Opinion ID: 661525
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peremptory Challenge Conference

Text: 31 Fontenot argues his conviction must be reversed because he was absent from the peremptory challenge conference, though he was present for the jury voir dire. He contends his absence violated his right to be present during trial in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Rule 43(a) provides that a defendant must be present at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury. 32 Fontenot raised this issue for the first time nearly seven months after the verdict. The district court noted that the issue was known to the defendant and his attorney from the beginning and denied the motion as untimely. Fontenot concedes that it was within the district court's discretion to do so, but argues that his absence from the peremptory challenge conference requires reversal because it was plain error.  'A plain error is a highly prejudicial error affecting substantial rights.'  United States v. Dischner, 960 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1290, 122 L.Ed.2d 682 (1993) (quoting United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979)). 33 The government argues Fontenot waived any claim regarding his absence from the peremptory challenge conference because he failed to object to that absence. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(b); United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527-28, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 1484-85, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (per curiam) (The district court need not get an express 'on the record' waiver from the defendant for every trial conference which a defendant may have a right to attend.... A defendant knowing of such a [conference] must assert whatever right he may have under Rule 43 to be present.). Rule 43(b) provides that a defendant waives his right to be present during a stage of the trial when he, initially present, ... is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced. In this case, the record does not show whether Fontenot was voluntarily or involuntarily absent from the peremptory challenge conference. We reject the government's waiver argument. 34 We need not determine whether the peremptory challenge conference is a stage of the trial or comes within the terms impaneling the jury under Rule 43(a). 2 Assuming, without deciding, that the peremptory challenge conference falls within Rule 43(a)'s proscriptions, we nonetheless reject Fontenot's argument of plain error. 35 Fontenot argues that his absence led to the presence of a possibly biased juror, whose close friend was murdered by her former husband, and he was denied his opportunity to assist counsel in the final selection of jurors. 36 After all challenges for cause were made, the parties were given time during a recess to discuss how to use their peremptory challenges. See Excerpt of Record 287-91. Fontenot had the opportunity to discuss his misgivings with counsel during and immediately following voir dire, prior to exercising his peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges were then apparently exercised in the jury room in the absence of Fontenot. No objection was made. Fontenot had an opportunity to participate at the impaneling of the jury to such an extent that we find no error that was highly prejudicial ... affecting substantial rights. See Dischner, 960 F.2d at 883.