Opinion ID: 760166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factors One and Two: Other adequate means for relief and

Text: 19 non-correctable prejudice. 20 Because these factors are similar, we consider them together. When we say that a litigant has no adequate means for relief other than mandamus, or that he or she will be prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal, we do not mean that the litigant has been forced by an erroneous ruling of the district court to suffer unnecessary cost and delay. Mortgages, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir.1991); In re Sugar Antitrust Litig., 559 F.2d 481, 484 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1977). That happens every single time a litigant loses a summary judgment motion that he or she should have won, every time a district court mistakenly thinks federal jurisdiction exists when it does not, and every time a meritorious motion for judgment as a matter of law is denied. Undoubtedly, the cost and delay occasioned by such erroneous rulings, in the aggregate, are quite significant and can be quite burdensome to the individual litigant. If such harm could support mandamus, however, then mandamus would no longer be an extraordinary remedy and we will have effectively abandoned our tradition against piecemeal appeals. 21 Thus, in order to satisfy either of the first two factors, a litigant must demonstrate some burden imposed by a clearly erroneous district court order, other than the mere cost and delay that are the regrettable, yet normal, features of our imperfect legal system. For example, these factors could be satisfied if the litigant's claim will obviously be moot by the time an appeal is possible, e.g., Medhekar v. United States Dist. Court, 99 F.3d 325, 326-27 (9th Cir.1996), or when the person affected by the district court's order will not have the ability to appeal. E.g., Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir.1990). But, in general, the mere annoyance and cost of having to litigate will not support mandamus. Mortgages, Inc., 934 F.2d at 211. 22 We see no reason why a first habeas petition in a death penalty case should be a unique exception to our general unwillingness to grant mandamus merely to avoid the normal cost and delay associated with litigation. Now that Congress has enacted a statute of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), and given our holding that this limitations period can be equitably tolled in the proper circumstances, see Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1389, 140 L.Ed.2d 648 (1998), there will undoubtedly be a number of cases in which the putative habeas petitioner's ability to qualify for equitable tolling will be in doubt. The inevitable prejudice that will accrue to the State in such cases is that executions will sometimes be delayed because the district court mistakenly tolled the one-year limitations period and proceeded to consider the petitioner's claims on the merits, when it should not have done so. This kind of delay is going to happen often enough that, if this circumstance were sufficient to support the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the writ would no longer be an extraordinary remedy. It would become all too commonplace and almost routine in death penalty cases. 4 23 We acknowledge that the prejudice to the State stemming from a delayed execution is different in character from the prejudice to a litigant in, for example, a trademark, a product liability or an air crash case, who is erroneously forced to endure a trial when he or she should have prevailed on summary judgment. On the other hand, however, the interest of the capital habeas petitioner in having his first habeas petition heard completely and fully is also different in kind. Given the near-prohibition against the filing of successive petitions now mandated by the AEDPA, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), and the irreversible consequences that flow from the rejection of a capital habeas petitioner's first petition, we are constrained to assign less importance to the State's interests in Bauman factors one and two when we deal with a first petition from a sentence of death. McDaniel, 127 F.3d at 889 ([W]hile the State probably cannot correct on appeal any negative effects it sustains as a result of compliance with the district court's ... order, this factor carries little weight compared with the needs of an incarcerated capital habeas petitioner....). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stressed that a capital habeas petitioner is entitled to a full consideration of all of his or her claims in his or her first petition before a stay of execution can be lifted. Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 319-20, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996). Lonchar supports our reluctance to truncate the district court's consideration of a capital petitioner's first habeas petition by piecemeal review of selected issues by way of mandamus. 24 Thus, we find that the first two Bauman factors weigh against the State. Kelly has never had a federal court rule on his constitutional claims stemming from his convictions and death sentences. It would be inappropriate for us to prevent that consideration merely to accommodate the State's desire for a quick execution. 25 Indeed, mandamus would be particularly inappropriate in this case because a stay of execution is inevitable. Kelly's claim of present incompetence to be executed became ripe and exhausted only in 1998. Under Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1618, 140 L.Ed.2d 849 (1998), Kelly's presentation of the Ford claim to the district court is a first petition; under the AEDPA, this claim is clearly not time-barred; and under Lonchar, Kelly is therefore entitled to a stay. Thus, the prejudice that the State seeks to avoid cannot be avoided. A delay in Kelly's execution is inevitable. To be sure, the extent of this delay may depend on whether the district court considers only Kelly's Ford claim, or whether it considers all of Kelly's claims. At this point, however, the special need for mandamus is so vitiated, because the writ cannot really give the State the relief it desires, that factors one and two weigh strongly against mandamus. 26