Opinion ID: 792365
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Essential Elements

Text: 28 In order to prove a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (the Hobbes Act), the Government must show that two or more persons entered into an agreement to commit the substantive offense as charged. See. e.g., United States v. Clemente, 22 F.3d 477, 480 (2d Cir.1994) (holding that conspiracy under the Hobbes Act requires proof of an agreement but that no overt act need be shown). In order to convict a given defendant of conspiracy, the [G]overnment must prove that he knew of the conspiracy and joined it with the intent to commit the offenses that were its objectives, that is, with the affirmative intent to make the conspiracy succeed. United States v. Ceballos, 340 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir.2003) (citations omitted). 29 The agreement that is the gist of conspiracy may be tacit rather than explicit.... Ceballos, 340 F.3d at 124. However, knowledge of the existence and goals of a conspiracy does not of itself make one a coconspirator. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 711, 63 S.Ct. 1265, 87 L.Ed. 1674 (1943) (holding that the essence of a conspiracy is not mere knowledge of another's illegal purpose, but the intent to further, promote[,] and cooperate in it). In other words, the defendant's `attitude towards the forbidden undertaking must be more positive,' United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 588 (2d Cir.1963) (quoting United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1940), aff'd 311 U.S. 205, 61 S.Ct. 204, 85 L.Ed. 128 (1940)); he must somehow have made an affirmative attempt to further its purposes, id.; accord Ceballos, 340 F.3d at 124. 30 Here, the object of the alleged conspiracy was to commit extortion, which, in the context of federal crimes, in relevant part, means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (emphasis added). Extortion is frequently exemplified by revenue-producing measures ... utilized by organized crime to generate income — measures such as shakedown rackets and loan-sharking. United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 295, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). 7 Of course, another familiar form of extortion is blackmail — where, for example, the extortioner obtains money from the victim by threatening to expose private or embarrassing conduct. See id. at 295-96, 89 S.Ct. 534 (describing how the extortioner threatened to expose the alleged homosexuality of the victims). 31 Choice on the part of the victim is a common theme in all extortion cases. As noted above, the Hobbs Act definition of coercion speaks of obtaining property from another `with his consent.' United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 394 (2d Cir.1999). Indeed, [t]he legislative history of the Act makes clear that its proponents understood extortion to encompass situations in which a victim is given the option of relinquishing some property immediately or risking unlawful violence resulting in other losses, and he simply chooses what he perceives to be the lesser harm. Id. at 395 (emphasis added) (citing 91 Cong. Rec. 11,904, 11,907 (discussing decision of business owner to pay tribute to extortionists rather than risk the physical destruction of his trucks: The man pays the money to save himself and his property.)). In order to foreclose any argument by an extortionist that the relinquishment of property in such circumstances was [truly] voluntary, [however,] the Hobbs Act definition of extortion simply prohibits the extortionist from forcing the victim to make such a choice. Id. 32 At bottom, undeniably, the victim of an extortion acts from fear, whether of violence or exposure. But both the language of the statute and the relevant precedents make clear that he or she always retains some degree of choice in whether to comply with the extortionate threat, however much of a Hobson's choice that may be. Indeed, this element of consent is the razor's edge that distinguishes extortion from robbery, which, in contrast, is defined in pertinent part as 33 the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his company at the time of the taking or obtaining. 34 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (emphasis added). 35 Among the essential elements of the federal crime of extortion, then, are (i) the defendant's use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, and (ii) the victim's consent — however forced — to the transfer of the property. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). And concordantly, essential to a determination of conspiracy to commit extortion are (i) an agreement to use actual or threatened force to obtain property with the consent of the victim and (ii) actions taken in affirmative furtherance of that agreement. See Cianchetti, 315 F.2d at 588 (reversing conviction for conspiracy to violate drug law because there was no fixed agreement to cooperate and defendant did noting to further the success of the enterprise). 36 Here, the Government's theory is that Appellants conspired to extort — and in fact committed extortion, and not robbery — when they informed Hua by telephone that [Xiao] was coming to the gambling parlor to collect $10,000 from him, instructing him to leave the money for Xiao's pick-up in a red envelope, and, later, when they summoned Hua outside the parlor and attempted to collect the money that had been demanded in the extortionate telephone call. The Government contends that [t]his call clearly represented a request, albeit under duress, for the money, rather than a forcible taking. After all, the Government observes, robbers typically do not telephone in their requests to victims ahead of time. In making this distinction between robbery and extortion, however, the Government fails to identify any element of duress, either express or implied, in the telephone call, thus calling into question whether the Government has proved each and every element of the extortion-related crimes charged in the Indictment, as required by fundamental precepts of our law. 8