Opinion ID: 2629622
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: SCC Treatment

Text: ¶ 22 Duncan's remaining arguments focus on the trial court's decision not to allow expert testimony regarding the effectiveness of the treatment program at the SCC. He first argues that his due process rights were violated when the trial court precluded him from meaningfully cross-examining the State's expert witness, Dr. Paul Spizman. The State called Dr. Spizman to testify about Duncan's behavior at the SCC and about his failure to participate in treatment. On direct examination, Spizman testified that he didn't see any indication that he [Duncan] has fully invested himself for any significant period of time in the treatment program. RP (Nov. 4, 2005) at 1407. Later, defense counsel attempted to cross examine Dr. Spizman about the overall successes or failures of treatment at the SCC and the State objected. The trial court affirmed the objection, reasoning that evidence of the general effectiveness of the treatment program at the SCC was irrelevant. The judge noted that the case was about Duncan, not about the treatment program at the SCC. ¶ 23 Under ER 611(b), cross examination should be limited to the issues that were raised on direct. The State focused its direct examination of Dr. Spizman on issues pertaining specifically to Duncan's willingness to participate in treatment and Duncan's personal successes or failures within the program. The trial judge allowed Duncan to question Dr. Spizman about how success in treatment was measured for individuals engaged in the program and about Duncan's individual progress. But it was within the judge's discretion to determine whether cross examination regarding the general success rate of the entire SCC program was appropriate for a case that dealt with the specific issue of whether Duncan was an SVP and not with whether the treatment offered was effective. See In re Det. of Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 403-04, 986 P.2d 790 (1999). We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion. ¶ 24 Duncan's second argument on this issue is based on the trial court's decision to preclude Duncan from eliciting testimony regarding the effectiveness of the SCC treatment program from his own expert witness, Dr. Robert Halon. Duncan attempted to ask Dr. Halon about the quality of the SCC program, and the State objected arguing that the issue was irrelevant. The trial court agreed and excluded testimony from Dr. Halon on this issue. ¶ 25 Again, the trial court determined that testimony regarding the success rate of the SCC treatment program was beyond the scope of the issue in this case; namely, whether Duncan was likely to reoffend. The Court of Appeals in reaching its decision reasoned that the SCC program is barely relevant to the question of whether Duncan was likely to reoffend and that it in any event, is a side issue. In re Duncan, 142 Wash.App. at 109-10, 174 P.3d 136. We agree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting testimony on this issue.