Opinion ID: 1747978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Duplicativeness

Text: Appellant further argues that the first and third statutory aggravating circumstances, discussed above, are duplicative of each other since they both assert that Appellant's conduct as to Debbie Rainwater could warrant the death penalty because he was also trying to kill Stephen Rainwater. Thus, Appellant contends, they allowed the jury to double-count the same conduct in weighing aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and deciding whether to sentence Appellant to death. However, this Court has repeatedly rejected similar arguments that the statutory aggravating circumstances are impermissibly duplicative. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d at 271. Moreover, only one valid statutory aggravating circumstance is needed to consider imposition of the death penalty, State v. Brown, 902 S.W.2d 278, 293 (Mo. banc 1995), and a defective additional aggravating circumstance therefore usually affords a defendant no basis for relief. State v. Black, 50 S.W.3d 778, 791 (Mo. banc 2001). Thus, even assuming arguendo that some duplicativeness occurred with regard to the first and third submitted statutory aggravators, it would not have been prejudicial in the case at bar.