Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Irene H.

Text: The prosecutor stated he lacked confidence in Irene H. He felt she was not very bright, and he was concerned about discrepancies between some of her questionnaire answers and responses she gave during oral voir dire. In the prosecutor's opinion, the prospective juror also appeared to be predisposed toward defense counsel. The prosecutor believed Irene H. might have been an acceptable juror under some circumstances, but she was not a leader, and at the time he excused her the group appeared to be lacking in leadership. We recognized the validity of this type of strategic decision in People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at page 1220, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047: If the panel as seated appears to contain a sufficient number of jurors who appear strong-willed and favorable to a lawyer's position, the lawyer might be satisfied with a jury that includes one or more passive or timid appearing jurors. However, if one or more of the supposed favorable or strong jurors is excused either for cause or peremptory challenge and the replacement jurors appear to be passive or timid types, it would not be unusual or unreasonable for the lawyer to peremptorily challenge one of these apparently less favorable jurors even though other similar types remain. Defendant contends the trial court erred by applying the standards set out in People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 255 Cal.Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047, and by not comparing the responses of the jurors not stricken by the prosecutor with those of the Hispanic jurors he did strike, in evaluating the good faith of the prosecutor. Defendant did not request that the trial court engage in such an analysis, but argues that we should do so on appeal. In Johnson, we held that a reviewing court is not required to engage in a comparative analysis of jurors. Assuming without deciding that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 ( Miller-El ) requires us to perform an analysis comparing jurors the prosecutor excused with those he or she did not excuse, we conclude that the comparative analysis relied upon by defendant fails to demonstrate purposeful discrimination. In Miller-El, the high court stated that [i]f a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step. ( Miller-El, supra, 545 U.S. at p. ___, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2325.) That analysis does not provide a basis to doubt the trial court's findings in the present case, however, because the examples of comparative jurors cited by defendant are not truly comparable to those whom the prosecutor excused. For example, the circumstance that the prosecutor did not strike some jurors who had received traffic citations for speeding does not call into question the validity of his explanation that he excused Jimmy B. because that prospective juror had convictions for brandishing a weapon and driving under the influence (which was only one of several reasons given by the prosecutor). Defendant contends the procedures employed by the trial court were improper in that the court ruled one at a time on the propriety of each of the prosecutor's reasons for excusing the prospective jurors, rather than ruling on the basis of the totality of the circumstances after all of the explanations had been given. Defendant complains that this procedure deprived defense counsel of the opportunity to argue, based on all of the circumstances, that the prosecutor was discriminating against Hispanics, and that the trial court did not make a meaningful and sincere determination concerning the prosecutor's intent. [7] Even if it might have been better practice for the trial court to withhold its ruling until hearing all of the prosecutor's reasons, we find no basis for concluding that its ruling might have been different had it done so. The trial court did not deny defense counsel the opportunity to argue, and defendant does not point to any circumstances in the record that would support the conclusion that the prosecutor was discriminating unlawfully in his use of peremptory challenges despite the apparently valid, race-neutral reasons he provided.
Defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in a continual pattern of misconduct during the voir dire proceedings, violating defendant's right to a fair trial under the state and federal Constitutions. In essence, he complains that the prosecutor accused defense counsel of misconduct in the presence and hearing of prospective jurors, leading to frequent heated exchanges and reciprocal accusations between the two attorneys. For example, the prosecutor complained that defense counsel was interrupting him and engaging in distracting conversation at the counsel table, stated that defense counsel's answer to a juror's question was incorrect and unfair, and accused defense counsel of grandstanding. Defendant did not object to most of the prosecutor's comments, and to that extent the claim is forfeited. In any event, the contention is without merit. A prosecutor's conduct violates the Constitution only when it is `so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.' ( People v. Gionis (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1196, 1214, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 456, 892 P.2d 1199; People v. Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) Conduct that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation will constitute prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' ( Espinoza, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 820, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 838 P.2d 204.) In the present case, both counsel engaged in a pattern of aggressive advocacy and mutual expressions of antagonism, which caused the trial court to admonish them frequently. Although the prosecutor at times might have conducted himself in a more restrained manner, we do not find that any of these incidents, considered singly or in combination, amount to prejudicial misconduct. Defendant did object and requested a mistrial when the prosecutor asked Prospective Juror Peter W., who worked at the county jail, whether he ever had seen defendant there. The trial court sustained the objection and directed the prosecutor not to pursue that line of questioning. Defendant contends the prosecutor's voir dire of Peter W. deliberately was designed to inform other jurors that defendant was in custody and thereby undermine the presumption of innocence. We find no misconduct. Whether Peter W. had contact with defendant was a legitimate subject of inquiry on voir dire. As we have observed, the mere fact that the jury is made aware of a defendant's custodial status does not deprive the defendant of his constitutional rights. ( People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 73, 121, 8 Cal. Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) [I]n certain circumstances a jury inevitably will learn a defendant is in custody for the current charged offense, for example where the jury is presented with the testimony of a jailhouse informant. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1336, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [prosecutor did not commit misconduct in eliciting responses from a witness about her continuing contacts with the defendant, from which the jury could have inferred he was in custody].) Furthermore, the trial court sustained defendant's objections, and defendant did not request the court to admonish the jury to ignore the fact that defendant was in custody.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial after a prosecution witness, during cross-examination, mentioned that defendant had been on death row. When defense counsel was questioning Jona Cardona about conversations she testified she had with defendant, she stated, He called me when he was on death row. Although the witness's statement did not reveal to the jury that defendant had been on death row as a result of prior proceedings in this same case, defense counsel subsequently revealed that circumstance. Counsel asked the witness, Did you not learn that Mr. Ledesma was previously convicted and went to death row in this case because he was incompetently represented, that his attorney was on drugs and gambling during the trial, and because of that the Supreme Court ruled that he had an unfair trial and that's why we are back today? The witness replied that she did not know, although she might have read about it in the papers. Counsel further asked, And you learned, did you not, that he had gone to death row or been sentenced because he had an attorney who did no investigation, put on a false defense to the court, himself, was on PCP and other drugs during trial, and was addicted to gambling. . . . The prosecutor objected to that question, and the court sustained the objection. When questioning resumed, defense counsel referred once again to calls that defendant had made to the witness during those many years that he sat on death row. A few minutes later, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. He argued the prosecutor was responsible for the witness and should have told her in advance not to mention defendant's having been on death row. Once that information was revealed, defense counsel tried to minimize the prejudice by trying to explain the reason for the new trial, but was stopped by the court when it sustained the prosecutor's objection. Defense counsel argued that no admonition the court could give would erase this from the minds of the jurors. The prosecutor explained that he did admonish this witness not to mention the previous trial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, noting that it was defense counsel's question that indicated that the defendant was on death row as a result of prior proceedings in this same case. Defense counsel made a strategic decision to avoid juror speculation concerning whether defendant had committed another murder and to attempt to mitigate the damaging effects of this information by explaining to the jury that defendant previously had been convicted of the same offense for which he now was being tried but that he had not had an adequate defense at his previous trial. Although objections had been sustained to counsel's questions to Cardona about the prior trial, it was subsequently made clear through other witnesses that defendant's prior trial was for the same offense and that prior defense counsel had not conducted a thorough defense. For example, when the prosecution attempted to impeach defense witnesses who testified about defendant's drug use on the grounds that they had not mentioned the subject in the prior trial, defense counsel brought out the circumstance that the prior defense attorney had not questioned them on the subject. One of the defense experts, Dr. Evans, testified that prior defense counsel did not have psychological tests of defendant performed. Prosecution witness Dr. Glathe testified under cross-examination that he had performed only the brief examination of defendant that prior defense counsel had asked him to perform, and that the results of tests that had been performed subsequently would have been helpful in assessing defendant. The issue here is whether the witness's comment was so incurably prejudicial that a new trial was required. A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) A witness's volunteered statement can, under some circumstances, provide the basis for a finding of incurable prejudice. (See People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 565, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 [motion for mistrial properly was denied because court's admonition and witness's later testimony under cross-examination dispelled prejudice]; People v. Rhinehart (1973) 9 Cal.3d 139, 152, 107 Cal.Rptr. 34, 507 P.2d 642 [witness's inadvertent answer was insufficiently prejudicial to justify a mistrial].) But we do not presume that knowledge that a defendant previously has been convicted and is being retried is incurably prejudicial. (See People v. Anderson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 453, 468, 276 Cal.Rptr. 356, 801 P.2d 1107 [claim that trial court improperly disclosed to jury that the defendant previously had been sentenced to death for the same offense was waived by counsel's tactical failure to object, and was not prejudicial].) In the present case, the length of time between the crime and the trial and the numerous unavoidable references to witnesses' prior statements created a high risk that the jury would become aware that defendant had been tried previously. As the high court has recognized, it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect their vote. ( Smith v. Phillips (1982) 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 [verdict did not deny due process, even though one juror had applied for employment with the prosecutor's office during the trial, absent showing of actual bias].) We find no basis for concluding, on the present record, that the knowledge that defendant previously had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death was incurably prejudicial. Furthermore, defense counsel made a strategic decision to inform the jury that defendant previously had been convicted of the same offense, rather than a different crime, and that his conviction was reversed because of the inadequate defense provided by his attorney. Counsel's approach appears to be an appropriate attempt to minimize damage and speculation, particularly in light of the circumstance that the jury inevitably would learn that defendant had been on death row if the case went to a penalty phase. [8] Defendant argues that the jury's knowledge that the first jury had convicted him for the same offense was prejudicial not only because it may have influenced the jury's verdict directly, but also because it enhanced the credibility of prosecution witnesses Michael Shay, Floyd Cowdell, and Sylvia Ontiveros, who had testified at the first trial and whose testimony apparently had been accepted by the first jury. The jury was given the standard instruction, You must decide all questions of fact in this case from the evidence received in this trial and not from any other source. We presume the jury followed that instruction. [9] There is no reason to believe that the jurors, who observed each of these witnesses, felt compelled to ignore the court's instruction and defer to the judgment of a different jury that resulted from a different trial. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the witness's comment did not require a mistrial. [10]
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial after the prosecutor referred to defendant's false testimony at his first trial during cross-examination of defense witnesses. Testifying at his first trial, defendant denied committing the robbery or murder, claiming that on the day of the gas station robbery he had loaned his motorcycle to two friends, who later told him they had committed the robbery. At the retrial, the prosecutor asked defense expert Dr. Evans whether she had reviewed defendant's prior testimony. When defense counsel objected, the court asked the prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, whether he would be getting into the defendant's testimony. At that point, the court conducted a bench conference and directed the prosecutor not to pursue that line of questioning. Subsequently, the prosecutor asked defense witness Dr. Rosenthal whether defendant had admitted to him that he previously lied in court about this matter. Dr. Rosenthal did not directly answer but instead attempted to clarify the question. After the court overruled defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor asked whether Dr. Rosenthal was comfortable relying upon information provided by a man who admitted that he lied in court. The court sustained defense counsel's objection. Thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the prosecutor's question denied defendant a fair trial and violated the trial court's prior ruling (in the context of the examination of Dr. Evans) that defendant's prior testimony was inadmissible. The prosecutor argued that the question was based on Dr. Rosenthal's notes, which indicated that defendant told him he had lied at the first trial. The court denied defendant's motion for mistrial, concluding there was no misconduct by the prosecutor and no prejudice. Defendant contends his testimony at his first trial was inadmissible at his second trial because it was a direct result of the ineffectiveness of his first attorney. (See People v. Karlin (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 227, 232, 41 Cal.Rptr. 786 [trial court erred in admitting at trial a confession the defendant made at his preliminary hearing, because his attorney had a conflict of interest that prevented her from providing effective assistance and the defendant's testimony at the preliminary hearing was the product of the failure to honor his constitutional right to adequate legal representation].) In our prior opinion, we upheld the referee's conclusion that Attorney Parrish took an active part in the decision to use, and in preparation of, the alibi defense. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 221, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) The decision to present the false alibi derived from Parrish's ineffective assistance in failing to undertake adequate investigation and research, especially with regard to the issue of diminished capacity. We need not decide whether or not the prosecutor's reference to defendant's prior testimony was a proper means of impeaching the defense's expert witnesses because, even assuming for the purposes of discussion that it was not, defendant has not shown that the prosecutor's questions caused prejudice that was incurable by admonition or instruction. ( People v. Haskett, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 854, 180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776.) As noted earlier, [w]hether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. ( Ibid. ) Defendant's objections were sustained by the trial court, and neither witness answered the questions. The jury did not hear specific evidence about what defendant said in his prior testimony. Defense counsel did not request the court to admonish the jury to ignore the question and, in any event, the jury was instructed that questions are not evidence. Furthermore, because defendant did not testify at the second trial, the defense case did not rest upon his credibility. The jury heard other evidence that suggested defendant was not always truthful; indeed, the defense theory was that he made numerous false admissions about his participation in the crime. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor's brief reference to defendant's lying in his prior testimony was so prejudicial as to require a mistrial. [11]
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly was permitted to impeach defense witnesses Adelita Jordon, Pasqual Ledesma, and Ruben Gomez with their testimony at the previous trial. Defendant asserts the prosecutor's ability to impeach these witnesses is attributable to Attorney Parrish's ineffective assistance. In Ledesma I, this court concluded that Attorney Parrish had failed to investigate adequately a diminished capacity defense based upon defendant's drug use. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 223, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) As a result of this failure, the witnesses did not testify at the first trial concerning defendant's drug use. Subsequently at the retrial, the prosecutor was able to use these (and other) omissions and inconsistencies between their earlier testimony and their current testimony to imply that their current testimony was fabricated. Defendant cites no authority establishing an absolute bar to the prosecution's use of testimony from a previous trial at which the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Rather, decisions that have addressed such issues have examined the circumstances surrounding the prior testimony and how it was used in the subsequent trial, to determine whether the evidence at issue is attributable to counsel's ineffective assistance and whether its use denied the defendant a fair trial in the subsequent proceeding. (See, e.g., People v. Sixto (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 374, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 264 [upholding trial court's denial of motion for certain findings and for exclusion of evidence as means of curing effect of ineffective assistance of counsel at prior trial]; People v. Karlin, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 227, 41 Cal.Rptr. 786 [the defendant's admissions made at preliminary hearing, when his attorney had a conflict of interest, could not be used at his subsequent trial]; see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States (D.C.1979) 407 A.2d 626 [the defendant's testimony at first trial, after which a mistrial was declared due to ineffective assistance of counsel, could be used at second trial only for impeachment purposes]; People v. Duncan (1988) 173 Ill. App.3d 554, 123 Ill.Dec. 422, 527 N.E.2d 1060, 1062 [because ineffective assistance of counsel colored the entire proceeding, the defendant's testimony at first trial could not be used in second trial except for purposes of impeachment].) Even if the failure of these witnesses to testify at the first trial concerning defendant's drug use may be attributed to prior counsel's ineffective assistance, we do not find that the use of their prior testimony for impeachment purposes denied defendant a fair trial. Defense counsel had a full opportunity to rehabilitate these witnesses and to permit them to explain discrepancies between their prior testimony and their subsequent testimony. Adelita Jordon testified for the defense that after she and defendant separated, he began using PCP and there was a substantial change in his behavior. She remembered that when she served him with marital dissolution papers, he was very shaky and did not make sense. The prosecutor cross-examined her regarding her prior testimony that when defendant came to visit her and her daughters he was polite and pleasant, that she did not recall whether defendant appeared to be under the influence of drugs at the time she served him, and that he appeared to be straight on other occasions when she saw him at her mother's house. When asked about these discrepancies, she said she had been nervous at the prior trial. On redirect examination, she testified that at the previous trial defense counsel did not ask her anything about defendant using drugs and he did not ask her whether he was acting strange. The prosecutor questioned witness Ruben Gomez concerning why he had not mentioned in his previous testimony that Jona Cardona told him in 1979 that she heard defendant did not commit the murder and that someone named Crazy Joe had done so. On redirect examination, Gomez testified that at the first trial defendant's lawyer asked Gomez only a few questions concerning whether defendant was a nice person and did not ask him about drug use. Gomez also explained that he had heard many rumors concerning whether defendant had committed the crime, and that the conversation with Jona Cardona stood out in his mind only because she now had become a witness in the case and had testified differently from what she told him back in 1979. Furthermore, Gomez testified, he mentioned the conversation as soon as defense counsel told him she was a witness. Defendant's brother Pasqual Ledesma testified he never had seen defendant use drugs but he had observed him acting as if he were in a daze, out of contact with reality, and in a state in which he just was not himself. The prosecutor cross-examined defendant's brother concerning his prior testimony, in which he stated he had not seen defendant under the influence of drugs but had only heard rumors about his drug use. Pasqual responded that, not being an expert in such matters, he did not necessarily know whether his brother was under the influence of drugs and that he had not been asked at the prior trial whether his brother seemed to be out of contact with reality. On redirect examination, Pasqual further testified that since defendant's first trial, Pasqual had learned more about drug use and had thought more about his brother's behavior. As demonstrated above, each of these witnesses was able to provide plausible explanations for omissions from their testimony at the first trial, including prior defense counsel's failure to develop the issue. Under these circumstances, prior counsel's ineffective assistance did not deny defendant a fair retrial.

Defendant contends the admission of the testimony of psychiatrist Dr. John P. Glathe regarding statements made to him by defendant violated the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges and defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Prior to defendant's first trial, the court appointed Dr. Glathe at the request of defense counsel. The appointment was made under Evidence Code section 1017, which provides that the psychotherapist-patient privilege applies when the psychotherapist is appointed by the court to advise the defendant's lawyer regarding defendant's emotional or mental condition for the purpose of determining whether to raise insanity or some other mental defense. ( See Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 179, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) No type of mental defense was presented at defendant's first trial, and Dr. Glathe did not testify at that trial. ( Ibid. ) In the subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, one of the claims made by defendant was that his trial attorney, Mr. Parrish, failed to research adequately the facts and the law regarding the availability of a diminished capacity defense. The referee who conducted the habeas corpus hearing ordered defendant, over his objection, to provide to the prosecution Dr. Glathe's report and notes. At the hearing on the habeas corpus petition, the prosecution called Dr. Glathe as a witness, and his report was admitted into evidence. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 194, fn. 5, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) The report does not mention any confession by defendant, but Dr. Glathe testified at the hearing that defendant told him he had committed the charged offenses. ( Id. at p. 205, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) One of the defense experts, Dr. Evans, testified at the present trial that she had read portions of the transcripts of the hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding as well as this court's decision in Ledesma I. That decision quotes the full text of Dr. Glathe's report and includes a summary of Dr. Glathe's testimony at the habeas corpus hearing that references defendant's confession. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 194, fn. 5, & p. 205, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Evanswithout objectionwhether she was aware that defendant had confessed to Dr. Glathe. She testified that she was, but that defendant told her he was innocent. She commented further that Dr. Glathe had not performed any psychological tests and that the information he had was inadequate. Another defense expert, Dr. Clark, also had read this court's decision in Ledesma I. When the prosecutor attempted to cross-examine him concerning his awareness of defendant's confession to Dr. Glathe, defense counsel objected, arguing that defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe were privileged. Defense counsel objected to any reference to Dr. Glathe's report, on the grounds that defendant's statements to him were protected by the attorney-client and psychotherapist-patient privileges, and that the prosecution should not be able to benefit from any evidence produced at the habeas corpus hearing, because it was produced as a consequence of the ineffective representation provided by Attorney Parrish at the first trial. The trial court ruled that the prosecutor could question the experts concerning their awareness of defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe, and could ask them hypothetical questions regarding the confession, but that the statements could not be considered for their truth unless Dr. Glathe testified. [12] Subsequently, defense counsel asked defense expert Dr. Rosenthal whether, if defendant had made a confession to a doctor, such a statement might be an example of his bragging or attempting to bolster himself. Dr. Rosenthal testified that it might be, and that making a shocking claim could be a way for defendant to accord himself a sense of power in a relationship with a person in authority. Defense counsel questioned Dr. Rosenthal concerning the statement in Dr. Glathe's report that defendant had exhibited an inappropriately macho affect. Dr. Rosenthal had read Dr. Glathe's report, and had testified about it at the habeas corpus hearing in 1985. In Dr. Rosenthal's opinion, Dr. Glathe's statement in the report that defendant probably was sane at the time of the crime was an indication that more work needed to be done before a conclusion could be reached on that issue. The prosecutor called Dr. Glathe to testify in rebuttal. The trial court heard further argument and ruled that his testimony was admissible. Dr. Glathe, consulting his notes from his one-hour interview with defendant in October of 1979, testified that defendant told him that at the time of the offense, he had been laid off from work and had broken up with his girlfriend. According to Dr. Glathe, defendant told him that he got the notion to commit an armed robbery. He robbed a gas station attendant of $60.00 and used the money to purchase the drug PCP. He warned the victim he would kill him if he reported the crime. Thereafter he received an anonymous phone call informing him that the police were looking for him. Dr. Glathe recounted defendant's assertions that he had not covered the license plate on his motorcycle and that one week after the robbery, he went back to the gas station and kidnapped the victim, took him to Watsonville, shot him in the head, back, and chest, and stabbed him. Dr. Glathe also testified that defendant stated, If I get the death penalty, I get it, I will hang myself first rather than give them the pleasure. At the time defendant made his statements to Dr. Glathe, they were protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. (Evid.Code, § 1017; People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 583, 621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) But under the patient-litigant exception, the psychotherapist-patent privilege was lost when defendant put his mental and emotional state in issue at trial. (Evid.Code, § 1016.) Because Dr. Glathe conducted a confidential interview of defendant for the purpose of assisting defense counsel in the preparation and presentation of a defense, defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe also were protected by the attorney-client privilege unless that privilege was waived or an exception applied. ( People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500, 510, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) There is no client-litigant exception to the attorney-client privilege that is comparable to the patient-litigant exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. ( Id. at p. 514, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793; Evid.Code, § 1016.) The attorney-client privilege continues to protect a defendant's statements to a defense psychiatrist even if the defendant tenders a mental defense. ( Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 514, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) The Attorney General argues that Dr. Glathe's testimony nevertheless was admissible because defendant waived all privileges when, in the habeas corpus proceeding, defendant claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and present a diminished capacity defense. (See In re Gray (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 614, 615-617, 176 Cal.Rptr. 721.) Evidence Code section 958 provides that there is no privilege as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by the lawyer or by client, of a duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship. Thus, for example, if the defendant in a criminal action claims that his lawyer did not provide him with an adequate defense, communications between the lawyer and client relevant to that issue are not privileged. (Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code (Jan.1965) 7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1965) p. 176; see In re Gray, supra, 123 Cal.App.3d at p. 616, 176 Cal.Rptr. 721.) The exception established in section 958 was intended precisely for the type of situation that occurred at defendant's habeas corpus hearing. Defendant does not dispute that the attorney-client privilege was lost for purposes of the habeas corpus proceeding but contends that his statements to Dr. Glathe remained privileged for other purposes, including the retrial. Generally, a waiver of the privilege for purposes of one proceeding is applicable to all subsequent proceedings. ( People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1005, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [because the defendant waived attorney-client privilege by calling psychiatrist to testify during a suppression hearing, the defendant's statements to psychiatrist could be used to impeach other experts who testified at trial]; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 243, 276 Cal.Rptr. 80, 801 P.2d 323 [because the defendant waived privilege by calling psychiatrist to testify at first penalty trial, psychiatrist could testify regarding the defendant's admissions at penalty retrial].) Strictly speaking, however, Evidence Code section 958 establishes an exception to the privilege, not a waiver. A waiver occurs if the holder of the privilege discloses the communication or consents to disclosure by another, without coercion, or fails to claim the privilege in a proceeding in which he or she has the opportunity to do so. (Evid.Code, § 912, subd. (a).) Defendant asserted the privilege in the habeas corpus hearing, but the referee ruled that communications to Dr. Glathe were not privileged under Evidence Code section 958. The question presented here is whether the applicability of the section 958 exception in the habeas corpus proceeding rendered the privilege inapplicable in all further proceedings, including the retrial. This court has not previously had the occasion to address that question. Defendant relies on People v. Dennis (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 874-876, 223 Cal.Rptr. 236 ( Dennis ), which concluded that a defendant must be granted use immunity for disclosures he makes in support of a motion for a new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. [13] Dennis held that because the information a defendant would be required to disclose in support of a new trial motion might lighten the prosecution's burden in bringing about a conviction upon a new trial, the defendant should be granted use immunity for the material disclosed. Dennis relied upon the reasoning of a number of decisions by this court granting use immunity in other contexts in which it would be unfair to require the defendant to choose between maintaining a privilege and asserting other important rights. For example, in People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024, we concluded that when a defendant is subject to probation revocation proceedings upon grounds that are also the basis for criminal charges, his testimony at the revocation proceedings is inadmissible at a subsequent trial on the criminal charges (except to rebut inconsistent testimony by the defendant in the criminal trial). We recognized that the public interest in informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions would be furthered if the probationer were not discouraged from speaking freely at such proceedings. ( Id. at p. 874, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024.) On the other hand, the prosecution's burden to prove guilt at a criminal trial without requiring the defendant to incriminate himself would be lightened if the prosecution, simply by moving to revoke probation before the criminal trial, could attempt to force the probationer into making incriminatory statements at the revocation proceeding. ( Id. at p. 876, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024.) We concluded that to force an individual to choose among the unpalatable alternatives of self-accusation, perjury, or silence at the probation hearing in order to protect his or her constitutional right not to incriminate oneself at the criminal proceedings runs counter to our historic aversion to cruelty reflected in the privilege against self-incrimination. ( Id. at p. 878, 120 Cal. Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024.) Similarly, in Bryan v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 575, 586-589, 102 Cal.Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079, we held that a minor's statements made in connection with juvenile court proceedings cannot be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial after he has been found unfit for treatment as a juvenile. We reasoned, in part, that the minor should not be put to the unfair choice of being considered uncooperative by the juvenile probation officer and juvenile court because of his refusal to discuss his case with the probation officer, or of having his statements to that officer used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings. ( Id. at pp. 587-588, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831, 498 P.2d 1079; see also In re Wayne J. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, 602, 156 Cal.Rptr. 344, 596 P.2d 1 [admissions made to a probation officer at a required postdetention interview may not be used at the minor's juvenile court jurisdiction hearing]; People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991, 999-1000, 88 Cal.Rptr. 161, 471 P.2d 961 [use immunity applied to the defendant's discussion of case details with a probation officer after conviction].) Although few courts have addressed the issue directly, the weight of authority from other jurisdictions supports the reasoning of Dennis, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 223 Cal.Rptr. 236. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that the policy inherent in the legislative recognition and judicial enforcement of the attorney-client privilege, as it implicates a defendant's exercise of the right to effective assistance of counsel and to freedom from compelled self-incrimination, restricts the use as well as the scope of permitted disclosures. Just as an attorney may not respond to allegations of ineffectiveness by disclosing confidences unrelated to such allegations, so the client confidences properly disclosed by an attorney at an ineffectiveness hearing may not be imported into the client's subsequent trial on criminal charges. ( Com. v. Chmiel (1999) 558 Pa. 478, 738 A.2d 406, 424.) A Missouri appellate court reached a similar conclusion, holding that a defendant's testimony at a postconviction hearing challenging his conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel could not be admitted against him when he was retried. ( State v. Samuels (Mo.App. 1998) 965 S.W.2d 913.) Samuels relied upon the reasoning of Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247. In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial hearing on his motion to suppress evidence of an illegal search could not be used against him at trial. The high court reasoned that a defendant should not be forced to surrender his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself in order to protect his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Missouri court similarly reasoned that a defendant should not be forced to choose between enforcing his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. ( Samuels, supra, 965 S.W.2d at p. 919; see also Waldrip v. Head (2000) 272 Ga. 572, 532 S.E.2d 380 [defendant waived attorney-client privilege as to documents relevant to claims of ineffective assistance, but disclosure of such documents should be limited to the purpose of rebutting claim of ineffectiveness].) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly has held, in an en banc decision, that in federal habeas corpus proceedings the petitioner's waiver of the attorney-client privilege arising from a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel extends only to litigation of the petition. ( Bittaker v. Woodford (9th Cir. 2003) 331 F.3d 715.) Bittaker upheld a district court's order precluding the disclosure of privileged attorney-client materials for any purpose other than litigating the federal habeas corpus petition. The court could conceive of no federal interest in enlarging the scope of the waiver beyond what is needed to litigate the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in federal court. ( Id. at p. 722.) On the other hand, [a] broad waiver rule would no doubt inhibit the kind of frank attorney-client communications and vigorous investigation of all possible defenses that the attorney-client and work product privileges are designed to promote. ( Ibid. ) Furthermore, [t]he fortuity that defendant's initial trial was constitutionally defective gives the prosecution no just claim to the lawyer's case file or testimony. To the contrary, allowing the prosecution at retrial to use information gathered by the first defense lawyerincluding defendant's statements to his lawyerwould give the prosecution a wholly gratuitous advantage. ( Id. at p. 724.) We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive. We have recognized that in some circumstances the attorney-client privilege may apply even when the communications at issue have been disclosed in another context and are no longer confidential. ( People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d 583, 620-621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127 [although defense psychologist properly disclosed communications to third parties to avert potential danger to them, thereby eliminating the psychotherapist-patient privilege, attorney-client privilege nevertheless applied].) In Clark, we noted that the purpose of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is to promote the therapeutic relationship, a purpose that can no longer be achieved once the therapist has revealed the confidential communications to third parties. ( Id. at p. 621, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) In contrast, however, we found no provision in the Evidence Code that reflected an intent that the attorney-client privilege terminate if a communication to an attorney is made public without a waiver of confidentiality by the client. ( Ibid. ) The attorney-client privilege exists to permit a client to freely and frankly reveal confidential information, including past criminal conduct, to the attorney or others whose purpose is to assist the attorney, and to thereby enable the attorney to adequately represent the client. [Citation.] In a criminal case the privilege also serves to preserve the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination . . . . To make adequate representation possible, therefore, these privileges assure criminal defendants that confidential statements to their attorney will not be admissible in any proceeding. ( Id. at p. 620, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, fn. omitted.) The purpose of the exception to the attorney-client privilege established by Evidence Code section 958 is to avoid the injustice of permitting a client either to accuse his attorney of a breach of duty and to invoke the privilege to prevent the attorney from bringing forth evidence in defense of the charge or to refuse to pay his attorney's fee and invoke the privilege to defeat the attorney's claims. (7 Cal. Law Revision. Com. Rep., supra, p. 176.) That purpose was fully met when Dr. Glathe was permitted to testify for the prosecution at the habeas corpus hearing. To interpret section 958 as abolishing the privilege for all purposes in this context would raise serious questions as to whether section 958 conflicts with the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that the privilege is intended to promote. Furthermore, in a case such as this, in which the defendant successfully established that his previous attorney provided constitutionally ineffective assistance, the disclosure of confidential communications at the habeas corpus hearing can be attributed to the attorney's ineffective assistance. The admission of those communications at a retrial may be viewed as a further consequence of the violation of the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. (Cf. People v. Karlin, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 227, 41 Cal.Rptr. 786 [the defendant's admissions made at preliminary hearing, when his attorney had a conflict of interest, could not be used at his subsequent trial].) In light of these serious constitutional concerns, we conclude the attorney-client privilege continues to apply for purposes of retrial after otherwise privileged matters have been disclosed in connection with habeas corpus proceedings, under Evidence Code section 958. Nevertheless, we agree with the Attorney General's alternative argument that the privilege was waived at trial when the defense presented the testimony of expert witnesses who had reviewed and considered Dr. Glathe's report and prior testimony. Both Dr. Evans and Dr. Clark testified that they had reviewed this court's decision in Ledesma I, which included the complete text of Dr. Glathe's report and referred to defendant's confession to Dr. Glathe. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 195, fn. 5, 205, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Dr. Evans had reviewed a transcript of the hearing in the habeas corpus proceeding, which included Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's confession to him, and the prosecution cross-examined her about defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe without objection. An expert witness may be cross-examined as to the matter upon which his or her opinion is based and the reasons for his or her opinion. (Evid. Code § 721, subd. (a).) The scope of cross-examination permitted under section 721 is broad, and includes examination aimed at determining whether the expert sufficiently took into account matters arguably inconsistent with the expert's conclusion. (See People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 712, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [under Evidence Code section 721, subd. (a), expert who was familiar with the defendant's juvenile record could be cross-examined about it to determine whether he took it into account in forming his opinion].) Once the defendant calls an expert to the stand, the expert loses his status as a consulting agent of the attorney, and neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work-product doctrine applies to matters relied on or considered in the formation of his opinion. ( People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 241, 246 Cal.Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669; compare People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 604-606, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081 [prosecutor's cross-examination of testifying defense experts about prior examinations of the defendant by nontestifying defense experts violated work-product privilege, when testifying experts were not aware of the earlier examinations].) In People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007 ( Combs ) we recognized that the prosecution is entitled to cross-examine an expert concerning an otherwise privileged report considered by the expert in formulating his or her opinion. In Combs, a psychiatrist, Dr. Oshrin, examined the defendant and provided a report to defense counsel. ( Id. at p. 862, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Although Dr. Oshrin did not testify, the prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine two other defense experts concerning Dr. Oshrin's report. Both doctors had read and considered Dr. Oshrin's report and relied upon portions of it in forming their opinions. ( Id. at p. 863, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) We rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in requiring the defense to provide a copy of Dr. Oshrin's report to the prosecution, noting that, contrary to the defendant's contention, the defendant voluntarily had furnished Dr. Oshrin's report to the prosecutor during the examination of another defense expert, Dr. Crinella. This court presume[d] that defense counsel provided Dr. Oshrin's report because he knew that the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Dr. Crinella about its contents. ( Id. at p. 862, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) The defendant in Combs also argued that allowing the prosecutor to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness violated the attorney-client privilege. Although we concluded that the defendant had forfeited the issue by failing to assert the attorney-client privilege at trial, we addressed the merits of the claim, stating that [d]efendant waived any protections that the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine, and the privilege against self-incrimination afforded him regarding all matters that [the testifying defense experts] considered or on which they relied, including Dr. Oshrin's report. ( Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 864, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) We rejected the defendant's argument that the defense experts could be cross-examined only as to those portions of Dr. Oshrin's report that they had adopted and relied upon. ( Id. at pp. 893-894, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Furthermore, because the defendant waived all privileges regarding Dr. Oshrin's report, the prosecutor was free to call Dr. Oshrin as a rebuttal witness and to question him about that report. ( Id. at p. 864, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Likewise, in the present case, defendant waived the protections of the attorney-client privilege as to his statements to Dr. Glathe by presenting the testimony of experts who had reviewed and considered Dr. Glathe's report and his testimony at the habeas corpus hearing. [14]
Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's confession to him could be considered for the truth of the matter and as evidence of guilt. The trial court did not formally instruct the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony could be considered as evidence of guilt, but did make statements in the jury's presence indicating that the testimony had been admitted for that purpose. During the cross-examination of Dr. Glathe, defense counsel asked the court whether it was correct that what the witness had been told by defendant had not been received for the truth of the matter stated. The court, in the presence of the jury, replied, No, it has been offered for the truth of the matter stated. Later during the cross-examination, the court sustained an objection to a question asked by defense counsel that may have appeared to relate to the witness's opinion concerning whether defendant had been telling him the truth. The court explained its ruling as follows: The doctor has testified to a statement made by the defendant. . . . [B]ut it's for the jury to determine whether or not that statement is to be believed. . . . [I]t's the truth or falsity of the statement that is in question and this witness cannot help us on that. Defendant asserts that the court's comments were erroneous, because under In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33 ( Spencer ) defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe could be considered only as the basis for his expert opinion. We have stated, It is well settled that an expert's testimony as to a defendant's incriminating statements may not be regarded as proof of the facts described in such statements. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1327, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221, citing People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 and Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) This rule derives from our decision in Spencer. Spencer held that a defendant may be examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist without the presence of his attorney, but established two safeguards in order to protect the defendant's right to counsel: First, the psychiatrist may not testify unless the defendant puts his or her mental state in issue. Second, if the psychiatrist testifies, the jury must be instructed that any incriminating statements made to him or her by the defendant may be considered only as the basis for an opinion, and not for the truth of the matters stated. ( Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 412-413, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) Even if Spencer is applicable (and, as discussed below, we conclude it is not), defendant has forfeited any claim that the trial court's comments were erroneous, because he did not request an instruction that Dr. Glathe's testimony could be considered only for the limited purpose of evaluating the basis of the experts' opinions. The trial court is not required to give the limiting instruction prescribed by Spencer in the absence of a request. ( People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d 672, 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256.) Defendant argues that the issue has not been forfeited because any request for a limiting instruction would have been futile. We disagree. The trial court did indicate in response to defense counsel's questions that the testimony was admissible for its truth, but defense counsel never argued that it could be admitted only for a limited purpose under Spencer. Rather, counsel argued that Dr. Glathe could not testify at all, because of the attorney-client privilege. Defense counsel also objected to Dr. Glathe's testifying on the ground that his testimony should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative, and as cumulative. Defense counsel did not argue that the testimony, if admitted, could be admitted for a limited purpose. Even if the issue had not been forfeited, we would find no error, because Spencer applies when the defendant's admissions are made to an expert who has been appointed to report to the court, but not when the defendant's admissions are made to an expert appointed to assist defense counsel. Spencer required a limiting instruction when an expert who was appointed by the court to examine the defendant testified regarding the defendant's mental state. Spencer acknowledged that under Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, the defendant has a right to have counsel present at such an examination, but that such presence may largely negate the value of the examination. ( Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 411, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) The court concluded that the presence of counsel at such a psychiatric examination is not constitutionally required so long as certain safeguards are afforded to defendant. ( Id. at p. 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) These safeguards include the following: (1) before submitting to an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist, the defendant must be represented by counsel or must waive that right; (2) counsel must be informed of the appointment of the psychiatrist; (3) if the defendant does not place his or her mental state in issue, the psychiatrist should not be permitted to testify; and (4) if the psychiatrist does testify, the court should instruct the jurors that the psychiatrist's testimony as to defendant's incriminating statements should not be regarded as proof of the truth of the facts disclosed by such statements and that such evidence may be considered only for the limited purpose of showing the information upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion. ( Id. at p. 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) These safeguards are sufficient to justify the exclusion of counsel from the psychiatric examination and at the same time avoid a deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights. ( Id. at p. 413, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) Under this formulation, a defendant's constitutional rights are amply protected, while the court, the prosecution, and the defendant will obtain the benefit of the testimony of an impartial psychiatrist as to defendant's mental condition. ( Ibid. ) Spencer's rationale is inapplicable when the psychiatrist is appointed to assist the defense and the communications between defendant and the psychiatrist are, hence, protected by the attorney-client privilege. When, as in the present case, the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense and operates under the attorney-client privilege, the state has not interfered in any way with the defendant's right to counsel. The defendant and his or her attorney may decide whether the attorney should be present when the psychiatrist interviews the defendant and may decide whether or not to use the results of the examination at trial. Even if the defendant places his or her mental state in issue, the defendant does not thereby waive the attorney-client privilege. ( People v. Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 514, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) The psychiatrist may testify only if the defendant calls the psychiatrist as a witness or waives the privilege in some other manner. Defendant cites this court's decision in People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607 ( Morse ) for the proposition that the safeguards set out in Spencer apply even when the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense. Morse sometimes has been cited for that proposition, and on occasion we have assumed that Spencer does apply to defense psychiatric experts. ( See, e.g., People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1008, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [jury was admonished not to consider statements made by defendant to defense psychiatrist for the truth of their contents; defendant's claim that evidence was misused for its substance was rejected]; People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d 672, 683-684 & fn. 2, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 [finding no error in the court's failure to give a limiting instruction under Spencer, because the defendant had not requested one when three psychiatrists, called by the defense (one of whom had been selected by the defendant's counsel to advise the defense), testified concerning the defendant's incriminating statements]; see also People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 167, fn. 7, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480 [trial court admonished jury to consider defense expert's testimony concerning the defendant's admissions only as bearing on his opinion and not as evidence of guilt].) Nevertheless, Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607, does not hold that the Spencer safeguards apply whenever the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense. In Morse, a psychiatrist testified for the defense and gave an opinion concerning the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. During cross-examination, the psychiatrist admitted he had reviewed a transcript of an interview between the defendant and police officers. The trial court previously had ruled this interview inadmissible because it was conducted in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to question the psychiatrist about several of the statements made by the defendant during the police interview but admonished the jury that it could consider those statements only for the purposes of testing the psychiatrist's credibility and opinion. ( Id. at p. 725, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) On appeal the defendant argued that, because the interview had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, it could not form the basis of cross-examination without infringing upon those same rights. ( Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 725, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) Analogizing to Spencer, this court rejected the defendant's argument, because the jury had been admonished to consider the statements only for the purpose of impeaching the expert and not for their substance. ( Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d. at p. 726, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) This court indicated that the circumstances that the psychiatrist involved was appointed specifically to aid the defense, and that there were other differences between the two cases, do not render our Spencer rationale inapplicable. ( Ibid. ) In both situations the defendant's interview with the court-appointed psychiatrist without the presence of counsel in Spencer, and the defense experts' consideration of the defendant's statements to the police made without counsel in Morse defense counsel has consented to the use of incriminating statements for the purpose of psychiatric evaluation. . . . In either situation the defense can have no cause for complaint when the incriminating statements are brought to light as one of the bases of the expressed opinion, provided of course that the proper limiting instruction has been given. ( Ibid. ) The Spencer rationale that applied in Morse was Spencer's conclusion that a defendant's right to counsel is not violated if a limiting instruction is given. A violation of the defendant's right to counsel in Morse occurred because he was interviewed by the police without his counsel being present, not because he was interviewed by the defense psychiatrist without his counsel being present. Morse does not support the proposition that the defendant's right to counsel, or any other constitutional right, is violated when a defense psychiatrist testifies concerning statements made to him or her by the defendant. Neither Spencer nor Morse supports the conclusion that a limiting instruction must be given even when the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is not at issue. Accordingly, the trial court was not required by Spencer to instruct the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's statements could not be considered as proof of the truth of the matter stated. [15] Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the absence of a limiting instruction denied defendant a fair trial. Defendant's confessions to other witnesses already were properly before the jury. It was permissible for the jury to consider the fact that defendant made a confession to Dr. Glathe for the nonsubstantive purpose of rebutting the defense experts' theory that his similar confessions to other witnesses were false. Under these circumstances, a limiting instruction would have had little or no effect. ( People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 [absence of a limiting instruction required by Spencer did not deny the defendant a fair trial when incriminating statements he made to psychiatrists were essentially the same as those he made to other witnesses].)
Defendant further asserts that the trial court erred in admitting Dr. Glathe's testimony under Evidence Code section 352, asserting that it was more prejudicial than probative. We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 134, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) The evidence was relevant to rebut defendant's assertions that he had not confessed to other witnesses or that in doing so he was merely bragging. Defendant contends the jury could not properly evaluate whether Dr. Glathe's testimony related a true or false confession without considering the context in which defendant's statement was made, including the ineffective assistance of prior counsel, and that such consideration could not be accomplished without undue prejudice. The question of whether defendant's confessions were false was fully litigated, however. Defense counsel cross-examined Dr. Glathe concerning his failure to conduct further psychological tests or explore the truth or falsity of the confession, and Dr. Glathe admitted thathad he been aware defendant had a pattern of telling stories and had brain damagethose circumstances might have affected his expert opinion. Defense expert Dr. Rosenthal testified that defendant could have made a false confession to Dr. Glathe as a means of establishing power in a relationship with an authority figure. We find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant argues alternatively that Dr. Glathe's testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 804, because Dr. Glathe was defendant's agent within the meaning of that statute. Subdivision (a) of section 804 provides that if an expert witness testifies that his opinion is based in whole or in part upon the opinion or statement of another person, such other person may be called and examined by any adverse party as if under cross-examination concerning the opinion or statement. Section 804 does not apply if the person upon whose opinion the expert relied is identified with a party, a term that includes someone who is an agent of the party. (Evid.Code, §§ 804, subd. (b), 776, subd. (a).) Defendant's argument is misplaced. Evidence Code section 804 governs the manner of examination; it permits a party to cross-examine the expert even though the expert is the party's own witness. (See 7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, p. 152.) The circumstance that section 804 does not apply if the expert is an agent of a party does not preclude calling the expert as a witness; that circumstance simply signifies that the examination is governed by other applicable statutes. (See, e.g., Evid.Code, § 776 [authorizing a party or person identified with a party to be called as a witness by an adverse party, but requiring that counsel for the party who is the witness or is identified with the witness examine the witness as if on redirect examination]; 7 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, p. 1221 [noting that language of Evidence Code section 1203, subdivision (b), which is identical to the relevant language of Evidence Code section 804, subdivision (b), would prohibit counsel for a party from examining his or her own client as if under cross-examination].)
Defendant contends evidence of a telephone call from him that was intercepted by police officers when they were in his apartment was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and should have been excluded at trial. Evidence presented in the trial court at a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence of the telephone call established the following: When the police interviewed the victim (Mr. Flores) about 15 minutes after the robbery, he reported a license plate number for the motorcycle that had been used by the robbers. Defendant was the registered owner of that vehicle. His name and the address used for the registration were broadcast over the police radio. Officer Webster heard the broadcast and promptly went to the address, where he was told that defendant no longer resided at that location but now resided in a duplex in the vicinity of Third and Hedding in San Jose and that he drove a white Cadillac. As Officer Webster drove around the area of Third and Hedding, he observed a white Cadillac parked in a driveway in front of a house. Webster ran a check on the license plate and found that the Cadillac was registered to defendant. The officer watched the house for approximately 20 minutes until additional officers arrived. He and two other officers went to the front door, and he knocked at approximately 6:15 or 6:30 p.m. The door was answered by Lawrence Santiago, who stated when asked that he was not defendant and that defendant was not in the house. Officer Webster asked Santiago whether he would mind if the officers entered and looked around. Santiago said he was just visiting but that he did not mind, and stepped back to let the officers in. Millie Dominguez also was present. The officers entered and searched the house but did not find defendant. One of the two occupants of the house mentioned that defendant had called earlier and was expected to call back. When the telephone rang, the officers instructed the occupants not to answer it. Officer Guerra picked up the phone, pretending to be Millie Dominguez. The caller identified himself as defendant and said that he was hot and that the police were looking for him. He instructed her to lock the doors of the apartment and the Cadillac and to take a walk. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the officers' entry into the house was consensual, and that the interception of the call was the result of a fresh pursuit situation. Officer Guerra was permitted to testify at trial concerning the contents of the telephone call. In its opinion reversing defendant's first conviction, this court concluded that counsel at defendant's first trial provided ineffective assistance in failing to move to suppress evidence of the intercepted telephone call. We observed that because the officers' entry into the apartment was without a warrant, it was presumptively unlawful. ( Ledesma I, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 227, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) However, we also noted that if counsel had challenged the admissibility of the call, the prosecution may well have been successful in rebutting the presumption of unlawfulness, and stated that the prosecution was not foreclosed from attempting on retrial to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness. ( Id. at p. 227, fn. 11, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839; see also id. at p. 236, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [concluding that it appeared the police entry was not based on voluntary consent and that even if it was, the consent did not extend to interception of the telephone call, but noting that if defense counsel had challenged the admissibility of the intercepted call, the prosecutor might have presented evidence and argument to show that the entry was lawful or that the intercepted telephone call was admissible].) We conclude, based on the record of the retrial, that the prosecution succeeded in rebutting the presumption that the entry into defendant's house and subsequent interception of the telephone call were unlawful. To establish consent, the prosecution was required to prove that the officers reasonably and in good faith believed that Santiago had the authority to consent to their entry into the apartment. (See Illinois v. Rodriguez (1990) 497 U.S. 177, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148; People v. Escudero (1979) 23 Cal.3d 800, 153 Cal. Rptr. 825, 592 P.2d 312.) Although Santiago was just visiting, he and Dominguez were present in the apartment in the early evening when defendant was not at home. Cases from a number of jurisdictions have recognized that a guest who has the run of the house in the occupant's absence has the apparent authority to give consent to enter an area where a visitor normally would be received. (See, e.g., United States v. Turbyfill (8th Cir.1975) 525 F.2d 57; Nix v. State (Alaska 1981) 621 P.2d 1347; State v. Thompson (Minn.1998) 578 N.W.2d 734; see also 4 La Fave, Search and Seizure (4th ed.2004) § 8.5(e).) Furthermore, the police may assume, without further inquiry, that a person who answers the door in response to their knock has the authority to let them enter. (See Mann v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 1, 88 Cal. Rptr. 380, 472 P.2d 468 [entry was consensual where the police knocked on the door of the defendant's house, in which a party was taking place, and voices inside called out come in].) There is no indication that the consent given here was involuntary. The officers asked Santiago for permission to enter and inspect; such a request, by its nature, carries the implication that permission may be withheld. ( See People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 116, 137 Cal.Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135.) Therefore, the officers reasonably believed they had consent to enter and were lawfully in the apartment when they answered the phone. [16] The officers' interception of defendant's phone call when they were lawfully present in his apartment was not improper, because it was based on probable cause, and exigent circumstances justified the officers' failure to obtain a warrant. The information supplied by Santiago and Dominguez gave them reason to believe that the incoming call would be from defendant and that, by answering it, they would obtain information leading to his imminent capture. (See People v. Sandoval (1966) 65 Cal.2d 303, 308, 54 Cal.Rptr. 123, 419 P.2d 187 [officers who were engaged in a lawful search justifiably could answer the telephone and conceal their identity, because they had information that the telephone was being used in drug transactions]; People v. Drieslein (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 591, 216 Cal.Rptr. 244 [same].) The delay required to obtain a warrant obviously would have resulted in the loss of this opportunity. People v. Harwood (1978) 74 Cal.App.3d 460, 141 Cal.Rptr. 519 is distinguishable. In that case, the court held that consent to enter and search the premises did not include consent to intercept telephone calls. In Harwood, the police suspected that narcotics were kept in the apartment but had no specific information indicating that the telephone was being used for narcotics transactions. ( Id. at p. 468, 141 Cal.Rptr. 519.) In the present case, the police had specific information that defendant was likely to call and thus reason to believe that answering the telephone could lead to information regarding his location.
Defendant argues that several of the trial court's various rulings regarding defense counsel's attempts to impeach prosecution witness Jona Cardona were erroneous and denied him his right to confront and cross-examine the witness under the confrontation clause of the federal Constitution. Trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679-680, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674; see People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 372, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) A trial court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence offered for impeachment is reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9-10, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) As explained below, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings. First, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling sustaining objections to defense counsel's questions regarding burglary charges that were pending against Cardona in 1980, at the time she made an anonymous telephone call to the police to report discussions she had heard about the murder. The trial court ruled that the information sought to be elicited by defense counsel was not relevant to establishing that she had a motive to lie in order to curry favor with the police, because the call was anonymous; she could not have received favorable treatment had the police not known who she was. This conclusion is reasonable, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining objections to defense counsel's questions concerning Ms. Cardona's involvement in a variety of criminal activities, including prostitution and the use and distribution of drugs. To the extent evidence of such activities was relevant to her credibility, it was cumulative. Cardona testified that she had felony convictions for burglary and petty theft with a prior, that she had been arrested and went to jail many times, that she had served time in prison, and that she had used drugs, including PCP and heroin. Second, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling sustaining objections to a line of questions asked by defense counsel regarding Cardona's hospitalization for psychiatric treatment in 1972. Defense counsel attempted to inquire whether, when she was in the mental hospital, she had expressed violent feelings toward her child or other violent fantasies, whether she was told that she was a person who manipulated other individuals and had a psychopathic streak, and whether she had told anyone she had delusions, hallucinations, confusion, and poor memory. The trial court sustained objections to these questions on the grounds of relevance and, in some instances, privilege, and ordered counsel to discontinue this line of questioning. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The hospitalization occurred in 1972, more than 16 years before her testimony at trial, and thus had little bearing on Cardona's credibility at the time she testified. (See People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 749, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113 [trial court did not err in excluding testimony regarding the witness's psychiatric treatment five years before trial, when she was only 15 years of age, because the evidence did not have sufficient bearing upon the credibility of her testimony at the trial, when she was 20].) Third, defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to establish, through the testimony of Mary Perez, that Cardona could have been motivated by jealousy and revenge to falsely implicate Jesse and George Perez. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence, the relevance of which was minimal. The testimony did not provide any motive for Cardona to falsely implicate defendant. Defendant also contends the trial court should have instructed the jury, on its own motion, on the rule that an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with distrust and must be corroborated. (See CALJIC Nos. 3.10-3.18.) Defendant's theory is that the jury could have believed that Cardona did not actually hear defendant confess to the crimes, and that her testimony was based instead on information she received from George Perez, one of defendant's accomplices in the murder. Instructions on accomplice testimony must be given if there is evidence to support the conclusion that a prosecution witness was an accomplice. ( People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 564-565, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928.) No accomplice testified at defendant's trial, and defendant's theory that Cardona indirectly testified based upon information obtained from an accomplice amounts to nothing more than conjecture.

Defendant contends the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony that the victim Flores picked defendant's picture out of a photographic lineup. [17] After a pretrial hearing on the issue, the trial court ruled that evidence of the identification was relevant for a nonhearsay purposeto establish that defendant's motive for killing Flores was to eliminate him as a witness. The identification that was made provided evidence of a motive, regardless of whether it was accurate. The trial court also concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court instructed the jury that this evidence was offered to show a motive for the murder and was not to be considered for its truth, that is, to prove that defendant committed the robbery. It was alleged as a special circumstance that the victim was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(2).) It is the accused's subjective intent that is crucial to establish the witness-killing special circumstance. ( People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 854, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) In People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 171, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629, we held that evidence establishing that the deceased victim had identified the defendant as the person who had raped her was admissible to prove a witness-killing special circumstance. In Heishman, the defendant actually had been charged with the rape at the time of the capital crime. Although the defendant's knowledge of the pending charges provided some evidence that he killed the victim to prevent her from testifying, we concluded that evidence demonstrating that she actually had identified him nevertheless was relevant to prove the special circumstance allegation. The defendant would not likely believe it was necessary to kill his accuser unless he knew or believed she had identified him to the police and was prepared to identify him at trial. ( Id. at p. 172, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) [18] Defendant contends that the victim Flores's identification of defendant's photograph nevertheless should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352 because of the risk that the jury would use it for an improper purpose, that is, to prove the charge that defendant robbed Flores. Defendant also contends the probative value of the actual identification was minimal, because there was other evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant believed he had been identified namely, that the police had told Jesse Perez that a witness had identified defendant, and Jona Cardona testified that defendant knew he had been identified. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 134, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) Other witnesses testified that defendant's motive in killing the victim was that he had identified defendant, but that did not render proof of the actual identification superfluous as to motive. Jona Cardona testified that, before the killing, defendant told her he had committed a robbery at a gas station and wanted to obtain revenge on the victim because he had picked out defendant from a photograph and had his motorcycle license number. Shirley Chavez testified that defendant admitted he killed the victim because he had identified him. Evidence of the identification tended to corroborate the testimony of these other witnesseswitnesses whose credibility the defense vigorously challenged at trial. Furthermore, the risk that the jury would rely on the identification as proof of defendant's guilt of the robbery was low, because several other witnesses testified that defendant had admitted committing the robbery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant also contends the actual photo display from which the victim Flores made the identification was irrelevant and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant argues the photo display was prejudicial because the jury could have interpreted defendant's photograph as a mug shot and could have concluded he had been previously arrested and had a criminal history. The trial court rejected that argument, ruling there was nothing about the photograph that would identify it as a mug shot. Having reviewed the photograph at issue, we agree.
Defendant further contends the trial court erred in admitting, as spontaneous declarations, victim Flores's hearsay statements concerning the robbery and the license plate number of the motorcycle used in the robbery. Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: [¶] (a) purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception. (Evid.Code, § 1240.) We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision to admit evidence as a spontaneous declaration. ( People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 58, 991 P.2d 145.) The trial court conducted a hearing at which Officer Guerra testified that when she interviewed the victim Flores at the gas station on August 26, 1987, he appeared to be nervous. He said he had been robbed about 15 minutes earlier, described the robbery and robbers in some detail, and gave her the license plate of the motorcycle they were driving. The trial court concluded that Flores's statements to Officer Guerra were admissible as spontaneous declarations, and Officer Guerra testified concerning these statements at trial. In addition, Flores's supervisor, Eulalio Solorio, testified that on the day of the robbery, Mr. Flores called him at home, sounding scared. Flores told Mr. Solorio that he had just been robbed and that he had recorded the license number of the getaway motorcycle. The trial court's decision is sufficiently supported by the evidence. Mr. Flores described a robbery that he had personally perceived, shortly after it occurred. The court's conclusion that he was under the stress of the event at the time he made the statements is supported by the brief lapse of time before he made the statement, by Officer Guerra's statement that he seemed nervous, and by Mr. Solorio's statement that he sounded scared. That statements were made to Officer Guerro in response to her questions does not render the exception inapplicable. Neither lapse of time between the event and the declarations nor the fact that the declarations were elicited by questioning deprives the statements of spontaneity if it nevertheless appears that they were made under the stress of excitement and while the reflective powers were still in abeyance. ( People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1170, 1176, 81 Cal.Rptr. 5, 459 P.2d 259.) Defendant contends that the admission of Mr. Flores's statements to the police regarding the robbery nevertheless violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. The confrontation clause applies to hearsay statements that are testimonial in nature, including statements made during police interrogation. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177.) Such hearsay may be admitted at trial only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The high court recently concluded that hearsay statements are testimonial when made in the course of police interrogation and the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. ( Davis v. Washington (2006) ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273-2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.) Assuming for the purposes of discussion that Mr. Flores's statements to Officer Guerra were made in response to interrogation and that their admission in this case violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, we conclude that any error was nevertheless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [19] To the extend that Officer Guerra's testimony tended to establish that Flores had been robbed and tended to connect defendant to that robbery, it was cumulative of other evidence. Mr. Solorio testified that the victim told him he had been robbed and had obtained the license plate number of the motorcycle used in the robbery. He also testified that $30 was missing from the gas station. Numerous other witnesses testified that defendant had admitted committing the robbery.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding statements made by the witness Santiago Ontiveros during a police interview. When Ontiveros testified at trial, he denied that defendant had told him he was involved in a robbery or that Ontiveros had told anyone else that defendant had admitted being involved in a robbery. He further testified that he did not remember any conversation with a San Jose police officer in March of 1979. When the prosecutor asked him how he could flatly deny telling anyone that defendant had committed a robbery, but also testify that he did not remember what he told the police, he stated, It's in my nature. I wouldn't tell anything to begin with. Over a hearsay objection, a police officer testified that in March of 1979 he interviewed Ontiveros, who said that defendant had told him that defendant and Jesse Perez were involved in the robbery at the Hudson gas station. In addition, the prosecutor was permitted to play for the jury a portion of the tape-recorded interview during which Ontiveros told an officer that he did not know anything about the murder, but that defendant had told him that Jesse Perez was on the back of the motorcycle during the robbery. The trial court admitted the tape and the testimony as prior inconsistent statements. (Evid.Code, § 1235.) A witness's prior statement that is inconsistent with his or her testimony is admissible so long as the witness is given the opportunity to explain or deny the statement. (Evid.Code, §§ 770, 1235.) Defendant complains that the trial court failed to make a factual finding that Ontiveros's testimony was inconsistent with his prior statement, a prerequisite for the admission of those statements. No such explicit finding is required. A ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever finding of fact is prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is unnecessary unless required by statute. (Evid.Code, § 402, subd. (c); see People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 935, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) Furthermore, Ontiveros's insistence that he never told anyone that defendant had admitted being involved in the robbery was plainly inconsistent with his prior statements to the officer.
Defendant similarly challenges the admission of prior statements of Sylvia Lopez Ontiveros, Santiago's former wife, which also were admitted as prior inconsistent statements. Sylvia Ontiveros initially testified that she did not remember having a conversation with defendant concerning a robbery or murder. Subsequently, she denied that he ever had told her he was going to kill someone. Ontiveros recalled speaking to a police officer in March of 1979, and she recalled testifying at the preliminary hearing in 1979. But she stated she did not remember what she testified about, and did not remember testifying that defendant had told her he had killed somebody. She did remember being in the district attorney's office during the last year and listening to a tape recording in which she was speaking to a man about defendant, but stated she did not remember many of the things she said on the recording. She did, however, admit that she might have said on the recording that defendant had killed the gas station attendant because the man was going to testify against him. She testified she did not want to be in court and admitted that when she was called to testify in a previous proceeding in the same case, she failed to appear and the police had to bring her to court. After Ontiveros read a copy of her prior preliminary hearing testimony, she testified that she still did not remember her testimony or the conversations with defendant to which she had testified. She said she blanked things out because she did not want to think about them. Over defense objection, the prosecutor was permitted to have a portion of her preliminary examination testimony read to the jury. That testimony disclosed that defendant had told her he had killed someone who had identified him in a robbery, in order to eliminate the witness. She also testified at the preliminary hearing that, prior to the murder, she had overheard defendant tell her husband that he was thinking of getting rid of the witness because the witness had identified him. Evidence of statements made by Ontiveros during a police interview also were admitted over a hearsay objection. In the interview, she stated that defendant had told her, prior to the murder, that he wanted to get rid of the victim. She recounted that he later had told her he had shot the victim and had told another guy to finish him off. Defendant also told her he felt that if he eliminated the victim, the police would not be able to press charges against him. Defendant argues that the trial court failed to make a finding that Ontiveros's prior statements were inconsistent with her testimony. Normally, the testimony of a witness that he or she does not remember an event is not inconsistent with that witness's prior statement describing the event. ( People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988, 92 Cal.Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998.) However, . . . [w]hen a witness's claim of lack of memory amounts to deliberate evasion, inconsistency is implied. ( Id. at pp. 988-989, 92 Cal.Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998.) As long as there is a reasonable basis in the record for concluding that the witness's `I don't remember' statements are evasive and untruthful, admission of his or her prior statements is proper. ( People v. O'Quinn (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 219, 225, 167 Cal.Rptr. 141.) ( People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1.) The requisite finding is implied from the trial court's ruling. (Evid.Code, § 402, subd. (c).) Although Ontiveros consistently denied at trial being able to remember anything that defendant had told her, what she had told the police, or her prior testimony, the record provides a reasonable basis to conclude she was being evasive. (See People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 78, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) She had been a friend of defendant's and admitted she was reluctant to testify and had failed to appear at a previous hearing. She claimed that even reading her prior testimony in full and listening to a tape recording of her police interview did not refresh her recollection.