Opinion ID: 2599666
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Heading: The Date of Injury In Occupational Disease Claims Under The Workers' Compensation Law

Text: HRS § 386-82 (1993) [6] establishes the time within which a claimant must file a claim under the Workers' Compensation Law. In Hayashi v. Scott Company, 93 Hawai`i 8, 994 P.2d 1054 (2000), we reiterated that, pursuant to HRS § 386-82, `the time period for notice or claim does not begin to run until the claimant, as a reasonable [person], should recognize the nature, seriousness and probable compensable character of his injury or disease.' 93 Hawai`i at 12, 994 P.2d at 1058 (quoting Demond v. University of Hawai`i, 54 Haw. 98, 104, 503 P.2d 434, 438 (1972)) (brackets in original). The Employers in the present matter initially contended that Flor's claims were untimely filed. For reasons not disclosed by the record, the parties stipulated that the LIRAB would not resolve the timeliness issue in its ruling on the Employers' motions for summary judgment. Nevertheless, we note that the statute of limitations on Flor's claims would not have begun to run until her discovery that she had contracted hepatitis C, see Hayashi, supra, which, she asserts, occurred on April 17, 1996Flor's self-identified date of injury for purposes of filing her claims. Occupational disease cases typically show a long history of exposure without actual disability, culminating in the enforced cessation of work on a definite date. In the search for an identifiable instant in time which can perform such necessary functions as to start claim periods running, establish claimant's right to benefits, determine which year's statute applies, and fix the employer and insurer liable for compensation, the date of disability has been found the most satisfactory. Legally, it is the moment at which the right to benefits accrues; as to limitations, it is the moment at which in most instances the claimant ought to know he has a compensable claim; and, as to successive insurers, it has the one cardinal merit of being definite, while such other possible dates as that of the actual contraction of the disease are usually not susceptible to positive demonstration. Lowery v. McCormick Asbestos Co., 300 Md. 28, 475 A.2d 1168, 1174 (1984) (quoting Larson, § 95.21 (1981)) (emphasis added). Flor did not actually cease working until May 4, 1996. Thus, her date of disability, as construed pursuant to Lowery, would be May 4, 1996. Flor herself designated May 4, 1996 as the date disability began. However, April 17, 1996 was the date on which Flor recognized the nature, seriousness[,] and probable compensable character, Hayashi, at 12, 994 P.2d at 1058, of her disease. It is undisputed that her ultimate cessation of work was enforced by her hepatitis C. The Hansen court noted that hepatitis itself is an impairment in capacity because it disabled [the] claimant from employment as a dental hygienist and therefore caused her to lose earnings. Hansen, 602 A.2d at 566. In the present case, the LIRAB entered no express FOFs as to the effect of Flor's April 17, 1996 discovery of her diagnosis on her employability. However, even if the diagnosis did not directly precipitate the cessation of her employment, the record reflects, at the very least, that the diagnosis contributed to Flor's retirement, inasmuch as her physicians recommended that she cease working. The date on which a claimant becomes totally disabled is a question of fact for the referee to determine on the basis of the evidence. Novak v. Mathies Coal Co., [29 Pa.Cmwlth. 122, 370 A.2d 435, 436-37 (1977) ]. The date disability begins is not automatically the date of last exposure [to an occupational hazard] or the date on which claimant is examined and determined by his doctor to be disabled.... Novak v. Mathies Coal Co., supra . Gateway Coal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 36 Pa.Cmwlth. 608, 388 A.2d 1122, 1124 (1978). The [worker's compensation] board may set as the date of disablement the date on which physical impairment in the nature of occupational disease was diagnosed. Where no medical finding of occupational disease is initially made but such condition is established upon later diagnosis, the board may properly set the date of the later diagnosis as the date of disability. Barnett v. Edmur Baking, Inc., 37 A.D.2d 653, 322 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (N.Y.App.Div. 1971) (citing Zambrona v. Renell Bake Shop, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 707, 309 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (N.Y.App.Div.1970)). See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 758-59 (1st Cir.1992) (holding that, for purposes of Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988), liability for effects of occupational disease falls upon last responsible insurer on date of disability, as determined by date of decreased earning capacity, which may coincide with date of diagnosis despite absence of outward physical symptoms). The determination of the precise date on which a claimant has become disabled due to an occupational disease is a factual determination to be made by the Director based on the circumstances of each case. However, the record in the present matter indicates that Flor's cessation of work was directly related to her discovery of her hepatitis C diagnosis on April 17, 1996, and, accordingly, the Director may consider that date to be Flor's date of disability for purposes of establishing (1) the statute of limitations period applicable to her claims pursuant to HRS § 386-82, (2) the date on which her right to benefits began to accrue for purposes of computing her weekly permanent disability benefit rate, as prescribed in HRS § 386-31 (1993) and (3) which year's version of the Workers' Compensation Law is applicable. Lowery, 475 A.2d at 1174. [7] It is generally held under workmen's compensation acts that injury results when the right to compensation arises. Injury and compensable disability are more in the nature of synonymous terms than are date of injury and date of the accident. Thus, in Esposito v. Marlin-Rockwell Corp., [96 Conn. 414,114 A. 92, 94 (Conn.1921) ], it is said: A compensable injury is an injury for which compensation is payable, and the date of such an injury is not the time of the accident or occurrence causing the injury, but the time ... when the right to compensation accrues. In Re Palama, 34 Haw. 65, 71, 1937 WL 4432 (1937) (quoting Acme Body Works v. Koepsel, 204 Wis. 493, 234 N.W. 756, 758 (Wis.1931)). We hold that a claimant in a case arising under the injury-by-disease prong of HRS § 386-3 may rely upon the foregoing date of disability, which typically is the last day of employment but, as indicated supra, may also be the date of diagnosis of the disabling condition, in order to identify the date of injury required by the DLIR in connection with the filing of a workers' compensation claim. Flor was therefore justified in identifying either the date on which she learned of her diagnosis ( i.e., April 17, 1996) or the date on which she ceased working ( i.e., May 4, 1996) as the date of injury on her claim form. Cf. Nelson v. Industrial Comm'n, 120 Ariz. 278, 585 P.2d 887, 890-91 (Ariz.Ct.App.1978) (holding that the `date of injury' in an occupational disease claim must be viewed as the date the claimant, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovers a relationship between a disabling condition and employment); Chavira v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 235 Cal.App.3d 463, 286 Cal.Rptr. 600, 605-06 (1991) (noting legislative codification of proposition that, in the case of a progressive occupational disease, the date of injury is the date on which disability occurs and by reasonable diligence the employee can discover the disability was industrially caused); King v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 742 A.2d 460, 471-72 (D.C.1999) (noting that Railco Multi-Construction Co. v. Gardner, 564 A.2d 1167, 1168 (D.C.1989), adopted a rule that the time of injury is normally deemed to be when the employee is first aware of the injury and its relationship to the employment); Garcia v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Rhode Island, 892 F.Supp. 153, 157 (W.D.Tex.1995) (quoting Texas labor code for proposition that the date of injury for an occupational disease is the date on which the employee knew or should have known that the disease may be related to the employment). On remand, the Director will be required to determine Flor's date of disability for the purposes enumerated in this section. However, regardless of the outcome of that determination, Flor's workers' compensation claim was not foreclosed by the fact that she identified a different date as the date of injury on her claim form.