Opinion ID: 452077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fees for specific phases of the proceedings

Text: 14 The district court included in the lodestar five categories of work (phases I, II, III, VI, and IX) for which the Commonwealth contends that fees cannot be awarded. Before we examine these contentions, we state two general propositions. First, we have no doubt that, by gaining implementation of the consent decree, plaintiff has achieved some success in its efforts and a fee award is therefore appropriate under Sec. 304(d) of the Act. We hold, therefore, that the work done in each of the five phases is compensable if the work contributed to DVCCCA's successful efforts to implement the consent decree. 15 Second, we point out that the district court made certain findings that bear generally upon the relationship between work in these phases and success in implementing the decree. The court stated: 16 During the litigation and up until the present day, there has existed an intense adversarial atmosphere among all concerned parties. The defendants' presence has constantly been dominated by either a policy or an attitude that has tried to prohibit or delay the implementation of the I/M program in response to which the plaintiffs have constantly heldfast to their position, without being totally inflexible. Additionally, plaintiffs have been required to partake in activities which, while not directly required under the consent decree, were sufficiently related to its goals and the ongoing litigation that such efforts should, and will be compensated for in some reasonable measure. 17 These findings, based upon the district court's nine-year experience in this case, are subject to the clearly erroneous rule. We conclude that they should not be disturbed. 18 We now consider whether the district court erred in awarding fees for work performed during the five phases at issue. Phase I involved the portion of the litigation that followed the Commonwealth's initial delay in promulgating proposed regulations for the I/M program as required by the consent decree. The Commonwealth objects to the award of fees for this work because it contends that DVCCCA acted in bad faith in refusing to negotiate what the Commonwealth considered a suitable extension of time for fulfillment of its obligations to publish the proposed regulations. The district court found that DVCCCA had not acted in bad faith, that its actions were appropriate, and indeed that a court order compelling compliance by the Commonwealth was required for the protection of DVCCCA's rights under the decree. 19 Phase II of the litigation primarily involved the submission by DVCCCA of comments to the proposed regulations that were required by the consent decree. The Commonwealth objects to the award of fees for this work because any person may submit comments on proposed regulations and the work was technical, rather than legal. The district court held that because DVCCCA was a party to the consent decree it had a special interest in commenting on the proposed regulations. The district court concluded that DVCCCA's efforts to ensure that the regulations were consistent with the consent decree should be compensated. 20 Phase III involved negotiations over a modification to the consent decree undertaken by the parties in the wake of legislative activity by the Pennsylvania General Assembly designed to thwart its implementation. The district court found that this work was necessitated by the Commonwealth's actions and was vital to the survival of the rights of DVCCCA and of the public under the consent decree. 21 We affirm the district court's decision to award fees for phases I, II, and III for the reasons stated by that court. DVCCCA's work during each of these phases contributed to its successful efforts to enforce the consent decree. The district court's findings are not clearly erroneous, and it correctly applied the law. 22 Phase VI involved plaintiff's successful opposition to the intervention of various Pennsylvania legislators in the underlying action. Defendants also opposed the attempt to intervene. The Commonwealth argues, therefore, that it should not have to pay the fees awarded for work on this phase, and that, if fees are to be awarded, they should be assessed against the proposed intervenors. The district court concluded that the Commonwealth was liable for fees for three reasons: the identity of the legislators was not wholly independent from the identity of the executive; all branches of the Commonwealth were equally bound by the consent decree; and plaintiff's opposition to intervention was necessary for it to protect its rights thereunder. 23 The Commonwealth's position is not without force, but it is ultimately unpersuasive, because in this context we cannot parse out the roles and responsibilities of various branches of the state government. The intentions of the would-be intervenors were subsequently made clear by their instigation of the litigation leading to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Scanlon v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 502 Pa. 577, 590, 467 A.2d 1108, 1115 (1983), which played a role in retarding implementation of the I/M program. As the district court indicated, plaintiff's work was necessary in its continuing struggle, resisted by various agencies of the Commonwealth at every turn, to implement the requirements of the consent decree; an award of fees is therefore appropriate. 24 Finally, the Commonwealth objects to the award of fees for work on phase IX of the litigation. During this phase, DVCCCA submitted an amicus brief in the Scanlon litigation in state court in opposition to an attempt by several members of the Pennsylvania General Assembly to prevent implementation of the I/M program; additionally, DVCCCA participated in EPA regulatory proceedings, opposing the Commonwealth's request to modify its state plan to provide for a reduced coverage area for the I/M program. 25 In regard to the latter portion of the work, the district court properly concluded that, because adoption of the state plan modification would have impaired the rights won by DVCCCA in the consent decree, an award of fees was proper. In regard to DVCCCA's work in state court, the district court concluded that DVCCCA had acted reasonably in deciding that involvement in the state court proceeding was important in vindicating its rights under the consent decree. We agree that the award of fees for this work was proper. By pursuing the battle in the state courts, plaintiff materially aided its position in defense of the consent decree. As with the intervention issue, DVCCCA acted reasonably in refusing to rely on defendants to promote DVCCCA's interests. Plaintiff's amicus brief thus contributed to its ultimately successful efforts to enforce the decree. We will therefore affirm the district court's fee award for phase IX. 7