Opinion ID: 1291712
Heading Depth: 2
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Heading: How Enhancements Apply to Indeterminate Terms

Text: Before July 1, 1977, California law provided for indeterminate sentencing. Under that sentencing scheme, penal statutes specified a minimum and a maximum sentence for felonies, often ranging broadly from as little as one year in prison to imprisonment for life. [Citation.] [T]he actual length of a defendant's term, within the statutory maximum and minimum, was determined by the Adult Authority. ( People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 94, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) On July 1, 1977, the Legislature replaced California's indeterminate sentencing scheme with a new law, the Determinate Sentencing Act. Under the new law, most felonies specify three possible terms of imprisonment (the lower, middle, and upper terms); ... the trial court selects one of these terms. ([Pen.Code,] § 1170, subd. (b).) ( Id. at p. 95, 86 Cal. Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) These terms are generally referred to as determinate sentences. (Pen.Code, § 1170, subd. (a)(1); [1] see People v. Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 92, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Some crimes, however, remain punishable by imprisonment for either some number of years to life, or simply life. ( People v. Jefferson, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 92-93 & fn. 2, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441.) Thus, two different sentencing schemes coexist today: one determinate, the other indeterminate. Every person who commits a public offense, for which any specification of three time periods of imprisonment in any state prison is now prescribed by law or for which only a single term of imprisonment in state prison is specified, i.e., for any determinate term, shall ... be sentenced pursuant to the DSA, section 1170 et seq. (§ 1168, subd. (a) [determinate sentencing].) For any person not sentenced under such provision, but who is sentenced to be imprisoned in the state prison, including imprisonment not exceeding one year and one day, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix the term or duration of the period of imprisonment. (§ 1168, subd. (b) [indeterminate sentencing].) Under the DSA, if a defendant is convicted of more than one offense carrying a determinate term, and the trial court imposes consecutive sentences, the term with the longest sentence is the principal term; any term consecutive to the principal term is a subordinate term. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a).) The court imposes the full term, either lower, middle, or upper, for the principal term. However, in general (there are exceptions), the court imposes only one-third of the middle term for subordinate terms. ( Ibid. ) A determinate term for a given offense might also be lengthened by sentence enhancements. Typical is the enhancement imposed in this case for firearm use. Section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1), provides that any person who personally uses a firearm while committing the offense shall receive an additional term of 3, 4, or 10 years. The full term for the enhancement is added to the principal term. Enhancements are excluded from subordinate terms for felonies not defined as violent under section 667.5, subdivision (c). Enhancements are added to subordinate terms for violent felonies, but they can be only one-third of the term. (§ 1170.1, subd. (a); see also § 1170.11.) [2] In any given case, an overall sentence might include both determinate terms and indeterminate terms. Whenever a person is convicted of two or more crimes, the court must impose either concurrent or consecutive sentences. (§ 669.) As section 669 currently reads, Life sentences, whether with or without the possibility of parole, may be imposed to run consecutively with one another, with any term imposed for applicable enhancements, or with any other term of imprisonment for a felony conviction. Whenever a person is committed to prison on a life sentence which is ordered to run consecutive to any determinate term of imprisonment, the determinate term of imprisonment shall be served first.... (Stats.1997, ch. 750, § 1.) [3] Even though enhancements such as that for section 12022.5 are themselves determinate, i.e., for a specified number of years, they may be attached to indeterminate as well as determinate terms. Section 669 makes this clear, as do the applicable enhancements themselves. (E.g., § 12022.5, subd. (a)(1) [applying whenever a person uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony].) If an enhancement is attached to more than one indeterminate term, the first enhancement clearly would be for its full term. No reason appears for it to be less than full term. But this observation gives rise to the question here. If enhancements are attached to two or more consecutive indeterminate terms, are the second and subsequent enhancements full term or, as would be the case with determinate sentences, only one-third of the term? The court confronted this question in People v. Jackson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1818, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 586. The Jackson court upheld two `full strength' consecutive sentences for gun use enhancements attached to indeterminate terms imposed under section 1168. ( Id. at p. 1832, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 586.) Because they are attached to indeterminate terms, the gun-use enhancements are not subject to the determinate sentencing law, including the provisions of section 1170.1. ( Ibid. ) We agree with this holding. Section 1170.1, subdivision (a), itself provides that its consecutive sentence provisions, including the portions concerning one-third terms, apply to consecutive terms imposed under Sections 669 and 1170. (Italics added.) `Thus, it must follow that section 1170.1, subdivision (a), cannot apply to consecutive terms imposed under sections 669 and 1168, the case here.' ( People v. Jackson, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1833, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, quoting People v. McGahuey (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 524, 531-532, 175 Cal.Rptr. 479.) For these reasons, like the Jackson court, we find that section 1170.1 does not apply to a gun-use enhancement attached to an offense which carries an indeterminate term of imprisonment. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1833, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 586.) That being the case, section 1170.1's one-third limit for consecutive subordinate terms and enhancements does not apply. We thus conclude that the court should impose the full term for enhancements attached to indeterminate terms. This conclusion means that consecutive enhancements are full term for indeterminate crimes, one-third the term for violent determinate crimes, and not imposed at all for nonviolent determinate crimes. (See § 1170.1, subd. (a).) This pattern is consistent with legislative policy to punish more serious crimes more severely. With the adoption of the DSA, indeterminate sentences are generally reserved for more serious crimes than those subject to determinate sentences. (See, e.g., People v. Yates (1983) 34 Cal.3d 644, 649-650, 194 Cal.Rptr. 765, 669 P.2d 1.)