Opinion ID: 1740158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in overruling bridgeforth's objections to hearsay testimony?

Text: During the trial, two specific instances occurred in which Bridgeforth contends the prosecution introduced blatant and highly prejudicial hearsay testimony. During the direct examination of Detective S.N. Harvey of Memphis, the following took place: Q. In the course of your investigation, did you ascertain names of three individuals who committed the armed robbery in Mississippi? A. Yes, sir. Q. What was those names? A. Alonzo Bridgeforth ... COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (Mr. Jones): Excuse me, sir. If the Court, please, we object to obvious hearsay. What this man said ought to be stricken. It's obviously hearsay. ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY (Mr. Kelly): I think, if Mr. Jones wants to pursue that, he can ask the witness where he got the information. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (Mr. Jones): Your Honor, I think the burden is on the State to give competent evidence, and we stand on our objection of hearsay. ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY (Mr. Kelly): May I proceed? THE COURT: Restate the question for my benefit. ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY (Mr. Kelly): In the course of his investigation, he ascertained the names of three individuals who committed the armed robbery of Crisp Grocery Store in Mississippi. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (Mr. Jones): To which we object to as being obvious hearsay, Your Honor. THE COURT: I overrule the objection. I think he's a competent man to answer that. Q. Did you understand the question, Sgt. Harvey? A. Yes, sir. Q. What did you learn? A. I learned that Alonzo Bridgeforth, Manuel Bridgeforth and Tony Lorenzo Bobo were responsible for the robbery. The prosecution also offered the testimony of Detective Shettlesworth of Memphis as follows: Q. Let me repeat it again, Detective Shettlesworth. Now, you've indicated that you interviewed Joe Dean Felix? A. Yes, sir. Q. You've indicated that you interviewed Tony Lorenzo Bobo? A. Yes, sir. Q. You've indicated that you recovered a gun and interviewed Thurman Johnson? A. Yes, sir. Q. You've  you've indicated that you photographed this vehicle at 200 Dudley Street? A. Yes, sir. Q. Now, the field investigative work that you did  that you related to the Jury, did that corroborate the information and statements given by Felix and Bobo or not? COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (Mr. Jones): I don't mean to interrupt, but just for the record, let me object to that on hearsay. THE COURT: The objection's overruled. Q. Go ahead. A. Yes, sir, it did. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Citizens Bank of Coldwater v. Callicott, 178 Miss. 747, 174 So. 78 (1937). A witness cannot testify to what he knows only by the statements of others. Melius v. Houston, 41 Miss. 59 (1866). McCormick, Evidence, 2d Ed.Sec. 246 (1972), offers the following definition of hearsay: Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out of court assertion. McCormick, Evidence, at 584. We have on several occasions accepted this definition of hearsay. Tolbert v. State, 407 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1981); and Lee v. State, 338 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1976). Therefore the question is whether the statements given by the two Memphis Police Detectives were offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein. We have repeatedly condemned the use of hearsay testimony by officers obtained by way of investigation. Agee v. State, 185 So.2d 671 (Miss. 1966). In Robertson v. State, 185 So.2d 667 (Miss. 1966), a conviction of attempted arson was reversed and remanded because of evidentiary problems, one of which was erroneously admitted hearsay testimony. There we said: Primarily, hearsay testimony obtained by an officer in conducting an investigation is inadmissible. In Shipp v. State, 215 Miss. 541, 551, 61 So.2d 329, 332 (1952), we pointed out: Certain evidence of the officers wherein they testified to the results of their investigations and as to what other people told them and pointed out to them in the course of their investigations was objected to, but the objections were overruled. This evidence was hearsay and inadmissible. Also, in Bester v. State, 212 Miss. 641, 645, 55 So.2d 379, 380 (1951), we stated: Appellant, on this appeal, presents two assignments of error. He contends, first, that the court erred in permitting the sheriff to testify over appellant's objections that his investigation based on information derived from talking to the people showed that the deceased did not have a crowbar at the time of the difficulty or at any time. This testimony of the sheriff was, of course, based on hearsay and was clearly incompetent. Appellant's objection to Sheriff Ainsworth's testimony regarding the mysterious car without lights which he had learned about from discussions with witnesses, Clark and Sullivan, should have been sustained. (Emphasis added.) Roberson at 668. In Ratcliff v. State, 308 So.2d 225 (Miss. 1975), this Court held that testimony by officers of what an informant told them in the course of their investigation was hearsay and inadmissible to the jury. Investigators cannot be permitted to relate to the jury hearsay which is incriminating in its effect as to a defendant on trial for a crime. 308 So.2d at 227. Also in McVeay v. State, 355 So.2d 1389 (Miss. 1978), this Court held that testimony of an undercover narcotics agent as to what he was told by the defendant's companion was hearsay, incompetent, highly prejudicial, and should have been excluded. It is apparent from the lack of direct evidence in this case, except through the testimony of accomplice Felix, that the State introduced the two statements of the Tennessee detectives not for the purpose of showing the information upon which those detectives acted but in an effort to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statements and to bolster its case. For this reason the trial judge committed reversible error when he allowed the hearsay testimony of the two detectives to be heard by the jury. Because the case must be remanded for a new trial we suggest that Instruction S-4A not be granted in its present form. The complained of language in Instruction S-4A is as follows: Instruction S-4A. ... If you find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that a .22 calibre pistol was the personal property of C.C. Crisp and the accomplices of the defendant, Tony Lorenzo Bobo, and Manuel Bridgeforth feloniously took a .22 calibre pistol ... The problem with this instruction is that directs and overly emphasizes to the jury that Tony Bobo and Manuel Bridgeforth were accomplices of the defendant, Alonzo Bridgeforth. This is tantamount to telling the jury that Alonzo was present and participated in the robbery. This assumes as true a material fact and such finding of fact is for the jury alone. Van v. State, 477 So.2d 1350 (Miss. 1985); McBride v. State, 366 So.2d 666 (Miss. 1979); Fields v. State, 272 So.2d 650 (Miss. 1973); Eubanks v. State, 85 So.2d 805 (Miss. 1956). In his closing argument the prosecutor made the following statement: I anticipate that, during the course of my remarks, I may become loud. I may hit this podium. If I do, I apologize in advance. If I thought I could stand on my head and that would convince you to get this scum off the street, I'd do it. Defense counsel objected and the court sustained the objection. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial which was overruled. Defense counsel did not ask that the jury be cautioned to disregard the argument and the trial judge did not take it upon himself to so caution the jury. There is no justification for such an argument to the jury. While an attorney has a right to argue his case a prosecutor should not indulge in personal abuse or vilification of the defendant. We have condemned closing arguments by a prosecutor which referred to the defendant as a professional criminal where there was no proof in the record to that effect. Ellis v. State, 254 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1971). The interest of the State of Mississippi is best served by the orderly rational lawful presentation of the facts and the law. That is the way the criminal justice system is designed to operate. Justice is not served by attorneys who use closing argument to express inflammatory personal ideas or engage in personal vilification. The purpose of closing argument is to enlighten the jury, not to enrage it. Where counsel lacks the self-discipline necessary to avoid arguments such as these, that discipline should be imposed by the trial judge from the bench. An otherwise orderly and fair trial can be instantly destroyed by such unprepared intemperate argument. The price that all of us must pay for these untimely flights of oratorical fancy is far too high. The remaining errors assigned by Bridgeforth have been examined and found to be without merit. For the reasons set forth above the conviction of Alonzo Bridgeforth of the crime of armed robbery and his sentence of life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections is reversed and the case is remanded to the Circuit Court of DeSoto County. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.