Opinion ID: 2359652
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inconsistency in the Jury's Verdict

Text: The defendant's motion for acquittal contended that because the jury did not follow the presiding justice's instructions on the possible verdicts it could properly return, the defendant's criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon conviction must be vacated. Although we vacate that conviction on other grounds, we discuss the issue for the benefit of the court on remand. The jury was instructed that it could find the defendant not guilty of both Count I, aggravated assault, and Count II, criminal threatening with the use of a dangerous weapon, or the jury could find the defendant guilty of either count but not the other. According to the presiding justice, the jury could not find the defendant guilty on both counts. In addition, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault rather than aggravated assault if the jury believed the defendant caused bodily injury without the use of a dangerous weapon. Putting aside whether the jury misapplied the instructions when it found the defendant guilty of both the lesser included offense and Count II rather than guilty of both Counts I and II, the defendant cannot complain of rulings more favorable than he has a right to expect. See State v. Gagnon, 383 A.2d 25, 31 (Me. 1978). Although the jury might have misapplied the presiding justice's interpretation of the law, no harm was done to the defendant because the instructions incorrectly stated the law to the defendant's advantage. The jury could have found that the defendant committed the simple assault when he pulled his wife's hair and grabbed her. Had the jury been properly instructed on the meaning of use of a dangerous weapon and serious bodily injury and the evidence supported it, the jury also could have found that the defendant violated the criminal threatening statute if he threatened his wife with a butcher knife although he may not have used the knife to inflict any bodily injury. A person's continuous conduct need not constitute a single unitary act; or even if continuous conduct is one indivisible act, the same act may violate more than one statute as long as none of the violations are a lesser included offense of the other. See State v. Thurlow, 387 A.2d 22, 24 (Me.1978); Newell v. State, 371 A.2d 118, 119 (Me.1977); State v. Gagne, 362 A.2d 166, 172 (Me.1976).