Opinion ID: 2054068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Has the Legislature delegated to the TPA the power and established proper standards to require contractors on projects to enter project-labor agreements with designated unions?

Text: On the first point, appellants argue that the Legislature would not intend that an executive agency adopt so far-reaching a policy in the absence of express statutory authorization. Appellants support their argument by the separation-of-powers doctrine. [W]ithin limits the legislature may delegate its authority to a government agency. Township of Mount Laurel v. Department of Pub. Advocate, 83 N.J. 522, 532, 416 A. 2d 886 (1980); New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Comm'n, 82 N.J. 57, 82-83, 411 A. 2d 168 (1980). [T]he Legislature may not vest unbridled or arbitrary power in [an] administrative agency, Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123, 93 A. 2d 385 (1952), but [a]s long as the discretion of administrative officers is `hemmed in by standards sufficiently definitive to guide its exercise,' the delegation of legislative powers is not unconstitutional. Township of Mount Laurel, supra, 83 N.J. at 532, 416 A. 2d 886 (quoting Cammarata v. Essex County Park Comm'n, 26 N.J. 404, 410, 140 A. 2d 397 (1958)); accord In re Egg Harbor Assocs., 94 N.J. 358, 372, 464 A. 2d 1115 (1983). Standards must accompany the delegation of power for three reasons: First, [they] prevent[] the Legislature from abdicating its political responsibility and prevent[] undemocratic, bureaucratic institutions from wielding all-encompassing, uncontrollable government power. Second, limiting standards define the area in which the agency develops the experience and expertise that the legislature has neither the time nor resources to develop. With too broad a standard the agency stands in no better position than the legislature that created it. Third, and most important, standards facilitate judicial review of agency decisions, which guards against arbitrary and capricious governmental action. As long as the statutory standards achieve these purposes, such standards should be considered sufficiently definite to pass constitutional muster. [ Township of Mount Laurel, supra, 83 N.J. at 532-33, 416 A. 2d 886.] Our courts have consistently sustained the delegation of legislative authority under broad and general statutory standards governing the manner in which administrative agencies must exercise the authority delegated. Thus, against constitutional attacks, we have upheld standards authorizing the Public Advocate to represent the public interest in administrative and court proceedings, Township of Mount Laurel, supra, 83 N.J. 522, 416 A. 2d 886, and standards requiring the Department of Environmental Protection to use its power to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the public. Egg Harbor Assocs., supra, 94 N.J. at 372, 464 A. 2d 1115. In other circumstances, we have given broad latitude to executive agencies to flesh out the contours of a statutory mission. See, e.g., GATX Terminals Corp. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 86 N.J. 46, 429 A. 2d 355 (1981). Obviously, the mission of the TPA is to operate and maintain the most efficient roadways possible for the citizens of the State. N.J.S.A. 27:23-5. If in the construction and maintenance of that highway system the TPA deems a project-labor agreement necessary, the proposition that the requirement of such an agreement is within the TPA's mission is difficult to reject. The more difficult question is whether standards exist to guide the agency's discretion. For example, how far does the agency's discretion extend, and may that discretion be delegated to third parties? For example, in Utility Contractors Ass'n of New England, Inc. v. Department of Public Works, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 726, 565 N.E. 2d 459 (1991) ( Central Artery ), the consultant for the Department of Public Works actually negotiated the project-labor agreement with the building-trades council, an organization representing the building-trades unions. The Department of Public Works intended to require prospective contractors to execute such an agreement. Among the features of that agreement were provisions that: 1. Dictated the scheduling of hours of work; 2. Limited the contractor's right to select supervisors; 3. Determined the circumstances under which employees might be discharged; 4. Precluded in effect the hiring of any employees not members of the unions. Brief for the Utility Contractors Association of New England, Inc. at 10-12, Central Artery, supra, 565 N.E. 2d 459 (Nos. 90-P-921, 90-P-1062). Here the TPA did not use an independent agent to negotiate the project-labor agreement but attached a proposed form of the agreement to its bid specifications, stating that potential qualified contractors must consent to enter into such an agreement with BCTC unions. The record does not disclose whether the form agreement was negotiated, by whom it was negotiated, or what requirements were placed on the negotiator by the TPA. The most relevant standards to guide the agency's action are in our State's public-bidding laws. A closer examination of the TPA's delegated statutory power and those bidding standards is warranted. 2.