Opinion ID: 1236784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirements for Arranger Liability

Text: CERCLA does not define arrange[]. We have avoided giving the term arranger too narrow an interpretation to avoid frustrating CERCLA's goal of requiring that companies responsible for the introduction of hazardous waste into the environment pay for remediation. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1081 (9th Cir.2006); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. United States, 41 F.3d 562, 565 n. 4 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam) ( citing with approval United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir.1989)); see also Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir.1992) (discussing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380). Accordingly, we have recognized, in addition to direct arranger liability, a broader category of arranger liability, see United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1054-55 (9th Cir.2002), in which disposal of hazardous wastes is a foreseeable byproduct of, but not the purpose of, the transaction giving rise to PRP status. Direct arranger liability  also referred to as `traditional' direct arranger liability  involves transactions in which the central purpose of the transaction is disposing of hazardous wastes. See id. ; see, e.g., Cadillac Fairview, 41 F.3d at 563-65 (involving rubber companies that transferred contaminated styrene to Dow Chemical for reprocessing); Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 749-50 (9th Cir.1994) (involving a company that sold used automotive batteries to a lead reclamation plant). In contrast, broader arranger liability involves transactions that contemplate disposal as a part of, but not the focus of, the transaction; the arranger is either the source of the pollution or manages its disposal. See Shell Oil, 294 F.3d at 1058. In the broader arranger liability cases, such as Shell Oil, we examined the connection between the alleged arranger transaction and the disposal and decided whether the transaction necessarily constituted an arrangement for disposal of hazardous substances, whatever immediate form it may have taken. These broader arranger cases can involve situations, like the present one, in which the alleged arrangers did not contract directly for the disposal of hazardous substances but did contract for the sale or transfer of hazardous substances, which were then disposed of. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1315, 1318 (11th Cir.1990) (involving purchaser and recycler that sued manufacturer of transformers for cleanup costs from later disposal); Mathews v. Dow Chemical Co., 947 F.Supp. 1517, 1519-20 (D.Colo.1996) (involving neighbors of chemical company who sued manufacturer of paint thinner for contamination resulting from packaging paint thinner); Courtaulds Aerospace, Inc. v. Huffman, 826 F.Supp. 345, 347-48, 353-54 (E.D.Cal.1993) (involving neighbor of smelting plant who sued companies that contracted with plant for burning and smelting of copper wire for resulting contamination). There are no Ninth Circuit cases in this category. [30] The inclusion of such circumstances within the arranger concept, however, accords with the statutory language and structure as a whole. To be an arranger, one must arrange[] for disposal or treatment, or arrange[ ] with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances . . . . § 9607(a)(3). CERCLA's definition of disposal, in turn, includes the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or constituent thereof may enter the environment or be . . . discharged into any waters, including ground waters. § 6903(3) (referred to by § 9601(29)). That disposal includes such unintentional processes as leaking indicates that disposal need not be purposeful. See Carson Harbor Vill., 270 F.3d at 880 (holding that leaking may not require affirmative. . . conduct (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting and adopting interpretation of United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 714 (3d Cir. 1996))). Thus, an entity can be an arranger even if it did not intend to dispose of the product. Arranging for a transaction in which there necessarily would be leakage or some other form of disposal of hazardous substances is sufficient.