Opinion ID: 1572758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: metropolitan's inconsistent positions

Text: Tepper, the injured plaintiff/insured brought an action against Lucas, the alleged tortfeasor (count I for negligence) and against Metropolitan (count II for UM benefits). Metropolitan, 969 So.2d at 404. After Metropolitan paid Tepper $25,000, the settlement offer by Lucas, and preserved its subrogation rights pursuant to section 627.727(6), Florida Statutes (2004), Lucas moved to dismiss Tepper's claim without objection from Tepper. Id. at 405. Although Metropolitan made no claim of its own against Lucas, it objected to the trial court's dismissal of Tepper's claim against Lucas. Id. The trial court granted Lucas' motion to dismiss, stating that [t]he court finds that if Lucas is to be a part of these proceedings based upon the present status of the case, it would have to be based upon a third party action brought by Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company. The trial court did not permit Metropolitan to require Tepper's claim against Lucas to go forward when Tepper had no desire to do so and the policy language did not require it. The only remaining claim in the lawsuit was Tepper's UM claim against Metropolitan. Accordingly, the trial court noted that under the present status of the case, if Metropolitan Casualty wanted to make Lucas a part of these proceedings, it would have to bring a third-party action. The trial court did not rule on the merits of a third-party action not yet brought  that would have been premature. It simply stated that if Lucas was to be brought into this UM action, Metropolitan would need to initiate it through its own action rather than require Tepper to bring the claim. Metropolitan elected to not file a third-party claim under the trial court's ruling and instead appealed Lucas' dismissal. Accordingly, the third-party complaint was not brought, no legal defense to a third-party complaint under the statutory language of section 627.727(6)(b) was made, and the trial court never reached the merits of the meaning of section 627.727(6)(b). On appeal to the Fifth District, Metropolitan made three arguments: (i) the trial court erred by looking beyond the four corners of the complaint when it granted Lucas' motion to dismiss; (ii) the trial court's order directly conflicts with the requirements of section 627.727(6)(b); and (iii) the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because the policy language required Tepper to join Lucas as a defendant. Id. at 405-08. It is the second issue, the interpretation of section 627.727(6)(b), that is before this Court and the basis of alleged conflict jurisdiction. As the majority recognizes, Metropolitan argued in the Fifth District that the trial court erred by requiring it to bring a third-party action because the statute required its subrogation claim to be brought after the UM claim was concluded. Specifically, in its initial brief to the Fifth District, Metropolitan argued: According to the clear language of [section 627.727(6)(b)], METROPOLITAN's subrogation claim, if any, necessarily arises after the conclusion of Tepper's UM claim against METROPOLITAN, not during the pendency of the UM claim. The Trial Court essentially ordered that LUCAS could be brought back into the proceedings below, only as a third party defendant in an action brought by METROPOLITAN. According to the statute, however, the insurer's entitlement to a subrogation action against the tortfeasor and its insurer does not exist until after the UM claim is resolved. Thus, the statutory language refutes the Trial Court's conclusion below that any further participation by LUCAS in the pending UM claim would be as a third party defendant in an action brought by METROPOLITAN. The clear and unambiguous terms of the statute specifically contemplate that an action by the insurer against the tortfeasor arises only after the completion of the insured's UM claim against its insurer. Consequently, METROPOLITAN is not permitted under the statute to file a subrogation action or a third party action against LUCAS until TEPPER's UM claim against METROPOLITAN is resolved. Initial Brief of Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company at 11-12, Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tepper, 969 So.2d 403 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (emphasis added). Although the Fifth District concluded that the trial court did not err by dismissing Lucas, it agreed with Metropolitan that the trial court erred in finding Metropolitan could bring a third-party action against Lucas. Metropolitan, 969 So.2d at 407. Metropolitan sought review in this Court, asserting that the Fifth District's opinion conflicted with the Second District's opinion in Dominion. In its jurisdictional brief, Metropolitan noted that the Fifth District concluded it could file an action against Lucas only after the final resolution of Tepper's underinsured motorist claim. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company's Jurisdictional Brief at 3. Metropolitan then noted that the Second District in Dominion held that the statutory provision is permissive and does not preclude the institution of a subrogation action until after the underinsured claim is resolved. Id. No mention was made in Metropolitan's jurisdictional brief or in its initial brief to this Court that the Fifth District's opinion interpreted the statutory provision consistently with Metropolitan's argument to that court. On appeal before this Court, Metropolitan now argues that the Fifth District erred (i) by dismissing Lucas from Tepper's claims and (ii) by concluding that a third-party action against Lucas could not be filed because the subrogation claim must wait until after final resolution of the UM claim. This second argument, interpreting section 627.727(6)(b), is contrary to the argument Metropolitan made to the Fifth District. Lucas answers Metropolitan's initial brief by rejecting Metropolitan's contention that it should be permitted to file a subrogation claim against LUCAS prior to the final resolution of TEPPER's UM claim.... The plain meaning of the emphasized text [from section 627.727(6)(b)] is that an insurer may not seek subrogation until after there has been a final resolution of the UM claim. Answer Brief of Respondent Angel Lucas at 9-10. This language is strangely almost identical to Metropolitan's initial brief to the Fifth District. Yet, Metropolitan, in its reply brief, states that Florida Statute § 627.727(6)(b), contains no language prohibiting a UM carrier from seeking subrogation in a pending lawsuit. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Company's Reply Brief at 4. In short, the Fifth District ruled in favor of Metropolitan's legal position on whether it could file a third-party complaint against Lucas, but then Metropolitan has argued the opposite position to this Court. And [t]he general rule is that a party cannot occupy inconsistent positions in the course of a litigation. Battles v. State, 919 So.2d 621, 622 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (quoting McPhee v. State, 254 So.2d 406, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)). Indeed, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in maintaining that position he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it is to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position taken by him. Id. (quoting McPhee, 254 So.2d at 409-10 (quoting Fla. Jur. Estoppel & Waiver § 51)). Given this general rule, I would reject Metropolitan's inconsistent position taken to invoke the Court's conflict jurisdiction and discharge this case.