Opinion ID: 797699
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Frye

Text: 43 As an initial matter, we note that our review of the transcript left us with the firm impression that the IJ's desire to help the translator make a six o'clock flight weighed substantially in the decision to exclude Dr. Frye. This is an obviously improper factor to consider when assessing the admissibility of an expert. The IJ did not, however, expressly rely on this fact, and our analysis need not focus on this apparent basis for rejecting Dr. Frye. Rather, we look to Dr. Frye's qualifications and the reasons for exclusion expressly stated by the IJ. 44 Among the express reasons given by the IJ for the exclusion of Dr. Frye were (1) her lack of travel to Burma, (2) her membership and work for the human rights organization, (3) her focus on internal medicine and infectious diseases rather than trauma, and (4) her lack of specialization in psychiatry or psychology. Whether she had ever traveled to Burma has absolutely no bearing on her ability as a physician to recognize physical or psychological trauma or to comment regarding the consistency between Petitioner's actual, present physical symptoms and his claims of abuse and torture. Further, we find it more than a little troubling that an immigration judge who is ostensibly working as a neutral arbiter in a fact-finding and decisionmaking capacity would use a physician's participation in an advocacy and aid organization as a basis to presume a conflict and bias (as opposed to considering such participation as affecting the weight of the evidence). This is especially troubling where, as here, the immigration service itself has used the very same organization to give presentations to immigration judges during training and continuing education seminars regarding torture. 3 In our view, the IJ's assessment of Dr. Frye contained commentary regarding participation with the human rights organization that suggests the IJ may not have acted as a neutral arbiter. Cf. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir.2005) (collecting cases involving suspect rulings by immigration judges); Wang v. Attorney General, 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3rd Cir.2005) (The tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to a court television show than a federal court proceeding.). 45 Further, Dr. Frye was clearly qualified and offered critical corroborating testimony based on a recent medical examination of the Petitioner. There does not appear to have been any objection to her methodology, only to her qualifications, and even if the Rules of Evidence were to apply in this context, it is not necessary that a physician be a specialist or publish in a particular area to provide assistance in the evaluation of claims of abuse or torture. See Fed.R.Evid. 702 (requiring only that an expert be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education). Given Dr. Frye's medical education and work experience as a physician and nurse in the United States and abroad, she was qualified to comment on physical trauma, physical scars, the consistency between Petitioner's claims and his physical scars and symptoms, and, based on her experience with trauma victims, psychological effects of trauma. See, e.g., Hanaj v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 694, 696, 700 (7th Cir.2006) (ordering a remand and suggesting reassignment to a different IJ where the initial IJ ignored aspects of a petitioner's evidence, including an affidavit from a board certified family physician who documented scars on [the petitioner's] heel, head, shoulder, back, palms and leg consistent with [the petitioner's] allegations of . . . beatings). 46 Regarding the possibility of prejudice under the standard of Torres-Sanchez, we believe that the exclusion of Dr. Frye's report and testimony may have affected the outcome of the proceedings. The contents of her report and anticipated testimony were strong evidence of torture and strongly corroborated Petitioner's claims. The markings around Petitioner's waist and ankles were consistent with his claims of having been shackled in the work camp, and his numerous small scars and skin discolorations were consistent with his claims of having been tortured with electrical shocks. The IJ and the Board, however, chose to wholly disbelieve Petitioner by focusing only on perceived conflicts between the applications, affidavit, and testimony regarding the details of when and where the abuse occurred. It is clear the IJ wholly disbelieved Petitioner because the IJ stated, [t]he horrific facts Tun describes, if true, surely amount to past persecution. 47 Notwithstanding this conclusion, the IJ and the Board completely ignored the most valuable corroborating evidence of his torture—his scars—and relied specifically on infirm aspects of the translation to discount his claims. Petitioner's claim for relief, however, depended not on the precise details of when, how often, and in which place of confinement he was tortured, but whether he was tortured and whether it is likely to happen again upon his return to Burma. The inconsistencies relied upon by the IJ and the Board pale in comparison to the strong physical evidence corroborating his claims of torture, forced labor, and bondage. Given this fact, we have little trouble concluding that the improper exclusion of Dr. Frye's affidavit and testimony strongly suggest prejudice under the due process standard.