Opinion ID: 4273082
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Assorted Instructional Errors

Text: Reed argues that the trial court erred when it denied his request for an instruction that the law does not have a preference for death. We have repeatedly held that trial courts need not include such an instruction in light of the standard penalty phase jury instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Watson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 652, 699.) Reed offers no persuasive reason to rethink our precedent. b. Deterrent Value and Monetary Cost of Death Penalty Reed also argues that the trial court should have instructed the jury that it could not consider the deterrent (or non-deterrent) effect of the death penalty, or the cost of executing a defendant versus imprisoning him or her for life. These instructions are unnecessary, however, when “such considerations are not raised at trial.” (People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 696.) Reed does not contend that either party raised arguments related to cost or deterrence, so we reject the claim. c. CALJIC No. 17.41.1 Reed faults the trial court for instructing the jury using CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which asked jurors to advise the court if “any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other] improper basis.” We disapproved use of this instruction in 2002 but have since rejected “claims that the instruction violates a defendant’s federal constitutional rights.” (People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 587; see also People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 805-806.) Reed’s trial occurred prior to our 2002 opinion, and he fails to persuade that we should reconsider our precedent. 35 d. CALJIC No. 8.85 Reed argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury with a version of CALJIC No. 8.85 that included inapplicable factors and failed to specify whether each factor was aggravating, mitigating, or potentially either. But we have long held that the state and federal constitutions do not require trial courts to provide such a gloss on CALJIC No. 8.85. Reed has not demonstrated why we should overturn settled law on the question. (See, e.g., People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 505 [“ ‘[T]he jury is capable of deciding for itself which factors are “applicable” in a particular case.’ ”], quoting People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777; People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1178-1179 [rejecting claim that instructions must advise whether CALJIC No. 8.85 factors are aggravating, mitigating, or potentially either].) e. CALJIC No. 8.88 Reed argues that CALJIC No. 8.88 is unconstitutional in various respects. As he recognizes, we have repeatedly rejected these claims. (See, e.g., People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1211; People v. Coffman (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 124.) Reed offers no reason to conclude otherwise.