Opinion ID: 4164855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McFadden’s Speedy Trial Rights

Text: McFadden argues that his speedy trial rights were violated when 152 days elapsed between his final speedy trial waiver and the trial. We review “the district court’s findings of fact as they pertain to a speedy trial challenge for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Lynch, 726 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2013). We find no violation of McFadden’s speedy trial rights. The district court here made repeated, thorough on-the-record findings that failing to grant requested continuances would visit a miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., McFadden Supp. App’x at 9, 16, 24–25; Gov’t App’x at 26. McFadden is correct that this Court has suggested that continuances for plea negotiations are not explicitly excludable as “other proceedings” under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A), see United States v. Lucky, 569 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2009), but the exclusions of time for the continuances in this case were based on the interests of justice under § 3161(h)(7)(A), not on the “other proceedings” exclusion in § 3161(h)(1)(A). The district court was tasked with managing a complex, multi-defendant indictment. Given McFadden’s central role in the conspiracy, and his failure to move for a severance, it was reasonable for the district court to grant several relatively short continuances to allow other defendants to engage in plea negotiations. 3 16-264-cr (L) United States v. McFadden, Brown, & Germany McFadden also fails to demonstrate prejudice from the delay. “[P]rejudice is concerned with impediments to the ability of the defense to make its own case (e.g., if defense witnesses are made unavailable due to the government’s delay); the opportunity for the prosecution to prepare for trial does not, on its own, amount to prejudice to the defense.” United States v. Abad, 514 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2008). McFadden points to no evidence that he was impeded in presenting his case. McFadden’s ineffective assistance challenge, based on what he asserts was denial of a speedy trial, is meritless. His counsel’s performance did not fall below “an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), when, given the questionable legal basis for moving to sever or to dismiss the indictment, McFadden’s counsel declined to do so.