Opinion ID: 767873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contribution Limits

Text: 17 Both sets of appellants challenge the per se constitutionality of the limits on contributions. They allege that the limits violate their First Amendment free speech and associational rights. 18 The district court, without the benefit of the recently decided Supreme Court decision in Shrink Missouri PAC, held that the contribution limits are not unconstitutional because they do not burden the First Amendment rights of candidates or donors. The court invoked the principles set forth in the Supreme Court's landmark political speech case of Buckley, in which the Court upheld a $1,000 limit on contributions by individuals or groups to federal office candidates and a $5,000 limit on donations from political committees. In Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court reaffirmed the principles enunciated in Buckley and applied them to validate a $1,075 limit on contributions to certain candidates for offices in Missouri. See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 903-10. 19 Political speech, including commentary on the qualifications of a political candidate, has long been recognized as integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14. Speech has historically been protected to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (restating the profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open). The protection afforded by the First Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and thus it applies to this action by a state. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 276-77. 20 An indirect restriction on political speech, in the form of a limitation on contributions to candidates, was evaluated and upheld by the Court in Buckley. The Court identified three areas of potential First Amendment implication: the contributor's free speech, the candidate's free speech, and the freedom of association. First, regarding a contributor's right to free speech, the Court discounted the effect of contribution ceilings: 21 [A] limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may contribute to a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign organization thus involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor. 22 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21 (footnote omitted). 23 Second, with respect to candidates' free speech rights, the Court indicated that contribution limits are constitutional if they do not prevent candidates from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. See id. at 21. The Court concluded that there was no indication . . . that the contribution limitations imposed by the [Federal Clean Election] Act would have any dramatic adverse effect on the funding of campaigns and political associations. Id. In Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court explained that in Buckley, We asked, in other words, whether the contribution limitation was so radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless. Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 909. 24 Third, the Court identified the major constitutional issue invoked by contribution limits: [T]he primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25. The Court pronounced that [m]aking a contribution, like joining a political party, serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. Id. at 22. Freedom of political association is a 'basic constitutional freedom,' restrictions on which are subject to the 'closest scrutiny.' See id. at 25 (citations omitted). Yet the right is not absolute and even a significant interference may be sustained if the state demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 25 The Court in Shrink Missouri PAC, while applying the principles of Buckley, supplied a clarification of approach that represents a checkrein on the enhancement of the state's burden implicit in some lower court cases subsequent to Buckley. See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 909. Acknowledging that [p]recision about the relative rigor of the standard to review contribution limits was not a pretense of the Buckley per curiam opinion, the Court referred to the general reliance on 'exacting scrutiny' and elaborated: under Buckley's standard of scrutiny, a contribution limit involving 'significant interference' with associational rights . . . could survive if the Government demonstrated that the contribution regulation was 'closely drawn' to match a 'sufficiently important interest,' . . . though the dollar amount of the limit need not be 'fine tun[ed].' Id. at 903-04 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, 30). 7 26 It then invoked Buckley's identification of the actuality and appearance of corruption as the justification of contribution limits, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-27, adding: In speaking of 'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse' in addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,' we recognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors. Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 905. 27 The Court in Shrink Missouri PAC also spoke to several related issues. It observed that although the quantum of evidence of corruption or its appearance in Buckley exemplifies a sufficient justification for contribution limits, it does not speak to what may be necessary as a minimum. Id. at 906. It also made clear that an argument based on adjusting the Buckley-approved $1,000 ceiling for subsequent loss of purchasing power to establish the maximum limit was the product of misunderstanding. See id. at 909. And it was unmoved by the argument that contribution limits necessarily favor incumbents over challengers. See id. at 905 n.4. Finally, the Court was apparently unimpressed that following the imposition of the contribution limits, total spending for five statewide offices affected by the $1,075 contribution limit declined by more than half, a fact pointed out in Justice Thomas's dissent. See id. at 925 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Buckley, the Court was faced with the more benign statistic, agreed to by the parties, that only about 5% of the funding raised by all federal congressional candidates in the prior election would not have been allowed by the limits. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21 n.23. 8 28 Given this framework of principles, we first consider whether there is sufficient evidentiary support of the threat of corruption or its appearance to warrant the potential infringement on the freedom of association by the contribution ceilings, because if this infringement is constitutional, any limits on free speech rights would necessarily pass muster. Following that, we will consider whether the limits prevent candidates from amassing the necessary resources, thus eclipsing their free speech rights. 29 Generally, factual findings of the district court are reviewed only for clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). An appellate court's review of a First Amendment claim sometimes, however, carries with it a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole, without deference to the trial court. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)). In a case like this, 'a conclusion of law as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts.' Id. (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927)). Our decision must be based largely on legislative, as opposed to adjudicative, facts. See Daggett, 81 Supp.2d at 128-30 Daggett v. Commission on Gov't Ethics and Election Practices, 172 F.3d 104, 112 (lst Cir. 1999) ([S]o-called 'legislative facts,' which go to the justification for a statute, usually are not proved through trial evidence but rather by material set forth in the briefs, the ordinary limits on judicial notice having no application to legislative facts. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201 advisory committee's note)). 9 30
31 We now inquire whether, under the guidelines of Shrink Missouri PAC, the evidentiary showing of corruption or its appearance is sufficient to establish Maine's interest. There, the Court found that the evidence in support of Missouri's statute was more than sufficient to sustain the state's evidentiary obligation. See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 907-08 ([T]his case does not present a close call requiring further definition of whatever the State's evidentiary obligation may be. . . . There might, of course, be need for a more extensive evidentiary documentation if petitioners had made any showing of their own to cast doubt on the apparent implications of Buckley's evidence and the record here.); see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (because corruption can never be reliably ascertained, all that is required is that the threat not be illusory). Although the evidence did not show that the Missouri legislature relied on the findings accepted in Buckley, a state senator, the co-chair of the legislature's Interim Joint Committee on Campaign Finance Reform, stated that large contributions had the 'real potential to buy votes.' See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 907. There were also several newspaper accounts recounting large contributions that supported inferences of impropriety. See id. Finally, the evidence established that '74 percent of [those who voted on a referendum to impose contribution limits in] Missouri determined that contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance thereof.' Id. at 908 (citation omitted). 32 In this case, the State contends that Maine voters as well as legislators and those intimately involved in the political process have valid concerns about corruption and the appearance thereof caused by large contributions. Under the prior contribution limits of $1,000 per election for an individual and $5,000 for a PAC, a single political action committee could fund the average 1998 House campaign twice over and could provide over half of the average 1998 Senate campaign by making the maximum primary and general election donations. An individual, again making the maximum contributions, could provide nearly one-half of the average House race funding and over one-tenth of the average Senate campaign funding. 33 Further, the opportunity to make such large contributions translated into a perception among Maine voters that corruption was a reality in the State House. Statements similar to the one relied upon in Shrink Missouri PAC were offered here. One representative attested to the belief of many of his constituents that legislators are beholden to large contributors: Representative David Shiah, currently the House Assistant Majority Leader, attested that, Based upon extensive conversations with voters in my district, it is my opinion that voters believe that there is too much money in politics today and that most politicians are beholden, or give special access, to those who give large amounts to their campaigns. Senator Chellie Pingree related instances in which she and other legislators were pressured to change their position on an issue or risk the loss of contributors' support. On one occasion, for example, she was admonished by lobbyists for a certain interest that if she continued to sponsor a bill in opposition to that interest, Democratic legislators would lose significant campaign contributions; after Pingree and Democratic leaders forged ahead with the legislation, the special interests did not, in fact, donate to Democratic leadership PACs the following year, despite their history of doing so. 34 An abundant file of press clippings includes both news stories and editorial comment covering the years 1995-1999. The following sampling suggests that large contributions have occurred in Maine and that Maine citizens are concerned about their impact on lawmakers. Indeed, the evidence to this effect is far greater than that cited in Shrink Missouri PAC. 35 One story states that [r]anking lawmakers and their committees pulled in close to $400,000 in big gifts from special interests, almost all of which lobby the Legislature. Paul Carrier, Contributions Give Special Interests Political 'Box Seats,' Maine Sunday Telegram, Jan. 3, 1999, at 1A. One column declared, There is nothing illegal about tobacco companies bankrolling political campaigns - only suspicious. We can debate the influence of campaign contributions till the cows come home, but one fact remains: The money is given on the expectation that it will influence policy. Editorial, Taking the Money, Maine Times, May 15, 1997. This sentiment has been oft-repeated: A group with a certain point of view can buy influence during a political campaign with a campaign donation. Politicians routinely deny that influence is being bought; evidence is often to the contrary. Editorial, A Stain-Guard for State Government, Lewiston Sun-J., May 7, 1997. Not only are Maine's citizens concerned, but so are its political leaders; Governor Angus King, who self-imposed a contribution limit of $250 in his 1998 reelection campaign, stated on a national news program that the problem is we've got this situation where you either have to have your own money or you have to be beholden. Newshour with Jim Lehrer, (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 26, 1997). 36 The fundraising practices of Maine legislators have drawn much criticism. One article reported negatively on a fundraising breakfast that an organization hosted for legislators who served on a committee handling bills affecting the organization, emphasizing the absence of average citizens. See Bill Nemitz, Dough Rises for Political Pancakes, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 8, 1996, at 1B. Another questioned the propriety of an industry hosting a fundraiser for a legislator the day before a hearing on an important bill affecting the industry. See Editorial, Gravel Industry Didn't Expect Anything for Lord Fund-Raiser?, Portland Press Herald, Mar. 26, 1996, at 6A. An editorial criticizing such fundraisers commented, The whiff of too-close connections between influential lawmakers and interests with big money on the line added an acrid aroma to legislating in both the House and the Senate this session. Nancy Grape, Let's Change the Pockets Instead of Pocketing the Change, Portland Press Herald, Apr. 7, 1996, at 5C. 10 37 In addition, a survey of Maine residents showed that over 70% of respondents believed that large campaign contributions were a major source of political corruption, that large donors received special treatment from legislators, that the new contribution limits would renew currently lagging faith in the integrity of the process among the electorate, and that the new limits would help decrease the potential for undue influence. 11 38 Finally, we take note, as did the Court in Shrink Missouri PAC, of the fact that Maine voters approved the referendum imposing reduced contribution limits as indicative of their perception of corruption. The body of evidence here clearly surpasses the quantum of evidence offered and accepted as sufficient in Shrink Missouri PAC and would meet an even higher standard if one were applicable. 39 Moreover, the limits are sufficiently closely drawn by the standards set forth in Buckley, as applied in Shrink Missouri PAC. In Buckley, the Court concluded that the $1,000 limit on contributions to federal office seekers was closely drawn because it focused on the narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified - while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees with financial resources. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28. The statute here also leaves these avenues open and confronts only those making the largest donations, touching only 3.7% of donors to House campaigns and 7.1% of donors to Senate campaigns in 1998. 12 40 Appellants assert that the statute is overbroad, reminiscent of the challengers' contentions in Buckley. They allege that the State's only compelling interest is in preventing corruption arising from large contributions and that $250 and $500 contributions are not sizeable enough to allow the fruition or create the appearance of corruption. 41 The Court in Buckley concluded that the statute was not overbroad because it was important for the government to safeguard against even the appearance of potential corruption; the Court's role was not to determine whether a higher limit would have been as effective, and a contribution limit was not invalid merely because of a legislative failure to engage in . . . fine tuning. See id. at 30. The Court in Shrink Missouri PAC added that the public interest in countering [the perception of corruption] was, indeed, the entire answer to the overbreadth claim raised in the Buckley case. Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 906. Cases referenced by Shrink Missouri PAC display the reluctance of the Court to second-guess legislative determinations, especially when corruption is the harm to be prevented. See, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500 (1985) (recognizing the proper deference to a congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic rule where the evil of potential corruption had long been recognized); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982) (Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared.). 42 Further, we cannot determine whether the limits would better serve their purpose if set at some other monetary level; '[i]f it is satisfied that some limit on contributions is necessary, a court has no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve as well as $1,000.' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30 (quoting court of appeals opinion, Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Such distinctions in degree become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in kind. Id. In Shrink Missouri PAC, the Court rejected a claim that the limitations at issue were different in kind from those allowed in Buckley. See Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 909. 43 The Court in Shrink Missouri PAC validated the constitutionality of a $1,075 limit for state-wide offices and any office representing more than 250,000 constituents, see id. at 903-10; in Maine, there are 35 Senate districts comprised of approximately 34,000 constituents and 151 House districts comprised of roughly 8,000 constituents. Moreover, campaigns are inexpensive compared to most other states. 13 As the district court stated, If contribution limits are permissible, differences in their level from state to state should reflect democratic choices, not court decisions. Daggett, 81 F.Supp.2d at 139 (footnote omitted). 44 We cannot say that the limits here are different in kind from those upheld in Buckley and Shrink Missouri PAC. Thus, we conclude that Maine's contribution limits of $250 do not unconstitutionally infringe upon candidates' and donors' free association rights because they are supported by a sufficiently important governmental interest to which the ceilings are closely tailored. Now we turn to consider the final question regarding contribution limits, whether they disallow candidates from gathering enough financial support to efficiently advocate their views. 45
46 Here we confront an extraordinary statistical battle between the parties. Both sides rely on data collected by the Commission through election reports as well as a database, compiled by the Edmonds amici, categorizing and summarizing the Commission data. 47 Appellants strongly urge that the contribution limits will cripple the campaigns of legislative candidates, assailing us with distressing statistics and dire predictions from their experts. The Daggett appellants marshal the statistics to support their argument that donations to legislative candidates would be greatly decreased and to emphasize particular categories of losers, who they identify as challengers, those seeking traditionally expensive seats, and candidates unenrolled in one of the two parties recognized in Maine, who cannot collect contributions for a primary election. They argue that if even one candidate's ability to amass sufficient resources is affected, the limits are unconstitutional. 48 The statistics they provide are wide-ranging, and depict, for example, that in 1998 contributions to all House candidates would have declined by 16% and all Senate candidates by 33%; 14 donations to Senate incumbents would have declined by 25.7% and to Senate challengers would have decreased by 39%. 15 The Stearns appellants make similar baleful forecasts, calculating that 39% of the total funds contributed to Senate candidates and 21% of funds contributed to House candidates in 1998 would have been lost. 16 They also highlight the worst-hit challengers, one of whom would have lost almost 73% of her funding. 17 49 The State responds with its own statistics and the conclusion of its expert that the contribution ceilings will not have a significant effect on campaign fundraising. The State's expert, Professor Anthony Corrado, concluded that the average 1998 House candidate would have experienced a spending reduction of 14.7%, or $778, and the average Senate candidate 29.0%, or $5,694. 18 Corrado concluded that in 1998, almost half of House candidates would have experienced no loss at all and nearly two-thirds would have lost less than 10%, or $318; approximately one-quarter of Senate candidates would have suffered no loss and almost one-half would have lost less than 10% of their funds, or $495. 50 The district court eschewed reliance on any of the statistics proffered by the parties and instead relied on the only concrete facts regarding the impact of the limits - information provided by the one election conducted since the limits took effect, a 1999 special election for the City of Lewiston's seat in the House. In that seven-week campaign, one candidate raised $10,892 and her opponent, without party support, raised $5,409; both were well above the 1998 expenditure average. 51 Although it was somewhat unique because by definition it was the only race occurring at that time and thus the candidates were not in competition for donors' dollars with candidates in other races, we agree that the Lewiston special election provides useful information. The only other concrete information available to us is that Governor Angus King succeeded in his reelection bid in 1998 under a self-imposed contribution limit of $250. 19 These two pieces of information, in conjunction with other factors we have considered, suggest to us that the effects on campaign funding are not so significant as appellants predict. 52 The official records of the Commission state that in 1998 the average Senate candidate incurred expenses of $18,445 and the average House candidate $4,725. Beyond that, as evinced by the parties' calculations, there are a variety of approaches to analyzing the statistics in order to exaggerate or downplay the results. At present, only worst-case scenario statistics, which consider the historical funding pattern and discount any contribution made over the limit, are available. These statistics, however, do not account for adaptations in human behavior and the likelihood that patterns will change to recoup whatever may be lost. Thus, the only picture that we can create by utilizing past statistics is one which likely overpredicts the resultant loss of contributions. Indeed, with such a bellwether, the flock would never go anywhere. 53 For example, a donor who wishes to give $500 to a legislative candidate may choose to make a $250 donation to the primary campaign and another $250 donation for the general election, fully in compliance with the limits. Because some candidates will opt for public funding, there will be fewer candidates competing for donors' dollars. Furthermore, candidates will seek out additional supporters if necessary, as contemplated in Buckley: 54 The overall effect of the [contribution limits] is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons and to compel people who would otherwise contribute amounts greater than the statutory limits to expend such funds on direct political expression, rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression. 55 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21-22; see id. at 26 n.27 (Presumably, some or all of the contributions in excess of $1,000 could have been replaced through efforts to raise additional contributions from persons giving less than $1,000.). Candidates may, as some have predicted, resort to additional kinds of low-level fundraising events. 56 Moreover, there exists, as appellants' expert acknowledged, the obvious opportunity for more members of a family, or officers and employees of a company, to make individual contributions. And there is the open-ended possibility for new PACs to form in support of a candidate, a group of candidates, or a legislative objective. 57 With regard to particularly affected groups, we reiterate that our role is not to probe the intricacies of the limit. See id. at 30. Even if we were to consider the effects on individual groups, we would not find enough to deem the limits facially unconstitutional. 58 For example, incumbents are inherently benefitted by our political establishment and the limits do not make that advantage significantly more powerful. See, e.g., Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 905 n.4. (stating that in Buckley, We found no support for the proposition that an incumbent's advantages were leveraged into something significantly more powerful by contribution limitations applicable to all candidates, whether veterans or upstarts). 20 Further, the argument that candidates unenrolled in parties are unfairly prejudiced was rejected as a basis for overturning contribution limits in Buckley. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 31, 33-34 (elaborating that the record provides no basis for concluding that the [Federal Election Campaign] Act invidiously disadvantages such candidates because the Act on its face treats all candidates equally with regard to contribution limitations). Finally, we cannot accept appellants' argument that if even one candidate is affected the limit is unconstitutional; a showing of one affected individual does not point up a system of suppressed political advocacy that would be unconstitutional under Buckley. Shrink Missouri PAC, 120 S. Ct. at 909. 59 In sum, under Maine's contribution limits, any person who wishes to contribute to a candidate or engage in independent speech may do so; candidates are free to solicit from any individual they wish; 96.3% of House candidate donors and 92.9% of Senate candidate donors can continue to contribute at the level they did in the last election, 21 and the average House candidate would lose only approximately $778 and Senate candidate $5,694. We cannot say, in the language of Shrink Missouri PAC, that the limits on contributions to Maine's legislative candidates areso radical in effect as to render political association ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate's voice below the level of notice, and render contributions pointless. Id. 60 We add one observation to what has been an effort to assess the likely impact of contribution limits under ever-changing conditions by a branch of government singularly removed from the realities of political processes. It is the statistics distilled from experience that, far more than worst-case scenarios, should inform decisions as to proper contribution limits. 61 We note that our discussion applies to the limits on contributions from individuals, see 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1015(1), as well as those from groups and associations, see id. §§ 1015(2), 1056(1). As the Supreme Court explained in Buckley, limitations on contributions from groups are a necessary adjunct if limits on individual contributions are to be effective. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 35-36. 62 Although the district court dismissed, due to lack of standing, the challenge on contributions from political parties, we see no reason to parse political parties from the more general association and committee referenced by the statute. See 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1052(2) & (5). In Maine, a political party's fundraising committee must register as a political committee the same way that a political action committee does. 22 Here we have appellants who clearly have standing to challenge the group contribution limitation and our holding as to their claims necessarily applies to all groups. That is not to say, however, that political parties might not later mount a challenge to the limits once the effect of their application to parties becomes clear. See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-98 (1982) (considering effect of state campaign expense reporting requirements on minor parties). 63
64 The district court also dismissed without prejudice appellants' challenge to the limits on contributions to gubernatorial candidates on the ground that none of the parties had standing to challenge this particular limit. In order to have standing, a party must exhibit an actual or threatened injury that is traceable to the defendant's action and that will be redressed by a favorable decision. See Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano, 4 F.3d 26, 36 (lst Cir. 1993) (citing Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 51 (1991)). None of the appellant candidates claims to be a candidate for governor in 2002, and none of the appellant donors claim that they would give more than $500 to an identifiable gubernatorial candidate but for the contribution limits. The Daggett appellants hold out Christopher Harte, a long-time donor to various campaigns, as someone with a sufficiently real or threatened injury to challenge the limits, alleging that he also has listener standing, because he is an interested individual who will hear less campaign speech under the new limits. 65 The concept of listener standing, as briefly sketched by appellants, does not find support in the jurisprudence of this court, which has emphasized the importance of a real or threatened injury. See, e.g., Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 919 (lst Cir. 1993) (The injury-in-fact inquiry 'serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation - even though small - from a person with a mere interest in the problem.' (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 690 n.14 (1973))). Even if the Supreme Court cases relied on by appellants, principally Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), stood for the proposition that a mere listener to campaign speech has standing to assert a challenge to a statute that he alleges will diminish such speech, which we doubt, in the case before us, there is no specific speech that appellants can point to that is being compromised. See id. at 756 (remarking that in that case a definite speaker existed who attested that but for the statute at issue he would advertise certain information). 66 Further, although the Stearns appellants have made gubernatorial contributions over $500 in the past, that is not sufficient. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (It must be alleged that the plaintiff 'has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury' as the result of the challenged statute or official conduct. (quoting Massachusetts v. Melon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)). Finally, none of appellants' affidavits provide enough specificity about future plans for contributions to display a real or even a threatened injury. 23 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (injury may not be conjectural or hypothetical (internal quotations and citations omitted)). Therefore, we affirm the district court's dismissal without prejudice of the challenge to the gubernatorial campaign limits. 67 The district court also indicated that the issue was not ripe because the next election for governor in Maine will not occur until 2002. 24 Ripeness is an issue that often overlaps with standing; [j]usticiability concerns not only the standing of litigants to assert particular claims, but also the appropriate timing of judicial intervention. Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 320 (1991); see also Rhode Island Ass'n of Realtors v. Whitehouse, 199 F.3d 26, 33 (lst Cir. 1999) ([S]tanding and ripeness may substantially overlap.). Whether or not the issue is technically ripe, the clock is certainly ticking. Although apparently no one has officially declared candidacy for the governorship yet, potential candidates may very well be testing the waters and could begin seeking contributions at any time. We hope that the current situation, in which unforeseeable delay has caused both the parties and the court to face imminent statutory deadlines, will be avoided in the next phase of litigation, if there is one. 68