Opinion ID: 4525098
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Procedural-Due-Process Analysis

Text: Meskel and Zerezghi contend that the government’s use of undisclosed records like the rental application in making a determination of marriage fraud was unconstitutional. We agree. Since Zerezghi has a constitutionally protected interest in the grant of the I-130 petition, “we must then determine whether additional process was due.” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157. Three factors guide the analysis: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 4 The formal denial letter included a bit more information about the “records” in the form of a vague reference to the “testimony of the manager of Mr. Ghidei’s previously associated address.” But it still did not mention the rental application, name the manager, describe his “testimony” in any way, or specify the “previously associated address.” 18 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). All three of these factors favor Meskel and Zerezghi. Ching held that the first Mathews factor—the private interest affected by the government’s action—favors the couple that filed an I-130 petition, for three reasons. First, a finding of past marriage fraud often means that the noncitizen spouse “faces imminent removal from the United States, thus undoubtedly causing immense hardship to herself and her husband.” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157. Second, “[t]he right to marry and to enjoy marriage are unquestionably liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Ibid. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). Third, “[t]he right to live with and not be separated from one’s immediate family is ‘a right that ranks high among the interests of the individual’ and that cannot be taken away without procedural due process.” Ching, 725 F.3d at 1157 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982)). All three rationales apply with equal force in this case, and so the first Mathews factor favors Meskel and Zerezghi. The third Mathews factor—“the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail”—similarly favors the couple. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The government interest in immigration enforcement in general is surely substantial. But the question here is not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement but its interest in not disclosing the information on which it based its decision. As to that ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 19 interest, the government does not assert that the rental application is confidential or that its disclosure would be even minimally expensive. Indeed, the government’s briefing does not contest that its interest in withholding the document would be quite low. Thus this factor, too, favors the couple. The most contested Mathews factor in this case is the second one—“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the constitutionally protected] interest” and “the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Ibid. Meskel and Zerezghi argue that USCIS’s nondisclosure of the rental application during its decisionmaking process violated due process, and that the agency should have shared with them all documents upon which it based its determinations of marriage fraud prior to issuing its decision. The couple maintains that if they had known about the rental application, they would have researched the listed addresses, interviewed building managers, and used other methods to establish that Ghidei had not actually been living outside of the marital residence, but had only occasionally appeared at or patronized the other addresses. We agreed with a very similar argument in ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2015). The case involved a State Department program that allowed foreign citizens to visit the United States on cultural and educational exchanges. ASSE was an organization that found qualifying visitors, sponsored them for visas, and placed them with third-party host organizations. Id. at 1064–65. Under the program’s rules, the State Department could sanction ASSE for any misconduct committed by the third-party host. Id. at 1065. One of the program’s participants complained to the State Department about the conditions at her host 20 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS organization and, after an investigation, the Department “provided ASSE with a written Notice of Intent to impose sanctions.” Id. at 1067. The notice named the host organization and the complaining program participant, and summarized that the participant reported “having endured almost 30 separate instances of harassment, threats regarding her immigration status, and threats to her family if she did not remain silent about the working conditions imposed by” the host. Id. at 1077. However, the Department never produced a transcript nor any notes from its interview with the participant. Ibid. We held that the Department violated procedural due process by not providing ASSE with “complete interview notes” associated with the participant’s complaint, because withholding such documents precluded ASSE from having “an opportunity to rebut the details of the harassment.” Ibid. We reasoned that “had the Department given ASSE more details about [the] accusations” then ASSE “may have been able to produce evidence refuting them” and the evidence could “have affected the Department’s decision as to the severity of sanctions, or whether to even impose sanctions at all.” Ibid. Meskel and Zerezghi’s claim is similar to ASSE’s. The couple contends that if they had been given the rental application, they would have been able to refute (or at least attempt to refute) the allegation that Meskel’s first husband lived at the addresses listed on the application instead of with her. Importantly, the summary that the State Department issued in ASSE was much more specific than the one that USCIS issued to Meskel and Zerezghi, yet it was still constitutionally deficient. The State Department’s summary provided details about the identity of the complainant, the parties involved, and the general contents of the allegations. ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 21 Here, by contrast, USCIS’s Notice of Intent to Deny provided no crucial details and did not even list specific documents that USCIS had in its possession other than a vague reference to certain “records.” If the ASSE notice violated due process, then the much vaguer notice in this case did as well, especially in light of the harsh marriagefraud penalty. Kaur v. Holder, 561 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2009), reinforces this conclusion. In Kaur, the BIA denied the plaintiff asylum by relying on classified information submitted by the Department of Homeland Security. Id. at 960. The Department gave Kaur a short summary of the classified evidence which stated, in part, that “reliable confidential sources have reported that Kaur has conspired to engage in alien smuggling; has attempted to obtain fraudulent documents; and has engaged in immigration fraud by conspiring to supply false documents for others.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the BIA’s “use of the secret evidence without giving Kaur a proper summary of that evidence was fundamentally unfair and violated her due process rights,” noting that “Kaur cannot rebut what has not been alleged.” Id. at 961, 962. Again, the same situation exists in our case: Zerezghi and Meskel, back in 2011, received a “conclusory and opaque” statement rather than “a proper summary” of the rental application. Id. at 961–62. The government has three responses. First, USCIS had apparently informed Meskel back in 2011 about the rental application when it denied her application to remove the conditional status of her permanent residency during her marriage to Ghidei. USCIS’s denial of that application, dated December 10, 2011—approximately four years before Zerezghi filed the I-130 petition in this case—stated that 22 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS “officers visited the management office of the Alderwood Heights apartment complex” and that “[t]he manager of the apartment complex provided USCIS” with a copy of Ghidei’s rental application. The denial then listed the previous addresses provided on the 2008 rental application. Thus, according to the government, Meskel and Zerezghi essentially had notice about the 2008 rental application and simply chose to not act on it. However, the government’s contention misconstrues Meskel and Zerezghi’s argument. Even if the couple— actually only Meskel, as Zerezghi was not a party to the earlier proceeding—had access to a short description of the rental application buried within the files of a different proceeding that had ended years earlier, they still never had access to the actual document. The couple also had no way of knowing that the application summarized by USCIS in the previous proceeding was also what the agency had relied on in the current proceeding, because USCIS noted only that it had “records indicat[ing] that Mr. Ghidei was living . . . at another location during the relevant time period.” It never specified what those “records” were, and did not specifically connect that statement to a specific rental application which, though mentioned in a previous proceeding, the couple had never been given. Put simply, USCIS’s statement did not allow the couple to know what to investigate or what to rebut against. “Procedural due process requires that a party against whom an agency has proceeded be allowed to rebut evidence offered by the agency if that evidence is relevant.” Carnation Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 641 F.2d 801, 803 (9th Cir. 1981). Next, the government contends the Notice of Intent to Deny put the couple on notice of the agency’s conclusion that Ghidei had not been living at the marital home during ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 23 Meskel’s first marriage. But this argument contradicts Kaur and ASSE, for in both cases the government had issued documents that simply summarized findings without disclosing the underlying documents themselves. In Kaur, the summary issued by USCIS put the asylum applicant on notice of the alleged smuggling and fraud, and the State Department document in ASSE put the company on notice of the accusations of misconduct against its host organization, but in neither case did the government agency divulge specific, rebuttable details about the situation or produce the underlying documents. We held that the notices provided in both cases were constitutionally insufficient. An agency cannot satisfy due process merely by giving notice of the conclusion it intends to reach. In our case, the Notice of Intent to Deny was, “at best, conclusory and opaque.” Kaur, 561 F.3d at 961. Since Meskel and Zerezghi did not have access to the rental application until after the administrative record had been filed in the district court, they “did not have a meaningful opportunity to rebut” the BIA’s allegations, and thus the agency “did not afford [them] adequate procedural protections.” ASSE, 803 F.3d at 1079. Finally, the government argues that the rental application was not the only evidence of Meskel and Ghidei living at different addresses while they were married. But the evidence on this issue was mixed. Unlike other marriagefraud cases, there was no direct evidence indicating that Meskel and Ghidei’s marriage was a sham. See Singh, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 610; Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 805; cf. Simko v. B.I.A., 156 F. Supp. 3d 300, 312 (D. Conn. 2015) (noting that where there was “no direct evidence that Simko’s marriage . . . was fraudulent,” it was arbitrary and capricious to conclude that there was “substantial and probative evidence” of marriage fraud). Instead, numerous declarants swore that although Ghidei would often leave for long periods of time, 24 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS he and Meskel lived together as husband and wife. Meskel also submitted joint rent receipts and a joint lease agreement. Granted, Meskel made inconsistent statements during the immigration process, but she explained that they were made at the instruction of Ghidei and in deference of his desire to supervise the process. With the rest of the record equivocal, the rental application was the strongest piece of evidence that Meskel and her first husband lived separately. It was thus vital that Meskel and Zerezghi have been given an opportunity to rebut it. All three Mathews factors favor Zerezghi and Meskel. We hold that the BIA violated due process by not disclosing the rental application to the couple before denying the I-130 petition on the basis that Meskel had committed prior marriage fraud. Given the harsh effects of a marriage-fraud determination, Zerezghi and Meskel are entitled to at least the complete administrative record on which USCIS and the BIA relied in reaching its determinations, including any and all documents that the couple were not given prior to the agency making its decisions. Indeed, it is an “immutable” principle of due process “that where governmental action seriously injures an individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence used to prove the Government’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity to show that it is untrue.” Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959); see also Am.- Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the “use of undisclosed information in adjudications should be presumptively unconstitutional”). Because Meskel and Zerezghi received only a vague reference to unspecified “records,” they had no meaningful opportunity to respond to the apartment-rental application before USCIS made its determination. This violated procedural due process. ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 25 D. Standard of Proof Required to Establish Marriage Fraud Meskel and Zerezghi also contend that the BIA applied too low a standard of proof when it affirmed USCIS’s marriage-fraud determination and that, on remand, the agency must apply a more stringent standard. We agree. Under a USCIS regulation, the agency can deny any immigration petition if there is “substantial and probative evidence” that the noncitizen “has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii). The government acknowledges that it bears the initial burden of proof. If it produces substantial and probative evidence of marriage fraud, the burden shifts to the petitioner to rebut the allegation. Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 806–07. In the government’s view, “substantial and probative evidence” requires much less than a preponderance of the evidence. In its briefing and at oral argument, the government argued that the standard is equivalent to how courts deferentially review an agency’s factual findings for “substantial evidence,” only that in this instance, it is applicable to initial determinations of marriage fraud. 5 The government insists that this 5 To support its position, the government cited several district court opinions that have seemingly used the “substantial and probative evidence” and the “substantial evidence” standards interchangeably. See Yu An v. Napolitano, 15 F. Supp. 3d 976, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Zemeka v. Holder, 989 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2013). However, these cases involved situations in which the evidence of marriage fraud was so overwhelming that a precise articulation of the standard of proof was unnecessary. For example, in Yu An, the petitioner signed an affidavit admitting that his marriage to the beneficiary was a sham, and that he had never had a relationship with his purported wife. Yu An, 15 F. Supp. 3d at 979. In Zemeka, USCIS denied an I-130 petition after it determined 26 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS empowers USCIS to deny any immigration application as long as there was evidence of marriage fraud, even if it was more likely than not that the marriage was bona fide. This is incorrect. Although the “substantial and probative evidence” language in the USCIS regulation seems similar to how courts review formal agency adjudications for “substantial evidence,” the two are not the same. One is a standard of review, while the other is a standard of proof. 6 Further background on the two standards makes this clear. “The phrase ‘substantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’ used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citing T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015)) (emphasis added). It is an that the beneficiary had previously been married to an American woman who had married a different noncitizen in the same month that she married the beneficiary. Zemeka, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 131. That woman filed immigration petitions for both noncitizens, but then failed to appear for any subsequent hearings and also failed to respond to the agency’s Notice of Intent to Deny. Ibid. The facts in these cases indicate that even if the correct standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence, the government would have met it. Thus, the need for a clear articulation of the substantial-and-probative-evidence standard was low. However, the facts in our case present a much closer call. 6 As the Supreme Court has noted, the distinction between an initial burden of proof and the standard of review is best illustrated in criminal law, where a finding of guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but an appellate court reviews only whether that judgment is supported by sufficient evidence. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966). Here, the immigration judge or BIA must find that there was marriage fraud by “substantial and probative evidence” but, on review, the appellate court must examine whether there was “substantial evidence” to support the finding. ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 27 extremely lenient standard that asks courts to consider only whether the administrative record “contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Ibid. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). It requires “more than a mere scintilla” of evidence, but a court will sustain a determination as long as there is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ibid. (citation omitted). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Ibid. In the immigration context, the substantialevidence standard means that a reviewing court “must affirm the BIA’s order when there is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support it, even if it is possible to reach a contrary result on the basis of the evidence.” Oropeza-Wong v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). In contrast, the substantial-and-probative-evidence standard is a standard of proof, not of review. Although the phrase has never been included in any immigration statute, it is stated in the agency regulation governing eligibility for immigration petitions as the evidentiary standard for establishing marriage fraud. 7 See 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1)(ii). The phrase first appeared in a 1978 BIA opinion that held that a denial of an immigration application based on a finding of marriage fraud “must be based on evidence that is substantial and probative.” Matter of Agdinaoay, 16 I. & N. Dec. 545, 546 (BIA 1978). The opinion did not elaborate on what level of proof—or what type of evidence (direct or circumstantial)—would satisfy the standard, stating only 7 The phrase was first included in the regulation governing Section 204 of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1992, two years after the BIA decided Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166 (BIA 1990). 28 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS that “a factual determination based on clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence” would suffice. Id. at 547; see also Kahy, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 805 (concluding that “clear and convincing” evidence is enough to sustain a finding of marriage fraud). The standard was again invoked in Matter of Tawfik, which held that a mere “reasonable inference [of marriage fraud] does not rise to the level of substantial and probative evidence[.]” 20 I. & N. Dec. at 168. In Tawfik, the only evidence that indicated marriage fraud was that the beneficiary had divorced his first citizen wife a little over a year after they had married. Id. at 169. Despite the existence of a divorce decree that averred that the couple were married and had lived together, the factfinder apparently relied on inferences from facts that were not in the record when denying the petition. Id. at 170. On appeal, the BIA held that this inference alone was insufficient for establishing “substantial and probative” evidence of fraud and thus vacated the finding. Id. at 167. After oral argument in our case, the BIA recently again addressed the standard in Matter of Singh, which held that “to be ‘substantial and probative,’ the evidence must establish that it is more than probably true that the marriage is fraudulent.” 27 I. & N. Dec. 598, 607 (BIA 2019). Importantly, the BIA explained that “substantial and probative evidence” is a “standard of proof” which “refers to the quality and quantity of competent, credible, and objective evidence.” Id. at 606. “Whether the evidence in any given case is sufficiently substantial and probative to support a finding of marriage fraud will depend upon the factual circumstances of each case.” Id. at 607. In Singh—a situation in which the beneficiary was the petitioner’s father, and who, at the time of filing for ZEREZGHI V. USCIS 29 immigration benefits, was married to the petitioner’s maternal grandmother—the BIA determined that there was “substantial and probative evidence” of marriage fraud based on a variety of factors. For example, during an interview with the beneficiary’s wife, at the marital residence, the wife “admitted that she married the beneficiary as a favor to her daughter,” the petitioner’s mother, “to allow [the beneficiary] to remain in the United States.” Id. at 600. The BIA held that “[a] sworn statement by the parties admitting that the marriage is fraudulent . . . is direct evidence of fraud that is ‘substantial and probative.’” Id. at 607. But that was not the only evidence to support its finding. Observations made by USCIS officers during the visit also indicated that the beneficiary slept in the master bedroom with his wife’s daughter, rather than with his wife. Id. at 610. The BIA held that, together, these facts served to constitute substantial and probative evidence of marriage fraud. The exegeses offered by these BIA opinions makes it clear that the substantial-and-probative-evidence standard is a standard of proof, which is at least as high as a preponderance of the evidence. We see no reason for departing from this conclusion. Although a determination of marriage fraud does not implicate as fundamental a right as, for example a civil commitment, see Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983); a loss of parental rights, see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000); or an order of removal, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010), it is nevertheless a harsh penalty, limiting the noncitizen’s ability to obtain future immigration benefits and putting her at risk of removal. On remand, the BIA can reexamine the permissible interpretation of the words of its regulation. We hold only that, given the seriousness of a marriage-fraud determination and the risk of a finding being made in error, 30 ZEREZGHI V. USCIS the Constitution requires at least a preponderance of the evidence before imposing this sanction.