Opinion ID: 380743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the admission of impeachment evidence

Text: 12 Appellant next questions the admissibility for impeachment purposes of his prior felony conviction for distributing heroin. Before Lewis testified on his behalf, defense counsel requested the court to rule on whether, if his client took the witness stand in January, 1979, the Government could impeach him with a 1972 felony conviction for distributing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). (Tr. 118, et seq.) This required a ruling under Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides: 13 (a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record during cross examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment. 14 (1) Crimes Involving Dishonesty or False Statement. 15 The Government contended at trial that Lewis' prior conviction was admissible under both Rule 609(a)(1) and (a)(2). The trial judge first rejected, as we do here reject, the Government's contention that the crime of heroin distribution involves dishonesty or false statement. 6 It was argued that he who lives by surreptitiously selling drugs on the street to innocent members of the community engages in a crime involving dishonesty. The argument is ingenious, but it does not comport with the plain meaning of dishonesty, and we have rejected the same contention previously. United States v. Millings, 175 U.S.App.D.C. 293, 295, 535 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C.Cir.1976). While Millings involved a conviction for simple possession of a narcotic drug, we do not discern that a conviction for distributing heroin is any more indicative of dishonesty or false statement. 16 Contrary to the Government's construction, we do not perceive that it is the manner in which the offense is committed that determines its admissibility. Rather we interpret Rule 609(a)(2) to require that the crime involved dishonesty or false statement as an element of the statutory offense. While narcotics may be sold in a manner that is deceitful, which is one synonym for dishonest, 7 the statutory elements of offenses under the Controlled Substance Act 8 do not require that the drug be sold or possessed in a manner that involves deceit, fraud or breach of trust. If a narcotics pusher misrepresents the strength or quality of his heroin, as frequently happens, he may be defrauding his purchaser, but the statutory crime concerns itself only with the sale, not the fraud. Therefore, Lewis' prior felony conviction, involving as it did only unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, did not involve dishonesty or false statement within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). 17 (2) Felony Convictions and Balancing Probative Value and Prejudicial Effect. 18 The Government also contended that the conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1), since heroin distribution is a crime . . . punishable by . . . imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which (Lewis) was convicted, and the court determine(d) that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweigh(ed) its prejudicial effect to the defendant . . . . Since the conviction was for a felony punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year the only remaining issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the probative value of that evidence did outweigh the prejudicial effect upon the defendant's case. 19 When the question was first presented to the court, the lawyers argued their positions and the trial judge made an initial observation: 20 I guess he would be prejudiced, the jury might say he was convicted once, he probably did it again, that is how he would be prejudiced. 21 (Tr. 122) In subsequent argument defense counsel stated that Lewis would be the only witness in this case and quite frankly he is going to deny these transactions and testify to the effect that it wasn't him and if there was such transaction it would have to be with somebody else. (Tr. 122) It thus became clear that the jury would be required to determine the issue of credibility between Lewis and the government witnesses. 22 Following further argument by both sides the Court ruled that the evidence was admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). 23 THE COURT: Well, I am going to let it in. . . . I don't agree with the prosecution this offense involves dishonesty or false statement, but I do believe that under 609(a), unlike 609(b), ( 9 there is a strong presumption of letting in prior convictions of felonies, they should be admitted if the Court determines the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. 24 In the absence of a decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals I am prepared to determine that the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect with the instruction being given. (Tr. 123). 25 In making its ruling to admit the felony conviction the court observed that the Government had a strong case, that the police officer who testified that he had bought preludin from the defendant on two separate occasions impressed him as being a credible witness, and on a third occasion, according to the second officer's testimony, the defendant was caught with preludin at his side only six inches away. Under those circumstances the court ruled that the prior conviction was proper impeachment and that it would be admitted for that purpose only. When the ruling was communicated to the defendant, he decided that irrespective of the court's ruling he would testify as a witness and tell his side of the story. (Tr. 125). 26 Lewis then took the stand and denied having sold drugs as charged in the First and Second Counts. He also initially implied that his brother, who looked like him, might have been the one who sold the drugs to the officer, but almost immediately thereafter he asserted that his brother did not sell drugs. Lewis also professed ignorance of street drug transactions and claimed to be a candy salesman. (Tr. 136-141). 27 He admitted that he saw people pass money around in the neighborhood but did not assume that drug selling was going on because as he lamely testified: I didn't think nothing, I didn't pay it no mind. (Tr. 147). Lewis tried to convince the jury that he was a relative stranger to the use and sale of illegal drugs: 28 Q What were they passing money for then? 29 A I don't know. 30 (Tr. 148). He denied ever having seen pills like the phenmetrazine he allegedly sold to the officer. (Tr. 150). I never seen a pill like this before. He claimed that his only knowledge of the use of phenmetrazine was that his sister used it for weight reduction. (Tr. 151-152). He denied ever seeing the washcloth that was covering the 3 pills of phenmetrazine on the park bench only six inches from his side. (Tr. 140, 67-93). 31 After these denials he was impeached on cross-examination by his admission that he had been convicted in the United States District Court on April 7, 1972 for distributing drugs in violation of the Controlled Substance Act. (Emphasis added) (Tr. 154). Immediately following Lewis' testimony admitting his prior conviction (Tr. 154-155), the jury was instructed that the prior conviction was admissible only for the purpose of evaluating the credibility to be given to his testimony. At the conclusion of defendant's testimony the judge remarked to counsel that defendant's denials had made his credibility an even more vital consideration in the trial and created added support for the court's earlier ruling that the probative value of the prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect. 10 The court also repeated the limiting instruction in its final charge to the jury. (Tr. 175-176). 32 Notwithstanding the trial judge's explicit balancing of the probative value of the prior conviction against its possible prejudicial effect, appellant maintains that the trial judge applied the wrong standard in so balancing and hence committed reversible error. In particular, appellant points to the court's comment that under 609(a), unlike 609(b), there is a strong presumption of letting in prior convictions of felonies, they should be admitted if the Court determines the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. (Tr. 123). (Emphasis added) Appellant contends that this comment indicates that the court admitted evidence of his prior conviction on the basis of a presumption of admissibility, rather than placing the burden of proof upon the Government to establish admissibility, a standard that we found to be dictated by the new Federal Rules of Evidence in United States v. Smith, 179 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 173-174, 551 F.2d 348, 359-360 (D.C.Cir.1976). 33 To analyze the strength of appellant's argument, we review our decision in United States v. Smith, supra. The trial judge in Smith was apparently unaware that the new Federal Rules of Evidence had become effective by the time of trial, for he never mentioned Rule 609 in determining the admissibility of defendant's prior conviction. Indeed, on appeal, a panel of this court felt that he had decided the issue of admissibility by reference to earlier law in the circuit that preceded the new Federal Rules of Evidence. 34 The trial judge's determination of admissibility in Smith was rendered even more important by the defendant's resultant decision not to take the stand. 179 U.S.App.D.C. at 170-1, 551 F.2d at 356-7. In these circumstances, we decided that the judge's failure to apply the new Federal Rules of Evidence was not assuredly harmless error, since not only might use of the new rules have produced a different ruling on the question of admissibility, but also in that event, there was a strong probability that the defendant would have taken the stand to deny his participation in the robbery. We therefore conditioned our affirmance of the conviction, making it subject to a new determination on remand of the question of admissibility of the prior conviction in accordance with the new Rule. We instructed the trial judge to order a new trial if he found the prior conviction inadmissible after application of Rule 609(a). 179 U.S.App.D.C. at 171, 551 F.2d at 357. 11 35 Upon comparison of the instant facts to those in Smith, we do not have the same cause for concern that necessitated the remand in that case. The trial judge in Smith was oblivious to the new standard promulgated by the federal rules and applied instead the previous standard based upon this court's decision in Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 783 (D.C.Cir.1965). In this case Judge Greene in the district court, however, was fully cognizant of the distinction between the old and new rules, as he illustrated when defendant's counsel argued that a case was controlling and Judge Greene asked, (w)as it under this rule or was it under Luck?  (Tr. 119). 36 More importantly, Judge Greene explicitly considered the nature of the prior conviction sought to be introduced 12 and evaluated its possible prejudicial effect, 13 and only then reached the reasoned conclusion that the probative value of admitting the felony conviction outweighed its prejudicial effect. 14 This was a correct utilization of the decisional mechanics involved in determining whether a prior felony conviction is admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). 15 37 We also consider that appellant's objection to the use of the term presumption in a statement made by the judge when he ruled the prior conviction to be admissible misconceives the thought the judge was expressing. In so ruling the court stated that he (b)elieve(d) that under 609(a), unlike 609(b), 16 there is a strong presumption of letting in felonies, they should be admitted if the court determines the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. (Emphasis added). The remark must be read in its context. The judge was distinguishing between the intent Congress expressed in Rule 609(a) and that expressed in 609(b). The court's observation was accurate. The format of Rule 609(a) states that prior convictions shall be admitted . . . but only if . . .  the felony meets certain conditions, etc. In Rule 609(b) Congress reversed the format and provided that certain prior convictions are not admissible . . . unless the court determines . . . (additionally that the interests of justice will be served, etc.). Thus, Rule 609(b) carves out a specific class of prior convictions, that would otherwise be admissible under Rule 609(a), but are declared to be inadmissible unless additional considerations are met. 38 In view of this inverse treatment of the two classes of prior convictions, it was not incorrect for the judge to comment that the intent to be derived from 609(a), unlike that in 609(b), inferred that in balancing for admissibility, those convictions that were more recent should receive more favorable consideration than those that were over 10 years old. The Editorial Comment, § 609.2 on Rule 609(b) expresses much the same thought as the court when it states: It is believed that courts will very rarely exercise their discretion to admit convictions over 10 years old, and only in exceptional circumstances. Certainly that cannot be said of Rule 609(a). 39 The court thus correctly commented on a significant difference between two Rules. One stresses admissibility while the other stresses inadmissibility. 17 The judge was recognizing the fundamental rule that in the system of Evidence, the rules of exclusion are, in their ultimate relation, rules of exception to a general admissibility of all that is rational and probative. J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 10 (1940) (3rd Ed.) 293. (Emphasis added). 40 Finally, the record demonstrates that the actual decision to admit evidence of Lewis' prior conviction was made only after the court determined that the government had shown that the probative value of admitting the evidence exceeded its prejudicial effect. When the trial court explicitly balances probative value and prejudicial effect, his decision will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Stewart, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 195, 196, 581 F.2d 973, 974 (D.C.Cir.1978). We find no abuse here. Quite to the contrary, we find that the judge's decision to admit evidence of the prior conviction was a reasonable response to the conflict in testimony. Where such conflict exists, it is of prime importance that the jury be given as much help in determining credibility as the Rules of Evidence permit. See United States v. Stewart, supra, 189 U.S.App.D.C. at 196, 581 F.2d at 974. The fact that the prior felony conviction was for a narcotics offense, and the defendant was again being tried for a similar offense, does not render the prior conviction inadmissible. It may even, as the judge found here, increase its probative value. In such circumstances the court, however, should give a limiting instruction when the conviction is admitted, and in the final charge. Courts should be reluctant to exclude otherwise admissible evidence that would permit an accused to appear before a jury as a person whose character entitles him to complete credence when his criminal record stands as direct testimony to the contrary. United States v. Simpson, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 261, 445 F.2d 735, 737 (D.C.Cir.1970). 41 With appellant defending himself by denying knowledge of drug transactions, it is clear that his prior conviction on a plea of guilty to distributing heroin has substantial probative value on the issue of his credibility. It is unfair and misleading to a jury, when credibility is an issue, to refuse to admit relevant evidence that is directly probative on that issue. United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784-85 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897, 98 S.Ct. 277, 54 L.Ed.2d 183 (1977). 42 As Judge Burger (now Chief Justice Burger) wrote in Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 348, 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968), before adoption of the present Federal Rules of Evidence: 43 the admission of Appellant's criminal record here, along with the criminal record of the complaining witness, was not in a vindictive or eye for an eye sense, as Appellant argues. Rather it was received because the case had narrowed to the credibility of two persons the accused and his accuser and in those circumstances there was greater, not less, compelling reason for exploring all avenues which would shed light on which of the two witnesses was to be believed. 44 While it is true in a narcotics prosecution that a prior narcotics conviction carries more prejudice, it is also true that evidence of such conviction carries more probative value and is more necessary when the accused testified that he is not knowledgeable in drug transactions and his testimony on that point directly contradicts that of his accuser. 45 We accordingly find that in allowing the admission into evidence of Lewis's prior conviction the court applied the proper standard and exercised a proper judicial discretion.