Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Investigation into Defendant's Competency

Text: Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his mental competence at the time of the offense and of trial. Specifically, defendant argues that a competent defendant is able to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense, citing N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(g). Defendant says that his long psychiatric history, his irrational behavior at trial, and the hostile relationship that developed between him and counsel cast doubt on whether he met that criterion. Furthermore, he contends that his waiver of his rights to testify and to allocute are suspect because of [his] dubious competence. Defendant cites numerous instances of his in-court behavior to show his irrationality: · On March 14, 1994, during a pre-trial hearing, defendant was spitting all over the place: At the wall in front of him, at chairs behind him and next to him, on the floor in front of him. · He said to the pre-trial judge, Judge Schroth, Now, go on over there, cracker, you white racist bigot. You know what you is. You're just doing the devil's work. You tell me why I spit. You have no laws that I'm honored to respect. My forefathers, you understand, and my ancestors did not sit down and decide any laws. You understand that, you racist? · On July 13, 1995, Harris refused to come to court, and instead crawled back in bed and covered up, supposedly afraid that a corrections officer would harm him. · During trial, Harris spit on Judge Delehey's desk, and tried to tweak the Judge a little bit during voir dire by exhibiting his middle finger. · On February 13, 1996, right after entering the courtroom, the court told Harris to sit down and be quiet. Harris responded, I got it off already. And my [penis] hurt too. You know, you can see if you can get me a doctor for that. · While the victim's father testified, Harris mocked his sympathy by dabbing under his own eyes with his handkerchief. Defendant points out that despite counsel's repeated warnings that his conduct would affect the jury's deliberations, he continued to engage in disruptive behavior. In addition, defendant relies on his long psychiatric history. As a youth, defendant was diagnosed as schizophrenic and psychotic. He was committed at age thirteen to the State Psychiatric Hospital as insane. Dr. Edward Dougherty, retained by trial counsel, examined Harris and concluded that there was a possibility of an organic impairment of his thought processes. Despite those facts, defense counsel failed to ask for additional testing regarding his competence. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsels' attitude toward him affected the decision not to order further examinations. Defendant claims that Call despised [him] and doubted that his behavior was the result of some pathology with legal significance. The State disputes the characterization of defendant's behavior as bizarre in the sense that would call into question his competency. According to the State, defendant's behavior was intentional, and served to express his disdain for the court, the prosecutors, and the Huggins family. Furthermore, neither trial counsel nor Dr. Dougherty provided any indication that defendant was incompetent. See State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 73-74, 152 A.2d 50 (1959) (stating that defense counsel are in a better position than trial court to gauge their client's competency). Finally, the State distinguishes defendant's behavior from other behavior that raised legitimate questions about a defendant's competency. For example, in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed. 2d 103 (1975), the defendant attempted suicide during trial; in Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed. 2d 815 (1966), the defendant heard voices. In State v. Spivey, 65 N.J. 21, 319 A. 2d 461 (1974), the defendant brayed like a donkey and grunted like a pig in court. Here, the State argues, Harris understood the role of the judge and the nature of the charges. He was able to assist Call and Scully, and, albeit offensive in his conduct, he was competent.
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4a prohibits the trying, convicting, and sentencing of a defendant who lacks [the] capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense ... so long as such incapacity endures. See also State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 549, 231 A. 2d 565 (1967) (competency requires understanding of one's position and ability to consult intelligently with counsel). N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b states that a defendant is fit to stand trial if the proofs establish: (1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and (2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends: (a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense; (b) That there is a judge on the bench; (c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge; (d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge; (e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify; (f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and (g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. Defendant's statement to the trial court, before being sentenced on the non-capital convictions, demonstrates that he met each of the criteria outlined in subsections 4b(1) through 4b(2)(f), which pertain to a defendant's awareness of where he is and the nature of the proceedings against him. Specifically, the record reveals that: · Harris addressed his comments to the judge. (Number one, Judge, I find your presence as a judge here a disgrace to the bench.); see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(b) (defendant must know there is a judge on the bench). · He disputed the reliability of the evidence against him. He argued, Who is to say, you know, that [Dunn] wasn't the person that did it?; that if Huggins saw him coming, she would have locked her car door; that the evidence of a rape was untrustworthy; and that the evidence did not show he shot Huggins; see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(1), -4b(2)(a), -4b(2)(f) (requiring that a defendant know where he is and that there are charges against him). · He understood that a jury was deciding his fate (arguing that this here jury system ... is not fair); see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(f) (defendant must know role of jury). · Defendant knew the prosecutor's goal was to have him convicted (arguing that the Huggins family is naïve to believe the prosecution; and that the prosecutor just want[ed] to make a name for his f____g self); see N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(c) (defendant must know prosecutor is there to convict him). · In fact, in claiming that the death penalty is administered arbitrarily, he compared the moral blameworthiness of the acts attributed to him to those of Gloria Dunn, Jeffrey Dahmer, and others. The remaining requirement for competency is that a defendant must be able to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4b(2)(g). At the PCR hearing, when asked whether Harris knew how Tariq would be cross-examined, Scully stated that defendant saw the entire file. The direct examination of Scully continued: Q: Did you ever discuss with [defendant] your decision prior to the cross-examination not to ask A: I discussed every decision that we made during the course of the trial at length with both Mr. Harris and with Mr. Call, and with many other individuals in the public defender's office. Q: Judge Scully, what was your purpose in discussing Tariq Ayers' statement with Mr. Harris? A: I discussed everything. I discussed the entire discovery packet with Mr. Harris. Q: And I'm asking you with respect to those particular statements, what was your purpose in discussing them with Mr. Harris? A: Discussing what we could expect to be the proffered testimony during the state's case, and the manner in which we would approach our, our cross-examination as to each witness. Q: Because we're talking about the defendant's nephew now, right? A: Correct. Although in this exchange Scully was not being asked about the issue of Harris's competency specifically, it is apparent that Harris communicated with his attorneys and answered questions about the kind of testimony to expect from State witnesses. Cf. Spivey, supra, 65 N.J. at 43, 319 A. 2d 461 (describing incompetent as totally uncommunicative; even though he was aware of what was going on, ... such knowledge is not necessarily conclusive on the question of one's ability to ... assist in his own defense). That evidence of intelligent communication between Harris and his attorneys supports Scully's and Call's assertion that there was no reason to doubt defendant's competency. Moreover, Scully affirmed that he, in fact, did ask Dr. Dougherty to examine Harris to make sure that, that were no competency issues that needed to be addressed. [5] Scully said he asked, not because anything about Harris raised that specter of incompetency, but because in any type of major prosecution, it is prudent ... to have the client ... examined to make sure there aren't any issues as to competency or any other issues, mental-health-related issues. As noted, Dr. Dougherty mentioned the possibility of a neurologic impairment or organic problem, but, after consultation with their appellate counsel, Call and Scully decided it was unnecessary to request further competency assessment. Call's PCR testimony, like Scully's, indicated that he really did not have any doubt about Harris's competency. [6] Call stated that he formed that opinion based on his meetings and conversations with Harris, on the information he read about Harris's entire life, and on defendant's correspondence, including communications to his previous attorneys. He added that Harris's letters to his prior counsel showed certainly insight into the nature of his problems. When asked again whether he had questions about Harris's competency, Call stated: No, I did not. Mr. Harris, based on our initial meeting with Mr. Harris [on January 11, 1995)], I felt that he was certainly legally competent, and that is not necessarily a high hurdle in the State of New Jersey, but Mr. Harris was clearly legally competent as to his mental status, based upon the information that I had received to date concerning his past criminal history. Call added that he received letters from Harris that showed his abilities. Two were marked into evidence at the PCR hearing. In one, Harris asked his attorneys to file an injunction against a Trentonian columnist, stating that the relevant columns prejudiced potential jurors. In the same letter, defendant mentioned that he requested that prison officials provide a skilled paralegal for him. Last, we have defendant's contentions in respect of his childhood diagnoses of schizophrenia and psychosis. However, both defense experts who testified during the penalty phase agreed that those diagnoses were wrong. Neither Dr. Gruen nor Dr. Greenfield saw evidence that defendant was psychotic; each diagnosed him with a conduct disorder as a child, based on the records they reviewed. And, even if the diagnoses had been correct, the issue is whether Harris was competent as an adult.
The record supports trial counsels' conviction that Harris was competent. His soliloquy to the court before being sentenced on the non-capital counts demonstrates that Harris knew his whereabouts, the nature of the proceedings and of the charges, and the role of the different actors. All statutory factors were demonstrated. Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that counsels' performance fell below an objective reasonableness standard because they did not investigate further into defendant's competency.