Opinion ID: 1268788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employee/Temporary Worker

Text: Meeks and Harrell also argue that Floyd was not an employee under the Policy because he was a temporary worker. The Policy excludes a temporary worker from its definition of employee and defines temporary worker as a person who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent `employee' on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. The Policy does not define the term furnished to. Meeks and Harrell argue that Floyd was a temporary worker either because he furnished himself to Harrell or because the furnished to requirement does not apply to a worker who was hired to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. Insurance contracts are to be construed strictly against the insurer, but where language is unambiguous, and only one reasonable interpretation is possible, it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the plain wording of the policy. Smith v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 353 Ark. 188, 114 S.W.3d 205, 206 (2003). [T]he language of an insurance policy is to be construed in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. Id. at 206-07 (quotation omitted). The Arkansas Supreme Court has not addressed this issue or interpreted the phrase furnished to in an insurance contract. When there is no state supreme court case directly on point, our role is to predict how the state supreme court would rule if faced with the issues before us. Cotton v. Commodore Exp., Inc., 459 F.3d 862, 864 (8th Cir.2006). While Meeks and Harrell argue that the term furnished to is ambiguous and must be construed in their favor, we find that the Policy's use of the term furnished to is unambiguous and clearly requires the involvement of a third party in furnishing a worker either to substitute for a permanent `employee' on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. We first consider whether a third party must furnish the worker to the insured in order to qualify as a temporary worker, or whether, as Meeks and Harrell claim, Floyd could qualify as a temporary worker by furnishing himself to Harrell. Other courts have determined that a third party must furnish the worker based, in part, on the definition of furnish in Black's Law Dictionary and other dictionaries. See AMCO Ins. Co. v. Dorpinghaus, No. 05-1296, 2007 WL 313280, at  n. 3 (D.Minn. Jan. 12, 2007); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Gardner, No. 04-1858, 2005 WL 664358, at  (E.D.Pa. Mar.21, 2005). Black's Law Dictionary defines furnish as to supply, provide or equip, for accomplishment of a particular purpose. Black's Law Dictionary 675 (6th ed.1990). Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language defines furnish as to provide or supply with what is needed, useful, or desirable. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 923 (2002). [3] We believe that the term furnished to, in the context of the Policy's definition of temporary worker, is not ambiguous and necessarily implies that a third party has been involved in providing or supplying the worker to the insured. Gavan v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 242 S.W.3d 718, 721 (Mo.2008) (en banc). Thus, we predict that the Arkansas Supreme Court would follow the courts that have determined that the involvement of a third party is required by the use of the term furnished to in the definition of temporary worker. See AMCO, 2007 WL 313280, at  n. 3; Nautilus, 2005 WL 664358, at . We also believe that the structure of the temporary worker definition unambiguously requires the involvement of a third party. If furnished to did not require a third party to supply the temporary worker and any worker could furnish himself or herself to an employer as Meeks and Harrell argue, then the term furnished to would be meaningless. See AMCO, 2007 WL 313280, at . Construction that neutralizes any provision of [an insurance] contract should never be adopted if the contract can be construed to give effect to all provisions. Smith, 114 S.W.3d at 207. Under Meeks and Harrell's interpretation, any worker who substituted for a permanent employee on leave or who met seasonal demands or short-term workload conditions would satisfy the furnished to requirement. See AMCO, 2007 WL 313280, at . Such an interpretation of the temporary worker definition would neutralize the term furnished to, and we predict that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not adopt such a definition. Furthermore, we disagree with Meeks and Harrell's argument that the Policy's definition of leased worker creates ambiguity as to whether the term furnished to requires the involvement of a third party in the furnishing of a temporary worker. The Policy's definition of leased worker specifically states that a leased worker must be furnished by a labor leasing firm. Meeks and Harrell contend that if the Policy meant to require another party to furnish a temporary worker, then the Policy would have specified that the temporary worker be furnished by such a third party. However, just because one provision of an insurance policy refers to third-party involvement more explicitly than another provision of the same policy does not mean that third-party involvement is excluded from the latter provision. Id. at . The distinction merely shows that the provisions contemplate differing degrees of specificity. Id. It does not eliminate the requirement that a temporary worker must still be furnished by a third party. Therefore, we believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would determine that the term furnished to in the definition of temporary worker requires that a third party furnish the temporary worker to the insured. Next, we determine whether the term furnished to unambiguously applies both to the clause to substitute for a permanent employee and to the clause to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. If it only applied to the clause to substitute for a permanent employee, the temporary worker definition would not make grammatical sense. See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tickle, 99 S.W.3d 25, 30-31 (Mo.Ct.App.2003) (applying a grammatical analysis of the temporary worker definition). As the American Family Mutual court reasoned, [t]he structure of the sentence defining `temporary worker' indicates that the clause `who is furnished to you to substitute for a permanent employee on leave or to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions' is a subordinate adjective clause modifying `person'. Id. at 30. The phrases to substitute for a permanent employee on leave and to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions are parallel infinitive phrases that equally modify the verb is furnished because they are separated by the word or. Id. at 30-31. Reading the second clause without the term furnished to is grammatically impossible. Id. at 31. Based on this sound grammatical analysis, we predict that the Arkansas Supreme Court would find that the term furnished to applies to both to substitute for a permanent employee on leave and to meet seasonal or short-term workload conditions. Therefore, we reject Meeks and Harrell's argument that Floyd qualified as a temporary worker merely because he was hired as a seasonal driver. Meeks and Harrell rely on Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Mike Ross, Inc. in support of their arguments. 413 F.Supp.2d 740 (N.D.W.Va.2006). The Bituminous court held that furnished to was ambiguous and that it only applied to the first part of the temporary worker definition, to substitute for a permanent employee on leave, and not the second part of the definition, to meet seasonal demands [or] short-term workload conditions. Bituminous, 413 F.Supp.2d at 745. However, the majority of courts that have reviewed this policy language in one or both of these contexts have agreed with our conclusion. See, e.g., AMCO Ins. Co., 2007 WL 313280, at  ([A] worker is not furnished to an insured unless a third partytypically a staffing agencyhas been involved in providing or supplying the worker to the insured.); Gavan, 242 S.W.3d at 721; Gen. Agents Ins. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Mandrill Corp., 243 Fed.Appx. 961, 967-68 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); Carl's Italian Rest. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 183 P.3d 636, 639-40 (Colo.Ct.App. 2007), cert. denied, No. 08SC23, 2008 WL 2008622 (Colo. May 12, 2008) (en banc); Nautilus, 2005 WL 664358, at -7; Brown v. Ind. Ins. Co., 184 S.W.3d 528, 537-40 (Ky.2005); Monticello Ins. Co. v. Dion, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 46, 836 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (2005); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 83 Conn.App. 526, 850 A.2d 1047, 1057 (2004); Am. Family Mut., 99 S.W.3d at 30-31. [4] We believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court would find that the term furnished to unambiguously requires that a third party furnish the temporary worker to the insured. Accordingly, Floyd does not qualify as a temporary worker under the Policy.