Opinion ID: 1568022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Support the Convictions.

Text: ¶ 28. Nelson challenges both the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence. In his statement of the issue, Nelson challenges both counts of the indictment, however, he ultimately requests relief from the kidnapping conviction. The Court will address the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight of the evidence for both the murder conviction and the kidnapping conviction. Nelson also argues that the kidnapping occurred as part of the murder and, therefore, double jeopardy bars prosecution for both murder and kidnapping. Nelson argues that the kidnapping conviction should be overturned because the alleged kidnapping occurred after the victim was deceased and therefore not susceptible to being kidnapped.
¶ 29. Motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence, and the standard of review for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict are identical. Croft v. State, 992 So.2d 1151, 1157 (Miss. 2008) (citations omitted). In Jones v. State, 904 So.2d 149, 153-154 (Miss.2005), this Court stated: To determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction. Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968). The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Jones, 904 So.2d at 153-154. The jury determines the weight and credibility of witness testimony. Moore v. State, 933 So.2d 910, 922 (Miss.2006). ¶ 30. Nelson was indicted for capital murder pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(e) based on alleged murder and the underlying crime of robbery. Nelson also was indicted for the crime of kidnapping pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-3-53. ¶ 31. After the State rested, Nelson argued his motion for directed verdict. The trial court heard arguments from both Nelson and the State. The trial court denied that motion and stated: We have two crimes charged, that of capital murder, we have that of kidnapping. I, having heard the testimony of Doctor Haynes [sic], having viewed the exhibits that has been offered into evidence, and having heard the statement of the defendant, find certainly that there is evidence for the jury to accept that the victim wouldhad been kidnapped. I asked the question, and I still cannot conceive of any reason that the two defendants would have to place a garbage bag over a man's head and use duct tape to seal it off if they believed him to be dead. To me that's an indication that they believed that he was alive and if they transported him from that house as testified to, then that is the crime of kidnapping. With the crime of robbery, II at one time could recall certain cases that would be relevant to this issue, but II know there is such a case wherea capital murder case, and I think it happened up in north Mississippi back in the 70's, where there was a killing and then the defendant took the victim's car and left in it, and the Supreme Court considered that as a crime of robbery and upheld the death penalty. In this case here, according to the testimony or the statement of the defendant, after theuhkilling there, that they left with the victim in the trunk of the car, disposed of his body, carried the car to East Central Community College in an effort to conceal the car. I think those are certain issues that the jury can resolve. I think the State has made out a prima facie case of guilt. Your motion's overruled. ¶ 32. Nelson chose to rest his case without presenting any evidence. The jury returned a verdict and convicted Nelson of the lesser offense of simple murder, not capital murder. The jury also convicted Nelson of kidnapping Shannon. Following the jury verdicts, Nelson filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. ¶ 33. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Nelson committed the essential elements of the murder and kidnapping. In regard to the murder, Nelson confessed to choking Shannon. When Shannon begged Nelson to stop choking him, McBeath began to choke Shannon. At McBeath's request, Nelson found a plastic garbage bag and duct tape. McBeath placed the bag around Shannon's face and Nelson taped the bag around Shannon's head. Dr. Hayne testified that the causes of Shannon's death were twofold, strangulation and suffocation, and that the suffocation was the terminal event that caused Shannon's death. In addition, Dr. Hayne stated that Shannon had suffered linear abrasions and bruises on his back. In his opinion, Shannon was alive when these marks were made on his back, because the bleeding that occurred under the skin indicated that blood still was pumping into the injured area. ¶ 34. As for the kidnapping, the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to support a conviction of kidnapping. Nelson confessed to choking Shannon and then taping the duct tape around Shannon's head. In his confession, Nelson stated that after McBeath choked Shannon, he just knew that Shannon was dead. Despite Nelson's claim that he just knew that Shannon was dead, Nelson complied with McBeath's request and found a garbage bag and duct tape. McBeath placed the bag on Shannon's face, and Nelson stated that he wrapped the duct tape around Shannon's head. Nelson confessed to removing Shannon from his home, with the help of McBeath, placing Shannon in the trunk of Shannon's car, and dumping Shannon's body in the woods. ¶ 35. Dr. Hayne testified that the suffocation was the terminal event that ended Shannon's life. It was determined that a small amount of air could flow through a plastic bag. However, Dr. Hayne testified that a person could survive only a short period of time under those circumstances. Furthermore, Dr. Hayne testified that Shannon had sustained linear scrapes on his back which signified a dragging or sliding movement. The scrapes and bruises also signified that Shannon was alive at the time he sustained the injuries based on the type of bleeding. Dr. Hayne explained that, in contrast, a deceased victim would have pale linear marks with no bruises. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Nelson of murder and kidnapping. ¶ 36. Furthermore, Nelson's contention that the kidnapping occurred as part of the murder and therefore, double jeopardy bars the prosecution of murder and kidnapping, is without merit. Murder and kidnapping have separate statutory elements, requiring different facts. ¶ 37. In Bannister v. State, 731 So.2d 583, 586 (Miss.1999), this Court held: Although the state may freely define crimes and assign punishments, it is not allowed to punish a defendant for a crime containing elements which are completely enveloped by an offense for which a defendant was previously convicted. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). If an individual is charged with two offenses, and all the elements of one are included within and are part of a second greater offense, Blockburger intervenes. It charges that we compare statutory offenses, as indicated, and see whether each requires proof of a fact which the other does not. Meeks v. State, 604 So.2d 748, 751 (Miss. 1992). Even though there may be a substantial overlap in the proof supporting the convictions of the different crimes, the Blockburger test is met where each offense requires proof of an element not necessary to the other. Holly v. State, 671 So.2d 32, 44 (Miss. 1996) (citing Brock v. State, 530 So.2d 146, 150 (Miss.1988)). Bannister, 731 So.2d at 586. ¶ 38. Nelson was charged with capital murder pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-19(2)(e) for murder and the underlying crime of robbery, which provides: (2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the following cases: .... (e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any attempt to commit such felonies.... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. 2006). ¶ 39. Nelson also was indicted for the crime of kidnapping pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-3-53, which provides, in part: Any person who, without lawful authority and with or without intent to secretly confine, shall forcibly seize and confine any other person, or shall inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be confined or imprisoned against his or her will, or without lawful authority shall forcibly seize, inveigle or kidnap any child under the age of sixteen (16) years against the will of the parents or guardian or person having the lawful custody of the child.... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (Rev.2006). ¶ 40. The crimes of capital murder and kidnapping each require proof of an element not necessary to the other. See Bannister, 731 So.2d at 586 (quoting Holly, 671 So.2d at 44) ( Blockburger is met when each crime requires proof of an element not necessary to the other). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
¶ 41. Following the jury verdicts, Nelson filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. In Jones, this Court also addressed the weight of the evidence and stated: ¶ 42. When reviewing a denial of a motion for a new trial based on an objection to the weight of the evidence, we will only disturb a verdict when it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss.1997). The evidence should be weighed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Jones, 904 So.2d at 154. ¶ 43. Without restating the facts previously presented, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we cannot say that the verdicts convicting Nelson of murder and kidnapping are so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow them to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Nelson confessed to choking Shannon, placing a plastic bag over his head, and securing duct tape around Shannon's head to keep the bag in place notwithstanding his claim that he already believed that Shannon had died after McBeath choked him. Dr. Hayne testified that the bleeding of the skin under the linear drag marks and the bruises on Shannon's body signified that Shannon was alive at the time he sustained those injuries. He also stated that these linear marks were consistent with dragging. ¶ 44. The jury heard the conflicting testimony of Nelson and Dr. Hayne. Nelson's confession indicated that Nelson believed that McBeath had choked Shannon to death. In addition, Nelson stated in his confession and that he just knew that Shannon was dead prior to securing the duct tape around Shannon's head. The jury also heard Dr. Hayne's opinion on Shannon's cause of death and his opinion on whether Shannon had been alive at the time he sustained the linear abrasions consistent with dragging. After hearing all the evidence, including the conflicting evidence, the jury convicted Nelson of murder and kidnapping. Accordingly, we find that this issue is without merit.