Opinion ID: 437648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: absence of hearing

Text: 4 Plaintiffs Irby, Wilson, and Brown claim that they were denied equal protection and due process of law by the failure of the Sheriff's Department to grant them hearings before they were dismissed. 2 We disagree. Public employees are entitled to pretermination hearings under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if they have a cognizable property or liberty interest in continued employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Price v. City of Junction, Texas, 711 F.2d 582, 589 (5th Cir.1983); Broadway v. Block, 694 F.2d 979, 985 (5th Cir.1982); White v. South Park Independent School District, 693 F.2d 1163, 1166 (5th Cir.1982). A protected property interest in employment exists only if the employee has a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. Roth 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709; Conley v. Board of Trustees of Grenada County Hospital, 707 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1983). The property interest can emanate from a statute, local ordinance, or rule, or from a mutually explicit understanding. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-2700, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2077, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); White v. Mississippi State Oil and Gas Board, 650 F.2d 540, 541 (5th Cir.1981); Conley at 179. In either case, however, the sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344, 96 S.Ct. at 2077. 5 Texas law gives sheriffs, and other elected county officials, virtually unbridled authority in hiring and firing their employees. Murray v. Harris, 112 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex.Civ.App.--Amarillo 1938, writ dism'd); Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193, 1199 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied sub nom., 456 U.S. 925, 936, 102 S.Ct. 1969, 1992, 72 L.Ed.2d 440, 455 (1982); White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S.Ct. 1731, 72 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d 391, 404 (5th Cir.1980). Under Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6869 (Vernon 1960), sheriff's deputies serve during the pleasure of the sheriff. It follows that deputy sheriffs have no legal entitlement to their jobs as public employees; the sheriff may fire them for many reasons or for no articulable reason at all. 3 Barrett at 1199. Accord, McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Texas, 730 F.2d 1009, 1010 n. 2 (5th Cir.1984) (en banc); Murray at 1093-94. Plaintiffs, therefore, lacked any property interest in their continued employment. 4 Plaintiffs do not assert that their dismissal deprived them of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, nor is there any evidence in the record which would support such an assertion. 6 Plaintiffs Irby, Brown and Wilson also allege that they were denied equal protection of the laws by the absence of pretermination hearings. They assert that a Texas statute guarantees to city employees the right to such a hearing, 5 and that as a matter of equal protection of the laws, the right should be extended to individuals employed by county governments. Assuming, arguendo, that a county or its officials or employees can be liable for an equal protection violation based on allegedly improper classifications made by state statutes, we find no such improper classification here. 7 The test for scrutinizing state policies like the one at issue here is well-settled: 8  'Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'  City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976), quoted in Laird v. Board of Trustees of the Institutions of Higher Learning, 721 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir.1983). 9 Employees of county governments do not comprise a suspect class, and the holding of public employment is not a recognized fundamental right. Arceneaux v. Treen, 671 F.2d 128, 133 (5th Cir.1982), citing Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976). Therefore, we review the classification here under the rational basis test. In such a situation, 'the burden is not upon the state to establish the rationality of its restriction, but is upon the challenger to show that the restriction is wholly arbitrary.'  Kite v. Marshall, 661 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1120, 102 S.Ct. 2934, 73 L.Ed.2d 1333 (1982), quoting Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 617 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989, 93 S.Ct. 307, 34 L.Ed.2d 256 (1972). We must ask whether  'any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify'  the challenged distinction. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), quoted in Pappanastos v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 615 F.2d 219, 221 (5th Cir.1980). We do not consider here whether article 1006 or any other Texas statute guarantees city employees under all circumstances the right to a pretermination hearing, or the extent of that guarantee. See Bell v. Gayle, 384 F.Supp. 1022, 1025 (N.D.Tex.1974). Assuming such a guarantee exists, the failure to extend it to county employees was not irrational. 10 We have recognized that the elected county official occupies a singular place in Texas government. Because of the unique structure of county government in Texas, the sheriff, like other elected county officials, holds virtually absolute sway over the particular tasks or areas of responsibility entrusted to him by state statute and is accountable to no one other than the voters for his conduct therein. Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619 F.2d at 404. The legislature might well have rationally concluded that the effect of requiring a pretermination hearing for county employees, even if such a right is afforded city employees, would be to undermine the uniquely broad discretion granted elected county officials. The equal protection clause does not require that all public employees be treated alike. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979); Arceneaux v. Treen, supra. Our holding in this respect disposes of all of plaintiff Wilson's claims on appeal. We next severally consider the remaining claims of plaintiffs Brown and Irby, and the claims of plaintiffs Trabue and Johnson.