waller would violate a defendant's right to a public trial. Counsel's failure to object to such a closure may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, because denial of a public trial is structural error, it would be impossible for Owens to establish actual prejudice, and as such, it must be presumed. Given these conclusions, it was error for the district court to conclude that, assuming the truth of his allegations, Owens was not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. Without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing to determine the nature and extent of the trial closure, we think it improvident to determine whether the trial was actually closed, and whether counsel's failure to object to the closure in this case would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for full consideration (including an evidentiary hearing) of Owens' claim regarding the closure of his trial during jury selection.