Opinion ID: 1939744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the teachers' tenure act

Text: Plaintiff claims in this Court, as he did in the trial court, that pursuant to the Michigan teachers' tenure act a writ of mandamus should have been issued. The sections of the act upon which plaintiff relies, and other parts of the act we deem worthy of consideration in determining this appeal, are attached as an appendix to this opinion. The following from plaintiff's brief summarizes his contention: Appellant readily admits that school district should be given some discretion in determining whether or not a particular probationary teacher's work is satisfactory. He contends, however, that Article II, § 3 and Article III, § 1 of the teachers' tenure act dictates that once it is established that a probationary teacher's work is satisfactory, either as a matter of fact or by operation of law, the school district is obligated to rehire said teacher and, after two years of satisfactory service, a school board must grant him tenure in that school district, absent some compelling reason not found in this case, such as a `necessary reduction' in personnel due to a loss of students or income. Plaintiff also contends that, in view of the clear, express provisions of Article II, § 3, of the Michigan teacher tenure act, the decision of the school board as to whether to renew the contract of a probationary teacher must be related to the satisfactoriness of the teacher's work in that district during the probationary period. Therefore, when plaintiff completed his second year of probation and the board did not give him any notification that his work was unsatisfactory, he gained tenure status and, pursuant to the Tenure Act, the Elk Rapids Board had a clear duty to offer him a contract for the next school year. The interpretation urged by plaintiff is supported by the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court in Wilson v. Flint Board of Education (1960), 361 Mich 691. The following excerpts from defendants' brief brings into focus the board's answer to plaintiff's contention: The high school principal, who was only one individual in an evaluation procedure involving nine individuals, rated plaintiff-appellant as satisfactory by a written report. `There is no proof or evidence offered by the plaintiff that the board acted in an arbitrary manner by not offering the plaintiff a contract for the third year.' The tenure act is a statute which provides a two year period of discretion to local school boards after which time the teacher must either be granted the status of security called `tenure,' or the Board of Education must exercise their discretion and terminate the employment. The purpose and intent of the tenure act is to establish a procedure whereby school systems are free to select their own teachers, and those teachers who are selected are subsequently free to teach without arbitrary and capricious local political anxiety to affect their performance. The procedure unambiguously sets forth a two year period permitting full administrative discretion, and a subsequent indefinite period of employment security subject only to just cause. It is plain that it was the intention of the legislature when adopting the act, to make it mandatory on the controlling board to act and inform the second year probationary teacher in writing that he would not be offered a third year contract or employed by the school district for the next year, otherwise he attained tenure and had to be given employment.  Wilson v. Flint Board of Education (1960), 361 Mich 691 does not settle the question posed in the case at bar. In the Wilson case, the school board did not give a written statement to the probationary teacher during the first two years, at the end of the third year they notified her she would not be rehired for the following year. This the Court said they could not do because she had acquired tenure status at the end of two years and they could only dismiss her by compliance with the provisions of the tenure act. The Wilson case is the only Michigan case touching on the matter of probationary teachers. The trial court's opinion emphasized that plaintiff was not on a continuing contract for the ensuing year of 1968 and 1969, and that defendant, on February 20, 1968, notified plaintiff in writing he would not be offered a contract for the 1968-69 school year, in pursuance of MCLA § 38.83 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 15.1983), § 3; that such notice was not a dismissal nor a termination of a contract, and the Court of Appeals concluded its opinion with the following paragraph (p 371): This case does not involve discharge or demotion. It is a case of not rehiring plaintiff, which the board could decide to do, and its action is controlling on the facts of this case. We find it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional issues raised by plaintiff. The teachers' tenure act was first construed by this Court in Rehberg v. Board of Education of Melvindale, Ecorse Township School District No. 11, Wayne County (1951), 330 Mich 541. In that opinion, commenting upon legislative intent in regard to the control that was given to school boards, we stated (pp 547, 548): School districts, though state agencies, are governed locally and their controlling boards are chosen by the electorate. (See PA 1927, No 319 [CL 1948, § 341.1 et seq. (Stat Ann § 15.1 et seq. )].) [2] If the legislature intended to deprive local governing bodies of administrative control of teachers, that intent should have been definitely stated in the tenure act. CONCLUSION: We agree with defendants that Wilson v. Flint Board of Education (1960), 361 Mich 691, does not settle the question here before our Court. The issue in the Wilson case was whether the board could establish a three-year probationary period, give no written statement as to the character of her work during the first year, a failure to give her any written notification whatever as to the quality of her work during the second year, and, during March of the third year, notify her of her discharge effective June 12th. We held: The board of education of a school district may not require of a teacher a probationary period of more than two years but, for the benefit of a teacher, may grant a third year of probation (Syl 2), and stated that the failure of the board during the two-year period to in any way advise plaintiff as to whether her work was satisfactory or not established plaintiff as a tenure teacher as she commenced teaching during the third year. We concluded the Wilson opinion as follows (p 697): Under the view we have taken of the case it follows that the State Tenure Commission had jurisdiction of the matter and we need not pass upon its jurisdiction over probationers as such. We approve the commission's remand to the Flint School Board. It will conduct a proper hearing on the merits after specific charges shall have been furnished the teacher, all in accordance with the provisions of the teachers' tenure act. Costs to appellee. An examination of Articles II, III and VI of the teachers' tenure act (all attached to this opinion as an appendix) clearly discloses the distinction the legislature has made between the probationary period teacher (Article II) and the continuing tenure teacher (Article III). The right to challenge a board's decision granted to the teacher who has acquired continuing tenure is not granted to the probationary teacher. This distinction, which has existed since the teachers' tenure act was enacted in 1937, was accentuated by the 1963 legislature by additions and amendments (PA 1963, No 242). The legislature added § 4 to the three previous sections of Article II, entitled Probationary Period, thereby making doubly sure that the provisions in regard to discharge being based on reasonable and just cause (Article IV) would not apply to teachers serving a probationary period. The same act amended Article VI, § 1, by changing the words, A teacher shall have the right to appeal any decision of a controlling board to read: A teacher who has achieved tenure status may appeal any decision of a controlling board   . (Emphasis ours.) It is apparent that it was legislative intent as expressed in Articles IV and VI that disputes between controlling boards and teachers should be settled and determined by the State Tenure Commission, which the legislature created by Article VII of the teachers' tenure act. During oral argument when counsel for plaintiff was asked why he was before our Court instead of before the commission, the transcript of argument discloses: Mr. White: Article 2, § 4, states: `Articles 4, 5 and 6 shall not apply to any teacher deemed to be in a period of probation.' The Court: So this plaintiff here now, then had to go directly to court? Mr. White: That is right. That is why we went in that direction rather than to the commission. Articles 4, 5 and 6 deal with the right to a hearing and the right to appeal to the Tenure Commission. That avenue is not open to the probationary teacher. We agree with the trial court's finding that the board's notice was not a dismissal or termination of contract; that plaintiff was not on a continuing contract for the year 1967-68, and that the board's action notifying plaintiff in writing that he would not be offered a contract for 1968-69 was authorized by statute. The Court of Appeals' determination in regard to this issue is affirmed.