Opinion ID: 1347679
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Preparation Theory for Penalty Phase

Text: The district court vacated Gardner's death sentence and granted him a new penalty hearing because defense counsel failed to provide Gardner's expert psychiatric witness sufficient time to examine Gardner prior to testifying at the penalty hearing. The court stated in its memorandum decision: Effective representation of the accused in a capital case remains that counsel challenged the State's aggravating evidence and present a cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation. Petitioner contends this was not done. Primarily, there was inadequate investigation relating to petitioner's mental health prior to trial. Whatever evidence was presented was inadequate  too little and too late. There is dispute regarding Dr. Peter Heinbecker's testimony. Was there sufficient time and sufficient medical or psychological evaluations for Dr. Heinbecker to adequately and completely testify on behalf of petitioner? The Court is of the opinion there was not. Dr. Heinbecker was contacted a mere 24 hours before he testified. During that time, he was only able to examine some of the record, interview Mr. Gardner for about one hour, and talk to his mother and brother for a total of 2.5 hours. Further, Dr. Heinbecker testified that, in a case of this significance, he would have expected more time to prepare his evaluation. The district court also observed that although defense counsel had arranged for psychiatrist Dr. Mark Rindflesh to evaluate Gardner in May 1985, counsel did not ask him to testify for Gardner. Gardner's attorneys also asked Dr. Agnes Plenk to evaluate Gardner and to testify for him, but she also declined. The court stated: No further effort was made to seek professional assistance for petitioner, nor seek state assistance in doing so. In addition, present counsel's efforts to secure expert testimony for petitioner's evaluation was opposed by the State and sustained by this Court. As a result, no satisfactory mental health evaluation of petitioner has ever been available to petitioner to present at any hearing. Petitioner contends the deprivation of adequate evaluations has prevented petitioner from presenting any evidence of possible organic brain damage or other mitigating information which further prevented presentation of a cohesive and understandable theory of mitigation. The Court agrees. The district court did not comment either on the testimony of Dr. Heinbecker at the penalty hearing or suggest any additional evidence that might have been presented had he had more time to prepare. The Court stated only that Dr. Heinbecker's preparation time was severely limited and that in the habeas proceeding, Dr. Heinbecker testified that in a case of this significance, he would have expected more time to prepare his evaluation. In fact, Dr. Heinbecker did not indicate that he might have produced any new evidence. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate first that counsel committed specific acts or omissions that fall outside the wide range of professionally competent counsel and, second, that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's error, the result would have been different. Gardner, 789 P.2d at 288; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). This requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064; see also Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. In a death penalty case, when an ineffectiveness claim is made on a petition for post-conviction relief with respect to the penalty hearing, the petitioner must be able to show some possibility that but for the error, the sentences would have imposed a life sentence rather than death. This standard is necessitated by the extremely sensitive nature of the issue before the sentencer and the inexact and somewhat subjective nature of the considerations that must guide the sentencer. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77-82 (Utah 1981); see also State v. Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359-61 (Utah 1994); State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless, it was Gardner's burden, in the habeas proceeding, to adduce what favorable evidence could have been presented in his behalf if Dr. Heinbecker had been given more time to prepare. At the penalty hearing, Dr. Heinbecker presented evidence that Gardner suffered from organic brain damage and that, coupled with other mitigating circumstances, explained Gardner's antisocial behavior. Prior to the penalty hearing, Dr. Heinbecker interviewed Gardner for one hour, Gardner's mother for one hour, and Gardner's brother for one and a half hours. Dr. Heinbecker did not administer any psychological tests to Gardner, but he reviewed a number of psychological and medical records relating to Gardner's mental status from the Utah State Hospital and other institutions, beginning when Gardner was about two years old through 1980. A psychiatric report completed after the courthouse shooting in 1985 was also available to Dr. Heinbecker. Based on his own interviews and the psychological records he reviewed, Dr. Heinbecker testified that Gardner suffered from organic brain damage. Gardner had contracted meningitis at the age of four and had sniffed glue and gasoline from age nine until after age thirteen. Both meningitis and glue sniffing can cause brain damage. Psychological tests performed on Gardner at the Utah State Hospital in 1972, according to Dr. Heinbecker, suggested the possibility of some brain damage. Although Gardner's overall I.Q. was 88, which falls in the dull-normal range, he had comparatively high scores on parts of the test and low scores on other parts, which suggested a degree of organic brain damage. The test was administered by an evaluator from the Utah State Hospital, who concluded that his practical reasoning ability is in the average or above average range; whereas, his impaired ability to deal with and reproduce written symbols seriously hinders his chance to profit from the usual academic learning situation. In addition, Dr. Heinbecker explained Gardner's behavior in terms of three other facts. Dr. Heinbecker testified that Gardner grew up in an unstable and impoverished environment. Indeed, Gardner had been institutionalized for most of his life, beginning at age eight and continuing into adulthood, with the result that Gardner absorbed the moral values of others involved in antisocial criminal conduct. Dr. Heinbecker also testified that Gardner suffered from an antisocial personality disorder that might be explained genetically. Gardner's grandfather, brother, sister, nephew, three cousins, and two half-siblings had all been involved in juvenile court proceedings and/or spent time in prison. Finally, Dr. Heinbecker suggested that Gardner's problems stemmed from parental neglect and inadequate parenting. On cross-examination in the penalty hearing, the prosecutor did not challenge Dr. Heinbecker's opinions with respect to Gardner's institutional and family background or the personality disorder but confined his questions to the statements that Gardner suffered from organic brain damage. On redirect examination, defense counsel elicited the following information: Q. You indicated that the only way that you can find organic brain damage is to test. What test was that? A. Well, the Bender-Gestalt is one of the tests. There are a number of tests that could be used to learn about organic damage, and the Bender-Gestalt is certainly not the best one, but it is the only one that I could find that was used in these tests. The prosecution presented a psychological evaluation made by Dr. John Gill, a clinical psychologist, who stated, based at least in part on the results of a Bender-Gestalt test, that his findings are not indicative of blatant organic impairment. Dr. Heinbecker had not previously seen a copy of the report but testified, What this suggests to me is that he may have had some questions about it. Defense counsel then asked Dr. Heinbecker what Dr. Gill's statement meant, to which he replied, Well, you know, when he says it is not indicative of blatant organic impairment, it sounds to me like he is hedging his bets on whether there is organic impairment or not. In other words, he is saying, to me, more sophisticated testing ought to be done. In the evidentiary hearing in the Rule 65B proceeding, Gardner was given an opportunity to demonstrate exactly how the short preparation time given Dr. Heinbecker impaired his ability to present evidence favorable to Gardner. Dr. Heinbecker was asked if the four hours he spent interviewing Gardner and his family were enough for him to make a complete diagnosis. Dr. Heinbecker stated only that he would have expected to have more time in a case of this magnitude. He did not indicate that any more information could have been developed that would have favored Gardner if he had had more time to prepare. He did not testify that had he administered tests such as the Bender-Gestalt, the Halstead-Rectar, or the Lowery Nebraska, how such additional information would have affected any aspect of Dr. Heinbecker's assessment of Gardner's relevant judgment, reasoning, or behavior, even if they specified more precisely the degree of brain damage. Dr. Heinbecker stated only that it would have been helpful in formulating his diagnosis if Gardner had performed a psychological pen and paper test. Gardner's attorney then, by a leading question, suggested that if there had been more time, there are many things that you would have done that would have helped you in diagnosis. Dr. Heinbecker merely responded that he would have liked to have planned the evaluation more carefully. He proved no prospect of any other information of mitigating evidence. In light of Dr. Heinbecker's testimony, both at the penalty hearing and at the evidentiary hearing below, we do not believe that Gardner was prejudiced by the initial trial court's failure to give Dr. Heinbecker more time or by defense counsels' failure to provide more time to Dr. Heinbecker to prepare. In short, the district court erred in determining that Gardner was denied the effective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase.