Opinion ID: 2387538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Impeachment of Biased Witness

Text: Jones next claims that the trial court erred in not allowing him to impeach state witness Cynthia Polk with evidence that the prosecution had filed drug charges against her, and that they were pending. According to Jones, this could have shown that she was biased. Polk was Jones's ex-wife, whom he stayed with the night of the murder. She testified on direct examination by the defense after being recalled that Jones told her Haire had shot someone and that Jones seemed scared when he came over. She further stated that Jones had used one of her hair pieces and a hat the following day when they went out to buy marijuana. The State elicited testimony during its cross-examination that Jones was scared but not crying. Polk further testified that she concluded he was not remorseful because he was not crying. There was no disagreement between the parties that there were pending charges against Polk set for trial a few weeks later. Arkansas Rule of Evidence 607 provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him. And Arkansas Rule of Evidence 611 limits cross-examination to the subject matter of the direct examination and to matters of credibility. This court has stressed the importance of allowing wide latitude with respect to the admission of evidence relevant to the bias of the witness. See Woodruff v. State, 313 Ark. 585, 856 S.W.2d 299 (1993); Wilson v. State, 289 Ark. 141, 712 S.W.2d 654 (1986). By the same token, a trial court is given wide discretion in evidentiary rulings. See Esry v. Carden, 328 Ark. 153, 942 S.W.2d 846 (1997); Willett v. State, 322 Ark. 613, 911 S.W.2d 937 (1995). Jones argues that the trial court's ruling violated his state and federal constitutional rights to confront his accusers. See Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987). We agree that disallowing the impeaching evidence was an abuse of discretion by the trial court. However, the State counters that even if this was error, there is still overwhelming evidence of Jones's guilt and that this issue should be decided under a harmless-error analysis. We agree. Although some constitutional rights are so fundamental that their violation can never be deemed harmless error, see Allen v. State, 310 Ark. 384, 838 S.W.2d 346 (1992), others are subject to the harmless-error analysis. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). To conclude that a constitutional error is harmless and does not mandate a reversal, this court must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Schalski v. State, 322 Ark. 63, 907 S.W.2d 693 (1995); Allen v. State, supra ; Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992). In Winfrey v. State, supra , we held that the erroneous denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness is subject to a Chapman harmless-error review. In applying the Chapman analysis, we excise the unimpeached testimony of Cynthia Polk and determine whether the remaining evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict. See Chapman v. California, supra . The salient points of Polk's testimony were:  Haire and Jones came to her home one night in February 1996 and Jones spent the night with her.  Jones told her Haire had shot someone.  Jones was upset but not remorseful because he was not crying after the homicide.  The next morning Jones put on a wig and hat when he and Polk went out to get marijuana.  Polk told Jones to turn himself in after seeing a police report on the murder, and she contacted the Little Rock Police Department about Jones. It is the testimony about Jones's lack of emotion over the homicide that he argues is the most damaging aspect of Polk's testimony. We first note that some points made by Polk were actually helpful to Jones, the primary one being that Haire was the trigger man. There is, too, the fact that other points made by Polk in her testimony were also testified to by police detective Keith Nicholas and by Jones himself. Thus, the testimony was cumulative to the statements by Polk. Finally, Polk's testimony about Jones being upset after the killing was first elicited by defense counsel when he recalled Polk as a witness for the defense. On cross-examination, the prosecution extracted from Polk that Jones was scared but not crying or remorseful. In short, it was the defense that first delved into the area of Jones's demeanor and, thus, opened the subject for cross-examination. But even assuming that the error in disallowing Polk's impeachment was not cured, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue boils down to whether Polk's assessment that Jones was not remorseful because he was not crying was so pivotal that it contributed to the jury's verdict. We are hard pressed to conclude that this was the case. Accordingly, we hold that though the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing impeachment, the error was harmless and did not contribute to the verdict in light of the other evidence.