Opinion ID: 2310654
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Stone's Request for a Limiting Instruction

Text: Mr. Stone argues that the testimony by Ms. Wright about Norris' statements following the robbery constituted evidence of other crimes committed by Stone and that, consequently, the admission of this evidence created the danger of jury misuse and the need for a limiting instruction. We think Stone has misapprehended the nature of the evidence at issue here and, consequently, the possibility of jury misuse of the evidence. Sophia Wright testified that a man named Norris identified the man who robbed her and Nicholes as Carlos Kemper, not Stone or Boone. She then went on to say that Norris told her that Kemper had been seen with Stone and Boone earlier in the evening. At this point, Stone's counsel requested a limiting instruction, which the court declined to give. Since the testimony did not show that Stone was the person who had engaged in other criminal activity  namely, the robbery of Nicholes and Wright  it was not other crimes evidence as that term is traditionally understood. See Drew, 118 U.S.App. D.C. at 15-16, 331 F.2d at 89-90. Merely being in the presence of someone who later commits a crime does not necessarily implicate a person in that crime. Moreover, Ms. Wright's testimony was not true other crimes evidence because it was not introduced to prove that other crimes had actually been committed. See Sweet v. United States, 449 A.2d 315, 319 (D.C.1982). As Stone's counsel admitted at trial, the testimony was introduced only for the purpose of showing the effect that Norris' statement had upon Stone's state of mind. Nor did the government attempt to show that Stone was in any way involved in the robbery with Kemper. [14] There was thus no reason for the court to give a limiting instruction, especially when the jury would have had to engage in speculation to make any improper use of Ms. Wright's testimony. [15]