Opinion ID: 59430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Limitation on the Presentation of Evidence and Trial Location

Text: Lufkin argues that given the complexity of the issues involved in this case, the district court's imposition of rigid time limits on the presentation of evidence deprived Lufkin of a fair trial. A district court has broad discretion in managing its docket and structuring the conduct of a trial. Sims v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 846, 849 (5th Cir.1996). It may maintain the pace of the trial by setting time limits on counsel. Id. Moreover, a judge has special latitude in applying time limits in a bench trial, since the court often has become familiar with the case long before trial begins and can readily comprehend the evidence presented. Id. at 850. Nevertheless, discretion has its limits. See id. at 849; see also Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 358 (5th Cir. 1995). When the manner of the presentation of information . . . is judicially restricted to the extent that the information becomes incomprehensible then the essence of the trial [is] destroyed. Sims, 77 F.3d at 849. In this case, we do not doubt that it was difficult for Lufkin to mount a defense against generalized claims of subjective decision making  claims that implicated all of its divisions and spanned almost a decade  in the mere twenty hours the district court allowed each side. But even if the strict time limits amounted to an abuse of discretion, the district court's error is presumed harmless until shown to be prejudicial. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1129 (5th Cir.1982); see also Sims, 77 F.3d at 849-50 (declining to reverse where the complaining party did not establish there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would be different upon retrial). Lufkin has not persuaded us that it suffered reversible prejudice. Lufkin's related claim of cumulative error fails because it is essentially rendered moot by the pervasive effect of our appellate ruling.