Opinion ID: 2801766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Victim’s 9-1-1 Recording Statements

Text: [¶19] Although the trial court did not specify the hearsay exception it applied to admit the 9-1-1 recording, the record amply supports a conclusion that the victim’s statements on the recording were admissible as excited utterances. “Pursuant to M.R. Evid. 803(2), an excited utterance is (1) a statement relating to a startling event or condition; (2) made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement; (3) caused by the event or condition.” Ahmed, 2006 ME 133, ¶ 14, 909 A.2d 1011; see also State v. Robinson, 2001 ME 83, ¶ 12, 773 A.2d 445 (listing factors for a court to consider in admitting a statement as an excited utterance, including “the nature of the startling or stressful event” and “the amount of time that passed between the startling event and the statement”). The declarant need not be unavailable for this exception to apply.5 5 The restyled Maine Rules of Evidence now in effect contain slightly adjusted language for the excited utterance exception. See M.R. Evid. 803(2) (restyled Rules); Introductory Advisory Committee Note to the restyled Maine Rules of Evidence (stating that the restyled Rules are not intended to change the meaning of the superseded rules). 11 [¶20] Here, the victim’s statements on the 9-1-1 recording related directly to a recent traumatic event. Although the record does not indicate precisely how much time passed between the incident and the 9-1-1 call, one can infer that the call was made shortly after the victim had locked the defendant out of the house. The court had evidence that the victim remained under the stress of the event when she placed the call, and when police arrived on the scene, they found that the victim was still “in hysterics.” [¶21] We have affirmed assault convictions reliant on excited utterance evidence, M.R. Evid. 803(2), when the victim’s statements to police occurred seven minutes after a 9-1-1 call, see Ahmed, 2006 ME 133, ¶ 15, 909 A.2d 1011, and “three to twelve minutes” after an attack while the victim remained very upset, see Robinson, 2001 ME 83, ¶ 14, 773 A.2d 445; see also State v. McLaughlin, 642 A.2d 173, 175 (Me. 1994) (upholding the trial court’s admission of a statement made ten minutes after an assault). It was not error for the court to admit statements in the 9-1-1 call as substantive evidence to support the conviction. [¶22] Kimball contends that, regardless of its admissibility pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, the contents of the 9-1-1 recording are testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clauses because, at the time of the call, the victim was locked inside her residence and isolated from immediate danger. Although he did not testify, Kimball asserts to us that he had walked away from 12 the residence, and the victim merely wanted someone to “look at her house” to keep Kimball from returning. We have applied four criteria, derived from the Davis opinion, to distinguish between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in this context. Statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 9-1-1 call are nontestimonial when: (1) the caller is speaking about events as they are actually happening; (2) it would be clear to a reasonable listener that the victim is facing an ongoing emergency; (3) the nature of the questions asked and answered are objectively necessary and elicited for the purpose of resolving the present emergency; and (4) the victim’s demeanor on the phone and circumstances at the time of the call evidence an ongoing emergency. State v. Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 12, 967 A.2d 671 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827). [¶23] We have observed that “[a]n interrogation that initially serves to determine the need for emergency assistance may evolve into an interrogation solely directed at ascertaining the facts of a past crime.” Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 13, 967 A.2d 671. There exists no bright-line rule demarcating when or where this transition takes place. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that “at least the initial interrogation conducted in connection with a 911 call[] is ordinarily not designed primarily to establish or prove some past fact, but to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. [¶24] In Rickett, we considered the admissibility of three separate 9-1-1 calls, holding that the victim’s first call and part of her third call were 13 nontestimonial and admissible because they were made while the victim “was outside her home[,] her assailant was still inside, and she lacked the ability to leave to go to a place that would be safe for her.” 2009 ME 22, ¶ 14, 967 A.2d 671. At the point when Rickett left the residence and ended the immediate danger to the victim, the call became testimonial, and we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering that the latter portion of the call be redacted. Id. Importantly, the questions asked by the dispatcher in Rickett “were of the type that would allow the officers who were called to investigate to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and the possible danger to [the victim].” Id. [¶25] An “ongoing emergency” is by its nature broader than the attack itself; it includes the victim’s untreated injuries, the ongoing stress of the event, and the possibility that the assailant is still at large and could attack the victim again. See Metzger, 2010 ME 67, ¶¶ 17, 19, 999 A.2d 947. Contrary to Kimball’s contentions, a victim need not make a 9-1-1 call during a physical assault in order to be “speaking about events as they are actually happening” pursuant to the first factor of the Davis test. Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 12, 967 A.2d 671 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827). The victim’s belief that she remains in danger can render a 9-1-1 call statement part of an ongoing emergency. The victim’s emergency is “not limited to the victim’s medical condition,” but may also include situations “where 14 the officer has been unable to identify the suspect and satisfy himself that no one is in further danger.” Metzger, 2010 ME 67, ¶ 19, 999 A.2d 947. [¶26] The record evidence in this case, viewed objectively, indicates that the victim was facing an ongoing emergency when she placed the 9-1-1 call, and that she sought assistance for her injuries and protection from further harm by Kimball, who remained at large. Her emergency had not ended at this point, as indicated by her distressed demeanor and her description of her injuries. Further, the “questions asked and answered” during the 9-1-1 call were limited to questions about the victim’s injuries and whether Kimball was still outside or could be found at the residence—questions aimed at sending police assistance to aid in an ongoing emergency, rather than collecting evidence. See Rickett, 2009 ME 22, ¶ 14, 967 A.2d 671. Thus, the court’s admission of the 9-1-1 recording into evidence was proper and not violative of Kimball’s constitutional right to confrontation.