Opinion ID: 1891447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the court erred when it failed to suppress haynes' march 3, 2004, confession which was made after haynes invoked his right to counsel.

Text: ¶ 10. On February 9, 2004, Haynes was arrested for Nowell's murder. During Officer Pope's first meeting with Haynes, Officer Pope first advised Haynes of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). At this time Haynes did not request an attorney. Officer Pope met with Haynes a second time, and again advised Haynes of his Miranda rights. However, this time, Haynes requested counsel, and Officer Pope subsequently stopped the interview. About one week later, Haynes received counsel. On March 3, 2004, Officer Pope received a phone call from the jail informing Officer Pope that Haynes had asked to speak with him. ¶ 11. Thereafter, Officer Pope and Detective Blakely went to the jail and met with Haynes, re-advised Haynes of his rights, and had Haynes sign a waiver form. Haynes did not say he wanted to talk about his case, but instead asked Officer Pope several questions about his bond, scheduling, and a preliminary hearing. Although Officer Pope's testimony is unclear as to the sequence of the remaining conversation's topics, the record provides a general description about the details of the conversation. At some point Officer Pope asked Haynes if anything else was bothering him, to which Haynes shook his head, and then began talking about problems at the jail. ¶ 12. Following this discussion, Officer Pope asked Haynes if he wanted to tell us anything about the situation. Again, Haynes shrugged his shoulders. On cross-examination during a pretrial motion, defense counsel asked Officer Pope what he meant by situation. Officer Pope replied [w]ell, the whole situation. We probably were talking about the charges. However, Officer Pope went on to say I don't think I would, I ever directly brought up the address or anything like that. ¶ 13. Officer Pope then asked Haynes if he previously had told the truth, to which Haynes shrugged his shoulders again. At some point Haynes discussed his vocational activities, his instructor, and fishing, although the record is not clear as to when this discussion took place. Officer Pope then stated Haynes was told that it was obvious he had something bothering him. Officer Pope stated he and Detective Blakely continued talking with him. Officer Pope testified Haynes eventually put his head down, took a deep breath, raised his head, and said I'm ready to do my time and be a man. Officer Pope stated Haynes confessed that he attempted to kill Nowell and set fire to her home, but never admitted having intercourse with her. ¶ 14. After the confession, Officer Pope stated he and Detective Blakely asked Haynes if he would write down or allow a videotaping of his statement. Officer Pope testified Haynes told him no, because Haynes' attorney did not want him to give any statements. Thereafter, Officer Pope asked Haynes if he would like to speak with his attorney, to which Haynes responded affirmatively. After being contacted, Haynes' attorney went to the jail and after talking with Haynes, told Officer Pope that he could not advise his client to give a statement at that time. ¶ 15. Haynes claims his confession was the result of police interrogation, and therefore was inadmissible as a violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Whether a confession is admissible is a fact-finding function for the trial court, and its decision will not be overturned unless the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard, committed manifest error, or made a decision against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Thorson v. State, 895 So.2d 85, 115 (Miss.2004); Payton v. State, 897 So.2d 921, 935 (Miss.2003); Swinney v. State, 829 So.2d 1225, 1235 (Miss.2002). ¶ 16. In Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that an accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 451 U.S. at 484-45, 101 S.Ct. 1852; see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 156, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990); Kirkland v. State, 559 So.2d 1046, 1047 (Miss.1990). ¶ 17. In other words, once an accused has invoked his right to counsel, any statements given by the defendant in response to further police questioning are admissible only where (1) the defendant initiated further discussions with the police and (2) knowingly and intelligently waived the rights he had invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984). ¶ 18. At first glance, it would appear that any type of conversation initiated by a defendant would fall under the Edwards exception. However, in Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) (plurality opinion), the United States Supreme Court held otherwise: While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements around the word initiate in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to initiate any conversation or dialogue. There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a telephone that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquiries or statements by either an accused or a police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally initiate a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards. Stated differently, the Supreme Court's use of the term initiate involves more than the inquiry of simply who talks first. See Sattayarak v. State, 887 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Okla.Crim.App.1994). ¶ 19. In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court held that the defendant's ambiguous statement, [w]ell, what is going to happen to me now? expressed a desire to open up a generalized discussion about the investigation. 462 U.S. at 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (plurality opinion); Id. at 1050, 103 S.Ct. 2830 (Powell, J., concurring) ([T]he facts and circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, clearly establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel). In the case at bar, after invoking the right to counsel, Haynes admits to initiating conversation as to his bond and other matters, but argues he did not initiate a conversation as to the charges he was facing. ¶ 20. For this Court, this case is of first impression with regard to what constitutes initiation as to a conversation relating directly or indirectly to the investigation and conversation relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship. ¶ 21. Although this Court is not bound by case law from other states, we look to Kraft v. State, 713 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.App. Houston 1st Dist.1986) (affirmed on appeal for separate reason), which provides guidance as to how other courts have construed inquiries relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship. In Kraft, the defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Id. at 169. Kraft was informed of his Miranda rights and thereafter stated he wanted to call his lawyer. Id. While Kraft was on the phone, an officer told the defendant that his attorney could not come down to the police station. Id. After hanging up, Kraft asked the officer whether the advice he received over the phone was correct; specifically, whether a bondsman could get him out of jail. Id. at 169-70, 172. The officer told Kraft he would be able to call a bondsman, and then the officer recommenced questioning. Id. at 169-70. ¶ 22. Although a Texas trial court held the defendant's question reinitiated conversation with the officer, the Texas Court of Appeals held otherwise: [i]nquiries about bail are the type of necessary inquiries arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship, distinguished in Edwards from conversations evincing a desire to open up more generalized discussion relating to the investigation. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). [1] The court went on to find that the State failed to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of Kraft's Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during interrogation because the police officer repeatedly told the defendant that his attorney could not come to the police station during the interview. Id. ¶ 23. In this case, Haynes asked to speak to Officer Pope regarding what he terms procedural matters, including bond, scheduling, and a preliminary hearing. Following Texas' lead in Kraft, we find those inquiries are matters relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship as discussed in Bradshaw. Therefore, Haynes' questions did not initiate a conversation as the word was used in Edwards. ¶ 24. Moreover, at no point in Officer Pope's testimony did he say Haynes asked other questions which evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046, 103 S.Ct. 2830; United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d 1076, 1085 (3d Cir.1989); see also United States v. Whaley, 13 F.3d 963 (6th Cir.1994) ([A]n Edwards initiation occurs when, without influence by the authorities, the suspect shows a willingness and a desire to talk generally about his case.) In Smith, 469 U.S. at 98, 105 S.Ct. 490, the Supreme Court stated: Edwards set forth a bright-line rule that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel. In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through badger[ing] or overreachingexplicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentionalmight otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel's assistance. (Citations omitted). In this case, it was only after Officer Pope and Detective Blakely's questions, specifically, if he wanted to tell us anything about the situation, whether Haynes had told the truth, and what was bothering him, that Haynes gave his confession. Therefore, Officer Pope and Detective Blakely's questions constituted interrogation after Haynes invoked his right to counsel, and those questions were in violation of Edwards. ¶ 25. However, the State argues that because Haynes received his Miranda rights and signed a waiver of those rights before the conversation took place between Haynes and the two officers, the trial court was correct in allowing Haynes' confession into evidence. Moreover, the State argues, neither Officer Pope nor Detective Blakely used any threats, promises, or coercion to obtain Haynes' confession. ¶ 26. Essentially, the State is asking this Court to skip the first step of the Edwards analysis, which requires this Court to determine whether the defendant initiated further discussions with the police, and focus only on the second step, which requires this Court to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the rights he had invoked. We find this argument is without merit. See United States v. Cannon, 981 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir.1993) (Determining who initiated the conversation after [defendant] invoked his right to counsel is essential to a Fifth Amendment inquiry.) (citing Bradford v. Whitley, 953 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1992)). Even if Haynes knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right, the waiver does not cure a violation of Edwards. See United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 390 (5th Cir.1985) (citing Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984)). ¶ 27. A case dealing with both defendant initiation and waiver of rights is Sattayarak, 887 P.2d at 1329. There, Sattayarak invoked her right to counsel during custodial interrogation. Id. The next morning, she was handcuffed and placed in a car with a police officer. Id. As the car began to drive off, she asked the officer where they were going. Id. In response, the officer told her their destination and then asked if she had made any statements to other officers. Id. Before she could answer, the officer read Sattayarak her Miranda rights. Id. The officer went on to ask her if she would answer his questions and give a statement. Id. The Oklahoma criminal appeals court not only held Sattayarak's question could not be construed as an invitation to discuss any aspect of the investigation, but also held the waiver was the result of police-initiated questioning and [was] not valid. Id. at 1329-30. As such, the court held it was error to admit Sattayarak's statements given after the officer initiated the conversation. Id. at 1330. ¶ 28. In this case, although Officer Pope had Haynes sign a waiver of his Miranda rights before any conversation took place, just as in Sattayarak, it was the officers who initiated discussion relating to the investigation when Officer Pope asked Haynes if he wanted to tell us anything about the situation, whether he had told the truth, and what was bothering him. ¶ 29. Furthermore, to accept the State's argument that Haynes waived his right to counsel would invalidate the initiation distinction set forth in Bradshaw. Adopting the State's position would allow an officer to question a defendant subsequent to the invocation of counsel, where the defendant asked a question that is custodial in nature. ¶ 30. Because the trial judge allowed Haynes' confession into evidence based on the judge's finding that Haynes' initiated contact with Pope in the sense that Haynes was essentially the first to speak, we find the trial judge erred by applying an incorrect legal standard. As case law shows, an initiation by a defendant regarding inquiries relating to the custodial relationship does not constitute an initiation within the meaning of Edwards. As such, Officer Pope and Detective Blakely violated Haynes' Fifth Amendment right under Edwards when the officers began questioning Haynes about the investigation. Haynes had previously invoked his right to counsel and reinitiated conversation with Pope only as to matters of bond, scheduling, and preliminary hearing. Therefore, we find the circuit judge erred in admitting the confession into evidence.
¶ 31. We must now determine whether the admission of the confession constituted harmless error, thus allowing the verdict to stand. The admission of confessions obtained in violation of Edwards and its progeny constitutes trial error, and is therefore amenable to harmless error analysis. Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 181 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 392 (5th Cir.1985). In order for a violation of a constitutional right to be held harmless, this Court must determine that the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Similarly, this Court has held errors involving a violation of an accused's constitutional rights may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the weight of the evidence against the accused is overwhelming. Clark v. State, 891 So.2d 136, 142 (Miss.2004) (citing Riddley v. State, 777 So.2d 31, 35 (Miss.2000)). ¶ 32. Here, without Haynes' confession, the State submitted only circumstantial evidence establishing that Haynes' actually set the fire which led to Nowell's death. Although DNA of the semen found on Nowell's body matched Haynes' DNA indicating sexual battery, the State presented little concrete evidence actually showing Haynes was responsible for setting the fire. Only a small burn on Haynes' jacket as well as the odor of smoke linked him to the fire. Without Haynes' confession, the jury may have given different weight to the State's evidence, and possibly in Haynes' favor. See Palm v. State, 748 So.2d 135, 142 (Miss.1999) (While some statements by a defendant may concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision.) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)). ¶ 33. Moreover, Haynes' argument that Love may have played a role in the crime also constitutes a shift in the trial's dynamic. Haynes argued during trial that police did not fully investigate Love as a suspect in the crime, although Haynes originally told police Love perpetrated the crime. Haynes also argued that police did not request Love's clothes to check for ignitable fluids in order to show Love might have caused the fire, nor did they check Love's shoes to determine whether they matched a shoe print found at Nowell's home. Furthermore, without Haynes' confession, the jury might have questioned Love's credibility. Haynes pointed out Love's inconsistent stories as to how Love came into possession of Nowell's gun. Even though Love's mother testified Love was at her house the night of the murder, when confronted, Love originally denied knowing about the gun. Love later changed his story stating Haynes sold him the gun. ¶ 34. However, the evidence against Haynes, disregarding his confession, is overwhelming and links him to the scene of the crime. The evidence includes Haynes' DNA found at the crime scene; Haynes' fingerprints found on a note outside Nowell's home; a burnt spot on Haynes' jacket, as well as the odor of smoke; Haynes' knowledge of the crime as told to Officer Steed and Officer Pope, alleging Love was responsible for the crime; that Haynes' grandmother served as Nowell's caretaker; bullets taken from Nowell's home were found in the floorboard of the car belonging to Haynes' grandmother; a piece of cloth found at Nowell's home was similar to a piece found in the car; Haynes had possession of his grandmother's car keys the night of the crime; and Love's testimony that Haynes sold him a gun that was registered in Nowell's name and was taken from her home. Based on this large amount of evidence establishing Haynes' culpability, we find the circuit judge's admission of Haynes' confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 35. Finally, although this Court held in Balfour v. State, 580 So.2d 1203, 1209 (Miss.1991), that the admission of a defendant's full confession did not constitute harmless error where the confession was obtained in violation of Edwards and no other confessions were presented into evidence, we find Balfour is distinguishable from this case. In Balfour, this Court found the defendant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the officers reinitiated interrogation after the defendant had invoked her right to counsel. Id. Here, however, Haynes initiated the meeting with Officer Pope and Detective Blakely in which Haynes subsequently gave a confession. ¶ 36. Because we find the admission of Haynes' confession constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, we find no reversible error.