Opinion ID: 1972293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: double recovery for medical expenses

Text: The final issue which we must address was raised by Hope Mineo in her cross-appeal. She complains that the trial court erred in denying her motion to mold the verdict and add $100,000 representing her accrued and future medical expenses plus delay damages thereon. Prior to trial Hope Mineo had already received payment for incurred medical expenses from the no-fault carrier for Anthony Cafara. Now, in effect, Ms. Mineo is asking us to reverse the trial court and award her a second recovery for her incurred and anticipated medical expenses. Section 201(a) of the recently repealed Pennsylvania No-fault Motor Vehicle Act [3] provided: If the accident resulting in injury occurs in this Commonwealth, any victim or any survivor of a deceased victim is entitled to receive basic loss benefits in accordance with the provisions of this act. Since Hope Mineo was a resident of Maryland at the time of the accident, we must also consider Section 110(c)(1) and (c)(2) of the Act which dealt with interstate travel. Those sections provided: (1) The basic loss benefits available to any victim . . . shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of the state no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance in effect in the state of domicile of the victim on the date when the motor vehicle accident resulting in injury occurs. If there is no such state no-fault plan in effect . . ., then basic loss benefits available to any victim shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of the state no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance, if any, in effect in the state in which the accident resulting in injury occurs. (2) The right of a victim . . . to sue in tort shall be determined by the law of the state of domicile of such victim . . . . . Because Maryland is a state where there is no state no-fault plan in effect, we must look to Pennsylvania law to determine if Hope Mineo is entitled to a double recovery even though we look to the state of Maryland to determine whether Hope Mineo can sue in tort. Just because Hope Mineo has the right to bring a tort action in the instant case under Maryland law according to Section 110(c)(2), that does not mean that this Court is bound by Maryland law regarding Hope Mineo's right to such basic loss benefits. That determination must be made under Pennsylvania law according to Section 110(c)(1). In the case of Toter v. Knight, 278 Pa.Super. 547, 420 A.2d 676 (1980) this Court held that the right of a non-resident to sue in tort was determined by the law of the state in which the victim was domiciled. In Toter, the $200.00 threshold under the New Jersey no-fault act was found applicable to a suit brought in Pennsylvania by a New Jersey domiciliary injured in Pennsylvania rather than the $750.00 threshold applicable under the Act. Therefore, the right to sue in tort is determined by the victim's home state law. Under Toter, the victim's expectations are fulfilled and the victim has not been penalized for interstate travel. The holding of Toter v. Knight only determined which state's no-fault threshold would apply to limit a victim's right to sue in both states. It does not address the extent of the recovery. [4] Only an interpretation of Section 110(c)(2) of the Act was necessary to the opinion, and the result was consistent with this Court's prior result in Dubose v. McCoy, 277 Pa.Super. 149, 419 A.2d 705 (1980). Neither Toter v. Knight , nor Dubose v. McCoy , addressed the question presented here of whether the non-resident victim is entitled to double recovery of medical expenses. In his majority opinion in Toter, Judge Spaeth intimates that a non-resident may receive liberal treatment by receiving Pennsylvania no-fault benefits and yet retain the right to sue in tort. However, Judge Spaeth's opinion does not endorse, or even suggest, that such a non-resident should be entitled to double recovery of medical expenses. Further, in Toter he examined the New Jersey no-fault scheme, not Maryland's statutory plan. The question of whether the non-resident victim is entitled to double recovery of medical expenses has recently been addressed by Judge Mencer of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in Gyulay v. Aiuppy, 603 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.Pa. 1985). Under the facts in Gyulay: [t]he plaintiffs, Ohio residents, brought suit against the defendant, a Pennsylvania resident, to recover damages for injuries sustained by them in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on March 26, 1982, in Crawford County, Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged negligence on the defendant's part in the operation of her vehicle. The accident occurred at a time when Pennsylvania, but not Ohio, had a no-fault motor vehicle insurance act in effect. 40 P.S. § 1009.101 et seq. (1984-85 Supp.) The plaintiffs made claims for and received benefits pursuant to the Pennsylvania act from the Ohio Casualty Group for medical expenses and work loss. Id. at 1157. After giving deference to the views expressed by this Court in Toter, the District Court held that plaintiff can recover under both the Pennsylvania No-fault Act and Ohio law. Judge Mencer specifically limited his holding by addressing the question of double recovery in the following manner: However, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a double recovery. The plaintiffs have chosen to take their assured basic loss benefits, which are payable regardless of fault, under the Pennsylvania No-fault Act. Having made this choice, the plaintiffs should not be able to recover the amounts paid under the Act a second time in their tort action, even though they have the right to bring this tort action under Ohio law. Flowers v. Smith, 12 Pa.D. & C.3d 434 (1979). The plaintiffs, having received the benefit of the Pennsylvania No-fault Act, have no right to the benefits of a second recovery of those amounts from the defendant. Gyulay, supra at 1158. We concur with Judge Mencer's analysis and hold that a nonresident, who has already received payment for medical expenses under the now repealed Pennsylvania No-fault Act, is precluded from securing a second recovery for those same medical expenses when suit is brought pursuant to Section 110(c)(2) of this Act. We believe that the trial court properly denied Hope Mineo's motion to mold the verdict by the addition of $100,000 in medical expenses. The judgment entered on March 16, 1984 as modified by the trial court's order of May 30, 1985 is affirmed. SPAETH, President Judge files a concurring opinion. SPAETH, President Judge, concurring: I join in Parts I through VII of the majority's opinion. I agree with the result reached by the majority in Part VIII. With respect to Part VIII of the majority's opinion: The majority states that a non-resident, who has already received payment for medical expenses under the now repealed Pennsylvania No-Fault Acts, is precluded from securing a second recovery for those same benefits when suit is brought pursuant to Section 110(c)(2) of this Act. Majority op. at 132. This statement, I suggest, is dictum because unnecessary to our decision, and is in error. The legislature recognized that when a non-resident victim of an automobile accident brings suit in Pennsylvania, one of two situations will arise: the victim's own state either does or does not have its own no-fault act. Section 110(c) was enacted in anticipation of these situations. If the victim's own state has a no-fault act, then the victim may not recover benefits under the Pennsylvania no-fault act but may recover only under the no-fault act of the victim's own state. If, however, the victim's own state does not have a no-fault act, then the victim may recover benefits under the Pennsylvania no-fault act. 40 P.S. § 1009.110(c)(1); Toter v. Knight, 278 Pa.Super. 547, 420 A.2d 676 (1980). Here, the victim's own state, Maryland, does not have a no-fault act. See Ropka, et al. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 347 Pa.Super. 507, 500 A.2d 1171 (1985). Accordingly, the victim is entitled to recover, and she has recovered, benefits under the Pennsylvania no-fault act. The victim is not, however, entitled to recover those benefits twice  once under the no-fault act and once as part of his damages for trespass. This is settled if the victim is a resident of Pennsylvania. 40 P.S. § 1009.301. The fact that here the victim is a resident of Maryland does not alter this conclusion. Section 110(c)(2) provides that [t]he right of a victim . . . to sue in tort shall be determined by the law of the state of domicile of such victim. Here, looking to Maryland law, one sees that the victim does have a right to sue in tort  in other words, Maryland does not have a no-fault act extinguishing her right to sue in tort. Cf. Toter v. Knight, supra (New Jersey resident allowed to sue in tort in Pennsylvania because under New Jersey no-fault act, resident's right to sue in tort was not extinguished, although if Pennsylvania's no-fault act were applicable, it would be extinguished). The fact that the victim was therefore entitled to maintain her action in Pennsylvania, however, does not by itself entitle her to recover double damages in Pennsylvania. To provide that one may maintain an action in Pennsylvania is not to say that in that action one may recover double damages. Since under Pennsylvania law double damages may not be recovered, the trial court properly refused to mold the verdict to permit such recovery. Appellee argues, however, that had she brought her action in Maryland, she would have been able to recover double damages, and that therefore she should be able to recover them in her action in Pennsylvania. However, she did not bring her action in Maryland. If she had, the Maryland court might, or might not, have permitted her to recover double damages. In Toter, we said that if the victim's state did permit recovery of double damages, that was not precluded by the Pennsylvania no-fault act. I believe this statement was correct.