Opinion ID: 1491821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionaility of the September 30 order.

Text: When DHS first moved to set aside the trial court's September 30 order, it argued that it was entitled to assert sovereign immunity and could not be made a defendant without waiving sovereign immunity. On appeal, DHS argues that the trial court's order coerced DHS into bearing a financial burden, which is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. While intervenor suggests that this argument was not made below, our review of the record shows that the issue was sufficiently developed for our review. Additionally, we decline to find, as intervenor suggests, that sovereign immunity has been waived simply because the prosecutor filed the FINS petition here. DHS was never the initial moving party in these proceedings. See Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993). However, we nonetheless find that there is a waiver of sovereign immunity under the circumstances presented. This court has recognized an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of immunity. See State of Arkansas Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 954 S.W.2d 907 (1997); State v. Tedder, 326 Ark. 495, 932 S.W.2d 755 (1996). Unlike the statutes at issue in Arkansas Department of Human Servs. v. State, 312 Ark. 481, 850 S.W.2d 847 (1993), or Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21, 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), the Juvenile Code expressly empowers the court to order cash assistance in FINS cases. When a family is found to be in need of services, the court may order family services. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-332(1) (Repl.1993). The following are included within the definition of family services: Family services means relevant services, including, but not limited to: child care; homemaker services; crisis counseling; cash assistance; transportation; family therapy; physical, psychiatric, or psychological evaluation; counseling; or treatment, provided to a juvenile or his family. Family services are provided in order to: (A) Prevent a juvenile from being removed from a parent, guardian, or custodian; (B) Reunite the juvenile with the parent, guardian, or custodian from whom the juvenile has been removed; or (C) Implement a permanent plan of adoption, guardianship, or rehabilitation of the juvenile. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-303(17) (Repl.1993) (emphasis added). A FINS petition may be initiated by any adult. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-310(b)(3)(A) (Repl.1993). Before a juvenile may be removed from a parent, the court is required to order family services appropriate to prevent removal. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-27-328(a) (Repl.1993). Given that the trial court is empowered to order family services in FINS cases to prevent a juvenile from being removed from a parent, which by definition includes cash assistance, we conclude that the General Assembly has specifically waived sovereign immunity as to DHS in such instances. Any other interpretation would effectively eviscerate the court's power to order family services in FINS cases. This is especially true considering that a FINS case may be initiated by any adult, where DHS will not be the initial moving party. Such a consequence could not have been intended by the General Assembly in enacting the Juvenile Code.
DHS also argues that the September 30 order violated separation of powers, but we decline to reach the merits given that this theory was not sufficiently raised or developed below with respect to setting aside the September 30 order. See Stricklin v. Hays, 332 Ark. 270, 965 S.W.2d 103 (1998) ( supp. opinion on denial of reh'g, Ark. 1998). DHS concedes that its motion to set aside did not discuss the doctrine of separation of powers by name or at any length, but asserts that its separation of powers issue is preserved by the language in its motion and amended motion to set aside that both the State and its agencies may not be compelled to expend funds not appropriated by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas. However, our review of the record shows that DHS's separation of powers argument on appeal was not presented to the trial court. Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying DHS's motion to set aside the September 30 order.