Opinion ID: 4238479
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consent Decrees Generally

Text: A consent decree “entered in federal court must be directed to protecting federal interests.” Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004). The consent decree “must spring from, and serve to resolve, a dispute within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986)). Equity requires a federal court fashioning and implementing a consent decree to focus on three factors. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 (1977). First, a federal consent decree must “be remedial in nature” and thus “designed as nearly as possible to restore the victims of [illegal] conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct.” Id. at 280 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the nature and scope of the remedy provided by a federal consent decree depends on the nature and scope of the federal-law violation. Id. at 280, 282. This means a “federal-court decree[] must directly address and relate to the [federallaw] violation itself.” Id. at 282. And it must be “tailored to cure the condition that offends” federal law. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But a decree exceeds appropriate limits if it is “aimed at eliminating a condition that does not violate [federal law] or does not flow from such a violation.” Id. Third, federal courts “must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,” consistent with the demands of federal 26 law. Id. at 280–81. Indeed, principles of federalism require that federal courts give “significant weight to the views of government officials,” and that “state officials with front-line responsibility for administering [a state program] be given latitude and substantial discretion.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 442 (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, federal consent decrees are temporary solutions that may be kept in place only as long as necessary to cure an unlawful condition. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88-89 (1995). The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts should not continue their “oversight of state programs for long periods of time . . . absent an ongoing violation of federal law.” Frew, 540 U.S. at 441. Thus, a “federal court must exercise its equitable powers to ensure that when the objects of the decree have been attained, responsibility for discharging the State’s obligations is returned promptly to the State and its officials.” Id. at 442. Keeping a consent decree in place any longer than necessary to assure compliance with federal law risks violating principles of federalism and “improperly depriv[ing] future officials of their designated legislative and executive powers.” Id. at 441; see also John B v. Emkes, 710 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 2013) (stating that a consent decree “may remain in force only as long as it continues to remedy a violation of federal law”); United States v. Washington, 573 F.3d 701, 710 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The [Supreme] Court has repeatedly reminded us that institutional reform injunctions were meant to be temporary solutions, not permanent interventions, and could be kept in place only so long as the violation continued.”). 27