Opinion ID: 1429
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fee Arrangement

Text: Noe argues that Garcia's fee arrangement created a conflict of interest that deprived Noe of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Noe urges us to apply the standard pronounced in Cuyler v. Sullivan . The Supreme Court has not extended the Cuyler standard that presumes prejudice to conflicts other than those arising from situations in which an attorney represents more than one defendant. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-75, 122 S.Ct. 1237. Likewise, we have not yet determined whether Cuyler's presumed prejudice analysis extends beyond conflicts arising from multiple representation. See Covey, 377 F.3d at 907; Wemark v. Iowa, 322 F.3d 1018, 1021(8th Cir.2003). We need not decide whether Cuyler applies here, because Noe's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails under either Cuyler or Strickland. See Covey, 377 F.3d at 907 (concluding that the petitioner would lose under either Cuyler or Strickland and declining to decide the applicability of Cuyler ); Caban v. United States, 281 F.3d 778, 783-84 (8th Cir.2002) (same). Cuyler established that a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. 446 U.S. at 337, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708. This standard does not require an inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 1237. An `actual conflict,' for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel's performance. Id. The effect must be actual and demonstrable, causing the attorney to choose to engage or not to engage in particular conduct. Covey, 377 F.3d at 908. To make such a showing, the defendant must identify a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that defense counsel might have pursued, show that the alternative strategy was objectively reasonable under the facts of the case, and establish that the defense counsel's failure to pursue that strategy or tactic was linked to the actual conflict. Winfield v. Roper, 460 F.3d 1026, 1039 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Covey, 377 F.3d at 908) (internal quotations omitted). Even accepting as true Noe's unsubstantiated contention that his attorney was paid by his co-defendant's family and friends, Noe's claim fails because he cannot demonstrate an adverse effect. Noe contends that Garcia's failure to pursue the split conspiracy defense or to point the finger at Schultz establishes an actual conflict, but he has not shown that these strategies were objectively reasonable. As the district court noted, the point the finger defense would have required Garcia to argue that the government's witnesses were telling the truth about Schultz's involvement, but lying about Noe's involvement. The split conspiracy defense theory is untenable because Noe failed to present proof of the substantial evidence that the investigator working for Mattox allegedly uncovered regarding this defense, and he has not demonstrated how such a strategy could plausibly have been pursued in light of the evidence presented at trial. Because these alternate strategies, the presentation of which would strain credulity in the absence of any supporting evidence, were not objectively reasonable, Noe has not established that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel under Cuyler. Noe similarly fails to meet the ineffective assistance of counsel standard pronounced in Strickland v. Washington , which requires a petitioner to show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel's representation which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. When assessing counsel's performance, we must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Noe has failed to show that Garcia's representation was deficient. Garcia's decision not to pursue a point the finger or split conspiracy defense was a reasonable trial strategy. See James v. Iowa, 100 F.3d 586, 590 (8th Cir.1996) (Reasonable trial strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel simply because it is not successful.). Moreover, Garcia's fee arrangement was acceptable because Noe consented to third party payment and there is no evidence that the fee arrangement interfered with Garcia's independent judgment. Finally, Garcia's current disciplinary problems are by themselves insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, and Noe has failed to establish prejudice. See United States v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir.2007) (declining to extend a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule to cases where the defendant was represented by a trained and qualified attorney, albeit one with licensing problems and requiring a showing a prejudice to establish a claim). Accordingly, Noe's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails under both the Cuyler standard and the Strickland standard. Noe's argument that his constitutional right to effective assistance was violated by a possible conflict of interest also fails. See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (holding that the lower court had inappropriately granted relief based on the existence of a possible conflict and explaining an actual conflict is required).