Opinion ID: 790121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conflicting Precedent

Text: 18 Our decision in Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.1986), has been widely criticized by our sister circuits and by several commentators. Many interpret the case as holding that the right of publicity as protected by state law is preempted by § 301 in all instances. We take this opportunity to clarify our holding. The case simply does not stand for the proposition that the right of publicity as protected by state law is preempted in all instances by federal copyright law; it does not sweep that broadly. 19 Baltimore Orioles holds that state laws that intrude on the domain of copyright are preempted even if the particular expression is neither copyrighted nor copyrightable. Such a result is essential in order to preserve the extent of the public domain established by copyright law. Therefore, states may not create rights in material that was published more than 75 years ago, even though that material is not subject to federal copyright. Also, states may not create copyright-like protections in materials that are not original enough for federal protection, such as a telephone book with listings in alphabetical order. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). Baltimore Orioles itself makes clear that [a] player's right of publicity in his name or likeness would not be preempted if a company, without the consent of the player, used the player's name to advertise its product. 805 F.2d at 666 n. 24. Therefore, the bottom line is that Toney's claim under the Illinois right of publicity statute is not preempted by federal copyright law. 4