Opinion ID: 2430934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does the Evidence Support Negligence on the Part of the City?

Text: Negligence requires the presence of three basic elements: duty on the part of one person to another; breach of that legal duty; and injury to the person to whom the duty is owed as a proximate result of the breach. Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519, 531 (Tex.Civ.App.Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The City of Gladewater takes issue only with the jury's finding of proximate cause. Proximate cause was described to the jury in this case as: ... that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not have occurred; and in order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen that event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom.... See Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex.1965); Young v. Massey, 128 Tex. 638, 101 S.W.2d 809, 810 (1937). Thus, the two elements of proximate cause are cause-in-fact and foreseeability. Williams v. Steves Industries, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Tex.1985); McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex.1980); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex.1977). Cause in fact means that the omission or act involved was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which no harm would have occurred. McClure, 608 S.W.2d at 903. Foreseeability requires that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, would have anticipated the danger that his negligent act created for others. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549-50 (Tex.1985). Foreseeability does not require that a person anticipate the precise manner in which injury will occur once a negligent situation that he has created exists. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Bauman, 659 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.App.El Paso 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In applying these rules of law, however, we are dependent upon the facts of the case. To begin with, it is clear under the facts that the injury here was foreseeable. The major reason to keep a record of burials is to ensure that it is known where bodies are interred. By failing to keep the records, it is obvious that the exact occurrence sought to be avoided herein has occurred, namely, that a body cannot be found. The City Manager and City Secretary, as reasonable people, should have anticipated the dangers that their lack of diligence threatened. The City of Gladewater maintains that no evidence exists to support the jury finding of factual causation. In deciding a no evidence point, this court may consider only that evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom which, when viewed in their most favorable light, support the jury's verdict, and reject all evidence to the contrary. Stanglin v. Keda Development Corp., 713 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex.1986). McKnight v. Hill & Hill Exterminators, Inc., 689 S.W.2d 206, 207 (Tex.1985); King v. Bauer, 688 S.W.2d 845, 846 (Tex.1985). In approaching this question, we are cognizant of our decision in McClure v. Allied Stores of Texas, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1980), where we held that proximate cause may not be established by a mere guess or conjecture, but rather must be proved by evidence of probative force. McClure, 608 S.W.2d at 904. Like any other ultimate fact, however, proximate cause need not be supported by direct evidence, as circumstantial evidence and inferences therefrom are a sufficient basis for a finding of causation. Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex.1975). As in McClure, the issue here is whether there is any evidence from which reasonable minds could draw an inference that the negligence was a cause in fact of the injury. The Pikes are not required to distinguish all possible inferences, but must only show that the greater probability was that the lack of record keeping probably caused the injury. The relevant facts show that the Pike family entrusted the body of their loved one to the City, that the remains were placed in a grave, and that the gravesite cannot be located under the City records. The fact that the Pikes believed they knew where Johnny's remains lay should not be controlling. For example, had the Pikes forgotten precisely where the grave was, then sought the proper plot through City records, they would have been unable to find the gravesite. The fact that no traces whatsoever were uncovered, a situation which even the defense's expert witness said would be extremely unlikely, makes it probable that the wrong grave was uncovered, or at least the excavation was commenced at the wrong spot. How then are the Pikes to determine where the proper site is? Without City records showing which plots are empty or filled, it is impossible for them to do so. The dissent seizes on the fact that the Pikes never actually relied on the records in their search for the remains. Such a statement may very well be so, but any argument on that score is certainly answered by the equitable maxim that a court should not require the doing of a useless thing. Boman v. Gibbs, 443 S.W.2d 267, 272 (Tex. Civ.App.Amarillo 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Proximate cause eventually mandates weighing of policy considerations. It is a practical test, a test of common experience applied to human conduct. Cook Consultants, Inc. v. Larson, 700 S.W.2d 231, 236 (Tex.App.Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It is a result of endeavors by the courts to evade, when possible, the metaphysical and philosophical niceties in the time-worn discussion of causation. Springall v. Fredericksburg Hosp. & Clinic, 225 S.W.2d 232, 235 (Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1949, no writ). Had the City kept proper records, then common sense shows that no problem could have arisen here. Because the injury which has occurred is failure to find the body, and the omission of the City contributed in some ways to that failure, we hold there is evidence of proximate cause from which reasonable minds could draw an inference of negligence. Thus, the Pikes are entitled to actual damages from the City.