Opinion ID: 2973177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patronage Dismissal of Deputy County Clerks

Text: Because we have jurisdiction over this appeal, we now turn to the merits. This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 336 F.3d 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2003). For the purposes of this appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 190 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)). We first address the claims of the three deputy county clerk Plaintiffs. We then address the claims of former County Clerk Lynn Butler, who seeks to be hired as a deputy clerk. Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), patronage dismissals (i.e., dismissals for failure to support a particular party or candidate) have been, Nos. 04-6017/6018 Caudill, et al. v. Hollan Page 6 in general, unconstitutional.4 The Supreme Court in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), clarified this rule by affirming that, although patronage dismissals were, in general, unconstitutional, “party affiliation may be an acceptable requirement for some types of government employment.” Id. at 517. The Branti court indicated that the plaintiff must make out a prima facie case that he or she was discharged because of his or her political affiliation. See id. The defendant then must show that the plaintiff’s job is of the type that would qualify for an exception to the general rule. Id. The Branti court described the types of positions that would qualify for the exception as policymaking positions. Id. This court, in McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996), interpreted Branti by outlining four categories that qualified for the Branti exception: Category One: positions specifically named in relevant federal, state, county, or municipal law to which discretionary authority with respect to the enforcement of that law or the carrying out of some other policy of political concern is granted; Category Two: positions to which a significant portion of the total discretionary authority available to category one position-holders has been delegated; or positions not named in law, possessing by virtue of the jurisdiction’s pattern or practice the same quantum or type of discretionary authority commonly held by category one positions in other jurisdictions; Category Three: confidential advisors who spend a significant portion of their time on the job advising category one or category two position-holders on how to exercise their statutory or delegated policymaking authority, or other confidential employees who control the lines of communications to category one positions, category two positions or confidential advisors; Category Four: positions that are a part of a group of positions filled by balancing out political party representation, or that are filled by balancing out selections made by different governmental agents or bodies. Id. at 1557 (footnotes omitted). Thus, since 1996, in this circuit, assuming that a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of unconstitutional patronage dismissal, the defendant must show that the job in question falls within one of the four McCloud categories. In this case, the district court did not address whether a patronage dismissal of a deputy county clerk is a constitutional violation. It chose, instead, to rely on qualified immunity in dismissing the complaint.5 Plaintiffs assert that Defendant failed to rehire them based on their support of Defendant’s opponent in the election. Viewing the deposition evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is evidence that Plainiffs supported Defendant’s opponent, that Defendant was aware of that support, and that Defendant failed to rehire Plainiffs. This evidence raises a triable question of fact as to whether Defendant engaged in patronage dismissals and violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. 4 In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n.6 (1980), the Supreme Court made clear that failure to rehire due to political affiliation was no different from discharging a worker due to his or her political affiliation. Testimony in the record indicates that deputy clerks were traditionally reappointed after each election, regardless of whether a new County Clerk took office. It appears to be undisputed that deputy clerks had a reasonable expectation that they would be reappointed barring poor job performance, misconduct, or malfeasance. 5 We take this opportunity to remind district courts that they may not assume a constitutional violation or skip to qualified immunity, even when qualified immunity analysis seems conclusive. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). Nos. 04-6017/6018 Caudill, et al. v. Hollan Page 7 Because Plaintiffs have placed sufficient evidence in the record from which a fact-finder could infer that Defendant knew that they supported her opponent, the burden shifts to Defendant to prove that Plaintiffs’ positions fall within one of the four McCloud categories. We decide whether the deputy county clerk position is a position subject to political patronage as a matter of law. Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing McCloud, 97 F.3d at 1546 and Blair v. Meade, 76 F.3d 97, 100 n.2 (6th Cir.1996). Unfortunately, Defendant Hollan does not indicate which McCloud category should apply to deputy county clerks. The undisputed testimony on the types of jobs Plaintiff deputy county clerks perform reveals that their jobs are essentially clerical. They either do not have, or do not exercise, the type of discretion or authority that one would normally associate with a job subject to patronage dismissal under McCloud. It would, therefore, appear that Plaintiffs’ positions do not fall into any of the McCloud categories; however, our analysis does not end here. The so-called “Rice cannon” requires this court to give “some deference” to the legislature’s determination as to whether a particular job is political. See Rice v. Ohio Dep’t of Transp., 14 F.3d 1133, 1143 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 246 (1st Cir. 1986)). Defendant points to three different statutes as evidence of the Kentucky General Assembly’s understanding of the deputy county clerk position. We address each of the statutes discussed by Defendant Hollan in turn. First, Defendant Hollan points to K.R.S. § 62.210, which makes 6 the office of the County Clerk liable “for the the acts or omissions of deputy county clerks.” In Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2002), this court found that K.R.S. § 70.040,7 a statute with almost exactly the same wording as K.R.S. § 62.210, but which applies to sheriffs, does not convert a deputy sheriff position into a position subject to patronage dismissal. See Heggen, 284 F.3d at 683. Because we can find no meaningful difference between the two statutes, adopting our reasoning in Heggen, we find that the Rice cannon is not implicated by this statute.. Next, Defendant Hollan argues that K.R.S. § 382.990(5), which states that a “County Clerk who, by [themselves or their deputies], fail[s] to perform any duty enjoined upon them [by any of several various provisions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes] shall be guilty of8 a violation[,]” converts the deputy county clerk position into one subject to patronage dismissal. Defendant, in essence, argues that by virtue of this statute, a County Clerk can be criminally liable for the acts of his or her subordinates, and that this fact requires her to be able to pick politically compatible employees. This statute, however, is no more availing than the first, since K.R.S. § 62.210 6 The full text of K.R.S. § 62.210 reads: “The office of County Clerk, rather than the individual holder of the office, shall be liable for the acts or omissions of deputy county clerks. When a deputy clerk omits to act or acts in such a way as to render the clerk responsible, and the clerk discharges such responsibility, the deputy clerk shall be liable to the clerk for all damages and costs which are caused by the deputy's act or omission.” Given that deputy county clerks can be forced to reimburse the clerk’s office for any acts or omissions, the fact that the clerks office is liable for the actions of the deputy county clerks is of limited utility in determining whether the position is subject to political patronage. 7 The full text of K.R.S. § 70.040 reads: “The sheriff shall be liable for the acts or omissions of his deputies; except that, the office of sheriff, and not the individual holder thereof, shall be liable under this section. When a deputy sheriff omits to act or acts in such a way as to render his principal responsible, and the latter discharges such responsibility, the deputy shall be liable to the principal for all damages and costs which are caused by the deputy's act or omission.” 8 A violation, as defined by K.R.S. § 500.080(17), is: “an offense, other than a traffic infraction, for which a sentence to a fine only can be imposed.” Nos. 04-6017/6018 Caudill, et al. v. Hollan Page 8 eliminates any personal criminal liability that could attach to the individual officeholder9 and because K.R.S. § 62.210 requires deputy county clerks to reimburse the clerks office for any fines levied on the clerk. Finally, Defendant Hollan points to K.R.S. § 61.035, which provides that: “Any duty enjoined by law or by the Rules of Civil Procedure upon a ministerial officer, and any act permitted to be done by him, may be performed by his lawful deputy.” Although this statute is one of general application in that it does not specifically mention County Clerks or deputy county clerks, Kentucky courts have held that it can apply to deputy county clerks in the performance of some duties. See Hallahan v. Cranfill, 383 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Ky. 1964) (a deputy county clerk can participate in the public examination of absentee ballot applications by virtue of K.R.S. § 61.035); see also Asher v. Sizemore, 261 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Ky. 1953) (a deputy county clerk can administer an oath in his or her own name pursuant to K.R.S. § 61.035). This statute, however, is not a clear enough expression of the Kentucky General Assembly’s wish to convert the position of deputy county clerk into a political position covered by one of the McCloud categories. We, therefore, decline to hold that the Kentucky legislature has determined that the position of a deputy county clerk is a political position as opposed to a clerical position. Consequently, the Rice cannon is inapplicable. Because Defendant has not shown that the deputy county clerk position falls under any of the McCloud categories, and because the Rice cannon is inapplicable, we hold that patronage dismissals of Kentucky deputy county clerks with routine duties violates the U.S. Constitution. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, questions of material fact exist as to whether Defendant Hollan violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights by terminating them for political reasons. We now proceed to the second step of our analysis and address whether Defendant Hollan is entitled to qualified immunity.10 9 K.R.S. § 62.210 does not differentiate between criminal and civil liability. It simply makes the office of the County Clerk liable for all acts and omissions of deputy clerks. It appears that a violation has no effect other than a monetary penalty under Kentucky law. K.R.S. § 62.210 also requires deputy clerks to reimburse the office of the County Clerk for any fines imposed on the office of the County Clerk because of the deputy clerks’ acts or omissions. It would appear, then, that, under Kentucky law, the exposure of a County Clerk to criminal liability by virtue of the acts of his or her subordinates is not a large concern. 10 As we recently indicated in Estate of Carter, 408 F.3d at 311 n.2: Panels of this court occasionally employ a three-step qualified immunity analysis, as opposed to the two-step analysis set forth here. As two recent opinions indicate, both the two-step approach and the three-step approach can be said to capture the holding of Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). Compare Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 491 n. 6 (6th Cir.2004) (two-step approach), with Sample v. Bailey, 2005 Fed.App. 0209P, 409 F.3d 689, 696 n. 3 (6th Cir.2005) (three-step approach). The third step is “whether the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights.” Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 905 (6th Cir.2004) (internal quotation omitted). In cases subsequent to Saucier the Supreme Court has not formally broken up the two steps prescribed by Saucier into three steps, see, e.g., Brosseau v. Haugen, --- U.S. ----, 125 S.Ct. 596, 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004), but the three-step approach may in some cases increase the clarity of the proper analysis. In many factual contexts, however, including this one, the fact that a right is “clearly established” sufficiently implies that its violation is objectively unreasonable. Cf. Champion, 380 F.3d at 905. Like Estate of Carter, this case is one of the many cases where, if the right is clearly established, the conduct at issue would also be objectively unreasonable. Thus, in order to avoid duplicative analysis, we choose to collapse the second and third prongs discussed in some of our cases into one prong in this case. Nos. 04-6017/6018 Caudill, et al. v. Hollan Page 9