Opinion ID: 3029395
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Criminal Intent

Text: 2 We use “Weaver” to refer to Eugene Weaver. When referring to Delores Weaver, we use her full name. 3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (offenses against the United States). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 3 Weaver does not dispute that the Government’s evidence supported most of the elements of the crimes for which he was tried. One element that he does dispute is intent. Wire fraud is a specific intent crime. A defendant cannot be convicted of it unless the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly and willfully participated in a scheme to obtain money or property through fraud and specifically intended to do so. United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 590 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 260 (3d Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Henry, 20 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 1994). Similarly, a conviction for theft from a federally funded program under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) requires a specific intent to convert money or property from the program. United States v. Richards, 9 F. Supp. 2d 455, 458 (D.N.J. 1988); cf. United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that § 666(a)(1)(B) is a specific intent crime). Thus, we accept Weaver’s argument that, to sustain convictions on all counts, the Government must have proved that he knew he improperly received payment for courses he did not teach. Weaver admits that he received money from CCP and that it recorded the payments as salary for courses listing him as the teacher. He also does not dispute that Delores Weaver and Faridah Ali were involved in a large-scale conspiracy to steal money from the adult education program. He claims, however, that the Government did not prove that he knew that he was receiving money as part of that fraudulent scheme. Rather, he argues that he reasonably could have believed that the payments were (1) for legitimate work that he performed for CCP a few years earlier, or (2) for his mother’s 4 legitimate work at CCP (because Delores Weaver was a CCP administraor and was a secondary holder of the account into which the money was paid). In this context, Weaver contends that the Government did not prove that he had the criminal intent required to support his convictions. At trial the Government introduced evidence of the following facts relevant to Weaver’s specific intent argument. The School assigned teachers to courses using “availability notices” on which the putative teacher requested courses and stated his availability. The Government submitted notices through which Weaver requested that he be assigned to teach courses at the School. There are signatures on the notices that purport to be those of Eugene Weaver. The Government submitted the signature on Weaver’s passport and other documents so that the jury could compare them. The signatures appear to be similar—certainly enough so that the jury reasonably could have concluded that Weaver signed the availability notices and, therefore, affirmatively requested that he be assigned to teach courses. Fed. R. Evid. 903(b)(3); see also United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir. 1983). Weaver, however, was out of town for much of the time that the notices indicated that he was available and had numerous intown conflicts when he was not. From that evidence, the jury could have concluded that Weaver did not teach and never intended to teach the courses to which he was assigned. As to the payments Weaver received, the Government submitted evidence showing that he was the primary holder of the account into which CCP paid his teaching salary. When it made a ghost-teaching payment, the entry on the next bank statement reflected 5 that the payment was from CCP and that it was a payroll payment. Weaver withdrew money from his account soon after many of the deposits. CCP business records admitted in evidence show that Weaver was notified on several occasions that his payments for teaching would be forthcoming but late. Under the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), the jury was entitled to consider the records as substantive evidence that he was in fact notified by CCP that his payments for teaching were forthcoming. As to Weaver’s claim that money could have been for legitimate work for CCP, the Government counters that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Weaver did any legitimate work for CCP. Thus, the jury had no reasonable basis on which to draw that conclusion. As to his argument that the money could have been his mother’s, the Government notes that it would make little sense for the payments to be his mother’s regular salary, as the payments were spaced irregularly and of varying amounts. From the evidence presented, the jury reasonably could have concluded that Weaver knowingly and willfully participated in every aspect of the ghost-teaching scheme, from requesting courses that he knew he would not teach to spending the money that CCP paid him. We would be hard pressed to conjure anything that would make a reversal on this issue even a possibility.