Opinion ID: 1984228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: VMI's Petition for Writ of Mandamus prayed for a writ requiring the deposit and for judgment against defendants    for costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees. But the motion for summary judgment was limited to the mandamus relief, and the court's order was confined accordingly. Because trial court did not rule on the merits of VMI's prayer for costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, VMI argues the summary judgment entered was an interlocutory order and not appealable. See rule 1, Iowa Rules of Appellate Procedure. We disagree. The Petition for Writ of Mandamus was aimed at securing compliance with § 472.30, The Code (If, on the trial of the appeal, the damages awarded by the commissioners are increased, the condemner shall, if he is already in possession of the property, make such additional deposit with the sheriff, as will, with the deposit already made, equal the entire damages allowed.   ). There is an indication in papers filed below and here that the other relief prayed for in VMI's petitioncosts, including attorney feeswas based on a different statute, § 472.34 (Should the applicant decline, at any time after an appeal is taken as provided in section 472.18, to take the property and pay the damages awarded, he shall pay, in addition to the costs and damages actually suffered by the landowner, reasonable attorney fees to be taxed by the court.). The City's brief asserts that VMI's prayer for recovery of costs including reasonable attorneys' fees constitutes in actuality a separate cause of action. The only allegation in VMI's petition which supports this branch of the prayer is a statement that plaintiff will incur in the future indebtedness for attorney's fees in the enforcement of its statutory and constitutional rights. Chapter 661 (Mandamus) makes no provisions for taxation of attorney fees as part of the costs. Ordinarily attorney fees are not recoverable as costs unless explicitly provided for by statute. Harris v. Short, 253 Iowa 1206, 1208, 115 N.W.2d 865, 866 (1962). Properly pled, the joinder of a § 472.34 damage claim with this action for mandamus would have been improper. See § 611.12, The Code. In absence of an improper joinder motion pursuant to rule 27(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, the court could have severed such a claim for separate trial. Rule 186, R.C.P. In the case before us, there was no proper pleading to support attorney fees under any theory. We view the court's ruling that such a claim should await further motions or pleadings relating thereto as merely preserving VMI's right, if any, to bring such a claim in the future, and rejecting consideration of such claim in the mandamus proceeding. We think trial court's judgment was a final appealable disposition. We have the requisite jurisdiction to proceed.