Opinion ID: 2638938
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Department of Employment's Jurisdiction to Hear Mr. Rohde's Wage Claim

Text: [¶13] Diamond B Services insists that the Department did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rohde's claim for unpaid wages. We will consider this issue first because subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of such magnitude. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is so fundamental that it cannot be waived, can be raised on the court's own motion, and can be raised at any time, even on appeal. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Blury-Losolla , 952 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Wyo. 1998). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Lacey v. Lacey, 925 P.2d 237, 238 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 903 (Wyo. 1977)). Like a court, an administrative agency is required to have subject matter jurisdiction before it can hear a case. Bruns v. TW Services, Inc., 2001 WY 127, ¶16, 36 P.3d 608, 613-14 (Wyo. 2001). The determination of whether the agency has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Director of the Office of State Lands & Investments, Board of Land Commissioners v. Merbanco, Inc., 2003 WY 73, ¶7, 70 P.3d 241, 246 (Wyo. 2003). [¶14] The Department derives its subject matter jurisdiction to hear wage claims from statute. There are two statutes which pertain to the Department's authority to resolve Mr. Rohde's wage claim  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-4-502 and § 27-4-104 (LexisNexis 2005). Section 27-4-502 states: The department is hereby empowered to take claims for unpaid wages under the provisions of W.S. 27-4-101 and 27-4-104. The department in taking a claim for unpaid wages as provided for in this act is not to exceed the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or two (2) months wages, whichever is the greater, per employee per wage claim. Section 27-4-104 pertains to wage claims from employees who quit or are discharged from their positions. That provision provides, in pertinent part: (a) Whenever an employee quits the service or is discharged, the employee shall be paid whatever wages are due him in lawful money of the United States of America, or by check or draft which can be cashed at a bank, within five (5) working days of the date of termination of employment. The employer may offset from any monies due the employee as wages, any sums due the employer from the employee which have been incurred by the employee during his employment. . . . (b) Whenever an employee who has quit or has been discharged from service has cause to bring suit for wages earned and due, and shall establish in court the amount which is justly due, the court shall allow to the plaintiff interest on the past due wages at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum from the date of discharge or termination, together with a reasonable attorney fee and all costs of suit. . . . [¶15] To resolve this issue, we must interpret the relevant statutory provisions. Our statutory interpretation rules are well-known: We first decide whether the statute is clear or ambiguous. This Court makes that determination as a matter of law. A `statute is unambiguous if its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability.' A `statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations.' Powder River Coal Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 2002 WY 5, ¶6, 38 P.3d 423, 426 (Wyo. 2002) (citations omitted). State ex rel. Dep't. of Revenue v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶16, 18 P.3d 1182, 1187 (Wyo. 2001). If, on the other hand, the Court determines that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation to help it determine the legislature's intent. Shippy v. Rogers (In re Estate of Kirkpatrick), 2003 WY 125, ¶7, 77 P.3d 404, 406 (Wyo. 2003). It is a basic rule of statutory construction that courts may try to determine legislative intent by considering the type of statute being interpreted and what the legislature intended by the language used, viewed in light of the objects and purposes to be accomplished. Furthermore, when we are confronted with two possible but conflicting conclusions, we will choose the one most logically designed to cure the mischief or inequity that the legislature was attempting to accomplish. Id., quoting Collicott v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div. , 2001 WY 35, ¶9, 20 P.3d 1077, 1080-81 (Wyo. 2001). While considering the statutory language, we give effect to every word, clause and sentence, and construe them in pari materia . Kunkle v. State ex rel., Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2005 WY 49, ¶11, 109 P.3d 887, 889-90 (Wyo. 2005); Pedro/Aspen, Ltd. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 2004 WY 84, ¶27, 94 P.3d 412, 420 (Wyo. 2004). [¶16] Focusing on the word take in § 27-4-502, Diamond B Services insists that the legislature limited the Department's authority by allowing it to hear only wage claims which have a value of $500 or two months wages, whichever is greater. Larger claims, argues Diamond B Services, must be resolved through civil suit, which is allowed by § 27-4-104(b). [2] The Department interpreted its statutory authority differently. It concluded that it can hear wage claims of any amount, but it is limited to awarding two months salary or $500, whichever is greater. [¶17] In accordance with our rules of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute. In the first sentence of § 27-4-502, the Department is empowered to take claims for unpaid wages under the provisions of § 27-4-104. Section 27-4-104 allows a separated employee to bring a suit for any wages earned and due which are not paid within five days after termination of the employment relationship. The second sentence of § 27-4-502 limits the Department's authority by stating that [t]he department in taking a claim for unpaid wages as provided for in this act is not to exceed the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) or two (2) months wages, whichever is the greater, per employee per wage claim. The question then, is whether the legislature intended that the Department entertain only claims involving $500 or two months wages, whichever is greater, or if it simply meant to limit the amount it could award for unpaid wages. [¶18] Take is defined by Black's Law Dictionary 1492 (8th ed. (1999)) as to obtain possession or control. To the extent the statute in one part seems to give the Department jurisdiction over all unpaid wage claims and then, in another part, states that in taking the claim it is limited to a certain monetary amount, we conclude that it is ambiguous. We must, therefore, turn to our typical statutory interpretation tools to determine whether the Department has jurisdiction over claims which exceed two months salary. [¶19] Section 27-4-104 is an old statute, having first been adopted in 1919, when courts almost exclusively exercised judicial powers. See A. Aman & W. Mayton, Administrative Law, Introduction, 1-8, 118-20 (2000) (generally discussing the history of administrative law and the growth of administrative agency adjudicatory powers). Over time, the Wyoming Legislature empowered some administrative agencies with the authority to make adjudicatory decisions in contested case hearings. See e.g., Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101, et seq. (LexisNexis 2003). Following this trend, in 1971 the legislature enacted § 27-4-502, thereby providing employees with an administrative procedure to recover unpaid wages. [3] [¶20] When considered in pari materia, the wage collection statutes emphasize the importance of an employee's right to the prompt payment of wages. Jensen v. Fremont Motors Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, ¶21, 58 P.3d 322, 328 (Wyo. 2002). The statutes provide several tools to aid the employee in recovering wages rightfully due to him, including the expedited contested case process before the Department and authorizing the county attorney to assist the employee in collecting wages which the Department has declared must be paid. Sections 27-7-504 through 506. [¶21] The legislature is, however, also cognizant of the fact that contested case proceedings are different than court proceedings. See e.g., Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act, § 16-3-101, et seq. In general, contested case proceedings have more lenient rules of evidence and procedures than formal court proceedings. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-3-107 through 109 (LexisNexis 2005). See also, Lunde v. State ex rel., Wyo. Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 6 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Wyo. 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that the legislature recognized the limitation of administrative processes by placing a limit on the amount the Department could award to an employee after a contested case proceeding. [¶22] Many of these same principles were evaluated in Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943 (Wyo. 1963). In that case, the landlord sought to eject a tenant from his property and collect $600 in unpaid rents. Id. at 943-45. At that time, exclusive jurisdiction for forcible entry and detainer suits lay in the justice of the peace courts. Id. The justice of the peace court's monetary jurisdiction was, however, limited to $200. Id. at 950. We recognized that the legislature's principal objective in enacting the forcible entry and detainer statutes was to give landlords a summary remedy against tenants who hold over after their tenancy has expired. Id . at 949. The legislature did not intend to deny a landlord, who was owed more than $200 in rent, the opportunity to use the abridged procedure provided in the forcible entry and detainer statute. Id. [¶23] We recognized, however, that the legislature had placed a monetary limit on the justice of the peace court's jurisdiction. In resolving this conundrum, we stated that, although a judgment by the justice of the peace court for an amount of rent due in excess of its monetary jurisdiction would be erroneous, a mere finding of the amount of rent due, even though that amount be in excess of the jurisdictional limitation would be lawful. Id. at 950. Thus, the justice of the peace court could order that the tenant vacate the property, find the amount of rent due, and award the landlord a judgment for unpaid rent up to the amount of its statutory jurisdiction. Id. This rationale was confirmed more recently in Jessen v. Burry, 13 P.3d 1118, 1121 (Wyo. 2000). [¶24] Considering this precedent, together with the purposes of the wage collection statutes, we conclude that the Department's interpretation of its statutory authority is correct. The Department may hear wage claims of any amount, but it is limited to awarding two months salary or $500, whichever is greater. [¶25] In making this ruling, we do not want to give the impression that we are weakening the amount in controversy requirement for subject matter jurisdiction. When a statute clearly states an amount in controversy requirement, it must be enforced. In Mutual of Omaha, 952 P.2d at 1120, we discussed the amount in controversy limitations upon the county court's (now known as the circuit court) jurisdiction. When the question of subject matter jurisdiction revolves around the amount claimed, this court has established the following determinative rules: (1) the sum claimed, rather than the amount eventually recovered, controls unless the amount claimed was not done in good faith; (2) to find a lack of good faith, it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than $7,000.00; (3) the amount is determined as of the time the action is commenced; and (4) a plaintiff cannot control jurisdiction between the county and district court by setting forth an improper amount in the prayer for relief. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, if we were to interpret § 27-4-502 as stating an amount in controversy jurisdictional requirement, we would have to agree with Diamond B Services' argument that the Department did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Rohde's wage claim because it exceeded the statutory limit. Our ruling here, however, is that § 27-4-502 does not limit the claims the Department can hear, it simply limits the amount it can award for each unpaid wage claim. The Department correctly ruled that it had the authority to consider and decide Mr. Rohde's wage claim, but that it was limited to awarding a maximum of two months worth of wages.