Opinion ID: 2037652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: arnette powe

Text: Defendant finally argues that the prosecutor engaged in purposeful discrimination when he peremptorily challenged Arnette Powe, who was questioned for a seat as an alternate juror. When asked whether she would have any commitments or obligations that were so important that she could not continue to serve as a juror into the next week, Powe answered that she did. Powe explained that she worked in a dental office and was the only assistant to her employer, and that the office was only open on Tuesday and Thursday of each week. This was Powe's only job, and Powe's employer had told her to ask the court if she could be dismissed from jury service. However, Powe stated that her employer did not indicate that her job was in jeopardy if she had to serve as a juror, and Powe said that it would not create any kind of hardship on her personally if she could not work those days. Powe also stated that the fact that her employer asked her to request a dismissal from jury service would not cause her any problems in sitting and listening to the evidence at trial, and that she could put her employer's request out of her mind. At the time Powe and the other venireperson were interviewed in the judge's chambers, the jury and the first alternate had been selected. The prosecutor and defense counsel had also indicated to the court which of the remaining venirepersons they knew they would peremptorily challenge. The court then struck those venirepersons. Defense counsel was at this time out of peremptory challenges. Powe and the other juror, a white woman, were then brought into the judge's chambers and questioned. The prosecutor explained that he challenged Powe because she expressed a strong desire to go to work, and the prosecutor did not want her mind on work during the trial. Also, the prosecutor explained that when the court informed Powe that the death penalty would be sought, Powe gave all the right answers, but puckered up and made a sour face as if that was distasteful to her. After the prosecutor gave this explanation, defense counsel noted that Powe did not indicate that she had a strong desire to go to work, and that she said she could put it out of her head. Defense counsel did not deny that Powe made a sour face when informed of the possibility of the death penalty. Defendant argues on appeal that the prosecutor misstated Powe's voir dire testimony, as she did not express a strong desire to go to work. Instead, defendant argues, Powe minimized the intrusion that jury service would have. Defendant concludes that the prosecutor's misstatement or exaggeration of Powe's testimony severely undercuts his explanation and gives rise to the likelihood of pretext with respect to that explanation. Defendant cites United States v. Alcantar (9th Cir.1990), 897 F.2d 436, for this argument. Alcantar does not stand for the proposition which defendant asserts. Alcantar held that where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons are given by the prosecution in peremptorily challenging jurors, the need for a timely and meaningful Batson hearing is especially strong. ( Alcantar, 897 F.2d at 440.) The Batson hearing in Alcantar took place several years after trial, and the trial judge admitted not remembering the jury. In the instant case, defendant had a Batson hearing during jury selection. Moreover, although Powe later stated that her job situation would not affect her if she sat on the jury, she did first indicate to the court that she did have commitments or obligations or engagements that [were] so important that she could not continue to serve as a juror into the next week. Additionally, defendant ignores the prosecutor's assertion that Powe made a face when asked about the death penalty, which appeared to the prosecutor to indicate her distaste for the death penalty. The fact that defense counsel did not dispute this, and the fact that the trial court was present to observe, and did not dispute this, leads us to conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no racial motivation on the prosecutor's part in dismissing Powe. Also of note here is the fact that when Powe was questioned along with the white member of the venire, who was eventually chosen as the second alternate, only one spot remained. The white juror did not indicate she would have any problem sitting on the jury into the next week, or exhibit any distaste for the death penalty. Thus the prosecutor was left with the choice of Powe, whose employer asked her to be excused from the jury and who made a face, or the other juror, who did not pose any problems for the prosecution. The prosecutor chose to challenge Powe. Defendant makes several other arguments that Powe's challenge was racially motivated, all of which are without merit. Defendant first argues that the fact that Powe was an alternate juror gives rise to an inference of racial motivation for the challenge. Defendant again cites Grandison which, as explained previously, does not stand for this proposition. Defendant also argues, without authority, that the fact that the prosecutor excused Powe from serving as a second alternate presents an even stronger inference of purposeful discrimination (than apparently striking a juror or first alternate) due to the even more remote chance that that alternate would actually be called into service on the jury. Common sense dictates, however, that the more remote a chance a venireperson has of serving on the jury, the less likely the prosecution would exercise a racially motivated challenge to keep the person from deciding the case. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the prosecutor's reasons for peremptorily challenging McGruder, Jones, and Powe to be valid and neutral. In concluding this, we are mindful of defendant's argument's concerning factors which may suggest racial discrimination. However, we also note that two black jurors did serve on the jury, and the State did not strike the three black venirepersons consecutively. (See Grandison, 885 F.2d at 148.) Moreover, defendant's contention concerning the percentage of black jurors on the petit jury is without merit. First, defense counsel withdrew his motion concerning the percentage of black venirepersons in the initial jury pool, apparently because he realized there was no merit to his argument. Also, while defendant notes that the percentage of blacks in St. Clair County is 27.5%, 14% of the petit jury and its alternates were black, while only 11.7% of the general voir dire was black. Thus, a higher percentage of black jurors actually served on the jury than were in the venire. Finally, the Batson court itself has noted that the final venire need not mirror the racial composition of the community. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 & n. 6, 106 S.Ct. at 1717 & n. 6, 90 L.Ed.2d at 80 & n. 6.