Opinion ID: 787590
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requisite Level of Scrutiny

Text: 65 As a regulation of the amount that a candidate can spend on speech made for the purpose of influencing an election, Vermont's expenditure limits are a content-based restriction on speech. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (treating election provision as content-based because whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights ... depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign). 8 Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992), and the government bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). To uphold a content-based restriction on speech, the government must prove the existence of a compelling state interest to support the restriction, and that the restriction is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. 66 In the context of expenditure limits, then, the level of scrutiny applied is akin to the strict scrutiny standard frequently employed in the equal protection context, in terms of the required degree of fit between means and ends. Cf. Guido Calabresi, Antidiscrimination and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. Rev. 80, 112-13 n.94 (citing cases) (noting that, traditionally, judicial review has been at its strongest in protecting against infringement on First Amendment rights). Our application of this standard is informed both by the particular First Amendment right implicated by the challenged restrictions, as well as by the degree of deference owed to the supporting legislative findings. 67 Turning to the first of these factors, there is no doubt that [p]olitical speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Moreover, in our representative democracy, the free exchange of political information should receive the most protection when it matters the most — during campaigns for elective office. Id. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 897. However, the precise object of First Amendment protection in this case, for most plaintiffs, is the ability to spend money on political speech — not the speech itself. See Shrink, 528 U.S. at 400, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring) (money is not speech; it  enables speech). To be sure, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the expenditure of money is so critical in enabling political speech in today's mass society, that it should receive the same First Amendment protection as the speech itself. We do not question this proposition — and indeed apply it in this case — but, particularly in light of at least one Supreme Court Justice's willingness to rethink the money equals speech equation (J. Stevens concurring in Shrink, 528 U.S. at 398, 120 S.Ct. 897), think it important to define the protected interest as precisely as possible. 68 Although most of the plaintiffs are persons or organizations that want to spend money on speech, plaintiff Marcella Landell is a voter who wants to receive political speech. Her First Amendment right to receive such speech is the equivalent of the right of the speakers. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976) (the First Amendment protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both). As Landell describes her interest in her brief, she does not wish her ability to cast a wise and informed vote to be restricted by the State of Vermont imposing a direct barrier on the amount of candidate speech she may receive. Restrictions of political speech that hamstring[ ] voters seeking to inform themselves about the candidates and the campaign issues are unconstitutional. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). Plaintiffs argue that this high level of protection, as applied in Buckley, dictates that the expenditure limit provision must automatically be struck down. 69 On the other hand, Vermont appears to argue that deference to the legislature — on whether the interests asserted in favor of expenditure limits are compelling, and whether expenditure limits are necessary to achieve these goals — is warranted. Vermont cites several Supreme Court cases in support of its view of legislative deference, including Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210, 103 S.Ct. 552, 74 L.Ed.2d 364 (1982) (it is improper to second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) ( Turner I ) (courts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of the legislature); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997) ( Turner II) (We owe Congress' findings an additional measure of deference out of respect for its authority to exercise the legislative power.); and Walters v. National Association of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 330-31 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. 3180, 87 L.Ed.2d 220 (1985) (Congress' factual findings are entitled to a great deal of deference, inasmuch as Congress is an institution better equipped to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on an issue). Indeed, the District Court concluded that [a]lthough legislative findings are not entirely isolated from review, it was required to exercise considerable deference to such findings. 118 F.Supp.2d at 476 (citing Turner II ). Accordingly, the court adopted the fifteen official findings excerpted supra and in the District Court opinion, but made clear that it was also considering the other evidence presented at trial. Id. at 468-74. 70 As to plaintiffs' position, we disagree that the high level of protection accorded political speech or the money enabling it dictates that the provision must automatically be struck down. Cf. McConnell, 540 U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 706 (Many years ago we observed that `[t]o say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard ... an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.') (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545, 54 S.Ct. 287, 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934)); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974) (compelling interest in the integrity and stability of the election process means that every substantial restriction on the right to vote or to associate should not automatically be invalidated). In our view, this level of protection is the starting point, not the endpoint, for scrutiny of Vermont's expenditure limits. 71 Indeed, the Supreme Court has been clear in its rejection of the view that strict scrutiny is `strict in theory, but fatal in fact.' Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring)) (explaining that [w]hen race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the `narrow tailoring' test this Court has set out in previous cases). This observation has proven true in the First Amendment context, as the Supreme Court has validated a number of electoral regulations against First Amendment challenge even while applying strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S.Ct. 1846, 119 L.Ed.2d 5 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding state ban on electioneering activity near polling places); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S.Ct. 1391, 108 L.Ed.2d 652 (1990) (upholding statute restricting independent expenditures by corporations on campaigns). Careful analysis is particularly important in applying strict scrutiny, where, as Justice Breyer has put it, a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex ways. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring). As we will explain, this is a case where constitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation, preventing a simple equation of strict scrutiny with constitutional infirmity. Id. at 400, 120 S.Ct. 897; see also, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 199, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (plurality opinion) (recognizing compelling interest in preserving integrity of electoral process); id. at 213, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ([T]here is a narrow area in which the First Amendment permits freedom of expression to yield to the extent necessary for the accommodation of another constitutional right.); Storer, 415 U.S. at 736, 94 S.Ct. 1274 (allowing some restrictions on ballot access in order to further the State's interest in the stability of its political system). 72 Nor should we adopt total legislative deference as the appropriate level of scrutiny. Deference to legislative findings may well be warranted on certain issues relating to the constitutionality of election-related laws, such as the precise level of contribution limits, as in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612, or whether 100 feet, as opposed to 50 or 75 feet, is an adequate radius surrounding a polling place to ban electioneering, as in Burson, 504 U.S. at 209-10, 112 S.Ct. 1846. Some degree of deference on the issue of whether there are state interests that justify legislative changes to the State's electoral system may also be appropriate. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003) ([D]eference to legislative choice is warranted particularly when Congress regulates campaign contributions, carrying as they do a plain threat to political integrity and a plain warrant to counter the appearance and reality of corruption and the misuse of corporate advantages.). But total deference is not warranted on the core questions of whether those interests are truly compelling enough, in a constitutional sense, to justify the expenditure limits, and whether this regulation places an undue burden on the First Amendment rights of those who bring this challenge. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 519, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800 (1981) (plurality opinion) ([I]t has been this Court's consistent position that democracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational legislative judgment in this area.); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939) (This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties.... [T]he delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts ... to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights.). 73 We read the District Court opinion as consistent with this view. It gives considerable deference to the legislative findings on the need for the law only, but not to the legislature's assessment of whether its solution is narrowly tailored. Cf. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978) (Powell, J.) (Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, but the standard of justification will remain constant), quoted in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224-25, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). This approach is consistent with Justice Breyer's concurrence in Shrink, where he indicated that the Court should defer to [the Missouri legislature's] political judgment that unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process, but not with respect to whether its solution, by imposing too low a contribution limit, significantly increases the reputation-related or media-related advantages of incumbency and thereby insulates legislators from effective electoral challenge. 528 U.S. at 403-04, 120 S.Ct. 897. 74 Although we bear in mind Justice Breyer's observations in Shrink, we cannot adopt his conclusion, in light of the extensive Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, that the interests must be balanced here, and that there is therefore no place for a strong presumption against constitutionality of the sort often thought to accompany the words `strict scrutiny.' Id. at 400, 120 S.Ct. 897. Such a presumption is proper, at least until the Supreme Court tells us otherwise, and it means that the burden of persuasion at trial was on the State to defend Act 64 — i.e., to establish that there was a compelling state interest to support the expenditure limit provision and that the provision was narrowly tailored to advance that interest. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 226, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor and Souter) (noting that a core premise of strict scrutiny is that the heavy burden of justification is on the State ). But this burden does not excuse the courts from actually applying the scrutiny that the First Amendment demands, and the State of Vermont deserves. 75 Therefore, although we do not question the validity of the factual findings developed by the legislature in support of Act 64, 9 our system of judicial review provides plaintiffs the opportunity to present competing evidence, assigns to the District Court the responsibility for making findings of fact and conclusions of law after weighing the evidence, and leaves to the Court of Appeals the independent responsibility to assess the legal significance of these factual findings. This responsibility is particularly important here, where, as plaintiffs claim, complete deference to the legislature could risk such constitutional evils as permitting incumbents to insulate themselves from effective electoral challenge. Shrink, 528 U.S. at 402, 120 S.Ct. 897 (Breyer, J., concurring). 76 Put differently, this level of scrutiny is a serious barrier for expenditure limits, but it is not impenetrable. Rather, an independent court must be convinced that the legislature was serving the people's interest and not its own. See, e.g., Burson, 504 U.S. at 213, 112 S.Ct. 1846 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing the use of the compelling-interest test as one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law), quoted in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493, 109 S.Ct. 706 (noting in the equal protection context that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to `smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool, with the narrow tailoring analysis helping to ensure that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate).