Opinion ID: 1134368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Plea

Text: Appellant claims the trial court erred by refusing to vacate the plea agreement. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(f) provides: Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty. The court may, in its discretion, and shall upon good cause, at any time before a sentence, permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn... . A plea of guilty is both a confession of guilt in open court and an agreement for the entry of a conviction. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Williams v. State, 316 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1975). Appellant does not argue that his plea was involuntary, that he did not understand the nature of the charges, or that the plea lacked a factual basis. Instead, Long asserts that the plea should be set aside because the agreement was entered into inadvisedly and the defendant [Long] could not possibly receive a fair sentencing phase trial under the plea agreement. The principal point of appellant's argument is that, because the confession's admissibility was in question, the plea agreement must be invalidated. We disagree. In this case, appellant received multiple life sentences for each of the other seven murders and eight sexual battery offenses with which he was charged in Hillsborough County, all but one of which were concurrent sentences, and an agreement not to use those convictions in the penalty phase of this proceeding. Appellant entered the plea after extended discussions with counsel and the court. On its face, the plea agreement reflects that the number of possible offenses in Hillsborough County for which a death sentence could be imposed was reduced from seven to one. The record clearly reflects that appellant made an informed choice with full knowledge that the admissibility of the confession was an issue to which he was waiving his appeal rights. The guilty plea itself is a confession. Appellant is arguing that, because the confession entered into on November 16, 1984, was later invalidated, see Long v. State, 517 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1987), the confession by guilty plea entered on December 12, 1985, should also be declared invalid. In Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970), the United States Supreme Court rejected Parker's claim that his plea was involuntary because it was made on the advice of his counsel who thought his prior confession was admissible. Parker, who was charged with burglary and rape, had confessed and later entered a guilty plea. He contended that his guilty plea was invalid because the plea was the product of a coerced confession that was obtained in clear violation of Miranda. The Supreme Court stated Parker's position as follows: On the assumption that Parker's confession was inadmissible, there remains the question whether his plea, even if voluntary, was unintelligently made because his counsel mistakenly thought his confession was admissible. As we understand it, Parker's position necessarily implies that his decision to plead rested on the strength of the case against him: absent the confession, his chances of acquittal were good and he would have chosen to stand trial; but given the confession, the evidence was too strong and it was to his advantage to plead guilty and limit the possible penalty to life imprisonment. On this assumption, had Parker and his counsel thought the confession inadmissible, there would have been a plea of not guilty and a trial to a jury. But counsel apparently deemed the confession admissible and his advice to plead guilty was followed by his client. Parker now considers his confession involuntary and inadmissible. The import of this claim is that he suffered from bad advice and that had he been correctly counseled he would have gone to trial rather than enter a guilty plea. He suggests that he is entitled to plead again, a suggestion that we reject. Id. at 796 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Further, we note that in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), the Supreme Court held that a guilty plea, motivated by existence of a coerced confession, was not subject to a collateral attack if the defendant had counsel unless counsel was incompetent. There is no question from our review of this record that appellant's decision to plead guilty, after consulting with his attorney, was a tactical decision. Under this plea agreement, if counsel could obtain a jury recommendation of life because of appellant's mental problems, a life sentence could probably be sustained and appellant would not be subject to be tried for any other offenses in Hillsborough County for which the death penalty could be imposed. We find no basis in this record to show that appellant's counsel was incompetent or ineffective. Under the facts, the plea agreement was clearly voluntary and entered with appellant's full understanding that he was expressly waiving his right to challenge the confession's admissibility. To accept appellant's argument would mean that there never could be an express waiver of prior legal challenges in pretrial matters by a guilty plea. [4] As reiterated above, that is not the law. Since we have upheld the validity of the plea, appellant's other related claims are without merit.