Opinion ID: 3029395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Culpable Participation

Text: We have held that a jury can only convict a person of mail or wire fraud if it is convinced of the person’s “culpable participation,” United States v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 545 (3d Cir. 1978), that is, if it is convinced that the person “ha[d] knowledge of the illicit objectives of the fraudulent scheme and willfully intend[ed] that those larger objectives be achieved.” Gentry v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 908–09 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Dobson, 419 F.3d 231, 237 (3d Cir. 2005). Thus, a district court must make the culpable participation requirement clear. That occurred here. The Court instructed that to convict the jury must find that each defendant “was a knowing participant in a fraudulent scheme to obtain money . . . 10 from the community college . . . without a right to have it.” App. at 1150. In addition, the Court stated: [T]he defendant cannot be convicted merely because students dropped out of the courses . . . [or ] because the program didn’t work out the way everybody wanted it to. They can be convicted only if, in fact, they knowingly arranged matters, so that they would be paid for—when they shouldn’t— . . . paid money that they were not entitled to receive. .... If that was the arrangement and if, in fact, they knowingly arranged matters so that they collected money for not teaching when they were supposed to be teaching, that would be a basis on which you could find that they acted with fraudulent intent. .... . . . [T]he key to all of these charges is, do you find that the defendant whose case you are considering acted with fraudulent intent? Did they knowingly commit a crime, or were they simply going with the flow of what—of this—and were they—were all of the unfortunate wasting of money the result of poor organization and poor supervision? .... The issue then is, is the Government correct in characterizing this as simply hiring ghost employees for the purpose of draining money away from the community college program that the people did not deserve and . . . kn[ew] they were not entitled to? Was this—in short—a fraudulent scheme to derive money from the community college that the—instead of providing the program that was intended for—went into the pockets of people, who didn’t deserve it? In short, the issue is, were the defendants acting in good faith or were they not? .... And I will emphasize one more time that before you can convict of conspiracy, you must prove that the defendant whose case you are considering was a knowing participant in an illegal scheme. That is to say, a scheme to defraud that he 11 or she knew that that was what was going on and acted with criminal intent. .... As I said, you consider each person’s case separately. App. at 1158–63 (emphasis added). These instructions conveyed the basic point that guilt requires that Weaver knew that he was participating in the fraudulent scheme alleged in the indictment. The instructions drew the proper distinction between unwitting participation in a fraudulent scheme and culpable participation. They are not erroneous.