Opinion ID: 1860418
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lesser Included Offense Pertaining to First-Degree Rape

Text: Appellant's final insufficiency argument regarding the first-degree rape charge for the bathroom incident, alleges that there was insufficient evidence to support an instruction on the lesser included offense of third-degree rape. We address this issue as it is capable of repetition. However, the issue was not properly preserved, so we will review it under the palpable error standard. RCr 10.26. During trial, C.O. testified to numerous consensual sex acts and one non-consensual sex act. The non-consensual act happened in the bathroom of Appellant's home. C.O. had refused to have sex with Appellant, but Appellant refused to take no for an answer. C.O. locked herself in the bathroom in an attempt to stop Appellant's sexual advances. Unfortunately, Appellant was nonetheless able to gain access to the bathroom. C.O. continued to tell Appellant that she did not want to have sex, but she was overpowered. C.O. testified that she told him no, and told him to stop, but he did not and eventually penetrated her. The trial court instructed the jury on both first and third-degree rape for this incident. Rape in the first degree, however, occurs when the defendant engages in sexual intercourse with another: (1) by forcible compulsion; or (2) who is incapable of consent because they are physically helpless or less than twelve years old. KRS 510.040 (emphasis added). Rape in the third degree occurs when a defendant has consensual sexual intercourse with another person who is: (1) mentally retarded; (2) less than sixteen years old, when the defendant is twenty-one years old or more. ... KRS 510.060 (emphasis added). C.O.'s testimony was the only evidence admitted at trial. She testified that the intercourse was non-consensual, and Appellant testified that he never had sexual contact with CO. An instruction on a lesser included offense is required only if, considering the totality of the evidence, the jury might have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of the greater offense, and yet believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the lesser offense. Houston v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Ky.1998) ( quoting Wombles v. Commonwealth, 831 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Ky.1992)) (emphasis added). We note, however, that it has long been held that the trier of fact has the right to believe the evidence presented by one litigant in preference to another. King v. McMillan, 293 Ky. 399, 169 S.W.2d 10 (1943). The trier of fact may believe any witness in whole or in part. Webb Transfer Lines, Inc. v. Taylor, 439 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Ky.1968). The trier of fact may also take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including the credibility of the witness. Hayes v. Hayes, 357 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Ky.1962). Therefore, having weighed the evidence in this case, the jury was entitled to believe the sexual encounter at issue was not forcible rape. It was within the jury's province to conclude Appellant and C.O. had consensual sex while she was under the age of consent, especially given the numerous consensual sexual encounters to which C.O. testified. Thus, under any standard, there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of third-degree rape.