Opinion ID: 1577924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Validity of the Defendant's Guilty Plea.

Text: A. Error preservation. The State contends the defendant may not challenge her guilty plea on appeal because she did not file a motion in arrest of judgment contesting the legality of her plea in the district court. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.24(3) (A defendant's failure to challenge the adequacy of a guilty plea proceeding by motion in arrest of judgment shall preclude the defendant's right to assert such challenge on appeal.); State v. Antenucci, 608 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Iowa 2000) (same). The defendant responds that this requirement does not apply here because the trial court did not adequately advise her of the necessity of filing a motion in arrest of judgment to preserve any error in the guilty plea proceeding. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)( d ) (The court shall inform the defendant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal.); State v. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d 44, 46 (Iowa 1994) (stating court's failure to comply with rule 2.8(2)( d ) operates to reinstate the defendant's right to appeal the legality of his plea). With the issues so framed, we examine the record to determine whether the district court complied with rule 2.8(2)( d ). The State maintains the district court substantially complied with the rule when it imparted the following information to Loye: At the outset if you decide within a two-week period from today that you don't want to be in drug courtwe will release you from drug court and you'll be transported back to district court and your case will be prosecuted through to completion which is the option we give everybody. The reason for that is because we really only want people here in drug court who want to be here. Is that what you want to do? The defendant responded, I want the help. I want a different life when it's over with. We do not think the court's comments are sufficient to discharge the court's duty under rule 2.8(2)( d ). Nor do we believe this colloquy manifests a knowing and intelligent waiver by Loye of her right to challenge her guilty plea within forty-five days as permitted by rule 2.24(3)( b ). See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.24(3)( b ) (allowing forty-five days to file motion in arrest of judgment). Although we employ a substantial compliance standard in determining whether a trial court has discharged its duty under rule 2.8(2)( d ), at a minimum the court must ensure the defendant understands the necessity of filing a motion to challenge a guilty plea and the consequences of a failure to do so. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d at 46; State v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1981). The record does not show such an understanding here. The comments of the district court upon which the State relies merely informed Loye that she had two weeks to withdraw from the drug court program. This knowledge is not equivalent to an understanding that she had forty-five days to challenge her guilty plea. Moreover, the court's comments in no way conveyed the fact that the defendant's failure to file a motion attacking the adequacy of her plea would forfeit her right to challenge the plea on appeal. [3] Under these circumstances, we conclude the defendant was not satisfactorily informed of the requirements of rule 2.24(3)( b ). Accordingly, her acquiescence to the judge's statement that she had two weeks to withdraw from the drug court program fails to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver of her rights under this rule. Cf. State v. Smith, 300 N.W.2d 90, 91 (Iowa 1981) (holding defendant's voluntary waiver of time for sentencing did not operate as a waiver of defendant's right to move in arrest of judgment because court had not informed defendant of this right as required by rule 2.8(2)( d )). Consequently, Loye's failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment does not prevent her from challenging her guilty plea on appeal. B. Scope of review. The defendant claims her guilty plea was not made knowingly and intelligently. Because this claim implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, our review is de novo. See Thomas, 659 N.W.2d at 220. C. Discussion. Although the defendant offers several reasons why her plea was not knowing and intelligent, we need only address her argument that the district court did not comply with rule 2.8(2)( b )(1)-(2) by adequately informing her of the nature of the charges to which she was pleading guilty and the potential penalties for these crimes. We start with the governing legal principles. The Due Process Clause requires that a guilty plea be voluntary. See State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Iowa 1980), overruled on other grounds by Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d at 804-05. To be truly voluntary, the plea must not only be free from compulsion, but must also be knowing and intelligent. Id. Consequently, a defendant must be aware not only of the constitutional protections that he gives up by pleading guilty, but he must also be conscious of the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the potential penalties. Id. Rule 2.8(2)( b ) codifies this due process mandate. See State v. Mensah, 424 N.W.2d 453, 455 (Iowa 1988); see also Kirchoff, 452 N.W.2d at 803-04. The rule provides in pertinent part: b. Pleas of guilty. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea was made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the following: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. (2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered. .... Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b )(1)-(2). As noted earlier, we apply a substantial compliance standard in assessing whether the trial court has adequately informed the defendant of the items listed in the rule. State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 578 (Iowa 2002). Substantial compliance requires at a minimum that the defendant be informed of these matters and understand them. State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 21 (Iowa 2001). In applying this standard to the requirement that the defendant know and understand the nature of the charges against him, we have held the court need not review and explain each element of the crime if it is apparent in the circumstances the defendant understood the nature of the charge. Smith, 300 N.W.2d at 92. Moreover, if the record shows the court gave misleading or inaccurate advice concerning the nature of the offense, the requisite understanding cannot be found. Id. A clearer understanding of these principles can be gained from a comparison of this court's decision in the Smith case with the court of appeals' decision in State v. Ludemann, 484 N.W.2d 611, 612 (Iowa Ct.App.1992). In Smith, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree theft based on an allegation that he uttered false checks on two banks and received cash or property having a value in excess of $500. 300 N.W.2d at 92. The defendant claimed on appeal the district court had failed to determine that he understood he was guilty only if he knew at the time he passed the checks that they would not be paid upon presentment to the banks. Id. During the plea proceeding, the defendant acknowledged that he was pleading guilty because he wrote checks on a bank account in which he had insufficient funds to cover the checks and on another bank where he did not even have an account. Id. The court then asked the defendant if he understood the State would have to prove he did not knowingly have an understanding with the bank so that the checks would be honored. Id. The defendant said he understood. Id. This court concluded on appeal that even though the trial court did not expressly identify the knowledge element the State had to prove, the defendant was adequately advised of the nature of the crime because he understood the charge would require proof that he knew the checks would not be paid when presented. Id. In contrast, in Ludemann, the court of appeals determined the trial court failed to substantially comply with the requirement that the defendant know and understand the nature of the charges against him. 484 N.W.2d at 613. In that case the defendant pled guilty to second-degree burglary. Id. at 612. In taking his plea, the trial court confirmed that the defendant understood second-degree burglary was a class C felony. Id. at 613. The court also asked the defendant's attorney whether he had explained the elements of the offense to his client and what the State would have to prove. Id. The defendant's attorney affirmed that he had done so and that the defendant understood. Id. The court of appeals held this colloquy was not sufficient: [The defendant's] decision to enter a plea did not relieve the trial court of its duty to inform him of the nature of the offense, including the element of specific intent. Additionally, a court may not abrogate or delegate to anyone, including the attorney for the accused, the duty to determine defendant's knowledge of the charge, appreciation of legal consequences of a guilty plea, whether it is voluntarily entered, or [the] existence of facts supporting it. Id. (citation omitted). In reviewing the transcript of Loye's plea hearing, we conclude the degree of inquiry made by the trial court here is not much more than that found deficient in Ludemann. With respect to the possession charge, the court told the defendant that she was charged with possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of section 124.401(5), a serious misdemeanor. The court asked Loye whether she possess[ed] marijuana ... at the time [she] was apprehended, but did not otherwise engage the defendant in any discussion of the elements of the charge. Loye was not informed of the penalty for this offense. The colloquy on the possession-of-burglar's-tools charges was similarly deficient: the court stated the charge, identified the code section violated, and indicated the crime was an aggravated misdemeanor. There was no further discussion with respect to the elements of this offense or what the State would have to prove, nor was the penalty that would result from conviction mentioned. With respect to the ongoing criminal conduct charge, Loye was informed of the code section violated, and that it was a class B felony, a 25-year offense. The same type of information was offered on the burglary charges: the court identified the code section violated and told Loye third-degree burglary was a class D felony. Although the court reviewed the punishment for the burglary charges, the information given the defendant was incomplete and inaccurate. The court told Loye the penalty for third-degree burglary was five years in the penitentiary or as much as a $7500 fine. (Emphasis added.) In fact, the possible penalty was five years imprisonment and a fine of at least $750 and not more than $7500. See Iowa Code § 902.9. The only discussion of the substance of the ongoing-criminal-conduct charge and the burglary charges was the following exchange: THE COURT: In that particular instance you're charged with the [ongoing-criminal-conduct] offense because you were involved with allegations that you intended to defraud or to injure another person and that you engaged in a series of acts for financial gain that resulted in a continuous course of conduct; in this particular case, burglary, where youI assume you tell me if I'm wrongthat you burglarized several properties in order to obtain property that you could either fence or sell in order to raise money to support your drug habit. Is that about right? THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, it was money. THE COURT: It was money that you wanted, right? THE DEFENDANT: It was money that I was stealing. Although this discussion tends to establish Loye's intent to steal money when she burglarized several properties, it does not shed any light on the defendant's understanding of what it means to burglarize property. The court's failure to specify the punishments for some of the offenses was somewhat rectified when the court announced its intention to impose consecutive sentences should the defendant fail the drug court program. The court stated: So you have seven times five is 35 plus 25 making 60 and two aggravated misdemeanors of two years each mean 64 years that you could be sent to the penthe penitentiary for. Even if we were to accept this mental math as a sufficient explanation of the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute[s] defining the offense[s], Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.8(2)( b )(2), it fails to encompass the possible fines that could be imposed as part of the sentence. The State attempts to excuse the court's deficient plea colloquy by relying on defense counsel's cryptic statement at the hearing that he had talked to Loye about punishments. The State concludes from this statement that [t]he terms of Loye's sentence were negotiated by the parties prior to her entry into drug court and Loye was adequately informed of the punishment for each of the offenses. But, as we noted earlier, the fact that a defendant pleads guilty does not relieve the court of its obligation to ensure the defendant's knowledge and understanding of the nature of the charges and the potential punishments. See Ludemann, 484 N.W.2d at 613. Nor is the court's obligation lessened because the defendant's attorney has discussed the same matters with the accused in preparation for the plea hearing. Id. The State also relies on the alleged existence of an underlying plea agreement to supply the deficiencies in the court's oral plea colloquy. The State argues in its brief: The fact that Loye entered the drug court program pursuant to a plea agreement is important because the extent of the trial judge's explanation and inquiry into defendant's understanding of the plea varies with the circumstances of each case, including the complexity of the charge and other factors involved in the particular case. (Citation omitted.) We initially observe there is no record of a plea agreement and the State's repeated references to one are without merit. See Oliver, 588 N.W.2d at 415. More importantly, a plea agreement, if one exists, would not save Loye's plea to the felony charges. We held in State v. Hook, 623 N.W.2d 865 (Iowa 2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Barnes, 652 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa 2002), that a written guilty plea to a felony could not serve as a substitute for a question the court is required to pose to the defendant directly. 623 N.W.2d at 870. The same reasoning applies to a plea bargain. A written plea agreement is not a substitute for the in-court colloquy required by rule 2.8(2)( b ) in felony cases. In conclusion, the trial court did not substantially comply with rule 2.8(2)( b )(1)-(2) because it did not confirm that the defendant knew and understood the nature of the charges to which she intended to plead guilty or the maximum possible punishments that might result from her plea. See Kress, 636 N.W.2d at 22 (finding lack of compliance with rule 2.8(2)( b ) where defendant was not informed of correct punishment for offense to which she pled guilty). Under these circumstances, Loye's plea was not made knowingly and intelligently and, therefore, was not voluntary. For this reason, the defendant's guilty plea violated the Due Process Clause and must be set aside.