Opinion ID: 582662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Criminal History Departure

Text: 42 The district court justified the remainder of its upward departure on the ground that Streit's criminal history category of VI significantly underrepresented his past criminal conduct and the likelihood that he would commit further crimes. Specifically, the court found that because a number of Streit's prior sentences had been consolidated, much of Streit's prior criminal conduct was not reflected in the calculation of his criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1. S.T. 80. 43 Streit began with an offense level of 12 because of his career offender status. As discussed above, the district court then imposed an upward departure equivalent to four offense levels to account for the physical injury to the two FBI agents. We view the remainder of the court's upward departure--from a recommended range of 46-57 months to Streit's ultimate assault sentence of 72 months--as reflecting the court's departure based on Streit's criminal history. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, at 5.2 (Sentencing Table). 44 Streit argues that his sentence should be vacated because the district court failed to articulate reasons for the extent of its upward departure based on criminal history. Streit raises an issue that has not previously been addressed by this circuit in a published opinion--namely, in what manner should a district court justify the degree of an upward departure based on the inadequacy of a defendant's criminal history category when the defendant already is in category VI? We attempt to shed some light on that question as we proceed through the Lira-Barraza analysis.
45 The Sentencing Guidelines make clear that an upward departure is warranted when reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (Policy Statement). We have held that an upward departure based on the inadequacy of a defendant's criminal history category is proper only in those limited circumstances where the defendant's criminal record is significantly more serious than that of other defendants in the same category. United States v. Singleton, 917 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 853 (9th Cir.1991). 46 Such departures involve two steps. First, to aid in achieving the congressional goal of eliminating unwarranted sentencing disparity and to facilitate meaningful appellate review, the district court must specify the events in the defendant's criminal history that it believes are inadequately represented in the guidelines criminal history calculation. United States v. Hoyungowa, 930 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Cervantes-Lucatero, 889 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Wells, 878 F.2d 1232, 1232-33 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam). The district court may build the appropriate factual record by adopting a presentence report (PSR) that has made specific findings of fact regarding the defendant's criminal history that support the decision to depart. Singleton, 917 F.2d at 412-13; United States v. Gayou, 901 F.2d 746, 748-49 (9th Cir.1990). 47 Second, the sentencing court must explain the extent of its upward departure by analogy to the guidelines range for defendants in higher criminal history categories. United States v. Faulkner, 952 F.2d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d 425, 431 (9th Cir.1990); Cervantes-Lucatero, 889 F.2d at 918-19 (9th Cir.1989). We do not search the record for permissible reasons for departure; we consider the reasons actually articulated by the district court both for the departure and for the extent of the departure. Faulkner, 952 F.2d at 1071; Cervantes-Lucatero, 889 F.2d at 919. 48
49 The guidelines identify prior consolidated sentences for independent crimes committed on different occasions as one possible justification for an upward departure based on the inadequacy of a defendant's criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b). The commentary accompanying section 4A1.2 counsels that 50 [t]he court should be aware that there may be instances in which this definition [of related cases] is overly broad and will result in a criminal history score that underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public. For example, if the defendant commits a number of offenses on independent occasions separated by arrests, and the resulting criminal cases are consolidated and result in a combined sentence of eight years, counting merely three points for this factor will not adequately reflect either the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the frequency with which he commits crimes. In such circumstances, the court should consider whether departure is warranted. See § 4A1.3. 51 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n. 3). 5 See also United States v. Bishop, 921 F.2d 1068, 1071-72 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that upward departure under section 4A1.3 was justified on the basis of prior consolidated sentences), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2034, 114 L.Ed.2d 119 (1991); United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 335-36 (1st Cir.1990) (same). 52
53 The Sentencing Commission specifically considered the possibility that in certain situations category VI might not adequately reflect a defendant's prior criminality and recidivist tendencies. The Commission stated that 54 there may, on occasion, be a case of an egregious, serious criminal record in which even the guideline range for a Category VI criminal history is not adequate to reflect the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history. In such a case, a decision above the guideline range for a defendant with a Category VI criminal history may be warranted. 55 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 (emphasis added). See United States v. Singleton, 917 F.2d at 413 (affirming an upward departure from category VI). 56 Streit has a long and violent criminal history. His record reveals nine major criminal episodes, for which he has been convicted of some 17 different offenses. He was first sentenced in 1978 to five years in prison for armed robbery. He served that sentence concurrently with sentences for auto theft, two counts of second degree burglary, and one count of receiving stolen property. Streit received three criminal history points for this sentence. PSR at 7-8; U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a). In 1983, Streit was convicted of first degree murder and attempted robbery. Streit was subsequently convicted of kidnaping, burglary, auto theft, three counts of robbery, and three counts of armed criminal action. All of these convictions were consolidated into a single ten-year term of confinement, for which Streit also received just three criminal history points under the guidelines. PSR at 8-9. Streit committed the instant offenses while on parole and while charges were pending against him in Missouri for armed robbery and assault. PSR at 9-10. 57 The district court adopted the findings of the presentence report and explained its reasons for departing as follows: 58 THE COURT: With respect to the criminal history category, the Court makes an upward adjustment from criminal history category six to a criminal history Roman numeral IX, it being the judgment of the Court that the upward adjustments are appropriate to account for all of the relevant conduct, including the adequacy or inadequacy, as I would characterize it, of the criminal history points that were given or afforded, previously, considering the fact that the defendant had a number of violent--convictions for violent crimes, but received consolidated sentences. 59 S.T. 80. The district judge properly concluded that Streit's criminal record was sufficiently egregious to justify an upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.
60 Streit does not challenge the district court's factual findings or the presentence report's account of his criminal history, which the district judge adopted, and we find no error. Our focus thus turns to the third part of the Lira-Barraza analysis, the reasonableness of the extent of the district court's departure based on Streit's criminal history. 61
62 The guidelines instruct that a sentencing court departing upward on the basis of the inadequacy of a defendant's criminal history category should use, as a reference, the guideline range for a defendant with a higher ... criminal history category. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. We have interpreted this section to require that when a district court departs upward on the ground that a defendant's criminal history category underrepresents the defendant's past criminal conduct, the degree of departure must be guided by analogy to higher criminal history categories. Faulkner, 952 F.2d at 1071; Pearson, 911 F.2d at 190-91; Cervantes-Lucatero, 889 F.2d at 919. If the district court fails to articulate reasons for the extent of its departure or if the analogy is not reasonable, we must vacate and remand. United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F.2d at 431. 63
64 Because Streit was already in category VI, the district court could not readily engage in this type of departure by analogy in his case for the simple reason that there were no higher criminal history categories left. The guidelines do not tell us where to look for analogies in such situations. Examination of the sentencing table reveals that a district court generally may move to a higher sentencing range either by increasing a defendant's criminal history category and thereby moving horizontally along the sentencing table from left to right, or by increasing the defendant's offense level and moving vertically down the table. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, at 5.2. Other circuits that have considered the question have invoked both types of analogies in reviewing category VI departures. 65 The Seventh and Tenth Circuits have endorsed efforts to extrapolate along the horizontal axis of criminal history categories. In United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.1990), the court held that the reasonableness of the degree of a departure from category VI may be reviewed by reference to the structure of the Sentencing Table. Id. at 560. Observing that for any given offense level, the recommended sentencing ranges increase roughly ten to fifteen percent from one criminal history category to the next higher category, the Seventh Circuit concluded that [i]n the case of a Category VI defendant, a sentencing judge can use this ten to fifteen percent increase to guide the departure. Id. Relying on Schmude, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc), held that a sentencing court departing from category VI may assign points to the elements of a defendant's criminal history that warrant a departure to derive a new criminal history score, and then calculate an analogous sentencing range by referring to the increments between categories in the Guidelines sentencing table. Id. at 993. 6 66 The Seventh Circuit also has voiced its approval of departures beyond category VI based on vertical analogies to higher offense levels. In United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.1990), Judge Easterbrook noted that the vertical increments on the sentencing grid are identical to the horizontal increments and concluded that [a] judge who runs out of criminal history levels may read down to find the next higher range. Id. at 1062; see also United States v. Scott, 914 F.2d 959, 965 (7th Cir.1990). A number of circuits have condemned this resort to vertical analogies on the ground that the guidelines nowhere recommend it and that [a]rbitrarily moving to a new offense level when the highest criminal history category proves inadequate would skew the balancing of factors which the Commission created in the Sentencing Table. United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 607-08 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 861, 110 S.Ct. 175, 107 L.Ed.2d 131 (1989); see also United States v. Molina, 952 F.2d 514, 521-22 n. 8 (D.C.Cir.1992); United States v. Thornton, 922 F.2d 1490, 1494 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 267, 112 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990). 67 Finally, some courts have abandoned the search for suitable analogies in favor of what might be called a pure common law approach to reasonableness. Under this approach, the district court states reasons for the degree of its departure, and the appellate court relies solely on its own judgment as to whether the sentence imposed is proportional to the crime committed, in light of the past criminal history. United States v. Bernhardt, 905 F.2d 343, 346 (10th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 337 (1st Cir.1990). The apparent hope is that an initial batch of appellate pronouncements on reasonableness eventually will generate a body of rules to circumscribe the discretion of trial courts departing in these circumstances. 68 While we do not believe the Sentencing Commission intended to impose any particular mechanical formula on trial judges who exercise their discretion to depart upward from category VI in appropriate circumstances, we also do not believe that Congress's goal of bringing uniformity and proportionality to the sentencing process would be well served were we to abandon our requirement that sentencing departures be guided, so far as possible, by articulated analogies to other provisions of the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (6); Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d at 749 (The reasonableness of sentences determined without reference to identified standards would not be susceptible to rational review.). 69 We decline to mandate that sentencing judges adhere to any one particular approach to departures beyond category VI. We do require, however, that the sentencing court follow some reasonable, articulated methodology consistent with the purposes and structure of the guidelines. 70
71 The district court sought to justify its criminal history departure by resort to both horizontal and vertical analogies. It appears that the probation officer prepared an extended sentencing table in which the mathematical relationship among the sentencing ranges for the extant offense levels and criminal history categories was extrapolated in a manner akin to that endorsed by the Seventh Circuit in Schmude. At one point, the district judge stated that he planned to make the upward departure by increasing the criminal history category additional levels. S.T. 62. The judge then apparently disaggregated Streit's prior consolidated sentences to derive a new criminal history point total. At sentencing, the court and counsel repeatedly made reference to hypothetical criminal history categories of IX, X, and XII. In determining Streit's sentence, the district judge remarked that he was increasing Streit's criminal history category from category VI to category IX. S.T. 80. 72 The district judge's attempt to link the magnitude of his departure to the structure of the sentencing table was commendable. Such an approach has the virtue of preserving, at least to some degree, the relationship that the Sentencing Commission has determined should prevail between a defendant's criminal history and the severity of his sentence. Cf. United States v. Molina, 952 F.2d 514, 522 (D.C.Cir.1992) (commenting that the percentage approach to post-category VI departures described in Schmude appears to make the most sense). 73 We nevertheless must remand because the district court failed to explain adequately the reasoning process that led it to select the 72-month assault sentence it ultimately imposed. The record does not reveal how the district court calculated the extended criminal history categories upon which it relied, and the court did not provide any explanation why it deemed the intermediate categories between VI and IX to be inappropriate. Moreover, the court did not indicate which prior consolidated sentences it had determined were responsible for the underrepresentation of Streit's past criminal conduct, and it did not indicate how many additional criminal history points it was assigning to Streit. See United States v. Notrangelo, 909 F.2d 363, 366 (9th Cir.1990) (holding that it was error for the district court automatically to have taken all prior convictions into account in departing upward under section 4A1.3). We believe the district judge clearly was on the right track. His failure to give a more complete statement of reasons, however, makes it impossible for us to review the reasonableness of the extent of the departure in a meaningful way. 74
75 As an additional justification for the extent of its departure, the district court drew an analogy to the guideline sentencing range for the separate offense of aggravated assault: 76 THE COURT: And as I said earlier, those adjustments and the sentence then fit within the, I think, the guideline purposes and principles and would be comparable to the sentence for aggravated assault, in going through the guideline determinations that we have discussed previously. 77 S.T. 81. Faced with conceptual difficulty in moving laterally across the sentencing table, the district judge evidently chose a different and more serious offense to serve as a supplemental guide in increasing Streit's sentence. The guidelines do not condone this mode of reasoning. 78 The offense guideline for aggravated assault specifies a base offense level of 15, which is increased by four levels if a firearm is used. See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2. For a defendant in category VI with an offense level of 19, the sentencing table prescribes a range of 63-78 months of imprisonment. In comparing Streit's ultimate sentence with the sentence Streit might have received for aggravated assault, the district court analogized to a wholly separate substantive offense that had been rejected by the jury. 79 The commentary to the offense guideline for aggravated assault defines that offense as a felonious assault that involved (a) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e., not merely to frighten), or (b) serious bodily injury, or (c) an intent to commit another felony. U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, comment. (n. 1). At Streit's trial, however, the jury specifically declined to convict Streit of assault with a dangerous weapon and instead convicted on the lesser included offense of assault without a dangerous weapon. 80 The structure of the Sentencing Guidelines makes clear that the factors to be considered in departing from applicable criminal history categories are distinct from those relevant to departing from appropriate offense levels. Offense level departures are based on extraordinary aspects of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0. We agree with the D.C. Circuit that the guidelines assume a basic dichotomy between conduct that is related to the current offense and conduct that is part of the defendant's criminal history. United States v. Jones, 948 F.2d 732, 739 (D.C.Cir.1991); see also United States v. Thornton, 922 F.2d 1490, 1494 (10th Cir.1990) (Prior criminal conduct reflecting on the adequacy of a defendant's criminal history category does not provide the basis for an offense level departure.). Indeed, in the instant case, the district court already had increased Streit's sentence--through the section 5K2.2 departure--to reflect the physical injury to the FBI agents. 81 Finally, we note that permitting departures by vertical analogy to more serious offenses suggests no obvious limit on the district court's discretion once the court determines that a defendant's criminal history category is inadequate. We therefore join those circuits that have rejected this approach to justifying upward departures from category VI.