Opinion ID: 853879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Excusing a Juror for Cause

Text: Byers first contends that the trial court erred when it excused the only African-American prospective juror for cause. During voir dire, the juror stated that he had been previously represented by Byers' trial counsel in a criminal case in which he pleaded guilty to trespass. He felt that he was treated unfairly in that case by the police, agreed that serving as a juror in the case might present a problem, and stated that if he were the defendant having someone in his position serve as a juror would probably be a plus on my side. Trial courts have the inherent discretion to excuse prospective jurors and abuse that discretion only when it is exercised in an illogical or arbitrary manner. Owens v. State, 659 N.E.2d 466, 476 (Ind. 1995) (citing Campbell v. State, 547 N.E.2d 843, 844 (Ind.1989)). This Court has previously held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing a prospective juror for cause solely because one of the attorneys for a party had recently drawn wills for the prospective juror and her husband. Lamar v. State, 266 Ind. 689, 696, 366 N.E.2d 652, 656 (1977). In this case, the attorney-client relationship is at least as problematic because of the closer similarity between this proceeding and the one in which defense counsel had represented the juror. Moreover, the excused juror also indicated that he had not been treated fairly by the police and that his service would probably be a plus for Byers, both suggesting an inability to be impartial beyond extending Byers his constitutional presumption of innocence. See IND. CODE § 35-37-1-5(a)(11) (1998) (listing [t]hat the person is biased or prejudiced for or against the defendant as one of fifteen good causes for challenge to any person called as a juror in any criminal trial). [1] Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excusing the juror.