Opinion ID: 667246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: downward departure: diminished capacity and substantial

Text: ASSISTANCE 10 The government next argues that the district court improperly departed downward based on a combination of Munoz-Realpe's diminished capacity and substantial assistance to the government. The district court awarded Munoz-Realpe a two-level reduction for diminished capacity pursuant to U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.13, making the following finding: 11 It occurs to me that although he had the capacity to be a mule and carry this material into the country, the diminished capacity certainly affected his ability to walk away scott [sic] free because if he had been smarter, he would have been able to trap the recipient of this and the co-conspirators by helping the government do that. 12 He did what he could do and I so find that he wore a time recording device or monitor. He went out and did his best. I have no evidence to the contrary in this matter ... It seems to me that he rendered what assistance he could render and that his assistance was substantial and that had he had a greater capacity he would have caught the next guy. 13 So it seems to me that it is a mixture of things, that the diminished capacity did have an effect on his ultimate liability. 14 U.S.S.G. Sec. 5K2.13 provides for a downward departure based on diminished capacity to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense. It does not authorize a court to depart downward because a defendant did not have the mental capacity to render substantial assistance to the government. 7 Thus, to the extent that the district court in this case departed downward under Sec. 5K2.13 based on Munoz-Realpe's inability to render substantial assistance, it erred. 15 Munoz-Realpe argues that the district court was also authorized to depart downward based on Sec. 5K2.0, the catch-all departure provision. 8 We disagree. In United States v. Chotas, 968 F.2d 1193 (11th Cir.1992), this court rejected the argument that behavior not qualifying as substantial assistance under Sec. 5K1.1 could still justify a departure under Sec. 5K2.0. The court stated: 16 A sentencing court is not free to ignore a requirement for a particular adjustment under the guidelines: [i]f the Commission did adequately consider a certain aggravating or mitigating circumstance, departure must be in accordance with the Commission's directive. ... A fortiori, a sentencing court may not simply circumvent that directive by departing under a separate guideline for the same mitigating circumstance. 17 Id. at 1196 (citations omitted). The Sentencing Commission has set forth guidelines governing downward departures for both substantial assistance and diminished capacity. This case is similar to Chotas. In this case, the Guidelines consider diminished capacity, but limit its relevance to the effect on the defendant's commission of the offense. Guidelines Sec. 5K2.13 does not authorize consideration of the effect of a defendant's diminished capacity on his ability to provide substantial assistance. Thus, under the Chotas rationale, the reasons given by the district court--i.e., diminished capacity affecting substantial assistance--cannot support a downward departure under Sec. 5K2.0. Of course, Munoz-Realpe did not qualify for the substantial assistance departure because the government did not so move. We conclude that the district court was not authorized to combine diminished capacity and substantial assistance to justify a downward departure under Sec. 5K2.0. 9 18 We vacate this portion of Munoz-Realpe's sentence and remand the case for a determination whether Munoz-Realpe's mental incapacity contributed to the commission of his offense to such a degree as to justify a downward departure pursuant to Sec. 5K2.13. On remand, the district court is directed to evaluate Munoz-Realpe's diminished capacity only as it relates to the commission of his offense.