Opinion ID: 3013079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of principles of law to this

Text: CASE Applying these principles of law to Toliver’s case, we must determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, if he was harmed. As a prelude, we note that the propriety of providing excerpted transcripts of witness testimony is an issue we confronted in United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994). There the jury on several occasions during its deliberations requested transcripts of what ultimately would be the entire testimony of twelve witnesses. We noted that we previously had held that a trial court has broad discretion to accede to a jury’s request to have witness testimony read back to them, but that we had not addressed the similar practice of complying with a jury’s request for written transcripts. The defendant argued that submitting written transcripts posed different dangers than those present when testimony is read to the jurors a second time, but our Court concluded that “we do not believe that the distinctions between reading testimony to the jury and providing the jury with copies of written testimony are sufficient so that we should apply different considerations 16 when reviewing determinations by the court to supply them.” Id. at 1400. Accordingly, we joined other courts that had considered the issue and held that a trial judge’s decision to supply transcripts is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing cases). This case, of course, presents a slightly different issue — not simply the propriety of the trial judge’s granting the jury’s request for a transcript of specific testimony, but the propriety of doing so without first consulting, and in the absence of, the defendant or defense counsel. Bertoli is still relevant, however, as it outlines certain dangers the trial court must take into account and protect against. For instance, in their review of a transcript, jurors may seize upon an answer without focusing on limitations or qualifications developed during cross-examination. If the request poses such a danger, the court should give the attorneys an opportunity to make sure that the transcript incorporates all appropriate and relevant aspects of the requested testimony. Moreover, although it did not happen in this case, the district court generally should accompany the transcripts with a cautionary instruction to focus on the entire testimony and evidence. Id. at 1400-01. For three reasons, we concluded in Bertoli that the trial court in that case had not abused its discretion. First, “[t]he jury requested the transcripts of 12 witnesses, so the danger of giving undue weight to particular testimony was minimized.” Id. at 1401. Second, “Bertoli fails to specify a single example in the procedure the court followed that presented a particularized danger of prejudice.” Id. And finally, “the district court adequately informed the jury that it was to consider the entire body of evidence submitted in the case, and not to emphasize unduly one piece of evidence over another.” Id. The facts in our case, counterposed to those in Bertoli, point to many of the perils that may result from judge-jury interaction in the absence of counsel. The jury here requested the testimony of only two prosecution witnesses, and only a single specific statement by each officer. Also, by not informing counsel of the jury’s note before responding, 17 the trial judge foreclosed any opportunity for the defense to argue against submitting the testimony at all, or at least to argue that the transcript should include relevant portions of cross-examination. Moreover, the excerpted transcript submitted by the trial judge was not accompanied by any cautionary reminder that the jury was to consider carefully the entire body of evidence in the case. In other words, the safeguards we found persuasive in Bertoli are not present here. Put another way, the real harm is . . . that the aggrieved party will have lost the value of the chance: the opportunity to convince the judge that some other or different response would be more appropriate, the circumstances considered. . . . [I]t is entirely plausible that defense counsel, if seasonably apprised, might successfully have prevailed upon the district court to withhold the written version, or to [add a] supplemental instruction . . . at least to remind the jury of its obligation to heed the charge as a whole. Being kept in the dark, defense counsel was powerless to prime the pump of persuasion. United States v. Parent, 954 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1992) (internal citation, quotation omitted).9 Hence we conclude that Toliver’s counsel should have been consulted concerning the jury’s first transcript request and been present during the District Court’s communication to the jury. However, we glean no particular prejudice to Toliver by the trial judge submitting to the jury, with or without the presence of Toliver’s counsel, correct excerpts of limited trial testimony. 9. Parent involved, however, the trial court providing to the jury a written supplemental instruction on the key issue of constructive possession. As the trial judge in this case submitted excerpts of witness testimony, and not an instruction on the applicable law, the concerns of the Parent Court do not apply here with equal force. While defense counsel for Toliver asserts on appeal that, had he been given notice of the jury’s request, he would have argued that the jury be told (as initially instructed) to rely on its collective memory, the trial judge denied this objection (albeit ex post). 18