Opinion ID: 1819622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exploring Legislative History

Text: The State argues that in determining the Legislature's intent, we should also review the statute's legislative history, and that the history supports the State's interpretation. Although not advanced by the parties, the dissents suggest that the bill title clarifies the Legislature's intent. Lewis, J., dissenting op. at 823-830; Bell, J., dissenting op. at 829-830. We now address these arguments. Before 1997, the prohibition on obscene or pornographic materials read: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. § 948.03(5)(g), Fla. Stat. (1995). Clearly, under this provision, the Legislature intended a total ban on obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material. In 1997, the Legislature amended this language as follows: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory explicit material, including telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Ch. 97-308, § 3, at 5520, Laws of Fla. (1997). [4] Given that the previous version of the statute already prohibited the possession of any obscene, pornographic, or sexually explicit material, the 1997 amendment seems intended to narrow the prohibition's scope. [5] This is consistent with Kasischke's proffered reading of the statute. The dissenting justices cite the bill title as indicating that the Legislature intended to keep the broad ban on obscene and pornographic materials and either clarify that telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services are within the ban, Lewis, J., dissenting op. at 823-824, or add to it a ban on telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services relevant to the offender's deviant behavior, Bell, J. dissenting op. at 829-830. We certainly agree that the bill title may be helpful in determining legislative intent. See, e.g., Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Easton, 894 So.2d 20, 25 (Fla.2004) (quoting State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824-25 (Fla.1981)). We disagree, however, that in this case the bill title reveals the Legislature's intent one way or the other. The title to chapter 97-308, Laws of Florida, states in pertinent part: An act relating to sex offenders; ... amending section 948.03, F.S.; requiring a curfew between specified hours; providing alternatives; revising requirements for treatment for sex offenders; revising a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning or possessing certain materials; prohibiting a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern; .... Ch. 97-308, Laws of Fla. The dissents suggest that the clause prohibiting a sex offender from possessing telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern in the bill title demonstrates that the phrase relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern is limited to telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services. Lewis, J., dissenting op. at 823-824; Bell, J., dissenting op. at 829-830. We disagree. This language in the bill title merely tracks the amendment to the statute; it does not clarify how that language is to be interpreted in relation to the remainder of the subsection. This ambiguity is further highlighted by the immediately preceding clause in the bill title, which states that it revis[es] a provision that prohibits a sex offender from viewing, owning or possessing certain materials.  Ch. 97-308, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). If anything, this suggests that the Legislature did not intend to leave the broad ban intact, but instead intended to revise the entire provision. In short, the bill title simply does not clarify the ambiguities in the statute. Justice Bell argues that the bill title demonstrates the Legislature's intent to keep the total ban on obscene and pornographic materials and add to it a ban on telephone, electronic media, or computer programs or services that are relevant to the offender's behavior pattern. Bell, J., dissenting op. at 830. This interpretation, however, would require us to replace including in the statute with as well as or and. To illustrate, if the Legislature intended to simply add a prohibition on relevant telephone, electronic media, and computer programs or services to the total ban on obscene and pornographic materials, it would have amended the provision to read as follows: Unless otherwise indicated in the treatment plan provided by the sexual offender treatment program, a prohibition on viewing, owning, or possessing any obscene, pornographic, or sexually stimulating visual or auditory material, including as well as telephone, electronic media, computer program, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior. The Legislature did not include such language, and we cannot add it on our own. See, e.g., State v. City of Fort Pierce, 88 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla.1956) (It is not the province of this Court to rewrite the acts of the Legislature.). The State asks us to dive even deeper into the legislative history. It argues that a Senate Staff Analysis addressing the amendment, and the results of study by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) cited there, demonstrate that the Legislature did not intend to narrow the broad ban on pornographic and obscene materials. See Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. J., CS/SB 1930 (1997) Staff Analysis (April 8, 1997) (on file with the Florida State Archives) [Staff Analysis] (citing Kim English, et al., Managing Adult Sex Offenders in the CommunityA Containment Approach, Nat'l Inst. Just. 1 (Jan. 1997) [ NIJ report ]). As we recently noted, [t]his Court is not unified in its view of the use of legislative staff analyses to determine legislative intent. GTC, Inc. v. Edgar, 967 So.2d 781, 789 n. 4 (Fla.2007); see also White v. State, 714 So.2d 440, 443 n. 5 (Fla.1998) (recognizing that staff analyses are not determinative of legislative intent, but are only one touchstone of the collective legislative will (quoting Sun Bank/South Fla., N.A. v. Baker, 632 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994))); American Home Assur. Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 376 (Fla.2005) (Cantero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (proposing that legislative staff analyses add nothing to an investigation of legislative intent). In any event, a defendant on probation or community control cannot be expected to research staff analyses to determine whether particular conduct is permitted. The language of the statute should be enough. Assuming that staff analyses can ever assist in determining legislative intent, in this case it is at best inconclusive. For example, the Staff Analysis states that the amendment would clarify the condition of probation, community control, and conditional release that prohibits the possession, viewing, or use of sexually `explicit' material to be sexually stimulating visual or auditory material that would include telephone, electronic media, computer programs, or computer services that are relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. Staff Analysis at 8. This sentence supports the State's argument that the Legislature intended to retain the total ban on pornographic or obscene material, and also to prohibit sexually stimulating material to the extent relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern. The Staff Analysis also indicates, however, that the amendment was based, at least in part, on the NIJ report. See Staff Analysis at 6-7 (detailing the NIJ report ). That report proposed a five-part model containment process for managing adult sex offenders. NIJ report at 3. The Staff Analysis notes that one of the components of managing adult sex offenders is utilizing sex offender-specific containment strategies, focus[ing] on a containment approach to case processing and case management that can be tailored to the individual sex offender and his or her deviant sexual history.  Staff Analysis at 7-8 (emphasis added) (quoting NIJ report at 3). The NIJ report also indicates that priorities include individualized treatment, supervision, and surveillance,  with sex offender-specific probation or parole conditions. NIJ report at 5. One of the recommended offender-specific conditions is strikingly similar to that at issue here: You shall not possess any pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually stimulating visual, auditory, telephonic, or electronic media and computer programs or services that are relevant to your deviant behavior pattern. Id. at 5, 9 (suggesting individualized supervision plans for adult sex offenders according to their particular risk factors). This passage supports the Petitioner's argument that the Legislature intended to focus on the particular offender's deviant behavior and tailor the prohibitions accordingly. Thus, some language from the Staff Analysis suggests an intent to retain the total ban on pornographic and obscene material and add a prohibition on possessing sexually stimulating material that is relevant to the offender's deviant behavior pattern; while other language suggests an intent to focus all prohibitions on the offender's specific deviant behavior. [6] Therefore, even if staff analyses may sometimes help in determining legislative intent, and even if we could expect defendants to review them to determine what conduct was permitted, the Staff Analysis here fails to clarify the Legislature's intent.