Opinion ID: 682155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence for Dangerous Offender Sentencing

Text: 31 Lambert argues there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that he is a dangerous offender for purposes of Oregon Revised Statute Sec. 161.725, and that the court exercised unbridled discretion in enhancing his sentence in accordance with that statute. The standard of review on federal habeas is whether no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the facts necessary to support the enhanced sentence. French v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983). Factual determinations by state courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness if they are fairly supported by the evidence. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). 32 Under Oregon law, a defendant being sentenced for a class A felony, such as Lambert, is subject to an enhanced term of up to thirty years if the court finds that: (1) because of the dangerousness of the defendant an extended period of confined correctional treatment or custody is required for the protection of the public, and (2) the defendant is suffering from a severe personality disorder indicating a propensity toward crimes that seriously endanger the life or safety of another. Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 161.725. 33 Oregon's dangerous offender statute does not grant sentencing judges unbridled discretion to determine whether a defendant qualifies for sentence enhancement. State v. Jones, 558 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Or.App.1977). The court may sentence a defendant as a dangerous offender only after: (1) ordering a presentence investigation, including an examination by a psychiatrist or psychologist; (2) conducting a presentence hearing; and (3) considering the presentence report, the psychiatrist's or psychologist's written evaluation, and the evidence in the case. Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 161.735. See also Jones, 558 P.2d at 1275 (indicating that the court's discretion is constrained by the statutorily required procedures, as well as by the statute's specific identification of the class of defendants to which the dangerous offender categorization may apply). 34 In this case, there is no question that the trial court followed the procedural requirements of the dangerous offender statute. Lambert was examined by two experts, both of whom submitted written evaluations and both of whom were subjected to cross-examination at a presentencing hearing. Lambert contends, however, the court's determination that he suffers from a severe personality disorder is not supported by the experts' evaluations. 35 This argument is without merit. The state's expert testified that Lambert has a severe personality disorder and a consequent propensity to commit crimes posing serious danger to others. The defense's expert agreed that Lambert has a personality disorder, but testified that he did not have sufficient information to determine its severity. However, after learning from the court that Lambert was previously convicted of harassing a woman with whom he thought he was having an affair but in fact had no relationship whatsoever, the expert conceded this information indicated a pathological condition and propensity [for] deviant sexuality that cause[d] [him] concern. Furthermore, this expert agreed that Lambert's denial of the crime and of his alcohol problem increased the likelihood that he would be a repeat offender. The expert also emphasized that, because of the nature of the crime and Lambert's denial, Lambert continues to be sexually dangerous. 36 The dangerous offender statute requires a sentencing judge to obtain, but not necessarily to accept, an expert's opinion regarding the existence of a severe personality disorder. State v. Huntley, 730 P.2d 1234, 1244 (Or.1986). The judge is required by statute to make his own findings on that issue. Id. The Oregon Supreme Court has upheld trial courts' findings of severe personality disorder where an expert witness refused to give an opinion for lack of sufficient information, State v. Pryor, 772 P.2d 431 (Or.App.1989), and even where the expert's evaluation unequivocally indicated that the defendant was not so afflicted. Huntley, 730 P.2d 1234. 37 In this case, the trial court based its decision to sentence Lambert as a dangerous offender on Lambert's prior offense, his unacknowledged alcoholism, the nature of his crime, and the experts' evaluations and testimony. We cannot say, based on this record, that no rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lambert has a severe personality disorder indicating a propensity to endanger the safety of others, and that an extended period of confinement is therefore necessary to protect the public. 38 AFFIRMED.