Opinion ID: 2598537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Repeal of Statutory Proportionality Review

Text: [ś 214] The statutory provision in the death penalty statute requiring this court to conduct a proportionality review was repealed by the legislature in 1989. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 171, § 2. Although Olsen raises no issue concerning the repeal, we will address whether we are constitutionally required to conduct such a review. [ś 215] In Hopkinson II, we considered the issue whether Wyoming's death penalty statutes were unconstitutional because of the review procedures granted to this court. Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d at 50. In resolving the issue we noted that the Wyoming Legislature in providing for the death penalty as a sentence in the case of first degree murder was restrained by [federal] constitutional provisions and guarantees. This necessitated incorporating into the death penalty sentence constitutional restraints as a condition to its availability. Id. at 51. We said: When this court is presented with a constitutionally based challenge to a statute, it presumes the statute constitutional. Any doubt must be resolved in favor of constitutionality. Before we strike it down we must find that it clearly violates some constitutional principle, state or federal. The Supreme Court of the United States has said that, even when a serious doubt of constitutionality is present, courts should ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932). The most important reason for holding that §§ 6-4-102(g) and 6-4-103 are constitutional is that they are an important and necessary part of the total sentencing structure. In that regard, the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens in Gregg v. Georgia, supra, 428 U.S. at 198, 96 S.Ct. at 2937, in announcing the judgment of the Court said: As an important additional safeguard against arbitrariness and caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for automatic appeal of all death sentences to the State's Supreme Court. That court is required by statute to review each sentence of death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases. § 27-2537(c) (Supp.1975). In short, Georgia's new sentencing procedures require as a prerequisite to the imposition of the death penalty, specific jury findings as to the circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant. Moreover, to guard further against a situation comparable to that presented in Furman [v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972)], the Supreme Court of Georgia compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not disproportionate. On their face these procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman. No longer should there be `no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.' 408 U.S., at 313 [92 S.Ct. at 2764] (WHITE, J., concurring). Again, 428 U.S. at page 204, 96 S.Ct. at 2939, the Court explained: Finally, the Georgia statute has an additional provision designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants. The new sentencing procedures require that the State Supreme Court review every death sentence to determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, whether the evidence supports the findings of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. § 27-2537(c)(3) (Supp.1975).    Then at page 206, 96 S.Ct. at 2940, the Court went on to say: The provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty. In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. Finally, at page 207, 96 S.Ct. at 2941, the Court said:    In addition, the review function of the Supreme Court of Georgia affords additional assurance that the concerns that prompted our decision in Furman are not present to any significant degree in the Georgia procedure applied here. The concurring opinion of Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined, also stressed the state supreme court review of the death penalty as [a]n important aspect of the new Georgia legislative scheme   . In Proffitt v. Florida, supra, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913, the Court, in approving the Florida death penalty statutes, called attention to the provision § 921.141(4), F.S.A., by stating that this automatic review provision is designed to assure that the death penalty will not be imposed on a capriciously selected group of convicted defendants. While the provision is not structured in the same fashion as that of Georgia, it was held by the United States Supreme Court that the manner in which the Florida Supreme Court reviews each death sentence does ensure similar results in similar cases, citing State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 10 (Fla., 1973). The certiorari petition in Proffitt asserted that such a skimpy provision made the role of the state supreme court necessarily subjective and unpredictable. The United States Supreme Court responded to that by stating:    While it may be true that that court has not chosen to formulate a rigid objective test as its standard of review for all cases, it does not follow that the appellate review process is ineffective or arbitrary. In fact, it is apparent that the Florida court has undertaken responsibly to perform its function of death sentence review with a maximum of rationality and consistency. For example, it has several times compared the circumstances of a case under review with those of previous cases in which it has assessed the imposition of death sentences. By following this procedure the Florida court has in effect adopted the type of proportionality review mandated by the Georgia statute. And any suggestion that the Florida court engages in only cursory or rubber-stamp review of death penalty cases is totally controverted by the fact that it has vacated over one-third of the death sentences that have come before it.    Id., 428 U.S. at 258-259, 96 S.Ct. at 2969. We conclude and hold that the action of the Wyoming State Legislature in specifying the nature of our review does not purport to take away any of our powers or jurisdiction. The judicial function of making the requisite determinations on review are [sic] left to this court. It would be something else if the legislature enacted a statute whereby the legislature would review the trial proceedings; it then would be exercising powers properly belonging to the courts. We consider the challenged statutory sections to be a proper exercise of legislative power to provide for the sentencing of convicted first degree murders. This does not mean that under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure we could not conduct the same review as that directed by the legislature. If we disregarded the legislative directions, we would still be required to conduct a review within the standards set out in Gregg and Proffitt, as did the Supreme Court of Florida. Hopkinson II, 664 P.2d at 54-56 (some citations and footnotes omitted). [ś 216] In 1984, the United States Supreme Court decided that a statutorily mandated proportionality review was not a constitutional requirement. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 45, 50-51, 104 S.Ct. 871, 876, 879, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). Proportionality review had previously been approved by the Court as a safeguard against discriminatory, wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty; however, the Court determined that no decision mandated the review. Id. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 876-77. If a sentencing scheme provided safeguards that adequately directed and limited the jury's discretion, it would be constitutional without a proportionality review. Id. at 50-51, 104 S.Ct. at 879. [ś 217] Pulley reviewed the safeguards of the California sentencing scheme at issue and determined the safeguards in place served to assure thoughtful and effective appellate review, focusing upon the circumstances present in each particular case. Id. at 53, 104 S.Ct. at 881. The Court found this determination was proved by the fact the California Supreme Court had reduced a death sentence to life imprisonment in another case where the evidence did not support the findings of special circumstances. Id. [ś 218] Accordingly, the Wyoming Legislature's repeal of this statutory provision does not render the Wyoming death penalty unconstitutional. As we made clear in Hopkinson, however, this court reviews death sentences independently of the legislative mandate. As seen in Pulley, the Court continues to consider a state supreme court's willingness to set aside death sentences when warranted as an important indication that the constitutional safeguards are in place and effective. Our review of each death sentence must be sufficient to permit vacating an arbitrary, unjust death sentence if warranted.