Opinion ID: 1215347
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Liability of Cornelius

Text: On appeal, plaintiff says that the following issues are to be decided as to Cornelius. Did plaintiff establish prima facie a case of failure to warn of a dangerous condition connected with the use of the product, i. e., mixing a Cornelius lid with a Firestone tank, a case of negligent design, or a case of breach of warranty of fitness for the intended use? He argues that the gravamen of his claim against Cornelius is based upon two items of proof: first, that using a Cornelius lid with a Firestone tank created a potentially dangerous condition which was neither known to plaintiff, nor obvious; and second, that Cornelius represented that its safety release valve contained in the lid was a safety device, which would open at approximately 135 psi pressure, preventing excessive or unintended pressure in the syrup tank, and that, at the time of the accident, the valve clearly failed to operate. We turn first to the claim of failure to warn. The manufacturer of a chattel will be subject to liability when he (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965); see Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9. The duty to warn stems from the view that the manufacturer should have superior knowledge of his product and it extends not only to the immediate purchaser but to other persons who might in the ordinary and natural course of events be subjected to danger. 2 R. Hursh & H. Bailey, American Law of Products Liability § 8:11, at 170-71 (2d ed. 1974). Nevertheless, there is no duty to warn in respect to a product which is not in fact dangerous, id. § 8:13, at 175, and no such duty exists when the product is used in an unlikely, unexpected or unforeseeable manner. Id. § 8:16, at 185. In the present case, there was no sufficient proof that the Cornelius lid or safety release valve was dangerous or that any dangerous condition existed which may have resulted from the manufacture of the piece. Indeed, one of plaintiff's witnesses affirmed that, in his experience, Cornelius lids did a good job for what they were intended to do. From the mere happening of an accident, we will not conclude that the product was inherently dangerous. Also, there was no evidence that Cornelius had actual or constructive knowledge that its lids were being used with Firestone tanks, or that if they were so used the combination failed to function properly. Moreover, the evidence does not raise any inference that it was likely, expected or foreseeable by Cornelius that the lid and safety valve would be employed in a prolonged cleaning process. From the evidence, we know nothing of the effect, if any, of the chemical properties in the cleaning solution as opposed to cola syrup on the components of the lid and safety valve. Thus the evidence utterly failed to establish any duty upon Cornelius to warn under these circumstances. The plaintiff's evidence is likewise inadequate upon the question of negligent design. The manufacturer is not required to supply an accident-proof product. Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 251, 217 S.E.2d 863, 868 (1975). Other than the fact that the accident happened, the only evidence touching that issue came from plaintiff's expert who testified: The design of the safety release valve with the exit port was adequate. Contrary to plaintiff's assertion in his reply brief, we construe that testimony as being related to the fitness of both the valve and the exit port (an opening in the valve to allow gas to escape), not just to the exit port alone. Also, even though the plaintiff testified that there was rubber-to-metal contact when the pressure relief valve was closed which could cause sticking and resulting failure of the valve to release, plaintiff was disqualified as an expert on that subject and his opinion excluded. Plaintiff's subsequent lay testimony on the subject of rubber clinging to metal was inconclusive and insufficient to support a prima facie showing of faulty design. And too, it will be remembered that the accident lid, apparently undamaged, functioned properly and according to specifications when tested after the accident. Plaintiff's breach of warranty claim against Cornelius must also fail for many of the same reasons to which we have already adverted. Here, there was an implied warranty of merchantability that the lid with safety valve was reasonably fit for the purposes of providing closure for a Cornelius tank and for pressure release during a soft-drink dispensing operation. We can also infer from plaintiff's evidence that there was an implied warranty of fitness for the same specific purpose. Thus, there is here no distinction between the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. See Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantability and Fitness For Use: Recent Developments, 16 Rutgers L. Rev. 493, 506-07 (1962). Under these warranty theories, the burden was upon the plaintiff to show (1) that the goods were unreasonably dangerous either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or for some other reasonably foreseeable purpose, and (2) that the unreasonably dangerous condition existed when the goods left the defendant's hands. Logan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 216 Va. 425, 428, 219 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1975). And there can be no recovery against the manufacturer for breach of these implied warranties when there has been an unforeseen misuse of the article supplied. Layne-Atlantic Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 467, 473, 201 S.E.2d 609, 614 (1974); see Turner v. Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. at 252, 217 S.E.2d at 869. In the present case, as we have already said, the evidence fails to show that these products manufactured by Cornelius were defective when they left that defendant's hands. Plaintiff argues that the unreliability of the pressure release valve was established by proof that the device operated properly when tested after the accident but failed to function at the time of the accident. He argues that a safety device that only works fifty percent of the time is not a proper safety device . . . . We do not agree with that logic as applied to the legal principle involved here. The mere happening of the accident and subsequent proper functioning of the valve does not establish prima facie that the device was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands. In fact, there was evidence tending to show that the pressure release valve had been repaired, and a part replaced with another part made by an unknown manufacturer, after the value had left the control of Cornelius. Moreover, there was misuse of these products, as previously noted. The proof fails as a matter of law to show directly or inferentially that Cornelius should have foreseen or reasonably anticipated that the lid with valve would be mismatched with another manufacturer's tank or employed in a long-term cleaning operation. We know from the record that the lid and valve were designed for use with a Cornelius tank in a soft-drink dispensing process. We also know that at the time of this accident, the products were not being used in such a manner but instead the lid was being used on a Firestone tank as a part of a prolonged cleaning process. While these parts and this system may customarily have been used in the trade in this manner to clean the dispenser, there is no evidence of this. Even though it may be reasonable to infer that Pepsi-Cola at its Alexandria plant habitually cleaned the dispensers in this way, we will not assume from the facts of this one incident of use and Pepsi-Cola's course of conduct either that such use should have been expected by Cornelius or that such was a proper use of this equipment which was designed, according to this record, to be employed with another tank and for an entirely different purpose.