Opinion ID: 1588415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: modification order is final because it disposed of every issue

Text: Applying the same reasoning, I believe that Rollins can appeal from the modification order temporarily ordering changing child custody and child support. We have held that a hearing to modify a child custody order is a special proceeding. [29] Arguably, it more properly falls under the third category of special proceedings: an order affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action after a judgment is rendered. But in either case, of course, the order must affect a substantial right. Relying on our decision in Steven S. v. Mary S ., [30] the majority opinion concludes that when a temporary custody order is contingent upon an outside event, it is not final. I disagree with this statement. In Steven S., the dissolution decree awarded the father primary custody of the parties' twin girls. Both parties filed applications to modify the decree, accusing each other of abusing the children. After an investigation, the Nebraska State Patrol determined the accusations against the father were unfounded and arrested the mother for sexual assault on a child. After a hearing, the court ordered both parties to have psychological evaluations and the mother to have an extensive evaluation. It suspended the mother's visitation rights until further order. In determining whether the order was final, we concluded that it was appropriate to look to juvenile cases for guidance in determining whether a denial of custody and visitation affects a substantial right. We relied on a case in which we considered whether a parent could appeal from an ex parte order removing a child from its parent's custody pending a detention hearing: `[T]he question ... whether a substantial right of a parent has been affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is dependent upon both the object of the order and the length of time over which the parent's relationship with the juvenile may reasonably be expected to be disturbed.' [31] Relying on the general principle that the length of interference with parental rights is critical, we concluded that the court's order only suspended the mother's visitation pending her psychological evaluation and the psychologist's recommendation on permanent custody: Because [the mother's] relationship with the children will be disturbed for only a brief time period and the order was not a permanent disposition, we conclude that a substantial right was not affected. [32] If Steven S. is interpreted to mean that we were concerned about the length of any interference in the parent-child relationship, our reasoning in Steven S. would compel the conclusion here that the length of the temporary custody400 daysaffected Rollins' substantial right to maintain custody of her child. More important, I believe Steven S. is another example of the difficulty we encounter by avoiding the more obvious solution to the statutory requirement that an order in a stand-alone special proceeding (or summary application) affects a substantial right. In juvenile cases, ex parte detention orders permitting a short detention without a hearing do not substantially interfere with a parent's fundamental rights. [33] But those cases are distinguishable from a temporary custody order entered in a custody modification proceeding when the parties are present and adducing evidence. When the parents are present, the due process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the issue is not a concern. And I do not believe we should extend the concern in Steven S. about a temporary severing of visitation rights to temporary custody orders. We do not permit parties to appeal temporary custody orders pending a final marital dissolution decree. [34] In dissolution cases, which we have defined as special proceedings, we have reasoned that temporary custody orders are interlocutory when the court has not determined all of the parties' substantial rights. [35] Our characterization of marital dissolution proceedings as special proceedings has also been criticized. [36] But even if we had characterized dissolution proceedings as actions, temporary custody orders would still be interlocutory. [37] The interlocutory character of the order in Steven S. is a more consistent rationale for concluding that it was not appealable. The court had not yet decided custody and visitation rights. In contrast, the order here is not interlocutory and there is nothing left for the court to decide. Its temporary child custody order terminates at a known time and requires that the parties follow its original decree after Rollins' deployment ends. It may appear that a temporary custody change for a defined period would often be moot by the time an appeal reaches this court. But, as this case illustrates, a temporary change in custody is often accompanied by a temporary change in child support obligations. That issue would not be moot. Because in this appeal, the modification order disposes of all the issues raised in the proceeding, I believe it is a final, appealable order. So I dissent from that part of the majority opinion concluding that Rollins could not appeal from the modification order.