Opinion ID: 2997111
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Trickery” by Detectives Green and Stamm

Text: We next address Conner’s assertion that the police officers “tricked and cajoled” him into confessing and agreeing to videotape an incriminating statement. This contention amounts to a claim that the post-conviction court unreasonably determined that Conner’s confession was voluntary. Because the test for voluntariness is a totality of the circumstances test, see supra, we consequently must determine whether the PCR court’s weighing of the evidence was so incredible as to be “well outside the boundaries of permissible differences of opinion.” See Hardaway, 302 F.3d at 762. In this case, we can easily say that the PCR court was not unreasonable when it determined that the totality of the circumstances mediated in favor of the conclusion that Conner’s confession was voluntary. First, Conner had been apprised of his constitutional rights (i.e., read his Miranda rights) while incarcerated in Texas and again after his arrival in Indiana. He then voluntarily signed multiple waivers of his rights prior to being questioned and before he gave his videotaped statement. Conner stated during questioning that he understood his rights and confirmed his awareness of his situation and his option to decline to answer questions or make a statement until he had spoken with an attorney. Second, at the time of his confession, Conner was an adult, twenty-two years of age. Third, the interrogation lasted approximately three hours, at most. Fourth, during the interrogation Conner was provided with food and drink, allowed to use the restroom, given a pack of Camel cigarettes upon request, and when it was discovered that the heat was malfunctioning in the interrogation room, he was moved to a different room. Fifth, nowhere does Conner aver that he was physically harmed during the interrogation. Last, because involuntary confessions are “to an unascertained extent” untrustworthy, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Confessions wrung out of No. 03-1951 13 their makers may be less reliable than voluntary confessions . . . .”), we consider the reliability of Conner’s confession as a factor in the totality test. And we cannot say the post-conviction court was unreasonable when it found that Conner’s confession was reliable. Conner bases his unreliability argument on the fact that portions of his confession were incompatible with certain incontrovertible facts ascertained at trial. However, the PCR court implicitly determined that despite discrepancies between the details in Conner’s confession and particular facts adduced at trial, the principal facts provided in Conner’s confession were corroborated. In addition, the court credited the testimony of Detectives Green and Stamm, wherein they both expressed their belief that Conner had been truthful when he confessed. The evidence in the record supports these findings, and Conner has not pointed us to any other evidence which clearly and convincingly shows that the PCR court unreasonably determined that Conner’s confession was reliable. To summarize, the foregoing facts do not support a finding that Conner’s confession was anything but voluntary. Furthermore, we have repeatedly held that “a law-enforcement agent may ‘actively mislead’ a defendant in order to obtain a confession, so long as a rational decision remains possible.” Ceballos, 302 F.3d at 695 (quoting United States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir. 1990)); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992) (false statement that a witness had seen the defendant’s vehicle in the alley in which the victim had been raped was not coercive without more); see also United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (false statement that witness had seen her with a gun was not coercive); Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th Cir. 1998) (lie regarding fingerprint evidence was not coercive). Conner cannot point this court to any specific facts which demonstrate how he was “tricked” or “cajoled” by Detectives Green and Stamm. However, he obtusely argues that his alleged mental defect 14 No. 03-1951 (an “organic” personality/thought disorder discussed in detail later in this opinion) made him especially susceptible to confusion and trickery and that the detectives’ “misuse” of the criminal codebook, discussed supra, rendered his confession involuntary. First, although we explicitly rejected this assertion above, for argument’s sake we will assume that the detectives did in fact use a criminal codebook to affirmatively misrepresent Indiana criminal law to Conner. But such a basis is insufficient to deem a state court’s admission of a confession unreasonable under AEDPA when a defendant has already voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. In Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 663-65 (7th Cir. 2003), we considered whether a state court unreasonably applied federal law when it admitted a defendant’s confession despite a police officer’s misstatement of state law, which preceded the defendant’s Miranda waiver and concerned the availability of a public defender. We pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has not clarified whether a legal misstatement by a police officer would per se make a subsequent Miranda waiver involuntary, and that at least one other court of appeals has held that, in and of itself, such a misstatement does not. Id. (citing Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 20304 (1989); Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 576 n.8 (1987); Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). Consequently, we held that the state court’s decision to allow the confession was not unreasonable. Id. at 665. And because in Jackson we could not deem “unreasonable” the state court’s determination that an officer’s misrepresentation of the law prior to a Miranda waiver did not vitiate the voluntariness of the waiver, then we cannot hold in this case that the PCR court was “unreasonable” in determining that Conner’s confession was voluntary, solely because police officers may have misrepresented state criminal law after Conner’s indisputably voluntary Miranda waiver. No. 03-1951 15 Second, the post-conviction court considered conflicting evidence as to whether Conner suffered from a mental disorder or defect at the time of his interrogation. The court’s implicit decision to credit the evidence which tended to show that Conner did not suffer from any disorder or defect is entitled to our deference, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1983). Conner has not made such a showing. Even if we credit Conner’s evidence of his mental disorder at the time of his interrogation, in order to find that the PCR court’s determination was unreasonable, we would also have to find that the defect was of such magnitude as to render Conner so susceptible to trickery, deception, or other standard interrogation tactics (i.e., Conner asserts that Green and Stamm encouraged him to confess because it “is good for the soul”) that his free will was overborne. The evidence here in no way supports such a finding. In conclusion, Conner has failed to present this court with factors pertinent to the interrogation which would suggest that the post-conviction court was well outside the realm of permissible legal conclusions when it held there was no coercive police activity which caused Conner’s will to be overborne. Hence, the PCR court was reasonable in finding that Conner’s confession was voluntary and that the trial court’s admission of his statements to police and the videotaped statement was not error. There is no basis under AEDPA to support Conner’s habeas petition as to his confession and the district court’s denial of relief was proper.