Opinion ID: 1460047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lanham Act Trademark Claim

Text: The district court also ruled against defendants on the ground that Abboud's proposed use of his name in conjunction with his new jaz line of clothing would constitute trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act. We note that the issues in the litigation had been limited, with the dispute centering on Abboud's right to use his name in advertising. As the district court described the parties' respective positions, defendants conceded that they [we]re not seeking to use the Joseph Abboud name on clothes, labels, or hang-tags for the `jaz' line; Abboud merely wanted to be able to use his name in advertising materials . . . to be able to identify himself in text as the designer of the . . . jaz products that are at issue. JA Apparel, at 316 n. 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). JA, for its part, conceded that it was not seeking to prevent Abboud from being in business and competing, or personally presenting his new `jaz' line to prospective purchasers, such as Bloomingdale's, but it sought to prohibit Abboud from using his name in advertising. Id. (`[O]nce he starts advertising, then he's trading on the same reputation that is, in fact, merged into the goodwill of the brand that he sold to us.' (quoting counsel for JA)). Both sides introduced mock-ups of Abboud's proposed advertisements. In the district court, as here, defendants effectively conceded that JA owned valid Joseph Abboud trademarks and that it had made a prima facie showing under the Polaroid test, Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 36, 7 L.Ed.2d 25 (1961); see, e.g., Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 742 (2d Cir.1998), that the use of his name as a trademark would likely cause confusion, see, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360-61 (2d Cir.1983) ( Mattel ) (confusion means whether consumers [have been] misled into believing that the two [products] came from the same source). But defendants contended that they were entitled, under the Lanham Act, to the defense of fair use, which is not defeated by the existence of some confusion, see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. Ill, 121-22, 125 S.Ct. 542, 160 L.Ed.2d 440 (2004). Such a defense is available to a defendant who establishes, to the extent pertinent here, [t]hat the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party. . . . 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). Assessment of this defense thus requires analysis of whether a given use was (1) other than as a mark, (2) in a descriptive sense, and (3) in good faith. EMI Catalogue Partnership v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir.2000) ( EMI ). In making these assessments, the court focuses on the actual or proposed uses themselves. See, e.g., id. at 66-68 (evaluating both a mock-up and the final version of an allegedly infringing commercial); see also TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir.2001); Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1082 (2d Cir. 1970). In addressing defendants' fair-use defense, the district cited the above three elements of the defense, see JA Apparel, at 329, but its analysis of the first and third elements, discussed below, gives us pause. With respect to the first element, we have equated use . . . as a mark with the use of [a] term as a symbol to attract public attention. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir.1962). Compare id. (term was used as a mark where it was obviously employed as a symbol to attract public attention), with Mattel, 724 F.2d at 361 (phrase was used otherwise than as a mark where it was located on the package in a place and manner that only the close reader would notice). See also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 28 comment c (noting the relevance of the physical nature of the use in terms of size, location, and other characteristics in comparison with the appearance of other descriptive matter or other trademarks, as well as the presence or absence of precautionary measures such as labeling or other devices designed to minimize the risk that the term will be understood in its trademark sense). With respect to the third element of the fair-use defense, the inquiry into the defendant's good faith concerns the question whether the user of a mark intended to create consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship. EMI, 228 F.3d at 66-67; see also id. at 66 (noting that in analyzing the proper scope of fair use good faith, precedents discussing good faith as the sixth Polaroid factor . . . are relevant because the focus of the inquiry is the same); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweq Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1339 (2d Cir.1975) (analysis of the sixth Polaroid factor requires inquiry as to whether the alleged infringer had a deliberate intent to infringe). The district court in the present case indicated that defendants may have established the second element of their fair-use defense, as it noted that such phrases as `by the award-winning designer Joseph Abboud' have a descriptive component. JA Apparel, at 330. But it found that defendants had not established the otherwise-than-as-a-mark and good-faith elements. As to the latter, the court stated, inter alia, that in the context of the good faith analysis under the `fair use' doctrine, it must be noted that Abboud is attempting to use that which he expressly sold to [JA]. Id. As to the former, the court stated that Abboud is attempting to use his name, and the goodwill associated with it, to identify and distinguish goods, and to advise consumers that he is the source of his new jaz line. Therefore, although there is a descriptive component to Abboud's proposed uses, the Court concludes that he is also attempting to use his name, at least in part, as a trademark and that the confusion generated by his proposed uses would be far more than incidental. It is patently obvious that consumers seeing JA Apparel's products, marked or advertised as Joseph Abboud or by Joseph Abboud, would be utterly confused as to whether the jaz products advertised as by designer Joseph Abboud, were derived from the same source. Id. at 331. With respect to the good faith issue, we conclude that the district court applied a standard that was erroneous for at least two reasons. First, giving effect, respectively, to the end and the beginning of the above passage from , we note that the district court found that consumers would be confused by Abboud's proposed use of his name, but that Abboud was not attempting to confuse. Rather than finding an attempt to confuse, the court found that Abboud was  attempting  to  distinguish  his clothing from that of JA and to advise consumers that he is the source of his new `jaz' line (emphases added). Thus, the court's finding of a lack of good faith could not be premisedas required by our fair-use precedentson an intent to confuse. Second, the court's actual premise for finding that Abboud's proposed use of his name was not in good faith was its conclusion that the Sale Agreement unambiguously conveyed to JA all right to use Abboud's name commercially. See, e.g., JA Apparel, at 330 (in the context of the good faith analysis under the `fair use' doctrine, it must be noted that Abboud is attempting to use that which he expressly sold to [JA]); id. (finding it very difficult, if not improper, to completely ignore the Agreement in the context of Abboud's `fair use' defense); id. at 326 ([as JA] established that it purchased the exclusive right to the Joseph Abboud name for commercial purposes, . . . any proposed use by Abboud of his name commercially is improper (emphases added)); id. (what may have constituted a permissible use of Abboud's name under the Lanham Act is largely foreclosed by the express terms of the Agreement). As the district court's premise that the Sale Agreement was an unambiguous all-commercial-use-encompassing conveyance was erroneous ( see Part II.A. above), its rejection of the fair-use defense on the basis that there could be no good-faith use of what the court viewed as having been sold was likewise erroneous. In sum, given that the district court found that Abboud was attempting to distinguish the jaz line from JA products which is inconsistent with an intent to confuseand that its finding as to lack of good faith rested on its erroneous view of the Sale Agreement, the court's finding that Abboud's proposed advertising use of his name was not in good faith lacked any proper foundation. With respect to whether Abboud sought to use his name otherwise than as a mark, 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4), our principal difficulty with the district court's conclusion is that the court appears to have resolved this question without considering the proposed uses themselves. Although there is a sentence in the background section of the court's opinion in which the court, in describing defendants' contentions, mentions the presentation of advertisement mock-ups, see JA Apparel, at 315, the mock-ups are not mentioned again, and the court gives no indication of having considered such matters as the size, location, or context of the Joseph Abboud name in comparison with the appearance of other descriptive matter in any given proposed advertisement, or the likely effect of any given proposed advertisement as a whole. Our review of the record persuades us that individualized consideration of the various proposed advertisements is needed. For example, in some of the 8½-by-11-inch mock-ups, the jaz name is displayed prominently in script some three inches high; in others it is about one inch high. In the latter mock-ups, beneath the jaz logo are the wordsall in type smaller than jazA New Composition by JOSEPH ABBOUD in solid capitals, with the name JOSEPH ABBOUD in larger capitals than the rest. (JA Exhibits 41-42.) On the other hand, in several advertisements in which the jaz logo is some three inches high, the tagline below jaz does not mention Abboud but rather reads An american Luxury collection in letters about ¼ of an inch high. (JA Exhibit 43.) In these mock-ups, a picture of Abboud appears on the far right side, and in the bottom corner, below the image of Abboud, is the following text: Designer Joseph Abboud in a 2 Button Super 120 S Charcoal Chalkstripe from His Fall 2008 Jaz Collection Designer Joseph Abboud Is No Longer Associated or Affiliated with JA Apparel Corp., the Owner of the Trademark Joseph Abboud. ( Id. ) This text is in letters approximately 1/16 of an inch high. As indicated above, resolution of a fair-use defense requires the court to focus on the defendant's (actual or proposed) use. We see no indication that the district court considered the advertisement mock-ups submitted by the parties here, where given mock-ups could lend themselves to divergent conclusions as to, inter alia, whether Abboud's name was being used a trademark, whether consumers would likely be confused and believe the jaz line comes from JA, and whether a particular size and placement of Abboud's name in a mock-up evinced an intent to confuse. In the event that the district court does not rule in favor of JA on the contract claim on remand, it will be required to address the trademark issues.