Opinion ID: 2543789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: reducing the amount of liability

Text: BCI filed a cross-appeal, alleging that the trial court erred in reducing the amount of the McBeths' indebtedness, which was clearly set forth in the promissory note and guaranteed by the mortgage. BCI contends that where the language of the promissory note and mortgage are clear and can be carried out, there is no room for construction or modification of their terms. Promissory notes and mortgages are contracts to which the rules of contract construction apply. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Strnad, 255 Kan. 657, 661, 876 P.2d 1362 (1994). This court's review of the interpretation of a written contract is de novo. N.E.A.-Topeka v. U.S.D. No. 501, 269 Kan. 534, 540, 7 P.3d 1174 (2000). Absent a contract being ambiguous, a court must give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed within the four corners of the instrument. Metropolitan Life, 255 Kan. at 661. In this case, the promissory note and mortgage are not ambiguous as to price, even though the amount of the mortgage differs slighty from that of the note. In Nelson v. Robinson, 184 Kan. 340, 336 P.2d 415 (1959), the plaintiff sought cancellation of a real estate sales contract. The trial court, however, refused to grant cancellation of the contract and, instead, granted equitable relief by way of foreclosure with rights of redemption. On appeal, the vendor argued that the trial court did not have the power in law or equity to render such a judgment because it resulted in making a new contract between the parties. The Nelson court stated, as follows: In taking this position defendants either overlook or ignore numerous decisions of this court holding (1) that it is a well-settled principle of equity jurisprudence that where a court of equity has obtained jurisdiction of a controversy on any ground it will retain such jurisdiction for the purpose of administering complete relief and doing entire justice with respect to the subject matter [citations omitted]; (2) that a trial court, sitting as a court of equity, is not obliged to render the specific decree prayed for, but may render a decree in accord with its own good judgment or discretion as to what justice demands, in view of the facts pleaded and evidence adduced [citations omitted]; and (3) that in a suit in equity where a court has before it all the property involved, all the parties claiming rights thereto and their respective claims, it should complete the determination of their respective rights and make an appropriate decree so as to avoid future litigation, as far as possible [citations omitted]. 184 Kan. at 344-45. See also Kline v. Orebaugh, 214 Kan. 207, 211, 519 P.2d 691 (1974) (in equitable proceeding brought against trustee for violation of fiduciary duties, court of equity not obligated to render specific relief requested but may make such decree as justice demands under facts and circumstances). This case involves foreclosure of a mortgage, which is an equitable action. First Nat'l Bank of Olathe v. Clark, 226 Kan. 619, 623, 602 P.2d 1299 (1979). Thus, under Nelson, the trial court in exercising its equitable powers has jurisdiction to administer complete relief and may render judgment in accordance with what justice demands. 184 Kan. at 344-45. The trial court adjusted the amount the McBeths owed BCI. By representation of both parties, this adjustment was made by reducing BCI's builder's fee by half. The basis for the trial court's decision to adjust the amount of liability is not supported by the evidence or by the court's decision. However, because BCI did not object to the inadequacy of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court will presume the trial court found all the facts necessary to support the judgment. See Tucker, 253 Kan. at 378. Thus, the trial court did not err in adjusting the amount of the McBeth's indebtedness to BCI in exercising its equitable powers. Affirmed.