Opinion ID: 2371470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Labor Ready's Voucher System Constituted Check Cashing Under 19-14-1

Text: In addition to holding that DBR was entitled to find that Labor Ready's vouchers qualified as a type of instrument under § 19-14-1, we also conclude that DBR acted within its authority in determining that Labor Ready improperly engaged in an unlicensed check-cashing business in violation of § 19-14-2 when it provided currency to its employees for checks. The plain language of § 19-14-1(1) says that: `Check cashing' means providing currency for checks. Here, Labor Ready provided currency to those employees who used the numeric information contained on the vouchers to obtain payment for their labor through its CDMs. In that way, Labor Ready was providing currency for checks. We disagree with Labor Ready's contention that its voucher system could not constitute a check-cashing business because the statutory word for necessarily contemplates a physical tender or delivery of the instrument in question to the payor in exchange for a cash payment. Citing language from the Superior Court decision in this case, [6] Labor Ready suggests that its voucher system did not violate § 19-14-2 because it never took possession of the vouchers from the employee and because its workers did not exchange or transfer their vouchers for the cash they received from the CDM. Rather, the workers needed only `to enter their access code into the CDM to obtain the currency due to them; they were not required to physically exchange their vouchers for the currency. We are not persuaded, however, that the General Assembly's use of the word for necessarily requires a strict physical exchange between cash on the one hand and the voucher or instrument on the other in order for the activity in question to qualify as providing currency for checks. Section 19-14-1(1) simply defines check cashing as providing currency for checks. It does not require that a physical exchange occur in which a depositor exchanges, delivers, hands over, endorses, transfers, or relinquishes physical possession of the instrument in return for receiving currency. Just as the General Assembly could have easily defined the term instrument as a negotiable instrument, the General Assembly also could have said that check cashing requires a physical tender of the instrument itself in exchange for the receipt of currency. But it did not do so. Rather, the undefined statutory word for, in this context, simply means as regards or in respect to, or in view of, rather than necessarily requiring any physical tender or exchange of the instrument in question for the currency. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 886 (1993) (listing these definitions, among others, for the word for). Therefore, based on the relatively spare and undefined general language of the statute, we are not inclined to place a limiting construction on the phase providing currency for checks when the General Assembly declined to include such express limitations in the statutory language it selected when enacting this law. In addition, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis supports DBR's conclusion that Labor Ready's check cashing system violated § 19-14-2. Under the doctrine of `noscitur a sociis,' the meaning of questionable or doubtful words or phrases in a statute may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases associated with it. State v. Dearmas, 841 A.2d 659, 667 (R.I.2004) (quoting Wigginton v. Centracchio, 787 A.2d 1151, 1155 (R.I.2001)). The phrase noscitur a sociis translates literally from the Latin as `it is known by its associates.' Id. (quoting Allstate Insurance Co. v. Russo, 641 A.2d 1304, 1307 (R.I.1994)). The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, therefore, helps us to ascertain the meaning of the phrase check cashing by looking to the other types of activities prohibited by the statute. Here, § 19-14-2 not only prohibits unlicensed check cashing, but it also imposes a license requirement on making or financing loans, brokering loans, selling checks, or providing electronic-money transfers. All these prohibited actions share one common element: they are all functions that typically are performed by banks or by other types of commercial financial institutions. Indeed, title 19 of the General Laws is entitled Financial Institutions and chapter 14 thereof is entitled Licensed Activities. Hence, we are of the opinion that the General Assembly intended § 19-14-2 to prohibit employers such as Labor Ready from engaging in unlicensed banking or financial activities of the type that are at issue in this case. We also believe that Labor Ready's voucher system is an example of this type of unlicensed check cashing because Labor Ready engages in a profit-making activity when it charges its workers a fee to provide them with currency. Therefore, applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to interpret the phrase check cashing, we hold that the DBR properly found that Labor Ready's profitable voucher system actually constituted an unlicensed check-cashing business in violation of § 19-14-2. The bottom line in this case is that Labor Ready, for a fee, provided cash to those persons who punched in the correct access-code numbers shown on the vouchers. The CDMs disbursed this money to Labor Ready's employees, who were entitled to receive this payment, as defined and specified by the information set forth in the vouchers that Labor Ready provided to its employees. Accordingly, we hold that DBR did not err in finding that Labor Ready improperly engaged in the unlicensed business of providing currency for checks under § 19-14-1(1) and § 19-14-2.