Opinion ID: 810883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Role in the Scheme Enhancement

Text: Ronnanita first argues that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), which calls for a threelevel enhancement if “the defendant was a manager or supervisor . . . and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive[.]” (emphasis added). The Sentencing Guidelines define “participant” as “a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have been convicted.” § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. We have explained that this means a participant “could have been charged,” even if only Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 25 as an accessory; but “mere knowledge of a conspiracy” is insufficient to establish that a person was “criminally responsible.” United States v. Pabey, 664 F.3d 1084, 1097 (7th Cir. 2011). Ronnanita claims five people were not “criminally responsible” for the scheme, so the three-level enhancement was inappropriate. The parties agree that the Appellants were each “participants” in the scheme; that makes three. The dispute between them focuses on whether other individu- als—Jacqueline Hawkins and Jennifer Washington (MTE employees) and Phillip Rowe, Eric Blount, and Clarence Jones (mortgage company employees)—qualify as participants under Section 3B.1(b). We decline to decide whether these other individuals qualify as participants because we believe the entire scheme easily satisfies the “otherwise extensive” provision, so the number of “participants” does not matter. See United States v. Hussein, 664 F.3d 155, 162 (7th Cir. 2011). Section 3B1.1, commentary note 3 states, “In assessing whether an organization is ‘otherwise extensive,’ all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive.” In determining whether a scheme is otherwise extensive, we have considered: (1) the monetary benefits obtained during the scheme; (2) the length of time the scheme continued; (3) the number of people utilized to operate the scheme; and (4) the scheme’s geographic scope. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 696 (7th Cir. 26 Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082 2012); Pabey, 664 F.3d at 1097; Hussein, 664 F.3d at 162; United States v. Knox, 624 F.3d 865, 874 (7th Cir. 2010). We have also held that a scheme is otherwise extensive if the number of participants plus outsiders who unwittingly advance a conspiracy is greater than five. See, e.g., United States v. Tai, 41 F.3d 1170, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1994). At the bare minimum, the participation of the Appellants, plus at least Hawkins, Washington, and one other MTE Board Member, satisfies this “greater than five” standard, regardless of whether Hawkins and Washington were “criminally responsible.” See Pabey, 664 F.3d at 1097 (citing Tai, 41 F.3d at 1174-75). This number does not even include the additional MTE Board Members, the other MTE employees who helped organize venue meetings in numerous states, the mortgage company employees, or the numerous A-Buyers used to further the Housing Program. We believe the scheme was also extensive with respect to the amount of money obtained (over $18 million), the intended geographic scope (at least six states), the number of people affected (over 3,000), and the overall complexity (using straw buyers to facilitate Housing Program transactions). Thus, the scheme qualifies as “otherwise extensive” under U.S.S.G. § 3B.1(b), and the three-level enhancement was correct.