Opinion ID: 571328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Nazemian's Statements Made Via An Interpreter.

Text: 8 Nazemian argues that the testimony of Agent Eaton as to statements made by her during the course of four meetings held in Paris in June, 1986, was inadmissible hearsay and violated the confrontation clause because Agent Eaton was not able to understand her statements directly, but only heard them as translated by an interpreter, who did not testify at trial. 3 Nazemian did not object to the admission of the testimony at trial. However, we have held repeatedly under the plain error doctrine that a contention that the government failed to comply with the confrontation clause involves substantial rights and thus must be reviewed even in the absence of a timely objection. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1233 n. 6 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir.1984). 9 In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), the Supreme Court set out a two-pronged test for evaluating alleged confrontation clause violations. Where a defendant claims that an out-of-court statement was received into evidence in violation of the confrontation clause, the record must show that the government produced the declarant or presented facts showing that such person was unavailable. Secondly, the government must prove that the declarant's statements are trustworthy. Ordonez, 737 F.2d at 802. 10 Before we reach the two-prong analysis, however, we must consider as a threshold matter whether the interpreter or Nazemian should be viewed as the declarant. 4 If the statements properly are viewed as Nazemian's own, then there would be no confrontation clause issue since Nazemian cannot claim that she was denied the opportunity to confront herself. This is somewhat analogous to an adoptive admission, which some courts have held to avoid[ ] the confrontation problem because the words of the hearsay become the words of the defendant. Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730 (6th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1259, 71 L.Ed.2d 450 (1982). This threshold question likewise controls the hearsay analysis. If the statements are viewed as Nazemian's own, they would constitute admissions properly characterized as non-hearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(C) or (D). 11 Authority is sparse on the treatment of extrajudicial statements through interpreters. 5 While many of the early state cases and a number of contemporary state cases take the position that the statement of an interpreter constitutes inadmissible hearsay, see cases collected in Annotation, Admissibility of Testimony Concerning Extrajudicial Statements Made To, or in Presence of, Witness Through an Interpreter, 12 A.L.R.4th 1016, 1021-22 (1982), all of the federal circuits which have considered the question recently have taken the view that the translator may in some circumstances be viewed as an agent of the defendant, and the translation hence be attributable to the defendant as her own admission. See United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2nd Cir.1983); United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 859-60 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 905, 106 S.Ct. 274, 88 L.Ed.2d 235 (1985). Other cases have taken the view that there is no hearsay problem where the interpreter acts merely as a language conduit, United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2nd Cir.1989); see also United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir.1973) (per curiam) (holding testimony of interpreter admissible where he was acting as a mere conduit); or where the testimony is offered to prove that a statement was made and not the truth of the statement. United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 478, 24 L.Ed.2d 452 (1969) (testimony of witness in prosecution for contempt of order prohibiting public statements about a pending case admissible even though the witness heard the statements only via translation by a police officer sitting next to him). 12 This circuit has not squarely addressed the issue of how to treat extrajudicial statements made through an interpreter when the testifying witness was unable to understand the original language of the declarant and can testify only to the words of the interpreter. In Ushakow, the question was whether the testimony of the translator as to a conversation between the defendant and a third party would be admissible where the defendant only understood one of the languages involved. The panel held that where the translator acted as a mere conduit, the statements made by both parties would be treated for hearsay purposes as if the defendant and the third person conducted the conversation in the same language. The Ninth Circuit has touched on the question of when the agency-language conduit theory would apply to testimony by the listener in United States v. Felix-Jerez, 667 F.2d 1297, 1300 n. 1 (9th Cir.1982) (stating that where the guard/translator was not appointed by a court as an interpreter ... [and] was not named or appointed by the defendant to act as his agent, and where there was an obvious conflict of interest between them, the agency-language conduit theory was inapplicable). 13 Felix-Jerez assumes, without deciding, that this circuit would apply the agency or language conduit theories in some circumstances, but suggests a more rigid and formalistic application of the agency theory than that adopted by the other circuits which have addressed the question. We need not adhere to Felix-Jerez's suggested strict approach since its treatment of the issue was clearly dicta. 6 From a practical standpoint, were we to adopt the approach taken by Felix-Jerez, rigidly requiring either that a court appoint or the defendant himself actually provide the translator in order to attribute the statements to the defendant, it would result in a largely arbitrary distinction between the admissibility of statements by English and non-English speakers and between non-English speakers who bring their own translator and those who do not. 7 14 The better approach is to consider on a case-by-case basis whether the translated statements fairly should be considered the statements of the speaker. One commentator has asserted that [p]rovided the interpreter has a sufficient capacity, and there is no motive to misrepresent, the interpreter is treated as the agent of the party and the statement is admitted as an admission unless circumstances are present which would negate the presumption of agency. 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence p 801(d)(2)(C) at 801-217 n. 34 (1988); see also, 6 Wigmore Evidence § 1810(2) at 376 and 812(4) at 283. We need not resolve here whether there is a presumption of agency, or where the burden of proving agency or lack of agency lies, because in this case we review only for plain error and Nazemian has offered nothing to suggest that the interpreter should not have been treated as a language conduit. 15 The circuits which have considered the question have recognized a number of factors which may be relevant in determining whether the interpreter's statements should be attributed to the defendant under either the agency or conduit theory, such as which party supplied the interpreter, whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort, the interpreter's qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements as translated. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 503 F.2d 710, 717 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053, 95 S.Ct. 632, 42 L.Ed.2d 649 (1974). Nazemian argues that a number of these factors tilt the scales in favor of a finding that the interpreter's statements are not properly attributable to her. She contends that the interpreter, as a friend of the confidential informant, was aligned with the DEA; that there was no evidence presented as to the interpreter's language competence; and that the translations were additionally rendered unreliable because they were incomplete in nature. 16 Nazemian points to no specific evidence of bias on the part of the interpreter, just the fact that she was provided by the government informant. Other circuits have not held that the fact that the interpreter is provided by the government, in and of itself, is dispositive of the agency question. See United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832 (interpreter was a customs official supplied by the DEA); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d at 1135 (interpreter was employed by the American embassy and procured by the government); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 859 (translation was by one undercover agent for the benefit of another). We likewise do not find it dispositive in this case. 17 Although the government presented no formalized evidence of the interpreter's competence, such as language degrees or certifications, the fact that the interpreter continued in that role over a prolonged period and multiple meetings suggests that the translation must have been competent enough to allow communication between the parties. Again, Nazemian points us to no specific occasions where Agent Eaton's testimony repeating the translated statements did not accurately reflect what she said to him. 18 Nazemian's argument regarding the incompleteness of the translations, which relies heavily on the case of Kalos v. United States, 9 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.1925) (court found no agency relationship sufficient to impute the alleged interpreter's statements to the defendant), is likewise unpersuasive. Kalos is readily distinguishable since the defendant in Kalos had not authorized the interpreter to act as his agent, and the interpreter simply did the talking, rather than translating statements actually made by the defendant. Thus, the defendant had no knowledge of what was being said by either the purported interpreter or the party with which he was conversing. There was also a strong suggestion by the court in Kalos that the interpreter may have had an interest in deflecting blame from himself. 19 In the present case, the interpreter had no role other than translating statements between Agent Eaton and the Farsi-speaking individuals, and was clearly viewed as an interpreter by all parties over the course of repeated, lengthy meetings. Throughout the trial in this case, counsel for Nazemian referred to the interpreter as such. See, e.g., R.T. 188. In addition, Nazemian herself, when she testified at trial regarding the meeting with Mr. Francois, stated Well, of course I couldn't speak French. There was an interpreter. R.T. 814. Finally, unlike the situation in Kalos, the portions of the conversation which were not translated were in Farsi, not French, so that Nazemian was able to understand all of the conversations at the meeting except for the French translations themselves. 20 Given the setting of the conversation in this instance, i.e., an undercover drug negotiation where the DEA agent's goal was to persuade Nazemian of his authenticity and to arrange a drug translation, there would not be any motive to mistranslate, even were the interpreter biased toward the DEA. Indeed, mistranslation potentially could have threatened the DEA's objectives. Finally, both the confidential informant and Ms. Nazemian took subsequent actions which were consistent with Agent Eaton's testimony as to the content of those conversations, providing additional evidence that the translations were accurate. 21 Under the circumstances of this case, it was not plainly erroneous for the district court to treat the interpreter as a mere language conduit or as Nazemian's agent for purposes of conducting conversations with Agent Eaton. Because Nazemian and the translator are therefore treated as identical for testimonial purposes, the admission of Agent Eaton's testimony as to Nazemian's translated statements created neither confrontation clause nor hearsay problems. 22