Opinion ID: 770794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Individual Plaintiffs' Status as Losing Parties

Text: 41 Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in deeming individual plaintiffs Rogers, Gertino, Tach One, and BVF to be losing parties within the meaning of Haw. Rev. Stat. 607-14. Their arguments are without merit. 42 The district court ruled that each individual plaintiff is jointly and severally liable for defendants' attorneys' fees to the extent that fees were incurred before each plaintiff's dismissal from the action with prejudice. The court so ruled because all plaintiffs joined in asserting all claims against defendants. All plaintiffs were represented by the same attorneys. All plaintiffs sought the same relief. And finally, all claims of all plaintiffs were ultimately dismissed with prejudice, albeit at different times. Thus, the district court found: (1) Kona, BVF, Tach One, Rogers, and Gertino jointly and severally liable for fees incurred from the inception of the litigation until Rogers and Gertino were dropped as parties (deemed 50% of the fees); (2) Kona, BVF, and Tach One jointly and severally liable for fees incurred from the original filing of the Second Amended Complaint until Tach One and BVF were dismissed with prejudice (35% of the fees); and (3) Kona solely liable for the fees incurred thereafter (15% of the fees). 11 Given the unitary nature of this action and its prosecution, the district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in holding all plaintiffs jointly and severally liable for their portion of the full amount of attorneys' fees. See Pekarsky v. Ariyoshi, 575 F. Supp. 673, 677 (D. Haw. 1983) (holding that all plaintiffs may be held jointly and severally liable as losing parties where their claims are unitarily raised and litigated); see also Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 712 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming order holding defendants jointly and severally liable in a unitary civil rights action), disapproved on other grounds by Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 718 & n.4 (1987); Karrick v. Edes, 19 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (It is familiar law that, where several plaintiffs unite in bringing an action, costs may be taxed against all of them and recovery had against any of them.); Hughes v. Foster Wheeler Co., 932 P.2d 784, 791-92 (Alaska 1997) (same). 43 Moreover, plaintiffs' contention that Tach One and BVF should not be held liable for attorneys' fees because Tach One and BVF voluntarily dismissed their claims against defendants with prejudice in order to survive a dismissal of the entire action for incomplete diversity, although sympathetic, is without merit. Again, Wong unequivocally held that any dismissal that results in judgment is sufficient to support an award of attorneys' fees under Hawai'i law. See 961 P.2d at 614. Our circuit has similarly held that a voluntary dismissal of a diversity action with prejudice is tantamount to a judgment on the merits for purposes of attorneys' fees awards. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 130 (5th Cir.1985)); All American Distributing Co., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 736 F.2d 530, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that [i]n the absence of express language in the statute requiring an adjudication on the merits of the underlying damages claims, plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of its diversity action after preliminary injunctive relief was denied is a sufficient basis for awarding attorneys' fees under Arizona law to the defendant). Thus, the district court correctly deemed the individual plaintiffs to be losing parties within the meaning of Haw. Rev. 607-14. 44