Opinion ID: 2810564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-termination statements

Text: We now turn to claims based on comments the plaintiffs made after they were no longer employed by HPD. Culbertson claims there was retaliation for 12 Case: 13-20569 Document: 00513087139 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 No. 13-20569 c/w 13-20751 testimony in court in late May and in July. That testimony reasonably appears from the allegations of the complaint to have resulted from work she did while still at HPD, i.e., she was testifying as to BAT results that were determined before she left HPD. The testimony was relevant to whether a criminal defendant should be found guilty. The testimony was not given to someone independently investigating problems with the testing, such as a legislative committee or a grand jury. Testifying as a witness in the prosecution of those who her lab results showed had violated the law had been part of her official HPD duties. There would be no First Amendment protection for the testimony had Culbertson still been employed by HPD because testifying about lab results was one of her job duties. See Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 421. Our different question is the applicability of the First Amendment to testimony by former employees about matters lingering from their work. The pleadings in this case contain no allegation of whether HPD imposed on Culbertson or Wong a continuing duty to testify in cases on which they had worked while still employed. It may be of some importance that plaintiffs were allegedly subpoenaed as witnesses. In considering the range of job duties, we also note the admonition in Ceballos, that “excessively broad job descriptions” created by employers could unduly limit First Amendment rights. Id. at 424. Determining job duties is meant to be a practical inquiry. Id. 2 We conclude that at this stage in the case, that inquiry is premature. We leave the issue open for consideration on remand. Did Culbertson or Wong have a duty, either 2 Harris County argues that because those who have prepared lab reports are necessary witnesses for the introduction of those reports at trial, such testimony is part of the lab employees’ duties even after they leave their lab positions. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2716 (2011) (plurality opinion). Confrontation Clause analysis about what witnesses the prosecution must offer at trial is not controlling in First Amendment analysis about the job duties of former public employees who would be those witnesses. Bullcoming shows why prosecutors might want such testimony to be a duty, but it does not prove that the post-employment testimony is one. 13 Case: 13-20569 Document: 00513087139 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 No. 13-20569 c/w 13-20751 explicit or in some manner implied, arising from their employment to testify about results from their lab work even after they were no longer employed there? Even if such a duty is found to have existed, does it implicate the need identified in Ceballos for “managerial discipline based on an employee's expressions made pursuant to official responsibilities[?]” Id. at 424. Whether the First Amendment protects the testimony is an issue for remand. Besides the testimony in court, there is a second group of postemployment statements. Culbertson claimed she suffered retaliation for comments she made in a meeting with the DA’s Office in August, months after her resignation, and comments published in a newspaper in September and October. Wong also made post-employment comments to a supervisor fairly soon after his departure from HPD, and was quoted in a September newspaper article. We cannot tell from the complaint if either plaintiff spoke to a reporter directly or whether comments made to others, including court testimony, were quoted. From the complaint, it appears at least one of Culbertson’s quoted comments was not taken from testimony. The complaint does not indicate whether any of these statements were made as part of official job duties under the kind of continuing obligation we just applied to post-employment testimony in court. Thus, the First Amendment potentially will apply. As private citizens working for a governmental contractor, Culbertson and Wong’s claim must be analyzed using public-employee standards. See Kinney, 367 F.3d at 360. We have already held that losing their positions at Lone Star was an adverse employment action, and the speech about the BAT vans’ reliability was a matter of public concern. Whether the plaintiffs’ interest outweighed the governmental ones is a matter initially for the district court. The difficult question is again whether one or more defendants caused injury to the plaintiffs due to the exercise of First Amendment rights. We earlier 14 Case: 13-20569 Document: 00513087139 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/22/2015 No. 13-20569 c/w 13-20751 deferred consideration of whether comments Wong made before he left his employment at HPD motivated the cancelling of the Lone Star Contract. To answer these questions about causation, we need to determine who among the defendants, if any, caused relevant injury, and whether those defendants were motivated by the plaintiffs’ exercise of First Amendment rights. The remaining defendants, after the dismissal of former District Attorney Lykos in her individual capacity, are former Assistant District Attorney Palmer and Harris County. There are allegations that Palmer was involved in a campaign with Lykos to cause Harris County to drop its contract with Lone Star because of the plaintiffs’ criticism of the integrity of BAT results. The Contract was not renewed, and Lone Star fairly soon terminated the plaintiffs who had been hired to perform work under the Contract. The question for us is whether causation has been plausibly alleged, i.e., was Harris County’s non-renewal of the Contract motivated by the plaintiffs’ speech, and if so, did the non-renewal cause the plaintiffs to lose their jobs? The Harris County Commissioners Court made the decision that led to the loss of the plaintiffs’ employment. We examine that decision.