Opinion ID: 2276127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the fetal homicide statute.

Text: House Bill 108, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky.2004), effective February 20, 2004 (nine days after the oral argument in this case), which became KRS Chapter 507A, created the new offense of fetal homicide. The bill defines unborn child as a member of the species homo sapiens in utero from conception onward, without regard to age, health, or condition of dependency. H.B. 108 § 1(c). The Ex Post Facto Clauses of both the United States and Kentucky Constitutions preclude retrospective application of this statute to Appellee's conduct with respect to the unborn child in this case. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Ky. Const. § 19(2). However, we are invited to use this case as a vehicle to prospectively adopt that definition via common law. ( See Wintersheimer, J., concurring, post. ) Of course, KRS 507.040, the statute we now construe, refers not to an unborn child, but to a person, further defined as a human being. Since the human being that is the subject of this appeal was a viable fetus, it is unnecessary to address in this opinion whether killing a nonviable fetus would violate KRS 507.040. Presumably, future homicides of nonviable fetuses will be prosecuted under KRS Chapter 507A. Furthermore, to prematurely approve the definition in H.B. 108 would preempt a potential void for vagueness challenge to the statute, essentially declaring it constitutional without benefit of either briefs or arguments. [8] It might also tempt an overly zealous prosecutor to cite such a holding in an attempt to apply the KRS Chapter 507 homicide statutes to a consensual abortion of a nonviable fetus, or to seek the death penalty for the double murder of a pregnant woman and her nonviable fetus, applications expressly precluded in the new fetal homicide law. H.B. 108, supra, at §§ 1(2), (3); 6.