Opinion ID: 1559317
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the circuit court erred in its summary judgment decisions.

Text: ¶ 14. A conclusory, self-serving affidavit, unsupported by material facts relevant to the proposition at issue, is insufficient as a basis to grant summary judgment. See Burton, 730 So.2d at 9 (Miss.1997). See also Hubbard v. Wansley, 954 So.2d 951, 965-66 (Miss.2007); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996). In Burton, a wrongful-death case involving a nursing home, professional services, including nursing treatment, were contractually excluded from insurance coverage. Burton, 730 So.2d at 5. A nurse's aide submitted an affidavit, in which she claimed that, in giving a bath to a nursing-home resident, she had provided nursing treatment. Id. at 3. This Court, in a unanimous opinion, reversed the trial court by finding that the term nursing treatment was ambiguous, and that the affidavit, as a self-serving, conclusory statement, could not form the basis of summary judgment evidence. Id. at 9. The Burton Court held further that, as the party moving for summary judgment, Choctaw County bore the burden of persuading the trial court that no genuine issue of material fact exist[ed]. Id. at 4; see Frank v. Dore, 635 So.2d 1369, 1373 (Miss.1994). Here, the moving party, CSI, has the burden of production, persuasion and proof, as it would have the burden of proof at trial as the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action. See Calvert v. Griggs, 992 So.2d 627, 632 (Miss.2008); 26 C.J.S. Burden of Proof § 145 pp. 243-44 (2001). ¶ 15. The majority of cases illustrating this point of law involve the burden of summary-judgment nonmovants. See Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 964; Evan Johnson & Sons Constr., Inc. v. State, 877 So.2d 360, 365-66 (Miss.2004); Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047. In every case, before any burden falls to the nonmovant, the party moving for summary judgment first must have met its burden under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Van v. Grand Casinos of Miss., Inc., 767 So.2d 1014, 1017-18 (Miss.2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Our disdain for conclusory, self-serving affidavits applies equally to summary-judgment movants and nonmovants, especially considering our requirement to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Daniels, 629 So.2d at 599. ¶ 16. In Hubbard, the plaintiff's expert submitted multiple affidavits, the second of which was found to be conclusory in an effort to cure contradictory deposition testimony. Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 965-66 (affidavits which are `almost wholly conclusory' are `less than satisfactory') (quoting Walker v. Skiwski, 529 So.2d 184, 187 n. 2 (Miss.1988)). Further, the Hubbard Court found that the affidavit contained `magical' language without real facts to back it up. Hubbard, 954 So.2d at 965. This is not unlike CSI's tracking of contractual language in the affidavit to shore up its new position. CSI's conclusory affidavit was offered without foundation in fact as to how, when, and why CSI determined that continuation of the contract was detrimental to its well-being, reputation, and goodwill. ¶ 17. The relevant portions (paragraphs 5-8) of the Meena affidavit are as follows: Mr. Dalton's was one of approximately ninety (90) agency relationships terminated by [CSI] at my direction in late 2003 and early 2004.[CSI]'s decision to discontinue the use of independent agents was in large part due to the administrative burdens that it had experienced in managing independent agents throughout its service area. These administrative burdens included assigning a dedicated management employee to oversee the agents, keeping up with commissions earned by the agents, which did not vest until the customer had remained with [CSI] for a pre-determined period of time, and insuring that agents were marketing [CSI]'s service in a manner consistent with [CSI]'s corporate marketing strategy. At or about the same time that I made the decision to terminate the independent agents used by [CSI], [CSI]'s own network of company-owned retail stores had become sufficient to perform its necessary retail functions. [CSI]'s reputation for good customer service and the uniformity of the customers' experiences in dealing with [CSI], regardless of whether they contact [CSI] by visiting its stores, calling on the telephone or using the [CSI] website, are critical to [CSI]'s ability to maintain and grow its customer base. At the time I made the decision to terminate the use of agents, I believed and still do believe that [CSI] is better able to maintain its overall customer service standards without the use of independent agents. To the best of [CSI]'s and my knowledge, Dalton's agency was a successful agency in terms of sales. However, it was impractical for CSI to maintain some agents while terminating others, since the administrative burden of maintaining a few agents would have been very similar to the burden of maintaining them all. For these reasons, I determined that continuation of [CSI]'s agency relationships, including Dalton's, would be detrimental to the overall well-being, reputation and goodwill of [CSI]. Dalton, 20 So.3d at 1251, 2008 WL 4212553, at . The affidavit posits Meena's belief that continuation would be detrimental to the overall well being, reputation and goodwill of [CSI]. The claimed administrative burdens, if any, might or might not affect CSI's financial well-being, but we discern no evidence of detriment to CSI's reputation and good will, as the contract requires. ¶ 18. We find that CSI failed to satisfy the requirements for the grant of summary judgment, as it provided only a conclusory, self-serving affidavit in support thereof. Given our summary-judgment standard of review, we decline to affirm summary judgment in favor of CSI. Likewise, concerning Dalton's motion for partial summary judgment, we find it wanting for similar reasons. Dalton has failed to show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.