Opinion ID: 1727437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the department of human services may retroactively apply a change in statutory law and increase appellant's arrearage in the amount of approximately $6,000.00.

Text: ¶ 15. Patrick complains that, after Mississippi adopted the UIFSA, the MDHS erroneously applied the UIFSA retroactively by increasing the arrearage by approximately $6,000.00, but he does not cite a provision of the UIFSA that empowers a state agency to modify the amount of a child support arrearage. A review of URESA, the UIFSA and applicable case law convinces the Court that neither URESA nor the UIFSA affects substantive rights, but merely provides a procedure whereby child support orders may be enforced in foreign states. See, e.g., Child Support Enforcement Div. of Alaska v. Brenckle, 424 Mass. 214, 675 N.E.2d 390, 393 (1997) (It is also clear that UIFSA, like its predecessor URESA, does not create a duty of support, but rather provides the procedural framework for enforcing one State's support order in another jurisdiction.); State Dept. of Human Servs. v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939, 942 (Utah Ct.App.1999) (UIFSA merely provides a framework for enforcing one state's support order in another jurisdiction.). As the Massachusetts court held, URESA and the UIFSA do not, nor are they empowered to, create the duty to provide child support. Brenckle, 675 N.E.2d at 393. ¶ 16. This Court, in Hailey v. Holden, 457 So.2d 947 (Miss.1984), reiterated basic principles which apply to the enforcement of child support judgments and to the accrual of child support obligations: A child support judgment is awarded to the custodial parent for the benefit and protection of the child. Miller v. Miller, 29 Or.App. 723, 565 P.2d 382, 100 A.L.R.3d 1120 (1977). There is a public policy consideration involved because of the interest of society to provide for its children's needs and to decrease society's financial burden when a child is supported through public assistance. The underlying principle here is the legal duty owed to the child for the child's maintenance and best interest. McManus v. McManus, 428 So.2d 854 (La. Ct.App.1983). We, therefore, conclude that since both the child's interest and society's interest are involved both interests are to be considered in resolution of any dispute involving child support. The child's maintenance and best interest are to be satisfied; on the other hand, the parties cannot undermine the state's interest. Of equal importance in this situation is the inherent power of the court to enforce its own orders and decrees. In Mississippi judicial interpretation of this legal duty to support minor children has firmly established that, once ordered, installment[s] of child support become fixed and vested when due and unpaid. Cunliffe v. Swartzfager, 437 So.2d 43 (Miss.1983); Duncan v. Duncan, 417 So.2d 908 (Miss.1982); Hambrick v. Prestwood, 382 So.2d 474 (Miss. 1980); Howard v. Howard, 191 So.2d 528 (Miss.1966). Additionally, a court cannot relieve the civil liability for support payments that have already accrued. Cunliffe, supra ; Duncan, supra ; Howard, supra . Hailey, 457 So.2d at 950-51. ¶ 17. Therefore, under Mississippi law, none of the interested entities or parties a Mississippi court, a North Carolina court, Patrick, Pamela, or the Mississippi Department of Human Servicescan alter the amount of arrearage that had accrued since the entry of the chancery court's judgment which ordered Patrick to pay $200 per month in child support. The fact that the MDHS mistakenly relied upon the North Carolina court's orders, miscalculated the amounts currently due by Patrick, and miscalculated the amount of the arrearage do not relieve Patrick of his liability for the accrued arrearage. ¶ 18. Because the UIFSA does not affect in any way the accrual of Patrick's arrearage, his assignment of error pertaining to the retroactive application of the UIFSA is without merit.