Opinion ID: 2368225
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Legality of search of automobile pursuant to search warrant

Text: The State accurately observes that the police could have conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle immediately by the side of the road on probable cause that it contained fruits of the crime of burglary, e. g. State v. Barclay, Me., 398 A.2d 794, 798 (1979). Also, the search without a warrant could have been done shortly after the vehicle had been towed to Officer Taylor's back field. If the search is promptly carried out after removal of the vehicle from the public highway to a more convenient location, the probable cause factor and exigent circumstances existing at the original point of seizure on the highway remain in force and a warrantless search at the removal area is constitutionally permissible. State v. Morton, Me., 397 A.2d 171, 176 (1979); State v. Cress, Me., 344 A.2d 57 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). As stated previously the search of the car at the county jail yard did not take place immediately upon its removal; instead, the police secured a warrant before they searched the impounded vehicle two days after it had been removed to the yard. The defendant contends that the officers' procurement of the search warrant on the day following the removal of the automobile and the further delay of another day before its execution prolonged the warrantless detention of the vehicle unreasonably and fatally tainted the actual search, even though conducted under a search warrant. We disagree. In Chambers v. Maroney, supra, 399 U.S., at 50, 90 S.Ct., at 1981, the Court said that, [f]or constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. . . . there is little to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained. (Emphasis supplied). Where a search of the vehicle without a warrant could have been conducted promptly after its seizure without invasion of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, a search under warrant made within three days of the warrantless impoundment of the automobile was not unreasonable. Under Rule 41(d), M.R.Crim.P., search warrants may be executed and returned within ten days after the date of issue. The instant case did not present a situation where the issuance of the warrant would necessarily be based on stale information. At any rate, it is not incumbent upon law enforcement authorities to obtain a search warrant as soon as probable cause arises. The fact that the officers might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate its constitutional availability under the circumstances of this case; absent a prompt warrantless search and there being no reasonable likelihood that the impounded vehicle could be moved away or meddled with by the defendant or others, the officers' procurement of a search warrant under such circumstances showed proper official sensitivity to constitutional Fourth Amendment rights. See State v. Dunlap, Me., 395 A.2d 821, 824 (1978); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974). The use of the search warrant in this case was within the constitutional limitation of reasonableness on the part of the magistrate issuing it, as well as by the officers executing it. See Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Me. 56, 71 A. 70, 22 L.R.A., N.S., 819 (1908).