Opinion ID: 2054675
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: People v. Hoskinson

Text: On July 3, 1994, defendant Hoskinson and some friends were drinking beer and working on defendant's automobile. At approximately 7:00 p.m., defendant and his friends drove to a bar where they drank beer and shots of liquor for approximately two hours. Defendant was staggering when he left the bar. Testimony indicated that defendant may have refused the offer of one of his friends to drive. Defendant twice drove his vehicle into a parked car while trying to leave the parking lot. He next drove through a residential neighborhood at speeds of approximately forty to sixty miles an hour. Speed dips were located at almost every intersection throughout this neighborhood. Defendant had driven down this street numerous times and was aware of the speed dips. A vehicle traveling westbound just ahead of the defendant was stopped at a stop sign. Defendant swerved into the eastbound lane and passed the stopped vehicle, and then immediately swerved back into the westbound lane in order to avoid hitting an oncoming vehicle. Defendant hit a speed dip and lost control of his vehicle. He hit the westbound curb, swerved left, then swerved right, and struck a car parked on the right side of the street. Defendant jerked his wheel to the left, accelerated, drove across the eastbound lane, over the curb, and across some grass where he hit four-year-old Miranda Andres who was riding her tricycle on the sidewalk. Miranda's body was dragged across two lawns before defendant's automobile returned to the street. [9] Defendant continued to drive before bringing his vehicle to a stop approximately six blocks from the victim's home. An officer who was called to the accident scene testified that defendant approached him and admitted that he was the driver. A blood alcohol test disclosed that defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.22 percent. In a statement to the police, defendant admitted that he knew he was drunk when he left the bar and that he was driving too fast. Testimony indicated that before the accident occurred the occupants of defendant's car told defendant to slow down. The jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549, and failure to stop at a serious personal injury accident, M.C.L. § 257.617; M.S.A. § 9.2317. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction of involuntary manslaughter, finding that insufficient evidence of malice had been produced at trial. [10] We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal.