Opinion ID: 75949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Florida's Motion to Intervene Intervention as of Right

Text: 27 Before a party can intervene as a matter of right, it must timely move to intervene. The proposed intervenor must show that it has an interest in the subject matter of the suit, that its ability to protect that interest may be impaired by the disposition of the suit, and that existing parties in the suit cannot adequately protect that interest. Since no party disputes that Florida timely filed its motion to intervene, we consider each of the remaining criteria in turn. 28
29 Florida argues that it has a direct, substantial and legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit because the relief Georgia requests, namely, an order compelling the Corps to increase the supply of water from Lake Lanier available for use by the city of Atlanta, will have a direct impact on Florida. If Georgia's water supply request is granted, more water will be diverted from Lake Lanier for municipal and industrial uses near Atlanta and additional releases will be authorized to permit increased wastewater discharges. Florida argues that those actions would adversely affect its downstream interests by hindering the continued existence of endangered or threatened species in Florida and reducing the stock of fish and seafood available for harvest in the Apalachicola River and Bay. 6 30 Moreover, Florida argues that a declaration that the Corps must immediately grant [Georgia's] water supply request would violate federal law requiring the Corps to prepare an environmental impact statement and ensure that its actions are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species in Florida. Georgia's lawsuit, Florida maintains, demands that the Corps act without regard to the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq. (ESA), and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (NEPA). Florida asserts that, because granting the water supply request would have a negative impact upon the continued existence of endangered or threatened species in Florida, it should be permitted to defend against Georgia's claim that any law impeding its request is unconstitutional. 31 Florida further argues that its membership in the ACF Compact confers additional rights with regard to the subject matter of Georgia's suit. The Compact states that 32 [i]t is the intent of the parties to this Compact to develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin among the states while protecting the water quality, ecology and biodiversity of the ACF, as provided in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sections 1251 et seq., the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. Sections 1532 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 et seq., the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. Sections 401 et seq., and other applicable federal laws. 33 ACF Compact, Art. VII. Florida argues that the litigation contravenes the congressional intent of the ACF Compact as well as the intent of the state party signatories to the Compact. Because the Compact deals with the same subject matter as Georgia's litigation, Florida claims that it has a clear, protectable interest in the litigation. Florida argues that the litigation improperly interferes with the congressional intent of the ACF Compact, because it is through Compact negotiations that disputes concerning the ACF basin are to be resolved. 34 Georgia replies that this case involves the allocation of water in Lake Lanier between water supply and hydropower generation, and the outcome will not affect Georgia's obligation to deliver to Florida its equitable share of water. Georgia admits that the outcome of the litigation may make it more difficult for Georgia to deliver to Florida its equitable share, but contends that it will not affect the amount of water that Georgia is legally obligated to deliver to Florida. 7 Georgia further argues that the possibility that the litigation will have an indirect impact on Florida's economic interest is insufficient to establish that Florida has a legally protectable interest that would justify intervention, citing United States v. South Florida Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir.1991) (By requiring that the applicant's interest be ... `legally protectable,' it is plain that something more than an economic interest is necessary. What is required is that the interest be one which the substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant. (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464 (5th Cir.1984)) (emphasis in original)). 35 To determine whether Florida possesses the requisite interest for intervention purposes, we look to the subject matter of the litigation. Georgia claims that it only seeks an intrastate apportionment of water and a declaration of the Corps' obligations with regard to intrastate water. For intervention purposes, Florida's interests need not, however, be of a legal nature identical to that of the claims asserted in the main action. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1214 (11th Cir.1989) (quotations omitted). Although the remedy sought in Georgia's lawsuit may occur within Georgia's borders, it will have a practical effect upon water flowing in the Chattahoochee River, water that is part of the ACF basin and to which Florida has a right. Initially, Georgia seeks an order compelling the Corps to grant the water supply request, which would allow Georgia to increase withdrawals for municipal and industrial purposes. Unlike releases for the generation of hydroelectricity, where the water used is discharged into the Chattahoochee and continues its southward flow, water released for municipal purposes is consumed and not discharged into the river. Further, Georgia seeks additional releases from Lake Lanier to assimilate increased wastewater discharges. That wastewater would flow downstream to Florida. 36 We find that Florida has a legally protectable interest in the quality and quantity of water in the Apalachicola River and Bay. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104, 58 S.Ct. 803, 82 L.Ed. 1202 (1938) (The river throughout its course in both states is but a single stream, wherein each state has an interest which should be respected by the other.) (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466, 42 S.Ct. 552, 66 L.Ed. 999 (1922)); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-43, 51 S.Ct. 478, 75 L.Ed. 1104 (1931) (stating that an interstate stream offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have power over it and that, although an upstream state has the physical power to cut off all the water within its jurisdiction[,] clearly the exercise of such a power to the destruction of the interest of lower States could not be tolerated [because b]oth States have real and substantial interests in the River that must be reconciled as best they may). That interest exists irrespective of Florida's participation in the ACF Compact. Indeed, a state's right to an equitable apportionment of water flowing through an interstate stream located within its borders is well established. Whenever the action of one State reaches, through the agency of natural laws, into the territory of another State, the question of the extent and the limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a matter of justiciable dispute between them. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98, 27 S.Ct. 655, 51 L.Ed. 956 (1907). 37 Because of the interrelatedness of the Chattahoochee and the Apalachicola, and the impact of diverting more water from Lake Lanier for municipal purposes and permitting additional releases to accommodate increased wastewater discharges, we find that Florida's interest in the water in the ACF Basin could be affected by the resolution of Georgia's lawsuit. 8 Thus, we turn to the question of whether the outcome of this litigation will, as a practical matter, impair Florida's ability to protect those rights.
38 Georgia argues that, even if Florida has a legal interest sufficient for intervention, it is still not entitled to intervention because the disposition of this action will not impair or impede Florida's ability to protect that interest by means both of the ACF Compact negotiations and by filing an original action in the United States Supreme Court. See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104, 58 S.Ct. 803 (describing the two means provided by the Constitution for adjusting interstate controversies). Georgia argues that its lawsuit does not seek to enjoin or interfere with the ACF Compact process in any way. 39 Initially, we note that the Compact addresses the possibility that one or more of the parties will seek to increase its water consumption while negotiations are pending. Article VII of the ACF Compact specifically provides that 40 any person who is withdrawing, diverting, or consuming water resources of the ACF Basin as of the effective date of this Compact ... may increase the amount of water resources withdrawn, diverted or consumed to satisfy reasonable increases in the demand of such person for water between the effective date of this Compact and the date on which an allocation formula is approved by the ACF Basin Commission as permitted by applicable law. Each of the state parties to this compact further agree to provide written notice to each of the other parties to this compact in the event any person increases the withdrawal, diversion or consumption of such water resources by more than 10 million gallons per day on an average annual daily basis, or in the event any person who was not withdrawing, diverting or consuming any water resources from the ACF Basin as of the effective date of this Compact, seeks to withdraw, divert or consume more resources from the ACF Basin as of the effective date of this compact, seeks to withdraw, divert or consume more than one million gallon per day on an annual daily basis from such resources. This Article shall not be construed as granting any permanent, vested or perpetual rights to the amounts of water used between January 3, 1992 and the date on which the Commission adopts an allocation formula. 41 ACF Compact, Art. VII. It is not clear, however, what impact an order compelling the Corps to enter the long-term contracts Georgia seeks in this lawsuit would have on the Compact negotiations. 42 More importantly, however, even if no vested right under the Compact is achieved pursuant to this lawsuit, there exists the possibility that the historical pattern of extending the Compact deadline will continue and that the three states will remain at an impasse regarding the allocation of water. In that event, should Georgia prevail in its lawsuit, any negative impact upon the Apalachicola resulting from increased withdrawals from Lake Lanier would continue unabated for the duration of the impasse. Since the Compact requires the agreement of all three states — which cannot be compelled — it does not provide Florida a meaningful ability to protect its interests in this regard. Thus, the disposition of this action could impair or impede Florida's interests until such time, if any, that the parties reach agreement under the Compact. 9 43 Georgia alternatively argues that Florida can adequately protect its rights through an original action in the Supreme Court of the United States. Florida acknowledges that it could seek an equitable apportionment of the waters of the ACF Basin in a proceeding under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but it argues that the Court would almost certainly decline to exercise its jurisdiction over a matter that is presently being negotiated pursuant to a Compact created to achieve that same purpose. Florida further argues that in an equitable apportionment action, the Court would not re-adjudicate any issues already litigated in the district court, since an equitable apportionment action weighs the competing equities existing at the time the case is brought. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618, 65 S.Ct. 1332, 89 L.Ed. 1815 (1945). Florida thus suggests that if Georgia were successful in its suit against the Corps, the Supreme Court would honor the district court's decision that the Corps was obligated to grant Georgia's water supply request. Presumably — although Florida does not plainly say so — that could result in the Supreme Court deciding that Florida is entitled to less water than it would be entitled to absent a district court decision ordering the Corps to grant Georgia's water supply request. 44 Georgia replies that, if Florida could prove the requisite harm, the Supreme Court would exercise its jurisdiction and that, in so doing, proceedings in the Court would address a different issue than the issue in the present case — the Supreme Court would adjudicate Florida's rights to a certain quantity of water at the state line, which is not an issue before the district court. This response, however, does not address whether the Supreme Court might, as a practical matter, reach a different conclusion about Florida's equitable share if the district court in this case were to rule that the Corps is required to grant Georgia's water supply request. 45 There is a significant question regarding whether the Supreme Court would exercise its jurisdiction over an equitable apportionment action brought by Florida while the Compact is in effect and there is no proven shortage of water. Indeed, the Supreme Court has substantial discretion to make case-by-case judgments as to the practical necessity of an original forum in [the Supreme] Court for particular disputes within [its] constitutional original jurisdiction, Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983), and none of the equitable apportionment cases decided by the Supreme Court has ever been brought while an interstate compact was being negotiated. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that its original jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly. Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 76, 113 S.Ct. 549, 121 L.Ed.2d 466 (1992). In deciding whether to accept an action within its original jurisdiction, the Court considers the nature of the interest of the complaining State and the availability of an alternative forum in which the issue tendered can be resolved. Id. at 77, 113 S.Ct. 549. 10 Thus, Florida has no clear-cut and compulsory right to be heard by the Supreme Court. As long as the members of the Compact continue to negotiate, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would choose to hear an equitable apportionment claim involving the ACF Basin. And, although Florida can cause the Compact to expire by refusing to sign further extensions, termination of the Compact requires consent of all three signatory states. ACF Compact, Art. VIII. Given the string of contingencies involved in determining whether Florida would even be able to bring an original action in the Supreme Court, we cannot say with certainty that Florida would be able to protect its interests through an equitable apportionment claim. 46 Moreover, assuming the Court did take jurisdiction of a future case filed by Florida, the resolution of Georgia's lawsuit might adversely affect Florida's future lawsuit. While the Supreme Court will take into account existing uses, it would not necessarily honor water rights obtained by a state or private entity prior to an equitable apportionment action. The doctrine of equitable apportionment is neither dependent on nor bound by existing legal rights to the resource being apportioned ... although existing legal entitlements are important factors in formulating an equitable decree, such legal rights must give way in some circumstances to broader equitable considerations. Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1025, 103 S.Ct. 2817, 77 L.Ed.2d 387 (1983). At the same time, the Supreme Court has also said that it recognize[s] that the equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually be compelling. The harm that may result from disrupting established uses is typically certain and immediate. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 187, 103 S.Ct. 539, 74 L.Ed.2d 348 (1982). If Georgia wins, its use of any additional amount of water from Lake Lanier might be considered established, and Florida then would have to overcome this existing economy. 47 Thus, Florida has proven that the disposition of this action may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect its interest in the waters of the ACF Basin as required by Rule 24(a)(2).
48 The proposed intervenor has the burden of showing that the existing parties cannot adequately represent its interest, but this burden is treated as minimal. Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458, 461 (11th Cir.1999) (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n. 10, 92 S.Ct. 630, 30 L.Ed.2d 686 (1972)). Florida's interest is to ensure that Georgia's actions do not deprive Florida of its equitable share of water. That interest is not represented by the Corps, which has no independent stake in how much water reaches the Apalachicola. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (5th Cir.1994) (finding that the government did not adequately represent the interests of timber purchasers). 49 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's denial of Florida's motion for intervention as of right, and thus need not address the issue of permissive intervention. 11