Opinion ID: 2547611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: joinder of the williams murder with the sawyers and cherry murders and other crimes arising from the sheckles burglary was improper

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by consolidating the indictment containing the Sawyers and Cherry murder charges with the indictment containing the Williams murder charge. Appellant objected to the joinder of the two indictments for trial and moved unsuccessfully to sever the Williams murder trial from the other charges. He now argues that the trial court erred to his prejudice by consolidating all of the charges into a single trial. He specifically argues that the Williams murder was not connected to the other crimes as part of a common scheme or plan, and that the Williams murder was not of the same or similar character of the other crimes charged. We agree, and because we further find the improper joinder of charges was prejudicial to Appellant, we reverse the judgment and remand for new, and separate, trials. The interaction of RCr 9.12 and RCr 6.18 allows the charges brought in separate indictments to be joined for trial only when the offenses are of the same or similar character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. [2] When the conditions set forth in RCr 6.18 and RCr 9.12 are present, the trial judge has broad discretion to allow the joinder of offenses charged in separate indictments. Brown v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Ky.1970). We review such decisions for abuse of discretion. Violett v. Commonwealth, 907 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky.1995). Nevertheless, to be reversible, an erroneous joinder of offenses must be accompanied by a showing of prejudice to the defendant. Rearick v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Ky.1993). This showing of prejudice cannot be based on mere speculation, but must be supported by the record. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Ky.2000). Here, no serious contention was made that the Williams murder was connected to the other crimes as part of the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. That rationale for joinder under RCr 9.12/RCr 6.18 has no application here. The Commonwealth instead contends that joinder was proper because the Williams murder was of the same or similar character as the Cherry-Sawyers murders. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that murder is murder and, therefore, any charge of murder may be properly joined with any other charge of murder. We reject that oversimplification of RCr 6.18. Offenses are not of the same or similar character under RCr 6.18 simply because they involve conduct criminalized under the same chapter or section of the penal code. And even if we agreed with that point, the Commonwealth shows no authority for the joinder of the Williams murder charge with the totally dissimilar and unrelated crimes of burglary, retaliation against a witness, and unlawful imprisonment. The Commonwealth supplements its argument with the fact that all of the alleged crimes occurred close in time to each other and in Jefferson County. While temporal and geographic proximity will often be relevant considerations when the question is whether the acts or transactions [are] connected together or constitut[e] parts of a common scheme or plan, those factors often have little to do with whether the offenses are of the same or similar character. Upon consideration of the question on a previous occasion, we held that a significant factor in identifying prejudice from joining offenses for a single trial is the extent to which evidence of one offense would be inadmissible in the trial of the other offense. Rearick, 858 S.W.2d at 187 (citing Spencer v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Ky.1977)). [3] Rearick holds, for example, that for sexual offenses to qualify for joinder as offenses of the same or similar character, the crimes must be so strikingly similar as to meet the requirements for admission under KRE 404(b) as set out in Billings v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890 (Ky.1992), and Gray v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 895 (Ky.1992). The Commonwealth claims that test was met here because the Cherry and Sawyers murders would be admissible in the sentencing phase of a trial for the Williams murder. That answer is unpersuasive. First, we note that KRS 532.055(2)(a)(2) allows evidence in the sentencing phase of prior offenses for which [a defendant] was convicted. If Appellant was being tried only upon the Williams murder, the Sawyers and Cherry murders would not be admissible at the sentencing phase because he had obviously not yet been convicted of those murders. Furthermore, during the sentencing phase, guilt has already been fairly determined and the danger that evidence of other crimes will cause undue prejudice has largely passed. Indeed, at the sentencing phase we permit the jury to hear evidence of virtually any other criminal conviction on the defendant's record, regardless of its similarity or lack thereof. Under the Rearick analysis, we see no basis upon which evidence of the Cherry and Sawyers murders could have been introduced in the prosecution of Appellant for the Williams murder; neither do we see how evidence of the Williams murder could have been admitted in Appellant's trial for killing Cherry and Sawyers. The Commonwealth further argues that joinder of the Williams murder charges with the other murders was proper because this was a capital case in which each murder would necessarily serve as an aggravating factor under KRS 532.025(3) for imposition of the death penalty (or life without possibility of parole) for the other murders. We are aware of no authority and we are cited to none that supports the view that unrelated capital offenses may be joined for trial notwithstanding their failure to meet the requirements of RCr 6.18 and RCr 9.12. The consequence of such a rule would be that a defendant facing the death penalty would have less protection from the prejudicial effects of other crimes evidence than a non-capital defendant. We reject that argument. Finally, we address the Commonwealth's reliance upon Parker v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 647 (Ky.2009) as authority supporting the consolidation of the charges for trial. In Parker, the defendant was charged with multiple offenses including criminal syndication. Under RCr 6.18, joinder becomes an easy fit for the various crimes allegedly committed in the furtherance of a criminal syndicate because, as we said in Parker, the criminal syndication charge serves to link the other charges together. Id. at 657. They are acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Appellant's crimes were not charged as elements of a criminal syndicate, and as noted above, no argument was made that Appellant's crimes were linked together as parts of a common scheme or plan. Parker does not serve as authority for the joinder of the Williams murder with the other crimes. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it joined the Williams murder trial with the unrelated charges arising from the Sheckles burglary, including the Cherry and Sawyers murders. We next consider whether that error was prejudicial to Appellant. Whatever chance Appellant might have had to present a defense to the Williams murder was substantially impaired by the unrelated evidence that he had also killed both Cherry and Sawyer, unlawfully invaded Sheckles's home and held her in unlawful imprisonment. We said in Rearick that joinder of offenses with no more than a general similarity in character created a substantial likelihood that the inadmissible `other crimes' evidence tainted the jury's belief as to each of the crimes charged and that each additional unrelated charge took on a weight by virtue of being joined with the others whereby the whole exceeded the sum of its parts. Rearick, 858 S.W.2d at 188. Because of this prejudice, we reverse Appellant's convictions and remand this matter to the Jefferson Circuit Court for new trials consistent with this opinion.