Opinion ID: 700522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act

Text: 35 Roadway next contends that the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) provides the exclusive remedy for any injury Lightning suffered as a result of Roadway's intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault. Accordingly, Roadway argues, the district court should not have entertained Lightning's tort claims. 36 The Act states, in relevant part, that [t]he rights and the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee ... at common law or otherwise, on account of ... injury. O.C.G.A. Sec. 34-9-11(a) (1992). The Act provides the following definition of injury:  'Injury' or 'personal injury' means only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment.... O.C.G.A. Sec. 34-9-1(4) (1992 & 1994 Supp.). Georgia courts have consistently held that psychic trauma precipitated by psychic stimulus (as opposed to physical injury) does not constitute an injury under the Act. Hanson Buick Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga.App. 127, 292 S.E.2d 428, 428-30 (1982); see also Oliver v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 Ga.App. 703, 434 S.E.2d 500, 500-01 (1993); W.W. Fowler Oil Co. v. Hamby, 192 Ga.App. 422, 385 S.E.2d 106, 106-07 (1989). Consequently, Roadway's claim that the Act provides the exclusive means for Lightning's remedy lacks merit.