Opinion ID: 1881657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Filial Consortium Damages Claim

Text: We held in Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hospital, 984 S.W.2d 593 (Tenn. 1999), that loss of consortium is compensable for wrongful death under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113. On October 20, 2000, in Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2000), we held that Jordan applied retroactively to all cases tried or retried after Jordan and to all cases pending on appeal in which the issue decided in Jordan was raised at an appropriate time. On August 31, 2001, in Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, 54 S.W.3d 234 (Tenn. 2001), we extended our holding in Jordan to allow a parent to recover under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113 for loss of filial consortium. Because Jordan applies retroactively and Hancock allows recovery of filial consortium damages under Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the issue of consortium damages. The Rothsteins may seek recovery for loss of filial consortium. The remaining issue is the procedure that the trial court must follow on remand. A jury verdict was returned in favor of the Rothsteins in the amount of $275,000 for Lisa's pain and suffering. The trial judge remitted this amount to $200,000, which the Rothsteins accepted under protest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's remittitur, and the Rothsteins have not contested the remittitur in this Court. The wrongful death statute provides as follows: Where a person's death is caused by the wrongful act, ... of another, and suit is brought for damages, as provided for by §§ 20-5-106 and 20-5-107, the party suing shall, if entitled to damages, have the right to recover for the mental and physical suffering, loss of time, and necessary expenses resulting to the deceased from the personal injuries, and also the damages resulting to the parties for whose use and benefit the right of action survives from the death consequent upon the injuries received. Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-113. The statute allows for the recovery of two types of damages in a wrongful death action. Under the first prong, the survivor is entitled to damages sustained by the deceased from the time of injury until the time of death. See Jordan, 984 S.W.2d at 598. These damages include the mental and physical pain and suffering of the deceased. The second prong of damages allows survivors of the deceased to recover for their losses suffered as a result of the death. See id. This second type of damages includes incidental damages suffered by the decedent's next of kin. Id. at 600. Incidental damages include the pecuniary value of the decedent's life, which encompasses consortium damages. Id. at 602. Consortium damages include the loss of attention, guidance, care, protection, training, companionship, cooperation, affection, love, and in the case of a spouse, sexual relations. Id. Generally, a party has the right to have one jury determine all the issues at one time. Hurt v. Earnhart, 539 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Tenn. Const. Art. 1, § 6). An exception to this rule applies to cases in which liability is affirmed but an error has been committed in the assessment of damages. Id. Under these circumstances, the case may be remanded for a different jury to assess the proper amount of damages. Id. In this case, we have affirmed the lower court's ruling on the issue of liability. We have held, however, that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the Rothsteins' claim for consortium damages. When a general verdict is affirmed as to the issue of liability but reversed on the award of damages, we normally remand for a new trial on all of the elements comprising the monetary award. See, e.g., Holder v. Drake, 908 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1995). We need not do so in this case. Although the verdict was a general verdict, it is clear that the trial court charged the jury only as to the one requested element of damages included in the first prong of damages in the wrongful death statute. The jury was instructed that it could award damages for the mental and physical pain and suffering of the deceased from the onset of her illness to her death. The verdict is as clear and limited as if a special interrogatory had been answered by the jury. The trial court did not instruct the jury on the second prong of damages permitted under the wrongful death statute. Damages under this prong include the pecuniary value of the decedent's life, which encompasses damages for loss of consortium. Jordan, 984 S.W.2d at 602. Of the damages permitted under this prong, the plaintiffs sought only damages for loss of filial consortium. The request for loss of filial consortium was not submitted to the jury for its consideration. We must, therefore, presume that the jury followed the trial court's instructions, State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998), and limited the damages to pain and suffering. Under these circumstances, and in the interest of judicial economy, we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial on the issue of loss of filial consortium. Compare Brockie v. Omo Constr., Inc., 268 Mont. 519, 887 P.2d 167 (1995) (remanding for new trial on survivorship damages); Crowe v. Stewart Mach. & Engineering Co., 1994 WL 516612 (E.D. La. 1994) (remanding for a new trial on past medical expenses); Thatch v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 47 Ill.App.3d 980, 6 Ill.Dec. 242, 362 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (1977) (remanding for a new trial to reduce damages).