Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shigemura's Out-of-court Statement

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defense hearsay objections to the testimony of Steven Baldwin relating out-of-court statements by Denise Shigemura. Baldwin testified that on the day after Holloway's murder, defendant and Shigemura came to his house with Mark Schmidt. As the four of them sat together in the living room, Shigemura said to Baldwin: I no longer need what it was I asked you for. We took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Park. Baldwin testified that he thought Shigemura was referring to a conversation a few days earlier during which she had asked him if he could get her a gat because she had a problem she needed to take care of. The trial court admitted this evidence under the adoptive admissions exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence of a statement offered against a party is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is one of which the party, with knowledge of the content thereof, has by words or other conduct manifested his adoption or his belief in its truth. (Evid.Code, § 1221.) When a defendant remains silent after a statement alleging the defendant's participation in a crime, under circumstances that fairly afford the defendant an opportunity to hear, understand, and reply, the statement is admissible as an adoptive admission, unless the circumstances support an inference that the defendant was relying on the right of silence guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1189, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 741, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485.) Denise Shigemura's out-of-court statementWe took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Parkwas admissible as an adoptive admission by defendant. He must have heard and understood the statement because he was sitting on the same couch with Shigemura, the circumstances called for a denial or protest if the statement was inaccurate, nothing prevented him from making a response, and nothing supports an inference that he was relying on a constitutional right of silence. In this situation, the jury could properly view defendant's silence as adopting Shigemura's statement. Defendant claims that admission of this evidence violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. He did not, however, make a specific objection on constitutional grounds at trial. Assuming without deciding that the issue is preserved for appellate review (see People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, fn. 6, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93; see also People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 35 Cal. Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765), the claim is without merit. The right of confrontation is not violated when the jury hears evidence, from a witness subject to cross-examination, relating a defendant's own out-of-court statements and adoptive admissions. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 711, fn. 25, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289; People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 842-843, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) As defendant points out, he was not present a few days before when Shigemura asked Baldwin for a gat and said she needed it to take care of a problem, so this earlier statement was not admissible as an adoptive admission. The request for the gun, by itself, was not hearsay, however, because an out-of-court statement is hearsay only when it is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. (Evid. Code, § 1200.) Because a request, by itself, does not assert the truth of any fact, it cannot be offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. (See People v. Mayfield, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 741, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [pleas for help were not hearsay because they were not admitted for the truth of the matter stated]; People v. Bolden (1996) 44 Cal. App.4th 707, 714-715, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 [request that defendant not come around the house anymore was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of matter stated]; People v. Reyes (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 53, 67, 132 Cal.Rptr. 848 [words of direction or authorization do not constitute hearsay since they are not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted by such words].) Thus, Shigemura's request for a gun was not hearsay. Shigemura's earlier out-of-court statement to Baldwin was hearsay insofar as it asserted that Shigemura had a problem that she needed to take care of. The Attorney General argues that it was admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule (Evid.Code, § 1223) because it was made to further a conspiracy between defendant, Shigemura, and Brian Johnsen to kill Doug Mynatt. There was no substantial evidence at trial, however, that these three individuals reached any agreement to kill Doug Mynatt until the evening of May 15, 1991, shortly before Holloway's murder, whereas Shigemura's statement to Baldwin occurred a day or two earlier. Accordingly, this statement was not admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, and the trial court erred in not excluding it. Even if we assume this error violated defendant's right of confrontation under the federal Constitution, reversal is not required because defendant suffered no prejudice. Shigemura repeated the substance of the earlier hearsay statement (that she had a problem she needed to take care of) in defendant's presence (We took care of the problem and we dumped the body at Balboa Park) and defendant by his conduct adopted that statement as his own. We conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.