Opinion ID: 2433040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: abandonment remedy

Text: Having concluded that the defendant was abandoned by post-conviction counsel's failure to file a timely amended motion, we must decide what remedy is available to the defendant. We have resolved this issue in two ways: (1) appointing new counsel to file an amended motion, or (2) instructing the motion court to treat the previously drafted amended motion as timely. The previous cases, however, have been procedurally different than this one in regard to whether an amended motion was filed and whether the court ruled on the amended motion. In Luleff, 807 S.W.2d 495, we remanded to the motion court to determine whether movant was abandoned by counsel's failure to file an amended motion. We instructed the court that if movant was not negligent or otherwise a party to his appointed counsel's failure to file an amended motion, the court should appoint new counsel to file an amended motion if counsel determines that there are any meritorious claims for relief. See also State v. Bradley, 811 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. banc 1991). In Sanders, 807 S.W.2d 493, where counsel drafted an amended motion but failed to file it timely, we instructed the motion court to treat the amended motion as timely if counsel was exclusively responsible for its late filing. Prior to the remand in Sanders , the motion court had dismissed the amended motion as untimely and did not rule on it. In this case, however, the motion court ruled on the untimely amended motions prior to the defendant's appeal. Defendant contends that we should follow Luleff and allow the motion court to appoint new counsel to file a third amended 29.15 motion. The State persuasively argues, however, that in doing so we would permit the defendant a third bite at the apple, which would contravene the purpose of Rule 29.15. The State suggests that we dismiss both motions as untimely. Although we agree with the State that the second amended motion was properly dismissed as untimely, we reinstate defendant's first amended motion pursuant to Sanders . Defendant White was only abandoned with regard to the timing of his first amended motion, not as to its content. In his affidavit, defendant White stated that he gave his appointed counsel all of the information he had with regard to filing an amended motion. Defendant also signed the verification in blank, which resulted in his waiving any claim that the amended motions were incomplete. Plus, neither the defendant nor his second appointed counsel testified at the Sanders hearing that the first amended motion did not contain all grounds known to them at the time it was filed. Defendant's counsel merely complained that the first amended motion was late because he was not given enough time. Therefore, defendant was not abandoned as to the content of his first amended motion. He was only abandoned as to the timeliness of his first amended motion. We, therefore, conclude that defendant's first amended motion should be reinstated. The defendant is not entitled, however, to have his second amended motion reinstated. We have already determined that defendant was abandoned only by the late filing of his first amended motion. By reinstating the first amended motion, we have cured the timeliness problem, and the first amended motion now meets the minimum requirements of Rule 29.15. To let the defendant also have the benefit of the second untimely amended motion would grant the defendant additional relief beyond that which he was originally entitled to receive under Rule 29.15. Defendant White only had the right to have his appointed counsel draft one amended motion that complied with the requirements of Rule 29.15(e). We are unwilling to grant the defendant any additional relief beyond that which is required by Rule 29.15. Therefore, we will not reinstate the defendant's untimely second amended motion. Defendant contends, however, that the motion court failed to rule on all of defendant's points in his first amended motion. On remand, the motion court should determine the validity of this contention, which is similar to defendant's claim regarding his pro se motion. The motion court should have drafted findings and conclusions on all of the issues raised in defendant's pro se and first amended motions. On remand, the court should make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Barry, 850 S.W.2d 348. Defendant also argues that he was denied his right to due process under the Missouri and United States constitutions because the prosecutor drafted the August 1, 1989, findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendant further argues that the judge's alleged delegation of his duties to the prosecutor deprived White of his right under Article V, Section 1, of the Missouri Constitution to have his post-conviction motion decided by a court vested with judicial power. Adopting all or part of a party's proposed findings, or adopting by reference the wording of a party's motion, has become a common practice among lawyers and judges in both criminal and civil cases. Courts frequently request both parties to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law that conform to how the court intends to resolve the issues in dispute. The court then takes the parties' recommendations under advisement and either drafts its own findings of fact and conclusions of law or adopts one of the parties' findings in whole or in part. As long as the court thoughtfully and carefully considers the parties' proposed findings and agrees with the content, there is no constitutional problem with the court adopting in whole or in part the findings of fact and conclusions of law drafted by one of the parties. Once the trial court determines that it agrees with one of the parties' findings and signs the order, the court has in effect adopted that party's findings as its own. It is clear from the record that the prosecutor drafted some or all of the August 1, 1990, findings of fact and conclusions of law. We find no constitutional violation regarding this practice as long as the trial court is satisfied that its findings of fact and conclusions of law reflect its independent judgment. Because there was no evidence presented that the findings and conclusions did not reflect the court's own independent judgment, this point is denied.