Opinion ID: 2534195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether refusal to instruct on the doctrine was harmless

Text: The Attorney General contends that, even assuming arguendo the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the doctrine of imperfect defense of others, the error was harmless. Any error in failing to instruct on imperfect defense of others is state law error alone, and thus subject, under article VI, section 13 of the California Constitution, to the harmless error test articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243. Did defendant suffer prejudice from the trial courts failure to instruct the jury that an unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is involuntary manslaughter? A majority of this court recently held that when, as in this case, a trial court violates state law by failing to properly instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, the following test applies: `[I]n a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under [ Watson ]. A conviction of the charged offense may be reversed in consequence of this form of error only if, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence (Cal.Const., art. VI, § 13), it appears reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the error not occurred ( Watson, [at p. 836, 299 P.2d 243].)' ( People v. Breverman, [ (1998) ] 19 Cal.4th 142, 178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) ( People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 93, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 451, 999 P.2d 675.) Is it reasonably probable a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the trial court instructed the jury on imperfect defense of others? This is a close question, but on balance, we agree with defendant. The thrust of defendant's testimony was that he acted in perfect defense of another. He claimed he shot at Robinson in the reasonable belief he had to do so in order to protect Byron from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. However, the evidence was also susceptible of the interpretation that defendant's belief in the necessity of protecting Byron, supposing he held such a belief, was unreasonable because Byron was not really in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury. Indeed, the prosecutor argued to the jury that Bryon was not being beaten that badly; Byron did not, the prosecutor noted, seek any medical treatment for the injuries he claimed to have suffered. Under this view of the evidence, defendant was entitled to an instruction on imperfect defense of others. In concluding the failure to give the instruction was prejudicial, we note the jury, even without having been instructed on this theory, took five days to reach its decision.