Opinion ID: 6326396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Writ Standard.

Text: As stated in Appalachian Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 504 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky. 2016), “[w]e employ a three-part analysis in reviewing the appeal of a writ action.” First, we examine the Court of Appeals’ factual findings for clear error. Id. Second, we review all legal conclusions under the de novo standard. Id. And, third, since the ultimate “decision whether . . . to issue a writ of prohibition is a question of judicial discretion[, our] review of a court’s decision to issue a writ is conducted under the abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. In other words, “we will not reverse the lower court's ruling absent a finding that the determination was ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 sound legal principles.’” Id.; see also Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kleinfeld, 568 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Ky. 2019). Our standard for the issuance of writs, whether of prohibition or of mandamus, is oft stated: A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted. Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). Within the second class of writs, we have recognized a subcategory in certain special cases: [I]n certain special cases this Court will entertain a petition for prohibition in the absence of a showing of specific great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, provided a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing that if it fails to act the administration of justice generally will suffer the great and irreparable injury. Bender v. Eaton, 343 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Ky. 1961). In Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trude, we expounded on this latter subcategory, stating “these ‘certain special . . . cases’ are exactly that— they are rare exceptions and tend to be limited to situations where the action for which the writ is sought would violate the law, e.g., by breaching a tightly guarded privilege or by contradicting the requirements of a civil rule.” 151 S.W.3d 803, 808 (Ky. 2004) (footnotes omitted). 4 In all cases, the issuance of a writ depends on the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise. Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 801; see also Henderson Cnty. Health Care Corp. v. Wilson, 612 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Ky. 2020) (holding that “[e]ven in these special [second class writ] cases, the party seeking a writ must show that there is no adequate remedy by appeal[]”); Indep. Ord. of Foresters v. Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 617 (Ky. 2005) (“[w]e have tended to apply this exception only in those limited situations where the action for which the writ is sought would blatantly violate the law[]”). Furthermore, a writ is an extraordinary and disfavored remedy. Kleinfeld, 568 S.W.3d at 331; Buckley v. Wilson, 177 S.W.3d 778, 780 (Ky. 2005). Writs are reserved for situations wherein litigants will be subjected to substantial injustice if required to proceed. Kleinfeld at 331. Additionally, this remedy is disfavored since it may have a tendency to interfere significantly with the proper and efficient operation of the circuit and other courts, to short-circuit normal appeal procedure, possibly on an abbreviated record, Bender, 343 S.W.2d at 800, and to “magnif[y] the chance of incorrect rulings that would prematurely and improperly cut off the rights of litigants[.]” Cox v. Braden, 266 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Ky. 2008).