Opinion ID: 24411
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Holmes’s double jeopardy argument

Text: Holmes argues that he was subjected to double jeopardy because the federal and state prosecutions against him were intertwined such that the state prosecution was a “sham prosecution” that should bar the federal prosecution. See United States v. Paul, 853 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1988). Holmes had pleaded guilty in state court to one of the actions charged as an overt act in his federal conspiracy charge. He argues that the testimony in his federal prosecution of Officer Cogwell, a state law enforcement officer, and the testimony of the confidential informants used by Officer Cogwell in his local investigation, showed that the federal and state investigations were impermissibly intertwined. The government argues that a defendant may be prosecuted by dual sovereigns when his actions violate the laws of each. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985). Holmes has the burden of proving a prima facie double jeopardy claim, and we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 676 (5th Cir. 1995). The district court found that there was no evidence of collusion between the federal and state authorities sufficient to meet Holmes’s prima facie burden. Joint federal/state cooperation is permissible and does not automatically trigger the sham prosecution rule. United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 646, 650 (5th 14 Cir. 1992). Holmes must show not just that the two sovereigns shared resources, but that one of them dominated or controlled the prosecution of the defendant by the other. Id. Holmes never showed that a federal agent participated in his state court plea bargain. Thus, he has not shown clear error in the district court’s finding that he had not proven a prima facie case of a sham prosecution. 3. Stevie’s challenge to jury composition/trial venue We review a trial court’s exercise of substantial discretion regarding venue change and issues regarding pretrial publicity for abuse of that discretion. United States v. Parker, 877 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1989). Stevie contends that the jurors must have been prejudiced by pretrial publicity. The McKinney Courier Gazette ran two frontpage stories regarding the arrests of the alleged drug conspirators, picturing Stevie on the front page and identifying him as one of the leaders of the conspiracy (a retraction was later printed on the interior of the newspaper regarding Stevie being a leader of the conspiracy). McKinney is in Collin County, one of seven counties from which members for the jury venire were selected. Stevie argues, with no record support, that one-third of the jurors were from Collin County. 15 The court asked the jury panel (1) if any of them had heard of the case, (2) if any of them subscribed to the McKinney CourierGazette, (3) if any of them subscribed to any McKinney newspapers. No venire-member answered affirmatively. One venire-person admitted that he would be prejudiced because of publicity regarding a heroin problem in Plano, and was dismissed. Stevie’s counsel, when given the opportunity, asked no further questions of the panel members. He did not object when the jury was empaneled. Pretrial publicity can be harmful only when the publicity has so saturated the community that the inability to obtain a fair jury can be presumed. United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (5th Cir. 1975). Otherwise, the defendant must prove actual prejudice. United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 640 (5th Cir. 1977). The responses of the jury venire indicate no actual prejudice resulting from the two newspaper stories. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in neither omitting Collins County citizens from the jury nor transferring venue. 4. Stevie’s motion to suppress audio tapes/transcripts Admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 1997). We will reverse the district court’s decision to admit evidence only 16 when it has relied on an incorrect view of the law or a clearly erroneous factual finding. Id. The government has the burden of laying the foundation for the accuracy of the tape recordings; once the foundation has been laid, Stevie has the burden of proving their inaccuracy. United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 631 (5th Cir. 1995). When a participant in a taped conversation testifies that the transcript of the conversation is accurate, the foundation for admission has been established. United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1251 (5th Cir. 1997). Stevie complains that the recordings resulting from the taping of Zachery’s controlled buys were unintelligible, and that the transcripts were unreliable. The district court had found that portions of the tapes were unintelligible, but cited Fifth Circuit precedent that this would not render the tapes unreliable “unless these portions [we]re so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy, and that is a determination that is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1378 (5th Cir. 1978). Zachery testified that he spent more than eleven hours reviewing the tapes and the transcripts, and testified that, based on his review, the transcripts were accurate. This establishes the government’s burden of authentication, which Stevie does not counter by identifying any particular inaccuracies. His complaint about the unintelligibility of certain portions does not affect the 17 admissibility of the tapes and transcripts, but only affects the weight the jury might have accorded those tapes and transcripts during their deliberations. We hold, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tapes and transcripts. 5. Ortega’s challenge to the admissibility of evidence surrendered to police This evidentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1998). Ortega argues that his conviction resulted from the introduction into evidence cocaine seized from a rental car. This argument is without merit. Another co-conspirator had a rental car repossessed. At the car dealership, the dealership employees found crack and powder cocaine secreted in the trunk compartment, called police and surrendered it to them. The dealership employees were acting as the private owners of the car, not at the behest of the government, so the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply here to protect Ortega. See, e.g., United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the cocaine surrendered by the dealership to the police was not used as an exhibit against Ortega, nor was he implicated in the indictment or the trial proof with the cocaine found in the rental car. His conviction was supported with 18 the cocaine surrendered by Zachery after the controlled buy. Therefore, Ortega’s complaint regarding the seizure of this evidence is without merit. 6. Self’s challenge to admission of acts occurring prior to the time of the indictment Self did not object at the time of the introduction of the evidence of crack sales prior to 1992, so his challenge to this admission is reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 462 (5th Cir. 1984). We reverse for plain error only if “(1) there was error (2) that was clear and obvious and (3) that affected a defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 817 (5th Cir. 1997). Self contends that the admission of testimony by two of his co-conspirators that he cooked down powder cocaine into crack and distributed it to others prior to 1992, the time identified in the indictment as the commencement of the conspiracy, violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The government argues that the testimony was admitted to show Self’s role in the conspiracy, how the conspiracy was structured, and how the co-conspirators were introduced to each other. See Lokey, 945 F.2d at 834. When the evidence assists the jury by explaining the context, set-up, or motive of the charged crime, or forms “an integral and natural part 19 of an account of the crime,” it is not extrinsic and excludable under 404(b). United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1084 (5th Cir. 1995). Here, the district court did not commit plain error in admitting the testimony. 7. Jason’s Daubert challenge to the testimony regarding nature of seized substances Jason did not object at trial to the testimony of, nor seek cross-examination on the qualifications of, the forensic chemist who tested and identified the seized drugs as methamphetamines. Therefore, we review his Daubert challenge for plain error. Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 506 (5th Cir. 1999). The chemist testified regarding her experience, qualifications, and the specific tests she conducted in identifying the substance at issue. The results of those tests, in addition to her testimony, were admitted without objection or challenge on cross-examination. There is no clear and obvious error in the district court’s decision to admit this testimony.