Opinion ID: 1202769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: accomplice's opinion of sentence

Text: At sentencing, counsel for Sapp cross-examined Kathryn Boles, the driver of the pick-up truck and Sapp's former girlfriend, as to her relationship with Sapp. After stating that she was not in love with Sapp, but did love him, counsel asked whether she would like to see him put to death. The state objected that the question was inappropriate, and the court sustained the objection. Sapp contends Boles should have been permitted to respond to his inquiry. Although we agree that Boles should have been allowed to testify as to whether she wished to see Sapp put to death, her failure to respond to this question was in no way prejudicial. In State v. Johnson, 338 S.C. 114, 525 S.E.2d 519, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840, 121 S.Ct. 104, 148 L.Ed.2d 62 (2000), this Court stated: In [State v.] Torrence, we adopted the Georgia Supreme Court's distinction between a plea for mercy and the ultimate question to be decided by the jury: [A]lthough a defendant may present witnesses who know and care for him and are willing on that basis to ask for mercy on his behalf, a defendant may not present witnesses to testify merely to their religious and philosophical attitudes about the death penalty.... Nor is a defendant entitled to present the opinion of a witness about what verdict the jury `ought' to reach. Torrence, 305 S.C. at 45, 51, 406 S.E.2d 315, at 318 (quoting Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 357 S.E.2d 48, 60 (1987)). In Johnson, notwithstanding the ruling that the trial court should have permitted Johnson to inquire of his sister whether she wanted him to die, we found no prejudice to Johnson because the sister was able to make a general plea for mercy on her brother's behalf in the form of testimony concerning their abusive family life, and the fact that she expressed her love and affection for Johnson at trial. More recently, in State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 596 S.E.2d 475, 481-482, cert. denied 543 U.S. 948, 125 S.Ct. 355, 160 L.Ed.2d 263 (2004), we addressed the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow a surviving victim to testify on cross-examination during the sentencing phase of the trial that he did not personally believe Wise should receive the death penalty. We reiterated our holding in Johnson, stating, [a] close relative of a defendant, such as his sister, may be asked whether she wants the defendant to die, which is akin to asking her to make a general plea for mercy and not explicitly directed toward eliciting her opinion of what verdict the jury should reach. 359 S.C. at 26, 596 S.E.2d at 481. [2] Under Johnson and Wise, Boles should have been permitted to answer the question as to whether she would like to see Sapp put to death. However, we find no prejudice. Initially, it is implicit from Boles' testimony that she would have answered that she did not wish to see Sapp put to death. Further, given Boles' testimony that she loved Sapp and had known him for years, we find her testimony akin to that in Johnson in which Johnson's sister was able to express her love for him. In addition, Sapp's mother testified at sentencing, stating, I'm begging you, please don't take my son's life. To take my son's life is not going to bring back Corporal Johnson . . . Please if you kill my son, you're going to devastate the community again and more and more families. Please don't do it. Please don't kill him. Sapp's nine-year old nephew James also testified that if Sapp were gone from him, it would be the worst thing ever. In light of this testimony, Sapp cannot demonstrate prejudice. See State v. Myers, 359 S.C. 40, 596 S.E.2d 488, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 980, 125 S.Ct. 485, 160 L.Ed.2d 359 (2004) (exclusion of testimony is harmless where it is cumulative to other testimony in the record); State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 336 S.E.2d 150 (1985); State v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 105, 127, 326 S.E.2d 132, 145 (erroneous admission of evidence in sentencing phase may be reviewed for harmless error), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120, 105 S.Ct. 2368, 86 L.Ed.2d 266 (1985), overruled in part on other grounds State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991).