Opinion ID: 2996500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of the Petition for Habeas Corpus

Text: The respondents maintain that Mr. Robledo-Gonzales is not currently in their custody, nor was he at the time he filed his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, they argue, this court should dismiss the petition. We agree. Mr. Robledo-Gonzales brings his present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Although § 2241 is the substantive provision for the writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242 and 2243 set forth the procedure one must follow to bring a petition and to obtain the relief of the writ. Specifically, application for the writ “shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or detention, the name of the person who has custody over him and by virtue of what claim or authority, if known.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242 ¶ 2. The court must then issue the writ or issue an order to show cause why the writ should not be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 ¶ 1. That document “shall be directed to the person having custody of the person detained.” Id. ¶ 2. Furthermore, unless the writ raises only issues of law, “the person to whom the writ is directed shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained.” Id. ¶ 5. These procedural requirements establish that “[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973). Consequently, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be directed to the individual or individuals who holds the petitioner in allegedly unlawful custody. 8 No. 02-2475 Furthermore, it is not sufficient that the named respondent simply be involved, in some manner, with the petitioner’s detention. Sections 2242 and 2243 “indicate that the custodian is the person having a day-to-day control over the prisoner.” Guerra v. Meese, 786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Specifically, when a prisoner is serving a sentence in a federal facility, “the warden of that facility is the prisoner’s custodian within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242-2243 . . . .” Id. At the time the present petition was filed, Mr. RobledoGonzales was incarcerated awaiting trial on the charge of illegal reentry. Consequently, the proper respondent to Mr. Robledo-Gonzales’ habeas petition was the warden of the facility in which Mr. Robledo-Gonzales was being held. See 6 id. Mr. Robledo-Gonzales’ petition, however, failed to name the warden of the facility in which he was being detained. Mr. Robledo-Gonzales’ petition named only the Attorney General, the Commissioner of the INS and the District Director of the INS, none of whom possessed “day-to-day” control over Mr. Robledo-Gonzales at the time the petition was filed. Despite this shortcoming, Mr. Robledo-Gonzales maintains that the court nevertheless should entertain the petition against the named respondents for a number of reasons. First, he notes that “the ‘in-custody’ requirement is determined at the time of the filing of the petition,” and he “was detained at the time of the filing of his petition.” Reply Br. at 6. We do not dispute this as a general principle, see, e.g., 6 If Mr. Robledo-Gonzales had been released on bail pending his trial on the charge, the proper respondent would have been the court under whose order Mr. Robledo-Gonzales was temporarily released. See Reimnitz v. State’s Attorney of Cook County, 761 F.2d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 1985). No. 02-2475 9 Carafas v. Lavallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968); however, it does little to forward Mr. Robledo-Gonzales’ argument. Specifically, the question here is not whether Mr. Robledo-Gonzales was “in custody” per se at the time his petition was filed, but who held Mr. Robledo-Gonzales in custody at the time he filed his petition. As set forth above, “[t]he writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95. Here, Mr. Robledo-Gonzales failed to name as a respondent the person holding him in allegedly unlawful custody. Mr. Robledo-Gonzales also argues that, for purposes of this case, the Attorney General should be considered the legal custodian because “he controls the deportation and criminal processes for enforcement of the immigration laws.” Reply Br. at 6. Again, this argument misses the mark. The power to control some aspect of the petitioner’s legal process does not render that official the petitioner’s custodian for habeas purposes. In rejecting this argument with respect to the Parole Commission, the District of Columbia Circuit stated: Appellees argue that because the Commission has the power to release them, the commission is their custodian. But their argument extends to any person or entity possessing some sort of power to release them. Under appellees’ theory, the Attorney General of the United States could be considered the custodian of every prisoner in federal custody because he supervises the Federal Bureau of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. § 4041 (1982). We have specifically rejected this interpretation. Sanders v. Bennett, 148 F.2d 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Guerra, 786 F.2d at 416; see also Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“Thus it should be abundantly clear that habeas petitioners, such as Chatman-Bey, 10 No. 02-2475 cannot properly bring suit against such officials as the Attorney General and such entities as the Parole Commission. Rather the proper defendant in federal habeas cases is the warden.”). Finally, Mr. Robledo-Gonzales points to a number of district court cases in which the courts have found that the Attorney General was the proper respondent when a petitioner brings a habeas petition to challenge the execution of a final order of removal. See, e.g., Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp. 2d 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Although at least one circuit has addressed and soundly rejected this approach, see Vasquez v. Reno, 233 F.3d 688, 693 (1st Cir. 2000), we need not reach the issue. Here, Mr. Robledo-Gonzales is not being detained under a final order of deportation. Mr. Robledo-Gonzales was not the subject of immigration proceedings at the time his petition was filed, nor is he at the present time. Indeed, neither the INS nor its successor agency, the Department of Homeland Security, has taken even the preliminary step of filing a notice of detainer with the criminal authorities. Consequently, the cases cited by Mr. Robledo-Gonzales simply are not applicable to the present situation. Thus, at the time his petition was filed, Mr. RobledoGonzales was not in the custody of any of the named respondents for habeas purposes. “Absent custody by the authority against whom relief is sought, jurisdiction usually will not lie to grant the requested writ.” Campillo v. Sullivan, 853 F.2d 593, 595 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Vasquez, 233 F.3d at 697 (“Because the petitioner did not direct his habeas petition ‘to the person having custody of the person detained,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2243, the district court ought not to have acted on the merits.”); DiGrado v. Ashcroft, 184 F. Supp. 2d 227, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that, because the petitioner named the incorrect respondent, “jurisdiction is lacking pursuant to § 2241”). We therefore No. 02-2475 11 affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing Mr. RobledoGonzales’ petition for the writ of habeas corpus for fail- 7 ing to name the proper custodian. 7 The respondents maintain that, even if Mr. Robledo-Gonzales had named the proper custodian in his habeas action, there are other barriers to our granting relief, namely, that Mr. RobledoGonzales has waived any challenge to the 1997 deportation order by departing the Country. According to the respondents, the former 8 U.S.C. § 1105a bars habeas relief to aliens who have left the Country pursuant to a deportation order. That provision states: An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not be reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies available as of right under the immigration laws and regulations or if he has departed from the United States after the issuance of the order. Every petition for review or for habeas corpus shall state whether the validity of the order has been upheld in any prior judicial proceeding, and, if so, the nature and date thereof, and the court in which such proceeding took place. No petition for review or for habeas corpus shall be entertained if the validity of the order has been previously determined in any civil or criminal proceeding, unless the petition presents grounds which the court finds could not have been presented in such prior proceeding, or the court finds that the remedy provided by such prior proceeding was inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of the order. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1995) (emphasis added). Consequently, a district court cannot review an order of deportation by way of habeas if the petitioner has departed after issuance of the order. See, e.g., Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.2d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2001). Mr. Robledo-Gonzales counters that the former § 1105a does not apply to him by virtue of IIRIRA’s transitional rules. Those rules provide in relevant part: (continued...) 12 No. 02-2475 7 (...continued) (c) Transition for certain aliens.— (1) General rule that new rules do not apply.—Subject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings before the title III-A effective date— (A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and (B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments. ... (4) Transitional changes in judicial review.—In the case in which a final order of exclusion or deportation is entered more than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act [Sept. 30, 1996], notwithstanding any provision of section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [section 1105a of this title] (as in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act [Sept. 30, 1996]) to the contrary— ... (G) there shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense covered in section 212(a)(2) or section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [sections 1182(a)(2) or 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title] (as in effect as of the date of the enactment of this Act) [Sept. 30, 1996], or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of such Act [section 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title] (as in effect on such date) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of such Act [section 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title] (as so in effect). (continued...) No. 02-2475 13 7 (...continued) 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (statutory notes) (emphasis added). Mr. Robledo-Gonzales acknowledges that the transitional rules generally exempt from IIRIRA’s coverage those individuals whose proceedings were instituted prior to IIRIRA’s passage. However, he also points out that the transitional rules state that, notwithstanding any provisions of § 1105a, there is no further review of BIA orders for individuals whose final order of deportation issued after October 30, 1996, and who were found deportable because of the commission of certain offenses. Because he falls within these categories, Mr. Robledo-Gonzales maintains that he is excepted from the general rule that the provisions of § 1105a, including the bar to habeas relief for aliens who have departed the Country, apply. We disagree. The general rule, set forth in subsection (c), quoted above, is that aliens in removal proceedings prior to IIRIRA’s effective date will continue to be governed by the administrative process that existed prior to IIRIRA’s passage. However, subsection (c)(4)(G) of the transitional rules states that “notwithstanding any provision of section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. § 1105a] to the contrary,” there shall be no judicial review in the cases of certain aliens. The question then becomes whether the bar to habeas relief contained in § 1105a is contrary to the provision of the transitional rules that bars judicial review. We have to conclude, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), that the two provisions are not at odds. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the Court in St. Cyr determined that habeas relief and judicial review have had “historically distinct meanings” in the immigration context. Id. at 311. Thus, a provision that barred judicial review would not necessarily implicate the right to bring a habeas petition; it certainly would not be “contrary” to a provision that bars habeas relief. Thus, we believe that § 1105a’s general bar to habeas for those who have (continued...) 14 No. 02-2475