Opinion ID: 668596
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Object to Closing Argument

Text: 54 Nave's argument centers on the following portion of the prosecutor's penalty phase closing argument: 55 I don't necessarily think that the probation is bad or that parole is bad, but there comes a time when probation is expected, when mercy is the rule and when mercy is the order of the day and it's to be expected. Then it's not mercy, it's not mercy any more, it's just plain weakness and it's not a system of justice, it's a system of injustice and it's a fraud, a system right now where twenty-five years doesn't mean twenty-five years; where life doesn't mean life. 56 Now, I'm not going to have a chance to get up and answer Mr. Ossman after he finishes speaking to you. I expect Mr. Ossman is going to try [to] tell you that in this instance that life without eligibility for probation or parole for fifty years will guarantee you that Emmett Nave never comes out again, but there is no such guarantee. 57 (Emphasis added). The Missouri Court of Appeals indicated that this argument was improper under state law, but that the above brief remarks, even if objected to, did not constitute reversible error, State v. Nave, 757 S.W.2d at 254, and we must accept its statement to that effect. But see Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1067 n. 12 (8th Cir.1988) (indicating that the above type of argument, although improper in the guilt phase, would not be inappropriate in the penalty phase of a trial). However, assuming defense counsel's failure to object to this argument was objectively unreasonable, we fail to discern any prejudice stemming from this failure. The prosecutor's statements made clear that a life sentence with the possibility of parole in fifty years--the only alternative to the death penalty, Mo.Rev.Stat. Sec. 565.008 (1978)--did not guarantee a life sentence. Though this argument may be impermissible under state law, it was not an inaccurate statement. We also note that the statements were brief and composed a small part of the prosecutor's closing argument, which differentiates this case from Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1337 (8th Cir.1989) (As is apparent in reviewing the transcript of the prosecutor's argument, the argument is filled with improper statements. (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038, 110 S.Ct. 3301, 111 L.Ed.2d 810 (1990). We conclude that trial counsel's failure to object to these isolated comments did not have an effect on the jury's sentencing determination, so no prejudice resulted from counsel's failure to object. 58