Opinion ID: 2580978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sentence Reform Act of 1981

Text: The purpose of the Sentence Reform Act of 1981(SRA) is to provide structure for the sentencing of felony offenders, while maintaining judicial discretion in sentencing. RCW 9.94A.010. The legislature was careful to preserve this discretion when it provided that [t]he court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for that offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. Former RCW 9.94A.120(2) (1998). The purposes of the SRA are: (1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history; (2) Promote respect for the law by providing punishment which is just; (3) Be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses; [and] (4) Protect the public[.] RCW 9.94A.010. Having decided that there is no obstacle to the imposition of an exceptional sentence in Tili's case, we now review the appropriateness of the imposition itself. For illustrative purposes, the SRA sets out a nonexclusive list of both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, any one of which may be used to justify the imposition of an exceptional sentence. Former RCW 9.94A.390(1), (2) (1998). Aggravating circumstances must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Former RCW 9.94A.370(2) (1998). The aggravating circumstances of relevance to Tili's case are deliberate cruelty, multiple incidents of offense per victim, and that the operation of the multiple offense policy results in a presumptive sentence that is clearly too lenient in light of the purpose of [the SRA]. Pet. for Review at 10, 15, 17. See former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(a), (d)(i), (i) (1998). Exceptional circumstances must truly distinguish the crime from others of the same category. State v. Chadderton, 119 Wash.2d 390, 396, 832 P.2d 481 (1992). See generally David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington: A Legal Analysis of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 § 9.6 (1985). However, those factors that are inherent in the particular class of crimes at issue may not serve to distinguish defendant's conduct from what is typical for that crime and may not, therefore, serve as justification for an exceptional circumstance. See Chadderton, 119 Wash.2d at 396, 832 P.2d 481.