Opinion ID: 3154798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hughes Test: Timely Objections

Text: The second step in the harmless error review is to apply the three-pronged Hughes test, where we must consider (1) the closeness of the case, (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error. 43 prosecutor is simultaneously both an officer of this Court and an officer of this State; the direct report of a duly elected Attorney General.”); Hunter, 815 A.2d at 735 (explaining that prosecutors “must ‘seek justice, not merely convictions’”) (citation omitted). 43 Hughes, 437 A.2d at 571 (quoting Dyson, 418 A.2d at 132). 16 Although Slide 067 was improper, we agree that the slide does not require reversal of Spence’s conviction under the Hughes test. As to the closeness of the case, this case was not close. Spence admitted to the intentional killing of Williams and the attempted killing of Allen. Although Spence relied on the justification defenses of self-defense and defense of others, he could not satisfy the requirements of the defenses, even under his own version of the events. Under 11 Del. C. § 464(c), the use of deadly force is justifiable if the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself from death or serious physical injury. However, the use of deadly force is not justifiable if “[t]he defendant knows that the necessity of using deadly force can be avoided with complete safety by retreating . . . .”44 Likewise, as to the defense of others, “[w]hen the person whom the defendant seeks to protect would have been obliged under [11 Del. C.] § 464 . . . to retreat, . . . the defendant is obliged to try to cause the person to do so before using force in the person’s protection if the actor knows that complete safety can be secured in that way.”45 Therefore, the person claiming self-defense must retreat if he—or the person he seeks to protect—can do so safely. At trial, Spence testified that he had the opportunity to leave safely before he approached the victims with the shotgun, as well as after he began to fire. While at oral argument, Spence’s counsel argued that, at the precise time of the shooting by the elevator, Spence did not have an opportunity to retreat. According to Spence’s own 44 11 Del. C. § 464(e)(2). 45 11 Del. C. § 465(c). 17 recollection of the events at trial, however, Spence had multiple opportunities to retreat. Further, Spence continued to fire after the first shot, when he had another opportunity to retreat. In his testimony, he described how he continued to pump the shotgun and fire multiple times after the first shot: Q. And that gun you were using was a pump action shotgun? A. Yes. Q. That means after you fired the first time, you had to pull the gun back and jam it forward to get another shell into that chamber? A. Yes. Q. Didn’t automatically feed? A. No. Q. So when you fired, you had to move the action, move it up, fire again? A. Yes. Q. Move the action, move it up? A. Yes. Q. Fire again? A. Yes. In addition, Spence testified that he left the party at one point and chose to return despite the presence of the Sure Shots. During the trial, Spence also stated that, although he could have called the police, he chose not to because the police would “break the party up.” 18 Self-defense is also unavailable if the defendant, “with the purpose of causing death or serious physical injury, provoked the use of force against the defendant in the same encounter . . . .”46 Here, it was Spence, with shotgun in hand, who approached the two victims. According to Spence, it was only after his approach that he observed, in his view, Williams reaching for his waist. Therefore, the justification defense would also not be available based on Spence’s provocation. As Spence’s own testimony negated the applicability of self-defense and there were no other defenses offered, the case before the jury was not close on the issue of justification. Moreover, the State produced additional evidence during the trial, including testimony from a number of witnesses present during the party, eyewitnesses to the shooting, and the testimony of Allen. The State also provided forensic testimony, physical evidence, and Spence’s prior statements to the police. Ultimately, the jury took less than six hours to convict Spence on all the indicted charges. Therefore, this factor, “the closeness of the case,” weighs heavily in favor of harmless error. The second factor is “the centrality of the issue affected by the error.” The issue at trial was whether Spence had a meritorious justification defense. Slide 067 depicts the victim of the homicide but does not speak to the issue of justification. With respect to the third factor, “the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the error,” the jury instructions addressed the personal opinions or beliefs of the attorneys. Further, the defense rejected the trial court’s offer of a curative instruction at the time of its objection to Slide 067. 46 11 Del. C. § 464(e)(1). 19 Considering all three factors, we conclude that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, which was objected to in a timely manner, did not amount to more than harmless error under the Hughes test. The first factor, the closeness of the case, is particularly compelling. Accordingly, a mistrial was not required under Hughes.