Opinion ID: 889744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue One: Did the District Court err in granting summary judgment to ARS and Wilbur Curtis?

Text: ¶ 13 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Old Elk v. Healthy Mothers, Healthy Babies, Inc., 2003 MT 167, ¶ 15, 316 Mont. 320, 73 P.3d 795. The initial burden is on the moving party to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Old Elk, ¶ 15. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. To raise a genuine issue of material fact, the proffered evidence must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious. Id. at ¶ 16. A party is bound by the admissions in its pleadings. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Hill, 266 Mont. 258, 264, 879 P.2d 1158, 1161 (1993).
¶ 14 Generally, a shareholder may not bring a claim that belongs to their corporation. Gullett v. Van Dyke Construction Co., 2005 MT 105, ¶ 14, 327 Mont. 30, 111 P.3d 220; Stott v. Fox, 246 Mont. 301, 306, 805 P.2d 1305, 1308 (1990). ¶ 15 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to ARS. Weaver's complaint states he was representing Glacier Kitchens when he purchased the coffee urn from ARS. Weaver is bound by his pleadings. Farm Credit Bank, 266 Mont. at 264, 879 P.2d at 1161. Any claim against ARS for the defective coffee urn belongs to Glacier Kitchens, not to Weaver personally. As a shareholder, Weaver cannot bring the claim on behalf of Glacier Kitchens. Gullett, ¶ 14; Stott, 246 Mont. at 306, 805 P.2d at 1308. ¶ 16 Weaver was warned about this defect in his complaint. Lack of standing was one of ARS's affirmative defenses  Weaver lacks standing to bring any of the claims arising from the transactions giving rise to any of the claims alleged in the Complaint. Additionally, in response to Weaver's first motion for sanctions, ARS stated Weaver may believe that filing his claims in his individual capacity is proper. Whether this is correct as a matter of law is something he remains free to argue. Ultimately, it is for the Court to decide. Weaver had notice that he should at least consider amending his complaint to include Glacier Kitchens as a plaintiff. Even after receiving notice, Weaver did not attempt to amend his complaint. ¶ 17 Weaver's argument that the statute of limitations controls when he can amend is complaint is unavailing. The statute of limitations is a deadline by which an action must be commenced. If an action is not commenced before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the action is generally barred. Section 27-2-202, MCA (limitations period for an action based on contract). It is clear that Weaver commenced this action before the statute of limitations expired. However, once Weaver commenced the action, the District Court had the authority to set deadlines for amendments to the pleadings. M.R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1); Textana, Inc. v. Klabzuba Oil & Gas, 2009 MT 401, ¶ 80, 353 Mont. 442, 222 P.3d 580. According to the District Court's scheduling order, Weaver had nearly one year to amend his complaint. He did not do so. In fact, no motion to amend was ever filed by Weaver. ¶ 18 Finally, Weaver alleges for the first time on appeal that he has the right to bring this action because Glacier Kitchens is a dissolved/defunct corporation. We do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Belanus, 2010 MT 204, ¶ 17, 357 Mont. 463, 240 P.3d 1021. However, we note that dissolution does not prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name. Section 35-1-935(2)(e), MCA. ¶ 19 We affirm the grant of summary judgment to ARS.
¶ 20 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to Wilbur Curtis. First, as stated above, Weaver, an individual shareholder, cannot maintain an action that belongs to Glacier Kitchens. See ¶ 15 above. ¶ 21 Additionally, the District Court was correct in determining that Weaver, a stranger to the contract under which he sought damages, lacked standing to bring an action for breach of contract. Dick Anderson Construction, Inc. v. Monroe Construction Co., LLC, 2009 MT 416, ¶ 46, 353 Mont. 534, 221 P.3d 675. The obligation of the contract is limited to the contracting parties, and ordinarily only those who are parties to the contract are liable for their breach. Fordyce v. Musick, 245 Mont. 315, 319, 800 P.2d 1045, 1047 (1990). Weaver sought damages under Glacier Kitchens' contract with USFS. Undisputedly, neither Weaver nor Wilbur Curtis was a party to that contract. Therefore, Weaver lacked standing to bring his claim. ¶ 22 We affirm the grant of summary judgment to Wilbur Curtis.