Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Material from Defendant's First Trial

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after a prosecution witness, during cross-examination, mentioned that defendant had been on death row. When defense counsel was questioning Jona Cardona about conversations she testified she had with defendant, she stated, He called me when he was on death row. Although the witness's statement did not reveal to the jury that defendant had been on death row as a result of prior proceedings in this same case, defense counsel subsequently revealed that circumstance. Counsel asked the witness, Did you not learn that Mr. Ledesma was previously convicted and went to death row in this case because he was incompetently represented, that his attorney was on drugs and gambling during the trial, and because of that the Supreme Court ruled that he had an unfair trial and that's why we are back today? The witness replied that she did not know, although she might have read about it in the papers. Counsel further asked, And you learned, did you not, that he had gone to death row or been sentenced because he had an attorney who did no investigation, put on a false defense to the court, himself, was on PCP and other drugs during trial, and was addicted to gambling. . . . The prosecutor objected to that question, and the court sustained the objection. When questioning resumed, defense counsel referred once again to calls that defendant had made to the witness during those many years that he sat on death row. A few minutes later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. He argued the prosecutor was responsible for the witness and should have told her in advance not to mention defendant's having been on death row. Once that information was revealed, defense counsel tried to minimize the prejudice by trying to explain the reason for the new trial, but was stopped by the court when it sustained the prosecutor's objection. Defense counsel argued that no admonition the court could give would erase this from the minds of the jurors. The prosecutor explained that he did admonish this witness not to mention the previous trial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, noting that it was defense counsel's question that indicated that the defendant was on death row as a result of prior proceedings in this same case. Defense counsel made a strategic decision to avoid juror speculation concerning whether defendant had committed another murder and to attempt to mitigate the damaging effects of this information by explaining to the jury that defendant previously had been convicted of the same offense for which he now was being tried but that he had not had an adequate defense at his previous trial. Although objections had been sustained to counsel's questions to Cardona about the prior trial, it was subsequently made clear through other witnesses that defendant's prior trial was for the same offense and that prior defense counsel had not conducted a thorough defense. For example, when the prosecution attempted to impeach defense witnesses who testified about defendant's drug use on the grounds that they had not mentioned the subject in the prior trial, defense counsel brought out the circumstance that the prior defense attorney had not questioned them on the subject. One of the defense experts, Dr. Evans, testified that prior defense counsel did not have psychological tests of defendant performed. Prosecution witness Dr. Glathe testified under cross-examination that he had performed only the brief examination of defendant that prior defense counsel had asked him to perform, and that the results of tests that had been performed subsequently would have been helpful in assessing defendant. The issue here is whether the witness's comment was so incurably prejudicial that a new trial was required. A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) A witness's volunteered statement can, under some circumstances, provide the basis for a finding of incurable prejudice. (See People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 565, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 [motion for mistrial properly was denied because court's admonition and witness's later testimony under cross-examination dispelled prejudice]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 152, 107 Cal.Rptr. 34, 507 P.2d 642 [witness's inadvertent answer was insufficiently prejudicial to justify a mistrial].) But we do not presume that knowledge that a defendant previously has been convicted and is being retried is incurably prejudicial. (See People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 468, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107 [claim that trial court improperly disclosed to jury that the defendant previously had been sentenced to death for the same offense was waived by counsel's tactical failure to object, and was not prejudicial].) In the present case, the length of time between the crime and the trial and the numerous unavoidable references to witnesses' prior statements created a high risk that the jury would become aware that defendant had been tried previously. As the high court has recognized, it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. ( Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 [verdict did not deny due process, even though one juror had applied for employment with the prosecutor's office during the trial, absent showing of actual bias].) We find no basis for concluding, on the present record, that the knowledge that defendant previously had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death was incurably prejudicial. Furthermore, defense counsel made a strategic decision to inform the jury that defendant previously had been convicted of the same offense, rather than a different crime, and that his conviction was reversed because of the inadequate defense provided by his attorney. Counsel's approach appears to be an appropriate attempt to minimize damage and speculation, particularly in light of the circumstance that the jury inevitably would learn that defendant had been on death row if the case went to a penalty phase. [8] Defendant argues that the jury's knowledge that the first jury had convicted him for the same offense was prejudicial not only because it may have influenced the jury's verdict directly, but also because it enhanced the credibility of prosecution witnesses Michael Shay, Floyd Cowdell, and Sylvia Ontiveros, who had testified at the first trial and whose testimony apparently had been accepted by the first jury. The jury was given the standard instruction, You must decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial and not from any other source. We presume the jury followed that instruction. [9] There is no reason to believe that the jurors, who observed each of these witnesses, felt compelled to ignore the court's instruction and defer to the judgment of a different jury that resulted from a different trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the witness's comment did not require a mistrial. [10]
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to defendant's false testimony at his first trial during cross-examination of defense witnesses. Testifying at his first trial, defendant denied committing the robbery or murder, claiming that on the day of the gas station robbery he had loaned his motorcycle to two friends, who later told him they had committed the robbery. At the retrial, the prosecutor asked defense expert Dr. Evans whether she had reviewed defendant's prior testimony. When defense counsel objected, the court asked the prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, whether he would be getting into the defendant's testimony. At that point, the court conducted a bench conference and directed the prosecutor not to pursue that line of questioning. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked defense witness Dr. Rosenthal whether defendant had admitted to him that he previously lied in court about this matter. Dr. Rosenthal did not directly answer but instead attempted to clarify the question. After the court overruled defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor asked whether Dr. Rosenthal was comfortable relying upon information provided by a man who admitted that he lied in court. The court sustained defense counsel's objection. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor's question denied defendant a fair trial and violated the trial court's prior ruling (in the context of the examination of Dr. Evans) that defendant's prior testimony was inadmissible. The prosecutor argued that the question was based on Dr. Rosenthal's notes, which indicated that defendant told him he had lied at the first trial. The court denied defendant's motion for mistrial, concluding there was no misconduct by the prosecutor and no prejudice. Defendant contends his testimony at his first trial was inadmissible at his second trial because it was a direct result of the ineffectiveness of his first attorney. (See People v. Karlin (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 227, 232, 41 Cal.Rptr. 786 [trial court erred in admitting at trial a confession the defendant made at his preliminary hearing, because his attorney had a conflict of interest that prevented her from providing effective assistance and the defendant's testimony at the preliminary hearing was the product of the failure to honor his constitutional right to adequate legal representation].) In our prior opinion, we upheld the referee's conclusion that Attorney Parrish took an active part in the decision to use, and in preparation of, the alibi defense. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 221, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) The decision to present the false alibi derived from Parrish's ineffective assistance in failing to undertake adequate investigation and research, especially with regard to the issue of diminished capacity. We need not decide whether or not the prosecutor's reference to defendant's prior testimony was a proper means of impeaching the defense's expert witnesses because, even assuming for the purposes of discussion that it was not, defendant has not shown that the prosecutor's questions caused prejudice that was incurable by admonition or instruction. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) As noted earlier, [w]hether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's objections were sustained by the trial court, and neither witness answered the questions. The jury did not hear specific evidence about what defendant said in his prior testimony. Defense counsel did not request the court to admonish the jury to ignore the question and, in any event, the jury was instructed that questions are not evidence. Furthermore, because defendant did not testify at the second trial, the defense case did not rest upon his credibility. The jury heard other evidence that suggested defendant was not always truthful; indeed, the defense theory was that he made numerous false admissions about his participation in the crime. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor's brief reference to defendant's lying in his prior testimony was so prejudicial as to require a mistrial. [11]
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly was permitted to impeach defense witnesses Adelita Jordon, Pasqual Ledesma, and Ruben Gomez with their testimony at the previous trial. Defendant asserts the prosecutor's ability to impeach these witnesses is attributable to Attorney Parrish's ineffective assistance. In Ledesma I, this court concluded that Attorney Parrish had failed to investigate adequately a diminished capacity defense based upon defendant's drug use. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 223, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) As a result of this failure, the witnesses did not testify at the first trial concerning defendant's drug use. Subsequently at the retrial, the prosecutor was able to use these (and other) omissions and inconsistencies between their earlier testimony and their current testimony to imply that their current testimony was fabricated. Defendant cites no authority establishing an absolute bar to the prosecution's use of testimony from a previous trial at which the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, decisions that have addressed such issues have examined the circumstances surrounding the prior testimony and how it was used in the subsequent trial, to determine whether the evidence at issue is attributable to counsel's ineffective assistance and whether its use denied the defendant a fair trial in the subsequent proceeding. (See, e.g., People v. Sixto (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 374, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 264 [upholding trial court's denial of motion for certain findings and for exclusion of evidence as means of curing effect of ineffective assistance of counsel at prior trial]; People v. Karlin, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 227, 41 Cal.Rptr. 786 [the defendant's admissions made at preliminary hearing, when his attorney had a conflict of interest, could not be used at his subsequent trial]; see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States (D.C.1979) 407 A.2d 626 [the defendant's testimony at first trial, after which a mistrial was declared due to ineffective assistance of counsel, could be used at second trial only for impeachment purposes]; People v. Duncan (1988) 173 Ill. App.3d 554, 123 Ill.Dec. 422, 527 N.E.2d 1060, 1062 [because ineffective assistance of counsel colored the entire proceeding, the defendant's testimony at first trial could not be used in second trial except for purposes of impeachment].) Even if the failure of these witnesses to testify at the first trial concerning defendant's drug use may be attributed to prior counsel's ineffective assistance, we do not find that the use of their prior testimony for impeachment purposes denied defendant a fair trial. Defense counsel had a full opportunity to rehabilitate these witnesses and to permit them to explain discrepancies between their prior testimony and their subsequent testimony. Adelita Jordon testified for the defense that after she and defendant separated, he began using PCP and there was a substantial change in his behavior. She remembered that when she served him with marital dissolution papers, he was very shaky and did not make sense. The prosecutor cross-examined her regarding her prior testimony that when defendant came to visit her and her daughters he was polite and pleasant, that she did not recall whether defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs at the time she served him, and that he appeared to be straight on other occasions when she saw him at her mother's house. When asked about these discrepancies, she said she had been nervous at the prior trial. On redirect examination, she testified that at the previous trial defense counsel did not ask her anything about defendant using drugs and he did not ask her whether he was acting strange. The prosecutor questioned witness Ruben Gomez concerning why he had not mentioned in his previous testimony that Jona Cardona told him in 1979 that she heard defendant did not commit the murder and that someone named Crazy Joe had done so. On redirect examination, Gomez testified that at the first trial defendant's lawyer asked Gomez only a few questions concerning whether defendant was a nice person and did not ask him about drug use. Gomez also explained that he had heard many rumors concerning whether defendant had committed the crime, and that the conversation with Jona Cardona stood out in his mind only because she now had become a witness in the case and had testified differently from what she told him back in 1979. Furthermore, Gomez testified, he mentioned the conversation as soon as defense counsel told him she was a witness. Defendant's brother Pasqual Ledesma testified he never had seen defendant use drugs but he had observed him acting as if he were in a daze, out of contact with reality, and in a state in which he just was not himself. The prosecutor cross-examined defendant's brother concerning his prior testimony, in which he stated he had not seen defendant under the influence of drugs but had only heard rumors about his drug use. Pasqual responded that, not being an expert in such matters, he did not necessarily know whether his brother was under the influence of drugs and that he had not been asked at the prior trial whether his brother seemed to be out of contact with reality. On redirect examination, Pasqual further testified that since defendant's first trial, Pasqual had learned more about drug use and had thought more about his brother's behavior. As demonstrated above, each of these witnesses was able to provide plausible explanations for omissions from their testimony at the first trial, including prior defense counsel's failure to develop the issue. Under these circumstances, prior counsel's ineffective assistance did not deny defendant a fair retrial.