Opinion ID: 1652318
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objective Standard of Reasonableness

Text: Dr. Parwatikar, a licensed psychiatrist with an emphasis in forensic psychiatry, was hired to examine Johnson for any sign of mental disease, defect, or disorder. Dr. Parwatikar reviewed the police reports and conducted a two-and-a-half hour interview with Johnson. Dr. Parwatikar concluded that at the time of the crime Johnson did not suffer from mental disease or defect, but did suffer from cocaine intoxication delirium, a mental disorder precipitated by excessive cocaine intake. After arriving at his diagnosis, Dr. Parwatikar attempted several times, unsuccessfully, to speak with Johnson's attorneys. He eventually reported the above findings to a paralegal and offered to testify on Johnson's behalf if the case reached the penalty phase. Zembles scheduled Dr. Parwatikar as a defense witness. She later told the court that she expected Dr. Parwatikar to testify as to Johnson's mental health and his mental state at the time of the crime. She sought to introduce this evidence to support the statutory mitigating factor, The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. [43] She testified at the motion hearing that she absolutely intended to call Dr. Parwatikar to give the jury insight into Ernest's state of mind ... who Ernest was psychologically and intellectually and what kind of difficulties he had, and most importantly, he would have provided foundation for the doctor of pharmacy offered as an expert witness on the effects of longterm cocaine use. Zembles also testified that part of her strategy in calling Dr. Parwatikar was so that the jury could hear from Ernest without Ernest having to take the stand. Zembles blamed communication problems for the lack of Dr. Parwatikar's testimony. She testified that she did not contact Dr. Parwatikar before the guilt phase began because of her work for two other capital defendants, one of whom she was still defending at trial the week before Johnson's trial was scheduled to begin. Zembles asked her cocounsel, McKerrow, to move for a continuance. McKerrow did so, but the motion was denied. Zembles never moved for a continuance thereafter. Upon commencement of the guilt phase of Johnson's trial, Zembles instructed three different people from her office to contact Dr. Parwatikar to set up a meeting. Eventually, a teleconference was set up for nine o'clock, the evening before the conclusion of the guilt phase. Zembles claims that she was home at the appointed time, but never received a call, though she found out later that Dr. Parwatikar insisted he did call and no one answered. In any case, Zembles did not attempt to call Dr. Parwatikar that evening. A second teleconference was set up for the following evening, but Zembles missed it awaiting the jury's verdict in the guilt phase. Dr. Parwatikar left a message on Zembles's answering machine, but not a telephone number. Zembles described the message as not rude but curt and testy, it was easy for me to tell he was irritated. The next day, the penalty phase began. Zembles left instructions with her secretary to contact Dr. Parwatikar in St. Louis as early as possible so he would have time to drive to Columbia to testify. Before the trial started, the State informed the court it would complete its case before noon. When the court asked Zembles if the penalty phase would go longer than a day, she answered that she wouldn't be surprised if the case would go to the jury that very afternoon. That morning, while the State was presenting its evidence, Zembles received a note that Dr. Parwatikar would not make the twohour drive to Columbia until he talked to Zembles personally, but that Zembles could contact him over the noon hour. Zembles would later tell the court that she got the impression from her secretary who had contacted Dr. Parwatikar's secretary, that Dr. Parwatikar was down right hostile, somehow believing that I have not kept up my end of the bargain to get in touch with him, to spend time with him on the phone talking about his testimony. Zembles testified at the motion hearing that this information caused her to throw up my hands and say `I'm going without him.' She also told the motion court that's when I should have asked for a continuance and I cannot imagine why I didn't just ask for a brief continuance or a recess or something to try and get a hold of the man, but I didn't. The only medical expert Zembles called was Dr. William Watson, a doctor of pharmacy. As he had never examined Johnson, nor was he licensed in psychiatry, he was not allowed to testify as to Johnson's mental state at the time of the crime or describe the mental disorder of cocaine intoxication delirium. When the court refused to submit the statutory mitigating factor regarding substantial impairment of Johnson's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, Zembles moved for a mistrial, claiming that the denial of the motion for continuance before the guilt phase prevented her from contacting Dr. Parwatikar. The court responded: Well, the Court would note that here we are at the end of the instruction conference with nothing left but to argue the case tomorrow morning, and this is the first time the Court has heard about this matter. I have heard no indication at no time you talked to Dr. Parwatikar ... The Court would note that we've had witnesses this afternoon. We were still going on the evidence until roughly 3:30 this afternoon. And if you were looking at 12:30 or a quarter till 1:00, it's roughly 120 miles from here to St. Louis. But the fact of the matter is, I mean, we've gone through this period of time the last several days, and I haven't heard anything about it. You were around here last night while the jury was deliberating between 5:30, and, I think the jury came back on my docket sheet at 10:10 or something like that. But, you know, I'm hearing about this for the first time, and your request for a mistrial will be denied. At the motion hearing, Zembles was asked, Did you have any strategic reason for not contacting Dr. Parwatikar? to which she replied, No. In response to the question, So was it a strategic reason that you did not want Dr. Parwatikar to testify? Zembles answered No. No. Not at all. Counsel is strongly presumed to have made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. [44] The record in this case, however, demonstrates that Zembles was not acting in accordance with a reasonable trial strategy. The record reflects that Dr. Parwatikar's testimony was the cornerstone of Zembles's penalty phase strategy. Zembles had not planned for any other scheduled witness to cover the majority of Dr. Parwatikar's testimony, that portion devoted to Johnson's mental state at the time of the murders. Yet when Zembles was notified during the presentation of the State's case that Dr. Parwatikar wanted to speak with her personally, she did not move for a continuance. She decided instead to proceed with the same theory of defense, but without his expert testimony. This is documented by her persistence in proposing to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating circumstance on substantial impairment and her unsuccessful attempts to elicit opinions from a doctor of pharmacy, who had never had any personal contact with Johnson, as to Johnson's psychological state at the time of the murder. Zembles's conduct does not measure up to an objective standard of reasonableness. She failed to solidify arrangements with the scheduled key witness in the penalty phase of a capital trial as to when he would testifya witness whose office was located approximately a two-hour drive from the courthouse. Before she began presenting her case, she was notified that the key witness would not appear without first speaking to her personally. Instead of moving for a continuance or making tactical changes in her theory of defense, Zembles gambled on the chance that she could reproduce the evidence of a licensed psychiatrist who had personally interviewed Johnson through hypotheticals by a doctor of pharmacywho had never had any personal contact with Johnsonabout Johnson's mental state, without the foundation of any psychiatric evaluation of Johnson. We find that under these circumstances, hindsight aside, and evaluating the conduct from Zembles's perspective at the time, her performance fell short of the skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under similar circumstances.