Opinion ID: 1059170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to perform

Text: Holsapple argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that poor quality workmanship can mean a failure to perform within the meaning of the construction fraud statute. He says that the central issue in this phase of his appeal is the meaning of the word fail in the statute requiring the Commonwealth to prove that he did fail or refuse to perform such promise. He maintains that by construing the phrase fail to perform to include some but not all cases of faulty workmanship, the Court of Appeals has rendered the statute impermissibly vague. [3] Holsapple points out that Code § 18.2-200.1 uses the term fail in conjunction with the term refuse, and he says that the use of the latter term is clearly appropriate because such a refusal would provide direct evidence of the defendant's specific intent to commit larceny. He then says that [i]n this context, the word `fail' should be limited to those cases where such a direct admission of intent is not forthcoming from the defendant but other facts and circumstances indicate a specific intent to keep the advance of money and not complete the work. We disagree with Holsapple that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Code § 18.2-200.1 rendered the statute impermissibly vague. Quoting Rader v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 325, 332, 423 S.E.2d 207, 212 (1992), a case involving the very statute in issue here, the court made this statement: It is apparent from reason and common sense that construction fraud can occur despite the fact that a builder or contractor begins to perform on the contract ... The relevant question is whether a builder or contractor obtained an advance based upon future work promised with a fraudulent intent not to perform or to perform only partially, not whether the contractor had performed work for which he was paid.  Holsapple, 39 Va.App. at 537, 574 S.E.2d at 763. Continuing, the Court of Appeals said: Common sense would likewise dictate that a performance of construction which is so poor as to render a structure unsafe or uninhabitable could, under the appropriate circumstances, constitute the failure to perform the contractual promise at issue. Here, the evidence demonstrated that the truss work was done so poorly that the home was simply not safe to live in. Accordingly, while we do not hold that poor workmanship per se constitutes a failure to perform the contractual promise, on these facts we find no error in the trial court's determination that the faulty workmanship in this case constituted a failure to perform within the meaning of the statute. Id. Citing Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 Va. App. 150, 153, 462 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1995), Holsapple notes that [a] penal statute when measured by common understanding and practices must define the proscribed conduct with sufficient particularity to warn a person of what behavior is prohibited. We are of opinion that the Court of Appeals' construction of Code § 18.2-200.1 satisfies this test. And, for purposes of this discussion, we will take Holsapple at his word that [i]n this context, the word `fail' should be limited to those cases where ... a direct admission of intent is not forthcoming from the defendant but other facts and circumstances indicate a specific intent to keep the advance of money and not complete the work. Such other facts and circumstances are abundantly present in this case. Indeed, the record of Holsapple's conduct reeks with fraud. Holsapple suggests that the blame for what happened on the Frazier construction project should be placed on Currier. Specifically, Holsapple says that while he negotiated and drafted the contracts with Ms. Frazier, Currier, as the prime contractor, signed all contracts and received all advances of money directly from Ms. Frazier and that she never advanced any money to Holsapple. However, Holsapple forgets Ms. Frazier testified that she dealt only with him, that he told her what to pay and when to pay it, and that she paid the advances to Currier only because Holsapple told her to. Furthermore, Holsapple represented himself as the manager and agent of Star Bright Construction, and the record demonstrates clearly that he and Currier acted jointly throughout the construction project. [I]f a person is present at the commission of a crime, inciting, encouraging, advising or assisting in the act done, he is deemed to be an aider and abettor, and is liable as principal. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 1009, 1015, 121 S.E.2d 452, 457 (1961). It is in this light that Holsapple's conduct is to be assessed. Stripped permanently of his license to perform construction work and awaiting sentence on three convictions for construction fraud, Holsapple undertook a construction project and accepted an advance of money with full knowledge that he would be unable to complete the project if, as it turned out, he was sentenced to incarceration. He says he hoped the sentencing court would put him on work release so he could complete the project, but there was little chance that would happen and, apparently, it was not seriously considered by the sentencing court. And, to make matters worse, Holsapple continued to ask for and receive advance payments from Ms. Frazier even after he had been sentenced to incarceration and was free on bond. Further, Holsapple diverted a white vinyl glass sliding door from the Frazier construction project to one of his own. On the threat of filing a lien on her property, he extracted $1,100.00 from Ms. Frazier for work on the foundation when payment in full for that work had already been made. He secured another $3,745.00 from her to purchase roof trusses, for which only $983.84 was paid. He says that the contract with Ms. Frazier concerning the trusses provided that the amount received was for labor as well as materials and, since there was no evidence concerning the cost of labor, he cannot be charged with fraudulent intent with respect to the difference between what was received and what was paid for the trusses. However, the line on the printed form relating to the cost of labor was not filled in but instead contained a handwritten statement that the balance for Rafters will be Refunded if other Rafters are installed, whatever that means. No such refund was ever made. Finally, the sorry mess Ms. Frazier was left with is conclusive evidence that Holsapple's conduct amounted to more than a mere failure to perform. Everything about the uninhabitable structure from the unfilled mortar joints in the foundation to the insecure trusses in the roof displays a gross misperformance and corner-cutting on Holsapple's part, done with a specific intent to keep the advance of money and not complete the work. Accordingly, we find that all the elements of the crime of construction fraud proscribed by Code § 18.2-200.1 were fully established against Holsapple. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Affirmed.