Opinion ID: 2261551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: procedural background and jurisdiction

Text: Petitioner, a member of the New Jersey Bar, brought an action against this Court in the United States District Court, District of New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of R. 1:20A. While this action was pending, we invited petitioner to bring his challenge before our Court. Petitioner agreed to do so and on April 2, 1979, exercising original jurisdiction over this matter, we permitted petitioner to file a petition directly with this Court for a determination of the constitutionality of R. 1:20A and further, to determine the intended scope and meaning of the aforementioned Rule. Order of April 2, 1979. Subsequently, petitioner filed a brief in support of his claim, and an amicus brief was filed by the Association supporting his position. A brief in opposition was filed by the Attorney General. Although none of the parties before us challenges the procedure by which we are hearing this petition, we feel it necessary to explain this rather unusual exercise of our original jurisdiction. This Court is, of course, primarily an appellate body, N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § II, par. 2. [1] It could be argued that we are exclusively an appellate body because the only explicit grant of original jurisdiction to this Court comes from N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § V, par. 3, [2] which permits original jurisdiction as may be necessary to the complete determination of any cause on review. Plainly, this provision grants us original jurisdiction only over matters related to causes already before us. See, e.g., Kelly v. Curtiss, 16 N.J. 265 (1954); City of Newark v. West Milford Twp., 9 N.J. 295 (1952). We find, however, that N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VI, § II, par. 3, [3] provides this Court with an independent basis for exercising original jurisdiction in the case before us. This provision grants us jurisdiction over the discipline of persons admitted to the Bar. It is the source of our exclusive power over the practice of law. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 411-12 (1966). We have recently held that the Supreme Court, acting pursuant to that power, has the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings on its own as well as to review those conducted by Ethics Committees. In re Loring, 73 N.J. 282, 289 (1977). We have also held that this power enables us to adjudicate a dispute about the unauthorized practice of law even though the party seeking relief might not have traditional standing. In re Estate of Margow, 77 N.J. 316, 323 (1978). [4] These cases, recognizing that this Court's plenary constitutional authority includes original jurisdiction over cases involving the disciplining of attorneys, imply that we also have original jurisdiction over challenges to the methods by which we exercise constitutional authority. It would make little sense for us to have original jurisdiction over the appropriateness, or the constitutionality, of disciplining individual attorneys while challenges to the constitutionality of our agencies, such as the Committees, must necessarily go first to Superior Court. The constitutional provision, Art. VI, § II, par. 3, must be read as vesting original, as well as appellate, jurisdiction in this Court over all matters concerning our authority to discipline the Bar. [5] We therefore hold that we may exercise original jurisdiction over this challenge to R. 1:20A.