Opinion ID: 172763
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Manner or course of handcuffing

Text: The same analysis controls in this case. Handcuffing claims, in essence, concern the manner or course in which a petitioner is handcuffed. [4] Because handcuffing itself is not necessarily an excessive use of force in connection with an arrest, a plaintiff must show actual injury in order to prove that the officer used excessive force in the course of applying handcuffs. In short, without the handcuffing there would be no excessive force claim. Our holding in Cortez acknowledged and did not overruleour prior conclusion that in excessive force cases proof of physical injury manifested by visible cuts, bruises, abrasions or scars, is not an essential element. Id. at 1129 n. 24 (citing Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir.2001) (emphasis added)). Rather the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment are not confined to the right to be secure against physical harm; they include liberty, property, and privacy interestsa person's sense of security and individual dignity. Holland, 268 F.3d at 1195. We thus have consistently continued to reject a bright-line rule requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate physical [as opposed to other] injury when bringing excessive force claims. Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198, 1208 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1003, 173 L.Ed.2d 293 (2009) (emphasis added). What we do require, though, is actual harm whether it be physical or emotional. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129 n. 25. This rule also has the salutary side effect of weeding out weak or frivolous claims. We are equally consistent that in handcuffing cases, a plaintiff must establish some non-de minimis actual injury. Id.; see Vondrak, 535 F.3d at 1208 ([W]hen an excessive force claim relies upon unduly tight handcuffing, we have held that the plaintiff must show `some actual injury.'); see also Segura v. Jones, 259 Fed.Appx. 95, 103-04 (10th Cir.2007) (finding no more than a de minimis injury as a result of tight handcuffing or of the officer pushing petitioner against a wall in order to place handcuffs on her). A number of circuits agree and have adopted some form of a non-de minimis injury requirement in excessive force handcuffing cases. [5] See, e.g., Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416-17 (5th Cir.2007) ([M]inor, incidental injuries that occur in connection with the use of handcuffs to effectuate an arrest do not give rise to a constitutional claim for excessive force.); Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575-76 (explaining that in order to reach a jury on a handcuffing claim, the plaintiff must allege some physical injury from the handcuffing); Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir.2005) (Although we no longer require `significant injury' for excessive force claims ... the injury must be more than de minimis.); Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir.2003) ([F]or the application of handcuffs to amount to excessive force there must be something beyond allegations of minor injuries.). The concurrence worries that our rule will allow legitimate claims to fall through the cracks for want of sufficient injury. We disagree. The injury alleged here obviously occurred during the officers' handcuffing of Fisherduring the application of handcuffs itself. It is not a case where brutal or excessive force exists independent of the handcuffing or where handcuffing simply occurs at some point, by happenstance. While one can imagine a fact setting that could fall into a grey area during an encounter that results in a handcuffing, our holding in Cortez demonstrates that we will have little trouble in sorting out excessive force allegations that are a part of handcuffing. [6] Cortez does not require us to apply a different showing when the excessive force claim involves the officers' actions in applying handcuffsa manner of handcuffing claimas compared to an excessive force claim that involves only a complaint that the handcuffs were put on too tightly. [7] In sum, this case requires us not to extend Cortez, but to apply it. We are bound by circuit precedent, and see no significant analytical distinctions between an injury occurring because an officer fastens handcuffs too tightly and an injury arising out of the officer's manner of applying handcuffs. There may well be a nuanced distinction here, but the more obvious reading of Cortez is that it applies to those circumstances as well. And for now we are bound by Cortez.