Opinion ID: 884314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is there sufficient evidence to support Hagen's conviction?

Text: Hagen argues there is insufficient evidence from which a jury could find that he was in actual physical control of his vehicle. Therefore, he could be not be found guilty of driving under the influence. The State responds that Hagen could have filed a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of evidence pursuant to § 46-16-403,MCA; but because he did not, the issue is waived on appeal. We recently held that a defendant is not required to move for acquittal or for a directed verdict in order to preserve the issue of sufficiency of evidence on appeal. State v. Granby (Mont.1997), ___ Mont. ___, 939 P.2d 1006. Accordingly, we address whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict finding Hagen guilty of driving under the influence. To convict a defendant of driving under the influence, the State must prove that the defendant was (1) driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle; (2) upon the ways of the State open to the public; and (3) while under the influence of alcohol. Section 61-8-401, MCA; State v. Robison (Mont. 1997), 931 P.2d 706, 707, 54 St.Rep. 61, 62. In this case, only element (1) is in dispute. Based on his testimony and that of his wife, Hagen denies that he was in actual physical control of his pickup. This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Arlington (1994), 265 Mont. 127, 146, 875 P.2d 307, 318. A person has actual physical control of a vehicle when he has existing or present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation, of an automobile.... Robison, 931 P.2d at 707, citing State v. Ruona (1958), 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615. According to Hagen, he was not in actual physical control of his pickup because: (1) he did not attempt to move or start it on the date of his arrest; (2) he could not start it because it required thirty seconds to warm up; and (3) he did not have the keys. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that Hagen had actual physical control of his pickup. Kosola testified when he shook Hagen, that Hagen stated he had to go to work and started his pickup. Hagen's wife testified that although she may have given Hagen the keys to her son's truck, that there was a worn key which could fit Hagen's pickup. This evidence was before the jury, which was free to accept or reject it when it found that Hagen was in actual physical control of a vehicle. It is well settled that witness credibility and the weight to be given that testimony are to be determined by the trier of fact, and findings on disputed questions of fact and credibility will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Moreno (1990), 241 Mont. 359, 361, 787 P.2d 334, 336. We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hagen exercised actual physical control over his vehicle. We hold that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict Hagen of driving under the influence. In his reply brief, Hagen argues for the first time that the State did not offer, and the District Court did not instruct the jury on the definition of actual physical control. There are two problems with Hagen's argument. First, he did not object at trial or offer an instruction of his own. Second, he raised the issue for the first time in his reply brief, which as explained above does not make the issue proper for consideration pursuant to Rule 23, M.R.App.P. Affirmed. REGNIER, GRAY, LEAPHART and TRIEWEILER, JJ., concur.