Opinion ID: 1087442
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The defendant was under unusual and

Text: substantial duress, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution. § 13-703(G)(1), (2). In addition to the evidence submitted by the parties at sentencing, the judge must also consider any “[e]vidence admitted at the trial, relating to such aggravating or mitigating circumstances,” even if that evidence is not reintroduced at the sentencing proceeding. § 13-703(C). At the pre-sentencing hearing and in its sentencing memorandum, the State argued that the evidence presented at GULBRANDSON V. RYAN 13 trial demonstrated the aggravating circumstance that Gulbrandson “committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.” § 13-703(F)(6). Gulbrandson, in turn, advanced a number of statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances. First, Gulbrandson argued that his capacity to conform his conduct was significantly impaired by his mental illnesses, § 13703(G)(1), and that he was facing unusual stress at the time of the murder, § 13-703(G)(2). Gulbrandson also raised four non-statutory mitigating circumstances: his character and behavioral disorders, his difficult childhood, his good behavior while incarcerated, and his potential for rehabilitation. Among other things, Gulbrandson’s counsel presented Dr. Blinder’s 1992 report in support of these mitigating circumstances. Gulbrandson also gave a prepared statement. On February 19, 1993, the judge held a second sentencing hearing. In the presentencing report filed in anticipation of this hearing, Irene’s parents and two daughters all stated that they would like to see Gulbrandson receive the death penalty. These statements were reiterated at the hearing, where one of Irene’s daughters testified that she wanted to “see [Gulbrandson] killed. . . . [and] tortured the way he tortured my mom,” and Irene’s father stated that he believed “[Gulbrandson] should be executed as promptly as possible.” At the conclusion of this second hearing, the judge found that Gulbrandson had relished the murder, inflicted gratuitous violence, and that Irene was a helpless victim. Therefore, he concluded that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating circumstance that Gulbrandson killed Irene in an “especially heinous and depraved manner.” 14 GULBRANDSON V. RYAN As for statutory mitigation, the judge held that Gulbrandson failed to prove that his capacity to conform his conduct was impaired, Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 13-703(G)(1), but that he did show he was under unusual stress, § 13-703(G)(2). Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d at 588–89. The judge also found a variety of non-statutory mitigating circumstances, namely, that Gulbrandson had character and behavior disorders, a difficult childhood, and had behaved well while in jail. However, the judge determined that the mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to justify leniency. He sentenced Gulbrandson to death.