Opinion ID: 2621432
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Viewing of the Videotape During Deliberations

Text: ś 147 One of the exhibits admitted at trial was an edited copy of a video of the crime scene. Outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court asked if the defense had any objections to the jury replaying the video during deliberations. The defense replied that it had no objection. The trial court also mentioned that the jury might be able to use the courtroom for deliberations. The defendant was present during discussion of both of these matters. ś 148 During the first day of deliberations for the guilt phase, March 20, 2001, the jury notified the judicial assistant that they wished to view the video. The viewing equipment was in the courtroom with the power cords secured to the floor. The judicial assistant made sure the courtroom doors were locked, then escorted the jury into the courtroom. The judicial assistant exited the courtroom and remained outside in a hallway where he could see the jurors but could not see what they were watching or hear what was being said. After the jury returned to the jury room, the judicial assistant closed the door to the jury room and then unlocked the doors to the courtroom. ś 149 Gregory now asserts that his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his criminal proceeding was violated when the judicial assistant allowed the jury to replay the video during guilt phase deliberations. Gregory also contends that the judicial assistant had ex parte contact with the jury. Because the hearing was not recorded and because the defendant was not notified until afterward, Gregory argues that the action amounted to constitutional error, which the State cannot demonstrate was harmless. ś 150 This court has recognized that in the eyes of the jury, the bailiff is an agent of the trial judge. See State v. Bourgeois, 133 Wash.2d 389, 407, 945 P.2d 1120 (1997). Therefore, when an ex parte communication takes place between the bailiff and the jury that relates to an aspect of the trial the trial judge should generally disclose the communication to counsel for all parties. Id. Although an improper communication between the court and the jury amounts to constitutional error, it is subject to the harmless error analysis. Id. ś 151 Here, Gregory cites to various cases in which bailiffs or judges have engaged in or allowed improper communications with the jury. See, e.g., State v. Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d 501, 505, 664 P.2d 466 (1983) (trial court had FBI agent replay tapes for the jury, including portions that were not played at trial); O'Brien v. City of Seattle, 52 Wash.2d 543, 546-47, 327 P.2d 433 (1958) (bailiff allegedly discussed a jury instruction with the jury). However no such improper communication occurred here. The bailiff merely facilitated the use of the courtroom video equipment and ensured that the jury would not be interrupted. ś 152 Gregory also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to play the tape during deliberations without Gregory present. CrR 6.15(e) provides that when the jury retires for deliberation, it shall take with it the instructions given, all exhibits received in evidence and a verdict form or forms. Accordingly, we have held that the jury can take into deliberation tapes that have been admitted into evidence. State v. Elmore, 139 Wash.2d 250, 294-96, 985 P.2d 289 (1999) (discussing State v. Castellanos, 132 Wash.2d 94, 935 P.2d 1353 (1997)). Unrestricted access to recordings during deliberations does not place undue emphasis on the tape. Id. at 295, 985 P.2d 289. While the above cases involved audiotapes, the same principles should apply to videotapes. ś 153 Gregory distinguishes this case on the fact that the viewing occurred in the courtroom. However, the jury was alone when viewing the videotape, distinguishing this case from those where the jury was accompanied by a government agent. See Caliguri, 99 Wash.2d at 505, 664 P.2d 466; United States v. Kupau, 781 F.2d 740, 742-43 (9th Cir.1986). The tape viewed by the jury was the same one admitted into evidence at trial, distinguishing it from cases in which the jury gained access to new information during deliberations. See United States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1996). The only reason the viewing did not occur in the deliberation room was that the cords to the video equipment had been attached to the courtroom floor. There is no reason to distinguish this case from Castellanos and Elmore. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the jury to review an admitted videotape exhibit during deliberations.