Opinion ID: 529724
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The initiation requirement

Text: 40 Eight Justices in Bradshaw agreed that a two-step process applies in determining whether the suspect waived his rights, but they disagreed over what constitutes an initiation by the suspect. The four-Justice plurality stated that questions which evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation would suffice. 462 U.S. 1039, 1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835. The four dissenters accepted the two-step analysis but required a more stringent test for establishing an initiation, defining initiation as communication or dialogue about the subject matter of the criminal investigation. Id. at 1053, 103 S.Ct. at 2839 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Powell, providing the swing vote, rejected the two-step approach but considered the confession admissible because the defendant had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Id. at 1051, 103 S.Ct. at 2833 (Powell, J., concurring). 41 The Supreme Court has not addressed this specific issue since the Bradshaw case, nor have any lower courts provided guidance on this issue. Thus, uncertainty persists as to what constitutes an initiation. Although we are not bound by the Bradshaw plurality opinion on this issue and are free to apply either the plurality's or the dissent's test, we choose to adopt the plurality view that an initiation occurs when a suspect initiates a conversation evinc[ing] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. 462 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. We think that such a conversation is a reasonable middle ground between a routine statement purely incidental to the custodial relationship--for example, a request to use the bathroom--which cannot fairly be said to fulfill the first part of the Bradshaw plurality's test, and a more detailed statement about the subject matter of the investigation. The latter statement, while clearly satisfying the first part of the test, may set an unduly high standard. Such a standard might convert the prophylactic value of the initiation requirement, announced in Edwards and further developed in Bradshaw, into an overly stringent substantive hurdle. 42 The Supreme Court in Bradshaw characterized the initiation requirement not as a constitutional right itself, or a component thereof, but as in effect a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards was. Id. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. at 2834. We think that the substantive aspects of a suspect's statement are better considered in the second prong of the two-prong Bradshaw test, i.e., whether a voluntary and intelligent waiver has occurred considering the totality of the circumstances. Thus, until further guidance by the Supreme Court, we will apply the plurality's definition of initiation in this context. 43 The Bradshaw plurality also noted that an initiation must be evidenced by more than merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship. 462 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. The plurality explained: There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Id. at 1045, 103 S.Ct. at 2835. The Bradshaw dissenters, naturally, did not disagree with this principle.