Opinion ID: 179055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Amount of Gross Receipts

Text: When a defendant derive[s] more than $1,000,000 in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions as a result of the offense, his base offense level is increased by two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A). [5] `Gross receipts from the offense' includes all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly as a result of such offense. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(14)(A) cmt. n. 11(B). The term financial institution refers not only to banks, credit unions, and pension funds, but also to any similar entity whether or not insured by the federal government. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i) cmt. n. 1. Knox contends that the spreadsheets FDIC agent Bergan used to explain his gross receipt calculation were conclusory and insufficient to support the application of this enhancement because none of the HUD-1 forms or the checks on which the spreadsheets were based were presented as evidence. However, unlike at trial, a district judge is not constrained by the rules of evidence at sentencing hearings. United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir.2008). In determining whether the government has met its burden of proof at sentencing, a court may consider information that would not have been admissible at trial if it has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy. Id. at 753 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Bergan testified that he obtained the information reflecting the amount of money Knox received from cashiers' checks, bank accounts, HUD-1 forms, and other documents collected during his investigation. Knox did not challenge this testimony or the admission of the spreadsheets as exhibits during sentencing [6] , and the district court correctly accepted as sufficiently reliable Bergan's explanation as to how he obtained the figures. See United States v. Statham, 581 F.3d 548, 553 (7th Cir.2009) (finding that district court's reliance on testimony of two cooperating witnesses, some of which was contradictory, was no reason to upset the credibility determinations of the district court and that the information on which it depended was reliable). We find no error in the district court's finding that it was more likely than not that Knox's gross receipts totaled more than $1 million.