Opinion ID: 197293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against the Agents

Text: 6 Appellants do not dispute the settled proposition that their claims against Moran, Hernandez, and two other unknown DEA agents are subject to Puerto Rico's one-year statute of limitations governing, inter alia, personal injury torts. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5298(2) (1991); cf. Ramirez Morales v. Rosa Viera, 815 F.2d 2, 4 (1st Cir.1987). Rather, they argue that the period, which would have barred their suit from being brought after April 21, 1994, was tolled under the Puerto Rico tolling statute's extrajudicial claim provision. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5303 (1991). 3 Specifically, they argue that under the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's interpretation of the extrajudicial claim provision, their claim was tolled from the time of their August 18, 1993 letter to the DEA (stating appellants' intent to submit a claim against the United States government and requesting a reprimand of the officers) to at least January 4, 1994, the date of the government's letter purportedly denying the claim, at which point, under Puerto Rico law, the one-year period would have been restarted at zero and would have begun to run anew. See Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 45 (1st Cir.1990). 7 The problem with appellants' argument is that their August 18 letter--like the other letters they sent to the DEA--did not identify any legal claim against the individual officers, and therefore cannot be deemed to have tolled the statute of limitations as to the suit against the officers. Puerto Rico Supreme Court decisions applying the tolling provision of section 5303 indicate that one of the necessary requirements of an extrajudicial claim for the purposes of tolling is the requirement of identity. See Galib-Frangie v. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 1995 WL 905884 (P.R.1995); see also Kery v. American Airlines, Inc., 931 F.Supp. 947, 951-53 (D.P.R.1995) (summarizing Puerto Rico Supreme Court interpretation of section 5303). The identity requirement means that the same right and the same relief affected by the statute of limitations must appear in the extrajudicial claim. See Nazario, 895 F.2d at 44; Kery, 931 F.Supp. at 954. To satisfy this requirement, the extrajudicial claim must be made against the same debtor or passive subject of the right in question, and not against a third party. Nazario, 895 F.2d at 44 (citing Velilla v. Pueblo Supermarkets, Inc., 111 P.R.R. 732, 734-35 (P.R.1981)). 8 Appellants' August 18 letter, addressed to the associate chief counsel of the DEA, states an intent to make a claim against the United States government and also requests an official reprimand of the officers involved. It does not assert any legal claims directly against the officers. The letter, therefore, fails to satisfy the requirement of identity for the purposes of the extrajudicial claim doctrine. Appellants, citing the Galib-Frangie decision, argue that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has recently ruled that the extrajudicial claim doctrine should be applied liberally. We are not persuaded by this argument, because nowhere in the Galib-Frangie opinion, or, to our knowledge, in any other recent decision of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, is there any support for a departure from the well-established rule that an extrajudicial claim must request the same type of relief against the same defendants. 4 In fact, in Galib-Frangie, the case relied on by the appellants, the court iterated that the identity requirement is a necessary condition of an extrajudicial claim under section 5303. Galib-Frangie, 1995 WL 905884. Moreover, the learned commentary on this civil code provision suggests that an extrajudicial claim must serve as a notice or demand to the passive subject of said right, here the DEA agents. See Nazario, 895 F.2d at 44 (quoting Spanish civil code commentator Diez Picazo). 5 The DEA agents plainly could not be apprised of a damages suit against them as individuals by a letter stating an intention to bring a claim against the government. 9 In the alternative, appellants argue that summary judgment was improper because a question of material fact exists as to whether the individual DEA agents received copies of, or were otherwise informed of, the letters. This argument fails because, even assuming they received copies of the letters, the content of the letters would not put them on notice as to the possibility of being sued individually for damages. 10 These considerations lead us to conclude that the district court properly applied Puerto Rico law in finding the suit against the DEA agents to be time-barred.