Opinion ID: 398884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the secretary comply with section 18 in preparing

Text: 62 THE LEASING PROGRAM? 63 Petitioners argue that the Secretary's compliance with section 18 was flawed in several respects. First, they argue that he failed to specify the location of two proposed lease sales on the leasing program with the precision required by section 18(a). Second, they contend that the leasing program is not consistent with the principles set forth in sections 18(a)(2) and (a)(3), in that the Secretary 1) either misinterpreted or failed to consider certain factors enumerated in section 18(a)(2); 62 2) failed to actually base the leasing program upon the section 18(a)(2) factors; and 3) failed to select the timing and location of the proposed lease sales so as to achieve a proper balance among the potential for discovery of oil and gas, environmental damage, and adverse impact on the coastal zone as required by section 18(a)(3). 63 Finally, petitioners contend that the Secretary failed to respond to their comments and recommendations in the manner required by sections 18(c) and (d). We address these arguments seriatim. 64
65 The leasing program designates 1983's proposed lease sale 73 and 1984's proposed lease sale 80 as simply California. Petitioners contend that this designation violates the requirement of section 18(a) that the leasing program indicate the location of leasing activity as precisely as possible. Petitioners point out that California has 1100 miles of coastline, consisting of a largely rural, undeveloped coast in the northern and central parts of the state and a highly urbanized coast in the southern part. Because of the great diversity in the environmental and socioeconomic characteristics of these areas, as recognized by the final environmental impact statement prepared in connection with the program, 64 petitioners argue that the Secretary must identify the location of these two proposed sales with greater specificity. They note that greater precision is possible, because the Secretary designated the 1981 and 1982 proposed sales as taking place in either Central and Northern California or Southern California. 65 66 The Secretary concedes that it was indeed possible to make a more limited area designation for sales 73 and 80. 66 He asserts, however, that a more precise designation would not have served national energy needs, for it would have deprived him of the flexibility to assess at a later date which areas off California should be opened for leasing in 1983 and 1984. The Secretary also notes that the program's scheduling of proposed lease sales for simply the Gulf of Mexico, an area which encompasses more territory than the designation California, has not been challenged as violative of section 18(a). 67 We turn first, as we must, to the language of the statute, the most important manifestation of Congressional intent. 67 It unambiguously directs the Secretary to specify the location of leasing activity as precisely as possible. Although this language implicitly recognizes that absolute precision is unattainable at the program stage, it also reflects that Congress intended the Secretary to strive to achieve that goal to the extent he can at the program stage. As the Secretary acknowledges, 68 section 18(a)'s specificity requirement serves to notify state and local governments and other affected or interested groups of impending OCS activities off their shores in order to enable them to prepare and plan for its arrival and accompanying dislocations. Although the Secretary argues that the use of unnecessarily expansive area designations does not interfere with this purpose because such designations provide notice to every person located therein, we find this argument unpersuasive. First, the very breadth of the designation diminishes the possibility that any particular locality will be affected, and reduces the significance of any notice accordingly. Second, use of unnecessarily broad area designations may actually hinder participation and planning by affected entities, since they may be unable or unwilling to devote their limited resources to participation and planning on the basis of a signal so broad and undifferentiated that it may, in the end, portend no impact on their locality at all. Third, this argument, taken to its logical conclusion, would sanction a leasing program consisting of a schedule of proposed lease sales designated as merely Atlantic, Pacific, Alaska, and Gulf of Mexico. While these designations may indeed, in some sense, place the entire nation on notice; they hardly satisfy the requirement that the location of leasing activity be specified as precisely as possible. 68 Regarding the Secretary's expressed need for future flexibility, if he presently concludes that a basis therefor must currently be established, he should at this time designate additional leasing areas as precisely as present information supports. 69 We need not attempt to define today, however, the degree of exactitude compelled by section 18(a). It is enough to decide this case that the Secretary concedes greater specificity is possible, and has employed greater specificity in designating the other proposed sales scheduled for the waters off California. Sales 73 and 80 should be identified with commensurate precision. 70
71 Petitioners contend that the Secretary failed to prepare the leasing program in a manner consistent with the principle of section 18(a)(2). Before we can treat this argument in detail, however, we must first determine the precise manner in which section 18(a)(2) applies to the preparation of a leasing program. 72 As noted above, section 18(a) states that the leasing program shall be prepared ... in a manner consistent with the ( ) principle ( ) (that): 73 .... 74 (2) Timing and location of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas among the oil- and gas-bearing physiographic regions of the outer Continental Shelf shall be based on a consideration of (the following eight factors).  69 75 Petitioners argue that this language poses two related duties upon the Secretary in developing a leasing program; first, he must fully consider the eight factors listed in section 18(a)(2), and second, he must actually base the leasing program on the result of his consideration of these factors. In other words, the factors listed in section 18(a)(2) are matters which the Secretary must address at the leasing program stage, and are matters which the Secretary must factor into his decision-making process when drawing up the leasing program. 76 The Secretary takes a different view of section 18(a)(2)'s relevance at the program stage. He notes that section 18(a)(2) speaks of the timing and location of exploration, development, and production, and not the timing and location of proposed lease sales. Exploration, development, and production, the Secretary points out, are activities which occur during future stages of OCS exploitation, after a leasing program has been developed. Since section 18 only requires that the leasing program be prepared in a manner consistent with the principle that these future activities be based upon consideration of the factors enumerated in section 18(a)(2), the Secretary concludes that he has an obligation, at the program stage, only 77 to consider all of the factors enumerated in Section 18(a), to the extent that probative information exists now. Many of the elements, however, have viability only in connection with later stages of OCS activities. Thus his obligation now is to assure that his leasing program permits sufficient and proper consideration of those factors at their appropriate time in the future. 78 At the time of the leasing schedule, therefore, it is important to identify and consider the enumerated issues. This enables the Secretary to determine which, if any, factors present an absolute impediment to scheduling an area; which, if any, require particular studies or adjustments that would warrant placement of the area on the schedule later; and which, if any, depend on highly variable or speculative matters which are best addressed at a specific future time. 70 79 We conclude that Congress intended the Secretary to consider all factors listed in section 18(a)(2) in developing the leasing program, and did not envision the deferral thereof until some later date. We also conclude that the Secretary must base the leasing program upon the result of his consideration of these factors. 80 The legislative history of section 18 speaks quite clearly to both these points. For example, the House Committee Report explains: 81 In determining the timing and location of future activities in the various geographic regions, the leasing program should consider the existing characteristics of such regions, and the need to share developmental benefits and risks among the various regions, the location of these regions with respect to the needs of the various regional markets, the locations of the regions with respect of other uses of sea and seabed, the interest of developers in a particular area.... the environmental nature of the various OCS areas, and any relevant baseline or predictive information. 82 In addition, the Secretary is to consider the views of affected states as to any relevant law, goals or policies which they have identified specifically and as to the effect of any approved coastal zone management program. 71 83 In addition, the Conference Report provides: Considerations 84 The House amendment includes among the considerations for a leasing program, the sufficiency of resources including equipment and capital to assure exploitation expeditiously. The Senate bill contains no comparable provision. The House receded and the conference report contains no such provision. 85 The House amendment includes among the considerations for a leasing program, the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas. The Senate bill contains no comparable provision. The conference report is the same as the House amendment. 86 The House amendment includes among the consideration(s) for a leasing program the policies and plans under the Coastal Zone Management Act. The Senate bill contains no comparable provision. The conference report follows the House amendment and contains no such specific provision as it is included within the consideration of laws, goals, and policies of affected States. 72 87 The language of section 18(a)(2) also supports this interpretation, in that the factors specified in section 18(a)(2) are of such a nature that, practically, they can be fully analyzed only at the program stage. For example, section 18(a)(2)(B) requires consideration of an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various regions, 73 and section 18(a)(2)(G) mandates consideration of the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of the different areas of the outer Continental Shelf. 74 These factors by their very terms require the Secretary to engage in a comparative analysis, based on existing information, of the various OCS regions, and to strike an equitable allocation of benefits and risks among the various regions. This sort of analysis is one that the Secretary logically must undertake when he is considering the various regions at the one and the same time; namely, at the program stage. When a decision is being made or a particular lease sale, or a particular exploration, development or production plan, the focus of the inquiry is on the propriety of that particular lease sale or plan. 75 The Secretary failed to explain how he can determine whether his entire nationwide schedule of proposed lease sales strikes an equitable balance among the various OCS regions in the context of a decision on the placement of a particular exploratory well. 88 Under these circumstances, we think it reasonable to conclude that Congress' reference to the (t)iming and location of exploration, development and production in section 18(a)(2) merely reflects its recognition that the timing and location of the proposed lease sales specified in the leasing program affects the timing and location of exploration, development, and production. In other words, for the timing and location of exploration, development and production to be based upon the factors listed in section 18(a) (2), the leasing program itself must of necessity also be based thereon. Further support for this analysis is found in the language in section 18(a)(2) speaking to the (t)iming and location of exploration, development, and production ... among the ... regions of the outer Continental Shelf. 76 Once again, this nationwide allocation of OCS activities is performed at the leasing program stage. 89 We fully recognize that at the leasing program stage, much of the information culled from an assessment of the section 18(a)(2) factors may be predictive or speculative in nature. This does not mean, however, that consideration of any particular factor may be deferred until some later date. The Secretary's authority is to consider all regions and act on the basis of existing information. Although the continual collection and assimilation of pertinent information must of course continue throughout the OCS process, and although the speculative nature of any information may well affect the weight the Secretary attaches thereto in drawing up the leasing program, section 18(a)(2) nonetheless requires the Secretary at the program stage to consider, each factor listed therein on the basis of the best information available, and to base the leasing program upon the information thereby obtained. 90 (1) Did the Secretary misinterpret or fail to consider the factors enumerated in section 18(a)(2)? 91 (a) Section 18(a)(2)(B). 92 Petitioners contend that the Secretary misinterpreted the directive of section 18(a)(2)(B) that, in developing the leasing program, he consider an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various regions. The Secretary interpreted this factor as follows: 93 Subpart (2)(B)    supports the contention that no one region is to bear the burden of supplying our nation with energy supplies, and that all regions should contribute to energy supplies unless the environmental risks are too high. 94 The directive to share developmental benefits and environmental risks requires the Department to ensure that all regions of the country with economically recoverable deposits of hydrocarbons participate in the leasing program to the extent that environmental risks are not too high. This mandate addresses the historical inequity which has resulted from over-reliance on the Gulf of Mexico. 77 95 Accordingly to the Secretary, the primary environmental risk to be considered here was the risk of occurrence of a major oil spill. 78 Considering this factor, the Secretary found that the probability of an oil spill related most directly to the quantity of oil likely to be produced in an area, and did not vary significantly on the basis of geography, weather, or geohazards. 79 The Secretary therefore argues that the risk of an environmentally damaging incident is largely equal nationwide. 80 96 Petitioners argue that the Secretary defined environmental risks in an unduly narrow fashion. They assert that the environmental risks OCS activities pose to any region depend not only on the likelihood of an oil spill but also on an assessment of the damage such an oil spill would inflict. The amount of damage that would befall an area, according to petitioners, is a product of the area's environmental sensitivity. Thus, to determine the environmental risks posed to an area, petitioners argue that the Secretary must consider the likelihood of an oil spill, the environmental sensitivity of the area, and the damage which would result to that area if an oil spill occurred. Petitioners further contend that an equitable sharing of the environmental risks can only be brought about if the Secretary considers the relative environmental sensitivity of the various OCS regions. Petitioners claim, however, that because the Secretary failed to consider the relative environmental sensitivity of the various OCS regions under section 18(a)(2)(G), he was unable to consider an equitable sharing of environmental risks. 97 We find ourselves in essential agreement with petitioners. We note initially that the Secretary's conclusion does not follow from his premises; that is, it does not follow from the fact that the likelihood of an oil spill is related to the quantity of oil present in a region that the risk of an oil spill is equal nationwide. Rather, it follows that the risk of an oil spill is greatest where the most oil is to be found, and we have been directed to nothing in the record which indicates that the amount of oil to be found in the various regions is approximately the same. Be that as it may, we must also conclude that the Secretary's interpretation of environmental risks is at odds with the plain meaning of the statutory language. A risk is commonly understood to mean the exposure to the chance of injury or loss. 81 Injury or loss to the environment from an oil spill, however, does not flow from the mere mathematical possibility that the spill might occur; it depends upon both the likelihood of a spill and the amount of damage the spill would inflict. Indeed, the final environmental impact statement prepared by the Secretary states that perhaps the most important component of any oil spill risk analysis is an assessment of the potential damage to vulnerable resources. 82 And, as petitioners point out, this variable is in turn dependent on an assessment of the area's environmental sensitivity. For example, an oil spill in an area of high environmental sensitivity would cause greater damage and therefore pose greater environmental risks than an equivalent oil spill in an area of lesser environmental sensitivity. Since the Secretary interpreted the term environmental risk contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, his consideration of this factor was flawed. Similarly, since the Secretary failed to consider the relative environmental sensitivity of the various OCS regions as required by section 18(a)(2)(G), 83 it follows that he failed to give proper consideration to the mandate of section 18(a)(2)(B) that environmental risks be equitabl(y) shar(ed) among the various OCS regions. 98 As for lease sales 73 and 80, of course, it is imperative as per the reasoning set out in IV A above that the Secretary more specifically identify the areas under consideration. That task once accomplished, the Secretary will be able to make a far more accurate assessment of the relative environmental sensitivities of the OCS regions in which those areas are located. 99 (b) Section (a)(2)(C). 100 Section 18(a)(2)(C) requires the Secretary to consider the location of (OCS) regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional and national energy markets. The Secretary concluded that there are no constraints on OCS production resulting from these considerations. 84 Petitioners contend that this determination is contrary to the evidence in the record, which allegedly shows that a West Coast oil glut is expected in the 1980's. 101 Our review of the record persuades us that the Secretary did consider this factor, and we find adequate support in the record for the Secretary's conclusion. The Secretary considered, among other things, a 387-page study of national and regional energy needs prepared by the Department of Energy, entitled Federal Leasing and Outer Continental Shelf Energy Production Goals, in which DOE concluded that the market situation does not constrain OCS production. 85 The Secretary also considered a specific analysis of the Availability of Transportation Networks to Bring Oil and Gas to Market, 86 which explored the various avenues available, including pipelines and tankers, for bringing discovered resources to shore, and for transporting the landed resources to refinery and demand centers 87 . This analysis found no unresolvable problems to exist. 88 102 We recognize that, to a considerable extent, the Secretary relied upon the projection of estimates and predictive and judgmental information. These characteristics, however, are inherent in most if not all of the factors listed in section 18(a)(2), including section 18(a)(2)(C). The location and needs of regional and national energy markets are matters which may change rapidly over the years, and which are often dependent on factors outside the Secretary's control-for example, the projections of the oil and gas supply contained in the OCS are speculative in nature; the demand for OCS resources may vary depending upon the price and level of imported oil and the political climate at the time its importation is desired or under consideration; the availability of transportation and refinery capacity may change depending upon the interaction of all these factors and a variety of others. Section 18 does not assume the Secretary possesses a crystal ball that will enable him to predict the future with absolute precision. He is not required to. He is required only to consider the factors set forth by Congress on the basis of the best existing information available. We conclude that the Secretary adequately considered the location and relative needs of regional and national energy markets. 89 103 (c) Section 18(a)(2)(D). 104 Subsection (a)(2)(D) requires the Secretary to consider the location of (OCS) regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, including fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sealanes, potential sites of deepwater ports, and other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the outer Continental Shelf. In his Proposed Final Program, the Secretary reported that 105 The location of the planning areas with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed has been considered. We have concluded that other uses need not pose irresolvable conflicts causing any entire planning area to be excluded from the schedule. This is because of the extensive pre-sale and post-sale planning process followed by the Department, and the Department's ability to exclude tracts from leasing if there are local conflicts which cannot be resolved. 90 106 In response to specific complaints expressing concern about potential conflicts between OCS activities and other uses of the sea and seabed, the Secretary identified means by which conflicts could be minimized. For example, with respect to alleged interference with Coast Guard sea lanes, the Secretary mentioned subsea completions and slant drilling (as) operational alternatives. 91 The Secretary also referred to ongoing Coast Guard studies to determine whether safe access routes should be designated which would be paramount to lease rights. 92 With respect to potential conflicts between OCS activities and fishery interests, the Secretary adverted to a number of protective measures, including sale-specific lease stipulations, the Fisherman's Contingency Fund, and BLM regulations for leasing and pipeline rights-of-way. 93 The Secretary also cited the experience in the Gulf of Mexico (which) shows that the fishing and offshore oil and gas industries can live side-by-side. 94 107 In light of this discussion we must reject petitioners' assertion that the Secretary offhandedly dismiss(ed) the section 18(a)(2)(D) factor. In making this claim petitioners rely solely upon the evidence pertaining to alternative uses of the sea and seabed in the area of the Georges Bank. Yet, ironically, the source of all their information is the Secretary's own Final Environmental Statement, which first identifies the sea and seabed uses that potentially conflict with OCS activities, and then discusses measures to minimize the conflicts and the probable impacts of oil spills. 95 The Secretary's discussion and the record evidence fully support his contention that he considered the elements of section 18(a)(2)(D). 96 108 (d) Section 18(a)(2)(F). 109 Subsection (a)(2)(F) requires the Secretary to consider the laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been specifically identified by the Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary's consideration. In his proposed leasing program the Secretary stated that 110 The laws, goals and policies of affected States have been reviewed and considered in preparing the program and we have not identified any which would make inappropriate or preclude the initiation or continuation of planning for any of the potential sales in the proposed final leasing program. After the pre-sale planning is completed, we will be in a better position to assess whether a sale should go forward or not, whether certain areas should be excluded from leasing, or whether special lease terms and conditions should be required to provide extra protection to particular environmental values or resource uses. 97 111 This conclusion followed from the following statement in the February 1980 Secretarial Issue Document: 112 In regard to consideration of laws, goals or policies of affected States, we have not determined any absolute impediment to inclusion of any OCS area on the planning schedule. Also, it would be inconsistent with the Coastal Zone Management Act for any approved coastal plan to include provisions which would preclude an entire area from being considered as a candidate for leasing. While the Governors of some affected States have objected to inclusion of some area on the leasing schedule, when their views are balanced against national energy policy, there does not appear to be any reason to exclude the areas from the planning schedule. 98 113 Petitioners argue that the Secretary failed to comply with section 18(a)(2)(F) by declining to delete from the program areas seaward of Northern and Central California which, they have alleged, cannot be developed in a manner consistent with state law. Development in these areas, they say, is inconsistent with California's approved Coastal Management plan and with California policy that development occur only where there are sufficient resources to justify the construction of pipelines, which California requires to preserve air quality and to minimize the risk of oil spills. 114 The Secretary responds that California's specific charges on this issue are best addressed at later points in the OCS decision-making process, in conjunction with specific proposed activities. The Secretary notes further that in the event of an actual conflict between a state and a federal licensee, the state has no veto; rather, the final decision on whether the licensee can proceed is made by the Secretary of Commerce. 99 115 We are satisfied that the Secretary adequately considered the potential impediments to exploration and development posed by state laws and policies. Although the Secretary did not deliver a result satisfactory to petitioners, it cannot be doubted that he assembled and analyzed data addressed to their concerns. 100 116 (e) Section 18(a)(2)(G). 117 Section 18(a)(2)(G) requires the Secretary to consider the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the outer Continental Shelf. The statute provides no method by which environmental sensitivity and marine productivity are to be measured. But it does provide that these factors are to be considered in scheduling leasing activities among the OCS regions, and its use of the word relative confirms the evident meaning of this language-that the Secretary is to compare the environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of one OCS region with another. The Secretary reported that 118 The relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of the different OCS areas has been an important consideration in developing the leasing program. The areas have not been ranked as some have suggested since it is not meaningful to weigh and rank, for example, the Georges Bank fishery with the bird colonies of the Farallon Islands, the Pacific and Arctic whales, or the coral banks of the Gulf of Mexico. Furthermore, no consensus on such a ranking exists. Given the absence of meaningful measurements, non-comparability of values, and lack of agreement among experts, a sensitivity matrix was developed which went as far as we felt was credible in displaying relative environmental sensitivities of potential leasing areas. The matrix, together with the extensive material developed as a result of the processes conducted under Section 18 and under NEPA, have been used to identify environmental sensitivities and to determine the earliest date when sufficient information would be available to permit a decision on whether to lease and under what terms and conditions. 101 119 The matrix to which the Secretary referred analyzed relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity within each of four major OCS regions: Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Alaska. 102 These four areas together include all of the individual OCS regions considered. Within the Atlantic region, for example, the matrix assessed, from high to low, the sensitivity of the North Atlantic, Mid-Atlantic, South Atlantic, Blake Plateau, and Florida Straights regions in terms of commercial fishing, recreational fishing, marine mammal use, coastal birds, pelagic birds, and wetlands and estuaries. Individual OCS regions within the Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and Alaska regions were similarly compared. 120 Petitioners complain that this method does not go far enough in that it makes only intra-region comparisons; for example, it does not compare the Atlantic region with the Pacific region, or the individual OCS regions within the Atlantic with the individual regions within the Pacific. The Secretary explained that 121 it would not be meaningful ... (to) compar(e) the environmental values of the specific biological resources of each individual OCS area.... First, comparison and weighing of various fishery species in the Alaskan OCS cannot be equated to the species of the Georges Bank since, in general, they are completely different resources, each with their own distinct values (e.g., crabs in Bristol Bay vs. lobsters in the North Atlantic).... Similarly, it is not meaningful to compare, by value or rank, the Pacific or Arctic whales with the coral banks in the Gulf of Mexico. 103 122 In essence, the Secretary stated it was impossible or impracticable or simply not useful to perform the comparison of relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity required by the language of section 18(a)(2)(G). We find apt the observations made by this court in Alabama Power Co. v. Costle: 123 This is not a circumstance of an agency seeking relief from a change which, after a good faith effort, it has found it cannot perform. It is, rather, an agency seeking vindication of an approach contrary to the explicit statutory design on the basis of its estimate of its lack of capacity to handle the task delegated to it. Before a court sanctions such actions, it will carefully study the governing statute ... to ascertain whether the statute authorizes approaches that deviate from the legislative mandate in response to concerns about feasibility. 104 124 We held in Alabama Power that (t)he agency's burden of justification in such a case is especially heavy. 105 We are not convinced that the Secretary has even approached that burden here. 125 First, we note that, despite his later claim of impossibility, the Secretary had before him, in May 1979, an assessment of the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity within the Atlantic, Pacific, Alaska, and Gulf of Mexico regions. 106 Although this comparison also involved resources with distinct values, it was performed and produced data of use to a decisionmaker. In addition, analysis within a given region as large as the Atlantic or the Pacific may be just as complex as a comparative analysis between regions. Second, the Secretarial Issue Document itself included some rough comparisons among the OCS regions. For example, the North Atlantic, offshore California, and several areas offshore of Alaska were identified as areas in which bird populations were most sensitive to oil spills; the Chukchi Sea, North Aleutian Shelf, and St. Georges Basin were identified as the areas in which onshore lifestyles were most sensitive to OCS development. Other areas were labeled as the most sensitive areas or relatively high sensitivity areas with respect to endangered species, endangered marine mammals, recreation, and commercial fishing. 107 Third, the Secretary's staff was of the view that it was feasible to construct matrices to rate environmental factors and to assess their compatibility with oil and gas exploration and development. This approach was abandoned not because it was technically infeasible, but because of lack of time and lack of readily available information. 108 And finally, California, Massachusetts, and the Environmental Protection Agency all proposed ways in which the environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of the various OCS regions could be compared, 109 and the Council on Environmental Quality, as early as 1974, actually compiled a ranking among the various regions in terms of the environmental risks of OCS oil and gas development. 110 126 In light of this record, we cannot condone the Secretary's refusal to comply with the congressional mandate of section 18(a)(2)(G) to consider relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity. Lack of information, lack of time, and methodological imperfections all may make the consideration highly speculative, as will the difficulties inherent in comparing, to use the Secretary's example, coral reefs with arctic whales. But the difficulties inherent in this comparison were recognized by Congress when it stated, in the related provision of section 18(a)(3), that balancing of factors is to be performed to the maximum extent practicable. All that is required is that the Secretary make a good faith determination of the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of the various regions based upon the best existing information available to him. The statute does not require the Secretary to compile a top-to-bottom ranking among all OCS regions, but he must at least attempt to identify those areas whose environment and marine productivity are most and least sensitive to OCS activity. 127 (2) Did the Secretary base the leasing program on the section 18(a)(2) factors? 128 The areas covered by a leasing program (location) and the order in which they are opened up to leasing (timing) must be determined in accordance with the principles of section 18. By reasonably concluding that several of the section 18(a)(2) factors posed no absolute or categorical impediment to leasing a particular area, the Secretary fulfilled his duty to base the location of leasing among the regions on these factors. He failed, however, to properly consider other 18(a)(2) factors in making his location decisions. Moreover, the Secretary failed altogether to rely upon the environmental and coastal zone factors of section 18(a)(2) when he determined the timing of his program. 129 (a) Location 130 As explained in the Final Environmental Statement, 131 Resource potential, economic benefits, and industry interest (were) key determinants of where sales should be located. Taking into account the pre-sale planning which is necessary for first sales in frontier areas, we have attempted to select sale areas on the basis of resource potential, economic benefits, and interest in exploration, as indicated by industry responses. 111 132 Petitioners cite this passage as proof that the Secretary read section 18(a)(2) out of the program development process, for a reliance upon resource potential, economic benefits, and industry interest omits any consideration of the coastal and environmental impact factors identified in sections 18(a)(2)(B), (D), (F), (G), or of the relative regional and national energy markets mentioned in section 18(a)(2)(C). 133 We reject petitioners' argument with respect to sections 18(a)(2)(C), (D), and (F). With respect to each of these sections, the Secretary determined that, on the basis of the information then available to him, the potential hurdles-whether a West Coast oil glut, vulnerable alternative uses of the sea and seabed, or conflicting State coast policies-were not necessarily insuperable. None of the posited impediments was categorical or absolute, the Secretary determined, because conflicts could be resolved at one of several post-planning stages in the OCS development process. In making these determinations the Secretary did not unlawfully defer consideration of these factors insofar as location is concerned. He considered whether otherwise attractive areas should be subject to leasing and reasonably concluded, insofar as the factors identified in sections 18(a)(2)(C), (D), and (F) are concerned, that nothing compelled the exclusion of these areas from the leasing program. 134 No such conclusion was possible, however, with respect to sections 18(a)(2)(B) & (G), for the Secretary misinterpreted the meaning of section 18(a)(2)(B)'s mandate to consider equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among the various regions and flouted the section 18(a) (2)(G)'s directive to consider the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the outer Continental Shelf. On remand the new Secretary of Interior should determine whether these factors, properly considered in conjunction with other 18(a)(2) factors, warrant the exclusion of any area from his leasing program. 135 (b) Timing 136 The explanation in the May 1979 Proposed Program was that 137 The timing of lease sales is influenced by seven key factors: 138 1. Sound energy policy calls for opening up offshore areas to oil and gas activity as soon as this can be responsibly done; 139 2. Sound energy policy calls for the leasing and development of areas yielding greater economic benefits earlier than less promising areas; 140 3. Relative ranking of areas according to resource potential and industry interest in exploration provides a key to the probability of areas being hydrocarbon prone; 141 4. Availability of technology for exploration and development, determines the timing of successful industry operations in different areas; 142 5. Availability of environmental and geotechnical data determines ability to plan for sales and analyze the possible impacts of development; 143 6. Statutory and policy requirements for preparation of lease sales cannot be met immediately and simultaneously for all areas; and 144 7. Sales in frontier areas should be spaced so that the results of initial exploration can be available for planning subsequent sales. 112 145 None of these factors, obviously, incorporates the environmental and coastal zone impact considerations specified in section 18(a)(2). It was apparently the Secretary's belief that these considerations were merely issues which need to be addressed in the planning process or ... factors which could affect the precise timing of a sale. 113 As we have noted, this approach contradicts the statutory requirement that these considerations be taken into account at the programmatic stage; otherwise, the requirement that the Secretary select the timing of leasing among the regions is rendered meaningless. 146 In explanations accompanying the Proposed Final Program in April 1980, the Secretary claimed that timing and location were based on a consideration of oil and gas benefits and of costs broadly defined to include economic, environmental, and coastal zone impacts of exploration, development, and production. 114 Nowhere, however, does the Secretary indicate how this consideration occurred. What is more, the Secretary's final explanation of how timing was determined seems more consistent with the environmentally-blind scheme described in conjunction with the May 1979 proposed plan than with the terms of section 18(a)(2): 147 In developing a leasing program, sales were scheduled by starting at the top of the resource potential rankings provided by USGA and industry and determining the earliest date when sufficient information, from the environmental studies program and other sources within and outside the department, would be available to permit a decision, in light of potential cost, of whether to lease and under what terms and conditions. 115 148 Thus, although administrative exigencies were added to industry interest and resource potential as a consideration affecting the timing of leasing, the environmental and coastal zone considerations identified in the statute are still conspicuous by their absence. The Secretary failed to base timing and location of leasing activities among the OCS regions on all of the factors listed in section 18(a)(2). We remand to the present Secretary for him to cure this prior deficiency. 149
150 Section 18(a)(3) requires that the leasing program be prepared consistent with the principle that the Secretary shall select, to the maximum extent practicable, the timing and location of leasing ... so as to obtain a proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone. 116 These three elements are, in large part, a condensation of the factors specified in section 18(a)(2). 117 151 Although section 18(a)(3) does not define the proper balance among these elements, some notion of its meaning can be derived from the policy and purposes of the Act. In passing the 1978 Amendments, Congress declared the policy of the United States to be that 152 the outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource ... which should be made available for orderly and expeditious development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs. 118 153 Implicit in this statement of policy is both an end and a means. The end is to develop the oil and natural gas resources of the OCS expeditiously. The means includes an administrative scheme that permits detailed planning by the federal government and concerned states to minimize the potential conflicts and adverse impacts of OCS activities. 119 154 The congressional purposes also reflect this primary emphasis on expeditious development of the OCS, qualified by the recognition of a need for measures to alleviate or minimize its adverse impacts. Those purposes are to: 155 (1) establish policies and procedures for managing the oil and natural gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf which are intended to result in expedited exploration and development of the Outer Continental Shelf in order to achieve national economic and energy policy goals, assure national security, reduce dependence on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance of payments in world trade; 156 (2) preserve, protect, and develop oil and natural gas resources in the Outer Continental Shelf in a manner which is consistent with the need (A) to make such resources available to meet the Nation's energy needs as rapidly as possible, (B) to balance orderly energy resource development with protection of the human, marine, and coastal environments, (C) to insure the public a fair and equitable return on the resources of the Outer Continental Shelf, and (D) to preserve and maintain free enterprise competition; 157 (3) encourage development of new and improved technology for energy resource production which will eliminate or minimize risk of damage to the human, marine, and coastal environments; 158 (4) provide States, and through States, local governments, which are Impacted by Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas exploration, development, and production with comprehensive assistance in order to anticipate and plan for such impact, and thereby to assure adequate protection of the human environment; 159 (5) assure that State, and through States, local governments, have timely access to information regarding activities on the Outer Continental Shelf, and opportunity to review and comment on decisions relating to such activities, in order to anticipate, ameliorate, and plan for the impacts of such activities; 160 (6) assure that States, and through States, local governments, which are directly affected by exploration, development and production of oil and natural gas are provided an opportunity to participate in policy and planning decisions relating to management of the resources of the Outer Continental Shelf; 161 (7) minimize or eliminate conflicts between the exploration, development, and production of oil and natural gas, and the recovery of other resources such as fish and shellfish; 162 (8) establish an oilspill liability fund to pay for the prompt removal of any oil spilled or discharged as a result of activities on the Outer Continental Shelf and for any damages to public or private interests caused by such spills or discharges; 163 (9) insure that the extent of oil and natural gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf is assessed at the earliest practicable time; and 164 (10) establish a fishermen's contingency fund to pay for damages to commercial fishing vessels and gear due to Outer Continental Shelf activities. 120 165 The first stated purpose of the Act, then, is to establish procedures to expedite exploration and development of the OCS. The remaining purposes primarily concern measures to eliminate or minimize the risks attendant to that exploration and development. Several of the purposes, in fact, candidly recognize that some degree of adverse impact is inevitable. 121 166 That the Act has an objective-the expeditious development of OCS resources-persuades us to reject petitioners' view that the three elements in section 18(a)(3) are equally important and that no factor is inherently more important than another. 122 The environmental and coastal zone considerations are undoubtedly important, but the Act does not require they receive a weight equal to that of potential oil and gas discovery. A balancing of factors is not the same as treating all factors equally. The obligation instead is to look at all factors and then balance the results. The Act does not mandate any particular balance, but vests the Secretary with discretion to weigh the elements so as to best meet national energy needs. The weight of these elements may well shift with changes in technology, in environment, and in the nation's energy needs, meaning that the proper balance for 1980-85 may differ from the proper balance for some subsequent five-year period. It is also relevant, when assessing potential environmental and coastal zone harm, to consider the availability of regulatory measures to alleviate that harm. 123 This does not mean that consideration of environmental damage may be postponed or foregone. But the potential for environmental harm cannot be adequately considered and weighed without a like examination of the potential to mitigate such harm. 167 The Act recognized the difficult burden the Secretary must shoulder by stating that the selection of timing and location of leasing must strike the proper balance to the maximum extent practicable. The Secretary must evaluate oil and gas potential, which can be quantified in monetary terms, in conjunction with environmental and social costs, which do not always lend themselves to direct measurement. Because of this, they must be considered in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. 168 Although the secretarial discretion we have described is broad, as a result of both the general wording of the statute and the nature of the task Secretary is asked to perform, 124 the Secretary's discretion is not unreviewable. The policies and purposes of the Act provide standards by which we may determine whether the Secretary's decision was arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the requirements of the Act. 125 To do so, we consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. 126 169 The Secretary here recognized, in the enclosure accompanying his Final Program, that both the selection of the areas to be leased (location) and the priority in the schedule given to leasing those areas (timing), must strike a proper balance between the three elements of section 18(a)(3). As to location, the Secretary determined that 170 (i)f the anticipated benefits outweigh the anticipated costs for an area, then the proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone ... is to schedule the area for leasing consideration. The costs as well as the benefits involved will, of course, be much better known at sale time, but the lesser availability of information at this point is not a basis for declining to proceed with planning activities in an area unless the best estimate which can be made now is that the costs in that area outweigh the benefits. 127 171 As to timing, the Secretary determined that 172 (t)he timing of sales which best meets national energy needs is one which moves into the most valuable areas first, where value is calculated taking into account potential economic social and environmental costs of oil and gas activity as described above. 128 173 We endorse this interpretation of section 18(a)(3). It is reasonable to conclude that within the section's proper balance there is some notion of costs and benefits, recognizing that costs in this context must be a term of uncertain content to the extent it is meant to stand for environmental and social costs. 174 We also agree with the Secretary's view that an area should be included within the program for further consideration when its potential benefits exceed its potential costs. This is the view the Secretary urged upon Congress in his objections to those provisions in the bills preceding the 1978 Amendments which would have required that environmentally sensitive areas be leased last. 129 These provisions were subsequently modified to the present language of section 18(a)(3), which is clearly consistent with the Secretary's view. 175 Petitioners' objection to this view is essentially that it allows even significant environmental costs and coastal zone impacts to be overriden. Yet this is precisely what the Act intends, provided that the potential oil and gas benefits exceed those potential costs. If the Secretary makes that determination for a particular area, and is not arbitrary or capricious in doing so, the Act contemplates that it may be placed on the schedule and that the leasing process proceed, subject to the Secretary's power to regulate OCS activities to protect the environment at subsequent stages in that process. 130 It is not obvious either in theory or in practice that the Secretary's interpretation of the Act will invariably weigh benefits more heavily than costs, with the result that every area of the OCS is placed on the leasing program. 131 176 However reasonable we think the Secretary's interpretation of section 18(a)(3) is as a general matter, the record compels the conclusion that it was not completely implemented. First and foremost, of course, is the Secretary's failure to consider and factor in all aspects of section 18(a)(2). This omission precluded him from meeting the requirement of section 18(a)(3) to obtain a proper balance to the maximum extent practicable. That fact is evident in the Secretary's explanation of how he timed the areas for leasing, which we have quoted above. 132 In relying solely upon industry interest, resource potential, and administrative convenience, the Secretary did not fully comply with all the statutory standards. 177 A further difficulty with the Secretary's actual approach-as opposed to his general interpretation-is that no substantial evidence appears in the record to support his assertion that he performed an area-by-area cost-benefit analysis. The only comparison of costs and benefits made available to him is the SID, which the Secretary states is a reflection of an area by area assessment. 133 But actually the SID compares twelve leasing program alternatives. 134 Costs and benefits are shown only in the aggregate, for each leasing schedule; there is no area-by-area breakdown. We therefore have no basis on which to test the Secretary's program for fidelity to his interpretation of the statute, which is that locating an area within the program was based on a comparison of cost and benefit, and that timing of an area within the program was some function of its relative value, potential costs and benefits considered. 135 178 Petitioners not only complain that the Secretary understated environmental costs in striking his section 18(a)(3) balance, but also argue that he overstated potential economic benefits. The only report of expected economic benefit appears in the SID. The SID assigned to each of the twelve leasing program alternatives a net economic value. The values ranged from $112 billion to $0 (for the alternative of no future OCS leasing). 136 Petitioners' problem with the SID's economic analysis is fourfold: (1) the speculative nature of the resource estimates is masked by use of a single figure rather than a range of figures; (2) environmental costs are qualified only with respect to spill damage and cleanup costs; the economic losses that tourism, fishing, and other OCS-related activities would suffer in the event of an oil spill are ignored; (3) the $100 million figure used to represent oil spill damage is too low; (4) in treating delay in leasing as a factor reducing net economic value, the Secretary ignored the price rises in crude oil that make delay a factor increasing the value of any recovered resources. We address these points in turn. 179 First, we decline to require that the Secretary prepare a range of production estimates instead of a fixed number. The Department of Interior explained that the fixed numbers were calculated from estimates of the probabilities of oil and gas discoveries over a wide range of sizes. 137 We are presented with no cogent case that the reliance on fixed numbers was irrational. 180 Remaining unexplained, though, is the failure to evaluate the quantifiable impact of an oil spill upon fishing, tourism and other OCS-related enterprises. Estimates of damage to these activities, like estimates of potential oil and gas production, are necessarily speculative to a considerable degree. But, unlike some environmental costs, damage to tourism, fishing, and the like is not inherently insusceptible of quantitative analysis. No reason appears why such estimates cannot be made, and the Secretary offers no satisfactory excuse for the failure to make them. 181 The third complaint-that $100 million is too low an estimate for the damage and cleanup cost of a major oil spill (over 1,000 barrels)-we find to be without merit. The Department of Interior explained that $100 million was 142 percent of the estimated damage and cleanup costs of the mammoth Santa Barbara spill, and few if any of the major spills predicted during the life of the leasing program can be expected to be of that magnitude-over 100,000 barrels. 138 Although we might pick another number to represent the damage and cleanup cost of a predicted oil spill, we cannot say the selection of $100 million was a clear error of judgment. 182 Finally, we are left uncertain as to whether the Secretary properly considered the economic effect of delaying lease sales. The Department explained that (f)or alternatives involving the delay of specific sales, a discount factor was used to reduce the economic value of that sale to reflect the effect of the delay .... 139 The effect of this reduction, of course, was to favor speedier leasing. The rationale for this reduction was explained in the May 1979 Draft Program in materials prepared by the Department of Interior. 140 The materials described the economic benefits of OCS oil production in terms of the difference between (1) the oil price charged by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and (2) the cost of finding and producing that oil from the OCS. 141 The materials then explained that, holding other factors constant, it is better to realize income as soon as possible, meaning that delaying the acquisition of an asset reduces its present value: If resources 'earn' about 10% in our economy, the social value of a resource development can be increased 1.61 times if benefits can be made to occur 5 years earlier. A delay of 5 years reduces the value of the benefit by 38%. 142 The materials also recognized, however, that postponement of the realization of an asset makes sense if the asset increases in value faster than the figure (here, 10%) chosen to represent investment opportunities and the economic preference for immediate realization: it is worth postponing the production of oil and gas for 5 years if the benefits after this wait would be at least 1.61 times the benefits of producing now. 143 The materials also considered varying rates of inflation, which would affect both the costs of extracting OCS oil and the price of OPEC oil. The materials estimated, for example, that at a 6% rate of inflation, a delay from 1979 to 1984 of extracting oil available in 1979 would require a 1984 price of $29.61 a barrel to be worthwhile (the 1979 price was $18.10 a barrel). 144 The materials also considered the annual rate of real price increases (the actual rate adjusted for inflation) for OPEC oil. 145 The report estimated that the cost of 5 years of postponed production at $6 per barrel costs and 2% real growth in OPEC prices is $3.26 a barrel. 146 It concluded: 183 it is worthwhile finding and producing any OCS oil and gas that is less costly than OPEC oil as soon as possible unless extraordinary increases in future world oil prices are expected. Otherwise banking oil in the ground will deprive the American people of present consumption and investment without sufficient future gains to offset the income they would forego. 147 184 The record thus reflects a model for attributing a cost to delay. We are reluctant to interfere with an agency's choice of methodology so long as it is not irrational. 148 Certain aspects of the Department's computation of net economic worth are nevertheless troubling, and bear further explanation. First, it is unclear whether 2% as a rate of real increase for OPEC prices was chosen merely for purposes of illustration or as an assumption upon which the agency's computation was based. If the 2% figure was relied upon, then the basis for choosing that figure, when the experience of the period since 1973 suggests a far higher figure, is not revealed. Higher estimates of future OPEC prices would increase the estimate of the benefit of exploiting OCS benefits in the near future, as the Department has suggested, but it also appears to make further delay in exploitation more worthwhile, as petitioners argue. 149 Second, petitioners contend that there is an inconsistency in approach between the May 1979 program the Department cites in its brief to this court and the DOE study the Department pointed to in its September 1980 letter to NRDC. 150 Under the May 1979 program, net economic value is basically the difference between the OPEC price and the cost of OCS production. Under the DOE study, say petitioners, net economic value is determined by calculating industry profits from OCS production and expected federal tax revenues and royalty payments. 151 The interrelationship, if any, between the two studies, and the degree to which they informed the economic analysis affecting the Secretary's decision is not plain on the record before us. On remand, the Secretary should present a coherent explanation of how net economic value is being determined. 152 185
186 As described in detail above, 153 sections 18(c) and 18(d) provide a procedural framework for participation by state governments, among others, in the development of the five-year leasing program. In essence, these sections require the Secretary to consider comments on, and requests for modification of, the proposed program made by Governors of affected states and to state his reasons for accepting or rejecting such recommendations. Petitioners contend that the Secretary's responses to their recommendations were inadequate, because the responses either failed to address the suggestions made or failed to provide valid reasons for rejecting them. 187 We disagree. Although it is true that many of the Secretary's responses were not overly detailed, they sufficed to identify the basis, either legal or factual, for the Secretary's action and to explain why the Secretary acted as he did. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the recommendations the Secretary rejected relate primarily to substantive matters which this opinion has already addressed, and that petitioners found the Secretary's responses sufficiently coherent to explain them to this court and to argue that they were erroneous. In other words, petitioners seem to understand, from the Secretary's responses, why their suggestions were rejected. Sections 18(c) and (d) require no more. 154 188 We pause briefly to address the argument that sections 18(c) and (d) require the reasons advanced by the Secretary to be valid in some substantive sense. We find no basis for such a requirement in the statutory language. Section 18(c) directs the Secretary to respond to any state request for modification of the proposed program, granting or denying the request in whole or in part as he deems appropriate, and stating his reasons therefor. 155 Section 18(d) requires the Secretary to submit the proposed program to Congress and the President prior to approving it, indicating why any specific recommendation of ... a State ... government was not accepted. 156 These provisions merely require the Secretary to state his reasons for accepting or rejecting state recommendations. It is true, of course, that a substantively invalid response may demonstrate that the Secretary has not prepared the leasing program in compliance with the substantive requirements of section 18 or other pertinent provisions of the Act. Such matters, however, should be addressed and evaluated under the substantive portions of the statute, and not under sections 18(c) and (d). 157 V. THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY CLAIM 189 Petitioners North Slope Borough, et al. (the Borough), representing the interests of Inupiat Eskimos who live throughout the borough, contend that the Secretary, in preparing the leasing program, breached a trust responsibility owed the Eskimos. The claim is twofold: (1) the Secretary failed to accord special protection to Eskimo interests, and (2) he proceeded on the basis of environmental data inadequate to assure that Inupiat culture would not be undermined by his oil and gas decisions. The Eskimos' concern is that OCS operations in the Beaufort or Chukchi seas will have an adverse effect on the area's whales, caribou, seals, polar bears, fish, and birds. 158 Any such effect could undermine the subsistence lifestyle of the Eskimos, who rely on these animals for their food, clothing, and materials, 159 and whose village-wide whaling activity (is) a foundation of their socio-cultural system. 160 190 The Secretary was cognizant of these concerns in the preparation of the leasing program, but thought they required no more attention than that already required under environmental statutes: 191 The Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other statutes and treaties are designed primarily to protect certain species of fish and wildlife.    These statutes, amongst others, have been construed as specifically imposing on the Federal Government a trust responsibility to protect Native Alaskans right to subsistence hunting. The responsibility requires the Secretary to be cognizant of the needs of Native Alaskans' culture, and to protect the species necessary for subsistence purposes. The Secretary can discharge his trust responsibility primarily by complying with the two above-cited Acts. Decisions regarding compliance for particular species will occur as individual lease sale decisions are made. 161 192 The Borough contends that the Secretary interpreted his trust responsibility too narrowly. According to the Borough, the source of the trust responsibility is independent of any statute, treaty, or executive order, and its scope is necessarily broader than specific enactments. 162 From this premise it concludes that the Secretary, concerned only with fulfilling his statutory responsibilities, gave insufficient weight to the Eskimos' special interests. We reject this conclusion, for we find that its premise-the existence of a trust responsibility broader in scope than the duties imposed by environmental statutes-was rejected in our recent decision in North Slope Borough v. Andrus. 163 193 In North Slope Borough the same claims that the Borough makes here in the context of a leasing program were made in the context of an offshore lease sale in the Beaufort Sea. There, as here, the Borough identified three possible sources of a trust responsibility owed by the federal government to the Inupiat Eskimos. One was express statutory provision, another was a combination of the express and implied requirements of specific enactments, and the third was some combination of the law of nations, concepts of Indian sovereignty, and the historical course of dealing between Indians and the federal government. 164 The panel explicitly addressed only the first of these sources, finding no specific provision for a federal trust responsibility in any of the statutes argued to us. 165 It reached its conclusion that the Secretary has fulfilled his trust obligation, such as it is, 166 without determining whether any trust responsibility emanated from other statutes ... or ... a 'special relationship' between the United States and Indian tribes. 167 194 The Borough interprets this failure to address other possible sources of a trust responsibility as a failure to resolve the question whether the Secretary owed the Inupiat Eskimos a trust responsibility broader in scope than the responsibilities imposed by relevant environmental protection statutes, and invites us to resolve that question in its favor here. We decline that invitation, for both the structure and language of North Slope Borough indicate that while that decision left the source of the Secretary's trust responsibility undefined, it delineated the scope of that responsibility as being no broader than that of the environmental statutes with respect to which the Secretary already had a duty to comply. 195 First, and most fundamental, North Slope Borough's ultimate holding on the trust responsibility issue was that the Secretary has fulfilled his trust obligation, such as it is. 168 In arriving at that holding, which was grounded on the Secretary's compliance with pertinent environmental statutes, the panel necessarily rejected the Borough's contention that the Secretary had a trust obligation broader in scope than the requirements of relevant environmental statutes. 196 The Borough recognizes the obvious force of this logic, but submits that North Slope Borough could not have rejected its argument for a trust responsibility of broader scope because it did not address the possible extra-statutory sources for such a responsibility. We disagree. The panel approved, in effect, the approach of confining the extension of 'trust responsibility,' however defined and whatever the source, to the area of overlap with the environmental statutes. 169 Thus, regardless of the source of the trust responsibility-in this context an academic question only-the panel was satisfied that its scope is a limited one only. 170 The court explained those limits in some detail: 197 (T)he primary threat to the Inupiats can only be viewed as one of a possibly deleterious intrusion into their lands. But the Secretary, even aside from his imputed role of trustee, does not have a free hand to neglect the environment. All of the environmental statutes, particularly (the Endangered Species Act), structure and prescribe for the Secretary a solicitous stance toward the environment. Hence, where the Secretary has acted responsibly in respect of the environment, he has implemented responsibly, and protected, the parallel concerns of the Native Alaskans. In sum, the substantive interests of the Natives and of their native environment are congruent. The protection given by the Secretary to one, as we have held, merges with the protection he owes to the other. 171 198 We thus conclude that the dispositive issue here-the scope of the Secretary's trust responsibility to the Inupiat Eskimo-was addressed and decided adversely to the present contentions of the Borough in North Slope Borough v. Andrus. To the extent that the Secretary complied with relevant environmental statutes in preparing the leasing program, he also fulfilled any trust responsibility owed to the Eskimos.