Opinion ID: 1617337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Damages Awarded

Text: We now turn to the correctness of the damages awarded. Before we can address the arguments of the parties in this respect, however, we must examine a problem that also confronted the trial court. The jury's verdict was an undesignated award of $300,000. We do not know precisely the elements of that award. The jury's verdict was consistent with the form the trial court directed it to use. This form gave the jury only two options, to find an amount for the plaintiff or to find for the defendant. This form was defective in that it did not permit the jury to state a finding for both the plaintiff and the defendant, e.g., for the plaintiff as to compensatory damages, and for the defendant as to punitive damages, and it was defective as unresponsive to the issues at trial. For example, absent some specific jury determination as to punitive damages, the matter of Cochran's culpability remains unresolved. Rule 49, Ala.R.Civ.P., leaves it completely in the discretion of the court whether to direct a jury to return a general verdict, a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories, or special verdicts. Committee Comments to Rule 49. Whatever form the verdict takes, however, it must respond to the dispositive factual questions posed by the issues at trial. The law does not require any particular form in which a verdict must be rendered so long as it responds substantially to the issues raised. Whitmore v. First City Nat'l Bank of Oxford, 369 So.2d 517, 521 (Ala.1979). Because of the inherent flaws in the jury verdict form, which limited the jury's response, there is no way for this Court to know what part of the award was for compensatory damages and what part, if any, was for punitive damages. Confronted with this problem, the trial court held that the jury could not have properly found compensatory damages in excess of $5,000. Then, based on that determination, it concluded that all other damages awarded by the jury must have been punitive damages. The trial court then found that $295,000 in punitive damages ($300,000 minus $5,000 compensatory damages) was excessive. The Forbuses argue that it was pure speculation for the trial court to designate what portion of the verdict was compensatory and what portion was punitive. We agree. Who can say with certainty that the jury did not award, for example, $300,000 in compensatory damages, meaning, under the trial court's reasoning, that a remittitur of $295,000 would have been in order. We do not suggest that this was the case. To the contrary, we suggest that any such calculations are speculative and improper. [A] court's right to amend a jury verdict after discharge of the jury is limited to matters of form or clerical errors that are apparent from the record.... Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 530 So.2d 1371, 1377 (Ala.1988). A court's authority to amend a verdict after the jury has been discharged cannot extend to matters of substance that a jury must determine. Id.; Alexiou v. Christu, 285 Ala. 346, 232 So.2d 595 (1970). Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in its post-trial order. The trial court improperly apportioned the jury award into punitive and compensatory damages, and, based on that improper action, erred in ordering a remittitur of punitive damages. We reinstate the jury's verdict. Having reinstated the jury's verdict, we must consider how we are to review it. How can we consider whether the amount of the jury award is excessive when we cannot know what that amount represents? The Forbuses argue that the $300,000 verdict would be supported in any event, claiming that the award was supported by proof on the question of compensatory damages alone. If the jury verdict of $300,000 would have been supported by the evidence in any event, then our inability to review it in terms of specific punitive damages or compensatory damages would be of no meaningful consequence. So too, it would be harmless error that the trial court failed to comply with Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-1 (Supp.1988), which provides: In any civil action based upon tort ..., except actions for wrongful death ..., the damages assessed by the factfinder shall be itemized as follows: (1) Past damages (2) Future damages (3) Punitive damages [5] Although we would hold that some $300,000 combinations of compensatory damages and punitive damages would be supported by the evidence in this case, we would hold, for example, that an award of $300,000 compensatory damageswhich the jury might have intended as its awardwould not be supported by the evidence. We reject the Forbuses' arguments to the contrary. Obviously, in this situation a remand for further proceedings would seem the answer. However, to justify a remand, should there not have been an objection to the court's action regarding the verdict form? Not only was there no such objection in this case, it appears that the Forbuses, Cochran, and City Realty agreed to the form of the verdict. Perhaps for tactical reasons, [6] these parties agreed with the trial court that it solicit a verdict either wholly in favor of the plaintiff, with a lump sum award, or wholly in favor of the defendants: [Attorney for the plaintiffs]: Judge, before you bring the jury in, we would like to submit to the court our verdict forms dealing with compensatory and punitive damages. Court: Let me have them. [Attorney for the defendants]: Let me say for the record, I won't ask what the court is interested in, but I will say for the record that the defendants respectfully request the court to submit the case to the jury for a general verdict. [Attorney for the plaintiffs]: Your Honor, based on that request, ... we withdraw our requested jury verdict forms. Court: In that case, the court proposes to charge the jury as to rendering a general verdict either for or against the plaintiffs-defendants.  The parties then started discussing other matters with the court. In Green Tree Acceptance, 565 So.2d at 38, we discussed the situation of unitemized verdicts and § 6-11-1. On appeal, the defendant in that case argued that the trial court's failure to use verdict forms itemizing compensatory and punitive damages, consistent with § 6-11-1, required a new trial. The defendant had not properly raised this issue in the trial court. We stated: This Court will not put a trial court in error for failure to rule on a matter that, according to the record, was neither presented to nor decided by it. Id. at 46. We declined to remand the case on that ground for a new trial. Here, no one objected to the verdict form and, in any event, we cannot properly remand this case for another jury to determine matters that were not determined in the first instance because of a situation the parties in the Forbus case agreed to. The economic and judicial resources of this state should not be so burdened. In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in apportioning the verdict of $300,000 into compensatory and punitive damages. We do not disturb the $300,000 verdict. We cannot say whether it is right or wrong; we do not know what it represents, and it could be either right or wrong, i.e., either appropriate or excessive. We decline to remand this case for further determinations that would shed light on this issue, because the parties did not object to the undesignated verdict at trial. Thus, in case 1911687 we reverse the trial court's order of remittitur, and in case 1911599 we affirm the trial court's denial of a j.n.o.v.