Opinion ID: 68143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentence Enhancement Challenges

Text: Young also raises a number of challenges to the district court’s application of the sentencing enhancements.8 First, he argues that the district court’s 6 At the sentencing hearing, Young’s attorney directed the court to the: presentence report paragraph 28 wherein it states the details of the escape first in Coosa County and indicates . . . that he was at the Alexander work release facility, and he failed to check back in at the work release center after work, and he was placed on escape status, and he surrendered himself at the work release center the following day. So that would be our support for that the factual basis for that case. 7 Because the government concedes that it cannot distinguish Young’s case from Chambers, we need not address whether Chambers requires us to overrule our precedent in Gay. 8 We review de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Louis, 559 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2453 (2009); United States v. Miranda, 348 F.3d 1322, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003). We review de novo a claim that the district court double counted a sentencing factor. United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2006). And “[w]e review the district court’s findings of fact related to the imposition of sentencing enhancements . . . for clear error.” United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009). “Under this standard, we will not disturb a district court’s findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 9 enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A) and (b)(6) constituted impermissible double counting. “‘Impermissible double counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.’” United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999)). Unless the guidelines direct otherwise, this Court presumes “that the Sentencing Commission intended separate guideline sections to apply cumulatively.” Id. at 1227. “‘Double counting a factor during sentencing is permitted if the Sentencing Commission . . . intended that result and each guideline section in question concerns conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Stevenson, 68 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in original). Further, “[t]he offense level adjustments from more than one specific offense characteristic within an offense guideline are applied cumulatively (added together) unless the guideline specifies that only the greater (or greatest) is to be used.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.4(A). The district court did not err in applying the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A). Young contends that it is impermissible double 10 counting to apply the § 2K2.2(b)(4)(A) enhancement based on the firearm being stolen because the basis for his conviction was being a felon in possession of a firearm. In his view, the theft and the possession “were one in the same.” However, the enhancement, which was based on Young’s theft of a firearm, was not fully accounted for by Young’s base offense level, which was based on Young’s being a felon in possession of a firearm, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). A felon can impermissibly possess a firearm without stealing it. Thus, Young’s enhancement for stealing the firearm that he impermissibly possessed does not constitute impermissible double counting. Young also argues that the district court erred by applying a four-level enhancement, under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6), for possession of “any firearm . . . in connection with another felony offense.” The felony in this case was Young’s burglary of a home. In the plea colloquy, Young admitted that detectives responded to a burglary call at the home of another person in Owens Cross Roads, Alabama, that he was in the home, that he was chased out by the homeowner, and that he was in possession of a firearm he stole from that residence. Young does not argue that these facts are insufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he committed the felony offense of burglary. See United States v. Smith, 480 F.3d 1277, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the government has 11 the burden of proving, “by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to support [a] sentencing enhancement”). Rather, Young argues that this enhancement is duplicative with U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), which imposes a twolevel enhancement for possession of a stolen firearm. We find no impermissible double counting in this regard either. The fourlevel increase, under § 2K2.1(b)(6), accounts for the fact that Young possessed the gun in connection with his burglary of a home in Owens Cross Roads, Alabama. The two-level increase, under § 2K2.1(b)(4)(A), for possessing a stolen gun does not account for the harm involved with possessing a gun in the course of burglarizing a dwelling. Possessing a stolen gun is one thing. But possessing a stolen gun that one obtains by burglarizing a dwelling is quite another. And the guidelines reflect that difference.9 Lastly, Young asserts that he should not have received a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment during flight, because his conduct was more akin to the behavior outlined in U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which deals with obstructing or impeding the administration of justice. Section 3C1.2 authorizes a two-level increase “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial 9 The § 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement applies when “a defendant who, during the course of a burglary, finds and takes a firearm, even if the defendant did not engage in any other conduct with that firearm.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 n.14(B). 12 risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” For starters, at the plea hearing, Young admitted that law enforcement officials were forced to engage in a “three-hour stand-off with Young who was threatening to shoot himself with a firearm before surrendering the firearm to deputies.” The PSI confirms this, too. The PSI states that “the officers on the scene had their own firearms pointed at [Young] because [he] threatened suicide by putting the firearm to his head. After three hours of negotiation, [Young] subsequently released the firearm and was placed into custody. According to the government, the firearm was loaded.” The PSI further states that the incident occurred in congested areas where the general public was at risk: Not knowing whether or not [Young] would fire or attempt to fire at other individuals, the officers aimed their own firearms at [Young] for protection and security purposes. According to [Investigator] Chaffin, the instant offense occurred during the middle of the day, behind a congested service station, with a hardware store located next to the service station. There were individuals who were at the service station at the time of the instant offense. This conduct also occurred on a congested four-lane road where the general public was at risk to be fired upon.10 10 Young did not object to the facts contained in the paragraphs of the PSI where this information was contained. 13 The district court adopted the facts of the PSI and specifically noted that “the particular facts of this case did create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person, and [Young] was clearly fleeing.” These findings are supported by the record and thus are not clearly erroneous. We find no reversible error.