Opinion ID: 216584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The “In Furtherance Of” Element

Text: With respect to the requirement in Count Two that Leary have possessed the guns “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime, we have held that “[t]he term ‘furtherance’ should be understood in its ordinary or natural meaning, which . . . is ‘a helping forward: advancement, 14 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary promotion.’ In other words, the weapon must promote or facilitate the crime.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 460–61 (internal citation omitted); see also Cobbs, 233 F. App’x at 535 (“A firearm is possessed ‘in furtherance of’ a drug trafficking offense if it advances, promotes or facilitates the crime.”). “[T]he possession of a firearm on the same premises as a drug transaction would not, without a showing of a connection between the two, sustain a § 924(c) conviction.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. “By requiring that the possession be ‘in furtherance of’ the crime, Congress intended a specific nexus between the gun and the crime charged.” Id. “In order for the possession to be in furtherance of a drug crime, the firearm must be strategically located so that it is quickly and easily available for use. . . . Other factors that may be relevant . . . include whether the gun was loaded, the type of weapon, the legality of its possession, the type of drug activity conducted, and the time and circumstances under which the firearm was found.” Id. On the other hand, we have distinguished the “in furtherance of” prong from the “during and in relation to” prong also contained in § 924(c) by holding that the “in furtherance of” prong “requires the government to prove a defendant used the firearm with greater participation in the commission of the crime or that the firearm’s presence in the vicinity of the crime was something more than mere chance or coincidence.” United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 933 (6th Cir. 2004). We believe that the evidence in this case is insufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that Leary possessed the guns in the blue duffel bag “in furtherance of” drug trafficking. The strongest point in favor of such a finding is that the guns were in the closet where the drugs were found, but as Mackey makes clear, this proximity alone is not enough to establish that the guns were possessed 15 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary “in furtherance of” drug trafficking; there must be evidence tending to show “a connection between the two.” Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462. The government argues that the presence of the guns in the closet with the drugs shows that the guns were “strategically located so that [they were] quickly and easily available for use,” id., but it cannot be true that any time a gun is found near drugs it is necessarily the result of a strategic decision relating to drug activity. Indeed, the guns and the drugs were found in a closet—a storage space, rather than a place from which drugs were sold. Acceptance of the government’s argument would render meaningless the requirement that the government show that “a defendant used the firearm with greater participation in the commission of the crime or that the firearm’s presence in the vicinity of the crime was something more than mere chance or coincidence.” Combs, 369 F.3d at 933. Furthermore, we cannot say that the Mackey factors permit a finding that the guns were possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. First, two of the guns in the blue duffel bag were unloaded. Additionally, “the type of drug activity conducted,” see Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462, was not very substantial, with the amount of drugs involved—3.48 grams—being commonly in possession of both users and dealers. “[T]he time and circumstances in which the guns were found,” id., is also unhelpful. There is no evidence that any drug sales took place in Luhman’s apartment, much less in the closet connected to the bedroom, nor was any drug manufacturing equipment found on the premises. That leaves only “the type of weapon” and “the legality of its possession.” With respect to the type of weapon, Ensminger testified that “[y]ou’ll find firearms, handguns and regular guns more 16 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary commonly with a trafficker than you will a user,” but this testimony helped to establish only that the presence of guns indicated that the drugs were intended for distribution, and that drug dealers often need to protect themselves from other drug dealers and those who seek the money that drug dealers usually keep in their possession. R. 55–56 (Trial Tr. 128–29). It does not establish a “specific nexus” between these guns and the small amount of drugs found here; instead, it establishes only a general one, suggesting that drug dealers generally possess guns for protection from drug users and other drug dealers, not that the guns in this case were possessed for such drug-dealing-related protection. See United States v. Nance, 40 F. App’x 59, 67 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a drug-agent’s testimony “that drug traffickers usually have guns to facilitate trafficking” does not establish “specific facts linking [the] guns to the drugs found on [the defendant’s] person”). There was no testimony to illuminate for the jury whether these particular weapons were likely present to facilitate drug trafficking. Similarly, there was no testimony linking Leary’s unlawful possession of these weapons to the “specific nexus” needed to prove the facilitation of drug trafficking. In several of our prior cases, a “strategic[] locat[ion]” of a gun can be seen where the positioning and location of the gun is uniquely helpful to the defendant’s desire potentially to use the guns to protect against drug-activity-related threats. See, e.g., United States v. Swafford, 385 F.3d 1026, 1029 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he gun was found loaded, with its handle pointing up, within arm's reach of the bed where [the defendant] was lying”); United States v. Paige, 470 F.3d 603, 609–10 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding a “specific nexus” where “two loaded firearms were found 17 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary under a cushion and next to the couch in the duplex from which crack was being sold at all hours of the day and night and in which the officers found crack cocaine, $900 cash, and digital scales with cocaine residue”); United States v. Lengen, 245 F. App’x 426, 435–36 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding a “specific nexus” where one gun was found “in the headboard of defendant’s bed, only three or four feet from the wall safe in which police found $25,000 in cash and a substantial amount of methamphetamine,” and another was found “in a drawer in the defendant's office, either together with or very close to a supply of cocaine and other scheduled drugs”); United States v. Ham, 628 F.3d 801, 804, 808–09 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding a “specific nexus” where a loaded gun “was located about head-high on top of an armoire situated just outside the closet where the drugs were found” and in which the defendant was hiding when the police found him). A “specific nexus” can also be seen where the guns are simply located throughout the house, which may itself possibly be a strategic decision. See, e.g., United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding a “specific nexus” where guns were “placed throughout [the defendant’s] residence,” with several weapons next to $1,300 in cash). Beyond whether the guns were “strategically located,” a “specific nexus” is sometimes seen where the premises in which the guns and drugs are found is one in which drugs are sold or manufactured, thereby enhancing the inference that guns found on that premises may be “in furtherance of” the drug activity; this is especially true where the house is used only for drug activity, and not as a residence. See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 415 F.3d 583, 585–86, 589–90 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding a “specific nexus” where drugs were sold out of the house in which the gun was 18 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary found, the house was “unfit for habitation,” and the defendant was found with drugs on his person); Paige, 470 F.3d at 609–10 (finding a “specific nexus” where “two loaded firearms were found under a cushion and next to the couch in the duplex from which crack was being sold at all hours of the day and night and in which the officers found crack cocaine, $900 cash, and digital scales with cocaine residue”); United States v. Couch, 367 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding a “specific nexus” where “a loaded assault rifle was in plain view at the location where the officers arrested [the defendant],” and “the police located an additional eleven guns in [the defendant’s] garage—the area where [the defendant’s] drug transactions were known to occur and where the officers located over 200 additional pills”). A “specific nexus” between guns and drugs located on the same premises can also be seen where there is evidence that the defendant had actual possession of a gun while committing a drugtrafficking crime. See, e.g., United States v. Street, 614 F.3d 228, 236 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a “specific nexus” where the defendant had the gun on his person while selling drugs); United States v. Brooks, No. 08-2514, 2010 WL 4781421, at  (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (finding a “specific nexus” where the defendant had a gun on his person and others testified that the defendant carried a gun while selling drugs, and other guns were found on the premises at which drug activity took place). Additionally, a “specific nexus” can be seen in situations in which there is a large amount of drugs or money present, such that the very existence of these items on the premises may be seen to warrant a gun for protection. See, e.g., Penney, 576 F.3d at 315 (noting that guns were found near $1,300 in cash); Lengen, 245 F. App’x at 435–36 (noting that guns were found 19 No. 09-5418 United States v. Leary near “$25,000 in cash and a substantial amount of methamphetamine”). In all of these situations, the evidence permitted an inference that the guns must have been used to protect the defendant or otherwise to facilitate a drug crime. Here, the trial evidence does not permit the same inference. The guns were found in a duffel bag in the closet, not on Leary’s person or easily within his reach. There is no evidence that the sale or manufacture of drugs occurred within Luhman’s apartment. There is no evidence that Leary possessed a gun any time that Luhman saw him with drugs, and the amount of drugs and cash here was relatively small. We are left, then, with nothing more than the fact that the guns were found in a duffel bag near a relatively small amount of drugs in an apartment in which multiple people lived and in which there is no other evidence indicating that the guns were possessed to facilitate or promote drug trafficking. In such circumstances, we cannot say that a reasonable jury could find that the “in furtherance of” element was proved beyond a reasonable doubt; there is no evidence that would meaningfully indicate that the guns were present to facilitate drug trafficking. We therefore reverse Leary’s conviction on Count Two.