Opinion ID: 1226850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Right to Expand

Text: Arguably, the language a nonconforming business use may expand is ambiguous as to whether the right is mandatory, e.g., not subject to county regulation, or permissive. See Castregon v. Huerta, 119 Ariz. 343, 345, 580 P.2d 1197, 1199 (1978) (use of the word may is interpreted as permissive or mandatory according to the usual principles of statutory construction). Lacking any clear expression of legislative intent, we examine the legislative history of the statute. See City of Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz. 290, 394 P.2d 410 (1964). The county zoning scheme originated with the County Planning and Zoning Act of 1949, first codified at §§ 17-1901 through 17-1918. See Ariz.Code Ann. 1939 ed. (1952 Cum.Supp.). Section 17-1916 provided that [a] nonconforming business use within a district shall have the right to expansion providing the same does not exceed 100% of the area of the original business. (Emphasis added.) That section was later amended to its present form and codified as A.R.S. § 11-830(B) in the extensive 1956 revisions to the Code. See A.R.S. § 11-830(B) (1956). While the legislature did not expressly comment on the intent behind the changes, we note that the amended statute differs in three important respects from its predecessor: (1) it changes the language from shall to may, (2) it deletes the words right to expansion altogether, and (3) it separates the provision regarding continuance from that dealing with expansion. Although, as noted, the word may has occasionally been interpreted as mandatory, we are reluctant to accord that construction where the legislature has clearly amended a statute's mandatory language. As the court of appeals noted in another case in which a statute's language was amended from shall to may without specific expression of legislative intent, when the legislature amends a statute we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act. Lake Havasu City v. Mohave County, 138 Ariz. 552, 558, 675 P.2d 1371, 1377 (1983). Taken as a whole, the amendments to the statute are quite substantive in nature and indicate that the legislature intended to distinguish between the absolute right of a nonconforming business use to continue in its present state and the limited right of a nonconforming use to reasonable expansion. Thus, we believe the legislature contemplated that counties would have at least minimal regulatory authority to ensure that expansion of nonconforming uses would be reasonable. [4] The court of appeals acknowledged that counties have some regulatory authority, but apparently concluded that the one hundred percent area limitation was the sole permissible restriction on expansion, though the statute does not plainly state this. Rotter, 167 Ariz. at 205, 805 P.2d at 1026; cf. A.R.S. § 11-830(A)(2) (legislature specifically provided that no ordinance shall [p]revent, restrict or otherwise regulate the use or occupation of land [for stated purposes]. (emphasis added)). In a prior portion of the opinion, however, the court correctly realized that A.R.S. § 11-830(B) does not give a nonconforming use an absolute right to expand up to one hundred percent free of any regulation by the County. For example, the court acknowledged that nonconforming uses are subject to reasonable regulations under the police power to protect the public health, safety, welfare or morals. Rotter, 167 Ariz. at 202, 805 P.2d at 1023 (quoting Watanabe, 140 Ariz. at 577, 683 P.2d at 1179). In addition, a nonconforming use cannot be accorded greater rights than a conforming use in the same district. Jenkintown Towing Serv. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 67 Pa.Cmwlth. 183, 446 A.2d 716, 719 (1982). Thus, expansion of the nonconforming use is subject to the same sideyard and setback requirements that govern all structures in the district. [5] Thus, expansion of nonconforming uses is clearly subject to some county regulation aside from the one hundred percent area limitation. We must therefore determine whether A.R.S. § 11-830(B) authorizes expansion onto a parcel first acquired after passage of the ordinance and not previously subject to that use, or whether a county may prohibit such an expansion in the reasonable exercise of its regulatory authority. Because A.R.S. § 11-830(B) is silent on the issue, we must construe the statute to determine whether this is a permissible regulation.