Opinion ID: 804143
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Burdening of Employment Prospects

Text: Nor can Mead's plus be the imposition of tangible burdens on her future employment prospects. In Siegert v. Gilley, the Supreme Court reiterated that neither reputational harm nor the consequent impairment of future employment opportunities are constitutionally cognizable injuries. 500 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1991) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09). There, a clinical psychologist voluntarily resigned from his position at a federal hospital in -15- order to avoid being fired. See id. at 227-228. Three weeks later, his former supervisor wrote him an extremely negative reference letter, which had the effect of foreclosing clinical positions at other government hospitals. See id. at 228-29. The psychologist brought suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), asserting a stigma plus claim. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 229. In concluding that the psychologist had not adequately alleged the deprivation of a protected liberty interest, the Supreme Court explained that [t]he statements contained in the letter would undoubtedly damage the reputation of one in his position, and impair his future employment prospects[,] . . . [b]ut so long as such damage flows from injury caused by the defendant to a plaintiff's reputation, it may be recoverable under state tort law but it is not recoverable in a Bivens action. Id. at 234. The instant case is indistinguishable. Mead's complaint alleges that the stigmatizing effect of the DHHS Statement has rendered it virtually, if not literally, impossible for [her] to ever be employed as an administrator of an assisted living facility. The complaint further alleges that Mead's negative record with DHHS has diminished her attractiveness to potential employers who are regulated by DHHS and who must submit candidates for employment to DHHS for approval. These allegations, like the allegations in Siegert, concern only those damages to employment -16- prospects that predictably flow from reputational injury. Id. In these circumstances, Siegert stands for the proposition that . . . impairment of future employment prospects does not constitute a constitutional deprivation. Pendleton, 156 F.3d at 63 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vander Zee v. Reno, 73 F.3d 1365, 1369-70 (5th Cir. 1996). We recognize that, in different circumstances, some circuits have held that the burdening of a plaintiff's future employment prospects might constitute a valid plus. In Valmonte v. Bane, for example, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff, a former childcare worker, had been stigmatized by the inclusion of her name on a state registry of child abusers, and that the plus was a statutory requirement that potential employers consult the registry before making any hires and explain in writing the decision to employ anyone on the registry. See 18 F.3d 992, 100102 (2d Cir. 1994). The court explained: This is not just the intangible deleterious effect that flows from a bad reputation. Rather, it is a specific deprivation of her opportunity to seek employment caused by a statutory impediment established by the state. [The plaintiff] is not going to be refused employment because of her reputation; she will be refused employment simply because her inclusion on the list results in an added burden on employers who will therefore be reluctant to hire her. Id. at 1001; see also Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 617 (7th Cir. 2002). Similarly, some circuits have held that -17- a statutory impediment to a plaintiff's prospective ability to obtain government benefits might be a plus. For example, in Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit held that parents who had been stigmatized by their erroneous addition to a state database of suspected child abusers had a valid plus because state agencies were required by law to check the database and investigate anyone appearing on it before conferring benefits or granting certain licenses. See 554 F.3d 1170, 1187-92 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 447 (2010). The allegations in this case do not require us to address the very different circumstance in which a plaintiff's prospects have been impaired by operation of law in the wake of stigma attributable to the government. To the extent that Mead's career opportunities have been dimmed, the damage is solely the result of harm to her reputation, not some statutory impediment or other legal obstacle to her employment. Hence, she has no viable stigma plus claim on the basis of a burdening of employment prospects. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 234. In sum, Mead has not alleged that the DHHS employees deprived her of any protected liberty interest.3 As a result, they 3 In light of this conclusion, we have no reason to consider the DHHS employees' qualified immunity defense. See Redondo-Borges v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 421 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2005). -18- were not constitutionally required to provide her with a nameclearing hearing or other form of process.4 Affirmed. 4 After dismissing Mead's federal claims, the district court explained its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Mead says she is challenging all the rulings of the district court, including this one. Nevertheless, there is no argument in her briefing that the refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction after the dismissal of the federal claims was an abuse of discretion. In any event, that decision was well within the discretion of the district court. -19-