Opinion ID: 788787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background Interpretive Principle

Text: 13 Our analysis is informed by the interpretive principle that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action governing the construction of jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA, as articulated by INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001). Even where the ultimate result is to limit judicial review, the Court cautions that as a matter of the interpretive enterprise itself, the narrower construction of a jurisdiction-stripping provision is favored over the broader one. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 480-482, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's broad reading of § 1252(g)). Our Circuit has applied this admonition to conclude that a jurisdictional bar is not to be expanded beyond its precise language. Kwai Fun Wong v. United States INS, 373 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.2004) (interpreting § 1252(a)(2)(B)).