Opinion ID: 787859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard applied to davis's claim

Text: Davis has at least a colorable claim under the second prong of the competency test — the requirement that a defendant be able to communicate with and assist his attorneys. One of Davis's lawyers, William Maxwell, told the trial court on November 29, 1989 2 that Davis was incommunicado and that if he continued in his then mental state an incompetency hearing could become necessary. Maxwell also reported to the court: &#x2022; I think the Court needs to know that ... Mr. Davis is in a mental state ... where I don't think he is going to be any longer able to cooperate with his counsel in the conduct of his defense. &#x2022; If he's getting that paranoid and he's flipping out that much from whatever is happening over there with him and he can't even talk to his attorneys ... we may have a real problem. &#x2022; I think the problem is he's gonna fold up, he's not gonna talk, he's not gonna take part. &#x2022; So we are right back to — we are back in a situation ... I guess I can tell the Court this — the first several times I went to see Mr. Davis he would not talk to me about the case. In a declaration he signed in 1997, Maxwell indicated that the situation with Davis did not improve significantly before the sentencing phase: After the guilt phase ended, Mr. Davis stopped cooperating with me and Mr. Alvarado [Maxwell's co-counsel]. During the period between the guilt phase and the penalty phase, Mr. Davis would not talk to us. Maxwell explained his failure to pursue a competency hearing with the lay opinion that Davis was possibly just malingering, but Maxwell also recognized that a qualified psychiatrist might have found that Mr. Davis's behavior at the penalty phase was not purely volitional. 3 In fact, two psychiatric professionals have expressed the opinion that Davis's inability to communicate with counsel was not purely volitional. According to Dr. Vicary, Davis's inability to cooperate with counsel had both a mental illness and a behavioral component and some of Davis's actions had to have been the product of mental illness. Davis was severely depressed, agitated and anxious, so much so that he was exhibiting signs of paranoia. Dr. Vicary stated that Davis's competency was a legitimate concern at the penalty phase and that Davis was marginal, in a gray area between competency and incompetency. Dr. Vicary's opinion is significant and compelling because Dr. Vicary knew Davis at the relevant time. 4 The majority notes that Dr. Vicary did not see fit to place himself within the company of those few psychiatrists who would have found Davis incompetent. But because there cannot be a gray area between competency and incompetency in the context of the defendant's fitness to stand trial, Dr. Vicary's statements that Davis was marginal and in a gray area raise a substantial question about Davis's competence, which is all that is required to trigger the necessity for an evidentiary hearing. See Boag, 769 F.2d at 1343; see also Siripongs, 35 F.3d at 1310. Dr. Vicary's opinion is echoed by Dr. Sara Latz, a psychiatrist who has reviewed records from the trial and psychological evaluations and testing done at the time of trial. In Dr. Latz's opinion, the materials she has reviewed raise a serious question as to Mr. Davis's competency at the time of the penalty phase. Dr. Latz's opinions provide a response to Maxwell's concern that Davis may have been malingering. According to Dr. Latz: [Davis's] depression was likely misinterpreted by others as anger and defiance. Consequently, petitioner was likely to be treated with punishment rather than antidepressant medication. Punishment, however, would generally be ineffective with petitioner because his behavior was not entirely within his control. Dr. Latz recognizes that she would need more information to make a proper competency determination, but her conclusion that there is a serious question about competency provides support for the need for an evidentiary hearing. Retrospective competency evaluations are given less weight, but they are permissible where, as here, the psychiatrist has consult[ed] contemporaneous medical reports. Williams v. Woodford, 306 F.3d 665, 707 (9th Cir.2002). The deposition of Myra Thomas, a sentencing-phase consultant, provides additional support for Davis's claim. Thomas testified that Davis totally changed from when she first met him to the end of the trial. Davis believed he was physically paralyzed; he couldn't move; he was out of it and paranoid; he lost it; he became very difficult to get through to, hysterical, and unfocusable towards the end. The majority discounts Thomas's testimony on the grounds that Thomas and Davis had a poor rapport and that [Thomas's] testimony reflects that [Davis's] behavior probably resulted from his anger towards [Thomas], his attorneys, and the entire process, not from incompetency. But a poor rapport does not explain away Thomas's observation that Davis's behavior deteriorated significantly; there is no evidence that the relationship between Thomas and Davis worsened over time. The opinion's assumption about anger as the sole cause of Davis's condition is contradicted by Thomas's testimony. Thomas attributed Davis's condition to depression ... intermingled with ... anger and paranoia. Four other factors support the need for an evidentiary hearing in this case. First, Dr. Vicary testified during the sentencing phase that Davis had attempted suicide in the past and that he reported see[ing] things, animals, people around [him] that others do not see. Davis's past suicide attempts and hallucinations suggest a history of mental illness — illness that easily could have resurfaced during the penalty phase. Second, Judge Letts issued an order stating that a court-appointed mental health expert would evaluate his competence: Petitioner's request to retain a psychiatrist to determine if he was competent to stand trial at the penalty phase is granted. While funds are being authorized to allow petitioner to uncover factual support for potential claims, any questions relating to petitioner's mental state raised in the federal habeas petition will be addressed by a court appointed mental health expert. Judge Tevrizian read Judge Letts's order as stating only that Judge Letts would appoint an expert if Davis met the substantial evidence standard for an evidentiary hearing. I agree with Davis's counsel, however, that the language in Judge Letts's order must be read as stating that the court would appoint an expert. Because this is a death case, it is troubling that the majority would deny Davis's competency claim without an evidentiary hearing when the first trial court judge to consider the case indicated his intent to appoint a mental health expert. Third, there is evidence in the record that Davis may have been abused in prison during his trial. We have recognized that in-prison treatment may cause significant deterioration in a defendant's mental condition and may be relevant to a competency determination. See Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir.2000). Finally, I note that our recent opinion in Deere v. Woodford, 339 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir.2003), provides support for the conclusion that an evidentiary hearing must be granted in a case such as this. The Deere panel remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's claim that he had been incompetent to plead guilty. The petitioner in Deere presented the following evidence: (1) a psychiatric report prepared at the time Deere pled guilty that found him competent; (2) a report prepared by a psychologist (Dr. Jones) at the time Deere pled guilty which found that Deere understood the proceedings and evidenced no obvious thought disorders; (3) a post-plea declaration submitted by Jones in which he stated that Deere's competency was very questionable because although Deere understood the nature of the proceedings, he was bent on self-destruction and was unable to cooperate [ ] in a meaningful way with defense counsel; and (4) a declaration submitted by a psychiatrist (Dr. Rosenthal) who did not know Deere at the relevant time but who opined that Deere was incompetent when he pled guilty. Deere, 339 F.3d at 1085-86. Deere may have had something Davis does not — Dr. Rosenthal's opinion that Deere was incompetent when he pled guilty — but the Deere panel did not rely on Dr. Rosenthal's declaration because he did not know Deere at the relevant time. See Deere, 339 F.3d at 1086. Instead, the Deere panel emphasized Dr. Jones's opinion that Deere's competency was questionable and that Deere could not communicate meaningfully with defense counsel. Id. at 1086-87 (Dr. Jones's declaration, however, stands on different footing[than Dr. Rosenthal's]. It is based on his two examinations of Deere, which he performed in 1982, within several days of when Deere pleaded guilty. It is, therefore, probative of Deere's mental status at the critical time.). Dr. Vicary's declaration in this case is very similar to Dr. Jones's, and, as in Deere, provides strong support for the petitioner's claim. Davis also has some evidence that Deere did not: Maxwell's declaration that establishes communication problems; Thomas's testimony about Davis's deteriorating mental state; evidence that Davis had attempted suicide in the past; and evidence that Davis believed he was paralyzed when in fact he was not.