Opinion ID: 1891623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue relating to confession.

Text: Defendant made a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence of certain statements alleged to be made to two detectives concerning his involvement in the burglary. The motion merely asserts the alleged statements were made in violation of the Defendant's rights under the 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, under Article I, Section A [sic, Section 8] of the Constitution of the State of Iowa. A suppression hearing was held. The evidence related to the issue whether defendant was accorded his Miranda rights. A detective testified he and another officer were directed to question defendant about some armed robberies later in the morning of the burglary. They read aloud a Miranda waiving paper submitted for defendant's signature, but the latter said he wouldn't sign anything. According to the detective, defendant stated he understood his rights, never indicated he wanted to call a lawyer, and never refused to answer their questions. In the course of this questioning the burglary came up. Defendant testified he read the waiver form, then said he wanted a lawyer, but the detectives refused to permit him a telephone call. Although defendant testified he was interviewed twice rather than once as the detective had testified, there is little in the suppression hearing evidence which would have alerted trial court the defense was raising a voluntariness issue. Trial court's pretrial ruling suppressing evidence of defendant's statement was posited squarely on the State's failure to carry its burden to prove defendant waived his Miranda rights. This foreclosed use of the statements on the State's evidence in chief, but not for impeachment purposes. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The prosecution made no effort to introduce evidence of defendant's admissions to the detectives on its case in chief. But after defendant testified to his noninvolvement in the burglary, the prosecutor sought to cross-examine him concerning those prior statements. Defense counsel objected on the ground this Court has ruled those statements may not be used, inadmissible at the time of trial. The court ruled,  On direct. You may answer his questions, Mr. Washington, whatever he asks. You answer unless there is an objection that is sustained. (emphasis supplied) Defendant denied he had admitted committing the burglary. One of the detectives, called on rebuttal, testified without objection defendant said he had broken into the Gable home. Defendant, represented by a different counsel on appeal, concedes, [T]he wording of the Motion to Suppress is not specific regarding whether admissibility or voluntariness should have been decided. Nonetheless, defendant asserts alternatively 1) if the court's ruling was based in part on involuntariness the trial objection should have been sustained, 2) if the court did not rule on voluntariness it committed error as the admission could only be introduced upon such foundation, and 3) if the court's ruling was that the admissions were voluntary we should reach the opposite result upon considering the totality of the circumstances. Upon proper objection or motion the State is required to prove by a preponderance of evidence that defendant's statements sought to be introduced as evidence in chief against him were made after an effective waiver of his Miranda rights, and were made voluntarily. See, e. g., State v. Iowa District Court, 236 N.W.2d 54, 55-56 (Iowa 1975); State v. Cullison, 227 N.W.2d 121, 127 (Iowa 1975). These are separate issues. State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1976); State v. Hilpipre, 242 N.W.2d 306, 309 (Iowa 1976). There is a logical inference in the federal decisions that coerced or involuntary statements may not be used for impeachment purposes. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 1221, 43 L.Ed.2d 570, 578 (1975); Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. at 224, 91 S.Ct. at 645, 28 L.Ed.2d at 4. But defendant's alternative-error analysis ignores several basic principles. Absence of a timely objection is a waiver of the right to suppress evidence. State v. Bash, 214 N.W.2d 219, 221 (Iowa 1974); State v. Boose, 202 N.W.2d 368, 369 (Iowa 1972). Matters not raised in trial court, including constitutional questions, may not be effectively asserted for the first time on appeal. State v. Pardock, 215 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Iowa 1974). Every ground of exception which is not particularly specified is to be considered as abandoned. State v. Droste, 232 N.W.2d 483, 487 (Iowa 1975). One attempting to exclude evidence, whether by objection or motion, has a duty to indicate the specific grounds so as to alert the court to the question raised and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures to remedy the defect, if possible. State v. Williams, 207 N.W.2d 98, 110 (Iowa 1973). When this is not done, there is no proper basis for reversal unless the grounds of the objection are obvious. State v. Grady, 183 N.W.2d 707, 719 (Iowa 1971). Of course, proof of Miranda admissibility and voluntariness comprises an appropriate foundation for introduction into evidence of statements like those before us. But if this evidence is sought to be elicited without laying proper foundation, it is the obligation of defendant to assert such defect, specifically pointing out the fatal flaw. The State is obligated to assume its burden to prove voluntariness only when the statements or confession are challenged as involuntary. See State v. Fetters, 202 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Iowa 1972); State v. Alford, 260 Iowa 939, 943, 151 N.W.2d 573, 575 (1967). The United States Supreme Court has rejected defendant's contention a Jackson v. Denno (378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 [1964]) hearing on voluntariness of a confession is required even though a defendant does not object to its admission. Wainwright v. Sykes, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2505, 53 L.Ed.2d 594, 606 (1977); see Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 541-542, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 1711, 48 L.Ed.2d 149, 154-155 (1976). We hold defendant's burden to object with specificity was not met by the dragnet-type objection urged in his motion to suppress. Reference to several constitutional provisions, each containing a number of safeguards, would neither alert trial court to the question raised nor adequately inform the prosecutor so the required foundational evidence could be supplied. Trial court apparently surmised the suppression motion was grounded on Miranda admissibility, not voluntariness. The evidence had little bearing on voluntariness. The court's later interpretation of its suppression ruling as effective only on direct (State's case in chief) signalled the prior ruling was based on admissibility only. Yet defendant never made a trial objection on the basis his statements were coerced or involuntary. We hold the error, if any, was waived. Judgment of district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. MOORE, C. J., and LeGRAND, REES, UHLENHOPP, and HARRIS, JJ., concur. McCORMICK, MASON and RAWLINGS, JJ., dissent.