Opinion ID: 2514209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The circuit court insufficiently instructed the jury with respect to what constitutes a true threat.

Text: The circuit court, partially in accord with Chung, instructed the jury that, [t]o constitute a threat punishable by law, the threat on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made must be so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate[,] and specific as to the person threatened as to convey a gravity of purpose. The instruction, as Valdivia originally proposed it, was modified by the circuit court, over Valdivia's objection and without explanation, to delete the final phrase from the operative language of Chung, to wit, and imminent prospect of execution. However, the circuit court further instructed the jury that, with respect to the requisite state of mind, `[i]n reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing another person' means that the defendant recklessly disregarded the risk that his words or actions could cause another person serious alarm for his personal safety. The circuit court also instructed the jury that [t]he law does not require that the person actually experience such an alarm for personal safety, but that the person could have experienced such an alarm. As our discussion supra in section III.A.2 reflects, the foregoing instructions did not sufficiently inform the jury that, to constitute a true threat, Valdivia's threatening utterance was objectively susceptible to inducing fear of bodily injury in a reasonable person at whom the threat was directed and who was familiar with the circumstances under which the threat was uttered. Absent some appropriate language regarding imminency, see supra section III.A.2, we cannot say that the jury was sufficiently instructed with respect to differentiating a true threat from constitutionally protected free speech. [6] Inasmuch as erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful, see Valentine, 93 Hawai`i at 204, 998 P.2d at 484, and it does not affirmatively appear from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial  in that there is a reasonable possibility that the error may have contributed to Valdivia's conviction of first degree terroristic threatening , see id., we must remand this matter for a new trial with respect to that offense.