Opinion ID: 6345570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cumulative Civil Penalties

Text: [¶20] Turning to the City’s cross-appeal, the trial court considered what it determined to be an unresolved question of law: “[W]hether the two [land 13 use violation] penalties may run concurrently to each other . . . where the violations existed at the same time and were the subject of a unitary Notice of Violation and Land Use Enforcement action.” Analogizing from the criminal law, the court concluded that they could and imposed concurrent penalties, reducing the amount Verrinder was required to pay by $14,700—the amount of the broken stair penalty. We review for an error of law whether, as the City contends, the court exceeded its authority by imposing concurrent penalties. See Emerson, 616 A.2d at 1271. [¶21] The court was, as it recognized, required by statute to impose a minimum penalty of $100 per day for each violation. 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(B). The court also correctly recognized that our prior decisions “[have] made it clear that [the trial] court is . . . without discretion to suspend any portion of the minimum penalty imposed.” See Town of Orono v. LaPointe, 1997 ME 185, ¶ 12, 698 A.2d 1059 (“The only discretion permitted to the court is in assessing the penalty for each separate offense between the minimum of $100 and the maximum . . . . The District Court correctly assessed the minimum penalty . . . but erred by suspending any part of it.”); Emerson, 616 A.2d at 1272 (“The Superior Court erred as a matter of law in imposing a lesser penalty.”). 14 [¶22] We agree with the City that there is no practical difference between suspending the broken stair penalty—which would clearly be error under LaPointe—and making it concurrent with the larger trash violation penalty. In either case Verrinder would not be required to pay the minimum penalty prescribed by the Legislature for the broken stair violation. See 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(B). The court’s analogy to criminal law is inapposite because, as we have discussed, civil penalties are coercive, see Emerson, 616 A.2d at 1270, and are imposed to incentivize compliance with ordinances rather than to punish, see Anton, 463 A.2d at 706. As the City notes, a concurrent penalty is a disincentive to compliance with an ordinance because, using this case as an example, it would remove any reason for Verrinder to fix his broken stairs. [¶23] We therefore hold that the court erred in making the minimum civil penalties it imposed pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 4452(3)(B) concurrent with one another. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the judgment and remand for entry of a judgment requiring Verrinder to pay a total civil penalty of $39,000, plus the fees and costs awarded by the court. The entry is: That portion of the judgment making the civil penalties imposed concurrent with each other is vacated. Remanded for entry of a judgment 15 requiring payment of $39,000 in civil penalties. In all other respects, judgment affirmed. _______________________________ CONNORS, J., dissenting. [¶24] I would vacate the judgment and remand for a determination, before the application of res judicata, whether Verrinder was in fact unable to pay the appeal fee due to financial hardship. Assuming that Verrinder can show that he was unable to pay the appeal fee, the Court’s conclusion that Verrinder cannot contest the application of res judicata because he did not attempt to obtain a waiver of the fee before the Board, despite the lack of any legal avenue to seek such a waiver, is contrary to the requirement that, for res judicata to apply, the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had fair notice and a full and fair opportunity to participate in the preceding litigation.