Opinion ID: 1100590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Owens and Judd's Hiring of Floyd

Text: Owens and Judd argue that they are entitled to State-agent immunity because, they argue, in hiring Floyd they were performing a discretionary function. This Court stated in Cranman that a State agent is entitled to immunity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as ... hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel. Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405. Floyd was hired in May 1998 to work at the Tarwater Center. At that time, Judd was the personnel director of the Tarwater Center and Owens was a personnel specialist. Owens's duties included interviewing potential mental-health workers, and she interviewed Floyd for an opening at the Tarwater Center for a mental-health worker. [9] The DMHMR defendants attached to their summary-judgment motion Owens's deposition testimony in which she states that she reviewed Floyd's application, interviewed Floyd, and requested a background check and that nothing in the information she gathered indicated that Floyd was unsuitable for employment at the Tarwater Center. Therefore, Owens recommended to Judd that Floyd be employed as a mental-health worker at the Tarwater Center. The DMHMR defendants do not present deposition testimony by Judd. However, Owens indicates in her deposition testimony that Judd reviewed Floyd's application materials and Owens's recommendation. Floyd was subsequently hired to work at the Tarwater Center. This Court has declined to hold that a defendant was entitled to State-agent immunity when he [had] not presented to the trial court ... evidence dealing specifically with the activities ... that [were] made the basis of [the] action. Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d at 711. The evidence presented to the trial court on the motion for a summary judgment deals specifically with Floyd's hiring  the action that is made the basis of Sanders's action. The evidence showed that Judd and Owens reviewed Floyd's application, interviewed Floyd, and requested a background check before exercising their judgment in hiring him. Judd and Owens carried their burden of showing that their decision to hire Floyd falls within a category of conduct for which immunity is available. See Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 (State-agent immunity is available when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's ... exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as ... hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel). Once Owens and Judd satisfied their burden, the burden then shifted to Sanders to demonstrate that Owens and Judd acted in a manner that precludes State-agent immunity, that is, that they acted `fraudulently, willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith.' Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d at 709 (quoting Ryan v. Hayes, 831 So.2d at 28). Sanders argues in her answer to the petition for the writ of mandamus that Owens and Judd are not entitled to State-agent immunity because, she says, Floyd had been convicted of domestic violence and DMHMR policy prohibits DMHMR's hiring anyone with a history of violent criminal offenses. [10] In opposition to the DMHMR defendants' summary-judgment motion, Sanders presented Johnston's and Owens's deposition testimony indicating that, if a job applicant had been convicted of domestic violence, he or she cannot be hired as a mental-health worker. [11] However, Sanders did not, in opposition to the summary-judgment motion, present to the trial court evidence supporting her allegation that Floyd had been convicted of domestic violence. [12] Nor did Sanders present the trial court with any evidence indicating that either Owens or Judd was aware of the alleged conviction. There was no evidence before the trial court indicating that Floyd had been, in fact, convicted of domestic violence, [13] that Owens or Judd was aware of any such conviction, or that Owens and Judd acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law, Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405, in hiring Floyd. We cannot conclude that Sanders carried her burden to show that Judd and Owens are not entitled to State-agent immunity. Judd and Owens carried their burden on their summary-judgment motion to show that they are entitled to State-agent immunity as to Sanders's claims regarding the hiring of Floyd, and Sanders did not meet her burden to show otherwise.