Opinion ID: 6226222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Authority To Impose Consecutive

Text: NGI Commitment Periods ¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.17(1) establishes the commitment periods for individuals found NGI. Under the statute, commitment 7 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR periods are set by reference to the category of offense and when the offense occurred: (a) Felonies committed before July 30, 2002. Except as provided in par. (c), when a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of a felony committed before July 30, 2002, the court shall commit the person to the department of health services for a specified period not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed against an offender convicted of the same felony, including imprisonment authorized by any applicable penalty enhancement statutes, subject to the credit provisions of s. 973.155. (b) Felonies committed on or after July 30, 2002. Except as provided in par. (c), when a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of a felony committed on or after July 30, 2002, the court shall commit the person to the department of health services for a specified period not exceeding the maximum term of confinement in prison that could be imposed on an offender convicted of the same felony, plus imprisonment authorized by any applicable penalty enhancement statutes, subject to the credit provisions of s. 973.155. (c) Felonies punishable by life imprisonment. If a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of a felony that is punishable by life imprisonment, the commitment period specified by the court may be life, subject to termination under sub. (5). (d) Misdemeanors. When a defendant is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect of a misdemeanor, the court shall commit the person to the department of health services for a specified period not exceeding two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed against an offender convicted of the same misdemeanor, including imprisonment authorized by any applicable penalty enhancement statutes, subject to the credit provisions of s. 973.155. § 971.17(1). 8 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR ¶16 Thus, the maximum commitment period for felonies committed prior to July 30, 2002, is tied to the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed against an offender convicted of the same felony, while felonies committed on or after July 30, 2002, have a maximum period tied to the maximum term of confinement in prison that could be imposed in traditional criminal sentencing. Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(a), (b). A felony punishable by life imprisonment has a maximum commitment period of life, and the maximum commitment period for misdemeanors is based on two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed in criminal sentencing. § 971.17(1)(c), (d). ¶17 All four categories of NGI commitment, by the plain text of the statute, are tied to and directly dependent on the lengths of sentences in criminal proceedings. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. NGI commitment orders are limited by how long an offender convicted of the same [offense] may be imprison[ed] or confin[ed] in prison. Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(a), (b), (d). Instead of setting out an independent basis by which courts may determine the length of NGI commitments, the legislature made NGI commitment lengths dependent upon criminal sentencing lengths. Under § 971.17(1), to determine the length of NGI commitments, courts must look to criminal terms of imprisonment and confinement, as well as criminal penalty enhancement statutes, and nowhere else. Id. Further, the statute allows NGI committees to reduce their period of commitment by the terms of Wisconsin's criminal sentence credit statute. See id. (explaining that periods of NGI 9 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR commitment are subject to the credit provisions of s. 973.155). The statute does not limit or define lengths of NGI commitment for multiple offenses. Instead, under the plain terms of § 971.17, the length of NGI commitment is based on the total length of prison terms the individual could receive in traditional criminal proceedings. ¶18 The legislature certainly could have written the statute differently. For instance, in Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2), the legislature explicitly outlined the minimum and maximum 'original term of probation' that may be imposed for different quantities and classes of misdemeanor and felony offenses. State v. Dowdy, 2012 WI 12, ¶40, 338 Wis. 2d 565, 808 N.W.2d 691 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2) (2009-10)). Under § 973.09(2), courts are provided identified ranges for probation, and those ranges vary based on whether the individual was convicted of one misdemeanor, not less than 2 nor more than 4 misdemeanors, 5 or more misdemeanors, a felony, or 2 or more crimes, including at least one felony. § 973.09(2)(a), (b). The probation statute itself defines lengths of probation and bases them on the type, and number, of offenses committed. Unlike Wis. Stat. § 971.17, § 973.09 does not rely on lengths of incarceration as established under criminal sentencing statutes. In § 971.17, the legislature took a different approach. It cited and relied on the criminal sentencing system to define the lengths of NGI commitments. See § 971.17(1). 10 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR ¶19 In line with Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)'s statutory directive, we have repeatedly recognized that the length of NGI commitments is intimately tied to traditional criminal sentencing. See, e.g., State v. Fugere, 2019 WI 33, ¶47, 386 Wis. 2d 76, 924 N.W.2d 469 (In Wisconsin, NGI commitment terms may not exceed the maximum confinement term of the charged criminal offense.); State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 808-09, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995) ([NGI] commitment may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offenses charged.). As the court of appeals accurately explained in C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 140, the legislature intended to prohibit a person found not guilty by reason of mental defect or disease from being committed any longer than the underlying offense, i.e., how the person would have been sentenced if the NGI defense had failed. ¶20 When a defendant is criminally sentenced, a circuit court has the authority to impose consecutive terms of confinement. Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2). For decades, courts have understood that NGI commitment lengths, by the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.17, are dependent on the lengths of criminal sentences. Accordingly, courts have recognized that the maximum NGI commitment term a court can impose is the total length of consecutive criminal sentences 11 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR for the same offenses.8 See C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 139 (concluding that the maximum term of NGI commitment reflects the maximum length of time under consecutive sentences that [the defendant] could have been imprisoned); State ex rel. Helmer v. Cullen, 149 Wis. 2d 161, 163, 440 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that the maximum period of [NGI] commitment must be based on consecutive terms). ¶21 In C.A.J., the court of appeals provided sound reasons for permitting NGI commitment based on the lengths of consecutive criminal sentences. The court of appeals recognized that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1) tied NGI commitments to the length of the offense charged. C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 139. However, the court of appeals correctly noted that when the legislature uses a singular noun in a statute such as offense, both the singular and the plural are generally included. Id. at 140; see Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1) (stating that [i]n construing Wisconsin laws . . . [t]he singular includes the plural). This is true unless the result is inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature. § 990.001. Because § 971.17(1) by its plain terms prevents NGI commitments from exceeding criminal sentences, it did not conflict with the statute to impose NGI commitment for periods Under Wis. Stat. § 971.17, courts take into account the 8 distinction between confinement before and after Truth-inSentencing. NGI commitment terms for felonies committed prior to July 30, 2002, and for misdemeanors cannot exceed two-thirds of the maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed. Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1)(a), (d). For felonies committed on or after July 30, 2002, NGI commitment terms cannot exceed the maximum term of confinement in prison. § 971.17(1)(b). 12 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR equal to that of criminal imprisonment. C.A.J., 148 Wis. 2d at 140. It is well accepted that circuit courts can impose consecutive criminal sentences, and thus, NGI commitment periods can run consecutively. Id.; see Wis. Stat. § 973.15(2)(a) ([T]he court may impose as many [criminal] sentences as there are convictions and may provide that any such sentence be concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time or previously.). This reasoning is well-supported and correct. ¶22 The court of appeals in C.A.J. continued and explained that the legislature could have easily limited NGI commitment terms to the maximum criminal sentence for the most serious offense. This would have detached NGI commitments from traditional criminal sentencing, and, in the process, prohibited consecutive NGI commitment periods. In fact, the legislature demonstrated the ability to set lengths of commitment based on the most serious offense when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 971.14, which governs competency proceedings. Under § 971.14, unlike Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1), commitments to obtain competency to participate in legal proceedings are limited to a period not to exceed 12 months, or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged, whichever is less. § 971.14(5). If NGI commitment periods are based on the maximum sentence for the most serious offense, circuit courts would not be permitted to impose consecutive NGI commitments and criminal sentencing rules would not control. We adopt this reasoning in full. 13 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR ¶23 Similarly, the legislature could have limited the length of NGI commitments to specifically delineated terms, and varied the length based on the number of offenses of which the defendant was convicted. As explained above, the legislature did this with probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(2). ¶24 The legislature in Wis. Stat. § 971.17(1) did not limit NGI commitments to a period not to exceed 12 months, or the maximum sentence specified for the most serious offense with which the defendant is charged, whichever is less, as it did in Wis. Stat. § 971.14, nor did it limit commitment periods based on the number of offenses, as it did in Wis. Stat. § 973.09. Instead, it unambiguously based NGI commitment periods on the maximum term of confinement in prison that could be imposed on an offender convicted of the same [offenses], enhanced by any applicable penalty enhancement statutes and reduced by the [criminal sentence] credit provisions of s. 973.155. § 971.17(1)(a), (b), (d). As the court of appeals explained in C.A.J., the legislature has plainly demonstrated the ability to limit the use of consecutive NGI commitments. 148 Wis. 2d at 140. In § 971.17, it declined to do so, and we must give effect to the legislature's choice. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶44 (We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed in the statutory language.); Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶¶36-37, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 (explaining that the legislature knew how to draft [different] language in a statute, and the court must respect the text as written); United Am., LLC v. DOT, 2021 14 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR WI 44, ¶¶15-16, 397 Wis. 2d 42, 959 N.W.2d 317 (comparing the text of two statutory provisions and noting that the legislature knows how to write different statutory language). ¶25 A circuit court's authority to impose consecutive NGI commitment periods is not affected by the existence of separate orders.9 In this case, Yakich's five-year NGI commitment was set forth in two orders. In his first case, involving bail jumping and phone harassment, he was ordered to three years of NGI commitment. In his second case, involving two counts of bail jumping, he was ordered to two years of NGI commitment.10 Although the offenses at issue were not included in a single criminal charge and thus the NGI commitments were separated into two orders, that does not alter Wis. Stat. § 971.17's language permitting consecutive NGI commitments. There is no indication in § 971.17 that periods of NGI commitment vary depending on whether charges are brought under one or more criminal complaints. In fact, there may be victims and crimes that occur over the course of years, and Yakich does not appear to dispute that circuit courts can 9 impose consecutive NGI commitment periods for multiple counts included in the same case. In briefing, he contended that Wis. Stat. § 971.17 arguably . . . authorizes the court to calculate the overall commitment period in [a single] case based on consecutive terms of confinement for each count in that case. The parties do not dispute that these orders were well 10 within the statutory range for confinement had Yakich been criminally sentenced. The maximum term of confinement for a Class H felony, including felony bail jumping to which Yakich pleaded NGI on three counts, is three years. See Wis. Stat. § 946.49(1)(b); Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)8. Had Yakich not been found NGI, he could have received a sentence of at least nine years of confinement. 15 Nos. 2019AP1832-CR & 2019AP1833-CR in distinct factual circumstances. It is entirely possible that individuals requiring NGI treatment can be subject to multiple commitment orders, perhaps from different courts at different times. Circuit courts retain discretion to impose consecutive NGI commitments, whether the commitments are mandated in the same order or mandated in separate orders. Yakich's total commitment period of five years, set forth in two orders, was appropriate.11