Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Dismiss the Special Circumstances

Text: Defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking dismissal of the special circumstance allegations on the ground they were an ex post facto application of the laws and therefore a violation of his state and federal rights to due process. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying the motion and as a consequence violated his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. For the reasons discussed below, we discern no error and no violation of defendant's due process rights. [8] Defendant was charged with robbery and burglary special circumstances under section 190.2, as amended in 1990 by Proposition 115. Defendant contends that because this court decided the constitutionality of Proposition 115's amendments to section 190.2 after the commission of his crimes, charging the special circumstances violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. He also contends the special circumstances charges denied him due process because he lacked notice that he could be charged with the special circumstances. Addressing defendant's claim requires a brief review of the history of Proposition 115. In June 1990, the electorate passed both Propositions 114 and 115, which contained different versions of section 190.2. ( People v. Superior Court (Clark) (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1541, 1545, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 46 ( Clark) . ) Under the Proposition 114 version of section 190.2, the Legislature required a finding of intent to kill before the trier of fact could impose the death penalty on one who was not the actual killer. ( Clark, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1544-1545, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 46.) Under the Proposition 115 version of section 190.2, however, the felony-murder rule applied, with no required finding that a defendant had an intent to kill. ( Ibid. ) The passage of Propositions 114 and 115 spawned litigation that challenged whether Proposition 115's amendments to section 190.2 were effective. ( Clark, at p. 1546, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 46.) On June 25, 1992, we settled this issue in Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 992, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327. Yoshisato held that Proposition 115's amendments to section 190.2 were operative, and went into effect the day of Proposition 115's passage in June 1990. The crimes in the present case were committed on May 26-27, 1992. Defendant contends that the law was unsettled for the two-year period between the passage of Proposition 115 in June 1990, and our decision in Yoshisato on June 25, 1992, and that he lacked notice that a death judgment was proper in light of the actions constituting the two special circumstances charged. Defendant concedes that his argument fails under Clark, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at page 1541, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 46. He apparently asks us to disapprove that case. We decline to do so. As Clark observed, both the United States and California Constitutions forbid only `the retroactive application of an unexpected or unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute.' ( Clark, supra, 22 Cal. App.4th at p. 1550, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 46.) Our decision in Yoshisato was neither unexpected nor unforeseeable; all that can be said of the state of the law during the two-year period was that it was unsettled. ( Clark, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1550, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 46.) Defendant therefore was on notice that this court might find (as indeed we did) that the provisions of Proposition 115 were controlling. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the special circumstances.