Opinion ID: 4543064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Our Equitable-Tolling Test

Text: It is well established that a court may “rescue a claim otherwise barred as untimely by a statute of limitations when a plaintiff [shows she] has ‘been prevented from filing in a timely manner due to sufficiently inequitable circumstances.’” Id. at 197 (quoting Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)). Tolling “is [an] extraordinary” remedy, id., and “is proper only when the ‘principles of equity would make [the] rigid application [of a limitation period] unfair,” Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (alterations in original) (quoting Shendock v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 893 F.2d 1458, 1462 (3d Cir. 1990) (en banc)). “It is especially appropriate to be restrictive” in extending this remedy “in cases involving the waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States,” such as those arising under the FTCA. Santos, 559 F.3d at 197–98. Our Court uses the term “equitable tolling” broadly to encompass several situations under which a statute of limitations period may be tolled on equitable grounds. We have said that: 4 “The time limits in the FTCA are just time limits,” not jurisdictional requirements, and, therefore, “a court can toll them on equitable grounds.” Wong, 575 U.S. at 412. 8 [T]here are three principal, though not exclusive, situations in which equitable tolling may be appropriate: (1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting . . . her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted . . . her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.5 Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc), aff’d 140 S. Ct. 355 (2019). In addition, a litigant “will not receive the benefit of” tolling in any of these situations “unless she 5 Our Court often refers to all three of these situations “as falling under the overarching heading of ‘equitable tolling’” because each “tolls a limitations period on equitable grounds.” Edmonson v. Eagle Nat’l Bank, 922 F.3d 535, 550 (4th Cir. 2019) (describing the Third Circuit’s approach). Other circuits use the phrase to refer only to the second situation in our list— that is, “when a plaintiff’s failure to timely file suit is not attributable [to] wrongful conduct by the defendant.” Id.; see also Zappone v. United States, 870 F.3d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 2017); Valdez ex rel. Donely v. United States, 518 F.3d 173, 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990). In recent years, the Supreme Court has also used the phrase “equitable tolling” in this more specific sense. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 644–45 (2010). As we explain above, only the second of our three tolling scenarios is at issue here, so we need not (and do not) resolve the difference in terminology. 9 exercised due diligence in pursuing and preserving her claim.” Santos, 559 F.3d at 197. That is, tolling will never extend to “a garden variety claim of excusable neglect, such as a simple miscalculation that leads a lawyer to miss a filing deadline.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 651–52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The second tolling situation is at issue here—D.J.S.-W. argues that she encountered extraordinary circumstances that prevented her from timely filing.6 Thus, to be entitled to equitable tolling, D.J.S.-W. must show that she “in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting . . . her rights,” and that she “exercised due diligence in pursuing and preserving her claim.” See Santos, 559 F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is the same test that the Supreme Court uses to assess whether a petitioner may be entitled to equitable tolling in the habeas context. See Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (“[A] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.” (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005))). In Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the same test to assess a Tribe’s claim that equitable 6 D.J.S.-W. does not explicitly state that her claim falls under the second tolling situation in our list. But her argument relies heavily on Santos, which involved the second tolling doctrine. See 559 F.3d at 203. Furthermore, neither of the other two bases applies—D.J.S.-W. does not argue that she was actively misled, and all parties agree that she did not timely assert her claim in state court. Nor does D.J.S.-W. argue that any other tolling doctrine should apply. 10 tolling should excuse its failure to timely present a contract dispute to a federal contracting officer. 136 S. Ct. 750, 754–56 (2016). In doing so, the Court noted that it has “never held that [Holland’s] equitable-tolling test necessarily applies outside the habeas context” and, therefore, it has not yet “decide[d] whether an even stricter” or “a more generous test” may apply to nonhabeas cases. Id. at 756 n.2.7 Nevertheless, because the Holland test is the same as our test for assessing equitable tolling in the nonhabeas context, Menominee is instructive. In particular, the Court made two observations that help us more clearly define the contours of our test. First, it stated that the two requirements—extraordinary circumstances and diligence—are “distinct elements,” both of which must be satisfied for a litigant to be eligible for tolling. Id. at 756. Treating the two requirements as separate prongs, the Court said, was consistent with its prior language describing the components as “elements,” id. (citing Pace, 544 U.S. at 418), and its practice of denying “requests for equitable tolling where a litigant failed to satisfy one without addressing whether he satisfied the other,” id. (citing Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007), and Pace, 544 U.S. at 418). We agree with this characterization of the equitabletolling test. Although our prior case law may appear to have blended the two components, this is merely a reflection of the fact that, in practice, the two elements often go hand in hand. For example, if no extraordinary circumstances stood in the 7 In recent years, the Court has also referenced the Holland equitable-tolling test in other nonhabeas cases. See, e.g., Wong, 575 U.S. at 407–08; Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014). 11 litigant’s way, but she nevertheless failed to timely file, it is likely that she did not diligently investigate and pursue her claim. See, e.g., id. at 756–57 (declining to equitably toll limitations period because Tribe’s failure to timely present its claims was caused “not by an obstacle outside its control, but by [its] mistaken belief that presentment was unneeded”); Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 752–54 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to equitably toll limitations period because plaintiff’s pro se status and mental incompetence were not extraordinary circumstances and “[d]iligent research would likely have revealed . . . the existence” of his claim). Similarly, if, despite pursuing her claim diligently, a litigant was still unable to timely file, it is likely that some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way and prevented her from doing so. See Santos, 559 F.3d at 198–203 (holding plaintiff entitled to equitable tolling when she “diligently and vigorously pursued her claim” and, yet, she was unable to ascertain hospital’s federal status). Today, we follow Menominee’s guidance and confirm that the two requirements are distinct prongs, both of which a litigant must satisfy before equitable tolling may apply. Second, the Supreme Court also “reaffirm[ed]” that the extraordinary-circumstances element “is met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both extraordinary and beyond [her] control.” Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756. We agree with this description of the extraordinarycircumstances prong. Indeed, because equitable tolling is an extreme remedy that we extend “only sparingly,” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990), it “would make little sense if [it] were available when a litigant was responsible for [her] own delay,” Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756. In addition, because the extraordinary-circumstances and diligence components are distinct elements, “the diligence 12 prong already covers those affairs within the litigant’s control” and the “extraordinary-circumstances prong, by contrast, is meant to cover matters outside [her] control.” Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756. Accordingly, we also clarify today, following the Supreme Court’s guidance, that a litigant will only meet the extraordinary-circumstances prong of our test for equitable tolling when she shows that her delay was attributable to circumstances that were “both extraordinary and beyond [her] control.” Id. In sum, for a litigant to be entitled to equitable tolling, she must establish two elements: “(1) that [s]he has been pursuing her rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in h[er] way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 755; see also Santos, 559 F.3d at 197. The two components are distinct elements, both of which the litigant must satisfy. And to meet the extraordinary-circumstances element, the litigant must show that the circumstances were “extraordinary and beyond [her] control.” Menominee, 136 S. Ct. at 756.