Opinion ID: 3172726
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: MCRA Claim

Text: On the last page and one-half of his complaint, Snyder asserted a claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12, §§ 11H, 11I. This claim incorporated all of the allegations and theories of liability asserted in the federal claims. They make no reference to any theory of liability based on notions of either free speech or excessive fines. Nor do they add any factual allegations that might point to or support any such theories of liability. Specifically, there is no allegation that would suggest that any fine imposed was excessive, nor is there any allegation that the retaliatory campaign alleged was based on anything other than Collura's firing. Finally, Snyder raised no such theories in opposing the motion to dismiss, nor did he otherwise raise them in response to the original motion for summary judgment until after discovery closed. Accordingly, for the same reasons that we affirm the dismissal of the federal claims, we reject as well Snyder's effort to assert state law versions of those same claims. And the same logic leads us to reject Snyder's late attempt to assert two other state-law rights: the right to impartial interpretation of the laws, Mass. Const. pt. 1, Art. XXIX, and the right to access the courts, id. Amend. XLVIII, pt. 2, § 2 ¶ 3. Snyder's complaint did, however, fairly raise one state law theory of liability not incorporated in the section 1983 count. - 15 - His complaint asserts that the conduct of the defendants as described in the complaint violated a state law right to own land and use and enjoy it for his comfort and profit without harassment and unlawful interference. Apart from its cameo role in the complaint, this theory was never again discussed by Snyder beyond brief references in his briefs submitted to us now and in his opposition to the renewed motion for summary judgment. In support of this claim on appeal, Snyder does no more than point, in passing, to a Massachusetts case holding that the plaintiffs stated an MCRA claim by alleging that a neighborhood group's threatening and aggressive opposition to the construction of a tennis court, when the proposed construction violated no zoning law, impinged upon the plaintiffs' constitutionally-secure property rights. Bell v. Mazza, 474 N.E.2d 1111 (Mass. 1985); see also Ayasli v. Armstrong, 780 N.E.2d 926, 941 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (Rapoza, J., dissenting) (noting that in Bell, the plaintiffs complied with all relevant regulations and were without fault in the development of their land. (citing Bell v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Cohasset, 437 N.E.2d 532 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982))). While we are skeptical that Snyder's complaint could fairly be read to state such a claim,2 Snyder's wholly inadequate briefing on this point precludes our review of its merits. 2 In Bell, the Supreme Judicial Court was clear that MCRA liability did not attend the pursuit of legal rights absent - 16 - It is a settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived. United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990). As we have noted, [i]t is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones. Id. This rule is commonly deployed . . . against ancillary arguments tossed carelessly against the wall in the hope that one might stick. United States v. Zayas-Ortiz, 808 F.3d 520, 524 n.1 (1st Cir. 2015). Through perfunctory briefing, Snyder has waived this arm of his complaint.