Opinion ID: 1978898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defects in order.

Text: Defendant contends that the order of the department is defective in that it does not disclose the statutory reasons for the conclusion that the discharge of defendant would be dangerous to the public. Sec. 975.13, Stats., reads in part as follows:  If the department is of the opinion that discharge of a person from its control ... would be dangerous to the public for reasons set forth in s. 975.14, it shall make an order directing that he remain subject to its control . . . . Sec. 975.14 (2), Stats., requires the court to find that discharge from the control of the department would be dangerous to the public because of the person's mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality before the department's order can be confirmed. Defendant therefore argues that the order of the department should have specified that he was dangerous to the public because of his mental or physical deficiency, disorder or abnormality. We see no merit to this contention. The statutes do not specifically require the department to repeat the statutory language in its order; it is sufficient if the department's order informs defendant that the department believes his release would be dangerous to the public. Furthermore, there is absolutely no showing of any respect in which defendant was prejudiced by the absence of the statutory language from the order. Therefore, even if this could be considered error, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also contends that the order was a nullity because it made reference to sec. 975.13, Stats., rather than the predecessor statute, sec. 959.15 (13), Stats. 1967, which governs prosecutions commenced prior to July 1, 1970. However, as noted in Peterson v. State (1972), 54 Wis. 2d 370, 377, 378, 195 N. W. 2d 837, since the new statute is merely a renumbering of the old, with no material changes in the statutory language, the argument is without merit.