Opinion ID: 2092295
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: confidential employees

Text: The employer is also seeking to exclude six employees on the basis of an alleged confidential status. A confidential employee has been defined as follows: `Confidential employee' means an employee, who in the regular course of his or her duties, assists and acts in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine and effectuate management policies with regard to labor relations or who in the regular course of his or her duties has authorized access to information relating to the effectuation or review of the employer's collective bargaining policies. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1603(c). The purpose of excluding confidential employees is to keep employees from having their loyalties divided between their employer and the bargaining unit which represents them. The employer expects confidentiality in labor relations matters but the union may seek access to the confidential materials to gain a bargaining advantage. City of Wood Dale, 2 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2043, at 299, No. S-RC-261 (ISLRB September 5, 1986). Based upon section 3(c) of the Act, the Board has formulated three tests to be applied when determining whether an employee possesses confidential status. Should an employee meet the requirements established in any one of these tests, the employee is found to be confidential. See County of Peoria, 2 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2022, at 160, Nos. S-RC-4, S-RC-54, S-RC-56 (ISLRB April 29, 1986). The first test has been coined the labor-nexus test. Under this test, if an employee assists in a confidential capacity in the regular course of his or her duties a person or persons who formulate, determine or effectuate labor relations policies, then the employee holds confidential status. The person assisted by the employee must perform all three functionsformulating, determining and effectuatingbefore a finding of confidentiality can be made. City of Wood Dale, 2 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2043, No. S-RC-261 (ISLRB September 5, 1986). The authorized access test is the second method for determining if an individual is a confidential employee. Should the employee have authorized access to information concerning matters specifically related to the collective-bargaining process between labor and management, the employee is deemed confidential. City of Wood Dale, 2 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2043, No. S-RC-261 (IELRB September 5, 1986); see also West Harvey-Dixmoor School District No. 147, 2 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 1054, at 134, No. 85-UC-0015-C (IELRB April 8, 1986). In City of Burbank, 1 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2008, No. S-RC-45 (ISLRB June 6, 1985), the Board adopted a third confidential status test. This test, according to the Board, is to be applied where no collective-bargaining unit was previously in place, but it is expected that the establishment of the unit will require that confidential responsibilities be assumed by the employee. The `reasonable expectation' test was designed to determine, in the absence of a collective bargaining relationship, whether the onset of collective bargaining would reasonably bring the individual confidential duties. City of Burbank, 2 Pub.Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2036, at 249. Although, at oral argument, the employer alleged that these employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit solely because of the reasonable expectation test, the briefs appear to analyze the issue occasionally using another of the three tests. We therefore do not confine our analysis to the reasonable expectation test but consider each test in turn. Turning first to the labor-nexus test, the employer challenges the classification of Marlene O'Halleran, administrative assistant to the assistant chief probation officer in adult probation. It was noted at the supplemental hearing that Marlene O'Halleran had assumed the position of Cheryl Dix, who passed away after the first hearing had been completed. The hearing officer found that the assistant chief probation officer, James Cunningham, does not devise or decide management policies. Cunningham's responsibilities, although he hears employee grievances and may recommend disciplinary action, do not establish that he formulates, determines and effectuates labor relations policies. Therefore, the hearing officer found that O'Halleran does not act in a confidential capacity to one who formulates, determines and effectuates labor relations policies for the department. The hearing officer apparently further found that O'Halleran is not a confidential employee under the authorized access test. The hearing officer found that Cunningham chairs the deputy chief probation officer's meetings and collective-bargaining issues may be on the agenda of the meetings. Cunningham's administrative assistant, Marlene O'Halleran, attends these meetings and takes the minutes. However, the hearing officer concluded that there is no evidence that Cunningham participates in the present collective-bargaining negotiations with AFSCME. Therefore, O'Halleran does not have authorized access to collective-bargaining matters at this point in time. Section 3(c) of the Act requires that a secretary act in a confidential capacity in the regular course of his or her duties. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1603(c).) Although the employer argues that O'Halleran should be excluded because she occasionally substitutes for Gail Barta, a confidential employee, the substitution does not appear to occur in the regular course of her duties. We decline to disturb the findings of the hearing officer with respect to O'Halleran, as our review of the record leads us to conclude that the Board's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The employer next contests the status of Elisa Ortiz, secretary to Shirley Jones, personnel coordinator, and Thomas Brennan, assistant director of the department, both of social casework services. The hearing officer found that neither Jones nor Brennan formulated, determined and effectuated management policies with respect to labor relations at the time of the hearing. However, the employer argues that, because Jones has developed the disciplinary process now in place in social casework services, she formulates, determines and effectuates labor policies. As we have noted, the person assisted, Jones, must perform all three functions. It is not clear from the record, nor did the hearing officer find, that developing a disciplinary process means that Jones effectuates labor policies. Without more, we cannot reach a conclusion that Ortiz assists in a confidential capacity one who formulates, determines and effectuates labor policies. The employer further intimates that Jones will later be involved in such activities, as her supervisor has delegated authority to her. If such is the case, we suggest that the employer seek reclassification of Ortiz before the Board. We will not make that determination at this point. Both of these employees are also challenged under the reasonable expectation test. Also challenged under this test are the secretaries to Linnie Parillo, the deputy chief probation officer in charge of personnel and training, and Clotilda Kyle, the administrator of personnel and training at juvenile probation. These secretaries are Joan Kozak, Vanessa House, Diane Olvera and Sharon Williams. The employer expressed that all of the employees would have access to confidential matters now that the office was being reorganized pursuant to this court's decision in Orenic and because of the additional work created by a bargaining agreement between AFSCME and the employer. In Orenic v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1989), 127 Ill.2d 453, 130 Ill. Dec. 455, 537 N.E.2d 784, this court determined that the chief judge of the circuit court was the sole employer of the employees hired in the county court system. Because of this judgment, it was alleged during the hearing that the chief judge's office would be handling additional work related to collective-bargaining procedures. At the time of the hearings, in 1989 and early 1990, it was unclear what impact Orenic would have on individual job responsibilities. Therefore, it was unclear whether certain secretaries could later have access to labor relations materials, pursuant to a restructuring of responsibilities. In his recommended decision, the hearing officer found that no evidence was presented to show that these employees currently assumed confidential duties, as that phrase is defined in the statute. The hearing officer recommended that, if these employees were to assume such duties in the future, the employer should file for recertification of these employees. We agree that a petition for recertification should be filed at this time. At oral argument, the employer alleged that enough information is present in the record for this court to exclude these employees, based upon the reasonable expectation test. AFSCME and the Board argue that, because the Board's order indicates that the employer can petition the Board for recertification of the unit upon a determination of new, added job responsibilities, the employer should initiate proceedings before the Board, seeking a determination that these six employees do now hold confidential responsibilities. We agree with AFSCME. We reach this conclusion based upon the employer's own assertions. For instance, the employer states in his brief, The `reasonable expectation' test must be applied consistently with the greater role the judicial branch managers at the time of the hearing reasonably expected to take in labor and collective bargaining matters and, in fact, have assumed, now that the Chief Judge is the sole employer. ( Orenic v. ISLRB, 127 Ill.2d 453 [130 Ill.Dec. 455], 537 N.E.2d 784 (1989). (Emphasis added.) If the managers have assumed such responsibilities, then it likewise follows that the clerical staff should have assumed corresponding duties. Yet the record is replete with references to what the judicial managers anticipate will be added to their responsibilities. The reasonable expectation test should only be applied where the responsibilities may be reasonably expected but have not yet been assumed. That is not the case in the instant action. There is no evidence in the record to assist us in determining how these responsibilities have changed. Therefore, we decline to address the issue of whether these employees are confidential and instead suggest that the employer file a petition for recertification before the Board. For this reason, we decline to determine the status of Marlene O'Halleran, Elisa Ortiz, Joan Kozak, Vanessa House, Diane Olvera or Sharon Williams at this time. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the appellate court. We decline to further address the issue of the confidential employees, and instead remand the decision to the Board for further factual findings. Appellate court affirmed; remanded with directions. Justice BILANDIC, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.