Opinion ID: 1058439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony Regarding Diminished Capacity

Text: Faulkner sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Steinberg and Patricia McNealy during the guilt phase to establish diminished capacity. [3] At a jury-out hearing, Dr. Steinberg testified that Faulkner had experienced significant, multiple stressors at the time of the offense ranging from loss of job to marital problems. He also suffered from exacerbation of a drug problem. His grandmother was hospitalized. His best friend, whom he felt was like a brother, had committed suicide. All of these stressors occurred within a short period of time. According to Dr. Steinberg, these stressors in combination affected Faulkner's predisposed tendency to have a short fuse. However, Dr. Steinberg found no indication that Faulkner suffered from a mental disease or defect at the time of the offense. In short, Dr. Steinberg believed that Faulkner was capable of forming intent but that his ability to suppress his emotions was impaired. McNealy would have testified about Faulkner's drug dependency. Defense counsel described her testimony as dovetailing with Dr. Steinberg's testimony because she would be relating one of the stressors affecting Faulkner. The trial court ruled that Dr. Steinberg's testimony was inadmissible at the guilt phase under State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn.1997), because Dr. Steinberg could not testify that Faulkner was incapable of forming intent as a result of a mental disease or defect. The trial court also excluded McNealy's testimony, finding that its admissibility depended on the admissibility of Dr. Steinberg's testimony. In Hall, the Court held that if general relevancy standards and evidentiary rules are satisfied, psychiatric evidence that the defendant lacks the capacity, because of mental disease or defect, to form the requisite culpable mental state to commit the offense charged is admissible under Tennessee law. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). The Court cautioned against referring to such evidence as proof of diminished capacity. Id. at 690. Instead, such evidence should be presented as relevant to negate the existence of the culpable mental state. The Court distinguished mental disease or defect from emotional state or mental condition: [W]e emphasize that the psychiatric testimony must demonstrate that the defendant's inability to form the requisite culpable mental state was the product of a mental disease or defect, not just a particular emotional state or mental condition. It is the showing of lack of capacity to form the requisite culpable mental intent that is central to evaluating the admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony on the issue. Id. at 690 (emphasis in original). Dr. Steinberg's testimony was not offered to show that Faulkner lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent because of a mental disease or defect. His proposed testimony, therefore, did not meet the prerequisites of Hall. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the testimony of both Dr. Steinberg and Patricia McNealy during the guilt phase.