Opinion ID: 1205526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The confrontation right and the attorney-client privilege

Text: To show Barker had a motive to testify for the State and inculpate Defendant, even if he had to lie, Defendant cross-examined Barker about benefits he expected in return for his plea agreement. Defendant asked Barker whether his attorney had told him that the State might seek the death penalty if Barker did not cooperate with the prosecutor. Barker's lawyer was present and objected on grounds of attorney-client privilege, and the judge sustained the objection. A defendant has great latitude to cross-examine an accomplice or co-defendant who has turned State's evidence and testifies on behalf of the State in a trial of his co-defendant. State v. Morales, 120 Ariz. 517, 520, 587 P.2d 236, 239 (1978) (citations omitted). A trial judge who excludes testimony that would show bias and interest in this circumstance may commit reversible error. Id. Even if the defendant fails to object or give an offer of proof when such testimony is precluded, error may be found if the context of the questions makes their purpose clear. Ariz. R. Evid. 103(a). If cross-examination into privileged areas is necessary to show a witness' bias, the United States Supreme Court has held that the interest of confidentiality can be outweighed by [the defendant's] right to probe into the influence of possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In the few reported cases in which the confrontation right has collided with the attorney-client privilege, courts have employed a fact-specific balancing test to resolve the competing interests of confidentiality and the defendant's right to impeach an important government witness. See, e.g., State v. Cascone, 195 Conn. 183, 487 A.2d 186, 190-91 (1985) (trial court's exclusion of a co-defendant's pretrial statement to his attorney that would exculpate the defendant was not harmless error). In United States ex. rel. Blackwell v. Franzen, the court balanced the relevant interests: [T]he question in each case must finally be whether defendant's inability to make the inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness's direct testimony. To answer that question the court must look to the record as a whole and to the alternative means open to the defendant to impeach the witness. The court must ultimately decide whether the probative value of the alleged privileged communication was such that the defendant's right to effective cross-examination was substantially diminished. 688 F.2d 496, 500-01 (7th Cir.1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1072, 103 S.Ct. 1529, 75 L.Ed.2d 950 (1983). In Franzen, the defendant cross-examined his accomplice, who had agreed to testify for the state. The defendant elicited testimony from the witness that he had told his own attorney he was beaten [by the prosecutor] into making that statement [that inculpated defendant] to show that the prosecutor had induced the accomplice to incriminate the defendant. Id. at 499. The state objected, and the trial court sustained the objection on grounds that the attorney-client privilege overrides any relevancy it may have to the issues in [the] case. Id. However, because there was already ample evidence in the record to impeach the accomplice's testimony, the circuit court upheld the trial court's ruling. Id. at 501; see also Neku v. United States, 620 A.2d 259, 263 (D.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1003, 114 S.Ct. 577, 126 L.Ed.2d 476 (1993). As long as the jury heard evidence relevant to Barker's possible motives for testifying against Defendant, we assume it could then fairly assess Barker's truthfulness. No doubt Barker's plea agreement was relevant to his bias and interest. The jury apparently realized this and sent a note to the judge during deliberations asking what benefits Barker received in exchange for his testimony. Reporter's Transcript (R.T.), Aug. 13, 1992, at 110. The jury's note asked, Does Randy Barker have anything to gain if Towery is convicted? Are we allowed to see the plea agreement? In response to the note, the judge told the jurors they had all the evidence and instructed them to rely on their personal recollections and collective notes. At issue then is whether the jury knew what benefits Barker would receive from his plea bargain. If the statement made to Barker by his lawyer was sufficiently probative of Barker's credibility to outweigh the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege, [6] then the judge abused her discretion in prohibiting Defendant from asking about a privileged communication. The record shows that even without disclosure of whether Barker's lawyer told Barker that the State would seek the death penalty if he did not cooperate, other evidence informed the jury that Barker knew he could escape death by cooperating and testifying. The jury knew that the State would have pursued the death penalty if Barker were convicted of first-degree murder. Earlier in the day, the jury heard a stipulation that prior to Barker's plea agreement the State had filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty if Barker were convicted of first-degree murder. The jury knew that Barker then made a plea agreement with the State for second-degree murder. In short, although the jury questioned Barker's benefits if Defendant were convicted, as evidenced by the note to the judge, the jury must have understood all of the benefits Barker received from his plea agreement and testimony when it decided Defendant's guilt. The evidence would have been merely cumulative had the judge permitted Defendant to ask about Barker's privileged communication with his attorney. Moreover, in protecting the attorney-client privilege, the judge did not impair Defendant's ability to obtain the information he wanted. Defense counsel could have established a motive for Barker to lie without invading the attorney-client privilege. He simply could have asked if Barker knew or believed he would have been eligible for the death penalty or a life sentence had he not agreed to testify. In upholding the privilege, therefore, the judge did not abuse her discretion.