Opinion ID: 1173462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: unavoidable and special circumstance points

Text: Rose also argues that the CFEC should have awarded him a total of eleven points under the special circumstances [14] and unavoidable circumstances [15] provisions. At issue is whether an administrative closure of a fishery, which deprives an applicant of the opportunity to fish and thus, indirectly, of the opportunity to qualify for an award of points, constitutes a special or unavoidable circumstance within the context of the regulatory system. Rose's position on appeal is untenable for two reasons, either of which, in our view, is sufficient to uphold the denial of both unavoidable and special circumstance points. The principal argument advanced in the CFEC decision was that 20 AAC 05.650(a) denied all points to an applicant for any year in which there was an administrative closure for the entire season. The CFEC reasoned that this regulation has precedence over both provisions concerning the availability of discretionary points. In this regard, the relevant portion of the CFEC decision provided: When regulations governing application for the Prince William Sound purse seine fishery for salmon were adopted following a period for public comment, the Commission believed that fishery to fall under 20 AAC 05.650(a), granting 0 points for any year in which there was an administrative closure for the entire season. Consequently, related regulations such as 20 AAC 05.630(c)(1) and (2) dealing with consistent participation and income dependence for 1972 in the Prince William Sound purse seine fishery do not allow points to be received. We agree. One indication whether an agency has proceeded in the manner required by law is compliance with its own regulations. Jager v. State, 537 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Alaska 1975); see Mukluk Freight Lines, Inc. v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 516 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1973). Pursuant to 20 AAC 05.650(a), no applicant in the Prince William Sound purse seine fishery could receive any points for the year 1972. To countenance the award of discretionary points, under the guise of labeling the administrative closure a special or unavoidable circumstance, renders 20 AAC 05.650(a) meaningless. As a consequence, neither unavoidable circumstances points or special circumstances points are available for any hardship resultant from the 1972 administrative closure of the Prince William Sound purse seine fishery. On appeal, the CFEC sustains the denial of discretionary points by arguing that both the unavoidable circumstances and the special circumstances provisions comprehend only those particularized occurrences which affect an applicant uniquely. [16] Absent the requisite showing of non-universality, an applicant is not entitled to an award of discretionary points. The CFEC thus submits that the 1972 closure of the Prince William Sound purse seine fishery affected all participants similarly, and that, consequently, the administrative closure cannot serve as the basis for an award of either unavoidable or special circumstance points. We note at the outset the limited scope of our review. Two related inquiries are at issue  the CFEC's interpretation of the special circumstances and the unavoidable circumstances provisions, and the CFEC's ultimate determination that Rose's particular factual circumstances did not merit the award of discretionary points. An agency's interpretation of its own regulation presents a question of law. [17] We have oftentimes noted that the deferential reasonable basis standard of review is appropriate where a question of law implicates the agency's expertise as to complex matters or as to the formulation of fundamental policy. Compare Weaver Bros., Inc. v. Alaska Transportation Commission, 588 P.2d 819, 821 (Alaska 1978) (reasonable basis) with State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Templeton, 598 P.2d 77, 80 (Alaska 1979) (independent judgment). See generally Jager v. State, 537 P.2d at 1107 (Alaska 1975); Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 916-17 (Alaska 1971). In addition, where an agency interprets its own regulation, as in the present case, a deferential standard of review properly recognizes that the agency is best able to discern its intent in promulgating the regulation at issue. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.22, at 105-08 (2d ed., 1979). Rose's assertion that the interpretation of special and unavoidable requires no particular expertise to the contrary, we think it plain that the determination of the parameters of the discretionary point provisions is an integral part of the more general process of assessing an applicant's relative hardship if excluded from the fishery. This process, expressly delegated to the CFEC by the legislature, entails both administrative expertise and the formulation of fundamental policy. As the superior court observed, this process will not lightly be interfered with by this court. Accordingly, our inquiry is limited to determining whether there is a reasonable basis to the Commission's interpretation of the regulations. [18] It follows, further, that once the interpretation of the regulations is resolved, the Commission's application of the law to the particular factual circumstances presented by Rose is a matter committed to the Commission's sound discretion. Consequently, our scope of review is limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. State, Department of Administration v. Bowers Office Products, Inc., 621 P.2d 11, 13 (Alaska 1980) quoting, North Slope Borough v. LeResche, 581 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Alaska 1978). Rose first submits that an interpretation of unavoidable to include some notion of uniqueness distorts the commonly understood meaning of unavoidable. The evolution of the unavoidable circumstances provision, 20 AAC 05.630(a)(5), however, supports the Commission's interpretation. Formerly both provisions pertaining to the award of discretionary points provided that such points could be awarded for special circumstances. The provision pertaining to the award of discretionary past participation points was amended in April of 1975 (Reg. 54, Apr. 7, 1975) to read unavoidable circumstances. The Commission has consistently distinguished between the ambit of special and unavoidable. The following passage from CFEC File No. 75-28 (Aug. 4, 1975) is illustrative: The word `special' implies connotations different from that of `unavoidable,' particularly in light of the regulatory amendment to Section 630(a)(4) [sic], which changed the term `special' to `unavoidable' while not at the same time changing the term `special' as used in section 630(b)(2). By its nature, `special' implies a broader set of circumstances than does the term `unavoidable', since it assumes that the usual has not occurred, or conversely, that something unusual has occurred. The regulation does not specify that the circumstances be a result of unavoidable conditions. As the quoted passage reflects, the amendment to 20 AAC 05.630(a)(5) was intended to narrow the circumstances under which past and consistent participation points would be awarded. We conclude, therefore, that it is reasonable for the Commission to interpret unavoidable to include some notion of special. For an occurrence to qualify as an unavoidable circumstance, that situation must be both special and unavoidable as those terms are understood within the context of the regulations. In the present case, the administrative closure of the Prince William Sound purse seine fishery in 1972 undeniably made Rose's non-participation unavoidable. [19] It was not, however, a special or unique situation. The closure affected all participants in the fishery similarly, and was specifically provided for in the regulations by a provision which denied participation points to all applicants. Thus, we think the CFEC's interpretation of unavoidable is reasonable, and its discretion not to award past or consistent participation points on the basis of the unavoidable circumstances provision should be upheld. Rose next argues that even accepting that the special circumstances provision encompasses an element of uniqueness or nonuniversality, the 1972 closure affected first-year license holders, like himself, in a fashion different than other participants in the fishery. Rose, in essence, argues that the 1972 administrative closure was special because when coupled with the Commission's decision to substitute 1971 for 1972 and 1970 for 1971 in determining an applicant's economic dependence on the fishery, first-year gear holders were affected in a uniquely adverse manner. Rose, along with other first-year gear holders, did not qualify for an award of economic dependence points pursuant to this system because in the substituted years, 1970 and 1971, he was not a gear license holder. In large part, Rose's disagreement with the Commission's interpretation of what constitutes special circumstances merely restates the equal protection argument addressed previously. It would indeed be anomalous to hold that the Commission's regulatory response to the 1972 administrative closure did not deprive first-year gear holders of equal protection of the law, yet at the same time hold that the Commission must award discretionary special circumstances points to these very same parties out of concern for the disproportionate impact of the regulations. We conclude that the administrative closure of the fishery had universal effect. No purse seining was allowed and, consequently, no economic dependence (or participation) points were awarded for 1972. See 20 AAC 05.650(a). The cumulative effect of the administrative closure and the Commission's resultant regulatory response does not transpose an occurrence of universal effect, the administrative closure, to a special circumstance warranting the award of discretionary points. We acknowledge, in this regard, that Rose derived a substantial portion of his income from the fishery in the years surrounding 1972. [20] Yet, Rose's failure to obtain an award of economic dependence points is not directly attributable to the closure of the fishery in 1972. That Rose may well have received economic dependence points had the fishery not been closed is irrelevant. No parties received economic dependence points to reflect the income they could have derived from the fishery in 1972. Rose's failure to obtain points for either 1970 or 1971 is due solely to the fact that he did not then hold a gear license, and like all other crewmen employed in the fishery, he thus did not qualify for an award of economic dependence points. It is equally clear that Rose's income dependence in 1973 and 1974 has no bearing on the award of economic dependence points. We conclude, therefore, that it was reasonable for the CFEC to deny Rose an award of special circumstances points. The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. RABINOWITZ, C.J., dissents.