Opinion ID: 76239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: submission to polygraph testing

Text: 8 As a special condition on Taylor's supervised release, the district court ordered Taylor to participate in a mental health program specializing in sexual offender treatment approved by the probation officer, and abide by the rules, requirements and conditions of the treatment program, including submitting to polygraph testing to aid in the treatment and supervision process. Taylor makes five challenges to the polygraph testing. 9 First, Taylor contends that the polygraph testing is not reasonably related to his conviction under the standards listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), quoted in Section II above. Given his record, we disagree. The district court required polygraph testing to help insure Taylor's compliance with the supervised release terms imposed on him. 2 Following his 1986 conviction, Taylor failed to comply with the terms of his supervised release and that release was revoked. The district court also required the polygraph testing to help insure that Taylor receives the mental health/sexual offender treatment he requires. Taylor's 1986 conviction was for sexual battery of his toddler daughter. Taylor's current conviction is based on his extreme reaction to a contractual dispute which ultimately resulted in his placing a 12-year-old-child in harm's way by presenting her as a willing victim for pedophiles. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the polygraph testing is reasonably related to the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Compare United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (11th Cir.2003). Further, the polygraph testing does not, as Taylor suggests, result in an excessive deprivation of [his] liberty interests. 10 Second, Taylor contends that the polygraph testing condition is so vague that it delegat[es] ... judicial responsibility to the probation office and deprives Taylor [of] notice of what is required of him. We rejected this argument in Zinn, although the review was only for plain error because the objection had not been preserved for appeal. Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1087, 1092. In Zinn, we recognized that the sentencing guidelines expressly permit[ ] the district court to require defendants to `participate in a mental health program approved by the United States Probation Office ', and we repeated our firm belief that probation officers play a vital role in effectuating the sentences imposed by district courts. Id. at 1092 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5B1.3(d)(5), p.s. and citing United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.2001)). In Bernardine, we said that a probation officer is appointed by the district court and acts... under the discretion of the appointing court, is an arm of the court, and is a liaison between the [district] court ... and the defendant. Bernardine, 237 F.3d at 1282-83 (citations and internal marks omitted). We also said that a probation officer is statutorily mandated to perform any other duty that the court may designate and that we interpret this grant of authority broadly, though it is limited by Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the delegation of judicial functions. Id. at 1283 (citations and internal marks omitted). For these reasons, the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion. 11 Third, Taylor contends that the polygraph testing condition violates his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He argues that the district court's failure to specify the subject matter of the testing means that he could be asked questions that incriminate him, and that Florida law would require the examiner to report those answers, thereby subjecting Taylor to criminal liability. However, Taylor's injury is entirely speculative because no incriminating questions have been asked. See Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1091. Because Taylor has not been compelled to testify despite a valid claim of privilege, we can only decide whether requiring polygraph testing as a condition of supervised release generally violates the Fifth Amendment so as to amount to [an abuse of discretion]. Id. at 1092. Zinn held there was no plain error. Id. We hold there was no abuse of discretion. 12 Fourth, Taylor contends that the district court improperly ordered him to pay the costs of polygraph examinations, notwithstanding its conclusion that [he] did not have the ability to pay a fine. What the district court's order actually says is: [T]he defendant shall contribute to the costs of such treatment and/or polygraphs, not to exceed an amount determined reasonable by the probation officer based on ability to pay or availability of third-party payment and in conformance with the probation office's applicable sliding scale. Taylor's argument is meritless. 13 Finally, Taylor contends that the cumulative effect of his arguments requires that we find that the district court abused its discretion. We disagree. Taylor's arguments, which are inadequate individually, are no more adequate collectively.