Opinion ID: 2945
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Effect of Altm an n

Text: On remand, we must first determine how Altmann informs our disposition of this case. In Altmann, the Supreme Court departed from what it termed a pre-existing “antiretroactivity presumption,” 541 U.S. at 696, and held that the FSIA, including its exceptions, is applicable to conduct that preceded its enactment. The Court explained that because the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity “reflects current political realities and relationships,” id., courts have traditionally “resolved questions of foreign sovereign immunity by deferring to the decisions of the political branches,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court identified the FSIA as “the most recent such decision” and, “absent contraindications,” held that courts should defer to it—that is, apply it retroactively—rather than “presume” it inapplicable “merely because it postdates the conduct in question.” Id. Yet the Altmann Court “emphasiz[ed] the narrowness of [its] holding,” attributable in part to the particular posture assumed by the Executive Branch in that case. Id. at 700-02. The Court underscored that the United States Government had chosen not to submit a statement of its foreign policy interests implicated by the exercise of jurisdiction in Altmann. Id. at 701-02 & n.22. The Court then advised that in future cases, “should the State Department choose to express its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the should honor its com mitm ent to the GSF as the mechanism for resolving this class of N azi-era claims and to terminate this litigation “on any valid legal ground,” United States Supplemental Letter, at 6. Because we decide, pursuant to the political question doctrine and related jurisprudence concerning deference to the Executive in matters of foreign policy, that such questions are nonjusticiable, we decline our colleague’s invitation to prolong this litigation further by a remand of dubious purpose. 19 Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.” Id. at 702 (footnote omitted). Since no such State Department opinion was expressed in Altmann, the Court declined to explicate further the circumstances under which it would be appropriate for a federal court to defer to a statement of foreign policy interests of the United States in deciding whether to assert jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in a particular case. A few weeks after its Altmann decision, the Court again urged “case-specific deference to the political branches” in Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21. Relying on Altmann, the Sosa Court stated (albeit in dicta) that when the United States Government submits statements of interest to federal courts, “there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy.” Id. The Court again did not specify how much weight we should give to statements of United States foreign policy interests, or under what circumstances. II. Deference to the United States Statement of Interest Unlike Altmann, this case has elicited a statement of interest in which the United States invoked “its foreign policy interests” to urge the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. When the Government first presented its statement of interest to the District Court, it did not urge that Court to rest on the foreign policy interests of the United States as “an independent legal basis for dismissal.” United States Statement of Interest, at 20. In the wake of Altmann, however, the United States no longer offers this qualification and instead asserts that deference to “the views of the Executive on this nation’s foreign policy interests in determining whether to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case” supports the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims. United States Supplemental Letter, at 1; see also id. at 4-8. We are, therefore, squarely faced with the issue reserved in Altmann and Sosa—when, and to what extent, should the stated foreign policy interests of the United States be 20 accorded deference.13 In the circumstances presented in this case, we hold that deference is appropriate. Judicial deference to the Executive Branch on questions of foreign policy has long been established under the prudential justiciability doctrine known as the “political question” doctrine, which we apply here. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (“Not only does resolution of [foreign relations] issues frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government’s views.” (footnotes omitted)). Yet the Supreme Court has warned that it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action. Id. at 211-12. We, too, have emphasized that [n]ot every case “touching foreign relations” is nonjusticiable and judges should not reflexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat sensitive decisions in the context of human rights. We believe a preferable approach is to weigh carefully the relevant considerations on a case-by-case basis. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see also Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he doctrine is one of political questions, not one of political cases.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 13 While we readily acknowledge that the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to reach a holding identical to that of the case at bar, we nonetheless conclude, in light of the Court’s recent pronouncements and for the reasons elaborated below (1) that deference to the Executive is appropriate in certain cases and (2) that the case at bar is one such case. 21 In pursuing a “case-by-case” inquiry under the political question doctrine, we have consistently employed one or more of the “six independent tests” identified by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr: [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217); see also Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (applying the six Baker v. Carr tests before dismissing a FSIA claim on grounds of nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249 (relying on the six Baker v. Carr tests in a foreign relations context); Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (same). Our inquiry into the proper deference to be accorded to the United States Statement of Interest is guided by our application of the political question doctrine because this doctrine “reflect[s] the judiciary’s concerns regarding separation of powers,” Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.14 Our 14 Our dissenting colleague argues that by addressing the question of justiciability in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements regarding the appropriate scope of judicial deference to the Executive in the conduct of foreign relations, we “conflat[e]” two distinct strands of law, thereby “set[ting] a dangerous precedent.” Dissent, at [42]. Rather 22 resolution of this case under the political question doctrine is greatly reinforced by the historic deference due to the Executive in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States, as highlighted by the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Altmann and Sosa. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (recognizing the historic deference accorded to “decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities”).15 We further note that our decisions and those of other courts considering the application of the political question doctrine have properly relied on the views of the United States Government, as expressed in its statements of interest.16 See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250; see also Hwang Geum Joo, 413 F.3d at 48 than analyzing the broad language of Baker in a vacuum, however, it is appropriate that our political question analysis be informed by the well-established principles concerning the need for deference to the Executive Branch—one of the “coordinate branches of government” that is “due respect” within the Baker framework. 15 Nothing in this opinion should be understood to indicate that the D istrict Court may no t dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against parties that are not foreign sovereigns or instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns (and thus are not appellants here) under the “political question” doctrine. 16 We note that, in Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 200 4), the Elev enth Circ uit recently declined to dismiss a Holocaust-related claim against German banks on the basis of the “political question” doctrine, instead d ismissing th e claim o n the grou nds of international comity. In so hold ing, the court relied principally on a statement in the Agreement Concerning the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future,” July 17, 2000 , U.S.-F.R.G., Annex B, ¶ 7, 39 I.L.M. 1298, 1304, that “[t]he U nited States does not suggest that its policy interests concerning the Foundation in themselves provide an independent legal basis for dismissal” of the claims covered by the agreement. From this language, the Ungaro-Benages court concluded that the Executive has “pu rposely chose n not to settle” the claims and the refore signaled that pursuit of the claims in U nited States cou rts wou ld not “interfere with American foreign relations.” 379 F.3d at 1235-37. Although the precise language that the Eleventh Circuit found significant in Ungaro-Benages also appears in the executive agreements between the United States and Austria, we respectfully disagree with the Eleventh Circuit’s view that su ch a provision renders the “political question” doc trine inapplicable. It is tru e that the U nited States carefully declined to “suggest” in its agreements with Austria that its statements of interest would necessarily lead to the dismissal of all relevant litigation. Given the complexity of the issues at stake, this was an understandable and prudent clarification by the United States’ diplomatic representatives in a communication with a foreign State regarding the possible actions of the independent American judiciary under then-prevailing domestic United States law. But in declining to guarantee to Austria that courts would defer to its statements of interest, the United States surely did not express intent to waive the right to such deference. The United States never indicated that its foreign policy interests shou ld no t, as a m atter of law , lead to the dism issal of a claim covered by its executiv e agreements. Furtherm ore, the U nited States nev er stated that it wou ld not seek and, in its post-Altmann submission does indeed seek, dism issal on the basis of its foreign policy intere sts. See United States Supplemental Letter, at 1. That the United States 23 (deferring to the foreign policy views of the Executive Branch, as expressed “in a thorough and persuasive Statement of Interest”). We need not examine each of the six Baker tests in turn, for it is clear that this case meets the fourth test; in other words, “a court’s undertaking independent resolution” of this claim is impossible “without expressing lack of the respect due” the Executive Branch.17 To begin with, the foreign did not represent to Austria that its statements of interest would be accorded deference in every relevant judicial forum does not prec lude us from according d eference to the v iews of the United States in this case. Our dissenting colleague asserts that by dismissing this litigation, we will, in effect, grant by judicial fiat that which Au stria did not succeed in obtaining during the course of its negotiations with the United States G overnment. In the view of the dissent, this asserted undue benefit to Austria would do “more than what was anticipated in the agreement” and thereby “undermine[ ] the political balance clearly struck” by the Clinton Administration Dissent, at [37]. We d isagree for several reasons. First, the mere fact that, in the view of the dissent, the United States “could have guaranteed dism issal of dom estic claims against Austria,” Dissent, at [36], has no bearing on w hether, at this junc ture, it would be disruptive to U nited States foreign policy interests for this litigation to proceed; indee d, the United S tates’ international commitment to seek dismissal “on any valid legal ground” is entirely consistent with its view, then and now, that this litigation is harmful to U.S. foreign policy intere sts. Second, even if, arguendo, at the time of entering negotiations with Austria, the United States Department of State was not concerned about the precise ramifications of this litigation, intervening developments in foreign policy would provide an additional basis upon which the Executive Branch could now seek dismissal of this litigation. Third, representations by the United States in the course of diplomatic negotiations with the Austrian government were made against the backdrop of a legal landscape different from that w hich now prevails; to suggest tha t the U nited States is som ehow precluded from seek ing dismissal of this litigation because of its negotiating position with the Austrians would effectively subordinate the principles animating the political question doctrine to the undefined need to preserve the presumed “political balance” struck by a prior presidential administration in our country’s negotiations with a foreign state. (It is worth noting that, whereas our dissenting colleague reconstructs the United States’ negotiating strategy from a published memoir of a high-ranking Clinton administration official, our findings with respect to the foreign policy interests of the United States are drawn strictly from the formal litigation position asserted in this Court by the Executive Branch, including a sworn declaration, submitted in support of dismissal of these claims “in the enduring and high interest of the United States to vindicate [the GSF],” Eizenstat D eclaration ¶ 38, by the very official on whose inform al rec ollection our dissenting colleague relies.) 17 In applying this fourth Baker test, courts have been particularly attentive to the views of the United States Governm ent abou t the conse quences of proceeding with litigation . See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 250 (stating that the views of the Executive are entitled to “respectful consideration” in applying the fourth through sixth Baker tests, although these views “would not necessarily preclud e ad judication”); see also Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 556-57 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting “the Executive Bra nch’s co ntinuing silence on the H olocau st Survivors’ claim s,” but stating that “[h]ad the State Department expressed a view, that fact would certainly weigh in evaluating this fourth Baker form ulation”). Our decision here to rely principally on the fourth Baker test should not be taken to imply that w e agree with our dissenting colleague’s conclusion that “Wh iteman’s com plaint clearly would survive the other Baker tests.” See Dissent, at [31]. Moreover, the mere fact that the Supreme Court has indicated recently (and quite tentatively) that the Baker tests “are probably listed in descending order of both importance and certainty” provides no indication at all that the latter tests have somehow been repealed or are no longer proper grounds for application of the political question doctrine. See V ieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U .S. 267, 278 (2004); see also Alperin, 410 F.3d at 546 (focusing on first two Baker tests “because they are the m ost significant in the face of the specific allegations of the Co mplaint”). 24 policy interests asserted by the Executive with respect to plaintiffs’ particular claims are “due” the utmost “respect” because they are offered to us pursuant to executive agreements concluded in the exercise of the President’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs. As set forth above, see Background III(a), ante, fifty years of international negotiations have culminated in the signing of the GSF Agreement, which is accompanied by an exchange of diplomatic notes that constitutes an executive agreement between the Government of the United States and the Austrian Federal Government. See United States Statement of Interest, at 6 n.4. The President’s authority to settle claims through such executive agreements has long been recognized by courts, see, e.g., Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 415 (“[T]he President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by Congress, this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic.”), and acquiesced to by Congress, see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-82 (1981)—particularly where, as here, “the means chosen by the President . . . provided an alternative forum, . . . which is capable of providing meaningful relief,” id. at 686-87. The United States Government represents to us in this case that the GSF does not merely “provid[e] meaningful relief,” id. at 687, but indeed “provides the best mechanism for resolving claims such as plaintiffs’.” United States Supplemental Letter, at 8. We further conclude that “a court’s undertaking independent resolution” of plaintiffs’ claims would “express[ ] [a] lack of . . . respect,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, for the foreign policy interests of the United States as expressed in the GSF Agreement and elaborated upon in the United States Statement of Interest and Supplemental Letter. This is the “final case” holding up the implementation of the GSF. United States Supplemental Letter, at 6. In the almost five years since its initiation, this litigation has not moved beyond the threshold phase. See Background I-II, ante. Moreover, as the United States Statement of Interest underscores, “plaintiffs in this case face 25 numerous potential legal hurdles” in the future, including “justiciability, international comity, statutes of limitation, jurisdictional issues, forum non conveniens, as well as difficulties of proof inherent in these claims which originated more than 50 years ago and the various potential practical and legal obstacles to certification of a class of heirs.” United States Statement of Interest, at 22. Without commenting on the legal significance of these hurdles, we cannot disagree with the Government’s assertion that “[r]ecovery in this litigation is . . . by no means assured.” Id. In the meantime, the continued pendency of this case—and the consequent delay in the implementation of the GSF—“impedes the success of this important foreign policy initiative” and “threatens the foreign policy interests of the United States,” United States Supplemental Letter, at 6, most obviously the Government’s “important policy objective . . . to bring some measure of justice to Holocaust survivors and other victims of the Nazi era, who are elderly and are dying at an accelerated rate, in their lifetimes,” United States Statement of Interest, at 15 (emphasis added). We are also particularly mindful of the United States’ representation that the implementation of the GSF Agreement would advance the United States’ foreign relations with Austria, as well as with Israel and Western, Central, and Eastern European nations. See id. at 17-19; see also Background III(c), ante. These foreign policy interests—which, we are informed, have animated the Government’s “halfcentury effort” culminating in the signing of two recent executive agreements, United States Statement of Interest, at 19—are precisely ones that “defy judicial application,” “involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive,” and “uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government’s views,” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. In short, they counsel strongly in favor of deference to the Executive. We therefore hold that plaintiffs’ claims against Austria and its instrumentalities must be dismissed as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. In so holding, we defer to a United 26 States statement of foreign policy interests in this particular case, which is the one remaining litigation obstacle to the implementation of the GSF Agreement.18 We conclude that we cannot “undertak[e] independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due” the Executive Branch, id. at 217, because (1) the Executive Branch has exercised its authority to enter into executive agreements respecting the resolution of the claims in question; (2) the United States Government (a) has established through an executive agreement an alternative international forum for considering the 18 An “alternative” holding urged by the United States is that subject-matter jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claim s does no t lie under the FSIA. See Un ited S tates S upp lemental Letter, at 1; see also id. at 8-15. Alth ough this argu ment is both com plex and imp ortant, it need not be the first in our order of consid eration. W e have previously held that a federal court may consider “threshold” non-merits grounds for dismissing a claim—including, for example, deferenc e to the foreign affairs powers of the Execu tive pursuant to the “political question” doc trine—before determ ining whether it has subject-m atter jurisd iction to consider that claim. See Can v. United S tates, 14 F.3d 160, 162 n.1 (2d C ir. 1994). More rece ntly, the D istrict of Co lum bia C ircuit held that it “n eed not re solve the question of the d istrict court’s subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1330—that is, whether Japan is entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA— before considering whether the complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question.” Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 47-48 (D .C. Cir. 2005) (emp hasizing that “a dismissal under the political question doctrine” is not “an adjudication on the merits”) (internal citations omitted). In Hw ang Geum Joo— which involved a suit for dam ages against Japan alleging atrocities committed during World War II—the Court of Appeals applied the six tests set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U .S. 186 (19 62), as we do here, and co nclu ded tha t “[t]he Executive ’s judgm ent that adjudication by a domestic court would be inimical to the foreign policy interests of the United States is com pelling and renders this case nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.” Id. at 52; see also id. at 53 (hold ing that contravening the Executive ’s stated foreign policy intere sts “would be im prudent to a degree beyond [the court’s] power”); cf. Tenet v. Doe, 125 S. C t. 1230, 1235 n.4 (2005) (considering, before establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, the application of the Totten rule, which re quires dismissal of cases that d epend for their success on the existen ce of plaintiffs’ sec ret espion age relationship with the G overnm ent); Kowalski v. Tesmer, 125 S. Ct. 564, 567 (2004) (assuming A rticle III standing in order to “ad dress the alternative threshold question whether” attorneys had third-party standing to assert the rights of their current and future clie nts); Ruhrgas AG v. Mara thon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 578 (1999) (holding, in the context of cases removed from state to federal court, that “there is no unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy” that federal courts must follow in resolving certain threshold n on-m erits questions); Spargo v. N.Y. State Com m’n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that federal courts need not follow “a strict ‘sequencing of jurisdictional issues,’ as it does not violate separation of pow ers princ iples to dism iss an action on a no n-merits ground before finding su bject-m atter jurisdiction”). Acc ordingly, while w e apply the political question doctrine to the facts of this case, we express no opinion as to whether plaintiffs could, in the absence of the United S tates’ expressed foreign policy interests, bring their claims against Austria, a foreign sovereign, pursuant to any exceptions enumerated in the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-1607. Although our dissenting colleague suggests in passing that a foreign government’s expropriation of property belonging to its own nationals (as opp osed to aliens) vio lates “univ ersally rec ognized norms of international law,” Dissent, at [32], this propositio n is not free of doub t; indeed, it is, at a m inim um , a com plex and controversial que stion. Cf. Am erada H ess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine R epublic, 830 F.2d 421, 429 (2d Cir. 1987) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (noting the problem of allow ing jurisdiction to “ebb and flow w ith the vicissitudes of ‘evolving stand ards of international law’”), rev’d, 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 27 claims in question, and (b) has indicated to this Court that, as a matter of foreign policy, the alternative forum is superior to litigation; and (3) the United States foreign policy advanced by the executive agreement is substantially undermined by the continuing pendency of this case. Due to the “case-specific” nature of our “deference to the political branches,” Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21, we need not determine whether any one of these factors is necessary or sufficient for dismissal, and we merely conclude that the dismissal of a claim against a foreign sovereign is appropriate in the circumstances presented to us here.19