Opinion ID: 4561573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: HUD’s position

Text: At our request, HUD filed an amicus brief in this matter. We first note that at oral argument HUD’s counsel indicated that the agency did not request we give deference to its interpretation of the regulation because it believed the plain language controlled. (See Kisor v. Wilkie (2019) 588 U.S. ___ [139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415] [“If uncertainty does not exist, there is no plausible reason for deference. The regulation then just means what it means — and the court must give it effect”].) Urging us to affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment, HUD opines that the IHSS payments Reilly receives must be treated as 28 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. income under the regulation because that “compensation substitutes for income Reilly would otherwise earn for working outside the home.” HUD essentially echoes the reasoning of the Court of Appeal below. Though deference is generally accorded an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation in the face of ambiguity (see Auer v. Robbins (1997) 519 U.S. 452; Skidmore v. Swift & Co. (1944) 323 U.S. 134, 140), we conclude that such deference is not compelled here. (See United States v. Mead Corp. (2001) 533 U.S. 218, 228 [“[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances”].) Courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation unless an “ ‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the [agency’s] intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.’ ” (Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 512, italics added.) As explained above (see ante, at pp. 12–13), we conclude that HUD’s clearly expressed intent at the time it added the exclusion for homecare payments (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020)) was to encourage families to provide in-home care to, and avoid institutionalization of, developmentally disabled family members. This contemporaneous intent is fully realized only when in-home payments for services needed to keep the developmentally disabled member at home — are excluded from income for purposes of the Section 8 program, i.e., whether those payments are ultimately made to a family member or to a third party provider. This interpretation is consistent with exclusion’s language, which places no restrictions on who the provider of services can be. (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020).) 29 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Contrary to MHA’s suggestion, we do not perceive any intent by HUD to treat families with a developmentally disabled member and families with a medically disabled member the same, or to consider a parent’s outside income the same as a parent’s IHSS compensation. We will not pursue parity for parity’s sake, especially if such pursuit runs counter to the language and purpose of the exclusion. Including a parent’s inhome care payments as income to determine a family’s Section 8 eligibility will have the perverse effect of making it harder for a family to maintain a home in which to care for the child. In the end, we refuse to adopt a crabbed interpretation that does little to advance the tandem goals of offering affordable housing to low income families and of supporting families who themselves provide in-home care for developmentally disabled members. We cannot endorse a construction that yields a result antithetical to our nation’s “goal of providing families of children with disabilities with the support they need to raise their children at home.” (42 U.S.C. § 15091(c).) We conclude a parent’s IHSS compensation to provide care to keep a developmentally disabled child at home is excluded from income under 24 Code of Federal Regulations part 5.609(c)(16) (2020). 30 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.