Opinion ID: 2107935
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of conviction on other crimes evidence

Text: We review for abuse of discretion appellant's preserved objection that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of the May 2005 incident because the charges from that incident were dismissed and, therefore, such evidence was inadmissible under Drew. Goines v. United States, 905 A.2d 795, 799-800 (D.C.2006) (citations omitted) (a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion). By definition, Drew and its safeguards are concerned with the admission of acts that are not charged in the present prosecution, see Johnson, 683 A.2d at 1095, and that have not been previously adjudicated. However, unadjudicated prior bad acts that constitute other crimes evidence do not preclude the admissibility of that evidence to show motive and intent, if otherwise admissible under Drew. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 926 A.2d 1085, 1092 (D.C.2005) ([p]rior instances of unlawful conduct may be admitted under a Drew exception although not previously adjudicated a crime); Flores v. United States, 698 A.2d 474, 482-483 (D.C.1997) (evidence of prior assault was admissible although criminal charges were not adjudicated); Mitchell v. United States, 629 A.2d 10, 12-13 (D.C.1993) (prior bad acts evidence in a domestic violence case was admitted under a Drew exception even where the prior bad acts evidence was not criminally charged); Garibay v. United States, 634 A.2d 946, n. 2 (D.C.1993) (prior bad acts evidence was admitted under a Drew exception even where the prior assault case was apparently dismissed). The trial court has wide latitude in determining the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence. See generally Frye, 926 A.2d at 1092. On this record we find no abuse of discretion. We also reject appellant's argument challenging the admission of the other crimes evidence based on his analysis of Roper, 564 A.2d at 731. In Roper, this court held that where two or more offenses, joined under Rule 8(a) of the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, are misjoined and the defendant is acquitted of one of those offenses, the misjoinder cannot, under a theory of mutual admissibility, be held to be harmless. Id. at 732. In explanation, we stated that it is fundamentally unfair, that one could be acquitted of a crime by the trier-of-fact, yet have it held that that evidence of that same charge would have been admissible against him in another trial. Id. Appellant relies on Roper to support his argument that dismissal of the prior charges is equivalent to acquittal and, therefore, inadmissible in the instant case. His argument is flawed because, unlike the defendant in Roper, appellant was not acquitted of the charges, but rather the previous criminal charges were dismissed for want of prosecution. Dismissal for want of prosecution  particularly for the reasons (undisputed by appellant) proffered by the government, see supra note 7  is not the same as being acquitted after a trial on the merits. Thus, appellant's reliance on Roper is unfounded.