Opinion ID: 891593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Confession Was Properly Admitted

Text: {23} Defendant argues that his confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed by the district court because he has only an eighth grade education and because he was intimidated by the discussion of the death penalty during the interrogation. {24} A reviewing court will examine the totality of the circumstances to determine as a threshold matter of law whether the State has proved by the preponderance of the evidence that [a] [d]efendant's confession was voluntary. State v. Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 431, 134 P.3d 122. Voluntariness means freedom from official coercion. State v. Sanders, 2000-NMSC-032, ¶ 6, 129 N.M. 728, 13 P.3d 460 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A confession is coerced when the Defendant's will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination [was] critically impaired. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Direct or implied promises extended to a Defendant do not make the ensuing confession per se involuntary; rather, they are merely one factor to be considered in analyzing the totality of the circumstances. Id. ¶ 7. {25} First, defense counsel argues that Defendant's confession was involuntary because he has only an eighth grade education and a history of drifting from job to job. However, involuntariness requires official coercion: there must be an essential link between coercive activity of the State... and a resulting confession by a defendant. State v. Munoz, 1998-NMSC-048, ¶ 21, 126 N.M. 535, 972 P.2d 847 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However uneducated or unsophisticated Defendant may be, that alone is insufficient to make his confession involuntary without evidence that the officers took advantage of his lack of sophistication and used it to coerce him into making his incriminating statement. See Lobato, 2006-NMCA-051, ¶ 9 (A confession is involuntary only if official coercion has occurred.) {26} Next, Defendant claims that he confessed to killing Victim only out of fear of death after the prospect of his receiving the death penalty was discussed in the interrogation. Although Defendant's appellate counsel claims that the confession was involuntary because the officers essentially threatened Defendant with the death penalty, Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he was the one to introduce the prospect of the death penalty during the interrogation. {27} From Defendant's testimony at the suppression hearing, it seems that his claim that he confessed only out of fear of death essentially collapses into a claim that the confession was involuntary because the officers promised that they would advocate on his behalf with the district attorney about not seeking the death penalty for him. However, this Court has held that the existence of promises or threats extended to a suspect does not make any ensuing confession per se involuntary; rather, it is merely one factor to be considered in analyzing the totality of the circumstances. See Sanders, 2000-NMSC-032, ¶¶ 7, 10. Since Defendant points to no more reasons why his confession was involuntary, we cannot conclude that his will [was] overborne and his capacity for self-determination [was] critically impaired. Id. ¶ 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court properly admitted Defendant's confession.