Opinion ID: 3064640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Crowe’s Sentence

Text: Finally, Crowe argues that her sentence of thirty-two months of imprisonment is unreasonable under Booker13 and Kimbrough14 because (1) the district court misinterpreted the 12 Crowe also argues the admission of testimony by an investigating officer concerning the February 2006 incident violated her rights under the Due Process and Confrontation Clauses, citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). But the trial testimony of Officer Timothy Lingle concerning his investigation of the February 2006 incident was footed almost entirely upon his own observations and statements made to him at that time by Ms. Crowe herself. Crowe does not explain how her own out-of-court statements raise hearsay or Confrontation Clause concerns, cf. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (admissions by party-opponent), and at trial, her counsel could—and did —cross-examine the officer about what he had observed and what Crowe had told him about the February 2006 incident. 13 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-65 (2005); see United States v. Dallman, 533 F.3d 755, 760-761 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Booker directs that we review the overall reasonableness of [the defendant’s] sentence and that our review be guided by the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” (footnote omitted)). 14 Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), concluded that a sentence outside the guidelines range is not per se unreasonable when it is based on a disagreement with the sentencing policy reflected in particular guidelines provisions. Id. at 564. UNITED STATES v. CROWE 4859 facts surrounding the death of Donald Eagleman, ignoring Crowe’s evidence concerning her claim of self-defense and the victim’s behavior that night, as well as his prior violent conduct toward her; (2) the term imposed is greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553; (3) the federal sentencing guidelines routinely “produce a range of sentences that are unconscionably too long”; and (4) the victim’s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense conduct, warranting a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. Although Crowe concedes that the district court’s calculation of the applicable advisory Sentencing Guidelines range (27-33 months) was correct, taking into account her criminal history reflecting no prior criminal convictions, and that her thirty-two-month sentence falls within that range, she argues that “apart from the rote recitation of § 3553(a) factors and applicable Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases,” the district court’s sentencing analysis “was not ‘reasoned’ ” as the law requires, citing United States v. Rita, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468-69 (2007). When reviewing a sentence, we first consider “whether the district court committed significant procedural error,” including an incorrect Sentencing Guidelines determination. United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (citing Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007)), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2491 (2008). We next consider whether, in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),15 the dis15 These factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentences and the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines; (5) pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants who have similar criminal records and have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “These factors are to be applied parsimoniously—the sentence must be ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes’ of punishment.” United States v. Barsumyan, 517 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 4860 UNITED STATES v. CROWE trict court abused its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence. Id. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, its application of the Guidelines to the facts for an abuse of discretion, and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Garro, 517 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008). Appellate review of the severity of Crowe’s sentence is limited “to determin[ing] whether the sentence is reasonable; only a procedurally erroneous or substantively unreasonable sentence will be set aside,” and the abuse of discretion standard applies. Carty, 520 F.3d at 993.16 At Crowe’s sentencing, the district court explained that it had considered all of the statutory factors under § 3553(a), and detailed its evaluation of Crowe’s personal culpability and her claim of self-defense, explaining Crowe’s sentence primarily in terms of the nature and seriousness of the offense and the need for just punishment—both of which are statutory sentencing factors under § 3553(a)(1) and (2)(A).17 The district court rejected Crowe’s argument as to her diminished culpability, explaining that “the conduct of the decedent did not warrant the level of attack that you inflicted upon him with a knife, and the infliction in that process of fatal wounds,” that “such unexcused acts of violence have consequences under the law,” and that the facts did not warrant a downward departure from the applicable Sentencing Guide16 A substantively reasonable sentence is one that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to accomplish § 3553(a)(2)’s sentencing goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 804-05 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming sentence as reasonable where the record shows the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence that was sufficient but no greater than necessary to comply with § 3553(a)); United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 441 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). 17 As to these factors, Crowe’s Sentencing Memorandum conceded that “the seriousness of the offense cannot be challenged,” and asserted that “[i]n light of all pertinent sentencing factors, a sentence at or below the low end of the advisory guideline range promotes respect for the law and provides just punishment.” UNITED STATES v. CROWE 4861 line range in this case.18 Crowe disputes the district court’s characterization of Eagleman’s stabbing as an “unexcused” act of violence, but by finding her guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the jury had already determined Crowe’s act to be unexcused, at least to that extent.19 [8] In arguing more broadly that the federal Sentencing Guidelines routinely recommend sentences that are “unconscionably too long,” Crowe assails them with little more than anecdotes,20 which by themselves cannot justify excluding the Guidelines per se from consideration as one statutory factor under § 3553(a)(4)— just as they were treated in the context of this case. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 991 (the sentencing guidelines “are one factor among the § 3553(a) factors that are to be taken into account in arriving at an appropriate sentence” (citations omitted)). The district court properly treated the Guidelines range as a baseline, considered the factors enumerated in § 3553(a) in 18 In denying a downward departure, the district court also discussed the relative leniency of the applicable guidelines sentencing range in dealing with the killing of an unarmed man using a deadly weapon. Of course, after Booker “the scheme of downward and upward ‘departures’ [is] essentially replaced by the requirement that judges impose a ‘reasonable’ sentence.” United States v. Mohamed, 459 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 2006). “Booker’s mandate that we review a sentence for reasonableness now permits us to consider what we previously could not—the district court’s decision not to impose a lesser sentence” on grounds justifying a downward departure under the guidelines, at least to the extent that the decision implicates the overall reasonableness of the sentence. Dallman, 533 F.3d at 761. 19 Crowe acknowledged as much in her Sentencing Memorandum: “As the salient facts surrounding the incident unquestionably show, Ms. Crowe’s actions were understandable, if not completely excusable in the jury’s eyes.” (Emphasis added.) 20 Crowe points to the Presidential commutation of Lewis “Scooter” Libby’s thirty-month sentence for perjury and obstruction of justice as an example. 4862 UNITED STATES v. CROWE tailoring Crowe’s sentence to suit her offense of conviction,21 and arrived at a sentence it determined is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to accomplish § 3553’s sentencing goals—a sentence not more than five months longer than the low end of the applicable Guidelines range, which Crowe had asserted would be an appropriate sentence. As in Rita, 127 S. Ct. AT 2469,22 the district court sufficiently “listened to each argument,” “considered the supporting evidence” as well as Crowe’s personal circumstances and “imposed a sentence that takes them into account.” Crowe has not demonstrated how, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the district court abused its discretion in imposing her sentence. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 988. [9] We thus conclude that the sentence imposed by the district court was given sufficient explanation by the district court to permit effective appellate review, and is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97, 600-02; Carty, 520 F.3d at 993; Dallman, 533 F.3d at 760-761. We affirm it in all respects. AFFIRMED. 21 We give deference to the district court’s weighing of those factors. See United States v. Ruff, 535 F.3d 999, 1003 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e must defer to the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Carter, Nos. 05-50303, 05-50321, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 805801, at  (9th Cir., March 30, 2009) (“The Supreme Court has directed us to give substantial deference to the district court’s determination because it is better situated than we are to determine an appropriate sentence.” (citing Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597-98)). 22 In Rita, the Court affirmed as reasonable a sentence of thirty-three months’ imprisonment for perjury and obstruction of justice. 127 S. Ct. at 2470.