Opinion ID: 2064781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Newly Discovered Evidence. On his postconviction appeal Hicks suggests the trial court erred by denying a new-trial motion based on newly discovered evidence.

Text: Hicks' newly discovered evidence does not justify the granting of a new trial. The evidence is merely cumulative or impeaching, and it would probably not change the result if a new trial was granted. See State v. Sims, 239 N.W.2d 550, 554-55 (Iowa 1976). Hicks has the burden of establishing the requirements for a new-trial grant on the basis of newly discovered evidence. State v. Compiano, 261 Iowa 509, 518, 154 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1967). See also State v. Jackson, 223 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1974) (Motions for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are not favored in the law and should be closely scrutinized and sparingly granted. Also, This court will not interfere with the trial court's ruling on such a motion unless it is reasonably clear the court abused its discretion.). Our review of the evidence supports the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial on this ground. We have examined each allegation which Hicks asserts. He first contends that newly discovered testimony of Val and Earl Vincent is material. At trial Hicks testified that he and Lawrence were at the Hi-Ho tavern in Keokuk until sometime after one o'clock on the morning of the Foster homicide. At this point Hicks' and Lawrence's stories conflicted. Hicks testified that he left with Lawrence and fell asleep in the car, and that he remembered nothing prior to awakening in the hallway of an apartment building several hours later. Lawrence testified that after leaving the Hi-Ho with Hicks and before driving to the Fosters', the pair drove around for awhile before stopping at Vinnie's Tavern in Fort Madison. Hicks did not know of the Vincents' testimony until after the homicide trial when the postconviction hearing was held. He asserts that their testimony casts doubt on Lawrence's credibility and suggests that Willie Jefferson was with Lawrence. The facts relating to the Vincents' testimony follow. At trial Lawrence testified he went to the door and purchased some pork rinds. At the postconviction hearing Val Vincent testified that a black man came to the door about five minutes before 2:00 a. m. to purchase pork rinds. He stated the man drove away in a car matching the description of Lawrence's vehicle. Vincent also testified he noticed another person in the front seat of the vehicle. His testimony supports Lawrence's story. Lawrence also testified that shortly after leaving Vinnie's, Hicks got out of the car and said he was going back to Vinnie's. In the meantime Earl Vincent, Val's father, came to work at Vinnie's. Earl Vincent testified at the postconviction hearing that within five minutes after 2:00 a. m. a man came to the door. Vincent stated: Q. And would you identify or describe that person, please? A. Well, to my recollection, as I told you, I seen him briefly through a narrow piece of glass, and the vestibule was dark in there; and I would say he wasto my recollection, he was more or less light-complected Negro, and approximately six feet tall. Q. Would you say six feet or more, or six feet or less? A. Well, I had to look up at him to see him through the door. Q. Is there anything else about him you can tell ushair or shirt or anything? A. Well, I watched him walk across the street and get into his car on the driver's side; and he took off east, andbut I couldn't tell you how he was dressed or anything else. Q. Do you know Gentric Hicks? A. Who? Q. Gentric Hicks? A. No, I don't. Q. He is the gentleman sitting to my left. Is this the man that was at your door that night? A. As I say, I only seen him for two or three seconds through the glass, but toI don't believe he is. Q. Why do you say that? A. Well, because he doesn'twhen I seen him walk in the hallway, he didn't appear to be tall enough. On cross-examination Vincent testified: Q. Mr. Vincent, do you remember very much that evening? A. All I remember is the man coming to the door and me telling him that I was closed. Earl Vincent's testimony does not necessitate a new trial. Several officers testified at the postconviction hearing regarding conversations with Earl Vincent shortly after the crime. Sgt. Carle testified he talked with the Vincents within several hours of the crime. He stated that nothing was said about a second visitor. Deputy Taft and Sam Swaim talked with Earl Vincent the day after the crime. Taft's report stated that Earl Vincent was [u]nable to give any usable information other than that his son had mentioned. Swaim stated that Vincent told him of the second man, The only thing he identified the subject as being a black male. Also, Earl Vincent, when I talked to him, was very, very vague and had a hard time remembering a lot of things. At best, Earl Vincent's testimony might have been useful for impeachment, but given the officers' testimony and the fact that Earl Vincent admits he only saw the man for a few seconds in poor light we doubt his testimony would be significantly material. Hicks also claims a report prepared by Deputy Duffy satisfies the newly discovered evidence requirements for a new trial. Duffy took rough notes during an interview with the Fosters; he used these notes to write a report which contained a description of the events surrounding the robbery. Hicks claims the report was material because it contained no description of the robber and also it indicates Mrs. Foster may have been confused as to the door by which the robber departed. With regard to the robber's description, Mrs. Foster relayed identification information to other investigators both before and after this reportthus the failure to mention any identifying features (or Duffy's failure to write down any features mentioned) does not indicate Mrs. Foster could not identify the robber. Furthermore, Duffy stated at the hearing that he did not attempt to elicit an exact description of the robber, nor did he attempt to go into detail. This piece of evidence is insufficient for newly discovered evidence purposes. As to Hicks' contention that the report shows Mrs. Foster may have been confused about the door by which Hicks departed from the motel, Hicks urges materiality because fingerprints were found near a back door. We note, however, that Mr. and Mrs. Foster told other investigators that the robber left through the back kitchen door, not the side door as the report suggests; Mrs. Foster told investigators the robber was confused as to the door by which to leave, suggesting Duffy may have reported her interview incorrectly. Finally, the robber's hat was found outside a back porch door, thus supporting Mrs. Foster's trial statement. Again the evidence appears insufficient for newly discovered evidence purposes. Hicks makes other contentions regarding newly discovered evidence. He urges a new trial is required on the basis of evidence of Sgt. Carle. At trial Mrs. Foster testified the robber's hat flew off at the time of the shooting, shortly before the robber fled. She testified she then saw Hicks' forehead and hair. After trial the defense discovered that Sgt. Carle had found the hat outside a back porch door, suggesting that the hat did not come off inside. According to the evidence, Mrs. Foster had ample opportunity before this time to observe the robber's features. Again the evidence is insufficient for newly discovered evidence purposes. Finally, Hicks asserts materiality in a newly discovered page of a report prepared by Sheriff Arnold. The report stated: We put together seven photographs and # 1. Correction the subject, Mr. Hicks was picked out by Mr. Lawrence, this can be testified to by Mr. Swaim and I think Deputy Taft, also the seven pictures were taken and shown to Mrs. Foster and Mr. Foster. Hicks argues this statement indicates that eight rather than seven pictures were shown to Mrs. Foster and that two photographs of him were in the array. The police had one black-and-white and one color photograph in their possession; he suggests that both photographs were shown to Mrs. Foster. Everyone involved, however, testified that Mrs. Foster was shown only black-and-white photographs. Further, Mrs. Foster stated that after she chose Hicks' picture, she chose a profile, and neither of the photographs is a profile. The newly discovered evidence was impeaching, and it would probably not change the jury's verdict. It was of the kind which can usually be gathered by a close review at the conclusion of a hard-fought trial. The trial court rightly denied the motion. VIII. Exculpatory Evidence. Hicks further contends that a new trial is required because the State failed to produce material exculpatory evidence which existed. The defense made a general request for Brady material; the State apparently agreed to provide exculpatory material. Hicks suggests that several reports, especially Deputy Duffy's statement of an interview with the Fosters, should have been turned over to the defense. He asserts this report was material because it did not contain a description of the robber and because it indicated Mrs. Foster may have been confused about the door by which the robber departed. We have already reviewed this report. The landmark case in this area is Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963): We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. We stated in State v. Hall, 249 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822, 98 S.Ct. 66, 54 L.Ed.2d 79 (1977), To constitute a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland . . . the suppressed information must be material either to the guilt or punishment of the defendant, not merely potentially or inferentially helpful to the defense. The law relating to exculpatory evidence is set forth in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and State v. Hall . Defendant's request for Brady material was general, and this is not a case in which the information is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of a duty to produce. State v. Hall, 249 N.W.2d at 847. Hicks is correct that the standard to be employed in this case is whether `the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.' State v. Hall, 249 N.W.2d at 847 (quoting Agurs). We hold that the reports would have been only inferentially helpful and do not create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. The trial court did not err in overruling Hicks' motion for new trial. IX. Interests of Justice. Finally, Hicks asserts his trial was more than an imperfect one; it was unfair. Our review of the record convinces us that this assertion is not tenable. He also asserts that Mrs. Foster attempted to give the impression her son was shot in cold blood. The record does not substantiate this claim. A fair reading of her testimony indicates that her son and the robber got into a scuffle and her son tried to get the gun away. Hicks was well and vigorously defendedand prosecuted. The issues for determination were for the jury, which has spoken. AFFIRMED.