Opinion ID: 203211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Regarded As Claim

Text: The ADA provides a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that she was disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that' she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodation; and (3) that she was discharged or adversely affected, in whole or in part, because of her disability. Id.; see also Orta-Castro v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme Química P.R., Inc., 447 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir.2006). For purposes of the ADA, one is considered disabled if she (a) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities; (b) has a record of such an impairment; or (c) is regarded as having such an impairment. Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir.2002); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The regarded as prong of the ADA exists to cover those cases in which `myths, fears and stereotypes' affect the employer's treatment of an individual, Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 938 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2( l )), because Congress has recognized that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Regarded as claims primarily fall into one of two categories: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Sullivan, 358 F.3d at 117 (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999)). A plaintiff claiming that he is `regarded' as disabled cannot merely show that his employer perceived him as somehow disabled; rather, he must prove that the employer regarded him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.  Bailey, 306 F.3d at 1169. When working is the major life activity at issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the employer thought that he was impaired in his ability to do the job that he held, but also that the employer regarded him as substantially impaired in `either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities.' Sullivan, 358 F.3d at 117 (quoting Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 144 L.Ed.2d 484 (1999)). Because Ruiz Rivera did not appeal the District Court's dismissal of her failure to accommodate claim, that issue is not before us. Ruiz Rivera, 463 F.Supp.2d at 177. Therefore, it is the law of the case that for the periods of time relevant to this inquiry Ruiz Rivera was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, did not have an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity, and Pfizer was not obligated to accommodate her. On appeal, however, Ruiz Rivera appears to continue to press her argument that her impairment renders her disabled and entitles her to accommodation, while simultaneously arguing that Pfizer mistakenly believed her to be substantially limited in a major life activity, regarded her as disabled, and terminated her as a result of this perception of disability. From our review of Ruiz Rivera's submissions, from the Complaint to her papers on appeal, it is apparent that her regarded as claim is really nothing more than a poorly disguised version of her failure to accommodate claim. In fact, the initial pleading of her regarded as claim was so indistinct that Pfizer did not even move for summary judgment on that claim, apparently because it was unaware it had even been raised. [7] Indeed, the first time Ruiz Rivera spells out her regarded as theory is in her Opposition to Pfizer's Motion for Summary Judgment, something that Pfizer strenuously, but unsuccessfully objected to as being an 11th Hour claim. On appeal, with the failure to accommodate claim not on review, the only issue is whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on the regarded as claim, on a motion for reconsideration, after initially finding material facts in dispute and denying the motion. We can understand how the District Court may have been tripped up over this issue given the way in which Ruiz Rivera has plead and argued the case. But in the end, we think the District Court got to the right result, as we will explain. We begin with the Complaint itself. As noted above, Ruiz Rivera's Complaint does not separate her failure to accommodate claim and her regarded as claim into distinct causes of action. The First Cause of Action, which alleges that Pfizer's termination because of plaintiffs disability was in violation of the ADA, contains nothing that would signal to a reader that it intended to raise a regarded as claim. Instead, it affirmatively declares that Ruiz Rivera is disabled, because she has a record of a physical and mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of her major life activities. There is no factual allegation that Ruiz Rivera had any non-limiting impairment which Pfizer wrongly regarded as limiting a major life activity; any allegation that Pfizer had stereotyped her; or anything in fact that could remotely be characterized as a description of an impairment being mischaracterized or misperceived. Rather, the only indication that a regarded as claim might have been lurking in the shadows of the Complaint was the inclusion of the word perceived in one paragraph of her eleven paragraph First Cause of Action. Paragraph 45 of the Complaint alleges: On March 27, 1999, Pfizer intentionally discriminated against plaintiff because of her disability as described above in that Pfizer terminated plaintiff because of her perceived disability. (Emphasis added). While this paragraph could signal to a defendant that plaintiff is asserting a regarded as claim, with no facts alleged to explain any false perception on Pfizer's part, and no facts alluding to any nonlimiting impairment which Pfizer mistakenly believed to be substantially limiting, this allusion falls far short of the mark. As recently clarified by the Supreme Court, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the `grounds' of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965-66, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted), and [t]o survive Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, [a plaintiffs] well-pleaded facts must `possess enough heft to sho[w] that [plaintiff is] entitled to relief.' Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1959). The fundamental purpose of our pleadings rules is to protect a defendant's inalienable right to know in advance the nature of the cause of action being asserted against him. Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1171 (1st Cir.1995). We do not think that the mere inclusion in the Complaint of the word perceived was enough to put Pfizer on notice that Ruiz Rivera was making a regarded as claim against it. On this basis alone, the regarded as claim was subject to dismissal. Moreover, the Supreme Court has implied that regarded as claims under the ADA require an even greater level of specificity than other claims. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-91, 119 S.Ct. 2139. In order to allege an actionable regarded as claim, a plaintiff must select and identify the major life activity that she will attempt to prove the employer regarded as being substantially limited by her impairment. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (dismissing ADA regarded as claim in part for inadequacy of its pleading, wherein the petitioners failed to state a claim that respondent regard[ed] their impairment as substantially limiting their ability to work); see also Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir.2001); Kaiser v. Banc of Am. Inv. Servs., Inc., 296 F.Supp.2d 1219, 1221 (D.Nev.2003). It is apparent from our review that at the time Ruiz Rivera filed her Complaint, regarded as disability discrimination was barely an afterthought  a throwaway line in one paragraph of a lengthy complaint. Faced with a well-reasoned and convincing motion for summary judgment on her ADA claim, however, Ruiz Rivera shifted legal theories and sought to re-characterize her Complaint in a way that might parry Pfizer's blow. It simply will not do for a plaintiff to fail to plead with adequate specificity facts to support a regarded as claim, all-the-while hoping to play that card if her initial hand is a dud. See Fleming v. Lind-Waldock & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir.1990) ([S]ummary judgment is not a procedural second chance to flesh out inadequate pleadings.). Ruiz Rivera's regarded as claim also fails on substantive grounds. The undisputed facts [8] reveal that, in late March 2007, Ruiz Rivera presented to Dr. Felix at Pfizer a list of workplace restrictions imposed by her doctor based on her various ailments. Her doctor's note indicated that the restrictions should remain in place for at least six months, perhaps longer. Based on these restrictions  and these restrictions alone  Pfizer determined that Ruiz Rivera could not perform the essential tasks of her job as a packaging operator in the bottling department. Ruiz Rivera maintains that she then sought accommodation for her limitations and in doing so requested that she be given a different job at the facility. [9] Pfizer denied Ruiz Rivera's request, and, according to the testimony of Frances Guzman, Assistant Personnel Manager, informed Ruiz Rivera that Pfizer did not consider her to be disabled within the meaning of the ADA and Pfizer was under no obligation to accommodate her. These undisputed facts, of course, were the basis for Ruiz Rivera's now-dismissed claims for termination and failure to accommodate. She asserted that the impairments upon which her doctor's restrictions were based constituted a disability under the ADA which Pfizer was required to reasonably accommodate. Pfizer disagreed, concluding that Ruiz Rivera was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA, and thus not entitled to any accommodation, and the District Court concurred. [10] Now, Ruiz Rivera uses Pfizer's lawful refusal to provide her with the sought-after accommodation as the primary basis for her regarded as claim. Ruiz Rivera does not maintain that she could perform her job as packaging operator in the bottling department with the restrictions imposed by her doctor, but that Pfizer mistakenly believed her unable to do so; rather, she maintains that she could perform her job if granted the accommodations to which the District Court found she was not entitled. This, coupled with Pfizer's refusal to accommodate Ruiz Rivera's request for a different job, is what forms the basis for her regarded as claim. Specifically, Ruiz Rivera insists that Pfizer mistakenly regarded her as being substantially limited in the life activity of working. For her support, she cites to two events: first, she cites Dr. Felix's response to the restrictions imposed by her personal physician, wherein Dr. Felix determined she could not return to and work at her position in the bottling department at the Pfizer plant; and second, she points to the comment allegedly made to her by Guzman to the effect that with the conditions imposed by her doctors, she could not perform any work at the Pfizer plant or anywhere else in the pharmaceutical industry. As correctly argued by Pfizer in its Motion for Reconsideration, Ruiz Rivera may not rely exclusively on her employer's recognition or implementation of the restrictions imposed by her own physician to establish a regarded as claim. See Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir.2001) (Where the recognition of Plaintiffs limitations is not an erroneous perception, but is instead a recognition of fact, a finding that Plaintiff was regarded as disabled is inappropriate.); Breitkreutz v. Cambrex Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 783 (8th Cir.2006) (If a restriction is based upon the recommendations of physicians, then it is not based upon myths or stereotypes about the disabled and does not establish a perception of disability.); see also Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir.1995) (employer who terminated employee because of the restrictions associated with employee's impairment did not regard employee as disabled in the major life activity of working where its perception of employee's impairment was based not on speculation, stereotype, or myth, but on a doctor's written restrictions). Thus, Pfizer's recognition of Ruiz Rivera's impairment, and unwillingness to provide the accommodation that Ruiz Rivera sought, but to which she was not entitled, simply does not transform its actions into regarded as discrimination. Moreover, to allow this regarded as claim to stand would be tantamount to allowing her dismissed failure to accommodate claim in through the back door. See Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 848-49 (8th Cir.2005). Although the District Court's reconsideration of its original decision to deny summary judgment on the regarded as claim lacked written justification, it is clear to us that dismissal on reconsideration was both appropriate and warranted. Any reliance on Dr. Felix's statements or opinion, based entirely on Ruiz Rivera's own doctor's recommendations, cannot support a regarded as claim. Furthermore, the allegation that Pfizer mistakenly regarded Ruiz Rivera to be substantially limited in the life activity of working makes little sense in the face of the undisputed record that Pfizer told Ruiz Rivera that it did not consider her impairment to constitute an ADA covered disability. Moreover, Pfizer did not terminate Ruiz Rivera's employment when it refused to accommodate the restrictions imposed by her doctor; rather, it terminated her over nine months later, after numerous unsuccessful attempts to seek updates on her medical status. Finally, the isolated comment allegedly made by Guzman as to the impact of the restrictions on Ruiz Rivera's ability to find work in the pharmaceutical industry is of no help to Ruiz Rivera. At the time that Guzman allegedly made this comment, Pfizer had determined, in reliance upon Ruiz Rivera's own doctor's recommendations, that Ruiz Rivera could not perform the essential functions of her job; her impairment did not constitute a disability under the ADA; and it had no obligation to accommodate her. Thus, while Guzman may have considered the restrictions imposed by Ruiz Rivera's doctors as limiting her chances of finding work elsewhere in the pharmaceutical industry, there simply is no evidence that Ruiz Rivera was refused accommodation or terminated because of this generalization. In light of the record, Guzman's statement at worst amounts to little more than a stray remark, one which standing alone is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Patten v. Walr-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir.2002) (direct evidence of discrimination excludes mere background noise and stray remarks); Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir.1998) (stray remarks, including statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself normally are insufficient to establish discriminatory animus) (citations omitted).