Opinion ID: 2344772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Pennington Matter

Text: On these facts, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that respondent Pennington had committed multiple ethical violations, chief of which were to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 8.4(b), and to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id., Rule 4(d). It was these violations and the conduct underlying [them], the court stated, that lead the Court to conclude that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. Pennington, supra note 1, 876 A.2d at 660. Specifically, the court found that [r]espondent's misrepresentation[s] and deceitful conduct in concealing the true account of how she mishandled the Butlers' claims, falsifying a supposed settlement of those claims with the insurer, intentionally misrepresenting matters in negotiations with third-party health care providers to reduce their charges to the Butlers, and concealing from the Butlers the facts that might have supported lodging a professional negligence claim against respondent, implicate the core responsibilities of truth and honesty expected of attorneys. Id. Although Pennington had consulted Wiggins for advice in the matter, given her deceitful conduct, she could not have believed, in good faith, [that] her conduct was proper. Id. at 657. Moreover, the court stated: There is absolutely no evidence in this record . . . that respondent advised Mr. Wiggins that she intended to present a statement of settlement form to the clients. As the hearing judge found, this form, similar to the one respondent used with this client in a prior case, clearly created an impression that the case was settled. This misrepresentation to the client is at the heart of respondent's misconduct, and there is no evidence that Mr. Wiggins approved this conduct. Id. (footnote omitted). The court further found no evidence of mitigation, such as good intention, []sufficient to justify a sanction less than disbarment. Respondent's attempt to purchase a plenary indulgence with her own money is more indicative of a selfish plan to conceal than of a praiseworthy desire to `make the client whole.' Id. at 661.
In accordance with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c), the Board deem[ed Pennington's] violations of the Maryland ethical rules  primarily Rules 8.4(c) and (d)  as conclusively established. It nevertheless rejected disbarment as a proper sanction for her misconduct in the District of Columbia, concluding that [t]he misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline here. R. XI, § 11(c)(4). Instead, the Board recommended a thirty-day suspension from the practice of law. Essentially two questions, therefore, are presented to us: (1) Did the Board correctly find, by the required clear and convincing evidence, Rule XI, § 11(c), that disbarment is substantially different discipline from the sanction that identical conduct by Pennington in this jurisdiction would warrant? And (2), if so, what should the proper discipline be? See generally In re De Maio, 893 A.2d 583, 587-89 (D.C.2006).
We agree with the Board that Pennington's misconduct would not warrant disbarment in this jurisdiction absent additional circumstances of aggravation not demonstrated. The Board recognized, correctly, that Pennington's disbarment by Maryland was dictated by what amounts to a presumption under Maryland law that an attorney who engages in intentional dishonesty will be disbarred. The Pennington court cited, and relied on, its previous decision in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 773 A.2d 463 (2001). Although that case had involved the intentional financial misrepresentation genre of conduct violative of Rule 8.4(c), the Pennington court considered it to be a seminal case, in that it sought to return some measure of consistency to the analysis of sanctions in intentional dishonesty cases. After documenting the tortured and sometimes inexplicable all-over-the-ballpark array of sanctions in cases of attorney dishonesty that preceded it, Vanderlinde endeavored to restore a principal, guiding star for the sanctions in such cases: Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct. 876 A.2d at 661 (quoting Vanderlinde, 773 A.2d at 471-85, 488). Pennington's application of the rule that [d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct demonstrates an important difference between Maryland's treatment of intentional dishonesty  of no matter what kind  and this court's treatment of dishonesty. The distinction is made apparent by the Vanderlinde court's discussion of how mitigating or extenuating circumstances will be considered: [I]n cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as compelling extenuating circumstances, anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the root cause of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney's utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the [Maryland Rules]. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise. Vanderlinde, 773 A.2d at 485 (emphasis in original). Under this court's precedents, by contrast, a presumption of disbarment rebuttable only by compelling extenuating circumstances has heretofore been reserved for one class of intentionally dishonest conduct, that involving misappropriation of client funds. See In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190 (D.C.1990) (en banc). In Addams, we held that [w]hen a member of the bar is found to have betrayed his high trust by embezzling funds entrusted to him, disbarment should ordinarily follow as a matter of course. Id. at 193. Because the breach of trust entailed by intentional misappropriation is so reprehensible, striking at the core of the attorney-client relationship, id. at 198-99, we concluded that [o]nly the most stringent of extenuating circumstances would justify a lesser disciplinary sanction such as suspension, id. at 193, citing as an example of such limited circumstances chronic alcoholism. Id. at 195. Outside the context of intentional misappropriation, however, we have applied no such presumption of disbarment as the appropriate sanction rebuttable only by extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 191. Demonstrating that fact is that Bar Counsel cited to the Board, and has cited to us, only two cases in which the court has ordered disbarment for dishonesty not of the Addams kind, and both are dramatically different on their facts from this one. In re Goffe, 641 A.2d 458 (D.C.1994), concerned misconduct by a lawyer distinguish[able] . . . from any that we [had] previously seen, in that he had repeatedly resort[ed] not only to false testimony but to the actual manufacture and use of false documentary evidence in official matters. Id. at 464. Specifically, he had manufactured evidence for use before the IRS, lied under oath to the Tax Court, and continued to lie about his actions to the Hearing Committee. Id. at 465. Comparable to that behavior was the misconduct of the attorney in In re Corizzi, 803 A.2d 438 (D.C.2002), who [w]hile engaged in the practice of law . . . blatantly solicited outright perjury by two of his clients on separate occasions  conduct that, had it led to his criminal conviction, as it could have, would surely be for a perjury-related offense involving moral turpitude, hence requiring automatic disbarment. Id. at 442 (citing inter alia D.C.Code § 11-2503(a)). Goffe and Corizzi thus each involved misconduct criminal or quasi-criminal in nature that reflect[ed] a continuing and pervasive indifference to the obligations of honesty in the judicial system. Id. at 443. However Pennington's actions of deceiving her clients and falsifying a supposed settlement of claims may be characterized, they are far removed from the unexampled patterns of morally reprehensible behavior that caused both Goffe and Corizzi to be disbarred. Sound reasons can no doubt be offered for making all forms of intentional dishonesty presumptively sanctionable by disbarment, as Maryland has done. See Vanderlinde, 773 A.2d at 488 (Honesty and dishonesty [simply] are, or are not, present in an attorney's character.); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 800 A.2d 747, 757 (2002) (referring to the unparalleled importance of honesty in the practice of law). But the state of disciplinary law in this jurisdiction does not reach that far, and the difference, in our view, justifies the Board's conclusion that Pennington's conduct  which involved dishonesty neither of the Addams variety nor of the flagrant kind instanced in Goffe and Corizzi  warrants significantly lesser discipline in this jurisdiction than the ultimate sanction of disbarment.
We part company with the Board, however, in its recommendation that Pennington be suspended for thirty days. That proposal rests, first of all, on an impermissible relitigation by the Board  without benefit of the testimony heard and weighed by the Maryland court  of factual issues resolved against Pennington in the original proceeding. More basically, the Board in effect recharacterized, and in so doing seriously minimized, the misconduct found by Maryland in a manner that cannot be reconciled with Rule XI, § 11(c). [2] In keeping with the deference that underlies reciprocal discipline, see In re Velasquez, 507 A.2d 145, 147 (D.C.1986), a respondent-attorney may not seek[ ] to litigate anew issues he raised and lost before the disciplinary court of another jurisdiction. In re Meaden, 902 A.2d 802, 810 (D.C.2006). In important respects, the Board has allowed Pennington to do just that. As Bar Counsel points out, for example, the Board relied on its perception that her misconduct threatened no one with significant, tangible harm, except the attorney herself, [and] almost certainly worked to the Butlers' financial benefit. Yet the Maryland disciplinary judge found, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that the Butlers were indeed injured and that Pennington benefited economically from her misconduct: The Respondent argues that a conflict [of interest] occurs when an event [that] is economically detrimental to a client is economically beneficial to the lawyer. That is correct and this case provides an illustration of such a situation. The Butlers were injured because their lawyer never provided them the information necessary to determine if they wanted to accept a settlement offer from the Respondent or pursue their claim against her through a legal malpractice action. The Respondent was benefited economically because she avoided the costs and expenses of defending a possible malpractice claim that was available to the Butlers. Pennington, 876 A.2d at 650-51. In the same vein, the Board reasoned that [a] malpractice action was hardly a more advantageous alternative for [the clients] than receiving the approximately $4,000 that Pennington determined to pay them. But the Maryland court found that the sum Pennington paid to placate the Butlers in furtherance of her plan cannot represent the amount that would have been recovered in a malpractice claim, id. at 651, and that the Butlers' willingness to settle for $10,000 is not determinative of the value of their claims. Id. at 657. Most significantly, perhaps, where the Board saw Pennington's dishonesty as motivated by [her] desire to benefit her client at the attorney's own expense, the Maryland court found that her attempt to purchase a plenary indulgence with her own money is more indicative of a selfish plan to conceal than a praiseworthy desire to `make the clients whole.' Id. at 661. [3] Fundamentally, moreover, we think that the Board re-characterized Pennington's misconduct in a manner forbidden by Rule XI, § 11(c). See, e.g., In re Berger, 737 A.2d 1033, 1041 (D.C.1999) (whereas New Jersey disciplinary board analogized Berger's misconduct to cases involving mail and insurance fraud, the Board impermissibly re-characterized [it] as involving false swearing, and recommended a downward departure). In a telling statement, the Board said that Pennington's misconduct, while violating her professional obligations of keeping her client[s] fully informed and permitting them to decide the important choices in their legal matters, actually appears to have worked . . . to [their] economic advantage (emphasis added). Maryland, however, did not regard Pennington's conduct as only, or primarily, the failure to keep her clients informed, see Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4 (Communication), or failure to reserve important choices to their decision. It found her conduct to be affirmative deceit[ ], as she conceal[ed] the true account of how she mishandled the Butler's claims, falsif[ied] a supposed settlement of those claims with the insurer, intentionally misrepresent[ed] matters in negotiations with third-party health care providers, and conceal[ed] from the Butlers the facts that might have supported lodging a professional negligence claim against respondent. Pennington, 876 A.2d at 660. Given these actions, we cannot help concluding that the recommended thirty-day suspension by the Board reflects disagreement with the very nature of the misconduct found by Maryland  a disagreement that was beyond its authority in this reciprocal matter. See, e.g., In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1263 (D.C.1998) (Board's assessment of conduct in reciprocal case rejected because it did not reflect the full extent of [attorney's] misconduct as found by other jurisdiction). We therefore reject the Board's recommendation as disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct which Maryland found to implicate the core responsibilities of truth and honesty expected of attorneys. Pennington, 876 A.2d at 660. Instead, cases such as In re Foshee, 897 A.2d 203 (D.C.2006) (reciprocal three-year suspension; attorney dismissed action he had filed, failed to reinstate it, and instead of telling [client] he had dismissed it, told her she could not win and there was nothing more he could do), and In re Sheehy, 454 A.2d 1360 (D.C.1983) (en banc) (original two-year suspension plus fitness requirement; attorney neglected client's matter and later paid him with attorney's own funds without disclosing true status of case and fact that no settlement offer had been received), persuade us that Pennington should be suspended in the District of Columbia for a period of two years, with the requirement that she show fitness as a condition of reinstatement. Any lesser sanction, we believe, would convert this reciprocal proceeding into the near-equivalent of a de novo review, In re Spann, 711 A.2d at 1265, of Maryland's determination of misconduct.