Opinion ID: 24411
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-trial and trial errors

Text: 1 Mosley and Ortega also argue that the trial court clearly erred in its finding regarding the amount of drugs attributable to each of them for sentencing purposes. The appellants’ arguments based on the intervening U.S. Supreme Court decision of Apprendi subsumes these arguments, however, and our disposition of the Apprendi issue serves likewise to dispose of the initial arguments made by Ortega and Mosley regarding the drug amounts attributed to them in sentencing. 7
We review sufficiency of the evidence challenges by examining the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Willis, 6 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1993). The conspiracy convictions challenged by Stevie, Self, Jason, John, Mosley, and Ortega have three requisite elements: (1) existence of an agreement between two or more people to violate the narcotics law, (2) knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) voluntary participation in the conspiracy. 21 U.S.C. § 846; United States v. Mitchell, 31 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1994). The agreement may be tacit, and the jury may infer its existence from circumstantial evidence. United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 317 (5th Cir. 1999). The defendant’s knowledge need only encompass the essential purpose of the conspiracy. United States v. Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087, 1094 (5th Cir. 1986). The jurors may draw inferences from familial relationships and “mere knowing presence” to support the conspiracy conviction. United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997). The possession with intent to distribute crack convictions 8 challenged by Stevie and John have as requisite elements (1) knowing possession of crack cocaine, and (2) intent to distribute it. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); United States v. Gonzalez, 79 F.3d 413, 423 (5th Cir. 1996). Proof of possession may be inferential or circumstantial. Id. The distribution in a protected zone convictions challenged by Stevie, John, and Ortega require proof of (1) knowing possession of crack cocaine, (2) within 1000 feet of a protected zone. 21 U.S.C. § 860; United States v. Sparks, 2 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 1993). Stevie and John also challenge their convictions for aiding and abetting in these drug offenses. The requisite elements are (1) association in the criminal activity, and (2) some action to help the activity succeed. United States v. Pedroza, 78 F.3d 179, 183 (5th Cir. 1996). Neither actual nor constructive possession of the drugs is required. United States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285, 1292 (5th Cir. 1992). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the testimony presented against each of the defendants, as outlined below, appears uncontradicted and sufficient to support the convictions:
Rather than showing that the evidence against them had been 9 contradicted or had not shown one of the requisite elements, the defendants argue the insufficiency of the evidence by disparaging the reliability of the testimony against them. The defendants complain that Zachery’s uncorroborated testimony is not strong enough to base their convictions on, because Zachery was shown to have lied about his identity to his police handlers, and to have been an addict who was using and selling crack during the period of his cooperation with the police investigation. However, “the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice may support a conviction if it is not incredible or otherwise unsubstantiated on its face.” United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1976). Moreover, Zachery’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of other accomplice witnesses and law enforcement agents, all of whom were subject to thorough crossexamination. In light of this corroboration, and in the absence of arguments by the defendants that Zachery’s testimony was incredible on its face, we hold that Zachery’s testimony supports the convictions. b. Sufficiency of evidence to support Stevie’s convictions Five witnesses testified to Stevie’s activities (that he tested and sold methamphetamines, stored drugs in his leased house, beat up someone to extract a drug debt, pooled money with Jason to 10 buy one pound of methamphetamines, divided and processed drugs, delivered drugs, ordered payment of a crack debt, vandalized Zachery’s car in revenge for a drug debt, and sold crack in controlled buys). Additionally, Stevie was watched and tape recorded by police during the controlled buys. Officer Cogwell corroborated the occurrence of the controlled buys and Stevie’s participation in them. Maps generated using aerial photographs show that the stash house was within 1000 feet of two public playgrounds and a school. This evidence is sufficient to meet the elements of Stevie’s convictions on conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution within 1000 feet of a protected zone. c. Sufficiency of evidence to support Self’s conspiracy conviction Four witnesses testified regarding the relationship between Self and Holmes (that Self was Holmes’s cousin, that he delivered crack to Holmes and had crack picked up for delivery to Holmes, that he was seen with Holmes during drug transactions, that he and Holmes alternately would fulfill drug orders for customers). Self argues that some of the testimony regarded extrinsic acts; the government contends that this evidence was expressly admitted for the legitimate purpose of showing the formation of the conspiracy, 11 identity of the conspirators, relationship of the conspirators, and duration of the conspiracy. See United States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 834 (5th Cir. 1991). We agree with the government’s contention, and hold that the testimony against Self was sufficient to support his convictions. d. Sufficiency of evidence to sustain Jason’s conspiracy conviction Three law enforcement agents testified that they observed Jason direct a confidential informant to Holmes in order to purchase crack. One witness testified that Jason tried to recruit him into the drug ring. Other witnesses testified that Jason had others store drugs for him, that he delivered drugs for his coconspirators, that he picked up drugs from suppliers listed in the indictment, that he beat up and had others beat up drug debtors, that he referred potential buyers to his co-conspirators, that he divided and processed drugs, and that he directed others to deliver drugs. This testimony was sufficient to sustain Jason’s convictions. e. Sufficiency of evidence to sustain John’s convictions Six witnesses testified that John sold marijuana. Two 12 testified that he delivered the marijuana on behalf of his brother Jason. Zachery testified that John sold him crack in two controlled buys within 1000 feet of an elementary school. This testimony is sufficient to sustain John’s convictions. f. Sufficiency of evidence to support Mosley’s conspiracy conviction One witness, corroborated by telephone records for the hotel room phone where Mosley was staying and for his pager, testified that he made two deliveries to Mosley of crack cocaine. This corroborated testimony is sufficient to support Mosley’s convictions. g. Sufficiency of evidence to support Ortega’s convictions Evidence showed that one of the stash houses, used for storage, manufacture, and distribution of crack and methamphetamine, was leased to and maintained by Ortega. Zachery, corroborated by tape recordings, testified to a controlled buy involving Ortega. The aerial maps reveal that the site of the buy was within 1000 feet of a protected zone. Another controlled buy was testified to by the informant and by a police officer. This evidence was sufficient to support Ortega’s convictions. 13
Holmes argues that he was subjected to double jeopardy because the federal and state prosecutions against him were intertwined such that the state prosecution was a “sham prosecution” that should bar the federal prosecution. See United States v. Paul, 853 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1988). Holmes had pleaded guilty in state court to one of the actions charged as an overt act in his federal conspiracy charge. He argues that the testimony in his federal prosecution of Officer Cogwell, a state law enforcement officer, and the testimony of the confidential informants used by Officer Cogwell in his local investigation, showed that the federal and state investigations were impermissibly intertwined. The government argues that a defendant may be prosecuted by dual sovereigns when his actions violate the laws of each. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1985). Holmes has the burden of proving a prima facie double jeopardy claim, and we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. United States v. McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 676 (5th Cir. 1995). The district court found that there was no evidence of collusion between the federal and state authorities sufficient to meet Holmes’s prima facie burden. Joint federal/state cooperation is permissible and does not automatically trigger the sham prosecution rule. United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 646, 650 (5th 14 Cir. 1992). Holmes must show not just that the two sovereigns shared resources, but that one of them dominated or controlled the prosecution of the defendant by the other. Id. Holmes never showed that a federal agent participated in his state court plea bargain. Thus, he has not shown clear error in the district court’s finding that he had not proven a prima facie case of a sham prosecution. 3. Stevie’s challenge to jury composition/trial venue We review a trial court’s exercise of substantial discretion regarding venue change and issues regarding pretrial publicity for abuse of that discretion. United States v. Parker, 877 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1989). Stevie contends that the jurors must have been prejudiced by pretrial publicity. The McKinney Courier Gazette ran two frontpage stories regarding the arrests of the alleged drug conspirators, picturing Stevie on the front page and identifying him as one of the leaders of the conspiracy (a retraction was later printed on the interior of the newspaper regarding Stevie being a leader of the conspiracy). McKinney is in Collin County, one of seven counties from which members for the jury venire were selected. Stevie argues, with no record support, that one-third of the jurors were from Collin County. 15 The court asked the jury panel (1) if any of them had heard of the case, (2) if any of them subscribed to the McKinney CourierGazette, (3) if any of them subscribed to any McKinney newspapers. No venire-member answered affirmatively. One venire-person admitted that he would be prejudiced because of publicity regarding a heroin problem in Plano, and was dismissed. Stevie’s counsel, when given the opportunity, asked no further questions of the panel members. He did not object when the jury was empaneled. Pretrial publicity can be harmful only when the publicity has so saturated the community that the inability to obtain a fair jury can be presumed. United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 1203, 1208 (5th Cir. 1975). Otherwise, the defendant must prove actual prejudice. United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 640 (5th Cir. 1977). The responses of the jury venire indicate no actual prejudice resulting from the two newspaper stories. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in neither omitting Collins County citizens from the jury nor transferring venue. 4. Stevie’s motion to suppress audio tapes/transcripts Admission of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 683 (5th Cir. 1997). We will reverse the district court’s decision to admit evidence only 16 when it has relied on an incorrect view of the law or a clearly erroneous factual finding. Id. The government has the burden of laying the foundation for the accuracy of the tape recordings; once the foundation has been laid, Stevie has the burden of proving their inaccuracy. United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 631 (5th Cir. 1995). When a participant in a taped conversation testifies that the transcript of the conversation is accurate, the foundation for admission has been established. United States v. Rochan, 563 F.2d 1246, 1251 (5th Cir. 1997). Stevie complains that the recordings resulting from the taping of Zachery’s controlled buys were unintelligible, and that the transcripts were unreliable. The district court had found that portions of the tapes were unintelligible, but cited Fifth Circuit precedent that this would not render the tapes unreliable “unless these portions [we]re so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy, and that is a determination that is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.” United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1378 (5th Cir. 1978). Zachery testified that he spent more than eleven hours reviewing the tapes and the transcripts, and testified that, based on his review, the transcripts were accurate. This establishes the government’s burden of authentication, which Stevie does not counter by identifying any particular inaccuracies. His complaint about the unintelligibility of certain portions does not affect the 17 admissibility of the tapes and transcripts, but only affects the weight the jury might have accorded those tapes and transcripts during their deliberations. We hold, therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tapes and transcripts. 5. Ortega’s challenge to the admissibility of evidence surrendered to police This evidentiary ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 364 (5th Cir. 1998). Ortega argues that his conviction resulted from the introduction into evidence cocaine seized from a rental car. This argument is without merit. Another co-conspirator had a rental car repossessed. At the car dealership, the dealership employees found crack and powder cocaine secreted in the trunk compartment, called police and surrendered it to them. The dealership employees were acting as the private owners of the car, not at the behest of the government, so the Fourth Amendment protections do not apply here to protect Ortega. See, e.g., United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the cocaine surrendered by the dealership to the police was not used as an exhibit against Ortega, nor was he implicated in the indictment or the trial proof with the cocaine found in the rental car. His conviction was supported with 18 the cocaine surrendered by Zachery after the controlled buy. Therefore, Ortega’s complaint regarding the seizure of this evidence is without merit. 6. Self’s challenge to admission of acts occurring prior to the time of the indictment Self did not object at the time of the introduction of the evidence of crack sales prior to 1992, so his challenge to this admission is reviewed only for plain error. United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 462 (5th Cir. 1984). We reverse for plain error only if “(1) there was error (2) that was clear and obvious and (3) that affected a defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 817 (5th Cir. 1997). Self contends that the admission of testimony by two of his co-conspirators that he cooked down powder cocaine into crack and distributed it to others prior to 1992, the time identified in the indictment as the commencement of the conspiracy, violated Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The government argues that the testimony was admitted to show Self’s role in the conspiracy, how the conspiracy was structured, and how the co-conspirators were introduced to each other. See Lokey, 945 F.2d at 834. When the evidence assists the jury by explaining the context, set-up, or motive of the charged crime, or forms “an integral and natural part 19 of an account of the crime,” it is not extrinsic and excludable under 404(b). United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1084 (5th Cir. 1995). Here, the district court did not commit plain error in admitting the testimony. 7. Jason’s Daubert challenge to the testimony regarding nature of seized substances Jason did not object at trial to the testimony of, nor seek cross-examination on the qualifications of, the forensic chemist who tested and identified the seized drugs as methamphetamines. Therefore, we review his Daubert challenge for plain error. Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 506 (5th Cir. 1999). The chemist testified regarding her experience, qualifications, and the specific tests she conducted in identifying the substance at issue. The results of those tests, in addition to her testimony, were admitted without objection or challenge on cross-examination. There is no clear and obvious error in the district court’s decision to admit this testimony.