Opinion ID: 3003133
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a State, country, municipality, [etc.]

Text: (ii) any branch, department, agency, instrumentality, or official of an entity listed in clause (i); and (iii) any other person acting under color of State law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(a). As Miller concedes, this language appears to authorize suit against him in his individual capacity because the third prong allows for suits against “person[s] acting under color of State law” even apart from those persons as “official[s]” as described in the second prong. Indeed, this court found in Mack v. 38 No. 08-2044 O’Leary that identical language in the federal RFRA entitled a prisoner to sue prison officials in their individual capacities. 80 F.3d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated on other grounds by O’Leary v. Mack, 522 U.S. 801 (1997). But even if the language of the statute contemplates individual capacity liability, we still must address the question of whether a statute enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause should be interpreted as imposing individual liability on persons who do not, themselves, receive federal funds. The Spending Clause of the Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that “Congress shall have the Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art I., § 8, cl. 1. Pursuant to this authority, the Supreme Court has held that “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds” and may “further its broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (citation and quotations omitted). Congress’s Spending legislation typically grants federal funds to state institutions in exchange for the state’s compliance with certain conditions. Such legislation has been described as creating a “contract” between the federal government and the state that receives the federal funds. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17; Floyd v. Waiters, 133 F.3d 786, 789 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 802, reinstated at 171 F.3d 1264 No. 08-2044 39 (11th Cir. 1999). As a result, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power [] rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accept[ed] the terms of the ‘contract.’” Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. The two circuit court decisions that have addressed this constitutional issue with regard to RLUIPA, Smith and Sossamon, both found that state officials could not be held liable in their individual capacities under the statute.1 1 In Smith, the Eleventh Circuit began by analogizing cases in which plaintiffs sought damages under Title IX, which was also enacted pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power. The Eleventh Circuit had previously held that Title IX did not allow a private cause of action against a defendant in his individual capacity because individual defendants were not the “recipients” of the federal funds and thus were not parties to the “contract” created by state acceptance of the funds. Id. at 1273-74 (citing Floyd, 133 F.3d at 789 (“Because the contracting party is the grantreceiving local school district, a Title IX claim can only 11 The Ninth Circuit appears to have assumed that RLUIPA allows for individual capacity suits because it affirmed a district court’s grant of qualified immunity to a defendant official under the statute. Campbell v. Alameida, 295 F. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2008). The great number of district courts that have considered this question have been split, but few have considered the constitutional issue, instead focusing merely on the language of the statute. See, e.g., Agrawal v. Briley, No. 02-C- 6807, 2006 WL 3523750 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 2006) (summarizing split of authority but not discussing constitutional issue). 40 No. 08-2044 be brought against the grant-recipient . . . and not an individual”)). Based on this analogy, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “a construction of RLUIPA providing for individual liability raises substantial constitutional concerns” and consequently held that “a provision that derives from Congress’ Spending Power cannot be construed as creating a private action against individual defendants for monetary damages.” Id. at 1275 (citing Floyd, 133 F.3d at 789).1 2 The Sossamon court agreed with Smith. It first noted that the Fifth Circuit had already adopted the rule that Spending Clause legislation can only generate liability for funding grant recipients. Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328, 328 n.35 (citing Pederson v. LSU, 213 F.3d 858, 876 (5th Cir. 2000) and Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 654 (5th Cir. 1997)). It also believed that an interpretation of RLUIPA that disallowed individual capacity suits avoided the federalism and accountability 12 Our own circuit has also held in the Title IX context that “only a grant recipient” can violate the statute. See Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Township, 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997). But we came to this conclusion not based on limitations of Congress’s Spending Clause power but rather because the terms of Title IX prohibited discrimination “only by a ‘program or activity’ receiving federal funding.” Id. at 1018; see also Jennings v. Univ. of North Carolina, 444 F.3d 255, 268 n.9 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress’ spending power and prohibits discriminatory acts by funding recipients. Because school officials are not funding recipients under Title IX, school officials may not be sued in their individual capacities under Title IX.”) (emphasis added). No. 08-2044 41 concerns implicated by an alternative interpretation. Id. at 328-29. As the court explained: [I]f a congressional enactment could provide the basis for an individual’s liability based only on the agreement of (but not corresponding enactment of legislation by) a state, then important representation interests protected by federalism would be undermined. After passively acquiescing in the regulation of its citizens under a federal standard to receive needed funding from Congress, a state legislature could point its finger at the federal government for tying needed funds to an undesired liability—the regulation or law responsible for such liability not having been enacted by the state. Congress could reciprocate by pointing its finger at the state legislature for accepting the funds and visiting liability on its citizens by the state’s own choice, even though the state itself did not enact the law or regulation in question. Such an approach blurs the lines of decisional responsibility; that, in turn, undermines the popular check on both state and federal legislatures. Id. at 329 (footnotes omitted). The Fifth Circuit thus held that “Congressional enactments pursuant to the Spending Clause do not themselves impose direct liability on a non-party to the contract between the state and the federal government.” Id. (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Moxley v. Town of Walkersville, 601 F. Supp. 2d 648, 660 (D. Md. 2009) (agreeing with the rationale in Smith, and holding that a personal capacity suit 42 No. 08-2044 may is not available against an individual defendant under RLUIPA); Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 507 (S.D.N.Y 2008) (finding the reasoning in Smith to be convincing, and concluding that RLUIPA does not provide for money damages against defendants in their individual capacities); Boles v. Neet, 402 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240 (D. Colo. 2005) (“The Court understands [RLUIPA] to permit cases against a governmental entity, but not against an individual officer, except perhaps in his or her official capacity.”). Despite this weight of authority, Nelson argues that we should nonetheless allow Miller to be held individually liable because, as an employee of the state, Miller was a “third party beneficiary” of the “contract” created between the federal government and Illinois when Illinois accepted RLUIPA funds. Plaintiff contends that “[j]ust as third party beneficiaries to a contract have a right to sue for damages caused by a breach of a contract to which they are not a party, so do citizens have a right to damages when state officials violate the ‘contract’ implied in spending clause legislation.” But we have rejected this argument before. In Smith v. Metropolitan Sch. Dist. Perry Twp., we stated that the fact that a statute “ ‘was enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending power is evidence that it prohibits discriminatory acts only by grant recipients.’ ” 128 F.3d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Title IX did not allow for damages against school officials in their individual capacities) (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 (5th Cir. 1996)). Significantly, in Metropolitan Sch. Dist., we quoted approvingly the Fifth Circuit’s Rowinsky decision, No. 08-2044 43 which stated that “ ‘[w]hile it is plausible that the [federal government’s Title IX funding conditions] could encompass ending discriminatory behavior by third parties, the more probable inference is that the condition prohibits certain behavior by the grant recipients themselves.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012-13). Moreover, we remain concerned that interpreting RLUIPA to allow for suits against officials in their personal capacities could implicate significant federalism and accountability concerns, as voiced by our colleagues in Smith and Sossamon. See Smith, 502 F.3d at 1275 n.10 (citing Daker v. Ferrero, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1341-42 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (“By imposing liability on non-recipients of federal funding-individuals who are in essence involuntary and unknowing third parties to the funding contract-RLUIPA would become an example of an unprecedented and untested exercise of Congress’ [S]pending power.”)); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328-29. Construing RLUIPA to provide for damages actions against officials in their individual capacities would raise serious questions regarding whether Congress had exceeded its authority under the Spending Clause. Thus, as a matter of statutory interpretation, and to avoid the constitutional concerns that an alternative reading would entail,1 3 we decline to read RLUIPA as 13 The “canon of constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts.” FCC v. Fox TV Stations, (continued...) 44 No. 08-2044 allowing damages against defendants in their individual capacities.