Opinion ID: 1528607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Spontaneous Utterance Issue

Text: The admissibility of a spontaneous utterance `is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. We will reverse on appeal only if a ruling is clearly erroneous.' Lyons v. United States, 683 A.2d 1080, 1083 (D.C.1996) (quoting Alston v. United States, 462 A.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted)). In order to admit a statement under this exception to the hearsay rule, three factors must be met: (1) the presence of a serious occurrence which causes a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in the declarant, (2) a declaration made within a reasonably short period of time after the occurrence so as to assure that the declarant has not reflected upon his statement or premeditated or constructed it, and (3) the presence of circumstances, which in their totality suggest spontaneity and sincerity of the remark. Id. (quoting Nicholson v. United States, 368 A.2d 561, 564 (D.C.1977)). Mr. Reyes-Contreras contends that the government has not met the second factor. He argues that Ms. Gomez had time to reflect on her statement in the thirty minutes that she was looking around for the police. However, we have upheld the admission of excited utterances where the period of time between the startling event and the declaration exceeded the thirty minutes in this case. See Price v. United States, 545 A.2d 1219, 1226 (D.C.1988) (witness statement made three hours after shooting admitted where shock and spontaneity continued); and Harris v. United States, 373 A.2d 590, 593 (D.C. 1977) (statement admitted two hours after declarant was shot). Officer Parson described Ms. Gomez as crying, yelling, very upset, and waving her hands in the air as she made the declarations to him. Clearly, she had been through a startling event which cause[d] a state of nervous excitement or physical shock in her; and the circumstances of the assault and her search for police directly after the assault suggested spontaneity and sincerity of [Ms. Gomez's] remark[s]. Welch v. United States, 689 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1996) (citations omitted); Lyons, supra, 683 A.2d at 1083 (citations omitted). Under the circumstances presented here, we cannot say that the trial court's decision to admit Ms. Gomez's statements as spontaneous utterances was clearly erroneous. Mr. Reyes-Contreras also argues that Ms. Gomez's statements should not have been admitted into evidence through Officer Parson because the government failed to show that Ms. Gomez was unavailable for testimony. He relies on the Supreme Court decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), and our decision in Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734 (D.C.1981) (en banc) which applied Roberts. In Roberts, supra, the Supreme Court suggested that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution normally requires a showing of unavailability. The Harrison court read Roberts as requiring the prosecution to show that the declarant of the spontaneous utterance was unavailable for trial. Harrison, supra, 435 A.2d at 736. In White v. Illinois, supra , the Supreme Court discussed Roberts, and explicitly stated that no showing of unavailability is required under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment before a spontaneous utterance may be admitted into evidence: In the course of rejecting the Confrontation Clause claim in [the Roberts' ] case, we used language that might suggest that the Confrontation Clause generally requires that a declarant either be produced at trial or be found unavailable before his out-of-court statement may be admitted into evidence. However, we think such an expansive reading of the Clause is negated by our subsequent decision in [ United States v.] Inadi, [475 U.S. 387, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 89 L.Ed.2d 390 (1986)]. [2] 502 U.S. at 353, 112 S.Ct. 736. A footnote to our opinion in United States v. Woodfolk, 656 A.2d 1145 (D.C.1995), recognized the White holding as binding on us. In affirming the decision of the trial court admitting a 911 tape under the spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, we said in part: [A]ppellant's argument that his rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated, since he had no opportunity to cross-examine [the declarant], is meritless. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). Woodfolk, supra, 656 A.2d at 1151 n. 17. However, we did not expressly indicate that our opinion in Harrison, supra, had been superseded by the Supreme Court decision in White. We now make explicit the application of that higher authority, establishing that no showing of a declarant's unavailability for trial is required under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States before a spontaneous utterance may be admitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. White, supra, 502 U.S. at 353, 112 S.Ct. 736. Furthermore, we have not previously determined whether, as an evidentiary matter, a showing of a declarant's unavailability for trial is required before a spontaneous utterance may be admitted into evidence. One of the concurring opinions in Harrison, supra, broached this issue. Judge Ferren, joined by Judge Newman, pointed out in his concurring opinion in Harrison, supra : [U]nder the rules of evidence, admissibility of a spontaneous utterance ... is not premised on the [declarant's] unavailability. Authorities have long recognized that the report of a spontaneous utterance is typically more reliable than the memory of the witness who takes the stand and is subject to cross-examination. Id. at 738 (citations omitted). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently reached a similar conclusion in determining whether art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution [3] required a showing of unavailability before a spontaneous utterance could be admitted: We see no reason to impose an unavailability requirement on reliable evidence.... We conclude that art. 12, like the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, does not require a showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial before a statement is admitted under the spontaneous utterance exception to the rule against hearsay. Commonwealth v. Whelton, 428 Mass. 24, 696 N.E.2d 540, 545 (Mass.1998). See also People v. Dennis, 17 Cal.4th 468, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035, 1070-71 (1998) (court reject[ed] defendant's contention that a statement admissible under Evidence Code section 1240 nevertheless violates Sixth Amendment confrontation rights unless the prosecution shows both declarant unavailability and adequate indicia of reliability). We now hold that under the traditional rules of hearsay evidence, there is no unavailability requirement for the admission of a spontaneous utterance exception. Nor is unavailability required under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). In summary, we are bound by the holding in White, supra, that no showing of a declarant's unavailability for trial is required under the Confrontation Clause before a declarant's spontaneous utterance may be admitted into evidence, and similarly, we hold that traditional rules of hearsay evidence do not require a showing of a declarant's unavailability for the admission of a spontaneous utterance. In addition, we conclude that Ms. Gomez's statements properly fit within the firmly rooted spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and were made within a reasonably short period of time after her husband assaulted her. Thus, there is no Confrontation Clause violation, and no violation of the traditional rules of hearsay evidence.