Opinion ID: 1655839
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Heading: The Application of Section 668.4.

Text: Iowa Code section 668.4 provides: In actions brought under this chapter, the rule of joint and several liability shall not apply to defendants who are found to bear less than fifty percent of the total fault assigned to all parties. The issue is whether this section applies to this case, which was filed before July 4, 1984, the effective date of chapter 668. While the remainder of chapter 668 applies to all cases filed on or after July 1, 1984, section 668.4 specifically applies to all cases tried on or after July 1, 1984. See 1984 Iowa Acts Ch. 1293, § 15. The trial court ruled that section 668.4 therefore applied to this action. The effect of such ruling is to preclude the application of our rule of joint and several liability as to any of the named defendants who are found less than fifty percent negligent. Plaintiff presents two arguments in attacking this ruling: (1) Other language contained in section 668.4 suggests that this section should, like the rest of chapter 668, apply only to cases filed after July 1, 1984; and (2) that the application of section 668.4 is a taking of a vested right, thus a violation of her substantive due process rights under both the United States and Iowa Constitutions. A. [T]he meaning of a statute is always a matter of law, and final construction and interpretation of Iowa statutory law is for this court. Welp v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Iowa 1983), quoting Sorg v. Iowa Department of Revenue, 269 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Iowa 1978). The intent of the legislature is the polestar in construing the statute. Khort v. Yetter, 344 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Iowa 1984). Ordinarily, the usual meaning of words are attached to statutory language in the absence of a manifest, contrary intent of the legislature. See Welp, 333 N.W.2d at 483. The wording of this act could hardly be clearer. It says: This Act, except for section 4, applies to all cases filed on or after July 1, 1984. Section 4 of this Act applies to all cases tried on or after July 1, 1984. 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1293, § 15. We decline to attribute any other meaning to this provision in view of the clear language. B. The question remains whether application of section 668.4 would be a violation of the plaintiff's substantive due process rights. It is well established that a statute is presumed to be prospective only unless expressly made retrospective. Iowa Code § 4.5. Statutes which specifically affect substantive rights are construed to operate prospectively unless legislative intent to the contrary clearly appears from the express language or by necessary and unavoidable implication. See Matter of Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 334 N.W.2d 290, 293 (Iowa 1983). Conversely, if the statute relates solely to a remedy or procedure, it is ordinarily applied both prospectively and retrospectively. State ex rel. Leas in Interest of O'Neil, 303 N.W.2d 414, 419 (Iowa 1981). We have previously discussed the distinctions between substantive and procedural law. Substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights. State ex rel. Turner v. Limbrecht, 246 N.W.2d 330, 332 (Iowa 1976). Procedural law, on the other hand, is the practice, method, procedure, or legal machinery by which the substantive law is enforced or made effective. Id. at 332, quoting Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 260 Iowa 556, 560, 149 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1967). Finally, a remedial statute is one that intends to afford a private remedy to a person injured by a wrongful act. It is generally designed to correct an existing law or redress an existing grievance. Id. Noting that there is no constitutional prohibition against retrospective laws, we have said that [i]n the absence of an express constitutional inhibition retrospective laws are not prohibited as such. Moreover, the Constitution of the United States does not in terms prohibit the enactment by the states of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts or partake of the character of ex post facto laws. Thus, prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, a retrospective law, unless falling within other constitutional inhibitions, could constitutionally operate to divest property rights. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, the protection afforded by the due process clause was extended so as to prevent retrospective laws from divesting rights of property or vested rights generally. In many of the states there are constitutional provisions expressly prohibiting, not only the passage of any ex post facto law or law impairing the obligation of contracts, but any statute retrospective in its operation. State ex rel. Turner, 246 N.W.2d at 334, quoting 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 347, at 485-86 (1974). Plaintiff had no vested right in a particular result of this litigation or in the continuation of the principle of unlimited joint and several liability. See Schwarzkopf v. Sac County Board of Supervisors, 341 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1983). We have noted that a right is not vested unless it is something more than a mere expectation, based on an anticipated continuance of the present laws. It must be some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established, and is not open to doubt or controversy. Id. at 8, quoting from Leach v. Commercial Savings Bank, 205 Iowa 1154, 1165, 213 N.W. 517, 521 (1927). Any interest that these defendants might have in the continued state of the law concerning joint and several liability was not a vested right entitled to constitutional protection. We believe the trial court correctly ruled that section 668.1(4) is applicable in this case.