Opinion ID: 2624214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the State's Motion for Summary Disposition State with Particularity the Grounds of the Motion?

Text: Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) permits either party in a post-conviction relief proceeding to file a motion for summary disposition of the application. The trial court can grant the motion when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Because a post-conviction relief proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); I.C. § 19-4907(a), a motion for summary disposition must state with particularity the grounds therefor. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995); I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). DeRushé contends that for the notice to state its grounds with particularity, The notice must identify with particularity why an applicant's evidence or legal theories are considered deficient. The notice must provide any deficiency in the applicant's evidence or any legal analysis that needs to be addressed in order to avoid dismissal of the petition. The particularity requirement of Rule 7(b)(1) does not mandate that level of detail. The Rule only requires reasonable particularity. Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 292, 399 P.2d 262, 264-65 (1965). If the notice is sufficient that the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice, the requirement is met. Id. at 292, 399 P.2d at 265. This was not a situation as in Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001), in which the trial court had wrongly denied appointed counsel and had granted the State's motion for summary disposition because the applicant failed to allege sufficient facts to entitle him to any relief. In Brown, we stated that when a pro se applicant has requested the appointment of counsel, [i]t is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to give the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for counsel based upon the merits of the claims. Id. at 679, 23 P.3d at 141. The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his or her claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. If the ground for summary disposition is that assertions by the applicant are not admissible evidence, stating the ground with reasonable particularity requires no more than the level of particularity required to object to the admissibility of that evidence, such as that it is conclusory, hearsay, or lacking foundation. It is rarely necessary to further explain those objections. If the ground for summary disposition is that there is no admissible evidence on an essential element of a claim, reasonable particularity only requires pointing that out. For example, claims of ineffective assistance of defense counsel or of prosecutorial misconduct in withholding evidence favorable to the accused both require prejudice to the defendant. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008) (a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different); Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004) (an essential element of a Brady violation is that prejudice must have ensued). Reasonable particularity only requires pointing out that there is a lack of evidence showing prejudice. It does not require explaining what further evidence is necessary, particularly since it may not exist. In the present case, DeRushé was represented by counsel. If the State did not state the grounds of its motion with sufficient particularity, then DeRushé should have raised that issue below. He cannot raise the alleged lack of specificity for the first time on appeal. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001) (claim that state failed to give applicant a twenty-day notice of its motion for summary disposition could not be raised for the first time on appeal); McCoy v. State, 129 Idaho 70, 921 P.2d 1194 (1996) (applicant for post-conviction relief could not raise for the first time on appeal claims that his attorney in the underlying criminal action had a conflict and that the judge in that action breached a duty by failing to inquire about the conflict). Therefore, we will not consider DeRushé's claim that the State's motion for summary disposition did not state its grounds with sufficient particularity. DeRushé contends that Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003), holds that he can challenge on appeal whether the State alleged the grounds of its motion with sufficient particularity even though he did not raise that issue in the trial court. In Garza, the district court sua sponte gave notice of its intent to dismiss Garza's petition pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), which requires the court to indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing.  (Emphasis added.) Garza did not respond to the court's notice, and then appealed the dismissal contending that the notice was insufficient. We held that Garza's failure to respond to the district court's notice did not bar appeal of the dismissal. After considering the notice given by the district court, we held, The district court did not give the rationale for dismissing the claims. The notice was insufficient and the dismissal on these grounds is vacated. Id. at 538, 82 P.3d at 450. The district court cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does not give the parties a twenty-day prior notice stating its reasons for doing so as required by Idaho Code § 19-4906(b). Garza v. State . Likewise, if the State moves to dismiss a petition under Idaho Code § 19-4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on a ground not asserted by the State in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice required by Section 19-4906(b). Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). A district judge also errs in dismissing a petition where the State does not allege any grounds for the dismissal, other than Idaho Code §§ 19-4901 et seq. Id. In the instant case, however, DeRushé has not pointed to any error by the district court. The State specified the grounds for its motion, and DeRushé responded to the motion and argued it without challenging the sufficiency of the State's grounds. If the grounds lacked sufficient particularity, DeRushé should have presented that issue to the district court and obtained a ruling on it. We would then have reviewed that ruling on appeal.