Opinion ID: 544294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Martinez' version of the facts

Text: 15 Mr. Martinez testified that he had met Mr. Valencia in Miami at Mr. Valencia's clothing store; some time later, Mr. Valencia had called him from Chicago to request that he buy some mechanical parts and told him that a man named Ramero Gonzales would give him the specifications. Tr. at 321-28. Gonzales instructed Mr. Martinez to purchase some hydraulic lifts and to send the equipment to Oscar Alzante in Chicago. Id. at 328. When difficulties concerning the delivery of the equipment arose, Mr. Martinez traveled in an effort to locate the equipment. Id. at 329-30. 16 In his appellate brief, Mr. Martinez admits being present about five feet away when Mr. Valencia told the agent that Mr. Martinez was building a cocaine storage area. Martinez' Br. at 8. At trial, Mr. Martinez testified that he did not touch or count the money that was delivered to Mr. Valencia's house, Tr. at 339, but in his brief he admits that he removed rubber bands from the bundles, and handed the bundles to the agent who counted them. Martinez' Br. at 9. Mr. Martinez claims that he did not suspect any criminal activity, and thought that the money was proceeds from the sale of inventory from Mr. Valencia's clothing store. Tr. at 340. II Mr. Martinez' Appeal 17 For the sake of clarity in presentation, we shall deal with Mr. Martinez' appeal first. A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 18 Mr. Martinez first contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine. In asserting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, Mr. Martinez bears a heavy burden. In reviewing such a challenge, we view all of the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to the government and will uphold the jury's verdict if  ' any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. '  United States v. Duncan, 896 F.2d 271, 277 (7th Cir.1990) (quoting United States v. Pritchard, 745 F.2d 1112, 1122 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1085, 106 S.Ct. 860, 88 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986)) (emphasis supplied by Jackson Court). 19 Mr. Martinez does not seriously contest that there was sufficient evidence to find him guilty of attempted possession of cocaine. See Martinez' Br. at 15-17. Instead, he argues that there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of attempted possession with intent to distribute. He thus seeks to bifurcate the analysis of possession and distribution and to argue that, because his aid and assistance to Mr. Valencia related only to the storage of the cocaine, no reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the necessary intent to aid the distribution of cocaine. See id. at 17. 20 In evaluating this contention, we note Mr. Martinez' assertion that his conviction rests upon the theory that he aided and abetted Mr. Valencia's attempted possession with intent to distribute. Martinez' Br. at 11. For sake of argument, we shall assume that Mr. Martinez was convicted of aiding and abetting Mr. Valencia's attempt; such a conviction is entirely permissible. 4 One convicted as an aider and abettor may be punished as a principal. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2(a); United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 260, 107 L.Ed.2d 209 (1989). 5 21 In defining the elements of aiding and abetting liability, this court has adopted Judge Learned Hand's well-known formulation in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938). In order for Mr. Martinez to be convicted for aiding and abetting Mr. Valencia's attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, all the evidence need show is that Mr. Martinez  'in some sort associate[d] himself with the venture, that he participate[d] in it as in something he wishe[d] to bring about, [and] that he s[ought] by his action to make it succeed.'  Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1235 (quoting Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402). As this court stated in United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir.1980), the aiding and abetting standard has two prongs--association and participation. To prove association, the state must prove that the defendant had the state of mind required for the statutory offense; to prove participation, [a] high level of activity need not be shown.... Instead, 'there must be evidence to establish that the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct; that is, there must be evidence that [the] defendant committed an overt act designed to aid in the success of the venture.'  Id. at 449 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir.1978)); see also, United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585, 608 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 756 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3221, 106 L.Ed.2d 571 (1989). 22 The evidence, viewed most favorably toward the government, certainly could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that Mr. Martinez knowingly and intentionally associated himself with Mr. Valencia's attempted possession and intended distribution of cocaine and that Mr. Martinez participated in that venture by performing acts with an intent to facilitate the success of the venture. Mr. Martinez was building a twenty-four by twenty-four inch storage compartment for cocaine. Although he testified that he was ignorant concerning the use of this storage compartment, the other evidence adduced at trial simply belies this assertion. Mr. Martinez was present when Mr. Valencia explained to the undercover agent that this storage compartment would be used to store up to 1200 kilograms of cocaine. His diary contained electrical diagrams for a garage and instructions for the construction of hydraulic lift tables of the type found in Mr. Valencia's garage. He also had ordered hydraulic jacks for use in these storage compartments and had flown across the country in order to track down some of the equipment that was lost. 23 Knowledge and intent in narcotics cases often must be proved largely by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Moser, 509 F.2d 1089, 1092 (7th Cir.1975). The intent to distribute drugs has been inferred from the possession of a quantity of drugs larger than needed for personal use, United States v. Douglas, 874 F.2d 1145, 1154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 126, 107 L.Ed.2d 87 (1989), or from possession of drug-packaging paraphernalia. United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 886 (D.C.Cir.1978); see also United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d 1105, 1113, (7th Cir.1990). A defendant also need not obtain actual or constructive possession of drugs in order to be convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of drugs with intent to distribute. McNeese, 901 F.2d at 609; United States v. Wesson, 889 F.2d 134, 135 (7th Cir.1989). 6 Certainly, the fact that Mr. Martinez was participating in the construction of a highly sophisticated, twenty-four by twenty-four inch drug storage compartment permits the inference that he shared Mr. Valencia's intent to distribute drugs and was aiding and abetting Mr. Valencia's attempted possession of those drugs for distribution. 7 24 Moreover, the evidence of Mr. Martinez' construction of the elaborate storage area was not the only evidence in support of his guilt. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, also implicated Mr. Martinez in the procurement of cash to put together the cocaine deal. The trial testimony of both Mr. Valencia and the undercover agent established that on the day of the arrest, defendant Martinez drove Mr. Valencia's truck from the Palwaukee Airport and then returned to Mr. Valencia's house carrying a flight bag filled with cash. Mr. Martinez also assisted to some extent in counting the money for the transaction. See Martinez' Br. at 9. In light of all this evidence, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found Mr. Martinez guilty of aiding and abetting Mr. Valencia's attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Such a finding of guilt renders Mr. Martinez punishable as a principal. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1233. Thus, we cannot accept Mr. Martinez' sufficiency of the evidence argument. 8 B. The Conscious Avoidance Instruction 25 Mr. Martinez next contends that the district court erred in giving an ostrich or conscious avoidance instruction. The instruction at issue stated as follows: 26 You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly, as I have used that word. 27 Tr. at 538. Mr. Martinez contends that the giving of the instruction was impermissible in his case because there was no evidence that he consciously avoided the truth. He claims that the only reasonable finding the jury could have made was either that he knew nothing or that he had actual knowledge. Under such circumstances, Mr. Martinez claims, the ostrich instruction could only confuse the jury and enhance the chances of wrongful conviction by allowing the jury to find guilty knowledge when in fact none existed. We have approved an identical formulation of this instruction under appropriate circumstances in a number of cases. 9 However, we agree with Mr. Martinez' contention that an ostrich instruction is not appropriate unless the issue of conscious avoidance is raised by the evidence. As we have stated,  'this instruction, like all instructions should be given only when it addresses an issue reasonably raised by the evidence.'  United States v. Talkington, 875 F.2d 591, 595-96 (7th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2075, 104 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). We also have noted that  '[a] conscious avoidance instruction is properly given only when the defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of deliberate ignorance. '  Talkington, 875 F.2d at 596 (quoting United States v. White, 794 F.2d 367, 371 (8th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 92, 88 L.Ed.2d 76 (1985))). 28 We conclude that the district court did not err in giving the ostrich instruction in Mr. Martinez' case because, in light of all the evidence, Mr. Martinez' own testimony and theory of defense strongly support an inference of deliberate ignorance. Although the evidence showed that Mr. Martinez had ordered eight hydraulic lift tables for Mr. Valencia, had traveled across the country to procure this equipment, and had done mechanical work on the hydraulic lift in the hole in Mr. Valencia's garage, Mr. Martinez claimed at trial that he did not know the intended use of the hydraulic lifts and that he had never bothered to ask Mr. Valencia. Tr. at 361-63. Moreover, Mr. Martinez denied knowledge of the scheme despite the evidence that he was present only a few feet away from Mr. Valencia and the undercover agent when Mr. Valencia told the agent that Mr. Martinez was building a sophisticated storage area for cocaine. Id. at 12-13, 17-20, 362-63. Finally, although the evidence at trial showed that Mr. Martinez had dropped Mr. Valencia off at the airport to meet with the undercover agent, had later returned in the pickup to Mr. Valencia's house with a flight bag containing $150,000 in cash, and had assisted Mr. Valencia and the undercover agent in counting the money, id. 31-34, Mr. Martinez testified at trial that he assumed the money came from the sale of inventory from Mr. Valencia's clothing store. Id. 339-40. In light of the evidence against him, Mr. Martinez' testimony in his own defense certainly supports an inference of deliberate indifference to the truth. 10 We therefore conclude that the use of the conscious avoidance instruction in his case was not erroneous.