Opinion ID: 1868410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Medlin

Text: Long ago, we held in a prosecution for unlawful possession of liquor that [t]here must ... be a conscious and substantial possession by the accused, as distinguished from a mere involuntary or superficial possession. Reynolds v. State, 92 Fla. 1038, 1041, 111 So. 285, 286 (1926). However, since that time we have not been entirely clear on the issue in drug possession cases. Two of our decisions issued in 1973 are illustrative. In State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394 (Fla.1973), we quashed a district court decision which had found the evidence insufficient to sustain Medlin's conviction for unlawfully delivering an illegal drug to another, and explained: Defendant, in the instant case, is charged with the commission of the statutory offense of unlawfully delivering to another a barbiturate or central nervous system stimulant. Proof that defendant committed the prohibited act raised the presumption that the act was knowingly and intentionally done. Defendant then sought to prove lack of knowledge as to the nature of the drug delivered to Cathy Driggers. But the testimony of the Driggers girl, that he told her one capsule would make her go up and another pill was to be taken when she came down from the high, is evidence that defendant was aware of the nature of the drug involved. The proper arbiter was the jury. To reiterate, the State was not required to prove knowledge or intent since both were presumed from the doing of the prohibited act. Defendant's attempt, by way of defense, to prove lack of knowledge was rebutted by the Driggers girl's testimony which the jury was entitled to accept over that of the defendant. Id. at 397 (emphasis added). Medlin is the case most cited for the proposition that guilty knowledge is not an element of a simple possession crime. However, by our holding, we substantially begged the question of the nature of the guilty knowledge required by the statute. We held in Medlin that a jury question was presented as to whether the defendant was aware of the nature of the drug involved. Id. That is, we held that the State established a prima facie case and sufficient proof that the defendant was aware of the nature of the drug to get the case to the jury. That's a far cry from holding that guilty knowledge is unnecessary. Of course, if the defendant's awareness of the nature of the drug was not a necessary component of the crime, there would be no need for the jury to resolve that issue. Medlin stands for the proposition that evidence of actual, personal possession is enough to sustain a conviction. In other words, knowledge can be inferred from the fact of personal possession. Shortly after Medlin, we reversed a First District Court decision upholding a conviction for drug possession, and held the evidence was insufficient on the essential element of the defendant's knowledge of the contraband drug. See Smith v. State, 279 So.2d 27 (Fla.1973). It is apparent in Smith that we required proof of the knowledge of the contraband in order to sustain a conviction for simple possession. Of course, Smith was a joint possession case, and our comments requiring proof of the essential knowledge on the defendant's part must be taken in that context. Medlin and Smith mirror much of the confusion in the case law on the issue of guilty knowledge in drug possession cases.