Opinion ID: 1962322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Effect of violating a safety statute

Text: Plaintiffs contended at trial that the packaging and labeling of Flo-Free violated the requirements of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1261 et seq. (1976). The trial judge instructed the jury as to the legal effect of a violation of that statute. Holcomb claims on appeal that the instruction was incorrect. Since no objection was made at the time the instruction was given, the issue on appeal is whether the instruction deprived Holcomb of a fair trial and worked an injustice. Nyzio v. Vaillancourt, Me., 382 A.2d 856, 863 (1978); Wescott v. Vickerson, Me., 284 A.2d 902, 904 (1971); cf. State v. Daley, Me., 440 A.2d 1053 (1982) (interpreting M.R.Crim.P. 52(b), which authorizes appellate review of [o]bvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights ... although they were not brought to the attention of the court). The instruction was: Any violation of the applicable statutes by a manufacturer or distributor of a product constitutes a prima facie case of negligence. And unless explained or justified could constitute the negligence, itself. The rule in Maine is that violation of a safety statute is not negligence per se, but only evidence of negligence. See Jones v. Billings, Me., 289 A.2d 39, 41 (1972). Characterizing proof of violation of the statute as prima facie evidence of negligence is correct insofar as it states that the jury may draw an inference of negligence from the violation. But the presiding justice went further. From his statement that the violation unless explained or justified could constitute the negligence, itself, the jury might have inferred that proof of the violation shifted the burden of proof on the issue of negligence from plaintiffs to Holcomb. That would be incorrect. Insofar as Elliott v. Montgomery, 135 Me. 372, 374, 197 A. 322, 323 (1938), and Nadeau v. Perkins, 135 Me. 215, 216-17, 193 A. 877, 878 (1937), hold that a showing of statutory violation does shift the burden of proof to the defendant, we disavow them as having any continuing precedential authority. Jones v. Billings, supra , states the correct rule. However, the instruction at issue, though misleading, does not rise to the level of reversible error where no objection was made at trial. There was ample evidence otherwise supporting the jury's finding of negligence, and on appeal Holcomb makes no contention to the contrary. Flo-Free was almost pure sulfuric acid, a potent substance whose fearsome efficacy was physically demonstrated in court; [3] Holcomb never tested the container for safety; and the container had no safety cap although safety caps were available in the period in which the product was being sold. Holcomb contends that Flo-Free was marketed to and intended to be used by industrial, commercial, and institutional customers and consequently that its duty of care extended only to sophisticated users. But Flo-Free was not labeled as an industrial product and was packaged in a bottle similar in appearance to many consumer products; there was nothing to indicate that only sophisticated users should handle it or that it was unfit for use by consumers. Furthermore, plaintiffs' expert testified that Flo-Free was unsafe even for its intended purposes. In light of all this evidence, the judge's instruction on the legal effect of a violation of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, though in part wrong, did not result in any injustice or impair the basic fairness of the trial.