Opinion ID: 852830
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Specific Provisions of the Indiana Antitrust Act

Text: Natare claims a violation of Section 3, and seeks treble damages for its lost time in preparing a useless bid and attorney fees, under Section 7 of the Indiana Antitrust Act. [7] That section, tracking section 15 of the Clayton Act, provides treble damages and attorneys fees for those injured in their business or property by a violation of the Indiana Antitrust Act. This section purports to give a right to treble damages to any person injured by any person doing any thing forbidden or declared to be unlawful by any of the first three sections of the Indiana Antitrust Act. [8] Consistent with the usual legislative silence on the application of criminal laws to governmental entities, the Indiana Antitrust Act neither defines person to include a governmental entity nor specifically excludes the possibility of a crime by such an entity. The School Corporation argues that it is not a person as that term is defined in the antitrust act. Indiana Code section 24-1-2-10 provides definitions similar to those found in the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (2000): The words person or persons whenever used in this chapter shall be deemed to include corporations, associations, limited liability companies, joint stock companies, partnerships, limited or otherwise, existing under or authorized by the laws of the state of Indiana, or of the United States, or of any state, territory, or district of the United States, or of any foreign country. I.C. § 24-1-2-10. Natare argues that the School Corporation can be liable for treble damages and attorney fees because person is defined by the statute to include corporations, and school corporations are not explicitly exempt from this definition. School corporations, like general business corporations, are creatures of statute. In the case of school corporations, they are created pursuant to Indiana Code section 20-4-1. Reflecting that statute, the Brownsburg School Corporation uses the term corporation as a part of its legal name. The Court of Appeals found this persuasive and agreed with Natare that a school corporation is a person subject to the treble damages remedy provided by the antitrust act. We disagree for reasons grounded in the text of the Antitrust Act as well as the general assumption that criminal laws are not applicable to governmental entities. The School Corporation first argues that the term corporation is ambiguous and that the General Assembly did not intend the term to include governmental entities. As originally enacted in 1907, the antitrust law's definition of person included, corporations, associations, companies and partnerships. The School Corporation points out that the other entities included in this definition as persons are all private business entities, and argues that this implies all persons are from the private sector. Moreover, in contrast to the silence of the Antitrust Act on this point, the School Corporation offers a number of statutes where the General Assembly has treated political subdivisions as distinct from corporations and subjected public bodies to the same treatment as private corporations by express language. [9] We do not believe the definition of person is the central issue in determining whether the School Corporation, or any arm of government, is susceptible to a claim for treble damages. Although we recognize the maxims of statutory construction involved here, we find them at best suggestions, and not directives. It would be anomalous indeed if a private business overcharged as a result of price fixing can recover treble damages but a school corporation cannot. We agree that municipal corporations are persons as that term is used in the Indiana Antitrust Act. They therefore can sue under Section 7 if injured in their business or property by an antitrust violation. But it does not follow that they are also potential treble damage defendants. In order to be sued under Section 7, a person must have done something forbidden by the Indiana antitrust law. The substantive prohibitions of the antitrust laws are criminal in nature. Accordingly, we think the legislation did not contemplate the possibility of a governmental entity engaging in an action forbidden by the statute. Rather, as Section 4 reflects, the statute views governmental entities as victims, not perpetrators, and explicitly relieves them of liability from a contract that was the result of collusive bidding. Natare also asserts that when the General Assembly first enacted the statute that created school corporations, I.C. § 20-4-1-26.1 (formerly I.C. § 20-4-1-26), it expressly included a provision that school corporations could sue and be sued. We think this is of no relevance to the issue before us. The power to sue and be sued simply confers general legal capacity on the entity. It says nothing about what kinds of suits the entity may bring or what liabilities it may incur. Natare also points out that the Antitrust Act was amended by the General Assembly in 1986 and in 1993 and did not exempt municipal corporations form the act. [10] From this, Natare reasons that the General Assembly legislatively acquiesced in the municipal corporation's liability to suit. These amendments merely provided updated and uniform terms. They do not suggest that the General Assembly revisited the liability of municipal or local government entities.