Opinion ID: 1809395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to develop and introduce Havard's successful adaptation at Camp Shelby as mitigating evidence during the penalty phase.

Text: ¶ 53. In his next issue, Havard asserts that counsel were ineffective for failing to develop mitigating evidence that Havard applied for and was accepted to the Youth Challenge Program at Camp Shelby. He offers the affidavit of Daniel Bradshaw, who states that he was a fellow cadet with Havard in the program at Camp Shelby and that Havard thrived in the arduous and highly regimented atmosphere. Havard also offers the affidavit of his grandfather, who stated that Havard was such an exemplary cadet that he was offered a job at Camp Shelby to assist other youths. It is Havard's contention that the adaptability of a capital defendant to an institutional setting is powerful mitigation evidence because it provides a jury with an alternative to the death sentence. ¶ 54. Havard relies on Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). In Skipper, the petitioner sought to introduce testimony of two jailers and one regular visitor to the jail to show that he had made a good adjustment during his time spent in jail. The trial court ruled that under the South Carolina Supreme Court's previous decision in State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 298 S.E.2d 769 (1982), such evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. Skipper was sentenced to death, and he appealed. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 3, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected Skipper's contention and held that the trial judge properly refused to admit the evidence of his future adaptability to prison life, citing Koon, supra . Id. ¶ 55. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Skipper's claim that the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling was in conflict with prior United States Supreme Court decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Id. at 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 900, 106 S.Ct. 270, 88 L.Ed.2d 225 (1985). The United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling in Skipper, holding that There is no disputing that this Court's decision in Eddings requires that in capital cases `the sentencer ... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' Eddings, supra, at 110[, 102 S.Ct. 869] (quoting Lockett, supra, at 604[, 98 S.Ct. 2954] (plurality opinion of BURGER, C.J.)) (emphasis in original). Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. 455 U.S., at 114[, 102 S.Ct. 869]. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1670-71, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986). ¶ 56. The issue in Skipper and the issue sub judice are quite different, because in Skipper, the petitioner's counsel attempted to admit the evidence and it was refused. Id. at 3, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The issue asserted by Havard is whether his counsel were ineffective in failing to develop evidence of his participation in the program at Camp Shelby and present it to the jury. ¶ 57. The state argues that Havard's reliance on Skipper is misplaced and focuses on the dissimilarities between being institutionalized in a prison and the Youth Challenge Program. We find that the state's focus is misplaced. Skipper specifically states: `[T]he sentencer ... [may] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' Eddings, supra, at 110[, 102 S.Ct. 869] (quoting Lockett, supra, at 604[, 98 S.Ct. 2954] (plurality opinion of BURGER, C.J.)) (emphasis in original). .... Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. 455 U.S., at 114[, 102 S.Ct. 869]. Id. at 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669. However, even if this Court were to consider, for the sake of argument, that Havard's counsel were deficient in failing to develop and present this evidence, Havard has not shown that the outcome of his sentence would have been different. Havard must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. ¶ 58. Havard did not present any affidavits other than those of his family and friends. In Skipper, the United States Supreme Court discussed South Carolina's contention that the jailer's testimony would be merely cumulative of the testimony the jury already had heard from the petitioner's family and friends. Id., 476 U.S. at 7-8, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Supreme Court did not accept this argument. In its analysis, the Skipper Court stated: Finally, the State seems to suggest that exclusion of the proffered testimony was proper because the testimony was merely cumulative of the testimony of petitioner and his former wife that petitioner's behavior in jail awaiting trial was satisfactory, and of petitioner's testimony that, if sentenced to prison rather than to death, he would attempt to use his time productively and would not cause trouble. We think, however, that characterizing the excluded evidence as cumulative and its exclusion as harmless is implausible on the facts before us. The evidence petitioner was allowed to present on the issue of his conduct in jail was the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving. The testimony of more disinterested witnesses  and, in particular, of jailers who would have had no particular reason to be favorably predisposed toward one of their charges  would quite naturally be given much greater weight by the jury. Id. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 1669 (emphasis added). ¶ 59. The affidavits presented by Havard in support of this issue, particularly those of his grandfather, William Havard, and his friend, Daniel Bradshaw, are the kind of evidence the United States Supreme Court described in Skipper as the sort of evidence that a jury naturally would tend to discount as self-serving. For the foregoing reasons, Havard cannot pass the standard set forth in Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This issue is without merit.