Opinion ID: 697012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Propriety of Jury Instructions

Text: 23 The district court instructed the jury that, in order to recover on his discrimination claim, Strong had to prove that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied for and was qualified for the position; (3) he was not hired; (4) the position was kept open or given to a less qualified person; and (4) he sustained damages as a result. Strong argues these instructions were erroneous. He also contends references in the instructions to the position were vague and ambiguous because more than one job announcement was at issue, and the jury could have found him qualified under one but not the other. 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides that [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. This court interprets Rule 51 strictly. Glover v. Bic Corp., 987 F.2d 1410, 1418 (9th Cir. 1993). In civil cases, we will not reverse a jury verdict because of improper jury instructions in the absence of a proper objection, even if the instructions given were plain error. Id. 25 Strong filed written objections to the district court's proposed jury instructions. These objections did not include a claim that the term the position was vague and ambiguous. We therefore decline to consider that question. 26 In his written objections, Strong requested that the phrase or given to a less qualified person be deleted from the instructions because [t]he complete sentence is vague and ambiguous as to whether it is up to the jury to decide which of the two phrases should be applied or whether plaintiff may prove either of the said essential elements. Strong also complained in his written objections that the jury instructions failed to mention the shifting burdens of proof applicable in employment discrimination cases--specifically, the defendant's burden of articulating, after the plaintiff states a prime facie case of employment discrimination, a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Hagans v. Clark, 752 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1985). We find no merit to these contentions. 27 Under McDonnell-Douglas, a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination must prove that the position for which he applied remained open or was given to a member of an unprotected class. Id. at 802. The person hired need not be less qualified than the plaintiff. Thus, Strong correctly notes that the jury instructions misstated the McDonnell-Douglas test. However, the instructions of which Strong complains could not have affected the result, because Strong did not make the cut for interviews, and the instructional errors he points to spoke only to who was finally selected for the job. 28 The trial judge has substantial latitude in tailoring jury instructions. United States v. Beltran-Rios, 878 F.2d 1208, 1214 (9th Cir. 1989). The jury need not be confuse[d] ... with legal definitions of the burdens of proof, persuasion and production and how they shift under McDonnell-Douglas. In re Lewis, 845 F.2d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 1988). It is sufficient that the jury is instructed on the plaintiff's burden of proving that a discriminatory reason more likely than not was responsible for the defendant's employment decision. See Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1987). 5 In the present case, the district court instructed the jury that: 29 Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had a racially discriminatory purpose or motive in refusing to hire him.... 30 Plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that his race was a reason that defendant refused to hire him. 31 Record of Trial at 669. The question central to Strong's claim was whether the failure to include him in the group that was selected for oral interviews and consequently the failure to hire him was motivated by a racially discriminatory reason. The instruction directly and sufficiently addressed that question.