Opinion ID: 672361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a controlled substance with intent to sell it; or

Text: 16 2. one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate weight of one-half ounce or more containing a narcotic preparation; or 17 3. fifty milligrams or more of phencyclidine; or 18 4. one or more preparations, compounds, mixtures or substances of an aggregate weight of one-quarter ounce or more containing concentrated cannabis ...; or 19 5. five hundred milligrams or more of cocaine. 20 New York Penal Law Sec. 220.06 (McKinney). There is no evidence before this Court, nor apparently before the trial court, as to exactly which subsection applied to Neal's two convictions. 2 21 The government argues, as it did before the district court, that although subsection 1 plainly requires intent to distribute as an element of the offense, one can infer from the amounts specified in the remaining subsections that they too require such an element. In contrast, Neal argues as he did before the lower court that as a matter of simple statutory interpretation, the facts that intent to distribute is required only in subsection 1 and that the subsections are listed disjunctively mean that the remaining subsections punish only simple possession. We find this position to be the correct one. 22 Neal analogizes his case to cases decided by this Court that deal with the crimes of violence section of the career offender enhancement provision. In United States v. Wilson, 951 F.2d 586 (4th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2294, 119 L.Ed.2d 218 (1992), this Court adopted a categorical (as opposed to a particularized) approach to determining whether an offense qualifies as a crime of violence for purposes of applying Sec. 4B1.1. In doing so, we stated that 23 the plain language of the Guidelines contemplates a legal rather than a factual approach to determining which offenses qualify as crimes of violence.... [T]he Guidelines' definition clearly mandates a categorical approach by focusing the inquiry on the elements of the offense rather than the particular conduct involved. Thus, the sentencing court's task is reduced to a simple legal inquiry--the court simply reads the statutory or common law definitions of the defendant's prior felonies to see whether they list as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. 24 Id. at 588. If the statutory definition of the offense does not use these terms, then the trial court may look to the conduct described in the indictment against the defendant (but no further) in determining if the offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir.1991). 25 When we take the statute at face value and give effect to every phrase in it as standard statutory interpretation requires, it clearly indicates that the intent to distribute requirement is limited to the offense spelled out in subsection 1. None of the subsections that follow list as an element the intent to distribute. It is normally presumed that a legislature intends for the plain meaning of its laws to control. See United States v. Tremble, 933 F.2d 925, 929-30 (11th Cir.1991). 26 This conclusion ends our inquiry under Wilson. If, however, we were to look to sources outside the statute, those sources would only strengthen our conclusion, as they indicate that the New York legislature clearly meant to limit the intent to distribute requirement to subsection 1. 27 The New York Attorney General has described the state's drug laws as a comprehensive, detailed scheme, 1990 N.Y.Op.Atty.Gen. (Inf.) 1143, in which possession of controlled substances is prohibited and punished in a series of statutes separate and distinct from those dealing with sales of controlled substances. Compare New York Penal Law Secs. 220.03--220.21 (possession offenses) with New York Penal Law Secs. 220.31--220.43 (sales offenses). Cf. 21 U.S.C.A. Sec. 841(a)(1) (West Supp.1993) (punishing both possession and distribution in same provision). Within the offense of possession, there are six degrees. The lowest degree, seven, represents the basic offense. 28 New York Penal Law Sec. 220.03. According to the practice commentary: 29 The higher degrees are premised on certain aggravating factors. The principal aggravating factor ... is the weight of the particular drug or class of drugs which is possessed. 30 A second commonly utilized aggravating factor requires the possession of any quantity of the controlled substance to be with intent to sell it. 31 For certain non-narcotic drugs, the possession with intent to sell ... is coupled with a requirement of proving that the defendant has previously been convicted of [a drug offense]. 32 In other instances, an amount of the drug required to be possessed with the intent to sell is specified. The amount specified is understandably less than the amount required to constitute the crime solely by possession. 33 New York Penal Law article 220 supplementary practice commentaries (McKinney Supp.1994) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The detailed nature of the drug possession statutes has also been recognized by New York's highest court. See People v. Ryan, 82 N.Y.2d 497, 503, 605 N.Y.S.2d 235, 626 N.E.2d 51 (1993) (The primary distinctions between one grade or another relate to the type and weight of the controlled substance, and in some instances the existence of an intent to sell ....) (emphasis added). 34 These sources make it clear that the intent to distribute requirement is only one of several factors considered by the New York legislature in determining the appropriate punishments for illegal drug possession. It is equally clear that the legislature arrived at a judgment that possession of drugs with intent to sell is a worse offense than simple possession; hence the commentary's remark that the amount required for possession with intent to sell is understandably less than the amount required for simple possession. To read the intent to distribute requirement of Sec. 220.06(1) into the subsections that follow, as the trial court did and the government requests this Court to do, would obliterate the New York legislature's careful work. 35 In light of the above discussion, we cannot find that Neal was properly sentenced under the career offender section of the sentencing guidelines. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for resentencing. At that time, the trial court will determine under which subsection(s) of New York Penal Law Sec. 220.06 Neal was previously convicted. Unless each conviction falls under subsection 1, the court may not resentence Neal as a career offender. 36 REVERSED AND REMANDED.