Opinion ID: 2210281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: necessity of appropriation

Text: The third summarized assignment of error claims the director misinterpreted § 46-2, 115(2) and thus erroneously determined that the appropriation was necessary to maintain the instream use for which it was sought. There was unchallenged evidence of the existence of adult trout and trout reproduction in the area of the lower and middle study sites. There was also testimony from a number of witnesses, including some of the applicant's, that there was no imminent threat to these trout and their reproductive efforts. Before an application for an instream appropriation can be approved, the director must determine that [t]he appropriation is necessary to maintain the instream use or uses for which the appropriation has been requested. § 46-2,115(2). The complaining objectors contend that the director misinterpreted the statute when he concluded that it did not require a showing of an imminent threat to the use. The applicant, on the other hand, contends that such a reading would defeat the very purpose of the statute. The meaning of a statute is a question of law, State v. Ewing, 221 Neb. 462, 378 N.W.2d 158 (1985), and this court is obligated to reach its conclusions on such questions independent of the determination made by an administrative agency, see Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds Co., 236 Neb. 233, 461 N.W.2d 55 (1990). The meaning of a statute is ascertained, when possible, from the language of the act. Peterson v. Minden Beef Co., 231 Neb. 18, 434 N.W.2d 681 (1989). The language is to be considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Georgetowne Ltd. Part. v. Geotechnical Servs., 230 Neb. 22, 430 N.W.2d 34 (1988). Unfortunately, necessary, particularly when used in a statute, may mean anything from indispensable to convenient. Banks v. Board of Education of Chase County, 202 Neb. 717, 277 N.W.2d 76 (1979). In order to construe the statute, we must look to its purpose and give the statute a reasonable construction which best achieves that purpose, rather than a construction which would defeat it. See Nuzum v. Board of Ed. of Sch. Dist. of Arnold, 227 Neb. 387, 417 N.W.2d 779 (1988). Clearly, the purpose of the statutory scheme before us is to provide a means for protecting instream uses for fish, recreation, and wildlife. Would application of the complaining objectors' construction defeat this purpose? If an instream flow appropriation could only be obtained after showing an imminent threat to the use to be protected, the use may well be irreparably harmed or even destroyed before an application is granted. In the case before us, the application was filed in April 1988. The director's order granting the application was entered in December 1989, 1 year 8 months later. If we add to this the amount of time consumed in making the studies to justify the appropriation, the timelag becomes even greater. If the applicant had waited until there was an imminent threat to the fishery before making its application, there would be few trout left in the stream to protect. In addition, when the threat is one due to or exacerbated by overappropriation, once the water is appropriated out of stream it is too late. The instream appropriation can preserve only unappropriated water; it cannot undo existing appropriations. For these reasons it is apparent that the complaining objectors' construction would defeat the very purpose of the statute, and because of this it must be rejected. A more reasonable interpretation in light of the purposes of the legislation is to read § 46-2,115(2) as requiring a finding of a sufficient causal link between maintaining the flow and maintaining the use for which the flow is requested. This appears to be the approach the director used in his analysis. He determined that [b]ecause use of the upper study site by adult trout is very limited and habitat for trout reproduction is nearly absent, the applicant failed to show that that portion of the application was necessary to maintain a naturally reproducing trout fishery. As to the remaining reach of the application, the director found that the existence of trout reproduction was undisputed and that at least some instream flow is unquestionably necessary to maintain naturally reproducing trout habitat. The director applied the proper standard, and there is no basis for finding his factual conclusions erroneous. The complaining objectors' contention that the director erred in determining that the appropriation is necessary to maintain the use is therefore without merit.