Opinion ID: 2175635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requested Instruction on Motive

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred in declining to give an instruction concerning the absence of any motive for Houde to have committed this crime. The specific instruction requested was as follows: If you find that there is no evidence [of] motive to commit the crime charged, then you may consider the absence of a motive to be a factor in determining whether the state has met its burden in proving its case against the accused. We have held in State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575 (R.I. 1987), that [c]onviction of crime never requires proof of motive, and the absence of motive, by itself, does not raise a reasonable doubt of guilt. Id. at 584 (citing State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d 860, 868 (Me. 1983)). We went on to say that evidence of motive may at times be probative and relevant and thus admissible at trial provided it does not cause the jury to speculate or to focus on collateral matters. 524 A.2d at 584 (citing State v. Gazerro, 420 A.2d 816, 825 (R.I. 1980)). The defendant argues that we further asserted in Caruolo, that a trial justice may instruct the jury that although motive is not essential to proof of guilt, its presence or absence is a circumstance that may be considered in conjunction with other evidence. Our stating that a trial justice might properly give such an instruction is not the equivalent of holding that such an instruction must be given. In Caruolo we also cited State v. Fenner, 503 A.2d 518 (R.I. 1986), for the proposition that a trial justice should not act as an advocate for either the state or the defendant in respect to accomplice testimony but should leave arguments concerning credibility to counsel for the parties. We note further that in State v. Bahre, 456 A.2d at 868, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine suggested that motive is a proper matter for counsel's argument rather than for the judge's charge. The trial justice in the case at bar instructed the jury in accordance with our holding in Caruolo that the state was not required to prove motive as an element of the crime. This statement of the law was accurate. The argument that the trial justice misconceived the holding of State v. Cohen, 93 R.I. 215, 172 A.2d 737 (1961), does not merit extensive analysis. We held in Caruolo that Cohen was superseded and suggested that a trial justice was no longer required to assign a weight to the absence of evidence of motive. In rejecting the proffered instruction, the trial justice did not err.

A. We have examined this tripartite issue and conclude that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in rejecting the photograph of John Picard (Picard). The trial justice allowed evidence that Picard had at about 10 p.m. been engaged in an altercation with Smith. Obviously the purport of this evidence was to indicate that Picard might have been the person who committed the crime of which defendant was accused. We have already indicated earlier in this opinion that a trial justice has wide discretion in determining relevance, materiality, and admissibility of offered evidence. Our standard of review of the exercise of this discretion is limited only to abuse. Viewing the totality of the record in this case, we do not find such abuse. B. Detective Corley (Corley) was presented by defendant and testified that he had interviewed Picard and taken a photograph of Picard on the day that he was assigned to investigate Smith's death. On cross-examination he was asked by counsel for the state whether Picard was a suspect in the case. Corley answered that he was not. The defendant argues that this question and this response were inadmissible because they constituted an invasion of the province of the jury. We must respectfully disagree because Corley was not asked his opinion in regard to Picard's guilt or innocence. He simply characterized the posture in which he regarded Picard at the time of his taking a statement from him and photographing him. This does not implicate the elements that were present in our prior cases wherein we disapproved of the comment by a witness upon the credibility or lack of credibility of a witness. State v. Chakouian, 537 A.2d 409 (R.I. 1988); State v. Nicoletti, 471 A.2d 613 (R.I. 1984). C. Request 25 was declined by the trial justice. Its terms are set forth below. You have heard testimony as to an incident between the victim and one John Picard on October 5, 1987, at approximately 10:15 p.m. In determining whether the State has met its burden in proving its case against the accused, you may consider the fact that a person other than Richard Houde had a motive and an opportunity to commit the crime. If you find that evidence tending to implicate another person is of sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the accused's culpability, you must vote not guilty. Here again, as in the requested instruction on the significance of motive, the defense sought to enlist the aid of the trial justice in presenting that which should have been an appropriate argument for counsel. The trial justice instructed the jury adequately on the nature and extent of the state's burden of proof. It was certainly appropriate for the defense to argue to the jury that if it believed someone else had committed the crime, the state would not have met its burden of proof. The trial justice did not err in declining to include in his instruction this element of advocacy. The trial justice did not commit reversible error in respect to the challenged rulings.