Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Testimony of Defendant's Ex-wife

Text: Defendant raises several challenges to the admission of his ex-wife's testimony that he repeatedly forced her to engage in sodomy and oral copulation against her will and physically assaulted her on other occasions, as evidence of other violent offenses under section 190.3, factor (b) (factor (b)). None of these challenges is subject to appellate review, however. The sole challenge by the defense to the admission of this evidence at trial was that the testimony did not establish the sexual acts were performed against her will, because she continued in the marriage and engaged in other consensual sexual activities with defendant. Even if these contentions had not been forfeited, we would conclude they are without merit. Defendant contends the admission of evidence concerning the physical assaults was erroneous because the statute of limitations for the prosecution of charges of assault and battery had run before the commencement of trial in this matter. We repeatedly have rejected such claims, as defendant acknowledges, and see no reason to reconsider our decisions. (See, e.g., Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 246, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 593, 131 P.3d 995.) Next, defendant contends the trial court erred by not excluding the evidence of his sexual assaults upon his ex-wife under section 352 of the Evidence Code. Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, his attorneys asked only for a hearing on the admissibility of her testimony in general, and never objected to the admission of her testimony on the ground that under this statute its probative value was substantially outweighed by the likelihood of its causing undue prejudice. Nor did counsel raise such an objection after defendant's ex-wife testified at the ensuing hearing held outside the presence of the jury, and the trial court therefore never had occasion to weigh the probative value and potential for undue prejudice. Defendant has forfeited any claim that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard. (Evid.Code, § 353; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 ( Anderson ).) Defendant also claims his ex-wife's testimony was so unreliable as to render the jury's penalty determination constitutionally defective. Although, as defendant observes, the prosecution presented no corroboration of her accusations, the asserted untrustworthiness of this testimony goes to its credibility, an issue that was for the jury to determine. [51] The claimed lack of reliability did not deny defendant his constitutional right to a reliable penalty determination. ( Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 587, 106 Cal. Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) Defendant next contends that instructions given by the court, in the course of explaining section 190.3, factor (b), unconstitutionally diluted the reasonable doubt standard applicable to these sexual offenses. This contention is without merit. The trial court properly directed the jury at the beginning of the factor (b) instructions to consider this evidence only if it is established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed such criminal acts. The challenged instruction, which followed the trial court's instructions concerning the elements of the factor (b) offenses of assault likely to cause great bodily injury and battery, informed the jury that [w]ith respect to any act of violence, other than one involving a crime of a sexual nature testified to by [defendant's ex-wife], you may consider such evidence as a circumstance in aggravation only if the elements of one of the specific offenses which I have just described to you have been proven. This instruction simply defined for the jury, if it found them to have occurred, defendant's assaultive acts (such as throwing his ex-wife to the ground and hitting her head against the floor) as either an assault likely to cause great bodily injury or a battery, but told them that other potential offenses might have been committed by defendant in the course of his alleged forcible sexual conduct. The instruction did not dilute the previously given controlling instruction that all of the factor (b) crimes had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could consider the testimony as evidence in aggravation. Defendant raises two final, related challenges to this testimony, primarily concerning the circumstance that his ex-wife testified in a general manner to a nonspecific series of acts occurring over a period of several months, without providing exact dates upon which specific acts of forcible sodomy or oral copulation occurred. Defendant contends admission of this generic testimony unconstitutionally deprived him of notice of the allegations and the opportunity to present a defense, and constituted insufficient evidence of the offenses to allow the jury to consider this testimony under section 190.3, factor (b). We disagree. We previously have addressed similar challenges raised in cases in which the defendant was charged with child molestation and the alleged child victim testified to a series of acts occurring over a period of time without providing specific details regarding the exact dates of particular acts. (See People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314-316, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643 ( Jones ) [approving the use of generic testimony in such circumstances if certain requirements are satisfied].) As defendant recognizes, there is a fundamental difference between Jones and the present case: although Jones involved the admissibility of such evidence to prove substantive criminal charges, the evidence here at issue was introduced at the penalty phase of the trial as evidence in aggravation. [T]he penalty phase of trial [is not] the equivalent of a criminal prosecution for purposes of due process ... analysis. Evidence of prior unadjudicated violent conduct is admitted not to impose punishment for that conduct, but rather, in part, to give the jury in the capital case 'a true picture of the defendant's history since there is no temporal limitation on evidence in mitigation offered by the defendant.' [Citation.] As this court noted in People v. Balderas [ (1985) ] 41 Cal.3d 144, 205, footnote 32, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, the `penalty phase is unique, intended to place before the sentencer all evidence properly bearing on its decision under the Constitution and statutes.' ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 822-823, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) We agree with defendant that Jones and cases like it, concerning substantive charges, are distinguishable with respect to our analysis of the issue of generic testimony introduced at the penalty phase of a capital trial. This distinction does not, however, lead us to conclude, that the admission of generic factor (b) testimony at the penalty phase of defendant's trial was improper. We instead shall apply to defendant's claim the general principles we previously have enunciated concerning similar due process challenges to the admission of factor (b) evidence. In People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1, we concluded that the admission of violent criminal conduct occurring many years before the penalty trial is not necessarily inconsistent with a defendant's rights to due process, a speedy trial and a reliable penalty determination. We reasoned that `the state has a legitimate interest in allowing a jury to weigh and consider a defendant's prior criminal conduct in determining the appropriate penalty, so long as reasonable steps are taken to assure a fair and impartial penalty trial.' [Citation.] We identified those `reasonable steps' as including notice of the evidence to be introduced, the opportunity to confront the available witnesses, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. When these steps have been taken, we concluded, the remoteness of the offense affects its weight, not its admissibility. [Citation.] ( People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 136-137, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166; see also Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 585-586, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at pp. 1070-1071, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68.) We further emphasize that, unlike a criminal charging document, which must allege with sufficient specificity particular offenses (§ 952), the notice required under factor (b) is notification of the evidence to be introduced (§ 190.3). Notice of factor (b) evidence is sufficient if the defendant has a reasonable opportunity to respond. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1051, 47 Cal. Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775 ( Lewis and Oliver ).) Furthermore, we observe that, unlike what must be established with regard to substantive criminal charges, there is no requirement that a capital sentencing jury unanimously find the existence of a violent criminal offense to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before an individual juror may consider such evidence in aggravation under factor (b). ( Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th 536, 585, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) For these reasons, our review of whether factor (b) evidence properly was admitted and considered by the jury is quite different from our review of the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support a criminal conviction. [52] It long has been the rule under both the federal and state Constitutions that in resolving a due process challenge such as that made by defendant, we must balance the competing interests at issueon the one hand, the defendant's interest in having a fair opportunity to respond to the accusations and ensuring the reliability of the evidence offered against him, with, on the other hand, the state's interest in presenting the sentencing jury with a complete picture of the defendant's character. ( Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18; People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 269, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622.) We believe that adherence to the reasonable steps mentioned above with regard to the admission of generic factor (b) testimonykeeping in mind the goal of achieving a fair, reliable, and complete penalty proceedingensures a defendant due process. If those reasonable steps have been undertaken, the nonspecific nature of the testimony will affect its weight rather than its admissibility or the constitutionality of defendant's trial. In this case defendant received notice of the evidence to be introduced, through the prosecution's filing of a written notice of intent to offer evidence of defendant's sexual and physical assaults upon his ex-wife, as well as the sworn statement she made to the prosecution (which was provided to the defense before trial) and her testimony at the hearing held to determine the admissibility of the statement. Defendant had the opportunity to confront the available witness (his ex-wife) at trial, and the jury was instructed that before it could consider such evidence in aggravation, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed any violent offense against his ex-wife. Other than unsupported allegations, defendant makes no showing how the generic nature of this testimony denied him the opportunity to respond. (Cf. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 319-320, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643 [observing it is unlikely a defendant who had continuous access to a victim over a significant period of time would offer an alibi or misidentification defense, and a defendant can respond to the generic testimony of a victim by choosing to testify or by attacking the victim's credibility in other ways].) Indeed, the response made by defendant to his ex-wife's testimony apparently was sufficiently effective to cause at least the trial court to entertain doubts about her veracity. Regardless of the trial court's view of the evidence, and keeping in mind the objective of presenting the jury with a view of defendant's character as complete as possible, we cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that the testimony was insufficient to enable any rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed a violent offense against his ex-wife. The absence of testimony associating particular acts with specific dates may have affected the weight of the evidence, but did not render the testimony so unreliable that as a matter of constitutional due process the jury should not have been permitted to consider it as potential evidence in aggravation.