Opinion ID: 757299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Connell

Text: 28 As a police officer, Connell was legally barred by state and local laws (the validity of which he does not contest) from having any interest in the ownership or operation of a tavern. The Complaint affirmatively alleges that Connell and LaPointe maintained strict separation of their respective interests as landlord and bar owner, Complaint p 64, and that this landlord-tenant relationship had been set up by [their] attorney specifically to comply with the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. Complaint p 263. 29 Connell's affirmative disavowal of any financial interest or management role in LaPointe's bars means that the entertainment there cannot be characterized as self-expression by Connell. Accordingly, Connell has failed to allege a deprivation of any clearly established First Amendment right that he was exercising. That is the first ground for granting defendants' qualified immunity motion with respect to Connell's claims. 30 In addition, it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that their conduct did not violate Connell's First Amendment rights. The complaint alleges that the City and all the defendants [knew] for some time that Connell did not own or operate the bar itself; that Connell merely owned the building; and that the bar was and is owned and operated by Ms. LaPointe, Complaint p 99. That is the second ground for granting defendants qualified immunity with respect to Connell's claims. 31 One of the claims in the complaint is that the defendants' investigation of Connell's financial and management role in the bars was (i) groundless and (ii) malicious[ ]. See, e.g., Complaint pp 89, 125. One necessary premise of that claim is that Connell played no role in running the bars; otherwise the investigation would have constituted a legitimate effort to enforce the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and would not have been groundless. A second necessary premise is that the defendants knew that Connell had no financial or management role is the bars; otherwise Connell could not allege that the investigation was malicious. 32 Connell cannot have it both ways, dissociating himself from LaPointe's business and claiming at the same time that the topless dancing in LaPointe's bars was a First Amendment right that he was exercising. We need not decide whether a landlord exercises First Amendment rights in making premises available for expression that the landlord favors. Connell's pleading forecloses that argument. Nor may we decide on this appeal whether a landlord who is subjected to government harassment by reason of a tenant's expressive activities may have a due process or equal protection claim, or some other constitutional claim. No such claims are before us. We do hold that because the pleadings show that Connell was not engaging in expression, Connell cannot have a First Amendment claim--the only type of claim not already dismissed by the district court in this case. Consequently, all of the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Connell's sole remaining claim against them--his claim that they retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.