Opinion ID: 2376955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Work Product Privilege and Controversy Exemption

Text: ¶ 40 Justice Sanders argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled that some documents were privileged work product even though they (1) did not specify on their face the controversy to which they were relevant, (2) did not pertain to the three controversies specifically mentioned by the trial court in its opinion, or (3) were created well before litigation to have been created in reasonable anticipation of the litigation. ¶ 41 RCW 42.56.290 [16] exempts records from disclosure if they are relevant to a controversy to which an agency is a party but . . . would not be available to another party under the rules of pretrial discovery. The controversy must be completed, existing, or reasonably anticipated litigation. Morgan, 166 Wash.2d at 754, 213 P.3d 596. ¶ 42 (1) Controversy Not Facially Apparent. Nowhere does the statute say that the controversy must appear on the face of the record claimed exempt. Indeed, the use of the term relevant evokes the concept of relevance applicable to pretrial discovery: evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable. ER 401 (emphasis added). Clearly, this broad definition includes evidence that does not facially relate to a given controversy, but whose relevance arises indirectly from context. See Faust v. Albertson, 167 Wash.2d 531, 538, 222 P.3d 1208 (2009) ([C]ircumstantial and direct evidence are viewed as equivalently valuable.). ¶ 43 In Soter, we examined several records to determine if they were work product protected from PRA disclosure. 162 Wash.2d 716, 174 P.3d 60. Most of those records were handwritten notes of witness interviews, which was enough to reveal their connection to a controversy. Id. at 732-33, 743-44, 174 P.3d 60. We did not discuss whether the nature of the controversy appeared on the document. It was enough that one could infer the document's relevance to the pending suit from the fact that it pertained to testimony or facts that would be at issue in the suit. Thus, the trial court did not err in ruling that the work product privilege protects documents even if they do not specify on their face a controversy to which they are relevant. ¶ 44 (2) Controversy Not Enumerated. The trial court specially noted three controversies to which the exempt documents were relevant. See CP at 1721-22. However, the controversy exemption does not apply only to a specific controversy or controversies, but to any controversy to which the agency is a party. RCW 42.56.290 [17] exempts records relevant to a controversy to which an agency is a party, not the controversy, one controversy, or some controversies. Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, it was not necessary for the trial court to single out the controversy to which a given piece of work product was relevant, so long as the evidence revealed that the document was in fact relevant to a controversy to which the agency was a party. For example, in camera document 42 consists of an e-mail string among AGO attorneys regarding a letter to opposing counsel in a case involving an individual committed on McNeil Island. 1 Sealed Docs. 42; CP at 1398-99. Even though these e-mails do not relate to the controversies the trial court enumerated, they reveal AGO attorneys' mental impressions about ongoing litigation to which the State was a party, and so are privileged work product. See Soter, 162 Wash.2d at 743-44, 174 P.3d 60. Below, we review each disputed document to determine whether each claim of work product in fact related to any controversy to which the State was a party. See infra Part e. ¶ 45 (3) Document Predates Controversy by Too Long. The controversy exemption pertains to work product relevant to completed, existing, or reasonably anticipated litigation. Soter, 162 Wash.2d at 732, 174 P.3d 60. In Dawson v. Daly, we adopted this definition of controversy as opposed to one based on `a prolonged public dispute, debate or contention' because the latter was too broad. 120 Wash.2d 782, 790, 845 P.2d 995 (1993), abrogated on other grounds by PAWS II, 125 Wash.2d at 257-58, 884 P.2d 592. The distinction is one based on the expected likelihood of formal litigation, not merely the controversial nature of the agency's work. See Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wash.2d 439, 449-50, 90 P.3d 26 (2004). In Hangartner, the city claimed exemptions for documents pertaining to a city ordinance governing permits for construction of the light rail system. Id. at 443, 90 P.3d 26. The city argued that the controversy exemption applied because of the `litigation-charged atmosphere' surrounding the light rail's construction. Id. at 450, 90 P.3d 26 (quoting City's Opening Br. at 43). We declined to recognize the exemption: the considerable public debate over the light rail did not establish that there was any threat or reasonable anticipation of litigation concerning the enactment of the ordinance. Id. The opposite conclusion would endorse the `prolonged public dispute' definition rejected in Dawson. Id. (quoting Dawson, 120 Wash.2d at 790, 845 P.2d 995). ¶ 46 Under Hangartner, the issue is not how long before litigation commences a document is created, but whether the litigation is reasonably anticipated (as opposed to whether the issue is politically controversial). Thus, Justice Sanders's objection that certain documents, such as in camera document 75, were created months before litigation commenced misses the point. 2 Sealed Docs. 75. ¶ 47 In camera document 75 was redacted to remove an e-mail string from Chief Deputy Attorney General Kathy Mix to the Office of Financial Management discussing how to respond to Justice Sanders's request for a public defense before the CJC. CP at 1414. AGO claims that this document was created in reasonable anticipation of litigation, namely Justice Sanders's suit against the State when it refused to pay for his defense. Id. AGO claims that it anticipated litigation because Justice Sanders had previously sued the State to provide him with a defense in another ethics matter, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Sanders, 135 Wash.2d 175, 955 P.2d 369 (1998). Resp't Br. at 26-27 & n. 101. The fact that the suit did not occur until three months later does not render the State's anticipation of litigation unreasonable. ¶ 48 As the example shows, the trial court did not err by holding that documents can be exempt as work product even if created some time before the anticipated controversy. Accordingly, we review each disputed document to determine whether each claimed piece of work product was relevant to completed, existing, or reasonably anticipated litigation.