Opinion ID: 1302945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Soundness of and Support for the Findings of Suitability and Lack of Good Cause.

Text: Finally, Norland alleges two further deficiencies in the department's decision: first, that it was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious in its determination the offered work was suitable; and, second, that it was unsupported by substantial evidence of suitability or, if the job was suitable, of lack of good cause to have refused it. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(8)(f), (g). We disagree. A. Whether the Suitability Finding was Unreasonable, Arbitrary, and Capricious. The term `arbitrary' when applied to test the propriety of agency action means the action complained of was without regard to the law or consideration of the facts of the case. Burgess v. Great Plains Bag Corp., 409 N.W.2d 676, 678 (Iowa 1987). In this context, arbitrary and capricious are practically synonymous. Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. Transportation Regulation Bd., 274 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Iowa 1979). The decision here is clearly not arbitrary and capricious. The department applied the appropriate statutory and administrative factors for determining the suitability of work with a fair amount of particularity to the facts of this case. Its written decision referred specifically, in the context of the legal factors, to such facts as Norland's health, how long she had been unemployed, the type of work offered, and the potential wages. There can be no question that this decision is not arbitrary or capricious. Unreasonable, as a statutory term, has been said to mean action in the face of evidence as to which there is no room for difference of opinion among reasonable minds or not based on substantial evidence. Churchill Truck Lines, 274 N.W.2d at 300 (citations omitted). The question of substantial evidence will be discussed below. In the other sense, the decision here is not unreasonable because there is, in this situation, room for a difference of opinion among reasonable minds whether temporary work is suitable. In fact, the cases show that reasonable minds have differed on this subject under varying circumstances. Compare Brumley v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 292 N.W.2d 126, 127 (Iowa 1980) (claimant disqualified for benefits for not actively seeking suitable work because substitute teaching applications would be temporary and not suitable work contacts) and Toston v. Industrial Comm'n, 160 Colo. 281, 284, 417 P.2d 1, 2 (1966) (A refusal to accept an offer of temporary employment does not, in and of itself, end the period of unemployment.) and Johnson v. District Unemployment Compensation Bd., 408 A.2d 79, 82 (D.C. 1979) (claimant seeking permanent position found ineligible for benefits because he refused suitable temporary position after four months of unemployment) and Kuether v. Personnel Pool, 394 N.W.2d 259, 261 (Minn.App.1986) (claimant seeking permanent position found ineligible for benefits because proffered temporary work was unsuitable) and Winterle v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 65 Pa. Commw. 486, 488, 442 A.2d 1211, 1212 (1982) (claimant seeking permanent position found ineligible for benefits because she refused suitable continuing temporary work without good cause). That some of these cases involved situations in which temporary work was not considered suitable does not mean we should be persuaded, as a matter of law, temporary work is unsuitable. This court has repeatedly held, with regard to Chapter 96, ... [that] though remedial in character the Act must be construed in light of those facts peculiar to each given case. Iowa Malleable Iron Co. v. Iowa Employment Sec. Comm'n, 195 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Iowa 1972) (citations omitted). This preference for treating each case as a separate entity unconnected to any other case is emphasized by 345 Iowa Administrative Code 4.24(3), which provides that [e]ach case shall be determined on its own merits as established by the facts. This rule, when read together with Iowa Code section 96.5(3), the provision on disqualification for failure to accept work, makes it clear that suitability is a fact issue. Pohlman, 374 N.W.2d at 256 (emphasis added). Further, even if the department did have the duty to follow the common law from other states, as Norland implicitly argues, the Toston case would not be as persuasive as Norland suggests it is. She contends the situation in Toston is analogous to her own because the claimant there had also refused temporary work for fear of missing a more permanent opportunity. Norland urges us to hold, as the Toston court did, that she should also have a reasonable amount of time to secure permanent work. We note, however, the Toston court made its decision under a statutory scheme significantly different from ours. While the Colorado statute applied in Toston had very similar suitability factors to those in the Iowa statute, see 160 Colo. at 284, 417 P.2d at 2, it did not contain any criteria requiring that the wages of an offered job be at particular percentages of the former wages at certain times after unemployment begins, see Bayly Mfg. Co. v. Department of Employment, 155 Colo. 433, 440-41, 395 P.2d 216, 219-20 (1964) (Colorado statute does not require particular wages at offered job as long as wages not substantially less favorable than original wages). Compare Iowa Code § 96.-5(3)(a)(1)-(4) (offered wages must be at particular percentages of former wages at certain times after unemployment begins for work to be suitable). This difference emphasizes that under the Iowa statute, wages are the only factor which must be satisfied in a definite way for work to be suitable. The other suitability factors, including length of unemployment, need only be balanced by the department when making its decision. Clearly, the factual determination in Norland's case was made in the proper way. We have stated above that when findings of fact are at issue, we will defer to the agency action unless the agency has been shown to have acted unconstitutionally, in violation of a statutory mandate, or without substantial support in the record. Churchill Truck Lines, 274 N.W.2d at 299. No constitutional violation has been alleged here, and we have already addressed most of the possible statutory defects in the department's decision. Unless our remaining analysis on the issues of unreasonableness and substantial evidence reveals some legal problem in the department's decision, we must defer to its expertise. Id. B. Substantiality of the Evidence. As already noted, one meaning of unreasonable is that the challenged action is not based on substantial evidence. Id. at 300. Hence, we may address this definition of unreasonable and the question of substantial evidence as one issue. Fact findings of an agency are binding on the courts when they are supported by substantial evidence. New Homestead v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 322 N.W.2d 269, 270 (Iowa 1982); Iowa Malleable, 195 N.W.2d at 717. Evidence is not insubstantial merely because it would have supported contrary inferences. It is substantial when a reasonable mind could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. New Homestead, 322 N.W.2d at 270 (citation omitted); accord Ray v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 398 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa App.1986); Cerro Gordo County v. PERB, 395 N.W.2d 672, 675 (Iowa App. 1986). 1. Suitability of the Offered Work. Norland argues that because no testimony was presented on suitability factors other than wages and hours, the department's decision could not have been supported by substantial evidence. We must disagree, first, because as we said above, the only evidence that must be introduced is that which is relevant to issues that have been raised. The evidence in the record is sufficient in this respect. Next, we find that the evidence introduced on the issues that were raised was indeed substantial. It is conceivable temporary work can be unsuitable. But given the facts in this casethat the offered position was for the same employer, at the same wages, and entailed very similar dutiesthe objective reasonable mind could very easily reach the conclusion that this temporary work was quite suitable. Moreover, the department clearly had the discretion to make such a finding. Although neither the Code nor the department's rules addresses temporary work specifically, both sources of authority direct the department to consider other factors relevant to determining the suitability of work. See Iowa Code § 96.5(3)(a) (In determining whether or not any work is suitable ..., the department shall consider... any other factor which the department finds bears a reasonable relation to the purposes of this paragraph.); 345 Iowa Admin.Code 4.24(15) (In determining what constitutes suitable work, the [department] shall consider, among other relevant factors,....). When an agency is given the discretion to choose such other factors, they must be logically related to the particular facts at hand and their use must lend itself to consistency in the agency's reasoning from case to case. Anthon-Oto Community School Dist. v. PERB, 404 N.W.2d 140, 144 (Iowa 1987); see also City of Davenport v. PERB, 264 N.W.2d 307, 312 (Iowa 1978) (citing Bayside Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 303-04, 97 S.Ct. 576, 580-81, 50 L.Ed.2d 494, 500-01 (1977)) (`[T]he appropriate weight ... must be given to the judgment of the agency whose special duty is to apply this broad statutory language to varying fact patterns....'); B. Schwartz, Administrative Law § 216, at 606-07 (1976) ([T]he traditional rule [is] that agencies vested with discretion possess only the authority to exercise such discretion reasonably.); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 191, at 23 (1962) (The very essence of a discretionary power is that the [agency] may choose which of several permissive courses will be followed ... [and the agency may act] officially ... according to the dictates of [its] own judgment... as to what is just and proper under the circumstances....). In the present case the temporary nature of the offered work was one of the other factors which could logically and reasonably be considered. The department apparently did not think that, when balanced against the other suitability factors relevant here, the temporary nature of the offered work counseled against a finding of suitability. In keeping with the deference we owe to administrative findings of fact, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the department's finding regarding the suitability of the work offered. 2. Lack of Good Cause. Norland also argues there was not substantial evidence to support a finding that she refused the offered work, if it was suitable, without good cause. While she is correct that suitable work may be refused with good cause, see Iowa Code § 96.5(3), we disagree the department's implicit decision on this issue was unsupported by substantial evidence. Good cause for refusing work must involve circumstances which are real, substantial, and reasonable, not arbitrary, immaterial, or capricious. Mangan v. Bernardi, 131 Ill.App.3d 1081, 1084, 87 Ill. Dec. 412, 415, 477 N.E.2d 13, 16 (1985). Norland contends her refusal of the offered work fits this definition because it was uncontradicted that she was, in good faith, seeking permanent work. This argument must be rejected, first, because it makes no sense to say there is good cause to refuse one type of suitable workalbeit temporaryin order to seek another type of suitable work. Norland's justification for refusing the offered job is simply not substantial. A second ground exists on which we must reject this argument. The question of good cause, like that of suitability, is a fact issue within the discretion of the department to decide. See 345 Iowa Admin.Code 4.24(3) (Based upon the facts found by the [department] ... it shall then be determined ... whether the claimant has good cause for refusal. Each case shall be determined on its own merits.). Under such a decisional scheme, it must be remembered that the requirement of taking all evidence into account in reviewing administrative findings does not detract from the duty of courts to grant appropriate deference to agency expertise. City of Davenport v. PERB, 264 N.W.2d at 312 (citations omitted). Here, we find it appropriate to defer to the department's reasonable finding of fact that, based on substantial evidence, the work refused by Deloma Norland was suitable and that such a refusal, without good cause, disqualified her from receiving unemployment compensation. The department's final decision is well within the law as we have stated it: during the first five weeks of unemployment a claimant may not turn down a job if it meets statutory criteria for suitability and pays as much as the individual's prior job. New Homestead, 322 N.W.2d at 271.