Opinion ID: 2102153
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Jackson

Text: Appellant Jackson's appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress also focuses on an alleged violation of his Miranda rights. Jackson was interrogated for approximately thirty (30) minutes before being read his Miranda rights. During the initial thirty (30) minute interrogation, Jackson made incriminating statements. Upon making the incriminating statements, Jackson was arrested and read his Miranda rights, which he waived. Upon waiver of his Miranda rights, Jackson was questioned regarding the substance of his initial statements. Jackson now argues that his waiver of Miranda rights after the initial questioning is invalid pursuant to Missouri v. Seibert, supra . We disagree. Jackson's situation differs from Haydon's situation because the trial court specifically found that Jackson was not in custody at the time he made his initial statements to police. Because we agree with the trial court regarding this issue, we find Missouri v. Seibert, supra , to be inapplicable to Jackson's case. After hearing Jackson's name from several sources during the course of his investigation, the lead investigator in the case, Detective Wheeler, learned that Jackson was scheduled to appear in traffic court the next day. On March 19, 2002, Detective Wheeler and two other detectives approached Jackson at the courthouse and told Jackson that his name had come up in a homicide investigation. The detectives asked Jackson to accompany them back to the police station to talk about their investigation and Jackson agreed. While there was conflicting testimony as to what happened next, the trial court made a finding of fact that Jackson was not restrained or arrested when he accompanied the detectives to the police station. When they arrived at the station, Jackson was placed in a small interrogation room and left alone for approximately 10-15 minutes. Detective Wheeler then came back into the room and spoke with Jackson for some time. After approximately thirty (30) minutes of questioning, Detective Wheeler decided to arrest Jackson based on the statements he had just obtained. Miranda warnings were immediately administered, but Jackson waived his rights. Jackson subsequently gave additional statements regarding the substance of the statements he made prior to the Miranda warnings, which were recorded. After the interrogation was concluded, Jackson was taken to jail. At the hearing, the trial court found that Jackson was not in custody until the point when Detective Wheeler arrested Jackson mid-interrogation. Jackson argues the totality of the circumstances in this case do not support the trial court's determination. [T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 320, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1528-1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994). [T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. Jackson contends his case differs from other cases where custody was not found in the following ways: (1) he was never informed by the detectives that he was not under arrest or was free to leave, and (2) the coercive posture of the situation was heightened because he was arrested mid-interrogation and not allowed to go home after the interview. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (suspect was specifically informed that he was not under arrest and was permitted to go home after interrogation), Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (same); Little v. Commonwealth, 991 S.W.2d 141, 141-42 (Ky.App.1999) (suspect was advised that he was not under arrest and was not required to speak with police). While the above facts are relevant factors which must be considered when making a custody determination, neither fact is dispositive. A custody determination cannot be based on bright-line rules, but must be made only after considering the totality of the circumstances of each case. In Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), the United States Supreme Court stated that [a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. Id. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. However, the Court went on to state that the somewhat coercive nature of being questioned by a potential adversary does not create the type of risk which warrants a per se requirement to issue Miranda warnings every time a suspect is questioned by a police officer in the station house. Id. Similarly, a suspect is not entitled to be read his or her Miranda rights simply because he or she is the focus of an investigation. Little v. Commonwealth, 991 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ky.App.1999). Rather, the pivotal requirement triggering an officer's duty to administer Miranda warnings is whether the environment has become so coercive as to induce reasonable persons to believe that (1) they are under arrest; or (2) they have otherwise [been] deprived of [their] freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). In addition to the above considerations favoring Appellant's contention that he was in custody when he gave his initial statements to police, the trial court also found that (1) Jackson had the equivalent of a high school diploma and was familiar enough with the criminal justice system to fully understand what the detectives were asking him to do when they approached him at the courthouse, including the possible consequences of complying with the detectives' request; (2) Jackson was asked, not ordered, by the detectives to come to the police station that day and he freely and voluntarily agreed to do so; (3) Jackson freely and voluntarily accompanied the detectives to the police station without any kind of external restraints; and (4) Jackson testified at the suppression hearing that he was not threatened or physically coerced when he made his initial statements to Detective Wheeler. When all the circumstances are considered as a whole, the totality of the circumstances support the trial court's conclusion that Jackson was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda when he was first questioned by Detective Wheeler at the police station on March 19, 2005. Since Jackson was not in custody at the time he made his initial incriminating statements to police, we do not believe the premises underlying the holding in Missouri v. Seibert, supra , are applicable to these facts. In Missouri v. Seibert, supra , a question-first protocol for custodial interrogations was struck down for the precise purpose that such a technique was coercive by design. Id. at 612-13, 124 S.Ct. at 2610-11. The Court reasoned that where incriminating statements are obtained in a coercive custodial environment and in express violation of a suspect's Miranda rights, any subsequent issuance and waiver of such rights must be closely scrutinized for effectiveness. Id. Such scrutiny is unnecessary in a case such as this where the incriminating statements were not obtained in a coercive custodial environment or in violation of Jackson's Miranda rights. The purpose of Miranda warnings is to protect individuals from unduly coercive interrogation practices which disable them from making free and rational choice[s]. Id. at 611, 124 S.Ct. at 2609-10. We are persuaded that Jackson was able to make free and rational choices when he was questioned by detectives in this case, and accordingly, we find no violation of his Miranda rights. The trial court's denial of Appellant Jackson's motion to suppress his statements is affirmed. Appellants' convictions and sentences are vacated; and the cases are remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. All concur as to Part I. GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., concur as to Part II A. GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, ROACH, SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., concur as to Part II B. LAMBERT, C.J., dissents by separate opinion to Part II with COOPER, J., joining this dissent. ROACH, J., dissents to Part II A.