Opinion ID: 1860418
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Super 8 Incident

Text: Appellant claims that the sexual encounter that, according to C.O.'s testimony, occurred at the Super 8 motel can not be classified or punished as third-degree rape. He contends that C.O. never testified to penetration or consent pertaining to the incident at the Super 8 motel and therefore the trial court should have granted Appellant's motion for a directed verdict on this charge. We disagree. KRS 510.060 criminalizes third-degree rape. It requires penetration for a conviction; however, there is no requirement of testimony specifically describing penetration. A fact may be proved by circumstances no less than by words, and this rule is applied to the question of penetration just as it is in other questions of fact arising in criminal cases. Williams v. Commonwealth, 202 Ky. 664, 261 S.W. 18, 19 (1924). Here, the prosecutor asked C.O. if she and Appellant ever went to a hotel to have sex. C.O. testified that she and Appellant had sex in two (2) different hotels on three (3) separate occasions. C.O. did not offer testimony specifically describing penetration at the Super 8, but that is not required for a third-degree rape conviction. Given her previous descriptions of sex, C.O.'s testimony to the effect that she and Appellant had sex at the hotel was sufficient. Id. C.O.'s testimony was not contradicted, incredible, or inherently improbable. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a motion for directed verdict was not warranted as there was sufficient evidence to support this charge of third-degree rape.