Opinion ID: 836180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: vacation of office

Text: Const. 1963, art. 6, § 20, provides that [w]henever a justice or judge removes his domicile beyond the limits of the territory from which he was elected or appointed, he shall have vacated his office. The parties agree that the term domicile refers to respondent's primary residence. Furthermore, respondent admits that he changed his primary residence to the 2nd election division from 2005 to 2008. [14] The dispute centers on the meaning of the word territory. Respondent argues that territory refers to the entire 63rd judicial district, while the JTC argues that the term is limited to the election division within the district. Thus, when respondent moved his primary residence from the 1st election division to the 2nd election division of the 63rd District Court, the JTC maintains that respondent vacated his office, possessed no authority to continue to serve as a judge, and functioned as a nonjudge masquerading as a judge. However, this Court need not address which argument is correct, nor reach a conclusion regarding whether respondent vacated his office because our statutes, caselaw, and court rules provide that a quo warranto action brought by the Attorney General in the Court of Appeals is the only appropriate and exclusive proceeding to make the preliminary determination regarding whether respondent vacated or unlawfully held his judicial office. [15] MCL 600.4501 provides that the Attorney General shall bring an action for quo warranto when the facts clearly warrant the bringing of the action. [16] MCR 3.306(A)(1) provides that the quo warranto action must be brought in the Court of Appeals when a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a state office, or if a state officer does or suffers an act that by law works a forfeiture of the office. If a quo warranto action claims usurpation of office, the judgment may determine the right of the defendant to hold the office. [17] Moreover, if a defendant in a quo warranto proceeding is found to unlawfully hold or exercise the office at issue, the defendant may be assessed fines [18] and damages [19] in addition to being ousted from office. Significantly, our caselaw has held for more than a century that [t]he only way to try titles to office finally and conclusively is by quo warranto.  [20] Notwithstanding, the JTC asks this Court to make the prefatory determination that respondent vacated his office under Const. 1963, art. 6, § 20, and that he consequently was no longer a judge and acted without judicial authority, as a basis of removing respondent from office for judicial misconduct. However, this determination is precisely the issue to be resolved in a quo warranto action. While this Court could certainly review on appeal the decision made by the Court of Appeals in a quo warranto action, [21] and could determine whether the conduct surrounding respondent's forfeiture of office rose to the level of judicial misconduct warranting judicial discipline, [22] an original proceeding in the Supreme Court [23] is not the appropriate place to determine in the first instance whether respondent vacated his office. Rather, the law requires that this question be initiated by the Attorney General and resolved as an initial matter by the Court of Appeals. [24] Consequently, all evidence and testimony obtained during the proceeding by the JTC regarding whether respondent had vacated his office was obtained through an unconstitutional process because the JTC has no authority to proceed on the quo warranto issue or to determine whether respondent vacated his office. That determination can only be made by the Court of Appeals in a quo warranto proceeding, which could then be appealed to this Court. If a quo warranto action has been successfully brought in the Court of Appeals, and that decision is affirmed by this Court, only then may the JTC act on the appellate court decision and determine whether there has been any judicial misconduct associated with the determination of the Court of Appeals that a judge has vacated his or her office. Moreover, had the Michigan Supreme Court decided in a quo warranto appeal that respondent had vacated his office, the Supreme Court would have had the power to remove respondent from office, and, had that happened, any JTC proceeding regarding judicial misconduct involving the vacation of office would have been moot because the Supreme Court had already exercised the most severe punishment. Simply put, the JTC had the cart before the horse. Just as the JTC has neither the authority nor the power to decide whether a judge vacated his or her office, this Supreme Court does not have any constitutional authority to grant that authority and power to the JTC. The JTC only has the authority to let the quo warranto process lawfully proceed to a legal determination of whether or not a judge has vacated his or her office. With regard to our conclusion in this regard, we reject Justice Markman's attempt to characterize the JTC as having made a determination to which this Court must defer. The JTC only has the authority to recommend disciplinary action. Justice Markman's attempt to couch our rejection as unbelievable is improper. Indeed, Justice Markman asserts that a majority of this Court errs in its review of the JTC decision by afford[ing] no deference whatsoever to the Commission's factual findings. Post at 57 (emphasis added). To be precise, while this Court has a duty to review a recommendation, as to the deference afforded the JTC after this Court reads the recommendation, there is no duty to accept, or to defer, to any part of the JTC's recommendation. This Court has no duty to accept, even in part, any JTC decision because the JTC does not have the power to decide how and whether to discipline a judge; the JTC can only make recommendations to this Court and, in this regard our review of JTC recommendations is de novo. [25] In re Somers, 384 Mich. 320, 323, 182 N.W.2d 341 (1971). As established in Const. 1963, art. 6, § 30(2): On recommendation of the judicial tenure commission, the supreme court may censure, suspend with or without salary, retire or remove a judge for conviction of a felony, physical or mental disability which prevents the performance of judicial duties, misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, habitual intemperance or conduct that is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. For comparison purposes, consider this scenario: if the JTC believes a judge has committed armed robbery, it has no authority to proceed to determine whether or not the judge did commit armed robbery. Only the criminal judicial system guided by statutes and court rules has the authority to make that determination. If the court process legally determines a judge is guilty of armed robbery, only then can the JTC recognize the legally determined fact that the judge committed the crime and only then can the JTC bring a proceeding for judicial misconduct on the basis of the court's ruling that a judge committed the crime of armed robbery.