Opinion ID: 1058602
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Henry Buccigross

Text: Prior to trial, Crane disclosed that Buccigross would offer testimony on, among other topics, his research and/or his testing of various asbestos insulation products, including Unibestos and Kaylo, as well as his research and testing of Crane products. [5] Although the disclosure referenced a report by Buccigross on his testing of Unibestos and Kaylo, Crane admitted the report was not attached to the disclosure. The trial court refused to allow Buccigross to testify about the tests he had conducted on Kaylo and Unibestos products because the Estate had not received Buccigross' report relating to this subject. Crane assigned error to this ruling. Crane argues, as it did to the trial court, that regardless of its failure to provide Buccigross' report, the Estate knew the substance of Buccigross' testimony because the Estate's counsel had cross-examined Buccigross at trial about his reports going back to the '90s. Crane also pointed out that the Estate had failed to depose Buccigross or to ask Crane for representative samples of Buccigross' testimony, either of which would have allowed the Estate to ascertain the actual substance of the testimony. Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) requires that the substance of opinions to be rendered be disclosed. Here, while Crane did disclose the topic of Buccigross' testimony, Crane did not disclose the substance of Buccigross' opinions in the disclosure or through Buccigross' report. Crane thus failed to comply with the Rule and the trial court did not err by excluding the testimony. As we stated when considering Crane's challenge to the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of Dr. Roggli's testimony, an opponent's ability to depose an expert or familiarity with such expert through prior litigation does not relieve a party from complying with the disclosure requirements of Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i). Crane also argues that the trial court should have allowed the testimony of both Dr. Roggli and Buccigross because the Estate admitted that the disclosures regarding Roggli and Buccigross were exemplary, in comparison to Dr. Feingold's, another of Crane's intended expert witnesses. The record shows that the Estate's statement regarding the quality of Crane's disclosures at issue was made as a comparison to the fact that Crane had not disclosed any of the expected testimony of Dr. Feingold. The statement cannot be fairly taken as a concession that Crane complied with the requirements of the disclosure rule for all purposes. In summary, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the testimony at issue because Crane did not disclose that Dr. Roggli would render an opinion on asbestos in the ambient air and did not identify the substance of Buccigross' opinion as required by Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i).