Opinion ID: 2588352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of Publisher

Text: The Court of Appeal acknowledged that publication is an element of defamation, and that distributors are sometimes referred to as secondary publishers. (See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. (D.C.Wyo.1985) 611 F.Supp. 781, 785; Hart v. Bennet (Ct.App.2003) 267 Wis.2d 919, 672 N.W.2d 306, 318, fn. 14; Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, at p. 803; Smolla, The Law of Defamation (2d ed.2005) § 4:92, p. 4-140.15.) However, the court pronounced it reasonable to assume that Congress had in mind the different standards of common law liability imposed on primary publishers, who have control over content, and distributors, who do not. Thus, the omission of any reference to distributors in section 230(c)(1) was arguably intentional. The Court of Appeal noted that the goal of discouraging excessive self-censorship by immunizing publishers is at odds with the rights of individuals to recover for defamatory falsehood. It deemed the term publisher ambiguous, because it might refer to primary publishers only or to both primary publishers and distributors. According to the Court of Appeal, such a legally uncertain word could not support the broad immunity the Zeran court derived from the statute. It found nothing in the statutory findings and declarations to indicate that Congress considered online speech in need of blanket protection. Indeed, it detected a contrary intent in the terms of section 230(c)(2), which immunizes providers and users against liability for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be ... objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected or to provide others with the technical means to restrict access to [such] material. The Court of Appeal reasoned that section 230(c)(2) would be superfluous if all publishers enjoyed absolute immunity under section 230(c)(1). The Court of Appeal sought further support for limiting the scope of the term publisher to primary publishers by comparing the immunity provisions of the CDA with those of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act, enacted in 1998 (DMCA; 17 U.S.C. § 512). [10] The DMCA immunizes Internet service providers from liability for copyright infringement if the provider is unaware of the infringement and acts expeditiously to remove the copyrighted material upon notice. It includes detailed notice requirements, and procedures for replacement of the disputed material upon sufficient counter-notification. (17 U.S.C. § 512(c) & (g).) Because Congress did not include such specific regulation of notice liability in the CDA, the Court of Appeal decided it had failed to speak directly to the issue, thus preserving common law distributor liability. (See United States v. Texas, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 534, 113 S.Ct. 1631.) We conclude the Zeran court's construction of the term publisher is sound. The terms of section 230(c)(1) are broad and direct: No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider. Given that distributors are also known as secondary publishers, there is little reason to believe Congress felt it necessary to address them separately. There is even less reason to suppose that Congress intended to immunize publishers but leave distributors open to liability, when the responsibility of publishers for offensive content is greater than that of mere distributors. The Court of Appeal failed to respond to the Zeran court's point that once online distributors are notified of defamatory content, they are placed in a position traditionally occupied by publishers, and must make an editorial decision on how to treat the posted material. ( Zeran, supra, 129 F.3d at p. 332.) This is a persuasive justification for giving the term publisher an inclusive interpretation. (See, e.g., Gentry v. eBay, Inc., supra, 99 Cal.App.4th at p. 835, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 703; Green v. America Online, supra, 318 F.3d at p. 471; Donato v. Moldow, supra, 865 A.2d at pp. 725-726; Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., supra, 31 P.3d at pp. 41-42.) We are not convinced by the Court of Appeal's reasoning that a broad reading of section 230(e)(1) would make section 230(c)(2) unnecessary. These provisions address different concerns. Section 230(c)(1) is concerned with liability arising from information provided online. Section 230(c)(2) is directed at actions taken by Internet service providers or users to restrict access to online information. [11] Liability for censoring content is not ordinarily associated with the defendant's status as publisher or speaker. Those terms, employed in section 230(c)(1), are drawn from the law of defamation. (See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, at p. 803; Rest.2d Torts, § 568.) Section 230(c)(1) provides immunity from claims by those offended by an online publication, while section 230(c)(2) protects against claims by those who might object to the restriction of access to an online publication. The Court of Appeal's reference to the DMCA does not support its conclusion that Congress's use of the term publisher was insufficient to abrogate distributor liability. To the contrary, the DMCA shows that Congress has crafted a limited immunity in a closely related context, with specific provision for notice liability. (17 U.S.C. § 512(c).) The fact that it did not do so in the CDA, and has not amended section 230 to add a similar provision in the 10 years since it was enacted, or in the eight years since the example of the DMCA has been in existence, strongly supports the conclusion that Congress did not intend to permit notice liability under the CDA. [12] We note that it is far from clear how the distinction between traditional print publishers and distributors would apply in the Internet environment, with its many and various forms of discourse. (See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, supra, 521 U.S. 844, 850-853, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874.) As the high court noted, [a]ny person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet can `publish' information. ( Id. at p. 853, 117 S.Ct. 2329.) Whenever such information is copied from another source, its publication might also be described as a distribution. The distinction proposed by the Court of Appeal, based on rules developed in the post-Gutenberg, pre-cyberspace world, would foster disputes over which category the defendant should occupy. The common law of defamation would provide little guidance. In this case, for example, Rosenthal could claim that her active role in selecting and posting material disparaging plaintiffs qualified her as a primary publisher. Her participation in the dissemination of the Bolen article, particularly considered in light of her other alleged verbal attacks on plaintiffs, arguably went beyond mere distribution. (See Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts, supra, § 113, at p. 803; Smolla, The Law of Defamation, supra, § 4:92, p. 4-140.15; Rest.2d Torts, § 568.) The Court of Appeal provided no analysis justifying its conclusion that Rosenthal could be held liable as a distributor, noting only that she alleged no facts preventing her from being so characterized. We need not decide the question, but certainly the argument could be made that plaintiffs' allegations cast Rosenthal in the role of a publisher.