Opinion ID: 783828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the District Court Correctly Deny Anderson's Petition?

Text: 127 A. General Limitations Upon Judicial Review of a Jury's Deliberations. The centrality of the jury to our system of justice, and to our criminal justice system in particular, cannot be emphasized too often. Writing with a degree of enthusiasm for which he is not usually associated, Blackstone asserted that trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And, if it has so great an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must that advantage be heightened, when it is applied to criminal cases! 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 379 (1768). 128 In our own country, [f]rom the earliest possible date, English colonists in the American wilderness enjoyed trial by jury in criminal cases. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights, 223 (1999). And although the jury's proper province was a central issue of jurisprudential debate at the time of the American Revolution, no one suggested that anything other than trial by jury in criminal cases should be the norm. Thus, [e]very state that framed a constitution [during the Revolutionary Era] secured trial by jury. No other personal right received protection from the constitutions of so many states. Id. at 227. See generally Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law (1990). 129 The Sixth Amendment provides that criminal defendants shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed. But it has recently been asserted that, to an extent almost forgotten in contemporary legal and political discourse in America, the jury is what the Bill of Rights as a whole was intended to be about: 130 Juries, guaranteed in no fewer than three amendments, were at the heart of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment safeguarded the role of the grand jury; the Sixth the criminal petit jury; and the Seventh, the civil jury.... Indeed, the entire debate at the Philadelphia convention over whether to add a Bill of Rights was triggered when George Mason [of Virginia] picked up on a casual comment from another delegate that no provision was yet made for juries in civil cases. Between the close of the Philadelphia convention and the opening of the First Congress, five of the six state ratifying conventions that advanced [suggested] amendments put forth two or more jury-related proposals. 131 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 83 (1998); see also Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress, 14-28 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R. Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991) (collecting amendments proposed by state ratifying conventions). 132 Professor Amar has also emphasized that the jury was not solely viewed as a means toward protection of the rights of criminal defendants, it was seen as a vital task of citizenship for jurors themselves: 133 For the Framers, ... the criminal jury was much more than an incorruptible fact finder. It was also, and more fundamentally, a political institution embodying popular sovereignty and republican self-government. Through jury service, citizens would learn their rights and duties, and actively participate in the governance of society. 134 Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and Criminal Procedure, 121-22 (1997). Shortly after this passage, Professor Amar quotes from the very same passage of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, which has been relied upon by this Court in dealing with the specific issue concerning juries with which the instant case is concerned: the extent to which a jury's internal deliberations should be free from judicial review. We have said as follows in a case involving a civil jury: 135 The American jury system, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, is as direct and as extreme a consequence of the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage. Accordingly, the sanctity of the jury room is among the basic tenets of our system of justice. Inquiries into the thought processes underlying a verdict have long been viewed as dangerous intrusions into the deliberative process. They undermine the finality of verdicts and invite fraud and abuse. We thus prevent jurors from impeaching their verdict to guard the jury's special place in our democratic heritage. 136 Attridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Techs. Int'l., Inc., 836 F.2d 113, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1987) (Kaufman, J.) (quoting 1 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 293 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage 1945)). 137 Here we arrive at the dilemma presented by Anderson's petition. It is absolutely clear that the Sixth Amendment provides that [a]ny criminal defendant ... being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). Our Circuit stated seventy years ago that questions of jury coercion strike[] at the root of the right to a trial by jury. No person may lawfully be convicted by a jury unless every juror actually agrees that upon the evidence and the law of the case that person is guilty. If a verdict of guilty is returned for any other reason, it is a perversion of the constitutional guaranty to a jury trial. U.S. v. Pleva, 66 F.2d 529, 532 (2d Cir. 1933). 138 On the other hand, as we have already noted by quoting Attridge, there are universally recognized reasons for shielding jury deliberations from post-trial review. These were set forth by the Supreme Court at least as long ago as 1915: 139 [L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation — to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and conference. 140 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915). 141 This principle is established in the Federal Rules of Evidence. FRE 606(b) broadly prohibits accepting into evidence juror testimony regarding the course of a jury's deliberations. Although the argument is significantly more muted on this appeal, the Respondent argued before the district court that FRE 606(b) served as a virtually absolute bar upon all judicial review of jury deliberations. During the evidentiary hearing, the Respondent made a very stunning reply to a hypothetical posed by Judge Block: 142 THE COURT: So if you have twelve jurors and eleven pulled out a weapon and pointed collectively at the twelfth person's head and said vote guilty or we shoot, you would say that the federal court cannot inquire into that? You don't seriously mean that? 143 MR. ROSS: Yes, I do. I know you — I know you think that's outrageous, but yes, I do. 144 THE COURT: No. I think nine other people in Washington would also think that was outrageous. There has to come a point in time when the Constitution is violated even during the deliberation process. (A 1408-09) 145 Hearing Transcript at 102-03. 146 In his decision denying Anderson's petition, Judge Block made the following declaration regarding the applicability of FRE 606(b) to Anderson's petition: 147 The Court's research has not disclosed any reported case concerning the question of whether testimony of physical threats made by jurors against a fellow juror during deliberations is barred by the strictures of Rule 606(b). Because the Court has found that no jurors were physically threatened, the Court need not address this issue. The Court notes, however, that if Rule 606(b) precluded hearing juror testimony when there are credible allegations that a juror's safety was threatened by fellow jurors, it would raise serious constitutional concerns with respect to a defendant's right to a fair trial. 148 Anderson, 206 F.Supp.2d at 360. 149 Although we affirm Judge Block's holding that the issue need not be addressed, we also take this opportunity to state our agreement with his concerns regarding the scope of FRE 606(b)'s preclusion of juror testimony. Indeed, in a case relied upon heavily by the Supreme Court in Tanner v. U.S., 483 U.S. 107, 118-19, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987), we upheld the rule that possible internal abnormalities in a jury will not be inquired into except `in the gravest and most important cases.' U.S. v. Dioguardi, 492 F.2d 70, 79 n. 12 (2nd Cir.1974) (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269, 35 S.Ct. 783; first emphasis in original; second emphasis added), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 134, 42 L.Ed.2d 112 (1974). In Tanner, the Court specifically refused to decide whether FRE 606(b) may be interpreted to retain the common-law exception allowing post-verdict inquiry of juror incompetence in cases of `substantial if not wholly conclusive evidence of incompetency.' Tanner, 483 U.S. at 125, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (quoting Dioguardi, 492 F.2d at 80). See also Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir.1987) (even after Tanner, FRE 606(b) cannot be applied in such an unfair manner as to deny due process). It is certainly far from unreasonable to conclude that credible allegations of threats of violence leveled by one juror by another would fall within this exception. See State v. Vergilio, 261 N.J.Super. 648, 619 A.2d 671, 675 (1993) (A verdict of eleven jurors, with the vote of the twelfth coerced rather than convinced is no verdict at all.), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 443, 627 A.2d 1147 (N.J.1993). 150 But there is no question that a federal court's review into jury deliberations, even a criminal jury's deliberations is a decidedly limited enterprise. Tanner is in fact the leading case. In Tanner, a criminal defendant sought a new trial because, after his conviction, his attorney received an unsolicited telephone call from one of the trial jurors ... inform[ing] Tanner's attorney that several of the jurors consumed alcohol during the lunch breaks at various times throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons. 483 U.S. at 113, 107 S.Ct. 2739. After the district court denied the motion for a new trial, and while the case was on appeal, Tanner's attorney received an unsolicited communication from another juror, who described the jury's conduct throughout Tanner's trial as one long scene of dissipation. Id. at 115-16, 107 S.Ct. 2739. 151 The Supreme Court held that no new trial was warranted because FRE 606(b) precluded consideration of the jurors' post-trial statements regarding the behavior of fellow jurors. The Court noted that it had held that FRE 606(b) would not necessarily bar juror testimony concerning external influences upon juror conduct. Id. at 117, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966) (testimony concerning bailiff's comments to jurors); Remmer v. U.S., 347 U.S. 227, 228-230, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) (testimony concerning bribe offered to juror)). See also Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir.2001) (allowing consideration of juror testimony concerning rumors some jurors had heard about the defendant because a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are implicated when a jury considers incriminating evidence that was not admitted at trial). 152 But the Court went on to assert that lower federal courts [have] treated allegations of the physical or mental incompetence of a juror as `internal' rather than `external' matters. 483 U.S. at 118, 107 S.Ct. 2739. Admitting the latter into evidence while precluding the former, the Court stated, was wise policy in light of the necessity of shielding jury deliberations from public scrutiny. Id. at 119, 107 S.Ct. 2739. The Court continued: 153 There is little doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it. Allegations of juror misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks, or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the process. 154 Id. at 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739. 155 The Court did not mean to be understood as stating that allegations of juror misconduct made by fellow jurors, in and of themselves, did not raise Sixth Amendment concerns. On the contrary, it held that jurors are observable by each other, and may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before they render a verdict and that a party may seek to impeach the verdict by nonjuror evidence of misconduct. Id. at 127, 107 S.Ct. 2739 (emphasis in original). See also Jacobson v. Henderson, 765 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.1985) (per curiam) (noting that the absence of any complaints while [the jury was] being polled supported denial of motion for a new trial); Pleva, 66 F.2d at 533 (overturning verdict based upon statement made by juror during polling of the jury as to his illness, but leav[ing] untouched the question of what effect may be given to proof offered, after a verdict is recorded, of what transpired during the deliberations of the jury). In light of these other sources of protection of petitioners' right to a competent jury, however, the Court concluded that the district court had not erred in refusing to consider post-verdict statements by jurors in passing upon Tanner's motion for a new trial. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127, 107 S.Ct. 2739. 156 B. Anderson's Petition. The Respondent argues that Tanner is fully dispositive in this case because [a] verdict from jurors who are incompetent either because they slept through the evidence or because they heard the evidence in an altered state of consciousness is qualitatively no different from a verdict that was allegedly obtained through intrajury threats of violence. Respondent's Brief at 41. This is an overstatement. We considered the question of intrajury threats more than forty years ago in U.S. v. Grieco, 261 F.2d 414 (2d Cir.1958) (per curiam), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 582, 3 L.Ed.2d 572 (1959). In that case, a convicted defendant sought a new trial because 157 five days after the judgment had been entered, one of the jurors, a woman, wrote a letter to [the trial judge] in which she declared that she had wished to vote for acquittal, but being the only juror who did, another juror, a man, was `very abusive,' so much so that she was `shaking and crying' when she finally agreed to concur with the rest, and that she now wished to `retract.' 158 Id. We affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial because we held that the male juror's conduct only amounted to blustering arrogance and was not sufficient to justify a finding that the female juror had been actually coerced into agreeing with the verdict. Id. at 415. But we also declared that [w]e do not say that there can be no threats short of violence by one juror against a recalcitrant dissenter that will upset a verdict, but certainly there was nothing in the case at bar to justify such action. Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, then, we believed that threats of violence themselves might be sufficient to overturn a verdict. 159 We considered conduct even more egregious in Jacobson v. Henderson. In that case, several incidents of improper jury behavior were cited in support of a habeas petitioner's claim that he had been denied a fair trial: 160 It is alleged that, during the course of jury deliberations, there was screaming, hysterical crying, fist banging, name calling, and the use of obscene language. One of the jurors allegedly threw a chair at another, then broke down, crying and claiming that he was a sick man. It is further alleged that the jury foreman refused to notify the trial judge of these incidents although he was requested to do so by other jurors, and that at one point a court officer upon hearing the noise in the jury room opened the door and asked if anyone needed help, to which the foreman replied: It's all right, we can handle it. 161 765 F.2d at 14. The court denied habeas relief, holding that these allegations by themselves were not sufficient to support a holding that the petitioner had been denied a fair trial. The allegations fell short in particular because the complaining jurors had several opportunities to communicate directly with the court if any of them felt unfairly coerced, harassed, intimidated, or felt themselves to be in physical danger, but none did so. Id. at 15. As Judge Block pointed out in his opinion, there is considerable precedent from other Circuits which is analogous to Jacobson. Anderson, 206 F.Supp.2d at 360-61 (collecting cases). 162 In light of this precedent, we affirm Judge Block's denial of Anderson's habeas petition. Although we acknowledge that Anderson's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is at least implicated by the allegations made by Jurors Nos. 2 and 11 regarding the jury's deliberations at his trial, we cannot say that the jury's conduct at Anderson's trial amounted to a violation of those rights. We agree with Judge Block that, at most, Jurors Nos. 2 and 11 felt themselves to be under pressure, perhaps even under duress, to vote in favor of conviction. But we do not find that a reasonable juror, standing in the shoes of Juror Nos. 2 and 11, would have thought herself to be facing a physical assault if she refused to vote for conviction. 163 Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that, as in Jacobson, Juror Nos. 2 and 11 had several opportunities [during the trial] to communicate directly with the court concerning whatever threats they felt they faced at the hands of their fellow jurors. Neither availed herself of these opportunities. Compare Vergilio, 619 A.2d at 674-75 (conviction reversed where juror advised court of abusive conduct by fellow jurors, but court sent jury back for further deliberations without investigation into substance of complaints). In sum, the evidence in this case amounts to more than weakly authenticated juror statement[s] containing vague allegations of `harassment' and `verbal abuse.' Mercado v. Portuondo, 2000 WL 1663437, at  (S.D.N.Y. Nov.3, 2000). But there is insufficient objective evidence for us to find that Anderson did not receive a fair trial.