Opinion ID: 2051955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trespass Instructions.

Text: Frey proposed Instructions # 2 and # 3. These instructions defined trespass and justification of force to prevent trespass under SDCL 22-18-4. [] The trial court refused these instructions. Instead, the court instructed the jury, over Frey's objection, that an officer acting within his authority is ordinarily not trespassing when investigating a crime upon private property. To support the trial court's instruction, the State cites the general rule in State v. Cook, 319 N.W.2d 809 (S.D.1982): Conduct otherwise a trespass is often justifiable by reason of authority vested in the person who does the act, as, for example, an officer of the law acting in the performance of his duty. Id. at 812 ( citing 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 43 (1974)). Courts have recognized the rule that Ordinarily, an officer of the law who goes upon private property while investigating a crime is not a trespasser. Id. at 812. See United States v. Barnett, 492 F.2d 790 (5th Cir.1974); State v. Van Rees, 246 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lukus, 149 Mont. 45, 423 P.2d 49 (1967). However, this rule is not without limitation. The Van Rees court stated: We hold [the officer] was entitled to enter defendant's premises to carry out this duty. For this limited purpose he was not a trespasser and did not require defendant's consent. What we have said does not, of course, permit an officer to enter one's home or to conduct a search or make a seizure without a warrant or other authority. Id. at 343. The undisputed evidence showed the officers did not possess a search warrant, and that Roland requested the officers to leave the property. Although there is some testimony that the Freys consented to the search, there is also evidence indicating that the Freys did not consent to the officers' presence and search on the property. Under these circumstances, the court could not properly conclude, as a matter of law, that the Freys consented to the search. The plain view exception is inapplicable under these facts. Plain view requires that the evidence is discovered inadvertently, in other words that the officer did not know in advance the location of the evidence. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). This discovery was not inadvertent, as the officers went to the Frey ranch for the sole purpose of searching for the animals mentioned by the anonymous tip. Unable to determine the species of the animals from the highway, the officers waited and followed Roland up the driveway before proceeding onto the property. This indicates knowledge on the part of the officers that an unwarranted search was illegal and evidences a lack of good faith, another requirement of plain view. Brown, supra . Finally, the State has not shown other exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search by the officers. State v. Bennett, 295 N.W.2d 5 (S.D.1980); State v. Max, 263 N.W.2d 685 (S.D.1978). The trial court held that a search warrant was unnecessary under SDCL ch. 41-15, which relates to enforcement powers and procedures for the Department of Game, Fish, and Parks. Although these provisions purport to grant broad powers for warrantless administrative searches, these provisions cannot exceed the protections afforded by the constitution. State v. Stip, 246 N.W.2d 897 (S.D.1976). South Dakota has created a statutory privilege to use reasonable force to protect persons or property under SDCL 22-18-4. The trial court should have instructed the jury on this potential justification to aggravated assault, as the facts raised a jury question regarding consent to the trespass and the reasonableness of the force used under the circumstances. The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the warrantless search was justified under these provisions and that the officers were acting within their lawful and official duties.