Opinion ID: 2069963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Admission of Hearsay Statements of Codefendant Brooks

Text: On appeal before this Court, defendant argues that Brooks's statements to Det. Enright made during the search of his apartment were inadmissible hearsay and their admission into evidence amounted to reversible error. We note that before ruling on the admissibility of this testimony the trial justice ordered a voir dire of the witness. The record discloses that during the search of Brooks's apartment, Det. Enright made firsthand observations of his behavior as Brooks made these statements. However, defendant argues that neither Brooks's statement about the book bag nor his declarationabout instructing the defendant that he could not store drugs in his apartment qualified as an excited utterance or a present sense impression. Rule 803(1) provides that a present sense impression is [a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter, and Rule 803(2) describes an excited utterance as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. These hearsay exceptions, formerly admissible as res gestae, are closely related concepts with a temporal distinction between a present sense impression and an excited utterance. See State v. Dame, 488 A.2d 418, 424 (R.I.1985); State v. Vaccaro, 111 R.I. 59, 62 n. 1, 298 A.2d 788, 790 n. 1 (1973). These statements are not excluded by the hearsay rule notwithstanding the availability of the witness. The state concedes, and we agree, that neither statement qualifies as an excited utterance or a present sense impression. Although following his arrest and during the search of his dwelling Brooks may have appeared to be nervous and excited, we are unable to discern any startling event that would result in a statement, contemporaneous or otherwise, that was free of conscious fabrication. Indeed, the circumstances under which Brooks made these statements to Det. Enright clearly demonstrate that they were the product of deliberation and reflection. Brooks's exculpatory declarations to the police were intended to distance himself from the contraband that was seized from his home. The reliability of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule traditionally has been grounded on the belief that at the time the declarant makes the statement, he or she is still under the strain of the startling event that triggered the statement, with little orno opportunity to deliberate or prevaricate. Although the statement need not be strictly contemporaneous with the startling event to qualify as spontaneous, it nonetheless must be made while the declarant was still laboring under the stress of the event. State v. Mendez, 788 A.2d 1145, 1147 (R.I.2002) (per curiam). When considered in light of the facts and circumstances under which these statements were made, they simply cannot qualify as excited utterances. Likewise, a present sense impression is a statement that is made simultaneously or with only a slight lapse of time from the event about which the statement relates. A declaration about an event made while the declarant was observing the event is a present sense impression. Because the statement is made contemporaneously with the event, there is no time for reflection or deception and no question about the accuracy of the declarant's memory. See Rule 803 Advisory Committee's Note (exceptions (1) and (2)). The statement usually describes or explains the event that the declarant is observing or experiencing. An intentional attempt to explain away suspicious circumstances does not qualify as a present sense impression. Here, it is obvious that Brooks witnessed the police search his dwelling and rummage through his belongings; he thus had more than ample time to decide what to say in the event that incriminating evidence was discovered. Therefore, we conclude that neither statement qualifies as an exception to the hearsay rule. The state argues that although these statements were inadmissible hearsay, their erroneous admission into evidence was harmless error that could not have affected the verdicts in this case. Because defendant was acquitted of the weapons offenses, the state suggests that Brooks's declaration that the book bag was not his was merely cumulativeevidence that had no effect on the outcome. The state relies on In re Andrey G., 796 A.2d 452 (R.I.2002) (per curiam), in which this Court recognized that the admission of hearsay evidence is not prejudicial when the evidence is merely cumulative and when [defendant's] guilt is sufficiently established by proper evidence. Id. at 457 (quoting State v. Micheli, 656 A.2d 980, 982 (R.I.1995)). In particular, the state suggests that defendant was convicted of the drug counts based upon the cocaine and drug paraphernalia found in defendant's residence irrespective of Brooks's out-of-court declarations. Further, the state argues that the contraband discovered in Brooks's residence was cumulative proof that defendant possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver and conspired with Brooks to commit that offense. The state also suggests that in light of the evidence that defendant's fingerprints were actually identified on the digital scale discovered in Brooks's closet, Brooks's statement to Det. Enright that the scale belonged to defendant also was cumulative evidence. Although we are satisfied that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay evidence, we are not persuaded that its admission amounted to reversible error. In light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, including the testimony that more than an ounce of crack cocaine was discovered on his person and an additional amount was found in his bedroom, we are satisfied that the admission of Brooks's out-of-court statements was harmless error. We note that Brooks's remarks were wholly unrelated to the charges that emanated from the undercover operation in Olneyville. The defendant was convicted of these offenses based upon the seizure of more than an ounce of cocaine from his person while acting in concert with Perales and Brooks. Further, 4.9 grams of cocaine were found in defendant's bedroom closet along with a drug ledger and Brooks's driver'slicense, while defendant's driver's license was found in Brooks's apartment and his fingerprints were discovered on the scale seized from Brooks's closet. This evidence, independent of Brooks's hearsay statements, was abundant proof of defendant's participation in this criminal endeavor. As noted, defendant was acquitted of the weapons charges; thus, Brooks's statement denying that the book bag belonged to him could not have affected the result in this case. The record discloses that defendant was convicted of the counts related to the cocaine seized from his person and his home based upon evidence unrelated to the weapons found in the book bag and the scale seized from Brooks's closet. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the erroneous introduction of Brooks's out-of-court statements was harmless error.