Opinion ID: 2162363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Lesser Included Offenses Record Support and Section 274

Text: The Superior Court's instructions to Johnson's jury recited the relevant elements of first-degree assault and partially recited the relevant elements of second-degree assault. [76] On appeal, Johnson argues that it was reversible error for the Superior Court not to give a full instruction on the lesser-included offenses of second- and third-degree assault. According to Johnson, because there was evidence from which the jury could have found that Woodward suffered no serious physical injury, the jury could rationally have acquitted him of first-degree assault and instead convicted him of one of the lesser offenses. The various degrees of assault differ, at least in part, depending on whether the victim has suffered a serious physical injury. The Delaware Criminal Code defines serious physical injury as: physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious and prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ. [77] The State did not contend that Woodward's injuries created a risk of death or that they caused a prolonged impairment of health or the function of a bodily organ. Therefore, whether a serious physical injury occurred, pursuant to the statutory definition, required the jury to evaluate the severity and duration of Woodward's disfigurement. According to Johnson, the evidence at trial showed that the scarring from Woodward's reconstructive surgery would be minimal or might disappear entirely, except for a scar over the bridge of Woodward's nose. Thus, Johnson contends that a jury could rationally have found that Woodward suffered no serious physical injury. Therefore, Johnson submits this evidence would have provided a basis for acquitting Johnson of first-degree assault and instead convicting him of either lesser offense. A defendant is entitled to an instruction for a lesser-included offense when [t]here is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting [a] defendant of the offense charged and convicting him [or her] of the included offense. [78] The record reflects that there was a rational evidentiary basis in the record to support Johnson's request. Moreover, as discussed earlier in this opinion, a defendant charged as an accomplice, for committing an offense that is divided into degrees, is entitled to have the jury make an individual determination of his or her mental culpability and accountability. [79] That task could only be discharged properly at Johnson's trial if the Superior Court instructed the jury as to all lesser-included offenses of assault.