Opinion ID: 186623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 9  We will affirm a conviction where  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C.Cir.2002). We do not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence, and we give full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact. United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858, 863 (D.C.Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We review the evidence of record de novo, considering that evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375. 10 Ordinarily, an appellant seeking to overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence bears an exceedingly heavy burden. United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C.Cir.1993). However, where a defendant fails to renew his motion for a judgment of acquittal (MJOA) under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a) at the close of all the evidence, his burden is even heavier: He has waived his right to raise a sufficiency of the evidence claim on appeal unless declining to consider the sufficiency of the evidence on waiver grounds cause[s] a `manifest miscarriage of justice.' United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1051 (D.C.Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Sherod, 960 F.2d 1075, 1077 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 480, 121 L.Ed.2d 385 (1992)). We note that Booker—like the defendants in Thompson and Sherod —failed to renew his MJOA at the close of all the evidence. Unlike the defendants in Thompson and Sherod, however, Booker did renew his MJOA after the jury verdict. Insofar as the miscarriage of justice standard is intended simply to ensure that the District Court has the opportunity to order an MJOA after receiving all the evidence, see Sherod, 960 F.2d at 1077, Booker's post-verdict motion may be sufficient to preserve his objections to the sufficiency of the evidence against him. We need not determine this issue in the present case, because for the reasons set forth below, we conclude a rational juror could have convicted Booker for possessing the handgun. B 11 Booker argues the prosecution did not establish that he possessed a gun for purposes of either Count Three or Count Four because the gun was not found on his person, no one saw him holding it, and no fingerprints were recovered from it. However, we have long held that possession for purposes of both §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1) may be either actual or constructive. United States v. Alexander, 331 F.3d 116, 127 (D.C.Cir.2003) (upholding a conviction under § 922(g)(1) on the basis of constructive possession); see also Wahl, 290 F.3d at 375-76 (upholding a conviction under § 924(c)(1) on the basis of constructive possession). 12 We agree with the government that there was ample evidence to justify the jury's verdict that Booker constructively possessed the handgun for purposes of both Count Three and Count Four. Constructive possession is established with evidence supporting a finding that the defendant had the ability to exercise knowing dominion and control over the items in question. Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although mere proximity to a gun is insufficient to establish constructive possession, evidence of some other factor—including connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise—coupled with proximity may suffice. Alexander, 331 F.3d at 127 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, several Alexander -type plus factors allowed the jury to infer Booker's connection with [the] gun. The government's drug expert testified that drug dealers have a motive—namely, defense of themselves and their drug stashes—to carry guns. The undercover police officer watched (through his rearview mirror) as Booker walked up the street and made a gesture implying control over the gun, which was stashed immediately next to the Newport pack. Booker then made a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise when he told the arrest team that he was looking for his Newport cigarettes. Coupled with the fact that the stash was never more than 50-80 feet away from Booker, these factors constitute ample evidence to find constructive possession under Alexander and Wahl. 13 Moreover, Booker's indisputable dominion and control over the drugs, Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376, further supports our conclusion that he constructively possessed the nearby gun. The government's drug expert testified about the unique relation between drug stashes and firearms, stating that one often can't do without the other. The expert's testimony accords with our prior caselaw, which has frequently recognized that guns and drugs go together in drug trafficking. United States v. McLendon, 378 F.3d 1109, 1113 (D.C.Cir.2004); see also United States v. Brown, 334 F.3d 1161, 1171 (D.C.Cir.2003) (noting guns and drugs are often present together, and therefore, the presence of one can be used to infer the presence of the other); United States v. Conyers, 118 F.3d 755, 757 (D.C.Cir.1997) (same); United States v. Payne, 805 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (D.C.Cir.1986) (same). Thus, we reaffirm that evidence of a defendant's possession of [guns] can properly be used to show his connection to [drugs], McLendon, 378 F.3d at 1113, and vice versa. See United States v. Evans, 888 F.2d 891, 896 (D.C. Cir.1989) (The government presented evidence that [all three defendants] were engaged in a common [drug] enterprise. From this evidence a jury could reasonably infer that all three shared direct access to, and dominion and control over, the knapsack, which contained both cocaine and guns.), cert. denied sub nom. Curren v. United States, 494 U.S. 1019, 110 S.Ct. 1325, 108 L.Ed.2d 500 (1990); compare In re Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1465 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding there was insufficient evidence to support constructive possession of a gun because it was physically impossible for the defendant to grab the gun during the drug sale). 14 This case differs markedly from In re Sealed Case. There, the defendant remained inside a restaurant while his brother conducted a drug sale in a car, which was parked outside the restaurant. When the police arrested the defendant and his brother, they discovered a gun under the driver's seat of the car. We held there was insufficient evidence to support the District Court's conclusion that the defendant constructively possessed the gun because the spatial separation between the defendant, the gun, and the drugs precluded him from exercising dominion and control over the firearm during the transaction. See id. Here, by sharp contrast, Booker easily could have grabbed the gun during the drug sale (either when he went to pick up the Newport cigarette pack, or when he went back to re-hide it). The proximity of the gun and the drugs suggest they were stashed by the same person, as part of a common [drug] enterprise, Evans, 888 F.2d at 895, and the lack of frost and dirt on the gun suggests it had been stashed recently. Finally, Booker was a veteran drug-vendor in his high-crime neighborhood, and he doubtlessly had a motive to carry a gun to protect himself and his illicit assets. See United States v. Jefferson, 974 F.2d 201, 208 (D.C.Cir.1992) (concluding there was sufficient evidence that the guns were present `to protect [the] drug traffickers and their investment') (quoting United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 1128, 1141 (D.C.Cir.1989)). 15 In these circumstances, a rational juror could reasonably conclude Booker constructively possessed the gun lying next to his drugs, and it is certainly not a manifest miscarriage of justice to affirm the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we affirm Booker's conviction on Count Three and Count Four.