Opinion ID: 865443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the chancery court erred in awarding

Text: TEMPORARY CUSTODY TO THE PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER IN THE EVENT THE NO-CONTACT ORDER HAD NOT BEEN LIFTED. ¶39. As part of the chancery court’s decree denying Kristy’s petition to modify, the chancellor ordered the immediate return of the daughter to the custody of Travis. The order also included a provision that in the event the Navy’s no-contact order had not been lifted, the daughter’s custody was to be placed with Travis’s mother. ¶40. Kristy argues that this ruling was error. She avers that no proof was submitted at the hearing which would tend to show that she had abandoned the child, was unfit to have custody, or had engaged in conduct so immoral as to be detrimental to the child. ¶41. Grandparents have no legal right of custody of a grandchild, as against a natural parent. Carter v. Taylor, 611 So. 2d 874, 876 (Miss. 1992). Thus, in every custody case between a grandparent and a natural parent, there exists a legal presumption in favor of the natural parent. Id. This presumption, however, may be rebutted upon a clear showing that the parent (1) has abandoned the child, or (2) the conduct of the parent is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child, or (3) the parent is unfit mentally or otherwise to have custody 12 the child. McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44, 47 (Miss. 1993). Absent clear proof of one of the above circumstances, the natural parent is entitled to custody of his or her child. Id. ¶42. Kristy is correct; the chancellor did not make a specific finding that Kristy was either unfit or had engaged in immoral conduct detrimental to the daughter’s welfare. Rather, the chancellor found only that Kristy had failed to meet her burden of preponderant proof required for the modification request. This conclusion was grounded on the chancellor’s reasoned belief that Kristy’s sexual-abuse claim was false and based on motive. Termination of her parental rights would require a further finding based on proof adduced by clear and convincing evidence that Kristy did engage in such detrimental conduct. The chancellor’s finding does not reach this far. ¶43. However, the chancellor’s order does not terminate her parental rights, nor does it appear to alter the status quo of the final divorce decree. Kristy’s rights as the non-custodial parent, such as her visitation rights, have not been changed. ¶44. At the time the chancellor entered his judgment, the Navy’s no-contact order had not been lifted. Although NCIS apparently had determined the abuse charges against Travis to be unfounded, Travis’s case was still awaiting upper-level review. There is no indication in the record when the Navy would act, only that it could do so at any time. Furthermore, the no-contact order was implemented as a result of Kristy’s allegations, which the court determined to be false. ¶45. According to the record, when the Navy issued its order subsequent to Kristy’s allegation, Travis’s mother stood in for Travis and took care of the daughter for a short 13 period of time before Kristy was given temporary custody. The record also shows that, soon after Travis and Kristy divorced, Travis’s mother cared for the daughter while Travis was deployed at sea. ¶46. Placing the daughter in the custody of Travis’s mother until the Navy’s no-contact order was lifted was a sensible resolution concurrent with Travis’s custodial rights. We find that the chancellor’s decision was not an abuse of discretion.