Opinion ID: 2613254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: timing of discovery

Text: (2) Defendant next argues that the prosecution's discovery request is premature because defendant has not yet been convicted, special circumstances have not yet been found, and the penalty phase may never occur. As previously indicated, he fears that advance disclosure of his intended penalty phase evidence may jeopardize his guilt phase defense, potentially violating his privilege against self-incrimination and infringing on his right to a fair trial. We find merit in defendant's position, but we note that any such problems could be largely eliminated by deferring prosecution discovery of defense penalty phase evidence in an appropriate case pending the guilt and special circumstances determinations. The Court of Appeal likewise acknowledged the legitimacy of defendant's concerns, stating its assumption that the trial court had discretion to defer discovery until the guilt phase was concluded. As the court stated, We tend to agree that penalty phase discovery so early in the trial does not appear to be a very efficient use of time.... Procedural regulation is vested in the first instance in the trial court, and had it denied discovery here as premature, or otherwise disruptive, we would be inclined to defer to its superior knowledge of the parties and the case. However, the denial of discovery here was based solely on the supposed supremacy of section 190.3. The issue is somewhat more complicated than the Court of Appeal outlined. To resolve the issue, we must consider the interplay of two potentially conflicting provisions. Under section 1054.5, subdivision (b), the party seeking a court order compelling discovery must first make an informal request for disclosure. If opposing counsel fails to comply with this request within 15 days, the proponent of discovery may seek a court order. The court may make any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter, including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order. (§ 1054.5, subd. (b), italics added.) Viewed in isolation, the foregoing language is broad enough to authorize appropriate orders deferring penalty phase disclosure to the prosecution pending the jury's determination of the issues of guilt and special circumstances. The italicized phrase continuance of the matter reasonably could be construed as permitting continuance of the requested discovery, as well as continuance of trial. (See also § 1054.6 [protecting from disclosure any matter privileged under express statutory provisions or federal constitutional law]; Sturm, supra, 9 Cal. App.3d at p. 186 [recognizing possibility of protective order under § 1054.6 where advance disclosure to prosecution of penalty phase evidence may improperly interfere with defense at guilt phase].) Another provision, section 1054.7, requires all disclosures to be made at least 30 days prior to trial, but allows the parties to show good cause ... why a disclosure should be denied, restricted, or deferred.  (Italics added.) That provision, however, is considerably narrower than section 1054.5, subdivision (b), for it limits good cause to threats or possible danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other investigations by law enforcement. (§ 1054.7.) Initially, it appears that the reference to trial in section 1054.7 cannot reasonably be construed as referring to the penalty phase of trial when penalty phase evidence is sought. In other words, we cannot simply hold that under section 1054.7, guilt phase discovery occurs before the guilt trial and penalty phase discovery occurs before the penalty trial. As we previously explained in the course of determining that reciprocal discovery is available as to penalty phase evidence, a capital trial is a unitary proceeding that encompasses both the guilt and penalty phases. Indeed, this same reasoning induced us to hold that section 190.3 (requiring notice of aggravating evidence prior to trial) obligates the prosecutor to give such notice prior to the commencement of the guilt phase. (See People v. Robertson, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 45-46.) Thus, to be consistent with these decisions, we hold that the reciprocal discovery provisions contemplate both guilt and penalty phase disclosure ordinarily would occur at least 30 days prior to commencement of the trial on guilt issues. Are the trial courts empowered to defer prosecution discovery, as the Court of Appeal herein assumed? The answer largely depends on whether the limitations on good cause under section 1054.7 restrict the courts' general power to order continuances of such disclosure under section 1054.5. Section 1054.7 seems aimed at deferring disclosure of particular items of evidence (such as disclosure of information which might endanger a witness, or might be lost or destroyed) when specified good cause is shown, rather than at continuing a party's general discovery request if necessary to enforce the provisions of the reciprocal discovery statutes (§ 1054.5, subd. (b)), including protection of the defendant's constitutional rights (see § 1054.6; Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 382-383). Nothing in the text of section 1054.7 would necessarily override the courts' broad power under section 1054.5, subdivision (b), to order a general continuance of the prosecutor's discovery request. Likewise, nothing in section 1054.7 would or could constrict the court's authority to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. Thus, given a showing that such a continuance is appropriate (based on such considerations as the probable duration of the guilt phase, the likelihood that a guilty verdict, with special circumstances, will be returned, and the potential adverse effect disclosure could have on the guilt phase defense), trial courts possess discretion to defer penalty phase discovery by the prosecution until the guilt phase has concluded. On request, the court may permit such showing to be made in camera. (See Izazaga, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 383; § 1054.5, subd. (b) [power to make any other lawful order]; § 1054.7, 2d par. [any party may request good cause showing to be made in camera].) If the trial court deems a particular item or items constitutionally protected from discovery until the guilt phase has concluded, the court should nonetheless order immediate disclosure of all unprotected items in accordance with the provisions of section 1054.3, as long as no other considerations suggest that deferral of discovery of the remaining evidence is appropriate. Because we do not find the reciprocal discovery statutes (§ 1054 et seq.) necessarily inconsistent with section 190.3, we conclude that such discovery relating to the penalty phase of the trial is available to both parties. Accordingly the writ should issue, compelling the trial court to grant the People's motion for discovery unless it finds such discovery premature or constitutionally prohibited, as previously discussed. The judgment of the Court of Appeal, issuing a peremptory writ of mandate, is affirmed. The writ should direct the trial court (1) to vacate its order denying penalty phase discovery to petitioner, and (2) to exercise its jurisdiction to compel appropriately timed reciprocal penalty phase discovery between the parties as authorized by section 1054 et seq.