Opinion ID: 6499796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Financial Motive to Lie

Text: Wills argues that his constitutional rights were violated when he was prohibited from discovering certain evidence that purportedly showed Jane’s, Losoya’s, and their attorney’s financial motives to lie. By way of background, Jane filed a civil lawsuit against Wills shortly after he was convicted. Richard Nunez (“Nunez”) is the attorney who 11 Id. at 1964. 12 Id. at 1977 (quoting Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 130 (1959) (interpreting Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820))); see also id. (“In other words, [Houston v. Moore] . . . taught only that the law prohibits two sovereigns (in that case, Pennsylvania and the United States) from both trying an offense against one of them (the United States).”). 13 See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 130 (citing Houston, 18 U.S.C. (5 Wheat.) at 28, 35). 14 Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1977. 5 Case: 20-40648 Document: 00516392374 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 No. 20-40648 represented Jane in this lawsuit. Nunez also represented Losoya throughout the criminal proceedings, including when she pleaded guilty to sex trafficking and testified against Wills. Wills was wealthy, and he asserts that the prospect of a substantial money judgment in a civil suit motivated Jane to falsely accuse him of sexual abuse. Nunez, who represented Jane on a contingent-fee basis, likely also expected to profit from Jane’s lawsuit. This, Wills claims, created a conflict of interest between Nunez and his other client, Losoya; to wit: Nunez allegedly had a financial incentive in seeing Losoya plead guilty and testify for the prosecution, because a criminal conviction against Wills would help ensure a favorable outcome in the civil case. Thus, Wills surmises that Nunez encouraged Losoya to sacrifice her own interests, recant her prior denials, falsely admit to prostituting her own daughter (which carried a fifteen-year minimum sentence under federal sentencing guidelines), and provide incriminating testimony against Wills. Wills claims that he attempted to develop this theory before trial by seeking discovery of any contract or contact Jane had with any civil lawyer, but the district court thwarted these efforts. He contends this prevented him from exposing Jane’s and Losoya’s motives in testifying against him and, consequently, violated fundamental fairness and deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. We review constitutional claims de novo. 15 “[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” 16 For example, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 15 United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 2000). 16 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). 6 Case: 20-40648 Document: 00516392374 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 No. 20-40648 Clause requires that criminal defendants be treated with “fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,” and the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause “ensures that criminal defendants have . . . the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.” 17 In exercising these rights, however, a defendant “must comply with established rules of . . . evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” 18 The determination of whether the exclusion of evidence is of a constitutional dimension depends on the reason for and effect of the exclusion, and it typically includes an inquiry into the Federal Rules of Evidence. 19 Wills knew before trial that Nunez represented Losoya, and he presented this fact to the jury. He cites two pretrial motions to support his claim that he repeatedly sought disclosure of any contract or contact Jane had with Nunez but “was prevented from exploring these issues.” 17 United States v. Piper, 912 F.3d 847, 854 (5th Cir. 2019) (first quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982), then, Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 408 (1988)). 18 Id. (quoting United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 276–77 (5th Cir. 2010)) (omission in original); see also Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410–11 (“The principle that undergirds the defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence is also the source of essential limitations on the right. The adversary process could not function effectively without adherence to rules of procedure that govern the orderly presentation of facts and arguments to provide each party with a fair opportunity to assemble and submit evidence to contradict or explain the opponent’s case.”); United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 448 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The right to present a complete defense . . . ‘is an essential attribute of the adversary system. However, this right is limited and must be weighed against the countervailing interests in the integrity of the adversary process . . . the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process.’” (quoting United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 294 (5th Cir. 1996))). 19 United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Kittelson v. Dretke, 426 F.3d 306, 319 (5th Cir. 2005)). 7 Case: 20-40648 Document: 00516392374 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 No. 20-40648 First, Wills filed a motion to compel the Government to produce approximately 100 discovery items, including “[t]he fact of any contact Jane Doe [or any person on her behalf] had with any civil lawyer” and “[a]ny and all statements made by Jane Doe, including but not limited to conversations with Richard Nunez.” At a hearing on that motion, Wills’s counsel represented that the parties had resolved most of the discovery issues. Wills’s counsel also stated that the Government’s attorney “was checking on whether Maria Losoya’s lawyer had any communications with Jane Doe. He’s just double checking on that for me; he doesn’t believe there were any direct communications . . . .” The parties discussed several other matters at the hearing. Afterwards, the district court issued a minute entry stating that the parties “will continue to work together on remaining discovery issues” and “terminated” the motion. Nothing in the record indicates that the Government possessed prior to or during trial any evidence or information that was responsive to these discovery requests. Obviously, the Government could not disclose evidence it did not have. Indeed, while Wills asserts that he “was not permitted to present” the jury with evidence that Nunez represented Jane, he does not argue on appeal that the Government suppressed, failed to disclose, or otherwise prevented him from obtaining this evidence. Second, Wills filed an ex parte motion to issue under seal—and without notice to Jane—subpoenas duces tecum to Nunez, Losoya, and Jane’s guardian that would require them to produce before trial any agreements for legal services between Jane and Nunez (or any other lawyer). Criminal Procedure Rule 17(c)(3) requires that a victim be given notice of a subpoena that seeks production of the victim’s personal or confidential 8 Case: 20-40648 Document: 00516392374 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 No. 20-40648 information, unless “exceptional circumstances” are present. 20 The district court found there were no “exceptional circumstances” and declined to issue these subpoenas. At Wills’s request, the district court gave him two weeks to file additional briefing on whether “exceptional circumstances” were present. However, Wills did not file additional briefing. Wills does not argue on appeal that the district court erroneously interpreted Rule 17(c)(3), nor does he dispute that he failed to file additional briefing despite asking for and receiving the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, the district court did not prohibit all discovery of this topic; it merely refused to issue these subpoenas without giving notice to Jane. Wills does not explain why he could not provide this notice. It appears he simply chose to abandon his effort to discover this evidence before trial. In short, these two events do not establish that Wills was denied a “meaningful opportunity” to present a complete defense. We further note that both Losoya and Jane testified at trial, and Wills does not argue that the district court prohibited him from questioning them about Nunez’s representation or potential civil litigation. Nor does Wills assert that he was prohibited from calling Nunez or Jane’s guardian to testify about this issue. Wills also contends that the district court erred by refusing to grant him a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. We hold that Wills waived this argument by failing to adequately brief it. Wills learned after trial that Jane (through her guardian) hired Nunez to represent her in the civil case against Wills. The representation agreement is dated October 8, 2019, the same date the jury convicted Wills. Nine days later, on October 17, 2019, Nunez filed on Jane’s behalf the civil case against 20 Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(3). 9 Case: 20-40648 Document: 00516392374 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/13/2022 No. 20-40648 Wills. Wills moved for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that Jane’s lawsuit and her representation agreement with Nunez constitute newly discovered evidence of Jane’s and Losoya’s motives to lie. The district court rejected this argument because two of the five elements of the “Berry rule” were lacking. 21 Wills’s opening brief on appeal states in conclusory fashion that the district court erred when it denied this aspect of his motion for a new trial. He does not mention the Berry rule, much less explain why or how the district court’s application of that rule was incorrect. Consequently, Wills waived any argument that the district court erred when it denied this aspect of his motion for new trial. 22