Opinion ID: 2151244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Question of modification of obscenity test.

Text: The appellants contend that the decision in Redrup v. New York, supra , modified the constitutional definition of obscenity set forth in Roth v. United States, supra , and succeeding cases. Prior to Redrup the accepted obscenity standard was known as the Roth-Memoirs test, under which materials could not be proscribed unless there was a showing that: . . . (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. Memoirs v. Massachusetts (1966), 383 U. S. 413, 418, 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1. The only pre- Redrup  modification of this rule was made in Ginzburg v. United States (1966), 383 U. S. 463, 474, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 86 Sup. Ct. 969, 16 L. Ed. 2d 31, which added a theory that in close cases evidence of pandering may be probative with respect to the nature of the material in question and thus satisfy the Roth test. In 1967, the case of Redrup v. New York, supra , was decided. Redrup was actually a consolidation of three separate cases. The court had originally limited the scope of review in all three cases to the questions of scienter, vagueness of state statutes and prior restraint. Instead, the court did not reach the constitutional issues but merely recounted the differing views of the members of the court and stated, at page 771: Whichever of these constitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is clear that the judgments cannot stand. . . . The court first noted that none of the cases involved violation of a statute aimed at protecting minors; none involved publication in a manner so obtrusive as to cause unwilling individuals to be exposed to the materials; and none involved any pandering of the materials which the court found so significant in Ginzburg v. United States, supra . The appellants contend that the decision in Redrup modifies the use and scope of the Roth-Memoirs test. They argue that magazines such as those involved in this case may not serve as the basis for obscenity prosecutions unless it can be shown that: (1) they were sold to minors; or (2) they were so obtrusively displayed as to cause unwilling viewers to see them; or (3) they were pandered in the manner described in Ginzburg. We do not agree. Redrup is authority only for the proposition that the particular books and magazines there involved were not obscene. We think that if the Redrup decision was intended to reverse the Roth-Memoirs test, that obscenity is not constitutionally protected speech, the court would have so stated in no uncertain terms. Appellants' argument has been specifically rejected in Milky Way Productions, Inc. v. Leary (S. D. D. C. N. Y. 1969), 305 Fed. Supp. 288, and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. [3] In Milky Way the defendants contended that New York's obscenity statute was invalid because it contained only the Roth elements and did not include the other test claimed to be added to Roth-Memoirs by the Redrup decision. In rejecting this argument the trial court stated, at page 294: Plaintiffs misread the per curiam opinion in Redrup. As shown by the fuller opinions from which they derive, the supposedly additional, and allegedly essential, `tests' are only permissible kinds of relevant evidence which may serve in a close case to tip the balance toward a finding of obscenity. . . . . . . Nothing in Redrup changes the scope or effect of these added `tests.' There is no support in that or any other decision of the Supreme Court for the view that they must be satisfied in addition to the three tests of Memoirs before a finding of obscenity is permissible. The standard as laid down in Memoirs was cited with approval as recently as Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 568, 89 S. Ct. 1243, 22 L. Ed. 2d 542 (1969). For a view of the precedents similar to ours, see United States v. 77 Cartons of Magazines, 300 F. Supp. 851, 853-854 (N. D. Cal. 1969). We conclude that Redrup is strictly limited to the question of obscenity of the specific materials there under consideration.