Opinion ID: 1905769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: hearsay and accomplice testimony

Text: Appellant contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to admit statements made by Marc Stekloff to the state agents as declarations of a co-conspirator prior to the establishment by independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy and appellant's participation therein. We do not agree. In United States v. Jennings, 5 Cir., 527 F.2d 862, the court rejected a similar contention, stating: Courts have recognized the discretion of trial judges to control the order of proof, and in conspiracy trials the court may admit hearsay acts and statements of alleged co-conspirators subject to later proof by independent evidence of the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's connection therewith. 527 F.2d at 866. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has adopted a similar view: There is no requirement that the independent evidence of conspiracy be introduced prior to the introduction of the co-conspirator's statement. The order of proof is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. (citations omitted) Accordingly, the co-conspirator's statement may be conditionally admitted subject to being connected up subsequently by independent proof of conspiracy, which may be totally circumstantial. United States v. Jackson, 8 Cir., 549 F.2d 517, 533. See also 4 Weinstein's Evidence, 801-148 (1977). We are in agreement with the view set forth in these authorities. We held in an analogous case that the order of proof rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Best, S.D., 232 N.W.2d 447. We conclude that the same rule should apply here. Appellant next argues that there was insufficient corroboration of accomplice Stekloff's testimony to connect appellant with the commission of the offense as required by SDCL 23-44-10. We need not reach the question whether Stekloff's hearsay declarations, testified to by the officers, could be used to corroborate his trial testimony, for we find that there was sufficient corroborative evidence irrespective of those statements. The state agents' testimony established that appellant told them that Stekloff could procure Mexican marijuana for them; that they would have to contact the taxi office about the purchase; that appellant knew the price per pound; that appellant nodded his head when asked if the marijuana was good; and that when told by Stekloff that the agents wished to purchase the marijuana, appellant told Stekloff he would have to get the marijuana from the trunk of his car. The statute does not require that corroborative evidence be produced sufficient to support a conviction. As we said in State v. Rauscher, S.D., 267 N.W.2d 582, 583: The rule is satisfied if such evidence in some substantial degree (1) tends to affirm the truth of the testimony of the accomplice, and (2) tends to establish the guilt of the defendant. State v. Levers, 12 S.D. 265, 81 N.W. 294; State v. Walsh, 25 S.D. 30, 125 N.W. 295; State v. Drapeau [45 S.D. 507, 189 N.W. 305]; State v. Stecker [79 S.D. 79, 108 N.W.2d 47]. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, State v. Willers, 75 S.D. 356, 64 N.W.2d 810 . . . . Where such evidence of corroboration appears, its weight, credibility, and sufficiency is for the jury. The corroborative evidence in this case was sufficient to support appellant's conviction. We have considered appellant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. DUNN, C. J., and PORTER and MORGAN, JJ., concur. ZASTROW, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.