Opinion ID: 2507215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does delayed payment of wages provide a cause of action under the MWA?

Text: ¶ 31 The MWA provides in pertinent part: (1) Any employer who pays any employee less than wages to which such employee is entitled under or by virtue of this chapter, shall be liable to such employee affected for the full amount of such wage rate, less any amount actually paid to such employee by the employer, and for costs and such reasonable attorney's fees as may be allowed by the court. Any agreement between such employee and the employer to work for less than such wage rate shall be no defense to such action. RCW 49.46.090. ¶ 32 Champagne encourages the court to consider by analogy federal interpretations of section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (FLSA), since the FLSA provided the model for the MWA. Champagne cites several district and circuit court cases for the proposition that a delay in payment is tantamount to a failure to pay. However, this analogy is misleading given that federal courts have distinguished the treatment of additional pay from regular pay under the FLSA because the FLSA permits an employer to delay payment of overtime to allow for processing. [17] See O'Brien v. Town of Agawam, 350 F.3d 279, 298 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that the Secretary of Labor has interpreted the FLSA to allow delayed payment of overtime wages to allow for processing). Similarly, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, in Clark v. City of Kent, 136 Wash.App. 668, 150 P.3d 161 (2007), surveyed federal case law and found that [f]ederal law allows for some `reasonable' amount of processing or lag time under the FLSA for irregular pay such as overtime. Id. at 677, 150 P.3d 161 (distinguishing Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537 (9th Cir.1993), which held that delayed payment of regular wages violated the FLSA) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 778.106). Thus, Champagne's reliance upon federal law construing the FLSA is misplaced. ¶ 33 The County argues and the Court of Appeals concluded that SPEEA addressed this issue and determined that since the additional pay was eventually paid, no liability exists under the MWA. In SPEEA, the court held that in circumstances where an employer paid no compensation whatsoever to an employee, the employee, if not otherwise exempt under the [MWA], could recover wages representing the difference between the statutory minimum wage and what was actually paid. 139 Wash.2d at 831, 991 P.2d 1126. ¶ 34 Consistent with our holding in SPEEA, we hold that the MWA does not provide a cause of action where the employer has actually paid all wages due an employee. Champagne was paid all due regular and additional pay and, thus, does not have a cause of action under the MWA.