Opinion ID: 1106227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Law Applied to the Facts

Text: In addition to the foregoing, consideration of the Missouri Supreme Court's analysis in a factually-similar case provides some enlightenment in this Court's determination of whether the judge failed to exercise sound discretion: [P]laintiff urges that the [trial judge] abused [his] discretion in refusing permission to introduce a letter ... written by the defendant to the plaintiff ... in which it is claimed defendant admits that it owed a balance to the plaintiff. It would appear on the face of the letter, as offered, that the letter does, at least conditionally, tend to admit that there is some balance yet unpaid to the plaintiff on his subcontract. It is true that the plaintiff had closed his case and that a motion for a directed verdict had been made by the defendant. However, the motion had not been ruled upon and it is not shown that the defendant would have been subjected to undue disadvantage by the reopening of the case for the purpose of admission of the letter. Since the letter appears to be material for the purpose of showing the quantity and value of the work done, we think that under the circumstances the [judge] abused [his] discretion in refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of receiving the letter so offered. [This decision is consistent with our holding in a previous case:] If th[e] evidence was material, then the trial [judge] clearly erred in not permitting that fact to be shown. The mere fact that counsel through inadvertence or oversight omits to introduce certain material evidence should be no legal bar to his right to do so when his attention is called to the fact, [unless] the case has proceeded to such a point, or the conditions have so changed, that an undue advantage would thereby be acquired by him over his adversary. Ray M. Dilschneider, Inc., 283 S.W.2d at 635-36.
In the case sub judice, Wakefield mistakenly failed to introduce an itemized list of his missing belongings and their value before resting. The State took advantage of this failure and moved for a directed verdict. Wakefield then responded that he thought the list which he had provided in his complaint would be considered by the jury. Wakefield's mistaken belief, however, did not move the judge, who rendered the following opinion from the bench: [T]his Court would rule, if it were necessary, that [Wakefield] has made out a case against at least the administrative official in his official capacity as an agent/employee/servant and so forth of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. However, it's not necessary to rule that. There has been no [list] introduced here [with] which the jury could reach a verdict with anything other than speculation, guess work, and conjecture in that no measure of damages has been given to the jury, and the motion will be granted for that reason. ..... Mr. Wakefield, it is the law that in a suit where money damages are sought, which is what you seek here today, that some measure of damage  it doesn't have to be exact  but some measure of what you have been damaged, for example, the value of your property, must be given to the jury in order to give them some basis or some yard stick by which to measure the damage, and you didn't do that. Vol. II, at 21. The judge's ruling is disturbing  particularly in view of the various concessions he had made during the course of the trial: (1) that Wakefield acting pro se had  made a case against ... the Department of Corrections ; (2) that  I think some reasonable payment ought to be made or some reasonable payment made to [Wakefield] for his [missing] property ; and (3) that I don't take any delight in dismissing your case. Id. at 20-23 (emphasis added). The State also conceded: Your Honor, let me say for the record, I plan to make a suggestion to the superintendent that Internal Affairs investigate [the loss] and give [Wakefield] some sort of equitable [settlement]. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
Applying the law to the facts, this Court concludes that Wakefield should have been permitted to introduce his list: (1) because it constituted evidence which was critical or relevant to the material issue; (2) because the absence of the evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice (the judge conceded this when he noted that Wakefield had made a case against the Department of Corrections and that he should be compensated for his loss); (3) because no one would have been prejudiced if Wakefield were permitted to reopen his case (the State does not claim that it would have been prejudiced, and both the State and Judge Evans conceded that Wakefield deserves compensation notwithstanding that he lost his case); and finally (4) because permitting the evidence would not have provided Wakefield with an undue advantage over his adversary (indeed, the State had knowledge of this list since it was included in the complaint). In sum, the trial judge did not exercise sound discretion when he refused without explanation to permit Wakefield to fully develop his case. The case is reversed and remanded so that Wakefield may submit evidence of his lost property and its value to a jury.