Opinion ID: 624293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The September 28 Hearing

Text: On September 1, the district court issued an order scheduling Loughner's § 4241(d)(2)(A) commitment hearing. The order stated that the scope of the hearing will be limited to the question of whether an additional period of time should be granted to actually restore the defendant to competency. The court also conducted a telephonic status conference in advance of the commitment hearing. During the telephonic conference, Dr. Pietz informed the court that Loughner wished to attend the commitment hearing. The court concluded that Loughner had a right to attend the hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d), and accordingly require[d] that [Loughner] be present for the extension hearing. On September 28, the district court conducted the § 4241(d)(2)(A) commitment hearing. In addition to the district judge and counsel for both parties, Loughner, Dr. Pietz, and Dr. Ballenger (a clinical psychiatrist and expert witness for the government) convened at the Tucson courthouse for the proceedings. At the outset, the court reiterated its intention to restrict the evidentiary aspect of the hearing to the commitment issue, even though other mattersspecifically, the defense's recently submitted motion to stay Loughner's involuntary medication under the Harper III orderwere pending. As the majority describes in fuller detail, Dr. Pietz and Dr. Ballenger testified at length about Loughner's progress and his prospects for restoration through involuntary medication. During the hearing, the court persistently emphasized that [t]he limited focus here is whether an extension is likelysubstantially probable to restore him. So stating, the court repeatedly prevented defense counsel from cross-examining Doctors Pietz and Ballenger regarding Loughner's diagnosis and the propriety of the drugs prescribed for treating his dangerousness. Although defense counsel argued that [t]he restoration depends upon the treatment that's going to be given, the court reiterated that [t]he question here is whether he's likely to be restored with an extended commitment to Springfield. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court determined that Loughner was likely to be restored to competency within a reasonable period of time, assuming he continued to receive involuntary medication. It accordingly held that Loughner's commitment should be extended by four months, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2). The court emphasized that it was recommitting Loughner for the express purpose of restoration: I'm now committing him for the purpose of restoration. No more evaluation. It changes today with this ruling. He's being committed for another four months for the purpose of restoration. It also expressed a concern that the procedural and substantive standards applicable under Sell when the government seeks to medicate involuntarily a pretrial detainee for purposes of restoration to competency were implicated by the court's decision to extend Loughner's commitment for the express purpose of restoration. I'm committing him at a time that I know that they're continuing to treat him with medication that he declines to take, the court stated, I think this is a very different situation from what has existed to this point. I'm now telling them to continue to restore him. I think we're right up against Sell.  The court concluded that a Sell judicial hearing, or at least some acknowledgment of the Sell issue, needed to take place, but stated that it was postponing the matter to a later date. Before the hearing adjourned, defense counsel reminded the court of its pending motion to stay Loughner's involuntary medication. The court emphasized that it was not being stubborn, but stated that it continued to believe that the Bureau of Prisons should determine the propriety of Loughner's involuntary medication so long as the purpose of medication related to his dangerousness, even if it was an essential predicate for the court's commitment decision. Reaffirming its reliance on Morgan, the court stated it would review the prison's Harper III determination only for arbitrariness and for compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 549.46 and Harper. The court concluded that there was no arbitrariness in the third Harper hearing and that the medication going forward, at least of today, is authorized pursuant to the Harper case. Loughner appealed. While Loughner's appeal was pending, the district court issued an order holding that Loughner is not entitled to a judicial Sell hearing regarding the propriety of pretrial involuntary medication where the ultimate goal is restoration of competency. The court acknowledged that it was shifting the aim of [Loughner's] commitment from evaluation to restoration, but reasoned that the Supreme Court, in Sell, contemplated that a pretrial detainee could be incidentally restored to trial competency by being medicated on dangerousness grounds under Harper.  The court accordingly concluded that Loughner was not entitled to further procedural protections, because the prison doctors have made a medical determination in this case justifying the need for medicating Mr. Loughner under Harper, which the Court has reviewed and has concluded was not arbitrary.