Opinion ID: 4247223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: Alleyne v. United States In Alleyne, the defendant (Alleyne) was charged with using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, as well as other federal offenses, arising from the robbery of a store manager. 570 U.S. at 103. The applicable statute provided that anyone who uses or carries a firearm in relation to a crime of 6. Our decision in Falcon did not address the applicability of Alleyne to chapter 2014-220 because neither party raised the issue. -9- violence shall be sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison. Id. However, if the firearm is brandished, the statute mandated a minimum sentence of seven years’ incarceration. Id. at 104. The jury convicted Alleyne and indicated on the verdict form that he used or carried a firearm; however, the jury did not indicate a finding that the firearm was brandished. Id. The trial court found that the evidence supported a finding of brandishing and imposed a seven-year sentence on this count. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. Id. On certiorari review, the United States Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment with respect to the sentence on the count of using or carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of violence and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 117-18. The Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for an offense is an “element” which must be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 108. In reaching this holding, the Supreme Court relied upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which it held that any fact that increases the statutory maximum sentence is an “element” of the offense to be found by a jury. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 106; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). - 10 - The Supreme Court explained that “Apprendi’s definition of ‘elements’ necessarily includes not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor. Both kinds of facts alter the prescribed range of sentences to which a defendant is exposed and do so in a manner that aggravates the punishment.” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 108. The Court further stated: [I]t is impossible to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribed floor aggravate the punishment. Elevating the low end of a sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the crime: the defendant’s “expected punishment has increased as a result of the narrowed range” and “the prosecution is empowered, by invoking the mandatory minimum, to require the judge to impose a higher punishment than he might wish.” Apprendi, supra, at 522, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (THOMAS, J., concurring). Why else would Congress link an increased mandatory minimum to a particular aggravating fact other than to heighten the consequences for that behavior? This reality demonstrates that the core crime and the fact triggering the mandatory minimum sentence together constitute a new, aggravated crime, each element of which must be submitted to the jury. [n.2] [N.2.] Juries must find any facts that increase either the statutory maximum or minimum because the Sixth Amendment applies where a finding of fact both alters the legally prescribed range and does so in a way that aggravates the penalty. Importantly, this is distinct from factfinding used to guide judicial discretion in selecting a punishment “within limits fixed by law.” Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949). While such findings of fact may lead judges to select sentences that are more severe than the ones they would have selected without those facts, the Sixth Amendment does not govern that element of sentencing. Id. at 113 (citations omitted). - 11 - The Supreme Court rejected the contention that, because the seven-year sentence could have been imposed without the finding of brandishing, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury was not violated: [T]he essential Sixth Amendment inquiry is whether a fact is an element of the crime. When a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury. It is no answer to say that the defendant could have received the same sentence with or without that fact. It is obvious, for example, that a defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for assault, if the jury only finds the facts for larceny, even if the punishments prescribed for each crime are identical. One reason is that each crime has different elements and a defendant can be convicted only if the jury has found each element of the crime of conviction. Similarly, because the fact of brandishing aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be found by the jury, regardless of what sentence the defendant might have received if a different range had been applicable. Id. at 114-15. Section 775.082(1)(b) The relevant portion of section 775.082(1), Florida Statutes, provides: (b)1. A person who actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age shall be punished by a term of imprisonment for life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. If the court finds that life imprisonment is not an appropriate sentence, such person shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of at least 40 years. A person sentenced pursuant to this subparagraph is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(a). - 12 - 2. A person who did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim and who is convicted under s. 782.04 of a capital felony, or an offense that was reclassified as a capital felony, which was committed before the person attained 18 years of age may be punished by a term of imprisonment for life or by a term of years equal to life if, after a sentencing hearing conducted by the court in accordance with s. 921.1401, the court finds that life imprisonment is an appropriate sentence. A person who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 15 years is entitled to a review of his or her sentence in accordance with s. 921.1402(2)(c). (Emphasis added.) Thus, a finding that a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim results in a minimum sentence of forty years’ imprisonment under subsection (1)(b)1. Without this finding, the trial court is not required to impose a minimum sentence. See § 775.082(1)(b)2., Fla. Stat. Further, under section 921.1402, a finding of actual killing, intent to kill, or attempt to kill entitles a juvenile offender to a sentence review in twenty-five years, whereas without the finding, the juvenile offender is entitled to a sentence review in fifteen years (provided the trial court imposes a sentence greater than fifteen years). § 921.1402(2)(a), (c), Fla. Stat. Because a finding of actual killing, intent to kill, or attempt to kill “aggravates the legally prescribed range of allowable sentences,” Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 115, by increasing the sentencing floor from zero to forty years and lengthening the time before which a juvenile offender is entitled to a sentence review from fifteen to twenty-five years, this finding is an - 13 - “element” of the offense, which Alleyne requires be submitted to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 108.7 The Verdict In this case, the verdict form did not separate out the theories of first-degree murder; therefore, it is unclear whether the jury found Williams guilty of premeditated murder, felony murder, or both. Further, with respect to the offense of first-degree murder, there was no interrogatory on the verdict form as to whether Williams discharged a firearm.8 Based upon the jury instructions given, it cannot be determined from the general verdict form whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins. First, with respect to actual killing, as part of the instruction on premeditated first-degree murder, the jury received an instruction on principals, which allowed it to find Williams guilty even if he did not actually shoot Brookins. The jury was advised: If the defendant helped another person or persons commit a crime, the defendant is a principal and must be treated as if he had done all the things the other person or persons did if, one, the defendant had a conscious intent that the criminal act be done; and, 7. We recede from Falcon to the extent it concludes this determination is to be made by a trial court. 8. The lesser included offenses contained interrogatories. - 14 - two, the defendant did some act or said some word which was intended to and which did incite, cause, encourage, assist, or advise the other person or persons to commit—to actually commit the crime. Moreover, as part of the felony-murder instruction, the jury was instructed based both upon whether Williams was the actual killer or whether someone else shot Brookins: To prove the crime of first-degree felony murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. That James Vincent Brookins is dead. 2. The death occurred as a consequence of and while Rodrick Williams was engaged in the commission of a robbery, an attempted robbery, kidnapping, or an attempted kidnapping. 3. That Rodrick Williams was a person who actually killed James Vincent Brookins, or James Vincent Brookins was killed by a person other than Rodrick Williams but both Rodrick Williams and the person who killed James Vincent Brookins were principals in the commission of a robbery, an attempted robbery, kidnapping, or an attempted kidnapping. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, based upon the instructions given, the general guilty verdict for first-degree murder fails to demonstrate the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams actually killed Brookins. Whether the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams intended to kill Brookins cannot be determined from the verdict either. The jury was instructed under the premeditated theory of first-degree murder that “[k]illing with premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing.” Therefore, regardless of whether - 15 - Williams actually killed Brookins, or was a principal, a finding of intent to kill would have been inherent in a guilty verdict as to first-degree premeditated murder. However, the general verdict form that was used is problematic because the jury was instructed that “[i]n order to convict of first-degree felony murder, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill.” The jury found Williams guilty of the underlying felony of kidnapping. However, with respect to that offense, the jury was instructed as follows: To prove the crime of kidnapping, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. That Rodrick Williams forcibly or by threat confined or abducted or imprisoned James Vincent Brookins against his will. 2. Rodrick Williams had no lawful authority. 3. Rodrick Williams acted with intent to commit or facilitate commission of robbery or attempted robbery . . . . 4. Or inflict bodily harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. (Emphasis added.) Even if the jury found that Williams acted with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon Brookins,9 this does not equate to an intent to kill. 9. During the interrogation, Williams admitted to hitting Brookins with his hands. The jailhouse informant testified that Williams stated he struck Brookins with a gun. - 16 - Based upon the foregoing, and because of the general verdict form with respect to the charge of first-degree murder, there is no clear jury finding that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins. Therefore, an Alleyne violation occurred. Harmless Error Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has addressed whether Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review. We conclude such violations can be harmless. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Supreme Court explained: [T]he “statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted) (quoting 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Criminal Procedure § 87, at 55 (2d ed. 1872)). In Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 215 (2006), the Supreme Court held that Blakely violations are subject to harmless - 17 - error review. See also Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517, 522-23 (Fla. 2007) (“[T]o the extent some of our pre-Apprendi decisions may suggest that the failure to submit factual issues to the jury is not subject to harmless error analysis, Recuenco has superseded them.”). Because Blakely derived from Apprendi, and Blakely errors are subject to harmless error review, we conclude that Alleyne violations can be harmless as well. In Galindez, after concluding that Apprendi violations are subject to harmless error review, this Court delineated the applicable consideration under the facts of that case: Count I charged that “on various occasions” in a four-month period, Galindez “committed an act defined as sexual battery” on a child “by placing his penis in union with . . . and/or penetrating the vagina of A.M. (a minor) with his penis.” Galindez claims that because the charge was made in the alternative (and therefore the jury did not specifically find that penetration was involved), the trial court could assess only 40 points for victim injury. . . . [F]or purposes of our harmless error analysis the issue is whether the failure to have the jury make the victim injury finding as to Count I contributed to the conviction or sentence—in other words, whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found penetration. At trial the young victim, then pregnant by Galindez, testified that she and Galindez engaged in sexual intercourse on multiple occasions over a period of several months. Galindez’s confession confirming these facts, including his admission that they repeatedly had sexual intercourse, was admitted at trial. Finally, Galindez’s defense at trial was that the twelve-year-old victim consented. Thus, Galindez did not dispute the facts of the sexual relationship at trial, and he did not contest them at resentencing, either. - 18 - 955 So. 2d at 523-24 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We concluded that “[i]n light of the clear and uncontested record evidence of penetration,” the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 524. Based upon Galindez, the applicable question in evaluating whether an Alleyne violation is harmful with respect to section 775.082(1)(b) is whether the failure to have the jury make the finding as to whether a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim contributed to his sentence— stated differently, whether the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim. See Galindez, 955 So. 2d at 523. Application Based upon our review of the record in this case, the Alleyne violation cannot be deemed harmless. Unlike the defendant in Galindez, who did not dispute during trial that he and the victim engaged in sexual intercourse, Williams disputed both that he killed Brookins and that he was a willing participant in the murder. There was sharply conflicting evidence in the form of Williams’s statements during his interrogation that he hoped Brookins would live, and the testimony of the jailhouse informant who painted Williams as both an active participant in the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house and the actual killer. - 19 - In the light least favorable to Williams, the evidence reflects that (1) Parker called Williams and informed him that she had been robbed, and she believed Brookins “set her up”; (2) within a few hours of that call, Williams sent Parker a text message stating, “i cant talk cuz im round 2 many people but jus chill bae ima take care of yo problems jus give me the greenlight”; and (3) according to the informant, Williams helped devise the plan to lure Brookins to the trap house on the pretense of having gold teeth created and actively participated in the crimes against Brookins. This included striking Brookins with a firearm that Williams brought to the house; demanding the location of the safe while Brookins pleaded, “It doesn’t have to be like this. I thought we was better than this”; sending Parker to purchase duct tape; binding Brookins with the tape; waiting until the early morning hours to move Brookins to avoid being seen; placing Brookins in the trunk of a vehicle, bound and beaten but still alive; driving the vehicle to St. Johns County with Henderson in the passenger seat while Parker followed in a separate vehicle; wiping down the vehicle; and shooting Brookins twice. However, the jury could have rejected the informant’s testimony on the basis that he was a jailhouse informant who received a reduced sentence in exchange for his testimony, because certain aspects of his testimony did not make sense,10 or 10. The informant testified that Henderson, Parker, and Williams acquired approximately $300,000 from Brookins’s safe and divided it equally. According to the informant, Williams used a portion of his third of the money to purchase a - 20 - because the informant had been previously housed with codefendant Henderson, who, according to the informant, assisted him with having a criminal charge dropped. Nonetheless, Williams’s interrogation still paints an incriminating picture. Williams admitted the following: (1) when he arrived at the trap house, Henderson gave him a firearm; (2) once he saw Brookins, who was unconscious from being beaten, he stepped outside and covered a portion of his face with a shirt;11 (3) he told Brookins, “Just cooperate, bro, and . . . you won’t die”; (4) he struck Brookins with his hands; (5) while at the trap house, and after Brookins had been severely beaten and duct-taped, he smoked marijuana that had been removed from Brookins’s pocket; (6) he rode with Parker to the location where Brookins had parked a vehicle and then drove that vehicle back to the trap house; (7) he removed a scooter from the trunk of that vehicle to make room for Brookins; (8) for approximately forty-five minutes, he drove the vehicle with Brookins in the trunk to the rural road in St. Johns County while Parker and Henderson rode in a separate vehicle; and (9) upon arrival, he could hear Brookins in the trunk screaming. house for his mother and a vehicle. However, the informant testified immediately afterwards that Williams’s mother was evicted from the house for “falling behind in rent.” 11. When the detective suggested that Williams did this because he and Brookins knew each other and he “felt bad,” Williams agreed. - 21 - It can be argued that a juvenile who admits to participating in a kidnapping and homicide to this extent intended for the victim to be killed. The jury found Williams guilty of kidnapping Brookins; however, as previously discussed, intent to kidnap does not equal intent to kill, and the jury was instructed that to find Williams guilty of felony murder, the State need not prove Williams had a premeditated design or intent to kill. The jury could have believed that Williams intended to kidnap Brookins in an attempt to recover money or the drugs that had been stolen from Parker, a woman with whom he was having a sexual relationship, but that he neither shot Brookins nor intended for him to die. A review of the interrogation recording reflects that Williams stated he hoped and believed Brookins would live.12 Further, during closing statements, defense counsel argued that the fact that Williams placed a shirt over a portion of his face after seeing Brookins at the trap house demonstrated he believed Brookins would not be killed: Well, if he knows that Mr. Brookins is going to be murdered, why would you cover your face? He’s the only person there that could say anything about [Williams] being involved. You don’t cover 12. Williams made statements such as “[H]onestly, I was hoping that he would live,” “The plan was that . . . they was going to leave him alive,” “They telling me now at this point that they going to drop him off and leave him in the trunk . . . . [There’s] so much relief just going off in my body. I’m, like, okay, so he’s gonna live . . . . But little do we found out, when we get there [Henderson] kills him,” and “I was getting out of the car, and I heard [Brookins] still screaming or whatever. And I was, like, okay, he’s still living. So I was happy at that point . . . that he wasn’t dead.” - 22 - your face if you know somebody’s going to be murdered. That doesn’t make sense. Because the record fails to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found that Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins, the Alleyne violation here was not harmless. Remedy Williams suggests two alternative remedies for the Alleyne violation that occurred: empanel a new jury to make the requisite finding or resentence him pursuant section 775.082(1)(b)2., the applicable provision where there is a finding that the juvenile offender did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim. Our precedent in the context of Apprendi/Blakely violations demonstrates the latter is the appropriate remedy. In Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla. 2014), the circuit court during resentencing imposed upward departure sentences without a jury determining the applicable factual basis for the departure, in violation of Apprendi and Blakely. We described the remedy as follows: We remand to the district court for the application of a harmless error analysis under Galindez, and, if it is determined not to be harmless, to remand the case for resentencing. Id. (emphasis added).13 13. On remand, the Second District determined the error was harmless. See Plott v. State, 165 So. 3d 33, 34 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015). - 23 - Because Alleyne derives from Apprendi, and resentencing is the proper remedy where a harmful Apprendi/Blakely violation has occurred, see Plott, 148 So. 3d at 95, we hold resentencing is the appropriate remedy for an Alleyne violation that is not harmless. Here, because the record fails to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found Williams actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill Brookins, he is entitled to be resentenced under section 775.082(1)(b)2. The dissent questions whether this remedy is necessary or appropriate, and suggests that nothing precludes the empaneling of a jury to make the factual determination. We are, however, hesitant to wade into “a thicket of potential and thorny double jeopardy issues.” United States v. Pena, 742 F.3d 508, 518 (1st Cir. 2014). In Pena, a case that involved guilty pleas to drug offenses, the United States conceded an Alleyne error occurred that was not harmless, but requested that a “sentencing” jury be empaneled to make a factual determination as to an element that, if found beyond a reasonable doubt, would authorize an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 509, 514.14 In declining this request, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit first noted: 14. The element was death or serious bodily injury resulting from use of the drugs. Id. at 509. The defendant in Pena entered “a straight guilty plea to drug dealing but not to ‘death resulting.’ ” Id. - 24 - Decisions of the Courts of Appeals after Alleyne have remanded for resentencing by the court. We are not aware of any court that has been confronted with facts analogous to those here. But in at least nine circuit court cases that have found reversible Alleyne error, the sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing by the district judge. We are aware of no case, and the parties have cited none, remanding for use of a sentencing jury after a reversible Alleyne error. Id. at 517-18 (footnote omitted). Further, with respect to double jeopardy concerns, the First Circuit stated: If this conviction were final, the constraint of double jeopardy would be clearer. It is also true that those double jeopardy safeguards do not usually apply to resentencing. But the effect of Alleyne and its predecessors is to preclude certain sentences from being imposed unless the elements supporting them have been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has not yet dealt with the double jeopardy issues in this context, much less in these transition cases where what was once thought to be a sentencing issue has been recognized instead to be an element of a crime. .... The prosecution’s proposed course of action here seeks to . . . obtain the benefit of the plea’s admissions to the essential elements of the two drug crimes, which are also among the essential elements . . . of the aggravated “death resulting” crime. Indeed, the prosecution’s brief is explicit that the sentencing jury would take the admissions of guilt from the plea for the other elements and then decide only the “death resulting” issue. Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, we do not decide the double jeopardy issues associated with the government’s request, but note them and avoid them. Id. at 518-19 (citation omitted). In light of the constitutional concerns presented by the Pena court with respect to empaneling a jury where a harmful Alleyne error has occurred, we conclude that resentencing pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2. is the more prudent course. - 25 -