Opinion ID: 1786819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in denying motions for a new trial or a j.n.o.v.

Text: ¶ 6. Braxton asserts that the circuit erred in denying his motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, his motion for a j.n.o.v. A motion for new trial simply challenges the weight of the evidence. Sheffield v. State, 749 So.2d 123, 127 (Miss. 1999). Accordingly, we will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss.1983). ¶ 7. The standard of review for a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, implicates the sufficiency of the evidence and is set forth as follows: [W]e must, with respect to each element of the offense, consider all of the evidencenot just the evidence which supports the case for the prosecutionin the light most favorable to the verdict. The credible evidence which is consistent with the guilt must be accepted as true. The prosecution must be given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Matters regarding the weight and credibility to be accorded the evidence are to be resolved by the jury. We may reverse only where, with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fairminded jurors could only find the accused not guilty. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1087 (Miss.1998). Specifically, Braxton contends that the Mitchell's prior history of drug abuse challenges her credibility and that [Mitchell] seeks to create a case where there is none. This Court disagrees and finds the circuit court properly denied Braxton's motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, his motion for a j.n.o.v. ¶ 8. In the present case, Mitchell had worked as a confidential informant for five years. Both officers testified that Mitchell had a history of being a reliable informant. Braxton, however, alleges that Mitchell's prior drug usage makes her testimony unreliable. Braxton further contends that Mitchell creates the case because she was out of work, had a drug habit, and was paid money by law enforcement for each drug sale she secured. At trial, Mitchell did, in fact, testify that she has and does use drugs. Mitchell further testified to the events surrounding the transaction. The videotape corroborated Mitchell's testimony and was shown to the jury. While it is true that the videotape does not actually show the 5 rocks of cocaine, it does show Mitchell's tightly clinched fist from the time of the transaction until the moment she handed the rocks to Officer Errington. ¶ 9. Additionally, the jury heard Braxton testify that he was simply contracting to take pictures for Mitchell. The jury might, however, question why Braxton would orally contract to make pictures on a road behind a convenience store or why Braxton never took the pictures he supposedly contracted to take. The jury further heard Officers Errington and Davis testify that they thoroughly searched Mitchell and her vehicle before and after the transaction and found no signs of narcotics, other than the 5 rocks she handed Officer Errington immediately following the meeting with Braxton. ¶ 10. It is enough to say that the jury, and not the reviewing court, judges the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight and worth of their conflicting testimony. Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980). In the present case, sufficient evidence was introduced so that a reasonable juror could have found Braxton guilty of selling cocaine. Furthermore, the jury's resolution of the case did not present an unconscionable injustice. The State provided ample evidence to support the verdict, and we find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Braxton a new trial, in or in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.