Opinion ID: 2390586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Lack of Evidence at Trial of a Prescriptive Easement

Text: We now turn to the assertion by the defendants, Robert and Virginia Stegall, that plaintiff Michael O'Dell failed to establish a prescriptive easement. As we have previously related, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of several individuals who stated that the front part of the gravel lane had, for many decades prior to 1999, been regularly used by churchgoers approximately twice a week to access a parking lot at the rear of the church. The plaintiff's expert said that he did not think the plaintiff had a prescriptive easement. Instead, the expert said it was his opinion that when Isaac Strider deeded the four lots bordering the gravel lane to others, between 1893 and 1911, Mr. Strider must have intended for the owners of the four lots to have a right to use the gravel road for ingress and egress. This was pure speculation. Yet, on the basis of this testimony, the jury concluded that the plaintiff had a prescriptive easement. The plaintiff bore the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he (or his predecessors in title) (1) adversely used the gravel lane against the interests of its owner; (2) that the adverse use was continuous and uninterrupted for at least ten years; (3) that the adverse use was known to the owner, or open, notorious and visible; and (4), the precise line, width, starting and ending points, and use for which the easement was sought. After carefully scrutinizing the evidence and testimony produced at trial, we think it is clear that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. First and foremost, the plaintiff failed to show that his use of the gravel lane was adverse, that is, that it was wrongful and made without the express or implied permission of the rightful owner of the land. In part, this is because the plaintiff wholly failed to show that the defendants owned the land upon which the gravel lane rests. The essence of an adverse use is that such use be made of the land of another. Keller v. Hartman, 175 W.Va. 418, 424, 333 S.E.2d 89, 95 (1985). Without question, the owner of the alleged servient estate is an indispensable party to a lawsuit to establish an easement across that estate. The 1899 deed of the third lot (now owned by Ms. Seibert) clearly identifies the gravel lane as being owned by I.H. Strider, and the deed conveyed a right to use the gravel lane for ingress and egress 25 ft. wide running from the said lot through the land of I.H. Strider[.] At no point did the plaintiff ever identify for the jury the current successor to Mr. Strider, or otherwise suggest who the current owner of the gravel lane might be. When plaintiff's counsel was asked at oral argument before this Court, he conceded that none of the parties knows who owns the gravel roadway. [35] We therefore believe that the plaintiff failed to prove any use of the gravel lane was adverse to the owner of the servient estate over which the alleged prescriptive easement crosses. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show that the prior use of the gravel lane, by himself and his predecessors, was in any way wrongful toward, or without the express or implied permission of, the owner of the servient estate. The plaintiff was required to prove that his actions (and the actions of his predecessors) amounted to trespassing, and that the ownerwhoever it might bewould have wanted to prevent the plaintiff's use, or the churchgoers' use, by resorting to the law. We can conceive that when Mr. Strider deeded the plaintiff's lot to the German Baptist Brethren Church in 1898, he gave implicit or explicit permission for churchgoers to use the lane. Nothing in the record suggests that the churchgoers' use of the gravel lane was anything more than a neighborly accommodation by the owner of the gravel lane. [36] Second, the plaintiff was required to establish that the adverse use was continuous and uninterrupted for at least ten years. The record supports the plaintiff's claim that he and his predecessor's use of the gravel lane was uninterrupted for a ten year period, in the sense that there is no evidence to indicate that the owner of the gravel lane ever asserted control of the lane or that the use of the lane was discontinued. However, again, there is no evidence to support the plaintiff's claim that use was continuous, because there was no evidence that the churchgoers' use of the lane was adverse for a ten-year period, and no evidence that they believed they were using the gravel lane without the owner's permission (or otherwise in subordination to the owner). Nevertheless, if the owner of the servient estate is not identified at trial, then the adverse use cannot be proven. Third, the plaintiff was required to establish that the adverse use was actually known to the owner, or so open, notorious and visible that a reasonable owner would have recognized the adverse use. The plaintiff could not establish actual knowledge of the owner without first identifying the owner. And while the plaintiff may have established a use that was so open, notorious and visible that any reasonable owner of the land would have had ample opportunity to protect against the creation of a prescriptive easement, because the plaintiff never established that the use was adverse, his claim must fail. Fourth and finally, we cannot say that the plaintiff introduced clear evidence of the precise location of the land that was adversely used. The plaintiff also did not introduce clear evidence that the use for which he sought the easement was similar to the alleged adverse use during the prescriptive period. The plaintiff introduced evidence that churchgoers used the gravel lane approximately twice a week to access a parking lot at the rear of the buildinga parking lot that apparently no longer exists. The plaintiff sought a prescriptive easement to use the gravel lane daily to access the side of the building. The plaintiff bore the burden of proving how his proposed daily use of the gravel lane was reasonably similar to the churchgoers' twice-a-week use of the lane. Likewise, the plaintiff bore the burden of showing how his proposed access to the side of the building was reasonably similar to the churchgoers' use of the lane to access the parking lot that used to be at the rear of the building. The plaintiff would only have been entitled to use the gravel lane for the purposes encompassed within the original ten-year prescriptive period; he was not entitled to increase the burden on the servient estate. In sum, we conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a prescriptive easement was created to use the gravel lane to access a horseshoe driveway at the north side of his home for routine ingress and egress. C.