Opinion ID: 1772113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: did the trial court err in the imposition of sentence?

Text: The appellant was indicted for manslaughter, the penalty for which is addressed in Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-25 (Supp. 1988). Pursuant to this statute, anyone convicted of manslaughter shall be fined in a sum not less than $500, or imprisoned in the county jail not more than one year, or both, or in the penitentiary not less than two years, nor more than twenty years. In the original sentence handed down by the trial court, the appellant was sentenced to the full twenty years term, although execution of that sentence was suspended on conditions. Butler was given probation for five (5) years, with additional probationary terms as follows: (A) Defendant shall hereafter commit no offense against the laws of this or any state of the United States, or of the United States; (B) Avoid injurious or vicious habits; (C) Avoid persons or places of disreputable or harmful character; (D) Report to the Department of Corrections, as directed by it; (E) Permit the field officer to visit him at home, or elsewhere; (F) Work faithfully at suitable employment so far as possible; (G) Remain within a specified area to-wit: ____; (H) Remain within the State of Mississippi unless authorized to leave on proper application therefor; (I) Support his dependents; (J) That I do hereby waive extradition to the State of Mississippi from any jurisdiction in or outside the United States where I may be found and also agree that I will not contest any effort by any jurisdiction to return me to the State of Mississippi. (K) Shall pay to the Department of Corrections the sum of $15.00 per month by certified check or money order, until discharged from supervision, per Mississippi Code section 47-7-49 Annotated. (L) And further, that he pay $10,000.00 to his family [1] in Laurel, Mississippi by February 1, 1987, pay funeral expenses of $3,000.00 within six (6) months from date of this order and pay $100.00 for support on Chuck Lassabe beginning on February 1, 1987 for full five years on probation. (M) Submit, as provided in section 1 of House Bill 54, 1983 Regular Session, to any type of breath, saliva, or urine chemical analysis test, the purpose of which is to detect the possible presence of alcohol or a substance prohibited or controlled by any law of the State of Mississippi or the United States. (Emphasis added). The record denotes no objection to any of the probation conditions at the sentencing hearing. In fact, the sentencing order denotes that Butler accept[ed] the above probation in accordance with the terms thereof by his signature affixed at the bottom of the page. Neither is there an objection raised in Butler's motion for a new trial about the restitution ordered. It is William Butler's contention on this appeal that the trial court erred in requiring him to pay child support for the child of the girlfriend of Chuck Lassabe, the deceased. During her testimony, Dee Dee maintained that Chuck was the father of the child she was carrying at the time of the shooting. It is not disputed that Dee Dee was Chuck's girlfriend. Neither is it disputed that she was married to someone else at the time of the shooting and was not divorced until February of 1986.
Under Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-33 (Supp. 1988) any circuit court or county court which has original jurisdiction over a criminal action has authority to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, and place the defendant on probation as herein provided, ... Cobb v. State, 437 So.2d 1218, 1221 (Miss. 1983). In this case the trial judge found that based on the circumstances of this case, he was justified in suspending the sentence originally given to the appellant, with certain other terms of probation added. Pursuant to § 47-7-35, Miss. Code Ann. (1972 and Supp. 1988), the legislature listed a group of conditions or terms of probation that the trial court in its discretion may ormay not require of a guilty party. In the case before this Court now, the trial judge required most of the terms listed in this statute. The list is not all inclusive, for the statute provides that the trial court shall determine the terms and conditions and may include among them the statutorily enumerated list or any other term or condition. It is reasonable that among other conditions of probation, a trial court would consider the statutorily authorized restitution to victims of crime under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-1, et seq. Under § 99-37-3, the restitution statute specifically provides that a convicted defendant may be required to pay restitution in addition to any other sentence that the trial court may impose. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-1 defines several terms that are relevant to a reading of this act, including criminal activities, pecuniary damages, restitution and victim. For purposes of these statutes, the term victim encompasses any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-1(d). Therefore, it appears that the payment of restitution is not limited only to the person that has been directly injured by a guilty party; the payment of restitution can also be extended to members of the victim's family who suffer pecuniary damages. Pecuniary damages are defined as all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities ... with respect to which the defendant is convicted. Although the authority to impose restitution flows from the adjudication of guilt or the defendant's plea of guilty, that is not to say that restitution may not be imposed at any stage of the criminal process through informal, government-sanctioned compromises and settlements between offender and victim so long as detention is not used to induce an agreement. Falco, Inc. v. Bates, 30 Ill. App.3d 570, 334 N.E.2d 169 (1975). From an analysis of these statutes, the trial court has the authority to impose restitution.
Separating the authority to impose restitution from the procedure to impose, the Victim Restitution Act has additional directives. Under § 99-37-3(3) the defendant has the right to object to the imposition, amount or distribution of the restitution at the time of sentencing. Additionally, under § 99-37-3(4) if the Court determines that restitution is inappropriate or undesirable for some reason, an order stating the reasons for such a finding shall be entered, stating the circumstances for such a determination. Sections (3) and (4) of § 99-37-3 indicate the necessity for a hearing before restitution can be assessed. The type hearing is not specified, but would require at a minimum, (1) notice to the defendant that victim restitution was being considered by the court, (2) the nature of such restitution considered, (3) an opportunity to the defendant to be heard and to object, and (4) a finding by the court to afford adequate appellate review. ... (P)ersons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780, 785, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 118 (1971). However, the language of Section (4) suggests that there are cases in which restitution would not be appropriate, as when the victim's loss is difficult to quantify. Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harvard L.Rev. 931, 933 (1984). Lastly, § 99-37-17(1) notes that nothing in this chapter limits or impairs the right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action, but the restitution paid by the defendant will be credited against civil judgment. Very few cases decided by this Court have addressed this restitution issue directly. More often than not, restitution is only a tangential issue in an appeal made to this Court. In recent history, two cases decided by this Court have addressed the subject of restitution in light of the Restitution to Victims of Crimes Act. In Powell v. State, 536 So.2d 13 (Miss. 1988), this Court upheld the trial court's order that the appellant be required to pay almost $10,000 worth of medical expenses in the form of restitution. However, it is worth noting that in Powell, supra, the trial judge held a separate proceeding to determine sentencing. There is no evidence in the case before us of such a proceeding ever taking place. In Fanning v. State, 497 So.2d 70 (Miss. 1986), the Court upheld the trial court's assessment of restitution against the appellant in the form of repayment of the costs of a special election to the State of Mississippi in the amount of approximately $3,000. This Court found that the trial court was specifically authorized to make such an assessment; therefore, the conviction of the appellant was affirmed. There are decisions from other jurisdictions which address this issue. State v. Mayberry, 415 N.W.2d 644 (Iowa 1987), (upheld a restitution award of approximately $60,000 to the parents of a twenty-one year old college student who had been murdered by the defendant); People v. Wager, 129 Mich. App. 819, 342 N.W.2d 619 (1983), (upheld the payment of $30.00 per week for each of two children of the deceased victim); State v. Moore, 156 Ariz. 566, 754 P.2d 293 (1988) (upholding an award for economic loss of $2,554); State v. Crowder, 155 Ariz. 477, 747 P.2d 1176 (1987) (upholding an award for economic loss of $37,000); People v. Quinonez, 735 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1987) (medical expenses); Mellott v. State, 496 N.E.2d 396 (Ind. 1986) (a fine of $10,000 plus court costs); State v. Killian, 37 N.C. App. 234, 245 S.E.2d 812 (1978) ($500.00 larceny plus attorney's fees); People v. Harrison, 82 Ill. App.3d 530, 402 N.E.2d 822 (1980) (phone and travel expenses); U.S. v. Golomb, 811 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir.1987) (burglary  amount of loss and fine).
Having reviewed the legal authority of this and other jurisdictions and the procedural requirements of the Mississippi statute, this Court now addresses the issue before this Court of: (1) whether child support to the victim's child is within the statutory definition of pecuniary damages allowed and (2) whether the child is a legally eligible recipient. Pecuniary damages allowable under the statute are all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and shall include, but not be limited to, the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed, broken or otherwise harmed, and losses such as medical expenses. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-1(b) (Supp. 1988). The statutory language is not narrowly drawn to limit restitution to restoration of property. But the statute permits all special damages recoverable from a civil suit arising from the criminal act. The use of the words all special damages recoverable from a civil suit denotes more than just restoration of property. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-37-1(c) defines restitution to be full, partial or nominal payment of pecuniary damages to a victim. Harland, Monetary Remedies For the Victims of Crime: Assessing The Role of Criminal Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. Law Review 52, 89 (1982). Taking the two statutory sections together, the statute provides for repayment of financial loss to victims who have been wrongfully deprived of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the continued life of the deceased had he lived. The financial loss has to be quantifiable, and it would not include damages for loss of love and affection, mental anguish, or loss of companionship and society. The ordering of child support to the victim's child is a type of special damages that is encompassed under the statute and a quantifiable sum can be ascertained for the child's needs. The fixing of child support restitution may by analogy resort to the law regarding setting the amount of child support in divorce cases. It is noted that the duration of such payments is for five years during which the defendant is on probation. This Court, therefore, holds that child support to the victim's child is within the statutory definition of pecuniary damages ascertainable in a quantifiable sum. Lastly, the Court addresses whether the victim's child is a legally eligible recipient. It is noted that the child in question was alleged to be the child of Chuck Lassabe and Dee Dee Carter. As noted earlier, Dawn Carter (Dee Dee) was married to someone else at the time Chuck Lassabe was killed by the appellant. Under Mississippi law there is a strong presumption that the child of a married woman was fathered by her husband. The presumption that a child born in wedlock is the legitimate child of the husband is one of the strongest presumptions known to law and may be overcome only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the husband is not the father. Deer v. State Department of Public Welfare, 518 So.2d 649, 652 (Miss. 1988); Baker v. Williams, 503 So.2d 249, 253 (Miss. 1987); Brabham v. Brabham, 483 So.2d 341, 343 (Miss. 1986). In the case sub judice, there does not appear in the record any evidence of a hearing ever being held to determine the actual paternity of the child later born to Dawn Carter. Dawn Carter's former husband would have been a necessary party to such a determination; in the absence of a paternity hearing, the presumption that Carter's husband is the father remains. Therefore, in the absence of such a determination, with all necessary parties noticed, this Court holds that the presumption of legitimacy controls and that this minor child was not a legally eligible recipient. This result must obtain even in the face of Butler's acceptance of this condition of probation. Therefore, the provision of probation ordering that child support be paid to Chuck Lassabe is held to be void and is eliminated as a condition of probation. All other conditions remain valid. It is the holding of this Court that the sentence of twenty (20) years suspended with five (5) years on probation under the stated conditions was authorized and is affirmed with the one exception of the $100.00 per month child support to Chuck Lassabe which requirement is voided. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., concur. PITTMAN, J., not participating.