Opinion ID: 2222251
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: statute of limitations for 1996 injury

Text: Dawes assigns that the single judge erred in determining that Dawes' claim for medical benefits relating to the 1996 injury was time barred by § 48-137. Dawes' first argument is that the 1996 injury should be treated, not as an accident, but as part of the course of an occupational disease. We have already determined that this argument is without merit. Dawes then argues that, even analyzing the 1996 injury as an accident, his claim is not time barred. Section 48-137 provides, in relevant part: In case of personal injury, all claims for compensation shall be forever barred unless, within two years after the accident, the parties shall have agreed upon the compensation payable under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act, or unless, within two years after the accident, one of the parties shall have filed a petition as provided in section 48-173.... When payments of compensation have been made in any case, such limitation shall not take effect until the expiration of two years from the time of the making of the last payment. We assume without deciding, for purposes of this opinion, that the payments made by Union pursuant to the compromise agreement constitute payment of compensation within the meaning of the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. In making that assumption, we do not address whether the compromise agreement was itself appropriate, ethical, or legal. The last payment made by Union for benefits resulting from the 1996 injury was made on February 10, 1998. Dawes' petition was not filed until September 22, 2000. When payments of compensation have been made pursuant to an agreement between the parties, as in the instant case, the statute of limitations set forth in § 48-137 will not take effect until the expiration of 2 years from the time of the making of the last payment. See Snipes v. Sperry Vickers, 251 Neb. 415, 557 N.W.2d 662 (1997). There has been no allegation that this case presents any exception to the statute of limitations, such as a latent and progressive injury, or a material increase in the claimant's disability. See, id.; Binkerd v. Central Transportation Co., 236 Neb. 350, 461 N.W.2d 87 (1990). Consequently, Dawes' claims relating to the 1996 injury are time barred. Dawes argues, however, that his medical insurance carrier made payments, in 1998 and 1999, for treatment of recurrent back pain caused by the 1996 injury and that these payments were made less than 2 years prior to the filing of his petition. Dawes relies on Maxey v. Fremont Department of Utilities, 220 Neb. 627, 636-37, 371 N.W.2d 294, 301 (1985), in which we held that payment of wages or reimbursement of medical expense by an employer under an employee benefit plan or group health insurance agreement does not constitute remuneration in lieu of workmen's compensation benefits so as to toll the statute of limitations, unless, by the conduct of the employer, it may reasonably be inferred that such payments were made with an intent that payment constitute[s] compensation and a conscious recognition of liability for compensation benefits on the part of the employer. The facts of this case do not fall within the exception we recognized in Maxey. In Maxey, the claimant's medical expenses were paid, not by his employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, but by the employer's health insurance carrier. We rejected the claimant's argument that those insurance payments were payments of compensation within the meaning of § 48-137. But we left open the possibility that an employer might be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations where the employer had recognized its liability for workers' compensation benefits, and directed payments to be made by a health insurance carrier to satisfy that obligation. See Maxey, supra . The concern was that a claimant might misunderstand the character of payments received. See id. However, voluntary payment of wages or medical benefits does not toll the statute of limitations unless the employer is aware or should be aware that it constitutes payment of compensation for the injury. Id. at 637, 371 N.W.2d at 301. In this case, the health insurance carrier was not associated with the employer. Rather, Dawes was covered by his wife's health insurance plan, and there was no possibility of confusion regarding the source or character of the medical coverage. The concern expressed in Maxey about possible confusion regarding the nature of the benefits received is simply not present in this case. Instead, in Maxey, we specifically rejected the argument that benefits paid by collateral sources were compensation sufficient to toll § 48-137. That principle applies here. The last payment of compensation made in this case for the 1996 injury was made by Union more than 2 years prior to the filing of Dawes' petition. Finally, Dawes argues that § 48-137 was tolled in this case by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-144.04 (Reissue 1998), which provides in relevant part: Any employer, risk management pool, or insurance carrier who fails, neglects, or refuses to file any report required of him or her by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor for each such failure, neglect, or refusal.... In addition to the penalty, where an employer, risk management pool, or insurance carrier has been given notice, or the employer, risk management pool, or the insurance carrier has knowledge, of any injury or death of an employee and fails, neglects, or refuses to file a report thereof, the limitations in section 48-137 ... shall not begin to run against the claim of the injured employee or his or her dependents entitled to compensation ... or in favor of either the employer, risk management pool, or the insurance carrier until such report shall have been furnished as required by the compensation court. Dawes argues that pursuant to § 48-144.04, the statute of limitations was tolled when neither Wittrock nor Union filed one of the Subsequent Report[s] of payment required by Workers' Comp. Ct. R. of Proc. 30 (2000). The plain language of § 48-144.04, however, does not support Dawes' argument. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-144.01 (Reissue 1998) requires an employer or insurance carrier to file an initial report of a death or injury. Section 48-144.04 then provides that the statute of limitations in § 48-137 does not begin to run until the employer or insurance carrier is aware of the death or injury of an employee, and does not file a report of that death or injury. When read in pari materia, see Foote v. O'Neill Packing, 262 Neb. 467, 632 N.W.2d 313 (2001), the report of injury or death in § 48-144.04 is a clear reference to the initial report required by § 48-144.01. Section 48-144.04 establishes when the statute of limitations begins to run if an initial report is not filed, but plainly does not provide for tolling of an already-running statute of limitations if subsequent reports are not filed. The initial report of the 1996 injury, required by § 48-144.01, was timely filed. The facts of this case do not present any exception to § 48-137 under which Dawes' petition was timely filed. The single judge and review panel correctly concluded that any claims for benefits resulting from the 1996 injury are time barred by § 48-137. Dawes' second assignment of error is without merit.