Opinion ID: 2051701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judgment after trial

Text: [¶ 26] Blanchard also contends that the taking of her lot by the Department fails to satisfy Maine's constitutional requirement that any taking of private property be for a public use. Whether the use for which a taking is authorized is a public or private use is a question of law. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026, 1033 (Me.1984). Findings of fact by the trial court that are essential to answering this question of law will be set aside on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Sturtevant v. Town of Winthrop, 1999 ME 84, ¶ 9, 732 A.2d 264, 267. [¶ 27] Article I, § 21, of Maine's Constitution provides: Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation; nor unless the public exigencies require it. ME. CONST. art. I, § 21. The exercise of the State's power of eminent domain must be for a public use and upon a public exigency to meet this State's constitutional requirements. Finks, 328 A.2d at 794. [¶ 28] Private property can be taken without the owner's consent only for public uses, Warchalowski, 471 A.2d at 1033, and can be taken through government action for private use, with or without compensation, only with the owner's consent. Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 121, 123, 136 A. 664, 665 (1927). [¶ 29] The distinction between a public and a private use to a large extent depends on the facts of each case. Oxford County Agric. Soc'y v. School Admin. Dist. No. 17, 161 Me. 334, 336, 211 A.2d 893, 894 (1965). As a general rule, property is devoted to a public use only when the general public, or some portion of it (as opposed to particular individuals), in its organized capacity and upon occasion to do so, has a right to demand and share in the use. Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 372, 61 A. 785, 794 (1905). The public has to be able to be served by the use as a matter of right, not as a matter of grace of any private party. Id. The use must also be public at the time of the taking, not only in a theoretical aspect, but rather in actuality, practicality and effectiveness, under circumstances required by public exigency. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d at 1029-30. [¶ 30] Providing for public parking facilities on publicly owned land may constitute a public use: [M]unicipal parking facilities [open to everyone] in effect constitute a public use by any definition. The public will have full access to the facilities and the right to use the same. A direct benefit will lie in the increased safety of members of the public and their property. Opinion of the Justices, 231 A.2d 431, 434 (Me.1967). [¶ 31] The fact that a government agency and municipality lease lands owned by the public to a private corporation for the operation of a public-parking lot does not make the use private. Camden Plaza Parking, Inc. v. City of Camden, 16 N.J. 150, 107 A.2d 1, 3 (1954) (And the land and facility do not cease to be used for a public purpose when leased to private operators for operation as a public parking facility.); Court Street Parking Co. v. City of Boston, 336 Mass. 224, 143 N.E.2d 683, 687 (1957) (the fact that private operators may be expected to profit from the operation of [public parking facilities] does not ... mean that the statutory plan is not for a public purpose). [¶ 32] The Department undoubtedly could take the property and create a public parking facility open to every member of the public. Opinion of the Justices, 231 A.2d at 434. The Department could also contract with a private company for the maintenance and operation of such a parking facility. Camden Plaza Parking, 107 A.2d at 3. The issue in this case is whether prioritizing access to the publicly owned parking lot on the basis of need and giving priority to the year-round residents of Chebeague Island means that the parking facility is being put to private use. [¶ 33] We conclude that giving priority parking to year-round residents of Chebeague Island does not render the use private. The public use clause does not preclude the allocation of a scarce resource on the basis of need. [3] Even a narrow definition of public use does not require equal use by all members of the public at all times on equal terms. Poole v. City of Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94 N.E.2d 416, 419-20 (1950). [¶ 34] The trial court found that the lot was available for use by all members of the public. The only limitation on that right is that of space availability. The court further found that the limited number of parking spaces were allocated on the basis of need. The allocation of priority permits to those with the greatest need does not transform the character of the use from public parking to private parking. [¶ 35] Moreover, a use may be public even if the use is limited to the inhabitants of a restricted locality. Poole, 94 N.E.2d at 419-20. The Supreme Court of Illinois has concluded that pursuant to the public use clause of Illinois's Constitution a use may be limited to inhabitants of a community and remain public: It is not essential that the entire community or people of the state, or any political subdivision thereof, should be benefited or share in the use or enjoyment thereof. The use may be local or limited. It may be confined to a particular district, and still be public.... If local or limited, the use must be directly beneficial to a considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the state, and the property to be taken must be controlled by law, for the advantage of that particular portion of the community to be benefitted. Id. See also 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN & RUSSELL D. VAN BRUNT, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02[2], at 7-27 (3rd. ed.2000) (even a strict interpretation of public use allows the use to be limited to inhabitants of a small or restricted locality). [¶ 36] So long as the use concerns a community as opposed to a particular number of individuals, the use is public. The residents of Chebeague Island constitute a community. They are not a particular, identifiable group of individuals distinct from the public. Granting the year-round residents priority in the use of the small parking lot that serves Chebeague Island does not make the use private. [¶ 37] Finally, the lot was taken to support a transportation system that is open to all members of the public. The trial court found that the transportation system is accessible by the general public on equal terms. The lot is one component of a transportation system devoted to transporting all members of the public. Parking within this system includes both the Blanchard lot and the satellite lot. Within the system, sufficient parking is available to all members of the public at those lots. Because the Blanchard lot, limited in size, cannot accommodate all of the demand for parking, spaces within the lot are allocated on the basis of need. This allocation manages a public resource to best address the transportation needs of all the people using the transportation system. [¶ 38] Blanchard contends that the fact that the lot is being leased to and managed by the Ferry, a privately owned company, means that the use is private because the public does not have access to the lot as a matter of right because the Ferry could limit access to certain individuals. This contention is not supported by the facts in this case. [¶ 39] The Department has taken the property for parking purposes, and in exercising the eminent domain power has implicitly guaranteed that the lot will be put to a public use. Ulmer v. Lime Rock R.R. Co., 98 Me. 579, 593, 57 A. 1001, 1006 (1904). The lease between the Town and the Department retains with the Department the power to reassert control over the lot if, within the Department's sole discretion, the lot is not used for parking by persons using the ferry. The Town has promised to make the lot accessible and safe for use by the public. The Town has retained this same level of control in its lease with the Ferry and, the Ferry has covenanted to make the lot accessible to the public. Upon termination of the lease, through lapse of time or breach, possession returns to the Department. The control retained through the lease ensures that the use will remain public and makes the Department the sole arbiter of whether the Town or its assignee is providing safe and affordable public parking. The entry is: Judgments affirmed. SAUFLEY, C.J., with whom ALEXANDER, J., joins, dissenting. [¶ 40] It is the responsibility of the courts to assure that government does not abuse its extraordinary power to take the private property of its citizens against their wishes. Because the taking in this case is for the benefit of identifiable private individuals, the taking does not satisfy the public use requirement of the Maine Constitution. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. [¶ 41] It is well established that, without the consent of the property owner, the government may only exercise its power of eminent domain when the property is to be put to a public use and when a public exigency requires it. [4] ME. CONST. art. I, § 21; Ace Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. City of Augusta, 337 A.2d 661, 663 (Me.1975); Finks v. Me. State Highway Comm'n, 328 A.2d 791, 794 (Me.1974). [¶ 42] As a preliminary matter, whether any public exigency existed in this case is seriously in question. The Department initiated eminent domain proceedings despite the fact that the Blanchards were still negotiating a potential lease with the Chebeague Island Transportation Company. It is not clear from the record that the parties would not have entered into a renewed contract. Moreover, this is not a case where no spaces would be available to residents of Chebeague Island if the property was not taken. [¶ 43] Our review of public exigency findings, however, is limited to determining whether there is any rational basis to support a finding of public exigency. Ace Ambulance Serv., Inc., 337 A.2d at 663 ([T]he question of determining exigency has long been considered to be a political decision for the Legislature to make, free from judicial review (unless it can be said there is no rational basis upon which exigency could be found).). [5] The asserted basis for the taking, to resolve uncertainties about the future availability of the lot, the terms of a new agreement, and the cost to patrons, could rationally be said to satisfy this highly deferential standard. [¶ 44] In contrast to the deferential standard applied to the question of public exigency, however, a determination as to whether a use is public or private is a question of law subject to our de novo review. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026, 1033 (Me.1984); Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 231, 107 A.2d 841, 849 (1954). Courts across the country are increasingly scrutinizing the use of eminent domain to ensure that property is not taken for private purposes. Engaging in this scrutiny, the Illinois Supreme Court recently reminded the parties that [t]he power of eminent domain is to be exercised with restraint, not abandon. Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat'l City Envtl., L.L.C., 199 Ill.2d 225, 263 Ill. Dec. 241, 251, 768 N.E.2d 1, 11 (2002) (holding that property could not be taken for use as a private parking lot, thereby enabling a private business to avoid the open real estate market); see also 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, No. CV 00-07572 SVW, 2001 WL 811056, at  (C.D.Cal.2001) (finding a taking unconstitutional where property was taken to enable a private company to expand); Henn v. City of Highland Heights, 69 F.Supp.2d 908, 913 (E.D.Ky.1999) (Naked and unconditional governmental power to compel a citizen to surrender his productive and attractive property to another citizen ... [to use] predominantly for his own private use just because such an alternative private profit is thought ... preferable in the subjective notion of governmental authorities is repugnant to our constitutional protections....), vacated on other grounds by 3 Fed. Appx. 487 (6th Cir.2001); Condemnation of 110 Wash. St., 767 A.2d 1154, 1160 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2001) (holding that a private party may not direct condemnation of property), appeal denied by 567 Pa. 748, 788 A.2d 379 (2001). [¶ 45] A public use is `one in which all the public has a right to demand and share....' In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 515, 106 A. 865, 872 (1919) (quoting Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 372, 61 A. 785, 794 (1905)). Property cannot be taken from one private individual solely for the benefit of another private individual. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 81 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984). [¶ 46] Although the mere fact that the government's use of a piece of property will benefit private parties does not render a taking unconstitutional, a public use must be the dominant purpose of the taking. Crommett, 150 Me. at 236, 107 A.2d at 852 (holding that the dominant purpose of the taking was a public purpose); In re Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. at 516, 106 A. at 872 (finding the public benefit to be only incidental). As one court framed the issue: `[T]he tail cannot wag the dog' and allow the public purpose to be only incidental to a predominantly private one..... Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth. of Fort Lauderdale, 315 So.2d 451, 456 (Fla.1975). The use must be more than a mere theoretical right to use. It must be an actual, effectual right to use. Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. at 373, 61 A. at 794. [¶ 47] A use that benefits a particular class of identifiable individuals, rather than the community at large, is a private use. See Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 245, 104 S.Ct. 2321. In addition, a use is public only if the right to use the property is `independent of the will of the person or corporation taking title under condemnation, and [] such use by the public is protected by law.' Oxford County Agric. Soc'y v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 161 Me. 334, 337, 211 A.2d 893, 895 (1965) (quoting Tuomey Hosp. v. City of Sumter, 243 S.C. 544, 134 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1964)). In Brown v. Gerald , the illustrations used demonstrate this notion: If it be a railroad company, the public have a right to be transported, and to have their goods carried from place to place, upon payment of reasonable tolls. The company must accommodate them, whether it will or no. If it be a canal or turnpike or bridge, all may travel thereon. If it be a boom company, all who have logs in the river are entitled of right to have the booms used for them. If it be a telephone or telegraph company, its privileges are open to, and compellable by all. If it be a water company, the entire public has, and must have, a right to the use of the water. 100 Me. at 372, 61 A. at 794. [¶ 48] Here, prior to the taking, the Blanchard property had been used as a private parking lot, with spaces allocated on a priority basis. After the taking, the same use was made of the property. The only difference was that the Chebeague Island Transportation Company was charged a lower fee for leasing the property. [6] The ancillary private benefit to the company would not prove fatal to the taking if the post-taking use of the parking lot was in fact a public use. The dominant beneficiaries of the parking lot, however, are a select group of individuals living on Chebeague Island rather than the Chebeague Island community at large. The spaces in the lot are not available to the general public, but rather are allotted to private individuals. Only households with a member who lives on the island year-round and who works on the mainland get top priority for a space, and only one space is available per household. This is a particular, identifiable group of individuals. They have a private need for the spaces, which was being met by a private parking lot. Moreover, the priority system results in public access at the will of the company, thus preventing any member of the Chebeague Island community from demanding a right to use the lot. [¶ 49] Because the State has exercised its extraordinary powers to take private property by eminent domain in circumstances that benefit a private individual or industry, that is, the individuals allotted spaces and the company, there is insufficient public use of the property that has been taken, and therefore the taking does not satisfy the requirements of the Maine and United States constitutions. [¶ 50] I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.