Opinion ID: 73172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Anderson 's Balancing Test

Text: The Constitution provides that states may prescribe [t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives. U.S. Const. art I, § 4, cl. 1. The Supreme Court long has recognized that states have important and compelling interests in regulating the election process and in having ballot access requirements. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 & n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983); see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). The states' 6 compelling interests include maintaining fairness, honesty, and order, Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, minimizing frivolous candidacies, Lubin, 415 U.S. at 715, 94 S.Ct. 1315, and avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process, Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970. See also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 & n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564. These same Supreme Court cases also recognize candidates' constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to associate for political ends and to participate equally in the electoral process. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787-88, 103 S.Ct. 1564; Lubin, 415 U.S. at 71618, 94 S.Ct. 1315; Jenness, 403 U.S. at 440, 91 S.Ct. 1970. Therefore, in Anderson, the Supreme Court set forth the test for considering whether a state's ballot access requirements impermissibly infringe a candidate's constitutional rights. The Supreme Court instructed that the courts first must weigh the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate against the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule, taking into consideration the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564; see also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 213-14, 107 S.Ct. 544, 93 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986). This Court has described the Anderson test as a balancing approach in several decisions. See, e.g., Bergland v. Harris, 767 F.2d 1551, 1553-54 (11th Cir.1985) (describing Anderson as rejecting a litmus-paper test and adopting the balancing approach); Libertarian Party of Florida v. State of Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 793 (11th Cir.1983) (stating the test is whether the legislative requirement is a rational way to meet this compelling state interest).