Opinion ID: 516267
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure of others to develop the product.

Text: 251 Obviousness is not determined by the use of hindsight, the fact that something seems simple to you now does not mean that it was simple at the time it was invented. You must decide the issue of obviousness solely on the basis of what was known by a person with ordinary skill in the art of making window shades at the time of the invention. You must not decide this issue on the basis of what is known now; that is, on the basis of hindsight. 252 The court instructed the jury concerning the meaning and application of the Graham factors. Illustrative of the instructions concerning the Graham factors are the detailed instructions as to the level of skill: 253 In determining the level of ordinary skill in the art, you should first determine whether there was a number of people who regularly worked to solve the type of problem that the invention solved, and, if so, determine the level of ordinary skill of such people at the time the invention was made. You must consider the level of skill as to the time the invention was made. Among the factors that may be considered in your determination are: 254
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259 Neither party has asserted that there was error in the law that the jury was told to apply, including the question presented of whether the defendant 260 has proven by clear and convincing evidence that any of the claims of plaintiff's '770 patent are invalid because they are obvious ... 261 If yes, list claim numbers.... 262 We do not decide whether the trial judge, or an appellate tribunal, could reasonably have reached the independent conclusion that the claims were invalid for obviousness. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946) (it is immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable). The only question is whether a reasonable jury could have held, as this jury did, that the challenger Kenney had failed to show obviousness of any claims by clear and convincing evidence. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 893, 221 USPQ at 673. 263 The evidence before the jury included the following: Prior Art 264 The jury was told of the close prior art; that the Corcoran scored shade material was prior art and was acknowledged in the specification; and that adjustable-width rollers were part of the prior art. Witnesses explained to the jury that the Rice patent described a telescoping roller for use with standard (i.e. non-tearable) shade material, and that the Gossling '468 and Gossling '944 patents disclosed telescoping rollers to which a standard shade is affixed by various adhesive means. 7 265 There was testimony that Ferguson made a new product; and Kenney's own expert witness Donofrio testified as to the differences between Ferguson's invention and the prior art. Witnesses also testified that none of the attachment means or adhesive means disclosed in the prior art was specifically adapted to adjusting and installing a shade without tools. See the trial testimony of Newell's expert witness Bushnell: 266 Q. ... how would you characterize Tom Ferguson's patent on his do it yourself without tools window shade? 267 A. Well, this product apparently has no real antecedent. There was never a product from the testimony I've heard here today and from the prior patents I've seen, that had a roll up window shade that was able to be sized at home without the aid of tools. 268 Kenney's engineer Paul Comeau agreed that the Ferguson shade was a very different shade than he had seen. In its analysis, the district court agreed that No item of prior art teaches a tear shade mounted on a telescoping roller by adhesive means. 606 F.Supp. at 1293, 226 USPQ at 164. Prosecution History 269 It was explained to the jury that the examiner had twice rejected the claims, citing prior art references and also objecting that the claims as filed were too broad. The examiner would not allow the claims until they were amended to include the critical limitation that the shade assembly is width adjustable and installable by the consumer without the use of tools or cutting elements. Level of Skill 270 The parties agreed that this device did not require complex engineering skills. The district court found that a technical background not necessarily amounting to a college degree in engineering was the only reasonable jury finding on the level of skill, and concluded that: 271 This person [of ordinary skill] would be capable of designing a shade such as the one described in Vincent Sordillo's memo. 272 Newell, 606 F.Supp. at 1294, 226 USPQ at 165. The district court was referring to a private memorandum of a Kenney employee. The court recognized that this memorandum was not part of the prior art, although the court apparently drew inferences adverse to Newell from this abandoned idea, and did not discuss whether the jury could have drawn other inferences, favorable to Newell, such as why a person capable of designing a shade, in the district court's words, did not do so. See Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454, 227 USPQ 293, 298 (Fed.Cir.1985). 273 The jury may have given weight to the undisputed fact that despite the availability of the Corcoran shade material and the other prior art, the accused infringer did not make this innovation, criticized its value, and then rushed to copy it. Objective Indicia 274 The district court recognized the outstanding public acceptance of the claimed shade, but dismissed the considerable evidence of commercial success and copying, saying that such copying does not equal nonobviousness of the claimed invention. Newell, 606 F.Supp. at 1296, 226 USPQ at 167. The record shows extensive, uncontradicted evidence before the jury, in many instances the testimony of Kenney's own witnesses, of commercial success, copying, long-felt need, and failure of others: 1. Commercial Success and Long-Felt Need 275 William Uecker, Senior Vice President for Kenney, testified that the market for window shades had been altered by this new shade, which he foresaw as taking half the window shade market: 276 Q. Did you foresee any impact in the cut-in-store shades, for example, by virtue of this do-it-yourself shade? 277 A. I saw that, and probably still do, that the market for stock window shades will end up about fifty percent of what we call the cut window shades and fifty percent of what we call the adjustable window shades. 278 John Donofrio, Kenney's design expert, agreed with the testimony of Uecker: 279 Q. ... Now do you agree, Mr. Donofrio, with the deposition testimony that was read in of Mr. Uecker, that Tom Ferguson's do it yourself without tools window shade was a significant step forward in the window shade art? 280 A. Yes. 281 Q. And do you agree with Mr. Uecker's testimony that there was really nothing like it before? 282 A. Yes. 283 G. Dickson Kenney, defendant's President, discussed the demand in the marketplace for the Newell shade, and Kenney's loss of customers: 284 Q. Now, how did you first learn that, that there was this demand in the marketplace? 285 A. Several companies had come to Kenney and requested that we develop a product similar on their behalf ... And we were aware that there had been some limited, limited successes on the part of Newell and Clopay in switching certain customers from the so-called conventional shade to the size-at-home, and some of these people that switched early in the process were Kenney customers on other products. 286 Mr. Kenney testified that millions of dollars were involved. Mr. Wright, Operations Manager for Kenney, stated that a reason Kenney entered the do-it-yourself-without-tools window shade market was because K-Mart had switched to that product. 287 Mr. Fallin, the President of Newell's window shade furnishings division, stated that Ferguson's shade was about as new as you could get at that time: 288 Q. Would you describe Tom Ferguson's do it yourself without tools window shade as an improvement on what had gone before? 289 A. Well, it was more than an improvement because it really changed the method of marketing this product line, so it was about as new as you could get at that time. 290 Fallin testified concerning the immediate success of the do-it-yourself shade: 291 Well, from the very beginning, the product started selling. We had a success from the first test store and the sales continued to climb ever since. It's never peaked. It's been a real success story.... 292 Fallin, like Kenney's witnesses, testified to consumer demand and displacement of the prior art product: 293 Q. Well, in light of that [total shade sales staying flat], can you explain why the sales of Mr. Ferguson's shade show an upward trend ... from 1975, about 30,000, to 4 & 1/2 million in 1983? 294 .... 295 A. Well, it has to be taking business from the cut in store shade because if the total units are fairly constant, and the Ferguson shade is increasing in numbers, the only place it could come from would be at the expense of the cut in store type product. 296 The district court gave no weight to the evidence of commercial impact; nor did the panel majority. Precedent requires that all the evidence, including the objective indicia, must be considered in determination of unobviousness. See, e.g., Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575, 222 USPQ 744, 746 (Fed.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065, 105 S.Ct. 2138, 85 L.Ed.2d 496 (1985) (evidence arising out of the so-called 'secondary considerations' must always when present be considered en route to a determination of obviousness.) 2. Copying 297 Ferguson testified about the interest shown in his invention, by buyers and competitors, at the January, 1976 Housewares Show in Chicago: 298 A. Well, that was the first national introduction of the product, and it was a big booth. That's the largest show in our industry so that's where all the buyers come to see the new products, and we had a demonstration, and a large display, really introducing the product to everybody. The aisles were packed with people. It was the best I've ever seen for the demonstrations. During that time, the Clopay people spent quite a bit of time in our booth, actually even measuring the physical displays, trying to understand as much as they could about our product. 299 Uncontradicted evidence showing copying by six manufacturers (Kenney, Breneman, Graber, Clopay, Joanna-Western, and Stanley) appears throughout the record. The jury could have placed weight, in its determination of unobviousness, on this imitation by the entire window shade industry. 3. Failure by Others The district court stated in its opinion: 300 There was no evidence that others skilled in the art tried and failed to find a solution to the problems preventing in-home fitting of window shades once the Corcoran material was introduced. 301 Newell, 606 F.Supp. at 1294, 226 USPQ at 165. The record does not match this statement. There was testimony that the industry had long recognized the existence of significant problems with the way window shades were fitted, yet previous solutions failed for various reasons. Fallin testified about a device designed to enable cutting a shade at home. Ferguson testified about an adjustable end-plug. 302 The jury heard this testimony that the industry was aware of the problems with the cut-in-store type of shade. They heard of attempted remedies that failed, and the development of other take-home shade systems that failed. There was substantial evidence of failure by others who were presumably of skill in the window shade art. The Jury Verdict 303 The objective indicia can comprise compelling evidence of nonobviousness. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538, 218 USPQ 871, 879 (Fed.Cir.1983) (evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was not.) This considerable evidence was before the jury, along with the prior art, the prosecution history, and extensive argument and explanation and demonstration by counsel and witnesses for both sides. 304 Determining the weight and credibility of the evidence is the special province of the trier of fact. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). The trier of fact must not only identify the prior art, its scope and content, but it must also weigh all the evidence, impose the viewpoint of the person of ordinary skill, and determine if the burden of proof has been met. 305 A reasonable jury, on the evidence presented, could have concluded that the claimed invention had not been proved obvious by clear and convincing evidence. I would reinstate the jury verdict, for on the correct standard of review the grounds for reversal of the jury verdict are not met.