Opinion ID: 1829773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Third Prong of Murray

Text: The third prong of Murray requires clear and convincing evidence of independent consent and action on the part of the grantor/testator. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1193 (Miss. 1987). Again, the facts which were recounted above would be applicable here, as well. There are many instances which reveal independent action by Mrs. McCaffrey. In addition to taking control over the bulk of the estate's income and management of the rental properties, it was Mrs. McCaffrey who was reluctant to close her late husband's estate since she considered its continuation to be for her protection. Moreover, Fortenberry aptly notes that Costello v. Hall, 506 So.2d 293, 298 (Miss. 1987), instructs that even when a confidential relationship is found to exist, the beneficiary must have used that relationship for his personal gain or to thwart the intent of the testator. Costello, 506 So.2d at 298 (citing Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 723, 115 So.2d 683, 688 (1959)). See Matter of Will of Adams, 529 So.2d 611, 615 (Miss. 1988) (there must be abuse of relationship); Sacco v. Gordon, 515 So.2d 906, 909 (Miss. 1987) (citing Costello with approval; required finding of overreaching or bad faith by beneficiary); see also Matter of Will of Wasson, 562 So.2d 74, 79 (Miss. 1990) (beneficiary must have used relationship for personal gain or derailed intent of testator). The appellants have not attempted to allege that Fortenberry used his position to thwart the intent of Mrs. McCaffrey. While Fortenberry benefitted financially from the employment as the estate attorney, it will be recalled that he was already employed as Mr. McCaffrey's attorney for several years prior to his client's death. Mr. Fortenberry was very familiar with Mr. McCaffrey's business which consisted of considerable holdings. Further, his client's financial posture was bleak at the time of his death. Thus, Fortenberry's continued employment as the estate's attorney/executor was both logical and necessary. Although the appellants complain of excessive fees that Fortenberry withdrew, the chancellor found the fees to be fair and reasonable and less than the fees which were being charged to Mrs. McCaffrey's estate by attorneys under the employment of the appellants. Despite the deficiencies which Fortenberry exhibited as the executor/attorney for the estate of J.L. McCaffrey, we find nothing which would suggest an exercise of undue influence over Mrs. McCaffrey. While the appellants argue that Fortenberry's testimony is laced with self serving statements, we also note that nothing was offered by the appellants at trial to discredit the explanations which were furnished. While the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption of undue influence, once the alleged influencer has had his turn at bat, the ball then bounces back to the accusers for rebuttal. On the facts of this case, we concur with the finding of the learned chancellor who determined that Fortenberry had successfully rebutted the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence.