Opinion ID: 2746197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: ¶6 Appellants argue that the issue of whether the District Court erred by transferring venue to Missoula County presents a question of law. They contend that de novo review is appropriate. On the other hand, L.S.P. argues that the permissive nature of § 72-1-203(3), MCA, the controlling statute, indicates that transfer of venue was a matter of discretion. As such, L.S.P. contends that review for abuse of discretion is appropriate. ¶7 Section 72-1-203(3), MCA, states: “If a court finds that, as a matter of law or in the interest of justice, a proceeding or a file should be located in another court of this state, the court making the finding may transfer the proceeding or file to the other court” (emphasis added). When interpreting a statute, we give words and phrases their ordinary meaning. Given its ordinary meaning, we have held that the use of the word “may” generally denotes a permissive or discretionary choice. See, e.g., Gaustad v. City of Columbus, 265 Mont. 379, 381, 877 P.2d 470, 471 (1994). Yet, this is not always the case. When the word “may” is used to confer power upon the court, and the public has an interest in the exercise of the power, then the exercise of the power becomes imperative. State v. Swann, 2007 MT 126, ¶ 18, 337 Mont. 326, 160 P.3d 511. As it is used in § 72-1-203(3), MCA, the word “may” confers power upon the district court to transfer venue, but the public does not have an interest in the exercise of that power. Instead, venue is a personal privilege of the defendant. 3 It is merely a statutory device designed to facilitate and balance the objectives of optimum convenience for the parties and witnesses and efficient allocation of judicial resources. In re Support Obligation of McGurran, 2002 MT 144, ¶¶ 13-14, 310 Mont. 268, 49 P.3d 626. Thus, the use of “may” in § 72-1-203(3), MCA, makes transfer of venue in guardianship proceedings a matter of discretion for the District Court. We review discretionary decisions for an abuse of discretion. E.g., BNSF Ry. Co. v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 2010 MT 46, ¶ 7, 355 Mont. 296, 228 P.3d 1115.