Opinion ID: 1961817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Should the instant matter have been consolidated with appellant's subsequent action requesting partition of the entire property?[4]

Text: Rule 213, Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides: (a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue in the actions, may order all of the actions consolidated, and may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may avoid unnecessary costs or delay. The decision to consolidate actions rests within the discretion of the trial court. Balla v. Sladek, 381 Pa. 85, 112 A.2d 156 (1955); Hamilton v. Gallo, 233 Pa.Superior Ct. 476, 334 A.2d 692 (1975). In a proper case the court should consolidate separate actions to avoid multiplicity of trials or hearings and to reduce the expense to the parties. Goodrich-Amram 2d. § 213(a): 10. Considerations of costs and the court's backlog do not negate the requirement that the several actions contain a common question of law or fact. We find no abuse of the court's discretion in refusing to consolidate the actions. In Peterson v. Pittsburgh Public Parking Auth., 383 Pa. 383, 119 A.2d 79 (1956) consolidation was held to be proper where two plaintiffs raised in separate actions a common question of fact and law: did the plaintiffs have private rights or easements in the controverted alleys. The only question requiring separate treatment was the amount of damages. While in Bredt et al. v. Bredt, 231 Pa.Superior Ct. 65, 326 A.2d 446 (1974) an action in equity seeking to enforce a support agreement and maintain the status quo was consolidated for a hearing with a motion for enforcement filed in a support action. The actions involved the same parties and common questions of law and fact, i.e., issues concerning their agreement. Similarly in Raw et al. v. Lehnert et al., 238 Pa.Superior Ct. 324, 357 A.2d 574 (1976) consolidation of an equity and an assumpsit action was found to be appropriate. A first action was filed in equity seeking recision of a contract, punitive damages and restitution. The second action in assumpsit was commenced seeking the benefit of the bargain and damages for breach of the same contract. In the current case consolidation would not have been appropriate. The controlling law and procedure differ. As was noted in Recktenwald v. Recktenwald, 284 Pa.Superior Ct. 185, 425 A.2d 765, 767 (1981) the Rules of Civil Procedure [which control the partition of non-entireties property] directly conflict with the dictates of the Act of 1927 as amended. For example, Rules 1560 and 1561 concern the divisibility and creation of purparts; divisibility is superfluous under the Act. Id., 284 Pa.Superior 191, 425 A.2d at 768. Rule 1553, requires all co-tenants be joined, whereas § 501 is limited to the divorced spouses. See, discussion of Reeping v. Reeping, infra. Rules 1555 and 1556 permit pleadings involving more than one property irrespective of the parties proportionate interest in the properties; the Act of 1927 is clearly limited to property held by the entireties. One last comparison will be sufficient to demonstrate our point. Section 503 of the Act provides for the equal division of the proceeds of the sale (less costs and any recorded liens); Rule 1574 additionally allows attorneys' fees to be taxed against the property or proceeds as the court finds to be equitable. We find that the two different causes of action would travel sufficiently divergent courses; we can find no abuse of the lower court's discretion in refusing to consolidate. Order affirmed.