Opinion ID: 440214
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adequacy of the Process Provided

Text: 12 Against the backdrop of this precedent, it is clear that the district court was wholly justified in finding that Pierce County had afforded appellant Campbell the process necessary to redress any injury to her liberty interest.
13 The identification of appellant's claim as the deprivation of a liberty interest is dispositive of appellant's contention that she was entitled to a pre-termination hearing. The only process required in this case is the kind of name-clearing hearing described in Codd v. Velger and In Re Selcraig, supra; and such a hearing is not required to be held prior to termination. 2 Indeed, as the court in Selcraig observed, the factual predicate for a claim of reputational damage is the publication of adverse material which, in this case, did not occur until after appellant's termination. In Re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 797 (5th Cir.1983).
14 In cases involving only liberty interests, the courts have required only that the claimant be accorded notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however informal. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 n. 17, 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1564 n. 17, 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978); White v. Thomas, supra; Endicott v. Huddleston, supra. In light of such flexibility, the district court was correct to reject appellant's claim that the hearing provided by appellees was constitutionally inadequate. With respect to adequacy of notice, appellant had the full period between her termination and the January 21, 1982, hearing to familiarize herself with the charges that had been made against her; moreover, the record of the hearing shows that she had, and availed herself of, opportunity to hear and cross-examine all adverse witnesses and to attempt to rebut their claims of insubordination and mishandling of funds. As to appellant's charge that the composition of the tribunal rendered impartiality impossible, we agree with the district court that the nature of the hearing resolves this question. Because the purpose of the hearing was not to re-evaluate appellant's termination but to allow her to clear her name, the fact that the tribunal was composed of members of the Board of Commissioners did not impair its ability to preside in an acceptably impartial manner. 3
15 In her claim for damages, appellant cites a number of cases in which courts have awarded damages in connection with the deprivation of a liberty interest. Yet these cases, in which the claimant was denied any procedural opportunity to clear his name, Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); White v. Thomas, supra; Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, supra, or in which a substantial amount of time elapsed between the claimant's termination and the name-clearing hearing, Endicott v. Huddleston, supra (hearing not granted until almost three years after termination), are wholly distinguishable from the instant case. 4 Because appellant was provided with a constitutionally adequate opportunity to clear her name only 14 days after her dismissal, she cannot prevail on her claim for damages under Section 1983. 16 AFFIRMED.