Opinion ID: 2055255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bailey's motion to dismiss

Text: Bailey has filed a motion to dismiss. He claims he was denied due process of law in two regards. He first takes issue with the fact that only two members were present at the hearing before the inquiry panel for which provision is made in Rule BV6. He points out, correctly, that Rule BV6 d 2 says that the Chairman of the Inquiry Committee shall determine the number of regular members of that committee which shall constitute a quorum for panel proceedings ..., but in no event may a quorum consist of less than three members. He has stipulated that he waived this quorum. [2] It is the position of Bailey that since [t]here is no provision for a waiver of the mandatory composition of the panel included in the Maryland Rules, the petition must be dismissed. We do not see it that way. This Court has held in a variety of situations that mandatory provisions may be waived. Three examples will suffice. Possibly as well known as any provision of trial procedure is that a jury's verdict must be unanimous. Nevertheless, in State v. McKay, 280 Md. 558, 572, 375 A.2d 228 (1977), we held that an accused might waive a unanimous jury verdict. Equally well known is that in this State a jury must be composed of 12 persons. In Improvement Co. v. Gas etc. Co., 156 Md. 581, 144 A. 710 (1929), our predecessors were faced with an objection to a proceeding that had continued with 11 jurors by consent of counsel for both parties after one juror had been disabled by sickness on the second day of trial. [3] Chief Judge Bond there said for the Court: We believe it to be the settled view in this state, and certainly it is a view long followed in practice, that civil cases, if not criminal cases, too, may be tried by consent of the parties with a number of jurors less than twelve. And irrespective of the weight of authority elsewhere, which seems to be in accord with this view, we see no sufficient reason for holding that a trial must be before a jury of twelve throughout a trial, despite all imaginable accidents, and despite the wishes and convenience of the parties concerned. [ Id. at 586.] Also well understood by all Maryland lawyers is that a grand jury must be comprised of 23 people. In State v. Vincent, 91 Md. 718, 47 A. 1036 (1900), the Court was faced with an appeal where there had been a demurrer to an indictment on the ground, among others, that the grand jury returning the indictment was composed of only twenty-two grand jurors, when the law prescribes twenty-three as the requisite number. (Emphasis in original.) The Court affirmed the judgment entered by the trial judge who had sustained a demurrer to the indictment and quashed it on the ground that the provision of law fixing 23 as the proper number was mandatory, not directory. In the process of the opinion, however, Judge Pearce said for the Court: Upon that question there is much diversity of opinion in the adjudged cases, which may be conveniently divided into three classes. 1st. Those which hold that a Court has no authority to try a person upon an indictment found by a grand jury composed of fewer members than the minimum number required by statute, and that objection upon this ground may be raised at any time, and in any manner, and cannot be waived by any act, or failure to act, on the part of the defendant; 2nd. Those which hold that the objection is waived by failure to take advantage of the defect before pleading to the merits; and 3rd. Those which hold that statutes fixing the number to compose a grand jury, are directory merely, and do not alter the common law rule by which any number between 13 and 23 constitute a competent jury. It is settled in this State that an objection of this character does not go to the jurisdiction, but is waived by pleading to the merits, and can not avail on motion in arrest of judgment. Green v. State, 59 Md. [123,] 126 [(1882)]. [ Id. at 727-28.] If one may waive matters so fundamental as these, then it certainly follows that it is permissible for an attorney to waive the quorum required in the Maryland Rules for an inquiry panel. Since Bailey concedes that he waived the quorum, his objection is without merit. Bailey next attempts to have the proceeding dismissed because of a change in the rules we made on September 22, 1978. Prior to that time Rule BV9 b provided that we should designate the judges to hear the charges and Rule BV9 d referred to our order designating the court and panel of judges to hear the charges. Rule BV11 a 1 stated that if these judges found that the attorney [was] guilty of misconduct, [they] m[ight] recommend ... any of [certain] types of discipline [to] be imposed.... The current Rule BV9 b says we shall designate the judge or judges to hear the charges.... BV9 d likewise refers to judge or judges to hear the charges. Rule BV11 a no longer provides for recommendations but for [a] written statement of the findings of facts and conclusions of law.... Bailey asserts that because the hearing before the inquiry panel in his case was held on December 29, 1977, where he made several critical decisions which were irreversible in nature, citing as examples his decision to proceed [there] without representation, the decision to testify on his own behalf, the decision not to subpoena witnesses on his own behalf, and other critical decisions which were substantive and/or procedural in nature, he has been denied due process of law. Again, we do not agree. As we made plain in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. McBurney, 282 Md. 116, 383 A.2d 58 (1978), formal charges of misconduct do not exist against an attorney until a complaint is docketed in this Court. We observed, id. at 124 n. 1, The proceedings before the Inquiry Panel are merely a part of the preliminary investigation, just as under the prior procedure the preliminary investigation or hearing was before a committee of a bar association, usually its grievance committee. We analogized the proceedings before the inquiry panel and the Review Board to those before a grand jury. Also, id. at 123, we referred to Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 515-16, 307 A.2d 677 (1973), where we drew a parallel between the proceedings before a three-judge panel (under the former rule) and a hearing before a master in chancery who hears testimony and then makes his recommendation to the chancellor. In the case at bar the complaint was not docketed in this Court until after the change in the rule. We have nothing in this case akin to that in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Klauber, 284 Md. 306, 308, 396 A.2d 253 (1979), where we were requested to suspend and declined to suspend an attorney. Our reason there was that had we suspended him we would have been applying a rule retroactively to a conviction which took place prior to the effective date of the rule. We found there no indication that it was our intent in adopting the revised Rule BV16 that it be applied to convictions taking place prior to its effective date. Bailey filed no such petition, but we point out that had he so desired he could have filed a petition with us under Rule BV10 c which provides that were he to show us good cause we would designate two additional judges to consider the charges. As Judge Bowen so aptly observed: Nothing of a substantive nature has changed in the Disciplinary Rules. What has changed is the procedure by which those rules are enforced, and all Judicial Proceedings follow the current Rules of Procedure, and changes in the Rules of Procedure do not affect the right of litigants to proceed with their action. The matter here is entirely procedural. We find no denial of due process.