Opinion ID: 2600503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Higgins

Text: ¶ 8 On the evening of October 20, 2001, Washington State Patrol Trooper Cheek began to follow Kenneth D. Higgins' car after witnesses reported him driving erratically. After observing sustained weaving, Trooper Cheek stopped Higgins' car. A video camera mounted in the trooper's patrol car made a sound and video recording of their conversation. ¶ 9 After approaching the driver's side window of Higgins' car, Trooper Cheek told Higgins that he was being recorded. CP (Higgins) (hereinafter HCP) at 20. Higgins responded to the trooper's questions but refused to participate in a field sobriety test. Trooper Cheek arrested Higgins for DUI. After placing Higgins in the patrol car, Trooper Cheek read Higgins his Miranda [3] rights and stated that he was reminding him that he was being recorded. HCP at 3. ¶ 10 At a pretrial hearing in King County District Court, Higgins moved to suppress the videotape and all evidence gathered during the use of the videotape under the privacy act. HCP at 5. Higgins argued that the privacy act requires police officers to specifically inform traffic stop detainees that a sound recording is being made, rather than merely a recording. HCP at 8. The district court agreed and ordered the suppression of the recording and all other evidence related to Higgins' traffic stop. ¶ 11 The State appealed to the King County Superior Court, which reversed the district court's suppression order and held that traffic stop conversations are not private, or alternatively, that Trooper Cheek adequately informed Higgins that he was being recorded. Higgins appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the superior court, and concluded that an officer need not use the word sound when advising a detainee that he is being recorded. Lewis, 125 Wash.App. at 684, 105 P.3d 1029. [4]