Opinion ID: 42250
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Speech as a substantial motivating factor

Text: Because Boldin does not contest Raby’s termination of him was within the scope of Raby’s discretionary authority, he has the burden to show Raby is not entitled to qualified immunity. See Holloman ex. rel Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). “To overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must satisfy a two prong test; he must show that: (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. Boldin claims Raby violated his rights under the First Amendment of the Constitution. To establish this, Boldin must show (1) his speech was on a manner of public concern, (2) his right to speak on the matter of public concern outweighed his public employer’s interest in promoting the efficiency of the services it performs through its employees, (3) his speech played a substantial role in the decision to terminate his employment, and (4) the public employer did not have another valid reason for the adverse employment action. McKinley v. Kaplan, 262 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 2001). The district court held Boldin failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on the third prong. 8 We agree with the district court that Boldin cannot show his speech played a substantial role in the decision to terminate his employment. Raby discharged Boldin based on the conclusion Boldin caused damage to truck 112 by driving it abusively. Three mechanics concluded that driver abuse caused the damage to truck 112's transmission, and there is no dispute Boldin was the driver of the truck during this period. There is also no dispute that abuse of public property is an infraction warranting discharge. Boldin argues Puckett’s and Raby’s comments to run Truck 112 until it quit show Raby’s discharge of Boldin was pretextual. Further, Boldin takes issue with the district court’s finding his retaliatory motivation evidence was “too equivocal and remote in time.” The district court found “the most recent comment [by Raby to Lewter] . . . was still approximately a year prior to Boldin’s discharge on October 30, 2001.” Regardless of when the most recent comment occurred, we agree with the district court that the record is without any evidence that Raby orchestrated Boldin’s termination by ordering Boldin to drive the truck until it quit and then firing Boldin for abusing the dump truck when the transmission went out shortly after Boldin complained the truck was not running correctly. There is no evidence supporting the evidence of a conspiracy against Boldin. The evidence also shows when Boldin was accused of abusing equipment on a prior occasion, 9 Raby believed Boldin at his word that he did not intentionally abuse equipment. This evidence goes against any alleged conspiracy against Boldin. Boldin cannot show his protected speech played a substantial role in the decision to terminate his employment. Thus, because Raby did not violate Boldin’s rights under the First Amendment, Raby is entitled to qualified immunity.