Opinion ID: 3017915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admitting Evidence of Hearsay Statements

Text: The same standards apply to the Court’s consideration of Mr. Bobb’s challenge to the District Court’s admission of co-conspirators’ statements. A. Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the out-of-court statements of a defendant’s co-conspirators are not excluded as hearsay. Before any such statement may be admitted, however, the proponent must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the conspiracy existed; (2) both the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made in the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 333 (3d Cir. 1996). In determining whether the statement is admissible as a statement of a co-conspirator, the court may consider the statement itself. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987). While a casual conversation between co-conspirators does not meet the “in furtherance” requirement, “statements between co-conspirators which provide reassurance, serve to maintain trust and cohesiveness among them, or inform each other of the current status of the conspiracy further the ends of the conspiracy and are admissible so long as the other requirements of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) are met.” United 11 States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1983). Mr. Bobb specifically objects to statements admitted during the trial testimony of Julie Gyle, Melissa Rodriguez, Amy Sims and Danielle Lee. The declarants included Mr. Bobb, co-conspirators and non-conspirators, whose statements ostensibly were offered to give context and not for their truth. Mr. Bobb contends that the Government failed to satisfy the foundation requirements for the co-conspirator statements. The co-conspirator statements presented during the testimony of Julie Gyle, Melissa Rodriguez and Danielle Lee concerned, respectively, the amount of money Ms. Gyle was told she would receive for her drug sales, the quantity of crack members of the conspiracy had available for distribution, and the quantity of crack cocaine in Ms. Lee’s false bottom suitcase. These statements were all made by undisputed co-conspirators in the course of the conspiracy and in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus are admissible under FRE 801(d)(2)(E). Mr. Bobb also objected to the admission of certain surreptitiously recorded conversations played during the testimony of Amy Sims on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Ms. Sims, Mr. Bobb and the declarant were members of the conspiracy. The District Court, however, found the evidence sufficient to meet the foundational requirements, and we agree that the evidence amply supports this conclusion. B. The Confrontation Clause Mr. Bobb further contends that the recorded statements, even if not offered for 12 their truth, violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. During the pendency of Mr. Bobb’s trial, this Court held in United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005), that surreptitiously monitored conversations and statements are not “testimonial” for purposes of Crawford v. Washington. Id. at 181. Specifically, with regard to recorded statements of co-conspirators, we held that “party admissions and co-conspirator portions” of disputed tape recordings are “nontestimonial and thus, assuming compliance with the Federal Rules of Evidence, are admissible.” Id. at 183-84. We further noted that the Confrontation Clause “‘does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.’” Id. at 183 (citing United States v. Crawford, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004)); see also United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 544-45 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation where reliability of out-of-court statements was not at issue and where the statements were not introduced for their truth). Mr. Bobb urges that Hendricks be confined to its specific facts and also attempts to distinguish Hendricks because the declarant in Hendricks was a confidential informant. However, the holding in Hendricks did not turn on its own unique facts and did not rest on the status of the declarant; rather, its focus was on the non-testimonial nature of surreptitiously recorded conversations and the purpose for which they are offered. Here, the out-of-court statements were surreptitiously recorded and either were made by co-conspirators or, if made by non-conspirators, were offered for the purpose of establishing context, not for their truth. Thus, under Hendricks, the admission of the 13 recorded statements in Mr. Bobb’s trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. In sum, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed hearsay statements.