Opinion ID: 3011785
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effects of a Scienter Requir ement

Text: The government advances the intriguing ar gument that the condition could be interpreted so as to include a salvaging scienter requirement. But this cannot solve the problem. To begin with, although pr obation or parole will usually not be revoked for unknowing violations of conditions of release, unless a scienter r equirement is explicitly written into the condition (which is not the case here), there is no way to be certain that one will be applied during revocation proceedings. This is because release can be revoked for reasons that have nothing to do with the fault of the offender, but instead are more related to protection of the public. See, e.g., United States v. Warner, 830 F.2d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1987) (If . . . probation's purposes have been frustrated, revocation is fair and appropriate even if the probationer did not willfully violate _________________________________________________________________ 6. In United States v. Schave, 186 F .3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit avoided a vagueness problem in a condition of supervised release that prohibited associations with white supr emacists by construing it to encompass only those associations that r easonably relate[d] to the dangers against which the condition was intended to protect. Id. at 844. However appropriate such a measure may have been under the circumstances of that case, a similar construction would not save the condition here. The condition in Schave was not only more particular than Loy's (it prohibited associations with certain well-defined groups), but also was part of a long history of associational conditions that are so common that they have acquired something of a judicial gloss as to their scope. See Part IV, infra . 22 his probation conditions.); United States v. McLeod, 608 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (A good faith attempt to comply with a probation agreement is not a controlling factor, but only one of many factors that a District Court may consider in the exercise of its discretion to revoke probation.). Even if a scienter requirement wer e to be read into the condition, however, this construction would not save it. Though in some situations, a scienter requir ement may mitigate an otherwise vague statute, see, e.g ., Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. , 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1978), such a requirement will not cure all defects for all purposes, see, e.g., Cramp v. Boar d of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961) (invalidating a loyalty oath on the ground that, notwithstanding the fact that the oath-taker was required only to affirm that he or she had never knowingly counseled or supported Communists, the oath was too vague to be reasonably understood); Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a scienter requirement cannot save a statute criminalizing partialbirth abortion where the definition of such a procedure is, in itself, vague); Nova Records, Inc. v. Sendak, 706 F.2d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 1983) (A scienter r equirement cannot eliminate vagueness . . . if it is satisfied by an`intent' to do something that is in itself ambiguous.). Indeed, a contrary rule would rob the vagueness doctrine of all of its meaning, for legislatures would simply repair otherwise vague statutes by inserting the word knowingly. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmor e, 55 F. Supp. 2d 441, 498 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff 'd on other gr ounds, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2000).