Opinion ID: 2064646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is Materiality Alleged with Specificity?

Text: The indictment alleges that Dr. Hsu did unlawfully, wilfully, knowingly and contrary to oath, state material matters which he did not believe to be true . . . (Emphasis added). The modern view holds that no greater specification of materiality is required. Gebhard v. United States, supra ; United States v. Rook, 424 F.2d 403 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 966, 90 S.Ct. 2180, 26 L.Ed.2d 550 (1970); Meyers v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 171 F.2d 800 (1948); United States v. Simplot, 192 F.Supp. 734 (D.Utah 1961). Appellant has supplied some contrary authority, which we reject. See United States v. Cobert, 227 F.Supp. 915 (S.D.Cal.1964). We believe that the better approach is to require no greater elaboration of materiality than the general averment found in Dr. Hsu's indictment, and to permit a defendant to clarify, as needed, through a bill of particulars. See United States v. Debrow, supra, 346 U.S. at 378, 74 S.Ct. 113. We reject appellant's claim that the simple allegation of materiality rendered the indictment deficient for lack of specificity.