Opinion ID: 203289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Matters Related to Severance

Text: Bucci argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to sever. At issue is Exhibit 24, a recording of a May 19, 2004, conversation between Bucci's codefendant, Jordan, and Minotti, in which Bucci's name is mentioned. The recording was properly introduced against Jordan as an admission. The district court ruled, however, that Jordan's statements were inadmissible hearsay in relation to Bucci. The district court denied Bucci's pretrial motion to sever as well as his trial motion to redact his name from the statements. To protect Bucci from unfair prejudice, the district court, on two separate occasions, instructed the jury that the statements were not admissible against Bucci. Bucci concedes that his Confrontation Clause rights were not violated because Jordan testified in his own defense at trial. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence the prior statements of a witness who concedes making those statements). Thus, the issue at hand is one of evidence rather than constitutional law. We review the denial of a motion to sever only for a manifest abuse of discretion. United States v. Page, 521 F.3d 101, 109 (1st Cir.2008). [S]everance is particularly difficult to obtain where, as here, multiple defendants share a single indictment. Id. (quoting United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 37 (1st Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)). To merit reversal on the basis of a district court's denial of severance, a defendant must show `prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms.' United States v. Turner, 501 F.3d 59, 73 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. LiCausi, 167 F.3d 36, 49 (1st Cir.1999)). [S]everance is particularly disfavored in conspiracy cases. Id. As a general matter, we cannot say that the district court abused its wide discretion in refusing to grant separate trials at the outset of the proceedings. Our jurisprudence favors trying co-conspirators together, despite the reality that evidence admissible against one defendant may be, and often is, inadmissible with regard to others. See, e.g., id. We see no unusual circumstances that should have tilted the balance in favor of severance in this particular case. Second, we address Bucci's contention that the district court committed reversible error by issuing a limiting instruction rather than redacting Bucci's name from the recording and the transcript provided to the jury. Even where the Confrontation Clause is implicated, we ordinarily presume that jurors will follow limiting instructions. United States v. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 769 (1st Cir.2007). Occasionally, however, at least in the constitutional context, a limiting instruction will not be sufficient to preserve a co-defendant's rights where the extrajudicial statement is powerfully incriminating and `inculpatory on its face.' Id. (quoting United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 520 (1st Cir.2005)). Statements that are incriminating only when linked to other evidence in the case do not merit such scrutiny. Id. (quoting Vega Molina, 407 F.3d at 520) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court determined that Jordan's remarks, while powerfully incriminating as to Jordan, did not directly inculpate Bucci. Significantly, defense counsel candidly and explicitly agreed with this assessment while arguing Bucci's motion to sever. To be sure, Jordan's remarks were neither flattering nor helpful to Bucci's defense. The recording contains numerous derisive references to Bucci as well as a discussion concerning whether Bucci had been arrested and whether he was providing information to law enforcement. Thus, the recording surely implies that Bucci participated with Jordan and Minotti in an illicit undertaking of some species. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the district court erred by refusing to redact the recording to exclude Bucci's name. In light of our presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions such as those given here, the absence of constitutional error, and the inferential nature by which Jordan's statements link Bucci to the charged conduct, we find no abuse of discretion. Moreover, any error was clearly harmless given the substantial evidence of guilt as described above. [8] Finally, Bucci asserts that the prosecutor's closing remarks made it impossible for the jurors to follow the district court's limiting instruction. See Vega Molina, 407 F.3d at 522 (reversing conviction where prosecutor implored jury to infer defendant's guilt from codefendant's redacted confession). Because he failed to object at trial, we review this aspect of his challenge only for plain error. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d at 770-71. In large part, references to the May 19 conversation were restricted entirely to the prosecutor's discussion of Jordan. Neither the prosecutor nor the court were required to remind the jurors by rote, in each instance the recording was mentioned, that the recording was not admissible against Bucci. We think that the district court's two separate admonitions that the jurors should not consider the May 19 recording as evidence against Bucci were sufficient to prevent confusion. Bucci argues that the prosecutor's final summation, when he called for a guilty verdict against both defendants, was improper. Following a brief discussion of Bucci's culpability, the prosecutor stated: David Jordan, ladies and gentleman, at every step of this case . . . David Jordan chose to stand on the side of the criminal instead of the side of law enforcement. On December 24th at the Malden Medical Center parking lot, on December 26th when he was not protecting Jon Minotti and his family from the men who showed up at his home, in each of the calls with Agent Drouin, and on . . . May 19 as well. Ladies and gentleman, the most compelling testimony in this case, the most compelling word in this case didn't come from Jon Minotti. The most persuasive testimony in this case didn't come from Carloz Ruiz. It didn't even come from the agents [who] testified in this case. Ladies and gentlemen, the most persuasive, the most compelling, and the most damning words in this case came from David Jordan's own mouth, both on that tape and when he got up on that witness stand and he lied to you. Ladies and gentleman, I ask you to find both of these men guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the counts. Thank you. It is readily apparent, in context, that the discussion of the recording concerned Jordan alone. The prosecutor had already summed up his case regarding Bucci before discussing Jordan for the final time. By contrast, in Vega Molina, a case upon which Bucci relies, the prosecutor explicitly requested the jury to convict the defendant based on the co-defendant's out-of-court confession, over the objection of the defendant and without a limiting instruction. 407 F.3d at 522. In Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), to which Bucci also cites, the prosecutor argued that information gleaned from a codefendant's confession supported an inference of guilt. See id. at 205 & n. 2, 107 S.Ct. 1702. Here, the facts fall well short of showing such prejudicial conduct. Finally, to the extent they did invite confusion, we see very little prejudice in the prosecutor's remarks. As detailed above, the evidence against Bucci was daunting and his theory of innocence scarcely credible. Moreover, the recording was not highly incriminating of Bucci. While it suggested that Jordan did not consider him to be an exemplary citizen, the jury already knew that from the contents of his black Mercedes. Thus, the prosecutor's comments during closing argument do not warrant reversal of Bucci's convictions.