Opinion ID: 883333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Confusion Doctrine

Text: Does the confusion doctrine apply in the instant case? Charles argues that the police officer should have informed him that his constitutional right to counsel did not apply to the implied consent request. Charles also maintains that he thought he had a right to counsel before deciding whether to submit to a BAC test, and that because of his confusion, his refusal to submit to a BAC test should be excused. The State counters that the confusion doctrine which Charles attempts to implicate here, does not apply to the present case. We agree. The `confusion doctrine' provides that when an arresting officer introduces the question of a drunken-driving suspect's right to counsel by giving a Miranda warning prior to requesting a chemical test, the suspect's subsequent refusal to take a test until an attorney is consulted may not constitute a `refusal to submit' to a chemical test. Ehrlich v. Backes (N.D. 1991), 477 N.W.2d 211, 213. A number of states have adopted the confusion doctrine, and Charles urges this Court to, likewise, adopt that rule. See Rust v. Department of Motor Vehicles Div. of Driver's Lic. (Cal. Ct. App. 1968), 267 Cal. App.2d 545, 73 Cal. Rep. 366; State Department of Highways v. Beckey (Minn. 1971), 192 N.W.2d 441; and State v. Severino (Haw. 1975), 537 P.2d 1187. Whether we determine to adopt the rule in some future case, the facts here do not warrant the application of the doctrine. The confusion doctrine applies only when Miranda rights are given prior to or contemporaneously with a driver being advised of his rights and obligations under the implied consent law. The confusion is caused by informing the driver via his Miranda rights that he has a right to counsel and then asking him to take a BAC test under the implied consent law. It is recognized that this situation could easily confuse a driver and mislead him to believe he has the right to an attorney before he decides whether to submit to a BAC test. Beckey, 192 N.W.2d at 445; Severino, 537 P.2d at 1190. In the instant case, the police officer first informed Charles of his rights and obligations under the implied consent law. Charles then refused to take the breathalyzer test before his Miranda rights were even read. Because his Miranda rights were read after the implied consent form was read and after Charles refused to submit to a BAC test, there is no likelihood that he confused his right to counsel under Miranda, with his rights and obligations under the implied consent law. In short, having already refused the BAC test, Charles could not have been mislead by the subsequent reading of his Miranda rights into thinking that he had a right to counsel before deciding whether to take the BAC test. Charles refused to submit to the BAC test and has not brought his case within the application of the confusion doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court correctly denied Charles' petition for reinstatement of his driver's license. AFFIRMED. HARRISON, HUNT, TRIEWEILER and WEBER concur.