Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: The Allegedly Discriminatory Imposition of the Death Penalty

Text: Mr. Banks asserts for the first time on appeal that the death penalty in Tennessee is being imposed in a discriminatory manner based on race, gender, and geography. While the record contains no evidence of discrimination specific to his own case, Mr. Banks relies on various statistical studies to support his belated discrimination claims. We find that these claims came too late and that Mr. Banks's evidence proves too little. A defendant in a criminal proceeding who asserts an equal protection violation must prove (1) the existence of purposeful discrimination and (2) that this purposeful discrimination had a discriminatory effect on him or her. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 292, 107 S.Ct. 1756; see also State v. Irick, 762 S.W.2d 121, 129 (Tenn.1988). A discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part `because of,' not merely `in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298, 107 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). Thus, the defendant must prove that a discriminatory purpose was one of the factors that motivated the decisionmaker. Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Statistical proof may be used to prove the existence of a discriminatory purpose in limited circumstances. In rare cases, it can provide the sole evidence of discriminatory purpose, but to do so, it must depict a stark pattern of discrimination that is unexplainable on other grounds. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 293-94, 107 S.Ct. 1756; Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 266. The United States Supreme Court has also permitted the use of statistical evidence to prove discriminatory intent in jury selection [56] and in Title VII cases. [57] However, in McCleskey v. Kemp , the United States Supreme Court determined that two particular statistical studies [58] of murder cases in Georgia were insufficient to prove discriminatory intent in the context of decisions relating to the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia. The Court gave four reasons for its conclusion. First, the Court determined that inferences drawn from general statistics are not applicable to unique juries whose decisions rest on a consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the characteristics of the defendant and the facts of the particular offense. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 294, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Second, the Court pointed out that the State had no practical opportunity to explain any of the statistical disparities suggested by the studies. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 296, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Third, emphasizing the essential role that discretion plays in the criminal justice process, the Court determined that exceptionally clear proof of discriminatory purpose is required before the courts will infer that this discretion has been abused. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 297, 107 S.Ct. 1756. Fourth, a state legislature, exercising its broad discretion with regard to criminal penalties, has legitimate reasons to maintain capital punishment, and there was no showing that the legislature maintained capital punishment because of a racially disproportionate impact. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 298-99, 107 S.Ct. 1756. 1.