Opinion ID: 594785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Petitioner's Claims for Habeas Relief

Text: 18 Before we begin our discussion of the merits of Towler's claims, we re-emphasize the limited nature of our review. The district court determined that Towler's petition was not sufficient on its face to state a claim for habeas relief. When a district court has denied a habeas petition without the benefit of a state or federal evidentiary hearing, our inquiry is limited to a de novo review of whether the facts alleged in the petition, if proven, would justify relief. 12 28 U.S.C.A. § 2243 (West 1971); Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1483, 1485-86 (11th Cir.1989). If we conclude that Towler's allegations might merit relief, and if Towler's right to relief depends on the resolution of disputed issues of fact, we must remand Towler's petition so that the district court may order an evidentiary hearing on Towler's claims. 13 See Yordan v. Dugger, 909 F.2d 474, 478-79 (11th Cir.1990); Slicker v. Wainwright, 809 F.2d 768, 770 (11th Cir.1987). Therefore, we are not called upon to judge the truth or credibility of Towler's allegations for the purposes of this appeal.1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 19 Towler's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In the plea bargaining context, a petitioner seeking to establish ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate that (1) counsel's advice and performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial in the absence of his attorney's errors. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370-71, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In this case, Towler's alleges that his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient because his attorney misrepresented the nature of the plea agreement in explaining the proposed agreement to him, and that he was prejudiced as a result of his attorney's misrepresentations because he would not have entered his guilty pleas had he known the true nature of the agreement. Towler's allegations on both counts are sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. 20 Although not every misrepresentation by a lawyer that results in a guilty plea rises to the level of constitutionally ineffective assistance, see Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1540-41, this Court has repeatedly held that an attorney's patently erroneous advice regarding the nature or consequences of a client's decision to plead guilty falls below the wide range of professional competence demanded by the Sixth Amendment. See Yordan, 909 F.2d at 478; Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d 1545, 1553 (11th Cir.1989); Betancourt v. Willis, 814 F.2d 1546, 1549 (11th Cir.1987); Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530, 532 (5th Cir.1972). If sufficiently egregious, the misrepresentations of Towler's attorney in communicating the terms of the plea agreement to Towler could constitute ineffective assistance. Towler's allegation that his attorney affirmatively misled him as to the degree of the offenses identified in the plea agreement might justify relief, especially where, as here, the alleged misstatements directly affected the range of possible penalties Towler would be subject to as a result of his pleas. Cf. Thomas v. Dugger, 846 F.2d 669, 674 n. 1 (11th Cir.1988) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the degree of offense a petitioner pleads guilty to is not a trivial matter where the degree of the offense alters the consequences of the plea), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 921, 110 S.Ct. 285, 107 L.Ed.2d 265 (1989). 21 In addition, Towler has sufficiently alleged prejudice resulting from his counsel's misrepresentations. Towler repeatedly alleges that he would not have pleaded guilty to all five offenses in the same degree as charged in the informations. This allegation is circumstantially supported by the fact that Towler did move to withdraw his guilty plea at the sentencing hearing. Indeed, Towler's allegations, if proven, might also support a finding that Towler did not receive effective assistance of counsel during his sentencing hearing. See Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.1992). If Towler's attorney affirmatively misled the court as to Towler's grounds for seeking a withdrawal of his guilty plea, Towler was prejudiced in his attempt to legally withdraw his plea. See Castro v. State, 419 So.2d 796, 800 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982). 22 We conclude that the record does not conclusively establish that Towler is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance claim. Where the issue is the substance of an attorney-client communication, the record is often of limited usefulness and an evidentiary hearing may be necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact. See Holmes, 876 F.2d at 1552-53; Slicker, 809 F.2d at 769-70. 14 2. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea 23 A defendant who pleads guilty must be aware of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences surrounding the plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). A defendant who has not received the effective assistance of counsel in this regard may not be bound by the plea if as a result the plea was not an informed and voluntary waiver of the defendant's rights. See McCoy v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir.1986); Bradbury v. Wainwright, 658 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 992, 102 S.Ct. 2275, 73 L.Ed.2d 1288 (1982). A plea induced by the misrepresentations of counsel is ineffective. See United States v. French, 719 F.2d 387, 390 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960, 104 S.Ct. 2174, 80 L.Ed.2d 557 (1984). 24 In denying Towler's petition, the district court held that the transcript of the plea hearing conclusively refuted Towler's claim that his plea was involuntary. In other words, the district court concluded that any misrepresentations by Towler's counsel were cured by the information communicated to Towler in the plea colloquy. 15 The court observed that Towler was fully informed by the trial judge of each charge he pleaded guilty to and each charge's maximum sentence. Moreover, the district court noted that Towler told the trial judge that he understood the nature and consequences of his plea, and that Towler's conduct in the hearing supported his statement. 25 In order for Towler's pleas to have been knowing and voluntary, he must have been reasonably informed of the nature of the charges against him, the factual basis underlying those charges, and the legal options and alternatives that are available. LoConte, 847 F.2d at 751. Courts look at the totality of information held by the defendant at the time he makes his plea, and not merely the information communicated at the plea hearing, to determine if the defendant was adequately informed to make a knowing and voluntary plea. Id.; Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 944 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Deal, 678 F.2d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir.1982). Therefore, the fact that the trial court properly conducted the plea hearing does not guarantee that the plea is constitutionally valid. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 800 n. 8 (11th Cir.1987); Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1538 n. 9. 26 Our review of the plea hearing transcript leads us to conclude that the transcript does not conclusively refute Towler's claims. According to Towler, he went into the plea hearing believing that he would be pleading to the third degree version of each offense listed in the plea agreement. The written terms of the plea agreement did not flatly contradict this perception because the agreement listed only the counts Towler would plead guilty to, and was silent as to the degree of each offense Towler was pleading to. The trial judge, after asking Towler a series of preliminary questions designed to ensure Towler's competency to plea, opened the discussion of charges by saying: 27 Now, you are charged, as your attorney has indicated, in three separate cases, and I want to advise you of those charges and tell you what the maximum penalties are, and these are just the charges. It does not necessarily mean what you're pleading to, and I will go over that with you in just a minute, but first of all, the charges. (Emphasis added). 28 After a run-down of the all the charges with their corresponding maximum sentences, the trial judge turned back to those offenses Towler had agreed to plead guilty to in the plea agreement. 29 And by this written plea, you're offering to plead guilty to several of the offenses. And I'm going to tell you what you're offering to plead guilty to under this written plea to be sure that it is consistent with what you understand that you're pleading guilty to. 30 The trial judge then proceeded to identify those charges listed in the informations that the plea agreement indicated Towler would plead guilty to, and the court reiterated each offense's maximum penalty. Neither party has challenged the sufficiency of the trial judge's pre-plea colloquy. However, this is not conclusive proof that Towler was not prejudiced by his attorney's misrepresentations. See Slicker, 809 F.2d at 769-70; Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1538-41. In this case, Towler alleges that based on his attorney's misrepresentations, he interpreted the judge's rendition of offenses as correctly identifying those offenses he had agreed to plead guilty to, but that he interpreted the maximum sentences given as the maximum sentence for each offense as charged in the original informations. Towler alleges that he assumed, based on his attorney's representations, that the sentences actually imposed would be adjusted down to reflect the penalties appropriate for third degree offenses. 16 The record as it currently stands is insufficient to resolve conclusively Towler's involuntariness claim. Towler has alleged facts that, if proven, might explain his conduct in the plea hearing as stemming from the misrepresentations of counsel.