Opinion ID: 1357886
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Character of Equitable Relief Sought by the Suit of 1943.

Text: 1. Thus we are able to interpret more accurately the intent, scope and force of the decree. It is elementary law that the relief granted must necessarily be responsive to and in conformity with the pleadings and proof. State ex rel. Dean v. Dean, 136 Or 694, 697, 300 P 1027, 86 ALR 79; Reed v. Hollister, 106 Or 407, 415, 212 P 367; Treadgold v. Willard, 81 Or 658, 663, 160 P 803. The necessity for this inquiry and determination is dictated by the importance which the plaintiffs attach to the date of the decree (October 2, 1945). In their brief we find:    Having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, its final decree [i.e., the decree in the suit of 1943] effectively denuded the defendant heirs of their interest in the property and established that interest in appellants.   . The failure of the circuit court to accept this thesis is made an assignment of error. Whether the lower court was right or wrong in this respect depends to no small degree upon the legal theory and character of their suit of 1943 and the relief the plaintiffs sought to attain thereby. The defendant Weber treats the suit of 1943 as one to quiet title. The plaintiffs assert that it is one partaking of the nature of a suit for specific performance. We think neither analysis is correct. Because of the character which we hereinafter ascribe to the proceedings of 1943, we find it not necessary to demonstrate why we cannot concur in its designation as a suit to quiet title. It is more readily evident to us why the action of 1943 was not a suit for specific performance or even one in the nature of a proceeding of that kind. The contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant Schmidt heirs is pleaded in Paragraph VI of the complaint. It required the payment of the purchase price by the Binghams as vendees and the delivery of a deed or deeds by the Schmidt heirs as vendors to render it completely executed. Any doubt that all parties to that agreement had completely fulfilled their respective obligations is set at rest by Paragraphs VI, VII and VIII, particularly by the latter paragraph in which plaintiffs allege that the purchase price required of them has been paid and the delivery of the deeds from the defendant Schmidt heirs has been completed. Reading the three paragraphs together dispels any doubt in this respect. 2. What, then, was the nature of the suit brought by the Binghams against the Schmidt heirs in 1943? In our opinion, it was a suit to re-establish lost instruments (deeds, in that instance) which were delivered by the Schmidts to the Binghams by depositing in the mail in Germany, as and for delivery to plaintiffs [Binghams] but which deeds were lost or destroyed by the intervention of a state of war between Germany and the United States. This conclusion finds support in the prayer of the complaint where one of the items of relief sought is that the decree stand in lieu of the lost deeds. (Italics ours.) The prayer in this respect is reflected in the decree where we find a provision that the decree stand in lieu of the deeds    which are now lost. 3. A decree for the re-establishment of a lost or destroyed instrument is today's judicial voucher for the existence of a document which was a part of and evidenced yesterday's transactions so that those entitled to rely thereon may do so confidently and without delay in the furtherance of tomorrow's business and, to the same extent, as if the original of such instrument had not been rendered unavailable by loss or destruction. 4, 5. As a general rule, the loss or unintentional destruction of a written instrument in no way affects the validity or sufficiency of the transaction which it evidences or the rights or liabilities of those who are parties to it. 54 CJS, Lost Instruments, 802, § 2. The court only relieves against the accident by setting up the evidence of the instrument lost. Its decree adds nothing to or subtracts nothing from the pristine character of the instrument re-established. In 54 CJS, Lost Instruments, 818, § 16, it is said: The effect of establishing in equity a lost instrument is to restore it to its original vigor and power   . However, an established instrument is not clothed with any greater force than if it had not been lost; and any defense which might have been made to the original instrument may be set up in an action on the established instrument. 6. It, therefore, follows that when a lost deed is restored by decree, the deed so re-established does not take effect from the date of the decree of its re-creation but relates back to the time of the making of the lost deed and gives effect and validity to such lost deed. Wyman v. Hageman, 318 Ill 64, 148 NE 852, 856. 7. These observations drive us to the conclusion that the date of the decree in the suit of 1943, so heavily relied upon by plaintiffs, avails them nothing in the instant litigation. Such title as the Schmidt heirs had in the property was transferred by delivery of their deeds and not by the decree. This, however, does not complete our inquiry. We are still left with the necessity of determining