Opinion ID: 3134067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of Prior Orders

Text: [¶22] Pearson contends that the prior orders issued in this case had a res judicata effect and barred relitigation of the issues addressed in those orders, or alternatively that they constitute the “law of the case,” with a similar effect. From this, Pearson argues that the court erred in adjudicating those issues de novo. We disagree. [¶23] First, res judicata is a general doctrine that “prevents the relitigation of matters already decided.” Portland Water Dist. v. Town of Standish, 2008 ME 23, ¶ 7, 940 A.2d 1097. Under its umbrella are two applications: issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, and claim preclusion. Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 39, 2 A.3d 301. Here, Pearson contends that Wendell should have been collaterally estopped from presenting evidence about facts underlying prior orders in this action, and that the court was required to accept those prior orders and the findings therein. [¶24] A party is foreclosed from relitigating factual issues that have already been decided “if the identical issue was determined by a prior final judgment, and . . . the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive in an earlier proceeding to present the same factual issue or issues it wishes to litigate again in a subsequent proceeding.” Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). We have held that “[p]rinciples of res judicata must be applied with 13 caution in domestic relations cases” because of changing developments that affect a child’s best interests. Id. ¶ 41; cf. Preston v. Tracy, 2008 ME 34, ¶¶ 12, 15, 942 A.2d 718 (holding that a finding that a party willfully misused the protection from abuse process was not binding on the court in a subsequent divorce action because, “when determining parental rights and responsibilities, a court . . . must make an independent examination of the totality of the circumstances after hearing fresh evidence”). [¶25] Here, at the time of the final hearing in December 2014, none of the prior orders constituted a final judgment. Although the March 2013 order was originally issued as a final judgment on the grant of the divorce itself and on parental rights and responsibilities, the nature and effect of that order changed in March 2014 when, with the parties’ agreement, the court vacated the judgment and correctly recharacterized it, and all subsequent orders, as interim orders. See Gulesian v. Gulesian, 377 A.2d 119, 120 (Me. 1977) (holding that an order pending divorce is not a final judgment that creates a right of appeal). Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel was inapplicable, and none of the orders, including the one issued in October 2013, had a preclusive effect. [¶26] Pearson’s alternative argument is that the prior orders contained the “law of the case,” and that they were therefore entitled to deference. For two reasons, this argument fails. First, the “law of the case” doctrine “relates only to 14 questions of law.” Blance v. Alley, 404 A.2d 587, 589 (Me. 1979). Here, Pearson argues that the court should have deferred to prior findings and conclusions with respect to the best interests of the parties’ children. However, because the best interest analysis is not a pure question of law, see 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (requiring the court to make factual findings related to various statutory factors), the “law of the case” doctrine does not apply dispositively, and the court did not err in admitting evidence of events predating the October 2013 order that bore on the issue of parental rights. See Blance, 404 A.2d at 589. [¶27] Second, the “law of the case” doctrine embodies a jurisprudential policy that does not implicate a court’s adjudicative authority. Id. Rather, the policy “promotes the orderly conduct of the action[,] . . . avoids unseemly conflict[, and] . . . discourages judge-shopping.” Id. In this case, none of these laudable goals was more important than a full exposition of the facts necessary to allow the court to adjudicate issues affecting children in crisis. Once the venue of this action was changed to a court location that was a considerable distance away from the earlier proceedings, it was nearly inevitable that a different judge— unfamiliar with the parties’ history of deep conflict that judicial efforts had not resolved—would preside over the trial. The parties then agreed that the March 2013 order and all subsequent orders would be treated as interim orders, which stripped those orders of any doctrinally preclusive effect. This made it difficult, if 15 not impossible, for the judge who presided at the final hearing to gain a full understanding of the complicated dynamics of the case based on the cold record, without hearing the evidence firsthand. Therefore, with no meaningful alternative, and faithful to the principle that circumstances affecting a child’s best interests can evolve over time, see Guardianship of Jewel M., 2010 ME 80, ¶ 41, 2 A.3d 301, the court properly and sensibly approached the issues in the case de novo. [¶28] While rejecting Pearson’s argument that the evidence presented at the December 2014 trial should be limited to events that post-dated the October 2013 order, the court made clear that it had reviewed the court file and was familiar both with the difficult family history and the prior findings and adjudications adverse to Wendell, which is the material that Pearson wanted the court to consider. The court therefore was fully aware of the background of the case as revealed in the court file. The court, however, did not err by adjudicating the parties’ claims de novo. 2. Determination of Parental Rights and Responsibilities [¶29] Pearson argues that the court erred in awarding sole parental rights and responsibilities to Wendell because, he contends, the court did not properly evaluate the factors germane to the best interests of the children. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3). We review a court’s factual findings that bear on the best interest evaluation for clear error and the court’s “ultimate conclusion regarding [a] child’s 16 best interest for an abuse of discretion.” Grant v. Hamm, 2012 ME 79, ¶ 6, 48 A.3d 789. We afford “very substantial deference” to the court because of its opportunity to evaluate the evidence as presented during trial. Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶30] Contrary to Pearson’s contention, the court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the children’s best interests would be promoted if Wendell were to have sole parental rights and responsibilities. This case illustrates that the courts are simply not able to provide stability and emotional protection to children caught between two parents who are unwilling or unable to stand down from their conflict with each other. Here, the court had imposed parenting orders of varying configurations: initially, shared parental rights and responsibilities with the children living primarily with Wendell; then allocated parental rights and responsibilities with the children not living together primarily; and finally sole parental rights and responsibilities to Pearson, who then abdicated primary physical residence of the children by unilaterally transferring them to Wendell. The parties’ conduct ultimately frustrated the court’s extensive efforts to provide judicial relief, and none of those prior efforts proved to be effective in deescalating parental conflict or insulating the children from its damaging effects. [¶31] Particularly when viewed in light of the prior attempts to impose stability, the evidence supported the court’s findings that Pearson and Wendell 17 continued to be unable to co-parent effectively for the benefit of their children; that the children’s best interests militated toward an award of sole parental rights and responsibilities to one of the parties; that the children were in a more stable and emotionally healthy environment when they lived primarily with Wendell; and that parental rights and responsibilities therefore should be awarded to her. This is not a conclusion that Wendell has been free from fault but rather demonstrates that the court properly maintained its focus on the best interests of the children. This focus is apparent in the judgment itself, and, even more explicitly, in the court’s order on Pearson’s motion for further findings of fact and conclusions of law, where the court confirmed that it had considered the factors prescribed in section 1653(3) in making its best interest determination. Although Pearson vigorously disputed the evidence underlying these elements of the court’s syllogism, the court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, and the court acted within its discretion when it ultimately concluded that granting Wendell sole parental rights and responsibilities would be in the children’s best interest. 3. Pearson’s Rights of Contact [¶32] Pearson next argues that the court erred in assigning responsibility to a counselor for establishing a schedule of his rights of contact with the children. [¶33] We have held that it is error for a court to delegate responsibility to a third party to decide when a parent can have contact with his children. See Knight 18 v. Knight, 680 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Me. 1996). In Knight, because one of the parties (the father) was serving a lengthy prison sentence, the parties contested his contact rights, and the court’s judgment allowed him to have contact only if the children’s guardian ad litem or other mental health professional determined that the children were “willing and ready” to see their father. Id. at 1036 (quotation marks omitted). On appeal, we held that the requirement of third-party approval for contact was error because it improperly “transfer[red] the court’s responsibility for determining the best interest of the child to the therapist. Although the court can consider the expression of such an expert opinion by a therapist, the court cannot make the visitation outcome dependent upon that opinion.” Id. at 1038. [¶34] In the judgment at issue here, the court ordered the parties to engage in a therapeutic reunification process guided by a counselor . . . relating to the parties’ ability to co-parent and the parties’ ability to act in the children’s best interests. It is through this process that a contact schedule will be developed for contact between [Pearson] and the parties’ children. . . . The holiday schedule shall be determined as part of the therapeutic reunification process. After prescribing a one-year term for the therapeutic reunification process, the judgment went on to provide, “During the one year counseling process [Wendell] shall be responsible for making sure that [Pearson] has time with the children both together and individually.” 19 [¶35] Pearson argues that the judgment transferred to a third party, i.e., the counselor, the ultimate responsibility for decisions affecting Pearson’s rights of contact. Because Pearson’s construction of the judgment would violate our holding in Knight, we must examine the judgment to determine whether Pearson’s construction is correct. If the judgment is ambiguous but is amenable to a construction that renders it lawful, we will adopt that view of the order. See Harrigan v. Mason & Winograd, 397 A.2d 514, 516 (R.I. 1979) (stating that a court order may be construed to make it “reasonable, effective and conclusive”); cf. Town of Baldwin v. Carter, 2002 ME 52, ¶¶ 9, 11-15, 794 A.2d 62 (construing a statute to preserve its constitutionality); Irish v. Gimbel, 1997 ME 50, ¶¶ 6, 13, 691 A.2d 664 (same). [¶36] The judgment did not unambiguously grant the counselor authority to determine Pearson’s rights of contact with the children. Rather, pursuant to the judgment, a contact schedule would be developed “through this [therapeutic reunification] process,” in which both parties would engage with a counselor. This arrangement is materially different from the one vacated in Knight, where a third person alone would have ultimately controlled whether the father could have any contact with his children. Here, in contrast, the creation of a contact schedule is to be the product of a cooperative venture in which the parties themselves are among the principals. 20 [¶37] Additionally, the judgment assigns specific responsibility to Wendell to ensure that Pearson has contact with the children. This further demonstrates that the court did not give decision-making authority to the counselor, but rather that the counselor’s role would be to “guide[]” the parties to a breakthrough in their conflict and to develop a capacity to co-parent effectively, including establishing Pearson’s rights of contact. Therefore, even if the judgment is ambiguous because the internal dynamics of the process leading to a contact schedule were not fully explained, the judgment can be reasonably construed in a way that does not run afoul of our holding in Knight. Accordingly, we conclude that the court’s creative approach to formulating a contact schedule was not error. 4. Constitutional Rights of the Children [¶38] Relying on Miller v. Miller, 677 A.2d 64 (Me. 1996), Pearson argues that the court’s best interest determination impinged on the children’s constitutional right to procedural due process because of the judgment’s effect on their familial relationships. [¶39] In Miller, the minor children of parties to a divorce action sought to become parties so that they would have an opportunity to advocate in favor of their “custodial interest[s].” Id. at 68-70. We held that the children did not have a constitutional right to be joined as parties based on their their right to procedural due process because “any” constitutional interest they might have would be 21 satisfied by the participation of a guardian ad litem, who would promote their best interests pursuant to the standards set out in 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(5) (Supp. 1995), even if the guardian ad litem’s recommendation were inconsistent with the children’s own preferences. Miller, 677 A.2d at 69-70. [¶40] Our discussion in Miller does not support Pearson’s claim. First, Miller did not hold that children of divorcing parents have the constitutional right to participate as a party would. See id. at 70; see also Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.3[6] at 6-34 (8th ed. 2013). Second, even if such a right exists, it is fulfilled by the court’s overarching best interest analysis, in which the children’s preference is one of many factors, none of which is dispositive. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(C); Knight, 680 A.2d at 1038 (holding that a child’s preference regarding parental contact is not “determinative” of the best interest analysis and that a court must “assess [a child’s] best interest in light of” all statutory factors); Levy, Maine Family Law § 6.3[2] at 6-12 to 6-26. Here, as the court expressly confirmed, it made a determination of the children’s best interests after giving full consideration to the factors set out in section 1653(3). During the trial, the parties presented considerable evidence that reflected, either directly or indirectly, the children’s preferences about where they wanted to live and the nature of the contact they wanted to have with the respective parties. This allowed the court to take those preferences into account to the extent that the parties chose to present 22 such evidence. Finally, while Miller discussed the role of a guardian ad litem, Pearson makes clear in his brief that he is not arguing that the court was required to appoint a guardian ad litem for the final hearing. [¶41] We therefore conclude that because the court’s decision to grant sole parental rights and responsibilities to Wendell was predicated on a best interest analysis, the judgment did not violate any constitutional interest the children may have.