Opinion ID: 781300
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Successive representation

Text: 67 Although we concur in the district court's finding that Attorney Murphy never intended to represent Moss at trial,  the record reveals that Attorney Murphy developed an attorney-client relationship with Moss during the pre-indictment proceedings. Following Moss's initial consultation with counsel, Attorney Morreale assured Moss that he and Attorney Murphy would be working close together to resolve the matter. Attorney Murphy thereafter advanced several efforts on Moss's behalf, including corresponding with United States Attorney Markman and traveling to Arizona for the purposes of investigating potential witnesses. During the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Murphy acknowledged that these activities created an attorney-client relationship. While this attorney-client relationship ceased shortly after the arraignment, it is with little hesitation that we conclude that Attorney Murphy represented Moss during the pre-indictment period. 68 Attorney Murphy's pre-indictment representation of Moss, and subsequent representation of Kohn, presents the issue of whether Attorney Murphy labored under an actual conflict of interest arising from these successive representation. Successive representation occurs where defense counsel has previously represented a co-defendant or trial witness. 18 See generally Riggs, 209 F.3d at 833-34. Conflicts may arise when an attorney simultaneously represents clients with differing interests (multiple representation), or when an attorney representing a defendant has previously represented co-defendants or trial witnesses (successive representation). United States v. Shepard, 675 F.2d 977, 979 (8th Cir.1982). It is more difficult for a defendant to show that counsel actively represented conflicting interests in cases of successive rather than simultaneous representation. See Riggs, 209 F.3d at 833-34. See also Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490 (7th Cir.1995); McConico v. Alabama, 919 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1990); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir.1988). 69 The fear in successive representation cases is that the lawyer will fail to cross-examine the former client rigorously for fear of revealing or misusing privileged information. See Duncan, 256 F.3d at 198; Enoch, 70 F.3d at 1496; Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 580. Thus, the most common example of an actual conflict of interest arising from successive representation occurs where an attorney's former client serves as a government witness against the attorney's current client at trial. See, e.g., United States v. McCutcheon, 86 F.3d 187, 189 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Flynn, 87 F.3d 996 (8th Cir.1996); Enoch, 70 F.3d at 1496; United States v. Malpiedi, 62 F.3d 465 (2d Cir.1995); Takacs v. Engle, 768 F.2d 122, 125 (6th Cir.1985). 70 As the district court failed to address the issue of successive representation, it becomes the duty of this Court to address whether Attorney Murphy's successive representations of Moss and Kohn gave rise to a conflict of interest rendering the petitioners' representation constitutionally ineffective. 71 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1240, courts applied the Sullivan presumption of prejudice to conflict of interest claims arising from successive representation. See Riggs, 209 F.3d at 831 n. 1 ([T]his circuit applies the Cuyler [v. Sullivan] analysis to all Sixth Amendment conflict of interest claims.) (citing United States v. Mays, 77 F.3d 906, 908 (6th Cir.1996)). See also Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir.2001); Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775 (2d Cir.2000); Flynn, 87 F.3d at 1001; Beets v. Collins, 986 F.2d 1478 (5th Cir.1993); Church v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 1501, 1511 (10th Cir. 1991); Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 580. 19 In Mickens, however, the Court observed the holdings of the Courts of Appeals, which applied Sullivan unblinkingly to all kinds of attorney ethical conflicts, and cautioned: 72 It must be said ... that the language of Sullivan does not clearly establish, or indeed even support, such an expansive application.... Both Sullivan itself and Holloway stressed the high probability of prejudice arising from multiple concurrent representation and the difficulty of proving that prejudice. Not all attorney conflicts present comparable conflicts. 73 Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The Court specifically addressed the issue of successive representation, stating, albeit in dicta, we do not rule upon the need for the Sullivan prophylaxis in cases of successive representation.... Whether Sullivan should be extended to such cases remains, as far as the jurisprudence of the court is concerned, an open question. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1246. 74 In the wake of Mickens, no court has applied the Sullivan presumption to a case of successive representation. See, e.g., Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding in the context of a section 2254 petition that  Sullivan applied only to joint representation and the Supreme Court has yet to extend Sullivan's reach to any other type of conflict.); Holleman v. Cotton, 301 F.3d 737, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2002) ([T]he Supreme Court recently has cast doubt on whether the principle of Cuyler v. Sullivan should be applied to cases where trial judges have failed to inquire into conflicts of interest in successive representation cases....); Montoya v. Lytle, 53 Fed.Appx. 496 (10th Cir.2002). But see United States v. Young, 315 F.3d 911, 914-15 n. 5 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that Sullivan applies to cases of multiple or serial representation, while Strickland applies to all other ethical conflicts). 75 As the application of Sullivan to cases of successive representation appears to be in doubt, we briefly shall examine the Mickens dicta in an effort to discern which standard, Strickland or Sullivan, appropriately governs the instant appeal. 76 In explaining its rationale for differentiating between joint and successive representation cases, the Mickens Court cited Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a trial court to inquire into the likelihood of conflict whenever jointly charged defendants are represented by a single attorney ... but not when counsel previously represented another defendant in a substantially related matter, even where the trial court is aware of the prior representation. 20 Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245 (citations omitted). According to the Court, the distinction between joint and successive representations evident in Rule 44(c) supports the exclusive application of Sullivan only to instances of joint representation. The Court explained: 77 This is not to suggest that one ethical duty is more or less important than another. The purpose of our Holloway and Sullivan exceptions from the ordinary requirements of Strickland ... is not to enforce the Canons of Legal Ethics, but to apply needed prophylaxis in situations where Strickland itself is evidently inadequate to assure vindication of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 78 Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1246 (citation omitted). The foregoing rationale reaffirmed the Court's prior concern over the inadequacies of the Strickland test when applied to conflict of interest claims. As the Court previously recognized, in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil ... is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488, 98 S.Ct. 1173. Strickland places on the party alleging a conflict of interest the onerous burden of having to prove a negative, that is, demonstrating that his counsel improperly refrained from acting in a constitutionally-effective manner. The Court therefore created a narrow presumption of prejudice as a necessary prophylaxis against the high probability of prejudice arising in circumstances of multiple concurrent representation, and the difficulty in proving that prejudice under Strickland. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245. 79 While this Court has not had occasion to address this precise issue, several circuits have reasoned that Strickland similarly fails in the successive representation context where the alleging party demonstrates that: (1) counsel's earlier representation of the witness or co-defendant was substantially and particularly related to counsel's later representation of defendant; or (2) counsel actually learned particular confidential information during the prior representation of the witness or co-defendant that was relevant to defendant's later case. See Enoch, 70 F.3d at 1496-97 (citing Smith v. White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1405 (11th Cir.1987)). See also Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 580 (In successive representation, conflicts of interests may arise if the cases are substantially related or if the attorney reveals privileged communications of the former client or otherwise divides his loyalties.) (Citation omitted). An examination of Mickens reveals that it is the liberal application of this substantial relatedness test that troubled the Court. The Mickens Court explicitly indicated that the invocation of a presumption is unnecessary only in factually related cases because there is less likelihood of prejudice in circumstances of substantially related, as opposed to multiple concurrent, representations. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245. 80 We do not make an impermissible leap in predicting that a Supreme Court decision lingers on the horizon that expressly will limit the application of Sullivan in cases of successive representation. The eventual scope of this limitation is, however, a matter that we need not address in the case sub judice because the instant scenario fall outside of the traditional class of successive representation cases that were considered in Mickens. 81 Attorney Murphy's representations of Moss and Kohn differed from the traditional successive representation scenario in that they shared more than a substantial relatedness — they were nearly identical. Attorney Murphy's representations occurred during the same proceedings and arose from identical facts. This intertwining relationship posed similar concerns to those presented in cases of multiple concurrent representation, that, is, the high probability of prejudice and the difficulty of proving that prejudice. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245. See also Church, 942 F.2d at 1511([I]n the context of successive representations, we find it difficult to envision circumstances more fraught with inherent conflict than ... where the former representation was factually intertwined with the criminal defendant's case.). While we agree that there is a lesser likelihood of prejudice in traditional cases of successive representation, such as where the attorney is compelled to cross-examine a former client and the former representation bore only a substantial relation to the current proceedings, the probability of prejudice dramatically increases in circumstances where the attorney represented a co-defendant during the pre-indictment phase of the same proceeding. Cf. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708 (The provision of separate trials for Sullivan and his codefendants significantly reduced the potential for a divergence in their interests.). This probability reaches near certainty where, as here, the attorney's former and current clients collaborate to mount a defense. This extreme likelihood of prejudice, and the corresponding difficulty in demonstrating that prejudice, warrant the application of Sullivan to the petitioners' claims. 82 Our holding that Sullivan applies to the petitioners' claims is buttressed by the district court's determination that it is certainly not unlikely that, in fact, some, if not all, of the funds for representing [Kohn] came from co-defendant Moss. Third-party fee arrangements are inherently suspect, particularly when a member of the alleged conspiracy is the source of the payment. The Supreme Court made this clear in Wood, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220, where the Court stated: 83 Courts and commentators have recognized the inherent dangers that arise when a criminal defendant is represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party, particularly when the third party is the operator of the alleged criminal enterprise. One risk is that the lawyer will prevent his client from obtaining leniency by preventing the client from offering testimony against his former employer or from taking other actions contrary to the employer's interest. 84 Id. at 268-69, 101 S.Ct. 1097. See also Quintero v. United States, 33 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747 (1st Cir.1991); Danner v. United States, 820 F.2d 1166, 1170 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Shaughnessy, 782 F.2d 118, 120 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Carpenter, 769 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir.1976). 85 Here, the government charged Moss as the leader of the conspiracy, and evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing indicated that Moss provided the funding for Kohn's defense. Indeed, there exists ample evidence in the record indicating that Moss also paid the legal fees of other individuals involved in the conspiracy. Although Attorney Murphy denied receiving any funds from Moss, the district court found it difficult to reconcile this testimony with Kohn's statement that not only did [Kohn] not pay any money to Attorney Murphy ... [but] he was never in any financial position to do so. 86 We again decline to disturb the district court's finding. We note only that the district court found that it was not unlikely that Moss directed funds to Attorney Murphy, and a complete reading of the district court's opinion fails to clarify whether the court deemed this likelihood as amounting to a separate conflict of interest under the first prong of the Sullivan test. While the record provides some support for the district court's finding that Moss paid at least some part of Kohn's legal fees, we are unable to determine as a matter of law that this likelihood reached the level of a conflict of interest. See, e.g., Bucuvalas v. United States, 98 F.3d 652 (1st Cir.1996) (finding no conflict of interest in third party fee arrangement where co-defendants had separate counsel). 87 We determine that Attorney Murphy's successive representations of Moss and Kohn during inextricably linked proceedings, coupled with evidence that Moss paid at least some part of Kohn's legal fees to Attorney Murphy, creates a sufficient likelihood of prejudice, as well as attendant difficulties in proving that prejudice under Strickland, requiring the application of Sullivan.