Opinion ID: 1434460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of Closing Arguments

Text: Lewis additionally seeks a new trial based on allegedly prejudicial statements made by counsel for the City in their closing arguments. Specifically, Lewis takes issue with the City's criticism of her failure to produce other witnesses and evidence that would corroborate her story. For example, the City pointed out in closing that Lewis had not produced the officers who were riding in the squad car when Williams allegedly assigned her to assist with the narcotics call, or the officer who supposedly told Lewis that her SOS transfer request had been blocked by someone at an upper level. The City suggested to the jury that these events didn't actually happen, and that there is no corroboration [of] anything that she alleged happened in this case. Tr. at 1004. Lewis argues that this was a misstatement of the law. She cites to Pattern Instruction § 1.18, which says, [t]he law does not require any party to call as a witness every person who might have knowledge of the facts related to this trial. Similarly, the law does not require any party to present as exhibits all papers and things mentioned during this trial. See SEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 1.18, Comment E. Lewis failed to object to the closing argument when made and has therefore waived the issue on appeal. Improper statements should be objected to when made, so as to give the trial judge a chance to correct any prejudice caused by the statement. Doe By and Through G.S. v. Johnson, 52 F.3d 1448, 1465 (7th Cir. 1995). In any event, we find that the Defendants' closing did not create an improper missing witness instruction or otherwise unfairly prejudice Lewis. Attorneys have more leeway in closing arguments to suggest inferences based on the evidence, highlight weaknesses in the opponent's case, and emphasize strengths in their own case. Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 745 (7th Cir.2008). In Littlefield v. McGuffey, 954 F.2d 1337, 1347 (7th Cir.1992), the Court found that an argument that there's not a single witness, not a single witness put forth to corroborate any story that he was allegedly told, was not improper. The missing-witness rule permits an inference of unfavorable testimony from the missing witness, but may only be invoked if that witness is peculiarly within the opposing party's power to produce. Id. at 1346. Littlefield drew a distinction between asking a jury to infer that a missing witness's testimony would be unfavorable (which is not allowed according to the missing-witness rule) and asking a jury to question a party's credibility because it produced no corroborating evidence (which is permissible). Id. at 1346-47. Since the City was attempting to show the latter, the closing argument was appropriate.