Opinion ID: 528434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor's Penalty-Phase Argument (Claim 2)

Text: 77 During the sentencing phase of Bertolotti's trial, the prosecutor argued to the jury as follows: 78 And he says he didn't rape her.... But the evidence would show otherwise. And here she is found nude from the waist down, her underwear and pants and shoes on the floor of the kitchen. And what does that tell you? The man raped her. And yet he comes in here with the audacity to tell us, I didn't have sex with her. 79 The Florida Supreme Court decided that this remark was  'fairly susceptible' of being interpreted as a comment on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent, and as such was improper. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d at 132-33. Nevertheless, the Florida court determined that the comment was not so outrageous as to taint the validity of the jury's recommendation in light of the evidence of aggravation presented. Id., 476 So.2d at 133. Bertolotti strenuously urges that the decision of the Florida court is a factual finding that his fifth-amendment rights were violated, binding on a federal habeas court to the extent stated in 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). We disagree; the Florida decision is a non-binding opinion on a mixed question of law and fact. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714-15, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Although the prosecutor's comment may have been improper under Florida law, it was not a violation of Bertolotti's fifth-amendment right to remain silent. 80 Our test for determining whether the prosecutor's comments infringed the fifth-amendment right to silence is to ask whether the statement was manifestly intended or was of such character that a jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766, 772-73 (11th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1362 (11th Cir.1983) and United States v. Dearden, 546 F.2d 622, 625 (5th Cir.), 18 cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 295, 54 L.Ed.2d 188 (1977)), reh. in banc den., 749 F.2d 733 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107, 105 S.Ct. 2344, 85 L.Ed.2d 858 (1985). The reviewing court must look to the context in which the statement was made in order to determine the manifest intention which prompted it and its natural and necessary impact upon the jury. Hall, 733 F.2d at 773 (quoting Samuels v. United States, 398 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir.1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1021, 89 S.Ct. 630, 21 L.Ed.2d 566 (1969)). 81 Bertolotti's explanation of the circumstances in which the victim was found was provided to the jury through his taped confessions. Review of the prosecutor's closing argument shows that the attorney's intent was to argue a point in the evidence, not to comment on the fact that Bertolotti declined to take the stand. Nor do we think the jurors would have understood the prosecutor's remarks as a surreptitious comment on Bertolotti's failure to testify; the jury most likely took the comment as an exhortation to conclude from all the evidence admitted that Bertolotti had sexually abused his victim. The comment was within the bounds of reasonable prosecutorial argument, and did not so infect[ ] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1871, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974). 19