Opinion ID: 2173102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiffs' Right To Refuse To Respond At All To The Questionnaire

Text: Without detailed examination into the precise circumstances involved in this controversy, the majority holds that the Constitution does not accord plaintiffs the right to refuse to respond at all to the questionnaire. Instead, it holds that plaintiffs' rights will be sufficiently protected by allowing each licensee to affirmatively assert the privilege with respect to any questions whose answers might tend to incriminate him. Such a holding both contravenes the rationale underlying the privilege against self-incrimination and directly contradicts the holdings of relevant Supreme Court cases. Consequently, I dissent from this portion of the majority's holding. The basic goal underlying the privilege against self-incrimination is that the government must establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own mouth. Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 378 U.S. at 8, 84 S.Ct. 1493. In keeping with this purpose, the privilege not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction... but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute.... Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); see In re Ippolito, supra, 75 N.J. at 440-441. In certain circumstances, an individual's affirmative invocation of the privilege with respect to particular questions will just as surely provide a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute as an outright admission that he had engaged in particular conduct. That is, by bringing his identity to the attention of the State, an individual may significantly increase the possibility of future prosecution. In such a case, the mere invocation of the privilege constitutes an injurious disclosure in that it oblige[s] [an individual] `to [spotlight his] guilt [in order] to avoid admitting it.' Marchetti v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. at 50, 52, 88 S.Ct. 697, 704. If such circumstances exist, the individual has a constitutional right not to respond at all to the governmental inquiry. See, e.g., Marchetti, supra ; Grosso v. United States, supra ; Haynes v. United States, supra ; California v. Byers, supra . Of course, the privilege against self-incrimination will not justify an individual in refusing to disclose his name in connection with the administration of all government programs designed to secure information from citizens in order that proper legislative purposes be accomplished. However, it is also clear that an individual need not expressly invoke the privilege in response to a governmental inquiry if such an invocation would create `real and appreciable,' and not merely `imaginative and unsubstantial' hazards that he would thereby single himself out as the perpetrator of a past offense and serve to focus attention on criminal activities which otherwise might not have come to light. Marchetti, supra, 390 U.S. at 48, 88 S.Ct. 697; see, e.g., Grosso, supra, 390 U.S. at 66-67, 88 S.Ct. 709; Byers, supra, 402 U.S. at 429-430, 91 S.Ct. 1535. The factors to be considered in determining whether such a real and appreciable hazard is manifest include the purposes underlying the governmental inquiry, the number and types of persons who are required to respond to the inquiry, and the nature of the questions asked. If the governmental inquiry is non-criminal and regulatory in nature and the questions are facially neutral and directed to the public at large, an individual has no constitutional right to refuse to respond at all. Instead, he may, at most, affirmatively invoke the privilege with respect to particular matters. See, e.g., California v. Byers, supra ; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 47 S.Ct. 607, 71 L.Ed. 1037 (1927). Given the wide cross section of persons to whom such inquiries are directed as well as the regulatory context in which the inquiry is conducted, no real and appreciable danger exists that the mere invocation of the privilege will come to the attention of law enforcement agencies and lead them to uncover a crime which would otherwise have remained secret. If, however, the purpose  or at least one purpose  of the governmental inquiry is that of bringing to light past instances of illegal conduct and the questions are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities, the individual has the privilege not to respond to the inquiry at all. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, supra, 382 U.S. at 79, 86 S.Ct. 194; see, e.g., Marchetti, supra, 390 U.S. at 47-49, 88 S.Ct. 697; Grosso, supra, 390 U.S. at 64-67, 88 S.Ct. 709; Haynes, supra, 390 U.S. at 96-97, 88 S.Ct. 722. In such a situation, affirmative invocation of the privilege would have the direct and unmistakable consequence of incriminating [the individual] inasmuch as he would have singled himself out to be the target of a criminal investigation. Marchetti, supra, 390 U.S. at 49, 88 S.Ct. 697. In the present case, the major, if not sole, purpose underlying the Director's inquiry was that of discovering which of the plaintiffs had engaged in past illegal conduct. The questionnaire was not distributed to the public at large but rather to a finite and well-defined group of persons who were suspected of having committed illegal acts. Two of the questions listed (numbers 5 and 6, see ante at 515-516) required plaintiffs to state whether they had perpetrated specified offenses and to convey the details surrounding their commission. These questions can thus in no way be labelled facially neutral. Obligating each plaintiff to identify himself and affirmatively invoke the privilege with respect to these questions would therefore create a real and appreciable danger that he would spotlight his guilt and thus substantially increase the potential for prosecution. Although the remaining questions appear to be facially neutral, uncertainty exists as to whether they were included in order to further DABC's regulatory, as opposed to prosecutorial, goals. In any event, however, the presence of questions 5 and 6 taints the entire questionnaire, and hence plaintiffs have a constitutional right not to respond to any question contained therein. See Marchetti, supra ; Grosso, supra ; Haynes, supra . Should the Director, in pursuance of his regulatory functions, desire to reissue the remaining questions in a new questionnaire, the determination of whether plaintiffs can refuse to respond may be addressed at that time. In a belated effort to justify its holding, the majority asserts that since the director possesses the statutory authority to subpoena [plaintiffs] and examine them under oath as to the same matters contained in the questionnaire, subject to their right to claim [the] privilege [with respect to particular questions], no constitutional infirmity can possibly exist in requiring plaintiffs to affirmatively invoke the privilege on the questionnaire. See ante at 511. The majority could also have mentioned that the Director could even prevent the affirmative invocation of the privilege by granting plaintiffs immunity from prosecution. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, supra . What the majority fails to recognize is that the whole idea behind the privilege is that there are both right ways and wrong ways to secure evidence, and agents of the state cannot conduct themselves in the wrong way. Were the Director required to subpoena and interrogate each of the 1,500 members of plaintiff class, a strong possibility exists that the time and expense involved would convince him to abandon or narrow his areas of investigation. At the least, one would expect that the Director would be forced to question only those whom he had some grounds to suspect. Thus the initial burden of choosing those to investigate would properly rest on the Director. In order to avoid such a result, the majority holds that plaintiffs must help the Director uncover evidence which might incriminate themselves. It thus reads the policies and mandates of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments right out of the Constitution. Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiffs have a right to refuse to respond to the questionnaire in any manner. For modification and affirmance  Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices MOUNTAIN, SULLIVAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER  6. For reversal  Justice PASHMAN  1.