Opinion ID: 776169
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Comprehend Compelling and Substantial Mitigation Evidence

Text: 92 It is remotely conceivable that the decision not to extensively investigate a defendant's background may be, in exceptional cases, tactical. However, before an attorney can insulate his strategic behavior from review by claiming that a decision to forego mitigation evidence was tactical, an attorney must have chosen not to present mitigating evidence after having investigated the defendant's background, and that choice must have been reasonable under the circumstances. Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1369 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Bolender v. Singletary, 16 F.3d 1547, 1558 (11th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original)). Mr. Freeman could not have weighed the risks and benefits of presenting the testimony regarding Mr. Bryan's mental capacity where he did not even realize that he could present that testimony. He was apparently unable to articulate to Mr. Bryan any purpose mitigation evidence might serve and never considered any impact the mitigating evidence would have upon Mr. Bryan's moral culpability. Cf. Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1229 (holding counsel's performance ineffective and noting there was no strategic decision at all because [counsel] was ignorant of various other mitigation strategies he could have employed). 93 Mr. Freeman's own testimony makes this clear. Mr. Freeman admitted that he characterized Mr. Bryan's stories and events regarding the farm and business ventures as fantastic and delusional. He does not dispute the conclusions of the various medical reports that state Mr. Bryan was confused, depressed, delirious, paranoid, psychotic and delusional and that he had suffered brain atrophy and organic brain damage. He admits that multiple medical records indicated there was substantial evidence from competent professionals regarding his client's organic and mental problems. See Evid. Hr'g Tr. at 90-93, 100-03, 112. He acknowledges that Dr. Murphy concluded Mr. Bryan suffers from a serious mental disorder which places into serious question his competence to stand trial, as well as his legal culpability in the crimes for which he is charged. Id. at 95. It is almost unbelievable that Mr. Freeman did not seek to introduce this evaluation, which is appended to this dissent. See id. at 90-99. 94 Most important is not what Mr. Freeman admitted he knew, but what he admitted he did not know about mitigation. Mr. Freeman clearly testified that he saw no use for the experts' mental testimony, except to prove either insanity or incompetence. Id. at 105. Mr. Freeman ethically and honestly believed that he could not present evidence of mental defects at the sentencing stage simply because the experts were not going to say [Mr. Bryan] was insane. Id. at 86-87. Because he believed the experts could not testify as to Mr. Bryan's insane or incompetent state, Mr. Freeman did not consider any other use he could have made from the testimony. Rather he simply assumed that the testimony would not have been relevant at all. Id. at 106, 108. 95