Opinion ID: 2633065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: flagrant violation

Text: ¶21 On remand to the district court, we also offer guidance on the requirement that the conduct at issue be more than negligent to be actionable. In Bott, we held that the unnecessary rigor clause is a self-executing provision that allows for awards of money damages. [23] We also held, however, that prison employees may not be liable for all constitutional violations: To engender liability, an employee's conduct must be voluntary and sufficiently culpable to contravene a prisoner's right to be free from . . . unnecessary rigor. [24] ¶22 In Spackman v. Board of Education, we noted that the common law gives the judiciary authority to provide civil remedies for constitutional violations under appropriate circumstances. [25] Taking advantage of that authority, we specified that to proceed with a private suit for damages under a constitutional tort theory, a plaintiff must establish three elements: First, a plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered a flagrant violation of his or her constitutional rights. . . . Second, a plaintiff must establish that existing remedies do not redress his or her injuries. . . . Third, a plaintiff must establish that equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is wholly inadequate to protect the plaintiff's rights or redress his or her injuries. [26] ¶23 The flagrant violation element means that a defendant must have violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. To be considered clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that [constitutional] right. The requirement that the unconstitutional conduct be flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the ordinary human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without rendering [himself] liable for a constitutional violation. [27] ¶24 Defendants argue that, even if they violated the constitutional prohibition on unnecessary rigor when they failed to buckle Dexter's seatbelt, the failure to act did not constitute a flagrant violation. They argue that because there was no meaningful Utah law establishing the contours of the unnecessary rigor clause, the right to have the seatbelt buckled was not then a clearly established right. Defendants make a reasonable point. The factual circumstances surrounding Dexter's treatment, however, are insufficiently presented to allow us to decide as a matter of law just how clearly established this particular concern may have been at the time. ¶25 If an official knowingly and unjustifiably subjects an inmate to circumstances previously identified as being unnecessarily rigorous, that is obviously a flagrant violation. Where a clear prohibition has not been previously known to the official, more may be required to establish a flagrant violation. We are satisfied that a flagrant violation of the unnecessary rigor clause has occurred whenever the following two elements are established: First, the nature of the act presents an obvious and known serious risk of harm to the arrested or imprisoned person; and second, knowing of that risk, the official acts without other reasonable justification. ¶26 Whether a violation has occurred will depend on the specific facts of the case. The finder of fact must first determine whether the risk of harm was serious, and whether that risk was obvious and known to the defendants. If so, the finder of fact must then address what, if any, justification existed for the act, as well as the reasonableness of that justification. ¶27 Affirmed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith. ¶28 Justice Durrant concurs in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion.