Opinion ID: 2301511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court's Post-trial Findings and Indemnification Ruling

Text: Ms. Hubbard contends that the trial court erred by ruling, contrary to the jury's verdict, that Dr. Chidel was not negligent, and thus was entitled to indemnification from Dr. King and the District, as operator of the Southwest Clinic. Dr. Chidel claims that the trial court properly found that: Dr. Chidel's only negligent conduct ... was that he did not check up on Dr. King to ensure that Dr. King had done what he was supposed to do, [and that] [t]hese findings of fact ... were totally consistent with the jury's findings of facts. Moreover, since the trial court found that Dr. King dropped the ball terribly, terribly, terribly, and Dr. King had indeed received a call from Dr. Chidel regarding Ms. Hubbard's mammogram, the trial judge did not err by deciding that Dr. Chidel and Wener were entitled to indemnification from Dr. King and the District. They maintain that: It is crystalline that Ms. Hubbard's claim of negligence on the part of Dr. Chidel can only be characterized as innocuous, while the successive, extensive acts of negligence on the part of Dr. King resulted in extensive, severe injury to the appellant. Questions of [] indemnity pose legal issues that [are] resolved by the court rather than the jury. District of Columbia v. Murtaugh, 728 A.2d 1237, 1244 (D.C.1999). The court acts as fact finder to determine whether the second tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought was negligent. See Washington v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 188 n. 13 (D.C.1990). However, the trial court is bound by the jury's factual findings, unless it has granted an appropriate and timely post-trial motion which in effect sets aside the jury's verdict. See Jones v. Schramm, 141 U.S.App. D.C. 169, 172-73 n. 11, 436 F.2d 899, 902 (1970) (the way in which the court decides a contribution claim is dependent on and affected by the verdict(s)); see also Washington Health-care Corp. v. Barrow, 531 A.2d 226, 230-31 (D.C.1987). Here, the jury responded yes to two questions regarding Dr. Chidel and Wener: (1) Do you find the defendants Dr. Chidel and Wener, Boyle & Associates were negligent? and (2) If yes, do you find that their negligence was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff Mrs. Hubbard? Two theories of Dr. Chidel's and Wener's negligence were posited at trial: (1) the failure to make an initial telephone call to Dr. King to inform him of the results of the mammogram; and (2) the failure to follow-up to determine what action Dr. King had taken in response to the mammogram. The special jury verdict form did not ask the jury to indicate which of these theories of negligence prompted its finding that Dr. Chidel and Wener were liable to Ms. Hubbard. Nonetheless, in making post-trial factual findings the trial judge specifically ruled that Dr. Chidel made a phone call to Dr. King ... [and that] Dr. King's statement that he never remembers receiving it [is]just [] frankly [] not credible. Without having requested a specific question on the jury verdict form, Dr. Chidel and Wener are estopped from arguing, and the trial court is precluded from ruling, that the evidence was insufficient to support the first theory of liability (Dr. Chidel's failure to make the initial call to Dr. King), where there was sufficient evidence, if believed by reasonable jurors, to support both theories of liability. As we held in Newell v. District of Columbia, 741 A.2d 28, 33 (D.C.1999): [N]ot only is counsel in a civil case required to request a special verdict form to preserve a claim of error relating to fewer than all of the theories of liability (or defenses thereto) on which the jury permissibly could have based its verdict, but that in requesting a special verdict form, counsel must state the request with sufficient precision to indicate the specific interrogatories that should be included in the special verdict form, object to their noninclusion, and include the proposed special verdict form in the record on appeal. Id. at 333. Not only did Dr. Chidel and Wener fail to request a specific question as to the theory of their negligence on which the jury relied, but also the trial court specifically instructed the jurors that in determining whether Ms. Hubbard proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [Dr. Chidel and Wener] were negligent, ... some of Dr. King's actions [may be] relevant.... Thus, the jurors undoubtedly took into consideration not only the version of events given by Dr. Chidel and Wener, but also that recounted by Dr. King. It is reasonable to conclude, then, that the jurors either accepted Dr. King's assertion that Dr. Chidel never called him to report the mammogram results, or considered Dr. Chidel's failure to follow-up with Dr. King to constitute significant and active negligence which constituted a proximate cause of Ms. Hubbard's injury. Consequently, the trial court erred by finding that Dr. Chidel made a phone call to Dr. King ... [and that] Dr. King's statement that he never remembers receiving it [is]just [] frankly [] not credible. In making this finding, the trial court improperly rejected one theory of Dr. Chidel's and Wener's liability, on which sufficient evidence was presented to the jury and which the jury may have reasonably believed in reaching its verdict. Instead, the trial judge focused on the second theory of negligence (failure to take follow-up action with Dr. King) to support his conclusion of more egregious and continuous negligence by Dr. King and the District, compared with negligence [by Dr. Chidel and Wener that] was not continuous. However, under Schramm, supra, by which we are bound, see M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), we are constrained to conclude that the trial court was bound by the jury's findings regarding the negligence of Dr. Chidel and Wener, and further, that the equities [do not] support[] the trial court's ruling that Dr. Chidel and Wener are entitled to indemnification from Dr. King and the District. See District of Columbia v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 722 A.2d 332, 339 (D.C. 1998) (en banc). The trial judge in this case characterized Dr. King's and the Southwest Clinic's negligence as continuous and, in contrast, stated that, [Dr. Chidel's and Wener's] negligence was not continuous and any duty they had ceased well before any injury occurred to plaintiff. However, if the jury reasonably believed that the standard of care, as Dr. Chidel testified, required that he telephone Dr. King to inform him of the suspicious mass, but that he failed to do so, or to follow-up to see what action Dr. King had taken, [9] his negligence may not be deemed de minimis or merely passive. A telephone call from Dr. Chidel to Dr. King, or timely follow-up contact to see what action Dr. King had taken in response to the suspicious March 1993 mammogram, undoubtedly would have resulted in a diagnosis earlier than July 1994. Thus, Dr. Chidel's and Wener's negligence, as the jury implicitly found, was active negligence. We have said previously that: Where joint tort-feasors are guilty of active negligence and their negligence concurs in causing the injury, none is entitled to indemnity against the others but there may be contribution among them. Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C.1966); see also R. & G. Orthopedic Appliances and Prosthetics, Inc. v. Curtin, 596 A.2d 530, 548 (D.C.1991) ([I]f the `active' negligence of both defendants `concurred in causing [the plaintiff's] injury,'...., there is no equitable basis for a claim of indemnity.... (citation omitted)). [10] Similarly, given Dr. Chidel's and Wener's active negligence in this case, indemnity would be inappropriate. Id. Since indemnification is inappropriate on the facts of this case, and the trial court made post-trial findings that Dr. King and the District, as operator of the Southwest Clinic were negligent, we turn to the issue of contribution among joint tortfeasors.