Opinion ID: 1470023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Attorney General's Role Distinguished from the Role of the Usual Advocate

Text: Although all attorneys have numerous important duties and responsibilities by virtue of their role as members of the bar, attorneys general have additional special duties which, because of the nature of that ancient and powerful governmental office, differ from those of the usual advocate. [38] Unlike other attorneys who are engaged in the practice of law, the Attorney General has a common law duty to represent the public interest. Newport Realty, Inc. v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 1021, 1032 (R.I.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have previously stated, [t]he Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island holds a constitutional office with specific and significant responsibilities to the people of Rhode Island. Mottola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 424 (R.I.2002); see also State v. Briggs, 886 A.2d 735, 756 n. 9 (R.I.2005); State v. Peters, 82 R.I. 292, 297, 107 A.2d 428, 431 (1954) ([The Attorney General] is in effect the representative of the people and not an advocate in the ordinary meaning of that term.    He represents all the people of the [state], including the defendant   .) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In view of the grave responsibilities of attorneys general vis-à-vis the public, the holder of that high office, as distinguished from the usual advocate, [39] has a special and enduring duty to seek justice. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek Justice?, 26 Fordham Urban L.J. 607, 612 (1999) (The literature of the legal profession refers to the prosecutor's duty to `seek justice' or `do justice,' a professional ideal that analogizes prosecutors to judges and distinguishes prosecutors from other lawyers.). [40] In other words, the Attorney General has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. Commentary to Article V, Rule 3.8 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct; see also Newport Realty, Inc., 878 A.2d at 1032; State v. Ciulla, 115 R.I. 558, 568, 351 A.2d 580, 586 (1976); Orabona v. Linscott, 49 R.I. 443, 445, 144 A. 52, 53 (1928). We are acutely aware of and are in full accord with the principle that the United States Supreme Court so cogently expressed with respect to the prosecutorial role in the frequently quoted case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935): The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore,    is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law   . He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor  indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Id. at 88, 55 S.Ct. 629 (emphasis added). [41] While the just-quoted passage from the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in the Berger case related to a federal criminal prosecution, it is our conviction that the same philosophy should guide each and every undertaking of the Attorney General of this state. It is the duty of the Attorney General to see to it that justice shall be done not only in the context of criminal prosecutions, but also while he or she carries out all the functions of that high office-including engagement in litigation in the civil arena. Id.; see generally Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C.Cir.1992) (Mikva, C.J.) (stating that the solemn duty to do justice applies with equal force to the government's civil lawyers). [42] The principle that it is a government lawyer's duty to seek justice is as widely recognized as it is venerable. [43] See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co., 962 F.2d at 47; Hurd v. People, 25 Mich. 404, 416 (1872) (The prosecuting officer represents the public interest   . His object like that of the court, should be simply justice; and he has no right to sacrifice this to any pride of professional success.); Foute v. State, 4 Tenn. (3 Hayw.) 98, 99 (1816) ([The prosecutor] is    to    combine the public welfare and the [safety] of the citizens, preserving both, and not impairing either; he is to decline the use of individual passions, and individual malevolence, when he can not use them for the advantage of the public; he is to lay hold of them where public justice    requires it.). It is a principle that must at all times be carefully adhered to by every person who serves in that capacity, and the courts must be ever vigilant in this regard. Pursuant to article 9, section 12, of the present Rhode Island Constitution, the duties and powers of the Attorney General remain the same under the Constitution as they had existed at the time the Constitution was adopted or as from time to time may be prescribed by law. Accordingly, the Attorney General in Rhode Island has broad powers and responsibilities pursuant to the Rhode Island Constitution, several Rhode Island statutes, [44] and the common law. [45] In the course of exercising those powers, the Attorney General is vested with broad discretion. [46] In view of the Attorney General's position as a constitutional officer and in view of his or her considerable discretionary powers, this Court has historically tended, whenever appropriate, to give deference to the strategic and tactical decisions made by those who hold that high office. See, e.g., Mottola, 789 A.2d at 425 (It is not the province of this Court, or the Superior Court, to dictate how the Attorney General elects to carry out the    functions of his office.). It is our view that the Attorney General is entitled to act with a significant degree of autonomy, particularly since the Attorney General is a constitutional officer and is an independent official elected by the people of Rhode Island. We are impressed by the following language that appears in the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the case of State ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1976): The Attorney General is elected by the people; he is entrusted by them with the common law power to legally represent them or some of them in matters deemed by him to affect the public interest.    Regardless of the effectiveness of his efforts in particular public legal situations, at least the people have the continuing satisfaction of knowing that their elected Attorney General has the right to exercise his conscientious official discretion to enter into those legal matters deemed by him to involve the public interest, even though not expressly authorized by statute.  Id. at 268 n. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). [47] Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations relative to the Attorney General's powers and responsibilities, we now turn to the concrete issue before us  viz., whether or not it is appropriate for the holder of that office to enter into a contingent fee agreement in a civil case such as this one.