Opinion ID: 728946
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

Text: 34 Following Jojola's courtroom identification of Bell, the district court refused to admit expert testimony impeaching the reliability of Jojola's identification. When faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, the district court must determine whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2796, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). After a detailed offer of proof, the district court concluded that: (1) there had been no showing that the proffered testimony constituted scientific knowledge under the first prong of Daubert; (2) the proffered testimony would not assist the trier of fact under the second prong of Daubert because it invaded the province of the jury; and (3) the proffered testimony was likely to confuse the jury under Fed.R.Evid. 403. Instead, the district court subsequently gave the jury an instruction on eyewitness identification in order to assist the jury in evaluating the eyewitness testimony. Bell claims this decision was erroneous and denied him due process. 35 At the outset of this inquiry we note that the district court has broad discretion in, first, determining the reliability of the particular testimony and, second, balancing its probative value against its prejudicial effect. United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 839, 108 S.Ct. 124, 98 L.Ed.2d 82 (1987). The exclusion of expert testimony is a matter committed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1345 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 326, 83 L.Ed.2d 263 (1984). 36 We agree with the district court's assessment that the proffered expert eyewitness identification testimony fails to qualify as scientific knowledge under Daubert 's first prong. Daubert sets forth four factors which the district court should consider in determining whether the proffered expert testimony qualifies as scientific knowledge. These include: (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate for error; and (4) the particular degree of acceptance within the scientific community. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. Defense counsel submitted a preliminary opinion by Gary Wells, professor of psychology at Iowa State University, along with Dr. Wells' curriculum vitae, and one article he had written and another he had co-written on the topic of eyewitness identification in lineups. While the articles admirably articulate Dr. Wells' theories and hypotheses regarding how to conduct a non-misleading pretrial lineup, they are utterly deficient in regard to determining whether his views constitute scientific knowledge within the meaning of Daubert. Even assuming these articles are relevant in a case where no pretrial lineup was ever conducted, their reference to the research and/or studies upon which Dr. Wells' propositions and corollaries are based consist of nothing more than the name of the researcher followed by the date of the study (i.e. Wells, 1978.). Whereas this shorthand may communicate volumes to those in the field of psychology, it says nothing whatsoever to the district judge attempting to assess the credibility of the research underlying Dr. Wells' opinions. We are left in a situation analogous to that of the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Rincon, 28 F.3d 921, 923-25 (9th Cir.) (affirming the district court's exclusion of proffered expert eyewitness identification testimony under Daubert ), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1029, 115 S.Ct. 605, 130 L.Ed.2d 516 (1994): [W]hile the article identified the research on some of the topics, it did not discuss the research in sufficient detail that the district court could determine if the research was scientifically valid. Id. at 924. In short, the record supports the conclusion of the district court. 37 Even if the proffered testimony qualified as scientific evidence under the first Daubert hurdle, we agree with the district court's conclusion that it fails under the second phase of that inquiry. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits the use of expert testimony when scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The advisory committee's notes make it clear that when the layman juror would be able to make a common sense determination of the issue without the technical aid of such an expert, the expert testimony should be excluded as superfluous. Fed.R.Evid. 702, advisory committee's note. And while Rule 704 has largely abrogated the bar against expert testimony on ultimate issues, [t]he abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars so as to admit all opinions. Fed.R.Evid. 704, advisory committee's note. Rules 702 and 403 still provide for the exclusion of evidence which wastes time, such as opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach. Id. 38 The evaluation of eyewitness testimony is for the jury alone. It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine the believability of a witness.... An expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or truthfulness of a victim's story. Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). The proposed expert in this case was not merely going to offer testimony about eyewitness identification in general but specific, to the point, testimony regarding the inherently untrustworthy manner with which Jojola identified Mr. Bell in Court. Appellant Bell's brief at 47. This line of testimony intrudes into the jury's domain. Bell's defense counsel was capable of exposing to the jury any potentially unreliable bases underlying Jojola's identification through cross examination, assuming they were not already apparent. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir.1993) (affirming exclusion of proffered eyewitness identification expert testimony because jurors using common sense and their faculties of observation can judge the credibility of an eyewitness identification, especially since deficiencies or inconsistencies in an eyewitness's testimony can be brought out with skillful cross-examination.). We believe the jury, as the trier of fact, to have been fully capable of gauging Jojola's credibility without the aid of an expert. United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d 809, 815 (4th Cir.) ([E]xpert testimony can be properly excluded if it is introduced merely to cast doubt on the credibility of other eyewitnesses, since the evaluation of a witness' credibility is a determination usually within the jury's exclusive purview.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2631, 132 L.Ed.2d 871 (1995). 39 The minimal probative value of the proffered expert testimony is outweighed by the danger of juror confusion. Daubert makes it clear that when assessing the admissibility of proffered scientific expert testimony under Rule 702, the trial court must also take into account the interplay of other relevant rules of evidence, such as Rule 403: Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, 113 S.Ct. at 2798 (quotation omitted). Here the district court properly recognized the very real danger that the proffered expert testimony could either confuse the jury or cause it to substitute the expert's credibility assessment for its own. Dorsey, 45 F.3d at 816 (Because in the instant case, the district court was concerned that the expert testimony would confuse and mislead the jury, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony.); Rincon, 28 F.3d at 926 (Given the powerful nature of expert testimony, coupled with its potential to mislead the jury, we cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that the proffered evidence would not assist the trier of fact and that it was likely to mislead the jury.). 40 Our conclusion is buttressed by three additional considerations: First, the district court adequately addressed the concerns presented by the excluded expert testimony by giving a comprehensive instruction regarding the evaluation and reliability of eyewitness testimony. See Rincon, 28 F.3d at 925. Second, the reality of the potential unreliability of eyewitness identification had already been driven home to the jury in a manner no expert could hope to reproduce by Nelson's prior in-court misidentification of Bell as one of his assailants. Third, Jojola's eyewitness testimony is supported by that of numerous other witnesses, including McGee and Brown, both of whom implicated Bell as the third participant in the robbery. We are especially hesitant to find an abuse of discretion [in denying expert eyewitness identification testimony] unless the government's case against the defendant rested exclusively on uncorroborated eyewitness testimony. Blade, 811 F.2d at 465. As such, we find none.