Opinion ID: 702528
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparity Between the 16-Level Enhancement and the Seriousness of the Underlying Narcotics Offense

Text: 34 Guideline Sec. 2L1.2(b)(2) requires a 16-level enhancement when sentencing a defendant convicted of reentry after deportation if that deportation followed an aggravated felony conviction. That guideline defines an aggravated felony to include any drug trafficking crime as defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(2). U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L1.2, application note 7. Abreu-Cabrera's conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine meets the definition of aggravated felony and therefore the 16-level enhancement applies. The district court disagreed, believing that since defendant received a statutory minimum sentence for a single cocaine offense in an undisclosed amount departure was warranted. 35 Abreu-Cabrera was convicted of illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326. Such violation generally carries a maximum penalty of two years incarceration. Sec. 1326(a). Congress has nonetheless determined that such illegal reentry is a more significant offense when it occurs subsequent to a felony conviction. Thus, under Sec. 1326(b)--as in effect at the time of Abreu-Cabrera's reentry--the maximum penalty is increased from two years to five years when deportation is preceded by a felony conviction (other than an aggravated felony), and to 15 years when deportation is preceded by a conviction for an aggravated felony. Congress recently increased the maximum periods of incarceration under Sec. 1326(b) to 10 and 20 years, respectively. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-322, Title XIII, Sec. 130001(b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023. 36 The Sentencing Commission has implemented Congress' view of the increased seriousness of illegal reentry subsequent to a criminal conviction. Under U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L1.2(b), if deportation followed a felony conviction, other than a violation of the immigration laws, the offense level is increased by 4 levels, and if an aggravated felony, by 16 levels. See United States v. Campbell, 967 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir.1992) ([B]oth Congress and the Sentencing Commission have concluded that the fact that a defendant was deported subsequent to the commission of an aggravated felony is relevant to measuring the severity of the crime of reentry following deportation.). 37 Our decision in United States v. Polanco, 29 F.3d 35 (2d Cir.1994), the existence of which was known by the district court in its resentencing of Abreu-Cabrera, governs here. In Polanco, the defendant pled guilty to illegally reentering the country following his deportation as an aggravated felon, in violation of Sec. 1326(b)(2), the same violation at issue in the instant case. Polanco's aggravated felony was a state conviction for the sale of five grams of cocaine to an undercover police officer, for which he was sentenced to six months imprisonment and five years probation. The presentence report included the 16-level mandatory enhancement pursuant to guideline Sec. 2L1.2(b)(2). The district court found that guideline inapplicable because, it held, Polanco's prior conviction was not an aggravated felony under Sec. 2L1.2(b)(2). It then sentenced Polanco to a suspended one year sentence. See id. at 36-37. 38 In vacating the sentence, we stated, [b]ecause Polanco's felony conviction was for an offense punishable under the Controlled Substances Act, one of the statutes enumerated under section 924(c)(2), the offense rises to the level of 'aggravated felony' under section 2L1.2(b)(2) and 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1326(b)(2) regardless of the quantity or nature of the contraband or the severity of the sentence imposed. Id. at 38 (emphasis added). We further stated that the guidelines more than adequately account[ed] for the circumstances underlying the offense conduct. Id. at 38 n. 3. Thus, Polanco left no room for the district court to conclude that Sec. 2L1.2 did not completely account for the circumstances of Abreu-Cabrera's drug offense. 39 It should further be observed that both the Sentencing Commission and Congress have shown themselves capable of modifying the definition of aggravated felony to exclude circumstances deemed less significant. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 2L1.2, application note 7 (limiting crimes of violence that are aggravated felonies to those for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least five years); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1182(c) (excluding from discretionary waiver of deportability those aliens convicted of one or more aggravated felonies for which a term of imprisonment of at least 5 years has been served); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (deportable aliens include those convicted of a narcotics offense, other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana). 40 The failure similarly to limit the category of drug trafficking crimes that call for the enhanced sentence for illegal reentry following deportation as an aggravated felon cannot be seen as inadvertent. Congress has spoken within its lawful authority and the Sentencing Commission has incorporated that legislative decision into the guidelines. Such legislative decision cannot be overturned by judicial edict. See United States v. Maul-Valverde, 10 F.3d 544, 546 (8th Cir.1993) (departure from Sec. 2L1.2(b)(2)'s 16-level enhancement when prior aggravated felony was too ancient to be used in calculating criminal history category improper because Sec. 2L1.2(b)(2) counts all prior aggravated felonies no matter how ancient and Sentencing Commission's decision mirrored the governing statutes). 41 Other courts have taken the same categorical approach to determining predicate aggravated felony convictions for the sentence enhancement provided for under Sec. 1326(b) and guideline Sec. 2L1.2(b)(2). See United States v. Lomas, 30 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir.1994) (to determine whether state drug conviction is an aggravated felony under Sec. 2L1.2(b), court looks only to the statutory definition and not the underlying factual circumstances of the crime), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1158, 130 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1995); United States v. Frias-Trujillo, 9 F.3d 875, 876-77 (10th Cir.1993) (aggravated felony includes burglary conviction even though nobody was home, no property was damaged and nobody was injured); United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d 138, 140-41 (8th Cir.1992) (court need not look to underlying circumstances to conclude that commission of lascivious acts with a child is a crime of violence triggering 16-level enhancement); cf. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2159-60, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (adopting categorical approach to predicate offenses triggering the sentence enhancements under Sec. 924(e) for armed career criminals). 42 In sum, the 16-level enhancement provided for in guideline Sec. 2L1.2 applies regardless of the underlying facts of Abreu-Cabrera's drug trafficking crime, and downward departure based on a perceived disparity between the sentence enhancement and those facts was improper. 43