Opinion ID: 2296365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Short Form Deeds Act

Text: [¶ 30] The Short Form Deeds Act supports the approach embraced in Dana. The very premise of the Short Form Deeds Act is that technical words of inheritance are not necessary to convey or reserve an estate in fee. 33 M.R.S. § 772(1). Further, the Legislature expressly directed that section 772 must be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose of clarifying title to land currently encumbered by ancient deeds that lacked technical words of inheritance or an habendum clause. Id. § 772(5). As applied here, a liberal construction of section 772(1) is one that does not treat the omission of words of inheritance as establishing a clear intention to convey no more than an easement in gross. [¶ 31] The 1925 deed contains both words of inheritance and an habendum clause, and the only uncertainty it presents is that there are no additional words of inheritance expressly associated with the conveyance of the right-of-way. But if section 772 means anything, it is that a deed that contains words of inheritance and an habendum clause but omits additional words of inheritance in describing the grant of an included right-of-way still conveys an estate in fee as to the right-of-way, unless a different intention clearly appears in the deed. [¶ 32] Because there is no clearly expressed limitation in the 1925 deed on the estate conveyed in connection with the right-of-way, the effect of the habendum clause, as in Dana, is to convert what the premises leave as a life estate into an estate in fee. Dana, 114 Me. at 264, 95 A. 1034. For these reasons the judgment should be vacated.