Opinion ID: 887918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Issue 2. Did the District Court err in denying Munson's motion to suppress evidence seized from her apartment and vehicle?

Text: ¶49 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution safeguard the right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures. Unlike its federal counterpart, however, the Montana Constitution also explicitly ensures the right of individual privacy. Specifically, Article II, Section 10, states: The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. Search analysis in Montana, therefore, is typically conducted under both Article II, Section 10, and Article II, Section 11. See State v. Siegal, 281 Mont. 250, 264-65, 934 P.2d 176, 184 (1997), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Kuneff, 1998 MT 287, ¶ 19, 291 Mont. 474, ¶ 19, 970 P.2d 556, ¶ 19; State v. Scheetz, 286 Mont. 41, 45, 950 P.2d 722, 724 (1997); State v. Tackitt, 2003 MT 81, ¶ 17, 315 Mont. 59, ¶ 17, 67 P.3d 295, ¶ 17. Furthermore, we have long held that the unique language of the Montana Constitution affords Montanans broader protection than does the Fourth Amendment in cases involving searches of, or seizures from, private property. See State v. Sawyer, 174 Mont. 512, 515, 571 P.2d 1131, 1133 (1977), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Long, 216 Mont. 65, 67, 71, 700 P.2d 153, 155, 157 (1985); State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361, 384, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (1995); State v. Bassett, 1999 MT 109, ¶ 42, 294 Mont. 327, ¶ 42, 982 P.2d 410, ¶ 42. ¶50 Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable, subject to only a few carefully drawn exceptions. State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 39, 302 Mont. 228, ¶ 39, 14 P.3d 456, ¶ 39; see also State v. Rushton, 264 Mont. 248, 257, 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 (1994), overruled in part on other grounds, State v. Hermes, 273 Mont. 446, 449, 904 P.2d 587, 589 (1995); State v. Gomez, 2007 MT 111, ¶ 23, 337 Mont. 219, ¶ 23, 158 P.3d 442, ¶ 23; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1380 (1980). One such exception is consent, when it is given knowingly and voluntarily by an individual who has the authority to consent to the search and seizure. See State v. Copelton, 2006 MT 182, ¶ 18, 333 Mont. 91, ¶ 18, 140 P.3d 1074, ¶ 18; State v. Schwarz, 2006 MT 120, ¶¶ 9-10, 332 Mont. 243, ¶¶ 9-10, 136 P.3d 989, ¶¶ 9-10; State v. Parker, 1998 MT 6, ¶ 20, 287 Mont. 151, ¶ 20, 953 P.2d 692, ¶ 20; Rushton, 264 Mont. at 257, 870 P.2d at 1361. The prosecution carries the burden of establishing that consent to a warrantless search was freely and voluntarily given and was uncontaminated by any express or implied duress or coercion. State v. Olson, 2002 MT 211, ¶ 20, 311 Mont. 270, ¶ 20, 55 P.3d 935, ¶ 20; Rushton, 264 Mont. at 257-58, 870 P.2d at 1361. ¶51 We have adopted the Supreme Court's totality of the circumstances test for determining whether consent was given freely and voluntarily and without duress or coercion. See State v. Wetzel, 2005 MT 154, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 413, ¶ 16, 114 P.3d 269, ¶ 16; Rushton, 264 Mont. at 258, 870 P.2d at 1361; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 227, 248-49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 2048, 2059 (1973). This test focuses on the nature of [the individual's] subjective understanding, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 230, 93 S. Ct. at 2049, which in turn depends on the characteristics of [the individual] and the details of the interrogation, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S. Ct. at 2047. A number of considerations are pertinent to this inquiry, such as whether the individual was in custody or under arrest at the time consent was requested; whether consent was sought after the search had already been conducted; whether the individual was expressly informed that he or she had the right not to consent to the search; whether the individual was told that a search warrant could be obtained; whether the individual was advised of his or her constitutional rights; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the individual's age, education, and intelligence; and whether the individual was threatened or coerced in any manner. See Wetzel, ¶ 17; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S. Ct. at 2047; United States v. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d 494, 502 (9th Cir. 2004). In the end, however, the determination of whether consent was given freely and voluntarily and without duress or coercion depends on the totality of all of the surrounding facts, and no single fact is dispositive. Copelton, ¶ 19. ¶52 In its order denying Munson's motion to suppress the evidence collected from her residence and automobile, the District Court stated that Munson was aware the officers would leave her home if she decided not to talk with them, that she was advised several times she did not have to sign the consent form, and that the Officers made no promises to Munson before she consented to the search, nor did they threaten to circumvent the scope of her consent absent a warrant. The court thus reasoned that Munson analyzed the situation she was in, and came to the conclusion in her own mind that it was in her best interest to volunteer the drug paraphernalia, risk the possibility of what she thought was only a misdemeanor charge, and obtain help. Therefore, the court concluded, Munson knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search. ¶53 Munson challenges the District Court's conclusion in light of the following circumstances. First, Munson points out that she was not informed by the Officers that she could refuse their entry into her apartment and, furthermore, that when she in fact asked them if they would come back, Basnaw insisted that he needed to visit with her right now. Second, although Basnaw told Munson that he and Johnson were there to visit with her regarding that situation last night with George Snell over here, few of their questions actually pertained to Snell or his activities. Instead, Munson asserts, [the Officers] lectured her about her lifestyle, implied that they were there to help, and criticized her life to the point that [she] was crying for a good portion of the interview. Third, Munson refused twice at the outset of the questioning to consent to a search of her apartment, but the Officers did not accept her refusals and leave. Instead they asked, Why not? and continued to question her until she ultimately gave consent. Fourth, when Basnaw produced the Consent to Search form, he explained that the form just says that your, you're uh, having been informed of your right to refuse a search of your um, of your house . . .; however, at this point the Officers had not actually told Munson that she had the right to refuse the search. Munson points out that, [t]o the contrary, when she had refused to give consent fifteen minutes prior, the detectives had simply ignored her refusal, remained in her home, and continued their interrogation. Fifth, Munson contends that there was an implied threat that she would be incarcerated if she did not consent to the search. According to Munson, Johnson's earlier comment that [w]e didn't come here and take that Miranda card out implied, at least in her mind, that if she doesn't cooperate, they will Mirandize her and arrest her. Lastly, Munson argues that in its order, the District Court blatantly ignore[d] the lengthy time of the interrogation, or the coercive nature of the interrogation and state[d] the facts as if Ms. Munson willingly made admissions without any prompting or effort by the detectives. This view of the events, Munson maintains, is wholly unsupported by the facts. In sum, Munson asserts that the State did not meet its burden of proving that her consent was given freely and voluntarily and was uncontaminated by any express or implied duress or coercion, and that the District Court erred in concluding otherwise. ¶54 In response, the State argues that Munson's consent was given voluntarily for the following reasons. First, the State notes that Munson initially refused the Officers' request to search the apartment and Munson's person and that when she finally allowed a search for paraphernalia, she retained some control over where the officers looked. Thus, in the State's view, Munson was not intimidated so as to deprive her of the power of consent. Second, the State maintains that [e]ven though the officers were there to investigate criminal activity, that does not contradict their stated desire to help Munson get out of the pattern of drug use that was evident to them all. The State acknowledges that the Officers could have left to seek a warrant before they obtained Munson's consent to search, but how would that have benefited her? Third, the State suggests that the length of an interview is simply one of many factors, and it did not appear significant here. Lastly, the State asserts that [t]his is not a case in which the police wore down a suspect, since Munson was in her own home and made choices throughout the incident. Likewise, the State asserts that [t]his was not a coerced decision. It was made under emotional circumstances, and Munson certainly knew that her drug use was a problem for her, but she still made choices that reflected calculation albeit with mistaken assumptions that were not the result of being misled by the police. Thus, in sum, the State maintains that the District Court correctly concluded, assessing all the circumstances, that Munson's consent to search was voluntary. ¶55 Having considered the foregoing arguments and the record before us, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances weighs in Munson's favor. Although there unquestionably are circumstances supporting both sides of the consent issue, we consider the following facts to be most significant. ¶56 First, Munson indicated to the Officers upon their arrival that she did not want to visit with them at that time, but they insisted on visiting with her right now, thereby creating a coercive dynamic at the outset of the interview. Second, Munson unequivocally refused twice at the outset of the questioning to consent to a search of her apartment, but the Officers nevertheless pressured her to change her mind, thereby conveying that they would not take No for an answer. In this regard, we are not persuaded by the emphasis the State places on the Officers' altruistic motive in going to Munson's apartment to help [her] get out of the pattern of drug usea characterization that is dubious in light of Basnaw's statement, upon the Officers' arrival, that he and Johnson were there to follow up on allegations of criminal activity involving Munson and her apartment. Indeed, the State's portrayal of the events is belied by Basnaw's own characterization (while requesting transportation of Munson) of what had just transpired: Hi Hillary it's Jase. Good. Hey that female I talked to ya' about I'm at her house now. We did a consent to search and I'm gonna' end up takin' her to jail. Yeah. We got a little bit o' meth and meth paraphernalia. She's got a 1-year-old and a 5-year-old. So how do ya' like that? Hahaha. Made to order. ¶57 Third, the Officers employed what could fairly be characterized as psychological tactics to obtain Munson's consent. Cf. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S. Ct. at 2049 (In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents.). For instance, Johnson told Munson that [t]here's some pretty bad stuff goin' on here, opined that she was at a fork in the road, offered ideas on how she might change her life, and then suggested that signing the consent form would be the wise choice for her to make, noting that [t]he decision you make today is gonna' determine where your children are raised. As a result, Munson's consent ultimately was given while she was in an extremely emotional state brought on by the Officers' lecturing her at length about her lifestyle, her children, and her future. For this reason, we cannot agree with the State that [t]his is not a case in which the police wore down a suspect. To the contrary, our review of the thirty-one-page transcript covering the approximately one hour and forty-five minutes that the Officers were at Munson's apartment leads inescapably to the conclusion that Basnaw and Johnson's approach achieved exactly what they had intended: to wear Munson down to the point where she made inculpatory statements and yielded to their warrantless search of her home. ¶58 Lastly, although the Officers did indeed tell Munson that she did not have to sign the Consent to Search form, they also told her that she did have to sign the form. As a matter of fact, the transcript reflects virtually simultaneous contradictory statements by the Officers in this regard; at the very least, their statements to Munson that she did not have to sign the form were equivocal. ¶59 Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Munson's consent was not given freely and voluntarily and without duress or coercion. Thus, all evidence seized by the Officers under the guise of Munson's consent is inadmissible. We accordingly reverse the District Court's order denying Munson's motion to suppress that evidence.