Opinion ID: 3173899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: R.’s age, see J.A. 647.

Text: 15 each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” United States v. Martin, 523 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304). Because the Blockburger analysis is a “rule of statutory construction,” it “should not be controlling where . . . there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.” United States v. Allen, 13 F.3d 105, 108 (4th Cir. 1993) (omission in original) (quoting Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 691 (1980), and Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981)). Under Blockburger, sexual abuse of a minor is a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor by force. Section 2243(a) proscribes sexual abuse of a minor: Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who-- (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years younger than the person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. Section 2241(a) proscribes aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat: Whoever, in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act-- (1) by using force against that other person; or (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. 16 Section 2241(c) provides for a thirty-year mandatory minimum sentence when the victim of aggravated sexual abuse is a minor, including when the victim “has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years (and is at least 4 years younger than [the offender]).” Because § 2241(c) imposes a mandatory minimum penalty for aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat when the victim is a minor, age of the victim is an element of the offense that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013). As the government concedes, because the only difference between the two offenses is the additional requirement under § 2241(a)(1) that force be proved to establish aggravated sexual abuse, the § 2243(a) offenses are merely lesser included offenses of the greater § 2241(a), (c) offenses. Suppl. Br. Appellee 1. “It has long been understood that separate statutory crimes need not be identical either in constituent elements or in actual proof in order to be the same within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition.” Brown, 432 U.S. at 164 (citations omitted). A greater offense and a lesser included offense are the “same” offense for double jeopardy purposes because the lesser included offense “requires no proof beyond that which is required for conviction of the greater [offense].” Id. at 168. 17 The government nonetheless contends that Nielsen’s convictions do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause because Congress intended to authorize separate punishments for sexual abuse of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse of a minor by force. However, it can point to nothing in the legislative history of either statute evincing “a clear indication of contrary legislative intent” to impose multiple punishments for the same offense. Allen, 13 F.3d at 108 (quoting Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340). And the cases on which the government relies were decided based on a Blockburger analysis of the two statutes prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne and are therefore inapposite. See United States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1297 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Amos, 952 F.2d 992, 994 (8th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds, United States v. Allery, 175 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Morsette, 858 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1052–53 (D.N.D. 2012). We therefore see no reason to deviate from the result of the Blockburger analysis here. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court should have merged the offenses so that Nielsen would have only been convicted of, and sentenced for, the greater § 2241(a), (c) offense in connection with each of the four charged instances of abuse. See United States v. Jones, 204 F.3d 541, 544 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Brown, 432 U.S. at 169) (holding that district 18 court erred in imposing separate sentence for lesser included offense). In failing to do so, the district court erred. B. Nielsen, however, failed to preserve this issue for appeal. While Nielsen argues that the multiplicity error was not apparent until the district court charged the jury with the allegedly erroneous force instruction, the multiplicity error we identify above was apparent on the face of the indictment, yet was never raised before the district court. Pursuant to the version of Rule 12 in effect at the time of Nielsen’s trial, Nielsen’s challenge to the indictment is waived because he did not raise it in a pretrial motion, although “relief from the waiver” may be granted “[f]or good cause.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B), (e) (2011). Under the circumstances of this case, where the error is so obvious that the government now concedes that § 2243(a) is a lesser included offense of § 2241(a), (c) under Blockburger and Nielsen attempted to raise a multiplicity challenge during trial, we exercise our discretion to relieve Nielsen of his waiver under Rule 12 and review the multiplicity error discussed above under plain error review. See United States v. Bennafield, 287 F.3d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–32 (1993)). Under plain error review, a defendant must demonstrate that “an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error 19 affected his substantial rights.” Id. (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). An error is plain if it is “clear” or “obvious,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, and it affects substantial rights if it prejudices the defendant, Bennafield, 287 F.3d at 322 (citing United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235, 240 (4th Cir. 1998)). Correction of the error is at our discretion, which we exercise only when the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citation omitted). Nielsen’s multiplicitous convictions satisfy these requirements. That the § 2243(a) and § 2241(a), (c) counts shared all elements besides force is clear and obvious from the face of the indictment and from the district court’s instructions to the jury. The multiplicity error resulted in Nielsen’s conviction and sentencing on eight counts instead of four, including eight concurrent terms of imprisonment (and supervised release) and special assessment fees on eight convictions instead of four, and was therefore prejudicial to him. See United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing how even concurrent sentences on duplicative convictions are improper); United States v. Leftenant, 341 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2003) (vacating all but one of multiplicitous sentences and special assessments). And finally, because the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public 20 reputation of judicial proceedings,” Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citation omitted), we should exercise our discretion to correct it. When “a federal court exceeds its own authority by imposing multiple punishments not authorized by Congress, it violates not only the specific guarantee against double jeopardy, but also the constitutional principle of separation of powers in a manner that trenches particularly harshly on individual liberty.” Whalen, 445 U.S. at 689. The imposition of multiplicitous convictions and sentences in this case was therefore plain error.