Opinion ID: 1201619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Bifurcation of Issue of Guilt and Mercy

Text: Here, the defendant raises his most significant issue, namely, that the consolidation of his case both as to the guilt and sentencing phases effectively denied him a fair trial. The defendant's pretrial motion for bifurcation was denied, and the trial court properly relied on W.Va.Code, 62-3-15 (1965). [30] The defendant now contends the statute is unconstitutional or, alternatively, it should be construed to permit discretionary bifurcation. The constitutionality of W.Va.Code, 62-3-15, has been confirmed. Billotti v. Dodrill, 183 W.Va. 48, 394 S.E.2d 32 (1990); State ex rel. Leach v. Hamilton, ___ W.Va. ___, 280 S.E.2d 62 (1980); Moore v. McKenzie, 160 W.Va. 511, 236 S.E.2d 342 (1977); State ex rel. Rasnake v. Narick, 159 W.Va. 542, 227 S.E.2d 203 (1976). Further inquiry and evaluation of the statute's constitutionality hardly would be worth the effort, resources, and costs. Thus, we accept this Court's prior verdict on this issue as well as the judgment of our federal courts [31] that a unitary criminal trial in a first degree murder case meets muster under both the United States and West Virginia Constitutions. On the other hand, we cannot dismiss so easily the alternative contention of the defendant that we should construe the statute in such a way a trial court would have discretion to bifurcate the two stages of a criminal trial. The issue is one of construction of a statute and the Rules of Criminal Procedure; thus, our review of the trial court's ruling is plenary. The issue we address is one of first impression in West Virginia. Our prior cases have dealt exclusively with the constitutionality of bifurcation and in each instance a solid majority has upheld its validity. See Schofield v. West Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 185 W.Va. 199, 406 S.E.2d 425 (1991); Leach, supra (Neely, J., dissenting); Rasnake, supra (Neely, J., and Wilson, J., dissenting). The language in Leach fairly sums up the tone of these cases: A bifurcated proceeding may be preferable (although we think not); but it is not constitutionally imperative. A unitary jury trial under W.Va.Code, 62-3-15, is constitutional. ___ W.Va. at ___, 280 S.E.2d at 65. The judiciary, like every other institution, must be open to discarding habits that have outlived their usefulness and must bend under the pressures of modern life to find the most effective procedure in accomplishing its mission. Needless to say, efficiency cannot be permitted to prevail at the expense of justice. The obligation of the courts to deliver justice is paramount, and it may not be scrapped for the benefit of cheaper and more rapid dispositions. On the other hand, when enormous savings of expense and gains of efficiency can be accomplished without sacrificing justice, courts must adopt the procedure that produces the greater efficiency. There can be no doubt that unitary trials are a valuable and important tool of judicial administration which especially is true when courts are overwhelmed with huge numbers of criminal cases and they involve consolidation of claims and issues that can be resolved primarily on the same facts. In such cases, consolidation permits the trial court to more effectively husband scarce resources and to meet its constitutional obligation to give all criminal defendants a speedy trial. If carefully and properly administered, as it was intended by the Legislature, consolidation of the issues of guilt and sentencing also is capable of producing, with efficiency and greatly reduced expense for all parties, a fairer, more rational, and evenhanded delivery of justice. It requires little imagination to recognize that without the ability to consolidate all jury issues the courts simply would be incapable of handling criminal litigation of any volume. The waste of time and expense involved in empaneling separate juries or even permitting the same jury to hear separately the same facts offered at the guilt phase over and over again is staggering. If a trial court reaches the conclusion that a unitary trial will not impede justice, the trial court should take measures to assist the jury in comprehending the evidence for both issues of guilt and sentencing through the use of intelligent management devices. Such management devices include better organization of the evidence, allowing note taking by jurors, permitting counsel to more extensively use diagrams and charts so that evidence relevant to sentencing easily can be separated, interim explanations by the judge on issues of law and fact and on the limited use of the evidence, and even interim addresses to the jury by counsel. On the other hand, neither the language of W.Va.Code, 62-3-15, logic, nor common sense compels us to hold a trial judge has no discretion to bifurcate trial in a first degree murder case. Recently, in West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Garretson, 196 W.Va. 118, 124, 468 S.E.2d 733, 739 (1996), we stated: As in any case of statutory construction, we must interpret the law to avoid constitutional conflicts, if the language of the law will reasonably permit such an avoidance. While our reading of W.Va. Code, 62-3-15, is that unitary trials are permitted, there is nothing in the statutory language that forbids bifurcation. It may well be true that unitary trials are adequate and appropriate in most cases, but it equally is clear that there are instances in which unitary trials perpetuate rather than limit the prejudice to the parties and the harm to the adversarial process. Accordingly, we hold that a trial court has discretionary authority to bifurcate a trial and sentencing in any case where the jury is required to make a finding as to mercy. We believe awarding broad discretion to the trial court is most consistent with our mission of justice. Indeed, the ends of criminal justice would be defeated if mercy decisions were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. In her dissenting opinion in Schofield, 185 W.Va. at 207, 406 S.E.2d at 433, Justice Workman stated: The determination of whether a defendant should receive mercy is so crucially important that justice for both the state and defendant would be best served by a full presentation of all relevant circumstances without regard to strategy during trial on the merits. Today's holding is consistent with Syllabus Point 3 of State v. Bragg, 160 W.Va. 455, 235 S.E.2d 466 (1977), where we stated: The right to a bifurcated trial lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. The motion to bifurcate may be made by either the prosecution or the defense. The burden of persuasion is placed upon the shoulders of the party moving for bifurcation. A trial judge certainly may insist on an explanation from the moving party as to why bifurcation is needed. If the explanation reveals that the integrity of the adversarial process which depends upon the truth-determining function of the trial process would be harmed in a unitary trial, it would be entirely consistent with a trial court's authority to grant the bifurcation motion. In considering a motion to bifurcate, the court must balance the prejudice that the defendant or State may suffer from a unitary trial against the public's interest in judicial economy and efficiency. [32] Although it virtually is impossible to outline all factors that should be considered by the trial court, the court should consider when a motion for bifurcation is made: (a) whether limiting instructions to the jury would be effective; (b) whether a party desires to introduce evidence solely for sentencing purposes but not on the merits; (c) whether evidence would be admissible on sentencing but would not be admissible on the merits or vice versa; (d) whether either party can demonstrate unfair prejudice or disadvantage by bifurcation; (e) whether a unitary trial would cause the parties to forego introducing relevant evidence for sentencing purposes; and (f) whether bifurcation unreasonably would lengthen the trial. When a motion to bifurcate is made both sides must have an equal opportunity to present relevant evidence. The trial court may utilize whatever reasonable procedure deemed appropriate and efficient for the case at hand. See W.Va.R.Evid. 611(a). [33] The decision to bifurcate involves mostly trial management; thus, the trial court has enormous discretion and rarely will its ruling constitute reversible error. To demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion, a showing of compelling prejudice is required. Compelling prejudice exists where a defendant can demonstrate that without bifurcation he or she was unable to receive a fair trial regarding the finding of mercy and that the trial court could afford no protection from the prejudice suffered. In short, this Court will grant relief only if the appellant can show prejudice amounting to fundamental unfairness. We refuse to apply this new interpretation of W.Va.Code, 62-3-15, retroactively to include the defendant. The trial court, prosecution, witnesses, and jury have a great deal invested in the trial. The judge did nothing wrong by following established precedent. This case is not a situation in which error or an objection was brought to the judge's attention, and, in face of contrary law, the judge went the wrong way. Similarly, the error complained about is too speculative. Even today's decision may not have helped the defendant because the decision was a discretionary call for the trial judge. It is unfair to burden society with new trials or hearings where they were conducted fairly according to law, and subsequently were made questionable by an opinion of this Court, but the perceived errors have not been shown to affect the integrity of the proceedings. We emphasize our holding is driven primarily by the unique nature of our statutory provision and the important role a finding of mercy has in the administration of justice. Our analysis, therefore, is limited to the issue of mercy. E.