Opinion ID: 619213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nature of the Outburst

Text: The Board rejected the ALJ's conclusion that the nature of Aguirre's outburst weighed against protection. The ALJ described Aguirre's outburst as repeated, extensive, and personally derogatory statements to a supervisor, noting further that Mr. Aguirre repeatedly reviled Mr. Plaza in obscene and personally denigrating terms accompanied by menacing conduct and language. ER 14. In contrast, while the Board acknowledged that Aguirre uttered more than a brief profanity against Plaza, it characterized his conduct as a single, brief outburst provoked by Plaza's failure to respond to Aguirre's concerns and Plaza's suggestion that Aguirre work elsewhere. ER 3. Also, finding no evidence of actual or threatened physical harm or aggression, the Board concluded that Aguirre's outburst was unaccompanied by insubordination, physical contact, threatening gestures, or threat of physical harm. ER 4. Finally, the Board concluded that Aguirre's conduct was not outside the range of acceptable conduct because Felix himself had used obscene language when dealing with employees. Implicit in the Board's analysis is the suggestion that an employee's outburst does not factor into the loss of the Act's protection unless accompanied by physical conduct, or at least a threat that is physical in nature. We arrive at this interpretation because the Board seemingly considered immaterial the ALJ's finding that Aguirre personally denigrated Plaza with obscene and insulting language. Aguirre's verbal attackinvolving repeated insults and obscenities, all directed at Plaza, as the ALJ foundwas not brief and was, in fact, insubordination. The rule the Board seems to espouse is at odds with its own precedents, which recognize that an employee's offensive and personally denigrating remarks alone can result in loss of protection. See, e.g., Care Initiatives, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. at 151 (Among the specific types of conduct that could exceed the protection of the Act are vulgar, profane, and obscene language directed at a supervisor or employer, even though uttered in the course of protected concerted activity.). For example, in Stanford Hotel, 344 N.L.R.B. at 558, an employee responded to his supervisor's repeated demands that he admit he was not covered under the collective bargaining agreement by calling his supervisor a liar, a bitch, and a fing son of a bitch. Although it ultimately decided that the employee retained his protection in light of the other factors, the Board concluded that the employee's obscene and offensive outburst favored a loss of protection. Id. at 559; see also DaimlerChrysler Corp., 344 N.L.R.B. 1324, 1328-29 (2005) (concluding that the outburst, in which the employee called his supervisor an asshole and stated, Bullshit, I want this meeting now, fuck this shit, and that he did not have to put up with this bullshit was insubordinate and profane and weighed against protection). The District of Columbia Circuit had occasion to consider the Board's application of the third Atlantic Steel factor in Felix Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 1051 (D.C.Cir.2001). In that case, Yonta, a 42-year-old employee, was supervised by Petrillo, a 25-year-old whose father was the president of the company. While at home, Yonta called Petrillo at his office to inquire about not receiving a night shift differential. Petrillo assured Yonta that he would get every penny to which he was entitled, but then told Yonta that he was tired of carrying him. Yonta responded that Petrillo was just a fucking kid and added, I don't have to listen to a fucking kid. When Petrillo asked Yonta what he had just called him, Yonta confirmed, a fucking kid. In response, Petrillo fired Yonta. An ALJ concluded that Yonta lost his protection, but the Board disagreed, finding that `Yonta's conduct consisted of a brief, verbal outburst of profane language, unaccompanied by any threat or physical gestures or contact.' Id. at 1054(quoting the Board's decision). The court observed that the Board's rationale contradicted Atlantic Steel, in which it disavowed any rule whereby otherwise protected activity would shield any obscene insubordination short of physical violence. Id. at 1055(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court reasoned, [i]f an employee is fired for denouncing a supervisor in obscene, personally-denigrating, or insubordinate termsand Yonta here managed all three with economy then the nature of his outburst properly counts against according him the protection of the Act. Id. The court remanded the matter for the Board to conduct a proper balancing, with Yonta's statements weighing against protection. Id. The Board's explanation here is similar to its reasoning in Felix Industries. But Aguirre's outburst, even if brief, was no less obscene, degrading, and insubordinate than Yonta's outburst toward his supervisor. Even in that brief moment, as the Board characterized it, Aguirre called Plaza a fucking mother fucking, a fucking crook, and an asshole and told him that he was stupid, that nobody liked him, and that everyone talked about him behind his back. This conduct alone counts against Aguirre's retaining protection. Thus, like the Felix Industries court, we find it necessary to remand this matter to the Board to allow it to properly consider whether the nature of Aguirre's outburst caused him to forfeit his protection. See Trus Joist MacMillan, 341 N.L.R.B. at 371-72 (concluding that the third Atlantic Steel factor alone may carry enough weight to forfeit the Act's protection). The Board argues that we still should conclude that it properly balanced the factors because it stated that it would have reached the same result even if the third factor weighs against protection. But the reasoning supporting that statement is internally inconsistent. After stating that it was adopting the ALJ's credibility and factual findings regarding the October 28 meeting, the Board rejected the ALJ's findings that Aguirre's conduct was belligerent, menacing, and at least physically aggressive if not menacing. In another, similarly inconsistent statement, the Board claimed to rely on the ALJ's findings in concluding that Aguirre's outburst did not amount to a threat of physical harm. But, the belligerence finding was essentially a credibility finding: the only evidence regarding the nature of the outburst was the competing testimony of Aguirre and PAC's witnesses. The ALJ expressly determined that Aguirre's testimony was incongruous and not as believable as the PAC witnesses' testimony, and she did not credit Aguirre's account of the October 28 meeting where it conflicted with the accounts of the three PAC supervisors. Thus, it was precisely because the ALJ gave more credence to the testimony of the PAC witnesses that she found the outburst was physically aggressive and menacing. We cannot be sure whether this inconsistent logic colored the Board's statement regarding how it would balance the factors if the third factor weighed in favor of lost protection. In other words, although the Board stated that it would have reached the same result even if Aguirre's outburst, as the Board characterized it, weighed in favor of lost protection, we cannot be sure that the Board would have reached the same result had it adopted the ALJ's finding that Aguirre's outburst involved physically aggressive and menacing conduct. Accordingly, we remand this case to the Board to re-balance the Atlantic Steel factors as discussed in this opinion. In doing so, the Board should either (1) reject, with a reasoned explanation, the ALJ's credibility and factual findings regarding the October 28 meeting, or (2) adopt those findings in their entirety, including the finding regarding belligerence.