Opinion ID: 200517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of Dudley's ADA Claim.

Text: 40 To recover under section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) in a retail sale case, a plaintiff must show that he comes within the protections of the ADA as a person with a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), and that the defendant's establishment is subject to the mandates of Title III as a place of public accommodation, id. § 12181(7). Above and beyond these two abecedarian points, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has a discriminatory policy or practice in effect; that he (the plaintiff) requested a reasonable modification in that policy or practice which, if granted, would have afforded him access to the desired goods; that the requested modification — or a modification like it — was necessary to afford that access; and that the defendant nonetheless refused to modify the policy or practice. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n. 38, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001); Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1027 (8th Cir.1999); Johnson v. Gambrinus Co./Spoetzl Brewery, 116 F.3d 1052, 1058-60 (5th Cir.1997). Upon such a six-part showing, the defendant must make the modification unless it proves either that doing so would alter the fundamental nature of its business, see PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 683 & n. 38, 121 S.Ct. 1879, or that the requested modification poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 648-49, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). 41 In the lower court, Hannaford contested Dudley's claim that he had a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The district court resolved this point in Dudley's favor. Dudley II, 190 F.Supp.2d at 74. Because Hannaford does not renew this challenge on appeal, we deem the argument waived. See United States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27, 30 n. 3 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990). Consequently, Dudley meets the first prong of the test. Dudley also meets the second, as Hannaford concedes that its Gardiner store is a place of public accommodation within the purview of Title III. 42 As to the other elements, it is incontrovertible that Hannaford had a hard-and-fast refusal to reconsider policy in place, that Dudley requested Hannaford to deviate from that policy, that such a deviation was necessary for Dudley to gain access to the desired goods, and that his request was denied. What remains are questions concerning the reasonableness of the requested modification. As to those questions, Hannaford makes four main points. Its primary argument is that the district court erred in interpreting section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) to prohibit the unbending implementation of its refusal to reconsider policy. The argument takes two forms. We consider each of them. 43 First, Hannaford posits that section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) only applies to individuals with known or obvious disabilities. It says that since Dudley's condition was not of this nature — his symptoms were ambiguous, and Hannaford's personnel were uncertain as to whether his behavior stemmed from a disability or from substance abuse — its adherence to the store's policy did not violate section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 44 Hannaford derives this argument from 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), which prohibits employers from failing to mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability. (Emphasis supplied.) Its reliance on that provision is mislaid. Section 12112(b)(5)(A) is a part of Title I of the ADA — and there is no principled basis for importing it into Title III. 45 While Title III imposes certain requirements on operators of public accommodations vis-à-vis their interactions with the citizenry at large, Title I places obligations on employers regarding their relations with employees and prospective employees. This distinction is significant. In an employment context, where relationships are personalized and employers typically have a basic familiarity with their employees, section 12112(b)(5)(A)'s limited applicability to known physical or mental disabilities makes sense; it takes into account the possibility that an employee or prospective employee may, for whatever reason, choose not to disclose a disability. He may, for example, fear that if he discloses it, he will be disadvantaged (the employer will, say, refrain from promoting or hiring him). When such a disability is concealed, it would be mindless to hold the employer liable for failing to accommodate the (unknown) disability. So viewed, under Title I obviousness is relevant only as a proxy for actual knowledge. See Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 934 (7th Cir.1995) (explaining that the obviousness of symptomatology makes it reasonable to infer that an employer actually knew of the disability). 46 In contrast, Title III offers no incentive for an individual to conceal his or her disability. The operative provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), requires a person with a disability to request a reasonable and necessary modification, thereby informing the operator of a public accommodation about the disability. It would be pointless to impose upon the plaintiff the burden to inform the public accommodation's operator of his disability but then exempt the operator, by judicial fiat, from accommodating disabilities that are not obvious. Congress did not place a limitation on the reach of Title III based on the obviousness of an individual's disability, and it would be a usurpation of congressional authority for us to do so here. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30, 118 S.Ct. 285, 139 L.Ed.2d 215 (1997) ([W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (In re 229 Main St. Ltd. P'ship), 262 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.2001) (similar). For these reasons, we hold that the obviousness vel non of an individual's disability has no relevance to the mandates of Title III. 47 Hannaford's next objection posits that Dudley's request was not reasonable (and, thus, not within the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)). Hannaford claims, variously, that the requested modification is unworkable and that its implementation would fundamentally alter the nature of its business. Joined by the amici, Hannaford envisions a parade of horribles. It tells us that prohibiting merchants from following a strict refusal to reconsider policy would force retailers to sell alcoholic beverages to inebriated individuals who claim to be disabled, thus jeopardizing their licensure and exposing them to both civil and criminal liability under Maine law. See, e.g., Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 28-A, §§ 705(2-A), 705(3-A), 801(2), 2506. Hannaford and the amici also note that drunk driving is a salient public health concern and worry that the district court's ruling may increase the incidence of such behavior. 48 These are valid concerns, and the ADA requires us to weigh them when determining what is reasonable under section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (Nothing in [Title III] shall require an entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods... of such an entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.). That is not unfamiliar ground: striking a reasonable balance between avoiding health and safety risks, on the one hand, and protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination, on the other hand, is an exercise that lies at the core of Title III determinations. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987); Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 48-49 (1st Cir.1998). Here, our inquiry must address whether Hannaford's unbending refusal to reconsider policy is sufficiently essential to its stated goals to justify its discriminatory effect. We conclude that the policy, as applied, is overinclusive, and that a more flexible policy can offer comparable protections while complying with both the letter and spirit of the ADA. 49 We start this phase of our analysis with a frank appraisal of the doomsday alarms sounded by Hannaford and the amici: those concerns are overstated. Neither the ADA nor the district court's ruling guarantees individuals with disabilities access to alcoholic beverages; thus, the fear that a claim of disability will become a free pass for intoxicated individuals to purchase liquor is not well-founded. 50 Under the district court's holding, a merchant needs to initiate a reconsideration only when a customer claiming to be disabled presents some evidence of that disability. Even then, the obligation to reconsider is not to be confused with an obligation to sell; the reconsideration may well produce a second refusal without in any way violating the ADA. Put bluntly, the district court's ruling does not obligate a merchant to sell when in doubt. For that reason, Hannaford's (and the amici's) prediction that the ruling will promote a host of social ills seems farfetched. Cf. W. Shakespeare, Macbeth, act I, sc. 3, l. 134 (1606) (warning that [p]resent fears are less than horrible imaginings). 51 To be sure, the district court's ruling involves other costs. The law should leave ample room for Hannaford and other similarly situated merchants to adopt prophylactic policies to ensure that intoxicated individuals will not be able freely to purchase alcoholic beverages. To this end, a bright-line rule, such as Hannaford's refusal to reconsider policy, offers certain administrative efficiencies. Moreover, it forecloses potentially uncomfortable conversations with combative customers and spares store managers from making difficult decisions. But even though an individualized inquiry will consume more resources and involve less logistical ease, such an inquiry is precisely what the ADA requires. See PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 690, 121 S.Ct. 1879 (noting that the ADA has a basic requirement that the need of a disabled person be evaluated on an individual basis); Theriault, 162 F.3d at 50 (approving the tailoring of special policies for disabled individuals as long as there is an individualized assessment of each person's disabilities); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(c). This makes perfect sense, as Congress, in enacting the ADA, explicitly warned that overprotective rules and policies erect discriminatory barriers to people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5). Consequently, when an individual claims to be disabled and presents some evidence supporting that claim, the proprietor of a place of public accommodation does not satisfy its obligations under Title III of the ADA by refusing to consider that proffer and responding that the clerk already has made her decision. We hold, therefore, that the ADA bars Hannaford's unrelenting refusal to reconsider policy. 52 Hannaford's next contention can be dispatched more easily. It says that, notwithstanding the district court's factual finding of an established, albeit unwritten, refusal to reconsider policy, the personnel at its Gardiner store did not follow that policy on the evening in question, but, rather, listened to Dudley's plaint, gave it due consideration, and only then denied him the right to purchase alcoholic beverages. 53 If we were writing on a pristine page, this interpretation of the events of February 27 might seem plausible — but the page is not pristine. The district court found as a fact that Cookson rejected Dudley's attempted purchase by informing him that once [the clerk] had refused to sell him alcohol, the store policy was not to reverse that decision under any circumstances. Dudley II, 190 F.Supp.2d at 72. The court characterized Fossett's intervention in similar terms, noting that Fossett explained to Dudley that he would not reverse the earlier position. Id. This meant, the court wrote, that Fossett would override a cashier's decision only when a customer had alerted him to an intoxication-mimicking disability before attempting to purchase alcohol. Id. at 73 (emphasis in the original). 54 That ends this aspect of the matter. When a district court chooses between two plausible but conflicting interpretations of the evidence, its choice cannot be clearly erroneous. 4 Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 367 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir.1990). 55 These factual findings also guide us through Hannaford's remaining two arguments. Its claim that Dudley failed to prove that Hannaford's breach of its duty of reconsideration proximately caused any harm to Dudley, Appellant's Br. at 39, rests on the surmise that if Hannaford's employees had given Dudley due reconsideration, they nonetheless would have thought him three sheets to the wind and refused the sale. This is an interesting but irrelevant hypothetical. Our focus is on the exclusionary effect of Hannaford's policy — its unrelenting refusal to reconsider, come what may — and the only issue before us is whether a reasonable modification was necessary to afford disabled persons (like Dudley) access to goods that are available to individuals without disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Dudley does not need to prove that a particular modification would have worked in all cases but only that such a modification was a necessary and reasonable means of providing disabled persons access to the goods in question. The district court found that he had carried that burden. Dudley II, 190 F.Supp.2d at 76. That finding is not clearly erroneous. Carr v. PMS Fishing Corp., 191 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1999); Sierra Fria, 127 F.3d at 181. 56 Finally, Hannaford suggests that if it had a general duty to reconsider, that duty was superseded by Dudley's aggressive behavior. Passing over the fact that Dudley's behavior probably is part and parcel of the symptomatology related to his disabling condition, the fallacy of this suggestion lies in its construction. In this situation, the ADA proscribes mechanical resort to an inflexible refusal to reconsider policy. Dudley's behavior subsequent to the store's decision not to sell is simply irrelevant to a determination of whether the refusal to reconsider policy is consistent with the ADA. 5 57 We have said enough on this score. All equitable remedies are, in some sense, discretionary. Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 321 & n. 6 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc). The modest relief granted here — prohibiting Hannaford from maintaining its refusal to reconsider policy at its Gardiner emporium — was not an abuse of discretion. Given the court's factual findings, Dudley was entitled to injunctive relief under Title III of the ADA. 58