Opinion ID: 2586480
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Errors in the Competency Hearing

Text: As noted above, on November 13, 1996, a hearing was held under section 1368 regarding defendant's competence to stand trial. Defendant contends the trial court erred under section 1369 by appointing only one mental health expert to evaluate him for the competency hearing, and by failing to obtain his personal waiver of the right to a jury trial at the hearing. He claims these errors deprived him of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As explained below, each contention lacks merit.
Section 1369, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: In any case where the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two mental health experts to evaluate the defendant and render an opinion as to his competence. Defendant asserts the court should have inferred he did not want to be declared incompetent because that finding would have defeat[ed] his effort to regain sole control of his case in order to present his accidental ignition defense. The trial court's failure to appoint a second mental health expert to evaluate him, he contends, violated section 1369 and his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. The contention lacks merit. (1) We rejected an almost identical claim in People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 132-133 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461]. On appeal, the defendant in Lawley argued that, even though neither he nor his counsel expressly informed the judge conducting the competency hearing that he did not seek a finding of incompetence, the judge should have inferred as much based on his insistence on a court trial, new counsel, or, alternatively, the right to proceed in propria persona. ( Id. at p. 133.) In rejecting the argument, we held that [s]ection 1369, subdivision (a) plainly requires `defendant or the defendant's counsel' to `inform[] the court' that the defense is not seeking a finding of incompetence in order to trigger the required appointment of a second mental health expert. ( Ibid. ) Here, as in Lawley, because neither defendant nor counsel expressly informed the court during the competency hearing that defendant was not seeking a finding of incompetence, the trial court was not required to appoint a second mental health expert, and defendant's contention fails.
(2) A defendant enjoys a statutory right to a jury trial in a competency proceeding. ( People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 969 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 679, 884 P.2d 136]; § 1369.) Defendant contends the trial court was required to obtain his personal waiver of this right because he and Peters were cocounsel under the terms of Peters's appointment on April 15, 1996. He claims the court's failure to obtain his personal waiver deprived him of his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. We disagree. (3) Before addressing defendant's argument directly, it is necessary to clarify the status of defendant's representation. It is settled that a criminal defendant does not have a right both to be represented by counsel and to participate in the presentation of his own case. Indeed, such an arrangement is generally undesirable. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 97 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1368 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) If [a criminal defendant] chooses professional representation, he waives tactical control; counsel is at all times in charge of the case and bears the responsibility for providing constitutionally effective assistance. Upon a `substantial' showing [citation], and entirely subject to counsel's consent ..., the court may nonetheless permit the accused a limited role as cocounsel. Even so, professional counsel retains complete control over the extent and nature of the defendant's participation, and of all tactical and procedural decisions. ( People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14 [259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730], original italics.) [N]one of the `hybrid' forms of representation, whether labeled `cocounsel,' `advisory counsel,' or `standby counsel,' is in any sense constitutionally guaranteed. ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1218 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698].) Here, during the April 15, 1996, closed proceeding, the court approved a form of hybrid representation for defendant in which he was both represented by counsel and permitted to act as cocounsel. Specifically, in granting defendant's request for cocounsel status, the trial court advised defendant that his role would be limited to filing motions and examining witnesses at trial about his janitorial business practices, and that he would retain in propria persona privileges in jail. Peters consented to defendant's cocounsel status and was appointed counsel of record to conduct the trial proceedings. Turning to the merits, there is nothing in the record that suggests defendant's hybrid representation extended to the November 13, 1996, competency hearing. The reporter's transcript of the competency hearing reflects that only Peters appeared as counsel of record on behalf of defendant. In addition, whereas the minute order for the proceedings held on November 13, 1996, does not indicate defendant's cocounsel status during the competency hearing, it does reflect that defendant and Peters appeared as cocounsel in the proceedings that followed this hearing, when criminal proceedings were reinstated. Further, defendant's conduct during the competency hearing confirms that he in fact did not participate as cocounsel. Peters made an opening statement, examined the two defense experts, cross-examined the prosecution's expert, and provided closing remarks. Defendant, on the other hand, did not speak or otherwise participate, with two exceptions. First, defendant acknowledged a greeting by the court when the hearing was called to order. Second, during counsel's examination of Dr. Fischer, defendant attempted to ask the witness a question. The court interrupted defendant, stating, We're in a proceeding where you. Counsel interrupted the court and said, I'll ask it. Defendant remained silent throughout the rest of the competency hearing. Importantly, defendant never expressly asserted his cocounsel status or participated in the hearing in accordance with the limited cocounsel responsibilities the court had conferred on him in the criminal proceedings. In sum, the record fails to support the factual predicate to defendant's claim: that the hybrid representation extended to the competency hearing. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by accepting Peters's waiver of defendant's statutory right to a jury trial at the competency hearing. ( People v. Masterson, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 974 [counsel may waive a jury trial in a competency proceeding, even over the defendant's objection].) [13]