Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: First degree murder committed by means of torture and torture-murder special-circumstance finding

Text: One of the prosecution's theories of first degree murder was murder committed by means of torture. (§ 189.) To establish this theory of first degree murder, the prosecution must prove (1) acts causing death that involve a high degree of probability of the victim's death; and (2) a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose. ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566 , 602, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22 , 139 P.3d 492 .) The prosecution also alleged a torture-murder special circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18), which the jury found to be true. To prove that special circumstance allegation, the prosecution had to establish that defendant intended to kill and had a torturous intent, i.e., an intent to cause extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another sadistic purpose. ( People v. Streeter, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 237, 142 Cal.Rptr.3d 481 , 278 P.3d 754 .) For both first degree murder by means of torture and the torture-murder special circumstance, the question of sufficiency is directed at evidence of the defendant's torturous intent. (  People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144 , 1187, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 234 , 324 P.3d 88 ; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408 , 433, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822 , 827 P.2d 388 .) The perpetrator intends to  'cause pain and suffering in addition to death,'  and  'in the course, or as a result of inflicting pain and suffering, the victim dies.'  [Citation.] ( People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658 , 716, 161 Cal.Rptr.3d 191 , 306 P.3d 1049 .)  An intent to cause extreme pain or suffering  'may be inferred from the circumstances of the crime, the nature of the killing, and the condition of the  victim's body.'  ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158 , 1213-1214, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 .) Considering these factors, we conclude that there was substantial evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could have inferred that defendant intended to cause Kerr extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, thus supporting a verdict of murder committed by means of torture and the true finding on the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation. Defendant's intent to cause extreme pain in order to exact revenge is shown by evidence regarding the circumstances preceding the killing. Several months before Kerr's death, defendant had become increasingly jealous and possessive of Kerr, and he was angry and upset that she wanted to reconcile with her husband. On one or more occasions during this time, defendant indicated to his plumbing assistant that he wanted to get Kerr off his mind by blowing up her car or setting it on fire. The evidence also suggested that defendant had come to believe that Kerr was using him for financial support, and he also began to suspect that she was having a sexual relationship with fellow AA member Mark Harvey. The record further showed that, driven by his suspicions, defendant had planted a listening device in Kerr's apartment and began following her to her work and home. Then, on March 24, 1999, after having become even more obsessed with Kerr, defendant crawled under Harvey's house to listen as Harvey and Kerr talked into the early morning hours. Defendant believed he heard them having sex, and he may have overheard Kerr belittling him by referring to him as Squirrel Boy. The record indicates that defendant then confronted Kerr, either at her car as she was leaving Harvey's home or after she had returned to her own apartment. Defendant strangled Kerr into unconsciousness, but he was aware that she was not dead, and he placed her on her side on the floorboard between the front and back seats of her own car. The nature of the killing and the condition of Kerr's body further show a torturous intent. The record indicates that, once having decided Kerr's fate, defendant either drove or pushed the car down the secluded embankment of a freeway off-ramp. He then doused the car's interior and Kerr with a flammable liquid, and ignited a fire by tossing a burning piece of rolled up paper onto the driver's seat. The accelerant-induced fire burned quickly and intensely, obliterating Kerr's hands, the lower portion of her legs, and her feet. As this court has observed, [f]ire has historically been used as an instrument of torture and is generally known to cause extreme pain. ( People v. Cole, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 1203, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 .) In sum, a reasonable jury could infer from evidence of defendant's intense possessiveness and all-consuming suspicions that Kerr was using him financially and cheating on him with Mark Harvey, coupled with his dousing her  and her car with accelerant and lighting them on fire, that defendant intended to inflict severe pain on Kerr for the purpose of revenge. Defendant argues that he could not have intended to inflict extreme pain on Kerr if he believed she was dead when he set the car on fire. As we have previously explained, however, there is substantial evidence in the record from which to infer that defendant knew Kerr was alive when he set the car on fire. (See ante , 219 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 385-386, 396 P.3d at pp. 525-526.)  Referencing the medical examiner's conclusion that Kerr was most likely unconscious when the fire was started, defendant asserts alternatively that, even if he knew Kerr was alive, he would have known that she was unconscious when the fire started,  and therefore could not have harbored the intent to cause her to suffer. As defendant acknowledges, for purposes of murder by means of torture, there is no requirement that the victim be aware of the pain. ( People v. Cole, supra , 33 Cal.4th at p. 1207, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 ; see id . at p. 1228, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532 , 95 P.3d 811 [awareness of pain is not an element of the torture-murder special circumstance].) As our decisions have explained, the torture-murder theory of first degree murder liability is premised on the defendant's intent to cause pain to the victim, not on whether the victim actually suffered pain. ( People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 162 , 172-173, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 554 P.2d 881 .) From this proposition we have observed that a defendant who, intending to inflict pain and suffering, renders his victim unconscious at the outset of a homicidal attack may not assert the victim's condition as a fortuitous defense to his own deplorable acts. ( Id . at p. 173, 133 Cal.Rptr. 135 , 554 P.2d 881 .) Likewise here, the evidence that defendant had incapacitated Kerr by rendering her unconscious before dousing her body with accelerant and setting her car on fire does not foreclose the inference that defendant intended to cause her extreme pain and suffering. That inference was amply supported by the evidence recounted above. We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence from which to infer that defendant intended to cause Kerr extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, thus supporting a verdict of first degree murder based on torture, and the torture-murder special-circumstance finding. We also reject defendant's further assertion that the murder conviction and special circumstance finding must be overturned because the definition of torture is unconstitutionally vague. As defendant recognizes, this court has previously rejected the precise argument he advances here. (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344 , 394-395, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621 , 133 P.3d 534 .) He provides no persuasive reason for this court to revisit the issue in his case.  8. Claims of instructional error at the guilt phase a. Erroneous definition of asportation Defendant argues that the trial court's instruction explaining the elements of the special circumstance allegation that defendant murdered the victim while engaged in kidnapping stated an incorrect definition of the asportation requirement. We agree with defendant that the court erred by instructing the jury with a definition of asportation that was not in effect at the time of the crimes in question. We conclude, however, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore does not require that either the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding or the death sentence be set aside, as explained below. In connection with the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation, the jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 8.81.17. (1999 rev.) (6th ed. 1996) that to establish the truth of the allegation, the prosecution must prove, in relevant part, that [t]he murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of kidnapping in violation of section 207 of the Penal Code. As noted, section 207, subdivision (a), defines the crime of simple kidnapping  and provides, in relevant part, that [e]very person who forcibly ... steals or takes, or holds, detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the person ... into another part of the same county is guilty of kidnapping. The statute does not refer to any particular distance the victim must be moved. This court has long recognized, however, that the movement, or asportation, of the victim must be substantial in character, not slight or trivial ( People v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588 , 601, 114 Cal.Rptr. 250 , 522 P.2d 1058 ), and juries were instructed accordingly. (See CALJIC No. 9.50 (6th ed. 1996).) At the time defendant committed his crimes, in March 1999, the question whether the movement of the victim was substantial in character was determined solely by the actual distance that the victim was moved. ( People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562 , 572-573, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 .) Decisions applying Caudillo established that 90  feet did not satisfy the element of asportation as a matter of law ( People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d, at pp. 66-67, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 609 P.2d 468 ), but that a movement of 200 feet was sufficient ( People v. Stender (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 413 , 421-423, 121 Cal.Rptr. 334 ). In April 1999, this court issued our decision in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225 , 236, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 ( Martinez ), which abandoned as ultimately unworkable Caudillo 's exclusive focus on the actual distance the victim was moved to determine whether the movement was substantial in character. Martinez adopted in its place a totality of  the circumstances standard ( id . at p. 237, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 ) that took into account not simply the actual distance the victim was moved, but the 'scope and nature' of the movement ..., and any increased risk of harm ( id . at p. 236, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 ). The 1999 version of the standard instruction was revised accordingly. Defendant's trial was held in 2001 and the court instructed defendant's jury with the 1999 revision of CALJIC No. 9.50. Like the former version of CALJIC No. 9.50, the revised version told the jury in relevant part that [a] movement that is only for a slight or trivial distance is not substantial in character. The jury also was told, however, pursuant to this revision, that in determining whether a distance that is more than slight or trivial is substantial in character, you should consider the totality of circumstances attending the movement, including, but not limited to, the actual distance moved, or whether the movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed prior to the movement or decreased the likelihood of detection, or increased both the danger inherent in a victim's foreseeable attempt to escape and the attacker's enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. (See CALJIC No. 9.50 (1999 rev.) (6th ed. 1996).) We agree with defendant, and the People concede, that the court erred by giving the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 9.50. Martinez expressly stated that because its holding enlarged the reach of the kidnapping statute, the totality of the circumstances standard for determining whether the movement of the victim was substantial could not be applied retroactively to a defendant whose offense was committed at the time Caudillo was the governing test. ( Martinez, supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 239, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 .) Here, defendant committed the crimes against Kerr in March 1999, one month before Martinez was issued. The court therefore should have instructed the jurors with the version of the standard instruction on simple kidnapping that preceded the revisions  prompted by Martinez , which would have focused their attention only on whether Kerr had been moved a substantial distance ... [that is] more than slight or trivial. Although we agree with defendant that the court erred by giving the jury the revised 1999 version of CALJIC No. 9.50, which provided the jury with a more expansive definition of asportation than the one in effect at the time of defendant's crimes, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Misdescription of an element of a charged offense is subject to harmless error analysis and does not require reversal if the misdescription was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Hagen (1998) 19 Cal.4th 652 , 670, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 967 P.2d 563 ; accord, People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) Notwithstanding  defendant's arguments to the contrary, we can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the instructional error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 .) The court's instruction, although improperly expanding the factual basis on which the jury could decide whether defendant committed simple kidnapping, nonetheless allowed the jury to consider all of the evidence relevant to the issue of the actual distance Kerr was moved. (See People v. Hagen, supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 670, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 24 , 967 P.2d 563 .) The revised instruction given to defendant's jurors specifically directed them to consider the actual distance the victim was moved. Indeed, our decision in Martinez contemplated that a jury instructed in accordance with its holding could decide the asportation  element solely on the basis of evidence of the actual distance the victim was moved: While the jury may consider a victim's increased risk of harm, it may convict of simple kidnapping without finding an increase in harm, or any other contextual factors. ( Martinez, supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 237, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 533 , 973 P.2d 512 .) The instruction given here thus concerned, not the entirety of the definition of asportation, but rather one of the theories under which the jury was told the element of asportation could be established, a theory that was  'not itself necessary for the verdict.'  ( People v. Harris, supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 430, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) Because the court's instruction on the post- Martinez theories of asportation included actual distance, we presume, as we must, that the jury considered all relevant evidence relating to [the actual distance the victim was moved]. ( Harris , at p. 431, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) This court explained in People v. Harris, supra , 9 Cal.4th 407 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 , that in order to conclude that an instructional error  'did not contribute to the verdict'  within the meaning of Chapman ( Harris , at p. 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 ) we must  'find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record'  ( id., at p. 430, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 , quoting Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 , 114 L.Ed.2d 432 , italics omitted). Here, there was compelling, uncontroverted evidence showing that the actual distance defendant moved Kerr was sufficient to satisfy the asportation element of simple kidnapping as a matter of law. (See People v. Caudillo, supra , 21 Cal.3d at p. 574, 146 Cal.Rptr. 859 , 580 P.2d 274 , citing with approval People v. Stender, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d at p. 423, 121 Cal.Rptr. 334 [a movement of 200 feet is sufficient].) Evidence in the record showed two possible locations-either  outside Mark Harvey's home or at Kerr's apartment-where defendant rendered Kerr unconscious and moved her into the back of her own car. It is true, as defendant points out, that nothing in the record expressly indicated the precise number of feet between either Harvey's or Kerr's residence and the Hollywood Freeway's Roscoe Boulevard off-ramp where defendant ultimately set Kerr and the car on fire. The police investigator testified, however, that to drive in the early morning hours from those locations to the off-ramp would have taken 15 to 20 minutes, and five to 10 minutes, respectively. The substantial distance between Kerr's apartment and the off-ramp was further  shown by People's exhibit No. 12, an enlargement of a street and freeway map on which the prosecutor had labeled both the location of Kerr's residence and the off-ramp where her body was discovered. Also admitted into evidence at trial was a coverage map showing the radio frequency range of individual cellular telephone tower sites located in the San Fernando Valley, along with testimony that different tower sites, rather than the same site, covered calls placed or received from Kerr's apartment, Harvey's home, and the location where Kerr's body was found. We note, moreover, that both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued to the jury that defendant drove for hours with Kerr in the car before arriving at the off-ramp, the prosecutor asserting that defendant choked Kerr, placed her on the floorboard, and drove around to avoid detection, and defense counsel arguing that defendant drove around with Kerr's dead body in the backseat. Indeed, the arguments of counsel suggested that the actual distance defendant moved Kerr was even greater than the distance between the two possible locations where she was incapacitated and the off-ramp where she was killed. Given the argument of counsel and the undisputed evidence presented to the jury regarding the actual distance Kerr was moved, this jury could not possibly have found defendant guilty of committing arson near the freeway off-ramp where Kerr's car and body were discovered without also finding that the actual distance defendant moved Kerr after incapacitating her was substantial. We are convinced by the record in this case that the instructional error was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the [actual distance] issue. ( Yates v. Evatt, supra , 500 U.S. at p. 403, 111 S.Ct. 1884 .) We therefore conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the court's error in giving  a version of CALJIC No. 9.50 that was not in effect at the time of defendant's crimes did not contribute to the true finding on the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation. b. Failure to instruct on mistake of fact Premised on the assertion that he mistakenly believed that Kerr was dead when he placed her on the floorboard of her own car and drove off, defendant argues that the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance finding must be vacated, either because the court prejudicially erred by refusing defense counsel's request to give a mistake of fact instruction for that allegation or because the court had a duty to so instruct on its own motion and failed to do so. We agree with defendant that a court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on a mistake of fact defense to kidnapping when there is substantial evidence that the defendant mistakenly believed the victim was dead at the time of the asportation. As explained below, however, we  conclude that there was no substantial evidence supporting instruction on that defense in this case. Accordingly, we reject defendant's  argument that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury on mistake of fact. 1. Background After the close of evidence, but before the parties' closing arguments, the court met with counsel to discuss jury instructions. The defense asked the court to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 4.35, regarding ignorance or mistake of fact. 9 The court refused the mistake of fact instruction on the ground that the defense might not make such an argument to the jury. However, the court also indicated that its refusal to so instruct was without prejudice, and that defense counsel could renew his request at the conclusion of closing remarks. After closing arguments, counsel again requested a mistake of fact instruction. The court declined to give the requested instruction, agreeing with the prosecutor that even if defendant mistakenly believed that he had killed Kerr by strangling her, it would not have made any of his conduct after the strangulation lawful. As the court remarked, The fact of the matter is he's driving around with this body, and ... he ultimately sets it on fire. There's nothing lawful about that. 2. Discussion As a threshold matter, the People argue that because defendant never asked the court to give a mistake of fact instruction in connection with the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation, his claim that the court prejudicially erred in failing to give the instruction with regard to that allegation is not properly before this court. It is true that counsel repeatedly indicated to the court that the requested instruction was directed to one of the prosecutor's theories of first degree murder-that defendant harbored an intent to kill at the time he set the car on fire-and that counsel never mentioned the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation in his request for instruction. The forfeiture rule is inapplicable to the claim defendant raises here, however. As we explain below, if there was substantial evidence suggesting defendant believed he had killed Kerr when he strangled her and then placed her on the back floorboard of her car, the court would have been  obligated to instruct on that defense to the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation notwithstanding counsel's failure to ask the court to do so.  'It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence'  and  'necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.'  ( People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 , 1189, 185 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 345 P.3d 62 ; accord, People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703 , 715, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 .) It is also well settled that this duty to instruct extends to defenses if it appears  ... the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. ( People v. Sedeno , at p. 716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ; accord, People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967 , 982, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 624 , 127 P.3d 40 ;  People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342 , 424, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 .) We conclude that defendant's claim of instructional error comes within the analytical rubric of People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143 , 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 , and therefore implicates the rule that the court must instruct on any affirmative defense on which the defendant is relying, or which is supported by substantial evidence and is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. Mayberry involved a prosecution against two brothers, one of whom was charged with kidnapping and rape, among other crimes. At trial, the victim testified that she did not consent to accompany the defendant from a grocery store to his apartment and did not consent to sexual intercourse. She also indicated that she had  'put on an act'  to try  'to fool'  the defendant. ( Id . at p. 148, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 .) The defendant testified that the victim willingly walked to his home from the grocery store and agreed to sexual intercourse. ( Id . at p. 149, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 .) The trial court refused the defendant's request for a mistake of fact instruction to the effect that the defendant must be acquitted of kidnapping and rape if he reasonably and honestly believed that the victim consented to accompany him to his apartment and engage in sexual intercourse. The defendant was convicted of kidnapping and rape, but this court concluded the court's refusal to give the instruction was prejudicial error and reversed the convictions. ( Id . at pp. 153-158, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 .) In assessing the defendant's claim of error, Mayberry first looked to Penal Code section 26, which provides that a person committing a charged act or omission under a mistake of fact that disproves any criminal intent is not criminally liable for that offense. (§ 26, par. Three.) As Mayberry explained, the word  'intent'  means  'wrongful intent,'  and the requirement of a union of act and wrongful intent is a necessary element in nearly every crime, including the crimes of kidnapping and rape. ( Mayberry, supra , 15 Cal.3d at p. 154, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 ; see  id . at pp. 155-156, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 .) Relying on the requisite union of act and wrongful intent, and decisions finding a mistake of fact defense available for crimes such as unlawful sexual intercourse and bigamy, Mayberry held that if a defendant entertains a reasonable and bona fide belief that [the alleged victim] voluntarily consented to accompany [the defendant] and to engage in sexual intercourse, it is apparent he does not possess the wrongful intent that is a prerequisite [to a conviction of either kidnapping or rape]. ( Id . at p. 155, 125 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 542 P.2d 1337 .) If believed by the fact finder, a defendant's honest and reasonable, albeit mistaken, belief in the victim's consent is a complete defense to a charge of kidnapping or rape. ( Ibid . ; see also People v. Isitt (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 23 , 28, 127 Cal.Rptr. 279 .) Defendant's argument on appeal is that his belief he had killed Kerr when he strangled her meant he did not commit a kidnapping for purposes of the special circumstance allegation because a movement of the victim is a required element of kidnapping, and the victim must be alive to be kidnapped. The asserted mistaken belief here is analogous to that at issue in Mayberry : If the victim is dead, she cannot give or withhold her consent to the movement. In People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at page 499, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45 , 40 P.3d 754 , this court held that, like the crime of rape, kidnapping requires a live victim. For this proposition Hillhouse cited People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495 , 524, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677 , 822 P.2d 385 , which explained  that the crime of rape requires a live victim because rape is an act of intercourse against a person's will and a dead body cannot consent to, or protest against, the intercourse. Defendant's challenge to the court's failure to instruct on a mistake of fact defense therefore implicates the court's duty to instruct on its own motion either when the  defense is relying on that theory at trial, or when there is substantial evidence to support the defense and it is not inconsistent with the defense theory of the case. Nonetheless, for the reasons that follow, we conclude that the court in this case did not have a duty to instruct on its own motion on a mistake-of-fact defense to the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation. First, defendant was not relying on a mistake-of-fact defense at trial, and such a defense was arguably inconsistent with the defense he did present to the jury. The defense theory was not that Kerr was alive but defendant honestly and reasonably believed that she was dead. Rather, it was that defendant had confronted, strangled, and actually killed Kerr on the spur of the moment and in the heat of passion, either outside Harvey's home or at Kerr's apartment. Notably, counsel vigorously refuted the medical examiner's opinion that Kerr was alive at the time of the fire, arguing to the jury that it was just an opinion, and recalling the examiner's testimony during cross-examination that strangulation may have been a cause of death. (Cf.  People v. Dominguez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1141 , 1148, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 , 140 P.3d 866 [no Mayberry instruction was required, in part, because the defendant's defense at trial was that the victim had consented to sexual intercourse, not that he reasonably and honestly believed she had consented].) Nor was there substantial evidence that defendant honestly and reasonably believed he had killed Kerr when he strangled her. Substantial evidence supporting sua sponte instruction on a particular defense is evidence that is sufficient to 'deserve consideration by the jury, i.e., evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could have concluded '  that the particular facts underlying the instruction did exist. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307 , 325, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436 , 650 P.2d 311 ; People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668 , 684-685, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84 , 603 P.2d 1 .) Defendant did not testify at trial, so there is no direct evidence that he honestly and reasonably believed he had killed Kerr when he strangled her. And, contrary to defendant's argument, testimony by his Colorado roommate Jayne and his plumbing assistant Heiserman did not suggest any such a belief. Jayne testified that when defendant explained to him that he had gotten in trouble in California for strangling his girlfriend, he held his hands in a C-shape and said, Well, I'm going to go to jail for assault anyway, so I might as well kill her. This testimony indicates only that defendant intended to kill Kerr; it says nothing about the timing of that killing. Heiserman's testimony likewise does not support a mistake of fact defense instruction. According to that witness, after defendant had been extradited, he told Heiserman that he had confronted [Kerr] when she got to her car as she was leaving, strangled her, she was out, put her in the back seat. The words she was out do not raise the inference that defendant thought he had killed Kerr, only that he had rendered her unconscious. Defendant maintains that it could be inferred he would not have known Kerr was alive but unconscious while being transported in the back of the car because  defendant would not have been able to see her breathing. Such evidence does not trigger the court's duty to instruct on a mistake-of-fact defense, however. The inference it raises, that defendant would not have known Kerr was alive, provides no basis on which the jury could have concluded that defendant reasonably believed he had killed Kerr at the time he strangled her. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on a mistake-of-fact defense in connection with the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation. Because the defense did not request such an instruction for that allegation, the court did not err in failing to give one.  c. Failure to cross-reference the definitions of arson and kidnapping The jury was instructed that the predicate crimes for the felony-murder theory of first degree murder were arson and kidnapping. Defendant argues that the murder  conviction must be reversed because the court failed to instruct that the definitions of arson and kidnapping given in connection with the count charging arson causing great bodily injury and the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation, respectively, also applied to the felony-murder theory of first degree murder. Defendant did not ask the court to clarify for the jury that the definitions of arson and kidnapping in those instructions also applied to the felony-murder instructions. He therefore has forfeited his claim of error. ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763 , 790, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 , 171 P.3d 548 .) His claim lacks merit in any event. Defendant argues there was nothing in the wording of the arson instruction or the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance instruction that would have conveyed to the jury that the definitions of arson and kidnapping in those instructions also applied to the felony-murder instruction. We conclude to the contrary that, in light of the instructions as a whole, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury would have used an erroneous definition of arson or kidnapping when considering the felony-murder theory of first degree murder. The court referred to arson and kidnapping in both the felony-murder instructions and in the instructions that included the definitions of those crimes. There was no suggestion that those terms meant one thing in connection with the arson charge and the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation and something different, and undefined, with respect to felony murder. Indeed, were the jurors to have believed that different definitions might apply, we would expect them to seek clarification. On similar grounds, this court concluded in People v. Kelly, supra , 42 Cal.4th at page 790, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531 , 171 P.3d 548 , that there was no reasonable likelihood the jury in that case would have understood that the definition of rape and robbery given in the instructions regarding the special circumstance allegations applied only to those allegations, and that some other definition of those crimes applied for purposes of first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory. Defendant asserts that the jury received conflicting instructions regarding the mental state required for arson, a general intent crime, because the felony-murder instruction told the jury that a killing committed during arson is first degree murder when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit that crime. His argument is beside the point. The instruction on arson correctly informed the jury that to establish the elements of arson causing great bodily injury in violation of section  451, subdivision (a), the prosecutor must prove (1) that a person set fire to or burned or caused to be burned  property, (2) the fire was set or burning was done willfully and maliciously, and (3) the fire caused great bodily injury to another. The definition of arson created no inconsistency with the felony-murder instructions and would not have confused the jury. d. Failure to instruct on assault as a lesser offense of torture murder Defendant contends that his conviction for murder perpetrated by torture must be reversed and the torture-murder special-circumstance finding vacated because the court failed to instruct the jury sua sponte on the crime of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(a)(1)), as a lesser offense of torture. We reject his claim of error. Defendant acknowledges that he was not separately charged with the crime of torture. He also acknowledges that this court has long held that a court's sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses does not extend to an uncharged offense supporting a special circumstance allegation, or a charge of first degree felony murder. (See, e.g., People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73 , 110-111, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271 , 82 P.3d 296 [when robbery is not a charged offense but rather forms the basis of a felony-murder charge and a robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, the court has no sua sponte duty to instruct on theft as a lesser offense to robbery]; accord, People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821 , 856, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61 , 101 P.3d 1007 [same].) We express no view regarding whether assault by means of force likely to cause  great bodily injury is included within the crime of torture. (Cf. People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412 , 1456, 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 402 [holding that it is not].) But even assuming for argument that this form of assault is a lesser included offense of torture, under our precedent, the court had no duty to give an assault instruction here because defendant was not separately charged with the crime of torture. Defendant makes no attempt to explain why the court must instruct on a lesser included offense of torture in connection with a charge of first degree torture murder or a torture-murder special-circumstance allegation, but not on a lesser included offense of the felony on which a charge of felony murder or a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation is predicated. Nor does he present any grounds for reconsidering our prior pronouncements on the subject.