Opinion ID: 1160486
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Violation of exclusion order

Text: At the beginning of trial, the judge ordered all witnesses excluded pursuant to NRS 50.155, [16] the witness-exclusion rule. Evans objected to testimony from one of the State's rebuttal witnesses, Joseph Salley, because Salley had been in the courtroom during the first two days of the trial in violation of the court's exclusion order. The State was unaware of Salley's presence in the courtroom until defense counsel asked that Salley be prohibited from testifying on that basis. Although the district court did not specifically rule on the objection to Salley's testimony, the court did mention that it believed the proper remedy was something short of prohibiting the testimony. Salley was permitted to testify, prompting Evans to raise an assignment of error. In Rainsberger v. State, 76 Nev. 158, 350 P.2d 995 (1960), we had occasion to interpret a prior, similar witness-exclusion rule. The Rainsberger court held that it was prejudicial error to preclude a defense witness from testifying because he had been sitting in the courtroom in violation of an exclusion order where the witness misunderstood the order, was only in the courtroom for five minutes, and the defense had no knowledge of his presence. Id. at 161-62, 350 P.2d at 996-97. We explained that [w]hile a violation of the [exclusion order] may subject a witness to punishment such as contempt of court and will affect his credibility it will not of itself operate to render the witness incompetent to testify. Id. In Givens v. State, 99 Nev. 50, 657 P.2d 97 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Talancon v. State, 102 Nev. 294, 721 P.2d 764 (1986), this court explained that [t]he purpose of sequestration of witnesses is to prevent particular witnesses from shaping their testimony in light of other witnesses' testimony, and to detect falsehood by exposing inconsistencies. Id. at 55, 657 P.2d at 100. With this purpose in mind, the Givens court held that because requiring the requesting party to prove that actual prejudice occurred would be overly harsh and unjust, we will presume prejudice from a violation of NRS 50.155 unless the record shows that prejudice did not occur. Id. After reviewing the record, the court in Givens determined that there was no prejudice to the defendant because the testimony of one of the witnesses who was in the courtroom could not have been influenced by the testimony he heard, and the other two witnesses who listened to testimony already had testified and were not called in rebuttal. Id. at 55-56, 657 P.2d at 100. A review of the record reveals no evidence that Salley was influenced by the testimony given in his presence. Salley's testimony did not directly relate to the testimony occurring during the first two days of trial when he was present in violation of the exclusion order. Additionally, the defense used a transcript and tape recording of Salley's initial statement to the police in order to point out any inconsistencies. We therefore conclude that the purpose of excluding witnesses was not undermined in this case and Evans was not prejudiced. Evans asks us to assume prejudice because Salley might have realized that the prosecution's case during those first two days was weak and that Salley would need to give strong incriminating evidence when he testified in order to help the prosecution. Although this argument presents an element of appeal, to recognize it as dispositive would be tantamount to creating a virtually irrebuttable presumption of prejudice whenever an exclusion order is violated. This we decline to do.