Opinion ID: 880519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: product definition

Text: The standard of review for granting or denying a motion for summary judgment is the same as that used by the trial court  that is, the moving party is entitled to judgment at law if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Frigon v. Morrison-Maierle, Inc. (Mont. 1988), 760 P.2d 57, 45 St.Rep. 1344; Sevalstad v. Glaus (Mont. 1987), 737 P.2d 1147, 44 St.Rep 930; Kronen v. Richter (1984), 211 Mont. 208, 683 P.2d 1315; Reagan v. Union Oil Company of California (1984), 208 Mont. 1, 675 P.2d 953. Appellant alleges that there are material facts in dispute  namely, whether the design and manufacture of the facility and its component parts were defective or whether it was negligent use or misuse of the equipment by Papp himself which caused his death. The reason for the death, according to appellant, was that the treater facility was defective and unreasonably dangerous. The facility lacked ventilation, there was insufficient ingress and egress, and there were no signs warning of the dangers of H[2]S. Moreover, Papp had received no formal training regarding the dangers of the gas. To prove that the respondents are liable under strict liability, appellant must demonstrate that the treater facility was a product within the § 402A definition, that this product was built and maintained by the respondents, and that the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous. If the appellant is unable to show that the separator facility was a product, then § 402A is inapplicable to this case, and the summary judgment order will be affirmed. Respondents allege that the appellant has not met the requirements of the § 402A strict liability claim. To find strict liability of the seller of the facility, the facility and its component parts must be a product for § 402A purposes. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A states in pertinent part: (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product . .. From the time that the second Restatement was published in 1965, courts have struggled to find an all-inclusive definition for the term product. The Restatement writers themselves began the list in the official comments following § 402A. The list included the sale of food for human consumption, or other products for intimate bodily use. The authors of the Restatement also embraced any product which reached the consumer or ultimate user in substantially the same condition in which it was intended, such as an automobile, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair, or an insecticide. It also included any product which harmed the consumer's chattels or land. Since 1965, the list has expanded tremendously and courts have adopted policy reasons for defining a product, rejecting a strict dictionary definition of the word product. The social policy justifications for determining whether a product is found have been discussed by this Court in Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1973), 162 Mont. 506, 514-515, 513 P.2d 268, 273. The policy considerations applicable to the case at bar include: ..... (3) It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing of defective products; (4) It is in the public interest to place responsibility for injury upon the manufacturer who was responsible for its reaching the market; (5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the retailer and wholesaler of the defective product in order that they may act as the conduit through which liability may flow to reach the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility lies; ..... (7) That the consumer does not have the ability to investigate for himself the soundness of the product; (8) That this consumer's vigilance has been lulled by advertising, marketing devices and trademarks. See also: Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery (1970), 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256; Nalbandian v. Byron Jackson Pumps, Inc. (1965), 97 Ariz. 280, 399 P.2d 681; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1962), 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897; Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno (1944), 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436; Products Liability Symposium: What is or is not a Product within the Meaning of Section 402A, 57 Marq.L.Rev. 623 (1974). Therefore, courts analyzing a cause of injury to see if the injury-causing thing is a product within the confines of a strict liability definition for § 402A purposes, test the injury-causing thing against these preceding policy justifications. If it passes muster, it is then deemed to be a product. In applying the policy justifications, most courts have refused to adopt the contention that a building is a product. In Lowrie v. City of Evanston (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 376, 8 Ill.Dec. 537, 365 N.E.2d 923, decedent died from a fall in a parking garage. The Illinois Appellate Court held that neither the parking ramp nor the parking space was a product within the product liability definition. In Trent v. Brasch Manufacturing Co., Inc. (1 Dist. 1985), 132 Ill. App.3d 586, 87 Ill.Dec. 784, 477 N.E.2d 1312, the plaintiff was injured while checking a thermostat of the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system (HVAC) in a building. Defendants claimed that the HVAC was a component and indivisible part of the building. The court disagreed, reasoning that the HVAC was attached to real estate. The court applied the social policy considerations, ultimately sending the issue back to the trial court. See also: Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc. (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 472, 11 Ill.Dec. 252, 368 N.E.2d 803 (in which a shelteredcare facility was held not to be a product); and Heller v. Cadral Corp. (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 677, 40 Ill.Dec. 387, 406 N.E.2d 88. Other jurisdictions have also held that buildings are outside the scope of the product definition area. In Messier v. Association of Apartment Owners (Hawaii App. 1987), 735 P.2d 939, plaintiff was injured during a storm by an allegedly defective metal panel which dislodged from the roof of his condominium. The Hawaii court held that the condominium was not a product. The Washington Appellate Court in Charlton v. Day Island Marina, Inc. (1987), 46 Wash. App. 784, 732 P.2d 1008, held that a boathouse builder was not liable for the deaths of plaintiffs' decedents who died from carbon monoxide poisoning after being overcome by exhaust fumes caused by the boat's running engine within the boathouse. The plaintiffs claimed that there was inadequate ventilation in the boathouse. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the boathouse was a product given its similarities with other buildings. For more cases which regard buildings to be outside the purview of products for strict liability in tort, see: McClanahan v. American Gilsonite Co. (D.C.Colo. 1980), 494 F. Supp. 1334; and K-Mart Corp. v. Midcon Realty Group of Connecticut, Ltd. (D.C.Conn. 1980), 489 F. Supp. 813. A case which is nearly identical in terms of facts to the case at bar is Cox v. Shaffer (1973), 223 Pa.Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456. In Cox, the decedent died by asphyxiation while working in a silo. The Pennsylvania court held that a silo constructed in place on an employer's land is not a product. Some states have alternatively held that a building is a product within the scope of strict liability in tort, but only under limited circumstances. In 1965, the New Jersey Supreme Court was the first court to extend strict liability to home development in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc. (1965), 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314. In Schipper, a child of plaintiffs was scalded by hot tap water and plaintiffs sued the builder-vendor for failure to install a mixing valve to reduce the water temperature after the water left the heating boiler. In holding the builder-vendor strictly liable, the court stated: When a vendee buys a development house from an advertised model, as in a Levitt or in a comparable project, he clearly relies on the skill of the developer and on its implied representations that the house will be erected in reasonably workmanlike manner and will be reasonably fit for habitation. He has no architect or other professional adviser of his own, he has no real competency to inspect on his own, his actual examination is, in the nature of things, largely superficial ... Schipper, 207 A.2d at 325. The court continued, saying that if injuries are the result of defective construction, the builder should bear the cost. In 1969, California followed New Jersey in adopting strict liability for mass production and sale of tract homes in Kreigler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969), 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749. Defendant had constructed over 4000 homes in which steel tube radient systems had been installed in the concrete floor. Kreigler was injured when the floor collapsed from corrosion of the steel tubing. The California court, in holding defendant strictly liable, analogized mass-production of homes and mass-production of cars, stating that the buyer is not in a position to protect himself and that the policy reasons for product status were the same. In Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing (1982), 65 Haw. 447, 654 P.2d 343, the Hawaii Supreme Court also held in favor of strict liability in cases of construction of prefabricated buildings. See also: Lantis v. Astec Industries, Inc. (7th Cir.1981), 648 F.2d 1118. An alternative view in a few states is that the home itself is not a product but that the component parts or additions to the building are products within the § 402A definition. In Philadelphia National Bank v. Dow Chemical Co. (E.D.Pa. 1985), 605 F. Supp. 60, one of Dow's products, Sarabond, was a chemical in the mortar used in erecting plaintiff's bank building. The Sarabond corroded metals embedded in the mortar and brick panels of the building, causing structural damage. Defendants alleged that the mortar had become incorporated in the structure and indivisible from the building. The court rejected this argument holding that the Sarabond was a product and not part of the real property or a fixture thereto. In S.L. Rowland Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (1967), 72 Wash.2d 682, 434 P.2d 725, the court held that in cases where an insurance policy limited liability in case of fire, the house itself was not a product, but the component parts therein were products. Another dimension of product definition was added by the Nevada Supreme Court in Elley v. Stephens (Nev. 1988), 760 P.2d 768. There, the Supreme Court of Nevada held: ... even if we assumed, arguendo, that a prefab house is a product subject to the law of strict products liability, a strict liability theory is not applicable to an occasional seller of a product, who does not, in the regular course of his business, sell such a product. [Emphasis added.] Elley, 760 P.2d at 771. The foregoing discussion sets out the development of case law considering buildings in terms of product definition. In summary, a product is defined by policy considerations. Where a building is the alleged product, most jurisdictions do not subject defendants to strict liability scrutiny unless the homes are prefabricated and mass-produced and the defendants are in the business of constructing or selling these types of homes, thus eliminating the unique status of most buildings.