Opinion ID: 2156844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Grand Jury Orientation

Text: Appellant's primary argument is that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion to dismiss the indictment. He contends that the unknown detective's narcotics orientation lecture was testimony by a witness, and that a witness must be sworn or the grand jury has been tainted. The government responds that appellant cannot challenge a facially valid indictment on these grounds, and that he is, in any event, wrong in asserting that the detective's presentation violated any rule governing grand jury proceedings. While we agree with appellant that the detective who appeared before the grand jury should have been under oath, as required by statute, we conclude that any error was harmless. It is well established that the grand jury's responsibilities include both the determination whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been committed and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.... The grand jury may compel the production of evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, any witness who appears before the grand jury must first swear an oath. The oath requirement is established in this jurisdiction by D.C.Code § 14-101(a) (1995), which states: All evidence shall be given under oath according to the forms of the common law. By assuring that anyone who gives evidence against another may be held accountable for his or her statements, it discourages false or unreliable testimony. In the present case, the anonymous detective provided information to the grand jury about the behavior of typical narcotics users and sellers. We readily hold that such information was evidence as that term is used in section 14-101(a). The fact that he was not testifying about the events that occurred in appellant's individual case did not exempt him from the requirement of an oath. Moreover, the detective's presentation gave the grand jurors background details that formed an important part of the evidence in the cases that they went on to consider. For these reasons any defendant is entitled to insist that all information presented to the grand jury be provided only by witnesses who are under the solemnity of an oath. See In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455, 458 (D.C.1953) (the requirement that evidence shall be under oath is not limited to any particular proceeding). Nevertheless, it does not follow that the indictment in the instant case should have been dismissed. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988), the Supreme Court held, as a general matter, that a federal court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants. We agree with this standard and adopt it for the District of Columbia courts as well. Following Bank of Nova Scotia, we hold in this case that although it was a violation of section 14-101(a) for the government to present unsworn testimony to the grand jury, dismissal of the indictment was not required because there is nothing in the record to indicate that the violation had any substantial influence on the grand jury's decision to indict. The Court in Bank of Nova Scotia distinguished two classes of cases in which a court is asked to dismiss an indictment. The first class, which is very limited, consists of those cases in which the errors are deemed fundamental, id. at 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369that is, cases in which the structural protections of the grand jury have been so compromised as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of prejudice. Id. at 257, 108 S.Ct. 2369 (citation omitted). In such a case, an error of constitutional magnitude has occurred, and any remedy short of dismissing the indictment would be inadequate. The two specific cases within this category cited by the Court involved racial or gender discrimination in the selection of the grand jury. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (racial discrimination in selection of grand jury); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 67 S.Ct. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181 (1946) (women excluded from jury pool). The second and larger class includes those cases in which dismissal is sought for other violations which do not give rise to a presumption of prejudice. In such a case, a court must conduct a harmless-error inquiry, applying a special standard for determining prejudice: Under this standard, dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369 (citing United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The errors alleged in Bank of Nova Scotia involved violations by the prosecutor of FED.R.CRIM.P. 6, a witness immunity statute, and constitutional provisions governing grand jury proceedings, as well as matters of general practice which affected the quality and reliability of the evidence presented. In reviewing the district court's findings of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court concluded that none of the violations warranted dismissal of the indictment. 487 U.S. at 260-262, 108 S.Ct. 2369. The Court held that those violations that did occur do not, even when considered cumulatively, raise a substantial question, much less a grave doubt, as to whether they had a substantial effect on the grand jury's decision to charge. Id. at 263, 108 S.Ct. 2369. In future cases, the Court declared, [e]rrors of the kind alleged in these cases can be remedied by means other than dismissalfor example, a contempt citation, disciplinary proceedings, or simply chastising a prosecutor in a published opinion. Such remedies allow the court to focus on the culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the unprejudiced defendant. Id. The present case, like Bank of Nova Scotia, does not involve any fundamental error that would undermine the structural protections of the grand jury. The suggestion that presentation of narcotic-related information, not specific to any case that will come before the grand jury, so seriously undermines structural protections as to warrant automatic dismissal of the indictment finds no support in the case law. To the contrary, the cases cited by the Supreme Court in Bank of Nova Scotia as requiring automatic dismissal were cases which involved racial and gender discrimination in the selection of the grand juryfundamental errors of constitutional magnitude affecting the grand jury's composition. See 487 U.S. at 257, 108 S.Ct. 2369. Here, however, the conduct at issue was simply an ill-conceived procedure adopted by the United States Attorney's Office which has since been discontinued. [5] It does not, in our view, rise to the level of prosecutorial misconduct ... so systematic and pervasive as to raise a substantial and serious question about the fundamental fairness of the process which resulted in the indictment. Id. at 259, 108 S.Ct. 2369. The virtually uncontradicted testimony at trial established that the police asked for, and received, cocaine from appellant in exchange for money. In these circumstances we think it most reasonable to conclude that the grand jury's decision to indict was not substantially influenced by the general information provided by the anonymous detective, nor is there even grave doubt on the subject. We find no rational basis for a claim of prejudice and accordingly hold that any error in the proceedings before the grand jury was harmless. Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 257, 108 S.Ct. 2369; Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78, 106 S.Ct. 938 (O'Connor, J., concurring); [6] see Chambers v. United States, 564 A.2d 26, 29 (D.C.1989) (appellants cannot demonstrate any meaningful prejudice [resulting from the grand jury proceedings], which is a prerequisite to reversal of their convictions).