Opinion ID: 2680424
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New York Probate Law

Text: Having concluded that state law governs whether liability may be imposed against the beneficiaries of Rockefeller’s estate, we turn next to Asarco’s arguments based on New York law. The relevant New York statute provides: 19 Subject to the other provisions of this article, distributees and testamentary beneficiaries are liable, in an action, to the extent of the value of any property received by them as such, for the debts and reasonable funeral expenses of a decedent, the expenses of administering his estate and all taxes for which the estate is liable, which have not previously been recovered from the personal representative or from any other source . . . . N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 12‐1.1(a).6 The relevant question is whether the “debts . . . of a decedent” may arise as a result of legislation enacted following the decedent’s death, and which has been expressly made retroactive. “CERCLA by its terms has unlimited retroactivity,” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001), and it is by now settled that Congress intended CERCLA to have such retroactive effect. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986). Such retroactive application does not violate the due process clause, and does not convert CERCLA into a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d 6 The law in effect at the time of Rockefeller’s death was Decedent Estate Law § 170, which was materially similar to N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 12‐1.1(a). See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. Joseph Wechsler Estate, 259 N.Y. 9, 12‐13 (1932) (quoting that statute: “An action may be maintained, as prescribed in this article, against the . . . legatees of a testator to recover, to the extent of the assets paid or distributed to them, for a debt of the decedent . . . .”). 20 at 174‐75. Although Asarco does not identify any case in which New York courts have interpreted “debts . . . of a decedent” to include debts created by post‐ demise legislation that has been expressly made retroactive, and is not otherwise constitutionally infirm, it does cite cases that might support such a conclusion by negative pregnant. Essentially, those cases hold that New York courts will generally presume that New York statutes do not impose liability retroactively on the estates of decedents, and will not consider as “debts . . . of a decedent” liabilities retrospectively imposed by legislation after the decedent’s death where such retrospective imposition would be unconstitutional.7 Asarco argues that we can infer that New York law would recognize as such debts liabilities retrospectively imposed where, as in the case of CERCLA, the legislature clearly 7 See, e.g., In re Malavase, 133 A.D.2d 759, 760 (2d Dep’t 1987) (“It has been repeatedly held that the rights of individuals who may have an interest in a decedent’s estate are fixed as of the date of death. Thus, the Legislature is presumed not to have intended to deprive those individuals of their rights through the retroactive operation of a statute passed after the date of death.”); In re Kania’s Estate, 126 N.Y.S.2d 395, 400 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. Broome County 1953) (“It is well established that, even in an instance where it intended to do so, the Legislature is without power to enact a law which destroys or impairs pre‐ existing vested rights, titles and interests. A statute which assumes to do so is sometimes regarded as being in violation of the ‘due process of law’ provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions.”); id. at 401 (“Cases upholding the protection of vested property rights against the operation of an ‘ex post facto’ statute are very numerous.”). 21 did intend to impose such liability and the statute has been held constitutional. We are hesitant to rely on inference to decide an important issue of New York law. We might, of course, certify the issue to the New York Court of Appeals for its definitive resolution. See Second Cir. Local R. 27.2(a); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs., tit. 22, § 500.27(a); see also N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 3(b)(9). We do not do so in this case, however, because the answer to the potential “certified question is [not] determinative of a claim before us.” In re Thelen, 736 F.3d at 224 (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the conclusions we reach below regarding the statute of limitations, even if New York would consider liabilities imposed by CERCLA long after Rockefeller’s death to be “debts . . . of a decedent” chargeable to his estate or its beneficiaries, Asarco’s claims are, in any event, time‐barred. We therefore assume arguendo that New York law would permit the imposition of liability against John Rockefeller’s testamentary trusts under these circumstances, and proceed to consider the statute of limitations issues.