Opinion ID: 171835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Race and National Origin

Text: Pappan contends this case should be reversed and remanded for resentencing before a different judge because the judge improperly considered Pappan’s race and national origin and that of his presumed victims as an aggravating factor, in violation of the sentencing guidelines and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Though Pappan does not suggest the court possessed any animus toward him, he argues “[t]he district court’s comments essentially communicated that the district court viewed [him] as deserving of a harsher sentence than he would have deserved had he not been Northern Arapaho but engaged in precisely the same conduct -- selling drugs on the Wind River reservation.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2.) The government argues that the judge’s mention of Pappan’s tribal membership at sentencing was done “only in the context of explaining to [Pappan] some of the repercussions of his criminal conduct.” (Appellee’s Br. at 14-15.) Since re-sentencing is required in any event, we consider whether it must be done by a different judge. There are very limited circumstances in which we remand for re-sentencing before a different judge. The government’s breach of a plea agreement is one. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Pappan has pointed to, and our research has disclosed, no other line of Tenth Circuit cases where, absent consideration of a motion for recusal, we have remanded for -10- re-sentencing before a different judge. Pappan’s reasons for requesting exceptional relief are not compelling and we will not extend the reach of our cases to require re-sentencing before a different judge on these facts. The trial judge clearly wanted Pappan to appreciate the seriousness of his crimes given the length of the sentence, his prior record, problems with substance abuse and apparent inability (or unwillingness) to correlate conduct and consequences. Pappan puts a sinister spin on the judge’s remarks, a characterization we view as contrived. The judge was focusing Pappan’s attention on his conduct, not his heritage. Throughout the sentencing the judge treated Pappan as an individual, not a stereotype. The judge considered letters written by Pappan, his sister and his aunt. He told Pappan he was “aware of the fact . . . that . . . [he] had very few, if any, advantages in life” but expressed his “great concern” about his “rather lengthy . . . and menacing criminal history.” (Id. at 16-17.) He noted Pappan had a GED and possessed “the intellectual ability to succeed if [he] can somehow control all the addictions . . . .” (Id. at 17.) The judge told Pappan and his family members present at sentencing that he could “reduce this sentence down the road” if Pappan provided substantial assistance to the government. (Id.) He stated: “[I]f I’m impressed that you’re being honest – regardless of how the case turns out . . . it will go well for you.” (Id. at 18.) We perceive no error in the judge’s fleeting reference to Pappan’s ethnic heritage. -11- We REMAND to the district court, require it to vacate Pappan’s sentence and re-sentence him giving particular attention to whether or not his prior conviction for escape was a crime of violence. Entered for the Court