Opinion ID: 1304136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Legislative Repeal

Text: The next issue raised by the trial judge's order is whether the legislature implicitly repealed the provisions of the old Ethics Act, specifically S.C.Code Ann. § 8-13-490, by enacting the new 1991 Ethics Act. The trial judge dismissed the Ethics Act indictments against Sam and Tom Thrift, of Thrift Brothers, N.F. Reeves, a paving contractor, John Gilreath, a Highway Department official, and Joel Wilson, a Highway Department official, on the grounds that the old Ethics Act was impliedly repealed by the new Ethics Act. The 1991 Ethics Act does not contain an explicit provision concerning the repeal of § 8-13-490, and there is no savings clause addressed to § 8-13-490. The 1991 Ethics Act reenacts in a different article a more comprehensive series of statutes which address in greater depth the conduct formerly violative of § 8-13-490. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 8-13-700 et seq. (Supp.1992). The trial court ruled that the old Ethics Act was impliedly repealed by the new Ethics Act and that the Legislature did not intend that any prosecution under [the old Ethics Act] would continue after its repeal. Order of Judge Charles W. Whetstone, Jr., p. 27, dated January 22, 1993 (ROA p. 1). We must decide whether the General Assembly intended to grant what would amount to amnesty for all violations of the old Ethics Act occurring prior to January 1, 1992, the effective date of the new Ethics Act. In Independence Ins. Co. v. Independent Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 218 S.C. 22, 61 S.E.2d 399 (1950), we held that an enactment of revisions designed to embrace an entire subject of legislation operates to repeal acts which deal with the same subject matter. This rule receives further refinement in Lewis v. Gaddy, 254 S.C. 66, 173 S.E.2d 376 (1970). In Lewis, the Court stated that repeal by implication was not favored, and that the law should not be construed as impliedly repealed unless there is no other reasonable alternative. Id. On the present facts, it is argued that the new Ethics Act impliedly repeals the old. The problem with that analysis is that Lewis also stands for the proposition that all rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used as it is construed in the light of the intended purpose. Moreover, it would defeat the entire Lewis analysis if a statute was impliedly repealed without an examination of the legislative intent as espoused in the new legislation. Looking at the plain meaning of the 1991 Ethics Act, the unambiguous language of the new Act clearly states the legislative intent is to amend the old Act rather than to repeal it. In addition, there are other specific provisions in the Act which were expressly repealed. See, e.g., S.C.Code Ann. § 8-3-20 (Supp.1992). The language of the Act also evidences a legislative understanding of the difference between amendment and repeal. [16] To define the purpose of the 1991 Ethics Act, one need look no further than the preamble. See City of Spartanburg v. Leonard, 180 S.C. 491, 186 S.E. 395 (1936) (preamble of an act may be used as a guide in determining legislative intent). The preamble provides that the purposes of the Act include the fostering of public trust and confidence in government, and the promotion of the integrity of government through openness. Given the overall climate [17] in which the legislation was amended and the more stringent guidelines set forth in the new Act, it is apparent that the legislature did not intend to permit someone to escape prosecution for acts of bribery or similar activity committed prior to the amendment of the legislation. We find persuasive the State's argument that to allow a defendant this safe harbor from prosecution based on an implied repeal completely frustrates the legislative purpose and intent in enacting the later legislation. The Respondents argue that in State v. Defee, 246 S.C. 555, 144 S.E.2d 806 (1965), and in State v. Spencer, 177 S.C. 346, 181 S.E. 217 (1935), we held that the absence of a savings clause was fatal to continuing prosecutions under a repealed statute. See also State v. Patterson, 220 S.C. 269, 66 S.E.2d 875 (1951); Vaughn v. Kalyvas, 288 S.C. 358, 342 S.E.2d 617 (Ct.App.1986). In the cases which dismissed indictments, the court presumed that the statute in question had been repealed. In all of the cited cases which resulted in dismissals of the indictment, the defendants committed criminal acts which were decriminalized by later legislation. Under that factual scenario, there was no other logical way to reconcile the legislation. In the case at bar, there has been no decriminalization; rather, the new statutory scheme sets out more stringent and focused provisions regarding what constitutes criminal conduct. Respondent Norman Reeves raises two additional sub-issues which must be addressed. The first is that if the old Ethics Act charges are still viable, then the old Act: (1) requires the Ethics Commission to refer a complaint to the Attorney General before any prosecution can be maintained, and (2) requires that any complaint filed with the Commission must be raised within a three-year statute of limitations. Since these conditions were not met, Reeves argues that the trial court's dismissal of the indictment should be upheld. The State argues that if the statute is read to require Ethics Commission referral on every prosecution, then it is violative of Article V, § 24, of the South Carolina Constitution. Article V, § 24 provides in part that, [t]he Attorney General shall be the chief prosecuting officer of the State with authority to supervise the prosecution of all criminal cases in courts of record. The constitutional provision is dispositive that any requirement which places the authority to supervise the prosecution of a criminal case in the hands of the Ethics Commission is unconstitutional. As noted earlier in the plea agreement issue, the prosecution has wide latitude in selecting what cases to prosecute and what cases to plea bargain. This power arises from our State Constitution and cannot be impaired by legislation. Recognizing the constitutional implications of the State's argument, we note that the entire constitutional issue is avoided by recognizing the civil nature of the Ethics Act complaint. The older scheme allowed for a civil evaluation by the Ethics Commission prior to any criminal referral by the Ethics Commission; and with a narrow reading, the statute does not run afoul of the State Constitution. We adopt this narrow construction. In light of our narrow construction of the statute, neither issue raised by Reeves has merit. The statute of limitations applies only to the civil complaint before the Ethics Commission, and the referral system only applies to civil complaints to the Ethics Commission which are referred by it to the Attorney General for criminal prosecution. The absence of a complaint to the Ethics Commission will never operate as a limitation upon the State's independent right to initiate a criminal prosecution. Both statutory provisions are inapplicable on these facts. Therefore, so much of the trial judge's order which held that the old Ethics Act had been impliedly repealed must be reversed. The indictments against Respondents, Sam and Tom Thrift, N.F. Reeves, John Gilreath, and Joel Wilson, were properly brought under the old Ethics Act and would remain viable, absent any other limitations, for prosecution. [18]