Opinion ID: 6105527
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: John Locke

Text: The theory of natural rights traces its lineage from the writings of John Locke through the Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson, and the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, written by George Mason. 309 Kan. at 639. Thus, Locke's views on natural rights are significant and offer insight into the framers' intent in adopting section 1. 309 Kan. at 639. Locke's theory describes the inherent rights of persons in nature before consenting to civil governance. According to Locke, in nature all persons are in a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Bk. II, § 4 (1698). And consistent with such uninhibited personal freedom, the state of nature is also a state of Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another. Locke, Bk II, § 4. In this perfect state of nature, these inherent rights are to be exercised according to each person's free will and should not be impaired, unless the exercise of these rights would place another's natural rights in peril: The State of Nature, has a Law of Nature to govern it which obliges every one, and Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it; That being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, 28 or Possessions; . . . [E]very one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station wilfully, so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of Mankind, and not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another. Locke, Bk. II, § 6. Locke's contention that man is endowed with free will means, however, that the law of nature, though known by reason, is not necessarily universally obeyed. Suess, Punishment in the State of Nature: John Locke and Criminal Punishment in the United States of America, 7 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 367, 377 (2015). Given this reality, to uphold natural law . . . the rational man has the right to punish criminals. For if no one had such a right the law of nature would be in vain. 7 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. at 377. Locke's justification for punishment in nature was that the offender, by infringing the natural rights of another, had declare[d] himself to live by another Rule, than that of reason and common Equity. Locke, Bk. II, § 8. Such transgressions are a trespass against the whole Species. Locke, Bk. II, § 8. Thus, all persons may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that Law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his Example others, from doing the like mischief. Locke, Bk. II, § 8. Without question Locke viewed the act of murder as a transgression of natural law, warranting punishment up to and including capital punishment. The damnified Person has this Power of appropriating to himself, the Goods or Service of the Offender, by Right of Self-preservation, as every Man has a Power to punish the Crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the Right he has of Preserving all Mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: And thus it is, that every Man in the State of Nature, has a Power to kill a Murderer, both to deter others 29 from doing the like Injury, which no Reparation can compensate, by the Example of the punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure Men from the attempts of a Criminal, who having renounced Reason, the common Rule and Measure God hath given to Mankind, hath by the unjust Violence and Slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lion or a Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security. Locke, Bk. II, § 11. According to Locke, individuals who commit capital offenses forfeit their own natural rights, including the right to life, through their offensive conduct. Indeed having, by his fault, forfeited his own Life, by some Act that deserves Death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his Power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own Service, and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the Death he desires. (Emphasis added.) Locke, Bk. II, § 23. This concept of forfeiture enables Locke to philosophically justify notions of punishment that result in the deprivation of the perpetrator's own rights as they would have existed in nature. Interestingly, for Locke, the right to life gave rise to a reciprocal duty for a person to preserve his or her own life. Notwithstanding the vast freedom enjoyed by individuals in nature, Locke did not believe such freedom granted individuals the power to end one's own life. Locke, Bk. II, § 23. As a corollary, a person could not alienate that right to another person because a person did not hav[e] the Power of his own Life in the first place. Locke, Bk. II, § 23. Thus, a person cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases. Locke, Bk. II, § 23. No body can give 30 more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own Life, cannot give another power over it. Locke, Bk. II, § 23. Consistent with delegate Kingman's commentary regarding the intended scope of section 1, Locke's natural rights theory recognizes the right to life to be inalienable, meaning it cannot be sold, transferred, or assigned to another. But the right is not absolute, as it may be forfeited through acts of criminal conduct that give rise to the power of punishment. Even so, Locke's philosophical justification for punishment based on notions of forfeiture leads to an obvious question: who should impose punishment? Locke observed it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases, that Self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their Friends. And on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and Revenge will carry them to far in punishing others. Locke, Bk. II, § 13. Therefore, Locke concluded that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of the State of Nature. Locke, Bk. II, § 13. According to Locke, individuals do not relinquish their natural rights of life, liberty, and property merely by entering civil society. Locke, Bk. II, § 87. Instead, they consent to the same power of punishment that existed in nature. But instead of being meted out by the victim, punishment (including the death penalty) as it exists in the state of nature is transferred to, and imposed by, the civil society itself. Locke, Bk. II, § 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the Rights and Privileges of the Law of Nature, equally with any other Man, or Number of Men in the World, hath by Nature a Power, not only to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate, against the Injuries and Attempts of other Men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that Law in others, as he is persuaded the Offence deserves, even with Death it self, in Crimes where the heinousness of the Fact, in his Opinion, requires it. But because no Political Society can 31 be, nor subsist without having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in order thereunto punish the Offences of all those of that Society: There, and there only is Political Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, resign'd it up into the hands of the Community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for Protection to the Law established by it. And thus all private judgement of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled standing Rules; indifferent, and the same to all Parties: And by Men having Authority from the Community for the execution of those Rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any Members of that Society, concerning any matter of right, and punishes those Offences, which any Member hath committed against the Society with such Penalties as the Law has established; whereby it is easie to discern who are, and who are not, in Political Society together. (Emphasis added.) Locke, Bk. II, § 87.