Opinion ID: 619929
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Fourth Amendment and Foreign Intelligence

Text: Probable cause standards other than the typical requirement for belief regarding the commission of a crime have been determined to be appropriate and reasonable in the foreign intelligence context. The Supreme Court's decision in Keith provides a useful starting point in this area. While discussing the standards that apply to electronic surveillance for domestic security purposes, the Court there observed that certain policy and practical considerations differentiate domestic security investigations from ordinary criminal investigations:  The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.  The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crimes....  Often, ... the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322, 92 S.Ct. 2125. In sum, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less precise than that directed against more conventional types of crime. Id. In light of these considerations, the Court stated that Congress may wish to consider protective standards for domestic security surveillance warrants that differ from those prescribed in ordinary criminal cases. Id. In particular, it suggested that Congress might judge that the application and affidavit showing probable cause for such surveillance should allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases. Id. at 323, 92 S.Ct. 2125. Because the same policy and practical considerations highlighted by the Keith Court apply equally, or perhaps even to a greater extent, to foreign intelligence gathering, the Court's comments provide important guideposts for our analysis in this case. After Keith, several courts of appeals, including our own, have examined the Fourth Amendment's application to electronic surveillance conducted under the guise of the President's executive authority to collect foreign intelligence information. These courts almost uniformly have concluded that the important national interest in foreign intelligence gathering justifies electronic surveillance without prior judicial review, creating a sort of foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) ([B]ecause of the need of the executive branch for flexibility, its practical experience, and its constitutional competence, the courts should not require the executive to secure a warrant each time it conducts foreign intelligence surveillance.); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir.1974) (en banc) (holding, in light of the strong public interest in uninterrupted foreign intelligence collection, that the Fourth Amendment does not require prior judicial authorization of surveillance conducted and maintained solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information). See generally Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72 (summarizing foreign intelligence exception cases). Admittedly, FISA changed the landscape by instituting a procedure by which the executive branch could seek advance judicial review of, and procure a warrant-like order for, electronic foreign intelligence surveillance. Given the prevailing pre-FISA conclusion that the executive branch could conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes without a warrant, it was perhaps predictable that the courts of appeals that have reviewed FISA, both before and since the Patriot Act amendments, all would conclude that FISA's standards and procedures for authorizing foreign intelligence surveillance orders are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d at 128-29; Wen, 477 F.3d at 898-99; United States v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 573 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1075 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790-91 (9th Cir.1987); Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72-74; see also Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 746.