Opinion ID: 2995671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Signage and Painting Restrictions

Text: Plaintiffs next challenge Section 125.16, which regulates the outward appearance of a sexually-oriented business. Plaintiffs contend that the Signage Restrictions in Sections 125.16(D)(1) & (2) and the Painting Restrictions in Section 125.16(E) violate the First Amendment./10 Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that singling out sexually-oriented businesses for such restrictions violates the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs’ equal protection argument fails because the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the ability of municipalities to regulate sexually- oriented businesses in order to minimize the secondary effects associated with such businesses. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986). With respect to plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge, because the Ordinance does not ban all advertising by sexually-oriented businesses, Section 125.16 is properly analyzed as a time, place, or manner restriction. Compare 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 134 L. Ed. 2d 711 (1996) (holding complete ban on commercial speech analyzed under stricter scrutiny rather than as a time, place, or manner restriction), with Excalibur Group, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 116 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that restrictions on commercial speech analyzed as time, place, or manner restrictions). Proper time, place, or manner regulations must be (1) justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, (2) narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and (3) leave open alternative channels for communication. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. A regulation is content-neutral if it is justified without reference to the content of regulated speech. Id. (citation omitted). Such a regulation is neutral even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not [on] others. Id. The preamble to the Ordinance, and the studies relied on by the Council indicate that Mishawaka enacted the Signage and Painting Restrictions in order to minimize the adverse impact of sexually-oriented businesses on the surrounding area./11 Mishawaka’s purpose of combating secondary effects that are unrelated to the content of the restricted speech renders Section 125.16 a content-neutral ordinance. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-48; Excalibur, 116 F.3d at 1220. We next consider whether the Signage Restrictions in Sections 125.16(D)(1) & (2) and the Painting Restrictions in Section 125.16(E), are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. There is no question that minimizing the secondary effects of sexually-oriented businesses serves a significant governmental interest. See, e.g., Renton, 475 U.S. at 50. The issue is therefore narrowed to whether the Signage Restrictions in Sections 125.16(D)(1) & (2) and Painting Restrictions in Section 125.16(E) are themselves narrowly tailored to serve Mishawaka’s significant interests. The Signage Restrictions in Sections 125.16(D)(1) & (2) and the Painting Restrictions in Section 125.16(E) arenarrowly tailored if they advance a substantial interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the restrictions, and the restrictions do not burden substantially more speech than is necessary for such advancement. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. Narrow tailoring, therefore, does not require the restrictions to be the least restrictive means of serving Mishawaka’s content- neutral interests, and we will not strike down the restrictions solely because we can envision a less restrictive or more effective means of furthering Mishawaka’s interests. See id. at 799-800. Mishawaka justifies the Signage and Painting Restrictions as narrowly tailored to combat urban blight and to prevent a decline in the value of surrounding properties. Mishawaka asserts that the restrictions are necessary to minimize the visual impact of the businesses on the neighborhood by making the businesses blend into their surroundings. In SDJ, Inc. v. City of Houston, 837 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth Circuit upheld a font and color restriction similar to Section 125.16(D)(2) and a Painting Restriction similar to Section 125.16(E)./12 Such restrictions were appropriate in order to prevent a decline in the values of surrounding properties, and thus prevent deterioration of neighborhoods. SDJ, 636