Opinion ID: 1706950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: The instruction also allows for double-counting of the robbery aggravating circumstance.

Text: ¶ 74. In the guilt finding phase of the trial, the jury was instructed that a conviction of capital murder could be based on a finding that Bell unlawfully, willfully and feloniously killed Bert while engaged in armed robbery. The jury was then instructed at sentencing that it could find as an aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged or was an accomplice in the commission of armed robbery. Thus, Bell says, the State was allowed to double count the armed robbery, both as a ground for a capital conviction, and also as an aggravating circumstance justifying the death penalty. ¶ 75. He argues that a State may not constitutionally treat every unjustified intentional taking of human life as an aggravating circumstance because to do so does not narrow the class of death-eligible defendants in a principled manner. It is the proper function of the aggravating circumstances to make this distinction. The jury, under this reasoning, consequently, was allowed to convict Bell of capital murder, based on the armed robbery factor, and then to use the same armed robbery as an aggravating circumstance, thus boot-strapping all armed robberies to the death penalty level. ¶ 76. Bell relies primarily on Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993), for his position. Creech gives two requirements for a constitutionally-valid aggravating factor. It must be determinative, not vague, and it must genuinely narrow. In other words, it must embody a principle which, standing alone, would render the death penalty proportionate to the crime. Id. at 474, 113 S.Ct. 1534. Therefore, Bell asserts the robbery aggravating circumstance does not genuinely narrow because robbery-murder standing alone is not a crime for which the death penalty is proportionate punishment, and is thus violative of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 28 of the Mississippi Constitution. ¶ 77. We have previously rejected this argument. See Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 762 (Miss.1991) [4] ; Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77, 96-7 (Miss.1988), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). Ladner and Minnick expressly rejected the stacking argument based on the United States Supreme Court ruling in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). The Minnick Court stated that Lowenfield held that the fact that the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury in its penalty decision was identical to an element of the underlying offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Minnick, 551 So.2d at 97. Accordingly, the lower court should not be held in error on this point.