Opinion ID: 784673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Defendant Acting under Color of State Law?

Text: Dean is correct that Byerley acknowledged in his answer that the only reason Dean was at Byerley's house on the morning of March 27, 2001 was because of his status as Regulation Counsel for the State Bar, and that Dean's allegations arose from the events of that morning. Even if Byerley was acting under color of state law, Dean's claims would be barred by governmental immunity. Appellee's Br. at 25. 8 In his appellate brief, Byerley lumps together his assertions that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, absolute immunity and qualified immunity. Because Dean sued Byerley in Byerley's individual capacity, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not shield Byerley from Dean's damages claims. Byerley's assertions that he is entitled to absolute immunity and qualified immunity — which when applicable protect public officials sued in their individual capacity from damages claims — will be discussed in more detail in Sections II.C.1 and C.2. 9 The district court held that Dean failed to establish that Byerley acted under color of state law 10 On page 29 of his appellate brief, Byerley quotes the following passage from Watts v. Burkhart: The immunity of participants in the judicial process stems not from the location of the judicial process in one branch of government or another ... but from the characteristics of the process. One of these characteristics is that the controversies with which the process deals are often intense, and the loser, given an opportunity to do so, will frequently charge the participants in the process with unconstitutional animus; [a]bsolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation. Absolute immunity is designed to free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with litigation. Appellee's Br. at 29 (quoting Watts, 978 F.2d at 273) (citations omitted). 11 Although Barrett addresses the scope of the absolute immunity that shields judges engaged in judicial functions, its analysis also applies to the scope of the absolute immunity that shields other public officials engaged in adjudicative functions. See Barrett, 130 F.3d at 255-57. This is because the scope of absolute immunity depends upon the function performed by the defendant, not the identity of the defendant. Watts v. Burkhart, 978 F.2d 269, 275-76 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc). 12 Since we conclude that Byerley was not performing an adjudicative function during the March 27, 2001 confrontation, we do not need to reach the question of whether Dean dealt with Byerley in an adjudicative capacity 13 In a sworn deposition taken on June 19, 2001, Doolittle testified about the March 27, 2001 confrontation. Although Doolittle did not hear Byerley's alleged statement that Dean would never practice law due to his picketing, Doolittle did confirm several aspects of Dean's version of the confrontation. Doolittle Dep., June 19, 2001, at 28. More specifically, Doolittle stated that Dean and the two hired individuals only picketed on the street, that Byerley almost hit Dean with his car, and that Byerley threatened to have the picketers arrested if they did not leave Id. at 19-20, 31. Doolittle also testified that during the confrontation, he heard Byerley whisper something to Dean and that afterwards, Dean exclaimed, Did you hear what he said? You'll never practice law in Michigan as long as you're picketing. Id. at 28. 14 Additionally, we note that even if Byerley were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, the defense would only shield him from liability for Dean's claim for damages, not from Dean's claim for equitable relief, and thus would not end the action. This court has held that the defense of qualified immunity only bars claims for civil damages against officers in their individual capacities, not claims for equitable relief Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1071, 122 S.Ct. 678, 151 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765, 772 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1045, 106 S.Ct. 1260, 89 L.Ed.2d 570 (1986). 57