Opinion ID: 76559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cause and Prejudice for Procedural Default

Text: 37 In procedural default cases, the question is not whether legal developments or new evidence has made a claim easier or better, but whether at the time of the direct appeal the claim was available at all. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 534, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2666, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986); McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir.1992); Lomelo v. United States, 891 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir.1990). 19 Further, to show cause for procedural default, Lynn must show that some objective factor external to the defense prevented Lynn or his counsel from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly attributable to Lynn's own conduct. 20 Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1145 (11th Cir.2001) (noting that `the existence of cause for a procedural default must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule' (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645)); Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.2001); McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1258. 21 Lynn argues that he has shown cause because he has new evidence not available at the time of his 1990 direct appeal. We disagree and explain why.
38 We first point out that Lynn does not actually present any new evidence as to his improper vouching claim. Lynn's so-called new evidence is his allegation that the prosecutor admitted during Eyster's direct appeal that she knowingly solicited perjury from Sheehy about the Count 7-9 typo and knowingly misled the jury. However, Lynn's allegation is belied by this Court's Eyster decision, which noted that the government continued to assert that it conducted the redirect examination of Sheehy in good faith and did not intentionally mislead the jury. 948 F.2d at 1206. This Court further stated that [i]t is irrelevant whether the prosecutor asked her question in good faith, that [w]e do not attempt to divine whether the prosecutor indeed had a lapse of memory about the circumstances of Sheehy's plea, and that the prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of a witness even if she devoutly believes the facts she improperly places before the jury. Id. at 1207. Lynn's improper vouching claim is essentially the same as Eyster's and Marshall's and is procedurally barred due to Lynn's failure to pursue it on direct appeal. 22
39 Before discussing the merits of Lynn's claim that the government pollinated, primed and pumped witnesses to testify to a parade of perjury, we note that there are two ways in which to view Lynn's claim. The first is that Lynn is providing additional evidence that the government was involved in the known witness sequestration violations whereby the witnesses discussed and tailored their testimony to conform to each other's. The second way to view Lynn's claim is that Lynn is actually making a new, separate claim of prosecutorial misconduct; namely, that government agents fed information to prosecution witnesses from both other witnesses and from government agents themselves. Out of an abundance of caution, we address both versions of Lynn's claims. 40 To the extent Lynn raises a pure witness sequestration claim, Lynn has filed new affidavits, but they do not establish cause to overcome his procedural default of that claim. First, Eyster's brief on direct appeal stressed the intentional witness sequestration violations by the same witnesses, Sheehy and Purvis. Eyster's brief asserted that Sheehy, Purvis, and others intentionally violated the witness sequestration order by discussing and conforming their testimony to one another's while confined in jail during the trial. 23 This Court's Eyster decision already states that the record in that case reflected that both the district court and the government were lax in upholding the witness sequestration rule. Id. at 1211 (emphasis added). Because Eyster raised this very issue, Lynn has not shown that his claim about the government's involvement with the witness sequestration violations was unavailable at all on direct appeal. 41 Further, Lynn has not shown that any objective factor external to the defense prevented him from raising his witness sequestration claim on direct appeal. Jones, 256 F.3d at 1145; Johnson, 256 F.3d at 1171; McCoy, 953 F.2d at 1258. Rather, the factor preventing Lynn from raising his witness sequestration and improper vouching claims on direct appeal was his unlawful escape from custody. If Lynn had not escaped, this Court would have addressed not only his improper vouching claim but also his witness sequestration claim in his direct appeal. 42 Second, to the extent Lynn raises a pure, but stronger, witness sequestration claim, Lynn has not shown cause because he has not satisfied the standards for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This Court has concluded that § 2255 motions based on new evidence are subject to the standards generally applicable to motions for a new trial based on new evidence. Greene, 880 F.2d at 1306-07; Bentley v. United States, 701 F.2d 897, 898 (11th Cir.1983); Everitt v. United States, 353 F.2d 532, 532 (5th Cir.1965). There are now five requirements that a movant must satisfy before a new trial will be granted based on newly discovered evidence. United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir.2003). The five requirements are as follows: 43 (1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure of the defendant to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence, (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence is material to issues before the court, and (5) the evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. 44 Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, we have held that motions for a new trial are highly disfavored, and that district courts should use great caution in granting a new trial motion based on newly discovered evidence. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Lynn would have to satisfy these five requirements to obtain a new trial based on new evidence if the issue was raised on direct appeal. The standard is arguably higher, but certainly no lower, for Lynn to obtain a new trial based on new evidence through a § 2255 proceeding. 45 We need not analyze all five requirements because Lynn's new evidence of the government's involvement in the witness sequestration violations does not meet the third requirement, that the evidence not be merely cumulative or impeaching. Id. Here, Lynn's new evidence merely provides further impeaching evidence of witness testimony and is also cumulative of evidence already proffered by Lynn's codefendants in the district court and in their direct appeals. Because neither cumulative nor impeaching new evidence is sufficient to satisfy Lynn's burden in a § 2255 proceeding, the district court correctly found that Lynn failed to show cause for his procedural default of his witness sequestration claim.
46 Although the 1999 affidavits bolster Lynn's witness sequestration claim, it is certainly arguable that the government's alleged complicity — in the witnesses' tailoring their testimony and testifying to facts learned from other witnesses or government agents — creates a new and separate claim of prosecutorial misconduct. To the extent Lynn raises a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we conclude that the district court properly denied this claim as well. 24 47 As outlined above, Eyster and Marshall raised a similar witness sequestration claim in their direct appeals that asserted that witnesses Sheehy and Purvis discussed their testimony with other witnesses and tailored their testimony to conform with each other's. Eyster and Marshall's claim, in effect, was that Sheehy and Purvis perjured themselves by testifying to events not within their personal knowledge but learned from other prosecution witnesses. 48 In his 1999 motion to amend his § 2255 motion, Lynn claims that Sheehy and Purvis not only learned information from other witnesses but that the two men were fed information from government agents. Lynn claimed that he was able to learn of the government's involvement in this perjurious testimony only after additional interviews with Sheehy and Purvis. Lynn asserts that this newly discovered evidence of the government's involvement in the perjurious testimony constitutes a new claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was not available on direct appeal. 49 As discussed above, there are five requirements that Lynn must satisfy in order to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) the evidence must be discovered after trial; (2) the failure of the defendant to discover the evidence must not be due to a lack of diligence; (3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence must be material to issues before the court; and (5) the evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. Id. The government contends that Lynn has not satisfied the five requirements and that Lynn has not shown cause for failing to raise this prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. For example, the government challenges Lynn's due diligence, the second requirement, and asserts that Lynn has not explained: (1) why the information was not tendered until ten years after trial; (2) whether he took steps to investigate that matter during the ten-year period between trial and the tendering of the new affidavits; (3) how the government prevented the information from being available on direct appeal; and (4) the discrepancy ... between the first and second set of [Purvis and Sheehy] affidavits.... There is also a substantial question whether Lynn has satisfied the fifth requirement that his new evidence is such that a new trial would probably produce a different result. 50 Even assuming arguendo that Lynn's newly discovered evidence satisfied all five requirements and that Lynn has established cause for his procedural default, Lynn's new claim of prosecutorial misconduct still fails on the merits because the 1999 affidavits contain nothing more than conclusory allegations. In articulating its concerns with the 1999 affidavits, the district court correctly pointed out that the affidavits do not name any government agents or investigators and do not give details or a single example of what testimony or statements were tailored or conformed to be consistent or were based on information fed from government agents. Furthermore, neither 1999 affidavit identified any statement that was made without the witnesses' personal knowledge. Because the 1999 affidavits submitted by Lynn amount to nothing more than mere conclusory allegations, the district court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issues and correctly denied Lynn's § 2255 motion. Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir.1991) (A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing ... when his claims are merely conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics.... (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Stano v. Dugger, 901 F.2d 898, 899 (11th Cir.1990) ( en banc ) (The petitioner will not be entitled to an evidentiary hearing when his claims are merely `conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics' .... (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977))); United States v. Jones, 614 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.1980) (When claims for habeas relief are based on unsupported generalizations, a hearing is not required. (internal quotations and citations omitted)); Scott v. United States, 598 F.2d 392, 393 (5th Cir.1979) (Contrary to [the movant's] assertions, ... the right to a hearing is not established simply by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. When claims for habeas relief are based on unsupported generalizations, a hearing is not required.).