Opinion ID: 575830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissions of Evidence

Text: 17 Cota appeals Judge Sifton's decision not to suppress a number of her own statements, evidence, and testimony, which she claims unfairly prejudiced her case at trial. She first contends that the tape recorded conversation between her brother and sister-in-law (alleged co-conspirators), which revealed their plan to sell houses purchased with drug proceeds, should not have been admitted into evidence because no outside proof was first introduced to independently establish that there was indeed a conspiracy going on, or that Cota had any connection to it. See United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d 182, 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972, 99 S.Ct. 1537, 59 L.Ed.2d 789 (1979). 18 As Cota maintains, the tape was an out of court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. But Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) permits admission of such hearsay if offered against the accused by a co-conspirator during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy alleged. While United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 949 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940, 84 S.Ct. 345, 11 L.Ed.2d 271 (1963), determined that this type of evidence cannot be admitted absent an independent showing of appellant's participation in the conspiracy, the Supreme Court in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 180-81, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2781-82, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987) found that under Fed.R.Evid. 104 the hearsay statement itself may be considered along with independent evidence in deciding the question of appellant's membership. Moreover, it is accepted practice for a trial judge to admit one disputed piece of evidence subject to receipt of other evidence that, by the end of the government's case, will establish the alleged co-conspirator's involvement. See, e.g., United States v. Ziegler, 583 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.1978). This involvement, and the fact that a conspiracy existed at all, need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence for purposes of admission. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-76, 107 S.Ct. at 2778-79. 19 At trial, evidence of the strange nature of the deposits of the proceeds of the sale, Cota's use of a different bank to store the documents from the sale, her initial denial of having participated in the sale, and her attempts to contact the fugitive brother who had originally orchestrated the conspiracy for power of attorney after she had already signed the contracts of sale, all provided Judge Sifton with ample reason to rule to admit the tape. As this court has repeatedly held, once a conspiracy is established, only slight, even circumstantial evidence is needed to link another defendant with it. United States v. Ciambrone, 787 F.2d 799, 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1017, 107 S.Ct. 668, 93 L.Ed.2d 720 (1986); United States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1436 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3482, 87 L.Ed.2d 617 (1985).
20 Cota also contends the district court erred in not suppressing the statements she made when stopped, and later when arrested, arguing that they were made under duress and admitted into evidence in violation of her constitutional right against self-incrimination. 21 Cota first maintains that on June 13, 1989, she was effectively taken into custody by the officers who stopped her and took her to the Oneida Sheriff's office, and that their failure to read her her Miranda rights rendered her statements unusable at trial. The question of the voluntariness of Cota's statements is subject to de novo review by this court. We note from the outset that [o]nly questioning that reflects a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself constitutes interrogation the fruits of which may be received only after Miranda warnings have been given. United States v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir.1987). In making this assessment, we consider the totality of the circumstances of the agents' conduct. United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 649 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990). 22 Far from disagreeing with Judge Sifton's finding that Cota freely volunteered information and was not in custody during her six hour stay at the sheriff's station, we find the testimony of the DEA agents and Deputy Sheriff Hudson to have adequately established the consensual nature of Cota's visit. We also find it to have been reasonable for the district judge to believe that Cota's willingness to accompany the officers to the station in the first place was spurred by her own concern for the return of her seized car, rather than by the allegedly coercive environment of the stop. Not only was the initial use of guns and handcuffs necessitated by the officers' safety concerns, but the handcuffs were removed as soon as the car was examined and the perceived security threat abated. 23 Just as it was clearly Cota's choice to go to the station and wait for the agents, so was it her choice not to leave while they were asking her questions. At no time during the interview did Cota or her husband appear intimidated, or request that the questioning cease. Nor did they have their movement impaired. In fact, they were explicitly told by Agent McAleer that they were free to leave at any time. The statements made under these conditions were thus properly admitted. 24 Cota also claims that the circumstances of her arrest on November 8, 1991, were so coercive and intimidating as to render her volunteered statements inadmissable. While the factual question of whether Miranda rights were read to an apprehended suspect is the key determination to be made here, it also must be decided whether Cota's waiver of her right against self-incrimination was made knowingly and voluntarily, or if the behavior of arresting officers overbore her free, independent will. United States v. Fritz, 580 F.2d 370, 377 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 340, 58 L.Ed.2d 338 (1978) (citations omitted). 25 At the Pre-Trial Suppression Hearing, Agent Whipple testified that Cota was read the DEA's standard  'Advice of Rights 13-A' in English, immediately upon her arrest (Transcript, p. 68). Judge Sifton found this testimony, as later corroborated by Agent McAleer, to be persuasive. We defer to his findings, as [a]ssessments of the credibility of witnesses are the province of the district court and we are not entitled to overturn those assessments. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 972 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2858, 115 L.Ed.2d 1025, 1026 (1991). 26 There was no evidence that the manner of the arrest was made deliberately public or coercive. Nor is there any evidence to support Cota's claim that the delay occasioned by driving her back home, rather than directly to the arraigning magistrate, was excessive or intended to elicit incriminating statements. Cota volunteered the statements at her home in a manner that reflected her knowing and voluntary intent to waive her rights. As the court held in United States v. Rubio, 709 F.2d 146, 152 (2d Cir.1983), an express statement is not required to establish such a waiver. Moreover, Cota's request to call her lawyer midway through questioning indicated her awareness of her right not to respond in his absence. 27 Cota's subsequent statements in the car on the way to arraignment were also not the product of custodial interrogation. Nor were they solicited in any way. As Agent Whipple testified at trial, Cota was the one to initiate the discussion, inquiring of him why she was being arrested. In responding (and telling her of his awareness of the bank deposits she had made), Whipple did not engage in express questioning or its functional equivalent. Neither did he create an atmosphere whereby his words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Under these circumstances, where an agent supplied [the defendant] with general information regarding the crime [s]he was suspected of committing, in response to [her] own questions, voluntary statements made by a suspect who understands her rights are not prohibited. United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir.1983). Neither was a renewed reading of the Miranda warning necessary in order to render Cota's statements admissible.
28 Cota contends that the testimony of this witness, who did not even know her, should have been suppressed on grounds that its prejudicial effect monumentally outweighed its minimally probative value. Alipio Diaz was a confessed participant in the Hernandez' drug trafficking organization--an aspect of the scheme in which Cota was never involved. He was also arrested months before Cota got involved in the money laundering side of the conspiracy. But Diaz was in a position to know first-hand that the properties Cota sold were obtained with illegal drug money. Contrary to appellant's assertion, this aspect of the family's drug connections was an issue at her trial. Diaz also knew Leoncio Hernandez, and was able to testify about which members of the Hernandez family owned what properties. As the court held in United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 614 n. 2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989), testimony about such peripheral matters is admissible, even if it falls outside the time frame alleged in an indictment, so long as it is relevant to an issue at trial. The court therefore neither acted arbitrarily nor irrationally when it admitted the testimony of Diaz, particularly since Judge Sifton gave the jury limiting instructions as to what inferences they could derive from hearing the witness.