Opinion ID: 1474265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: .The Elmira Plant

Text: Twenty-seven polishers in respondent's Elmira plant were discharged in June, 1939, following a strike there. The Board claims that the respondent discharged and locked out union employees who had ceased work in a labor dispute. The facts are as follows: Prior to May, 1939, the company had laid off employees in disregard of seniority. The union protested and the matter was adjusted. In May, 1939, the company consulted Bassett, who was chairman of the shop committee, about a list of men to be laid off. Two of these, Mathews and Howell, were union men. The company, at Bassett's request, substituted the names of Maloney and Scheisepen, nonunion men, because the latter were less able workers. Mathews and Howell had only two days' less seniority than Maloney and Scheisepen. The agreement was carried out. On May 5, however, Maloney and Scheisepen were reinstated at their request, and Mathews and Howell were laid off. Bassett protested the violation of the agreement, and all four men were kept on. There was enough work for all, and all worked full time. Bassett continued to object, however, that, with Maloney and Scheisepen back at work, respondent was not keeping its May 4 agreement. He feared that, in time of slack, Mathews and Howell would be the first to be laid off. On June 5, negotiations having broken down, the union men stood at their machines and refused to work until the company cured the violation of the agreement. The men were then asked to leave the plant peacefully, which they did. They were all discharged by letter the same day. The Master found that the strike was not a lawful one, that no labor dispute was involved and that the discharge of the strikers was no violation of the decree. He further found that the dispute which existed was determined when the company heard grievances and made up its mind. The Master's findings were clearly erroneous. Section 2(9) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(9), defines a labor dispute as inclusive of any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment   . An employee is defined in § 2(3) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3), as any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice   . Section 8(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3), provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer    by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment    to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization   . The above language of the statute does not lend itself readily to misinterpretation. If the Elmira strike was a controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, which it certainly was, then indubitably, it was a labor dispute within the meaning of the statute. We cannot agree with the Master that there was no labor dispute here, merely because the dispute was determined when the company heard grievances and made up its mind. So to hold would go a long way towards emasculating the Act, and would render it difficult, if not impossible, ever to discover any state of industrial discord which could accurately be termed a labor dispute. The real issue here is whether or not the respondent's act of firing the 27 strikers was contumacious and contemptuous of the court's decree. The Board claimed that the discharges violated Section 1(a) and 1(c) of the decree of the court. Section 1(a) of the decree required respondent to cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection    Section 1(c) required that the respondent cease and desist from discouraging membership in any of the labor organizations affiliated with the Remington Rand Joint Protective Board of the District Council Office Equipment Workers, or any other labor organization of its employees, by discharging and refusing to reinstate employees, or otherwise discriminating in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any form or condition of employment, or by threats of such discriminations   . We think the discharges were discriminatory. The fact that prior concerted refusals to work on the part of employees who had worked during the strike, marked in one instance by violence, were in no way penalized by respondent, gives rise to an inference of bad faith and discriminatory motive for the discharges. [5] The respondent's defense rests mainly on the contention that a plant rule had been violated. The letter of discharge read: By your refusal to work today, a violation of plant rules, you have terminated your employment, effective today. The haste with which the strikers were discharged is further ground for an inference of discrimination. The immediate discharge gave no locus penitentiae and attempted to sever the employment relationship. It is clear from the definition of an employee in § 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act that a strike does not terminate the employer-employee relationship, where the individual has ceased work in connection with a current labor dispute or because of an unfair labor practice. Nor does the fact of a strike of itself relieve the employer of his duty under the Act to bargain collectively with his employees. [6] In the Mackay Radio case, [7] the Supreme Court held that an employer whose employees have struck and who has committed no unfair labor practice is not obliged to discontinue his business but may hire others in the place of the strikers. The employer's obligation to reinstate in such case extends only to such of the striking employees as have not been replaced during the strike. Where, however, the employer has been guilty of an unfair labor practice, he is under a duty to reinstate all striking employees, even though this may occasion the discharge of those employees hired to take the place of strikers during the strike. Thus, in the instant case, the polishers having gone on strike in a current labor dispute, retained their status as employees for the purposes of the Act and its protective provisions. As such they had a right to apply for and to be reinstated. If respondent was guilty of an unfair labor practice, this right was unconditional. If it was guilty of no unfair labor practice, the right existed, nevertheless, subject however to the condition that only such strikers could seek and get reinstatement as had not already been replaced during the strike. [8] Respondent, by its immediate discharge of the strikers and attempted abnegation of the employment relationship, was guilty of an unfair labor practice. It sought to discharge strikers who, under § 2(3) of the Act were still its employees and who were thus entitled to apply for reinstatement or at the very least entitled to reinstatement where their jobs remained unfilled. Respondent, though it sought to do so, could not deny the right to reinstatement to the striking polishers. Even if there had been no unfair labor practice, respondent could not rely upon its alleged right, if any, to discharge the strikers, because in the instant case, the strikers were discharged without being  or before being  replaced. The summary and immediate dismissal by respondent of the strikers, while also in contravention of the National Labor Relations Act, was a direct violation of § 1(a) of our decree in that it interfered with, and restrained, the striking employees from bargaining collectively and from engaging in concerted activities for the purposes of    mutual aid or protection.    It also violated § 1(c) of our decree in that it tended to discourage union membership. The inference of discriminatory treatment is unmistakable when a comparison is made between the discharge of the 27 strikers and respondent's attitude towards concerted refusals to work on the part of non-union employees in its other plants. We find that respondent violated our decree [9] and we now order that the 27 polishers be reinstated, and paid their loss in wages. The matter is referred to the Master for the taking of evidence, and to determine the net amount of back pay.