Opinion ID: 836201
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Sentencing Statutes

Text: MCL 768.7a(2) provides for consecutive sentences for all paroled offenders who are convicted of and sentenced for a new felony committed while they were on parole for their original offense. Once the parolee is sentenced for the new offense, the Parole Board calculates the date when he or she will again be eligible for parole pursuant to MCL 791.234(3). Under MCL 791.234(3), a prisoner must serve the total time of the added minimum terms before becoming eligible for parole. The parolee's new parole eligibility date is computed by considering first how much time the parolee must serve, then determining how much time the parolee has served. MCL 791.234(3) therefore defines when the Parole Board has jurisdiction to parole a prisoner serving consecutive indeterminate sentences. It does so by combining the terms of the old and new sentences into one aggregate term. The minimum and maximum terms of the old and new sentences are added together. The result is a single term with one minimum and one maximum. The new minimum and maximum set the new boundaries of the time a prisoner must serve. It is only when this aggregate, single term has been determined that the Parole Board can calculate the parolee's new parole eligibility date. [3] Thus, calculating what constitutes time served is inevitably a retroactive exercise. The Parole Board does not determine a defendant's new parole eligibility date until after he or she is sentenced for the new offense. Under the current practice of the Department of Corrections (DOC), the minimum sentence of a paroled defendant who offends again does not begin until the date of sentencing. Consequently, the Parole Board does not acquire jurisdiction over that defendant until he or she has served the equivalent of the minimum term of that new offense. That term is measured from the date of sentencing on the new offense. However, this practice does not reflect what the statute requires. The statute mandates only that the prisoner serve an amount of time equal to the added minimum terms of incarceration. That time served includes (1) time served in prison on the original offense, (2) time served on parole for the original offense, according to MCL 791.238(6), and (3) time spent in jail awaiting disposition of the new charges. The parties do not dispute that the Parole Board lacks authority to alter a defendant's sentence. It cannot add time to the minimum sentence already served. [4] As we have noted: [C]onsecutive sentences imposed on persons who, while incarcerated or on escape, commit another crime will commence to run when the total of the minimum sentences imposed for prior offenses has been served.[ [5] ] In Wayne Co. Prosecutor, we also observed that the Legislature's intent in enacting [MCL 768.7a(2)] was simply to extend the statutory provisions of [MCL 768.7a(1)] to parolees.... [6] The Parole Board has not only the authority but a statutory obligation to use the terms of sentences imposed by courts in order to calculate both (1) the earliest point at which a prisoner may be released on parole and (2) the point at which he or she must be discharged from prison. I conclude that the plain meaning of total time in the clause when the prisoner has served the total time of the added minimum terms must apply to all time served. Generally, no remaining portion remains on a defendant's minimum term when he or she is paroled. Therefore, any time served on parole or in jail awaiting disposition of new charges should be counted as time served toward the aggregate minimum sentence. Wayne Co. Prosecutor erred to the extent it went beyond that language and concluded that the consecutive sentence would commence immediately upon the parolee's new offense. That conclusion does not take into account the timing of the Parole Board's calculation of a defendant's added minimum terms under MCL 791.234(3). My interpretation is consistent with this Court's interpretation of MCL 768.7a(2) and truer to its holding in Wayne Co. Prosecutor. In that case, we also held that the remaining portion clause of [MCL 768.7a(2)] requires the offender to serve at least the combined minimums of his sentences, plus whatever portion, between the minimum and the maximum, of the earlier sentence that the Parole Board may, because the parolee violated the terms of parole, require him to serve.[ [7] ] We therefore rejected the prosecutor's argument that MCL 768.7a(2) requires a prisoner to serve his or her entire original maximum sentence before beginning to serve his or her new minimum sentence. Under MCL 791.234(3), the Parole Board lacks jurisdiction over the prisoner for the purposes of parole until he or she reaches the new parole eligibility date. However, after the prisoner is sentenced for the new offense, the Parole Board clearly has the authority to require the prisoner to serve an additional portion of the original maximum sentence. This is due to his or her parole violation. As indicated by the use of the permissive language from Wayne Co. Prosecutor, may ... require him to serve, the Parole Board need not add time. In current practice, however, the Parole Board does not make such a decision. It passively treats time served in prison before sentencing for a new offense, however long that may be, as time served for the defendant's parole violation. [8] But this time served is currently counted only toward the defendant's original maximum sentence. [9] I believe that this policy does not constitute a discretionary decision. Therefore, I believe Warda v. Flushing City Council [10] is not applicable. I believe that the Parole Board may exercise its discretion to decide whether a prisoner eligible for parole will serve additional time in prison because of a parole violation. However, I also believe that such an affirmative and individualized determination is the only proper mechanism for requiring the prisoner to serve additional time only toward his maximum term. The DOC's current practice also raises troubling questions about the constitutionality of its treatment of similarly situated individuals. [11]