Opinion ID: 203000
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of Vega's Confession

Text: Vega argues that the district court erred in admitting his confession into evidence, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, because the confession was not voluntarily given. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). He also claims that his Sixth Amendment right to representation was violated because the confession occurred after the commencement of prosecution. See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68, 121 S.Ct. 1335, 149 L.Ed.2d 321 (2001). The government counters that Vega was read his rights repeatedly, and knowingly and voluntarily chose to waive them. In reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review its factual findings for clear error and its ultimate Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo. United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 24 (1st Cir.2003) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)); see also United States v. Materas, 483 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.2007). We reverse only if no reasonable view of the evidence supports the district court's decision. Materas, 483 F.3d at 32. We find no error in the district court's determination that Vega voluntarily waived his rights. During Vega's trial, the district court conducted a suppression hearing to determine the admissibility of his confession. The officer who detained Vega testified that he read the Miranda warnings at the scene where the car was recovered. At that time, Vega refused to sign a waiver card and did not request an attorney. The police officer who took Vega into custody testified that, when given an opportunity to make a phone call, Vega called a client . . . whose car he fixes, rather than an attorney. The FBI agent who interrogated Vega on June 7 testified that he read Vega his rights and that Vega signed a form acknowledging that he understood and agreed to waive his rights. The FBI agent testified that, after signing this form, Vega confessed to the robbery. At the same suppression hearing, Vega testified that he had never been read his rights, that he repeatedly asked for an attorney, and that the officer who took him into custody put the [speed-loader] in his hand and he struck me. [4] On cross-examination, Vega admitted that the FBI agent who interrogated him never threatened him or struck him. The following colloquy regarding Vega's waiver ensued: Prosecutor: Isn't it [] a fact that you were requested to read that document by yourself? Vega: Yes, I read it. I read it from this point to this point. . . . That is where I read it to. Prosecutor: You did understand that you had a right to an attorney; isn't that right? Vega: Yes. Prosecutor: And you were also told and you read that you had a right to remain silent? Vega: Yes.  Prosecutor: And you were told that you had a right to consult with an attorney and to seek his advice, didn't you? Vega: Nope. Prosecutor: Didn't you read it? Vega: Well, it says there, but they didn't give me the opportunity to have the lawyer there with me. Prosecutor: No. My question is did you read that and if you did, did you understand what it said? Vega: Yes. Prosecutor: And you also understood . . . that if you were asked questions and you decided to answer them, that at some point if you didn't want to go on, you could quit and nothing would happen. . . . Vega: I don't remember that. Prosecutor: Isn't it a fact that there came a point in time when you were asked to answer who was the person accompanying you for this robbery and you decided not to answer any more questions. Vega: I don't remember. At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the court found Vega extremely evasive, and it gave him no credibility on the issue of his voluntariness. Our review of a district court's credibility ruling is highly deferential, United States v. Ivery, 427 F.3d 69, 72 (1st Cir.2005), and we find no basis for second-guessing the court's assessment of Vega's behavior. Its credibility determination was supported by the signed waiver and by the testimony of the two police officers and the FBI agent that they had read Vega his rights. We thus find no error in the court's ultimate conclusion that Vega's confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible.