Opinion ID: 4570673
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The New Evidence and Dr. Box’s Testimony

Text: In their motion for reconsideration filed in June 2019, the Derricks produced for the first time an April 8, 2019 histopathology report from the necropsy of a horse they euthanized on March 29, in which the examiner found a lesion in the heart tissue that “has been associated with ionophores, particularly monensin.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 400 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Based on this “new” evidence, the Derricks urged the court to reverse its summary judgment order and permit Dr. Box to read the report to the jury at the trial set to begin in July. Separately, they asked the court to reconsider its order relating to the scope of Dr. Box’s testimony.3 3 The district court acknowledged its authority under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) to review the order prior to entry of a final judgment and looked to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) for the standard of review. Under Rule 59(e), the court may amend or correct a judgment on the grounds of “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) [when] new evidence previously [was] unavailable, and (3) the need to correct 8 Regarding the untimely disclosure, the Derricks argued, and the district court agreed, that the factors in Woodworker’s Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mutual Life Insurance Co., 170 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1999), should guide the court’s decision. In Woodworker’s, this court held that the court should consider four factors in the exercise of its “broad discretion” to determine whether the failure to timely disclose the evidence is “justified or harmless.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The four factors to be considered are: “(1) the prejudice or surprise to the party against whom the testimony is offered; (2) the ability of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which introducing such testimony would disrupt the trial; and (4) the moving party’s bad faith or willfulness.” Id. In exercising its broad discretion, the district court reviewed the four factors and determined the late disclosure was neither justified nor harmless. First, in its thorough and comprehensive order, the court outlined in detail the prejudice to Standard Nutrition and found that the first factor “heavily leans in favor of excluding both Dr. Box’s expert testimony and the new evidence.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 441. Second, the court explained that “there is now little time to cure the prejudice . . . as trial is set for next month.” Id. Next, because the trial was imminent, the court determined that the admission of the new evidence would “significantly disrupt the trial.” Id. at 442. Last, while the court said it “hesitates to find that [the Derricks] acted in bad faith . . . the Court cannot find that [they] acted in good faith.” Id. In clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). 9 this regard, the court cited the Derricks’ “decision[] to wait until months after the discovery deadline to obtain [the report], [their] fail[ure] to submit the new evidence to the Court for approximately two months after obtaining it and only after the Court ruled on dispositive motions, and [their] continuous[] disregard [of] deadlines, the scheduling order, and the Local Rules.” Id. at 442-43. The district court further declined to reconsider its order regarding the scope of Dr. Box’s testimony. In this regard, the Derricks argued that the court mistakenly relied on medical malpractice cases and cited for the first time two products liability cases they maintained dictated a different outcome. The court squarely rejected their argument for two reasons. First, the court noted that “[a] motion to reconsider is not a second chance for the losing party to make its strongest case or to dress up arguments that previously failed.” Id. at 445 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the new authorities did not change the outcome. In particular, the court explained that in any type of case, a lay witness cannot offer opinion testimony on a topic such as monensin poisoning, which requires the special skill and knowledge of an expert witness. See James River, 658 F.3d at 1214.
“We review [the] district court’s decision denying [an interlocutory] motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion.” Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887 F.3d 1003, 1024 (10th Cir. 2018). “Under an abuse of discretion standard, a trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of 10 judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “That is to say, we will not alter a trial court’s decision unless it can be shown that the court’s decision was an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, the Derricks repeat the same arguments they made in the district court and argue for a different outcome. In other words, they ignore that the standard of review on appeal is for abuse of discretion, i.e.. whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable. Nonetheless, we have carefully examined the court’s thorough and comprehensive order, which is firmly anchored to the law and facts, and find no abuse of discretion.