Opinion ID: 2388227
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act

Text: On April 25, 1986 the Maine Legislature enacted the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act, P.L. 1985, ch. 782. That Act, subsequently codified as 12 M.R.S.A. § 571-573 (Supp.1987-1988), provides that the intertidal lands are the subject of a public trust, that the State is the trustee of public rights in the intertidal lands, and that public rights include recreation as well as fishing, fowling, and navigation. The legislation reads in its entirety as follows: § 571. Legislative findings and purpose The Legislature finds and declares that the intertidal lands of the State are impressed with a public trust and that the State is responsible for protection of the public's interest in this land. The Legislature further finds and declares that this public trust is part of the common law of Maine and generally derived from the practices, conditions and needs in Maine, from English Common Law and from the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47. The public trust is an evolving doctrine reflective of the customs, traditions, heritage and habits of the Maine people. In Maine, the doctrine has diverged from the laws of England and Massachusetts. The public trust encompasses those uses of intertidal land essential to the health and welfare of the Maine people, which uses include, but are not limited to, fishing, fowling, navigation, use as a footway between points along the shore and use for recreational purposes. These recreational uses are among the most important to the Maine people today who use intertidal land for relaxation from the pressures of modern society and for enjoyment of nature's beauty. The Legislature further finds and declares that the protection of the public uses referred to in this chapter is of great public interest and grave concern to the State. § 572. Definitions As used in this chapter, the term intertidal land means all land of this State affected by the tides between the mean high watermark and either 100 rods seaward from the high watermark or the mean low watermark, whichever is closer to the mean high watermark. § 573. Public trust rights in intertidal land 1. Public trust rights. The public trust rights in intertidal land include the following: A. The right to use intertidal land for fishing, fowling and navigation; B. The right to use intertidal land for recreation; and C. Any other trust rights to use intertidal land recognized by the Maine common law and not specifically abrogated by statute. 2. Limitations. The rights described in subsection 1 do not include: A. The removal from the intertidal land of any sand, soil, rocks or other minerals; B. Interference with any structure, development or improvement erected or maintained on intertidal land in accordance with the laws of this State; C. The depositing of any refuse or waste on intertidal land or in the water covering intertidal land; or D. Use or operation of motorized vehicles other than navigable watercraft, unless specifically authorized by state law or municipal ordinance. 3. Police Powers. Municipalities shall have jurisdiction to exercise their police powers to control public use of intertidal land, except where such exercise is superseded by any state law. 4. Other public rights. This chapter does not affect public rights in intertidal land arising from custom, prescription, implied dedication, acquiescence or any other source. This chapter does not affect public rights in dry sand areas upland from intertidal land arising from custom, prescription, implied dedication, acquiescence, the public trust doctrine or any other source. The Superior Court held that the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act violates the separation of powers provision of the Maine Constitution. Without addressing the Superior Court's ruling, this Court now holds that the Act is unconstitutional because it constitutes a taking of private property. Because, in my view, the public common law rights in the intertidal lands includes recreational uses, the Act merely declares the common law [15] and there is no taking of property. The statute, however, does contain provisions that may constitute an addition to existing common law, i.e., provisions declaring that intertidal lands are the subject of a public trust and that the State is trustee of those public rights. Accordingly, my analysis requires a review of the Superior Court's holding that the Act violated the separation of powers provision of the Maine Constitution. The Superior Court acknowledged the authority of the Legislature to codify, alter, or abrogate the common law but maintained that it must do so by making new law rather than by interpreting existing law. Construing our opinion in Bell v. Wells I as holding that the State is not a trustee of the public rights, the court found that the contrary legislative interpretation encroached upon the authority of the judiciary. Under the Maine Constitution, governmental powers are divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial. Me. Const. art. III, § 1. The separation of powers provision provides that [n]o person or persons, belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others. Id. § 2. Because the rule of separation of powers is explicit in the Maine Constitution, the principle is more strictly construed than in the federal system where the rule is only implicit. State v. Hunter, 447 A.2d 797, 799 (Me.1982). The inquiry is whether the particular power has been explicitly granted to one branch of state government, and to no other branch. If so, article III, section 2 forbids another branch to exercise that power. Id. at 800. As we have explained, the question is similar to the one posed by the federal courts in evaluating whether an issue is a non-justiciable political question namely, whether there is a `textually demonstrable constitutional commitment' of the issue to another branch of the government. Id. n. 4 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)). Although the Maine Constitution does not define the parameters of the judicial power, the opinions of this Court provide guidance. The essence of the judicial power, as distinguished from the legislative, is its focus on resolving specific controversies between particular parties in litigation. In Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326 (1825), we held that a legislative resolve granting to a particular litigant the right to appeal a decree of the probate court was an improper exercise of the judicial power by the Legislature. It is one of the striking and peculiar features of judicial power that it is displayed in the decision of controversies between contending parties; the settlement of their rights and redress of their wrongs. Id. at 332. [16] By contrast, a proper exercise of legislative power must in its nature be general and prospective; a rule for all, and binding on all. It is the province of the legislature to make and establish laws; and it is the province and duty of judges to expound and apply them. Id. at 333. Because the Legislature in Lewis had conferred upon an individual litigant a right particular to him alone, it had encroached upon the judicial power. In evaluating whether the Legislature encroached upon the judicial power when it enacted the Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act, I note first that legislative enactments must be presumed constitutional. Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90, 95 (Me.1973). The Superior Court held that the Legislature violated the separation of powers provision because it had purported to interpret the common law, rather than make new law. I conclude that the Legislature acted to declare the existence of a public trust in the intertidal lands, regardless of whether that trust existed at common law. The legislative findings and purpose, 12 M.R.S.A. § 571, include three independent findings only one of which refers to the common law. Significantly, in the first paragraph of section 571, the Legislature finds and declares the public trust in the intertidal lands and that the State is responsible for protecting the public's interest. Id. In the second paragraph of section 571, the Legislature further finds and declares that the public trust is part of the common law. In the final paragraph, the Legislature further finds that the protection of public uses ... is of great public interest and grave concern. Even if we assume that the Legislature has purported to interpret the common law, it has not encroached upon the essence of the judicial function which is, as noted above, the resolution of disputes between particular litigants. Undoubtedly, the Legislature acted partly in response to the present litigation. The Act, however, provides a rule of general applicability designed to aid in the resolution of all potential disputes regarding the scope of the public's rights in the entire coast of Maine. The Act provides a rule for all, and binding on all, not simply a rule for the parties to this litigation. Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 333 (1825). The Act is therefore within the scote of Legislature's authority to alter, abrogate, and codify the common law. See e.g., Atlantic Oceanic Kampgrounds v. Camden National Bank, 473 A.2d 884, 886 (Me.1984). I would find no violation of the separation of powers provision of the Maine Constitution.