Opinion ID: 4118870
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Harassment of Julia P.

Text: Before trial, the prosecutor moved to admit evidence that defendant had sexually assaulted Julia P. In a tape-recorded statement, Julia alleged that defendant had exposed himself to her and requested oral sex, then displayed a gun and attempted to rape her. The defense challenged the truth of these claims, noting Julia did not file a police report and had not mentioned the incident in multiple conversations with the police about defendant. The court ruled the evidence admissible, noting the delayed report went to the weight of the evidence and could be explored on cross-examination. In addition, while the alleged conduct was violent and threatening, the court ruled it was not so inflammatory as to require an additional hearing. At the penalty phase, Julia described three incidents. Once, when she was sitting under a hair dryer, defendant approached with his pants down. He forcefully touched her breasts and neck, exposed his penis, and asked for oral sex. Another time, she was lying on a couch watching television with friends. Defendant suddenly pushed her down, straddled her, pinned her wrists, and tried to pull her pants down. When she resisted, defendant ordered his younger brother to remove her pants. The brother refused, telling defendant to leave her alone. On a third occasion, Julia went into her friend‘s bathroom to escape defendant when he was pestering her to have sex. Defendant followed her in, shut the door behind him, and turned off the light. He pulled a gun and held the barrel near his chin. Eventually the friend‘s mother came to the door, and defendant let her leave. Sometime later, to end the harassment, Julia did allow defendant to engage in intercourse.23 23 Julia also described two factor (b) incidents related to Patterson. In the first, she saw Patterson repeatedly slap and kick his girlfriend on a street corner. In the second, she was lying on a couch and Patterson touched her sexually. 69 Defendant now claims this evidence was insufficient to demonstrate he used or threatened to use force or violence. To the contrary, Julia P.‘s testimony clearly establishes that defendant used force when he groped her under the hair dryer and pinned her to the couch by her wrists. In the third incident, defendant prevented her from leaving the bathroom and brandished a firearm. These acts violated several penal statutes. They were sufficient to be admissible as aggravating evidence. (§ 190.3, factor (b).)
Defendant also complains the court erred in precluding him from crossexamining Julia about two false claims of rape. Counsel asked whether Julia had told her friend Nicole that she had sex with Nicole‘s boyfriend, ―Pie,‖ because he forced himself on her. Julia answered, ―no,‖ and the prosecutor objected when counsel tried to inquire further. The court sustained the objection under Evidence Code section 352, finding any probative value of this evidence would be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, undue consumption of time, and confusion of the issues. Defense counsel asserted the evidence was relevant as a false accusation of rape, but when pressed for a more specific offer of proof he conceded he had not been able to locate Nicole or her boyfriend. The court ruled that no further questioning on the subject would be permitted until defendant was prepared to produce either of these witnesses. During the chambers conference, defense counsel mentioned he also wanted to introduce evidence that Julia told ―various people‖ she had had sex with her friend‘s grandfather, Zeke. Counsel wanted to ask her about these statements and ―hopefully the witness will testify truthfully that she lied.‖ The prosecutor objected that this offer of proof did not even involve a false claim of rape, but only sexual activity. Remarking that the offer of proof was ―very vague‖ and the questioning sought appeared to be ―a fishing expedition,‖ the court ruled that this line of questioning would be prohibited unless the defense satisfied Evidence 70 Code section 782.24 In response, the defense requested a continuance, which was denied. The court observed that the defense had prior notice of these issues and could recall Julia once it had made the proper showing. Evidence may be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 ―if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.‖ An exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352 will be affirmed unless it was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and the ruling resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10.) The trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in prohibiting further cross-examination on the witness‘s sexual activity. A prior accusation of rape is relevant to the complaining witness‘s credibility, but only if the accusation is shown to be false. (People v. Tidwell (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457.) In People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1097, after a witness testified the defendant threatened her with a gun when she refused his advances, the defendant sought to impeach with evidence that the witness had falsely accused two other men of sexual molestation. The trial court sustained an Evidence Code section 352 objection, and we affirmed. We explained: ―The value of the evidence as impeachment depends upon proof that the prior charges were false. This would in effect force the parties to present evidence concerning two long-past sexual incidents which never reached the point of formal charges. Such a proceeding would consume considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the case at hand.‖ (Bittaker, at p. 1097.) The same is true here. Julia denied accusing Pie of rape. For this line of questioning to have any relevance, then, the defense would have had to establish 24 This provision requires a written motion and sworn offer of proof, and a hearing, before a complaining witness‘s sexual activity may be used to attack credibility. (Evid. Code, § 782.) 71 both that the accusation was made and that it was false. (See People v. Tidwell, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1457-1458.) The trial court reasonably concluded this inquiry would consume undue amounts of time. Further, it appears that counsel could not establish adequate foundation in light of his admission that he had not located Pie or the person to whom Julia allegedly complained. Defendant‘s second proffered impeachment was even further afield. As the prosecutor observed, this alleged statement was not a claim of rape, but merely that the witness had sex with someone. It could conceivably have been relevant if the statement was false, but counsel merely ―hope[d]‖ this was the case and did not have ready proof. The court acted well within its discretion in preventing this fishing expedition from diverting undue time and attention from the trial. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. A midtrial continuance may be granted only for good cause. ―A showing of good cause requires a demonstration that counsel and the defendant have prepared for trial with due diligence. [Citations.]‖ (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1037; see § 1050, subd. (e).) The record demonstrates that defense counsel had been aware of Julia‘s allegations for at least six months. Yet they gathered no further evidence to support their argument that she had made false accusations against other men. Given counsel‘s unsuccessful attempt to locate the key witnesses, the trial court acted well within its discretion in concluding an additional continuance with no proffered basis to expect success was unjustified. We note that the court left open an opportunity for the matter to be revisited later if counsel made an appropriate showing. No such showing was attempted.
On cross-examination, the defense stressed Julia‘s failure to tell the police about defendant‘s harassing conduct until shortly before trial and her spotty memory as to what she told the police at various times. In an attempt to rehabilitate her, the prosecutor asked about a tape-recorded statement she made while in the hospital after Patterson‘s attack. When asked if she remembered 72 telling officers how she learned defendant had murdered Beeson, Julia said she overheard someone named Charles say to her friend Lakeisha, ― ‗your cousin‘s crazy for killing that white girl.‘ ‖ The court allowed the statement but instructed the jury it could not be considered for the truth of the matter asserted but only for its bearing on the witness‘s ability to recall the day in question. Defendant raised another hearsay objection when Julia testified that Lakeisha told her defendant and Patterson had killed Beeson because ― ‗they were trying to rob her, and she wouldn‘t cooperate so they killed her.‘ ‖ The court overruled this objection as well and again told the jury the statement could not be considered for its truth. Defendant now complains the court violated his due process right to a fair penalty hearing by admitting ―highly inflammatory evidence.‖ He complains the probative value of the evidence was slight because there was no serious dispute about Julia‘s ability to recall the day in question, or the reasons why she failed to tell the police about defendant‘s assaultive conduct. The record belies this assertion. Defense cross-examination repeatedly challenged Julia‘s memory of details. Moreover, the statements were only prejudicial insofar as they implicated defendant in Beeson‘s murder. But they were admitted at the penalty phase of trial, after the jury had already convicted him. Accordingly, the statements concerned a crime that was no longer in dispute. Because defendant‘s authorities all concern the admission of hearsay statements at the guilt phase, they are inapposite to the question of prejudice here. Finally, to the extent defendant‘s reply brief suggests the statements violated Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, the claim fails. (See id. at p. 59.) The trial court carefully reminded jurors that the statements could not be considered for their truth. As nonhearsay, the statements fall outside the Crawford rule.