Opinion ID: 44626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The RPT's Arguments for Finding Benkiser's Declaration Constitutional Under the Elections Clause Fail

Text: 31 States, through the Elections Clause, exercise some regulatory authority over federal elections because as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274. This authority, however, is not unlimited. Any regulation of time, place, and manner must not violate other portions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661-62, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944) (Texas is free to conduct her elections and limit her electorate as she may deem wise, save only as her action may be affected by the prohibitions of the United States Constitution....). In addition, while states enjoy a wide latitude in regulating elections and in controlling ballot content and ballot access, they must exercise this power in a reasonable, nondiscriminatory, politically neutral fashion. Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1125 (8th Cir.1999). There is evidence that Benkiser did not act reasonably and with political neutrality when she declared DeLay ineligible. Indeed, the district court's description of the events surrounding the letter sent by DeLay imply, at the very least, a lack of neutrality. Dist. Ct. Op. at  n.5 (explaining that Benkiser had personally revised a previous draft of DeLay's letter). 32 More to the point, even had Benkiser acted with political neutrality, her actions would not fall within the limited authority delegated to the states under the Elections Clause. The manner 13 of elections encompasses matters like `notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.' Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523-24, 121 S.Ct. 1029, 149 L.Ed.2d 44 (2001) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366, 52 S.Ct. 397, 76 L.Ed. 795 (1932)). Benkiser's determination of ineligibility does not fall within this definition of the manner of elections. 33 The RPT argues that the determination did affect merely the manner of elections because the act was procedural and predictive. Assuming the RPT's argument is correct, the problem with the theory is that the TDP makes an as-applied challenge. Despite the RPT's attempt to classify the declaration as merely predictive, the evidence shows that it was not. 14 Benkiser's declaration was based on DeLay's current residence, not his inhabitancy on election day. Simply put, her declaration of ineligibility was not a mere predictive, ministerial act affecting the manner of the election. It was a direct determination of DeLay's qualifications as a candidate. As such, the declaration was unconstitutional and cannot be saved by the Elections Clause. 34 The RPT also contends that the declaration of ineligibility is a permissible manner regulation because DeLay is a frivolous candidate and removing frivolous candidates from the ballot constitutes protection of voters under Supreme Court precedent. This argument fails. Whenever the Supreme Court has discussed the states' authority to prevent frivolous candidates from appearing on the ballot, it has been in the context of a candidate that will only receive minimal support in an election. See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834, 115 S.Ct. 1842; Storer, 415 U.S. at 743, 94 S.Ct. 1274. There is no evidence that DeLay, the incumbent candidate of a dominant political party, will receive only minimal support. Here, we fail to see how removing DeLay from the ballot would protect the voters, inasmuch as it was the voters themselves who selected DeLay as the Republican candidate for the general election. 35 Even if Benkiser's declaration could be construed as a manner regulation, it would only survive a constitutional challenge if it would not exclude classes of candidates from federal office. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832-33, 115 S.Ct. 1842; see also Schaefer, 215 F.3d at 1035 (asking whether state action has the likely effect of handicapping an otherwise qualified class of candidates). Given that Benkiser's method of application would exclude, or at a minimum handicap, the pool of nonresident prospective candidates, it is unconstitutional under U.S. Term Limits. 15 36