Opinion ID: 2299879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant's final claim is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government's evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed and intended to distribute the marijuana in the parcel that was delivered to him. In reviewing sufficiency claims, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Lewis v. United States, 767 A.2d 219, 222 (D.C.2001). The evidence must be sufficiently weighty to allow a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but it need not compel such a finding, nor must the government negate every possible inference of innocence. Timberlake v. United States, 758 A.2d 978, 980 (D.C.2000). Reversal of the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal is warranted only where there is no evidence upon which a reasonable [trier of fact] could infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 981 (quotations omitted). In a bench trial, the judge, as fact finder, has the right to make credibility determinations, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences of fact. Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762, 764 (D.C. 2006). In reviewing a bench trial, we will not overturn the trial court's factual findings unless they are plainly wrong or without evidence to support [them]. Lewis, 767 A.2d at 222 (alteration in original). Appellant was charged under D.C.Code § 48-904.01(a)(1) (2001), which states, in relevant part, that it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to ... possess ... with intent to ... distribute, a controlled substance. Id. Proof of possession requires that the government establish that the accused had actual or constructive possession of the prohibited item. See Smith v. United States, 809 A.2d 1216, 1221-22 (D.C.2002). Actual possession is the ability of a person to knowingly exercise direct physical custody or control over the property in question. Id. at 1222 (quoting United States v. Hubbard, 429 A.2d 1334, 1338 (D.C.1981)). Proof of possession can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Smith, 809 A.2d at 1222. The government presented sufficient evidence that appellant knowingly possessed the marijuana. Appellant accepted the parcel with the drugs addressed to Corey Johnson at the address where he was found, acknowledged he was the correct recipient, and signed the postal receipt, which was introduced at trial. A document found in appellant's car had the name Corey Johnson and the address where the package was mailed. Almost immediately after the delivery, appellant left the house carrying the unopened parcel, placed it in the front seat of his car, with the intent to transport it to another location. These actions evidenced actual physical custody and control of the package. And even though appellant never opened the parcel, the fact finder could have inferred from appellant's behavior that he knew what was in it, and thus knowingly possessed the marijuana in the parcel. After being arrested, appellant told the officers that the contents of the parcel were crushed cookies and medicine, and that the officers could test it. As the trial court noted in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal, it was reasonable for a factfinder to infer that appellant knew the contents of the parcel because, if you didn't know what was in the box, you wouldn't make up something. See United States v. Branham, 515 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (D.C.Cir.2008) (rejecting contention that evidence was insufficient because there was no indication defendant had any idea what was in the package[] where the jury could infer defendant had 1) arranged for the package to be delivered to him at another address, 2) was anticipating its arrival, 3) appeared to try to conceal his connection to the package, and 4) was dealing drugs from the building where the package was delivered); United States v. Calhoun, 49 F.3d 231, 236 (6th Cir.1995) (holding evidence sufficient to establish that defendant had knowledge of contraband in parcel even though the parcel was never opened, because she, inter alia, signed a false name for a package that contained a kilogram of cocaine and gave officers false information about the person she claimed was the intended recipient). Furthermore, as discussed infra, there was evidence linking appellant to a large-scale contraband operation, which bolsters the conclusion that appellant possessed the parcel with knowledge that it contained marijuana. See Bronham, 515 F.3d at 1274; cf. Moore v. United States, 927 A.2d 1040, 1050 (D.C.2007) ([W]e have recognized that a prima facie case of constructive possession may be established by evidence linking the accused to `an ongoing criminal operation of which that possession is a part.' (quoting Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1265-66 (D.C.1992)). The evidence also sufficed to prove that appellant possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute. We have held that such an intent can be inferred from the possession of a quantity of drugs that exceeds supply for personal use. See Taylor v. United States, 662 A.2d 1368, 1371 (D.C. 1995); Shorter v. United States, 506 A.2d 1133, 1135 (D.C.1986). The government presented unrebutted expert testimony that the quantity of the drugs recovered from appellant was consistent with an intent to distribute. The parcel contained approximately 4,797 grams of marijuana worth between $10,000 and $47,000. The trial court credited the expert witness who testified that, given the packaging of this very large crushed quantity of marijuana, appellant clearly intended to distribute the drugs on the streets of the District of Columbia. We have upheld PWID convictions for possession of contraband worth far less than the marijuana appellant possessed. See, e.g., Spriggs v. United States, 618 A.2d 701, 704 (D.C.1992) (eight packets of heroin and five packets of cocaine worth approximately $470); Taylor, 662 A.2d at 1370 (crack cocaine worth $180); Mack v. United States, 570 A.2d 777, 779 (D.C. 1990) (a gallon jar of PCP and one pound of marijuana worth an estimated $4,500). In addition to the quantity of drugs, there were other indications that the marijuana was intended for distribution. According to the government's narcotics expert, the parcel and the way the drugs were packaged were typical of how marijuana is sent through the Washington metropolitan area in bulk form for further distribution. Once the package is received, it is transported to another location where it is further distributed, to reduce the likelihood of raising law enforcement awareness. The expert testified that the buyers tend to use fictitious names and addresses that do not correspond with their residence or work addresses. The narcotics expert also testified that dealers often obtain supplies from the Midwest or California and pay for shipments by wiring money through Western Union or by mailing multiple money orders in $1,000 increments. He explained that money orders are the most common methods of payment because they leave almost no paper trail. The known scheme described by the expert closely resembles the operation of the transaction involving appellant. The two packages of marijuana located in the parcel Johnson accepted were wrapped in Saran Wrap and dryer sheets, in an apparent attempt to mask the odor of the drugs during delivery from the West to the East coast. The package was addressed to a fictitious name and delivered to appellant's girlfriend's house. Minutes after its delivery, appellant left the house with the parcel and placed it in his car, with the intention to take it to some other location. Finally, the government presented evidence that tied appellant to Ricardo Austin, who was connected to drug-trade activity: the parcel containing 16 pounds of marijuana addressed to appellant was sent by Austin from California; at least four money orders totaling $3,500 were purchased by Courthney Johnson and sent to Ricardo Austin in California; an express-mail receipt located in a postal office in Baltimore identified Courthney Johnson as its sender and an individual in California as the recipient; three different addresses, all within the greater D.C. area, were connected to a drug scheme and to a Corey, Courthney or Courtney Johnson; several other parcels containing marijuana found at the Barlow Place address, all of which used fictitious names, and similar packaging and the same handwriting as the package accepted by appellant, were connected to Ricardo Austin. These facts, taken as a whole, constitute ample evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant knowingly possessed the marijuana that was the subject of the controlled delivery with the intent to distribute it. Affirmed.