Opinion ID: 1813007
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Special Instruction on HAC

Text: We now turn to the penalty phase issues. Before the penalty phase, Hudson sought a modification to the standard jury instruction on the heinous, atrocious or cruel (HAC) aggravator that would have advised the jury that [i]n determining whether the killing was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, you are considering only the effect defendant's actions had upon the victim, and not the effect the actions had upon other people who were present but were not killed. The State contended that the special instruction was not necessary because the standard jury instruction correctly covered the matter. The trial court denied Hudson's request for the special instruction. In order to be entitled to a special jury instruction, [the defendant] must prove: (1) the special instruction was supported by the evidence; (2) the standard instruction did not adequately cover the theory of the defense; and (3) the special instruction was a correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing. Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 756 (Fla. 2001) (footnotes omitted). Hudson argues that the standard instruction is insufficient because it does not tell the jury not to consider the effect of the killing on others. We disagree. The standard jury instructions inform the jury that [t]he aggravating circumstances that you may consider are limited to any of the following that are established by the evidence. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.11 (emphasis supplied). This admonition precedes the discussion of the aggravating circumstances and acts as a limitation on what the jury may properly consider. The standard instruction pertaining to HAC also advises the jury that [t]he kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious or cruel is one accompanied by additional facts that show that the crime was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the victim. Id. (emphasis supplied.) Hudson also suggests that the jury instruction given by the trial court, which stated that [t]orturous murders are those that show extreme and outrageous depravity as exemplified by desire to inflict a high degree of pain or utter indifference to or enjoyment of the suffering of another, allows the jury to consider the suffering of someone other than the victim. However, this language was part of a special instruction expressly requested by Hudson. Therefore, Hudson cannot now be heard to complain that this particular instruction was confusing or incorrectly directed the jury to consider the suffering of anyone other than the victim. Accordingly, because the special instruction was adequately covered within the standard jury instructions and the standard instructions adequately advised the jury to focus only on the effect of the defendant's actions on the murder victim, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hudson's requested special instruction.