Opinion ID: 1345763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Given this precedent, what should be the proper interpretation of the words discretionary function?

Text: As discussed above, we have been clear that the discretionary function exception must be narrowly construed. This means, in part, that the exception should apply only when necessary to achieve separation of powers goals. Holmquist, 425 N.W.2d at 231, 233. But this broad, largely subjective formulation is difficult to apply consistently. Our decisions have attempted to develop more objective tests. In Nusbaum, we mentioned several distinctions that could be drawn: between operations and planning; between implementation and policy; between scientific or professional decisions and policymaking decisions; and between challenges to government conduct pursuant to a policy and challenges to the policy itself. Nusbaum, 422 N.W.2d at 720-21. But we acknowledged that these distinctions were not always helpful, and that the ultimate test was whether the challenged governmental action involves a balancing of policy with political, economic and social considerations. Id. at 720. Similarly, in Gleason v. Metro Council Transit Operations , we said: We have interpreted the discretionary function exception narrowly  protecting only those activities which require the balancing of policy objectives, involving social, political, or economic considerations, rather than merely professional or scientific judgments. [ Zank v. Larson, 552 N.W.2d 719, 721 (Minn.1996)] (quoting Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn.1994)). 582 N.W.2d 216, 219 n. 5 (Minn.1998). In Nusbaum, we determined that the decisions to place a sign ending a reduced speed zone before an unmarked curve and to provide no specific warning were not mandated by any policy considerations. 422 N.W.2d at 723. We said that the policy that required engineers to determine the appropriate speed on the roads by consideration of enumerated factors did not mandate the particular location of the sign, which was a matter of professional judgment. Id. As to the failure to warn, we said that the policy only determined that engineers may recommend warnings, not that they must, leaving room for professional judgment. Id. Accordingly, we held that the conduct of the engineers was not within the discretionary function exception. Id. In Holmquist, we again determined that the policy concerning warning signs left room for judgment in implementation, and that the state had failed to show that such judgment itself involved the balancing of public policy considerations. 425 N.W.2d at 234. From these cases, we should conclude that, when applying a narrow interpretation of the discretionary function exception, the burden is on the governmental body to show that the policymaking decision mandates the conduct that is the basis for the plaintiff's claim. If, instead, the policy merely permits that conduct, and leaves it to the employee to determine, by use of operating and not discretionary judgment, whether to engage in the conduct, then the discretionary function exception has not been shown.