Opinion ID: 512652
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interstate Dispute

Text: 39 The district court accepted the allegations that dust storms pollute not only the air of California but also that of Nevada (District Court Order at p. 22), and concluded that the plaintiff had stated a federal common law nuisance claim based on air pollution. We disagree. 40 Assuming that air pollution reaches into Nevada, this case does not involve the kind of interstate dispute previously recognized as requiring resolution under federal law, namely, a controversy whose interstate nature makes it inappropriate for state law to control. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641, 101 S.Ct. at 2067. 41 In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Company, 206 U.S. 230, 27 S.Ct. 618, 51 L.Ed. 1038 (1907), the State of Georgia sought to enjoin the Tennessee Copper Company from discharging noxious gas from their works in Tennessee over the plaintiff's territory. Id. at 236, 27 S.Ct. at 619. Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly state that it was creating a federal common law nuisance cause of action based on air pollution, the Court did enjoin the copper company's continued pollution of Georgia's air. The Court focused on the facts that the plaintiff was a state and the injury was interstate, rather than domestic, in nature: [i]t is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale ... and whatever domestic destruction [the forests] have suffered, should not be further destroyed or threatened by acts of persons beyond its control.... Id. at 238, 27 S.Ct. at 619. 42 In Milwaukee I, supra, the Court recognized a federal common law action for water pollution caused by Wisconsin sewerage commissions polluting Lake Michigan. Again, the case centered on an interstate controversy which involved a state suing sources outside its domain which were causing pollution within the state. The Court concluded that: [f]ederal common law and not the varying common law of the individual states, is, we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for dealing in a uniform standard with the environmental rights of a state against improper impairment by sources outside its domain. Id., 406 U.S. at 107, n. 9, 92 S.Ct. at 1395, n. 9, quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 241-42 (10th Cir.1971). 43 The great similarity between these cases underscores the limited context in which the Court has been willing to recognize a federal common law nuisance claim based on air pollution due to an interstate dispute. It appears that the Court considers only those interstate controversies which involve a state suing sources outside of its own territory because they are causing pollution within the state to be inappropriate for state law to control, and therefore subject to resolution according to federal common law. 44 Therefore, true interstate disputes require application of federal common law. See Milwaukee I, 406 U.S. at 107, n. 9, 92 S.Ct. at 1395, n. 9; Georgia v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. at 237, 27 S.Ct. at 619; Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. at 520, 521, 26 S.Ct. at 269, 270. Because we conclude this is essentially a domestic dispute and therefore not the sort of interstate controversy which makes application of state law inappropriate, reliance on federal common law is unnecessary. Audubon cannot rely on the federal common law of nuisance to state its air pollution claim. 45 Although we recognize that this case could develop into a dispute involving conflicting rights of States, that is not the case before this court, and we do not decide legal questions based on contingencies, speculation or potential conflicts. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 514 F.2d 492, 520-21 (8th Cir.1975) (en banc); Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir.1976) (en banc). Because we conclude that Audubon cannot properly assert a federal common law nuisance action based on air pollution on these facts, we need not decide whether or not such a cause of action would be preempted by the Clean Air Act, or whether Audubon would have standing to assert this claim.