Opinion ID: 1851863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the Search Reasonable as One to Which Defendant Gave His Valid Consent?

Text: Defendant made a pretrial motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence [10] seized by police officers in his apartment, contending that, as he did not know he could refuse permission for them to enter, he did not knowingly waive his Fourth Amendment rights and validly consent to the search. At the evidentiary hearing, testimony was received from police officers and the apartment manager that the police, without a search warrant, had, upon their discovery of the bodies in the alley and the drag marks and blood stains leading into the building, followed that trail, and, with the aid of the apartment manager, investigated three of the four apartments, finding nothing to connect them with the homicides. When the apartment manager's key would not fit into the lock of the fourth apartment, belonging to defendant, the police were in the manager's office, directly across the hall, telephoning the scientific laboratory for assistance. Defendant fortuitously appeared at the door and placed his key in the lock. The police approached him, and, according to their testimony and that of the manager, identified themselves and asked if they might come in and look around. They said defendant was not only courteous and genial, but also pointed out places to look. They indicated that at no point was he restrained and that defendant was not given his Miranda rights at that time because he was not suspected of anything. There were initially at least three, and perhaps four, officers in the apartment, with the number of police personnel, including those from the lab, finally totaling ten. Defendant, however, testified that he was ordered to open the door by two detectives and two patrolmen, that he insisted on their showing him a search warrant, and that they pushed their way into the apartment. Once they were inside, he said there was a fight (which he defined as not physical) in which he again demanded to see a warrant and the police forced him to sit down while they searched. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that defendant had validly consented to the search of his apartment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. A warrantless search and seizure is unreasonable per se and violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and art 1, § 11 of the state constitution unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule. 20 Michigan Law & Practice, Searches & Seizures, § 2. The burden is always on the state to show such an exception exists. People v Chism, 390 Mich 104, 123; 211 NW2d 193 (1973). Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443; 91 S Ct 2022; 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971). In the instant case, the government argues that defendant's valid consent rendered the search reasonable. Whether a consent is valid is a matter of fact based upon the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it. 390 Mich 104, 123. The presence of coercion or duress would require a finding that consent was not given. People v Kaigler, 368 Mich 281, 294; 118 NW2d 406 (1962). The Court of Appeals correctly noted that the United States Supreme Court has rejected defendant's contention that knowledge of the right to refuse admittance to police is required before consent to a search can be considered valid. The law today is that knowledge of the right to refuse is but one factor in the totality of circumstances to be examined in construing the reasonability of a search. [W]hen the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances, and while the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecutor is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 248-249; 93 S Ct 2041; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973). Refusing to apply the Johnson v Zerbst standard that the state must demonstrate an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege [11] in order to show consent to a search, 412 US 218, 238-245, the Court in Schneckloth indicated these general principles should be followed: (1) While the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments limit the circumstances under which the police can conduct a search, there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily allowing a search. 412 US 218, 242-243. (2) [U]nlike those constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at trial, it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment. 412 US 218, 243. (3) [T]he community has a real interest in encouraging consent   . 412 US 218, 243. (4) A waiver approach is unrealistic in the informal, unstructured context of a consent search, and would be inconsistent with third-party consents. [12] 412 US 218, 245. (5) Absent evidence of inherently coercive tactics, either from the nature of police questioning or conduct, or the environment and atmosphere in which events occur, traditional tests for determining voluntariness of consent will apply. 412 US 218, 247. (6) [T]he failure to require the Government to establish knowledge as a prerequisite to a valid consent will not relegate the Fourth Amendment to the special province of `the sophisticated, the knowledgeable and the privileged.' 412 US 218, 247-248. Analogizing to the problem of coerced confessions, the Court found these criteria did not turn on the presence or absence of a single factor, but required careful scrutiny of the totality of all the surrounding circumstances. Applying these Schneckloth criteria, we find the following facts made up the relevant circumstances: (1) The police followed a trail of blood stains and drag marks from two bodies into an apartment building and had already searched all other apartments when they reached defendant's. They had no search warrant. (2) The apartment manager tried to let the police enter defendant's apartment, but his key would not work. (3) The police were in the doorway of the manager's apartment, directly across the hall, when they saw defendant come to his door and insert his key. They say they identified themselves, asked whether defendant lived there, and when he answered yes, asked if they could come in and look around. They did not give defendant Miranda warnings at that time, nor did they advise him of his right to refuse admission. They also did not tell him why they were there. The police say defendant granted permission for the police to enter and look around. Defendant claims he was forced to let the police in and asked to see a search warrant. (4) The police made one hasty swing through the apartment, then made a more careful search, with the aid of persons from the scientific bureau. There were at least six police officers and three members of that bureau in the apartment with defendant. (5) Defendant was given his Miranda rights after the police questioned him about bloody trousers found soaking in water in the sink. At that time he was arrested. The search was still proceeding. (6) Following their initial entrance into the apartment, the police asked other officers and the scientific personnel to enter. Defendant was never asked if these additional people could come in and search. (7) The police testified that defendant was not only free to wander around the apartment, but also pointed out places for them to search. Defendant says he was forced to remain seated, but was not handcuffed until he was arrested. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the defendant had validly assented to the police entry and search. Upon review of the evidence this Court reaches the same conclusion. There is sufficient evidence to support a holding that the police asked permission to enter and that consent was given to a general search. Further, just as the mere fact of custody without more, does not necessarily render consent involuntary, United States v Jordan, 399 F2d 610, 614 (CA 2, 1968), the presence of a large number of officers in an apartment does not present a situation which is per se coercive. The United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth implied that situations where Miranda warnings were required may still not be such as to invalidate consent to a search. [13] The instant case is such a situation. The trial court's and the Court of Appeals' holdings that consent was validly given to the search and that the evidence was correctly not suppressed were not clearly erroneous. We affirm. VII  Conclusion In view of our previous findings of error, we believe it unnecessary to reach defendant's other claims of error, most of which would not be necessarily pertinent to another trial in any event. However, the majority of this Court agree with defendant's objection to the introduction of the specified photographs of the nude dead bodies. People v Falkner, 389 Mich 682; 209 NW2d 193 (1973). The Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed. We remand for new trial not inconsistent with this opinion.