Opinion ID: 1863727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law on Peremptory Challenges and Harmless Error

Text: ś 64. The Ramos decision did not fully describe and analyze long-standing Wisconsin law on peremptory challenges and harmless error. As a result, it presented a distorted view of Wisconsin law. ś 65. The Wisconsin Statutes have long given peremptory challenges to criminal defendants. For instance, Wis. Stat. Ch. 148, §§ 3, 5 (1849) provided: Sec. 3. Every person indicted for any offence, shall, when the jury is impannelled for his trial, be entitled to the same challenges that are allowed by law to defendants in civil causes. .... Sec. 5. Any person who is put on trial for an offence punishable with death, shall be allowed to challenge peremptorily twenty-four of the persons returned as jurors and no more. See also Wis. Stat. Ch. 191, § 4689 (1889); Wis. Stat. Ch. 191, § 4690 (1889); Wis. Stat. § 357.03 (1925); Wis. Stat. § 957.03 (1955); Wis. Stat. § 957.03 (1967); Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (1999-2000). ś 66. At the same time, from statehood until 1976, there was always a specific statute protecting the verdict from challenges for irregularity in impaneling jurors, except in certain situations. For instance, Wis. Stat. Ch. 97, § 29 (1849) provided: Sec. 29. No irregularity in any writ of venire facias, or in the drawing, summoning, returning or empanelling of petit jurors, shall be sufficient to set aside a verdict, unless the party making the objection was injured by the irregularity, or unless the objection was made before the returning of the verdict. See also Wis. Stat. Ch. 118, § 30 (1858); Wis. Stat. Ch. 128, § 2881 (1898); Wis. Stat. § 270.52 (1925); Wis. Stat. § 270.52 (1973); Judicial Council Committee Note, 1974, Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 715 (1976). ś 67. The two exceptions listed in these statutes were (1) when the party making the objection was injured by the irregularity, or (2) when the objection was made before the returning of the verdict. ś 68. The second exception in these statutes, that objection must be made before the returning of the verdict, was consistently interpreted in light of another statute that dates from the early years of the state's history. Wisconsin's general harmless error statute has been in effect since Chapter 120, Laws of 1856 set out to establish an uniform course of proceeding, in all cases (emphasis added). Section 84 of the Chapter provided: Sec. 84. The court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings, which shall not affect the substantial rights of the adverse party; and no judgment shall be reversed or affected by reason of such error or defect. This statute has appeared in substantially the same form since 1856. See Wis. Stat. Ch. 125, § 40 (1858); Wis. Stat. Ch. 127, § 2829 (1878); Wis. Stat. Ch. 127, § 2829 (1898); Wis. Stat. § 269.43 (1925); Wis. Stat. § 269.43 (1973); Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 714 (1976); Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (1999-2000). [7] ś 69. This general prohibition against reversal of a judgment for error or defect in proceedings unless the error affects substantial rights now appears in Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2), our harmless error statute. This statute applies to criminal cases. State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 547, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985). Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18 is especially pertinent to this case because it is substantially equivalent to ss. 269.43 and 270.52, the general harmless error statute and the specific irregularities in venires statute that were replaced when this court issued the order creating § 805.18. See Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 714 (1976). ś 70. The Ramos majority neglected to discuss this statute that specifically mentions errors in the selection of a jury: No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new trial granted in any action or proceeding on the ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which the application is made, after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a new trial. Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) (emphasis added). Moreover, when the court brushed aside two 19th century cases cited in the Ramos dissent, Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 453, 69 N.W. 65 (1896), and Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 82 N.W. 304 (1900), it was brushing aside cases that made explicit or implicit references to the harmless error statutes. ś 71. The best discussion of the point appears in Pool : [T]here is also presented the question whether the court erred in overruling a challenge of a juror for cause, and, if so, whether that is reversible error, in view of the fact that the objectionable juror did not sit upon trial of the case. On this point, People v. Casey, 96 N. Y. 115, is confidently relied upon. That is to the effect that if, by the erroneous ruling, the party is obliged to exhaust all his peremptory challenges, the error is harmful. The record here does not show such a case. It shows that all the peremptory challenges were exhausted, but not that the last challenge was used in striking from the panel the objectionable juror, or that the ruling was the cause which compelled such exhaustion of the challenges. The true rule, we hold, is laid down in Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, to the effect that it is not prejudicial error to overrule a challenge for cause, unless it is shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon the party, and sat upon the case after such party had exhausted his peremptory challenges. This court substantially adopted that view in Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. 313, where it is said in the opinion by Mr. Justice Cassoday, discussing a similar subject, The statute expressly precludes this court from reversing any judgment for any error not affecting the substantial right of the appellant. R.S. sec. 2829. There is nothing in the record to indicate that by such ruling the defendant was in any way prejudiced. 94 Wis. at 453 (emphasis added). [8] The statute of which Pool spoke was the general harmless error statute. Wis. Stat. Ch. 127, § 2829 (1889). ś 72. In Grace v. Dempsey , the court said: [T]he trial court must necessarily exercise a very large discretion in the impaneling of a jury; and the exercise of such discretion will not be disturbed except in case of its abuse or the violation of some rule of law. Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 67; Sutton v. Fox, 55 Wis. 531; Olson v. Solveson, 71 Wis. 663; Thomp. & M. Juries, §§ 258, 270, 271. The statute expressly precludes this court from reversing any judgment for any error not affecting the substantial right of the appellant. Sec. 2829, R. S. There is nothing in the record to indicate that by such ruling the defendants were in any way prejudiced. 75 Wis. 313, 321, 43 N.W. 1127 (1889) (emphasis added). As noted, Grace specifically cited the general harmless error statute. ś 73. In Bergman v. Hendrickson , the court said: An error assigned to a refusal to discharge a juror on challenge for cause cannot serve for reversal, since no prejudice resulted to appellants. The juror was removed on peremptory challenge, and no objection was made to the jury as finally impaneled. Emery v. State, 101 Wis. 627; Cornell v. State, 104 Wis. 527. Bergman v. Hendrickson, 106 Wis. 434, 438-39, 82 N.W. 304 (1900). This decision is consistent with harmless error analysis. ś 74. Both the Ramos majority and dissent discussed Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 47 N.W. 629 (1891), in which two defendants used their eighth and last peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror who allegedly should have been struck for cause. But the majority dismissed the case, saying: Without any analysis, this court in the Carthaus case quipped: `A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, and what more could the defendants ask for?' Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d at 34. By contrast, the dissent discussed the case at length, referring to passages in the 1890 briefs, arguments of counsel, and quotes from the opinion. ś 75. In Carthaus, the court began its opinion as follows: So many exceptions are relied on for a reversal of the judgment in this case that each exception can only be noticed in the briefest manner, in order to avoid extending this opinion to an inordinate length. 78 Wis. at 562. This passage helps to explain the court's relatively brief discussion of the peremptory challenge issue. Among the many claims were four challenges to jurors or potential jurors. At one point in the opinion the court said: Another error assigned is that the court permitted A. J. Lumsden to stand as a juror, after it appeared from his examination on the voir dire that he had been previously called as a juror at the former trial of the cause, and had been excused by the court. It appears from the record that Lumsden had been summoned as a juror on the first trial, but did not sit in the cause, being excused by the court. On this trial he was peremptorily challenged by the defendants, and set aside. We think he was qualified to try the cause, but as he did not there can be no objection to the conviction on that ground. Id. at 566. ś 76. Later in the opinion the court took up another challenge, saying: As to the objection to the juror Wayland Chaplain, we think it has no merit. He was peremptorily challenged by the defendants, and set aside. It is said the defendants should not have been put to their peremptory challenges as to this juror and Lumsden, because in so doing they exhausted their peremptory challenges; but it does not appear that they were prejudiced in any way by that fact. A fair and impartial jury was impaneled, and what more could the defendants ask for? Id. at 568. ś 77. Several points may be taken from the Carthaus case. First, the court made two rulings on peremptory strikes after the defendants challenged prospective jurors for cause. The court's reference to prejudice is completely consistent with the two relevant harmless error statutes in effect at that time. Second, the Carthaus decision came only 13 months after Grace v. Dempsey, 75 Wis. at 320-21, a case which had extensive discussion of the issues and cited three Wisconsin cases; Wis. Stat. Ch. 127, § 2829 (1889); and a treatise on juries. Third, the court's pithy summary of the law represented the tenor of Wisconsin law until the Ramos case. For example, in Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 717, [], 729, [] (1854), the court heard a challenge to a prospective juror named Morley, who in the end did not serve on the defendant's jury. The court said: Whether the juror Morley was challenged peremptorily by the prosecution or by the defendants, does not appear. If he was thus challenged by the prosecution, the defendants were not injured. If challenged by the defendants, that fact should appear upon the record. ...The name of not one of the jurors sworn and examined, as set forth in the bill of exceptions, was retained upon the list of jurors ultimately impaneled to try the issue. Upon the completion of the panel of jurors who tried the issue, it seems that the defendants had exhausted but thirty-seven peremptory challenges. In consequence of the overruling of the challenges for cause, of the defendants, not one of the objectionable jurors were retained, and we cannot perceive how the defendants could have been injured, even admitting the position of their counsel to be correct. Schoeffler, 3 Wis. at 729 [] (emphasis added). ś 78. In State v. Mendoza , this court unanimously issued an opinion in which the court applied Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) to a jury selection case. 227 Wis. 2d at 864. ś 79. Mendoza was not the first time that we applied a harmless error analysis in a jury selection case in recent years. For example, this court explicitly addressed the applicability of harmless error statutes in State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 209-11, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981). [9] ś 80. In Coble we examined Milwaukee County's process of compiling juror lists. We applied a harmless error analysis, noting that previously Wis. Stat. § 270.52 (1973) regulated when a verdict or judgment shall be set aside or a new trial granted on an objection to certain stages of the jury selection process. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d at 209. The court noted that Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) replaced the prior statute on January 1, 1976, and § 805.18(2), according to the Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1974, is substantially equivalent to sec. 270.52, Stats. Id. Coble also said: This court, in assessing jury challenges in prior cases, has stated that irregularities in the process are immaterial unless it appears probable that there has been prejudice. The rule in this state is that irregularities in the selection of jurymen are to be disregarded unless it appears probable that the person seeking to take advantage thereof has been prejudiced thereby. Ullman v. State (1905), 124 Wis. 602, 609, 103 N.W. 6. Petition of Salen, 231 Wis. 489, 491, 286 N.W. 5 (1939). Accord Pamanet v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 501, 509, 182 N.W.2d 459 (1971). In other cases this court has indicated that it will review a challenge to the selection of the jury array that is to the preparation of the jury list to determine if there was a violation in any material respect or whether there was substantial compliance with the jury selection statute. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 540, 129 N.W.2d 155 (1964), cert. denied 380 U.S. 918 (1965); State v. Bond, 41 Wis. 2d 219, 227, 163 N.W.2d 601 (1969). Id. at 211. We recognize that these cases relate to the composition of the venire but conclude that the application of harmless error analysis is instructive and relevant. In Coble, this court analyzed what was then a relatively new harmless error law (Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2)) and said: The legislature intended the doctrine of harmless error to apply to jury selection. 100 Wis. 2d at 201-11. ś 81. In one of the last major jury cases before Ramos, State v. Traylor, the court of appeals said: There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges; there is only a constitutional right to an impartial jury. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85, 88 (1988). Any claim that a jury is not impartial must focus not on the jurors who were removed by peremptory challenges but on the jury that actually sat in the case. See id. at 85-86. Where there is no showing that any of the actual jurors were biased, it would be speculative for a court to conclude that the jury would have been fairer if counsel had been allowed to preserve peremptory challenges on other, unspecified members of the jury venire. Moreover, there would be no stopping point if the deprivation of such speculative benefit, standing by itself, could establish prejudice. 170 Wis. 2d 393, 400, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992). The court referred to harmless error and then said: [T]he state argues that even if counsel was ineffective, this performance did not prejudice the defendant....The reason for this is that, under old and never overruled Wisconsin law, Traylor cannot prove prejudice unless he can show that the exhaustion of peremptory challenges left him with a jury that included an objectionable or incompetent member. Pool v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 94 Wis. 447, 453, 69 N.W. 65, 67 (1896). Wisconsin's long-standing rule is that where a fair and impartial jury is impaneled, there is no basis for concluding that a defendant was wrongly required to use peremptory challenges. See Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560, 568, 47 N.W. 629, 631 (1891). Id. [6] ś 82. Considering Traylor's clear and trenchant summary of the law, including its explicit reference to harmless error and prejudice to the defendant, this court should have confronted Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2) and the state's long history of statutes and cases linking the impaneling of jurors to harmless error, when we decided Ramos. We did not do so. [10] Consequently, this court could not reasonably conclude that the legislature had mandated the result we reached. The legislature had mandated exactly the opposite result.