Opinion ID: 2210518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Psychiatric Testimony Regarding Premeditation

Text: Appellant claimed that in prohibiting expert psychiatric testimony from the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial, the trial court precluded his defense as to the element of premeditation and thereby denied him due process of law. Appellant's claim is not new to this court. In State v. Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703 (Minn.1982), we held expert psychiatric testimony inadmissible with respect to the elements of premeditation and intent. Id. at 706. Although appellant correctly indicates that Bouwman focused almost exclusively on the rationale for precluding such testimony as to the element of criminal intent, we do not read Bouwman to permit a meaningful distinction between intent and premeditation with respect to our prohibition of psychiatric testimony. In Bouwman, we reasoned that psychiatric testimony is irrelevant as to intent because intent must almost always be inferred from the circumstances surrounding a particular crime. See Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705. Essentially, the fact finder is presented with physical evidence related to a given act and asked to draw on its sensory perceptions, life experiences, and common sense to determine whether that act was indeed intentional. Id. Because psychiatric evidence does not relate to the physical evidence upon which the jury is to determine the issue of intent, it is irrelevant to that issue and cannot be admitted either to prove or to disprove it. Id. Such evidence only becomes relevant when a criminal defendant's mental incapacity is actually put into issue  that is, in phase two of a bifurcated trial. See Minn.R.Crim.P. 20.02, subd. 6(2)-(4); see also Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705. Bouwman does not permit a different result with respect to premeditation. Although premeditation [7] involves more than an intent to kill, it, like intent, [8] is subjective and must be inferred from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the crime. State v. Ulm, 326 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Minn.1982) (citing State v. McCullum, 289 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Minn. 1979)); see also Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705. Indeed, both elements must be inferred from physical evidence related to a particular act. See Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705. Thus, psychiatric testimony is no more relevant to determining premeditation than it is to the determination of intent. Further, this court has followed Bouwman in rejecting subsequent challenges to the prohibition of psychiatric testimony as to the element of premeditation without developing a separate, premeditation-based rationale. See State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709, 715-17 (Minn.1982) (psychiatric testimony confined to mental illness phase of trial and not admissible with respect to determining premeditation); State v. Jackman, 396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn.1986) (affirming rejection of psychiatric testimony on the issue of premeditation). Appellant has not elucidated, and we do not now perceive, a means by which we might permit the introduction of psychiatric testimony as to premeditation without dismantling the entire bifurcated trial process. We therefore reiterate our conclusion in Bouwman that psychiatric testimony is inadmissible as to the element of premeditation. [9] This court previously concluded that prohibiting psychiatric testimony from the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial does not violate a criminal defendant's right to due process of law. See State v. Jackman, 396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn.1986). In Jackman, the trial court refused defendant Jackman's request to introduce psychiatric testimony regarding premeditation and intent during phase one of his bifurcated, first degree murder trial. Id. at 27. On appeal, Jackman argued that the trial court thereby denied him due process of law. Id. at 29. As does appellant here, he contended that precluding such testimony effectively denied him the opportunity to defend against the state's allegation that he intended and premeditated his conduct. Id. This court, however, rejected that claim, holding that prohibiting psychiatric testimony from the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial does not impinge the guarantee of due process of law. Id. Finding no reason to reach a different result here, we again conclude that prohibiting a criminal defendant from introducing testimony we have consistently deemed irrelevant, see Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d at 705, does not violate that individual's right to due process. In applying the due process clause of the Minnesota Constitution, Minn. Const. art. I, § 7, this court is bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court regarding what is prohibited by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. Oman, 261 Minn. 10, 21, 110 N.W.2d 514, 522-23 (1961). The United States Supreme Court has not recently addressed the constitutionality of excluding psychiatric testimony from the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial. However, in 1929 and again in 1942, it dismissed due process challenges to a bifurcated trial procedure similar to that presently used in Minnesota for want of a substantial federal question. See Troche v. California, 280 U.S. 524, 50 S.Ct. 87, 74 L.Ed. 592 (1929); Coleman v. California, 317 U.S. 596, 63 S.Ct. 162, 87 L.Ed. 487 (1942). These dismissals, though summary, operate as decisions on the merits of the claims raised, see Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2289, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), and indicate that a bifurcated trial procedure in which psychiatric testimony is inadmissible on the issue of premeditation does not violate the federal due process guarantee. [10]