Opinion ID: 884315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Was there sufficient evidence for the District Court to convict Granby of the offense of violating privacy in communications?

Text: Granby argues that sufficient evidence in the record does not exist to support the conviction of violating privacy in communications. Section 45-8-213(1)(a), MCA, provides the following: [A] person commits the offense of violating privacy in communications if he knowingly or purposely: (a) with the purpose to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend, communicates with any person by telephone and uses any obscene, lewd, or profane language, suggests any lewd or lascivious act, or threatens to inflict injury or physical harm to the person or property of any person (the use of obscene, lewd, or profane language ... is prima facie evidence of an intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend).... Granby testified that Aaberg called him on June 24, 1994. During this conversation Aaberg told Granby that her roommate, Richard Hayward, had died. Granby responded: So your dick died, huh, that's too bad. How long did you know him? Not very long at all, I'll bet. Granby argues that this statement does not contain obscene, lewd, or profane language and does not reflect an intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend. The State argues that, when taken in context, the obscene overtone in the comment is apparent. We hold that this statement alone does not constitute obscene, lewd, or profane language. Furthermore, considering the circumstances under which it was made, including the fact that Aaberg initiated the call, and that Granby was responding to Aaberg's comment, we hold that it was not made with the intent to harass or annoy. Therefore, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we hold that the evidence presented is not sufficient to support the conviction for violating privacy in communications and Granby's conviction on this charge is reversed. In conclusion, we hold that Granby did not waive his claims of insufficiency of the evidence; there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the offense of disorderly conduct; and there was not sufficient evidence to convict him of violating privacy in communications. Therefore, Granby's conviction for disorderly conduct is affirmed; his conviction for violation of privacy in communications is reversed; and his sentence for violation of privacy in communications is vacated. We concur: TURNAGE, C.J., and NELSON, GRAY, REGNIER, TRIEWEILER and HUNT, JJ., concur.