Opinion ID: 1788253
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: brooks' threat against law enforcement officer

Text: During Gilliam's testimony regarding the first failed attempt on Carlson's life, the trial court permitted him to relay that when he and Brooks were approached by the police officer after they had pulled behind Carlson's car, Brooks proclaimed that he can't go back, and he was going to have to shoot them, meaning the officer. Upon having his recollection refreshed with a previous statement, Gilliam testified that Brooks asserted he can't go back to jail. Gilliam stated that he encouraged Brooks to put the shotgun away and that Brooks did so, hiding the shotgun under the seat covers in the back. Brooks does not challenge on appeal, and indeed this Court perceives no tenable grounds to challenge, the general admission of Gilliam's testimony regarding the events of April 22, including the circumstances surrounding Carlson's stop for speeding and law enforcement officers' subsequent questioning of Gilliam and Brooks. Brooks limits his challenge to the admissibility of his stated desire to shoot the police officer who approached Gilliam's vehicle rather than return to jail. Abuse of discretion is the standard of review applicable to the instant claim. See, e.g., Ray, 755 So.2d at 610; Zack, 753 So.2d at 25. Evidence of a defendant's bad acts is inadmissible if solely relevant to demonstrate the bad character of the accused or the propensity of the accused to engage in criminal conduct. See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 663 (Fla.1959); see also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). Evidence of bad acts is admissible, however, if it casts light upon the character of the act under investigation by showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried. Williams, 110 So.2d at 662. According to the State, the expressed intent of Brooks to shoot the police officer rather than return to jail was relevant to establish his guilty knowledge regarding his involvement in a criminal enterprise. [17] In support of this contention, the State directs our attention to two cases, Wyatt v. State, 641 So.2d 355 (Fla.1994), and Straight v. State, 397 So.2d 903 (Fla.1981). In Straight, this Court held: When a suspected person in any manner attempts to escape or evade a threatened prosecution by flight, concealment, resistance to lawful arrest, or other indications after the fact of a desire to evade prosecution, such fact is admissible, being relevant to the consciousness of guilt which may be inferred from such circumstances. 397 So.2d at 908. Applying that principle, the Straight Court deemed relevant and admissible in a murder prosecution evidence of the defendant's flight and attempt to evade arrest. See id. at 908. In Wyatt, this Court applied the same principle in deeming admissible the defendant's statements to police officers upon his arrest that he was glad he did not have a gun when he got stopped, otherwise he would have shot the officer. Wyatt, 641 So.2d at 358. In 1997, this Court refined the principle articulated in Straight to provide that there must be evidence which indicates a nexus between the flight, concealment, or resistance to lawful arrest and the crime(s) for which the defendant is being tried in [a] specific case. Escobar v. State, 699 So.2d 988, 995 (Fla.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598 (Fla.2001). The principle articulated in Wyatt and Straight and refined in Escobar is equally applicable to the stated intent by Brooks to shoot the police officer to avoid returning to jail. The evidence shows that at the time Brooks uttered the statement, he, Davis, and Gilliam were involved in a conspiracy to commit murder. The statement of Brooks demonstrates that he was aware of the criminality of his actions at the time of the traffic stop and the precarious position he was in with regard to the approaching officer. The counter-argument, that the threat to shoot the officer has no relevance to the guilty knowledge of Brooks concerning the stabbing death of a mother and daughter committed two days later, misses the fundamental connection between the threat and the crime charged. Brooks did not make the threat in the context of a random traffic stop on any given day. He and Gilliam were following the intended victim, had the murder weapon and a pair of latex gloves in their possession, and, but for the traffic stop, would have proceeded to the predesignated place in Crestview to commit murder. Had the murder plan been foiled because of the police stop, due to the discovery by the police of the gun or some other piece of incriminating evidence, Brooks' statements certainly would be relevant and admissible under Wyatt and Straight. The relevancy of the threat voiced by Brooks against the law enforcement officer to his guilty knowledge is not diminished merely because his desire to evade prosecution and the successful completion of the planned crime were attenuated in time. Though relevant, the statement by Brooks still may have been inadmissible if its probative value was outweighed by unfair prejudice. See § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2002). Brooks argues that this is the case, and exhorts this Court to conduct the section 90.403 balancing test in accordance with the factors articulated in State v. McClain, 525 So.2d 420 (Fla.1988). In that case, this Court applied the principles advanced by Professor Ehrhardt for weighing the probative value of evidence against the threat of unfair prejudice, including the need for the evidence, the tendency of the evidence to suggest an improper basis to the jury for resolving the matter, the chain of inference necessary to establish the material fact, and the efficacy of any limiting instruction. See id. at 422. According to Brooks, the evidence fails the balancing test because the other portions of Gilliam's testimony amply demonstrated Brooks' intent, and the threat against the police officer simply portrayed Brooks as an individual determined to kill anyone who might send him back to jail. We disagree. The proffered analysis underestimates the probative value of the evidence. While Gilliam's testimony tends to establish the existence of a conspiracy, the statements by Brooks more clearly provide the proof of his individual intent to commit murder and acknowledgment of guilt. Moreover, in a case such as this, which involved the stabbing death of a woman and her infant child, introduction of the threat by Brooks against the police officer was unlikely to suggest an improper basis to the jury for resolving the matter.