Opinion ID: 889744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment for ARS

Text: ¶ 14 Generally, a shareholder may not bring a claim that belongs to their corporation. Gullett v. Van Dyke Construction Co., 2005 MT 105, ¶ 14, 327 Mont. 30, 111 P.3d 220; Stott v. Fox, 246 Mont. 301, 306, 805 P.2d 1305, 1308 (1990). ¶ 15 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to ARS. Weaver's complaint states he was representing Glacier Kitchens when he purchased the coffee urn from ARS. Weaver is bound by his pleadings. Farm Credit Bank, 266 Mont. at 264, 879 P.2d at 1161. Any claim against ARS for the defective coffee urn belongs to Glacier Kitchens, not to Weaver personally. As a shareholder, Weaver cannot bring the claim on behalf of Glacier Kitchens. Gullett, ¶ 14; Stott, 246 Mont. at 306, 805 P.2d at 1308. ¶ 16 Weaver was warned about this defect in his complaint. Lack of standing was one of ARS's affirmative defenses  Weaver lacks standing to bring any of the claims arising from the transactions giving rise to any of the claims alleged in the Complaint. Additionally, in response to Weaver's first motion for sanctions, ARS stated Weaver may believe that filing his claims in his individual capacity is proper. Whether this is correct as a matter of law is something he remains free to argue. Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide. Weaver had notice that he should at least consider amending his complaint to include Glacier Kitchens as a plaintiff. Even after receiving notice, Weaver did not attempt to amend his complaint. ¶ 17 Weaver's argument that the statute of limitations controls when he can amend is complaint is unavailing. The statute of limitations is a deadline by which an action must be commenced. If an action is not commenced before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the action is generally barred. Section 27-2-202, MCA (limitations period for an action based on contract). It is clear that Weaver commenced this action before the statute of limitations expired. However, once Weaver commenced the action, the District Court had the authority to set deadlines for amendments to the pleadings. M.R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1); Textana, Inc. v. Klabzuba Oil & Gas, 2009 MT 401, ¶ 80, 353 Mont. 442, 222 P.3d 580. According to the District Court's scheduling order, Weaver had nearly one year to amend his complaint. He did not do so. In fact, no motion to amend was ever filed by Weaver. ¶ 18 Finally, Weaver alleges for the first time on appeal that he has the right to bring this action because Glacier Kitchens is a dissolved/defunct corporation. We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Belanus, 2010 MT 204, ¶ 17, 357 Mont. 463, 240 P.3d 1021. However, we note that dissolution does not prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name. Section 35-1-935(2)(e), MCA. ¶ 19 We affirm the grant of summary judgment to ARS.