Opinion ID: 868508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merger of Idea and Expression

Text: While “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” are generally copyrightable, the protection does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) & (b). In short, the copyright law is not a patent law: it protects the expression of ideas rather than the underlying ideas themselves. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) (“The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.”) (quotations omitted). And, when a work expresses an idea in the only way it can be expressed, courts deny those expressions protection under the “merger doctrine” to avoid giving the author a monopoly over the underlying idea. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993). Conversely, when an idea is capable of many different “modes of expression,” the expression of the idea is eligible for copyright protection. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).5 Warrick argues Lippitt’s diagram is not eligible for copyright protection because it consists only of unprotectable ideas or expression so intertwined with the underlying ideas as to lose their protection under the merger doctrine. In Warrick’s view, Lippitt’s 5 Copyrightability is a mixed question of law and fact. Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997). But see Janky v. Lake Cnty. Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Copyrightability is always an issue of law.”) (quotations omitted). -8- diagram expresses a “fundamental” idea about organizational change and development. (Answer Br. 25.) It is, he says, a “statement about objective reality, not a work of fiction or the imagination.” (Id.) Warrick misses the point. Although Lippitt’s diagram may express an idea, Warrick could express the same ideas in his own fashion. He might have organized the components in a pie-chart-style format to show how each is a component of a larger whole. He could have approached the concept in a two-column format, listing each defect in the left column and the missing component in the right column. He could have simply described the concepts in prose, as he did in his motion for summary judgment. He could have used his own words to describe the components. He might have broken down or combined the components in a different way. He could have expressed the absence of one of the components with an “X” over the component, as did another writer’s sample diagram; one Lippitt attached as Exhibit 10 to her response to Warrick’s summary judgment motion. (Appellant’s App’x 247-52.) The freedom Warrick enjoyed to express the ideas depicted in Lippitt’s diagram in an alternative way is what distinguishes this case from the cases Warrick cites in defense of the summary judgment. For instance, in Ho v. Taflove, the model at issue was “a new mathematical model of how electrons behave under certain circumstances.” 648 F.3d 489, 497 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted). It was intended to mirror, as realistically as possible, a natural physical phenomenon. Id. at 498. Thus, the form of the model was dictated by technical concerns rather than expressive choices. See id. -9- This case is more like Arica Institute, Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067 (2d Cir. 1992). There, the court concluded the idea inherent in a diagram about “ego fixations” was not merged with its expression because there were “any number of ways” to construct the diagram. Id. at 1076. The diagrams at issue were constructed in the form of nine-pointed stars (“enneagrams”), with labels at the points, within a circle. Id. at 107071. The court imagined several alternative ways of expressing the same idea without the nine-pointed star, such as a numbered listing with interconnecting arrows. Id. at 1076. In short, because there are many ways to express the ideas depicted in Lippitt’s diagram, the expression does not “merge” with the underlying ideas. 2. Eligibility of Constituent Elements for Copyright Protection Even though Lippitt’s diagram does not merge with the underlying idea, we are also asked to determine whether the constituent elements of her diagram are eligible for copyright protection. See Reno, 555 F.3d at 1177-78. Predictably, Warrick says the elements of Lippitt’s diagram—short labels, shapes, symbols, and selection of typeface— are not eligible for copyright protection. See Arica Inst., 970 F.2d at 1072-73 (noting individual words and short phrases are generally not copyrightable); Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 979 F.2d 242, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting “simple geometric shapes and coloring alone are per se not copyrightable”) (quotations omitted); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (“familiar symbols” and “mere variations of typographic ornamentation” are not copyrightable). In essence, Warrick claims the diagram lacks the “minimal degree of creativity” necessary to qualify for copyright protection, even though “the requisite level - 10 - of creativity is extremely low.” Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345; see CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519 (1st Cir. 1996) (listing examples of expression lacking the requisite creativity). Warrick’s view misses the forest for the trees. Any copyrightable work can be sliced into elements unworthy of copyright protection. See CMM Cable Rep, 97 F.3d at 1514. Books could be reduced to a collection of non-copyrightable words. Music could be distilled into a series of non-copyrightable rhythmic tones. A painting could be viewed as a composition of unprotectable colors. Warrick’s impulse to unpack Lippitt’s diagram into ever-smaller and less-protectable elements is understandable, as copyright jurisprudence tends toward dissection.6 Nevertheless, a limiting principle constrains this reductionism. We must focus on whether Lippitt has “selected, coordinated, and arranged” the elements of her diagram in an original way. Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 358; Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1004 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 349 (“[I]f the selection and arrangement are original, these elements of the work are eligible for copyright protection.”). 6 See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 361, 363 (referring to “constituent elements”); Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1371 (applying a reductive “abstraction-filtrationcomparison” approach to examine alleged copyright infringement); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e use analytic dissection to determine the scope of copyright protection. . . .”); CMM Cable Rep, 97 F.3d at 1514 (“[W]e note that the Copyright Act itself seems to mandate the ‘dissection’ of works into copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements.”). - 11 - We see protectable creative insight in Lippitt’s arrangement and choice of expression. In Diagram 1A, she portrays the necessary components of organizational change as blocks or bricks, suggesting how they build on each other. In Diagram 1B, she uses mathematical symbols to illustrate how the essential components of organizational change must be combined to achieve successful organizational change. In both versions, she selects a particular word to crystallize the kind of failure resulting from any missing, but necessary, component. She has arranged the components from left-to-right in a particular order. And, both versions show the essential components chained together in a way suggesting they are vitally linked. These expressive choices push Lippitt’s diagram into the realm of copyrightability.7