Opinion ID: 6320235
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Winn challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his firearm convictions, arguing that the government failed to offer proof beyond a reasonable doubt 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. 6 that he possessed the guns found in the box in the cabinet. We review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a conviction to see if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). Our review is “highly deferential,” and we take care “not to usurp the role of the jury by weighing credibility and assigning weight to the evidence, or by substituting [our] judgment for that of the jury[.]” United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted). Where the record may support “multiple possibilities,” we draw all rational inferences in the prosecution’s favor. Id. at 430-32. Possession of an object, such as a firearm, can be actual or constructive. See United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (possession of a firearm for purposes of § 922(g)(1) can be constructive); United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 172 (3d Cir. 2011) (same for § 924(c)). As Winn points out, the government offered no proof that he actually “exercised direct physical control over the weapon[s,]” Caldwell, 760 F.3d at 278, so the government needed to establish constructive possession. Such possession exists when the defendant “knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over” the contraband. United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). We have held that there must be more than “mere proximity” to the contraband or “mere presence on the property where it is located” to establish dominion and control. Id. at 680 (citation omitted). 7 Here, a rational trier of fact, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, could find that more than mere proximity or presence tied Winn to the firearms. Winn concedes, for example, that there was enough evidence – including the text messages suggesting his involvement in drug sales – for jurors to infer that he had possession of the drugs found all over the stash house. The same kinds of drugs and packaging found all over the house were also in the box right alongside the guns. That evidence, taken together, could reasonably be interpreted to show that the guns were part and parcel of the drug operation with which Winn was intimately involved.4 Although Winn claims a lack of proof that he had ever previously been to the house, he had a key to it on his lanyard, allowing him access at any time. Cf. Brown, 3 F.3d at 683-84 (noting that “[p]ossession of the key to [a] crack house” would provide evidence “that the defendant was involved with the drugs found therein”). He rightly points out that the government does not know who else may have had a key, but the government is entitled to have us view his possession of a key in the light most favorable to the verdict – as evidence of his ready access to the contraband within the house. The prison call also helps support the verdict. There, Winn said he didn’t think the government had “put the guns” on him. (SJA at 5.) Both sides in this appeal understand Winn to have been expressing a belief that he was not facing any charges relating to the firearms. Although he ended up being wrong in that belief, Winn’s 4 Winn also argues that Green had more significant ties to the house and the guns than he himself did. Constructive possession, however, “need not be exclusive but may be shared with others.” United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1035 (3d Cir. 1972). 8 statement reveals that, at least as of three days after his arrest, he knew about the guns in the house. His counsel suggests that he could have learned about them from Green in prison, or at his preliminary hearing. And we do not know whether Winn saw the guns during the search of the house. The government, meanwhile, says that a reasonable jury could infer that if Winn knew of the guns three days after the search, he also knew about them before the search. We need not resolve which narrative is more persuasive, as our deferential standard requires us to interpret inferences from the call in the government’s favor and accept Winn’s statement as reflecting his knowledge of the guns being present as part of the drug dealing in which he was involved. While the lack of direct evidence connecting Winn to the firearms makes this case a close one, we are mindful of the deference we must give the jury verdict. See Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430-32. Together, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial was enough to allow a reasonable jury to find that Winn had constructive possession of the guns.