Opinion ID: 2062660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Imposition of a Greater Sentence After Post-Conviction Relief

Text: Linthicum argues the trial court erred by denying a motion to dismiss the habitual offender charge and by subsequently adding thirty years to his twenty-year robbery sentence. He contends that Rule PC 1, § 10, Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies, bars the assessment of a greater sentence after a successful post-conviction action. In light of the timing of this case, we agree. On April 1, 1982, when Linthicum filed for post-conviction relief, Rule PC 1, § 10, read: (a) If prosecution is initiated against a petitioner who has successfully sought relief under this Rule and a conviction is subsequently obtained, or (b) If a sentence has been set aside pursuant to this Rule and the successful petitioner is to be resentenced, then the sentencing court shall not impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed.... [1] This section protects important due process rights. A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue post-conviction remedies without apprehension that the State will retaliate by ... subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2102-2103, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, 634-635 (1974). In this case, as in Perry, there is no evidence that the prosecutor acted maliciously or in bad faith. This Court's objective, however, has been the removal of impediments which may deter a person from appealing a conviction: The intent of Section 10 is to assure that the avenue provided by the sections of the rule preceding it may be freely traversed. This does not come to pass if the would-be petitioner, in order to utilize the rule, must pay the toll of risking a penalty more severe than the one he is presently under. Ballard v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 482, 501, 318 N.E.2d 798, 810. The imposition of a greater sentence following post-conviction relief implicates due process even in the absence of prosecutorial abuse. After Linthicum filed for post-conviction relief but before this Court granted his petition, the legislature adopted Ind. Code § 35-50-1-5 (Burns 1985 Repl.), which provides: If: (1) Prosecution is initiated against a petitioner who has successfully sought relief under any proceeding for post-conviction remedy and a conviction is subsequently obtained; or (2) A sentence has been set aside under a post-conviction remedy and the successful petitioner is to be resentenced; the sentencing court may impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed. 1984 Ind. Acts, P.L. 179, § 3 (effective February 29, 1984). Linthicum urges that we declare this statute unconstitutional as a violation of due process. To its credit, the State acknowledges that Rule PC 1, § 10(a), barred imposition on remand of a sentence higher than Linthicum originally received. We see no need to rule on the constitutionality of Ind. Code § 35-50-1-5 because the recent amendments to Rule PC 1, § 10, make the two consistent. The statute provides that a sentencing court may impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed and the Rule outlines the procedural conditions under which that may be done. Because Rule PC 1, § 10, barred a greater sentence, we vacate the the habitual offender finding and remand to the trial court for correction of sentence.