Opinion ID: 158412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence of the Kansas Escape

Text: Mr. Ford challenges the district court's admission of evidence of his Kansas escape as res gestae and not barred by Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Batton, 602 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir.2010). After considering motions in limine, the district court allowed the government to introduce evidence of Mr. Ford's escape from prison. The court found the evidence admissible under the doctrine of res gestae because it was inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes, particularly the elements of Defendant being a fugitive from justice, that Defendant possessed stolen firearms and ammunition, and that Defendant had knowledge that the firearms and ammunition were indeed stolen. 1 R. 56. Alternatively, the court would have allowed the evidence as extrinsic evidence offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b). Id. at 57-58. The jury learned of Mr. Ford's escape through the testimony of two witnesses: Todd Kuzusko, a deputy United States marshal, and Ms. Goff, the former corrections officer who helped him escape. Mr. Kuzusko testified that Mr. Ford initiated a conversation while Mr. Kuzusko guarded him during a hospital visit. Mr. Ford related to Mr. Kuzusko the details of his escape and his capture, establishing that Mr. Ford was a fugitive and that he fired a gun during the police chase in Grants. 3 R. 89-96. Ms. Goff recounted her relationship with Mr. Ford, their planning of the escape, and the events from the escape until their capture in Grants. This testimony established that Mr. Ford was a fugitive, that he knew Ms. Goff stole the firearms, and that he knowingly possessed the Glock and had access to the .357 during the drive west. E.g., id. at 172-73, 183, 185-86, 189, 192-93. An uncharged act is admissible as res gestae intrinsic evidence not subject to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)if it was inextricably intertwined with the charged crime such that a witness's testimony would have been confusing and incomplete without mention of the prior act. United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1316 (10th Cir.1994) (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks); see also United States v. Parker, 553 F.3d 1309, 1314 (10th Cir.2009). Evidence of other crimes should not be suppressed when those facts come in as res gestae as part and parcel of the proof of the offense charged in the indictment. United States v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Ford argues that the res gestae doctrine does not apply because the government could have conveyed the operative facts without referring to the Kansas escape. Aplt. Br. at 46-47. According to Mr. Ford, his offer to stipulate that he was a convicted felon obviated any need to introduce evidence of the escape. Id. ; 1 R. 33. But the offered stipulation covered only one element of one of the three charged crimes, being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition. The government still had to prove Mr. Ford's knowledge that the firearms were stolen, his possession of the firearms, and his status as a fugitive. At the very least, the government needed evidence of the escape to show that Mr. Ford was a fugitive. Further, Ms. Goff was the best witness against Mr. Ford. She offered the memory and detail of an eyewitness and partner in crime. Her testimony about the planning of the escape was necessary to show how Mr. Ford knew the firearms were stolen. The Kansas escape could not be separated from the charged crimes. Mr. Ford's flight began with the escape, which explained his need for weapons and the circumstances of his arrest just two and a half days later. In short, the evidence of the Kansas escape is undoubtedly res gestae intrinsic evidence inextricably connected to the charged crimes. Despite its relevance, res gestae evidence is nonetheless subject to Rule 403's balancing test: it may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. Mr. Ford argues that no probative facts ... require an exploration of the inflammatory telling of a prison escape. Aplt. Br. at 48. As discussed above, the circumstances of the prison escape were highly relevant to the elements of the charged crimes. Mr. Ford has not shown how the evidence of his Kansas escape presented any danger of unfair prejudice, which makes a conviction more likely because it provokes an emotional response in the jury or otherwise tends to affect adversely the jury's attitude toward the defendant wholly apart from its judgment as to his guilt or innocense [sic] of the crime charged. United States v. Tan, 254 F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (10th Cir.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Any prejudice suffered on account of the escape evidence is not unfair. Again, the evidence of the escape was necessary to show that Mr. Ford was a fugitive, an element of a charged crime. [1] Any additional color of the escape was closely related to Mr. Ford's guilt. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.