Opinion ID: 500031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdictional arguments common to all appellants

Text: 48 All appellants in this action assert violations of the March 4th Agreement and RITEA. With one exception, they sought redress for their grievances in federal court without first resorting to arbitration. Appellants outline several legal theories in support of federal court jurisdiction. Each is unavailing. 49 B. Section 105 of RITEA Does Not Create a Right of Action in Federal Court 50 First, the former Rock Island employees claim that Section 105 of RITEA, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 1004, adopted May 30, 1980, creates a right of action in federal court. Section 105 states: 51 (a) Each person who is an employee of the Rock Island Railroad on August 1, 1979, and who, prior to January 1, 1981, is separated or furloughed (other than for cause) from his employment with such railroad    as a result of a reduction of service by such railroad    shall, unless found to be less qualified than other applicants, have the first right of hire by any other rail carrier that is subject to regulation by the Commission for any vacancy [not covered by an affirmative action plan]. 52 On January 13, 1983, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 797c(g) was amended to subject this right to arbitration. See Rail Safety and Service Improvement Act of 1982, Pub.L. No. 97-468, Sec. 235, 96 Stat. 2543, 2547 (1983). The amended statute provided: 53 Any dispute, grievance or claim arising under    section 1004 of this title (45 U.S.C. sec. 1004) shall be subject to resolution in accordance with the following procedures: 54 (1) Any employee with such a dispute, grievance, or claim may petition the [The Railroad Retirement] Board to review and investigate the dispute, grievance, or claim. 55 (2) The Board shall investigate the dispute, grievance, or claim, and if it concludes that the employee's rights under    section 1004 of this title may have been violated, the dispute, grievance, or claim shall be subject to resolution in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 153 of this title. 56 (3) In the case of any violation of    section 1004 of this title, the Adjustment Board (or any division or delegate thereof) or any other board of adjustment created under section 153 of this title shall, where appropriate, award such relief, including back pay, as may be necessary to enforce the employee's rights. 57 45 U.S.C. Sec. 797c(g) (emphasis added). 58 Based on the foregoing, the appellants claim that the language shall be subject to is permissive rather than mandatory. We agree fully with the district court and find that the language of 45 U.S.C. Sec. 797c(g) is clearly mandatory and that appellants' arguments in this regard are frivolous. 59 C. The Rock Island Employees Do Not Have a Vested Right to an Action in Federal Court 60 The appellants also contend that during the interim period between the date RITEA became law on May 30, 1980, and the date the right of first hire became subject to arbitration on August 13, 1983, the Rock Island employees had a vested right to bring an action in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 that could not be eliminated by a later amendment of the law. We disagree. The Supreme Court has clearly stated: 61 [W]hen the jurisdiction of a cause depends upon a statute the repeal of the statute takes away jurisdiction. And it is equally clear, that where a jurisdiction conferred by statute, is prohibited by a subsequent statute, the prohibition is, so far, a repeal of the statute conferring jurisdiction. 62 Merchants' Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541, 544-45, 18 L.Ed. 540 (1867). 63 Moreover, a closely related issue was decided in the case of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Burlington Northern, 580 F.Supp. 797 (D.Colo.1984). There the district court was faced with the issue of what happened to pending claims in federal district court after 45 U.S.C. Sec. 797c(g) had been amended to require arbitration for these claims. The court, after thorough review of the authorities, found that claims brought correctly in federal court before the enactment of the arbitration provision lacked jurisdiction after its effective date. 64 Clearly, jurisdiction was withdrawn in the present case by the amendment of 45 U.S.C. Sec. 797c(g). Appellants' case was not even properly pending in federal court at the time of the amendment. Thus, there is no conceivable basis for jurisdiction under any vested rights theory. 65 D. Section 122 of RITEA Does Not Create A Private Right of Action 66 The former Rock Island employees next contend that section 122 of RITEA creates a cause of action in federal court. We disagree. 67 Section 122 of the Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 1017, provides: 68 The Commission may authorize any rail carrier willing to do so voluntarily to use the tracks and facilities of a carrier which    was the subject of a proceeding pending under section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act or under subchapter IV of Chapter 11 of Title 11. The use of such tracks and facilities shall be under the terms of compensation as the carriers establish between themselves, or if the carriers are unable to agree under such terms of compensation as the Commission finds to be reasonable.    69 In carrying out the provisions of this section, the Commission shall require, to the maximum extent practicable, the use of the employees who would normally have performed work in connection with the traffic subject to the action of the Commission. 70 Section 105 already creates a cause of action. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1004. It is unlikely that, without some additional special purpose, Congress intended to create a duplicative action. Moreover, the language of section 122 only authorizes the ICC to act and does not support an interpretation which would provide jurisdiction for individual suits. 71 In a related argument, appellants contend that section 122 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1336 10 together create federal court jurisdiction over their claims. We again disagree. 72 Section 1336 of 28 U.S.C. permits the federal courts jurisdiction over causes of action elsewhere enumerated. It says nothing about causes of action based on alleged violations of section 122 or of ICC orders issued pursuant thereto. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that jurisdictional statutes such as 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1336 do not of themselves establish a private right of action. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979); Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246, 71 S.Ct. 692, 95 L.Ed. 912 (1951). 73 E. Plaintiff's Unfair Representation Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations 74 In terms of the unfair representation claims brought by the former Rock Island employees, we agree with the district court, both in that these claims are governed by the six-month statute of limitation set forth by the Supreme Court in Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) and that all of appellants' claims are thus barred.