Opinion ID: 1358987
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The district court plainly erred in using Booker's prior involuntary manslaughter conviction to enhance his sentence.

Text: Booker contends the district court should not have used his prior conviction for involuntary manslaughter to increase his offense level because it is not a crime of violence under the interpretation of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (ACCA) mandated by the Supreme Court in Begay v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). At the time of Booker's sentencing, case law made clear that involuntary manslaughter in Illinois was a crime of violence. However, eight months after the district court sentenced Booker, the Supreme Court decided Begay, which altered the landscape of recidivist enhancements. Following Begay, we recently held that a conviction for involuntary manslaughter in Illinois does not qualify as a crime of violence. United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 at 410-11, 2009 WL 2382700 at -11 (7th Cir.2009). Because that decision controls, Booker is entitled to resentencing. We note that Booker did not object to the enhancement in his plea agreement, but in light of Begay and our recent post- Begay precedent, the district court's sentencing enhancement was plain error. See United States v. High, 576 F.3d 429, at 431, 2009 WL 2382747, at  (7th Cir.2009) (under Begay and Woods the district court's classification of defendant's prior conviction as a violent felony was plain error); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).