Opinion ID: 2490
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Mathews Factor

Text: The third Mathews factor examines the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. 893. The district court concluded that the third Mathews factor weighed in the City's favor because, in the post-September 11th environment, the City had to act quickly in response to the perceived security lapses. According to the district court, the seizure of the guns was necessary to secure an important public interest, [and] there was a need for prompt action [by the NYPD]. The district court, however, applied the third Mathews factor by weighing the City's interest only with respect to pre-deprivation due process, not post-deprivation due process. In the latter context, the existence of exigent circumstances warranting a deprivation before holding a hearing is irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is whether the City had a legitimate interest in not providing Spinelli with meaningful post-deprivation due process. Our decision in Krimstock v. Kelly is instructive. The Krimstock plaintiffs challenged a City statute that permitted the City to hold motor vehicles that were seized as a result of DWI offenses, but had not yet been subject to an actual forfeiture proceeding (i.e., post-seizure, pre-judgment vehicles). 306 F.3d at 48. In assessing the third Mathews factor, the City argued that drivers should not be permitted to challenge the validity of the City's retention of their vehicles prior to final judgment, because (1) the drivers could sell the vehicles prior to the forfeiture proceedings, id. at 64-65, and (2) the possibility existed that the drivers might commit another DWI, creating an executive urgency, id. at 66. We concluded that there were other means of ensuring that the vehicles would not be sold prior to forfeiture, id. at 65, and that the urgency that permitted the City to seize the vehicles without a pre-deprivation hearing did not extend to the post-deprivation context, because by that time the drivers would have regained their sobriety, thereby eliminating the executive urgency, id. at 66. We held that, promptly after their vehicles are seized ... as alleged instrumentalities of crime, plaintiffs must be given an opportunity to test the probable validity of the City's deprivation of the vehicles. Id. at 70. Here, the City's asserted reasons for denying Spinelli a prompt post-deprivation hearing are similar to those it advanced in Krimstock, namely, that the urgent security situation in post-September 11th New York City required the suspension of Spinelli's license and seizure of her firearms without providing due process. But this logic only explains the absence of a pre-deprivation hearing; it does not explain why Spinelli should not be allowed to promptly challenge the City's actions after the suspension and seizure. The City's policy is to deny a dealer such as Spinelli her livelihood for an indeterminate period, possibly years, even if the circumstances that led to the City's action have been remedied or never existed at all. Not only is there no benefit to the City from such a hearing delay pending investigation, but the unnecessary deprivation of the citizen's livelihood actually incrementally threatens to harm the City, which is deprived of sales taxes, while increasing the likelihood of the administrative and fiscal burdens of an unnecessary investigation. Thus, the third Mathews factor favors Spinelli.