Opinion ID: 186552
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The 2000 Listing Petition

Text: 16 The district court amended its judgment and dismissed as moot the Fund's claim under the ESA because the finding the Service issued in January 2003 fully cured the defects of its September 2000 letter, 311 F.Supp.2d at 8. We review the district court's determination of mootness de novo. City of Houston v. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 24 F.3d 1421, 1426 (1994). 17 The Fund argues the 90-day finding did not supercede or amend the earlier letter, which addressed the Fund's petition to initiate emergency listing under section 1533(b)(7) of the ESA. Under the Fund's theory, the Service conclusively decided the issue of emergency listing in 2000, as evidenced by the letter. The district court, by this account, erred when it decided retroactively [to] dismiss [the Fund's] claim concerning the Service's September 2000 decision denying emergency listing because an extra-record, post-hoc document issued in January 2003 somehow cured the agency's failure to provide a coherent statement of reasons in September 2000. Moreover, the Fund points out that on its face the 90-day finding does not purport to `repromulgate,' `revise,' cancel, modify, or supercede the September 2000 emergency listing decision in any way. 18 In response the Service contends that a negative determination on the 90-day finding necessarily meant that emergency listing was not warranted. In addition, the Service argues that although it responded promptly to the Fund by letter, it was under no obligation to respond at all because the statutory and regulatory provisions addressing emergency listing do not provide for petitions. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 424.14. 19 Contrary to the Fund's suggestion, the ESA clearly establishes but a single petition process for listing a species as endangered or threatened, see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A); there is no separate process in the ESA or its implementing regulations for requesting an emergency listing as opposed to a non-emergency listing. Although § 1533(b)(7) does permit the Secretary to list a species based upon an emergency posing a significant risk to the well-being of [that] species, that type of listing is expressly committed to the Secretary's discretion, the exercise of which is not structured by any statutorily prescribed criteria or procedures. The Fund therefore had no statutory right to petition the Secretary for an emergency listing under § 1533(b)(7), and no right to a decision meeting any particular procedural or substantive standards. Insofar as the Service's letter of September 2000 addressed the Fund's petition for non-emergency listing, the district court did not err in dismissing as moot the Fund's claim because the letter was superceded in full by the belated 90-day finding. This sequence of events is analogous to the merger of a preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction, upon which an appeal from the grant of [the] preliminary injunction becomes moot. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 314, 119 S.Ct. 1961, 144 L.Ed.2d 319 (1999).