Opinion ID: 779125
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Firmly Established/Regularly Enforced

Text: 80 This Court reviews de novo the question of whether a state procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground. Luberda v. Trippett, 211 F.3d 1004, 1006 (6th Cir.2000). 81 To be adequate, a state procedural rule must be `firmly established and regularly followed' by the time as of which it is to be applied. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). To determine whether the rule is firmly established, the court should look to whether, at the time of the petitioner's actions giving rise to the default, the petitioner could not be deemed to have been apprised of [the rule's] existence. Id. at 423, 111 S.Ct. 850 (quotation and citation omitted). A petitioner must show more than [a]n occasional act of grace by a state court in excusing or disregarding a state procedural rule in order for a federal court to conclude that the state procedural rule is inadequate because inconsistently applied. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 429 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989). 82
83 Hutchison argues that the Tennessee procedural rules are not adequate or independent because Tennessee courts apply a due process exception, first articulated in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn.1992), to later-arising constitutional claims. Burford held that the state's previous three-year statute of limitations for postconviction petitions was facially constitutional, but recognized that there may be cases where the strict application of the limitations period would deprive prisoners of a meaningful opportunity to present their claims. In those cases, tolling of the statute of limitations is required to ensure that the statute is applied in a manner consistent with state and federal constitutional due process guarantees. See id. at 208. 84 Following Burford, Tennessee courts have employed a due process balancing test to determine whether to apply a statute of limitations bar where the grounds for relief actually arose after the limitations period would normally have commenced. Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn.1995). Under this rule, [t]o determine whether a petitioner was denied a reasonable opportunity to present a claim, a court must balance the liberty interest in collaterally attacking the constitutional violations ... against the State's legitimate interest in preventing the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims. Wright v. State, 987 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tenn. 1999). This exception for later-arising claims has been applied to permit consideration of procedurally barred Brady claims in circumstances involving both successive petitions and statute of limitations problems. Id. at 26; see also Sample v. State, Nos. 02C01-9505-CR-000131, 02C01-9505-CR-00139, 1996 WL 551754, at -7 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept.30, 1996) (holding that trial court erred in dismissing successive postconviction petition without a hearing on waiver and statute of limitations grounds where facts alleged in petition showed that exculpatory evidence was suppressed until after limitations period had expired and after first petition was dismissed). In applying the Burford exception, Tennessee courts have established no formal constraints on the amount of time that the statute may be tolled. Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tenn.2001). In addition, as Burford made clear, Tennessee courts will sometimes toll the statute of limitations in cases where, as here, the grounds for relief became known after the statute of limitations began to run but before the limitations period completely expired. 845 S.W.2d at 209 (holding that an untimely claim should be allowed on due process grounds notwithstanding the fact that grounds for relief became known ten months before expiration of the statute). 85 Hutchison argues that Tennessee courts' willingness to excuse procedural default pursuant to Burford demonstrates that state procedural rules are not regularly followed in the context of later-arising claims. The district court rejected this argument. The court noted that Burford applied only to a narrow category of later-arising claims, which were not presented in the instant case. The court also suggested that the 1995 amendments to the statute of limitations may have vitiated Burford, and limited the exceptions to the statute of limitations to the narrow grounds laid out in the statute. Dist. Ct. Op. at 21-22. This reasoning is unpersuasive. The district court's first point begs the question. Hutchison has asserted that his claim is later-arising because he did not possess the factual predicate — i.e., the Brady materials — until it was too late to include them in his first postconviction petition. As noted above, Burford tolling may be applied in cases where the reason for delay in bringing the claim was suppression of evidence by the prosecution. See Sample, 1996 WL 551754, at -7. The district court's second point is legally incorrect, insofar as the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that the Burford exception continues to apply after the 1995 amendments. Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 467 (remanding for further proceedings to determine whether counsel's misrepresentations to petitioner justified application of Burford exception to one-year statute of limitations under 1995 Act). 86 Nevertheless, we agree that Tennessee's due process exception does not render this provision inadequate. Tennessee's due process exception does not grant unfettered discretion to state courts in applying procedural default rules. Although Tennessee courts will often permit the hearing of an untimely claim, the decision is confined by the due process standards delineated in Burford and its progeny. The Tennessee courts consistently enforce a procedural scheme that encompasses both the one-year limitations period and a court-recognized procedure for tolling that statute when specific due process grounds are presented. Indeed, the postconviction court purported to follow this procedure in Hutchison's case, insofar as it considered his claim that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to present his claims earlier. Nevertheless, it found he had not made the showing required to warrant tolling. See Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at . 87 We have suggested in similar contexts that the state procedural rules at issue in the instant case are sufficiently firmly established to provide an adequate and independent state grounds for decision. This Court has previously determined that Tennessee's waiver rule, T.C.A. § 40-30-206(g), which provides that claims not raised in a prior proceeding are barred, constitutes an adequate and independent state-law rule precluding habeas relief. See Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 969 (6th Cir.2001) (finding Brady claim procedurally barred by predecessor to T.C.A. § 40-30-206(g)), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 842, 120 S.Ct. 110, 145 L.Ed.2d 93 (1999). In Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir.1995) (per curiam), this Court found that the then-applicable three-year statute of limitations for postconviction petitions in Tennessee was regularly applied and would bar presentation of an unexhausted claim. Id. at 1197. The Hannah court noted that the language of the statute was mandatory in that it provided that a claimant must petition within three years or his claim shall be barred. Id. at 1196. The current one-year statute of limitations contains the same mandatory language. See T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a). 88 Although the previous cases did not present a Burford -type later arising claim, we do not find that the state's Burford tolling rules command a different result. In Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281 (6th Cir.1989), we considered whether the Michigan state court had waived its right to enforce its procedural rule by briefly considering whether manifest injustice would result from a default. Id. at 285. This Court concluded that [w]e would be loath to adopt an exception to the `cause and prejudice' rule that would discourage state appellate courts from undertaking the sort of inquiry conducted by the Michigan court. Id. Similarly, in the instant case, to find that the repeated application of Burford -style tolling renders the Tennessee statute of limitations an inadequate basis to deny postconviction relief would have the unfortunate effect of discouraging a practice that provides states the opportunity to remedy unconstitutional convictions in cases involving later-arising claims. 89 Given that tolling under Burford is not discretionary and given this Circuit's reluctance to discourage state courts from exhibiting caution before applying procedural default rules in capital cases, we conclude that the Burford exception does not render Tennessee's procedural rules inadequate. 5 90
91 Hutchison also argues that the state postconviction court's determination that his claims were procedurally barred was intertwined with federal law, and therefore was not an independent state-law ground for denial of his petition. Hutchison bases this argument on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the defendant's constitutional due process claim on direct review from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion that the argument was waived under a state procedural rule. Id. at 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The Ake Court reasoned that because the state-law waiver rule did not apply to constitutional errors, [b]efore applying the waiver doctrine to a constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question. Id. at 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Thus, the Court could review the state supreme court's decision insofar as that decision was premised upon a determination of the merits of the defendant's federal-law claim. The Court explained that when resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. Id. 92 Hutchison argues that the Tennessee criminal appeals court's conclusion that his Brady claims were barred is similarly intertwined with federal law. In order to reach the conclusion that his claims had been waived, Hutchison argues, the court had to consider whether, under Burford, Hutchison was afforded a fair opportunity to present his claims. Hutchison argues that the exception recognized in Burford is based upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207-08 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982)); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000). Therefore, Hutchison asserts that the state court's determination of the waiver issue was necessarily based upon the application of federal constitutional law. 93 The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Coleman, 501 U.S. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. 2546. In Coleman, a habeas petitioner argued, relying on Ake, that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that his appeal was barred by the statute of limitations was not independent of federal law because state law required tolling of the limitations period if denial of an extension of time would abridge a constitutional right. Id. at 741, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Court, after expressing some doubt as to whether Ake applied in the habeas context, concluded that even if Ake applies here, it does [petitioner] no good because the Virginia Supreme Court relied on an independent state procedural rule. Id. The Court explained that the Virginia Supreme Court's tolling doctrine did not require state courts to examine the merits of the petitioner's federal constitutional claims before applying the bar. Instead, the Court concluded, [a] more natural reading is that the Virginia Supreme Court will only grant an extension of time if the denial itself would abridge a constitutional right. That is, the Virginia Supreme Court will extend its time requirement only in those cases in which the petitioner has a constitutional right to have the appeal heard. Id. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Court then explained that the tolling rule was of no help to the petitioner's jurisdictional argument, because he did not contend that the failure of the Virginia Supreme Court to hear his untimely state habeas appeal violated one of his constitutional rights. Id. 94 Coleman controls in the instant case. The Burford exception applies when the strict application of the statute of limitations would constitute a denial of federal and state due process rights by depriving the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. Thus, as with the Virginia rule, Burford provides an exception to the statute of limitations when the denial of the hearing itself would violate the petitioner's constitutional due process rights. Unlike Ake, the decision to apply the Burford exception does not depend upon the state court's determination of the merits of the petitioner's constitutional challenges to his conviction or sentence. 6 Indeed, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals expressly stated that it was not reviewing the merits of Hutchison's Brady claim. Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at  ([W]e determine[ ] that the petition was properly dismissed because it had been filed after expiration of the statute of limitations and a prior post-conviction petition had been filed and heard on the merits....). Because Hutchison, like the petitioner in Coleman, does not assert that the state's denial of a second postconviction hearing was itself a constitutional violation, the state court's decision not to apply the Burford exception is not reviewable by this Court. Accord Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 868 (6th Cir.2000) (The Supreme Court ... does not find the mere reservation of discretion to review for plain error in exceptional circumstances sufficient to constitute an application of federal law.). 95