Opinion ID: 533563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Injunction Against Further Discrimination

Text: 121 The final issue raised on appeal regards the district court's order that [t]he defendant is enjoined from discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the appointment, promotion and tenure of faculty members, and in particular with respect to the promotion, salary or other benefits to which the plaintiff may become entitled. The University argues that the injunction is overbroad insofar as it enjoins the University from sex discrimination against faculty other than Professor Brown, because it is tantamount to an injunction to obey the statute, which the Supreme Court rejected as too broad in N.L.R.B. v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 61 S.Ct. 693, 85 L.Ed. 930 (1941). The hazard of such an injunction, warns the University, is that the order has the potential to further embroil the courts in the University's internal affairs, allowing faculty members to circumvent administrative procedures by simply invoking the contempt jurisdiction of the district court whenever a dispute arises. 122 We agree. An injunction should be narrowly tailored to give only the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2558, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). Ordinarily, classwide relief, such as the injunction here which prohibits sex discrimination against the class of Boston University faculty, is appropriate only where there is a properly certified class. See Zepeda v. United States I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1983). Of course, [a]n injunction ... is not necessarily made overbroad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing parties in ... [a] lawsuit--even if it is not a class action--if such breadth is necessary to give prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled. Professional Association of College Educators, TSTA/NEA v. El Paso County Community College District, 730 F.2d 258, 273-74 (5th Cir.) (citing Meyer v. Brown & Root Construction Co., 661 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir.1981); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 633-34 (9th Cir.1972)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 881, 105 S.Ct. 248, 83 L.Ed.2d 186 (1984). But there is no such reason here for an injunction running to the benefit of nonparties. Professor Brown's case established that she alone had been the victim of sex discrimination. The only permissible focus of the injunctive relief, therefore, would be on protecting her from further instances of sex discrimination or retaliation. That portion of the injunction which provides that [t]he defendant is enjoined from discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to ... promotion, salary or other benefits to which the plaintiff may become entitled provides her with the outer limit of the relief to which she is entitled. 23 That portion of the injunction which provides that the University is enjoined from discrimination on the basis of sex with respect to the appointment, promotion and tenure of faculty members is overbroad, and is vacated.