Opinion ID: 1187046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Should the trial court have ordered Manville to produce her interview with her attorneys' employee?

Text: Within a few days after the accident, Manville contacted her present attorneys for legal advice. Since two of the firm's attorneys were then in trials, the firm sent its full-time employee, Chuck Ward, to interview Manville so that they could provide her with legal advice and possible legal assistance in regard to that accident. It is undisputed that Ward was not an attorney. Ward interviewed Manville in her hospital room and tape recorded a portion of his conversation with her. This tape recording was transcribed and delivered to the firm's attorneys. The firm subsequently accepted Manville's case. During discovery, defendants ANWC and Pendley learned of the existence of Manville's statement and requested its production. Manville refused, claiming the document was privileged. ANWC and Pendley then moved for an order to compel production of the statement, maintaining that as an eyewitness statement, it was not protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product privilege. In its opposition to the motion, Manville made clear that she was not claiming the attorney work product privilege, but rather was relying solely on the attorney-client privilege. After oral argument, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, ANWC again asserts that Manville's statement was not protected by either the attorney-client or attorney work product privileges, and therefore, the trial court should have ordered its production. ANWC's claim that the court should have ordered the production of Manville's statement is without merit. Her statement is protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege as a confidential communication from Manville to her attorneys through their agent. [1] The trial in this case took place before the promulgation of the current Evidence Rules which now govern privilege questions. See Alaska Rule of Evidence 501-512. Therefore, former Civil Rule 43(h)(2) provided the basis for the attorney-client privilege: An attorney shall not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by his client to him, nor as to the attorney's advice given thereon, in the course of the attorney's professional employment. As this court has noted: The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote the freedom of consultation of legal advisors by clients by removing the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisors. United Service Automobile Association v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 31 (Alaska 1974). However, this desire to promote the consultation of attorneys through the use of the attorney-client privilege must be balanced against the need for the discovery of facts. As we have stated: Given our commitment to liberal pre-trial discovery, it follows that the scope of the attorney-client privilege should be strictly construed in accordance with its purpose. Id. This court has never directly ruled on the question of whether a statement of facts given by a prospective client to an attorney's agent is protected by the attorney-client privilege. For analysis, this issue may be more conveniently broken into three subissues.