Opinion ID: 1922192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Lake's earning capacity.

Text: Although Ms. Lake acknowledges that the trial court properly considered her past and prospective finances in determining the appropriate amount of alimony, see McEachnie, 216 A.2d at 170 (noting that the factors to be considered in making an alimony determination include the parties' past and prospective financial situations), she claims that the court's finding that she was capable of earning $36,000 annually was not supported by the evidence. Ms. Lake argues that given the divorce court's finding in 1997 that her wage earning potential was limited, coupled with its finding that her current earnings were de minimis, [10] the alimony court abused its discretion in disregarding her uncontradicted testimony in 1998 that, at that time, severe depression prevented her from reaching even her limited earning potential. At the alimony trial, Ms. Lake testified that she had suffered from severe depression since the 1993 separation, describing her symptoms as [e]xtreme sadness and a great sense of loneliness, futility, apathy. I don't sleep well. I have great immobility at times. She blamed her depression on what she termed the apparently eternal litigation over the divorce. When asked whether there were any impediments preventing her from seeking full-time employment, Ms. Lake responded [m]y mental state. I find it very difficult to concentrate. And as any court reporter will tell you court reporting is all concentration. She also testified that she was being treated for depression by a Christian Science counselor three to four times a week, and that the treatment has kept [her] alive. [11] In response, Mr. Lake's counsel argued that Ms. Lake's testimony regarding her sale of the marital home demonstrated that she is very capable of utilizing her earning capacity. In its May 6, 1998, order, the alimony court found Ms. Lake capable of full-time employment, stating [Ms. Lake] is 59 years of age, and she testified that she is in good physical health but that she has been depressed since the separation. While not doubting [Ms. Lake's] stated feelings of depression, the court notes that she presented herself well at trial, and there was no evidence establishing that [she] is unable to work. Notwithstanding the fact that the court credited Ms. Lake's testimony regarding her feelings of depression, the court found no evidence to support her claim that she was unable to work as a result of the depression. [12] Ms. Lake claims that the trial court abused its discretion by disregarding her uncontradicted testimony regarding the effect of the depression on her ability to work, namely her statement that the depression seriously impeded her ability to obtain full-time employment as a court reporter because she found it difficult to concentrate. We realize that the alimony court's statement that there was no evidence about her inability to work appears to imply that Ms. Lake's testimony is not such evidence. After reviewing the trial court's ruling in context, however, we conclude that the court considered Ms. Lake's testimony regarding the effect of the depression on her mental state, but thought that her testimony alone was insufficient to counter other evidence of her ability to work. Viewing the evidence as a whole, the court's finding that Ms. Lake was capable of full-time employment, either as a real estate agent or a court reporter with earning potential of $36,000 to $40,00 per year, was not clearly erroneous. [13] In its May 6, 1998, order, the alimony court indicated that it had taken the health of the parties into account and that it did not doubt[] [Ms. Lake's] stated feelings of depression. From this language, it is evident that the court considered the entirety of Ms. Lake's testimony before making the alimony award. However, the alimony court was clearly disturbed by the fact that Ms. Lake's testimony regarding the debilitating effects of her depression lacked independent corroboration. See supra note 11. While reiterating the evidence at the conclusion of the alimony trial, the court stated The way the evidence stands in this hearing is that [Ms. Lake] says that since the marriage went bad, or at least since the divorce, she has been seriously depressed. I believe that is her term. And let's, let's put aside, let's assume for a minute that she was receiving regular or at least she said she was receiving regular psychiatric care for some condition. Still what we have is ... her word  I mean the state of the record right now is that's what she says, and it may very well be true, but that is all I have. I don't have any corroboration from either [the Christian Science practitioner]... or from any other doctor. [14] The trial court's concern regarding lack of corroboration is also reflected in the May 6, 1998, order, in which the trial court acknowledges Ms. Lake's testimony, but notes that her demeanor at trial belied her testimony and that the record lacks evidence suggesting that she is unable to work. Ms. Lake asserts that because her testimony was both uncontradicted and not inherently improbable, the trial court erred in disregarding it. See Stone v. Stone, 78 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 8, 136 F.2d 761, 764 (1943) (trier of fact may not disregard positive testimony, uncontradicted, and not inherently improbable). We disagree that the trial court disregarded Ms. Lake's testimony. Rather, Ms. Lake's own testimony regarding her sale of the marital home supports the trial court's conclusion that she was capable of full-time employment. When asked to describe her efforts to sell the marital home, Ms. Lake responded that [i]t required [her] presence ... almost every day. People who came to look at it. Writing ads. Holding open houses. Negotiating with agents, taking calls from agents. Talking to appraisers. Ms. Lake also indicated that she thought she did a competent job in selling the home, that she worked hard at it, and that she was successful. Absent independent corroboration of Ms. Lake's testimony regarding the negative effects of her depression, the record reflects her contradictory statements that depression prevented her from seeking employment and from obtaining a job as a court reporter because she was unable to concentrate, but that she was able to work very diligently to sell the marital home. [15] While Ms. Lake represented that her Christian Science practitioner was unable to testify regarding her mental state for Christian Science reasons, this did not prevent her from providing testimony from other witnesses in support of her claim that her income-earning capacity was diminished due to depression, such as her employer at the jewelry store where she worked part-time, a professor at Mt. Vernon College where she attended business administration classes for a semester, or even a friend. We do not disagree with Ms. Lake that depression can be severely debilitating and we are aware that symptoms of depression might not be readily apparent to the untrained eye. We cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, however, where, as in this case, the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering that Ms. Lake's uncorroborated testimony about the debilitating effects of her depression were unpersuasive in light of all the evidence presented at trial and finding that Ms. Lake was capable of full-time employment based on the trial court's assessment of her appearance and demeanor at trial and her testimony concerning her work in selling the marital home. See McEachnie, 216 A.2d at 171 (noting that we will reverse an alimony award only where the trial court's findings are plainly wrong or unsupported by substantial evidence).