Opinion ID: 1829408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the defendant was denied a right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury.

Text: ¶ 23. Under settled law in Mississippi, a juror who may be removed on challenge for cause is one against whom a cause for challenge exists that would likely effect (sic) his competency or his impartiality at trial. Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 653 (Miss.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1133, 119 S.Ct. 1097, 143 L.Ed.2d 34 (1999) (quoting Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 457 (Miss.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985), reh'g denied, 470 U.S. 1089, 105 S.Ct. 1858, 85 L.Ed.2d 154 (1985)); Armstrong v. State, 214 So.2d 589, 593 (Miss.1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965, 89 S.Ct. 2109, 23 L.Ed.2d 750 (1969) (Those [jurors] who say that they could follow the evidence and the instructions of the court should be retained, and those who cannot follow the instructions of the court should be released). Finding a prospective juror competent to sit and impartially hear a criminal matter is a judicial question reserved for the trial judge, and will not be disturbed unless clearly wrong. Dennis v. State, 555 So.2d 679, 682 (Miss.1989); Walls v. State, 371 So.2d 411, 413 (Miss. 1979). ¶ 24. In his appeal, the defendant offers nothing more than a conclusive assertion that the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause as to juror number 11, based on her disclosure that she casually knew the victim in this case from having seen him in the community. This is not enough to place the trial court in error. ¶ 25. A tangential relationship with the victim in a criminal case, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to exclude a potential juror for cause. See Bell v. State, 725 So.2d 836, 846 (Miss.1998) (Mere acquaintance or even family relationships with parties or those related to parties is not sufficient to require that a juror be excused for cause). Moreover, the record reveals that, following the juror's disclosure, the trial court conducted a followup inquiry. The juror affirmatively indicated this relationship would not prevent her from being fair and impartial, nor would it affect her ability to render judgment based solely on the evidence presented. The trial court's decision not to grant the defendant's causal challenge was a discretionary finding, which the defendant has failed to show was wrongly decided. ¶ 26. Furthermore, the defense accepted juror number 11 with four peremptory challenges remaining. A party who chooses not to challenge a juror peremptorily when he has unused challenges may not thereafter seek to put the trial court in error because the court declined to permit the juror to be challenged for cause. Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1244 (Miss. 1995) (citing Mettetal v. State, 602 So.2d 864 (Miss.1992)); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114 (Miss.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1231, 112 S.Ct. 3060, 120 L.Ed.2d 924 (1992). To hold otherwise would allow the defendant to invite error and later take advantage of it on appeal. [6] The appellant's argument that the trial court erred by refusing to remove juror number 11 for cause is without merit.
¶ 27. Archer's argument that juror 21 should have been removed on the court's own motion charges essentially that the juror's relationship with the victim and her circumstance as a prior victim herself disqualified her as a competent juror in this case. Archer submits that, regardless of his counsel's failure either to challenge the juror for cause or to peremptorily strike her from the venire panel, the trial court nevertheless was obligated to exclude this juror based on her disclosures. ¶ 28. Again, Archer provides this Court nothing other than a blanket assertion that the trial court erred. Lack of reasoning notwithstanding, Archer's contention is rejected on both procedural and substantive grounds. Procedurally, a party's failure to object to a juror's competency to sit before the jury was empaneled constitutes, based on unequivocal principles, a procedural bar. See Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554, 557 (Miss.1990) ([A] party who fails to object to the jury's composition before it is empaneled waives any right to complain thereafter). In limited circumstances, this Court will set aside the procedural bar and reverse when it is clear that a juror disqualified under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-67 was not removed before the jury retired to consider its verdict. Caldwell v. State, 381 So.2d 591, 594 (Miss.1980). Essentially, this requires a showing that the juror in question has been convicted of an infamous crime or has withheld information or misrepresented material facts that would have provided a legitimate basis for challenge. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-67 (Rev.2002); Myers v. State, 565 So.2d at 558; see also Odom v. State, 355 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Miss.1978). ¶ 29. Archer has failed to show either. There is nothing in the record to indicate that juror 21 had been convicted of an infamous crime at the time she was empaneled to render judgment in this case. Nor is there any indication that juror 21 withheld or misrepresented any information or material facts that otherwise would have made her incompetent to sit as a fair and impartial juror throughout, or that disadvantaged the defense in its decision whether to challenge her for cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge. [7] ¶ 30. Substantively, under Mississippi law, any person not disqualified under Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-1, who will make oath that he or she is impartial, is competent to sit as a juror in a criminal case. Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-79 (Rev.2002). The trial judge whose duty is to see that a competent, fair, and impartial jury is empaneled, is empowered with broad discretion to determine whether a prospective juror can be fair and impartial  notwithstanding the juror's admission under oath that he or she will be. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-79 (Rev.2002); Burt v. State, 493 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Miss.1986). This Court recognizes that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the jury as selected was fair and impartial, and therefore yields to a trial court's discretionary finding that a competent jury, under its oath to be fair and impartial, was empaneled to render judgment, and will not reverse absent clear abuse of that discretion. Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473, 498 (Miss.2002); Bell v. State, 725 So.2d at 846. ¶ 31. The record shows juror 21 was forthright in each of her responses to questions posed during voir dire. The juror affirmatively indicated that neither her relationship with the victim in this case, nor her prior circumstance as a robbery victim, would prevent her from being fair and impartial, nor would it affect her ability to render judgment based solely on the evidence presented. Archer has failed to show why the trial court's belief in the juror's oath to remain fair and impartial throughout was error. Archer's claim that the trial court erred by not sua sponte removing juror number 21 is without merit.