Opinion ID: 2115510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Erroneous instruction regarding right-of-way.

Text: Two conflicting versions of the accident emerged from the testimony: (1) Plaintiff crossed the street on a Walk light at a normal pace and defendant's automobile struck her after she had proceeded three or four steps off the curb and in the marked crosswalk; (2) plaintiff hurried across the street on a Don't Walk light to catch a bus on the southeast corner of the intersection and did so after defendant had started his turn west on an amber light; plaintiff struck defendant's automobile on its right side after jumping a little snowbank at the north edge of the street and proceeding a pace or two on the crosswalk. The case was submitted to a jury on a special verdict and no question is raised here on the jury's finding of negligence as to lookout on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant. As to negligence on failing to yield the right-of-way, the trial court asked in its special verdict as to the negligence of each in this regard and gave the following instruction: Questions Nos. 1 (a) and 3 (a) inquire with respect to whether the defendant, Albert Wendinger, or the plaintiff, Norma Schoenauer, was negligent with respect to right-of-way. Under the law, both parties cannot have the right-of-way. Either the plaintiff or the defendant had the right-of-way. It is for you to determine under the evidence of this case and by applying these instructions. You are instructed that the Wisconsin Statutes define right-of-way as 'the privilege of the immediate use of the roadway.' The statutes further provide that `a pedestrian facing a walk signal may proceed across the roadway in the direction of the signal and shall be given the right-of-way by the operators of all vehicles.' However, the statutes further provide that no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is difficult for the operator of the vehicle to yield. Thus, a pedestrian does not have the right-of-way if he suddenly steps from the curb into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is difficult for the driver to yield. You must determine whether Norma Schoenauer was crossing the highway on a `walk' or a `don't walk' signal. If you find that she was crossing the highway on a `don't walk' signal, then Albert Wendinger did not have a duty to yield the right-of-way, and Norma Schoenauer had the duty to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle of Albert Wendinger. If you find that Norma Schoenauer was crossing the highway on a `walk' signal, then you must also determine whether she did or did not leave the curb and ran into the path of the approaching automobile driven by Albert Wendinger when it was so close that it was difficult for the operator to yield the right-of-way. If you find that the pedestrian, Norma Schoenauer, did so walk, then the driver of the automobile, Albert Wendinger, did not have a duty to yield the right-of-way; but if you find that the pedestrian did not so walk, then it became the duty of the driver of the automobile, Albert Wendinger, to yield the right-of-way to Norma Schoenauer. This instruction was objected to by the plaintiff and she repeated her objection in her motion for a new trial and has done so again on this appeal. Appellant urges this instruction was prejudicial error because (1) the court improperly combined sec. 346.23 (1), Stats., dealing with controlled intersections, and sec. 346.24 (2), dealing with uncontrolled intersections; (2) the instruction implied a shifting of right-of-way; (3) the instruction confused right-of-way with lookout; and (4) the instruction generally confused the jury as to the law. The principal error in the instruction is the statement by the trial court that the pedestrian lost her right-of-way (and the defendant therefore had no duty to yield) if the jury believed that even though she faced a Walk light she suddenly left the curb and either walked or ran into the path of the vehicle which was so close that it was difficult for the operator to yield. This conduct by the plaintiff, if the jury believed the evidence established this, would be negligent conduct on her part, but it would not dissipate her right-of-way. [9] In discussing the instruction, the trial court stated in effect that since secs. 346.23 to 346.30, Stats., were headed Respective Rights and Duties of Drivers and Pedestrians, sub. (2) of sec. 346.24 was equally applicable to sec. 346.23, and that the caption on sec. 346.24, Crossing at uncontrolled intersection or crosswalk had no bearing on the matter. [10] Sec. 346.23 (1), Stats., provides: Crossing controlled intersection or crosswalk. (1) At an intersection or crosswalk where traffic is controlled by traffic control signals or by a traffic officer, the operator of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing or who has started to cross the highway on a green or `WALK' signal and in all other cases pedestrians shall yield the right of way to vehicles lawfully proceeding directly ahead on a green signal. The rules stated in this subsection are modified at intersections or crosswalks on divided highways or highways provided with safety zones in the manner and to the extent stated in sub. (2). Sec. 346.24 (1) and (2), Stats., provides: Crossing at uncontrolled intersection or crosswalk. (1) At an intersection or crosswalk where traffic is not controlled by traffic control signals or by a traffic officer, the operator of a vehicle shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian who is crossing the highway within a marked or unmarked crosswalk. (2) No pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb or other place of safety and walk or run into the path of a vehicle which is so close that it is difficult for the operator of the vehicle to yield. Thus, the rules for pedestrian right-of-way are different in secs. 346.23 and 346.24, Stats. [11] In order for the motorist to have a duty to yield under sec. 346.24, the pedestrian must be crossing within the crosswalk (sec. 346.24 (1)), and not have entered in such a manner as to make it difficult for the motorist to yield (sec. 346.24 (2)). The requirements under sec. 346.23, however, are that the pedestrian be crossing or have  started to cross  on a Walk light. The burden on the motorist is more absolute under sec. 346.23 than under sec. 346.24. While the instruction dealing with stepping off a curb into the path of a car is found under sub. (2) of sec. 346.24, Stats., this language is not found under sec. 346.23. This indicates an intention to make this requirement applicable to those situations only. [12] The committee notes to the revision of sec. 346.24, Stats., in 1957, [13] indicate that these provisions apply to uncontrolled intersections. [14] The meaning of these two sections must stand on their own words; they make the driver's duty to yield more stringent under sec. 346.23 (1), if not indeed absolute. The only factual issue to be decided on the question of right-of-way in a case such as this is whether the plaintiff was crossing or had started to cross on a Walk signal. If so, the defendant had a duty to yield; if not, the defendant had no duty to yield. The instruction as given was confusing. We also believe there is merit to appellant's further contention that the instruction implies the right-of-way may be shifted from the pedestrian to the motorist. Right-of-way is wholly statutory and cannot be transferred. [15] In the case of two motorists, the one having the right-of-way may forfeit this right-of-way by negligent speed. . . . When such negligence is found on the part of the right-hand driver, neither he nor the left-hand driver has a right superior to the other in entering the uncontrolled intersection. [16] In short, neither party has the right-of-way, since the only one having it has forfeited it. While one having the right-of-way is not relieved from the duty of due care, especially the duty of lookout, [17] there is no authority for the proposition that one loses the right-of-way because of negligent lookout; undoubtedly because lookout is not relevant to right-of-way, whereas speed is. Similarly, a pedestrian having the statutory right-of-way is not relieved of the duty of due care, or of lookout. If a pedestrian is guilty of negligent lookout he does not thereby forfeit his right-of-way, if indeed he has the right-of-way. On the other hand, a pedestrian crossing at an uncontrolled intersection can forfeit his right-of-way by stepping suddenly into the path of an approaching car. [18] However, even in this situation, the right-of-way would not transfer to the motorist. The situation would merely be that neither has a right superior to the other. [19] As to the pedestrian facing a Walk light at a controlled intersection, if he starts to cross the crosswalk while the Walk light is still on, but leaves the curb suddenly stepping into the path of a vehicle at such time as it would be difficult for the motor vehicle operator to yield, the pedestrian does not forfeit his right-of-way. We think the dignity attached to a pedestrian's position once he is crossing or has started to cross with a Walk light at a crosswalk at a controlled intersection is not unlike that of a driver lawfully proceeding directly ahead on an arterial highway. In the instant case the jury may well have believed that the plaintiff pedestrian was crossing or had started to enter the crosswalk at this controlled intersection while the Walk light was on. The error in the instruction is that the jury was told that the driver could not be negligent in failing to yield the right-of-way to plaintiff-pedestrian, even if the jury believed that the plaintiff had started to cross the crosswalk while the Walk light was on and at a time when it was difficult for the defendant-operator to yield the right-of-way. There is no doubt that the erroneous instruction was prejudicial, since the jury excused the defendant from any negligence with respect to right-of-way while finding the plaintiff negligent in this regard. The jurors were undoubtedly misled by the instruction and it undoubtedly affected their apportionment of negligence. [20] Because of the prejudicial errors we must reverse and order a new trial. By the Court. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to conduct further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.