Opinion ID: 2232440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: officer and employee immunity

Text: The immunity of a public officer or employee [32] from personal tort liability for actions within the scope of his official authority and in the performance of his official duties is an immunity separate and distinct from sovereign and governmental immunities. [33] Neither § 7 nor any other provision of the governmental tort liability act provides protection for public officers or employees. Section 7 limits statutory immunity to governmental agenc[ies]. [34] Section 1(d) of the act defines that term to include both the state and non-sovereign political units, but does not include individuals. The legislative intention not to provide public officers or employees with statutory immunity is manifested by § 8(1) of the act, which recognizes that an injured person may maintain an action against an officer or employee of a governmental agency for injuries caused by negligence of the officer or employee while in the course of employment and while acting within the scope of his or her authority, and provides that the governmental unit may indemnify the officer or employee. [35] It is apparent that whatever immunity public employees have in this state is provided by the common law. [36] The following factors are generally considered when a common-law claim of immunity is asserted by a public officer or employee: (1) Was the officer or employee acting within the scope of his official function? A public officer or employee can only claim immunity if he is performing his official function. No officer, of course, is absolved from liability for his private and personal torts merely because he is an officer, and the question arises only where he performs, or purports to perform, his official functions. [37] (2) Was the officer or employee acting in good faith? Judges and legislators are absolutely immune. [38] The highest executive officers of the federal and state governments also were traditionally held to be absolutely immune, so long as they did not clearly exceed the discretion vested in them by law. [39] More recently, however, the governor and other executive officers of a state have been limited to a qualified immunity. Qualified immunity can only attach when a public officer or employee is acting in good faith. [40] (3) Was the officer or employee exercising quasi-judicial or policy-making discretionary authority? The qualified immunity afforded to public officers and employees generally varies with the scope of their discretion as to the specific act in question: [41]  `[A]ctions or decisions of a legislative, executive, or judicial character which are performed within the scope of authority of the governmental body or officer concerned    enjoy freedom from liability. The people place great powers of decision making in the hands of their government. In the exercise of discretionary power, governmental duty runs to the benefit of the whole public, rather than to individuals. It is of great importance that this crucial function of democratic decision making be unhampered by litigation.' (Emphasis in the original.) Sherbutte v Marine City, 374 Mich 48, 54; 130 NW2d 920 (1964), quoting Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231; 111 NW2d 1 (1961). Public officers or employees are, however, liable for the negligent performance of ministerial acts. Id., p 54, fn 2. The scope of immunity granted a public officer or employee in any given situation turns on the specific character of the act complained of, not on the general nature of his job. [42] Accordingly, it is not determinative that the officer or employee has some general discretionary authority if the act complained of is properly characterized as ministerial. It is often difficult to distinguish between discretionary and ministerial activities: It seems almost impossible to draw any clear and definite line, since the distinction, if it exists, can be at most one of degree. `[I]t would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail.' Prosser, supra, § 132, p 990, quoting Ham v Los Angeles County, 46 Cal App 148, 162; 189 P 462 (1920). The discretionary decisions intended to be protected by official immunity are those that involve policy formulation [43] and those that are quasi-judicial in nature. In Sherbutte v Marine City, supra, pp 54-55, this Court said that official immunity protects democratic decision making, namely,  actions or decisions of a legislative, executive, or judicial character. (Emphasis in the original.) The Court in Sherbutte held that a police officer or employee was not immune from an action alleging excessive use of force during the course of an arrest: We think it unnecessary to expatiate on the point. The action of a police officer in making an arrest cannot be considered within the broad scope of the discretion allowed a free government in its legislative, executive, or judicial branch. In sum, if judges and legislators are acting within the scope of their official function, they are absolutely immune. Other public officers or employees only possess official immunity if they are acting within the scope of their official function, they are acting in good faith, and, focusing upon the specific activity complained of by the plaintiff, they are exercising quasi-judicial or policy-making discretionary authority.