Opinion ID: 3011720
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Involvement of the Company's Attorney.

Text: The Union also contends that the Company violated S 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), by providing Quick with counsel in an effort to invalidate a union security provision legally recognized by past practice between the parties in a collective bargaining relationship. Union's Br. as Respondent in Application for Enforcement (No. 00-3032), at 27. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfer e with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in S 7 of the Act. The Union appears to be ar guing that the Company wanted to invalidate the union security clause and therefore instigated Quick's r esignation and refusal to pay dues then supplied him with an attorney, Semler, to fight against the Union's efforts to collect.18 The Union further alleges that Semler obtained the law fir m of Rosenn, Jenkins and Greenwald, to represent Quick. Finally, the Union claims that Semler prepared the unfair labor practice charge that Quick filed with the NLRB. The Union believes that all of this Company-provided legal advice has been directed at terminating Mr. Quick's obligation to the Union and invalidating the union security clause fr eely agreed upon between the Union and [the Company]. Id. at 30. However, the Union's attack upon the Company and its involvement with Quick is beyond the scope of our r eview. Although the Union did file a charge alleging that the Company committed an unfair labor practice by pr oviding Quick with counsel, the General Counsel refused to issue a complaint on that charge. The General Counsel's exercise of discretion in refusing to issue a complaint is not subject to judicial review. NLRB v. Food & Commer cial Workers Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 122-23 (1987). Accordingly, we could only consider an allegation of the Company's unlawful _________________________________________________________________ 18. Steven R. Semler was the Company's lawyer and he helped Quick draft a response to the Union's notice that Quick was in arrears for past financial core obligations. Semler also filed the notice of removal when the Union sued Quick in state court. 27 conduct if that conduct arguably constituted a defense to the charge against the Union. See Chicago Tribune Co., 304 NLRB 259, 260 (1991). The NLRB found that the Company's conduct was not a defense to the Union's unlawful conduct. See NLRB's Decision and Or der at 4. Moreover, the Board affir med the ALJ's conclusion that there is no credible evidence to support[the Union's] assertion that [the Company], through Quick, attempted to invalidate the union-security provision. . . . The record clearly shows that Quick's desire to resign from membership preceded any assistance from the [Company] and was not caused by such assistance That finding is supported by the record. Quick first indicated his intention to resign from the Union in August of 1996, and the NLRB found that his resignation was effective as of March, 1997. Quick received no legal assistance from the Company's attorney until July of 1997. In its Decision and Order, the Boar d ordered the Union to reimburse Quick for any personal expenses he actually incurred in defending against the Union's lawsuit to collect his alleged arrearages after it concluded that the Union had engaged in unfair labor practices. Board's Decision and Order, at 1 n.2. However, Quick testified at the Board hearing that he did not incur any such expenses in defending against the Union's lawsuit. App. at 168-69. Moreover, both Semler and the Foundation agreed to represent him free of charge. 19 Nonetheless, Quick filed a petition for review in which he alleges that the NLRB erred by not awarding attorney's fees and costs to the Foundation for representing him in the Union's suit to collect $63.18 in arrearages. Section 10(f) of the NLRA provides in r elevant part: Any person aggrieved by a final order of the NLRB granting or denying in whole or in part the r elief _________________________________________________________________ 19. Semler waived any claim for his fees and costs. The Foundation admits that it has no fee arrangement with Quick and that it represented him for free. It also admits that Quick has not incurred any expenses in his defense of the Union's' lawsuit. Foundation's Br . on Behalf of Quick on Petition for Review (No. 99-4043), at 11 n.2. 28 sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person r esides or transacts business. Although S 10(f) does not define aggrieved, courts have held that one must suffer an adverse ef fect in fact, to be aggrieved under the NLRA. Retail Clerks Union 1059 v. NLRB, 348 F.2d 369, 370 (D.C. Cir . 1965). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972) (persons are aggrieved within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 702, only if the agency action causes them injury in fact.). 29 U.S.C.S 160(f). Not surprisingly, because Quick admitted that he incurr ed no personal expenses in defending the Union's lawsuit and because the Board's order assures him full reimbursement for any such expenses in any event, the Boar d argues that Quick has no standing to seek review of thefinal order denying fees because he is not aggrieved within the meaning of S 10(f) of the NLRA. We agr ee. Since Quick incurred no personal expenses in defending against the Union's lawsuit and since the Foundation volunteered to represent him at no charge, we are hardpressed to understand how Quick can now maintain that he suffered an adverse effect in fact by the NLRB's refusal to order the Union to pay him for legal expenses he never incurred and for which he has no personal liability. The NLRB expressly ordered the Union to r eimburse Quick for any expenses he did incur in defending himself against the Union's lawsuit, and he is therefore assur ed full reimbursement for whatever personal obligations he may have incurred. Accordingly, the NLRB's or der precludes Quick from suffering any injury in fact. Therefore, we conclude that Quick is not an aggrieved person under S 10(f) of the Act, and has no standing to seek review of the NLRB's order denying his request for attor ney's fees. We realize that at least one court has concluded that although S 10(f) requires an adverse effect in fact, it does not require an injury cognizable at law or equity. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 694 F.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C. Cir . 1982) (citation 29 omitted). Under that view, [a]s long as a charging party20 gets less than he requested, he is treated as a person aggrieved under section 10(f). Id. (citation omitted). However, we do not take this to mean that a charging party can request relief that is not authorized by the NLRA, and then seek compensation as an aggrieved party merely because he/she was denied some recovery the law did not allow in the first place. Common sense dictates that a party seeking relief under the NLRA must be denied something that is authorized by an applicable law befor e such person can be considered aggrieved under the Act, and Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers is not to the contrary. There, two unions attempted to discover the ingredients in certain products manufactured by Bor den Chemical Company and Colgate Palmolive that the unions maintained were harmful to the health and safety of employees. The companies refused to disclose that information, and the unions filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB in two separate pr oceedings. The two administrative law judges hearing the charges agreed that both Colgate and Borden had engaged in unfair labor practices in refusing to divulge the requested information. As a result, both companies were or dered to furnish a complete list of raw materials and chemicals stor ed, handled, or processed at the plants in question. However, the orders specifically excepted any infor mation that was propriety or a trade secret. The ALJs or dered the unions and companies to enter into good faith bargaining to resolve the disclosure of any materials that the companies claimed were excluded from disclosure, and the unions appealed the decision the to NLRB. The NLRB sustained the orders of disclosur e and agreed that the requested information related to the health and safety of employees and therefore r elated to the terms and _________________________________________________________________ 20. A charging party is the person bringing an unfair labor practice charge before the Board. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-418, AFL-CIO, 694 F.2d at 1295 n.10. The person or entity alleged to have committed the unfair labor practice is thecharged party. Id. Obviously, Quick is the charging party her e and the Union is the charged party. 30 conditions of employment. Id. at 1293. The Board therefore agreed that the union was entitled to all of the requested information, but declined to order the r elease of proprietary information or trade secrets because of the need to balance the union's need for such information against the legitimate and substantial confidentiality interests of the employer. Id. (quoting Detr oit Edison Company v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). However, the Boar d declined to undertake that balancing test itself, and or dered the parties to resolve it through bargaining. Both companies and the unions filed petitions of review with the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The companies moved to dismiss the unions' petitions arguing that the unions lacked standing under S 10(f). The companies insisted that the unions were not aggrieved because they had obtained virtually all the relief they sought.21 The companies reasoned that the Board's decision afforded the unions disclosure of nearly everything they sought. The court of appeals disagr eed, and held that the unions were aggrieved within the meaning of S 10(f) because the Board's order pr ecluded them from getting some information relating to the working conditions of union members even though the unions had won the right to get the vast majority of the information they sought. It was in that context that the court held that the charging party is aggrieved [as long as it] gets less than [it] requested. . .  Id. at 1294. However, the law clearly entitled those unions to the relief they were seeking, and the issue of their standing under S 10(f) turned on whether the Board's order actually gave them all they were entitled to under the law. Under the reasoning of Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers, Quick's status as an aggrieved party under the NLRB's order turns on whether the NLRB has the authority to award attorney's fees to a charging party who was forced to defend himself in an unlawful lawsuit filed by a union, but who incurred neither expense nor liability in defending against the suit. That is an entirely dif ferent question than the one posed by the inquiry into the unions' status in Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers. If the Boar d has the power to _________________________________________________________________ 21. Both sides agreed that 99.5% of the companies' ingredients and materials were not protected under the Board's order. 31 award attorney's fees here, Quick is arguably aggrieved under S 10(f); if it does not, he clearly is not aggrieved and therefore lacks standing.22 It is readily apparent that S 10(c) is the only provision of the NLRA which could possibly support Quick's r equest for an award of attorney's fees here. It provides in relevant part as follows: If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the NLRB shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the NLRB shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of [the Act]. 29 U.S.C. S 160(c)(emphasis added). Section 10(c) vest[s] in the NLRB the primary responsibility and br oad discretion to devise remedies that effectuate the policies of the Act, subject only to limited judicial review. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. _________________________________________________________________ 22. Quick's petition for review is not aimed at recovering attorney's fees and costs for representation in the NLRB proceedings. In fact, Quick could not request attorney's fees for r epresentation in the NLRB proceedings because the General Counsel pr osecutes the case in NLRB proceedings, the charging party's participation in the litigation is strictly voluntary. The union, employee, or employer filing a charge with the Board need not play any role in the pr oceedings beyond serving the respondent with a copy of the charge. Although the charging party may, if the General Counsel issues a complaint, participate in the hearing, nothing in the Act or in the Board's r egulations requires it to do so. If the General Counsel calls the char ging party as a witness, . . . then the General Counsel must pay the witness a fee for his time. In short, a charging party need not incur any litigation expense. Of course, the charging party may (and often does) intervene in the proceedings before the Board, but it does so as a volunteer, not a party haled into litigation willy-nilly. Unbelievable, Inc. v. NLRB, 118 F.3d 795, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1997)(citations omitted). 32 NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898-99 (1984). Judicial r eview of the NLRB's remedial orders is limited [b]ecause the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941). Therefore, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narr ow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy. Id. In devising remedies to undue the effects of unfair labor practices, the NLRB draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own, NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 613 n.32 (1969), and on its enlightenment gained by experience. Fibre Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964)(citation omitted). Consequently, courts of appeals should not substitute their judgment for that of the NLRB in determining how best to undue the effects of unfair labor practices. Sure-T an, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. at 899. The NLRB's choice of a remedy must be given special respect by reviewing courts, NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 613 n.32, and must not be disturbedunless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act. Fibre Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at 216 (citation omitted). It is not clear to us whether Quick is claiming that the Board abused its discretion in denying his request for attorney's fees or whether he is arguing that the NLRA requires that the Board order an award of attorney's fees. However, we do not find any support for the latter position in the text of the Act, or in case law interpr eting it. To the extent that Quick is arguing that the NLRB abused its discretion by not awarding him attor ney's fees, we disagree. In fact, we believe that the NLRB's remedial or der here was eminently reasonable. The NLRA confers rights only on employees, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992), and its purpose is the protection of employees and the r edress of their grievances . . . after the employees have been made whole. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 11 (1940). Accordingly, it has long been recognized that the NLRB's power to command affirmative action is r emedial, not 33 punitive. Id. at 12. However, the NLRB's remedial power under S 10 is merely incidental to the primary purpose of Congress to stop and prevent unfair labor practices. Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344, 352 (1983)(citation omitted). The Supreme Court reminds us[t]he NLRB is not a court; it is not even a labor court; it is an administrative agency charged by Congress with the enfor cement and administration of the federal labor laws. Id. at 351. Requests for complete relief  that might find a receptive ear in a court of general jurisdiction will often fall on deaf ears before the NLRB, because there ar e wide differences between administrative agencies and courts. 23 Id. There is nothing in the language or structure of the Act that requires the NLRB to reflexively or der that which a complaining party may regard as `complete relief ' for every unfair labor practice . . . Id. at 352 (citation omitted). Here, the Board found that the Union violated S 8(b)(1)(A). It then ordered the Union to r eimburse [Quick] only for the personal expenses he actually incurred in defending against the lawsuit filed by the [Union], pursuant to the discretion vested in it under S 10(c). Board's Decision and Order, at 1 n.2. The Board's order was the kind of r eimbursement order typically used to `make whole' employees for violations of the Act. Teamsters Local 36, 249 NLRB 386 n.2, affirmed sub nom., Shepar d v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344 (1983). Quick has clearly been made whole. Moreover, the remedial order here is consistent with prior NLRB practice. In a recent case involving the Foundation's attempt to recover attorney's fees under circumstances analogous to the case at bar, the Boar d stated: We note that it is not the individual Char ging Parties who seek reimbursement for such expenses, since it is undisputed that they incurred none. Rather it is the Charging Parties' attorney, employed by the National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, who seeks reimbursement for expenses and legal services which were provided under a no fee arrangement with the Charging Parties. The _________________________________________________________________ 23. See e.g., Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 141-44 (1940). 34 Foundation contends that [j]ust as in the context of litigation under 42 U.S.C. S 1988, the identity of the attorney or the fact that the litigant did not personally incur legal expenses - because those expenses wer e paid by a charitable organization - cannot be determinative of its entitlement to an award of attorney's fees. We disagree. The National Labor Relations Act, which is essentially remedial, authorizes the NLRB to provide relief for actual losses of parties to our pr oceedings or those found to be victims of unfair labor practices. It is not aimed at compensating attorneys. By contrast, the attorney fee provision in 42 U.S.C. S 1988, specifically authorizes Federal courts to award attor ney's fees to prevailing parties in certain civil rights actions brought in Federal court. Although 42 U.S.C. S 1988 has been construed, consistent with congressional intent to encourage the availability of competent counsel for plaintiffs in private civil rights suits, to allow entities like the Foundation to recover attorney fees in such suits regardless whether the plaintif fs themselves incurred those fees (see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)), it does not apply to proceedings under the NLRA. Accordingly, the judge did not err in failing to provide for such recovery. United Food and Commercial Workers Locals 951, 7 and 1036 (Meijer, Inc.), 329 NLRB No. 69, 1999 WL 818607 at -15 (NLRB Sept. 30, 1999). The NLRB relied upon United Food and Commercial Workers in denying Quick's request for attorney's fees. Nonetheless, Quick contends that by denying his r equest for attorney's fees for volunteered legal services the NLRB somehow ignored the Court's decision in Bill Johnson's Restaurants. There, the Court held that where the NLRB finds that an employer has an illegal objective infiling a lawsuit against employees, the NLRB, as a remedial measure, may order the employer to reimburse the employees whom [the employer] had wrongfully sued for their attorney's fees and other expenses . . .[and] may also order any other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act. Id. at 747 (emphasis added). Although 35 Bill Johnson's Restaurant involved an employer's suit against its employees, the underlying principles ar e equally applicable when a union files an unlawful lawsuit against an employee. Nevertheless, Quick's reliance on Bill Johnson's Restaurant, is completely misplaced. In fact, the Court's brief mention of available remedies ther e fully supports the Board's decision to deny Quick's request for attorney's fees here. The Court used the permissive may, not the mandatory shall, and thereby indicated that the Board has the discretion to award attorney's fees in an appropriate case. Since no attorney's fees were incurred here, this is not an appropriate case. Mor eover, in Bill Johnson's Restaurant the Court said that the Board may reimburse such fees. Reimburse means to pay back to someone. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 993 (1990). Quick's argument requires us to ignore that wording or redefine reimburse.24 We are neitherwilling, nor able to do that. The NLRA, unlike federal statutes expressly authorizing an award of attorney's fees,25 does not contain a provision for the award of attorney's fees to pr evailing parties. In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 262 (1975), the Court ruled that the cir cumstances under which attorney's fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to determine. Section S 10(c) of the Act does not expressly provide for the payment of attorney's fees. We need not now decide whether any _________________________________________________________________ 24.  `When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, `it means just what I choose it to mean-- neither more nor less.' `The question is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so many different things.' `The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to be master -- that's all.'  LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (1865). 25. See, e. g., the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. S 1988(b), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. S 12205. 36 circumstances could ever exist that would justify an award of attorney's fees under S 10. However , absent clear support for an award of attorney's fees, either in the language or the legislative history of the statute, we cannot infer congressional intent to override the historic presumption against an award of attor ney's fees in the circumstances here. Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 726 (1982). Quick relies on two cases in which the Foundation was awarded counsel fees for representing employees in actions against their unions even though the Foundation represented the employees free of charge. However, those cases involved public sector employees' lawsuits alleging constitutional violations against public sector unions and were, therefore, actions under 42 U.S.C. S 1983.26 The attorney's fee awards in those cases wer e therefore pursuant to fee-shifting provisions of S 1988, under which attorney's fees can be awarded even though the prevailing plaintiffs are represented fr ee of charge by nonprofit legal aid organizations. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). Accordingly, S 10(c) of the Act was not implicated in either case. For all of the above reasons, we find that Quick does not have standing to request attorney's fees from the Board under the NLRA, and that the requested awar d of fees is beyond the statutory powers of the NLRB under the circumstances here.