Opinion ID: 2978320
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BIA’s Sua Sponte Authority to Reopen

Text: Vakeesan argues that reversal of the BIA’s decision is appropriate because the BIA incorrectly found that she moved to reopen in response to being detained by the DHS for deportation. In fact, the DHS never took Vakeesan into custody. While the BIA did err by finding that Vakeesan was taken into custody for removal by the DHS, that error factored only into the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen Vakeesan’s proceedings. And the BIA’s decision not to exercise its sua sponte authority is not subject to judicial review. We have previously held that “[t]he decision whether to invoke sua sponte authority [under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)] is committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA” and therefore is not subject to judicial review. Harchenko v. I.N.S., 379 F.3d 405, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2004) . . . Section 1003.2(a) “allows the BIA to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it does not require the BIA to do so.” Harchenko, 379 F.3d at 411. “Harchenko affirmed the principle that review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Randhawa v. Gonzales, 184 Fed. App’x 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2006) . . . . Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 723 (6th Cir. 2008). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to forgo the exercise of its sua sponte authority. Id. at 724. That leaves us with jurisdiction to consider only whether the BIA abused its discretion by denying Vakeesan’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions.