Opinion ID: 2526547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: B. 10 is a Civil Remedial Scheme

Text: {¶ 44} The enactment of S.B. 10 has brought the same types of challenges to its constitutionality that we previously considered and rejected in our review of Megan's Law and its amendments. Adherence to the rule of law established in our prior decisions requires the rejection of these new arguments because S.B. 10 has not significantly altered the regulatory system of sex-offender registration. {¶ 45} There is no dispute that the General Assembly intended the provisions of S.B. 10 to apply retroactively. Thus, for purposes of determining whether S.B. 10 violates the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio Constitution, the question is whether the statute `takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.' Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 410, 700 N.E.2d 570, quoting Cincinnati v. Seasongood (1889), 46 Ohio St. 296, 303, 21 N.E. 630. {¶ 46} Nonetheless, we clarified in Ferguson that Ohio retroactivity analysis does not prohibit all increased burdens; it prohibits only increased punishment. 120 Ohio St.3d 7, 2008-Ohio-4824, 896 N.E.2d 110, at ¶ 39. Further, as we explained in State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437, 2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, a statute that operates retroactively is not unconstitutional if it is a remedial law, which we have defined to mean those laws affecting merely `the methods and procedure[s] by which rights are recognized, protected and enforced, not    the rights themselves. ' (Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15, quoting Bielat v. Bielat (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 350, 354, 721 N.E.2d 28, quoting Weil v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc. (1942), 139 Ohio St. 198, 205, 22 O.O. 205, 39 N.E.2d 148. {¶ 47} S.B. 10 does not provide for the infliction of punishment on sex offenders and therefore is a remedial law. The General Assembly expressed its intent to establish a civil, remedial system designed to protect the safety and general welfare of the people of this state and to assur[e] public protection, R.C. 2950.02(B), in light of its determination that [s]ex offenders and child-victim offenders pose a risk of engaging in further sexually abusive behavior even after being released from    confinement, R.C. 2950.02(A)(2). The General Assembly's legislative finding that sex-offender-registration laws are necessary to protect the public because sex offenders pose a present dangernot because additional punishment should be inflicted on themdeserves deference. {¶ 48} Further, this court has very recently determined that S.B. 10 is a civil, remedial law, explaining in State v. Clayborn, 125 Ohio St.3d 450, 2010-Ohio-2123, 928 N.E.2d 1093, that sex-offender-classification proceedings are civil in nature and require a civil manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Id. at ¶ 11. In that case, we considered whether the time limitation for filing an appeal in a criminal or in a civil case applies to the appeal from a judgment classifying a defendant as a Tier II sex offender. Although we held that the limitations period for appeals from criminal cases applied, relying on Cook, Wilson, and Ferguson, we nonetheless determined that an appeal from a sexual offender classification judgment is a civil matter within the context of a criminal case. Id. {¶ 49} Contrary to the majority's position, the fact that the sex-offender-registration provisions appear in the criminal code and that the classification categories are directly linked to convictions for specific offenses does not make S.B. 10 punitive in nature. Rather, the General Assembly found that a past conviction for a sex offense is an indication of the present threat that a sex offender poses to the public, and we have previously recognized that the legislature may us[e] past events to establish current status. Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 412, 700 N.E.2d 570. {¶ 50} While the legislature could have employed an individualized risk assessment of the danger posed by a sex offender, no constitutional mandate exists requiring that such measures be used. See Smith v. Doe (2003), 538 U.S. 84, 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (the determination to legislate with respect to convicted sex offenders as a class, rather than require individual determination of their dangerousness, does not make the statute a punishment for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause). {¶ 51} Moreover, as part of the national system of sex-offender registration and notification, and in response to the federal mandate for states to comply or risk losing federal funds otherwise allocated to them, Section 16925, Title 42, U.S.Code, the General Assembly has classified individuals as Tier I, II, or III sex offenders based on the offense of which they were convicted in order to establish in Ohio the national identification standards for these offenders. The United States Congress enacted the federal Adam Walsh Act, which Ohio adopted in S.B. 10, specifically to solve deficiencies in prior law that had enabled sex offenders to slip through the cracks    [b]y facilitating the collection of sex-offender information and its dissemination among jurisdictions. Carr v. United States (2010), ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2240-2241, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152. {¶ 52} Thus, the purpose of classifying all sex offenders into tiers based on the offense of conviction is not to punish an offender. Rather, the General Assembly sought to establish a system that provides for the efficient sharing of information about sex offenders necessary to safeguard the public from potentially dangerous individuals. {¶ 53} The provisions of S.B. 10 do require sex offenders to register more often, in more places, and for a longer period of time than formerly required by prior laws, but this does not mean that the statute violates the Retroactivity Clause. As the court explained in Cook, where no vested right has been created, `a later enactment will not burden or attach a new disability to a past transaction or consideration in the constitutional sense, unless the past transaction or consideration    created at least a reasonable expectation of finality.' Cook, 83 Ohio St.3d at 412, 700 N.E.2d 570, quoting State ex rel. Matz v. Brown (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 525 N.E.2d 805. Nonetheless, the court emphasized that `[e]xcept with regard to constitutional protections against ex post facto laws    felons have no reasonable right to expect that their conduct will never thereafter be made the subject of legislation. ' (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting Matz at 281-282, 525 N.E.2d 805. {¶ 54} Because S.B. 10 does not inflict punishment on sex offenders for past crimes, applying its provisions to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to the date of its enactment does not violate the Retroactivity Clause. {¶ 55} This view is supported by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, which upheld Alaska's sex-offender-registration statute against an ex post facto challenge. The court determined that the registration requirements (1) did not resemble traditional means of punishment in that they did not place offenders on public display for ridicule but instead disseminated accurate information, id. at 97-99, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, (2) imposed no physical restraint, leaving offenders free to live and work without direct supervision, id. at 100-101, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, (3) did not promote the traditional aims of punishment so as to overcome the legislature's regulatory objective, id. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, (4) were not retributive, because the categories of those who had to report and the corresponding length of the reporting requirement were reasonably related to the danger of recidivism, consistent with the regulatory objective, id. at 102, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, (5) were rationally related to the regulatory purpose, despite the lack of an individualized assessment of the risk of recidivism, id. at 102-104, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164, and (6) were not excessive in relation to the stated regulatory purpose given the high risk of recidivism posed by sex offenders, id. at 104, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164. {¶ 56} Because the practical effect of the statute did not negate the legislature's stated intent to establish a civil regulatory scheme, the United States Supreme Court held that it did not impose punishment and therefore did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 105-106, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164. {¶ 57} Moreover, every federal circuit court of appeals to consider whether the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), passed by Congress as part of the federal Adam Walsh Act, is constitutional has held that it may be retroactively applied to sex offenders who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment. See United States v. DiTomasso (C.A.1, 2010), 621 F.3d 17, 25 ; United States v. Guzman (C.A.2, 2010), 591 F.3d 83, 94; United States v. Shenandoah (C.A.3, 2010), 595 F.3d 151, 158-159; United States v. Gould (C.A.4, 2009), 568 F.3d 459, 466; United States v. Young (C.A.5, 2009), 585 F.3d 199, 203-206; United States v. Samuels (C.A.6, 2009), 319 Fed.Appx. 389, 394-395, whose overruling on other grounds was recognized by United States v. Utesch (C.A.6, 2010), 596 F.3d 302, 309, fn. 6; United States v. May (C.A.8, 2008), 535 F.3d 912, 919-920; United States v. George (C.A.9, 2010), 625 F.3d 1124, 1131; United States v. Hinckley (C.A.10, 2008), 550 F.3d 926, 936-938; United States v. Ambert (C.A.11, 2009), 561 F.3d 1202, 1207. {¶ 58} As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recently explained in United States v. Leach (C.A.7, 2011), 639 F.3d 769, 773, whether a comprehensive registration regime targeting only sex offenders is penal    is not an open question. In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Supreme Court held that an Alaska sex offender registration and notification statute posed no ex post facto violation because it was a civil, rather than penal, statute.    Leach has not identified any aspects of SORNA's registration provisions that distinguish this case from Smith. This is unsurprising, since we too are unable to find any meaningful distinctions. Therefore, we join our sister circuits in concluding that SORNA is not an ex post facto law. {¶ 59} There are no significant differences between Megan's Law, which this court has previously upheld, and S.B. 10, which conforms to the registration and notification requirements that have been upheld by federal circuit courts. In accordance with our precedent and in agreement with the federal circuit courts, I would hold that S.B. 10 is constitutional because it is a civil, remedial enactment designed to protect the welfare and safety of the public.