Opinion ID: 2626414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: E.E. Black's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: The plaintiffs contend that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of E.E. Black because it failed to recognize that E.E. Black had a duty to protect against foreseeable dangers, engaged in negligence notwithstanding the fact that it knew that the foreseeable range of danger extended to the public and future contractors, and the risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous included the specific sequence of events that led to . . . Pulawa's severe head injuries. The plaintiffs further argue that the circuit court failed to consider the material and competent evidence that had been presented and which showed that E.E. Black owed a legal duty to . . . Pulawa under the facts and circumstances of this case. The plaintiffs primarily rely on the testimony of Alan Los Banos, Jr., the plaintiffs' construction safety expert, who generally testified in his affidavit and deposition that burial of objects such as a bag of cement, in lieu of proper fill, creates a risk that a future contractor's heavy construction vehicles or equipment would strike or rollover the object and project it through the air with great force. Thus, the plaintiffs maintain that Los Banos' expert testimony alone, at the minimum, created a genuine issue of fact, which precluded summary judgment. Preliminarily, E.E. Black contends that the plaintiffs confuse the foreseeability issue by citing and referencing `foreseeability' in the context of a breach of a legal duty and/or causation instead of the context of whether there is a legal duty in the first instance. (Emphases omitted.) Consistent with its assertion that [f]oreseeability, in the context of a legal duty, is a question of law[,] E.E. Black argues that Los Banos' opinions regarding the issue of foreseeability within the context of whether E.E. Black had a legal duty of care owed to [the p]laintiffs should be disregarded, per prevailing case law as they cannot be used or considered to establish a legal duty of care. E.E. Black maintains that it owed no legal duty to the plaintiffs because the foreseeable danger or harm related to use of improper backfill for roads pertains to settlement of the road and its failure related to those traveling on or using the road. Voids, settlement, and street failure that possibly could endanger people using and driving on the street are the foreseeable dangers if improper backfill such as a bag of cement is used. The risk or hazard is not that the fill material will be dug up, run over by a vehicle, and projected into the air by the tire of the vehicle. It is a generous stretch of the imagination to conclude as a matter of law that the risk or hazard that fill material will be dug up, run over by a vehicle, and projected into the air by the tire of that vehicle is the likely or probable result of the alleged conduct. (Citations to the record omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)
[I]t is fundamental that a negligence action lies only where there is a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Bidar v. Amfac, Inc., 66 Haw. 547, 551-52, 669 P.2d 154, 159 (1983) (citations omitted). The existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, that is, whether . . . such a relation exists between the parties that the community will impose a legal obligation upon one for the benefit of the otheror, more simply, whether the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled legal protection at the hands of the defendant, is entirely a question of law. Knodle v. Waikiki Gateway Hotel, Inc., 69 Haw. 376, 385, 742 P.2d 377, 383 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (ellipsis in original). Regarding the imposition of a duty of care, this court has stated that, generally, [i]n considering whether to impose a duty of reasonable care on a defendant, we recognize that duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Legal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be imposed for damage done. In determining whether or not a duty is owed, we must weigh the considerations of policy which favor the [plaintiff's] recovery against those which favor limiting the [defendant's] liability. The question of whether one owes a duty to another must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Blair, 95 Hawai`i at 259-60, 21 P.3d at 464-65 (citations omitted) (format altered). In addition to the aforementioned principles, this court has also regarded several factors in determining whether to impose a duty: [W]hether a special relationship exists, the foreseeability of harm to the injured party, the degree of certainty that the injured party suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendants' conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendants, the policy of preventing harm, the extent of the burden to the defendants and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id. at 260, 21 P.3d at 465 (ellipsis and citation omitted) (format altered). Regardless of the source of a particular duty, [however,] a defendant's liability for failing to adhere to the requisite standard of care is limited by the pr[o]position that the defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct [or, as the circumstances may warrant, to take whatever affirmative steps are reasonable to protect another] is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct [or omission] unreasonably dangerous. Thus, if it is not reasonably foreseeable that the particular plaintiff will be injured if the expected harm in fact occurs, the defendant does not owe that plaintiff a duty reasonably to prevent the expected harm. Doe Parents No. 1 v. State Dep't of Educ., 100 Hawai`i 34, 72, 58 P.3d 545, 583 (2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (first set of brackets and bold emphases added); see also Janssen v. Am. Hawai`i Cruises, Inc., 69 Haw. 31, 34, 731 P.2d 163, 166 (1987) (stating that a defendant owes a duty of care only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 68, 647 P.2d 713, 720 (1982) (same). The test of foreseeability is whether there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that a reasonable and prudent person would take precautions to avoid it. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 388, 742 P.2d at 385 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). It does not mean foreseeability of any harm whatsoever, and it is not sufficient that injury is merely possible. Henderson v. Prof'l Coatings Corp., 72 Haw. 387, 396, 819 P.2d 84, 90 (1991) (quoting 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 5(5) (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lee v. Corregedore, 83 Hawai`i 154, 167, 925 P.2d 324, 337 (1996) ([T]here are clear judicial days on which a court can foresee forever and thus determine liability but none on which that foresight alone provides a socially and judicially acceptable limit on recovery of damages for that injury. (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)). [T]he concept of `duty[,]' [however,] involves more than mere foreseeability of harm. Taylor-Rice v. State, 91 Hawai`i 60, 71-72, 979 P.2d 1086, 1097-98 (1999). [A] court's taskin determining dutyis not to decide [merely] whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party. Id. at 72, 979 P.2d at 1098 (citing Thing v. La Chusa, 48 Cal.3d 644, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865, 771 P.2d 814, 819 n. 3. (1989)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
On appeal and at the circuit court level, the parties dispute whether foreseeability is an issue of fact for the trier of fact to decide or is an issue of law for the court to determine. The plaintiffs maintain that [r]easonable foreseeability is the very prototype of a question that must be left to a jury. (Citation omitted.) On the other hand, E.E. Black maintains that foreseeability in the context of duty is an issue of law for the court to determine. This court has previously noted that, in the context of determining the existence and scope of a duty, foreseeability is a question of law for the court to resolve. See Bidar, 66 Haw. at 553 n. 3, 669 P.2d at 159 n. 3 (noting that foreseeability may play an important role in the definition of duty and the delineation of its scope by the court) (citing Hulsman, 65 Haw. at 68, 647 P.2d at 720-21 (duty owed only to those foreseeably endangered; foreseeability is a question of law); Ajirogi v. State, 59 Haw. 515, 527, 583 P.2d 980, 988 (1978) (foreseeability of risk of harm to plaintiff is a question of law when determining whether plaintiff is among those to whom defendant's duty of care extends); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 209, 532 P.2d 673, 676 (1975) (as a matter of law, duty not owed to one to whom defendants could not reasonably foresee consequences)). Indeed, other jurisdictions have also recognized that foreseeability, in the context of determining the existence and scope of a duty, is a question of law for the court to determine. See Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal.3d 564, 224 Cal.Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624, 629 n. 6 (1986); Knoll v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 258 Neb. 1, 601 N.W.2d 757, 762-63 (1999); Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 149 N.J. 496, 694 A.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1997). Foreseeability, however, in the context of breach of duty and causation is a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. See Bidar, 66 Haw. at 552-53, 669 P.2d at 159-60. [T]he distinction between foreseeability as it applies to duty and as it applies to proximate cause is a critical distinction that is too often and too easily overlooked. Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763. Foreseeability as it impacts duty determinations refers to the knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of apprehension, of injury to another person, that is taken into account in determining the existence of the duty to exercise care [.] Foreseeability that affects proximate cause, on the other hand, relates to the question of whether the specific act or omission of the defendant was such that the ultimate injury to the plaintiff reasonably flowed from defendant's breach of duty. Foreseeability in the proximate cause context relates to remoteness rather than existence of a duty. Clohesy, 694 A.2d at 1021 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kenney, 323 Md. 116, 591 A.2d 507, 515 (1991) (Foreseeability as a factor in the determination of the existence of a duty involves a prospective consideration of the facts existing at the time of the negligent conduct. Foreseeability as an element of proximate cause permits a retrospective consideration of the total facts of the occurrence[.] (Citation omitted.) (Emphases added.)). Here, the plaintiffs have overlooked [t]he distinction between foreseeability as it applies to duty and as it applies to proximate cause. Knoll, 601 N.W.2d at 763. For example, the plaintiffs maintain that [t]he precise manner of the injury or the specific harm or consequence of the negligence need not be foreseeable. However, as E.E. Black points out, [t]he cases cited by [the p]laintiffs all involve[] factual analysis relating to foreseeability in the context of causation, not foreseeability in the context of duty. See Rogers ex rel. Standley v. Retrum, 170 Ariz. 399, 825 P.2d 20, 22 (Ct. App.1991) (stating that the particular manner in which the injury is brought about need not be foreseeable in the context of legal cause); Tieder v. Little, 502 So.2d 923, 927 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (stating that the foreseeability aspect of the proximate cause element is . . . satisfied in this case because [t]he collapse of a brick wall resulting in the death of a person near such wall is plainly a reasonably foreseeable consequence of negligently designing and constructing such a wall without adequate supports in violation of applicable building codes); Christopher v. Father's Huddle Café, Inc., 57 Mass.App.Ct. 217, 782 N.E.2d 517, 526 (2003) (stating that, in the context of causation, [t]he specific kind of harm need not be foreseeable as long as it was foreseeable that there would be harm from the act which constituted the negligence). Consequently, to the extent the plaintiffs rely on their cited cases for the proposition that [t]he precise manner of the injury or the specific harm or consequence of the negligence need not be foreseeable, we disregard them as not germane to the issues presented in the instant appeal. Inasmuch as the issue of foreseeability in the context of duty is a question of law for the court to resolve, the court, not the trier of fact, must determine the existence and scope of duty, if any, owed by E.E. Black to the plaintiffs.
As previously stated, the plaintiffs rely on Los Banos' expert opinion to establish the fact that [t]he risk of a buried cement bag becoming a projectile was . . . clearly foreseeable[] and not `highly extraordinary.' Specifically, Los Banos' affidavit provides in relevant part: 2. I am employed as a Safety Coordinator and Program Specialist for the AFL-CIO, Plasterers & Cement Masons, Local 630, and Bricklayers & Allied Craft-workers, Local 1. 3. I am a safety specialist who investigates construction accidents. I have been so employed over the past nine years, and have worked in the construction field since 1979. My background and experience includes various forms of training in construction and construction safety and OSHA-approved classes. . . . . . . . 8. In my opinion, it is improper for a contractor to bury objects not consistent with the job specifications as fill materials, such as this object buried under a public roadway such as Kamake`e Street. Such practices have resulted in materials being buried that could pose hazards to future construction workers. 9. The dangers of engaging in such practices would include the risk of heavy construction equipment or vehicles striking or rolling over materials such has [sic] hardened cement so as to project them through the air with great force, jeopardizing the lives and safety of workers and other persons in the immediate area. On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that Los Banos' expert testimony established, at least for summary judgment purposes, that: Burial of objects such as a bag of cement, in lieu of proper fill, creates a risk that a future contractor's heavy construction vehicles or equipment would strike or rollover the object and project it through the air with great force. Doing so has the potential for being a projectile that can basically fly. Heavy construction equipment and the amount of pressure . . . can launch such objects. Chunks will fly . . . from the tires, if it spins. [W]hen you're on a hard surface and you have a rubberized thing that's pressing down, something has to give. The weak area can be rocks that fly. When wheels spin, . . . we see things fly from the tires. Especially in the back, when it spins, the traction, as they're moving, you see it picks up sometimes in the grooves of the tires and just launches itself. In Hawai`i, construction workers know that such objects can be propelled through the air. Construction safety training classes are conducted which cover the danger of flying construction debris caused by improper materials that are abandoned or left at a job site. Indeed, similar incidents have occurred at construction worksites in Hawai`i. . . . Los Banos has personally seen large rocks fly out from under heavy equipment at construction sites. A flying object jeopardizes the lives and safety of workers. The frequency with which this happens depends on the type of equipment being operated, the speed at which it is being operated, and the type of materials in the vicinity. E.E. Black, however, maintains that Los Banos' opinions are inadmissible inasmuch as they cannot be used or considered to establish a legal duty of care. In response, the plaintiffs assert that legal duty must be examined in light of its factual context, not in a vacuum. Mr. Los Banos provided facts relevant to the court's legal duty analysis, and these facts establish some probability of harm sufficiently serious that a reasonable and prudent person (e.g. contractor) would have taken precautions to avoid it. (Citation omitted.) Generally, [t]he testimony of expert witnesses is . . . confined to matters of fact, as distinguished from matters of law. Create 21 Chuo, Inc. v. Southwest Slopes, Inc., 81 Hawai`i 512, 522 n. 4, 918 P.2d 1168, 1178 n. 4 (App.1996). In other words, an expert or nonexpert opinion that amounts to a conclusion of law cannot be properly received in evidence, since the determination of such questions is exclusively within the province of the court. Id. (citation omitted). Nevertheless, in the context of duty, expert testimony might be relevant to help establish some underlying fact on which duty may ultimately rest[.] Parra v. Bldg. Erection Servs., 982 S.W.2d 278, 284 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998); see also Peck v. Horrocks Eng'rs, Inc., 106 F.3d 949, 952 (10th Cir.1997) (Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law, although expert testimony may be helpful on the issue. (Citations omitted.)). Contrary to the plaintiffs' position, however, Los Banos did not provide[] facts relevant to the court's legal duty analysis[] in the instant case. (Emphasis added.) A closer examination of Los Banos' deposition testimony reveals that the basis for the fact that [t]he risk of a buried cement bag becoming a projectile was . . . clearly foreseeable[] and not `highly extraordinary' was Los Banos' prior observations of nine-inch rocks traveling maybe about five feet, six feet away. Specifically, Los Banos testified: Q: [By defense counsel] How big was the biggest rock that you've seen fly like that. [PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL]: Like that? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, when a loader or piece of equipment goes over it and then shoots it out. [LOS BANOS]: AboutI've seen rocks about, roughly, this big fly out of there. Q: (By [defense counsel]): When you say this big A: [By Los Banos] Roughly, what, about nine inches. Around there. Q: Nine inches, around? A: Yeah. Q: How far did it fly? A: Usually, it doesn't fly that far. It just flies maybe about five feet, six feet away. (Emphasis added.) However, in the present case, the cement rock that was propelled into the air weighed approximately thirty pounds and traveled at least fifteen to twenty-five feet before striking Pulawa in the head. When apprised of these facts, Los Banos testified: Q: [By defense counsel] Was this accident, then, unusual? A: [By Los Banos] My opinion Well, I feel it's unusual. Especially the launching that far. I thought it was, like, wow, this is different. Q: Going over 20 feet and the thing[, i.e., the concrete rock] is, what, 20, 30 pounds A: At least, uh-huh. Q: Unusual accident? A: That's a big chunk flying there. Because, usually, when you run over it, it doesn't fly that far. It just kind of just-Five, six feet. When it launches that far, it's, like, wow, you know, what is that? (Emphases added.) Thus, inasmuch as [t]he opinion of an expert must pertain to the facts of the particular case[,] Tortes v. King County, 119 Wash.App. 1, 84 P.3d 252, 258 (2003), and Los Banos' opinion does not, his opinion as to the fact that [t]he risk of a buried cement bag becoming a projectile was . . . clearly foreseeable[ ] and not `highly extraordinary' is not helpful to this court's legal duty analysis. See Nebraska Plastics, Inc. v. Holland Colors Ams., Inc., 408 F.3d 410, 416 (8th Cir.2005) (stating that [a]n expert opinion that fails to consider the relevant facts of the case is fundamentally unsupported[] and, therefore, must be excluded). Accordingly, we next turn to the dispositive issue in this case, that is, whether E.E. Black owed a legal duty of care to Pulawa. Other jurisdictions have recognized that a contractor has a duty to maintain the premises on which it performs work in a reasonably safe condition for persons who the contractor may reasonably expect to come onto the site. Raimo v. Fischer, 372 N.J.Super. 448, 859 A.2d 709, 712 (App.Div. 2004) (citation omitted); see also Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal.2d 368, 24 Cal.Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d 185, 190 (1962) (stating that an independent contractor's duty of care is a general duty imposed by law to use reasonable care to prevent damage to persons whem [sic] he may reasonably expect to be affected by his work) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, a contractor generally has a duty to use reasonable care both in his or her work and in the course of performance of the work[; h]owever, the duty of reasonable care is not, of course, owed to the world at large, but rather to those who might reasonably be foreseen as being subject to injury by the breach of the duty. Peters v. Forster, 804 N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ind. 2004) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). Indeed, as previously discussed, this court has held that the defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct . . . is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct . . . unreasonably dangerous.  Doe Parents No. 1, 100 Hawai`i at 72, 58 P.3d at 583 (emphasis added); see also Janssen, 69 Haw. at 34, 731 P.2d at 166. Moreover, in determining the scope of the defendant's duty, the focus is on the defendant's viewpoint, that is, whether the defendant could reasonably foresee the plaintiff's injury. Yager v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 281 Ill.App.3d 903, 217 Ill.Dec. 695, 667 N.E.2d 1088, 1092 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, Pulawa was standing approximately fifteen to twenty feet away from the excavation area that was located in the same vicinity of an excavation site of a prior construction project that was backfilled by E.E. Black two years earlier. Although E.E. Black has a duty to use reasonable care in both [its] work and in the course of performance of the work[,] it cannot be said that Pulawa was foreseeably endangered by E.E. Black's conduct such that the cement bag it allegedly failed to remove would be propelled in the air by the tire of a loader and strike Pulawa in the head. The plaintiffs adduced testimony from several GTE inspectors and engineers, as well as an E.E. Black project engineer, who purportedly oversaw the 1993-1994 underground duct line project. The testimony focused on the risks or hazards created by E.E. Black's alleged failures to remove the cement bag and to comply with contract specifications regarding proper backfill requirements. The risk or hazard that was consistently identified focused on the possibility of settlement of the road and street failure. In fact, the plaintiffs, in their memorandum in opposition to E.E. Black's motion for summary judgment, posited that [a]ppropriate backfill is necessary to assure `the integrity of the pavement structure,' while inappropriate fill can promote voids or settlement and allow for failure of the roadway. (Citation omitted.) The plaintiffs also argued that [u]se of improper fill by [E.E. Black] under a public roadway such as Kamake`e Street could lead to settlement and road failure. (Citations omitted.) The GTE inspector who oversaw the underground duct line project in 1993-1994 testified that compliance with contract specifications regarding proper backfill requirements is to prevent settlement and/or street failure. Indeed, the plaintiffs' own expert, Los Banos, confirmed that the purpose of job specifications relating to proper backfill requirements is to promote uniform compaction, which, in turn, prevents voids. Moreover, Los Banos testified that the purpose of such job specifications is not to prevent the possibility of non-conforming backfill material being unearthed and projected into the air, striking somebody: Q: [By defense counsel] So the purpose for designating specifically the size of backfill materials is so that there is proper compaction? A: [By Los Banos] Uniform compaction. Q: The purpose for those specifications are not so that it does impose a danger to others, right? A: What do you mean? For the size, you mean? Q: Yes. A: Yeah. No. Q: That has nothing to do with, well, you know, if you leave rocks about five, 10 inches in there[, i.e., in the trench,] and if somebody digs it out it might hit somebody? A: No. It's just engineering standards. You know, you're talking about dynamics. (Emphases added.) Although the plaintiffs adduced some testimony that improper backfill could potentially pose a danger to the safety of future contractors and that E.E. Black was generally aware that there would be future underground work along Kamake`e Street, such evidence does not meet the test of foreseeability, to wit, whether there is some probability of harm sufficiently serious that a reasonable and prudent person would take precautions to avoid it. Knodle, 69 Haw. at 388, 742 P.2d at 385 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted) (emphasis added). The aforementioned test does not mean foreseeability of any harm whatsoever, and it is not sufficient that injury is merely possible. Henderson, 72 Haw. at 396, 819 P.2d at 90 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added); see Ethyl Corp. v. Johnson, 345 Ark. 476, 49 S.W.3d 644, 648 (2001) (recognizing that there is no duty to guard against merely possible, as opposed to likely or probable, harm). Based on the evidence in the record, it appears that, although Pulawa did indeed suffer harm, such harm, though unfortunate, was merely possible and not likely or probable under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, the authorities relied upon by the plaintiffs regarding contractors all involve the type of foreseeable harm related to excavation and resurfacing work, that is, settlement, street failure, and holes. See Brent v. Unicol, Inc., 969 P.2d 627, 628 (Alaska 1998) (subsequent construction worker fell into a hole between an excavation wall and a rig mat left by a prior contractor); McMahon v. Richard Gorazd, Inc., 135 Ill.App.3d 211, 89 Ill.Dec. 944, 481 N.E.2d 787, 791-93 (1985) (painter fell from scaffold after ground under scaffold caved in where utility had earlier installed underground gas line; utility was under a duty to prevent or correct subsidence at the site of its excavations and could discharge such duty by, inter alia, filling in any subsidence caused by the expected settling of the earth after such an excavation) (emphasis added); Hankins v. Elro Corp., 149 Mich.App. 22, 386 N.W.2d 163, 164 (1986) (per curiam) (bicycle on which plaintiff was riding struck a gap between two pieces of cement); Kapalczynski v. Globe Constr. Co., 19 Mich.App. 396, 172 N.W.2d 852, 852-53 (1969) (plaintiff fell into a hole in a street that defendant had resurfaced). The plaintiffs' two remaining cases dealt with foreseeable harm relating to the improper installation of furniture and containers. See Chance, 24 Cal.Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d at 187 (diner fell into open planter box installed in a narrow foyer of a busy restaurant); Raimo, 859 A.2d at 711 (plaintiff descending temporary staircase injured when staircase fell away from a house). Thus, the evidence adduced below, coupled with the arguments of the parties, clearly established that the risk or hazard of the buried cement bag being propelled into the air during a future excavation was not what made the failures to remove the cement bag and to comply with the contract specifications by E.E. Black unreasonably dangerous. In other words, E.E. Black's general duty to use reasonable care did not include within its scope the protection of Pulawa from the particular risk that he encountered. See Selwyn v. Ward, 879 A.2d 882, 883, 887-89 (R.I.2005) (holding that harm resulting from a minor igniting a bottle of grain alcohol for sport was not a foreseeable consequence of selling alcohol to a minor; rather, foreseeable consequence would have been injuries resulting from minor's consumption of illegally obtained alcohol). Consequently, based on the state of the record, it cannot be said that E.E. Black owed a legal duty to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of E.E. Black. [14]