Opinion ID: 1906647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plymouth Sedan Applies to the Case Sub Judice

Text: We also address whether, as respondent argues, a civil in rem forfeiture proceeding under section 297 is distinguishable from the forfeiture proceeding in Plymouth Sedan. This argument, even if applicable, would depend on whether a civil in rem forfeiture action under section 297 is quasi-criminal, thus requiring Fourth Amendment protections to be enforced through the exclusionary rule by reason of language within Boyd, Plymouth Sedan, and their progeny. We conclude that section 297 is quasi-criminal.
Both parties in this appeal argue that the exclusionary rule should or should not be applied to section 297 depending on whether the Legislature intended the law to be punitive. Respondent, arguing the law is not intended to be punitive, relies on Ursery, 518 U.S. at 292, 116 S.Ct. at 2149, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, which held that civil in rem forfeitures, particularly under 21 U.S.C. § 881, the federal equivalent to section 297, are not punitive for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. In opposition, petitioner relies on Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115, 116 S.Ct. 916, 133 L.Ed.2d 846 (1996), which held that [section] 297... is, like [21 U.S.C.] §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), a punitive statute, the purpose of which is to require `direct payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,' under the Excessive Fines Clause contained in Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2915, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989)). Aravanis was premised largely on Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2812, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), which held that the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause applies to a federal civil forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 because of the statute's punitive nature. See also Bajakajian v. United States, 524 U.S. 321,____, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 2033, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (Forfeiturespayments in kindare thus `fines' if they constitute punishment for an offense.). The determination of whether the prophylactic, judicially-created exclusionary rule applies to a civil in rem forfeiture action is not based on whether the forfeiture statute was intended to be punitive. Rather, because the federal exclusionary rule remedies certain violations of the Fourth Amendment, but is not coextensive with it, we must determine whether the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply to proceedings outside the scope of a criminal trial. Although the purpose of the exclusionary rule may be to curb improper police conduct, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to insure the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.... It protects everybody, not just those of the criminal milieu, and, thus, is not limited to criminal proceedings. This issue was discussed by the Supreme Court in Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n. 4, 113 S.Ct. at 2804-05 n. 4, 125 L.Ed.2d 488: As a general matter, this Court's decisions applying constitutional protections to civil forfeiture proceedings have adhered to th[e] distinction between [constitutional] provisions that are limited to criminal proceedings and provisions that are not. Thus, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applies in forfeiture proceedings, [citing Plymouth Sedan and Boyd ], but that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not, see United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 480-482, 16 S.Ct. 641, 643, 40 L.Ed. 777 (1896). It has also held that the due process requirement that guilt in a criminal proceeding be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings. See Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 271-272, 24 L.Ed. 901 (1878). The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held not to apply in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only in cases where the forfeiture could properly be characterized as remedial. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 1105, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 93 S.Ct. 489, 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972); see generally United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446-449, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1900-1902, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second sanction that may not fairly be characterized as remedial). Conversely, the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, which is textually limited to criminal case[s], has been applied in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only where the forfeiture statute had made the culpability of the owner relevant, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721-722, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1045, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971), or where the owner faced the possibility of subsequent criminal proceedings, see Boyd, 116 U.S., at 634, 6 S.Ct., at 534; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253-254, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (discussing Boyd ). And, of course, even those protections associated with criminal cases may apply to a civil forfeiture proceeding if it is so punitive that the proceeding must reasonably be considered criminal. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963); Ward, supra . [Emphasis added.] The Supreme Court as late as 1993 in Austin noted that the Fourth Amendment's provisions were not limited to criminal proceedings, but, that the Confrontation Clause, the due process reasonable doubt standard, double jeopardy, and self-incrimination provisions were so limited. It clearly distinguished the applicability of these various provisions, squarely refusing to limit the Fourth Amendment's provisions to criminal cases, relying on Plymouth Sedan and Boyd in the process. The Court thus clearly implied in Austin that although the exclusionary rule is a judicially-created remedy intended to apply primarily to criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, the Fourth Amendment applies to all unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, regardless of context. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 51, 114 S.Ct. 492, 500, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (It is true, of course, that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and seizures in the civil context and may serve to resolve the legality of these governmental actions without reference to other constitutional provisions.). Some administrative proceedings, although civil in nature, also can involve evidence that an administrative agency has searched for and seized while inspecting private property. Several Maryland statutes grant administrative agencies the right to seek search warrants to inspect private property. See Md.Code (1992, 1998 Repl. Vol.), § 3-205 of the Business Regulation Article (amusement attractions); Md.Code (1982, 1996 Repl.Vol.), § 7-256.1 of the Environment Article (controlled hazardous substances); Md.Code (1991, 1998 Cum.Supp.), § 5.5-113 of the Labor & Employment Article (railroad safety and health conditions); § 6-105 of the Labor & Employment Article (high voltage power lines); Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 294 (controlled dangerous substances); Md.Code (1957, 1997 Repl.Vol., ), Art. 38A, § 8A (State Fire Marshal); Md.Code (1957, 1998 Repl.Vol.), Art. 89, § 2A (miscellaneous health and safety inspections by the Division of Labor and Industry). This Court, relying on Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978), held that search warrants sought pursuant to then Art. 89, section 2A were constitutionally valid only when based on probable cause. Fred W. Allnutt, Inc. v. Commissioner of Labor & Industry, 289 Md. 35, 50-51, 421 A.2d 1360, 1368 (1980). [8] That holding presumably applies to all statutorily authorized administrative search warrants. Although we realize that probable cause has somewhat different meanings in criminal and administrative contexts, see id. at 48-49, 421 A.2d at 1366-67, that Fourth Amendment protections apply to some administrative search warrants nonetheless demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment extends beyond traditional criminal cases. The Fourth Amendment is not limited by its language or its history to the context of criminal trials. Its goal is to insure freedom from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures of any nature. By contrast, the goal of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to prevent multiple punishments and prosecutions (textually and historically criminal punishments and prosecutions), Ursery, 518 U.S. at 273, 116 S.Ct. at 2139-40, 135 L.Ed.2d 549, and the goal of the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause is to prevent excessive punishments in the form of payments extracted by the government. See generally Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314; Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488. After Austin, therefore, a determination of whether a forfeiture statute is punitive in nature is only necessary when a double jeopardy or Eighth Amendment violation is alleged or when some other protections associated with criminal cases other than Fourth Amendment protections, are involved. Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n. 4, 113 S.Ct. at 2804-05 n. 4, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (citing Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742; Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644). Fourth Amendment protections, therefore, apply regardless of the criminality of the conduct of the owner of the property or the use to which the property is put. As for other constitutional protections, a reviewing court should concern itself with whether the particular protection was intended to apply to the particular case before it. Often, this decision will be based on whether the particular constitutional protection was intended to be limited to criminal or civil matters. Thus, as noted in Austin, 509 U.S. at 608 n. 4, 113 S.Ct. at 2804 n. 4, 125 L.Ed.2d 488, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, generally limited to criminal causes, do not apply to civil forfeitures. As noted, the Fourth Amendment lacks any such textual limitations. The Fourth Amendment applies, regardless of context, in cases in which the government allegedly has committed an unreasonable search or seizure or both.
Respondent argues, as the Court of Special Appeals opined below, that because Plymouth Sedan involved a case in which the penalty under the civil forfeiture action could exceed the criminal penalties, the term quasi-criminal is limited to those circumstances, making the current case distinguishable. In support of this argument, respondent notes that in the case before us, petitioner stands to lose his Corvette, yet in criminal court he would have faced up to twenty years of imprisonment, $25,000 in fines, and a mandatory minimum of five years imprisonment without parole. By contrast, in Plymouth Sedan, the punishment for the liquor offense was a $100 to $500 fine, but Mr. McGonigle's car was worth $1,000. [9] Noting this, the Supreme Court stated in Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700-01, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d 170, that the forfeiture is clearly a penalty for the criminal offense and can result in even greater punishment than the criminal prosecution. The Court reasoned that [i]t would be anomalous indeed, under these circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible. Id. at 701, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Respondent also alleges that when Plymouth Sedan referred to a forfeiture action such as the one involved here, the Court meant to limit its holding to forfeiture statutes similar to Pennsylvania's, which authorized a civil forfeiture action only after a criminal conviction. Respondent points out that under the Maryland forfeiture statute, criminal charges are irrelevant as to whether a forfeiture complaint may be filed under section 297 against the suspect property. Despite respondent's arguments, the conduct that gives rise to the forfeiture action under section 297 must, nevertheless, be criminal in nature. Under the statute, if there is no criminal conduct or criminal intent relating to the use of the object for which forfeiture is sought, no foundation for forfeiture exists. Subsection (b)(4) of section 297 provides that vehicles used or intended for use, to transport... property described in certain other paragraphs are subject to forfeiture. The property described in those paragraphs, subsections 297(b)(1) & (2), are controlled dangerous substances utilized in violation of the provisions of this subheading. The laws contained within the subheading, Health-Controlled Dangerous Substances, establish the criminality of the conduct at issue herethe illegal manufacture, distribution, or possession of controlled dangerous substances, including possession in sufficient quantities to indicate an intent to distribute. Although criminal charges may not be necessary, criminal conduct or criminal intent is. A more supportable interpretation of Plymouth Sedan is that it speaks in general terms, labeling as quasi-criminal any forfeiture action based upon inherently criminal activity, whether actually indictable or not, and no matter what the punishment. For instance, the Court noted that as Mr. Justice Bradley aptly pointed out in Boyd, a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Moreover, immediately after noting the disparity in the forfeiture and criminal penalties in the case before it, the Plymouth Sedan Court noted in a footnote that Boyd rejected any argument that the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights. Id. at 702 n. 11, 85 S.Ct. at 1251 n. 11, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (emphasis added). Considering the use of this broad language, the Court was referring impliedly not just to forfeitures based upon the specific statutes in Boyd or Plymouth Sedan, but to all forfeiture actions requiring evidence of a criminal nature, i.e., evidence of criminality. It is this general application of the exclusionary rule to most civil in rem forfeiture proceedings based upon criminal conduct, i.e., quasi-criminal proceedings, that the eleven federal circuits and thirty-four sister states have accepted and applied. See supra. We also note that the Supreme Court took great pains to distinguish its holding in Plymouth Sedan from United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 54, 72 S.Ct. 93, 96, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 1224-35, 92 L.Ed. 1663 (1948). In those cases, the Court stated in dicta that contraband per se, illegally seized and subsequently suppressed under the exclusionary rule, need not be returned to the criminal defendant because the contraband itself is illegal to possess. See Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 698-99, 85 S.Ct. at 1249-50, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. By contrast, in Plymouth Sedan, the Court noted that possession of an automobile is not even remotely criminal. Id. at 699, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Rather, the Court stated, [i]t is only the alleged use to which this particular automobile was put that subjects Mr. McGonigle to its possible loss. Id. The Court went on to explain that like in Boyd, the property involved in the forfeiture proceeding was not intrinsically illegal in character. Id. at 700, 85 S.Ct. at 1250, 14 L.Ed.2d 170. Just as there was nothing even remotely criminal in possessing a 1958 Plymouth, it was not criminal for petitioner to own a 1995 Corvette. To prove, therefore, that the derivative contraband in this case, the Corvette, should be forfeited under section 297, respondent must provide evidence of a drug crime or the intention to commit one by petitioner related to the use of the vehicle, just as the Commonwealth in Plymouth Sedan had to prove evidence of contraband per se, the unsealed liquor, to seize Mr. McGonigle's car. A section 297 forfeiture action is, therefore, quasi-criminal litigation because criminality is at the basic foundation of the conduct from which a forfeiture suit may arise under the Maryland statute. [10] Finally, we reject respondent's argument that section 297, unlike the statute in Plymouth Sedan, does not require the actual commission of a crime to trigger a forfeiture action. Respondent cites United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972), for this proposition that Plymouth Sedan covered only forfeiture actions triggered by a criminal conviction. Both of these cases, however, addressed the Double Jeopardy Clause, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly held does not apply to civil forfeiture proceedings the Legislature does not intend to be punitive. See generally Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549. That a civil forfeiture statute requires a criminal conviction prior to filing is more relevant under the Double Jeopardy Clause, which, as we have noted, seeks to prevent multiple punishments for the same offense. Considering Austin, the punitive terminology is of much lesser relevance, if applicable at all, in Fourth Amendment cases. Moreover, Boyd, upon which Plymouth Sedan relied heavily, concerned a revenue law that authorized forfeiture as a criminal penalty for failure to pay customs duties. Nevertheless, rather than initiating criminal proceedings, the government, in order to utilize a statute authorizing the issuance of a subpoena in non-criminal matters, filed a civil in rem action against the imported goods. The government's intention was obvious: the importer's papers were essential to prove the importer had not paid duties on the goods in question. The federal statute used by the government authorized it to issue a subpoena compelling production of such papers [i]n all suits and proceedings other than criminal, arising under any of the revenue laws of the United States. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619, 6 S.Ct. at 526, 29 L.Ed. 746 (emphasis added). The government based its subpoena on its showing that said action is a suit or proceeding other than criminal, arising under the customs revenue laws of the United States, and not for penalties. Id. (emphasis added). That the forfeiture derived from an act [authorizing subpoenas,] which expressly excludes criminal proceedings from its operation, (though embracing civil suits for penalties and forfeitures,) and ... an information not technically a criminal proceeding, id. at 633, 6 S.Ct. at 534, 29 L.Ed. 746, made little difference. The Court emphasized that because the government proceeded using a non-criminal action should not relieve the proceedings or the law from being obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment. Id. We, too, deal with a statute that does not create a criminal proceeding, even though criminal evidence or contraband per se, i.e., the drugs, is typically necessary to prove a forfeiture case as to derivative contraband, i.e., the car, under section 297. As Boyd points out, [i]t is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Id. at 635, 6 S.Ct. at 535, 29 L.Ed. 746. Like the Boyd Court, we decline to allow the government to avoid compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as traditionally applicable in criminal cases by proceeding under the auspices of a civil action that authorizes the taking of private property, but only if that property is used, or intended to be used, for criminally-related purposes. To do otherwise might facilitate a practice in which a car or other property, and the financial benefits resulting from forfeiture, might become the primary purpose of the actions rather than the apprehension and conviction of the criminals and their removal from society. See William Patrick Nelson, Should the Ranch Go Free Because the Constable Blundered? Gaining Compliance with Search and Seizure Standards in the Age of Asset Forfeiture, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1325-33 (arguing that pragmatic concerns, i.e., increased budgetary revenue, the ability to use valuable assets in future undercover operations, and an appearance of stronger job performance, have encouraged greater use of forfeiture laws).
Respondent also argues that even if we classify section 297 forfeiture actions as quasi-criminal, we still should decline to apply the exclusionary rule because the Supreme Court recently noted that the rule applies only in situations where its deterrence benefits outweigh its `substantial social costs.' Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 2019, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984)). Respondent contends that applying the rule to this case would provide minimal deterrence because the loss of the ability to use the evidence in petitioner's criminal prosecution alone would deter the police, especially given the severity of the criminal penalty versus the loss of his car. As we have indicated, this approach would result in the applicability of the exclusionary rule being dependent, at least in part, on the value of the vehicle seized. Such an approach, in our view, would not be feasible. Scott, moreover, is distinguishable because that case dealt only with parole revocation hearings, a type of proceeding completely unrelated to any issue determinative to this case. Scott, 524 U.S. at ____ _ ____,____, 118 S.Ct. at 2017-18, 2022, 141 L.Ed.2d 344. The Court noted that parole is essentially an agreement, i.e., a contract, between the state and a prisoner, granting a limited degree of freedom in return for the parolee's assurance that he will comply with the often strict terms and conditions of his release. Id. at ____, 118 S.Ct. at 2020, 141 L.Ed.2d 344. To allow an exclusionary rule in that context would hinder the state's ability to maintain close supervision over a parolee and, in turn, prove to the parole board that a parolee has violated his or her end of the deal, i.e., contract, thus exacting great societal costs which outweigh any deterrence effect. See id. By contrast, in a civil drug-related forfeiture case, the need for deterrence exceeds the societal costs. Without the application of the exclusionary rule to section 297 forfeiture actions, officers could seize contraband, absent sufficient probable cause to do so, even if that same evidence would be inadmissible in a criminal context to prove the wrongdoer's criminality. We already have recognized that this consideration, whether, at the time of the illegal search, the police were aware of the potential effect of using such evidence in civil proceedings is one factor of several in considering the motivation behind an improper search and seizure. Sheetz, 315 Md. at 216, 553 A.2d at 1285. The lack of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule under circumstances in which probable cause is lacking could lead to a separate line of police work devoted to forfeiture. We are keenly aware that governments increasingly have filed civil forfeiture actions in lieu of criminal charges, knowing that constitutional protections provide greater obstacles to their criminal cases, and that forfeitures have a great financial impact not only on the defendant but on the government's coffers as well. See Nelson, supra, at 1328 (noting one study in which eighty percent of property owners who lost their assets to forfeiture were never charged with a criminal offense). This practice has become more commonplace despite our repeated warning that in this state, forfeitures are disfavored in law because they are considered harsh extractions, odious, and to be avoided when possible. State ex rel. Frederick City Police Dept. v. One 1988 Toyota Pick-up Truck, 334 Md. 359, 375, 639 A.2d 641, 649 (1994) (citing United States Coin & Currency v. Director of Finance, 279 Md. 185, 187, 367 A.2d 1243, 1244 (1977); Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 199, 265 A.2d 748, 752 (1970)). We believe that the benefits of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule outweigh the costs society may incur with its proper application to forfeitures under section 297.