Opinion ID: 3011057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Federal-State Law Conflict

Text: Another rationale for finding that federal law does not preempt state and territorial safety standards rests upon the observation that Congress directed the Administrator to prescribe minimum standards to promote safety. 49 U.S.C. S 44701.13 Because the federal standards are minimum, some courts have determined that a common law duty of safety may be owed beyond the FAA regulations. See, e.g., In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland, 37 F.3d 804, 815 (2d Cir. 1994); Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1444-45; Sunbird Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 789 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (D. Kan. 1992); Holliday v. Bell Helicopters Textron, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. Haw. 1990). Indeed, as the District Court pointed out in its preemption analysis, some courts have concluded that the application of state standards would raise the level of air safety as a supplement to the federal regulations. See, e.g., Cleveland, 985 F.2d at 1445. After findingnothing inconsistent with Congress' goal of maximum safety and common law claims, id. at 1443, the court in Cleveland compared the state common law duties and the federal regulatory framework to determine whether there was an actual conflict. Id. at 1444-45. Finding no conflict between state and federal law, it found that the state common law action was not preempted. Id. at 1445. _________________________________________________________________ 13. 49 U.S.C. S 44701(a)(5) provides: The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration shall promote safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing-- ... (5) regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security. (emphasis added). 19 We have a problem with applying the type of analysis employed in Cleveland to determine that there is no federal preemption of aviation safety. First, as we demonstrate in Part III.A.1, there is no gap in the federal standards to fill with a state common law standard. The S 91.13(a) prohibition of careless or reckless operation of an aircraft occupies the apparent void beyond the specified minimum standards. Therefore, because the Administrator has provided both general and specific standards, there is no need to look to state or territorial law to provide standards beyond those established by the Administrator. Moreover, as the First Circuit noted in French, the lack of a conflict between federal standards and state law is irrelevant. The court in French remarked that the absence of a conflict was beside the point. So long as occupation of an envisioned field was intended, `any state law falling within th[e] field is pre-empted.' . . . The federal interest necessarily predominates, rendering states impotent to act. 869 F.2d at 6 (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248); see also Morales, 504 U.S. at 387 (holding that [t]he pre-emption provision [of the ADA] ... displace[s] all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with . . . substantive requirements.). In such instances, the state statute must yield to the force of federal law . . . , notwithstanding that it is constructed upon values familiar to many and cherished by most, and notwithstanding that it may fit neatly within or alongside the federal scheme. French, 869 F.2d at 6. As a consequence, in a federally preempted area, the question whether state or territorial law conflicts with federal law is a pointless inquiry. See id. If Congress has preempted a field -- whether it be expressly or by implication -- state laws attempting to regulate within that field will be invalidated no matter how well they comport with substantive federal policies. L. TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW S 6-27 at 497 (2d ed. 1988); see also Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.