Opinion ID: 169751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A qualified individual with a disability

Text: A disability within the meaning of the ADA is, inter alia, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Individuals attempting to prove disability status under this test may not merely rely on evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment. Instead, the ADA requires those `claiming the Act's protection . . . to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience . . . is substantial.' Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002) (quoting Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999)). It is uncontested that Mr. Robertson has a hearing impairment. It is also uncontested that hearing is a major life activity. See Williams, 534 U.S. at 197, 122 S.Ct. 681 (noting that the term major life activities, as used in the ADA, refers to those activities that are of central importance to daily life and includes such basic abilities as walking, seeing, and hearing); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (The phrase major life activities means functions such as . . . hearing. . . .). Thus, whether Mr. Robertson is disabled depends only on whether his impairment substantially limits his ability to hear. Mr. Robertson testified that his inability to hear does not physically bother him and that he does not consider it either a physical or a mental impairmenthe considers it a communication problem. Based on this testimony, the District Court held: by Plaintiff's own admission, Plaintiff's hearing impairment is not `substantial' within the meaning of the ADA. But the fact that Mr. Robertson is not bothered by his impairment or that he does not consider himself to be substantially limited by it does not enter into the calculus. See Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir.2002) (The focus is not on whether the individual has the courage to participate in the major life activity despite her impairment, but, rather, on whether she faces significant obstacles when she does so.). Whether a person is substantially limit[ed] must be determined by whether the individual is [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform,  or is [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. Doebele v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(i)) (emphasis added). Even taking into account the mitigating effects of the cochlear implant on his inability to hear, see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999) (requiring court to take into account measures taken to mitigate an impairment when determining whether person is substantially limited in major life activity), there is more than sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Robertson is substantially limited in his ability to hear as compared to the average person: Mr. Robertson can only hear human voices from those facing him and standing within two-to-three feet; he cannot hear sounds transmitted through electronic devices, such as a radio or television; and he cannot hear sounds originating from beyond a few feet. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is not warranted. Furthermore, there is also sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Mr. Robertson, as a detainee at the detention facility, was qualified to receive the benefits and services of the public entity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (defining a qualified individual with a disability as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity); Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 210-12, 118 S.Ct. 1952 (holding disabled prisoners are qualified to receive the benefits and services of state prisons if they meet eligibility requirements, despite the fact that prisoners may not always participate voluntarily in services or programs). The defendants do not contend that an inmate must meet particular eligibility requirements in order to use the phone or to participate in his own probable cause hearing. Indeed, the services appear to be available to all inmates. Thus, the District Court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Mr. Robertson was not a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA.