Opinion ID: 1847218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Lance's Allegedly Negligent and Wanton Conduct

Text: Lance first contends that the trial court erred in denying its postverdict motion for a JML because, it says, the parents did not produce evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Lance had been either negligent or wanton or that if it had been, that its negligence or wantonness had caused the child's death. When reviewing a ruling on a motion for a JML, this Court applies the same standard applied by the trial court in granting or denying the JML. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc. v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 3 (Ala.1997). Regarding questions of fact, the ultimate question is whether the nonmovant has presented substantial evidence to allow the factual issue to be submitted to the jury for resolution. Carter v. Henderson, 598 So.2d 1350 (Ala.1992). See, also, § 12-21-12, Ala.Code 1975; and West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). In reviewing a ruling on a motion for JML, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and entertains such reasonable inferences from that evidence as the jury would have been free to draw. Carter, 598 So.2d at 1353. If the question is one of law, this Court indulges no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's ruling. Ricwil, Inc. v. S.L. Pappas & Co., 599 So.2d 1126 (Ala. 1992).
Lance argues that the parents did not produce substantial evidence from which the jury could find that Lance had been negligent or that its negligence caused the child's death. To support their negligence claim, the parents had to produce substantial evidence that Lance owed a duty of care to the child or to a class of persons that included the child, that Lance breached that duty of care, and that this breach proximately caused the child's death. See Graveman v. Wind Drift Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 607 So.2d 199 (Ala.1992). Lance contends that the parents did not produce any evidence that it owed a duty of care to the child or to other persons using its vending machines, and that the parents did not produce substantial evidence that Lance's conduct was the proximate cause of the child's death. A duty of care arises when it is foreseeable that harm may result if care is not exercised. See Bush v. Alabama Power Co., 457 So.2d 350 (Ala.1984). Lance maintains that it was under no duty to police the condition of the circuitry providing electrical current to its vending machines because, it says, it was not foreseeable that someone might be electrocuted while using its machines. Lance says that no incident related to an electrical problem associated with its vending machines was reported before the child's death. [1] The parents direct our attention to Harris v. Board of Water & Sewer Comm'rs of City of Mobile, 294 Ala. 606, 320 So.2d 624, 630 (1975), where this Court, citing Havard v. Palmer & Baker Engineers, Inc., 293 Ala. 301, 302 So.2d 228 (1974), held that where one party to a contract assumes a duty to another party to that contract, and it is foreseeable that injury to a third partynot a party to the contractmay occur upon a breach of that duty, the promisor owes a duty to all those within the foreseeable area of risk. The foreseeability of injury to others upon the negligent performance of a contract is the touchstone of tort liability to a third party. See Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hospital, 454 So.2d 496 (Ala. 1984). The parents maintain that they produced substantial evidence that Lance and the motel had entered into a contract, and that pursuant to that contract Lance had assumed a duty to keep its vending machine safe. The parents say that they submitted substantial evidence that it was foreseeable that injury could occur if the vending machine was not properly installed and maintained, and that, therefore, the question of foreseeability was properly submitted to the jury. We agree. The evidence showed that although at the time of the accident vending machines owned by both Lance and Montgomery Coca-Cola were plugged into a receptacle that accepted a three-pronged plug typically used when a circuit is grounded, the receptacle had been improperly installed by the motel's handyman five years earlier; not only was the receptacle not grounded, it was wired with reversed polarity. The evidence further indicated that the motel did not take corrective measures after a series of specific complaints of electric shocks involving the machines that were plugged into that receptacle, beginning just three days before the child's death. The evidence also showed that Montgomery Coca-Cola was aware of an incident in which a user had been shocked at another vending machine located at the same motel four years before the child's death, that the soft drink machine was touching the Lance vending machine at the time of the death, that the soft drink machine was filthy, that the grounding prong had been removed from its plug, and that Montgomery Coca-Cola knew that its machines at many locations shocked customers at least once a year. The evidence reflected that, pursuant to its contract with the motel, Lance agreed to maintain and keep [the vending machine] in good working order, for a fee of approximately $300 per year. The Lance corporate representative who testified on the issue of safety testified that this contractual obligation imposed a duty to keep the machine in a safe condition. In addition, Lance's safety manual contains procedures for installing the Lance vending machine. That manual specifically requires that the installer verify that the electrical receptacle into which the machine is plugged is properly grounded. The section entitled Installation Instructions in the safety manual includes the following statement: To insure safe operation of an electrically equipped [vending machine], the [vending machine] must be grounded. The manual also states the proper procedure for ensuring that the receptacle into which the vending machine is plugged is properly grounded. Therefore, the jury could have found that Lance had entered into a contract with the motel, and that pursuant to that contract Lance had assumed a duty to keep its vending machine located on the motel's property safe. Thus, the only question regarding Lance's argument that it owed no duty of care is whether it was foreseeable that injury to a third partynot a party to the contract could occur. See Berkel & Co. Contractors, supra. Lance maintains that it did not have actual knowledge of the condition, and that, therefore, it could not foresee that injury to a third party could occur. However, the test is not what Lance in fact knew, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable that a failure to maintain the vending machine in a safe condition could cause injury to a third party. See Cherokee Elec. Co-op. v. Cochran, 706 So.2d 1188, 1192 (Ala.1997). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the parents, as we must, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to submit the question of foreseeability to the jury. The evidence before the jury included testimony from a vice president of sales administration of Lance, Inc., that Lance was aware, as early as 1979, of the significance of the shocking hazard of its vending machines. This awareness prompted Lance to reduce the voltage in certain parts of its vending machines. The vice president testified that in 1979, Lance developed a 24-volt system for its vending machines. He stated that this system reduced all voltage in its vending machines, except for the voltage of the overhead lights, from 110 volts to 24 volts. The parents also submitted expert testimony describing the concept of grounding and stating that the possibility of injuries from ungrounded equipment was well known. The parents' expert testified that an abundance of literature on the necessity of grounding electrical equipment exists and that anyone in the business of installing electrical equipment would know to ensure that its equipment is properly grounded. The same expert testified that it would be unsafe for Lance to assume that electric receptacles in older buildings such as the Clanton Holiday Inn were properly grounded and that Lance should have known to test the receptacle to determine whether it was properly grounded. The parents' expert also testified that Lance could have used a $5 tester to determine whether the outlet was grounded. Lance's employees, however, stated that they never used such a tester, and its routemen were not equipped with or trained to use such a tester. Our analysis of the foreseeability issue is also informed by the content of Lance's safety manual, which clearly required the installer to verify that the machine is grounded. Lance, however, seeks to avoid the effects of its own safety manual by relying upon Martin v. Goodies Distribution, 695 So.2d 1175 (Ala.1997), in which this Court held that the owner of an ice cream truck, who had given its lessee-operator a safety manual in which safety procedures for child patrons were set forth, did not voluntarily assume a legal duty to protect children from traffic hazards where such a duty had not otherwise been imposed by Alabama law. However, Martin is best understood as an example of judicial reluctance to find a duty where the Alabama legislature has not previously recognized such duty. See 695 So.2d at 1179 n. 1. In Martin, an automobile struck and killed a child when the child stepped into a street after purchasing ice cream from a Goodies ice cream truck. 695 So.2d at 1176. However, no evidence indicated that Goodies had entered into any contract with an entity, such as a school, by which it assumed a duty to assure the safety of child patrons crossing streets before or after purchasing ice cream at one of its trucks. See id. at 1178-79. Had that been the case, the manual would have been relevant to the issues of the foreseeability of an accident such as the one in which the decedent was killed and the scope of Goodies' duty. Martin is therefore distinguishable from the present case; we are not presented in this case with a naked question of public policy as to whether to create a new duty, in light of the evidence of the contractual duties to the motel assumed by Lance.
Lance next contends that the trial court erred in submitting the parents' negligence claim to the jury because, it says, the actions of the motel and Montgomery Coca-Cola were intervening causes and the proximate cause of the child's death. An intervening cause must be unforeseeable and must have been sufficient to have been the sole cause in fact of the injury. General Motors v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1195 (Ala.1985). Given the evidence of foreseeability summarized in our discussion of the existence of a duty earlier in this opinion, we conclude that the question of causation was properly submitted to the jury. Tuscaloosa County v. Barnett, 562 So.2d 166, 169 (Ala.1990).
Lance contends that the evidence was insufficient to support submission of the case to the jury on the issue of wantonness. In Alfa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roush, 723 So.2d 1250 (Ala.1998), this Court stated, To prove wantonness, it is not essential to prove that the defendant entertained a specific design or intent to injure the plaintiff. Wantonness is defined by statute as [c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3). In Roush, citing Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So.2d 601 (Ala.1994), we described wantonness as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act injury will likely or probably result. 723 So.2d at 1250. The parents argue that they presented ample evidence tending to show that Lance acted wantonly. Although much of the evidence marshaled by the parents relates to Lance's conduct after the child's death, the evidence they presented relating to Lance's conduct before the child's death was sufficient for the trial court to submit the wantonness claim to the jury. In addition, we note that Lance has not challenged the evidence of its conduct after the accident on grounds of relevancy. Because evidence of duration of the conduct is relevant to the issue of punitive damages under Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 223 (Ala.1989), and BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), we include the evidence of Lance's conduct both before and after the child's death in the following summary. Lance's routeman checked the machine weekly; however, even at the time of the trialsome two and one-half years after the child's deathhe demonstrated a lack of knowledge concerning electrical safety and grounding. Lance's routeman had received no training on grounding, either before or after the child's death, and although he carried the safety manual in his truck, he was unaware of its contents concerning electrical safety or grounding. He also admitted that he was not provided with a $5 electrical-outlet tester, referred to by the parents' expert, and that had he been trained to use such a tester and had one been provided, he certainly would have used it. Furthermore, as of the date of trial no one had ever told him that the ungrounded outlet into which the machine he serviced was plugged had caused the child's death. He had installed six additional machines since the child's death without checking the outlets for grounding. According to the routeman's supervisor, nobody at Lance was responsible for field safety or the safety of users of the machines. The parents also rely on the testimony of other Lance employees. The routeman's supervisor testified that none of the 225 vendors located in his district had been tested for proper grounding. The supervisor also stated that when new machines are installed they are plugged in and if the machine works, nothing else is done; he was unaware of any plans to alter this practice in the future. Furthermore, Lance's human resource manager, the corporate representative most knowledgeable about safety rules, regulations and procedures, testified that he did not learn of the child's death until he was being prepared for his deposition, some 21 months after the death. The safety representative, acknowledging that he now knows vending machines have to be grounded to be safe, testified that he had never seen Lance's safety grounding requirements until he was preparing for the trial, that no action had been taken to assure compliance with the safety manual, that nothing was being done differently after the child's death, and that there were no plans to make sure that all field personnel were aware of the warnings and instructions in the safety manual concerning grounded receptacles. He also conceded that had the vending machine been plugged into a grounded receptacle, the child would not have been electrocuted. On the other hand, Lance's vice president of sales administration testified that a program for routemen to test electrical outlets for grounding had been put in place. In response to the parents' contentions, Lance, in effect, argues that we must read that part of the definition of wantonness in Roush stating that wantonness is the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions to mean that unless Lance knew that the outlet into which its vending machine was plugged was not grounded, it could not be liable. We view the question of Lance's knowledge differently. We find the critical question to be whether it knew the necessity for testing electrical receptacles to which its vending machines are connected for adequate grounding at facilities such as the motel where this death occurred. As previously noted, the evidence of Lance's practices before the child's death, when coupled with the contents of Lance's safety manual and the expert opinion testimony concerning foreseeability, was sufficient to show circumstances from which one could reasonably infer such knowledge. See Hamme v. CSX Transp., Inc., 621 So.2d 281, 283 (Ala. 1993) (stating that to show wantonness [t]he actor's knowledge may be proved by showing circumstances from which the fact of knowledge is a reasonable inference). We therefore hold that the trial court properly presented to the jury the question whether Lance was guilty of [c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-11-20(b)(3).