Opinion ID: 2827101
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Lanier’s Failure to Cooperate

Text: Lanier argues that evidence related to his failure to cooperate was irrelevant to the charged offenses and that, even if it were relevant, its relevance was substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. Only evidence that is relevant is admissible at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant only if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Even relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage to a [party’s] case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest [a] decision on an improper basis.” United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 603 (6th Cir. 2006). A district court has broad discretion in making a Rule 403 determination. United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 567 (6th Cir. 1993). At trial, the Government presented evidence that Lanier agreed to cooperate with law enforcement but ultimately failed to fulfill his commitment. Scott Cothran testified that Lanier agreed to provide cooperation against his gang, the 98 Mafia Crips, and to provide information on drug sales and gun sales. Cothran testified that shortly after Lanier got out of jail, he “just quit answering his phone” when law enforcement officials called. This failure led to his indictment. John Nokes testified that Lanier “had every opportunity to cooperate” but did not do so. Mickey Welch testified that Lanier was - 14 - No. 13-5703, USA v. Lanier given the opportunity to cooperate but failed to contact investigators, even after they bought him minutes on his cell phone to facilitate communication. The Government also elicited evidence as to the danger Lanier’s failure to cooperate presented to the community. Specifically, Nokes testified that there were more gang members in the Nashville than police, and, therefore, Lanier could have been very helpful. Similarly, when asked whether Lanier’s cooperation would have enhanced overall public safety, Welch replied, “Yes, absolutely.” Lanier argues that this evidence was irrelevant because his lack of cooperation did not make any fact related to his guilt more or less probable. Critically, though, Lanier expressed his intent to cooperate contemporaneously with his confession to his role in the charged crimes. Accordingly, the evidence provided context for Lanier’s confession and allowed jurors to more comprehensively evaluate the credibility of the confession. Accordingly, we find that evidence related to Lanier’s agreement to cooperate, and failure to do so, was relevant.5 Lanier also argues that he was prejudiced by the Government’s implication that, while Lanier was given the opportunity to help an outmanned police force, he chose not to and, thereby, reduced overall public safety. The jury was instructed by the district court that its sole job was to decide whether the government had proven that the defendant guilty of the offenses charged, and that the defendant is not on trial for any other act or conduct. Juries are presumed to follow the instructions of the court. See 5 Further, as the district court noted, defense counsel had raised the issue of the voluntariness of Lanier’s confession at trial. - 15 - No. 13-5703, USA v. Lanier Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206-07 (1987). For this reason, even if the admission of this evidence were in error, the error was harmless. 2. Evidence Introduced During Howard Coleman’s Cross-Examination Lanier argues that his convictions must be vacated because the Government improperly introduced evidence that should have been excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) during Howard Coleman’s cross-examination. “Rule 404(b) forbids admitting evidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity with that character, but permits the introduction of character evidence for proper purposes, such as proof of motive, intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.” United States v. Pope, 335 F. App’x 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). When evaluating admissibility of prior acts evidence under Rule 404(b), a district court: (1) “must decide whether there is sufficient evidence that the other act in question actually occurred”; (2) “if so, . . . decide whether the evidence of the other act is probative of a material issue other than character”; and (3) “if the evidence is probative of a material issue other than character, . . . decide whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect.” United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Lanier called Howard Coleman to testify. During direct examination, Coleman testified that, on the day of the Lebanon Pike robbery, Lanier was recovering from a gunshot wound and on crutches, so he could not have participated in the robbery. - 16 - No. 13-5703, USA v. Lanier Coleman also testified that he had previously lied to law enforcement regarding Lanier’s involvement in a different robbery. On cross-examination, the Government attempted to impeach Coleman by asking about the false statement he made to law enforcement, specifically whether he said that Lanier sent someone to rob a person near a FedEx. Coleman testified that he may have said that. Coleman then testified that he did not remember who tried to carry out the robbery. The Government also asked about a robbery related to Archwood Apartments. At this point, the district court excused the jury and expressed concern that that the Government was getting too far afield. When the jury returned, the district court offered the following instruction: You have heard testimony by this witness about statements that he made to the government, and you have also heard testimony about specific statements he gave about the defendant involving other robberies. The Court is allowing this for the limited purpose of testing the credibility or the believability of this witness. You are not to consider those statements for the purpose of whether an actual offense was committed. Subsequently, the Government asked about a robbery of “Lil’ Ced.” Defense counsel objected, and the district court sustained the objection. Later, the Government asked about the “Lil’ Ced robbery” again; this time, Lanier’s objection was overruled. The Government’s cross-examination of Coleman was targeted toward his credibility. Coleman was asked about evidence that undermined his testimony on direct—specifically, his prior statements regarding robberies carried out with Lanier—in order to impeach his testimony and attack his credibility. “[I]ssues of witness credibility are always open to cross-examination.” United States v. Arnott, 704 F.2d 322, 324 (6th - 17 - No. 13-5703, USA v. Lanier Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 611(b) (“Cross-examination should not go beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s credibility. The court may allow inquiry into additional matters as if on direct examination.”) Further, in raising the topic of Coleman’s prior statements during direct examination, the defense opened the door to further examination on this same topic. See United States v. Bender, 265 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir. 2001) (“when a party opens up a subject . . . [the party] cannot complain on appeal if the opposing party introduces evidence on the same subject”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, Lanier fails to specify any evidence of prior bad acts that was improperly admitted or that was prejudicial. Instead, he complains of the Government’s questioning. Coleman essentially testified that he did not remember past instances despite having described them on prior occasions. Furthermore, the district court cautioned the jury to consider evidence regarding Coleman’s prior statements for the purpose of assessing his credibility only. For these reasons, we find that the relevance of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by prejudice to Lanier.