Opinion ID: 1107969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Prison Physicians

Text: We turn now to McFadden's claims against Dave Newton, prison physician and defendants Cabanero and Cox, physicians at the Mississippi Department of Corrections hospital. McFadden charges that the doctors have breached duties owed under Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-3-17 [6] and 41-3-59 [7] (1972). In an analogous case, Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689 (Miss. 1984), a widow of a factory worker who had been prescribed medication in order to prevent the spread of tuberculosis brought action under the wrongful death statute against physician (employee of the State Board of Health). The trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants  as distinguished from dismissal on the pleadings  was upheld by this court, ultimately because the physician's acts were found to be within his discretionary authority, so that his qualified immunity was not pierced. Hudson, 462 So.2d at 690. In affirming we reasoned that the discretion given to the defendants applied, not only to their decisions with reference to instituting a program of control, but also to the treatment administered in carrying out such policies. This was the part of an overall scheme designed for the public good to prevent the possibility of the spread of tuberculosis in the community. Besides, the administration of medical treatment involves the exercise of considerable professional judgment and hence discretion. Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d at 696. The plaintiff in Hudson had asserted facts sufficient only for negligent medical malpractice, insufficient as a matter of law to pierce the veil of the qualified public official immunity of these defendants performing their discretionary functions. The plaintiff asserted nothing which would suggest malice, willful wrongs or acts by these defendants substantially outside their official authority. Hudson, 462 So.2d at 696. More recently the Court addressed the point in Marshall v. Chawla, 520 So.2d 1374 (Miss. 1988). There, decedent's heirs sued an eleemosynary hospital, its Board and Doctor for the death of a patient. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss because of immunity. This court wrote: The legislature may, by prescribing specific duties of individual state employees, implicitly create tort liability for breaches of them resulting from gross negligence. But no such statute exists for state medical employees. Marshall v. Chawla, 520 So.2d 1374 (Miss 1988). This reaffirmation of Hudson 's grant of immunity to state medical staff appears quite broad. We return now to the allegations of the complaint. The gravamen of the complaint appears not to be a charge of medical malpractice against these doctors, with a possible exception of defendant Newton, who is charged with failing to vaccinate Frederick Marks for communicable diseases upon his entry into the MDOC. Rather, the charge is that these defendants owed a duty of reasonable care to protect McFadden from active tuberculosis and that they breached that duty by confining McFadden and housing him with an inmate who was suffering from active tuberculosis. It is not at all clear that these defendants had any duty or authority with respect to the housing and placement of inmates. Nevertheless, in the present state of the proceedings we do not think we should infer that a recommendation from one or more of these defendants that Marks be placed in isolation would have gone unheeded. We regard the likelihood of McFadden making proof of intentionally tortious conduct by these defendants and toward him necessary of recovery as quite slight. Still, we do not think it may be said that it appears on the face of the complaint beyond reasonable doubt that McFadden can prove no set of facts in support of his claim against these physician/defendants which would entitle him to relief against them. For this reason, the Circuit Court erred when it dismissed the complaint against these defendants. We reiterate: before plaintiff may recover against these defendants, he must show something which would suggest malice, wilful wrongs or acts by these defendants substantially outside their official authority. Hudson, 462 So.2d at 696. Moreover, nothing said here should be taken as a retreat from our holding in Marshall v. Chawla that there is no right of recovery against state medical employees for medical malpractice.