Opinion ID: 1959497
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Merger of Convictions Under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a and 2C:35-9

Text: Finally, Rodriguez asks this Court to address a question that is concededly moot, to provide guidance for lower courts. That question is whether a N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a conviction, the basic distributing/manufacturing/dispensing offense, should merge with a conviction under section 9. In the interests of judicial economy, and because we are convinced of the answer, we address it. In the first step of the Dillihay analysis we look at legislative intent. Section 9's anti-merger provision explicitly prohibits merger of that offense into a conviction under the basic offense, but that is not the issue raised. That anti-merger provision does not apply to a merger of the generic offense into the basic offense. See State v. Gonzalez, 241 N.J. Super. 92, 99, 574 A. 2d 487 (Skillman, J., dissenting) (analyzing school zone anti-merger provision as precluding merger into basic distribution offense, but not the reverse). [10] Whether the Legislature intended to impose multiple punishments is thus unclear. Hence, we turn to the Blockburger test. All the elements of the distribution offense are implicated when a defendant is convicted under the drug death statute. The statute says so on its face. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9a (Any person who ... in violation of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5). We performed a similar analysis and reached a similar conclusion in Dillihay, supra, when we held that multiple punishments for related convictions for the generic distribution offense and the school zone offense are constitutionally impermissible. 127 N.J. at 51, 601 A. 2d 1149. In the mooted question raised here, double-jeopardy principles would similarly require merger of convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-9 that arise out of the same transaction.