Opinion ID: 1252767
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Does NEPA Preempt City's Ordinances?

Text: Preemption of municipal ordinances by state law is based on the fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the state. 5 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 15.20 at 106 (3d ed.1996). Thus, `[w]here there is a direct conflict between a city ordinance and a state statute, the statute is the superior law.' Herman v. Lee, 210 Neb. 563, 567, 316 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1982) (quoting Arrow Club, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 177 Neb. 686, 131 N.W.2d 134 (1964)). The touchstone of preemption analysis is legislative intent. [T]he central question in a preemption case is not whether the legislature intended to grant authority to municipalities to act concerning a particular matter, but rather whether the legislature intended to deny municipalities the right to legislate on the subject. 5 McQuillin, supra at 107. In construing a statute for preemption purposes, a court must look to the statute's purpose and give to the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it. Village of Winside v. Jackson, 250 Neb. 851, 553 N.W.2d 476 (1996). The purpose and intent of the Legislature must be ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Id. When reviewing preemption claims, the court is obligated to harmonize, to the extent it legally can be done, state and municipal enactments on the identical subject. State v. Kubik, 159 Neb. 509, 67 N.W.2d 755 (1954); Phelps Inc. v. City of Hastings, 152 Neb. 651, 42 N.W.2d 300 (1950). When an ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, under one of which it is clearly valid, while under the other its validity may be doubtful, that construction which makes the ordinance clearly valid will be given. Gillis v. City of Madison, 248 Neb. 873, 540 N.W.2d 114 (1995). A municipal ordinance may be preempted by state law in three different circumstances. First, the Legislature may expressly declare in explicit statutory language its intent to preempt municipal ordinances. See Midtown Palace, Inc. v. City of Omaha, 193 Neb. 785, 229 N.W.2d 56 (1975) (recognizing that in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-926.33 (Reissue 1975), Legislature expressly declared in explicit statutory language its intent to preempt all municipal regulation of obscene material). Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, the Legislature's intent to preempt municipal ordinances may be inferred from a comprehensive scheme of legislation. See Phelps Inc., supra (determining that Legislature did not intend to preempt field of liquor regulation); Bali Hai', Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 195 Neb. 1, 236 N.W.2d 614 (1975) (affirming that Legislature did not intend to preempt field of liquor regulation). Often called field preemption, it has been described in the following manner: [A]n intent by the state to preempt an entire field of legislation need not be expressly declared. Preemption may be implied from the nature of the subject matter being regulated and the purpose and scope of the state statutory scheme.... .... ... [A]n ordinance may cover an authorized field of local laws not occupied by general laws, or may complement a field not exclusively occupied by the general laws. However, where the state has occupied the field of prohibitory legislation on a particular subject, a municipality lacks authority to legislate with respect to it. 5 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 15.20 at 107-08 (3d ed.1996). Third, a municipal ordinance is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with state law. Village of Winside, 250 Neb. at 854, 553 N.W.2d at 479 (determining local ordinance requiring nonusers of garbage service to pay fee was invalid because of conflict with state statute permitting municipalities to impose fee upon `each person whose premises are served by the [garbage] facility or system'  (emphasis omitted)); Bodkin v. State, 132 Neb. 535, 536-37, 272 N.W. 547, 548 (1937) (perceiving no conflict between a statute making it unlawful for licensee to sell alcohol to minors `knowing them to be such' and local ordinance providing that `[n]o person shall, within the city,' sell any alcoholic liquors to minors). [T]hat which is allowed by the general laws of the state cannot be prohibited by ordinance, without express grant on the part of the state. Conversely, without express legislative grant, an ordinance cannot authorize what the statutes forbid.... [T]he fact that a local ordinance does not expressly conflict with the statute will not save it when the legislative purpose in enacting the statute is frustrated by the ordinance. 5 McQuillin, supra at 107. This court has stated that `[a] city ordinance is inconsistent with a statute if it is contradictory in a sense that the two legislative provisions cannot coexist.... Generally, an ordinance cannot prohibit what the Legislature has expressly licensed, authorized, or permitted.' Herman v. Lee, 210 Neb. 563, 567, 316 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1982) (quoting Arrow Club, Inc. v. Nebraska Liquor Control Commission, 177 Neb. 686, 131 N.W.2d 134 (1964)). In its brief, FCF begins the first section of its preemption argument with the heading Exclusive Occupation of the Field by State Law: Express Preemption. Brief for appellant at 14. While in this heading FCF invokes both express and field varieties of preemption, in its argument which follows, FCF does not contend that the NEPA expressly preempts the ordinances. In any event, we are unable to find any language in the NEPA expressly declaring the Legislature's preemptive intent. We therefore consider FCF's specific preemption arguments with respect to field and conflict preemption. FCF first contends that the district court erred in determining that the field of pollution control has not been preempted by the NEPA. According to FCF, the Legislature's intent to preempt the field of pollution control may reasonably be inferred from the following subsections of § 81-1504 of the NEPA: The [D]epartment [of Environmental Quality] shall have and may exercise the following powers and duties: (1) To exercise exclusive general supervision of the administration and enforcement of the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, the Livestock Waste Management Act, and all rules and regulations and orders promulgated under such acts; .... (10) To require submission of plans, specifications, and other data relative to, and to inspect construction of, disposal systems or any part thereof prior to issuance of such permits or approvals as are required by the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, and the Livestock Waste Management Act; .... (13) To exercise all incidental powers necessary to carry out the purposes of the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, and the Livestock Waste Management Act; .... (23) To delegate, by contract with governmental subdivisions which have adopted local air, water, or land pollution control programs approved by the council, the enforcement of state-adopted air, water, or land pollution control regulations within a specified region surrounding the jurisdictional area of the governmental subdivisions. Prosecutions commenced under such contracts shall be conducted by the Attorney General or county attorneys as provided in the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, and the Livestock Waste Management Act; .... (30) Under such conditions as it may prescribe for the review, recommendations, and written approval of the [D]irector [of Environmental Quality], to require the submission of such plans, specifications, and other information as it deems necessary to carry out the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, and the Livestock Waste Management Act or to carry out the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to the acts. When deemed necessary by the director, the plans and specifications shall be prepared and submitted by a professional engineer licensed to practice in Nebraska. The existence of the foregoing provisions on the subject of pollution control does not per se indicate a preemptive intent on the part of the Legislature. [T]he mere fact that the legislature has enacted a law addressing a subject does not mean that the subject matter is completely preempted. 5 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 15.20 at 107 (3d ed.1996). To determine the Legislature's intent, we must consider the foregoing provisions relied upon by FCF in relation to all other provisions of the NEPA. The purpose and intent of the Legislature must be ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Village of Winside v. Jackson, 250 Neb. 851, 553 N.W.2d 476 (1996). In its brief, FCF does not address the following additional subsections of § 81-1504 which we find relevant in our analysis: The [D]epartment [of Environmental Quality] shall have and may exercise the following powers and duties: .... (18) To encourage local units of government to handle air, land, and water pollution problems within their respective jurisdictions and on a cooperative basis and to provide technical and consultative assistance therefore; (19) To consult with any person proposing to construct, install, or otherwise acquire an air, land, or water contaminant source or a device or system for control of such source, upon request of such person, concerning the efficacy of such device or system or concerning the air, land, or water pollution problem which may be related to the source, device, or system. Nothing in any such consultation shall be construed to relieve any person from compliance with the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, the Livestock Waste Management Act, rules and regulations in force pursuant to the acts, or any other provision of law. (Emphasis supplied.) Additionally, pursuant to § 81-1506(1)(b), it is unlawful for any person [t]o discharge or emit any wastes into any air, waters, or land of the state which reduce the quality of such air, waters, or land below the air, water, or land quality standards established therefor by the council. Any such action is hereby declared to be a public nuisance. A livestock operation is not a nuisance if ... [i] t is in compliance with applicable regulations adopted by the council and zoning regulations of the local governing body having jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.) Further, pursuant to § 81-1528(1), [t] he Environmental Protection Act shall not apply in any political subdivision which provides for the control of air, water, or land pollution by resolution, ordinance, or regulation not inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the Environmental Protection Act or any rule or regulation adopted pursuant to such act.... (Emphasis supplied.) In view of the foregoing provisions, the purpose and intent of the Legislature, ascertained from the entire language of the NEPA, does not support FCF's claim of field preemption. To the contrary, considering the NEPA in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense, it is clear that the Legislature contemplated that municipalities would continue to enact ordinances on the subject of pollution control after the enactment of the NEPA. See Village of Winside, supra . Consequently, we determine that in enacting the NEPA, the Legislature did not intend to deny municipalities the right to legislate on the subject of pollution control. FCF's contention that the NEPA preempts the field of pollution control is without merit. FCF next contends the district court erred in failing to determine that the ordinances are preempted because they conflict with the NEPA. FCF's first argument in this regard is with respect to the following provision of ordinance No. 11-047-3: The applicant shall submit an acceptable bond or financial guarantee to [en]sure that waste containment facilities are closed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations of the state without cost to the taxpayers of the country [sic]. (Emphasis supplied.) FCF argues such provision conflicts with the following provision of the NEPA: The [Environmental Quality C]ouncil shall adopt and promulgate rules and regulations requiring all new or renewal permit or license applicants regulated under the Environmental Protection Act, the Integrated Solid Waste Management Act, or the Livestock Waste Management Act to establish proof of financial responsibility by providing funds in the event of abandonment, default, or other inability of the permittee or licensee to meet the requirements of its permit or license or other conditions imposed by the department pursuant to the acts. The council may exempt classes of permittees or licensees from the requirements of this subdivision when a finding is made that such exemption will not result in a significant risk to the public health and welfare. § 81-1505(21)(a). According to FCF, the possibility of exemption from the bond requirement provided by § 81-1505(21)(a) conflicts with the mandatory bond requirement imposed by the City's ordinance. On this issue, we agree. The purpose of the mandatory bond requirement imposed by the subject provision of the ordinance is aimed to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations of the state for closing down waste containment facilities. See ordinance No. 11-047-3. The purpose of providing funds pursuant to § 81-1505(21)(a) is also to ensure compliance with the same provisions of state law referred to in the subject provision of the ordinance. The Legislature has determined, however, to permit an exemption from such requirements under certain circumstances. Consequently, the subject provision of the ordinance in effect prohibits what state law expressly allows. [T]hat which is allowed by the general laws of the state cannot be prohibited by ordinance, without express grant on the part of the state. 5 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 15.20 at 107 (3d ed.1996). Since the subject provision of the ordinance directly conflicts with § 81-1505(21)(a), it is preempted and unenforceable. We therefore determine the district court erred insofar as it failed to conclude that the mandatory bond provision of ordinance No. 11-047-3 is preempted by the NEPA. Finally, FCF argues that under our holding in Sarpy County v. City of Springfield, 241 Neb. 978, 492 N.W.2d 566 (1992), the City's authority to regulate its hog confinement facility is preempted by the NEPA and that as such, § 17-536 provides no authority or jurisdiction permitting the City to enact these ordinances. In Sarpy County, this court determined that pursuant to the then-existing provisions of the NEPA, a city of the second class has no authority to regulate solid waste disposal areas located outside that city's zoning jurisdiction. Sarpy County, supra, is clearly distinguishable. Our holding in Sarpy County, was specifically limited to the application of the then-existing provisions of the NEPA to solid waste disposal areas. The result in Sarpy County was based on our interpretation of § 81-1518(1) (Reissue 1987), which provided in part: Before the director shall approve a new solid waste disposal area, it shall be approved by the county board of the county, if the area is outside the zoning jurisdiction of a city or village, or by the city council or board of trustees if within the zoning jurisdiction of a city or village. Sarpy County, 241 Neb. at 984, 492 N.W.2d at 569. Pursuant to this subsection of the NEPA, we determined that notwithstanding § 17-536, the authority of a city of the second class to regulate solid waste disposal areas was limited by the NEPA to that city's zoning jurisdiction. Given that the zoning jurisdiction of a city of the second class extended only to within one mile of the city's corporate limits, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 17-1001 (Reissue 1997), we determined that § 17-536 did not, under this circumstance, provide the city of Springfield authority to enact the ordinances at issue. The NEPA contains no provision similar to that relied on in Sarpy County, supra, limiting the authority of a city of the second class to regulate a livestock confinement facility utilizing solid and liquid waste storage lagoons. Furthermore, FCF's hog confinement facility would not qualify either as a solid waste disposal area for purposes of this court's analysis in Sarpy County, or as a solid waste management facility for purposes of the NEPA. See, Sarpy County, supra ; §§ 81-1517 and 81-1518 (Reissue 1987). See, also, § 81-1502(26), (37), and (38). For these reasons, we find no merit to FCF's contention.