Opinion ID: 2898039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Forced Labor Convictions

Text: The federal forced labor statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, was enacted as part of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act of 2000 (also known as the Trafficking Victims Protection Act). Defendants rely on the Act’s legislative history to argue that § 1589 was passed to combat international trafficking in human beings and that Congress did not intend to criminalize the type of conduct charged in this case. They point out that § 1589 prosecutions have typically been directed toward those who hold undocumented immigrants for peonage or domestic service and those who hold individuals for the sex trade. Defendants also contend that the government, in the absence of jurisdiction and any compelling federal interest, usurped the prosecution of this “purely local” crime from state authorities. The first question before the Court is whether Defendants’ conduct is proscribed under § 1589. “To decide this question, we do not look first to the legislative history. Instead, we apply the well-known rule that statutory construction begins with the plain words of the statute.” United States v. Ransbottom, 914 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1990). Defendants were charged with violating § 1589(a). That provision of the forced labor statute provides: Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 8 (a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means— (1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint, shall be punished as provided under subsection (d). 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a) (emphasis added). The statute’s express terms do not limit its application to immigrant victims or sex workers. Rather, § 1589(a)’s proscription against the exploitation of the labor or services of “a person” by prohibited means encompasses any person, no matter her nationality or place of birth. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). In other sections of the Act, Congress imposed limitations on the scope of prohibited conduct and the category of victims, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (prohibiting “[s]ex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion”), providing further indication that the unqualified term “a person” is purposefully broad. Defendants are correct that “[w]hen construing a legislative enactment, [courts] must give effect to the intent of the legislature adopting the statute in question.” Chrysler Corp. v. C.I.R., 436 F.3d 644, 654 (6th Cir. 2006). But Defendants forget that “legislative intent should be divined first and foremost from the plain language of the statute,” Fieger v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 542 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 2008), and “reference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous.” Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 132 (2002). Here, “a person” is unambiguous, as is the rest of § 1589(a). Thus, contrary to Defendants’ suggestion, the charged activities in this case fall within the statute’s ambit. We are equally unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that because § 1589 prosecutions typically target those who exploit the unique vulnerabilities of foreign-born victims, the statute does not apply to those who exploit persons with other vulnerabilities, such as cognitive impairment. That restriction is not present in the statute, and in United States v. Kozminski, Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 9 487 U.S. 931, 953 (1988), the Supreme Court held that “the record contains sufficient evidence of physical or legal coercion to enable a jury to convict the [defendants]” of holding developmentally disabled men in involuntary servitude in violation of 18 U.S.C § 1584 (the predecessor to § 1589). We have analogous circumstances in this case. Congress enacted § 1589 in response to Kozminski to expand the forms of coercion that could result in forced labor. See United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106–939, at 101). Thus, there is every indication that the statute allows for the prosecution of Defendants on the facts of this case. Defendants also argue that any crime that occurred in this case is not a matter of federal concern. In an attempt to recast their first argument, Defendants rely on Bond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2077 (2014), and United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that the underlying conduct in this case was not the type of forced labor that Congress intended to criminalize when it passed the Act. In Bond, the defendant was prosecuted for possession and use of chemical weapons, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a), a provision of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998. 134 S.Ct. at 2083. The defendant, a microbiologist, discovered that her husband had a lover whom he had impregnated. In response, the wife obtained some toxic chemicals and spread them on various surfaces on the exterior of the girlfriend’s home, mailbox, and car, in hopes that the paramour would injure herself by touching the chemicals. The chemicals were easy to see, however, and the girlfriend avoided touching them on all but one occasion. Postal inspectors set up surveillance cameras around the girlfriend’s home and eventually caught the wife in the act. The § 229(a) prosecution followed. The government argued that the wife’s assault and attempted assaults fell within the broad scope of § 229 because a “toxic chemical” not used for a “peaceful purpose” (or other protected purpose) is statutorily defined as a chemical weapon. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 229F(1), (7)–(8). The Court rejected that argument and characterized the case as “an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s lover, which ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with water.” Bond, 134 S.Ct. at 2083. In reversing the conviction, the Court reasoned that § 229 was ambiguous due in part to the “improbably broad Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 10 reach of” the definition of chemical weapon and the “deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless reading.” Id. at 2090. The Court cautioned against inferring congressional intent to criminalize activity traditionally regulated by the states, and construed the definition of chemical weapon narrowly because Congress did not clearly indicate that it intended “to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon.” Id. at 2093. In Toviave, the defendant was prosecuted under § 1589, the same statute under consideration here. 761 F.3d at 623–25. The defendant brought four young relatives from Togo to live with him in Michigan, and he made them clean, cook, do laundry, and babysit. The defendant would beat the children with any readily accessible instrument if they misbehaved or failed to follow one of his rules. However, he was not always cruel to the children—he provided for the children by working two jobs and doing yardwork; he bought the kids sports equipment and allowed them to participate in recreational activities; they went on family vacations together; and he emphasized their education by hiring an English tutor, imposing mandatory study periods, making sure the children always attended school, and creating extra assignments and academic drills for the children to complete when their homework was finished. This Court reversed the defendant’s conviction. The panel held that though the defendant’s behavior was reprehensible, it was not forced labor. The Court explained that “treating household chores and required homework as forced labor because that conduct was enforced by abuse either turns the forced labor statute into a federal child abuse statute, or renders the requirement of household chores a federal crime.” Id. at 625. This conclusion was reached with reliance on Bond. Without a clear expression of congressional intent, the panel declined to “transform a statute passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude into one that generally makes it a crime for a person in loco parentis to require household chores, or makes child abuse into a federal crime.” Id. at 629. The Court made clear that its decision did not “undermine[] the reasoning of the forced labor decisions of this court and our sister circuits,” where extreme isolation, threats and violence, and denial of access to education, were used to prevent the victims from leaving and to keep them bound to their captors. Id. at 629–30. Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 11 The circumstances of this case are markedly different from those in both Bond and Toviave. Bond dealt with a statute implementing an international treaty that was drafted as a result of the horrors of chemical weapon use by terrorists and warring nations. The Supreme Court concluded that Congress likely did not intend (and certainly did not explicitly state) that the provision covered a simple assault. In Toviave, we recognized that § 1589 was “passed to implement the Thirteenth Amendment against slavery or involuntary servitude.” Id. at 629. The Thirteenth Amendment “was not intended to apply to exceptional cases well established in the common law at the time [of its passage], such as the right of parents and guardians to the custody of their minor children or wards.” Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 944. We held that § 1589 did not proscribe the defendant’s conduct in Toviave because “it has always been true that parents can make their children perform [household chores],” and the evidence showed that the defendant was otherwise concerned about the minors’ well-being. 761 F.3d at 626. To the contrary, Defendants’ charged conduct in the instant case goes to the heart of § 1589’s concern. As discussed more fully below, S.E. was compelled to perform domestic labor and run errands for Defendants by force, the threat of force, and the threat of abuse of legal process. Because this is a distinct harm that is a matter of federal concern pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, it matters little that Defendants’ conduct may have also violated various state laws. Indeed, the circumstances of this case are analogous to the circumstances in many forced labor cases—squalid living conditions, extreme isolation, threat of legal process, and violence. See id. at 629–30 (collecting cases). Accordingly, we conclude that the acts proscribed by § 1589 encompass the conduct Defendants were charged with committing. Defendants’ next contention is that the government failed to show that S.E. provided labor or services in the manner contemplated by the statute. They claim S.E. performed the same cleaning duties that would be expected of any roommate. “The term ‘labor or services,’ which is not defined by [§ 1589], is viewed in accord with its ordinary meaning.” United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 44 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Kaufman, 546 F.3d at 1261. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) defines “labor” as “expenditure of physical or mental effort esp. when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory;” and “service” is defined as “the performance of work commanded or paid for by Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 12 another.” There was voluminous testimony that S.E. was constantly cleaning the apartment, running errands for Defendants, doing yardwork, and otherwise performing domestic tasks from morning until night. These tasks certainly constitute labor or service under the ordinary meaning of those words, and Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that household chores do not constitute labor or service under the statute. In Toviave, we held that a parent or guardian who requires children to perform household chores and also abuses the children does not necessarily violate the forced labor statute; we did not hold that household chores do not constitute labor or services. In sum, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that there was substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could conclude that S.E. provided labor or services. Defendants, in their last-ditch attempt to get their forced labor convictions reversed, argue that there was no evidence that any of the threats or force used against S.E. were employed for the purpose of obtaining S.E.’s labor, as required by § 1589. Unfortunately for Defendants, this contention is belied by testimony from S.E. herself and a number of other witnesses. S.E. testified that she obeyed Hunt’s orders to clean out of fear that Hunt might hurt her because Hunt had done so in the past. S.E. also testified that Hunt assaulted her when she would not clean quickly enough. Another witness testified to observing Hunt shoving S.E.’s face in dog excrement and yelling at her to clean it up. And there were numerous occasions when Defendants threatened or assaulted S.E. when she exceeded the time limit they imposed for running errands or when she bought things for herself. Defendants enforced S.E.’s compliance to their demands in numerous other ways. They deprived S.E. and B.E. of food until S.E. completed the work they demanded. Defendants locked S.E. and B.E. in the basement from 8:00 p.m. until morning and would only let them out if S.E. performed the tasks she was assigned. Callahan forced S.E. to beat B.E. while he recorded it on his cellphone, and Defendants threatened to show the video to the police and Children’s Services if S.E. talked to any strangers, went to her mom’s house, or otherwise “messed up.” These are but a few examples of the abuse Defendants inflicted on S.E. and B.E. to force S.E. to work and prevent S.E. and B.E. from leaving. In sum, Defendants’ conduct is proscribed by the forced labor statute and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 13 that the elements of the crime were met beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, there was substantial evidence that Defendants knowingly coerced S.E. to provide labor and services. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Defendants’ motions to acquit and for a new trial on Counts I and II. II. Acquisition of a Controlled Substance by Deception Convictions Defendants argue that the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to sustain convictions for conspiracy to violate the deceptive acquisition of a controlled substance statute and the substantive offense itself because 21 U.S.C. § 843(a) does not proscribe their conduct. They claim that intentionally injuring S.E. for the purpose of acquiring a prescription for pain medication is not criminalized by § 843(a) because the statute is targeted at healthcare professionals. Defendants point to the legislative history of the statute for the proposition that the Act is regulatory in nature. We again remind Defendants that this Court will not consult legislative history unless the statute is ambiguous. See United States v. Roman, 2015 WL 4529437, at  (6th Cir. July 28, 2015). Section 843(a) provides: It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally— ... (3) to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge[.] 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) (emphasis added). The express terms of the statute indicate that it applies to all persons who commit the offense, not just healthcare professionals. And even if the Court were inclined to consult the legislative history of the statute as Defendants suggest, we would find “that Congress was concerned with the nature of the drug transaction, rather than with the status of the defendant.” United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 134 (1975); see also United States v. Wilbur, 58 F.3d 1291, 1292 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The focus of [§ 843(a)(3)] is on how the defendant obtained the drugs.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). Moreover, one of the nine subsections of § 843(a) further qualifies “any person” with “who is a registrant” and none of the Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 14 other subsections are so limited. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(1); see also Moore, 423 U.S. at 133–34. That the statute did specifically limit the scope of those eligible for punishment in some circumstances, and did not in others, indicates that “any person” truly means any person. Thus, we conclude that the charged activities in this case fall within the sweep of the statute. There was also substantial evidence that Defendants’ conduct actually violated § 843(a)(3). The jury was presented evidence that Defendants acquired Vicodin (a controlled substance) for their personal use by purposely injuring S.E. and then coaching her on the lies to tell medical personnel in order to be prescribed painkillers. S.E. was given Vicodin by a medical professional in the emergency room, and Defendants took it from her when she returned home, crushed and snorted the pills, and did not allow S.E. to take any of the medication. Defendants also took S.E.’s Vicodin prescription and kept it for themselves. Defendants’ argument that the government needed to present evidence that the hospital staff would have refused to provide painkillers to S.E. had they known the true circumstances of her injury is not well-taken. The argument boils down to an assertion that the statute requires but-for causation. True enough, at least three of our sister circuits have held that a defendant violates § 843(3)(a) only when he has made “a material misrepresentation, or committed fraud, deception, or subterfuge which was a cause in fact of the acquisition” of the controlled substance. Wilbur, 58 F.3d at 1292 (emphasis added) (alterations and citation omitted); see also United States v. Adade, 547 F. App’x 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 857 n.11 (5th Cir. 1974) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984). But even assuming that but-for causation is required, the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to sustain Defendants’ convictions. There was testimony at trial that Vicodin is a controlled substance; S.E. was prescribed Vicodin for the injuries inflicted on her by Defendants; the prescription was filled at a local CVS pharmacy; Hunt picked up the Vicodin from CVS; and S.E. never received any of the medication that was prescribed to her. When Hunt picked up S.E.’s Vicodin from the pharmacy, one of two things happened: she either represented herself as S.E. or she represented that she was picking up the medication on behalf of S.E. In either case, she resorted to “trickery” to obtain the drug because she never gave the medicine to S.E. See Willbur, 58 F.3d at 1293. Callahan also Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 15 obtained the Vicodin through this misrepresentation. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence for Defendants to be convicted of these offenses. In sum, Defendants’ conduct is proscribed by § 843(a)(3) and, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, a rational trier of fact could have found that the elements of the crime were met beyond a reasonable doubt. III. Pretrial Motion for Psychological Examination We review a district court’s decision denying a defendant’s motion for a psychological examination of a witness for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 583 (6th Cir. 1989). In the indictment, the government alleged that S.E. suffered from a “cognitive disability,” and that Defendants exploited this fact to control her. Callahan requested a psychological examination of S.E. to determine her competency to take the stand as a witness against him. The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned that as long as S.E. swore to tell the truth and understood the import of that obligation, then the jury could receive her testimony and give it whatever weight they thought it deserved. Courts recognize that “[e]very person is competent to be a witness unless [the Federal Rules of Evidence] provide otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 601. And courts know that they “cannot order a non-party witness to be examined by a psychiatrist.” Ramirez, 871 F.2d at 584. Instead, “[t]he most the court could do is condition such witness’s testimony on a prior examination,” id., and we have cautioned that this power “should be exercised sparingly,” id. at 585. Courts also know that witness capacity is “particularly suited to the jury as [a question] of weight and credibility,” and that “[d]iscretion is regularly exercised in favor of allowing the [witness to testify].” Fed. R. Evid. 601, Advisory Committee Notes. In this case, S.E. took an oath to testify truthfully, and the district court was satisfied that she understood that oath. S.E. then testified for three days, providing the jury with a full opportunity to evaluate her capacity and credibility. Considering these facts in the light of our decades-old precedent, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Callahan’s motion. Nos. 14-3771/3771 United States v. Callahan, et al. Page 16