Opinion ID: 1991120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Edwin's Motion for Further Findings of Fact

Text: [¶ 10] Edwin first contends that the court erred in denying his motion for further findings of fact. He argues that because many of the court's findings track Eaton's proposed findings, the court failed to make its own independent factual determinations. He asserts that the court should have made findings as to the dates on which the pre-death, pre-appointment, and post-appointment payments occurred. Eaton contends that the court's findings are sufficient and are supported by the evidence, and points out that the dates on which these payments occurred are undisputed and clearly ascertainable by simply referring to various exhibits found in the record. [¶ 11] We review the denial of motions for findings of fact and to amend or alter the judgment for an abuse of discretion. Ten Voters v. City of Biddeford, 2003 ME 59, ¶ 11, 822 A.2d 1196, 1201. Further, we have noted that a trial court's verbatim adoption of findings or orders proposed by one party in a case is disfavored, as such an approach suggests that the court has not carefully reviewed the evidence or applied its independent judgment in making its findings and conclusions. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 2003 ME 53, ¶ 14, 832 A.2d 775, 778. We will not automatically find error when a court engages in this practice, however. [A] key question on review, when draft orders are adopted without change or with little material change, will be whether the findings and order reflect the application of judgment by the court and not simply one of the parties. Id. ¶ 15, 832 A.2d at 779. Although the Probate Court did adopt most of Eaton's proposed findings without change, it did add additional findings regarding the forgiveness of the granddaughter's promissory note and an award of attorney fees. Viewed in their entirety, we are persuaded that the findings reflect the independent judgment of the court. [¶ 12] Moreover, the dates of the payments made to Edwin and to Faith are readily apparent from the record: (1) the pre-death payment to Faith Colburn was made on July 1, 1998; (2) the pre-appointment payment to Edwin was made on September 14, 1998; and (3) the post-appointment payment to Edwin and Faith occurred on May 28, 1999. Accordingly, the court did not act beyond its discretion in denying Edwin's motion. See Ten Voters, 2003 ME 59, ¶ 11, 822 A.2d at 1201.