Opinion ID: 464953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Danger of Prejudice from a Joint Trial

Text: 11 Consideration of these two specific conflicts between the duress and insanity defenses does not exhaust our treatment of the severance issue. We must next examine the closely-related question of whether the failure to sever effectively denied Wright a fair trial. Wright raises numerous reasons why he could not obtain a fair trial when tried jointly with Moss. Even though we find that Wright incurred some disadvantage from the joint trial, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in not ordering a severance. 12 Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure countenances some prejudice to a defendant from a joint trial. Rule 14 provides that If it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a joinder ... the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires (emphasis added). Hence, Rule 14 does not require reversal of a denial of severance merely because a defendant might have a better chance of acquittal if tried separately. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 434 F.2d 494, 501 (D.C.Cir.1970). We will reverse a denial of severance, however, where the failure to sever denies the defendant a fair trial. We must inquire, therefore, whether Wright was deprived of a fair trial. 13 Wright first claims that he was denied a fair trial because testimony by Moss that Wright murdered Tony Ivey and threatened to kill Moss and his family, including his eight-year-old daughter, was so inflammatory that no jury would be able fairly and impartially to consider Wright's defense. Wright's counsel renewed his motion for a severance immediately after Moss testified that Wright told him that if he did not cooperate, I will blow your family away. Tr. 1418-19. Wright's counsel also made a motion for severance at the time of Moss' testimony about Wright's version of Tony Ivey's death. Tr. 1272-77, 1453. The prejudice alleged here should be distinguished from the prejudice resulting from inconsistent defenses. In Part II.A, supra, we considered whether Moss' duress defense might tend to undermine the factual predicate of Wright's insanity defense. Here, on the other hand, we must examine whether certain aspects of Moss' defense might engender in the jury so severe a visceral reaction against Wright that the jury might convict him solely on that basis. While we find the question close, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in denying a severance on the basis of the inflammatory aspects of Moss' defense. We perceive no substantial danger that the jury convicted Wright on the basis of emotion rather than logic. The suggestion that Wright murdered Tony Ivey was effectively discounted at trial. The evidence at trial showed that Wright could not have murdered Ivey because he had been at the office in the company of others at the time of the murder. Wright testified that the police investigation after the murder suggested that the three black youths were responsible for the murder. The district court specifically assessed the impact of the Ivey incident on the jury. In denying a motion for severance the district court explained that when Wright took the stand, he established his candor, his directness, his objectivity with respect to the unfortunate events of this situation. I think it would be highly unlikely that the jury would put aside his own expressions concerning this man Ivey. Tr. 1277. While questions of credibility are, of course, for the jury, we think the trial record amply supports the district court's assessment of the impact of Moss' testimony on the jury. The trial court also agreed with Wright's counsel's characterization of Moss' testimony as the most blatant perjury I have ever heard from a defendant in a criminal case. Tr. 1452. A district court is generally in a far better position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of potentially inflammatory testimony; consequently, we will reverse a district court's denial of severance only for abuse of discretion. Despite the potentially inflammatory nature of the evidence here, we do not conclude that its effect on the jury denied Wright a fair trial. 14 Wright also contends that he was prejudiced by the joint trial because counsel for Moss became in effect a second prosecutor. Wright attempts to link his case to those in which courts have found that the taking of an adversarial stance by counsel for a co-defendant may deny a defendant a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir.1973). After examining the trial record, we reject any characterization that this trial degenerated into a contest between the two defendants. Moss' counsel engaged in very limited cross-examination of Wright's witnesses. He did not cross-examine Wright either about murdering Tony Ivey or about his insanity defense. We therefore do not find this trial to have been so prejudicial to the codefendant under multiple attack as to deny him a fair trial. United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1066 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982). 15 Wright next argues that the joint trial forced him to take the stand in order to defend against the allegation that he murdered Tony Ivey. To the extent that this argument relies on the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, we must reject the argument. The Fifth Amendment simply is not implicated when a defendant feels pressured to take the stand in order to rebut the evidence accumulated against him. Cf. United States v. Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 268 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1001, 79 L.Ed.2d 233 (1984). The real force behind this argument comes not from the Fifth Amendment but from the concern that the district court should not have allowed the introduction of Moss' testimony that Wright killed Ivey. We think, however, in light of the discussion above that the district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in admitting this evidence, and we cannot say that the prejudice to Wright was undue. 16 Finally, Wright argues that he was prejudiced by the joint trial because the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence against the two defendants. We reject this contention. The district court repeatedly charged the jury to consider Wright and Moss individually. See Tr. 1975, 2014-17. Moreover, Wright's counsel made no objection to the jury instructions on this basis. This case involved only two defendants and required the jurors to consider events of only a few days duration. Absent some more compelling showing of factual complexity, we find the danger of jury confusion to be minimal. See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1360 (D.C.Cir.1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976). 17