Opinion ID: 1932899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Lack of Prior Accidents Evidence

Text: Country Club attempted to introduce evidence through two witnesses establishing a lack of prior accidents at the intersection. Country Club urged that the lack of prior accidents established that the exit of its private roadway did not constitute a hazardous condition nor did individuals have difficulty in locating it during different types of climatological conditions. Mr. Truet from the Delaware State Highway Department would have testified that accident counts and traffic surveys indicated that the intersection could not be considered dangerous because neither the counts nor surveys indicated any accidents. Country Club's Assistant Manager, Carol Speakman, would have testified that from June 1, 1993, until November 2, 1993 at least 7,814 first-time visitors came to the country club and that no accidents occurred at the intersection during this time. The trial court refused to allow the testimony [28] and held that the witnesses failed to meet the foundational prerequisite for the admission of evidence as to the absence of prior accidents or injuries as set forth in Pippin v. Ranch House South, Del.Supr., 366 A.2d 1180 (1976). [29] Pippin holds that: [A] party who wishes to offer evidence as to the absence of other accidents must show that, during the period in question, the physical circumstances prior to the accident were reasonably comparable to those in issue. Additionally, it must be shown that the person offering the testimony is one who would, in the ordinary course of events, have either personal knowledge of the condition or that he is the person to whom reports as to accidents would ordinarily be made. [30] The trial court in the first trial held that the proffered testimony was not admissible because it did not relate to the night of Cowee's accident, but only to a general period of time prior to the accident. Additionally, the proffered testimony only related to a general perception of the relationship between the Country Club's driveway and the intersection. Evidence was not provided that established specific familiarity by the witness with the intersection on the night of the accident, or another substantially similar time. The intersection's configuration was a paramount consideration in determining the relevance of the proffered testimony. The trial court correctly held that the Pippin test was not met because Country Club did not proffer the testimony of any first-time visitors to the club on the same night as Mrs. Cowee's visit. For the Pippin foundation requirement to have been met, there must have been a proffer of similar physical circumstances. The Superior Court properly noted: The defendant was permitted the opportunity to show that there was evidence of others in substantially similar circumstances, i.e., newcomers to the club who left in a reasonable time proximity to the plaintiff-and would have encountered the same atmospheric and lighting conditions-who were able to recognize that Route 52 was the boundary to the Club and stop safely. No such proffer was ever made, no such individuals were ever identified. There is no merit to this argument. [31]