Opinion ID: 516191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression of Materially Exculpatory Evidence

Text: 23 The suppression of evidence favorable to the accused, material to either guilt or punishment, violates due process whether or not the prosecution acted in good faith. 11 Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defendant, 12 or, stated in another fashion, if the reviewing court's confidence in the outcome is undermined.
24 Jones contends that the state violated his right to due process by failing to give him lab reports of the serological tests conducted on the clothing allegedly worn by Jones and the victim during the crime and that these reports would have been exculpatory. If the tests did establish that Jones could not have been the perpetrator, they were clearly exculpatory. Without the test results, Jones asserts he was denied an opportunity to effectively cross-examine the state's expert witness regarding the chemical tests and to demonstrate his innocence or at least that the tests did not positively incriminate him. 25 Before trial, the state provided Jones with a two-page Scientific Analysis Report, which the state claims is an accurate and complete account of all of the scientific tests performed. Jones contends that the state should have produced the lab report itself because the testimony of the state's forensic expert is inconsistent with the information in the report. The report contained the following information about the serological tests done on the clothing: 26 Chemical tests indicated the presence of seminal fluid mixed with human blood on the boxer shorts, the panties, the pajama pants, the jeans, and the sweatshirt. 27 Serological examination of the stains on the boxer shorts, the panties, the pajama pants, the jeans and the sweatshirt detected the presence of H antigen (type O). These stains may or may not be mixed with vaginal secretions. 28 The blood of the victim is type O. Due to lack of a saliva sample from the victim, secretor status could not be determined.Serological examination of the blood and saliva of Andrew Lee Jones detected a type O secretor. 29 Further serological examination of the mixed blood and seminal stains on the boxer shorts and the panties gave results which are consistent with blood typing results expected from a mixture of the seminal fluid of Andrew Lee Jones and the blood of the victim. 30 (exhibit numbers omitted). 31 The expert testimony by the state's serologist was for the most part consistent with this report. The serologist testified that both the victim and Jones had blood type O, but that they differed in the types of enzymes in their blood. The victim's blood was enzyme type PGM-1 and Jones's was enzyme type PGM-2-1. The PGM enzyme appears in semen as well as in blood. Their blood also differed in EAP enzyme type. The serologist further testified that the stain analyzed on the boxer shorts was semen mixed with blood of the same type as the victim's and different from Jones's. He testified that the stains on the victim's panties and pajama bottoms contained blood mixed with semen of the same type as Jones's. In the one inconsistency with the report, the serologist testified that the traces of semen mixed with blood on the blue jeans and sweatshirt were not enough for typing. The serologist's testimony at trial was the same as the conclusion stated in the report: the results I got are the results you would expect if [Jones's] seminal fluid was mixed with the [victim's] blood. 32 Jones claims that the blood/semen stain on the boxer shorts showed an enzyme type of PGM-1, a result that exonerates Jones because his semen contains PGM-2-1 enzyme type, which masks the presence of the PGM-1 enzyme. The record is silent about the PGM enzyme type found in the blood/semen stain. The serologist testified only to his conclusion that the blood in the blood/semen stain was the same type as the victim's and different from Jones's. From this, Jones deduces that, because Jones and the victim had the same blood type O, which could not differentiate them, the mixed stain must have shown the presence of the PGM-1 enzyme in order for the serologist to find it consistent with the victim's blood type. This deduction, however, overlooks the testimony that Jones and the victim also differed as to EAP enzyme type. Since the EAP enzyme appears only in blood, not semen, the serologist might have concluded that the blood was consistent with the victim's from the presence of the EAP enzyme type. 33 The serologist's testimony about the stains on the boxer shorts, rather than exonerating Jones, was consistent with his being the perpetrator. Furthermore, the testimony that the semen in the blood/semen stains on the panties and pajamas was consistent with Jones's was clearly inculpatory and could have been determined from the presence of Jones's PGM enzyme type. Thus, the state did not conceal exculpatory evidence by giving Jones the conclusions of the lab tests rather than the actual lab reports. Had Jones wanted more, he should have requested it before trial.
34 Jones also contends that the state failed to disclose other evidence tending to exonerate him. One is information about potential jurors, a matter that can hardly be considered evidence. Another is written or recorded statements of witnesses given to the police prior to Mr. Jones' trial, but Jones gives no reason why that evidence or the information about jurors would have been material or exculpatory, thereby failing to articulate a Brady claim. 35 Jones also contends that the state had the following evidence: that the victim's neighbor told the police that she had seen two men in a blue car across the street from her home around the time Tumekica Jackson disappeared; that a neighbor of Jones's claimed she saw Jones and Mingo outside her window arguing between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. on the night the victim disappeared; that Jones was intoxicated at the time the police interrogated him; that the victim's relatives said she disliked Jones; that Reginald Jackson lied to police in saying Jones was not driven to his house by Donald Ray Nixon; that Rudolph Springer and Reginald Jackson had criminal arrest and conviction records; that Mingo had been threatened with the death penalty to persuade him to testify against Jones; and that the crime was committed by someone who smoked a different brand of cigarettes from Jones's. 36 The state denies that it had any such evidence. Its denial is supported by the fact that the trial court held a hearing on Jones's motion for production of Brady material and conducted an in camera inspection of the prosecution's case file to determine whether the state had any exculpatory information that it had not disclosed. The file contained police reports and statements and grand jury testimony of Abraham Mingo and Terry Jones. After reviewing the file, the court ordered the release of a polygraph report on Mingo indicating that he had lied in response to questions about the case. The court also said that, should any witnesses make statements during the trial inconsistent with their prior statements, he would advise the defense and probably release the statements. 37 Ordinarily when the trial court has conducted an in camera examination we will not go beyond its finding to determine whether exculpatory materials were withheld. 13 Even assuming, however, that the allegedly suppressed evidence was in the prosecutor's possession, it is not sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. While recognizing that impeachment evidence is exculpatory within the Brady rule, 14 the evidence here described is not of the magnitude that would suggest a reasonable probability that, had it been available to Jones, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 38 Finally, Jones argues that the allegedly supressed evidence would have created a residual doubt at the sentencing phase of his trial and, therefore, its nondisclosure requires a reversal of his death sentence. This claim must fail, not only because we have found that the allegedly suppressed evidence is nonmaterial, but also because a defendant has no constitutional right to have such residual doubts considered in sentencing. 15