Opinion ID: 2994161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bastien’s Complaint

Text: We do not need to go so far as to divine the intention of Congress to see that Bastien’s complaint directly attacks AT&T Wireless’s rates and its right to enter the Chicago market and therefore can be distinguished from the Long Distance Litigation. We merely need to look at the face of the complaint and ask what the nature of the claims are and what the effect of granting the relief requested would be. This shows that, in sharp contrast to the Long Distance Litigation, Bastien’s complaint would directly alter the federal regulation of tower construction, location and coverage, quality of service and hence rates for service. In Paragraph 9, Bastien alleges that AT&T Wireless signed up subscribers without first building the cellular towers and other infrastructure necessary to provide reliable cellular connections. In Paragraph 11, AT&T Wireless nevertheless continued marketing and selling its telephones and telephone service. In Paragraph 23, AT&T Wireless allegedly sign[ed] up subscribers without first building the cellular towers and other infrastructure necessary to accommodate good cellular connections. In Paragraph 25(a), AT&T Wireless sign[ed] up subscribers without first building the cellular towers and other infrastructure necessary to accommodate good cellular connections to such subscribers. In Paragraph 26, AT&T Wireless knew that it was signing up subscribers without first building the cellular towers and other infrastructure necessary to handle the call range reasonably expected to be used such subscribers. These claims tread directly on the very areas reserved to the FCC: the modes and conditions under which AT&T Wireless may begin offering service in the Chicago market. The statute makes the FCC responsible for determining the number, placement and operation of the cellular towers and other infrastructure, as well as the rates and conditions that can be offered for the new service. Should the state court vindicate Bastien’s claim, the relief granted would necessarily force AT&T Wireless to do more than required by the FCC: to provide more towers, clearer signals or lower rates. The statute specifically insulates these FCC decisions from state court review. Bastien’s complaint contains other allegations sounding more like state law claims. For instance, in Paragraph 9, AT&T Wireless allegedly knew that it could not deliver what it was promising. In Paragraph 23, AT&T Wireless violated: a) Its contracts; and b) The implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under such contracts. In Paragraph 25, AT&T Wireless allegedly b) [m]isrepresented the quality and benefits of its products and services; c) [concealed] the material facts that it did not have the capacity to handle the volume of its cellular calls. While these charges appear more like traditional state law claims, they are all founded on the fact that AT&T Wireless had not built more towers and more fully developed its network at the time Bastien tried to use the system. The reason AT&T Wireless had not more fully developed its network was because it was in compliance with the FCC schedule for building towers and establishing service in the Chicago market. In this complaint, Bastien has repackaged challenges to the FCC-approved plan in a state law wrapper, but the contents of that package remain challenges to the FCC approved plan. An indication of Bastien’s transparent attempt to recast federal claims as state law fraud and breach of contract actions can be seen in the complete absence of any details in the pleading regarding the particular promises or representations made by AT&T Wireless. Normally we do not scrutinize a complaint so closely because under our system of notice pleading, we set a very low threshold to determine whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Jackson v. Marion County, 66 F.3d 151, 153-54 (7th Cir. 1995). Such is not the case when a complaint is challenged for want of jurisdiction. On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court is not bound to accept the truth of the allegations in the complaint, but may look beyond the complaint and the pleadings to evidence that calls the court’s jurisdiction into doubt. Commodity Trend Service, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998); Aquafaith Shipping, Ltd. v. Jarillas, 963 F.2d 806, 808 (5th Cir. 1992). Scrutinizing Bastien’s complaint more closely, we note that the complaint alleges misrepresentation and concealing but does not offer specific instances of the words used by AT&T Wireless that would qualify as such. Rather we are left with facts suggesting AT&T Wireless had not sufficiently built up its network and the bare conclusory allegation that this constituted misrepresentation and fraud. That is not adequate to earn the plaintiff the protection of the well- pleaded complaint rule.