Opinion ID: 2538476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judge Michalski's Oral and Written Findings of Fact Were Sufficient To Indicate the Legal and Factual Bases for His Ruling.

Text: Alaska Electric's primary complaint is that the trial court's oral findings of fact, even as supplemented, are so general that it cannot ask this court to review each exhibit and all of the plaintiff's testimony in the case-in-chief to determine whether the court below erred in holding that the plaintiff's claim for damages was not clear enough to resist the defendant's Rule 41(b) motion. Alaska Electric argues that the trial court disregarded the facts that Trademark promised to pay for work under change orders on a time and materials basis and that Fletcher described at length the work performed above and beyond the original contract. Alaska Electric also contends that Judge Michalski should have hired a special master to help him sort through the documents presented at trial in order to arrive at properly proven damages. Trademark responds that under Merrill v. Merrill [6] and Roberts v. Brooks [7] findings of fact and conclusions of law need only be sufficient in quality and quantity to facilitate intelligent review on appeal. [8] Trademark argues that the bases of Judge Michalski's ruling are clear and that no special master was called for because the problem was the quality and presentation of Alaska Electric's evidence rather than the trial court's difficulty in understanding it. In Merrill we noted that findings of fact and conclusions of law are required by Civil Rule 52(a) [9] in order to promote precision in the trial judge's thinking, to establish issues for res judicata and estoppel purposes, and to aid the appellate court on review. [10] In regard to the latter, it is the duty of the trial court by sufficiently detailed and explicit findings `to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable it to determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision.' [11] When the trial court dismisses a case on the merits under Rule 41(b), it must make findings of fact under Rule 52(a). [12] Oral findings can be sufficient to satisfy the rule. [13] It is difficult to determine whether the superior court's findings of fact are sufficient to facilitate intelligent review on appeal when the appellant has not briefed us on its theory of appeal. [14] Nonetheless, Alaska Electric appears to challenge only the court's finding that it showed an insufficient nexus between any given hours worked or materials purchased and the revisions to the contract. The factual findings that led Judge Michalski to this conclusion are clear: he found that Fletcher was unable to testify as to the cost of materials relating to the change orders; that the documents presented did not provide a basis for distinguishing between base and revised materials costs; that the classification of hours worked on the project as base or extra in Exhibit 59 was arbitrary; and that no evidence supported Alaska Electric's assumption that all hours not budgeted for in the base contract bid must have been expended as the result of additions and revisions to the contract. These findings are sufficiently detailed to allow us to understand the factual basis of Judge Michalski's ruling, especially as they relate to the following testimony: (1) Hix and Fletcher testified that they created job codes for the time cards that would help them distinguish between base and revised contract work, but did not inform some of the foremen who actually filled out the time cards of those codes, and some time cards contained no such codes; (2) the hours spreadsheet/Exhibit 59 contained more hours than the time cards did; (3) Fletcher arrived at his revised contract materials costs amounts by telling his attorney to calculate these amounts from documents which did not always relate only to the revisions and from documents that might have been counted more than once. Alaska Electric does not appear to challenge the sufficiency of Judge Michalski's conclusions of law. The legal basis of the ruling was that the proof of the damages related to any change orders [must be] sufficiently established for the court to grant judgment and that is the burden of the plaintiff, using a preponderance of the evidence standard. Although the court cited no cases it accurately stated Alaska contract law. We have held that: Although a contractor need not prove damages with mathematical precision, it may only recover those damages which it proves with reasonable certainty. State v. Northwestern Constr., 741 P.2d 235, 237 (Alaska 1987). Recovery of damages for a breach of contract is not allowed unless acceptable evidence demonstrates that the damages claimed resulted from and were caused by the breach. Boyajian v. United States, 191 Ct.Cl. 233, 423 F.2d 1231, 1235 (1970). .... The contractor's failure to present any evidence demonstrating its increased costs justifies dismissal of its claims. Id. at 1235-36.[ [15] ] The trial court's conclusions of law also required an underlying contract interpretation ruling. Alaska Electric appears to have argued at trial that Trademark unilaterally agreed to reimburse it for all costs resulting from any change to the base contract made by any party, whereas Trademark appears to have argued that only changes resulting from Revision No. 2 were at stake and that the subcontract required Alaska Electric to provide very specific proof in sufficient detail to permit an analysis of all material, labor, equipment, and overhead costs. Based on his objection to the attribution of 1,311 labor hours to revisions to the contract, Judge Michalski must have rejected the all costs argument and concluded as a matter of law that only those changes in the contract attributable to revisions were compensable. [16] We therefore think that the legal basis of Judge Michalski's ruling is also sufficiently clear to facilitate review. The findings did not fail to address any necessary points nor are they internally contradictory; the superior court simply found that Alaska Electric had failed to present evidence showing its damages with reasonable certainty. In such a situation appointment of a special master was not warranted. [17] We hold that Judge Michalski's findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficiently detailed and explicit findings `to give the appellate court a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable it to determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision.' [18] B. The Trial Court Need Not Justify Its Decision To Rule on the Civil Rule 41(b) Motion at the Close of the Plaintiff's Evidence Rather Than at the Close of the Defendant's Evidence. Civil Rule 41(b) provides that the trial court may rule immediately on a motion for involuntary dismissal under that rule, or alternatively may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence. Alaska Electric contends that a judge facing a Rule 41(b) motion should have to explain why he or she rules immediately instead of waiting until the close of all evidence, arguing that this would be helpful upon review. But the purpose of granting the trial court discretion as to when to decide a Rule 41(b) motion is to increase the trial court's flexibility in managing the case, not to increase its workload or provide additional points for appeal. Alaska has traditionally held a pragmatic view of Rule 41(b): Where plaintiff's proof has failed in some aspect the motion should, of course, be granted. Where plaintiff's proof is overwhelming, application of the rule is made easy and the motion should be denied. [19] If the trial court refuses to delay ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion, it is because the plaintiff has failed to prove its case for the reasons set out in the court's findings under Civil Rule 52(a). Nothing would be gained from an additional requirement that the trial court explain why it did not delay its ruling. We decline to hold that such an explanation is required under Civil Rule 41(b). C. The Trial Court May Not Construe the Evidence in the Plaintiff's Favor When Ruling on a Civil Rule 41(b) Motion. Civil Rule 41(b) provides in part that upon a motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court may weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and render judgment against the plaintiff even if the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case; alternatively the trial court may delay its ruling until the close of all evidence. Alaska Electric contends that the permissive language of Rule 41(b)may weigh the evidenceleaves open the possibility that the judge may construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, similar to the standard for a directed verdict under Civil Rule 50(a) in jury-tried cases. [20] It asserts that the superior court erred in failing to recognize that it had the power to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Alaska Electric. Alaska Electric admits that a memorandum of the Court Rules Attorney demonstrates that the Alaska Supreme Court in 1987 [21] chose the current version of Civil Rule 41(b)the court may weigh the evidence... even if the plaintiff has made out a prima facie caseover another version that would have explicitly required the trial court to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The 1987 rule change overruled our former Civil Rule 41(b) requirement that the trial judge deny a motion to dismiss when the plaintiff has made an unimpeached prima facie case. [22] The change in the text of the rule brought it into compliance with the analogous federal rule, [23] about which WRIGHT & MILLER concludes that [t]he trial judge is not to draw any special inferences in the nonmovant's favor nor concern itself with whether the nonmovant has made out a prima facie case. [24] We conclude that Judge Michalski did not err in refusing to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.