Opinion ID: 2429155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: UCCJA and the PKPA

Text: The parties in this case do not challenge the Arkansas court's jurisdiction to enter the original divorce decree awarding Ms. Adcock custody. Hence, the sole issue is whether Arkansas or Oklahoma has jurisdiction to modify the original divorce decree entered by the Arkansas court. This is not the first time that we have dealt with conflicting jurisdiction in child-custody cases. As we have previously explained, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), Ark.Code Ann. §§ 9-13-201 to 228 (Repl.1998), and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.S § 1738A (1989), govern state conflicts over child-custody jurisdiction. Moore v. Richardson, 332 Ark. 255, 964 S.W.2d 377 (1998). Where the UCCJA and the PKPA conflict, the PKPA controls. Moore v. Richardson, 332 Ark. 255, 964 S.W.2d 377 (1998); Garrett v. Garrett, 292 Ark. 584, 732 S.W.2d 127 (1987). The PKPA provides that: A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if (1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and (2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(f). Hence, Oklahoma can modify the Arkansas divorce decree, and the child-custody order contained therein, only if Oklahoma has jurisdiction to make the child-custody determination, and Arkansas no longer has jurisdiction or has declined to exercise jurisdiction. See Perez v. Tanner, 332 Ark. 356, 965 S.W.2d 90 (1998); Moore, supra . It is clear that Oklahoma is Alana's home state under the PKPA and the UCCJA. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(b)(4) and (c); Ark.Code Ann. §§ 9-13-202(5) and 9-13-203(a)(1). However, from the language of subsection 1738A(f), it is also clear that the PKPA gives preference to the state with continuing jurisdiction. Perez, supra . Obviously, the Arkansas court has not declined to exercise jurisdiction in this case. Thus, we must decide if the Arkansas court, which made the original child-custody determination in 1987, has continuing jurisdiction. On this subject, the PKPA provides that: The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection(c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1738A(d) (emphasis added). The PKPA does not define the term residence. Other jurisdictions, however, have held that the word residence as used in section 1738A(d) should be defined by the law of the state that entered the original custody order. See McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir.1986); In re Marriage of Pedowitz, 179 Cal.App.3d 992, 225 Cal.Rptr. 186 (1986); Hines v. Shape, No. 314, 1993, 1994 WL 636493 (Del. March 8, 1994); In re Marriage of Anderson, 969 P.2d 913 (Kan.Ct.App.1998); Fortier v. Rogers, 44 Mass.App.Ct. 732, 693 N.E.2d 1058 (1998). For example, in Fortier, the Massachusetts court applied Florida law to determine whether Florida remained the residence of the child or of any contestant as stated in section 1738A(d) of the PKPA. Fortier, supra . Because the Arkansas court entered the original custody order in this case, the trial court should apply Arkansas law when determining whether Arkansas is the still the residence of Ms. Adcock. In the case before us today, there is an unresolved factual dispute as to whether Ms. Adcock, a contestant in this matter, has remained a resident of Arkansas since 1987. As previously explained, a writ of prohibition is inappropriate when the trial court has not resolved a factual dispute that is necessary to the determination of jurisdiction. See Steve Standridge Ins. Inc., supra ; Ellison, supra ; Porter Foods, Inc., supra ; Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp., supra . Accordingly, we deny Mr. Hudson's petition for a writ of prohibition so that the trial court may resolve the factual dispute of whether Ms. Adcock has resided in Arkansas since 1987. If either party is unsatisfied with the court's resolution, he or she may challenge the finding on direct appeal. See Wisconsin Brick & Block Corp., supra . Petition denied. GLAZE, CORBIN, and THORNTON, JJ., concur.