Opinion ID: 2627231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Civil Contempt under Alpha

Text: CHPP has also asserted that this court should hold Kline in contempt because his behavior violated the mandate of Alpha by failing to ensure a specific written protective order was ... in place, which led to copying and dissemination without chain of custody or accountability, unrestricted access, and misuse. CHPP also asserts that Kline's handling of the records failed to comply with privacy protections mandated by United States and Kansas Constitutions. We interpret CHPP's prayer for relief in this action to refer to civil rather than criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by the court for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding. State v. Davis, 266 Kan. 638, Syl. ¶ 2, 972 P.2d 1099 (1999); Edmiston v. First Nat'l Bank of Holcomb, 242 Kan. 13, 15, 744 P.2d 829 (1987). A proceeding in civil contempt is remedial in nature, designed to advance the private right of a litigant won by court order. Alpha, 280 Kan. at 927, 128 P.3d 364; Davis, 266 Kan. 638, Syl. ¶ 2, 972 P.2d 1099; Campbell v. Campbell, 198 Kan. 192, 193, 422 P.2d 941 (1967). Any penalty inflicted for civil contempt is intended to be coercive, and relief can be achieved only by compliance with the order. 198 Kan. at 193-94, 422 P.2d 941; Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, Inc., 176 Kan. 101, 109, 269 P.2d 435 (1954); see also State v. Jenkins, 263 Kan. 351, 358, 950 P.2d 1338 (1997); Krogen v. Collins, 21 Kan.App.2d 723, 726, 907 P.2d 909 (1995). In other words, a sentence imposed for civil contempt must permit the contemnor to unlock the door of the ... jail and discharge herself by doing what she has previously failed to do. In re Conservatorship of McRoy, 19 Kan.App.2d 31, 34, 861 P.2d 1378 (1993). We have already stated above that Alpha did not deal with the handling of the records once they reached the Attorney General's office. It dealt with safeguards for patients' constitutional privacy interests and the balance between those interests and the pursuit of Kline's criminal investigations. It dealt with the steps Judge Anderson was required to follow to manage the production of the records in response to inquisition subpoenas; it did not deal with the use of the records by prosecutors after that point. It is true, as CHPP has emphasized, that our Alpha opinion also urged all sides to be sensitive to the confidential nature of the information in the records and the imperative of secrecy in investigations and to therefore limit their public statements. In its penultimate paragraph, we stated: We caution all parties to resist any impulse to further publicize their respective legal positions, which may imperil the privacy of the patients and the law enforcement objectives at the heart of this proceeding. 280 Kan. at 930, 128 P.3d 364. Despite Kline's repeated invocations of the importance of patient privacy, his conduct evidences little or no respect for it. His decision to appear on The O'Reilly Factor and his facilitation of McHugh's interview are merely the most obvious examples of his pattern of willful disregard for the spirit that animated this court's careful balance of patients' constitutional privacy rights and the compelling state interest in criminal investigation articulated in Alpha. And these and other instances of his conduct raise troubling questions about Kline's and any other involved lawyer's compliance with the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct  particularly KRPC 3.8, which specifically governs prosecutors and with which Kline expressed complete unfamiliarity at oral argument before this court. That much being said, we do not at this time deem it advisable to institute a proceeding against Kline for indirect civil contempt under K.S.A. 20-1204a. He has not persuaded us that such an action will never be appropriate, particularly if additional or amplifying information should come to light about his behavior since October 24, 2006, when the patient records came into his possession as Attorney General. Our reluctance to pursue an indirect civil contempt proceeding today is in part a reflection of our decision not to grant the primary relief sought on the merits, as well as a recognition that the letter of Alpha was directed at Judge Anderson rather than Kline. This reluctance should in no way be interpreted as approval of Kline's attitude or behavior to this point. Indeed, we note that, during Judge Anderson's testimony before Judge King, Kline's counsel inquired whether it would be fair to say that Kline has not been contemptuous of any of your orders. Judge Anderson's response was that he had not found Kline in contempt. This was artfully put. Judge Anderson did not accede to counsel's effort to obtain his endorsement of Kline's attitude and behavior. Neither do we.