Opinion ID: 71204
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cooper’s Discharge

Text: Cooper also asserts that UPS terminated him on the basis of his race. However, while Cooper alleged below that he was discharged on the basis of his race, he failed to mention race as a reason he was fired in a subsequent deposition and he failed to point to anyone outside his protected class that either replaced him or was treated more favorably. Though the requirements are flexible, Cooper’s unsupported allegations of racial discrimination are insufficient to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of racially discriminatory discharge. Cf. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc; per curiam) (“Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. . . . This burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence[.]” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of UPS on Cooper’s racially discriminatory discharge claim was appropriate. 4 Cf. Keeton v. Flying J, Inc., 429 F.3d 259, 265 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that where an employee was transferred to a new job site over 120 miles away, that transfer, while not per se an adverse employment action, was an appropriate factor for the jury to consider in determining whether an adverse employment action occurred); Policastro v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 297 F.3d 535, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a transfer to a worksite 180 miles away from plaintiff’s home did not necessarily constitute an adverse employment action while noting that such a transfer could, under some circumstances, constitute an adverse employment action). 9 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 B. ADA Claims Cooper also claims that UPS failed to reasonably accommodate his disability and discharged him because of his disability. UPS responds that Cooper is not disabled and that, even if Cooper was disabled, he is not a qualified individual with a disability. The district court concluded that Cooper did not show that he could perform the essential functions of his job and thus dismissed his ADA claims. We agree.5 The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to [the] . . . advancement, [or] discharge of employees, . . . and other terms conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2005). “To prevail on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must prove that 1) he has a ‘disability’; 2) he is ‘qualified’ for the job; and 3) an adverse employment decision was made solely because of his disability.” Turco v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 101 F.3d 1090, 1092 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Relevant here, a “disability” is “any physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [the plaintiff’s] major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2005). Major life activities include “working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). A plaintiff is “substantially limited” in working when he is significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. 5 Cooper was discharged in August 2008. The ADA was amended in 2008 and these amendments took effect on January 1, 2009. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). We have previously held that these amendments are not retroactive. See EEOC v. Agro Distrib., LLC., 555 F.3d 462, 469 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Congress recently enacted the ADA Amendments Act . . . , but these changes do not apply retroactively.”). As such, the language and the law cited in this section reference the preamendment versions of the ADA. 10 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). However, even assuming that one has a disability, to be a qualified individual with a disability the plaintiff must be “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2005). Relevant here, reasonable accommodations include “[j]ob restructuring; part-time or modified work schedules; [or] reassignment to a vacant position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii). However, “[t]he ADA does not require an employer to relieve an employee of any essential function of his or her job, modify those duties, reassign existing employees to perform those jobs, or hire new employees to do so.” Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 621 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, it is undisputed that the essential functions of Cooper’s job include meeting Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for drivers and working in an environment with variable temperatures and humidity. Cooper does not present any evidence suggesting that he could perform these functions with or without accommodations. Indeed, Cooper’s own medical experts, Dr. Levy and Gooch, indicated that Cooper should not work in a variable temperature environment and could not meet DOT requirements. Further, both experts stated that no corrective devices or medications would aid Cooper’s condition. Thus, assuming arguendo that Cooper has a “disability,” Cooper is not a “qualified individual with a disability” because he cannot perform the essential functions of his job. Cf. Burch, 174 F.3d at 621 (firefighter who could not fight fires could not perform essential functions of firefighting job and thus could not be reasonably accommodated as a firefighter as a matter of law); Guerra v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 250 F.3d 739, at –3 (5th Cir. 2001) (unpublished table opinion) (employee who could not lift packages of certain weight could not 11 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 perform essential functions of warehouse job and could not be reasonably accommodated; thus, employee failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination). However, Cooper argues that UPS could have reassigned him to a position in plant engineering, a position that he claims would have accommodated his disability. “When no reasonable accommodation can be made to the plaintiff’s prior job, he may be transferred to another position.” Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2007). “For the accommodation of a reassignment to be reasonable, it is clear that a position must first exist and be vacant. Under the ADA, an employer is not required to give what it does not have.” Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800, 810 (5th Cir. 1997). “The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that an available position exists that he was qualified for and could, with reasonable accommodations, perform.” Jenkins, 487 F.3d at 315. Here, Cooper fails to assert that there are any vacancies in plant engineering, that he was qualified for such a job, or that he even formally applied for such a job. While the record indicates that Cooper did inquire about a plant engineering job, Cooper does not show that such a position was vacant or that he was qualified for that job. “[T]he law requires [a plaintiff] also to prove that he is qualified for [an alternative] position. Part of that proof must be more than the worker’s self-serving testimony that he could have performed [the job].” Burch, 174 F.3d at 622. Cooper’s desire for a job in plant engineering, without accompanying evidence demonstrating his qualifications for that job, is insufficient to sustain his claim that such a job would be a reasonable accommodation. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of UPS on Cooper’s ADA claims was appropriate.