Opinion ID: 788769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Commercial Misrepresentation.

Text: 27 Section 43 of the Lanham Act protects a trademark owner from commercial advertising or promotion [that] misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of ... goods, services, or commercial activities. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). The district court correctly instructed the jury that, to prevail on its commercial misrepresentation claim, Everest Capital must prove that the Everest Defendants made a false statement of fact about their investment management services that deceived or had a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of the audience, that was likely to influence purchasing decisions, and that injured or was likely to injure Everest Capital. See Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. American Simmental Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1035, 1042 (8th Cir.1999). 28 On appeal, Everest Capital argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on the undisputed evidence that Everest Funds Management falsely claimed on its website that it provides professional portfolio management of equity portfolios for high net worth individuals and families, endowments, foundations, and corporate retirement plans. At trial, Gupta admitted that Everest Funds Management has provided no such services; its function instead has been to manage the two small Everest Funds. There was evidence that only 74 people had visited the Everest Funds Management website, and no evidence that those people were eligible to invest in Everest Capital hedge funds. Like the district court, we conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the misstatement was inadvertent, that it did not deceive or have a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of the website's intended audience, that it was unlikely to influence purchasing decisions, and that Everest Capital failed to prove injury or likely injury as a result of the misstatement. We reject as contrary to law Everest Capital's further contention that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury that a literally false statement is presumed to be likely to deceive. 29