Opinion ID: 1432510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: consideration of other contentions made by appellant.

Text: The appellant, a police captain in the city of Aberdeen, brought this action against the city for pay lost during a fifteen-day suspension, and he sues also as the assignee of two patrolmen, each of whom lost thirty days pay in consequence of a suspension for that period. A demurrer to the second-amended complaint was sustained; the plaintiff refused to plead further, and a judgment of dismissal was entered. On the appeal therefrom, in addition to the basic issue heretofore considered, the appellant makes other contentions which we will now consider. It is urged that if the quoted provision of the city ordinance (part of § 8, Aberdeen ordinance 3613, adopted in 1932) is upheld as constitutional, then RCW chapter 41.12 CIVIL SERVICE FOR CITY POLICE (Laws of 1937, chapter 13, p. 23) should govern. That act provides in § 9 (RCW 41.12.090) that removals, suspension, demotions, and discharges must be only upon written accusation, and provides for a hearing thereon if requested. [2] The act specifically states, in its first section, that it has no application ... to cities and towns which at the present time have provided for civil service in the police department ... We quote that section in full: The provisions of this chapter shall have no application to cities and towns which at the present time have provided for civil service in the police department or which shall subsequently provide for civil service in the police department by local charter or other regulations which said local charter or regulations substantially accomplish the purpose of this chapter, nor to cities having a police force of not more than two persons including the chief of police. [1937 c 13 § 1; RRS § 9558a-1.]. RCW 41.12.010. Obviously Aberdeen had provided for civil service in its police department at least five years before the statute was enacted. It is, therefore, not necessary to determine, as in the case of cities which subsequently provided for civil service in the police department by local charter or other regulations whether said local charter or regulations substantially accomplish the purpose of this chapter. [3] It is also contended that, assuming the suspension clause of the ordinance to be valid, it should be implied, as a matter of law, that a suspension must be for cause and in good faith; and it is alleged that the suspensions were without cause and for political reasons. The ordinance under consideration is clear and unambiguous, and needs no interpretation. It permits a superior officer to suspend a subordinate without pay for not to exceed thirty days. There is no requirement that charges be filed, or that there be a hearing thereon. Where a removal is involved, the ordinance enumerates the grounds and provides for the filing of charges and a hearing thereon. We cannot rewrite the ordinance to make the procedure for temporary suspensions coincide with that governing removals. Notice and hearing are not prerequisites to a suspension unless required by the applicable ordinance or statute. State ex rel. Gebenini v. Wright, supra ; Darnell v. Mills, supra. The appellant urges that under the Aberdeen ordinance a civil service employee could be suspended month after month continuously, and thus  for all practical purposes  be removed without fulfilling the requirements of the ordinance governing removals. There is no suggestion of such a situation here. We will not consider the hypothetical situation presented by the appellant until such a subversion and misuse of the suspension rule is before us. The judgment of dismissal appealed from is affirmed. WEAVER, C.J., FINLEY, ROSELLINI, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.