Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The effect of Garrison's plea bargain

Text: As noted ( ante, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 371, 51 P.3d at p. 246), the terms of Garrison's plea bargain permitted the People to reopen his case if new evidence was uncovered that he, and not defendant, was the actual killer. Defendant contends this made Garrison an inherently unreliable witness because his plea bargain was conditional upon his promise to testify in conformity with the state's theory that [defendant] was the actual killer. Once again respondent contends that defendant failed to preserve the issue by making a timely objection. Defendant gives this issue scant attention, merely alleging in his reply brief that if counsel failed to object, they were constitutionally ineffective. Defendant makes no attempt to elucidate whether or not defense counsel objected to Garrison's testimony on the ground his plea bargain was inherently coercive (see People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1050, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 15(a), now see rule 14(a)(1)(C)), and our reading of the record discloses no such objection. Accordingly, we conclude defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Turning to whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to object (but see People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 221, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710 [failure to object rarely ineffective]), defendant contends counsel should have been aware of the issue, as People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 438, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133 states the legal proposition and was decided well before trial. The rule is more definitively set forth in People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1251-1252, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115, a case also decided before defendant's trial: `[A] defendant is denied a fair trial if the prosecution's case depends substantially upon accomplice testimony and the accomplice witness is placed, either by the prosecution or the court, under a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion.' ( People v. Medina [, supra, ] 41 Cal.App.3d [at p.] 455, 116 Cal.Rptr. 133....) Thus, when the accomplice is granted immunity subject to the condition that his testimony substantially conform to an earlier statement given to police ( id., at p. 450 [116 Cal.Rptr. 133]), or that his testimony result in the defendant's conviction [citation], the accomplice's testimony is `tainted beyond redemption' [citation] and its admission denies the defendant a fair trial. On the other hand, although there is a certain degree of compulsion inherent in any plea agreement or grant of immunity, it is clear that an agreement requiring only that the witness testify fully and truthfully is valid. (Fn.omitted.) Garrison's plea agreement did not run afoul of these limits. It provided in pertinent part that Garrison would plead guilty or nolo contendere to first degree murder, admit the truth of a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and receive a sentence of 30 years to life in prison. The bargain further states that Garrison will fully cooperate with [authorities] in the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses, including but not limited to the murder of Elliott Dolinka. Defendant Garrison's cooperation will include, but not be limited to, providing truthful and complete statements concerning the actions and criminal offenses of all persons involved in the murder of Elliott Dolinka and/or the robbery of Barry's Chevron gas station on May 15, 1982, including Raymond Anthony Gurule and defendant Garrison himself. Further, defendant Garrison will remain available to law enforcement agencies during the investigation and prosecution of persons involved in the murder of Elliott Dolinka and/or the robbery of Barry's Chevron station, and will testify truthfully and completely in all criminal proceedings involving the murder of Elliott Dolinka and/or the robbery of Barry's Chevron station, regardless of whether those proceedings occur before or after the sentencing of defendant Garrison in this case, and regardless of whether the proceedings involve an initial trial, a retrial, should one become necessary, or a proceeding following trial, [¶] ... Provided that no evidence is obtained proving that defendant Mark Anthony Garrison is the actual killer of Elliott Dolinka, the defendant [Garrison] will not be prosecuted for special circumstance murder in this case. [¶] ... Should defendant Mark Anthony Garrison refuse to testify or should he at any time testify untruthfully, then this entire agreement is null and void and all of the original charges will be automatically reinstated with no limitation on possible sentence. Garrison did not agree to testify in conformity with a prior statement or agree to ensure defendant would be convicted. Instead, he agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and to provid[e] truthful and complete statements concerning the actions and criminal offenses with which he was involved. This case is thus like People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1217, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163, where we approved a condition of immunity in which an accomplice was allowed to plead guilty on the condition she give a complete and truthful account at trial in order to avoid breaching the plea agreement. As we explained in People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 768, 254 Cal.Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419, [a] prosecutor may grant immunity to one jointly charged with a crime upon the condition that he or she testify fully and fairly as to the facts involved. Although it is true this immunity agreement was conditional on there being no new evidence showing Garrison was the actual killer, [14] and this condition probably resulted in some pressure on Garrison not to testify that heand not defendant actually stabbed the victim, that pressure already existed, for the plea agreement required Garrison to provid[e] truthful and complete statements, and it was clear the prosecutor believed that Garrison's statement to police that defendant was the actual killer was true. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1229, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047.) Because nothing about the terms of Garrison's plea bargain was improperly coercive, we conclude counsel were not ineffective for failing to object to his testimony on that ground.