Opinion ID: 2263392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the trial court's reprimands of defense counsel in the jury's presence

Text: Keyser's final claim of error is that the trial court openly reprimanded his defense counsel, in the presence of the jury, and thereby deprived Keyser of his right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. We ordinarily review claims alleging the infringement of a constitutionally protected right de novo, [13] but because Keyser failed to challenge those judicial remarks by requesting the trial judge to issue a curative instruction, he waived those claims. [14] In these circumstances, the challenged judicial remarks are reviewed only for plain error. [15] The trial judge made the three challenged remarks at different points during the trial, all in the presence of the jury. Only the second and third remarks merit discussion. The second comment occurred after defense counsel became concerned that one of the trial court's evidentiary rulings amounted to judicial comment on the evidence in violation of Article 4, Section 19 of the Delaware Constitution: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right, and we agree that the jury's recollection as to the question and answer that controls, correct? THE COURT: And we also agree [Counsel], that I will be the one who will give jury instructions; isn't that correct, sir? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: So if we have this discussion any more, it will be very unpleasant, okay? [Counsel], do we understand each other? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Absolutely, Your Honor. I am not rearguing. You sustained it. THE COURT: We are not arguing about what you and I, what our roles are. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No. I am not arguing with the Court at all. THE COURT: You may continue. The third comment occurred after defense counsel had concluded his cross-examination of a State witness. The prosecutor attempted to ask a question on redirect when the trial court interrupted: THE COURT: No. No. You get  this is her witness. I don't even know why you're standing up. She gets to stand up; you don't. [DEFENSE COUNSEL NO. 2]: [16] Your Honor, we are going to object to the form. THE COURT: The door's been open. You asked the questions you wanted to ask previously in regards to his reference. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That wasn't our objection, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well, I'm not sure what your objection is. To the extent that you have one, it's overruled. And both of you cannot stand up. You know the rules. [Counsel], don't even say anything else. I've let it go periodically, but this is her witness. If she wants to say something, she is certainly capable, I'm quite convinced, of saying whatever she'd like to say. Now she may not say exactly what you would like her to say, I understand that, but this is her witness. Okay. Now, if there's an objection as to form, we haven't even got to the question yet. So let's ask the question and see if you still have an objection to it. Don't say anything else, you're going to get yourself in trouble. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm not going into the objection, Your Honor. I just want to be able to, once we are done, to put on the record what we would have objected to. THE COURT: Well, no. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Can I confer with counsel? THE COURT: She's sitting right next to you. You can confer as much as you would like to. During the summations, the trial court thanked the prosecutor after her closing argument, but when defense counsel concluded her closing argument, the trial judge did not thank counsel, but asked the jury whether they needed a lunch break. After the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, again, the trial court personally thanked the prosecutor. Keyser claims that the trial court's remarks to his counsel were belittling and sarcastic, and unnecessarily demeaning towards the Defendant's counsel in front of the jury. Regrettably, we must agree. The record does not reveal the reasons for the trial court's apparent antipathy to defense counsel. Moreover, even if defense counsel's actions or behavior did justify the trial court's reprimands, the manner in which the court proceeded to rebuke defense counsel was unnecessarily demeaning and threatened to jeopardize Keyser's right to a fair trial. [17] We have previously noted that [j]uries may get the wrong impression when they witness the court reprimanding an attorney. They may not understand what the attorney did wrong, and they may lose confidence in the attorney's case because of the court's criticism. [18] To avoid the risk of prejudicing either side's case in the eyes of the jury, any reprimands of counsel, if justified, should be made outside the jury's presence. In this case, the trial court could have briefly sent the jury out, or held a sidebar on the record, or recessed the trial and met with counsel in chambers on the record. The trial court's choice to reprimand defense counsel before the jury, however, was improper. That said, for Keyser to prevail on his constitutional claim under the plain error standard, he must establish that the trial judge's rebuke of counsel affected his substantial rights, meaning that it must have affected the outcome of his trial. [19] Again, Keyser has failed to meet that burden, because the overwhelming evidence of Keyser's guilt at trial negates any inference that the trial court's remarks affected the outcome. Keyser made highly incriminatory admissions of his participation in Kimberly Holton's murder. Keyser admitted that he brought Ms. Holton to the motel room knowing that Jacob Jones wanted to kill her. Keyser also admitted that he held down Ms. Holton while Jones suffocated her, and helped Jones wrap her in a blanket bound with duct tape, and move the body from the motel room into the trunk of Jones' car. Moreover, Keyser told police that Jones had previously asked Keyser to help him kill Ms. Holton, remove her body from the motel, and take the body to an airplane to be dumped into the ocean. Besides his incriminating statements to police, there is significant evidence of Keyser's consciousness of guilt. Keyser had previously lied to police, telling them that he had not seen the victim for four or five months, even though video surveillance of a Dover Wawa convenience store showed that Keyser was with Ms. Holton on the night of the murder. Keyser also asked his girlfriend to tell the police (falsely) that he had been working on the night of the murder. And, Keyser attempted suicide the day after he made his statements to police, leaving two suicide notes. Given the overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Keyser has not shown that the trial court's reprimands of defense counsel before the jury, although improper, amounted to plain error that deprived him of his right to a fair trial.