Opinion ID: 1385402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issuing the summons

Text: Paragraph three of the complaint alleges Magistrate Browning refused to handle a case brought by an environmental inspector. The inspector went to the Mingo County Magistrate Court to obtain a summons against a company that was building a bridge across a stream in Mingo County. The inspector completed a criminal complaint in which he claimed that materials from the site were released into the water and may have resulted in a fish kill downstream. Magistrate Browning disclosed to the inspector that she fought for the construction of the bridge as it provided her with her only means of access to her house during periods of high water. Magistrate Browning told the inspector that she could not handle the complaint due to prejudice and, therefore, he should see another magistrate. In her brief, Magistrate Browning argues that by refusing to handle the case she was complying with her duty under Canon 3 of the Judicial Code of Ethics. Specifically, Canon 3C(1)(a) states: (1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.] [6] We recently held in Syllabus Point 3 of State ex rel. Brown v. Dietrick, 191 W.Va. 169, 444 S.E.2d 47 (1994): `[W]here a challenge to a judge's impartiality is made for substantial reasons which indicate that the circumstances offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, a judge should recuse himself.' Syllabus Point 14, in part, Louk v. Haynes, 159 W.Va. 482, 223 S.E.2d 780 (1976). We explained in Brown that this syllabus point is analogous to [t]he general standard under Canon 3C(1) to determine whether a judge should be disqualified because the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned[.] 191 W.Va. at___, 444 S.E.2d at 52. On the other hand, the Commission argues that Magistrate Browning was obligated to handle the complaint under Rule 4 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the Magistrate Courts. In relevant part, Rule 4(a) states that a warrant or summons shall be issued upon a showing of probable cause in a complaint or affidavit. [7] The Commission cites our prior cases of In re Pauley, 173 W.Va. 475, 318 S.E.2d 418 (1984), and In re Markle, 174 W.Va. 550, 328 S.E.2d 157 (1984), to support its position that Magistrate Browning was obligated to handle the complaint. In Syllabus Point 4 of In re Markle, we said: `The deliberate failure to follow mandatory criminal procedures constitutes a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics.' Syllabus Point 2, In Re K. Pauley, 173 W.Va. 475, 318 S.E.2d 418 (1984). See also In the Matter of Monroe, 174 W.Va. 401, 327 S.E.2d 163 (1985). However, unlike the case at bar, we find that in none of the above cited cases did the magistrates make an initial finding that they were disqualified. Instead, the allegations against the magistrates were that, once they were involved in the cases, they did not follow the proper procedure or they otherwise abused their positions. In the present case, Magistrate Browning explained that her impartiality could reasonably be questioned because she was familiar with the construction of the bridge and she derived a direct benefit from it being built. Magistrate Browning argues that if she would not have disqualified herself, her bias would give rise to the exact opposite complaint as we now have before us. [8] We agree and conclude that, except in very limited circumstances, [9] it is improper for a magistrate to act in a case in which the magistrate cannot remain neutral and detached. Therefore, Syllabus Point 2 of In re Pauley, supra, quoted in Syllabus Point 4 of In re Markle, supra , is limited to situations in which a magistrate is not otherwise disqualified. We hold that it is not a violation of the Judicial Code of Ethics or the Code of Judicial Conduct to fail to follow mandatory criminal procedure if a magistrate is disqualified from hearing the matter. Hence, we do not find that Magistrate Browning violated any Canons by failing to issue the summons, and we find she acted properly by referring the inspector to another magistrate. Again, we agree with the Hearing Board and dismiss paragraph three of the complaint.