Opinion ID: 2637623
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Erroneous Conspiracy Instructions

Text: Although the prosecution did not charge defendant with conspiracy, it alleged conspiracy as one of the theories of liability for counts 1 through 14. The trial court therefore gave various conspiracy instructions. In instructing the jury on the vicarious liability of a conspirator for the acts of a coconspirator, the trial court used a number of standard conspiracy instructions, including CALJIC Nos. 6.11, former 6.15, 6.16 and 8.26. The trial court did not, however, include CALJIC No. 6.25 which required the jury to agree unanimously on the crimes defendant conspired to commitand CALJIC No. 6.26which contained the verdict form for such a jury findingpresumably because the information did not separately charge defendant with conspiracy. According to defendant, this omission constitutes reversible error because the jury could have convicted defendant under a conspiracy theory even if the crime was not a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Defendant, however, misreads the instructions given by the trial court. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the instructions correctly informed the jury that a conspirator may be vicariously liable for a crime committed in furtherance of a conspiracy only if that crime was a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. CALJIC No. 6.11, as given by the trial court, states in relevant part: You [the jury] must determine whether the defendant is guilty as a member of a conspiracy to commit the crime originally contemplated, and, if so, whether the crimes alleged were a natural and probable consequence of the originally contemplated criminal objective of the conspiracy. As defendant concedes, this instruction properly informed the jury that it could not find defendant guilty under a conspiracy theory if the charged crime was not the natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Neither CALJIC former No. 6.15 [6] nor CALJIC No. 6.16 [7] contradicts CALJIC No. 6.11 or suggests otherwise. Likewise, CALJIC No. 8.26 [8] which defines a defendant's liability for killings in furtherance of a conspiracycorrectly states the law and does not suggest that a conspirator may be guilty of a charged crime if that crime was not a natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy. Thus, the instructions did not contain varying and irreconcilable standards. Even assuming the instructions were erroneous, defendant shows no prejudice. According to defendant, the alleged instructional error requires reversal because the jury had no way of knowing how to limit his liability if it found that he had left the car before the rapes and murder and had withdrawn from the conspiracy. Defendant, however, does not explain how the alleged error could have confused the jury on that point. Indeed, the court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 6.20 [9] which correctly defined the limitations on liability for conspirators who withdraw from the conspiracy. Finally, the jury necessarily concluded that defendant did not leave the car before the rapes and murder because it found that defendant personally used a firearm in murdering Woodruff. Accordingly, we find no reversible error.