Opinion ID: 4538432
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination of Maes

Text: On June 22, 2016, an officer of the Oakland Housing Authority Police Department arrested Maes after the officer found three pounds of marijuana in Maes’s rental vehicle. When Maes was being cross-examined at trial, the prosecutor asked several questions about this arrest. Q [Prosecutor]. In 2016, in June of 2016 when you were arrested by the Oakland [Housing Authority] Police Department, you were in possession of marijuana then, weren’t you? A [Maes]. Yes. Q. Three pounds of marijuana, in fact; correct? A. Yes. Q. And you were arrested for that? A. Yes. Q. Because that was illegal? 7 Case: 18-60881 Document: 00515438067 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 No. 18-60881 A. I’m not sure if it was like a probation thing or what the exact situation was. Q. You don’t know what the penalty for it was, but you know it’s illegal; right? A. That it’s illegal to -- Q. In 2016 to possess three pounds of marijuana in the State of California? A. It’s illegal to -- it’s illegal to sell it. It’s illegal to sell it. I could vend it to clubs. I could vend it to businesses. You would have -- you have to have a vending license, but you can’t just sell in the streets before 2016. As of now, it’s recreational where I could give you marijuana. I can give my friends marijuana. But as far as before that, yes, you’re right, you needed a vending license to vend. MR. CROSBY [Maes’s trial counsel]: I’m going to object to questions regarding arrests without convictions. That would be improper, and I object. The district court overruled the objection. It ruled that Maes had opened the door to a discussion about the arrest when he testified on direct that he was a marijuana dealer and did not believe there was anything illegal about his dealings. Maes now argues that the district court reversibly erred in overruling this objection. He cites Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) to support this argument. We review preserved errors of this type for abuse of discretion subject to a harmless error analysis. 8 See United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2008). Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides: Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, 8 The Government argues that plain error review should apply because Maes’s arrest was briefly mentioned earlier in the trial, and Maes’s counsel failed to object at that time. We disagree. Maes’s counsel raised the precise error below when the arrest was fully discussed, and this objection was “sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the nature of the alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.” Johnson, 943 F.3d at 221 (quoting Neal, 578 F.3d at 272). 8 Case: 18-60881 Document: 00515438067 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/02/2020 No. 18-60881 extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:

being cross-examined has testified about. On direct examination, Maes was asked: “You’re not trying to say that because [marijuana is] legal in California it makes it legal here, you’re not trying to make that argument‚ are you?” Maes answered: “I’m not trying to dispute that.” Additionally, Maes testified at length about his experiences growing and selling marijuana in California. The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to ask a few pointed questions about Maes’s arrest for possessing marijuana in California when he had essentially testified that he believed his dealings in California were entirely legal. See United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 154 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the Government to inquire on redirect about a specific instance of prior conduct when on cross the defendant had opened the door to the issue). Regardless, any error would have been harmless. The thrust of Maes’s defense at trial was that he dealt exclusively in marijuana, not methamphetamine. To the extent these questions focused the jury’s attention on Maes’s arrest for marijuana possession, it did not seriously prejudice him. Accordingly, any error in allowing this testimony did not affect his substantial rights, and it therefore would have been harmless.