Opinion ID: 1730571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant's Confession

Text: The court of appeal rested its ruling (that the trial court had erred in not excluding Green's confession) solely upon the expert testimony of Dr. Marc Zimmerman, the forensic psychologist who testified at the hearing on defendant's motion to reopen his motion to suppress. [6] Specifically, the court of appeal found that [g]iven the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Zimmerman establishing defendant's mental retardation and his brain dysfunction, we cannot find that the defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights. Green, supra, 634 So.2d at 508. It is this finding of the court of appeal, that Melvin Green was at the time of his confession mentally incapable of understanding and consequently giving a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, which we now scrutinize.
The trial court found, and the court of appeal did not dispute, that the defendant's confession was a voluntary one. Before a criminal defendant's confession may be admitted into evidence, the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. [7] The voluntariness requirement, which antedates the Miranda rule, is a component of the fundamental fairness which is guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) ( listing cases ). In cases, such as this one, which involve allegations of diminished mental capacity, although the defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of any mental abnormality which might render his confession per se involuntary, in the absence of such a showing the State retains the ultimate burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary. State v. Brooks, 92-3331, Slip. Op. P. 12 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 366, 373. See also State v. Napier, 385 So.2d 776 (La.1980). In all cases, regardless of the applicable burden of proof, courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding a confession to determine its voluntariness. See Withrow v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1745, 1754, 123 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), re'hg denied ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 3066, 125 L.Ed.2d 748 (1993) (listing factors relevant to voluntariness inquiry); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) ( same ). The only issue presented to us by the opinion of the court of appeal, however, concerns the defendant's ability to comprehend his Miranda rights. We have noted in the past that in cases involving mental retardation the question of a confession's voluntariness often becomes enmeshed in the related, but distinct, question of the knowing and intelligent nature of the defendant's Miranda waiver. Brooks, supra, at P. 12, 648 So.2d at 373, citing State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466, 472 (La.1981) ( citations omitted ). However, the current posture of this case makes it unnecessary for us to engage in an extensive discussion of the voluntariness issue. Because our review of the record reveals no reason to disturb the lower courts' findings regarding the voluntariness of Green's confession, we affirm the lower courts' judgment that Green's confession was voluntarily made and proceed to our discussion of Green's Miranda waiver.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), re'hg denied, 385 U.S. 890, 87 S.Ct. 11, 17 L.Ed.2d 121 (1966), the United States Supreme Court declared that a condition precedent to obtaining a statement admissible in court from a suspect in police custody is that the suspect be informed that he has the right to remain silent and to consult with an attorney. Miranda also made it clear that for such a statement to be admissible it must be made with a knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights. Miranda, supra, at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1602. In other words, for a statement which is the product of custodial interrogation to be entered into evidence against a criminal defendant, at the time the statement is made the defendant must understand that he is entitled to certain protections under the law and nevertheless decide to speak. Even when a defendant has not expressly invoked his rights under Miranda, [8] [t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Furthermore, it is well-settled that a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470, 100 S.Ct. 652, 653, 62 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980). When, as in this case, a defendant has expressly waived his Miranda rights, the question becomes whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent ... under the totality of the circumstances. Abadie, supra, 612 So.2d at 5, quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2834, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). This totality of the circumstances includes the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 647, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 1344, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984), quoting Butler, supra, 441 U.S. at 374-375, 99 S.Ct. at 1757-1759. See also State v. Wilson, 467 So.2d 503 (La. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 911, 106 S.Ct. 281, 88 L.Ed.2d 246 (1985); re'hg denied, 474 U.S. 1027, 106 S.Ct. 585, 88 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (diminished intellectual capacity of defendant only a factor to be considered in determining whether Miranda waiver knowing and intelligent). In reviewing the correctness of a trial judge's ruling on a motion to suppress a confession, we are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing(s) on this motion, but rather may consider all pertinent evidence adduced at trial. State v. Brooks, 92-3331, Slip Op. P. 10 (La. 1/17/95), 648 So.2d 366, 372, citing State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1223 n. 2 (La.1979) ( listing cases ). We examine this evidence in order to discern whether the testimony of the State's witnesses, when viewed in light of the entire record, was sufficient to sustain the State's heavy burden of proving a knowing and intelligent waiver. We do not review the record de novo, however; as we have often stated in the past, because the evaluation of witness credibility often plays such a large part in the context of a motion to suppress a confession, reviewing courts should defer to the finding of the trial judge unless his finding is not adequately supported by reliable evidence. Brooks, supra, at 11, 648 So.2d at 372; State v. Nuccio, 454 So.2d 93, 100 (La. 1984); State v. Thornton, 351 So.2d 480, 484 (La.1977).
The State presented the testimony of Detective McCord during the first motion to suppress, and Detectives Catalonotto and Demma during Green's trial. All of these detectives were experienced detectives, having each spent a number of years in the Homicide Division. The detectives consistently testified that Green was Mirandized on a number of occasions and that at no time did he articulate or in any other way evidence any lack of comprehension of his rights to remain silent or to have an attorney present. Contrast State ex rel. White v. State, 606 So.2d 787 (La.1992) (inconsistent testimony of interrogating officers regarding defendant's Miranda waiver rendered their testimony incredible). Furthermore, in addition to his multiple verbal waivers of his Miranda rights, prior to making his first tape-recorded statement Green signed a rights of arrestee form which included a clause providing for a waiver of his rights. [9] In addition, there is the testimony of Melvin Green himself through the medium of the two tape-recorded statements which were played in the trial court. These recordings clearly indicate that Green was read his rights prior to each recorded statement, and that prior to the second statement Detective Demma repeated the Miranda warnings twice, pointedly inquiring whether Green understood these rights. See State v. Nicholas, 319 So.2d 365 (La.1975) (police officer's careful explanation of Miranda rights to retarded defendant factor in determining if waiver knowing and intelligent). On each occasion Green expressly waived his rights, choosing to talk to the police officers rather than to remain silent. The only evidence presented in rebuttal to the State's proof was the testimony of Dr. Zimmerman. Dr. Zimmerman, who was qualified as an expert in forensic psychology, testified that he spent approximately nine (9) hours with Green, during which time he interviewed Green and administered a battery of psychological tests. [10] Zimmerman found Green's Intelligence Quotient (Weschler) to be around 65, making him mildly retarded but educable. [11] Zimmerman placed Green's mental age at around ten (10) years old, and diagnosed Green as suffering from brain dysfunction. [12] Discussing the parameters of Green's brain dysfunction, Zimmerman stated that the regions of Green's brain most impaired were those that are most associated with academic abilities and with his ability to process information, his intellectual abilities. In particular, Zimmerman found Green's concepts and receptive speech, i.e. the ability to understand what is said to an individual, to be impaired. As part of the psychological evaluation, Zimmerman had Green read parts of the rights of arrestee form, specifically the parts addressing the rights that he was giving up. After perceiving that Green was encountering difficulties understanding the form, Zimmerman read parts of the form to Green, purportedly at the same speed as the form had been read to Green by Detective Demma. Zimmerman testified that Green was unable to comprehend the form read at that speed, and that in any case certain key words, such as privilege or waiver, were not readily understood by Green. While Zimmerman felt that Green had been unable to understand his Miranda rights as read to him by the interrogating detectives, he did believe that Green could be made to understand his rights if we changed some of the wording and brought it down to a lower level vocabulary. Zimmerman also noted that many persons with Green's mental capacity tended to avow comprehension of things which they in fact failed to understand, for fear of being regarded as different from their peers. On cross-examination, Zimmerman reiterated that Green was educable and could be made to comprehend concepts that he was not, at least initially, readily able to grasp. Zimmerman stated that he was aware that Green had been arrested, and convicted, for criminal activity before, and that he assumed that the Miranda rights were given to him before. Zimmerman was unaware that Green had been Boykinized on previous occasions. The trial court denied the defendant's pretrial motion to reopen the motion to suppress, refusing to address again the question of whether Green's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and intelligent. The trial judge, specifically noting that Green had been Boykinized twice before and arrested and Mirandized on numerous other occasions, found that this defendant understood his rights. We find that the State met its burden of proof in this case. The trial judge evidently credited the testimony of the police officers, in particular their experienced opinion that Green knew what he was doing when he waived his rights and started to speak. See Withrow, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1755 (there is little reason to believe that the police today are unable, or even generally unwilling, to satisfy Miranda's requirements). Furthermore, the progress of Green's interrogation supports this view of the defendant's understanding of the interrogation process and his willingness to speak. Green's first statements to the police represented an attempt to extricate himself from culpability for the murder, and the evolution of his statements over time, in response to new facts presented Green by the detectives, reveals a mental agility and adaptability which cannot be readily associated with the diminished mental capacity found by the court of appeal. Compare State v. Penns, 407 So.2d 678, 681 (La.1981) (defendant's claimed retardation does not support a contention of low intelligence ... but rather shows the actions of an intelligent mind seeking to avoid the consequences of confessing). This view is bolstered by the extent to which extrinsic facts, i.e. the location of the gun, the details of the crime scene, etc., corroborated Green's ultimate confession. [13] Compare Brooks, supra, 648 So.2d at 375 (extrinsic corroboration is an additional factor to consider in evaluating the clarity of [a defendant's] mental processes at the time of his confession). In so stating, we emphasize that the object of our present inquiry is not the accuracy of Green's confession, but rather Green's ability to comprehend his rights to remain silent and have an attorney present during his custodial interrogation. However, when faced with a claim that the defendant's mental processes are so dysfunctional as to preclude a full understanding of those rights, any facts which shed light upon the functioning of that defendant's mental processes are relevant and pertinent evidence which the trial court is entitled to consider. See State v. David, 425 So.2d 1241 (La.1983) (circumstances surrounding confession showed defendant in control of his mental faculties despite having consumed alcohol and valium prior to confessing). In this case, Green's capacity to accurately recall specific details of the crime scene, as well as his attempt to manipulate the progress of the interrogation towards a result favorable to him, are both factors which bear upon the defendant's ability to understand his Miranda rights. See State v. Simpson, 629 So.2d 468, 473 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), discussing State v. Daniel, 378 So.2d 1361 (La.1979); State v. Taylor, 490 So.2d 459 (La.App. 4 Cir.1986), writ denied, 496 So.2d 344 (La. 1986). The trial court also relied in part upon Green's familiarity with the criminal justice process in finding that he understood exactly what he was giving up when he waived his Miranda rights. Such a reliance was proper, since it cast Green not in the light of a naive young man suddenly injected into a foreign environment, but rather showed that Green's custodial interrogation was an experience to which he was not a stranger. In addition, insofar as Green's criminal history, particularly his prior Boykinizations, indicated repeated exposure to his Miranda rights, this familiarity is relevant to the trial judge's appreciation of Green's understanding of his rights. Compare State v. Brogdon, 426 So.2d 158 (La.1983), appeal after remand, 457 So.2d 616 (La.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2345, 85 L.Ed.2d 862 (1985) (fact that defendant was read his Miranda rights five times relevant to voluntariness of his confession). The defense suggested at oral argument that the trial court's strong reliance upon the prior Miranda warnings and Boykinizations is impermissible, and cited as support for this proposition State v. McGinnis, 413 So.2d 1307 (La.1981) ( on rehearing ). In McGinnis we held, in the context of a prior Boykinization, that [s]imply because the defendant was advised of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination in a different court on a different charge in 1972 does not assure that the defendant intentionally relinquished a known constitutional right or privilege four years later in this case. McGinnis, supra, 413 So.2d at 1311. We went on to note that [t]o conclude otherwise would be to presume a waiver of a constitutional right by an accused from a silent record, which is clearly impermissible. Id. In this case, unlike McGinnis, there is no question as to whether the defendant waived any constitutional rights. Green expressly waived his rights, both by signing the rights of arrestee form and orally on a number of occasions, including at the beginning of both tape-recorded statements. Our inquiry involves his understanding of those rights, and consequently whether or not the defendant's express waiver was a knowing and intelligent one. While it may be true that, as defendant argues in brief, prior history with the criminal judicial system alone has never been considered a valid basis for determining the admissibility of a confession, that history is certainly a part of the totality of the circumstances which a trial judge may consider in determining a defendant's comprehension of his Miranda rights. Green's prior experiences with the criminal justice system are relevant to this inquiry because they show that Green in the past has on numerous occasions been informed of his constitutional rights against self-incrimination and to counsel, both by law enforcement and judicial officers. One of the ways that people are educated and gain an understanding of things is through repetition, through repeated exposure, and it was permissible for the trial court to read Green's Miranda waivers, in the light of this record, against Green's criminal history and to conclude that at some point Green became aware that he did not have to respond when questioned by the police and that if he desired an attorney one would be appointed for him. [14] We therefore reject the submission that the number of times that a defendant has been confronted with the exercise of his Miranda rights is irrelevant to his understanding them. Rather, Green's prior experiences are another factor the trial judge legitimately considered in determining whether Green understood his rights prior to waiving them.
The court of appeal erred in crediting Dr. Zimmerman's testimony over that of the other evidence presented in this case. We have often noted that expert testimony is not controlling, and that, while helpful, it may be rejected by the trier-of-fact. State v. Lefevre, 419 So.2d 862 (La.1982). In this case, the trial court clearly disagreed with Dr. Zimmerman's opinion that Green was unable to comprehend his Miranda rights, finding the proffer made by the defense too insubstantial to even warrant reopening the motion to suppress. While the court of appeal's statement that Dr. Zimmerman's testimony was uncontradicted is in some sense true, the court of appeal improperly ignored the trial judge's finding that the impact of Dr. Zimmerman's testimony was insufficient to warrant a reversal of his prior ruling that the State had met its burden of proof for admitting the confession. [15] While the trial court below was not free to capriciously reject the testimony of Dr. Zimmerman, the record reveals that the trial judge's disagreement with Dr. Zimmerman's ultimate opinion that Green was incapable of understanding his Miranda rights is adequately supported by the record. Dr. Zimmerman testified that Green was only mildly retarded, a condition he stated was shared by around 3% of the population. See State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 689, 696 (La. 1982) ( citations omitted ) (even moderate mental retardation and low intelligence or illiteracy do not of themselves vitiate the ability to knowingly and intelligently waive constitutional rights). Dr. Zimmerman further testified that Green was educable, and that he could be made to understand such things as his Miranda rights. It is conceivable that the trial court accepted Dr. Zimmerman's testimony and found that Green's prior encounters with the criminal justice system, which he specifically referred to in denying the defense's proffer to reopen the suppression hearing, had constituted just such a learning process. In addition, we note that Dr. Zimmerman testified that he spent only nine (9) hours with Green, much of it occupied in giving the defendant various psychological tests. When testimony such as Dr. Zimmerman's is considered, it must be remembered that it is not only the reliability of the psychological expert's opinion which is at stake, but the credibility of the defendant as well. Compare Brooks, supra at 14-15, 648 So.2d at 374 (defendant characterized as a malingerer... capable of selectively exercising discernment when it suited his purposes). Furthermore, the defense presented no hard medical evidence, e.g. psychiatric testimony, skull x-rays, cat scans, electroencephalogram results or other tangible diagnostic evidence of brain damage, to substantiate Dr. Zimmerman's opinion. Compare Brooks, supra at 14 n. 12, 648 So.2d at 374 n. 12 (psychiatric testimony linking defendant's alleged mental retardation to birth trauma). The trial court did not abuse his discretion in finding that Green was able to understand his rights, and therefore knowingly and intelligently waive them.
For these reasons, we find that the court of appeal erred in concluding that Melvin Green's waiver of his Miranda rights was not a knowing and intelligent one. In particular, the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's finding when there was ample evidence in the record to support it. The confession was properly admitted during the guilt phase of Melvin Green's trial.