Opinion ID: 12484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History and Purpose of the VRRA

Text: In support of his reading of section 2024(a), Sykes cites Hall' s discussion of the purpose of section 2024(a), the legislative history of several amendments to section 2024(a) since its earliest version in 1940, the general pro-veteran construction that is to be given to the VRRA, DOL handbooks and interpretive guidance, and the legislative history of the subsequently-enacted USERRA, which replaced the statutory scheme set forth in 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2027.
The district court in Hall, noting that one of the purposes of 9 the limitation period might have been to deny re-employment rights to persons who entered the Armed Forces for the purpose of making Military Service a career or to those who deliberately elect not to be separated, nevertheless determined that Congress's intention was not to penalize the patriotic employee, but rather, to relieve the employer of inconvenience and uncertainty. 240 F.Supp. at 800. The Northern District of Illinois thus viewed the limitations period as a concession to employers who were concerned not with the prospect of long-term veterans with reemployment rights, but rather with reemployment rights of indefinite duration.3 Accordingly, the Hall court viewed the limitation period as personal to the employer running only against the employer as to whom reemployment rights are asserted. Addressing (hypothetically) the precise situation at issue in this case, the court observed the manifest injustice that would result from deeming the limitation period to include pre-employment military service: For example, a veteran who ... graduated from school, enlisted in the Armed Forces for four years, was discharged from the Armed Forces, then found his first job, and 3 As observed by Sykes, when veterans' reemployment rights were first conferred by statute in 1940, there was no prescribed limitation period. In 1948 a three-year limitation period was imposed, Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, 614-18, followed by the current, four-year period in 1951, Act of June 19, 1951, 65 Stat. 75, 86-87. See also Christner v. Poudre Valley Coop. Ass'n, 235 F.2d 946, 949 (10th Cir.1956) (The 1951 amendment extended those [reemployment] rights to persons who served for not more than four years.); Smith v. Missouri Pac. Trans. Co., 208 F.Supp. 767, 770 (E.D.Ark.1961) (The older [1940] statute made no reference to the time spent in military service, whether on a voluntary or involuntary basis, as bearing on reemployment rights of a returning serviceman. The 1948 Act and subsequent Acts amendatory thereof were not silent in that regard.), aff'd, 313 F.2d 676 (8th Cir.1963). 10 subsequently re-enlisted (or was recalled to active duty) ... would never enjoy the re-employment benefits conferred by the Act. Surely Congress would not have intended to deny these individuals their reasonable expectation to re-employment following their satisfactory completion of military service by turning the limitation period in the Act into a weapon for denying such rights. Id. at 800. C&G does not address the merits of the Hall' s decision, choosing instead to rest its argument on the grounds that Hall is neither controlling nor persuasive because it was not decided in the Fifth Circuit. C&G contends that White alone must control our analysis. Hall' s determination that pre-employment military service is not included in the limitation period appears consistent with the legislative decision to accommodate employers' concerns regarding reemployment rights of indefinite duration. Correlating the duration of a veteran's reemployment rights with the length of his or her prior enlistment contracts would lead to incongruous results. For example, an employer's obligation to reemploy two veterans who terminated their employment and reenlisted on the same day would expire at different times—based not on the degree of inconvenience caused by the employees' departure, but rather based solely on service completed prior to their initial employment. Such a result could lead to precisely the type of discriminatory hiring practices now prohibited by the USERRA.4 White v. Frank, 718 F.Supp. 592, involved a thirty-year veteran of the Air Force who, upon retirement in 1984, subsequently obtained a position with the Postal Service. The veteran, Bruce 4 See 38 U.S.C. § 4311 (West Supp.1996). 11 White (White), held the position for just under six months before he resigned to pursue another civilian job opportunity. Id. at 594. Six months after his resignation, White sought reinstatement to his former Postal Service position, but was denied. White brought an EEOC claim asserting that he was denied reinstatement on the basis of his race, color, age, and physical handicap. Id. The Postal Service and the EEOC denied his claims. Id. White subsequently filed suit in federal district court under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Rehabilitation Act, the conspiracy provisions of the Civil Rights Act, and, finally, the VRRA. Id. Addressing the defendant's motion to dismiss White's VRRA claim, the district court observed that White did not even respond to the arguments that the VRRA was inapplicable. Id. at 597-98. The district court held that, as there was no allegation that the Plaintiff left the Postal Service to join the military and, in fact, White had left for a civil service position, the VRRA was thus wholly inapplicable to this case. Id. In what was plainly dicta, the district court went on to consider the application of section 2024(a) even if the VR[R]A applied in theory. Id. at 598. As C & G notes repeatedly, the district court concluded that section 2024(a)'s limitation period includes pre-employment military service. Id. That White 's statements concerning the application of section 2024(a) do not control the present case is obvious from the fact that White simply had no ability to assert reemployment rights in 12 the first place. The amount of his prior military service was not relevant unless he could establish that he left his position with the Postal Service to enlist (or reenlist) in the military. But White did not ever serve in the military after his Post Office employment and he did not even claim that he ever so served. The veteran in White would not have prevailed on his VRRA claim under either construction of section 2024(a) advanced before this Court. Although C&G discusses at some length the obligations of this Court to adhere to its own precedent, the summary affirmance of White neither addressed the theoretical discussion of section 2024(a) nor, for that matter, any issue other than the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the ADEA. White, 895 F.2d at 24344. C&G's entire argument that the Fifth Circuit adopted the district's court's dicta as a holding rests on the statement in the affirmance that this Court adopted the district court's holdings without limitation. Id. at 243. C&G places too much emphasis on White 's hypothetical discussion. An alternative holding requires, at the very least, to be alternative on the facts before, or asserted to be before, the court. When a court makes a point or illustrates the infirmities of a particular argument by speaking to facts or circumstances that are, without dispute, not present before it, the discussion that follows, by its very nature, does not address the controversy before the court.5 5 We do not disagree with C&G's undisputed contention on brief that  [i]t has long been settled that all alternative rationales for a given result have precedential value.'  (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 120 (5th Cir.1996) (citation omitted)). Rather we simply reject C&G's hopeful 13
Sykes concedes that there is no contemporaneous explanation of the effect on pre-employment military service, but argues that statements in the legislative history of the 1961 and 1968 amendments support his position. Sykes observes that, pursuant to the Military Training and Service Act of 1968, the legislative history restated existing law as providing that [o]nly active military service from employment to which restoration is claimed is to be included in computing service time to determine the 4-year limitation. S.Rep. No. 1477, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3421, 3424 n. 2. Although C&G contends that, because the 1968 amendments were subsequent to the first enacted statute conferring veteran reemployment rights, the 1968 legislative history is of no significance, the statement was included in the section restating existing law and is some indication of congressional understanding of the VRRA. See, e.g., Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 237 n. 18 (5th Cir.1969) (Although a committee report written with regard to a subsequent enactment is not legislative history with regard to a previously enacted statute, it is entitled to some consideration as a secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion.). See also United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 178 n. 7 (5th Cir.1989) ([A] later Congress' understanding of the legislative intent of an earlier Congress is entitled to deference.); 2B Norman J. Singer, characterization of White 's hypothesized situation as an alternative holding. 14 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 49.11, p. 84 (Rev. ed.1992) (same). We find the legislative history of the 1961 amendments, however, somewhat less enlightening. The 1961 amendments, which added the August 1, 1961, date restrictions in section 2024(a), were enacted to ensure that veterans of the Korean conflict—some of whom were approaching the four-year service limitation—would be able to serve up to an additional four years. The Senate report addressed the need to extend the post-employment limitation to enable then-current service members to extend their enlistments voluntarily, but did not expressly address the issue here presented. S.Rep. No. 1070, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3319, 3320 (noting that [s]ome of the persons who will perform additional active duty ... have ... already served a substantial part of the 4-year period during which they have reemployment protection under existing law).
Aside from the guidance from the plain language of the statute and the legislative history, the Supreme Court has dictated that the VRRA is to be given as liberal a construction for the benefit of the veteran as a harmonious interplay of the separate provisions permits. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 90 L.Ed. 1230 (1946). Accordingly, Sykes contends that, although VRRA reemployment rights can be an ungainly perquisite of military service ... provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to be construed 15 in the beneficiaries' favor. King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 218-20, 221 n. 9, 112 S.Ct. 570, 573, 574 n. 9, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991); see also Lee v. City of Pensacola, 634 F.2d 886, 889 (5th Cir.1981); Bell v. Aerodex, Inc., 473 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir.1973). We agree. To the extent that section 2024(a) is capable of multiple interpretations, Sykes is quite correct that ambiguities should be resolved in his favor. Given the purpose of the VRRA—and the purpose of the limitation period to limit the time an employer must permit the exercise of reemployment rights—the canon of favorable construction supports Sykes' reading of the section 2024(a) limitations period as including solely post-employment military service.
Sykes argues that deference is owed to DOL publications that have stated consistently that pre-employment military service is not included in section 2024(a)'s limitation period. DOL Field Letter No. 20 (1961), Veterans' Reemployment Rights Legal Guide 163 (1964), and the 1970 and 1988 editions of the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Handbook all clearly support the position that pre-employment military service should not be used to determine eligibility for reemployment rights.6 6 DOL Field Letter 20, issued in 1961, states [o]nly military service entered from employment to which restoration is claimed is to be included in computing service time under the 4 year limitation. Id. at 10. The 1964 DOL Legal Guide states that the service limitation was enacted for the purpose of relieving an 16 C&G contends that DOL publications are entitled to no more deference than a writing that their attorneys might publish in support of C&G's position. C&G is incorrect. Although Congress did not explicitly leave a gap in the VRRA and expressly delegate to the DOL the authority to issue regulations concerning this issue, considerable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). The DOL is charged with administering the VRRA. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 501 et seq. employer from an unlimited liability to restore to his position an employee who served in the armed forces. Id. at 163. It goes on to state that: The aggregate service limitations were intended only for use by an employer as to whom the serviceman's military service interrupted an existing employment, to which the serviceman might seek restoration, and the chargeable service was only that which interrupted this particular employment. Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, the 1970 Handbook states: It is essential to note that these limitations apply only to active duty performed after the employee leaves the employment to which he claims restoration. Active duty performed before the employment relationship began does not count toward the years of active duty for which the employee is permitted to absent himself from the employer in question. Id. at 20. When the Handbook was reissued in 1988, it contained the same admonition: These limitations apply only to active duty performed after the employee leaves the employment to which he claims restoration. Active duty performed before the employment relationship began does not count toward the years of active duty for which the employee is permitted to absent himself from the employer from whom he seeks restoration. Id. at 5-3. 17 Although [n]either the [Veterans' Reemployment Rights ] Legal Guide nor the [Veterans' Reemployment Rights ] Handbook has the status of interpretive regulations, ... they do have a measure of weight. Helton v. Mercury Freight Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 365, 368 & n. 4 (5th Cir.1971) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944)); see also Leib v. GeorgiaPac. Corp., 925 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir.1991) (noting that these publications provide  informed guidance'  regarding the VRRA). The weight to be given these DOL publications is enhanced by the longstanding and consistent nature of the position taken, and its inception so soon after the 1961 legislation. E. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 Sykes emphasizes that the USERRA's legislative history provides that reemployment rights protection shall apply to an individual if such person's period of service, with respect to the employment relationship for which a person seeks reemployment, does not, with certain exceptions, exceed five years. H. Rep. No. 10365, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2450. Sykes contends that this legislative history should be used to construe section 2024(a). The USERRA legislative history quoted by Sykes, however, addresses a newly-enacted version of the reemployment rights provision which unambiguously provides: (a) Subject to subsections (b), (c), and (d) and to section 4304, any person who is absent from a position of employment by reason of service in the uniformed services shall be entitled to the reemployment rights and benefits and other employment benefits of this chapter if— 18 .... (2) the cumulative length of the absence and of all previous absences from a position of employment with that employer by reason of service in the uniformed services does not exceed five years.... 38 U.S.C. § 4312(a)(2) (West Supp.1996) (emphasis added). The newly-enacted provisions of the USERRA unambiguously provide for the precise result that Sykes contends can be derived from section 2024(a). The USERRA's legislative history's guidance on the operation of section 4312(a)(2)—which is worded differently from section 2024(a)—sheds little light on the construction of section 2024(a). Much more significant in the legislative history of the USERRA is the House Report's background discussion that states that the task force that drafted the Act intended the USERRA to be largely a clarification of existing law. H. Rep., supra, at 2451 (noting that the current statute is complex and sometimes ambiguous, thereby allowing for misinterpretations). Indeed, under the USERRA, the DOL is given the authority to promulgate regulations to resolve the textual ambiguities under the Act. See 38 U.S.C. § 4331; H. Rep., supra, at 2473 (discussing the new regulatory power and acknowledging the measure of weight courts have afforded statutory interpretations in the Handbook and Legal Guide ). Although not dispositive, the legislative history of the USERRA indicates that a limited degree of deference to the DOL is appropriate and that the USERRA's provisions—which expressly adopt Sykes's position—likely were a clarification of existing law under section 2024(a). 19 F. C&G's Abuse Argument C&G contends that a construction of section 2024(a) that would include only post-employment military service in a determination of eligibility for reemployment rights would permit abuse of the VRRA's reemployment rights scheme: [A] person could obtain private employment, quit, enlist in the military, leave the military, demand and obtain reemployment under the VRRA, quit again, reenlist in the military, leave the military, again demand and obtain reemployment under the VRRA, quit again.... C&G's rather farfetched slippery-slope concern—one that so far as we are aware has never surfaced in actual practice, in legislative history, in administrative publications, or in relevant literature—is more than adequately addressed by the protective doctrines that both guard against abuses of veteran reemployment rights and limit employers' exposure. For example, to qualify for reemployment rights under the VRRA, the controlling determination is whether, regardless of the contract of employment, there was a reasonable expectation that the employment would be continuous and for an indefinite time. Akers v. Arnett, 597 F.Supp. 557, 561 (S.D.Tex.1983), aff'd, 748 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.1984). Other abuses of the VRRA are also precluded, for example, an employer need not create a position where the veteran's position no longer exists, Horton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 286 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.1961), and an employer need not rehire an employee terminated for cause simply because he subsequently becomes a veteran, Henry v. Anderson County, 522 F.Supp. 1112 (D.Tenn.1981). Further, VRRA reemployment must be sought within ninety days from 20 the receipt of an honorable discharge from military service. 38 U.S.C. former § 2021(a)(2); Leib v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 925 F.2d 240, 246 n. 10 (8th Cir.1991). In short, legitimate defenses were available to C&G to challenge either Sykes's status as a permanent employee or his ability to perform his position competently. C&G neither alleged nor argued before the district court that Sykes abused the VRRA; its farfetched theoretical concerns regarding abuse of the statutory reemployment rights scheme are not present in this appeal.