Opinion ID: 759747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Caldwell v. Mississippi claim

Text: 98 Johnston submits that, contrary to the Supreme Court's directive in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), both the prosecutor and the court made comments or delivered instructions during the course of the trial that misled the jury into believing that it bore only a marginal responsibility for Johnston's sentence. We note that Johnston's Caldwell claim has two divisible components: First, Johnston asserts a substantive claim that the prosecutor and court affirmatively misled the jury as to its role in the sentencing process. Second, Johnston argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the same remarks that, in his view, gave rise to a Caldwell violation. 11 99 We conclude that both of Johnston's Caldwell claims are without merit. Johnston points to numerous instances in which the prosecutor reminded jurors that the court bore the final decision-making authority with respect to sentencing. While we can imagine a situation in which such remarks, viewed in isolation, might cause a jury to question its role with respect to sentencing, these remarks must not be read (and were not heard by the jurors) in isolation from numerous other comments by both the prosecutor and the court that correctly informed the jury as to its significant responsibility. During voir dire, for instance, the prosecutor asked whether a juror understood that, although the court ultimately imposed punishment, it would place great weight upon whatever advisory sentence the jury recommended. Exh. 2 at 251. See also id. at 322 and 370 (The Court will pay great weight to the jury's advisory sentence, but the Court does have the power under the law to override it either way.) In charging the jury during the penalty phase of the trial, the court stated, in pertinent part: 100 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the Court as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant for his crime of murder in the first degree. 101 As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of myself as Judge of this court. 102 However, it is your duty to follow the law that will now be given to you, and to render to the Court an advisory sentence based on your determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty, and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist. 103 Exh. 43 at F. 104 Reading the record as a whole, we do not construe the referenced comments by either the prosecutor or the court to be misleading or to undermine the jury's sense of responsibility at the penalty phase. Moreover, the prosecutor's and court's representation of the advisory role of the jury under Florida law was legally correct and, as a result, did not contravene Caldwell. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 2010, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (To establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law.) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Davis v. Singletary, 119 F.3d 1471, 1482 (11th Cir.1997) ([R]eferences to and descriptions of the jury's sentencing verdict in this case as an advisory one, as a recommendation to the judge, and of the judge as the final sentencing authority are not error under Caldwell. Those references and descriptions are not error, because they accurately characterize the jury's and judge's sentencing roles under Florida law.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1848, 140 L.Ed.2d 1097 (1998). 12 Because we find that the prosecutor's and court's comments to the jury did not serve to diminish the jurors' sense of involvement or responsibility with respect to Johnston's sentence, and because these same challenged remarks accurately described the jury's advisory role during a capital trial under Florida law, Johnston's Caldwell claim does not afford a basis for habeas relief. For the same reason, we further determine that Johnston cannot show any prejudice resulting from trial counsel's failure to object to remarks which did not give rise to a Caldwell violation; in other words, Johnston cannot demonstrate that, had counsel timely objected to the prosecutor's and court's characterizations of the jury's role at sentencing, a reasonable probability exists that ... the result would have been different, Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2064). Both the substantive and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel components of Johnston's Caldwell claim, therefore, must fail.