Opinion ID: 2015103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reopening Suppression Hearing

Text: Defendant moved the trial court to reconsider its denial of his motion to suppress, and to order a psychiatric examination to determine whether he was especially vulnerable to psychological coercion. On April 20, 1993, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, at which Bridges and Charles Mickins testified in offers of proof. At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in: (a) refusing to reopen the suppression hearing or reconsider its determination that his statement was voluntary; and (b) refusing his request for a psychiatric examination. The general rule is that collateral estoppel bars a rehearing on a motion to suppress in the same proceeding. People v. Holland, 56 Ill.2d 318, 321, 307 N.E.2d 380 (1974) (citing People v. Armstrong, 56 Ill.2d 159, 306 N.E.2d 14 (1973), and People v. Hopkins, 52 Ill.2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283 (1972)). The only exception to the bar is where the defendant shows exceptional circumstances or any evidence in addition to that submitted upon the first hearing which had become available for submission in connection with the motion to suppress. Holland, 56 Ill.2d at 321, 307 N.E.2d 380. Defendant argues that his proffered evidence and his request for a psychiatric examination was evidence in addition to that submitted upon the first hearing. Defendant argues that Holland 's exception to the collateral estoppel bar requires only additional evidence and not newly discovered evidence. Thus, according to defendant, the trial court should have granted the rehearing. This argument lacks merit. Holland plainly describes the evidence necessary to escape the collateral estoppel bar as additional evidence which had become available for submission. It necessarily follows that such evidence was not available at the first suppression hearing, i.e., newly discovered evidence. The appellate court has so interpreted Holland. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 100 Ill.App.3d 707, 709, 56 Ill.Dec. 278, 427 N.E.2d 358 (1981) (collecting cases). In the present case, none of defendant's proffered evidence was newly discovered since the suppression hearing. Similarly, defendant could have requested a psychiatric examination when he filed his original suppression motion. We cannot say that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to reconsider its denial of defendant's motion to suppress.