Opinion ID: 895256
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Heading: Water Code section 49.066

Text: Section 49.066(a) provides that [a] district may sue and be sued in the courts of this state in the name of the district by and through its board. A suit for contract damages may be brought against a district only on a written contract of the district approved by the district's board. TEX. WATER CODE § 49.066(a). As we explained in Tooke v. City of Mexia , the effect of a sue and be sued clause in an organic statute depends on the context in which it is used. The words can mean that immunity is waived, but they can also mean only that a governmental entity, like others, has the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name. Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 337 (Tex.2006). Standing alone, then, sue and be sued does not plainly waive the Authority's immunity. The Developers argue that section 49.066 plainly waives a district's immunity because it specifies how a district may be served with a lawsuit for contract damages, and delineates the mechanisms for enforcing a judgment against it. See TEX. WATER CODE § 49.066(a)-(c). In Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital, we held that a sue and be sued statute that specified who would represent the district in civil proceedings was not an indication of legislative intent to waive immunity: instead, the phrase merely anticipates the district's involvement in civil proceedings of some nature at some point, but it does not address immunity from suit. Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg'l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 843 (Tex.2009). As the court of appeals in Friendswood II reasoned, the Legislature states that a suit for contract damages may be brought against a district only on a written contract of the district approved by the district's board; however, it does not state that all parties to such contracts may sue the district for breach of these contracts or that immunity from suit as to all such claims is waived. 256 S.W.3d at 743. This interpretation conforms with our holding in Tooke, in which we scrutinized similar statutory language providing that the City may contract and be contracted with, implead and be impleaded in all courts and places and in all matters whatsoever.... Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 344. We explained that the provision appears to address the capacity of the City to act as a corporate body, not its immunity from suit. All it clearly says is that the City can be sued and impleaded in court when suit is permitted, not that immunity is waived for all suits. Id. Hence, a statute that contemplates a government entity's involvement in litigation does not clearly and unambiguously waive the entity's immunity from suit. See Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697 (Tex. 2003) ([A] statute that waives the State's immunity must do so beyond doubt....). The Developers also point to the provision in section 49.066(a) setting forth the only conditions under which a contract against a district will be enforceable. See TEX. WATER CODE § 49.066(a) (A suit for contract damages may be brought against a district only on a written contract of the district approved by the district's board.). But such language does not go as far as waiving immunity from suit, but merely establishes a condition precedent to suit. Travis County v. Pelzel & Assocs., 77 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. 2002); see also Farmers State Bank of New Boston v. Bowie County, 127 Tex. 641, 95 S.W.2d 1304, 1306 (1936) (The language of said article indicates that the rejection by the commissioners' court of a claim against the county, or the failure of such court to act on the same, is merely a condition precedent to the filing of a suit to recover thereon.); Bexar Metro. Water Dist. v. Educ. and Econ. Dev. Joint Venture, 220 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. dism'd) (The language the legislature actually used in amending section 49.066(a) does not `authorize' a suit against a water district; nor does it expressly waive immunity. Rather, the amendment creates a condition precedent: if a suit for contract damages is otherwise authorized, it may be maintained only if the stated condition is met.). We therefore reject this argument as well. Since Tooke, we have consistently refused to find waivers of immunity implicit in statutory language: there can be no abrogation of governmental immunity without clear and unambiguous language indicating the Legislature's intent do so. See, e.g., Tomball, 283 S.W.3d at 842-43; Lamesa Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Booe, 235 S.W.3d 710, 711 (Tex.2007); City of Elsa v. M.A.L., 226 S.W.3d 390, 391 (Tex.2007). The present statute is no different. In fact, every court of appeals to interpret section 49.066 after Tooke has concluded that the statute does not waive immunity. See Clear Lake City Water Auth. v. MCR Corp., No. 01-08-00955-CV, 2010 WL 1053057, at , 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 2194, at  (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 11, 2010, pet. denied); Jonah Water Special Util. Dist., No. 03-06-00626-CV, 2009 WL 2837649, at , 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 7072, at  (Tex.App.-Austin, Aug. 31, 2009, no pet.); Boyer, Inc. v. Trinity River Auth. of Tex., 279 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. denied); Bexar Metro. Water Dist., 220 S.W.3d at 32; Valley Mun. Util. Dist. No. 2 v. Rancho Viejo, Inc., No. 13-07-545-CV, 2008 WL 384320, at -4, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 1109, at  (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi, Feb. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem.op.). Because section 49.066 does not contain a clear and unambiguous waiver, the sue and be sued language in 49.066(a) does not on its own abrogate governmental immunity.