Opinion ID: 9003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Downward Departure for Duress--Quicksall

Text: 39 Based on an adjusted offense level of 18 and a criminal history category of I (and leaving aside the error already discussed), Quicksall would have been subject to a sentence of between 27 and 33 months. The district court sentenced Quicksall to 12 months only, departing downward based on its finding that Quicksall committed the offense under duress. See § 5K2.12 (the court may decrease the sentence below the applicable guideline range if the defendant commits an offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress). 40 The district court considered Quicksall's age (60), his lack of an advanced education (some college), and his length of government service in concluding that Quicksall was economically and psychologically pressured by fear of career loss into following the orders he was given. This is not the type of duress contemplated by § 5K2.12 of the sentencing guidelines. The Commission considered the relevance of economic hardship and determined that personal financial difficulties and economic pressures upon a trade or business do not warrant a decrease in sentence. § 5K2.12. Nor is the departure justified by the district court's additional observations concerning Quicksall's personal characteristics. One of the primary goals of the Sentencing Guidelines is to impose a sentence based on the crime, not the offender. United States v. Vela, 927 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 875, 112 S.Ct. 214, 116 L.Ed.2d 172 (1991); see, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 (age not ordinarily relevant when determining whether sentence should be outside applicable range). The record does not support a downward departure on the basis of duress. On remand, Quicksall should be resentenced without resort to § 5K2.12. 41 There is ample support in the record, however, for the district court's additional observations that Quicksall, for a variety of reasons, was plainly among the least culpable of those involved in the conspiracy. That fact would support a 4 level downward departure on the basis that Quicksall was a minimal participant. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) & comment. 1; Gadison, 8 F.3d at 197. Quicksall clearly had an inadequate understanding of the contracts-for-politics scheme, as compared to his superiors at TDA and TFIS and political consultants Boyd and Koontz. As recognized by the district court, Quicksall's inability to grasp the finer points of the conspiracy was probably the reason he was selected for the role he played. A defendant's lack of understanding or knowledge about the scope and structure of the criminal enterprise is indicative of a minor or minimal role in the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 comment. 1; United States v. LaValley, 999 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir.1993). Quicksall filed timely objections to the PSR's failure to adjust the base offense level on the basis that he played a minimal role in the offense. 42 Quicksall must be resentenced without any departure for duress. Quicksall may, however, be entitled to either an adjustment of his offense level, or a departure from the applicable guideline range for other reasons, once the correct base offense level is determined. The district court is encouraged to reconsider the applicability of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 and U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and to make express findings of fact on those issues when resentencing Quicksall.