Opinion ID: 1480748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Steak Knife is a Deadly Weapon

Text: Robinson's second argument on appeal is that the Superior Court erred in not acquitting him of the PDWPP charge, sua sponte, because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that the steak knife was a deadly weapon. Because Robinson did not preserve this issue at trial, we review his claim on appeal for plain error. [15] At trial, Robinson was convicted of PDWPP under title 11, section 1448(b) of the Delaware Code, which states: [a]ny prohibited person as set forth in subsection (a) of this section who knowingly possesses, purchases, owns or controls a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm while so prohibited shall be guilty of possession of a deadly weapon or ammunition for a firearm by a person prohibited. On appeal, Robinson does not contest that the State properly proved he was a person prohibited, pursuant to title 11, section 1448(a), nor does he contest that it proved he was actually in possession of a steak knife when he was handcuffed by McClure. Instead, Robinson argues that the State failed to establish a necessary showing that this steak knife was [u]sed, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury, in order for it to qualify as a deadly weapon. This argument is incorrect: to be convicted of PDWPP, Robinson did not have to use or attempt to use the steak knife, a per se deadly weapon, to cause death or serious physical injury. Robinson's argument that the State was required to prove an additional element, involving his specific use of the steak knife, blurs the distinction between the statutory definitions of dangerous instrument and deadly weapon in the Delaware Code. A dangerous instrument is defined in title 11, section 222(4) of the Delaware Code as any instrument . . . which, under the circumstances in which it is used . . . is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury. . . . A deadly weapon is defined in title 11, section 222(5) of the Delaware Code as including, within a list of several other objects, a knife of any sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position). [16] Section 222(5) states, in its entirety: Deadly weapon includes a firearm, as defined in paragraph (11) of this section, a bomb, a knife of any sort (other than an ordinary pocketknife carried in a closed position), switchblade knife, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, metal knuckles, slingshot, razor, bicycle chain or ice pick or any dangerous instrument, as defined in paragraph (4) of this section, which is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury. For the purpose of this definition, an ordinary pocketknife shall be a folding knife having a blade not more than 3 inches in length. [17] The crux of Robinson's argument on appeal is that the language, which is used, or attempted to be used, to cause death or serious physical injury, qualifies the entire list of objects in section 222(5), including a knife of any sort, rather than only dangerous instruments as defined in section 222(4). Robinson cites no authority in support of this grammatical parsing of the statutory language. A review of the legislative history of this section of the Delaware Code demonstrates that the use language is intended to apply only to objects that are defined as dangerous instruments under section 222(4), and not to the listed per se deadly weapons such as a knife of any sort. When the Delaware Criminal Code was adopted in 1973, a knife of any sort was included within the list of deadly weapons. [18] As the Commentary to the original Code noted, the definition of `deadly weapon' [in the Code] is more narrow than that given in present Delaware law. [19] Accordingly, in 1992, the General Assembly amended the section of the Delaware Criminal Code defining deadly weapons, in order to expand the statutory definition. With this purpose in mind, the General Assembly newly added to the definition of deadly weapons any items that had previously been defined as dangerous instruments (and not ordinarily capable of being defined as deadly weapons under the statute), so long as such instruments were used in a manner which could cause death or serious physical injury. In Taylor v. State, [20] this Court held that the metal base of a fan, otherwise a dangerous instrument, constituted a deadly weapon for purposes of the PDWPP statute, based upon its particular use in that case. This Court stated: In our view both the purpose and meaning of the 1992 amendment to § 222(6) [prior numbering] are clear. The General Assembly intended to add to the specific list of deadly weapons any item which had previously fallen within the designation of a dangerous instrument. In doing so, the legislature imparted to such items a `use' test which characterized those items as deadly weapons if, under the circumstances of their use, they had the potential for the infliction of death or serious physical injury. [21] It is therefore clear that the use language which the General Assembly added in 1992 was intended to apply as a limitation only to dangerous instruments as a newly-included type of deadly weapon, and not to all deadly weapons already enumerated in the statute. [22] The Superior Court correctly instructed the jury on the two statutory elements of the offense of PDWPP: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a deadly weapon at the time of the charged offense. (2) the defendant was prohibited from possessing a deadly weapon because he had been convicted for the unlawful possession with intent to deliver a narcotic schedulein this case, possession with intent to deliver/manufacture a narcotic Schedule I or II substance. As this Court recently stated, possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, without more, is the crux of a PDWPP charge. [23] Accordingly, the Superior Court's failure to acquit Robinson of the PDWPP charge, sua sponte, was not plain error.