Opinion ID: 744246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The purpose of Schiller's suspension

Text: 10 The Air Force suspended Schiller's military driving privileges pursuant to AFR 125-14, which reads: 11 The objectives of motor vehicle traffic supervision are to assure-- 12 (a) Safe and efficient movement of personnel and vehicles. 13 (b) Reduction of traffic deaths, injuries, and property damage from traffic accidents.... 14 (c) Integration of installation safety, engineering, legal, medical, and law enforcement resources into the installation traffic planning process. 15 (d) Removal of intoxicated drivers from installation roadways followed by the expeditious application of appropriate sanctions. 16 AFR 125-14(1-5) (adopting 32 C.F.R. § 634.5 (1995)). Schiller argues that under subsection (d), the suspension of her military driving privileges is labelled a sanction, which connotes a punitive purpose. 17 Schiller's argument has some merit. Subsection (d) distinguishes between the [r]emoval of intoxicated drivers and the appropriate sanctions that follow removal. In Schiller's case, removal occurred on July 22, 1995, when she was first pulled off the road by the military police at Travis. The sanction that followed was the one-year suspension of Schiller's military driving privileges. Subsection (d)'s use of the term sanction-which connotes a punitive purpose-suggests that Schiller's suspension was intended as punishment. 18 On the other hand, the label attached to a given measure is not dispositive of its purpose. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) ([T]he labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance.... To that end, the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.). As the Fourth Circuit concluded in Imngren, the sum of the regulations involved in Schiller's case indicates that the Air Force's traffic supervision program is intended to serve safety-related, civil and remedial purposes: promoting safety and efficiency, reducing accidents, integrating safety and traffic planning, and keeping drunk drivers off military roadways. Imngren, 98 F.3d at 815. Therefore, the AFR's statement of objectives suggests that the overriding purpose of a drunk driving suspension imposed under these regulations is safety, not punishment. 19 Moreover, the memorandum from the Travis base commander in this case reinforces the conclusion that Schiller's suspension was intended to be civil, not criminal. The memorandum states: Any determinations made at the hearing [to challenge the suspension] are without prejudice to your rights or the rights of the government in subsequent criminal or administrative proceedings involving the same or a related incident. All hearing determinations will be based on the preponderance of the evidence presented. The wording of the memorandum shows that the Air Force did not intend the suspension proceedings to be conducted like criminal proceedings or to take the place of criminal proceedings. 20 Taken as a whole, the Air Force regulations and the Travis base commander's memorandum indicate that the suspension of Schiller's military driving privileges was intended to achieve safety-related, civil and remedial purposes. Therefore, the first factor supports a conclusion that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar Schiller's subsequent criminal prosecution. 21