Opinion ID: 836300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: accused's constitutional defense

Text: We turn to the accused's final theory of defense, which is that the Bar's decision to prosecute him in this case violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. As we have explained, the accused believes that the Bar does not prosecute government lawyers who participate in investigations that involve deception, but it does prosecute lawyers in private practice who engage in similar conduct. According to the accused, the Bar thereby has created two classes of attorneys in violation of Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution, [4] and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [5] In the accused's view, the Bar's decision to dismiss his 1992 complaint against SAIF and DOJ lawyers, who allegedly had participated in Operation Clean Sweep, demonstrates the constitutionally impermissible classification system that the Bar has created. The trial panel rejected that argument. It reasoned: To the extent that SAIF's lawyers were not prosecuted, they were not prosecuted because of a lack of evidence, and not because of any prosecutorial immunity, notwithstanding the fact that the parties have raised the immunity issue in these proceedings. The Bar does not respond specifically to the accused's argument, stating only that the SPRB dismissed the [accused's 1992 complaint against SAIF and DOJ lawyers] based on lack of evidence. The accused is correct that discriminatory application of a generally applicable law might violate Article I, section 20, or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 239, 630 P.2d 810 (1981) (Article I, section 20, reaches forbidden inequality in the administration of laws); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (selective prosecution claim cognizable under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection principles); Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000) (class of one can support equal protection claim if plaintiff alleges treatment different from others and no rational basis for difference in treatment). To prevail on such a claim, however, the accused must show that the Bar's decision not to prosecute SAIF and DOJ lawyers was based on an unconstitutional favoritism for those persons. See Hunter v. State of Oregon, 306 Or. 529, 533, 761 P.2d 502 (1988) (Article I, section 20, prohibits, among other things, prosecution based on impermissible factors such as race or personal animosity or the absence of any standards that could ensure consistency); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (identifying impermissible classifications such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classifications for purposes of equal protection analysis). Even assuming that it is impermissible under either constitution for the Bar to distinguish between government lawyers and lawyers in private practice in choosing whether to prosecute alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the accused has failed to make the requisite showing in this case that the Bar follows that practice. The accused has shown only that the Bar believed that it did not have evidence to press charges against certain government lawyers in response to his complaint in 1992. The accused has not demonstrated that the Bar has a policy of prosecuting lawyers in private practice but not prosecuting government lawyers who are accused of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. On the facts of this case, we reject the accused's claim that the Bar violated Article I, section 20, or the Equal Protection Clause, in bringing this proceeding. Having rejected the proposal that this court adopt an investigatory exception to DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and ORS 9.527(4), and concluded that the accused's constitutional defense is unavailing, we hold that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5), and ORS 9.527(4). We turn to the matter of sanction.