Opinion ID: 1185095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: use of codefendant's confession

Text: Martin contends that it was error for the trial court to admit into evidence the incriminating confession of his co-defendant, Acton, where Acton did not take the stand at the trial. As authority, Martin cites Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Therein, petitioner Bruton and a co-defendant, Evans, were tried jointly before a jury and were both convicted of armed postal robbery. During the trial a postal inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed to him that Evans and Bruton committed the robbery. The trial court instructed the jury that although Evans' confession was competent evidence against Evans it was inadmissible hearsay against Bruton and, therefore, had to be disregarded in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. The Supreme Court held that the admission of the co-defendant's confession that implicated the defendant [Bruton] at the joint trial was prejudicial error, even though the trial court gave clear, concise, and understandable instructions that the confession could be used only against the co-defendant and had to be disregarded with respect to the defendant. The underlying reason behind the holding of prejudicial error was that the admission of the co-defendant's extra-judicial confession under these circumstances violated the defendant's right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the principles enunciated in Bruton v. United States were retroactive and applied to both federal and state cases. Hence, the holding of Bruton is applicable to the instant case. The facts in Roberts v. Russell were parallel to those in Bruton v. United States, except that Bruton involved a federal prosecution and Roberts a state prosecution. As we understand the cases, in neither case was there any evidence presented at the joint trial as to a confession by the defendant [i.e., the petitioner before the Supreme Court]; rather, the evidence as to confessions related only to the alleged confession of the co-defendant. In the instant case, however, evidence was presented as to the confessions of both defendant Martin and his co-defendant, Acton. The content of the confessions was substantially identical and there were no significant contradictions, or conflicts between, the two confessions. There was nothing in Acton's confession which enlarged upon Martin's own confession. Martin was as thoroughly incriminated before Acton's confession was introduced into evidence as he was after. Under these circumstances, we believe the holding in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), is applicable. That decision arose out of a murder trial in a California state court in which confessions of the petitioner's three co-defendants were introduced in evidence, with limiting instructions that the jury was to consider each confession only against the confessor. One of the co-defendants testified and was cross-examined by the petitioner's attorney, but the other two co-defendants did not testify. Petitioner was convicted of murder. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the use of the confessions of the co-defendants who did not testify amounted, under Bruton v. United States, to a denial of the petitioner's constitutional right of confrontation. However, the Court continued, the evidence supplied through such confessions was merely cumulative and the other evidence against the petitioner was so overwhelming that the Court could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that this denial of the petitioner's constitutional rights constituted harmless error. The opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Douglas, first stated that: We held in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.2d 1065, that `before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 395 U.S. at 251, 89 S.Ct. at 1727; 23 L.Ed.2d at 286. The opinion then reviewed the facts of the case as related to the admission of the confessions of the co-defendants at the trial. Based on these facts, the Court reached the following conclusion: [W]e conclude that on these special facts the lack of opportunity to cross-examine Cooper and Bosby constituted harmless error under the rule of Chapman.    Their evidence, supplied through their confessions, was of course cumulative. But apart from them the case against Harrington was so overwhelming that we conclude that this violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, unless we adopt the minority view in Chapman (386 U.S. at 42-45 [87 S.Ct. at 836-838], 17 L.Ed.2d at 720-723) that a departure from constitutional procedures should result in an automatic reversal, regardless of the weight of the evidence. It is argued that we must reverse if we can imagine a single juror whose mind might have been made up because of Cooper's and Bosby's confessions and who otherwise would have remained in doubt and unconvinced. We of course do not know the jurors who sat. Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury. We admonished in Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 [87 S.Ct. at 827], 17 L.Ed.2d at 710, against giving too much emphasis to `overwhelming evidence' of guilt, stating that constitutional errors affecting the substantial rights of the aggrieved party could not be considered to be harmless. By that test we cannot impute reversible weight to the two confessions. We do not depart from Chapman; nor do we dilute it by inference. We reaffirm it. We do not suggest that, if evidence bearing on all the ingredients of the crime is tendered, the use of cumulative evidence, though tainted, is harmless error. Our decision is based on the evidence in this record. The case against Harrington was not woven from circumstantial evidence. It is so overwhelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute harmless error, we must leave this state conviction undisturbed.  [Emphasis added.] 395 U.S. at 253-254, 89 S.Ct. at 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d at 287-288. As stated earlier, in the instant case there was nothing in Acton's confession which enlarged upon Martin's own confession. Martin was as thoroughly incriminated before Acton's confession was introduced into evidence as he was after. The case against Martin was so overwhelming that we conclude, under Harrington v. California, supra, that the use of Acton's confession was harmless error.