Opinion ID: 4469816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Angelo Johnson

Text: Johnson pleaded guilty to conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of a mixture and substance containing heroin and less than 50 kilograms of a mixture and substance containing marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 841(b)(1)(D), and 846. Johnson was sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment. In determining Johnson’s Guidelines sentencing range, the district court found that he was responsible for distributing more than 1 kilogram of heroin; applied a two-level increase for possession of a firearm, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1); applied a three-level increase for his role in the offense as a manager or supervisor, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b); and denied a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Johnson’s total offense level was 35, his criminal history category was IV, and his Guidelines sentencing range was 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. The district court varied downward and imposed a 200-month sentence. Johnson challenges the district court’s drug calculation, the application of the two enhancements, and the denial of the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he had distributed more than one kilogram of heroin. See United States v. Harris, 908 F.3d 1151, 1153 (8th Cir. 2018) (standard of review). We disagree. One witness testified that she purchased between one-half to one gram of heroin from Johnson every day for two years. A second witness testified that he purchased one to two grams of -8- heroin every day for two years. Using the conservative numbers, the court found that the first witness had purchased 365 grams from Johnson and that the second had purchased 730 grams. The government also presented evidence that Johnson distributed other quantities of heroin. We thus conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Johnson distributed more than one kilogram of heroin. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 (“Where there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”). Johnson next argues that the district court clearly erred in finding that he possessed a firearm. See United States v. Anderson, 618 F.3d 873, 879 (8th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) instructs the district court to apply a two-level increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” This enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons,” and it “should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11(A). At sentencing, a police sergeant testified regarding Johnson’s arrest and the search of his residence.3 An informant reported that Johnson had been holding a gun before his arrest. A pill bottle containing heroin, crack cocaine, and alprazolam was found in the stairwell leading to the basement. A Glock nine-millimeter pistol with an extended magazine and two additional magazines were recovered from the basement of Johnson’s residence. The pistol had been buried in 3 The presentence report identified Johnson’s residence as being located in the 400 block of Ninth Street in Davenport, Iowa, where the firearm was found. In his appellate reply brief, Johnson argues that the government did not prove that Johnson lived at the Ninth Street address. The government was not required to offer evidence that Johnson lived there, however, because Johnson did not object to the paragraph in the presentence report identifying the Ninth Street address as his residence. See United States v. Razo-Guerra, 534 F.3d 970, 975 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that in determining whether the government has proven the facts necessary to establish a sentencing enhancement, the district court “may accept any undisputed portion of the [presentence report] as a finding of fact” (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A))). -9- loose dirt, and officers noticed dirt on Johnson’s pants and cobwebs in his hair when they arrested him. Two witnesses also testified that Johnson possessed firearms during drug deals. The evidence thus supported the findings that Johnson possessed a firearm and that it was not “clearly improbable” that the firearm was connected with the offense. Johnson contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that he managed or supervised another participant in the drug conspiracy. Although he does not dispute the evidence that his sister and an individual identified as “MellyMel” sometimes delivered heroin after buyers placed orders with him, Johnson argues that the government did not produce any evidence of supervision, management, or control. A fair inference from the evidence presented is that Johnson instructed his sister and MellyMel where to meet his customers and how much to collect from them, and we thus conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Johnson acted as a manager or supervisor. See Alcalde, 818 F.3d at 794 (holding that the district court did not err in applying a role enhancement based on evidence that the defendant “directed the actions of two coconspirators by instructing them to deposit drug proceeds and by instructing one of them to send photos of drug packages”). Finally, Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred in denying him a three-level decrease for accepting responsibility under Guidelines § 3E1.1. United States v. Fischer, 551 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review). The district court denied the decrease because Johnson challenged the amount of drugs involved, the manner in which they were distributed, and whether he possessed a firearm. The evidence set forth above wholly discredited Johnson’s claim that he did not possess the Glock nine-millimeter firearm. As the district court explained, firearms “are not peripheral to drug conspiracies and it isn’t peripheral here.” Because Johnson falsely denied or frivolously contested relevant conduct the court determined to be true—particularly his possession of a firearm— the district court did not err in concluding that he acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. -10- See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A) (“A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility, but the fact that a defendant’s challenge is unsuccessful does not necessarily establish that it was either a false denial or frivolous . . . .”). The judgments are affirmed. ______________________________ -11-