Opinion ID: 1058208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Abolition of Intrafamily Tort Immunity

Text: Until relatively recently, the common law prevented family members from suing each other in tort. Interspousal tort immunity was predicated on the longstanding concept that there was a  unity of interest of husband and wife in each other's respective rights and duties. . . . Davis, 657 S.W.2d at 754 (quoting Tobin v. Gelrich, 162 Tenn. 96, 34 S.W.2d 1058, 1058 (1931)). Parent-child immunity, a more recent development, was based upon the notion of preserving family peace coupled with the parent's right to discipline and control his or her child. See Barranco v. Jackson, 690 S.W.2d 221, 223 (Tenn.1985) (Drowota, J., dissenting). Following the modern trend, this Court eliminated interspousal tort immunity in 1983 in Davis, 657 S.W.2d at 757-58, and greatly limited parent-child immunity eleven years later in Broadwell, 871 S.W.2d at 476-77. One practical effect of intrafamily tort immunity was to act as a sort of exclusionary clause. If a husband's negligent operation of the family auto inflicted injuries on the wife, for example, the wife simply could not bring suit against the husband to collect on the auto liability policy. In Davis , this Court acknowledged that abolition of spousal immunity would affect insurance coverage, suggesting that, to the extent that insurance companies may fear collusive actions, they have the right to protect themselves by either restricting the scope of their coverage or adjusting premiums accordingly. 657 S.W.2d at 758 (quoting Luna v. Clayton, 655 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tenn.1983)); see also Dockins, 764 S.W.2d at 530 (the Legislature ha[s] not required the carrier to provide coverage in situations that it unquestionably could exclude from liability coverage, namely, injuries to the insured caused by his own negligence or that of a family member or permittee.). Notwithstanding this Court's statements in Davis and Dockins , Purkey argues that the abolition of intrafamily tort immunity makes it impermissible to treat family members as a single unit for automobile tort purposes. Because household and family exclusions in automobile insurance policies essentially restore the immunity between family members, she argues that they must be void in light of Davis and Broadwell , unless the Legislature has acted specifically to permit them. She argues that because the Legislature has not so acted, the exclusions violate Tennessee public policy as expressed in the Financial Responsibility Law. We turn next to an examination of that law.