Opinion ID: 780224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Justification for the Protective Frisk

Text: 24 Defendant next argues that, even if Officer Allen had reasonable suspicion to make the initial stop, he did not have a reasonable belief that Defendant might be armed and dangerous and, therefore, should not have conducted the protective frisk. Evidence introduced at the suppression hearing and at trial indicates that after Officer Allen approached Defendant and his acquaintance and twice asked for their identification, Defendant passed Officer Allen and began walking backwards, facing Officer Allen, with his hands in the front pockets of his jeans. Noticing that Defendant was acting nervously, and fearing that he might be concealing a weapon, Officer Allen asked Defendant to remove his hands from his pockets. When Defendant refused, Officer Allen seized him for a protective frisk. 25 Defendant contends that evidence that he was acting nervously and had his hands in his pockets is insufficient to justify Officer Allen's protective frisk. We disagree. Although we recognize that [n]ervousness alone cannot support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir.1998) (citation omitted), nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (citations omitted). Therefore, we may take into account Defendant's nervous behavior in determining whether Officer Allen's protective frisk was justified. However, we believe the more important factor here is that Defendant refused to take his hands out of his pockets after Officer Allen requested that he do so. Officer Allen testified that he asked Defendant to take his hands out of his pockets because he was concerned that Defendant might be concealing a weapon in one of the pockets. When Defendant refused to remove his hands, Officer Allen was reasonably justified in believing that Defendant might be armed and dangerous. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (citations omitted) (The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.). Accordingly, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Allen had the reasonable and articulable suspicion necessary to conduct the protective frisk of Defendant.