Opinion ID: 2584939
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Drunken Prowling Incident

Text: Defendant claims his penalty verdict was prejudiced by the admission of evidence of the July 7, 1991 incident that led to his arrest for public intoxication on that same date. On this occasion defendant, who appeared drunk, began prowling around a mobilehome in McArthur at which two teenage girls were babysitting a nine-month-old infant. Defendant's questions frightened the girls, who retreated into the home. Defendant then pressed his face against the kitchen window, further scaring the girls, who began crying. One girl called her father who was nearby; upon his arrival he saw defendant attempting to open a window to gain access to the home. He chased defendant half a block before subduing him, and was kicked by defendant before police arrived and made the arrest. Defendant first contends Deputy Dikes should not have been permitted to testify that at the time of this incident, he (defendant) threatened the deputy by stating that when he got out of jail he would obtain a gun and shoot the deputy in the back of the head. As already noted ( ante, p. 669), Deputy Dikes's testimony constituted evidence of a prior express threat to use force or violence, and was therefore properly admitted at the penalty phase as a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). Defendant further contends there was nothing about the prowling incident itself that rendered testimony regarding it admissible in the People's case in aggravation at the penalty phase, and hence such testimony was erroneously admitted. We disagree. (20) [W]hether a particular instance of criminal activity `involved ... the express or implied threat to use force or violence' (§ 190.3, factor (b)) can only be determined by looking to the facts of the particular case. ( People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 955 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950] ( Mason ).) The facts established were that defendant tried to enter a mobilehome, knowing it was occupied by two minor girls. He peered in the window, and did not leave even when one of the girls screamed in fear. Instead, he tried to gain access into the residence by attempting to open a window. He fled only when confronted by the girl's returning father, who chased him one-half block before subduing him, and whom defendant was fighting with and kicked before police arrived and arrested defendant. The prosecutor argued that defendant's conduct, separate and apart from his subsequent threat to shoot Deputy Dikes upon being arrested, contained an implied threat of violence, given that defendant knew he was attempting to enter an occupied residence in which the young occupants had seen him, become frightened, and started screaming. The trial court agreed in ruling the evidence admissible: And I think that the Mason case basically discusses thethat a burglary per se, just a straight burglary which involves no requirement of the presence of any other human being, that that by itself would not be sufficient to raise this issue. And I don't dispute that at all. [¶] But because of the fact that not only the two girls, but more importantly the father who is an adult who presumably ... [after being called home by the girls] was looking to confront the individual who was prowling or was around the house, the likelihood of there being that confrontation and the likelihood of that implied threat of violence to me is sufficiently established. We agree with the trial court's ruling. The facts surrounding the July 1991 prowling incident support the finding of an implied threat of violence within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 176 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988].) The evidence was therefore properly admitted in the People's case in aggravation of penalty.