Opinion ID: 2010460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cooke's Sixth Amendment Claim

Text: Cooke contends that the Superior Court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution when it: (1) permitted his defense attorneys to present evidence and argue to the jury that he was guilty but mentally ill over his express and repeated objections; and (2) failed to sufficiently and timely inquire into his dispute with his defense attorneys about their decision to pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. [25] We review claims of violations of constitutional rights de novo. [26] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. [27] The United States Supreme Court has long held that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. [28] The purpose of this right is to ensure a fair trial and ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. [29] Accordingly, [t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. [30]
When a defendant is represented by counsel, the authority to manage the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the attorney. [31] Specifically, the defense attorney has the immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. [32] In addition to shouldering these tactical decisions, representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. [33] The defense attorney's duty to consult with the defendant regarding important decisions does not require counsel to obtain the defendant's consent to every tactical decision. [34] However, certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial and appellate rights are so personal to the defendant that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. [35] In Jones v. Barnes, [36] the United States Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant has ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal. Such choices implicate inherently personal rights which would call into question the fundamental fairness of the trial if made by anyone other than the defendant. [37] Therefore, as to these decisions on the objectives of the representation, a lawyer must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action. [38] These rights cannot be waived by counsel without the defendant's fully-informed and publicly-acknowledged consent. [39] Accordingly, the defendant has autonomy to make the most basic decisions affecting his case, including whether to plead not guilty and have a trial by jury where he has an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and whether to testify. [40] Although these fundamental decisions are indeed strategic choices that counsel might be better able to make, because the consequences of them are the defendant's alone, they are too important to be made by anyone else. [41] Moreover, counsel cannot undermine the defendant's right to make these personal and fundamental decisions by ignoring the defendant's choice and arguing affirmatively against the defendant's chosen objective. [42] Here, defense counsel pursued a guilty but mentally ill verdict over Cooke's vociferous and repeated protestations that he was completely innocent and not mentally ill. This strategy deprived Cooke of his constitutional right to make the fundamental decisions regarding his case.
One of the fundamental decisions reserved for the defendant alone to make is the plea decision. [43] In Delaware, [a] defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, nolo contendere, or guilty but mentally ill. [44] A defendant may also raise the defense of guilty but mentally ill at trial. [45] In this case, Cooke was competent to stand trial and chose the alternative of a plea of not guilty over a plea of guilty but mentally ill. [46] Nevertheless, Cooke's attorneys decided to override Cooke's choice and advised the trial judge that they would ask the jury, over Cooke's objection, to find Cooke guilty but mentally ill. In a pretrial conference, the defense attorneys told the trial judge that the conflict between their objective and Cooke's objective might result in disastrous consequences before the jury. The judge was concerned about the propriety of the defense attorneys pursuing an objective that was inconsistent with Cooke's objective. The trial judge stated: I don't know how you can argue something that has the word `guilty' in it when the defendant doesn't want you to, because it's guilty as charged, not guilty of the lesser-included offense. Yet, the record reflects that defense counsel did so without the trial judge ever attempting to address the rift counsel described as an impending disaster. In their opening statement, Cooke's defense attorneys gave no support for Cooke's desire to plead not guilty. Instead, they told the jury they would introduce evidence that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill. Later, in presenting that mental illness evidence during trial, Cooke's defense attorneys introduced a confession which he disputed. Then, in their closing argument to the jury, Cooke's defense attorneys asked the jury to reject Cooke's plea of not guilty because he committed the crimes with which he was charged. They did not ask the jury to consider Cooke's objective of being found not guilty, but instead asked the jury to agree with their objective by finding Cooke guilty but mentally ill. The defense attorneys told the trial judge that they saw no problem with Cooke entering a not guilty plea and asserting his innocence while they argued to the jury that he was guilty but mentally ill. We find two problems with that course of conduct. First, Cooke did not have the assistance of counsel in pursuing his chosen objective for the trialobtaining a not guilty verdict. [47] Second, Cooke was denied the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case. [48] Consequently, Cooke's fundamental right to enter a plea of not guilty was effectively negated by the conflicting objective of his defense attorneys to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [49]
A second fundamental decision reserved for the defendant alone to make is the decision to testify. [50] Cooke wanted to exercise his right to testify in his own defense, but his attorneys refused to call him as a witness because they believed that he would assert his innocence, contradicting counsel's position that Cooke was guilty of the crimes charged. They explained that Cooke's assertion of factual innocence would not be perjury because Cooke believed he was innocent. [51] The defense attorneys then told the trial judge, who would make the final decision on whether to sentence Cooke to life or death, that they believed Cooke had committed the crimes and was guilty but mentally ill. Ultimately, the trial judge called Cooke to testify because his defense attorneys refused to do so. Cooke testified that he did not agree with his attorneys' guilty but mentally ill strategy and that he was on his own for representation. Cooke denied committing the crimes in an effort to realize his trial objective of being found not guilty. In an effort to realize their independent trial objective of having the jury return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, Cooke's defense attorneys completely negated Cooke's objective of having the jury find him not guilty by introducing into evidencewithout seeking Cooke's waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege [52] a confession which Cooke denied making. Cooke's attorneys also attempted to ask Cooke's pastor, on direct examination, whether Cooke had confessed, but Cooke refused to waive his right to protect the privileged communication. [53] That exchange on the record illustrates the magnitude of the conflict between Cooke and his attorneys. The prosecution recognized that the question of Cooke's innocence was no longer an issue after the defense attorneys introduced Cooke's disputed statements to Dr. Turner. The prosecutor said: I would ask your Honor to consider the shifting landscape as of today; to wit, Cooke's confession is now in evidence. In response to an argument about prejudice from the introduction of other crimes, the prosecutor said: That issue is dead and gone now because Cooke has admitted at least that crime, that Bonistall burglary, rape and homicide. What's at issue in this case now, and really it's been an issue in the case first and foremost since [defense counsel's] wonderful opening statement, is Cooke's mental state. Consequently, Cooke's fundamental right to testify in his own defense was effectively negated by the objective of his defense attorneys to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [54]
A third fundamental decision reserved for the defendant alone to make is the decision to have a jury trial. [55] Cooke's defense attorneys compromised the impartiality of his jury, starting with their opening statement, in which they told the juryagainst Cooke's wishesthat Cooke was guilty but mentally ill. The record reflects frequent exchanges between the trial judge, the defense attorneys, and the State about the fear that Cooke would react adversely in front of the jury about the conflict between him and his attorneys over the objective of Cooke's trial. Although the trial judge met with Cooke and all of the attorneys in a separate courtroom after the opening statements, the trial proceeded without the conflict in objectives being either addressed or resolved. This resulted in the frequent outbursts in front of the jury that defense counsel had predicted. Not only did Cooke testify about his dispute with his defense attorneys about the guilty but mentally ill objective, but on two separate occasions his outbursts on the subject resulted in his attorneys moving for a mistrial, because Cooke's assertion that he was not guilty was highly prejudicial to the defense that we're putting on. The record reflects that Cooke's right to a jury trial was also compromised by his exclusion from the courtroom at the request of his counsel. [56] Although Cooke was removed from the courtroom for outbursts about the conduct of his defense attorneys generally and specifically on occasions when evidence to support the guilty but mentally ill objective was presented, at other times, Cooke's defense attorneys told the judge it would be better for Cooke not to be in the courtroom when they presented the mental illness evidence to the jury over Cooke's objection. Accordingly, despite Cooke's request for a jury trial, the objective of his defense attorneys led to their asking for his exclusion from the courtroom while they presented either evidence or argument that Cooke opposed. The denial of Cooke's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury on the issue of his guilt is apparent from his defense attorneys' closing argument, during which they told the jury that Cooke's testimony about his innocence was not credible and should not be believed because it was a manifestation of his mental illness. They also told the jury that Cooke committed the crimes with which he was charged. The defense attorneys then asked the jury to find Cooke guilty but mentally ill. Moreover, by pursuing the objective of obtaining a guilty but mentally ill verdict during the guilt phase, the defense also compromised the impartiality of Cooke's jury during its penalty phase consideration of the statutory aggravating factors that would make Cooke death eligible. Defense counsel hoped that a guilty but mentally ill verdict would give Cooke the advantage of a mental illness mitigating factor as a matter of law during the penalty phase. However, by asking the jury to find Cooke guilty but mentally ill, as charged, defense counsel also asked the jury to find Cooke guilty of all the felonies that established statutory aggravating circumstances as a matter of law. [57] Cooke's assertion of factual innocence disputed not only his guilt, but also his eligibility for the death penalty. His own attorneys affirmatively opposed his assertion of innocence by contending he committed the crimes charged and that his testimony asserting innocence demonstrated mental illness. As result, Cooke's fundamental right to have an impartial jury during both the guilt and the penalty phases was effectively negated by the objective of his defense attorneys to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [58]
In Florida v. Nixon , [59] the United States Supreme Court explained that, although defense counsel is obligated to discuss potential strategies with the defendant, when counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent. In that case, defense counsel decided that the best strategy was to concede that the defendant had committed murder in the guilt phase of the capital trial, and to concentrate on attempting to spare the defendant's life in the penalty phase. Counsel consulted with and informed the defendant that the strategy was the best way to attempt to avoid a death sentence. The defendant did not respond affirmatively or negatively, and so counsel proceeded with that strategy without the defendant's express consent. [60] The United States Supreme Court explained that, when a defendant fails to give express consent to pursue a tenable strategy [that] counsel has adequately disclosed to and discussed with the defendant, prejudice is not presumed. [61] Instead, [t]he reasonableness of counsel's performance, after consultation with the defendant yields no response, must be judged in accord with the inquiry generally applicable to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, that is, whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. [62] The court explained that a presumption of prejudice is not in order based solely on a defendant's failure to provide express consent to a tenable strategy counsel has adequately disclosed to and discussed with the defendant. [63] This case is not like Nixon, where the defendant did not respond to counsel's proposed strategy, and neither consented nor objected when his counsel pursued that strategy at trial. In stark contrast to the defendant's silence in that case, Cooke repeatedly objected to his counsel's objective of obtaining a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and asserted his factual innocence consistent with his plea of not guilty. [64] The Court's holding in Nixon that counsel was not required to acquire the defendant's affirmative, explicit acceptance to a tactical decision to concede guilt, was expressly qualified as applying only to the factual scenario in which the defendant is unresponsive to counsel's proposed strategy. [65] However, where, as here, the defendant adamantly objects to counsel's proposed objective to concede guilt and pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and counsel proceeds with that objective anyway, the defendant is effectively deprived of his constitutional right to decide personally whether to plead guilty to the prosecution's case, to testify in his own defense, and to have a trial by an impartial jury. [66] The right to make these decisions is nullified if counsel can override them against the defendant's wishes. In this case, the trial court's failure to address the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship allowed defense counsel to proceed with a trial objective that Cooke expressly opposed. This deprived Cooke of his Sixth Amendment right to make fundamental decisions concerning his case. [67]
Generally, we do not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal. [68] The reason for that practice, in part, is to develop a record on that issue in a Superior Court Rule 61 post-conviction proceeding. In Cooke's case, however, the actions of trial counsel are not disputed and are clearly reflected in the Superior Court proceedings. [69] Therefore, the present record is sufficient for this Court to review Cooke's constitutional claims, including the argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. [70] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must typically satisfy the two-pronged test set out in Strickland v. Washington . [71] First, counsel's performance must have been deficient, meaning that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. [72] Second, if counsel was deficient, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [73] However, in United States v. Cronic, [74] a companion case to Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that there are three scenarios in which the defendant need not satisfy the Strickland test, because prejudice is presumed: (1) where there is a complete denial of counsel; (2) where counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and (3) where counsel is asked to provide assistance in circumstances where competent counsel likely could not. The second circumstance applies in this case. In Cronic, the Court explained what it considered to be meaningful adversarial testing: The adversarial process protected by the Sixth Amendment requires that the accused have counsel acting in the role of an advocate. The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted... the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee is violated. [75] The Court further explained the defendant must show either the deprivation of a constitutional right of the first magnitude or specific errors of counsel [that] undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt. [76] The United States Supreme Court elaborated on Cronic's second exception more recently in Bell v. Cone. [77] In that case, the defendant's attorney failed to call witnesses, present available mitigating evidence, or make a closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial, although he did make an opening statement and cross-examine witnesses. The Court explained that in order to presume[e] prejudice based on an attorney's failure to test the prosecutor's case ... the attorney's failure must be complete. [78] The Court further explained that in distinguishing between the rule of Strickland and that of Cronic, [the] difference is not of degree but of kind, and that this distinction hinges on whether the petitioner alleges a defect in the proceeding as a whole or at specific points of the trial. [79] Noting that the defendant had alleged only that his counsel failed to introduce certain evidence and waived a closing argument, the Court held that these challenges were plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland's performance and prejudice components. [80] In this case, when Cooke exercised his ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions, his attorneys insisted on their own objective. The enormity of this conflict was accurately summarized by defense counsel during an exchange with the trial judge. They explained that Cooke had been nice and congenial in conversations with his attorneys, but in terms of where the two ships are sailing in this litigation, they're not on the same course. Cooke's overarching strategy was to obtain a verdict of not guilty by presenting evidence that he was factually innocent. Defense counsel had an independent and inconsistent strategy: to obtain a verdict of guilty but mentally ill by conceding Cooke's guilt and introducing evidence of his mental illness during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Counsel's override negated Cooke's decisions regarding his constitutional rights, and created a structural defect in the proceedings as a whole. Unlike the specific allegations at issue in Cone, the record in this case demonstrates to us a two-fold breakdown in the adversarial system of justice that pervaded Cooke's entire proceeding. [81] First, Cooke's attorneys did not assist Cooke with his trial objective of obtaining a not guilty verdict. [82] Second, in pursuing their own inconsistent objective of proving that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill, defense counsel not only failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, but also undermined the due process requirement that the State prove Cooke's guiltand his eligibility for the death penaltybeyond a reasonable doubt. [83] The defense attorneys introduced Cooke's confession to Dr. Turner, argued to the jury that Cooke's testimony was not credible, and told the sentencing judge and the jury that Cooke committed the crimes. Thus, on the issues of his guilt and his eligibility for a death sentencethe elements of capital murderCooke's defense attorneys' alignment with the prosecutors was complete. [84] Indeed, Cooke's attorneys helped the prosecution by introducing evidence against Cooke that was beyond the reach of the prosecutors. The assistance of counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their denial can never be treated as harmless error. [85] The conduct of Cooke's defense attorneys was inherently prejudicial and does not require a separate showing of prejudice, because Cooke's counsel negated his basic trial rights and failed to function in any meaningful sense as the [prosecution's] adversary. [86] Although done in good faith, defense counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Accordingly, we find no other alternative except to grant Cooke a new trial.
Every criminal defendant is presumed to be innocent and is entitled to a fair trial. [87] The trial judge has a duty to see that a defendant is denied no necessary incident of a fair trial. [88] This includes ensuring that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard. [89] By refusing to address Cooke's express opposition to his counsel's pursuit of a guilty but mentally ill verdict, the trial court failed to protect Cooke's right to a fair trial. [90] The decision to pursue a verdict of not guilty and assert his factual innocence belongs to the defendant. [91] The record before us reflects that Cooke was deprived of the opportunity to meaningfully oppose the prosecution's case. [92] His counsel's strategy to pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, which included introducing a confession Cooke disputed, undermined Cooke's right to plead not guilty, to testify at trial and assert his innocence, and to present his chosen plea to the jury. [93] We have previously concluded that this strategy constituted attorney error which effectively denied Cooke the assistance of counsel and his fundamental trial rights. [94] The trial judge also erred by failing to intervene and provide a remedy for this error, notwithstanding Cooke's explicit requests. [95] Even though the trial court knew that Cooke had entered a plea of not guilty, opposed the guilty but mentally ill strategy, and wanted to testify that he was innocent so that he could receive the full benefit of the reasonable doubt standard in a trial by a jury, the trial court permitted defense counsel to seek a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, introduce Cooke's disputed confession, and concede Cooke's guilt to the jury, so that the only jury issue was whether Cooke was mentally ill. The inherent prejudice to Cooke, and defense counsel's prediction of a disastrous happening as a result of their conflict with Cooke, required intervention by the trial court. Defense counsel's strategy, and the trial court's refusal to address their conflict with Cooke, resulted in complete chaos at trial. [96] Cooke's counsel sat at one side of the defense table, arguing that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill, and Cooke sat at the other side, arguing that he was factually innocent and not mentally ill. Cooke repeatedly stated that he was not guilty, and that he did not want his attorneys to present evidence to support a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. He was entitled to have his attorneys follow these directions. [97] Instead, the prosecutors and his own counsel simultaneously opposed him. The trial court was aware of these significant issues as early as the pre-trial conference. The conflict between Cooke and his attorneys manifested itself throughout the trial through Cooke's numerous outbursts, culminating in his testimony during the guilt/innocence phase, when he stated: These counsel have misrepresented me so bad. They have railroad me through this whole thing.... I been got rid of these public defenders. I fired them a long time ago. The judge allowed me to keep them. When defense counsel decides to concede not only guilt, but also eligibility for the death penalty over the defendant's express objection, the trial judge has an obligation to inquire into the propriety of counsel's representation. A strategy that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill is incompatible with factual innocence. In this instance, the trial judge's obligation to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial required the trial judge to instruct counsel not to pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill against Cooke's wishes. The trial court's failure to provide this remedy denied Cooke his right to a fair trial. Finally, we respectfully address our colleagues' dissent which concludes (1) that a Strickland analysis applies, and (2) that under that analysis, counsel satisfied Cooke's Sixth Amendment right to reasonably effective assistance of counsel. We agree with the Dissent that Florida v. Nixon does not reach the facts of this case. [98] We also recognize, as the Dissent does, the challenges defense counsel face in a capital case. Indeed, a capital case is the most challenging of criminal cases for everyone involved. But these challenges cannot justify infringement of a defendant's personal and fundamental right to plead not guilty, to testify in his own defense, and to have the issue of guilt determined by an impartial jury. Only the defendant may waive these rights, which are personal to him. If we focus, as the Dissent has, upon the reality of a capital murder trial, that reality includes the likelihood that no jury will give fair consideration to a defendant's plea of not guilty, his sworn denial of guilt, or enforce the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, when a defendant's own counsel act against his wishes and argue he is guilty, introduce evidence that incriminates him, and thereby prove his eligibility for a death sentence. The plain language of the Sixth Amendment confers the right to the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. Cooke was effectively left without counsel during his testimony and throughout the proceedings on the critical issues of his guilt and his eligibility for the death penalty. In our view, the wide range of reasonable professional assistance allowed under Strickland does not contemplate such a structural defect so inherently prejudicial to the adversarial process and a fair trial. Instead, Cronic applies and the rationale of that case requires us to reverse. [99] The Dissent's assertion that Cronic does not apply to the facts of this case is primarily based on its analysis of five factors that the Dissent contends are relevant to analyzing whether counsel failed to subject the State's case to meaningful adversarial testing: time afforded for investigation and preparation; experience of counsel; gravity of the charge; complexity of possible defenses; and accessibility of witnesses. The Dissent's reliance on these factors is misplaced. In Cronic, the United States Supreme Court criticized the Sixth Circuit's use of the factors (which were created by the Sixth Circuit), and later explained that, while relevant to an evaluation of a lawyer's effectiveness in a particular case ... neither separately nor in combination do they provide a basis for concluding that competent counsel was not able to provide this respondent with the guiding hand that the Constitution guarantees. [100] Moreover, to the extent Cronic could be read as endorsing these factors, the Court addressed them only in the context of whether circumstances surrounding the [defendant's] representation justified a presumption that his conviction was insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Constitution. [101] They were expressly not applied to analyze whether the defendant was denied the presence of counsel at a critical stage of the prosecution or whether based on the actual conduct of the trial, that there was a breakdown in the adversarial process. [102] While we agree that death is different, we do not agree with the Dissent's analysis that the wide discretion given defense counsel permitted the strategy in this case against Cooke's wishes. Cooke's ultimate authority to exercise his fundamental rights under Jones was personal to him. It is all the more important in a capital case for the court to protect these fundamental rights, otherwise, all defendants but capital defendants would have them. Cooke's attorneys were constitutionally bound to respect the choices Cooke was entitled to make under Jones. We also disagree with the Dissent's public policy argument. The short answer to the detrimental public policy considerations enumerated by the Dissent is that the fundamental rights we have explained are personal to the defendant and are not subject to these considerations. Every defendant, including Cooke, is entitled to a fair trial with the assistance of counsel necessary to justify reliance on the outcome. The Dissent describes the evidence as overwhelming but [w]hether a man is innocent cannot be determined from a trial in which ... denial of counsel has made it impossible to conclude, with any satisfactory degree of certainty, that the defendant's case was adequately presented. [103] Given the failure of the adversarial process in this case, there is no other alternative except to grant a new trial.