Opinion ID: 1136715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: confusion caused by kumbera

Text: The majority apparently concludes the Disciplinary Board qualified its recommendation of disbarment. I disagree. A 7-to-1 vote for disbarment is not qualified in any way! While the Board sent a subsequent letter concerning respondent, it did not qualify its earlier recommendation of disbarment. The letter was no more than an expression of confusion over how this court could apply the long-standing view of In re Cary, supra at 766 ( i.e., that the basic and underlying purposes of discipline are protection of the public and preservation of confidence in the legal profession as well as the judicial system) [2] in light of this court's seemingly inconsistent, more subjective and oversolicitous view of its role in lawyer discipline recited in In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979). In effect, the letter merely states that the Bar has always believed that preservation of confidence in the legal profession and the judicial system and public protection were basic to lawyer discipline. But, it goes on to say, if this court chooses to abandon those basic principles for a lesser standard, as it appeared to do in Kumbera, then respondent should benefit by the reduced ethical standards. The Board reiterated its confusion over the abandonment of the basic principles of lawyer discipline and requested clarification and guidance. For the Bar to suggest respondent should get the benefit of a newly weakened ethical principle is quite different from saying it recommended (qualified or otherwise) that respondent should not be disbarred. I can fully understand the Bar's confusion and consternation over the apparent rejection of this court's long-standing recognition of its basic duty to the public, the legal profession and the judicial system. The confusion is even heightened by our action subsequent to Kumbera. In In re Zderic, supra at 787-88, we restated In re Cary's more responsible statement of the judicial role. I can only say that the instant case is a good example of the overly subjective, overly solicitous approach initiated in Kumbera. Following, as it does, the long-standing Cary approach, interrupted by Kumbera, thence followed by a return to the strict approach in Zderic, lawyers, the Disciplinary Board and interested members of the public must feel as if they are observing an intellectual yo-yo. I cannot condone an abandonment of the more strict recognition of our duty to the public, the legal profession and the judicial system itself. At best it adds a spot of dry-rot to the legal structure. Finally, I must observe that for years this court has consistently held that in making the ultimate determination as to the measure of disciplinary action, we will give consideration to the following matters: (1) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense, (2) avoidance of repetition by the offender, (3) the sanctions' likely deterrent effect upon others, (4) maintenance of respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession, and (5) assurance that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional conduct. In re Zderic, supra ; In re Kumbera, supra ; In re Livesey, 85 Wn.2d 189, 532 P.2d 274 (1975); In re Smith, supra . The majority has not even paid lip service to these principles. The opinion has down-played the actual seriousness of the individual offenses set out at length in this dissent. It has ignored the fact that sanctions should be employed so as to have a deterrent effect on others. Instead of considering the series of serious offenses, however, the majority has imposed a penalty that virtually invites others to victimize clients with the expectation that they need only repay the stolen funds if caught, remembering, of course, to act contrite and express their sorrow. The majority also has overlooked the requirement that a sanction should be sufficient to permit the public to maintain respect for the honor and dignity of the legal profession. This decision gives no assurance to a vulnerable public that those who seek legal services will be insulated from unprofessional conduct. This decision will not impress the public favorably. Instead of upholding the welfare of the Bar as a whole, instead of considering those individual lawyers who honorably serve the public, and, instead of protecting the welfare of the public at large, the majority has directed its solicitude toward the individual miscreant. In so doing, it has turned former principles governing lawyer discipline on their heads by focusing only upon a small segment of the disciplinary picture to the near exclusion of the larger and more important consideration of the public, the legal profession and the Bar. For the reasons stated above, I dissent and would disbar respondent. WRIGHT and BRACHTENBACH, JJ., and HAMILTON, J. Pro Tem., concur with STAFFORD, J.