Opinion ID: 1534985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards of Review, Policy Interpretation, and Burden of Proof

Text: On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, our review is de novo, and we conduct an independent review of the record. Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C.1994). We employ the same substantive standard as the trial court. Summary judgment is proper if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and, on the record, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, under the appropriate burden of proof. See, e.g., Cameron v. USAA Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 733 A.2d 965, 967 (D.C. 1999); Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 41-42 (D.C.1979). In this case, the parties do not dispute the material facts concerning the loss that Chase sustained. The propriety of summary judgment turns primarily on a question of contract interpretationwhether the earth movement exclusion in the homeowners insurance policy that State Farm issued to Chase excepts her loss from coverage. The burden of proving that Chase's loss falls within that exclusion is on State Farm. See Cameron, 733 A.2d at 969. Our examination of the earth movement exclusion is governed by long settled principles of insurance contract interpretation. Insurance contracts are complicated and often confusing instruments, employing specialized concepts and terminology. The phraseology of contracts of insurance is that chosen by the insurer and the contract in fixed form is tendered to the prospective policyholder who is often without technical training, and who rarely accepts it with a lawyer at his elbow. Pennsylvania Indem. Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 73 App.D.C. 161, 162, 117 F.2d 774, 775 (1941) (quoting Aschenbrenner v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 292 U.S. 80, 84, 54 S.Ct. 590, 78 L.Ed. 1137 (1934)). In recognition of these realities, ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed against the insurer and in favor of the reasonable expectations of the purchaser of the policy. Smalls v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 678 A.2d 32, 35 (D.C.1996). [T]he general rule applicable in the interpretation of an insurance policy is that, if its language is reasonably open to two constructions, the one most favorable to the insured will be adopted. Any fair doubt as to the meaning of its own words should be resolved against the insurer. Aldridge, 73 App.D.C. at 162, 117 F.2d at 775. It is the insurer's duty to spell out in plainest terms-terms understandable to the man in the streetany exclusionary or delimiting policy provisions. Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If an exclusion in an insurance policy is not ambiguous, the courts must enforce as written, without favoring one party or the other, so long as the exclusion does not violate a statute or public policy. See Smalls, 678 A.2d at 35. Whether language in a contract is genuinely ambiguous is a question of law, and thus we consider that question de novo on appeal. We follow the guideline that, unless it is obvious that words which appear in an insurance contract are intended to be used in a technical connotation, they will be given the meaning which common speech imports. Aldridge, 73 App.D.C. at 162, 117 F.2d at 775. We may not indulge in forced constructions to create an obligation against the insurer. Cameron, 733 A.2d at 968 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, otherwise clear language in an insurance agreement is not to be deemed ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on its meaning. See Byrd v. Allstate Ins. Co., 622 A.2d 691, 694 (D.C.1993). Policy language is not genuinely ambiguous unless it is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation. American Bldg. Maint. Co. v. L'Enfant Plaza Prop., Inc., 655 A.2d 858, 861 (D.C. 1995) (emphasis added).