Opinion ID: 203736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facts Underlying the Present Case

Text: The facts in the present case are undisputed, and it is undisputed that there are gaps in the evidence about plaintiffs' hirings and layoffs. This may in part be attributable to the fact that plaintiffs did not bring suit until 2005, some eight years after they were hired. [3] In 1996, Springfield decided to hire sixty new police officers. Its police commission chairman requested a list of eligible candidates from HRD. Eligibility meant something more limited however; in the intervening years, HRD had delegated to the local appointing authorities most of the responsibility for determining the eligibility of candidates for eligibility criteria other than the examination. On January 13, 1997, in response to the City's request, HRD generated a list, Certification No. 961295, of 374 candidates who had passed a written examination. Under the Castro decree, the list placed the minority candidate who had scored highest on the test first, followed by the non-minority candidate who had scored highest on the test, followed by the second highest scoring minority candidate and the second highest scoring non-minority candidate, and so on, in alternating order. [4] After the City received the HRD examination certification list, it asked those candidates who were still interested in being considered for the job to come in and sign the certification list. The record does not establish which candidates signed the list, and which were eliminated from consideration for failure to do so. Although an appointing authority such as the City would generally have sent the original, signed certification list back to HRD, the relevant certification listor other evidence as to which candidates signed and which did notis not in the record. HRD retained oversight of the process used by local appointing authorities to ensure compliance with its rules. The City applied a series of hiring prerequisites to the remaining candidates to decide which candidates would receive offers and be able to go through the police academy. For each candidate, the City ran a background check, [5] a residency check and an interview; if the candidate was not eliminated at this point, he or she would be given a conditional offer of employment, after which he or she would be further subject to a medical examination, a psychological examination, and a physical abilities test. Captain William Cochrane, who from 1996 to 2001 was the commanding officer of the Academy for the Springfield Police Department, was responsible for this process. Cochrane and his staff evaluated and eliminated candidates on the basis of the qualifications listed above. Once they had a list with enough qualified candidates to meet the City's hiring goals, Cochrane passed this list to the chief's office, which then filled out an Authorization of Employment Form 14 (Form 14). Form 14, which was sent to the state HRD on May 5, 1997, contained the names of officers who had been selected for appointment. In addition to candidates who were on the HRD certification list, Form 14 included the names of eight former police cadets as well as two other officers whose employment applications were processed differently. Cochrane testified at deposition that in carrying out this process, he and his staff attempted to comply with the requirements of the Castro decree. To this end, he had spoken with HRD many, many times to try and clarify how we were to proceed. Cochrane testified that, in order to comply with what he understood as the requirements of the Castro decree, after he received the original list from HRD, he and his staff worked off of two separate listsone with the minority candidates in ranked order and the other with the non-minority candidates in ranked order. If a minority candidate was eliminated from consideration under the qualification procedures, Cochrane and his staff would proceed to considering the next minority candidate. Likewise, if a non-minority candidate was eliminated, Cochrane and his staff would proceed to considering the next non-minority candidate. Cochrane testified that his memory was that, at the end of the process, these two lists were combined in alternating orderone minority candidate followed by one non-minority candidate. That racially reordered list was then given to the chief's office, which filled out Form 14 accordingly. That Form 14 was placed into evidence. The Form 14 shows that the City did not hire on a one-for-one minority-to-non-minority basis. Rather, in the spring of 1997, the City hired about twice the number of white officers as minority officers, excluding police cadets. If cadets are counted, the City hired more than twice the number of white officers as minority officers. Contrary to Cochrane's memory, Form 14 was not in fact organized on a one-to-one minority-to-non-minority basis. The district court justifiably concluded that Cochrane's memory was simply incorrect. Sullivan, 555 F.Supp.2d at 253. Even discounting the eight cadets and the two other candidates who were treated separately, Form 14 contained twenty-one non-minority candidates and twelve minority candidates. The minority candidates are not in alternating order. Within each group, the candidates were in the same rank order as they were on the original HRD list. But some non-minority candidates, including the plaintiffs, appeared lower on Form 14, relative to some minority candidates, than they did on the original HRD list. As the district court noted, there is no evidence as to when (if ever) the City created one or more reordered one-for-one lists. And there is no evidence that the ordering on the list was based on race. The City assigned badge numbers according to the order on Form 14. It also simultaneously assigned seniority according to officers' badge numbers; the greater the officer's seniority, the lower the badge number. Thus, those who appeared lower on Form 14 were assigned less seniority than those who appeared higher on Form 14. Plaintiffs' seniority dates were assigned on this basis. Almost six years later, in early 2003, the City laid off approximately seventy-five police officers. It is undisputed that the layoff order was determined purely by senioritythat is, by badge number, and not by race. The City laid off the five plaintiffs over a two-week period beginning March 13, 2003. Later that year, and through the end of 2004, the City obtained more funding through grants and retirements, and was able to recall all of the laid-off police officers who wanted to return. As a result, plaintiffs were all recalled. It is undisputed that the recall order was also based on seniority, not race. Because both the layoffs and the recalls were conducted on the basis of seniority, officers with less seniority were laid off sooner and recalled later than those with more seniority. On January 11, 2005, plaintiffs brought their § 1983 suit, claiming that they were assigned higher badge numbers in 1997, and thus were given less seniority, on the basis of impermissible race-based determinations. That is, they argued that if the City had not racially reordered the HRD list as it was going through the various qualification procedures, they would have been hired with greater seniority, and thus would have been either not laid off at all in 2003, or would have been recalled more quickly than they were. As the district court viewed their claim, the plaintiffs were arguing that the failure to assign seniority based on the original, alternating HRD certification, ... instead [of] the Form 14, violated both the Castro decree and the Equal Protection Clause. Sullivan, 555 F.Supp.2d at 255. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the City's actions, they lost, among other things, back pay, overtime, details, and health insurance contributions. They sought compensatory damages, back pay, front pay, and compensation for lost overtime and details. Plaintiffs' claims of harm necessarily rest on their contention that the original assignment of seniority was discriminatory. They do not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the City's continuing obligations under the Castro decree, but argue that the City's actions were not within the scope of the decree. On November 3 and December 19, 2005, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On January 3, 2007, the district court denied both motions without prejudice, citing certain gaps in the record, but invited the parties to file substitute motions that resolved these gaps. Plaintiffs filed a new motion for summary judgment on May 14, 2007, which attempted to clarify the record. The City filed a cross motion for summary judgment on September 5, 2007. On March 28, 2008, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion and granted defendant's motion; the court issued a second memorandum on May 23, 2008 reiterating its conclusion and explaining its reasoning more fully. Sullivan, 555 F.Supp.2d at 246. The court noted that there was no material dispute of fact. Id. at 247. It found that plaintiffs had not established the causal connection between defendant's actions and their injuries because there appeared to be no racial reordering of Form 14. See id. at 253-54. Furthermore, the court held that even if this causal connection could be established, the City's actions were within the scope of the Castro decree. See id. at 258. Plaintiffs timely appealed.