Opinion ID: 2557538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Damages Cap.

Text: The Maryland Constitution prohibits the Legislature from impairing retrospectively vested rights. One necessarily asks, in performing such an analysis, what constitutes a protected vested right? From its infancy, our vested rights jurisprudence focused on a plaintiff's ability (or inability) to bring a cause of action. Thus, 150 years ago in Thistle v. The Frostburg Coal Co., 10 Md. 129, 144 (1856), we confronted a purported retrospective legislative provision which enabled adverse possessors of real property to challenge paper title holders on the basis of mere use, rather than the then-law, actual enclosure. Because the statutory provision changed the elements of adverse possession to make it easier for adverse possessors to challenge successfully paper title holders, we deemed it invalid. Dua v. Comcast Cable of Md., Inc., 370 Md. 604, 623, 805 A.2d 1061, 1072 (2002) (citing Thistle ); see also Thistle, 10 Md. at 145 (Hence, ... it was not in the power of the legislature to change this rule of law, so far as to give it retroactive operation, because it would virtually be taking the land of one man, held [previously] by a good legal title, and giving it to another, who the law has said had none.). We made clear in Thistle, however, that it was within the power of the legislature, to alter and remodel the rules of evidence and remedies, to which parties claiming title and possession of land, might resort. ... Thistle, 10 Md. at 145 (emphasis added). Reflecting in Dua on our Thistle holding, we concluded that there is a vested right in an accrued cause of action. Dua, 370 Md. at 632, 805 A.2d at 1077. As in Thistle, we recognized that there is a difference between the Legislature abrogating the right to bring a cause of action, and the Legislature altering the remedy sought by, but not yet conferred upon, a plaintiff. In particular, we relied on Baugher, et al. v. Nelson, 9 Gill 299, 308 (1850), which upheld a retrospective provision because [i]t [was] no more than the exercise of the legislative authority over the subject of remedies[, a] power which the legislative may unquestionably exercise at pleasure in relation to past as well as future contracts. We looked also to WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 564, 520 A.2d 1319, 1323 (1987), in which we observed that a statute governing [only] procedure or remedy will be applied to [all] cases, whether they be accrued, pending or future. ... WSSC, 308 Md. at 563 n. 2, 564, 520 A.2d at 1323. In addition, we invoked Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363, 66 A.2d 795, 797 (1949), which acknowledged that [i]t is thoroughly understood that a statute of limitations, which does not destroy a substantial right, but simply affects remedy, does not destroy or impair vested rights. We expressed some reservations in Dua regarding the distinction between remedy and substantive right, but, in the process, strengthened further the ultimate holding that the Legislature may change, under many circumstances, the former with retrospective effect, but not the latter. In particular, we quoted from State, use of Isaac v. Jones, 21 Md. 432, 437 (1864) for the contention that the ` abrogation or suspension of a remedy, necessary to enforce the obligation of an existing contract,... is void.' Dua, 370 Md. at 635, 805 A.2d at 1079 (emphasis added). We relied on Allen, 193 Md. at 363-64, 66 A.2d at 797 to underscore that by cut[ting] off all remedy ... in such a way as to preclude any opportunity to bring suit, the Legislature deprive [s improperly] a party of his [accrued] cause of action. ... (Emphasis added.) In these and other cases, we recognized that the Legislature may legislate retrospectively, as long as the effect does not cut off all remedy. Contrary to this principle, the Majority concludes that the Maryland Constitution protects not only a plaintiff's accrued right to bring a cause of action, but also his or her associated prospect of recovering an amount of as-of-yet unidentified, uncertain, and unawarded damages. See Majority op. at 486-87, 19 A.3d at 881.
The Majority opinion relies heavily on Dua to bolster its conclusion that the Maryland Constitution protects against the legislative impairment of the recovery of any amount of damages associated with causes of action. See id. It seizes upon the Dua Court's description of the statute there as one that abrogates the plaintiffs' rights to particular sum[s] of money. ... Dua, 370 Md. at 642, 805 A.2d at 1083. Seemingly, the Majority opinion equates particular sum[s] of money with the unliquidated damages claims Longtin sought at the time the Legislature amended the damages cap in the LGTCA. The Majority does so wrongly. [13] In Dua, we confronted consolidated cases where two plaintiffs sought to recover particular sum[s] of money already paid to two creditors. When the plaintiffs made the payments, however, the creditors did not have a right to demand or receive the money. Dua, 370 Md. at 611-16, 805 A.2d at 1066-68. In a sense, then, the plaintiffs were pursuing replevin-type actions to recover wrongfully relinquished and unreturned liquidated amounts of money, i.e., property. Subsequent to the wrongful payments, the Legislature passed laws purporting to grant to those creditors retrospectively a right to the money. The Legislature was not limiting, however, the amount of damages the aggrieved plaintiffs could recover from the creditors, over and above their already-paid sums of money. Rather, it purported to eliminate the heart of the dispute  the plaintiffs' right to brings claims to recover their already-paid, known sums. It was, in other words, taking the [property] of one man, held [previously] by a good legal title, i.e., the money paid by the plaintiffs, and giving it to another, who the law has said had none, i.e., the creditors. Thistle, 10 Md. at 145. In the present case, the heart of the dispute was the underlying torts of false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, etc. By limiting, through the LGTCA, the amount of possible damages Longtin could recover, the Legislature was not affecting his ability to bring and pursue his claims in the first instance. As we stated in a related context, punitive damages: [T]he limitation upon recoverable noneconomic tort damages under § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does not amount to a restriction upon access to the courts. ... The plaintiffs' cause of action based on negligence was not abolished by § 11-108. Instead, § 11-108 simply modifies the law of damages to be applied in tort cases. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 366, 601 A.2d 102, 114 (1992) (emphasis added). [14]
Having concluded that the Legislature may limit retrospectively the amount of damages to some extent and under certain circumstances, I now ask (rhetorically) whether the LGTCA damages cap limits recovery effectively in such a way as to preclude any opportunity to bring suit.... Allen, 193 Md. at 363-64, 66 A.2d at 797. By enacting the $200,000/$500,000 LGTCA damages limit, I conclude that the Legislature did not so transform plaintiffs' substantive rights. Prior to the LGTCA, local governments (but not their officers or employees) enjoyed immunity against most non-constitutional tort claims. See Housing Auth. v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 359-60, 754 A.2d 367, 368-69 (2000). Through the LGTCA, the Legislature altered the common law, giving plaintiffs limited access to the often sizable assets of local government, which must satisfy the awards returned by juries. Ashton, 339 Md. at 107-08, 660 A.2d at 465-66 (stating that the Legislature, through the LGTCA, provided a remedy for those injured by local government officers.. ., while ensuring that the financial burden ... is carried by the [ultimately responsible] local government). In the process, it encouraged coincidentally local governments to better train their officers and employees. To mitigate the budgetary impact of this statutory sea change, the Legislature also limited the amount that plaintiffs could recover. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. at 370, 601 A.2d at 115-16 (holding that the Legislature did not act arbitrarily in enacting a $350,000 cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury actions, as it possessed several studies which concluded that $250,000 would cover most noneconomic damage claims); Gooslin v. State, 132 Md.App. 290, 296, 752 A.2d 642, 645 (2000), cert. denied, 359 Md. 334, 753 A.2d 1031 (2000) (finding constitutional the Maryland Tort Claims Act, Maryland Code (1984, 2009 Repl. Vol) State Government Article, §§ 12-101 et. seq., because the $50,000 waiver represented the level at which the Legislature chose to waive governmental immunity). The $200,000/$500,000 damages cap was a reasonable, rational, and constitutional balancing. Indeed, it may well have been a necessary prerequisite to the passage of the LGTCA.
Because the Legislature is permitted to cap damages recovery retrospectively and because the LGTCA cap is not so unduly low as to equate with cutting off all remedy, the damages cap should apply to the jury award in the present case. The fact that Longtin brought and proved constitutional tort violations does not dictate a different result under the Maryland Constitution or the legislative history of the LGTCA. At common law (that is, before the LGTCA), a plaintiff could bring a constitutional tort claim directly against local government officers and employees, as well as their employersthe local governments. After the passage of the LGTCA, a plaintiff lost, however, his/her/its ability to recover from the officers and employees, provided those tortfeasors acted within the scope of employment. The LGTCA restriction on liability ultimately applies to constitutional and non-constitutional tort claims alike, such that a plaintiff bringing a constitutional claim may recover only from the employing-local government. See DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18, 52, 729 A.2d 354, 371 (1999) ([L]ocal governmental entities do, indeed, have respondeat superior liability for civil damages resulting from State Constitutional violations committed by their agents and employees within the scope of the employment.); Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n. 19, 660 A.2d at 465 n. 19 ([T]here is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts.... [T]he local government is required to pay the judgment against the employee....); see also Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 256, 863 A.2d 297, 304 (2004) (holding that the Maryland Tort Claims Act applies to constitutional and non-constitutional torts, such that the State steps into the shoes of public officials for purposes of liability). Moreover, we recognize, at least implicitly, that the LGTCA procedural requirements ( e.g., notice) apply also to constitutional tort claims. Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n. 19, 660 A.2d at 465 n. 19 ([Although] there is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts[,] .... [t]he parties in this case[, who raised constitutional and non-constitutional claims,] would appear to have waived [its] procedural requirements.); see also Gonzalez v. Cecil County, 221 F.Supp.2d 611, 615-16 (D.Md.2002) (dismissing state constitutional tort claims because plaintiffs did not comply with the LGTCA notice requirement). The Court of Special Appeals has applied the notice requirement to constitutional tort claims in at least three cases. See Wilbon v. Hunsicker, 172 Md.App. 181, 913 A.2d 678 (2006) cert. denied 398 Md. 316, 920 A.2d 1060 (2007); White v. Prince George's County, 163 Md.App. 129, 877 A.2d 1129 (2005), cert. denied, 389 Md. 401, 885 A.2d 825 (2005); Chappelle v. McCarter, 162 Md.App. 163, 873 A.2d 458 (2005). We implied that the LGTCA damages cap should apply to constitutional claims. In Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n. 19, 660 A.2d at 465 n. 19, we observed that there is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts. Therefore, [a]s long as the local government employee is acting in the scope of his employment and without malice, the local government is required to pay the judgment against the employee to the extent it represents compensatory damages, up to certain statutory limits. Id. (emphasis added); see also Ashton, 339 Md. at 108, 660 A.2d at 466 (holding that plaintiffs are entitled to a trial for their constitutional tort claims and that [a]ny judgment rendered should, under the [ LGTCA ], be paid by the City) (emphasis added). We also held relevantly that the cap on noneconomic damages in § 11-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies to constitutional claims. Specifically, in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 544, 976 A.2d 279, 288 (2009), we agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that: [N]othing in the legislative history [of § 11-108] suggests that the General Assembly even thought of the difference between actions claiming personal injury due to common law torts as opposed to causes of action claiming personal injury arising out of statutory or constitutional torts. And, when interpreting a statute, a court must presume that the legislature did not intend to make any alteration other than what is specified and plainly pronounced. Also, in light of the reasons for the original cap statute, and its amendment, it is impossible to believe that the legislature intended to narrow the statute in the way appellant suggests so that insurers would now have to cover non-economic damages awards that exceeded the cap so long as the personal injury action arose out of the violation of a statute or a constitutional provision. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Regarding the damages cap provided by the Maryland Tort Claims Act, we observed in Benson v. State, 389 Md. 615, 628, 887 A.2d 525, 532 (2005), that not all constitutional tort claims must [necessarily] comply with the ... MTCA. We reasoned thus, however, because the constitutional provision at issueArticle 14 of the Maryland Declaration of Rightswas not compensable in monetary damages. Id. Presumably, therefore, constitutional violations that are compensable in monetary damages are governed by the MTCA. [15] In sum, I would hold that good cause existed to waive Longtin's failure to comply strictly with the LGTCA notice requirement. I would conclude also that the LGTCA damages cap limits Longtin's overall recovery. In all other respects, I agree with the Majority opinion. Judge BARBERA authorizes me to state that she joins the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.