Opinion ID: 2481410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Remarks in Closing Argument Regarding Evidence in Aggravation

Text: Next, defendant argues that the State violated the trial court's discovery sanction order by arguing that defendant committed the murders in order to prevent the victims from being witnesses against him. In July 2006, defendant requested notice from the State of the statutory aggravating factors upon which the State would rely. The State failed to respond by the court-imposed deadline in December of that year. Defendant sought to have the State sanctioned by not allowing it to seek the death penalty. The trial court declined to grant this request. The court did so because it found the State was nonetheless in substantial compliance with Rule 416. The court concluded that defendant suffered no prejudice or surprise as a result of the State's violation of the rule, as he had been on notice since the very start of the trial that the State would be seeking the death penalty and that the State would argue several statutory and nonstatutory factors. However, although the court denied defendant's request, the court did restrict the State only to those aggravating factors originally disclosed prior to defendant's first trial. The statutory aggravating factors originally disclosed were that the defendant (1) committed multiple murders, (2) committed a murder in the course of another felony and (3) committed a murder in a cold and calculated way. The State had also disclosed several nonstatutory aggravating factors. The State argued that the young age of the victims, the execution manner of the murders, the unprovoked nature of the offenses, the defenselessness of the victims, defendant's prior criminal history and defendant's lack of remorse were all aggravating factors. Defendant is not challenging this remedy fashioned by the trial court. Rather, defendant is challenging an alleged violation of the court's order restricting the State's available arguments. Specifically, defendant alleges that the State argued the following statutory aggravating factor: (b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:    (8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8), `participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution' is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors[.] 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(8) (West 2006). Throughout the State's closing statement, the prosecutor expressly argued that defendant killed L.M. and Lonna to prevent them from being witnesses against him. Defendant argues that, with this part of the State's closing, the State violated the trial court's order limiting argument to those aggravating factors originally disclosed in 1997. Defendant argues he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing as a result of this violation. Defendant first acknowledges that he failed to properly preserve this issue for appeal. No objection was made at trial to the State's statements and defendant failed to raise the issue in a posttrial motion. Thus, defendant argues the issue should be reviewed for plain error. As noted above, a reviewing court will only reverse for plain error when a clear or obvious error occurs and (1) the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 565, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403. We first consider whether a clear or obvious error occurred. If the prosecutor's comments constitute an argument for the statutory aggravating factor in section 9-1(b)(8) of the Criminal Code, then the State violated the trial court's order. Under that scenario, we would then consider whether defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on the closeness of the evidence or the seriousness of the error. However, the State's argument is that it did not improperly argue a statutory aggravating factor. The State contends that no clear or obvious error occurred because the trial court's order imposed limitations only on the available statutory aggravating factors and did not limit nonstatutory aggravating evidence. The State also argues that the statements made during closing argument referred to conduct that does not qualify for the statutory aggravating factor specified in subsection (b)(8) and, therefore, did not improperly argue an additional statutory aggravating factor. Rather, the prosecutor's comments provided the basis for a nonstatutory aggravating factor. Thus, for defendant to prevail, either we must conclude that the prosecutor improperly argued an undisclosed statutory aggravating factor or, in the alternative, we must reject the State's argument that the trial court's order limiting the aggravating factors to be argued during the sentencing phase did not also preclude additional nonstatutory factors. The State's argument on this issue rests on there being a significant distinction between the argument that defendant was motivated to kill his victims by a desire to prevent them from later serving as witnesses and an argument based on the statutory factor covering that very motivation. The State argues it can argue the former without arguing the latter if the motivation and circumstances of the crime do not meet the technical requirements of the statutory factor codified in subsection (b)(8). The State distinguishes People v. Adams, 109 Ill.2d 102, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339 (1985). In that case, the prosecutor made several references which expressly argued application of subsection (b)(8). In the first phase of the sentencing trial, the prosecutor stated, I would ask you to sign the verdict finding the aggravating factors stating that Adams not only committed murder and armed robbery but he committed in the fashion that the Legislature has said if you do it that way with the intent, if you are the person who did it, if you do it to knock off a witness, then you qualify for the death penalty. (Emphasis omitted.) Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 125-26, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. In the second phase, the prosecutor was more direct, stating there's another factor and another way that Adams qualified for falling into the category of the death penalty, and that was that the murdered individual was a witness in the prosecution or was an eyewitness or possessed other material evidence against the Defendant. Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 128, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. In Adams, this court concluded, based on People v. Brownell, 79 Ill.2d 508, 525-26, 38 Ill.Dec. 757, 404 N.E.2d 181 (1980), that subsection (b)(8) could not be used as an aggravating factor permitting the State to regard the slain person not only as the victim of murder but also as a witness to the crime of his own murder as well. Adams, 109 Ill.2d at 127, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339. In this case, as noted above, the State argued in closing that defendant executed L.M. to prevent her from being a witness against him. The record does reflect that defendant told police he was afraid L.M. would tell on him. However, the State argues that this statement should not be construed as a suggestion by the State that subsection (b)(8) applies. Specifically, the State notes it is implausible that defendant killed L.M. with the intent to silence her from talking to police that is required under subsection (b)(8). (Emphasis in original.) We agree with the State that Adams would have prevented the State from seeking and arguing an instruction based on the statutory aggravating factor of killing a witness, as L.M. was a witness only to the crimes being perpetrated by the defendant at that timeher rape and murder. Likewise, at trial the State suggested that Lonna was killed because [t]his defendant can't have any witnesses. He had just shot Rachel, and 12-year-old Lonna knows him. She begged for her life. She could also be a witness, and he can't have that. So he executed her, too. Again, under Adams, the only crimes to which Lonna was a witness were those crimes being committed by the defendant at that time, including her own murder. The State, therefore, recognizes that section (b)(8) could not have applied and that arguing this statutory factor would have been improper. However, as the State suggests, arguing that defendant did not want to leave any witnesses is not the same as arguing the statutory factor. Importantly, unlike the prosecutor in Adams, the State here made no reference to subsection (b)(8) or to the legislature having decided this factor was important. As far as the jury was concerned, defendant's motivation to leave no witnesses had no imprimatur from the legislature and the jury could choose, or choose not, to assign aggravating weight to that motivation. Thus, although the State was not entitled to argue the statutory aggravating factor codified in subsection (b)(8), both by the factor's own terms and by the limits placed upon the State by the trial court, the State was entitled to argue the facts and circumstances of the case as a nonstatutory aggravating factor. By way of analogy, subsection (b)(7) is an aggravating factor based on the age of the victim and the cruelty leading to the victim's death. However, if a victim in a particular case were over 12 years old, the State is not precluded from arguing, as a nonstatutory factor, that the victim was young and that his death resulted from cruel, brutal and heinous behavior. Indeed, in this case, the jury was not instructed to consider the statutory factor codified at subsection (b)(7). Nonetheless, the State emphasized that Lonna was 12 years old and that defendant coldly executed her after she begged for her life. Although we agree that the State did not improperly argue an additional statutory factor, we must still ask whether the trial court's order also prevented the State from arguing additional nonstatutory factors. The State argues that the context of the discussion regarding the discovery violation suggests that the court's order prohibited the State only from arguing additional statutory factors. The State also asserts that a defendant is not entitled to disclosure of nonstatutory aggravating factors and that, therefore, even if the court intended to prohibit additional nonstatutory aggravating factors, it was improper for the court to enter such an order. Defendant's original motion for discovery, which the trial court granted, asked the court to compel discovery of aggravating factors pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 416. Defendant asked that he be informed which statutory and non-statutory aggravating factors the State intends to rely upon. However, although defendant's motion asked for disclosure of both types of aggravating factors, Rule 416 requires the State to file a Notice of Intent to Seek or Decline Death Penalty, which shall also include all of the statutory aggravating factors enumerated in section 9-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961. (Emphasis added.) 188 Ill.2d R. 416(c). Thus, the rule itself does not expressly require disclosure of nonstatutory aggravating factors. The discussion of defendant's motion seeking to bar the State from seeking the death penalty also fails to support defendant's argument and instead suggests that only disclosure of statutory aggravating factors was required. Counsel for the defendant suggested to the court that the issue that the defendant has raised is whether there is compliance with Rule 416. Later, after the State had provided the court with its original notice of intent, filed in 1996, defense counsel again referenced Rule 416, noting [Rule] 416 says `the State shall' in two places and puts the burden and requirement on the State. Counsel noted defendant filed a motion    requesting that [the State] give us those aggravating factors as they are required to do by rule. Counsel's argument was centered on its claim that the State had failed to conform to the rule. The trial court acknowledged this fact, specifically noting the issue in this matter is whether the State complied with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 416 in disclosing to the defendant the statutory aggravating factors which it intends to prove in the sentencing phase of this proceeding. The State's argument acknowledged that there had been a technical violation of Rule 416 in that it had not complied with the court's order to again provide disclosure of the statutory aggravating factors. Still, the State argued that the spirit and the letter of 416 were complied with ten years ago and that there was no danger of unfair surprise to defendant. After considering the parties' arguments, the court found that there has been a failure to make a written disclosure pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 416(c). As noted above, however, the court concluded that there was substantial compliance with the rule because the State had, prior to defendant's first trial, provided written disclosure of aggravating factors and had, prior to the second trial, orally indicated it would be seeking the death penalty. In fashioning a remedy when there is substantial compliance with the rule, the court noted that the purpose of the rule is to avoid unfair surprise. Concluding that there had been no surprise to defendant, the court declined to grant defendant's motion in full. Instead, it allowed the State to seek the death penalty, but required it to comply with Rule 416(c) by the end of the day and prohibited the State from adding aggravating factors that were not originally disclosed. Although the court's order did not expressly limit the aggravating factors to be disclosed, we conclude that given the framing of the issue by the court and both parties, the court's order instructed the State to bring itself into compliance with Rule 416. Rule 416 requires only disclosure of statutory aggravating factors. Although the State, prior to the first trial, did opt to inform the defendant of the nonstatutory aggravating factors it intended to argue, Rule 416 does not compel the State to do so. Therefore, the fact that the State did not disclose this additional argument as a nonstatutory aggravating factor cannot be a ground upon which we can grant defendant relief. As we conclude that the trial court's order limiting the State's use of additional aggravating factors applied only to statutory factors, we need not address the State's second argument that any order limiting nonstatutory aggravating factors was improper. Because the State's arguments were proper, we also conclude that no clear or obvious error occurred and, therefore, we need not address the rest of defendant's plain-error argument.