Opinion ID: 2684152
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The DOL Guidance.

Text: The Second Circuit, puzzling over essentially the same riddle that confronts us today, asked the DOL to provide its interpretation of how the relevant ERISA provisions affect insurers' decisions to use RAAs as a method of claim redemption. See Faber, 648 F.3d at 102. The DOL responded by submitting a 16page amicus brief. See Secretary of Labor's Amicus Curiae Letter Brief in Response to the Court's Invitation (the DOL Guidance), Faber, 648 F.3d at 98 (No. 09-4901). In it, the DOL, after sedulous analysis, made it crystal clear that an insurer discharges its fiduciary duties under ERISA by furnishing a beneficiary unfettered access to an RAA in accordance with plan terms and does not retain plan assets by holding and managing the funds that back the RAA. The insurer, citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), exhorts us to defer to the DOL Guidance. The plaintiffs demur, arguing that the DOL Guidance was hastily prepared and is inconsistent with other authority. It is important to note that the DOL shares enforcement responsibility for ERISA. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 107 n.14 (1993) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1204(a)). This responsibility paves the way for — but does not require — a finding that some deference is due to the DOL's views. An agency's interpretation of a statute that it -12- administers may warrant judicial deference, depending on the degree to which the agency's exposition of the issue is deemed authoritative. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). While agencies are generally presumed to have particular expertise with respect to the statutes that they administer, agencies speak in a variety of ways. As a result, authoritativeness often depends, at least in part, on context. For example, when an agency speaks with the force of law, as through a binding regulation, its interpretation of ambiguous provisions of a statute that falls within its purview is due judicial deference as long as that interpretation is reasonable. See id. at 229-30; Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). But when an agency speaks with something less than the force of law, its interpretations are entitled to deference only to the extent that those interpretations have the 'power to persuade.' Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). That is the situation here. We must, therefore, dig deeper. To gauge persuasiveness, an inquiring court should look to a mix of factors that either contributes to or detracts from the power of an agency's interpretation to persuade. Doe v. Leavitt, 552 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2009). Those factors include -13- the thoroughness evident in [the agency's] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, [and the] consistency [of its interpretation] with earlier and later pronouncements. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). [T]he most salient of the factors that inform an assessment of persuasiveness [is] the validity of the agency's reasoning. Id. at 82. We appraise the DOL Guidance with these factors in mind. In doing so, we are acutely aware that if this inquiry is to have any real utility, it must involve something more than merely determining whether the agency's views comport with the court's independent interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. See id. at 80-81. If the relevant factors tilt in favor of giving weight to the agency's views, it would be an exercise in vanity for a court to disregard those views. The DOL Guidance is plainly well-reasoned. Here, as in Doe, the agency has consulted appropriate sources, employed sensible heuristic tools, and adequately substantiated its ultimate conclusion. Id. at 82. The meticulous nature of the agency's statement of its views, coupled with the logic of its position, combine to lend the DOL Guidance credibility. To be sure, the DOL Guidance was not forged through a transparent and structured process, nor was it tempered in the crucible of public comment. Such accouterments would have given -14- added heft to the DOL Guidance — but none of them is a condition precedent to deference. See Sun Capital Partners III, LP. v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 140-41 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014); Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy for Pers. with Disabs. v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 464 F.3d 229, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2006) (Sotomayor, J.). Persuasiveness (or the lack of it) depends on the totality of the relevant factors. So, too, the fact that the DOL's position is of relatively recent vintage is not fatal. While the longstanding nature of an agency interpretation may constitute an added reason for deference, see Lapine v. Town of Wellesley, 304 F.3d 90, 106 (1st Cir. 2002), new interpretations — particularly new interpretations addressing questions not previously posed to the agency — can be convincing, see, e.g., Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy, 464 F.3d at 244; In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 81-83 (2d Cir. 2004). In the last analysis, we are satisfied that the considerations of process and duration stressed by the plaintiffs are insufficient to sully the well-reasoned DOL Guidance. The amicus brief filed by the DOL bears the hallmarks of reliability. There is no good reason to dismiss it, especially since the agency was not a party to the litigation in which the amicus brief was filed but articulated its views only in response to the Second -15- Circuit's direct request. See Conn. Office of Prot. & Advocacy, 464 F.3d at 236, 239-40. Taking into account the scrupulousness of the DOL Guidance, its analytic rigor, and its crafting of a set of clear and easily applied rules that are consistent with ERISA's structure, text, and purpose, we conclude that the DOL Guidance is deserving of some weight. See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991).