Opinion ID: 852615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence for Felony Murder Conviction

Text: Duncan does not challenge her convictions for reckless homicide, dealing methadone, and neglect of a dependent, but she contends the evidence does not support the felony murder charge. The murder statute includes among the felony murder definitions killing another human being while committing or attempting to commit . . . dealing in a . . . schedule II . . . controlled substance. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1(3)(C) (West Supp.2006). [1] Methadone is a schedule II substance. The definition of dealing includes possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance . . . classified in . . . schedule II . . . to a person under eighteen (18) years of age at least three (3) years junior to the person. Ind.Code. § 35-48-4-2 (2004). Possession of methadone with intent to give it to a two-year old was therefore dealing. The only issue as to this unusual form of felony murder is whether, as Duncan puts it, Noah's death occurred during the commission of the dealing offense. Duncan points out that Noah died one day after the delivery of methadone. She argues that therefore he was not killed during the felony. Duncan concedes that this Court has held that if an injury inflicted during the commission of a felony contributes mediately or immediately to the death of the victim then the defendant is guilty of homicide. Sims v. State, 466 N.E.2d 24, 25-26 (Ind.1984); Pittman v. State, 528 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ind.1988). However, Duncan contends, no injury was inflicted upon Noah in the course of the dealing because Noah was not immediately harmed by the pill and the moment Duncan administered the pill to Noah she no longer possessed it with the requisite intent. It is undisputed that Noah died of methadone poisoning. The jury found that Duncan administered the drug and therefore committed the felony of dealing. In Sims, the victim died from congestive heart failure following surgery after sustaining a fractured jaw in the course of a burglary. 466 N.E.2d at 25-26. In Pittman, the victim died after a post-surgical complication caused by the victim's obesity and post-operative immobility after being stabbed also in a burglary. 528 N.E.2d at 70. Both Sims and Pittman dealt with a physical injury that in concert with other factors eventually led to death. The injury to Noah in Duncan's case is ingesting a controlled substance, and that led directly, if not immediately, to death. Although Noah died the next day, the dealing was the first step in a chain of events that led to his death. This rendered the act killing that occurred during the felony even though the victim survived for some period of time. Indeed, in both Sims and Pittman the death occurred over two weeks after the felony. Sims, 466 N.E.2d at 25-26; Pittman, 528 N.E.2d at 70. Duncan also argues that the death was not a foreseeable consequence of her act. She cites this passage from Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 35, at 246 (1972), as this Court did in Sims: [E]ven when cause in fact is established, it must be determined that any variation between the result intended (with intent crimes) or hazarded (with reckless or negligent crimes) and the result actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result. Variations may occur (a) as to the person who is harmed, or (b) as to the manner in which the harm occurs, or (c), in felony murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter cases, as to the type of harm. Assuming this is a correct statement of the law, Noah's death is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold [Duncan] responsible. Duncan administered a prescription drugindeed a schedule II controlled substanceto a two-year old with no prescription and no medical advice. Harmful consequences, including death, are not outside the range of predictable results. In sum, we find sufficient evidence in the record to support the felony murder conviction.