Opinion ID: 166321
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arrest-related claims2

Text: 18 Price's complaint makes clear he is asserting separate claims arising from both the June 14, 2000, search of his home and from his September 14, 2000, arrest. Indeed, Price emphasizes this on appeal by noting that [t]he complaint outlines two different dates, one the date of the search (i.e., June 14, 2000) and two, the date of arrest (i.e., September 14, 2000). Thus, Price's pleadings argue that his excessive force upon arrest claims are separate from his search-related claims and accrued instead on the day of his arrest, September 14, 2000. Specifically, Price asserts that his physical beating claim survives the statutory bar where occurring moments after his September 14, 2000, arrest. 19 We agree. The initiation of the June 14 search did not put Price on notice that he would have an excessive force upon arrest claim arising three months later. It is clear that Price is making a separate constitutional claim of abuse, dealing with a specific subset of named Defendants, occurring at his September 14, 2000 arrest. The district court erroneously lumped all of Price's abuse claims into a single claim arising upon the initiation of the search on June 14, 2000. Therefore, we reverse and remand Price's arrest-related excessive force claims for further proceedings. 3 20