Opinion ID: 2820505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: I-213 Forms

Text: Watson next contends that the I-213 forms should not have been admitted. The I-213 form records an individual’s “routine biographical information,” such as “name, date of birth, place of birth, parents’ names, height, weight, address, country of citizenship, and information concerning whether the entrant had an immigration visa.” United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1226 (11th Cir. 2010). Agent John Solek testified at trial that the I-213 form is “a basic Border Patrol arrest form.” According to Watson, the I-213 forms were testimonial hearsay. As such, Watson says, the admission of those forms violated both his Confrontation Clause rights and the rules of evidence because the United States did not demonstrate that the declarants were unavailable to testify. Watson objected to the forms only on hearsay grounds at trial, and so we review his Confrontation Clause argument for plain error. See United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1291 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2006). Watson, however, does not frame his constitutional argument under the 21 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 22 of 38 plain-error standards. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (holding that the defendant bears the burden under plain-error review). And, as Watson acknowledges, Caraballo held that the I-213 forms are admissible hearsay and their admission does not violate the Confrontation Clause. 595 F.3d at 1226– 27. Given on-point precedent and the absence of any plain-error argument from Watson, the district court’s admission of the I-213 forms was not plain error. As to Watson’s Federal Rule of Evidence objection, his argument is foreclosed by Caraballo. D. District Court’s Limitation of Cross Examination Watson challenges the district court’s limitation of his cross-examination of two witnesses: Donovan Morgan and Agent Malone. According to Watson, the district court excluded relevant evidence and violated his right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Federal Rule of Evidence 611(b) grants district courts “broad discretion . . . to determine the permissible scope of cross-examination.” United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the district court’s decision to tailor the scope of cross examination may not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. But the district court must comply with the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which includes the defendant’s cross-examination of witnesses. United States v. Lankford, 955 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir. 1992) 22 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 23 of 38 (concluding that the district court’s discretion “is somewhat narrower where the district court limits a defendant’s right to cross-examine witnesses against him”). The Sixth Amendment ensures the defendant a “sufficient cross-examination,” but not an unlimited one. United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994). In assessing a Confrontation Clause challenge to cross-examination, courts look to “whether a reasonable jury would have received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility had counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination.” Id. at 1539–40 (internal quotation marks omitted). As to the cross-examination of Morgan, Watson takes issue with the court’s refusal to allow two questions: (1) whether Morgan had any receipts from the money his family and friends sent through Western Union and (2) how Morgan got the money. Morgan testified that he received $10,000 from family and friends in Jamaica, which he used to attempt to illegally enter the United States on Watson’s boat. On cross, he testified that he received the money from remittances, “like Western Union.” After Morgan stated that his family and friends sent money “a lot,” counsel asked whether Morgan had “any of the receipts from when they sent you this money.” The United States objected on the basis of relevance, and the district court sustained the objection. Then, after asking several other questions, counsel again asked Morgan how he “g[o]t the money from [his] friends in 23 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 24 of 38 Jamaica and [his] friends from abroad?” The district court also sustained the United States’ objection to that question. Under both the Confrontation Clause and the Federal Rules of Evidence, the district court properly limited the cross-examination. Whether Morgan kept the receipts is not “highly relevant” to Morgan’s credibility, as Watson asserts. If Morgan had answered “No, I do not have the receipts,” a reasonable jury would not have reached a “significantly different impression” of Morgan’s credibility. Diaz, 26 F.3d at 1539–40. It is not unusual for people to discard receipts—think of trips to the ATM or gas station where one instinctively hits “No” to the prompt “Would you like your receipt?” Indeed, a reasonable jury might have found it unusual had Morgan kept all the receipts from the many times his family and friends sent money—especially when he was using the money for illegal purposes. Moreover, Watson’s counsel had sufficient opportunity to expose Morgan’s potential biases or credibility issues, such as his cooperation with the prosecution. Accordingly, the district court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. Likewise, the second question excluded by the district court—“how did you get the money from your friends in Jamaica and your friends from abroad?”—had already been asked and answered on cross examination. Indeed, knowing that Morgan received the money from Western Union is how counsel ended up asking about the receipts. Questioning Morgan a second time about the source of the 24 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 25 of 38 money served no purpose and was cumulative. Neither the Confrontation Clause nor the Rules of Evidence require the presentation of cumulative testimony. Watson also contends that the district court should have permitted questioning of Agent Malone regarding Miguel Angel Valdez, an illegal immigrant on Watson’s vessel. Watson sought to impeach Valdez—who did not testify— through Malone’s testimony. The basis for allowing this line of inquiry, according to Watson, is Federal Rule of Evidence 806, which allows impeachment of a hearsay declarant’s credibility. See Fed. R. Evid. 806 (“When a hearsay statement . . . has been admitted in evidence, the declarant’s credibility may be attacked . . . .”). The proposed question was whether Malone knew that Valdez had “15 aliases and two federal convictions.” The prosecution objected at trial, and the district court sustained the objection. Watson argues that impeachment was appropriate because two portions of the trial testimony are hearsay from Valdez. First, Malone testified that Watson’s “nightcap” story did not “match up” to what Valdez told Malone. Watson contends that Malone relied on “implicit hearsay” from Valdez in identifying the inconsistency between the two stories. Malone, however, never repeated what Valdez said and the United States did not introduce any hearsay statements from Valdez regarding Watson’s nightcap defense. Moreover, Malone did not rely on Valdez’s statement for the truth of the matter asserted. Malone testified only that 25 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 26 of 38 the two statements did not match—he never described Valdez’s underlying statement as the correct or truthful version as between Watson’s and Valdez’s statements. Because no hearsay statement from Valdez was admitted in evidence, Rule 806 did not allow Watson to attack the credibility of Valdez on the basis of “implicit hearsay.” See also Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. R. Evid. 806 (“The declarant of a hearsay statement which is admitted in evidence is in effect a witness.” (emphasis added)). Second, Watson contends that Valdez’s I-213 immigration form, prepared by the Border Patrol agents, contained hearsay statements from Valdez establishing his inadmissibility. The statements on Valdez’s form are statements Valdez made to the government agents about his biographical information. According to Watson, impeaching Valdez’s credibility was relevant because it would have undermined Valdez’s biographical statements. Even though Valdez’s hearsay was admitted through the I-213 form, see Caraballo, 595 F.3d at 1226, his credibility was irrelevant to the issue at hand: whether Valdez could legally enter the United States. The relevant element of the charged offense requires that Watson knew that Valdez was inadmissible. See United States v. Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1254 (11th Cir. 2009). Agent Solek testified that Valdez, while operating under the alias Juan B. Molallanos, was convicted of conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws in 1999 and removed. As 26 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 27 of 38 a result of that conviction, Valdez could never reenter the United States. Valdez then illegally reentered the United States and was removed in 2007. Through this testimony about Valdez’s prior convictions and removals, the United States established that Valdez was inadmissible. Valdez’s credibility on his I-213 form had no bearing on that evidence. Furthermore, the information Watson sought to elicit from Malone regarding Valdez had already come out at trial. During Agent Solek’s direct examination, Solek testified that Valdez had “15 different aliases.” Solek also stated that Valdez had a conviction for conspiracy to violate federal narcotics law, as well as a subsequent conviction for illegal reentry. Having Malone repeat the same information would have been cumulative. As a result, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Watson’s question regarding Valdez’s criminal history. E. Lieutenant Belcher’s Testimony on the Contiguous Zone Watson also appeals the district court’s ruling permitting Lieutenant Belcher to testify that a vessel “crossing the contiguous zone line heading towards the [United States] . . . [has] intent to enter” the United States. Belcher’s testimony, Watson says, impermissibly stated a legal conclusion. Watson cites to Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), but that section of the Rule applies only to expert witnesses, not fact witnesses. Fed R. Evid. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert 27 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 28 of 38 witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”). Belcher was not an expert witness. Consequently, Rule 704(b) is not the pertinent section. Instead, the default rule articulated in Rule 704(a) governs. Under that section, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a); see also United States v. Goodman, 633 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence do not . . . categorically prohibit lay witnesses from offering opinion testimony regarding the defendant’s mental state.”). Watson does not argue that Belcher’s testimony was impermissible lay opinion under Rule 701. See Fed. R. Evid. 701 (stating that a lay witness’s opinion may “not [be] based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge”). But even if there was error, the admission of the testimony was harmless. The three agents testified that Watson confessed that he was bringing his passengers to the United States, Morgan testified that he had paid to come to the United States, and the circumstances of Watson’s “nightcap”— traveling at a high rate of speed, without lights, and attempting to evade capture by the Coast Guard—all provide a more than adequate basis for a jury to find that Watson’s intent was to bring illegal immigrants to the United States. Accordingly, Lieutenant Belcher’s testimony was not reversible error. 28 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 29 of 38 F. Lieutenant Kelley’s Unsworn Testimony The parties agree that Lieutenant Kelley was never sworn in as a witness. The trial transcript affirmatively states “Witness was not sworn.” Watson did not object at trial and neither the United States nor the district court noticed the error. On appeal, the United States relies on binding precedent holding that a defendant’s failure to object to an unsworn witness at trial is an affirmative waiver precluding the defendant from asserting the error on appeal. See United States v. Perez, 651 F.2d 268, 272–73 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). Watson replies that we have implicitly overruled Perez in United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Lewis distinguished waiver and forfeiture in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Olano: “a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas the simple failure to assert a right, without any affirmative steps to voluntarily waive the claim, is a forfeiture to be reviewed under the plain error standard embodied in [Federal] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 52(b).” Id. at 1222. Even if we review Watson’s objection under plain error, Watson does not satisfy his burden. An error is reversible under plain error when (1) there was an error, (2) which was plain, and (3) affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Id. If those three factors are met, “an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if . . . the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation 29 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 30 of 38 marks omitted). Watson contends that the failure to swear-in Lieutenant Kelley was a structural error requiring automatic reversal, without a showing of the last two plain-error elements. Whether structural error modifies a defendant’s burden to satisfy all four plain-error factors remains an open question. See United States v. Smith, 433 F. App’x 847, 851 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[T]he Supreme Court has expressly reserved the question of whether a structural error alleviates a defendant’s burden to show prejudice under plain error review.” (citing United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164–65 (2010))). Even if structural error did alter that inquiry, Watson cites no cases holding that the failure to swear a witness rises to that level, nor does he attempt to analogize to any of the “very limited class of cases” where the Supreme Court has found structural errors. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468–69 (1997). According to Watson, unsworn testimony “inherently undermines the integrity and legitimacy of the conviction.” Reply Brief of Appellant at 20. That is not the appropriate test. Rather, the inquiry looks at whether the defect “def[ies] harmless-error standards” because it “affec[t][s] the framework within which the trial proceeds, and [is] not simply an error in the trial process itself.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, the question of structural error focuses on “the difficulty of assessing the effect of the error.” Id. at 149 n.4. 30 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 31 of 38 Watson provides no analysis under that framework. Without any development to support his claim, we reject his argument that Lieutenant Kelley’s unsworn testimony amounted to structural error. Even if we analyzed his argument on the merits, the presence of unsworn testimony does not amount to a structural defect. Courts can readily determine the effect of such an error through harmlesserror analysis. For example, the court may look at the strength of the evidence from the sworn witnesses to determine whether the error was harmless. Unlike structural errors, which “pervade[ ] the entire trial,” the error emanating from an unsworn witness’s testimony may be much more limited, as it was here. Id. at 150; cf. id. at 149 (citing cases involving structural errors, including the denial of the right to counsel, the denial of the right to self-representation, the denial of the right to a public trial, and the denial of the right to a jury trial as a result of a defective reasonable doubt-instruction). Indeed, no one even noticed the lack of an oath— including probably the witness. Because the error was not structural and Watson does not argue that the remaining plain-error factors are satisfied, the unsworn testimony does not require reversal. G. Deliberate Ignorance Instruction As part of the jury charge, the district court instructed the jury on deliberate ignorance. The court stated, in relevant part, that the jury could find that Watson had knowledge that each of his passengers’ entry to the United States would be 31 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 32 of 38 illegal if he either had actual knowledge or if he “believe[d] the alien’s entry into the United States would be illegal, but deliberately and consciously avoid[ed] learning of the alien’s nationality or legal status so that he c[ould] deny knowledge.” Our review of the deliberate ignorance instruction is for plain error, as Watson did not object to the instruction at trial. See Lewis, 492 F.3d at 1222. “A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate when the facts . . . support the inference that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question and purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). If, however, the evidence “only points to either actual knowledge or no knowledge on the part of the defendant,” a deliberate ignorance instruction is inappropriate. United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 973 (11th Cir. 1997); see United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992) (“In determining whether a deliberate ignorance instruction is proper in a particular case, we have held that it must be based upon facts which would point in the direction of deliberate ignorance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even assuming there was error that was plain, Watson cannot demonstrate that the error affected his “substantial rights.” In the “ordinary case,” an error 32 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 33 of 38 impacts a defendant’s substantial rights when that error “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (citation omitted). Any error from the instruction had no effect on the proceedings because the evidence at trial supported a finding that Watson actually knew that his passengers could not legally enter the United States. All the individuals on the boat were inadmissible to enter the United States. More importantly, the three agents testified that Watson knowingly accepted money to transport illegal immigrants to the United States. From that testimony, a reasonable jury could find that Watson had actual knowledge that the individuals in his boat were illegal immigrants. The district court instructed the jury as to actual knowledge as well as deliberate ignorance. As the jury could have reasonably found that Watson had actual knowledge, any error with regard to deliberate ignorance did not affect his substantial rights. Cf. Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1572 (“[B]ecause the jury was also instructed that it could convict based on a theory of actual knowledge, any error is harmless if there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions under that theory.”). 3 3 Watson contends that cumulative error requires reversal. Because only one error, the admission of the 404(b) evidence, occurred at trial, there “can be no cumulative error.” United States v. Waldon, 363 F.3d 1103, 1110 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Allen, 269 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001)). 33 Case: 14-12994 Date Filed: 07/27/2015 Page: 34 of 38