Opinion ID: 1989907
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Crawford v. Washington

Text: For purposes of our analysis of the Crawford issue, the foundational documents identified by the Special Master are only part of the matters we must consider. Overall, we perceive of three categories of documents [42] relevant to our discussion: (1) the documents evidencing the qualifications of the operator; (2) the documents evidencing that the machine was in working order at the time of the test; and (3) the AIR being offered into evidence to demonstrate [43] the results of the breath testing. Very different levels of analysis pertain to each of these categories.
For Crawford purposes, we begin by noting that the parties agree that, unlike the breathalyzer, the Alcotest is not operator-dependent, meaning that the device is not subject to influences from the operator. Instead, the record demonstrates that the operator will play a relatively lesser role here than has been the case in the past. His role now consists of observing the subject to ensure that twenty minutes has passed and to be certain that the subject has neither swallowed nor regurgitated any substances during that time that would influence the test results; inputting and verifying the accuracy of the identifying information needed to start the sequence; changing the control solution if the machine alerts him to do so; attaching a new mouthpiece; reading the instructions about how to blow into the machine; observing the LED screen and following its prompts; and observing the subject to ensure that he or she actually provides a sample. There are no meters to read, no dials to turn, and if the machine detects an error, the error is reported and no test results are derived. The operators are not able to alter or affect the software that governs the performance of the device and cannot fix the machine should a repair be needed. Even so, the Special Master recommended, and the State concedes, that the operator should be available to testify in a contested matter. Notwithstanding this reduced role to be played by the operator as relates to the ultimate BAC results reported, requiring that he or she be made available for cross-examination is an important constitutional safeguard. We therefore, consistent with our longstanding practice, see Romano, supra, 96 N.J. at 90-91, 474 A. 2d 1, can ensure that each defendant has the opportunity to confront the witness who has potentially relevant testimony. [44] It is in this context, however, that we consider the Special Master's requirement that the operator produce evidence of his qualifications through a certificate or a current operator card. [45] We perceive of no potential violation of the right to confrontation that might arise from the admission into evidence of these documents. Apart from the fact that these documents fall squarely within the traditional business records exception [46] to the hearsay rule, N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6); see State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 28, 499 A. 2d 1363 (1985) (defining scope of business record exception), and thus are presumably exempted from the Crawford analysis entirely, see 541 U.S. at 56, 124 S.Ct. at 1367, 158 L.Ed. 2d at 195, they are not testimonial within the contemplation of Crawford. On the contrary, these supporting documents are not testimonial because they neither establish an element of the offense charged nor demonstrate the truth of any fact in issue. Even were we concerned that there is some constitutional infirmity in permitting these documents to be offered into evidence, in light of the fact that the operator will ordinarily be called to testify, all defendants will be able to exercise their right to cross-examine the individual to whom these documents actually pertain.
In addition to the requirement relating to the operator's credentials, however, we next consider the Crawford -based challenge to the twelve foundational documents, relating to the good working order of the device, that the Special Master has recommended be produced and admitted into evidence. These documents fall into two categories: (1) documents directly evidencing the good working order of the machine as of the time of the test, including: the most recent calibration record, the most recent new standard solution report, and the certificate of analysis of the 0.10 simulator solution used in the control tests; and (2) documents evidencing the accuracy of the devices used and chemical composition of the solutions used to routinely test and calibrate the machine, including the analysis of all of the solutions used to test linearity, the documents attesting to the accuracy of the devices used in the simulator, and the certificates of accuracy of the simulator and temperature probes. As a threshold matter, we perceive no shortcoming, from a constitutional perspective, with respect to any of this large group of foundational documents that the Special Master identified as prerequisites to a finding of guilt. All of the twelve documents that the Special Master identified qualify as business records in the traditional sense. For purposes of the hearsay exception, we can describe all of these documents as being records of tests of the device, or of the simulator unit that is used to calibrate the device, or of the chemical composition of the solutions used to either perform the control tests or calibrate the machine. Although these are part and parcel of ensuring that the machine is in good working order, from the perspective of the hearsay analysis, we do not regard them as being anything other than business records that are ordinarily reliable. We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the arguments raised by defendants to the effect that any document prepared by either the State Police or Draeger, in connection with the Alcotest, should be viewed with suspicion. In part, defendants' concerns pre-suppose that these documents are similar to affidavits or include statements by their preparers. There is, however, nothing in this record that suggests that any of these foundational documents is subject to manipulation by the preparer. Nor do we reach a different conclusion on the question of whether they fall within the ambit of that which Crawford teaches us is testimonial and therefore requires an opportunity for cross-examination. In this, we find accord with the great majority of the jurisdictions that have considered this, or similar, questions relating to foundation documents for scientific testing devices. See Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 212 Ariz. 182, 129 P. 3d 471, 476-77 (App.2006) (holding that maintenance and calibration records for breath testing machine are routine business records that are not testimonial); Rackoff v. State, 281 Ga. 306, 637 S.E. 2d 706, 707, 709 (2006) (holding that inspection certifications are business records and are not testimonial); People v. Kim, 368 Ill.App. 3d 717, 307 Ill.Dec. 92, 859 N.E. 2d 92, 93-94 (2006), appeal denied, 224 Ill.2d 589, 312 Ill.Dec. 660, 871 N.E. 2d 60 (2007) (holding that affidavit certifying that device was tested is non-testimonial); Jarrell v. State, 852 N.E. 2d 1022, 1026 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (holding that a breath test device certification is not testimonial); Napier v. State, 820 N.E. 2d 144, 149 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that inspection and operator certifications are not testimonial); Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W. 3d 570, 575 (Ky.2006) (holding that notations regarding maintenance and testing of device are not testimonial); State v. Fischer, 272 Neb. 963, 726 N.W. 2d 176, 181-83 (2007) (holding that a simulator solution certificate is not testimonial); People v. Lebrecht, 13 Misc. 3d 45, 823 N.Y.S. 2d 824, 826-27 (Sup.2006) (holding that calibration/maintenance report and simulator solution certification are not testimonial); State v. Norman, 203 Or.App. 1, 125 P. 3d 15, 18-20 (2005), review denied, 340 Or. 308, 132 P. 3d 28 (2006) (holding that certificates of accuracy are not testimonial). But see Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005) (holding that breath test affidavit, including portion used to show that device had required maintenance, is testimonial). To be sure, some of these documents and certificates are prepared by the police, but none of them relates to or reports a past fact and none of them is generated or prepared in order to establish any fact that is an element of the offense. See Davis, supra, 547 U.S. at 821-24, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed. 2d at 237. The fact that they may be used to demonstrate that a device, which was used to conduct the breath tests for a particular defendant, was in good working order does not transform them into evidence of an element of the offense nor make them testimonial in the constitutional sense. We perceive both in the Constitution itself and in Crawford, ample room for admissibility of these foundational documents consistent with protecting defendants' rights. Although we therefore conclude that they would all be admissible within the confines of the Constitution, we will not adopt the Special Master's recommendation and require that they all be offered into evidence routinely. Indeed, as the State has correctly pointed out, many of the documents on the Special Master's list of foundational proofs are tests of tests and, therefore, are too attenuated to require that they be admitted as part of the evidence. We include in that category all of the documents relating to the working order of the simulator, the reports of the solutions used during simulation and calibration, the certificate of accuracy of the simulator used to calibrate the device, and the temperature probe documents. Although, as all parties agree, these documents should continue to be produced in discovery, [47] they are not fundamentally a part of demonstrating that the particular device was in good working order. [48] The foundational documents that we conclude need to be entered into evidence therefore are few. They are: (1) the most recent calibration report prior to a defendant's test, with part I  control tests, part II  linearity tests, and the credentials of the coordinator who performed the calibration; (2) the most recent new standard solution report prior to a defendant's test; and (3) the certificate of analysis of the 0.10 simulator solution used in a defendant's control tests. Absent a pre-trial challenge to the admissibility of the AIR based on one of the other foundational documents produced in discovery, we perceive of no reason to require that they be made a part of the record routinely.
The final aspect of our Crawford analysis must be focused on the AIR itself. In the time since Crawford was decided, courts around the country have struggled to analyze its import in matters relating to scientific or forensic testing generally. A few have directly confronted documents that are similar to the AIR and have attempted to apply Crawford's constitutional commands in that context. The AIR, unlike the foundational documents evidencing the good working order of the machine, reports the results of a test which, in and of itself under our statute, suffices to support a conviction. It is proof of BAC, over a specified threshold, that forms the basis for a per se violation. Were we to step back and consider it in Crawford terms, we might well conclude that it is the modern day, functional equivalent of testimony. It comes, however, not from the mouth of a living witness, but from a machine. Surely the Founding Fathers did not envision the day when a device that cannot itself be cross-examined would be the equivalent of a witness. We have previously addressed the constitutional question of the right to confront a written document that is itself evidence of a crime. In State v. Simbara, 175 N.J. 37, 811 A. 2d 448 (2002), we identified the essence of the constitutional quandary in considering the admissibility of a laboratory certificate analyzing suspected controlled dangerous substances. We reasoned: A laboratory certificate in a drug case is not of the same ilk as other business records, such as an ordinary account ledger or office memorandum in a corporate-fraud case. Those latter documents have not been prepared specifically for the government's use in a potential criminal prosecution. In contrast, the analyst prepares the laboratory certificate at a prosecuting agency's request for the sole purpose of investigating an accused. Because the certificate is singularly important in determining whether the accused will be imprisoned or set free, we must be sensitive to Sixth Amendment interests whenever a defendant preserves those interests for trial. [ Id. at 49, 811 A. 2d 448.] In Simbara, we acknowledged that a defendant could seek to cross-examine the laboratory technician who performed the test on the sample as a means to protect his or her Confrontation Clause rights. Ibid. The AIR presents us with a somewhat more complex constitutional question. Although no court has considered the Alcotest and its AIR, other courts have suggested a variety of analytical frameworks to be utilized in determining whether test results are testimonial. Some have concluded that because a test result or report is generated by a machine, rather than a human, it cannot qualify as a statement in the sense Crawford intended. See United States v. Washington, 498 F. 3d 225, 230-32 (4th Cir.2007) (finding that [t]he raw data generated by the diagnostic machines are the `statements' of the machines themselves, not their operators); United States v. Khorozian, 333 F. 3d 498, 506 (3d Cir.2003) (explaining that a statement is something uttered by `a person,' so nothing `said' by a machine . . . is hearsay). Other courts have focused on the fact that the machine has no discretion as to whether it will produce a particular result and cannot be manipulated to produce a result to secure a conviction of a particular defendant in the way that interrogating a person could. See People v. Geier, 41 Cal. 4th 555, 61 Cal.Rptr. 3d 580, 161 P. 3d 104, 140 (2007) (holding that lab reports are not testimonial because they are made of part of a routine and non-adversarial process); Commonwealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 827 N.E. 2d 701, 705 (2005) (holding that lab reports are not testimonial because they are neither discretionary nor based on opinion); State v. Forte, 360 N.C. 427, 629 S.E. 2d 137, 143 (2006) (holding that a serology report is nontestimonial because it is neutral and has the possibility to exonerate or convict). Neither of these analytical frameworks is entirely sufficient in our view. Instead, we return to the fundamentals of the definition of testimonial as the Court explained in both Crawford, supra, and Davis, supra . Viewed against that standard, the essential elements of testimonial evidence are a report of a past event, given in response to police interrogation, with the purpose of establishing evidence that a defendant committed an offense. Judged against this standard, the AIR falls outside of the definition of testimonial on two, and arguably all three, grounds. First, the AIR reports a present, and not a past, piece of information or data. Second, although given in the presence of a police officer who operates the device, nothing that the operator does can influence the machine's evaluation of the information or its report of the data. Third, although the officer may have a purpose of establishing evidence of a BAC in excess of the permissible limit, the machine has no such intent and may as likely generate a result that exonerates the test subject as convicts him or her. Seen through this prism, we conclude that the AIR is not testimonial in the sense that was intended by the Framers of the Confrontation Clause. Although we have concluded that the AIR is not testimonial, we have nevertheless concluded that defendants are entitled to certain safeguards that we have required be implemented in prosecutions based on the Alcotest. We have directed that an opportunity for cross-examination similar to that described in Simbara and Romano be provided to these defendants through our requirement that the operator of the device be made available to testify. Likewise, we have required the routine production in discovery of all of the foundational documents that might reveal some possible flaw in the operation of the particular device and we have demanded that the core foundational documents that establish the good working order of the device be admitted into evidence. But more than implementing these safeguards, because the ability to cross-examine the operator of the Alcotest will provide little means to challenge the veracity of the AIR, we appointed a Special Master, who we commend and thank for his extraordinary assistance. Through him, we have engaged in a lengthy process of receiving testimony and evidence, both initially and in the supplemental proceedings to ensure the scientific reliability of the Alcotest. In our effort to judge the scientific reliability of the device, we have made available the opportunity for cross-examination of the witnesses who are most familiar with the device and we have directed that the manufacturer divulge its source code and make available the personnel who can explain it. We are confident, based on this far-reaching and searching inquiry, that the device is sufficiently reliable so that the rights of all defendants have been protected. We are satisfied that, with the directions we here adopt for pending and future matters, the confrontation rights of all defendants have been, and will continue to be, protected. We have no doubt that the device, with the safeguards we have required, is sufficiently scientifically reliable that its reports may be admitted in evidence. And we are confident that, in so concluding, all of defendants' rights have been advanced and considered.