Opinion ID: 2613581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is. there sufficient evidence of premeditation to support the verdict?

Text: When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, Syl. ¶ 13, 875 P.2d 242 (1994). The appellate court looks only to the evidence in favor of the verdict to determine if the essential elements of a charge are sustained. State v. Patterson, 243 Kan. 262, Syl. ¶ 1, 755 P.2d 551 (1988). Rice acknowledges that premeditation may be proven circumstantially, see State v. Phillips, 252 Kan. 937, 939, 850 P.2d 877 (1993), but argues that an inference of premeditation may be founded only on facts established by evidence and may not rest on other inferences. Rice argues that because the death of Lindy is itself an inference, an inference that the death was a premeditated killing impermissibly stacks one inference upon another. Rice cites State v. Williams, 229 Kan. 646, 648-650, 630 P.2d 694 (1981), and State v. Cruz, 15 Kan. App.2d 476, 491, 809 P.2d 1233, rev. denied 249 Kan. 777 (1991), as authority. In essence, defendant would have this court hold that first-degree murder could never be proven circumstantially in the absence of a body because in such cases the inference of death always accompanies an inference of premeditation. Rice's reliance on Williams and Cruz is misplaced. In Cruz, the court found: The bottom line of our holding is that findings of guilt are not justifiable based on the evidence presented. There was insufficient evidence to support the conclusions. 15 Kan. App.2d at 492. Thus, the problem in Cruz was that the inferences required to support the conviction were patently unreasonable. 15 Kan. App.2d at 492. State v. Doyle, 201 Kan. 469, 488, 441 P.2d 846 (1968), explains that the prohibition against stacking inferences is a way of requiring that each element of the crime be supported by evidence of sufficient content and strength to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. The Doyle court noted: Any finding in this case of deliberation, premeditation, willfulness, or any of the other ingredients of either first or second degree murder could be based only upon a suspicion as foundation for a presumption, and then finally another presumption based upon the primary presumption. Presumptions and inferences may be drawn only from facts established, and presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference. 201 Kan. at 488. Williams makes explicit that the concern of prohibiting one inference based upon another is that the final fact inferred might not be adequately supported by the evidence adduced: Convictions based on circumstantial evidence, as in the instant case, can present a special challenge to the appellate court. Juries are permitted to draw fustifiable inferences from proven circumstances and established facts; but the appellate court must determine whether findings based upon inferences are justifiable by applying additional rules of law. 229 Kan. at 648-49. Williams restates the rule prohibiting the stacking of inferences in a way particularly appropriate to our discussion here: `Another way, perhaps, of verbalizing the rule prohibiting an inference on an inference and a presumption on a presumption is the rule, as stated by some courts, that where reliance is placed upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances in question must themselves be proved and cannot be inferred or presumed from other circumstances.' 229 Kan. at 649 (quoting 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 91, pp. 150-51 [13th ed. 1972]). Thus, as applied to the present case, if the circumstances alleged to justify a finding of premeditation are adequately proven by evidence, and are not merely suppositions themselves, there is no impermissible stacking of inferences such that reversal is required. This case does not involve an impermissible stacking of inferences or inferences unreasonably drawn from the evidence presented, but is merely a case in which each element of the charge is individually proven circumstantially from facts adduced at trial. Premeditation is the process of simply thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal conduct. State v. Henson, 221 Kan. 635, 645, 562 P.2d 51 (1977). Whether one thinks about a proposed killing is independent of whether the killing is actually performed. Proof of premeditation, thus, does not rely on proof of a killing. Therefore, contrary to Rice's argument, an inference of premeditation does not rely on an inference of death, but on other circumstances surrounding the death which must be proven by evidence. Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the established circumstances of the case, provided the inference is a reasonable one. In such case, the jury has the right to make the inference. ( Craft v. State, 3 Kan. 450 [1866].) State v. Buie, 223 Kan. 594, 597, 575 P.2d 555 (1978). Consequently, both premeditation and homicide may be supported by circumstantial evidence if that evidence is sufficiently strong to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant both premeditated a killing and subsequently committed the homicide. The evidence presented was sufficient that the jury could determine that Ruce acted with premeditation. The testimony of Mark and Amanda establishes that Rice administered more than a single death stroke to Lindy. It establishes that over a span of time and in various locations outside and inside the house, Rice continued a course of conduct that could foreseeably bring about Lindy's death. Rice beat Lindy in the yard but did not stop upon seeing the nature of the injuries his beating had inflicted. Instead, he followed Lindy into the house and beat her in the kitchen and then in another room until she stopped making any noise and lay nearly motionless. Yet, that still did not stop him; he then dragged Lindy up the stairs by her hair. We have held that dealing lethal blows after the victim is rendered helpless by the attacker supports an inference of premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Henson, 221 Kan. 635, Syl. ¶ 1. In Phillips, 252 Kan. at 940, we found premeditation could properly be inferred from the fact the defendant continued to kick the victim after he was knocked to the ground and unable to fend off the defendant's blows. In addition, the long history of marital abuse, which reached a level where Rice threatened to kill Lindy and Lindy feared for her life, was proper evidence of Rice's motive and intent. It was a proper basis, when considered with the evidence of the fight, to conclude Rice's acts were premeditated. See, e.g., State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, 386, 807 P.2d 86 (1991); Henson, 221 Kan. at 645 (prior violent acts relevant evidence of premeditation). There was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the killing to be premeditated. IV. Did the trial court commit reversible error by allowing the State to present expert testimony regarding the ability of a key child witness to recall the events he had seen? Over the objections of the defense, the State called Dr. John Helminsld, a psychologist, as an expert witness. He testified he had examined Mark and talked with him about the events leading up to his mother's death. Dr. Helminski recounted the story Mark had told him along the same lines as the testimony Mark had previously given. He also explained the difference between core events, such as the fact he saw Rice hit Lindy, heard her screaming, and saw her lying motionless on the bathroom floor, and peripheral events such as time, seasons, and what clothes people were wearing. He testified that it is not unusual for a child of Mark's age, 8 years old at the time of the incident, to consistently remember core events, but be unable to recall peripheral details. Rice argues that the trial court impermissibly allowed Dr. Helminski to bolster the inconsistent testimony of Mark by testifying that children can better recall core events than peripheral details. Rice contends that this expert testimony addressed the veracity of a key witness and was therefore improper and prejudicial, citing State v. Graham, 246 Kan. 78, 785 P.2d 983 (1990). Rice maintains that Dr. Helminski's testimony did not meet the standards for the admission of expert testimony. The State argues that the issue of whether the proper foundation was laid for this testimony was not raised contemporaneously with the admission of the evidence and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The State also argues the evidence was helpful to the jury and that it was proper to corroborate the children's testimony because they had been impeached on cross-examination by questions regarding their inconsistent statements about the details of the events they had described. Moreover, the State argues Dr. Helminski offered no opinion of the witnesses' truthfulness, but merely discussed a child's capacity to recall. `The admissibility of expert testimony is within the broad discretion of the trial court. A party claiming an abuse of trial court discretion bears the burden of showing abuse of discretion.' State v. Cheeks, 253 Kan. 93, 99, 853 P.2d 655 (1993) (quoting Marshall v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 249 Kan. 620, Syl. ¶ 8, 822 P.2d 591 [1991]). The boundaries of the trial court's discretion are set by statute in K.S.A. 60-456. The basis for the admission of expert testimony is necessity arising out of the particular circumstances of the case. To be admissible, expert testimony must be helpful to the jury. Where the normal experience and qualifications of lay persons serving as jurors permit them to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances, expert conclusions or opinions are inadmissible. State v. Hodges, 239 Kan. 63, 67, 716 P.2d 563 (1986). An expert's opinion, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-456, is admissible up to the point where an expression of opinion would require him to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed evidence.... An expert witness may not pass on the weight or credibility of evidence.... State v. Colwell, 246 Kan. 382, 389, 790 P.2d 430 (1990). Dr. Helminski did not give an improper opinion on Mark's credibility. See State v. Arrington, 251 Kan. 747, 753, 840 P.2d 477 (1992) (expert testimony that a witness was not capable of being purposefully deceitful was not improper); Colwell, 246 Kan. at 391 (expert testimony that witness could distinguish truth from lie and recounting statements witness made in interview not improper); State v. Clements, 241 Kan. 77, 80, 734 P.2d 1096 (1987) (testimony that victim/witness acted consistent with having been sodomized gave no opinion of whether witness was telling the truth and was not improper). However, Dr. Helminski did testify with regard to the weight to be given to the inconsistency of Mark's recollection of peripheral details and thus passed on the weight of disputed evidence. Thus, the admission of the testimony was erroneous. Moreover, the fact that children recall major events while forgetting minor ones would seem to be within the normal experience of lay jurors and, therefore, again, it should not have been permitted by the trial court. Where an expert was permitted to opine, based on an interview with a victim/witness, that the witness was telling the truth about being molested by the defendant, we held a new trial was required. State v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 470, 721 P.2d 232 (1986). Similarly, expert testimony of police officers that they believe a defendant is guilty of the crime charged may justify reversing the conviction. See State v. Steadman, 253 Kan. 297, Syl. ¶ 2, 855 P.2d 919 (1993). In State v. Cheeks, 253 Kan. 93, we held that improper expert witness testimony that permitted jurors to draw an impermissible inference of guilt from the established facts warranted reversal of the conviction. However, the error in the present case is considerably less prejudicial than testimony that directly addresses the credibility of a witness or opines that the defendant is guilty, and the testimony at issue here does not give rise to an impermissible inference of guilt. In State v. Graham, 246 Kan. at 82, we held that improper admission of expert testimony that compared the defendant's photograph to photographs taken during the commission of the crime constituted harmless error in light of other evidence in the case. We said: [T]here is little, if any, likelihood that this erroneous admission of evidence changed the result of the trial. 246 Kan. at 82. The effect of Dr. Helminski testifying as to what lay jurors would already understand from common experience would be negligible, and the admission of his testimony, although erroneous, is likewise harmless. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 140, 148, 871 P.2d 1246 (1994).