Opinion ID: 2058346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Crimes Testimony at Suppression Hearing

Text: Coleman argues that testimony given at his pretrial suppression hearing concerning a rape for which he was not charged, which had occurred on the same day in the same vicinity, but involving a different victim was unfair and prejudicial. The testimony to which Coleman objects was elicited by Coleman's attorney during the cross-examination of the arresting officer. Coleman's attorney asked why the police did not obtain a warrant before arresting Coleman. The officer answered that he did not obtain a warrant because, at the time, the police suspected Coleman's involvement in the rape and were concerned with the need for immediate action to preserve possible physical evidence relating to that crime. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant is inadmissible in a proceeding to prove the propensity of the defendant to act in a criminal nature. D.R.E. 404(b). Getz v. State, Del.Supr., 538 A.2d 726, 730 (1988). Nevertheless, this Court has adopted the inclusionary approach in interpreting D.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 731. [19] Under the inclusionary approach, evidence of prior bad acts is admissible not only if it fits within the enumerated exceptions of D.R.E. 404(b), but also if it has independent logical relevance and when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. See D.R.E. 403. The rationale underlying D.R.E. 404(b) is to prevent the trier of fact from taking the uncharged other crimes evidence as proof of guilt of the crime charged. Getz v. State, 538 A.2d at 730 (citing 1A Wigmore, Evidence, § 58.2, at 1212-13 (Tillers rev. 1983)). In this case, evidence of the rape was logically relevant to the material facts surrounding the issue of Coleman's warrantless arrest. Moreover, by its very nature, the pretrial suppression hearing was conducted out of the presence of the jury. Therefore, the jury, as the trier of fact at trial, was never made aware of the uncharged crime. Coleman has been unable to articulate or demonstrate any prejudice to his case from this pretrial testimony. Accordingly, we find that the other crimes testimony, which was admitted during the pretrial suppression hearing, did not constitute reversible error.