Opinion ID: 337716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: DiGILIO'S COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL

Text: 57 On April 7, 1975, counsel for DiGilio moved on his behalf pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244 for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 15 the District court directed DiGilio to report to the Carrier Clinic at Belle Mead, New Jersey on May 12, 1975, to be examined with regard to his competency to go to trial on June 10, 1975. DiGilio reported to the Clinic and underwent psychiatric and psychological examination. On June 6, 1975 and for eight trial days in June the district court conducted a hearing on the motion. 58 Ultimately, the court concluded that DiGilio was competent to stand trial. At the hearing there was substantial evidence, which the district court apparently credited, tending to establish that DiGilio suffers from organic brain disorders of traumatic origin, and functions at a retarded level. The court nonetheless concluded that he was legally competent. That conclusion is reflected in findings of fact dictated from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing on June 19, 1975 and supplemented by a letter to counsel dated June 24. At the outset the court stated that the defendant in a § 4244 proceeding bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence his incompetency to stand trial. It then reviewed the medical evidence in some detail and concluded: 59 The test is: Can he cooperate with counsel to a reasonable degree? And can he achieve a reasonable understanding of the nature of the charges against him? 60 I find, in short, that Mr. DiGilio can do both; that while he is mentally impaired because of his organic brain disease, that impairment is not so extensive that I should declare him incompetent to stand trial. And by the standard I have previously quoted I do find him, in fact, competent to go to trial in this case. 61 DiGilio's attorneys urge that the court erred in two significant respects. They first complain that in weighing the evidence the court proceeded on the assumption that DiGilio had the burden of proof. As we pointed out above, the court explicitly announced that assumption. They next complain that the court, in evaluating the evidence of competency to stand trial, erroneously took into account DiGilio's committability in the event he were adjudicated incompetent. Certainly the court in its findings made reference to that factor. 16 62 There is surprisingly little case law dealing with the allocation of the burden of proof in a proceeding under § 4244. 17 Perhaps this absence of discussion reflects the fact that a § 4244 motion may be made by the United States Attorney, by the court on its own motion, and in behalf of the accused. In such a proceeding, no matter by whom it is brought, the critical issue is the capacity of the defendant to assume any burden in any adversarial judicial proceeding. Although § 4244 does not say so explicitly, due process requires that the trial court inquire sua sponte into the defendant's competence if there is reason to doubt it. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). It would make little sense to impose such a due process burden on the court but to place the burden of proof on the defendant. Nor, we assume, would the burden of proof rest with the defendant when the United States Attorney makes the motion. There is nothing on the face of the statute suggesting that the burden of proof should be different when the motion is made in behalf of the accused. 18 63 In the somewhat analogous context of a proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 4245, 19 the District of Columbia Circuit discussed, but did not resolve, the issue of the burden of proof of incompetency to stand trial. Fooks v. United States, 100 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 246 F.2d 629 (1956) (per curiam); 100 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 246 F.2d 631 (1957) (statements of majority and minority on petition for rehearing in banc). In Fooks the defendant was in custody following three separate sentences. The federal custodians, on the basis of observation during post-trial confinement, concluded that there was probable cause to believe Fooks was incompetent at the time of his trial. Pursuant to § 4245, hearings were held in each of the sentencing courts and resulted in findings that Fooks was competent. On appeal the panel, consisting of Circuit Judges Miller, Bastian and Burger, in a per curiam opinion wrote: 64 Two of the District Judges specifically ruled that, even if the Government had the burden of establishing such competency beyond a reasonable doubt, as to which we now express no opinion, it had carried that burden; and it is fairly inferable that the third District Judge, who, by consent heard the testimony with one of the other judges, did likewise. 246 F.2d at 630-31. 65 On petition for rehearing in banc the court divided sharply over the effect to be given to the § 4245 certification from the Bureau of Prisons. Then-Judge Burger for a majority of five wrote that a § 4245 certificate created a rebuttable presumption of incompetency, which fell out of the case when the government introduced some evidence of competency. Without deciding the issue that majority said that even if in that posture of the case the burden of proof was on the government, and included an obligation to establish competency beyond a reasonable doubt, the findings of the district judges that this burden had been met were not clearly erroneous. Judge Bazelon for the minority would have held that filing the § 4245 certificate was prima facie evidence of incompetency and that thereafter the government had the burden of proving competency, which in Fooks' case had not been met. It appears to have been common ground, then, that the government in a § 4245 proceeding had to meet some burden of proof. That conclusion is consistent with the provision in § 4245 that the certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall be prima facie evidence of the facts and conclusions certified therein. 66 We note that § 4245 relief is available only when the issue of mental competency was not raised and determined before or during said trial. Moreover, § 4244 does not contain any language making a certificate prima facie evidence of the facts and conclusions certified therein. But the obligation to hold a § 4244 hearing arises only if a psychiatrist's report indicates a present state of mental incompetency. Such a report would seem to serve the same purpose as the Certificate of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons in a § 4245 proceeding. 67 But we do not believe that it is reasonable to construe § 4244 as placing the burden on the defendant to prove incompetency as long as the burden shifts to the government in a § 4245 proceeding after trial. Such a construction might well encourage defense counsel to delay raising the issue of competency until after trial, gambling for an acquittal with the knowledge that the competency issue could be litigated later. We are mindful, as well, of the Court's admonition in Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at 384, 86 S.Ct. at 841 that it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial. It is equally contradictory to argue that a defendant who may be incompetent should be presumed to possess sufficient intelligence that he will be able to adduce evidence of his incompetency which might otherwise be within his grasp. As the Court said in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960) (per curiam) and reiterated in Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975), the due process rule against trying an incompetent protects a defendant who cannot effectively consult with counsel and cannot comprehend the nature of the proceedings against him. 68 Allocation of the burden of proof will be significant, in theory at least, only in the rare case when, assuming the evidence is weighed by the preponderance of evidence standard, the conflicting evidence is in equipoise in the mind of the fact finder. At that point the triability of a defendant will depend on where the burden of proof is placed. To put the question another way, what we are determining is a rule of law, of due process dimensions, that a defendant, about whom the evidence of competency to stand trial is in equipoise, should or should not be tried. If, as the Court has made clear, the concept of competency to stand trial is grounded in notions of fundamental fairness in the operation of the judicial process, see Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at 171-72, 95 S.Ct. 896, the question can only be answered in the negative. Evidence showing competency must be more persuasive than that showing incompetency. Of necessity, then, there is no room for a rule of law placing any burden of proof on the defendant. 20 69 DiGilio's counsel would have us go further, and hold that the government must prove competency, once it is in issue, beyond a reasonable doubt. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test is constitutionally mandated for all elements of a criminal offense. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). But competency to stand trial is not an element of the crimes for which DiGilio was indicted. Compare Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1974) (sanity at the time of the offense). Moreover, the government is not, on every subsidiary issue arising during the course of a criminal proceeding, required to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The preponderance-of-the-evidence test has been utilized in determining the admissibility of evidence under the constitutional exclusionary rules. See, e. g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972) (plurality opinion) (voluntariness of a confession); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (fourth amendment suppression). We do not believe that a more rigorous evidentiary standard is warranted here, and hold that a defendant's competency to stand need be established by a preponderance of the evidence only. 70 Since the district court, in weighing the evidence on what was obviously a close and troublesome issue, explicitly referred to the defendant's burden of proof, and since that placement of the burden may have been decisive in resolving the ultimate issue, we cannot affirm its finding that DiGilio was competent to go to trial. The government would have us hold that because DiGilio's attorney made no simultaneous objection to the court's statement with respect to burden of proof, we should disregard the error. In view of the court's independent due process obligation on the competency issue, Pate v. Robinson, supra, there is not in our view room for the mechanical operation of the simultaneous objection rule. 71 There remains the question whether the district court must hold a new hearing, and if DiGilio is found competent, conduct a new trial. Here the hearing was extensive and is not so remote in time as to present insurmountable problems of recollection. While nunc pro tunc determinations of mental competency are not favored, Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at 183, 95 S.Ct. 896; United States v. Pogany, 465 F.2d 72, 79 (3d Cir. 1972), we have in a state habeas corpus case recently recognized the possibility that a nunc pro tunc determination may be constitutionally permissible. See United States ex rel. McGough v. Hewitt, 528 F.2d 339, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1975). The district court is in the best position to determine whether it can, either on the present record or with supplementary testimony, make a retrospective determination of DiGilio's competency throughout his trial. If the court concludes that this can be done, and concludes after applying the proper burden of proof that DiGilio was competent, then no new trial will be required. 72 Since DiGilio's case is being remanded for further proceedings, it is appropriate to note that if the district court intended by its reference to DiGilio's non-committability to suggest that this factor is relevant to the competency inquiry, we do not agree that it is. Congress has dealt with the problem of committability, explicitly if not satisfactorily, in 18 U.S.C. §§ 4246, 4247. The statute contemplates that in some cases a defendant may be incompetent to stand trial and also releasable. It is not at all clear from the context in which the reference to non-committability was made 21 that the district judge intended anything more than an observation about the statute. But if the fact that DiGilio might be released without trial did weigh in the determination of his competency to stand trial, on remand that factor should be disregarded.