Opinion ID: 853845
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Questions as Hearsay

Text: Jones testified on direct examination that one of the three men involved in the shooting said something about, what, you think we ain't got guns, too, or whatever. Defense counsel objected on the basis of hearsay and asked that the testimony be stricken. The State responded that it was a report of a question, which by its very nature was not hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and instructed the jury that it was only to take this evidence as a fact that a question was asked, not to prove the truth of the matter contained within that question. The State contends that because the utterance was a question, it contained no assertion of fact. Citing Craig v. State, 630 N.E.2d 207 (Ind.1994), [1] it argues that an utterance that does not assert a fact susceptible of being true or false cannot be hearsay. We agree with this principle, but do not agree that an assertion can never be found in a question or command. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). A statement is defined as an oral or written assertion. Evid. R. 801(a)(1). The Evidence Rules make no mention of the grammatical form of the statement. Indeed the Rules explicitly provide that nonverbal conduct can be a statement. Evid. R. 801(a)(2). If so, verbal conduct intended to assert a fact but phrased as a question is equally capable of being a statement. This conclusion is consistent with the fundamental purpose of the hearsay rule to preserve the right to cross examine the declarant. See Cain v. State, 261 Ind. 41, 45, 300 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1973) (citing 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1362, at 3-7 (3d ed.1940)). If a report of a question or command in effect transmits the questioner's claimed observations, the need for cross examination is as great as if the witness reported a direct statement. Other states agree. See, e.g., Carlton v. State, 111 Md.App. 436, 681 A.2d 1181, 1184 (1996) (questions Does Mr. Zinkhan have an alarm? and What time, if ever, will Mr. Zinkhan leave? made no explicit or implied assertion and were therefore not hearsay); State v. Saunders, 23 Ohio App.3d 69, 491 N.E.2d 313, 318 (1984) (in prosecution for robbery of several hundred dollars of coins from laundromat, defendant's companion asking motel employee if employee could use some spare change was hearsay because it asserted and was offered to prove that companion had access to spare change that she wished to exchange for paper currency); Brown v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.App. 171, 487 S.E.2d 248, 251-52 (1997) (because question Does Peggy know I am here? necessarily implies or asserts that declarant knew Peggy (the victim) personally and was offered to prove that the defendant knew Peggy, it was hearsay). Some commands (Tell me your name!) or questions (What is your name?) have no factual content and clearly are not assertions. Based on this, some treatises suggest, consistent with the State's view at trial, that all questions are ipso facto not hearsay. See, e.g., DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 19 (3d ed. 1991) (A question is not hearsay.) (emphasis in original); 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.02[3][b] (1999) (An inquiry is not an assertion, and is not hearsay.). Although it is true that most questions or inquiries are not hearsay, the cases cited by these treatises make clear that that is not always the case. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir.1990) (The questions asked by the unknown caller, like most questions and inquiries, are not hearsay because they do not, and were not intended to, assert anything.) (cited in both treatises). An utterance that is in the form of a question can in substance contain an assertion of a fact. The classic example is Joe, why did you stab Bill? There may be other exceptions to the hearsay rule permitting witnesses to testify to such a question, but a report of hearing this question is not admissible to prove that Joe stabbed Bill on the ground that it is not hearsay at all. Rather, such an utterance clearly carries a factual allegation within it, and should be subject to cross-examination unless exempt for some other reason. The utterance at issue in this case asserted that the men in the group confronting Jones and McVea were carrying guns, and that of course is susceptible of being true or false. To run afoul of the hearsay rule the evidentiary purpose of the proffered statement must be the truth of the matter asserted. Evid. R. 801(c). In this case, the alleged hearsay testimony came in a line of questioning regarding the nature of [the] conversation between Jones and the three men at the Meadows. Although the State argued at trial that a question by its very nature cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the trial court's admonishment to the jury plainly demonstrates the possibility that the factual content of a question may be offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Despite the trial court's admonishment, we agree with Powell that it is difficult to imagine how the alleged `question' of the unidentified declarant, offering the remark that the group possessed guns, could be admitted for some purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. The State offers no alternative purpose. We conclude that the utterance here was offered for the truth of the matter asserted and therefore is hearsay. Although Powell's hearsay objection should have been sustained, the erroneous admission of this utterance was nevertheless harmless. See Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140 (Ind.1995); Ind. Trial Rule 61. The fact asserted in the question, that the men had guns, was established beyond doubt moments later when the three men opened fire. There is no realistic possibility that this ruling affected Powell's substantial rights.