Opinion ID: 2222288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Filing Death Sentence Count

Text: The State filed its four-count information on July 18, 1983. At the initial hearing the following day, the trial court set September 26, 1983, as the omnibus date. On October 11, 1983, six days before the then-scheduled trial date, the State filed an Information for Death Sentence, to which defendant filed written objections. Following presentation of arguments at a pre-trial conference, the trial court overruled the defendant's objections but expressly granted defendant the opportunity to file any motions to dismiss directed toward the information for death sentence. After motions for continuance on behalf of both parties, jury trial finally commenced on February 27, 1984. Defendant claims that reversible error was committed when the trial court accepted the State's information for death sentence filed after the omnibus date, in violation of Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5. Defendant claims the following harm resulted thereby: a) he received the death sentence; b) he was forced to seek a continuance, which gave the State additional time to locate witnesses and complete key plea agreements; and c) his tactical preparation was harmed. The State contends that Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 does not apply to informations requesting imposition of the death penalty and, alternatively, that defendant suffered no actual prejudice. Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5 provides: (a) An indictment or information which charges the commission of an offense may not be dismissed but may be amended on motion by the prosecuting attorney at any time because of any immaterial defect, including: (1) Any miswriting, misspelling, or grammatical error; (2) Any misjoinder of parties defendant or offenses charged; (3) The presence of any unnecessary repugnant allegation; (4) The failure to negate any exception, excuse, or provision contained in the statute defining the offense; (5) The use of alternative or disjunctive allegations as to the acts, means, intents, or results charged; (6) Any mistake in the name of the court or county in the title of the action, or the statutory provision alleged to have been violated; (7) The failure to state the time or place at which the offense was committed where the time or place is not of the essence of the offense; (8) The failure to state an amount of value or price of any matter where that value or price is not of the essence of the offense; or (9) Any other defect which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. (b) The indictment or information may be amended in matters of substance or form, and the names of material witnesses may be added, by the prosecuting attorney, upon giving written notice to the defendant, at any time up to: (1) Thirty [30] days if the defendant is charged with a felony; or (2) Fifteen [15] days if the defendant is charged only with one or more misdemeanors; before the omnibus date. When the information or indictment is amended, it shall be signed by the prosecuting attorney. (c) Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may, at any time before, during, or after the trial, permit an amendment to the indictment or information in respect to any defect, imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. (d) Before amendment of any indictment or information other than amendment as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the court shall give all parties adequate notice of the intended amendment and an opportunity to be heard. Upon permitting such amendment, the court shall, upon motion by the defendant, order any continuance of the proceedings which may be necessary to accord the defendant adequate opportunity to prepare his defense. [IC XX-XX-X-X, as added by Acts 1981, P.L. 298, § 3; 1982, P.L. 204, § 21; P.L. 320-1983, § 13.] We agree with the State that the amendment procedure and limitations prescribed by section 5 do not preclude informations requesting imposition of the death penalty filed subsequent to the initial charging information. The State may seek to enhance the sentence by seeking the death penalty pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a), which requires that such request be filed on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument. This enhancement request is analogous to that prescribed when the State seeks to have a person sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8. Discussing the relationship between a previous statute authorizing the amendment of a charge, this Court in State v. Hicks (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 1014, 1018, held that the amendment statute did not preclude the State from seeking, after the filing of the original information, sentence enhancement under the habitual offender statute. In Howard v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 589, 377 N.E.2d 628, cert. denied (1978), 439 U.S. 1049, 99 S.Ct. 727, 58 L.Ed.2d 708, we held that permitting an information to be amended to charge habitual offender status did not constitute the charging of a separate crime and did not prejudice the substantial rights of the appellant. The holding in Howard was applied in Gilmore v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 134, 415 N.E.2d 70, which permitted the delayed addition of a habitual offender count: An information may be amended at any time before, during or after trial so long as it does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Since the habitual criminal statute does not impose punishment for a separate crime but provides a more severe penalty for the crime charged and since defendant was given adequate time to prepare a defense, an amendment to add the habitual criminal count did not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. Id. at 137, 415 N.E.2d at 73. See also Barnett v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 625; Radford v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 219. While the prescribed statutory filing sequence is not here applicable, a belated death penalty request will be improper if it operates to prejudice a defendant's substantive rights. On this question, we find particularly significant that, following the filing of the death penalty request, trial did not occur for more than four months. Continuances were sought and granted. Defendant claims resulting harm in the following particulars: He received the death sentence; the resulting additional time permitted the State to enhance its evidence, and the death penalty request impaired trial preparation, diligence and tactics. The element of prejudice to defendant's substantial rights is not shown by the fact that he is ultimately convicted or receives the penalty sought. The issue is whether defendant's opportunity for a fair trial was detrimentally affected by the denial of procedural opportunities for the ascertainment of truth to which he otherwise would have been entitled. We conclude that the belated filing of the death penalty information and the ensuing four-month delay did not impair defendant's opportunity for a fair trial in this case. The fact that the State's evidence may have been strengthened is not inconsistent with the ascertainment of truth. In addition, we are not convinced that the delay operated to cause any improper imposition upon defendant's trial tactics. Defendant cites Trotter v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 637; Gillie v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1380; and Humphrey v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 597, 377 N.E.2d 631, in support of his argument that the amended information prejudiced his substantial rights. However, these cases did not involve indictments or informations amended to request habitual offender sentence enhancement or imposition of the death penalty. We find no error on this issue.