Opinion ID: 1915285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffectiveness Relating to Good Conduct in Prison

Text: Appellant asserts that evidence tending to show the he was a well-behaved and well-adjusted prisoner, from which the jury could draw favorable inferences regarding Appellant's character and future conduct as a prisoner, if sentenced to life in prison, is admissible mitigating evidence, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present such evidence to the jury. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (holding that evidence that a petitioner has been a well-behaved and well-adjusted prisoner from which the jury could draw favorable inferences regarding the petitioner's character and probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison is admissible as mitigating evidence). Specifically, Appellant alleges counsel ineffectiveness for failing to investigate, develop, and present evidence regarding four instances of good conduct in prison. First, after years of incarceration, Appellant had established that he was able to reside in prison with no instances of misconduct. He asserts that counsel could have discovered this fact by simply calling the Department of Corrections (DOC) and requesting Appellant's records. See Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of the appellant's good conduct in prison). Second, Appellant helped save the life of a fellow inmate who had tried to hang himself. He claims this evidence was available from the Washington County jail. Third, Appellant assisted the FBI in its investigation of another inmate, Samuel Wallace. Finally, Appellant asserts that he saved the lives of two women while in prison. When an inmate named Robert McGrogan approached Appellant and offered him $1500 if Appellant would kill two women, Mary and Donna Hoegrel, Appellant telephoned one of the women and told her of McGrogan's intentions and later assisted the Commonwealth in McGrogan's prosecution by testifying at his preliminary hearing. See Commonwealth v. McGrogan, 367 Pa.Super. 394, 532 A.2d 1203 (1987). Appellant asserts that evidence of his role in McGrogan's prosecution was readily available to counsel because McGrogan's trial took place before Appellant's trial. [32] Appellant asserts that there could be no reasonable basis for failing to uncover this evidence, because trial counsel clearly thought that evidence that Appellant saved someone's life was useful, as that was the focus of counsels' penalty phase presentation. Appellant further claims that he was prejudiced by these failures, because evidence that he was a model prisoner, an aid to law enforcement, had assisted corrections officers in aiding another inmate, and had saved the lives of two women would have shown the jury that he posed no threat to society while in prison. This evidence, he asserts, would have deflated the argument made by the prosecution that although Appellant had saved the life of Mr. Stephens when he was young, the personality trait leading to this action had not endured. The PCRA court rejected Appellant's four instances of good conduct as adequate to prove counsel ineffectiveness. First, the PCRA court found no arguable merit to Appellant's assertion that counsel was ineffective for failing to offer evidence of Appellant's lack of prison misconduct. The PCRA court noted that there was some question concerning Appellant's behavior while incarcerated. Specifically, the PCRA testimony revealed that Appellant had appeared in court on preliminary matters clothed in a towel, and had created problems while incarcerated. Additionally, the PCRA court concluded that trial counsel reasonably decided not to introduce evidence of Appellant's good conduct while incarcerated because, as Attorney Tershel testified, it would not have benefited Appellant to have the jury hear of his long history of incarceration. Second, the PCRA court noted that Appellant and the FBI agent involved in the investigation of Mr. Wallace testified during the guilt phase concerning Appellant's role in the investigation, and found that counsel reasonably chose not to rehash the evidence concerning [Appellant's] assistance with the FBI at the sentencing phase given that this evidence was introduced in the guilt phase. PCRA Ct. Op. at 50. Third, the PCRA court concluded that there was no arguable merit to the claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Appellant's role in saving the life of another inmate, because Appellant did not make counsel aware of this event. PCRA Ct. Op. at 51; N.T. PCRA at 199. Finally, regarding Appellant's role in saving the lives of the two women, the PCRA court found that although this claim had arguable merit, counsel was not unreasonable in failing to introduce this evidence because Attorney Tershel did not find out about it until after the completion of the penalty phase of Appellant's trial. We will address separately each piece of evidence that Appellant argues counsel should have obtained and presented to the jury. First, regarding Appellant's assertion that he had no instances of misconduct while in prison, he claims that counsel would have discovered this evidence if counsel had obtained Appellant's DOC records, which were readily available. Appellant bears the burden of proving his ineffectiveness claim. See Cooper, 941 A.2d at 664. This burden necessarily includes his obligation to prove that the records he faults counsel for not obtaining actually existed and were available to counsel. Appellant, however, did not provide his DOC records to the PCRA court. The PCRA court, therefore, had no way to evaluate them to determine whether they, in fact, contained the information Appellant claimed was within them. Without the records before it, neither the PCRA court nor this Court has any way of verifying that the records exist or that, if they do, they contain the information Appellant claims. The record here contains only Appellant's bald assertions that his DOC records would have supported his argument. Appellant's claims, however, are not self proving; his failure to demonstrate that the DOC records actually existed and were substantively consistent with his representations is fatal to his argument. [33] See Commonwealth v. Busanet, 572 Pa. 535, 817 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2002) (Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that relevant evidence actually existed); Commonwealth v. Smith, 544 Pa. 219, 675 A.2d 1221, 1234 (1996) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court) ([T]rial counsel is not ineffective for failing to submit evidence of mitigation where no such evidence exists.); Commonwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 508 A.2d 1167, 1177 (1986) (Counsel could only present that which exists.). Moreover, while Appellant was awaiting trial, he was uncooperative in jail, resisted following directions, and threatened corrections officers with karate, thus providing support for the PCRA court's conclusion that Appellant failed to prove counsel ineffectiveness for not offering as mitigation Appellant's lack of prison misconduct. See N.T. PCRA at 188, 190-91. PCRA Ct. Op. at 50. Next, we address Appellant's assertion that he helped to save the life of an inmate who had tried to commit suicide in prison, and that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present this evidence to the jury. In support of this contention, Appellant presented a Washington County jail incident report that describes that when two corrections officers investigated a noise, they saw an inmate on the floor, and Appellant helped the officer hold the inmate down while he kicked and convulsed. They discovered a shoestring around the inmate's neck. Appellant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to present this evidence. In addition to proving arguable merit and a lack of reasonable strategic basis for counsels' actions, Appellant must prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's conduct. See Pierce, 527 A.2d at 975. Evidence that Appellant helped corrections officers attend an inmate who had attempted suicide would be mitigating evidence under the catch-all mitigator. See 42 Pa. C.S. 9711(e)(8). As noted, however, the jury found the existence of this mitigator in reliance on counsel's argument that Appellant had saved the life of Mr. Stephens. While this additional evidence would have bolstered counsel's portrayal of Appellant as heroic, in light of the gruesome nature of the crime and the jury's acceptance of the Commonwealth's aggravating factors, we cannot conclude that it would have persuaded at least one juror to give more weight to the already found catch-all mitigator, such that the juror would have held out for life in prison. The burden on Appellant is to prove sufficient prejudiceโ i.e., a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would have been different had counsel presented this additional evidence to the jury. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (articulating the prevailing standard for assessing prejudice from deficient stewardship in the presentation of mitigation evidence in terms of whether there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.). He has not done so. See Rios, 920 A.2d at 812-13 (rejecting the appellant's ineffectiveness claim grounded in counsel's failure to provide more evidence in support of a mitigating circumstance found by the jury); Commonwealth v. Scott, 561 Pa. 617, 752 A.2d 871, 877 n. 7 (2000) (where the jury found the catch-all mitigating circumstance, the appellant failed to show that he suffered any prejudice from his counsel's failure to introduce more evidence in support of this mitigator). [34] Next, we examine Appellant's allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to explain to the jury that it could consider evidence of Appellant's role in the FBI's investigation of Mr. Wallace or request a jury instruction in this regard. Even assuming this claim has arguable merit, we find that Appellant has failed to prove that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure. See Pierce, 786 A.2d at 213. The jury was already aware of Appellant's role in the investigation because the FBI agent testified in the guilt phase. Although trial counsel did not remind the jury of this fact during closing or request a jury instruction regarding it, we find that because the jury had just heard this evidence there is not a reasonable probability that but for counsel's error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Cox, 863 A.2d at 546. Finally, we turn to Appellant's contentions that he notified Mary and Donna Hoegrel of Mr. McGrogan's attempt to hire Appellant to kill them. Appellant claims that trial counsel should have presented the Hoegrels to testify at Appellant's penalty phase hearing, or presented evidence of Appellants' effort to save them. Before counsel can be found to be ineffective for failing to uncover substantial mitigation evidence, Appellant must demonstrate that such evidence exists. Busanet, 817 A.2d at 1070. It appears that there are several possible sources of this evidence: the Hoegrels themselves, Appellant's DOC records, the Superior Court opinion in Mr. McGrogan's appeal, see McGrogan, 367 Pa.Super. 394, 532 A.2d 1203, which discusses Appellant's role in the McGrogan investigation and preliminary hearing, and Appellant, who obviously was aware of his role in this incident. To prove the arguable merit prong of Appellant's claim of counsel ineffectiveness for failing to call the Hoegrels as witnesses in the penalty phase, see Pierce, 786 A.2d at 213, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the witnesses existed; (2) such witnesses were available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of the witnesses; (4) the witnesses were willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of such witnesses was so prejudicial as to have denied the petitioner a fair trial. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261, 292 (2000). Appellant has not attempted to prove any of these factors; thus, we cannot conclude counsel was ineffective for failing to call these witnesses. Regarding Appellant's DOC records as a possible source of information regarding Appellant's role in Mr. McGrogan's prosecution, as noted, Appellant has not provided these records to the PCRA court or this Court, so they cannot form a basis of a finding of ineffectiveness. Busanet, 817 A.2d at 1070. Nor was the Superior Court opinion describing Appellant's notification of the Hoegrels and his testimony against Mr. McGrogan available to counsel during the penalty phase because it was filed October 21, 1987, after the completion of Appellant's trial. That leaves us to consider Appellant himself as a source of this information. Appellant, however, does not argue that he told counsel of his involvement, was ready and willing to testify about his involvement at the penalty phase, or that there was any reason for counsel to be aware of and ask him about it. Therefore, Appellant has not proven the arguable merit prong of his claim of counsel ineffectiveness because he has not demonstrated that the evidence existed or was available to counsel.