Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Newman's absence from the trial

Text: Defendant contends that Newman could not possibly have rendered effective assistance, because he was absent from the courtroom for more than half of the trial. We disagree. We never have held that advisory counsel must be present during the entire trial. In any event, here defendant had the assistance of additional advisory counsel, Lucas, at trial; the court appointed Lucas as additional advisory counsel specifically to assume Newman's role in Newman's absence. Lucas was present on each of the days that Newman was not, and defendant points to nothing in Lucas' representation on those days that was not competent. Relying upon State v. Parson (Minn.Ct.App.1990) 457 N.W.2d 261, 263, defendant contends that advisory counsel at a minimum should be present in court during the trial. That case, however, dealt with standby counsel, not advisory counsel. The two roles are distinct. Standby counsel is an attorney appointed for the benefit of the court whose responsibility is to step in and represent the defendant if that should become necessary because, for example, the defendant's in propria persona status is revoked. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 149, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730.) Advisory counsel, by contrast, is appointed to assist the self-represented defendant if and when the defendant requests help. ( People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730; see also Littlefield v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 856, 858, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 659; People v. Kurbegovic (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 731, 757, 188 Cal.Rptr. 268.) Here, whatever Newman's status when he initially was appointed, the court subsequently made clear that he was solely advisory counsel. As such, there was no requirement that he be present at each court session, particularly because additional advisory counsel Lucas was present when Newman was not. Defendant next contends that it was Newman's job to prepare the defense experts for trial, yet Newman did so ineffectively, with the result that the defense that was supposed to be asserted, that the cause of death was not the cyanide but some other intervening cause, was never presented. In this regard, defendant observes that Judge Krieger denied defendant's request to instruct the jury on intervening cause, because there was no evidence presented to support that instruction. We first note that nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that Newman assumed full responsibility for preparing defense experts. Even assuming he had done so, defendant's claim would fail. Defendant contends in effect that Newman failed to meet in advance with the defense experts  Dr. Latif and Dr. Itabashi  and failed to provide them with sufficient information to testify effectively for the defense. We have repeatedly stressed `that [if] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected.' ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Because claims of ineffective assistance are often more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding, the rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal [citations] would not bar an ineffective assistance claim on habeas corpus. ( Id. at pp. 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Here, the record on appeal does not explain why Newman prepared the experts as he did, and there could be a satisfactory explanation for Newman's conduct. For example, Newman's failure to give Dr. Itabashi any of Green's medical records to review before testifying could have been a deliberate defense strategy to keep Dr. Itabashi in the dark about defendant's case so that he could testify only about a hypothetical situation. In any event, defendant does not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any failure to prepare the experts. The jury was instructed that a proximate cause of death is a cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces death and without which the death would not have occurred. Defendant does not explain how, even had the defense experts been better prepared, they could have persuaded the jury that the cyanide given to Green was not a proximate cause of her death. Defendant also contends that Newman's absence from the trial made it impossible for him to give a coherent guilt phase closing argument. Because defendant expressly waived any objection to Newman's closing argument, we decline to reach this claim. In any event, we would find the claim meritless. We note that Newman had available the daily trial transcripts for preparation of his argument. Although Newman's argument elicited objections from the prosecution for misstating evidence, on the whole Newman presented a coherent argument based upon an effort to persuade the jury to find a reasonable doubt that defendant could have placed cyanide in a sealed gin bottle or that Green died of cyanide poisoning. [15]