Opinion ID: 2068433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Robinson's Right to a Public Trial was Violated When the Trial Judge Excluded Members of Robinson's Family and Others from the Trial

Text: The United States Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that the right to an open and public trial is vital to the fair administration of justice. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S.Ct. at 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d at 38 (The central aim of a criminal proceeding must be to try the accused fairly, and `[o]ur cases have uniformly recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.'); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501, 508, 104 S.Ct. 819, 823, 78 L.Ed.2d 629, 637 (1984) (No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial. But the primacy of the accused's right is difficult to separate from the right of everyone in the community to attend the voir dire which promotes fairness.); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 506, 92 L.Ed. 682, 692 (1948) (Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution.); Carter v. State, 356 Md. 207, 214, 738 A.2d 871, 874 (1999) (The right to a public trial ... is deeply rooted in the English common law tradition to promote fairness and public confidence in criminal proceedings, upon which our system of justice is based.); Watters v. State, 328 Md. 38, 612 A.2d 1288 (1992). This right, however, is not without its limits. [T]he Court has made clear that the right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 2215, 81 L.Ed.2d at 38. Because the right to a public trial is so essential to the criminal justice system, the process for restricting this right is rigid: [T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. at 2216, 81 L.Ed.2d at 39. The record of the trial judge's decision to exclude Robinson's family and other spectators from the trial does not meet this four-part test: (1) an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced; (2) narrowly tailored closure; (3) consideration of reasonable alternatives; and (4) findings adequate to support the closure. The state's interest in protecting the integrity of legal proceedings is certainly an overriding interest. [3] See Wisconsin v. Ndina, 315 Wis.2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, 629 (2009) ([D]isruptions within the courtroom may be viewed as a justification for a trial court's order excluding family members from the trial ....); see also United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir.1979) (The right to a public trial `has always been interpreted as being subject to the trial judge's power to keep order in the courtroom. Were this not so a public trial might mean no trial at all at the option of the defendant and his sympathizers.') (quoting United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 971 (2nd Cir.1965)). Indeed, the parties do not dispute that the trial judge had a duty to ensure the fairness and credibility of the proceedings. Failure to meet the remaining three elements of the Waller test is where the trial court erred. The specific allegations of improper contact with witnesses only extended to Robinson's sister. The trial judge failed to make findings on the record to support the decision to exclude the rest of the family and other unidentified spectators. This indicates that the exclusion order was not narrowly tailored to address the specific problem at hand. There is no evidence that the trial judge considered reasonable alternatives, such as excluding only those individuals who had engaged in inappropriate behavior. Robinson's mother requested that she be allowed to remain even if the rest of the family was excluded. The trial judge denied the mother's request without explanation. In Yung v. Walker, 341 F.3d 104, 111 (2nd Cir.2003), the Second Circuit held that, Waller prevents a court from denying a family member's request to be exempted from a courtroom closure order unless the court is convinced that the exclusion of that particular relative is necessary to protect the overriding interest at stake. Indeed, it would be an unreasonable interpretation of Waller for a court to deny such a request if the exclusion of that particular relative, under the specific circumstances at issue, is not necessary to promote the overriding interest. Without specific findings on the record, it is impossible to determine whether the exclusion order was narrowly tailored to the identified problem. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to engage in the Waller analysis required before infringing on Robinson's right to a public trial.