Opinion ID: 6329208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: A. Sufficiency of the evidence on money-laundering conspiracy count Segura-Corro argues on appeal that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that he conspired to commit money laundering. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Howard, 947 F.3d 936, 947 (6th Cir. 2020). “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we assess whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2015)). Because we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor, Segura-Corro must overcome a “very heavy burden” to prevail. United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Ross, 502 F.3d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 2007)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), a person who conspires to commit a money-laundering offense is “subject to the same penalties as those prescribed” for the underlying offense. The superseding indictment for the underlying offense alleged that Segura-Corro conspired to launder money in 4 No. 21-5109, United States v. Segura-Corro violation of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), which prohibits so-called “promotional” money laundering, and § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), which prohibits so-called “concealment money laundering.” R. 35 (Superseding Indictment at 3–4) (Page ID #86–87).2 After the district court instructed the jury that it could find Segura-Corro guilty under either a promotional or concealment theory, the jury found that he conspired to commit money laundering. R. 73 (Jury Instr. at 29–33) (Page ID #270–74); R. 72 (Jury Verdict Form at 3) (Page ID #237). We begin with promotional money laundering. “To prove conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering, the government had to show that [Segura-Corro] knowingly and voluntarily joined an agreement between two or more people to (1) conduct a financial transaction from the proceeds of illegal activity, (2) knowing the money came from illegal activity, and (3) intending to promote that activity.” United States v. Tolliver, 949 F.3d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 2020). Segura-Corro argues that the government did not prove the first and third elements—that he agreed to conduct a financial transaction and intended to promote illegal activity. Appellant Br. at 23, 25. The evidence at trial, however, supported the government’s theory that Segura-Corro intended to promote his cocaine distribution activities through the exchange of drugs and cash. 2 The relevant portion of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 states, (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity— (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or ... (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part— (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; ... shall be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. 5 No. 21-5109, United States v. Segura-Corro “The paradigmatic example of [promotional money laundering] is a drug dealer using the proceeds of a drug transaction to purchase additional drugs and consummate future sales.” United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 317 (6th Cir. 2010). This form of “reinvesting” the proceeds “promotes the conspiracy by allowing it to continue or grow.” Tolliver, 949 F.3d at 248. Hernandez-Herrera testified that she paid Segura-Corro over $450,000 for large quantities of cocaine. R. 151 (Trial Tr. Day 3 at 45, 52–53, 55–57) (Page ID #892, 899–900, 902–04). The $94,500 in cash that police found in Segura-Corro’s home, along with evidence that Segura-Corro could not have made that much money through his job and side businesses, supports the inference that Segura-Corro was generating drug proceeds. Furthermore, Hernandez-Ruvalcaba testified that Segura-Corro purchased large amounts of drugs from him, and a juror could infer that those amounts were not for personal use. Id. at 142–43, 152–53 (Page ID #989–90, 999–1000). The timing of HernandezRuvalcaba’s deliveries and Segura-Corro’s payments is somewhat unclear, but a jury could reasonably infer that Segura-Corro used the proceeds from some of Hernandez-Ruvalcaba’s deliveries to pay for the remainder of the drugs. Putting this all together, a rational juror could find that Segura-Corro used the proceeds from drug sales like the one to Hernandez-Herrera to purchase more drugs from suppliers like Hernandez-Ruvalcaba to promote his drug business. The record further reflects one additional fact supporting the government’s promotional theory of money laundering. Hernandez-Herrera also testified that when she was in Mexico, Segura-Corro paid her for referring her drug customers in the United States to him. R. 151 (Trial Tr. Day 3 at 71–72) (Page ID #918–19). A jury could reasonably infer that Segura-Corro was using drug proceeds to pay Hernandez-Herrera for sending customers his way, thus promoting his drug business. 6 No. 21-5109, United States v. Segura-Corro Segura-Corro’s arguments to the contrary do not persuade us. Although Segura-Corro argues that the government presented no evidence of “movement of funds” as required under § 1956(c)(4)(A)(i)’s definition of “financial transaction,” Appellant Br. at 23–24, the government presented evidence that Segura-Corro agreed to exchange cash for drugs in transactions such as the one between him and Hernandez-Ruvalcaba, and also exchanged cash for referrals. R. 151 (Trial Tr. Day 3 at 71–72, 142–43, 152–53) (Page ID #918–19, 989–90, 999–1000). Such exchanges undoubtedly constitute “movement of funds.” See United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that a “purchase, sale, transfer, delivery,” or other “disposition of funds” constitutes a financial transaction). Segura-Corro also argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the $94,500 that police found in his apartment was intended to promote drug-trafficking activities. Appellant Br. at 25. In this regard, he notes that no evidence was presented regarding whether he paid for drugs in full or had them delivered on consignment. Id. Because, he asserts, the payment of money to a supplier for drugs delivered on consignment does not amount to “promotion” absent a subsequent sale of drugs, and there was no subsequent sale of drugs here, the government could not prove promotion with respect to the $94,500. Id. In support of this argument, Segura-Corro relies on United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998), in which the Fourth Circuit reversed a defendant’s conviction for money laundering and conspiracy to launder money on the ground that “[t]here was absolutely no evidence presented” that the defendant’s payment for drugs “was made to create goodwill for subsequent drug transactions.” Id. at 484. The Fourth Circuit further noted that in addition to there being no subsequent drug 7 No. 21-5109, United States v. Segura-Corro transactions, “neither Government witness testified that the purpose of the payment was to encourage the defendant to supply more drugs. Rather, the payment was merely to satisfy a debt of a completed and, as far as the record shows, the final transaction.” Id. To the extent Heaps departs from “the binding precedent of our own circuit [that] makes clear” that “payment for drugs can constitute promotional money laundering,” Tolliver, 949 F.3d at 247, we must disregard it. In any event, circumstantial evidence could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that Segura-Corro used drug proceeds from his sales to promote his drug business. See United States v. Wettstain, 618 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2010). The $94,500 in cash was simply circumstantial evidence that Segura-Corro was dealing in large sums. The government may prove conspiracy to commit money laundering through promotion or concealment—both are “alternative bases for a money laundering conviction.” United States v. Martin, 516 F. App’x 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Because the evidence was sufficient to convict Segura-Corro under a theory of promotional money laundering, we decline to address his arguments regarding concealment money laundering.3 See United States v. AgundizMontes, 679 F. App’x 380, 388 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that defendant’s conviction would still stand based on promotional-money-laundering theory even if government failed to prove concealment money laundering); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 47, 60 (1991) 3 We note only that the government must provide “proof that the purpose—not merely effect” of the transaction “was to conceal or disguise a listed attribute” to support a theory of concealment money laundering. Regalado Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 567 (2008); see also United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 585–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying analysis in Cuellar to convictions under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). “Concealment—even deliberate concealment—as mere facilitation of some other purpose, is not enough to convict.” Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d at 586. The only evidence that the government provided to support concealment was that Hernandez-Herrera hired individuals to wire money to Mexico. Although one may question whether the government provided sufficient evidence that Segura-Corro conspired to wire the money to Mexico for the purpose of concealing the source or nature of the money, rather than to avoid the wire-transfer cap, we need not reach this issue because there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of promotional money laundering, and we therefore decline to address it. 8 No. 21-5109, United States v. Segura-Corro (upholding multi-object conspiracy verdict when government failed to prove that defendant was involved in one of the objects). B. Sentencing Segura-Corro next challenges his sentence as substantively unreasonable. “For a sentence to be substantively reasonable, ‘it must be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).’” United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 371 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2008)). A sentence within the guidelines range is presumed to be substantively reasonable. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). We review for an abuse of discretion the reasonableness of a district court’s sentence. United States v. Lanning, 633 F.3d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 2011). The district court sentenced Segura-Corro to 168 months in prison, the highest sentence within the applicable guidelines range. R. 153 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 24) (Page ID #1090). In challenging this sentence as unreasonable, Segura-Corro argues that the district court “placed undue weight on” a 2020 U.S. Sentencing Commission Report, which found that persons serving sentences longer than 120 months have lower rates of recidivism than those serving shorter sentences. Appellant Br. at 32; Ryan Cotter, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Length of Incarceration and Recidivism 4 (2020). Segura-Corro challenges the district court’s use of the 2020 report. Appellant Br. at 32. He asserts that “[t]here is no basis from the report to conclude that a sentence of 168 months has any greater deterrent effect than a sentence of 120 months.” Id. The district court noted that for sentences longer than 60 months and longer than 120 months, “the longer the sentence, the greater 9 No. 21-5109, United States v. Segura-Corro deterrent effect that the sentence has because there is a lower percentage of recidivism that occurs.” R. 153 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 17) (Page ID #1087). Because nothing in the report explicitly shows that a 168-month sentence would have a greater deterrent effect than a 121-month sentence, the report’s findings alone do not justify imposing a sentence over 121 months. Segura-Corro does not show, however, that the 2020 report unduly influenced the district court, which considered other circumstances such as Segura-Corro’s unlawful re-entry into the United States and his ability to secure gainful employment. R. 153 (Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 16– 17) (Page ID #1086–87). Nor does Segura-Corro show that the district court erred when it considered the § 3553(a) factors and determined that a lesser sentence “would not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense.” Id. at 17 (Page ID #1087). Segura-Corro has therefore failed to rebut the presumption of substantive reasonableness that we must apply to his sentence.