Opinion ID: 1717460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: custodial interrogation and miranda

Text: In Miranda v. Arizona, supra , and to counter potentially coercive circumstances surrounding a suspect's statement to police officers, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated prerequisites for admissibility of a suspect's in-custody statement(s) obtained in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements, 384 U.S. at 445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, namely, the  Miranda warning, by which law enforcement personnel must inform the person in custody that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Miranda Court continued: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-28, and, If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. [Citation omitted.] This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [citation omitted].... 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Finally, the Court in Miranda concluded that the  Miranda warning serves as a means to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored.... 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. In considering admissibility of a defendant's statement made after invocation of the right to remain silent or the privilege against self-incrimination, this court, in State v. Teater, 209 Neb. 127, 131-33, 306 N.W.2d 596, 599 (1981), stated: This court has previously set out the Miranda -imposed requirements on police officers when a suspect invokes his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel. In State v. Fuller, 203 Neb. 233, 238-39, 278 N.W.2d 756, 759-60 (1979), this court said: Although Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), does not require an absolute halt to all conversations by the police with the defendant once the right to silence is asserted, observance of the constitutional right is tested by the circumstances to determine whether the right was `scrupulously honored.'... Recent cases consider the validity of a subsequent waiver of the once-asserted right to counsel under certain circumstances. [Citations omitted.] These cases hold that the defendant cannot be persuaded to waive his rights and there is a strong presumption against waiver. `If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.' [Citing Miranda v. Arizona . ] In In re Interest of Durand, 206 Neb. 415, 293 N.W.2d 383 (1980), this court said: Once Miranda warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. .... ... The evidence is undisputed that the defendant's assertion of his constitutional right to remain silent and right to counsel was not scrupulously honored. The evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to meet the heavy burden resting on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. The motion to suppress should have been granted. More recently, in State v. LaChappell, 222 Neb. 112, 118-19, 382 N.W.2d 343, 348 (1986), we stated: Once an individual in custody indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he or she wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease, for at this point the individual being interrogated has shown that he or she intends to exercise his or her fifth amendment right to remain silent. [Citations omitted.] Moreover, once the right to remain silent has been invoked, there is a strong presumption against its subsequent waiver. See, also, State v. Joy, 218 Neb. 310, 353 N.W.2d 23 (1984).