Opinion ID: 691304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Secretary of State's duty under Sec. 106 of the NHPA

Text: 11 The plaintiffs argue that the Secretary of State's failure to disapprove Turkey's proposal under Sec. 205 of the FMA constitutes an undertaking within the meaning of Sec. 106 of the NHPA  and that, therefore, the Secretary was required to afford the ACHP a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposal. As discussed below, no tenable reading of the statute supports such a view. At most, Turkey's project--not the Secretary's failure to disapprove it--is an undertaking within the meaning of Sec. 106. In any event, the statute applies only to an undertaking that receives federal funding or a federal license, and Turkey's chancery project received neither. 12
13 Section 106 requires each federal agency to take into account the effect of [a proposed] undertaking upon historic properties and to afford the [ACHP] a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to such undertaking prior to the agency's funding or licensing it. Accordingly, federal authority to fund or to license a project can render the project an undertaking, but the decision of the funding or licensing agency is not itself an undertaking. The plaintiffs' contrary suggestion is peculiar indeed. If the Secretary's decision by inaction not to disapprove Turkey's proposal under the FMA were an undertaking, then so too would be every decision he makes. The plaintiffs have no interest, however, in having the ACHP review the internal decision-making process of the State Department; their interest is in having the ACHP review Turkey's plan to demolish and reconstruct its chancery before the State Department considers the proposal. 14 The State Department's failure to disapprove Turkey's proposal may have been a prerequisite to Turkey's project going forward, but it cannot itself be an undertaking within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, if Sec. 106 applies to this case, it is only because the demolition and reconstruction of Turkey's chancery is an undertaking and is funded or licensed by the Secretary. 15
16 In 1990, when the Secretary of State could have but did not disapprove Turkey's proposal, the NHPA defined an undertaking by indirection, viz., as any action as described in [Sec. 106 of the Act]. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7) (1988). In 1992, however, the Congress amended the definition of undertaking in the NHPA to read in pertinent part as follows: 17 Undertaking means a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including ... (c) those requiring a Federal permit[,] license, or approval.... 18 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7) (Supp. IV 1992). The plaintiffs argue that this definition applies retroactively to Turkey's proposal, and that the Secretary's authority to disapprove the proposed project rendered it a project ... requiring a Federal permit[,] license, or approval--in short, an undertaking. 19 The question whether the new definition applies retroactively to Turkey's project is complicated by the timing of the amendment. It was enacted after the time for the Secretary's review had passed--indeed, it was enacted after the plaintiffs had filed this suit in district court. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (holding statutes that would impair rights a party possessed when he acted ... or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed should not be applied retroactively absent an indication of clear congressional intent to the contrary). Rather than explore the mysteries of retroactivity doctrine as applied to these facts, however, we will assume for the sake of the plaintiffs' argument that the 1992 definition applies, for even under that version of the statute the plaintiffs fall short of their mark. 20 Upon a first reading, the amended definition seems actually to confine the notion of an undertaking to a project (etc.) funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a federal agency, and thus by omission to exclude a federally licensed project from the coverage of the statute. That reading of the definition, however, would deprive the references to licensing in Sec. 106 of any practical effect. We infer, therefore, that the amending Congress intended to expand the definition of an undertaking--formerly limited to federally funded or licensed projects--to include projects requiring a federal permit or merely federal approval. 21 Of course, the Secretary was not called upon by the FMA to approve Turkey's proposal, but rather to disapprove it or not, as he saw fit. Other things being equal, we are hesitant to conclude that failure to disapprove means approve in this context, where the result would be to impose a regulatory burden upon the Secretary of State and, more important, to intrude into his conduct of the Nation's foreign relations. The plaintiffs argue, however, that we should overcome our reluctance to decide the question against the Secretary because the ACHP--to which we extend substantial even if not full deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), see McMillan Park Committee v. National Capital Planning Commission, 968 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (D.C.Cir.1992)--regards his failure to disapprove as an approval under the amended definition of undertaking in 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7)(c). Here the plaintiffs direct us first to a letter from the ACHP to the State Department dated August 25, 1988, opining that the Secretary was required by Sec. 106 to submit Turkey's proposal to the ACHP and to a recent notice of proposed rulemaking in which the ACHP proposes to amend the definition of undertaking in its regulations under the NHPA specifically to include any project that requires a Federal permit, license[,] or approval, including agency authority to disapprove or veto the project. 59 Fed.Reg. 50396, 50404 (October 3, 1994); see also 36 C.F.R. Sec. 800.2(o). First, the ACHP's 1988 letter to the Secretary proffered its interpretation of Sec. 106 prior to the amendment of the definition of undertaking in 1992. Yet the plaintiffs have not argued, even in the alternative, that Turkey's project is an undertaking under that definition. Second, it is far from obvious that the court should defer to an agency's proposed interpretation, upon which it is still considering public comments. 22 As it turns out, however, we need not decide whether the ACHP's interpretation of undertaking warrants our deference. For as shown below, even if Turkey's project is an undertaking within the meaning of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470w(7), the Secretary was still not required to submit the proposal to the ACHP because the Secretary neither has authority to license nor has he issu[ed] any license for Turkey's undertaking, as is required for Sec. 106 to apply. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f. 23
24 The plaintiffs--and indeed the ACHP, see, e.g., 59 Fed.Reg. 50396, and some other courts, see, e.g., Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce, 714 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.1983)--proceed as if the review provision of Sec. 106 automatically applies once a project is deemed an undertaking. Such confusion is understandable; for the 1992 amendment oddly appends the concepts of licensing and approval to the definition of undertaking, even though the text of Sec. 106 still applies by its terms only to federally funded or federally licensed undertakings. Thus however broadly the Congress or the ACHP define undertaking, Sec. 106 applies only to: 1) any Federal agency having ... jurisdiction over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking; and 2) any Federal ... agency having authority to license any undertaking. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 470f. Such an agency is required, as the case may be, either to take certain actions prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the undertaking, or prior to the issuance of any license. See Lee v. Thornburgh, 877 F.2d 1053, 1056-57 (D.C.Cir.1989). Therefore, unless Turkey's efforts to replace its chancery are either federally funded or federally licensed, Sec. 106 simply does not apply to its project. 25 The plaintiffs do not suggest that Turkey's project will receive any federal funds; therefore, Sec. 106 applies only if the State Department licensed the project when the Secretary failed to disapprove it under the FMA. The NHPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder provide no definition of license, and the plaintiffs have not shown that the statute uses that term in anything other than its ordinary sense. Indeed, the closest the plaintiffs come even to arguing that Turkey's project was issued a federal license is in their contention that Turkey's proposal received a permit[,] license, or approval so as to bring it within the scope of the definition of an undertaking. 26 Yet even if we transpose the plaintiffs' argument from the definition of an undertaking to the meaning of the term license, we are still not convinced that Sec. 106 applies in this case. This court has never decided whether failure to disapprove a project is equivalent to licensing a project under Sec. 106. In Lee we held that clearing a project with a federal agency that did not have the authority to grant or refuse permission did not amount to a federal licensing of the project. 877 F.2d at 1057. In McMillan Park, a majority of the panel declined to reach the issue whether the National Capital Planning Commission's review of a local plan to permit commercial development in an historic district triggered the Sec. 106 process. 968 F.2d at 1287; cf. id. at 1290 (Randolph, J., concurring) (reasoning that NCPC's review of D.C. City Council's amendment of comprehensive plan was not an undertaking where NCPC had the power only to veto). 27 Other circuit courts have also been cautious in extending the reach of Sec. 106 beyond the grasp of its terms. See Yerger v. Robertson, 981 F.2d 460, 465 (9th Cir.1992) (holding Forest Service refusal to renew land-use permit does not trigger Sec. 106 even though refusal was clearly preparatory to action that will affect the site's historical character); Waterford Citizens' Association v. Reilly, 970 F.2d 1287, 1292 (4th Cir.1992) (holding EPA continuing authority to exercise control over project does not render project a federal undertaking); Sugarloaf Citizens Association v. FERC, 959 F.2d 508, 515 (4th Cir.1992) (holding FERC certification of incinerator does not amount to licensing project); Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. Barnhart, 906 F.2d 1477, 1484 (10th Cir.1990) (holding Federal Highway Administration approval of environmental impact study does not require compliance with the NHPA). See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958 n. 23, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2787 n. 23, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (rejecting argument that because congressional approval is indicated by the failure to veto, the one-House veto satisfies the requirement of bicameral approval). Yet, as the district court said in its opinion in this case: A judicial interpretation of 'license' as including not only explicit written permission but also a failure to veto a project when possible would read all limitations out of the Act. NTHP I, 834 F.Supp. at 450; accord Weintraub v. Rural Electrification Administration, 457 F.Supp. 78, 92 (M.D.Pa.1978). 28 Though the meaning of license may be broad in some statutory contexts, see Atlantic Richfield Co. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1193, 1200 (1985); 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551(8) (defining license to include any form of permission), we have never found it so broad as to encompass failure to disapprove a proposal. Nor should we do so in this case, where the context cautions against so capacious an interpretation of the text. 29 First, the Secretary's consideration of a chancery proposal pursuant to the FMA, being bound up with security concerns and issues of reciprocity among nations, see 22 U.S.C. Sec. 4301(b); S.Rep. No. 329, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (noting that FMA regulatory mechanisms ... are designed to provide the State Department with the leverage necessary to remove ... unreasonable restraints and costs on U.S. missions abroad), is highly discretionary. Indeed, there are no substantive criteria in the statute to limit the Secretary's discretion. It would be singularly inappropriate, therefore, for a court operating without a clear mandate from the Congress to encumber the exercise of that discretion with the requirement that proposals be shunted back and forth between agencies. 30 Second, the NHPA was passed in 1966, the relevant portions of the FMA in 1982. The later statute was designed in part to insure an expeditious process which will avoid ... extensive and overlapping proceedings. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 693, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1982) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982 at pp. 651, 703. To conclude that the Congress intended the FMA review provisions to trigger the NHPA review process would be inconsistent with that goal. The inconsistency is all the more glaring when one considers that, as discussed below, the Congress made provision in the FMA itself for the DCFMA-BZA to take historic preservation issues into account. The more plausible reading of the statutes in pari materia, therefore, is that by not requiring the Secretary's affirmative approval of chancery proposals, the Congress specifically meant to avoid subjecting the Secretary to the procedures of the NHPA and perhaps of similar statutes. See, e.g., Sugarloaf Citizens Association, 959 F.2d at 515 (noting analysis for requirement of detailed statement of environmental effects of a major federal action in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4332(C) similar to NHPA inquiry). 31 The plaintiffs in effect contend that their expansive interpretation of undertaking, and the ACHP's equally generous interpretation of that same term, somehow convert Turkey's undertaking into a federally licensed undertaking. They have argued, that is, not only that a project need not receive an actual license in order to be an undertaking--a point upon which we need not rule today--but also that a project that does not receive an actual license can be a federally licensed project--a point that we squarely reject. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusion that the Secretary of State was not required to comply with the review procedures mandated by Sec. 106 of the NHPA.