Opinion ID: 1296862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: right to be represented by counsel

Text: Appellant claims that he was deprived of his right to have counsel. The State argues that Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to have counsel, asserted his right to represent himself, never waived his right to represent himself, and never reasserted his right to be represented by counsel. A defendant has a constitutional right to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself at criminal trial. However, to be valid, the trial judge must ensure that the waiver of counsel is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. United States v. McConnell, 749 F.2d 1441, 1450-51 (10th Cir.1984) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Ideally, the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se. United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1388 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1200, 117 L.Ed.2d 440 (1992) (some citations omitted). The district court's failure to conduct a complete inquiry on the record into the defendant's understanding does not require reversal when the surrounding facts and circumstances, including [the defendant's] background and conduct, demonstrate that [the defendant] actually understood his right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation and knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. 941 F.2d at 1389. [A] defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). When Appellant asserted his right to represent himself, the district court did not formally make the findings described in WYO. STAT. § 7-6-107 (1987). [1] The district court asked Appellant about his prior trial experience; asked him what he knew about the rules of evidence, including hearsay evidence and using evidence to impeach witnesses; and asked him how he planned to investigate his case while he was in jail without having the assistance of counsel. The colloquy continued with the following exchange: THE COURT: How do you expect to defend yourself effectively, by playing it by ear? MR. VAN RIPER: The court will have to go ahead and convict me, and I'll address it on appeal. It's just that simple. THE COURT: Very well. I'm going to let you defend yourself in this case. I don't thinkI think you are a fool, but if you insist and persist to defend yourself, I have no choice but to let you do that. Although Appellant had never conducted a trial before, he had pleaded guilty in at least one other case without having the assistance of counsel, and he had been convicted of at least three other offenses which were related to vehicle thefts. He filed twenty-six motions and other documents on his own before trial which included a formal notice that he would represent himself. In the notice, he stated that he was forty-five years old, and he claimed that he was college educated and that he had completed a course in paralegal science. Under these circumstances, Appellant's initial decision to waive his right to be represented by counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Willie, 941 F.2d at 1389. Cf. United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 980 n. 7 (10th Cir.1991) (defendant was not so much interested in defending against the crimes charged as he was in trying to inject trial error into the proceedings which could result in reversal on appeal). Once he had asserted his right to represent himself, Appellant never requested to have appointed counsel, although he was experienced at requesting counsel since at his initial appearance he had requested and received appointed counsel. See WYO.STAT. § 7-6-104(d) (Supp.1993). Appellant declined the district court's offer to obtain counsel for him. After Appellant asserted his right to represent himself, the court had no duty to appoint counsel in the absence of a timely and affirmative request for counsel. Such a duty would require the district court to read the defendant's mind and would enable a defendant to play a cat and mouse game with the district court. See Treff, 924 F.2d at 979. Appellant suggests that the district court had a duty to appoint standby counsel. To force an attorney on a defendant who has asserted his right to represent himself constitutes reversible error. Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221, 224 (Wyo.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 842, 98 S.Ct. 139, 54 L.Ed.2d 106 (1977). See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Of course, a State mayeven over objection by the accusedappoint a standby counsel to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46. See, e.g., Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574 (Wyo.1988). The appointment of standby counsel is not mandatory. See Sanchez v. Mondragon, 858 F.2d 1462, 1463 n. 3 (10th Cir.1988), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Allen, 895 F.2d 1577 (10th Cir.1990). Appellant expressly assumed the responsibility for obtaining another attorney. The district court warned him before trial about the consequences which could result if he failed to obtain counsel. While the district court had the discretion to appoint standby counsel, its failure to do so in this case did not constitute an abuse of that discretion. Appellant asserts that the district court erred by failing to question why he discharged his attorneys. When a defendant discharges his attorney and elects to proceed on his own, the district court has a duty to ensure that the defendant is not proceeding on his own merely because his attorney was unprepared or incompetent. United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 248-49 (10th Cir. 1989). An inquiry about the defendant's reasons for being dissatisfied with his counsel is not required when the defendant otherwise states his reasons on the record. Willie, 941 F.2d at 1391. Appellant replaced the Public Defender with private counsel; therefore, the district court did not have a duty to inquire about Appellant's reasons for being dissatisfied with the Public Defender. Appellant did not complain about his private counsel's performance in his notice that he would represent himself. At that time, his only stated reason for discharging his attorney was that he was unable to access his savings account... in order to pay the agreed upon retainer [fee]. The district court did not have any reason to believe that Appellant had decided to proceed on his own because his attorney was incompetent or unprepared. [2] Silkwood, 893 F.2d at 248-49. The district court, therefore, did not have a duty to question Appellant about his motives for wanting to represent himself.